neutrality and the private provision of public goods with incomplete information abstract in this paper we introduce incomplete information about income into a standard model of private provision of public goods generally one obtains neutrality results similar in nature to those obtained in the complete information model however with incomplete information several additional difficulties exist in attaining neutrality for neutrality to hold i positive contributions have to be made by all individual types ii any redistribution of income must not convey information to the individuals and iii any redistribution must not depreciate the private information individuals have

more shock than therapy market transition employment and income in russia 1991 1995 sixteen predictions from market transition theory are assessed using survey data on employment earnings and income in russia during the first five years of market reform although the private sector has grown self employment is still rare incomes are down and unemployment is up a distended income distribution reflects unprecedented income inequality distinctive features of late soviet era stratification persist low returns to education a gender gap in earnings and low earnings among professionals the russian market transition offers more opportunity in trade consumer services and speculation and less in manufacturing than do other emerging makets this corresponds to merchat capitalism and contradicts the predictions of market transition theory everything the communists told us about communism was a lie everything they told us about capitalism turns out to be true popular russian joke circa 1996

a note of the theory of international transfers abstract if each of n trading countries supplies each of several international public consumption goods then sufficiently small international transfers have no effect on the consumption production or welfare of any country

the distribution of income in china preface notes on the contributors introduction k griffin z renwei part 1 the distribution of income household income and its distribution a r khan k griffin c riskin z renwei three features of the distribution of income during the transition to reform z renwei part 2 income and wealth in rural china the determinants of household income in rural china a r khan the distribution of wealth in rural china t mckinley income distribution and poverty in rural china c riskin part 3 employment and human capital workers in china s rural industries j knight s lina why urban wages differ in china j knight s lina the determinants of educational attainment j knight l shi annex the 1988 household sample survey m eichen z ming index

letter from the editor in chief lifting the veil on how institutions matter in ib research journal of international business studies 2010 41 175 177 doi 10 1057 jibs 2009 92 this issue of jibs contains a bounty of riches a letter from the editors eight articles and two research notes two of the articles were submitted under the previous editorial team but all were completed under the current team the issue opens with a letter from the editors common method variance in international business research by chang van witteloostuijn and eden a response to the high number of jibs submissions that appear to suffer from common method variance cmv when data sets are constructed solely from self report questionnaires completed at the same time by the same participants cmv may be a concern particularly when the dependent and key independent variables are perceptual and are both drawn from the same survey cmv can create false internal consistencies that lead to type i and ii errors in this letter the editors explain cmv and the current state of best practices for handling cmv in international business research several of the articles in jibs 41 2 cluster around the theme of institutions and international business which i explore briefly below

revealed preference analysis of non cooperative household consumption we develop a revealed preference approach to analyse non unitary household consumption behaviour that is not cooperative or pareto efficient we derive global necessary and sufficient conditions for data consistency with the model we show that the conditions can be verified by means of relatively straightforward mixed integer programming methods which is particularly attractive in view of empirical analysis our framework extends to tests for separate spheres and joint contribution to public goods an application to data drawn from the russia longitudinal monitoring survey demonstrates the empirical relevance of the non cooperative consumption model

protection lobbying and market structure abstract we look at a model of lobbying by oligopolistic industry where firms allocate resources between lobbying and internal cost reducing activities we ask the following questions i if firms differ with respect to comparative advantage in lobbying what is the equilibrium allocation of resources between lobbying and cost reducing activities ii can lobbying opportunities reverse the profitability ranking among firms iii under what condition is the conventional wisdom that highly concentrated industries tend to obtain more protection valid the answers depend on various measures of comparative advantage in lobbying and on the demand curve

the continuing wind of change in the balkans sources of housing inequality in bulgaria the research in this paper explores the institutional changes in the housing system during the period of market transition in bulgaria which follow suit with the greater societal transformations the societal changes are linked theoretically with polanyi s understanding of the transition from a non market to a market society his argument helps in establishing the institutional context of the macroeconomic changes in the past decade the article then focuses on the changing sources of housing inequality it is argued that there are two urban regimes of housing inequality the regime of controlled uniformity during the period of socialism and the regime of primitive diversity during the period of market transition the two regimes are produced mainly through the changing role of the state

the transfer problem in the context of public goods abstract it is argued that if each country is egalitarian then the standard samuelsonian proposition that an international transfer benefits the recipient and harms the donor nation remains valid in the context of privately provided public goods

subscription equilibrium with production non neutrality and constrained suboptimality abstract we study a general equilibrium model with a non profit firm producing a public good using private goods as inputs which are financed by voluntary contributions subscriptions of households we analyze policy interventions that increase the public good level at subscription equilibria and show that some of the standard results of the neutrality literature do not survive in our model with many private goods and relative price effects allowed first we show that a redistribution away from a contributor or even a decrease in the total wealth of all contributors while the contributing set of agents remains intact can lead to an increase in the provided level of public good moreover we prove that increasing the production of public good is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition to increase all households welfare finally we present conditions under which for a generic set of economies well chosen interventions will pareto improve upon a given subscription equilibrium outcome as a consequence a general non neutrality result in terms of utilities holds even if all households are contributors

strategic transfers and private provision of public goods abstract this paper considers strategic monetary transfers between two agents when these contribute to a mutual public good if the agents differ in their contribution productivity then the less productive agent has an incentive to make large unconditional transfers to the more productive agent although agents move simultaneously in each stage of the game the less productive agent becomes a stackelberg leader furthermore the generic subgame perfect equilibrium is characterized by full specialization

market transition and the persistence of power the changing stratification system in urban china research on transitional socialist societies has explored trends in income inequality and issues concerning who gains and who loses during market reforms we find that income inequality in a major chinese city declined only slightly during the first decade of reform policies it then increased dramatically in the subsequent five years strategic position in the state bureaucracy continues to be an important determinant of income although connections to the market system are becoming alternate sources of advantage we interpret these findings in light of the historical and institutional context of urban china

markets and income inequality in rural china political advantage in an expanding economy when market reform generates rapid growth in an agrarian subsistence economy changes in inequality may be due to economic growth and structural change rather than to the intrinsic features of markets the case of post mao china is examined using nationally representative survey data gathered in 1996 to address unresolved questions about findings from 1980s surveys well into reform s second decade political officeholding has a large net impact on household income comparable to that of operating a private enterprise contrary to findings based on earlier surveys and expectations about the impact of growth cadre household advantages are stable across levels and forms of economic expansion returns to entrepreneurship however decline sharply with the spread of wage employment future declines in relative returns to political position are therefore unlikely to occur due to the further spread of private household entrepreneurship and theories of change based on this mechanism appear untenable

getting ahead in urban china this article argues that structural segmentation is a universal phenomenon in all complex societies and across political economies each political economy uses specific criteria in delineating segments of its economic and work organizations furthermore it is argued that segmentation identification constitutes a critical destination status for individuals engaged in the status attainment process a representative sample of the working population in tianjin china is analyzed to show that entrance into the core sectors state agencies and enterprises rather that the job per se constitutes the primary goal of status attainment entering into a more desirable work unit sector in china takes on differential significance and process for males and females formales the direct effect of intergenerational factors i e the effect of father s work unit sector is evident for females such an effect is only indirect instead to a great extent their status attainment also upward occupational mobility acr

the emergence of a market society changing mechanisms of stratification in china this article examines the effect of institutional change the shift from redistribution to markets in altering the mechanisms of stratification new institutionalists maintain that interests are emb

international equity markets and trade policy abstract this paper derives optimal trade policies for exporting and importing countries when a market is imperfectly competitive and firms are internationally owned it is shown that an increase in foreign ownership of firms lowers both the optimal export subsidy of the exporting country and the optimal import tariff of the importing country at the same rate foreign ownership also affects the distribution of world welfare between countries however it does not affect trade patterns and firm values

social inequalities in reforming state socialism between redistribution and markets in china this article extends market transition theory to an analysis of inequality under the conditions of partial reform in china logit regression analysis indicates cadres officials have no greater odds than other households of being among the privileged or avoiding poverty entrepreneurs andformer team cadres however are advantaged despite the rise of a hybrid elite of entrepreneurs who are currently cadres that capitalizes on redistributive power to gain competitive advantage in the marketplace increases in income inequality are modest when market reform stimulates improved economic performance the poor appear to benefit and experience comparable improvements in household income as a result there is only a slight increase in inequality at least in the early stages of market reform the empirical analysis is based on survey data collected in rural china in 1985

getting personal networks and stratification in the russian labor market 1985 2001 the authors use employment histories from survey data to examine personal network use and stratification in the russian labor market from 1985 to 2001 institutional changes associated with the soviet collapse increased the use of networks and shaped their prevalence and benefits in theoretically coherent ways in russia networks positively affect job quality whether measured by occupation current earnings or wage arrears these findings relate to recent debates over whether job contacts provide advantages and how social capital relates to postsocialist inequalities involving gender communist party membership and education russia also exhibits a previously overlooked relationship between network use and locality type

housing tenure choice in transitional urban china a multilevel analysis summary using a 1996 national survey of housing in china and a multilevel modelling technique we examine housing tenure choice in transitional urban china where households have been granted limited freedom of choice in the housing market since the housing reforms of 1988 we e nd that both market mechanisms and institutional forces affect households tenure choice in urban china while some socioeconomic factors such as age household size household income and housing price have similar effects on tenure choice as in the west others such as the number of workers and marital status have rather different effects in addition factors characterising institutional relationships among the state work units and households such as hukou job rank and work unit rank still play important roles in tenure choice

property rights and stratification in socialist redistributive economies in socialist economies work organizations differ widely in the compensation they provide employees despite the absence of key product and labor market processes thought to ex plain such inequalities in market economies existing theories of stratification in socialist economies focus on the power and privilege of elites but inequalities among organizations are not created by political particularism or elite power in this paper i sketch elements of an institutional theory of stratification anchored in a conception of property rights the right to derive income from productive assets two aspects of property rights guide the analysis 1 the dispersion of property rights across a hierarchy of governmentjurisdictions and 2 the exercise of these rights by government jurisdictions as they extract revenues primarily through taxation extraction of revenues from a work organization varies with the budgetary resources of a government jurisdiction and the dependence of that jurisdiction on the out puts of the organization variation in revenue extraction in turn creates inequalities among work organizations in their abilities to provide benefits to employees an analysis of survey data on the provision of housing and benefits by work organizations in the large industrial city of tianjin china provides provisional support for these ideas s tudents of communist states have had little reason to dispute lenski s 1966 claim that the distribution of rewards in a society is a func tion of the distribution of power p 63 as ex emplified in szelenyi s wedding of elite theory to institutional economics this idea has been de veloped primarily in terms of the power of class es or occupational groups szelenyi 1978 be gan with the observation that planned economies operate according to redistributive rather than market principles however the process of re

the first shall be last entrepreneurship and communist cadres in the transition from socialism this article reviews the sociological literature on the transition from socialism to capitalism it distinguishes between the erosion and transition phases and between traditional and corporate segments in the emerging private sector panel survey data from hungary show that during the transition ex communist cadres maintain their advantageous position and do especially well in the more dynamic corporate segment they are successful because human capital is important in both capitalism and socialism and because the cadres are able to convert past political power to economic advantage contrary to the findings of studies based only on agriculture the transition increases income inequalities

noncooperative household demand we study noncooperative household models with two agents and several voluntarily contributed public goods deriving the counterpart to the slutsky matrix and demonstrating the nature of the deviation of its properties from those of a true slutsky matrix in the unitary model we provide results characterising both cases in which there are and are not jointly contributed public goods demand properties are contrasted with those for collective models and conclusions drawn regarding the possibility of empirically testing the collective model against noncooperative alternatives and the noncooperative model against a general alternative

foreign aid and public goods abstract most less developed countries ldcs use foreign economic aid to finance public consumption goods or public intermediate inputs this paper constructs a two country general equilibrium trade model where an income transfer that takes place between the two countries is used by the recipient to finance a public consumption good within this framework the paper identifies the conditions under which the income transfer improves or deteriorates the donor country s terms of trade and shows that the transfer can be welfare enriching for the donor and welfare immiserizing for the recipient country the paper also demonstrates that the transfer can raise reduce world welfare in which case a welfare increase decrease in both the donor and the recipient country is possible

monitor objectivity with important clients evidence from auditor opinions around the world we examine whether monitors are likely to compromise their monitoring objectivity in the face of economically important clients in international business settings in the context of external auditing and assurance services we measure monitor objectivity by whether auditors are more or less likely to issue to their important clients modified audit opinions that is audit opinions provided to outside investors about the firm that demotes explicit areas of concern using a large cross country sample we document that auditors are more likely to issue modified opinions to their economically important clients relative to other clients furthermore we find that this association is stronger 1 for big n auditors 2 for multinational audit clients and 3 in countries with stronger legal regimes these results suggest that monitors prioritize the protection of their reputation over lucrative economic relationships and such information certification function is more pronounced for international auditors multinational client firms and in strong legal regimes

impure public goods and transfers in a three agent model abstract this paper extends previous models of non cooperative private funding of pure public goods by allowing for impure public goods the analysis is developed in the context of international public goods under certain conditions the consequences of transfers on utility are paradoxical if the preferences are divergent a country may gain by giving a transfer the receiver may lose and these two phenomena may appear at the same time

china s changing urban governance in the transition towards a more market oriented economy china s changing urban development processes and urban landscapes in the transition towards a more market oriented economy have received extensive research attention in recent years relatively the governing of chinese cities is still underresearched this article aims to analyse the forces released both inside and outside the formal socialist state system and the impacts on phenomenal restructuring of urban governance especially at local levels marketisation has created new elements beyond the reach of state work units that represent the state s hierarchical control the pillars of the socialist governing structure the party state the work units system and household registration are shaken by these forces the changes in the organisation of people capital production materials infrastructure and space fundamentally demand new urban governance territorial organisations such as the municipality urban districts street office and residents committees are reinvented and consolidated to restore a governable society the devolution towards the base level and the reinvention of local communities reflect the state s attempt to reconsolidate its power to create a governable society as well as to cope with practical pressures such as the provision of social assistance to poor and aged residents re employment of laid off workers and the management of floating immigrants the combination of new market elements and decentralised state apparatus has given rise to the entrepreneurial endeavour of china s governance this research highlights the micro foundation of the new urban governance in addition to the globalisation capital mobility city competitiveness thesis

distributional effects in household models separate spheres and income pooling we derive distributional eects for a non cooperative alternative to the unitary model of household behaviour we consider the nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions to public goods game our main result is that in general the two partners either choose to contribute to dierent public goods or they contribute to at most one common good the former case corresponds to the separate spheres case of lundberg and pollak 1993 the second outcome yields local income pooling a household will be in dierent regimes depending on the distribution of income within the household any bargaining model with this non cooperative case as a breakdown point will inherit the local income pooling we conclude that targeting bene ts such as child bene ts to one household member may not always have an eect on outcomes

extending the internationalization process model increases and decreases of mne commitment in emerging economies the internationalization process model suggests that firms internationalize by building positions in foreign markets and networks following iterative cycles of learning and changes in commitment however as subsidiaries evolve commitments may be decreased as well as increased a phenomenon that has rarely been studied moreover it remains an open question why strategic intentions at the outset of an investment project differ from the actual operations established we address these questions by extending the model and combining it with mintzberg and waters framework of strategy formation specifically we suggest that commitment decisions correspond to statements of intended strategy while network positions correspond to realized strategies the processes of learning opportunity creation and trust building triggered by commitment decisions are however moderated by institutional influences that lead to divergences between realized and intended strategies we test propositions derived from this framework on a survey data set of subsidiaries of multinational enterprises in hungary lithuania and poland and find that institutional voids and institutional uncertainty affect subsidiary strategy implementation but in opposing directions under high institutional uncertainty investors prefer low commitment but flexible modes that enable later commitment increases whereas institutional voids increase up front information search and adaptation costs that reduce the likelihood of early post entry adjustments our analysis reinforces the need for more differentiated theoretical analyses of how institutions affect business strategies over time

revolution reform and status inheritance urban china 1949 1996 do regime change and market reform disrupt patterns of intergenerational mobility china s political trajectory is distinctive from that of other communist regimes in two ways during its first three decades the regime enforced unusually restrictive barriers to elite status inheritance and during the subsequent market transition unlike most of its counterparts the communist party survived intact data from a multigeneration survey suggest that despite their obvious exclusion from the party and related administrative careers in the mao era certain prerevolution elites transmitted one type of elite status to their offspring to a surprising degree party elites in contrast were hit hard by radical maoism but recovered quickly afterward and their offspring inherited elite status at much higher rates

the dubious role of institutions in international business a road forward our commentary returns to the conundrum of how institutions matter in international business ib by revisiting the 2018 jibs decade award article by jackson and deeg 2008 on comparing capitalisms we first synthesize their main insights around institutional diversity and track its significant impact within ib and other management fields we then suggest three main takeaways that could move jackson and deeg s agenda further in terms of developing a more nuanced approach to institutions in ib we close with suggestions for future research and urge ib scholars to be more cautious when drawing on different strands of institutions theory

the persistence of power despite the changing meaning of homeownership an age period cohort analysis of urban housing tenure in china 1989 2011 using nine successive waves of the china health and nutrition survey chns data set this study employs hierarchical age period cohort logistic models hapc to analyse temporal patterns of urban homeownership from 1989 to 2011 with the changing meaning of homeownership due to housing reforms the strong period increases in homeownership track policy changes and the most dramatic increase occurs mainly in the era of housing privatisation rather than housing commodification the temporal analyses also offer insights into housing stratification from redistribution to markets the positive effect of education on homeownership is explained by period increases in homeownership whereas working in state sectors has persistently attached to preferred housing tenure choice before and after the housing reforms moreover the significant cohort effect lends support to strengthened temporal inequalities in the reform era these findings not only provide a dynamic understanding of housing stratification in post so

elite opportunity in transitional economies command economies gave communist era elites administrative control and material privilege but severely restricted money income and private wealth markets and privatization have injected new value into public assets and create unprecedented opportunities for elite insiders these opportunities depend on the extent of regime change and barriers to asset appropriation regime change varies from the survival of the entire party hierarchy to its rapid collapse and defeat in competitive elections barriers to asset appropriation vary with the extent pace and form of privatization and the concentration and liquidity of assets different combinations of such circumstances jointly affect the extent to which prior elites obtain ownership or control of privatized assets use political office to extract larger incomes move into salaried elite occupations or fall out of the elite altogether regime change and barriers to asset appropriation affect change at the national level but outcomes vary across economic sectors because of characteristics of organizations elite positions and assets this elementary theory serves to integrate varied findings from recent research on central europe china and russia and yields predictions for other regions

taxes institutions and innovation theory and international evidence we develop an international model of the design of institutions for regulating innovative activities of private corporations informational limitations faced by the social planner preclude complete contracting with private firms corporate innovation creates positive and negative externalities the social planner in each country takes into account the legal system in place and designs an umbrella of institutions that include a menu of organizational forms liability structures corporate taxes and subsidies we show that limited liability may be accompanied by excessive innovation however when the nonmonetized benefits are very high private firms may be too conservative in innovation policies firms choose their organizational form and level of innovation consistent with private optimality with the optimal institutional design for each country we demonstrate that private innovation choices are aligned with social optimality in particular we show that the optimally designed corporate tax rate in each country is a decreasing function of its legal effectiveness using data from 63 countries over 2003 2018 we document supporting evidence mncs can take advantage of differential liability and corporate tax structures across national boundaries to circumvent institutional design constraints however when mncs generate positive externalities to host countries their governments may provide subsidies and incentives

market culture and authority a comparative analysis of management and organization in the far east three frameworks purport to explain industrial arrangements and practices a market approach that emphasizes economic characteristics a cultural approach that sees organization as the expression of patterned values and an authority approach that explains organization as a historically developed structure of domination the efficacy of each approach is tested in explaining the organizational structures of three rapidly growing east asian economies japan south korea and taiwan the paper argues through comparative analysis that organizational growth is best explained by market and cultural factors but that authority patterns and legitimation strategies best explain organizational structure