dualism and reform in china according to the dual economy tradition of economic development models less developed economies at an early stage of development are marked by a dichotomy between a modern sector in which workers are hired at an institutional wage in numbers that rise with the growth of the industrial capital stock and a traditional sector in which workers subsist at an income level that is somewhat below the indus

innovation and bureaucracy under soft and hard budget constraints because of the inherent uncertainty promotion of innovation critically depends on screening mechanisms to select projects this paper studies the relationship between bureaucracy and financial constraints as two such mechanisms the lack of commitment to hard financial constraints interferes with its ex post screening capability ex ante bureaucratic screening is optimally chosen as a substitute however bureaucracy makes mistakes by rejecting promising projects and delays innovation and the efficiency loss due to soft financial constraints increases as prior knowledge becomes worse and as research stage investment requirements become lower in a centralized economy bureaucracy may reduce the number of parallel projects particularly for projects with higher uncertainties and less research stage requirements this theory fits much of the evidence and in particular it explains why the computer industry but not the nuclear or aerospace industries has fared so poorly in centralized economies the fundamental importance of innovation to the survival and evolution of economic systems and organizations has long been recognized marx 1978 schumpeter 1950 innovation is characterized by its inherent uncertainty because it is a process whose every element takes considerable time in revealing its true features and ultimate effects schumpeter 1950 p 83 and people are unable to anticipate the future impact of successful innovations even after their technical feasibility has been established rosenberg 1994 an understanding of how different systems and organizations deal with the uncertainties associated with innovation and the resultant consequences is crucial for understanding alternative economic systems and organizations in this paper we provide a theory to analyse how different systems screen uncertain innovative projects and the impact of the various screening mechanisms on those systems we distinguish two alternative screening mechanisms the bureaucratic screening mechanism vs the market screening mechanism the latter is directly linked to financial constraints with this perspective our theory explains why centralized economies did well in certain areas of innovation but fared poorly in others for instance in the early 1960s the west was frightened by the ussr s great success in launching the first unmanned satellite and the first manned space capsule while in the 1980s in contrast the centralized system

transition and integration in europe implications for agricultural and food markets policy and trade agreements several central and eastern european countries are on their way to becoming members of the european union agriculture and agricultural policy is an important issue in eu enlargement this paper reviews the changes that have occurred in the agricultural and food sector of the ceecs and draws implications for the impact of eu enlargement on agri food markets and policy first those countries which have reformed most rapidly and most thoroughly are now doing best and their reform efforts have resulted in significant recovery and efficiency improvements second the impact of eastern enlargement will be less dramatic than initially feared although some uncertainty remains the possibility that the accession of the ceecs into the cap will cause a conflict with wto commitments has been reduced but cannot be excluded for some specific commodities depending on the ceec supply evolution however the likelihood of a wto conflict and the impact on the cap will depend more on the outcome of the negotiations in the wto millennium round than on enlargement similarly the impact of enlargement on the eu budget depends mostly on the political decision on the allocation of direct payments to ceec farmers and or of the extent of structural funds for ceecs

common fallacies in the debate on the transition to a market economy fallacies and other lessons leszek balcerowicz words and the concepts they express exert a powerful influence on political debate and policy decisions in transition economies in this introductory essay the principal architect of the first radical reform programme in europe after the fall of the berlin wall develops a lexicon of common fallacies in the political debate and introduces many of the main themes of the volume one common fallacy is that of country specificity ukraine is different what worked or did not work elsewhere is not relevant here some countries may indeed have specific economic problems viz the huge military industrial sector in ukraine but economic theory is clear about which policies are best for basic problems macroeconomic stabilization as the appropriate response to hyperinflation price liberalization and liberalization of supply are the prescribed therapy for massive shortages etc so there are useful lessons to be learned from prior experience by the same token erroneous interpretation of those experiences can give credence to mistaken policy arguments for example the argument that whatever has been done before in the west must be right is itself clearly wrong similarly balcerowicz argues that china s success does not prove the universal merits of gradualism the agricultural reforms of the late 1970s in china were in practice surprisingly radical the essay identifies many other pitfalls in reasoning about transition experience several having to do with the failure to apply ceteris paribus reasoning for example the fall in output in 1991 in all the countries connected with the former soviet union including finland was caused in large part by the collapse of their trade with the union and certainly not exclusively by the policies they followed there are numerous other examples

the transition to a market economy pitfalls of partial reform we present a theory of a partial economic reform of a planned economy similar to the one that took place in russia since 1988 and in china earlier in such a reform some markets are liberalized in the sense that producers can sell output to whomever they want including private firms at free prices but at the same time must sell to state firms at state prices we show that such a reform can result in a substantial diversion of subsidized inputs away from state firms and toward private firms even when state firms value these inputs more the result may be a reduction of total output the simple analysis sheds light on many consequences of the soviet reform such as breakdown of coordination of production increased state policing of delivery quotas prohibitions of trading cooperatives and opposition to privatization the model also explains why partial reform failed in russia but worked in china

prohibition of factor market exchanges and technological choice in chinese agriculture this article constructs a model of technological choice in an economy where market exchanges in land and labour are prohibited empirical data on demand for tractors tractor usage and chemical fertilisers in china are employed to test several hypotheses derived from the theoretical model the theory implies that the impact of relative factor scarcity on the pattern of technological choice in such an economy is similar to that in a market economy as postulated by the hicks ruttan hayami binswanger hypothesis of induced technological change the empirical evidence is found to be consistent with the implications of the model

the impact of china s economic reforms on agricultural productivity growth this paper presents a method for assessing the relative importance of price increases and strengthened individual incentives due to the introduction of the responsibility system for the post 1978 increase in china s agricultural productivity data on post 1978 chinese agricultural performance suggest that a little over three quarters of the measured productivity increase is due to payment system changes and the remainder to price increases we also use our method to calculate incentive indices giving an estimate of the fraction of their marginal product that peasants received under the pre 1978 regime

the virtues of gradualism and legitimacy in the transition to a market economy this paper presents a simplified model of sectoral restructuring in eastern europe a move towards allocative efficiency is desired by the reform minded government but the shift to higher productivity which such efficiency requires would lead to massive layoffs and labour reallocation in the transition period we look at the impact of political constraints unanimity and or majority worker approval on reform proposals when the government faces a heterogeneous workforce holding private information on relative outside opportunities when the budgetary consequences of exit compensations are so important as to make partial reforms preferable to full reforms gradualism emerges as the optimum in a dynamic context without government commitment it is also shown that under democratic majority rule a government in control of the agenda of reforms can win majority approval for plans which end up hurting majority interests intertemporally by threatening to switch majorities in future reform proposals this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

r d cooperation with asymmetric spillovers this paper analyses r d cooperation with asymmetric spillovers it is shown that the change in r d by a firm following cooperation is proportional to the gap between the spillover rate transmitted by that firm and a critical level of spillovers in consequence cooperation increases total r d investments when the average of firms spillover rates is sufficiently high whereas with symmetric spillovers cooperation is always beneficial to firms with asymmetric spillovers only a very limited range of spillovers makes cooperation beneficial to both firms asymmetries also create a potential conflict between maximizing total welfare and maximizing effective cost reduction jel classification l13 o33 cooperation en r d avec effets de retombee asymetriques ce memoire analyse l effet de la cooperation en r d quand il y a des asymetries dans les effets externes technologiques on montre que le changement dans la r d d une entreprise a la suite de la cooperation est proportionnel a l ecart entre l externalite transmise par cette entreprise et une valeur critique de l externalite en consequence la cooperation augmente les investissements totaux en r d quand le taux de retombee moyen est suffisamment eleve alors que la cooperation est toujours benefique lorsque les externalites sont symetriques les asymetries rendent la cooperation non benefique pour au moins l une des entreprises pour un vaste eventail de parametres les asymetries peuvent aussi creer un conflit potentiel entre la maximisation du bien etre total et la maximisation des reduction de couts effectifs

production organization and efficiency during transition an empirical analysis of east german agriculture enterprise restructuring is expected to improve efficiency in transition economies with data from former east germany we compare the efficiency of family farms and partnerships with large scale successor organizations of the collective and state farms lsos using parametric and nonparametric techniques we show that lsos display lower technical efficiency than do family farms and partnerships but that this difference is small and declining during transition mainly as a result of structural changes in agriculture family farms are not as scale efficient as partnerships and lsos and partnerships are superior to all other organizational forms

russian poverty muddling through economic transition with garden plots abstract household level analysis based on a comprehensive survey in three regions of russia sheds some light on new dimensions of poverty an important aspect of households responses to economic stress in the transition economy is home gardening and subsistence agriculture in urban and rural areas subsistence agriculture plays an important role in real income and food consumption of the middle income strata the income poor also tend to have poor plots and gardens household labor force distance to plots and opportunity costs of time are the main determinants of the level of labor allocation to household agriculture while on average marginal returns to labor in household plots are about 0 50 us day they are not different from zero for the poor agriculture policy neglects this sector which now provides almost 40 of russia s agricultural output

worse than expected uncertainty and earnings subsequent to return migration analyses of unique cross country register data reveal that earnings subsequent to return migration are strongly dependent on uncertainty in the initial migration decision migrants who miss their target have 10 25 lower earnings than those at the expected level

the design of reform packages under uncertainty the authors present a model of large scale economic reforms modeled on the transition process in eastern europe with aggregate and individual uncertainty concerning the outcome of reforms the government is assumed to choose the speed and sequencing of reforms the authors compare big bang strategies with gradualist reform packages they show that gradualist reform packages may be easier to get started optimal sequencing of reforms should aim at creating constituencies for further reforms and gradualism may generate a higher investment response because of a lower option value of waiting than would a big bang approach copyright 1995 by american economic association

rural reforms and agricultural growth in china this paper employs province level panel data to assess the contributions of decollectivization price adjustments and other reforms to china s agricultural growth in the reform period decollectivization is found to improve total factor productivity and to account for about half of the output growth during 1978 84 the adjustment in state procurement prices also contributed positively to output growth its impact came mainly from the responses in input use the effect of other market related reforms on productivity and output growth was very small reasons for slowdown in agricultural growth after 1984 are also analyzed copyright 1992 by american economic association

success and failure of reform insights from the transition of agriculture this paper analyzes the linkages between the reform strategies in transition countries and economic performance the authors focus on agriculture because of the sharpness of the policy changes fundamental differences among countries and relative simplicity of agricultural relationships the authors document post reform performance in the transition countries of asia and europe the authors show how a pricing reform and subsidy reductions b land rights reform and policies that affect farm restructuring and c the presence institutions that facilitate exchange either markets or market substitutes affect output and productivity the paper ends with general lessons on reforms and transition

land market imperfections and agricultural policy impacts in the new eu member states a partial equilibrium analysis this article analyses how transaction costs and imperfect competition in the land market affect the welfare effects of agricultural subsidies in the new eastern member states of the european union benefits of land subsidies end up with landowners in new eastern member states also with imperfections in the new eastern member states land markets with unequal access to subsidies small tenant farmers may even lose out from the subsidies decoupling of payments shifts policy rents to farmers but constrains productivity enhancing restructuring using reserve entitlements to mitigate this effect reduces the intended benefits on distortions and target efficiency

total factor productivity change in china s farming sector 1952 1989 a crucial problem in economic development is choosing institutions that are relatively efficient in resource allocation and conducive to growth however institutional innovations usually take time and it is often difficult to isolate these effects from the effects of noninstitutional factors modern china is one of the few exceptions it offers a rich experience in dramatic institutional changes after 1949 a smallholder system was experimented with immediately after the land reform this was quickly followed by various forms of collectivization since 1979 the household responsibility system hrs has gradually replaced the commune system thus china provides a unique opportunity for a comparative study of these different rural institutions in terms of the total factor productivity index tfpi this index measures the change in output relative to the change in inputs the examination of the tfpi also has policy implications the apparent plateau in grain production and the slow growth in other crop production from 1985 to 1989 constitute a sharp contrast to the period 1979 84 which witnessed rapid growth in both grain and economic crop production in china public ownership is favored by orthodox ideology and noneconomic factors often play an important role in economic life 2 in facing slower growth in crop production whether the hrs should or should not be the long term rural institution has become a sensitive question again and has kindled a heated debate within china in this study i will examine the performance of the successive rural institutions in china in terms of changes in the tfpi over the period 1952 89 using 1989 as the final year of my study the most important finding of this study is that the hrs showed a clear advan

responsiveness flexibility and market liberalization in china s agriculture been at most only limited gains from market liberalization if one were to take the findings of this admittedly scant literature seriously it would appear as if there is at most only a relatively small impact from market reforms in china we believe there are three possible but only one plausible explanations for the findings first if market liberalization actually contributes little to no growth or increases in output or incomes this would of course in part explain why economies that lead reform with market liberalization do not experience significant gains theory and the experiences of other economies in other settings however would argue against such an interpretation second it could be that china s agricultural market liberalization has just proceeded so slowly that it is still too early for output to have been positively affected by market liberalization however as seen above the record on the market expansion and the observations of many researchers would not support this view

completing china s move to the market beginning in late 1978 by luck as much as design china arrived at a strategy for market oriented economic reform that combined substantial reform with rapid growth in gdp and exports the sequencing of reform began with the easy to reform sectors agriculture and foreign trade and then took up the more difficult task of reforming the large state owned enterprises with respect to agriculture small scale industry and foreign investment china found ways of introducing meaningful property rights into the increasingly marketized system a partially unreformed financial system and inadequate autonomy of large state enterprises accounts however for the current stop go nature of chinese development

how to reform a planned economy lessons from china the countries of eastern europe and the former soviet union have been flooded with advice from the west on how to liberalize their planned econo mies this advice is unfortunately offered in an empirical vacuum no one knows how these econo mies will react to the proposed liberalization meas ures there exists however a neglected source of information china offers a long time series of data over a decade s worth on the effects of reforms on a planned economy china s reforms were gradual but their cumulative effect has been large and they have been remarkably successful china s experiments provide some practical les sons on what kinds of reforms can work elsewhere the dominant school of thought among economists favours the big bang policy of reforming quickly and according to a comprehensive plan partial reforms in this view are useless they will be negated by the remnants of the planning system the proponents of big bang reform have been influential with poland czechoslovakia and rus sia announcing plans for a rapid transition to capi talism