trade offs and depletion in choice abstract four experiments examine why choices deplete executive resources the authors show that the resolution of trade offs is a driver of depletion effects arising from choice and the larger the trade offs the greater is the depletion effect the authors also find that choice difficulty not related to trade offs does not influence the depleting effect of the choices finally the authors find that though people can intuit some depletion effects they do not intuit that choices or trade offs within choices might be depleting and therefore fail to predict that larger trade offs are more depleting

what have we learned from empirical studies of unemployment and turnover unemployment reminds economists that we have a lot to be modest about twenty years ago robert hall 1972 asked why is the unemployment rate so high at full employment at the time hall wrote male unemployment in the united states had risen to 3 5 percent and it would peak at 4 4 percent in the recession of 1971 since then every cyclical low of unemployment has exceeded the one before it the end of the 1980 s expansion reduced unemployment to about 4 5 percent and unemployment peaked at 7 4 percent of the labor force in the recession that just ended the natural rate of unemployment has evidently risen through time which led lawrence summers 1986 to place a modifier in hall s question why is the unemployment rate so very high in what follows i pose three questions about the causes and consequences of rising joblessness first who are the unemployed i will show that unemployment and nonparticipation are heavily concentrated among the least skilled and more importantly that virtually all of the long term increase in joblessness occurs among low wage men unemployment and nonparticipation among highly skilled men are unchanged since the 1960 s second what factors have caused jobless time to rise there are many theories including changes in labor force demographics social programs that discourage employment and changes in the amount of frictional unemployment caused by sectoral shifts none of these is consistent with the evidence which points instead to a secular decline in the demand for lessskilled workers the data also cast doubt on nonmarket clearing models of rising unemployment wages are demonstrably flexible in the long run and they have fallen dramatically among the unskilled whose jobless rates have risen third what happens to the unemployed in contrast to the view that unemployment spells cause transitory reductions in income recent evidence indicates that job losses have substantial and permanent effects on earning power many of the unskilled who are unemployed or out of the labor force appear to have been high wage workers whose specialized skills have become obsolete

consumer preference for a no choice option the traditional focus in the decision making literature has been on understanding how consumers choose among a given set of alternatives the notion that preference uncertainty may lead to choice deferral when no single alternative has a decisive advantage is tested in seven studies building on recent research the article shows that the decision to defer choice is influenced by the absolute difference in attractiveness among the alternatives provided and is not consistent with trade off difficulty or the theory of search these findings are then extended to show that choice deferral can also be modified for the same alternatives by manipulations that make them appear more similar in attractiveness or that decrease the need to differentiate among them the results are consistent with the notion that preference uncertainty results in a hesitation to commit to any single action since small differences in attractiveness among the alternatives are potentially reversible consistent with this premise the effect of attractiveness difference on choice deferral decreased significantly when subjects were first allowed to practice making monetary trade offs among the available alternatives

uncertainty and incentives empirical work testing for a trade off between risk and incentives has had at best mixed success this article provides two simple reasons associated with subjectivity of performance appraisals why we might not expect to see any negative relationship both reasons relate to empirically observed problems associated with monitoring i supervisors sometimes bias their evaluations based on their personal feelings toward their subordinates and ii supervisors will sometimes offer evaluations that reduce their costs these aspects of monitoring are ignored in the standard model and can reverse the usual negative trade off between risk and incentives

technology and the us labor market evidence from the sectoral and regional decomposition of the change in the us workforce skill mix abstract researchers have found indirect evidence supporting the role of technology in changing the workforce skill mix in the us by decomposing the change in the skill mix into within between industry components this paper provides additional support for the role of technology by extending the decomposition analysis into both the sectoral and the regional dimensions

consumption self control by rationing purchase quantities of virtue and vice consumers attempts to control their unwanted consumption impulses influence many everyday purchases with broad implications for marketers pricing policies addressing theoreticians and practitioners alike this paper uses multiple empirical methods to show that consumers voluntarily and strategically ration their purchase quantities of goods that are likely to be consumed on impulse and that therefore may pose self control problems for example many regular smokers buy their cigarettes by the pack although they could easily afford to buy 10 pack cartons these smokers knowingly forgo sizable per unit savings from quantity discounts which they could realize if they bought cartons by rationing their purchase quantities they also self impose additional transactions costs on marginal consumption which makes excessive smoking overly difficult and costly such strategic self imposition of constraints is intuitively appealing yet theoretically problematic the marketing literature lacks operationalizations and empirical tests of such consumption self control strategies and of their managerial implications this paper provides experimental evidence of the operation of consumer self control and empirically illustrates its direct implications for the pricing of consumer goods moreover the paper develops a conceptual framework for the design of empirical tests of such self imposed constraints on consumption in consumer goods markets within matched pairs of products we distinguish relative virtue and vice goods whose preference ordering changes with whet her consumers evaluate immediate or delayed consumption consequences for example ignoring long term health effects many smokers prefer regular relative vice to light relative virtue cigarettes because they prefer the taste of the former however ignoring these short term taste differences the same smokers prefer light to regular cigarettes when they consider the long term health effects of smoking these preference orders can lead to dynamically inconsistent consumption choices by consumers whose tradeoffs between the immediate and delayed consequences of consumption depend on the time lag between purchase and consumption this creates a potential self control problem because these consumers will be tempted to over consume the vices they have in stock at home purchase quantity rationing helps them solve the self control problem by limiting their stock and hence their consumption opportunities such rationing implies that per purchase occasion vice consumers will be less likely than virtue consumers to buy larger quantities in response to unit price reductions such as quantity discounts we first test this prediction in two laboratory experiments we then examine the external validity of the results at the retail level with a field survey of quantity discounts and with a scanner data analysis of chain wide store level demand across a variety of different pairs of matched vice regular and virtue reduced fat calorie or caffeine etc product categories the analyses of these experimental field and scanner data provide strong convergent evidence of a characteristic crossover in demand schedules for relative vices and virtues for categories as diverse as among others potato chips chocolate chip cookies cream cheese beer soft drinks ice cream and frozen yogurt chewing gum coffee and beef andturkey bologna vice consumers demand increases less in response to price reductions than virtue consumers demand although their preferences are not generally weaker for vices than for virtues constraints on vice purchases are self imposed and strategic rather than driven by simple preferences we suggest that rationing their vice inventories at the point of purchase allows consumers to limit subsequent consumption as a result of purchase quantity rationing however vice buyers forgo savings from price reductions through quantity discounts effectively paying price premiums for the opportunity to engage in self control thus purchase quantity rationing vice consumers are relatively price in sensitive from a managerial and public policy perspective our findings should offer marketing practitioners in many consumer goods industries new opportunities to increase profits through segmentation and price discrimination based on consumer self control they can charge premium prices for small sizes of vices relative to the corresponding quantity discounts for virtues virtue consumers on the other hand will buy larger amounts even when quantity discounts are relatively shallow a key conceptual contribution of this paper lies in showing how marketing researchers can investigate a whole class of strategic self constraining consumer behaviors empirically moreover this research is the first to extend previous theoretical work on impulse control by empirically demonstrating its broader implications for marketing decision making

labor contracting and a theory of contract choice in california agriculture we present a model of labor contracts where seasonality the sensitivity of output to labor quality and work intensity and the relative advantages of labor contractors in recruitment and growers in supervision of seasonal farm workers determine the choice of employment contract differences in the optimal means of extracting work result in lower wages paid under labor contracting than direct hiring we derive and estimate the probability of labor contracting and wages as functions of worker and job characteristics using data on california farm workers and employers from estimated expected wages our results indicate that successful unionization or reducing the flow of undocumented workers into california agriculture both would reduce contracting and increase wages

regional labor markets and the determinants of wage inequality from 1972 to 1990 the united states experienced the largest increase in wage inequality of any developed country the spread in log wages between the 90th and 10th percentiles of the male wage distribution increased by about 60 points and inequality increased within virtually every demographic or skill category of the labor force see chinhui juhn et al 1993 various explanations have been offered including changes in the relative demand for skill intensive goods international trade immigration of less skilled workers and increased labor force participation of women yet attempts to quantify the relative importance of these factors have not met with much success this leaves skill biased technical change as the residual claimant that rationalizes the data this paper uses regional differences in the evolution of wage inequality to provide new evidence on the determinants of relative wages using a model of factor demand in geographic markets i isolate contributions of i changing skill ratios in the labor force ii increased participation of women iii technical change and iv changes in the industrial composition of labor demand the data indicate that changing skill ratios and women s labor supply have affected the wages of low skilled men in the west the data indicate that increased immigration of less skilled hispanic and asian workers has adversely affected the wages of natives causing a greater increase in inequality there than in any other region of the country i modeling wage inequality in regional markets

piece rates fixed wages and incentives evidence from a field experiment data from a field experiment are used to estimate the gain in productivity that is realized when workers are paid piece rates rather than fixed wages the experiment was conducted within a tree planting firm and provides daily observations on individual worker productivity under both compensation systems unrestricted statistical methods estimate the productivity gain to be 20 since planting conditions potentially affect incentives structural econometric methods are used to generalize the experimental results to out of sample conditions the structural results suggest that the average productivity gain outside of the experimental conditions would be at least 21 7

order in product customization decisions evidence from field experiments differentiated product models are predicated on the belief that a product s utility can be derived from the summation of utilities for its individual attributes in one framed field experiment and two natural field experiments we test this assumption by experimentally manipulating the order of attribute presentation in the product customization process of custom made suits and automobiles we find that order affects the design of a suit that people configure and the design and price of a car that people purchase by influencing the likelihood that they will accept the default option suggested by the firm

wages employment structure and employer size wage premia their relationship to advanced technology usage at us manufacturing establishments a common theme in the labour econiomics literature is that use of advanced technology in production requires a skilled and educated workforce using a new survey of production processes at us manufacturing plants we ask whether plants that employ advanced technology require a skilled workforce we find that plants that use the most advanced technology pay the highest wages and employ the greatest fraction of non production workers who are generally regarded as more skilled than production workers the inclusion in standard wage regressions of variables that indicate the use of advanced technology reduces the size wage premia by as much as 60 for some size categories

risk sharing vs incentives contract design under two sided heterogeneity we study the matching patterns between heterogeneous principals and agents in a principal agent model the resulting equilibrium relationship between risk and incentives could be negative positive or u shaped these results may provide an explanation for the absence of systematic empirical support for the standard risk model d 2005 elsevier b v all rights reserved

piece rate incentive schemes this paper uses recent results from incentive theory to study heretofore informal critiques of piece rate compensation schemes the informal critiques are based on the history of failed attempts to install piece rate compensation schemes at the turn of the century the formal analysis emphasizes the importance of information and commitment in contracting the main result is as follows in a work environment characterized by hidden information and a hidden action if neither the firm nor the worker can commit to future behavior then no compensation scheme piece rate or otherwise can induce the worker not to restrict output

salaries or piece rates on the endogenous matching of harvest workers and crops the objective of this paper is to determine whether the choice of payment schemes hourly vs piece rates is systematically related to the workers risk aversion and ability we derive the equilibrium relationship between agents risk aversion and ability and the power of incentives payment scheme in a market where many heterogeneous principals and agents are endogenously matched the equilibrium matching between principals and agents depends on the traits and is critical in determining the contract choice using confidential data from the national agricultural workers survey naws we find evidence of matching between agricultural workers and the riskiness of their jobs crops they harvest based on workers risk aversion and no matching based on ability when controlling for matching we find strong evidence that high risk averse workers choose hourly rates and low risk averse workers choose piece rates we also found that high ability types choose piece rates and low ability types choose hourly rates but the evidence is weaker jel j33 d82 q12

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

salaries and piece rates compensation can take many forms remuneration can come as pecuniary payments as fringes such as health and pension benefits or as a nonpecuniary reward such as plush office furniture that costs the firm less than it benefits the worker a significant literature has examined the trade offs between pecuniary and nonpecuniary compensation the modern work having been pioneered by rosen 1974 more recently another body of literature has examined the selection of method of total compensation ignoring the distinction between pecuniary and nonpecuniary payment this work has focused on risk and incentive factors it has resulted in comparisons of compensation based on absolute output levels to that based on relative performance it has also led to explorations of the relation of compensation to experience over the work life 2 little attention has been paid to what may be among the most important and obvious distinction in methods of compensation namely the choice between a fixed salary for some period of time that is paying on the basis of input and some workers receive compensation that is specified in advance and not directly contingent on performance instead it depends on an input measure such as hours worked for others compensation is directly related to output this essay is an attempt to predict a firm s choice of compensation method piece rates are defined more rigorously among the more important factors discussed are worker heterogeneity incentives sorting considerations monitoring costs and asymmetric information one result is that salary workers tend to be of lower quality and more homogeneous than are their piece rate counterparts numerous additional results are provided helpful comments by victoria lazear and yoram weiss are gratefully acknowledged support was provided by the department of labor and the national science foundation 1 see lazear and rosen 1981 stiglitz 1981 holmstrom 1982 green and stokey 1983 2 see lazear 1979 1981 and harris and holmstrom in press

the tenuous trade off between risk and incentives empirical work testing for a negative trade off between risk and incentives has not had much success the data suggest a positive relationship between measures of uncertainty and incentives rather than the posited negative trade off i argue that the existing literature fails to account for an important effect of uncertainty on incentives through the allocation of responsibility to employees when workers operate in certain settings firms are content to assign tasks to workers and monitor their inputs by contrast when the situation is more uncertain they delegate responsibility to workers but to constrain their discretion base compensation on observed output

self control for the righteous toward a theory of precommitment to indulgence prior research has examined consumers use of self control to avoid hedonic myopic temptations such as overspending and smoking in this research we investigate the opposite form of self control whereby consumers force themselves to indulge and avoid default forms of spending on utilitarian necessities and or savings in particular consumers who have difficulty choosing items that are perceived as indulgences or luxuries e g a cruise over necessities e g saving for college education and cash in everyday decisions may use precommitments to indulgence especially when the psychological cost of such commitments is less concrete these propositions were tested in a series of studies involving real and hypothetical choices as well as process measures the results indicate that a substantial segment of consumers choose hedonic luxury rewards over cash of equal or greater value consumers typically explain such choices based on the need to precommit to indulgence to make sure that the award does no

the red and the black mental accounting of savings and debt in the standard economic account of consumer behavior the cost of a purchase takes the form of a reduction in future utility when expenditures that otherwise could have been made are forgone the reality of consumer hedonics is different when people make purchases they often experience an immediate pain of paying which can undermine the pleasure derived from consumption the ticking of the taxi meter for example reduces one s pleasure from the ride we propose a double entry mental accounting theory that describes the nature of these reciprocal interactions between the pleasure of consumption and the pain of paying and draws out their implications for consumer behavior and hedonics a central assumption of the model which we call prospective accounting is that consumption that has already been paid for can be enjoyed as if it were free and that the pain associated with payments made prior to consumption but not after is buffered by thoughts of the benefits that the payments will finance another important concept is coupling which refers to the degree to which consumption calls to mind thoughts of payment and vice versa some financing methods such as credit cards tend to weaken coupling whereas others such as cash payment produce tight coupling our model makes a variety of predictions that are at variance with economic formulations contrary to the standard prediction that people will finance purchases to minimize the present value of payments our model predicts strong debt aversion that they should prefer to prepay for consumption or to get paid for work after it is performed such pay before sequences confer hedonic benefits because consumption can be enjoyed without thinking about the need to pay for it in the future likewise when paying beforehand the pain of paying is mitigated by thoughts of future consumption benefits contrary to the economic prediction that consumers should prefer to pay at the margin for what they consume our model predicts that consumers will find it less painful to pay for and hence will prefer flat rate pricing schemes such as unlimited internet access at a fixed monthly price even if it involves paying more for the same usage other predictions concern spending patterns with cash charge or credit cards and preferences for the earmarking of purchases we test these predictions in a series of surveys and in a conjoint like analysis that pitted our double entry mental accounting model against a standard discounting formulation and another benchmark that did not incorporate hedonic interactions between consumption and payments our model provides a better fit of the data for 60 of the subjects the discounting formulation provides a better fit for only 29 of the subjects even when allowing for positive and negative discount rates the pain of paying we argue plays an important role in consumer self regulation but is hedonically costly from a hedonic perspective the ideal situation is one in which payments are tightly coupled to consumption so that paying evokes thoughts about the benefits being financed but consumption is decoupled from payments so that consumption does not evoke thoughts about payment from an efficiency perspective however it is important for consumers to be aware of what they are paying for consumption this creates a tension between hedonic efficiency and what we call decision efficiency various institutional arrangements such as financing of public parks through taxes or usage fees play into this tradeoff a producer developing a pricing structure for their product or service should be aware of these two conflicting objectives and should try to devise a structure that reconciles them

performance pay and wage inequality an increasing fraction of jobs in the u s labor market explicitly pay workers for their performance using bonus pay commissions or piece rate contracts using data from the panel study of income dynamics we show that compensation in performance pay jobs is more closely tied to both observed and unobserved productive characteristics of workers than compensation in non performance pay jobs we also find that the return to these productive characteristics increased faster over time in performance pay than in non performance pay jobs we show that this finding is consistent with the view that underlying changes in returns to skill due for instance to technological change induce more firms to offer performance pay contracts and result in more wage inequality among workers who are paid for performance thus performance pay provides a channel through which underlying changes in returns to skill get translated into higher wage inequality we conclude that this channel accounts for 21 of the growth in the variance of male wages between the late 1970s and the early 1990s and for most of the increase in wage inequality above the eightieth percentile over the same period

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

the league composition effect in tournaments with heterogeneous players an empirical analysis of broiler contracts we compare welfare effects of tournaments and piece rates in contracts with heterogeneous ability agents and demonstrate that tournaments that mix players of unequal abilities create a league composition effect when leagues are fixed and the time horizon sufficiently long piece rates improve welfare over tournaments using contract production data for broiler chickens we estimate the variances of growers abilities common production shock and grower s idiosyncratic shock growers abilities are heterogeneous and common production shocks are significant leagues in broiler tournaments disintegrate rapidly over time suggesting that tournament contracts offer more welfare than piece rates

the influence of consumer distractions on the effectiveness of food sampling programs abstract sampling programs are a significant element of the promotions mix particularly in the food category in this research the authors find that the degree to which consumers are distracted while sampling a product can influence the effectiveness of such programs in particular the authors find that distraction actually increases subsequent choice of the sampled food a finding that is contrary to what industry experts predict the authors propose a dual process model of somatosensory experiences to account for the findings in line with the model the findings suggest that the ultimate pleasure that a consumer derives from the taste of a food sample depends on two components an informational component and an affective component furthermore the findings suggest that distraction affects the subsequent choice of the sampled item by increasing decreasing the impact of the affective component informational component on subsequent choice