time consistent public policy in this paper we study how a benevolent government that cannot commit to future policy should trade off the costs and benefits of public expenditure we characterize and solve for markov perfect equilibria of the dynamic game between successive governments the characterization consists of an inter temporal first order condition a generalized euler equation for the government and we use it both to gain insight into the nature of the equilibrium and as a basis for computations for a calibrated economy we find that when the only tax base available to the government is capital income an inelastic source of funds at any point in time the government still refrains from taxing at confiscatory rates we also find that when the only tax base is labour income the markov equilibrium features less public expenditure and lower tax rates than the ramsey equilibrium

inequality inflation and central bank independence what can account for the different contemporaneous inflation experiences of various countries and of the same country over time we present an analysis of the determination of inflation from a political economy perspective we document a positive correlation between income inequality and inflation and then present a theory of the determination of inflation outcomes in democratic societies that illustrates how greater inequality leads to greater inflation owing to a desire by voters for wealth redistribution we conclude by showing that democracies with more independent central banks tend to have better inflation outcomes for a given degree of inequality jel classification e5 h0 inegalite inflation et l independance de la banque centrale quels sont les facteurs qui pourraient expliquer les experiences inflationnistes tellement differentes des divers pays dans le passe recent et l experience tellement differente d un pays donne dans le temps les auteurs analysent ce probleme de la determination du taux d inflation dans une perspective d economie politique ils determinent qu il y a une correlation positive entre l inegalite et l inflation et presentent une theorie de la determination de l inflation dans les societes democratiques qui montre comment une inegalite plus grande entraine une inflation plus grande a cause du desir des electeurs de demander une redistribution de la richesse le memoire montre en terminant que les democraties e quipees de banques centrales plus independantes tendent a avoir de meilleurs resultats en terme d inflation pour un degre d inegalite donne

credibility versus control agency independence and partisan influence in the regulatory state there is a natural tension between theories of party government and theories of regulatory politics whereas effective party government requires that politicians have firm control over public polic

a critical assessment of measures of central bank independence the methodology of measuring central bank independence suggested by bade and parkin three decades ago and inverse correlations between the measures and inflation have been widely accepted the measurement literature has made important contributions identifying elements of institutional design that establish the relationship between the central bank and the government and the measurements from an ordinal perspective provide some useful insights about the major institutional redesigns of central banks during the past several decades at the same time the measurement literature is problematic first a dummy variable bifurcating central banks into groups of independent and less independent central banks can duplicate the standard correlations suggesting the information content of the specific measures is limited second the correlations between inflation and measures of independence are not as stable as claimed and most important the measurements are subject to classification problems that have not been fully appreciated review of the institutional design and history of the bank of korea bank of japan and the federal reserve provide evidence the classification problems are important the measures of independence are more appropriately regarded as ordinal rankings of central bank independence rather than considered cardinal measures suitable for econometric modeling jel e50 e58 e65

competitive nonlinear tariffs abstract this paper generalizes the study of nonlinear tariffs i e those depending nonlinearly on the quantity purchased to the case of a symmetric oligopoly competitive equilibria and the corresponding tariffs are analyzed in a cournot framework various equilibria are obtained which depend both upon the number of competing suppliers and the choice of market parameters used to characterize the competitors strategies buyers are classified by type each selecting an optimal consumption level in response to the prevailing tariff the phenomena of buyer self selection found in monopoly nonlinear pricing and the scaling of equilibrium demand elasticity found in cournot models both appear in the results

the political economy of inflation bargaining structure or central bank independence the causes of inflation are commonly analyzed as the function of either the organization of wage bargaining or the independence of the central bank although these explanations are widely treated as competing recent evidence suggests that there may be merit to both arguments this paper presents a game theoretic model of wage bargaining and monetary policy making that shows why the two institutional causes are not only complementary but elements of a more encompassing logic the empirical superiority of this synthesizing model is demonstrated by reanalyzing data used in al marhubi and willett 1995 and by presenting new evidence

necessity as the mother of invention monetary policy after the crisis we examine recent changes in monetary policy due to the financial crisis and ask whether they are likely to be temporary or permanent we present evidence from two original surveys one of central bank governors the other of academic specialists we find that central banks in crisis countries are more likely to have resorted to new policies to have had discussions about changing mandates and to have communicated more extensively but thinking has changed more broadly for instance many central banks in non crisis countries also report implementing macro prudential measures looking forward we expect central banks to have broader mandates use macro prudential tools more widely and communicate more actively than before the crisis while there is no consensus yet about the usefulness of unconventional monetary policies we expect most of them will remain in central banks toolkits as governors who gain experience with a particular tool are more likely to assess that tool positively finally the relationship between central banks and their governments might well have changed with central banks crossing the line into the political realm more often than in the past

the anti inflationary influence of corporatist structures and central bank independence the importance of the hump shaped hypothesis many studies have found strong negative correlations between central bank independence and inflation but the casual significance of this relationship is often challenged we find that the negative relationship remains even when a number of other explanatory variables are considered special attention is given to the role of corporatism following calmfors and driffell it is argued that both high and low levels of centralization should be associated with lower inflation we present empirical support for his hump shaped hypothesis and find that the inclusion of corporatism does not diminish the significance of central bank independence

the last word on the wage curve abstract since 1990 there has been extensive international research on the responsiveness of wages of individuals to changing local labour market conditions for many countries an inverse relationship between wages and local unemployment rates has been found in their book the wage curve blanchflower and oswald argued that the unemployment elasticity of pay is around 0 1 in most countries in a 1995 literature survey card referred to this striking empirical regularity as being close to an empirical law of economics nonetheless reported elasticities do vary even excluding outliers between about 0 5 and 0 1 there is also considerable heterogeneity among wage curve studies in terms of data and model specification this paper carries out meta analytic techniques on a sample of 208 elasticities derived from the literature to uncover the reasons for the differences in empirical results across studies several causes of variation are identified there is also clear evidence of downward publication bias in addition many reported t statistics are biased upwards due to the use of aggregate unemployment rates a maximum likelihood method and a trimming procedure are used to correct for these biases both methods give similar results for our sample an unbiased estimate of the wage curve elasticity at the means of study characteristics is about 0 07

the effects of eu corn cotton and sugar beet policies on greek producers a multimarket analysis this article examines the welfare effects of the european union s common agricultural policy cap corn cotton and sugar beet regimes practiced in greece after its 1981 entry into the european union since greek farmers produce corn cotton and sugar beets on the same land in different years we model these markets as horizontally linked by incorporating the demand for corn in our model we take into account that corn is used as feed in livestock production we use line integral theory to properly deal with the complications of welfare measurement in a multimarket setting we estimate producer welfare effects of greek corn cotton and sugar beet policy and use bootstrapping techniques to obtain confidence intervals for the welfare measurements our analysis indicates that the income transfers to greek farmers corn cotton and sugar beet growers as well as livestock producers considered as a total rose between 1981 and 1992 the 1992 cap reform led to a stabilization of income transfers to crop farmers and lessened the negative impact on livestock producers

a model of production with supply management for the canadian agricultural sector the production structure of the canadian agricultural sector is modeled by an output constrained multiproduct profit function to account for the existence of supply management policies the le chatelier effects of supply constraints are illustrated and the comparative statics of supply management is shown to depend under input normality on the type of jointness convexity is tested and accepted and nonjointness is rejected by the estimated normalized quadratic profit function the results support the hypothesis of nonjointness due to allocatable fixed factors decreasing the supply of managed commodities will increase the supply of unrestricted commodities while total input use is reduced

monetary fiscal policy interaction and fiscal inflation a tale of three countries abstract we study the impact of the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy on the low frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation using cross country data from 1965 to 1999 in a first step we contrast the monetary fiscal narrative for germany the u s and italy with evidence obtained from simple regression models and a time varying var we find that the low frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation is low during periods of an independent central bank and responsible fiscal policy and more pronounced in times of non responsible fiscal policy and accommodative monetary authorities in a second step we use an estimated dsge model to interpret the low frequency measure structurally and to illustrate the mechanisms through which fiscal actions affect inflation in the long run the findings from the dsge model suggest that switches in the monetary fiscal policy interaction and accompanying variations in the propagation of structural shocks can well account for changes in the low frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation

mixed signals central bank independence coordinated wage bargaining and european monetary union plans for the european monetary union emu are based on the conventional postulate that increasing the independence of the central bank can reduce inflation without any real economic effects however the theoretical and empirical bases for this claim rest on models of the economy that make unrealistic information assumptions and omit institutional variables other than the central bank when signaling problems between the central bank and other actors in the political economy are considered we find that the character of wage bargaining conditions the impact of central bank independence by rendering the signals between the bank and the bargainers more or less effective greater central bank independence can reduce inflation without major employment effects where bargaining is coordinated but it can bring higher levels of unemployment where bargaining is less coordinated thus currency unions like the emu may require higher levels of unemployment to control inflation than their proponents envisage they will have costs as well as benefits and these will be unevenly distributed among and within the member nations depending on the changes they induce in the status of the bank and of wage coordination

managing channel profits a channel of distribution consists of different channel members each having his own decision variables however each channel member s decisions do affect the other channel members profits and as a consequence actions a lack of coordination of these decisions can lead to undesirable consequences for example in the simple manufacturer retailer consumer channel uncoordinated and independent channel members decisions over margins result in a higher price paid by the consumer than if those decisions were coordinated in addition the ensuing suboptimal volume leads to lower profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer this paper explores the problems inherent in channel coordination we address the following questions what is the effect of channel coordination what causes a lack of coordination in the channel how difficult is it to achieve channel coordination what mechanisms exist which can achieve channel coordination what are the strengths and weaknesses of these mechanism what is the role of nonprice variables e g manufacturer advertising retailer shelf space in coordination does the lack of coordination affect normative implications from in store experimentation can quantity discounts be a coordination mechanism are some marketing practices actually disguised quantity discounts we review the literature and present a simple formulation illustrating the roots of the coordination problem we then derive the form of the quantity discount schedule that results in optimum channel profits this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 3 pages 239 272 in 1983

a classification of literature on determining the lot size under quantity discounts abstract determining a lot size in the presence of either all units or incremental discounts has represented one of major interests of materials managers it is a common practice that the suppliers offer quantity discount to entice the buyers to purchase more and to achieve economies of scale for transportation and processing costs this paper will classify the literature on lot sizing determination under several types of discount schemes and discuss some of the significant literature in this area over two decades also some future research areas have been identified

on the validity of aggregate models in designing supply chain contracts abstract the vast majority of the existing papers on supply chain contracts analyse these contracts based on a highly aggregate model description of the supply chain recognizing the high complexity of real supply chain systems such models can naturally only be rough approximations of reality out of the many possible ways for aggregating a planning model our study focuses on item aggregation here due to computational informational or organizational reasons a multi product reality is approximated by a model representation with fewer products we explore the aggregation error made when using an aggregate model in order to optimize a supply chain contract which is subsequently applied to a more detailed real system based on a numerical analysis it is shown that the design of supply chain contracts by means of an aggregate planning model may lead to significant suboptimalities

fiscal decentralization central bank independence and inflation abstract we develop earlier cross sectional studies of inflation rates by adding the degree of tax centralization as another explanatory variable this makes central bank independence perform appreciably better as an explanatory variable also we find that centralized countries have higher inflation

an approach for developing an optimal discount pricing policy this paper addresses the problem of why and how a seller should develop a discount pricing structure even if such a pricing structure does not alter ultimate demand the situation modeled is most appropriate where the seller s product does not represent a major component of the buyer s final product where the demand for the product is derived or where the price is only one of many factors considered in making a purchase decision a model of buyer reaction to any given pricing scheme is developed to show that there exists a unified pricing policy which motivates the buyer to increase its ordering quantity per order thereby reducing the joint buyer and seller ordering and holding costs as a result the seller is able to reduce its costs while leaving the buyer no worse off and often better off the model is extended to handle variable ordering and shipping costs and situations where the seller faces numerous groups of buyers each having different ordering policies finally a case study is presented explicitly showing how the proposed pricing policy can be applied to the situation of a large seller selling to a number of different buyer groups

political influence on the central bank international evidence political influence on the central bank is measured bere by looking at the probability that a central bank governor will be replaced shortly after a political change of government the governor changes about half the time witbin six months of a nonconstitutional or other radical change of government a military coup or a restoration of democracy the governor is much less likely to change within six months following a routine change in the head of government about one fourth of the time in developing countries and one tenth in industrial countries these indicators vary across countries and correlate statistically with inflation and its variability and with real growth and real interest rates differences in the vulnerability of the central bank to political instability in political instability itself and in central bank turnover in nonpolitical periods seem to be a major part of the explanation for why developing countries have on average higher and more variable inflation than industrial countries do

note comments on a quantity discount pricing model to increase vendor profits monahan monahan j p 1984 a quantity discount pricing model to increase vendor profits management sci june 720 726 adapted the quantity discount model of inventory theory to the problem of determining an optimal quantity discount schedule from a vendor s point of view and opened up an important direction of research however his one item one customer one vendor model is based on several implicit assumptions that must be judged unreasonable monahan must account for the vendor s inventory carrying charges and redefine his variable s2 it is shown that a rational vendor s manufacturing frequency would not be identical to the buyer s ordering frequency if the vendor s manufacturing setup costs are substantially larger than the buyer s ordering costs a numerical example presented in this note also questions the practical usefulness of monahan s model even after its theoretical inaccuracies axe corrected monahan s model may explain discounts that are a fraction of 1 of the price of an item but it fails to explain commonly observed magnitudes of quantity discounts such as 10 of the unit price

increasing public debt and the role of central bank independence for debt maturities abstract governments are interested in lengthening debt maturity to reduce fiscal refinancing and default risks on the other hand investors may worry that highly indebted governments will inflate away their debts when it is long term based on a new panel dataset spanning from 1990 2016 for 28 oecd countries the paper finds that governments prolong the average debt maturity if debt ratios increase interestingly the marginal effect of the debt ratio on average maturity is higher for countries with an independent central bank than for countries with a more politically dependent one there are two possible explanations for this effect of central bank independence first an independent central bank reduces the inflation risk premium that longer maturities otherwise would have second governments with independent central banks are unable to use monetary policy for inflating and reducing fiscal and interest rate shock burdens again this calls for longer maturities to reduce the relevant risks

the societal benefit of a financial transaction tax we provide a novel justification for a financial transaction tax for economies where agents face stochastic consumption opportunities a financial transaction tax makes it more costly for agents to readjust their portfolios of liquid and illiquid assets in response to liquidity shocks which increase both the demand for and the price of liquid assets the higher price improves liquidity insurance and welfare for other market participants we calibrate the model to u s data and find that the optimal financial transaction tax is 1 6 and that it reduces the volume of financial trading by 17

whither monetary economics i argue that monetary economics should be pursued by applying implementation theory to models which contain explicit frictions that make money essential the argument has two parts first i argue that models in which real balances are assumed to be productive models with money in utility or production functions or with cash in advance constraints contain hidden inconsistencies second i argue that the approach advocated is capable of providing new insights about some of the main issues in monetary economics the effects of monetary shocks the welfare cost of inflation and the roles of inside and outside money

sectoral variability and the foundations of optimal inflation rate abstractthe recent monetary search models argue that the real effects of inflation on economic activity can be gauged through relative price variability rpv our study uses a large panel data of

price stability and central bank independence discipline credibility and democratic institutions despite mixed empirical evidence in the past two decades central bank independence cbi has been on the rise under the assumption that it ensures price stability using an encompassing theoretical approach and new yearly data for de jure cbi seventy eight countries 1973 2008 we reexamine this relationship distinguishing the role of printing less money discipline from the public s beliefs about the central bank s likely actions credibility democracies differ from dictatorships in the likelihood of political interference and changes to the law because of the presence of political opposition and the freedom to expose government actions cbi in democracies should be directly reflected in lower money supply growth besides being more disciplinarian it also ensures a more robust money demand by reducing inflation expectations and therefore inflation empirical results are robust and support a discipline effect conditioned by political institutions as well as a credibility effect

a simple empirical measure of central banks conservatism in this paper we suggest a simple empirical and model independent measure of central banks conservatism based on the taylor curve this new indicator can easily be extended in time and space whatever the underlying monetary regime of the considered countries we demonstrate that it evolves in accordance with the monetary experiences of 32 oecd member countries from 1980 and is largely equivalent to the model based measure provided by krause mendez southern economic journal 2005 we finally bring forward the interest of such an indicator for further empirical analysis dealing with the preferences of central banks

variation in central bank independence across countries some provisional empirical evidence in this paper seven hypotheses to explain variation in central bank independence across countries are tested the predictions based upon the theory that delegation of authority by politicians to the central bank is used as a commitment device are not supported central bank independence is not higher the larger the employment motivated inflationary bias the higher political instability or the larger the government debt central bank independence is positively related to historical inflation experience and negatively with political instability we do only find limited support for the view that countries with a universal banking system and countries whose central banks do not regulate financial institutions have more independent central banks

viewpoint a microfoundation of monetary economics in this lecture i explain what the microfoundations of money are about and why they are necessary for monetary economics then i review recent developments of a particular microfoundation of money commonly known as the search theory of money finally i outline some unresolved issues dans cette presentation l auteur explique ce que sont les microfondations de la monnaie et pourquoi elles sont necessaires a l economie monetaire ensuite il passe en revue certains developpements recents d une microfondation particuliere de la monnaie connue sous le nom de theorie de la recherche de la monnaie enfin l auteur fait le tour d un ensemble de problemes qui restent sans solution pour le moment

doing more with less innovation input and output in family firms family firms are often portrayed as an important yet conservative form of organization that is reluctant to invest in innovation however simultaneously evidence has shown that family firms are flourishing and in fact constitute many of the world s most innovative firms our study contributes to disentangling this puzzling effect we argue that family firms owing to the family s high level of control over the firm wealth concentration and importance of nonfinancial goals invest less in innovation but have an increased conversion rate of innovation input into output and ultimately a higher innovation output than nonfamily firms empirical evidence from a meta analysis based on 108 primary studies from 42 countries supports our hypotheses we further argue and empirically show that the observed effects are even stronger when the ceo of the family firm is a later generation family member however when the ceo of the family firm is the firm s founder innovation input is higher and contrary to our initial expectations innovation output is lower than that in other firms we further show that the family firm innovation input output relationships depend on country level factors namely the level of minority shareholder protection and the education level of the workforce in the country

meta regression analysis a quantitative method of literature surveys abstract pedagogically literature reviews are instrumental they summarize the large literature written on a particular topic give coherence to the complex often disparate views expressed about an issue and serve as a springboard for new ideas however literature surveys rarely establish anything approximating unanimous consensus ironically this is just as true for the empirical economic literature to harmonize this dissonance we offer a quantitative methodology for reviewing the empirical economic literature meta regression analysis mra is the regression analysis of regression analyses mra tends to objectify the review process it studies the processes that produce empirical economic results as though they were any other social scientific phenomenon mra provides a framework for replication and offers a sensitivity analysis for model specification in this brief essay we propose a new method of reviewing economic literature mra and discuss its potential

bootstrapping in applied welfare analysis bootstrapping procedures are used to estimate the statistical properties of common empirical welfare measures results from a monte carlo experiment indicate that welfare estimates such as marshallian consumer surplus often exhibit significant bias standard errors of welfare estimates are found to often exceed the magnitude of the point estimate for typical cross section data sets and are generally larger than the difference between comparable hicksian and marshallian measures precision of welfare estimates can be markedly enhanced through generating larger data sets obtaining better model fits and through imposition of innocuous inequality restrictions on the demand function parameters

degreasing the wheels of finance can there be too much trading in financial markets we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model where agents face idiosyncratic liquidity shocks a financial market allows agents to adjust their portfolio of liquid and illiquid assets in response to these shocks the optimal policy is to restrict access to this market because portfolio choices exhibit a pecuniary externality agents do not take into account that by holding more of the liquid asset they not only acquire additional insurance against these liquidity shocks but also marginally increase the value of the liquid asset which improves insurance for other market participants

reconsidering the principal components of central bank independence the more the merrier we use principal component analysis to reassess the link between different attributes of central bank independence and inflation performance we suggest that coding problems may account for the fact that almost none of the attributes included in the cukierman index has a systematic plausible relationship with inflation the multi faceted cukierman index also seems to be out performed by a much narrower index focusing solely on policy independence these findings point to the importance of using public choice analysis to isolate the real problem here namely finding specific central bank structures that effectively insulate central bankers from political pressures

central bank independence and inflation corporatism partisanship and alternative indices of central bank independence a well developed theoretical literature suggests that central bank independence causes low inflation empirical work supporting this hypothesis is unsatisfactory however for two reasons statistical analysis has only recently begun to include control variables and important political variables that are related to inflation have not yet been included analysis has not yet undertaken a systematic comparison of alternative indices of central bank independence this paper addresses both weaknesses by testing the explanatory power of eight indices of central bank independence in a political economic model of inflation the results suggest that while support for the central bank independence hypothesis survives a relatively inclusive set of control variables support for the hypothesis is not independent of the particular index upon which analysis relies

central bank independence and inflation good news and bad news abstract the bad news is that the findings of recent studies of central bank independence and inflation are very sensitive to outliers the good news is that evidence presented here reinforces the existing case for bank independence in high income economies

central bank independence an update of theory and evidence this paper reviews recent research on central bank independence cbi after we have distinguished between independence and conservativeness research in which the inflationary bias is endogenised is reviewed finally the various challenges that have been raised against previous empirical findings on cbi are discussed we conclude that the negative relationship between cbi and inflation is quite robust

central bank independence and macroeconomic performance some comparative evidence this note uses information on a sample of sixteen oecd countries to assess the relationship between central bank independence and macroeconomic performance as previous work suggests politically controlled central banks are more likely to pursue policies that lead to high and variable inflation however the authors find little evidence that political control of central bank policy has any impact on measures of the level or variability of growth unemployment or the ex ante real interest rate copyright 1993 by ohio state university press

fiscal policymaking and the central bank institutional constraint una vez mas new latin american evidence evidence on the degree to which central bank independence can constrain government budget deficits remains surprisingly scarce this paper finds empirical support for the importance of the central institutional constraint for a 14 country sample of latin american countries over 1990 2012 these results suggest that greater central bank autonomy has indeed helped reign in fiscal excesses in a region that has been plagued by inflationary deficit expansion for much of the post war period the ability to potentially discipline government policy adds to an independent central bank s inherent role in adding to the checks and balances essential to a well functioning democracy

how to solve the price puzzle a meta analysis the short run increase in prices following an unexpected tightening of monetary policy constitutes a frequently reported puzzle yet the puzzle is surprisingly easy to explain away when all published models are quantitatively reviewed we collect about 1 000 point estimates of impulse responses from 70 articles using vector autoregressive models and present a simple method of research synthesis for graphical results our ndings indicate publication selection in favor of the intuitive response of prices to a tightening the estimates depend systematically on study design when misspecications are

inflation and central bank independence a meta regression analysis using 59 studies we perform a meta regression analysis of studies examining the relationship between inflation and central bank independence cbi the studies considered are very different with respect to the cbi indicator used the sample of countries and time periods covered model specification estimators used and publication outlet we conclude that there is a significant publication bias however we also find a significant genuine effect of cbi on inflation differences between studies are not caused by differences in cbi indicators used

markov perfect capital and labor taxes abstract this paper analyzes the markov perfect equilibrium of an economy were a benevolent government that lacks the ability to commit to future policy choices uses taxes on capital and labor income to finance the provision of a public good the main finding is that the government taxes capital and subsidizes labor so that only the dynamic inefficiency of future capital taxes remains if agents preference for the public good is sufficiently high then capital is confiscated setting bounds on taxes alleviates the dynamic inefficiency inherent in capital taxation but some implementations carry a high welfare cost allowing for endogenous capital utilization makes the current capital tax distortionary and implies capital and labor tax rates that are relatively close to those measured for the u s economy

the economic effects of supply controls the simple analytics of the u s peanut program a gricultural commodity programs employ a wide variety of policy tools to regulate u s agriculture price supports are the most common form of intervention but rights to sell at the supported price are allocated very differently under different commodity programs under recent feed grain programs for example the right to sell at the supported price is linked to acreage set asides agreements not to produce on certain acres in other programs sales by individual farmers are controlled under marketing orders sponsored by the u s department of agriculture usda 2 a third method is through permanent maketing quotas that directly limit output only two major commodity programs those for tobacco and peanuts currently allocate the right to sell in this way the peanut program is the subject of this article 3

partially independent central banks politically responsive governments and inflation theories of central bank independence have more exact implications regarding inflation in different political economic environments than generally understood or empirically examined they imply that inflation in any given country time will be a weighted average of what it would be if the central bank completely controlled monetary policy and what it would be if the government completely controlled it with the degree of central bank independence weighting the former an equation embodying this theoretical expectation is estimated by constrained least squares from a time series cross section of inflation rates in developed democracies since the bretton woods era the results confirm that the antiinflationary benefit of central bank independence is not constant but rather depends on every variable in the broader politicaleconomic environment to which wholly autonomous central banks and governments would respond differently conversely the inflationary impacts of all such political economic variables depend on the degree of central bank independence

inflation targeting genuine effects or publication selection bias abstract this paper uses a meta regression analysis mra to evaluate the impact of publication selection bias as for the macroeconomic effects of inflation targeting it a popular approach to implementing monetary policy documented in the existing literature using 8 059 point estimates from 113 studies we show that a significant part of the documented positive effects of it on inflation and to some extent output growth volatility is in fact due to publication selection bias in particular results pointing to lower inflation volatility and higher real gdp growth tend to be favored by researchers as well as those pointing to statistically significant macroeconomic effects however even after controlling for these two types of biases we find it to be correlated with lower inflation and higher real gdp growth differently the evidence on the it inflation volatility relationship is found to be less clear

consumption savings decisions with quasi geometric discounting we study the consumption savings problem of an infinitely lived rational consumer who has time inconsistent preferences in the form of quasi geometric discounting the consumer operates a weakly concave production function and must simply divide current resources into current consumption and savings there is no uncertainty a solution to the consumer s problem is a subgame perfect equilibrium of a dynamic game between the consumer s successive selves we show that this game has a continuum of equilibria in stationary markov strategies not only is the stationary point of the consumer s asset holdings indeterminate but each stationary point has a continuum of dynamic paths converging to it the savings policy rules underlying these dynamic paths are step functions

goals and consequences of rice policy in japan 1965 80 the change in welfare of producers and consumers government cost and the deadweight loss arising from the various forms of government interventions into the rice market in order to protect domestic producers in japan are estimated in a partial equilibrium framework results of the quantitative analysis indicate that the motivation of the government was to minimize budget costs in achieving the target level of producer price support while consumer welfare had an insignificant weight in the government s objective function it is aiso found that acreage control is a second best policy to reduce social inefficiency produced from other forms of market distortions

a bargaining model of partisan appointments to the central bank abstract in this paper a bargaining model is developed to analyze the appointment of central bankers in a two party political system the major results of the paper are 1 the party in power will appoint partisans early on but later appointments will be increasingly moderate in their views concerning monetary policy 2 changing the timing of the appointment of the board chairman from the end of a president s term in office to the first period of the president s term will lead to more partisan monetary policy 3 in equilibrium nominations to the board are not rejected thus confirmation hearings appear to be nothing more than a rubber stamp process 4 lengthening the terms on the board relative to the electoral cycle will lead to more moderate appointments to the central bank and a reduction in partisan policymaking

publication bias in the economic freedom and economic growth literature abstract the impact of institutions on economic performance has attracted significant attention from researchers as well as from policy reformers a rapidly growing area in this literature is the impact of economic freedom on economic growth the aim of this paper was to explore publication bias in this literature by means of traditional funnel plots meta significance testing as well as by bootstrapping these meta significance tests when all the available estimates are combined and averaged there seems to be evidence of a genuine and positive economic freedom economic growth effect however it is also shown that the economic freedom economic growth literature is tainted strongly with publication bias the existence of publication bias makes it difficult to identify the magnitude of the genuine effect of economic freedom on economic growth the paper explores the differences between aggregate and disaggregate measures of economic freedom and shows that selection effects are stronger when aggregate measures are used

central bank independence and inflation revisited we re examine the relationship between central bank independence cbi proxied by the central bank governor s turnover rate and an indicator based on central bank laws in place and inflation using a random coefficient model with the hildreth houck estimator for more than 100 countries in the period 1980 to 2005 we conclude that there exists no general significant negative relation between our indicators of central bank independence and inflation central bank independence has a significant effect only in a minority of the countries in our sample

government policy in monetary economies i study how the specic details of a micro founded monetary economy aect the determination of government policy i consider three variants of the lagos wright monetary framework a benchmark were all markets are competitive a case which allows for nancial intermediaries and a case with trading frictions although intitutions frictions are shown to have a signicant structural impact in the determination of policy the calibrated articial economies are observationally equivalent in steady state the policy response to aggregate shocks is qualitatively similar in the variants considered however there are signicant quantitative dierences in the response of government policy to productivity shocks mainly due to the idiosyncratic behavior of money demand the variants with no trading frictions display the best t to u s post war data

decentralization and inflation commitment collective action or continuity do political and fiscal decentralization make it easier or harder to control inflation statistical analysis of average annual inflation rates in a panel of 87 countries in the 1970s and 1980s found no clear relationship between decentralization and the level of inflation political decentralization however does appear to reduce change in countries relative inflation rates over time by creating additional veto players federal structure may lock in existing patterns of monetary policy whether inflationary or strict among the mostly developed countries that started with low inflation inflation tended to increase more slowly in federations than in unitary states among the mostly developing countries that started with high inflation inflation tended to increase faster in the federations there is evidence that political decentralization locks in a country s degree of practical central bank independence whether high or low and the relative hardness or softness of budget constraints on subnational governments

comment managing channel profits comment in a recent paper in this journal jeuland and shugan jeuland a s shugan 1983 managing channel profits marketing sci 2 summer 239 272 proposed a quantity discount schedule as a way of coordinating a channel as they put it on p 253 of their paper a quantity discount schedule which would fix the retailer s and hence the manufacturer s profits to some fixed linear function of total channel profits would lead the channel to maximize profits the purpose of this note is to show that a quantity discount schedule is not necessary for channel coordination

does central bank independence really matter new evidence for developing countries using a new indicator abstract this paper provides a new indicator for central bank independence cbi based on the turnover rate of central bank governors for 82 developing countries over the period 1980 1989 using this new indicator it is concluded that this proxy for cbi is related to inflation only if the high inflation countries are included in the sample the view that both cbi and inflation are caused by effective opposition towards inflation is not supported using both the extreme bound analysis and sala i martin s method we do not find evidence that cbi is robustly related to economic growth

note on a quantity discount pricing model to increase vendor profits monahan monahan james p 1984 a quantity discount pricing model to increase vendor profits management sci 30 june 720 726 develops a model for establishing an optimal quantity discount schedule from a vendor s viewpoint in this note we show that this model is limited to the case where the vendor buys from another supplier incorporating vendor s inventory carrying costs we develop a generalized version of monahan s model and demonstrate its equivalence with the joint economic lot size approach suggested by banerjee banerjee avijit 1986 a joint economic lot size model for purchaser and vendor decision sci 17 summer 292 311

a unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis search theoretic models of monetary exchange are based on explicit descriptions of the frictions that make money essential however tractable versions of these models typically make strong assumptions that render them ill suited for monetary policy analysis we propose a new framework based on explicit micro foundations within which macro policy can be studied the framework is analytically tractable and easily quantifiable we calibrate the model to standard observations and use it to measure the cost of inflation we find that going from 10 percent to 0 percent inflation is worth between 3 and 5 percent of consumption much higher than previous estimates

inflation and central bank independence conventional wisdom redux until recently there existed a broad consensus that an important institution for combating inflation is a central bank insulated from political influence this conventional wisdom has been challenged by among others campillo and miron 1997 who present evidence purporting to show that if an inflation regression equation is expanded to include not only their proxy for central bank independence cbi but other regressors as well then the negative correlation between inflation and cbi vanishes the present paper argues that allegations of the demise of this nexus should not be accepted uncritically this paper which reports the results of an analysis of covariance structures finds a strong negative relationship between inflation and cbi

financial liberalization and economic growth a meta analysis this study provides a systematic analysis of the empirical literature on the relationship between financial liberalization and economic growth by conducting a meta analysis based on 441 t statistics reported in 60 empirical studies we focus on explaining the heterogeneity of results in our sample in terms of study data and method specific characteristics although our findings indicate that on average there is a positive effect of financial liberalization on growth the significance of this effect is only weak moreover we find that most of the variables that may help explain the heterogeneity of results are insignificant there are two exceptions first studies carried out based on data from the 1970s on average find a statistically less significant relationship between financial liberalization policies and growth i e they report lower t statistics as compared to studies using data from the 1980s second studies controlling for the level of development of the financial system report lower t statistics for the relationship between liberalization and growth

money is memory abstract this paper examines the sets of feasible allocations in a large class of economic environments in which commitment is impossible following myerson 8 the standard definition of feasibility is adapted to take account of the lack of commitment the environments feature either memory or money memory is defined as knowledge on the part of an agent of the full histories of all agents with whom he has had direct or indirect contact in the past money is defined as an object that does not enter utility or production functions and is available in fixed supply the main proposition is that any allocation that is feasible in an environment with money is also feasible in the same environment with memory depending on the environment the converse may or may not be true hence from a technological point of view money is equivalent to a primitive form of memory journal of economic literature classification numbers e40 c73 d82

on the impossibility of central bank independence four decades of time and intellectual inconsistency the intellectual justification for modern central banking time inconsistency celebrated its fortieth anniversary in 2017 alongside the cambridge journal of economics however the key progeny of the time inconsistency literature central bank independence has fundamental flaws that have been thus far neglected in mainstream research in the first instance the argument for independence relies on a utilitarian rather than institutional analysis one that neglects the genesis of central banks and their relation to other institutions within a country second central bank independence neglects the complex interdependencies of the global monetary and financial system applying an institutional lens to the concept of central bank independence i conclude that independence fails under the reality of globalization as much as it does in a domestic context with central banks reliant on all manner of political institutions they are never really independent operationally or in terms of policy

a procurement decision support system in business volume discount environments emergence of a new discount pricing schedule called business volume discount becomes a major obstacle for procurement managers in finding the best purchasing strategy in the context of business volume discount a supplier offers discounts on total dollar amount of sales volume not on the quantity or variety of the products purchased from the supplier this paper describes a procurement decision support system pdss that has been successfully implemented to improve the purchasing activities of regional bell telephone companies in most purchasing operations a flexible procurement plan is considered a necessity because of the uncertainties associated with product demand and procurement budget pdss provides this flexibility by combining two different purchasing strategies purchasing on an annual commitment basis and on an as ordered basis although the development of the system is motivated by a particular application procurement of transmission plug in in one of the regional telephone companies the system is being used for a variety of procurement decisions involving business volume discount in the telecommunications industry the results of the implementation indicate that cost savings of up to 15 are achieved pdss use is not limited to the companies in the telecommunications industry the pdss model is applicable to any organization having a centralized procurement operation with business volume discount

economic rents under supply controls with marketable quota we analyze the distribution of economic rent between owners and renters of marketable production quotas and examine how this distribution changes with increases in marginal costs while quota owners unambiguously lose because of a marginal cost increase quota renters may gain depending on whether the marginal cost shift is divergent parallel or convergent using output and input prices county production quotas and quota rental rate data we estimate a marginal cost function for north carolina flue cured tobacco to demonstrate how wage increases affect owners and renters welfare

political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries institutions and policies vittorio grilli donato masciandaro and guido tabellini why do countries as similar as the industrialized oecd countries go through such different experience in terms of public deficits and debts or in terms of inflation the answer cannot come from macroeconomic policy responses to different disturbances nor from the principles of optimal taxation but rather from politics this article focuses on the role that particular institutions exert in providing constraints and incentives which shape the actions of policymakers the electoral process and political traditions affect the ability of governments to deal with deficits and mounting debts what seems to matter most it is found is the effect of the durability of governments governments with short horizons act myopically and never quite tackle the hard choices such governments typically exist in countries with an electoral system favouring many small political parties central bank independence promotes low inflation with no apparent costs in terms of real economic performance irrespective of the political institutions in fact there is no link between monetary and fiscal discipline these findings carry powerful implications for countries facing high indebtedness or stubborn inflation but also for the construction of the european economic and monetary union

why inflation rose and fell policy makers beliefs and u s postwar stabilization policy this paper provides an explanation for the run up of u s inflation in the 1960s and 1970s and the sharp disinflation in the early 1980s which standard macroeconomic models have difficulties in addressing i present a model in which rational policymakers learn about the behavior of the economy in real time and set stabilization policy optimally conditional on their current beliefs the steady state associated with the self confirming equilibrium of the model is characterized by low inflation however prolonged episodes of high inflation ending with rapid disinflations can occur when policymakers underestimate both the natural rate of unemployment and the persistence of inflation in the phillips curve i estimate the model using likelihood methods the estimation results show that the model accounts remarkably well for the evolution of policymakers beliefs stabilization policy and the postwar behavior of inflation and unemployment in the united states

do central bank law reforms affect the term in office of central bank governors in this paper we confirm the hypothesis that central bank independence reforms reduce the likelihood that a central bank governor will be replaced however the strength of this effect depends on the rule of law and the degree of political polarization c 2009 elsevier b v all rights reserved

central bank independence centralization of wage bargaining inflation and unemployment theory and some evidence abstract this paper proposes a conceptual framework to investigate the effects of central bank independence of the degree of centralization of wage bargaining and of the interaction between those institutional variables on real wages unemployment and inflation in a framework in which unions are averse to inflation this aversion moderates union s wage demands as they attempt to induce the central bank to inflate at a lower rate an increase in the degree of centralization of wage bargaining a decrease in the number of unions triggers two opposite effects on real wages unemployment and inflation it reduces the substitutability between the labor of different unions and therefore the degree of effective competition between them this reduced competition effect raises real wages unemployment and inflation but the decrease in the number of unions also strengthens the moderating effect of inflationary fears on the real wage demands of each union this strategic effect lowers real wages unemployment and inflation for sufficiently inflation averse unions the interaction between those two effects produces a calmfors driffill type relation between real wages and centralization the paper analyzes the effects of central bank independence on the position and the shape of this relation as well as on inflation and unemployment the paper features two mechanisms one of which is novel through which monetary institutions have real effects the model implies that if there is a single union social welfare is maximized when the central bank attaches a zero weight to inflation but when the number of unions is larger than one this result is no longer true in general empirical evaluation of some of the theoretical implications using data from 19 developed economies is for the most part supportive of those implications

distortionary taxes and public investment when government promises are not enforceable abstract we characterize the optimal financing of productive public capital and compute the welfare loss from being unable to commit to the ramsey policy because this calculation ultimately relies on numerical approximations we contrast alternative approaches while perturbation and linear quadratic methods deliver accurate steady states the latter can yield misleading policy implications during transitions we find that moving from a regime with commitment to one with discretion implies only a small welfare loss although markov perfect consumption falls noticeably short of its ramsey counterpart in steady state consumption under discretion is higher in the short run which largely offsets this long run loss

central bank independence economic freedom and inflation rates william a luksetich measures of central bank independence combine many attributes that may or may not affect inflation central bank attributes are chosen as a result of political calculations over the distribution of resources between competing interest groups simultaneity bias results from regressions of central bank independence or of economic and political freedom on inflation or growth our estimates demonstrate the connections between economic and political freedom and central bank attributes that lead to inflation countries showing high degrees of economic freedom adopt structures that lead to lower inflation those that show high degrees of political freedom do not adopt inflation reducing institutional structures jel e0 e5 i introduction the relationship between inflation rates and central bank independence from political control has been the subject of a number of recent studies generally these studies provide evidence that greater central bank cb independence is associated with lower inflation rates banaian et al 1983 1995 1997 burdekin and willett 1991 masciandaro and spinelli 1993 alesina and summers 1993 this relationship appears to be weaker when developing countries are included in the analysis cukierman 1992 all of these draw rather strong conclusions about the importance of cb independence as a force constraining the political system from using the monetary system to achieve political goals that are likely to be hostile to price stability supporting evidence is not strong however and the indices used to measure cb independence are far from perfect moreover even if the cb independence measures were accurate they may simply be proxies for political and economic freedoms that are the more important checks on political manipulations of the economic system others question the evidence and draw different conclusions lohmann 1994 1997 and posen 1993 1995 1997 argue that the correlation between inflation and central bank independence is spurious lohmann argues that the federalist nature of the german government and its frequent use of coalitions in forming governments limit the number of threats to bundesbank independence posen 1995 finds that political support for independence comes from the financial sector if they effectively lobby for price stability an independent central bank tends to accompany that lobbying miller 1998 provides a framework for understanding the behavior of various interest groups in controlling the rate at which governments inflate their currencies cukierman s 1992 gb independence indices have been widely used in empirical studies to assess the effects of cb independence on inflation rates 1 the term of office of the head of a cb which we will call the central banker is one measure of bank independence he assigns a ranking of 1 if the term of office too is greater than eight years 0 75 if the too is great than or equal to six years and less than or equal to eight years 0 50 if the too is equal to five years 0 25 if it equals four years and 0 if it is less than four years he does this for numerous measure of bank independence since the publication of cukierman s index nearly all the aforementioned researchers have either used these individual rankings or a weighted average of these rankings in their efforts to determine the importance of cb independence on inflation rates in this article we extend the research in this area in three ways first the use of a multipoint ranking of central bank attributes imposes restrictions on the marginal impact of changing structures or attributes of the cb law that have no a priori basis moreover the weights within the aggregate cukierman index are quite arbitrary and do not hold up under any reasonable degree of scrutiny see banaian et al 1998 hereafter referred to as bbw constructing dummy variables for each of the classifications would be more appropriate than using the classification scheme cukierman devised as a continuous variable