occupational choice and the process of development this paper models economic development as a process of institutional transformation by focusing on the interplay between agents occupational decisions and the distribution of wealth because of capital market imperfections poor agents choose working for a wage over self employment and wealthy agents become entrepreneurs who monitor workers only with sufficient inequality however will there be employment contracts otherwise there is either subsistence or self employment thus in static equilibrium the occupational structure depends on distribution since the latter is itself endogenous we demonstrate the robustness of this result by extending the model dynamically and studying examples in which initial wealth distributions have long run effects in one case the economy develops either widespread cottage industry self employment or factory production employment contracts depending on the initial distribution in the other example it develops into prosperity or stagnation

getting ahead of the joneses when equality increases conspicuous consumption among bottom tier consumers it is widely believed that increasing the equality of material possessions or income in a social group should lead people at the bottom of the distribution to consume less and save more however this prediction and its causal mechanism have never been studied experimentally five studies show that greater equality increases the satisfaction of those in the lowest tier of the distribution because it reduces the possession gap between what they have and what others have however greater equality also increases the position gains derived from status enhancing consumption since it allows low tier consumers to get ahead of the higher proportion of consumers clustered in the middle tiers as a result greater equality reduces consumption when consumers focus on the narrower possession gap but it increases consumption when they focus on the greater position gains i e when consumption is conspicuous social competition goals are primed and the environment is competitive

status in markets this project tests for the effect of social status in a laboratory experimental market we consider a special box design market in which a vertical overlap in supply and demand ensure that there are multiple equilibrium prices we manipulate the relative social status of our subjects by awarding high status to a subset of the group based on one of two procedures in the first a subject s score on a trivia quiz determines his or her status in another subjects are assigned randomly to a higher status or lower status group in both treatments we find that average prices are higher in markets where higher status sellers face lowerstatus buyers and lower when buyers have higher status than sellers across all sessions the higher status side of the market captures a greater share of the surplus earning significantly more than their lower status counterparts

explaining fashion cycles imitators chasing innovators in product space abstract this paper considers the problem of a fashion trend setter confronting an imitator who can produce the same product at lower cost a one dimensional product space is considered which is an abstraction of the key attribute of some consumer good three broad strategies can be optimal for the fashion leader 1 never innovate which milk profits from the initially advantageous position but ultimately concede the market without a fight 2 innovate once but only once which just temporarily defers conceding the market 3 cycle infinitely around product space never letting the imitator catch up and capture the market sometimes the cycles start immediately sometimes the innovator should wait for a time before beginning the cycles the optimal solution exhibits strong state dependency with so called skiba curves separating regions in state space where various of these strategies are optimal there are even instances of intersecting skiba curves in most cases analytical expressions can be stated that characterize these skiba curves

investment in real assets and information acquisition the oce preferences case abstract an agent optimizes over real investment and investment in information acquisition while maximizing a two period utility that captures his ordinal certainty equivalent oce preferences optimal investment is characterized and the impact of risk and time preferences on it is investigated

military spending and stochastic growth abstract this study examines capital accumulation military spending arms accumulation and output growth in a stochastic endogenous growth model the analysis shows that higher lower growth in foreign military spending leads to faster slower economic growth in the home country if the home country s intertemporal substitution elasticity in consumption is smaller larger but more volatility in foreign military spending can lead to higher economic growth in the home country when its intertemporal substitution elasticity is large in addition shocks to output production may stimulate economic growth

street crime and street culture a model shows how reputation concerns can support widespread street crime a street culture where the direct incentives for such behavior are weak there are social benefits to street reputations but those benefits are dominated when reputation concerns draw into crime those who obtain no direct gain from it the model matches facts about violent crime that a standard model cannot easily explain including low monetary returns disproportionate victimization of the young and poor and high variance in rates across small distances the model generates novel implications for policy and social science including a negative effect of social capital

social culture and economic performance the connection between obtaining higher paying jobs and undertaking some seemingly irrelevant activity is interpreted as social culture in the context of a society trying to adopt a new technology i show that by allowing the firms to give preferential treatment to workers based on some cultural activity the society can partially overcome an informational free riding problem therefore social culture may affect the economic performance by altering the effective production technology of the economy jel p17 z1 what is social culture what is the role of social culture in economic performance in a provocative article kenneth arrow 1971 argued that norms of social behavior including ethical and moral codes are reactions of society to compensate for market failure somewhat surprisingly this idea of the role of social culture has not been further pursued in the literature in this paper i take arrow s viewpoint seriously and construct a simple model to examine the possibility that social culture may alleviate market failure i consider a society that is deciding whether to adopt a new technology three important assumptions are made about the economy first adoption decisions are made by entrepreneurs or firms but the operators of the new technology are workers second the new technology can be successfully operated only when the worker has invested in some imperfectly observable requisite skills and third it is costly for the workers

money and rank in the labor market abstract we analyze the gains losses in wage and in rank position for workers switching firm voluntary movers enjoy a wage premium relative to stayers but that premium declines with rank inside the new firm indicating that movers are trading off money and rank

social norms and moral hazard the probability of income loss depends on talent and effort effort has positive externalities and therefore individuals are awarded status in proportion to their perceived diligence the social no

macroeconomic implications of conspicuous consumption a sombartian dynamic model this chapter presents a dynamic general equilibrium model in which consumers have status preference i investigate the manner in which capital accumulation is impeded by conspicuous consumption a la corneo and jeanne j public econ 66 55 71 1997a following the literature social norms are given as either bandwagon type or snob type i then show that when the economy is characterized by a bandwagon type social norm capital accumulation exhibits interesting patterns those patterns include for example an oscillating convergence path the rise of the economy feeds its decay through conspicuous consumption and that decay suppresses conspicuous consumption and engenders prosperity as predicted by sombart liebe luxus und kapitalismus reprinted 1967 deutscher taschenbuch verlag munchen 1912

optimal income tax in the presence of status effects abstract the existence of distortions from individuals competing to attain social status by using consumption signals justifies some measure of income tax as a counter acting distortion the question posed here is whether it also constitutes a reason for a more progressive income tax schedule the answer is found to be broadly negative if progressiveness is interpreted as a more convex tax schedule unless the rich are more concerned with status seeking than the poor on the other hand status seeking makes the optimal tax schedule steeper so that redistribution is increased essentially the analysis of status seeking based on a signaling approach confirms and strengthens the existing view of an optimal tax schedule and can be incorporated into the diamond american economic review 88 1998 83 95 approach

income distribution and macroeconomics this paper analyzes the role of wealth distribution in macroeconomics through investment in human capital it is shown that in the presence of credit markets imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital the initial distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and investment both in the short and in the long run as there are multiple steady states this paper therefore provides an additional explanation for the persistent differences in per capita output across countries furthermore the paper shows that cross country differences in macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate shocks can be attributed among other factors to differences in wealth and income distribution across countries

high school graduation performance and wages using data from the panel study of income dynamics and a proprietary sample of semiskilled production workers this paper investigates the reasons for the discontinuous increase in wages associated with graduation from high school i find a discontinuous decrease in workers propensities to quit or be absent however i do not find that high school graduates have a comparative advantage in production jobs requiring more training nor in either sample is there a discontinuous increase in required training associated with the jobs held by high school graduates the wage premium associated with graduation from high school appears to be procyclical falling during slumps periods in which employers are likely to be hoarding labor and in which quits and absences are least important to firms there is also some evidence suggesting that prior quits have a larger effect on the wages of high school graduates than on the wages of high school dropouts

pecuniary emulation inequality and growth abstract we study a two class growth model in which agents care about both consumption and the social perception of their wealth rank the latter determines the social status enjoyed by agents social perceptions are based upon noisy signals of wealth and in equilibrium there is incomplete separation of classes the steady growth rate of the economy increases with the full information status differential between classes and contrary to the growth model without status it is affected by the initial level of wealth inequality both too much equality and too much inequality are detrimental to economic growth

social status and economic performance a survey abstract this survey combines ideas and results from sociology and economics recognizing that economic decisions are often shaped by social concerns and influences based on the sociological literature we define social status and describe its measurement we then describe the role of social status in economic analysis of saving and consumption wages and economic growth we review recent work on status determination in equilibrium including evolutionary models we conclude with some remarks on the need for further interaction between sociology and economics

the effectiveness of the public support policies for the european industry financing as a contribution to sustainable development in recent years the debate about the role of the public institutions in the fields of corporate social responsibility and sustainable development has gained momentum nevertheless the ambiguity of the latter concepts makes it difficult both to measure them and to estimate the impact that the different public initiatives may have on them in this sense the present research has the aim to design a fuzzy logic based methodology applied to the evaluation of the above mentioned processes in relation to the state aid policies for the european industry regarding the study contour the european union state aids seems not to have introduced important changes leading to socially responsible results and therefore favourable for the sustainable development generated by the european manufacturing industry

interdependent preferences and the competitive wage structure this article shows by example that when workers care about relative income and are free to choose their coworkers the equilibrium distribution of wages within firms must be less dispersed than the corresponding distribution of marginal products an implicit market for within firm status is shown to produce welfare gains by sorting workers among firms in accordance with how much they are willing to pay for high rank the resulting equilibrium pareto dominates allocations in which each worker is paid his marginal product

labor market advantages of organizational status a study of lateral partner hiring by large u s law firms prior research demonstrates product market advantages of organizational status but largely neglects factor market advantages we propose that status is advantageous in labor markets because individuals generally consider employer status a nonpecuniary employment benefit dyadic analyses of lateral partner hiring by large u s law firms demonstrate two status based advantages in employee hiring and retention first high status firms are more likely than low status ones to hire an employee from a more profitable competitor second high status firms are most likely to lose an employee to a lower status competitor when the competitor is atypically more profitable we discuss implications of these findings for individual and organizational status attainment and for the stability of industry status hierarchies

can africa s saving collapse be reversed private saving in sub saharan africa declined from more than 11 percent of disposable income in the 1970s to less than 8 percent in the 1980s and only partially recovered to less than 9 percent in the 1990s this article analyzes the determinants of private saving in sub saharan africa seeking to explain the region s dismal performance and identify policies that could help to reverse the region s decline in saving the analysis shows that in sub saharan africa causality runs from growth to investment and perhaps to private saving whereas a rise m the saving rate granger causes an increase in investment the empirical analysis of private saving in sub saharan africa and other regions over 1970 95 suggests that private saving in africa can be explained by standard behavioral models according to these models private saving in africa lags behind that in other regions most notably the high performing asian economies because of the region s lower per capita income high young age dependency ratio and high dependence on aid the combined effects of these factors substantially outweigh africa s advantage from its lower public saving and higher government consumption finally analysis of the experiences of kenya zimbabwe and botswana provides further insight into the saving process in sub saharan africa

conspicuous consumption and race evidence from south africa abstract a century ago thorstein veblen introduced socially contingent consumption into the economic literature this paper complements the scarce empirical literature by testing his conjecture on south african household data and finds that black and coloured households spend relatively more on visible consumption than comparable white households following the approach of charles et al 2009 this paper explores whether the differences in visible expenditures can be explained with a signaling model of status seeking moreover it is assessed to which extent positional concerns motivate conspicuous consumption although the socially contingent share in visible consumption increases with income different incentives to consume conspicuously seem to explain that at every level of income black households spend relatively more on visible consumption than comparable white households in contrast to the findings of charles et al 2009 where differential spending on conspicuous consumption can be found also within each group separately the model s core hypothesis fails to hold within the group of white south africans

social status education and growth this paper investigates the implications of social rewards on the allocation of talent in society and consequently on the process of economic growth we consider two sources of heterogeneity among workers nonwage income and innate ability a greater emphasis on status may induce the wrong individuals that is those with low ability and high wealth to acquire schooling causing workers with high ability and low wealth to leave the growth enhancing industries this crowding out effect taken alone discourages growth growth may be enhanced by a more egalitarian distribution of wealth which reduces the demand for status

a note on demand for information the oce preferences case abstract this paper considers the optimal decisions of an investor with ordinal certainty equivalent preferences we prove that if risk preferences are of the constant absolute risk aversion type optimal demand for the risky asset and information are independent of time preferences

choosing the right pond social approval and occupational choice we model the endogenous emergence of social perceptions about occupations and their impact on occupational choice in particular an individual s social approval increases with his community s perception of his skill in his chosen career these perceptions vary across communities because individuals better assess the skill of those in occupations similar to their own such imperfect assessment can distort choices away from comparative advantage when skill distributions differ across occupations and or correlate positively the community perceives one occupation more favorably this favored sector experiences overcrowding but misallocation occurs across both sectors furthermore a positive skill correlation can produce multiple steady states

why do firms train theory and evidence this paper offers a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for the general training they receive the superior information of the current employer regarding its employees abilities relative to other firms creates ex post monopsony power and encourages this employer to provide and pay for training even if these skills are general the model can lead to multiple equlibria in one equilibrium quits are endogenously high and as a result employers have limited monopsony power and provide little training while in another equilibrium quits are low and training is high using microdata on german apprentices we show that the predictions of our model receive some support from the data

market transparency and market structure the livestock mandatory reporting act of 1999 the premise of the livestock mandatory reporting act of 1999 is that enhanced transparency promotes competition this article provides a theoretical study of the consequences of such transparency for the structure conduct and performance of the livestock industry i conclude that the usefulness of the act to the livestock industry may not be in the value of reported information to feeders as the supporters of the act claim rather by forcing packers to pool information at negligible marginal cost the act may foster more competitive conduct in the procurement of livestock copyright 2003 oxford university press

social status culture and economic performance in analysing the differences in productive capacity among economies it is usual to concentrate on the physical aspects of the population the different attributes of capital including human capital and on the available production technologies societies also differ in culture in ways which are relevant for economic performance the sociological literature recognises that different occupations have different social status and that workers benefit not only from the wage they receive but also from being associated with a particular occupation cultural differences among societies may translate into different status of occupations and can therefore affect the choice of education and occupation and consequently the equilibrium level of output and wages conversely the economic choices of individuals influence the social status of occupations in particular it is well established by sociological research that the social status of an occupation is influenced by economic attributes such as the average wage and the average level of education in the occupation a major objective of our work is to illustrate that sociological and economic approaches can be combined within a unified framework this is in contrast to some social scientists who view the two approaches as competing with each other phelpsbrown i 977 ch 4 in this paper we construct a simple general equilibrium model in which both wages and status are determined endogenously we show that changes in the demand for status triggered by changes in preferences or in income distribution influence the wage structure the level of aggregate output and economic welfare the link between status and aggregate output is created by the fact that differences in occupational status imply occupational wage differences among workers of the same skill the larger is the demand for status the larger is the wage gap and the lower is aggregate output our discussion of status is closely related to the economic analysis of discrimination against ethnic or racial groups becker i 97 i arrow i 973

on limiting the market for status signals abstract in many societies individuals care how others view them in their efforts to impress such individuals engage in consumption signals which attempt to establish higher levels of status than their true status type this leads to an inefficiency which offers the possibility of a pareto improving tax policy the impacts of tax policy and benefits on the signalling equilibrium are considered

pricing of conspicuous goods a competitive analysis of social effects abstract social needs play an important role in the purchase of conspicuous goods in this article the authors extend traditional economic models to accommodate social needs such as desire for uniqueness and conformism and examine their implications for pricing conspicuous goods first in the context of a duopoly the authors identify the conditions under which the desire for uniqueness can increase demand among some consumers as the price of a product increases second the authors show that though the desire for uniqueness leads to higher prices and firm profits a desire for conformity leads to lower prices and profits third the authors find that consumers purchase high quality products not because of their desire for uniqueness but despite it finally marketers of conspicuous goods may find it beneficial not to emphasize the functional differences among their products when the need for uniqueness is high in a laboratory test the authors find support for the claim that demand for a product amo

design innovation and fashion cycles a model of fashion cycles is developed in which designs are used as a signaling device in a dating game a monopolist periodically creates a new design over time the price of the design falls as it spreads across the population once sufficiently many consumers own the design it is profitable to create a new design and thereby render the old design obsolete this paper gives conditions under which all consumers would be better off by banning the use of fashion competition among designers may lead to less frequent changes in fashion and to higher prices than monopoly copyright 1995 by american economic association

attitudes and allocations status cognitive dissonance and the manipulation of attitudes abstract economic studies of social status have typically focused on individuals engaging in relative comparisons based on certain characteristics e g consumption wealth without considering why these characteristics are deemed status worthy in this paper individuals choose a status earning characteristic in order to reduce mental discomfort dissonance as a result those individuals with the highest marginal utility from income are often the first to misconstrue or abandon these incentives in favor of alternate forms of seeking status the model provides an explanation for endogenous class formation and highlights the role of redistributive taxation in manipulating individuals attitudes towards status

money social status and capital accumulation in a cash in advance model this paper presents an infinite horizon model of optimal capital ac cumulation with the social status concern and the cash in advance constraint when the cash in advance constraint applies to both consumption and investment money is not supemeutral if only consumption is subject to the cash in advance constraint inflation increases capital accumulation

saving in the world abstract this paper presents new evidence on the behavior of saving in the world by extending previous empirical research in several dimensions after extensively surveying the relevant theoretical and empirical literature the paper reports estimates of saving determinants relying on the newly constructed and largest available database covering 165 countries over 1981 2012 the empirical specification includes determinants not considered in the literature explores differences in saving behavior nesting the 2008 10 crisis period and four different country groups searches for commonalities across key saving aggregates national private household and corporate saving rates and is subject to a robustness analysis based on different estimation techniques the results confirm in part existing research but also shed light on some ambiguous or contradictory findings and highlight the role of neglected determinants compared to the literature we find a larger number of significant determinants changes across periods and country groups and similarities across different saving aggregates

on the cultural transmission of preferences for social status abstract we study the formation of preferences for social status as the result of intergenerational transmission of cultural traits we characterize the behavior of parents with preferences for status in terms of socialization of their children to this particular cultural trait we show that degenerate distributions of the population whereby agents have either all status preferences or all non status preferences are dynamically unstable moreover under some conditions there exists a unique stationary distribution which is non degenerate in which both status and non status preferences co exist in the population and this distribution is locally stable finally we study the dependence of the stable stationary distribution of status preferences on institutional technological and policy parameters which affect agents economic conditions

contests for ranks experimental evidence we use experiments to analyze multiple dimensions of the relationship between rank incentives and individual performance in our experiment i rank is defined as subjects relative position in their group based on their performance in a real effort task and ii subjects earnings are independent of their performance we find that any rank incentive improves mean performance than no rank incentive and this result is independent of the group size in the large group the mean performance increases strictly in all except at the highest rank incentive but in the small group the mean performance increases weakly in rank incentives finally the mean performance is significantly higher in the large than in the small group because of a higher prestige effect in additional treatments in which we do not reveal the identity of the statusprize winners we find that average performance is identical to that in the baseline treatment without any status prizes the last result signifies the important role that public revelation plays to enhance the strength of status the results are important for managerial practices

social norms savings behavior and growth we argue that many goods and decisions are not allocated or made through markets we interpret an agent s status as a ranking device that determines how well he or she fares in the nonmarket sector the existence of a nonmarket sector can endogenously generate a concern for relative position in for example the income distribution so that higher income implies higher status moreover it can naturally yield multiple equilibria it is thus possible to explain differences in growth rates across countries without recourse to differences in underlying preferences technologies or endowments different social organizations lead to different reduced form preferences which lead to different growth rates

a theory of migration as a response to occupational stigma a theory is developed of labor migration that is prompted by a desire to avoid social humiliation in a general equilibrium framework it is shown that as long as migration can reduce humiliation sufficiently migration will occur even between two identical economies migration increases the number of individuals who choose to perform degrading jobs and consequently migration lowers the price of the good produced in the sector that is associated with low social status moreover the greater an individual s aversion to performing degrading jobs the more likely it is that he will experience a welfare gain when the economy opens up

keeping one step ahead of the joneses status the distribution of wealth and long run growth assuming that the utility of each agent depends on its relative wealth position in the society this chapter constructs an endogenous growth model it is shown that even if the subjective discount rates differ across agents there exists a unique balanced growth equilibrium in which each agent owns a positive share of the world wealth it is also shown that if the agents are identical then an increase in savings incentives always raises the long run growth rate but if they are heterogeneous then an increase in savings incentives may lower the long run growth rate

conspicuous conservation the prius halo and willingness to pay for environmental bona fides abstract this paper develops a theory of conspicuous conservation a phenomenon related to conspicuous consumption in which individuals seek status through displays of austerity amid growing concern about environmental protection we identify a statistically and economically significant conspicuous conservation effect in vehicle purchase decisions and estimate a mean willingness to pay for the green signal provided by the distinctively designed toyota prius in the range of 430 4200 depending upon the owner s location results are related to the growing literature on green markets and suggest that policy should target less conspicuous conservation investments that will be under provided relative to those that confer a status benefit

dynamic analysis in the viner model of mercantilism abstract this paper models the central theme of mercantilism in jacob viner s interpretation power vs plenty in a framework of modern theory of international finance it is shown that in the viner model of mercantilism a nation with strong mercantilist sentiment ends up with large foreign asset accumulation and high consumption in the long run an import tariff leads to more foreign asset holding and more total consumption furthermore in the viner model the harberger laursen metzler effect exists unambiguously a permanent terms of trade deterioration causes a current account deficit in the short run

institutions transaction costs and economic growth this essay develops a theoretical framework which explores the historical obstacles to economic growth these obstacles are examined in the context of the political economic institutional framework of economies in history and consequent transaction costs that determine economic performance and growth the essay concludes with specific suggestions for the study of economic growth

signalling inequality and the social structure this paper proposes a theory of endogenous transmission of social status through signalling in the labour market a signalling game is analysed in which education acting as a signalling good determines one s position in society the economy s degree of inequality is shown to be a determinant of whether a society is aristocratic where high income is the source of social standing or meritocratic bestowing status on high ability each social structure shows a different balance between production efficiency and social factors such as equality or mobility

conspicuous consumption snobbism and conformism abstract we develop a model in which consumers purchase a conspicuous good in order to signal high income and thereby achieve greater social status in equilibrium the signalling value of conspicuous consumption depends in an identifiable way on the number of consumers and consumer behaviour is characterized by either snobbism or conformism the market demand curve for the conspicuous good may exhibit a positive slope if consumers are conformist we derive some unconventional policy implications concerning the taxation of luxuries and the voluntary provision of public goods

do government subsidies stimulate training expenditure microeconometric evidence from plant level data this paper examines whether financial assistance provided by government induces firms to spend more of their own funds on training expenditures using plant level data for the republic of ireland we pay particular attention to the potential problems in such an evaluation study namely selectivity and endogeneity by first identifying a valid counterfactual for grant receiving plants via a matching estimator and then employing a difference in differences technique on this matched sample our results show that there are differences in causal effects between domestic and foreign owned plants for the former we find clear evidence that grant receipt stimulates private expenditure whereas there are no statistically significant effects for foreign owned plants based in ireland

status the distribution of wealth private and social attitudes to risk this paper supposes an individual cares about his her own wealth not only directly but also via the relative standing that this wealth induces the implications for risk taking are investigated in particular such a model provides a natural explanation of the concave convex concave utility described by friedman and savage however there are a number of key differences between the present model and any model based on own wealth alone for example an equilibrium wealth distribution here may have a middle class further the status interaction involves an externality and an equilibrium wealth distribution may be pareto inefficient but also about the implied relative standing in the distribution of wealth has a long but checkered history an early exponent of such ideas was of course veblen 1899 it is indeed a notion which most economists reject albeit usually without explicit comment a notable and articulate exception however is frank 1985 for example see also the references frank cites on pp 33 34 it is however a notion with substantial intuitive appeal and it seems useful to ascertain its consequences before coming to a final judgement as to its merits the present paper is concerned with deriving the consequences of such valuation of status for risk taking what seems to be the sharpest possible model is adopted here this assumes that what is essentially ordinal rank in the wealth distribution enters von neumann morgenstern utility as an argument in addi tion to wealth itself thus higher wealth increases utility not only directly but also indirectly via higher status in the interests of both simplicity and drama it is typically assumed here that all individuals have identical utility functions which are concave in wealth but convex in status section 2 discusses how the model provides a natural explanation of the fundamental phenomenon addressed by friedman and savage 1948 that individuals may simultaneously purchase insurance and participate in lotteries although each individual here has a utility function which is concave in wealth itself utility can nevertheless be convex in wealth over some range when the indirect effect via status is included this effect is enhanced by the convexity of utility in status but will follow in any case if increasing wealth entails moving up in status much more rapidly than losing wealth entails moving down it is shown

veblen effects in a theory of conspicuous consumption the authors examine conditions under which veblen effects arise from the desire to achieve social status by signaling wealth through conspicuous consumption while veblen effects cannot ordinarily arise when preferences satisfy a single crossing property they may emerge when this property fails in that case budget brands are priced at marginal cost while luxury brands though not intrinsically superior are sold at higher prices to consumers seeking to advertise wealth luxury brands earn strictly positive profits under conditions that would with standard formulations of preferences yield marginal cost pricing the authors explore factors that induce veblen effects and they investigate policy implications copyright 1996 by american economic association

cognitive dissonance status and growth of the underclass we present a model of cognitive adaptation to examine the growth and behaviours of the underclass in the model individuals experiencing cognitive dissonance between status seeking and social recognition adapt their attitudes regarding what is deemed status worthy this yields the endogenous formation of an underclass in which non pecuniary social returns counteract the effect of traditional incentives i e wages in motivating behaviour by gaining insight into the process of psychological adaptation of those living in poverty the paper sheds light on economic policies that mitigate the disenfranchisement and hence the growth of the underclass

why do people care about social status abstract this paper shows that complementary interaction can induce people to care about social status because it serves as a signal of non observable abilities there is a unique separating equilibrium in which everyone cares about social status in this equilibrium a person s social status perfectly reveals his abilities and everyone matches with a person of like ability the analysis shows that people s instrumental concern for social status has important welfare and policy implications indeed peoples efforts to keep up with the joneses may be welfare enhancing

human capital theory and uk vocational training policy since the industrial training act of 1964 the uk government has adopted a variety of policies intended to redress a problem of under investment in vocational training in the 1960s and 1970s it attempted to regulate the training provided by firms through a levy scheme more recently subsidised training schemes have been the centrepiece of policy this paper examines the explanations for market failure in vocational training and explores the rationale for such policies under investment can arise from credit constraints and uncertainty facing trainees and from imperfect competition in the labour market which creates external benefits for firms both subsidies and regulation can be effective in dealing with these problems although it is argued that the training levy scheme as implemented in the uk and other countries should be viewed mainly as a mechanism for releasing credit constraints copyright 1999 by oxford university press

individual well being in a dynamic perspective this paper explores the determinants of individual well being as measured by self reported levels of satisfaction with income making full use of the panel data nature of the german socio economic panel we provide empirical evidence for well being depending on absolute and on relative levels of income in a dynamic framework this finding holds after controlling for other influential factors in a multivariate setting the main novelty of the paper is the consideration of dynamic aspects individual s own history as well as the relative income performance with respect to the others living in the society under analysis do play a major role in the assessment of well being