the impact of endowment framing on market prices an experimental analysis framing effects are well known in individual decision making using experimental markets we investigated whether similar effects could be found in a market environment two series of experiments showed that negative framing can give different market prices than a positively framed endowment we also found that volume may be affected by the framing of the endowment 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

peer effects and risk sharing in experimental asset markets abstract we investigate the effect of introducing information about peer portfolios in an experimental arrow debreu economy confirming the prediction of a general equilibrium model with inequality averse preferences we find that peer information leads to reduced variation in payoffs within peer groups information also improves risk sharing as the data suggests that experiencing earnings deviations from peers induces a shift to more balanced portfolios in a treatment where we highlight the highest earner we observe a reduction in risk sharing while highlighting the lowest earner has no effects compared to providing neutral information our results indicate that the presence of social information and its framing is an important determinant of equilibrium in financial markets

dynamic allocations for currency futures under switching regimes signals abstract over the last decades speculative investors in the fx market have profited in the well known currency carry trade strategy ct however during currencies or global financial crashes ct produces substantial losses in this work we present a methodology that enhances ct performance significantly for our final strategy constructed backtests show that the mean semivolatility ratio can be more than doubled with respect to benchmark ct to do the latter we first identify and classify ct returns according to their behavior in different regimes using a hidden markov model hmm the model helps to determine when to open and close positions depending whether the regime is favorable to ct or not finally we employ a mean semivariance allocation model to improve allocations when positions are opened

predictable behavior in financial markets some evidence in support of heiner s hypothesis recently ronald heiner 1983 has proposed a theory of predictable behavior which has its roots in what heiner labels a competence difficulty gap hereafter called a c d gap this gap is a measure of the spread between an economic agent s competence to make an optimizing decision and the difficulty of the decision problem heiner argues that as the c d gap widens the agent is increasingly likely to follow rule governed behavior and it is this rule governed behavior that produces observed regularities in economic behavior if there is no c d gap heiner argues that rule governed behavior would disappear and along with it the observed regularities instead unpredictable behavior characterized by constant perturbation would replace predictable behavior furthermore the dynamic properties of heiner s theory are characterized in his words by sudden switching behavior this switching behavior is described as a sudden reversal of previous behavior and a persistent movement in another direction or behavior of a different kind one of the casual or intuitive examples heiner offers for support of his theory is the switching between buying and selling strategies in financial markets resulting in sudden movement in stock prices p 582 this paper explores this idea and argues that there is more than intuitive support for heiner s speculation that in fact the behavior of daily price changes in financial markets conforms better to the prediction of heiner s theory than to standard efficient market theory predictions

the speculative efficiency hypothesis the hypothesis that forward prices are the best unbiased forecast of future spot prices is often presented in the economic and financial analysis of futures markets this paper considers the hypothesis independently of its implications for rational expectations or market efficiency and in order to stress this fact the term speculative efficiency is used to characterize the state envisaged under the hypothesis if a market is subject to efficient speculation the supply of speculative funds is infinitely elastic at the forward price that is equal to the expected future spot price the expected future spot price is a market price determined as the solution to the underlying rational expectations macroeconomic model although the paper is primarily concerned with testing this hypothesis in the foreign exchange market the methodology introduced in the paper is of general application to all futures markets this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

bubbles crashes and endogenous expectations in experimental spot asset markets1 spot asset trading is studied in an environment in which all investors receive the same dividend from a known probability distribution at the end of each of t 15 or 30 trading periods fourteen of twenty two experiments exhibit price bubbles followed by crashes relative to intrinsic dividend value when traders are experienced this reduces but does not eliminate the probability of a bubble the regression of changes in mean price on lagged excess bids number of bids minus the number of offers in the previous period p pt a f b 1 o l supports the hypothesis that a e d the one period expected value of the dividend and that f 0 where excess bids is a surrogate measure of excess demand arising from homegrown capital gains losses expectations thus when bt 1 o goes to zero we have convergence to rational expectations in the sense of fama 1970 that arbitrage becomes unprofitable the observed bubble phenomenon can also be interpreted as a form of temporary myopia tirole 1982 from which agents learn that capital gains expectations are only temporarily sustainable ultimately inducing common expectations or priors tirole 1982 four of twenty six experiments all using experienced subjects yield outcomes that appear to the chart s eye to converge early to rational expectations although even in these cases we get 0 and small price fluctuations of a few cents that invite scalping

papers in experimental economics on nonbinding price controls in a competitive market interest in the effect of nonbinding price controls on double auction markets stems from two primary considerations the double auction institution converges to a competitive allocation more rapidly and with fewer participating agents than any other institution with which it has been compared see smith et al one way to improve our understanding of this important property is to determine what conditions if any can interfere with or retard this convergence process nonbinding price controls represent a condition that may affect this convergence process hence if such effects can be documented they will provide a body of data that any future proposed model of the double auction process should be able to explain a second reason for studying the effect of nonbinding controls on the double auction is practical the organized commodity exchanges often set limits on price fluctuations during any single day when prices at any point during a day rise above qr fall below the closing prices of the preceding day by more than the amount of the limit no further trading for that day is permitted walter labys p 162 consequently commodity trading frequently occurs at prices near the level of nonbinding price floors or ceilings mark issac and charles plott report the results of twelve exploratory experiments in which various price control constraints are imposed on double auction markets their two principal conclusions can be summarized as follows 1 the hypothesis is rejected that nonbinding price controls that is price ceilings above or price floors below the competitive equilibrium ce will serve as a focal point or signalling price on which sellers and buyers will key their contracts 2 inconclusive evidence is presented in support of the hypothesis that nonbinding controls near the ce will bias prices below ce when there is a price ceiling and above ce when there is a price floor support for this second hypothesis is not conclusive because some experimental markets show a tendency to converge from below and others from above depending upon the relative bargaining strength of buyers as against sellers thus sampling variation among subjects can yield a group in which buyers sellers are able to make contracts at an average price below above ce for several periods of trading consequently in an experiment in which there is a price ceiling floor five cents above below ce and in which contract prices are observed to occur below above ce one cannot determine conclusively whether the observed effect was due to the nonbinding price control or to the bargaining characteristics of the market participants we report below an experimental design developed for the purpose of separating these confounding factors and allowing the effect of nonbinding controls to be isolated the results of sixteen experiments strongly support the hypothesis that markets with a nonbinding price ceiling floor near ce will converge from below above relative to any otherwise identifiable tendency to converge from below above an analysis of the effect of a nonbinding price ceiling floor on the distributions of bids and offers reveals the cause of this bias ceilings limit the bargaining strategies of sellers especially but also that of buyers while floors have the opposite effect thus in the absence of price controls double auction trading is characterized by a process in which sellers typically make concessions from offer prices well above ce while buyers most often concede from bid prices well below ce a price ceiling truncates seller offer prices at the ceiling requir university of arizona and indiana university respectively research support by the national science foundation is gratefully acknowledged

the multiple unit double auction the note outlines institutional features of an open outcry market that permit multiple unit or block trades the purpose of the note is to introduce the process as a tool to be used in economics experiments the detailed rules governing the multiple unit double auction muda are stated for the case where offers are tendered by voice as opposed to through a computer the results of markets that use the rules are reported as a demonstration that convergence to equilibrium price traditionally observed in experimental markets remains with the use of the muda process

uncertainty and partial adjustment in double auction markets abstract a model is presented of price determination in double auction markets the framework is contrasted with naive autoregressive models of price behavior implications of model choice are illustrated with the use of market experiments from several institutions

carry trade the gains of diversification market participants routinely take advantage of the failure of uncovered interest rate parity to speculate in currency markets perhaps the most widely used currency speculation strategy is the carry trade in this article we take the perspective of an individual currency trader and document the gains to diversifying the carry trade across different currencies we show that these gains are large diversification boosts the typical sharpe ratio by over 50

the carry trade and fundamentals nothing to fear but feer itself the carry trade is the investment strategy of going long in high yield target currencies and short in low yield funding currencies recently this nave trade has seen very high returns for long periods followed by large crash losses after large depreciations of the target currencies based on low sharpe ratios and negative skew these trades could appear unattractive even when diversied across many currencies but more sophisticated conditional trading strategies exhibit more favorable payos we apply novel within economics binary outcome classication tests to show that our directional trading forecasts are informa tive and out of sample loss function analysis to examine trading performance the critical conditioning variable we argue is the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate feer expected returns are lower all else equal when the target currency is overvalued like traders researchers should incorporate this information when evaluating trading strategies when we do so some questions are resolved negative skewness is purged and market volatility vix is uncorrelated with returns other puzzles remain the more sophisticated strategy has a very high sharpe ratio suggesting market ineciency

the emergence of chaos from classical economic growth this paper shows how fluctuations of an erratic and unstable nature can emerge from the classical deterministic economic growth process implications of the analysis would appear to be at least two first pronounced changes in the way an economy behaves need not cause us to reject our understanding of how it works second we need not seek in exogenous forces an explanation as to why behavioral patterns change and why it may be so difficult to anticipate future events from the profile of past experience

the formation of price forecasts in experimental markets this study utilizes laboratory experimental methods to evaluate the empirical validity of 1 muthian rational expectations assumptions 2 an adaptive expectations model and 3 an extrapolative expectations model over 5 00 price forecasts from 146 participants in twelve experimental double auction m arkets with a cash reward structure are analyzed the forecasting objective is t hemean price over a sequence of trading periods governed by stationary market parameters the price forecasts are found to be inconsistent with strict muthian rational expectations and the extrapolative modelis not supported by the data however the forecasts generally support the adaptive expectations model copyright 1987 by ohio state university press

tests of market outcomes with asymmetric valuations of gains and losses smaller gains fewer trades and less value abstract the pervasive finding that individuals value losses more than gains suggests that actual gains from trade and numbers of market exchanges may well be much smaller than would be the case if people s buying and selling prices were equivalent as normally assumed the results of two sets of costless market simulations using actual gain and loss valuations show that the actual gains from exchange and trade volumes are less than half of those expected with conventional assumptions and that completion of all pareto efficient exchanges fail by wide margins to shift entitlements to those willing to pay the most for them these findings suggest the valuation disparity has significant welfare implications and may be a major cause of market stickiness

threshold models of interpersonal effects in consumer demand abstract whether one buys may be determined in part by how many others have when the correlation is positive we refer to bandwagon effects and when negative reverse bandwagons we construct demand schedules in the presence of such effects and with simple assumptions about supply investigate the existence of and approach to equilibrium stable price quantity equilibria exist but for many plausible parameter values equilibria are asymptotically unstable and system trajectories consist of cycles that can move with slight parameter changes via successive bifurcations into what has been called chaotic dynamics essentially indistinguishable from random noise these conditions occur despite assumptions of erfect information profit maximizing firms and utility maximizing individuals

rational choice and erratic behaviour in this paper we show that rational choice in a stationary environment can lead to erratic behaviour when preferences depend on experience we mean by erratic behaviour choice sequences that do not converge to a long run stationary value or to any periodic pattern early investigations of the effects of experience on choice goes back to pareto see also benhabib 1979 some keynesian theories of the consumption function incorporate the effects of experience and habit formation on current levels of consumption duesenberry 1949 modigliani 1949 and brown 1952 a general model of experience dependent choice was described in day 1970 and investigated in day and kennedy 1971 while the specific issue of the existence of stable representable long run consumer demand when tastes vary endogenously has been treated by gorman 1967 pollak 1970 1976 weizsaicker 1971 mccarthy 1974 and hammond 1976 pollak gave conditions for the representability of long run choice when the equations of preference dependence are linear and utility additive hammond in a generalization of these findings provides conditions for stable representable long run choice when preferences are acyclic a condition which in essence assures convergence to a long run choice

exchange economies and loss exposure experiments exchange economies were created in which individuals faced losses if people are risk seeking in the losses as predicted by prospect theory then due to the nonconvexity the competitive equilibria are all on the boundaries of the edgeworth box the experimental results are that risk seeking behavior is observed in many people and appears in markets as predicted in addition market behavior is consistent with answers to hypothetical questionnaires contrary to prospect theory risk seeking seems to diminish with experience preferences in the market setting are not labile and risk seeking preferences are not simply a result of framing effects copyright 1997 by american economic association

the necessity of delaying economic adjustment abstract i give an explanation for why agents react with a delay to decision and expectation parameters by showing that imperfect agents must adjust very slowly relative to optimally adjusting agents if they begin reacting as soon as the latter agents would react the results follow from the hypothesis of imperfect choice alone irrespective of whether there are any information search transaction or other costs of adjusting decisions the results thereby provide a general reason for observing inertially lagged behavior and also agree with recent asset market experiments whose dynamics are governed by adaptive rather than rational expectations

predicting buyer seller pricing disparities numerous studies have shown that compensation demanded cd to give up a commodity often greatly exceeds willingness to pay wtp to obtain the same commodity even in incentive compatible experiments that penalize strategic misrepresentation observed cd wtp disparities are too large to be reconciled with traditional assumptions of economic rationality a prospect theory based behavioral framework for predicting cd and wtp is proposed which produces five distinct transaction encoding rules any one of which can in principle apply to a buyer or a seller according to this framework cd wtp gaps occur when buyers and sellers encode the prospective transaction differently and gaps can occur in multiple ways and vary in size depending on encoding the transaction encoding framework was tested in two experiments in experiment 1 model fits to subjects cd and wtp for lottery tickets were consistent with the hypothesis that buyers and sellers encode transaction problems differently moreover the quite large observed cd wtp gaps were explained fully by encoding when differences between buyers and sellers encoding processes were taken into account their estimated utility value and probability weighting functions did not differ the present framework and results show that the widely cited endowment effect is but one of several ways in which loss aversion can give rise to cd wtp gaps consistent with this broadened perspective experiment 2 demonstrated cd wtp gaps in the absence of an endowment effect and in the absence of rational economic causes the transaction encoding framework 1 provides a structured approach for predicting and testing the effects of a variety of task factors on pricing behavior and transaction outcomes and 2 reveals the useful property that in many cases the ratio cd wtp can be interpreted as a direct measure of the degree of loss aversion

origin of predictable behavior further modeling and applications economic theory is founded on the assumption that agents act as if they are able to maximize according to well behaved preferences regardless of how complex their decision problems might be consequently the theory has never investigated the consequences of a genuine gap between an agent s decision making competence and the difficulty of a decision problem called a c d gap in a recent paper 1983 hereafter called the origin paper i outlined a general theory for investigating the latter possibility a major theme was that recurrent pattern in behavior arises because of decision making uncertainty due to a c d gap so that uncertainty becomes the basic source of predictable behavior here i discuss certain theory topics that were only sketched in the origin paper and briefly suggest a few related applications to pursue these objectives i begin with a short restatement of the reliability condition introduced in the origin paper

conditioning carry trades less risk more return abstract prior studies show that extreme interest rate differentials irds and high foreign exchange rate fx volatility have substantial explanatory power for the validity of uip we show that these contemporaneous drivers also have predictive power by implementing a conditional currency carry trade ct strategy that excludes regimes for which uip is likely to hold conditioning high fx volatility only or on both fx volatility and extreme irds outperforms the base case unconditional ct strategy in virtually any of the settings analyzed conditioning on very large irds only shows mixed findings our strategy works best for smaller ct portfolios

experimental tests of the endowment effect abstract the endowment effect which predicts undertrading and a willingness to accept greater than willingness to pay is studied using responses that remove all reference to buying or selling and focuses only on choice tasks the results significantly lower the willingness to pay willingness to accept discrepancy but the latter is still significant a high efficiency open display uniform price auction is used to exchange mugs for money since mugs are randomly assigned to half of 2n subjects n 2 mugs are predicted to trade less than n 2 mugs trade on average but more than previously reported the phenomenon exists but is less prominent than reported previously

rationality of self and others in an economic system in this paper i want to disentangle some of the senses in which the hypothesis of rationality is used in economic theory in particular i want to stress that rationality is not a property of the individual alone although it is usually presented that way rather it gathers not only its force but also its very meaning from the social context in which it is embedded it is most plausible under very ideal conditions when these conditions cease to hold the rationality assumptions become strained and possibly even self contradictory they certainly imply an ability at information processing and calculation that is far beyond the feasible and that cannot well be justified as the result of learning and adaptation let me dismiss a point of view that is perhaps not always articulated but seems implicit in many writings it seems to be asserted that a theory of the economy must be based on rationality as a matter of principle otherwise there can be no theory this position has even been maintained by some who accept that economic behavior is not completely rational john stuart mill 1909 bk 2 ch 4 argued that custom not competition governs much of the economic world but he adds that the only possible theory is that standard economic doctrine makes assumptions of rationality that have very strong implications for the complexity of individuals decision processes the most complete assumptions of competitive general equilibrium theory require that all future and contingent prices exist and be known in fact of course not all these markets exist the incompleteness of markets has several side consequences for rationality for one thing each decision maker has to have a model that predicts the future spot prices this is an informational burden of an entirely different magnitude than simply optimizing at known prices it involves all the complexity of rational analysis of data and contradicts the much praised informational economy of the price system it is also the case that equilibria become much less well defined similar problems occur with imperfect competition this research was supported by the office of naval research grant onr n00014 79 c 0685 at the center for research in organizational efficiency institute for mathematical studies in the social sciences stanford university stanford california

risk premia carry trade dynamics and economic value of currency speculation in this paper we derive the dynamics and assess the economic value of currency speculation by formalizing the concept of a trader inaction range we show that exchange rate returns comprise a time varying risk premium and that uncovered interest parity uip holds in a speculative sense the often cited forward bias puzzle originates from the omission of the risk premium in standard uip tests consistent with its popularity among market professionals the carry trade strategy can be rationalized as it systematically collects risk premia and generates economic value when applied in multi currency portfolios

effects of ambiguity in market experiments prior studies have shown that individuals are averse to ambiguity in probability many decisions are however made in market settings where an individual s decision is influenced by decisions of others participating in the market in this paper we extend the previous research to evaluate the effect of ambiguity on individual decisions and the resulting market price in market settings we therefore examine an important issue whether ambiguity effects persist in the face of market incentives and feedback two different market organizations the sealed bid auction and the double oral auction were employed the subjects in the experiments were graduate business students and bank executives our results show that the individual bids and market prices for lotteries with ambiguous probabilities are consistently lower than the corresponding bids and market prices for equivalent lotteries with well defined probabilities the aversion to ambiguity therefore does not vanish in market settings our results provide insights into what a manager can expect in bidding situations where the object of the sale oil leases mineral rights involves ambiguity in probability due to for example lack of information or prior experience the results may also be useful in understanding some phenomena in insurance and equity markets

ergodic fluctuations in deterministic economic models abstract nonperiodic business fluctuations are shown to exist with positive measure generically and to behave like stationary stochastic processes in the standard dynamic macro model the implication is that so called chaotic fluctuations are probable for random initial conditions in a large class of recursive economies

information mirages in experimental asset markets one explanation for the apparent volatility of asset prices is that people overreact to trades that are uninformative creating self generated information mirages the authors test whether mirages occur in experimental asset markets there are insiders in only half the periods so traders cannot be sure if the trades of others reveal information the authors observed four clear mirages in forty seven periods without insiders mirages always occurred early in an experimental session in later periods traders learn whether there are insiders by observing nonprice information such as the speed of trading and mirages occurred only temporarily copyright 1991 by university of chicago press

evaluation periods and asset prices in a market experiment we test whether the frequency of feedback information about the performance of an investment portfolio and the flexibility with which the investor can change it influence her risk attitude in markets in line with the prediction of myopic loss aversion benartzi and thaler 1995 we find that more information and more flexibility result in less risk taking market prices of risky assets are significantly higher if feedback frequency and decision flexibility are reduced this result supports the findings from individual decision making and shows that markets do not eliminate such behavior

satiation and habit persistence or the dieter s dilemma abstract frequently individual consumption varies cyclically over time in order to model such behavior we have to generalize the intertemporal utility function so that it depends not only on current consumption but on total previous consumption and on the change in current consumption solving the resulting model requires a generalization of the euler lagrange equations

testing choquet expected utility many theories have been developed to model decision behavior under ambiguity in this paper we empirically investigate choquet expected utility which is based on nonadditive probabilities we first replicate ellsberg paradox behavior then we elicit nonadditive probabilities called capacities for individual decision makers those capacities did not have all properties theoretically required by ceu finally we found that ceu is not really superior to eu in predicting the participants decisions

a new meta analysis on the wtp wta disparity abstract this study reports a new meta analysis of papers that elicit willingness to pay wtp and willingness to accept compensation wta measures of value for the same good we investigate the effects of type of good and several survey design features on the wtp wta disparity measured as the logarithm of the ratio of mean wta to mean wtp confirming horowitz and mcconnell s 2002 pioneering meta analysis we find the disparity is smaller for ordinary private goods than for public and non market goods that it is not solely an artifact of using hypothetical transactions or other weak experimental or survey methods and that it is smaller for studies using student subjects in addition we find that the disparity is smaller when subjects have experience valuing the good in real markets or through repeated experimental trials in contrast to horowitz and mcconnell we find the disparity is significantly smaller in studies using incentive compatible elicitation mechanisms the disparity is smaller in more recent studies an effect that is attributable only in part to changes in study characteristics

the origin of predictable dynamic behavior abstract nonlinear dynamic theory implies optimal decisions often behave like random chaos such random target motion is impossible for imperfect agents to follow without error however they can still gradually approach the optimal target if and only if they partially adjust toward its perceived location so as to induce their behavior to converge to an equilibrium reducing dynamic errors through partial adjustment thereby induces a stable regularity in behavior that otherwise may never evolve this result agrees with the stability properties observed in experimental markets including cobweb auction and asset markets whose dynamics before reaching equilibrium exhibit adaptive rather than rational expectations