interpreting measures of economic loss evidence from contingent valuation and experimental studies abstract from the standpoint of conventional welfare theory it is surprising that responses to contingent valuation studies of environmental goods have shown a consistent difference between willingness to pay and compensation demanded measures of economic loss this paper examines these results in light of four reasons most often given as grounds for their dismissal new experimental evidence supports an interpretation of the observed disparity in payment and compensation based measures as both real and psychologically meaningful an alternative conceptual framework suggested by prospect theory is outlined and its relevance for economic assessments of potential environmental change is discussed briefly

does money talk the effect of a monetary attribute on the marginal values in a choice experiment when designing choice experiments for nonmarket valuation the role of the price attribute is of major importance in the energy sector the uncertainty of future direction of changes in prices makes it difficult to include an adequate price vector in the design we separately investigate the implication of using price vectors with increases and decreases in tariffs from current levels on marginal value estimate from choice experiment data developed using prospect theory in addition we also analyse the effect of excluding the price vector on these marginal values by and large our results support the neoclassical theory as we find that the means of the conditional estimates of the marginal values of attributes are unaffected by the direction of the price change and from exclusion of the price attribute however the distributions show a larger spread of values when the choice experiment implies a tariff decrease which may have policy implications

agents evaluations and the disparity in measures of economic loss abstract recent studies have revealed a large and unexpected disparity between willingness to pay and compensation demanded measures of economic loss further evidence of this difference is presented here together with the results of a series of survey and real money exchange experiments which indicate that when advisors evaluate entitlements on behalf of third parties the variation between the measures is far less than is shown by individuals acting on their own behalf given the wide dependence on agents a finding that they may weigh losses differently from people they act for suggests that agents choices may compromise welfare positions

a growth model of inflation tax evasion and financial repression abstract this paper studies the relation between policies of financial repression inflation rates and long term growth we set up a model which shows that governments might want to express the financial sector because this sector is an easy source of resources for the public budget the inflation tax to the extent that the financial sector increases the efficiency of the allocation of savings to productive investment the choice of the degree of financial development will have real effects on the growth rate of the economy in countries where tax evasion is large the government will optimally choose to repress the financial sector in order to increase seigniorage taxation this policy will then reduce the efficiency of the financial sector increase the costs of intermediation reduce the amount of investment and reduce the growth rate of the economy financial repression will therefore be associated with high tax evasion low growth and high inflation

corruption and inflation abstract this paper analyzes the relationship between corruption and inflation using alternative indicators of corruption i find a significant positive association between corruption and inflation even after controlling for a variety of other determinants of the latter

taxing the unobservable the impact of the shadow economy on inflation and taxation summary because the shadow economy cannot be taxed it erodes the tax base and reduces tax revenues forcing governments to resort to other ways to finance their expenditures accordingly a larger shadow economy should give governments an incentive to shift revenue sources from taxes to inflation in line with the public finance motive of inflation in this paper we recall that point in a simple canonical model then empirically test it in a sample of up to 153 developed and developing countries over the 1999 2007 period in line with the model s prediction we indeed observe a positive relation between inflation and the size of the shadow economy and a negative relation between the tax burden and the size of the shadow economy we find that both relations are conditional on central bank independence and on the exchange rate regime implying that it is the strongest in institutional set ups that constrain monetary policy the least both relations are present in the sub sample of developed countries as well as the sub sample of developing countries both relations survive several robustness checks using various sets of control variables including the stock of debt controlling for endogeneity using alternative estimates of the shadow economy and estimating the two relations as a system of equations

endogenous efficiency gains from mergers this article analyzes endogenous efficiency gains from mergers it considers oligopolistic homogeneous good markets and duopolistic and triopolistic markets under product differentiation pd quantity and price competition in a two stage game firms invest in cost reducing innovation with and without mergers and then compete in output prices it is found that in homogeneous good markets all possible mergers generate efficiency gains and that these are most significant when r d spillovers are very low or very high efficiency gains increase with the number of insiders and generally decrease with the number of outsiders with pd in most cases the merger generates efficiency gains when spillovers and or pd are sufficiently high with pd efficiency gains increase with spillovers but may increase or decrease with the level of pd the implications of the results for the relationship between competition and innovation outputs and for merger policy are discussed

why don t poor countries catch up a cross national test of an institutional explanation early neoclassical analyses predicted that poor countries would grow faster than wealthy countries because of technological advances and diminishing returns to capital in the latter the reverse has occurred poor countries are falling back rather than catching up we suggest here that deficient institutions underlie this divergence employing various indicators of institutional quality including the rule of law the pervasiveness of corruption and the risk of expropriation and contract repudiation we show that the ability of poor countries to catch up is determined in large part by the institutional environment in which economic activity in these countries takes place jel o00 o10

preference reversals under ambiguity preference reversals have been widely studied using risky or riskless gambles however little is known about preference reversals under ambiguity unknown probabilities subjects were asked to make a binary choice between ambiguous p bets big likelihood of giving small prize and ambiguous bets small likelihood of giving large prize and their willingness to accept was elicited subjects then performed the same two tasks with risky bets where the probability of winning for a given risky bet is the center of the probability interval of the corresponding ambiguous bet preference reversals are not only replicated under ambiguity but are even stronger than are those under risk this is due to higher elicited prices for the bet and lower elicited prices for the p bet under ambiguity than under risk this result can be explained by the shape of the weighting function for different levels of uncertainty and for different elicitation modes this paper was accepted by peter wakker decision analysis

direct tests of the reservation wage property this paper provides the first direct experimental tests of the reservation wages predicted by finite horizon job search models previous indirect tests were based on search duration and search income the authors show that such indirect tests are weak by demonstrating that a naive rule performs essentially as well as the risk neutral model in predicting search duration in contrast direct tests of predicted reservation wages imply rejections of both the naive rule and the risk neutral model the general concave model survives direct tests with reservation wage data as does a specific logistic concave model copyright 1992 by royal economic society

mergers of producers of perfect complements competing in price abstract the endogenous merger model of kamien and zang qje 1990 is generalized to price competition with perfect complements and used to show that some socially desirable mergers will fail to occur we also clarify the link between this merger model and the exogenous merger literature

leaders riverboat gamblers or purposeful unintended consequences in the management of complex dangerous technologies utilities investment in nuclear generating technology and prior earnings growth were used to predict variations in three measures of plant operating safety the pattern of results is consistent wi

corruption inflation and growth abstract we present a model in which the embezzlement of tax revenues by public officials leads the government to rely more on seigniorage to finance its expenditures this raises inflation which depresses investment and growth via a cash in advance constraint

a test of the theory of reference dependent preferences eight alternative methods of eliciting preferences between money and a consumption good are identified two of these are standard willingness to accept and willingness to pay measures these methods differ with respect to the reference point used and the dimension in which responses are expressed the loss aversion hypothesis of tversky and kahneman s theory of reference dependent preferences predicts systematic differences between the preferences elicited by these methods these predictions are tested by eliciting individuals preferences for two private consumption goods the experimental design is incentive compatible and controls for income and substitution effects the theory s predictions are broadly confirmed

buyers pricing behavior for risky alternatives encoding processes and preference reversals numerous studies have examined individuals minimum selling prices or certainty equivalents for lotteries as measures of preference but few have examined maximum buying prices because every transaction involves a buyer as well as a seller buyers pricing behavior is of interest in its own right two prospect theory based descriptive models of maximum buying prices the integration and segregation models are developed from different assumptions about cognitive encoding processes the models were tested experimentally using an incentive compatible cash payoff scheme in which maximum buying prices for bets and choices between bets were elicited from subjects surprisingly observed maximum buying prices were far below expected values even for bets with probabilities of winning near 1 0 this suggests buyers are strongly influenced by loss aversion and that the conventional assumption that the buying price for a risky alternative is a reduction in the alternative s payoffs fails to describe behavior instead it appears subjects predominately employed a segregation encoding process in which the buying price was encoded separately from the bet s payoffs and treated as a sure loss however an additional result was not explained adequately by either encoding model buying prices were less risk averse than choices for 3 expected value bets creating preference reversals of the standard kind lichtenstein and slovic 1971 but more risk averse for 100 expected value bets creating reverse preference reversals casey 1991 implications for the scale compatibility principle tversky et al 1988 are discussed two theoretical approaches are outlined which offer promise in the development of a unified model of price judgments and choice preferences under risk

teams take the better risk abstract one reason why decision makers are often teams and not individuals may be that team decisions comply more closely with economic rationality we compare individual and team decisions when systematic deviations from the expected utility theory eut and the portfolio selection theory pst are to be expected we find almost no evidence for the greater compliance of team decisions with the principles of eut however there is substantial evidence for the consistency of team decisions with the pst compared to individuals teams accumulate significantly more expected value at a significantly lower total risk measured in standard deviation s d

time preference and preference reversal among experienced subjects the effects of real payments preference reversal has been frequent in tests with hypothetical or small real payoffs concerning lotteries as well as claims redeemable at different future dates pr is tested here for the latter case with nontrivial payment levels and subjects likely to deal with decisions of this type it is found i that replacing hypothetical by real payment tests reduces pr rates from 62 to i 5 for subjects predicted to reverse preferences and 2 that the real overall pr rate before correcting for response errors is i9 much lower than in earlier studies

or forum perspectives on utility theory utility theory is a branch of decision analysis that is concerned with building models to explain and guide choice behavior under uncertainty in situations in which long run expected values are too simplistic beginning with bernoulli in the 18th century researchers have tried to analyze how people do and how people should make decisions when risk aversion is a factor in this paper we review some recent developments in the area

commentary on the interpretation of temporal inflation parameters in stochastic models of judgment and choice the implications of salisbury and feinberg s 2010 paper salisbury l c f m feinberg 2010 alleviating the constant stochastic variance assumption in decision research theory measurement and experimental test marketing sci 29 1 1 17 for the process of model development and testing in the field of intertemporal choice analysis is explored although supporting the overall thrust of salisbury and feinberg s critique of previous empirical work in the area we also see their paper as illustrating the dangers of drawing strong inferences about the behavioral interpretation of statistical model parameters without seeking convergent empirical evidence in particular we are skeptical about the extent to which the reported effects of temporal distance on the estimated scale parameter c are uniquely or even primarily due to unobserved error inflation that reflects consumer s uncertainty about future utility this interpretation is brought into question by several lines of reasoning conceptually we note that uncertainty is different from error and that for choice data the error inflation model is mathematically identical to a model in which the scale parameter is a deterministic function of the temporal discount rate empirically a reanalysis of data from previously published experiments does not consistently support temporal error inflation temporal convergence of choice shares or the scale parameter as an explanation of variety seeking in choice sequences in our opinion the cumulative results of research on intertemporal choice require models in which the attributes of choice alternatives are differentially discounted over time despite these findings we advocate that choice researchers should indeed follow salisbury and feinberg s advice to not assume that error variances will be unaffected by experimental manipulations and such effects should be explicitly modeled we also agree that uncovering effects on error variance is just the first step and the ultimate goal should be to rigorously explain the reasons for such effects

experimental economics comment in two important studies charles plott 1982 and vernon smith 1982 assess the current state of the literature about laboratory experiments in economics as a profession we are becoming aware that experimental methods can be applied to our models with cautious but growing confidence that these procedures can help us evaluate alternative theories these are significant developments whose potential ramifications are only beginning to be explored given the importance of laboratory testing i would like to discuss a key feature of past experiments one that has not been fully appreciated because of its central role in standard economic theory in particular these experiments depend on inducing agents to respond according to a prespecified value structure this usually amounts to starting with a known and fully determinate set of demand and supply value schedules for all transacting agents smith for example specifies four major principles about how preferences are to be experimentally induced nonsatiation saliency dominance and privacy see pp 931 35

preference paradoxes and lexicographic choice abstract results of various experiments reported in the literature have shown repeated violations of expected utility theory this paper presents a model of lexicographic choice under uncertainty that has the probability of gain or at least no loss and the best possible outcome as well as expected utility as determinants of choice under different conditions the model easily explains the observed violations and other curious preference patterns including the allais and ellsberg paradoxes probalistic insurance preference reversals preference cycles and the reflection isolation and translation effects despite its explanatory power the model is as testable as the expected utility hypothesis

the uncertainty effect when a risky prospect is valued less than its worst possible outcome expected utility theory prospect theory and most other models of risky choice are based on the fundamental premise that individuals choose among risky prospects by balancing the value of the possible consequences these models therefore require that the value of a risky prospect lie between the value of that prospect s highest and lowest outcome although this requirement seems essential for any theory of risky decision making we document a violation of this condition in which individuals value a risky prospect less than its worst possible realization this demonstration which we term the uncertainty effect draws from more than 1000 experimental participants and includes hypothetical and real pricing and choice tasks as well as field experiments in real markets with financial incentives our results suggest that there are choice situations in which decision makers discount lotteries for uncertainty in a manner that cannot be accommodated by standard models of risky choice from the time of bernoulli on it has been common to argue that a individuals tend to display aversion to the taking of risks and b that risk aversion in turn is an explanation for many observed phenomena in the economic world arrow 1971 p 90

the incidence and persistence of corruption in economic development abstract economic development and bureaucratic corruption are determined jointly in a dynamic general equilibrium model of growth bribery and tax evasion corruption arises from the incentives of public and private agents to conspire in the concealment of information from the government these incentives depend on aggregate economic activity which in turn depends on the incidence of corruption the model produces multiple development regimes transition between which may or may not occur in accordance with recent empirical evidence the relationship between corruption and development is predicted to be negative

the relevance of irrelevant alternatives abstract in an experimental setting subjects face a standard elicitation task for certainty equivalents we show that when a third objectively irrelevant option is added to the standard task the willingness to take risks increases

the limits of monopolization through acquisition we address the question of whether competitive acquisition of firms by their rivals can result in complete or partial monopolization of a homogeneous product industry this question is modeled in terms of two distinct three stage noncoopera tive games analysis of subgame perfect pure strategy nash equilibria of these games discloses that under simplifying assumptions monopolization of an industry through acquisition is limited to industries with relatively few firms partial monopolization is either limited in scope or can be completely eliminated by prohibiting any owner from acquiring over 50 percent of the firms in the industry

foundations of decision analysis along the way this paper offers a personal perspective on the development of decision theory and related subjects during the past half century it first reviews six milestones in the foundations of decision analysis that are associated with frank p ramsey john von neumann and oskar morgenstern leonard j savage maurice allais and ward edwards west churchman and russell ackoff and kenneth arrow it then gives a personal account of further developments over the past 30 years in linear utility theory subjective probability and ambiguity nonlinear preference and utility stochastic dominance and inequality analysis multiattribute utility theory and the theory of social choice the paper could be viewed as a supplement to my extensive review of utility theory in management science some 20 years ago however it makes no claim of completeness since its main aim is to recall important debts and describe what it has been like to be a part of the development of decision analysis in the past few decades

choices involving uncertain probabilities abstract this paper contains an analytic and empirical component the analytic one examines how people should value information on probabilities versus payoffs according to expected utility theory it also examines under what conditions various generalized utility models such as subjective expected utility theory prospect theory and rank dependent utility entail testable predictions for preference for information the empirical component examines people s actual information preferences and to what extent they fit the various models after describing two experiments and their findings it is concluded that generalized utility models are unlikely to offer much insight into risky decision making

decision theory the next 100 years advances in decision theory have often been driven by paradoxes early in the eighteenth century daniel bernoulli and others wrestled with why prudent individuals often violate the principle of maximising expected return they were fascinated by the paradox of people paying at most a few pounds to engage in an infinite expectation game that returns 2 shillings if the first heads in a succession of coin tosses occurs at toss n later in the same century the marquis de condorcet was intrigued by the paradox of cyclical majorities for multicandidate elections in which there is no majority candidate who could defeat or tie every other candidate under simple majority comparisons based on voter preference rankings bernoulli s i 738 resolution of the prudent people paradox was an early version of expected utility theory in which one s utility for money increases at a decreasing rate his legacy is evident in later expected utility theories as well as the principle of diminishing marginal utility of wealth that was so popular

the role of asset specificity in the vertical integration decision abstract according to the logic of transaction cost economics several factors determine the most efficient form of economic organization these factors include uncertainty and frequency of transactions involving the transfer of goods or services although the most important factor is asset specificity these characteristics of transactions engender high transaction costs but they also parallel the conditions under which the sunk cost effect is most likely to be observed the potential influence of sunk cost considerations in the choice of corporate governance structure is illustrated with respect to vertical integration and was tested in a laboratory study in which subjects were asked to play the role of a firm s chief strategist the results support the view that asset specificity drives vertical integration but for reasons that may have little to do with transaction cost economizing

fiscal deficits and growth in developing countries this paper examines the relation between fiscal deficits and growth for a panel of 45 developing countries based on a consistent treatment of the government budget constraint it finds evidence of a threshold effect at a level of the deficit around 1 5 of gdp while there appears to be a growth payoff to reducing deficits to this level this effect disappears or reverses itself for further fiscal contraction the magnitude of this payoff but not its general character necessarily depends on how changes in the deficit are financed through changes in borrowing or seigniorage and on how the change in the deficit is accommodated elsewhere in the budget we also find evidence of interaction effects between deficits and debt stocks with high debt stocks exacerbating the adverse consequences of high deficits

regret theory a bold alternative to the alternatives in their famous 1982 paper in this journal loomes and sugden introduced regret theory now more than 30 years later the case for the historical importance of this contribution can be made

observing violations of transitivity by experimental methods the preference reversal phenomenon is usually interpreted as evidence of nontransitivity of preference but has also been explained as the result of the difference between individuals responses to choice and valuation problems the devices used by experimenters to elicit valuations and the random lottery selection incentive system this paper reports an experiment designed so that none of these factors could generate systematic nontransitivities yet systematic violations of transitivity were still found the pattern of violation was analogous with that found in previous preference reversal experiments and is consistent with regret theory copyright 1991 by the econometric society

designing transactions without framing effects in iterative question formats abstract several studies document that iterative question formats used in contingent valuation studies produce anomalies in respondent behavior that appear to threaten the validity of welfare estimates by decomposing iterative question formats into their ascending and descending sequences we show that these anomalies occur only in ascending sequences we describe the conditions under which comparable patterns of behavior are likely to be found in other iterative question formats that begin with a discrete willingness to pay question we then develop a unified explanation of these anomalies using our model of framing based on prospect theory we provide the first head to head test of rival explanations of these behavioral patterns by developing refutable hypotheses for the strategic behavior yea saying anchoring and cost expectations models finally based on our own statistically robust model we show how these anomalies can be eliminated without loss of the statistical efficiency of most iterative question formats

aggregation and deliberation in valuing environmental public goods starting from a distinction between kantian principle based and utilitarian preference based approaches in political theory this essay argues that we may understand normative judgments individuals make about policy to express principled views of the public interest or purpose not private preferences about their own consumption opportunities these judgments in other words state opinions about what we ought to do as a society rather than report preferences about what i want as a utility maximizer this essay then argues that contingent valuation can take into account these kinds of judgments which dominate public discourse about the environment only if it moves toward a deliberative discursive jury like research method emphasizing informed discussion leading toward a consensus based on an argument about the public interest

divisionalization franchising and divestiture incentives in oligopoly a two stage game is used to model firms strategic incentives to divide production among autonomous competing units through divisionalization franchising or divestiture firms simultaneously choose their number of competing units which then engage in cournot competition while it is costly to form autonomous units each firm does so in equilibrium thus reducing firm profits and increasing social welfare relative to the case where firms cannot form competing units with linear demand and costs duopolists choose the socially optimal number of competing units oligopolies with larger numbers of firms choose too many the case of nonlinear demand is also examined copyright 1996 by american economic association

bargaining failures and merger policy in this paper we study the optimal ex ante merger policy in a model where merger proposals are the result of strategic bargaining among alternative candidates we allow for firm asymmetries and in particular we emphasize the fact that potential synergies generated by a merger may vary substantially depending on the identity of the participating firms the model demonstrates that under some circumstances relatively inefficient mergers may take place that is a particular merger may materialize despite the existence of an alternative merger capable of generating higher social surplus and even higher profits such bargaining failures have important implications for the ex ante optimal merger policy we show that a more stringent policy than the ex post optimal reduces the scope of these bargaining failures and raises expected social surplus we use a bargaining model that is flexible in the sense that its strategic structure does not place any exogenous restriction on the endogenous likelihood of feasible mergers

are preferences stable the case of health care abstract experiments concerned with modelling individual preferences are based on the assumption of stability of preferences violations of the stability assumption have implications for the increasing amount of experimental work in health care concerned with the welfare implications of alternative policies this paper reports the results of a discrete choice experiment dce carried out to examine the effect of experience on stability of preferences within health care whilst the results provide evidence of stability further research is required before these results are generalised

anticipated inflation and the capital stock in a cash in advance economy abstract an economy is constructed in which the steady state capital stock is inversely related to the rate of inflation as a result that is directly opposite the usual conclusion

cooperating with competitors patent pooling and choice of a new standard abstract i examine the efficiency of patent pooling in a setting that allows for the interplay between the standards process in which owners of essential intellectual property ip develop a new product and the subsequent pooling decision in which ip prices are coordinated if one of the ip owners is also the incumbent of a product that employs the current competing standard referred to as overlapping ownership then the relationship among the ip owners will be both vertical through their ip and horizontal through their competing interests in the final products consumers are better off when ip owners cooperate even when these owners are effectively competitors because of lower prices and greater product variety consumers prefer however that the agreements not admit firms with overlapping ownership these results inform antitrust policy on cooperative agreements among competitors

distribution and development in a model of misgovernance abstract this paper presents an analysis of bureaucratic corruption income inequality and economic development the analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which bureaucrats are appointed by the government to implement a redistributive programme of taxes and subsidies designed to benefit the poor corruption is reflected in bribery and tax evasion as bureaucrats conspire with the rich in providing false information to the government in accordance with empirical evidence the model predicts a positive relationship between corruption and inequality and a negative relationship between corruption and development

confining the coase theorem contracting ownership and free riding if individuals own the right to take any action that they please and are free to contract about behaviour will outcomes be efficient in all situations that is does the coase theorem hold we study this classic question through the lens of a non cooperative model of contract negotiations considering both compulsory and voluntary participation in negotiations in either case we find that all consistent equilibria of the contracting game are efficient in the case of two players but if participation is voluntary and there are more than two players there are situations in which all consistent equilibria are inefficient specifically the provision of public goods tends to be inefficiently low due to strategic abstention from contracting free riding on others agreements can be avoided if individuals do not own all their actions when actions involve the use of assets efficient action ownership may correspond to collective rather than individual asset ownership

incommensurability and monetary valuation at the very heart of environmental cost benefit analysis cba is the claim that benefits and costs can be expressed in terms of money and hence made comparable in particular cba puts all benefits and costs on a cardinal monetary scale it assumes monetary commensurability a significant literature in ethics and political philosophy has arisen which doubts this assumption but has so far had little impact on the theory or practice of cba in light of this the paper assesses the defense of monetary commensurability offered by cost benefit analysts and the wider economics literature

tax policy and the demand for health insurance estimates of the price and income elasticities of demand for health insurance are derived from econometric estimates of the parameters of a discrete choice model of health insurance demand using data from a survey of plan choices among a sample of federal government employees the estimated income elasticity 0 01 is similar to most previous estimates the estimated price elasticity 0 16 is in absolute value much less than the earlier previous estimates and somewhat less than the more recent previous estimates possible causes of these differences in price elasticity estimates are discussed

preference reversal information processing effect or rational non transitive choice preference reversal is often explained as an information processing effect whereby individuals respond differently to valuation problems than to straight choices regret theory offers the alternative explanation that individuals act on consistent but nontransitive preferences regret theory in its most general form is shown to make specific predictions about nontransitive pairwise choices that correspond with the preferences reversal phenomenon some experiments designed to discriminate between these two explanations are reported the main finding is that as regret theory predicts the preference reversal phenomenon can be reproduced in situations in which subjects confront only choice problems copyright 1989 by royal economic society

choice under uncertainty problems solved and unsolved ffifteen years ago the theory of choice under uncertainty could be considered one of the success stories of economic analysis it rested on solid axiomatic foundations it had seen important breakthroughs in the analytics of risk risk aversion and their applications to economic issues and it stood ready to provide the theoretical underpinnings for the newly emerging information revolution in economics 1 today choice under uncertainty is a field in flux the standard theory is being challenged on several grounds from both within and outside economics the nature of these challenges and of our profession s responses to them is the topic of this paper

the optimal public expenditure financing policy does the level of economic development matter i introduction does the growth effect of public expenditures depend on the way these expenditures are financed over the years a substantial volume of theoretical and empirical research has been directed toward identifying the elements of public expenditure at its aggregated and disaggregated level that bear significant association with economic growth in contrast only a handful of studies have paid particular attention to examine the extent to which the growth effect of public expenditures depends on the method of financing such expenditures e g de gregorio 1993 miller and russek 1997 palivos and yip 1995 the consensus appears to be that the two primary modes of financing income taxation and seigniorage are distortionary opinions however are divided as to their relative merits for example according to palivos and yip 1995 income tax financing is more detrimental to growth than seigniorage financing at the same time de gregorio 1993 suggests that as long as the rate of return on indexed bonds is substantially responsive to changes in the rate of inflation seigniorage financing of public expenditure is more growth reducing pecorino 1997 on the other hand prescribes a mix of both modes of financing despite these differences the above mentioned studies share a common characteristic the optimal mode of financing public expenditure in these studies is viewed as being not contingent on the stages of economic development accordingly there remains little understanding of the process by which public expenditure financing policies shape the prospect of economic growth for developing vis a vis developed countries the primary objective of this paper is to bridge this gap in the existing literature it is a long standing belief among development experts that outcomes of public expenditures and revenue policies are conditional on the state of an economy recent evidence supports such belief for example miller and russek 1997 suggest that for developing countries a deficit financed increase in public expenditure retards economic growth and a tax financed increase leads to higher growth for developed countries a deficit financed increase in government expenditure does not affect economic growth and a tax financed increase leads to a lower growth in light of these findings and in light of the theoretical controversy about the relative merits of seigniorage versus tax finance it is meaningful to ask the following question does the relative merit of seigniorage vis a vis tax financing of public expenditure depend on the stage of economic development this paper seeks an answer to this question using both theoretical and empirical analyses the theoretical framework developed in this paper shares many of the characteristics of the models proposed by espinosa vega and yip 1999 2000 and schreft and smith 1997 in particular we consider a two period overlapping generations model where agents are subjected to stochastic relocations shocks which act like shocks to their portfolio preferences these shocks have the same consequence as liquidity preference shocks as in diamond and dybvig 1983 and create a role for financial intermediaries who take deposits and make a portfolio decision on behalf of the households in addition there is a government that relies on two alternative sources of revenue seigniorage and tax revenue to finance its exogenously given expenditure sequence the results that we derive are shaped by the portfolio decision of the financial intermediaries in particular at each point in time financial intermediaries are required to allocate their portfolios between a nonproductive liquid asset money and a productive illiquid asset the illiquid asset takes the form of financing risky investment projects which in turn generate productive capital stock for the economy the financial intermediaries optimal portfolio allocation rules depend on the relative rate of return of the two available assets

preferences with and without prices does the price attribute affect behavior in stated preference surveys the experimental as well as the non market valuation literature include several examples of how an introduced price can affect behavior in otherwise not expected ways it has become standard to include a price vector as an attribute in choice experiments something that enables us to estimate a marginal willingness to pay for other attributes we test the impact on preferences by an inclusion of a price in a choice experiment preferences are affected as might be expected however also the relative ranking of individual attributes is affected

specification seeking how product specifications influence consumer preference we offer a framework about when and how specifications e g megapixels of a camera and number of air bags in a massage chair influence consumer preferences and report five studies that test the framework studies 1 3 show that even when consumers can directly experience the relevant products and the specifications carry little or no new information their preference is still influenced by specifications including specifications that are self generated and by definition spurious and specifications that the respondents themselves deem uninformative studies 4 and 5 show that relative to choice hedonic preference liking is more stable and less influenced by specifications

the welfare effects of upstream mergers in the presence of downstream entry barriers we examine the incentives for upstream firms to consolidate horizontally and the impact of this process on industry performance when there are downstream entry barriers and firms negotiate bilaterally in the short run consumers are not worse off with upstream mergers since consolidation only results in a redistribution of industry rents in the long run consumers are better off after upstream mergers since they induce more entry into that segment when social welfare is evaluated a limit on upstream consolidation may prevent excessive entry but upstream entry can be sometimes insufficient if the retailers intrinsic bargaining power is excessive

a new model for decisions under uncertainty abstract a representation for preferences between uncertain acts that is not unduly more complex than the ramsey savage model can simultaneously accomodate allais s paradox ellsberg s paradox preference reversals and cyclic preferences

divisionalization and strategic managerial incentives in oligopoly under uncertainty abstract this paper argues that divisionalization and incentive contracting are complementary rent shifting tools in the presence of demand uncertainty the role for divisionalization arises if managers know the state of demand prior to making output decisions and if incentive contracts are linear and non state contingent in this context incentive contracts achieve expected stackelberg outcomes but have no impact on the firm s responsiveness to demand shocks divisionalization on the other hand has the strategically beneficial effect of making the firm more responsive to demand shocks

technical compatibility and the mode of foreign entry with network externalities we examine the preferences of a foreign firm and a local government over two modes of foreign direct investment de novo entry and acquisition of the domestic incumbent two crucial features of the model are network externalities and partial incompatibility between the domestic and the foreign technology the relative welfare impact of the two entry modes depends on the degree of market competition and the strength of the network externality the clash between the foreign firm s choice and the local government s ranking of the two entry modes can motivate limits on the degree of foreign ownership of the local firm ce texte examine les preferences d une firme etrangere et d un gouvernement du pays hote quant a deux modes d investissement direct de l etranger entree de novo de la firme etrangere versus acquisition d une firme domestique en place deux facteurs pris en compte sont la presence d externalites de reseau et d incompatibilite partielle entre la technologie locale et celle introduite par la firme etrangere l impact relatif des modes d entree sur le mieux etre local depend du degre de concurrence sur le marche et de l importance des externalites de reseau le conflit entre les preferences de l entreprise etrangere et les preferences du gouvernement local peuvent etre a la source de politiques qui limitent le degre de proprieteetrangere permis

hicksian welfare measures within a regret theory framework for many years the neoclassical economic paradigm for consumer theory has been based on axioms of rational behavior equivalent to utility maximization for decisions under complete certainty and another set of axioms equivalent to expected utility eu maximization for decisions under risk von neumann and morgenstern recently however this theory has come under fire both from within the economics profession and from outside due to a growing body of evidence suggesting that actual choices display consistent and predictable violations of the behavioral implications of these axioms particularly within the context of risk and uncertainty at least since the 1950s with simon s work on bounded rationality alternative models of behavior have been proposed in the past few years this area has received increasing emphasis notable contributions include the work of akerlof and dickens on cognitive dissonance kahneman and tversky on prospect theory heiner on reliability theory bell and loomes and sugden on regret theory and machina on local approximations to eu functions to date work on these alternative theories has focused on empirical testing of their predictions and their abilities to explain the observed violations of expected utility theory no attempt has yet been made to study formally the implications of these alternatives for welfare analysis and the definition and measurement of the costs or benefits resulting from projects or events yet since the estimates of such costs or benefits often play an important role in public decisions it is important to know whether the standard welfare results based on the eu model continue to hold under what appear to be more realistic theories of choice under uncertainty this paper explores this question in the context of one particular theory namely regret theory this does not imply that the various paradigms are necessarily mutually exclusive for example regret may be an important factor in decision making and at the same time individuals may display bias concerning small probability events as discussed by kahneman and tversky however this paper will focus only on regret to simplify the analysis regret theory was chosen from among the different alternative theories because it has intuitive appeal it contains eu theory as a special case and it is capable of explaining some observed forms of behavior that are inconsistent with eu theory but that are observed consistently in various empirical contexts in addition decisions under regret theory can be formulated within a mathematical optimization framework similar to that used for eu

stable coalition structures with externalities this paper argues that the sign of external effects of coalition formation provides a useful organizing principle in examining economic coalitions in many interesting economic games coalition formation creates either negatie externalities or posi tie externalities for nonmembers examples of negative externalities are research coalitions and customs unions examples of positive externalities include output cartels and public goods coalitions i characterize and compare stable coalition structures under the following three rules of coalition formation the open