price discrimination in broadway theater a common thread in the theory literature on price discrimination has been the ambiguous welfare effects for consumers and the rise in profit for firms relative to uniform pricing in this study i resolve the ambiguity for consumers and quantify the benefit for a firm i describe a model of price discrimination that includes both second degree and third degree price discrimination using data from a broadway play i estimate the structural model and conduct various experiments to investigate the implications of alternative pricing policies the observed price discrimination may improve the firm s profit by approximately 5 relative to uniform pricing while the difference for aggregate consumer welfare is negligible also i show that the gain from changing prices in the face of fluctuating demand is small under the observed price discrimination

competitive coupon targeting with the advent of panel data on household purchase behavior and the development of statistical procedures to utilize this data firms can now target coupons to selected households with considerable accuracy and cost effectiveness in this article we develop an analytical framework to examine the effect of such targeting on firm profits prices and coupon face values we also derive comparative statics on firms optimal mix of offensive and defensive couponing the number of coupons distributed redemption rates face values and incremental sales per redemption among our findings when rival firms can target their coupon promotions at brand switchers the outcome will be a prisoner s dilemma in which the net effect of targeting is simply the cost of distribution plus the discount given to redeemers

competition in posted prices with stochastic discounts we study price competition between firms over public list or posted prices when a fraction of consumers can subsequently receive discounts with some probability such stochastic discounts are a feature of markets in which some consumers bargain explicitly and of markets in which sellers use the marketing practice of couponing even though bargainers receive reductions off the posted prices the potential to discount dampens competitive pressure in the market thus raising all prices and increasing profits welfare falls because of the stochastic nature of the discounts which generates some misallocation of products to consumers stochastic discounts facilitate collusion by reducing the market share that can be gained from a deviation

the role of brand image and product characteristics on firms entry and oem decisions we investigate the optimal market entry and original equipment manufacturer oem decisions of a firm facing a market in which firms brands can be horizontally differentiated and products can be vertically differentiated the entrant might sell under its own brand and compete with an incumbent become a supplier to the incumbent or both findings reveal that when consumers perceive the firms are horizontally and vertically differentiated the entrant profits by simultaneously entering the market and establishing an oem arrangement with the incumbent in such competitive scenarios both buyer and seller increase profits by agreeing on wholesale prices that are not too low which softens both horizontal and vertical conflict between the firms findings also show that the incumbent may prefer to pay high wholesale prices to the entrant even if the incumbent had the option to source the product independently at a lower marginal cost when firms have the capability of producing each other s product lines su

elasticity of demand and behaviour based price discrimination behaviour based price discrimination bbpd is typically analysed in a framework characterised by perfectly inelastic demand this paper provides a first assessment of the role of demand elasticity on the profit consumer and welfare effects of bbpd we show that the demand expansion effect that is obviously overlooked by the standard framework with unit demand plays a relevant role in comparison to uniform pricing we show that firms are worse off under bbpd however as demand elasticity increases the negative impact of bbpd on profits gets smaller despite a possible slight increase in the average prices charged over the two periods in comparison to uniform pricing we show that bbpd boosts consumer surplus and that this benefit is independent of elasticity in contrast to the welfare results derived under the unit demand assumption where bbpd is always bad for welfare the paper shows that bbpd can be welfare enhancing if demand elasticity is sufficiently high

job quality and the economics of new labour a critical appraisal using subjective survey data this paper assesses the record on job quality during the early term of office of the new labour government by interpreting from a political economy perspective changes in a variety of subjective measures of job quality taken from several different data sources we find some improvements in job quality over the period 1998 2004 however we argue that these improvements have arisen not because of new labour s policies towards the workplace but because of low and falling rates of unemployment despite recent improvements a large number of workers in britain remain in low quality jobs and without a radical change of policy direction sustained and substantial progress in the quality of work will remain elusive

the neoclassical trojan horse of steady state economics the vision of a steady state economy elaborated by herman daly describes an economy that uses materials and energy within the regenerative and assimilative limits of the planet s ecosystems sustainable scale just distribution and efficient allocation are its constitutive theoretical goals this paper is a critique of the theoretical foundations of steady state economics it argues that steady state economics consists in an attempt to squeeze neoclassical economics into a biophysical and ethical corset as a result many fundamental flaws and criticisms of neoclassical economics remain as a consequence steady state economics does not lead to a radical departure from or improvement upon neoclassical theory but rather to fundamental internal inconsistencies between the old economics paradigm and new progressive ecological economic thinking contradictions appear at various levels ranging from ontology and methodology to theory and values as daly has pioneered the foundations of ecological economics with his thinking these ambiguities are not only problematic for steady state economics but ecological economics as a field more generally the paper concludes that ecological economics has to let go of neoclassical foundations as they contradict its core values and ambitions a new and consistent theory of political economy of the environment along heterodox lines is needed

colluding on relative prices firms sometimes agree to limit the discounts they offer a class of customers i e they collude on the price differences across consumer classes why courts have struck down agreements to limit discounts as violations of the laws against price fixing are these collusive agreements in fact efficient this article addresses these questions in a multiproduct duopoly model under one interpretation the incentive to collude on relative prices can be traced to heterogeneity in consumers time costs under fairly general conditions total surplus increases with the collusion this efficiency effect is most striking in the case where collusion raises the prices faced by all consumers over which firms compete

the resurrection of the italian wage curve we show that the italian wage curve inexistent in the eighties and early nineties has reemerged after the 1993 income policy agreements owing to the greater role granted to exible and locally bargained top up wage components

on two part tariff competition in a homogeneous product duopoly abstract we explore aspects of two part tariff competition between duopolists providing a homogeneous service when consumers differ with respect to their usage levels competition in only one price component the fee or the rate may allow both firms to enjoy positive profits if the other price component has been set at levels different enough between firms fixing one price component alters the nature of competition indirectly introducing an element of product differentiation endogenous market segmentation emerges with the heavier users choosing the lower rate firm and the lighter users choosing the lower fee firm when no price component can be negative competition becomes softer profits tend to be higher but there is also a disadvantage for the firm that starts with a higher fee than that of its rival

reward programs and tacit collusion reward programs a promotional tool to develop customer loyalty offer incentives to consumers on the basis of cumulative purchases of a given product or service from a firm reward programs have become increasingly common in many industries the best known examples include frequent flier programs offered by airlines frequent guest programs offered by hotels and frequent shopper programs offered by supermarkets despite the widespread business practice of reward programs research efforts on reward programs particularly in marketing have been scarce our paper takes an important step towards understanding the design of reward programs and its implications on pricing strategies we study a market that consists of two segments heavy and light user segments the key distinction between the two segments is that the heavy user segment purchases in each period and thus is a candidate for the reward programs in contrast the light user segment exits the market after one purchase and is not in a position to exploit reward programs an important feature of our model is that we allow for different price sensitivity between heavy user and light user segments our model closely examines the type of rewards a reward worth a dollar to the consumer might have different cost implications for the offering firm depending on the type of reward for example cash rewards have higher unit reward cost inefficient reward for the firm than a free product of the firm such as an airline ticket or long distance minutes efficient reward specifically we examine an interesting puzzle observed in the marketplace several firms offer a cash reward or a product not made by the firm such as jackets electronic items etc these firms could offer their own product as rewards and significantly lower their cost we examine whether there is any reason for such a seemingly suboptimal practice our analysis shows that reward programs weaken price competition by offering the incentives for repeat purchases reward programs increase a firm s cost to attract competing firms current customers because firms gain less from undercutting their prices equilibrium prices go up moreover as consumers become unwilling to switch because of potential rewards the firm with a larger market share in the heavy user segment charges higher prices therefore a low price in the first period which leads to a larger market share in the heavy user segment will always be followed by a high price in the second period in our model consumers are rational and can correctly anticipate firms incentive to offer lower prices initially to enroll them into the reward programs our paper offers an explanation as to why the type and amount of reward may vary across the programs we identify two determining factors for the selection of rewards size and relative price sensitivity of the heavy user segment we find that in a market with a small heavy user segment that is also much more price sensitive than the light user segment it is optimal for firms to offer the most inefficient rewards the intuition is based on the firms incentive to exploit the price insensitive light user segment by offering inefficient rewards firms are able to commit to weaker competition and therefore higher prices when the heavy user segment is large or not very price sensitive when compared to the light user segment competing firms should adopt the most efficient rewards to maximize their profit this may well be the case in a number of real world situations in which efficient rewards are quite prevalent we also find that optimal reward amount has a negative relationship with unit reward cost because both firms use rewards to attract the heavy users they tend to offer more when they adopt the more efficient rewards finally our paper identifies the relationship between market characteristics and theimpact of reward programs on firms profits and consumers benefits we find that firms gain from the adoption of reward programs as long as light users are not too price sensitive when light users are very price sensitive firms engage in intense price competition thus benefiting little from the loyalty of heavy users created through rewards because reward programs increase market prices light users who do not get the reward earn strictly lower benefit in contrast heavy users often stand to gain more from the reward program in most cases firms and the heavy users are better off at the expense of light users

price discrimination in free entry markets using a spatial model of monopolistic competition we investigate price discrimination in free entry zero profit markets we show that when brands are heterogeneous competition does not prevent discrimination the power to earn economic profits is not necessary for a firm to maintain discriminatory prices our model treats formally the fact that consumers difer not only in the utility they derive from a good but also in how strongly they prefer one brand over all others in markets where firms are very competitive sorting consumers on the strength on brand preference produces larger price differentials between groups than sorting on the basis of consumers reservation prices for the good when firms sort customers on the basis of strength of brand preference however we find that the output and welfare effects are generally less favorable than when sorting is more closely related to consumers reservation prices

digital piracy a competitive analysis in recent years the issue of copyright protection for intellectual properties such as computer software music cds and videos has become increasingly important it is often claimed that illegal copying of intellectual property costs companies billions of dollars in lost revenues and reduces firms incentives to innovate some researchers have shown that copying can be beneficial to firms when there are strong network effects and copying expands the market in this paper we first examine the impact of illegal copying of software and other similar intellectual properties on firms prices profits and quality choices even when there are no network effects and the market is saturated we show that contrary to the claims of manufacturers there are conditions under which copying can increase firms profits lead to better quality products and increase social welfare this is because weaker copyright protection enables firms to reduce price competition by allowing price sensitive consumers to copy thus weaker copyright protection can serve as a coordination device to reduce price competition we also examine how equilibrium copyright enforcement is affected by network externalities in contrast to previous research we show that strong network effects can sometimes lead to a firm choosing higher levels of copyright protection our results show that in the presence of strong network effects stronger copyright enforcement by one firm can serve as a coordinating device to reduce price competition

a materialist development of some recent contributions to the labour theory of value the paper offers a novel interpretation and affirmation of the opening arguments of capital answering the fundamental but neglected question of why labour is the substance of value marx s arguments require that two philosophical threads often separated in the literature on value be woven together the argument that value is the intrinsic content making commodities exchangeable employs the thread of realism the argument that abstract labour is the emergent social substance of value employs the thread of dialectics this interpretation develops the materialist and dialectical philosophy of e v ilyenkov and deepens the approach to value theory initiated by ben fine

dynamic targeted pricing with strategic consumers abstract we investigate in this paper whether dynamic targeted pricing based on consumer purchase history could benefit a practicing firm even when consumers are strategic in that they actively seek to avail themselves of a low price in the future such strategic behavior on the part of consumers has been shown in the literature to render such dynamic targeted pricing unprofitable even for a monopoly firm we show that dynamic targeted pricing can benefit competing firms when they actively pursue customer recognition based on consumer purchase history this is because in order to pursue customer recognition competing firms need to price high to screen out price sensitive consumers and hence price competition is moderated as a result all competing firms can become better off with targeted pricing than without even when consumers behave strategically interestingly because of this competition moderation effect the paradoxical outcome occurs where dynamic targeted pricing may not benefit a monopolist but it may benefit competing firms we also show that dynamic targeted pricing can expand the market such that social welfare unambiguously improves

competition of firms discriminatory pricing and location1 two costlessly mobile firms are to be located in a market region a subset of the plane the firms compete by setting locations and delivered price schedules to study this competitive stiuation an appropriate extensive form game is defined along with an appropri ate noncooperative solution concept existence and general properties of the equilibrium are demonstrated among the results are each firm increases its profit by locating so as to decrease total cost to both firms of serving the market firms will never locate coinciden tally if they have identical production costs and transport cost rates or if these are different and the firms are located in a circular market region having a uniform demand distribution this paper studies competition between two profit maximizing firms in space who are costlessly mobile and may discriminate in price we will allow the firms to set locations and delivered price schedules and we will be concerned with the existence and properties of equilibria in location and price starting with hotelling 9 the spatial competition literature has focused on location on bounded linear markets by two or more firms hotelling assumed identical firms that produced a single good with constant cost of production and considered consumers to be uniformly distributed and to have inelastic demand he also assumed that the consumers pay transport cost and purchase the good from the cheapest source hotelling claimed that a nash equilibrium in locations for the two firm market existed and yielded back to back locations at the center of the market many authors most recently d aspremont gabszewicz and thisse 2 have noted that an equilbrium in prices and location does not exist for hotelling s model however if the firms employ identical exogeneously specified prices hotelling s conclusions hold subsequent work by smithies 14 hartwick and hartwick 7 and eaton 3 claimed to show that a nash equi librium in f o b prices and locations can exist in markets with a uniform distribu tion of consumers each of whom have identical elastic demand functions for the two and three firm problems the work of d aspremont et al casts doubt on these conclusions without the adoption of restrictive conditions our work contrasts with these works and related research which has dealt with linear markets with uniform distributions of customers and with identical firms our work will involve markets that are subsets of the plane having nonuniform distributions of customers our firms will be allowed to be different that is have differences in production and transport costs however the fundamental difference in our approach is that our firms will set discriminatory prices and not price f o b in many ways our work will represent the discriminatory pricing

how should consumers willingness to pay be measured an empirical comparison of state of the art approaches abstract this study compares the performance of four commonly used approaches to measure consumers willingness to pay with real purchase data real the open ended oe question format choice based conjoint cbc analysis becker degroot and marschak s bdm incentive compatible mechanism and incentive aligned choice based conjoint icbc analysis with this five in one approach the authors test the relative strengths of the four measurement methods using real as the benchmark on the basis of statistical criteria and decision relevant metrics the results indicate that the bdm and icbc approaches can pass statistical and decision oriented tests the authors find that respondents are more price sensitive in incentive aligned settings than in non incentive aligned settings and the real setting furthermore they find a large number of none choices under icbc than under hypothetical conjoint analysis this study uncovers an intriguing possibility even when the oe format and cbc analysis generate

augmenting conjoint analysis to estimate consumer reservation price consumer reservation price is a key concept in marketing and economics theoretically this concept has been instrumental in studying consumer purchase decisions competitive pricing strategies and welfare economics managerially knowledge of consumer reservation prices is critical for implementing many pricing tactics such as bundling tar get promotions nonlinear pricing and one to one pricing and for assessing the impact of marketing strategy on demand despite the practical and theoretical importance of this concept its measurement at the individual level in a practical setting proves elusive we propose a conjoint based approach to estimate consumer level reservation prices this approach integrates the preference estimation of traditional conjoint with the economic theory of consumer choice this integration augments the capability of traditional conjoint such that consumers reservation prices for a product can be derived directly from the individuallevel estimates of conjoint coefficients with this augmentation we can model a consumer s decision of not only which product to buy but also whether to buy at all in a category thus we can simulate simultaneously three effects that a change in price or the introduction of a new product may generate in a market the customer switching effect the cannibalization effect and the market expansion effect we show in a pilot application how this approach can aid product and pricing decisions we also demonstrate the predictive validity of our approach using data from a commercial study of automobile batteries

the nature of economics and the failings of the mainstream lessons from lionel robbins s essay lionel robbins in his famous essay on the nature and significance of economic science correctly showed that the task of economics is to develop step by step a realistic comprehension of the economic system based upon the abstract starting point of a theory of value his mistake was to think that the marginal utility theory of value can be and was actually in the process of being developed in a concrete and realistic direction in fact marginal utility theory has not to this day been developed in a concrete and realistic direction and ironically one can find in robbins s cogent exposition of marginal utility theory the reason why it is impossible to do so this reason is not primarily methodological attachment to equilibrium to formalism or some such philosophical attachment to positivism or ideological pro capitalist bias rather the reason is theoretical specifically marginal utility theory can provide no comprehension of the macroeconomic aggregates that drive the reproduction and development of the economic system the implications for contemporary economics are clear utterly unrealistic toy models will persist in economics until an alternative value theory is adopted that is able to justify macroeconomic aggregation these implications ironically bring into consideration the very labour theory of value that robbins had argued to be usurped by marginal utility theory copyright 2012 oup

the evolution of u s airline competition studies by academic economists were a significant force in the movement towards deregulation of the domestic airline industry in the early 1970s levine 1965 jordan 1970 keeler 1972 douglas and miller 1974 during the critical 1977 78 period in which deregulation was imposed first de facto by the civil aeronautics board cab and then de jure by congress the chairman and vice chairman of the cab were economists for the 14 years since deregulation economists have continued intensive study of the industry in part because of the unusual availability of reliable firm and transaction level data and in part because of the rare opportunity to observe an industry as it evolves from strict economic regulation to fairly unimpeded competition and strategic behavior the simplest prediction of economists about airline deregulation and one of the few on which nearly all economists agreed was that deregulation would improve consumer welfare in comparison to continued price and entry regulation fourteen years later nearly all economists still agree on this though the degree of enthusiasm for the deregulation outcome varies considerably there was substantial disagreement among economists about the market structure that would result because studies of scale economies in the airline industry had concluded that none existed beyond the scale of the smaller major airlines of the 1970s caves 1962 eads et al 1969 many economists argued that deregulation would result in more than the 11 major airlines that existed at the time of deregulation others predicted that only a few or possibly only one airline would survive at a large scale two noted university of chicago economists sam peltzman and lester telser made a bet in 1979 on whether

the wage local unemployment relationship in a highly regulated labour market greece livanos i the wage local unemployment relationship in a highly regulated labour market greece regional studies using data obtained from 80 000 employees this paper examines the relationship between individual wages and regional unemployment in greece the findings highlight the dynamics of the local labour markets in a case such as greece where the organisation for economic co operation and development oecd claims that wage flexibility is limited this study does not find evidence that wages in greece are rigid but finds a wage curve elasticity of close to 0 1 which corresponds to evidence from many counties interestingly graduates are found to be the most responsive group of workers to the behaviour of local labour markets livanos i le rapport salaire chomage local dans un marche du travail extremement reglemente la grece regional studies a partir des donnees provenant de 80 000 salaries cet article cherche a examiner le rapport entre les salaires des individus et le chomage regional

commodity market dynamics and the joint executive committee 1880 1886 using weekly spot and future commodity prices in chicago and new york we construct expected transportation rates for grain between these two cities expected inventory levels in new york and realized errors in the expectations of such variables we incorporate these exogenous commodity market dynamics into porter s 1983 structural modeling of the joint executive committee railroad cartel as in porter we model marginal cost as a parametric function of instrumented output among other factors unlike porter we model pricing over marginal cost as a nonparametric function of a set of variables which include expectations of deterministic demand cycles and cartel stability we estimate the pricing and demand equation simultaneously and semiparametrically our estimated weekly markups during periods of cartel stability are shown to reflect optimal collusive pricing over deterministic business cycles as modeled in haltiwanger and harrington 1991 periods of cartel instability are proven to be trigger

a price discrimination theory of coupons the objective of this paper is to analyze the consumer s decision in electing to use cents off coupons distributed by manufacturers of consumer products arguing that the decision to use coupons is based on the tradeoff between costs of using coupons and the savings obtained it is shown that coupons can serve as a price discrimination device to provide a lower price to a particular segment of consumers based on a price theoretic model it is shown that the users of coupons are more price elastic than nonusers of coupons and that the opportunity cost of time and other household resource variables are determinant factors in consumers decisions implications derived from the model are tested using diary panel data

research note consumer addressability and customized pricing the increasing availability of customer information is giving many firms the ability to reach and customize price and other marketing efforts to the tastes of the individual consumer this ability is labeled as consumer addressability consumer addressability through sophisticated databases is particularly important for direct marketing firms catalog retailers such as l l bean and land s end credit card issuing banks and firms in the long distance telephone market we examine the strategic implications of consumer addressability on competition between database direct marketing firms we address questions such as in a competitive environment how should firms invest in addressability will future improvements in the degree of addressability increase or mitigate the intensity of competition between the firms will greater addressability always be beneficial for firms we model competition between two firms in a market where consumers differ on a horizontal attribute of product differentiation the market comprises consumers located on a linear attribute space and firms located at the ends of the line we represent the degree of addressability or the reach of a firm s database as the proportion of consumers at each point in the market who are in the firm s database consequently the firm can offer these consumers customized prices consumer addressability creates two effects that govern the competition between firms a surplus extraction effect because a firm might address a consumer who is not reached by its competitor and a competitive effect that is created by the set of consumers who can be addressed by both firms the key results of the paper pertain to when the addressability decision is endogenous when the extent of market differentiation or consumer heterogeneity in preferences for a product brand attribute as well as the incremental cost of addressability are sufficiently large firms make symmetric investments in equilibrium given high costs firms choose sufficiently low levels of addressability low addressability and high levels of market differentiation both help reduce price competition which facilitates symmetric choice of addressability by the firms in equilibrium however when market differentiation and the cost of incremental addressability become small firms face the prospect of destructive competition as a result they strategically differentiate in their choice of addressability to mitigate this competition interestingly even in the extreme case when incremental addressability is costless not every firm chooses full addressability in equilibrium this has useful implications for direct marketing given that the advances in information technology should improve the ability of firms to address their consumers it might indeed not be desirable for all direct marketing firms to indefinitely pursue greater addressability as costs of doing so decline the analysis also shows an interesting effect of market differentiation in addressable markets equilibrium profits can decrease with an increase in market differentiation when the marginal cost of addressability is sufficiently high finally we discuss the competitive outcome that would result when firms compete with addressable as well as uniform posted prices

a model of price promotions with consumer search this paper presents a price discrimination model of price promotions the distinguishing feature of our model is the explicit distinction between regular and promotional prices regular prices are chosen first then promotional prices further while regular prices are always available to everyone promotional prices are only available when offered and only to those who search for them we show that even a monopolist will offer random promotions under these circumstances furthermore as search costs increase the frequency and depth of promotions increase with competition for the promotion oriented consumers the seller becomes more aggressive in his promotional policies even more so as search costs increase the high reservation price consumers however end up worse off with competition

product differentiation and collusion sustainability when collusion is costly a widely debated question in recent years by both strategy theorists and antitrust practitioners is what role product differentiation between firms plays in their ability to sustain a collusive agreement in order to reduce the strength of competition and gain higher profits this paper addresses the following question what happens to the product differentiation collusion sustainability relationship when setting up and maintaining an agreement is costly we show that introducing collusion costs into the discussion has relevant implications indeed sufficiently high collusion costs modify the underlying market structure thus altering the product differentiation collusion sustainability relationship with respect to the case where collusion costs are absent or low in particular if the gains from collusion are increasing decreasing with the degree of product differentiation the relationship between product differentiation and collusion sustainability is always positive negative whereas if the gains from collusion are inverted u shaped the relationship is inverted u shaped too these results stress the importance of considering those markets where the coordination between firms is sufficiently costly as structurally different from those markets where coordination has no costs for firms

price discrimination and social welfare studies the effect of price discrimination on social welfare using methods from duality theory features of the reservation model presented quasi linear utility and consumers surplus upper and lower bounds on welfare change bounds on welfare change with optimal price discrimination from ebsco

competitive price discrimination strategies in a vertical channel using aggregate retail data we explore opportunities for targeted pricing for a retailer that only tracks weekly store level aggregate sales and marketing mix information we show that it is possible using these data to recover essential features of the underlying distribution of consumer willingness to pay knowledge of this distribution may enable the retailer to generate additional profits from targeting by using choice information at the checkout counter in estimating demand we incorporate a supply side model of the distribution channel that captures important features of competitive price setting behavior of firms this latter aspect helps us control for the potential endogeneity generated by unmeasured product characteristics in aggregate data the channel controls for competitive aspects both between manufacturers and between manufacturers and a retailer despite this competition we find that targeted pricing need not generate the prisoner s dilemma in our data this contrasts with the findings of theoretical models due to the flexibility of the empirical model of demand the demand system we estimate captures richer forms of product differentiation both vertical and horizontal as well as a more flexible distribution of consumer heterogeneity

the unknown masterpiece marx s model of capital this paper develops an alternative to traditional interpretations of karl marx rooted in his 1859 preface widely regarded as the definitive summary of his materialist conception of society it does this by reading marx in the light of the ontology of realism and the reproductive mode of inference via an examination of some pivotal texts centered around the grundrisse notebooks the paper indicates how a realist understanding of marx s reproductive method can be used to reconstruct and develop its creation marx s model of capital copyright 1998 by oxford university press

customer information sharing among rival firms abstract the recent rapid growth of the internet as a medium of communication and commerce combined with the development of sophisticated software tools are to a large extent responsible for producing a new kind of information databases with detailed records about consumers preferences these databases have become part of a firm s assets and as such they can be sold to third parties this possibility has raised numerous concerns from consumer privacy advocates and regulators who have entered into a heated debate with business groups and industry associations about whether the practice of customer information sharing should be banned regulated or left unchecked this paper investigates the incentives of rival firms to share their customer specific information and evaluates the welfare implications if such exchanges are banned in the context of a perfect price discrimination model

pay as you wish pricing some firms use a curious pricing mechanism called pay as you wish pricing payw when payw is used a firm lets consumers decide what a product is worth to them and how much they want to pay to get the product this practice has been observed in a number of industries in this paper we theoretically investigate why and where payw can be a profitable pricing strategy relative to the conventional pay as asked pricing paap strategy we show that payw has a number of advantages over paap such that it is well suited for some industries but not for others these advantages are as follows 1 payw helps a firm to maximally penetrate a market 2 it allows a firm to price discriminate among heterogenous consumers 3 it helps to moderate price competition we derive conditions under which payw dominates paap and discuss ways to improve the profitability of payw

social positioning and the nature of money the question of the nature of money is pursued drawing on results generated in the field of social ontology as well as on observations from history the conception of the nature of money found in this manner to be the most sustainable is compared to various other prominent if usually held to be mutually incompatible theories

the wage curve a review in the wage qurve david g blancflower and andrew j oswald argue that there is a fundamental negative relation between wages and the unemployment rate in a worker s local labor market blancflower and oswald use large scale micro data sets to estimate this relation for the united states britain and 10 other countries i review their empirical methods and findings and provide some further evidence on the nature of the wage curve relationship in the united states i conclude that there is a strong statistical correlation between rates of pay and local unemployment although the interpretation of this correlation remains unresolved this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

economic and ecological concepts for valuing ecosystem services abstract the purpose of this special issue is to elucidate concepts of value and methods of valuation that will assist in guiding human decisions vis a vis ecosystems the concept of ecosystem service value can be a useful guide when distinguishing and measuring where trade offs between society and the rest of nature are possible and where they can be made to enhance human welfare in a sustainable manner while win win opportunities for human activities within the environment may exist they also appear to be increasingly scarce in a full global ecological economic system this makes valuation all the more essential for guiding future human activity this paper provides some history background and context for many of the issues addressed by the remaining papers in this special issue its purpose is to place both economic and ecological meanings of value and their respective valuation methods in a comparative context highlighting strengths weakness and addressing questions that arise from their integration

coordinating price reductions and coupon events abstract in this article the authors use an economic model to show that it may be optimal to lower the retail price during a coupon event when marginal consumers have moderate hassle costs of coupon redemption results from the model offer predictions on the relationships among coupon redemptions shelf price and coupon face value the authors test these predictions on a large data set of hundreds of coupon events across six packaged goods categories the data show that when a small coupon face value is offered the shelf price is likely to be reduced they also find that coupon efficiency increases when there is a lower retail price the results are of interest to managers planning a promotion calendar and deciding whether to coordinate price promotions with coupon events and they contribute to economic theory when a firm moves from uniform pricing e g no coupons to second degree price discrimination e g coupons all consumers may face a lower price this finding has public policy implication

the strategic role of exchange promotions an exchange promotion allows consumers to turn in an old good and receive a discount toward the purchase of a new product the old good that is turned in can either be within the same category as the new good or it may be in a different category for example one can turn in an old cd player to count toward a new cd player a within category exchange or traditional trade in or toward a new television a cross category exchange this paper studies both within category and multicategory exchange promotions and analyzes their similarities and differences in a competitive setting with two firms we model exchange promotions and establish the equilibrium outcomes we find that categories in which consumers have a high level of waste aversion are more likely to have multicategory exchange promotions rather than within category or no promotions multicategory exchange promotions can increase both consumers replacement purchases and their new purchases interestingly we also find that strategic considerations can lead to a prisoner s dilemma outcome in which neither firm offers any kind of exchange promotion however waste aversion and multicategory exchange promotions can give firms stronger incentives to get out of the prisoner s dilemma outcome

invited commentary structural modeling in marketing some future possibilities the growing interest in using structural modeling to test theories of consumer and firm behavior stems from the increased availability of market data at the individual level both longitudinal and crosssectional for a variety of products the emergence of online consumer panels where data on behavioral intentions can be collected and the availability of retail transactional data from online stores can be expected to only accelerate the trend hence the recent review article by chintagunta et al 2006 is a timely contribution to the structural modeling along with other recent contributions by wittink 2005 franses 2005a b van heerde et al 2005 and bronnenberg et al 2005 chintagunta et al 2006 and the other authors mentioned discuss the state of the art in the development and application of structural models in marketing they discuss the advantages and disadvantages of using structural modeling to test marketplace theories and the cautions to be observed in the valida

personalized pricing and advertising an asymmetric equilibrium analysis we study personalized price competition with costly advertising among n quality cost differentiated firms strategies involve mixing over both prices and whether to advertise in equilibrium only the top two firms advertise earning bertrand like profits welfare losses initially rise then fall with the ad cost with losses due to excessive advertising and sales by the wrong firm when firms are symmetric the symmetric equilibrium yields perverse comparative statics and is unstable our key results apply when demand is elastic when ad costs are heterogeneous and with noise in consumer tastes

the turkish wage curve evidence from the household labor force survey this paper examines the turkish wage curve using individual data from the household labor force survey including 26 nuts 2 regions over the period 2005 2008 we find an unemployment elasticity of 0 099 with a higher elasticity for younger less educated less experienced and female workers

commentaries and rejoinder to marketing of vice goods a strategic analysis of the package size decision by sanjay jain jain jain s 2012 marketing of vice goods a strategic analysis of the package size decision marketing sci 31 1 36 51 examines the impact of consumers self control problem on the equilibrium package sizes offered by firms marketing vice goods this series of discussions offers commentaries and a rejoinder that discuss competitive implications of firms offering small sizes and the impact of smaller sizes on the total consumer expenditure

endogenous switching costs in a duopoly model we analyze the effect of alternative pricing policies on the competitive outcome in a two period differentiated product duopoly model if firms can precommit to a second period price for their loyal customers equilibrium profits fall but if they precommit to a discount then the equilibrium profits increase in either case switching costs are endogenized in period two firms discriminate against newcomers

competitive promotional strategies this article analyzes the equilibrium pricing strategies of brands engaged in a pricing game each brand has a monopoly market loyal consumers and competes with others in a common market called brand switchers in the case of a duopoly it is shown that the behavior of the brand switchers characterizes the equilibrium behavior of the duopolists this article focuses on two key comparative statics namely the depth of discounts away from a regular high price and the probability of giving a deal or the frequency of deals how these properties vary with the size of the loyal markets and the behavior of the brand switching population is discussed copyright 1988 by the university of chicago

non discrimination clauses in the retail energy sector the british energy regulator will soon review a non discrimination licence condition which it imposed to ensure that energy retailers charge the same mark up in different regions many consumers are loyal to incumbent firms necessitating heavy discounting by entrants to attract customers which had led to regional price discrimination matching characteristics of the energy market to models of discrimination we identify the necessary conditions for the licence condition to have a positive effect for consumers and explore whether the policy has helped potentially vulnerable consumers we conclude that the most likely effect of the licence condition is to reduce competition in the mainstream energy markets and welcome the regulator s latest review of the retail market

behavior based pricing in vertically differentiated industries we study behavior based pricing bbp in a vertically differentiated model vertical differentiation is innately asymmetric because all customers prefer the higher quality product when prices are equal this asymmetry causes bbp to have different properties than symmetric horizontally differentiated models we highlight two dimensions that affect the analysis the role of quality adjusted cost differences between the firms and the role of consumer discounting relative to firm discounting in the second period consistent with the prior literature we find that there are conditions based on market shares and quality adjusted costs under which either the low quality firm or the high quality firm but not both will reward its current customers with lower prices than it charges to new customers we then consider whether these conditions can arise in a two period equilibrium we find that if consumers sufficiently discount the future periods then firms at enough of a competitive disadvantage will reward their customers i e the low quality firm will reward its current customers if the quality adjusted cost differential between the two firms is small while the high quality firm will reward its current customers if this cost differential is large conversely we find that if consumers do not discount the future very much then the firm at a competitive disadvantage i e a low quality firm competing against a low cost high quality firm or a high quality firm that has very high costs can earn greater profits with bbp than without bbp although there are cases where both firms may benefit from bbp this paper was accepted by j miguel villas boas marketing

pricing with cookies behavior based price discrimination and spatial competition we present a model of dynamic competition between two firms where firms gather customer information through first period purchase this creates asymmetric information in the second period whereby a

a theory of channel price promotions manufacturers can stimulate sales by a temporary wholesale price reduction for the retailer a rebate directed toward consumers or a combination of both the trade offs between these price promotions are analyzed providing insights about their roles profitability and welfare properties retailers rebates are also studied while price discrimination is a common explanation for rebates to consumers when a product is sold through a distribution channel the manufacturer may also use rebates to motivate retail participation in the promotion this explains why rebates may be offered even when all consumers use them and price discrimination does not occur copyright 1991 by american economic association

individual marketing with imperfect targetability our research investigates the competitive ramifications of individual marketing and information management in today s information intensive marketing environments the specific managerial issues we address are as follows first what kinds of incentive environments do competing firms face when they can only target individual customers imperfectly second does the improvement in an industry s targetability intensify price competition in the industry such that all competing firms become worse off third should a firm share its customer knowledge so as to improve its rival s targetability fourth how should an information vendor sell its information that can improve a firm s targetability finally do competing firms have the same incentives to invest in their own targetability to answer those questions we develop a simple model a la narasimhan 1988 in which each of the two competing firms have their own loyal customers and compete for common switchers we assume that each firm can classify its own loyal customers and switchers correctly only with a less than perfect probability this means that each firm s perceived customer segmentation differs from the actual customer segmentation based on their perceived reality these two competing firms engage in price competition as an extension we also allow the competing firms to make their investment decisions to acquire targetability we show that when individual marketing is feasible but imperfect improvements in targetability by either or both competing firms can lead to win win competition for both even if both players behave noncooperatively and the market does not expand win win competition results from the fact that as a firm becomes better at distinguishing its price insensitive loyal customers from the switchers it is motivated to charge a higher price to the former however due to imperfect targetability each firm mistakenly perceives some price sensitive switchers as price insensitive loyal customers and charges them all a higher price these misperceptions thus allow its competitors to acquire those mistargeted customers without lowering their prices and hence reduce the rival firm s incentive to cut prices this effect softens price competition in the market and qualitatively changes the incentive environment for competing firms engaged in individual marketing a prisoner s dilemma occurs only when targetability in a market reaches a sufficiently high level this win win perspective on individual marketing has many managerial implications first we show that superior knowledge of individual customers can be a competitive advantage however this does not mean that a firm should always protect its customer information from its competitors to the contrary we find that competing firms can all benefit from exchanging individual customer information with each other at the nascent stage of individual marketing when firms targetability is low indeed under certain circumstances a firm may even find it profitable to give away this information unilaterally however as individual marketing matures as firms targetability becomes sufficiently high further improvements in targetability will intensify price competition and lead to prisoner s dilemma therefore it is not only prudent politics but also a business imperative for an industry to seize the initiative on the issue of protecting customer privacy so as to ensure win win competition in the industry second we show that the firm with a larger number of loyal customers tends to invest more in targetability when the cost of acquiring targetability is high however the firm with a smaller loyal base can through information investment acquire a higher level of targetability than the firm with a larger loyal base as long as the cost of acquiring targetability is not too high as the cost further decreases competing firms will all have more incentives to increase their investments in targetability until they achieve the highest feasible level third an information vendor should make its information available nonexclusively exclusively when its information is associated with a low high level of targetability when the vendor does sell its information exclusively it should target a firm with a small loyal following if it can impart a high level of targetability to that firm finally our analysis shows that an information intensive environment does not doom small firms in fact individual marketing may provide a good opportunity for a small firm to leapfrog a large firm the key to leapfrogging is a high level of targetability or customer knowledge

product diversion to a direct competitor a manufacturer will often limit competition among downstream partners by authorizing only a select group of retailers to carry its product however it is not uncommon for authorized retailers to create an additional competitor by diverting units to an unauthorized seller this paper presents an analytical model that demonstrates how diversion from authorized retailers to an unauthorized direct competitor can occur under circumstances not considered by the prior literature in fact diversion can represent a prisoner s dilemma whereby retailers diminish their own profit by selling to the unauthorized direct seller the authorized retailer s profit loss actually increases as the per unit diversion costs incurred by the authorized retailer decrease the model also shows that the unauthorized direct seller earns greater profit by strategically procuring a unilaterally constraining quantity even though this procurement strategy results in an equivalent increase in the quantity sold by the retailers combined the results identify a new reason for diversion and its consequences for retailers and the unauthorized direct seller

behavioral price discrimination in the presence of switching costs we study the strategic impacts of behavioral price discrimination bpd on manufacturers and retailers in a distribution channel when there are switching costs in consumer demand unlike previous empirical studies of behavioral price discrimination which rely only on differences in price elasticity across customers our pricing model allows the firm strategies to additionally account for differences in price elasticity across time due to switching costs we estimate a dynamic pricing model using empirical data from the cola category and through a series of counterfactuals we find that the retailer should simply outsource the data analytics and customization of coupons to manufacturers and improve its profit beyond what it can achieve by proactively couponing on its own we further find that serving as an information broker to sell its customer database to manufacturers can be a vital source of profit to the retailer by contrast manufacturers end up worse off illustrating that customer information

pricing information goods a strategic analysis of the selling and pay per use mechanisms we analyze two pricing mechanisms for information goods these mechanisms are selling where up front payment allows unrestricted use and pay per use where payments are tailored to use we analytically model a market where consumers differ in use frequency and where use on a pay per use basis invokes a psychological cost associated with the well known ticking meter effect we demonstrate that pay per use yields higher profits in a monopoly provided the associated psychological cost is low in a duopoly one firm uses selling and the other uses pay per use here in contrast to the monopoly selling yields higher profits than pay per use we demonstrate that surprisingly the profits of both duopolists can increase as the psychological cost associated with pay per use increases next we show that uncertainty in consumer use frequency does not affect pay per use in a monopoly but lowers profits from selling in a duopoly both the seller and the pay per use provider obtain lower profits when use frequency is uncertain we also analyze how pricing mechanism performance is affected if the firms cannot commit to prices if the pay per use provider offers a two part tariff and if consumers are risk averse

price discrimination in grocery trade evidence from italy this paper investigates the determinants of price dispersion between staple and non staple goods in grocery retailing as the result of pricing decisions by multiproduct firms theoretical predictions about the nature of supermarkets pricing behaviour are compared and tested empirically using disaggregated data from the italian grocery trade over the period 1990 1992 the empirical results provide evidence for the existence in all types of retail organization of the form of price discrimination suggested by bliss particularly for specialist shops the results are consistent with discrimination due to the exploitation of consumers switching costs

research note using basket composition data for intelligent supermarket pricing how can supermarkets use the vast data they have to design strategies to compete for large basket shoppers potentially their most profitable customers we say analyze the data to glean basket composition of heterogeneous consumers of theoretical and practical interest is the question will our suggestion improve supermarket profits and if so by what pricing strategies by answering this we can also answer the question do results of extant research on single product marketing that using such information intensifies competition and lowers profits generalize to multiproduct marketing by supermarkets that carry several products and whose patrons purchase multiple items we derive equilibrium data based intelligent pricing strategies that also produce increased supermarket profits what is more interesting is our result that data analysis is profitable whether or not a competitor undertakes data analysis if not too costly implementing data analysis is a dominant strategy moreover with comprehensive data analysis connecting basket information and household data stores can increase profits further by targeting rewards at individual households thereby segmenting the market more completely in contrast to past research findings we show that for supermarkets even under competition use of information on past purchases enables intelligent pricing better segmentation and higher profits

easing countries transitions from price controls and subsidies abstract in transitional economies initial popular support of market reforms is often followed by disillusionment and repudiation of the reform program to facilitate economic transition this paper proposes a marketable discount coupon system dcs that reassures the public even as an economy moves from nonmarket to market prices unlike price controls subsidies or ration coupons dcs involves no queuing or allocative distortions unlike vouchers dcs would not be negated by inflation to avoid distortions discount coupons would be marketable and redeemable even without purchase of specific products this procedure permits efficient adjustment of domestic prices to international levels

monopolistic competition price discrimination and welfare abstract this paper studies third degree price discrimination in a monopolistically competitive market when the number of firms is fixed price discrimination raises firm profit and reduces consumer welfare relative to uniform pricing when entry is endogenized the equilibrium product variety under price discrimination is always excessive compared with the social optimum whereas under uniform pricing variety may be too much or too little except when entry is far below the welfare optimum under uniform pricing a ban on price discrimination leads to enhanced consumer and social welfare

imperfect price discrimination in a vertical differentiation model abstract we explore the competitive implications of third degree price discrimination based on consumer information of varying degrees of precision in a vertical differentiation duopoly model we show that if the cost of information is below a threshold only the high quality firm will acquire it and offer targeted promotions while the low quality firm will commit to a uniform price for any degree of consumer information precision equilibrium profits of the high quality firm are monotonically increasing and that of the low quality firm monotonically decreasing as a function of the consumer information precision finally social and consumer welfare are monotonically increasing with respect to the precision of consumer information

two paradoxes with one stone a critical reading of ecological modernization abstract the current contribution aims at critically reviewing state initiatives in the frame of ecological modernization under the lenses of the labor theory of value further the article addresses two phenomena related to ecological modernization that have received much attention namely the porter hypothesis and the jevons paradox state led environmental regulation in terms of environmental legislation as well as initiatives to promote green technology can be understood as a twofold attempt which ultimately leads to re defining socially necessary labor time first state intervention would wish to remove surplus profit from polluting or resource depleting capitals through legislation which would tend to increase socially necessary labor time in the branch of production under reference state policy might then attempt to propel the adoption of green technology which would tend to decrease socially necessary labor time in the sectors targeted through state initiatives competition among rival capitals would be re aligned so as to allow for conditions of production to be renewed the porter hypothesis can be approached as a strategy followed by individual capitals to gain an early mover advantage while the jevons paradox can be seen as the result of an imitation process when rival capitals take up technological modifications launched by innovators

the perils of behavior based personalization behavior based personalization has gained popularity in recent years whereby businesses offer personalized products based on consumers purchase histories this paper highlights two perils of behavior based personalization in competitive markets first although purchase histories reveal consumer preferences competitive exploitation of such information damages differentiation similar to the classic finding that behavior based price discrimination intensifies price competition with endogenous product design there is yet a second peril it emerges when forward looking firms try to avoid the first peril by suppressing the information value of purchase histories ideally if a market leader serves all consumers on day 1 purchase histories contain no information about consumer preferences however knowing that their rivals are willing to accommodate a market leader firms are more likely to offer a mainstream design at day 1 which jeopardizes differentiation based on this understanding i investigate how the perils of behavior based personalization change under alternative market conditions such as firms better knowledge about their own customers consumer loyalty and inertia consumer self selection and the need for classic designs

the effects of third degree price discrimination in oligopoly retail firms and restaurants commonly offer senior citizen discounts i suspect this practice is not motivated by altruism rather the behavior can be better explained as profit maximizing price discrimination these firms are setting a low price in a market which probably has high elasticity of demand but why should the demand of senior citizens be more elastic than average one possibility is that elderly people have below average income and they would not eat out if restaurant prices were high perhaps a more plausible explanation is that retired people simply have more time on their hands to spend commuting across town to take advantage of discounts the purpose of these discounts may then be to lure senior citizens away from other restaurants rather than to get them out of the house the analysis of third degree price discrimination has a long history a c pigou 1920 joan robinson 1933 and two articles on the subject have recently appeared in this review richard schmalensee 1981 hal varian 1985 the industry structure in these analyses is monopoly but an explicit model of some form of competition is obviously needed to study discriminatory discounts meant to attract customers from rival firms and even discounts meant to get people out of the house may have an oligopoly analysis which is qualitatively different from their monopoly anlysis in this paper i present a simple duopoly model of a differentiated products industry i show that a firm s price elasticity of demand in a market can be expressed as the sum of two parts the industry demand elasticity and the cross price elasticity the first measures the tendency of consumers in a market to stay home when the price goes up the second the tendency to switch suppliers in the monopoly case in which the crossprice elasticity is zero and the collusive case in which the cross price elasticity is irrelevant discrimination between markets is due to differences in industry demand elasticity in the noncooperative oligopoly case equilibrium price differentials can be accounted for both by differences in cross price elasticity as well as differences in industry demand elasticity total industry output when the firms can discriminate between two markets is compared to what it would be if discrimination were impossible which regime has larger output depends on the sum of the adjustedconcavity condition and the elasticity ratio condition the first predominates when the rival products are poor substitutes and the firms have approximate monopoly power while the second predominates at the other extreme where the products are close substitutes and the firms have almost no market power the adjusted concavity condition compares the relative curvature of demands in the two markets and was originally discovered by robinson 1933 in her analysis of monopoly price discrimination the elasticity ratio condition compares the relative difference in industry demand elasticity between the two markets with the relative difference in cross price elasticity according to the elasticity ratio condition a discriminatory discount due to high industry elasticity of demand would be more likely to increase total output than one due to high cross price elasticity the effect of discrimination on profit is also discussed the distinction made here department of economics university of wisconsin madison madison wi 53706 this paper is a revision of part of my doctoral dissertation i am grateful to steve matthews ken judd and john panzar for guidance in this research i also thank seminar participants at wisconsin the justice department and the 1986 econometric society meetings in new orleans and the discussant martin perry the excellent comments of the referees improved the exposition of the paper

labour market reforms in greece and the wage curve we offer strong evidence of a wage curve mechanism in greece which seems to be substantially enhanced by reforms aimed at increasing labour market flexibility male older more qualified and rural employees appear to be more sensitive to regional unemployment

the german wage curve evidence from the iab employment sample abstract this paper examines the german wage curve using the institut fur arbeitsmarkt und berufsforschung iab employment sample over the period 1981 1990 a random sample of 6590 employees covering 142 labor market regions over a ten year period is considered the total number of observations is 40 852 taking into account the endogeneity of unemployment as well as controlling for region and time effects this paper finds support for the wage curve in germany the overall unemployment elasticity estimate is 0 07 and is higher for younger workers than older workers the wages of less qualified workers are more responsive to local unemployment rates than the wages of more qualified workers also the wages of men are slightly more responsive to local unemployment rates than the wages of women ignoring endogeneity of the local unemployment rate yields results in favor of the wage curve only for younger and less qualified workers accounting for endogeneity of the unemployment rate yields evidence in favor of the wage curve across all types of workers

targeted pricing and customer data sharing among rivals it is increasingly observable that competitors in different industries share customer data which can be used for targeted pricing we propose a modified hotelling model with two dimensional consumer heterogeneity to analyze the incentives for such sharing and its ensuing welfare effects we show that these incentives depend on the type of customer data and on consumer heterogeneity in the strength of brand preferences only data on consumer transportation cost parameters is shared the incentives to do so are stronger if consumers are relatively homogeneous customer data sharing is most likely to be detrimental to consumer surplus while the effect on social welfare can be positive

add on pricing by asymmetric firms this paper uses an analytical model to examine the consequences of add on pricing when firms are both horizontally and vertically differentiated and there is a segment of boundedly rational consumers who are unaware of the add on fees at the time of initial purchase we find that consumers who know the add on fees can be penalized and increasingly so by the existence of boundedly rational consumers our consideration of quality asymmetries on base goods and add ons plus the inclusion of boundedly rational consumers leads to several novel findings regarding firm profits when quality asymmetry is on base goods only and with boundedly rational consumers add on pricing can diminish profit for a qualitatively superior firm and increase profit for an inferior firm i e a lose win result compared to when add on pricing is prohibited or infeasible when quality asymmetries exist on both base goods and add ons and without boundedly rational consumers the opposite win lose result prevails when quality asymmetries exist on both base goods and add ons and with boundedly rational consumers the result can be win win win lose or lose win depending on the magnitude of quality differentiation on add ons this paper was accepted by j miguel villas boas marketing

personalized pricing and quality differentiation we develop an analytical framework to investigate the competitive implications of personalized pricing pp whereby firms charge different prices to different consumers based on their willingness to pay we embed pp in a model of vertical product differentiation and show how it affects firms choices over quality we show that firms optimal pricing strategies with pp may be nonmonotonic in consumer valuations when the pp firm has high quality both firms raise their qualities relative to the uniform pricing case conversely when the pp firm has low quality both firms lower their qualities although many firms are trying to implement such pricing policies we find that a higher quality firm can actually be worse off with pp while it is optimal for the firm adopting pp to increase product differentiation the non pp firm seeks to reduce differentiation by moving in closer in the quality space while pp results in a wider market coverage it also leads to aggravated price competition between firms because this entails a change in equilibrium qualities the nature of the cost function determines whether firms gain or lose by implementing such pp policies despite the threat of first degree price discrimination we find that pp with competing firms can lead to an overall increase in consumer welfare

pricing and promotions in asymmetric duopolies this paper develops a modeling framework for making promotions decisions in contrast to some of the prior research the framework explicitly models promotions its central feature is the view of promotions competition as a multistage game in which regular prices are chosen first followed by the choice of promotion depths and frequencies it is used to illustrate the nature of competition between a national brand and private label in equilibrium the national brand promotes to ensure that the private label does not try to attract consumers away from the national brand moreover the private label does not promote this equilibrium is also contrasted with varian s framework used by other researchers in which mixed strategy equilibrium prices are interpreted as promotions

an empirical investigation of the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination rand 054 rand2007 cls 1994 07 13 v1 2u standard latex document class rand rand 054 dispatch 12 7 2008 ce n a journal msp no no of pages 26 pe sharon rand journal of economics vol 40 no 1 spring 2009 pp 20 45 an empirical investigation of the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination sofia berto villas boas economic theory does not provide sharp predictions on the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination if downstream cost differences exist then discrimination shifts production inefficiently toward high cost retailers so a ban increases welfare if differences in price elasticity of demand across retailers exist discrimination may increase welfare if quantity sold increases so a ban reduces welfare using retail prices and quantities of coffee brands sold by german retailers i estimate a model of demand and supply and separate cost and demand differences simulating a ban on wholesale price discrimination has positive welfare effects in this market and less if downstream cost differences shrink or with less competition introduction wholesale price discrimination means that an upstream firm sets different prices for the same product for various downstream retailers wholesale price discrimination is commonly practiced in many markets examples include markets such as petroleum distribution steel heavy trucking tobacco and pharmaceuticals in several countries milk and other dairy products are sold using government administered or sanctioned discriminatory pricing schemes wholesale price discrimination practices are also used for services such as loans insurance and advertising 1 competition authorities have been concerned with wholesale price discrimination the european union treaty s article 82 c prohibits practices where a dominant firm would place trading partners at a competitive disadvantage the u s robinson patman act forbids discriminat ing in price between different purchasers where the effect may be to lessen competition unless the university of california berkeley sberto are berkeley edu i thank the editor igal hendel and two anonymous referees for many helpful comments and max auffhammer cyndi berck peter berck gal hochman silke januszewski forbes george judge kai uwe k uhn diana lazo mark muendler aviv nevo ariel pakes jeff perloff andrew sweeting miguel villas boas and participants at uc san diego university of michigan the inra idei conference in toulouse and the university of british columbia summer conference in industrial organization for their suggestions i thank daniel klapper for letting me have access to the data support from the giannini foundation and from an aes grant are gratefully appreciated see for gasoline markets texaco v hasbrouck 496 us 543 no 87 2048 1990 and the new york state motor fuel marketing practices act for steel chan hall and rust 2003 for heavy trucking volvo trucks north america inc v reeder simco gmc inc docket no 04 905 for tobacco brooke group ltd v brown and williamson tobacco corp 509 us 209 no 92 466 1993 for wholesale pharmaceuticals see http www datcp state wi us trade business unfair comp drug price jsp for dairy markets see for example gardner 1984 and for services see givens 1983 c 2009 rand copyright

should mobile marketers collect data other than geo location we take today s mobile marketing data landscape as a starting point and consider a duopoly model of third degree price discrimination in which firms can complement geo location information with data on consumer flexibility of varying quality we show that depending on consumer heterogeneity higher quality flexibility data affect profits according to three different patterns in equilibrium both firms tend to acquire data if the data are of high quality while only one acquires data if the data quality is low firms are likely to gain from additional data if consumers have similar preferences and or when data are precise although social welfare weakly improves consumers can be harmed

segmentation advertising and prices this paper explores the implications of market segmentation on firm competitiveness in contrast to earlier work here market segmentation is minimal in the sense that it is based on consumer attributes that are completely unrelated to tastes we show that when the market is comprised by two consumer segments and when there is sufficient variation in the per consumer costs firms need to incur to access the different consumer populations then firms obtain positive profits in symmetric equilibrium otherwise the equilibrium is characterized by zero profits as a result a minimal form of market segmentation combined with advertising cost asymmetries across consumer segments give firms an opportunity to generate positive rents in an otherwise bertrand like environment

dealing temporary price cuts by seller as a buyer discrimination mechanism this paper is concerned with temporary price cuts deals sales and specials as a mechanism for the seller to price discriminate between buyers with different intensities of demand we analyze why a seller offers such price cuts which buyers take advantage of them and what the parameters are that determine the amount and frequency of the discount offered in the remainder of this section we briefly review the literature on price deals 1 in section ii simple models of buyer and seller behavior are developed and we show why and how a seller adopts a dealing strategy section iii summarizes the key implications of the model and indicates how the price discrimination hypothesis could be tested in practice section iv suggests possible extensions of the model finally section v gives our conclusions in the marketing literature the issue of who is deal prone has been extensively researched an explanation for temporary price cuts usually called deals sales or specials is provided we hypothesize that they are a mechanism that discriminates between more intense and less intense demanders we further hypothesize a positive relationship between demand elasticity and holding costs buyers with more intense demand with high holding costs are those who will be buying the product at its regular price the low holdingcost buyers take advantage of deals by forward buying the model is applicable to three relationships 1 manufacturer reseller where the reseller may be a wholesaler or a retailer 2 resellerreseller for example wholesaler retailer and 3 retailer consumer we are grateful to michael mussa and albert madansky for their comments we also benefited from comments made by the marketing faculty of the wharton school at a seminar where an earlier version of this paper was presented neil beckwith in particular is acknowledged 1 for a more detailed review of deals and similar pricecutting mechanisms e g mail in rebates cents off labels coupons etc see narsimhan 1982 chan 2 journal of business 1985 vol 58 no 3 1985 by the university of chicago all rights reserved 0021 9398185 5803 0004 01 50

technical note personalized dynamic pricing of limited inventories prior work has investigated time and inventory level dependent pricing of limited inventories with finite selling horizons we consider a third dimension in addition to time and inventory level that the firms can use in setting their prices the information that the firm has at the individual customer level an arriving customer provides a signal to the firm which is an imperfect indicator of the customer s willingness to pay and the firm makes a personalized price offer depending on the signal inventory level and time we consider two different models full personalization and partial personalization in the full personalization model the firm charges any price it wishes given the customer signal while in the partial personalization model the firm can charge one of two prices we find that a mere correlation between the signals and customers willingness to pay is not sufficient to ensure intuitive relationships between the signal and the optimal prices we determine a stronger condition which leads to several structural properties including the monotonicity of the optimal price with respect to the signal in the full personalization model for the partial personalization model we show that the optimal pricing policy is of threshold type and that the threshold is monotonic in the inventory level and time

pricing with customer recognition abstract this article studies the dynamic effects of behaviour based price discrimination and customer recognition in a duopolistic market where the distribution of consumers preferences is discrete consumers are myopic and firms are forward looking in the static and first period equilibrium firms choose prices with mixed strategies when price discrimination is allowed forward looking firms have an incentive to avoid customer recognition thus the probability that both will have positive first period sales decreases as they become more patient furthermore an asymmetric equilibrium sometimes exists yielding a 100 0 division of the first period sales as a whole price discrimination is bad for profits but good for consumer surplus and welfare

multi dimensional price discrimination we examine the profitability and welfare implications of price discrimination in a multi dimensional model first when firms price discriminate on one and the same dimension uniform price lies in between discriminatory prices and price discrimination raises profits relative to uniform pricing this is in contrast to common findings in existing one dimensional models featuring best response asymmetry suggesting that price discrimination can have qualitatively different implications in one and multi dimensional models second price discrimination on one and the same dimension is the likely outcome when price discrimination decisions are endogenized using a two stage discrimination then pricing game correspondingly an observation of one dimensional price discrimination in practice does not necessarily indicate that the underlying model should be one dimensional