attracting attention cheap managerial talk and costly market monitoring we provide a theory of informal communication cheap talk between firms and capital markets that incorporates the role of agency conflicts between managers and shareholders the analysis suggests that a policy of discretionary disclosure that encourages managers to attract the market s attention when the firm is substantially undervalued can create shareholder value the theory also relates the credibility of managerial announcements to the use of stock based compensation the presence of informed trading and the liquidity of the stock our results are consistent with the existence of positive announcement effects produced by apparently innocuous corporate events e g stock dividends name changes recent regulations such as the sarbanes oxley act stress the importance of providing timely and accurate information to investors in practice firm information can be concealed and is often difficult to substantiate moreover there is likely to be fundamental disagreement between managers and shareholders with respect to the firm s disclosure policy managers can be reluctant to disclose information because for example it may reflect prior poor managerial decisions and hence question their performance inducing managers to disclose information is therefore an essential component of managerial incentives as a result a firm s disclosure and compensation policies are intrinsically related aspects of corporate governance that cannot be considered in isolation this paper develops a theory of information disclosure that incorporates the following two elements first managers who become informed through the course of everyday operations are unwilling to disclose their private information when it reflects poorly on them in this sense the theory explores the trade offs that agency conflicts between managers and shareholders create on information disclosure second apparently innocuous corporate actions such as andres almazan is with the university of texas at austin sanjay banerji is with the university

stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers the regular case abstract we analyze relative performance of stochastic and deterministic mechanisms in an environment that has been extensively studied in the literature on communication e g vincent p crawford joel sobel strategic information transmission econometrica 50 6 1982 1431 1451 and optimal delegation e g bengt holmstrom on the theory of delegation in m boyer r e kihlstrom eds bayesian models in economic theory north holland 1984 pp 115 141 a principal agent model with hidden information no monetary transfers and single peaked preferences we demonstrate that under the common assumption of quadratic payoffs and a certain regularity condition on the distribution of private information and the agent s bias the optimal mechanism is deterministic we also provide an explicit characterization of this mechanism

skilled labor unskilled labor and economic growth abstract we study a growth model in which workers with different skill levels are imperfect substitutes we show that economies with high substitutability between skilled and unskilled workers have high levels of capital output and a high proportion of skilled workers

ces production functions and economic growth we examine inconsistencies and controversies related to the use of ces production functions in growth models first we show that not all variants of ces functions commonly used are consistently specified second using a simple growth model we find that a higher elasticity of substitution leads to a higher steady state and makes the emergence of permanent growth more probable it is also pointed out that the effect of a higher elasticity of substitution on the speed of convergence depends on the relative scarcity of the factors of production finally we discuss possible explanations of variations in the elasticity of substitution jel classification o41 o11

money talks an experimental investigation of cheap talk and burned money we experimentally study the strategic transmission of information in a setting where both cheap talk and money can be used for communication purposes theoretically a large number of equilibria exist side by side in which senders either use costless messages money or a combination of the two we find that senders prefer to communicate through costless messages only when the interest disalignment between sender and receiver increases cheap talk tends to break down and high sender types start burning money to enhance the credibility of their costless messages a behavioral model due to kartik 2009 assuming that sellers bear a cost of lying fits the data best

we will be right with you managing customer expectations with vague promises and cheap talk delay announcements informing customers about anticipated service delays are prevalent in service oriented systems how delay announcements can influence customers in service systems is a complex problem that depends on both the dynamics of the underlying queueing system and on the customers strategic behavior we examine this problem of information communication by considering a model in which both the firm and the customers act strategically the firm in choosing its delay announcement while anticipating customer response and the customers in interpreting these announcements and in making the decision about when to join the system and when to balk we characterize the equilibrium language that emerges between the service provider and her customers the analysis of the emerging equilibria provides new and interesting insights into customer firm information sharing we show that even though the information provided to customers is nonverifiable it improves the profits of the firm and the expected utility of the customers the robustness of the results is illustrated via various extensions of the model in particular studying models with incomplete information on the system parameters allows us also to highlight the role of information provision in managing customer expectations regarding the congestion in the system further the information could be as simple as high congestion low congestion announcements or it could be as detailed as the true state of the system we also show that firms may choose to shade some of the truth by using intentional vagueness to lure customers

inflation and economic growth a multi country empirical analysis the world eocnomy is currently adjusting to a low inflation regime which has implicastions for the cross country distribution of world growth opportunities in contrast to previous related work which assumes unidirectional causality this paper uses the granger methodology to examine both the direction and pattern of causality between inflation and economic growth in 70 countries using annual data over the period 1960 89 among the conclusions are that first the relationship between inflation and growth is non uniform across countries 40 of countries studied reveal no causality one third exhibit unidirectional causality and about one fifth of countries show bidirectional causality second a vast majority of countries which show either uni or bi directional causality beong to the industrial group and third the low world inflation regime will on balance redistribute real growth opportunities benefit away from the developing countries towards the industrialized countries

dynamic pricing for network service equilibrium and stability consider a data communication network owned and operated by a single organization the network has an infinite number of small users and is managed by a system manager sm whose objective is to maximize the net value of the system as a whole the objective of this paper is to study pricing mechanisms that induce the optimal arrival rates when the sm has no full knowledge of the demand in advance we investigate the system behavior under three alternative dynamic pricing rules and users expectations models and characterize the equilibrium and its stability conditions

efficient secrecy public versus private threats in crisis diplomacy this paper explores when and why private communication works in crisis diplomacy conventional audience cost models suggest that state leaders must go public to reveal information in interstate crises because leaders cannot enhance their credibility by tying their hands if domestic audiences cannot observe their private signals i present a crisis bargaining game where both the sender and the receiver of signals have a domestic audience the equilibrium analysis demonstrates that a private threat albeit of limited credibility can be equally compelling as a fully credible public threat secrecy works in crisis diplomacy despite its informational ine cacy because secrecy insulates leaders from domestic political consequences when they capitulate to a challenge to avoid risking unwarranted war the logic of e cient secrecy may shed light on the unaccounted history of private diplomacy in international crises the alaska boundary dispute illustrates this logic

competition and outsourcing with scale economies scale economies are commonplace in operations yet because of analytical challenges relatively little is known about how firms should compete in their presence this paper presents a model of competition between two firms that face scale economies i e each firm s cost per unit of demand is decreasing in demand a general framework is used which incorporates competition between two service providers with price and time sensitive demand a queuing game and competition between two retailers with fixed ordering costs and pricesensitive consumers an economic order quantity game reasonably general conditions are provided under which there exists at most one equilibrium with both firms participating in the market we demonstrate in the context of the queuing game that the lower cost firm in equilibrium may have a higher market share and a higher price an enviable situation we also allow each firm to outsource their production process to a supplier even if the supplier s technology is no better than the firms technology and the supplier is required to establish dedicated capacity so the supplier s scale can be no greater than either firm s scale we show that the firms strictly prefer to outsource we conclude that scale economies provide a strong motivation for outsourcing that has not previously been identified in the literature

two level ces production technology in the solow and diamond growth models the two level ces aggregate production function that nests a ces into another ces function has recently been used extensively in theoretical and empirical applications of macroeconomics this paper examines its theoretical properties and establishes existence and stability conditions of equilibria under the solow and diamond growth models in addition it examines the efiect of changes in substitution parameters on transitional growth and steady states it is shown that in the solow model the su cient condition for a steady state is fulfllled for a larger range of substitution parameter values than with the basic ces function in the diamond model an increase in substitution parameters results in higher transitional growth under weaker conditions than with the basic ces function

a note on cheap talk and burned money abstract austen smith and banks cheap talk and burned money j econ theory 91 1 2000 1 16 study how money burning can expand the set of pure cheap talk equilibria of crawford and sobel strategic information transmission econometrica 50 6 1982 1431 1451 i identify an error in the main theorem of austen smith and banks and provide a variant that preserves some of the important implications i also prove that cheap talk can be influential with money burning if and only if it can be influential without money burning this strengthens a result of austen smith and banks but uncovers other errors in their analysis finally an open conjecture of theirs is proved correct

discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism abstract this paper studies the use of discretionary rewards in a finitely repeated principal agent relationship with moral hazard the key aspect is that rewards have informational content when the principal obtains a private subjective signal about the agent s performance she may pay discretionary bonuses to provide credible feedback to the agent in accordance with the often observed compression of ratings we show that in equilibrium the principal communicates the agent s interim performance imperfectly i e she does not fully differentiate good and bad performance furthermore we show that small rewards can have a large impact on the agent s effort provided that the principal s stake in the project is small

evidence on inflation output trade off in developing and industrial countries this paper subjects lucas s output inflation trade off study to further empirical investigation the cross country study divides the 111 countries covered into 90 developing countries and 21 advanced countries lucas s proposition is that volatility of aggregate demand growth should reduce the impact of aggregate demand growth on the cyclical output and the implication of this is that there is no output inflation trade off in line with the natural rate theory we employ annual data over periods that fall between 1958 and 1985 in order to conduct the test our findings suggest that lucas s proposition is valid for developed economies but not for developing economies

setting customer expectation in service delivery an integrated marketing operations perspective service firms have increasingly been competing for market share on the basis of delivery time many firms now choose to set customer expectation by announcing their maximal delivery time customers will be satisfied if their perceived delivery times are shorter than their expectations this gap model of service quality is used in this paper to study how a firm might choose a delivery time commitment to influence its customer expectation and delivery quality in order to maximize its market share a market share model is developed to capture 1 the impact of delivery time commitment and delivery quality on the firm s market share and 2 the impact of the firm s market share and process variability on delivery quality when there is a congestion effect we show that the choice of the delivery time commitment requires a proper balance between the level of service capacity and customer sensitivities to delivery time expectation and delivery quality we prove the existence of nash equilibria in a duopolistic competition and show that this delivery time commitment game is analogous to a prisoners dilemma

economic growth and the elasticity of substitution two theorems and some suggestions at the beginning of the twentieth century the work of the swedish economist knut wicksell 1901 marked an important advance in our understanding of the relationship between the structure of production functions and income distribution wicksell had asked the following question among many others suppose that the marginal productivities are equal to the remuneration rates of each factor what then should be the form of the corresponding production function he pointed out p 125 that the general integral of the partial differential equation implied by this relationship was of the form y lf kil which meant in turn that the product y was necessarily a homogeneous of degree one function of capital k and labor l as an example he gave a function where the shares of k and l in y were constant and wrote down the function which would be rediscovered decades later by charles w cobb and paul h douglas 1928 however it is only half a century later in robert m solow s nobel prize winning 1956 essay that implications between the structure of the production function and long run equilibrium or disequilibrium of the economy were drawn in his classic article a contribution to the theory of economic growth solow had considered three cases analytically other cases were also discussed geometrically using a phase diagram he had labeled the two first cases 1hlarrod domar and cobb douglas respectively and he referred to the third type of production function as offering a bit of variety it was y ak 2 l 2 2 a particular case of y akp lp 1p in those early days solow had not pointed out to the reader that his cases could have been numbered 0 1 and 2 following the elasticity of substitution of the corresponding production function it would be only five years later in 1961 that with his coauthors kenneth j arrow et al he would find the general form of the two factor constant elasticity of substitution ces production function by integrating the differential equation corresponding to the observed relationship between output per capita and the wage rate solow s third case was indeed highly interesting since it allowed the possibility of everincreasing income per head even without any technical progress indeed solow showed that due to the efficiency of the system entailed by the particular production function he had chosen there existed a threshold for the savings rates s to generate investment per head large enough for income per head to grow forever that threshold was s nla2 where n is the growth rate of the population it was then natural to ask whether one could express that threshold in terms of the elasticity of substitution a the value of that threshold was determined by de la grandville 1989 to be equal to s no3 or where a is k s coefficient in a normalized ces function equal to a in solow s third case where u 2 for any s and n values this relationship gives also the threshold value in implicit form by the solution of ao1 1 log 3q or ilog nls by totally differentiating the last relationship one could observe that the threshold for the elasticity of substitution to entail ever sustained growth was an in klump faculty of mathematics and economics university of ulm helmholtzstrasse 20 d 89081 ulm germany de la grandville department of economics university of geneva 102 boulevard carl vogt ch 1211 geneva 4 switzerland we gratefully acknowledge the comments of seminar participants at stanford university and at the universities of stuttgart hohenheim and munich where parts of the paper were presented also we would like to thank without implicating in any way robert solow for his insightful remarks and an anonymous referee for very helnfuil supgestions wicksell cobb and douglas would no doubt burst with pride if they knew that one of our first year students wrote in a paper of his of course we recognize here a kirk douglas production function

extremist platforms political consequences of profit seeking media we analyze how information about candidate quality affects the choice of electoral platforms made by an office motivated political challenger the incumbent is of known quality and located at the ideal policy of the voter the voter cares for both policy and the candidates quality and can learn about the challenger s quality by buying information a high quality challenger then has an incentive to signal her quality by choosing a policy that induces the voter to buy information we first study the benchmark case in which the information is supplied exogenously and its quality is independent of the challenger s platform this yields multiple equilibria and indeterminacy of equilibrium platforms by contrast when the information is supplied by a profit maximizing media outlet its quality depends on the challenger s platform and we obtain a unique equilibrium platform in particular when the incumbent s quality is relatively low the media coverage rises and the challenger s platform diverges further from the voter s ideal policy as the voter s preference for quality increases

do antitrust laws facilitate collusion experimental evidence on costly communication in duopolies bertrand supergames with non binding communication are used to study price formation and stability of collusive agreements on experimental duopoly markets the experimental design consists of three treatments with different costs of communication zero cost low cost and high cost prices are found to be significantly higher when communication is costly moreover costly communication decreases the number of messages but more importantly it enhances the stability of collusive agreements mccutcheon 1997 presents an interesting application to antitrust policy by letting the cost of communication symbolize the presence of an antitrust law that prohibits firms from discussing prices although our experimental results do not support the mechanism of mccutcheon s 1997 argument the findings point in the direction of her prediction that antitrust laws might work in the interest of firms

warning labels as cheap talk why regulators ban drugs abstract one explanation for drug bans is that regulators know more than consumers about product quality but why not just communicate the information in their ban perhaps via a would have banned label because product labeling is cheap talk any small market failure tempts regulators to lie about quality inducing consumers who suspect such lies to not believe everything they are told in fact when regulators expect market failures to result in under consumption of a drug and so would not ban it for informed consumers regulators ex ante prefer to commit to not banning this drug for uninformed consumers

cheap talk and burned money we augment the standard crawford sobel 1982 econometrica 50 1431 1451 model of cheap talk communication by allowing the informed party to use both costless and costly messages the issues on which we focus are the consequences for cheap talk signaling of the option to burn money and the circumstances under which both cheap talk and burned money are used to signal information

cheap talk with two audiences these problems have in common a simple structure an informed sender says something to two interested but uninformed receivers who then take actions based on their beliefs these actions affect the sender as well as the receivers in this paper we study how costless nonverifiable claims cheap talk can affect these beliefs and hence the actions and how the incentives for truthful revelation to one receiver are affected by the presence of the other we then ask how welfare is affected by whether claims are made in public or in private as some of the above examples suggest public messages may be more credible than private messages addressed to either audience one possibility is that the presence of one audience can discipline the sender s relationship with the other we call this one sided

autoregressive modelling and money income causality detection abstract a step wise procedure based on granger s concept of causality and abaike s final prediction error criterion is suggested as a practical means to identify the order of lags of each variable in a multivariate autoregressive process the model seems useful because it can serve as a reduced form formulation to avoid imposing often spurious or false restrictions of the model it also provides a reasonably powerful test of causality the idea is applied to u s postwar money and income data it is found that between m1 and gnp a bivariate feedback model fits the data best between m2 and gnp a one way causal model from money to income performs better diagnostic checks applied to our model seem to indicate the adequacy of our approach

inflation tax rules and investment some econometric evidence this paper presents econometric evidence on the effect of tax incentives on business investment in the united states in the period from 1953 through1978 the analysis emphasizes that the interaction of inflation and existing tax rules has contributed substantially to the decline of business investment since the late 1960 s because the investment process is far too complex for any simple econometric model to be convincing i have estimated three quite different models of investment behavior the strength of the empirical evidence rests on the fact that all three specifications support the same conclusion more generally the analysis and evidence show that theoretical models of macroeconomic equilibrium should specify explicitly the role of distortionary taxes especially taxes on capital income the failure to include such tax rules can have dramatic and misleading effects on the qualitative as well as the quantitative properties of macroeconomic theories this paper was presented as the fisher shultz lecture at the fourth world congress of the econometric society 29 august 1980 in aix en province this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

military coercion in interstate crises in an international crisis states make demands backed by threats to use force although these threats can be explicit in diplomatic communications they will not generally carry much weight unless substantiated by some show of force military measures designed to convey the commitment to resort to arms if one s demands are not satisfactorily met to have an impact this commitment must be credible it must be in one s interest to carry out the threat if the opponent refuses to comply in an environment where states possess private information about their valuations capabilities or costs credibility can be established by actions that a state unwilling to fight would not want or would not dare to take military moves such as arms buildups troop mobilizations and deployments to the potential zone of operations can alter incentives in a crisis by changing one s expected payoff from the use of force these are tacit bargaining moves that can restructure the strategic context thereby creating and possibly signaling one s commitments while undermining those of the opponent how can states use the military instrument to establish commitments and how does the nature of the instrument affect their ability to communicate them credibly to their adversaries there are two distinct mechanisms for credible signaling in economic models information can be transmitted reliably by sinking costs actors burn money to reveal that they value the disputed issue even more in contrast theories of interstate crisis bargaining usually rely on choices that increase the difference between backing down and fighting actors tie their hands by running higher risks of war to reveal their resolve the first mechanism involves costs that actors pay regardless of outcome and the second involves costs that actors pay only if they fail to carry out some threat or promise

adding asymmetrically dominated alternatives violations of regularity and the similarity hypothesis an asymmetrically dominated alternative is dominated by one item in the set but not by another adding such an alternative to a choice set can increase the probability of choosing the item that dominates it this result points to the inadequacy of many current choice models and suggests product line strategies that might not otherwise be intuitively plausible

cheap talk games may have unique informative equilibrium outcomes abstract we demonstrate that cheap talk games can have unique informative equilibrium outcomes by providing an example of an infinite action bayesian game which absent cheap talk does not possess an equilibrium

inequality lobbying and resource allocation this paper describes how wealth inequality may distort public resource allocation a government seeks to allocate limited resources to productive sectors but sectoral productivity is privately known by agents with vested interests in those sectors they lobby the government for preferential treatment the government even if it honestly seeks to maximize economic efficiency may be confounded by the possibility that both high wealth and true economic desirability create loud lobbies broadly speaking both poorer economies and unequal economies display greater public misallocation the paper warns against the conventional wisdom that this is so because such governments are more corrupt jel d72 d78 d82 016 in this paper we propose a particular channel through which wealth inequality distorts the resource allocation process our analysis rests on four premises

the impact of delaying the delay announcements many service providers use delay announcements to inform customers of anticipated delays however this information is usually not provided immediately but after a short period of time spent either waiting or occupied by the system the focus of this paper is on the impact of this postponement on the ability of the firm to influence customer behavior by communicating nonverifiable congestion information to its customers as well as on the profits and utilities for the firm and the customers respectively we show that this postponement can actually help the firm create credibility and augment the resulting equilibrium however in other settings this delay can also detract from the resulting equilibrium furthermore we show that whenever credibility is created it improves not only the profit for the firm but also the customers overall utility under certain settings

the strategic perils of delayed differentiation the value of delayed differentiation also known as postponement for a monopolist has been extensively studied in the operations literature we analyze the case of imperfectly competitive markets with demand uncertainty wherein the choice of supply chain configuration i e early or delayed differentiation is endogenous to the competing firms we characterize firms choices in equilibrium and analyze the effects of these choices on quantities sold profits consumer surplus and welfare we demonstrate that purely strategic considerations not previously identified in the literature play a pivotal role in determining the value of delayed differentiation in the face of either entry threats or competition these strategic effects can significantly diminish the value of delayed differentiation in fact under plausible conditions these effects dominate the traditional risk pooling benefits associated with delayed differentiation in which case early differentiation is the dominant strategy for firms even under cost parity with delayed differentiation we extend the main model to study the effects of alternate market structures asymmetric markets and inventory holdback our results in particular that for a broad range of parameter values early differentiation is a dominant strategy even under cost parity with delayed differentiation are robust to these relaxations

bequests as signals an explanation for the equal division puzzle in the united states more than two thirds of decedents with multichild families divide their estates exactly equally among their children in contrast gifts given before death are usually unequal these findings challenge the validity of existing theories regarding the determination of intergenerational transfers in this paper we develop a theory that accounts for this puzzle based on the notion that the division of bequests provides a signal about a parent s altruistic preferences the theory can also explain the norm of unigeniture which prevails in other societies

the lucas hypothesis on the phillips curve further international evidence abstract this paper is a further attempt to test the lucas hypothesis on the phillips curve by making cross country comparisons that hypothesis posits that nominal shocks affect real aggregates only if individuals mistake them for what they are not movements in real variables the existence of a trade off between output and inflation is conditional on economic agents misinterpreting the price movements they observe countries with widely fluctuating exogenous shocks will have a more vertical phillips curve as their inhabitants sharpen their instrumental to differentiate between real and nominal shocks hence cross country comparisons provide fertile grounds to test this hypothesis if it holds true we should find a positive correlation between phillips curve slopes and the standard deviations of the exogenous shocks the evidence presented here confirms lucas s findings

costly information transmission in continuous time with implications for credit rating announcements abstract this paper formulates a continuous time information transmission model in which an altruistic sender privately observes a stochastic state variable and incurs a communication cost when she broadcasts a message we characterize the sender s optimal announcement strategy using an ordinary differential equation we prove the optimality of the sender s strategies using a martingale verification argument and show that the sender s optimal strategy involves sending discrete messages furthermore we apply the model to the timing decision of credit rating announcements and provide a framework to study various aspects of rating announcements such as the probability of rating reversals and the expected time before a rating change

persuasion with communication costs this paper studies strategic transmission of verifiable information with reporting costs that continuously increase in the precision of the report contrary to previous literature it is shown that the unraveling result first derived by milgrom 1981 is relatively robust to costly reporting a separating equilibrium exists even with arbitrarily high reporting costs intuitively the costs work as a signaling device and a combination of disclosure of information and costly signaling accomplishes full separation with reporting costs there are typically multiple equilibria for example a pooling equilibrium exists if and only if the reporting costs are high finally a separating equilibrium exists when the receiver has to make a costly effort in order to access the information in a report as long as this cost is not too high

cheap talk can matter in bargaining this paper describes an intuitive way in which cheap talk can matter in a twostage bargaining game in which talk may be followed by serious negotiation the intuition that all buyers would claim to have low reservation prices is incorrect in our model instead if good faith participation is endogenously determined then the parties can use talk to trade off bargaining position against the probability of continued negotiation our cheap talk equilibrium features bargaining behavior that could not be equilibrium behavior in the absence of talk

money and the bias of technical progress in the literature on the behaviour of a monetary economy it has been suggested that in addition to its role as a medium of exchange the role of money in production should be recognized explicityliy however on this latter point there is some disagreement as to the mechanism by which it affects production for example mundell 1971 bailey and friedman 1969 attribute direct productivity to money and consequently sugest that is should be treated as a separate facto of production on the other hand brunner and meltzer 1971 perlman 1971 stein 1971 gabor and pearce 1958 saving 1972 and moroney 1970 emphasize the role of money as an innovational factor while the reasoning varies the basic idea is that the use of money enhances efficiencies of capital and labour in other words money acts as an input augmenting factor in a recent paper subrahmanyam and cosimano 1979 using data on the indian economy for 1950 51 1969 70 and the ces production function framework have tried to test t

waiting time and decision making is time like money time is a resource as such consumers have to make decisions regarding their use of time in the purchase and consumption of goods and services using prospect theory and mental accounting as theoretical frameworks this article investigates whether consumers treat time like money when they make decisions in a series of studies we found that the value of consumers time is not constant but depends on contextual characteristics of the decision situation our results also suggest that in deterministic situations people make decisions involving time losses in a manner consistent with the convex loss function proposed by prospect theory however in decision making under conditions of risk people seem to make risk averse choices with respect to decisions in the domain of time in contrast to the risk seeking behavior often found with respect to decisions involving losses of money we discuss the nonfungibility of time as an explanation for the discrepancy between decisions involving time and those involving money

optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines a seller maximizes revenue from selling an object in a dynamic environment with buyers that differ in their patience each buyer has a privately known deadline for buying and a privately known valuation first we derive the optimal mechanism neglecting the incentive constraint for the deadline the deadline of the winner determines the time of the allocation and therefore also the amount of information available to the seller when he decides whether to allocate to a buyer depending on the shape of the markup that the seller uses this can lead to a violation of the neglected incentive constraint we give sufficient conditions on the type distribution under which the neglected constraint is fulfilled or violated second for the case that the constraint cannot be neglected we consider a model with two periods and two buyers here the optimal mechanism is implemented by a fixed price in period one and an asymmetric auction in period two the asymmetry which is introduced to prevent the patient type of the first buyer from buying in period one leads to pooling of deadlines at the top of the type space

strategic communication with lying costs i study a model of strategic communication between an uninformed receiver and an informed but upwardly biased sender the sender bears a cost of lying or more broadly of misrepresenting his private information the main results show that inflated language naturally arises in this environment where the sender almost always claims to be of a higher type than he would with complete information regardless of the intensity of lying cost there is incomplete separation with some pooling on the highest messages the degree of language inflation and how much information is revealed depend upon the intensity of lying cost the analysis delivers a framework to span a class of cheap talk and verifiable disclosure games unifying the polar predictions they make under large conflicts of interest i use the model to discuss how the degree of manipulability of information can affect the trade off between delegation and communication copyright 2009 wiley blackwell

spending time versus spending money we find systematic differences in the way that people spend time versus money ex post people are able to more easily accommodate negative outcomes by adjusting the value of their temporal inputs ex ante people are willing to spend more time for higher risk higher return options whereas when spending money the pattern is reversed and the more standard pattern of increasing risk aversion is observed although accurate assessment of the opportunity costs of time is key to making good decisions ambiguity in the value of time promotes accommodation and rationalization

optimal limited authority for principal abstract this article studies a principal agent problem where the only commitment for the uninformed principal is to restrict the set of decisions she makes following a report by the informed agent we show that an ex ante optimal equilibrium for the principal corresponds to a finite partition of the state space and each retained decision is ex post suboptimal for the principal biased toward the agent s preference generally an optimal equilibrium does not maximize the number of decisions the principal can credibly retain compared to no commitment limited authority improves the quality of communication from the agent as a result it can give the principal a higher expected payoff than delegating the decision to the agent

secrecy two sided bias and the value of evidence abstract we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on players preferences for a verifiable message game to possess a separating equilibrium and or a pooling equilibrium as well as sufficient conditions for every equilibrium of such a game to be pooling we also characterize all nonseparating equilibria and use this property to show that less information might be conveyed in any equilibrium of a verifiable message game than in some equilibrium of the cheap talk game with the same parameters