digging for golden carrots an analysis of research tournaments contracting for research is often infeasible because research inputs are unobservable and research outcomes cannot be verified by a court sponsoring a research tournament can resolve these problems a model is presented in which contestants compete to find the innovation of highest value to the tournament sponsor the winner receives a prespecified prize the tournament game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium free entry is not optimal because equilibrium effort by each researcher decreases in the number of contestants an optimally designed research tournament balances the probability of overshooting the first best quality level against the probability of falling short copyright 1995 by american economic association

contest design and optimal endogenous entry this paper derives the effort maximizing contest rule and the optimal endogenous entry in a context where potential participants bear fixed entry costs the organizer is allowed to design the contest under a fixed budget with two strategic instruments he sets the value of the prize purse and arranges a monetary transfer entry subsidy or fee for each participating contestant in other words the budget can either be used to subsidize participation or an entry fee can be charged to fund the prize purse the results show that the optimally designed contest attracts exactly two participating contestants in its unique subgame perfect equilibrium when there is a positive fixed entry cost and extracts all the surplus from participating contestants the study also shows that the direction and amount of the monetary transfer depend on the magnitude of the entry cost the contest organizer subsidizes entry when contestants bear substantial entry costs but charges an entry fee to fund the prize purse whenever the entry cost is sufficiently low

shipwrecks and treasure hunters we examine dynamic search as a game in which two rivals explore an island for a hidden prize of known value in every period until its discovery the players decide how much of the unsearched area to comb if a player finds the prize alone he wins it and the game ends players have a per period discount factor and costs proportional to the area they search first as a benchmark for efficiency we solve the one player search problem second in the two player setting we show that typically there is inefficient over search a result akin to the tragedy of the commons however for players with intermediate levels of patience there is the possibility of inefficient under search as players incorporate the expected future payoffs in their current search decisions finally with patient players several counterintuitive results can arise for example players might be better off searching a larger island or looking for a less valuable prize

self selection and the efficiency of tournaments when exogenously imposed rank order tournaments have incentive properties but their overall efficiency is reduced by a high variance in performance bull schotter and weigelt 1987 however since the efficiency of performance related pay is attributable both to its incentive effect and to its selection effect among employees lazear 2000 it is important to investigate the ex ante sorting effect of tournaments this paper reports results from an experiment analyzing whether allowing subjects to self select into different payment schemes helps in reducing the variability of performance in tournaments we show that when the subjects choose to enter a tournament the average effort is higher and the between subject variance is substantially lower than when the same payment scheme is imposed sorting is efficiency enhancing since it increases the homogeneity of the contestants we suggest that the flexibility of the labor market is an important condition for a higher efficiency of relative performance pay

intergenerational transfers borrowing constraints and saving behavior evidence from the housing market abstract we examine the effects of intergenerational transfers on saving behavior by analyzing transfers targeted to first time home purchases transfer recipients have a shorter time to save for a down payment of 9 20 for each dollar of transfer received total savings falls by 29 40 cents and the down payment rises by 61 71 cents transfer recipients increase the value of the home purchased but by an amount that is much lower than possible if the transfer were fully leveraged in addition transfers appear to help households achieve certain down payment thresholds that give favorable mortgage terms

credits and non interest rate determinants of loan demand a spanish case study this article uses bivariate probit analysis to model the potential relationship between the condition of being credit unconstrained and holding loans as well as to ascertain determinants of a household being credit unconstrained and likely holding consumer and real estate loans it documents that family size education permanent and transitory incomes among others affect spanish households desire and capacity to hold loans furthermore these factors were found to affect demands for real estate and consumer loans differently in general the above and other results from this research provide insights that would interest credit consumers credit suppliers and policy makers in spain

selection of entrepreneurs in the venture capital industry an asymptotic analysis we study a model of entrepreneurs who compete in an auction like setting for venture capital vc funding in a setting where limited capital dictates that the vc can only finance the best entrepreneurs with asymmetric information vcs can only assess entrepreneurs by the progress of development which in equilibrium reveals the quality of the new technology using an asymptotic analysis we prove that in attractive industries having a large number of entrepreneurs competing for vc funding could lead to underinvestment in technology by entrepreneurs as the effort exerted by losing entrepreneurs is wasted the study then proceeds to characterize the conditions under which a greater number of competing entrepreneurs is better the model also demonstrates that vcs could possibly increase their payoff by concentrating on a single industry in addition the study also provides some insights on the effects of multiple investments by vcs and the effects of competition among vcs on the same investments

availability of mortgage loans in volatile real estate markets abstract this paper presents a default model for mortgages on single family houses implying a higher probability of negative equity and thus default in real estate markets with high price volatility mortgage lenders compensate for the increased default probability in volatile markets by demanding higher downpayments or increased creditworthiness of loan applicants thus making mortgage loans more difficult to obtain an empirical analysis finds greatly varying price volatility in single family real estate markets in a sample of 42 cities consistent with the implications of the model the empirical analysis finds that the fraction of low downpayment loans declines in volatile markets

economic contests comparative reward schemes contests are situations in which an individual s reward depends on his performance relative to others students are graded on a curve the candidate with the most votes gets the political office the underling who performs best is promoted to the executive position contests are useful in dealing with indivisible rewards reducing monitoring costs and minimizing risks from common uncertainties they are employed to sort potential participants and once they have entered to induce appropriate effort from them with monitoring precision and prize spreads as potential choice variables optimal contest structures are derived for fair and unfair contests among equal and unequal participants the converse problems of climbing low ability individuals enter the contest designed for high ability candidates and slumming are shown to be manageable

testing a theoretical model of mortgage demand on uk data mortgage demand is a poorly understood and under researched aspect of the financial behaviour of households this paper tests empirically the basic results of brueckner s model of mortgage demand on uk mortgage market data the choice of mortgage instrument is used to identify impatient debt maximizers and patient borrowers who borrow at intermediate levels thus the research confirms the conditions under which households will use the largest possible mortgage and the circumstances under which savings are invested in the property a unique contribution of the work is the estimation of mortgage demand equations corrected for endogenous housing demand for a single housing finance system where borrowers face different opportunity costs of equity in their owner occupied property allowing a purer test of the theoretical model

distributional conflict in organizations abstract hierarchy can function as an instrument to channel influence activities or power struggles in organizations contrary to what has frequently been argued we show that multi divisional organizations may involve lower influence costs than single tier organizations even though they offer more scope for organizational conflict and have more executives that can be influenced these benefits derive from two effects first part of the conflict in multi divisional organizations takes place on the division level where a small number of agents fight over only a fraction of the overall prize second by grouping agents into common divisions multi divisional organizations create free rider problems in rent seeking our model sheds new light on the desirability of divestitures and the transition from the u to the m form by us corporations in the 1920s

the relation between financial and housing wealth evidence from dutch households abstract we analyze households joint investment decisions for financial wealth and homes we use a bivariate censored regression model with endogenous switching fixed costs or transaction costs are captured by an unobserved nonzero censoring threshold the model allows for spillover effects of a binding threshold for one asset on the demand for the other asset we find that tenure choice affects the level of financial wealth our results do not support the view that people first accumulate financial wealth before acquiring homes this can be due to the absence of down payment constraints in the netherlands

auctionin entry into tournaments a research tournament model with heterogeneous contestants is presented for a large class of contests the optimal number of competitors is two this insight makes designing the tournament easier and highlights the importance of selecting highly qualified contestants while customary uniform price and discriminatory price auctions are intuitively appealing mechanisms for solving this adverse selection problem in practice they generally will not be efficient mechanism for selecting contestants instead we propose an alternative auction format that is equally simple to implement and efficiently selects the most qualified contestants to compete regardless of the form of contestant heterogeneity

rigging the lobbying process an application of the all pay auction textabstractin a world where a politician can explicitly auction off a prize to the high bidder the standard auction literature can be used to analyse political behavior the justice system however precludes politicians from explicitly selling the prize to the highest bidder thus politicians cannot let it become public knowledge that they are in the business of selling political favors an institution has emerged in political markets to overcome this constraint which are termed as lobbying lobbyists make implicit payments to the politician through campaign contributions if these up front payments were rebated to those failing to receive the prize it would be clear that the politician was selling favors this article has examined an interesting principle arising in all pay auctions this principle states that a politician wishing to maximize political rents may find it in his best interest to exclude certain lobbyists from participating in the lobbying process particularly lobbyists valuing most the political prize

opposites attract the effect of the federal income tax code on community composition abstract if houses in two homogeneous but dissimilar communities are reorganized as a single heterogeneous community property tax payments are shifted from owners of small houses to owners of large houses we consider three aspects of the federal income tax code which causes this shifting to raise aggregate property values in the heterogeneous community first the property tax is deductible and the tax rate structure is progressive second some families do not itemize third the restriction on saving in tax deferring assets suggests the use of different interest rates to capitalize future property taxes because of these aspects heterogeneous communities are established provided the different family types desire similar levels of public service

a complete solution to a class of principal agent problems with an application to the control of a self managed firm this paper considers a class of principal agent problems which have the following features 1 there is adverse selection because the principal ignores the value of one parameter of the agent s true characteristics 2 leaving aside the information parameter the principal s welfare as well as the agent s welfare depend on two types of variables observable to both of them the first ones possibly multidimensional are called action variable s and the second one which is one dimensional has in general the meaning of a money transfer 3 the principal is a stackelberg leader of the two person game he can commit himself to decision rules which are admissible on informational grounds he optimizes within the adequate class taking into account besides the agent s reaction one constraint which has generally the meaning of an individual rationality constraint and sometimes of a feasibility constraint the optimization is limited to the class of non stochastic mechanisms 4 the problem can also receive an alternative interpretation the principal faces a continuum of agents of unknown characteristics the distribution being known however stylized principal agent problems of this type have often been considered in the economic literature in particular the reader will later be able to recognize that the standard income tax model a la mirrlees 1971 the quality or quantity choice model of the monopolist a la mussa and rosen 1978 or maskin and riley 1982 and the model of government regulation of the private monopolist of baron and myerson 1982 all belong to

evidence on the demand for mortgage debt by owner occupants abstract this paper explores the relationship between household mortgage debt burdens and housing consumption periodic income nonhousing wealth the income tax position of the household expected mobility and other micro level characteristics that proxy for household risk preferences and life cycle effects we use 1985 and 1989 american housing survey data to estimate mortgage debt level equations simultaneous with house value equations controlling for the contemporaneous nature of these two choices we find that larger debt levels are positively associated with greater value residences and with the level of household income numerous household level demographic characteristics are also systematically related to mortgage demand of particular interest are our findings that the use of mortgage debt is affected significantly by the rate of tax savings on mortgage interest deductions and by the expected mobility of the household

regional differences in mortgage demand and mortgage instrument choice in the uk koblyakova a hutchison n and tiwari p regional differences in mortgage demand and mortgage instrument choice in the uk regional studies this paper presents empirical evidence of regional variations in mortgage choice decisions within the uk s mortgage sector utilizing british household panel survey bhps data for the years 2001 2007 and 2008 the paper suggests that a household s decision to choose a variable rate mortgage is more likely to occur in areas with lower incomes and affordability rates such as northern england scotland and wales since variable rate mortgages are more sensitive to income and monetary policy shocks the disproportional distribution of variable contracts within the mortgage sector may have a differential impact on the regions

multi stage sequential all pay auctions abstract we study multi stage sequential all pay contests auctions where heterogeneous contestants are privately informed about a parameter ability that affects their cost of effort we characterize the perfect bayesian equilibrium of these contests and analyze the effect of the number of contestants and their types on the contestants expected highest effort

rivals search for buried treasure competition and duplication in r d we model an r d race in which each fi rm decides in each period between two research projects only one of which has positive success probability and it is not known which there is symmetric information and hence scope for strategic search if the prize is shared when discovery is simultaneous there is too much duplication of projects if neither is rewarded in this event then equilibrium is efficient unless projects have asymmetric costs in which case there is a bias toward the high cost project or asymmetric success probabilities in which case too little duplication is possible if one firm is informed it may choose the wrong project to put the other off the scent

competition policy rivalries and defense industry consolidation declining outlays for new weapons programs have triggered a process of consolidation that promises to shrink the u s defense industry drastically consolidation in the defense industry raises complex competition policy issues that are not amenable to conventional antitrust merger analysis this paper presents a framework for identifying important contractor competencies assessing rivalries in defense industry segments and evaluating the competitive effects of mergers and other consolidation events as applied to antitrust oversight and to department of defense funding program and acquisition strategy decisions this framework can help preserve supply alternatives for developing state of the art weapons needed to satisfy national security requirements

carbon trading in a socialist market economy can china make a difference a global carbon trading system has gained shape since several major asia pacific economies declared their participation as the largest national source of greenhouse gases china is probably the most prominent newcomer pilot emission trading schemes are being introduced in this country with prospects for developing into a national scheme the initiative is primarily motivated by expected economic benefits rather than environmental commitments viability is uncertain due to the absence of a liberal political economic system as we know in the western world the theory of carbon trading is being tested in an unusual place with huge implications both practically and theoretically

balance of power and the propensity of conflict we study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict our experimental results suggest in a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal the likelihood of conflict is independent of the balance of power if bargaining involves endogenous demand choices however the likelihood of conflict is higher if power is more imbalanced even though endogenous bargaining outcomes reflect the players unequal fighting strengths strategic uncertainty causes outcomes to be most efficient when power is balanced in turn the importance of exogenous mediation proposals depends on the balance of power

property tax capitalization in a model with tax deferred assets standard deductions and the taxation of nominal interest previous property tax capitalization studies assume that families itemize that they save in taxable assets and that real interest income is taxed however many families do not itemize many families invest in tax deferred assets and nominal interest income is taxed as a consequence prior studies likely misspecify the property tax capitalization equation for roughly ninety percent of their samples taking federal tax provisions into account increases the precision of our estimated capitalization rate in addition our results suggest that biases in prior studies likely contribute to the variety of capitalization estimates in the literature

tournament rewards and risk taking this article considers a lazear rosen tournament model where agents can influence both the spread of their output distribution risk taking and its mean the unique equilibrium induces excessive risk taking and a low level of effort by modifying the tournament to give the highest prize to the agent with the most moderate output a low level of risk taking and high level of effort can be sustained as an equilibrium the first result can be useful to understand the relative performance evaluation puzzle of executive compensation and the second result can be useful to understand puzzling workplace norms promoting mediocrity

performance responses to competition across skill levels in rank order tournaments field evidence and implications for tournament design tournaments are widely used in the economy to organize production and innovation we study individual data on 2775 contestants in 755 software algorithm development contests with random assignment the performance response to added contestants varies nonmonotonically across contestants of different abilities precisely conforming to theoretical predictions most participants respond negatively whereas the highest skilled contestants respond positively in counterfactual simulations we interpret a number of tournament design policies number of competitors prize allocation and structure number of divisions open entry and assess their effectiveness in shaping optimal tournament outcomes for a designer

supply driven mortgage choice variable mortgage contracts dominate the uk mortgage market the dominance of the variable rate mortgage contracts has important consequences for the transmission mechanism of monetary policy decisions and systemic risks this raises an obvious concern that a mortgage market such as that in the uk where the major proportion of mortgage debt is either at a variable or fixed for less than two years rate is vulnerable to alterations in the interest rate regime theoretically mortgage choice is determined by demand and supply factors so far most of the existing literature has focused on the demand side perspective and what is limited is consideration of supply side factors in empirical investigation on mortgage choice decisions this paper uniquely explores whether supply side factors may partially explain observed ex post mortgage type decisions empirical results detect that lenders profit motives and mortgage funding pricing issues may have assisted in preferences toward variable rate contracts sec

human capital vs signalling explanations of wages increases wages by directly increasing the worker s productivity this learning explanation is usually associated with human capital theory however it seems unlikely that learning explains all the wage differences associated with schooling and work history better educated workers are not a random sample of workers they have lower propensities to quit or to be absent are less likely to smoke drink or use illicit drugs and are generally healthier it is unlikely that employers make full use of differences in propensities to quit or to be absent or sick when hiring workers these characteristics are often not directly observed and the americans with disabilities act precludes firms from using either poor health or the likelihood of future sickness as a hiring criterion unless it is directly related to job performance however if low levels of education are associated with these unfavorable employee characteristics and employers are allowed to take education into account when hiring workers we would expect employers to favor better educated workers as a means of reducing their costs of sickness and job turnover in turn students will take these hiring criteria into account when deciding how long to stay in school students will choose a length of schooling to signal their ability to employers and employers will demand a minimum level of schooling

optimal prize allocation in contests the role of negative prizes abstract in this paper we analyze the role of negative prizes in contest design with a fixed budget risk neutral contestants and independent private abilities the effort maximizing prize allocation rule features a threshold when the highest effort is above the threshold all contestants with lower efforts receive negative prizes these negative prizes are used to augment the prize to the contestant with the highest effort which better incentivizes contestants with higher abilities when no contestant s effort exceeds the threshold all contestants equally split the initial budget or a portion of it to ensure their participation we find that allowing negative prizes can increase the expected total effort dramatically in particular if no bound is imposed on negative prizes the expected total effort can be arbitrarily close to the highest possible effort inducible when all contestants have the maximum ability with certainty the above contest is shown to be the optimal mechanism for a more general class of mechanisms