consideration review of research and prospects for future insights the authors review the behavioral underpinnings of consideration set formation and revisit the theoretical and empirical evidence that led them to develop an individual level model of consideration

retail pricing and clearance sales sellers of new products are faced with having to guess demand conditions to set price appropriately but sellers are able to adjustprice over time and to learn from past mistakes additionally it is not necessary that all goods be sold with certainty it is sometimes better to set a high price and to risk no sale this process is modeledto explain retail pricing behavior and the time distribution of transactions prices start high and fall as a function of time on theshelf the initial price and rate of decline can be predicted and depends on thinness of the market the proportion of customers who are window shoppers and other observable characteristics copyright 1986 by american economic association

selling to overconfident consumers consumers may overestimate the precision of their demand forecasts this overconfidence creates an incentive for both monopolists and competitive firms to offer tariffs with included quantities at zero marginal cost followed by steep marginal charges this matches observed cellphone service pricing plans in the us and elsewhere an alternative explanation with common priors can be ruled out in favor of overconfidence based on observed customer usage patterns for a major us cellular phone service provider the model can be reinterpreted to explain the use of flat rates and late fees in rental markets and teaser rates on loans nevertheless firms may benefit from consumers losing their overconfidence

salience in experimental tests of the endowment effect starting with knetsch 1989 experiments on the endowment effect thaler 1980 typically rely on a two stage procedure in the first stage subjects are endowed with a good such as a mug in the second stage the same subjects are given the opportunity to trade this good for another good of similar value such as a pen the endowment effect holds that very few subjects chose to trade sometimes as few as ten percent in related experiments subjects state selling prices for their endowment that are much higher than their buying prices for the same good these patterns are hard to reconcile with standard choice theory which predicts that about half the subjects would trade and that selling prices and buying prices are similar the common explanation of this evidence relies on prospect theory s loss aversion tversky and kahneman 1979 because the pain of parting with the endowment looms larger in the decision maker s mind than the pleasure of acquiring a good of similar value kahneman knetsch and thaler 1990 a decision maker endowed with a mug is unwilling to trade it for a

competition and price variation when consumers are loss averse we modify the salop 1979 model of price competition with differentiated products by assuming that consumers are loss averse relative to a reference point given by their recent expectations about the purchase consumers sensitivity to losses in money increases the price responsiveness of demand and hence the intensity of competition at higher relative to lower market prices reducing or eliminating price variation both within and between products when firms face common stochastic costs in any symmetric equilibrium the markup is strictly decreasing in cost even when firms face different cost distributions we identify conditions under which a focal price equilibrium where firms always charge the same focal price exists and conditions under which any equilibrium is focal

markets vs management what drives profitability this study addresses the issue of the relative degree of variance in roa accounted for by industry corporate and sbu effects while controlling for the business cycle and the interaction between the business cycle and industry two key articles schmalensee 1985 and rumelt 1991 are discussed in detail research results on a recent data base compustat using variance components analysis varcomp are presented that not only confirm most of the rumelt 1991 findings but also suggest the existence of a corporate effect heretofore undetected

does the human capital educational sorting debate matter for development policy if education increases human capital subsidizing education can generate economic growth and combat poverty estimates of its return suggest that education is a good social investment in sorting models the return reflects in part the information about productivity revealed by the worker s education thus the social and private returns diverge it might appear that if we believe the sorting model we should be less swayed by evidence that estimated returns to education exceed the social discount rate and therefore less likely to support education based development policies this conclusion is shown to be incorrect this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

neuroeconomic foundations of economic choice recent advances neuroeconomics combines methods and theories from neuroscience psychology economics and computer science in an effort to produce detailed computational and neurobiological accounts of the decision making process that can serve as a common foundation for understanding human behavior across the natural and social sciences because neuroeconomics is a young discipline a sufficiently sound structural model of how the brain makes choices is not yet available however the contours of such a computational model are beginning to arise and given the rapid progress there is reason to be hopeful that the field will eventually put together a satisfactory structural model this paper has two goals first we provide an overview of what has been learned about how the brain makes choices in two types of situations simple choices among small numbers of familiar stimuli like choosing between an apple or an orange and more complex choices involving tradeoffs between immediate and future consequences like eating a healthy apple or a less healthy chocolate cake second we show that even at this early stage insights with important implications for economics have already been gained

salience and consumer choice we present a theory of context dependent choice in which a consumer s attention is drawn to salient attributes of goods such as quality or price an attribute is salient for a good when it stands out among the good s attributes relative to that attribute s average level in the choice set or more broadly the choice context consumers attach disproportionately high weight to salient attributes and their choices are tilted toward goods with higher quality price ratios the model accounts for a variety of disparate evidence including decoy effects and context dependent willingness to pay it also suggests a novel theory of misleading sales

limited information and advertising in the u s personal computer industry traditional discrete choice models assume buyers are aware of all products for sale in markets where products change rapidly the full information assumption is untenable i present a discrete choice model of limited consumer information where advertising influences the set of products from which consumers choose to purchase i apply the model to the u s personal computer market where top firms spend over 2 billion annually on advertising i find estimated markups of 19 over production costs where top firms advertise more than average and earn higher than average markups high markups are explained to a large extent by informational asymmetries across consumers where full information models predict markups of one fourth the magnitude i find that estimated product demand curves are biased toward being too elastic under traditional models i show how to use data on media exposure to improve estimated price elasticities in the absence of micro ad data

adding asymmetrically dominated alternatives violations of regularity and the similarity hypothesis an asymmetrically dominated alternative is dominated by one item in the set but not by another adding such an alternative to a choice set can increase the probability of choosing the item that dominates it this result points to the inadequacy of many current choice models and suggests product line strategies that might not otherwise be intuitively plausible

price induced patterns of competition this research focuses on how price changes influence the observed pattern of brand competition the paper begins with a basic utility model formulation and examines the implications of three major classes of preference distributions on the expected patterns of competition a price tier model is proposed to operationalize the theory and to allow predictive testing the price tier model is estimated on 28 brands across four product categories the results show a specific asymmetric pattern of price competition higher price higher quality brands steal share from other brands in the same price quality tier as well as from brands in the tier below however lower price lower quality brands take sales from their own tier and the tier below brands but do not steal significant share from the tiers above the results are consistent with a bimodal preference distribution with the regular price indifference point being located toward the lower quality end of the preference distribution for the categories analyzed

sequentially rationalizable choice a sequentially rationalizable choice function is a choice function that can be retrieved by applying sequentially to each choice problem the same xed set of asymmetric binary relations rationales to remove inferior alternatives these con cepts translate into economic language some human choice heuristics studied in psychology and explain cyclical patterns of choice observed in experiments we study some properties of sequential rationalizability and provide a full character ization of choice functions rationalizable by two and three rationales

shrouded attributes consumer myopia and information suppression in competitive markets bayesian consumers infer that hidden add on prices e g the cost of ink for a printer are likely to be high prices if consumers are bayesian firms will not shroud information in equilibrium however shrouding may occur in an economy with some myopic or unaware consumers such shrouding creates an inefficiency which firms may have an incentive to eliminate by educating their competitors customers however if add ons have close substitutes a curse of debiasing arises and firms will not be able to profitably debias consumers by unshrouding add ons in equilibrium two kinds of exploitation coexist optimizing firms exploit myopic consumers through marketing schemes that shroud high priced add ons in turn sophisticated consumers exploit these marketing schemes it is not possible to profitably drive away the business of sophisticates it is also not possible to profitably lure either myopes or sophisticates to nonexploitative firms we show that informational shrouding flourishes even in highly competitive markets even in markets with costless advertising and even when the shrouding generates allocational inefficiencies

context dependent preferences the standard theory of choice based on value maximization associates with each option a real value such that given an offered set the decision maker chooses the option with the highest value despite its simplicity and intuitive appeal there is a growing body of data that is inconsistent with this theory in particular the relative attractiveness of x compared to y often depends on the presence or absence of a third option z and the market share of an option can actually be increased by enlarging the offered set we review recent empirical findings that are inconsistent with value maximization and present a context dependent model that expresses the value of each option as an additive combination of two components a contingent weighting process that captures the effect of the background context and a binary comparison process that describes the effect of the local context the model accounts for observed violations of the standard theory and provides a framework for analyzing context dependent p

a model of focusing in economic choice we present a generally applicable theory of focusing based on the hypothesis that a person focuses more on and hence overweights attributes in which her options dier more our model predicts that the decisionmaker is too prone to choose options with concentrated advantages relative to alternatives but maximizes utility when the advantages and disadvantages of alternatives are equally concentrated in intertemporal choice because the relative concentrations of an option s costs and benets can be dierent from the perspective of a single period and the perspective of the entire choice problem the decisionmaker often exhibits a form of time inconsistency she is present biased when the costs of current misbehavior are distributed over many future dates such as in harmful consumption but future biased when the benet of many

uncertain demand consumer loss aversion and flat rate tariffs we consider a model of firm pricing and consumer choice where consumers are loss averse and uncertain about their future demand possibly consumers in our model prefer a flat rate to a measured tariff even though this choice does not minimize their expected billing amount a behavior in line with ample empirical evidence we solve for the profit maximizing two part tariff which is a flat rate if a marginal costs are not too high b loss aversion is intense and c there are strong variations in demand moreover we analyze the optimal nonlinear tariff this tariff has a large flat part when a flat rate is optimal among the class of two part tariffs

contextual inference in markets on the informational content of product lines context can influence decisions this malleability of choice is usually invoked as evidence that people do not maximize stable preference orderings in a market equilibrium however context conveys payoff relevant information to consumers consequently these consumers rationally violate naive formulations of standard choice theoretic principles i identify informational asymmetries under which apparently anomalous behaviors namely the compromise effect and choice overload arise as market equilibria firms respond to consumers contextual inference in case of the compromise effect a firm may introduce premium loss leaders expensive goods of overly high quality that increase the demand for other goods

a rational reconstruction of the compromise effect using market data to infer utilities this article explores the possibility that consumers use market data to make inferences about product utilities the argument is made by means of an example based on the compromise effect found in extant experimental data this phenomenon is generally looked at as a manifestation of deviations from rationality in choice however assuming full rationality i describe a decision rule that is based on consumers inferences about their personal valuation of alternatives from the portfolio of market offerings and some information about their own relative tastes through a number of examples i will argue that consumers often use this or similar decision rules to make inferences about utility i then show that the decision rule may generate compromise effects in experiments and that it may be sustainable the compromise effect could therefore be seen as preliminary evidence that consumers make such inferences

do customers learn from experience evidence from retail banking we study customers adoption and subsequent switching decisions with regard to a menu of three part tariff plans offered by a commercial bank using a rich panel data set covering 70 510 fee based checking accounts over 30 months before and after the introduction of the plans we find that most customers adopt non cost minimizing plans preferring plans with large monthly allowances and high fixed payments furthermore after adoption customers who exceed their allowances and consequently pay overage fees are more likely to switch to plans with larger allowances than customers who do not experience such fees notably after switching these overage paying customers pay higher monthly payments than before in contrast switching customers who did not pay overage payments before switching pay less after switching our findings unlike those of previous research on experience based learning suggest that the behavior of experienced customers does not converge to the predictions of neoclassical models we p

choice based on reasons the case of attraction and compromise effects building on previous research this article proposes that choice behavior under preference uncertainty may be easier to explain by assuming that consumers select the alternative supported by the best reasons this approach provides an explanation for the so called attraction effect and leads to the prediction of a compromise effect consistent with the hypotheses the results indicate that 1 brands tend to gain share when they become compromise alternatives in a choice set 2 attraction and compromise effects tend to be stronger among subjects who expect to justify their decisions to others and 3 selections of dominating and compromise brands are associated with more elaborate and difficult decisions

the timing of sales this paper presents a model of intertemporal price discrimination a fixed number of sellers produce a homogeneous good consumers with different preferences enter the market in each period and leave when they make a purchase the sellers typically vary their prices over time charging a high price in most periods but occasionally cutting the price to sell to a large group of customers with a low reservation price in some equilibria all stores lower their price at the same time and to the same level

consideration sets and competitive marketing we present a model of competitive marketing based on the notion that consumers are boundedly rational and that firms use marketing tactics in an attempt to influence consumers decision process the standard model of consumer behaviour assumes that the consumer applies well defined preferences to a perfectly perceived set of available alternatives we retain the assumption that consumers have stable preferences but relax the assumption that they have a perfect perception of what is relevant for their consumption problem thus allowing firms to manipulate that perception our aim is to explore the market implications of this departure from the standard model especially for the way firms deploy marketing strategies in competitive environments the cornerstone of our model is the observation that in the modern marketplace consumers face an overwhelmingly large variety of products and therefore often use screening criteria deliberate as well as unconscious in order to reduce the number of relevant alternatives as a result consumers apply their preferences not to the set of objectively feasible alternatives but to a potentially smaller set which they construct at an earlier stage of the decision process borrowing a term from the marketing literature we refer to this set as the consideration set the basic idea underlying this term is that consumers may be unaware of some of the feasible products and even when they become aware of a new product they still need to be persuaded to consider it as a potential substitute to their currently consumed product

poverty and the political economy of public education spending evidence from brazil a large body of literature has emphasized the elite capture of democratic institutions as the explanation for the low levels of spending on public education in many low income democracies this paper provides an alternative to that longstanding hypothesis motivated by new cross country facts and evidence from brazilian municipalities we hypothesize that many democratic developing countries might invest less in public education spending because poor decisive voters prefer the government to allocate resources elsewhere one possible explanation is that low income voters could instead favor redistributive programs that increase their incomes in the short run such as cash transfers to test for this possibility we design and implement an experimental survey and an incentivized choice experiment in brazil the findings from both interventions support our hypothesis

wine retail price dispersion in the united states searching for expensive wines similar to other markets in which deviations from jevons law of one price is the norm rather than the exception the retail wine market in the united states is characterized by large price dispersions drawing on a large sample of retail prices from wine searcher com we find an average per wine coefficient of variation of 23 percent some of this is due to differential market conditions especially state regulations our evidence suggests that dispersion also depends positively on price levels after controlling for consumer market and state heterogeneity

your loss is my gain a recruitment experiment with framed incentives empirically labor contracts that financially penalize failure induce higher effort provision than economically identical contracts presented as paying a bonus for success an effect attributed to loss aversion this is puzzling as penalties are infrequently used in practice the most obvious explanation is selection loss averse agents are unwilling to accept such contracts i formalize this intuition then run an experiment to test it surprisingly i find that workers were 25 percent more likely to accept penalty contracts with no evidence of adverse or advantageous selection consistent with the existing literature penalty contracts also increased performance on the job by 0 2 standard deviations i outline extensions to the basic theory that are consistent with the main results but argue that more research is needed on the long term effects of penalty contracts if we want to understand why firms seem unwilling to use them

reference dependent risk attitudes we use koszegi and rabin s 2006 model of reference dependent utility and an extension of it that applies to decisions with delayed consequences to study preferences over monetary risk because our theory equates the reference point with recent probabilistic beliefs about outcomes it predicts specific ways in which the environment influences attitudes toward modest scale risk it replicates classical prospect theory including the prediction of distaste for insuring losses when exposure to risk is a surprise but implies first order risk aversion when a risk and the possibility of insuring it are anticipated a prior expectation to take on risk decreases aversion to both the anticipated and additional risk for large scale risk the model allows for standard consumption utility to dominate reference dependent gain loss utility generating nearly identical risk aversion across situations

asymmetric decoy effects on lower quality versus higher quality brands meta analytic and experimental evidence prior research demonstrates that adding decoys to choice sets can increase choice shares of brands similar to decoys while reducing shares of brands dissimilar to decoys such effects have been dubbed attraction effects and violate the principles of independence of irrelevant alternatives ha and regularity we report a meta analysis that in addition to revealing heretofore unsupported range effects demonstrates an effect of brand quality decoys reduce shares of lower quality competitors more than they reduce shares of higher quality competitors moreover whereas iia is violated throughout regularity is violated only when higher quality brands are targeted decoys increase shares of higher quality brands but typically do not increase shares of lower quality brands to assess the generalizability of the meta analytic pattern we tested decoy effects on two distinct populations in a large experiment the more traditional population replicated the meta analytic pattern standard asymmetry while the more nontraditional population reversed it these findings suggest that while the standard asymmetry is replicable it may not generalize to all market segments