nonstationarity in job search theory generally structural job search models are taken to be stationary in this paper models are examined in which every exogenous variable can cause nonstationarity for instance because its value is dependent on unemployment duration a general differential equation that describes the evolution of the reservation wage over time is derived as an empirical illustration a nonstationary structural model is estimated that focuses on the consequences of a downward shift in the level of benefits it appears that the elasticity of duration with respect to the level of benefits after the shift is much larger than the elasticity with respect to the level before the shift this paper examines the movement of a job seeking individual s reservation wage over time in a general nonstationary job search model also results concerning comparative dynamics of the reservation wage and the distribution of the duration of unemployment are derived as an empirical illustration a nonstationary structural model is estimated the nonstationarity originates from the decrease in the level of benefits when unemployment duration equals two years from the results some detailed policy recommendations can be deduced as one is able to distinguish the effect of a change in the level of benefits in the first two years of unemployment from the effect of a change in the level after that period recently the use of job search models for the analysis of unemployment duration has become widespread the reduced form approach in empirical studies see e g lancaster 1979 in which only the hazard of the duration distribution is estimated is gradually being replaced by a more structural approach the latter way of modelling is characterized by the explicit use in empirical analysis of the reservation wage equation as stated by the theory e g yoon 1981 lancaster and chesher 1983 lynch 1983 narendranathan and nickell 1985 and van den berg 1988 use the complete theoretical framework of job search theory to make inferences about search behaviour however the structural models used in these studies are stationary this implies that variables like unemployment benefits or the rate of arrival of job offers are assumed to be constant over the spell of unemployment which is often at variance with reality what is more various reduced form empirical studies indicate a significant durationdependence of the re employment probability which is generally interpreted as evidence in favour of the presence of nonstationarity see e g blau and robins 1986 kooreman and ridder 1983 lancaster 1979 and narendranathan nickell and stern 1985 consequently there is a need to model reservation wage movements over time based on a nonstationary theoretical framework

unemployment assistance and transition to employment in argentina abstractin 2001 2 argentina experienced a wrenching economic crisis plan jefes implemented in may 2002 was argentina s institutional response to the increase in unemployment and poverty triggered by the crisis the program provided a safety net and appears to have protected some families against indigence despite this success the continued existence of the program which provides benefits to eligible unemployed individuals for an unlimited duration may have unappealing consequences reliance on the plan may reduce the incentive to search for work and in the long run may damage individual employability and perpetuate poverty motivated by these concerns this article examines the effect of participating in plan jefes on the probability of exiting unemployment regardless of the data set the specification and the empirical approach the article shows that plan enrollees are at least 14 percentage points less likely to transit to employment as compared to individuals who applied but did not join the

a pragmatic approach to capital account liberalization in the mid 1990s mainstream economists of nearly all stripes commonly recommended capital account liberalization that is allowing a free flow of funds in and out of a country s economy as an essential step in the process of economic development but then came the east asian financial crisis of 1997 98 in which even seemingly healthy and well managed economies like those of south korea were engulfed by massive capital outflows and tremendous currency volatility and capital account liberalization became quite controversial in the economics profession a decade later now that time has quelled passions and intervening research can shed more light on the debate it appears that both the costs and benefits of capital account liberalization may have been misunderstood in that earlier debate now it appears that the main benefits of capital account liberalization for emerging markets are indirect more related to their role in building other institutions than to the increased financing provided by capital inflows and these indirect benefits are important enough that countries should look for creative approaches to capital account liberalization that would help attain these benefits while reducing the risks countries don t have much choice but to plan for capital account liberalization because capital accounts are de facto becoming more open over time whatever governments may do to try to control them

on the efficiency of participation with vertically differentiated workers in this journal albrecht et al 2010 assume that the planner problem is constrained by participation decisions when this constraint is relaxed participation is too high whereas market tightness is too low subsidizing non participants improves market efficiency and reduces unemployment

lessons from the u s unemployment insurance experiments recent social experiments have evaluated two reforms of the unemployment insurance ui system reemployment bonuses and job search programs the bonus experiments show that economic incentives affect the length of ui receipt and provide weak evidence that an earlier return to work does not decrease earnings the experiments do not show the favorability of a permanent bonus program as they ignore its effect on the number of the claimants the job search experiments test several more promising reforms nearly all of the combinations of services and increased enforcement reduce ui receipt and have favorable cost benefit analyses earnings often increase though the estimates are imprecise

participation recruitment selection and the minimum wage this paper reexamines the efficiency of participation with heterogeneous workers in a search matching model with bargained wages and free entry assuming that firms hire their best applicants we state that participation is insufficient whatever workers bargaining strengths the reason for this is that when holding a job the marginal participant should receive the entire output as a consequence introducing a small minimum wage raises participation job creation and employment therefore the aggregate income of the economy is enhanced

wage bargaining and the phillips curve the identification and specification of aggregate wage equations most economists believe that wage setting is very important for understanding macroeconomic behavior but the form of wage equations commonly estimated suffer from problems of identification the aim of this paper is to consider whether these problems are inevitable and if they are not to suggest ways in whi ch one can estimate structural models of wage setting it is argued that if one confines attention to models of wage bargaining t hat are commonly used identification of the parameters of wage setting should not be a problem and that the most appropriate form of an aggregate wage equation should be a phillips curve copyright 1993 by royal economic society

real exchange rate overvaluation and currency crises evidence from thailand this article examines real exchange rate rer misalignment in thailand in the lead up to the 1997 1998 currency crisis the methodology involves estimating the long run equilibrium rer based on the internal and external balance approach rer misalignment is measured by comparing the actual rer with the estimated long run equilibrium rer the results suggest that there was a persistent rer overvaluation from 1991 up to the onset of the crisis in 1997 too much net short term capital inflows and government expenditure expansion were the main contributory factors after the massive depreciation of nominal exchange rate during the crisis the rer seems to have gradually returned to its long run equilibrium level

unemployment insurance and male unemployment duration in canada a model of unemployment duration is estimated with weekly micro data on canadian men entitlement provisions in the unemployment insurance program and demand conditions are found to have a significant effect on the probability of leaving unemployment the probability of a worker leaving unemployment declines with the duration of unemployment holding unemployment insurance entitlement constant when entitlement is allowed to vary the probability of leaving first falls and then generally rises with unemployment duration these results are robust with respect to allowing for person specific unobserved heterogeneity and alternative specifications of duration dependence

the impact of the potential duration of unemployment benefits on the duration of unemployment abstract this paper examines the impact of the potential duration of unemployment insurance ui benefits on unemployment in the united states first we use a large sample of household heads to examine differences in the unemployment spell distributions of ui recipients and nonrecipients sharp increases in the escape rate from unemployment both through recalls and new job acceptances are apparent for ui recipients around the time of benefits exhaustion such increases are not apparent at similar points of spell duration for nonrecipients second our analysis of accurate administrative data from 12 states indicates that a one week increase in potential benefit duration increases the average duration of the unemployment spells of ui recipients by 0 16 to 0 20 weeks

do benefit cuts boost job finding swedish evidence from the 1990s in june 1995 the swedish parliament decided to cut the replacement rate in unemployment insurance from 80 percent to 75 percent a change that took effect on january 1 1996 this paper examines h

inflation volatile public spending and endogenously sustained growth i construct a model of an economy whose government finances volatile public spending via money creation the model jointly accounts for the emergence of some well known empirical observations specifically it predicts a negative correlation between output growth and policy volatility furthermore given that both the mean and the variance of the inflation rate are elevated by fluctuations in public spending the model provides a novel theoretical justification for the simultaneous negative correlation of long run growth with both average inflation and inflation variability the model also supports the view that policy volatility reduces social welfare

an equilibrium model of search unemployment this paper develops a simple general equilibrium model with sequential search in which a nondegenerate wage offer distribution is endogenously determined we use this model to analyze the comparati

unemployment duration unemployment benefits and labor market programs in sweden abstract standard search theory as well as some empirical evidence suggest that an unemployed individual s probability of entering employment increases as he approaches the time when unemployment benefits are due to expire this pattern may not carry over to a country like sweden where labor market programs are targeted at the long term unemployed at risk of benefit exhaustion the paper examines transitions out of unemployment using data on unemployed individuals in sweden a semi parametric competing risks model for transitions to employment labor market programs and non participation is estimated there is some evidence that the exit rate from unemployment to employment increases as benefit exhaustion is approached

compositional effects of capital controls theory and evidence this paper examines the effects of capital controls on the composition of inter national capital flows paying particular attention to debt inflows versus equity inflows a two period small open economy model with stochastic second period output and asymmetric information between domestic agents and international financiers is utilised to generate predictions regarding the effects of capital controls on the relative use of debt versus equity for financing first period investment these capital control implications are then investigated with quarterly frequency panel data for latin america capital controls are found to significantly affect the composition of the capital account

the effects of unemployment compensation in general equilibrium with search unemployment it is shown that when the effects of an increase in unemployment subsidies are studied in a general equilibrium framework unemployment increases far less than in a partial partial model in fact the result may very well be a decrease in unemployment if the general equilibrium forces are strong enough in the model used in this paper an increase in unemployment compensation unambiguously decreases the rate of unemployment copyright 1990 by the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

unemployment in britain male unemployment in britain has risen from around 2 per cent in the 1950s to around 17 per cent in 1985 see figure 1 the figures are for male unemployment because there is no consistent series for women 1 even more remarkably unemployment has fallen in only three years out of the last twenty 1973 1978 and 1979 to account for this we need a model that explains both changes in the natural or non accelerating inflation rate of unemployment nairu and deviations from it we use a three equation supply side model centred on the labour market this has two main features the first concerns the determination of employment in the short run the labour demand function that we use cuts through the fruitless debate now raging especially in europe as to whether current unemployment is classical or keynesian according to the classical view employment is too high because real wages are too high according to the keynesian view real wages are not binding and unemployment is high because the product market does not clear with prices too high relative to nominal demand the whole debate is set in the framework of perfect competition yet in perfect competition prices are set by impersonal forces and it is not clear what could possibly stop prices clearing the market it is much more reasonable to think of prices as being set by imperfectly competitive firms existing prices being the best they can think of given the demand they face in this context firms demand for labour will depend on both the real product wage and the level of real aggregate demand this is the demand function we estimate and it conforms both to common sense and to the data however this does not imply that employment can be made to grow without limit by pumping up real demand for in the medium term when price surprises are eliminated our model determines three variables employment real wages and real demand on the basis of three equations an employment equation a price equation and a wage equation thus in the medium term there is a natural level of employment and corresponding to this a natural level of real aggregate demand the second key feature of our model concerns the medium term determination of unemployment in the medium term the planned mark up of wages over prices in wage settlements must be consistent with the mark up of prices over wage costs in employers pricing behaviour for if wage setters try to set real product wages higher than is consistent with employers pricing behaviour this generates ever increasing inflation thus the key to understanding unemployment in the medium term is the behaviour of wage setters if events occur that push them towards too high real wages then unemployment has to rise to offset these influences we shall call these influences wage pressure variables or push factors and they are clearly crucial in understanding unemployment the variables here include the social security system employment protection

unemployment benefits contract length and nominal wage flexibility we show in a union bargaining model that a decrease in the unemployment benefit level increases not only equilibrium employment but also nominal wage flexibility and thus reduces employment varia

scar effects of unemployment an assessment of institutional complementarities this article uses panel data from the survey of income and program participation sipp and the european community household panel echp for a comparative analysis of workers post unemployment earnings trajectories in the united states and 12 western european countries across the study sample of industrialized countries results of difference in difference propensity score matching show post unemployment earnings losses to be largely permanent and particularly significant for high wage and older workers as well as for women the analyses also show that negative effects of unemployment on workers subsequent earnings are mitigated through either generous unemployment benefit systems or strict labor market regulation these effects stem partly from favorable behavioral responses that prevent downward occupational and industrial mobility and partly from changes in the overall structure of labor markets favoring the transferability of worker skills between jobs these positive effects materialize despite t

temporary stabilization predetermined exchange rates the paper analyzes the impact of a stabilization policy based on a temporary reduction in the rate of devaluation against a background in which a constant rate of devaluation has no real effects it is shown that the temporary policy does and furthermore that the real effects tend to become bigger in absolute value as the horizon of the temporary policy is shortened the central discussion is carried out in terms of a one good cash in advance model with perfect capital mobility and ramsey type consumers results are extended to account for home goods and variable velocity the roles of capital mobility and banking liberalization are briefly discussed

does unemployment compensation affect unemployment duration abstract we use a flexible hazard rate model with unrestricted spell duration and calendar timeeffects to analyse a dataset including all norwegian unemployment spells during the1990 s the dataset provides a unique access to conditionally independent variation inunemployment compensation we find that a marginal increase in compensation re duces the escape rate from unemployment significantly irrespective of business cycleconditions and spell duration the escape rate rises sharply in the months just prior tobenefit exhaustion while men are more responsive than women with respect to mar ginal changes in compensation women are most responsive with respect to benefitexhaustion keywords unemployment spells business cycles unemployment compensation non parametric duration analysis jel classification c41 j64 the ragnar frisch centre for economic research oslo we wish to thank the re search council of norway for financial support and christian brinck harald goldstein costas meghir espen moen steinar strom rolf aaberge and three anonomyous referees for helpful comments cor respondence to knut roed the ragnar frisch centre for economic research gaustadalleen 21 0349oslo norway e mail knut roed frisch uio no

unemployment a survey this paper presents a survey of the economics of unemployment it covers competitive and imperfect competition models the role of different methods of wage determination and explanation of postwar unemployment patterns in the oecd countries copyright 1990 by royal economic society

currency crashes in emerging markets an empirical treatment we use a panel of annual data for over 100 developing countries from 1971 through 1992 to characterize currency crashes we define a currency crash as a large change of the nominal exchange rate that is also a substantial increase in the rate of change of nominal depreciation we examine the composition of the debt as well as its level and a variety of other macroeconomic factors external and foreign crashes tend to occur when output growth is low the growth of domestic credit is high and the level of foreign interest rates are high a low ratio of fdi to debt is consistently associated with a high likelihood of a crash

optimal firm size taxes and unemployment abstract we analyze a model similar to the standard implicit contracting framework but assume that the size of the firm the number of workers under contract is endogenous some well known predictions from contract theory with firm size fixed exogenously are reversed in particular a result obtained by feldstein concerning unemployment insurance does not hold when firm size is chosen optimally he concludes an increase in experience rating the extent to which firms pay for unemployment benefits through their taxes reduces unemployment while we show that it increases unemployment under reasonable conditions

unemployment insurance design inducing moving and retraining evidence suggests that unemployed individuals can sometimes aect their job prospects by undertaking a costly action like deciding to move or retrain realistically such an opportunity only arises for some individuals and the iden tity of those may be unobservable ex ante the problem of characterizing con strained optimal unemployment insurance in this case has been neglected in previous literature we construct a model of optimal unemployment insurance where multiple incentive constraints are easily handled the model is used to analyze the case when an incentive constraint involving moving costs must be respected in addition to the standard constraint involving costly unobserv able job search in particular we derive closed form solutions showing that when the moving retraining incentive constraint binds unemployment bene ts should increase over the unemployment spell with an initial period with low bene ts and an increase after this period has expired

unemployment compensation finance and labor market rigidity abstract the systematic use of experience rating is an original feature of the u s unemployment benefits system at first glance experience rating does not appear to be a desirable choice for a lot of european labor markets which are characterized by high firing costs we provide a simple matching model of a rigid labor market that includes firing costs temporary jobs and a minimum wage in order to analyze this issue our analysis leads us to argue that experience rating is likely to reduce unemployment and improve the welfare of low skilled workers in france and more generally for low skilled workers in a typical rigid continental european labor market

exploring the political economy of labour market institutions labour markets how reforms took place many economists argue that the european unemployment problem relates to large labour market rigidities this paper argues that many of those inflexibilities and the underlying institutional regulations can be understood as the outcome of political influence by incumbent employees this is because many policies that increase unemployment actually benefit these insiders an empirical investigation of the determinants of labour market institutions demonstrates that the observations are consistent with this view the findings imply 1 higher exposure of the employed to unemployment facilitates a reduction in the level of employment protection 2 unemployment benefits are lower the more employment reacts to wages 3 a higher level of unemployment and the existence of a right wing government slow down the growth rate of the minimum wage giles saint paul

optimal unemployment insurance in search equilibrium should unemployment benefits be paid indefinitely at a fixed rate or should the rate decline or increase over a worker s unemployment spell we examine these issues using an equilibrium model of search unemployment the model features worker firm bargaining over wages free entry of new jobs and endogenous search effort among the unemployed the main result is that an optimal insurance program implies a declining benefit sequence over the spell of unemployment numerical calibrations of the model suggest that there may be nontrivial welfare gains associated with switching from an optimal uniform benefit structure to an optimally differentiated system

should unemployment benefits decrease with the unemployment spell abstract in this paper we investigate whether unemployment benefits should decrease with the unemployment spell in a model where both job search intensity and wages are endogenous wages are set by collective agreements bargained by insiders it is shown that a more declining time sequence of unemployment benefits leads to wage increases when the tax rate is given such an effect may imply an increase in unemployment and counteracts the response of job search intensity that can be found in standard job search models with a given wage distribution calibration exercises suggest that it costs twice as much in terms of welfare loss for the long term unemployed workers to reduce the unemployment rate by 1 when wages are endogenous than in the standard job search model

the narrow moving band the dutch disease and the competitive consequences of mrs thatcher notes on trade in the presence of dynamic scale economies abstract this paper presents a model of trade in which comparative advantage instead of being determined by underlying attributes of countries evolves over time through learning by doing in this model arbitrary patterns of specialization once established tend to become entrenched over time the model sheds light on three widely held views that do not make sense in more conventional models first is the view that temporary protection of selected sectors can permanently alter the pattern of comparative advantage in the protecting country s favor second is the view that seemingly favorable developments such as the discovery of exportable natural resources may lead to a permanent loss of other sectors and reduce welfare in the long run third is the possibility that a temporary overvaluation of a currency due to tight money can lead to a permanent loss of competitiveness in some sectors

temporary controls on capital inflows abstract during the past decade a number of countries imposed capital controls that had two distinguishing features they were asymmetric in that they were designed principally to discourage capital inflows and they were temporary this paper studies formally the consequences of these policies calibrates their potential effectiveness and assesses their welfare implications in an environment in which the level of capital inflows can be sub optimal in addition motivated by the fact that these types of controls have often been left in place after the dissipation of the shock that lead to the controls being implemented the paper evaluates the welfare cost of procrastination in removing these types of controls

on the inefficiency of matching models of unemployment with heterogeneous workers and jobs when firms rank their applicants in a circular matching model with bargained wages firms rank their applicants and pick the most suitable one job creation appears to lower the average output as firms do not internalize this effect there are too many jobs in a laissez faire equilibrium under the hosios condition by contrast job rejection is efficient for the equilibrium value of market tightness consequently introducing unemployment compensation raises the aggregate income by lowering market tightness due to the isomorphism between the two models these results extend to match specific productivities however competitive search restores market efficiency

targeting the real exchange rate theory and evidence abstract this paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of policies aimed at setting a more depreciated level of the real exchange rate an intertemporal optimizing model suggests that in the absence of changes in fiscal policy a more depreciated level of the real exchange rate can only be attained temporarily this can be achieved by means of higher inflation and or higher real interest rates depending on the degree of capital mobility evidence for brazil chile and colombia supports the model s prediction that undervalued real exchange rates are associated with higher inflation

unemployment insurance benefits and the supply of labor of an employed worker abstract the unemployment insurance program is believed to adversely affect the supply of labor of the unemployed yet it generates favorable incentives for the employed since unemployment benefits are aimed to compensate the unemployed for earnings loss of which past earnings serve as a practical measure a worker might choose to increase his efforts when employed insuring himself partially against future unemployment however this possible impact on labor supply has escaped any attention until very recently incorporating an earnings related benefits scheme into a multi period decision model the present paper investigates the labor supply behavior of an insured worker over time

job matching when employment contracts suffer from moral hazard abstract we consider a job matching model where the relationships between firms and wealth constrained workers suffer from moral hazard specifically effort on the job is non contractible so that parties that are matched negotiate a bonus contract higher unemployment benefits affect the workers outside option the latter is improved for low skilled workers hence they receive a larger share of the surplus which strengthens their effort incentives and increases productivity effects are reversed for high skilled workers moreover raising benefit payments affects the proportion of successful matches which induces some firms to exit the economy and causes unemployment to increase

unemployment insurance in theory and practice a hallmark of modern labor economics is the close interplay between the development of theory data sources and econometric testing the evolution of the economic analysis of unemployment insurance provides a good illustration new theoretical approaches in particular job search theory have inspired a large amount of empirical research some of it methodologically innovative and most of it highly relevant for economic policy the paper presents a broad survey and an assessment of the economic analysis of unemployment insurance as it has evolved since the 1970s

optimal workfare with voluntary and involuntary unemployment this paper addresses the welfare implications of introducing workfare into unemployment benefit policy we consider a population composed of employed and unemployed workers and of individuals who do not seek employment job search behavior is unobservable which means that voluntarily unemployed individuals can claim unemployment insurance ui benefits intended for unemployed workers as a consequence pecuniary benefit schemes underinsure workers against unemployment we show that requiring unproductive activities workfare in exchange for ui benefits may generate a pareto improvement by facilitating better unemployment insurance for workers and we characterize the situations where this is the case

the effects of capital controls on international capital flows in the presence of asymmetric information abstract this paper examines the effects of capital controls on the volume and composition of international capital flows in the presence of asymmetric information in the two period small open economy model stochastic second period output depends on the level of first period investment which cannot be verified by international investors domestic agents obtain external funding by borrowing on international capital markets and by selling equity to international investors the paper investigates the effects of various capital controls on the debt equity choice domestic investment and welfare controls on capital inflows are shown to shift the composition of flows from fixed income instruments towards equity and to reduce the overall volume of inflows

the redistributive roles of unemployment insurance and the dynamics of voting abstract public unemployment insurance is analyzed as the majority voting equilibrium policy of a dynamic stochastic economy abstracting from incentive effects we focus on redistribution some results are because of the distribution of heterogeneous employment opportunities public insurance may be democratically chosen even if complete private markets exist and because of the dynamics even when agents are intrinsically homogeneous the equilibrium benefit level or duration benefit schedule deviates from what has been described as optimal in the literature the effects of differences in the average frequency or duration of unemployment on equilibrium taxes and benefits are investigated with some unanticipated results

unemployment insurance and unemployment spells this paper tests the effects of the level and length of unemployment insurance benefits on unemployment durations the paper particularly studies individual behavior during the weeks just prior to when benefits lapse higher unemployment insurance benefits are found to have a strong negative effect on the probability of leaving unemployment however the probability of leaving unemployment rises dramatically just prior to when benefits lapse individual data are used with accurate information of spell durations and the level and length of benefits the semiparametric estimation techniques used in the paper yield more plausible estimates than conventional approaches and provide useful diagnostics copyright 1990 by the econometric society

multiple equilibria in the british labour market some empirical evidence abstract this paper takes a simple imperfectly competitive aggregate labour market model with increasing returns which can lead to non existence or multiplicity of equilibria the model is estimated using annual aggregate data for britain some evidence is found and recent british economic history is interpreted using the model

unemployment compensation and high european unemployment a reassessment with new benefit indicators generous unemployment benefits lie at the heart of the conventional explanation for persistent high unemployment the effects of benefit generosity on work incentives are more ambiguous in a broader behavioural framework in which workers get substantial disutility from unemployment given income and know that unemployment has scarring effects in the future the micro evidence suggests modest effects of changes in generosity but there are reasons to doubt that the impacts on national unemployment rates are consequential the empirical case for the orthodox prediction comes from cross country regressions on the oecd s gross replacement rate grr but the published evidence is mixed and we find little support in the pattern of annual changes in the grr and the unemployment rate for oecd countries over the last three decades we take advantage of new and much improved net replacement indicators from the oecd which show little correlation with either the grrs or with unemployment and employment rates we conclude that the available evidence does not offer compelling support for the conventional view

employment protection reform in search economies the design of employment protection legislation epl is of particular importance in the european debate on the contours of labor market reform in this article we appeal to an equilibrium unemployment model to investigate the virtues of epl reform which reduces the red tape and legal costs associated with layo s and introduces a u s style experiencerating system which we model as a combination of a layo tax and a payroll subsidy the reform considered shows that it is possible to improve the e ciency of employment protection policies without a ecting the extent of worker protection on the labor market these results are consistent with the conventional wisdom that experience rating is desirable not only as an integral component of unemployment compensation nance as most studies acknowledge but also as part and parcel of a virtuous epl system

improving incentives in unemployment insurance a review of recent research abstract this paper provides a review of the recent literature on how incentives in unemployment insurance can be improved we are particularly concerned with three instruments i e the duration of benefit payments or more generally the time sequencing of benefits monitoring in conjunction with sanctions and workfare our reading of the theoretical literature is that the case for imposing a penalty on less active job search is fairly solid a growing number of empirical studies including randomized experiments are in line with this conclusion

capital account liberalization as a signal the authors present a model in which a government s current capital control policy signals future policies controls on capital outflows evolve in response to news on technology conditional on government attitudes toward taxation of capital when there is uncertainty over governmental types a policy of liberal capital outflows sends a favorable signal that may trigger a capital inflow this prediction is consistent with the experience of several countries that have liberalized their capital accounts copyright 1997 by american economic association

optimal unemployment insurance abstract we investigate the design of an optimal unemployment insurance program using an equilibrium search model calibrated using data from the reemployment bonus experiments there are three main conclusions first insurance considerations suggest that the potential duration of ul benefits would be unlimited under an optimal program second if the potential duration to benefits were unlimited current replacement rates in the u s about 0 5 would probably be about right third the optimal replacement rate rises as the potential duration of benefits is increasingly limited reaching 1 when the potential duration of benefits is limited to 32 weeks