is free trade in the interest of exporting countries when there is ecological dumping abstract given conditions of oligopolistic competition the coordinated ban of direct export promoting policies e g in the eu or by gatt increases the income of exporting countries however in the presence of environmental distortions free trade can lead to ecological dumping in exporting countries the question arises if free trade is still in the interest of exporting countries we show that welfare maximizing governments of exporting countries prefer free trade even if countries subsidize their local industries indirectly via ecological dumping the existence of further national policy instruments does not make free trade agreements obsolete

multiregional oligopoly with capacity constraints we develop a model of cournot competition between capacity constrained firms that sell a single good to multiple regions we provide a novel characterization for the unique equilibrium allocation o

strategic pricing with customer rationing the case of primary metals firms in primary metal industries often charge subcompetitive prices and in periods of high demand they may ration their customers a model is developed to ex plain these empirical regularities in the model firms with market power are aware that the price they charge today affects their demand tomorrow in addition the strategic interaction among firms reinforces this intertemporal effect in the equilibrium of the two stage game oligopolists can price below marginal cost and when capacity constraints are introduced the equilibrium can involve rationing model predictions are assessed using market structure and technology data for several primary metal industries

on the effects of downstream entry we study the effects of entry in a downstream market where firms e g compaq and ibm cvs and safeway buy an input e g microprocessor grocery items from an upstream supplier e g intel procter gamble and sell their output to consumers we show demand conditions where contrary to conventional wisdom entry of a new downstream firm lowers the downstream market output and increases the consumer price thus consumers may be better off with fewer sellers in such markets we also show that this entry may cause the profit of each incumbent downstream firm to i remain unchanged ii decrease or iii even increase also for a class of widely used demand conditions the supplier s optimal price is shown invariant to the entry exit of its downstream buyer firms we classify all possible effects of downstream entry in terms of fundamental market demand conditions

strategic labour contracts labor contracts affect a firm s cost function and for this reason they can be used as a recommitment device to gain a strategic advantage against other firms in a model that is otherwise neutral it is found that if firms compete in prices then strategic considerations alone yield results similar to those obtained by c azariadis 1983 workers are underemployed and worse off in more adverse states of nature on the other hand if firms compete in quantities then the equilibrium contracts resemble those of j green and c kahn 1983 workers are overemployed and better off in more adverse states

optimum discriminatory tariffs under oligopolistic competition this paper attempts to present a simple cournot model to determine the optimal discriminatory tariff rates when the international market is a homogeneous heterogeneous product market in the model there are two foreign firms located in two different countries competing for sales in a local market when the firms sell a homogeneous product and the home country can impose differential tariffs on imports from different countries then the tariff on the low cost producer should be hgher in particular with constant marginal costs the tariff difference should equal half the cost difference on the other hand if the firms sell differentiated products with symmetric linear demands and technologies then the weaker the degree of product differentiation the greater is the tariff difference compared with the cost difference

protection lobbying and market structure abstract we look at a model of lobbying by oligopolistic industry where firms allocate resources between lobbying and internal cost reducing activities we ask the following questions i if firms differ with respect to comparative advantage in lobbying what is the equilibrium allocation of resources between lobbying and cost reducing activities ii can lobbying opportunities reverse the profitability ranking among firms iii under what condition is the conventional wisdom that highly concentrated industries tend to obtain more protection valid the answers depend on various measures of comparative advantage in lobbying and on the demand curve

welfare aspects of technological adoption with learning abstract this paper considers the welfare implications of adoption of a new technology when this technology is characterized by costs of adaptation and some localized learning effects a two period model is developed to represent the adoption game between firms in a duopolistic framework optimal social patterns of adoption are compared with private patterns emerging as equilibria of the game it is shown that differences between the two patterns are due first to the shape of the demand function of the product sold on the duopolistic market and secondly to strategic interaction effects between the adopting firms

an analysis of preemptive behavior in the titanium dioxide industry abstract much of the recent theoretical work on oligopoly theory focuses on preemptive capital expansion this paper continues this work by testing whether dupont s behavior in the titanium dioxide industry was consistent with the capital commitment model between 1972 and 1977 this is different from previous empirical papers analyzing preemptive capital expansion because it focuses on strategic behavior in a specific industry and because the hypothesis tests in this paper are based on a formal model of firms optimizing behavior the results lend support to the conclusion that dupont committed capital to preempt the smallest five firms in the industry between 1972 and 1977

can revenue maximizing export taxes yield higher welfare than welfare maximizing export taxes abstract in this paper we show that commodity exporting countries may obtain a higher welfare under revenue maximizing export taxes than under welfare maximizing export taxes this result cannot be obtained in the traditional two country models

protection versus free trade lobbying competition between domestic and foreign firms this article considers how political interaction between policymakers and domestic and foreign firms endogenously determines tariff rates we show that because of lobbying competition between foreign and domestic firms even a less competitive foreign firm can successfully elicit a tariff reduction under reasonable conditions moreover lobbying competition may also increase the level of aggregate domestic welfare when the market powers of the competing firms are sufficiently alike

exchange rate economics 1986 in the past fifteen years key exchange rates have moved in larger and more persistent ways than advocates of flexible rates in the late 1960s would have left anyone free to imagine certainly there was no expectation of constancy for nominal exchange rates but real exchange rate movements of 30 or forty percent were definitely not suggested as a realistic possibility moreover where these large movements did occur they did not obviously appear to be connected with fundamentals and hence seemed difficult to explain in terms of the exchange rate theories at hand the persistence of rate movements was as surprising as the rapid unwinding of apparent misalignments when they did ultimately occur the past fifteen years provide a natural dividing line between the keynesian and monetary approaches of the 1960s and the more recent analysis that takes into account exchange rate expectations and portfolio issues which took off in the early 1970s as well as the brand new approaches that concentrate on partial equilibrium microeconomics to review these ideas the paper starts with a brief look at the u s experience with flexible exchange rates from there it proceeds to the mundell fleming model as a comprehensive framework of analysis the following sections deal with persistent effects of policy disturbances links between exchange rates and prices the political economy of exchange rate movements and the question of policies toward excess capital mobility this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

a duopoly game with heterogeneous green supply chains in optimal price and market stability with consumer green preference abstract as environmental problems exponentially rising the necessity of environmental protection and green purchase behavior is addressed by the increasing consumers this paper aims to analyze the effects of consumer green preference on members optimal decisions and the speed of the adjustment of the optimal price strategies for heterogeneous green supply chains the results elaborate that consumer green preference significantly influences the product green level of the manufacturer and the supplier and has intricate effects on the speed of the adjustment of the boundedly rational supply chain which directly affects the social stability the vicious competition and the unbalance market are caused by the overreaction of the boundedly rational and naive supply chain to consumer green preference

tax evasion and strategic behaviour of the firms abstract the purpose of this paper is to analyze the optimal tax evasion decision in the context of an oligopolistic market with quantity setting firms it is shown that the optimal amount of tax evasion for each firm depends not only on the degree of collusion in the market but also on the relative market shares of the firms increasing collusion however leads to a larger amount of tax evasion in the market it is proved that with constant probability of detection separability between shifting and evasion decisions holds whereas it might fail to hold if the probability of detection is a function of the declared tax base in this case a probability function which decreases with the declared tax base will lead to lower evasion and lower shifting

endogenous r d symmetry in linear duopoly with one way spillovers a duopoly model of cost reducing r d cournot competition is extended to study the endogenous timing of r d strategic investment under the assumption that r d spillovers only flow from the r d leader to the follower sequential and simultaneous play at the r d stage are compared in order to assess the role of technological externalities in stimulating or attenuating endogenous firm asymmetry the only timing structure of the r d stage sustainable as subgame perfect nash equilibrium involves simultaneous play and zero spillovers

collusive behavior with heterogeneous firms in a repeated duopoly with heterogeneous firms i ask which enforceable collusive arrangement is likely to prevail i propose the equilibrium at which both firms are just indifferent between colluding and defecting for discount factors not exceeding a critical level i show this equilibrium is pareto optimal possibly even the unique pareto optimum i then apply bargaining theory and show that the proposed equilibrium is the likely outcome of explicit negotiations finally i argue that the proposed equilibrium is an obvious focal point on which firms may tacitly coordinate the proposed equilibrium promises to be useful for comparative statics analysis of collusive oligopoly

home or overseas an analysis of sourcing strategies under competition motivated by the recent backshoring trend this paper studies a sourcing game where competing firms may choose between efficient sourcing e g sourcing from overseas and responsive sourcing e g sourcing from a home country efficient sourcing usually provides a cost advantage whereas responsive sourcing allows a firm to obtain more accurate demand information when making procurement decisions by characterizing the equilibrium outcome we find some interesting results driven by the strategic interaction between the firms first a firm may still use efficient sourcing in equilibrium even when the cost advantage associated with efficient sourcing does not exist this is because the firm can dampen competition by reducing the correlation between its own demand information and the competitor s second a cost hike in efficient sourcing e g the rising labor cost in asia may benefit all the firms in the industry the reason is that the cost hike may alleviate competition by inducing a new equilibrium sourcing structure this paper also sheds some light on the recent backshoring trend first our analysis indicates that more firms will shift from efficient sourcing to responsive sourcing in equilibrium i e backshore if the market size shrinks the demand becomes more volatile or the sourcing costs rise simultaneously second a firm s backshoring behavior reduces the competition on the cost dimension but it also has an ambiguous informational impact on the other firms in the market in particular some firms may benefit from increased correlation of their demand information under cournot competition with substitutable products overall the backshoring behavior can be beneficial to all the firms sticking to their original sourcing strategies under certain conditions this paper was accepted by martin lariviere operations management

cost heterogeneity industry concentration and strategic trade policies abstract we show that if domestic firms do not have identical unit costs then the interplay between the herfindahl index of concentration and the elasticity of the slope of the demand curve is of major importance in the determination of optimal trade policies in some cases the direction of optimal policy is reversed

environmental standards and cournot duopoly a stability analysis in this paper the dynamic effects of public environmental policies are investigated in a cournot duopoly with both heterogeneous and homogeneous expectations in a context of limited rationality it is shown that the increase in upper limits to emissions always tends to destabilise markets and generate a chaotic market dynamics in both cases the policy implication of this result is that the use of environmental policies may favour market stability it is also shown that higher costs of abatement technology entail a higher likelihood of stability loss although in the heterogeneous expectations case also a decrease in costs may destabilise

the tax they pay may be your own promotion taxes and labour supply a model of labour supply is formulated in which increased effort results in an increase in the probability of promotion a simple benchmark model is extended in two directions the first emphasizes the link between labour supply and saving decisions the other takes account of the interaction between workers via contests for promotion a general insight that emerges from the analysis is that when studying the effects of wages and taxes on incentives to work it is sometimes the after tax incomes of other workers in particular senior workers who have already been promoted which are of crucial importance

equilibrium pollution taxes in a two industry open economy abstract this paper involves strategic implications of environmental policy in case of two international oligopolies when countries take part in an international environmental agreement and have agreed on national target levels for a global pollutant this set up permits an analysis of the design of optimal emission taxes across domestic producers by differentiating taxes between industries with different abatement cost demand and number of domestic firms governments are in a position to raise national net foreign rents it is argued that a single national emission trading programme encompassing all domestic producers cannot provide the equivalent strategic policy design

customer markets credit market imperfections and real price rigidity according to standard theory an increase in demand should raise prices of goods given factor prices empirically however prices appear to be unaffected by short run variations in demand this paper suggests an explanation of this observation if customers react slowly to price changes and credit markets are imperfect prices may be unchanged or even fall when demand increases the reason is that when demand is high profits are high and firms can compete more intensely for customers without increasing their borrowing copyright 1991 by the london school of economics and political science

market structure and organizational form this paper studies the determinants of a firm s organizational form in the context of an imperfectly competitive industry there are two kinds of organizational forms the multi divisional form m form and the unitary form u form an m form firm suffers from ignorance of demand externalities among different products and double marginalization is eliminated in contrast in a u form firm demand externalities are taken into consideration and double marginalization exists a firm s optimal choice of organizational form depends on the market structure

comparative statics for integrable nash equilibria abstract this paper derives comparative statics results for stable nash equilibria in integrable concave orthogonal games application of these results to cost curve shifts in the asymmetric cournot oligopoly immediately uncovers some apparently new comparative statics results

share tenancy as strategic delegation abstract the paper develops a new explanation of sharecropping based on the idea of an incentive equilibrium it considers a set up in which a few landlords in a village confront the choice of cultivating their farms by adopting different tenurial arrangements ranging from owner operation through the fixed rental system to sharecropping these landlords are the only sources of employment in the village and compete in the wages they pay to their workers in such an environment sharecropping is explained as a form of strategic delegation where a landlord gets extra benefit by having a share tenant and giving him suitable incentives

cost manipulation games in oligopoly with costs of manipulating we analyze a class of two stage games where rival firms incur real resource costs in manipulating their marginal costs so as to influence the outcome of the game they want to play in stage two marginal costs may be manipulated by various means such as redistribution of productive assets choice of location or creation of an internal input market a general formulation of the game is provided and several applications are analyzed we show that the optimal allocation of resources within an oligopoly can be asymmetric even for ex ante symmetric firms this is an additional explanation of heterogeneity in oligopoly

games with strategic complementarities new applications to industrial organization this paper provides an introduction to the analysis of games with strategic complementarities and applications to industrial organization oligopoly pricing comparative statics and a taxonomy of strategic behavior in two stage games

international technology transfer under potential threat of entry a cournot nash framework abstract this paper analyses the possibility of technology transfer from a technologically advanced foreign firm to a domestic firm of a less developed country when the product market is characterized by cournot nash competition the foreign firm is not allowed to enter the home market by a prohibitive tariff but the backward firm may not face any such resistance in the foreign markets this means that technology transfer under this situation involves potential threat of competition from the latecomer it is shown that by designing a suitable payment policy the host country government can induce the foreign firm to transfer the best technology however there are possible equilibria where worse than the best technologies are transferred

imperfect competition functional forms and the size and distribution of research benefits abstract the effects of functional forms for supply and demand on the size and distribution of the returns to research are examined under a range of forms of competition under perfect competition the choice of functional form is relatively unimportant for the estimation of research benefits under imperfect competition the combination of the choice of functional forms for supply and demand and the nature of the research induced supply shift can have profound implications for the results functional form plays a much more important role than in the competitive model the most important contrast is between the constant elasticity model and the linear model along with various cases of a generalized linear model these findings are illustrated using a combination of analytical results and numerical simulations

abuse of eu emissions trading for tacit collusion in this paper we show that loopholes in eu emissions trading law foster tacit collusion that impacts oligopolistic product markets the abuses originate from the covert misuse of eu emissions trading institutions such as pooling or project based mechanisms we analyse two types of these loopholes by means of game theoretical methods to show how oligopolistic firms establish output restrictions even if those firms are price takers on the permit market which might actually be the case for the majority of obligated firms in the eu the identified misuse of emissions trading law increases firms profits decreases the consumers surplus and has negative effects on social welfare for specified parameter ranges consequently public authorities should not allow emissions trading s overall good reputation based upon its efficient abatement of pollution to blind them to options in european emissions trading legislation that would eventually restrict competition

an empirical model of mark ups in a quality differentiated export market abstract this paper develops an empirical model to allow for imperfect competition in the market for traded goods a simultaneous equation model incorporating the demand for and supply of taiwanese footwear exports to the united states is specified and estimated the model allows the identification of two separate sources of mark ups in export prices the first comes from the u s imposed quantitative restriction on these exports the second comes from imperfect competition in the international market for these exports the results suggest competitive behavior by taiwanese footwear exporters the quantitative restriction resulted in a 16 9 percent mark up of prices over marginal cost

comparative statics for oligopoly a generalized result we perform comparative statics for a general model of asymmetric oligopoly and derive a concise formula for the response of one firm to a marginal change in its rival s strategic variable taking into account the responses of all other firms we obtain the conditions under which the sign of this response coincides with that of the mixed second order partial derivative of the firm s payoff function we then propose a distinction between gross and net strategic relationships i e strategic substitute and complement

tax incidence under imperfect competition comment abstract delipalla and o donnell 2001 contains a formula for the incidence of specific and ad valorem taxes in a conjectural variation oligopoly model with potentially asymmetric firms the formula is incorrect we derive the correct formula and provide a discussion of the error and its implications for empirical studies of pass through

the effect of farm supply shifts on concentration and market power in the food processing sector in this paper we examine the marginal impact of changing farm supply on the market structure of the downstream food processing sector we develop a theoretical model that allows for cost differences among processors and endogenizes downstream entry and exit comparative statics results are consistent with several well established trends in the food processing sector in particular the analysis demonstrates that increasing concentration in the food processing sector is consistent with decreasing market power indeed we find that when the farm supply curve shifts outward an increase in concentration can only occur when there is a decrease in market power

tax design in the presence of imperfect competition an example abstract this paper studies the effects upon price output and entry in an oligopolistic market induced by tax policy elsewhere in the economy the results derived are applied to a model of copying to find conditions for which subsidisation of the manufacturers of originals is welfare improving the critical factor is found to be the distribution of consumers tastes

capital structure and interaction among firms in output markets theory and evidence i develop a simple model that examines the relations between the extent of competitive interaction among firms in output markets their capital structures and the aggressiveness of their operating strategies a firm s optimal leverage is related to the degree to which its operating strategy affects its rivals value functions and resulting optimal output market choices this relation is positive regardless of whether the competition in output markets is in strategic substitutes or in strategic complements i test the model s prediction using two proxies for the extent of competitive interaction among firms the empirical evidence provides support for the model

conjectural variations and the nature of equilibrium in rent seeking models in a symmetric two person rent seeking game it is shown that nonzero conjectural variations can be incorporated to yield a larger class of solutions than has been hitherto analyzed the author shows that the fraction of rents dissipated as expenditures by seekers depends on the conjectural variation which is assumed and that posner s assertion of full dissipation in his model only holds under a bertrand conjecture all admissible constant conjectural variations which are held by both players yield conjecturally consistent equilibria but the result no longer holds if the game has a systematic bias toward one player

comparative statics of altruism and spite abstract the equilibrium outcome of a strategic interaction may depend on the weight players place on other players payoffs or more generally on some social payoff that depends on everyone s actions a positive negative or zero weight represents altruism spite or complete selfishness respectively as it turns out even in a symmetric interaction the equilibrium level of social payoff may be lower for a group of altruists than for selfish or spiteful groups in particular a concern for others payoffs may paradoxically lower these payoffs however this can only be so if the equilibrium strategies involved are unstable if they are stable the social payoff can only increase or remain unchanged with an increasing degree of altruism in these results stability stands for a general notion of static stability which includes a number of established ones such as evolutionarily stable strategy as special cases

taxation and welfare in an oligopoly with strategic commitment this paper establishes comparative statics results for an oligopoly model with strategic commitment firms compete in two stages in the first stage firms decide on strategic cost reducing r d investment whereas they choose output in the second stage taking an excise tax subsidy as a shift parameter in the second stage game the short run as well as long run effects on output cost reducing r d investment and second best welfare will be examined the crucial role played by the strategic substitutability of outputs as well as cost reducing r d investments is clarified and a variant of the le chatelier samuelson principle in the authors game theoretic model is obtained copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

iterative computation of cournot equilibrium abstract in a homogeneous coumot model with quasi concave profit functions the problem of determining an equilibrium can be posed as one of solving an equation in one real variable total sales if the response functions are monotone or firms are identical then a certain iterative process based on averaging converges to an equilibrium such iterations have the interpretation that every firm responds to the average of sales by other firms in brevious periods

export orientation and domestic merger policy theory and some empirical evidence abstract recent open economy industrial organization literature finds export orientation enhances the weight of post merger international competitive gains favouring lenient domestic merger policy however mergers seldom generate the significant synergies supportive of international competitive gains since a joint economies of production effect suggests domestic mergers tend to generate international competitive losses not gains export orientation favours strict not lenient domestic merger policy we show how non synergistic domestic mergers in the presence of international sales might reduce national welfare and incur stringent merger reviews a panel data set of u s merger policy by manufacturing sector 1990 2001 empirically supports export orientation leading to strict merger policy jel classification l40 f10

stochastic pollution permits and merger incentives pollution permit regulations introduce nonlinearities into the objective function of a polluting firm we develop a microeconomic model to show the effects these nonlinearities might have upon firm decisions when emissions are stochastic under perfect competition the fraction of planned pollution covered by permits is shown to be separable from planned production we also demonstrate that permit management incentives may motivate a merger of otherwise independent firms incentives to petition for bubble coverage are also considered the model is studied under risk neutrality and risk aversion imperfectly competitive situations in the output and permit markets are also analyzed

airline network rivalry in this paper the effects of the strategic interaction between deregulated airlines on their network choice are analyzed the authors examine whether switching from a linear to a hub spoke network confers a strategic advantage because it saves costs and improves service quality they find that if hubbing lowers total cost which includes both airline and passenger inconvenience costs the pursuit of strategic advantages usually intensifies the extent of hubbing even if hubbing raises total cost it might be pursued by the airline either because hubbing is a dominant strategy in an oligopolistic setting or because hubbing will be useful in deterring entry

tax incidence under oligopoly a comparison of policy approaches abstract this paper presents a methodological approach for the analysis of tax incidence that encompasses familiar forms of taxation in a general and analytically convenient model in oligopolistic industries the performance of a tax depends on the sensitivity of the unit tax rate to changes in industry output output elastic tax schedules are less likely to be over shifted and have superior welfare properties relative to regulatory instruments that are less responsive to the equilibrium market quantity for revenue neutral tax reforms the finding of delipalla and keen 1992 that ad valorem taxes welfare dominate specific taxes under oligopoly is derived as a special case of this general result

firm heterogeneity imitation and the incentives for cost reducing r d effort i develop and test a model of strategic r d investments where innovating and non innovating firms compete on the basis of their ability to reduce costs and imitate rivals i find that a larger proportion of non innovating rivals stimulates cost reducing investments and attenuates the disincentive effect of imitation by innovators on firm level r d key model properties are verified by estimating the first order condition for the optimal choice of r d using the 1994 carnegie mellon survey of u s industrial r d results also suggest that r d and size are simultaneously determined with r d being proportional to size as predicted by the theoretical model

the combined effect of salary restrictions and revenue sharing in sports leagues i introduction invariance principles are the golden eggs of economics franco modigliani merton miller and ronald coase were awarded nobel prizes for their formulations of important invariance principles a predecessor of the famous coase theorem is rottenberg s invariance proposition according to rottenberg 1956 the distribution of playing talent between clubs in professional sports leagues does not depend on the allocation of property rights to players services el hodiri and quirk 1971 fort and quirk 1995 and vrooman 1995 extend this invariance proposition to gate revenue sharing based on their models they claim that revenue sharing does not change the level of competitive balance within a league this form of invariance proposition has become one of the most heavily disputed issues in sports economics because its centerpieces revenue sharing and the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis represent two of the most important idiosyncrasies in the professional team sports industry according to the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis fans prefer to attend games with uncertain outcomes and enjoy close championship races unlike toyota which benefits from weak competitors in the automobile industry real madrid and the new york yankees need strong competitors to maximize their revenues in sports a weak team produces a negative externality on its stronger competitors revenue sharing arrangements have been introduced as a measure to improve the competitive balance by partially internalizing this externality if the invariance proposition held revenue sharing would be worthless current revenue sharing schemes vary widely among professional sports leagues all over the world in north america the most prominent is possibly that operated by the national football league nfl where the visiting club secures 40 of the locally earned television and gate receipt revenue in 1876 major league baseball mlb introduced a 50 50 split of gate receipts that was reduced over time since 2003 all the clubs in the american league have put 34 of their locally generated revenue gate concession television etc into a central pool which is then divided equally among all the clubs the national basketball association nba and the national hockey league nhl also operate with a pool sharing arrangement moreover in the australian football league afl gate receipts were at one time split evenly between the home and the visiting team this 50 50 split was finally abolished in 2000 other measures to increase competitive balance are salary caps and floors a salary cap floor puts an upper lower bound on a club s payroll since most leagues compute their salary caps and floors on the basis of the revenues of the preceding season caps and floors can be treated as fixed limits the nba was the first league to introduce a salary cap for the 1984 1985 season for the 2008 2009 season the soft salary cap is fixed at us 58 7 million today salary caps are in effect in professional team sports leagues all over the world in the nhl for example each team had to spend between us 34 3 million and 50 3 million on player salaries in the 2007 2008 season in the nfl the salary cap in 2009 is approximately us 128 million per team whereas the salary floor was 87 6 of the salary cap which is equivalent to us 112 1 million the afl also operates with a combined salary cap and floor for 2009 the salary cap was fixed at a 7 69 million the floor at 7 12 million another australian league the national rugby league nrl has implemented a salary cap and floor system which forced each team to spend between a 3 96 million and 4 4 million in 2009 in europe salary caps are in effect in the guiness premiership in rugby union and the super league in rugby league 1 in most industries payroll caps would be regarded as an exploitation of market power and would be prohibited by anti trust authorities

financial constraints competition and hedging in industry equilibrium we analyze the hedging decisions of firms within an equilibrium setting that allows us to examine how a firm s hedging choice depends on the hedging choices of its competitors within this equilibrium some firms hedge while others do not even though all firms are ex ante identical the fraction of firms that hedge depends on industry characteristics such as the number of firms in the industry the elasticity of demand and the convexity of production costs consistent with prior empirical findings the model predicts that there is more heterogeneity in the decision to hedge in the most competitive industries

a structural model of the analysis of retail market power the case of fluid milk we derive a structural model of firm behavior that is composed of the generalized quadratic almost ideal demand system to represent both consumers milk preferences and firm profit maximization conditions that allow for a range of competitive scenarios the importance of this specification is found in its fuller representation of consumer preferences as opposed to the linear approximate almost ideal demand system used in previous analyses we apply this structural framework to investigate retailer conduct in the sale of beverage milk in a u s market using product level data our lerner index estimates show that retailers are not perfectly competitive however this deviation is small copyright 2012 oxford university press

adaptation for mitigation this paper develops a two region north and south dynamic model in which regional stocks of effective labor are negatively influenced by the global stock of pollution by characterizing the equilibrium strategy of each region we show that the regions best responses can be strategic complements through a dynamic complementarity effect the model is then used to analyze the impact of adaptation assistance from north to south it is shown that north s unilateral assistance to south thus enhancing south s adaptation capacity can facilitate pollution mitigation in both regions especially when the assistance is targeted at labor protection pollution might increase in the short run but in the long run the level of pollution will decline the adaptation assistance we propose is incentive compatible and pareto improving

fiscal competition and public debt the existing theoretical literature on fiscal competition has to a large extent ignored the role of government debt as a determinant of taxes and productive public spending we develop a simple model of fiscal competition with government borrowing if a default on government debt is no option initial debt levels play no role in fiscal competition this neutrality result is overturned when a default is possible a government that is constrained in its borrowing due to a possible default responds optimally by lowering spending on durable public infrastructure which in turn induces more aggressive tax setting a rise in exogenous firm mobility reinforces the link between legacy debt and fiscal competition our model may help explain the observation that highly indebted countries in europe have decreased corporate tax rates over proportionally our model may also be useful for evaluating decentralization reforms in which the power to tax firms is devolved to lower levels of overnments which differ in their initial debt levels

comparative economic performance of conventional and profit sharing firms abstract this paper compares the various economic properties of conventional firms and profit sharing firms the properties contrasted include wage level employment output price total economic rents and industry efficiency the firms operate in an oligopolistic industry with a labor union in general profit sharing firms outperform non sharing firms however there exist counterexamples in which non sharing firms can outperform sharing firms to test the robustness of the results the analysis is conducted for a variety of oligopolistic industries quantity setting pricesetting and joint collusion

intra industry trade and strategic interaction theory and evidence abstract we conduct a theory based empirical study of intraindustry trade in homogeneous products we derive an oligopolistic model of intra industry trade which is an extension of the segmented market model of trade initially proposed by brander j a 1981 intra industry trade in identical commodities journal of international economics 11 1 14 the empirical implementations of the model are investigated in the context of the petrochemical industry our analysis employs a unique data set containing detailed product and location specific data on the petrochemical industries in germany and the united states allowing for different empirical specifications we find that cross product variations in bilateral intra industry trade of petrochemicals are well explained by the variables suggested by the theoretical model

paternalism and tax competition when consumers make mistakes the government may wish to use paternalistic taxation as a corrective measure we analyse the extent to which tax competition undermines the feasibility of paternalistic taxation we show that the paternalistic component of a tax on a harmful good is reduced when there is cross border shopping but it does not disappear altogether in a model with tax competition between two countries only one of which has a paternalistic objective we show that a minimum tax rate requirement can be pareto improving despite the divergence in policy objectives tax harmonization however reduces welfare in the non paternalistic country

cost reducing r d in oligopoly abstract this paper provides a conjectural variations model to explore competition in cost reducing r d and the nature of the inter firm externalities it is shown that 1 r d investment in a market with price competition becomes optimal if firms expect that changes in their own r d investment are followed by the rival firms 2 the optimal r d subsidies are positive in collusive oligopolies but negative in competitive oligopolies 3 joint r d ventures in oligopoly could reduce total surplus by causing underinvestment and 4 promoting price competition reduces welfare if firms are not collusive in their r d decisions

symmetric research joint ventures cooperative substitutes and complements we introduce the concepts of cooperative substitutes and complements and use them to explain when all firms in a research joint venture will choose equal levels of r d we show that the second order conditions for a symmetric optimum take a particularly simple form ruling out both excessive cooperative substitutability and excessive cooperative complementarity and nesting conditions already derived in the literature finally we apply our results to the comparison between cooperative and non cooperative r d and show in an important special case that asymmetric outcomes are only optimal for a very limited range of parameter values

research joint ventures and the cost paradox abstract we consider the impact of the cost paradox on the likelihood of cooperative firms to use a cost reducing research joint venture rjv to increase research levels when spillovers are large the cost paradox cp occurs whenever industry wide cost reductions would lead to such intense competition that profits would fall we give a restriction on cost reducing research which guarantees that an rjv will prefer marginal reductions in research to the noncooperative levels whenever cp would arise and spillovers are less than perfect in such cases firms use an rjv to lessen competition rather than to lower costs

comparative statics for oligopoly demand shift effects when demand rises in an imperfectly competitive industry price output profits consumer surplus and welfare may individually rise or fall the possibilities are thus broader than with either a demand shift under competition or a cost shift in either typ e of industry systematic relationships are established showing howe ver that the pattern of effects cannot be arbitrary imperfect compe tition is necessary for profits to fall when demand rises profits alw ays rise with either perfect competition or perfect collusion this a gain contrasts with the cost shift case where imperfect competition is not necessary for perverse profit effects copyright 1988 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

profit sharing and welfare in an export subsidy game abstract this paper studies an export subsidy game in a duopoly in which one firm engages in sharing profits with its union in a non cooperative equilibrium of an export subsidy game without any cost advantage of firms the export subsidy to the profit sharing firm is smaller than the export subsidy to the non sharing firm and the output of the profit sharing firm is smaller than the output of the non sharing firm thus in an export subsidy game a profit sharing contract reduces the welfare in the country

a free lunch in the commons we derive conditions under which raising costs through a regulatory constraint or a fully expropriated tax can increase the profits arising from a common pool resource the basic model assumes a fixed number of identical agents with linear costs selling in a single period at an exogenous price a necessary and sufficient condition for a cost increase to be profitable is that aggregate output from the resource be locally convex in aggregate effort we also show that cost increases can be profitable even if price is endogenous agents are heterogeneous entry is costless or agents are playing a markov perfect equilibrium of a dynamic game we also discuss more general welfare implications of the result along with its relation to existing results for a cournot oligopoly

oil demand shocks reconsidered a cointegrated vector autoregression abstract we reconsider the conclusions about the importance of oil demand shocks and the unimportance of supply shocks reported by kilian 2009 we investigate whether the proxy for worldwide real economic activity dry bulk maritime freight costs represents anything more than transportation costs by analyzing the relation between these costs and oil prices the meaning of this variable is critical because transportation costs appear on both sides of the equations estimated by kilian directly as dry bulk maritime freight costs and as part of the measure for oil prices we also investigate the effects of representing oil supply with an aggregate of opec and non opec production because they likely use different criteria to chose output finally we investigate kilian s use of the first difference of supply while the other variables in his model are represented as levels the results suggest that opec and nonopec nations use different criteria to set output and that reductions increases in opec production raise lower oil prices the elements of the cointegrating relations their loadings and impulse response functions suggest that the positive relation between dry bulk maritime freight costs and oil prices simply represents the effect of higher oil prices on transportation costs sensitivity analyses suggest that these differences are caused by including transportation costs in the measure of oil prices aggregating opec and non opec productions and using a very long lag length to estimate the var together these results suggest that conclusions about the importance of demand shocks and the unimportance of supply shocks are not robust to alternative specifications that are consistent with many empirical findings about the world oil market

lechatelier samuelson principle in games and pass through of shocks abstract the lechatelier samuelson principle states that as a reaction to a shock an agent s short run adjustment of an affected action is smaller than its long run adjustment when the agent can also adjust other related actions we extend the principle to strategic environments where the long run adjustment also accounts for other players adjusting their strategies we show that the principle holds for supermodular games strategic complements satisfying monotone comparative statics and provide sufficient conditions for the principle to hold in games of strategic substitutes heterogeneity we discuss the principle s implications for cost pass through of multiproduct firms

on the private provision of public goods on networks abstract this paper analyzes the private provision of public goods where consumers interact within a fixed network structure and may benefit only from their direct neighbors provisions we present a proof of the existence and uniqueness of a nash equilibrium for general networks and best reply functions in addition we investigate the neutrality result of warr 38 and bergstrom blume and varian 6 whereby consumers are able to undo the impact of income redistribution as well as public provision financed by lump sum taxes to this effect we show that the neutrality result has a limited scope of application beyond a special network architecture in the neighborhood of the set of contributors

foreign direct investment under oligopoly profit shifting or profit capturing abstract in this paper a model of taxation of foreign source corporate income is developed when the output market is not perfectly competitive profit shifting policies similar to those in the new trade literature are also present in the case of foreign direct investment fdi there are however important differences to the new trade theory since in case of fdi i corporate taxation and double taxation relief are the policy instruments rather than output or revenue taxes ii countries are not symmetric in the sense that the host country has the first right to tax the multinational s profit and the home country reacts by providing double taxation relief and iii output but not corporate taxation is specific to imperfectly competitive industries it is argued that a variants of a tax credit are analogous to export subsidies b when the home country operates a tax credit system the host country s incentive to capture the multinational s profit is bounded under imperfect competition c when the host country offers a tax holiday the home country should imitate this policy and d in the presence of perfect competitive industries double taxation relief is a good instrument to target imperfectly competitive industries

the effect of emission taxes and abatement subsidies on market structure abstract emission taxes and abatement subsidies are considered to be efficient measures for environment protection the purpose of this paper is to quantify their effects on industry output firm output and on the number of firms in the industry three types of market structure are under discussion perfect competition oligopoly and a dominant firm with a competitive fringe it turns out that emission taxes and abatement subsidies affect the structure of the polluting industry in opposite ways while the effects on industry s emissions are similar in direction but different

strategic foreign exchange management this paper argues that it is possible to advise firms on how to hedge against foreign exchange risks only if one has detailed knowledge of the competitive environment they work in to illustrate this we compare firms hedging requirements in a number of different standard industrial organizations models in particular the cournot model a model with conjectural variations price taking firms and monopolistic competition consider the situation of a firm producing in germany and selling an important part of its total output in the us obviously its profitability may be seriously compromised by an unexpected appreciation of the dm relatively to the the company can react to this uncertainty in two ways either it can assume that the conditions of the modigliani miller theorem are approximately fulfilled and that it best serves the interests of its shareholders by behaving in a risk neutral fashion alternatively the firm may for a variety of reasons behave as a risk averter itself and try to obtain some coverage against exchange rate risk when looking at the amount of insurance taken up by companies on conventional insurance markets one gets the impression that the latter alternative risk averse firms is for many practical cases a realistic assumption the activities of many companies are more easily understood if one admits that they exhibit a certain degree of risk aversion if one accepts this one may go on to ask just how companies should go about insuring themselves against unexpected exchange rate fluctuations more specifically one has to study how much exchange risk the firms should insure against and which exchange rates are of relevance in the example above of a german company selling in the us the answer might at first sight seem obvious the company should obtain coverage against dm fluctuations for an amount approximately equal to its anticipated revenues on brief reflection it immediately appears that this is surely an excessively simplistic answer first the amount of coverage required must be affected by the question of how the price of the product varies when the dm exchange rate shifts second it may be the case that the german company s main competitors are located in say france in this case fluctuations of the

data envelopment analysis cross like efficiency model for non homogeneous decision making units the case of united states companies low carbon investment to attain corporate sustainability abstract traditional data envelopment analysis dea models assume directly comparability among decision making units dmus however this assumption is not necessarily applied in practice dmus do not always utilize similar inputs to produce similar outputs sometimes a dmu may not choose to produce a certain output e g a steel plant may not produce tool steels or cannot produce the certain output for some certain reasons meanwhile dmus may choose different resources to achieve the general productions or services e g papermaker mills consume different raw materials to produce paper how to compare a dmu to other units objectively becomes an issue when evaluating efficiency in the absence of homogeneity in this study a cross like efficiency model for the dea of non homogeneous dmus is established to handle the aforementioned issue the proposed method can even assign unique rankings to dmus with missing outputs or inputs furthermore prior information on the appropriate bound for the share of resources is not needed the proposed model is applied to an existing data set used in previous studies 39 companies on s p 500 corporations in 2013 are also studied with this model it is confirmed that investors focus on the company s green thoughts and long term sustainability by the empirical investigation furthermore this study shows that the information technology sector has the highest low carbon investment performance among the nine sectors investigated the measurement of low carbon technology investment can be an available benchmark for a specific industry to attain corporate sustainability