income tax evasion revisited the impact of interest rate yields on tax free municipal bonds 1 introductionincome tax evasion remains a timely issue as evidenced by recently published studies e g see feige 1989 1994 alm jackson and mckee 1992 pestieau possen and slutsky 1994 cebula 1997 2001 alm mcclelland and schulze 1999 atkins 1999 panteghini 2000 ali cecil and knoblett 2001 saltz 2001 in an effort to provide further insight into the determinants of tax evasion this study hypothesizes that the tax evasion decision may include an assessment of the tax free interest rate yield on say high grade municipal bonds relative to the taxable interest rate yield on alternative high quality bond issues such as 10 year treasury notes presumably the higher the interest rate yield on high grade municipals whose interest is legally exempt from federal income taxation relative to the taxable interest rate yield on 10 year treasury notes the more attractive those municipals become ceteris paribus in effect the interest paid on tax free bonds especially for households in higher tax brackets may offer an attractive legal alternative income tax avoidance to illegal income tax evasion 1 thus it is hypothesized that the higher the tax free interest rate yield on high grade municipals relative to the taxable yield on 10 year treasury notes or equivalent taxable issues the less the incentive for and hence the less the degree of income tax evasion this study investigates empirically whether higher yields on tax free municipals relative to the taxable yields on 10 year treasury notes reduce the degree of aggregate federal personal income tax evasion section 2 provides the model which includes a variety of variables already established in the literature to affect tax evasion section 3 describes the data sections 4 and 5 provide the empirical findings and concluding remarks 2 the modelthe economy consists of agents who generate economic value that is reflected in the form of income and choose whether to report none some or all of their income to the internal revenue service irs the probability that the representative economic agent will not report taxable income pnr is treated as an increasing function of the expected gross benefits to the agent of not reporting income eb and a decreasing function of the expected gross costs to the agent of not reporting income ec formula omitted see article image the expected gross benefits from not reporting income to the irs are hypothesized to be an increasing function of income tax rates unlike previous studies this study focuses on both the average effective federal personal income tax rate aept and the maximum marginal federal personal income tax rate max such that formula omitted see article image furthermore as suggested by feige 1994 and cebula 2001 the higher the level of public dissatisfaction dis with the perceived performance of government employees and elected government officials the greater the subjective benefit taxpayers derive from tax evasion accordingly becomes formula omitted see article image finally as explained in section 1 it is hypothesized in this study that the higher the tax free interest rate yield on high grade municipal bonds tf relative to the taxable interest rate yield on 10 year treasury notes ten the greater the incentive to engage in legal tax avoidance and the lower the incentive to engage in tax evasion thus becomes formula omitted see article image the expected gross costs of not reporting income to the irs are hypothesized to be an increasing function of the expected risks thereof in this study to the representative economic agent the expected penalty from not reporting taxable income to the irs if said activity is detected by the irs is measured in part by the total pecuniary penalties including both penalties per se and interest previously assessed by the irs on audited tax returns pen

why is corruption less harmful to income inequality in latin america summary conventional wisdom says corruption is bad for income inequality but recent research on latin america finds a trade off between corruption and inequality and suggests this is due to the large informal sector in the region using data on a large sample of countries we find that the informal sector impacts the link between corruption and inequality in particular the marginal impact of corruption becomes negative once the informal sector becomes large this is true in latin america and more generally corruption reducing policies should be accompanied by measures that help displaced informal sector workers

law enforcement and transition abstract we present a simple model to analyze law enforcement problems in transition economies law enforcement implies coordination problems and multiplicity of equilibria due to a law abidance and a fiscal externality we analyze two institutional mechanisms for solving the coordination problem a first mechanism which we call dualism follows the scenario of chinese transition where the government keeps direct control over economic resources and where a liberalized non state sector follows market rules the second mechanism we put forward is accession to the european union we show that accession to the european union even without external borrowing provides a mechanism to eliminate the bad equilibrium provided the accessing country is small enough relative to the european union interestingly we show that accession without conditionality is better than with conditionality because conditionality creates a coordination problem of its own that partly annihilates the positive effects of expected accession

regulatory discretion and the unofficial economy johnson kaufmann and shleifer 1997 find that the share of the unofficial economy in gdp is determined by the extent of control rights held by politicians and bureaucrats in post communist economies exploring in more detail the role of bribes and using a broader data set from the oecd latin america and transition economies we find that the unofficial economy accounts for a larger share of gdp when there is more corruption and when the rule of law is weaker while these findings are consistent with the earlier results for transition economies in the larger country sample we find it is not necessarily the case that more regulation or higher taxes directly increases the size of the unofficial economy the problem appears to be not regulation or taxation per se but whether the state administrative system can operate without corruption a high level of regulatory discretion helps create the potential for corruption and drive firms into the unofficial economy

the economics of poverty traps and persistent poverty an asset based approach abstract longitudinal data on household living standards open the way to a deeper analysis of the nature and extent of poverty while a number of studies have exploited this type of data to distinguish transitory from more chronic forms of income or expenditure poverty this paper develops an asset based approach to poverty analysis that makes it possible to distinguish deep rooted persistent structural poverty from poverty that passes naturally with time due to systemic growth processes drawing on the economic theory of poverty traps and bifurcated accumulation strategies this paper briefly discusses some feasible estimation strategies for empirically identifying poverty traps and long term persistent structural poverty as well as relevant extensions of the popular foster greer thorbecke class of poverty measures the paper closes with reflections on how asset based poverty can be used to underwrite the design of persistent poverty reduction strategies

the underground economies tax evasion and information distortion list of contributors preface introduction edgar l feige part i the meaning measurement and policy implications of the underground economies 1 the meaning and measurement of the underground economy edgar l feige 2 information distortions in social systems the underground economy and other observer subject policymaker feedbacks robert r alford and edgar l feige 3 policy illusion macroeconomic instability and the unrecorded economy robert t mcgee and edgar l feige 4 how large or small should the underground economy be bruno frey part ii the underground economy in western developed nations measurement in different laboratories 5 monetary perspective on underground economic activity in the united states richard d porter and amanda s bayer 6 the unrecorded economy and the national income accounts in the netherlands a sensitivity analysis g a a m broesterhuizen 7 assessing the underground economy in the united kingdom michael o higgins 8 the underground economy in the federal republic of germany a preliminary assessment enno langfeldt 9 the underground economy in sweden ingemar hansson 10 the irregular economy of italy a survey of contributions bruno contini 11 the hidden economy in norway with special emphasis on the hidden labor market arne jon isachsen and steiner strom 12 canada s underground economy rolf mirus and roger s smith 13 the underground economy in france philippe barthelemy part iii the underground economy under central planning 14 the soviet second economy in a political and legal perspective f j m feldbrugge 15 second economy and socialism the hungarian experience istvan r gabor bibliography

why do firms hide bribes and unofficial activity after communism abstract our survey of private manufacturing firms finds the size of hidden unofficial activity to be much larger in russia and ukraine than in poland slovakia and romania a comparison of cross country averages shows that managers in russia and ukraine face higher effective tax rates worse bureaucratic corruption greater incidence of mafia protection and have less faith in the court system our firm level regressions for the three eastern european countries find that bureaucratic corruption is significantly associated with hiding output

an evolutionary interpretation of van huyck battalio and beil s experimental results on coordination this paper proposes an adaptive interpretation of the results of some recent experiments with repeated tacit coordination games these experiments revealed several behavioral regularities including a systematic discrimination between strict nash equilibria in certain games that appear to be driven by strategic uncertainty and are not explained by traditional equilibrium refinements the observed patterns of discrimination correspond closely to predictions based on maynard smith s notion of evolutionary stability an adaptive model in the spirit of the evolutionary dynamics but recognizing the important differences between learning in human populations and evolution promises to yield a unified explanation of the results journal of economic literature classification numbers 020 026

an econometric analysis of income tax evasion and its detection this article presents an econometric analysis of income tax evasion and its detection based on individual level data drawn from the internal revenue service 1982 and 1985 taxpayer compliance measurement programs i specify a model consisting of two equations the first measures the extent of evasion the second the fraction of evasion detected the empirical analysis explores the effects of income the marginal tax rate and various socioeconomic characteristics on filer evasion behavior and it assesses the variability in detection rates among irs examiners finally i use the empirical estimates to construct new estimates of the income tax gap the new estimates are very close to the previous irs estimates

after the big bang obstacles to the emergence of the rule of law in post communist societies when russia launched mass privatization it was widely believed that it would create a powerful constituency for the rule of law that didn t happen we present a dynamic equilibrium model of the political demand for the rule of law and show that beneficiaries of mass privatization may fail to demand the rule of law even if it is the pareto efficient rule of the game the reason is that uncertainty about the legal regime can lead to asset stripping and stripping can give agents an interest in prolonging the absence of the rule of law this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

tax evasion in transition outcome of an institutional clash testing feige s conjecture in albania a field survey of households was conducted in tirana albania in 2000 a response rate of 89 3 yielded 1 340 valid questionnaires allowing me to test feige s in nelson j m tilley c walker l eds transforming post communist political economics national academy press washington dc p 21 conjecture that more tax evasion will be observed when formal and informal institutions clash respondents attitudes towards formal and informal institutions were obtained by applying factor analysis to their responses to a series of attitudinal questions the theoretical importance of the interaction between formal and informal institutions in determining tax evasion finds empirical support in the data

determinants of the crude oil futures curve inventory consumption and volatility abstract since 2008 the wti oil futures curve has been positively sloped for extended periods we test whether changes in inventory alone can explain this atypically long contango to do this we estimate monthly vars of the cme wti oil futures spread and oecd and u s inventory in line with standard theory and add petroleum consumption and implied volatility to the vector of endogenous variables when we model the futures spread as one continuous series results confirm two way causation between inventory and the futures curve as predicted by the theory of storage however when we separate negative and positive futures spreads we find that two way causation between the futures spread and u s inventory breaks down shocks to oecd petroleum consumption cause more negative spreads and shocks to u s consumption cause more positive spreads in addition to inventory driven changes and increases in volatility directly raise positive spreads these new causal channels have become significant since 2008 and can be related to higher inventory inelastic supply of oil and uncertainty about global economic conditions

taxpayer response to an increased probability of audit evidence from a controlled experiment in minnesota abstract in 1995 a group of 1724 randomly selected minnesota taxpayers was informed by letter that the returns they were about to file would be closely examined compared to a control group that did not receive this letter low and middle income taxpayers in the treatment group on average increased tax payments compared to the previous year which we interpret as indicating the presence of noncompliance the effect was much stronger for those with more opportunity to evade in fact the difference in differences is not statistically significant for those who do not have self employment or farm income and do not pay estimated tax surprisingly however the reported tax liability of the high income treatment group fell sharply relative to the control group

exogenous shocks and growth crises in low income countries a vulnerability index summary this paper develops a new index which provides early warning signals of a growth crisis in the event of large external shocks in low income countries lics multivariate regression analysis and a univariate signaling approach are used to map information from a parsimonious set of underlying policy structural and institutional indicators into a composite vulnerability index both the in sample and out of sample predictive power of the index are high in particular it explains well the growth crises observed in lics during the global financial crisis

exiting a lawless state an earlier paper showed that an economy could be trapped in an equilibrium state in which the absence of the rule of law led to asset stripping and the prevalence of asset stripping led to the absence of a demand for the rule of law highlighting a coordination failure this paper looks more carefully at the dynamics of transition from a non rule of law state the paper identifies a commitment problem as the critical feature inhibiting the transition the inability under a rule of law to forgive theft this can lead to the perpetuation of the non rule of law state even when it might seem that the alternative is pareto improving

shadow economies size causes and consequences using various methods the size of the shadow economy in 76 developing transition and oecd countries is estimated average size varies from 12 percent of gdp for oecd countries to 23 percent for transition countries and 39 percent for developing countries increasing taxation and social security contributions combined with rising state regulations are driving forces for the increase of the shadow economy especially in oecd countries according to some findings corruption has a positive impact on the size of the shadow economy and a growing shadow economy has a negative effect on official gdp growth

corruption as a gamble abstract in the following model of corruption a simple game is set up whose players are a government official granting a permit conditional on a test and a candidate requesting the permit the game is solved under different assumptions as to the information sets of the players perfect information asymmetric information and imperfect information on both sides in the latter case after characterizing the solution and presenting some important comparative statics results the paper moves on to show the emergence of multiple equilibria in corruption illustrating the interaction of corruption at different hierarchical levels of an administration

honesty and evasion in the tax compliance game conventional models of tax compliance emphasize that taxpayers make strategic tax reports underreporting income to the extent that this behavior is functionally rewarded in contrast to this view considerable empirical evidence suggests that many taxpayers are inherently honest reporting truthfully regardless of the incentive to cheat in this article we build a game theoretic model of tax compliance that includes both honest and potentially dishonest taxpayers we show that including honest taxpayers significantly alters the model leading to much improved empirical predictions and somewhat different and novel policy implications

the impact of public transfer expenditures on tax evasion an experimental approach abstract this paper outlines the methodology and results of an experiment undertaken to analyze primarily the impact of public sector transfer payments on tax evasion behaviour apart from the use of transfer payments further explanatory variables used were income expected auditing probability and perceived tax burden the influence of these variables on both the propensity to evade taxes and the extent of taxes evaded are investigated in an attempt to add more realism some innovative changes to the experimental approach were incorporated

some implications of the unofficial economy bureaucratic corruption relationship in transition countries abstract this paper shows why some countries are trapped in an equilibrium with high unofficial economic activity and corruption while other countries are not the potential for different outcomes follows directly from the complementary nature of unofficial economy and corruption activity

the effect of informal networks on corruption in education evidence from the household survey data in bangladesh abstract using the 2007 household survey data collected by transparency international bangladesh we examine corruption in the education sector in bangladesh our main findings are i the incidence of corruption and the amount of bribe increase with the level of red tape ii poorer households households with a less educated household head and households with girls studying in school are more likely to be victims of corruption iii households with higher social status are more likely to use informal networks to bypass the red tape or pay less amount of a bribe and as a result iv corruption is likely to be regressive

how corruption may corrupt abstract the incidence of corruption appears to vary strongly across societies even for comparable activities the model highlights how the profitability of bureaucratic corruption may be related to its frequency and points toward a few mechanisms that can be used in explaining the stylized facts of varying incidence of corruption there might be multiple self fulfilling equilibria levels of corruption even when both supply and demand of corrupt acts are considered

business culture and tax evasion why corruption and the unofficial economy can persist abstract this paper shows that business and tax inspection culture can create multiple equilibria in bad equilibria high cheating and corruption increases in penalties or auditing can have perverse impacts and increase cheating the source of the multiple equilibria is the externalities created by business and tax inspection cultures as tax evasion and corruption become more common they become more acceptable and their cost is lowered a third externality that between firms and inspectors is the source of the perverse effect more cheating by firms is good for bribe taking inspectors and more bribe taking inspectors are good for cheating firms

a dynamic model of corruption deterrence abstract this paper presents a model of corruption deterrence with a simple overlapping generations structure built into it a crucial assumption is that when corruption becomes more prevalent in the economy it is harder to audit a corrupt official effectively it is shown that this assumption may give rise to several stationary equilibrium levels of corruption this possibility has been exploited to explain why sometimes a government may temporarily resort to an extremely severe deterrence policy and why the same deterrence scheme may imply quite different levels of corruption a case study is provided to give empirical support to the model

cheating ourselves the economics of tax evasion no government can announce a tax system and then rely on taxpayers sense of duty to remit what is owed some dutiful people will undoubtedly pay what they owe but many others will not over time the ranks of the dutiful will shrink as they see how they are being taken advantage of by the others thus paying taxes must be made a legal responsibility of citizens with penalties attendant on noncompliance but even in the face of those penalties substantial tax evasion exists and always has the history of taxation is replete with episodes of evasion often notable for their inventiveness during the third century many wealthy romans buried their jewelry or stocks of gold coin to evade the luxury tax and homeowners in eighteenth century england temporarily bricked up their fireplaces to escape notice of the hearth tax collector webber and wildavsky 1986 p 141 this essay reviews what is known about the magnitude nature and determinants of tax evasion with an emphasis on the u s income tax alm 1999 andreoni erard and feinstein 1998 and slemrod and yitzhaki 2002 offer more comprehensive recent reviews of the literature it then places this information into a conceptual and policy context

measuring income tax evasion using bank credit evidence from greece we document that in semiformal economies banks lend to tax evading individuals based on the bank s assessment of the individual s true income this observation leads to a novel approach to estimate tax evasion we use microdata on household credit from a greek bank and replicate the bank underwriting model to infer the banks estimate of individuals true income we estimate that 43 45 of self employed income goes unreported and thus untaxed for 2009 this implies 28 2 billion of unreported income implying forgone tax revenues of over 11 billion or 30 of the deficit our method innovation allows for estimating the industry distribution of tax evasion in settings where uncovering the incidence of hidden cash transactions is difficult using other methods primary tax evading industries are professional services medicine law engineering education and media we conclude with evidence that contemplates the importance of institutions paper trail and political willpower for the persistence of tax evasion jel codes g21 h22 h24 h26 p37

corruption tax evasion and the laffer curve in a corrupt tax administration a rise in tax ratesets off complicated strategic moves by both taxpayersand administrators it is shown that in somecircumstances this may bring about laffer likebehavior of overall tax revenue i e a higher taxrate results in smaller net revenue for thegovernment further a more intense tax effort byincreasing the number of returns audited may alsoreduce net revenues finally if tax and fine ratespositively influence the level of corruption in theadministration these outcomes become more likely

exchange market mayhem the antecedents and aftermath of speculative attacks exchange market mayhem the antecedents and aftermath of speculative attacks this paper evaluates the causes and consequences of episodes of turbulence in foreign exchange markets using data from 1959 through 1993 for twenty oecd countries we consider the antecedents and aftermath of devaluations and revaluations flotations fixings and speculative attacks which may not be successful we find that realignments of fixed exchange rates are alike devaluations are preceded by political instability budget and current account deficits and fast growth of money and prices revaluations are mirror images of devaluations speculative attacks resemble devaluations but money growth and inflation are more endemic and there is no last minute attempt to tighten monetary policy in contrast few consistent correlations link regime transitions like flotations or fixings to macroeconomic or political variables transitions between exchange rate regimes are largely idiosyncratic and are neither consistently provoked ex ante by systematic imbalances nor typically justified ex post by subsequent changes in policy we conclude that there are no clear early warning signals of many speculative attacks and no easy solutions for policy makers barry eichengreen andrew k rose and charles wyplosz

population size and civil conflict risk is there a causal link does an expansion of the population size expose nation states to a higher risk of suffering from civil conflict obtaining empirical evidence for a causal relationship is difficult due to reverse effects and omitted variable bias this article addresses causality issues by using randomly occurring drought as an instrumental variable to generate exogenous variation in population size for a panel of 37 sub saharan countries over the period 1981 2004 instrumental variable estimates yield that a 5 increase in population size raises the risk of civil conflict by around six percentage points

defining and estimating underground and informal economies the new institutional economics approach abstract a taxonomy of underground economies is elaborated based on the new institutional approach to economic development members of formal sectors confront different sets of transformation and transaction costs than do members of informal sectors and these differences are regarded as crucial to the development process the paper distinguishes illegal unreported unrecorded and informal economies and examines the conceptual and empirical linkages among them alternative micro and macro methodologies for measuring underground activities are reviewed and evaluated including census and survey procedures discrepancy and monetary methods when you cannot measure your knowledge is meager and unsatisfactory lord kelvin inscription at harper library university of chicago

taxes and bribery the role of wage incentives this paper presents a simple model to evaluate alternative payment schemes for tax inspectors in the presence of corruption we consider problems of both moral hazard which arises because taking bribes cannot be observed without costly monitoring and adverse selection since not all potential tax inspectors can be identified as being honest or dishonest we identify three wage regimes first one could pay the same wage that a tax inspector could earn elsewhere his reservation wage second one could pay a wage which solves the moral hazard problem i e deters bribery this we call an efficiency wage by analogy with recent models examined i n macro economics third the government could pay a wage below the reservation wage at which only the dishonest become tax inspectors the capitulation wage we make precise the conditions under which each yields the greatest amount o f tax revenues net o f administrative costs many countries in the developing world are undergoing structural adjustment programmes which require fundamental fiscal changes outside agencies advise restoration of budget balance a task which involves expenditure cuts and tax increases the treatment of public employee pay scales often poses a particular dilemma i n this process wages and salaries are a significant component of government expenditures and one important question concerns the extent to which wages rather than employment cuts should be used to save money there is sometimes a reluctance to advocate wage cuts stemming in part from a feeling that this might impair the performance of the public sector hence tanzi 1990 argues that a policy of wage cutting is likely to increase the inefficiency of public sector employees especially at a time when the public sector is expected to play a larger role in restructuring the economy p 16 in the context of tax collection the issue is particularly pressing given the need to raise more tax revenues a reduction in efficiency in this branch of the government i s likely t o mean that fewer returns are processed and when individuals living standards are squeezed their incentive to accept bribes in lieu o f collecting taxes i s increased o n this count i t i s even sometimes suggested that wages of tax inspectors should be increased to aid the effort to the comments of henry bienen john hey and two anonymous referees have been helpful in revising this paper the authors are also grateful t o the john m olin program for the study o f economic organization and public policy at princeton university and the pew charitable trusts for financial support mclaren also acknowledges support from the international finance section of princeton university none of the above should be implicated in any way see for example goode 1984 chapter 1 3 and gould and amaro reyes 1983

asset markets as an equilibrium selection mechanism coordination failure game form auctions and tacit communication abstract in this paper we explore the possibility that asset markets provide a means of tacit communication which may allow subjects to coordinate on the payoff dominant equilibrium in an underlying coordination game we find that the existence of a market price for the right to play does communicate information about the equilibrium selection problem specifically behavior never converged to the efficient outcome when subjects were endowed with the right to participate but always converged to the efficient outcome when subjects purchased the right to participate journal of economic literature classification numbers c720 g120

corruption across countries and regions some consequences of local osmosis abstract large and persistent differences in corruption across comparable countries is a challenging research issue even more intriguing are such differences across regions within the same country because the typically considered socioeconomic and governance characteristics are generally more similar across such regions than across different countries this paper s principal theme is that individuals perceptions of their environments are influenced by the realities that they have faced in the past these perceptions affect their current and future actions which in turn influence the current and future realities an articulation and analysis of these dynamics yields significant observations concerning individuals behavior and societal outcomes