transferring williamson s discriminating alignment to the analysis of environmental governance of social ecological interdependence institutional fit is operationalized by transferring transaction costs economics tce to the analysis of instances of social ecological interdependence we carefully spell out the differences with conventional tce and outline analytical steps based on discriminating alignment that enable a tce analysis of environmental governance of nature related transactions we illustrate the approach through the example of wildlife management in germany here we find hierarchical governance a prohibition of killing of wolves embedded into a polycentric hybrid monitoring arrangement in applying tce to nature related transactions we argue that characteristics of nature related transactions can be subsumed under the core categories of jointness uncertainty asset specificity frequency rivalry excludability and social relational distance benefits of this approach include its generating a narrow list of descriptors of instances of biophysically mediated interdependence related to one evaluation criterion cost effectiveness the tce of nature related transactions thus identifies sets of stylized contextual factors and aspects related to the governance of hazards of ex post opportunistic behavior that cut across scales they can be used as composite descriptors that facilitate analysis of complex multi scalar arrangements of natural resource governance we propose the concept of governance challenge derived from tce as being useful for building research on environmental governance

efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

substitute goods auctions and equilibrium this paper identifies two notions of substitutes for auction and equilibrium analysis weak substitutes the usual price theory notion guarantees monotonicity of t tonnement processes and convergence of clock auctions to a pseudo equilibrium but only strong substitutes which treats each unit traded as a distinct good with its own price guarantees that every pseudo equilibrium is a walrasian equilibrium that the vickrey outcome is in the core and that the law of aggregate demand is satisfied when goods are divisible weak substitutes along with concavity guarantees all of the above properties except for the law of aggregate demand

how should we incentivize private landowners to produce more biodiversity globally much biodiversity is found on private land acting to conserve such biodiversity thus requires the design of policies which influence the decision making of farmers and foresters in this paper we outline the economic characteristics of this problem before reviewing a number of policy options such as conservation auctions and conservation easements we then discuss a number of policy design problems such as the need for spatial coordination and the choice between paying for outcomes rather than actions before summarizing what the evidence and theory developed to date tell us about those aspects of biodiversity policy design which need careful attention from policy makers and environmental regulators

walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes in this paper we study the problem of efficient production and allocation of indivisible objects among a set of consumers we assume that the agents preferences depend on the bundle of objects and the quantity of money they consume furthermore we assume that preferences are quasilinear in money and that agents have a large endowment of money with indivisibilities it is well known that many familiar properties of the utility functions fail to ensure existence in their striking analysis of the matching problem kelso and crawford 5 introduce the gross substitutes gs condition which ensures the non emptiness of the core we propose two new conditions and show that with quasilinearity they are equivalent article id jeth 1999 2531 available online at http www idealibrary com on

communication competition and social gift exchange in an auction for public good provision abstract reverse auctions are an established policy instrument for allocating conservation contracts while the auction mechanism has been the subject of a number of studies less attention has been paid to the post bidding contract phase as contracts involving natural resource management are usually incomplete trust becomes crucial for the effectiveness of the programme we test the effect of communication between auctioneer and bidders on bidding behaviour and contract fulfilment using experimental economics we combine a repeated reverse auction with an effort level game and use a bilateral chatting tool as treatment variable without communication auctioneers tended to select the lowest priced bidders who invested substantially less than the socially optimal level of effort when fulfilling their contract to provide the public good relational contracting proved important with effort levels and profits tending to be higher when auctioneers and bidders entered into consecutive contract relationships in the communication treatment there was no evidence of price competition as auctioneers were more likely to accept high priced bids however an overall higher price level did not lead to efficiency losses since contractors realised higher effort levels in return establishing a social gift exchange our results demonstrate the importance of trust based relationships between the auctioneering institution and landholders

job matching under constraints studying job matching in a kelso crawford framework we consider arbitrary constraints imposed on sets of doctors that a hospital can hire we characterize all constraints that preserve the substitutes condition for all revenue functions that satisfy the substitutes condition a critical condition on hospitals revenue functions for well behaved competitive equilibria a constraint preserves the substitutes condition if and only if it is a generalized interval constraint which specifies the minimum and maximum numbers of hired doctors forces some hires and forbids others additionally generalized polyhedral constraints are precisely those that preserve the substitutes condition for all group separable revenue functions

substitutes and stability for matching with contracts we consider the matching problem with contracts of hatfield and milgrom 2005 and we introduce new concepts of bilateral and unilateral substitutes we show that bilateral substitutes is a sucient condition for the existence of a stable allocation in this framework however the set of stable allocations does not form a lattice under this condition and there does not necessarily exist a doctor optimal stable allocation under a slightly stronger condition unilateral substitutes the set of stable allocations still does not necessarily form a lattice with respect to doctors preferences but there does exist a doctor optimal stable allocation and other key results such as incentive compatibility and the rural hospitals theorem are recovered

misrepresentation of utilities in bargaining pure exchange and public good economies in order to analyze bargaining in pure exchange and public good economics when the agents are not informed about their opponents payoffs we embed each bargaining problem into a noncooperative game of misrepresentation in pure exchange public good economies with an arbitrary number of agents whose true utilities satisfy a mild assumption the set of allocations obtained at the linear strategies nash equilibria of this game is equal to the set of constrained walrasian lindahl allocations with respect to the agents true utilities without this assumption the result holds for two agent pure exchange economies and under alternative assumptions for public good economies c 2002 elsevier science usa

elicitation of honest preferences for the assignment of individuals to positions the problem of eliciting honest preferences from individuals who must be assigned to a set of positions is considered individuals know that they will be charged for the positions to which they are assigned a set of prices that provide no incentive for the individual to misrepresent his preferences is suggested it is shown that these prices constitute an element of the optimal solution to the dual of a linear programming assignment problem both the optimal allocation and the prices to be charged can be derived by solving two linear programming problems once preferences have been elicited the procedure can usefully be viewed as a simulation of a competitive market under conditions where such a market cannot be expected to function well it results in an efficient allocation where all resources are valued at their opportunity costs and consumer surplus is maximized its outcome thus has the desirable properties of competitive market equilibria

transaction costs and institutional performance in market based environmental water allocation policy reforms in the columbia basin spurred water rights reallocation for ecological recovery transaction costs have caused implementation to lag this paper examines transaction costs and institutional performance in environmental water allocation it evaluates spatial and temporal performance trends in watershed cases along three dimensions of adaptive efficiency water recovery transaction costs and program budgets performance trends demonstrate intrastate variability and volatility over time due to the importance of local institutional capacity which is uneven within states higher levels of water recovery may coincide with moderate to high transaction costs and program budgets particularly during initial implementation efforts this finding reflects investments in multilevel policy reform to strengthen enabling conditions and adapt to unintended consequences jel q25 q58

why do transaction costs of agricultural policies vary policy related transaction costs tcs is an important issue when evaluating different policy options however tcs are often not taken into account in policy evaluations but may be as important for efficiency as the direct production costs different policies may result in different tcs and the main aim of this article is to explore possible reasons for these differences we compare the level of tcs for 12 different agricultural policy measures in norway and we analyze the causes of the differences along three different dimensions asset specificity frequency and point of policy application at the national level we find that all three dimensions are of importance when explaining the differences while variation in tcs incurred by farmers are mainly due to differences in point of policy application and asset specificity data show that direct price support has the lowest tcs while more direct payments for environmental amenities has the highest

matching with couples stability and incentives in large markets accommodating couples has been a longstanding issue in the design of centralized labor market clearinghouses for doctors and psychologists because couples view pairs of jobs as complements a stable matching may not exist when couples are present this paper s main result is that a stable matching exists when there are relatively few couples and preference lists are suciently short relative to market size we also discuss incentives in markets with couples we relate these theoretical results to the job market for psychologists in which stable matchings exist for all years of the data despite the presence of couples

transaction costs and environmental policy design abstract this article synthesizes the growing empirical literature on transaction costs to identify pragmatic design recommendations for environmental and natural resource policies the new institutional economics literature recognizes that appropriate policy choice and design will be a function of the specific characteristics of the problem the physical and institutional determinants of both transaction costs and abatement costs should be considered in the policy design process due to potential interactions between them analysts also need to incorporate the extent to which the technologies institutional environment governance structures or policy designs can be changed some factors can only be adjusted to or designed around while others can be designed differently this framework highlights the importance of property rights since transaction costs will be incurred to obtain or retain property rights and since the rights assignment may affect both the magnitudes and distribution of costs another implication is that education and extension programs or use of behavioral economics concepts to affect choices can be cost effective in some circumstances policy design should take advantage of economies of scale and foster technical change appropriate sequencing of policy instruments may decrease transaction costs particularly if there is potential for technical change

self optimality and efficiency in utility distortion games in social choice problems where players may strategically misrepresent their preferences we call a profile of preferences self optimal if reporting them is a nash equilibrium given that they are the true preferences self optimality can be interpreted as a very weak honesty requirement we apply the self optimality concept to a utility distortion game in the context of bargaining and obtain a characterization of efficient nash equilibria

an efficient dynamic auction for heterogeneous commodities this paper proposes a new dynamic design for auctioning multiple heterogeneous commodities generalizing earlier work that treated identical objects an auctioneer wishes to allocate one or more units of each of k heterogeneous commodities to n bidders the auctioneer announces a vector of current prices bidders report back quantities demanded at these prices and the auctioneer adjusts the prices units are credited to bidders at the current prices as their opponents demands decline and the process continues until every commodity market clears bidders rather than being required to behave as price takers are permitted to strategically exercise their market power nevertheless with pure private values the proposed auction yields walrasian equilibrium prices an efficient outcome results as from a vickrey clarke groves mechanism but bidders are only required to evaluate their demands along a one dimensional path of prices rather than reporting their utilities over the entire k dimensional consumption set the auction is also more transparent and potentially simpler for bidders to understand and has the advantage of assuring the privacy of the upper portions of bidders demands theoretically the new auction provides a new foundation for convergence to walrasian equilibrium in an exchange economy practically it provides an efficient method for simultaneously auctioning two or more related types of securities for example three month and six month treasury bills it is also potentially useful for auctioning multiple types of communications spectrum for example licenses for paired and unpaired spectrum

reconsidering carbon permits auction mechanism an efficient dynamic model one of major concerns for china and developing countries is the new international trade rule concerning carbon emissions which one needs to know its suitable mechanism and the possible implication on china s carbon trading market precisely in an emission and trade scheme an important question is whether the auction outcome is efficient since this is closely related with the economic costs of emissions reduction due to the unique features of carbon permits existing auction mechanisms do not seem to be suitable for their distribution inspired by the t tonnement process this paper proposes a new auction mechanism for them for both practical application and theoretical extension the discrete and continuous situations are examined respectively the result shows that the proposed auction converges to pareto optimal equilibria and that without ties the equilibrium is unique for bidders the straightforward bidding strategy is the most preferred one in the sense that the strategy makes them avoid the risk of loss intuitively the auctioneer s utility is increasing in the number of bidders while bidders pay off is increasing in permits to a certain extent the proposed auction mechanism resolves the confliction between efficiency and revenue in the multi item auction theory while it increases people s understanding for carbon emission auction mechanism design

appropriation and efficiency a revision of the first theorem of welfare economics the first theorem of welfare economics rests on the assumption that individuals have neither price making nor market making capacities we offer a revision in which individuals have such capacities the revision emphasizes two keys for market efficiency i the need to align private rewards with social contributions called full appropriation and ii the need for an assumption to counter the possibility of coordination failures in the choice of produced commodities called noncomplementarity we also emphasize that information about prices of unmarketed commodities involves decentralized knowledge available only to product innovators and that pecuniary extemalities are important potential sources of market failure jel d51 d60 d62

identifying combinatorial valuations from aggregate demand abstract we study identification of combinatorial valuations from aggregate demand each utility function takes as arguments subsets or alternatively quantities of the multiple goods we exploit mathematical insights from auction theory to generically identify the distribution of utility functions in our setting aggregate demand for each item is observable while demand for bundles is not nevertheless our identification result allows us to recover the latter

the perception and measurement of transaction costs the chapter discusses various explanations of how transaction cost minimising corporate configurations come about it contrasts darwinian with rational explanations finding both unsatisfactory what matters rather than computation of fully recognised transaction costs are managerial perceptions of transaction costs these perceptions are not expressed in numbers but in language this is related to arguments derived from bounded rationality and from transaction cost economics the chapter argues that issues of managerial perception must become central to analysis existing academic traditions which accord primacy to perception and to language are drawn upon and argued to be of great relevance to future work

a theory of buyer seller networks this paper introduces a new model of exchange networks rather than markets of buyers and sellers it begins with the empirically motivated premise that a buyer and seller must have a relationship a link to exchange goods networks buyers sellers and the pattern of links connecting them are common exchange environments this paper develops a methodology to study network structures and explains why agents may form networks in a model that captures characteristics of a variety of industries the paper shows that buyers and sellers acting strategically in their own self interests can form the network structures that maximize overall welfare

matching with contracts comment the theory of two sided matching markets has interested researchers for its theoretical appeal and its relevance to the design of real world institutions the medical residency matching mecha nism in the united states the national resident matching program nrmp and student assign ment systems in new york city and boston are important mechanisms designed by economists using the theory 1 hatfield and paul r milgrom 2005 present a unified framework of matching with contracts which includes the two sided matching and package auction models as well as a simplified version of a labor market model of alexander kelso and vincent p crawford 1982 as special cases they introduce the substitutes condition of contracts which is an adaptation of the substitutability condition in the matching literature roth and marilda a oliveira sotomayor 1990 to matching with contracts they show that there exists a stable allocation if contracts are substitutes for hospitals and that a number of other results in matching generalize to problems with contracts they further claim that the substitutes condition on individual hospitals prefer ences is necessary to guarantee the existence of a stable allocation for all possible singleton preferences of others that is if contracts are not substitutes for a hospital then there exists a preference profile of other hospitals with single job openings and doctors such that there exists no stable allocation we show that this last claim of hatfield and milgrom 2005 does not hold in general the counterexample we present involves a hospital which has two different kinds of positions and the preferences of the hospital are a combination of preferences of these two positions while the substitutes condition does not hold for that hospital we adopt a technique developed by bettina klaus and flip klijn 2005 and show that there exists a stable allocation we then present the weak substitutes condition which we show is necessary to guarantee existence of stable allocations the modified result we present as well as the original contribu tion of hatfield and milgrom 2005 suggest a connection between the substitutes condition and stability 2

factors that influence transaction costs in development offsets who bears what and why abstract environmental policy instruments generate transaction costs to public and private parties there is a growing literature reporting on the size of transaction costs produced by environmental policy instruments this paper extends that literature through an analysis of the factors that influence transaction costs in environmental policy and how this influence occurs the theory based factors that influence transaction costs are categorised as 1 transaction characteristics 2 transactor characteristics 3 nature of the institutional environment and 4 nature of the institutional arrangements we examined how these factors influenced transaction costs through the analysis of two australian based development offset schemes with different policy designs we found evidence of all four theory based categories of influence in the policy case studies the degree of influence and how each factor influenced transaction costs varies across the two policies and between parties policy design as a component of the institutional environment had a particularly large bearing on transaction costs of offset buyers and the policy administrator an important contribution to transaction cost theory assumes the institutional environment as given

achieving efficiency with manipulative bargainers abstract two agents bargain over the allocation of a bundle of divisible commodities after strategically reporting utility functions to a neutral arbitrator the outcome is decided by using a bargaining solution concept chosen from a family that includes the nash and the raiffa kalai smorodinsky solutions when reports are restricted to be continuous strictly increasing and concave it has been shown that this kind of distortion game leads to inefficient outcomes we study the distortion game originated when agents are also allowed to claim non concave utility functions contrasting with the previous literature any interior equilibrium outcome is efficient and any efficient allocation can be supported as an equilibrium outcome of the distortion game in a similar fashion to the nash demand game we consider some uncertainty about the opponent s features to virtually implement the nash bargaining solution

the package assignment model we study assignment problems where individuals trade packages consisting of several rather than single objects although buyers reservations values are non additive efficient assignments can be formulated as a linear programming problem in which the pricing functions expressing duality may be non linear in the objects constituting the packages the interconnections among the linear programming formulation walrasian equilibrium and the core are established in the single seller auction version a necessary and sufficient condition is given for the vickrey payoff point to be implementable by a pricing equilibrium journal of economic literature classification numbers c62 d44 d51

manipulation of preferences and relative utilitarianism abstract given n agents with who wish to divide m commodities consider the n person noncooperative game with strategies consisting of concave increasing utility functions and whose outcomes are the relative utilitarian solution any constrained equal income competitive equilibrium allocation for the true utilities is shown to ba a nash equilibrium outcome for the noncooperative game conditions are presented under which these are the only pure strategy equilibrium outcomes journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c78 d71

a dominant strategy double auction a double auction mechanism that provides dominant strategies for both buyers and sellers is analyzed this mechanism satisfies the 1n convergence to efficiency of the buyer s bid double auction in addition the mechanism always produces full information first best prices the inefficiency arises because the least valuable profitable trade may be prohibited by the mechanism the mechanism has an oral implementation utilizing bid and asked prices

auction protocols for decentralized scheduling decentralized scheduling is the problem of allocating resources to alternative possible uses over time where competing uses are represented by autonomous agents market mechanisms use prices derived through distributing bidding protocols to determine schedules we investigate the existence of equilibrium prices for some general classes of scheduling problems the quality of equilibrium solutions and the behavior of an ascending auction mechanism and bidding protocol to remedy the potential nonexistence of price equilibria due to complementarities in preference we introduce additional markets in combinations of basic goods finally we consider direct revelation mechanisms and compare to the market based approach journal of economic literature classification numbers c62 c70 d44

an efficient ascending bid auction for multiple objects when bidders exhibit multi unit demands standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes this article proposes a new ascending bid auction for homogeneous goods such as treasury bills or telecommunications spectrum the auctioneer announces a price and bidders respond with quantities items are awarded at the current price whenever they are clinched and the price is incremented until the market clears with private values this dynamic auction yields the same outcome as the sealed bid vickrey auction but has advantages of simplicity and privacy preservation with interdependent values this auction may retain efficiency whereas the vickrey auction suffers from a generalized winner s curse

a comment on the nash program and the theory of implementation abstract the nash program for cooperative games is made compatible with the framework of the theory of implementation it is shown that the core is the only major cooperative solution that is maskin monotonic the mechanisms in the nash program are adapted into our model closer to that of the theory of implementation

transaction costs and tradeable permits abstract tradeable permit systems are at the center of current interest and activity in market based reforms of environmental policy because these systems can offer significant advantages over conventional approaches to pollution control unfortunately claims made for their relative cost effectiveness have often been exaggerated transaction costs which may be significant in these markets reduce trading levels and increase abatement costs in some cases equilibrium permit allocations and hence aggregate control costs are sensitive to initial permit distributions providing an efficiency justification for politicians typical focus on initial allocations

compensation payments for habitat heterogeneity existence efficiency and fairness considerations abstract compensation payments for voluntary conservation measures have become an important tool for biodiversity conservation worldwide each year substantial financial resources are spent on such measures particularly in the context of agri environmental schemes in europe a debate has started on whether this money is spent effectively in response to this debate it has been suggested that a portfolio of measures leading to habitat heterogeneity be implemented although payments for heterogeneous conservation measures have been analysed in the literature it has never been questioned that payments can be designed in a way that encourages enough land users to carry out each conservation measure within a portfolio of measures the purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that such payments do not always exist moreover in cases where payments for habitat heterogeneity exist the payment scheme may require overcompensation of the land users posing a limit to both efficiency and fairness considerations

r d cooperation between firms a perceived transaction cost perspective transaction cost is considered as an explanatory variable for the choice between markets and various organizational arrangements for performing some predefined tasks such as engaging in private r d with respect to r d cooperation between firms we show that the perception of high transaction cost is related to certain characteristics of the firm and to the type of r d task we also show a relationship between the perception of transaction cost and the perceived success of the cooperation the analysis sheds light on various determinants of transaction costs

risk sensitivity in bargaining with more than two participants abstract in two person bargaining over riskless outcomes where the outcome is chosen according to the nash solution or the kalai smorodinsky solution an increase in a player s risk aversion is to the advantage of the opponent it is shown in this note that for the n person nash solution an increase in risk aversion is to the player s own disadvantage but needs not be advantageous to all the opponents for the n person kalai smorodinsky solution the increase is to the player s own disadvantage and to the advantage of all the opponents

the english auction with differentiated commodities abstract we study economies with indivisibilities that satisfy the gross substitutes gs condition we define an excess demand set with the property that increasing the prices of all goods in excess demand eventually leads to the smallest walrasian prices this procedure is a generalization of the auction studied by g demange d gale and m j sotomayor polit econ 94 1986 863 872 in our auction truthful revelation of demand is a perfect bayesian equilibrium if the smallest walrasian prices correspond to the vickrey clarke groves payments however no dynamic auction can reveal sufficient information to implement the vickrey mechanism if all gs preferences are allowed journal of economic literature classification numbers d4 d44 d5 d51

public transaction costs of agri environmental schemes and their determinants analysing stakeholders involvement and perceptions despite an overall budget increase for rural development in the new programming period 2007 2013 most older member states in the now expanded european union are facing a substantial reduction in their budget for rural development and thus for agri environmental schemes aess it can be assumed that in most countries none or at best only part of this loss can be offset by national funds therefore the design of more efficient national governance structures for aess which decrease public transaction costs tcs would be an appropriate solution to this problem the objective of this paper is to define the factors that influence these public tcs so that appropriate action can then be taken to reduce them a statistical analysis with a proxy for public tcs is combined with an analysis of stakeholder perceptions excluding farmers concerning public tc influencing factors the research showed that it is mainly scheme related factors that are perceived to be important although the governance structure institutional environment and level of trust also play a role finally the analysis of perceptions concerning tcs also showed that aes related actors have a limited knowledge of tcs

modularity and greed in double auctions abstract designing double auctions is a complex problem especially when there are restrictions on the sets of buyers and sellers that may trade with one another the goal of this paper is to develop a modular approach to the design of double auctions by relating it to the exhaustively studied problem of designing one sided mechanisms with a single seller or alternatively a single buyer we consider several desirable properties of a double auction feasibility dominant strategy incentive compatibility the still stronger incentive constraints offered by a deferred acceptance implementation exact and approximate welfare maximization and budget balance for each of these properties we identify sufficient conditions on two one sided algorithms one for ranking the buyers one for ranking the sellers and on a method for their composition into trading pairs which guarantee the desired property of the double auction our framework also offers new insights into classic double auction designs such as the vcg and mcafee auctions with unit demand buyers and unit supply sellers

the vulnerability of price stabilization schemes to speculative attack this paper examines the effects of government attempts to stabilize the prices of commodities by use of buffer stocks agricultural goods subject to supply uncertainty as well as depletable resources are considered in each case it is shown that the resulting rational expectations competitive equilibrium contains a speculative attack a situation where the entire government stock is suddenly purchased by previously inactive speculators the analysis is applied to the historical attempt to peg the gold price which caused the attack of 1968 the insights gained and the methodology developed also apply to the various international agreements to impose bans on commodity prices which have been proposed by the united nations conference on trade and development

matching with contracts we develop a model of matching with contracts which incorporates as special cases the college admissions problem the kelso crawford labor market matching model and ascending package auctions we introduce a new law of aggregate demand for the case of discrete heterogeneous workers and show that when workers are substitutes this law is satisfied by profit maximizing firms when workers are substitutes and the law is satisfied truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for workers in a worker offering auction matching algorithm we also parameterize a large class of preferences satisfying the two conditions

spatial competition with price taking firms we consider a price taking equilibrium in the spatial setting a unique pricing equilibrium is shown to exist for any set of firm locations this equilibrium is then used to examine locational incentives in the two stage process in whiclh firms first choose locations anticipating the subsequent price taking outcome the result is spatial agglomeration if demand is inelastic and there are only two firms agglomeration does not occur if demand is too elastic or if there are more than two firms this paper presents a two stage model of spatial competition in which the prices in the second stage constitute a competitive equilibrium rather than being chosen by firms the analysis applies to an industry in which firms prices are regulated by an authority whose concern is to maximize social surplus as we show the prices the regulator would choose are those that would arise in the price taking equilibrium of course the full social optimum could be attained if the authority were also to regulate locations however apart from coarse restrictions such as zoning location regulation does not seem common in practice thus we model firms as deciding on the locations non cooperatively and anticipating correctly the subsequent price regulation for example when airlines were regulated they could choose the quality of their service such as departure times but price was controlled 2 the price taking equilibrium is also relevant even in the absence of regula tion when there are several suppliers at each location then the marginal cost curve associated with each point occupied by firms is simply interpreted as the supply curve the points occupied by suppliers can be thought of as market places or as shopping malls and the rents earned owing to increasing marginal costs can be extracted by the developer of the market place or mall the developer s location decision aims to maximize rents earned in choosing a location each developer takes into account how the ensuing price competition among suppliers both in the mall and across different malls affects the rents that can be extracted in this way locations are determined as a non cooperative equilibrium whereas prices are subsequently determined by walrasian competition we first assume that demand is completely inelastic and we prove the existence of a unique price equilibrium and that an allocation is optimal if and only if it can be supported by a price equilibrium the proofs do not require fixed point theorems and are a direct application of an intuitively appealing result of dubins and spanier 1961 we then extend our existence uniqueness and optimality results to allow for price sensitive demands different demand

stability and auctions in labor markets with job security fu et al 2016 introduced a stability concept for labor markets with job security we show that their proposed outcomes form nash equilibria of an auction where firms compete for workers this parallels literature on stable outcomes and similar auctions and yields new price of anarchy bounds

competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities abstract we analyze an exchange economy in which i all commodities except money are indivisible ii agents preferences can be described by a reservation value for each bundle of indivisible objects and iii all agents are price takers we obtain a necessary and sufficient condition under which market clearing prices exist implications for market mechanisms are discussed journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d51 c78

mechanisms for a spatially distributed market abstract we consider the problem of a spatially distributed market with strategic agents a single good is traded in a set of independent markets where shipment between markets is possible but costly the problem has previously been studied in the non strategic case in which it can be analyzed and solved as a min cost flow problem we consider the case where buyers and sellers are strategic our first result gives a double characterization of the vcg prices first as distances in a certain residue graph and second as the minimal for buyers and maximal for sellers equilibrium prices this provides a computationally efficient individually rational and incentive compatible welfare maximizing mechanism this mechanism is necessarily not budget balanced and we also provide a budget balanced mechanism which is also computationally efficient incentive compatible and individually rational that achieves high welfare finally we present results for some extensions of the model

a spatially explicit choice model to assess the impact of conservation policy on high nature value farming systems this study was funded by project poci 01 0145 feder 016664 ptdc aag rec 5007 2014 supported by norte portugal regional operational programme norte 2020 under the portugal 2020 partnership agreement through the european regional development fund erdf the study was also sponsored by the portuguese foundation for science and technology fct through projects ptdc agr aam 102300 2008 fcomp 01 0124 feder 008701 and ptdc bia bic 2203 2012 fcomp 01 0124 feder 028289 under feder funds through the operational programme for competitiveness factors compete and by national funds through fct foundation for science and technology and grants to pfr sfrh bd 87530 2012 and js sfrh bd 63566 2009 lr received support from the portuguese ministry of education and science and the european social fund through fct under poph qren typology 4 1 post doc grants sfrh bpd 62865 2009 and sfrh bpd 93079 2013 pb was supported by edp biodiversity chair fm was supported by the ren biodiversity chair and fct if 01053 2015

economists perceptions versus managers decisions an experiment in transaction cost analysis are the perceptions of professional economists on transaction costs consistent with make or buy decisions made within firms the answer may have important implications for transaction cost research data on firms outsourcing during the new product development process are taken from a largescale survey of uk german and irish manufacturing plants and we test the consistency of these outsourcing decisions with the predictions derived from the transaction cost perceptions of a panel of economists little consistency is evident between actual outsourcing patterns and the predictions of the williamsonian transactions cost model derived from the panel of economists there is however evidence of a systematic pattern to the differences suggesting that a competence or resource based approach may be relevant to understanding firm outsourcing and that firms are adopting a strategic approach to managing their external relationships cambridge political economy society 2005 all rights reserved

package auctions and exchanges we report recent advances concerning the package allocation problem in which traders seek to buy or sell combinations of goods the problems are most difficult when some goods are not substitutes in that case competitive equilibrium typically fail to exist but the core is non empty and comprises the competitive solutions also in that case the vickrey auction fails to select core allocations and yield revenues that are less than competitive the ausubel milgrom auction generally selects core allocations and when goods are substitutes prescribes the vickrey allocation we also evaluate the problems and promise of mechanisms for the package exchange problem

the manipulability of resource allocation mechanisms the vulnerability to manipulate behaviour of resource allocation mechanisms is evaluated by determining the nash equilibria of associated manipulation games under manipulation all monotonic correspondences are essentially equivalent to the walrasian correspondence for most non monotonic correspondences of interest the initial position appears at equilibrium to be efficient

nash equilibrium and welfare optimality if is a set of social alternatives a social choice rule scr assigns a subset of a to each potential profile of individuals preferences over a where the subset is interpreted as the set of welfare optima a game form or mechanism implements the social choice rule if for any potential profile of preferences 1 any welfare optimum can arise as a nash equilibrium of the game form implying in particular that a nash equilibrium exists and 2 all nash equilibria are welfare optimal the main result of this paper establishes that any scr that satisfies two properties monotonicity and no veto power can be implemented by a game form if there are three or more individuals the proof is constructive

agent competition double auction mechanism this paper proposes an agent competition double auction mechanism to simplify decision making and promote transactions for the customer to customer marketplaces under the proposed double auction mechanism bidding one s true valuation private information is the best strategy for each individual buyer and seller even when shipping costs and sales taxes are different across various possible transactions the proposed mechanism also achieves budget balance and asymptotic efficiency furthermore these results not only hold for an environment where buyers and sellers exchange identical commodities but also can be extended to an environment with multiple substitutable commodities