economic deregulation days of reckoning for microeconomists economic deregulation of american industry is one of the most important experiments in economic policy of our time 1 in 1977 17 percent of u s gnp was produced by fully regulated industries 2 by 1988 following ten years of partial and complete economic deregulation of large parts of the transportation communications energy and financial industries that total had been cut significantly to 6 6 percent of gnp 3 the political forces behind the decision to change the market conditions under which roughly 600 billion of u s output is produced were strong and varied but according to political scientists martha derthick and paul quirk 1985 p 36 deregulation would never have occurred if economists especially microeconomists had not generally supported it through their research 4 in retrospect it is fair to ask were microeconomists able to develop a theoretical and empirical framework to explain regulation and its effects and to form predictions of deregulation s effects were they able to predict the actual effects of deregulation this paper surveys the evidence to address these questions and of

competition among differentiated health plans under adverse selection market power and adverse selection are prevalent features of the market for pre paid health plans however most of the literature on adverse selection considers extreme cases either perfect competition or monopoly if instead health plans are horizontally differentiated then i profits derived from each low risk are higher than from each high risk and ii when the profits derived from each high risk are negative cross subsidization a health authority as informed as the health plans can implement a pareto improvement both local and global deviations from cross subsidization are addressed within a nash equilibrium framework

endogenous future preferences and conservation a dynamic optimization model is developed in whichuncertainty about future preferences is endogenous namely depending on the state of the environment atthe time the change in preferences occurs endogeneizing preferences not only provides economicintuition to previous results but also implies thatoptimal policies are less conservative

gold and silver health plans accommodating demand heterogeneity in managed competition abstract new regulation of health insurance markets creates multiple levels of health plans with designations like gold and silver the underlying rationale for the heavy metal approach to insurance regulation is that heterogeneity in demand for health care is not only due to health status sick demand more than the healthy but also to other taste related factors rich demand more than the poor this paper models managed competition with demand heterogeneity to consider plan payment and enrollee premium policies in relation to efficiency net consumer benefit and fairness the european concept of solidarity specifically this paper studies how to implement a silver and gold health plan efficiently and fairly in a managed competition context we show that there are sharp tradeoffs between efficiency and fairness when health plans cannot or may not because of regulation base premiums on any factors affecting demand enrollees do not choose the efficient plan when taste e g income can be used as a basis of payment a simple tax can achieve both efficiency and fairness when only health status and not taste can be used as a basis of payment health status based taxes and subsidies are required and efficiency can only be achieved with a modified version of fairness we refer to as weak solidarity an overriding conclusion is that the regulation of premiums for both the basic and the higher level plans is necessary for efficiency

optimal growth resource amenities and the preservation of natural environments this paper examines the conditions for which it is optimal to permanently preserve natural environments in which a productive natural resource is found the conditions are more restrictive than those previously indicated in the literature on the economics of natural environments increasing consumption and declining commodity prices are not sufficient to warrant permanent preservation the initial capital stock can be an important determinant of the optimal level of preservation in addition resource amenity values will increase the initial resource price and decrease the rate of growth of the resource price the natural world provides a variety of services to the human community natural resources are essential inputs in the production of goods and services in addition the natural world generates a variety of amenity services including the scientific recreational and aesthetic value of preserved natural environments krutilla 1967 krutilla and fisher 1975a this paper examines the impact of resource amenity values on the optimal growth of an economy which depends upon natural resource inputs for the production of goods and services in particular the paper examines the conditions under which it is optimal to permanently preserve some natural environments in which the productive resource is found the conditions which warrant permanent preservation are more restrictive than previously indicated by the literature on the economics of natural environments increasing consumption and declining commodity prices are not sufficient to warrant permanent preservation in addition the initial capital endowment can be an important determinant of the optimal level of preservation

challenges of existing in a market as a small low quality producer this paper explores the strategy of a small firm entering a monopolist s market thereby creating a duopoly market the small firm avoids competing with the larger incumbent firm by producing a lower quality product at a lower price the model here establishes an equilibrium under a specific set of assumptions and examines how exogenous factors affect prices qualities and profits although the strategy might allow the firm to enter and earn a profit the market conditions may make this position much less desirable to that of the large firm for several reasons in the case explored here where tastes for the product are uniformly distributed the small firm s profit is about six percent of that of the larger firm the smaller firm is more severely threatened by the entrance of a third firm furthermore even if the smaller firm can cut costs its position is not well suited for exploiting such increases in efficiencies

price and quality competition under adverse selection market organization and efficiency firms compete with prices and qualities in markets where consumers have heterogeneous preferences and cost characteristics consumers demand two goods which can be supplied jointly or separately by firms we consider two strategy regimes for firms uniform price quality pairs and screening price quality menus for each regime we compare the equilibria under integration each firm supplying both goods and separation each firm supplying one good integrating and separating markets change quality efficiency and welfare the theory illustrates phenomena such as the carveout of mental health and substance abuse coverage from general health insurance and creaming for low cost students in locales with school choices copyright 2003 by the rand corporation

quasi option value some misconceptions dispelled abstract we discuss a couple of important issues in the recent literature on quasi option value we show that the assertion that quasi option value can be negative in a model with independent learning is based on confusion between quasi option value which is always positive and the net benefit of preservation of a natural environment subject to development which is not we also explore the significance of different assumptions about the nature of learning and show that the result that quasi option value is positive is surprisingly robust

product competition in microprocessors there have been some striking recent developments in the theory of spatial and product competition but relatively few empirical studies see however shaw 1982 a and b this paper is an attempt to assess the empirical usefulness of these developments drawing on the history of product competition in microprocessors over the period 1971 81 in particular our interest centres on attempts to introduce a role for what have been called agglomeration economies 1 that is mutual external economies accruing to two or more producers selling similar products in a recent survey graitson 1982 suggested that this particular development would provide theoretical models of special empirical relevance and the evidence presented here though by no means conclusive tends to support that view the paper is in five parts section i gives a brief review of some of the relevant developments in spatial and product competition theory section ii gives a brief account of how the wide variety of microprocessors will be classified for the purposes of this study section iii describes the history of developments in microprocessors over the period 1971 to 1981 and section iv assesses the theoretical developments in the light of this evidence finally section v summarises the main points of the paper

the interaction of direct and indirect risk selection abstract this paper analyzes the interaction of direct and indirect risk selection in health insurance markets it is shown that direct risk selection using measures unrelated to the benefit package like selective advertising or losing applications of high risk individuals nevertheless has an influence on the distortions of the benefit package caused by indirect risk selection direct risk selection drs may either increase or decrease these distortions depending on the type of equilibrium pooling or separating the type of drs positive or negative and the type of cost for drs individual specific or not regulators who succeed in reducing drs by e g banning excessive advertising or implementing fines for losing applications may therefore unintendedly mitigate or exacerbate the distortions of the benefit package caused by indirect risk selection it is shown that the interaction of direct and indirect risk selection also alters the formula for optimal risk adjustment

health insurance without single crossing why healthy people have high coverage standard insurance models predict that people with high risks have high insurance coverage it is empirically documented that people with high income have lower health risks and are better insured we show that income differences between risk types lead to a violation of single crossing in an insurance model where people choose treatment intensity we analyse different market structures and show the following if insurers have market power the violation of single crossing caused by income differences and endogenous treatment choice can explain the empirically observed outcome our results do not rely on differences in risk aversion between types

quality vs quantity in military procurement it is often argued that the same expenditures on military procurement would produce a more effective defense if larger numbers of less sophisticated and thus cheaper weapons were purchased this paper shows that such a result can occur even if the military derives no private consumption value from technically sophisticated weapons rather the organization of the decision making process itself can produce this result this suggests some possible solutions through organizing decision making in a different fashion copyright 1990 by american economic association

cost minimizing risk adjustment conventional risk adjustment which sets capitation payments equal to the average cost of individuals with similar observable characteristics is not optimal if health plans can use private information to select low cost enrollees cost minimizing risk adjustment minimizes the sum of capitated hmo premiums plus ffs costs by balancing the gains from hmo cost efficiency against the overpayments that result from hmo selection estimations using privately insured data suggest that cost minimizing risk adjusted premiums reduce total sponsor costs as much as 25 6 below conventional risk adjustment premiums

an empirical model of product design and pricing strategy abstract using the hedonic approach as a point of departure this paper develops an empirical model for analyzing product design and pricing strategies the model focuses on a multi product firm in a differentiated product market it identifies criteria for optimal design and pricing for the firm s several products given the firm s production costs the prices and designs of competing products and given consumer tastes the model is demonstrated with a real world application to the microcomputer industry

uncertain climate change in an intergenerational planning model a three generation planning model incorporating uncertain climate change is developed each generation features a production activity based on capital and an exhaustible resource an irreversible climate change may occur in period two or three reducing the productivity for this and the remaining generation the model is solved by stochastic dynamic programming if the climate impact and climate change probability is constant the optimal period one and two resource extraction is larger than for the reference case of climate stability if however climate impact and climate change probability increases with increased aggregate resource use this result is reversed

competition leverage how the demand side affects optimal risk adjustment we study optimal risk adjustment in imperfectly competitive health insurance markets when high risk consumers are less likely to switch insurer than low risk consumers insurers then have an incentive to select even if risk adjustment perfectly corrects for cost differences to achieve first best risk adjustment should overcompensate insurers for serving high risk agents second we identify a trade off between efficiency and consumer welfare reducing the difference in risk adjustment subsidies increases consumer welfare by leveraging competition from the elastic low risk market to the less elastic high risk market third mandatory pooling can increase consumer surplus further at the cost of efficiency

optimal risk adjustment with adverse selection and spatial competition abstract paying insurers risk adjusted prices for covering different individuals can correct selection incentives and induce the market to provide optimal insurance policies to calculate the optimal risk adjusted prices we need to know a what the optimal policies are b how much they cost and c how competitive the market is we examine these issues in a model with spatial heterogeneity and adverse selection market equilibrium is characterized and delivery of the socially optimal insurance policies is possible as long as providers are paid risk adjusted fees for each individual they serve when the payment can be made on the basis of an individual s risk it should be sufficient to cover the expected cost of the socially optimal policy for that person plus a mark up if payments can be made only on the basis of a partially informative signal the optimal risk based payments should be adjusted according to a simple linear transformation identified by glazer and mcguire glazer j mcguire t 2000 optimal risk adjustment of health insurance premiums an application to managed care american economic review 90 4 1055 1071

reimbursing health plans and health providers efficiency in production versus selection the tradeoff between an insurer s or medical provider s incentives to select good risks and to produce efficiently is governed by the supply price analog to the demand price tradeoff between moral hazard and risk aversion under a variety of models the optimum supply price is a mixture of capitation and fee for service payments empirical literature shows that pure capitation payment leaves strong incentives for selection that are acted upon the presence of contracting costs in a rothschild stiglitz model means a limited pooling equilibrium can exist and that poor risks will not be at their preferred outcome

the greenhouse effect and intergenerational transfer abstract the scientific basis for understanding the economic issues involved in the greenhouse effect is outlined four important aspects of the problem are identified and discussed irreversibility international and institutional constraints uncertainty and intergenerational equity attention is focused upon the intertemporal choice problem a model describing the potential for intergenerational transfers under the uncertainty of climatic change due to fossil fuel combustion is presented we conclude intergenerational compensation can be achieved by investment in capital or technology or by bequest and is ethically required regardless of any other action

irreversible environmental investments with uncertain benefit levels abstract the principal property of irreversibilities is that they generate incentives for policies that are smaller in scale than a myopic policy the circumstances in which this irreversibility effect occurs are first considered for a model with unit benefit uncertainty and time invariant cost functions with changes in cost relationships over time such as fixed costs for augmenting investment it may be desirable to adopt policies with scales that are larger than smaller than or the same as the scale of a myopic policy with rising unit benefits over time one adopts a policy scale larger than or the same as that in the myopic case and with declining unit benefits the opposite result holds irreversibilities will however lead to underinvestments in comparison with incompletely reversible investments with similar adjustment costs for increasing policy investments

product proliferation in characteristics space the uk fertiliser industry in recent years a number of theoretical papers have addressed both the positive and normative aspects of the problem of how competitive products may be located in characteristics space the major theoretical antecedents have been hotelling s analysis of spatial competition 6 chamberlin s analysis of product differentiation 1 2 and lancaster s goods characteristics theory of demand 7 unfortunately there has been little corresponding empirical analysis two approaches in the theoretical analysis seem to have predominated firstly the examination of the welfare implications of product variety offered in equilibrium conditions 2 and secondly the dynamics of product competition using the spatial competition analogy 3 this paper which adopts the second approach uses an adaptation of lancaster s goods characteristics framework it examines the process of product competition in the uk agricultural fertiliser market the first and second sections briefly outline the main features of the goods characteristics and spatial competition theories and the uk fertiliser market respectively the third section contains the empirical analysis

the economics of product variety a survey demand for variety may arise from a taste for diversity in individual consumption and or from diversity in tastes even when each consumer chooses a single variant the full degree of variety potentially demanded will not in general be supplied because scale economies even to a small degree mean that the potential welfare or revenue gain from greater variety must be balanced against the lower unit production costs with fewer variants the economics of product variety consists essentially in analysing the effect of this balance in different situations and comparing the degree of product variety for different market structures with each other and with the optimum the survey commences with the work on market structures with single product firms generalized monopolistic competition tracing modern developments in both the chamberlinian and hotelling traditions the latter has been particularly fruitful due to the expansion of the original locational ideas into virtual spaces in product characteristics the emphasis in recent work on product variety has been on multiproduct firms in both monopolistic and oligopolistic structures including strategic market preemption although most work has been in a full information context there have been advances in product variety under imperfect information either by consumers to properties of the firms products or firms as to consumers demands

the incidence of mandated maternity benefits i consider the labor market effects of mandates which raise the costs of employing a demographically identifiable group the efficiency of these policies will be largely dependent on the extent to which their costs are shifted to group specific wages i study several state and federal mandates which stipulated that childbirth be covered comprehensively in health insurance plans raising the relative cost of insuring women of childbearing age i find substantial shifting of the costs of these mandates to the wages of the targeted group correspondingly i find little effect on total labor input for that group jel 118 j32 h51 in an era of tight fiscal budget constraints mandating employer provision of workplace benefits to employees is an attractive means for a government to finance its policy agenda consequently in recent years there has been a growth of interest in mandated benefits as a tool of social policy for example the centerpiece of president bill clinton s health care proposal is mandated employer provision of health insurance and more than 20 states have man

limit qualities and entry deterrence in this article we investigate how the interplay of competition among incumbents and the magnitude of a potential entrant s setup cost determines the configuration of the array of products to be offered in a perfect nash equilibrium we show that incumbents can use limit qualities to deter entry we also demonstrate that rivalry among incumbents may lead to excessive entry deterrence our analysis generates predictions about the correlation between the degree of product differentiation and the size of the entrant s setup costs

vertical product differentiation with entry abstract this paper examines the non cooperative behaviour of established firms that compete in product quality and prices while foreseeing the effects of their rivalry on the decisions made by the later entrants we prove an existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium and show that the dominant firms engage in maximal product differentiation i e select the highest and lowest technologically feasible qualities later entrant however always selects an intermediate quality moreover we show that the equilibrium configuration is identical to that generated by perfect foresight equilibrium in a model of sequential entry furthermore the profits earned by each firm are ranked in the same order as the qualities implifying that the later entrant despite being the last mover ends up with higher profits and larger market share than one of the incumbents

controlling selection incentives when health insurance contracts are endogenous the paper examines the nature of health insurance contracts when insurance companies pool high and low risk individuals in a spatial product differentiation model the normal forces of competition induce quality provision but selection incentives induce insurers to under provide quality to offset selection incentives the government can reimburse some of the insurers costs however such a subsidy can in some cases reduce quality further as well as discourage production efficiency in such cases the optimal reimbursement rate is negative 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

setting health plan premiums to ensure efficient quality in health care minimum variance optimal risk adjustment abstract risk adjustment refers to the practice of paying health plans a premium per person or per family based on a formula using risk adjusters such as age or gender and weights on those adjusters one role of risk adjustment is to make sure plans have an incentive to accept all potential enrollees another role at least as important in our view is to lead health plans to choose the efficient level of quality of care for the various services they offer most of the research and policy literature on risk adjustment focuses on the first problem this paper proposes a new way to calculate weights in a risk adjustment formula that contends with both problems for a given set of adjusters we identify the weights that minimize the variance in plan predictable health care costs that are not explained by risk adjustment addressing the access problem subject to the payments satisfying conditions for an optimal risk adjuster making sure plans provide the efficient quality we call the formula minimum variance optimal risk adjustment mvora

information and the dynamics of environmental protection the concept of the critical period earlier work on environmental decisions under uncertainty is extended from two periods to many permitting treatment of a richer variety of problems implications for pollution control policy of several different kinds of ecosystem recovery dynamics are considered in the context of improving information about ecosystem behavior and preferences for environmental goods multiperiod analogs of the two period concept of quasi option value are developed

how does risk selection respond to risk adjustment new evidence from the medicare advantage program to combat adverse selection governments increasingly base payments to health plans and providers on enrollees scores from risk adjustment formulae in 2004 medicare began to risk adjust capitation payments to private medicare advantage ma plans to reduce selection driven overpayments but because the variance of medical costs increases with the predicted mean incentivizing enrollment of individuals with higher scores can increase the scope for enrolling overpriced individuals with costs significantly below the formula s prediction indeed after risk adjustment ma plans enrolled individuals with higher scores but lower costs conditional on their score we find no evidence that overpayments were on net reduced

monopolistic competition and a firm s product range abstract a model is presented which assumes that firms maximise profits with respect to both the number of varieties supplied as well as the output level of a typical variety the incentive to produce more than one variety comes from a cost advantage due to inter product economies it is found that in a long run free entry equilibrium the industry is characterised by too few product varieties and each variety is over supplied compared to the welfare maximum for any conjectural variation elasticity the former result also holds if the number of firms is held fixed

optimal risk adjustment in markets with adverse selection an application to managed care it is well known that adverse selection causes distortions in contracts in markets with asymmetric information taxing inefficient contracts and subsidizing the efficient ones can improve market outcomes bruce c greenwald and joseph e stiglitz 1986 although regulators rarely seem to implement tax and subsidy schemes with adverse selection motives in mind contracts are often complex and incomplete and it is the inefficient elements of the contract that are difficult to verify and hence tax or subsidize this is precisely the reason that in health insurance markets rather than subsidizing contracts regulators and payers contend with adverse selection by taxing and subsidizing the price paid to insuring health plans on the basis of observable characteristics of the persons joining the plan a practice known as risk adjustment risk adjusted premiums are paid to managed care plans plans that ration care by management rather than by conventional approaches like coinsurance and deductibles and offer a bundle of characteristics quality access for many services that is fundamentally outside the scope of direct regulation selection related incentives threaten the efficiency and fairness of this organization of health insurance markets by inducing plans to distort the quality of the services they offer to discourage high cost persons from joining the plan as managed care becomes the predominant source of health care for residents of the united states and many other countries payers attempt to address this incentive by setting a risk adjusted price that pays more for more expensive enrollees as it is conventionally practiced risk adjustment sets prices for people proportional to their expected cost based on observable characteristics the federal medicare program for example has used age sex welfare status and county of residence adjusters to set prices to managed care plans to convey how what we term conventional risk adjustment works suppose age is the risk adjuster for a medicare population over 65 if it is determined that the 75to 84 year old population costs 20 percent more than the overall average in medicare the assumption in conventional risk adjustment is that the premium paid to plans for someone in this group should be 20 percent above the average we fundamentally disagree that this is the right way to think about and do risk adjustment

hospital profits the effects of reimbursement policies this paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the effect of cost based reimbursement cbr on hospital costs and charges it takes issue with previous analyses which have treated cbr as paying economic costs plus a mark up and have concluded that the mark up is too small to significantly distort hospital decision making the basic thesis here is that if reimbursement is based on costs accounting costs become a price to cost paying patients and will be optimized to maximize revenue a hospital serving both cost and charge paying private patients can set two price schedules accounting profits ratio of charges to costs are not a measure of economic profit but of relative prices to these two groups of patients in the absence of constraints from regulation or patient co payment the optimum level of accounting costs would be infinite in practice the medicare reimbursement formula links allowable costs to charges received from charge paying patients this formula creates incentives for the hospital to raise charges above the single price profit maximizing monopoly level this inflationary effect of the medicare formula does not presuppose that medicare pays less than full cost the empirical analysis of hospital laboratory costs and charges generally supports the predictions for other departments the conclusions are consistent but more tentative because of data limitations overall evidence suggests minimal cross subsidy between cost and charge paying patients comparisons of cost and charge levels in for profit voluntary non profit and government hospitals are presented but it is emphasized that inferences about relative efficiency and profitability cannot be drawn from accounting data given the incentives created by cbr