games with espionage abstract we consider normal form games in which two players decide on their strategies before the start of play and player 1 can purchase noisy information about his opponent s decisions concerning future response policies i e spy on his opponent we give a full characterization of the set of distributions over the players payoffs that can be induced by such equilibria as well as describe their welfare and pareto properties in 2 2 games we find three equilibrium phenomena i when the game is non degenerate the information purchased is independent of its cost the cost determines only whether information is purchased or not ii the player who spies treats his information as if it were deterministic even though it is correct only probabilistically and iii in chain store models espionage is used if and only if the perfect equilibrium payoff differs from the stackelberg equilibrium payoff with player 2 being the stackelberg leader

do better schools matter parental valuation of elementary education the evaluation of numerous school reforms requires an understanding of the value of better schools given the difficulty of calculating the relationship between school quality and student outcomes i turn to another method and use house prices to infer the value parents place on school quality i look within school districts at houses located on attendance district boundaries houses then differ only by the elementary school the child attends i thereby effectively remove the variation in neighborhoods taxes and school spending i find that parents are willing to pay 2 5 percent more for a 5 percent increase in test scores this finding is robust to a number of sensitivity checks

using maimonides rule to estimate the effect of class size on scholastic achievement the twelfth century rabbinic scholar maimonides proposed a maximum class size of 40 this same maximum induces a nonlinear and nonmonotonic relationship between grade enrollment and class size in israeli public schools today maimonides rule of 40 is used here to construct instrumental variables estimates of effects of class size on test scores the resulting identiecation strategy can be viewed as an application of donald campbell s regression discontinuity design to the class size question the estimates show that reducing class size induces a signiecant and substantial increase in test scores for fourth and efth graders although not for third graders when asked about their views on class size in surveys parents and teachers generally report that they prefer smaller classes this may be because those involved with teaching believe that smaller classes promote student learning or simply because smaller classes offer a more pleasant environment for the pupils and teachers who are in them mueller chase and walden 1988 social scientists and school administrators also have a longstanding interest in the class size question class size is often thought to be easier to manipulate than other school inputs and it is a variable at the heart of policy debates on school quality and the allocation of school resources in many countries see e g robinson 1990 for the united states ofsted 1995 for the united kingdom and moshel ravid 1995 for israel this broad interest in the consequences of changing class size

how financial incentives induce disability insurance recipients to return to work using a local randomized experiment that arises from a sharp discontinuity in disability insurance di policy in norway we provide transparent and credible identification of how financial incentives induce di recipients to return to work we find that many di recipients have considerable capacity to work that can be effectively induced by providing financial work incentives we further show that providing work incentives to di recipients may both increase their disposable income and reduce program costs our findings also suggest that targeted policies may be the most effective in encouraging di recipients to return to work

incentive effects of the u s welfare system a review the author would like to acknowledge support for prior work on this topic from the u s department of health and human services and helpful comments from three anonymous referees rebecca blank howard chernick john fitzgerald irwin garfinkel peter gottschalk edward gramlich david greenberg judith gueron james heckman v joseph hotz robert hutchens michael keane frank levy larry mead michael murray robert plotnick anuradha rangarajan philip robins howard rolston jeffrey smith and daniel weinberg all opinions and errors are those of the author alone

what mean impacts miss distributional effects of welfare reform experiments labor supply theory predicts systematic heterogeneity in the impact of recent welfare reforms on earnings transfers and income yet most welfare reform research focuses on mean impacts we investigate the importance of heterogeneity using random assignment data from connecticut s jobs first waiver which features key elements of post 1996 welfare programs estimated quantile treatment effects exhibit the substantial heterogeneity predicted by labor supply theory thus mean impacts miss a great deal looking separately at samples of dropouts and other women does not improve the performance of mean impacts we conclude that welfare reform s effects are likely both more varied and more extensive than has been recognized

family welfare cultures strong intergenerational correlations in various types of welfare use have fuelled a long standing debate over whether welfare receipt in one generation causes welfare participation in the next generation some claim a causal relationship in welfare receipt across generations has created a culture in which welfare use reinforces itself through the family others argue the determinants of poverty or poor health are correlated across generations so that children s welfare participation is associated with but not caused by parental welfare receipt however there is little empirical evidence to sort out these claims in this paper we investigate the existence and importance of family welfare cultures in the context of norway s disability insurance di system to overcome the challenge of correlated unobservables across generations we take advantage of random assignment of judges to di applicants whose cases are initially denied some appeal judges are systematically more lenient which leads to random variation in the probability a parent will be allowed di using this exogenous variation we find strong evidence that welfare receipt in one generation causes welfare participation in the next generation when a parent is allowed di their adult child s participation over the next five years increases by 6 percentage points this effect grows over time rising to 12 percentage points after ten years while these findings are specific to our setting they serve to highlight that welfare reforms can have long lasting effects on program participation since any original effect on the current generation could be reinforced by changing the participation behavior of their children as well the detailed nature of our data allows us to compare the intergenerational transmission with spillover effects in other networks and to explore mechanisms our findings point to a special link between parents and their children with little impact due to close neighbors di participation we find suggestive evidence that what may change as a result of a parent being allowed di is their children s beliefs about the efficacy of trying to get on to the di program or their attitudes about di participation and its stigma

earnings disposable income and consumption of allowed and rejected disability insurance applicants ticipation rate has increased from less than 1 percent to over 5 percent of the adult population in many european countries the increases are even more striking from 1 percent to 7 percent in the united kingdom and from 2 percent to almost 10 percent in norway two key questions in thinking about the size and growth of the di program are to what extent it discourages work and how valuable the insur ance is to individuals and families these questions motivate our paper we begin by describing the earnings disposable income and consumption of awarded and rejected di applicants before and after the disability onset and the allowance decision next we discuss alternative interpretations of these descriptive results either through the lens of the approach taken in bound

local labor markets and welfare spells do demand conditions matter this paper examines the impact of changes in labor market conditions on participation in the aid to families with dependent children afdc program in california transitions off welfare and transi

political violence and excess liquidity in egypt in this article we estimate a time series model of excess liquidity in the egyptian banking sector while financial liberalisation and financial stability are found to have reduced excess liquidity these effects have been offset by an increase in the number of violent political incidents arising from conflict between radical islamic groups and the egyptian state the link between political events and financial outcomes provides a rationale for economic policy interventions by the international community in response to increases in political instability

the rise in the disability rolls and the decline in unemployment between 1984 and 2001 the share of nonelderly adults receiving social security disability insurance income di rose by 60 percent to 5 3 million beneficiaries rapid program growth despite improving aggregate health appears to be explained by reduced screening stringency declining demand for less skilled workers and an unforeseen increase in the earnings replacement rate we estimate that the sum of these forces doubled the labor force exit propensity of displaced high school dropouts after 1984 lowering measured u s unemployment by one half a percentage point steady state calculations augur a further 40 percent increase in the rate of di receipt

labor supply and taxes a survey i survey the male and female labor supply literatures focusing on implications for effects of wages and taxes for males i describe and contrast results from three basic types of model static models especially those that account for nonlinear taxes life cycle models with savings and life cycle models with both savings and human capital for women more important distinctions are whether models include fixed costs of work and whether they treat demographics like fertility and marriage and human capital as exogenous or endogenous the literature is characterized by considerable controversy over the responsiveness of labor supply to changes in wages and taxes at least for males it is fair to say that most economists believe labor supply elasticities are small but a sizeable minority of studies that i examine obtain large values hence there is no clear consensus on this point in fact a simple average of hicks elasticities across all the studies i examine is 0 30 several simulation studies have shown that such a value is large enough to generate large welfare costs of income taxation for males i conclude that two factors drive many of the differences in results across studies one factor is use of direct vs ratio wage measures with studies that use the former tending to find larger elasticties another factor is the failure of most studies to account for human capital returns to work experience i argue that this may lead to downward bias in elasticity estimates in a model that includes human capital i show how even modest elasticities as conventionally measured can be consistent with large welfare costs of taxation

the marginal cost of public funds hours of work versus labor force participation this paper extends the theory and measurement of the marginal cost of public funds mcf to account for labor force participation responses our work is motivated by the emerging consensus in the empirical literature that extensive participation responses are more important than intensive hours of work responses in the modelling of extensive responses we argue that it is crucial to account for the presence of non convexities created by fixed work costs in a non convex framework tax and transfer reforms give rise to discrete participation responses generating first order effects on government revenue these revenue effects make the marginal cost of funds higher and we show numerically that the implications for mcf tend to be substantial

disability insurance benefits and labor supply a critical input for assessing the optimal size of disability insurance programs is the elasticity of labor force participation with respect to the generosity of benefits unfortunately this parameter has been difficult to estimate in the context of the u s disability insurance program since all workers face an identical benefits schedule i surmount this problem by studying the experience of canada which operates two distinct disability insurance programs for quebec and for the rest of canada the latter program raised its benefits by 36 percent in january 1987 whereas benefits in quebec were constant i find a sizable labor supply response to the policy change my central estimates imply an elasticity of labor force nonparticipation with respect to disability insurance benefits of 0 28 0 36

the growth in the social security disability rolls a fiscal crisis unfolding the u s social security disability insurance di program has grown dramatically over the last 20 years in size and expense this growth poses significant risks to the finances of the di program and the broader social security system and raises troubling questions as to whether the program is being misused by claimants this article first provides an overview of the disability insurance program describing who qualifies for the program how an individual applies for benefits and how the level of benefits is determined next we summarize the factors responsible for the growth in the di rolls and discuss how the characteristics of di recipients have changed as a result we then explore the extent of moral hazard in the di program and the effectiveness of the screening process in distinguishing meritorious from nonmeritorious claims finally we identify the challenges that the di program creates for social security finances and social security reform and discuss potential reforms to the di program

the health and earnings of rejected disability insurance applicants applicants for social security disability benefits who fail to pass the medical screening form a natural control group for beneficiaries data drawn from the 1972 and 1978 surveys of the disabled done for the social security administration show that fewer than 50 percent of rejected male applicants work typical earnings of those that do are less than 59 percent of median earnings for other men their age these data cast doubt on recent econometric work that suggests that the disincentive effects of the social security disability program have been substantial copyright 1989 by american economic association

trends in employment and earnings of allowed and rejected applicants to the social security disability insurance program since the early 1980s changes in the economic environment and in the process for determining eligibility for the social security disability insurance di program have had significant effects on the program first the economic situation and labor force opportunities for lower skilled people continued to decline leading to lower rates of participation in the labor force for less educated men second changes in the eligibility process made it easier to obtain di benefits based on conditions difficult to clearly identify on medical terms alone such as back pain or depression 1 those two factors have likely contributed to a substantial increase in the number of individuals receiving di as well as a significant change in the characteristics of applicants and new beneficiaries over the same period both applicants and new beneficiaries have become younger longer lived more likely to apply because of nonterminal conditions such as back pain or mental health and more likely to be female 2 as a result recent work projects a rapid increase in program costs as greater numbers of beneficiaries stay on the program for more years e g david h autor and duggan 2006 the concurrent developments in the economy and eligibility rules have also fueled the concern that the generosity of di increasingly induces low income workers to apply for and sometimes receive benefits and that some of those beneficiaries would be able to work in the absence of the program indeed a growing body of research suggests that some workers in difficult economic conditions exit the labor force to

disability insurance benefits and labor supply some additional evidence this article examines the effects of a change in the canada quebec pension plan c qpp disability benefits on the labor supply of older canadian workers i obtain my estimates by exploiting a large increase in benefits that only occurred in the qpp program which only operates in quebec while benefits in the cpp program which operates in the rest of canada were unaffected unlike the existing estimates from the united states as well as earlier canadian obtained by gruber i find that disability benefits are not associated with a large increase in the nonparticipation of older men

income and substitution effects of a disability insurance reform abstract disability insurance di systems are widely criticized for their inherent work disincentives this paper evaluates the effects of a swiss di reform that aims to lower di benefits for a group of existing di beneficiaries and introduces an additional level to the di benefit schedule the reform has only modest effects on earnings and employment but increases the disability degree of those threatened by a di benefit decline we estimate bounds on the income and substitution effects by employing the principal stratification framework the income effect is quantitatively important whereas the substitution effect is smaller and has bounds that include zero the evidence suggests that caseworkers helped the insured with low labor market attachment to maintain a full di benefit

disability retirement in a welfare state the increasing number of disability pensioners may put a strain on the welfare state in this paper we try to assess the effect of financial incentives on disability entrance a sample of norwegians on long term sick leave at the beginning of 1989 is examined as of the end of 1989 and the exit routes are studied in a multinomial logit model the results indicate that the incentive effects of wages are larger than the disincentive effects of benefits furthermore there is no evidence that having a subjective diagnosis affects the probability of becoming a disability pensioner jel classification h55 i18 j26

disability policy and the labor market evidence from a natural experiment in canada 1998 2006 abstract this paper examines the effect of changes in two key parameters in disability policy a the earnings that disability insurance beneficiaries are allowed to earn without losing their disability benefits and b automatic reinstatement where beneficiaries can have benefits reinstated without re application and re testing for disability determination we examine the effects of these policy changes on the probability of employment for disability beneficiaries as well as the flows onto and off the disability rolls we obtain our estimates using a difference in difference strategy that exploits the unique structure of disability insurance arrangements in canada namely that there are two programs one that covers individuals in the province of quebec and one in the rest of canada our preferred estimates indicate that the introduction of the allowable earnings change increased the propensity of disability beneficiaries to work but we do not find that the earnings exemption had an effect on the flows on to or off the disability rolls in contrast we find that the introduction of the automatic reinstatement policy did not have an effect on any of the outcomes we examine

does disability insurance receipt discourage work using examiner assignment to estimate causal effects of ssdi receipt abstract we present the first causal estimates of the effect of social security disability insurance benefit receipt on labor supply using all program applicants we use administrative data to matc

disability benefits consumption insurance and household labor supply while a mature literature finds that disability insurance di receipt discourages work the welfare implications of these findings depend on two rarely studied economic quantities the full cost of di allowances to taxpayers summing over di transfer payments benefit substitution to or from other transfer programs and induced changes in tax receipts and the value that individuals and families place on receiving benefits in the event of disability we comprehensively assess these missing margins in the context of norway s di system drawing on two strengths of the norwegian environment first norwegian register data allow us to characterize the household impacts and fiscal costs of disability receipt by linking employment taxation benefits receipt and assets at the person and household level second random assignment of di applicants to norwegian judges who differ systematically in their leniency allows us to recover the causal effects of di allowance on individuals at the margin of program entry accounting for the total effect of di allowances on both household labor supply and net payments across all public transfer programs substantially alters our picture of the consumption benefits and fiscal costs of disability receipt while di allowance causes a significant increase in household income and consumption on average it has little impact on income or consumption of married applicants because spousal earnings responses via the added worker effect and benefit substitution entirely offset di benefit payments among those who are allowed relative to those who are denied to develop the welfare implications of these findings we estimate a dynamic model of household behavior that translates employment reapplication and savings decisions into revealed preferences for leisure and consumption we find that household valuation of receipt of di benefits is considerably greater for single and unmarried individuals than for married couples because spousal labor supply substantially buffers household income and consumption in the event of di denial

the impact of economic conditions on participation in disability programs evidence from the coal boom and bust abstract we examine the impact of the coal boom of the 1970 s and the coal bust of the 1980 s on disability program participation these shocks provide clear evidence that as the value of labor market participation increases disability program participation falls for the disability insurance program the elasticity of payments with respect to local earnings is between 0 3 and 0 4 and for supplemental security income the elasticity is between 0 4 and 0 7 consistent with a model where qualifying for disability programs is costly the relationship between economic conditions and program participation is much stronger for permanent than for transitory economic shocks

the employment effects of terminating disability benefits abstract few social security disability insurance di beneficiaries return to the labor force making it hard to assess their likely employment in the absence of benefits using administrative data i examine the employment of individuals who lost di eligibility after the 1996 removal of drug and alcohol addictions as qualifying conditions approximately 22 started working at levels that would have disqualified them for di an employment response that is large relative to their work histories those who received di for 2 3 years had the largest response suggesting that a period of public assistance may maximize the employment of some disabled individuals

labor market effects of u s sick pay mandates this paper exploits temporal and spatial variation in the implementation of nine city and four state level u s sick pay mandates to assess their labor market consequences we use the synthetic control group method and traditional difference in differences models along with the quarterly census of employment and wages to estimate the causal effects of mandated sick pay on employment and wages we do not find much evidence that employment or wages were significantly affected by the mandates that typically allow employees to earn one hour of paid sick leave per work week up to seven days per year employment decreases of 2 percent lie outside the 92 percent confidence interval and wage decreases of 3 percent lie outside the 95 percent confidence interval abstract from author

adjustment cost and incentives to work evidence from a disability insurance program abstract how important is adjustment cost for individuals who face a change in work incentives induced by a policy change i provide the first estimate of adjustment cost in the context of a disability insurance di program by exploiting a policy change that increased work incentives by increasing the exemption threshold i use bunching at the thresholds to estimate adjustment cost and earnings elasticity the estimates of adjustment cost are quite sizeable and heterogeneous the estimates of earnings elasticity from both static and dynamic models are larger than the elasticity estimated with no adjustment cost suggesting that adjustment cost attenuates the responses to work incentives policies designed to increase labor supply will work if the work incentives are large enough to offset the adjustment cost accounting for adjustment cost then might explain the disparate findings on the effects of an increase in work incentives on the labor supply of beneficiaries of di programs