on the link between exchange rate regimes capital controls and monetary policy autonomy in small european countries 1979 2000 we investigate international monetary policy transmission under different exchange rate and capital account regimes in eleven small open economies during the 1980s and 1990s we find no systematic link between ex post monetary policy autonomy and exchange rate regimes capital controls appear to have provided a degree of temporal insulation from foreign monetary policy shocks though not strict autonomy the results are consistent both with short term autonomy for small countries even under fixed exchange rates and an open capital account and with long term dependence under flexible exchange rates and an independent stability target results also indicate that euro area market interest rates are significantly more responsive to the development of the corresponding us rate than were the previous national rates

to float or to fix evidence on the impact of exchange rate regimes on growth we study the relationship between exchange rate regimes and economic growth for a sample of 183 countries over the post bretton woods period using a new de facto classification of regimes based on the actual behavior of the relevant macroeconomic variables in contrast with previous studies we find that for developing countries less flexible exchange rate regimes are associated with slower growth as well as with greater output volatility for industrial countries regimes do not appear to have any significant impact on growth the results are robust to endogeneity corrections and a number of alternative specifications borrowed from the growth literature

the economics of exchange rate regimes a review essay the exchange rate regime issue has taken centre stage in discussions of international economic policy much of the profession appears to have been converted to the hypothesis of the vanishing middle regime for countries well integrated into world capital markets there is little if any middle ground between floating exchange rates and monetary unification this paper considers the exchange rate regime issue in the context of recent books on the subject by w max corden and morris goldstein both authors prescribe managed floating exchange rates supplemented with inflation targeting for emerging market economies under managed floating and with a credible monetary policy the public finances in order and strengthened debt management and prudential regulation the exchange rate is free to act as a market gauge for assessing policies and as a mode of conflict resolution both authors also argue however that no exchange rate regime is a holy grail ultimately a credible exchange rate regime depends upon the trust evoked by governments there is no exchange rate regime whether of the managed floating or hard fix variety that can eradicate a history of failed stabilisation attempts

tax collection with agency costs private contracting or government bureaucrats historically governments contracted with private agents known as tax farmers to collect taxes this paper develops a theoretical framework for determining when a welfare maximizing government should choose tax farmers over bureaucratic tax collectors while bureaucratic collectors have an incentive to shirk and raise collection costs above least costs profit maximizing private collectors tend to reduce tax evasion below the optimal level generally the choice of collection methods depends on a comparison of the welfare loss associated with monitoring in the bureaucratic setting and the welfare loss associated with overdetection of evasion in the private setting copyright 1992 by the london school of economics and political science

royalties vs fees how do firms pay for foreign technology abstract the theoretical determinants of technology licensing contracts have been extensively studied but empirical evidence is scarce we assemble a data set of all the foreign technology licensing agreements entered into by manufacturing firms in india between 1989 and 1993 industry firm and contract characteristics are used to explain differences between the forms of payment in licensing contracts our findings support theoretical arguments licensing contracts are more likely to use royalties when sales are relatively high while increased volatility of sales and greater profitability favor fixed fee contracts we also find that firms are more likely to use output based payments to control the sale and diffusion of r d or brand intensive know how to unaffiliated firms

the erm and monetary integration in the european union an investigation of long run relationships this paper investigates the integration of eu money supplies for the erm period 1979q1 93q4 an estimating equation is derived from a simple equilibrium model of the eu money markets estimation is undertaken using the johansen maximum likelihood cointegration procedure the results show that those eu members with relatively low exchange rate premia against the dm are those whose variations in the money supply have been most sensitive to those of germany

the licensing of patents under asymmetric information abstract this paper seeks to explain the use of royalty payments rather than fixed fees in the licensing of patents by the presence of asymmetric information the licensee is assumed to know the value of the patent and makes a single offer of a contract to the licensor it is shown that there is a unique equillibrium satisfying cho and kreps intuitive criterion qualitative properties of the equilibrium contract are derived by considering a continuum of types

why exchange rate bands monetary independence in spite of fixed exchange rates abstract the paper argues that the reason real world fixed exchange rate regimes usually have finite bands instead of completely fixed exchange rates between realignments is that exchange rate bands counter to the textbook result give central banks some monetary independence even with free international capital mobility the nature and amount of monetary independence is specified informally and in a formal model and quantified with swedish krona data altogether the amount of monetary independence appears sizable for instance an increase in the swedish krona band from zero to about 2 percent may reduce the krona interest rate s standard deviation by about a half

an exploration in the theory of exchange rate regimes three exchange rate regimes a float a one sided peg and a cooperative peg are evaluated and compared in terms of efficiency and welfare levels the framework of analysis embodies country specific monies with the money of each country being used to transact in its commodity markets and its currency denominated bonds welfare levels depend only on consumption levels in the presence of perfect foresight all equilibrium allocations are pareto efficient in a floating exchange rate regime the perfect foresight equilibrium allocation coincides with an equilibrium of a costless barter economy the same result holds in a one sided peg if the pegging country s exchange rate stabilizing authority breaks even over time in a cooperative peg regime there is a different equilibrium allocation for each combination of exchange rate levels and monetary policies problems of policy coordination and conflicts in desired monetary policies are discussed

unit roots and granger causality in the ems interest rates the german dominance hypothesis revisited abstract the aim of this paper is twofold first it shows that a sufficient conditions for unit roots found in ar systems to persist in var systems amount to granger non causality in any direction among the variables involved this implies that a necessary condition for the disappearance of one unit root in a var system implies granger causality in at least one direction b for first order models with non explosive variables granger causality is also sufficient for cointegration and c causality and cointegration inference are strongly affected by the omission of an important causing variable second our new analytical framework allows us to formulate and test several new variations of the so called german dominance hypothesis in a unified cointegrating framework which we define as strong semi strong and weak types 1 and 2 german dominance in addition we allow for the possibility that the dominant player may lie outside the ems so that we introduce and test the us dominance hypothesis

the credibility of a fixed exchange rate how reputation is gained or lost we examine the interest rate differential between each of the four largest nordic countries and the countries of their foreign currency baskets on monthly data for the period 1978 79 92 the interest rate differential is assumed to reflect devaluation expectations which partly depend on government reputation we investigate the formation of the reputation of the government assuming that reputation is updated using bayes s formula it is shown theoretically that when there is no devaluation the improvement in government reputation is larger the larger the prior devaluation expectations for norway the evidence gives support to this assertion

when do auctions ensure the welfare maximizing allocation of scarce inputs we determine when an unfettered auction will ensure the welfare maximizing allocation of a scarce input that enhances product quality and may reduce production costs a supplier values the input for this use value and for its foreclosure value because once the input is acquired it is unavailable to rivals an unfettered auction often ensures the welfare maximizing allocation of an input increment however it can fail to do so when the input would increase relatively rapidly the competitive position of a rival with a moderate competitive disadvantage bidder handicapping that ensures auctions generate welfare maximizing input allocations differ from standard handicapping policies

tv wars exclusive content and platform competition in pay tv the article examines incentives for exclusive distribution of premium television programming static analysis shows that a vertically integrated operator with premium programming always supplies this content to the rival distributor using per subscriber fees to soften competition in a dynamic setting with switching costs exclusivity confers a market share advantage benefiting the operator in the future under certain conditions this future benefit outweighs the opportunity cost of forgone wholesale fees making exclusivity the preferred choice alternative dynamic mechanisms are explored identifying essential features the analysis explains the observed incidence of content exclusivity in pay tv and provides guidance for policy makers

interest rate linkages within the european monetary system further analysis j costas karfakis and demetrios m moschos 1990 examine the interest rate linkages within the european monetary system ems concluding that the german interest rate plays a dominate role within the ems the authors reexamine the interest rate linkages within the ems with the addition of the interest rate of the united states their results suggest that both the united states and german interest rates play an important but not dominant role in ems interest rate linkages copyright 1993 by ohio state university press

choosing the competition and patent licensing this article examines licensing as a means of choosing the competitors which a patentee monopolist will face in the period after the patent expires the queue of entrants consists of two firms which differ in their relative strengths as competitors for example by size or level of marginal cost by structuring the industry to be composed of weak competitors the incumbent is able to prolong its dominant position in the industry after the patent expires examples are presented in which the evidence suggests that choosing the competition was an important motivation of the licensor s behavior

european integration and asymmetry in the ems abstract the empirical literature offers conflicting views of german dominance in the european monetary system we examine the validity of the german dominance hypothesis gdh by analyzing the responses of european central banks and money markets to monetary innovations originating both in europe european asymmetry and abroad international asymmetry our results reconcile the conflicting views in the literature the gdh is confirmed when the analysis is conducted with intervention rates before german unification results support european asymmetry with short rates before 1990 but not international asymmetry after 1990 the gdh is not supported by either set of rates

rewriting monetary policy 101 what s the fed s preferred post crisis approach to raising interest rates abstract for many years prior to the global financial crisis the federal open market committee set a target for the federal funds rate and achieved that target through small purchases and sales of securities in the open market in the aftermath of the financial crisis with a superabundant level of reserve balances in the banking system having been created as a result of the federal reserve s large scale asset purchase programs this approach to implementing monetary policy will no longer work this paper provides a primer on the fed s implementation of monetary policy we use the standard textbook model to illustrate why the approach used by the federal reserve before the financial crisis to keep the federal funds rate near the federal open market committee s target will not work in current circumstances and explain the approach that the committee intends to use instead when it decides to begin raising short term interest rates

international technology transfer under potential threat of entry a cournot nash framework abstract this paper analyses the possibility of technology transfer from a technologically advanced foreign firm to a domestic firm of a less developed country when the product market is characterized by cournot nash competition the foreign firm is not allowed to enter the home market by a prohibitive tariff but the backward firm may not face any such resistance in the foreign markets this means that technology transfer under this situation involves potential threat of competition from the latecomer it is shown that by designing a suitable payment policy the host country government can induce the foreign firm to transfer the best technology however there are possible equilibria where worse than the best technologies are transferred

private contracting with externalities divide and conquer abstract this paper considers the efficacy of divide and conquer strategies in principal agent games involving contracting with externalities we find that whereas divide and conquer offers can arise in equilibrium under some conditions when the principal s offers are publicly observable they cannot arise in equilibrium when the principal s offers are privately observable and the agents hold passive out of equilibrium beliefs this insight applies to technology and platform adoption decisions with network effects labor relations settlement negotiations and input licensing among others

asymmetry in the ems new evidence based on non linear forecasts abstract in this paper we provide new evidence on the hypothesis of german leadership and asymmetric performance in the ems in the framework of causality tests using daily data given the evidence about non linearity in financial series we propose applying non linear forecasting methods based on the literature on complex dynamic systems our analysis covers nine countries and the sample period runs until 30 april 1998 so including the more recent events in the ems history a comparison of our results with those obtained from standard linear econometric techniques leads us to conclude that inference on causality based on our non linear predictors would be preferable to that based on the standard linear approach

an analysis of cooperative research and development i analyze the effects of cooperative research whereby member firms agree to share the costs andfruits of a research project before they undertake it in this model industrywide agreements tend to have socially beneficial effects when the degree ofproduct market competition is low when there are r d spillovers in the absence of cooperation when a high degree of sharing is technologically feasible and when the agreement concerns basic research rather than development activities i show that a royalty free cross licensing agreement among any number offirms lowers the equilibrium level of innovation even though it increases the efficiency of r d through sharing

licensing in the theory of innovation this article analyzes licensing in a noncooperative r d game we ask two questions what are the incentives for licensing a production technology and what is the impact of licensing on the pattern of innovation and the consequent evolution of industry costs and market structure the gainsfrom trading information through licensing contracts are achieved through the replacement of inefficient production techniques the ex post incentive and the elimination of inefficient research expenditures the ex ante incentive in a duopoly the availability of licensing encourages research when the firms initial production technologies are close in costs and discourages research when initial costs are asymmetric

autoregressive modelling and money income causality detection abstract a step wise procedure based on granger s concept of causality and abaike s final prediction error criterion is suggested as a practical means to identify the order of lags of each variable in a multivariate autoregressive process the model seems useful because it can serve as a reduced form formulation to avoid imposing often spurious or false restrictions of the model it also provides a reasonably powerful test of causality the idea is applied to u s postwar money and income data it is found that between m1 and gnp a bivariate feedback model fits the data best between m2 and gnp a one way causal model from money to income performs better diagnostic checks applied to our model seem to indicate the adequacy of our approach

deterrence by market sharing a strategic incentive for licensing the potential of an incumbent firm to retain its dominant position in a market is a focal point of the modem theory of industrial organization a recent literature examines this issue for markets in which challengers threaten an incumbent s position by engaging in research for a new technology richard gilbert and david newbery 1982 show that an incumbent firm with a firstmover advantage will preempt potential entrants by inventing a new technology slightly earlier than would its rivals in a stochastic r d therefore its introduction does not alter the decision to research when the pre innovation market is characterized by an incumbent and potential entrants stephen salant 1984 shows that licensing ex post to innovation can alter the research decision as anticipation of the returns from future licensing encourages research by the entrant as a counterpoint to the salant result i find that licensing ex ante to research may discourage further research by the entrant indeed this strategic incentive for licensing may be so strong as to persuade the incumbent as well as the entrant to terminate research activity to isolate this incentive for licensing from the one discussed by salant a simple model is constructed in which licensing of future technologies is not desirable anecdotal evidence suggests that the strategic incentive does lead innovators in some markets to license their technologies examples of this information sharing are prevalent in markets where technological change is rapid in the 1940 s standard oil of new jersey discovered a process for synthetic rubber it traded patent rights on this process for a synthetic oil production process discovered by farben a german rubber company in both the synthetic oil and synthetic rubber markets rival companies were department of economics scarsborough college university of toronto toronto ontario canada m5s lal i thank jon cohen and ron saunders for discussions that inspired this paper i am also grateful to yehuda kotowitz andy mclennan jennifer reinganum ralph winter myma wooders two anonymous referees and seminar participants at the university of toronto for helpful comments on earlier drafts

the dynamics of the transfer and renewal of patents this article explores new data on the transfer and renewal of u s patents and interprets this new evidence using a model of patent transfers and renewal we find that the proportion of transferred patents is large and differs across technology fields and especially type of patentees we also find that the probability of a patent being traded depends on a number of factors the age of the patent the number of citations received by a given age the patent generality and whether the patent has been previously traded or not these findings are consistent with the predictions of a model of patent transfers and renewals

on the competitive effects of vertical integration by a research laboratory abstract an independent research laboratory owns a patented process innovation ready to be used by an industry that produces differentiated goods we analyze whether the laboratory prefers to license the innovation as an external patentee or to merge with one of the firms in the industry licensing the innovation as an internal patentee under linear demand and cournot competition we show first that the vertical merger is profitable only in the case of small innovations whereas a merger increases welfare only for significant innovations second all profitable vertical mergers reduce welfare however some profitable mergers are welfare improving under price competition

contracts and externalities how things fall apart a single principal interacts with several agents offering them contracts the crucial assumption of this paper is that the outside option payoffs of the agents depend positively on how many uncontracted or free agents there are we study how such a principal unwelcome though he may be approaches the problem of contract provision to agents when coordination failure among the latter group is explicitly ruled out two variants are considered when the principal cannot re approach agents there is a unique equilibrium in which contract provision is split up into two phases in phase 1 simultaneousoffers at good though varying terms are made to a number of agents in phase 2 offers must be made sequentially and their values are discontinuously lower they are close to the very lowest of all the outside options when the principal can repeatedly approach the same agent there is a multiplicity of equilibria in some of these the agents have the power to force delay they can hold off the principal s overtures temporarily but they must succumb in finite time in both models despite beingable to coordinate their actions agents cannot resist an invasion by the principal and hold to their best payoff it is in this sense that things eventually fall apart

horizontal mergers with synergies cash vs profit share auctions we consider takeover bidding in a cournot oligopoly when firms have private information concerning the synergy effect of merging with a takeover target and bidders can influence rivals beliefs through their bids we compare cash and profit share auctions first and second price supplemented by entry fees since non merged firms benefit from a merger if synergies are low bidders are subject to a positive externality with positive probability nevertheless pooling does not occur unlike cash auctions profit share auctions are not revenue equivalent and the second price profit share auction is more profitable than the other auctions

cross licensing of competing patents as a facilitating device this paper hypothesizes that when their products are imperfect substitutes firms can promote collusion by cross licensing their competing patents cross licensing is shown to enhance the degree of collusion achieved in a repeated game by credibly introducing the threat of increased rivalry in the market for each firm s product the paper then examines the consistency of the theory developed with the available evidence antitrust implications of the practice of cross licensing of competing patents are discussed

coordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities abstract building on genicot and ray g genicot d ray contracts and externalities how things fall apart j econ theory 131 2006 71 100 we develop a model of non cooperative bargaining that combines the two main approaches in the literature of contracting with externalities the offer game in which the principal makes simultaneous offers to the agents and the bidding game in which the agents make simultaneous offers to the principal allowing for agent coordination we show that the outcome of our bargaining procedure may differ remarkably from those of the offer and the bidding games in particular we find that bargaining can break agents coordination and that the principal s payoff can be decreasing in his own bargaining power

special exchange rates for capital account transactions the governments of developing countries are constrained in the effective implementation of domestic policy by the interlinkages of national and international financial markets domestic macroeconomic conditions are influenced by the interaction of national and world interest rates and prices and through the impact of real exchange rates on employment the domestic responses to changes in these factors are often strong and rapid this article suggests that dual rates can indeed be used successfully as a strictly transitory policy to offset sudden shocks in capital markets the article develops models which indicate why these dual systems are able to prevent inflationary or recessionary pressures caused by a misaligned exchange rate in the short term while free capital account rates can cut the flow of capital flight however a dual rate system cannot prevent a possibly equivalent loss of foreign reserves that will ultimately result because of the impact of the overvaluation of the commercial rate on the trade balance in the longer term a dual rate system with a misaligned commercial rate exacerbates the government s deficit ultimately real wages must be cut and real interest rates raised to generate sufficient foreign exchange to finance the external debt thus a dual rate works well if the commercial rate is maintained close to the equilibrium level

milestone payments or royalties contract design for r d licensing we study how innovators can optimally design licensing contracts when there is incomplete information on the licensee s valuation of the innovation and limited control over the licensee s development efforts a licensing contract typically contains an up front payment milestone payments at successful completion of a project phase and royalties on sales we use principal agent models to formulate the licensor s contracting problem and we find that under adverse selection the optimal contract structure changes with the licensee s valuation of the innovation as the licensee s valuation increases the licensor s optimal level of involvement in the development directly or through royalties should decrease only a risk averse licensor should include both up front and milestone payments moral hazard alone is not detrimental to the licensor s value but may create an additional value loss when combined with adverse selection our results inform managerial practice about the advantages and disadvantages of the different terms included in licensing contracts and recommend the optimal composition of the contract

trust and the market for technology abstract conditional on the decision to enter the market for immature technology we test for the effects that trust proxied by the context in which the negotiating parties first met has on the likelihood that these negotiations are successful using survey responses from 860 university firm and firm firm technology transactions we find that trust matters parties with high levels of trust i e know each other from a previous business are between 6 and 23 per cent more likely to conclude a transaction compared with those with low levels of trust i e cold callers we also find that patents can effectively substitute for a lack of trust and that trust is more important in upstream stages basic or applied science

stochastic devaluation risk and the empirical fit of target zone models in the model of this paper an exchange rate fluctuates between given boundaries for random lengths of time and jumps discretely when devaluation occur we provide explicit solutions for the stochastic processes followed by the exchange rate and by the expected rate of depreciation when the likelihood and the size of devaluations vary stochastically over time the model produces realistic patterns of covariation between exchange rates and interest rate differentials and provides interesting interpretations of available empirical evidence we also specify how to infer devaluation risk from target zone data

fee versus royalty reconsidered for an outsider innovator in a cournot oligopoly royalty licensing could be superior to both fixed fee and auction the result depends on a simple fact that has been overlooked in the existing literature namely the number of licenses can take only integer values

how strong are weak patents economists usually conceive of patents as property rights that prevent others from practicing the patenting technology unless they first obtain a license from the patent holder even for ironclad patents i e for patents that are certain to be valid the existing literature has shown that the analysis of equilibrium licensing contracts is surprising subtle and complex 1 for example the analysis is quite different depending upon whether one firm s licensing contract is observable to the other firms likewise equilibrium outcomes are quite different if royalties must be linear than in the case where two part tariffs and other non linear royalties are permitted in that literature a downstream firm that refuses to sign a contract with the upstream supplier either exits the industry in the case that the upstream supplier controls an essential input or must rely on more costly inputs in the case of a non essential input in other words the downstream firm s threat point is to use some backstop technology in practice however patents are issued after a brief examination by the patent office to see if they meet the statutory requirements for novelty and non obviousness mounting evidence indicates that many weak patents i e patents unlikely to be found valid if challenged in court are issued by the u s patent and trademark office uspto 2 some observers view this with great alarm arguing that uspto is handing out undeserved monopolies others by contrast have suggested that these weak patents are of little concern because they will have little commercial impact because they will be licensed at commensurately low royalty rates or not enforced at all we study the commercial impact of weak patents more precisely we define a patent s strength as the probability that it will be found valid if challenged in court and we examine the relationship between a patent s strength and the royalties that it can command the distinctive

cost reducing r d in oligopoly abstract this paper provides a conjectural variations model to explore competition in cost reducing r d and the nature of the inter firm externalities it is shown that 1 r d investment in a market with price competition becomes optimal if firms expect that changes in their own r d investment are followed by the rival firms 2 the optimal r d subsidies are positive in collusive oligopolies but negative in competitive oligopolies 3 joint r d ventures in oligopoly could reduce total surplus by causing underinvestment and 4 promoting price competition reduces welfare if firms are not collusive in their r d decisions

optimal licensing of technology in the face of asymmetric competition abstract we reconsider the optimal technology licensing by an incumbent firm facing multiple competitors first we cover the case of one license and show that competition has a drastic effect on optimal two part tariffs we also consider license auctions and design a more profitable dynamic mechanism next we allow the licensor to award multiple licenses and design a dynamic mechanism that extracts the maximum industry profit it awards licenses to all firms prescribes maximum permitted royalty rates and positive fixed fees and is more profitable than other dynamic mechanisms finally we show that a slight modification of that mechanism is also optimal for outside patent holders

fees versus royalties and the private value of a patent we compare how much profit an owner of a patented cost reducing invention can realize by licensing it to an oligopolistic industry producing a homogeneous product by means of a fixed fee or a per unit royalty our analysis is conducted in terms of a noncooperative game involving n 1 players the inventor and the n firms in this game the inventor acts as a stackelberg leader and it has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies it is shown that licensing by means of a fixed fee is superior to licensing by means of a royalty for both the inventor and consumers only a drastic innovation is licensed to a single producer

how to license intangible property we examine the optimal licensing strategy of a research lab selling to firms who are product market competitors we consider an independent lab as well as a research joint venture we show that 1 demands are interdependent and hence the standard price mechanism is not the profit maximizing licensing strategy 2 the seller s incentives to develop the innovation may be excessive 3 the seller s incentives to disseminate the innovation typically are too low 4 larger ventures are less likely to develop the innovation and more likely to restrict its dissemination in those cases where development occurs and 5 a downstream firm that is not a member of the research venture is worse off as a result of the innovation

dynamic patent licensing abstract this paper shows one way a fixed fee can dominate an auction if no one knows whether the innovation will succeed or not when it appears and if its life exceeds the life of the patent then selling one licence by fixed fee maximizes inventor profit for some probabilities of success the reason is a nonlicensee is better off when a rival buys a license because this reveals the nature of the innovation if it succeeds the nonlicensee can adopt in the future after the patent has expired this expected future gain can outweigh the expected loss during the life of the patent

on intrabrand and interbrand competition the strategic role of fees and royalties abstract we examine oligopolistic markets with both intrabrand and interbrand competition we characterize equilibrium contracts involving a royalty or wholesale price and a fee when each upstream firm contracts with multiple downstream firms royalties control competition between own downstream firms at the expense of making them passive against rivals when the number of downstream firms is endogenous each upstream firm chooses to have only one downstream firm this result is in sharp contrast to previous literature where competitors benefit by having a larger number of independent downstream firms under only fixed fee payments we discuss why allowing upstream firms to charge per unit payments in addition to fixed fees dramatically alters their strategic incentives

interest rates in the nordic countries evidence based on devaluation expectations over the period 1979 92 investments in danish and norwegian kroner in the euromarket have had an annual excess return of about 2 and 1 1 per cent compared to investments in the euromarket in foreign currencies assuming risk neutrality the subjective probability of a devaluation within the next month is derived from the excess returns on the euromarket these derived probabilities are found to be inconsistent with the actual number of devaluations that have taken place over this period so that the probability of devaluation has been significantly overrated for denmark and norway

general licensing schemes for a cost reducing innovation optimal combinations of upfront fees and royalties are considered for a cost reducing innovation in a cournot oligopoly for both outside and incumbent innovators it is shown that for any nondrastic innovation a the license is practically sold to all firms ensuring full diffusion of the innovation b consumers are better off firms are worse off and the social welfare is improved c the optimal licensing policy involves positive royalty for relatively significant innovations d compared to an incumbent firm an outsider invests more in r d and has higher incentive to innovate and e as a function of the magnitude of the innovation the industry size that provides the highest incentive to innovate is u shaped

incomplete adoption of a superior innovation we consider a model in which an innovating monopolist of a technologically superior intermediate input must sell this product to final output producers prior research shows that with complete information the monopolist s optimal strategy will lead to complete adoption of this technologically superior innovation in this article we show that when the price of some competitively supplied input used in the final product market is endogenous and is altered by adoption of the innovation then the optimal pricing strategy of the monopolist may lead to incomplete innovation thus the standard result of complete adoption of the superior technology is partly attributable to the partial equilibrium nature of prior models

dominant interest and inflation differentials within the ems abstract this paper investigates nominal interest and inflation behavior in the ems between march 1979 and september 1989 using a modified version of principal components analysis neither over the whole period nor after march 1983 has the ems functioned as a dmark zone deviating movements in inflation and interest rates between ems countries still persist most important is the division between germany the netherlands and the united kingdom on the one hand and belgium france and italy on the other differences in deflationary policies between countries inside and outside the ems appear to be the most important determinant of this result

on the duration of technology licensing abstract we model an innovator s choice of payment scheme and duration as a joint decision in a multi period licensing game with potential future innovations and some irreversibility of technology transfer we find that it may be optimal to license the innovation for less than the full length of the patent and that royalty contracts can be more profitable than fixed fee licensing even in the absence of information asymmetry and risk aversion moreover licensing contracts based on royalty have a longer duration than fixed fee licenses and are more likely to be used in industries where innovations are frequent and intellectual property protection is weak our paper also highlights an important link between the study of technology licensing and the theory of durable goods

the federal reserve s tools for policy normalization in a preferred habitat model of financial markets we develop a model to analyze monetary policy implementation with multiple federal reserve liabilities and superabundant reserves the analysis demonstrates the federal reserve s tools including interest on excess reserves ioer overnight reverse repurchase agreements on rrp and term deposits should allow the federal reserve to raise the short term interest rates to any desired level we find the contribution of each the increase in the ioer and on rrp offering rates in firming money market rates suggested by the data during the december 2015 policy tightening event is remarkably similar to the effect of each tool implied by the calibrated model

obtaining strategic advantage from being imitated when can encouraging clones pay an important business strategy research theme concerns finding ways to minimize competition faced by the firm this paper however focuses on a different set of situations the model developed suggests that an innovator s best strategy may be to encourage clones of its product when a network externality is present key factors to consider in assessing whether encouraging cloning is the innovator s best strategy are 1 the benefit to be derived in terms of added user base contributed by the clone sales traded off against 2 the unit sales that will be lost to the clones these factors in turn depend upon the strength of the network effect and the degree to which the innovator s product quality is perceived by consumers to be superior to the clone s the model further suggests that both the innovator and clone earn their highest payoffs when the clone takes the lead in price setting i e when the clone establishes its own price by considering for each price it might set how the innovator will react to that price and the innovator as price follower responds to the price the clone chooses the paper demonstrates that the clone leader innovator follower situation represents the unique nash equilibrium in price setting strategies a central implication is that when operating in a network externality environment instead of a problem to be avoided clones may be valuable assets to an innovating firm building up the user base for the innovator s technology by bringing lower valuing consumers into the market which in turn makes the innovator s product more attractive to high and medium valuing purchasers thus when the above described conditions hold being cloned can be more profitable for an innovating firm than dominating the market alone

the impact of royalty contract revision in a multistage strategic r d alliance this paper investigates the impact of royalty revision on incentives and profits in a two stage research and development r d stage and marketing stage alliance with a marketer and an innovator the marketer offers royalty contracts to the innovator we find that the potential for royalty revision leads to more severe distortions in the optimal initial royalty contracts offered by the marketer we show that if the innovator plays a significant role in the marketing stage the marketer should offer a low royalty rate initially and then revise the royalty rate up later otherwise she should do the opposite we identify two major effects of royalty revision first royalty revision provides the marketer with a flexibility to dynamically adjust royalty rates across the two stages of the alliance to better align the innovator s incentives this incentive realigning effect improves the marketer s profit second royalty revision makes it harder for the marketer to obtain private information from the innovator because the innovator worries that the marketer will take advantage of the information to revise the initial contract to a more favorable one to herself later this information revealing effect hurts the marketer s profit we characterize in what kind of alliances marketers would benefit the most from royalty revision so that managers should clearly establish the expectation for royalty revision and in what kind of alliances markerters would not benefit from royalty revision so that managers should commit not to revise the initial royalty contract with royalty contracts that are contingent on the r d outcome of the r d stage we find that contingent contract structure could be either substitutable by fully capturing the incentive re aligning effect or complementary by weakening the information revealing effect to royalty revision depending on whether the innovator plays a significant role in the marketing stage managers may need to use a contingent contract if possible either to replace or with royalty revision accordingly to improve profits this paper was accepted by kamalini ramdas entrepreneurship and innovation

how do banks adjust to changing input prices a dynamic analysis of u s commercial banks before and after the crisis abstract the 2000 2013 period was characterized by substantial regulatory monetary and technological change especially after the onset of the global financial crisis this study assesses the total impact of these policy shifts and technological changes on u s commercial banks short run and long run substitution elasticities an endogenous break test divides the sample into a pre crisis period and a post crisis period during the former period banks inputs tend to be inelastic substitutes after the onset of the crisis particularly the long run substitutability of most input factors decreases to even lower levels due to changes in both cost technology and economic conditions at the same time banks response to input price changes becomes more sluggish hence especially after the onset of the crisis banks have little flexibility regarding input factor usage and are thus sensitive to input price changes from a cost perspective

optimal patenting and licensing of financial innovations recent court decisions starting with the state street decision in 1998 allow business methods to be patentable and now give financial institutions the option to seek patent protection for financial innovations this new patentability paradigm and the heterogeneity of characteristics associated with financial innovations pose an immediate decision problem for senior management what to patent we present a parsimonious decision framework that answers this question we show that for innovations with certain characteristics it is optimal not to patent even if the option of patenting and licensing is available our model emphasizes the role of embedded real options that arise from certain types of financial innovations the model provides an explanation of observed patenting behavior of financial institutions and the success of a wide class of innovations including swaps credit derivatives and pricing algorithms

the effect of government ideology on an exchange rate regime some international evidence this paper comprehensively investigates the effect of government ideology on the type of exchange rate regime that a country implements via multinomial logit and multinomial probit models for 147 countries in the period 1974 2009 our results clearly indicate that a left wing government increases the likelihood that a country implements a flexible regime in the classifications of exchange rate regimes nevertheless evidence is weaker when using the de jure imf course classification which is set up by ilzetzki et al 2008 in a deeper investigation we find that left wing governments are more likely to choose a flexible regime relative to a fixed one in our sample of oecd non oecd and non eurozone countries as the impacts from government ideology on the determinant of the choice of exchange rate regime in eurozone countries disappear more importantly we present many explanations for exchange rate regime choices when macroeconomic conditions political constraints and institutions impact the choice of exchange rate regime