taxation and the allocation of risk inside the multinational firm abstract this paper provides the first theoretical and empirical analysis of how taxation shapes the joint allocation of risk and profits inside the multinational firm theoretically we identify three mechanisms through which corporate taxes may shape the within firm allocation of risk 1 transfer pricing rules requiring risk to be compensated with higher expected returns create incentives to shift risk to low tax jurisdictions as a means to shift profits 2 risk averse owners create incentives to allocate risk to high tax affiliates to maximize risk sharing with governments 3 limited loss offset creates incentives to shift risk to affiliates in other countries empirically we show that multinational firms disproportionately allocate risk to low tax countries and that the key mechanism is the nexus between risk and profits established by transfer pricing rules within firm differences in risk explain a significant fraction of the well established correlation between profits and tax rates suggesting that risk shifting is a quantitatively non negligible channel for profit shifting

do r d tax credits work evidence from a panel of countries 1979 1997 this paper examines the impact of fiscal incentives on the level of r d investment an econometric model of r d investment is estimated using a new panel of data on tax changes and r d spending in nine oecd countries over a 19 year period 1979 1997 we find evidence that tax incentives are effective in increasing r d intensity this is true even after allowing for permanent country specific characteristics world macro shocks and other policy influences we estimate that a 10 fall in the cost of r d stimulates just over a 1 rise in the level of r d in the short run and just under a 10 rise in r d in the long run

measuring contagion between energy market and stock market during financial crisis a copula approach abstract in this paper we apply time varying copulas to investigate whether a contagion effect existed between energy and stock markets during the recent financial crisis using the wti oil spot price the s p500 index the shanghai stock market composite index and the shenzhen stock market component index returns evidence was found for a significantly increasing dependence between crude oil and stock markets after the failure of lehman brothers thus supporting the existence of contagion in the sense of forbes and rigobon s 2002 definition moreover increased tail dependence and symmetry characterize all the paired markets this indicates that significant increases in tail dependence are an actual dimension of the contagion phenomenon and that crude oil and stock prices are linked to the same degree regardless of whether markets are booming or crashing during the sample period finally the contagion effect is found to be much weaker for china than the us the empirical results have potentially important implications for risk management

multinationals profit response to tax differentials effect size and shifting channels this paper provides a quantitative review of the empirical literature on profit shifting behavior of multinational firms we synthesize the evidence from 25 studies and find a substantial response of profit measures to international tax rate differentials accounting for misspecification biases by means of meta regressions we predict a tax semi elasticity of subsidiary pre tax profits of about 0 8 moreover we disentangle the tax response by means of financial planning from the transfer pricing and licensing channel our results suggest that transfer pricing and licensing are the dominant profit shifting channel

corporate taxes and the location of intangible assets within multinational firms intangible assets like patents and trademarks are increasingly seen as the key to competitive success and as the drivers of corporate profit moreover they constitute a major source of profit shifting opportunities in multinational enterprises mnes due to a highly intransparent transfer pricing process this paper argues that for both reasons mnes have an incentive to locate intangible property at affiliates with a relatively low corporate tax rate using panel data on european mnes and controlling for unobserved time constant heterogeneity between affiliates we find that the lower a subsidiary s corporate tax rate relative to other affiliates of the multinational group the higher is its level of intangible asset investment this effect is statistically and economically significant even after controlling for subsidiary size and accounting for a dynamic intangible investment pattern

international corporate tax avoidance a review of the channels magnitudes and blind spots this paper reviews the rapidly growing empirical literature on international tax avoidance by multinational corporations it surveys evidence on main channels of corporate tax avoidance including transfer mispricing international debt shifting treaty shopping tax deferral and corporate inversions moreover it performs a meta analysis of the extensive literature that estimates the overall size of profit shifting we find that the literature suggests that for the most recent year a 1 percentage point lower corporate tax rate compared to other countries will expand before tax income by 1 5 percent an effect that is larger than reported as the consensus estimate in previous surveys and tends to be increasing over time the literature on tax avoidance still has several unresolved puzzles and blind spots that require further research

contracts intellectual property rights and multinational investment in developing countries abstract the policy debate between multinational firms favoring strong contract law and host country governments who often oppose such protection motivates the paper local agents managers learn the multinational s technology and can defect to start a rival firm contract enforcement including binding the multinational itself makes the multinational better off outcomes for the host country are more complex depending on mode switches induced by enforcement if enforcement induces the multinational to switch from exporting to local production welfare improves if local production was occurring anyway enforcement may result in the loss of rents to local agents and lower welfare

information the cost of credit and operational eﬃciency an empirical study of microfinance we provide direct evidence on the impact of asymmetric information on both financing and operating activities through a study of credit evaluations of microfinance institutions mfis we employ a regression discontinuity model that exploits the eligibility criteria of an evaluation subsidy ofered by a nonprofit consortium evaluations dramatically cut the cost of financing this efect is strongest for commercial lenders and for short term mfi lender relationships the impact of evaluations on the supply of finance is mixed evaluated mfis lend more efciently extending more loans per employee the author 2010 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oxfordjournals org oxford university press

credit rating inflation and firms investments we analyze credit rating effects on firm investments in a rational bond financing game that features a feedback loop the credit rating agency cra inflates the rating providing a biased but informative signal to creditors creditors response to the rating affects the firm s investment decision and thus its credit quality which is reflected in the rating the cra might reduce ex ante economic efficiency which results solely from its strategic effect the cra assigns more firms high ratings and allows them to gamble for resurrection we derive empirical predictions on the determinants of rating standards and inflation and discuss policy implications

does the market understand rating shopping predicting mbs losses with initial yields we study rating shopping on the mbs market outside of aaa losses are higher on single rated tranches than on multi rated ones and yields predict future losses for single rated tranches but not for multi rated ones conversely ratings have less explanatory power for single rated tranches these results suggest that single rated tranches have been shopped whereby pessimistic ratings never reach the market for aaa rated mbs by contrast 93 receive two or three such ratings and those ratings agree 97 of the time this ratings convergence suggests that agencies cater to investors who cannot purchase a tranche unless it has multiple aaa ratings

the ethics of credit rating agencies what happened and the way forward during the short span of a few months in 2008 14 trillion dollars of highly rated bonds fell into junk status surprising the global financial system and accelerating an economic decline the result was the worst fracture of the us financial system since the great depression credit rating agencies cras in particular have come under intense scrutiny as a result of this latest disaster both domestically and internationally including many congressional inquiries and government investigations most of the public and scholarly discussions about cras focus on reforming the financial system so that the crisis of the magnitude of the 2008 disaster will not happen again an important overtone of industry criticisms includes a sense of ethical impropriety on the part of cras and ethical uncertainty about the institutional mechanisms that are currently in place rarely however are the ethics of the industry the explicit subject of analysis in this article we discuss the lessons from the policy debates and recent legislation to develop an account of the ethics of the cra industry

the boundaries of multinational enterprises and the theory of international trade this paper begins with a review of empirical evidence on multinational firms conceptual underpinnings of a theory are developed relying in particular on the notion of knowledge capital as a mobile joint input into geographically separated production facilities this idea is embedded in a simple two country general equilibrium model that supports multinational production in equilibrium under conditions consistent with the empirical evidence the final section examines internalization and shows why certain properties of knowledge capital also imply a preference for transferring technologies internally within the firm rather than through arm s length markets

the effect of uncertainty on investment evidence from texas oil drilling this paper estimates the response of investment to changes in uncertainty using data on oil drilling in texas and the expected volatility of the future price of oil using a dynamic model of firms investment problem i find that i the response of drilling activity to changes in price volatility has a magnitude consistent with the optimal response prescribed by theory ii the cost of failing to respond to volatility shocks is economically significant and iii implied volatility data derived from futures options prices yields a better fit to firms investment behavior than backward looking volatility measures such as garch jel c58 d92 g13 g31 l71 q31 the real options literature beginning with marschak 1949 and arrow 1968 and developed in bernanke 1983 pindyck 1991 and dixit and pindyck 1994 explains how firms should make decisions about investments that involve sunk costs real options theory views such investments as options in that at any point in time a firm may choose to either invest immediately or delay and observe the evolution of the investment s payoff a key insight is that the option to delay has value when future states of the world with positive returns to investing and states with negative returns are both possible even holding the expected future return constant at its present level thus in the presence of irreversibility and uncertainty a naive investment timing rule proceed with an investment if its expected benefit even slightly exceeds its cost is suboptimal because it does not account for the value of continuing to hold the option instead firms should delay irreversible investments until a significant gap develops between the investments expected benefits and costs moreover as uncertainty increases real options theory tells us that the incentive to delay should grow stronger and the gap between the expected benefit and cost necessary to trigger investment should widen while real options theory therefore prescribes how firms should carry out irreversible investments in uncertain environments it is not empirically well known

ratings quality over the business cycle credit rating agencies cras have long held that reputational concerns discipline their behavior the value of reputation however depends on economic fundamentals that vary over the business cycle in a model of ratings incorporating endogenous reputation and a market environment that varies we find that ratings quality is countercyclical specifically a cra is more likely to issue less accurate ratings when fee income is high competition in the labor market for analysts is tough and securities default probabilities are low persistence in economic conditions can diminish our results while mean reversion exacerbates them the presence of naive investors reduces overall quality but quality remains countercyclical finally we demonstrate that competition among cras yields similar results

exogenous shocks and the spillover effects between uncertainty and oil price this paper evaluates the information spillover between equity related uncertainty and the oil price before and after the 2008 global financial crisis and the effects of exogenous shocks on the pattern of information spillover in particular we investigate mean and volatility spillovers between uncertainty and the oil price with and without exogenous shocks by using a bivariate egarch model there are two main findings in our paper first the evidence ensures significant information transmission between equity related uncertainty and the oil price and shows remarkable differences in transmission patterns before and after the crisis second the results show that exogenous shocks can intensify information transmission between oil prices and uncertainty in terms of both the mean and volatility spillover effects moreover exogenous shocks exhibit direct spillover effects on oil prices

certification and market transparency we provide elementary insights into the effectiveness of certification to increase market transparency in a market with opaque product quality sellers use certification as a signaling device while buyers use it as an inspection device this difference alone implies that seller certification yields more transparency and higher social welfare under buyer certification profit maximizing certifiers further limit transparency but because seller certification yields larger profits active regulation concerning the mode of certification is not needed these findings are robust and widely applicable to for instance patents automotive parts and financial products

patent protection imitation and the mode of technology transfer abstract this paper analyzes a model in which a firm endowed with a new technology can choose between exports licensing and direct investment as entry modes in a foreign market i endogenize the vintage of the transferred technology and allow for imitation by the licensee subsidiary production and exports circumvent imitation but involve higher costs for the innovating firm the firm can strategically use the vintage of the technology to deter imitation by the licensee as a result transfers to affiliates might be of later vintage than technologies sold to outsiders through modification of the imitation costs the host country s system of patent protection influences the mode of technology transfers which in turn affects the welfare of the recipient economy

competition and strategic incentives in the market for credit ratings empirics of the financial crisis of 2007 we study the market for ratings agencies in the commercial mortgage backed securities sector leading up to and including the financial crisis of 2007 2008 using a structural model adapted from the auctions literature we characterize the incentives of ratings agencies to distort ratings in favor of issuers we find an important equilibrium distortion which decreased after the crisis we study several counterfactual experiments motivated by recent policymaking in this industry

did credit rating agencies make unbiased assumptions on cdos article appears in papers and proceedings of the 123rd annual meeting of the amerian economic association denver co usa 6 9 january 2011

ratings competition in the cmbs market we consider the relationship between competition among credit rating agencies and the ratings of commercial mortgage backed securities cmbs using data from 2002 to 2007 we characterize competition using fitch s aggregate share of cmbs ratings and a measure of fitch s deal specific market share constructed as the probability of fitch being hired for a specific transaction controlling for deal characteristics we find that subordination levels were lower when fitch s aggregate and deal specific market shares were higher which suggests that ratings competition yielded less stringent ratings when fitch was a more significant competitor although this effect dissipates when fitch s market shares were high

fear of rejection tiered certification and transparency product quality certifiers may not reveal the identity of unsuccessful applicants sellers for three reasons first they respond to the desire of individual sellers to avoid the stigma from rejection second nontransparency helps a certifier to increase his market power by raising the stigma from lower tier certification third transparency does not help screen among heterogeneous sellers strategic complementarities arise as sellers move down the certification pecking order and lead to the stigmatization of the lower tiers mandating transparency benefits the sellers but has an ambiguous impact on buyers who actually become less informed about product quality

toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium a step toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium is taken by considering a double auction with n buyers and m sellers with interdependent values and affiliated private information if there are sufficiently many buyers and sellers and their bids are restricted to a sufficiently fine discrete set of prices then generically there is an equilibrium in nondecreasing bidding functions that is arbitrarily close to the unique fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium of the limit market with unrestricted bids and a continuum of agents in particular the large double auction equilibrium is almost efficient and almost fully aggregates the agents information

international diversification an extreme value approach abstract international diversification has costs and benefits depending on the degree of asset dependence we study international diversification with two dependence measures correlations and extreme dependence we discover that dependence has typically increased over time and document mixed evidence on heavy tails in individual countries moreover we uncover three additional findings related to dependence first the timing of downside risk differs depending on the region surprisingly recent latin american returns exhibit little downside risk second latin america exhibits a great deal of correlation complexity third according to the empirical results correlation does not vary with returns but extreme dependence does vary monotonically with regional returns our results are consistent with a tradeoff between international diversification and systemic risk they also suggest international limits to diversification and that international investors demand some compensation for joint downside risk during extreme events

on the effect of aggregate uncertainty on certification intermediaries incentives to distort ratings abstract we analyze a certification intermediary s incentives to distort ratings in a model with a monopolistic profit maximizing certification intermediary a continuum of heterogeneous sellers and a competitive market of risk neutral buyers the value of a seller s good is known to the seller and observable by the certifier but not by buyers sellers can choose to get a rating the certification intermediary can reveal a signal of arbitrary precision about the quality of the good in contrast to the existing literature we allow aggregate uncertainty as in the existing literature one rating class is optimal however the certification intermediary does not generally choose a socially optimal cutoff the certifier is more likelyto be too lenient if the distribution of aggregate uncertainty has a lower mean a higher variance and is more left skewed it is more likely to be too strict if the opposite holds

estimating the costs of issuer paid credit ratings we compare the stability and timeliness of credit ratings produced by a traditional issuer paid rating agency moody s investors service and a subscriber paid rater rapid ratings moody s ratings exhibit less volatility but are slower to identify default risk we control for moody s aversion to ratings volatility and still find its ratings lag rapid ratings more importantly accuracy ratios indicate that rapid ratings provides a better ordinal ranking of credit risk we quantify the loss avoidance associated with rapid ratings signals to estimate costs associated with regulatory and contractual systems based on issuer paid ratings the author 2013 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

an experimental investigation of rating market regulation abstract we introduce a simple game theoretical model that captures the main aspects of the repeated interaction between an issuer and a credit rating agency it involves up front payments of issuer fees and direct publication of requested ratings due to pecuniary injuries for untruthful ratings the credit rating agency should always report truthfully in the subgame perfect equilibrium knowing this the issuer should never request a rating conducting laboratory experiments we find that behavior significantly deviates from the equilibrium prediction in favor of a cooperative solution issuers frequently do request ratings which is often reciprocated with untruthful good ratings

imperfect information transmission from banks to investors macroeconomic implications abstract our goal is to elucidate the interaction of banks screening effort and strategic information production in loan backed asset markets using a general equilibrium framework asset quality is unobserved by investors but banks may purchase error prone ratings the premium paid on highly rated assets emerges as the main determinant of banks screening effort the fact that rating strategies reflect banks private information about asset quality helps keep this premium high conventional regulatory policies interfere with this decision margin thereby reducing signaling value of high ratings and exacerbating the credit misallocation problem we propose a tax subsidy scheme that induces efficiency

ratings shopping and asset complexity a theory of ratings inflation abstract many identify inflated credit ratings as one contributor to the recent financial market turmoil we develop an equilibrium model of the market for ratings and use it to examine possible origins of and cures for ratings inflation in the model asset issuers can shop for ratings observe multiple ratings and disclose only the most favorable before auctioning their assets when assets are simple agencies ratings are similar and the incentive to ratings shop is low when assets are sufficiently complex ratings differ enough that an incentive to shop emerges thus an increase in the complexity of recently issued securities could create a systematic bias in disclosed ratings despite the fact that each ratings agency produces an unbiased estimate of the asset s true quality increasing competition among agencies would only worsen this problem switching to an investor initiated ratings system alleviates the bias but could collapse the market for information

contracting to compete for flows abstract we present a model in which asset managers design their contracts to attract flows of investor capital we find that they make their contracts depend on public information e g credit ratings or benchmark indices as a way to attract flows rather than as a way to mitigate incentive problems as has been emphasized in the literature unfortunately asset managers competition for flows triggers a race to the bottom asset managers use public information in their contracts even though it is socially inefficient this inefficiency arises because contracting on public information prevents risk sharing

information acquisition in financial markets tions agents have exponential utility and random variables are normally distributed these assumptions are often necessary to obtain closed form solutions we present an example with alternative assumptions and demonstrate that some of the conclusions from previous literature fail to hold in particular we show that in our example as more agents acquire information prices do not necessarily become more informative and agents may have greater incentive to acquire informatioln learning can therefore be a strategic complement allowing for the possibility of multiple equilibria

cross listed bonds information asymmetry and conservatism in credit ratings we propose information asymmetry as an additional explanation for rating conservatism because information asymmetry is likely higher for cross listed bonds than for u s bonds we expect and find that cross listed bonds are rated more conservatively than u s domestic bonds at issuance further cross listed bonds receive less frequent upgrades and take longer to be upgraded after issuance because lower ratings might also reflect higher default risk based on agencies private information we conduct additional tests to discriminate between the rating conservatism and private information explanations the results are consistent with ratings conservatism and inconsistent with the private information explanation

credit rating industry a helicopter tour of stylized facts and recent theories the recent subprime crisis and the ongoing euro zone crisis have generated an enormous interest in the credit rating industry not only among economists but also among average citizens as a consequence we have seen an explosion of the economic literature on the industry the objective of this survey is to introduce readers to the key stylized facts of the credit rating industry and to the recent theoretical economic literature on this industry

conflicts of interest information provision and competition in the financial services industry abstract in some markets sellers have better information than buyers over which products best serve a buyer s needs depending on the market structure this may lead to conflicts of interest in the provision of information by sellers this paper studies this issue in the market for financial services the analysis presents a new model of competition between banks where price competition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation we also compare conflicts of interest in two different firm structures specialized banking and one stop banking

discretionary ratings and the pricing of subprime mortgage backed securities using a dataset of home equity loan securities issued up to june 2007 and rated by moody s and or sp however these alternative thresholds do not appear to play a role as relevant as that of the ig sg boundary rating bias is also found to have an asymmetric impact on spreads the relevance of actual over expected ratings is greater for tranches receiving evaluations that are higher rather than lower than expected taken together these pieces of empirical evidence point toward ratings based regulation as an important explanation for the observed mispricing of structured finance products

good disclosure bad disclosure we study the implications of public information in a model where market prices convey information to relevant decision makers and the uctuation of market prices is driven by multiple factors disclosure has a positive direct eect of providing new information and an indirect eect of changing the price informativeness if disclosure is about a variable of which real decision makers are well informed then the indirect eect is also positive so that the direct eect is ampli ed leading to a positive overall eect on real e ciency if disclosure is about a variable that real decision markers care to learn much then the indirect eect is negative and the direct eect is attenuated moreover in markets which aggregate private information eectively the negative indirect eect can dominate so that disclosure can harm real e ciency

international diversification a copula approach abstract the viability of international diversification involves balancing benefits and costs this balance hinges on the degree of asset dependence in light of theoretical research linking diversification and dependence we examine international diversification using two measures of dependence correlations and copulas we document several findings first dependence has increased over time second we find evidence of asymmetric dependence or downside risk in latin america but less in the g5 the results indicate very little downside risk in east asia third east asian and latin american returns exhibit some correlation complexity interestingly the regions with maximal dependence or worst diversification do not command large returns our results suggest international limits to diversification they are also consistent with a possible tradeoff between international diversification and systemic risk

corporate taxation and the choice of patent location within multinational firms corporate patents are perceived to be the key profit drivers in many multinational enterprises mnes moreover as the transfer pricing process for royalty payments is often highly intransparent they also constitute a major source of profit shifting opportunities between multinational entities for both reasons mnes have an incentive to locate their patents at affiliates with a relatively small corporate tax rate our paper empirically tests for this relationship by exploiting a unique dataset which links information on patent applications to micro panel data for european mnes our results suggest that the corporate tax rate differential to other group members indeed exerts a negative effect on the number of patents filled by a subsidiary the effect is quantitatively large and robust against controlling for affiliate size the findings prevail if we additionally account for royalty withholding taxes moreover binding controlled foreign company rules tend to decrease the number of patent applications

bank ratings what determines their quality this paper examines the quality of credit ratings assigned to banks by the three largest rating agencies we interpret credit ratings as relative assessments of creditworthiness and define a new ordinal metric of rating error based on banks expected default frequencies our results suggest that on average large banks receive more positive bank ratings particularly from the agency to which the bank provides substantial securitization business these competitive distortions are economically significant and contribute to perpetuate the existence of too big to fail banks we also show that overall differential risk weights recommended by the basel accords for investment grade banks bear no significant relationship to empirical default probabilities harald hau sam langfield and david marques ibanez

wealth information acquisition and portfolio choice i solve with an approximation a grossman stiglitz economy under general preferences thus allowing for wealth effects because information generates increasing returns decreasing absolute risk aversion in conjunction with the availability of costly information is sufficient to explain why wealthier households invest a larger fraction of their wealth in risky assets one no longer needs to resort to decreasing relative risk aversion an empirically questionable assumption furthermore i show how to distinguish empirically between these two explanations finally i find that the availability of costly information exacerbates wealth inequalities copyright 2004 oxford university press

behavioral equilibrium in economies with adverse selection i propose a new solution concept behavioral equilibrium to study environments with players who are naive in the sense that they fail to account for the informational content of other players actions a behavioral equilibrium requires that i players have no incentives to deviate given their beliefs about the consequences of deviating ii these beliefs are consistent with the information obtained from the actual equilibrium play of all players and iii when processing this information naive players fail to account for the correlation between other players actions and their own payouncertainty i apply the framework to certain adverse selection settings and show that contrary to the received literature the adverse selection problem is exacerbated when naive players fail to account for selection more generally the main distinguishing feature of the framework is that in equilibrium beliefs about both fundamentals and strategies are jointly restricted consequently whether a bias may arise or not is determined endogenously in equilibrium jel c72 d82 a large literature presents evidence that psychological and cognitive biases aect people s be havior this evidence raises some questions what are the eects of these biases and can they persist at all in economic settings where people strategically interact with each other and have the opportunity to learn from their experience 1 in this paper i introduce a game theoretic equilibrium framework to study these questions in the context of a particular bias people s failure to take into account the informational content of other people s actions i apply the framework to a class of games that arises naturally in adverse selection settings and then show that the adverse selection

oil prices and economic activity an asymmetric cointegration approach the aim of this paper is to study the long term relationship between oil prices and economic activity proxied by gdp to account for asymmetries existing in the links between the two variables we propose an approach based on asymmetric cointegration our empirical analysis concerns the u s economy but also the g7 europe and euro area economies results indicate that while standard cointegration is rejected there is evidence for asymmetric cointegration between oil prices and gdp

ratings hardwiring and asset prices this paper discusses the asset pricing implications of ratings hardwiring the latter is defined as the mechanical response of trading decisions to changes in ratings this issue is studied within a noisy rational expectations framework of asset pricing under asymmetric information in which traders specialize in different driving factors of asset payoffs and interact with others who mechanically link their asset supply to ratings we show that ratings hardwiring leads to predictable supply shocks and induces informed traders to overreact to new information thus creating a channel through which shocks are amplified and prices become less informative and more volatile

using privileged information to manipulate markets insiders gurus and credibility access to private information is shown to generate both the incentives and the ability to manipulate asset markets through strategically distorted announcements the fact that privileged information is noisy interferes with the public s attempts to learn whether such announcements are honest it allows opportunistic individuals to manipulate prices repeatedly without ever being fully found out this leads us to extend sobel s 1985 model of strategic communication to the case of noisy private signals our results show that when truthfulness is not easily verifiable restrictions on trading by insiders may be needed to preserve the integrity of information embodied in prices

international profit shifting within multinationals a multi country perspective abstract we model the opportunities and incentives generated by international tax differences for international profit shifting by multinationals the model considers not only profit shifting arising from international tax differences between affiliates and parent companies but also from tax differences between affiliates in different host countries our model yields the prediction that a multinational s profit shifting in a country depends on a weighted average of international tax rate differences between all countries where the multinational is active using a unique dataset containing detailed firm level information on the parent companies and subsidiaries of european multinationals and information about the international tax system we test our model and empirically examine the extent of intra european profit shifting by european multinationals on average we find a semi elasticity of reported profits with respect to the top statutory tax rate of 1 3 while shifting costs are estimated to be 0 6 of the tax base international profit shifting leads to a substantial redistribution of national corporate tax revenues many european nations appear to gain revenues from profit shifting by multinationals largely at the expense of germany

credit rating and debt crises we develop an equilibrium theory of credit rating in the presence of rollover risk by influencing rational creditors ratings affect sovereigns probability of default which in turn affects ratings our analysis reveals a pro cyclical impact of credit rating in equilibrium the presence of a rating agency increases default risk when it is high and decreases default risk when it is low

multinational firms and tax havens multinational firms with operations in high tax countries can benefit the most from reallocating taxable income to tax havens though this is sufficiently difficult and costly that only 20 4 of german multinational firms have any tax haven affiliates among german manufacturing firms a 1 percentage point higher foreign tax rate is associated with a 2 3 greater likelihood of owning a tax haven affiliate this is consistent with tax avoidance incentives and contrasts with earlier evidence for u s firms the relationship is less strong for firms in service industries possibly reflecting the difficulty of reallocating taxable service income