limited commitment and crowding out of private transfers evidence from a randomised experiment this paper studies some empirical implications of models with limited risk sharing due to the imperfect enforceability of contracts we test whether the amount by which public transfers reduce private transfers is affected by features of the economy such as the variance of income and its persistence these implications are unique to models with imperfect enforceability we use data from mexico collected to evaluate a public transfer programme it included a randomised component that we exploit as a source of exogenous variation our results support the theoretical model in that the crowding out of private transfers is larger in villages where the variance of income is smaller

behavioural development economics lessons from field labs in the developing world abstract explanations of poverty growth and development depend on the assumptions made about individual preferences and the willingness to engage in strategic behaviour economic experiments especially those conducted in the field have begun to paint a picture of economic agents in developing communities that is at variance with the traditional portrait we review this growing literature with an eye towards preference related experiments conducted in the field we also offer lessons on what development economists might learn from experiments we conclude by sharing our thoughts on how to conduct experiments in the field and then offer a few ideas for future research

content protection and oligopolistic interactions in oligopolistic situations content protection can have unexpected effects as it changes the nature of interactions between input suppliers with a duopoly it does so in a manner that makes the foreign firm wish to match price increases and decreases of the domestic firm domestic input suppliers can therefore lose from such policies even when set at free trade levels the relation between input demands the form of protection and the degree of substitution between inputs is shown to define the effects of content protection and to provide the basis for understanding who might lobby for protection in different environments

informal insurance arrangements with limited commitment theory and evidence from village economies recent work on consumption allocations in village economies finds that idiosyncratic variation in consumption is systematically related to idiosyncratic variation in income thus rejecting the hypothesis of full risk pooling we attempt to explain these observations by adding limited commitment as an impediment to risk pooling we provide a general dynamic model and completely characterise efficient informal insurance arrangements constrained by limited commitment and test the model using data from three indian villages we find that the model can fully explain the dynamic response of consumption to income but that it fails to explain the distribution of consumption across households

microenterprise growth and the flypaper effect evidence from a randomized experiment in ghana standard models of investment predict that credit constrained firms should grow rapidly when given additional capital and that how this capital is provided should not affect decisions to invest in the business or consume the capital we randomly gave cash and in kind grants to male and female owned microenterprises in urban ghana for women running subsistence enterprises we find no gain in profits from either treatment for women with larger businesses we strongly reject equality of the cash and in kind grants only in kind grants cause growth in profits suggesting a flypaper effect whereby capital coming directly into the business sticks there but cash does not the results for men also suggest a lower impact of cash but differences between cash and in kind grants are less robust there is suggestive evidence that the difference in the effects of cash and in kind grants is associated more with lack of self control than with external pressure

content protection and tariffs under monopoly and competition abstract this paper compares the relative efficiency of local content schemes and tariffs as alternative means of achieving certain non economic distributional objectives the efficiency comparison is made under the alternative assumptions that an intermediate good component is produced a competitively and b by a single firm the paper shows how the ranking of tariffs and content schemes i is sensitive to these assumptions and ii depends on the local content ratio and the elasticity of demand for components the possible implications of vertical integration in the production process and rent revenue seeking behaviour are also considered insofar as they affect the ranking of policies

proliferating regional trade arrangements why and whither this paper investigates why regional trade arrangements rtas are proliferating extensively and how the effects of multiple rtas by interacting with each other evolve over time our empirical analysis based on an extended gravity model utilising a large panel dataset of 175 countries from 1948 to 1999 shows that rtas on average increase global trade by raising intra bloc trade without damaging extra bloc trade the net trade effects however heavily depend on the types of rta strategic evolution over time which we categorise as expansionary rtas duplicate rtas or overlapping rtas we find that countries excluded from an rta can benefit more from duplicating a separate rta than from joining an existing rta this result explains why the number of bilateral trade blocs rather than the membership size of existing rtas is currently exploding we also find that the net trade creating effects of rtas are substantially lower for countries participating in overlapping rtas this result suggests that it is less likely that the currently proliferating rtas will completely merge and lead the world economy to global free trade our empirical results are robust to controlling for the characteristics of countries that may influence the impact of rtas

informal risk sharing in an infinite horizon experiment author s charness gary b genicot garance abstract this paper presents the first laboratory study of risk sharing without commitment our experiment captures the main features of a simple model of voluntary insurance between two agents in the model two individuals interact over a potential infinite horizon and suffer random income shocks risk averse individuals have incentives to smooth consumption by making transfers to each other these transfers being voluntary only self enforcing risk sharing arrangements are possible transfers can never be so large as to tempt individuals to renege on them this constraint when binding has strong implications for the shape of the constrained optimal risk sharing arrangement in our experiment participants are matched in pairs each period one of them randomly drawn receives a given amount in addition to its regular income after observing both incomes each person in a pair chooses a non negative transfer to make to the other person two features of the experimental design are crucial first it is common information that all pairs will be dissolved at the end of each period with a given probability participants are informed when this occurs and randomly re matched this replicates the effect of infinite horizon and discounting in the model second at the end of the experiment a single period is randomly drawn to count for cash payment this feature is essential for individuals to care about the utility outcome of each period we find evidence generally consistent with risk sharing with most transfers coming from individuals who received h in the period moreover in support of the theory transfers are much higher with a higher continuation probability and they also are highly correlated with the individual s degree of risk aversion however while the model predicts an increase in transfers with ex ante inequality we observe the opposite effect this may reflect considerations of identity or group membership

now or later the allocation of the pot and the insurance motive in fixed roscas abstract we start from the observation that in fixed roscas in sub saharan african members often prefer to take the last turn we argue that when exchanges of turns are allowed during a cycle a late turn allows to request the pot when an urgent need arises survey data indicate that insurance needs are critical in determining the preferred position of rosca members we develop a theoretical model to formalize the argument and show that the preference for the last position requires that the probability of a shock is neither too low nor too high we test this prediction in a lab in the field experiment and confirm that the preference for being last is non monotonic in the risk of negative shocks

forced gifts the burden of being a friend abstract in many developing countries gift expenses escalate with income growth and account for a substantial share of household expenditure we develop a theoretical model to demonstrate how unequal income growth may trigger gift competition and drive up the financial burden associated with gift exchange we use unique census type panel data from rural china to test our model predictions and demonstrate that 1 the value of gifts responds to the average gift in the community 2 the escalation of gift giving may have adverse welfare implications especially for the poor and 3 escalating gift expenses crowd out expenditures on other consumption items

risk averse behavior in generalized matching pennies games in experimental studies of behavior in 2 2 games with unique mixed strategy equilibria observed choice frequencies are systematically different from mixed strategy nash predictions this paper examines experimental results for a variety of such games and shows that a structural econometric model which incorporates risk aversion into a quantal response equilibrium explains the data very well moreover risk aversion estimates are stable across the different games and are close to those obtained from laboratory and field auction data as well as from individual lottery choice experiments

vertical foreclosure and international trade policy international differences in the cost of production of a key intermediate product can mean that a domestic firm is dependent on supplies from a foreign vertically integrated firm this paper considers the incentives for the foreign firm and foreign country to supply the domestic firm when the firms compete in a cournot or bertrand market for the final product the vertical supply decision is significantly affected by domestic supply conditions for the input and a domestic tariff on final product imports optimal policy by the exporting country may require a tax on both exports or a subsidy on both exports countries that are dependent on imports of a key intermediate product or raw material from a dominant world supplier are often concerned about the price and the availability of imports a notable current example involves the computer industry japanese suppliers with the help of the japanese government recently restricted the exports of dram semiconductors substantially raising their price these suppliers control about 80 of the market for semiconductors and the higher prices and shortage in supply have forced u s producers of computers to curtail production and increase prices vertically integrated japanese firms such as toshiba and n e c have benefitted both from increased profits in the export market for semiconductors and from the improvement in their competitive position in the market for final computers as this example indicates the price and availability of imported supplies can depend on both public and private incentives in the exporting country in this paper we first examine the private incentives for a vertically integrated firm to export an intermediate product to a higher cost rival lowering its rival s costs the exporting firm may choose vertical foreclosure thus fully cutting off supplies we then consider the public interest of the exporting country does the exporting country gain by encouraging the export of the intermediate product or alternatively might government foreclosure occur the government is in a position to affect the quantity of exports of both the input and the final product by an appropriate choice of export tax and subsidy policies

measuring productivity growth under factor non substitution an application to us steam electric power generation utilities a theoretical framework is developed for decomposing partial factor productivity and measuring technical inefficiency when the underlying technology is characterized by factor non substitution with farrell s 1957 radial index of technical inefficiency being inappropriate in this case russell non radial indices are adapted to measure technical inefficiency in a leontief type model a system of factor demand equations with a regime specific technical inefficiency term is proposed and estimated allowing for dependence across inputs using a copula approach then the paper presents a complete decomposition of partial factor productivity changes using a dataset of us steam power electric generation utilities

spousal control and intra household decision making an experimental study in the philippines i elicit causal effects of spousal observability and communication on financial choices of married individuals in the philippines when choices are private men put money into their personal accounts when choices are observable men commit money to consumption for their own benefit when required to communicate men put money into their wives account these strong treatment effects on men but not women appear related more to control than to gender men whose wives control household savings respond more strongly to the treat ment and women whose husbands control savings exhibit the same response changes in information and communication interact with underlying control to produce mutable gender specific outcomes

income timing and liquidity constraints evidence from a randomized field experiment abstract people in developing countries sometimes desire deferred income streams which replace more frequent income flows with a single later lump sum we study the effects of short term wage deferral using a randomized experiment with participants in a temporary cash for work program workers who are assigned to lump sum payments are five percentage points more likely to purchase a high return investment we discuss the role of both barriers to saving and credit constraints in explaining our results while stated preferences for deferred payments suggest a role for savings constraints the evidence is also consistent with a simpler model of credit constraints alone

analysis of perfonnance standards for direct foreign investments within the framework of a duopolistic model we investigate the impact of foreign investment standards on welfare output and employment minimum local content and export requirements reduce world output world welfare and the source country s welfare under certain conditions the decline in host country s consumer surplus resulting from diminished competition outweighs the shift of monopoly rent from the source country s firm to the host country s firm minimum content standards can increase host country s employment but only to a point marginal increases in the content requirement can actually reduce employment as the magnitude of foreign investment declines

two sided altruism and signaling abstract when donors and recipients care about each other two sided altruism asymmetry of information about the donor s income or about the donor s altruism leads naturally to a signaling game the desire to signal income or altruism puts upward pressure on transfers

efficient allocations with hidden income and hidden storage we consider an environment in which individuals receive income shocks that are unobservable to others and can privately store resources we provide a simple characterization of the unique efficient allocation of consumption in cases in which the rate of return on storage is sufficiently high or alternatively in which the worst possible outcome is sufficiently dire we show that unlike in environments without unobservable storage the symmetric efficient allocation of consumption is decentralizable through a competitive asset market in which individuals trade riskfree bonds among themselves in this paper we consider an environment in which individuals have random income and can accumulate assets through a storage technology their income realizations and their asset position are private information given these informational frictions we provide a simple characterization of the unique efficient allocation of consumption in cases in which the rate of return on storage is sufficiently high or alternatively in which the worst possible outcome is sufficiently dire we show that the symmetric efficient allocation of consumption is decentralizable through a competitive asset market in which individuals trade risk free bonds among themselves there is a large prior literature which examines the characteristics of efficient risksharing in dynamic settings in the presence of private information unlike our paper this literature generally finds that efficient allocations do not coincide with the equilibrium allocations of any economy with a competitive bond market see atkeson and lucas 1992 in particular the key difference between our paper and these preceding ones is that the earlier literature assumes either that agents cannot accumulate resources over time or that if they can this accumulation is observable in contrast we assume that both agents incomes and their stored resources are private information it is this combination of assumptions that leads to our result our findings are reminiscent of allen s 1985 he considers a dynamic principalagent relationship in which the agent is risk averse and has hidden stochastic income the

public goods hidden income and tax evasion some nonstandard results from the warm glow model abstract a large literature explores crowd out in situations where public goods are jointly provided work in this area typically depicts a tax system where individuals take taxes as given but in some settings such as those in developing economies efforts to evade or avoid taxes may be widespread using the canonical warm glow model this paper considers joint public good provision in a setting where individuals can evade taxes by hiding their income the model s implications change significantly in this setting with hidden income stronger warm glow will lead to greater crowd out not less using research on crowd out and inter family transfers i present suggestive evidence that the model s results may help to reconcile divergent estimates of crowd out in the literature

the economic consequences of mutual help in extended families in the absence of well developed markets for credit and insurance extended families play a major role as a traditional system of mutual help however these arrangements have important consequences on economic choices in this paper we use first hand data from western cameroon to explore this question we find that the large majority of transfers follow a given pattern whereby elder siblings support their younger siblings in the early stages of their lives who in turn reciprocate by supporting their elder siblings when they have children we interpret this pattern as a generalised system of reciprocal credit within the extended family we propose a simple overlapping generation model to investigate its welfare properties we then explore the implications of this pattern on labour market outcomes and find evidence of large disincentive effects this pattern of transfers also implies that younger siblings are more educated but have fewer and less educated children

consistency and heterogeneity of individual behavior under uncertainty by using graphical representations of simple portfolio choice problems we generate a very rich dataset to study behavior under uncertainty at the level of the individual subject we test the data for consistency with the maximization hypothesis and we estimate preferences using a two parameter utility function based on faruk gul 1991 this specification provides a good interpretation of the data at the individual level and can account for the highly heterogeneous behaviors observed in the laboratory the parameter estimates jointly describe attitudes toward risk and allow us to characterize the distribution of risk preferences in the population

dispensing with nafta rules of origin some policy options the objective of this paper is to use a computable general equilibrium cge methodology to estimate the economic gains for both canada and mexico of 1 adopting a north american customs union cu that would also liberalise rules of origin roo and 2 reviving the wto scenario of multilateral free trade thereby eliminating preferential commerce and thus the need for preferential roo across free trade agreements ftas such a cge methodology is useful as the approach permits computation of an efficiency or ex post cost of roo that might in some contexts be more relevant than the existing ex ante indices of roo restrictiveness which are unable to account for the fact that the use of preferential access in an fta and the concomitant roo compliance is an option not an obligation the paper shows that the erosion of nafta tariff preferences at the end of the 1990s and early 2000s which resulted from a different phasing of the nafta and uruguay round measures has reduced the efficiency cost of nafta roo making these rules economically less relevant especially for canada and therefore limiting somewhat the gains from liberalising them through a cu given this the wto scenario of multilateral free trade remains the approach that would deliver the largest economic gains in terms of gdp and welfare while making preferential commerce and roo obsolete

asymmetry of information within family networks this paper studies asymmetry of information and transfers within a unique data set of 712 extended family networks from tanzania using cross reports on asset holdings we construct measures of misperception of income among all pairs of households belonging to the same network we show that there is significant asymmetry of information and no evidence of major systematic over evaluation or under evaluation of income in our data although there is a slight over evaluation on the part of migrants regarding non migrants we develop a static model of asymmetric information that contrasts altruism pressure and exchange as motives to transfer the model makes predictions about the correlations between misperceptions and transfers under these competing explanations testing these predictions in the data uncovers the active role played by the recipient our findings suggest that the recipient sets the terms of the transfers either by exerting pressure to give on the donor or by holding the bargaining power during the exchange of services with the donor

some models for estimating technical and scale inefficiencies in data envelopment analysis in management contexts mathematical programming is usually used to evaluate a collection of possible alternative courses of action en route to selecting one which is best in this capacity mathematical programming serves as a planning aid to management data envelopment analysis reverses this role and employs mathematical programming to obtain ex post facto evaluations of the relative efficiency of management accomplishments however they may have been planned or executed mathematical programming is thereby extended for use as a tool for control and evaluation of past accomplishments as well as a tool to aid in planning future activities the ccr ratio form introduced by charnes cooper and rhodes as part of their data envelopment analysis approach comprehends both technical and scale inefficiencies via the optimal value of the ratio form as obtained directly from the data without requiring a priori specification of weights and or explicit delineation of assumed functional forms of relations between inputs and outputs a separation into technical and scale efficiencies is accomplished by the methods developed in this paper without altering the latter conditions for use of dea directly on observational data technical inefficiencies are identified with failures to achieve best possible output levels and or usage of excessive amounts of inputs methods for identifying and correcting the magnitudes of these inefficiencies as supplied in prior work are illustrated in the present paper a new separate variable is introduced which makes it possible to determine whether operations were conducted in regions of increasing constant or decreasing returns to scale in multiple input and multiple output situations the results are discussed and related not only to classical single output economics but also to more modern versions of economics which are identified with contestable market theories

does social capital affect investment in human capital family ties and schooling decisions we analyse whether traditional sharing norms within kinship networks affect education decisions of poor black households in kwazulu natal theory predicts that the size of the kinship network ambiguously impacts on the incentive to invest in human capital due to opposing empathy and free rider effects our empirical analysis based on a range of different estimators suggests the latter effect dominates forced solidarity within the network discourages investments in human capital

heterogeneity in risky choice behaviour in a broad population we analyse risk preferences using an experiment with real incentives in a representative sample of 1 422 dutch respondents our econometric model incorporates four structural parameters that vary with observed and unobserved characteristics utility curvature loss aversion preferences towards the timing of uncertainty resolution and the propensity to choose randomly rather than on the basis of preferences we find that all four parameters contribute to explaining choice behaviour the structural parameters are significantly associated with socio economic variables but it is essential to incorporate unobserved heterogeneity in each of them to match the rich variety of choice patterns in the data

raw materials processing activities and protectionism a country s export sector may encompass a raw material as well as a final commodity that processes that raw material a general equilibrium model is developed in a competitive setting to analyze a nation s optimal strategy in restricting raw materials exports when allowance is made for potential beneficial effects on the export price of processed goods when faced with a foreign tariff on exports of the processed commodity a country s optimal response could entail an easing of raw materials export constraints instead of retaliation illustrations are provided of the 1986 american tariff on canadian exports of cedar shakes and shingles

pretending to be poor borrowing to escape forced solidarity in cameroon abstractfrom field observations of credit cooperatives in cameroon we find that 19 of the loans taken are fully collateralized by savings held in the same institutions this behavior is costly to the borrower as it represents a net interest payment of about 24 per year while traditional explanations may partly explain this behavior interviews with members of the cooperatives suggest the following new rationale members resort to borrowing to signal to friends and relatives that they are poor and do not have savings available by doing so they can avoid requests for financial help we develop a signaling model to analyze the conditions under which this behavior is an equilibrium outcome

the impact of rules of origin on trade flows a great deal of post war trade liberalization resulted from regional preferential trade agreements preferential trade agreements cut tariffs on goods originating only in those nations that have signed the agreement therefore they need rules of origin to determine which goods benefit from the tariff cut rules of origin have long been ignored for two good reasons they are dauntingly complex and at first sight appear mind numbingly dull the third standard reason for ignoring them the assertion that they do not matter much turns out to be wrong we show that rules of origin are important barriers to trade moreover such rules are emerging as an important trade issue for three additional reasons first preferential trade deals are proliferating worldwide second the global fragmentation of production implies complex international supply chains which are particularly constrained and distorted by rules of origin third the extent to which regionalism challenges the wto based trading system depends in part on incompatibilities and rigidities built into rules of origin our empirical results exploit a natural experiment that was created by technical changes to europe s lattice of rules of origin roos in 1997 this change known as diagonal cumulation relaxed the restrictiveness of rules of origin on trade among the eu s free trade agreement fta partners without changing the degree of tariff preference our analysis allows us to establish a lower bound and upper bound estimate of trade impact of roos reduced trade among the eu s trade partners the lower bound we find is something like 10 while the upper bound is around 70 the second part of the paper draws the policy lessons that arise from considering the implications of our empirical findings the most direct lessons are for fta writers we argue that europe s implementation of cumulation is a good way of reducing the welfare reducing impact of overlapping rules of origin without gutting their fraud fighting ability we also suggest a three part procedure for establishing a more multilateral framework for rules of origin which would be more transparent flexible administratively feasible and negotiable patricia augier michael gasiorek and charles lai tong

migration and economic mobility in tanzania evidence from a tracking survey this study explores the extent to which migration has contributed to improved living standards of individuals in tanzania using longitudinal data on individuals the authors estimate the impact of migration on consumption growth between 1991 and 2004 the analysis addresses concerns about heterogeneity and unobservable factors correlated with both income changes and the decision to migrate the findings show that migration adds 36 percentage points to consumption growth during a period of considerable growth in consumption these results are robust to numerous tests and alternative specifications unpacking the findings the analysis finds that moving out of agriculture is correlated with much higher growth than staying in agriculture although growth is always higher in any sector if one physically moves economic mobility is strongly linked to geographic mobility the puzzle is why more people do not move if returns to geographic mobility are high the evidence is consistent with models in which exit barriers are set by home communities through social and family norms that prevent migration of certain categories of people

the discriminatory nature of specific tariffs this paper quantifies the distortions from specific tariffs levied by the european union eu the most favored nation mfn specific tariffs levied by the eu translate into higher tariff barriers for poor countries exporting low price goods the author shows that for poor countries these higher tariff barriers from specific tariffs offset the gains from preferential tariffs the author apply a two stage analysis to show that the specific tariffs levied by the eu on its agricultural imports wash away more than half of the welfare benefits enjoyed by the sub saharan african countries from eu preferential tariffs the results provide the first quantitative estimate of the distortions associated with specific tariffs

consumption and investment in resource pooling family networks this paper examines a novel motive for resource pooling in family networks in rural economies to relax credit constraints and facilitate investment in non collateralizeable assets for which credit market imperfections are most binding we thus complement established literatures examining risk sharing motives for resource transfers within family networks as well as motives based on kinship tax obligations we do so exploiting the progresa program data in which family networks can be identified households are subject to large exogenous resource inflows and detailed responses on consumption and an array of investments can be tracked in a household panel over five years we find that for every dollar that accrues to the family network through progresa transfers food consumption expenditures increase by around 65c for both households eligible for progresa and ineligible members of the same family network hence the marginal propensity of families to invest save out of every dollar is around 35 and we document how this is channelled towards easing credit constraints poorer network members face in financing non collateralizable investments into their children s human capital we show these consumption and investment benefits of being embedded within a family network are sustained five years after households first experience resource transfers from progresa hence the interplay between resource inflows and resource pooling by family networks can place network members on sustained paths out of poverty this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

kinship incentives and evolution we analyze how family ties affect incentives with focus on the strategic interaction between two mutually altruistic siblings the siblings exert effort to produce output under uncertainty and they may transfer output to each other with equally altruistic siblings their equilibrium effort is non monotonic in the common degree of altruism and it depends on the harshness of the environment we define a notion of local evolutionary stability of degrees of sibling altruism and show that this degree is lower than the kinship relatedness factor numerical simulations show how family ties vary with the environment and how this a ects economic outcomes

the more the merrier the effect of family size and birth order on children s education there is an extensive theoretical literature that postulates a tradeoff between child quantity and quality within a family however there is little causal evidence that speaks to this theory using a rich dataset on the entire population of norway over an extended period of time we examine the effects of family size and birth order on the educational attainment of children while we find a negative correlation between family size and children s education when we include indicators for birth order and or use twin births as an instrument family size effects become negligible in addition birth order has a significant and large negative effect on children s education we also study adult earnings employment and teenage childbearing and find strong evidence for birth order effects with these outcomes particularly among women these findings suggest the need to revisit economic models of fertility and child production focusing not only on differences across families but differences within families as well

a dark side of social capital kinship consumption and savings abstract we explore whether traditional sharing norms in kinship networks affect consumption and accumulation decisions of poor black households in kwazulu natal south africa using a proxy for the number of family dependents our results are consistent with the interpretation that households try to evade their sharing obligations by i accumulating durables that are non sharable at the expense of durables that may be shared and ii reducing savings in liquid assets by attenuating accumulation incentives kinship sharing may come at the expense of income growth if so a culturally induced poverty trap can possibly eventuate we demonstrate tentative evidence that more extensive kinship networks are associated with lower incomes

measures of technical efficiency abstract fare and lovell j econom theory 19 1978 150 162 suggest four properties that a measure of technical efficiency should satisfy the commonly employed debreu farrell measure fails three of them necessary and sufficient conditions for a measure to satisfy the four conditions are provided and recently proposed measures are analyzed in the light of this result also it is argued that the debreu farrell measure has several desirable properties when one takes account of 1 perhaps unknown market prices and the relationship between technical and economic efficiency and 2 its characterization as a measure of economic efficiency using the shadow prices implicit in the production technology

trade and protection in vertically related markets abstract we consider home country tariff and subsidy policies in a setting where a home firm is partially dependent on a foreign vertically integrated firm for supplies of a key input the firms are cournot competitors in the home market for the final product we show that a tariff on final product imports may cause the foreign vertically integrated firm to reduce the price charged for the input under circumstances where a simple monopoly supplier of the input would increase its price supply conditions for the input significantly affect whether imports of the input should be taxed or subsidized

the economics of roscas and intrahousehold resource allocation this paper investigates individual motives to participate in rotating savings and credit associations roscas detailed evidence from roscas in a kenyan slum nairobi suggests that most roscas are predominantly composed of women particularly those living in a couple and earning an independent income to explain this phenomenon we propose an argument based on conflictual interactions within the household participation in a rosca is a strategy a wife employs to protect her savings against claims by her husband for immediate consumption the empirical implications of the model are then tested using the data collected in kenya

buy as you need nutrition and food storage imperfections abstract in this paper we investigate whether and how a more steady supply of foodgrain in local markets impacts the nutritional status measured with body mass indexes of both children and adults in a context characterized by large seasonal fluctuations in the price and availability of foodgrain taking advantage of the random scaling up of a program of food security granaries in burkina faso we reach three conclusions first especially in remote areas where local markets are thin the program considerably dampens nutritional stress the effect is strongest among children and young children in particular for whom deficient nutrition has devastating long term consequences second we argue that it is a change in the timing of food purchases translated into a change in the timing of consumption that drives the nutritional improvement a simple two period model shows that once we account for various forms of storage costs an increase in nutrition does not necessarily require larger quantity of food purchases or even consumption our last and unexpected conclusion is that the losses associated with foodgrain storage do not stem from physical losses in household granaries but rather from inefficient seasonal bodymass fluctuations one plausible mechanism behind this particular storage imperfection rests on the households urge to consume readily available foodgrain

economic integration and rules of origin under international oligopoly free trade agreements ftas have rules of origin roos to prevent tariff circumvention by firms of non member countries this paper points out that in imperfectly competitive markets roos have another role overlooked in the existing literature instead of focusing on the impacts of roos in the intermediate good markets we draw our attention to the final good markets to examine the effects of roos we find that under some conditions roos benefi tb othfirms at the expense of consumers under some other conditions roos benefi tt hefirm producing outside the fta and hurt the firm producing inside the fta

rules of origin and the eu med partnership the case of textiles this paper analyses the impact of rules of origin on patterns of trade in the context of the pan european system of diagonal cumulation the paper first highlights the importance of rules of origin in all preferential trading arrangements while arguing that those rules can easily lead to trade suppression and or trade diversion we then focus on the introduction of the pan european system in 1997 and show evidence to suggest that the introduction of the system materially impacted on trade between the eu and its cefta efta and baltic states partner countries the main body of the paper then empirically explores the impact of the lack of cumulation in the textile industry on the countries of the southern mediterranean the results suggest that rules of origin may indeed substantially constrain trade between non cumulating countries possibly by as much as 70 80 per cent in aggregate while preferential trading agreements thus serve to increase intra pta trade through the liberalisation of trade barriers they may also be doing so by effectively raising external barriers to trade through the use of constraining rules of origin to the extent that they do so increases the likelihood of trade diversion and trade suppresion

the effects of a content requirement on a foreign duopsonist abstract this paper considers the operation of a local content requirement in a duopsony between domestic and foreign firms and demonstrates its consequences for the domestic producer of a final good it is shown that content protection may have perverse effects on a foreign firm s profits and may be welfare improving overall shifting profits from the domestic firm to both the foreign firm and domestic input producers

trade and protection with multistage production this paper analyses trade in manuf acutured goods that are produced via a vertical production structure with many stages where some value is added at each to an intermediate product to yield a good in process ready for the next stage we consider the stage at which a good is traded to be an economically endogenous variable with comparative advantage determining the pattern of production specialization by stages across countries we study how endowment changes and policy shifts move the margin of comparative advantage which thus provides a channel for resource allocation adjustment that is additional to the usual ones of factor substitution and changes in the quantity of output

kin groups and reciprocity a model of credit transactions in ghana this paper studies kinship band networks as capital market institutions membership in a community where individuals are dynastically linked has two effects on informal credit first the nonanonymity of the dynastic link allows to sanction the defaulters offspring and induce compliance even in short term interactions social enforcement second preferential agreements can arise in which kin members condition their behavior on the characteristics of a player s predecessor expecting others to do the same with their offspring reciprocity these effects are incorporated in an olg game with endogenous matching between lenders and borrowers and tested using household level data from ghana

strategic choices in polygamous households theory and evidence from senegal this paper proposes a strategic framework to account for fertility choices in polygamous households a theoretical model specifies the main drivers of fertility in the african context and describes how the fertility of one wife might impact the behavior of her co wives it generates predictions to test for strategic interactions exploiting original data from a household survey and the demographic and health surveys in senegal empirical tests show that children are strategic complements one wife raises her fertility in response to an increase by the other wife because children are the best claim to resources controlled by the husband this result is the first quantitative evidence of a reproductive rivalry between co wives it suggests that the sustained high level of fertility in africa does not merely reect women s lack of control over births as is often argued but also their incentives to have many children this paper also contributes to the literature on household behavior as one of the few attempts to open the black box of non nuclear families

is increasing inequality harmful experimental evidence abstract increasing inequality is commonly associated with social unrest and conflict between social classes this paper reports the results of a laboratory experiment to study the implications of greater inequality on the tendency to burn others income the experiment considers an environment where higher earnings in a real effort task are typically associated with higher effort and varies how fair and transparent this relationship is the findings indicate that greater inequality does not lead to more money burning itself rather it depends on whether the increase in inequality can be unequivocally attributed to exerted effort i e the fairness of the income generating process only if greater inequality can be the result of morally questionable activities subjects engage in substantially more money burning while most income burning aims at reducing inequality the fairness of inequality only plays a role in the extent of money burning but not so much for the qualitative burning patterns

intra household experiments a survey experiments with family groups are rare but since many decisions are taken at the household level or occur within the household it is an important area to investigate this paper provides a survey of the recent experimental work on intra household decision making i discuss some of the challenges involved in doing experiments with couples and families and consider major areas that remain yet to be explored while general themes from the research are still emerging four results repeatedly occur 1 the absence of efficiency in intra household decisions 2 joint decisions that are not a convex combination of individual decisions 3 individual behaviour is affected by opportunities for hiding actions from spouses and 4 deviations from standard models of microeconomics in line with those seen in the anomalies literature of individual decision making

risk sharing commitment and information an experimental analysis this paper describes and analyzes the results of a unique field experiment especially designed to test the eects of the level of commitment and information available to individuals when sharing risk we find that limiting exogenously provided commitment is associated with less risk sharing while limiting information on defections can be associated with more risk sharing these results can be understood by distinguishing between intrinsic and extrinsic incentives and by recognizing that social sanctions are costly to inflict or that individuals suer from time inconsistent preferences comparing the groups formed within our experiment with the real life risk sharing networks in a few villages allows us to test the external validity of our experiment and suggests that the results are salient to our understanding of risk sharing arrangements observed in developing countries jel classification numbers c93 d71 d81 o12

returns to capital in microenterprises evidence from a field experiment small and informal firms account for a large share of employment in developing countries the rapid expansion of microfinance services is based on the belief that these firms have productive investment opportunities and can enjoy high returns to capital if given the opportunity however measuring the return to capital is complicated by unobserved factors such as entrepreneurial ability and demand shocks which are likely to be correlated with capital stock the authors use a randomized experiment to overcome this problem and to measure the return to capital for the average microenterprise in their sample regardless of whether they apply for credit they accomplish this by providing cash and equipment grants to small firms in sri lanka and measuring the increase in profits arising from this exogenous positive shock to capital stock after controlling for possible spillover effects the authors find the average real return to capital to be 5 7 percent a month substantially higher than the market interest rate they then examine the heterogeneity of treatment effects to explore whether missing credit markets or missing insurance markets are the most likely cause of the high returns returns are found to vary with entrepreneurial ability and with measures of other sources of cash within the household but not to vary with risk aversion or uncertainty

industrial targeting in free trade areas with policy independence we investigate the limits of a mechanism for free trade area fta formation that simultaneously satisfies internal industrialization targets for arbitrary targets we find necessary and sufficient conditions that guarantee that the mechanism is efficient for member countries individually even if other members do not implement the efficient policy when the objective is conservative designed to protect the level of industrialization previously achieved by the target industry member countries are guaranteed gains from the efficient policy and their fta participation the analysis covers cases with transportation costs and explains why minimally restrictive rules of origin support efficiency and policy independence on etudie les limites d un mecanisme de formation d une zone de libre echange zle qui simultanement rencontre certains objectifs internes d industrialisation pour des cibles arbitraires on definit les conditions necessaires et suffisantes qui garantissent que le mecanisme est efficient pour les pays membres individuellement meme si d autres membres ne mettent pas en place la politique efficiente quand les objectifs sont conservateurs tentant seulement de proteger le niveau d industrialisation auquel on s est donne acces anterieurement dans l industrie ciblee on peut garantir des gains pour les pays membres decoulant de la politique efficiente et de la participation a la zle l analyse examine aussi des situations avec couts de transport positifs et explique pourquoi des restrictions minimales sur l origine des produits assurent l efficacite et l independance des politiques

nudging farmers to use fertilizer theory and experimental evidence from kenya we model farmers as facing small fixed costs of purchasing fertil izer and assume some are stochastically present biased and not fully sophisticated about this bias such farmers may procrastinate post poning fertilizer purchases until later periods when they may be too impatient to purchase fertilizer consistent with the model many farmers in western kenya fail to take advantage of apparently profit able fertilizer investments but they do invest in response to small time limited discounts on the cost of acquiring fertilizer free deliv ery just after harvest calibration suggests that this policy can yield higher welfare than either laissez faire policies or heavy subsidies

preference utilisation and tariff reduction in eu imports from acp countries textabstractdespite the long relationship between the eu and the african caribbean and pacific acp countries aimed at encouraging their exports while stimulating growth and investment the acp states still face difficulties in integrating into the world economy this paper examines the non least developed acp countries preferential trade with the eu the objective is to explain the determinants of preferential exports of acp countries towards the eu and to assess the impact of preferences on trade volumes we also investigate the existence of a threshold in the offered duty reduction under which traders have no incentives to ask for preferences

revising commitments field evidence on the adjustment of prior choices the very poor in developing countries often make intertemporal choices that seem at odds with their individual self interest there are many possible reasons why this paper investigates several of these reasons with a lab in the field experiment in rural malawi involving large stakes it makes two contributions first it constructs a new dependent variable revisions of prior choices regarding the allocation of future income this allows us to directly examine intertemporal choice revision and its determinants in particular this dependent variable permits a novel test for the existence of self control problems it turns out revisions of money allocations toward the present are positively associated with measures of present bias from an earlier baseline survey as well as the randomly assigned closeness in time to the first possible date of money disbursement second the paper investigates other potential determinants of revision aside from self control problems it finds little evidence that revisions of money allocations toward the present are associated with spousal preferences for such revision household shocks or the financial sophistication of respondents

risk sharing and information in village economies arrangements for achieving efficient risk sharing vary depending on the information available to agents in the economy the usual euler equation restricts efficient allocations in an economy which obeys the permanent income hypothesis while efficient allocations in an economy with private information and long term contracts satisfy a symmetric restriction but not the euler equation full insurance arrangements are unique in that they satisfy both restrictions we look at an environment in which it seems likely that long term contracts play a role in mitigating the effects of private information three village economies in south india the evidence that consumption allocations satisfy the private information restriction is quite strong for households in two of the three villages the evidence for the third village suggests that while consumption for some households satisfies the private information restrictions other households consumption obey the permanent income hypothesis

imperfect commitment altruism and the family evidence from transfer behavior in low income rural areas in this paper we examine empirically whether risk pooling is more advantageous among altruistic compared to selfish agents in a framework where individuals cannot make binding commitments in particular we incorporate altuism into a model of risk sharing under imperfect commitment and use simulation methods to establish tests of the roles of both altruism and commitment problems in determining the extent of insurance and the intertemporal movements in interhousehold transfers the tests are carried out using three panel data sets from two countries of rural south asia that provide detailed information on transfers and enable the measurement of income shocks the estimates provide strong support for the notion that imperfect commitment substantially constrains informal transfer arrangements whether kin based or not but also provide evidence that altruism plays an important role in ameliorating commitment constraints and thus in increasing the gains from income pooling

you can t save alone commitment in rotating savings and credit associations in kenya abstract this article examines one reason why individuals develop and maintain local level financial savings organizations known as rotating savings and credit organizations or roscas economic theories suggest that individuals form roscas to finance the purchase of a lumpy durable good in response to intrahousehold conflict over savings or to provide themselves with insurance the article proposes an additional hypothesis for rosca participation saving requires discipline and some roscas may be formed to provide a collective mechanism for commitment in the presence of time inconsistent preferences data from 70 roscas located in western kenya indicate that the commitment hypothesis is plausible and broadly consistent with the design and patterns of participation in these roscas as many rosca participants put it you can t save alone

corruption investments and contributions to public goods experimental evidence from rural liberia we analyze how corruption affects incentives to invest or contribute to public goods we obtain a proxy for corruption among liberian community leaders by keeping track of a flow of inputs associated with a development intervention measuring these inputs before and after giving them in custody to the chief we then use the gap between these measurements missing inputs to explain variation in investment behavior of villagers investment behavior is gauged with two simple artefactual field experiments our main results are that corruption i undermines incentives for voluntary contributions to local public goods and ii may reduce private investments of individuals subject to rent seeking by the chief in real life we also provide weaker evidence that the impact of corruption on investments and contributions to public goods is heterogeneous this impact may be gender specific and appears to vary with accessibility of communities

is informal redistribution costly evidence from a lab in the field experiment in senegal in sub saharan africa individuals frequently transfer a substantial share of their resources to members of their social networks social pressure to redistribute however can induce disincentive

the theory of domestic content protection and content preference this paper investigates the resource reallocation effected by content protection and content preference schemes under alternative assumptions regarding the definition of domestic content the number of intermediate goods and the market structure of the domestic intermediate good industry content protection is shown to be equivalent to a combination of more familiar commercial policies however the extent of application of these policies is determined endogenously by parameters of the production functions for intermediate and final goods a number of anomalous and undesirable outcomes that may result from content protection and content preference are discussed

the introduction of formal insurance and its effect on redistribution abstract transfers motivated by altruism guilt and norms of giving play an important role in supporting individuals who suffer losses due to risk we present empirical evidence from an artefactual field experiment in ethiopia in which we introduce formal insurance in a setting where donors make redistributive transfers to recipients who experience losses we find that donors tend to reduce their transfers to recipients who are offered insurance whether or not they take it up when insurance is rejected by a recipient transfer reductions are larger for donors who firmly expect that the recipient would take up insurance the results are consistent with a framework in which the introduction of insurance erodes norms of giving by revealing differences in the extent to which individuals value precautionary behavior with respect to risk taking welfare calculations show that when formal insurance is introduced the welfare of those who fail to take it up may be reduced

why don t the poor save more evidence from health savings experiments using data from a field experiment in kenya we document that providing individuals with simple informal savings technologies can substantially increase investment in preventative health and reduce vulnerability to health shocks simply providing a safe place to keep money was sufficient to increase health savings by 66 percent adding an earmarking feature was only helpful when funds were put toward emergencies or for individuals that are frequently taxed by friends and relatives group based savings and credit schemes had very large effects

the structure of technical efficiency it is common practice to decompose measures of efficiency into component measures of technical and allocative efficiency in this paper we show how and why to decompose a general measure of technical efficiency into component measures of purely technical efficiency congestion and scale efficiency and we investigate the properties of each measure we do so for a multiple output technology which satisfies a weak axiom system that does not include either constant returns to scale or strong input disposability

new roles for marriage in urban africa kinship networks and the labor market in kenya abstract this paper explores new roles that traditionally rural kinship networks organized around the marriage institution might play in improving labor market outcomes in urban africa using new data from kisumu kenya and controlling for selection into marriage we find that marriage significantly increases employment levels and incomes in our sample of migrants at the same time marriage increases the remittances that migrants send to the extended family consistent with the view that the benefits of the network come with additional social obligations these obligations appear to be borne disproportionately by high ability individuals who consequently defer marriage the negative selection into marriage that we uncover has consequences for the future viability of the urban networks with implications for long term growth and distribution in this economy

intra household resource allocation and familial ties abstract in this paper we investigate the link between intra household resource allocation and familial ties between household members we show that within the same geographic economic and social environments households where members have stronger familial ties nuclear family households achieve near pareto efficient allocation of productive resources and pareto efficient allocation of consumption while households with weaker familial ties extended family households do not we propose a theoretical model of the household based on the idea that altruism between household members vary with familial ties which generates predictions consistent with the observed empirical patterns

group size and the efficiency of informal risk sharing this paper seeks to understand and test empirically the relationship between group size and informal risk sharing models of informal risk sharing with limited commitment and grim trigger punishments upon deviation imply that larger groups provide better insurance however when subgroups of households can credibly deviate so that sustainable informal arrangements ought to be coalition proof the relationship between group size and the amount of insurance is unclear building on genicot and ray 2003 we show that this relationship is theoretically ambiguous we then investigate it empirically using data on the size of the sibships of the household head and spouse in rural malawi to identify the relevant potential risk sharing group we exploit a social norm among the main ethnic group in our sample that the wife s brothers play a key role in ensuring her household s wellbeing we find that households where the wife has many brothers are poorly insured against crop loss events we fail to uncover a similar relationship for the wife s sisters ruling out that our findings are driven by wives with many siblings e g brothers simply having poorer extended family networks a simple calibration exercise indicates that the threat of coalitional deviations can explain our empirical findings

an experiment on risk taking and evaluation periods does the period over which individuals evaluate outcomes influence their investment in risky assets results from this study show that the more frequently returns are evaluated the more risk averse investors will be the results are in line with the behavioral hypothesis of myopic loss aversion which assumes that people are myopic in evaluating outcomes over time and are more sensitive to losses than to gains the results have relevance for the equity premium puzzle and also for the marketing strategies of fund managers

does africa need a rotten kin theorem experimental evidence from village economies this paper measures the economic impact of social pressure to share income with kin and neighbors in rural kenyan villages the authors conduct a lab experiment in which they randomly vary the observability of investment returns the goal is to test whether subjects reduce their income in order to keep it hidden the analysis finds that women adopt an investment strategy that conceals the size of their initial endowment in the experiment although that strategy reduces their expected earnings this effect is largest among women with relatives attending the experiment parameter estimates suggest that women behave as though they expect to be pressured to share four percent of their observable income with others and substantially more when close kin can observe income directly although this paper provides experimental evidence from a single african country observational studies suggest that similar pressure from kin may be prevalent in many rural areas throughout sub saharan africa

who is more rational we report on the results of a large scale field experiment that enables us to test for consistency with utility maximizing behavior and to investigate the correlation between individual behavior and demographic and economic characteristics we conducted the experiment with the centerpanel a representative sample of over 2 000 dutch households using procedures similar to those used by choi et al 2007b in a setting with risk we find a high level of consistency in the individual level decisions there is also considerable heterogeneity in subjects consistency scores high income and high education subjects display greater levels of consistency men are more consistent than women and young subjects are more consistent than those who

payment mechanisms and antipoverty programs evidence from a mobile money cash transfer experiment in niger abstractcash transfers have become an increasingly important component of social protection policies in both developed and developing countries while such programs are often implemented electronically in developed countries in many developing countries with weak financial infrastructure such transfers are distributed manually resulting in significant costs to program recipients and the public sector alike the introduction of mobile money systems in many developing countries offers new opportunities for distributing cash transfers using data from a randomized experiment of a mobile money cash transfer program in niger we find evidence of benefits of this new system household diet diversity was 9 16 higher among households who received mobile transfers and children ate an additional one third of a meal per day these results can be partially attributed to time savings associated with mobile transfers as program recipients spent less time traveling to and waiting for their transfer they are also

choice under uncertainty evidence from ethiopia india and uganda we review experimental evidence collected from risky choice experiments using poor subjects in ethiopia india and uganda using these data we estimate that just over 50 of our sample behaves in accordance with expected utility theory and that the rest subjectively weight probability according to prospect theory our results show that inferences about risk aversion are robust to whichever model we adopt when we estimate each model separately however when we allow both models to explain portions of the data simultaneously we infer risk aversion for subjects behaving according to expected utility theory and risk seeking behaviour for subjects behaving according to prospect theory

dis advantages of informal loans theory and evidence abstract we study borrowers choice between formal and informal credit in a setting with imperfect debt enforcement in contrast to formal loans e g from banks informal loans e g from friends or relatives can be enforced by the threat of severing social ties if the underlying social capital is sufficiently large we show that informal loans carry lower interest rate and collateral than formal loans including the possibility of zero interest and collateral this makes informal credit a priori more attractive to borrowers at the same time since physical collateral is divisible unlike the social capital pledged in informal credit default on formal loans is less costly to both parties than default on informal loans because of this trade off formal and informal credit can co exist depending on the loan riskiness measured by the ratio of loan size to borrower s wealth ltw ratio borrowers choose formal credit for riskier larger loans while informal credit is preferred for smaller projects with low default risk empirical results using household data from rural thailand are consistent with the predicted choice pattern and terms of formal and informal credit

don t tell on me experimental evidence of asymmetric information in transnational households although most theoretical models of household decision making assume perfect information empirical studies suggest that information asymmetries can have large impacts on resource allocation i demonstrate the importance of these asymmetries in transnational households where physical distance between family members can make information barriers especially acute i implement an experiment among migrants in washington dc and their families in el salvador that examines how information asymmetries can have strategic and inadvertent impacts on remittance decisions migrants make an incentivized decision over how much of a cash windfall to remit and recipients decide how they will spend a remittance migrants strategically send home less when their choice is not revealed to recipients recipients make spending choices closer to migrants preferences when the migrants preferences are shared regardless of whether or not the spending choices are revealed to the migrants suggesting that recipients choices are inadvertently affected by imperfect information

optimal contracts under costly state falsification we examine an exchange economy with two agents one risk neutral with a certain endowment and a second risk averse with a random endowment the realization of the endowment is public but can be falsified by the second agent at a cost for a broad class of falsification cost functions the optimal no falsification contract is noncontingent on a left hand interval and strictly increasing with a slope strictly less than one on a right hand interval under a mild further restriction optimal no falsification contracts are in addition piece wise linear optimal contracts may in general require falsifying the state but for a set of the highest endowment realizations there is no falsification we find simple conditions under which the optimal contract is a no falsification contract the model has applications that include financial insurance and employment contracts and tax policy

product mixes as objects of choice in non parametric efficiency measurement abstract non radial measures of technical efficiency essentially differ from their radial counterparts in that the product mix of the efficient reference is allowed to be different from the product mix of the evaluated observation whereas existing non radial measures are still based on the product mix of the evaluated i e possibly inefficient observation we change the perspective and propose a measure based on the mix properties of the efficient reference the resulting inverse measure can be considered as complementary to the fare lovell or russell efficiency measure

semi radial technical efficiency measurement semi radial efficiency measurement combines technical efficiency as captured by the classical farrell measure with an economically meaningful mix efficiency component the semi radial evaluation we propose proceeds in two steps first we build on the price interpretation of the generally accepted koopmans efficiency notion to characterize appropriate benchmarks next we present both a quantity based distance measure and its dual price based equivalent to evaluate the mix efficiency factor the type of measures we propose may e g be used to provide a price rationale for the zieschang technical efficiency evaluation procedure

the effect of social pressure on expenditures in malawi abstract i vary the observability of windfall payments to 291 members of agricultural clubs in rural malawi in order to study the effect of redistributive pressure on the timing of expenditures while other studies have documented that social pressure affects the quantity of income and consumption i focus on timing because spending money quickly may be a strategy for reducing obligatory transfers respondents who receive money in the presence of their agricultural club anticipate spending an extra 14 percent 0 28 standard deviations in the week immediately following the payment than those who receive equivalent transfers in private settings there are limited changes in the composition of spending but some evidence that social pressure to share windfall income has a larger effect on poorer households

demand for insurance and within kin group marriages evidence from a west african country abstract we ask whether parents have incentives to marry their children to a member of the kin group in order to better insure against adverse idiosyncratic income shocks exploiting original panel data from a household survey collected in senegal in 2006 2007 and 2011 2012 we find that daughters within kin group marriage helps their parents household to better smooth food consumption when a parent has fallen ill this better smoothing is notably driven by the fact that households having married a daughter within the kin group receive relatively more transfers our results indicate that parents demand for insurance can explain part of their demand for marrying within the kin group their daughter and extend the literature on inter linkages between marriage decisions and demand for insurance

rules of origin as commercial policy instruments this article examines the role of rules of origin as a commercial policy instrument that targets the input composition of imports using a three country partial equilibrium structure we demonstrate conditions under which the imposition of a binding rule will be welfare improving for an importer facing competitive export suppliers we further show that employing rules of origin in this way would be complementary to rather than a substitute for conventional optimal tariffs copyright economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association