equilibrium search models and the transition from school to work this paper applies the burdett mortensen 1998 equilibrium search model to study the school to work transitions of u s high school graduates we consider the case of discrete firm heterogeneity and provide a computational method to obtain the mle our results show that unemployed blacks receive fewer offers than whites and employed blacks are more likely to lose their jobs importantly employed blacks and whites receive job offers at the same rate assigning the whites search parameters to the blacks and re solving reveals that 75 percent of the observed wage differential is explained by the job destruction rate differences

job mobility and earnings instability there is still no consensus on the causes of the increase in the variance of transitory earnings earnings instability in the united states it is difficult to attribute the rise in instability to job mobility because there is no evidence of a concurrent increase in job turnover or separations using an error component model of the covariance structure of earnings on panel survey of income dynamics and survey of income and program participation data this study shows that job mobility and the increase in the variance of wage changes upon job change accounts for a substantial part of the increase in earnings instability the empirical evidence is consistent with the simulations of a search and matching model where an increase in the variance of productivity shocks increases on the job search and earnings instability among job changers while leaving job turnover approximately constant jel j21 j31

does search boost efficiency poaching externality arising from job to job turnovers implies that a planner should allocate fewer resources to costly job creations however these search efforts increase competition among employers and this could in turn internalize the externality whereas the congestion externality requires a unit elastic matching function

a quantitative evaluation of payroll tax subsidies for low wage workers an equilibrium search approach abstract phelps phelps e 1994 low wage employment subsidies versus the welfare state american economic review 84 54 58 presented the case for a low wage subsidy policy since the mid 1990s france has experimented with this strategy this paper evaluates the effect of this policy on employment and also on output and welfare we construct an equilibrium search model incorporating wage posting and specific human capital investment where unemployment and the distribution of both wages and productivity are endogenous we estimate this model using french data numerical simulations show that the prevailing minimum wage allows a high production level to be reached by increasing training investment even though the optimal minimum wage is lower we show that payroll tax subsidies enhance welfare more than a reduction in the minimum wage when they are spread over a large range of wages in order to avoid specialization in low productivity jobs

inflation and reputation in many macroeconomic models with rational expectations optimal policy is time inconsistent and therefore announced policy may not be credible this paper models the government s credibility explicitly using kreps and wilson s analysis time consistent optimal government policy emerges as a sequential equilibrium in a repeated game this policy is at least as good as the inconsistent optimal policy and dominates the consistent policy when reputational effects are ignored thus the analysis resolves the problem of specifying a credible optimal policy in such models the results show why attempts to disinflate may lead to recession even with perfectly flexible prices this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the distribution of earnings in an equilibrium search model with state dependent offers and counteroffers we construct an equilibrium job search model with on the job search in which firms implement optimal wage strategies under full information in the sense that they leave no rent to their employees and counter the offers received by their employees from competing firms productivity dispersion across firms results in wage mobility both within and across firms workers may accept wage cuts to move to firms offering higher future wage prospects equilibrium productivity dispersion across ex ante homogeneous firms can be endogenously generated productivity dispersion then generates a nontrivial wage distribution which is generically thin tailed as typically observed in the data

informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents abstract for an incomplete information model of public good provision with interim participation constraints we show that efficient outcomes can be approximated with approximately full surplus extraction when there are many agents and each agent is informationally small the result holds even if agents payoffs cannot be unambiguously inferred from their beliefs the contrary result of neeman z neeman the relevance of private information in mechanism design j econ theory 117 2004 55 77 rests on an implicit uniformity requirement that is incompatible with the notion that agents are informationally small because there are many other agents who have information about them

asymmetric enforcement of cooperation in a social dilemma we use a public good experiment to analyze behavior in a decentralized asymmetric punishment institution the institution is asymmetric in the sense that players differ in the effectiveness of their punishment at the aggregate level we observe remarkable similarities between outcomes in asymmetric and symmetric punishment institutions controlling for the average punishment effectiveness of the institutions we find that asymmetric punishment institutions are as effective in fostering cooperation and are as efficient as symmetric institutions at the individual level we find that players with higher punishment effectiveness contribute similar amounts to the public account but have higher earnings and punish more than their weak counterparts

do reputation feedback systems really improve trust among anonymous traders an experimental study feedback systems are claimed to be a crucial component of the success of electronic marketplaces like ebay or amazon marketplace this article aims to compare the effects of various feedback systems on trust between anonymous traders through a set of experiments based on the trust game our results indicate that trust is significantly improved by the introduction of a reputation feedback system however such mechanisms are far from being perfect and are vulnerable to strategic ratings and reciprocation our findings indicate that some changes in rating rules may significantly improve the efficiency of feedback systems by avoiding strategic rating or reciprocation and hence stimulate trust and trustworthiness among traders in particular a system in which individuals are not informed of their partner s rating decision before making their own decision provides better results both in terms of trust and earnings

economic policy precommitment and social welfare abstract the claim that economic policy precommitment is advantageous is investigated in a context in which the welfare basis of the government s objectives is explicit three results are demonstrated each one defining a class of welfare functions and a class of models such that precommitment would not raise welfare in models of that class it is concluded that if a purely welfare economic argument for precommitment is to be found attention will have to be paid either to conflicts asymmetries and differences within the private sector or to multiple equilibria

on the job search and the wage distribution the article structually estimates an on the job search model of job separations given each employer pays observably equivalent workers the same but wages are dispersed across employers an employer s separation flow is the sum of an exogenous outflow unrelated to the wage and a job to job flow that decreases with the employer s wage using data from the danish integrated database for labour market research the empirical results imply as predicted by theory that search effort declines with the wage furthermore the estimates explain the employment effect defined as the horizontal difference between the distribution of wages earned and the wage offer distribution

excess capacity and collusion in this paper the authors analyze a restricted class of equilibria in the dynamic model of j p benoit and v krishna 1987 in which firms choose their scale of operation before engaging in a repeated game of price competition benoit and krishna established that all firms carry excess capacity in all collusive equilibria as the authors are interested in the relationship between excess capacity and collusion in price they examine equilibria in which firms tacitly collude in price but not in investment decisions copyright 1990 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

horizontal mergers and collusive behavior abstract in the industrial organization literature it is generally felt that mergers hurt consumers not only because of the increased industrial concentration they effect but also because collusion becomes more likely in this paper we show that at least in one important case this intuition is misguided if a tacitly collusive agreement enforced by trigger strategies is not initially sustainable mergers will tend to reduce the chance that it becomes sustainable in the future this is so because the threat point implicit in the agreement becomes more favorable for outsiders

corporatism monetary policy and macroeconomic performance a simple game theoretic analysis the effects of corporatism on inflation and output are analyzed in a model of a game between a government and a union this model allows consideration of aspects of corporatism other than centralization of wage bargaining and permits monetary policy to be endogenized corporatist attitudes on the part of the union have beneficial effects on economic performance provided the game is played noncooperatively with simultaneous moves through the nature of their impact depends critically on the government s preferences if the government leads certain forms of corporatism can be inflationary cooperative play reduces inflation but has an ambiguous effect on output copyright 1995 by the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

majority voting and the welfare implications of tax avoidance abstract a benchmark result in the political economy of taxation is that majority voting over a linear income tax schedule will result in an inefficiently high tax rate whenever the median voter has a below average income the present paper examines the role of tax avoidance for this welfare result for a right skewed distribution of taxed income we show that the political distortion from majority voting is increasing in the median voter s avoidance vice versa keeping the decisive voter s avoidance constant the political inefficiency is decreasing in the average level of avoidance in the economy

equilibrium search with continuous productivity dispersion theory and nonparametric estimation in this article we develop an equilibrium search model with a continuous distribution of firm productivity types within a given labor market we characterize equilibrium derive expressions for the endogenous equilibrium wage distributions and characterize the set of wage distributions that can be generated by the model we develop a structural nonparametric estimation method for the productivity distribution we estimate the model using french longitudinal survey data on labor supply and we compare the results with those from a french panel data set of firms the results are informative on the degree to which firms exploit search frictions

frictional wage dispersion in search models a quantitative assessment we propose a new measure of frictional wage dispersion the mean min wage ratio for a large class of search models we show that this measure is independent of the wage offer distribution but depends on statistics of labor market turnover and on preferences under plausible preference parameterizations observed magnitudes for worker flows imply that in the basic search model and in most of its extensions frictional wage dispersion is very small notable exceptions are some of the most recent models of on the job search our new measure allows us to rationalize the diverse empirical findings in the large literature estimating structural search models

job matching and the wage distribution this paper brings together the microeconomic labor and the macroeconomic equilibrium views of matching in labor markets we nest a job matching model a la jovanovic 1984 into a mortensen and pissarides 1994 type equilibrium search environment the resulting framework preserves the implications of job matching theory for worker turnover and wage dynamics and it also allows for aggregation and general equilibrium analysis we obtain two new equilibrium implications of job matching and search frictions for wage inequality first learning about match quality and worker turnover map gaussian output noise into an ergodic wage distribution of empirically accurate shape unimodal skewed with a paretian right tail second high idiosyncratic productivity risk hinders learning and sorting and reduces wage inequality the equilibrium solutions for the wage distribution and for the aggregate worker flows quits to unemployment and to other jobs displacements hires provide the likelihood function of the model in closed form

asymmetric network monitoring and punishment in public goods experiments abstract we extend the recent experimental literature on incomplete punishment networks in linear public goods games in these games we use an exogenous network to restrict both monitoring and the set of feasible punishment flows in addition to two baseline structures the complete network and the circle network we examine a novel asymmetric network in which both punishment responsibility and exposure differ across players average contributions are significantly lower in the asymmetric network driven entirely by the under monitored player who faces only one potential punisher we formulate and examine the hypothesis that asymmetry among a player s potential punishment targets may lead to discriminatory patterns of punishment in particular players might wish to punish targets for whom they are solely responsible discriminately more than targets for whom they share responsibility the experimental data do not support this hypothesis although they do suggest a compelling explanation as to why specifically we find that the under monitored player in the network retaliates against previous punishment significantly more often than others in the group which deters their only potential punisher from issuing stronger sanctions thus an additional complication of asymmetry in the network is that it may lead to more instances of anti social retaliation inhibiting the effectiveness of the decentralized punishment institution

time inconsistency of benevolent government economies abstract a dynamic walrasian economy is said to exhibit inconsistency if the competitive equilibrium path resulting from government reoptimization at some time 0 is not a continuation of the competitive equilibrium path resulting from the initial government optimization at time 0 the present paper establishes necessary and sufficient conditions for consistency for a general class of dynamic walrasian economies it is seen for example that reliance on nondistortionary policy instruments is neither necessary nor sufficient for consistency it is also shown that pareto optimal paths can be supported as optimal competitive equilibrium paths only if consistency prevails however consistent optimal competitive equilibrium paths need not be pareto optimal

job duration seniority and earnings an important stylized fact about labor markets is that workers with longer seniority with their current employer have higher earnings than other workers with the same total labor market experience this study shows that workers in longer jobs earn more throughout than workers in a series of shorter jobs and that the measured positive cross sectional return seniority is largely a statistical artifact due to the correlation of seniority with an omitted variable representing the quality of the worker the job or the worker employer match the implication is tha t earnings do not in fact rise very much with seniority copyright 1987 by american economic association

do non strategic sanctions obey the law of demand the demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism abstract the prospect of receiving a monetary sanction for free riding has been shown to increase contributions to public goods we ask whether the impulse to punish is unresponsive to the cost to the punisher or whether like other preferences it interacts with prices to generate a conventional demand curve in a series of experiments we randomly vary the cost of reducing the earnings of other group members following voluntary contribution decisions in our design new groups are formed after each interaction and no subject faces any other more than once so there is no strategic reason to punish we nonetheless find significant levels of punishment and we learn that both price and the extent to which the recipient s contribution is below the group mean are significant determinants of the quantity of punishment demanded moreover punishment is mainly directed at free riders even when it costs nothing to the punisher

samaritan versus rotten kid another look abstract we set up a two stage game with sequential moves by one altruist and n selfish agents the samaritan s dilemma rotten kid theorem states that the altruist can only reach her first best when the selfish agents move after before the altruist we find that in general the altruist can reach her first best when she moves first if and only if a selfish agent s action marginally affects only his own payoff the altruist can reach her first best when she moves last if and only if a selfish agent cannot manipulate the price of his own payoff

unemployment fluctuations over the life cycle abstract in this paper we show that i the volatility of worker flows increases with age in us cps data and ii a search and matching model with life cycle features endogenous separation and search effort is well suited to explain this fact with a shorter horizon on the labor market older workers outside options become less responsive to new employment opportunities thereby making their wages less sensitive to the business cycle their job finding and separation rates are then more volatile along the business cycle the horizon effect cannot explain the significant differences between prime age and young workers as both age groups are far away from retirement a lower bargaining power on the youth labor market brings the model closer to the data

the composition of wage differentials between migrants and natives we consider the role of unobservables such as differences in search frictions reservation wages and productivities for the explanation of wage differentials between migrants and natives we disentangle these by estimating an empirical general equilibrium search model with on the job search due to bontemps et al 1999 on segments of the labour market defined by occupation age and nationality using a large scale german administrative dataset the native migrant wage differential is then decomposed into several parts and we focus especially on the component that we label migrant effect being the difference in wage offers between natives and migrants in the same occupation age segment in firms of the same productivity counterfactual decompositions of wage differentials allow us to identify and quantify their drivers thus explaining within a common framework what is often labelled the unexplained wage gap

charitable bequests and taxes on inheritances and estates aggregate evidence from across states and time this paper examines the impact of wealth transfer taxes on charitable bequests we exploit the fact that federal and state taxes on estates and inheritances vary over time states and real wealth levels the effects of taxes are estimated using pooled cross sectional data spanning several decades based on aggregated information from federal estate tax returns under several different specifications we find evidence of a strong incentive effect of estate and inheritance taxes on charitable bequests

do wages rise with job seniority many previous studies have found a strong positive effect of job seniority tenure on wages this paper re examines the evidence using a simple instrumental variables scheme to deal with the fact that tenure is likely to be related to unobserved individual and job characteristics that affect the wage we use the variation of tenure over a given job match as the principal instrumental variable for tenure the variation in tenure over the job is uncorrelated by construction with the fixed individual and job match specific components of the error term of the wage equation our main finding is that the partial effect of tenure on wages is small and that general labour market experience and job shopping account for most wage growth over a career the strong cross section relationship between tenure and wages is due primarily to heterogeneity bias prior researchers see mincer and jovanovic 1981 bartel and borjas 1981 borjas 1981 cline 1979 and mellow 1981 and many others have established that job seniority has a strong positive relationship with wage rates in a cross section or a cross section time series of individuals in this paper we re evaluate the evidence concerning the partial effects on wages of job seniority tenure and total labour market experience the extent to which wages rise with tenure is important for several reasons first and foremost the wage tenure profile is a fundamental question about the structure of earnings over careers second the wage tenure profile is a key determinant of the extent to which the earnings power of individuals is tied to specific jobs and it is important for assessment of the losses suffered by displaced workers hamermesh 1984 third evidence that wages rise with job tenure has been used to explain the decline in quits with tenure since the wage growth on the current job lowers the probability that the worker will locate a superior alternative a growing theoretical literature surveyed in parsons 1984 has taken the evidence of a strong wage tenure profile at face value and sought to provide an explanation for the relationship the most prominent explanation is the theory of specific human capital oi 1962 becker 1962 mincer 1974 parsons 1972 kuratani 1973 and hashimoto 1980 in which the growth of wages with tenure holding experience constant is attributed to the worker s share of investments in firm specific skills more recently lazear 1981 has presented a supervision model of wage growth in which firms defer compensation as a means of inducing workers not to shirk freeman 1977 and harris and holmstrom 1982 provide an explanation for wage growth based on an insurance motive salop and salop 1976 nickell 1976 and guasch and weiss 1982 present adverse selection models of wage growth in which firms use a wage tenure profile as a

does unmeasured ability explain inter industry wage differentials this paper provides empirical assessments of the two leading explanations of measured inter industry wage differentials 1 true wage differentials exist across industries and 2 the measured differentials simply reflect unmeasured differences in workers productive abilities first we summarize the existing evidence on the unmeasured ability explanation second we construct a simple model which shows that if matching is important then endogenous job change decisions can create important self selection biases even in first differenced estimates of industry wage differentials third we analyze a sample that approximates the experiment of exogenous job loss we find that i the wage change experienced by a typical industry switcher closely resembles the difference in the relevant industry differentials estimated in a cross section and ii pre displacement industry affiliation plays an important role in post displacement wage determination

monetary policy and policy credibility theories and evidence within the past decade there has been a significant shift in attitude by many western industrialized countries toward the objectives and conduct of national economic policy the events of the 1970s accelerating inflation and stagnant economic growth motivated the view that inflation had created its own stubborn self sustaining momentum that either was not amendable to the influences of conventional macroeconomic policy or else would yield to such influences only at unacceptable costs this led to the development of a program aimed at reestablishing control over prices while minimizing any adverse consequences of anti inflationary policies on output and employment seen as a new monetary experiment the essential ingredients included prudent financial management abstinence from discretionary intervention commitment to intermediate targets and above all prior announcement of these policies evidence of this program and its effects can be found oni the continents of europe north america and latin america and provide further important lessons in anti inflationary management this paper is a survey of recent theoretical developments in monetary policy which among other issues attempt to explain one rationale for this program and the likely consequences thereof to the extent that the new program of monetary and fiscal reform was deliberately made public and impressed upon citizens as an overriding commitment of governments in advance of its execution reflects a prevailing opinion that economic policies are more effective if they are credible to private economic agents this view emphasized forcefully by william fellner 1976 1979 may be seen as being mainly due to the assimilation of the rational expectations hypothesis

on the job search and cyclical unemployment crowding out vs vacancy effects incorporating on the job search otjs into a real business cycle model has been shown to increase the cyclical volatility of unemployment using a particularly simple model of otjs we show that the increased search of employed workers during expansions induces firms to open more vacancies but also crowds out unemployed workers in the job search resulting in an ambiguous overall effect on unemployment volatility we show analytically and numerically that the difference between the employer s share of the match surplus with an employed versus an unemployed job seeker determines the degree to which otjs increases unemployment volatility we use this result to re consider some related papers of otjs and explain the amplification of volatility they obtain finally we show that a plausible calibration of the otjs model allows us to reproduce most significant features of the us labor data

the contributions of search and human capital to earnings growth over the life cycle abstract this paper presents and estimates a unified model where both human capital investment and job search are endogenized this unification enables us to quantify the relative contributions of each mechanism to life cycle earnings growth while investigating potential interactions between human capital investment and job search within the unified framework the expectation of rising rental rates of human capital through job search gives workers more incentive to invest in human capital in addition unemployed workers reduce their reservation rental rates and increase their search effort to leave unemployment quickly to take advantage of human capital accumulation on the job the results show both forces are important for earnings growth and the interactions are substantial human capital accumulation accounts for 50 of total earnings growth job search accounts for 20 and the remaining 30 is due to the interactions of the two

wage dispersion over the business cycle abstract in this paper i provide robust evidence that fluctuations in wage dispersion are independent of the business cycle while residual wage dispersion i e dispersion of wages within narrowly defined demographic and skill groups of workers increases during booms and lessens during recessions moreover i show that the procyclical fluctuations in residual wage dispersion are mainly generated by cyclical changes in the upper half of the residual wage distribution

reputation in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information abstract previous models of rules versus discretion are extended to include uncertainty about the policymaker s type when people observe low inflation they raise the possibility that the policymaker is committed to low inflation type 1 this enhancement of reputation gives the uncommitted policymaker type 2 an incentive to masquerade as the committed type in the equilibrium the policymaker of type 1 delivers surprisingly low inflation with corresponding costs to the economy over an extended interval the type 2 person mimics this outcome for awhile but shifts eventually to high inflation this high inflation is surprising initially but subsequently becomes anticipated

limited attention interaction and the gradual adjustment of a firm s decisions a person cannot make many decisions at a time but an organization needs millions of interrelated decisions we incorporate this idea into a standard theory of production two assumptions are emphasized an agent cannot optimize more than one input at a time and there is interaction among inputs when a firm alternates its attention the demand for inputs gradually adjusts to the static optimal level when a firm optimally allocates its attention this adjustment may not occur we investigate the conditions under which the adjustment takes place the results are applied to a standard investment theory the derived investment capital ratio is independent of firm size and imperfectly correlated with tobin s q

job search and academic achievement abstract the paper develops a structural model for the labor market behavior of students entering the labor market we explicitly model the trade off between devoting effort to studying and to job search furthermore we allow for on the job search the model is estimated using a unique data set of individuals who completed undergraduate education in the netherlands between 1995 and 2001 our estimation results show that labor market returns of high grades are low wage increases between jobs are explained by labor market friction rather than returns of early work experience our results indicate that a 1 percentage point decrease in the unemployment rate increases wage offers on average by 3 percent but that the amount of job search effort is not very sensitive to business cycle fluctuations policy simulations show that study effort and hence academic achievement are much more sensitive to financial incentives than job search effort and labor market outcomes

productivity growth on the job search and unemployment abstract the impact of long run productivity growth on unemployment is studied we incorporate disembodied technological progress and on the job search into the endogenous job separation model of mortensen and pissarides 1994 because we include on the job search faster growth reduces unemployment by decreasing job separation and inducing job creation the incorporation of on the job search substantially improves the ability of the mortensen and pissarides model to explain the effect of growth on labor market variables specifically our model generates not only an empirically consistent sign of the effect but also a larger impact of growth on unemployment than the standard matching model

the empirical content of the job search model labor mobility and wage distributions in europe and the us abstract job search models of the labor market hypothesize a very tight correspondence between the determinants of labor turnover and individual wage dynamics on one hand and the determinants of wage dispersion on the other this paper offers a systematic examination of whether this correspondence is present in the data by estimating a rudimentary partial equilibrium job search model on a three year panel of individual worker data covering 10 european countries and the u s we find that our basic job search model fits the data surprisingly well this also allows us to point at a number of interesting empirical regularities about wage distributions our results suggest that cross sectional data on individual wages contain the basic information needed to obtain a reliable measure of the magnitude of labor market frictions as measured by a parameter of the canonical job search model finally we use our results in a cross country comparison of the intensity and nature of job to job turnover we arrange countries into two different groups according to their turnover intensity we further show that the nature of job to job turnover is very different between those two groups turnover is predominantly voluntary in low turnover countries whereas it is to a large extent involuntary in high turnover countries

equilibrium search and tax credit reform an empirical equilibrium job search model with wage posting is developed to analyze the labor market impact of uk tax reforms the model allows for a rich characterization of the labor market with hours responses accurate representations of the tax and transfer system and both worker and firm heterogeneity the model is estimated with pre reform longitudinal survey data using a semi parametric estimation technique and the impact of actual tax reform policies is simulated the model predicts that the british working families tax credit and contemporaneous reforms increased employment with equilibrium effects found to play a relatively minor role

identification of search models using record statistics this paper shows how record value theory a branch of statistics that deals with the timing and magnitude of extreme values in sequences of random variables can be used to recover features of the wage offer distribution in conventional search models using national longitudinal survey of youth nlsy wage data i show that the data are not compatible with specifications for the offer distribution characterized by extreme negative skewness in addition i show that my approach can be used to construct a bound on the returns to job seniority my results suggest that job seniority plays only a minor role in the wage growth of the workers surveyed in the nlsy copyright 2008 wiley blackwell

worker search effort as an amplification mechanism abstract it is well known that the diamond mortensen pissarides model exhibits a strong trade off between cyclical unemployment fluctuations and the size of rents to employment introducing endogenous job search effort reduces the strength of the trade off while bringing the model closer to the data ignoring worker search effort leads to a large upward bias in the elasticity of matches with respect to vacancies merging the american time use survey and the current population survey new evidence in support of procyclical search effort is presented average search effort of the unemployed is subject to cyclical composition biases

the determinants of equilibrium unemployment the paper takes the search and matching model of the aggregate labor market to the data it tests the model s empirical validity and employs structural estimation to generate a characterization of the optimal behavior of firms and workers the model is applied to israeli data that are uniquely suited for this kind of empirical investigation the structural estimates are used to quantify the frictions embodied in the model including the costs of search the congestion and trading externality effects and the matching process a calibration simulation analysis then studies the effect of several key variables on equilibrium unemployment

the role of workfare in striking a balance between incentives and insurance in the labour market unemployment insurance tends to distort incentives in the labour market affecting job search and wage formation adversely we show in a search matching model that this moral hazard problem can be reduced by attaching a workfare requirement to the eligibility conditions for claiming unemployment benefits even when workfare has no effects on human capital or productivity it is possible to improve labour market performance to create more jobs and lower unemployment by the introduction of workfare and also to improve welfare hence the incentive structure in the labour market can be improved by workfare policies rather than benefit reductions

sorting by search intensity abstract in this paper i characterize matching in an on the job search model with endogenous search intensity heterogeneous workers and firms and match surplus is shared between workers and firms through bargaining i provide proof of existence and uniqueness of steady state equilibrium given equally efficient matched and unmatched search the worker skill conditional distribution of firm productivity over matches is stochastically increasing decreasing in worker skill if the production function is supermodular submodular i also show that this strong notion of sorting does not obtain everywhere for the firm productivity conditional match distribution

the pervasive absence of compensating differentials we study the relation between individual preferences for job amenities e g type of work job security and compensating wage differentials in cross section to this end we estimate a partial equilibrium job search model on panel data from eight european countries there are five non wage job characteristics and two sources of job to job mobility on the job search and reallocation shocks we also allow for two types of unobserved heterogeneity we find strong preferences for amenities especially job security yet these preferences do not translate into significant wage differentials in cross section counterfactual experiments show that one would need extremely low levels of search frictions for compensating differentials to arise lastly a similar exercise on the distribution of job change outcomes reveals the role of constrained job to job mobility in the absence of compensating wage differentials copyright 2009 john wiley sons ltd

unemployment fluctuations match quality and the wage cyclicality of new hires we revisit the issue of the high cyclicality of wages of new hires we show that after controlling for composition effects likely involving procyclical upgrading of job match quality the wages of new hires are no more cyclical than those of existing workers the key implication is that the sluggish behaviour of wages for existing workers is a better guide to the cyclicality of the marginal cost of labour than is the high measured cyclicality of new hires wages unadjusted for composition effects key to our identification is distinguishing between new hires from unemployment versus those who are job changers we argue that to a reasonable approximation the wages of the former provide a composition free estimate of the wage flexibility while the same is not true for the latter we then develop a quantitative general equilibrium model with sticky wages via staggered contracting on the job search and heterogeneous match quality and show that it can account for both the panel data evidence and aggregate evidence on labour market volatility

an empirical model of wage dispersion with sorting we estimate an equilibrium on the job search model with endogenous search intensity workers differ by skill firms by productivity workers respond to mismatch by intensive search and sorting may result from complementarities in the match level production function the model is estimated on danish matched employer employee data firms are ranked through revealed preference by the fraction of hires that is poached from other firms the poaching rank identification is obtained by firm rank conditional mobility and wage patterns wage variation is decomposed into four sources sorting 40 worker heterogeneity 32 firm heterogeneity 18 and frictional competition 10 a social planner can improve output net of search cost by 1 5 relative to the decentralized solution