politics growth and inequality in rural china does it pay to join the party abstract economic reform is often constrained because rank and file bureaucrats responsible for implementation have vested interests that oppose change drawing on an unusual longitudinal survey data set for a representative rural county in northern china we show an alternative positive scenario consistent with the presence of an implicit performance based incentive contract that ties the household incomes of local officials to market liberalization increases in consumer demand and the provision of local public goods the mechanisms appear to be tolerated as the fruits of growth are shared fairly equitably thus allowing implementation of a politically and economically self reinforcing reform process

market structure and market outcomes in deregulated rail freight markets abstract using cross section data on a national sample of city pair markets for rail freight i examine correlations between prices quantities and the number of single line and interline firms serving markets i estimate the reduced form of a structural model in which rail rates and quantities depend on the number of firms i find that rates increase as the number of firms serving the market falls and quantities shipped rise as the number of firms falls the result is consistent with market power for rail freight shippers that causes markups to rise when fewer firms serve the market and is not consistent with other explanations of the relationship between number of firms and rates and quantities interline shipment is much more costly than single line suggesting that mergers may be desirable even if they exacerbate market power problems

interfirm rivalry in a repeated game an empirical test of tacit collusion rivalry in the vancouver retail gasoline market is modeled as a repeated game service station demand cost and intertemporal reaction functions are estimated from daily data on individual station prices costs and sales these functions are then used to calculate noncooperative and cooperative solutions to the constitutent game and the actual outcome of the repeated game the actual outcome is found to be substantially less lucrative than the monopoly solution nevertheless all stations are better off than if they played their noncooperative strategies in every period copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

accounting rates of return many economic studies provide empirical evidence regarding cross sectional differences in firm profitability in most of these studies firm profitability is measured by an accounting rate of return net income dividend by the book value of assets hereafter arr rather than an economic rate of profit franklin fisher and john mcgowan define the firm s economic rate of profit irr as that interest rate which equates the present value of its net revenue stream to its initial outlay 1983 p 82 fisher and mcgowan examine the analytic relation between a firm s arr and its irr in a series of examples and conclude that the arr is such a bad surrogate for the irr that the results of arr based empirical studies are likely to be totally misleading p 91 william long and david ravenscraft 1984 have criticized the theoretical work of fisher and mcgowan because the nature of the analytic relationship between the arr and the irr in the context of highly simplified hypothetical examples may not be indicative of the nature of the relationship in empirical settings their criticism adopts the utilitarian view that the arr has to be treated as a suitable surrogate for the irr as long as no preferable alternative measure of profitability is available for empirical work this view has merit as long as the measurement error which is contained in the arr is random rather than systematic unfortunately the nature and extent of the measurement error which is contained in the arr in a particular empirical setting can only be determined unequivocally if the irr is unequivocally known in such a case of course there would be no need to rely on the arr at all due to this unhappy circle empirical research on firm profitability has continued to rely on the arr despite the fact that many persons reasonably believe that the results of such research may be totally misleading fisher and mcgowan g c harcourt 1965 while others reasonably believe that the results are reliable enough to form a basis for policy decisions long and ravenscraft recent work by y ijiri 1978 1979 1980 and by myself 1982 has shown that conditional irr estimates can be obtained from data in firms financial statements while these irr estimates are conditional they do abstract from certain extraneous factors that influence arrs and that differ across firms consequently the conditional irr estimates are free from some of the sources of measurement error which are known to contaminate the arr thus the conditional irr estimates can be used to provide evidence on whether these sources of measurement error have or have not affected the outcome of prior studies in which profitability was measured by the arr such evidence can help to objectively resolve the conflict between the opposing views on the reliability of arr based profitability research this paper uses conditional irr estimates to examine the properties of the measurement error in the arr in a study of the relationship between firm profitability and firm size the remainder of the paper is organized as follows in section i the theoretical work of fisher and mcgowan is used professor of accounting university of iowa iowa city ia 52242 i gratefully acknowledge the comments of william albrecht dan dhaliwal gary fethke franklin fisher scott linn william r kinney jr and the participants of a workshop at the university of florida on earlier versions of this paper 1 some authors for example william long and david ravenscraft 1984 have used the sales margin ratio earnings sales as a measure of profitability however if one views profitability as return per unit of sacrifice the sales margin ratio is not a profitability measure since it ignores the sacrifice or investment required to generate a dollar of sales consequently this paper does not attempt to shed any insight into prior studies that have relied on the sales margin ratio as a measure of profitability

wage vacancy contracts and coordination frictions abstract we consider a directed search model with risk averse workers and risk neutral entrepreneurs who can set up firms that post wage vacancy contracts i e contracts where firms can make payments to more than one applicant and where the payments can be different for each applicant and be contingent on the number of applicants we establish that the type of contracts the literature focuses on are not offered if firms can post wage vacancy contracts we show that there exists an equilibrium satisfying a monotonic expected utility property which is efficient furthermore we investigate the role of wage vacancy contracts on welfare and competition

competitive search equilibrium in this paper i construct an equilibrium for markets with frictions which is competitive in the sense that all agents are price takers and maximize utility subject to a set of market parameters i show that the equilibrium allocation is socially optimal i also show how the competitive search equilibrium can be achieved if employers with vacancies can advertise publicly the wages they pay

dictator loyal and opportunistic agents the soviet archives on creating the soviet economic system studies of the mature soviet economy focus on the structuralweaknesses of rent seeking and corruption such an economy ispresumed to perform better in its adolescent phase under astrong stationary bandit dictator dedicated to growth andable to control rent seekers we use the recently openedsoviet state and party archives to show the process that beganin the 1930s of transforming the inner circle of the sovietstationary bandit into a rent seeking bureaucracy lackinglong term goals

a study of cartel stability the joint executive committee 1880 1886 this article employs weekly time series data on the joint executive committee railroad cartel from 1880 to 1886 to test empirically the proposition that observed prices reflected switches from collusive to noncooperative behavior an equilibrium model of dynamic oligopoly with asymmetric firms together with explicit functional form assumptions about costs and demand determines the estimating equations and stochastic structure of the econometric model the hypothesis that no switch took place so that price and quantity movements were solely attributable to exogenous shifts in the demand and cost functions is then tested against this alternative and rejected

interpreting a correlation between market structure and performance certain types of controlled experiments may enable causal inferences to be made about the relationship between two variables other types of experiments can be used to deal with the not completely unrelated notions of consistency in estimation exogeneity of variables and with temporal ordering generally however causal interpretations of a relationship are simply imposed on the data by appeal to an underlying theory in this paper we shall examine the theoretical basis of profits concentration correlations arguing that such correlations cannot be given a causal interpretation of the conventional kind running from structure to performance section iii 1 lest this conclusion seem to undermine the basis for anti trust policy we shall also argue that such erroneous causal interpretations are unnecessary in making a case for intervention based on structure although they do direct attention towards inappropriate targets profits concentration regressions play a role it will be argued mainly in the derivation of intervention rules section iii while the causal interpretation of co efficients is our primary concern here there is also a sense in which correlations can be interpreted as measuring the known but unobserved parameters of a model imposed on the data and we shall close section iv with a few remarks on this second issue

testing hypotheses about firm behavior in the cigarette industry data on the effects of excise taxes are used to investigate the level of competition in the cigarette industry a lower bound on the numbers equivalent of firms in the context of the conjectural variations model is derived and estimated results point to at least a moderately high level of competition and in particular allow for the rejection of the perfect cartel model this paper relies on comparative statics results and hence circumvents recent criticisms of a study of monopoly behavior in the cigarette industry

changes in the structure of public housing provision in urban china housing provision in a socialist country is generally characterised by the dominance of public housing however provision of public housing is a complicated process which involves various social agencies in the case of china the simple notion of state provision covers huge differences between municipally managed and work unit housing the lack of understanding in the structure of public housing provision has led to unsuccessful efforts in promoting the commercialisation of housing in recent years this paper adopting a perspective of structure of housing provision shp attempts to examine the changes in public sector housing in china and to reveal the critical role of state work units in the shp housing reform has led to some significant changes in the shp the transformation however is far from a process of commercialisation or privatisation of public housing stock on the production side work units do withdraw themselves from direct involvement in housing construction however on the con

a graphical exposition of the economic theory of regulation i introduction historically many if not most economic theories have advanced in three fairly distinct stages progressing from descriptive to graphical to mathematical formulations generally in that sequence the economic theory of regulation however has been an exception to this normal order of progression the fundamental corpus of this theory was laid out initially in the descriptive discussions provided by stigler 1971 posner 1974 and others from these early presentations however the theory was subsequently formalized mathematically by peltzman 1976 and becker 1983 without passing through the graphical stage of its development 1 regardless of the chronological order of the progression of this theory however we believe that a fully developed graphical exposition is likely to be of considerable value even now at least two considerations support this view specifically by making this theory more accessible to a wider audience and by better illustrating the basic underlying mechanics behind it the likelihood of significant future advancement we believe is enhanced indeed currently there remain a number of observed regulatory phenomena that have yet to be satisfactorily explained by the existing theory e g the deregulation movement and the specific pattern of observed cross subsidies 2 an improved understanding of the fundamental components of the theory should facilitate its further advancement and lead to an expanded ability to explain a broader range of regulatory practices we illustrate this point through a variety of applications to provide an improved understanding of inter alia the markets likely to be chosen for regulation the propensity of regulatory benefits to be spread across interest groups the symbiotic nature of regulation and cross subsidization and the economics of deregulation we also are able to depict graphically the relationship between the economic theory of regulation and the traditional normative model of regulation which assumes that regulators maximize social welfare the article is organized as follows in section ii we briefly describe the regulator s general optimization problem viz what precisely is being maximized and what constraints apply to that maximization problem the latter topic the constraints will be of primary interest here section iii presents the formal graphical analysis of these constraints by deriving what we label the regulator s benefits budget constraint as its name suggests the benefits budget constraint defines the locus of maximum benefits the regulator is able to deliver to the affected interest groups importantly that constraint is determined by the prior unregulated market equilibrium price and output and by general market parameters such as demand elasticity costs and so on section iv describes the resulting regulatory equilibrium section v then applies the graphical tools developed in sections ii iv to explain a number of commonly observed regulatory phenomena here both the ability to provide new insights and the pedagogical value of the graphical approach are illustrated finally section vi concludes ii the regulator s general optimization problem the economic theory of regulation postulates that regulators will attempt to maximize some objective function most generally the regulator s utility by implementing regulatory policies that benefit and by necessity harm particular interest groups 3 the benefits provided to these groups are then used to purchase from them the objects that are directly valued by the regulator that is the direct arguments contained in the regulator s objective function the distribution of these benefits and harms across the affected groups which is determined by the regulator s choice of a particular regulatory policy is selected to maximize the value of the regulator s objective function the ability of any specific interest group to curry regulatory favor then will depend on the capacity of that group to deliver the objects of value to the regulator in exchange for the benefits provided by the regulatory process

measurement of monopoly behavior an application to the cigarette industry a simple scheme is proposed to measure monopoly pricing behavior the coefficient of the tax rate term in a price equation identifies the ratio of price to marginal cost no direct measurement of costs is required so a major problem for other empirical studies of monopoly is avoided empirical results for cross section time series data support rejection of atomistic competition but also provide evidence against the operation of an effective cartel in the cigarette industry the model represents an alternative interpretation of related results in a recent paper by barzel application of the methodology to other markets is feasible

market specific effects of rail deregulation since partial deregulation of the railroad industry in 1980 real rail rates have fallen yet previous studies are inconclusive in identifying deregulation as the reason for lower rates in this paper the author develops a model that tests a variety of deregulation effects on the rates charged for transporting thirty four different commodities the results suggest that deregulation has significantly affected almost all commodities and that the effects vary by commodity and through time initially deregulation increased rates for some commodities had no effect on others and decreased rates on still others however by 1988 deregulation lowered rates significantly for almost all commodities copyright 1994 by blackwell publishing ltd

directed search and the bertrand paradox i study a directed search model of oligopolistic competition extended to incorporate general capacity constraints congestion effects and pricing based on ex post demand in the presence of any one of these ingredients the bertrand paradox fails to hold hence despite the emphasis that has been placed by the literature on sellers capacity constraints as a resolution to the paradox the existence of such constraints is only a subcase of a general class of environments where the paradox fails specifically bertrand s paradox will not arise whenever the buyers expected utility from visiting a seller is decreasing in that seller s realized demand

oligopoly supergames some empirical evidence on prices and margins this paper is a panel data study on the behavior of prices and margins of oligopolies involved in repeated games the authors examine two supergame models which generate very different predictions about the cyclical behavior of prices and margins evidence on the levels of price cost margins indicates that oligopolies achieve equilibria that more closely resemble a one shot cournot nash outcome than monopoly the authors find however that industries with high price cost margins exhibit cyclical price behavior which is quite different from that of unconcentrated industries little evidence of price wars during either recessions or booms is found copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

imperfect competition in auction designs we study the competition between two owners of identical goods who wish to sell them to a pool of potential buyers the sellers compete simultaneously setting reserve prices for their second price sealed bid auctions upon observing the set reserve prices the buyers decide simultaneously in which auction to bid we show that this game has at least one equilibrium and that all equilibria are inefficient reserve prices are not driven to zero cost we also discuss where and why the parallel between optimal auction design and optimal pricing in the case of monopoly breaks down for oligopoly

directed search with multiple job applications we develop an equilibrium directed search model of the labor market where workers can simultaneously apply for multiple jobs the main result is that all equilibria exhibit wage dispersion despite the fact that workers and firms are homogeneous wage dispersion is driven by the simultaneity of application choice risk neutral workers apply for both safe and risky jobs the former yield a high probability of a job oer but for low pay and act as a fallback option the latter provide with higher potential payo but are harder to get furthermore the density of posted wages is decreasing consistent with stylized facts unlike most directed search models the equilibria are not constrained ecient

a theory of market transition from redistribution to markets in state socialism state socialist redistributive economies are characterized by the allocation and distribution of goods through central planning this paper develops a theory of market transition which argues that in reforming socialist economies the transition from redistributive to market coordination shifts sources of power and privilege to favor direct producers relative to redistributors the shit improves incentives for direct producers stimulates the growth of private markets and provides to entrepreneurs an alternative path for socioeconomic mobility a set of hypotheses test the market transition theory with householdand village level data

persistent wage dispersion and involuntary unemployment it is costly for firms offers to workers to be turned down both because firms must make additional offers and making offers is costly and because capital is underused or unused provided that workers apply to at least two firms for jobs there will be wage dispersion in equilibrium and some workers will randomly fail to receive any wage offers firms in the same industry with access to the same technology may nevertheless choose different levels of capital intensity firms using capital intensive technologies will pay higher wages

the convergence of profits in the long run inter firm and inter industry comparisons this paper considers the extent to which the short run dynamic behavior and long run equilibrium levels of profitability differ among firms within the same industry movements in profits are modeled in terms of firm specific deviations from average industry profits and industry specific deviations from economy wide average returns applied to a sample of 217 large u k firms 1951 77 the results suggest that considerable heterogeneities exist within most industries that is most firms profitability experience differs considerably from those of their closest rivals copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

directed search and firm size standard directed search models predict that larger firms pay lower wages than smaller firms contrary to the data this article proposes one way to obtain this positive size wage differential in a directed search setting i posit that there is an optimal size associated with a firm a firm suffers a penalty by not operating at its optimal size i show that if this penalty is sufficiently large the size wage differential will be obtained my model also gives a new way to look at the data because it highlights the importance of the distinction between intended and realized firm sizes

equilibrium wage dispersion and interindustry wage differentials this paper develops a search theoretic explanation of interindustry wage differentials given coordination problems in the labor market the probability of filling a vacancy is an increasing function of the wage offered in equilibrium firms that find vacancies more costly will offer higher wages the model thus explains the persistence of interindustry wage differentials and their correlation with industry average capital labor ratio and profitability additionally the model predicts that high wage firms will receive more applications per job opening and that wages in the labor market will behave as strategic complements

health human capital height and wages in china abstract we estimate the returns to height using data from 12 chinese cities we present both ordinary least squares ols and two stage least squares tsls estimates in the latter height is instrumented using proxies for health human capital accumulated in childhood and adolescence which influence adult height the tsls estimates are much higher reflecting the fact that the ols estimates are determined by the random genetic factors influencing height while the tsls estimates also take into account returns from investment in health human capital during childhood and adolescence these results imply considerable returns to investment in health human capital

measuring the multilateral allocation of rents wyoming low sulfur coal this article develops a general econometric procedure for determining the amount of rent captured by buyers and sellers of goods produced under any market structure we use this technique to measure the rents earned by firms involved in the extraction transportation and consumption of low sulfur wyoming coal statistical results indicate that railroads and coal producers each capture about 23 of potential rent while the state and purchasing utilities capture 7 and 47 respectively further statistical tests support the hypothesis that rents have shifted towards the railroads since their deregulation in 1980 we also examine the extent of discriminatory pricing by relating the percentage markups of price over estimated marginal cost to the demand elasticity for coal we find evidence of price discrimination by coal producers and railroads but the degree of price discrimination exercised by coal producers declines with more recent contracts

mechanism design by competing sellers a dynamic model with many sellers and buyers is constructed agents failing to trade may trade in the next period an equilibrium is found where sellers hold identical auctions and buyers randomize over the sellers they visit the distribution of buyer valuations is endogenous an auction with efficient reserve is an optimal mechanism from each seller s point of view in spite of the ability of any seller to alter the distribution of buyer types participating in the seller s mechanism by altering the mechanism copyright 1993 by the econometric society

business cycles and the relationship between concentration and price cost margins using a newly constructed panel data base we examine changes in price cost margins in 284 manufacturing industries between 1958 and 1981 a key finding is a dramatic narrowing of the spread between the margins of concentrated and unconcentrated industries over this period we provide evidence that this narrowing is a result of the greater sensitivity of price cost margins in more concentrated industries to demand fluctuations this finding is robust to the inclusion of other industry variables and to measures of import competition the results indicate that cross sectional estimates of the concentration margins relationship are likely to be both biased and misleading

in pursuit of monopoly power recent quantitative work in industrial economics this paper reviews empirical work in industrial organization devoted to the question of inferring the existence of monopoly power from data on observed market outcomes like profits and prices the discussion covers inter industry work long conventional in the area newer developments in intra industry analysis and case studies and concludes with some remarks on a small but growing body of work assessing market dynamics the wide range of studies reviewed all generally reveal that market power exists in many industries

enjoying the quiet life under deregulation evidence from adjusted lerner indices for u s banks abstract the quiet life hypothesis posits that firms with market power incur inefficiencies rather than reap monopolistic rents we propose a simple adjustment to lerner indices to account for the possibility of forgone rents to test this hypothesis for a large sample of u s commercial banks we find that adjusted lerner indices are significantly larger than conventional lerner indices and trending upward over time instrumental variable regressions reject the quiet life hypothesis for cost inefficiencies however lerner indices adjusted for profit inefficiencies reveal a quiet life among u s banks

getting personal networks and stratification in the russian labor market 1985 2001 the authors use employment histories from survey data to examine personal network use and stratification in the russian labor market from 1985 to 2001 institutional changes associated with the soviet collapse increased the use of networks and shaped their prevalence and benefits in theoretically coherent ways in russia networks positively affect job quality whether measured by occupation current earnings or wage arrears these findings relate to recent debates over whether job contacts provide advantages and how social capital relates to postsocialist inequalities involving gender communist party membership and education russia also exhibits a previously overlooked relationship between network use and locality type

why join the party in a one party system popularity versus political exchange the paper investigates empirically the determinants of political stability in one party states taking as an example socialist yugoslavia we assume that the number of the party members is an indicator of the stability of the regime and perform a time series analysis for the six yugoslav republics in the 1953 1988 period we find that rents distributed to the population were far more important than the popularity of economic policies and perhaps even more important than repression these findings provide strong empirical support for economic models of dictatorship based on the notion of political exchange

market structure capacity expansion and pricing a model applied to the japanese iron and steel industry abstract the main objective of this paper is to study empirically the simultaneous and recursive relations between short run pricing capacity decision and fluctuations in the elements of market structure for this purpose a time series industry model was constructed and applied to the japanese iron and steel industry for 1957 1975 the statistical results imply that over time industry market structure especially seller concentration might change endogenously in the system the model also indicated that seller concentration as an element of market structure was a significant determinant of short run domestic and export prices and also had a significant effect on the capacity decisions these findings support the proposition that market structure affects market conduct at any moment in time while it is some degree shaped by past market conduct or behavior and structure

coal rates and revenue adequacy in a quasi regulated rail industry this article considers whether equitable rates to captive coal shippers are compatible with competitive rates of return in the rail industry using the results of a translog cost function based on panel data of class i railroads for 1974 1986 i show that returns to scale are sufficiently large to cause coal rates to rise to socially unacceptable levels if coal shippers have to bear the entire revenue burden moreover even if noncoal traffic makes a contribution to overhead the revenue burden on coal traffic is still substantial and would require increases in coal rates that are probably neither politically nor economically feasible

does compulsory school attendance affect schooling and earnings we establish that season of birth is related to educational attainment because of school start age policy and compulsory school attendance laws individuals born in the beginning of the year start school at an older age and can therefore drop out after completing less schooling than individuals born near the end of the year roughly 25 percent of potential dropouts remain in school because of compulsory schooling laws we estimate the impact of compulsory schooling on earnings by using quarter of birth as an instrument for education the instrumental variables estimate of the return to education is close to the ordinary least squares estimate suggesting that there is little bias in conventional estimates every developed country in the world has a compulsory schooling requirement yet little is known about the effect these laws have on educational attainment and earnings 1 this paper exploits an unusual natural experiment to estimate the impact of compulsory schooling laws in the united states the experiment stems from the fact that children born in different months of the year start school at different ages while compulsory schooling laws generally require students to remain in school until their sixteenth or seventeenth birthday in effect the interaction of school entry requirements and compulsory schooling laws compel students born

railroad deregulation pricing reforms shipper responses and the effects on labor the staggers rail act of 1980 relaxed restrictions on pricing and eased abandonment procedures in the railroad industry although the act made virtually no reference to labor its impact on labor has been dramatic the long term contraction of industry employment accelerated quite sharply after 1980 wages increased until 1985 then declined substantially the authors whose empirical analysis uses data on aggregate rail employment for the years 1963 90 current population survey data for 1973 88 and evidence from collective bargaining agreements for 1971 90 argue that pricing adjustments under the staggers act led to changes in shipper behavior which in turn allowed for large declines in the derived demand for rail labor despite increasing output and the observed pattern of wage change followed from the realization of the act s eventual effects on employment

market structure and price cost margins in a paper that has become a standard reference in the structure conductperformance approach to industrial economics cowling and waterson 1976 developed a theoretical rationale for expecting industry profitability to be positively correlated with the level of concentration their model based on a simple algebraic description of oligopoly behaviour has been interpreted as providing a justification for the common empirical practice of cross industry regression analysis of price cost margins in terms of concentration levels in the present paper we show that on further examination this model implies a joint determination of margins and concentration this provides some interesting comparative static results of relevance to inter industry differences in concentration levels equally however it leads to various cautionary insights concerning the meaning of price cost margin versus concentration regressions

income distribution in urban china during the period of economic reform and globalization this paper addresses three issues that are central to understanding the effects of the transition in china from central planning to a more market oriented economic system first what have been the consequences of the economic reforms for the distribution of income in urban areas second what has happened to the incidence of urban poverty third have government policies helped to diminish or accentuate urban poverty and inequality answers to these questions are based on a comparison of two national sample surveys conducted in 1988 and 1995

the revelation and delegation principles in common agency games in the context of common agency adverse selection games we illustrate that the revelation principle cannot be applied to study equilibria of the multi principal games we then demonstrate that an extension of the taxation principle what we term the delegation principle can be used to characterize the set of all common agency equilibria this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

opec behavior a test of alternative hypotheses since interpretations of past and future oil price patterns depends on the model chosen the author tests and compares alternative theories of opec as a first step in validating the choice on any one model the results show that among opec countries the partial market sharing cartel model is the only model not rejected by at least some of the 11 members and gives the best explanation of production in comparison with 11 non opec countries the competitive model could not be rejected for 10 of the 11 non opec producers this raises the question of why if opec is a cartel friedman s predictions have not come true and introduces new questions for future research 19 references 3 tables

directed search coordination failure and seller profits an experimental comparison of posted pricing with single and multiple prices we experimentally examine posted pricing and directed search in one treatment capacity constrained sellers post fixed prices which buyers observe before choosing whom to visit in the other firms post both single buyer applied when one buyer visits and multibuyer when multiple buyers visit prices we find based on a 2 2 two buyers and two sellers market and a follow up experiment with 3 and 2 3 markets that multibuyer prices can be lower than single buyer prices or prices in the one price treatment also allowing the multibuyer price does not affect seller profits and increases market frictions

equalizing discrimination and cartel pricing in transport rate regulation there are two possible outcomes of transport regulation 1 maintaining a carrier cartel and 2 imposing equalizing discrimination against advantaged and in favor of disadvantaged shippers both functions have required a complex rate structure to enforce the respective forms of price discrimination using a sample of freight bills from motor carriers and railroads this paper demonstrates that the principal result of motor carrier regulation has been to maintain a cartel of truckers while railroad regulation has thwarted the wishes of the railroad cartel by imposing equalizing discrimination on weak and strong shippers motor carrier rates respond in an economically rational manner to costs and shipper bargaining power rail rates are either unresponsive or perversely responsive to the same factors deregulation should have divergent effects in the two industries

entry barriers and multiproduct oligopolies do they forebear or spoil abstract we provide a flexible method to test for a variety of multiproduct oligopolistic models and to estimate the relevance of entry conditions on industrial conduct we find that for the case of the uruguayan banking sector during the late 1970s multiproduct oligopolistic interactions were present however the partial relaxation of legal entry barriers substantially removed the multiproduct nature of these interactions

conjectures firm characteristics and market structure abstract this paper makes use of a unique data set to investigate how firms in the vancouver british columbia retail gasoline market view their rivals and how consumers in turn view these firms own and rival price elasticities of demand conjectural variations and lerner indices are estimated for thirteen service stations in a submarket of vancouver these variables are then related to firm characteristics such as type of ownership degree of horizontal and vertical integration and type of service in this way systematic patterns in seller behavior and in buyer attitudes are revealed

holdups and efficiency with search frictions a natural holdup problem arises in a market with search frictions firms have to make a range of investments before finding their employees and larger investments translate into higher wages in particular when wages are determined by ex post bargaining the equilibrium is always inefficient recognizing that capital intensive production relations have to pay higher wages firms reduce their investments this can only be prevented by removing all the bargaining power from the workers but this in turn depresses wages below their social product and creates excessive entry of firms in contrast to this benchmark we show that efficiency is achieved when firms post wages and workers can direct their search toward more attractive offers this efficiency result generalizes to an environment with imperfect information where workers only observe a few of the equilibrium wage offers we show that the underlying reason for efficiency is not wage posting per se but the ability of workers to direct their search toward more capital intensive jobs

wage vacancy contracts and multiplicity of equilibria in a directed search model of the labour market this paper studies a directed search model of the labour market which is standard in all aspects except two first we allow firms to post wage vacancy contracts advertising the number of workers they would pay as well as the payment all will receive second we consider two cases one where workers are risk neutral and one where workers are risk averse both in finite and large economies our paper shows that when firms post wage vacancy contracts whether workers are modelled as risk neutral or risk averse matters the types of symmetric equilibria and the nature of multiplicity of equilibria are different somewhat surprisingly when there are finite numbers of risk neutral workers and firms we obtain a finite number of symmetric equilibria but when workers are risk averse we obtain a continuum of equilibria furthermore our paper sounds a cautionary note on using large economies as an approximation of finite economies when workers are risk neutral the nature of equilibrium is preserved going from a finite to a large economy but the nature of equilibrium is different when workers are risk averse les contrats salaire emploi et la multiplicite des equilibres au sein d un modele de recherche dirigee applique au marche du travail cet article etudie un modele de recherche dirigee applique au marche du travail qui differe du modele standard en deux points premierement les entreprises peuvent proposer des contrats dits salaire emploi qui en plus du salaire indiquent le nombre de travailleurs qu un employeur est dispose a recruter deuxiemement nous considerons deux cas un ou les travailleurs ne presentent pas d aversion au risque et l autre ou ils sont averses au risque a chaque fois pour des economies avec une nombre fini puis infini d agents l article demontre que la presence ou non d aversion au risque a de l importance quand les entreprises peuvent proposer des contrats salaire emploi car les types d equilibres symetriques et la nature des multiplicites different dans les deux cas par exemple si l on considere une economie avec un nombre fini de travailleurs il existe un nombre fini d equilibres symetriques lorsque les travailleurs ne presentent pas d aversion au risque alors qu il en existe un continuum lorsque les travailleurs sont averses au risque qui plus est l article invite a la prudence en utilisant une economie a nombre infini d agents comme approximation d une economie peuplee d un nombre fini d agents car en allant de l une a l autre la nature des equilibres est preservee dans le cas de travailleurs ne presentant pas d aversion au risque alors qu elle change lorsque les travailleurs sont averses au risque

auctions vs fixed pricing competing for budget constrained buyers abstract we investigate price mechanism selection in a setting where sellers compete for budget constrained buyers by adopting either fixed pricing or auctions first or second price we show that first and second price auctions are payoff equivalent when some bidders are financially constrained so sellers are indifferent to adopt either format we characterize possible equilibria and show that if the budget is high then sellers compete via fixed pricing if it is low then they compete via auctions and if it is moderate then they mix so both mechanisms coexist the budget constraint becomes less binding if sellers use entry fees interestingly an improvement of the budget e g letting customers pay in installments may lead to fewer trades and a loss of efficiency

rent seeking and the two track price system in china a simple general equilibrium model is specified to analyse the impact on the chinese economy of the introduction of a two track price system on to a centrally planned economy it is shown that national income will rise as a result together with a fall in the costs associated with rent seeking some estimates of welfare gains and costs of rent seeking are provided for seven commodities within a partial equilibrium framework they are shown to be dependent on the price elasticities of demand and supply the latter determine the ratio of plan to market prices and the share of plan in total output

directed search and optimal production abstract i consider a model of directed search where strategic sellers advertise general trading mechanisms a mechanism determines the number of buyers that will get served and the side payments as a function of ex post realized demand buyers observe these advertisements and visit one seller without being able to coordinate their visiting strategies despite the oligopolistic nature of the model all symmetric equilibria are constrained efficient in small markets multiple equilibria exist that are not payoff equivalent this indeterminacy vanishes as the market grows large i provide closed form solutions for equilibrium prices profits and the matching function under any parameter values

directed search with multi vacancy firms abstract i construct a directed search model in which firms decide whether to enter a market and how many positions to create within this framework the number of firms and the size of each firm are determined endogenously wages play an allocative role in the matching process and the frictions inherent in this process derive from the equilibrium behavior of workers and firms i characterize the unique equilibrium comparative statics generate testable implications for cross sectional variation in matching efficiency as well as the dynamic behavior of vacancies and unemployment moreover allowing for ex ante heterogeneity across firms the model can easily and naturally generate the observed relationship between firm size wages profitability and hiring

pricing and matching with frictions suppose that n buyers each want one unit and m sellers each have one or more units of a good sellers post prices and then buyers choose sellers in symmetric equilibrium similar sellers all post one price and buyers randomize hence more or fewer buyers may arrive than a seller can accommodate we call this frictions we solve for prices and the endogenous matching function for finite n and m and consider the limit as n and m grow the matching function displays decreasing returns but converges to constant returns we argue that the standard matching function in the literature is misspecified and discuss implications for the beveridge curve

wage differentials of transportation industries deregulation versus regulation this article investigates the wage differentials of similar occupations in three for hire transportation carrier industries railroad truck and motor bus under regulation and deregulation the estimation results indicate that the union wage gaps among all occupations have widened under deregulation specifically the union wages of railroad occupations have increased relative to those of truck drivers and the union wages of truck drivers have increased relative to those of motor bus drivers further wage gaps for all occupations for this period are greater among nonunion than among union workers jel l92 i introduction economic regulation of u s transportation carrier industries has been classified into three distinct eras the monopoly regulatory era the competition regulatory era and the regulatory reform era beginning in the late 1800s the 1930s and the 1970s talley 1983 these eras addressed carrier abuses destructive intramodal and intermodal competition and the negative impacts of regulation respectively the 1887 interstate commerce act sought to prevent monopolistic abuses and limit discriminatory practices of railroads the motor carrier act of 1935 of the competition regulatory era placed motor carriers freight and passenger under federal regulation by the 1970s advocates for federal regulatory reform argued that economic regulation protected inefficient carriers promoted high rates and fares and in general fostered an inefficient allocation of resources subsequently a number of deregulation or regulatory reform acts were passed including the railroad revitalization and regulatory reform act of 1976 the staggers rail act of 1980 the motor carrier act of 1980 and the bus regulatory reform act of 1982 though shippers and passengers have generally benefited from transportation deregulation paying lower real rates and fares the impact on carrier labor earnings has been negative for example the real weekly wages of union railroad engineers have declined 11 7 talley and schwarz miller 1998 the real hourly wages of union and nonunion for hire truck carrier drivers have declined 23 and 10 hirsch and macpherson 1998 and the real hourly wages of both union and nonunion for hire motor bus carrier drivers have declined 17 schwarz miller and talley 1994 the impact of deregulation however on the relative labor earnings of transportation carrier industries is unknown specifically have wage differentials changed from those of the regulation period if so have these differentials widened narrowed under deregulation thereby increasing decreasing the gap in the labor earnings of one industry relative to those of another do the changes in wage differentials differ for union and nonunion labor the purpose of this article is to investigate occupational wage differentials among transportation industries under regulation and deregulation as intermodal competition intensifies such information is expected to play a more important role in industry wage negotiations wage differentials of similar occupations in three for hire carrier industries under regulation and deregulation are estimated the three industries are the railroad truck and motor bus industries and the occupations include railroad engineers conductors and brakemen switchmen truck drivers and motor bus drivers the estimation results indicate that the union wages of railroad occupations have increased relative to those of truck drivers and the union wages of truck drivers have increased relative to those of motor bus drivers during the postderegulation period further wage gaps for all occupations for this period are greater among nonunion than among union workers the remainder of this article is structured as follows section ii discusses railroad truck and motor bus for hire carrier industries and in particular their labor under regulation and deregulation

liberalization and rent seeking in china s labor market communist party membership can generate labor market benefits in at least two ways first the party may hand out direct benefits to favored groups in the form of higher earnings alternatively the party may function in much the same way as education in western countries screening workers for talent and motivation we find very little evidence of earnings premiums to party membership or to cadre status prior to chinese market liberalization with liberalization comes less emphasis on being red and a greater capacity to earn wages that reflect ability both observed through schooling and identified by the party we find that party premiums are inversely related to education modest premiums to cadre status appear in 1995

efficient unemployment insurance this paper constructs a tractable general equilibrium model of search with risk aversion an increase in risk aversion reduces wages unemployment and investment unemployment insurance has the opposite effect insured workers seek high wage jobs with high unemployment risk an economy with risk neutral workers achieves maximal output without any unemployment insurance but an economy with risk averse workers requires a positive level of unemployment insurance to maximize output therefore moderate unemployment insurance not only improves risk sharing but also increases output

do markets differ much this essay reports the results of a crosssection study of differences in accounting profitability that sheds light on some basic controversies in industrial economics most previous cross section studies in this field have been concerned with testing hypotheses about structural coefficients in models meant to apply to essentially all markets as we have learned more about the difficulties of constructing such general models and of performing tests on their structural parameters properly structural cross section analysis has fallen out of fashion in contrast to most of the cross section literature the analysis reported here is fundamentally descriptive it does not attempt directly to estimate or to test hypotheses about structural parameters i hope to show by example that one can perform illuminating analysis of cross section data without a host of controversial maintained hypotheses cross section data can yield interesting stylized facts to guide both general theorizing and empirical analysis of specific industries even if they cannot easily support full blown structural estimation one can view the sort of search for stylized facts conducted here as either a replacement for or an input to interindustry structural estimation depending on one s feeling about the long run potential of that research approach this study also departs from much of the cross section literature by being fundamentally concerned with the importance of various effects not just with coefficient signs and t statistics in particular this essay provides estimates of the relative importance of firm market and market share differences in the determination of business unit divisional profitability in u s manufacturing using 1975 data from the line of business program of the u s federal trade commission ftc i find support neither for the existence of firm effects nor for the importance of market share effects moreover while industry effects apparently exist and are important they appear to be negatively correlated with seller concentration in these data section i relates firm market and share effects to current issues and controversies in industrial economics and thus supplies the motivation for our empirical analysis the remainder of the essay treats the data and

the inefficiency of regulating a competitive industry productivity gains in trucking following reform this study confirms the higher productivity levels predicted by advocates of regulatory reform in trucking and shows that these gains have been substantial cost simulations suggest that following a year of higher expenditures efforts to remain competitive have yielded considerable cost savings that increase over time from 1 percent in 1981 to 23 percent in 1984 the indirect effects of reform through the independent variables initially decrease costs but later lead to higher costs the cumulative effect has been a less than 1 percent increase in costs in 1980 becoming by 1984 a significant 16 percent productivity gain copyright 1990 by mit press

a competitive distribution of auctions in this paper a competitive distribution of auctions is described for an economy consisting of an infinite number of buyers and sellers all of whom differ according to their valuation for the single indivisible object being traded a competitive distribution of auctions is such that no seller can improve his profits by deviating to any alternative direct mechanism it is shown that the competitive distribution of auctions will have the property that each buyer and seller s best reply is independent of his beliefs about the tastes of other buyers and sellers on the market the purpose of this paper is to provide an equilibrium for an economy in which sellers compete by offering different direct mechanisms to buyers no attempt is made to give a complete characterization of all possible equilibria rather we focus on one equilibrium in which the contracts that are offered by sellers in equilibrium and buyer s behaviour under these contracts are both independent of traders beliefs about one another the equilibrium illustrates one of the reasons why contracts that are employed in practice may not be as finely tuned to beliefs as the theory of mechanism design says that they should be the answer is simply that contracts are not offered in a vacuum sellers in the model studied in this paper need to compete with one another in order to attract buyers highly tuned mechanisms tend to extract buyer surplus in such an environment sellers are able to attract many buyers by offering to use cruder mechanisms that leave some surplus for buyers in this paper sellers are allowed to have different costs for the commodity that is being traded nonetheless the equilibrium for the limit economy in which there are infinitely many buyers and sellers is such that every seller offers a second price auction and publicizes a reserve price equal to his cost in a standard monopoly auction the optimal reserve price for the seller exceeds his cost by an amount that depends on his beliefs about buyers valuations myerson 1981 a seller who raises his reserve price has his profits affected in two distinct ways by raising his reserve price the seller makes it unprofitable for some buyer types to participate in his auction the seller therefore loses any surplus that he might have earned by trading with these buyers the buyers who still find it profitable to participate in the seller s auction will end up having to pay a higher price when they win because of this increase in the seller s reserve price this means that the seller will be able to extract a bit more surplus from buyers who continue to participate the seller raises the reserve price until the marginal cost associated with raising the reserve price is just equal to the marginal gain associated with the ability to extract more surplus from remaining buyers competition mitigates this argument since there is a limit to the amount of surplus that the seller can extract from remaining buyers before they decide that they should instead choose one of the alternative auctions that are being held on the market with

compensation unionization and deregulation in the motor carrier industry abstract previous research on the deregulation of the motor carrier industry has concluded that firms have become more efficient under deregulation and that costs have fallen largely at the expense of labor most studies that examine the effects on labor use current population survey data and find that wage premiums to union labor have fallen as a result of deregulation this study uses firm data and finds that deregulation had a very small effect on the average compensation paid by surviving union firms for nonunion firms the impact of deregulation is much larger these results suggest that the compensation premium for the labor of surviving union firms has increased but this increase applies only to surviving union labor in the paper we also point to and note a major exodus of union firms with the result that union labor levels have fallen and fallen dramatically