games of fair division abstract we consider the problem of fairly allocating an indivisible good to one of several agents equally entitled to it when monetary compensations to the others are possible our primary normative concept is no envy first we show that there is no non manipulable selection from the no envy solution then we study the direct revelation games associated with subsolutions of the no envy solution the set of equilibrium allocations of any one of them coincides with the set of envy free allocations for the true preferences journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d63 d7l d82

threshold strategy proofness on manipulability in large voting problems in voting problems where agents have lipschitz continuous utility functions on a multidimensional space of alternatives a voting rule is threshold strategy proof if any agent can obtain only a limited utility gain by not voting for a most preferred alternative if the number of agents is large enough for anonymous voting rules it is shown that this condition is not only implied by but is in fact equivalent to the influence of any single agent decreasing to zero as the number of agents grows if there are at least five agents the mean rule taking the average vote is shown to be the unique anonymous and unanimous voting rule that meets a lower bound with respect to the number of agents needed to obtain threshold strategy proofness

a solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good a benevolent planner wishes to assign an indivisible private good to n claimants each valuing the object differently individuals have quasi linear preferences therefore the possibility of transfers is allowed a second best efficient mechanism is a strategy proof and anonymous mechanism that is not pareto dominated by another strategy proof and anonymous mechanism in this context we identify three conditions that are necessary and together with voluntary participation sufficient for a mechanism to be second best efficient this set includes mechanisms that destroy the good at certain profiles for domains comprising two individuals we provide an explicit characterization of the family of second best efficient mechanisms

strategy proof house allocation with price restrictions abstract this paper considers a house allocation problem with no initial ownership and where prices are bounded from below and above by exogenously given price restrictions this type of housing market contains e g the assignment market and the student placement problem as special cases a mechanism called the minimal rpe mechanism is defined and two main results are obtained first it is demonstrated that the mechanism is manipulable at some profile in the full preference domain r second it is proved that there is a subset r r of the full domain containing almost all profiles in r such that the minimal rpe mechanism is strategy proof in that subset

sticky price models of the business cycle can the contract multiplier solve the persistence problem we construct a quantitative equilibrium model with firms setting prices in a staggered fashion and use it to ask whether monetary shocks can generate business cycle fluctuations these fluctuations include persistent movements in output along with the other defining features of business cycles like volatile investment and smooth consumption we assume that prices are exogenously sticky for a short time persistent output fluctuations require endogenous price stickiness in the sense that firms choose not to change prices much when they can do so we find that for a wide range of parameter values the amount of endogenous stickiness is small thus we find that in a standard quantitative model staggered price setting alone does not generate business cycle fluctuations

large indivisibles an analysis with respect to price equilibrium and fairness an exchange economy is considered in which there are a finite number of individuals the same number of indivisibles and a fixed amount of a divisible good each individual consumes exactly one of the indivisibles and a certain quantity of the divisible good the existence of prices corresponding to pareto efficient allocations is proved it is also shown that this economy possesses fair allocations income fair allocations coalition fair allocations and pareto efficient egalitarian equivalent allocations in this study the effect of including large indivisibles in an exchange economy will be analyzed the analysis will be carried out with respect to the existence of price equilibrium and with respect to the existence of different forms of fairness the economy consists of a finite number of individuals the same number of indivisibles and a fixed amount of a divisible good it is assumed that each individual consumes exactly one of the indivisibles and some quantity of the divisible good we may interpret the indivisibles as being professions or houses the relationship between price equilibrium and a pareto efficient allocation is well known and proved in a number of cases under different assumptions about preferences and commodities for a standard economy see e g debreu 5 in case of nonconvexities which may also describe a certain type of indivisibility we may have an exact relationship in economies with a continuum of individuals see e g hildenbrand 11 but otherwise an approximate relationship obtains the degree of approximation depends on the degree of nonconvexities in preferences and not on the number of individuals see e g arrow and hahn 1 we will prove the existence of prices characterizing a pareto efficient allocation in a case where the indivisibles play an essential role and where approximate results would be too approximate the indivisibles may be considered large for the individual compared to his total consumption the theory of fairness has developed considerably during the seventies different kinds of concepts of fairness have been introduced and analyzed see daniel 41 foley 81 pazner and schmeidler 121 and schmeidler and vind 141 among others normally these authors have considered models with divisible goods or an infinite number of individuals for exchange economies the existence of fair allocations an envy free and pareto efficient allocation has been proved in

maximal manipulation of envy free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money abstract we consider the problem of the fair allocation of indivisible goods and money with non quasi linear preferences the purpose of the present study is to examine strategic manipulation under envy free solutions we show that under a certain domain richness condition each individual obtains the welfare level of his optimal envy free allocation by maximally manipulating the solutions this maximal manipulation theorem is helpful in analyzing the set of nash equilibrium allocations in the direct revelation games associated with a given envy free solution if an envy free solution satisfies a mild condition the set of nash equilibrium allocations in its associated direct revelation game coincides with that of envy free allocations

global value chain participation and current account imbalances abstract this paper draws a causal link between increased levels of global value chain participation gvcp and increases in a country s current account we document empirically that stronger gvcp is associated with larger current account balances according to our estimates cross country differences in gvcp reduce the hitherto unexplained part of current account imbalances substantially for some countries for example for the united states and japan the unexplained part of the current account falls by 75 and 50 over the sample period when controlling for their gvcp relative to the rest of the world for germany the unexplained part of the current account deficit falls by an average of 10

transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants a market design approach this paper explores a housing market with an existing tenant in each house and where the existing tenants initially rent their houses the idea is to identify equilibrium prices for the housing market given the prerequisite that a tenant can buy any house on the housing market including the one that he is currently possessing or continue renting the house he is currently occupying the main contribution is the identification of an individually rational equilibrium selecting and group non manipulable price mechanism in a restricted preference domain that contains almost all preference profiles in this restricted domain the identified mechanism is the minimum price equilibrium selecting mechanism that transfers the maximum number of ownerships to the existing tenants we also relate the theoretical model and the main findings to the u k housing act 1980 whose main objective is to transfer ownerships of houses to existing tenants

who produces for whom in the world economy la part du commerce en produits intermediaires dans le commerce international appele aussi commerce vertical n a cesse d augmenter depuis vingt ans cet article propose une nouvelle mesure du commerce international le commerce en valeur ajoutee qui re alloue les flux commerciaux aux pays et aux secteurs produisant les intrants en 2004 le commerce vertical represente 27 du commerce total les repartitions geographique et sectorielle du commerce en valeur ajoutee sont tres differentes de celles du commerce standard la difference entre le commerce en valeur ajoutee et le commerce standard est plus importante dans le cas du commerce regional mais ce n est pas plus le cas en asie qu en amerique

house allocation with transfers we consider the shapley scarf house allocation problem where monetary transfers are allowed we characterize the class of mechanisms that are strategy proof ex post individually rational ex post budget balanced and collusion proof in these mechanisms the price of each object is fixed in advance and the objects are reallocated according to the unique core assignment of the shapley scarf economy associated with the prices the special case in which all prices are zero is the core mechanism studied by shapley and scarf our mechanisms are compelling alternatives to the groves mechanisms which satisfy neither budget balance nor our condition of collusion proofness journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 c78 d71 d78 d89

house allocation with existing tenants an equivalence abstract we analyze two mechanisms designed to eliminate inefficiencies in house allocation problems where there are both existing tenants and newcomers the first mechanism chooses the unique core allocation of a sister exchange economy constructed by endowing each existing tenant with her current house and each newcomer with a random vacant house the second mechanism chooses an ordering from a given distribution and determines the final outcome as follows assign the agents the best available house one at a time following their ordering in the queue and whenever an agent demands the house of an existing tenant who is still in the line modify the queue by inserting the existing tenant at the top whenever a loop of existing tenants forms assign each of them the house she demands and proceed we show that the first mechanism is equivalent to an extreme case of the second which favors the newcomers

international outsourcing and the productivity of low skilled labor in the eu this article presents first insights into the role of international outsourcing on the productivity of low skilled workers in eu manufacturing whereas in the short run international outsourcing exhibits a negative marginal effect on real value added per low skilled worker the long run parameter estimates reveal a positive impact this may be explained by imperfections in european labor and goods markets which prohibit an immediate adjustment in the factor employment and the output structure the change in the outsourcing intensity since 1993 alone acounts for a long run increase of about 6 0 in the real value added per low skilled worker jel c33 f14 f15

manipulation through bribes we consider allocation rules that choose outcomes and transfers based on agents reported valuations of the outcomes a bribing situation exists when one agent could pay another to misreport his valuations resulting in a net gain to both a bribe proof rule eliminates such opportunities we show that under a bribe proof rule each agent s payoff is a continuous function of other agents reported valuations furthermore on connected domains if the set of outcomes is finite or the domain is smoothly connected each agent s payoff is a constant function of other agents reports finally under a domain richness condition a bribe proof rule must be constant the results apply to a broad class of economies journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 d70

on the generic nonoptimality of dominant strategy allocation mechanisms a general theorem that includes pure exchange economies it is shown that if an economy s participants cannot be separated into groups across which there are no potentially conflicting interests i e if the economy is indecomposable then every continuous truth dominant allocation mechanism will attain nonoptimal allocations on an open dense set of preference profiles classical edgeworth box exchange economies economies with no externalities and no production but with arbitrary numbers of consumers and goods as well as economies with public goods and economies with other kinds of externalities are all shown via simple arguments to be indecomposable the results are extended to cover nonrevelation mechanisms copyright 1990 by the econometric society

inventories sticky prices and the persistence of output and inflation post war business cycle fluctuations of output and inflation are remarkably persistent many recent sticky price models however grossly underpredict this persistence we assess whether adding inventories to a standard sticky price model raises the persistence of output and inflation for this addition we consider a shopping cost model in the model consumers find shopping activities costly and the cost of shopping depends on the stock of goods available in this context producers manage inventories to smooth production and to affect the cost of shopping we find that the shopping cost model generates a persistence for output and inflation that matches the persistence observed in the post 1985 us data

how much persistence should sticky price models generate to match us data abstract a number of recent papers find that sticky price models fail to explain the persistence of output and inflation we argue that this failure is partially attributable to low frequency fluctuations present in us data but absent from sticky price models

eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation abstract we describe strategy proof rules for economies where an agent is assigned a position e g a job plus some of a divisible good for the 2 agent 2 position case we derive a robust characterization for the multi agent position case many arbitrary such rules exist so we consider additional requirements by also requiring coalitional strategy proofness or nonbossiness the range of a solution is restricted to the point that such rules are not more complex than those for the shapley scarf housing model no divisible good third we show that essentially only constant solutions are immune to manipulations involving bribes finally we demonstrate a conflict between efficiency and strategy proofness the results extend to models without externalities in which agents share positions journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d70

sluggish inflation and optimizing models of the business cycle abstract many researchers have added sticky prices to quantitative business cycle models i simulate several of these models in order to evaluate their success at reproducing two features of us data the lagged reaction of inflation to monetary growth and the persistence of inflation

who profits from innovation in global value chains a study of the ipod and notebook pcs in an era when new ideas are brought to the market by global value networks of specialists rather than by one company a key question is who captures the most value from innovation in such a structure and why this paper addresses the question of who benefits from innovation in global value chains by looking at specific computer and electronics products we apply a novel industry studies methodology for measuring the distribution of financial value across the supply chains for two models from apple s ipod family and notebook pc models from lenovo and hewlett packard hp these are all examples of globally innovated products combining technologies from the u s japan and other countries and assembled in china our analysis shows that the gross margins of apple for its high end ipod products are generally higher than those earned by hp and lenovo for notebook pcs although not so high as to be considered supernormal a key reason for the difference is that apple s control of the core software proprietary standards and complementary infrastructure of the ipod enables it to retain greater profits whereas a large share of the pc industry profits are siphoned off to microsoft and intel who control key technical standards consistent with teece 1986 our results confirm the importance of stages of technical evolution appropriability regimes and complementary assets as determinants of profiting from innovation on the other hand we find that manufacturing has become commoditized and is no longer a key to profiting from innovation in final electronic products also contrary to recent suggestions in the literature we find no evidence of a causal link between product and industry architectures instead there is a vast electronics industry architecture that can easily support product level value chain configurations ranging from modular to integrated

thousands of models one story current account imbalances in the global economy the global financial crisis has led to a revival of the empirical literature on current account imbalances this paper contributes to that literature by investigating the importance of evaluating model and parameter uncertainty prior to reaching any firm conclusion we explore three alternative econometric strategies examining all models selecting a few and combining them all out of thousands or indeed millions of models a story emerges the chance that current accounts were aligned with fundamentals prior to the financial crisis appears to be minimal

strategyproof collective choice in economic and political environments this paper surveys some recent results characterizing strategyproof collective choice rules when preferences satisfy conditions that are meaningful in economic or political environments

maskin monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods and money abstract we consider the problem of allocating indivisible objects with monetary transfers we show that any maskin monotonic allocation rule exhibits strong asymmetry in treating agents even on finitely restricted preference domains

impossibility of strategy proof mechanisms in economies with pure public goods this paper investigates the structures of strategy proof mechanisms in general models of economies with pure public goods under the assumptions that the set of allocations is a subset of some finite dimensional euclidean space and that the admissible preferencees are continuous and convex i establish that any strategy proof mechanism is dictatorial whenever the decision problem is of more than one dimension furthermore i establish a similar result when preference relations also satisfy the additional assumption of monotonicity these results properly extend the gibbard satterthwaite theorem to economies with pure public goods

the strategy structure of two sided matching markets we study two sided markets in which agents are buyers and sellers or firms and workers or men and women the agents are to form partnerships which provide them with satisfaction and at the same time make monetary transfers e g salaries or dowries the core of this market game is shown to have a particularly nice structure so that precise answers can be given to questions concerning comparative statics and manipulability the idea of using walrasian equilibrium as a mechanism for making allocations with desirable properties of fairness and efficiency has been studied extensively the scheme involves having agents specify their supply and demand functions the competitive equilibria are then calculated and allocations are made accordingly in general this procedure may run into two difficulties first nonuniqueness if there are several equilibria there may be no fair way to decide which one should be implemented and second manipulability if there is only one equilibrium an informed agent may be able to influence it by suitably falsifying his demand data however as we will show here using the walrasian mechanism does work remarkably well for a certain class of important markets these are the matching markets of our title and they include markets for single items like houses where it is assumed that traders do not wish to acquire more than one item they also include labor markets in which it is desired to match workers with jobs at suitable salaries academic markets in which students are to be assigned to educational institutions marriage markets where men and women are matched through negotiating of dowries it turns out that in these markets both the problems of nonuniqueness and manipulability can be resolved in a

strategy proofness and pivotal voters a direct proof of the gibbard satterthwaite theorem this paper presents a proof of the gibbard satterthwaite theorem the importance of the theorem itself has been widely recognized and there already exist several alternative proofs the present one is offered because it is technically simple direct and emphasizes the role of pivotal individuals in the manipulation of voting schemes some indirect proofs of the theorem rely on the connections between voting schemes and social welfare functions and one interesting corollary of such proofs is to provide new arguments in behalf of arrow s condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives yet a direct proof has the advantage of showing the complete independence of the manipulation phenomena from any requirement of consistency in choice under varying sets of alternatives also our proof emphasizes the role of pivotal individuals in manipulation a classical approach in social choice theory is to concentrate on the global distribution of power among groups of agenits i e on the ability of coalitions to impose outcomes regardless of the preferences of agents not in the coalition for example standard proofs of arrow s theorem concentrate on decisive coalitions to end up proving that there must exist one such coalition containing a single individual the dictator our approach concentrates on the local distribution of power among single agents i e on the ability of each single individual to determine the social outcome given the preferences of all other members of society this approach may be more intuitive for some readers moreover it closely parallels the work on incentives in economic environments with public goods and suggests a possible way to unify results which have been obtained from different initial specifications we do not attempt such a rejoinder here but let us observe the following for certain environments with public goods where transfer payments make perfect sense nontrivial strategy proof mechanisms can be obtained by appropriately taxing pivotal agents so that they take into account the costs that their actions impose upon others 2 one explanation for the nonexistence of equivalent mechanisms in our case is that the environment as specified does not allow for a corresponding procedure whereby different costs to individuals could be attached to different acts of preference revelation

no envy and consistency in economies with indivisible goods we consider the problem of fair allocation in economies with indivisible goods our main objective is to identify appealing subsolutions of the no envy solution we formulate desirable properties of solutions and look for solutions satisfying them given an allocation chosen by a solution for some economy and given a subgroup of the agents consider the problem of fairly distributing among its members the resources that this group has collectively received the solution is consistent if it recommends that the same bundle be attributed to each of these agents as initially we show that there is no proper subsolution of the no envy solution that satisfies consistency however many subsolutions satisfy bilateral consistency or the converse of consistency but again there is no proper subsolution satisfying these two properties together

on strategy proofness and symmetric single peakedness we characterize the class of strategy proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single peaked preferences this class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes the class of strategy proof and tops only social choice functions on the domain of single peaked preferences characterized by moulin 1980 since under the domain of symmetric single peaked preferences generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy proof on the smaller domain our result identifies the specific nature of these discontinuities which allow to design non onto social choice functions to deal with feasibility constraints

endogenous capacity utilization and macroeconomic persistence abstract this paper presents a monetary dynamic general equilibrium model featuring a strong internal propagation mechanism limited short run factor substitutability and idiosyncratic demand uncertainty play a prominent role in the results firms are ex post heterogeneous and a well defined distribution of capacity utilization rates characterizes the equilibrium of the model the economy responds gradually to aggregate shocks since firms with excess capacity can raise production without experiencing large increases in their marginal costs the modeling framework presented in this paper offers a plausible microeconomic interpretation for reduced form mark up shocks typically considered in the new keynesian literature

international real business cycles we ask whether a two country real business cycle model can account simultaneously for domestic and international aspects of business cycles with this question in mind we document a number of discrepancies between theory and data the most striking discrepancy concerns the correlations of consumption and output across countries in the data outputs are generally more highly correlated across countries than consumptions in the model we see the opposite

incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods abstract in a market in which each trader s initial endowment is one unit of an indivisible good there exists an incentive compatible procedure for reaching a competitive allocation this contrasts with some recent results for similar problems

fair allocation of indivisible goods and criteria of justice a set of n objects and an amount m of money is to be distributed among m people example the objects are tasks and the money is compensation from a fixed budget an elementary argument via constrained optimization shows that for m sufficiently large the set of efficient envy free allocations is nonempty and has a nice structure in particular various criteria of justice lead to unique best fair allocations that are well behaved with respect to changes of m this is in sharp contrast to the usual fair division theory with divisible goods