credit market imperfections and economic development theory and evidence abstract a model of credit markets in which there is a costly state verification problem is integrated into a neoclassical growth model the presence of a credit market friction gives rise to credit rationing which in turn impacts on the growth path of an economy the model delivers predictions about the co movements between per capita income credit rationing interest rates and factor prices the implications of the model are generally empirically supported in u s and taiwanese data the model also makes predictions about the consequences of government regulation of credit markets which are supported by the taiwanese data

debt futures and options optimal price linked financial contracts under moral hazard and limited liability this paper characterizes the optimal financial contract between a risk neutral entrepreneur and risk neutral lender investors when the entrepreneur has limited liability there is moral hazard and the investor payoff function can depend on both output and output price but is nondecreasing in output in this setting the optimal contract is a price contingent commodity bond that can be replicated by combining pure debt commodity futures and commodity call option contracts although a pure commodity bond contract is sometimes optimal a pure debt contract is almost never optimal various properties of the entrepreneur s optimal price contingent promised payment are described copyright 1993 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

limited liability and incentive contracting with ex ante action choices abstract this article examines a principal agent model of financial contracting in which a risk neutral entrepreneur agent makes an unobservable ex ante effort choice while employing the investment funds of a risk neutral investor principal the key innovation is that the investment contract is subject to statutory liability limits given these liability limits two settings are considered one in which the investor payoff function is also constrained to be monotonically nondecreasing in firm profit and another in which no such monotonic contract constraint is imposed in the former case a standard debt contract is shown to emerge and a first best effort choice is not achieved in the latter setting the optimum is characterized by a live or die payoff function and a first best effort level may or may not be realized

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

inflation financial markets and long run real activity abstract empirical evidence suggests that real activity the volume of bank lending activity and the volume of trading in equity markets are strongly positively correlated at the same time inflation and financial market activity are strongly negatively correlated in the long run as are inflation and the real rate of return on equity inflation and real activity are also negatively correlated in the long run particularly for economies with relatively high rates of inflation we present a monetary growth model in which banks and secondary capital markets play a crucial allocative function we show that at least under certain configurations of parameters the predictions of the model are consistent with these and several other observations about inflation finance and long run real activity

consumer information labelling and international trade in agri food products abstract the focus of the world trade organization is establishing limits on governments ability to impose trade barriers in response to producers requests for protection in recent years however requests for protection from imports has increasingly come from consumers over issues ranging from animal welfare concerns employment of child labour the use of growth hormones differing environmental standards and gm foods the current international trade regime is ill suited to deal with consumer based protectionism this paper develops a model that explicitly incorporates consumer concerns into an international trade model and compares the result with the standard treatment further using the model incorporating consumer concerns a labelling policy for imports is compared to an import embargo the labelling policy is found to be superior to an embargo implications are drawn for future trade negotiations pertaining to sanitary and phytosanitary measures and technical barriers to trade

overcoming information asymmetries in low income lending lessons from the working wheels program without access to transportation the welfare to work transition is nearly impossible yet little is known about the effectiveness of programs designed to improve credit access since 1998 vermont s tanf funds have provided automobile loans through the working wheels program we use microlevel data from this program to explore how to cost effectively provide loans to clients who cannot obtain affordable loans elsewhere our results verify the importance of relationship lending particularly among those without documented credit histories in the presence of information asymmetries about credit history our results justify the increased trust placed in clients with whom the bank has a stronger relationship such clients ceteris paribus are less likely to default we conclude that in the current climate of welfare reform policymakers should consider programs that encourage welfare recipients to establish and maintain relationships with financial institutions in order to facilitate access to credit and minimize the risk of default

an expectations driven interpretation of the great recession abstract the boom years preceding the great recession were a time of rapid innovation in the financial industry we explore the idea that both the boom and eventual bust emerged from overoptimistic expectations of efficiency gains in the financial sector we treat the bankruptcy costs facing intermediaries in a costly state verification problem as a stochastic process and model the boom bust in terms of an unfulfilled news shock where the expected fall in costs are eventually not realized in response to a change in expectations only the model generates a boom bust cycle in aggregate activity asset prices and leverage and a countercyclical credit spread

financial development and reserve requirements abstract many countries have either eliminated or considerably reduced reserve requirements during the last decade this paper derives the optimal reserve requirements of a simple economy with production and financial intermediation subject to costly state verification and shows that one motivation for the widely observed reduction in the level of mandatory reserves is linked to the process of financial markets development

symmetrical information and credit rationing graphical demonstrations as this article shows the pro debtor u s bankruptcy code alone can cause credit rationing even without asymmetrical information in the market because the code entails substantial costs to lenders if borrowers file for bankruptcy in the absence of bankruptcy cost lenders are always justified in raising interest rates and clearing markets if the bankruptcy cost is nontrivial however lenders profits are concave in the relevant range of interest rates thus lenders cannot always clear the market by using higher rates the study reported here also found that the use of collateral in debt contracts can reduce rationing but that even 100 percent collateral does not eliminate all rationing possibilities a positive relationship was found between credit risk and the amount of pledged collateral which is not necessarily true with models based on asymmetrical information

an empirical test of credit rationing in the mortgage market abstract recent theoretical models of credit rationing suggest that mortgages are rationed with nonprice terms on the basis of default risk despite the development of secondary mortgage markets and the deregulation of deposit rates we test this hypothesis using aggregate time series data on fha and conventional mortgage originations fha loans are more expensive for borrowers but provide federal guarantees which protect lenders against default losses for this reason fha loans should be subject to easier credit constraints than conventional mortgages and the fha share of mortgage originations should increase with aggregate default risk default risk is proxied by a bond rate quality spread consistent with previous studies our results imply that default risk induced mortgage rationing persists in the post disintermediation era but that fha programs help offset the overall impact of rationing on housing markets

bank lending policy credit scoring and the survival of loans to evaluate loan applicants banks increasingly use credit scoring models the objective of such models typically is to minimize default rates or the number of incorrectly classified loans thereby they fail to take into account that loans are multiperiod contracts for which reason it is important for banks not only to know if but also when a loan will default in this paper a bivariate tobit model with a variable censoring threshold and sample selection effects is estimated for 1 the decision to provide a loan or not and 2 the survival time of granted loans the model proves to be an effective tool to separate applicants with short and with long survival times the bank s loan provision process is shown to be inefficient loans are granted in a way that conflicts with both default risk minimization and survival time maximization there is thus no trade off between higher default risk and higher return in the lending policy

asymmetric information auditing commitment and economic growth we analyze in this paper the growth and welfare consequences arising from the lack of auditing commitment in a credit market with costly state verification specifically two endogenous growth models of which one allows lenders to commit to costly auditing strategies to identify borrowers investment returns and the other does not are compared we show that the inability to commit acts as an additional source of informational friction that leads to more stringent contractual terms which in turn result in lower capital accumulation growth and welfare in addition when a tax on capital is considered the tax induced investment distortions are amplified by the absence of auditing commitment from the policy perspective our analysis can be interpreted as suggesting a new micro economic channel through which institutional failings hinder economic growth and social welfare

credit rationing and the demand for owner occupied housing abstract this study applies cross sectional data to test whether default risk induced credit constraints affect the demand for owner occupied housing credit constrained households are argued to exhibit different elasticities of demand for housing than less constrained households housing demand elasticities are then estimated separately for households obtaining va insured and non va loans the government guarantee on va loans insures lenders against default enabling lenders to apply easier nonprice terms of credit results indicate that observed demand elasticities differ significantly across va and conventional mortgage holders that marginal changes in credit constraints affect housing demand and that fha financing mitigates the effect of mortgage constraints

how do banks respond to shocks a dynamic model of deposit taking institutions abstract this paper proposes a dynamic model of the optimal choices of a bank that benefits from market power and takes into account the impact of the deposit generation process interbank lending borrowing emerges as a buffer that assists the bank in smoothing intertemporal adjustments in interdependent loan and deposit choices the bank smooths the impact of interest rates shocks on its customers to minimize the adjustments over time of the stocks of deposits and loans it does not however provide insurance against negative shocks of real origin that increase its expected default costs the predictions of the model help to shed light on the available empirical evidence and to analyze some recent developments of the banking industry

how good are standard debt contracts stochastic versus nonstochastic monitoring in a costly state verification environment the authors investigate ex ante efficient contracts in an environment in which implementation is costless in this environment standard debt contracts will typically not be optimal optimal contracts may involve defaults even in states in which the borrower is fully able to repay the authors then examine the welfare costs of arbitrarily restricting the set of feasible contracts to standard debt contracts when model parameters are calibrated to realistic values the welfare loss from exogenously imposing this restriction is extremely small thus if implementation costs are actually nontrivial as seems likely standard debt contracts will be very close to optimal copyright 1994 by university of chicago press

financial intermediation delegated monitoring and long term relationships abstract this paper considers the consequences of enduring relationships for bank structure and policy in an information based banking model adding a richer time dimension allows repeated lending between the intermediary and borrower this contract lets a bank produce information and enforce compliance more easily than direct monitoring of the borrower s organization this implies an asymmetric banking structure banks enter long term relationships with borrowers but not with depositors next it shows how enduring relationships solve problems with loan participations and security underwriting by commercial banks

agricultural effects of changes in financial markets in this paper i will argue that nominal interest rates are being increased by rising real rates real rates are being driven by demands to finance economic development and infrastructural management in recent decades they have been suppressed by highly regulated domestic financial markets and distorted by less developed international financial markets

costs and benefits of livestock systems and the role of market and nonmarket relationships in developing countries livestock are kept not only for their physical products but also for insurance financing and to display status though this range of purposes is acknowledged livestock policies nevertheless often emphasize physical production a limited perspective that hampers the formulation and implementation of effective livestock policies this article presents a comprehensive appraisal of costs and benefits of livestock systems that takes into account the institutional environment of livestock keepers indicators are developed that capture quantify and organize not only the benefits resulting from the physical production but also those from the intangible functions the method is illustrated by an analysis of cattle in the western province of zambia the results indicate that the perspective on livestock systems developed more closely reflects the observed decisions of the livestock keepers

rent seeking bureaucracies and oversight in a simple growth model abstract following recent cross country empirical work research on public policy and growth has come to examine the impact of inefficient or corrupt bureaucracies most of this work has emphasized the interactions of bureaucracies with private markets by contrast this paper focuses on the relationship between rent seeking bureaucracies and their political authority we show that when oversight is relatively costly as in many developing economies the political authority exercises little monitoring of its agencies which reduces the effectiveness of productive government spending moreover when the technology used to provide public services is poor bureaus better succeed in requesting overly large budgets before triggering any monitoring both of these characteristics contribute to reducing the growth rate of already poor economies

the north american european union dispute over beef produced using growth hormones a major test for the new international trade regime at the time the negotiation of the sps agreement was seen as a major accomplishment of the uruguay round one of the first major tests of both the sps and the wto s new dispute settlement system was the long standing and acrimonious dispute between the eu and the us and canada over trade in beef produced using hormones both the sps and the disputes system performed as expected but the eu the loser in the case has chosen to ignore the wto panel s ruling and accept retaliation as a result the credibility of the wto is threatened and the outcome suggests that new negotiations may be required the issues in the case are outlined and implications for trade in biological products drawn

imperfect information and the theory of government intervention in farm credit markets this paper describes some possible economic motivations for government intervention in farm credit markets these motivations are made possible by explicit departures from the perfect information and complete market assumptions that underlie both the neoclassical competitive paradigm and the fundamental theorems of welfare economics to be more precise the analysis focuses on three types of asymmetric information between farmers and prospective outside investors both of whom are assumed to be risk neutral arguably the three informational asymmetries examined here represent natural departures from perfect markets in that unlike the unencumbered neoclassical model each elicits farmers optimal use of debt contracts rather than equity instruments or other contractual forms to raise investment capital despite their consistency with observed contractual choices all three of the models analyzed below yield free market equilibria that diverge from first best perfect information outcomes given the inefficiency of these market equilibria the key question raised and discussed here is can government improve upon the derived competitive outcomes and if so how despite the enormity of the credit rationing literature only a few extant studies address this question in models that are consistent with debt contracts among them are demeza and webb 1987 1988 1989 and innes 1988 which focus on the third type of informational asymmetry considered below the other two information structures posited in this paper have been studied in several analyses of credit markets but with attention focused on positive attributes of the unfettered competitive equilibrium rather than on prospective implications for welfare enhancing government intervention in what follows th s literature is surveyed and for the first two information structures some new policy results a e presented a critical discussion of the paper s limitations concludes the article

cities constitutions and sovereign borrowing in europe 1274 1785 this article investigates the politics of sovereign borrowing in europe over the very long run i consider three alternative hypotheses regarding the sources of borrower credibility according to the first european states with constitutional checks on executive authority found it easier to obtain credit at low interest rates than did states that lacked such constraints my second hypothesis focuses on state type city state versus territorial state and the way in which this may have influ enced the balance of political power between owners of land and owners of capital in a society this hypothesis suggests that after controlling for other factors one should observe that city states in europe found it easier to borrow than did larger territorial states and that these city states paid lower interest rates on their debt finally my third hypothesis suggests that borrower credibility depended on the simultaneous presence of both constitutional checks and balances and a city state when one con siders a broad sample of cases over a long time span there is strong support for the proposition involving city states and merchant power but less support for the argu ment that constitutional checks influenced credibility regardless of state type city state or territorial state there is however some empirical evidence of an interaction effect whereby constitutional constraints on rulers made city states particularly cred ible as borrowers my results are robust to a number of controls for alternative deter minants for sample selection bias and for the endogeneity of city state development one of the most frequently cited recent arguments about european state develop ment involves the effect of constitutional checks and balances on economic per formance in areas where political institutions placed constraints on rulers scholars have argued that property rights were more secure which helped stimulate invest ment innovation and growth authors have suggested that checks and balances also facilitated long term borrowing by governments since creditors found it less likely that constrained rulers would default on loans easier access to loans at low interest rates gave some states an advantage in international competition the con trasting cases of great britain and france provide a popular illustration of the

asymmetric information in the credit market and discount rates for public investment abstract with asymmetric information in the credit market the optimal discount rate for public investment differs from the market interest rate this paper obtains the optimal discount rate for the two state case where returns on private projects can take only two values depending on the magnitudes of collateral costs screening through collateral requirements may or may not occur it is shown that the optimal discount rate is higher than the market interest rate in either case

a theory of corporate capital structure and investment this article uses a general equilibrium framework to explore the origins and limitations of financial intermediaries in the model investors have a generic lending technology that they can improve at a cost those who upgrade become intermediaries to exploit their advantage however conflicts with depositors will limit the banks market presence and they will only lend to moderately endowed firms while bondholders will finance cash rich corporations the article also analyzes the extent to which investors adopt the superior lending technique the nature of bank competition and how corporate and bank conditions affect interest rates and investment copyright 2004 oxford university press

what s different about banks abstract negotiable certificates of deposit cd s trade in the capital market in competition with other securities like commercial paper and bankers acceptances if cd s must pay lenders competitive monetary interest the reserve tax on cd s is borne by bank borrowers viability of the tax means there must be something special about bank loans that makes some borrowers willing to pay higher interest rates than those on other securities of equivalent risk moreover there must be something special about banks that prevents other intermediaries from competing to assure that it never pays to finance loans with cd s

the availability doctrine abstract this paper develops a general equilibrium model in which monetary disturbances have effects reminiscent of roosa s classic description of the availability doctrine the model is a marriage of the modern credit rationing literature and the recent sluggish cash flow models of monetary transmission both elements are crucial the credit rationing aspect leads to a focus upon the quantity or availability of credit however the rationing model in and of itself is a real model and there is no reason for fluctuations in the nominal quantity of fiat money to have any effect on the availability of real credit this is where the sluggish cash flow assumption enters into the analysis under this assumption changes in the nominal supply of fiat money do affect the real supply of credit because a subset of the economy absorbs a disproportionate share of the monetary injection

monetary policy bank leverage and financial stability abstract this paper shows that with limited liability banks lever up excessively to finance new loans lower monetary policy rates can worsen or reduce these incentives depending on the size of the shock when equity financing is ruled out when this constrained is relaxed but the bank faces costly dividend adjustment lower monetary policy rates always worsen risk taking incentives and the effect is persistent the reason is that costly dividend adjustment lowers the opportunity cost of lending in this model capital requirements are closer to the source of the distortion and thus work better than loan to value caps in reducing excessive risk taking

credit rationing concessionary lending and debt maturity abstract a firm raises capital for a two period investment while creditors observe the project status midstream unobservable managerial perks may consume capital each period when the firm is unfortunate early on short term financing results in either concessionary lending or costly liquidation rolling over short term debt may be problematic because the high risk premium creditors demand when asset value is low relative to debt impares managerial motivation precisely when the incentive to defer perk consumption is weakest long term financing may reduce total agency costs be enabling lenders to charge higher initial premia in effect shifting loan repayments to states in which incentive constraints are non binding

interest rates and credit risk this paper explores the effects of shifts in interest rates on corporate leverage and default we develop a dynamic model in which the relationship between firms and their outside financiers is affected by a moral hazard problem and entrepreneurs initial wealth is scarce the link between leverage and default risk comes from the lower incentives of overindebted entrepreneurs to guarantee firm survival the need to finance new investment with outside funding pushes firms leverage ratio above some state contingent target towards which they gradually adjust through earnings retention the dynamic response of leverage and default to interest rate rises and cuts is both asymmetric and heterogeneously distributed across firms both rises and cuts increase the aggregate default rate in the short run however a higher interest rate reduces firms target leverage and hence produces lower default rates in the longer run this helps rationalize some evidence regarding the risk taking channel of monetary policy

moral hazard under commercial and universal banking many claims have been made about the potential benefits and the potential costs of adopting a system of universal banlcing in the united states we evaluate these claims using a model where there is a moral hazard problem between banks and borrowers a moral hazard problem between banks and a deposit insurer and a costly state verification problem under conditions we describe allowing banks to take equity positions in firms strengthens their ability to extract surplus and exacerbates problems of moral hazard the incentives of universal banks to take equity positions will often be strongest when these problems are most severe for many decades commercial banks in the united states have been prohibited from making equity investments in the firms they serve rather they are restricted to providing them with loans in the form essentially of debt contracts this longstanding regulatory restriction1 results in distinctly different roles for bank lenders and equity investors and has had important implications for the entire financial sector the american system of commercial banking presents a sharp contrast with the banking systems of some other countries most notably germany in which banks are permitted to take equity positions under such universal banking arrangements banks can make equity investments as well as loans vote their equity shares and even hold seats on the boards of directors of nonfinancial firms in general they can be actively involved in all aspects of firm decision malqing in germany the control rights the authors have benefitted from the helpful comments of doug diamond joe haubrich ross levine stan longhofer joao santos and an anonymous referee the views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the federal reserve bank of minneapolis or the federal reserve system 1 the key legislation which constrains u s banks equity investments is the glass steagall act of 1933 however a number of other laws also pertain to this issue particularly the bank holding company act of 1956 and its 1970 amendments incidentally there are some important exceptions to the equity investment prohibition in default situations banks are perrnitted to restructure loans into equity positions with the requirement of divestiture after a few years see james 1993 also bank holding companies are permitted to form separately capitalized venture capital subsidiaries for the expressed purpose of investing in start up enterprises john h boyd is a professor of finance in the carlson school of management at the university of minnesota and an adjunct consultant with the federal reserve bank of minneapolis chun chang is an associate professor of finance in the carlson school of management at the university of minnesota bruce d smith is a professor of economics at the university of texas ataustin

from institutions to financial development and growth what are the links this paper presents an integrated overview of the literature linking institutions financial development and economic growth from the large body of research on institutional development the paper first selects those contributions that make it possible to study the role of institutional arrangements in ameliorating worsening the information frictions and transaction costs that characterize the development of financial markets the paper then investigates the theoretical mechanisms by which these specific frictions affect economic growth and presents the stock of empirical evidence quantifying the impact of institutions on growth through financial development

banks as multioutput oligopolies an empirical evaluation of the retail and corporate banking markets the distinction between retail and corporate banking markets is of much importance in real life banking organizations the two markets differ with respect to concentration the importance of informational asymmetries and the extent of customer mobility within a standard conjectural variation model estimated on cost efficient banks as well as on the full sample of banks the authors empirically characterize the strategic behavior in each of these markets and also focus on cross market interactions to see whether initial moves in one market affect the equilibrium in the other market they compare their findings to the predictions that would follow from merely considering concentration ratios such as the herfindahl index

credit rationing race and the mortgage market abstract this study applies microdata from the 1983 survey of consumer finances to evaluate the effects of borrower race and default risk in mortgage lending the empirical analysis is based on a probit model of whether borrowers obtain fha or conventional mortgages the former are fully insured and are characterized by easier downpayment constraints but are typically more expensive hence households borrowing through the fha will tend to be credit constrained in the conventional market results of the analysis indicate that variables which proxy lender concerns about default risk and cost have an important effect on the type of loan borrowers obtain empirical estimates also suggest that minority households are significantly less likely to obtain conventional financing than whites even after controlling for various proxies of default risk these results suggest that race effects in mortgage lending may persist for reasons unrelated to borrower default risk

capital requirements monetary policy and aggregate bank lending theory and empirical evidence capital requirements linked solely to credit risk are shown to increase equilibrium credit rationing and lower aggregate lending the model predicts that the bank s decision to lend will cause an abnormal runup in the borrower s stock price and that this reaction will be greater the more capital constrained the bank i provide empirical support for this prediction the model explains the recent inability of the federal reserve to stimulate bank lending by increasing the money supply i show that increasing the money supply can either raise or lower lending when capital requirements are linked only to credit risk the motivation of this article is first to examine the impact of risk based capital requirements namely those that link mandatory capital to asset ratios for banks to their loans on aggregate bank lending these requirements called the basle capital rules or bis guidelines went into effect in march 1989 for banks in the leading industrialized nations these rules initially required banks to maintain capital equal to 7 25 percent of business and most consumer loans with the requirement increasing to 8 percent by the end of 1992 secondly i wish to understand the link between monetary policy and aggregate bank credit in the presence of risk based capital requirements my curiosity is sparked in part by two recent phenomena one is the experience of the u s economy which displayed sluggish growth during 1989 93 despite a monetary policy that attempted to spur bank lending and economic activity and the other is the striking decline in loans relative to security holdings mostly government bonds in the asset portfolios of u s

bank lending policy credit scoring and value at risk this paper builds on the credit scoring literature and proposes a method to calculate portfolio credit risk individual default risk estimates are used to compose a value at risk var measure of credit risk in general credit scoring models suffer from a sample selection bias the starting point is therefore to estimate an unbiased scoring model using the bivariate probit approach the paper uses a large data set with swedish consumer credit data that contains extensive financial and personal information on both rejected and approved applicants we study how marginal changes in a default risk based acceptance rule would shift the size of the banks loan portfolio its var exposure and average credit losses finally we compare the risk in the sample portfolio with that in an efficiently provided portfolio of equal size the results show that the size of a small consumer loan does not affect associated default risk implying that the bank provides loans in a way that is not consistent with default risk minimization var calculations indicate that an efficient selection by means of a default riskbased rule of loan applicants can reduce credit risk by up to 80 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

the nature of credit market failure abstract hidden knowledge gives rise to over lending if as evidence suggests the returns distributions preferred by borrowers are also favoured by lenders even the stiglitz weiss model yields over lending when entrepreneurs are sufficiently risk averse

empirical measurement of credit rationing in agriculture a methodological survey empirical analysis of rural credit market failure has been of key scientific and political interest in recent years the aim of this article is to give an overview of the various methods for measuring credit rationing that are employed in the literature furthermore the methods are subjected to a comparative evaluation of their specific strengths or shortcomings six approaches are distinguished measurement of loan transaction costs analysis of qualitative information collected in interviews analysis of quantitative information collected in interviews using the credit limit concept analysis of spill over effects with regard to secondary credit sources econometric household modeling and the econometric analysis of dynamic investment decisions an explicit comparison with a first best solution is impossible in the first three approaches since they essentially rely on a subjective assessment of borrowers access to credit based on qualitative or quantitative indicators the fifth and sixth approaches allow a rigorous interpretation in the framework of neoclassical equilibrium theory the fourth approach takes an intermediate position since spill over on segmented loan markets reveals a willingness to pay with regard to the supposedly less expensive but rationed primary source the approaches are fairly data demanding in general usually requiring specific data on loan transactions even so most approaches are applicable to cross sectional household data with the exception of the first all methods surveyed might plausibly be used to empirically detect credit rationing

financial market frictions monetary policy and capital accumulation in a small open economy abstract we consider a small open economy with a costly state verification problem and binding reserve requirements the presence of these frictions leads to the existence of two steady states with credit rationing an increase in the money growth rate the world interest rate or reserve requirements raises lowers gdp in the high low activity steady state however sufficiently large increases in money growth or the world interest rate can transform the high activity steady state from a sink to a source the model also delivers prescriptions for restoring the stability of this steady state in such an eventuality journal of economic literatureclassification numbers e5 f4

contract design and costly verification games abstract in this paper the signalling subgame in costly verification models is studied in the context of the investor entrepreneur contract without assuming the possibility of commitment to verification it is shown that the game has a unique perfect bayesian equilibrium in mixed strategies implying that truth telling and deterministic verification are not an equilibrium behavior when the entire game starting from the stage of contract design is considered it is shown that the contract designed by the informed entrepreneur results in less verification cost than the one designed by the uninformed investor this could be taken as a normative criterion based upon which institutional arrangements as regards the distribution of bargaining initiative are to be designed

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

the dual role of demand deposits under asymmetric information when there is initial asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers accepting checkable deposits can give banks information about the quality of future borrowers hence the two main types of bank activities are complementarities nevertheless it is shown that intermediaries who fund themselves by other means and thus do not get the same borrower information as banks can coexist with banks in equilibrium with the possibility of legally binding contingent contracts banks earn zero expected profits in equilibrium in spite of their information advantage relative to other intermediaries if legally binding contingent contracts are infeasible there may exist an implicit contract equilibrium

dynamic credit relationships in general equilibrium abstract we construct a general equilibrium model with private information in which borrowers and lenders enter into long term dynamic credit relationships each new generation of ex ante identical individuals is divided in equilibrium into workers and entrepreneurs workers save through financial intermediaries in the form of interest bearing deposits and supply labor to entrepreneurs in a competitive labor market entrepreneurs borrow from financial intermediaries to finance projects which produce privately observed sequences of random returns each financial intermediary holds deposits from a large number of workers and operates a portfolio of dynamic contracts with different credit positions we calibrate the model to the u s economy and find that dynamic contracting is very effective at mitigating the effects of private information moreover restricting borrowers and lenders to use static one period contracts with a costly monitoring technology has adverse effects both on the level of aggregate economic activity and on individual welfare unless monitoring costs are very small finally the optimal provision of intertemporal incentives leads to increasing consumption inequality over time within generational cohorts as in u s data

financial crises and recapitalizations we develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with financial frictions on both financial intermediaries and goods producing firms since financial intermediaries are highly leveraged we show that the welfare gains from their recapitalization in response to large but rare net worth losses are as large as those from eliminating typical business cycle fluctuations we also find that these gains are increasing in the size of the net worth loss are larger when recapitalization funds are raised from the household rather than the real sector and can be larger when lower idiosyncratic risk leads to higher leverage

the beliefs of borrowers and lenders and investment decisions abstract this paper examines the role of beliefs in the determination of equilibrium in a standard model of credit markets and investment project choice with asymmetric information it is shown that with ex ante asymmetric information the beliefs of entrepreneurs are important for the equilibrium level of aggregate investment and with ex post asymmetric information the beliefs of creditors are important for the types of projects selected by entrepreneurs

costly monitoring loan contracts and equilibrium credit rationing this paper develops a model with asymmetrically informed agents and costly monitoring of loan contracts where an equilibrium can exhibit credit rationing borrowers are identical ex ante but some receive loans and others do not in contrast to existing credit rationing theories rationing does not occur here due to inflexible prices adverse selection or moral hazard optimizing behaviour produces a standard debt contract in equilibrium the aggregate quantity of loans and equilibrium interest rates respond differently depending on whether there is rationing in equilibrium

the employment effects of credit market disruptions firm level evidence from the 2008 9 financial crisis this article investigates the effect of bank lending frictions on employment outcomes i construct a new data set that combines information on banking relationships and employment at 2 000 nonfinancial firms during the 2008 9 crisis the article first verifies empirically the importance of banking relationships which imply a cost to borrowers who switch lenders i then use the dispersion in lender health following the lehman crisis as a source of exogenous variation in the availability of credit to borrowers i find that credit matters firms that had precrisis relationships with less healthy lenders had a lower likelihood of obtaining a loan following the lehman bankruptcy paid a higher interest rate if they did borrow and reduced employment by more compared to precrisis clients of healthier lenders consistent with frictions deriving from asymmetric information the effects vary by firm type lender health has an economically and statistically significant effect on employment at small and medium firms but the data cannot reject the hypothesis of no effect at the largest or most transparent firms abstracting from general equilibrium effects i find that the withdrawal of credit accounts for between one third and one half of the employment decline at small and medium firms in the sample in the year

information reusability competition and bank asset quality this paper explains the recent decline in bank asset quality using the notion of information reusability banks are viewed as information processors they exist because of their advantage in extracting the surplus associated with the reusability of borrower specific information it is shown that a bank s incentive to screen loan applicants and hence maintain the quality of its assets depends on the surplus this screening can produce which in turn depends on information reusability two recent changes in banks operating environment are increased competitition and greater temporal volatility in borrower credit risks the former has directly reduced banks informational surplus while the latter has impaired information reusability hence screening expenditures have been reduced and the diminution of screening has lowered the quality of bank assets it is also shown that an increase in deposit insurance premia has an effect similar to that of narrowing interest spreads and therefore will result in reduced asset screening and impaired asset quality

financial structure and aggregate economic activity an overview this paper surveys literature that explores the possible links between the financial system and aggregate economic behavior the survey is in two parts the first reviews the traditional work and the second discusses new research copyright 1988 by ohio state university press

a reexamination of credit rationing in the stiglitz and weiss model we reexamine stiglitz and weiss 1981 credit rationing by simultaneously considering adverse selection and moral hazard if returns of the projects are ranked by first order stochastic dominance neither adverse selection nor moral hazard exists if the projects have equalized expected returns moral hazard does not exist and credit rationing due to adverse selection occurs under extreme conditions if the projects are ranked by second order stochastic dominance ssd adverse selection and moral hazard may coexist logically restoring credit rationing but ssd imposes strict limitations on lenders ability to classify borrowers in general our results do not support significance of credit rationing

liquidity provision interest rates and unemployment abstract the effective liquidity supply of the economy the weighted sum of all assets that serve as media of exchange matters for interest rates and unemployment we formalize this idea by adding an over the counter market with collateralized trades to the mortensen pissarides model an increase in public liquidity through a higher supply of real government bonds raises the real interest rate crowding out private liquidity and increasing unemployment if unemployment is inefficiently high keeping liquidity scarce can be socially optimal a liquidity crisis affecting the acceptability of private assets as collateral widens the rate of return difference between private and public liquidity also increasing unemployment

monitoring and market power in credit markets abstract whether or not banks are engaged in monitoring of customers information acquisition may have important consequences to the whole economy theory suggests an inverse relation between both average loan interest rates and credit losses and banks investments in monitoring in contrast investments in market power result in a direct relation these predictions are tested using panel data on finnish local banks we find evidence that banks investments in branch network density and human capital personnel contribute more to monitoring than to market power we also find that managing the money transactions of customers enables banks to better control risks in their lending

the macroeconomic implications of financial deregulation abstract this paper explores the possible macroeconomic consequences of financial deregulation in an institutional environment where deregulation raises risks in banking the central bank is supposed to maximize an objective function in which the probability of bank failure is an argument it is then shown that the usual tradeoffs between policy objectives imply that financial deregulation will lead to more interest rate smoothing than would otherwise take place and further that because of restricted entry into banking deregulation will call for some inflation the transition toward deregulation raises special problems which are likely to require a more gradual approach toward the stationary equilibrium

moneylenders and bankers price increasing subsidies in a monopolistically competitive market abstract in many areas of the world a significant part of the cost of obtaining a good or service is the cost of enforcing the contracts entailed in its provision we present models of markets with endogenous enforcement costs motivated by studies of rural credit markets we show that subsidies may have perverse effects under monopolistic competition increasing prices or inducing exit higher prices interest rates result from the loss of scale economies or from negative externalities among suppliers the models are consistent with the puzzling evidence that infusions of government subsidized formal credit have not improved the terms offered by moneylenders

optimal contracts under costly state falsification we examine an exchange economy with two agents one risk neutral with a certain endowment and a second risk averse with a random endowment the realization of the endowment is public but can be falsified by the second agent at a cost for a broad class of falsification cost functions the optimal no falsification contract is noncontingent on a left hand interval and strictly increasing with a slope strictly less than one on a right hand interval under a mild further restriction optimal no falsification contracts are in addition piece wise linear optimal contracts may in general require falsifying the state but for a set of the highest endowment realizations there is no falsification we find simple conditions under which the optimal contract is a no falsification contract the model has applications that include financial insurance and employment contracts and tax policy

should courts enforce credit contracts strictly the intimate linkages between law and nance are currently the centre of wide rangingempirical investigations this article presents a simple banking model with informationasymmetries concerning borrowers entrepreneurial talent it is shown that improvements inthe enforcement of contract by courts reduce agency problems but can also reduce the bank sincentive to screen borrowers adequately thus worsening credit allocation a stricterenforcement of credit contracts therefore may be socially harmful even if costlessly achieved improvements in accounting standards however always make bank screening of borrowers lesscostly and improve credit allocation and social welfare

investment and government intervention in credit markets when there is asymmetric information abstract this paper models private firm investment choices and government credit policy in an entrepreneurial firm financial market wherein firm owners have better information about the quality of their return distributions than do external financiers the analysis shows that despite the absence of an informational advantage the government can often increase social welfare by offering subsidized debt contracts however the paper also finds that some common credit subsidy policies including loan guarantees and government backing of targeted lending institutions yield constrained inefficient outcomes in general

monetary policy in a dollarized economy where balance sheets matter abstract does the dollarization of liabilites and the resulting balance sheet vulnerability prevent monetary policy from serving its conventional countercyclical role we study this question in a model of a small open economy in which domestic firms face an imperfect capital market with risk premia depending on net worth as in bernanke and gertler am econ rev 79 1989 14 in spite of the financial fragility channels present in the model the conventional wisdom still holds under a floating exchange rate countercyclical monetary policy does help cushion the impact of foreign real shocks

the growth effects of property rights the role of finance summary using a variety of statistical approaches we show that the relationship between property rights and growth is nonlinear stronger enforcement of property rights raises growth up to a point before growth begins to decline we provide a simple theoretical rationale for this conclusion using a model with informational asymmetries in the financial sector stronger property rights have two opposing effects on the one hand it increases capital formation and growth on the other hand it encourages bad borrowing practices thus there exists an optimal level of property rights which maximizes growth however as financial markets mature the negative effects associated with stronger property rights become weaker

on the possibility of credit rationing in the stiglitz weiss model contrary to what is consistently assumed in the literature the return function cannot be hump shaped in the stiglitz weiss 1981 model this has important consequences for the possible occurrence of credit rationing and redlining with a single class of borrowers banks offer credit in two stages demand possibly exceeds supply in stage one but not in stage two with several observationally distinguishable borrower classes the firms in a borrower class are redlined only under circumstances which imply that they would not get credit in a perfect capital market either die rendite funktion kann im stiglitz weiss 1981 modell nicht so wie das in der literatur durchgangig angenommen wird hugelformig sein das hat wichtige implikationen fur die moglichkeit von kreditrationierung einerseits und fur die moglichkeit des ausschlusses ganzer kreditnehmergruppen vom kapitalmarkt andererseits mit nur einer klasse von kreditnehmern erfolgt die kreditvergabe in zwei stufen wahrend auf der ersten stufe eine ubernachfrage vorliegen kann herrscht auf der zweiten stufe marktraumung bei mehreren unterscheidbaren kreditnehmerklassen wird eine klasse nur unter den bedingungen vom kreditmarkt ausgeschlossen bei deren vorliegen sie auch in einem vollkommenen kreditmarkt keinen kredit erhalten wurde

future directions for food and agricultural trade policy during the 1970s u s agriculture experienced an unprecedented export boom this export boom produced an unusual albeit short lived period of prosperity for agriculture land previously idled by government programs was brought back into production and new land cleared with the result that by 1981 cropland in production was a record high 391 million acres in constant value 1967 dollars terms net farm income rose from 12 2 billion in 1971 to an unusual peak of 25 1 billion in 1973 the need for direct government support of agriculture declined in the 1980s this strong export performance of u s agriculture has been reversed the physical volume of exports reached a peak in 1980 and the value of exports reached a peak in 1981 both volume and value have steadily declined since those peaks total value of exports declined from 43 8 billion in 1981 to 34 8 billion for the 1983 fiscal year a decline of 21 this decline in foreign markets has contributed to a serious income problem in agriculture net farm income declined to an unprecedentedly low figure of 7 6 billion in 1967 dollars in 1982 it also contributed to a serious financial crisis in agriculture as expanded debt commitments based on an export driven expectation of continued prosperity for agriculture was met with significantly reduced farm incomes serious cash flow problems and reduced equity as land values declined the decline in farm markets has also created a serious challenge to farm programs and policy makers from negligible program costs in the 1970s except for the dairy program the costs of farm programs burgeoned out of control by 1981 they were up to 3 2 billion in 1982 they tripled to 10 billion and for 1983 the regular program costs are expected to more than triple again to 21 8 billion commodity stocks also burgeoned to very high levels as recordand near record breaking crops were met with slumping markets the acre equivalent of the decline in exports of corn cotton wheat and soybeans from 1980 to 1983 was 22 6 million acres u s agriculture obviously faced a serious adjustment problem the administration s response to this crisis was the payment in kind pik program which removed close to 82 million acres of land from production in 1983 the pik program is expected to add anywhere from 12 to 21 billion to this year s outlays for farm programs that means that total program costs for 1983 may well be as large as 35 billion but as important as program costs is the paid idling of some of this nation s most productive resources at the very time it is attempting to recover from the worst economic slump in the post world war ii period it is no exaggeration to say that u s agriculture and agricultural policy are at a crossroads if its export performance does not improve it will be forced to deal with a sizable adjustment problem of transferring resources out of agriculture it can do that by letting market forces do their job or by costly government programs in the form of paid diversion large export subsidies or some other means to bring supply in balance with demand or some combination of the two in this paper i want to address the export performance issues the emphasis on export performance rather than trade policy is a considered one i find it impossible to discuss trade policy without considering domestic commodity programs the two are inextricably intertwined hence i choose the generic concept of export performance since i will discuss both domestic program issues and trade policy issues the first part of this paper reviews the changes in the international economy over the last fifteen to twenty years these changes are g edward schuh is a professor and head department of agricultural and applied economics university of minnesota

loan performance and race r carter hill recent studies find evidence of racial discrimination in mortgage markets although these studies explore loan approval rates for whites versus minorities they do not specifically consider loan performance either in the form of default rates or loan administration costs this study considers discrimination in the used car credit market where the collateral is not subject to location externalities collateral value and quality do not vary as much as in real estate and the loan terms are shorter we find administration costs and default rates are higher for minorities than for whites controlling for age income home ownership wealth occupation loan terms and geographic location jel k2 i introduction credit discrimination occurs whenever minorities are denied credit on the basis of race or are offered loans at terms different than the terms offered similarly situated whites 1 economists identify two types of discrimination preference taste based discrimination and information statistical based discrimination 2 the legal definition of discrimination makes no such distinction in their statistical studies munnell brown mceneaney and tootell 1996 carr and megbolugbe 1994 and gabriel and rosenthal 1991 find evidence of discrimination whereas most economic theorists such as becker 1993 and commentators such as brimelow 1993 and brimelow and spencer 1993 argue competition will greatly reduce if not eliminate discrimination in section iii we demonstrate why under regulation statistical discrimination may increase with increasing competition this anomalous result occurs because the legal definition does not distinguish between the two types of discrimination some economists implicitly assume credit markets are unregulated when considering the effect of competition on discrimination antidiscrimination regulation changes the effect of competition in unregulated markets taste based discrimination is unprofitable and increasing competition will reduce this form of discrimination if the industry s employees or white borrowers have a taste for discrimination competition will not necessarily eliminate taste based discrimination when regulation is binding and the economic foundation for statistical discrimination exists discrimination is profitable and increasing competition may increase discrimination the effect of regulation and competition on discrimination depends critically on the information basis for discrimination the relationship between loan performance and race therefore the appropriate empirical question is does a statistical basis for discrimination exist this question cannot be answered by loan approval studies rather it must be addressed by evaluating how loans perform after they are approved further the appropriate public policy issue is should society regulate statistical discrimination this article is an empirical inquiry into the relationship between race and loan performance we measure loan performance by estimating the same marginal default rates that lenders use to score credit applications and by the variables that have the most impact on loan administration costs we find that race matters regrettably in the fashion suggested by stereotypes in general minorities have higher default rates and contribute to higher administration costs in other words the foundation for statistical discrimination appears to exist section ii contains a review of the extant literature a theoretical model of credit scoring with both taste and statistical discrimination is contained in section iii the data are discussed in section iv and the empirical models are presented in section v ii literature as in arrow 1973 and becker 1957 an individual is said to have a preference or taste for discrimination if he is willing to pay a price or forgo income in order to practice discrimination

equilibrium lending mechanism and aggregate activity we construct a model of the credit market where financial contracting is subject to costly state verification and moral hazrd the economy s aggregate activity and its equilibrium lending mechanism are determined jointly we analyze how changes in the model s exogenous variables including the returns of the economy s investment projects and the supply of loans aect the economy s aggregate output and the types of the credit through which investment is funded

reforming the wto to defuse potential trade conflicts in genetically modified goods perdikis nicholas kerr w a hobbs j e reforming the wto to defuse potential trade disputes in genetically modified goods world economy 2002 24 3 pp 379 398

intermediation and the equilibrium allocation of investment capital implications for economic development abstract we investigate several common assertions about intermediation and how it affects the allocation of investment capital we use a model with adverse selection and costly state verification in which both debt contracts and credit rationing are observed intermediaries arise due to a comparative advantage in information acquisition relative to the situation absent intermediation intermediaries reduce credit rationing and inefficient interest rate differentials the model also shows how large interest rate differentials can be observed when financial markets are not integrated and how the volume of intermediation is affected by changes in the environment

the welfare implications of costly monitoring in the credit market a note unconventional policy prescriptions it is worthwhile to check its robustness in a more general setting in this note we extend the hw model to allow for endogenous determination of monitoring costs and show that the hw result can be reversed the general equilibrium model developed in this note provides a better foundation for policy analysis in the costly monitoring situation 1 the model this section extends the hw model to allow for endogenous determination of monitoring costs consider an economy with a capitalists and 1 a entre

deposit insurance a reconsideration abstract this paper undertakes a simple general equilibrium analysis of the consequences of deposit insurance programs the way in which they are priced and the way in which they fund revenue shortfalls in our economy the central issue in analyzing deposit insurance is how the government will make up any fdic losses deposit insurance premia matter only in so far as they affect the level of implied fdic revenue shortfalls moreover local variations in the magnitude of fdic losses will generically be irrelevant for the determination of any equilibrium quantities that affect agent welfare however large enough changes in these losses can matter there is no presumption that keeping these shortfalls low is a good idea finally we show that multiple pareto ranked equilibria can be observed the potential for multiplicity of equilibria may depend on components of fdic policy our analysis provides counterexamples to the following propositions 1 actuarially fair pricing of deposit insurance is always desirable 2 implicit fdic subsidization of banks through deposit insurance is always undesirable 3 large fdic losses are necessarily symptomatic of a poorly designed deposit insurance system 4 risk based deposit insurance premia can easily be used to reduce moral hazard problems associated with deposit insurance provision

how islamic is islamic banking abstract islamic banks hold well over us 700 billion in assets and are growing at over 15 p a islamic banking and finance ibf involves wider ethical and moral issues than simply interest free transactions its advocates argue that these make it more economically efficient than conventional banking and promote greater economic equity and justice to what extent then do actual islamic banking practices live up to the ideal and how different are they from conventional banking a preliminary investigation shows that three decades after its introduction there remain substantial divergences between ibf s ideals and its practices and much of ibf still remains functionally indistinguishable from conventional banking this runs counter to claims by ibf advocates that it would rapidly differentiate itself from conventional banking however despite not providing an alternative to conventional banking and finance ibf does strengthen a distinctly islamic identity by providing the appropriate islamic terminology for de facto conventional financial transactions

capital accumulation under different financial agreements abstract this paper develops a simple overlapping generations model where agents income is given both by a stochastic endowment and by the profits generated by a production activity the purpose is to analyze the consequences of different forms of financial agreements on capital accumulation in this model pareto optimality requires that the capital stock is a deterministic function of the previous level of capital agents can eliminate any randomness in the capital accumulation process when contingent claims markets are available when standard loan contracts prevail because of asymmetric information the economy incurs an efficiency loss due to capital stock fluctuations the expected level of capital under this last regime is always smaller than the one achieved when markets for contingent claims exist

some evidence on the empirical significance of credit rationing this paper examines the credit rationing debate using detailed contract information on over one million commercial bank loans from 1977 to 1988 while commercial loan rates are sticky consistent with rationing this stickiness varies with loan contract terms in ways that are not predicted by equilibrium credit rationing theory in addition the proportion of new loans issued under commitment does not increase significantly when credit markets are tight despite the fact that borrowers without commitments can be rationed whereas commitment borrowers are contractually insulated from rationing overall the data suggest that equilibrium rationing is not a significant macroeconomic phenomenon

credit and equity rationing in markets with adverse selection previous theories of financial market rationing focussed on a single market either the credit or the equity market an interesting question is whether credit and equity rationing are mutually compatible and how they interact we consider a model with two dimensional asymmetric information where entrepreneurs have private information about both the expected returns and the risk of their projects we show that credit and equity rationing may occur individually or simultaneously moreover competition between the two markets may generate the adverse selection that leads to rationing outcomes

equilibrium subprime lending this paper develops an equilibrium model of a subprime mortgage market our goal is to offer a benchmark with which the recent subprime boom and bust can be compared the model is tractable and delivers plausible orders of magnitude for borrowing capacities as well as default and trading intensities we offer simple explanations for several phenomena in the subprime market such as the prevalence of teaser rates and the clustering of defaults in our model both nondiversifiable and diversifiable income risks reduce debt capacities thus debt capacities need not be higher when a larger fraction of income risk is diversifiable

stochastic costly state verification and dynamic contracts abstract i consider a dynamic costly state verification environment in which a risk averse agent enters into a contract with a risk neutral principal the agent has random income which is unknown to the principal but can be verified at a cost the principal can commit to executing random verifications i extend the standard recursive methods to study the problem and show that it is optimal to set verification probabilities strictly less than 1 if the agent s absolute risk aversion declines sufficiently slowly the principal will use verification regardless of its cost if the agent s income is verified then he would get consumption and continuation utility strictly higher than if his income were not verified