nash cournot or lindahl behavior an empirical test for the nato allies this paper derives systems of demand equations for distinguishing between nash cournot and lindahl behavior in a group that either shares a pure public good or an activity that provides a private and a pure public joint product systems of simultaneous equations are estimated based upon nash cournot and lindahl behavior for a sample of ten nato allies for the 1956 1987 period nonnested hypothesis tests support the nash cournot specification for five of the ten sample allies no evidence of lindahl behavior is found the nash cournot joint product specification outperforms the pure public model for all sample allies

strategic buyers and exclusionary contracts this paper characterizes equilibrium exclusionary contracts between buyers an incumbent firm and a potential entrant when buyers can either vertically integrate or contract with the outside entrant in this setting exclusionary contracts are generally shown to be efficient and to deter inefficient entry that would otherwise occur with multiple unorganized buyers equilibrium contracts are shown to take a divide and conquer form and in some cases to deter some efficient entry in such cases efficient contracting can be restored by a policy that prohibits price discrimination and gives agents free reign to sign exclusionary agreements copyright 1994 by american economic association

market power of local cable television franchises evidence from the effects of deregulation the 1989 cable act eliminated most price regulation of cable television operators including the right of municipalities to enforce price terms in franchise agreements deregulation was justified at least partially by the contention that competition from other entertainment media eliminated any market power of cable franchises we examine the value at sale of existing cable systems before and after deregulation assuming that this value represents the expected present value of future profits deregulation had the predicted negligible effect on profits in cities with significant broadcast competition however profits appear to have increased in areas where the competition from broadcast television was less severe we explore several explanations for this increase and conclude that significant market power is the most plausible explanation

trade and protection in vertically related markets abstract we consider home country tariff and subsidy policies in a setting where a home firm is partially dependent on a foreign vertically integrated firm for supplies of a key input the firms are cournot competitors in the home market for the final product we show that a tariff on final product imports may cause the foreign vertically integrated firm to reduce the price charged for the input under circumstances where a simple monopoly supplier of the input would increase its price supply conditions for the input significantly affect whether imports of the input should be taxed or subsidized

the competitive effects of vertical agreements for many years there were few distinctions drawn between horizontal and vertical agreements both were considered anticompetitive and subject to per se condemnation under the antitrust laws recently however this approach has come under attack and what was once the conventional wisdom is no longer so indeed there is growing acceptance of the view that vertical agreements can rarely have anticompetitive consequences per se legality would then be the appropriate standard in this paper we investigate the competitive implications of a particular vertical agreement the imposition of exclusive dealing requirements by a manufacturer on his distributors however to maintain the focus of the analysis we do not consider ultimate welfare gains or losses in an early application of economic analysis to this practice aaron director and edward levi 1956 suggest that exclusive dealing would be anticompetitive if it raised entry costs for rivals our object following this conjecture see their p 293 is to examine the market conditions under which exclusive dealing impedes entry howard marvel 1982 dealt with the practice of exclusive dealing he provides an efficiency rationale for exclusive dealing ignores the prospect that anticompetitive effects may follow and concludes that exclusive dealing ought therefore to be treated as legal per se p 25 this paper examines the possible anticompetitive effects neglected by marvel i market conditions for exclusive dealing

econometric developments in agricultural and resource economics the first 100 years this article reviews the major contributions of agricultural and resource economists in the area of econometrics over the past 100 years early on a number of agricultural economists were in on the ground floor in terms of developing new econometric methods over time as the economics profession became more empirically oriented agricultural and resource economists increasingly assumed the role of early adopters of new econometric methods even so agricultural and resource economists continue to make useful modifications to econometric techniques in order to adapt the methods to the unique nature of the problems and applications that we study

contracts as a barrier to entry it is shown that an incumbent seller who faces a threat of entry into his or her market will sign long term contracts that prevent the entry of some lower cost producers even though they do not preclude entry completely moreover when a seller possesses superior information about the likelihood of entry it is shown that the length of the contract may act as a signal of the true probability of entry

macroeconomic linkages taxes and subsidies in the u s agricultural sector lj ar division of agricultural sciences unlversily of califorj ha ma croecono nc linkages t xes and subsidies in tiie u s agr cuttural secl or by gordon c rausser james a chalfant h alan love and kostas g stamoulis tt r i f r in i jq lifor ia agricultura experiment station clmoation of j gricultural economics january 1986

when do long run identifying restrictions give reliable results many recent articles have identified behavioral disturbances in vector autoregressions by imposing restrictions on the long run effects of shocks this article demonstrates that this approach will be unreliable unless the underlying economy satisfies three types of strong restrictions although many aspects of these issues have been raised before this article draws out and illustrates the implications for inferences under the long run scheme furthermore it provides strategies for dealing with the problems

public good provision and ancillary benefits the case of climate agreements several studies found ancillary benefits of the provision of public goods to be of considerable size if these additional private benefits were noticed they would imply not only higher cooperative but also non cooperative provision levels however beyond these largely undisputed important quantitative effects there would be qualitative and strategic implications associated with ancillary benefits public policy would no longer be a pure but an impure public good in this paper we investigate these implications in a setting of non cooperative coalition formation in the context of climate change in particular we address the following question would ancillary benefits if they were taken in consideration increase participation in international climate agreements and raise the success of these treaties in welfare terms

monetary impacts on prices in the short and long run some evidence from new zealand this paper presents support for long run monetary neutrality based on evidence that individual time series for money manufacturing prices and agricultural prices are nonstationary but cointegrated with a stationary proportional long run relationship among their levels dynamic simulations from a vector error correction model with this restriction imposed show that monetary shocks shift relative prices in favor of agriculture in the short run and permanently raise nominal prices manufacturing price shocks have similar long run effects but initially place agriculture in a cost price squeeze while agricultural price shocks are transitory and have little impact on the other series

the dynamic effects of money combining short run and long run identifying restrictions using bayesian techniques this paper proposes a bayesian approach to incorporating specification and identification uncertainty into a var analysis of the dynamic effects of money supply shocks on the macroeconomy the approach follows poirier 1991 in averaging over discrete model specifications in forming posterior densities of the dynamic responses to such shocks two distinct means of identifying money supply shocks are considered here one that imposes contemporaneous restrictions and one that imposes long run monetary neutrality i estimate bounds on dynamic responses that account for specification and parameter uncertainty and find strong evidence of short run real effects of money on the economy including a liquidity effect for both long term and short term interest rates furthermore some results differ substantially across identifying restrictions if model uncertainty is ignored

equilibrium existence and uniqueness in impure public good models abstract despite widespread application of the impure public good model surprisingly little attention has been given to the model s equilibrium properties this paper presents a proof that clearly shows sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of a nash equilibrium

cooperative versus noncooperative behavior the case of agricultural research voluntary provision of public goods is generally considered suboptimal this result is based on the underlying assumption of noncooperation resulting in the standard nash cournot outcome agents however can reach a cooperative equilibrium if the aggregate level of the public good provided has to coincide across agents given each agent s tax share the resulting lindahl equilibrium implies pareto optimal provision of the public good this paper tests these two competing models by taking the case of agricultural research in the united states results indicate that in over 50 percent of the cases agents follow the noncooperative scheme copyright 1993 by mit press

economics of alliances the lessons for collective action this essay provides an up to date summary of the findings of the literature on the economics of alliances we show that the study of the economics of alliances has played a pivotal role in understanding and applying public good analysis to real world applications we establish that the manner in which alliances address burden sharing and allocative issues is related to strategic doctrines weapon technology perceived threats and membership composition past contributions are evaluated and areas needing further development are identified the theoretical and empirical knowledge gained from the study of alliances is shown to be directly applicable to a wide range of international collectives

school finance reform and voluntary fiscal federalism california has transferred the financing of its public schools from localities to the state in response many families have supplemented the tax revenue of their local public schools with voluntary contributions this paper analyzes that phenomenon we propose a model of partial cooperation among parents in making voluntary contributions to their public schools under reasonable conditions the model predicts that contributions per pupil should decline with school size we estimate this relationship using data on contributions to california schools our estimates reveal that contributions per pupil do decline with size however the rate of decline is surprisingly slow 2002 elsevier b v all rights reserved

a bayesian view of nominal money and real output through a new classical macroeconomic window this study investigates the empirical evidence on the effects of unanticipated changes in nominal money on real output in 47 countries when viewed through a window i e likelihood function that assumes the neutrality of anticipated changes using a bayesian predictivist approach it provides a pedagogical bayesian analysis of generated regressor models in the face of specification uncertainty involving among other things multiple unit roots and trend stationary alternatives

aggregation without separability tests of the united states and mexican agricultural production data the generalized composite commodity theorem gcct and testing procedure is extended to test for consistent aggregation of the united states and mexican agricultural production data in each category for which earlier tests rejected homothetic separability nonrejected gcct and separability hypotheses provide empirical support for aggregating all the united states agricultural outputs into as few as two categories crops and livestock mexican agricultural outputs also can be aggregated into as few as two categories support for aggregating all outputs into a single category is ambiguous in both countries and is only provided by the gcct

revisiting aggregate u s meat demand with a bayesian averaging of classical estimates approach do we need a more general theory although meat demand is one of the most studied issues in agricultural economics our understanding of this phenomenon has been hampered by valid concerns about model specification uncertainty this article revisits the need for more general theories of aggregate u s meat demand using a bayesian averaging of classical estimates approach we draw comprehensive inferences over 1 048 576 demand systems we find very little evidence supporting the need for more general theories that include demand determinants beyond prices and expenditures we find strong evidence in support of symmetry and negativity but strong evidence against homogeneity which is consistent with other research copyright 2008 oxford university press

the competitive effects of vertical agreements comment recent economic analyses of vertical restraints and integration emphasize the circumstances under which these arrangements are socially efficient efficiency claims have proven contentious however for exclusive dealing a vertical restraint that prohibits any outlet carrying a manufacturer s product from stocking substitute brands this paper analyzes the impact of exclusive dealing on competition and allocative efficiency opinions expressed on the impact of exclusive dealing range from the extreme view that it is invariably anticompetitive to the view that it is always procompetitive the u s supreme court has concluded that in hundreds if not thousands of communities where there is a single retailer for a product

the competitive effects of vertical agreements comment in a recent paper comanor and frech 1985 cf claim that a manufacturer enjoying a product differentiation advantage could impose exclusive dealing on distributors while also raising its wholesale price the two consumer groups in the model would then pay higher prices than under nonexclusive dealing cf also suggest that exclusive dealing is more likely to emerge when product differentiation is relatively strong cf s analysis does not carefully incorporate the constraints imposed by dealer rationality doing so within cf s model i reach opposite conclusions exclusive dealing will be accepted only if the manufacturer reduces its wholesale price to dealers relative to nonexclusive dealing price rises to one group of consumers but falls to the other moreover exclusive dealing is more likely to emerge when product differentiation is relatively weak

fiscal federalism in europe lessons from the united states experience the existing political and legal institutions of fiscal policy making are under challenge as the united states and the eastern european and soviet states experiment with policy decentralization the states of western europe are looking to a more centralized policy structure via the e e c this paper seeks to raise issues of importance to all such reform efforts notably the need to consider and balance the inefficiencies of fiscal policy decentralization spillovers and wasteful fiscal competition against the inefficiencies of fiscal policy centralization policy cycles and localized pork barrel spending and taxes the need to develop new fiscal policy institutions emphasizing voluntary agreements and responsive agenda setters is stressed robert p inman daniel l rubinfeld department of finance and economics school of law and the wharton school of management department of economics university of pennsylvania university of california philadelphia pa 19104 berkeley ca 94720 and neer fiscal federalism in europe lessons from the united states e perienc by robert p inman and daniel l rubinfeld2 in democratic and totalitarian regimes alike the existing political and legal institutions of economic policy making are under challenge the wisdom of centralized fiscal regimes is now being questioned quietly under the banner of the new federalism in the united states and vocally if not violently through the secessionist movements of eastern europe and the soviet states as these nations experiment with decentralized fiscal institutions the countries of western europe are now looking to the potential of a more centralized economic order within the new european economic community this paper seeks to raise issues of importance to all such reform efforts and within that context to offer some cautionary advise for the design of e e c fiscal institutions based upon the recent american experience with centralized fiscal policy making ii the role for central government fiscal policies in economic unions the european community s progress towards an economic and monetary union the authors wish to thank allesandra casella and barry eichengreen for helpful comments and discussions 2 the authors are professor of finance and economics university of pennsylvania and research associate of the nber and professor of law and economics university of california at berkeley respectively professor rubinfeld gratefully acknowledges the support of the center for real estate and urban economics at the university of california berkeley based upon a common currency will create new demands for the design of fiscal policy 3 perhaps most importantly with a common currency and thus a common monetary policy member states will no longer be able to influence their local economies through exchange rate or monetary policies when state specific economic shocks occur 4 state specific fiscal policies stand as an alternative three questions arise 1 can member state fiscal policies be effective in offsetting local economic shocks in an integrated economic union 2 if effective are such policies likely to be optimally managed at the state level and 3 if ineffective or non optimal what central government policies might be then preferred the recent united states experience is instructive on each point can member state fiscal policies be effective in open integrated economies deficit financed demand creation may be of only limited usefulness to small member states first the demand stimulus of deficit financing is dissipated through import demands from other union states gramlich 1987 has shown that the effectiveness of deficit policies in the smallest u s states is significantly import constrained though larger states may be able to use own deficits to affect state employment prospects second in member states the use of such deficits to combat local shocks may be significantly limited by what the capital markets will allow while deficits may be see eichengreen 1990 there is growing evidence of the economic importance of state specific economic shocks to the short run and long run prospects of states and regions in integrated economic unions see bernard and durlauf 1991 for a study of oecd countries many of which are in the eec and brown coulson and engle 1990 for a study of u s states member states which manage these shocks well are likely to enjoy higher long run growth beneficial to the local economy during downturns and while member states may promise to repay those deficits with surpluses during the upswing such promises are difficult to enforce the u s capital market has appeared reluctant to accept a state s promise of a balanced budget over a business cycle such promises lack credibility when temporary economic downturns are not easily distinguished from long run structural declines when good deficits cannot be distinguished from bad the only credible local government promise may be a balanced budget in each fiscal year the stringent u s state budgets for the recessionary 1992 fiscal year balanced through major tax increases and deep spending cuts offer evidence on the point 5 even if member state deficit policies are economically feasible their management may be non optimal in interdependent economic unions the benefits from local demand creation through deficit financing may spillover to other member states via import expansion while the interest costs of deficits remain with the borrowing state the result will be an under provision of expansionary fiscal policies by member states using the arguments of hart 1982 central government fiscal policies stand as the policy

economic models of nato abstract the seminal work of olson and zeckhauser 1966 on the economic theory of alliances in particular nato provides the theoretical background for this paper after restating their results on alliance allocation behavior in a formal framework we show that these results may fail in a context with decentralized production of the public defense commodity finally we introduce a simple mechanism which allows the implementation of an efficient allocation characterized by proportional burden sharing and cost monotonicity these results can also be applied to other public goods problems

the dynamic effects of aggregate demand and supply disturbances we interpret fluctuations in gnp and unemployment as due to two types of disturbances disturbances that have a permanent effect on output and disturbances that do not we interpret the first as supply disturbances the second as demand disturbances demand disturbances have a hump shaped mirror image effect on output and unemployment the effect of supply disturbances on output increases steadily over time peaking after two years and reaching a plateau after five years

on the dampening of competition effect of exclusive dealing the authors compare and contrast the profit and welfare effects of exclusive dealing sales through a common retailer and vertical integration as did y j lin 1990 the authors find that imperfectly competitive manufacturers prefer to impose exclusive dealing on their retailers unlike lin the authors find that welfare is higher under exclusive dealing than when products are sold through a common retailer this finding suggests a new interpretation of the standard stations v united states 1949 antitrust case copyright 1993 by blackwell publishing ltd

monetary policy shocks and the dynamics of agricultural commodity prices evidence from structural and factor augmented var analyses fluctuation in commodity prices is a significant and timely issue to be studied this study is to examine the impact of monetary policy and other macroeconomic shocks on the dynamics of agricultural commodity prices the major contributions of this study are twofold first unlike other studies that use indexes this study analyzes the commodities individually affording the inclusion of commodity specific fundamentals such as the level of inventory an important determinant of commodity price in a structural var framework second it exploits a rich data set of agricultural commodity prices which includes commodities that are usually overlooked in the literature and extracts a common factor using the dynamic factor model to understand the extent of comovement of the prices and to gauge the extent to which macroeconomic shocks drive the comovement in a factor augmented var favar framework the findings show that monetary policy global economic conditions and the u s dollar exchange rates play an important role in the dynamics of agricultural commodity prices

fiscal federalism in europe in democratic and totalitarian regimes alike the existing political and legal institutions of economic policy making are under challenge the wisdom of centralized fiscal regimes is now being questioned quietly under the banner of the new federalism in the united states and vocally if not violently through the secessionist movements of eastern europe and the soviet states as these nations experiment with decentralized fiscal institutions western europe is now looking to a more centralized economic order within the new european economic community this paper seeks to raise issues of importance to all such reform efforts and within that context to offer some cautionary advise for the design of e e c fiscal institutions

downstream r d raising rivals costs and input price contracts we analyze the incentives for cost reducing r d by downstream firms in a two tier market structure by increasing the demand for an input downstream r d allows the upstream firm to raise its input price this lowers the benefit of r d to a downstream firm but raises its rivals costs as a result a downstream oligopolist may invest more in r d than a downstream monopolist a phenomenon that is absent in a purely horizontal r d setting fixed price agreements where the input price remains unchanged following downstream r d promote innovation by eliminating the opportunistic behavior of the input supplier and are welfare enhancing

the competitive effects of exclusive dealing evidence from the u s beer industry abstract several recent theoretical articles have modeled the effects of exclusive dealing contracts that restrict dealers to selling a single brand yet detailed empirical analysis of the impact of exclusivity on actual market outcomes has been lacking i analyze a unique set of firm level data on nearly 400 beer distributors in the united states the impacts of economies of scale and restrictions on distributor promotional activities on the use of exclusive dealing are measured as well as the effects of exclusivity on costs prices and output the results support the view that exclusive dealing serves to minimize manufacturer dealer incentive conflicts and enhances social welfare

exclusive dealing limiting outside activity and conflict of interest exclusive dealing is one of a number of non price vertical restraints that have become the subject of considerable scrutiny and rethinking both in the courts and in the academic literature 2 8 10 17 because of its association with antitrust law the emphasis of the exclusive dealing literature 3 7 13 16 21 has been on whether exclusive dealing can enhance or protect a firm s market power exclusive dealing and related restrictions on agent activities however are far more widespread than can credibly be attributed to antitrust considerations or interfirm strategic behavior the range of instances where exclusive dealing broadly construed applies is quite large including the familiar manufacturer retailer relationship as well as other situations where there may be a conflict of interest the decision to hire a worker to do a job or to have the job done by an independent contractor could be interpreted as the decision whether a firm wants its workers to exclusively deal their labor the exclusivity question arises in less formal or familiar settings as well should one for example permit a babysitter to have friends visit or should her attention be exclusively directed toward one s children should a university permit its faculty to engage in outside consulting or non university sponsored research or should it lay down rules restricting the time available for outside activities or the types of outside research that can be carried out antitrust courts and legal commentators over the past ten years especially since sylvania 4 have come to view non price vertical restraints more benignly than in the past 2 299 304 15 17 18 20 benign neglect however offers no help to a firm wondering whether to institute exclusive dealing not only may the costs and benefits of doing so be subtle but the decision may be controversial among the affected parties in the conventional exclusive dealing case retailers may not want a major supplier to cut them off if they continue to sell another manufacturer s product and will likely demand to be compensated for their lost business opportunities exclusive dealing may be viewed as the limiting version of a policy to limit outside activities by agents the purpose of this paper is to set out a very general neoclassical choice framework to discover conditions in which exclusive dealing or limitations on outside activities to mitigate conflicts of interest can enhance the operating efficiency of a vertical relationship a specific goal

downstream vertical foreclosure and upstream innovation i examine a link between downstream foreclosure and upstream innovation the crucial ingredient of the model is the presence of dynamic economies of scale upstream in the form of competition in r d the reason an upstream supplier has a captive buyer is to force rival suppliers to incur the disadvantages of low scale production and discourage them from innovating the downstream buyer is offered favorable terms and is convinced to sign an exclusive supply contract and accept captivity in this context downstream foreclosure may reduce consumer welfare

stochastic trends and economic fluctuations are business cycles mainly the result of permanent shocks to productivity this paper uses a long run restriction implied by a large class of real business cycle models identifying permanent productivity shocks as shocks to the common stochastic trend in output consumption and investment to provide new evidence on this question econometric tests indicate that this common stochastic trend cointegration implication is consistent with postwar u s data however in systems with nominal variables the estimates of this common stochastic trend indicate that permanent productivity shocks typically explain less than half of the business cycle variability in output consumption and investment copyright 1991 by american economic association

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

identifying monetary impacts on agricultural prices in var models since the mid 1970s a number of studies have used vector autoregressive var models to evaluate the magnitude and timing of macroeconomic impacts on agriculture use of the var method has been viewed as a way to obtain empirical evidence about these impacts that might not emerge from more traditional overidentified and less dynamic econometric models the hope has been that by placing minimal restrictions on var models the true structure of the economic relationships under investigation can be observed while the aim is laudable critics of var models have argued that it has had the unfortunate consequence of obscuring some important structural identification issues and seeming to promise that something can be obtained for nothing cooley and leroy leamer they point out that identifying restrictions are required to give economically interpretable meaning to the results of any simultaneous equation model sem in standard practice identification of var models is obtained implicitly by choice of a choleski decomposition of the covariance matrix of one step ahead forecast errors which is equivalent to imposing a recursive structure for the economy of concern is that the recursive structure may not be believable further as bernanke has observed examination of ad hoc variants of the recursive order implies a strange set of prior beliefs in which the analyst holds strongly that the system is recursive but is not sure in what order the variables should be arranged in response to these concerns several recent papers have pointed out that identification of var models does not have to rely on the assumption that the contemporaneous structure is recursive bernanke sims rather the distinguishing features of a var model are first that identification rests on the assumption that distinct mutually orthogonal behavior shocks drive the economy and second that lagged relationships among the endogenous and exogenous variables if any are left entirely unrestricted given these features a var model must be identified solely by restrictions placed on the contemporaneous interactions among the variables but the identifying restrictions do not have to preclude simultaneity in this paper we elaborate on the structural interpretation of var models and use this analysis to examine monetary impacts on agricultural prices we discuss the identification problem and the implications of a recursive structure we illustrate our points with respect to the three variable model of money industrial prices and agricultural prices that has been used in several articles to evaluate the effects of monetary shocks on price dynamics bessler devadoss and meyers we then introduce a somewhat richer behavioral model of the macroeconomy and its effects a simultaneous model is shown to offer a more believable identification of monetary policy and other macroeconomic shocks than a recursive model and monetary impacts on agricultural prices are assessed

alternative collective goods models of military alliances theory and empirics i introduction in a seminal article mancur olson and richard zeckhauser 1966 characterized the north atlantic treaty organization nato in the mid 1960s as a group of allies who shared a pure public good in the form of deterrence to qualify as a pure public good a good s benefits must be nonexcludable i e available to all group members once provided and nonrival in consumption i e consumption opportunities associated with a unit of the good do not decline with the number of users pure public goods are characterized by free riding behavior owing to non excludability which permits individuals to partake in the benefits of the good without expending their own scarce resources olson and zeckhauser also demonstrated that a pure public good such as deterrence is associated with an exploitation hypothesis whereby the large agents allies shoulder the payment burdens of the small agents allies using data from 1964 olson and zeckhauser 1966 274 77 established that defense burdens are positively correlated with the economic size of the allies as measured by gross national product gnp over the next twenty five years a large literature has generalized and extended the olson and zeckhauser collective goods theory of alliances van ypersele de strihou 1967 recognized that defense expenditures could generate country specific private benefits e g disaster relief protection of colonies management of domestic unrest along with purely public deterrence with the presence of ally specific benefits the strength of the exploitation hypothesis is attenuated since a small ally might willingly shoulder a relatively large burden provided that this ally views its defense expenditures as possessing a large share of nation specific benefits in a series of articles murdoch sandler and others 1 formulated a joint product model in which the military activity of an ally yields pure public impure public and or private jointly produced outputs or benefits if the benefits derived from the allies military expenditures were from a single purely public good then the joint product model would obviously degenerate to the model of olson and zeckhauser 1966 murdoch and sandler 1984 sandler and forbes 1980 and sandler and murdoch 1990 have shown that the joint product model outperforms the pure public good deterrence model for nato during various time periods in recent years a number of important contributions to the collective good analysis of alliances have appeared these include the inclusion of foreign trade considerations wong 1991 marginal cost differentials among allies mcguire 1990 weber and wiesmeth 1991 leader follower behavior bruce 1990 and median voter considerations dudley and montmarquette 1981 murdoch sandler and hansen 1991 and okamura 1991 mcguire and groth 1985 engineered an econometric procedure for distinguishing between allocative processes e g non cooperative and cooperative within an alliance while subsequent work by sandler and murdoch 1990 operationalized this econometric procedure until now collective good models of alliances have computed alliancewide defense levels by simply summing the allies expenditures however the appropriate manner for aggregating defense efforts among allies may depend on geographical strategic and technological determinants for example the defense efforts of the weakest ally or link along a front may determine the strength of the allies defenses since the enemy s ability to penetrate behind the front hinges on the weakest fortification hirshleifer 1983 in consequence the minimal defense level of the allies and not the sum determines alliance capabilities the purpose of this paper is fivefold first we intend to look at different methods of aggregating allies military expenditures to determine alliancewide defense levels three procedures summation weakest link and best shot are examined

strategic interaction among governments in the provision of a global public good abstract how do governments respond to other governments when providing a global public good using data from 2007 to 2014 on medical research funding for infectious and parasitic diseases we examine how governments and foundations in 41 countries respond to funding changes by the us government which accounts for half of funding for these diseases because funding across governments might be positively correlated due to unobserved drivers they have in common we use variation in the representation of research intensive universities on us congressional appropriations committees as an instrument for us funding we find that a 10 increase in us government funding for a disease is associated with a 2 to 3 reduction in funding for that disease by another government in the following year

invention under uncertainty and the threat of ex post entry abstract this article proposes a theoretical framework for studying the invention of new products when demand is uncertain in this framework under general conditions the threat of ex post entry by a competitor can deter invention ex ante asymmetric market power in the ex post market exacerbates the problem the implications of these general results are examined in a series of examples that represent important markets in the computer industry the first is a model that shows how an operating system monopolist by its mere presence can deter the invention of complements to its own detriment as well as that of society the implications of policies such as patent protection price regulation and mandatory divestiture are considered three additional examples consider the ability of a monopolist in one market to commit to bundling an unrelated product a pair of horizontally differentiated firms that can add a new feature to their products and a platform leader that can be challenged in its base market by the supplier of a complementary product

on vertical relations and the timing of technology adoption we study the timing of new technology adoption in markets with input outsourcing and thus with vertical relations we find that technology adoption can take place earlier when firms engage in input outsourcing than when they produce the input in house hence the presence of vertical relations can accelerate the adoption of a new technology we also find that particular features of a vertically related market such as the distribution of bargaining power and the contract type through which trading is conducted can crucially affect the speed of technology adoption

tying foreclosure and exclusion in recent years the leverage theory of tied good sales has faced heavy and influential criticism in an important sense though the models used by its critics are actually incapable of addressing the leverage theory s central concerns here the author reconsiders the leverage hypothesis and argues that tying can indeed serve as a mechanism for leveraging market power the mechanism through which this leverage occurs its profitability and its welfare implications are discussed in detail copyright 1990 by american economic association

elderly care and intrafamily resource allocation when children migrate this paper considers the intrafamily allocation of elderly care in the context of international migration where migrant children may be able to provide financial assistance to their parents but are unable to offer physical care to investigate sibling interaction i estimate best response functions for individual physical and financial contributions as a function of siblings contributions after addressing the endogeneity of siblings contributions and selection into migration i find evidence that siblings financial contributions function as strategic complements while time contributions operate as strategic substitutes this suggests that contributions may be based on both strategic bequest and public good motivations

vertical foreclosure and international trade policy international differences in the cost of production of a key intermediate product can mean that a domestic firm is dependent on supplies from a foreign vertically integrated firm this paper considers the incentives for the foreign firm and foreign country to supply the domestic firm when the firms compete in a cournot or bertrand market for the final product the vertical supply decision is significantly affected by domestic supply conditions for the input and a domestic tariff on final product imports optimal policy by the exporting country may require a tax on both exports or a subsidy on both exports countries that are dependent on imports of a key intermediate product or raw material from a dominant world supplier are often concerned about the price and the availability of imports a notable current example involves the computer industry japanese suppliers with the help of the japanese government recently restricted the exports of dram semiconductors substantially raising their price these suppliers control about 80 of the market for semiconductors and the higher prices and shortage in supply have forced u s producers of computers to curtail production and increase prices vertically integrated japanese firms such as toshiba and n e c have benefitted both from increased profits in the export market for semiconductors and from the improvement in their competitive position in the market for final computers as this example indicates the price and availability of imported supplies can depend on both public and private incentives in the exporting country in this paper we first examine the private incentives for a vertically integrated firm to export an intermediate product to a higher cost rival lowering its rival s costs the exporting firm may choose vertical foreclosure thus fully cutting off supplies we then consider the public interest of the exporting country does the exporting country gain by encouraging the export of the intermediate product or alternatively might government foreclosure occur the government is in a position to affect the quantity of exports of both the input and the final product by an appropriate choice of export tax and subsidy policies

a traditional interpretation of macroeconomic fluctuations under the traditional interpretation of macroeconomic fluctuations aggregate demand shocks move output and prices in the same direction while aggregate supply shocks move output and prices in opposite directions this paper examines the joint behavior of u s output unemployment prices wages and nominal money and asks whether it is consistent with this interpretation the answer is a qualified yes

the dynamic responses of crop and livestock prices to money supply shocks a bayesian analysis using long run identifying restrictions the impact of monetary policy on agriculture has been much debated this study examines the dynamic responses of u s agricultural prices to money supply shocks using three innovations first the variables responses are identified by long run money neutrality restrictions instead of the more common contemporaneous ordering second a bayesian approach to model uncertainty is used to add robustness to the estimation process third agricultural prices are disaggregated into crop and livestock components the empirical results find that both agricultural sectors benefit in the short run from positive money supply shocks with agricultural prices increasing relative to the general price level

market power and price increases for basic cable service since deregulation since the deregulation of rates for basic cable television service increases in price have outpaced the rate of inflation this article examines whether or not cable systems increased market power or their increased exercise of market power explains these price increases an estimated quasi supply function for cable systems before and after deregulation implies that real basic cable prices increased 18 since deregulation holding quality and other costs constant accounting for 43 of the total real price increase a demand equation is also estimated and the estimated demand elasticity of basic cable does not change after deregulation implying that this 18 real price increase is due to greater exercise of existing market power made possible by the elimination ofprice regulation rather than to an increase in market power caused by a change in the demand elasticity for cable

equilibrium vertical foreclosure the authors formulate a complete but analytically simple equilibrium model of vertical mergers to evaluate the logic of standard vertical foreclosure claims and the criticisms made of those claims the model includes incentives of the integrated firm and unintegrated input suppliers to exclude rivals and the potential holdout problem in this fully specified model vertical foreclosure can emerge in equilibrium copyright 1990 by american economic association

burden sharing in the nato alliance an empirical test of alternative views this paper undertakes an empirical test of two opposing views of interdependencies among members of military alliances the first view associated with olson and zeckhauser argues that the public good aspect of defense induces free riding behavior by smaller alliance members which imposes a disproportionate burden of supporting the alliance on the larger members a second view argues that nato defense activities produce a mix of outputs some of which are not purely public and some of which may be complementary across nations furthermore the nature of the weapons systems and their relative use by alliance members may induce substantial cooperation by allies the test proposed here analyzes the relationship between defense spending shares of nato members and their population and relative wealth shares a simple model is specified and tested using pooled time series cross sectional data the empirical results indicate more support for the cooperative view of ally relationships than the olson zeckhauser non cooperative model

testable restrictions of pareto optimal public good provision abstract this paper is a theoretical examination of the testable restrictions of pareto optimality in an economy with public goods in contrast to other methods for deriving tests for the optimality of public good provision ad hoc assumptions about individual public good demand are not required the testable restrictions derived in this paper are defined over a finite series of aggregate level data production data and individual after tax income despite the relatively sparse data requirements and the minimal assumptions about preferences and technology these restrictions are not vacuous thus they provide a strong theoretical basis for empirical work that tests the pareto optimality hypothesis in a broad variety of public good economies

strategic aspects of vertical delegation abstract this paper offers an overview of the strategic aspects of situations where either institutionally or contractually a firm delegates some of its decisions to another firm a subsidiary an internal division etc delegation may have several kinds of strategic benefits in the short term it may improve the competitive position of the firm or induce a more lenient behavior from its competitors in the long run it may be used to deter the entry of potential competitors to foreclose market access or to induce actual competitors to exit the paper analyzes the trade off between these possible benefits and the agency costs of delegation and emphasizes the key issues of credibility and commitment

vertical mergers and market foreclosure ythe model in this paper illustrates three effects of vertical mergers when both stages are oligopolistic and vertically integrated and unintegrated producers coexist first the merging firm increases its final good output second the resulting backward shift in the residual demand curve facing unintegrated final good producers ylowers their demand for the intermediate good third the merged firm withdraws from the intermediate good market the increased concentration pushes the intermediate good price upward which effect dominates depends on market structure under some conditions a vertical merger causes the price of the final good to increase

selective contracts foreclosure and the chicago school view abstract i examine a mechanism by which exclusive supply contracts may inefficiently deter entry into the market in the model the incumbent supplier selectively offers contracts only to some buyers and convinces them to consent by guaranteeing them low prices the contracts strengthen the monopoly position of the incumbent supplier and allow it to extract rents from the remaining buyers that were not offered contracts aside from the favorable contract terms buyers have another reason to consent to the exclusivity scheme the latter raises the input costs of rival buyers that were not offered contracts the model has potential applications to the recent microsoft antitrust case 1994 i define exclusive supply contract as an agreement under which an upstream firm becomes the exclusive supplier of a downstream firm the downstream firm is prohibited from buying from other suppliers

market foreclosure and vertical merger a case study of the vertical merger between turner broadcasting and time warner abstract we employ an event study methodology the event being the vertical merger between time warner and turner broadcasting distribution and programming respectively in the cable television industry we assess the effects of the merger on final prices subscriptions and carriage and marketing decisions of time warner the analysis finds several interesting facts first foreclosure in time warner markets following the merger is observed for the rival channels that are not integrated with any cable distributors second the turner broadcasting channels that increased market shares because of this merger appeared to be foreclosed by time warner prior to the merger the preference for own channels by time warner persisted despite a lower quality of channel bundles in its markets efficiency gains from the merger were not passed on to consumers

agricultural and financial market interdependence in the short run a theoretical model capable of examining the effects of various monetary policies on agriculture is developed results from comparative static experiments with the model show that a restrictive monetary policy may adversely affect agriculture results from the theoretical model are compared with earlier studies and are empirically investigated using vector autoregression techniques in general empirical analysis supports the theoretical developments

incomplete contracts vertical integration and supply assurance this paper extends the analysis of transactions cost models of vertical integration to multilateral settings its main focus is on supply assurance concerns which arise when several downstream firms are competing for inputs in limited supply integration reduces supply assurance concerns for an integrating firm but it may increase them for others therefore to explain the scope of any firm one must consider the overall network of production and distribution relations three fundamental questions are addressed 1 what are the effects of different integration structures 2 what are the determinants of the socially efficient integration structures 3 in what way do equilibrium integration structures differ from socially efficient structures

innovation and integration in the agri food industry abstract we deal with the link between innovation and market structure using the empirical example of the danish agri food industry vertical integration may resolve hold up problems and here we test for the importance of vertical integration and networks on innovation we further examine the effects of network relationships on innovation behaviour we use data from an extensive survey of 444 danish firms over two years 2000 and 2005 to estimate a bootstrapped zero inflated poisson regression model the first and most significant result is that organization matters further we find that vertical integration as well as contractual arrangements are significant determinants for firms innovation behaviour the direction of integration is important as well also economies of size seem to play an important role similarly the export orientation of the firm is a significant determinant of innovation whereas the sector the firm is operating in is not significant for its innovation behaviour

cooperative r d between vertically related firms with spillovers abstract this paper analyzes the effects of cooperative r d in two vertically related duopolies which are two final good manufacturers and two input suppliers with horizontal and vertical spillovers vertical r d cartels yield a larger social welfare than non cooperative r d and if the horizontal spillover rate between the input suppliers is not sufficiently high than horizontal r d cartels technological improvement is accelerated by forming vertical research joint ventures rjvs whether or not their member firms r d decisions are coordinated vertical rjv cartels yield the largest social welfare when the vertically related firms can coordinate their r d decisions and or share useful knowledge fully

relative prices and money a vector autoregression on brazilian data recent data on brazilian agricultural prices industrial prices and money supply are analyzed in a vector autoregression the empirical findings show strong one way granger type causality from money supply to agricultural prices while feedback is observed between industrial prices and money supply under the usual monetarist ordering of contemporaneous innovation covariance agricultural prices do not adjust faster than industrial prices to a shock in the money supply

estimating the impact of the soviet union s threat on the united states japan alliance a demand system approach an empirical model of the united states japan alliance is presented by employing the linear logarithmic expenditure system to analyze and test the impact of the soviet union s threat on both allies external threats are incorporated into the demand system the empirical results obtained the military buildup by the soviet union affects the preferences of both japan and the united states toward military over civilian goods japan is more sensitive to the soviet union s threat than the united states and the external threat is a more significant factor in affecting the military expenditures of each ally than a change in prices copyright 1991 by mit press

an investigation of the effect of monetary factors on agriculture abstract this paper uses an econometric model to assess some of the effects of macro monetary factors on u s agricultural markets attention is focused on impacts of decreasing increasing the level of domestic credit on agricultural trade prices inventory accumulation and domestic disappearance results show that tight monetary policy lowers prices and increase demand for domestic agriculture however the upward pressure on the exchange rate seriously deteriorates the position of u s exports in international markets

upfront payments and exclusion in downstream markets although upfront payments are often observed in contracts between manufacturers and retailers little is known about their competitive effects or the role retailers play in securing them in this article we consider a model in which two competing retailers make take it or leave it offers to a common manufacturer we find that upfront payments are a feature of equilibrium contracts and in all equilibria only one retailer buys from the manufacturer these findings support the claims of small manufacturers who argue that they are often unable to obtain widespread distribution for their products because of upfront payments copyright 2007 rand

macroeconomics and agriculture in tunisia this article aims to analyse the impact of changes in the monetary policy and the exchange rate on agricultural supply prices and exports the methodology used is based on the multivariate cointegration approach ten variables are considered interest and exchange rates money supply inflation agricultural output and input prices agricultural supply and exports income and the rate of commercial openness the sample period covers annual data from 1967 to 2002 due to the short sample period two subsystems are considered first long run relationships are identified in each subsystem second both subsystems are merged in order to calculate the short run dynamics the results indicate that changes in macroeconomic variables have an effect on the agricultural sector but the reverse effect does not hold

an econometric technique for comparing median voter and oligarchy choice models of collective action the case of the nato alliance this paper devises an empirical methodology for discriminating between the median voter model and the oligarchy choice model when applied to the collective provision of a public good in particular an empirical methodology is engineered so that a nested test procedure can evaluate competing models the authors apply this methodology to examine the demand for military activities of ten members of the nato alliance a two stage least squares procedure corrected for autocorrelation is used to estimate the demand equations test results vary some allies abide by the median voter model others by the oligarchy model and still others by neither copyright 1991 by mit press

relative prices and money further results for the united states empirical results support the hypothesis that agricultural prices respond faster than manufactured product prices to a change in money supply in the united states sims vector autoregression var technique was applied in examining this hypothesis the monte carlo integration method was used to test the significance of the impulse responses generated by the var technique

discount chains and brand policy retail chains are observed in many industries the question addressed here is whether retail chains can exploit buyer power by excluding some brands in a theoretical model with two differentiated producers and a single retailer we show that a retailer will require exclusivity exclude a brand if the brands are sufficiently symmetric in demand potential exclusivity will increase welfare if the excluded brand is a close substitute for the brand carried by the retailer our theoretical results are also set in relation to some findings from the norwegian grocery industry jel classification l12 l42

equilibrium incentives for exclusive dealing in a differentiated products oligopoly we consider the incentives for oligopolistic manufacturers to adopt exclusive dealing manufacturers producing differentiated brands can choose to distribute through exclusive retail dealerships or nonexclusive dealerships with nonexclusive dealing manufacturers face an interbrand externality because brand enhancing investments made by one manufacturer may benefit the brands of other manufacturers although exclusive dealing eliminates this externality oligopolistic manufacturers may not choose exclusive dealing exclusive dealing enhances the incentive to invest but the promotional investments are a form of competition between manufacturers thus manufacturers might earn higher profits with nonexclusive dealing making lower promotional investments we find cases in which nonexclusive dealing is a dominant strategy we also find cases in which some but not all manufacturers adopt exclusive dealing moreover even if adoption of exclusive dealing by all manufacturers is the equilibrium it can arise from a prisoner s dilemma in that each manufacturer would prefer nonexclusive dealing

the economic theory of vertical restraints the types of contracts arising in a typical vertical manufacturer retailer relationship are more sophisticated than a simple uniform price in addition to setting per unit prices manufacturers and retailers also revert to non linear pricing and non price instruments these instruments or contracts are referred to as vertical restraints and can take the form of franchise fees resale price maintenance exclusive dealing exclusive territories and slotting allowances the use and the effects of one type of instrument versus another depend crucially on specific market assumptions upstream and downstream and on the division of bargaining power between manufacturers and retailers this paper surveys the industrial organization literature on retail pricing and shows that vertical restraint instruments have important effects on producer and consumer prices market structure efficiency and welfare

the political economy of the peace dividend we develop a model of the peace dividend and use it to predict the fiscal consequences of a reduction in the demand for military spending the model is based on the assumption that the political process responds to political demands and costs in a way that maximizes net political benefits the predictions of our model on how a peace dividend will be allocated over nonmilitary spending tax relief and deficit reduction is tested against the experience of eight major wars in united states history