substitute goods auctions and equilibrium this paper identifies two notions of substitutes for auction and equilibrium analysis weak substitutes the usual price theory notion guarantees monotonicity of t tonnement processes and convergence of clock auctions to a pseudo equilibrium but only strong substitutes which treats each unit traded as a distinct good with its own price guarantees that every pseudo equilibrium is a walrasian equilibrium that the vickrey outcome is in the core and that the law of aggregate demand is satisfied when goods are divisible weak substitutes along with concavity guarantees all of the above properties except for the law of aggregate demand

the fetal origins hypothesis in finance prenatal environment the gender gap and investor behavior we find that differences in individuals prenatal environments explain heterogeneity in financial decisions later in life an exogenous increase in exposure to prenatal testosterone is associated with the masculinization of financial behavior specifically with elevated risk taking and trading in adulthood we also examine birth weight those with higher birth weight are more likely to participate in the stock market whereas those with lower birth weight tend to prefer portfolios with higher volatility and skewness consistent with compensatory behavior our results contribute to the understanding of how the prenatal environment shapes an individual s behavior in financial markets later in life received may 2 2014 accepted september 30 2015 by editor david hirshleifer

sufficient decisions in multi sided and multiproduct markets we show that in many models where firms make multiple decisions analysis can be made more tractable by re formulating the model into one in which each firm makes a single choice which we call a sufficient decision the transformation allows application of standard techniques in these settings including pass through for tax incidence and upward pricing pressure for merger analysis the transformation works because the assumption of profit maximization links the firms decisions together examples include models of monopoly and oligopoly in two sided markets where a natural sufficient decision may be the number of transactions that the firm facilitates and multiproduct markets

the lechatelier principle the lechatelier principle in the form introduced into economics by paul a samuelson asserts that at a point of long run equilibrium the derivative of long run compensated demand with respect to own price is larger in magnitude than the derivative of short run compensated demand the authors introduce an extended lechatelier principle that applies also to large price changes and to uncompensated demand as well as to a wide range of concave and nonconcave maximization problems outside the scope of demand theory this extension also clarifies the intuitive basis of the principle copyright 1996 by american economic association

comparing optima do simplifying assumptions affect conclusions consider a family of maximization models in which the optimum trades off beneficial and costly effects then comparative statics derived under many kinds of simplifying assumptions about the benefits technology are also true for general convex and nonconvex technologies for example any comparative statics conclusion about investment by a risk averse decision maker under uncertainty that holds when expected returns are described by a general linear function also holds for an arbitrary nonlinear expected return function

the hyperbolic consumption model calibration simulation and empirical evaluation ur preferences for the long run tend to conflict with our short run behavior when planning for the long run we intend to meet our deadlines exercise regularly and eat healthfully but in the short run we have little interest in revising manuscripts jogging on the stairmaster and skipping the chocolate souffleala mode delay of gratification is a nice long term goal but instant gratification is disconcertingly tempting this gap between long run intentions and short run actions is apparent across a wide range of behaviors including saving choices a 1997 survey found that 76 percent of respondents believe they should be saving more for retirement looking only at respondents who believed they were at an age where you should be seriously saving already the survey found that 55 percent reported being behind in their savings and only 6 percent reported being ahead farkas and johnson 1997 the report on the survey concluded t he gaps between people s atti tudes intentions and behavior are troubling and threaten increased insecurity and dissatisfaction for people when they retire americans are simply not doing what logic and their own reasoning suggests they should be doing a 1993 luntz webber merrill lynch survey found similar answers when baby boomers were asked what percentage of your annual household income do you think you should save for retirement and what percentage of your annual

technological progress and optimal factor demand abstract this paper analyzes the employment and investment demands of the competitive firm when technological progress embodied in new investment goods is a source of productivity improvements it is shown that technological progress reduces the implicit cost of capital services as well as its sensitivity to variations in the price system several versions of lechatelier s principle are established showing how technological progress modifies the price sensitivity of the factor demands rapid technological progress makes the factor demands less sensitive to price variations however employment demand becomes less more sensitive to interest rate changes when capital and labor are complements substitutes

the endowment effect as blessing we study the idea that seemingly unrelated behavioral biases can coevolve if they jointly compensate for the errors that any one of them would give rise to in isolation we pay specific attention to barter trade of the kind that was common in prehistoric societies and suggest that the endowment effect and the winner s curse could have jointly survived natural selection together we develop a new family of hybrid replicator selection dynamics and show that under such dynamics even if biases only partially compensate for each other individuals with both biases can survive in the population in the long run

scope economies market information and make or buy decision under asymmetric information abstract this paper presents a make or buy m b model in which a firm say firm 1 may produce in house or outsource a product to the unique vendor the monopolist in the outsourcing market demand for the finished product is stochastic and price sensitive and firm 1 s information forecast about the base market demand and corresponding precision are known when the m b decision is faced firm 1 is risk neutral and owns a constant return to scale technology while the vendor is risk averse and enjoys the advantage of scope economies a traditional solution is provided under perfect information under asymmetric information we demonstrate that when outsourcing is realized both parties expected profits increase with firm 1 s forecast accuracy only if the forecasted market demand is higher than the base demand i e good news outsourcing strictly dominates in house production if the yield of the vendor s production input is sufficiently low or its economies of scope are remarkably attractive furthermore it is optimal for firm 1 to hide information at first and decide whether or not to share information only after the vendor s supply price is announced however the vendor s profit is constrained by the trade off between the coordination effort for impelling firm 1 to share information and the advantages of its monopoly on outsourcing market low production costs as well as scope economies

nonlinear strategies in dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices abstract we discuss nonlinear strategies in an infinite horizon duopoly game with sticky prices where firms maximize their discounted sum of profit we construct a stationary feedback equilibrium without guessing value functions and feedback strategies that solve the hamilton jacobi equation for this purpose we study the auxiliary equation that is derived from the hamilton jacobi equation we show that the domain of the state space plays an crucial role in characterizing feedback equilibria and discuss several implications of this observation in particular we find that when the upper bound of the state space is not very high previously unknown feedback equilibria emerge

selling online versus live a seller choosing between auctioning online and live faces a tradeoff lower transaction costs online against more rents left with the bidders we model this tradeoff and apply the theory to auctions of art the crucial parameter for whether the seller does better online than live is not the expected price but the valuation uncertainty

majority voting with single crossing preferences we clarify and extend a number of sufficient conditions for the existence of a majority voting equilibrium on one dimensional choice domains these conditions variously stated in the previous literature all impose order restrictions on voter preferences for instance monotone marginal rates of substitution which we show to imply or be equivalent to a general ordinal version of the single crossing condition this simple property is economically intuitive and easily checked in applications this ease of application is demonstrated through an examination of voting models of redistributive income taxation and trade union bargaining behaviour

subgame perfect reaction function equilibria in discounted duopoly supergames are trivial abstract this paper is concerned with infinitely repeated duopoly games with discounting a question which has been open since friedman s rev econ stud 35 1968 257 272 reaction function article is settled for a general class of games the question is wheter nontrivial reaction function equilibria can be subgame perfect this question is answered in the negative such equilibria must be trivial in the sense of prescribing the stage game noncooperative equilibrium actions in every period independent of prior history

lechatelier effects for the competitive firm under price uncertainty lechatelier effects confirm the intuition that constrained decisions are not only suboptimal but also restrained in the sense of being less elastic samuelson 1947 introduced this idea into economics and showed that it blends neatly with economic models of decision making under certainty being particularly well suited to the competitive firm as emphasized by silberberg 1971 linearity of the objective function combines with convexity in the constraint imposed by the production technology to yield envelope results at the first order and lechatelier effects at the second as powerful consequences of the maximization hypothesis the envelope results of primary interest in producer theory shephard s lemma for cost functions and hotelling s lemma for profit functions are equality relations reflecting the firstorder stationarity of an optimum lechatelier effects in contrast are inequality relations reflecting the restrained nature of short run responses compared with long run less constrained responses thus the quantities of labor demanded and output supplied are more elastic with respect to wage rate and output price changes in the long run than in the short run these lechatelier predictions pertain to a firm that has fully adjusted to an exogenous set of factor and output prices and thus apply only in the neighborhood of a long run equilibrium configuration for the firm however they apply equally well whether capital and labor are substitute or complementary factors of production milgrom and roberts 1996 have established a global lechatelier principle under the assumption that capital and labor are always substitutes or always complements in production a stipulation that is necessarily true for the infinitesimal changes contemplated in the local lechatelier predictions when the firm makes decisions while facing uncertainty about output price risk preferences influence behavior if the uncertainty cannot be fully diversified through futures contracts or the sale of ownership shares as in the case of closely held family businesses such as some of those

dynamic monotonicity and comparative statics for real options abstract we analyze the relationship between complementarities and monotonicity in dynamic programs while complementarities supermodularity and nondecreasing differences are sufficient for monotonic statics in stochastic dynamic programs they are only robustly necessary in a limited way under heavy discounting monotonicity of the decision rule doesnotin general imply monotonicity of the optimal path in fact optimal paths in such models may exhibit extremely complex behavior for convex adjustment costs many real option models have monotone decision rules while for fixed costs they typically do not we also strengthen a well known characterization of complementarities due to milgrom and shannon 19 journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c61 d92 e22

central banks at war war is expensive troops must be equipped and weapons must be procured when the enormous borrowing requirements of war make the sovereigns credibility problem more difficult central banks enhance a government s ability to borrow by being the sole direct purchaser of government debt the central bank increases the effective punishment that can be imposed on the government for defaulting on the marginal lender this increases lenders confidence that the government will be punished in case of default making lenders willing to purchase the debt at a lower rate of interest the sovereign dependent on the low borrowing costs offered by the central bank has an incentive to retain the bank data covering the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reveal that possessing a central bank lowers the sovereign s borrowing costs particularly during times of war

testing static oligopoly models conduct and cost in the sugar industry 1890 1914 we explore the widespread methodology of using demand information to infer market conduct and unobserved cost components under the hypothesis of static oligopoly behavior direct measures of marginal cost and conduct indicating small market power serve as benchmarks the more competitive models yield better cost estimates the best cost estimates occur when conduct is estimated as a free parameter which in turn only slightly underestimates our direct measure it also tracks the decline in market power accompanying the industry s structural changes the methodology is largely validated although partial cost information can improve its predictive power conclusions are robust to demand function

the impact of pricing policy on sales variability in a supermarket retail context abstract the bullwhip effect is recognized to be a significant cost driver in supply chains one of the measures proposed frequently to counter bullwhip effect is price stability through everyday low pricing edlp however this study suggests that with an auto regressive ar1 demand process the use of constant instead of dynamic pricing may result in lower profitability and higher demand volatility an optimal price and stocking level policy is developed with normally distributed demand in this study and the model is tested using parameters from a supermarket scanner data set to determine the impact of two pricing policies the hypothesis that low prior period demand leads to discounted pricing is also tested and partially supported

the genetics of investment biases abstract for a long list of investment biases including lack of diversification excessive trading and the disposition effect we find that genetic differences explain up to 45 of the remaining variation across individual investors after controlling for observable individual characteristics the evidence is consistent with a view that investment biases are manifestations of innate and evolutionary ancient features of human behavior we find that work experience with finance reduces genetic predispositions to investment biases finally we find that even genetically identical investors who grew up in the same family environment often differ substantially in their investment behaviors due to individual specific experiences or events

estimating the economic return to educational levels using data on twins this paper relaxes some restrictions of previous twin based estimates of the effects of education on earnings first it estimates the earnings premiums associated with different educational levels second it estimates a piecewise linear relationship between the natural logarithm of annual earnings and years of schooling third the measurement error corrections are based on a less restrictive non classical measurement error model the estimation strategy implies that ability bias can be investigated separately in different parts of the educational distribution the linear relationship between the logarithm of annual earnings and years of schooling is rejected furthermore the results in the sample of identical mz twins indicated both that the ability bias could be of different signs and of different magnitudes in different parts of the educational distribution the twin based estimates in the sample of fraternal dz twins did not display any marked differences as compared to the cross sectional estimates finally the results indicated that the error corrected twin based estimates of the average return to years of schooling that rely on a classical measurement error model are upwards biased by approximately 30 copyright 2004 john wiley sons ltd

oligopoly experimentation of learning with simulated markets abstract learning is investigated using experimental methods agents have no information about demand conditions the same oligopoly market is finitely repeated and the only link between successive markets is that agents acquire experience over time as the game is played adaptive as well as least squares learning are tested the model of price adjustment followed by firms indicates that the non cooperative bertrand nash equilibrium constitutes an attractor to players strategies

voting under ignorance of job skills of unemployed the overtaxation bias abstract usual models on voting over basic income flat tax schedules rest on the assumption that voters know the whole distribution of skills even if at equilibrium some individuals do not work if individuals productivity remains unknown until they work it may be more convincing to assume that voters have only beliefs about the distribution of skills and that a learning process takes place in this paper at each period individuals vote according to their beliefs which are updated when getting new information from the job market the voting process converges towards some steady state equilibrium that depends on both the true distribution of skills and the initial beliefs the equilibrium tax rate is higher than or equal to the tax rate achieved in the perfect information framework an illustration is provided on french data if voters are over pessimistic as to the potential productivity of unemployed people majority voting may lock the economy in an informational trap with a high tax rate and a high level of inactivity

risk aversion and expected utility theory a calibration theorem within the expected utility framework the only explanation for risk aversion is that the utility function for wealth is concave a person has lower marginal utility for additional wealth when she is wealthy than when she is poor this paper provides a theorem showing that expected utility theory is an utterly implausible explanation for appreciable risk aversion over modest stakes within expected utility theory for any concave utility function even very little risk aversion over modest stakes implies an absurd degree of risk aversion over large stakes illustrative calibrations are provided

how large is the economy wide rebound effect abstract the size of the economy wide rebound effect is crucial for estimating the contribution that energy efficiency improvements can make to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and for understanding the drivers of energy use economy wide rebound from an energy efficiency improvement includes changes in the use of energy to produce complementary and substitute goods or inputs and other flow on effects that affect energy use across the economy as well as the direct rebound due to energy users using more of an energy service that has become less costly as result of improved energy efficiency jevons first argued in 1865 that improvements in energy efficiency increase total energy use and in recent decades researchers have argued for and against this backfire hypothesis theory provides some guidance on the factors affecting rebound but does not impose much constraint on the range of possible responses historical evidence suggests that the improved energy efficiency of recent technology has not reduced energy use because consumption has shifted to more energy intensive goods and services simulations and econometric research have produced mixed results some recent general equilibrium studies find large rebound around 100 but more research is needed to confirm or refute these findings

different paths to the modern state in europe the interaction between warfare economic structure and political regime theoretical work on taxation and state building borrows heavily from early modern european experience while a number of european states increased centralized tax revenues during this period for others revenues stagnated or even declined and these variations have motivated alternative arguments for the determinants of fiscal and state capacity this study reviews the arguments concerning the three determinants that have received most attention namely warfare economic structure and political regime and tests them by making use of a new and comprehensive tax revenue dataset our main finding is that these three determinants worked in interaction with each other specifically when under pressure of war it was representative regimes in more urbanized commercial economies and authoritarian regimes in more rural agrarian economies that tended to better aggregate domestic interests towards state building

genetic variation in financial decision making individuals differ in how they construct their investment portfolios yet empirical models of portfolio risk typically account only for a small portion of the cross sectional variance this paper asks whether genetic variation can explain some of these individual differences following a major pension reform swedish adults had to form a portfolio from a large menu of funds we match data on these investment decisions with the swedish twin registry and find that approximately 25 of individual variation in portfolio risk is due to genetic variation we also find that these results extend to several other aspects of financial decision making

technology asymmetries group algebra and multiplant cost minimization for a homogeneous good this article studies firm level production activities when the firm controls a plural number of plants through careful construction of cost function technology asymmetries we inquire into the ordinal structure of the production vector for multiplant cost minimizers when schur convexity of a reference pseudo cost technology is the principal functional assumption then ordinal concepts of technical asymmetries map into rank order on the equilibrium production vector under a more generalized characterization of the technical asymmetries a multiplant firm encounters group theory is used to map a cardinal concept of asymmetries into cardinal bounds on the optimum allocation

pass through in a concentrated industry empirical evidence and regulatory implications we estimate pass through with thirty years of data from a concentrated industry the empirical model accounts for oligopoly interactions yet facilitates estimation with aggregate price data robust statistical evidence supports that industry wide cost changes are more than completely transmitted downstream and that this industry pass through is largely unaected by competitive conditions the industry in question portland cement is a major focus of environmental and antitrust regulators we use our pass through estimates to i evaluate the welfare consequences of marketbased co2 regulation ii predict the magnitude and location of price eects due to a merger under review by antitrust authorities and iii corroborate the simulation based analysis of the epa regarding its impending regulation of local pollutants

market information and firm performance the value of new information depends on how accurate the information is but it may also depend on the characteristics of the firm and the nature of the industry it operates in we develop a game theoretic model to understand how firm and industry characteristics moderate the effect of market information on firm profits our results suggest that information is more valuable when product substitutability is higher suggesting that information is of greater value in more competitive industries our results also suggest that although industry size does not affect the value of information information is more valuable for larger firms we find that except under some conditions more precise market information has a greater impact on profits in a stackelberg mode of conduct than in a bertrand nash mode

dual approaches to the analysis of risk aversion we present a dual formulation of choice under uncertainty based on a few simple assumptions about preferences it is shown that the additive separability restriction on preferences key to expected utility theory can be dropped with little loss of analytic power for a broad class of choice problems dual risk premiums are characterized and it is shown that placing various invariance restrictions on them leads naturally to generalizations of the concepts of cara crra and lrt familiar from expected utility theory each of these generalizations conforms to a notion of homotheticity

the existence of nash equilibria in reaction functions for dynamic models of oligopoly consider cournot s stability analysis of his mineral spring duopoly cournot 1838 each of the two firms believes that its rival s output in the next period will simply equal that observed currently profit maximization yields reaction functions which are explicitly dynamic and are assumed to govern the actual evolution of the system cournot proved that the system is asymptotically stable in this simplest case cournot s result was shown by theocharis 1960 not to generalize to three or more firms fisher 1961 discusses more general cost and demand functions than those used by cournot even in the case considered by cournot however there is an obvious conceptual objection each firm s output will generally vary from one period to the next flagrantly violating its rival s conjecture some of james friedman s work especially 1968 1973 1976 and 1977 might best be viewed as an attempt to eliminate this delusional quality from dynamic models of oligopoly consider a typical duopoly scenario with two firms making repeated simultaneous quantity determinations friedman more commonly discusses price setting models but these are straightforwardly analogous each firm believes that the other firm s behavior is determined only by the quantity pair selected in the previous period in friedman s work as distinct from cournot s these beliefs are ultimately required to be consistent with the other firm s actual behavior for example firm 2 believes that firm l s output in the current period is given as

vancouver s gasoline price wars an empirical exercise in uncovering supergame strategies this paper uses a unique data set to determine which dynamic model of tacit collusion best describes behaviour in a particular industry the area investigated is a region of the vancouver british columbia retail gasoline market players are service station managers who compete daily firms choose price in each period using strategies that depend on prices chosen in the previous period periodically unanticipated demand shocks precipitate price wars when shocks occur the firms in the market must determine the new demand conditions and adjust their strategies from an econometric point of view slopes of intertemporal reaction functions are latent variables the resulting system of equations with time varying parameters is estimated via the kalman filter different repeated game oligopoly models correspond to different transition matrices for the latent variables the models can thus be assessed in terms of their power to explain firm behaviour in this market

nature or nurture what determines investor behavior abstract using data on identical and fraternal twins complete financial portfolios we decompose the cross sectional variation in investor behavior we find that a genetic factor explains about one third of the variance in stock market participation and asset allocation family environment has an effect on the behavior of young individuals but this effect is not long lasting and disappears as an individual gains experience frequent contact among twins results in similar investment behavior beyond a genetic factor twins who grew up in different environments still display similar investment behavior our interpretation of a genetic component of the decision to invest in the stock market is that there are innate differences in factors affecting effective stock market participation costs we attribute the genetic component of asset allocation the relative amount invested in equities and the portfolio volatility to genetic variation in risk preferences

subgame perfect equilibrium with continuous reaction functions abstract earlier efforts by friedman examined infinite horizon oligopolies trying and failing to show existence of subgame perfect nash equilibria with the firms strategies being continuous reaction functions here in a typical game theoretic model with discounting we prove the existence of such equilibria the equilibrium strategies mimic trigger strategies in their method of operation but are continuous so that small defections from equilibrium actions result in small per period punishments we prove our results by constructing equilibria in a fashion analogous to that found in proofs of folk theorems in repeated games

the short and long run comparative statics of uncertainty abstract if a two input stochastic reward function is supermodular then a first degree stochastic shift increases both inputs and the more variable factor is more responsive in the long run these results hold for second degree dominance under additional curvature conditions

the behavioral genetics of behavioral anomalies a number of recent papers have examined the environmental and genetic sources of individual differences in economic and financial decision making here we contribute to this burgeoning literature by extending it to a number of key behavioral anomalies that are thought to be of importance for consumption savings and portfolio selection decisions using survey based evidence from more than 11 000 swedish twins we demonstrate that a number of anomalies such as for instance the conjunction fallacy default bias and loss aversion are moderately heritable in contrast our estimates imply that variation in common environment explains only a small share of individual differences we also report suggestive evidence in favor of a shared genetic architecture between cognitive reflection and a subset of the studied anomalies these results offer some support for the proposition that the heritable variation in behavioral anomalies is partly mediated by genetic variance in cognitive ability taken together with previous findings our results underline the importance of genetic differences as a source of heterogeneity in economic and financial decision making this paper was accepted by brad barber teck ho and terrance odean special issue editors

supermodularity and complementarity in economics an elementary survey the literature on supermodular optimization and games is surveyed from the perspective of potential users in economics this methodology provides a new approach for comparative statics based only on critical assumptions and allows a general analysis of games with strategic complementarities the results are presented in a simplified yet rigourous manner without reference to lattice theory for the special case of one dimensional parameter and actions sets with the emphasis being on wide accessibility detailed applications are presented for well known models of consumer behavior monopoly pass through bertrand and cournot competition strategic r d search and matching wherever appropriate useful tricks for applications and comparative comments are inserted

lechatelier samuelson principle in games and pass through of shocks abstract the lechatelier samuelson principle states that as a reaction to a shock an agent s short run adjustment of an affected action is smaller than its long run adjustment when the agent can also adjust other related actions we extend the principle to strategic environments where the long run adjustment also accounts for other players adjusting their strategies we show that the principle holds for supermodular games strategic complements satisfying monotone comparative statics and provide sufficient conditions for the principle to hold in games of strategic substitutes heterogeneity we discuss the principle s implications for cost pass through of multiproduct firms

the lechatelier principle in a dea model abstract this paper aims to relate the lechatelier principle first introduced into economics by samuelson 1947 with the dea approach through two propositions these propositions allow for bridging the principle over a dea model with and without the presence of non discretionary inputs and enable one to make comparisons for the various efficiency measures under different conditions the quasi fixity of some inputs hinders a firm s capacity from instantly and freely adjusting its input combination in order to minimize its production costs the assumption that all inputs are discretionary tends to exaggerate managers ability to dispense resources and renders invalid information on the adjustment of the current input mix

tax incidence with strategic firms in the soft drink market abstract because soft drink sd consumption is considered to be a contributor to the epidemic of obesity there is a growing interest in evaluating the impact on sd consumption of alternative tax policies in this paper we propose a methodology to evaluate the impact of taxation of a food market taking into account the strategic price response of both manufacturers and retailers we apply this methodology to the french sd market and simulate the impacts of ad valorem and excise taxes we find that firms behave differently when facing an ad valorem tax or an excise tax an excise tax is overshifted to consumer prices while an ad valorem tax is undershifted to consumer prices we find that an excise tax based on the sugar content of sd is the most effective at reducing sd consumption our results also indicate that ignoring strategic pricing by firms leads to misestimations of the impact of taxation by between 15 and 40 depending on the products and the tax implemented in the short term that is ignoring positive long term health effects a 9 cents l excise tax has a small negative welfare effect about 1 person year

monotone comparative statics under uncertainty this paper analyzes monotone comparative statics predictions in several classes of stochastic optimization problems the main results characterize necessary and sufficient conditions for comparative statics predictions to hold based on properties of primitive functions that is utility functions and probability distributions the results apply when the primitives satisfy one of the following two properties i a single crossing property which arises in applications such as portfolio investment problems and auctions or ii log supermodularity which arises in the analysis of demand functions affiliated random variables stochastic orders and orders over risk aversion

a foundation for behavioral economics jessica l cohen and william t dickens the core theory of behavior in economics which structures inquiry and provides a framework for empirical analysis is largely responsible for the success of the discipline behavioral economics be challenges this theory but has failed to provide a coherent alternative consequently the influence of be has been limited in what follows we argue that evolutionary psychology ep suitably adapted can provide at least a partial foundation for be its methods offer a way of generating theories of the origins of anomalous behaviors and of testing those theories

theoretical models of sales promotions contributions limitations and a future research agenda our objective in this paper is to review theoretical models of sales promotions we highlight the key contributions of these models discuss their limitations and outline an agenda for future research managerial questions examined in these models include some very fundamental issues such as why firms resort to the use of sales promotions in mature markets and why the use of sales promotions has increased dramatically during the last two decades also included in this review are models that address firm level strategic issues such as the allocation of dollars between advertising and sales promotions and the relative emphasis on trade promotions vis a vis consumer promotions we also review theoretical models that explain how consumers respond to price promotions and what type of sales promotion tools may be superior to others in a particular market the review concludes with a possible agenda for future research

computing productivity firm level evidence we explore the effect of computerization on productivity and output growth using data from 527 large us firms over 1987 1994 we find that computerization makes a contribution to measured productivity and output growth in the short term using one year differences that is consistent with normal returns to computer investments however the productivity and output contributions associated with computerization are up to five times greater over long periods using five to seven year differences the results suggest that the observed contribution of computerization is accompanied by relatively large and time consuming investments in complementary inputs such as organizational capital that may be omitted in conventional calculations of productivity the large long run contribution of computers and their associated complements that we uncover may partially explain the subsequent investment surge in computers in the late 1990s

nobel lecture the economic way of looking at behavior an important step in extending the traditional theory of individual rational choice to analyze social issues beyond those usually considered by economists is to incorporate into the theory a much richer class of attitudes preferences and calculations while this approach to behavior builds on an expanded theory of individual choice it is not mainly concerned with individuals it uses theory at the micro level as a powerful tool to derive implications at the group or macro level the lecture describes the approach and illustrates it with examples drawn from my past and current work

on the existence of cournot equilibrium this paper examines the existence of n firm cournot equilibrium in a market for a single homogeneous commodity it proves that if each firm s marginal revenue declines as the aggregate output of other firms increases which is implied by concave inverse demand then a cournot equilibrium exists without assuming that firms have nondecreasing marginal cost or identical technologies also if the marginal revenue condition fails at a potential optimal point there is a set of firms such that no cournot equilibrium exists the paper also contains an example of nonexistence with two nonidentical firms each with constant returns to scale production