improving supply chain performance and managing risk under weather related demand uncertainty we consider a manufacturer retailer supply chain for a seasonal product whose demand is weather sensitive the retailer orders from the manufacturer supplier prior to the selling season and then sells to the market we examine how a manufacturer can structure a weather linked rebate to improve his expected profit the proposed class of rebate contracts offers several advantages over many other contract structures including no required verification of leftover inventory and or markdown amounts and no adverse effect on sales effort by the retailer we provide a thorough analysis of the manufacturer s and retailer s decisions in this context we show that the weather linked rebate can take many different forms and this flexibility allows the supplier to design contracts that are pareto improving and or limit his risk in offering the contract and the retailer s risk in accepting it for weather rebates with certain characteristics the manufacturer can fully hedge his risks of offering a weather rebate by paying a risk premium we show how this can be accomplished we also show that the basic structural results extend to settings in which the two parties would like to limit their risk

perishable inventory theory a review this paper reviews the relevant literature on the problem of determining suitable ordering policies for both fixed life perishable inventory and inventory subject to continuous exponential decay we consider both deterministic and stochastic demand for single and multiple products both optimal and sub optimal order policies are discussed in addition a brief review of the application of these models to blood bank management is included the review concludes with a discussion of some of the interesting open research questions in the area

optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities this paper considers the pricing decision faced by a producer of a commodity with a short shelf or demand life a hierarchical model is developed and the results of the single period inventory model are used to examine possible pricing and return policies the paper shows that several such policies currently in effect are suboptimal these include those where the manufacturer offers retailers full credit for all unsold goods or where no returns of unsold goods are permitted the paper also demonstrates that a policy whereby a manufacturer offers retailers full credit for a partial return of goods may achieve channel coordination but that the optimal return allowance will be a function of retailer demand therefore such a policy cannot be optimal in a multi retailer environment it is proven however that a pricing and return policy in which a manufacturer offers retailers a partial credit for all unsold goods can achieve channel coordination in a multi retailer environment this article was originally published in marketing science volume 4 issue 2 pages 166 176 in 1985

loss aversion and rationality in the newsvendor problem under recourse option abstract risk neutral assumption in the newsvendor problem under recourse option predicts the order quantity insensitive to the selling price and risk aversion modeled through common utility functions gives decreasing order quantity with increasing selling price in this paper we consider loss aversion to model the choice preference of the decision maker in the newsvendor problem under recourse option and prove that loss aversion predicts the rational ordering behavior of the newsvendor with respect to the changes in price and cost parameters further we find that loss aversion can significantly improve the performance of utility function based models in predicting the rational behavior we extend the analysis to a supply chain setting and establish coordinating contract between a loss averse retailer facing a newsvendor problem and a risk neutral supplier under recourse option we find that the contract parameter does not depend on the loss aversion hence the same contract can be implemented with retailers with different levels of loss aversion

vertical control of price and inventory this paper offers a simple approach to the theory of decentralizing inventory and pricing decisions along a supply chain we consider an upstream manufacturer selling to two outlets which compete as differentiated duopolists and face uncertain demand demand spillovers between the outlets arise in the event of stockouts the price mechanism in which each outlet pays a two part price and chooses price and inventory virtually never coordinates incentives efficiently contracts that can elicit first best decisions include resale price floors or buy back policies retailer held options to sell inventory back to the manufacturers

the impact of sharing customer returns information in a supply chain with and without a buyback policy in this paper we examine a single period problem in a supply chain in which a stackelberg manufacturer supplies a product to a retailer who faces customer returns and demand uncertainty we show that the manufacturer incurs a significant profit loss with and without a buyback policy if it fails to account for customer returns in the wholesale price decision under the assumption that the retailer is better informed than the manufacturer on customer returns information we show that without a buyback policy the retailer prefers not to share if the manufacturer overestimates while it prefers to share customer returns information if the manufacturer underestimates this information if the manufacturer offers a buyback policy we have the opposite results we also discuss incentives to share the customer returns information and some of the issues that are raised in sharing this information

a model of the liquidity structure based on asset indivisibility abstract although the notion of a liquidity structure of asset yields is widely accepted there do not seem to be models of such a structure here the liquidity of an asset is taken to be its transaction velocity the amount traded per unit time divided by the stock assets are assumed to be indivisible and to differ in size trade using such assets is implied by pairwise matching and absence of double coincidence in produced goods it is shown that a sufficiently large asset has a lower velocity and a higher yield than a sufficiently small asset

modeling a multi attribute utility newsvendor with partial backlogging abstract traditional newsvendor models usually focus on single profit maximization or cost minimization approaches however making a monetary estimate of the consequences of lost sales as a result of shortages is often a difficult task for many practitioners besides there is still a lack of an explicit account of decision making judgments on the multiple consequences of making decisions with regard to order quantities in order to deal with this problem this paper presents a multi attribute utility model for the newsvendor problem with regard to profit the impacts of service level on corporate image and on customers goodwill and the impact on the environment arising from the disposal of unsold products demand is partially backlogged according to a decreasing exponential function of the waiting time the fundamental principles and limitations related to the application of the model built are also discussed

the impact of customer returns on pricing and order decisions abstract in this paper we address the simultaneous determination of price and inventory replenishment when customers return product to the firm we examine cases when the quantity of returned product is a function of both the quantity sold and the price in single and multi period problems with and without uncertainty in demand we derive results for optimal prices and order quantities and discuss how the firm should change price and inventory quantities in order to mitigate the negative effects of returns from customers

managing supply uncertainty under supply chain cournot competition abstract we study the cournot competition between two supply chains that are subject to supply uncertainty each supply chain consists of a retailer and an exclusive supplier which has random yield we examine how the levels of supply uncertainty and competition intensity affect the equilibrium decisions of ordering quantity contract offering and centralization choice we show that a retailer should order more if its competing retailer s supply becomes less reliable or if its own supply becomes more reliable a supply chain with reliable supply can take great advantage of the high supply risk of its competing chain furthermore for decentralized chains we characterize the optimal wholesale price contracts with linear penalty under different supply risks and competition scenarios finally we show that supply chain centralization is a dominant strategy and it always makes the customers better off nevertheless if the supply risk is low and the chain competition is intensive centralization could actually decrease the supply chain profit compared with the case where both chains do not choose centralization this results in a prisoner s dilemma on the other hand if the supply risk is high and or the competition level is low centralization always increases the supply chain profit the desirability of supply chain centralization is enhanced by high supply uncertainty or low chain competition

channel coordination under price protection midlife returns and end of life returns in dynamic markets this paper examines three channel policies that are used in declining price environments price protection p is a mechanism under which the manufacturer pays the retailer a credit applying to the retailer s unsold inventory when thewholesale price drops during the life cycle midlife returns m allow the retailer to return units partway through the life cycle at some rebate and end of life returns e allow the retailer to return unsold units at the end of the life cycle under decliningretail prices if the wholesale prices and the return rebates are set properly then em i e midlife and end of life returns achieves channel coordination however such a policy may not be implementable because it may require the manufacturer to be worse off as a result of coordination if p is used in addition to em and the terms are set properly then pem guarantees both coordination and a win win outcome if theretail price is constant over time then em is sufficient to guarantee both coordination and a win win outcome

the marketing channel as an equilibrium set of contracts nash bargaining theory and recent developments in economic contract theory are employed in the analysis of the marketing channels individual dyadic contracts involving payment schedules between members of a simple 3 level channel are investigated with particular reference to monitoring problems and intrachannel power relations the interrelations between individual contracts are examined and the equilibrium set of contracts constituting the channel derived the performance of the channel in terms of risk sharing allocative efficiency and the distribution of gains is then evaluated it is found that the risk aversion of channel members and the cost of monitoring and enforcement affect channel efficiency and that under certain types of interdependencies and externalities the nature of the power structure is crucial to channel efficiency

managing channel profits a channel of distribution consists of different channel members each having his own decision variables however each channel member s decisions do affect the other channel members profits and as a consequence actions a lack of coordination of these decisions can lead to undesirable consequences for example in the simple manufacturer retailer consumer channel uncoordinated and independent channel members decisions over margins result in a higher price paid by the consumer than if those decisions were coordinated in addition the ensuing suboptimal volume leads to lower profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer this paper explores the problems inherent in channel coordination we address the following questions what is the effect of channel coordination what causes a lack of coordination in the channel how difficult is it to achieve channel coordination what mechanisms exist which can achieve channel coordination what are the strengths and weaknesses of these mechanism what is the role of nonprice variables e g manufacturer advertising retailer shelf space in coordination does the lack of coordination affect normative implications from in store experimentation can quantity discounts be a coordination mechanism are some marketing practices actually disguised quantity discounts we review the literature and present a simple formulation illustrating the roots of the coordination problem we then derive the form of the quantity discount schedule that results in optimum channel profits this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 3 pages 239 272 in 1983

government transaction policy and gresham s law abstract a search theoretic model is used to study how legal restrictions may account for the fact that gresham s law sometimes holds but other times fails legal restrictions is modeled here as policies that government adopts in the transactions with private agents such as at what prices it accepts a currency in exchange for goods and at what ratios it conducts currency exchange a government policy sufficiently favorable to light coins can induce the existence of an equilibrium where both coins circulate and light coins are even accepted at a premium a policy favorable to heavy coins may increase their value to such an extent that they are hoarded from circulation when this equilibrium did not exist without interventions

a search based theory of the on the run phenomenon we propose a model in which assets with identical cash flows can trade at different prices infinitely lived agents can establish long positions in a search spot market or short positions by first borrowing an asset in a search repo market we show that short sellers can endogenously concentrate in one asset because of search externalities and the constraint that they must deliver the asset they borrowed that asset enjoys greater liquidity a higher lending fee specialness and trades at a premium consistent with no arbitrage we derive closed form solutions for small frictions and provide a calibration generating realistic on the run premia

barter and monetary exchange under private information the authors develop a model of production and exchange with uncertainty concerning the quality of commodities and study the role of fiat money in ameliorating frictions caused by private information the model is specified so that without private information only high quality commodities are produced and there is no welfare gain from using money with private information there can be equilibria and sometimes multiple equilibria where low quality commodities are produced and money can increase welfare money works by promoting useful production and exchange in efficient monetary equilibria agents adopt strategies that increase the probability of acquiring high quality output copyright 1994 by american economic association

on the coexistence of money and higher return assets and its social role this paper adopts mechanism design to investigate the coexistence of at money and higherreturn assets we consider an economy with pairwise meetings where at money and riskfree capital compete as means of payment as in lagos and rocheteau 2008 the trading mechanism in pairwise meetings is chosen among all individually rational renegotiation proof mechanisms to maximize society s welfare we show that in any stationary monetary equilibrium capital commands a higher rate of return than at money

analysis of the impact of price sensitivity factors on the returns policy in coordinating supply chain this paper analyzes the impact of price sensitivity factors on characteristics of returns policy contracts in a single period product supply chain the contract considers stochastic and price dependent demand we present an analytical model and then use numerical methods with the stackelberg game to identify the contract properties we numerically show that a returns policy indeed improves supply chain performance however the benefits earned from the returns policy under price sensitive and variable demand are different for different supply chain partners first when price sensitivity is high profit of the manufacturer decreases with increase in demand variability second when price sensitivity is sufficiently high and demand variability increases the manufacturer has to surrender part of the profits to the retailer in order to continue sales however even after surrendering part of the profits to the retailer the manufacturer still earns profits that are higher than those available in a wholesale price contract last from the perspective of division of channel profits the retailer is always worse off in case of returns policies than in a wholesale price contract therefore to apply this form of incentive in practice managements should consider the impact of price sensitivity on the returns policy and its performance

search bargaining money and prices the goal of this paper is to extend existing search theoretic models of fiat money which until now have assumed that the price level is exogenous by explicitly incorporating bilateral bargaining this allows us to determine the price level endogenously and leads to additional insights concerning the role of money for example we find that monetary equilibria are generally inefficient in the sense that output and prices differ from the solution to a social planner s problem although the difference can become small as the discount rate or search friction vanishes we also find that there exist nonstationary inflationary equilibria

coexistence of money and interest bearing securities abstract a random matching model with money is used to study the nominal yield on small denomination bearer safe discount securities issued by the government there is always one steady state with matured securities circulating at par and for some parameters another with them circulating at a discount in the former a necessary and sufficient condition for a positive nominal yield on not yet matured securities is exogenous discriminatory treatment of them by the government in the latter the post maturity discount on securities induces a deeper pre maturity discount even without such discriminatory treatment

monetary policy and asset prices a mechanism design approach we investigate the eects of monetary policy on asset prices in economies where assets are traded periodically in over the counter otc markets with bilateral meetings between buyers and sellers the trading mechanism in pairwise meetings is designed to maximize social welfare taking as given the frictions in the environment e g lack of commitment and limited enforcement and monetary policy we show that asset price bubbles emerge in a constrained e cient monetary equilibrium only if liquidity is abundant and the rst best allocation is implementable in contrast if liquidity is scarce assets are priced at their fundamental value in any constrained e cient monetary equilibrium in which case an increase in in ation has no eect on asset prices but it reduces output and welfare finally for low in ation rates the bursting of an asset price bubble can be an optimal response to a shock that reduces assets resalability

customer return policies for experience goods this paper studies the economic rationale for customer return policies by focusing on the experience goods aspect of many products return policies allow consumers to defer their purchasing decisions until after they gain some experience with goods in so doing they insure consumers against ex post loss which allows a monopoly seller to charge more than otherwise it is shown that the seller adopts the return policy when consumers are highly risk averse or retail costs are high consumers are strictly better off under the return policy but there is too little adoption of the policy in equilibrium copyright 1996 by blackwell publishing ltd

bargaining in competing supply chains with uncertainty abstract substantial literature has been devoted to supply chain coordination the majority of this literature ignores competition between supply chains moreover a significant part of this literature focuses on coordination that induce the supply chain members to follow strategies that produce the equilibria chosen by a vertically integrated supply chain this paper investigates the equilibrium behavior of two competing supply chains in the presence of demand uncertainty we consider joint pricing and quantity decisions and competition under three possible supply chain strategies vertical integration vi manufacturer s stackelberg ms and bargaining on the wholesale price bw is the bargaining parameter over a single or infinitely many periods we show that in contrast to earlier literature using vivi vi in both chains is the unique nash equilibrium over one period decision while using msms or bw bw may be nash equilibrium over infinitely many periods

the option value of returns theory and empirical evidence when a firm allows the return of previously purchased merchandise it provides customers with an option that has measurable value whereas the option to return merchandise leads to an increase in gross revenue it also creates additional costs selecting an optimal return policy requires balancing both demand and cost implications in this paper we develop a structural model of a consumer s decision to purchase and return an item that nests extant choice models as a special case the model enables a firm to both measure the value to consumers of the return option and balance the costs and benefits of different return policies we apply the model to a sample of data provided by a mail order catalog company we find considerable variation in the value of returns across customers and categories when the option value is large there are large increases in demand for example the option to return women s footwear is worth an average of more than 15 per purchase to customers and increases average purchase rates by more than 50 we illustrate how the model can be used by a retailer to optimize his return policies across categories and customers

manufacturer s return policy in a two stage supply chain with two risk averse retailers and random demand abstract this paper studies the manufacturer s return policy and the retailers decisions in a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and two risk averse retailers under a single period setting with price sensitive random demand we characterize each retailer s risk embedded objective via conditional value at risk and construct manufacturer stackelberg games with and without horizontal price competition between the retailers we explore through numerical studies the effects of the retailers aversion to risk and other parameters on the manufacturer s return policy and profit and the retailers decisions we further investigate the effect of distribution asymmetry by comparing the results with normal and lognormal demand

viewpoint a microfoundation of monetary economics in this lecture i explain what the microfoundations of money are about and why they are necessary for monetary economics then i review recent developments of a particular microfoundation of money commonly known as the search theory of money finally i outline some unresolved issues dans cette presentation l auteur explique ce que sont les microfondations de la monnaie et pourquoi elles sont necessaires a l economie monetaire ensuite il passe en revue certains developpements recents d une microfondation particuliere de la monnaie connue sous le nom de theorie de la recherche de la monnaie enfin l auteur fait le tour d un ensemble de problemes qui restent sans solution pour le moment

liquidity and asset market dynamics this study analyzes economies with an essential role for liquid assets in the exchange process the model can generate multiple stationary equilibria across which asset prices market participation capitalization output and welfare are positively related it can also generate a variety of nonstationary equilibria even when fundamentals are deterministic and time invariant including periodic chaotic and stochastic sunspot equilibria with recurrent market crashes some equilibria have asset price trajectories that resemble bubbles growing and bursting endogenous private and public liquidity is also introduced sometimes it is efficient to provide enough liquid assets to satiate demand other times it is not

testing the long run neutrality of money in a developing economy the case of india abstract seasonal integration and cointegration techniques are used to test the hypothesis of long run money neutrality using indian data on the basis of money real output and price level quarterly data empirical evidence is presented showing that money is cointegrated with prices but not with output at the zero frequency this evidence is interpreted to imply that money affects nominal but not real variables in the long run it is concluded that money is neutral in the long run

liquidity premia in dynamic bargaining markets abstract this paper develops a search theoretic model of the cross sectional distribution of asset returns abstracting from risk premia and focusing exclusively on liquidity in contrast with much of the transaction cost literature it is not assumed that different assets carry different exogenously specified trading costs instead different expected returns due to liquidity are explained by the cross sectional variation in tradeable shares the qualitative predictions of the model are consistent with much of the empirical evidence

manufacturer s return policies and retail competition manufacturers returns policies are a common feature in the distribution of many products the obvious rationale for returns policies is insurance practitioners not surprisingly have a different perspective and view returns as a cost of doing business in this paper we study the strategic effect of returns policies on retail competition and highlight its profitability implications for a manufacturer the setting for our research is the distribution of products with uncertain demand limited shelf lives and retail competition our objective is to provide a better understanding of when manufacturers should adopt returns policies the insights are obtained with a model based on the economics of strategy and decision making under uncertainty we show that when retailing is competitive and there is no uncertainty in demand a returns policy subtly induces retailers to compete more intensely the provision of a returns policy reduces retail prices without affecting wholesale prices thereby reducing retailer margins and improving manufacturer profitability the intuition is that with a returns policy cournot like levels of retail stocks cannot be sustained each retailer will order stocks so that it will not be constrained by stocks and so intensifying retail competition when however demand is uncertain and there is a single retailer a returns policy encourages the retailer to over stock and so decreases upstream manufacturer profits while the provision of a returns policy leads to lower retail margins the optimality of returns policy depends on the overall uncertainty and marginal cost a returns policy reduces the dispersion in retail prices between the high and low states of demand and the range of retail prices in the returns case is contained within the range of retail prices for the no returns case in the general setting when there are competing retailers and demand is uncertain there is a trade off for the manufacturer between the benefits more intense retail competition and the costs excessive stocking of a returns policy we find that a manufacturer should accept returns when the marginal production cost is sufficiently low and demand uncertainty is not too great to validate the results of our theory we conduct an empirical test with data from a major u s retailer the tests confirm our prediction that a returns policy intensifies retail competition and reduces retailer margins our theory and empirical test should interest practitioners and researchers in distribution especially those concerned with managing retail competition

selling to the newsvendor with a forecast update analysis of a dual purchase contract we consider a supply chain in which a manufacturer sells to a procure to stock retailer facing a newsvendor problem with a forecast update under a wholesale price contract the retailer waits as long as she can and optimally places her order after observing the forecast update we show that the retailer s wait and decide strategy induced by the wholesale price contract hinders the manufacturer s ability to 1 set the wholesale price and maximize his profit 2 hedge against excess inventory risk and 3 reduce his profit uncertainty to mitigate the adverse effect of wholesale price contract we propose the dual purchase contract through which the manufacturer provides a discount for orders placed before the forecast update we characterize how and when a dual purchase contract creates strict pareto improvement over a wholesale price contract to do so we establish the retailer s optimal ordering policy and the manufacturer s optimal pricing and production policies we show how the dual purchase contract reduces profit variability and how it can be used as a risk hedging tool for a risk averse manufacturer through a numerical study we provide additional managerial insights and show for example that market uncertainty is a key factor that defines when the dual purchase contract provides strict pareto improvement over the wholesale price contract

an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration this paper investigates the effect of product substitutability on nash equilibrium distribution structures in a duopoly where each manufacturer distributes its goods through a single exclusive retailer which may be either a franchised outlet or a factory store static linear demand and cost functions are assumed and a number of rules about players expectations of competitors behavior are examined it is found that for most specifications product substitutability does influence the equilibrium distribution structure for low degrees of substitutability each manufacturer will distribute its product through a company store for more highly competitive goods manufacturers will be more likely to use a decentralized distribution system this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 2 pages 161 191 in 1983

information sharing in a long term supply chain relationship the role of customer review strategy in this paper we study the practice of forecast sharing and supply chain coordination with a game theoretical model we find that in a one shot version of the game forecasts are not shared truthf

a model of a currency shortage abstract until the mid 19th century shortages of currency were common moreover a frequent policy response was a prohibition on the export of coins we use a random matching model with indivisible money to explain a shortage and to judge the desirability of a prohibition on the export of coins the model although extreme in many regards represents better than earlier models a demand for outside money and the problems that arise when that money is indivisible it can also rationalize a prohibition on the export of money

how a dominant retailer might design a purchase contract for a newsvendor type product with price sensitive demand abstract a dominant retailer will purchase a newsvendor type product from a manufacturer who incurs a unit manufacturing cost k the expected retail demand is a function of the unit retail price p how should the retailer design her purchase contract for this increasingly prevalent but inadequately studied scenario we propose plausible adaptations of several contract formats that have been widely studied in the dominant manufacturer context for both symmetric k and a symmetric k knowledge situations we present performance results of these contracts our results then reveal that the performance of these contract formats under our scenario differs considerably from what one would surmise from the well known results published for closely related scenarios for example the widely studied buyback and revenue sharing formats turn out to be largely ineffective when implemented by a dominant retailer in contrast the two part tariff format performs well relative to the theoretically optimal menu of contracts our results highlight the need to study purchase contract formats designed specifically for dominant retailer newsvendor product channels

goodwill hunting and profit sharing decision making in a newspaper chain a generalised equilibrium solution to the stochastic two echelon newsvendor problem is achievable when formulated in the context of some cooperation and coordination between the primal retailer and dual manufacturer operators we build on previous work detailing this equilibrium solution and apply it to the newspaper business the solution incorporates changes in variability encountered due to promotional activity which extends the efficient frontier we also consider consequences for profit and goodwill costs of identifying an equilibrium solution when additional income is generated from a source outside of the supply chain such as advertising we generalise to the supply chain network where there is some knowledge of demand or supply distributions further up or down the supply chain we find that the primal dual formulation and equilibrium solution apply to interactions between components of supply chain networks and illustrate with the transition to the direct distribution of newspapers

money and prices a model of search and bargaining abstract this paper makes commodities divisible and incorporates bargaining into the search theoretic model of money to determine the purchasing power of money or price it is shown that two monetary equilibria always coexist where fiat money is universally accepted the two equilibria differ in price output welfare and the velocity of money sunspot monetary equilibria exist in which money is universally accepted in all states of the economy multiplicity has novel implications on the effectiveness of currency substitution and exchange market intervention journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 e40

manufacturer buyer coordination for newsvendor type products with two ordering opportunities and partial backorders abstract in a recent paper weng z k 2004 coordinating order quantities between the manufacturer and the buyer a generalized newsvendor model european journal of operational research 156 148 161 a newsvendor type coordination model was developed for a single manufacturer single buyer channel with two ordering opportunities this paper further extends the model to the case where the excess demand after the first order is partially backlogged and both parties share the manufacturing setup cost of the second order if happened we show that the decentralized system would perform best if the manufacturer covers utterly the second production setup cost which is opposite to that obtained in weng 2004 another extension in the present paper is that in the centralized system the second order decision is made by the buyer based on the channel s benefit rather than based on the buyer s benefit as in weng 2004 it is proved that the expected profit of the system in our paper is always larger than that in weng 2004 in order to maximize the expected profit of the channel two coordinated policies are proposed to achieve perfect coordination a two part tariff policy for the special case that the buyer pays all the manufacturing setup cost and a revised revenue sharing contract for the case that two parties share the manufacturing setup cost

on returns policies with exogenous price we contribute to current research on single period returns policies by making a clear distinction between models in which transfer price is exogenous and models in which one dominant party unilaterally declares a price we compare the equilibrium contracts that result from these two approaches and derive conditions for the equilibrium returns policy to be pareto efficient when transfer price is exogenous our main result is distribution free but we make some interesting observations on channel performance when demand is uniformly distributed

note the role of returns policies in pricing and inventory decisions for catalogue goods manufacturers often use returns policies to encourage retailers to stock and price items more aggressively we focus on the effect that such policies have on both a retailer s and a manufacturer s profits when the retailer must commit prior to the selling season to both a stocking quantity and a price at which to sell an item such a commitment is often necessary for retailers who sell primarily through catalogues

option and forward contracting with asymmetric information valuation issues in supply chains we investigate the role of forward commitments and option contracts between a seller supplier and a buyer retailer in the presence of asymmetric information in our case both parties face price and demand uncertainty but the retailer being closer to the market has additional information about the true demand and price the supplier aware of this asymmetry and acting as a stackelberg leader designs a contracting arrangement that best meet his interest we contrast the role of forward and option contracts in this environment and identify cases where combinations of the two are dominant finally we investigate how alternative contracting arrangements alter the expected value of obtaining information that eliminates asymmetric information

analysis of supply chains with quantity based fixed incentives abstract this paper examines the use of quantity based fixed incentives to coordinate inventory decisions in a decentralized supply chain we consider a two stage supply chain of autonomous supplier and distributor and prove that the optimal ordering policy for the newsvendor distributor under fixed incentives is an s s type policy we further show that external and internal quantity based incentives can restore channel coordination in single period and channel members can benefit through arbitrary splitting of the resulting additional chain profit the single period results are extended to multiple periods and the impact of fixed incentives on the distributor s optimal stocking policy and channel efficiency are examined under three different multi period supplier strategies numerical examples are used to compare the multi period strategies and to provide additional managerial insights the results show that contrary to common belief incentive plans developed and maintained based only on current inventory data perform poorly in long term and that such incentive plans must be periodically updated to enhance their efficiency furthermore we show that high level of incentives designed to push too much inventory downstream of the supply chain can actually reduce the chain s efficiency

mean variance analysis of option contracts in a two echelon supply chain abstract this paper studies the implications of risk considerations for option contracts in a two echelon supply chain under the mean variance framework we first investigate the conditions for coordinating the supply chain by using option contracts we find that supply chain coordination is not always achieved contrasting with the result that properly designed option contracts can always coordinate a supply chain in the absence of risk considerations second we analyze the stackelberg game for a decentralized supply chain in two cases depending on whether the retailer s risk aversion threshold is known to the supplier we show that when the threshold is public information there exists a unique equilibrium in which the supplier with a higher risk tolerance prefers to reduce the exercise price and thus the retailer s order quantity increases when the retailer s risk aversion threshold is private information the retailer has an incentive to pretend to be less risk averse to curb this incentive distortion we design a new minimum option quantity commitment for the supplier we complement our theoretical results with numerical simulations

liquidity a new monetarist perspective this essay surveys the new monetarist approach to liquidity work in this literature strives for empirical and policy relevance plus rigorous foundations questions include what is liquidity is money essential in achieving desirable outcomes which objects can or should serve in this capacity when can asset prices differ from fundamentals what are the functions of commitment and collateral in credit markets how does money interact with credit and intermediation what can and should monetary policy do the research summarized emphasizes the micro structure of frictional transactions and studies how institutions like monetary exchange credit arrangements or intermediation facilitate the exchange process

channel coordination using product returns for a supply chain with stochastic salvage capacity abstract we examine returns policy in a newsboy framework unlike the prior literature however we assume that both supplier and retailer have limited and stochastic salvage capacities we first analyze the case of integrated supply chain in which the agents decisions are fully coordinated for the joint profits the result prescribes a partial returns policy in which the retailer returns a part of the leftovers to the supplier and liquidates the remainder through its clearance sale in a decentralized system the supplier should motivate the retailer to duplicate the outcome of the integrated system in choosing order and returns quantities we propose three coordination contracts of which each uses two benefit transfer schemes as an incentive to the retailer instead of using a single benefit scheme as in the prior literature all three effectively coordinate the supply chain the supplier as a stakelberg leader chooses the most profitable one since each contract yields the different shares of the agents profits

pairwise trade asset prices and monetary policy abstract we construct a search theoretic model where fiat money coexists with real assets and all assets can be used as a media of exchange the terms of trade in bilateral matches are determined by a pairwise pareto efficient pricing mechanism we do not have to appeal to exogenous liquidity constraints to generate asset prices that are consistent with the following facts i fiat money can be valued despite being dominated in its rate of return ii real assets with identical dividend flows can have different rates of return and iii an increase in inflation raises asset prices lowers their returns and widens the rate of return differences between assets on the normative side we show that there is a range of inflation rates that implement the first best allocation

a serial supply chain of newsvendor problem with safety stocks under complete and partial information sharing abstract we consider a supply chain where multiple members are serially connected the decision is to determine the ordering quantity of a member to the next upstream member in the supply chain the basic cost model is similar to the newsvendor problem with additional consideration to safety stock this paper presents optimal approaches for coordination of the supply chain under both complete and partial information sharing in order to maximize the total expected benefit for complete information sharing we develop an optimal coordination algorithm for partial information sharing we propose an optimal coordination algorithm based on the alternating direction method and the diagonal quadratic approximation method a numerical example is discussed to show the optimal convergence of ordering quantities and discuss the properties of the proposed algorithms

do returns policies intensify retail competition the paper manufacturer s returns policies and retail competition by padmanabhan and png 1997 argues that returns policies intensify retail competition and therefore raise the manufacturer s profits they reach that result through a problematic method to solve the game particularly in the game where the manufacturer accepts returns they unreasonably assume the retailers would never face stock constraints thus changing the retail competition from a cournot like competition to a bertrand one actually in a game where retailers first order stocks and then compete by choosing prices even if a manufacturer offers full return policies the retailers can still use insufficient stocks as quantities precommitment in order to uphold retail prices hence the retailers still face stock constraints at the final stage of the game the nature of the game is essentially unaffected by returns policies when demand is certain this note shows that returns policies do not intensify retail competition in the model proposed by padmanabhan and png 1997

anticipated inflation and rates of return in a search theoretic monetary model abstract how does anticipated inflation of fiat money affect the real return of a near money an asset with real value used to mediate trades this essay studies a search model in which decentralized trade takes place under a fixed bargaining rule the essay analytically studies the comparative statics of a near money s real return as it varies with inflation the effects diverge markedly over the parameter space there exist parameters for which higher inflation lowers the real asset return as suggested by asset substitution theories there also exist parameters for which inflation has the opposite effect