reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests we analyze reputation effects in two player repeated games of strictly conflicting interests in such games player 1 has a commitment action such that a best reply to it gives player 1 the highest individually rational payoff and player 2 the minmax payoff players have equal discount factors with positive probability player 1 is a type who chooses the commitment action after every history we show that player 1 s payoff converges to the maximally feasible payoff when the discount factor converges to one this contrasts with failures of reputation effects for equal discount factors that have been demonstrated in the literature journal of economic literature classification number c71

understanding agricultural policy in africa the contributions of robert bates abstract robert bates s writings on the determinants of agricultural policy in africa employ rational choice and dialectical approaches to political economy this paper discusses some of the strengths and weaknesses of each and proposes an alternative dynamic approach to understanding both the limitations and the sources of agricultural policy with particular reference to kenya

democracy and economic growth a meta analysis despite a sizeable theoretical and empirical literature no firm conclusions have been drawn regarding the impact of political democracy on economic growth this article challenges the consensus of an inconclusive relationship through a quantitative assessment of the democracy growth literature it applies meta regression analysis to the population of 483 estimates derived from 84 studies on democracy and growth using traditional meta analysis estimators the bootstrap and fixed and random effects meta regression models it derives several robust conclusions taking all the available published evidence together it concludes that democracy does not have a direct impact on economic growth however democracy has robust significant and positive indirect effects through higher human capital lower inflation lower political instability and higher levels of economic freedom democracies may also be associated with larger governments and less free international trade there also appear to be country and region specific democracy growth effects overall democracy s net effect on the economy does not seem to be detrimental

the state and economic stagnation in tropical africa abstract politics while only one strand in the explanation of africa s massive economic problems is nonetheless a significant factor a central conundrum facing postcolonial political leaders is how to govern and hold together unintegrated peasant societies in the absence of legitimacy personal rule a particular mode of patrimonial governance provides an answer permitting regime survival and the advancement of political insiders but personal rule has an economically destructive tendency that only shrewd political leadership and propitious world economic conditions can check if uncontrolled certain political practices corrode bureaucratic and legal rationality and promote the misallocation of scarce public resources the result can be a downward spiral of interrelated political and economic decline that is increasingly difficult to reverse

reputation and experimentation in repeated games with two long run players this paper considers reputation effects in a repeated game between two long run players one of whom is relatively patient and may be committed to a fixed strategy which punishes the opponent for increasingly long periods whenever inappropriate actions are taken by following this commitment strategy the more patient player can induce a sufficiently patient opponent to experiment to see whether the commitment strategy is also being followed off the equilibrium path this can guarantee the more patient player in any nash equilibrium a payoff close to the highest feasible payoff consistent with the individual rationality of the other player for an arbitrary degree of patience of the less patient player a weaker result is established the more patient player is guaranteed an average equilibrium payoff close to the static stackelberg payoff this latter result generalizes that of schmidt 1993 who established the same result for the restricted class of games of conflicting interests

sources of stagnation in sub saharan africa abstract this paper investigates the sources of economic stagnation in sub saharan africa during the 1970s several policy variables are considered as well as a set of environmental variables which include climate violence export prices and other exogenous factors the paper uses statistical analysis in an attempt to identify the relative importance of the policy variables and the environmental variables taken as groups it also seeks to identify particular policy variables which seem to have been most significant in determining growth outcomes the technique employed for investigation is reduced form econometric estimation in a preliminary analysis the impact of the international trade environment on average economic performance in africa during the period since independence is investigated the results suggest an extremely close relationship between movements in export prices and average performance throughout the 20 year period a second econometric exercise investigates the joint impacts of environmental and policy variables on growth in a cross section of african states since 1970 the spirit of the approach is exploratory and a relatively large number of variables are constructed and tested through multivariate analysis a primary finding is that the environmental variables seem to have had more impact on growth as a group than the policy variables this finding must be qualified however by the continuing lack of some important policy variables agricultural price data have not yet become available in sufficient quantity for cross section analysis nor have several important human resource variables and indices of the use of resources in the public domain among the policy variables which have been used for the analysis those identified with retrenchment during periods of declining commodity prices seem most significant primary among these are the real effective exchange rate and some measures of effectiveness in foreign exchange reallocation during periods when imports must contract severely in the final section of the paper the cross section results are used for a counterfactual analysis of the growth experiences of individual african states measures of growth opportunity cost are constructed which suggest the degree to which errors in management and uncontrollable circumstances have held states below their potential growth paths the results suggest that some success stories may owe much to good luck while some failures may well be due less to bad management than to adverse circumstances

reputation and dynamic stackelberg leadership in infinitely repeated games abstract the paper studies a repeated game in which a long run player without discounting faces another long run player with strict discounting the game is perturbed so that there is uncertainty in the patient player s strategy choice she may be a rational player but she may also be one of many irrational types who are committed to various repeated game strategies the rational patient player s equilibrium payoff in this perturbed game is analyzed in particular it is shown that the lower bound on her payoff in the set of extensive form trembling hand perfect equilibria is given by her stackelberg payoff in a dynamics sense journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d82

openness external risk and volatility implications for the compensation hypothesis a central assumption in the globalization literature is that economic openness generates economic insecurity and volatility based on this assumption schol ars of international political economy have proposed the compensation hypothesis which claims that globalization bolsters rather than undermines the welfare state by increasing public demand for social protection against externally generated eco nomic instability the openness volatility link is dubious however on both theoret ical and empirical grounds in this study i revisit the volatility assumption focusing on a crucial difference between openness and external risk in their effect on volatil ity my statistical analysis of a panel data set from 175 countries 1950 2002 finds a consistent effect of external risk on volatility of the major economic aggregates but a largely insignificant effect of openness these findings suggest that economic volatility may be a mistaken link in explaining the openness spending nexus calling for further research on the causal mechanisms linking the two the general growth of government in the post world war ii era is one of the most important empirical regularities in political science measured by general govern ment consumption or sectoral expenditures government size grew dramatically during most of the postwar period intrigued by this phenomenal government growth political scientists offered numerous accounts some viewing this growth as a corollary of economic phenomena such as modernization industrialization income distribution or fiscal illusion and others attributing government growth to political causes such as bureaucratization interest group politics and electoral competition 1

participating in african monetary unions an alternative evaluation abstract this paper complementary to that of devarajan and de melo deals with the development strategies and performances of 12 franc zone african countries 11 of them gathered in two monetary unions during 1960 1981 beside the actual rate of growth the relative growth performance is considered this performance measured as a residual of a regression on exogenous factors factors independent of economic policy appears to be close to the average performance of other developing countries and better than that of other african countries the results are explained by the direct influence of the foreign exchange regime of the zone and by its impact on economic policy economic policies of individual countries show however some substantial degree of autonomy

why aren t countries rich weak states and bad neighbourhoods this article challenges a common viewpoint that the policy choices made by state leaders are central to explanations of economic growth it argues that there are two possible flaws in this viewpoint first that state leaders have a free choice in policy decisions second that it is policies that in large part determine growth rates using a set of variables designed to capture the weakness of the policy autonomy of the state and possible non policy influences on growth rates the article concludes that initial conditions are a better determinant of wealth and growth than free policy choice

reputation and perfection in repeated common interest games abstract we consider a wide class of repeated common interest games perturbed with one sided incomplete information one player the informed player might be a commitment type playing the pareto dominant action as discounting which is assumed to be symmetric and the prior probability of the commitment type go to zero it is shown that the informed player can be held close to her minmax payoff even when perfection is imposed on the equilibrium journal of economic literature classification numbers c73 d83

financial signalling and the deep pocket argument this article provides a formal representation of telser s 1966 deep pocket argument by considering a model in which the entrant s and the incumbent s financial structures are endogenous the entrant s financial vulnerability may be explained by informational asymmetries in financial markets financiers are uncertain of the entrant s true value but they know the incumbent s true worth both firms have to finance a fixed expenditure before starting production in equilibrium the incumbent finances with equity while the high value entrant comes into the market heavily leveraged compared with the incumbent this provides an incentive for the incumbent to engage in predatory practices such as a price war to exhaust the entrant financially and cause his bankruptcy

sunk costs entry deterrence and financial constraints this paper studies how sunk costs affect a financially constrained incumbent s ability to deter entry into its market sunk costs make it less attractive to the incumbent to accommodate entry by liquidating assets in place and exiting the market this may render entry by a prospective rival unprofitable and thereby facilitate entry deterrence however sunk costs also make it harder for the incumbent to pledge valuable collateral to outside investors to make up for the poor collateral value the incumbent will have to give stronger liquidation rights to its lenders consequently a larger fraction of the incumbent s assets will be liquidated in the event of a liquidity default this potentially creates room for profitable entry the overall effect of sunk costs on the incumbent s ability to deter entry into its market is thus ambiguous

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

reputation in long run relationships we model a long run relationship as an infinitely repeated game played by two equally patient agents in each period the agents play an extensive form stage game of perfect information with either locally non conflicting interests or strictly conflicting interests there is incomplete information about the type of player 1 while player 2 s type is commonly known we show that a sufficiently patient player 1 can leverage player 2 s uncertainty about his type to secure his highest pay off compatible with player 2 s individual rationality in any perfect bayesian equilibrium of the repeated game copyright 2012 oxford university press

accommodating public expenditure policies the case of fast growing asian economies abstract it is widely believed that the exceptional economic performances of the east asian economies are attributable as much to the visible hand of the state as to the invisible hand of the market this paper analyzes the experiences of japan south korea singapore and taiwan in implementing a key instrument of state intervention namely public expenditure policy the analysis shows that these economies could achieve high standards of physical and social infrastructure even with relatively low spending the key features of complementary spending policy include emphasis on macroeconomic stability cost effective spending involvement of private sector in providing quasi public goods minimum distortions in the labor markets and human resource development to achieve a broad based development

learning to love the dutch disease evidence from the mineral economies abstract recent literature proposes that a booming minerals sector may not only lead to dutch disease effects it may also be a development curse mineral economy case studies have tentatively confirmed this recourse curse thesis this paper examines the long run economic and development performance of a more general grouping of mineral based economies and finds little corroborating evidence

monetary co operation and economic growth in africa comparative evidence from the cfa zone countries this article compares economic growth performance of ten african countries all members of the cfa monetary zone with that of 23 non zone sub saharan african ssa countries our descriptive results suggest that overall african economies have experienced similar growth trends which are higher in the 1970s than the 1980s however contrary to previous studies disaggregated comparison of the cfa with the ssa indicate that no significant growth differences exist between these economies moreover our empirical findings suggest that monetary expansion and capital formation have positive impacts on output growth whereas inflation and government spending show negative effects in sum although participating in a monetary union has not necessarily resulted in faster output growth it has enabled the cfa countries to better control price fluctuations and monetary expansion

the relationship between the rate of inflation and its unpredictability in high inflation latin american countries pourgerami and maskus pm 1987 find three difficulties in our analysis of the relationship between the rate of inflation p and its unpredictability pf in latin american countries the first of these is a point very well taken namely that the positive relationship we hypothesized might well be offset by a negative one arising because higher rates of inflation could be expected to induce the relevant economic agents to invest more in generating the relevant information in utilizing it efficiently and in developing the instruments capable of hedging against inflation however since any such adjustments would be institutional in nature and take time to be carried out it is obvious that this consideratipn would not be relevant for short run analysis involving year to year or especially quarter to quarter changes in inflation rates as in our analysis the other difficulties namely that quarterly observations are more relevant than annual ones in testing such relationships and that rational expectations re models of the type employed by pm are preferable to adaptive expectations models of the type we used are criticisms more relevant to the short run relation between inflation and its predictability but as we shall presently demonstrate are not persuasive nevertheless since the results presented by pm as they have noted show the relationship between pi and p to be considerably weaker than was indicated in earlier results including our own the substantial difference in results deserves explanation since their time coverage frequent of adjustment of expectations model of esprct ltions and to some extent countr coverage were all different than ours it is not possible to learn from their results the reason for the difference by employing the same time and country coverage as in pm and also an estimation procedure hildreth lu which corrects for autocorrelation and continuing to use a modified version of our adaptive expectations model mae but varying the duration of the periods the results presented in table 1 shed light on the source of the difference as can be seen the use of quarterly instead of annual data does not have a large effect on the results thereby suggesting that pm s use of quarterly data is not the source of their weaker results indeed note that in six of the seven high inflation countries the slope coefficient is larger and more significant when quarterly data are employed than when annual data are employed the largest differences are between the results obtained from our own mae model estimated with quarterly data and those obtained by pm with their re model with the same data in all seven cases the pm estimate of is significantly lower than our own corresponding estimate which estimate is more reliable even if one were to agree in principle with pm that re models are superior to ae models of price expectations the particular re model employed by pm can hardly be considered acceptable let alone superior to our mae model with their 20 right hand side variables i e four lags of each of five different explanatory variables relative to our four right hand side variables it is not surprising that pm havq been able to increase the explained variation of p correspondingly reduc

the effect of capital structure on a firm s liquidation decision abstract a firm s liquidation can impose costs on its customers workers and suppliers an agency relationship between these individuals and the firm exists in that the liquidation decision controlled by the firm as the agent affects other individuals the customers workers and suppliers as principals the analysis in this paper suggests that capital structure can control the incentive conflict problem of this relationship by serving as a pre positioning or bonding mechanism appropriate selection of capital structure assures that incentives are aligned so that the firm implements the ex ante value maximizing liquidation policy

on the strategic role of high leverage in entry deterrence abstract this paper examines the strategic role of high levels of debt and bankruptcy threats in deterring entry into monopolistic markets in the context of an infinite horizon entry game we show that if a potential entrant has access to debt financing with limited liability the unique sub game perfect equilibrium involves the entrant successfully issuing a high level of debt entering the market and being met with cooperation if in addition to the entrant the incumbent also has access to debt with limited liability it will be highly levered and will completely pre empt any entry in equilibrium finally if the incumbent faces a variety of potential entrants with differing abilities to capture market shares its optimal capital structure will help pre empt the entry of the tougher entrants while allowing the weaker ones to share the market the results of extreme leverage are also shown to hold in an alternative formulation analyzed by kreps and wilson 1982 and milgrom and roberts 1982 and thus are robust to model specifications the empirical implications and possible application to high leverage industries are briefly discussed

the folk theorem with imperfect public information the authors study repeated games in which players observe a public outcome that imperfectly signals the actions played they provide conditions guaranteeing that any feasible individually rational payoff vector of the stage game can arise as a perfect equilibrium of the repeated game with sufficiently little discounting the central condition requires that there exist action profiles with the property that for any two players no two deviations one by either player give rise to the same probability distribution over public outcomes the results apply to principal agent partnership oligopoly and mechanism design models and to one shot games with transferable utilities copyright 1994 by the econometric society

maintaining a reputation against a long lived opponent we consider a game between a patient player 1 and a nonmyopic but less patient opponent player 2 as usual in reputation models we suppose that the patient player s type is private information and that he may be a commitment type who is locked into playing a particular strategy we investigate the extent to which an uncommitted or normal type of patient player can exploit his less patient opponent s uncertainty to maintain a reputation for playing like a commitment type

private irrigation investment in colombia effects of violence macroeconomic policy and environmental conditions abstract this paper identifies and estimates the effects of several determinants on private investment in irrigation in colombia it attempts to quantify macroeconomic policy environment and violence variables that have been identified in previous studies as significantly affecting investment in agriculture in general and in irrigation in particular variables such as violence climate and governmental price and credit policies are used to explain changes in private investment in irrigation across regions and over time violence negatively affects private investment climate affects the investment such that in regions with favorable climate conditions investment in irrigation is less attractive and appropriate government crop price and credit policies promote investment in irrigation

commitment through renegotiation proof contracts with third parties the paper analyzes contracts as means of strategic commitment that is commitment against outside parties to the agreement it considers the example of an incumbent firm which enters a contractual relationship with its workers in order to deter entry it assumes away the possibility for the parties to precommit not to make pareto improving renegotiations of the agreement once entry has taken place under symmetric information the contract is thus found to be useless for entry deterrence if the incumbent firm or workers possess some private information excessive post entry production levels can however be sustained ex post since output reductions may not be incentive compatible while information asymmetries are usually welfare decreasing when the goal is optimal risk sharing they can thus be welfare improving for the contracting parties when commitment against outsiders is the goal of the contract the role of the renegotiation process as a constraint on sustainable agreements is stressed in the paper and the general relevance of strategic contractual commitment is discussed

the real exchange rate and macroeconomic performance in sub saharan africa abstract pooled time series and cross section data for 33 countries in sub saharan africa ssa confirm the negative relationship between the real exchange rate rer misalignment and economic performance economic growth imports exports saving and investment macroeconomic instability also slows growth and other indicators of performance higher levels of misalignment are accompanied by higher levels of macroeconomic instability both lower levels of rer misalignment and instability lead to better economic performance the edwards model of rer determination performs well for the region black market premia tend to show a greater degree of misalignment in rer than alternative measures

debt agency costs and industry equilibrium we show that risk characteristics of projects cash flows are endogenously determined by the investment decisions of all firms in an industry as a result in reasonable settings financial structures which create incentives to expropriate debtholders by increasing risk are shown not to reduce value in an industry equilibrium without taxes capital structure is irrelevant for individual firms despite its effect on the equityholders incentives but the maximum total amount of debt in the industry is determinate allowing for a corporate tax advantage of debt capital structure becomes relevant but firms are indifferent between distinct alternative debt levels the effect of firms financial structures on subsequent investment and output decisions has recently received considerable attention in the finance literature the central insight that equityholders control the firm s investment and production decisions and in general do not maximize the value of a levered firm has been applied to the analysis of risk shifting underinvestment and firms abilities to enter into optimal contracts with their customers existing models of firms financial structures and their effect on investment decisions are generally based on a single firm framework and do not take into account the relationship between project cash flows and the investment decisions of all firms in the industry 2 in this paper we allow the distribution of investment projects within an industry to adjust and show that this generates new insights and reverses several key results of single firm agency cost models the new predictions conform with well documented

the impact of debt financing on entry and exit in a duopoly this article investigates the interaction between market entry company foreclosure and capital structure in a duopoly we find that the order in which firms foreclose is determined not only by differences in firm specific factors but also by common economic factors such as the interest rate and the market profit volatility we extend the exit model by allowing financially distressed firms to renegotiate their debt contracts through a one off debt exchange offer we find that firms with high bankruptcy costs or with prospects of profit improvement can get bigger reductions on their debt repayments investigating market entry we find that financial vulnerability of the incumbent induces earlier entry article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

reputation and equilibrium characterization in repeated games with conflicting interests a two person game is of conflicting interests if the strategy to which player one would most like to commit herself holds player two down to his minimax payoff suppose there is a positive prior probability that player one is a commitme nt type who will always play this strategy then player one will get a t least her commitment payoff in any nash equilibrium of the repeated game if her discount factor approaches one this result is robust against further perturbations of the informational structure and in striking contrast to the message of the folk theorem for games with incomplete information copyright 1993 by the econometric society

governance and growth in sub saharan africa real income per head in much of sub saharan africa grew rapidly in the 1960s but faltered following the first opec oil price shock in 1973 74 and then stagnated or fell from the late 1970s to the early 1990s africa also saw a broad wave of authoritarian rule sweep the continent in the 1960s and early 1970s since 1990 however the african political landscape has experienced significant changes many in the direction of greater pluralism and democracy moreover where civil strife has been avoided africa has seen a broad tendency towards rapid growth for several years after 1995 this sequence of events suggests that political economy may offer useful perspectives on africa s growth record over the last several decades we begin with a summary of africa s growth patterns and the evolution of african political regimes we then examine models of authoritarian rule for insights into the conditions under which elites may sacrifice the general interest to extract rents and retain power or in which leaders may find ways of making growth enhancing policy politically acceptable it would be premature to conclude that africa s political reforms of the 1990s have helped to generate economic progress however we do believe that the increase in political pluralism in combination with greater unity among african aid donors bodes well for a continuation of africa s growth recovery

government and economic growth in the less developed countries an empirical study for 1960 1980 adam smith founded modern economics with a powerful argument that free markets are the best route to prosperity and economic growth his conclusion has been studied and debated by economists ever since including nobel prize winners friedman hayek kuznets lewis myrdal and schultz whatever economists have concluded since world war ii the majority of the less developed countries seem to have opted for extensive government regulation of the private sector and for a large public sector has the large government role slowed or accelerated the growth of ldcs obviously this is an important issue this study looks at government expenditure revenue raising and regulation greater emphasis is put on expenditure because 1 the revenue raised is presumably a function of the level of expenditure and 2 there are few internationally comparable measures of regulation there are virtually no empirical studies of the general impact of government on economic growth an extensive literature search turned up only three papers gemmell analyzed the impact of nonmarket sector growth on various measures of macroeconomic performance for 27 ldcs and developed countries for 1960 and 1970 he drew no general conclusions about the relation between the size of the nonmarket sector and economic growth marsden found a negative relation between tax gdp ratios and economic growth for a cross section of 20 ldcs and developed countries for the 1970 79 period 2 i found a negative relationship between the share of government consumption expenditure in gdp and the growth of per capita gdp for a cross section of 96 ldcs and developed countries over various time periods between 1961 and 1976 3 this paper extends the approach used in my 1983 article

how should structural adjustment programs be designed abstract more than seven years have elapsed since the onset of the generalized debt crisis of 1982 yet the affected countries have still not managed to stabilize their economies these countries must now attempt structural adjustment in the midst of pervasive macroeconomic and political instability structural adjustment packages should be designed with this reality in mind this paper argues that structural adjustment programs should strive for sustainability rather than the economic liberalization that they presently stress illiberal policies which do not damage overall macro stability are preferable to liberal policies which are inherently unsustainable or engender macro instability liberalization programs that are not sustainable are likely to bring few benefits but have high costs in terms of private investment the paper discusses some of the chief implications of this opinion for the design of adjustment programs

is more information always better a case in credit markets this paper studies the impact of behavioral and non behavioral information contained in consumer credit reports on the credit market a repeated game of incomplete information between a borrower and a sequence of lenders is considered lenders beliefs regarding the borrower s type depend on the borrower s historical loan performance and other informative signals it is established that for low beliefs strategic defaults occur in equilibrium as the borrower defaults on his loans despite having the ability to repay them further as the ancillary signals become increasingly informative of the borrower s type the range of beliefs over which strategic defaults occur expands this increase in strategic defaults highlights an unintended negative effect of allowing informative signals to influence beliefs on the upside the informative signals allow lenders to learn the borrower s type more quickly

medium run adjustment under import compression macroeconomic analysis relevant for sub saharan africa abstract the dynamic small open economy model of kouri 1979 is modified to analyze the role of the foreign exchange constraint in import dependent economies typical for sub saharan africa structural adjustment and investment allocation are related to the sectoral balance between traded and protected goods the import compression policy of the region establishes a linkage between the export performance of the traded sector and the capacity utilization of the protected sector it is shown that the relationship implies possible contractionary effects of demand expansion since exports are crowded out and the import capacity is reduced a destabilizing downward growth spiral may follow policies modifying the excessive demand and the import dependency seem necessary to turn contraction into growth

anticipated inflation and the capital stock in a cash in advance economy abstract an economy is constructed in which the steady state capital stock is inversely related to the rate of inflation as a result that is directly opposite the usual conclusion

avoiding the resource curse indigenous communities and canada s oil sands summary concerns about a resource curse in canada have been raised in response to rapid growth in the petroleum sector in northern alberta in previous research there has been little consideration of how symptoms of the resource curse are experienced and managed at a regional scale and by indigenous communities an analysis of effects and responses is offered using a natural financial human and social capitals framework without consideration of how to manage the symptoms of the resource curse oil and gas activity is likely to further disadvantage indigenous populations already living on the margins of canadian society

evaluating participation in african monetary unions a statistical analysis of the cfa zones abstract thirteen african nations are engaged in two monetary unions with france often referred to as the cfa zone despite the acknowledged benefits of zone membership a convertible currency pooled resources and greater monetary and fiscal discipline several observers have questioned whether particular aspects of the zone such as the lack of autonomy of the two central banks and the surrender of the exchange rate as a policy instrument have impeded its members growth this paper addresses that question by testing whether cfa zone countries had different gnp growth rates from selected comparator countries during 1960 1982 results show that cfa countries grew significantly faster than comparator sub saharan african countries but usually slower and often significantly so than the whole sample of developing countries when the comparison is made by subperiod before and after 1973 cfa countries performance vis a vis that of their comparators improved during the 1973 1982 period casting further doubt on the claim that the monetary union is not functioning adequately

explaining african economic performance africa has had slow growth and a massive exodus of capital in many respects it has been the most capital hostile region we review and interpret the aggregate level and microeconomic literatures to identify the key explanations for this performance there is a reasonable correspondence of the two sets of evidence pointing to four factors as being important these are a lack of openness to international trade a high risk environment a low level of social capital and poor infrastructure these problems are to a substantial extent attributable to government behaviour and the paper includes a review of the political economy literature which addresses that behaviour

perspectives and problems of development in sub saharan africa this paper analyzes the initial conditions for development facing post colonial african nations outlines alternative development strategies followed by different groups of countries and assesses the consequences for growth and poverty alleviation on the basis of this diagnosis the paper outlines a number of policy priorities for the future including greater research extension and infrastructure support for smallholder agriculture an improvement in the overall structure of incentives in favor of agriculture a more realistic urban formal sector wage structure to reduce rural urban migration and foster a more internationally competitive manufacturing sector and greater emphasis on surplus generation through government budgets and parastatal enterprises

financially constrained entry in a game with incomplete information in an earlier paper we presented an entry game with a monopolist and a potential entrant facing financial constraints in which the unique perfect equilibrium involved no entry here we consider a one sided incomplete information variant of the game in which the monopolist allows for the possibility that the entrant is committed to endure a price war to the limit of his capability we find a unique sequentially perfect equilibrium in which entry sometimes occurs when it does predatory price wars may result with the incumbent sometimes driving out the entrant but other times eventually abandoning the fight

trade policy and growth of developing countries some new data abstract the present study provides empirical evidence on trade policy and economic growth of developing countries our data indicate that adverse changes in world demand carried greater weight in determining export performance than changes in trade policy the results presented confirm that high growth rates of export earnings occur only when external demand to strong low income countries are shown to fare worse across all time periods though there are regional variations these are not due solely to differences in trade policy thus an outward oriented policy is not necessarily a valid policy recommendation for all conditions and all countries

terms of trade fluctuations and stabilization of producer prices by compensatory taxation abstract a small general equilibrium model is presented which highlights the role of the real exchange rate in the south in determining the terms of trade between the south and the north the dynamics of the model may generate terms of trade instability for some values of the parameters of the system compensatory taxation of export earnings by a stabilization fund in the south is shown to increase the likelihood of instability

public expenditures in sub saharan africa during a period of economic reforms abstract public expenditure restraint is the most direct means of reducing balance of payments and budget deficits and is consequently a key aspect of macroeconomic adjustment programs the results of this study indicate a steady increase in total central government and social services spending during 1977 1989 in sub saharan africa the growth in population however contributed to an overall erosion in per capita expenditures while total government expenditures as a share of gdp have been stable during the past decade they have declined net of interest repayments which represent an increasingly large share of total spending an analysis of spending in the three years before and after donor financed adjustment programs began reveals no pattern of increase or decrease in real levels of total and social sector expenditures or in social sector spending as a share of the total expenditures elasticities of health and education spending with respect to gdp were found to be greater than unity in recent years indicating that as countries develop social spending will constitute a larger share of gdp

take the money and run political turnover rent seeking and economic growth abstract we find a negative and significant relationship between gubernatorial turnover and u s state economic growth although our finding of an inverse relationship between growth and political instability may seem to contradict olson s 1982a famous hypothesis regarding the growth retarding nature of political stability such constitutional political changes were not primarily what olson had in mind we argue that enhanced political turnover is associated with more rent seeking since payoffs to focusing on special interest redistributive policies vs general growth enhancing ones are greater for less durable regimes therefore we interpret our evidence as supportive of olson s broader argument concerning the negative affect of rent seeking behavior on growth

reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player a single long run player plays a simultaneous move stage game against a sequence of opponents who play only once but observe all previous play let the stackelberg strategy be the pure strategy to which the long run player would most like to commit himself if there is positive prior probability that the long run player will always play the stackelberg strategy then his payoff in any nash equilibrium exceeds a bound that converges to the stackelberg payoff as his discount factor approaches one when the stage game is not simultaneous move this result must be modified to account for the possibility that distinct strategies of the long run player are observationally equivalent

price instability and inflation the latin american case abstract this paper provides empirical evidence substantiating the existence of an over time relationship between inflation and price variability for 23 latin american countries by employing a novel measure of price instability based on price expectations

reputation in the long run with imperfect monitoring abstract we study an infinitely repeated game where two players with equal discount factors play a simultaneous move stage game player one monitors the stage game actions of player two imperfectly while player two monitors the pure stage game actions of player one perfectly player one s type is private information and he may be a commitment type drawn from a countable set of commitment types who is locked into playing a particular strategy under a full support assumption on the monitoring structure we prove a reputation result for stage games with a strong stackelberg action if there is positive probability that player one is a particular type whose commitment payoff is equal to player one s highest payoff consistent with the players individual rationality then a patient player one secures this type s commitment payoff in any bayes nash equilibrium of the repeated game in contrast if the type s commitment payoff is strictly less than player one s highest payoff consistent with the players individual rationality then the worst perfect bayesian equilibrium payoff for a patient player one is equal to his minimax payoff

trade matters in the fight against poverty narratives perceptions and lack of evidence in the case of fish trade in africa two opposing views exist in the literature on the potential role that international fish trade plays in economic development while some claim that fish trade has a pro poor effect others denounce the negative effect of fish export on local populations food security and doubt its contributions to the macro economy in this paper we explore this debate in sub saharan africa our analysis did not find any evidence of direct negative impact of fish trade on food security neither did it find evidence that international fish trade generates positive pro poor outcomes this paper discusses the possible reasons for this apparent lack of development impact and highlights the unsupported assumptions underlying the current discourse about international fish trade we suggest that given lack of evidence for the development benefits of fish trade between africa and developed countries fisheries policy could consider support for regional africa to africa trade that meets the growing african demand for lower value fish means of overcoming barriers to intra african trade in fish are discussed

maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed this paper studies reputation effects in games with a single long run player whose choice of stage game strategy is imperfectly observed by his opponents we obtain lower and upper bounds on the long run player s payoff in any nash equilibrium of the game if the long run player s stage game strategy is statistically identified by the observed outcomes then for generic payoffs the upper and lower bounds both converge as the discount factor tends to 1 to the long run player s stackelberg payoff which is the most he could obtain by publicly committing himself to any strategy

government size and growth a survey and interpretation of the evidence the literature on the relationship between the size of government and economic growth is full of seemingly contradictory findings this conflict is largely explained by variations in definitions and the countries studied an alternative approach of limiting the focus to studies of the relationship in rich countries measuring government size as total taxes or total expenditure relative to gdp and relying on panel data estimations with variation over time reveals a more consistent picture the most recent studies find a significant negative correlation an increase in government size by 10 percentage points is associated with a 0 5 to 1 percent lower annual growth rate we discuss efforts to make sense of this correlation and note several pitfalls involved in giving it a causal interpretation against this background we discuss two explanations of why several countries with high taxes seem able to enjoy above average growth one hypothesis is that countries with higher social trust levels are able to develop larger government sectors without harming the economy another explanation is that countries with large governments compensate for high taxes and spending by implementing market friendly policies in other areas both explanations are supported by ongoing research

the effects of inflation on the predictability of price changes in latin america some estimates and policy implications abstract this paper argues that the relationship between price variability and inflation in high inflation countries should be estimated on a frequent basis and that rational expectations are the appropriate formulation for predicting inflation analysis of seven latin american countries taking these factors into account suggests that higher inflation contributes to the difficulty of predicting price changes the impact is more moderate than that found in previous studies however indicating that less concern may be warranted about the possible stagflationary effects of expansionary policies

stock markets in africa emerging lions or white elephants abstract the number of stock markets in african countries has doubled over the last 7 years although these markets remain small and illiquid they are growing rapidly and will become an increasingly important part of many african economies using examples taken from experience in other developing regions and africa s recent past this paper evaluates the common economic criticisms of stock markets and the political pitfalls involved in their operation it concludes that the positive economic effects of bourses on african economies are far larger than any negative effects and argues that the political costs can be mitigated while political benefits can also be gained it finishes by suggesting reforms that can be put in place to reap more benefits and further reduce costs from stock markets on the continent

economic growth in africa abstract this paper draws on the recent endogenous growth methodology to study the factors behind differences in per capita growth rates across africa the results indicate that various economic factors including initial conditions investment population growth trade orientation inflation financial development and the growth of the government sector contribute significantly to economic growth in addition to economic variables we find the degree of political freedom to be a significant contributor to economic growth finally we find some evidence that economic growth by the members of the cfa franc zone has not fared well in comparison to other african countries

government expenditure and economic growth a cross country study this paper examines the relationship between the share of government consumption expenditure in gdp and the rate of growth of real per capita gdp the work of the u n international comparison project has recently made available new estimates for over 100 countries of both per capita gdp and the share of government consumption these new estimates are based on direct price comparisons rather than exchange rate conversions as a result the statistics for different countries are more comparable and cross country studies will be more reliable