option bounds with finite revision opportunities this article generalizes the single period linear programming bounds on option prices by allowing for a finite number of revision opportunities it is shown that in an incomplete market the bounds on option prices can be derived using a modified binomial option pricing model tighter bounds are developed under more restrictive assumptions on probabilities and risk aversion for this case the upper bounds are shown to coincide with the upper bounds derived by perrakis while the lower bounds are shown to be tighter in 1984 perrakis and ryan 6 derived upper and lower bounds on european option prices in discrete time and under modest assumptions on preferences and

what explains collective action in the commons theory and evidence from the philippines summary i examine the factors that influence collective action in the commons using econometric analyses on a data set of 1958 irrigation associations in the philippines i find that collective action is associated with water scarcity proximity to markets group size farm size and governance structure water scarcity has a curvilinear effect on collective action and is mediated by the governance structure the results suggest the need for a diagnostic approach in the analysis of institutional arrangements in diverse socio ecological settings these also suggest that collective action in the commons is more complex than is conventionally assumed in the decentralization literature

a three gap model of foreign transfers and the gdp growth rate in developing countries abstract a simplified macroeconomic framework is developed for the fiscal gap which is considered to be an important stumbling block for adjustment with growth in highly indebted developing countries distinctive characteristics of a fiscally constrained economy are compared with those of economies constrained either by the availability of savings or foreign exchange tentative implications for external conditionality accompanying debt relief measures are derived

one size fits all decentralization corruption and the monitoring of bureaucrats summary the majority of theoretical and empirical studies on the relationship between decentralization and corruption argue that the devolution of power might be a feasible instrument for use in keeping corruption at bay we argue that this result crucially depends on the effectiveness of monitoring bureaucrats behavior the benefits of decentralization only occur if there is a supervisory body such as a free press which is often lacking in a substantial number of countries using cross country data we analyze the relationship between decentralization and corruption taking different degrees of the freedom of the press into account our main finding is that decentralization counteracts corruption in countries with high degrees of freedom of the press whereas countries without effective monitoring suffer from decentralization our policy implication is that a free press is a necessary pre condition for successful decentralization programs

on the empirics of foreign aid and growth the present paper re examines the effectiveness of foreign aid theoretically and empirically using a standard olg model we show that aid inflows will in general affect long run productivity the size and direction of the impact may depend on policies deep structural characteristics and the size of the inflow the empirical analysis investigates these possibilities overall we find that aid has been effective in spurring growth but the magnitude of the effect depends on climate related circumstances finally we argue that the collier dollar allocation rule should be seriously reconsidered by donor agencies if aid effectiveness is related to climate the usefulness of foreign aid in promoting growth in developing countries has been an area of controversy ever since rosenstein rodan in 1943 advocated for aid to eastern and south eastern europe browsing through successive editions of a leading textbook in development economics provides a telling illustration of how the confidence in aid effectiveness dwindled over the years in the first edition of leading issues in economic development meier 1964 dedicated a full 18 page section to the issue of foreign aid he started out asking how much aid by the time of the sixth edition meier 1995 the treatment of foreign aid had been cut into half and the questions in focus were why official assistance and does aid work in the 2000 edition meier and rauch 2000 foreign aid is not even listed in the index

decentralisation and accountability in infrastructure delivery in developing countries many developing countries are experimenting with decentralisation of public service delivery to elected local governments instead of bureaucrats appointed by a central government we study the resulting implications in a theoretical model in which the central government is uninformed about local need and unable to monitor service allocations bureaucrats charge bribes for services as monopoly providers resulting in underprovision of services especially for the poor local governments are directly responsive to their citizens needs but may be subject to capture by elites effects of decentralisation on service volumes efficiency and equity are analysed under different financing arrangements for local governments the theme of the 2004 world development report is summarised by its opening paragraph too often services fail poor people in access in quantity in quality but the fact that there are strong examples where services do work means governments and citizens can do better how by putting poor people at the center of service provision by enabling them to monitor and discipline service providers by amplifying their voice in policymaking and by strengthening the incentives for providers to serve the poor problems of accountability associated with traditional modes of delivery involving centralised bureaucracies include cost padding service diversion limited responsiveness to local needs limited access and high prices charged especially to the poor 1 many developing countries have thus begun to experiment with initiatives to increase accountability of service providers by providing greater control rights to citizen groups these include decentralisation of service delivery to local governments community participation direct transfers to households and contracting out delivery to private providers and ngos the programmes include a wide range of infrastructure services water sanitation electricity telecommunications roads and social services education health and welfare programmes countries where such trends have gathered

aid policies and growth reply in burnside and dollar 2000 we used standard regression techniques from the growth literature to measure the effect of foreign aid on growth the main finding in our paper was that the effect of foreign aid on growth depended on the macroeconomic policies of recipient countries in this issue william easterly et al 2004 challenge the robustness of our result to new data before commenting on their findings it is useful to review the basis of our original findings our paper focused on three versions of a panel growth regression estimated using data for 51 countries and six four year periods from 1970 to 1993 these regressions may be summarized as

aid and growth in sub saharan africa the recent experience abstract this paper presents some quantitative evidence on the relationship between foreign aid and economic growth in the low income countries of sub saharan africa two key findings are presented first aid is positively and significantly correlated with investment and economic growth in africa second fix capital formation contributed to the rate of growth this result which emerges from analyzing time series data is somewhat surprising given the disappointing performance of african countries since the early 1970s

fiscal federalism and economic growth this paper uses an endogenous growth model with overlapping generations to explore the connection between fiscal federalism and economic growth the analysis shows that federalism which allows public good levels to be tailored to suit the differing demands of young and old consumers who live in different jurisdictions increases the incentive to save this stronger incentive in turn leads to an increase in investment in human capital and a byproduct of this higher investment is faster economic growth

regional decentralization and fiscal incentives federalism chinese style abstract aligning the interests of local governments with market development is an important issue for developing and transition economies using a panel data set from china we investigate the relationship between provincial government s fiscal incentives and provincial market development we report three empirical findings first we find that during the period of fiscal contracting system the discrepancy between ex ante contracts and ex post implementation was relatively small suggesting that the fiscal contracts were credible second we find a much higher correlation about four times between the provincial government s budgetary revenue and its expenditure during 1980s and 1990s as compared to 1970s demonstrating that provincial governments faced much stronger ex post fiscal incentives after reform third we find that stronger ex ante fiscal incentives measured by the contractual marginal retention rate of the provincial government in its budgetary revenue are associated with faster development of the non state sector as well as more reforms in the state sector in the provincial economy this holds even when we control for the conventional measure of fiscal decentralization finally we compare federalism chinese style to federalism russian style

political decentralization and corruption evidence from around the world abstract how does political decentralization affect the frequency and costliness of bribe extraction by corrupt officials previous empirical studies using subjective indexes of perceived corruption and mostly fiscal indicators of decentralization have suggested conflicting conclusions in search of more precise findings we combine and explore two new data sources an original cross national data set on particular types of decentralization and the results of a firm level survey conducted in 80 countries about firms concrete experiences with bribery in countries with a larger number of government or administrative tiers and given local revenues a larger number of local public employees reported bribery was more frequent when local or central governments received a larger share of gdp in revenue bribery was less frequent overall the results suggest the danger of uncoordinated rent seeking as government structures become more complex

what is the aggregate economic rate of return to foreign aid in recent years academic studies have been converging towards the view that foreign aid promotes aggregate economic growth we employ a simulation approach to i validate the coherence of empirical aid growth studies published since 2008 and ii calculate plausible ranges for the rate of return to aid our results highlight the long run nature of aid financed investments and the importance of channels other than accumulation of physical capital we find the return to aid lies in ranges commonly accepted for public investments and there is little to justify the view that aid has had a significant pernicious effect on productivity

are there negative returns to aid the world bank report assessing aid assumes that an inflow of aid above a certain level starts to have negative effects in this analysis we empirically test this assumption we find evidence for negative returns to aid at high levels of aid inflows however the results are sensitive to both the countries included in the sample and model specification moreover the turning point above which aid starts to have a negative effect on growth seems to be much higher than assumed in the background calculations for assessing aid

option bounds in discrete time extensions and the pricing of the american put in a recent paper perrakis and ryan 1984 upper and lower bounds on european option prices were derived in discrete time these bounds were based on an extension of the discrete time derivation of black scholes pricing first presented in the work of black and scholes 1973 the bounds are functions of the stock and exercise prices the riskless rate of interest the time to maturity and the entire distribution of stock returns in other words they need more information than black scholes for their computation and the derived results are weaker on the other hand they are significantly more general in their assumptions insofar as they do not rely on the continuous time riskless hedge of the original black scholes derivations or on the assumption of a binomial distribution of stock returns used in cox ross and rubinstein 1979 and rendleman and bartter 1979 for this reason they are likely to be particularly useful in valuing options on assets for which the black scholes methodology is clearly this paper generalizes and tightens the discrete time bounds for european options and develops similar bounds for american puts the stock return has a distribution with a finite range and is subject to the restriction that the stock be nonnegative beta the bounds are derived from arbitrage portfolios using the stock the option and the riskless asset they converge to the previous ones when the range coincides with the nonnegative real line and they both become equal to the binomial option model under a two state stock return upper and lower bounds for the american put are derived recursively by the same method with arbitrage portfolios involving the stock the riskless asset and american and european puts an example is provided with a trinomial return distribution part of this research was done while i was a visiting professor 1983 84 ecole superieure de commerce et d administration des entreprises reims france i wish to thank peter ryan albert madansky and a referee of this journal for helpful advice and comment while retaining all responsibility for any remaining errors or omissions 1 note however that this is also true of other blackscholes generalizations such as merton 1976

regime changes economic policies and the effect of aid on growth this study finds that on average aid has little impact on economic growth although a robust finding is that aid promotes growth only in a politically stable environment irrespective of the quality of the country s economic policies aid is ineffective in an unstable environment even in the presence of good policies the results however indicate that policy is more effective in promoting growth when supported by increased aid flows rather than aid being more effective in good policy environment the empirical results also provide some tentative support for the presence of an aid laffer curve in the politically stable countries the allocation of aid is found to be influenced by the country size and its state of development rather than the quality of policy

decentralization of governance and development all around the world in matters of governance decentralization is the rage even apart from the widely debated issues of subsidiarity and devolution in the european union and states rights in the united states decentralization has been at the center stage of policy experiments in the last two decades in a large number of developing and transition economies in latin america africa and asia the world bank for example has embraced it as one of the major governance reforms on its agenda for example world bank 2000 burki perry and dillinger 1999 take also the examples of the two largest countries of the world china and india decentralization has been regarded as the major institutional framework for the phenomenal industrial growth in the last two decades in china taking place largely in the nonstate nonprivate sector india ushered in a landmark constitutional reform in favor of decentralization around the same time it launched a major program of economic reform in the early 1990s on account of its many failures the centralized state everywhere has lost a great deal of legitimacy and decentralization is widely believed to promise a range of benee ts it is often suggested as a way of reducing the role of the state in general by fragmenting central authority and introducing more intergovernmental competition and checks and balances it is viewed as a way to make government more responsive and efe cient technological changes have also made it somewhat easier than before to provide public services like electricity and water supply relatively efe ciently in smaller market areas and the lower levels of government have now a greater ability to handle certain tasks in a world of rampant ethnic cone icts and separatist movements decentralization is also regarded as a way of diffusing social and political tensions and ensuring local cultural and political autonomy these potential benee ts of decentralization have attracted a very diverse range

the ghost of financing gap testing the growth model used in the international financial institutions abstract the harrod domar growth model supposedly died long ago still today economists in the international financial institutions ifis apply the harrod domar model to calculate short run investment requirements for a target growth rate they then calculate a financing gap between the required investment and available resources and often fill the financing gap with foreign aid the financing gap model has two simple predictions 1 aid will go into investment one for one and 2 there will be a fixed linear relationship between growth and investment in the short run the data soundly reject these two predictions of the financing gap model

does foreign aid distort incentives and hurt growth theory and evidence from 75 aid recipient countries foreign aid transfers can distort individual incentives and hence hurt growth by encouraging rent seeking as opposed to productive activities we construct a model of a growing small open economy that distinguishes two effects from foreign transfers i a direct positive effect as higher transfers allow the financing of infrastructure ii an indirect negative effect as higher transfers induce rent seeking competition by self interested individuals in this framework the growth impact of aid is examined jointly with the determination of rent seeking behavior we test the main predictions of the model for a cross section of 75 aid recipient countries there is evidence that aid has a direct positive effect on growth which is however significantly mitigated by the adverse indirect effects of associated rent seeking activities this is especially the case in recipient countries with relatively large public sectors

aid effectiveness the role of the local elite we study the importance of the local elite as a determinant of the effectiveness of foreign aid in developing countries the local elite serves as an intermediary between aid donors and aid recipients through its control of the government and major firms the likelihood of misusing aid is large if the elite is characterized by extensive economic and political power and little concern for social groups besides itself to determine which countries have this type of elite we use a historically determined variable the percentage of european settlers in total population in colonial times we provide strong empirical evidence that the level of european settlement in colonial times is negatively related to the effectiveness of foreign aid as measured in a growth regression framework our results are robust to the inclusion of a wide set of alternative explanatory factors advanced in the aid effectiveness literature

explicating factors for companies inclination towards corruption in operations and supply chain management an exploratory study in germany abstract the literature on corruption is rich in works focusing on individual and organizational aspects however existing research is void in studies that specifically deal with factors for a company s inclination towards corruption in operations and supply chain management the present paper fills this gap by explicating why some firms are more prone to corruption than others within this context it is our objective to explore the structural and organizational bases for companies especially their purchasing units to engage in corrupt business practices grounding our work in principal agent theory and the fraud triangle we suggest that the factors of organizational complexity corporate culture internationality and functional complexity all influence a firm s inclination towards corruption which in turn should manifest itself in the presence or absence of corruption control and prevention mechanisms this framework is tested with data collected from 104 purchasing managers in germany and implications for both theory and practice are highlighted

fiscal decentralization and economic growth reconsidered recent studies examining the relation between fiscal decentralization and economic growth have failed to take account of the extent of the independent taxing powers available to sub national governments and thus have substantially overstated the degree of effective decentralization results from a cross section study of 19 oecd member countries suggest that when the measure of fiscal decentralization is limited to the revenues over which sub national governments have full autonomy its impact on economic growth is not statistically significant

aid policies and growth the authors of this paper use a new database on foreign aid to examine the relationships among foreign aid economic policies and growth of per capita gdp in panel growth regressions for 56 developing countries and 6 four year periods 1970 93 they find that the policies that have a great effect on growth are those related to fiscal surplus inflation and trade openness they construct an index for those three policies and have that index interact with foreign aid they have instruments for both aid and aid interacting with policies they find that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal monetary and trade policies in the presence of poor policies aid has no positive effect on growth this result is robust in a variety of specifications which include or exclude middle income countries include or exclude outliers and treat policies as exogenous or endogenous they examine the determinants of policy and find no evidence that aid has systematically affected policies either for good or for ill they estimate an aid allocation equation and show that any tendency for aid to reward good policies has been overwhelmed by donors pursuit of their own strategic interests in a counterfactual they reallocate aid reduce the role of donor interests and increasing the importance of policy such a reallocation would have a large positive effect on developing countries growth rates

aid the public sector and the market in less developed countries a reply the article in this journal by mosley et al i987 concludes its analysis of aid effectiveness as demonstrating inability of development aid over more than twenty years to provide a net increment to overall growth in the third world p 636 this note purports to show that this conclusion which is ostensibly distressing as the authors claim is not warranted the section of the study which is the basis of the conclusion cited and the subject of this note is a cross section regression analysis full details of which are shown in mosley et al table 3 the note is concerned with the relation between the dependent variable specified as the growth rate of real gdp per cent per annum hereafter gdp and aid specified as a percentage of gdp hereafter aid the aid results with only two significant positive coefficients in one subsample certainly give no basis for claiming aid effectiveness in terms of gdp growth the intention in this note is to interpret the results which are assumed to be valid this is made possible by the fact that the authors have helpfully provided the full input set of mean values derived from the raw data from this it is possible to calculate the gdp aid relationship for each country for the second and third period the procedure for deriving these relationships is as follows for each country the mean values of the time series of gdp and aid are extracted from the data for i 960 70 and for i 970 80 using i 960 70 as the base the signs of the change in the levels of the gdp and aid mean values between periods are recorded this is repeated for i980 4 with i970 80 mean values as the base the relationship between the two signs is an indication of the effect of aid on gdp in the period in which the change in levels is effected thus in the case of an increase in aid being combined with a decrease in gdp the latter must have fallen relatively to the former and aid effectiveness is negative mutatis mutandis for the other three sign combinations thus generating the appropriate gdp aid relationship for each country in each period a frequency distribution of the four sign combinations relating to the full sample is presented in table i since the signs of the changes in the levels of gdp and aid are derived by making explicit the arithmetic relationship implicit in the data they form a valid base from which to draw conclusions without requiring any test of

aid growth and devolution considering aid modality and different types of decentralization in this paper we provide further evidence on the relationship between decentralization and foreign aid effectiveness our previous work has shown that decentralization decreases aid effectiveness i e the impact of aid on economic growth is negative in decentralized countries however our previous work has not taken different types of aid and different types of decentralization into account which is at the heart of our current analysis we consider different measures of decentralization in particular measures of fiscal decentralization derived from government finance statistics and measures of political decentralization that are constructed based on countries constitutional rules in addition we take different types of aid into account grants loans technical assistance total net oda and we distinguish between multi lateral and bi lateral aid in order to consider differences in the donor structure our empirical analysis is based on panel data of up to 53 developing countries in our growth regressions we combine all types of decentralization with the different types of aid we find important differences between different types of decentralization i fiscal decentralization negatively affects aid effectiveness in line with our previous work ii employment decentralization may increase aid effectiveness and iii political decentralization does not hamper aid effectiveness or may even have positive effects

option pricing bounds in discrete time upper and lower bounds are derived for call options traded at discrete intervals these bounds are independent of assumptions on the stock price distribution other than a restriction satisfied by the stock being non negative beta the development of the bounds relies on the single price law and arbitrage arguments both single period and multiperiod results are produced and put option bounds follow by extension the bounds exist as equilibrium values given a consensus on stock price distribution they are also valid for empirical studies being adjustable for dividends and commissions following the impetus of the black scholes pricing model the majority of option analyses have been in continuous time such approaches have relied on the formation of perfect riskless hedges involving the option its underlying security and a riskless asset since the hedge must be continuously revised and maintained while actual trading opportunities are discrete this crucial assumption limits the accuracy and applicability of the black scholes and related formulae in fact the black scholes formula can only be considered as a valid approximation to the discrete time solution merton 8 p 663 while the closeness of that approximation has not been ascertained in general 1 earlier discrete models such as boness 3 and samuelson 12 have been succeeded by those of brennan 5 cox et al 6 and rubinstein 11 in which distributional restrictions are imposed on share returns usually the discrete formula converges to the black scholes expression under appropriate limit conditions using the rubinstein 11 approach we derive upper and lower bounds for option prices with both a general price distribution and discrete trading opportunities the bounds are functions of the share and exercise prices the riskless rate of interest the distribution of the share price change per period and the number of periods of expiration of the option the lower bound is tighter than that of merton 7 derived from more general arbitrage considerations while being less exact than the results already mentioned for restricted distributions

balancing rural poverty reduction and citizen participation the contradictions of uganda s decentralization program abstract uganda s ambitious decentralization program is analyzed in terms of a dual mode system of local governance under a technocratic mode conditional funding from the center is earmarked for particular programs but with little local participation in contrast the patronage mode is an elaborate system for local bottom up planning but with limited resources which are largely consumed in administrative costs and political emoluments along with the spoils of a committee system controlling contracts and appointments these resources provide the means for building political alliances and loyalty in the absence of a culture of transparency and civic engagement to assure downward accountability it remains to be seen whether decentralization can promote both efficient service delivery and local empowerment simultaneously

stochastic dominance and expected utility survey and analysis while stochastic dominance has been employed in various forms as early as 1932 it has only been since 1969 1970 that the notion has been developed and extensively employed in the area of economics finance agriculture statistics marketing and operations research in this survey the first second and third order stochastic dominance rules are discussed with an emphasis on the development in the area since the 1980s

tight bounds on american option prices in contrast to the constant exercise boundary assumed by broadie and detemple 1996 broadie m detemple j 1996 american option valuation new bounds approximations and comparison of existing methods review of financial studies 9 1211 1250 we use an exponential function to approximate the early exercise boundary then we obtain lower bounds for american option prices and the optimal exercise boundary which improve the bounds of broadie and detemple 1996 with the tight lower bound for the optimal exercise boundary we further derive a tight upper bound for the american option price using the early exercise premium integral of kim 1990 kim i j 1990 the analytic valuation of american options review of financial studies 3 547 572 the numerical results show that our lower and upper bounds are very tight and can improve the pricing errors of the lower bound and upper bound of broadie and detemple 1996 by 83 0 and 87 5 respectively the tightness of our upper bounds is comparable to some best accurate efficient methods in the literature for pricing american options moreover the results also indicate that the hedge ratios deltas and gammas of our bounds are close to the accurate values of american options

does foreign aid corrupt abstract we estimate the impact of foreign aid on corruption using geographical and cultural distance to the donor countries as instrumental variables to assess causality aid decreases corruption our results are statistically and economically significant and robust to different controls

decentralization and economic growth revisited an empirical note abstract although it is theoretically expected that decentralization leads to efficient provision of local public services and stimulates economic development there is a mixed picture of the decentralization effect on economic growth across earlier empirical studies using the instrument variables iv technique with the latest cross country data for the period from 1997 to 2001 this paper found that fiscal decentralization has a significant positive impact on per capita gdp growth therefore when the focus is placed on the latest information on the economic situation in the latter 1990s decentralization particularly on the fiscal expenditure side is instrumental in economic growth

fiscal decentralisation and idc economic growth an empirical investigation the impact of fiscal decentralisation on ldc economic growth and development is widely debated in the development literature notwithstanding this there has been little attempt to test systematically this relationship accordingly in this note we present an empirical examination of the relationship between the level of fiscal decentralisation and economic growth rates across a sample of twenty three ldcsfrom 1974 to 1991 we fail to find however any strong systematic relationship between the two among our sample of ldcs

taxation and growth with overlapping generations abstract this paper examines the growth effects of wage and interest income taxation in an endogenous growth model which is characterized by diminishing point in time returns in human capital producing technology and overlapping generations of two period lived individuals we show that the greater the long term learning time of individuals the more individuals inherit human capital from the previous generation we demonstrate that a flat rate wage tax stimulates economic growth while interest income taxation does not necessarily foster such growth intergenerational redistribution induces individuals to change both physical and human capital accumulation affecting the growth rate through changes in factor prices

aid policies and growth in developing countries a new look at the empirics the relationship between foreign aid and economic growth has been the subject of much controversy a recent theme suggesting that aid promotes growth but only in a good policy environment has ratcheted up that debate in this paper we assess the importance of policy and aid in generating growth when the aid policy and growth relationship is nonlinear this allows us to examine the varying effects of aid and policy in different data segments which we do without imposing any particular structure on the underlying relationship we find that policy is an important determinant of growth we also find partial corroboration of the view that aid is growth enhancing in a good policy environment and some evidence of diminishing returns to aid these findings suggest that nonlinearities if not appropriately addressed fail to capture the detailed underlying dynamics and thereby mask some key features of the aid policy growth relationship

on aid growth and good policies this study provides a critical analysis of the growth regressions in burnside and dollar 2000 first we analyse the relationship between aid and government expenditure in a modified neo classical growth model one of the main results of the analysis is that while good policies spur growths they may at the same time reduce the effectiveness of foreign aid second we show that the econometric results in burnside and dollar emphasising the crucial role of interaction between aid and good policies in the growth process are fragile as they are extremely data dependent finally we demonstrate that the burnside and dollar data lend support to the idea that the association between aid and growth can be approximated by decreasing returns to aid this finding conforms well to regression results in other recent studies

equilibrium pricing in incomplete markets given the exogenous price process of some assets we constrain the price process of other assets that are characterized by their final payoffs we deal with an incomplete market framework in a discrete time model and assume the existence of the equilibrium in this setup we derive restrictions on the state price deflators these restrictions do not depend on a particular choice of utility function we investigate numerically a stochastic volatility model as an example our approach leads to an interval of admissible prices that is more robust than the arbitrage pricing interval

the anarchy of numbers aid development and cross country empirics the recent literature contains many stories of how foreign aid affects economic growth aid raises growth in countries with good policies or with difficult economic environments or outside the tropics or on average but with diminishing returns the diversity of the results suggests that many are fragile seven important aid growth papers are tested for robustness using 14 minimally arbitrary tests deriving mainly from differences among the studies themselves this approach investigates the importance of potentially arbitrary specification choices while minimizing the arbitrariness in testing choices all of the results appear fragile especially to sample expansion

aid policies and growth comment in an extraordinarily influential paper craig burnside and david dollar 2000 p 847 find that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal monetary and trade policies but has little effect in the presence of poor policies this finding has enormous policy implications the burnside and dollar 2000 henceforth bd result provides a role and strategy for foreign aid if aid stimulates growth only in countries with good policies this suggests that 1 aid can promote economic growth and 2 it is crucial that foreign aid be distributed selectively to countries that have adopted sound policies international aid agencies public policy makers and the press quickly recognized the importance of the bd findings this paper reassesses the links between aid policy and growth using more data the bd data end in 1993 we reconstruct the bd database from original sources and thus 1 add additional countries and observations to the bd data set because new information has become available since they conducted their analyses and 2 extend the data through 1997 thus using the bd methodology we reexamine whether aid influences growth in the presence of good policies given our focus on retesting bd we do not summarize the vast pre bd literature on aid and growth we just note that there was a long and inconclusive literature that was hampered by limited data availability debates about the mechanisms through which aid would affect growth and disagreements over econometric specification see gustav f papanek 1972 robert cassen 1986 paul mosley et al 1987 peter boone 1994 1996 and henrik hansen and finn tarp s 2000 review since bd found that aid boosts growth in good policy environments there have been a number of other papers reacting to their results including paul collier and jan dehn 2001 carljohan dalgaard and hansen 2001 patrick guillaumont and lisa chauvet 2001 hansen and tarp 2001 robert lensink and howard white 2001 and collier and dollar 2002 these papers conduct useful variations and extensions some of which had already figured in the pre bd literature such as introducing additional control variables using nonlinear specifications etc some of these papers confirm the message that aid only works in a good policy environment while others drive out the aid policy interaction term with other variables this literature has the usual limitations of choosing a specification without clear guidance from theory which often means there are more plausible specifications than there are data points in the sample we differentiate our paper from these others by not deviating from the bd specification thus we do not test the robustness of the results to an unlimited number of variations but instead maintain the bd methodology this paper conducts a very simple robustness check by adding new data that were unavailable to bd thus we expand the sample used over their time period and extend the data from 1993 to 1997 easterly department of economics new york university 269 mercer street new york ny 10003 center for global development and national bureau of economic research e mail william easterly nyu edu levine department of finance carlson school of management university of minnesota 321 19th avenue south minneapolis mn 55455 and national bureau of economic research e mail rlevine csom umn edu roodman center for global development 1776 massachusetts avenue nw washington dc 20036 e mail droodman cgdev org we are grateful to craig burnside for supplying data and assisting in the reconstruction of previous results without holding him responsible in any way for the work in this paper thanks also to francis ng and prarthna dayal for generous assistance with updating the sachs warner openness variable and to three anonymous referees craig burnside and henrik hansen for helpful comments 1 see for instance the world bank 1994 2001 2002 the u k department for international development 2000 president george w bush s speech march 16 2002 the announcement by the white house on creating the millennium challenge corporation white house 2002 as well as a washington post editorial february 9 2002 a financial times column by alan beattie march 11 2002 and the economist march 16 2002

stochastic dominance bounds on derivatives prices in a multiperiod economy with proportional transaction costs by applying stochastic dominance arguments upper bounds on the reservation write price of european calls and puts and lower bounds on the reservation purchase price of these derivatives are derived in the presence of proportional transaction costs incurred in trading the underlying security the primary contribution is the derivation of bounds when intermediate trading in the underlying security is allowed over the life of the option a tight upper bound is derived on the reservation write price of a call and a tight lower bound is derived on the reservation purchase price of a put these results jointly impose tight upper and lower bounds on the implied volatility

fiscal decentralization and economic growth a cross country study abstract we use a panel data set of 46 countries over the 1970 1989 period to investigate the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth we find a negative relationship between fiscal decentralization and growth in developing countries but none in developed countries several explanations are offered for our findings

politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid abstract critics of foreign aid programs have long argued that poverty reflects government failure in this paper i test predictions for aid effectiveness based on an analytical framework that relates aid effectiveness to political regimes i find that aid does not significantly increase investment nor benefit the poor as measured by improvements in human development indicators but it does increase the size of government the impact of aid does not vary according to whether recipient governments are liberal democratic or highly repressive but liberal political regimes and democracies ceteris paribus have on average 30 lower infant mortality than the least free regimes this may be due to greater empowerment of the poor under liberal regimes even though the political elite continues to receive the benefits of aid programs an implication is that short term aid targeted to support new liberal regimes may be a more successful means of reducing poverty than current programs

aid allocation and poverty reduction the authors derive a poverty efficient allocation of aid and compare it with actual aid allocations they build the poverty efficient allocation in two stages first they use new world bank ratings of 20 different aspects of national policy to establish the current relationship between aid policies and growth onto that they add a mapping from growth to poverty reduction which reflects the level and distribution of income they compare the effects of using headcount and poverty gap measures of poverty they find the actual allocation of aid to be radically different from the poverty efficient allocation in the efficient allocation for a given of poverty aid tapers in with policy reform in the actual allocation aid tapers out with reform in the efficient allocation aid is targeted disproportionately to countries with severe poverty and adequate polices the type of country where 74 percent of the world s poor live in the actual allocation such countries receive a much smaller share of aid 56 percent than their share of the world s poor with the present allocation aid is effective in sustainably lifting about 30 million people a year out of absolute poverty with a poverty efficient allocation this would increase to about 80 million people even with political constraints introduced to keep allocations for india and china constant poverty reduction would increase to about 60 million reallocating aid is politically difficult but it may be considerably less difficult than quadrupling aid budgets which is what the authors estimate would be necessary to achieve the same impact on poverty reduction with existing aid allocations

aid and growth what does the cross country evidence really show abstract we examine the effects of aid on growth in cross sectional and panel data after correcting for the possible bias that poorer or stronger growth may draw aid contributions to recipient co

aid growth and devolution summary this paper examines whether the degree of fiscal decentralization in aid receiving countries matters in explaining aid effectiveness the decentralization theorem predicts that the devolution of powers should increase aid effectiveness since local decision makers are better informed about local needs thereby decentralization may also have reverse effects e g through coordination problems excessive regulation administrative costs and local capture we use panel data for up to 60 countries and find that aid contributes to economic growth in centralized developing economies whereas it is less effective or even harmful in decentralized countries the cases of indonesia the philippines and uganda support our findings our results imply that donor countries should carefully consider how the two development instruments foreign aid and decentralization interact

aid and growth regressions this paper examines the relationship between foreign aid and growth in real gdp per capita as it emerges from simple augmentations of popular cross country growth specifications it is shown that aid in all likelihood increases the growth rate and this result is not conditional on good policy there are however decreasing returns to aid and the estimated effectiveness of aid is highly sensitive to the choice of estimator and the set of control variables when investment and human capital are controlled for no positive effect of aid is found yet aid continues to impact on growth via investment we conclude by stressing the need for more theoretical work before this kind of cross country regressions are used for policy purposes

do corrupt governments receive less foreign aid critics of foreign aid programs argue that these funds often support corrupt governments and inefficient bureaucracies supporters argue that foreign aid can be used to reward good governments this paper documents that there is no evidence that less corrupt governments receive more foreign aid on the contrary according to some measures of corruption more corrupt governments receive more aid also we could not find any evidence that an increase in foreign aid reduces corruption in summary the answer to the question posed in the title is no

aid and performance a reassessment two visions of aid effectiveness and allocation are compared the first corresponding to the new aid paradigm argues that aid is only effective if domestic policies are appropriate the second in contrast argues that aid effectiveness depends on the external and climatic environment the worse this environment or the more vulnerable the recipient countries the greater the effectiveness of aid cross sectional econometric tests related to gdp growth on two 12 year pooled periods clearly favour the second view the two views can be reconciled through the principle of performance based aid allocation where performance is defined as outcomes adjusted for the impact of environmental factors performance can then be measured in several manners which are subject to comparison one approach would lead one to allocate more aid the worse the external environment is for a given policy and the better the policy is for a given environment