regret and feedback information in first price sealed bid auctions we investigate the effect of regret related feedback information on bidding behavior in sealed bid first price auctions two types of regret are possible in this auction format a winner of the auction may regret paying too much relative to the second highest bid and a loser may regret missing an opportunity to win at a favorable price in theory under very general conditions being sensitive to winning and paying too much should result in lower average bids and being sensitive to missing opportunities to win at a favorable price should result in higher bids for example the u s government s policy of revealing losing bids may cause regret sensitive bidders to anticipate regret and bid conservatively decreasing the government s revenue we test these predictions in the laboratory and find strong support for both

what are asset demand tests of expected utility really testing assuming the classic contingent claim setting a number of financial asset demand tests of expected utility have been developed and implemented in experimental settings however the domain of preferences of these asset demand tests differ from the mixture space of distributions assumed in the traditional binary lottery laboratory tests of von neumann morgenstern expected utility preferences we derive new sets axioms that are necessary and sufficient for preferences over contingent claims to be representable by an expected utility function we also indicate the additional axioms required to extend the representation to the more general case of preferences over risky prospects

multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities abstract in an auction with externalities a buyer s type is multidimensional and specifies the payoff he would get for each of the n 1 possible outcomes the seller keeps the object or buyer i i 1 n gets the object we provide a characterization of multidimensional incentive compatible mechanisms similar to that for one dimensional mechanisms although reservation utilities are endogenous and type dependent the participation constraint is binding for only one critical type a main difficulty in a multidimensional setting is the integrability condition we present a geometric characterization for discontinuous conservative vector fields in auctions where the buyers submit scalar bids and the seller transfers the object to one of the buyers for sure a second price auction maximizes revenue with two buyers this auction remains optimal even if the seller can set a reservation price journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 c72

secret versus public reserve price in an outcry english procurement auction experimental results abstract in a set of human experiments we analyze the impact of the buyer s reserve price policy in an online open outcry reverse auction we measure the impact of revealing or not the reserve price on the buyer s expected cost when suppliers may be risk averse results confirm that the optimal public reserve price policy dominates for the buyer when the lowest cost supplier is weakly risk averse but in contrast with theory the secret reserve price policy does not dominate when he becomes very risk averse analysis of strategic suppliers bidding behavior shows in conformity with theory that they react to the secret reserve price and are more aggressive when they are more risk averse this explains why the optimal public reserve price does not perform better in this context but is equivalent to the secret one however strongly risk averse bidders are less aggressive than predicted by theory that is why the secret reserve price policy does not strictly dominate

how not to sell nuclear weapons we consider situations where a sale affects the ensuing interaction between potential buyers these situations are modeled by assuming that an agent who does not acquire the object for sale incurs an identity dependent externality we construct a revenue maximizing auction for the seller we observe that 1 outside options and participation constraints are endogenous 2 the seller extracts surplus also from agents who do not obtain the auctioned object 3 the seller is better off by not selling at all while obtaining some payments if externalities are much larger than valuations

understanding overbidding in second price auctions an experimental study we present results from second price private value auction spa experiments where bidders may receive noisy signals about their opponentsvalue such signals change biddersperception about the strengthof their opponent and the relationship between biddersperception of their opponent and overbidding provides a novel channel to understand overbidding in spa we found that small and medium overbids are more likely to occur when bidders perceive their rivals to have similar values supporting a modifiedjoy of winninghypothesis but large overbids are more likely to occur when bidders believe their opponents to have much higher values consistent with thespite hypothesis second price private value auctions spas are the most easily understood auction format from a theoretical point of view 1 in standard private value auction models of fully rational bidders with standard preferences bidding one s own value is a weakly dominant strategy this theoretical prediction holds irrespective of biddersrisk atti tudes the number of rival bidders symmetry in the value distributions and so on in laboratory experiments however subjects are found to exhibit a consistent pattern of overbidding kagel et al 1987 found that the actual bids are on average 11 above the dominant strategy bids kagel and levin 1993 found that about 62 of all bids in their five bidder spa sessions exceed the bidder s value while only 8 of all bids were below it both kagel and levin 1993 and harstad 2000 further reported that experience has only a small effect in reducing overbidding in spa an important related finding is that overbidding in english auctions a mechanism that is strategically equivalent to the spa in the case of private values is known to be a short term phenomenon that subjects quickly learn not to undertake kagel and levin 1993 thus any explanation for the prevalence and persistence of overbidding in the spa must also explain its rarity in the english auction given the robustness of the findings of overbidding in spa it is surprising that economists have little understanding of why it happens kagel et al 1987 conjectured that bidding above one s own value in a spa is based on the illusion that it improves the probability of winning with little cost because the winner only pays the second highest bid 2 moreover they argue that overbidding is sustainable because bidders still on average earn positive profits and because the negative feedback from overbidding is a weak mechanism in the spa for example if a bidder overbids in a spa by 10 above her value it is quite possible that she does not win at all and thus does not experience

habit formation in consumer preferences evidence from panel data this paper tests for the presence of habit formation using household data a simple model of habit formation implies a condition relating the strength of habits to the evolution of consumption over time when the condition is estimated with food consumption data from the panel study on income dynamics the results yield no evidence of habit formation at the annual frequency this finding is robust to a number of changes in the specification it also holds for several proxies for nondurables and services consumption created by combining psid variables with weights estimated from consumer expenditure survey data

does feedback really matter in one shot first price auctions does the type of posterior feedback affect how people decide in one shot environments we revisit this question in first price auction markets we consider three feedback types minimal only knowing whether winning or not loser also knowing the winning bid and winner knowing the second highest bid if winning filiz ozbay and ozbay 2007 find that loser as opposed to minimal or winner feedback increases bids we use three novel protocols and additionally replicate theirs using a sample of 624 subjects we find that bidders ex ante knowledge of posterior feedback type has no systematic effect on the average bid value ratios

information disclosure in auctions an experiment we report experimental results on the importance of information disclosure policy in first price sealed bid auctions interaction takes place in 10 periods according to a random matching protocol and we control the level of information feedback bidders receive after each period when bidders are informed about the losing bids in previous periods prices are higher than the theoretical prediction however when this information is not revealed the bidding becomes more competitive and the bids come close to the theoretical prediction we suggest that a signaling phenomenon may be important for explaining these results 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

scale effects in multi unit auctions abstract we argue that auctions with multi unit demand can be used to experimentally conduct new and novel tests of auction theory the focus of the paper is on changes in bidding behavior as the auction is scaled up by adding more bidders and increasing both the demand per bidder and supply of the auctioned good we identify uniquely tractable environments and obtain clear cut theoretical comparative statics in these settings this leads to the construction of uniform price auctions of different scales where the prediction is that risk neutral bidders bids on the last unit they demand are independent of scale in our experiment bidders on average bid much more aggressively than predicted by theory there is also evidence of a scale effect with more aggressive bidding in the small scale treatment compared to the large scale treatment it is argued that these features are consistent with joy of winning and anticipated regret

paying not to go to the gym how do consumers choose from a menu of contracts we analyze a novel dataset from three u s health clubs with information on both the contractual choice and the day to day attendance decisions of 7 752 members over three years the observed consumer behavior is difficult to reconcile with standard preferences and beliefs first members who choose a contract with a flat monthly fee of over 70 attend on average 4 3 times per month they pay a price per expected visit of more than 17 even though they could pay 10 per visit using a 10 visit pass on average these users forgo savings of 600 during their membership second consumers who choose a monthly contract are 17 percent more likely to stay enrolled beyond one year than users committing for a year this is surprising because monthly members pay higher fees for the option to cancel each month we also document cancellation delays and attendance expectations among other findings leading explanations for our findings are overconfidence about future self control or about future efficiency overconfident agents overestimate attendance as well as the cancellation probability of automatically renewed contracts our results suggest that making inferences from observed contract choice under the rational expectation hypothesis can lead to biases in the estimation of consumer preferences

independent private value auctions bidder behaviour in first second and third price auctions with varying numbers of bidders the symmetric equilibrium of third price auctions is characterized it makes a number of contrasting predictions relative to firms and second price auctions bids exceed private values the marginal effects on bids of an increase in private values is greater than one increasing numbers of bidders reduces bids and risk aversion requires bidding below the risk neutral nash equilibrium in the experiment bidders do not always satisfy the point predictions of the theory however the game theoretic models correctly anticipate at least directionally the important effects of the price rule changes copyright 1993 by royal economic society

disappointment in decision making under uncertainty decision analysis requires that two equally desirable consequences should have the same utility and vice versa most analyses of financial decision making presume that two consequences with the same dollar outcome will be equally preferred however winning the top prize of 10 000 in a lottery may leave one much happier than receiving 10 000 as the lowest prize in a lottery this paper explores the implications of disappointment a psychological reaction caused by comparing the actual outcome of a lottery to one s prior expectations for decision making under uncertainty explicit recognition that decision makers may be paying a premium to avoid potential disappointment provides an interpretation for some known behavioral paradoxes and suggests that decision makers may be sensitive to the manner in which a lottery is resolved the concept of disappointment is integrated into utility theory in a prescriptive model

a theory of disappointment aversion an axiomatic model of preferences over lotteries is developed it is shown that this model is consistent with the allais paradox includes expected utility theory as a special case and is only one parameter beta richer than the expected utility model allais paradox type behavior is identified with positive values of beta preferences with positive beta are said to be disappointment averse it is shown that risk aversion implies disappointment aversion and that the arrow pratt measures of risk aversion can be generalized in a straight forward manner to the current framework copyright 1991 by the econometric society

english auctions with resale an experimental study i design and test a simple english auction and two english auctions with resale but with different informational backgrounds all three treatments theoretically have the same equilibrium i find however that the possibility of resale alters behavior significantly in the two treatments with resale subjects deviated from both the nash prediction and the common results about bidding behavior in english auctions subjects tend to overbid when they are certain they can reap the whole surplus in the resale market i employ different models like qre and levels of reasoning and conclude that overbidding can be explained as a rational response to the noisy environment in markets with human participants that is as rational decision making when anticipating others to make errors when the outcome of the resale market is not certain there is significant signaling behavior and auction prices tend to be lower than the nash prediction

an endowment effect for risk experimental tests of stochastic reference points recent models of reference dependent preferences indicate that expectations may play a prominent role in the presence of behavioral anomalies a subset of such expectations based models predicts an endowment effect for risk that risk attitudes differ when reference points change from certain to stochastic in two purposefully simple risk preference experiments eliminating often discussed confounds i demonstrate both between and within subjects such an endowment effect for risk these results provide needed separation between expectations based reference dependent models allow for evaluation of recent theoretical extensions and may help to close a long standing debate in decision science on inconsistency between utility elicitation methodologies

habit formation in consumption and its implications for monetary policy models this paper explores a monetary policy model with habit formation for consumers in which consumers utility depends in part on current consumption relative to past consumption the empirical tests developed in the paper show that one can reject the hypothesis of no habit formation with tremendous condence largely because the habit formation model captures the gradual hump shaped response of real spending to various shocks the paper then embeds the habit consumption specication in a monetary policy model and nds that the responses of both spending and inflation to monetary policy actions are signicantly improved by this modication jel d12 e52 e43

pricing substitutable products under consumer regrets abstract since many firms provide consumers with substitutable products which may be launched sequentially over several periods strategic consumers need to make their purchase or wait decisions at the beginning of the first period however they may face second period valuation uncertainty when such decisions are made and decisions made under uncertainty may lead to regrets ex post lots of empirical studies show that consumers anticipate these regrets and take anticipated regrets into consideration this paper studies the impact of valuation uncertainty and consumer anticipated regrets on consumer purchasing behavior firm s prices and pricing strategy we consider a firm selling two substitutable products over two periods one product for one period in a selling season the firm announces all its prices at the beginning of the selling season price commitment or announces each price at the beginning of each period dynamic pricing besides a consumer may experience purchase regret from missing a better choice if she chooses to buy in the first period and otherwise wait regret if she chooses to wait consumers make decisions based on the firm s prices and strategies and the anticipated regrets we find that a firm may need to set a lower price in the first period even when the average valuation in this period is higher second with price commitment the impact of each type of regret on the optimal second period price can be opposite and depends on the value of the uncertainty and regret parameters finally we show that price commitment dominates dynamic pricing and the value of price commitment depends on the uncertainty and anticipated regret

expectations as endowments evidence on reference dependent preferences from exchange and valuation experiments while evidence suggests that people evaluate outcomes with respect to reference points little is known about what determines them we conduct two experiments that show that reference points are determined at least in part by expectations in an exchange experiment we endow subjects with an item and randomize the probability they will be allowed to trade subjects that are less likely to be able to trade are more likely to choose to keep their item in a valuation experiment we randomly assign subjects a high or low probability of obtaining an item and elicit their willingness to accept for it the high probability treatment increases valuation of the item by 20 30 copyright 2011 oxford university press

consumer rationality and the status quo received microeconomic theory presumes rational consumers maximize utility over all commodity bundles recent analysis however suggests that a consumer s status quo may limit economic rationality bias consumer decisions and induce serious errors in survey based valuations of public and private goods using regression and choice theoretic frameworks we investigate the existence of status quo effects in the consumer valuation of a particular unpriced product the reliability of residential electrical service such valuations have become important in electric utility resource planning and rate making we find substantial status quo effects which must be addressed in welfare comparisons regarding electric service reliability

habit formation in a monetary growth model abstract this paper introduces the hypothesis of habit formation in consumption in the sidrauski am econ rev papers proc 57 1967 534 model a number of results are derived 1 as in the sidrauski model money is superneutral and the friedman rule still provides the optimal quantity of money 2 the demand for money in this model is greater than in the sidrauski model 3 the money demand reflects the habit persistence related to past consumption and the rate of time preference and it is more sensitive to changes in inflation and nominal interest rates than the sidrauski model

the effect of regret on optimal bidding in auctions while most models of auctions and competitive bidding assume that each bidder s utility for an outcome depends only on his own profit we allow the utility to also depend on any regret that a bidder suffers after the fact and characterize when and how this affects bidding specifically a winner might regret money left on the table in federal offshore oil lease sales while a loser might regret seeing an object sell for less than his own value for it we show that for risk neutral bidders who after the fact know the winner s price for the object a bidder s optimal bidding strategy will not depend on the relative weight given to profit versus regret if both forms of regret weigh equally heavily however if bidders weight money left on the table regret more heavily then the bid taker suffers likewise if losers do not learn the winner s price then the bid taker also suffers thus the existing models exclusion of regret from risk neutral bidders utility functions affects the applicability of the

5 information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values a laboratory study in affiliated private value auctions each bidder has perfect information regarding his her own value for the object at auction but higher values of the item for one bidder make higher values for other bidders more likely we report on a series of experiments examining three key implications of these auctions i in a first price auction public information about rivals values increases expected revenue ii an english auction increases expected revenue compared to a first price auction and iii a second price auction is isomorphic to an english auction in examining these issues we compare predictions of some ad hoc bidding models with nash equilibrium predictions in the first price auction experiments nash equilibrium bidding theory organizes the data better than either of two ad hoc bidding models public information about others valuations does increase average revenue but the increase in revenue is smaller and less reliable than predicted under risk neutral nash equilibrium bidding lower average revenue might be attributed to risk aversion while the high variability is attributed to a sizable frequency of individual bidding errors relative to the theory bidding theory precisely organizes english auction outcomes after a brief initial learning period the dominant strategy equilibrium does not organize second price auctions nearly as well as market prices persistently exceed predicted prices the difference between english and second price outcomes is attributed to effects of different information flows inherent in the structure of the two institutions on eliminating bidding errors revenue impacts of these two institutions relative to a first price auction are examined in light of observed bidding patterns

anticipated loser regret in third price auctions abstract losing the auction at an affordable price generates loser regret in third price auctions if bidders anticipate loser regret then in line with the experimental findings in a symmetric equilibrium the bids are more than the risk neutral nash equilibrium

reference dependent subjective expected utility abstract a reference dependent generalisation of subjective expected utility theory is presented in this theory preferences between acts depend both on final outcomes and on reference points which may be uncertain acts it is characterised by a set of axioms in a savage style framework a restricted form of the theory separates attitudes to end states encoded in a satisfaction function from attitudes to gains and losses of satisfaction given weak additional assumptions the restricted theory excludes cycles of choice explains observed disparities between willingness to pay and willingness to accept valuations of lotteries and predicts preference reversal

who is more rational we report on the results of a large scale field experiment that enables us to test for consistency with utility maximizing behavior and to investigate the correlation between individual behavior and demographic and economic characteristics we conducted the experiment with the centerpanel a representative sample of over 2 000 dutch households using procedures similar to those used by choi et al 2007b in a setting with risk we find a high level of consistency in the individual level decisions there is also considerable heterogeneity in subjects consistency scores high income and high education subjects display greater levels of consistency men are more consistent than women and young subjects are more consistent than those who

price formation in single call markets this paper reports a laboratory experiment designed to examine the price formation process in a simple market institution the single call market the experiment features random values and costs each period so each period generates a new price formation observation other design features are intended to enhance the predictive power of the bayesian nash equilibrium bne theory developed recently for this trading institution we find that the data support several qualitative implications of the bne but that subjects bid and ask behavior is not as responsive to changes in the pricing rule as the bne predictions bids and asks tend to reveal more of the underlying values and costs than predicted particularly when subjects are experienced nevertheless observed trading efficiency falls below the bne prediction the results offer more support for the bne when subjects compete against nash robot opponents a simple learning model accounts for several of the deviations from bne

information feedback in first price auctions i apply the notion of a self confirming equilibrium sce to study how feedback in first price auctions influences bidders perceptions about their strategic environment and consequently their bidding behavior in a private values setting revealing the two highest bids at the end of each auction is sufficient for bidders to have correct beliefs justifying the assumption of nash equilibrium in contrast in every symmetric sce of a symmetric affiliated private values model bidding strategies and revenue are weakly higher if only the highest bid is revealed i also consider interdependent valuations and discuss implications for the empirical auction literature

revealing preferences graphically an old method gets a new tool kit because uncertainty is endemic in a wide variety of economic circumstances models of decision making under uncertainty play a key role in every field of economics the standard model of decisions under uncertainty is based on von neumann and morgenstern expected utility theory eut so it is natural that experimentalists should want to test the empirical validity of the savage axioms on which eut is based empirical violations of eut provoke intriguing questions about the rationality of individual behavior and at the same time raise criticisms about the status of the savage axioms as the touchstone of rationality these criticisms have generated the development of various theoretical alternatives to eut and the investigation of these theories has led to new empirical regularities for the most part these experimental investigations use several pairwise choices a la allais to test eut and its various alternatives such as weighted utility implicit expected utility and prospect theory among others each of these theories gives rise to indifference curves with distinctive shapes in some part of the marschak machina probability triangle so each theory can be tested against the others by choosing alternatives that the various theories rank differently in these studies the criterion used to evaluate a theory is the fraction of choices it predicts correctly generally speaking experimental work has on the one hand collected only a few decisions from each subject and on the other presented subjects with a serious of choices designed to compare the predictive abilities of competing theories or discover violations of specific axioms colin f camerer 1995 and chris starmer 2000 review the experimental and theoretical work that focuses on evaluating non eut theories although this practice is understandable given the purposes for which the experiments were designed critics say that it limits the usefulness of the data for other purposes first while these experiments reveal that violations exist they give us little sense of how important they are or how frequently they

rent seeking with regretful agents theory and experiment abstract we investigate both theoretically and experimentally the role that information disclosure has on behavior in all pay environments in which all agents must exert costly effort but only the winner is rewarded through the lens of all pay auctions we show that bidders who have regret concerns when they lose an auction may alter their bids whether or not information about the winning bid is disclosed all losing bidders regret not bidding 0 however when feedback on the winning bid is provided those bidders who lost at an affordable price may regret not bidding more we show that the former effect causes bidders to lower their bids while the latter effect causes bidders to raise their bids our experimental results indicate overbidding whether or not the winning bid is disclosed to losing bidders however disclosing the winning bid leads to even more aggressive bidding increases revenues decreases the frequency of dropouts and also leads to more efficient allocations thus our results show that information disclosure is a powerful tool that mechanism designers may wish to exploit to extract more rents in all pay environments

portfolio choice and trading in a large 401 k plan we study nearly 7 000 retirement accounts during the april 1994 august 1998 period several interesting patterns emerge most asset allocations are extreme either 100 percent or zero percent in equities and there is inertia in asset allocations equity allocations are higher for males married investors and for investors with higher earnings and more seniority on the job equity allocations are lower for older investors there is very limited portfolio reshuffling in sharp contrast to discount brokerage accounts daily changes in equity allocations correlate only weakly with same day equity returns and do not correlate with future equity returns

the anatomy of distributional preferences with group identity abstract the increasing diversity of societies raises questions about the consequences for redistributive preferences this paper assesses the impact of social identity on distributional preferences in a modified dictator game i estimate individual level utility functions with two parameters that govern the trade offs between equity and efficiency and giving to self and to other subjects on average put less weight on income of the out group the out group treatment also changes the distribution of equity efficiency concerns however the experiment also uncovers a large individual heterogeneity of preferences an analysis of garp violations reveals that choices in both treatments overwhelmingly stem from well behaved yet systematically different underlying utility functions hence the evidence presented here suggests that the rational choice approach is a useful tool for understanding the effect of social identity on preferences

disappointment and dynamic consistency in choice under uncertainty the central proposition of disappointment theory is that an individual forms expectations about uncertain prospects and that if the actual consequence turns out to be worse than or better than that expectation the individual experiences a sensation of disappointment or elation generating a decrement or increment of utility which modifies the basic utility derived from the consequence by incorporating a simple disappointment elation function into a model of individual choice many observed violations of conventional expected utility axioms including violations of savage s sure thing principle and the isolation effect can be predicted and defended as rational and dynamically consistent behaviour

information and conspiracy in sealed bid auctions abstract this paper examines the allocative properties of the sealed bid institution when different aspects of the available information to bidders are considered specifically we examine a the effect on price determination in repeated sealed bid auctions of post auction revelation of losing bids and b the effect on price determination when conspiratorial discussions are allowed

poverty and economic decision making evidence from changes in financial resources at payday we study the effect of financial resources on decision making low income u s households are randomly assigned to receive an online survey before or after payday the survey collects measures of cognitive function and administers risk and intertemporal choice tasks the study design generates variation in cash checking and savings balances and expenditures before payday participants behave as if they are more present biased when making intertemporal choices about monetary rewards but not when making intertemporal choices about non monetary real effort tasks nor do we find before after differences in risk taking the quality of decision making the performance in cognitive function tasks or in heuristic judgments

the transition to a new inflation rate in models with habit formation abstract the money in utility model is re considered to allow for habit forming preferences in which habits develop over instantaneous utility from consumption and real money holdings an increase in the inflation rate does not affect the steady state level of capital or consumption but reduces the steady state levels of real money holdings and habits the model has important off steady state dynamics

risk averse behavior in generalized matching pennies games in experimental studies of behavior in 2 2 games with unique mixed strategy equilibria observed choice frequencies are systematically different from mixed strategy nash predictions this paper examines experimental results for a variety of such games and shows that a structural econometric model which incorporates risk aversion into a quantal response equilibrium explains the data very well moreover risk aversion estimates are stable across the different games and are close to those obtained from laboratory and field auction data as well as from individual lottery choice experiments

theory and misbehavior of first price auctions comment glenn harrison s recent 1989 article in this review has provoked the loudest debate yet heard among experimental economists his critique of the james cox vernon smith and james walker 1983a b 1985a b 1988 henceforth csw laboratory studies of first price sealed bid auctions with independent and private values in my view raises a fundamental methodological issue that is well worth debating and the csw research program deserves further discussion in this short comment i confine myself to what i see as the most important issues and do not try to address all evidence relevant to the ongoing debate first i summarize harrison s central argument very briefly after pointing out two shortcomings in harrison s specific analysis of csw i propose a methodological reconciliation finally and with some trepidation since my own experience with the auction data is relatively slight i suggest an alternative approach to understanding the anomalies discovered by csw

robust monopoly pricing we consider a robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing with incomplete information in the robust version the seller faces model uncertainty and only knows that the true demand distribution is in the neighborhood of a given model distribution we characterize the pricing policies under two distinct decision criteria with multiple priors i maximin utility and ii minimax regret the equilibrium price under either criterion is lower then in the absence of uncertainty the concern for robustness leads the seller to concede a larger information rent to all buyers with values below the optimal price without uncertainty

a theory of anticipated utility abstract a new theory of cardinal utility with an associated set of axioms is presented it is a generalization of the von neumann morgenstern expected utility theory which permits the analysis of phenomena associated with the distortion of subjective probability

auctions with anticipated regret theory and experiment this paper demonstrates theoretically and experimentally that in first price auctions overbidding with respect to the risk neutral nash equilibrium might be driven from anticipated loser regret felt when bidders lose at an affordable price different information structures are created to elicit regret bidders know they will learn the winning bid if they lose loser regret condition or the second highest bid if they win winner regret condition or they will receive no feedback regarding the other bids bidders in loser regret condition anticipated regret and significantly overbid however bidders in the winner regret condition did not anticipate regret jel d44

regret theory a bold alternative to the alternatives in their famous 1982 paper in this journal loomes and sugden introduced regret theory now more than 30 years later the case for the historical importance of this contribution can be made

nonparametric comparative revealed risk aversion abstract we introduce a nonparametric method to compare risk aversion of different investors based on revealed preference methods using yaari s 1969 50 definition of more risk averse than we show that it is sufficient to compare the revealed preference relations of two investors this makes the approach operational the central rationalisability theorem provides strong support for this approach we also provide a measure of economic significance to quantify the differences in risk aversion which can also help to interpret differences in risk aversion in parametric models the approach is an alternative or complement to parametric approaches and a robustness check as a necessary first step towards this comparative approach we show how to test data for consistency with stochastic dominance relations which can also be used to recover larger parts of preferences we include an application to experimental data by choi et al 2007 10 11 which demonstrates the potential of the comparative approach

auctions with anticipated emotions overbidding underbidding and optimal reserve prices the experimental literature has documented that there is overbidding in second price auctions regardless of the valuations of bidders in contrast in first price auctions there tends to be overbidding for large valuations but underbidding for small valuations we show that the experimental evidence can be rationalized by a simple extension of the standard auction model where bidders anticipate constant positive or negative emotions caused by the mere fact of winning or losing even if the emotional dis utilities are very small the revenue maximizing reserve price r might be significantly different from the standard model moreover r decreases with the number of bidders

the rich domain of uncertainty source functions and their experimental implementation we often deal with uncertain events for which no probabilities are known several normative models have been proposed descriptive studies have usually been qualitative or they estimated ambiguity aversion through one single number this paper introduces the source method a tractable method for quantitatively analyzing uncertainty empirically the theoretical key is the distinction between different sources of uncertainty within which subjective choice based probabilities can still be defined source functions convert those subjective probabilities into willingness to bet we apply our method in an experiment where we do not commit to particular ambiguity attitudes but let the data speak

theory and misbehavior in first price auctions comment in his recent paper in this review glenn harrison 1989 argues that the conclusions of james cox et al 1982 1983 1985 1988 in their studies of first price private value auctions are not well supported because of shortcomings in the way their experimental investigations were designed analyzed and reported harrison argues that the expected cost of deviations from risk neutral nash equilibrium rnne bidding in these auctions was quite small less than 0 05 at the median so that in terms of expected monetary payoffs payoff space many subjects had little to lose from deviating from the rnne strategy harrison suggests that the significance of the differences cox vernon smith and james walker hereafter csw report between subjects bids and the rnne bids deviations in the message space may therefore need to be reexamined in discussing harrison versus csw we have three primary points to make first in arguing that it is more natural to evaluate subject behavior in expected payoff space harrison 1989 p 749 we think harrison has overstated his case however we agree with his more important point that looking at the cost of deviations is a useful diagnostic tool for determining when experimenters are likely to have lost control over subjects incentives further as we will show in section i this part of harrison s critique applies with special force to csw s studies of bidding second a broader examination of the results of private value auction experiments indicates that risk aversion cannot be the only factor and may well not be the most important factor behind bidding above the rnne found so often in first price privatevalue auctions the most telling evidence here is bidding above the dominant bid price found in second price auctions kagel et al 1987 kagel and levin 1990 and the risk loving found under several treatment conditions in csw s 1984 own multipleunit discriminative auctions auctions in which the high bidders pay their bid price these and other data inconsistent with risk averse bidding are largely ignored in csw 1988 but are nevertheless relevant to the substantive issue of risk aversion in private value auctions they are discussed in section ii third there are data gathered in other investigations which provide strong support for the view that the deviations from rnne bidding reported in first price auctions are not the results of the low expected cost of such deviations however these data unlike the higher stakes payoff data that csw offer in response to harrison are not consistent with csw s subsidiary conclusions that the data can be well accounted for by a narrow class of risk aversion parameters for the bidders together with the assumption that all agents are playing a nash equilibrium of the resulting game of incomplete information a key difference between these experiments and csw s is that if subjects do not respond to csw s treatment condition increasing the payoffs from experimental to u s dollars their behavior will be consistent with csw s theory in contrast department of economics university of pittsburgh pittsburgh pa 15260 we thank jack ochs and emilie roth for thoughtful discussions on earlier drafts of the paper jim cox and glenn harrison for helpful comments on the initial draft of the paper susan garvin for research assistance and ray battalio carl kogut and don meyer for providing us with access to their data research support was provided by the information science and technology and economics divisions of the national science foundation the alfred p sloan foundation and the russell sage foundation the usual caveat applies with special force iwe do not respond to specific comments that csw 1992 make in response to our comment as in order to avoid indefinite regress the ground rules for this debate required us to comment on csw s criticism of harrison after which they would be given the opportunity to respond to our comment

nonlinear behavior in sealed bid first price auctions the extent to which the behavior of people is consistent with game theoretic principles is investigated in a first price sealed bid auction environment three linear rules of thumb with increasing complexity are used as benchmarks to gauge the accuracy of the constant relative risk aversion model crram in addition the crram is tested against the relaxation of the rational expectation hypothesis existing competitive bidding experiments cannot clearly distinguish between game theoretic models and linear markdown rules on an individual level within the parametric environments studied and reported in the experimental literature game theoretic solutions are linear over the range of private values in which bid functions are estimated in this study agents drew values from non uniform distributions as a result the game theoretic bidding behavior is nonlinear due to the nonlinearity special econometric and numerical techniques are applied to solve the model and obtain the estimates the crram exhibits good fit of the data the pseudo r2 is greater than 0 8 in 90 percent of the subjects the crram is more accurate than the markdown model mm and the simple ad hoc model simam but not as accurate as the sophisticated ad hoc model sop am the data also supports the relaxation of the rational expectation hypothesis and suggests that substantial increases in the predictive power of game theoretic models can be gained from improvements in the theory of belief formation

does uncertainty cause inertia in decision making an experimental study of the role of regret aversion and indecisiveness previous research has shown that individual decision making is often characterized by inertia that is a tendency for decision makers to choose options that maintain the status quo in this study i conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate two potential determinants of inertia in uncertain environments i regret aversion and ii ambiguity driven indecisiveness i use a between subjects design with varying conditions to identify the effects of these two mechanisms on choice behavior in each condition participants choose between two simple real gambles one of which is the status quo option the findings indicate that regret aversion and ambiguity driven indecisiveness are equally important determinants of inertia which in turn plays a major role in individual decision making

afriat s theorem and some extensions to choice under uncertainty the first part of the paper reviews the methodology developed by sydney afriat for determining whether a finite set of price and quantity data are consistent with utility maximizing behavior by a consumer some extensions of his basic model to models of consumer behavior where the structure of preferences is restricted in some way are also explained examples of special structures are homotheticity separability and quasilinearity of the utility function the second half of the paper is devoted to developing afriat type consistency tests for expected and nonexpected utility maximizing behavior

developments in non expected utility theory the hunt for a descriptive theory of choice under risk this article reviews recent developments in the economic theory of individual decision making under risk since the 1950s it has been known that individual choices violate the standard model of expected utility in predictable ways considerable research effort has now been devoted to the project of developing a superior descriptive model following an overview of non expected utility theories which distinguishes between conventional and non conventional approaches the paper seeks to assess these alternative models in terms of empirical success using laboratory and field data and theoretical usefulness the closing sections reflect on some new directions emerging in this literature

homothetic efficiency theory and applications we provide a nonparametric revealed preference approach to demand analysis based on homothetic efficiency homotheticity is widely assumed often implicitly because it is a convenient and often useful restriction however this assumption is rarely tested and data rarely satisfy testable conditions to overcome this we provide a way to estimate homothetic efficiency of consumption choices the method provides considerably higher discriminatory power against random behavior than the commonly used afriat efficiency we use experimental and household survey data to illustrate how our approach is useful for different empirical applications and can provide greater predictive success

auction fever rising revenue in second price auction formats the prevalent term auction fever visualizes that ascending auctions inconsistent with theory are likely to provoke higher bids than one shot auctions to explore and isolate causes of auction fever experimentally we design four different strategy proof auction formats and order these according to expected rising bids based on pseudo endowment effect arguments psychological ownership and disparity between willingness to pay and willingness to accept observed revenues in the experiment in the four formats rank as expected if bidders have private uncertain values the private information of a bidder is the distribution of her value a control treatment supports our view that the traditional private certain values approach prevents auction fever in the laboratory another control treatment with a procurement auction relates the auction fever bids to bids in a one shot auction with real endowments we conclude that when bidders are uncertain about their valuations auctions that foster pseudo endowment may raise bids and revenues

design choices in privatized social security systems learning from the swedish experience in the 2000 u s presidential campaign george w bush advocated a partial privatization of the social security system according to his plan a portion of the payroll tax would be designated for individual savings accounts at the same time as this issue was being debated in the united states sweden was in the process of launching a system that is very similar to president bush s proposal although bush s plan did not get much attention in the early years of his administration the proposal may resurface either in the united states or in other countries if so important lessons can be learned from the swedish experience in particular the swedish plan adopted an interesting mix of design choices that can now be evaluated based on three years of post implementation experience although there is a large literature in economics on the design of social security systems most of that literature is concerned with macroeconomic considerations such as funding in contrast there has been much less attention devoted to the details of how plans might be designed in part because these details do not seem important from a standard economic perspective in this paper we reverse this usual pattern and focus our attention on the design aspects of the swedish plan we find that although most of the design choices are those that might be approved by most economists in some cases these choices produced undesirable consequences

endogenous price expectations as reference points in auctions the paper models auctions with bidders who have reference dependent payos the reference point is endogenised as the expected price of the good in the auction the model predicts that in equilibrium bidders both overbid and underbid in comparison to the standard bidding function without reference dependent utility the model predicts that more bidders overbid than underbid and that bidders bid more aggressively as the number of bidders or the reserve price increases finally it is shown perhaps surprisingly that revenue equivalence continues to hold between rst and second price

impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions abstract experimental sealed bid first price auctions with private values in which feedback on the losing bids is provided yield lower revenues than auctions where this feedback is not given the concept of weighted impulse balance equilibrium which is based on a principle of ex post rationality and incorporates a concern for social comparison captures the data

when does it pay to delay supplier qualification theory and experiments we study a procurement setting in which the buyer seeks a low price but will not allocate the contract to a supplier who has not passed qualification screening qualification screening is costly for the buyer involving product tests site visits and interviews in addition to a qualified incumbent supplier the buyer has an entrant of unknown qualification the buyer wishes to run a price only open descending reverse auction between the incumbent and the entrant and faces a strategic choice about whether to perform qualification screening on the entrant before or after the auction we analytically study the buyer s optimal strategy accounting for the fact that under postauction qualification the incumbent knows he could lose the auction but still win the contract in our analysis we derive the incumbent s optimal bidding strategy under postauction qualification and find that he follows a threshold structure in which high cost incumbents hold back on bidding or even boycott the auction to preserve their profit margin and only lower cost incumbents bid to win these results are strikingly different from the usual open descending auction analysis where all bidders are fully qualified and bidding to win is always a dominant strategy we test our analytical results in the laboratory with human subjects we find that qualitatively our theoretical predictions hold up quite well although incumbent suppliers bid somewhat more aggressively than the theory predicts making buyers more inclined to use postauction qualification this paper was accepted by martin lariviere operations management

anticipation of future consumption a monetary perspective we adapt the monetary model sidrauski 1967 to study the hypothesis of anticipation of future consumption we assume that anticipation of future consumption affects an agent s instantaneous utility and that all effects of future consumption on current well being are captured by the stock of future consumption monetary policy effectiveness is thereby reduced and a zero nominal lower interest rate and thus the friedman rule is destabilizing given this we can derive a just stable equilibrium nominal interest rate with matching definitions for inflation and monetary growth we demonstrate that these implied lower bounds match their historical analogues well

advance selling when consumers regret we characterize the effect of anticipated regret on consumer decisions and on firm profits and policies in an advance selling context where buyers have uncertain valuations advance purchases trigger action regret if valuations turn out to be lower than the price paid whereas delaying purchase may cause inaction regret from missing a discount or facing a stockout consumers whom we describe as emotionally rational act strategically in response to the firm s policies and in anticipation of regret in this context regret explains two types of behavioral patterns inertia delayed purchase and frenzies buying early at negative surplus we show how firms should optimally respond to consumer regret and also characterize a normative regret threshold above which they should not advance sell action regret reduces profits as well as the value of advance selling and booking limit policies for price setting firms inaction regret has the opposite effects these effects are diminished by capacity constraints and are reversed for firms facing price pressure in the advance period owing e g to competition or market heterogeneity regret heterogeneity explains premium advance selling for the capacity constrained firm which may benefit from larger shares of regretful buyers finally we show how the negative effects of regret on profits can be mitigated by regret priming marketing campaigns and by offering refunds or options or allowing resales our results highlight the importance of assessing the relative strength of regret within and across market segments and of accounting for these factors in pricing and marketing policies this paper was accepted by christian terwiesch operations management

consistency and heterogeneity of individual behavior under uncertainty by using graphical representations of simple portfolio choice problems we generate a very rich dataset to study behavior under uncertainty at the level of the individual subject we test the data for consistency with the maximization hypothesis and we estimate preferences using a two parameter utility function based on faruk gul 1991 this specification provides a good interpretation of the data at the individual level and can account for the highly heterogeneous behaviors observed in the laboratory the parameter estimates jointly describe attitudes toward risk and allow us to characterize the distribution of risk preferences in the population

reference dependent risk attitudes we use koszegi and rabin s 2006 model of reference dependent utility and an extension of it that applies to decisions with delayed consequences to study preferences over monetary risk because our theory equates the reference point with recent probabilistic beliefs about outcomes it predicts specific ways in which the environment influences attitudes toward modest scale risk it replicates classical prospect theory including the prediction of distaste for insuring losses when exposure to risk is a surprise but implies first order risk aversion when a risk and the possibility of insuring it are anticipated a prior expectation to take on risk decreases aversion to both the anticipated and additional risk for large scale risk the model allows for standard consumption utility to dominate reference dependent gain loss utility generating nearly identical risk aversion across situations

behavioral models for first price sealed bid auctions with the one shot decision theory abstract we build an auction model with the one shot decision theory which describes the process of a bidder deciding his her bidding price in first price sealed bid auctions the decision making procedure involves two steps first for each of his her possible bidding prices the bidder examines every possible highest bidding price provided by the other bidders and chooses one as a focus point of this bidding price of him her then the bidder determines such a bidding price as the optimal one that generates the best outcome when its focus point occurs the optimal bidding price can be obtained and two common phenomena in auction markets throwing away and overbidding are well explained

multi dimensional reference dependent preferences in sealed bid auctions how most laboratory experiments differ from the field abstract we study bidding behavior in first and second price sealed bid auctions with loss averse agents our model predicts overbidding in first price induced value auctions consistent with evidence from most laboratory experiments substantially different bidding behavior could result in commodity auctions where money and auction item are consumed along different dimensions of the consumption space differences also result in second price auctions our study thereby indicates that transferring qualitative behavioral findings from induced value laboratory experiments to the field may be problematic if subjects are loss averse

a characterization of sustainability with indicators abstract economists favor the use of criteria to characterize sustainability in practice policy makers use indicators i e measurements based on the current economic state and decisions representing given sustainability issues in this paper i introduce a criterion characterizing sustainability with indicators and thresholds acting as constraints i interpret the thresholds as minimal rights to be guaranteed to all generations and define sustainable trajectories as those satisfying all the constraints at all times the new criterion is a generalized maximin criterion the approach is applied to a simple production consumption economy with non renewable resources to derive some policy recommendations on the use of indicators to deal with sustainability i discuss the implications of such a criterion in terms of trade off between sustainability thresholds efficiency and time consistency in particular the resulting problem is time inconsistent and sustainability thresholds may be revised over time following the time inconsistent policy based on indicators with dynamic revision of the thresholds may however result in a sustained utility path and even in utility growth