long term competition in a dynamic game the cold fish war this article presents a model of credible voluntary collective agreements in a dynamic game these agreements are implicit in collections of history dependent threat strategies i consider the strategies in a game of resource exploitation credibility is represented by perfect equilibrium voluntarism requires at least that all behavior be supported by the threat of collapse of the agreement which would return the players to the memoryless equilibrium collective rationality requires that the agreement be robust to the possibility of mutually beneficial renegotiation i analyze the set of agreements meeting each of these restrictions

the contingent governance of teams analysis of institutional complementarity the first purpose of this paper is to design a model of governance structure called the contingent governance which can control the free riding problem in teams in the second best manner the second is to show by a new method of comparative static analysis that the effectiveness of the contingent governance may be enhanced by complementary institutional arrangements of the imperfect labor market and bank centered financial system the paper discusses the implications of such institutional complementarity for the dynamic change of the japanese main bank system and financial system design of transitional economies copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

adverse selection repeated insurance contracts and announcement strategy in this note we present a strategy which relies on multi period contracts and on a self selection mechanism which induces the insured to announce his true risk in the first period thus eliminating inefficiency due to adverse selection

market equilibrium with private knowledge the effect of asymmetric information between buyers and sellers on product quality was first explored by akerlof 1970 in his pathbreaking paper on the market for lemons he showed that if all purchasers have imperfect information on quality then a market for the product may not exist or if it does function it may not be efficient these results have led to a number of papers concerning insurance and labor markets under different assumptions regarding how agents discriminate between products of varying quality see pauly 1974 rothschild and stiglitz 1976 wilson 1977 miyasaki 1977 and spence 1978

gendering the varieties of capitalism a study of occupational segregation by sex in advanced industrial societies this article explores the unintended gendered consequences of employment protection and vocational training systems it develops a micrologic of skill investment by workers and employers to identify the mechanism by which specific skills become disadvantageous for women the central claim of the article is that institutions that encourage male investment in specific skills exacerbate occupational sex segregation the article finds that coordinated market economies because of their robust institutional protection of male skill investments are generally more sex segregating than are liberal market economies the empirical section provides cross sectional analyses of advanced industrial countries

a theory of interlinked rural transactions this paper argues that the interlinking of labor output and credit contracts often observed in rural economies can be regarded as an attempt to improve allocative efficiency in the face of moral hazard it advances an economic explanation of the phenomenon which is rooted in the view that prevalent modes of transaction of which interlinked contracts are an example are shaped by technological considerations interlinking is shown to be an efficient economic response to unequally distributed information arising from the uncertainty which characterizes subsistence agriculture all pareto efficient allocations require a combination of wage cum output sharing with consumption credit contracts the analytical framework set up to demonstrate the results is used to examine the response of the contractual parameters to changes in i the returns to alternative occupations available to tenant laborers ii the cost of credit to the village economy and iii the riskiness of cultivation the analysis concludes that public policy to alleviate rural poverty must recognize the relationships between technological considerations and modes of transaction in the absence of a complete set of markets

multi period insurance contracts this paper examines the form of insurance contracts in the presence of asymmetric information about consumers accident probabilities our goal is to understand the adjustment in contract terms as a function of accident histories in a finite horizon model we also compare these adjustments between alternative market structures our principal findings indicate that history dependent insurance contracts serve a useful sorting role individuals who declare themselves low risks to insurance companies face adverse contracturai terms if they subsequently have many accidents these adjustments are strongest in the case of a single insurance seller but are present in the competitive model as well

is there a glass ceiling over europe exploring the gender pay gap across the wages distribution using harmonised data from the european union household panel we analyse gender pay gaps by sector across the wages distribution for ten countries we find that the mean gender pay gap in the raw data typically hides large variations in the gap across the wages distribution we use quantile regression qr techniques to control for the effects of individual and job characteristics at different points of the distribution and calculate the part of the gap attributable to differing returns between men and women we find that first gender pay gaps are typically bigger at the top of the wage distribution a finding that is consistent with the existence of glass ceilings for some countries gender pay gaps are also bigger at the bottom of the wage distribution a finding that is consistent with sticky floors third the gender pay gap is typically higher at the top than the bottom end of the wage distribution suggesting that glass ceilings are more prevalent than sticky floors and that these prevail in the majority of our countries fourth the gender pay gap differs significantly across the public and the private sector wages distribution for each of our eu countries

efficient equilibria in a differential game of capitalism abstract one considers a differential game of capitalism a la lancaster feedback nash equilibria and pareto optimal solutions are characterized under the assumption that the planning horizon is infinite it is then shown that by combining a pareto optimal solution with the nash feedback equilibrium strategy pair which plays the role of a threat one can obtain an efficient equilibrium which is also subgame perfect in the sense of selten this result modifies sensibly the previous interpretation of the inherent inefficiency of capitalism

theories of share tenancy a critical survey for the past 2 decades the problems of agricultural tenancy have attracted a great deal of attention not only from agricultural economists but also from economists in general as a typical example of agencyprincipal contract relations despite the prolific growth of literature both theoretical and empirical there has been little convergence in opinions on tenancy contracts the divergence has been especially great on the understanding of the causes and the effects of sharecropping tenancy much confusion underlying the widely divergent perspectives has stemmed from partial treatments of contractual choice which unduly limit the optimizing behavior of contracting parties and the options of contract forms this essay aims at clarifying the sources of the confusion by reviewing the past literature in light of the more general theory of agency principal relations the agency theory in order to examine the problems of various theoretical models in a unified framework in section ii we first develop the basic framework of a general model of tenancy contract in section iii we clarify in terms of the general model contradictions latent in the traditional marshallian theory which asserts that share tenancy is inefficient because of the disincentive effect of cropsharing on the tenant s work effort in section iv we attempt to show that recent efforts to reconstruct the theory based on the traditional assumption have not yet been quite successful section v draws implications and testable hypotheses from more general theories incorporating the aspects of risk and uncertainty section vi tests allocational and distributional implications of those alternative hypotheses based on the summary of evidence col

overwork and the slow convergence in the gender gap in wages despite rapid changes in women s educational attainment and continuous labor force experience convergence in the gender gap in wages slowed in the 1990s and stalled in the 2000s using cps data fr

industry self regulation without sanctions the chemical industry s responsible care program industry self regulation the voluntary association of firms to control their collective action has been proposed as a complement to government regulation proponents argue that the establishment of

on the dominance of capitalists leadership in a feedback stackelberg solution of a differential game model of capitalism abstract this paper deals with a modified version of the lancaster model of capitalism where it is assumed that there is a cost jointly borne by the two groups of players workers versus capitalists and associated with the bargaining of a larger share of consumption for the workers it is shown that a feedback stackelberg solution with the capitalists acting as leaders and announcing their investment policy at the beginning of each period is a solution dominating the feedback nash solution the paper is also intended to be a tutorial on the feedback stackelberg solution a concept not so often used by economic modelers

can group incentives alleviate moral hazard the role of pro social preferences abstract incentivizing unobservable effort in risky environments such as in insurance credit and labor markets is vital as moral hazard may otherwise cause significant welfare losses including the outright failure of markets ensuring incentive compatibility through state contingent contracts between principal and agent however is undesirable for risk averse agents we provide a theoretical intuition on how pro social preferences between agents in a joint liability group contract can ensure incentive compatibility two independent large scale behavioral experiments framed in an insurance context support the hypotheses derived from our theory in particular effort decreases when making agents payoff less state dependent but this effect is mitigated with joint liability in a group scheme where agents are additionally motivated by pro social concerns activating strategic motives slightly increases effort further particularly in non anonymous groups with high network strength the results support existing evidence on joint liability groups and further suggest that even if peer pressure to ensure effort provision is absent such group policies can improve efficiency when agents are pro social

incentives in principal agent relationships this article identifies some of the major issues that have been examined in the literature on incentives the article begins by discussing the frictions that lie at the heart of incentive problems next the principal s optimal response to these frictions is explored taking as given the characteristics of the agents with whom the principal interacts in a nonrepeated setting the design of individualized contracts contests and tournaments is analyzed then the principal s task of selecting the best agent is addressed and repeated agency relationships are considered

financial intermediation delegated monitoring and long term relationships abstract this paper considers the consequences of enduring relationships for bank structure and policy in an information based banking model adding a richer time dimension allows repeated lending between the intermediary and borrower this contract lets a bank produce information and enforce compliance more easily than direct monitoring of the borrower s organization this implies an asymmetric banking structure banks enter long term relationships with borrowers but not with depositors next it shows how enduring relationships solve problems with loan participations and security underwriting by commercial banks

duopoly with both ruin and entry duopoly is modeled here as a prisoner s dilemma repeated in continuous time firms wish to maximize discounted flows of dividend payments which are paid when capitalization levels permit a firm is ruined when its capitalization falls below zero but each ruined firm is immediately replaced by a new entrant attempting to ruin a rival is not necessarily an attractive strategy here since the postentry game against the new rival may be a less favorable one on the other hand firms that are close to ruin have little to lose by playing aggressively and hence are attractive targets of aggression themselves equilibria are constricted that reflect these considerations

optimal employment contracts in a principal agent relationship abstract two unique characteristics of modern japanese labor management practice are the prevalence of lifetime employment and of biannual bonuses in contrast these practices are relatively infrequent in the united states many of the explanations offered so far attribute the difference to cultural and or institutional differences in the two countries in this paper we present a different point of view one that provides an economic rationale for various practices the model developed is based upon the framework of the principal agent relationship the principal employer offers to the agent employee a contract which specifies contract length wage rate and profit sharing schedule so as to maximize the expected value of a stream of future profits the agent in turn accepts this contract if and only if he can make himself better off in doing so if the appropriate level of effort can be specified and enforced by the principal there is no agency problem the resulting outcome is said to be first best on the other hand in many situations the principal is not able to enforce the effort level due to for example monitoring costs or lack of observability thus in the presence of this agency problem the appropriate level of effort is chosen for any given contract by the agent in such a way that his expected utility is maximized the optimal contracts in this framework are said to be second best the main focus in the paper is on the second best case we find that the optimal contracts depend upon various factors such as labor productivity disutility of effort risk aversion alternate market opportunity transaction cost demand conditions and discount rates by using numerical examples obtained by dynamic programming we illustrate that any form of employment policy can be optimal for the appropriate situations in addition we estimate the agency cost or the incentive gap between the first best and second best solutions

a meta analysis of the international gender wage gap abstract since the early 1970s a number of authors have calculated gender wage differentials between women and men of equal productivity this meta study provides a new quantitative review of this vast amount of empirical literature on gender wage differentials as it concerns not only differences in methodology data and time periods but also different countries we place particular emphasis on a proper consideration of the quality of the underlying study which is done by a weighting with quality indicators the results show that data restrictions i e the limitation of the analysis to new entrants never marrieds or one narrow occupation only have the biggest impact on the resulting gender wage gap moreover we are able to show what effect a misspecification of the underlying wage equation like the frequent use of potential experience has on the calculated gender wage gap over time raw wage differentials worldwide have fallen substantially however most of this decrease is due to better labor market endowments of females

equal pay as a moving target international perspectives on forty years of addressing the gender pay gap this paper provides an overview of the key factors impacting upon the gender pay gap in the uk europe and australia forty years after the implementation of the first equal pay legislation the pay gap remains a key aspect of the inequalities women face in the labour market while the overall pay gap has tended to fall in many countries over the past forty years it has not closed in some countries it has been stubbornly resistant or has even widened in reviewing the collection of papers that make up this special issue we identify four broad themes with which to group the contributions and draw out the explanations for diverse trends theoretical and conceptual debates legal developments and their impacts wage setting institutions and changing employer demands and newly emerging pay inequalities between and within educational and ethnic groups across the four themes we underline how the trends in the gender pay gap capture the dynamism of inequalities as the market power of different groups and stakeholders changes over times three key dimensions emerge from the papers to provide a framework for future research and policy discourse the relationship between litigation and bargaining strategies the interaction between wage setting institutions and new organisational practices and the increasing and range of diversity or equality strands competing for equal treatment we conclude that progress towards closing the gender pay gap will not be easy will require a collective effort of various actors and will not be quick

output effects of government purchases the theoretical analysis focuses on the distinction between temporary and permanent movements in government purchases under plausible conditions the temporary case involves an output response that is positive less than one to one with the change in government purchases and larger than that generated by an equal sized but permanent shift in purchase the equilibrium real rate of return rise in the temporary case but changes little in the permanent one defense purchases are divided empirically into permanent and temporary components by considering the role of temporary wars no temporary shifts in nondefense purchases were isolated empirical results verify an expansionary output effect for temporary purchases that exceeds that of permanent purchases the results for some other expectational hypotheses are found to be generally supportive of the theory

the political economy of the neoliberal transformation of french industrial relations the author advances the literature on the role of the state in the decentralization of industrial relations in france by providing a political economic analysis of right and left backed governments in recent decades while both have pursued reforms to reduce regulation and to increase labor market flexibility they have used the state apparatus in different ways to achieve these goals the right has reformed labor law by obtaining partial support from employers associations and unions the social partners the left by contrast has relied on decentralized bargaining with the social partners because its political base would not have accepted flexibility increasing legal reforms the author examines critical episodes of reform in collective bargaining unemployment insurance and employment protection laws to show how the state has intervened in different ways depending on the political identity of the governing coalition

welfare state retrenchment the partisan effect revisited this paper aims to shed light on the role of the ideology of political parties in shaping the evolution of the welfare state in 18 developed democracies by providing empirical findings on the determinants of social programs entitlements and social spending over the period 1981 1999 the paper shows that structural change is a major determinant of the extent of social protection our results suggest that overall spending is driven up by structural change on the other hand strong structural change has a negative influence on welfare entitlements measured by net replacement rates of sickness insurance or unemployment benefits partisan influence plays an important role in the dynamics of the welfare state left wing governments strengthen the positive effect of shocks on aggregate social expenditure while right wing governments undertake even stronger cutbacks in replacement rates as a reaction to structural change

contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models abstract settings are considered in which optimal multiperiod contracts can have no memory i e where second period payments do not need to depend on first period outcomes if contracts have no memory a repeated agency game can be played myopically there are no gains to long term relationships conditions on preferences for a no memory contract are presented in an agency game with moral hazard on the act selection preference separability and domain additivity imply the existence of a no memory contract in a setting without moral hazard but with asymmetric information on the outcome domain additivity implies no memory

forgiveness in vertical relationships incentive and termination effects two types of contractual solutions have been proposed for resolving incentive conflicts in vertical relationships formal and relational i e enforceable or not by third parties much is known about the optimal structure of formal contracts but relatively little is known about the structure of relational contracts we study a core feature of the latter the conditions leading to continuation of the relationship whose prospect gives relational contracts their force we build a formal model of a vertical relationship between two parties that endogenizes the choice of the minimum performance necessary for continuation as a function of the values of contractibles noncontractibles and outside options the model highlights a basic trade off between providing strong incentives for the present incentive effect and safeguarding relationships for the future termination effect the stable relationships that follow from a more forgiving contract are more important under certain conditions when a lot of value is jointly created by exchange partners i e high contractible value high noncontractible value or unattractive outside options however strong incentives from a less forgiving contract are more important under other conditions when a formal contract is insufficient and a relational contract is most important i e high noncontractible relative to contractible value we discuss implications for the choice of governance of interorganizational relationships

moral hazard and secured lending in an infinitely repeated credit market game we analyze repeated moral hazard with discounting in a competitive credit market with risk neutrality even without learning or risk aversion long term bank borrower relationships are welfare enhancing the main result is that the borrower obtains an infinite sequence of unsecured loans at below spot market cost following the first good project realization this contract produces first best action choices prior to this stage the borrower gets secured loans with above market borrowing cost the optimal contract thus displays a selective memory feature taking only one of two forms at any given point in time depending on prior history we consider an infinitely repeated bank borrower relationship with moral hazard and universal risk neutrality and explore the ramifications of credit contract duration when the two well known benefits of long term contracting learning and improved risk sharing are absent our objectives are twofold the first is to analyze an infinitely repeated game with discounting in a credit market context we thus relate the theory of repeated games to financial intermediation theory particularly to issues of moral hazard and collateral related distortions the second objective is to understand noteworthy stylized facts of credit markets such as durability in credit relationships lower borrowing costs for established borrowers and unsecured loans for established borrowers versus secured loans for newer borrowers while these practices may be partly due to learning we show that learning is not essential to rationalize them even if information decays rapidly and banks learn nothing about borrowers through time these aspects of credit contracting arise in a repeated game context our main results are as follows first despite universal risk neutrality and the absence of learning a durable bank relationship benefits the borrower 2 the intuition is that the long term contracting permitted by a durable relationship enables the bank to efficiently tax and subsidize the borrower through time to reduce the use of costly collateral second the average welfare loss due to moral hazard per period is positive even as the time horizon goes to infinity third the optimal infinite horizon contract has the striking property that following the period

optimal labour contracts under asymmetric information an introduction the review of economic studies has instituted a new series of lectures to be given annually by a younger british economist at the association of university teachers of economics meetings the choice of lecturer is determined by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay this paper is a revised version of the first lecture in the series it was presented at the aute meeting held at the university of surrey in april 1982 and was refereed in the usual way mak

using game theory to model competition the article is an exposition of the basic concepts of noncooperative game theory and their application to advertising product and price competition

business cycles in the united kingdom facts and fictions this paper documents the statistical properties of contemporary business fluctuations in the united kingdom we study the period 1956 90 using quarterly detrended data on key aggregate variables we compute selected moments of the data compare our results with those for the united states and rigorously test for dynamic instabilities our findings confirm the existence of substantive cyclical regularities both across countries and across time some notable cross country differences are also identified conclusions about stability are shown to be potentially sensitive to the method of testing in general cross correlations are appreciably more stable than standard deviations

automobile insurance ratemaking in the presence of asymmetrical information automobile insurance is an example of a market where multi period contracts are observed this form of contract can be justified by asymmetrical information between the insurer and the insured insurers use risk classification together with bonus malus systems in this paper we show that the actual methodology for the integration of these two approaches can lead to inconsistencies we develop a statistical model that adequately integrates risk classification and experience rating for this purpose we present poisson and negative binomial models with regression component in order to use all available information in the estimation of accident distribution a bonus malus system which integrates a priori and a posteriori information on an individual basis is proposed and insurance premium tables are derived as a function of time past accidents and the significant variables in the regression statistical results were obtained from a sample of 19 013 drivers

labor and product market reforms questioning policy complementarity this article proposes a dynamic efficiency wages model with imperfect competition on labor and product markets in this framework job insecurity generates a perverse effect on workers incentives which shifts up the real wages schedule and may yield employment losses product market regulation and redundancy payments contribute to reducing labor turnover thus easing the workers incentive constraint consequently and against conventional wisdom regulations may have a positive impact on employment and a substitution effect may emerge across deregulation policies moreover in some cases a complementarity arises between regulations in product and labor markets both interacting to ensure more stable labor relations

trade unions and economic efficiency in this paper i shall investigate a role for trade unions in increasing economic efficiency this role is enabling an improvement in the allocation of riskbearing between a firm and its employees the essential idea is straightforward if employers and employees are both risk averse the optimal wage contract will not leave one party bearing all the risk if state contingent contracts are possible grossman and hart 1981 give several reasons for firms being risk averse that firms are indeed risk averse would seem to follow from the fact that employees bear substantial risks few firms offer a job for life at a guaranteed real wage employees bear the risks of layoff redundancy and changes in the real value of their earnings with transactions costs in finding and moving to another job which may be substantial in periods of high unemployment these are real risks yet the states of the world in which these eventualities are to occur are rarely specified in any legally enforceable form indeed it is hard to imagine that they ever could be both because of the problem of envisaging all the relevant states of the world the bounded rationality of simon 1979 and because of the problem of defining those states in such a way that the courts could in the event of a dispute decide which state had occurred in the absence of legal enforceability of state contingent contracts the analysis depends on whether or not decisions about production must be made before a firm knows which state has occurred if they do not have to be then it is not essential to negotiate any contract before the firm knows the state but it may still be desirable from a risk sharing point of view to have a long term contract covering different possible states for that case hall and lilien 1979 and grossman and hart 1981 have argued that some degree of state contingency may be achieved by negotiating a contract which allows the firm in the light of the state which occurs to choose between limited combinations of employment and wages the firm may for example be permitted to reduce wages under the contract but only at the expense of reducing employment so that it is only in its interest to do so if marginal productivity is low this can overcome some of the moral hazard problems arising when states are observed only by firms but as grossman and hart show only at the cost of pareto inefficiency in the employment contract at an empirical level it may explain provisions for compulsory overtime at premium rates this type of contract will work only in the case in which the firm observes the state of the world before making employment decisions but given that

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

from wage regulation to wage gap how wage setting institutions and structures shape the gender wage gap across three industries in 24 european countries and germany whilst a common and persisting feature of advanced market economies the gender wage gap nevertheless varies across countries amongst the factors affecting this wage gap industrial relations and industry differences still require further research using data from eu silc in 25 european countries this article analyses how national wage setting institutions impact wage differences between male and female full time employees in three distinct industries complementing the country comparison is an in depth study of the german case using data from the german linked employer employee database shedding light on the interaction of industry specific wage setting regulations and gender equity in living wages findings from the international comparison suggest a substantial gender wage gap for full time employees across industries with specific country patterns country patterns seem to be due to the overall influence of trade unions and the relationship between pay bargaining strategies and specific minimum wage policies the german case adds to these findings by analysing the impact of sectoral models of wage bargaining for industry specific gender wage gaps focussing on living wages for skilled full time employees

short term contracts and long term agency relationships abstract long term contracts are valuable only if optimal contracting requires commitment to a plan today that would not otherwise be adopted tomorrow we show that commitments are unnecessary and hence short term contracts are sufficient if 1 all public information can be used in contracting 2 the agent can acess a bank on equal terms with the principal 3 recontracting takes place with common knowledge about technology and preferences and 4 the frontier of expected utility payoffs generated by the set of incentive compatible contracts is downward sloping at all times

evidence on the incentive properties of share contracts abstract ever since adam smith share contracts have been condemned for their lack of incentives sharecropping tenants face incentives to undersupply productive inputs since they receive only a fraction of the marginal revenue the empirical literature reports that lands under sharecropping are indeed less productive and employ inputs less intensively than those operated by owners this paper shows that 1 sharecropping and fixed rent tenancy are both associated with low quality lands 2 plots under sharecropping and fixed rent present on average the same unconditional productivity 3 controlling for observed land quality and input use their average productivities are also identical to those of owner operated plots and 4 the input choices satisfy the same profit maximization conditions for all land contracts these results challenge the conventional wisdom connecting sharecropping to incentive distortions they support an alternative view that farmers optimally employ more input resources into

work incentives hierarchy and internal labor markets this paper argues that contracts with payment based on a ranking of employee performance can provide performance incentives even under asymmetric information that prevents payment based on individual performance only being enforceable such contracts also fit with five features of labor markets that have aroused considerable interest 1 hierarchical wage structures 2 internal promotion 3 wage rates that rise with seniority and experience more than productivity 4 the variance of earnings increasing with experience and 5 wage rates attached to jobs rather than individuals with differentials set by administrative procedures rather than by reference to external market wages

optimal retention in agency problems this paper studies the interaction between a single long lived principal and a series of short lived agents in the presence of both moral hazard and adverse selection we assume that the principal can influence the agents behavior only through her choice of a retention rule this rule is further required to be sequentially rational i e no precommitment is allowed we provide general conditions under which equilibria exist where a the principal adopts a cut off rule under which agents are retained only when the reward they generate exceeds a critical bound and b agents separate according to type with better agents taking superior actions we show that in equilibrium a retained agent s productivity is necessarily declining over time but that retained agents are also more productive on average than untried agents due to selection effects finally we show that for each given type agents of that type are more productive in the presence of adverse selection than when there is pure moral hazard i e when that type is the sole type of agent in the model nonetheless adding uncertainty about agent types cannot benefit the principal except in uninteresting cases

moral hazard insurance claims and repeated insurance contracts the paper develops a simple model of repeated automobile insurance contracts providing a framework for analyzing changes in aggregate insurance data in periods of changes that affect driver incentives experience rating of premiums gives drivers an incentive to exert effort to avoid accidents ex ante moral hazard and an incentive to hide accidents ex post moral hazard the empirical analysis using data from the competitive insurance markets in ontario and alberta over a period of major legislative changes in ontario suggests that much of the recent decline in accidents in ontario was due to an increased incentive to hide accidents jel classification d 12 d82 hasard moral reclamations d assurance et contrats d assurance renouveles le texte developpe un modele simple de contrats d assurance automobile renouveles fournissant un cadre d analyse des donnees d assurance agregees dans des periodes de changement qui affectent les incitations des chauffeurs un regime de primes cotees selon l experience donne aux chauffeurs une incitation a faire des efforts pour eviter les accidents hasard moral ex ante et une incitation a cacher qu il y a eu accident hasard moral ex post l analyse empirique utilisant les donnees recueillies dans les marches d assurance con currentiels de l ontario et de l alberta pour une periode au cours de laquelle il y a eu des changements legislatifs majeurs en ontario suggere qu une bonne partie du declin des accidents enregistre en ontario a ete attribuable a une incitation accrue a cacher les accidents

overcoming incentive constraints by linking decisions consider a bayesian collective decision problem in which the preferences of agents are private information we provide a general demonstration that the utility costs associated with incentive constraints become negligible when the decision problem is linked with a large number of independent copies of itself this is established by defining a mechanism in which agents must budget their representations of preferences so that the frequency of preferences across problems mirrors the underlying distribution of preferences and then arguing that agents incentives are to satisfy their budget by being as truthful as possible we also show that all equilibria of the linking mechanisms converge to the target utility levels the mechanisms do not require transferable utility or interpersonal comparisons of utility and are immune to manipulations by coalitions

real business cycles in this paper we demonstrate how certain very ordinary economic principles lead maximizing individuals to choose consumption production plans that display many of the characteristics commonly associated with business cycles our explanation is entirely consistent with i rational expectations ii complete current information iii stable preferences iv no technological change v no long lived commodities vi no frictions or adjustment costs vii no government viii no money and ix no serial dependence in the stochastic elements of the environment we also provide a completely worked out example of the type of artificial economy we have in mind the time series properties of the example exhibit some major features of observed business cycles although this type of model may not be capable of explaining all of the regularities in actual business cycles we believe that it provides a useful well defined benchmark for assessing the relative importance of factors e g monetary disturbances

mobility and innovation a cross country comparison in the video games industry open labour markets are often seen as a precondition for innovation particularly for new industries however this view ignores two core findings of the economic systems literature first that mobility patterns are institutional microsystems that need to be complementary to other institutions in the labour market and second that new industries may be characterised by incremental and complex innovation based on these considerations we ask how mobility affects innovation in the video games industry in the us and japan we find that inter firm mobility is beneficial for innovation in the us but has negative effects in japan we further find that inter functional mobility is beneficial for innovation in both countries our analysis is based on career histories from the video games industry in the us and japan we present an empirical study based on the game development of 815 video games and the careers of 28 426 video game developers who were involved in the development of games released between 1999 and 2009

costly participation and heterogeneous preferences in informational committees informational committees are groups of people who are designated to gather information this article develops a simple model of committee size based on costly participation and preference heterogeneity in a setting in which the information structure and policy preferences are both represented by normal random variables i characterize an equilibrium under the mean decision rule and derive the optimal committee size i show that when effort costs are sufficiently high preference heterogeneity can provide members additional incentives to gather information and thus the optimal committee size and the principal s expected payoff can increase in the heterogeneity of committee members policy preferences

adverse selection and finite horizon insurance contracts abstract we use a particular contract to analyze three issues regarding adverse selection monopoly and the use of time within a finite horizon the description and existence of an epsilon equilibrium equilibrium the achievement of a nash equilibrium and the optimality of risk revelation among the results obtained we show that at equilibrium low risk individuals buy full insurance most of the time and high risk individuals always buy full insurance we also show that the equilibrium with risk revelation is a nash equilibrium these results are compared with those of the self selection mechanism stiglitz 1977 and of the equilibrium under moral hazard radner 1981

do government purchases affect unemployment we estimate the effect of government purchases on unemployment in 20 oecd countries for the period 1980 2007 an increase in government purchases equal to one percent of gdp is found to reduce unemployment by about 0 3 percentage points in the same year the effect is greater and more persistent under less employment friendly labour market institutions and greater and more persistent under a fixed exchange rate regime than under a floating regime the effect is also greater in downturns than in booms the effect on unemployment reflects a corresponding positive effect of increased government purchases on the employment to population rate this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

efficiency wages and equilibrium wages i introduction economists have long sought to explain unemployment in ways consistent with individual agents optimizing behavior a recent although controversial model in this vein is the efficiency wage paradigm which focuses on the difficulty of monitoring worker performance when production is organized in teams to discourage nonperformance by employees firms monitor their workers and dismiss those who are caught shirking a firm may further discourage nonfeasance by paying its workers higher wages than they could earn elsewhere then workers caught shirking not only become unemployed but forfeit the rents associated with their jobs 1 in this scenario in order to maintain the incentives not to shirk firms will not cut wages even though equally qualified unemployed workers are willing to work for less the result is disequilibrium in the labor market and possibly involuntary unemployment 2 a series of theoretical studies have demonstrated the conditions under which efficiency wages may occur standard references include eaton and white 1982 1983 shapiro and stiglitz 1984 foster and wan 1984 bowles 1985 and calvo 1985 yellen 1984 reviews the early literature while katz 1986 stiglitz 1987 and carmichael 1990 discuss more recent work but as carmichael emphasizes in his review few papers have actually attempted to test the predictions of the efficiency wage models most of the existing empirical investigations examine the importance of industrial wage differentials krueger and summers 1987 1988 dickens and katz 1987 and murphy and topel 1987a find that there are substantial unexplained industrial wage differentials which bulow and summers 1986 and krueger and summers 1987 1988 attribute to efficiency wages however the magnitude as well as the interpretation of these industrial wage differentials is disputed see carmichael 1990 leonard 1987 and murphy and topel 1987a 1987b for differing views this paper extends the efficiency wage model in a straightforward way to address two questions will the labor market clear if firms can only imperfectly monitor worker effort and do industrial wage differentials provide a test for the importance of efficiency wages we offer two modifications to traditional efficiency wage models first we recognize that there may be an explicit cost to being fired for instance dismissed workers may find it more difficult to find future employment because of poor references from their previous employer they may incur high psychic costs as a result of being fired or they may have to suffer large search costs in locating another job second we let the firm choose the performance standard 3 it seems only natural that a firm wanting more effort from its employees would hold its workers to a more rigorous performance standard just as a firm seeking a higher quality labor force may require more schooling of its applicants while the firm must compensate the worker for the extra effort necessary to meet the higher performance standard payment of efficiency wages could be avoided following the efficiency wage literature we make the strong assumption that all implicit or explicit bonding mechanisms are prohibitively costly to implement our model of the worker s and firm s behavior is specified in section ii the model includes as special cases a market paying equilibrium wages one paying non market clearing efficiency wages and a dual labor market that is a combination of the two we demonstrate that the firm need not pay efficiency wages even in the presence of the agency problem the use of the performance standard gives the firm another instrument other than the wage to control worker effort and welfare there are limits to how high the performance standard will be adjusted however before the firm will offer an efficiency wage we present the details of these arguments in section iii

theoretical foundations for sticky wages abstract the paper compares three different types of theoretical explanation of sticky wages they are implicit contracts efficiency wage models and insider outsider models it then reconsiders keynes rationale for sticky wages which focuses on relative wage issues finally the paper considers possible directions for future research

capitalist economies and wage inequality this article presents new stylized facts on the incidence of low pay and mobility out of low pay for 13 european countries and the usa women the young the less skilled and part timers are generally most at risk as are those who work in retail hotels catering and personal services however the relative importance of these characteristics can vary from country to country the incidence of low pay varies considerably across countries as does its trend no direct link is found to aggregate employment or to the employment rate of the less skilled nor does the industrial structure of employment have much effect however differences between the low wage production of goods and of services are important inclusive labour relations are central in containing the incidence of low pay by inclusiveness is meant the existence of mechanisms formal or informal to extend terms and conditions negotiated by workers with strong bargaining power to workers with less bargaining power in some countries a national minimum wage is an essential accompaniment the article considers the extent to which countries can maintain the more benign institutions that limit low pay copyright 2009 oxford university press

syndications in sovereign lending abstract the paper develops a gmae theoretic model of lender sovereign borrower relationships conditions that determine a self enforced equilibrium in loan contracts are derived the model is extended to explain syndicated lending under different regimes of cost and penalty structures for example it is shown that for certian atypes of penalty functions when the marginal penalty imposition capability of a low penalty type lender at smaller loan levels is greater than the marginal penalty impositon of a high penalty type lender at higher loan levels there will be an incentive for banks to lend as a syndicate with particular types of interbank clauses implications of the model in terms of responsibilities of syndicate members as understood in the legal literature are also discussed

human capital and self enforcing contracts this essay analyzes labor contracts as a device for rearranging factor incomes over time under conditions of extreme adverse selection in particular the lack of verifiable public information about future compensation prevents finitely lived workers from borrowing against their earnings specific human capital is used as an incentive to implement intertemporal self enforcing contracts between workers and firms after proposing a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of such contracts the resulting equilibrium earnings profiles are explored along with the effects of imperfections in the credit market on the way workers choose jobs and allocate time between current production and training copyright 1988 by the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

on delegating price authority to a regulated firm this article models a regulatory environment in which the regulated firm possesses better information about demand conditions than does the regulator the regulator would like to tie prices to the firm s private information in a socially optimal way to do so the regulator must induce the firm either truthfully to reveal private information or equivalently unilaterally to set socially optimal prices this is accomplished by assessing lump sum subsidies or taxes that depend in an appropriate way on the prices announced by the firm this mechanism can be reinterpreted as a two part tariff scheme whereby both the service fee and price per unit respond to shifting demand conditions

efficient share tenancy contracts under risk the case of two rice growing villages in thailand abstract two categories of thai sharecroppers are observed to be efficient those under high poverty and high risk and those in a long term relation of gift exchange with their landlord econometric estimates show that use of variable factors by these sharecroppers is insignificantly different from that by owner operators and significantly higher than that by generic sharecroppers interpretations for this behavior are provided by models of sharecropping under safety first and of repeated contracts with gift exchange

mortal managers and long term goals an impossibility result this article examines decision myopia under effort and risk neutrality an infinite non overlapping sequence of mortal managers is selected and their performance evaluated contracts admit premature termination plant condition depends on maintenance which induces an interstage linkage in production when ability and action are imprecisely known by employers no contract achieves the first best outcome furthermore if the manager discounts less than the owners inefficiency is partially due to moral hazard which resembles myopia optimal contracts infer ability and motivate behavior via manipulation of wage schedules and tenure guidelines

performance promotion and the peter principle this paper considers why organizations use promotions rather than just monetary bonuses to motivate employees even though this may conflict with efficient assignment of employees to jobs when performance is unverifiable use of promotion reduces the incentive for managers to be affected by influence activities that would blunt the effectiveness of monetary bonuses when employees are risk neutral use of promotion for incentives need not distort assignments when they are risk averse it may sufficient conditions for this are given the distortion may be either to promote more employees than is efficient the peter principle effect or fewer

efficient moral hazard abstract this paper presents an infinite horizon discounted dynamic programming model of the endogenous opportunity costs of an agent s effort that is allocated among an endogenous number of principals an agent allocates effort between evaluating new principals and attending to current principals since each principal s return is not maximized by the agent s optimal allocation moral hazard occurs in equilibrium however since the agent maximizes the total expected value of all undertaken projects the agent s allocation of effort is efficient if the agent chooses a single principal then moral hazard does not occur and the allocation is efficient these results are contrary to the inefficient moral hazard results in bilateral principal agent p a and common agency c a models

repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard abstract an attempt is made to account for the frequently observed phenomenon of insurance companies offering discounts to clients who possess a favorable record of past claims we argue that such discounts provide a mechanism which enables both insurer and insured to counteract the inefficiency which arises from moral hazard

labour market effects of parental leave in europe we investigate the aggregate level effects of parental leave legislation on various labour market outcomes of women in 16 european countries for the period between 1970 and 2010 the paper updates and extends previous findings in the literature the results show increases in participation rates that diminish with length and generosity of leave schemes while pure participation numbers may not increase dramatically there is strong evidence of increases in weekly working hours on the other hand a decrease in wages for high skilled women and amplified occupational segregation are possible results of long parental leave schemes we conclude with a discussion of the recent debates over extending minimum maternity and parental leave rights on the european level copyright oxford university press

contemporaneous perfect epsilon equilibria we examine contemporaneous perfect equilibria in which a player s actions after every history evaluated at the point of deviation from the equilibrium must be within of a best response this concept implies but is stronger than radner s ex ante perfect equilibrium a strategy profile is a contemporaneous perfect equilibrium of a game if it is a subgame perfect equilibrium in a perturbed game with nearly the same payos with the converse holding for pure equilibria

a positive economic theory of regulatory enforcement a positive economic model of regulatory enforcement is developed th at allows the agency to use both legal and informal methods to gain compliance with the law the paper fills a gap in the economic literature on regulation by developing and testing a model of enforcement it also provides a theoretical framework for the recent empirical work of political scientists and sociologists on enforcement practices copyright 1988 by royal economic society

family policies wage structures and gender gaps sources of earnings inequality in 20 countries this study uncovers an unexpected effect of family friendly policies on women s economic attainments using hierarchical linear models the analysis combines individual level data obtained from th

on repeated moral hazard with discounting in this paper we analyze optimal contracts in an infinitely repeated agency model in which both the principal and agent discount the future we show that there is a stationary representation of the optimal contract when the agent s conditional discounted expected utility is used as a state variable this representation reduces the multi period problem to a static variational problem which can be analyzed using standard variational techniques this reduction is used to obtain several properties of the contract

structural reforms in europe and the in coherence of institutions the aim of this paper is to analyse the consequences of some structural reforms on the institutional coherence of oecd countries particularly in continental europe and on their economic performance particularly as regards employment because institutions in developed political economies are interrelated through a complex network of complementarities institutional change has consequences beyond the area concerned in a reform this also implies that there are complementarity effects in reforms themselves a challenge of reform programmes is therefore to achieve a new type of complementarity between reformed institutions the paper presents empirical evidence questioning the compatibility of the ongoing structural reforms in product and labour markets with the existing institutional structures in some oecd countries the coherence of the flexicurity strategy i e a combination of labour market flexibility and a generous welfare state is also questioned from the point of view of both economic efficiency and political economy

reputations for safety market performance and policy remedies this paper examines the provision of industrial safety in a competitive labor market under the assumption that it takes time for workers to learn about changes in safety levels at a firm it is shown that safety will in general be underprovided and that in some cases government enforced workmen s compensation can bring improvements the results hold even though in equilibrium all workers are perfectly informed about the level of safety prevailing at each firm and each is free to move to any firm he likes

formal contracts in the presence of relational enforcement mechanisms evidence from technology development projects formal contracting addresses the moral hazard problems inherent in interfirm deals via explicit terms designed to achieve incentive alignment alternatively when firms expect to interact repeatedly relational mechanisms may achieve similar results without the associated costs however as we now know from a growing body of theoretical and empirical work the resulting intuition that relational mechanisms will be substituted for formal ones whenever possible does not generally hold the extent to which firms substitute relational mechanisms for formal ones in the presence of repeated interaction is an empirical question that forms the basis of this paper we study a sample of 52 joint technology development contracts in the telecommunications and microelectronics industries and devise a coding scheme to allow empirical comparison of contract terms counter to the above intuition but consistent with recent research we find that a firm s contracts are more detailed and more likely to include penalties when it engages in frequent deals whether with the same or different partners our results suggest complementarity between formal and relational contracts and have implications for optimal contracting particularly in high technology sectors

the multiperiod principal agent problem in repeated principal agent models long term contracts can improve on short term contracts only if they commit either principal or agent to a payoff in some future circumstance lower than could be obtained from a short term contract negotiated if that circumstance occurs we show that efficient contracting under moral hazard alone does not require long term commitment from the principal provided a short term contract can punish the agent sufficiently in a sense made precise it requires no commitment from the agent either then linking payoffs in one period to outcomes in previous periods does not improve the tradeoff between incentives and risk sharing

the formation of financial networks modern banking systems are highly interconnected despite various benefits linkages between banks carry the risk of contagion in this article i investigate whether banks can commit ex ante to mutually insure each other when there is contagion risk in the financial system i model banks decisions to share this risk through bilateral agreements a financial network that allows losses to be shared among various counterparties arises endogenously i characterize the probability of systemic risk defined as the event that contagion occurs conditional on one bank failing in equilibrium interbank networks i show that there exist equilibria in which contagion does not occur