note on the open loop von stackelberg equilibrium in the cartel versus fringe model one of the ways to model the supply side of the world oil market is by means of the cartel versus fringe model and to employ the open loop von stackelberg equilibrium concept this note shows that the equilibrium as presented in the literature does not satisfy the optimality conditions for the open loop equilibrium the authors show furthermore that in contrast with the prevailing view the equilibrium can display discontinuous price trajectories copyright 1992 by royal economic society

on agreements in a nonrenewable resource market a cooperative differential game approach abstract we consider a nonrenewable resource duopoly with economic exhaustion we characterize the set of pareto efficient equilibria we show that when firms are sufficiently patient there exists no pareto efficient agreement that yields short run gains with respect to the noncooperative equilibrium given a pair of stocks there exists a unique interior pareto efficient agreement we characterize the set of stocks where a pareto efficient agreement results in larger discounted sum of profits for both players we show that social welfare under the interior pareto efficient agreement is smaller than under non cooperation despite the gains from a more cost effective extraction of the resources under an agreement

an oligopoly fringe non renewable resource game in the presence of a renewable substitute abstract in accordance with recent empirical evidence we model the oil market as an oligopoly facing a fringe as well as competition from renewable resources within this framework we fully characterize i e for all vectors of initial resource stocks the equilibrium extraction paths of the fringe and the oligopolists we show that i the sequence of extraction in equilibrium crucially depends on the oligopolists market power ii there always exists a phase of simultaneous supply of the oligopolists and the fringe iii the oligopolists pursue a limit pricing strategy near the end of the extraction horizon and iv an increase in the reserves of the fringe may lead to a decrease in their initial supply

computational economics and economic theory substitutes or complements abstract this essay examines the idea and potential of a computational approach to theory discusses methodological issues raised by such computational methods and outlines the problems associated with the dissemination of computational methods and the exposition of computational results we argue that the study of a theory need not be confined to proving theorems that current and future computer technologies create new possibilities for theoretical analysis and that by resolving these issues we will create an intellectual atmosphere in which computational methods can make substantial contributions to economic analysis

do oil producers act as oil igopolists in this paper the author analyzes an oligopoly model of exhaustible resource extraction and develop predictions about relative extraction patterns of different producers using the open quote oil close quote igopoly model of loury one can show that producers with large stocks produce a larger amount but a smaller percentage of their stocks than producers with small stocks the authors extend loury s model to cases where extraction costs differ among producers and where costs are a function of cumulative extraction an increase in extraction costs for a producer causes it to produce less relative to its rivals when extraction costs rise with cumulative extraction producers with large reserves tend to have lower extraction costs and a smaller ratio of cumulative production to initial reserves than producers with small reserves the authors test the predictions of the model using oil industry data and find that the empirical results are consistent with the predictions of open quotes oil close quotes igopoly theory producers with larger reserves extract a smaller share of their reserves and have lower production costs than producers with smaller reserves this pattern holds for 73 countries with oil reserves during the time period 1970 1989 and for approximately 400 us oil companies in 1983 and 1984 more the observed pattern of production for both opec and non opec producers is consistent with open quote oil close quote igopoly theory opec producers do not appear to restrain production given their level of reserves relative to non opec producers thus viewing the oil market as containing one dominant firm opec with a competitive fringe may be misleading further the pattern of extraction observed in oil markets is inconsistent with the pattern predicted by competitive theory 29 refs 5 figs 6 tabs less

dynamic cournot duopoly with intertemporal capacity constraints this paper studies a dynamic cournot duopoly in which suppliers have a limited amount of products available for two consecutive periods we derive optimal sales strategies and analyze welfare effects with and without commitment under commitment strategies do not depend on the rival s realized sales in this case there is a unique nash equilibrium for any allocation of initial supplies and prices increase over time absent commitment sellers can adjust their supply decision after the first period in this case a subgame perfect nash equilibrium does not always exist and prices may decline over time a more asymmetric allocation of stocks generally leads to higher first period prices whereas the impact on second period prices is ambiguous the larger firm typically prefers not to commit whereas the smaller firm is better off under commitment commitment generates a higher total surplus and almost always a higher consumer surplus our findings thus suggest that market transparency or flexible supply contracts can adversely affect welfare in situations where production precedes sales and firms face an intertemporal capacity constraint

oligopoly equilibria in nonrenewable resource markets abstract most nash cournot oligopoly models of nonrenewable resources apply open loop equilibrium concepts and are based on physical resource depletion this paper studies feedback equilibria and economic depletion assuming affine quadratic functional forms the existence uniqueness and explicit solutions for the equilibria are derived for duopoly and n player oligopoly with multiple resource stocks for the cases of nonquadratic criteria we develop a numeric solution scheme for the nash feedback equilibrium this scheme is an application of a discrete time discrete state controlled markov chain approximation method originally developed for solving deterministic and stochastic dynamic optimization problems in our nash cournot equilibrium the degree of concentration in supply declines over time whereas the previous models with physical depletion and open loop equilibrium concepts predict that a nash cournot resource market will develop in the direction of monopoly supply

backward induction algorithm for a class of closed loop stackelberg games abstract in the paper a new deterministic continuum strategy two player discrete time dynamic stackelberg game is proposed with fixed finite time duration and closed loop information structure the considered payoff functions can be widely used in different applications mainly in conflicts of consuming a limited resource where one player called leader is a superior authority choosing strategy first and another player called follower chooses after in case of convex payoff functions and certain parameter values we give a new particular backward induction algorithm which can be easily realized to find a leader follower equilibrium of the game in a certain sequential equilibrium realization from the last step towards the first one with respect to the current strategy choices of the players considerations on uniqueness and game regulation i e setting parameters of the game to achieve a predefined equilibrium are also provided the finite version of the game with finite strategy sets is also given along with its simplification and solution method several practical examples are shown to illustrate the comprehensive application possibilities of the results

strong time consistency in the cartel versus fringe model due to developments on the oil market in the 1970s the theory of exhaustible resources was extended with the cartel versus fringe model to characterize markets with one big coherent cartel and a large number of small suppliers called the fringe because cartel and fringe are leader and follower the von stackelberg solution concept is appropriate for the supply side of this market the solution for the cartel versus fringe model presented in the previous literature proved to be time inconsistent for a large plausible range of values for extraction costs and initial reserves this paper provides a strongly time consistent solution for the cartel versus fringe model

exchange rates and trade the case of irish exports to britain this paper examines the effect of changes in the punt sterling exchange rate on exports from ireland to britain the approach used here differs significantly from that used in most other studies in that the long run neutrality of the punt sterling exchange rate with regard to exports from ireland to britain is tested using a recently developed technique there is strong evidence that the exchange rate is neutral in the long run

long run neutrality high inflation and bank insolvencies in argentina and brazil abstract using long low frequency data on money and output over 1884 1996 for argentina and over 1912 1995 for brazil it is found that money is long run neutral but not long run superneutral with regard to real output a rise in money growth is associated with a decline in output the opposite of the tobin effect the introduction of dummy variables for 1930s or to capture recent periods of financial disruption associated with bank insolvencies does not restore long run superneutrality for either country however results indicate that bank insolvency episodes have a distinct and negative influence on output

natural resource economics under the rule of hotelling abstract natural resource stocks held in situ are physical assets equilibrium in the assets market requires that their rates of return be such that their owners are just willing to hold on to them rather than invest elsewhere i discuss a number of factors relating to the evolution of extraction costs to the durability of the resource to market structure and to uncertainty that are important in correctly characterizing the rate of return on holding exhaustible natural resource stocks the emphasis is put on how those factors can potentially help bridge the gap between the basic hotelling s rule of natural resource exploitation and the historical behaviour of the flow price of a number of resources i also highlight some theoretical and empirical issues that need further attention

strategic resource dependence we consider a situation where an exhaustible resource seller faces demand from a buyer who has a substitute but there is a time to build delay for the substitute we find that in this simple framework the basic implications of the hotelling model 1931 are reversed over time the stock declines but supplies increase up to the point where the buyer decides to switch under such a threat of demand change the supply does not reflect the current resource scarcity but it compensates the buyer for delaying the transition to the substitute the analysis suggests a perspective on costs of oil dependence

carbon taxation opec and the end of oil abstract i develop a differential game between an oil cartel and an importer investing in research and development r d to reduce the cost of a green substitute to oil in equilibrium the cartel is forced to deter the substitute which thus imposes a price ceiling falling over time credible carbon taxes are below the pigovian level implying the importer cannot internalise the full pollution externality much less capture resource rents without carbon pricing the importer curtails long run pollution using a costly r d programme normatively climate policy will be more expensive if relying on green r d programmes only

testing long run neutrality using intra year data previous tests of the long run neutrality hypothesis have generally relied on annual time series data this paper analyses the long run neutrality of money in australia using different sources of intra year data which permits an examination of the effects of seasonality and the robustness of previous empirical results a reduced form arima model is used with both quarterly seasonally unadjusted and adjusted australian real gdp and nominal money supply to test the neutrality hypothesis using two measures of money stock namely m1 and m3 it is shown that the hypothesis is supported using m1 as the measure of money supply while it is rejected using m3 recent trends and developments in the money and credit markets in australia provide a possible explanation of the sensitivity of the outcome to the measure of money stock employed in the analysis

exhaustible resources non convexity and competitive equilibrium theoretical underpinnings of competitive equilibrium in an exhaustible resource market with non convex u shaped costs are proposed the analysis extends to intertemporal production novshek and sonnenschein s approximation of static competitive equilibrium by limits of cournot equilibria a problem with using novshek and sonnenschein s method is that oligopolistic equilibrium even an open loop equilibrium to which limits might be applied does not exist when there is a non convex technology using epsilon equilibrium as the equilibrium concept finesses this problem there are two types of limiting competitive equilibrium a third type of competitive equilibrium that has been prominent in the literature is found to be inconsistent with limiting approximations

on price taking behavior in a nonrenewable resource cartel fringe game abstract we consider a nonrenewable resource game with one cartel and a set of fringe members we show that i the outcomes of the closed loop and the open loop nonrenewable resource game with the fringe members as price takers the cartel fringe game a la salant 1976 coincide and ii when the number of fringe firms becomes arbitrarily large the equilibrium outcome of the closed loop nash game does not coincide with the equilibrium outcome of the closed loop cartel fringe game thus the outcome of the cartel fringe open loop equilibrium can be supported as an outcome of a subgame perfect equilibrium however the interpretation of the cartel fringe model where from the outset the fringe is assumed to be price taker as a limit case of an asymmetric oligopoly with the agents playing nash cournot does not extend to the case where firms can use closed loop strategies

can carbon tax eat opec s rents abstract we consider the optimal emission tax for a stock pollutant when the pollutant flow is also regulated by a resource exporting cartel we consolidate clarify and generalize a set of previous results to obtain clear isolation of the pigouvian and trade policy components of the tax because of the trade policy component the tax can shift more rents from the cartel than the pollution causes damage related costs this leads to the possibility that the pollution problem accompanied by the coordination of taxation can bring about net benefits at the expense of the cartel

a theory of oil igopoly cournot equilibrium in exhaustible resource markets with fixed supplies the emergence of an effective and powerful cartel in the international petroleum market has stimulated considerable effort among economists to develop models of pricing and supply behavior for this industry 2 this modeling task poses two basic difficulties first as in the standard oligopoly problem one must characterize the behavior of several sellers in a market aware of each other and of their effect on market price second there is here the added difficulty of treating the explicitly intertemporal nature of suppliers decision wherein a limited stock must be optimally allocated over time this paper studies the implications of the simplest non trivial postulates about these two aspects of the problem it is assumed that suppliers are non cooperative cournot nash players each of whom is imagined to select an optimal supply strategy taking as given the strategies of the others moreover it is hypothesized that the feasible strategies are limited to open loop paths chosen at the initial date to maximize the present value of profits in light of the paths of supply which the others have chosen 3 these basic postulates together with a few technical assumptions concerning the structure of resource demand permit one to demonstrate the existence of at least one non cooperative equilibrium concerning thisequilibrium we show that 1 the average and marginal return on resource stocks is inversely related to the size of a player s initial endowment 2 aggregate production decreases over time until all stocks are exhausted while firms with smaller stocks exhaust their supplies no later than firms with larger stocks do 3 the present value of price net of extraction cost declines over time 4 industry production maximizes a weighted average of intertemporal consumer s surplus and producers profits

ordering the extraction of polluting nonrenewable resources energy markets are often characterized by the use of multiple nonrenewable resources such as coal and natural gas with different pollution characteristics the same resource may have different qualities as when high and low sulfur coal is used to generate electricity multiple resources are used in providing transportation services such as cars running on gasoline or plug in hybrids that may be fueled by electricity produced from coal when these nonrenewable resources contribute differentially to pollution what is the opti mal sequence of extraction over time harold hotelling 1931 developed the classical theory of extraction of a nonrenewable resource orris c herfindahl 1967 extended the hotelling model by considering many resources with different unit costs of extraction and proposed the least cost first principle extraction must be ordered by cost with the cheapest resource used first others have examined whether herfindahl s model remains valid in a variety of situations in a general equilibrium setting see murray kemp and ngo v long 1980 tracy r lewis 1982 in the presence of setup costs g rard gaudet moreaux and stephen w salant 2001 under het erogeneous demands chakravorty and darrell l krulce 1994 and when the extraction rate is constrained jean pierre amigues et al 1998 stephen p holland 2003 in these studies following hotelling and herfindahl resources were differentiated by cost alone in this paper we abstract from cost considerations and focus on how the sequence of extraction may be affected when resources are differentiated only by their pollution character istics we consider two resources one more polluting than the other without loss of generality consider coal to be the dirty resource and natural gas the clean one both may be used to generate electricity environmental regulation is imposed through a cap on the stock of pollution this may be a stylized approximation of an international agreement such as the kyoto protocol which aims to stabilize the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere 1 with heterogeneity in pollution the results are nonintuitive and do not depend on the emis sion rates of the resources when the economy is already at its allowable stock of pollution the clean natural gas is used first and use of the dirty coal is postponed to the future this is what one would expect armed with insights from the herfindahl model however when the economy starts from below the ceiling and accumulates pollution coal may be used first and use of the clean natural gas is postponed the optimal strategy is to benefit from natural dilution by build ing the stock of pollution as quickly as possible this is done by burning coal rather than natural

stackelberg versus cournot a differential game approach abstract we propose an infinite horizon differential oligopoly game where at each point in time m stackelberg leaders and n m stackelberg followers exploit a common pool renewable resource and sell their harvest in the marketplace at a price that depends on total harvest we derive a feedback generalized stackelberg nash cournot equilibrium a generalization of the feedback stackelberg equilibrium nesting feedback stackelberg and feedback cournot as special cases we proceed with a comparison between the feedback stackelberg and the feedback cournot equilibria and find a number of interesting results in contrast with static oligopoly theory as to the relative efficiency of the two equilibria we show that the cournot equilibrium can be more efficient than the stackelberg equilibrium this holds true in the short run at the steady state and in terms of discounted welfare

collusion discounting and dynamic games abstract this paper investigates the following claims in a dynamic game i pareto optimal outcomes are sustainable only by patient players and ii the set of equilibrium outcomes expands in the discount factor the intuition for these results although immediate for purely repeated games is shown to be incomplete for dynamic games consequently there is no direct link between patience and the sustainability of pareto optimal outcomes in fact there are dynamic games arbitrarily close to a repeated game in which such collusion is facilitated by impatience however for a class of dynamic games any equilibrium outcome that is sustainable by less patient players is also an equilibrium outcome when players are more patient journal of economic literature classification numbers c73 d90

on strategic quantity bidding in multiple unit auctions standard studies of multiple unit auctions generally overlook the strategic role of bidders quantity decisions using a simple equilibrium model of bidding the author analyzes bidders incentives to choose quantities in discriminatory and competitive auctions the main result is that bidders have a stronger strategic incentive to bid for fewer units in competitive auctions since under competition a bidder pays the lowest accepted price for each unit she gets she may benefit from dropping her quantity to let lower valuing bidders enter the set of winners this prediction is consistent with empirical observations from foreign currency and spectrum auctions copyright 1997 by blackwell publishing ltd

learning and price volatility in duopoly models of resource depletion the aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical model that can account for price fluctuations in depletable resource markets we do so by introducing learning into a hotelling style duopoly model of optimal resource depletion before the depletable resource becomes scarce the self confirming equilibrium of the model mirrors noncooperative rational expectations equilibrium in that supply is high and price is low although learning does induce occasional upward price spikes that are followed by a long period of falling price once the depletable resource becomes scarce the dynamics of the market change significantly with the self confirming equilibrium mirroring the cooperative rather than noncooperative rational expectations equilibrium supply is low and price is high price spikes still occur but against a background of increasing prices when scarcity is sufficient then the market is permanently in a self confirming equilibrium that is equivalent to cooperative rational expectations equilibrium

leviathan governments and carbon taxes costs and potential benefits abstract this paper addresses positive aspects of the global warming debate that so far has been concerned by and large with normative issues the paper considers a consumers government that appreciates tax revenues as such leviathan in addition to conventional measures of welfare i e carbon taxes serve the dual purpose of correcting for externalities here global warming or more generally a stock externality from energy use and of raising revenues this government faces either a competitive or a perfectly cartelized supply the major findings are 1 i consumers may benefit from a leviathan government that appropriates some of the monopoly rent by deterring preemption to some extent 2 ii the leviathan motive raises initial taxes and thereby lowers initial emissions but increases the long run stock externality in a play with linear strategies 3 iii there exists a continuum of equilibria in nonlinear markov strategies which are however pareto inefficient compared with the linear strategies 4 iv but in case of a binding resource constraint nonlinear strategies are the only feasible ones

would hotelling kill the electric car in this paper we show that the potential for endogenous technological change in alternative energy sources may alter the behaviour of resource owning firms when technological progress in an alternative energy source can occur through learning by doing resource owners face competing incentives to extract rents from the resource and to prevent expansion of the new technology we show that in such a context it is not necessarily the case that scarcity driven higher traditional energy prices over time will induce alternative energy supply as resources are exhausted rather we show that as we increase the learning potential in the substitute technology lower equilibrium energy prices prevail and there may be increased resource extraction and greenhouse gas emissions we show that the effectiveness and the incidence of emissions reduction policies may be altered by increased potential for technological change our results suggest that treating finite resource rents as endogenous consequences of both technological progress and policy changes will be important for the accurate assessment of climate change policy

opec unconventional oil and climate change on the importance of the order of extraction we show that opec s market power contributes to climate change by enabling producers of relatively expensive and dirty oil to start producing before opec reserves are depleted we examine the importance of this extraction sequence effect by calibrating and simulating a cartel fringe model of the global oil market while welfare net of climate damage under the cartel fringe equilibrium can be significantly lower than under a first best outcome almost the entire welfare loss is due to the sequence effect of opec s market power in our benchmark calibration the cost of the sequence effect amounts to 15 trillion us which corresponds to 97 percent of the welfare loss moreover we find that an increase in non opec oil reserves decreases global welfare in a counterfactual world without non opec oil global welfare would be 13 trillion us higher 10 trillion us of which is due to lower climate damages

the long horizon regression approach to monetary neutrality how should the evidence be interpreted abstract fisher and seater american economic review 83 1993 402 develop a long horizon regression test of long run monetary neutrality and reject it in a long annual u s sample this test often fails to be rejected elsewhere we can resolve the conflicting results

inefficiency of credible strategies in oligopolistic resource markets with uncertainty abstract the implications of different information patterns for firms in oligopolistic resource markets are considered the traditional open loop nash equilibrium with static information sets is one of many possible nash equilibria and is not suitable for stochastic environments when shocks to resource growth are serially uncorrelated there are no gains from conditioning the harvest on past stock levels and the feedback or credible nash equilibrium is the appropriate nash equilibrium concept this credible equilibrium assumes that firms have knowledge of current stocks of reserves which typically leads to more rapid extraction of the resource and possibly extinction since the open loop nash equilibrium is efficient when demand is iso elastic and extraction costs are zero it is clear that an increase in information can be detrimental to firms in the industry

asset auctions information and liquidity a model is presented of a uniform price auction where bidders compete in demand schedules the model allows for common and private values in the absence of exogenous noise it is shown how private information yields more market power than the levels seen with full information results obtained here are broadly consistent with evidence from asset auctions may help explain the response of central banks to the crisis and suggest potential improvements in the auction formats of asset auctions jel d44 d82 g14 e58

a well based cost function and the economics of exhaustible resources the case of natural gas abstract a cost function for natural gas production is estimated using a pool of data from 29 wells statistically exact tests are performed for parameter stability across locations formations wells and producing firms costs are determined to be inversely related to remaining recoverable reserves and marginal costs of production are decreasing in all cases theoretical implications of these cost characteristics on optimal exhaustible resource extraction are analyzed although marginal cost is decreasing production effects on the resource stock imply that an interior production path may be optimal conditions under which production optimally occurs at the capacity bound are delineated and optimal interior production paths are characterized

depreciation erodes the coase conjecture if a durable good monopolist produces at constant marginal costs and the good depreciates there exists a family of strong markov perfect equilibrium smpe one member of this family entails instantaneous production of the level of stock produced in a competitive equilibrium this is consistent with the coase conjecture other smpe in the family entail steady state production at a stock level lower than in the competitive equilibrium there may be a jump to these steady states or they may be approached asymptotically monopoly profits are positive in these equilibria and the coase conjecture fails

some evidence on strategic quantity reduction in multiple unit auctions abstract theoretical models of multi unit auctions predict that bidders have a stronger incentive to reduce demand in uniform price auctions than in discriminatory auctions i find support for this prediction using data from foreign currency auctions in zambia during the mid 1980 s 1997 elsevier science s a

the effect of natural resources on a sustainable development policy the approach of non sustainable externalities abstract the debate about the importance of non renewable resources for economic development between optimists and pessimists shows that the extensive depletion of non renewable resources particularly oil along with a higher level of consumption could have a significant impact on the economic development of future generations based on this debate this paper proposes criteria under which the depletion of non renewable resources would create excess costs for future generations therefore this paper aims to answer the question what will be the impact of the depletion of non renewable resources on sustainable economic development accordingly a sustainable development policy appears feasible by minimizing non sustainable externalities which derive from future externalities that weigh the benefits from a previous employment of natural resources the research based on qualitative analysis clarifies the reasons for and the extents of taking sustainability into account as well as points to difficulties of implementing policies to time the transition towards a sustainable economic development finally the research shows the implications of this approach for environmental degradation the depletion of non renewable resources and energy production

substitution between biofuels and fossil fuels is there a green paradox we show that i subsidies for renewable energy policies with the intention of encouraging substitution away from fossil fuels may accentuate climate change damages by hastening fossil fuel extraction and that ii the opposite result holds under some specified conditions we focus on the case of subsidies for renewable resources produced under increasing marginal costs and assume that both the renewable resources and the fossil fuels are currently in use such subsidies have a direct effect and an indirect effect working in opposite directions the direct effect is the reduction in demand for fossil fuels at any given price the indirect effect is the reduction in the current equilibrium price for fossil fuels which tends to increase the amount of fossil fuels demanded whether the sum of the two effects will actually result in an earlier or later date of exhaustion of the stock of fossil fuels depends on the curvature of the demand curve for energy and of the supply curve for the renewable substitute

strategic climate policy with offsets and incomplete abatement carbon taxes versus cap and trade abstract this paper provides a first analysis of a policy bloc of fossil fuel importers which implements an optimal climate policy faces a non policy fringe of other fuel importers and an exporter bloc and purchases offset from the fringe we compare a carbon tax and a cap and trade scheme for the policy bloc in either case accompanied by an efficient offset mechanism for reducing emissions in the fringe the policy bloc is shown to prefer a tax over a cap since only a tax reduces the fuel export price and by more when the policy bloc is larger offsets are also more favorable to the policy bloc under a tax than under a cap the optimal offset price under a carbon tax is below the tax rate while under a cap and free quota trading the offset price must equal the quota price the domestic carbon and offset prices are both higher under a tax than under a cap when the policy bloc is small when the policy bloc is larger the offset price can be higher under a cap fringe countries gain by mitigation in the policy bloc more under a carbon tax since the fuel import price is lower

capacity investment preemption and commitment in an infinite horizon model the commitment value of capacity is analyzed in an infinite horizon duopoly model the paper focuses on the role of alternative behavioral assumptions about the ability of firms to commit to investment paths each firm s investment strategy in a feedback nash equilibrium is shown to be a decreasing function of its rival s current capacity this creates an incentive for a firm to expand its capacity to preempt subsequent rival investment in a precommitment equilibrium there are no incentives to invest preemptively as a consequence steady state capacity levels are greater in a feedback nash equilibrium than in a precommitment equilibrium copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

consumer surplus enhancing cooperation in a natural resource oligopoly abstract in this study we use a differential game to illustrate that cooperation among oligopolists selling a common pool renewable resource may lead not only to higher industrial output consumer surplus and resource stock in the stationary equilibrium but also a greater discounted sum of consumer surplus a priori this finding is not straightforward an increase in the coefficient of cooperation causes industry output to first decrease and then increase over time thus making consumers worse off in the short run and better off in the long run this study establishes the conditions under which the long run effects outweigh the short run effects of cooperation leading to an increase in the discounted sum of consumer surplus our analysis suggests that in some cases conservation cartels should be promoted on the basis of not only resource conservation but also efficiency

effects of foreign currency component in monetary aggregates on money neutrality abstract we test the money neutrality from a new angle the in sample investigation provides evidence that m1 and m2 with or without foreign currency component affect nominal gdp the out of sample approach shows money tends to affect nominal more than real gdp

exhaustible resources and alternative equilibrium concepts we compare the open loop and feedback nash equilibria that obtain in oligopolistic resource markets when the resource is exhaustible and privately owned when the resource is common property the two equilibrium concepts are known to yield significantly different results under the regime of private property the choice of equilibrium concept does not appear to be as important restricting our attention to the cases of iso elastic demand and zero extraction costs and linear demand and quadratic extraction costs we identify instances where the open loop and feedback nash equilibria coincide and demonstrate that in other cases the two equilibria do not differ significantly

private storage of common property abstract many resources extracted under the rule of capture are not utilized immediately but are stored instead for later use oil is stockpiled fish are frozen groundwater is bottled rivers are dammed land deforested as the way to establish title remains uncultivated we examine the positive and normative effects of such storage privatization of common property through storage may eliminate inefficiencies altogether but the accelerated extraction it induces may also exacerbate them even if rapid extraction does not reduce ultimate recovery once storage commences extraction accelerates until the open access reserves are drained in limiting cases these speculative acquisitions are instantaneous the naturally occurring analogue of policy induced speculative attacks studied in the international finance literature when some reserves are privately owned while others are open access the order of extraction no longer follows the progression from lowest to highest per unit cost first noted by o c herfindahl in extractive resources and taxation m gaffney ed univ of wisconsin press madism 1997 instead the common property may be extracted in its entirety before any private reserves are extracted even if it has the higher per unit extraction cost

analysis of nash equilibria in a class of capital accumulation games in a simple capital accumulation game we study existence and dynamic properties of the cooperative solution two kinds of markov perfect equilibria mpe and a trigger strategy equilibrium in the cooperative solution the stock always converges towards a steady state this property is shared by our first mpe whereas the second type of mpe may result in complicated dynamics a pareto comparison of both mpe depends on the parameter specifications but can turn out either way finally we show how the players can achieve the efficient payoffs of the cooperative solution as an equilibrium outcome by using trigger strategies

trade with polluting nonrenewable resources abstract the paper considers nonrenewable resource extraction in a situation where the resource buyers have formed a government which applies emission taxation for slowing pollution accumulation and the sellers are competitive or a resource cartel the noncompetitive situation is studied as a stackelberg differential game which the cartel leads it is first assumed that extraction costs do not depend on the resource stock level and that the pollution stock does not decay in the time consistent and markov perfect equilibrium the sellers monopoly power vanishes asymptotically the sellers market power reduces the buyers emission tax at each point in time in the stackelberg equilibrium the emission tax is below the marginal present value of pollution damage if pollution decays and extraction costs depend on the resource stock level buyers have monopsony power and the ability of sellers to receive emission tax revenues is weakened when the rate of pollution decay is high the producer price falls below the pareto optimal level

dynamic oligopoly with capacity adjustment costs abstract the literature on strategic investment emphasized the case of completely irreversible investment this paper considers an oligopoly model in which investment is reversible and capacity is subject to adjustment costs an n player linear quadratic differential game is analyzed existence and characterization results for perfect equilibrium feedback strategies are provided feedback strategies provide incentives for each player to invest strategically so as to preempt subsequent expansion by rivals a larger set of perfect equilibria is constructed by using memory dependent trigger strategies equilibria of this type are shown to support joint value maximization for some initial states and asymmetric steady states

dynamic demand and noncompetitive intertemporal output adjustments abstract this paper integrates dynamics on the demand and on the supply side which are characteristic for many goods in particular fuels due to costly adjustments furthermore firms often pursue a quantity strategy and decide on output adjustments additional capacities etc instead of fixing prices e g opec moved from posting prices to adjusting output in 1986 this paper provides a corresponding framework surprisingly ignored in the literature and derives intertemporal market equilibria cooperative and noncooperative in open loop and in markov strategies the equilibrium in markov strategies is different mostly opposite to the much discussed sticky price models the qualitative properties are non trivial and some of them are even surprising e g increased demand sluggishness can raise supply

on nonrenewable resource oligopolies the asymmetric case we give a full characterization of the open loop nash equilibrium of a nonrenewable resource game between two types of firms differing in extraction costs we show that i there almost always exists a phase where both types of firms supply simultaneously ii when the high cost mines are exploited by a number of firms that goes to infinity the equilibrium approaches the cartel versus fringe equilibrium with the fringe firms acting as price takers and iii the cheaper resource may not be exhausted first a violation of the herfindahl rule that may be detrimental to social welfare

cyclical and noncyclical redistributive taxation consider the optimal time path of a tax on capital income the proceeds of which are transferred to labor in a lump sum it is known from earlier open loop formulations that if the optimal rate of tax converges to a point it converges to zero implying that in the long run a tax on capital income can do nothing for social welfare it is now shown that the optimal rate of tax need not converge to zero and in the case of feedback formulations that it may converge to a positive or negative number or to a limit cycle copyright 1993 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

oligopoly extraction of a common property natural resource the importance of the period of commitment in dynamic games the theory of noncooperative dynamic games has provided an extremely powerful framework for studying many of the classic questions in industrial organization for example questions about resource extraction advertising research and development investment in new capacity and barriers to entry where interactions over time among few firms are involved however an important methodological issue arises when economic competition over time is modeled as a dynamic game the issue is the appropriate formulation of the players strategy spaces

aggressive oil extraction and precautionary saving coping with volatility the effects of stochastic oil demand on optimal oil extraction paths and tax spending and government debt policies are analyzed when the oil demand schedule is linear and preferences quadratic without prudence optimal oil extraction is governed by the hotelling rule and optimal budgetary policies by the tax and consumption smoothing principle volatile oil demand brings forward oil extraction and induces a bigger government surplus with prudence the government depletes oil reserves even more aggressively and engages in additional precautionary saving financed by postponing spending and bringing taxes forward especially if it has substantial monopoly power on the oil market gives high priority to the public spending target is very prudent and future oil demand has high variance uncertain economic prospects induce even higher precautionary saving and if non oil revenue shocks and oil revenue shocks are positively correlated even more aggressive oil extraction in contrast prudent governments deliberately underestimate oil reserves which induce less aggressive oil depletion and less government saving but less so if uncertainty about reserves and oil demand are positively correlated