information transmission cournot and bertrand equilibria we examine how incentives for two duopolists to honestly share information change depending upon the nature of competition cournot or bertrand and the nature of the information structure while in earlier papers uncertainty is about an unknown common demand intercept in the present paper uncertainty is about unknown private costs the different information structure reverses the incentives to share information while with unknown common demand sharing is a dominant strategy with bertrand competition and concealing is a dominant strategy with cournot competition with unknown private costs sharing is a dominant strategy with cournot competition and concealing is a dominant strategy with bertrand competition

installed base and compatibility innovation product preannouncements and predation a good is often more valuable to any user the more others use compatible goods the authors show that this effect may inhibit innovation if an installed base exists and transition to a new standard must be gradual early adopters bear a disproportionate share of transient incompatibility costs this can produce excess inertia the installed base however is stranded if the new standard is adopted this may create excess momentum these dynamic effects have strategic implications temporary price cutting can permanently prevent entry and product preannouncements can be critical in innovation these strategic actions have ambiguous welfare effects

financial constraints and firm post entry performance abstract firms finance production by internally generated funds and external loans the benefits of leverage however come with a cost this cost is related to the uncertainty banks face about the firm s quality and output price as time evolves banks learn about the firm and adjust the terms of the loan contract because of this firms do not have equal access to credit small young firms face greater binding debt constraints than more mature firms with well known prospects the firm survival rate as well as the firm rate of growth are therefore important issues in analyzing firm post entry performance

platform competition in two sided markets many if not most markets with network externalities are two sided to succeed platforms in industries such as software portals and media payment systems and the internet must get both sides of the market on board accordingly platforms devote much attention to their business model that is to how they court each side while making money overall this paper builds a model of platform competition with two sided markets it unveils the determinants of price allocation and end user surplus for different governance structures profit maximizing platforms and not for profit joint undertakings and compares the outcomes with those under an integrated monopolist and a ramsey planner jel l5 l82 l86 l96

the effects of information transparency on suppliers manufacturers and consumers in online markets this paper looks into the effects of information transparency on market participants in an online trading environment we study these effects in business to business electronic markets with firms competing in both upstream and downstream industries the prior literature generally assumes that either the downstream firm buyer or the upstream firm seller is a monopoly it is not clear whether information transparency would still create value if both buyers and sellers face oligopolistic competition where the benefits of information transparency could be competed away to answer this question we first develop a simple two echelon e market model and then extend the model to more general settings we find that information transparency can create value for the overall e market yet it affects buyers and sellers very differently one side will be hurt depending on the competition mode cournot or bertrand in the downstream this suggests that a manufacturer owned a supplier owned and a neutral e market will have different preferences for information transparency finally we find that information transparency can hurt consumers when the downstream industry engages in bertrand competition this is a surprising result given the expectation that online markets create substantial value for consumers

financial market imperfections and productivity growth abstract this paper examines the impact of financial market imperfections on long term productivity growth it focuses on failures in markets for the sale of equity securities and hence on the failure of markets which help firms diversify the risks of real investment the paper examines separately situations in which productivity growth is driven by learning by doing in general a multiplicity of steady state growth paths exist with different growth rates along each path the particular path followed by any single economy and hence the growth rate of that economy will depend significantly on policy interventions which mitigate effects of financial market failures

electronic b2b marketplaces with different ownership structures this paper analyzes electronic marketplaces with different ownership structures biased marketplaces and neutral marketplaces biased marketplaces can be either buyer owned or supplier owned whereas neutral marketplaces are owned by independent third parties we develop a single period model with fulfilled expectations equilibrium the buyers experience positive network effects that are a function of the number of suppliers and the suppliers receive similar positive network effects depending on the number of buyers we develop a general model with atomistic buyers and suppliers we find that biased marketplaces set prices to induce greater participation demand from both buyers and suppliers compared to a neutral marketplace this counterintuitive result can be understood in the context of the positive cross network effects experienced by buyers and suppliers and the added benefit to the owner of a biased marketplace from participating in the marketplace biased marketplaces also provide greater social welfare compared to neutral marketplaces

business to business electronic commerce just as the industrial revolution mechanized the manufacturing functions of firms the information revolution is automating their merchant functions four types of potential productivity gains are expected from business to business b2b electronic commerce cost efficiencies from automation of transactions potential advantages of new market intermediaries consolidation of demand and supply through organized exchanges and changes in the extent of vertical integration of firms the article examines the characteristics of b2b online intermediaries including categories of goods traded market mechanisms employed and ownership arrangements and considers the market structure of b2b e commerce

credit markets and the control of capital traditional discussions of the role of capital markets have identified a number of distinct functions which they perforrn they allocate scarce capital among competing users and uses l and they provide signals to guide managers in making their investment decisions 2 in this lecture i wish to focus on a rather different function of the capital market what i shall refer to as the control of capital 3 conventional theory treats the typical firrn in an anthropomorphic manner it acts as a single rational individual doing what it is supposed to be doing maximizing stock market value that may have been well and good in those nostalgic bygone days of small firrns each run tightly by their owners who were single mindedly pursuing their lust for wealth but today a majority of production occurs in large corporations in which no shareholder owns more than a small fraction of the shares in which the separation of ownership and control that frank knight was so concerned with in his writings some sixty five years ago has become a reality those

new firm survival new results using a hazard function a limitation of audretsch s 1991 study of new firm survival was the level of aggregation to industries this precluded linking establishment specific characteristics such as organizational structure and size to post entry performance the purpose of this paper is to relate the post entry performance of individual establishments not only to their technological and market structure environments but also to establishment specific characteristics we do this by estimating a hazard duration function for more than 12 000 individual establishments in u s manufacturing started in 1976 by tracking their subsequent performance over a ten year period we conclude that establishment specific characteristics which audretsch was not able to capture in his earlier study play an important role in shaping the exposure to risk confronting new establishments copyright 1995 by mit press

investment uncertainty and pre emption this paper examines irreversible investment in a project with uncertain returns when there is an advantage to being the first to invest and externalities to investing when others also do so we show that the possibility of pre emption can have significant qualitative and quantitative effects on the relationship between uncertainty and investment in a single agent real options model the trigger threshold for investment increases without bound as uncertainty grows in contrast the investment trigger of a leader faced with pre emption is bounded above as uncertainty increases in fact we show that under certain parameter values greater uncertainty can lead the leader to invest earlier these findings reinforce the importance of extending real options analysis to include strategic interactions between players applications to industry situations are also discussed

imperfect information credit markets and unemployment this paper describes how imperfect information in both capital and labor markets can in a context of maximizing firms and perfectly flexible prices and wages give rise to cyclical variations in unemployment whose character closely resembles that of observed business cycles this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the relation between price and marginal cost in u s industry an examination of data on output and labor input reveals that some u s industries have marginal cost well below price the conclusion rests on the finding that cyclical variations in labor input are small compared with variations in output in booms firms produce substantially more output and sell it for a price that exceeds the costs of the added inputs the paper documents the disparity between price and marginal cost where marginal cost is estimated from annual variations in cost it considers a variety of explanations of the findings that are consistent with competition but none is found to be completely plausible

information transparency of business to business electronic markets a game theoretic analysis the abundance of transaction data available on the internet tends to make information more transparent in electronic marketplaces in such a transparent environment it becomes easier for suppliers to obtain information that may allow them to infer their rivals costs is this good news or bad news in this study we focus on theinformational effects of business to business b2b exchanges and explore firms incentives to join a b2b exchange that provides an online platform for information transmission we then study the equilibria by developing a game theoretic model under asymmetric information we examine whether the incentives to join a b2b exchange would be different under different competition modes quantity and price different information structures and by varying the nature of the products substitutes and complements our results challenge the information transparency hypothesis i e open sharing of information in electronic markets is beneficial to all participating firms in contrast to the popular belief we show that information transparency could be a double edged sword the individual rationality of participation in the online exchange reflects the tradeoff between information transparency and data confidentiality this may have important implications for the microstructure design e g data access rules of b2b electronic marketplaces

externalities in economies with imperfect information and incomplete markets this paper presents a simple general framework for analyzing externalities in economies with incomplete markets and imperfect infonnation by identifying the pecuniary effects of these externalities that net out the paper simplifies the problem of determining when tax interventions are pareto improving the approach indicates that such tax interventions almost always exist and that equilibria in situations of imperfect information are rarely constrained pareto optima it can also lead to simple tests based on readily observable indicators of the efficacy of particular tax policies in situations involving adverse selection signaling moral hazard incomplete contingent claims markets and queue rationing equilibria traditional discussions of externalities have emphasized the distinction between technological externalities in which the action of one individual or firm directly affects the utility or profit ofanother and pecuniary externalities in which one individual s or firm s actions affect another only through effects on prices while the presence of technological externalities imply in general that a competitive equilibrium may not be pareto efficient pecuniary externalities hy themselves are not a source of inefficiency the fact that prices change has of course important consequences there are both distributional and allocational effects but the distribution effects net out gains for example hy firms whose prices increase are precisely offset by losses e g to individuals who must pay higher prices and there are no welfare losses from the allocation effects as long as the price changes involved are small if firms are maximizing profits and individuals are maximizing utility both facing prices that correctly refiect opportunity costs then standard envelope theorem arguments imply that changes in profits or utility induced by changes in allocations resulting from any small change in prices are negligible

rent seeking for pure public goods in this paper we present a formal analysis of rent seeking for public goods by two or more groups with different numbers of individuals we begin by considering equally wealthy groups under risk neutrality a case which constitutes our basic model several surprising and interesting results emerge from the analysis of this basic case the problem is then extended to deal with a groups with different wealth levels and b risk aversion this last extension brings about a further crop of interesting and useful results

analyzing online b2b exchange markets asymmetric cost and incomplete information this research applies the discriminating auction to analyze the online b2b exchange market in which a single buyer requests multiple items and several suppliers having equal capacity and asymmetric cost submit bids to compete for buyer demand in the present model we examine the impact of asymmetric cost and incomplete information on the participants in the market given the complete cost information each supplier randomizes its price and the lower bound of the price range is determined by the highest marginal cost in addition the supplier with a lower marginal cost has a larger considered pricing space but ultimately has a smaller equilibrium one than others with higher marginal costs when each supplier s marginal cost is private information the lowest possible price is determined by the number of suppliers and the buyer s reservation price comparing these two market settings we find whether it is beneficial to buyers or suppliers depends on the scale of the bid process and the highest marginal cost when the number of suppliers and the difference between the highest marginal cost and the buyer s reservation price are sufficiently large each supplier can gain a higher profit if the marginal costs are private information on the contrary when the highest marginal cost approaches the buyer s reservation price complete cost information benefits the suppliers

financial structure production and productivity evidence from the u s food manufacturing industry this study integrates production and financing to examine the impacts of financial structure change on the production profitability and productivity growth in the u s food manufacturing industry empirical results show that during the period covered by this study agency cost associated with increased debt use by this industry negatively affected its output growth input demand profitability and overall productivity growth dividend payment positively contributed to the production and performance of this industry via signaling benefit however the negative effects of increased debt use by this industry far outweighed the positive contribution of dividend payment the u s food industry achieved a 0 9 average annual productivity growth which came primarily from technological progress and capital adjustment the rapid increase in debt use by this industry was responsible for slowing down the pace of productivity growth via its negative contribution to the total factor productivity growth capital expansion was the principal driver of output growth and profitability in this industry

electronic data interchange competitive externalities and strategic implementation policies electronic data interchange edi is an emerging type of standardized inter organizational information system we analyze the impact of edi on the upstream suppliers competitive position in a simple two level hierarchical market structure where the buyer faces a linear demand curve and the competing heterogeneous suppliers have an upward sloping marginal cost function we show that a suppliers adoption of edi can generate positive externalities for the buyer and negative or competitive externalities for other suppliers as a result the buyer provides a price premium to those suppliers who adopt edi and increases their sales volume and market share moreover when the benefits that the buyer can derive from implementing edi are substantial and the suppliers edi adoption costs are high it may be in the buyer s best interest to subsidize the suppliers so as to encourage them to adopt edi instead of mandating them to do so regardless of whether the buyer employs a mandatory or a subsidizing policy the buyer and the end consumers may be the only ones who gain from this new technology consequently a partial adoption by the supplier base may be optimal for the buyer when the suppliers adoption costs are sufficiently high we also show that while edi reduces the transaction costs of the buyer the upstream market tends to become more concentrated as a result of increased cost differentials these results provide one economic explanation of the fact that many companies have actually reduced their supplier base after implementing edi despite a significant reduction in their market transaction costs

preemption contests between groups we consider a preemption game between competing groups firms lobbying individually for their groups interests provide an empirical example among symmetric groups the first firm to take action bears an unobserved cost and wins the prize on behalf of its group in equilibrium the firm with the lowest cost takes action but with delay more competition and a smaller ratio of costs to benefits reduce delay firms in larger groups wait longer but group action can occur earlier as the probability of a low cost firm is higher asymmetries in group size or strength of externalities also matter