choice under uncertainty a model of applications for the social security disability insurance program abstract not all people with health problems are disabled some individuals with severe physical or mental impairments such as blindness or limb amputation continue to hold jobs and generally function satisfactorily they constitute however a group of potentially disabled individuals who might apply and qualify for disability insurance or other disability related benifits if they were to lose their jobs or to decide that employment offered an inadequate financial or non pecuniary reward thus disability or a health related inability to work is more than a medical problem but involves motivational and attitudinal factors we specify a model of the application process which we model as choice under uncertainty about approval of an application for disability insurance we specify the possible outcomes to the choice process of an individual in which the probability of acceptance for disability insurance is a key consideration we then estimate a joint model of labor supply and application to the disability insurance program based on the 1972 survey we then compare our results to the observed time series applications process since 1976 lastly we estimate the sensitivity of the application process to the probability of acceptance and the level of benifits

district magnitude and representation of the majority s preferences evidence from popular and parliamentary votes representatives have more effective incentives to cater to the preferences of the majority of citizens when they are elected in districts with few rather than many seats we investigate this hypothesis empirically by matching swiss members of parliament s voting behavior on legislative proposals with real referendum outcomes on the same issues for the years 1996 to 2008 we thus identify the impact of district magnitude on representatives incentives to adhere to citizens revealed preferences we find systematic statistically significant and economically relevant evidence that individual representatives from districts with few seats vote more often in line with majority preferences

explaining party ideological stances we apply the iterative algorithm by merrill and adams political analysis 9 347 361 2001 to compute the optimal positions of vote maximizing parties along a one dimensional space for a large number of elections this allows us to systematically evaluate factors that push parties toward more centrifugal locations in equilibrium our findings largely corroborate expectations suggested by the theoretical literature albeit with one notable exception the relative size of a partisan constituency reduces rather than enhances the likelihood of a party having an extreme optimal position we then compare derived equilibrium positions with actual party positions with the aim of understanding the nature of electoral incentives and offering insights about party system competition in particular we show that the age of a party the party family to which it belongs post election expectations and internal rules for candidate and leader selection are all factors that increase the probability of a party approaching the position predicted by pure vote maximizing considerations

multiparty electoral competition in the netherlands and germany a model based on multinomial probit a typical assumption of electoral models of party competition is that parties adopt policy positions so as to maximize expected vote share here we use euro barometer survey data and european elite study data from 1979 for the netherlands and germany to construct a stochastic model of voter response based on multinomial probit estimation for each of these countries we estimate a pure spatial electoral voting model and a joint spatial model the latter model also includes individual voter and demographic characteristics the pure spatial models for the two countries quite accurately described the electoral response as a stochastic function of party positions we use these models to perform a thought experiment so as to estimate the expected vote maximizing party positions we go on to propose a model of internal party decision making based both on pre election electoral estimation and post election coalition bargaining this model suggests why the various parties in the period in question did not adopt vote maximizing positions we argue that maximizing expected vote will not in general be a rational party strategy in multiparty political systems which are based on proportional representation

why small centrist third parties motivate policy divergence by major parties plurality based elections between two major parties or candidates sometimes feature small cen trist third parties we modify the standard two party spatial model of policy seeking parties to incorporate a centrist third party and we show that the presence of such a party even if it has no chance of winning motivates the major parties to propose policies that are much more divergent than without the third party we derive explicit formulas for party locations at a three party equilibrium and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for existence ofthat equilibrium we show that over time the major parties can be expected to shift their policies in the same direction relative to each other but in the opposite direction relative to the minor party the predictions of this model are compared with estimates of party policy locations during appropriate periods in postwar britain for the past half century a small british party first the liberals now the liberal demo crats has occupied a policy position in between the two major british parties labour and the con servatives during much of the same period the free democrats in germany have held a similar posi tion between the social democrats and the christian democrats in addition recent american presidential elections have featured the candidates john anderson in 1980 and ross perot in 1992 and 1996 who had no realistic chance of winning and who were arguably located between the democratic and republican nom inees 1 what are the policy consequences of the existence of such small centrist parties or candidates on what political institutions do these consequences depend do these consequences benefit the policy aspirations of the centrist party or do they undermine these goals under proportional representation it is well known that a small centrist party such as the free democrats in germany may hold the balance of power bargaining with each of the major players as they attempt to form governing coalitions but in a plurality based system as in britain or the united states the consequences are far

gendered occupational differences and earnings gaps in globalising urban economies the case of tel aviv the major theoretical purpose of the paper is to investigate the implications of globalising and restructuring urban economies on gender related differences in occupational distribution and earnings within the urban context the study uses data from national censuses 1983 and 1995 and a labour force survey of 2001 in israel to investigate the evolution of gender gaps in tel aviv the findings that point to the erosion of advantages in the globalising and restructuring urban economy compared with the nation as a whole may indicate new potential sources of gender inequality the theoretical implications for both the restructuring and globalisation theses and the study of sources of inequality among men and women are discussed

does proportional representation foster closer congruence between citizens and policy makers this article assesses the claim that proportional representation pr fosters a closer correspondence between the views of citizens and the positions of the government the study uses the comparative study of electoral systems data set and compares respondents self placements on a left right scale with placements of cabinet parties locations in 31 election studies the authors argue that pr has two contradictory consequences on one hand pr leads to more parties and more choice for voters but these parties are less centrist and this increases the overall distance between voters and parties on the other hand pr increases the likelihood of coalition governments this pulls the government toward the center of the policy spectrum and reduces the distance between the government and voters these two contradictory effects of pr wash out and the net overall impact of pr on congruence is nil the data support the authors interpretation

optimal social security with imperfect tagging workers are exposed to the risk of permanent disability we rely on a dynamic mechanism design approach to determine how imperfect information on health should optimally be used to improve the trade off between inducing the able to work and providing insurance against disability after deriving the fi rst order conditions to this problem we calibrate the model to the u s economy and run a numerical simulation the government should offer back loaded incentives and make strategic use of the difference between the age at which disability occurs and the age of eligibility to disability bene ts also the able who are mistakenly tagged as disabled should be encouraged to work until some early retirement age this makes a decrease in the strictness of the disability test desirable which would reduce the number of disabled who are not awarded the tag and hence improve insurance finally we show how the first best allocation of resources can asymptotically be implemented by making strategic use of the disability test

proportionality and turnout evidence from french municipalities many studies find that voter turnout is higher in proportional representation pr elections than in plurality elections but because the two systems differ in multiple ways and are used in differe

male labour force participation following illness or injury this paper develops a model of the disabled individual s labour force participation decision following illness or injury and confronts it with data on the financial consequences of ill health a utility function is specified which allows for the effect of changes in health on work leisure preferences and is evaluated in relation to a household budget constraint estimation is through maximization of the appropriate likelihood function correcting for self selection bias within a switching regression model results are presented showing significant effects of financial variables on participation and these are seen to vary with age disability and income

centripetal and centrifugal incentives under different electoral systems inaseminalarticle cox 1990 suggestedthatelectoralsystemswithlargerdistrictmagnitudesprovideincentivesforparties to advocate more extreme policy positions in this article we put this proposition to the test informed by recent advances in spatial models of party competition we introduce a design that embeds the effect of electoral rules in the utility function of voters we then estimate the equilibrium location of parties as the weight voters attach to the expected distribution of seats and votes changes our model predicts that electoral rules affect large and small parties in different ways we find centripetal effects only for parties that are favorably biased by electoral rules by contrast smaller parties see their vote share decline and are pushed toward more extreme equilibrium positions evidence from 13 parliamentary democracies supports model predictions along with testing the incentives provided by electoral rules results carry implications for the strategies of vote maximizing parties and for the role of small parties in multiparty competition

macroeconomic policy in a two party system as a repeated game this paper considers the interaction of two parties with different objectives concerning inflation and unemployment and rational and forward looking wage setters if discretionary policies are followed an economic cycle related to the political cycle results in equilibrium this cycle is significantly different from the traditional political business cycle reputational mechanisms due to the repeated interaction of the two parties and the public or commitments to a common policy rule can improve upon the discretionary outcome by reducing or eliminating the magnitude of the economic fluctuations

the impact of incarceration on wage mobility and inequality a life course perspective on crime indicates that incarceration can disrupt key life transitions life course analysis ofoccupations finds that earnings mobility depends on stable employment in career jobs these two lines of research thus suggest that incarceration reduces ex inmates access to the steady jobs that usually produce earnings growth among young men consistent with this argument evidence for slow wage growth among ex inmates is provided by analysis of the national longitudinal survey of youth because incarceration is so prevalent one quarter of black non college males in the survey were interviewed between 1979 and 1998 while in prison or jail the effect of imprisonment on individual wages also increases aggregate race and ethnic wage inequality

securing the base electoral competition under variable turnout i evaluate the securing the base strategy which prescribes that candidates position themselves away from the political center in order to maximize turnout among their supporters and reduce defections of their supporters to third party candidates my results support the notion that voters abstain due to indifference and imply that candidate positioning has a large effect on voter turnout and third party voting nonetheless my results indicate that the candidates can best compete by adopting centrist positions while a candidate can increase turnout among his supporters by moving away from the center many moderate voters will defect to his opponent

social security and retirement decision a positive and normative approach social insurance for the elderly is judged responsible for the widely observed trend towards early retirement in a world of laissez faire or in a first best setting there would be no such trend however when first best instruments are not available because health and productivity are not observable the optimal social insurance policy may imply a distortion on the retirement decision the main point we make is that while there is no doubt that retirement systems induce an excessive bias towards early in many countries a complete elimination of this bias i e a switch to an actuarially fair system is not the right answer this is so and for two reasons first some distortions are secondbest optimal this is the normative argument second and on the positive side the elimination of the bias might be problematic from a political perspective depending on the political process it may either not be feasible or alternatively it may tend to undermine the political support for the pension system itself

lessons from the u s unemployment insurance experiments recent social experiments have evaluated two reforms of the unemployment insurance ui system reemployment bonuses and job search programs the bonus experiments show that economic incentives affect the length of ui receipt and provide weak evidence that an earlier return to work does not decrease earnings the experiments do not show the favorability of a permanent bonus program as they ignore its effect on the number of the claimants the job search experiments test several more promising reforms nearly all of the combinations of services and increased enforcement reduce ui receipt and have favorable cost benefit analyses earnings often increase though the estimates are imprecise

optimal demogrants with imperfect tagging abstract this paper considers optimal taxation of income when some individuals are imperfectly tagged as disabled it proves that under very general conditions these individuals should receive a larger demogrant if leisure is a normal good

issues economics and the dynamics of multiparty elections the british 1987 general election we offer a model of multiparty elections that combines voters retrospective economic evaluations with consideration of parties issue positions and the issue preferences of voters we show that both policy issues and the state of the economy matter in british elections in 1987 voters made a largely retrospective evaluation of the conservatives based on economic performance those who rejected the conservative party chose between labour and alliance based on issue positions through simulations we move the parties in the issue space and reestimate vote shares as well as hypothesize an alternative distribution of views on the economy and we show that labour had virtually no chance to win with a centrist party as a viable alternative the predictions from our 1987 simulations are supported in an analysis of the 1992 british election we argue for multinomial probit in studying three party elections because it allows for a richer formulation of politics than do competing methods

effectiveness of electoral systems for reducing government corruption a game theoretic analysis abstract a theoretical model is developed for predicting the relative effectiveness of different electoral systems for reducing government corruption we consider voting games in which parties with known corruption levels and known positions on a major policy question compete for legislative seats we find that approval voting and proportional representation are fully effective in the sense that all equilibria exclude corrupt parties from legislative seats plurality voting is partly effective in the sense that there always exist some equilibria that exclude corrupt parties borda voting is ineffective because for some political situations no equilibria can guarantee the exclusion of corrupt parties journal of economic literature classification number d72

agency and the design of welfare systems abstract transfers to the needy are administered by social workers whose job it is to tag welfare applicants to determine eligibility for disability benefits the accuracy of tagging depends on the effort of the social workers which is private information to prevent shirking and induce optimal effort costly monitoring is required using the framework of optimal non linear taxation we characterize the form of the optimal tax transfer system when the government operates a costly welfare system financed by income taxation higher income persons self select into the income tax system the needy apply for welfare if tagged they receive a disability benefit if untagged they receive general welfare benefits we characterize circumstances under which welfare recipients should or should not be induced to work the structure of the optimal tax transfer system and the optimal payment and monitoring of social workers

modeling government popularity in postwar britain a methodological example economic theory suggests that government popularity may be related to the rate of change of nonstationary economic quantities and the level of stationary financial variables like inflation or interest rates political theory suggests that this relationship may not be stable over time we find that there is a well defined relationship between u k government popularity in the postwar period and a small set of economic variables i e unemployment inflation and real interest rates unusual political events are also important voters appear to discount history at a high rate remarkably the estimated equation is very stable and passes a battery of stability tests including postsample parameter stability tests furthermore estimation using the kalman filter shows no tendency for the parameters to vary systematically over time implying that voter preferences have remained broadly constant throughout the postwar years

welfare work requirements with paternalistic government preferences work requirements in means tested transfer programmes have grown in importance in the us and in some other countries the theoretical literature which considers their possible optimality generally operates within a traditional welfarist framework where some function of the utility of the poor is maximised here we consider a case where society instead has preferences over the actual work allocations of welfare recipients optimality of work requirements is shown to be possible but depends on the accuracy of the screening mechanism which assigns work requirements numerical simulations show that accuracy must be high for optimality earnings subsidies may also be optimal work requirements in means tested or welfare programmes have seen a resurgence in the last twenty years in the us and in a few european countries these requirements generally stipulate that benefit recipients must work or engage in some work like activity for some minimum number of hours each week most economists who have studied the

a directional theory of issue voting from stokes s 1963 early critique on it has been clear to empirical researchers that the traditional spatial theory of elections is seriously flawed yet fully a quarter century later that theory remains the dominant paradigm for understanding mass elite linkage in politics we present an alternative spatial theory of elections that we argue has greater empirical verisimilitude based on the ideas of symbolic politics the directional theory assumes that most people have a diffuse preference for a certain direction of policy making and that people vary in the intensity with which they hold those preferences we test the two competing theories at the individual level with national election study data and find the directional theory more strongly supported than the traditional spatial theory we then develop the implications of the directional theory for candidate behavior and assess the predictions in light of evidence from the u s congress

explaining applications to the u s disability system a semiparametric approach this study investigates the determinants of applications for u s disability benefits between 1986 and 1993 using a semiparametric discrete factor procedure separately for men and women approximating a dynamic optimization model the estimation accounts for a variety of potential biases that were unaddressed in prior studies our results indicate different responses of men and women to variations in policy measures past labor earnings and fringe benefits as well as benefit eligibility and benefit amounts clearly affect application behavior

disability transfers and the work decision of older men the potential causal relationship between the availability and generosity of disability transfers and the nonparticipation rates of older men is often asserted and much studied parsons 1980 haveman and wolfe 1984 leonard 1986 however estimates of the magnitude of this linkage vary widely the growth in transfer availability and generosity has been credited with from 30 to 100 percent of the significant post 1960 fall in older male participation rates the disparity in these research results stems primarily from 1 alternative sources of data that differentially constrain estimation of relevant expected wage and transfer incomes 2 specifications that are unable to distinguish income transfer from labor market effects and 3 reliance on measures of health status that are endogenous to the work leisure decision this study seeks to narrow the range of estimates by addressing each of these issues our utility maximization model of work status choice assumes that workers who differ in health status choose between the mutually exclusive options of working at the wage offered for their characteristics and accepting public or private disability transfers because the income flows in the two options are censored they are estimated using switching regression techniques as expectations conditional on exogenous individual characteristics hence accounting for the potentially endogenous process that separates wage earners from transfer recipients the marginal utilities of income from the two sources are allowed to differ because of stigma effects in the estimation we adjust the choice based nature of our sample employ longitudinal earnings data to measure expected changes in as distinct from the expected level of income in the two options and use a separately estimated latent health status measure largely purged of its endogeneity with the participation decision

privatization and the british electorate microeconomic policies macroeconomic evaluations and party support despite much scholarly research on the link between macroeconomic evaluations and political behavior relatively little is known about the influence of government economic policy on this process margaret thatcher s recent sales of public assets privatization in britain provide a unique opportunity to examine the link between microeconomic activity measured by privatization macroeconomic evaluations and voting by applying multivariate analysis to data collected during the 1983 and 1987 general elections we show that privatization measured by share purchases and council house ownership stimulates positive judgments about the country s economy however the effect of privatization on the vote is almost entirely indirect via these retrospective judgments about the economy while privatization has undoubtedly benefited the conservatives electorally the evidence on council house purchases suggests that the impact may be temporary

political parties world demand and unemployment domestic and international sources of economic activity this article replicates and extends earlier work on the politics of macroeconomic policy by considering political effects on unemployment in 14 western industrial nations between 1960 and 1983 changes of party control of government display broadly the expected effects namely that unemployment falls under left wing governments and rises under right wing governments however the principal conclusions of this article are that partisan effects on unemployment in open economies that is economies heavily dependent on trade with other countries can only be satisfactorily estimated relative to the constraint imposed by the level of world economic activity and that in addition to politicians strategic incentives political institutions and economic regime constraints also determine whether partisan effects on unemployment will be sustained transitory or absent with respect to the latter on the whole no effects are found where no such effects were promised by the new government before taking office where one party or dominant partner coalitions form the effect on unemployment is transitory whereas where broad coalitions form it is sustained or absent finally ceteris paribus any partisan effects are more likely where governments secure parliamentary majorities

the competitive road to proportional representation partisan biases and electoral regime change under increasing party competition one of the most noteworthy political regularities in the early twentieth century was the shift away from majoritarian electoral rules in western europe the conventional wisdom suggests that proportional representation pr was introduced by elites who believed that under the existing majoritarian rules simple plurality block vote two ballot rules they would soon lose power to rapidly growing socialist parties but this does not explain why many electoral reforms were carried out in countries with weak or nonexistent socialist parties the author shows that increasing the number of parties distorts the seat vote properties of electoral rules to a larger degree than previously anticipated under increasing party competition electoral regimes display larger partisan biases than those observed in two party races and crowd out minority parties that have territorially dispersed constituencies in favor of minority parties that have territorially concentrated constituencies using a dynamic bayesian model for seats and votes the author measures the partisan biases brought about by the expansion of voting rights in the late nineteenth century to explain the drive to reform majoritarian electoral systems

when politics and models collide estimating models of multiparty elections theory the spatial model of elections can better be represented by using conditional logit models which consider the position of the parties in issue spaces than by multinomial logit models which only consider the position of voters in the issue space the spatial model and random utility models in general suffer from a failure to adequately consider the substitutability of parties sharing similar or identical issue positions hypotheses multinomial logit is not necessarily better than successive applications of binomial logit conditional logit allows for considering more interesting political questions than does multinomial logit the spatial model may not correspond to voter decision making in multiple party settings multinomial probit allows for a relaxation of the iia condition and this should improve estimates of the effect of adding or removing parties methods comparisons of binomial logit multinomial logit conditional logit and multinomial probit on simulated data and survey data from multiparty elections results multinomial logit offers almost no benefits over binomial logit conditional logit is capable of examining movements by parties whereas multinomial logit is not multinomial probit performs better than conditional logit when considering the effects of altering the set of choices available to voters estimation of multinomial probit with more than three choices is feasible

a downsian spatial model with party activism a unidimensional spatial model is proposed in this article although its formal structure parallels the spatial model of electoral competition this model examines the decisions of individuals as they choose whether or not to become activists in one of two political parties an individual calculus of participation is developed that is similar to the spatial interpretation of the calculus of voting this calculus is then generalized by examining conditions that may hold for aggregate activism probabilities and the relationship between the two forms is investigated some results are then presented which concern the distributions of activists in the two parties these results in general conform to the existence of party cleavages in which there are two stable equilibrium distributions of activists such that the two parties activists are relatively cohesive internally and relatively distinctive externally finally some suggestions are offered about how this model can be combined with the spatial model of candidate competition to provide a more complete model of elections

fair income tax fairness is a key concept in redistribution issues in this paper we study how particular requirements of fairness can shed light on the design of the optimal income tax schedule we consider a population of heterogeneous individuals or households who differ in two respects first they have unequal skills and therefore unequal earning abilities second they differ in terms of their preferences about consumption and leisure and as a consequence typically make different labour time choices both kinds of differences generate income inequalities we study how to justify and compute a redistribution income tax in this context redistribution through an income tax usually entails distortions of incentives but the resulting efficiency loss has to be weighed against potential improvements in the fairness of the distribution of resources we address this efficiency equity trade off here by constructing social preferences which obey the standard pareto principle in addition to fairness conditions

government partisanship labor organization and macroeconomic performance governments of the left and right have distinct partisan economic policies and objectives that they would prefer to pursue their propensity to do so however is constrained by their desire for reelection we argue that the ability of governments to further their partisan interests and preside over reelectable macroeconomic outcomes simultaneously is dependent on the organization of the domestic economy particularly the labor movement we hypothesize that there are two different paths to desirable macroeconomic performance in countries with densely and centrally organized labor movements leftist governments can promote economic growth and reduce inflation and unemployment conversely in countries with weak labor movements rightist governments can pursue their partisan preferred macroeconomic strategies and achieve similarly beneficial macroeconomic outcomes performance will be poorer in other cases these hypotheses are supported by analysis of pooled annual time series data for 16 advanced industrial democracies between 1967 and 1984

electoral majorities political parties and collective representation in practice democracies privilege plurality parties theories of the democratic process challenge the democratic credentials of this practice abstract social choice theory wonders whether an elec

disability cash transfers in the context of poverty and unemployment the case of south africa summary south africa s disability grant dg program has been criticized for its poor administration and the dependency culture it promotes this paper assesses the program s targeting effectiveness and its effects on labor supply using disability self reports and standard measures of economic well being the results suggest that dg s inclusion errors are relatively limited but exclusion errors are substantial and serious the paper also shows that increased leniency in disability screening policy in the gauteng province in the early 2000s does not appear to have altered labor market behaviors relative to northern cape a province where there was no change in policy

conflict and distribution abstract we develop a behavioral model that links the level and pattern of social conflict to the societywide distribution of individual characteristics the model can be applied to groups that differ in characteristics such as wealth ethnicity religion and political ideology we settle questions of existence and uniqueness of conflict equilibrium conflict is seen to be closely connected with the bimodality of the underlying distribution of characteristics however in general the conflict distribution relationship is nonlinear and surprisingly complex our results on conflict patterns also throw light on the phenomena of extremism and moderation journal of economic literature classification numbers d63 d72 d74

how did the increase in economic inequality between 1970 and 1990 affect children s educational attainment 1 this study estimates the effect of changes in economic inequality between 1970 and 1990 on children s educational attainment data on individual children from the panel study of income dynamics is combined with other data on state characteristics growing up in a state with widespread economic inequality increases educational attainment for high income children and lowers it for low income children most of the effect is due to factors unassociated with family income or economic segregation in the state these other factors include state spending for schooling and the increase in the returns to schooling over this period

who becomes a politician can a democracy attract competent leaders while attaining broad representation economicmodels suggest that free riding incentives and lower opportunity costs give the less competent a comparative

a theory of voting in large elections this paper provides a game theoretic model of probabilistic voting and then examines the incentives faced by candidates in a spatial model of elections in our model voters strategies form a quantal response equilibrium qre which merges strategic voting and probabilistic behavior we first show that a qre in the voting game exists for all elections with a finite number of candidates and then proceed to show that with enough voters and the addition of a regularity condition on voters utilities a nash equilibrium profile of platforms exists when candidates seek to maximize their expected margin of victory this equilibrium 1 consists of all candidates converging to the policy that maximizes the expected sum of voters utilities 2 exists even when voters can abstain and 3 is unique when there are only 2 candidates

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

targeting transfers through restrictions on recipients our objective is to design transfer programs that maximize some social welfare function following the optimal income tax formulation we assume that a random process endows individuals with characteristics that influence welfare such as ability to earn income medical condition or unmonitorable income the goal is to maximize the utility of a randomly chosen individual other individualistic social welfare functions would lead to equivalent results if the random characteristics were observable a first best outcome could be achieved by making them the basis for lump sum transfers in practice however we can observe only indicators of these characteristics such as earnings medical expenditures or consumption patterns the challenge for policy is to design an efficient second best transfer program based on indicators in this paper we argue that 1 an optimal transfer program in general must sacrifice productive efficiency to target efficiency this is done by imposing restrictions on the choices made by intended beneficiaries 2 a program that incorporates restrictions such as means tested in kind transfers commodity specific taxes and subsidies and even ordeals i e the imposition of deadweight costs to qualify for a transfer will perform better than programs that rely solely on income taxes and cash transfers

equilibrium in multicandidate probabilistic spatial voting this paper presents a multicandidate spatial model of probabilistic voting in which voter utility functions contain a random element specific to each candidate the model assumes no abstentions sincere voting and the maximization of expected vote by each candidate we derive a sufficient condition for concavity of the candidate expected vote function with which the existence of equilibrium is related to the degree of voter uncertainty we show that under concavity convergent equilibrium exists at a minimum sum point at which total distances from all voter ideal points are minimized we then discuss the location of convergent equilibrium for various measures of distance in our examples computer analysis indicates that non convergent equilibria are only locally stable and disappear as voter uncertainty increases

dynamic pie a strategy for modeling trade offs in compositional variables over time the substance of politics involves competition that evolves over time while our theories about competition emphasize trade offs across multiple categories most empirical models tend to oversimplify them by considering trade offs between one category and everything else we propose a research strategy for testing theories about trade off relationships that shape dynamic compositional variables this approach improves current methods used to analyze compositional dependent variables by addressing two limitations first although scholars have considered compositional dependent variables they have done so in contexts that were not dynamic second current approaches toward graphical presentations become unwieldy when the compositional dependent variable has more than three categories we demonstrate the utility of our strategy to expand current theories of party support and political budgeting in both cases we can extend trade offs across pairs of alternatives e g prime minister versus all other parties or spending on defense versus everything else to competition across multiple alternatives

strategic electoral rule choice under uncertainty we study electoral rule choice in a multi party model with office motivated parties and electoral outcome uncertainty we show that when all dominant parties parties with positive probability of winning the election have sufficiently good chances of winning they agree to switch from the pr rule to a more majoritarian one in order to increase their chances of forming a single party government we identify the exact degree of disproportionality of the new rule and we prove that it is increasing in the expected vote share of the smaller parties parties with zero probability of winning otherwise the necessary and sufficient conditions for such collusion in favor of a majoritarian rule are a the high rents from a single party government and b sufficient uncertainty over the electoral outcome our theoretical predictions regarding the degree of the disproportionality of the electoral rule are supported by empirical evidence

electoral rules strategic entry and polarization abstract how does electoral rule disproportionality affect the structure of the party system i e the number and the policy platforms of the competing parties by studying a model where both party entry and platform choice are endogenous we are able to provide a unified theory an increasing electoral rule disproportionality exhibits a a first order negative effect on platform polarization b a second order negative effect on the number of parties as polarization decreases centrist parties are squeezed between other contenders and prefer not to enter and c an additional third order negative effect on polarization via the reduction of the number of parties we then conduct a laboratory experiment and strongly confirm the theoretical predictions of the model

stratification and spatial segregation of human capital as determinants of metropolitan productivity in the united states this paper explores the dynamics of how the human capital embodied in metropolitan populations might impact metropolitan productivity three aspects of human capital are examined the average aggregate level of human capital stratification according to human capital and spatial segregation according to human capital these are measured for the 100 largest metropolitan areas in the us for 1970 1980 and 1990 and then tested as explanatory variables of metropolitan productivity econometric analysis confirms a strong relationship between higher average levels of human capital and higher productivity and growth stratification appears negatively correlated with productivity in 1970 and 1980 but positively correlated in 1990 segregation appears negatively correlated with productivity in the 1970s and in 1990 when controlling for stratification

the electoral sweet spot low magnitude proportional electoral systems can electoral rules be designed to achieve political ideals such as accurate representation of voter preferences and accountable governments the academic literature commonly divides electoral systems into two types majoritarian and proportional and implies a straightforward trade off by which having more of an ideal that a majoritarian system provides means giving up an equal measure of what proportional representation pr delivers we posit that these trade offs are better characterized as nonlinear and that one can gain most of the advantages attributed to pr while sacrificing less of those attributed to majoritarian elections by maintaining district magnitudes in the low to moderate range we test this intuition against data from 609 elections in 81 countries between 1945 and 2006 electoral systems that use low magnitude multimember districts produce disproportionality indices almost on par with those of pure pr systems while limiting party system fragmentation and producing simpler government coalitions

labor supply of politicians using data on members of the european parliament meps we examine the impact of salaries on the composition and the behavior of legislators employing a differences in differences approach we exploit the introduction of a law that equalized meps salaries which had previously differed by as much as a factor of 10 increasing salaries raises the fraction of meps who run for re election but decreases the quality of elected meps proxied by college quality salary has no discernible impact on effort or legislation output higher salaries induce more political competition

gender and the new inequality explaining the college non college wage gap the new inequality is often characterized by the increasing wage gap between workers with a college education and those without yet although the gap in hourly wages between college educated and non college educated women is high and rising the topic has been overshadowed by research on gender inequality and wage inequality among men using the 1990 5 percent public use microdata samples independent sources of macro data and controls for individual human capital characteristics i examine the association between the college non college wage gap and key aspects of local economic conditions for women and men while the college non college wage gap among women is comparable in size to the gap among men significant gender differences emerge in the underlying sources of high wage gaps in over 500 labor markets across the united states compared with men flexible and insecure employment conditions e g joblessness casualization and immigration are more important in fostering high wage gaps among women than are technology trade and industrial composition the prevailing explanations of rising wage inequality over time based on these gender differences i reconsider the debate on labor market restructuring and inequality and discuss a new analytical focus on differences in within gender inequality

policy divergence in multicandidate probabilistic spatial voting existing models of multicandidate spatial competition with probabilistic voting typically predict a high degree of policy convergence yet in actual elections candidates advocate quite divergent sets of policies what accounts for this disparity between theory and empirical observation i introduce two variations on the basic probabilistic vote model which may account for candidate policy divergence 1 a model which incorporates candidate specific variables so that candidates may enjoy nonpolicy related electoral advantages or disadvantages 2 a model which allows nonzero correlations between the random terms associated with voters candidate utilities thereby capturing situations where voters view two or more candidates as similar on nonpolicy grounds i report candidate equilibrium analyses for each model which show far greater policy divergence than exists under the standard probabilistic vote model i then analyze the strategic logic which underlies these results

principle vs pragmatism policy shifts and political competition this article investigates the electoral effect of party policy shifts i argue that whether party policy shifts are damaging or rewarding depends on whether the shift occurs in the pragmatic or principled issue domain on pragmatic issues voters value getting things done policy shifts in this domain signal responsiveness to the changing environment and are likely to be rewarded principled issues however concern core beliefs and values any policy shift in this domain is a sign of inconsistency and lack of credibility which is likely to lead to voter withdrawal these arguments are supported by evidence from 23 advanced democracies over a period of 40 years

self screening in targeted public transfer programs the self screening properties of initial eligibility determination a mechanism often under the control of the administrators of targeted transfer programs are derived and the use of this mechanism in the social security disability insurance system is explored empirically an increase in the rigor of initial eligibility screening may discourage potential applicants because they are unaware of appeal prospects and because the eligibility decision delay is lengthened as denied applicants are forced to appeal their claims in the disability program a 10 percent increase in the initial denial rate induces a 4 percent decrease in applications self selection is nonperverse

transparency political polarization and political budget cycles in oecd countries we investigate the effects of fiscal transparency and political polarization on the prevalence of electoral cycles in fiscal balance while some recent political economy literature on electoral cycles identifies such cycles mainly in weak and recent democracies in contrast we show conditioning on a new index of institutional fiscal transparency that electoral cycles in fiscal balance are a feature of many advanced industrialized economies using a sample of 19 oecd countries in the 1990s we identify a persistent pattern of electoral cycles in low er transparency countries while no such cycles can be observed in high er transparency countries furthermore we find in accordance with recent theory that electoral cycles are larger in politically more polarized countries

heightening comparativists concern for model choice voting behavior in great britain and the netherlands as the research methodology more closely approximates the causal process being analyzed the inferences and predictions derived from that methodology will better represent actual behavior statistical models were specified on the basis of accepted theories of voting behavior and political cleavages in the netherlands and great britain we hypothesize that multinomial models provide a more accurate characterization of voting behavior in countries with more than two political parties competing for votes binomial logit multinomial logit and nested multinomial logit models of voting behavior are estimated on dutch and british national election study data compared to binomial methods we find that multinomial models of voting behavior produce results that are more congruent with accepted theories of dutch and british politics

electoral rule disproportionality and platform polarization despite common perception existing theoretical literature lacks a complete for mal argument regarding the relationship between the electoral rule disproportionality and platform polarization in this paper we build a model that incorporates the disproportionality of the electoral system in a standard downsian electoral competition setup with mainly but not necessarily purely policy motivated parties we first show that in equilibrium platform polarization is decreasing in the level of the electoral rule disproportionality we then argue that the number of parties has a positive effect on platform polarization when polarization is measured by the distance between the two most distant platforms this effect does not hold when polarization is measured by the widely used dalton index constructing a dataset covering more than 300 elections our main theoretical findings are empirically supported pointing towards the electoral rule disproportionality as a major determinant of polarization

the promise of positive optimal taxation normative diversity and a role for equal sacrifice abstract a prominent assumption in modern optimal tax research is that the objective of taxation is utilitarian i present new survey evidence that most people reject this assumption s implications for several prominent features of tax policy instead preferring tax policies based at least in part on a classic alternative objective the principle of equal sacrifice i generalize the standard model to accommodate this preference for a mixed objective proposing a method by which to make disparate criteria commensurable while respecting pareto efficiency then i show that optimal policy in this generalized model calibrated to the survey evidence and u s microdata is capable of quantitatively matching several features of existing tax policy that are incompatible in the conventional model but widely endorsed in the survey and reality including the coexistence of substantial redistribution and limited tagging together these findings demonstrate the potential of a positive theory of optimal taxation

economic aspects of optimal disability benefits this paper analyzes optimal disability and retirement or welfare benefits with imperfect disability evaluation with some able workers judged disabled and some disabled workers judged able thus the levels of both disability and retirement benefits affect labor supply with anyone not working eligible for retirement benefits we analyze the optimal structure of benefits for a given disability screening mechanism and briefly consider the problem of optimal evaluations of disability evidence in the united states there is an overlap in eligibility for disability and retirement portions of social security more generally welfare is sometimes available to people denied disability benefits

party policy diffusion do parties learn from or emulate parties in other political systems this research develops the argument that parties are more likely to employ the heuristic of learning from and emulating foreign successful incumbent parties spatial econometric analyses of parties election policies from several established democracies robustly confirm that political parties respond to left right policy positions of foreign political parties that have recently governed by showing that parties respond to these foreign incumbent parties this work has significant implications for our understanding of party competition furthermore we contribute to the literature on public policy diffusion as we suggest that political parties are important vehicles through which public policies diffuse

economic inequality new methods for new trends two positions dominate the debate over the recent increases in economic inequality in the united states the job skill mismatch thesis attributes rising inequality to growth in the number of high skill high wage jobs that leaves less skilled workers behind the polarization thesis in contrast argues that the service shift generates growth in the number of both high wage and low wage jobs and declines in the middle standard summary measures of distributional inequality cannot discriminate between these depictions of where job growth is occurring we propose new methods for measurement that provide both summary and detailed information about the distributional shifts in earnings and aframework for statistical inference using data from the curent population survey cps on yearly earnings from 1967 to 1987 we show that the trends in distributional inequality vary considerably by race gender and time while the evidence provides more support for the polarization argument this thesis needs refinement if it is to account for the variations in changing inequality observed here

centripetal and centrifugal incentives in electoral systems this paper investigates how electoral laws affect the position taking incentives of parties and candidates it seeks to extend the finding presented in the classical median voter theorem to a wide class of electoral systems or to show the limits of such extension the factors examined are the district magnitude the electoral formula the number of votes each voter is allowed to cast whether voters can cumulate their votes and whether voters can partially abstain i suggest a crude division of electoral systems into those producing predominantly centripetal incentives and those producing predominantly centrifugal incentives among the factors found to produce centripetal incentives at least in noncumulative systems are the following increases in the number of votes per voter outlawry of partial abstention and decreases in the district magnitude in systems allowing the cumulation of votes matters are a bit different

the mean voter theorem necessary and sufficient conditions for convergent equilibrium formal models of elections have emphasized the convergence of party leaders towards the centre of the electoral distribution this paper attempts to resolve the apparent disparity between the formal result and the perception of political divergence by considering a model incorporating valence valence can be interpreted as the non policy basis of political judgement made by the electorate concerning the quality of political contenders the theorem presented here shows that there is a necessary condition for convergence the condition involves the difference in party valences and the electoral variance when the condition fails the low valence parties will be forced to adopt policy positions far from the electoral centre the inference appears to be substantiated by an empirical model of the israel election in 1996 copyright 2007 wiley blackwell

political selection under alternative electoral rules we study the patterns of political selection in majoritarian versus proportional systems political parties face a trade off in choosing the mix of high and low quality candidates high quality candidates are valuable to voters and thus help to win elections but they crowd out loyal candidates who are most preferred by the parties under proportional representation politicians selection depends on the share of swing voters in the entire electorate in majoritarian elections it depends also on the distribution of competitive versus safe single member districts we show that a majoritarian system with only a few competitive districts is less capable of selecting good politicians than a proportional system as the share of competitive districts increases the majoritarian system becomes more efficient than the proportional system however for a large enough share of competitive districts a non monotonic relation arises the marginal positive effect of adding high quality politicians on the probability of winning the election is reduced and highly competitive majoritarian systems become less efficient than proportional ones in selecting good politicians

why so much stability another opinion in this paper i have suggested three important factors that render majority rule stable in real world settings small numbers of alternatives constraints on agenda setters and a meaningful weakening of the single peakedness condition these simple points along with shepsle s complementary notion of structure induced equilibria and an extension thereof incorporating strategic behavior krehbiel 1983 go a long way toward explaining the existence of stable outcomes in the real world

skill biased technological change and wage inequality evidence from a plant retooling1 one of the most popular explanations for the increased wage inequality that has occurred since the late 1970s is that technological change has resulted in a downward shift in the demand for low skill workers this pattern is also alleged to account for the growth in racial inequality in wages over the same period this article reports on a case study of the retooling of a food processing plant a unique longitudinal multimethod design reveals the nature of the technological change the changes in job requirements and the mechanisms by which the changes affect the wage distribution for hourly production workers this research finds that indeed the retooling resulted in greater wage dispersion and that the changes have also been associated with greater racial inequality in wages however contrary to the claims of advocates of the skill bias hypothesis organizational and human resources factors strongly mediated the impact of the changing technology absent these high road organizational choices th

electoral reform and trade offs in representation we examine the effect of electoral institutions on two important features of representation that are often studied separately policy responsiveness and the quality of legislators theoretically we show that while a proportional electoral system is better than a majoritarian one at representing popular preferences in some contexts this advantage can come at the price of undermining the selection of good politicians to empirically assess the relevance of this trade off we analyze an unusually controlled electoral reform in switzerland early in the twentieth century to account for endogeneity we exploit variation in the intensive margin of the reform which introduced proportional representation based on administrative constraints and data on voter preferences a difference in difference analysis finds that higher reform intensity increases the policy congruence between legislators and the electorate and reduces legislative effort contemporary evidence from the european parliament supports this conclusion

social policy responsiveness in developed democracies do mass policy preferences influence the policy output of welfare states in developed democracies this is an important issue for welfare state theory and research and this article presents an analysis that builds from analytical innovations developed in the emerging literature on linkages between mass opinion and public policy the authors analyze a new dataset combining a measure of social policy preferences with data on welfare state spending alongside controls for established causal factors behind social policy making the analysis provides evidence that policy preferences exert a significant influence over welfare state output guided also by statistical tests for endogeneity the authors find that cross national differences in the level of policy preferences help to account for a portion of the differences among social christian and liberal welfare state regimes the results have implications for developing fruitful connections between welfare state scholarship comparative opinion research and recent opinion policy studies

negative marginal tax rates and heterogeneity the bulk of the theory of optimal taxation recommends that the marginal tax rate be everywhere positive labor supply is distorted downwards compared with laissez faire the conditions under which the result holds continuous labor supply or intensive margin unobserved productivity constant opportunity cost of work utilitarian planner with a redistributive motive towards lower incomes have been thoroughly investigated jesus seade 1977 1982 ivan werning 2000 martin f hellwig 2007 the purpose of the present paper is to describe how negative marginal tax rates can be optimal keeping with the intensive set up largely studied in the literature when there are multiple dimensions of heterogeneity indeed james a mirrlees 1976 in its section iv indicates along a line that will be pursued further here that the sign of the marginal tax rate cannot be predicted when the agents in the economy differ along several dimensions of heterogeneity workers differ in both their productivities and opportunity costs of work under utilitarianism heterogeneity comes into play through its impact on cardinal utilities how social weights or marginal utilities of income vary with income determines the shape of the optimal tax scheme conditionally on income utility and more importantly its derivative with respect to income may either decrease or increase with work opportunity costs this may vary according to circumstances depending on whether the cost is associated with poor living conditions i e a handicap or reflects a taste for leisure or opportunities outside the labor market such as gardening at home or black market activities for a given income the social weight is proportional to the expected marginal utilities where the expectation is taken over the distribution of work opportunity costs at this income level therefore the social weight curve depends on both the specification of the cardinal utility function and on how the distribution of work opportunity costs changes with income the fact that heterogeneity can blur the redistribution motive through the possible correlation between ability and onerousness of work has been discussed in models where agents have a finite number of types a pioneer work is that of joseph e stiglitz 1982 who shows that the high skilled individual should face a negative marginal tax rate if the low skilled individual s upward incentive constraint binds which is the case if social weights are increasing in type the importance of this observation for policy was pointed out in katherine cuff 2000 who is the first to explicitly link social weights to the opportunity cost of work using alternative choices of cardinal utilities in a model with four types combining two values for productivity and two values for the cost of work robin boadway et al 2002 showed how it can be optimal to have binding upward incentive constraints when high opportunity costs are associated with small social weights

the kuznets curve and the great u turn income inequality in u s counties 1970 to 1990 the authors examine the determinants of inequality in the distribution of family income in approximately 3 100 counties of the united states in 1970 1980 and 1990 such a study provides a window on global trends in social inequality during the period which spans the tail end of the kuznets curve and the more recent upswing in income inequality results from random effects regression models that control for unmeasured heterogeneity among states reveal the continued importance of the kuznetsian pattern of declining inequality with economic development a positive effect of urbanization on inequality a declining positive impact of sector dualism an increasing positive effect of educational heterogeneity and a persistent effect of racial dualism several variables associated with the recent upswing in inequality have significant effects female labor force participation negative female headed households positive percent of the population over age 65 changes from positive to negative over the period manufacturing employment negative and unemployment ambiguous they also discuss methods of estimating the gini coefficient for income inequality at the county level and measures of sector farm nonfarm dualism racial black white dualism and educational heterogeneity

democracy redistribution and political participation evidence from sweden 1919 1938 in this paper we compare how two different types of political regimes direct versus representative democracy redistribute income toward the relatively poor segments of society after the introduction of universal and equal suffrage swedish local governments are used as a testing ground since this setting offers a number of attractive features for a credible impact evaluation most importantly we exploit the existence of a population threshold which partly determined a local government s choice of democracy to implement a regression discontinuity design the results indicate that direct democracies spend 40 60 percent less on public welfare our interpretation is that direct democracy may be more prone to elite capture than representative democracy since the elite s potential to exercise de facto power is likely to be greater in direct democracy after democratization

all that glitters is not gold polarization amid poverty reduction in ghana ghana is an exceptional case in the sub saharan africa landscape together with a handful of other countries ghana offers the opportunity to analyze the distributional changes in the past two decades since four comparable household surveys are available in addition different from many other countries in the continent ghana s rapid growth translated into fast poverty reduction a closer look at the distributional changes that occurred in the same period however suggests less optimism the present paper develops an innovative methodology to analyze the distributional changes that occurred and their drivers with a high degree of accuracy and granularity looking at the results from 1991 to 2012 the paper documents how the distributional changes hollowed out the middle of the ghanaian household consumption distribution and increased the concentration of households around the highest and lowest deciles there was a clear surge in polarization indeed when looking at the drivers of polarization household characteristics educational attainment and access to basic infrastructure all tended to increase over time the size of the upper and lower tails of the consumption distribution and as a consequence the degree of polarization

don t stand so close to me spatial contagion effects and party competition in this article we bring together elements from the literatures on economic voting and spatial voting to gain theoretical leverage on the combined role of clarity of responsibility party policy positions and economic performance in elections building on evidence of voter knowledge we develop a theory of spatial contagion effects to explain how factors drawn from both of these literatures combine to shape changes in support for political parties we test this theory with a spatial autoregressive model of party competition in 23 nations from 1951 to 2005 as expected we find evidence of strong spatial contagion effects in elections with low clarity of responsibility

the effects of alternative power sharing arrangements do moderating institutions moderate party strategies and government policy outputs advocates of consensual political institutions i e institutions that promote compromise and powersharing among political parties claim that these institutions promote moderation in government policy outputs to date however there exists little research either theoretical or empirical that evaluates whether consensual institutions promote moderation in parties policy declarations we develop a multiparty spatial model with policy seeking parties operating under proportional representation in which we vary the extent to which government policies reflect power sharing among all parties as opposed to being determined by a single party we determine parties optimal nash equilibrium policy positions and conclude that power sharing does not typically motivate parties to moderate their policy declarations in fact policy positioning under power sharing appears to be similar to or more extreme than under single party dominance consistent with previous research however we find that power sharing does promote moderation in government policy outputs our results have implications for parties election strategies for the design of political institutions and for representative government

imperfect tagging in social insurance programs abstract this paper derives the optimal benefit structure of an earnings insurance program when a characteristic or tag imperfectly identifies those unable to work with a two sided classification error the optimal program is a dual work incentive system with a work non work consumption differential maintained for the tagged and untagged just sufficient to induce the able in each group to work and with more generous payments to tagged than to untagged individuals of the same work status it includes premiums to program eligible individuals who work a price missing in the u s social security disability system and in earlier attempts to characterize the optimal disability program

cost minimizing welfare programs abstract we study opportunities for lowering the cost of welfare programs by exploiting heterogeneity in the unobservable tastes of welfare recipients relying on the inability of cash based programs to achieve self selection we provide circumstances in which it is optimal to provide payments in kind our model differs from other self selection models because we allow the recipients the opportunity to trade the subsequent to the receipt of their welfare packages the presence of unreported cash among the recipient population is considered

how do electoral systems affect fiscal policy evidence from cantonal parliaments 1890 2000 using a new data set on swiss cantons since 1890 we analyze how the adoption of proportional representation affects fiscal policy in line with economic theory we show that proportional systems shift spending toward broad goods like education and welfare benefits but decrease spending on geographically targetable goods like roads we find little evidence that proportional representation increases the overall size of government an analysis of the underlying theoretical mechanisms reveals that proportional representation increases electoral turnout left wing representation and political fragmentation these changes in political representation explain a substantial share of the rise in education spending but a small share of the rise in welfare spending or the decline in road expenditures jel h4 h11 i38

electoral rules and political selection theory and evidence from a field experiment in afghanistan voters commonly face a choice between competent candidates and those with policy preferences similar to their own this article explores how electoral rules such as district magnitude mediate this trade off and affect the composition of representative bodies and the quality of policy outcomes we show formally that anticipation of bargaining over policy causes voters in elections with multiple single member districts to prefer candidates with polarized policy positions over more competent candidates results from a unique field experiment in afghanistan are consistent with these predictions specifically representatives selected by elections with a single multi member district are better educated and exhibit less extreme policy preferences

optimum taxation with errors in administration abstract the paper compares the welfare levels which can be achieved by two distinct tax regimes lump sum taxation where one attempts to identify individuals and allocate transfers or subsidies on the basis of characteristics and income taxation where characteristics are not observed but personal incomes are measured and taxed where there are no errors in classifying individuals lump sum taxation is superior but where mistakes are made in the allocation of lump sum grants or subsidies income taxation may be more attractive the level of errors where the regimes are equally desirable in terms of social welfare is computed in simple models following that of feldstein 1973 where there is strong aversion to inequality then income taxation becomes preferable at quite small errors in analysing income taxation it is shown that in the feldstein model with endogenous wages the marginal tax rate in optimum income taxation on the more skilled is negative and that on the less skilled is positive in contrast to the standard results see seade 1977 with exogenous wages