capacity constraints mergers and collusion abstract the objective of this paper is two fold to contribute to the analysis of tacit collusion in bertrand supergames with asymmetric capacity constraints and from a more applied perspective to bring a new light on merger analysis and provide useful guidelines for competition policy taking into account dynamic aspects of competition it is well known that capacity constraints affect tacit collusion as they limit both incentives to deviate e g to undercut rivals and retaliation possibilities however most studies have so far focused on symmetric situations where all firms have the same capacity which leads to ambiguous and unintuitive results and also considerably limits the scope of application studying asymmetric situations makes it possible to analyse the impact of changes in the distribution of these capacities expansions but also mergers split offs transfers etc and to provide guidelines for competition policy and particularly for merger policy these guidelines which differ substantially from those inspired by more static analyses such as the herfindahl or other standard concentration tests are applied to a famous merger that took place in the french bottled water market the nestle perrier merger case

on governing multilateral transactions with bilateral contracts bilateral contracts while neither negotiated nor enforced in an integrated way are nevertheless often interrelated both economically and strategically owing to production or consumption complementarities and to asymmetric information a set of bilateral contracts forms a mechanism with special properties this mechanism forms a contract equilibrium if there is no joint incentive for a supplier and any individual customer unilaterally to alter the terms of their contract if agents preferences are risk neutral in money income and if their private information is independent then there exists a contract equilibrium that implements efficient transactions if in addition preferences are strictly concave and differentiable in goods and services and technologically feasible sets are suitably convex then this equilibrium is essentially unique

firm size and the nature of innovation within industries the case of process and product r d the effect of firm size on the allocation of r d effort between process and product innovation is examined it is hypothesized that relative to product innovations process innovations are less saleable in disembodied form and spawn less growth this implies that the returns to process r d will depend more on the firm s output at the time it conducts its r d than the returns to product r d incorporating this distinction in a simple model the authors derive and test predictions about how the fraction of r d devoted to process innovation varies with firm size within industries

a guide to health care reform there are four rationales for health care reform increasing the efficiency of health delivery reforming the market for health insurance providing universal coverage and reducing the federal deficit these goals are reflected in most reform proposals achieving these goals involves several problems however paying for universal coverage may lead to labor supply or demand reductions in addition reform involves large federal risks that must be dealt with through deficit financing reduced benefits or lower subsidies

the non existence of pairwise proof equilibrium abstract private bilateral contracting between a supplier and competing customers admits multiple equilibria we show that requiring equilibrium to be pairwise proof immune to bilateral deviations by the supplier and any customer can imply non existence of equilibrium in normal environments

economic growth population theory and physiology the bearing of long term processes on the this lecture sketches a theory of the secular decline in morbidity and mortality that takes account of changes induced in physiological functioning since 1700 the synergism between technological and physiological improvements has produced a form of human evolution biological though not genetic rapid culturally transmitted and not necessarily stable which is still ongoing in both oecd and developing countries thermodynamic and physiological aspects of economic growth are defined and their impact on growth rates is assessed implications of this theory for population forecasting measurement of national income demand for leisure pension policies and demand for health care are considered excerpt

bertrand competition for inputs and walrasian outcomes market making by merchants who obtain stock from suppliers and resell it to con sumers is modeled as a two stage pricing game with winner take all c ompetition for the inputs in contrast to fixed capacity models the re is a unique subgame perfect nash equilibrium spne which is walr asian for elastic demand and non walrasian for inelastic demand alte rnatively when merchants first sell forward contracts to consumers a nd then compete for supplies the unique spne is always walrasian th us the author has an equilibrium model in which walrasian price aris es not from the benevolent actions of a fictitious auctioneer but fr om optimal price setting behavior of merchants copyright 1988 by american economic association

offshoring administrative and technical work new fields for understanding the global enterprise in this paper we introduce the journal of international business studies special issue on offshoring administrative and technical services ats in doing so we have attempted to locate the topic within the international business research tradition as well as suggest challenges and opportunities that the phenomenon offers to theoretical and empirical research in the field we examine the interplay of costs knowledge and innovation in the evolution of ats offshoring from modest beginnings to its current stature as an accepted business practice we suggest that understanding the continuing evolution of ats offshoring requires researchers to take into account not only the business imperative of cost saving but also a more complex set of underlying factors and potential outcomes we argue that the rapid growth of ats offshoring has brought about an accumulation of resources including financial flows knowledge infrastructure and human capital to create new platforms for knowledge creation and innovation low costs may characterize the initial conditions for offshoring but they also provide the basis for up market moves as firms increasingly pursue innovation based strategies we introduce the papers in the special issue as integral elements in our discussion contributing new ideas that stimulated our thinking and hopefully will do the same for others seeking to understand this emerging area of globalization and international managerial practice journal of international business studies 2009 40 887 900 doi 10 1057 jibs 2009 22

medical care costs how much welfare loss hardly a week goes by without a front page newspaper article on rising health care costs and the uninsured in this article i focus mainly on costs arguing that the issue has been somewhat misconceived while the level of medical care spending in the u s is a cause for concern the welfare losses associated with rises in that level of spending may not be as large as the public rhetoric can make them seem in fact cost containment may not be as urgent as is widely supposed and some proposed cost containment policies may result in welfare losses for the insured and even increase the number of uninsured

health care costs on the rise again since 1999 health care costs have been growing faster than national income this rapid growth has occurred as the ability of private and public purchasers to reduce service utilization and bargain for lower prices has fallen insurers have recouped lost profits through higher premiums and new technologies have driven up costs throughout the sector private insurance market responses to these rising costs may lead to reductions in the number of people with insurance and to increased fragmentation of the insurance market over time technological change in medicine both increases costs and improves the quality of care the challenge for public policy is to maintain insurance and some degree of equity in the face of these rising costs

the globalisation of technology what remains of the product cycle model this paper reexamines two hypotheses associated with earlier versions of the product cycle model the first hypothesis that innovations are almost always located in the home country of the parent company is rejected on the basis of evidence drawn from one hundred years of u s patent office data the second hypothesis that the international dispersion of activity is led by technology leaders is historically valid however over the last twenty years technology leaders have been ahead instead in the globalization of technology that is in developing internal international networks to exploit the locationally differentiated potential of foreign centers of excellence c 1995 academic press inc copyright 1995 by oxford university press

the case for a new fiscal constitution for the first 140 years of u s history the federal budget was effectively constrained by two fiscal rules the formal limits within the constitution on the enumerated spending powers and an informal rule that the government could borrow only during recessions and wars at the end of the 1920s federal expenditures were 2 6 percent of gnp the federal debt was constrained to about equal to 16 percent of gnp the general price level was roughly stable over this long period over the past six decades however federal expenditures have increased to nearly 25 percent of gnp larger and more frequent budget deficits have increased the federal debt held by the public to an amount equal to about 50 percent of gnp and the general price level is now about nine times the level at the beginning of this period this dramatic change in fiscal and monetary conditions occurred without one amendment to the constitution to authorize a change in the fiscal rules our effective fiscal constitution has been transformed into one in which congress and the president may authorize any type or amount of expenditures and taxes subject only to the voting rules for routine legislation how did this happen should economists be concerned about this change in the fiscal constitution what if anything should be done about it

equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information abstract games with imperfect information often feature multiple equilibria which depend on beliefs off the equilibrium path standard selection criteria such as passive symmetric or wary beliefs rest on ad hoc restrictions on beliefs we propose a new selection criterion that imposes no restrictions on beliefs we select the action profile that is supported in equilibrium by the largest set of beliefs we conduct an experiment to compare the predictive power of the existing and our novel selection criteria in an application on vertical multi lateral contracting we find that our criterion outperforms the other selection criteria

are medical prices declining evidence from heart attack treatments we address long standing problems in measuring medical inflation by estimating two types of price indices the first a service price index prices specific medical services as does the current cpi the second a cost of living index measures a quality adjusted cost of treating a health problem we apply these indices to heart attack treatment between 1983 and 1994 more frequent reweighting and accounting for price discounts lowers the measured price change for heart attacks by three percentage points annually accounting for quality change lowers it further we estimate that the real cost of living index fell about 1 percent annually

symposium on health care reform the papers in this symposium focus on two major issues of health economics in the context of president clinton s health security act cost containment and labor market effects of financing insurance the act proposes to limit public and private spending a key issue is the extent to which without a limit but with a standardized basic plan supplementary insurance will exist to allow scope for individual choice the act s financing will have an ambiguous effect on labor supply but will encourage formation of small low wage firms several features including community rating and standardization of dependent coverage imply substantial redistribution

contracting with externalities the paper studies inefficiencies arising in contracting between one principal and n agents when the utility of each agent depends on all agents trades with the principal when the principal commits to a set of publicly observable bilateral contract offers the arising inefficiency is due entirely to the externalities imposed on non signers in contrast when the principal s offers are privately observed the distortion is due to the externalities given agents equilibrium trades comparison of the two externalities determines the relative efficiency of the two contracting regimes in both cases we show that when n is large each agent can be treated as non pivotal provided that appropriate continuity assumptions are satisfied we also study the case in which the principal can condition each agent s trade on other agents messages we characterize the set of such mechanisms in which each agent s participation is voluntary when the principal can commit to any such mechanism she implements the first best outcome while threatening each deviator with the harshest possible punishment however in the presence of noise that goes to zero slower than n goes to infinity in the limit we obtain a generally inefficient outcome in which each agent feels non pivotal

upstream capacity constraint and the preservation of monopoly power in private bilateral contracting this article presents a model of private vertical contracting with a capacity constrained monopolistic supplier i consider full capacity beliefs that are consistent with an upstream capacity constraint and are wary when the constraint is tight or production is costless i show that facing a capacity constraint the supplier may preserve its monopoly power in equilibrium this result stands in sharp contrast to the standard result that the supplier cannot preserve its monopoly power which holds under the usual implicit assumption of an infinite production capacity

opportunism in multilateral vertical contracting nondiscrimination exclusivity and uniformity comment an input supplier selling to competing downstream firms would benefit from publicly committing at the outset to all contracts efficient commitment however would require complete contracts the authors study instead bilateral contracting without commitment regarding others terms each firm then fears that the supplier might opportunistically renegotiate another s contract to increase bilateral profit at the firm s expense the authors show that nondiscrimination clauses generally cannot curb such third party opportunism even with symmetric firms to reassure firms crude forms of commitment may be adopted this could explain the pervasiveness of exclusivity arrangements and the striking uniformity and intertemporal rigidity of franchise contracts copyright 1994 by american economic association

market making oligopoly this paper analyzes price competition between market makers who set costly capacity constraints before they intermediate between producers and consumers the unique equilibrium outcome with pure strategies at the capacity stage is the cournot outcome the paper thus provides a rationale for cournot type competition between market makers this contrasts with previous findings in the literature where due to the absence of capacity constraints that are set ex ante the bertrand result typically obtains

communication in vertical markets experimental evidence abstract an upstream monopolist supplying competing downstream firms may fail to monopolize the market because it is unable to commit not to behave opportunistically we build on previous experimental studies of this well known commitment problem by introducing communication allowing the upstream firm to chat privately with each downstream firm reduces total offered quantity from near the cournot level observed in the absence of communication halfway toward the monopoly level allowing all firms to chat together openly results in complete monopolization downstream firms obtain such a bargaining advantage from open communication that all of the gains from monopolizing the market accrue to them a simple structural model of nash in nash bargaining fits the pattern of shifting surpluses well using third party coders unsupervised text mining among other approaches we uncover features of the rich chat data that are correlated with market outcomes we conclude with a discussion of the antitrust implications of open communication in vertical markets

paying for health insurance the trade off between competition and adverse selection we use data on health plan choices by employees of harvard university to compare the benefits of insurance competition with the costs of adverse selection moving to a voucher type system induced significant adverse selection with a welfare loss of 2 to 4 percent of baseline spending but increased competition reduced harvard s premiums by 5 to 8 percent the premium reductions came from insurer profits so while harvard was better off the net effect for society was only the adverse selection loss adverse selection can be minimized by adjusting voucher amounts for individual risk we discuss how such a system would work governments are increasingly turning to market forces as a way to limit the cost of social insurance traditionally social insurance programs were operated as nonmarket goods governments mandated participation in a central program collected revenues to finance the program and ran the insurance system there was no role for competition among suppliers in providing the basic benefit as the costs of social insurance have increased however the centralized model of social insurance is coming under increasing strain in the united states for example recent proposals have called for replacing the medicare program with a health care voucher for the elderly aaron and reischauer 1995 cutler 1996 the voucher would guarantee people a basic insurance plan but the plans would be privately run competition among plans would generate plan premiums and enrollments similarly longstanding proposals for social security reform have called for replacing the current system with a system of individual accounts where people would make saving investment and annuitization decisions on their own advisory council on social security 1996 feldstein 1996 the trend is not just domestic in the united kingdom the national health service has moved to encourage more competition in recent years with the establishment of hospital trusts that bid for patients and partially fixed payments to physicians

offshoring of r d looking abroad to improve innovation performance the offshoring of knowledge services has become a phenomenon of increasing importance for firms but many of its implications are yet to be discussed thoroughly this paper analyzes whether r d offshoring contributes to enhancing firms innovation capabilities specifically the study distinguishes between two governance models of offshoring captive offshoring and offshore outsourcing and two types of innovation outcomes product and process innovations we suggest that r d offshoring has different impacts depending on the innovation results and governance models considered the study empirically tests these relationships using the spanish technological innovation panel this survey contains information on a large sample of firms from diverse sectors for the period 2004 2007 the empirical findings allow us confirm our hypotheses and highlight the strategic importance of r d offshoring the empirical evidence reveals a positive relation between offshoring and innovation performance with a greater effect on product than on process innovations the results for different governance models show that captive offshoring has a greater effect on innovation outcomes than offshore outsourcing these findings lead us to conclude that firms that look overseas can benefit from location specific and specialization advantages to improve innovation performance

co operative r d why and with whom an integrated framework of analysis abstract firms use r d partnerships to access knowledge and build global r d networks this article develops an integrated framework to examine the determinants of the choice of partners with which firms co operate on r d this resource based perspective underscores the interactions between three major questions why co operate who does and with whom it argues in particular that the choice of partners is dictated by the complementary resources which the latter command the framework is then expanded to predict the relative efficiency of r d co operation with different partners including suppliers clients rivals academic institutions and foreign firms the empirical analysis which is based on responses to france s version of the second european community innovation survey cis 2 strongly supports the overall framework of analysis

walking the tightrope on medicare reform a central controversy in the debate about medicare is whether the program spends too much money or whether instead it should be expanded to cover more i consider the value of increased medicare spending i argue that on average medicare spending is worth it the health gains brought by medicare have been greater than their cost at the margin however services are overused and have low value medicare reforms need to promote the high average value of care while eliminating care of low value many of the proposed reforms fall short of this goal

bilateral control with vertical contracts when a manufacturer contracts secretly with competing retailers he is subject to opportunism and linear or non linear tariffs may not allow the manufacturer to maintain monopoly prices to analyse the effects of rpm o brien shaffer 1992 use a concept of contract equilibrium which concentrates on pairwise deviations thereby questioning the robustness of the analysis this paper emphasises the distinction between the contract equilibrium and standard non cooperative concepts we advocate for some caution in the use of the former concept as if overlooks an inexistence problem we then confirm the intuition that rpm can help solve the manufacturer s commitment problem this confirms that o brien shaffer s insight is robust and validates the courts reluctance against rpm