does the gap in family friendly policies drive the family gap a segregation of the labour market into a family friendly and a non family friendly sector has the effect that women self select into the sectors depending on institutional constraints preferences for family friendly working conditions and expected wage differences we find that neglecting the sector dimension tends to understate the effect of birth related interruptions in both sectors the combined effect of a large depreciation effect and no recovery means that females in the non family friendly sector e g private sector are punished severely after childbirth in the family friendly sector e g public sector we find complete catch up

is there a glass ceiling in sweden using 1998 data we show that the gender log wage gap in sweden increases throughout the wage distribution and accelerates in the upper tail we interpret this as a strong glass ceiling effect we use quantile regression decompositions to examine whether this pattern can be ascribed primarily to gender differences in labor market characteristics or in the rewards to those characteristics even after extensive controls for gender differences in age education both level and field sector industry and occupation we find that the glass ceiling effect we see in the raw data persists to a considerable extent

how to identify trust and reciprocity this paper uses a three games or triadic design to identify trusting and reciprocating behavior a large literature on single game trust and reciprocity experiments is based on the implicit assumption that subjects do not have altruistic or inequality averse other regarding preferences such experimental designs test compound hypotheses that include the hypothesis that other regarding preferences do not affect behavior in contrast experiments with the triadic design do discriminate between transfers resulting from trust or reciprocity and transfers resulting from other regarding preferences that are not conditional on the behavior of others decomposing trust from altruism and reciprocity from altruism or inequality aversion is critical to obtaining empirical information that can guide the process of constructing models that can increase the empirical validity of game theory

on representative social capital abstract this paper analyzes the behavior of subjects randomly drawn from the dutch population who reveal their capacity to provide and sustain social capital by their propensity to invest and reward investments in an economic experiment we find that heterogeneity in behavior is characterized by several asymmetries men the young and elderly and low educated individuals invest relatively less but reward significantly more investments the age effects are found to corroborate existing findings whereas those of gender and education do not higher expected levels of investments by others are found to have a positive and significant effect on own investments finally a laboratory experiment with student subjects is found to provide a lower bound of the population level of social capital

if the worst comes to the worst dictator giving when recipient s endowments are risky abstract donors may often not be sure whether a recipient really needs their help does this uncertainty deter generosity we experimentally investigate a situation in which donors do not know the financial endowment of the recipient for certain but still have some information on the distribution the endowments are drawn from in the experiment we find that uncertainty does not deter generosity in fact if we filter out selfish dictators under most specifications of uncertainty dictators give more compared with the donation dictators make to a recipient they know to have the expected value of the endowment with certainty they are particularly concerned about the possibility of a recipient leaving the lab with no payoff from the game

public expenditure international specialisation and agglomeration abstract it is widely recognised that public sector purchasers tend to favour domestic suppliers we study the consequences of such home biased public procurement on international specialisation using a general equilibrium model with a monopolistically competitive sector we find that a country will specialise in that sector if it has relatively large home biased procurement the pull effect furthermore home biased procurement can counter agglomeration forces in that sector and thereby attenuate the overall degree of international specialisation the spread effect our empirical analysis conducted on input output data for the european union yields supporting evidence for the pull effect and some support for the spread effect

favoring domestic firms in procurement contracts abstract this paper studies the rationale for giving preference to domestic firms in the award of government contracts when the regulator is interested in maximizing domestic welfare it is seen that in the absence of comparative advantages the regulator should discriminate in favor of the domestic firms because foreign firms profits do not enter in domestic welfare furthermore i show that the form of the discrimination function depends on the mechanism being used in order to simplify the implementation of an optimal policy the regulator should choose mechanisms based on second price auctions

distinguishing trust from risk an anatomy of the investment game the role of trust in promoting economic activity and societal development has received considerable academic attention by social scientists a popular way to measure trust at the individual level is the so called investment game berg dickhaut and mccabe 1995 it has been widely noted however that risk attitudes can also affect decisions in this game and thus in principle confound inferences about trust we provide novel evidence shedding light on the role of risk attitudes for trusting decisions to the best of our knowledge our data are the first rigorous evidence that i aggregate investment distributions differ significantly between trust and risk environments and ii risk attitudes predict individual investment decisions in risk games but not in the corresponding trust games our results are convergent evidence that trust decisions are not tightly connected to a person s risk attitudes and they lend support to the trust interpretation of decisions in investment games

gordon tullock and experimental economics gordon tullock s research has substantially influenced the development of economic science in general and experimental economics in particular we present the first comprehensive survey of this significant achievement we show how tullock s research in bioeconomics influenced later developments in neuroeconomics and how his pioneering work on rent seeking generated a literature of laboratory tests of his hypothesis we also describe tullock s own experiments and draw attention to his early insights on trust games

money for nothing universal child care and maternal employment abstract the strong correlation between child care and maternal employment rates has led previous research to conclude that affordable and readily available child care is a driving force both of cross country differences in maternal employment and of its rapid growth over the last decades we analyze a staged expansion of subsidized child care in norway our precise and robust difference in differences estimates reveal that there is little if any causal effect of subsidized child care on maternal employment despite a strong correlation instead of increasing mothers labor supply the new subsidized child care mostly crowds out informal child care arrangements suggesting a significant net cost of the child care subsidies

from mill town to board room the rise of women s paid labor the widespread participation of women in paid labor outside of the home and in the highest echelons of society would have been unheard of a century ago this paper documents this dramatic change in women s social and economic status and argues that it was determined both by contemporaneous demand factors and by the characteristics expectations and social norms regarding work and family of different cohorts of women history suggests that change in women s labor force experiences may be slow because it must await the entry of new cohorts of women and also of men into the labor market

pharmaceutical price controls and entry strategies abstract this paper finds that the use of price controls has a statistically and quantitatively important effect on the extent and timing of the launch of new drugs firms headquartered in countries that regulate price reach fewer markets than those in countries without price controls companies avoid price controlled markets and are less likely to introduce products in additional markets after entering a price controlled country launches into low price european countries are further delayed following legalization of parallel imports the results suggest that price regulation in one country affects entry into other countries and may affect the strategies of domestic firms

taste for variety and optimum production patterns in monopolistic competition abstract many positive and normative results in models using the monopolistic competition framework of the dixit stiglitz spence type depend on the value of an important parameter the taste for variety in these models however the taste for variety is linked in a close but arbitrary manner to the degree of market power of monopolistic competitors in this paper we make a simple modification to the basic model which clearly disentangles taste for variety and market power we then show how this changes the usual comparisons between social optimum and market outcomes

trust and cooperation social capital and community resource management social capital is one of the main determinants of community resource management success we use the average amount sent in a trust game as a measure of social capital in five rural villages in india combining these experimental data with household surveys we analyze i how the amount sent is correlated with socio cultural community characteristics ii how social capital affects community resource management and iii to what extent experimental play is consistent with real on farm behavior in terms of providing a semi public good the results are interesting from a policy perspective and provide insight into bridging the gap between lab experiments and the field

separating reputation social influence and identification effects in a dictator game abstract this study explores the ways in which information about other individual s action affects one s own behavior in a dictator game the experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient s within game reputation on the dictator s decision reputation causing indirect reciprocity social influence and identification the separation of motives is an important step in trying to understand how impulses towards selfish or generous behavior arise the statistical analysis of experimental data reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators actions than the social influence and identification

market structure r d and advertising in the pharmaceutical industry jungere entwicklungen der literatur zum thema marktstruktur ermoglichen es robuste testbare hypothesen aus der theorie des strategischen verhaltens abzuleiten das grundlegende industrieokonomische modell geht von einer einfachen aber allgemein gultigen beziehung zwischen konzentration und marktgrose aus dabei wird insbesondere der einflus endogener versunkener kosten fur werbung und oder forschung und entwicklung fue auf den wettbewerb untersucht die empirischen ergebnisse dieser fallstudie zeigen das endogene versunkene kosten tatsachlich eine entscheidende rolle fur die herausbildung der marktstruktur in der pharmazeutischen industrie spielen die ergebnisse zeigen jedoch auch das unternehmensspezifische fahigkeiten geeignet sind die reaktionsweisen der unternehmen im wettbewerb zu erklaren

informal risk sharing in an infinite horizon experiment author s charness gary b genicot garance abstract this paper presents the first laboratory study of risk sharing without commitment our experiment captures the main features of a simple model of voluntary insurance between two agents in the model two individuals interact over a potential infinite horizon and suffer random income shocks risk averse individuals have incentives to smooth consumption by making transfers to each other these transfers being voluntary only self enforcing risk sharing arrangements are possible transfers can never be so large as to tempt individuals to renege on them this constraint when binding has strong implications for the shape of the constrained optimal risk sharing arrangement in our experiment participants are matched in pairs each period one of them randomly drawn receives a given amount in addition to its regular income after observing both incomes each person in a pair chooses a non negative transfer to make to the other person two features of the experimental design are crucial first it is common information that all pairs will be dissolved at the end of each period with a given probability participants are informed when this occurs and randomly re matched this replicates the effect of infinite horizon and discounting in the model second at the end of the experiment a single period is randomly drawn to count for cash payment this feature is essential for individuals to care about the utility outcome of each period we find evidence generally consistent with risk sharing with most transfers coming from individuals who received h in the period moreover in support of the theory transfers are much higher with a higher continuation probability and they also are highly correlated with the individual s degree of risk aversion however while the model predicts an increase in transfers with ex ante inequality we observe the opposite effect this may reflect considerations of identity or group membership

vocational training and gender wages and occupational mobility among young workers this paper investigates the relationship between the gender wage gap the choice of training occupation and occupational mobility we use longitudinal data for young workers with apprenticeship training in west germany workers make occupational career choices early during their careers and women and men pursue very different occupational careers we reconsider whether through occupational segregation women are locked in low wage careers kunze 2005 or whether they can move up to higher wage paths through mobility we furthermore investigate whether patterns have changed across cohorts during the period 1975 and 2001 and whether effects vary across the distribution the main results are first while there exists a persistent gender wage gap over experience the gap has decreased over time second in the lower part of the wage distribution the gap is highest and it increases with experience third occupational mobility is lower for women than for men and the wage gains due to occupational mobility are higher for men than for women especially in the lower part of the wage distribution we conclude that occupational mobility has reduced the gender wage gap but lock in effects are still stronger for women compared to men

government procurement and international trade abstract we model the bidding for a government contract in which there is imperfect competition each bidder is better informed about his own costs than either his rival bidders or the government and the distribution of the domestic firms costs differs from the distribution of foreign firms costs because of comparative advantage effects we find that the government minimizes its expected procurement cost by operating a price preference policy not necessarily purchasing from the lowest bidder

strategic procurement openness and market structure abstract we examine strategic procurement behaviour by governments and its effect on market structure in sectors such as defence and pharmaceuticals where the government is the dominant consumer in a world economy with trade between producer countries and between producers and non producers we use a modified dixit stiglitz utility function with an independent taste for variety there is free entry and exit by firms but by anticipating their participation constraint governments can indirectly choose the number of domestic firms and their size through its choice of procurement price unlike the standard model with no independent taste for variety and no external sector of non producer countries there are incentives for subsidies openness impacts on industrial structure and procurement coordination between producer countries affects firm numbers

the right amount of trust we investigate the relationship between individual trust and individual economic performance we find that individual income is hump shaped in a measure of intensity of trust beliefs heterogeneity of trust beliefs in the population coupled with the tendency of individuals to extrapolate beliefs about others from their own levels of trustworthiness could generate this non monotonic relationship highly trustworthy individuals tend to form overly optimistic beliefs to assume too much social risk and to be cheated more often ultimately performing less well than those with a belief close to the mean trustworthiness of the population on the other hand less trustworthy individuals form overly pessimistic beliefs and avoid being cheated but give up profitable opportunities therefore underperforming the cost of either too much or too little trust is comparable to the income lost by foregoing college our findings in large scale survey data are supported and extended with experimental findings we show that in the trust game own trustworthiness and beliefs about others trustworthiness are strongly correlated and persistent and that patterns in earnings lost due to incorrect beliefs are comparable to those in the survey data

public trust and corruption perception disaster relief public trust in government and nongovernment organizations is essential to the public s willingness to donate and to support those organizations we measure public trust in disaster aid using people s perception of these organizations effectiveness in delivering aid relief to the victims of two recent major earthquakes in china based on the survey data collected in 2013 from about 2100 residents in hong kong we document the vulnerability of these residents trust perceptions in aid delivery we find that the sharp decline in trust perception is highly negatively correlated with their perception of corruption of local governments in china

the dynamics of technological innovation the case of the pharmaceutical industry abstract this paper examines the mechanisms and dynamics of the process of innovation in companies and sectors of the chemical industry it is based on analysis of science and technology output indicators namely patents and innovations evaluated in terms of originality and in the case of innovations in terms of market success as well radical innovation ri is identified as the kingpin for the evolution of technologies in both the micro and macro economic context not only because it provides a model for imitation but also because it turns out to be more profitable for the innovating companies than incremental innovation at the micro economic level this paper examines the significance of diverse driving forces which lead a company to the launching of projects aiming at ri measures the length of commitment to such projects and describes the dynamic effects generated by the introduction of a successful ri and how they affect the company s subsequent r d and market orientation at the macro economic level this paper identifies the stages of youth growth maturity and decline of the subsectors of the chemical industry examines the distribution of ri and market successful innovations over the development of a sector describes the influence of market demand and capital investment on technological advance and compares the development of national chemical industries the paper concludes with an account of the dynamics of technological innovation in the chemical industry over the period 1930 1985 which is based on the empirical findings of the previous sections

house money effects on trust and reciprocity in a typical laboratory investment game experiment participants endowments are provided by the experimenter thus the worst case for the investor is that she loses all of her found money by contrast in naturally occurring environments investment decisions can often lead to a loss of one s own money this paper investigates whether trust found in one shot anonymous laboratory interaction is robust to own money environments our results show that consistent with previous investment game results most investors send a positive amount and most trustees return at least the transfer amount regardless of whether the investors purchase or are gifted their endowment however investments are on average lower when participants use their own money and the fraction of maximum investments the most risky investment decision is only half as large under own money as it is under gifted endowments our results explain why one should exercise caution in placing trust in any government s ability to spend other people s money prudently

temporal stability and psychological foundations of cooperation preferences abstract a core element of economic theory is the assumption of stable preferences we test this assumption in public goods games by repeatedly eliciting cooperation preferences in a fixed subject pool over a period of five months we find that cooperation preferences are very stable at the aggregate level and to a smaller degree at the individual level allowing us to predict future behavior fairly accurately furthermore our results provide evidence on the psychological foundations of cooperation preferences the personality dimension agreeableness is closely related to both the type and the stability of cooperation preferences

coordination in split award auctions we analyze split award procurement auctions in which a buyer divides full production between two suppliers or awards all production to a single supplier and suppliers have private cost information an intriguing feature of split awards is that the equilibrium bids are implicitly coordinated because a split award price is the sum of offered split prices each supplier can unilaterally veto a split award by bidding very high for the split the need to coordinate is reflected in a split price that does not vary with private information we also explore conditions under which split award auctions may be preferred to winner take all auctions

the rise of female professionals are women responding to skill demand for years college educated women were limited mainly to lower paying female dominated professions such as teaching and nursing over the past several decades however there has been a remarkable increase in the percentage of college educated women in higher paying traditionally male professional occupations in 1967 the fraction of college educated women working in these occupations was less than 20 percent by 1997 this number had increased to almost 40 percent this increase is particularly striking when compared to the slightly declining trend among college educated men what can explain this increase in female professionals there are a number of possible explanations one explanation is a demand shift favoring women over men in these highly skilled occupations while the notion of a gender specific demand shift is compelling in the case of high school graduate men and women who work in very different industries and occupations the story is much less convincing for the college educated group collegeeducated men and women work in more similar occupations and are presumably closer substitutes for each other to the extent that they are different the available evidence suggests that this may have worked to the disadvantage of women see francine blau and lawrence kahn 1997 another explanation and the one we focus on in this paper is that college educated women have responded to the rise in overall skill demand a phenomenon which has characterized the u s labor market during the 1980 s and perhaps even as early as the 1970 s an important margin of response for these women may have been labor market participation in 1970 less than 60 percent of college educated women were working the economy wide rise in skill demand may have attracted educated women not only from other occupations but from nonparticipation as well since virtually all college educated men work labor market participation is less likely to be a factor for men while we postulate that the overall increase in skill demand played an important role we are also aware that this is not the only explanation within these high wage professional occupations women s wages rose relative to male wages even as women increased their share this suggests to us that declining discrimination which both made it easier for women to enter these occupations and resulted in wage convergence vis a vis the male workers or unobserved skill upgrading also may have played a role in addition the spread of more effective birthcontrol devices roe v wade and no fault divorce laws just to name a few of the factors which changed marriage and fertility patterns of women also most likely contributed to women s willingness and ability to invest in career jobs see claudia goldin and lawrence katz 2000

promoting fair competition in public procurement abstract if a government cares for local firms profit but not for foreign firms foreign firms will be discriminated against when competing for government procurement contracts foreign firms will be chosen less often and when chosen earn less profit than local firms we analyze a more central authority s policies against such discrimination given a situation in which a government has private information on product quality and the competing firms have private information on own costs necessary and sufficient conditions for free revelation of quality information are derived finally optimal policy when these conditions are not satisfied is characterized and discussed

time to cook expenditure at retirement in spain detailed panel expenditure data from spain reveal little evidence of a retirement consumption puzzle in 1985 2004 there is a drop in food at home expenditure in the later years of the sample along with evidence of households paying lower prices for the food they purchase after retirement however our findings are consistent with a model that allows for home production as long as one accounts for the greater participation in housework by men after retirement coinciding with this latter period our work adds to the evidence from several countries and helps in reconciling the retirement consumption puzzle with life cycle models

in group versus out group trust the impact of income inequality author affiliation vivian lei department of economics university of wisconsin milwaukee 3210 n maryland avenue bolton hall 818 milwaukee wi 53201 usa and department of economics and finance city university of hong kong hong kong vlei uwm edufilip vesely department of economics university of wisconsin milwaukee 3210 n maryland avenue bolton hall 812 milwaukee wi 53201 usa and department of economics hong kong university of science and technology hong kong vesely uwm edu acknowledgment we are particularly grateful to the center for research on international economics at the university of wisconsin milwaukee city university of hong kong and hong kong university of science and technology for financial and laboratory support we thank kenneth chan john heywood kamhon kan steven tucker two anonymous referees and participants at the 2007 economic science association north american regional meeting and the 10th experimental economics days dijon for valuable comments we thank cici lo and jennifer tse for excellent research assistance 1 introductionwhat promotes trust and what destroys it various studies have shown that institutional development age structure population size religious composition income inequality and ethnic diversity are linked to and may directly impact the overall trust level in a society or community see for example knack and keefer 1997 la porta et al 1997 zak and knack 2001 knack and zak 2002 uslaner 2002 zelmer 2003 berggren and jordahl 2006 bjornskov 2006 of all these variables income inequality measured by the gini coefficient is perhaps the most consistent and robust determinant of social solidarity and trust greater income inequality widens the social distance between different income classes and thereby reduces the overall level of trust there are two things worth noting about this particular result first while it can be shown with cross country data that income inequality is strongly associated with lower trust the causal relation between these two variables is not yet clear due to omitted variables and endogeneity problems second the measure of trust used in most of the empirical literature is based on responses to the question generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can t be too careful in dealing with people from the world values surveys responses to this survey question reflect at best respondents attitude regarding generalized trust to say nothing of the finding by glaeser et al 2000 that they are a much better predictor of a society s overall level of trustworthiness rather than of trust note that to study exactly how income inequality affects trust it is necessary to first identify what type of trust generalized or particularized trust that the research question is meant to address contrary to generalized trust that involves faith in a wide range of strangers particularized trust also called in group trust concerns faith in primarily in group members people of one s own kind or people who share the same values and norms via social ties or social identities uslaner 2002 inequality influences particularized trust by allowing social identities that are associated with different income classes to be developed social identities create similarity and similarity cultivates trust among in group members see for example allport 1954 coleman 1990 fukuyama 1995 alesina and la ferrara 2000 hardin 2006 while allport 1954 argues that in group positivity does not necessarily imply out group negativity income inequality could nevertheless activate out group hostility and further facilitate in group favoritism if it creates conflicts over scarce resources or political power between different income classes sherif and sherif 1953 levine and campbell 1972 brewer 1999 given the limited field data that can be directly used to measure the impact of income inequality on particularized trust this article contributes to the literature by studying the relationship between inequality and in group favoritism in a stylized laboratory environment

collective trust behavior this paper investigates trust behavior in situations where decision makers are large groups and the decision mechanism is collective theories from behavioral economics and psychology suggest that

female employment and occupational changes in the 1990s how is the eu performing relative to the us abstract this paper provides a comparison of the incidence and composition of female employment both in the eu and in the us despite a significant increase in female labour market participation in the eu about 50 of the difference between the employment rates in the us and the eu can still be attributed to differences in the educational attainments and the employment rates of women aged 25 54 we highlight the main features of female employment in both areas paying particular attention to the differences across age cohorts and educational levels our main findings are as follows i the educational level of the eu female population is slowly converging to that of the us across age cohorts ii the employment rates of less educated women are much lower in the eu than in the us with the exceptions of the scandinavian countries even for women aged 25 34 and iii occupational segregation is lower for the younger highly educated women who seem to be entering more typically male occupations and less typically female occupations although at a higher rate in the us than in the eu

can social preferences explain gender differences in economic behavior abstract this study examines whether gender differences in some economic behaviors are due to differences in social preferences as measured by dictator allocation decisions we find that compared to men women are significantly more likely to be inequity averters and significantly less likely to be social surplus maximizers these differences in social preferences explain to a large extent why women send less than men in trust games inequity averters can ensure equal payoffs if nothing is returned by sending one fourth of the endowment while surplus maximizers can increase total payoffs by a factor of three for each dollar sent social preferences also help explain the size of gifts in dictator games and choice of compensation method for simple tasks however after controlling for social preference type gender is still influential in these decisions women give significantly more to charity than men even after accounting for our measure of social preferences women prefer egalitarian payment systems both because they are inequity averters and because low self confidence may lead them to believe they will earn more with equal sharing

individual s religiosity enhances trust latin american evidence for the puzzle this paper explores the effect of religious observance and affiliation to the dominant religion catholicism on trust in institutions towards others and market attitudes the analysis is performed using a latin american database of twenty thousand respondents from 2004 by means of ordered probit models the most interesting results are i trust toward others is positively correlated with religious observance and with catholic affiliation ii there is a positive correlation between

incomplete information and optimal market structure public purchases from private providers abstract market structure is endogenized in a normative model of public procurement featuring a social cost of profit product variety economies of scale and incomplete information about cost depending on parameters either sole sourcing or dual sourcing might be optimal however if the social cost of profit is positive but not too large incomplete information biases optimal market structure in favor of sole sourcing on the other hand this bias in favor of sole sourcing may be reversed if the social cost of profit is large an application to the publicly financed treatment for drug abuse motivates the analysis