intervention analysis of electoral tax cycle the case of japan this paper analyzed the impact of elections on tax policy in japan using an arima autoregressive integrated moving average intervention analysis from 1953 through 1992 we used discretionary tax revenues which means the changes in tax receipts attributable to changes in the tax code rather than automatic tax revenues due to business cycles in the economy

explaining presidential priorities the competing aspiration levels model of macrobudgetary decision making this article develops a new statistical model of trade offs among defense nondefense and fiscal policy concerns as they are reflected in the presidential budgetary process the competing aspiration levels model calm builds on crecine s 1971 great identity argument unlike most previous attempts to model presidential budgeting calm explicitly represents the interdependence of decisions about defense nondefense and totalfederal expenditures calm models this interdependence as the result of the interaction of minimal aspirations for defense and nondefense expenditures with a maximum acceptable level of expenditures from a fiscal policy standpoint statistical analyses of presidential budgets for the fiscal years from 1955 through 1980 provide strong support for the calm formulation substantively the results indicate that fiscal constraints on total expenditures have progressively weakened that the maximum acceptable expenditure level has generally exceeded the minimal expenditure aspiration level and that when a potential fiscal surplus has existed the nondefense sector has been more successful in capturing a share of this surplus than the defense sector in keeping with traditional incrementalist arguments the results indicate that previous year expenditure levels provide a relatively secure budgetary base for both the defense and nondefense sectors both sectors tend to receive their minimal aspiration levels plus a share of whatever fiscal surplus exists the analysis also indicates that the executive branch has not been as strong a direct force for budgetary growth as congress

pricing in a customer market in standard pricing models movements in demand are partially offset by price responses in a customer market however price markups may decrease with high demand thus price may magnify rather than stabilize demand movements i consider a monopolist selling a good of which first time consumers are uncertain repeat customers know that the product works the monopolist trades the objectives of exploiting past customers and attracting new ones in a period with many new potential customers the monopolist gives more weight to attracting and lowers its markup last i examine some evidence on whether expansions are periods with disproportionately many new customers

fair pay and a wage bill argument for low real wage cyclicality and excessive employment variability this article considers a two period optimal contracting model in which firms make new hires in the second period subject to the constraint that they cannot pay discriminate either against or in favour of the new hires in the absence of fully contingent contracts it is shown that wages are less flexible than needed for efficient employment levels with the result that too few hires are made in bad states of the world unemployment is involuntary in an extension to the model there may also be involuntary and excessive layoffs in some states of the world this article investigates the consequences for wage and employment outcomes of assuming that firms follow a fair wage policy by a fair wage policy is meant that workers receive equal pay for equal work irrespective of when they were hired the fair wage restriction is combined with the assumption that wage contracts are not state contingent while both of these features have much empirical support there has been no previous attempt to analyse their interaction it is shown to lead to reduced wage volatility and increased employment variability as well as the possibility of involuntary unemployment the essential idea of the article is simple if the wage paid to new hires is

taxation and political business cycles in eu economies this paper examines whether incumbent national governments of 11 member states of the european union manipulated the tax policy instruments at their disposal in order to create national political business cycles opportunistic or partisan the empirical evidence based on data concerning the 1965 to 1997 period does not support this hypothesis rather it appears that governments have pursued stabilization policies

an essay on the rationality of economic policy the test case of the electional cycle the literature on electional cycles is discussed in the light of the empirical findings by in particular the author two basically different types of explanations of such cycles are compared explanations based on the maximizing behavior of governments aiming at re election explanations building on the insufficiently controlled pressures of events in a democracy it is demonstrated that even when the most well known theory under the nordhaus macraemodel is a rather fragile construction a more robust argument termed the popularity investment argument can be constructed yielding the same basic result from the empirical literature it is concluded that almost the opposite pattern actually occurs in the data it is finally demonstrated that the weak but significant empirical pattern is easy to explain by the elections generate promises which give most real expansion in the second governmental year and most inflation in the third year an average behavior which hardly implies even medium term maximization by governments as assumed under

how connected is the global sovereign credit risk network abstract this paper estimates the global network structure of sovereign credit risk by applying the diebold yilmaz connectedness methodology on sovereign credit default swaps scdss the level of credit risk connectedness among sovereigns which is quite high is comparable to the connectedness among stock markets and foreign exchange markets in the aftermath of the recent financial crises that originated in developed countries emerging market countries have played a crucial role in the transmission of sovereign credit risk while developed countries and debt ridden developing countries have played marginal roles secondary regressions show that both trade and capital flows are important determinants of pairwise connectedness across countries the capital flows became increasingly important after 2013 while the effect of trade flows decreased during the crisis and did not recover afterwards

a model of nominal contracts a model is produced in which labor contracts that prespecify unindexed nominal wage payments arise endogenously these contracts function as a self selection mechanism under appropriately different attitudes toward price level risk which can either arise directly from preferences or be induced by different patterns of asset holdings nominal contracts allow high productivity workers to signal their type by their willingness to accept unindexed contracts this explanation of nominal contracts does not require that money be used in any particular set of transactions and nominal contracts enhance the risk faced by all parties accepting them

nominal wage flexibility wage indexation and monetary union membership in a monetary union implies stronger incentives for nominal wage flexibility in the form of wage indexation and shorter contract length than non membership this counteracts the stabilisation policy cost of giving up monetary independence but more wage flexibility is only an imperfect substitute for an individual monetary policy it is possible that an increase in wage flexibility is welfare decreasing because of the accompanying rise in price variability the interaction between wage setting and central bank behaviour may result in either multiple equilibria or a unique full indexation equilibrium

elections keynes bureaucracy and class explaining u s budget deficits 1961 1978 the determination of u s federal budget deficits and surpluses during a period of keynesian fiscal activism is modeled in light of relevant social science literatures rational choice emphases upon electoral manipulation of the economy and keynesian stabilization marxian emphases upon monopolization andfiscal control of labor militancy organizational decision theory emphases upon budgeting inertia and a number of additional thrusts from other literatures are supported by time series regression analyses of 1961 1978 surpluses deficits the final model is statistically well behaved analysis of so called high employment measures of discretionary surpluses deficits supports all interpretations requiring discretionary policy making but an indication of automatic stabilization emerges as well a focus upon executive policy making roles is suggested as one means to further theoretical integration of explanations of state macroeconomic policy

on real and sticky price theories of the business cycle after presenting some facts about the growth of government in western industrialized countries possible causes of this development are analyzed from a public choice perspective next some empirically tested theories which seek to explain this growth are discussed finally possible consequences for efficiency and individual liberty are examined it is shown that both the number and size of interest groups age of democracy as stated by mancur olson 1982 and the increasing share of government expenditure in gdp seem to exert a negative influence on the growth rate of gdp copyright 1986 by ohio state university press

are prices too sticky nominal price rigidity has a negative externality rigidity in one firm s price increases the variability of aggregate real spending which harms all firms this paper investigates whether this externality is large which would imply that stabilization policy can be highly beneficial even if the costs of making prices flexible are small there are three conclusions first both the private cost of price rigidity and the externality are second order in the size of fluctuations second the externality can nonetheless be arbitrarily large third in a simple model the externality is small for plausible parameter values

the political policy cycle presidential effort vs presidential control after disentangling presidential budget proposals from budgetary changes attributable to fluctuations in the economy and to congressional action we find consistent evidence for a presidential macroeconomic policy cycle attuned to the elctoral cycle proposed budgets are more expansionary in election years than at other times the congress however also plays a significant role in determining fiscal outcomes its budgets are systematically related to those of the president and in general reinforce presidential efforts to respond to the electoral cycle

pay and employment determination in britain what are labour contracts really like the recent growth of unemployment in western economies has prompted new research on the workings of the labour market there has been much interest in particular in the questions what determines the level of real pay and why is it apparently so insensitive to changes in aggregate demand and unemployment european economists now find it hard to take seriously the notion still taught to many undergraduate that wages are determined by the intersection of demand and supply curves roughly half of all british employees belong to trade unions a much higher percentage have their pay fixed by some kind of collective bargain in this country it is negotiations not impersonal com petitive markets which decide what most of us will be paid the difficult problem is that of how to understand this process or to put it differently of how to think up the right model of the world

customer markets credit market imperfections and real price rigidity according to standard theory an increase in demand should raise prices of goods given factor prices empirically however prices appear to be unaffected by short run variations in demand this paper suggests an explanation of this observation if customers react slowly to price changes and credit markets are imperfect prices may be unchanged or even fall when demand increases the reason is that when demand is high profits are high and firms can compete more intensely for customers without increasing their borrowing copyright 1991 by the london school of economics and political science

rational expectations and price rigidity in a monopolistically competitive market this paper analyses monopolistically competitive markets under incomplete information facing unanticipated disturbances firms determine their prices before they have information about other firms prices and form their expectations about the average price rationally if the market becomes very competitive in the sense that the price elasticity of individual demand is close to infinity then the average price is completely insensitive to short run unanticipated disturbances in the intermediate case if a cost disturbances are uniform and b demand and cost disturbances are correlated then the average price is sensitive to cost and insensitive to demand

on union preferences and labour market models insiders and outsiders this paper constructs a model of trade union behavior in which there is a distinction between insiders and outsiders this is used to examine one of the most troublesome issues in macroeconomic theory namely the extent to which a rise in aggregate demand might generate wage increases rather than growth in employment a generalization of the most widely used union utility function is presented the analysis reveals the conditions under which insiders will agree to let outsiders into employment derives two step wage preferences and proves a new result on wage rigidity copyright 1987 by royal economic society

nominal wage contracts and the persistent effects of monetary policy we consider an efficiency wage model where wages affect turnover and firms choose optimal labor contracts under uncertainty about demand and productivity we show that there may be an equilibrium with nominal wage contracts where monetary shocks affect output furthermore monetary shocks have persistent effects on output because the previous state of the labor market affects the reemployment probability of quitting workers persistence increases if workers have bargaining power with endogenous policy a credibility problem arises naturally in the model equilibrium inflation increases with persistence but decreases with the natural rate of unemployment for given persistence

is equilibrium indexation efficient this paper investigates the welfare properties of equilibrium indexation in a decentralized economy if indexation is costless so all firms index then the equilibrium degree of indexation is efficient but if indexation is costly and this leads some firms not to index equilibrium indexation is inefficient because indexation has externalities for nonindexed firms firms choose too little indexation if labor demand is more responsive to movements in real money than to movements in real wages the results do not depend on the relative importance of real and nominal shocks

sovereign spreads in the eurozone which prospects for a eurobond in this paper we provide new evidence on the determinants of sovereign yield spreads and market sentiment effects in the eurozone in order to evaluate the rationale for a common eurobond jointly guaranteed by eurozone member states we find that default risk is the main driver of yield spreads suggesting small gains from greater liquidity fiscal fundamentals matter in the pricing of default risk but only as they interact with other countries yield spreads that is with the global risk that the market perceives more importantly the impact of this global risk variable is not constant over time a clear sign of contagion driven by shifts in market sentiment this evidence points to a discontinuity in the disciplinary role of financial markets if markets can stay irrational longer than a country can stay solvent then the role of yield spreads on national bonds as a fiscal discipline device is considerably weakened and issuing eurobonds can be economically justified carlo favero and alessandro missale

trade union efficiency and overemployment with seniority wage scales inefficient unemployment of union members depends upon the inability of the union to bargain over employment as well as wages the issue of union membership limitations has received less attention as seen in the survey by oswald i 983 grossman i983 considers endogenous membership size with mixed efficiency results but he imposes a number of severe restrictions on allowable contracts in the current paper we examine the issue of union membership size under very general contracts where unions negotiate over wage rates employment levels and compensation payments to laid off workers and further can negotiate differential treatment of seniority groups these general contracts represent a useful benchmark case recognising that the results will change as various limitations on the contract are imposed the treatment of seniority is crucial and we model this by an overlapping generations approach continuing workers at the firm negotiate the contract to be applicable to the following period new hires over that period in the number stipulated in the contract then gain seniority and negotiate the contract for the period after the formulation of the problem with the exception of the treatment of new hirings is similar to that in the implicit contracting literature and many of the results will be familiar unemployment of union members only occurs when the marginal value product of labour fails below the opportunity cost leisure value

an empirical model of wage indexation provisions in union contracts this paper describes the responses of index linked wage rates to concurrent price increases for a sample of canadian union contracts and then analyzes theseresponses in terms of a simple model of indexation to the aggregate price level the model highlights the importance of aggregate price movements in conveying information about industry specific prices the empirical analysis confirms that industry specific correlations between input and output prices and the consumer price index are important determinants of the flexibility of wages to prices across indexed contracts

a near rational model of the business cycle with wage and price inertia this paper presents a model in which insignificantly suboptimal behavior causes aggregate demand shocks to have significant real effects the individual loss to agents with inertial price wage behavior is second order in terms of the parameter describing the shock while the effect on real economic variables is first order thus significant changes in business activity can be generated by anticipated money supply changes provided that some agents are willing to engage in nonmaximizing behavior which results in small losses

presidential politics budget deficits and monetary policy in the united states 1960 1976 this paper has focused on the extent to which the traditional tools of macroeconomic management in the united states monetary and fiscal policy have contributed to a political business cycle regardless of whether politicians can successfully influence real economic variables to their own ends the evidence presented here suggests that they tried and that they enjoyed some at least indirect aid from their independent monetary authorities in doing so several major conclusions emerge

the wage price spiral this paper rehabilitates the old wage price spiral it shows that after an increase in aggregate demand the process of adjustment of nominal prices and nominal wages results from attempts by workers to maintain or increase their real wage and by firms to maintain or increase their markups of prices over wages under continuous price and wage setting the process of adjustment would be instantaneous under staggering of price and wage decisions the adjustment takes time the more inflexible real wages and markups are to shifts in demand the higher is the degree of price level inertia and the longer lasting are the effects of aggregate demand on output

insiders and outsiders in wage determination a firm starts with a group of insiders or seasoned workers there is also a large pool of outsiders who are initially less productive but are transformed into insiders after one period of employment the firm gains from having a large pool of insiders some of whom may be laid off in bad years insiders gain from keeping their numbers small if the insiders set their wage unilaterally they will choose a path that in this extreme case prevents employment of outsiders even if future employment prospects are good if the wage path is set by bilateral bargaining the extra advantage to the firm permits employment of some outsiders in some situations

how high is the private gain from wage indexation the effects of firm specific shocks on the gain from writing state contingent wage contracts are examine in an extension of the model in gottfries 1992 it is shown that the introduction of firm specific uncertainty increases the gain from indexation to prices only moderately moreover nominal wage contracts should be more prevalent when unemployment benefits are high or unemployment spells are short

the clash of central bankers with labour market insiders and the persistence of inflation and unemployment this paper analyses the implications of monetary policy for the dynamic behaviour of inflation in a natural rate model characterized by endogenous unemployment persistence we present evidence for the main industrial economies that suggests that inflation displays persistence which is of the same order of magnitude as the persistence of deviations of unemployment from its natural rate we provide a theoretical explanation of this fact based on a model of the dynamic interactions between central bankers and labour market insiders the clash in the objectives of central bankers and labour market insiders is what causes both inflation and unemployment to display the same persistence in this model the analysis suggests that inflation persistence could be addressed in a welfare improving way if central banks adopted monetary policy rules that targeted unanticipated changes in unemployment rates instead of deviations of unemployment from its natural rate

tax structure turbulence in oecd countries this paper analyses whether and to what extent politiciansmanipulate tax structures strategically in order to winelections or for ideological purposes we introduce anindicator for tax structure turbulence which measures thedegree to which a country s tax structure changes from oneyear to another using data on 18 oecd countries over theperiod 1965 1995 we find clear evidence of a politicalbudget cycle in national tax structures more precisely wefind that in election years tax structures are changedsignificantly less than in other years further thedispersion of political power significantly lowers the abilityof governments to change the tax structure we do not however find any evidence of partisan budget cycles innational tax systems following political regime changes

underemployment equilibrium with rational expectations in this paper i use some recent work in the microeconomics of imperfect information to construct a macro model the microeconomic theory suggests that atomistically competitive firms face kinked demand curves in this model there is a range of aggregate equilibria consistent with correct information i then show that individual firms can face a free rider problem in trying to move from one equilibrium to another by changing the price level monetary policy is not subject to this problem even if the policy is fully anticipated

monopolistic competition and the effects of aggregate demand how important is monopolistic competition to an understanding of the effects of aggregate demand on output we ask the question at three levels can monopolistic competition by itself explain why aggregate demand movements affect output can it together with other imperfections generate effects of aggregate demand in a way that perfect competition cannot if so can it give an accurate account of the response of the economy to aggregate demand movements the answers are no yes and yes

price dynamics under imperfect information abstract the paper considers the pricing decision of a monopolist firm having demand and costs exposed to nominal and real shocks which include both permanent and transitory changes the firm obtains information through both price and quantity signals and the price equation is found by use of a filtering technique it is shown that imperfect information implies nominal price smoothing where the price adjusts only partially relative to the past price by incorporating new information observed through price and quantity signals

the importance of lifetime jobs in the u s economy though the u s labor market is justly notorious for high turnover and consequent high unemployment it also provides stable near lifetime employment to an important fraction of the labor force this paper investigates patterns of job duration by age race and sex with the following major conclusions 1 the typical worker today is holding a job which has lasted or will last about eight years over a quarter of all workers are holding jobs which will last twenty years or more sixty percent hold jobs which will last five years or more 2 the jobs held by middle aged workers with more than ten years of tenure are extremely stable over the span of a decade only twenty to thirty percent come to an end 3 among workers aged thirty and above about forty percent are currently working in jobs which eventually will last twenty years or more three quarters are in jobs which will last five years or more 4 the duration of employment among blacks is just as long as among whites even though the jobs held by blacks are worse in almost every other dimension they are no more unstable than those held by whites 5 women s jobs are substantially shorter than men s on the average only about a quarter of all women over the age of thirty are employed in jobs which will last over twenty years whereas over half of men over thirty are holding these near lifetime jobs this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

insider bargaining power starting wages and involuntary unemployment recent analyses of wage bargaining has emphasized the distinction between insiders and outsiders yet one typically assumes that insiders and recently hired outsiders are paid the same wage we con

the congress and fiscal policy although the common belief is that the congress has paid little attention to fiscal policy the same kinds of political economic models which have been used to explain presidential budgetary policy may be used equally well to explain congressional budgetary behavior the congress fiscal policy appears to be systematically sensitive to both economic and political factors changes in the unemployment rate have a major impact on congressional budgetary policy as for political factors the president s lead is followed most closely on revenue proposals and not at all on the expenditure side the electoral cycle in particular the off year congressional election year is also important inducing larger deficits and smaller increases in revenues

a new look at the ui effect on transitions from unemployment into wage employment in spain the limited duration of the ui benefits entitlement this article is a new look at the study of the unemployment insurance effect on the transition probability from unemployment into wage employment in spain it is found that individuals increase their search effort and reduce their reservation wage as the unemployment insurance benefit entitlement exhaustion approaches and their exit rate equals that of the unemployed who never got benefits from the exhaustion moment financial constraints are not important in spain business cycle affects more to long term unemployed and finally it is found that the probability of being offered a vacancy decreases with time spent in unemployment having allowed for unobservable heterogeneity

microfoundations of macroeconomic price adjustment survey evidence from swedish firms this paper presents the results of a survey on price setting behavior conducted on a large random sample of swedish firms the median firm adjusts the price once a year state and time dependent price setting are about equally important the four highest ranked explanations for price rigidity in this study implicit contracts sluggish costs explicit contracts and the kinked demand curve have close correspondents among the top five places in two similar large scale surveys carried out in the uk and the u s the results point to the importance of the long term relations with customers for the rigidity of prices the estimated share of sales that go to regular customers is more than 80

implicit contracts a survey 7mplicit contracts resolve the distribution of uncertainty and utilization of specific human capital between risk averse workers and less risk averse firms incomplete contracts are required to yield involuntary layoffs in contract markets otherwise contracts are efficient and pareto optimal by construction there is a close relation between contract theory and neoclassical labor market theory contracts smooth consumption but increase the volatility of labor supply and labor utilization to demand disturbances because contractural insurance eliminates the income effects of socially diversifiable risks this result is similar to the intertemporal substitution hypothesis however the price mechanism in a contract is substantially different contracts embody a nonlinear two part pricing scheme the lump sum part allocates the income consumption consequences of risks and the marginal pricing part allocates production and labor utilization this implicit pricing mechanism is in all respects flexible though the observed average hourly wage combines both parts and may give the outward appearanceof rigidity furthermore the observed average wage rate in a contract does not reflect marginal conditions necessary for structural econometric estimation indivisibilities appear necessary to account for the split between work sharing and layoffs contracts with private information are also considered in the nonlinear pricing context this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

small menu costs and large business cycles a macroeconomic model of monopoly i introduction the conflict between modern neoclassical and traditional keynesian theories of the business cycle centers upon the pricing mechanism in neoclassical models prices are fully flexible they represent the continuous optimization of economic agents and the continuous intersection of supply and demand in keynesian models prices are often assumed to be sticky they do not necessarily equilibrate all markets at all times one of the reasons for the resurgence of the equilibrium approach to macroeconomics has been the absence of a theoretical underpinning for this keynesian price stickiness this note shows that sticky prices can be both privately efficient and socially inefficient the business cycle results from the suboptimal adjustment of prices in response to a demand shock to the extent that policy can stabilize aggregate demand it can mitigate the social loss due to this suboptimal adjustment in some keynesian models prices are simply exogenously fixed 2 in others agents must set their prices in advance of the transaction date the act of altering a posted price is certainly costly these costs include such items as printing new catalogs and informing salesmen of the new price yet these menu costs are small and therefore generally perceived as providing only a weak foundation for these fixed price models however this inference is flawed small menu costs can cause large welfare losses the claim that price adjustment costs are small does not rebut the claim that they are central to understanding economic fluctuations

insiders outsiders and nominal wage contracts while the consequences of nominal wage contracts have been rather thoroughly analyzed there is no generally accepted theory of why such contracts prevail in this paper i argue that the distinction between insiders and outsiders is important for understanding nominal wage contracts since most employment fluctuations take the form of fluctuations in hiring insiders are normally not affected by them since prices are primarily determined by costs demand shocks have small effects on real wages thus insiders have little incentive to change to more complicated contracts with rigid nominal wages nominal demand shocks have large effects on the employment opportunities of outsiders but outsiders have little influence on labor contracts

wages policy and unemployment in australia it is generally accepted among australian economists that high rates of growth of wages at various times over the last decade have made the achievement of full employment and lower rates of inflation more difficult fear of a further acceleration of wage growth has also been a policy constraint it is when one attempts to go further that considerable disagreement becomes evident from a labour market viewpoint there does not seem to be a consensus as to the answers to the two broad questions that should be addressed first how important are wage changes relative to other factors that depress employment and add to the inflation rate second how does government policy impinge on the process that generates wage changes to do justice to both of these in a paper as short as this one is difficult so i shall focus most of the paper on the second question the relationships between government policy and wage changes are particularly important at this time for most of the last decade successive governments have operated a national wages policy which to a large degree has been based on the indexation of wages for past price changes the latest experiment the prices and incomes accord is the centrepiece of the current government s employment and inflation policy and after almost two years of wide community and media support the key principles upon which it is based are suddenly being questioned 1 our prime endeavour therefore will be to build up sufficient understanding of the wage determination process so that some evaluation can be made as to the effectiveness of these national wage policies this turns out to be a remarkably difficult task which generates considerable concern in our mind that the data may not be sufficiently rich to serve as a basis for sound judgments it does appear however that the effect of a given level of unemployment upon wage changes has consistently weakened over the last decade why this should be so is a major unresolved puzzle i offer a loosely constructed theory that is consistent with the facts but it is by no means the only possible explanation section i provides a description of wage setting in australia and some key facts of the economy in section ii the statistical analysis of wage changes focuses on two competing theories one is the phillips curve approach and the other stresses that wage outcomes may be to a significant degree independent of the level of unemployment and may depend instead on utilization rates of labour within the firm section iii considers the efficacy of incomes policies in australia some final comments areoffered in section iv

the political business cycle under rational voting behavior this essay argues that politically motivated business cycles could persist in a democratic society even if the electorate votes in a rational fully informed manner provided that government policymakers have the means to systematically generate macroeconomic fluctuations this cyclic outcome reflects the preferences of an electorate that is composed of imperfectly altruistic voters belonging to different overlapping generations since each generation has a different horizon over which it would like to have elected politicians provide an optimal economic policy plan an intergenerational conflict of interests situation arises this conflict is placed into an explicit political context whereby cycles become generated under the institutional constraint of periodic elections