tripartite income employment contracts and coalition incentive compatibility tripartite contracts between workers a firm and an insurance broker pareto dominate the usual bilateral arrangements if coalitions are not feasible they do this by allowing the broker to run surpluses over a reservation expected utility in some states and deficits in others we show that these contracts are manipulable by coalitions this motivates our main contribution the definition and characterization of coalition incentive compatible tripartite contracts we then ask whether broker intermediation can still be useful the answer is that not every coalition incentive compatibility requirement annuls the critical budget breaking property specifically if firm broker coalitions are feasible there is no three party contract that is coalition incentive compatible and pareto superior to bilateral firm worker contracts except in the extreme case where the workers demand for leisure is income inelastic but if only a firm worker coalition can form the addition of a broker to a bilateral arrangement does reduce the welfare losses caused by the existence of asymmetric information

involuntary unemployment and implicit contracts this paper provides an explanation of involuntary umemployment arising as a consequence of asymmetric information between firms and workers involuntary unemployment is defined as a situation where ex post gains to trade exist a model of labor contracts is developed where the allocations are not ex post optimal it is shown that inferiority of leisure is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of involuntary unemployment

optimal incentive schemes with many agents the grossman hart principal agent model of moral hazard is extended to the multiple agent case to explore the use of relative performance in optimal incentive contracting under the assumption that the principal chooses incentive schemes to implement agent actions as nash equilibria necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for the optimality of independent contracts of rank order tournaments and for attainability of the first best in this context the relation of the principal s welfare to the correlation between the underlying randomness in outputs of different agents is also investigated finally some problems with the nash equilibrium implementation assumption are discussed in this paper we extend the grossman hart analysis of the principal agent problem to a multiple agent setting in this version of the problem a risk neutral principal is assumed to observe the output or a performance index for each risk averse agent the output of any agent depends on a privately observable action chosen by the agent and an exogenous random variable the realization of which is not observed either by the principal or by the agent before choosing its action we especially focus attention on the role of relative performance evaluation in optimal incentive contracts and the way this depends on properties of the underlying production technology and the joint distribution of the random variables affecting the outputs of different agents in section 2 of the paper we consider the principal s problem of finding an optimal incentive scheme and an action tuple for agents subject to the constraint that the latter be implemented as a nash equilibrium between agents by the chosen incentive scheme where agents must attain at least their reservation utilities a characterization of optimal incentive schemes is derived analogous to the grossman hart characterization for the single agent problem this characterization is then utilized to find sufficient and generically necessary conditions for a optimal contracts for any agent to be independent of the performance of other agents and b optimality of rank order tournaments where payments depend solely on ordinal comparisons of output across agents we then describe a necessary and sufficient condition for the principal to extract maximum advantage from relative performance clauses i e achieve the first best level of expected utility in the multiagent situation an implication of this result is that under fairly weak conditions perfect correlation in the underlying production uncertainties for different agents enables the principal to attain the first best if and only if sufficiently heavy penalties can be inflicted on agents we then enquire what happens in intermediate cases of non perfect correlation it turns out that while in general the principal s welfare is a continuous function of the correlation coefficient it is not always nondecreasing in the latter because the correlation coefficient is not a general measure of association between two random variables but rather a measure of linear association between them

underemployment and normal leisure abstract a combined worksharing layoff wage severance pay contract is shown to imply inter alia that normal leisure and underemployment do coexist provided the elasticity of substitution between employment and hours is sufficiently low as defined rigorously in the text

wage employment contracts this paper studies the efficient agreements about the dependence of workers earnings on employment when the employment level is controlled by firms the firms superior information about profitability conditions is responsible for this form of contract governance under plausible assumptions such agreements will cause employment to diverge from efficiency as a byproduct of their attempt to mitigate risk it is shown that if leisure is a normal good and firms are risk neutral employment is always above the efficient level such a one period implicit contracting model cannot therefore be used to explain unemployment as a rational byproduct of risk sharing between workers and a risk neutral firm under conditions of asymmetric information

the optimal indexation of asymmetric information contracts the indexation of labour contracts is examined in a setting from which the hedging motive for partial indexation has been excluded since firms have better information than workers contracts must satisfy an incentive compatibility constraint the optimal degree of indexation depends on the incentives generated by the best fully indexed contract if firms would understate overstate the productivity of labour under this contract the optimal contract is partially more than fully indexed l indexation optimale des contrats quand l information est asymetrique l auteur examine l indexation de contrats de travail dans un monde dont on a elimine l indexation partielle dans le simple but de se couvrir comme les firmes ont une meilleure information que les travailleurs les contrats doivent satisfaire une contrainte de compatibilite le degre optimal d indexation depend des incitations engendrees par le meilleur contrat pleinement indexe si les firmes sous evaluent sur evaluent la productivte des travailleurs dans le contrat le contrat optimal est partiellement plus que pleinement indexe

optimal unemployment insurance and experience rating in the presence of asymmetric information adding a public unemployment insurance ul to labor contracts is potentially pareto improving unfortunately most successful mechanisms are manipulable by coalitions this leads us to design coalition incentive compatible ui systems their welfare effect depends on which coalitions are feasible whenever firm ui coalitions may form one ends up with an impossibility result as contracts are made coalition proof they no longer pareto dominate firm worker contracts however if only firm worker coalitions are feasible the public ui is strictly pareto improving even though it cannot implement the welfare levels that would be reached if no coalition were feasible at all

implicit contracts moral hazard and unemployment this paper considers a firm whose marginal revenue product of labor is a random variable we derive the form of an optimal long term contract between workers and the firm under the assumption that labor s marginal product is observed by the firm but not by the workers we show that the existence of asymmetric information causes unemployment to be greater than in a situation where information about labor s marginal product is public or where employment is determined in spot markets in particular unemployment can occur when the marginal product of labor exceeds the reservation wage

asymmetric information multiperiod labor contracts and inefficient job separations economists have for some time been telling the world and each other that in a dynamic economy some labor turnover is to be expected and is in fact efficient however there is a pervasive feeling that not all of the observed turnover is efficient the dilemma of course is to provide satisfactory reasons why inefficient turnover should occur with optimizing rational economic agents in light of this problem recent developments in implicit contract theory 1 4 5 have begun to focus on the idea that in a world of uncertainty asymmetric information and moral hazard problems may prevent efficient fully enforceable contingent claims contracts from developing in particular the asymmetric information i e firms privately observe their profits and workers privately observe their alternatives and moral hazard problems make efficient turnover unlikely because parties making separation decisions have neither all available relevant information nor have an incentive to use this information to make an efficient decision while this investigation into the ramifications of asymmetric information has yielded new insights analysis in previous studies has been limited to models in which separations occur only in the final period of the model in this paper a simple multiperiod model is developed in which separations may occur in each of several successive periods the multiperiod specification enables us to distinguish between temporary and permanent separations and to focus attention on the potential for inefficient separations induced by asymmetric information problems in an intertemporal setting in an intertemporal model in which separations may occur in any one of several successive periods intertemporal allocation problems arise because compensation in a given period plays an allocative role not only in that particular period but also in all periods prior to that period that the terms of compensation may play a multiple intertemporal role in allocating labor has been recognized previously in other contexts for instance this argument has been used to explain the observed occurrence of rising wage profiles with tenure in the presence of such factors as worker shirking or firm specific skill acquisition 2 9 in this asymmetric information setting intertemporal allocation problems

the incidence of and returns to overeducation in the uk the 1991 wave of the british household panel survey is used to examine the extent of and the returns to overeducation in the uk about 11 of the workers are overeducated while another 9 are undereducated for their job the results show that the allocation of female workers is more efficient than the allocation of males the probability of being overeducated decreases with work experience but increases with tenure overeducated workers earn less while undereducated workers earn more than correctly allocated workers both the hypothesis that productivity is fully embodied and the hypothesis that productivity is completely job determined are rejected by the data it is found that there are substantial wage gains obtainable from a more efficient allocation of skills over jobs

mismatch in the spanish labor market overeducation the objective of this article is to explain the job match which is assessed by comparing attained education and job required education as reported by workers we frame our empirical work according to the occupational mobility theory using a cross section of workers from a representative survey of the spanish labor force we consider overeducated workers to be those who report that the level of education their jobs require is below the level of education they have attained our results indicate that overeducated workers have less experience decreased on thejob training and higher turnover than other comparable workers we also observe an improvement in the job match over age and mobility

why u s wage and employment behavior differs from that in britain and japan if a poll were to be conducted among american academic economists to select the most mystifying economic phenomenon of our time surely the sticky nominal wage rate would emerge at or near the top of the list the slow and partial response of the nominal wage rate to changes in aggregate nominal spending has been a central postulate of macroeconomic theory for the past 45 years from keynes general theory down to the standard postwar textbook keynesian paradigm to the more modern fixed wage price models of robert barro and herschel grossman i976 and edmond malinvaud i977 unwilling passively to accept nominal wage rigidity as an unexplained assumption many labour market theorists have followed the lead of costas azariadis i975 and martin baily i974 in building models to explain rigid wages and layoff unemployment as the rational outcome of a profit maximising calculus as i pointed out in an early critique of the azariadis baily model i976a their assumptions cannot explain cycles in employment but rather why workers would want fixed incomes i e a fixed wage rate and fixed employment soon thereafter barro i977 went one step further and argued that contract theory is a facade which cannot explain why workers would choose a rigid wage and variable employment in preference to the classical equilibrium quantity of employment that equates the marginal product of labour with the marginal value of time now an examination of the evidence has led me to the realisation that rigid wages cannot provide the underpinnings for a universally valid theory of the business cycle simply because wages are not universally rigid i document below with postwar quarterly data that the share of fluctuations in the manufacturing wage bill taking the form of nominal wage changes as compared to changes in hours worked is five to ten times greater in britain and japan than in

the impact of surplus schooling on productivity and earnings this article examines the impact of surplus schooling on individual productivity and earnings it proposes a model that divides workers education into two components education that is required and thus fully utilized in the job and education that exceeds the amount required and thus may be underutilized in the job the model is tested with data from the 1969 1973 and 1977 quality of working life surveys quinn and staines 1979 required schooling for each occupation is derived from estimates by job incumbents and by the dictionary of occupational titles the results show thqt surplus or underutilized education is rewarded at a lower rate than required education with the actual return dependent on the type of job

economic policy advice and political preferences this essay argues that public choice offers an appropriate approach for thinking about economic policy advice first i discuss the nature of the policy advice that is proffered by economists then i specifically suggest that one of the most common modeling features in the public choice literature viz the assumption that individuals have political preferences may be useful in helping us understand the nature of this advice finally i also carry out a tentative exploration of the implications of accepting the perspective that is provided when the suggested modeling feature is used in this context

university quality and labour market outcomes this paper uses proxies for university quality derived from the research assessment exercise and the teaching quality assurance agency to assess the impact of university quality on the labour market outcomes of a cohort of uk graduates the impacts on job quality and earnings were mainly limited to graduates in particular disciplines or those obtaining poor degrees from good universities the results suggest that after controlling for pre entry qualifications labour market outcomes for most graduates depended more on the subject studied and degree classification awarded than on the university attended

mandatory retirement as a clause in an employment insurance contract this paper postulates the existence of an employment insurance contract in which firms insure the employment of workers at a predetermined wage against potential age related declines in productivity to limit its liability the firm establishes an age limit to its promise the mandatory retirement age it is demonstrated that pareto efficient contracts exist which involve mandatory retirement at a specific age the existence of these contracts including mandatory retirement increases workers life time utility and encourages the accumulation of human capital empirical results are consistent with the predictions of the model

efficient labor contracts with employment risk this article analyzes efficient employment agreements where the demand for consumption insurance can be satisfied by noncontractual means we assume that workers can save and that consumption is determined by a strong form of the permanent income hypothesis under conditions of asymmetric information about exogenous shocks to labor demand we derive a unique compensation schedule that efficiently guides decisions by both workers and employers efficient employment outcomes are generated without a need for third party enforcement or monitoring and workers choose a consumption policy that leaves them indifferent among realizations of labor demand within this solution it is both costless and efficient for workers to delegate employment decisions to the firm within the context of the model we analyze implications for the equilibrium distribution of wages and for empirical studies of labor supply

overeducation job mobility and earnings mobility among holders of first degrees abstractovereducation has been researched extensively for nearly three decades but some major issues in regard to it are still topics of ongoing debate by using a panel data that combines a survey of two cohorts of israeli first degree holders and data from administrative sources on jobs and wages we examine the contribution of job turnover cognitive abilities and continuing graduate studies to the likelihood of overeducation and wage dynamics the study produces four main findings first rapid job switching makes a negative contribution to the increase in employee s wage and there is a negative correlation between two variables an employee s tenure and the number of past employers in the years after the completion of degree studies and the probability of being overeducated second the contribution of the individual s cognitive abilities and quantitative reasoning skills to the likelihood of becoming overeducated is negative third the wages of overeducated employees are some 11 lower and ris

noncooperative regulation of a nonlocalized externality with a nonlocalized pollution externality different groups bear the costs and benefits of abatement in the case of acid rain these groups are respectively consumers in the midwest and pollutees in the northeast these groups have conflicting interests that are represented respectively by a public utilities commission and an environmental regulator we analyze a model in which the environmental protection agency acting as a von stackelberg leader regulates pollution and the public utility commission regulates the price for a monopolist that has private information about the effectiveness of its abatement alternatives we characterize a noncooperative equilibrium and compare it with a cooperative equilibrium a nonlocalized pollution externality poses special regulatory problems when the benefits and the costs of abatement are borne by distinct groups whose interests are represented by different regulatory agencies a relevant example is acid rain which is believed to be caused in part by coal fired electricity generating plants these emit sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide which upon contact with moisture in the atmosphere form acid that falls with rain measures to reduce these emissions are of concern to the residents of the states in which the coal fired generating plants are located because abatement costs increase the prices they pay for electricity a number of plans have been proposed for distributing those costs more broadly but the costs of reducing the emissions of generating plants located in ohio will likely be borne in large part by ohio consumers and utilities while the benefits from abatement will largely be realized by the residents of the northeast and canada the control of a nonlocalized externality such as acid rain raises the issue of the relationship between the environmental regulator the environmental protection agency epa and the public utility commission the former is responsible for achieving an acceptable balance between the damage from pollution and the cost of abatement the latter is responsible for pricing electricity on the basis of the costs of production and pollution control one possibility is that cooperation between the two regulators leads to the joint regulation of emissions and prices cooperation would internalize the conflicting interests and mandates of the regulators but the distributive consequences of the regulatory alternatives inhibit cooperation the public utility commission for example has an interest in avoiding abate

trade unions and economic efficiency in this paper i shall investigate a role for trade unions in increasing economic efficiency this role is enabling an improvement in the allocation of riskbearing between a firm and its employees the essential idea is straightforward if employers and employees are both risk averse the optimal wage contract will not leave one party bearing all the risk if state contingent contracts are possible grossman and hart 1981 give several reasons for firms being risk averse that firms are indeed risk averse would seem to follow from the fact that employees bear substantial risks few firms offer a job for life at a guaranteed real wage employees bear the risks of layoff redundancy and changes in the real value of their earnings with transactions costs in finding and moving to another job which may be substantial in periods of high unemployment these are real risks yet the states of the world in which these eventualities are to occur are rarely specified in any legally enforceable form indeed it is hard to imagine that they ever could be both because of the problem of envisaging all the relevant states of the world the bounded rationality of simon 1979 and because of the problem of defining those states in such a way that the courts could in the event of a dispute decide which state had occurred in the absence of legal enforceability of state contingent contracts the analysis depends on whether or not decisions about production must be made before a firm knows which state has occurred if they do not have to be then it is not essential to negotiate any contract before the firm knows the state but it may still be desirable from a risk sharing point of view to have a long term contract covering different possible states for that case hall and lilien 1979 and grossman and hart 1981 have argued that some degree of state contingency may be achieved by negotiating a contract which allows the firm in the light of the state which occurs to choose between limited combinations of employment and wages the firm may for example be permitted to reduce wages under the contract but only at the expense of reducing employment so that it is only in its interest to do so if marginal productivity is low this can overcome some of the moral hazard problems arising when states are observed only by firms but as grossman and hart show only at the cost of pareto inefficiency in the employment contract at an empirical level it may explain provisions for compulsory overtime at premium rates this type of contract will work only in the case in which the firm observes the state of the world before making employment decisions but given that

a model of rationing and labour supply theory and estimation a number of authors most prominently clower 1965 and leijonhofvud 1968 have interpreted keynes s theory of unemployment as a disequilibrium model nominal price and wage rigidity prevent the labour market from clearing the actual level of employment is given by the minimum of the effective demand for labour and the effective supply general disequilibrium models of income and employment determination have been developed by barro and grossman 1976 and malinvaud 1977 the model has been extended to the open economy by dixit 1978 and to a two period rational expectations context by neary and stiglitz 1979 the econometric implications of the disequilibrium approach have been developed by goldfeld and quandt 1972 maddala and nelson 1974 and rosen and quandt 1978 among others in summary the disequilibrium approach has provided a fruitful context for analysing macroeconomic behaviour in a competitive walrasian system the notional supply of labour is defined as the amount of labour a worker wishes to provide when he can buy and sell as much as he would like in all markets subject only to his budget constraint and given prices and wages the notional supply of labour then is given by l where 1 c attains the indirect utility function

the rhetoric and reality of redistribution it is customary when giving a presidential address to begin by remarking on how happy you feel i have an even stronger reason for being happy than most presidents it will at long last permit me to break into the southern economic journal up to this point referees of that august institution have always rejected everything that i sent them finally however i am privileged to put an unrefereed paper in the journal and hence do not have to worry about this one being rejected the audience may feel that although it is nice for me it is hard on the journal but under the sacred traditions of the southern economic association the editors and referees can do nothing about it the blame if there is any has to be laid on me and not on the management of the journal in a way the fact that i will not face referees is important because in this paper i propose to violate a number of implicit taboos in the discussion of income redistribution indeed i propose to argue that most of the current discussion of income redistribution is drastically defective this will not only include rawls it will include what most members of the economic profession normally say on the subject and presumably what the potential referees of this paper would have thought let me very briefly survey the existing economic as opposed to the philosophic literature on the redistribution of income firstly a good many economists have said simply that economics can say nothing about the subject because somebody gains and somebody loses but we can t say whether this is a good or a bad thing with our apparatus hochman and rodgers 9 have started another tradition of dealing with income redistribution in which the government is seen as simply organizing what is essentially a voluntary transfer from the better off american citizens to the less well off american citizens why the government should be used as an instrumentality for this kind of transfer was interestingly enough first explained by milton friedman 6 191 92 such redistribution has the interesting characteristic that it does not actually involve redistribution because the people who make the gift are maximizing their own utility and hence are better off it is a case in which human preferences are so arranged that a given dollar of income benefits two people a full dollar s worth the donor gains a dollar from expending money at its best use to him i e making a gift to the poor and the poor gain the dollar in a somewhat metaphysical sense it can be said here

incentive contracting with asymmetric and imperfect precontractual knowledge abstract the pareto optimal contract between principal and risk neutral agent is analyzed for the case in which the agent s information is initially imperfect but better than that of the principal in contrast to the case where precontractual information is symmetric the final contract between principal and agent will not always guarantee an efficient outcome however in contrast to the case where the agent s information is initially perfect the agent may be unable to command rents from his superior information and the outcome will always be efficient the conditions under which efficient or inefficient outcomes are guaranteed differ qualitatively according to whether the random stete of nature follows a continuous or a discrete distribution journal of economic literature classification numbers 022 026 611

credit rationing and implicit contract theory an empirical study abstract this paper investigate whether or not implicit contract relations predominate in the japanese bank loan market and produce equilibrium credit rationing the empirical evidence suggests that risks are shared between banks and firms through interest rate arrangements this implies that commercial banks in japan operate in a market dominated by implicit contract relations however the evidence does not support the view that japanese commercial banks execute credit rationing in the sense of fried and howitt 1980 furthermore the results show that large banks differ from small banks in the risk consideration of loan contracts these empirical results are completely consistent with the intermarket business group hypothesis such that the group formation aims to share risks and profits among members

employment with asymmetric information in an economy without informational and other distortions entrepreneurs and workers can write labor contracts that support a pareto optimal allocation of resources this paper is an attempt to characterize contracts when enterpreneurs are better informed about the state of nature than are their workers asymmetric information generally results in a suboptimal allocation of both risk and worker effort in particular if consumption and leisure are perfect substitutes employment will be less than fully pareto optimal in all but the most favorable states of nature

implicit contracts with asymmetric information and bankruptcy the effect of interest rates on layoffs this paper develops a model in which a firm writes labour contracts with workers and debt contracts with creditors firms have more information than do the owners of the factors of production and they are also subject to limited liability we show that if the limited liability constraint is binding then the employment level is inefficient relative to a situation of symmetric information the firm is then embedded into a partial equilibrium model in which the real rate of interest is exogenously determined we show that increases in the real rate of interest increase the inefficiency of the optimal employment contract and lead to layoffs in more states of nature than would occur at lower real interest rates recent literature in the area of implicit contracts has shown considerable interest in the assumption of asymmetric information henceforth a i papers by azariadis 1982 green and kahn 1982 and grossman and hart 1981 have all shown that a i will interfere with optimal risk sharing but although these models produce non walrasian outcomes it is not clear that they are capable of explaining the observed variations in employment over the business cycle in the absence of a link between the level of employment and other macroeconomic variables these new versions of contract theory are open to the charge that they are presenting a complicated explanation of frictional unemployment one potential link between variations in output and variations in intertemporal prices is suggested by models which explicitly allow for the possibility of bankruptcy sappington 1983 has shown that bankruptcy will generate inefficient outcomes even between risk neutral agents and farmer 1984 has shown that if sappington type contracts are incorporated into a macroeconomic structure then the resulting model predicts that bankruptcies will vary countercyclically over the business cycle although bankruptcy is important however it is unlikely that bankruptcies alone will account for all of the output loss during a recession the purpose of this paper is to show that the assumptions of a i and limited liability will generate a model in which the employment level is inefficient and in which the magnitude of this inefficiency varies systematically with the expected real rate of interest this model predicts that the observed increase in the incidence of layoffs during recessions is directly attributable to the effects of high interest rates on aggregate supply some evidence of the phenomenon to be explained is presented below

insurance within the firm we evaluate the allocation of risk between firms and their workers using matched employer employee panel data unlike previous contributions this paper focuses on idiosyncratic shocks to the firm which are the correct empirical counterpart of the theoretical notion of diversifiable risk we allow for both temporary and permanent shocks to output and find that firms absorb temporary fluctuations fully but insure workers against permanent shocks only partially risk sharing considerations can account for about 15 percent of overall earnings variability the remainder originating from idiosyncratic shocks to individual workers our welfare calculations indicate that firms are an important vehicle of insurance provision

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

enforcement of implicit employment contracts through unionization in a world in which employment contracts are incomplete it is costly for a firm to establish credibility for honoring implicit terms of employment agreements by monitoring the employment relationships between the firm and its workers the labor union may provide the workforce with valuable information regarding the firm s adherence to these implicit agreements thus the union provides a signaling mechanism that allows workers to coordinate their actions in order to discipline the firm for a breach of the implicit contract this mechanism enhances the firm s credibility when forming employment contracts and facilitates increased employment levels

optimal labour contracts and involuntary unemployment under costly and imperfect monitoring this paper provides an explanation for the concurrence of rigid wages and involuntary unemployment we consider cases in which a firm monitors its workers but at some cost a key assumption in the model is that the firm cannot perfectly distinguish shirkers from nonshirkers thus the firm has to rely on negotiated compensation and work effort as well as monitoring to reduce the incentive to shirk we find that rigid wages and involuntary unemployment arise simultaneously when monitoring costs are large and the effectiveness of monitoring is low

labor contracts and the role of monetary policy in an overlapping generations model abstract this paper characterizes labor contracts in a dynamic economy subject to both real and nominal shocks in this environment we compare alternative means of trading labor services spot markets fixed nominal wage contracts and price contingent contracts the welfare ordering of these market structures is shown to depend on the relative variability of the real and nominal shocks and the costs of contingent contracts the paper also investigates the role of monetary policy and the neutrality of feedback rules finally we demonstrate that the optimal policy is nonstochastic

public choice and public policy the vulnerability of economic advice to the interpretation of politicians the confidence with which politicians defend their policies is in marked contrast to the qualifications which academic researchers attach to their results the difference is indicative of a failure of the political market whereby politicians have an incentive to select policies for electoral and ideological reasons and to minimise any uncertainty associated with policy effectiveness in this scenario dissension between economists is of value if it alerts individuals to the sensitivity of policy answers to the framework in which they are derived moreover with government failure public choice analysts are faced with the problem of how best to amend policy advice in order to allow for potential distortion at the hands of politicians

graduate overeducation as a sheepskin effect evidence from northern ireland this article examines the nature of graduate overeducation amongst a group of applicants to a graduate conversion programme it was found that while a substantial proportion of earnings differentials were associated with a mismatch between individual skill levels and job requirements wage gaps were still likely to occur should such mismatches be eliminated the evidence suggests that graduate wage levels are heavily related to sheepskin effects associated with the attainment of jobs with graduate level entry requirements these sheepskin effects suggest that the process of job categorization is arbitrary in nature with stated job requirements somewhat independent of actual skill requirements the analysis suggests that graduate overeduction is better understood within the context of both skill and categorization mismatches as opposed to skill matches alone

the moral hazard of budget breaking it has recently been suggested in the agency literature that moral hazard in teams can be dealt with by introducing a third party who breaks the budget balancing constraint and that this facilitates the design of contracts that can sustain the pareto optimum as a perfect nash equilibrium this note offers an explanation for why the use of budget breaking schemes is not so widespread as that of active monitoring despite the fact that such schemes would save the resources expended on supervision the note demonstrates that allowing the budget to be broken introduces the potential for moral hazard on the part of the third party which could render the proposed equilibrium incredible

double penalty in returns to education informality and educational mismatch in the colombian labour market abstractthis article examines the returns to education taking into consideration the existence of educational mismatches in the formal and informal employment of a developing country results show that the returns of surplus required and deficit years of schooling are different in the two sectors moreover they suggest that these returns vary along the wage distribution and that the pattern of variation differs for formal and informal workers in particular informal workers face not only lower returns to their education but suffer a second penalty associated with educational mismatches that puts them at a greater disadvantage compare to their formal counterparts

economics and the political processt i want to use this once in a lifetime opportunity for pontificating to the profession to explore ways of improving the interaction between what economists do and the political process tension and conflict are of course inherent in political decisions especially on economic policy nothing can make such decisions easy nevertheless it is my contention that economic policymaking in washington in the last decade has been more frustrating muddled and confusing than necessary some of the fault lies with economists and economics some with politicians and the political process some in the interactions i want to offer some suggestions for modest improvements most economists probably share my premise that economics ultimately ought to be more than just challenging intellectual gymnastics it ought to help us understand how the economy works and provide a basis for intelligent political choices among economic policies even those who devote their energies to resolving purely theoretical issues imagine that somehow in the end their efforts will prove socially useful the dedicated idealistic young economist who aspires to advise a government may well envision herself someday as the wise and impartial adviser to the philosopher queen in this daydream the adviser presents the best forecasts that can be made of the future course of the economy she explains the macroeconomic policy options and what is likely to happen if each is undertaken she elucidates why market solutions are efficient when markets are likely to fail and what can be done when this occurs she identifies risks and uncertainties which fortunately are not overwhelming she represents the best professional judgment of her fellow economists indicating the major respects in which most economists agree and scrupulously pointing out that in minor respects the views of some of her professional colleagues might differ from her own she remains above the political fray identifying any values or distributional biases that may creep into her judgments and eschewing identification with interest groups or ideological causes the queen for her part listens carefully and intelligently asks thoughtful questions and weighs the options she may consult other experts on noneconomic aspects of the decisions but these can be assumed not to be very important she then makes final decisions even very hard ones and sticks to them the decisions are carried out the economy prospers and a grateful nation applauds the wisdom of the monarch and her economist and the usefulness of economics but in the real world both economics and politics are frustratingly unlike this picture both are pluralistic in the extreme and appear to be getting more so economists and political leaders not only miscqmmunicate but each accuses the other of incompetence obfuscation self serving motives and antisocial behavior economists of course do not wait for others to attack them they do it themselves walter heller said in his presidential address that the chorus of self criticism has risen to a new crescendo 1975 p 1 and the selfdeprecation has not abated in the intervening decade if a golden age of economists self confidence ever occurred it is long past events of recent years have kept reminding us that our national economy is diverse and complex battered by unpredictable shocks and increasingly interconnected with the even the brookings institution 1775 massachusetts avenue n w washington d c 20036 the views set forth here are solely my own and do not necessarily represent the opinions of the trustees officers or other staff members of the brookings institution i am grateful for the insights and assistance of many colleagues especially robert d reischauer charles l schultze mary s skinner and valerie m owens presidential address delivered at the ninety ninth meeting of the american economic association december 29 1986 new orleans louisiana

optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents abstract a setting in which a single principal contracts with two agents who possess perfect private information about their own productivity is considered with correlated productivities each agent s private information also provides a signal about the other agent s productivity in contrast to the setting in which there is only one agent it is shown that such private information may be of no value to the agents it is only if the agents are risk averse that their private information may allow them to command rents moreover when the agents are constrained only to reveal their private information truthfully as a nash equilibrium the pareto optimal incentive scheme may induce the agents to adopt strategies other than truth telling this leads to the consideration of truth telling equilibria that are not pareto dominated in the subgame played by the agents among all such equilibria the one preferred by the principal restricts one agent to tell the truth as a dominant strategy and the other as a nash response to truth

a characterization of employment distortions in labor contracts with asymmetric information abstract employment distortions are characterized for different combinations of firm s risk aversion and the degree of normality of leisure in worker s preferences using a novel method all previously established results are derived and the previously unresolved cases are worked out

overeducation in the labor market this article examines the reasons for the observed discrepancy between workers actual and required levels of schooling and the resulting differences in returns to schooling overeducated workers are found to be younger and to have lower amounts of on the job training than workers with the required level of schooling they also have higher rates of firm and occupational mobility characterized by movement of higher level occupations the findings suggest that overeducation can be explained by the trade off between schooling and other components of human capital and by the mobility patterns of overeducated workers

overeducation in the labour market abstract this paper presents a review of the literature on overeducation the paper assesses the consistency of overeducation within the context of a number of theoretical frameworks including human capital theory hct and assignment theory the analysis goes on to discuss the various measurement controversies associated with the study of overeducation in order to provide an assessment of the extent to which the impacts of the phenomenon represent an economic reality as opposed to a statistical artefact after reviewing the literature it is concluded that the impacts of overeducation are likely to be non trivial and that the phenomenon may potentially be costly to individuals and firms as well as the economy more generally the existence of overeducation also raises some doubts with respect to the validity of some of the central assumptions and predictions of hct that are unlikely to be fully explained by gaps in the standard wage equation framework

dynamic contractual enforcement a model of strikes this paper provides a theory of strikes as part of a constrained efficient enforcement mechanism for an implicit contractual agreement a firm possessing contemporaneously private information about demand engages in an enduring relationship with its workforce if the information becomes perfectly observable subsequently then modulo discounting the first best is implementable but strikes are always off the equilibrium path if the observations of the workforce are imperfect strikes occur in equilibrium the dynamic contracting problem is modeled as a repeated game with imperfect monitoring the equilibrium exhibits production inefficiency and incomplete insurance to mitigate the inefficiencies caused by strikes

a note on overemployment underemployment in labor contracts under asymmetric information abstract models of labor contracts under asymmetric information may predict either overemployment or underemployment this paper shows that this result depends crucially on whether or not leisure is a normal good if firms are risk neutral

dynamic labor contracts under asymmetric information abstract this paper discusses the distortion of employment within a two period asymmetric information contracting model in which an exogenous demand shock is serially correlated and is known only to firms the obtained results show that serial correlations of the state of nature can cause not only underemployment but also overemployment even when overemployment never occurs in the context of a static asymmetric information contracting model

overeducation undereducation and the british labour market this paper addresses the issue of overeducation and undereducation using for the first time a british dataset which contains explicit information on the level of required education to enter a job across the generality of occupations three key issues within the overeducation literature are addressed first what determines the existence of over and undereducation and to what extent are over and undereducation substitutes for experience tenure and training second to what extent are over and undereducation temporary or permanent phenomena third what are the returns to over and undereducation and do certain stylized facts discovered for the us and a number of european countries hold for britain

the heckman correction for sample selection and its critique this paper gives a short overview of monte carlo studies on the usefulness of heckman s 1976 1979 two step estimator for estimating selection models such models occur frequently in empirical work especially in microeconometrics when estimating wage equations or consumer expenditures it is shown that exploratory work to check for collinearity problems is strongly recommended before deciding on which estimator to apply in the absence of collinearity problems the full information maximum likelihood estimator is preferable to the limited information two step method of heckman although the latter also gives reasonable results if however collinearity problems prevail subsample ols or the two part model is the most robust amongst the simple to calculate estimators

implicit contracts incentive compatibility and involuntary unemployment this paper considers the enforceability of employment contracts when employees performance cannot be verified in court so that piece rate contracts are not legally enforceable part i shows that there exists a variety of self enforcing implicit contracts modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and characterizes all the wage and performance outcomes that can be implemented implementation requires a strictly positive surplus from employment the form of the contract depending on how this surplus is divided between firm and employee piece rate contracts and contracts with an informally agreed bonus can be made self enforcing but the use of severance pay and bonding does not extend the set of implementable allocations the resulting contracts resemble actual labor contracts more than do the contracts in standard principal agent models part ii analyses market equilibrium with these contracts also modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and shows that many such equilibria exist unfilled vacancies and unemployed workers can co exist despite the existence of contracts that are potentially mutually beneficial for those jobs that are filled any division of the potential surplus is possible so that the market can have at the same time involuntary unemployment and vacancies that are unfilled despite filled jobs earning positive profits as a criterion for selecting equilibria a notion of renegotiation proofness is applied then either all workers are employed or all jobs filled but any division of the potential surplus is still possible the paper explores what further restrictions on beliefs give rise to a walrasian outcome in which all the potential surplus goes to the short side of the market and to an efficiency wage type outcome in which the potential surplus goes to the long side

searching for leviathan an empirical study in several papers and a recent book geoffrey brennan and james buchanan 1977 1978 1980 have put forth a striking and controversial view of the public sector drawing by analogy on the conventional theory of monopoly in the private sector they envision a monolithic government that systematically seeks to exploit its citizenry through the maximization of the tax revenues that it extracts from the economy from this perspective they develop a fiscal constitution whose central purpose is to constrain leviathan by limiting in various ways its access to tax and other fiscal instruments while the leviathan hypothesis has been the source of lively debate and a wide range of policy proposals it has not been the subject of much systematic empirical work or testing this is a matter of some importance since the policy implications of the leviathan view are disturbing to put it mildly in particular brennan and buchanan virtually stand on their heads many of the basic theorems in public finance for an efficient and equitable tax system if in fact the leviathan view is an inaccurate depiction of the functioning of the public sector the introduction of their policy proposals is likely to make a sorry mess of the fiscal system the leviathan model does however have some straightforward implications for observable fiscal behavior it is the purpose of this paper to examine one of these testable implications brennan and buchanan stress that fiscal decentralization is itself a powerful constraint on leviathan competition among governments in the context of the interjurisdictional mobility of persons in pursuit of fiscal gains can offer partial or possibly complete substitutes for explicit fiscal constraints on the taxing power 1980 p 184 such competition among governments in a federal system that places heavy reliance on local fiscal decisions will greatly limit the capacity of leviathan to channel resources into the public sector in short as indicated by the epigraph to this paper the leviathan model implies that other things equal the size of the public sector should vary inversely with the extent of fiscal decentralization 2

endogenous unemployment insurance in a monopoly union model when job search matters abstract the aim of the paper is to derive an optimal unemployment insurance policy for a utilitarian trade union when job search matters it is shown that the well known result from the theory of insurance concerning the optimal risk sharing between risk averse agents changes essentially if the search behavior is allowed to affect the performance of the labor market we assume that labor market mismatch decreases with search effort which in turn decreases with the benefit the resulting equilibrium benefit is shown to be a decreasing function of the trade union s share of the costs of the insurance fund the model is also extended to the case where the benefit is made conditional on monitored search effort