an empirical analysis of life cycle fertility and female labor supply this paper examines us household fertility and female labor supply over the life cycle using data from the panel study of income dynamics the authors investigate how maternal time inputs and market expenditures on offspring as well as the benefits they yield their parents vary with ages of offspring and influence female labor supply and contraceptive behavior the econometric framework combines a female labor supply model and a contraceptive choice index function it also accounts for the fact that conceptions are not perfectly controllable events using longitudinal data on married couples the authors estimate these equations and test alternative specifications of the technologies governing child care the findings suggest that while parents cannot perfectly control conceptions variations in child care costs do affect life cycle spacing of births furthermore the results demonstrate the gains of modeling the linkages between female labor supply and fertility behavior at the household level authors modified

multiple experiments for the causal link between the quantity and quality of children this article presents evidence on the child quantity child quality trade off using quasi experimental variation due to twin births and preferences for a mixed sibling sex composition as well as ethnic differences in the effects of these variables our sample includes groups with very high fertility an innovation in our econometric approach is the juxtaposition of results from multiple instrumental variables strategies capturing the effects of fertility over different ranges for different sorts of people to increase precision we develop an estimator that combines different instrument sets across partially overlapping parity specific subsamples our results are remarkably consistent in showing no evidence of a quantity quality trade off

incentive effects of the u s welfare system a review the author would like to acknowledge support for prior work on this topic from the u s department of health and human services and helpful comments from three anonymous referees rebecca blank howard chernick john fitzgerald irwin garfinkel peter gottschalk edward gramlich david greenberg judith gueron james heckman v joseph hotz robert hutchens michael keane frank levy larry mead michael murray robert plotnick anuradha rangarajan philip robins howard rolston jeffrey smith and daniel weinberg all opinions and errors are those of the author alone

imagined risks and cost benefit analysis everyone recognizes substantial discrepancies between the public s rankings of hazards and those of the experts for example experts at the environmental protection agency think that hazardous waste sites pose mediumto low risks to the public while indoor air pollution poses a high risk yet public perceptions have driven policy to focus on hazardous waste sites rather than on indoor air quality stephen breyer 1993 pp 19 20 whose beliefs should determine government policy when the public s beliefs differ from those of the experts the problem evaporates if the public perhaps recognizing its inability to deal with complex technical issues entrusts risk assessment to the government and its experts but what if the public perhaps distrusting government and experts is unwilling to leave risk assessment to the experts paul portney 1992 p 131 posed a version of this whose beliefs question succinctly in his fable trouble in happyville

private incentives and social interactions fertility puzzles in israel this paper explores how private and social incentives for fertility may have combined to produce the complex fertility pattern observed in israel in the past half century fertility has declined within some ethnic religious groups moderately increased in others and parts of the ultra orthodox jewish population have experienced a reverse fertility transition in which childbearing has increased rapidly and substantially we present a theoretical analysis of the social dynamics of fertility that shows how private preferences preferences for conformity to social norms in childbearing and piecewise linear child allowances could have combined to yield such a complex fertility pattern we then explain the identification problem that makes it so difficult to infer the actual israeli fertility process from data on completed fertility jel jel jel jel jel jel

minority advantage and disadvantage in competition and coordination abstract we explore how a minority advantage or disadvantage endogenously arises in two contrasting environments a population comprises two unequally sized groups each individual allocates effort between a majority skill and a minority skill it is cheaper to invest in the skill of one s own group individuals are subsequently pairwise matched in an environment that encourages either competition or coordination we find both theoretically and experimentally that under competition the minority players earn more than the majority players when the share of the minority group is sufficiently small as players acquire more of the majority skill to maximize the chance of winning against a majority opponent moreover when there are no theoretical predictions for a relatively large share of the minority we find experimentally that the minority players still enjoy an advantage and the advantage is smaller under coordination in contrast payoffs are reversed both theoretically and experimentally players are more likely to coordinate on the majority skill and this yields a minority disadvantage the minority disadvantage grows with the imbalance in the size of the two groups

changing the cost of children and fertility evidence from the israeli kibbutz prior to 1996 israelis in collective communities kibbutzim shared the costs of raising children equally this paper examines the impact of privatizing costs of children on the behavior of young couples using universal microdata on kibbutz members exploiting variation in the increase in cost sharing across kibbutzim we estimate that lifetime fertility declined by 0 65 children in the cohorts of affected parents we also examine the exit decisions of members and find that couples were most likely to leave the kibbutz if they were either higher income or lower fertility this pattern is also observed among israeli emigrants in which higher educated and lower fertility couples are more likely to leave israel

sect subsidy and sacrifice an economist s view of ultra orthodox jews israeli ultra orthodox men study full time in yeshiva until age 40 on average why do fathers with families in poverty choose yeshiva over work draft deferments subsidize yeshiva attendance yet attendance typically continues long after exemption fertility rates are high tfr 7 6 and rising a social interaction approach explains these anomalies yeshiva attendance signals commitment to the community which provides mutual insurance to members prohibitions strengthen communities by effectively taxing real wages inducing high fertility historically the incursion of markets into traditional communities produces ultra orthodoxy subsidies induce dramatic reductions in labor supply and unparalleled increases in fertility illustrating extreme responses social groups may have to interventions

samuelson and neoclassical economics this is not a festschrift but a study of the prodigious samuelson phe nomenon his history making contributions to and impact on the econom ics of our age and the intricate often perplexing and divergent trends in modern economics all intensely controversial subjects that will be argued scrutinized and periodically reassessed by economists of various strands and traditions for years to come for as samuelson wrote of pigou immortality does have its price a scholar with such an out standing body of contributions must expect other men to swarm about it 1966 p 1233 subject it to scholarly scrutiny and challenge it although paul samuelson was 65 on may 15 1980 and our best wishes go out to him for long life and continued enrichment of economics this is neither a birthday party nor a gathering of only the good fairies for as he himself has said of marx a great scholar deserves the compliment of being judged seriously and critically 1972 p 268 in accordance with the rule of roman law audiatur et altera pars i have invited representative scholars of widely divergent perceptions to offer their critical evaluation of the age of samuelson while the response was by and large gratifying some scholars were unable to meet the deadline ix x preface and with much compunction i have had to expand my own essays to partly fill the gaps

a prospect theory nash bargaining solution and its stochastic stability abstract we consider the long run outcomes of bargaining games when players obey prospect theory we extend the evolutionary bargaining model of young 1993 to a two stage nash demand game two players simultaneously choose whether to exercise an outside option in the first stage and play the nash demand game in the second stage which will be reached only if neither player exercises the outside option we address the influence on the stochastically stable division of reference dependent preferences where the reference point is the value of the outside option we show that the division consistently differs from the nash bargaining solution under expected utility theory inspired by this we propose a prospect theory nash bargaining solution which coincides with the stochastically stable division

why did wicksell change his mind about the machinery question abstract the article investigates wicksell s change of mind about the machinery question between 1890 and 1900 1901 wicksell at first sided with the so called compensation theory that workers are not harmed by the introduction of machinery in his lecture notes of april 1900 made available here for the first time wicksell deployed marginal productivity theory to discuss the effects of labour saving technical progress with inconclusive results finally in his published 1901 lectures and in his 1900 article about marginal productivity wicksell claimed that the introduction of machinery increases output and reduces wages his analysis was based on the demonstration that free competition maximizes output but not total utility it is argued that wicksell s change of mind and his mature formulation of the machinery question result from his critical assessment of the then new concept of pareto optimality together with his reinterpretation and rejection of ricardo s 1821 contention that the introduction of machinery may diminish output and employment

regulation in happyville how does risk perception affect risk regulation happyville is a society in which citizens wrongly believe that the drinking water supply is contaminated we discuss conditions under which a benevolent director of environment protection would invest in a water cleanup technology this holds if the director is populist namely if he maximises social welfare based on citizens pessimistic beliefs more surprisingly investment in the water cleanup technology may occur if the director is paternalistic in the sense that he maximises social welfare based on his own beliefs the reason is that he must take into account citizens responses to regulation

nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences abstract a population of players is randomly matched to play a normal form game g the payoffs in this game represent the fitness associated with the various outcomes each individual has preferences over the outcomes of the game and chooses an optimal action with respect to those preferences however these preferences need not coincide with the fitness payoffs when evolution selects individuals on the basis of the fitness of the actions they take the distribution of aggregate play must be a nash equilibrium of g weak additional assumptions on the evolutionary process imply perfect equilibrium journal of economic literature classification number c72

measuring lying aversion abstract we introduce a new method for measuring the decision to lie in experiments in the game the decision to lie increases own payment independent of the counterpart s decision but potentially at a cost for the counterpart we identify at the individual level the decision to lie and measure how individuals react to different incentives to lie furthermore we investigate how lying behavior changes over time our method allows us to classify people into types including those who never lie those who always lie and those who react to incentives to lie we suggest this method as a useful instrument for examining factors that influence the decision to lie

discrete choice with social interactions this paper provides an analysis of aggregate behavioural outcomes when individual utility exhibits social interaction effects we study generalized logistic models of individual choice which incorporate terms reflecting the desire of individuals to conform to the behaviour of others in an environment of noncooperative decisionmaking laws of large numbers are generated in such environments multiplicity of equilibria in these models which are equivalent to the existence of multiple self consistent means for average choice behaviour will exist when the social interactions exceed a particular threshold local stability of these multiple equilibria is also studied the properties of the noncooperative economy are contrasted with the properties of an economy in which a social planner determines the set of individual choices finally a likelihood function based on the theoretical model is given and conditions for the econometric identifiability of the model are established

trust social capital and economic development many argue that elements of a society s norms culture or social capital are central to understanding its development however these notions have been difficult to capture in economic models here we explore ap ossible role for trustworthiness as corresponding to social capital individuals are trustworthy when they perform in accordance with promises even if this does not maximize their payoffs the usual focus on incentive structures in motivating behaviour plays no role here instead we emphasize more deep seated modes of behaviour and consider trustworthy agents being socialized to act as they do to model this socialization we borrow from a process of preference evolution pioneered by bisin and verdier 2001 the model developed endogenously accounts for social capital and explores its role in the process of economic development it captures in a simple formal way the interaction between social capital and the economy s productive processes the results obtained caution against rapid reform and provide an explanation for why late developing countries may not easily be able to transplant the modes of production that have proved useful in the west

evolution of preferences we endogenize preferences using the indirect evolutionary approach individuals are randomly matched to play a two person game individual subjective preferences determine their behaviour and may differ from the actual objective pay offs that determine fitness matched individuals may observe the opponents preferences perfectly not at all or with some in between probability when preferences are observable a stable outcome must be efficient when they are not observable a stable outcome must be a nash equilibrium and all strict equilibria are stable we show that for pure strategy outcomes these conclusions are robust to allowing almost perfect and almost no observability with the notable exception that inefficient strict equilibria may fail to be stable with any arbitrarily small degree of observability despite being stable with no observability

willingness to pay for improved air quality in sweden the aim of the paper is to quantify individual willingness to pay measures of improved air quality in sweden by using the contingent valuation method cvm such measures are important for policy makers when deciding about public investments and policy instruments in order to regulate environmental impacts e g from road transportation and industry the mean willingness to pay wtp for a 50 reduction of harmful substances where the respondents live and work was about 2000 sek year which is of the same order of magnitude as earlier stated preference studies in nordic countries most parameters in the econometric analysis had the expected sign wtp was increasing in income wealth and education it was larger for men members of environmental organizations people living in big cities which are on average more polluted and people who own their house or apartment it was lower for retired people however the additional wtp for people in big cities although significantly higher than for other people

norm conformity across societies this paper studies the aggregate distribution of declared opinions and behavior when heterogeneous individuals make the trade off between being true to their private opinions and conforming to a social norm the model sheds light on how various sanctioning regimes induce conformity and by whom and on phenomena such as societal polarization and unimodal concentration in strict societies individuals will tend to either fully conform to the social norm or totally ignore it while individuals in liberal societies will tend to compromise between these two extremes furthermore the degree of strictness determines whether those who nearly agree with the norm or those who strongly disagree with it will conform the degree of liberalism similarly determines which individuals will compromise the most a number of empirical predictions and several methods of how to test them are suggested

economics and identity this paper considers how identity a person s sense of self affects economic outcomes we incorporate the psychology and sociology of identity into an economic model of behavior in the utility function we propose identity is associated with different social categories and how people in these categories should behave we then construct a simple game theoretic model showing how identity can affect individual interactions the paper adapts these models to gender discrimination in the workplace the economics of poverty and social exclusion and the household division of labor in each case the inclusion of identity substantively changes conclusions of previous economic analysis

linear social interactions models this paper provides a systematic analysis of identification in linear social interactions models this is a theoretical and econometric exercise as the analysis is linked to a rigorously delineated model of interdependent decisions we develop an incomplete information game for individual choice under social influences that nests standard models as special cases we consider identification of both endogenous and contextual social effects under alternative assumptions regarding an analyst s a priori knowledge of social structure or access to individual level or aggregate data finally we discuss potential ramifications for identification of endogenous formation of social structure

identification of endogenous social effects the reflection problem this paper examines the reflection problem that arises when a researcher observing the distribution of behaviour in a population tries to infer whether the average behaviour in some group influences the behaviour of the individuals that comprise the group it is found that inference is not possible unless the researcher has prior information specifying the compisition of reference groups if this information is available the prospects for inference depend critically on the population relationship between the variables defining reference groups and those directly affecting outcomes inference is difficult to implossible if these variables are functionally dependent or are statistically independent the prospects are better if the variables defining reference groups and those directly affecting outcomes are moderately related in the population

subsidizing the stork new evidence on tax incentives and fertility this paper exploits the introduction of a pronatalist transfer policy in the canadian province of quebec that paid up to c 8 000 to families having a child i implement a quasi experimental strategy by forming treatment and control groups defined by time jurisdiction and family type the incentive was available broadly rather than to a narrow population as studied in previous work providing an exceptional opportunity to investigate heterogeneous responses i find a strong effect of the policy on fertility and some evidence of a heterogeneous response that may help reconcile these results with previous estimates

cultural integration and its discontents a community s culture is defined by the preferences and equilibrium behaviours of its members contacts among communities alter individual cultures through two interrelated mechanisms behavioural adaptations driven by pay offs to coordination and preference changes shaped by socialization and self persuasion this paper explores the workings of these mechanisms through a model of cultural integration in which preferences and behaviours vary continuously it identifies a broad set of conditions under which cross cultural contacts promote cultural hybridization the analysis suggests that policies to support social integration serve to homogenize preferences across communities thereby undermining a key objective of multiculturalism yielding fresh insights into strategies pursued to influence cultural trends it also shows that communities benefit from having other communities adjust their behaviours

attitudes toward catastrophe in light of climate change and other global threats policy commentators sometimes urge that society should be more concerned about catastrophes this paper reflects on what society s attitude toward low probability high impact events is or should be we first argue that catastrophe risk can be conceived of as a spread in the distribution of losses based on this conception we review studies from decision sciences psychology and behavioral economics that explore people s attitudes toward various social risks contray to popular belief we find more evidence against than in favor of catastrophe aversion the preference for a mean preserving contraction of the loss distribution and discuss a number of possible behavioral explanations next we turn to social choice theory and examine how various social welfare functions handle catastrophe risk we explain why catastrophe aversion may be in conflict with equity concerns and other regarding preferences finally we discuss current approaches to evaluate and regulate catastrophe risk

malthus was right after all poor relief and birth rates in southeastern england the payment of child allowances to laborers with large families was widespread in early nineteenth century england this paper tests thomas malthus s hypothesis that child allowances caused the birth rate to increase a cross sectional regression model is estimated to explain variations in birth rates across parishes in 1826 30 birth rates are found to be related to child allowances income and the availability of housing as malthus contended the paper concludes by examining the role played by the adoption of child allowances after 1795 in the fertility increase of the early nineteenth century

social norms and welfare state dynamics the paper analyses the interaction between economic incentives and work norms in the context of social insurance if the work norm is endogenous in the sense that it is weaker when the population share of beneficiaries is higher then voters will choose less generous benefits than otherwise we also discuss welfare state dynamics when there is a time lag in the adjustment of the norm in response to changes in this population share and show how a temporary shift in the unemployment rate may cause persistence in the number of benefi