strategic behavior in contests comment almost by definition contests involve strategy this is especially true in contests between unevenly matched contenders in a recent article avinash dixit 1987 explored strategic commitment in contests between a favorite and an underdog the favorite is defined as the player whose chance of victory exceeds one half at the nash equilibrium an underdog s chance is less than one half dixit concludes that if the favorite has the opportunity to move first then he will overcommit effort compared with the nash equilibrium an important implication of the favorite overcommitting effort is that strategic behavior leads to greater social costs see gordon tullock 1980 the opposite holds if the underdog has the opportunity to move first this paper demonstrates that the favorite will never overcommit effort given endogenous order of moves the favorite finds it advantageous to wait until the underdog moves surprisingly the underdog s best strategy is not to wait but to make the first move throwing the first punch the equilibrium order of play is for the underdog to move before the favorite in this equilibrium one never observes overcommitment of effort consequently extending dixit s model to allow for endogenous order of moves suggests that strategic behavior in contests will lead to undercommitment compared with nash behavior

merger policy with merger choice we analyze the optimal policy of an antitrust authority towards horizontal mergers when merger proposals are endogenous and firms choose which of several mutually exclusive mergers to propose in our model the optimal policy of an antitrust authority that seeks to maximize expected consumer surplus imposes a tougher standard on larger mergers i e those involving firms with a larger pre merger market share or equivalently leading to a larger naively computed post merger herfindahl index the optimal policy is a response to a bias in firms proposal incentives firms always propose a larger merger when it is better for consumers than a smaller one but sometimes will propose the larger one even when it is worse for consumers

predicting how people play games a simple dynamic model of choice we use the simple dynamic model developed in sarin and vahid 1999 games and economic behavior 28 294 309 to explain the experiments reported in erev and roth 1998 american economic review 88 848 881 in an earlier paper sarin and vahid 1998 mimeo texas a m university and monash university we showed that the model predicted behavior in repeated coordination games remarkably well and better than equilibrium theory or reinforcement learning models in this paper we show that the same one parameter model can also explain behavior in games with a unique mixed strategy nash equilibrium better than alternative models hence we obtain further support for the simple dynamic model journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 d8

discrimination in the payment of full time wage premiums this study investigates how many hours must be worked per week in order for workers in different race and gender groups to receive a high hours full time wage premium an analysis of 1989 current population survey data shows that across occupations both white and black men received a full time wage premium for working at least 33 hours per week whereas white women had to work at least 37 hours and black women at least 39 hours to receive the premium controlling for occupation changes the threshold for black women to 33 hours but does not change the results for the other groups the authors find that the observed differences account for at most two percentage points of the wage differentials across race and gender

framing effects in public goods prospect theory and experimental evidence this paper studies both theoretically and experimentally frame effects in the context of a public good game in which players have to make a costly contribution either i to achieve or ii not to lose a non excludable monetary prize our protocol leads to public good provision not deterioration only if a certain contribution level is achieved since both frames differ with respect to the reference point we use prospect theory to derive testable predictions in particular prospect theory predicts more contribution in the second frame our evidence suggests that a subjects behavior is highly sensitive to frames and b the theoretical prediction is confirmed except when the threshold is low we also estimate the parameters which better suit our experimental evidence partly confirming previous results in the literature

competitive lobbying over common pool resource regulations abstract common pool resource regulations are developed through a combination of resource assessment economic analysis and politics we investigate a management institution wherein users can influence a proposed common extraction cap through costly effort or lobbying our model incorporates two user types a few harvesters who efficiently handle extraction externalities and a larger number who do not without regulation we observe the efficient harvesters extracting more than the social optimum consistent with nash equilibrium given the opportunity to lobby we observe harvesters contributing to move inefficient proposed caps toward more efficient levels however lobbying is a public good and consistent with nash equilibrium the user type with weaker preference free rides on the type with stronger preferences leading to insufficient lobbying and inefficient regulations especially when the cap must be lowered this highlights an important limitation to participatory governance mechanisms when participation is costly

rent seeking with bounded rationality an analysis of the all pay auction the winner take all nature of all pay auctions makes the outcome sensitive to decision errors which we introduce with a logit formulation the equilibrium bid distribution is a fixed point the belief distributions that determine expected payoffs equal the choice distributions determined by expected payoffs we prove existence uniqueness and symmetry properties in contrast to the nash equilibrium the comparative statics of the logit equilibrium are intuitive rent dissipation increases with the number of players and the bid cost overdissipation of rents is impossible under full rationality but is observed in laboratory experiments our model predicts this property

caps on political lobbying the cost of political campaigns in the u s has risen substantially in recent years for example real spending on congressional election campaigns doubled between 1976 and 1992 steven d levitt 1995 there are many reasons why increased campaign spending might be socially harmful first increased spending means increased fund raising which may keep politicians from their legislative duties 1 second a lobbyist who makes a large campaign contribution may have undue influence on electoral outcomes on the shaping of legislation or on the outcome of regulatory proceedings 2 that is the socially preferred candidate or legislation may not prevail likewise a lobbyist involved in a regulatory matter or a competition for a government contract may benefit unduly from a legislator s intervention 3 third a perception that campaign contributions purchase influence may lead to increased tolerance of corruption in the private sector a desire to control campaign spending has spawned many initiatives to limit both campaign contributions and spending beginning with the passage of the federal election campaign act feca political action committees pacs can contribute at most 5 000 per election to a candidate while individuals can contribute at most 1 000 restrictions have also been put on in kind contributions making it more difficult to circumvent these limits 4 while direct restrictions on campaign spending have proven difficult to implement recent initiatives aim to impose voluntary spending limits and stricter limits on contributions 5 despite the existing legislation and the proposals to limit contributions little is known about the impact of contribution limits on aggregate expenditures while it is intuitively appealing that aggregate expenditures would drop we challenge that intuition here we study a lobbying game and show that a cap on individual lobbyists expenditures may have the perverse effect of increasing aggregate expenditures and loweri this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

collective choice in the commons experimental results on proposed allocation rules and votes we analyse and empirically examine a multi level common pool resource cpr game consisting of a collective choice level game and an operational level game in the collective choice game participants anonymously propose allocation rules to be used in the operational game and vote anonymously on the proposed rules majority and unanimity rules are investigated our major finding is that both types of voting rules substantially increase efficiency relative to a baseline with no opportunity for collective choice but the distributional consequences of the rules differ to understand the process by which efficiency is improved better we examine four predictive theories related to proposals votes and outcomes

addressing social dilemmas with mascots information and graphics acknolwedgements this research was supported by funding from the national science foundation for the north east water resources network newrnet grant iia 1330406 and from the center for behavioral and experimental agri environmental research cbear which is supported by the u s department of agriculture economic research service we are grateful for comments received during the 2015 northeastern agricultural and resource economics association annual meeting and the 2015 behavioral and experimental economists of the mid atlantic conference authors listed in alphabetical order

adaptive learning in weighted network games abstract this paper studies adaptive learning in the class of weighted network games this class of games includes applications like research and development within interlinked firms crime within social networks the economics of pollution and defense expenditures within allied nations we show that for every weighted network game the set of pure nash equilibria is non empty and generically finite pairs of players are shown to have jointly profitable deviations from interior nash equilibria if all interaction weights are either non negative or non positive then nash equilibria are pareto inefficient we show that quite general learning processes converge to a nash equilibrium of a weighted network game if every player updates with some regularity

appropriation and concern for resource scarcity in the commons an experimental study abstract we use an experimental linear design and a logit probabilistic choice function to model and estimate agents concern for resource scarcity although full appropriation is the dominant strategy of the basic game whatever the resource size we expect that if agents exploiting a common pool resource feel any concern for resource scarcity they would be more likely to alter their appropriation strategy the scarcer the resource stock our results show that this expectation holds and appropriation is restrained when resources are scarce further as this result could be attributed to both agents concern for resource scarcity and calculation errors in the determination of the appropriation strategies we estimate the relevance of both

the tragedy of the commons and socialization theory and policy we revisit the tragedy of the commons in an dynamic overlapping generations economy peopled of shepherds who decide how many sheep they let graze on a common parcel of land while relying on di fferent forms of rationality nash players pure or impure kantian players we examine the dynamics of heterogeneity and land congestion when the prevalance of those di fferent forms of rationality evolves over time follow ing a vertical oblique socialization process a la bisin and verdier 2001 we study the impacts of a quota and of a tax on the congestion of land and we show that introducing a quota may in some cases reduce the proportion of kantians pure and impure and worsen the tragedy of commons with respect to the laissez faire finally we examine whether a government should promote either a pure or an impure kantian morality by comparing the relative fi tness of pure impure kantians and their interactions with the congestion of land

distributional preferences in probabilistic and share contests we analyze nash equilibria of probabilistic and share contests where players have distributional preferences if players are sufficiently similar distributional preferences create multiple equilibria for the case of only mildly heterogeneous players equilibrium effort can be lower as well as higher than effort exerted by players with selfish preferences these findings can explain the following three anomalies observed in empirical tests of probabilistic and share contests the large variance of effort levels overspreading individual spending that exceeds the nash equilibrium prediction overspending and aggregate spending that exceeds the value of the prize overdissipation if players are sufficiently heterogeneous the game has a unique equilibrium that is more egalitarian than the selfish nash equilibrium it turns out that the less talented competitor may win the larger share of the prize if his inequality aversion is sufficiently strong we analyze how the equilibria evolve if the number of players becomes larger and how sequential moves influence behavior two new insights follow from the analysis of the sequential move game first sequential moves act as a coordination device in case of multiple simultaneous equilibria and second inequality aversion of the more egalitarian player can be used as a commitment device for low effort this effect can reverse the conventional wisdom that the underdog should lead

does information matter in the commons experimental evidence abstract common pool resources cprs typically involve interaction where precise information about payoffs is absent however all experimental studies of cprs we are aware of study environments where the payoff structure is known in this paper we address the behavioral consequences of two degrees of information on the mapping between decisions and payoffs we run two treatments one with complete information on the payoff structure and one with none remarkably aggregate behavior is not significantly different between the two treatments in both cases the aggregate tendencies converge to the nash equilibrium furthermore the best reply dynamics organize individual behavior in both treatments remarkably well

cournot oligopoly and the theory of supermodular games abstract we reconsider the cournot oligopoly problem in light of the theory of supermodular games invoking the recent ordinal version of this theory proposed by milgrom and shannon we generalize novshek s existence result derive the associated uniqueness result give an extension of a classical existence result under symmetry and provide conditions making a cournot oligopoly into a log supermodular game with the natural order on the action sets we also provide extensive and precise insight as to why decreasing best responses are widely regarded as being typical for the cournot model with production costs several illustrative examples are provided journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c72 l10 l13

are part time women paid less a model with firm specific effects this paper uses data from a survey of child care establishments to compare part and full time wages within two narrow occupations one high skill and one low skill unlike previous studies it controls for firm specific effects we find that when firm specific effects are accounted for only the low skill workers in our sample receive lower wages for working part time on the other hand when compensation is defined to include prorated fringe benefits establishments appear to compensate both high and low skill part timers at a lower hourly rate

modeling long term dynamics of electricity markets in the last decade many countries have restructured their electricity industries by introducing competition in their power generation sectors although some restructuring has been regarded as successful the short experience accumulated with liberalized power markets does not allow making any founded assertion about their long term behavior long term prices and long term supply reliability are now center of interest this concerns firms considering investments in generation capacity and regulatory authorities interested in assuring the long term supply adequacy and the stability of power markets in order to gain significant insight into the long term behavior of liberalized power markets in this paper a simulation model based on system dynamics is proposed and the underlying mathematical formulations extensively discussed unlike classical market models based on the assumption that market outcomes replicate the results of a centrally made optimization the approach presented here focuses on replicating the system structure of power markets and the logic of relationships among system components in order to derive its dynamical response the simulations suggest that there might be serious problems to adjust early enough the generation capacity necessary to maintain stable reserve margins and consequently stable long term price levels because of feedback loops embedded in the structure of power markets and the existence of some time lags the long term market development might exhibit a quite volatile behavior by varying some exogenous inputs a sensitivity analysis is carried out to assess the influence of these factors on the long run market dynamics

on the learning and stability of mixed strategy nash equilibria in games of strategic substitutes abstract this paper analyzes the learning and stability of mixed strategy nash equilibria in games of strategic substitutes gss complementing recent work done in the case of strategic complements gsc mixed strategies in gss are of particular interest because it is well known that such games need not exhibit pure strategy nash equilibria first we establish bounds on the strategy space which indicate where randomizing behavior may occur in equilibrium second we show that mixed strategy nash equilibria are generally unstable under a wide variety of learning rules multiple examples are given

starting even job mobility and the wage gap between young single males and females standard econometric analysis of male female earnings differentials ignores job mobility despite its vital role in theories of discrimination and its demonstrated importance in explaining the earnings of young men this paper develops a model of male and female earnings and job mobility and estimates it for young single men and women in canada using the 1981 survey of work history the results corrected for sample selection bias arising from job mobility suggest that male and female earnings determination differs considerably by job mobility status returns to mobility are much greater for males than for females the results also show significantly different mobility behaviour for men and women but if anything females are more mobile than males faced with the same earnings opportunities thus differential job mobility behaviour does not appear to account for any portion of the male female earnings gap

aggregate comparative statics abstract in aggregative games each player s payoff depends on her own actions and an aggregate of the actions of all the players many common games in industrial organization political economy public economics and macroeconomics can be cast as aggregative games this paper provides a general and tractable framework for comparative static results in aggregative games we focus on two classes of games 1 aggregative games with strategic substitutes and 2 nice aggregative games where payoff functions are continuous and concave in own strategies we provide simple sufficient conditions under which positive shocks to individual players increase their own actions and have monotone effects on the aggregate the results are illustrated with applications to public good provision contests cournot competition and technology choices in oligopoly

governing a groundwater commons a strategic and laboratory analysis of western water law we examine strategic behavior in groundwater depletion within the setting of state governance of groundwater resources in the american west solving a dynamic common pool resource model for its optimal solution and its subgame perfect equilibrium provides benchmarks for behavior observed in laboratory experiments three forms of legal rules common pool depletion with a rule of capture to establish ownership absolute ownership doctrine entry restrictions prior appropriation doctrine and stock quotas correlative rights doctrinekre examined in terms of their impact on individual strategic behavior in laboratory experiments

uncertain preassigned non contestable and contestable rents abstract potential beneficiaries of government commitments often face the problem of guaranteeing that the commitments are carried out for example funds can be allocated via the budget but not disbursed the disbursement may be subject to the ambiguities of non specified timing or non specified appropriate conditions potential beneficiaries then have incentives to undertake activities that affect the timing of disbursement of the prespecified funds this paper studies the ensuing rent seeking game against the uncertain behavior or discredibility of the government we show that the resources expended by potential beneficiaries of government rents can be substantial but they cannot exceed 30 of the preassigned rents the extent of rent dissipation is incomplete and approaches unity for the critical value of government discredibility that still induces the individual to engage in rent seeking contestability of the allocated funds now referred to as contestable rents increases the extent of rent seeking outlays nevertheless delayed uncertain contestable rents cannot be overdissipated

can incomplete information lead to under exploitation in the commons abstract this paper analyzes the protection of a common pool resource cpr through the management of information specifically we examine an entry deterrence model between an incumbent perfectly informed about the initial stock of a cpr and an uninformed potential entrant in our model the appropriation of the cpr by the incumbent reduces both players future profits from exploiting the resource in the case of complete information we show that the incumbent operating in a high stock common pool overexploits the cpr during the first period since it does not internalize the negative external effect that its first period exploitation imposes on the entrant s future profits this inefficiency however is absent when the commons totally regenerate across periods under incomplete information we identify an additional form of inefficiency in particular the incumbent operating in a low stock cpr underexploits the resource in order to signal the low available stock to potential entrants deterring entry

an experimental analysis of optimal renewable resource management the fishery this paper experimentally studies the extraction decisions of a sole owner in a fishery the population dynamics of which behave according to the standard deterministic logistic growth model four treatments were implemented which differed in the level of information supplied to the subjects compared to the theoretic benchmark the data reveal that efficiency losses increase as the information on population dynamics and stock size deteriorates three common patterns of behaviour are identified the distribution of these patterns is significantly affected by the informational setting

modeling hourly electricity dynamics for policy making in long term scenarios abstract energy policies are often related to the global effort in reducing greenhouse gas emissions through increased use of renewable energies in electricity production the impact of these policies is usually calculated by energy planning tools however the modeling methodologies most currently used are not adequate to simulate long term scenarios while considering the hourly dynamics of supply and demand this paper presents an extension of the times energy planning tool for investment decisions in electricity production that considers seasonal daily and hourly supply and demand dynamics the inclusion of these dynamics enables the model to produce more accurate results in what concerns the impact of introducing energy efficiency policies and the increased use of renewable energies the model was validated in sao miguel azores portugal for the years 2006 2009 where a comparison with real data showed that the model can simulate the supply and demand dynamics further the long term analysis shows that the inclusion of these dynamics contributes to a better assessment of the renewable energy potential suggests the postponement of investments in new generation capacity and demonstrates that using fine time resolution modeling is very valuable for the design of effective policy measures under high renewable penetration energy systems

imitators and optimizers in cournot oligopoly we analyze a symmetric n firm cournot oligopoly with a heterogeneous popu lation of optimizers and imitators imitators mimic the output decision of the most successful firms of the previous round a la vega redondo 1997 optimizers play a myopic best response to the opponents previous output firms are allowed to make mistakes and deviate from the decision rules with a small probability apply ing stochastic stability analysis we find that the long run distribution converges to a recurrent set of states in which imitators are better o than are optimizers this finding appears to be robust even when optimizers are more sophisticated it suggests that imitators drive optimizers out of the market contradicting a funda mental conjecture by friedman 1953

strategic complements and substitutes and potential games abstract we show that games of strategic complements or substitutes with aggregation are pseudo potential games the upshot is that they possess nash equilibria in pure strategies ne even if the strategy sets are not convex and that various dynamic processes converge to ne in particular ne exist in cournot oligopoly with indivisibilities in production our notion of aggregation is quite general and enables us to take a unified view of several disparate models

overbidding and overspreading in rent seeking experiments cost structure and prize allocation rules we study experimentally the effects of cost structure and prize allocation rules on the performance of rent seeking contests most previous studies use a lottery prize rule and linear cost and find both overbidding relative to the nash equilibrium prediction and significant variation of efforts which we term overspreading we investigate the effects of allocating the prize by a lottery versus sharing it proportionally and of convex versus linear costs of effort while holding fixed the nash equilibrium prediction for effort we find the share rule results in average effort closer to the nash prediction and lower variation of effort combining the share rule with a convex cost function further enhances these results we can explain a significant amount of non equilibrium behavior by features of the experimental design these results contribute towards design guidelines for contests based on behavioral principles that take into account implementation features of a contest

better reply dynamics and global convergence to nash equilibrium in aggregative games we consider n person games with quasi concave payoffs that depend on a player s own action and the sum of all players actions we show that a discrete time stochastic process in which players move towards better replies the better reply dynamics converges globally to a nash equilibrium if actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements for all players around each nash equilibrium that is asymptotically stable under a deterministic adjusted best reply dynamics we present an example of a 2 person game with a unique equilibrium where the derivatives of the best reply functions have different signs and the better reply dynamics does not converge

fragility of the commons under prospect theoretic risk attitudes abstract we study a common pool resource game where the resource experiences failure with a probability that grows with the aggregate investment in the resource to capture decision making under such uncertainty we model each player s risk preference according to the value function from prospect theory we show the existence and uniqueness of a pure nash equilibrium when the players have heterogeneous risk preferences and under certain assumptions on the rate of return and failure probability of the resource greater competition vis a vis the number of players increases the failure probability at the nash equilibrium we quantify this effect by obtaining bounds on the ratio of the failure probability at the nash equilibrium to the failure probability under investment by a single user we further show that heterogeneity in attitudes towards loss aversion leads to higher failure probability of the resource at the equilibrium

what are the right policies for electricity supply in middle east a regional dynamic integrated electricity model for the province of yazd in iran energy planning techniques are essential tools in the management of new complex energy systems among different techniques system dynamics is an appropriate technique for the simulation of complex energy systems and the analysis of their dynamism in this paper a regional dynamic integrated electricity model rdiem is developed for a regulated electricity supply system in order to analyze the results of different scenarios and policies and find the right policies for the electricity generation the results of model are validated with a real case in the province of yazd in iran the results show that the balanced growth and the environment oriented policies have the best results among different policies although the application is related to the iranian case the implications are much wider especially in the middle east

rent seeking firms consumer groups and the social costs of monopoly i introduction when a positive monopoly rent is secured under government protection firms compete with one another to win the monopoly by expending resources the opportunity costs of such rent seeking activities the values of goods and services that could be produced with resources expended on such rent seeking activities are part of the social costs of monopoly many economists have examined the social costs of monopoly defining them as the sum of the deadweight loss and the firms rent seeking costs examples include tullock 1967 krueger 1974 posner 1975 rogerson 1982 and fisher 1985 1 recently several economists such as wenders 1987 ellingsen 1991 and schmidt 1992 have pointed out that consumers do not always allow government protection of a monopoly rather consumers often seek government protection of themselves they try to defend their consumer surplus against a monopoly by spending resources for example consumers often lobby politicians for government regulation that requires a natural monopolist to set its price below the unregulated profit maximizing level the opportunity costs of such consumer surplus defending henceforth cs defending activities are also part of the social costs of monopoly an interesting question then becomes whether consumers cs defending activities increase or decrease the social costs of monopoly as compared with those incurred in the case of inactive consumers wenders 1987 argues that consumers cs defending activities lead to higher social costs of monopoly on the other hand ellingsen 1991 and schmidt 1992 show that consumers participation to defend their consumer surplus lowers the social costs of monopoly this paper also addresses the question of whether consumers cs defending activities increase or decrease the social costs of monopoly but differs from previous research by analyzing a model in which the government decides first whether or not to regulate a monopoly and then decides which firm to be the monopolist 2 we compare the social costs of monopoly in the case of active consumers with those incurred in the case of inactive consumers we demonstrate that given just one rent seeking firm consumers cs defending activities generally increase the social costs of monopoly but given two or more rent seeking firms such activities generally reduce the social costs of monopoly section ii sets up the basic model we consider a rent seeking and cs defending henceforth rcs contest with one consumer group it has two stages in the first stage firms and the consumer group compete by expending outlays to win their prizes 3 the prize for each firm is an unregulated monopoly and that for the consumer group is a regulated monopoly each firm and the consumer group choose their outlays simultaneously and independently in the second stage after knowing the government s decision on the form of the monopoly the firms compete against each other to win the monopoly they expend their outlays simultaneously and independently at the end of the second stage the government chooses the winning firm ellingsen 1991 argues that his sequential move framework is more realistic than his simultaneous move framework since in most cases consumers compete against existing monopolists rather than potential ones over the forms of monopolies in his sequential move framework potential monopolists first compete to win the monopoly and then the winner and consumers compete over the form of the monopoly however consider a situation in which the government periodically reassigns a monopoly in this situation consumers compete against potential monopolists including the incumbent monopolist over the form of the monopoly and the firms periodically compete to be the monopolist the sequential move game in this paper is more appropriate for this situation than the sequential move game of ellingsen 1991

wage offers and full time and part time employment by british women strong evidence in support of the hypothesis that women receive lower wage offers in part time jobs than in full time jobs is provided by estimation of wage offer functions for british women which control for self selection into these two types of jobs analysis of married women s employment decisions indicates that the difference in a woman s expected wage offers between full time and part time employment is an important determinant of whether she works full time while husband s income mainly affects the decision of whether to work in addition it appears that women who work despite having observed characteristics that discourage employment are much more likely to work part time

negative externalities in cropping decisions private versus common land this paper analyzes to what extent the entitlement of property rights affects cropping decisions when these decisions generate negative externalities to that end we implement an experimental study where agents make cropping decisions in two different treatments private and common land the results show that there are no statistically significant differences between the two treatments in the contribution to the negative externality thus revealing that the entitlement of property rights does not affect cropping decision in this context furthermore our findings indicate that the implication of the agents in activities generating negative externalities tends to increase over time thus amplifying its adverse consequences

working part time by choice or by constraint the selection of workers into part time jobs and the wages they earn are analysed using the 1989 labour market activity survey we focus on the distinction between voluntary and involuntary part time workers since involuntary part time workers earn substantially lower wages than other workers we find that the selection of individuals into involuntary part time work is more closely tied to job characteristics than personal or human capital characteristics the lower wage earned by involuntary part time workers is largely due to differences in returns and selection effects rather than differences in endowments

complete rent dissipation when the number of rent seekers is uncertain the focal question in the theory of rent seeking is the extent of rent dissipation as the indicator of social loss in general rent seeking models assume that the number of contenders in a rent seeking contest is known with certainty but given the hidden nature of rent seeking participants in rent seeking more usually can be expected to face an uncertain number of rivals we show that in a tullock contest with a stochastic number of participants complete ex ante rent dissipation is consistent with a pure strategy nash equilibrium this contrasts with but complements previous results of under dissipation when the number of rent seekers is uncertain our complete dissipation result expands the range of circumstances consistent with association of an observed rent with social loss

selection dynamics asymptotic stability and adaptive behavior selection dynamics are often used to distinguish stable and unstable equilibria this is particularly useful when multiple equilibria prevent a priori comparative static analysis this paper reports an experiment designed to compare the accuracy of the myopic best response dynamic and an inertial selection dynamic the inertial selection dynamic makes more accurate predictions about the observed mutual best response outcomes

union wage differentials in the public and private sectors a simultaneous equations specification the paper attempts to integrate new approaches to estimating union wage effects with the analysis of public private sector wage differentials estimates of the union differential in both public and private sectors allowing for the endogeneity of union status are presented the hypothesis that the recently measured rents to public sector employment primarily reflect the recent increase in unionization in that sector is examined and receives considerable empirical support there was evidence of positive selection into the union sector especially for private sector workers union status appears to be strongly influenced by the expected wage gain from joining the union sector

bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games abstract equilibria in noncooperative games are typically inefficient as illustrated by the prisoner s dilemma in this paper we quantify this inefficiency by comparing the payoffs of equilibria to the payoffs of a best possible outcome we study a nonatomic version of the congestion games defined by rosenthal int j game theory 2 1973 65 and identify games in which equilibria are approximately optimal in the sense that no other outcome achieves a significantly larger total payoff to the players games in which optimization by individuals approximately optimizes the social good in spite of the lack of coordination between players our results extend previous work on traffic routing games

the lottery contest is a best response potential game it is shown that the n player lottery contest admits a best response potential voorneveld 2000 this is true also when the contest technology reflects the possibility of a draw the result implies in particular the existence of a non trivial two player zero sum game that is best response equivalent to a game with identical payoff functions

female labor supply with a discontinuous nonconvex budget constraint incorporation of a part time full time wage differential this paper incorporates the well documented part time full time wage differential into an empirical labor supply model with both a heterogeneity and a random error term and estimates that model fo

best of three contest experiments strategic versus psychological momentum abstract we conduct an experimental analysis of a best of three tullock contest intermediate prizes lead to higher efforts while increasing the role of luck as opposed to effort leads to lower efforts both intermediate prizes and luck reduce the probability of the contest ending in two rounds the patterns of players efforts and the probability that a contest ends in two rounds are consistent with strategic momentum i e a momentum generated due to strategic incentives inherent in the contest we do not find evidence for psychological momentum i e a momentum which emerges when winning affects players confidence similar to the previous studies of contests we find significantly higher efforts than predicted and strong heterogeneity in effort between the subjects

technology adoption in the presence of network externalities we analyze technology adoption in industries where network externalities are significant the pattern of adoption depends on whether technologies are sponsored a sponsor is an entity that has property rights to the technology and hence is willing to make investments to promote it key findings include the following 1 compatibility tends to be undersupplied by the market but excessive standardization can occur 2 in the absence of sponsors the technology superior today has a strategic advantage and is likely to dominate the market 3 when one of two rival technologies is sponsored that technology has a strategic advantage and may be adopted even if it is inferior 4 when two competing technologies both are sponsored the technology that will be superior tomorrow has a strategic advantage

experimental comparison of multi stage and one stage contests this article experimentally studies a two stage elimination contest and compares its performance with a one stage contest contrary to the theory the two stage contest generates higher revenue than the equivalent one stage contest there is significant over dissipation in both stages of the two stage contest and experience diminishes over dissipation in the first stage but not in the second stage our experiment provides evidence that winning is a component in a subject s utility a simple behavioral model that accounts for a non monetary utility of winning can explain significant over dissipation in both contests it can also explain why the two stage contest generates higher revenue than the equivalent one stage contest

interindustry part time and full time wage differentials regional and national analysis this paper provides more evidence that the wage differential is far smaller than is suggested by simple comparison of gross wages of full time and part time workers it is noted that to obtain a more reasonable measure of the full time and part time wage differential it is necessary to adjust for differences in workers characteristics labour market conditions and sample selection it is found that in general full time and part time workers exhibit different personal characteristics in particular full time workers possess more human capital and experience than part timers also labour market conditions such as unions and pension plans favour full timers these differences may partly account for the wage disparity between full time and part time workers it was noted that the nonrandomness of the workers into full time and part time jobs influences the wage determination of both full time and part time workers the results indicate that the adjustment of the wage equations to reflect the above menti

the effect of part time work on wages evidence from the social security rules this article identifies the part time wage effect using hours variation caused by the social security rules we show that work hours and wages drop sharply at ages 62 and 65 we argue that the hours decline causes the wage decline resulting in a 25 wage penalty for men who cut their work week from 40 to 20 hours however we find little evidence for such an effect among women we also show that models that fail to account for the joint determination of hours and wages will understate the labor supply response to a tax change by about 26

rigging the lobbying process an application of the all pay auction textabstractin a world where a politician can explicitly auction off a prize to the high bidder the standard auction literature can be used to analyse political behavior the justice system however precludes politicians from explicitly selling the prize to the highest bidder thus politicians cannot let it become public knowledge that they are in the business of selling political favors an institution has emerged in political markets to overcome this constraint which are termed as lobbying lobbyists make implicit payments to the politician through campaign contributions if these up front payments were rebated to those failing to receive the prize it would be clear that the politician was selling favors this article has examined an interesting principle arising in all pay auctions this principle states that a politician wishing to maximize political rents may find it in his best interest to exclude certain lobbyists from participating in the lobbying process particularly lobbyists valuing most the political prize

a general analysis of rent seeking games in this paper we reconsider the basic model of efficient rent seeking we stress the importance of the shape of the players reaction curve in order to understand the impact of the technology of rent seeking on the structure of the outcome of the game we give a complete characterization of the pure strategy equilibria moreover the possibility of preemption by a stakelberg leader is discussed according to the nature of the technology of rent seeking available to the agents

analysis of part time pay in canada this paper analyses the difference between part time and full time wages in canada using the 1981 survey of work history since part time and full time workers are distinguished by hours worked and since hours worked and wages are interdependent selectivity bias occurs if ordinary least squares regression is used a modification of heckman s procedure to account for the fact that part time hours are doubly truncated is used to correct this problem the results indicate that adjusting for differences in characteristics the wage differential between part time and full time workers is 10 per cent or one third the unadjusted differential results vary somewhat by sex and marital status analyse de la remuneration du travail d temps partiel au canada ce memoire analyse les differences entre les salaires pour le travail a temps plein et a temps partiel au canada a partir des resultats de l enquete sur l activite en 1981 puisque les travailleurs a temps plein et a temps partiel sont definis par le nombre d heures de travail et puisque le nombre d heures de travail et les niveaux de salaire sont interdependants il y a biais de selectivite quand on utilise la methode des moindres carres ordinaires dans l analyse de regression l auteur utilise une modification de la technique de heckman pour tenir compte du fait que le nombre d heures de travail a temps partiel est doublement tronque pour corriger le probleme les resultats montrent que apres avoir tenu compte des differences dans les caracteristiques des personnes on observe un differentiel de niveau de salaire de 10 pourcent entre les travailleurs a temps plein et a temps partiel soit le tiers du differentiel brut avant les ajustements pour tenir compte de caracteristiques differentes ces resultats varient quelque peu selon le sexe et selon la situation familiale the trend towards part time employment has generally escaped the attention and scrutiny of economists part time employment in canada grew at an annual rate of 4 1 per cent between january 1972 and january 1984 compared 1 one exception is nakamura and nakamura 1983 who examine related labour supply issues for married females canadian journal of economics revue canadienne d economique xix no 4 november novembre 1986 printed in canada imprim6 au canada 0008 4085 86 798 807 1 50 0 canadian economics association this content downloaded from 207 46 13 159 on sat 22 oct 2016 04 29 38 utc all use subject to http about jstor org terms analysis of part time pay in canada 799 with a growth rate of only 2 4 per cent for full time employment as a result 15 4 per cent of jobs were part time as of january 1984 compared with 13 per cent in january 1972 2 the growth of part time employment raises a number of issues in particular labour canada 1983 argues that the hourly wage differential between full time and part time workers reached 26 3 per cent in 1981 it is not clear however that this gross wage differential between full time and part time workers is a useful figure a number of accepted measurable characteristics that determine wage differentials among workers may confound this comparison unless full time and part time workers have identical characteristics it would therefore be useful from a policy standpoint to eliminate these effects to identify part time effects and the gravity of the part time pay problem per se this paper analyses the differences between part time and full time wages to try to distinguish part time effects whatever the source from other established bases for differentials in the first section a standard model for wage comparison among workers is considered the source of selectivity bias is identified and a consistent estimation technique is described the second section uses this technique to analyse the differences in part time and full time wages using microdata from the 1981 survey of work history used by labour canada 1983 the third section summarizes the results and provides suggestions for further research a model for wage comparison with selectivity bias consider a standard model used extensively for union and non union wage comparisons lee 1978 duncan and leigh 1980 robinson and tomes 1984 simpson 1985 let wf be a vector of observations on the natural logarithm of hourly wages paid to full time workers and let x be a matrix of observations on measurable worker characteristics commonly used in such models namely educational attainment age sex union status public vs private sector status and region let wp and x be the corresponding observations for part time workers let h be the maximum hours of work permitted for classification as a part time worker then we specify wf xff3f if if h h 1

the effect of environmental uncertainty on the tragedy of the commons abstract we model a common pool resource game under environmental uncertainty where individuals in a symmetric group face the dilemma of sharing a common resource each player chooses a consumption level and obtains a corresponding share of that resource but if total consumption exceeds a sustainable level then the resource deteriorates and all players are worse off we consider the effect of uncertainty about the sustainable resource size on the outcome of this game assuming a general dynamic for resource deterioration we study the effect of increased ambiguity i e uncertain probabilities pertaining to the common resource s sustainable size we show that whereas increased risk may lead to more selfish behavior i e to more consumption increased ambiguity may have the opposite effect

the strategic advantage of interdependent preferences in rent seeking contests we study rent seeking contests where the set of players contains two groups of players one with independent preferences and the other with negatively interdependent preferences it turns out that the latter experience a strategic advantage in general two player contests and in n player contests with non increasing marginal efficiency for general n player contests with increasing marginal efficiency the strategic advantage prevails provided convexity of contest technologies is sufficiently weak for strongly convex contest technologies other types of equilibria exist including one where individualists receive strictly higher pay off

orchestrating rent seeking contests contests have different sometimes quite complex organisational structures in particular while most of the existing literature focusses on simultaneous contests multistage contests are also quite frequently encountered this paper seeks to provide a rationale for the latter by endogenising the choice of a contest structure which is made by an organiser of a contest interested in maximising the efforts expended by the contenders

rent seeking in groups abstract rent seeking contests between groups involve conflicts of interests at the levels of individuals groups and the society as a whole we conduct a series of economic experiments to study the behavior of groups and individuals competing against each other in rent seeking contests we find substantial over contribution to rent seeking relative to the equilibrium predictions of standard models regardless whether individuals compete against other individuals groups compete against other groups or individuals compete against groups

choice under uncertainty problems solved and unsolved ffifteen years ago the theory of choice under uncertainty could be considered one of the success stories of economic analysis it rested on solid axiomatic foundations it had seen important breakthroughs in the analytics of risk risk aversion and their applications to economic issues and it stood ready to provide the theoretical underpinnings for the newly emerging information revolution in economics 1 today choice under uncertainty is a field in flux the standard theory is being challenged on several grounds from both within and outside economics the nature of these challenges and of our profession s responses to them is the topic of this paper

decentralized management of common property resources experiments with a centuries old institution for centuries villages in the alps employed a special system for managing their common properties individual users could inspect other users at their own cost and impose a predetermined sanction a fine when a free rider was discovered the fine was paid to the user who found a violator experiments with the institutions demonstrate that this mechanism considerably improves efficiency of resource use the classical model of identical selfish agents does not capture the data as well as a model with heterogeneous and linear other regarding preferences altruism and especially potentially dysfunctional behavior such as spite and mistake play important positive roles

comparative statics of contests and rent seeking games this paper develops the comparative statics properties of a contest encountered in patent races and rent seeking games the author shows that symmetric equilibrium expenditure and profit per player decrease with the number of competitors and the discount rate but increase with the value of the prize a fundamental lemma established in the paper shows that a stability condition usually imposed on the model is automatically satisfied the author identifies a class of likelihood or hazard rate functions for which aggregate expenditure increases with the number of competitors and total profits converge to zero copyright 1997 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

contests with money and time experimental evidence on overbidding in all pay auctions competition for a prize frequently takes the form of dedicating time toward winning a contest those who spend more time become more likely to obtain the prize we model this competition as an all pay auction under incomplete information and report an experiment in which expenditures and rewards are in terms of time in the experiment subjects must stay in the laboratory doing nothing for an initially prespecified length of time however they can bid in terms of time to leave early the auction has an all pay structure so that if an individual does not submit the highest bid within her group she must stay for the additional time that she bid we correlate behavior in this game with behavior in an isomorphic all pay auction played with money bids we also consider how two measures of sophistication the cognitive reflection test crt score and performance on a probability calibration task correlate with behavior we find strong similarities in overall behavior between the auctions conducted with money and with time bidding greater than equilibrium levels is typical and as a consequence average earnings are negative in both auctions thus the result that there is overdissipation of rent in all pay auctions extends to competition in terms of time

contest efforts in light of behavioural considerations this study shows that distortion of probabilities is a possible reason for rent under dissipation incontests with relatively small number of participants such distortion may also result however inover dissipation of the contested rent focusing on contests with homogeneous contestants and thecommonly studied contest success function our main results clarify under what circumstances i rents are more under dissipated relative to the standard situation where probabilities are notdistorted ii rents are under dissipated yet less intensely relative to the standard situation whereprobabilities are not distorted iii rents are over dissipated and iv the contest does not possess asymmetric interior equilibrium in pure strategies

risk aversion in rent seeking and rent augmenting games the effects of risk aversion are examined for two types of expenditures in rent seeking contests a rent seeking expenditures which improve the probability that the rent is obtained and b rent augmenting expenditures which increase the size of the rent to be awarded risk aversion is shown to reduce expenditures of type b unambiguously while having an indeterminate effect on those of type a these two contrasting results are shown to derive from the very different effects rent seeking and rent augmenting expenditures have on the riskiness of a player s position

an index of loss aversion to a considerable extent risk aversion as it is commonly observed is caused by loss aversion several indexes of loss aversion have been proposed in the literature the one proposed in this paper leads to a clear decomposition of risk attitude into three distinct components basic utility probability weighting and loss aversion the index is independent of the unit of payment the main theorem shows how the indexes of different decision makers can be compared through observed choices

local smoothness and the price of anarchy in splittable congestion games abstract congestion games are multi player games in which players costs are additive over a set of resources that have anonymous cost functions with pure strategies corresponding to certain subsets of resources in a splittable congestion game each player can choose a convex combination of subsets of resources we characterize the worst case price of anarchy a quantitative measure of the inefficiency of equilibria in splittable congestion games our approximation guarantee is parameterized by the set of allowable resource cost functions and degrades with the degree of nonlinearity of these cost functions we prove that our guarantee is the best possible for every set of cost functions that satisfies mild technical conditions we prove our guarantee using a novel local smoothness proof framework and as a consequence the guarantee applies not only to the nash equilibria of splittable congestion games but also to all correlated equilibria

the incidence of overdissipation in rent seeking contests tullock s analysis of rent seeking and overdissipation is reconsidered we show that while equilibrium strategies do not permit overdissipation in expectation for particular realizations of players mixed strategies the total amount spent competing for rents can exceed the value of the prize we also show that the cross sectional incidence of overdissipation in the perfectly discriminating contest ranges from 0 50 to 0 44 as the number of players increases from two to infinity thus even though the original analysis of overdissipation is flawed there are instances in which rent seekers spend more than the prize is worth

rationalizability learning and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities we study a rich class of noncooperative games that includes models of oligopoly competition macroeconomic coordination failures arms races bank runs technology adoption and diffusion r d competition pretrial bargaining coordination in teams and many others for all these games the sets of pure strategy nash equilibria correlated equilibria and rationalizable strategies have identical bounds also for a class of models of dynamic adaptive choice behavior that encompasses both best response dynamics and bayesian learning the players choices lie eventually within the same bounds these bounds are shown to vary monotonically with certain exogenous parameters we study the class of noncooperative supermodular games introduced by topkis 1979 and further analyzed by vives 1985 1989 who also pointed out the importance of these games in industrial economics supermodular games are games in which each player s strategy set is partially ordered the marginal returns to increasing one s strategy rise with increases in the competitors strategies so that the game exhibits strategic complementarity 2 and if a player s strategies are multidimensional marginal returns to any one com ponent of the player s strategy rise with increases in the other components this class turns out to encompass many of the most important economic applications of noncooperative game theory in macroeconomics diamond s 1982 search model and bryant s 1983 1984 rational expectations models can be represented as supermodular games in each of these models more activity by some members of the economy raises the returns to increased levels of activity by others in oligopoly theory some models of bertrand oligopoly with differentiated products qualify as supermodu lar games in these games when a firm s competitors raise their prices the marginal profitability of the firm s own price increase rises a similar structure is present in games of new technology adoption such as those of dybvig and spatt 1983 farrell and saloner 1986 and katz and shapiro 1986 when more users hook into a communication system or more manufacturers adopt an interface standard the marginal return to others of doing the same often rises similarly in some specifications of the bank runs model introduced by diamond and dybvig 1983 when more depositors withdraw their funds from a bank it is more worthwhile for other depositors to do the same in the warrant exercise

comparing regulations to protect the commons an experimental investigation in a laboratory experiment we test three regulations imposed on a common pool resource game with heterogeneous users an access fee and subsidy scheme transferable quotas and non transferable quotas we calibrate the game so that all regulations improve users profits compared to free access extraction we compare the regulations according to five criteria resource preservation individual profits profit difference pareto improvement from free access and sorting of the most efficient users one of the main findings is that even though it performs better in sorting out the most efficient subjects the fee and subsidy scheme is not more profitable than tradable quotas

bidding in hierarchies this paper reconsiders the comparison between hierarchical contests and single stage contests a condition is given that characterizes whether and when the aggregate equilibrium payoff of contestants is higher in the single stage contest and when the single stage contest is more likely to award the prize to the contestant who values it most highly the outcome depends on inter and intra group heterogeneity and is not driven by free rider incentives

systems competition and network effects this paper discusses firm behavior market performance and the public and private institutions that arise in systems markets i e markets where consumers use compatible components together to generate benefits in such markets which include communications networks and hardware software networks popular products are inherently more valuable these network effects can drive corporate strategies and are critical in understanding innovation in many high technology markets the discussion here emphasizes the dynamics of consumer adoption decisions in the presence of network effects competition between incompatible systems and how suppliers choose which components are compatible and which are not

strategic behavior in contests comment in an influential paper avinash dixit 1987 considers a class of symmetric two player contests in which each player s effort xi influences the probability of winning a prize valued at k 0 letting p x1 x2 denote the probability 1 that player 1 wins the expected payoffs of the two players are p1 5 p x1 x2 k 2 x1 and p2 5 1 2 p x1 x2 k 2 x2 dixit s main result is that if there is perfect symmetry between the players and each player s effort has a positive but diminishing marginal effect on his or her probability of winning i e

on the existence of cournot equilibrium this paper examines the existence of n firm cournot equilibrium in a market for a single homogeneous commodity it proves that if each firm s marginal revenue declines as the aggregate output of other firms increases which is implied by concave inverse demand then a cournot equilibrium exists without assuming that firms have nondecreasing marginal cost or identical technologies also if the marginal revenue condition fails at a potential optimal point there is a set of firms such that no cournot equilibrium exists the paper also contains an example of nonexistence with two nonidentical firms each with constant returns to scale production