distributed energy infrastructure paradigm community microgrids in a new institutional economics context abstract this paper provides a theoretical framework based on new institutional economics nie concepts to guide the development of community microgrids given limited application thus far of such energy systems this paper also draws on empirical studies and experiences from the planning and development of other public community infrastructure and utility services in the development of this framework it links an efficient ownership and governance structure with transactional characteristics such as asset idiosyncrasy frequency and uncertainty defined in section 3 1 the key role of the customers and the microgrid service provider and more specifically their bilateral monopoly relationship and its effects on the choice of institutional structure is highlighted the paper examines the optimum conditions for public private or hybrid financial ownership and for unified or network governance through long term contracting this allows ex ante investment uncertainty and ex post appropriation risks to be efficiently managed the analysis suggests that long term contract completeness future demand for electricity and level of uncertainty are the determining factors in the selection of institutional structure this has significant real world implications for the communities seeking to achieve electricity self sufficiency and environmental benefits through community microgrids service providers and other private or public actors

bookbuilding and strategic allocation in the bookbuilding procedure an investment banker solicits bids for shares from institutional investors prior to pricing an equity issue the banker then prices the issue and allocates shares at his discretion to the investors we examine the books for 39 international equity issues we find that the investment banker awards more shares to bidders who provide information in their bids regular investors receive favorable allocations especially when the issue is heavily oversubscribed the investment banker also favors revised bids and domestic investors investment banks commonly build a book before pricing an equity issue in the united states it has been standard practice for a number of years in many other countries where fixed price offerings were traditionally used the bookbuilding procedure is becoming increasingly common especially for international equity issues 1 under the formal bookbuilding procedure the investment banker solicits indications of interest from institutional investors such indications consist of a bid for a quantity of shares and might include a maximum price i e a limit price or other details the investment banker uses the information to construct a demand curve the issue price is not set according to any explicit rule but rather based on the banker s interpretation of investors indications of interest he generally sets the price at a level at which demand exceeds supply and then allocates shares to the bidders at his discretion thus the

an investigation of market microstructure impacts on event study returns we investigate the importance of bid ask spread induced biases on event date returns as exemplified by seasoned equity offerings by nyse listed firms we document significant negative return biases on the offering day which explain a large portion of the negative event date return documented in the literature buy sell order flow imbalance is prominent around the offering and induces a relatively large spread bias if order imbalances are suspected the researcher can use returns calculated from the midpoint of the closing bid and ask quotes instead of returns calculated from closing transaction prices to avoid this return bias several studies document the impact of bid ask spreads on security return patterns which appear inconsistent with the informational efficiency of capital markets phillips and smith 1980 find spread induced bias to be important in explaining apparent arbitrage opportunities in the option markets lakonishok and smidt 1984 uncover evidence suggesting a relation between bid ask spreads and turn of the year seasonality in stock returns 1 keim 1989 and porter 1989 further document the empirical importance of

buy local pollute less what drives households to join a community supported farm this paper examines which factors determine the participation of households in long term contracting with local farmers are households motivated by reducing the environmental impacts of their food consumption a discrete choice model of community supported agriculture csa participation is applied to a sample of 264 french households the findings suggest that difficult to measure attributes notably environmental considerations play a major role in explaining csa participation

discounting and underpricing in seasoned equity offers abstract expected discounting in seasoned equity offers is a cost of uncertainty about firm value marketing new shares and acquiring information that raises the offer price stockholders incorporate predictable discounting in stock prices when equity offers are first announced the surprise component of discounting reflecting the lead bank s final adjustment to the offer price releases information that often causes economically large price swings on the offer day disparities between the issuer s closing price and the price suggested in the lead bank s final order book are a primary source of information the discount surprise appears to be used by lead banks to update capital suppliers with that eleventh hour information before they commit their funds

the new institutional economics this outstanding book presents new original contributions from some of the world s leading economists including ronald coase douglass c north masahiko aoki oliver e williamson and harold demsetz it demonstrates the extent and depth of the new institutional economics research programme which is having a worldwide impact on the economics profession

justice failure efficiency and equality in business ethics this paper offers the concept of justice failure as a counterpart to the familiar idea of market failure in order to better understand managers ethical obligations this paper takes the market failures approach mfa to business ethics as its point of departure the success of the mfa i argue lies in its close proximity with economic theory particularly in the idea that within a larger scheme of social cooperation markets ought to pursue efficiency and leave the pursuit of equality to the welfare state as a result the core ethical responsibility of business actors is to avoid profiting off of market failure after reviewing this approach i challenge its emphasis on efficiency i argue that just as we note the suboptimal efficiency of actual markets market failure we should also take seriously the suboptimal equality of actual welfare states what i call justice failure taking this idea seriously results in a whole other set of ethical responsibilities for businesses to take into account in addition to market imperfections and regulatory lacunae managers should also avoid profiting from and exacerbating structural inequalities and injustices i offer an outline of the kinds of injustices and inequalities that would have bearing on business ethics and the kinds of ethical responsibilities that this approach suggests that business actors should take into account

information technology and transnational integration theory and evidence on the evolution of the modern multinational enterprise reflecting amplified hazards in cross border exchange and imperfections in markets for intangibles internalization has been central in multinational enterprise mne theory this centrality notwithstanding the fact is that internalization coheres with lower powered incentives and carries an implicit drawback namely higher realized production costs with the emergence and deployment of information and communication technology ict modern mnes are reshaping their transnational governance to address this cost the modern mne uses ict to mitigate transaction costs and evolves more to arm s length exchange to incentivize lower production costs a testable prediction is that mnes in industries more susceptible to and employing more ict will exhibit a reduced propensity for transnational integration we examine this hypothesis using available data from 1982 to 1997 for us mnes across all manufacturing sectors regression results and robustness tests are strongly congruent with the prediction this study a first to explore empirically the role of ict in the evolution of transnational exchange suggests that mne theory until now founded primarily on transaction cost economics and a cross border control theory of value capture is more likely to keep pace with developments in mne practice by opening up to incentive theories of exchange governance and a cross border coordination theory of value creation

efficient adaptation in long term contracts take or pay provisions for natural gas to mitigate the inflexibility of long term contracting for natural gas parties will look for terms that minimize the need for costly adjudication while maintaining incentives for appropriate adaptation the authors examine the incident of take or pay provisions in contracts between natural gas producers and pipelines from this perspective they argue that take obligations can be viewed as a mechanism for effecting appropriate incentives for contractual performance and show that efficient breach considerations define an optimal take percentage as a function of characteristics of the transaction these incentives are distorted by regulated price ceilings which cause the adoption of take obligations in excess of optimal levels the findings refute the common perception that take or pay provisions are just an artifact of wellhead price regulation and serve no useful purpose in the absence of regulation 20 references 1 figure 1 table

the choice of equity selling mechanisms abstract this paper examines the impact of information asymmetry and monitoring of managers on the choice between public offerings and private placements three key findings emerge first private placement firms have higher information asymmetry than public offering firms second private placement investors do not engage in more monitoring than public offering investors finally discounts for private placements sold to managers are higher than discounts for private placements in which managers do not participate the final two findings cast doubts on the widely held view that private placements are motivated by a demand for enhanced monitoring

issuing costs to existing shareholders in competitive and negotiated underwritten public utility equity offerings abstract this paper presents the results of an empirical investigation of whether there is any difference in the cost incurred by public utilities if they issue new equity through a negotiated or competitive underwriting we conclude that the expected cost of a competitive offer is less than the expected cost of a negotiated offer but that the variance of the cost is substantially greater with a competitive offer these results are interesting because most public utilities use negotiated underwriting unless forced by regulation to use competitive offers this paper is also an addition to the growing agency theory literature

asset specificity and economic organization abstract this paper examines the optimization problem of firm and market organization in which both production cost and transaction cost differences are expressed as a function of asset specificity in general markets enjoy advantages by aggregating the demands of many buyers thereby realizing economies of scale or scope such production cost savings need to be assessed in relation to the transaction cost advantages that internal organization sometimes enjoys over markets in adapting to changed circumstances as it turns out both production cost economies and the transaction cost differences between firm and market organization vary systematically with the characteristics of the investments this paper employs a unified framework to assess the choice of organization form the condition of asset specificity is featured

the effects of foreign strategic investors on business models in china s commercial banks does ownership structure matter abstractintroducing foreign strategic investors fsis is a vital step in the ownership reforms of china s banking industry using china s data from 1995 to 2014 we employ propensity score matching and difference in differences approaches to investigate the effects of fsis on the business models of chinese banks including income structure and funding structure we find that fsis significantly influence income structure the bank s non interest income nii share significantly rises after introducing fsis the higher ownership shares of fsis are associated with the higher nii share and the nii share has been increased when fsis assign directors or senior managers to chinese banks we also report that the effects of fsis on income structure are weaker in state owned banks than those in other banks and ownership concentration weakens the links between fsis and income structure finally this article shows that fsis have no significant influence on funding structure these findings will be informative and

diversification in banking is noninterest income the answer this paper assesses potential diversification benefits in the u s banking industry from the steady shift toward activities that generate fee income trading revenue and other types of noninterest income in the aggregate declining volatility of net operating revenue reflects reduced volatility of net interest income not diversification benefits from noninterest income which is quite volatile and increasingly correlated with net interest income at the bank level greater reliance on noninterest income particularly trading revenue is associated with lower risk adjusted profits and higher risk this suggests few obvious diversification benefits from the ongoing shift toward noninterest income

the contained rivalry requirement and a triple feature program for business ethics this paper proposes a description of the moral obligations of economic agents it will show that a threefold division should be adopted to distinguish moral obligations applying to their interactions in the market obligations applying to their interactions inside business firms and obligations applying to their interactions with agents outside the market competition might be permissible in the first case since markets are special patterns of social interactions called adversarial schemes they produce their benefits when agents try to satisfy exclusive preferences at the expense of others however moral obligations inside the firm and moral obligations outside the market are of a different nature this argument will be developed in the two first parts of this paper in the third part it will outline the relevant strengths of that account in relation with two popular views of economic agents moral obligations the shareholder primacy view and the stakeholder theory

relational contracts and the theory of the firm relational contracts informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships are prevalent within and between firms we develop repeated game models showing why and how relational contracts within firms vertical integration differ from those between nonintegration we show that integration affects the parties temptations to renege on a given relational contract and hence affects the best relational contract the parties can sustain in this sense the integration decision can be an instrument in the service of the parties relationship our approach also has implications for joint ventures alliances and networks and for the role of management within and between firms

a theory of collective reputations with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality the paper is a first attempt at modelling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations a member s current incentives are affected by his past behaviour and because his track record is observed only with noise by the group s past behaviour as well the paper thus studies the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations and derives the existence of stereotypes from history dependence rather than from a multiplicity of equilibria or from the existence of a common trait as is usually done in the literature it shows that new members of an organization may suffer from an original sin of their elders long after the latter are gone and it derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which group reputations can be rebuilt last the paper applies the theory to analyse when a large firm can maintain a reputation for quality 1 collective reputations collective reputations play an important role in economics and the social sciences countries ethnic racial or religious groups are known to be hard working honest corrupt hospitable or belligerent some firms enjoy substantial rents from their reputations for producing high quality products some departments are reported to treat their faculty or students fairly the paper is a first attempt at modelling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations a member s current incentives are affected by her past behaviour and because her track record is observed only with noise by the group s past behaviour as well the paper studies the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations in a model in which current generations are progressively replaced by new ones and derives the existence of stereotypes from history dependence rather than from a multiplicity of equilibria or from the existence of a common trait as is usually done in the literature see section 2 for a detailed comparison with the literature it shows that new members of an organization may suffer from an original sin of their elders long after the latter are gone and it derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which group reputations can be rebuilt last the paper applies the theory to analyse when a large firm can maintain a reputation for quality let us spell out the building blocks of our theory in more detail a a group s reputation is only as good as that of its members each member is characterized by individual traits such as talent diligence or honesty past individual behaviour conveys information about these traits and generates individual reputations

the optimal spread and offering price for underwritten securities abstract the paper develops the net proceeds maximization theory explaining how the spread and offering price are determined in all underwritten offerings in the u s the theory yields solutions for the optimal spread and offering price for all underwritten securities and it yields comparative statics that explain the cross sectional variation in actual spreads and initial returns across different types of underwritten securities the theory also suggests two alternative explanations to the ones offered by chen and ritter j finance 55 2000 1105 for the clustering of unseasoned equity offerings spreads at 7

the effects of business models on bank risk before during and after financial crisis evidence from china using chinese data from 2004 to 2016 we investigate the effects of business models on bank risk before during and after financial crisis three main results emerge first insolvency risk and roa

the diversification and financial performance of us credit unions abstract for us credit unions revenue from non interest sources has increased significantly in recent years we investigate the impact of revenue diversification on financial performance for the period 1993 2004 the impact of a change in strategy that alters the share of non interest income is decomposed into a direct exposure effect reflecting the difference between interest and non interest bearing activities and an indirect exposure effect which reflects the effect of the institution s own degree of diversification on both risk adjusted and unadjusted returns measures a positive direct exposure effect is outweighed by a negative indirect exposure effect for all but the largest credit unions this may imply that similar diversification strategies are not appropriate for large and small credit unions small credit unions should eschew diversification and continue to operate as simple savings and loan institutions while large credit unions should be encouraged to exploit new product opportunities around their core expertise

incentive intensity forbearance law and the governance of transactions this paper uses a simple make or buy model to summarize and illustrate some of the distinguishing aspects of williamson s transaction cost theory it is shown that each mode of governance is associated with a different degree of incentive intensity which in turn is attributable to the difference in court access and in the control of accounts copyright 2004 oxford university press

on the origin content and relevance of the market failures approach the view of business ethics that christopher mcmahon calls the implicit morality of the market and joseph heath calls the market failures approach has received a significant amount of recent attention the idea of this view is that we can derive an ethics for market participants by thinking about the point of market activity and asking what the world would have to be like for this point to be realized while this view has been much discussed it is still not well understood this paper seeks to remedy this problem i begin by showing against some recent commentators that mcmahon s view and heath s view are fundamentally the same second i clarify the sense of efficiency at work in the market failures approach finally i argue that in its current form this view has little relevance to the real world of business i conclude by sketching two ways of modifying it to fit our world

can green building councils serve as third party governance institutions an economic and institutional analysis abstract green building councils gbcs have been established in many different countries in recent years this paper discusses the role such organizations can play in the respective construction and real estate industry and under what circumstances a gbc can contribute positively to the development of a greener or more sustainable stock of buildings the paper investigates the main informational problem of the industry by looking at the relation between a developer and an investor from an economic point of view we argue that the investor s uncertainty about the true quality of a building and the corresponding incentive for the developer to cheat may lock them into a prisoners dilemma trap the corresponding barriers for a transition toward a greener buildings market are analyzed gbcs are described as institutions of economic governance that can assist the economy in overcoming these problems they can act as third party institutions in transactions between developers and investors by certifying the quality of a building they can reduce the risk for the investor to be cheated by the developer and also increase the incentive to develop good quality buildings for the developer this task however raises some severe management challenges for the gbcs

signalling and the pricing of new issues this paper develops a signalling model with two signals two attributes and a continuum of signal levels and attribute types to explain new issue underpricing both the fraction of the new issue retained by the issuer and its offering price convey to investors the unobservable intrinsic value of the firm and the variance of its cash flows many of the model s comparative statics results are novel empirically testable and consistent with the existing empirical evidence on new issues in particular the degree of underpricing which can be inferred from observable variables is positively related to the firm s post issue share price

shareholders and social responsibility the article presents an analysis and critique of milton friedman s argument that the social responsibility of business is merely to increase its profits the analysis uncovers a central claim that friedman implies but does not explicitly defend namely that the shareholders of a corporation have no duty to direct that corporation s management to exercise social responsibility an argument against this claim is then advanced by way of a convergence strategy whereby multiple influential moral approaches are shown to align themselves against friedman the convergence strategy shows that friedman s position lies on the lonely fringes of western moral thought and that at least some of friedman s professed adherents appear to offer incoherent moral views the convergence strategy is shown to suggest but not entail a stakeholder model of the corporation the article concludes by considering two objections

an adversarial ethic for business or when sun tzu met the stakeholder in the economic literature on the firm especially in the transaction cost tradition a sharp distinction is drawn between so called market transactions and administered transactions this distinction is of enormous importance for business ethics since market transactions are governed by the competitive logic of the market whereas administered transactions are subject to the cooperative norms that govern collective action in a bureaucracy the widespread failure to distinguish between these two types of transactions and thus to distinguish between adversarial and non adversarial relations has led many business ethicists to develop a uniform moral code yet in market transactions the checks and balances built into the system of commercial exchange are such as to permit more instrumental forms of behavior in administered transactions by contrast these checks and balances are absent and thus the institutional context calls for much greater exercise of moral restraint in this paper i begin the task of developing an adversarial ethic for business according to this view the competitive environment licenses a greater range of self interested behavior but also imposes its own constraints on the strategies that firms may adopt in the pursuit of their interests

an empirical investigation of ipo returns and subsequent equity offerings abstract several recent papers present signaling models in which firms underprice their initial public offerings of equity ipos so that they can subsequently issue seasoned equity at more favorable prices we test the implications of these models we find a positive relation between ipo underpricing and the probability and size of subsequent seasoned offerings although these results are consistent with the implications of the signaling hypotheses the economic significance appears weak we conduct additional tests to evaluate other explanations for these findings and find the alternatives more compelling

perfect competition and the creativity of the market from the perspective of the walrasian general equilibrium model entrepreneurial and opportunistic behavior seems foreign can the model be refashioned so that it can accommodate such behavior many would say no but we argue the contrary indeed we present a reformulation of the model that serves as a gateway to rather than a detour from such contemporary issues as innovation and incentives the trick is to reexamine what perfect competition means starting with an historical summary of general equilibrium we sketch an image of the perfect competitor as an active market opportunist seeking out profit potentials wherever he can

is the ipo pricing process efficient this paper investigates underwriters treatment of public information throughout the ipo pricing process two key findings emerge first public information is not fully incorporated into the initial price range while the economic magnitude of the bias is small it is puzzling because it is not clear who benefits from it further it indicates that the filing range midpoint is not an unbiased predictor of the offer price as prior literature has assumed second while public information is similarly not fully incorporated into the final offer price the small economic significance of this relation indicates that the ipo pricing process is almost efficient

business ethics and the end of history in corporate law henry hansmann has claimed we have reached the end of history in corporate law organized around the widespread normative consensus that corporate managers should act exclusively in the economic interests of shareholders in this paper i examine hansmann s own argument in support of this view in order to draw out its implications for some of the traditional concerns of business ethicists about corporate social responsibility the centerpiece of hansmann s argument is the claim that ownership of the firm is most naturally exercised by the group able to achieve the lowest agency costs and that homogeneity of interest within the ownership group is the most important factor in achieving lower costs he defends this claim through a study of cooperatives attempting to show that homogeneity is the source of the competitive advantage most often enjoyed by shareholders over other constituency groups such as workers suppliers and customers when it comes to exercising control over the firm some business ethicists impressed by this argument have taken it to be a vindication of milton friedman s claim that profit maximization is the only social responsibility of management i would like to suggest that this conclusion does not follow and that the hansmann argument lends itself to a less minimalist view what i refer to as a market failures approach to business ethics

the impact of global equity offerings this article examines the impact of u s firms issuing equity in multiple markets we compare the stock price reactions to announcements of global equity offers to a control group of issues offered exclusively in the domestic u s market all else equal the adverse price reaction that typically accompanies equity issuance is reduced by 0 8 percent when some shares are sold abroad the overall evidence suggests global offers are effective in expanding demand and reducing the price pressure effects associated with share issuance the benefits of global offers appear to be associated with an increase in the number of foreign shareholders the search for new capital markets and lower costs of capital is an ongoing search for most firms in recent years the number of u s firms issuing common equity in international markets has increased significantly in 1985 u s firms raised 89 million through follow on equity offers in foreign markets and this amount increased to 18 915 million in 1995 a greater than 200 fold increase in nominal terms this paper focuses on follow on global equity issues by u s firms and attempts to assess why firms widely acknowledged to have access to broad and deep domestic capital markets increasingly seek to raise equity abroad the global equity offerings we examine involve a simultaneous sale of common equity at the same offer price in the u s market and one or more international markets we examine the characteristics of the issuers and issues and investigate to what extent the wider distribution of shares affects the pricing and costs of these issues our main line of inquiry examines whether the distribution of shares to multiple markets results in a higher offer price for equity shares than would be obtained had the shares been sold exclusively in the u s market domes

an optimally viable version of stakeholder theory this article is the final one in a series of four papers investigating the stakeholder approach to running businesses it argues that the optimally viable version of that approach is one in which employees have a co equal status as stakeholders with shareholders the maximum allowed for under stakeholder theory while other groupings only have a minimal status as stakeholders and are generally restricted to just customers suppliers and lenders this version is argued for on the grounds that it both overcomes the implementation problems attendant upon having to serve the interests of a range of groupings and is justified in terms of stakeholder membership being confined to those groupings with a claim on the services of a business in virtue of directly contributing to its economic functioning the ranking of non shareholder stakeholders in the recommended version and in particular the maximal ranking granted to employees is argued to reflect the scale of the various contributions as measured by the degree to which making it exposes those stakeholders to both financial risk and a non financial work related risk peculiar to employees it is concluded that although this is the best available version of the stakeholder approach it may not be the best of all possible ways of running a business

local market size social capital and outsourcing evidence from emilia romagna based on a unique dataset concerning small firms operating in the machinery and equipment industry in emilia romagna italy we estimate the separate effects of social capital and local market size on the probability to either fully or partially outsource parts of the production process we are able to distinguish 29 different phases of the production cycle from design to early processing to post production our estimates show that 1 social capital influences the full outsourcing of core assembly and post assembly activities while local market size affects the full outsourcing of early processing activities 2 neither social capital nor local market size have a statistically significant effect on the probability of partially outsourcing any step of the production process robustness tests confirm our results vis a vis the endogeneity of the local market size and social capital and the potential modifiable area unit problem relating to local market size

blockchain and the evolution of institutional technologies implications for innovation policy abstract for the past century economists have proposed a suite of theories relating to industrial dynamics technological change and innovation there has been an implication in these models that the institutional environment is stable however a new class of institutional technologies most notably blockchain technology lower the cost of institutional entrepreneurship along these margins propelling a process of institutional evolution this presents a new type of innovation process applicable to the formation and development of institutions for economic governance and coordination this paper develops a replicator dynamic model of institutional innovation and proposes some implications of this innovation for innovation policy given the influence of public policies on transaction costs and associated institutional choices it is indicated that policy settings conductive to the adoption and use of blockchain technology would elicit entrepreneurial experiments in institutional forms harnessing new coordinative possibilities in economic exchange conceptualisation of blockchain related public policy an innovation policy in its own right has significant implications for the operation and understanding of open innovation systems in a globalised context

corporate earnings and financings an empirical analysis this article examines the long term behavior of corporate earnings around three corporate financing events sales of common stock convertible bonds and straight bonds the article shows that earnings declined for all issuers and that more capital is raised the larger the earnings decline these findings indicate that external financings are motivated by earnings declines no evidence is found of a relationship between the size of the subsequent earnings downturn or the amount of capital raised and stock price reactions to the financing announcements these findings suggest that security sales did not systematically provide new information about either the magnitude of subsequent earnings downturn or the amount of financing copyright 1990 by the university of chicago

a neoinstitutionalist interpretation of the changes in the russian oil model this paper deals with the current change of the institutional and organizational framework of the russian oil industry regarding this evolution the main characteristic is the increasing involvement of national oil companies in the upstream activities the point is to explain this reorganization by relying on the new institutional economics framework these theoretical works highlight that institutional environment and governance structures complement each other we argue that the current reorganization in an attempt to increase the coherence of the institutional arrangement governing the transaction between the russian state and the private oil companies

price stabilization in the market for new issues abstract this study examines price stabilization in new equity issues stabilizationtruncates the distribution of post issue prices at a floor price lowering the risk of adverse price moves and hence in a competitive dealer market reducing the bid ask spread using 1 523 nasdao traded firm commitment initial public offerings issued between 1982 and 1987 we find that spreads narrow when the market price is close to the offer price and stabilization is most likely moreover significant negative returns are documented after the hypothesized termination of stabilizing activities suggesting that stabilization and its cessation affect market prices

the impact of underwriting and dealing on bank returns and risks abstract this study uses portfolio theory to investigate empirically the potential for diversification gains from expanded bank securities powers diversification potential is examined using microeconomic data on returns to existing bank securities and non securities activities over 1976 through 1985 both the mean and standard deviation of returns to securities activities are found to be greater than those of non securities activities some potential for diversification gains is found although this appears to be quite limited experiments designed to estimate the effect of using industry and time aggregated data are performed

dealer intermediation and price behavior in the aftermarket for new bond issues municipal bonds trade in decentralized broker dealer markets and are underpriced when issued but unlike equities the average price rises slowly over several days newly issued municipal bonds have high levels of price dispersion and the average price rises because the mix of trade sizes changes over time while large trades occur close to the reoffering price small trades occur between the reoffering price to as much as 5 above the reoffering price using a mixed distribution model we quantify the losses uninformed traders or issuers give up to broker dealers

signalling by underpricing in the ipo market abstract empirical evidence suggests the existence of hot issue markets for initial public offerings in certain periods and in certain industries new issues are underpriced and rationing occurs this paper develops a model consistent with this observation which assumes the firm itself best knows its prospects in certain circumstances firms with the most favorable prospects find it optimal to signal their type by underpricing their initial issue of shares and investors know that only the best can recoup the cost of this signal from subsequent issues

four formal izable theories of the firm in this essay i define and compare elemental versions of four theories of the firm these elemental theories are distilled from important contributions by hart holmstrom klein williamson and others although these contributions have been widely cited and much discussed i have found it difficult to understand the commonalities distinctions and potential combinations of these seemingly familiar contributions in this essay therefore i attempt to clarify these issues in three steps i begin with informal summaries of the theories then turn to simple but formal statements of each elemental theory and finally nest the four elemental theories in an integrative framework

why don t issuers get upset about leaving money on the table in ipos one of the puzzles regarding initial public offerings ipos is that issuers rarely get upset about leaving substantial amounts of money on the table defined as the number of shares sold times the difference between the first day closing market price and the offer price the average ipo leaves 9 1 million on the table this number is approximately twice as large as the fees paid to investment bankers and represents a substantial indirect cost to the issuing firm we present a prospect theory model that focuses on the covariance of the money left on the table and wealth changes our reasoning also provides an explanation for a second puzzling pattern much more money is left on the table following recent market rises than after market falls this results in an explanation of hot issue markets we also offer a new explanation for why ipos are underpriced copyright 2002 oxford university press

the theory of the firm as governance structure from choice to contract the propositions that organization matters and that it is susceptible to analysis were long greeted by skepticism by economists one reason why this message took a long time to register is that it is much easier to say that organization matters than it is to show how and why the prevalence of the science of choice approach to economics has also been an obstacle as developed herein the lessons of organization theory for economics are both different and more consequential when examined through the lens of contract this paper examines economic organization from a science of contract perspective with special emphasis on the theory of the firm

stock price effects and costs of secondary distributions abstract this study does not support the view that a large number of shares can be sold at the prevailing market price and at a small cost a significant stock price decrease is observed at the initial announcement of secondary distributions the price declines are greater for offerings by officers and directors and for larger offerings but are significant for all types of sellers and for large and small offerings there is no significant price decline at the offering when secondaries are announced in advance underwriting and other selling costs are substantial and are positively related to relative offering size

bank income structure and risk an empirical analysis of european banks the purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between bank risk and product diversification in the changing structure of the european banking industry based on a broad set of european banks for the period 1996 2002 our study first shows that banks expanding into non interest income activities present higher risk and higher insolvency risk than banks which mainly supply loans however considering size effects and splitting non interest activities into both trading activities and commission and fee activities we show that the positive link with risk is mostly accurate for small banks and essentially driven by commission and fee activities a higher share of trading activities is never associated with higher risk and for small banks it implies in some cases lower asset and default risks

what precludes the development of noninterest activities in chinese commercial banks from the perspective of the price of interest activities noninterest activities of chinese commercial banks remain sluggish this article examines the price of interest activities and noninterest activities of chinese commercial banks over 2000 2010 based on ols and 2sls regression we find that the price of interest activities has a significant negative effect on the noninterest activities it appears that controlled interest rate is the main hindrance of the development of noninterest activities and the result is consistent with political view we also find that among state owned commercial banks and nonstate owned ones the relationships of interest activities and noninterest activities are differential the link between the price of interest activities and noninterest activities in state owned commercial banks is stronger than that in nonstate owned commercial banks that is the result of different government intervention degree

a model of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for new issues this paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for the case in which the investment banker is better informed about the capital market than is the issuer and the issuer cannot observe the distribution effort expended by the banker the optimal contract under which the offer price decision is delegated to the better informed banker in order to deal with the adverse selection and moral hazard problems resulting from the informational asymmetry and the observability problem is characterized the model demonstrates a positive demand for investment banking advising and distribution services and provides an explanation of the underpricing of new issues an investment banker performs three functions which may be of value to an issuer of new securities underwriting advising and distribution this paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services based on an informational asymmetry between an issuer of new securities and an investment banker ultimately a theory of the organization of the financial intermediary industry is required that would predict which firms would use which types of financial intermediaries for which purposes and which firms would raise capital without engaging the services of a financial intermediary only a limited set of such predictions are developed here in the context of a model of a fixedprice offering under a negotiated contract in which the investment banker is

the structure of ownership and the theory of the firm the separation of ownership from control produces a condition where the interests of owner and of ultimate manager may and often do diverge and where many of the checks which formerly operated to limit the use of power disappear in creating these new relationships the quasi public corporation may fairly be said to work a revolution it has divided ownership into nominal ownership and the power formerly joined to it thereby the corporation has changed the nature of profit seeking enterprise 1

the making of economic policy a transaction cost politics perspective economic policymaking as a political process the normative approach to policy analysis the positive view of political economy a synthesis the policy process in real time a theme transaction costs the transaction cost politics framework political outcomes and economic efficiency transaction cost analysis in politics mechanisms to cope with transaction costs in politics national differences two case studies to illustrate transaction cost politics tax and expenditure reform in the united states the gatt and national trade politics some reflections and suggestions some lessons for the policy process the role of the economist concluding comments appendix multiprincipal multitask agencies

stakeholder theory corporate governance and public management what can the history of state run enterprises teach us in the post enron era this paper raises a challenge for those who assume that corporate social responsibility and good corporate governance naturally go hand in hand the recent spate of corporate scandals in the united states and elsewhere has dramatized once again the severity of the agency problems that may arise between managers and shareholders these scandals remind us that even if we adopt an extremely narrow concept of managerial responsibility such that we recognize no social responsibility beyond the obligation to maximize shareholder value there may still be very serious difficulties associated with the effective institutionalization of this obligation it also suggests that if we broaden managerial responsibility in order to include extensive responsibilities to various other stakeholder groups we may seriously exacerbate these agency problems making it even more difficult to impose effective discipline upon managers hence our central question is a strong commitment to corporate social responsibility institutionally feasible in searching for an answer we revisit the history of public management and in particular the experience of social democratic governments during the 1960s and 1970s and their attempts to impose social responsibility upon the managers of nationalized industries the results of this inquiry are less than encouraging for proponents of corporate social responsibility in fact the history of public sector management presents a number of stark warnings which we would do well to heed if we wish to reconcile robust social responsibility with effective corporate governance

markets and hierarchies and mathematical economic theory over the past decade transaction cost economics has been partially translated in the more mathematical language of game theory and understanding of the costs of transactions has been deepened refined and extended but the translation is incomplete a great deal of human behaviour is missed and doing game theory with more life like models of individuals will bring theory closer to phenomena transaction cost economics particularly the economics of relational contracts provides a major arena for these developments since the important issues of bounded rationality and individual behavior are central to the topic copyright 1996 by oxford university press

efficiency and ethically responsible management one common justification for the pursuit of profit by business firms within a market economy is that profit is not an end in itself but a means to more efficiently produce and allocate resources profit in short is a mechanism that serves the market s purpose of producing pareto superior outcomes for society this discussion examines whether such a justification if correct requires business managers to remain attentive to how their firm s operation impacts the market s purpose in particular it is argued that the value of efficiency despite views to the contrary cannot be fully separated from the planning and intentions of business managers as long as those managers direct their firms in an ethically responsible fashion this position is inspired by and serves as a supportive clarification of joseph heath s so called market failures approach to business ethics

the relationship between net interest margin and noninterest income using a system estimation approach abstract this paper examines the determinants of bank net interest margin nim and non traditional banking activities nii a system estimation approach is employed to control for the simultaneity between nim and nii for commercial banks in a group of 28 financially liberalized countries during the period between 1997 and 2004 we find a statistically significant negative relationship between nim and nii for the period between 1997 and 2002 a generally positive but statistically insignificant association between nim and nii is found for the subsequent period 2003 2004 banks increasing involvement in non traditional activities is negatively correlated with risk adjusted profitability measures in the former subperiod suggesting no obvious diversification benefits however the share of noninterest income is positively related to the return on assets roa and the return on equity roe for the latter subsample

the fundamental problem of accounting the fundamental problem of economic accounting is to determine a forward looking schedule of rentals user costs or quasi rents to provide for the recovery of irreversible investments the method derived herein relaxes some restrictive assumptions that are common in capital theory there can be multiple forms of comprehensive capital accounting for all forms of capital including tangible and intangible capital is symmetrical the analytical focus becomes one of fixities and frictions and not optimality rentals obey inequalities as opposed to marginal conditions if discounted profit is positive rentals depreciation and capital value are not unique le probleme fondamental de la comptabilite le probleme fondamental de la comptabilite economique est de determiner une cedule des loyers couts d utilisation ou quasi rentes anticipes permettant de recuperer la mise de fonds dans des investissements irreversibles la methode proposee ici relaxe certains postulats restrictifs conventionnels en theorie du capital la comptabilite de toutes les formes de capital y compris le capital tangible et intangible est symetrique la focalisation analytique devient centree sur les fixites et les frictions et non l optimalite si le profit escompte est positif loyers depreciation et valeur du capital ne sont pas uniques

equity issue specific versus broad regulatory protections against expropriation risk international evidence from seos abstract we compare non issue specific broad investor protections against expropriation by firm s insiders with regulations that specifically protect investors of new equity issues issue specific since in nation regulations rarely change and are homogenous for all firms it is difficult to compare issue and non issue specific investor protection mechanisms in country specific studies we utilize cross country differences in regulations to study the relative importance of issue specific and broad regulatory protections using data on seasoned equity offerings seo we find that seo underpricing is related to broad protections in particular seo underpricing is negatively positively related with the strength of ex post ex ante anti self dealing laws independent of broad protections seo underpricing is unaffected by issue specific investor protections that is neither by disclosure requirements imposed on equity issuers nor by equity issue specific liability rights conferred on investors interactions between broad protections and issue specific protections indicate issue specific protections reduce seo underpricing only in countries with strong broad protections

venture capitalist certification in initial public offerings this paper provides support for the certification role of venture capitalists in initial public offerings consistent with the certification hypothesis a comparison of venture capital backed ipos with a control sample of nonventure capital backed ipos from 1983 through 1987 matched as closely as possible by industry and offering size indicates that venture capital backing results in significantly lower initial returns and gross spreads in effect the presence of venture capitalists in the issuing firms serves to lower the total costs of going public and to maximize the net proceeds to the offering firm in addition we document that venture capitalists retain a significant portion of their holdings in the firm after the ipo the ability of third party specialists to certify the value of securities issued by relatively unknown firms in capital markets that are characterized by asymmetric information between corporate insiders and public investors has attracted much academic interest in recent years several authors including james 1990 blackwell marr and spivey 1990 and barry muscarella peavy and vetsuypens 1991 have developed and tested models based at least in part on the formal certification hypothesis presented in booth and smith 1986 a related body of work represented by deangelo 1981 beatty and ritter 1986 titman and trueman 1986 johnson and miller 1988 carter 1990 simon 1990 and carter and manaster 1990 has examined how investment bankers and auditors help resolve the asymmetric information inherent in the initial public offering ipo process in this paper we examine whether the presence of venture capitalists as investors in a firm going public can certify that the offering price of the issue reflects all available and relevant inside information we hypothesize that venture capitalists can perform this function that it will be an economically

beware of the watchdog rethinking the normative justification of gatekeeper liability one of the prevailing explanations of the corporate scandals of the enron era and the recent financial crisis is the failure of professional gatekeepers such as auditors corporate lawyers and securities analysts to detect and disrupt corporate misconduct the alleged solution to this failure typically proposed and justified on consequentialist grounds is to impose legal liability on professionals the purpose of this paper is to critically examine the normative foundations of gatekeeper liability in the course of this paper i shall defend the claim that gatekeeper liability may be morally objectionable not only on grounds of fairness but also on consequentialist grounds the expected contribution of this paper is threefold first it systematizes the framing and moral justification of gatekeeping duties second it calls into question the normative underpinnings for targeting intermediaries instead of primary wrongdoers third it anticipates some negative and often overlooked results of gatekeeping strategies in the accounting profession specifically in the realm of clientele selection the expectation gap and auditor compensation

the economics of governance the economics of governance is an effort to implement the study of good order and workable arrangements where good order includes both spontaneous order in the market which is a venerated tradition in economics adam smith 1776 friedrich hayek 1945 kenneth a arrow and gerard debreu 1954 and intentional order of a conscious deliberate purposeful kind chester irving barnard 1938 p 9 also i interpret workable arrangements to mean feasible modes of organization all of which are flawed in comparison with a hypothetical ideal avinash dixit 1996 pp 4 9 the object is to work out the efficiency logic for managing transactions by alternative modes of governance principally spot markets various long term contracts hybrids and hierarchies interest among social scientists economists included in the study and practice of good order and workable arrangements has been steadily growing in contrast with the orthodox lens of choice prices and output supply and demand the economics of governance is a lens of contract construction broadly in the spirit of james buchanan s 2001 p 29 observation that mutuality of advantage from voluntary exchange is the most fundamental of all understandings in economics the economics of governance as herein described is principally an exercise in bilateral private ordering by which i mean that the immediate parties to an exchange are actively involved in the provision of good order and workable arrangements to be sure the need for private ordering varies with the rules of the game as provided by the state distinctions between lawlessness where the state provides limited or unreliable protection for property and contract dixit 2004 and lawfulness where the state undertakes to protect property and enforce contracts in a principled way are pertinent the first of these applies mainly to primitive and transition economies the second is commonly associated with western democracies recourse to private ordering under conditions of lawlessness is altogether understandable given the absence of state support the walter a haas school of business university of california berkeley ca 94720 1900 the paper has benefited from workshop presentations at the university of california berkeley the university of valencia insead fountainebleau and the 2004 annual conference of the international society for new institutional economics an abbreviated version was also given as the horst claus recktenwald lecture at nuremburg on 4 november 2004 comments and suggestions from fred balderston ernesto dalbo avinash dixit robert gibbons witold henisz ian larkin steven tadelis and dean williamson are especially acknowledged 1 lon fuller s 1954 p 477 definition of eunomics as the science theory or study of good order and workable arrangements is very much in the spirit of what i refer to as governance 2 one of the immediate ramifications of insistently comparing feasible alternatives all of which are flawed is that the purported inefficiencies that are ascribed to failures to achieve first best optimality are not dispositive but invite the query as compared with what i return to this issue in section iv 3 excluding corporate governance the numbers of articles that used the word governance during the period 1998 2000 as compared with the period 1977 1979 in selected economics business management sociology organization and political science journals were 60 vs 1 76 vs 4 79 vs 18 and 60 vs 25 where the journals surveyed were the american economic review journal of political economy quarterly journal of economics rand journal of economics and journal of economic perspectives in economics strategic management journal management science academy of management journal and academy of management review in business management administrative science quarterly organization science american journal of sociology american sociological review and annual review of sociology in sociology organization and american political science review political science quarterly journal of politics and political research quarterly in political science combining these four categories articles using the word governance increased from 48 to 275 over this 20 year interval dixit 2004 pp 149 50 reports that the number of web pages that turn up under the search for governance is huge

evaluating stakeholder theory this paper is the third in a series of four that is directed at understanding and assessing stakeholder theory for the purposes of business ethics it addresses the suitability and viability of the theory rejecting objections of a moral and efficiency sort based respectively on claims about property rights and the economic superiority of the alternative stockholder approach but accepting that implementation problems require limiting both the number of groupings admitted to stakeholder status and the degree of responsibility towards them the conclusion looks forward to the construction of a suitably limited version of the stakeholder approach in a fourth paper drawing upon this one and the previous two

the determinants of bank interest rate margins an international study abstract this paper studies the determinants of bank net interest margins nims in six selected european countries and the us during the period 1988 1995 for a sample of 614 banks we apply the ho and saunders model ho t saunders a 1981 the determinants of bank interest margins theory and empirical evidence journal of financial and quantitative analyses 16 581 600 to a multicountry setting and decompose bank margins into a regulatory component a market structure component and a risk premium component the regulatory components in the form of interest rate restrictions on deposits reserve requirements and capital to asset ratios have a significant impact on banks nims the empirical results suggest an important policy trade off between assuring bank solvency high capital to asset ratios and lowering the cost of financial services to consumers low nims the more segmented or restricted the banking system both geographically and by activity the larger appears to be the monopoly power of existing banks and the higher their spreads macro interest rate volatility was found to have a significant impact on bank nims this suggests that macro policies consistent with reduced interest rate volatility could have a positive effect in reducing bank margins