the effect of annuity insurance on savings and inequality this paper examines the amount of precautionary savings and wealth inequality arising from life span uncertainty by comparing saving behavior under perfect insurance arrangements with that arising under imperfect arrangements namely when longevity risk can be pooled only with members of one s own family the central findings of the paper are that 1 perfecting insurance arrangements can sharply lower savings in both intergenerationally altruistic and life cycle economies and that 2 in altruistic economies perfecting annuity insurance can greatly influence inequality indeed in the long run in our model switching from imperfect family insurance to perfect insurance can mean the difference between absolute inequality and absolute equality

saving wealth and the exchange bequest motive a model of exchange motivated bequests based upon childrens attentions to parents provided when the children are young adults is joined to a standard life cycle specification to examine the consequences for wealth and savings the results of general equilibrium simulations show contribution to be far below some recent estimates exchange motivated bequests produce offsets to life cycle savings that limit their ability to increase total savings epargnes richesse et le legs motive par la logique de l echange l auteur combine un mod0e de legs motive par la logique de l 6change les parents obtenant en echange l attention de leurs enfants quand ceux ci sont jeunes adultes et une specification standard du modele

survival of the gene intergenerational transfers and precautionary saving abstract this paper provides a model of bequest and investment in children s human capital at low incomes it posits that parents and children are linked through their common concern of grandchildren and intergenerational transfers provide a material basis for the perpetuation of the family line the model characterizes intergenerational strategic interactions in a dynamic game theoretical framework moreover it explores intergenerational uncertainty as a source of precautionary saving in contrast with the existing literature the model implies that there are qualitative differences between precautionary saving from one s own income uncertainty and precautionary bequests from children s income uncertainty

why do people save a micro analysis of motives for household saving in japan this paper estimates the contribution of net saving for each of twelve motives to overall household saving in japan using micro data from a japanese government survey and finds that net saving for the retirement and precautionary motives both of which are consistent with the life cycle model are of dominant importance it also finds that the saving motives of japanese households vary greatly by age and that they save at each life stage for motives that are appropriate for that life stage these findings suggest that the life cycle model is highly applicable in the case of japan

wealth distribution in life cycle economies abstract this paper compares the age wealth distribution produced in life cycle economies to the corresponding distribution in the us economy the idea is to calibrate the model economies to match features of the us earnings distribution and then examine the wealth distribution implications of the model economies the findings are that the calibrated model economies with earnings and lifetime uncertainty can replicate measures of both aggregate wealth and transfer wealth in the us furthermore the model economies produce the us wealth gini and a significant fraction of the wealth inequality within age groups however the model economies produce less than half the fraction of wealth held by the top 1 percent of us households

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

capital accumulation and the characteristics of private intergenerational transfers many recent studies of the process of family accumulation in general and household response to social security in particular have revealed growing dissatisfaction with the life cycle theory of saving see for example barro 1978 kotlikoff 1979 darby 1979 kotlikoff and summers 1981 kurz 1981 blinder gordon and wise 1981 david and menchik 1982 leimer and lesnoy 1982 an alternative to the life cycle hypothesis is expressed by defining the preference of each family over its own consumption as well as the welfare of the generations that follow thus each family consists of an infinite chain of generations who have interdependent preferences and for this reason we shall call it the inter generational hypothesis it was recently used by barro 1974 1978 to attack the conclusions of the life cycle hypothesis our purpose in this paper is to start the long road of studying the structure of the private inter generational transfer system with the aim of providing additional tests of the two competing hypotheses

intergenerational transfers borrowing constraints and saving behavior evidence from the housing market abstract we examine the effects of intergenerational transfers on saving behavior by analyzing transfers targeted to first time home purchases transfer recipients have a shorter time to save for a down payment of 9 20 for each dollar of transfer received total savings falls by 29 40 cents and the down payment rises by 61 71 cents transfer recipients increase the value of the home purchased but by an amount that is much lower than possible if the transfer were fully leveraged in addition transfers appear to help households achieve certain down payment thresholds that give favorable mortgage terms

secular changes in wealth inequality and inheritance data suggest that the distribution of wealth among households in the usa and uk has become more equal over the last century though at least for the usa the pattern may have reversed recently this paper shows that a model in which all households save for life cycle reasons and some for dynastic purposes as well offers a possible or partial explanation the model predicts rising cross sectional equality of wealth when longevity increases there may also be implications about very recent changes expansion of social security programmes and government deficits can lead toward more wealth inequality slower growth may do the same

the strategic bequest motive although recent research suggests that intergenerational transfers play an important role in aggregate capital accumulation our understanding of bequest motives remains incomplete we develop a simple model of strategic bequests in which a testator influences the decisions of his beneficiaries by holding wealth in bequeathable forms and by conditioning the division of bequests on the beneficiaries actions the model generates falsifiable empirical predictions that are inconsistent with other theories of intergenerational transfers we present econometric and other evidence that strongly suggests that bequests are often used as compensation for services rendered by beneficiaries

saving behavior and wealth accumulation in a pure lifecycle model with income uncertainty several models of economic behavior currently compete for an explanation of individual wealth accumulation and savings patterns in this paper we focus in particular upon the role of income uncertainty and the role played by a retirement period during which time expected earnings are zero we nd that income uncertainty can alter savings patterns over the lifecycle signi cantly with the greatest in uence on the wealth of young individuals however its in uence on the aggregate stock of wealth is less than earlier theoretical work indicates 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved jel classixcation e21 e25 e60

precautionary savings a panel study theoretical literature shows that income uncertainty boosts saving yet empirical work is incomplete i test for the precautionary motive for saving using panel data knowing this motive s size is important for gauging the responsiveness of saving to government programs that reduce uncertainty and for comparison to other motives such as bequests most empirical studies of precautionary saving use either aggregate time series or cross sectional data which cannot capture the effects of individual income uncertainty i derive measures of total permanent and transitory income uncertainty from panel data the national longitudinal survey and find a strong precautionary motive a doubling of uncertainty increases the ratio of wealth to permanent income by 29

is ricardian equivalence a good approximation ricardian equivalence may be a good approximation even if all households have finite horizons many households have short horizons and an appreciable fraction of wage income is received by liquidity constrained households the approximation is likely to be better the more imperfect annuity markets are

the effect of increased longevity on capital accumulation one of the more startling demographic trends of the 1970 s has been the sharp rise in lifespan in the united states between 1970 and 1980 the life expectancy of 25year old men and women increased by at least two years while longevity has been steadily rising for many decades the recent spurt has hastened the trend the increase for both men and women in the 1970 s more than doubled the improvement of the 1960 s 1 the 1970 s were also characterized by a decline in labor force participation of older workers although rising income and increased disability payments may have explained some of the decline donald parsons 1980 it seems clear that expanding longevity has not been strongly associated with deferred retirement daniel hamermesh 1984 2 thus the retirement years have assumed greater importance in financial planning for the consumer as he or she retires earlier and lives longer the traditional life cycle model would predict greater savings rates as consumers increase accumulation of assets for their retirement consumption while young would drop and there might be an increase in labor supply as individuals substitute leisure while young for greater levels of life cycle consumption even under a social security system as long as the current generation s tax liabilities reflect their longer lifespan total savings private plus public should also rise 3 the predicted increase in savings is substantial a simple example using the modigliani ando brumberg life cycle model can illustrate the extent of the savings shift assume that earnings and consumption are constant over working years and lifespan respectively and that the interest rate is zero consumption is then a constant proportion k of earnings where k is the ratio of working years to one s lifespan if consumers made plans based on average lifespan the representative 25 year old would have saved 18 percent of earnings in 1970 1 40 49 when he plans to retire at age 65 and expects to live until age 74 in 1980 after a rise in life expectancy of two years the representative 25 year old would have increased savings to 21 percent of earnings or a net rise in the savings rate per worker of 17 percent that is this simple life cycle model implies that savings in the last decade should have risen other things held constant by approximately 17 percent or about 80 billion dollars per year the evidence from aggregate time series data appears to contradict the life cycle model s prediction of rising savings rates the net private savings rate in the united states declined from 7 8 percent of nnp in 1970 to 6 2 percent in 1980 while alan auerbach 1982 has suggested that some of the reported decline in savings may be caused by mismeasurement it seems clear that there has been no substantial rise in the savings rate there are numerous explanations for department of economics university of virginia charlottesville va 22901 i am grateful to maxim engers daniel hamermesh william r johnson laurence j kotlikoff john strauss and especially james davies and john r wolfe for helpful suggestions and comments life table data can be found in daniel hamermesh 1985 the life insurance fact book various years or in unpublished form from the national center for health statistics 2john wolfe 1983 provides an ingenious argument for why the social security benefit schedule has induced those with shorter life expectancies to retire early we might therefore expect some rise in the average retirement age as those expecting to live longer defer retirement until age 65 3if the social security taxes do not rise as expected lifespan increases perhaps because current tax proceeds are paid out as current benefits rather than retained in a trust fund young workers will save more to offset the lower expected benefits in the future 4in a two period model the percentage change in savings by the young is equal to the percentage change in aggregate savings

does the balance of power within a family matter the case of the retirement equity act abstract this paper studies within family decision making regarding investment in income protection for surviving spouses using a simple and tractable nash bargaining model a change in us pension law the retirement equity act of 1984 is used as an instrument to derive predictions from the bargaining model about the household demand for survivor annuities and life insurance and to contrast these with the predictions of the classical single utility function model of the household in the empirical part of the paper the predictions of the classical model are rejected in favor of the predictions of the nash bargaining model

bequest and wealth accumulation are some pieces of the puzzle missing the lively debate between laurence j kotlikoff and franco modigliani presented in the spring 1988 issue of this journal concerns an old question what is the main motivation for saving and therefore for the accumulation of wealth more specifically what are the respective contributions to aggregate wealth of 1 saving for retirement also known as hump saving 2 precautionary savings and unintended bequests due to uncertainty about the length of life and 3 planned bequests of course other wealth holding motives are possible but let us follow kotlikoff and modigliani in setting them aside for now if modigliani s life cycle hypothesis is to be viewed as a close to approximation of reality then the bulk of existing wealth should have resulted from some combination of hump and precautionary saving our comment on this dispute attempts to advance two issues first the controversy involves an enormous gap between empirical estimates of the share of inherited wealth in total accumulation even though the estimates are often based on the same data we hope to clarify why the estimates vary so widely second the kotlikoff modigliani dispute is presented as an american issue with little extension abroad we will present some results from other countries that bear on the controversy some of the estimates from kotlikofi s paper originated in a 1981 paper he wrote with lawrence summers which is why we sometimes refer to his position as the kotlikoff summers argument in this comment the problem of conceptualizing the contribution of bequest to aggregate savings can be summarized with a thought experiment assume all bequests were confiscated

social security reform and national wealth recent trends in common stock prices suggest a distinction between increases in national net worth and flows of physical investment in this paper we present a simple overlapping generations model in which such differences can arise technological progress occurs exogenously yet firms own new technologies for a time we examine possible consequences for social security reform reform which increases private saving depletes part of its force raising the capitalized price of proprietary technologies a calibrated example suggests an increase in physical capital one third smaller than without inelastic factors both steady states and transition paths are considered

ricardian equivalence are the required assumptions defensible abstract ricardian equivalence re requires universal provision of bequests for purely altruistic reasons this paper argues that no defensible set of values for relevant parameters is consistent with this requirement hence observed bequests must at least partly reflect motives inconsistent with re

forestry and the bequest motive abstract with an overlapping generations model for trees and humans it is shown that in a small open timber producing economy both in a setting where the economy is planned in order to maximize an intertemporal social welfare function and in a decentralized market economy long term forest investments should be evaluated by their net present value this is so provided that the existing generation has some if even very small concern for the well being of the next generation a review of empirical studies among nonindustrial private forest owners in the u s and in sweden gives support to the suggestion that this mechanism based on a tinge of altruism may be more important in promoting long term silvicultural investments than the incentives given by existing land markets

on the long run evolution of inheritance france 1820 2050 this paper attempts to document and account for the long run evolution of inheritance we find that in a country like france the annual flow of inheritance was about 20 25 of national income between 1820 and 1910 down to less than 5 in 1950 and back up to about 15 by 2010 a simple theoretical model of wealth accumulation growth and inheritance can fully account for the observed u shaped pattern and levels using this model we find that under plausible assumptions the annual bequest flow might reach about 20 25 of national income by 2050 this corresponds to a capitalized bequest share in total wealth accumulation well above 100 our findings illustrate the fact that when the growth rate g is small and when the rate of return to private wealth r is permanently and substantially larger than the growth rate say r 4 5 vs g 1 2 which was the case in the 19th century and early 20th century and is likely to happen again in the 21st century then past wealth and inheritance are bound to play a key role for aggregate wealth accumulation and the structure of lifetime inequality contrarily to a widely spread view modern economic growth did not kill inheritance

the ricardian approach to budget deficits persistent budget deficits have increased economists interest in theories and evidence about fiscal policy this paper develops the ricardian approach and contrasts it with standard models the discussion considers from major theoretical objections to ricardian equivalence finite lifetimes imperfect capital markets uncertainty about future taxes and incomes and the distorting effects of taxation the paper then considers empirical evidence on interest rates consumption and saving and current account deficits the conclusion is that the ricardian approach is a useful first order approximation and that this approach will probably become the benchmark model for assessing fiscal policy this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the effect of inheritance receipt on retirement abstract this paper provides new evidence on how wealth shocks influence retirement behavior economic theory generally posits that leisure is a normal good yet it is difficult to obtain reliable empirical estimates of the wealth effect because wealth is correlated with numerous unobservable characteristics that affect labor supply we use inheritance receipt as a wealth shock and find that it is associated with a significant increase in the probability of retirement especially when the inheritance is unexpected this evidence has important implications for how public policies such as pension or tax reform may influence retirement behavior through the wealth effect

long run equilibria with borrowing constraints and altruism this paper adapts a nonstochastic overlapping generations model to include liquidity constraints and intergenerational altruism existing work indicates the importance of both but often considers them separately this paper studies their interactions first it shows that they tend to conflict the model only admits stationary equilibria with dynastic wealth accumulation but no binding liquidity constraints or wity binding constraints but no dynastic accumulation second it examines the latter type of equilibrium closely if liquidity constraints bind quantitative examples imply that consequent utility losses may be small and that economywide wealth accumulation tends to be unrealistically low

optimal timing of farm transferal from parent to child when farm income is first increasing and then decreasing in the operator s age the timing of farm transferal from parent to child is optimally determined by families who seek to maximize joint income or utility using a sample of israeli farms in which the operation of the farm changed from parent to child between 1971 and 1981 equations of transfer time and child s education are derived a simultaneous equation censored regression model is estimated using a two stage method results support the theoretical predictions that transfer time is decreasing with parent s age and with child s schooling and increasing with parent s experience

innovation and the persistence of monopoly abstract the auction framework enables us to highlight a crucial feature of many r d races the losing firm can recoup part but not the entirety of its r d investments this feature is shown to account for the marked differences in results obtained by gilbert and newbery and by reinganum when the firm investing the largest amount wins with certainty we establish the existence of a unique equilibrium neither firm employs a pure strategy and the incumbent wins more often than the challenger

the wealth age relation among the aged aged people face the problem of allocating over the rest of their lifetimes the wealth that they have accumulated during their working years this problem is fairly complex because they are uncertain about the dates of their death and because they may wish to use their wealth to finance general consumption or hold it to meet emergencies leave estates or maintain power or status whether skilled at dynamic programming or not aged people effectively do make these decisions what are the results some studies of the entire lifetime pattern of saving and wealth tend to support the simple life cycle model in which the aged use up their wealth to help finance consumption harold lydall for example found saving rates to increase and then decrease with age in the whole population and to be negative for the group aged 65 and over guarded support for the theory was found by franco modigliani and albert ando in britain and by dorothy projector in the united states more recently a f shorrocks examined the lifetime pattern of wealth holding in estate tax data for a single cohort and found the hump pattern that is characteristic of life cycle saving other evidence on wealth holding runs contrary to this however in a study of estate tax returns in washington d c james d smith found that wealth increased with age among the aged after controlling for other demographic variables examining national estate tax data john brittain found wealth to increase with age in the united states and a b atkinson and a j harrison reported the same pattern in england and wales in a sample of tiaa annuity recipients analyzed by james mulanaphy over half reported that their total savings had increased during retirement and another quarter reported that their savings had remained about the same in this paper i examine wealth holding patterns among aged married couples using survey data representing the entire aged population of the united states in 1968 the statistical analysis serves as a test of the hypothesis that emerges from life cycle theory and provides some further exploration into the economic behavior of the aged i find that the aged tend to increase their wealth over time

the saving of the elderly in micro and macro data examination of household micro data on the elderly has generally concluded that they do not dissave significantly whereas estimates using aggregate macro data have shown that the presence of a large elderly population leads to a lower saving rate this paper shows that if interactions between generations are important one would not expect these estimates to be the same the paper presents new evidence that bequests are plausibly the source of this discrepancy examination of data from young households that have received or expect bequests confirms that bequests are indeed an important factor determining the saving of the young

dynamic r d competition with learning to account for the possibility that firms are unsure about the ease of innovation we formulate a differential game of r d competition with an unknown hazard rate we show as time passes with success firms become more pessimistic about eventual innovation reducing their r d investment and possibly exiting the race an increase in the number of competing firms tends to increase firms r d intensities for given beliefs but because beliefs evolve at different rates depending on the number of firms in the race time paths of r d investment intensity are not unambiguously ordered with respect to the number of competing firms

do bequests increase or decrease wealth inequalities this paper finds that individuals in japan do not leave very significant bequests that parents often require a quid pro quo for bequests to their children and that wealthier individuals leave less bequests meaning that bequests ameliorate wealth inequalities

uncertainty and optimal social security systems this paper examines the annuity aspect of social security within the framework of an overlapping generations model the duration of life is assumed to be uncertain under a fully funded system demand for social security is determined by each generation so as to maximize expected lifetime utility taking into account the welfare of future generations under a pay as you go system with intergenerational transfers demand for retirement benefits by the working population takes into account taxes paid by descendants it is shown that the two modes of finance are equivalent in terms of all real aggregates effects of changes in expected lifetime and in the birth rate are analyzed starting at the optimal level a compulsory balanced increase in social security taxes and benefits is shown to increase short run savings

optimal timing in the problem of family farm transfer from parent to child an option value approach abstract the optimal time for transferring the family farm from parent to child is modeled in an option value framework it is assumed that parents have the ability to wait and enrich their information set before making the decision when to transfer the farm to a succeeding child rather than making a prompt decision the results indicate that the optimal timing depends on the wedge between the parents critical level of utility and disutility from the farm transfer to a succeeding child the arguments of parents utility function are country culture and family specific

intergenerational transfers and savings in recent years the role of intergenerational transfers in the process of wealth accumulation has been the subject of substantial empirical and theoretical analysis the key question stimulating this research is what is the main explanation for savings is it primarily accumulation for retirement as claimed by albert ando richard brumberg and franco modigliani in their celebrated life cycle model of savings is it primarily intentional accumulation for intergenerational transfers or is it primarily precautionary savings much of which may be bequeathed because of imperfections in annuity markets this paper examines a range of findings on the importance of intergenerational transfers the strong conclusion that emerges from this evidence is that intergenerational transfers play a very important if not a key role in aggregate wealth accumulation while intergenerational transfers figure very large in savings the precise motivation for such transfers is unclear intergenerational altruism might appear the most likely candidate but at least sane stylized facts such as the equal allocation of bequests among children are strongly at adds with the altruism model other explanations involving imperfect insurance arrangements or payments for child services do not appear capable of explaining the substantial amounts of transfers actually observed sorting cut the relative contributions of different models to intergenerational transfers and the precise role of intergenerational transfers in the process of wealth accumulation remains an intriguing and exciting enterprise this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

is firm size conducive to r d choice a strategic analysis of product and process innovations abstract using a duopoly model of multiproduct firms we show that different innovation incentives cause the larger firm to invest more in process cost reducing innovations and the small one to allocate more resources to search for new products because of this heterogeneity of r d behavior the large firm remains dominant for the original product in the post innovation market but the small firm is more likely to be a leader in the new product market these theoretical results are consistent with recent empirical findings

long term care utility and late in life saving older wealth holders spend down assets much more slowly than predicted by classic life cycle models this paper introduces health dependent utility into a model with incomplete markets in which pre

the effect of social security on lifetime wealth accumulation and bequests this paper is an empirical study of the effects of social security on lifetime wealth accumulation and bequests using a sample of wisconsin males we have matched lifetime earnings records from income tax returns with their social security account records and their bequests obtained from probate court records since the cohort of males was born between 1890 and 1899 they represent a cohort that saw a great change in the size and coverage by occupation of the system hence there is substantial within cohort variation in social security wealth from which effects can be estimated for nearly 30 years the life cycle theory of savings has enjoyed an enormous amount of academic support in the no bequest variant individuals save with the sole intention of consuming their savings in later years the economy wide stock of capital can therefore be generated by this pattern without any reliance on bequests modigliani 1966 such a model will lead to rather strong predictions about the effect of a pay as you go public pension hereafter social security on private savings as feldstein 1974 points out social security should displace private savings as well as reduce macro saving since the programme is unfunded this result follows from the assumption that each household will consume all of its assets during its own lifetime some recent research however has been at odds with the no bequest variant of the life cycle model see kurz 1984 and included references darby 1979 claims that life cycle assets savings consumed later in the life cycle constitute only 13 29 per cent of total assets kotlikoff and summers 1981 report that the major share nearly 80 per cent of capital stock in the united states is due to intergenerational transfers 2 indeed these authors write life cycle models of savings that emphasize savings for retirement as the dominant form of capital accumulation should give way to models that illuminate the determinants of intergenerational transfers p 706 in addition recent empirical work suggests that people tend to accumulate or fail to significantly decumulate wealth wealth in old age a finding at odds with the strict life cycle model 3 given the potentially large role of bequests in the process of capital accumulation it is important to know how bequests are affected by the large public programme that social security has become even if social security depresses private savings among those near or at retirement if people bequeath it is conceivable that saving during retirement is augmented by the programme 4 aside from the issue of savings effects the response of people s bequests to their old age benefits might allow one to assess the target efficiency of the social security system since the original objective of the system was to ensure adequate levels of consumption among the elderly a finding that benefits

the role of intergenerational transfers in aggregate capital accumulation this paper uses historical u s data to directly estimate the contribution of intergenerational transfers to aggregate capital accumulation the evidence presented indicates that intergenerational transfers account for the vast majority of aggregate u s capital formation only a negligible fraction of actual capital accumulation can be traced to life cycle or hump savings a major difference between this study and previous investigations of this issue is the use of more accurate longitudinal age earnings and age consumption profiles these profiles are simply too flat to generate substantial life cycle savings this paper suggests the importance of and need for substantially greater research and data collection on intergenerational transfers life cycle models of savings that emphasize savings for retirement as the dominant form of capital accumulation should give way to models that illuminate the determinants of intergenerational transfers

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

uncertain lifetimes and the welfare enhancing properties of annuity markets and social security this paper explores the implications of social security programs and annuity markets through which agents who are characterized by different distributions of length of lifetime share deathrelated risks when annuity markets operate a non discriminatory social security program affects only the intragenerational allocation of resources in the absence of private information regarding individual survival probabilities such a program will lead to a non optimal intragenerational allocation of resources however the presence of adverse selection considerations gives rise to a pareto improving role for a mandatory non discriminatory social security program

household response to government debt evidence from life insurance holdings we use state level panel data on life insurance in force in the united states and find that a 1 increase in government debt at either the state or federal level is associated with a 0 96 increase in the face value of the average life insurance holdings per capita for a household in the average state this increase represents an intention to save that would almost completely offset the government debt in specific states of the world i e if the insured dies because this state of the world is rare the immediate increase in actual savings is only about 0 03 the cost of the additional insurance we find in addition that this response occurs mainly on the intensive margin meaning that the size of the average life insurance policy increases when government debt increases along the extensive margin we find the number of policies in force falls slightly with federal debt and rises slightly with state debt increases the results show altruistic planning in response to changes in government debt that are consistent with ricardian equivalence and the long run neutrality of government debt

intergenerational transfers production and income distribution abstract we consider an overlapping generations economy where the aggregative production process uses physical capital and human capital intergenerational transfers from parents to their children are motivated by altruism we distinguish between two types of transfers investment of parents in the education of their offspring and capital transfer the gift bequest motive we show that the intensity of each type of altruism and hence the composition of the two types of transfers affect significantly the equilibrium output and the intragenerational income distributions comparing competitive equilibria from the same initial distributions of capital transfers and human capital we derive a the economy with the higher education inclined altruism attains lower output and more equal intragenerational income distributions if either the production function s elasticity of substitution is not large or the altruism is weak b for more bequest inclined altruism the effects are usually reversed c under public provision of education higher bequest inclined altruism results in lower output and less equal distribution of income in all dates

one is almost enough for monopoly it has been argued that two factors product durability and potential entry may force a monopolist to price at marginal cost this article shows that when these two forces coexist the tendency toward competition may be negated first we prove that durable goods oligopolists without commitment powers may attain joint profits arbitrarily close to those of a monopolist with perfect commitment power second we demonstrate that the presence of a potential entrant may enable a durable goods monopolist to act as if he had commitment power thus potential as well as actual entry may restore monopoly power

on the share of inheritance in aggregate wealth europe and the usa 1900 2010 this paper provides historical series on the evolution of the share of inherited wealth in aggregate private wealth in europe france the uk germany sweden and the usa over the 1900 2010 period until 1910 the inheritance share was very high in europe 70 80 it then fell abruptly following the 1914 45 shocks down to about 30 40 during the 1950 80 period and is back to 50 60 and rising since around 2010 the us pattern also appears to be u shaped albeit less marked and with significant uncertainty regarding recent trends due to data limitations we discuss possible interpretations for these long run patterns

r d rivalry with licensing or imitation the authors study the rivalry between two firms to develop an innovation in a dynamic setting that allows for post development dissemination of the innovation such as licensing or imitation this dissemination may cause the noninnovating firm to benefit from the discovery when this occurs conventional results in the economics of r d no longer need apply they find that industry leaders will tend to develop minor innovations but will develop major innovations only if imitation is difficult copyright 1987 by american economic association

preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly this article takes a different tack and inquires whether institutions such as the patent system create opportunities for firms with monopoly power to maintain their monopoly power the results apply to other situations such as brand identification spatial location and capacity expansion which share the characteristic that early or preemptive actions may lower the returns to potential competitors

fulfilled expectations of entry i develop a two period model of entry deterrence with endogenous market demands such that the consumer s expectation about the future market structure is fulfilled in equilibrium i find that both expectations duopoly and monopoly are fulfilled in the incumbent s price setting game while there is a unique equilibrium in the quantity setting game i also find that quantity is more entry deterring than price in the sense that the maximum value of the entry cost that allows entry in the price setting game is higher than or equal to that of the quantity setting game

the importance of bequests and life cycle saving in capital accumulation a new answer as the workhorse of consumption and saving research for the past four decades the life cycle model has proved flexible and useful for examining a variety of questions in a classic paper albert ando and franco modigliani 1963 p 56 stated a key assumption of the basic model t he individual neither expects to receive nor desires to leave any inheritance although the authors contended that the absence of a bequest motive was not critical to the heart of their results the assumption set off a long standing battle over the relative importance of different motives for saving in an influential study laurence kotlikoff and laurence summers 1981 estimated that a large fraction of the u s capital stock was attributable to intergenerational transfers modigliani and his collaborators vigorously disagreed and based on their own empirical work claimed that life cycle saving was the primary source of capital accumulation modigliani 1988 subsequent work has failed to reach a consensus since this debate began an important advance in the consumption literature has been the incorporation of uncertainty in life cycle models see e g r glenn hubbard et al 1995 we argue that allowing for uncertainty resolves the controversy over the importance of life cycle and bequest saving by showing that these motives for saving are overlapping and cannot generally be distinguished a dollar saved today simultaneously serves both a precautionary life cycle function guarding against future contingencies such as health shocks or other emergencies and a bequest function because in the likely event that the dollar is not absorbed by these contingencies it will be available to bequeath to children or other worthy causes under this view households have a bequest motive but bequests are given i e the motive is operative in only some states of the world wealth is something like traveler s checks you take them along on vacation just in case but odds are they will remain uncashed and available for sundry goods after the journey is complete we first demonstrate the result using a simple model and then argue that this approach reconciles the apparent importance of bequests with households declared focus on life cycle saving finally we consider implications of our analysis

motives for private income transfers private income transfers are becoming increasingly recognized as a key aspect of the u s economy the majority of private income transfers occur inter vivos i e between living persons but very little is known about this type of transfer behavior this paper tests alternative hypotheses concerning motivation for inter vivos transfers two motives are considered altruism and exchange evidence presented here casts doubt on the altruistic model of transfer behavior observed patterns for inter vivos transfers are more consistent with exchange related motives this finding has important implications for the effects of public transfer programs on the distribution of economic well being

the family inheritance and the intergenerational transmission of inequality unequal inheritance of material wealth is commonly considered a major cause of inequality in consumption however theoretical models of the intergenerational transmission of inequality by becker blinder and ishikawa imply that unequal inheritance may either increase or reduce consumption inequality differences in inherited wealth resulting from unequal parental incomes increase inequality in recipients consumption however unequal bequests caused by differences among families in the endowed ability of children or the costs of producing human capital are equalizing empirical results confirm these predictions the inheritance received by children is inversely related to both children s income and parental education thus bequests are compensatory in that ceteris paribus low income children inherit more than their advantaged contemporaries

are family transfers crowded out by public transfers we give an account of an overlapping generations experiment with multiple families in which voluntary transfers can take the form of support to the elderly or grants to children support to the old is a purely intergenerational intra family transfer whereas grants to children also involve an element of intra generational inter family redistribution through a compulsory pension system our data show that higher compulsory inter family transfers lead subjects to place relatively more emphasis on support instead of grants grants are crowded out but support is not significantly affected the efficiency of voluntary transfers increases however furthermore if subjects give transfers they do not use tokens of direct reciprocity evidence of indirect reciprocity in transfer behavior can only be obtained for the case where compulsory transfers are high

intergenerational wealth mobility and the role of inheritance evidence from multiple generations this study estimates intergenerational correlations in mid life wealth across three generations and a young fourth generation and examines how much of the parent child association that can be explained by inheritances using a swedish data set we find parent child rank correlations of 0 3 0 4 and grandparents grandchild rank correlations of 0 1 0 2 conditional on parents wealth grandparents wealth is weakly positively associated with grandchild s wealth and the parent child correlation is basically unchanged if we control for grandparents wealth bequests and gifts strikingly account for at least 50 per cent of the parent child wealth correlation while earnings and education are only able to explain 25 per cent

multiple expectational equilibria under monopolistic competition this paper shows that a monopolistically competitive economy with real investment can have multiple rational expectations equilibria one is associated with entrepreneurs optimistic expectations about future demand another with entrepreneurs pessimism it also shows that an optimistic expectational equilibrium pareto dominates a pessimistic equilibrium an investment subsidy can be beneficial both by reducing the original underinvestment distortion and by changing firms expectations from pessimistic to optimistic the most important assumption is increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition makes increasing returns consistent with each producer s optimization

evidence on wealth age profiles in canadian cross section data this paper reports on one component of a research program in which we are studying household behaviour to establish a set of empirical facts upon which researchers can construct more realistic models evidence on whether wealth age profiles conform to the inverse u shape predicted by the standard life cycle model is mixed here we show that there are significant differences in accumulation behaviour across major household types on average blue collar households decumulate after retirement but white collar do not la relation entre la richesse et l dge profils dr en moyenne les menages de cols bleus font l experience d une decumulation de richesse apres la retraite alors que les menages de cols blancs ne font pas cette experience

the distribution of wealth with uncertain income it is well known that an uncertain income stream will induce individuals to save if they are forward looking in this paper we investigate the consequences of such saving on the distribution of wealth among households the inquiry is motivated by the fact that both the dispersion of the us wealth distribution and the variance of transitory income have increased in the recent past surprisingly we find that an increase in earnings uncertainty is more likely to decrease than increase the inequality in wealth holdings

optimal growth with unobservable resources and learning abstract this paper examines the problem of choosing optimal resource consumption from an imperfectly observable aggregate capital wealth or resource stock which the decision maker learns about over time learning is complicated by the fact that the planner receives information about an object the true resource stock which is a moving target under the assumption that the utility of zero consumption is we show that the optimal policy follows a completely deterministic cautious or minmax policy that assumes the worst in each period and optimizes against that when this model is compared to a model with completely observable wealth levels the following insights are obtained 1 there is over saving 2 investment and output processes are more volatile than consumption and 3 regressions underestimate the risk aversion of agents information about the wealth or stock level is only valuable if it alters the support of the agent s beliefs thus information may be statistically informative yet economically valueless if information changes the support of the agent s beliefs then the optimal solution features an endogenous resource discovery process

family transfers involving three generations most models of family transfers consider only two generations and focus on two motives altruism and exchange they also assume perfect substitution between inter vivos downward transfers and bequests based on french evidence we show that parent to child transfers belong to three distinct categories investment in child s education financial assistance wealth transmission and advocate a three generation framework thus transfer behavior of parents toward their children is strongly influenced by the behavior of their own parents there is also some evidence of the cox and stark demonstration effect parents help their own parents expecting to receive comparable support from their children such behavior can be regarded as indirect reciprocity the beneficiary does not give back to the initial giver but to a third person of another generation jel classification d10 d31 d63 d64

savings and wealth in models with altruistic bequests during recent years much attention has been given to the role of bequests in explaining various aspects of economic behavior for example authors have studied the impact of bequests on physical wealth accumulation laurence kotlikoff and lawrence summers 1981 the interest elasticity of savings owen evans 1983 tax reform laurence seidman 1984 and the distribution of wealth alan blinder 1976a more recently economists have begun to distinguish between human and physical bequests gary becker and nigel tomes 1986 acknowledging the presence of bequest in human form is important in analyzing each of the issues mentioned above outlays on children affect the shape of the family s labor supply and expenditure profiles upon which the level of aggregate savings crucially depends if these outlays are interest sensitive substitutes for physical bequests they will also influence the interest elasticity of savings in the area of tax reform the neutrality of the consumption tax depends on the ability of the government to identify human capital bequests from general consumption raymond batina 1987 if this is not possible the portfolio choice of investment in human versus physical capital may be distorted at the margin finally the unequal transmission of wealth across generations may be explained by the lack of physical bequests and the inefficiently low levels of human bequests made by wealthconstrained households becker and tomes 1986 to distinguish clearly the behavior of constrained households from unconstrained households who make sizeable physical bequests both types of bequests must be recognized this paper introduces a model that makes explicit examination of these issues possible it extends lord s 1989 multiperiod model of life cycle savings and adult human capital investment by adding altruistically motivated human and physical bequests 2 the model is calibrated using microeconomic data on earnings time and goods expenditures on children s human capital and physical bequests we then use the model to examine the contribution of bequests to wealth accumulation and the level of savings this topic is the source of an important but yet unresolved debate between franco modigliani 1988 and kotlikoff 1988 kotlikoff maintains that u s wealth accumulation is primarily the consequence of bequests as opposed to life cycle savings for retirement one type of evidence cited by kotlikoff comes from simulation results demonstrating the failure of realistically calibrated life cycle models to generate sufficiently high saving rates and wealth income ratios alan auerbach and kotlikoff 1987 we show however that if a pure life cycle

precautionary saving and accidental bequests this paper presents a simple general equilibrium model of precautionary saving and accidental bequests this model is used to analyze the implications of individual lifetime uncertainty for aggregate consumption and capital accumulation a precautionary demand for saving arises because an individual consumer does not know in advance the date at which he will die and he wants to avoid low levels of consumption in the event that he lives longer than expected an implication of this precautionary saving is that when death does occur the consumer is generally holding some wealth which is then passed on to his heirs in the form of an accidental bequest even if all consumers have the same ex ante mortality probabilities there will be some intracohort variation in the date of death consequently there will be a nondegenerate distribution of bequests left by consumers in a cohort this nondegenerate distribution of bequests left by one generation induces variation in the distributions of wealth consumption and bequests of subsequent generations the importance of bequests in aggregate saving has been established by laurence kotlikoff and lawrence summers 1981 who reported that 80 percent of u s household wealth is inherited wealth one interpretation of this finding is that the simple life cycle model without bequest motives is an inadequate description of saving behavior in the united states but the model i present demonstrates that accidental bequests by selfish consumers can account for a potentially sizeable fraction of aggregate wealth although some part of bequests especially by the wealthy undoubtedly results from an explicit bequest motive accidental bequests also play a role in the intergenerational transfer of wealth as well as in the intragenerational variation in wealth in order to focus on the role of accidental bequests i purposely exclude a bequest motive from the specification of the utility function the effects of lifetime uncertainty on individual consumption behavior were first examined formally in a seminal paper by menachem yaari 1965 yaari s model provided the basic framework for virtually all subsequent work on uncertain lifetimes including well known papers by nils hakansson 1969 stanley fischer 1973 robert barro and james friedman 1977 david levhari and leonard mirman 1977 and kotlikoff and avia spivak 1981 however all of these papers focused on the consumption decision of an individual and ignored the effect of accidental bequests on the behavior of the recipients of these accidental bequests 2 as will be shown at various points in this paper changes in the economic environment can have effects on aggregate behavior which differ sharply from the effects on individual behavior because of the endogenous adjustment of bequests the effects of department of economics harvard university cambridge ma 02138 this paper is a revised version of bequests and social security with uncertain lifetimes nber working paper no 1372 june 1984 i thank olivier blanchard john burbidge christopher cavanagh robert clower stanley fischer benjamin friedman elhanan helpman mervyn king nobuhiro kiyotaki laurence kotlikoff robert mcdonald james pesando julio rotemberg lawrence summers lars svensson mark watson and jeffrey wolcowitz for valuable conversations and correspondence i also thank the participants in seminars at boston university columbia university cornell university federal reserve board harvard university university of iowa mit university of minnesota university of montreal national bureau of economic research north carolina state university the wharton school and yale university and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments i also thank the national science foundation for financial support 1 in the presence of perfect annuity and life insurance markets there may or may not be bequests depending on the presence or absence of a bequest motive but there would be no accidental bequests 2 kotlikoff and spivak focus on the role of the family in providing an incomplete annuities market but stop short of a full scale overlapping generations model in which the distribution of bequests is determined endogenously

uncertain lifetime consumption and dissaving in retirement this paper asks whether the continued accumulation or mild dissaving observed among the retired can be explained by uncertain lifetime in the absence of annuities after an initial period influenced by borrowing constraints under constant relative risk aversion uncertain lifetime depresses consumption by a proportion increasing with age if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption is small illustrative computations based on actual income and survival data show that plausible elasticities are sufficiently small to give this effect the reduction in consumption is large enough to explain much of the lack of decumulation by the elderly

noncooperative collusion in durable goods oligopoly coase conjectured that a durable goods monopolist who can make offers to sell arbitrarily frequently will lose the ability to extract positive profits this result which has now been proved can be attributed to the inability of the monopolist to commit to maintaining sufficiently high prices in the near future for the case of durable goods oligopoly we show that letting the firms make offers arbitrarily frequently enhances their ability to commit to high prices and in the limit enables the firms to enjoy total market profits equal to the full commitment one shot monopoly profit

intergenerational transfers and the accumulation of wealth h t ouseholds acquire wealth from two sources they save out of income they have earned and they receive transfers from other people the first method of wealth accumulation goes under the name of life cycle saving in which people save during their working lives and dissave after retirement the second involves either an inter vivos transfer that is a transfer between living people or a bequest a transfer that occurs at the death of the donor while inter vivos transfers and bequests will arise in dynastic models where preferences include a taste for the well being of one s descendents few empirical life cycle models reflect these concerns indeed a sharp debate has arisen over the ability of the simple life cycle model to explain observed wealth accumulation understanding the relative sizes of these sources of wealth accumulation affects a variety of issues for example the effects of government debt social insurance public transfer programs estate taxes and incentives for charitable giving depend to some extent on the magnitude and nature of private saving and transfers of wealth analyses of the inequality of wealth may depend on whether most of wealth is earned or received as transfers appropriate policies for encouraging private saving may look rather different depending on whether most saving is to be consumed later in life or passed along to the next generation finally evidence on transfer patterns relates to more fundamental

measuring and modeling intergenerational links in relation to long term care long term care has profound intergenerational implications it can be costly for those who need it and onerous for loved ones who provide it we pinpoint three intergenerational aspects of long term care that require further research one concerns the link between costs of private care and intergenerational wealth transfers the second concerns the link between participation in care and the work and welfare of family providers the third relates to intergenerational tensions that these and other late in life interactions create we outline innovations in modeling and measurement that would improve understanding of intergenerational linkages and their implementation in appropriate panel data jel d91 i13 j22

intergenerational transfers and demographic transition abstract this paper presents an analysis of demographic transition based on the endogenous evolution of intergenerational transfers along an economy s endogenous path of development two period lived agents belonging to overlapping generations choose optimally their desired levels of consumption and fertility together with their desired sizes of transfers to both parents and children parents are more efficient than children in producing output but some parental time must be devoted to child rearing at low levels of development fertility is high and the flow of net intergenerational transfers is from the young to the old at high levels of development fertility is low and the flow of net transfers is from the old to the young these results accord strongly with empirical observations and the analysis may be seen as formalising for the first time a long standing and well respected hypothesis in the demographic transition literature

altruism deficit policies and the wealth of future generations i introduction there is now a substantial body of evidence suggesting that altruistic financial bequests are zero for the vast majority of households 1 other studies seem to indicate that the financial bequests which are made are not likely to be altruistically motivated 2 while this evidence against the importance of altruistic financial bequests seems reasonably convincing it is by no means clear that the importance of altruism per se has been dismissed 3 for example the results reported in altonji hayashi and kotlikoff 1992 tables 14 17 indicate that extended family resources while not perfectly linked to own resources are important for explaining own consumption the authors do not reject the notion that substantial altruistically motivated transfers occur in the u s rather they suggest the altruistically motivated transfers which are made take the form of less than fully efficient human capital transfers to children if most altruistic transfers do take place via educational expenditures how does this affect the ricardian equivalence theorem robert barro 1974 1989 argues the presence of any altruistic transfer is sufficient to guarantee that intergenerational transfers caused by government policy are neutral other forms of intergenerational transfers such as inter vivos gifts to children support of children s education and so on can work in a similar manner therefore the ricardian results will hold even if many persons leave little in the way of formal bequests 1989 41 4 an alternative view however is expressed by allan drazen 1978 he argues if parents possess an insufficient mix of wealth and altruism intergenerational transfers could be exhausted before the efficient level of human capital investment is achieved if explicit or implicit loans between parents and children are not possible then the government may be able to improve welfare by generating intergenerational transfers from children to parents 5 a cut in the parents tax burden and an equal present value increase in the tax on the next generation is equivalent to a government enforced loan at the going market interest rate since educational expenditures are inefficiently low the return on human capital investment exceeds the loan rate therefore parents could put an amount less than the tax cut into their children s education and still leave the children with enough additional income to pay for the future tax increase thus a deficit policy serves to expand the consumption possibility set of the family viewed in this way drazen 1978 514 footnote 7 imagines an argument for a pareto optimal level of public debt issue 6 a third possibility was identified by nerlove razin and sadka 1988 who conduct the most explicit analysis of government transfers in an economy with altruistic but financial bequest constrained households they also find a transfer or implicit loan to parents from their children will make the parents unambiguously better off however they were the first to point out that a deficit policy may lower the welfare of the children although they fail to explain why thus even in the presence of altruistic transfers from parents to children the effect of deficits on the consumption of future generations is far from clear in this paper we wish to clarify the effect of intergenerational transfers on bequest constrained families the next section intuitively explains why a government loan or deficit policy generates an ambiguous effect on the children s consumption even though altruistic parents are fully capable of making both generations better off after the loan we also identify the key structural determinants of the change in the children s wealth due to the loan in section iii we extend the simple model of section ii to a more quantitatively realistic multi period life cycle simulation model of a bequest constrained household the simulation model is then used in section iv to examine how a government intergenerational transfer affects the consumption of each generation under various settings of the key structural determinants identified in section ii

sustainable forestry timber bequests future generations and optimal tax policy this paper analyzes harvesting and timber bequest behavior in a two period overlapping generations model where the government uses site productivity yield and inheritance taxation the ceteris paribus effects of forest and inheritance taxes are derived first then the paper discusses the optimal design of forest and inheritance taxes by assuming that intergenerational externalities are either absent or operative in the absence of intergenerational externalities it is optimal to use only the site productivity tax and not to introduce yield and inheritance taxes at all in the presence of intergenerational externalities the situation changes the paper demonstrates that the externality can be internalized by introducing either a yield tax or an inheritance subsidy or both if the government is able to use both at the same time it is desirable to use the yield tax to punish excessive harvesting and an inheritance subsidy to bribe to give bequests