the effective tax rate and the pretax rate of return abstract this paper presents new estimates of the taxes paid on nonfinancial corporate capital on the pretax rate of return to capital and on the effective tax rate the basic time series show that both the pretax rate of return and the effective tax rate have varied substantially in the past quarter century an explicit analysis indicates that after adjusting for different aspects of the business cycle pretax profitability was between one and 1 5 percentage points lower in the 1970s than in the 1960s the rate of profitability in the 1960s was also about one half of a percentage point greater than the profitability in the 7 years of the 1950s after the korean war changes in productivity growth in inflation in relative unit labor costs and in other variables are all associated with changes in profitability none of these variables however can explain the differences in profitability between the 1950s 1960s and 1970s looking at broad decade averages the effective tax rate and the pretax rate of return move in opposite directions lower pretax profits occuring when the tax rate is high there thus appears to have been no tendency for pretax profits to vary in a way that offsets differences in effective tax rates

how should we incentivize private landowners to produce more biodiversity globally much biodiversity is found on private land acting to conserve such biodiversity thus requires the design of policies which influence the decision making of farmers and foresters in this paper we outline the economic characteristics of this problem before reviewing a number of policy options such as conservation auctions and conservation easements we then discuss a number of policy design problems such as the need for spatial coordination and the choice between paying for outcomes rather than actions before summarizing what the evidence and theory developed to date tell us about those aspects of biodiversity policy design which need careful attention from policy makers and environmental regulators

adverse selection and moral hazard with risk neutral agents abstract this paper surveys some recent developments of the literature on adverse selection and moral hazard in agency problems it is concerned with the case where both aspects coexist and both agents are income risk neutral it shows that in most cases the moral hazard aspect does not entail welfare losses compared to the pure adverse selection case it moreover analyses different ways using a single contract or a family of contracts of deriving the optimal contracts from the optimal pure adverse selection solution

when do firms generate evidence on in house electricity supply in africa this paper attempts to identify the underlying causes and costs of own generation of electric power in africa rigorous empirical analysis of 8483 currently operating firms in 25 african countries shows that the prevalence of own generation would remain high at around 20 even if power supplies were perfectly reliable suggesting that other factors such as firms size emergency back up and export regulations play a critical role in the decision to own a generator the costs of own generation are about three times as high as the price of purchasing subsidized electricity from the public grid however because these generators only operate a small fraction of the time they do not greatly affect the overall average cost of power to industry the benefits of generator ownership are also substantial firms with their own generators report a value of lost load of less than us 50 per hour compared with more than us 150 per hour for those without nevertheless when costs and benefits are considered side by side the balance is not found to be significantly positive

controlling stochastic pollution events through liability rules some evidence from ocs leasing under the ocs lands act firms are strictly liable for damages from oil spills to the extent that this liability rule causes firms to internalize environmental risks incentives for damage avoidance behavior are provided using data from the 1979 georges bank lease sale we use a robust estimation technique to test the hypothesis that potential environmental costs are reflected in bids for ocs leases the results indicate a substantial response to environmental risks recognizing reduced rents we estimate that total high bids have declined by 20 because of firms perceptions of environmental risks the results suggest that liability rules have considerable potential in controlling stochastic pollution events

stream ecosystem service markets under no net loss regulation abstract we analyze interactions between economics and ecology for ecosystem service markets under no net loss regulation previous studies of no net loss regulation address the ecological efficacy and valuation of restoration but largely ignore the effects of market dynamics we link an economic model of free entry equilibria with an ecological model that includes returns to scale and inefficiency of restored ecosystems and apply the result to stream mitigation banking in north carolina intuition from ecology alone must be modified to account for economic processes and vice versa to implement no net loss regulation one must not only account for ecological differences between restored and natural ecosystems but also consider the effect of market entry on the number and size of restoration projects in a purely economic model free entry equilibria are characterized by excess entry the equilibrium number of firms is greater than the welfare maximizing number ecological considerations may exacerbate or ameliorate this so that either excess entry or insufficient entry may occur depending on the specific ecosystem services sought

does the tax system favor investment in high tech or smoke stack industries in this paper we examine whether differential use of depreciable assets gives rise to differential tax treatment of high technology industries relative to other industries we calculate the total effective tax rate on a marginal investment in each of 34 assets and weighting by the use of these assets we calculate total effective tax rates for 73 industries we find considerable variation within the high tech sector and within the more traditional sector but for the case of a taxable firm with a given debt equity ratio we do not find any systematic differences between overall rates in the two sectors

monitoring moral hazard asymmetric information and risk sharing in procurement contracting this article characterizes the optimal procurement contract for a monopsonistic purchaser who contracts with a risk averse supplier with private information about his costs and who contributes an unobservable effort the costs incurred by the supplier may be uncertain and the purchaser has access to a monitor of costs that may be subject to noise that complicates risk sharing the purchaser prefers to respond to the observability problem with afixed price contract and to respond to the private information problem with a cost plus contract with uncertain costs and a perfect monitor the optimal contract relieves the supplier of some risk and the purchaser prefers that the effort of the supplier be subsidized with deterministic costs and a noisy monitor the optimal contract places risk on the supplier and the purchaser may prefer that the effort of the supplier be taxed procurement of goods and services is an important form of economic exchange that is often characterized by bargaining and contracting rather than by exchange in a competitive market the procurement setting analyzed here corresponds to the case in which the purchaser is a monopsonist who contracts with a single supplier as in the case of the department of defense contracting for the delivery of a military system in such a setting a principalagent model may be a reasonable representation of the relationship between the purchaser and the supplier and the economics of the procurement arrangement is then captured in the contract when the item procured is standardized the relevant information is likely to be common knowledge and risk may be minimal in such a case a fixed price contract may satisfactorily resolve the purchaser s contracting problem in contrast the model considered here is intended to represent the procurement of a nonstandardized item about which information is incomplete costs are uncertain and observability of supplier costs by the purchaser is limited procurement thus is complicated by the conjunction of adverse selection risk sharing and moral hazard problems

regulation moral hazard and insurance of environmental risks abstract a large class of major environmental risks are subject to severe moral hazard problems the purpose of this paper is to study the potential conflicts between cost minimization and safety care the intuition is that regulatory efforts or sheer competition inducing a greater focus on cost minimization may tilt the agents trade off towards taking too much risk here we study the problem in the context o regulation of a natural monopoly and see how high powered incentives may conflict with safety care we address the issue of moral hazard in environmental risk with adverse selection limited liability risk aversion and multiprincipals

fossil fuel subsidy removal and inadequate public power supply implications for businesses abstract we briefly consider the impact of fossil fuel subsidy removal policies in the context of inadequate power supply with a focus on the implications for businesses in doing so we utilize the case of the early 2012 fuel subsidy removal in nigeria the rationale for such subsidy removal policies is typically informed by analysis showing that they lead to an economically inefficient allocation of resources and market distortions while often failing to meet intended objectives however often the realities of infrastructural and institutional deficiencies are not appropriately factored into the decision making process businesses in many developing countries already impaired by the high cost of power supply deficiencies become even less competitive on an unsubsidized basis we find that justifications for removal often do not adequately reflect the specific environments of developing country economies resulting in poor recommendations or ineffective policy

regulation of a risk averse firm abstract we extend the laffont tirole regulation model to the case of risk averse firms our main results are the impact of risk aversion is to shift the optimal contract toward a cost plus contract as compared with the risk neutral case distortions are greater and informational rents are smaller for high levels of risk aversion the optimal contract involves cost ceilings and the less efficient firms are bunched together journal of economic literature classification numbers d8 l5

industry level emission trading between power producers in the eu in this paper we investigate how restrictions for emission trading to the energy intensive power sector will affect the magnitude and distribution of abatement costs across eu countries vis a vis a comprehensive eu emission trading regime we find that emission trading between european power sectors allows the harvest of a major part of the efficiency gains provided by full trade as compared to strictly domestic action however trade restrictions may create a more unequal distribution of abatement costs across member states than is the case for a comprehensive trade regime the reason for this is that restricted permit trade enhances the secondary terms of trade benefits to eu member countries with low marginal abatement costs at the expense of the other eu member states

a firm level analysis of outage loss differentials and self generation evidence from african business enterprises abstract this study examines the outage loss differential between firms that engage in backup generation and those that do not unmitigated outage losses were estimated to be us 2 01 23 92 per kwh for firms engaging in self generation and range from us 1 54 to 32 46 per kwh for firms without self generation we also find that firms engaging in self generation would have suffered additional 1 183 outage losses had they not invested in self generation on the other hand firms without self generation would have reduced their outage losses by around 6 46 if they had engaged in self generation further analyses however reveal that although engagement in self generation reduced outage losses a firm engaging in self generation may still suffer a greater unmitigated outage loss relative to a firm without a backup generator the relative outage losses depend on the relative vulnerability of the operations of the two sets of firms to power interruption and the relative generating capacity of a self generating firm to its own required electricity loads policy reforms that allow firms whose operations are highly vulnerable to outages to make a binding contract with utilities in order to get preferential supply are recommended

the cost of electric power interruptions in the industrial sector estimates derived from interruptible service programs the electric power industry has become increasingly interested in the value customers place upon service reliability with the demand for reliability couched in terms of outage or shortage costs the survey based method of eliciting these costs dominates the literature this paper explores and demonstrates a method for estimating outage and shortage costs based upon behavioral data a discrete choice model is developed for estimating shortage costs using observed decisions of industrial customers regarding participation in interruptible service programs the resulting shortage cost estimates of 4 per kwh unserved for a one hour interruption are consistent with previous survey based estimates

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

monitoring of performance in organizational contracting the case of defense procurement this paper contains an agency theoretic analysis of procurement contracts in which the government designs optimal linear contracts for a risk averse supplier in the presence of moral hazard private information and imperfect monitoring optimal contracts deviate from first best risk sharing the direction of the deviation depends on the relative severity of the moral hazard and private information problems and on the precision of the monitor in contrast to the usual result in the moral hazard literature the government may in some cases prefer that the effort of the supplier be taxed choice of the precision of the monitor and the categories of costs covered by the monitor are also studied

coping with poor public capital abstract despite recent successes in stabilization and structural reforms in many developing countries the private investment response to date has been mixed even among the strongest reformers this disappointing result can be partly explained by the continued poor provision of public capital and services we test this hypothesis using unique firm level data on investment and provision of public infrastructure services the results suggest that poor complementary public capital significantly reduces private investment however firms can substitute for deficient public services by investing in complementary capital themselves but this comes at a cost less productive capital will be installed

corporate financial policy with personal and institutional investors abstract in this paper we present a simple general equilibrium model of the portfolio behavior of households and institutions paying particular attention to the influence of differences in tax rates and attitudes toward risk under the plausible assumptions that households are more risk averse than institutions and possess a greater relative tax preference for equity versus debt we are able to characterize the equilibria which may result when debt is subject to bankruptcy risk

incentive contracts for natura 2000 implementation in forest areas the implementation of nature conservation policy is often based on contracts between public authorities and landowners in this article we model incentive contracts in forest areas in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard when the conservation outcome is uncertain ex ante but observable ex post the results show that agents who are likely to achieve a higher level of conservation should be offered a contract where transfers depend on the final outcome with a bonus for a high ecological level of the forest when conservation measures are correlated with forest management we show that the contractual measures involve distorted transfers we analyse the payment mechanisms used in france and denmark in the context of the natura 2000 policy these mechanisms result in overcompensation and under performance since they do not take the problem of moral hazard and natural variability into account

dropout behavior in r d races with learning we examine a game theoretic model of a two firm r d race in which expenditures on r d and the concomitant increase in experience learning enable thefirms to increase their probability of discovering an invention the learning process is stochastic it generates a unique subgame perfect equilibrium for identicalfirms with the characteristic that the leader never drops out but the follower drops out if the leader gains a significant lead the leader can find it optimal to drop out if the firms value the invention differently or have different r d efficiencies thus our analysis generates results between vigorous competition and natural monopoly central to schumpeter s 1934 vision of entrepreneurship are the extraordinary profits associated with innovation the lure of these profits fuels the fires of creative destruction as innovators replace declining firms this article analyzes the competition for the profits obtained by bringing an innovation to fruition and receiving the associated patent we restrict attention to the subclass of innovations known as inventions innovations that are the product of a firm s research and development in particular we are concerned with the conditions that cause a firm after having invested in r d to drop out of the competitive race situations in which the leading firm drops out are of even greater interest competition in r d is often modelled as a race in which the winner receives a patent and reaps most or all of the benefits of the invention as exemplified by kamien and schwartz 1972 the early theoretical literature tended to be based on decision theoretic models the firm seeks an optimal rate of expenditure on r d determined in part by the expected value of the invention the extent of the first mover advantage the economies or diseconomies of scale in r d and the perceived intensity of rivalry it is not anticipated that the firm s decisions will affect the r d efforts of the perhaps unknown rivals kamien and schwartz 1982 p 124 show that the firm does no research if rivalry is sufficiently intense because their model is static however it is never the case that a firm enters the race and then drops out

on the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection abstract this paper characterizes a class of optimal incentive schemes in a simple principal agent model which allows for moral hazard and adverse selection we show that incentive compatible allocation can always be approximately implemented through a menu of quadratic incentive schemes it is also proved that the set of incentive compatible allocations is independent of the distribution of the additive uncertainty which affects the outcome informational requirements and economic interpretation of quadratic and linear schemes are discussed

environmental accidents under moral hazard and limited firm liability we study optimal government policy when firms operations involve a risk of a large environmental accident firms do not have sufficient assets to cover such costs and the risk is affected by firms efforts which are unobservable to outsiders when firms profits and government revenues have equal weights in the social welfare function a first best can be implemented and requires that the firm be subsidized heavily when operating with no accident and all its assets confiscated in the event of an accident with a lower weight on firm profits the solution is always second best with lower subsidies to the firm and a firm effort lower than at the first best solution when firm investments affect both the required accident preventing effort for given risk and the work effort required for a given output the first best never involves specific investment subsidies while a second best solution generally always does

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

a complete solution to a class of principal agent problems with an application to the control of a self managed firm this paper considers a class of principal agent problems which have the following features 1 there is adverse selection because the principal ignores the value of one parameter of the agent s true characteristics 2 leaving aside the information parameter the principal s welfare as well as the agent s welfare depend on two types of variables observable to both of them the first ones possibly multidimensional are called action variable s and the second one which is one dimensional has in general the meaning of a money transfer 3 the principal is a stackelberg leader of the two person game he can commit himself to decision rules which are admissible on informational grounds he optimizes within the adequate class taking into account besides the agent s reaction one constraint which has generally the meaning of an individual rationality constraint and sometimes of a feasibility constraint the optimization is limited to the class of non stochastic mechanisms 4 the problem can also receive an alternative interpretation the principal faces a continuum of agents of unknown characteristics the distribution being known however stylized principal agent problems of this type have often been considered in the economic literature in particular the reader will later be able to recognize that the standard income tax model a la mirrlees 1971 the quality or quantity choice model of the monopolist a la mussa and rosen 1978 or maskin and riley 1982 and the model of government regulation of the private monopolist of baron and myerson 1982 all belong to

simultaneous moral hazard and adverse selection with risk averse agents abstract while the existing literature assumes either agents to be risk neutral or information about the outcome to be perfect in this paper we allow for risk averse agents and find an optimal contract scheme which is robust to errors on the distribution of outcome the optimal payment contract is derived and the comparative statics of the optimal payment scheme are analyzed as the main insight it is shown that in the presence of simultaneous moral hazard and adverse selection the agent strictly prefers to relax the first of the two informational problems

regulating nitrogen pollution with risk averse farmers under hidden information and moral hazard we consider a model of pollution regulation for a risk averse farmer involving hidden information moral hazard and risk sharing the representative farmer faces a production risk originating from nitrogen leaching and privately observes the soil capacity in retaining nitrogen only after the regulation contract is signed the latter specifies a transfer and a nitrogen quota whose decomposition by the farmer among different production stages is unknown to the regulator we first characterize the optimal solution to the regulator s problem the sequential decision model is estimated on french crop production data and the results are used to calibrate and simulate the optimal contract

species conservation and the principal agent problem abstract principal agent problems occur in contract or management contexts they arise out of the agent s desire to imperfectly follow the principal s preferences despite being under the authority of the principal principal agent problems may be present in biodiversity recovery programmes a principal agent model is constructed where rewards and sanctions are based on the change in a species status an optimal contract is derived but it is then argued that this contract will be impossible to implement principal agent problems may impose costs to recovery programmes both in terms of lower odds of persistence and the mix of species prioritised three institutional devices ecosystem management agent selection mechanisms and attaching economic returns to the change in species status may offset some of these costs

contractual difficulties in environmental management the case of wetland mitigation banking abstract this paper offers a principal agent model of private contracting in mitigation banking aimed at protection of wetland acreage and habitat bio diversity and physical functions of us wetlands while it is straightforward to design an incentive contract such a contract may be incapable of achieving the federally mandated objective of no net loss of wetland functions through wetland mitigation there may be failure of contract design or execution also considered are several institutional mechanisms that may promote the convergence of private contracting and attainment mandated wetland protection these include greater oversight by the government payment of subsidies greater accuracy in the identification of actual wetland quality by the principal and use of several other incentive alignment mechanisms

restoring wetlands through wetlands mitigation banks this paper offers the first economic analysis of wetlands mitigation banks the banks are a new alternative for restoration of wetlands by developers before receiving regulatory approval for future development of wetlands in the same watershed a stochastic optimal control model is developed which incorporates ecological uncertainty of wetlands restoration the model helps in examining the decisions of how much to invest in a wetlands mitigation bank the model is calibrated with data from california bioeconomic parameters numerical simulation of the model provides a sensitivity analysis of how model parameters of restoration costs stochastic biological growth interest rate and the market value of credits affect the trajectory of investment and the optimal stopping state of wetlands quality when the investment ends the analysis reveals that restoration of the whole site will occur when there is a reduction in restoration costs an increase in biological uncertainty or an increase in the value of wetlands credits continued restoration is harder to justify with a higher interest rate

an incentive approach to land set aside programs abstract this paper is devoted to a theoretical analysis of policies aiming at reducing the supply of agricultural produce through contractual or mandatory land set aside the model relies on contract theory under adverse selection it allows us to evaluate the impact of asymmetric information about yields on the optimal price support policy and on land set aside specifically we analyze an optimal contractual policy consisting of a subsidy system which makes transfers dependent on the set aside area and a policy of mandatory land set aside applying uniformly to all farms and ignoring incentive constraints numerical simulations allow us to assess and compare the respective effects of these policies

assessing the cost effectiveness of a biodiversity conservation policy a bio econometric analysis of natura 2000 contracts in forest abstract in france the implementation of the eu biodiversity conservation policy within the natura 2000 network combines regulatory tools and voluntary contracting in this article we empirically assess the cost effectiveness of natura 2000 contracts in forest areas we simultaneously estimate a cost function for biodiversity conservation and the production set of biodiversity output and timber while controlling for conservation measures we show strong substitutability between biodiversity conservation and timber production estimate results on the cost elasticity of biodiversity conservation also suggest the possibility of more ecologically ambitious contracts with lower average costs results also show that public owners are able to bear higher opportunity costs than private owners our findings may help to formulate policy recommendations in terms of contracts targeting likely to enhance the cost effectiveness of the incentive scheme

incentives for wetland creation abstract when information about soil quality is complete wetland creation with a take it or leave it contract which specifies wetland size and transfer yields higher social benefits than if a uniform contract which offers a payment proportional to the wetland size had been used this result points to a paradox because uniform contracts have been used a lot in practice this article concentrates on the presence of asymmetric information about soil quality as a possible explanation for this paradox it shows that the choice of instrument for wetland creation has welfare implications different contracts typically yield quite different social welfare surpluses and distribution between interest groups it is not obvious which of four contracts studied dominates when a farm characteristic affecting costs is unknown to the social planner the probability distribution of the characteristic the size of the excess burden the elasticity of costs and benefits to wetland size and the cost of acquiring missing information influence the outcome

economic consequence analysis of electric power infrastructure disruptions general equilibrium approaches abstract we develop a stylized two sector analytical general equilibrium model that elucidates mechanisms of adjustment to widespread long duration electric power disruptions algebraic solutions illustrate the relative importance of resilience through producer and consumer input substitutability and mitigation investment in backup infrastructure capacity in moderating the economy wide costs of outages simulations of the impacts of a two week power outage on california s bay area economy using both the analytical model and a computational general equilibrium model yield welfare losses that are substantially smaller than stated preference estimates of willingness to pay results highlight the role of resilience in moderating consequences of energy supply shocks

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

regulatory policy design for agroecosystem management on public rangelands this paper analyzes regulatory design for agroecosystem management on public rangelands we present an informational and institutional environment where three of the most prominent regulatory instruments on public rangelands input regulation cost sharing taxation and performance regulation can be de ned and compared the paper examines how the optimal regulation is shaped by the informational and institutional constraints faced by federal land management agencies flmas such as the bureau of land management and the u s forest service these constraints include informational asymmetries between ranchers and flmas limitations on flmas ability to monitor ranch level ecological conditions and constraints on flmas actions due to budget limitations and restrictions on the level of penalties they can assess the theoretical model extends the previous work of baker 1992 prendergast 2002 and hueth and melkonyan 2009 by considering optimal regulation by a budget constrained regulator in an environment of asymmetric information and moral hazard

multi task incentive contract and performance measurement with multidimensional types abstract this paper provides a new explanation for the dominance of the low powered incentive contract over the high powered incentive contract using a hybrid model of moral hazard and adverse selection we first show that unobservable risk aversion or cost leads to low powered incentives we then consider the case where both risk aversion and cost of the agent are unobservable to the principal this multidimensional mechanism design problem is solved under two assumptions with regard to the structures of performance measurement system and wage contract it is shown that if the deterministic and stochastic components of performance measures vary proportionally the principal is inclined to provide a low powered incentive contract moreover it is shown that if the base wage depends on a quadratic function rather than the direction of the performance wage vector no incentive is provided for most of the performance measures in an orthogonal performance measurement system