insecure alliances risk inequality and support for the welfare state popular support for the welfare state varies greatly across nations and policy domains we argue that these variations vital to understanding the politics of the welfare state reflect in part the degree to which economic disadvantage low income and economic insecurity high risk are correlated when the disadvantaged and insecure are mostly one and the same the base of popular support for the welfare state is narrow when the disadvantaged and insecure represent two distinct groups popular support is broader and opinion less polarized we test these predictions both across nations within a single policy area unemployment insurance and across policy domains within a single polity the united states using a new survey results are consistent with our predictions and are robust to myriad controls and specifications when disadvantage and insecurity are more correlated the welfare state is more contested hy do citizens support the welfare state the answer remains as elusive as the question is fundamental we know that patterns of public support vary greatly across nations and domains of social policy we also know that these differences are associated with variations in levels of spending and program generosity brooks and manza 2006a 2006b 2007 kang and powell 2010 svallfors 1997 2004 yet there has only been limited effort to explain why patternsofpublicsupportvary thatis whyaggregatepublic support polarization of opinion and the breadth of opposition to the welfare state differ across societies and social policy areas in this article we develop such a proposition distinguish it from other leading claims and show that it finds strong confirmation not only in cross national analysis but also when examining popular support for different social policies within the united states the proposition is that the structure of support for the welfare state varies with the joint distribution of economic disadvantage low income and economic in

a theory of voting equilibria a voting equilibrium arises when the voters in an electorate acting in accordance with both their preferences for the candidates and their perceptions of the relative chances of various pairs of candidates being in contention for victory generate an election result that justifies their perceptions voting equilibria always exist and the set of equilibria can vary substantially with the choice of voting system we compare equilibria under the plurality rule approval voting and the borda system we consider a candidate positioning game and find that the plurality rule imposes little restriction on the position of the winning candidate in three candidate races while approval voting leads to a winner positioned at the median of the voter distribution we contrast campaign activities intended to influence voter preferences with activities meant to influence only perceptions of candidate viability

on the optimality of the nordic system of dual income taxation abstract in recent years the nordic countries have introduced a so called dual income tax which combines a proportional tax on capital income with progressive taxation of labour income the paper argues that this asymmetric treatment of the two types of income can be defended on pure efficiency grounds because the progressivity of the labour income tax serves to reduce the private return to human capital investment thereby offsetting the tendency of a proportional comprehensive income tax to discriminate in favour of such investment the analysis is based on an overlapping generations model of a small open economy where consumers face a trade off between investment in human capital and investment in non human capital extended versions of the model allow for liquidity constraints and an endogenous labour leisure choice

why democracies produce efficient results by applying the standard tools of microeconomic analysis i argue that democratic markets work as well as economic markets in particular i show that previous work has greatly exaggerated the existence of principal agent and informational problems in electoral markets and has drawn incorrect conclusions

the political economy of publicly provided private goods abstract this paper integrates two different approaches to the analysis of public provision of private goods education health care day care etc while normative public economics has established an efficiency case for such provision the commonly held political economy view has been that it is an economically inefficient phenomenon generated by the political process we establish a political economy framework which in general yields an efficient choice of distributional policy it follows that the central mechanism studied in the normative theory is equally relevant to voting models of decisions on public provision it is shown that under plausible information constraints economically efficient public provision of private goods will be part of politically rational decisions the result is established both within a median voter process and a representative democracy of political parties

an economic model of representative democracy this paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office the approach has a number of attractive features first it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by as well as of the people second the model is analytically tractable being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally third it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy

does the welfare state induce risk taking abstract in cross national data on individual and country level characteristics the variance of log annual income is shown to correlate positively with indicators of redistribution the database comes from the panel comparability paco project which provides uniquely comparable cross national panel data including both eastern and western europe and the us a random effects permanent income regression is used to estimate income variance the variance estimates are then regressed on individual and country characteristics the results indicate robustly that various measures of risk are higher in countries with a higher share of social spending in gdp the evidence can be interpreted as support for the argument that the welfare state encourages risk taking and thereby economic growth

spatial equilibrium with entry this paper examines spatial equilibrium in political competition when established parties choose their platforms competitively while rationally anticipating entry of a vote maximizing third party the resulting equilibrium is substantially different from the hotelling median equilibrium established parties are spatially separated and third parties will generally lose the election this provides one theoretical explanation for the stability of two party systems namely that non cooperative behavior between established parties can effectively prevent third parties from winning

expressive voting and electoral equilibrium there are two rival accounts of rational voting in the public choice tradition the mainstream instrumental account that sees the vote as a revelation of preference over possible electoral outcomes essentially analogous to a market choice and the expressive account that sees the vote as expressing support for one or other electoral options rather like cheering at a football match this paper attempts to lay out some of the implications of the expressive account of voting for the issue of who votes as well as for the nature of political equilibrium and to compare these implications with those derived from the instrumental account we also identify and discuss the alternative views of the domain of electoral politics associated with the instrumental and expressive accounts of voting and sketch a route towards the integration of expressive and instrumental ideas in the analysis of rational electoral politics

structure behavior and voter turnout in the united states electoral participation in the united states is examined to provide a clearer account of the effect of the registration requirement on individual voting behavior pooling nes data from 1980 1984 and 1988 i first model with traditional and selection bias techniques the full electorate to distinguish among three groups nonregistrants registered nonvoters and voters analyses limited to recent movers then reported to understand more fully the forces associated with the actual decision calculi of registering and voting the influences of many factors commonly accepted as important determinants of voting are disentangled and their effect at each stage is ascertained factors yielding inconsistent effects in previ research or believed to be unimportant such as race gender attitudes toward the candidates and trust government are shown to deserve closer scrutiny by electoral scholars

a spatial theory of positive and negative campaigning abstract in order to explore the content of electoral campaigns this paper makes two modifications to hotelling s model of spatial competition first we assume that agents inherit initial locations and engage in costly relocation second an agent s relocation is affected by her rival s actions we investigate how a candidate allocates resources between positive campaigning which influences voters perceptions of her own ideology and negative campaigning which influences her opponent s perceived ideology our theory predicts that the candidate who is perceived as having less attractive personal attributes runs a relatively more negative campaign the theory s implications are illustrated for the 1988 presidential election journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 h0

inequality and the territorial fragmentation of solidarity a long tradition of research has shown decentralized political struc tures as an important cause behind lower levels of redistribution and higher levels of inequality this article offers an alternative interpretation of the association between fragmented fiscal structures and higher levels of inequality i argue that the distribu tive effects of decentralization depend on the preexisting territorial patterns of inequal ity therefore the political choice between alternative fiscal structures is largely driven by their expected distributive consequences as a result the territorial structure of inequality becomes an important factor to explain why some fiscal structures are more integrated than others two mechanisms link regional income distributions and preferences about the decentralization of redistributive policy differences in the demand for redistribution associated with interregional income differences and dif ferences in the demand for social insurance associated with the incidence of labor market risks i test the argument using a data set of fourteen countries in the orga nization for economic cooperation and development oecd over the period 1980 2000 in addition i illustrate the potential of the approach by analyzing why social solidarity remains territorially fragmented in the european union despite the fact that it has a common currency and a common market

privacy and time consistent optimal labor income taxation abstract incomplete information is a commitment device for time consistency problems in the context of time consistent optimal labor income taxation privacy can lead to a pareto superior outcome and increases the effectiveness of public education as a second best policy

international competition in r d and technological leadership an examination of the posner hufbauer hypothesis abstract this paper develops a dynamic game theoretic model of international competition in r d to examine the posner hufbauer hypothesis that trade based on the generation and diffusion of superior technology is relatively disadvantageous to the technologically less advanced countries the impact of three forms of technological leadership technological endowments costs of r d and preemptive behavior on the outcome of the game provides some support for the hypothesis if the quasi rent period is sufficiently long and if the original technological follower reacts aggressively to increased r d rivalry the leader and the follower will switch positions in the later part of the game

rational choice and turnout turning out to vote is the most common and important act of political participation in any democracy voting is also less well understood and explained empirically than other political acts engaged in regularly by citizens turnout however presents a special problem for rational choice theories of politics for it is taken to be the paradigmatic example of the problem of collective action in which although all may benefit from voting it is rarely in the individual s self interest to vote this paper begins by examining the problem of explaining turnout a basic form of rational choice models of turnout is developed basic in the sense that it is common to all such models this basic model is shown to be incomplete and the two most important models the calculus of voting and the minimax regret model are illustrated as alternative ways to complete this basic model along with mention of game theoretic models their strengths and weaknesses are then assessed the remainder of the paper argues that rational choice accounts of turnout are possible the first step is to argue that turnout is not an especially problematic version of the collective action problem because it is for many a low cost low expected benefit decision a strategic politicians account of turnout and campaigns is examined next a reinterpretation of the intrinsic benefits of voting is then considered and is used to examine the most important substantive problem in the turnout literature its decline these steps i argue make theories of ordinary political decisions at once both more political and more integrated into the politics of the larger system

import quotas and the product cycle this paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium model of the product cycle in north south trade to analyze the short run and long run effects of import quotas imposed in the north on manufactured goods from the south the short run effects are predictable real wages in the north may rise as a result of the protection though even this is not certain if the south captures the quota rents the long run effect of the protection is to unambiguously reduce real wages in the north because the quotas artificially increase production costs in the north relative to the south accelerating the transfer of technology and capital from north to south

credibility and policy convergence in a two party system with rational voters the traditional approach to modeling political parties behavior based upon the contribution of anthony downs 1957 assumes that the parties unique objective is to win elections thus they maximize their popularity the crucial implication of this assumption for a two party system is that if the two parties have the same information about voters preferences full convergence of policies results from electoral competition this is the crucial implication of the median voter theorem more generally it may be argued that different parties are motivated differently because they represent different constituencies parties may not care only about winning elections per se but also about the quality of the policies resulting from an election in this case the candidates of the two parties view winning an election not only as a goal per se but also as a means of implementing a better policy for their respective constituencies this paper shows that electoral competitions imply dynamic inconsistency if the voters are modeled as rational and forwardlooking agents and parties do not care exclusively about being elected but also about which policy to implement once elected the dynamic inconsistency arises as follows the parties have an incentive to announce convergent platforms to increase their chances of election however if the elected party is not committed to its electoral platform it has an incentive to follow its most preferred policy rather than the policy announced in its platform if voters are rational they account for this incentive thus in general in a one shot electoral game the only timeconsistent equilibrium is one in which no convergence is possible the two parties follow their most preferred policies and the voters rationally expect this outcome full convergence of parties platforms results only as a limiting case when the parties are completely indifferent with respect to the quality of the policies resulting from the election thus these results differ from the existing literature on ideologically motivated politicians for instance donald wittman 1977 1983 randall calvert 1985 which implicitly assumes the possibility of binding commitments to electoral platforms complete or partial policy convergence can be the outcome of political competition if the interaction between the parties and the voters is modeled as an infinitely repeated game in fact if the candidates have concave objective functions the welfare maximizing policy rule implies a complete convergence of parties policies however this cooperative and agreed upon policy may or may not be sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium depending on parameter values in particular it depends on the discount rates of the two parties the degree of polarization of their preferences and the relative popu graduate school of industrial administration carnegie mellon university pittsburgh pa 15213 and national bureau of economic research cambridge ma 02138 this paper is based upon a chapter of my unpublished doctoral dissertation at harvard university i am greatly indebted to jeffrey sachs for directing my attention toward these issues and for many conversations i also wish to thank andrew abel dilip abreu olivier blanchard ramon caminal andrew caplin alex cukierman morris fiorina benjamin friedman herschel grossman howard rosenthal and the referees for very useful comments the responsibilitv af anv n mtnkieis af calrirp nfnlv mine the result of policy convergence in a two party system is more general than the median voter theorem for discussions of convergence results not at the median see john ledyard 1984 peter coughlin 1984 coughlin and shmuel nitzan 1981 melvin hinich 1977 for earlier work on spatial competition see richard mckelvey 1975 hinich ledyard and peter ordeshook 1972 1973 and the references quoted therein the present paper focuses on the result of convergence rather than on the median voter theorem per se

intergenerational risk sharing abstract in this paper we examine government debt and tax transfer policies that can be improve the allocation of risk between generations markets cannot allocate risk efficiently between two generations whenever the two generations are not both alive prior to the occurence of a stochastic event this implies that government policies transferring risk between generations have the potential to create first order welfare improvements our model provides a non keynesian justification for the debt finance of wars and recessions as well as an added rationale for social security type tax transfer schemes which aid unlucky generations e g the depression generation at the expense of luckier generations

education redistributive taxation and confidence we consider redistributional taxation between people with and without human capital if education is endogenous and if individuals differ in their perceptions about own ability those who see their ability as low like redistributive taxation because of the transfers it generates those who see their ability as high may also like redistributive taxation because it stops other people receiving education and increases the quasi rents on their own human capital it is surprising that this rather indirect effect can overcompensate them for the income loss from taxation and make the highly confident want higher taxes than the less confident do the results however turn out to be in line with empirical evidence on the desired amount of redistribution among young individuals

explaining voter turnout patterns an information theory voting research is rich in empirical regularities yet a parsimonious theory of voter turnout that can match the facts has proven to be elusive this paper argues that voter turnout patterns can be explained by extending the traditional rational voter model to include limited information a model is presented in which utility maximizing consumers receive higher payoffs from voting the more confident they are of their vote choice the model provides an explanation for the most important cross sectional voter turnout patterns in addition it suggests a novel explanation for the post 1960 decline in u s participation

needs economic constraints and the distribution of public home care when private goods are publicly provided at subsidized prices government authorities have to determine the distribution of services on recipients the distribution of services according to need is frequently referred to as an important policy goal thus governments are assumed to develop standards for evaluating the relative needs of different clients this paper analyses the impact of needs and economic constraints on the distribution of public home care in norway the empirical results show that individual needs have a significant effect on the distribution of home care another finding is that local public authorities with higher disposable incomes meet client needs better finally the results are utilized to derive a measure of client specific need

uncertain income and redistribution in a federal system abstract this paper considers income redistribution in a federal system where regions experience random shocks federal redistribution serves as insurance against jurisdiction specific shocks but provides a uniform assistance to the poor and cannot suit individual jurisdictions demands for redistribution consequently whether the federal government should redistribute depends on the advantage of pooling the risk and the disadvantage of compromising different preferences for redistribution with mobile individuals federal redistribution loses its advantage because migration ensures the equalization of factor incomes between regions and because even local redistribution serves as insurance however local redistribution creates fiscal externalities and distorts the allocation of labor

two moment decision models and expected utility maximization two moment decision models are consistent with expected utility maximization only if the choice set or the agent s preferences are restricted this paper identifies a restriction which is sufficient to ensure this consistency and confirms that it holds in many economic models the implications for economic analysis are then derived two different approaches to representing an agent s preferences over strategies yielding random payoffs are in wide use under the mean standard deviation ms approach the agent is assumed to rank the alternatives according to the value of some function defined over the first two moments of the random payoff while the expected utility eu criterion assumes that the expected value of some utility function defined over payoffs is used instead the fact that there are these two competing approaches has generated a considerable literature some authors are concerned with the advantages and disadvantages of each while others deal with conditions under which the potentially different approaches would yield the same results or at least approximately so space does not

analysis of democratic institutions structure conduct and performance t s ahe structure of a democratic political system consists of the offices that politicians may seek the constitutional powers associated with these offices and the procedures by which candidates are elected to these offices these structures together form a complex incentive system for politicians determining what kinds of political decisions and strategies will be rewarded thus the constitutional structure of a democracy may influence the conduct of its politicians and the performance of its government in this way political theory confronts a set of questions that have much in common with the classic economic questions of structure conduct and performance in industrial organization this paper develops this economic perspective on political theory as a guide to some problems and directions of current research economic and political interpretations of a classic model

externalities and technology transfer through multinational corporations a theoretical analysis abstract this paper examines the optimal behavior of a multinational firm s subsidiary in a host country when learning of its production techniques by its native rivals occurs in a dynamic framework it is shown among other things that a it is worthwhile for the subsidiary to import better technology from its parent firm and that b such technology transfer may not benefit the firms of the host country despite their learning while the host country as a whole does benefit

a theory of the welfare state the welfare state can be seen as an insurance device that makes lifetime careers safer increases risk taking and suffers from moral hazard effects adopting this view the paper studies the trade off between average income and inequality evaluating redistributive equilibria from an allocative point of view it studies the problem of optimal redistributive taxation with tax induced risk taking and shows that constant returns to risk taking are likely to imply a paradox where more redistribution results in more post tax inequality in general optimal taxation will either imply that the redistribution paradox is present or that the economy operates at a point of its efficiency frontier where more inequality implies a lower average income redistribution welfare state

the uncertain foundations of the welfare state abstract the welfare state is often portrayed as provider of insurance against uncertainties in knight s 1921 sense of the term which would be refused or underinsured on private markets this image conflicts with the standard economic model of risk exchange founded on the subjective interpretation of probability which predicts that all individual uncertainties will be insured by private markets our aim in this paper is to explain why this prediction fails and building on contributions to decision theory that take seriously the idea of knightian uncertainty to show why social insurance may be justified

privatization risk taking and the communist firm this paper studies alternative methods of privatizing a formerly communist firm in the presence of imperfect risk markets the methods include cash sales a give away scheme and a participation contract where the government retains a sleeping fractional ownership in the firm it is shown that with competitive bidding the participation contract dominates cash sales because it generates both more private restructuring investment and a higher expected present value of revenue for the government under weak conditions the participation contract will induce more investment than the give away scheme and it may even share the cash sales virtue of incentive compatibility

privatisation and market structure in a transition economy abstract a model is developed in which an industry of n 1 firms is privatised the participation method of privatisation is used whereby firms are sold for cash but the state retains a proportionate share of ownership in each firm the new private owner has the opportunity to make a reorganisational investment before output is produced this investment is unobservable by the state and therefore non contractible there is cournot competition in the product market the welfare maximising retained ownership share for the state is analysed taking into account that potential buyers of firms may have limited access to finance

technology transfer licensing and the speed of endogenous technological change abstract as licensing contracts usually require the licensee firm to purchase tied inputs from the seller of the technology the licensee firm has an incentive to embark on an r d program for development of substitutes for the tied inputs this paper characterizes the licensee firm s optimal speed of r d and the optimal expected date of switch over to the substitute inputs in an infinite horizon model under uncertainty about the timing of success of the r d program the effects of different government subsidies or taxes changes in input prices and other parameters on the optimal speed of r d and on the expected date of switchover to the substitute are also investigated it is also shown that strategic behavior by the seller of the technology may delay the development of the substitute by the licensee firm

multinationals multi plant economies and the gains from trade a general equilibrium model of a multinational enterprise based on economies of multi plant operation is developed these economies are modelled as arising from the existence of a joint input whose productivity in each production facility is independent of the number of facilities maintained by a firm the multinational thus offers the world increased technical efficiency by eliminating the duplication of the joint input that would occur with independent national firms since this technical efficiency may come at the expense of increased market power the full determinants of home country host country and world welfare are considered

optimal foreign exchange rate policy for a small open economy abstract this paper examines optimal exchange rate policy for a small open economy which faces temporary and pemanent real and nominal disturbances it demonstrates that exchange rate stabilization is desirable if most diturbances are nominal if most disturbances are real then stabilization should be greater 1 the greater the fraction of exchange rate variance accounted for by permanent disturbances 2 the greater the information available to firms in setting the wage 3 the greater the fraction of exchange rate variance attributed to domestic productivity shocks compared with foreign relative price shocks and 4 the more elastic is labor supply

different ways of looking at old issues a time series approach to inequality and growth in this article we propose an econometric approach that steers clear of parameter heterogeneity omitted variable bias and endogeneity problems from which suffers the econometric analysis of economic growth we propose to investigate the relation between income inequality and economic growth in a cointegrated var setting and present an application to belgium us and finland

who gives who gains progressivity and preferences the extent to which popular support for the welfare state depends on income varies greatly across nations and policy domains we argue and show formally that these variations largely overlooked yet essential to understanding the politics of redistribution reflect in part the design of tax and transfer policies in terms of progressivity when progressivity is high politics is perceived by income groups as a zero sum game and conflicts over who gets what intensify when progressivity is low and tax contributors and benefit recipients overlap redistributive struggles become politically less salient we test these predictions both across nations and across policy domains within a sample of advanced industrial democracies our findings indicate that the progressivity of the tax and transfer system is a major determinant of the predictive power of income on preferences for redistribution

union strategy and optimal direct taxation restrictions on work hours are more important in countries with a large welfare state we show that this empirical observation is consistent with the strategic effects of such restrictions in a welfare state in the context of optimal direct taxation in the tradition of mirrlees 1971 our results also apply to non welfarist states which have income redistribution but not in purely extortionary states

exogenous volatility and the size of government in developing countries this paper presents instrumental variables estimates of the effects of gdp per capita volatility on the size of government we show that for a panel of 157 countries spanning more than half a century rainfall volatility has a significant positive effect on gdp per capita volatility in countries with above median temperatures in these countries rainfall volatility has also a significant positive reduced form effect on the gdp share of government there is no significant reduced form effect in the sample of countries with below median temperatures where rainfall volatility has no significant effect on gdp per capita volatility using rainfall volatility as an instrumental variable in the sample of countries with above median temperatures yields that greater gdp per capita volatility leads to a significantly higher gdp share of government

social policy by popular demand why are unemployment benefits more generous in some countries this article argues that citizens trade off the redistributive and insuring effect of social insurance as a result the distribution of risk in a society has important consequences via popular demand for social policy making at the microlevel the article shows that in addition to income the risk of unemployment is a key predictor of individual level preferences for unemployment benefits based on the microlevel findings the article argues that at the macrolevel the homogeneity of the risk pool is an important determinant of benefit generosity the more equally unemployment risk is distributed the higher unemployment replacement rates are empirical testing at both levels finds support for this account of social policy by popular demand

technological innovations capital mobility and the product cycle innorth south trade this paper constructs a general equilibrium model of north south tradein which the north continually introduces new goods the rate at whichtechnology diffuses to the south is a function of differences in the cost of production in the two regions the key result of the model is that labor force growth in the south initially increases real wages inthe north a standard result in classical trade models but in the long run reduces northern wages by accelerating the transfer of technology and drawing capital out of the north as well copyright 1986 by american economic association

appropriate technology in a model of multinational duopoly this paper seeks to motivate the observed tendency of multinationals with home bases in ldcs to adopt labour intensive technology relative to their counterparts in industrial countries two multinationals play a spatial duopoly game in which the location mode of market service exports or on site production and technology choice of the third world multinational are simultaneously determined the model is calibrated using observed data on transport costs factor shares research intensity and international income distribution ldc firms are shown to prefer labour intensive technological adaptation even when the option of producing on site in high income markets is available

international technology transfer abstract this paper presents a formal analysis of the process of technological assimilation or catch up of a typical least developed country in the context of a three sector dynamic model the optimal time path of r d and current production is determined and the comparative static and dynamic properties of the model are examined

inequality social insurance and redistribution is the political support for welfare policy higher or lower in less egalitarian societies we answer the question using a model of welfare policy as publicly financed insurance that pays benefits in a redistributive manner when voters have both redistributive and insurance motives for supporting welfare spending the effect of inequality depends on how benefits are targeted greater inequality increases support for welfare expenditures when benefits are targeted to the employed but decreases support when benefits are targeted to those without earnings with endogenous targeting support for benefits to those without earnings declines as inequality increases whereas support for aggregate spending is a v shaped function of inequality statistical analysis of welfare expenditures in advanced industrial societies provides support for key empirical implications of the model

economic and social security in the twenty first century with attention to europe a partly heuristic attempt at exploring long run policies aimed at a second best compromise between ex ante risk sharing efficiency and ex post productive efficiency wage subsidies for low skilled workers financed by taxes on high wages are advocated together with improved risk sharing between capital and labour between generations and between the countries belonging to emu the scope of the advocated policies is limited by considerations of moral hazard time consistency and fiscal competition also estimates of some key economic parameters remain very imprecise several avenues of further research are identified

the paradox of voting intelligently classical economic models predict far less voting than happens in practice expressive voting may partly explain the divergence but some who are generally uninterested in politics and thus unlikely to take elections as an important form of personal expression nevertheless vote one possible explanation is that these voters overestimate the instrumental outcome changing consequences of voting such systematic misperception may be more likely among those with less cognitive capacity analysis of responses to the american national election studies confirms this hypothesis while intelligence and interest both increase the likelihood of voting the combination enhances the likelihood of turnout still further

risks and redistribution an individual level analysis much of the disagreement in the debate about globalization and its present or absent effects on the welfare state stems from competing assumptions about the individual level determinants of redistributional preferences this article calls for and provides testing of these causal mechanisms at the individual level traditional accounts suggest that risks at the industry level are important determinants of redistributional preferences this article argues that risks at the occupational level should also be considered a comprehensive new data set is used to test whether and what types of risks in the labor market play an important role in shaping preferences statistical analyses of public opinion surveys european social survey show strong evidence for the assumed causal mechanism contrary to much of the literature but in line with this article s claims it is the occupational rather than the industry level that is most important the article lays out implications of these findings

income tax deductions for losses as insurance the federal income tax allows deductions for some categories of personal losses notably for casualty losses such as destruction of one s home or car and medical expenses above a threshold the latter even with lower marginal rates and further restrictions brought about by the 1986 tax reform involves more than a 3 billion annual revenue loss office of management and budget 1990 1 deductions like these act as partial insurance individuals receive a tax benefit equal to their marginal rate multiplied by the magnitude of their loss however this form of insurance is unnecessary when private insurance is available moreover as will be emphasized here these deductions have a perverse effect because they are allowed only for the uninsured portion of losses this induces individuals to be less protected against risk in the aggregate than if the implicit insurance provided by the tax system were unavailable if the tax rate is sufficiently high individuals would forgo insurance coverage altogether 2 it will be demonstrated that a tax system with no deductions for personal losses pareto dominates the current system these conclusions are demonstrated in section i using a simple model in which risk averse individuals may purchase actuarially fair insurance against loss and individual behavior does not affect the risk of loss no moral hazard section ii considers the applicability of the results when one allows for moral hazard administrative costs and other imperfections it also discusses the applicability of traditional notions of tax equity

a decision theoretic model of innovation technology transfer and trade we analyse a dynamic north south model of innovation technology transfer and trade northern firms conduct r d using labour which has alternative uses producing in the r d sector or a nontraded good sector since technology transfer prevents the north from fully appropriating benefits of r d the optimal rate of innovation for either profit maximizing firms or a utility maximizing northern planner is less than globally optimal an increased transfer rate intensifies competition of lower wage southern workers with northern workers in production so profit maximizing northern firms irrespective of their number or cooperation in r d reallocate labour toward r d

product cycles and domestic wage inequality in innovating countries high technology industries comprise a significant and increasing share of manufactured output in industrialized countries increasing international competition in high technology industries raises an important question what is the effect of innovation in one country on the standard of living in another through the introduction of two types of workers the effects of innovation and technology transfer on relative prices wages and income between workers both within and across innovating countries that transfer technology also can be examined the results show that a change in the determinants of innovation and technology transfer in one country redistributes income in both countries

technology transfer licensing contracts and incentives for further innovation technology licensing is common in agricultural and natural resource sectors an important characteristic of technology licenses is that they provide incentives for further innovation on the part of the buyer this paper develops a risk sharing model to analyze how risk preferences and expectations about further innovation possibilities alter technology payments and the incentives for complementary local innovation higher buyer risk aversion which is associated with lower fixed payments reduces the technology buyer s level of innovation sellers are generally better off when innovation is anticipated but buyers are generally better off when innovation is unanticipated although less innovation may be realized

privatization under incomplete information and bankruptcy risk abstract we study privatization under moral hazard and adverse selection we show that if the fraction of efficient investors is either insignificant or productivity differences between efficient and inefficient investors are negligible the government would offer a pooling contract and sell the same fraction of equity to both types of investors the lower the productivity difference the greater the equity stake offered to investors on the other hand if the fraction of efficient investors is significant or productivity differentials are large the optimal policy consists of a dual method of privatization in which it offers two methods of privatization to outside investors the first method consists of a sale of 100 equity together with a subsidy and charges higher price under the second option the investor pays a smaller price but buys less than 100 equity without any subsidy efficient investors opt for the first method while inefficient investors prefer the second the dual privatization method screens investors and provides them with maximum incentives to invest while minimizing the risk of post privatization bankruptcy

preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities this paper explores how individual preferences for redistribution depend on future income prospects in addition to estimating the impact of individuals socioeconomic background and of their subjective perceptions of future mobility we employ panel data to construct dobjectivet measures of expected gains and losses from redistribution for different categories of individuals we find that such measures have considerable explanatory power and perform better than dgeneral mobilityt indexes we also find that preferences for redistribution respond to individual beliefs on what determines one s position in the social ladder ceteris paribus people who believe that the american society offers equal opportunities are more averse to redistribution d 2004 published by elsevier b v

polarization and inefficient policies of the economy in this case the costs of producing a public good the parties each propose a policy an election is held and the policy of the winning party is implemented voters and parties care about the level of the public good and costs two kinds of sequential equilibria exist revealing where voters learn the true costs and the implemented policy adjusts to costs and non revealing if parties preferences are polarized only non revealing equilibria fulfill a refinement criterion like the intuitive criterion if they are alike only revealing equilibria fulfill this criterion thus less political polarization improves information revelation in electoral democracies policy motivated parties are likely to be better informed about the functioning of the economy than are voters this paper presents a model where two parties but not voters are informed about the cost of producing a public good we study whether an electoral democracy leads to efficient production of the public good given this asymmetry of information in particular under which circumstances will the implemented policy the level of the public good reflect actual costs the main result is that the policy will reflect costs if and only if at least one of the parties has preferences which are sufficiently similar to the median voter s in this sense polarization leads to inefficiency the public good can be for instance infrastructure medicare or military services both a continuum of voters and the parties have preferences over the amount of the good that is provided by the government the preferences of the two parties are situated on each side of those of the median voter the costs of providing the good are not precisely known to the voters who only know the distribution of costs and that they will pay for these costs as taxpayers on the other hand the parties know the costs

privatization policies in central and eastern europe privatization in central and eastern europe patrick bolton and gerard roland this paper assesses policies of mass privatization in germany czechoslovakia hungary and poland a central concern stemming from the analysis is that in view of the fiscal crisis facing economies in transition it is crucial for governments to try to maximize the proceeds from the sale of state assets because of the low initial level of private wealth it is important in this respect to let potential buyers borrow from the government or issue claims on future revenues obtained with the privatized assets to the government in order to pay for the privatized firms allowing for such non cash bids removes the government s incentive to delay privatization for fiscal reasons reduces its ability to squander immediately the proceeds from privatization and improves the decentralization of control by allowing less wealthy but more able bidders to buy the firms they are best suited to run

paying for public inputs with public consumption goods pareto optimality can be achieved in equilibrium through lindahl pricing this requires that each consumer pays a price proportional to his marginal utility from the public good the marginal cost of providing the good is then equated to the sum of the marginal benefits some public goods serve as inputs into production processes rather than as consumption goods the lighthouse is an example efficiency in an economy with public intermediate goods requires that the marginal cost of providing them equals the sum of their marginal benefits to firms by analogy with the case of public consumption goods it might seem that lindahl pricing can be extended to public intermediate goods by requiring that firms pay in proportion to the marginal contribution of these goods to profits agnar sandmo 1972 explicitly proposes this for convex technologies for nonconvex technologies that arise with an important class of production functions essentially those exhibiting atmosphere externalities in the phrase of james meade 1952 lindahl pricing for such public inputs is infeasible the principal result derived here is a sim

taxation of corporate capital income tax revenues versus tax distortions this paper shows that when uncertainty is taken into account explicitly taxation of corporate income can leave corporate investment incentives and individual savings incentives basically unaffected in spite of the sizable tax revenues collected in some plausible situations such taxes can increase efficiency the explanation for these surprising results is that the government by taxing capital income absorbs a certain fraction of both the expected return and the uncertainty in the return while investors as a result receive a lower expected return they also bear less risk when they invest and these two effects are largely offsetting

the taxation of risky assets this paper reconsiders the effects of taxation on risky assets recognizing the importance of variations in asset prices we show that earlier analyses that assumed that depreciation rates are constant and that the future price of capital goods is known with certainty are very misleading as guides to the effects of corporate taxes we then examine the concept of economic depreciation in a risky environment and show that depreciation allowances if set ex ante should be adjusted to take account of future asset price risk some empirical calculations suggest that these adjustments are large and have important implications for the burdens of and nonneutralities in the corporation income tax

social preferences self interest and the demand for redistribution preferences for redistribution may be influenced by values and beliefs about distributive justice as well as by self interest people may prefer more redistribution to the poor if they believe that poverty is caused by circumstances beyond individual control therefore beliefs about the causes of income may affect demand for redistribution alternatively the effect of these beliefs on redistributive preferences may be spurious if they are correlated with income and self interest is not properly controlled for they may also measure incentive cost concerns using social survey data i find that self interest cannot explain the effect of these beliefs on redistributive preferences 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

on hierarchical spatial competition in this paper we consider a hierarchical model of spatial electoral competition with two dominant players incumbents and one entrant the incumbents engage in a non cooperative game against each other and act as stackelberg leaders with respect to a vote maximizing entrant we prove that the equilibrium of this game called a hierarchical equilibrium exists and is unique for an arbitrary single peaked distribution of voters ideal points moreover we fully characterize the set of equilibrium strategies and show its equivalence to the set of strategies generated by a perfect foresight equilibrium most of the recently developed models of entry in oligopolistic markets and the theory of political competition deal with the case of dominant firms or parties which face a threat of potential entry these models possess a number of features on which they may be compared and contrasted the most important of these features are the ways in which the existing parties or firms compete against each other for votes or profits and types of expectations the incumbents have about the responses of potential entrants to changes in their decisions in most of the cases an electoral or oligopolistic competition is represented by some type of a non cooperative game played by parties or firms in this paper we also consider a non cooperative model of electoral race where the established parties incumbents compete against each other by offering positions ideologies to the population of voters given the profile of voters preferences over the space of ideologies or issue space each of the established parties attempts to maximize its vote share in making their choices the incumbents however anticipate that a new party an entrant will join the electoral race consistent with the other parties objectives the entrant is assumed to maximize its share of voters while taking the incumbents choices as given the resulting non cooperative game possesses therefore a structural hierarchy the established parties behave as nash players with respect to each other whereas acting as stackelberg leaders with respect to the entrant and correctly anticipating its vote maximizing response to their choices in the issue space the main purpose of this paper is to study the properties of the game we described and in particular to characterize its equilibrium which we will call hierarchical equilibrium naturally some assumptions are needed in order to guarantee the existence of the equilibrium we assume that there are two established parties the issue space i is the uni dimensional interval all voters have symmetric single peaked peaked preferences over i and the distribution of the voters ideal points is represented by a quasi concave continuous density function under these rather mild assumptions we are able to prove the existence and uniqueness of the hierarchical equilibrium and to completely

endogenous technological change and international technology transfer in a ricardian trade model abstract the study uses a ricardian model two goods two countries one factor to analyze the interdependence of technology creation and the conditions of international technology transfer costly r d performed in a third sector in the home country yields process improving new technology an intermediate public good the level of r d depends on the value of domestic and foreign royalties accruing to this sector the levels of national welfare are related to various conditions of transfer including no transfer free transfer globally optimal royalties and nationally optimal royalties

beyond ses a resource model of political participation this paper develops a resource model of political participation the resources considered are time money and civic skills those communications and organizational capacities that are essential to political activity these skills are not only acquired early in life but developed in the nonpolitical institutional settings of adult life the workplace organizations and churches and synagogues these resources are distributed differentially among groups defined by socioeconomic status a two stage least squares analysis shows these resources have powerful effects on overall political activity thus explaining why socioeconomic status has traditionally been so powerful in predicting participation we disaggregate overall activity into three kinds of acts those that involve giving time those that entail donating money and voting each requires a different configuration of resources resulting in different patterns of stratification across various political acts

redistribution as a selection device abstract this paper studies the role of the wealth distribution for the market selection of entrepreneurs when agents differ in talent it argues that the redistribution of initial endowments can increase an economy s surplus because more talented individuals get credit for their risky investment projects moreover the redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a pareto improvement although all agents are non satiable an agent s entrepreneurial ability is his private information and there is moral hazard in production i find conditions such that unproductive rich entrepreneurs crowd out productive poor ones on the capital market then redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a new equilibrium where market participants are better informed about the entrepreneurs ability the new equilibrium is characterized by i the selection of better entrepreneurs ii a higher riskless rate of return on capital iii lower repayments of successful entrepreneurs to their creditors and iv the fact that all agents are better off