repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory the case of risk neutrality we consider a repeated moral hazard problem where both the principal and the wealth constrained agent are risk neutral in each of two periods the agent can exert unobservable effort leading to success or failure incentives provided in the second period act as carrot and stick for the first period so that the effort level induced in the second period is higher after a first period success than after a failure if renegotiation cannot be prevented the principal may prefer a project with lower returns i e a project may be too good to be financed or similarly an agent can be overqualified this article offers a new perspective on dynamic moral hazard problems consider a riskneutral principal who can hire a risk neutral but wealth constrained agent the agent can exert unobservable effort which increases the likelihood of success in the one shot problem there is a well known trade off between effort incentives and rent extraction which leads to a downward distorted effort level compared to the first best solution we extend the standard model by assuming that there is a second period in which the principal can make an investment to continue the project and the agent can again exert unobservable effort it turns out that there are several interesting insights that so far have escaped the literature on repeated moral hazard which was focused on the case of risk averse agents in particular if the principal can commit not to renegotiate the second period incentives can be used to partially circumvent the limited liability constraint in the second period the principal induces the agent to choose a particularly high effort level following a first period success and a particularly low effort level following a first period failure the prospect of a higher second period rent following a first period success motivates the agent to exert more effort in the first period i e rents in the second period act as reward and punishment for the first period it should be emphasized that we assume no technological impact of a first period success or failure on the second period technology nevertheless an optimal dynamic contract exhibits memory hence if an outsider observed today a principal agent pair that was successful and another identical pair that was not successful he would be right to predict that the first pair also is more likely to succeed tomorrow in other words a serial correlation across periods which we sometimes refer to as a hot hand effect is generated endogenously merely based on incentive considerations 2

mexico and the brady plan mexico has throughout the 1980s been centre stage in the debates and events shaping the sovereign debt problem caught between a sudden collapse of its terms of trade and rising world interest rates mexico suspended debt service payments in august 1982 and ushered in what has since become known as the debt crisis in the following years lending to ldcs dried up and debtor countries were increasingly forced to run high trade surpluses to effect ever growing transfers from poor back to rich countries in the face of falling growth rates and rising inflation in the high debt countries then secretary of the treasury baker proposed the baker plan in return for economic reforms high debt countries would get new access to medium term new loans in addition to rolling over of amortization of old loans new loans had to come both from commercial creditors and the official lending institutions with access to capital markets restored the economic reforms would it was hoped allow the debtors to grow out of debt but experience in the high debt countries showed that the original hopes of the proponents of the baker plan went unfulfilled net transfers out of the borrowing countries went up rather than down as

rising inequality as a cause of the present crisis the article argues that the economic imbalances that caused the present crisis should be thought of as the outcome of the interaction of the effects of financial deregulation with the macroeconomic effects of rising inequality in this sense rising inequality should be regarded as a root cause of the present crisis i identify four channels by which it has contributed to the crisis first rising inequality creates a downwards pressure on aggregate demand since poorer income groups have high marginal propensities to consume second international financial deregulation has allowed countries to run larger current account deficits and for longer time periods thus in reaction to potentially stagnant demand two growth models have emerged a debt led model and an export led model third in the debt led growth models higher inequality has led to higher household debt as working class families have tried to keep up with social consumption norms despite stagnating or falling real wages fourth rising inequality has increased the propensity to speculate as richer households tend to hold riskier financial assets than other groups the rise of hedge funds and of subprime derivatives in particular has been linked to rise of the super rich

limited liability and incentive contracting with ex ante action choices abstract this article examines a principal agent model of financial contracting in which a risk neutral entrepreneur agent makes an unobservable ex ante effort choice while employing the investment funds of a risk neutral investor principal the key innovation is that the investment contract is subject to statutory liability limits given these liability limits two settings are considered one in which the investor payoff function is also constrained to be monotonically nondecreasing in firm profit and another in which no such monotonic contract constraint is imposed in the former case a standard debt contract is shown to emerge and a first best effort choice is not achieved in the latter setting the optimum is characterized by a live or die payoff function and a first best effort level may or may not be realized

forms of trust and conditions for their stability of the three principal approaches to trust we decided to investigate in greater detail the one in which trust is regarded as a belief that the individuals involved hold about a relationship trust was defined as a delegatory relationship based on anticipation of the delegatee s behaviour we reached four main conclusions first the solution to the problem posed by the indeterminacy of trust lies in the differentiation and hierarchisation of the various forms of trust contractual organisational and tacit on the basis of their degree of irreversibility and stability second contractual trust is unstable because it comes up against the problem of guarantees of individual intentions this leads to the third conclusion rational evaluation by individuals cannot by itself establish trust which is based on collective beliefs practices and rules fourth we identified two conditions for the stability of trust the creation of irreversibilities through adherence to a rule and the creation of a confidence interval within which different interpretations of contradictory individual strategies are tolerated thus the viability of the various forms of trust depends on the ability of institutions and organisations to create rules that are likely when applied to produce an interval in which tolerance of mutual intentions is the norm these analyses of trust hence highlight the role of time and period of time in the notion of trust

conflicting tasks and moral hazard theory and experimental evidence abstract we study a multi task principal agent problem in which tasks can be in direct conflict with each other in theory it is difficult to induce a single agent to exert efforts in two conflicting tasks because effort in one task decreases the success probability of the other task we have conducted an experiment in which we find strong support for the relevance of this incentive problem in the presence of conflict subjects choose two efforts significantly less often when both tasks are assigned to a single agent than when there are two agents each in charge of one task

the economics of worldwide stagflation the last fifteen years have witnessed dramatic changes in economics not only in the manner in which the economics profession views economics but also in the manner in which the general public views economics and economists by the late 1960 s there had emerged more or less a consensus macroeconomic framework that is an agreed upon structure to be used to study economic problems at the aggregate level robert solow stated as quoted in leijonhufvud 1968

perquisites risk and capital structure in a corporate agency problem perquisites and risk interact to produce novel complex comparative statics for example even if additional debt induces risk neutral insiders to increase risk they never seek to increase the market value of their stock instead insiders decrease the present value of their subsequent conditionally optimal perquisites also the firm s optimal capital structure includes a risky bond with an agreement to remove insiders whenever the bond defaults however the optimal sharing rule between corporate claimants cannot be supported solely by standard securities such as bonds stocks options and their hybrids

executive effort and selection of risky projects this article examines the incentives of executives to adopt risky projects the agency problem considered is that of motivating the executive to expend effort to generate information about the profitability of projects and to select the best project conditional upon the information that his effort generates we show that the executive and the principal will not always agree regarding which project is best we provide conditions under which this conflict of interest leads from the principal s perspective to either an underinvestment or an overinvestment in risky projects

incentive schemes with multiple agents and bankruptcy constraints abstract we explore the effects of bankruptcy constraints on incentive schemes when two risk neutral agents operate in correlated environments our focus is on the subgame equilibrium in which each agent is induced via a direct mechanism to truthfully reveal his private information as a nash response to truth telling by his counterpart we identify a class of examples in which in contrast to the case where the agents are risk averse the nash constraints induce a subgame dominant strategy equilibrium thus implementation via direct mechanisms is feasible for this class more generally however the truth telling nash equilibrium may be subgame dominated so the question of implementation via direct mechanisms remains a delicate one

the foundations of trust macro and micro this comment on beugelsdijk s 2006 critique of trust and its measurement argues that it misses the mark and that there is neither a theoretical nor an empirical foundation for thinking that the macro and micro foundations of trust or its measurement are different from each other generalised trust is more than a simple illusion hiding behind institutional structures

macroeconomic performance and collective bargaining an international perspective this paper critically reviews the research on how collective bargaining systems influence macroeconomic performance in industrialized countries the review considers effects of bargaining level coordination and corporatist institutional arrangements key empirical results turn out to be quite fragile and much of the paper explores issues of measurement and specification that account for the fragility the paper concludes that complementarities between key institutions and between institutions and the economic environment may be more important for macroeconomic performance than the effects of individual institutions and it suggests research strategies

from sick man of europe to economic superstar germany s resurgent economy in the late 1990s and into the early 2000s germany was often called the sick man of europe indeed germany s economic growth averaged only about 1 2 percent per year from 1998 to 2005 including a recession in 2003 and unemployment rates rose from 9 2 percent in 1998 to 11 1 percent in 2005 today after the great recession germany is described as an economic superstar in contrast to most of its european neighbors and the united states germany experienced almost no increase in unemployment during the great recession despite a sharp decline in gdp in 2008 and 2009 germany s exports reached an all time record of 1 738 trillion in 2011 which is roughly equal to half of germany s gdp or 7 7 percent of world exports even the euro crisis seems not to have been able to stop germany s strengthening economy and employment how did germany with the fourth largest gdp in the world transform itself from the sick man of europe to an economic superstar in less than a decade we present evidence that the specific governance structure of the german labor market institutions allowed them to react flexibly in a time of extraordinary economic circumstances and that this distinctive characteristic of its labor market institutions has been the main reason for germany s economic success over the last decade

trust institutions and the generally speaking question a reply to uslaner in his critical reply on my article uslaner points to several issues amongst others the lack of observations in the principal components analysis and the fundamental relationship between micro and macro trust on the one hand and institutions on the other hand of these two i hold the second one to be most important and i will therefore focus on this issue i will also use this opportunity to position our trust discussion in the broader context of contemporary economic research on culture copyright the author 2008 published by oxford university press on behalf of the cambridge political economy society all rights reserved oxford university press

premiums to employment in larger establishments evidence from peru abstract examination of the employer size wage effect for males in urban peru suggests the following higher wages in larger establishments do not merely compensate for higher worker quality or inferior working conditions size differences in the use of rising wage tenure profiles cannot provide a market clearing explanation for the employer size wage effect unless workers are extremely impatient thus larger employers appear to pay premiums unionization explains none of the premiums and minimum wage compliance explains at best a small fraction shirking based efficiency wage explanations for premiums are implausible because peruvian job security legislation greatly inhibits dismissals in larger establishments explanations meriting further research involve the use of high wages to reduce turnover and to improve productivity enhancing morale

justifying the first order approach to principal agent problems it is of interest to know when the incentive compatibility conditio n in principal agent problems can be replaced by the condition that the agent s expected utility be stationary in effort the mirrlees rogerson conditions do not work if the principal can observe more than one observable statistic also the mirrlees rogerson assumption that the distribution function of output is convex in the agent s action is unsatisfactory even in the context of the basi c model it is too restrictive the paper presents a suite of conditio ns that are applicable to the multistatistic case and replaces the objectionable convex distribution function assumption copyright 1988 by the econometric society

growth efficiency and convergence in china s state and collective industry in china as in the soviet union and eastern europe economic reform initiatives seek to increase productivity by introducing elements of market oriented policies and institutions into an economy formerly dominated by state planning efforts to evaluate the impact of reform of chinese industry have focused on the measurement of productivity change in state enterprises this study expands the prior framework of analysis in several directions our investigation of productivity trends is not limited to state enterprises but includes quantitative comparisons with china s fast growing collective industries which contributed 36 of overall industrial output in 1988 1 unlike previous studies our analysis works with gross rather than net output this permits us to investigate changes in the productivity of intermediate inputs which occupy a large portion of total costs in chinese industry as well as labor and capital to do this we develop a quasi frontier estimation procedure which seems appropriate for comparisons of total factor productivity based on chinese industrial data finally we offer a quantitative perspective on the extent to which reform efforts have moved industrial resource allocation toward patterns expected of a market system the analysis confirms our previous finding based on a restricted framework employing only labor fixed capital and net output that multifactor productivity in state industry has risen substantially during

understanding economic policy reform one of the eventual consequences of the global debt crisis was a wave of market oriented economic reforms this paper discusses the state of our knowledge on the political economy of this process why were inefficient and often unsustainable policies maintained for so long why are so many governments reforming now after decades of adherence to policies of an opposite kind have the reformers internalized the correct lessons from the east asian experience finally are there any helpful rules for reformers to follow in guiding their policies through complicated political terrain

limited liability contracts between principal and agent abstract the optimal strategy of the principal is examined in an environment where there are ex post limitations on the maximum penalty that can be imposed on a riskneutral agent contrary to the case in which such limitations are not imposed it is in the principal s interest to deliberately forego the opportunity to induce socially efficient behavior and to instead design a contract that induces the agent to realize an efficient outcome only in the most productive state of nature and perhaps in certain very unproductive states the properties of the contract are examined in detail

too much investment a problem of asymmetric information this paper shows that under plausible assumptions the inability of lenders to discover all of the relevant characteristics of borrowers results in investment in excess of the socially efficient level raising the rate of interest above the free market level will restore optimality this conflicts with generally held views and is contrasted with the stiglitz weiss model it is shown that the assumptions which yield overinvestment support debt as the equilibrium method of finance however under the stiglitz weiss assumptions used to derive an underinvestment result equity is shown to be the equilibrium method of finance

job design with sequential tasks and outcome externalities revisited we revisit job design with sequential tasks and outcome externalities from a different perspective extending schmitz 2013a when two sequential tasks need to be performed by wealth constrained agents the principal can hire only one agent or two different agents when there exists an outcome externality in terms of the fixed cost and such an externality is not too large if the two tasks are conflicting resp synergistic then it is optimal for the principal to hire two different agents resp only one agent when there exists an outcome externality regarding the marginal cost the opposite result holds

costly monitoring loan contracts and equilibrium credit rationing this paper develops a model with asymmetrically informed agents and costly monitoring of loan contracts where an equilibrium can exhibit credit rationing borrowers are identical ex ante but some receive loans and others do not in contrast to existing credit rationing theories rationing does not occur here due to inflexible prices adverse selection or moral hazard optimizing behaviour produces a standard debt contract in equilibrium the aggregate quantity of loans and equilibrium interest rates respond differently depending on whether there is rationing in equilibrium

wage led growth in the eu15 member states the effects of income distribution on growth investment trade balance and inflation this paper estimates a multi country demand led growth model for eu15 countries a decrease in the share of wages in national income in isolation leads to lower growth in finland france germany greece italy luxembourg netherlands portugal spain sweden and the united kingdom whereas it stimulates growth in austria belgium denmark and ireland however a simultaneous decline in the wage share leads to an overall decline in eu15 gdp hence eu15 as a whole is a wage led economy furthermore austria and ireland also experience negative effects on growth when they decrease their wage share along with their trading partners the results indicate that a decline in the wage share has had significant negative effects on growth in the eu15 countries and supports the case of wage coordination we present different wage led recovery scenarios taking into account further effects of a change in the wage share on prices nominal unit labour costs investment and net exports

moral hazard and adverse selection the question of financial structure this paper looks at the moral hazard and adverse selection problems confronting an entrepreneur offering securities to an uninformed but competitive financial market the adverse selection aspect of the problem is generated by the unobservable entrepreneur s ability to transform effort into value moral hazard arises because the investment decision is made subsequent to financing we consider the joint use of both debt and equity and characterize the equilibrium relation between capital structure and unobservable attributes it is shown that 1 investment and financing are not separable 2 there is an underinvestment problem for better firms and 3 simultaneous use of both debt and equity can resolve this difficulty we also establish a connection between expected terminal firm value and debt promised payment level and between share retention and standard deviation agency problems in corporate finance originated with the influential papers of jensen and meckling 11 myers 17 ross 21 and leland pyle 14 they show that the market imperfections induced by unobservable actions lack of contracting ability and information asymmetry generally lead to second best outcomes in which the distribution of corporate ownership is achieved only at significant cost these costs take the form of excessive perquisite consumption overinvestment underinvestment and incomplete diversification of personal investment portfolios moral hazard and adverse selection comprise two forms in which agency problems may take shape arrow 1 equates these two terms with hidden action and hidden information respectively moral hazard arises when the action undertaken by the agent is unobservable and has a differential value to the agent as compared to the principal adverse selection problems arise when the agent has more information than the principal the resolution of such difficulties has been explored in a number of contexts with both signals and contingent contracting mechanisms these definitions exclude certain agency problems in the delegation literature for which the preference incongruity results from a lack of precommitment rather than some exogenous feature of the model in corporate finance one would thus identify the jensen meckling paper with moral hazard because perquisites enter the insider s objective differently from outsiders while darrough is from columbia university and stoughton is from the university of california irvine the second author s research was partially supported by grant number 410 83 0786 r 1 from the social sciences and humanities research council of canada this paper was presented at the 1984 meetings of the western finance association in vancouver and at the 1985 european finance association meetings in bern we thank kose john and frans tempelaar for their comments at the meetings

a note on the theory and measurement of trust in explaining differences in economic growth this paper takes issue with the trend to attribute differences in economic growth rates to differences in interpersonal trust i discuss the world values survey wvs measure that is used to operationalise trust at the macro level i hypothesise that there is a mismatch between the theoretical argument and the empirical operationalisation of trust instead of measuring trust the wvs measure may instead proxy the well functioning of institutions i provide circumstantial evidence for this thesis by a principal components analysis of trust and institutions and a robustness test of zak and knack s 2001 trust and growth economic journal vol 111 295 321 seminal study on trust and economic growth

collective wage bargaining and the role of institutional stability a cross national comparison of macroeconomic performance since the advent of the economic crisis interest in the efficacy of collective wage bargaining institutions has increased as the labour market was required to bear the burden of economic adjustment and became an important policy field for institutional reform in many countries in this article the role of institutional stability trust and certainty for the efficacy of collective bargaining systems is investigated and their effects on macroeconomic outcomes inflation and unemployment are analysed we argue that stability of the institutional framework of collective bargaining is of major importance for its efficacy as it reduces uncertainty and provides the necessary basis for trust among bargaining actors thus we hypothesise that institutional change and instability are associated with significant transaction costs and have at least temporarily negative effects on economic outcomes the hypotheses are confirmed by an empirical analysis which uses data of 34 industrialised countries from 1965 to 2014

addressing uncertainty in economics and the economy this article explores the way society in general and economists in particular deal with fundamental uncertainty it is argued that uncertainty is interdependent with the evolution of institutions and behaviour including that designed to help society cope with uncertainty whilst some mainstream theory does address uncertainty it employs a much narrower concept than fundamental uncertainty generally in spite of the evident increase in fundamental uncertainty during the crisis most mainstream theory ignores it although ignoring uncertainty can sometimes be a successful coping mechanism it is argued that as a blanket coping mechanism ignoring uncertainty seriously limits the realism of theory and therefore also practice and policy it is concluded that economists should embrace uncertainty by tailoring methodologies and theories to address it this would provide a more fruitful basis for policy aimed at reducing uncertainty in the economy and also reducing our own uncertainty

market reforms technological capabilities and the performance of small enterprises in china this paper shows that the domestic and foreign trade liberalization of the chinese economy since the late 1970s has led to much dynamism among small and medium firms such firms have grown at a rapid pace and have increased their share of value added in the chinese economy at the same time they have recorded gains in total factor productivity however after two decades of decontrol the potential for further growth among small and medium industries is limited unless further liberalization is undertaken and government policies pertaining to the allocation of credit levy of taxes and grants of research and other subsidies are applied in a more even handed fashion

job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered a principal wants two sequential tasks to be performed by wealth constrained agents suppose that there is an outcome externality i e a first stage success can make second stage effort more or less effective if the tasks are conflicting the principal s profit maximizing way to induce high efforts is to hire one agent to perform both tasks so that the prospect to get a larger second stage rent after a first stage success motivates the agent to work hard in the first stage in contrast when there is an effort externality i e first stage effort reduces or increases the probability of a second stage success then the principal prefers to hire two agents whenever the tasks are conflicting

who is afraid of political instability abstract an unstable macroeconomic environment is often regarded as detrimental to economic growth among the sources contributing to such instability much of the blame has been assigned to political issues this paper empirically tests for a causal and negative long run relation between political instability and economic growth but finds no evidence of such a relationship sensitivity analysis indicates that there is a contemporaneous negative relationship but also that in the long run and ignoring institutional factors the group of african countries plays the determining role

europe s hunger games income distribution cost competitiveness and crisis the dominant view both on the mainstream right and on the left holds that the eurozone crisis is a crisis of labour cost competitiveness with trade imbalances and hence foreign indebtedness being driven by divergences in relative unit labour costs rulcs between surplus and deficit countries to re balance eurozone growth the mainstream solution is a deflationary policy of internal devaluation i e cutting the wage share by as much as 30 in the deficit countries the progressive view holds that the surplus countries should adjust by raising their wage shares we argue that both sides of this debate are wrong and unhelpful europe s trade imbalances are determined by domestic and world demand whilst rulc divergences play only a negligible role eurozone growth can only be revived when eurozone demand growth is restored not by lowering wages here and or raising them there the current deflationary adjustment forced on the wage led economies of greece italy portugal and spain is self destructive it is a confidence killer not only deepening the free fall of southern european incomes but also damaging their productive base and productivity growth the outlook is depressing further increases in already high unemployment rates inequality measures and poverty rates inconceivable in prosperous europe just a few years ago and arguably dystopian

public versus private ownership of firms evidence from rural china why are many of china s successful rural enterprises publically owned by local communities using a set of provincial data we find that the share of community public firms township village enterprises or tves relative to private enterprises is higher where the central government s influence is greater the community government s power is stronger and the level of market development is lower we also find that tves help achieve the community government s goals of increasing government revenue rural nonfarm employment and rural income however tves do not increase rural income given the levels of nonfarm employment and local public goods provision indicating possible inefficiency as compared with private enterprises