deposit guarantee evaluation and incentives analysis in a mutual guarantee system abstract this paper analyzes how the deposit guarantee value affects the risk incentives in a mutual guarantee system we liken the guarantee s value to that of a european style contingent claims portfolio the main feature emerging from our model is that a mutual guarantee system would give banks an adverse incentive to increase riskiness to mitigate this incentive we introduce a regulatory provision modelled using a path dependent contingent claim by comparing the mutual guarantee system with a non mutual one we show that the former is less expensive but implies higher adverse incentives for the banks especially for undercapitalized institutions

pension regulation and the market value of pension liabilities a contingent claims analysis using parisian options abstract we analyze the market consistent valuation of pension liabilities in a contingent claim framework whereby a knock out barrier feature is applied to capture early regulatory closure of a pension plan we investigate two cases which we call immediate closure procedure and delayed closure procedure in an immediate closure procedure when the assets value hits the regulatory boundary the pension plan is terminated immediately whereas in a delayed closure procedure a grace period is given to the pension fund for reorganization and recovery before premature closure is executed the framework is then used to construct fair pension deals furthermore we provide rules for deriving the optimal recovery period in pension regulation using utility analysis and interconnect the recovery period to the regulatory liquidation probability

environmental risk and extended liability the case of green technologies abstract we analyze the effect of extending environmental risk to banks we assume that the firm needs external funds to invest in green technology and reduce the risk of environmental damage prevention may affect the distribution of both environmental losses and operating revenues we show that under moral hazard the firm does not always invest less in prevention than the optimal social level we also show that extending liability may improve both the level of prevention and the level of compensation however extended liability always leads to an increased probability of bankruptcy for the firm we also obtain that partial extended liability improves social welfare while full extended liability does not

how good are standard debt contracts stochastic versus nonstochastic monitoring in a costly state verification environment the authors investigate ex ante efficient contracts in an environment in which implementation is costless in this environment standard debt contracts will typically not be optimal optimal contracts may involve defaults even in states in which the borrower is fully able to repay the authors then examine the welfare costs of arbitrarily restricting the set of feasible contracts to standard debt contracts when model parameters are calibrated to realistic values the welfare loss from exogenously imposing this restriction is extremely small thus if implementation costs are actually nontrivial as seems likely standard debt contracts will be very close to optimal copyright 1994 by university of chicago press

the dynamic structure of optimal debt contracts abstract in a two period model of costly state verification the optimal contract is characterized and shown to exist the optimal contract is interpreted as a bond contract the model extends the result of one period models that the verification region must be a left tail interval to a multi period setting conditions are identified for the optimal contract to exhibit features such as call prepayment option coupon payment or sinking fund the optimality of certain bond covenants such as refinancing covenants and dividends covenants is also studied

a model of lending resumption after default lessons from capital markets during the nineteenth century this paper mines the experience of the nineteenth century capital markets to propose an alternative interpretation of international defaults the standard view that sovereign default entails exclusion from markets was often contradicted by reality in some cases lending ceased but in others it continued this paper claims that lenders responses to default stem from the additional knowledge about borrowers that is acquired during default episodes lending is modelled in a costly state verification environment where sovereigns have private information about their investment projects good or bad after default lenders audit projects and interrupt lending only if the project is believed to be a bad one

identifying the elasticity of taxable income we use matched panels from the current population survey along with a grouping instrumental variables estimator to provide new estimates of the elasticity of taxable income our identification strategy exploits the fact that federal and state tax reforms over the past three decades have differentially affected cohorts across states and over time we find that the elasticity is in the range of 0 4 0 55 the implication of our new estimates for tax policy is that the revenue maximising tax rate is nearly 30 percentage points lower than that obtained when we use the typical identification strategy in the literature

toward obtaining a consistent estimate of the elasticity of taxable income using difference in differences abstract the elasticity of taxable income eti is a central parameter for tax policy debates this paper shows that mean reversion prevents most estimators employed in the literature from obtaining consistent estimates of the eti a new method is proposed that will resolve inconsistency due to mean reversion under testable assumptions regarding the degree of serial correlation in the error term using this procedure i estimate an eti of 0 858 which is about twice as large as the estimates found in the most frequently cited paper on this subject 13 the corresponding elasticity of broad income is 0 475

optimal pension insurance design abstract in this paper we analyze how the traditional life and pension contracts with a guaranteed rate of return can be optimized to increase customers welfare given that the contracts have to be priced correctly we use individuals preferences to find the preferred design assuming crra utility we cannot explain the existence of any form of guarantees through numerical solutions we quantify the difference measured in certainty equivalents to the preferred merton solution of direct investments in a fixed proportion of risky and risk free assets the largest welfare loss seems to come from the fact that guarantees are effective by the end of each year not only by the expiry of the contract however the demand for products with guarantees may be explained through behavioral models we use cumulative prospect theory as an example showing that the optimal design is a simple contract with a life time guarantee and no default option

from search to match when loan contracts are too long a model of lending is presented where loans are established in matches between banks lenders and entrepreneurs borrowers who meet in a search process projects turn out randomly a quick payoff or a long term payoff that requires a rollover of the loan the model generates under proper parameter conditions two steady states without or with rollover and rollover is socially inefficient under imperfect information the standard debt contract is privately efficient however it extends the domains of equilibria with socially inefficient rollover the global dynamics displays a continuum of equilibrium paths that each exhibits sudden discontinuities crises in which the mass of outstanding loans is reduced by a quantum amount of terminations crises have a cleansing effect

what are corporate pension liabilities analyses of corporate pension plans often make unstated assumptions about an implicit labor contract an example of the effect of such an assumption is that many mistakenly believe that if a worker s benefits are tied to final salary he is protected against inflation until retirement also the value of a worker s claims is often considered to be independent of the status of the firm s pension fund these implicit contract assumptions are examined and questioned the implications of analyzed pension liabilities in a manner consistent with the analysis of other corporate liabilities are explored

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

assessing tax reforms through the elasticity of reported income an empirical analysis for spain this paper demonstrates the usefulness of the elasticity of reported income to assess tax reforms from the perspectives of tax revenue and well being employing different identification strategies

the elasticity of taxable income with respect to marginal tax rates a critical review this paper critically surveys the large and growing literature estimating the elasticity of taxable income with respect to marginal tax rates using tax return data first we provide a theoretical framework showing under what assumptions this elasticity can be used as a sufficient statistic for efficiency and optimal tax analysis we discuss what other parameters should be estimated when the elasticity is not a sufficient statistic second we discuss conceptually the key issues that arise in the empirical estimation of the elasticity of taxable income using the example of the 1993 top individual income tax rate increase in the united states to illustrate those issues third we provide a critical discussion of selected empirical analyses of the elasticity of taxable income in light of the theoretical and empirical framework we laid out finally we discuss avenues for future research jel h24 h31 j22

the effect of marginal tax rates on taxable income a panel study of the 1986 tax reform act this paper uses a treasury department panel of more than 4 000 taxpayers to estimate the sensitivity of taxable income to changes in tax rates on the basis of a comparison of the tax returns of the same individual taxpayers before and after the 1986 tax reform the analysis emphasizes that the response of taxable income involves much more than a change in the traditional measures of labor supply the evidence shows an elasticity of taxable income with respect to the marginal net of tax rate that is at least one and could be substantially higher the implications for recent tax rate changes are discussed

bank capital regulation in a barrier option framework abstract the barrier options theory of corporate security valuation is applied to the contingent claims of a regulated bank the regulator insurer of a bank owns a down and in call option on the bank assets which can be balanced against the expected coverage cost raising the regulatory barrier critical asset level triggering bank closure leads to a transfer of wealth from stockholders to the insurer and reduces stockholder incentives to increase asset risk empirical tests on a sample of 152 one bank holding companies show that regulatory barriers are priced in the stock market and are inversely related to tier 1 leverage ratios

managers compensation and misreporting a costly state verification approach i introduction the use of stock options in compensation packages as a way of providing the firm management with the right incentives has been quite popular in the 1990s the favor encountered by options started however to decrease in the past few years the decline in the use of option grants in top executives compensation packages occurred mainly as a reaction to the recent accounting scandals which has prompted the design of alternative stock based compensation schemes e g restricted stock grants or indexed options as reported by hall and murphy 2003 the grant date value of options assigned to all employees of an average standard poor s 500 firm measured in millions of 2002 constant us increased from 22 in 1992 to 238 in 2000 and subsequently decreased to 141 in 2002 although percentages varied from year to year the ceos share of the total grant has fallen from about 7 in the mid 1990s to less than 5 in 2000 2002 1 the decline in the use of options for top management is widely confirmed according to a pearl meyer partners study for the new york times stock option grants that accounted for 52 of the pay of the average ceo of a major company in 2002 were down to an estimated 35 in 2003 a recent watson wyatt report states that the value of new stock option awards granted to ceos at large companies fell by nearly 60 between 2001 and 2003 with the average value of new stock option grants declining from us 10 2 million in 2001 to us 4 2 million in 2003 the decline in options has been softened by the sharp increase in restricted stock grants and other long term incentive award values 2 in this paper we aim to reevaluate the role of stock options as an ingredient of top management compensation packages able to align the interests of managers and shareholders avoiding misreporting of the firm value at the same time 3 in a costly state verification csv model with moral hazard we show that incentive compatible contracts inducing both incentive alignment and truthful revelation of the firm value must entail a strictly convex compensation schedule that is a fixed payment wage when the firm value is sufficiently low and a state contingent claim increasing in the firm value otherwise a simple and commonly observed way to achieve a convex compensation scheme is to design a remuneration including a fixed wage and a call option on the firm equity as we will show such remuneration allows on the one hand to preserve top management incentives providing for a compensation increasing in equity value and on the other hand to reduce the verification costs that must be incurred to avoid misreporting as verification is not needed in the region where the remuneration is fixed 4 options are by no means the only way to achieve a convex compensation however many other schemes having otherwise desirable properties over options do not have the convex shape discussed above for instance combining a fixed wage with restricted stock grants defines a compensation linearly increasing in the firm s equity value which does not allow to reduce misreporting verification costs that always have to be sustained in this case using an incentive compatible compensation scheme fixed wage plus call options we characterize the contract offered by the firm under the assumption of a deterministic and perfect audit technology showing that for any given value of the option package the manager should receive the largest possible number of options at the highest strike price allowing shareholders to reduce the expected verification cost furthermore the strike price of the option turns out to be determined by incentive compatibility i e the option value must be such that the manager is induced to exert the desired level of effort while the magnitude of the fixed wage is defined by individual rationality there are three main policy implications of our analysis

mean variance skewness portfolio performance gauging a general shortage function and dual approach this paper proposes a nonparametric efficiency measurement approach for the static portfolio selection problem in mean variance skewness space a shortage function is defined that looks for possible increases in return and skewness and decreases in variance global optimality is guaranteed for the resulting optimal portfolios we also establish a link to a proper indirect mean variance skewness utility function for computational reasons the optimal portfolios resulting from this dual approach are only locally optimal this framework permits to differentiate between portfolio efficiency and allocative efficiency and a convexity efficiency component related to the difference between the primal nonconvex approach and the dual convex approach furthermore in principle information can be retrieved about the revealed risk aversion and prudence of investors an empirical section on a small sample of assets serves as an illustration

the effect of income taxes on household income research on the distribution of income during the 1980s has identified a trend towards increasing inequality which may be the continuation and acceleration of trends spanning several decades this paper explores to what extent behavioral responses to the tax changes during the 1980s may also explain the rising inequality the 1986 tax reform act is used as a natural experiment to explore the roles played by both taxes and a variety of nontax factors our principal finding is that both tax rates and nontax factors appear to have had significant effects on relative income growth during the late 1980s

intertemporal diversification in financial intermediation abstract this paper examines the incentive problem between a bank and depositors or deposit insurer limited liability makes risk shifting lucrative we show how intertemporal diversification of lending decisions i e bank s loan portfolio consists of overlapping long term loans and is thus gradually renewed may solve the incentive problem of risk shifting a new or expanding bank sets a high equity level and acquires depositors confidence subsequently it can allow its equity to depreciate to a permanently lower level depositors can control the bank by monitoring equity and realized credit losses ex post they do not have to monitor bank s lending choices ex ante maturity mismatch illiquidity of long term loans and liquidity of deposits is optimal the analysis can be extended more generally to the borrower lender relationship

institutional and individual investors saving for old age this paper brings together the academic literature on individual and institutional investors in order to understand the nature of difficulties faced by them and set the background for the special issue this introductory article and the papers in the special issue contribute to the debate on how to support individuals in their savings commitments and investment decision making and whether and how institutional investors have fulfilled their role in supporting the development of the funded pension industry there are three main conclusions i individual investors are not ready for the role that has been assigned to them in the pension industry ii institutional investors are a long way short of establishing healthy relational contracts and trustworthy relationships with their clients and iii more effective regulation may be needed

the labor contract and true economic pension liabilities most pension covered workers in the united states are covered solely or primarily by defined benefit plans in these plans workers are typically promised a pension that is proportional to their years of service in the firm and their final wage depending upon how workers pay for it the existence of a pension in the labor contract may play either an important role or no role at all in the worker firm relationship this paper addresses the issue how workers pay for the cumulating pension benefit over their tenure cycle in the firm and derives several economic implications for the worker firm contract while the theory itself has ambiguous implications the data confirm the longstanding presumption that pensions offer strong incentives for the worker to complete the normal tenure cycle in the firm not to quit early but if this intuitive notion is accepted it is shown that a perhaps less intuitive notion is also true firms make workers longterm bondholders in the firm the same flow of worker pension savings that tie workers to the firm are not accounted for in the pension trust fund pension plans are significantly underfunded in a true economic sense this is a peculiar characteristic of the labor contract which raises several unanswered questions the paper also shows that the nature of the pension contract can play an important role in determining the wage service profile and the capitalized value of the firm recent contributions to the literature pose an interesting and unconventional view of pensions one which leads to the conclusion that pensions play a relatively minor role in the worker firm contract the argument has been implicitly made by burt barnow and ronald ehrenberg 1979 and william sharpe 1976 but has recently been stated more directly by jeremy bulow 1982 2 in essence their views rest on a legal interpretation of pension liabilities namely since the firm can legally terminate its pension plan anytime the firm s pension liabilities cannot exceed the present value of the nominal pension promises it would owe workers if the firm terminated the plan immediately if workers believe the firm will exercise its legal right it is intuitively apparent and easy to show that workers will deposit only that amount of compensation into the pension plan that they expect to receive upon immediate termination using this interpretation of pension plan liabilities pensions have no influence on whether the worker leaves or remains in the firm moreover it will be shown that if the pension contract is written in nominal terms reflecting the legal view workers are not bondholders in the firm pension plans are excessively overfunded an alternative view is that the pension plan is an implicit contract between the worker and the firm see for example jack treynor 1977 an implicit contract theory implies that workers anticipating careers with a firm will consider the package of wage and pension benefits they expect to collect over their life cycle it is shown that these expectations lead quite directly to several implications that the pension contract is written in real terms that firms intend to meet their pension promises and that the firm will re u s department of labor s 4521 washington d c 20210 the views expressed in this paper are my own and do not necessarily represent the views of the department of labor the paper has substantially benefited from the comments of pauline ippolito and discussions with jeremy bulow i am also indebted to robert clark gary fields alan gustman olivia mitchell james pesando john turner michael ward and participants at the labor relations workshop at cornell university and the law and economics workshop at the university of chicago for comments see my 1985a book 2 the argument is also implicit in other related papers see for example martin feldstein and randall morck 1982

hourly wage rate and taxable labor income responsiveness to changes in marginal tax rates recently a voluminous literature estimating the taxable income elasticity has emerged as an important field in empirical public economics however to a large extent it is still unknown how the hourly wage rate an important component of taxable income reacts to changes in marginal tax rates in this study we use a rich panel data set and a sequence of tax reforms that took place in sweden during the 1980 s to estimate the elasticity of the hourly wage rate with respect to the net of tax rate while carefully accounting for the endogeneity of marginal tax rates as well as other factors that determine wage rates we do find a statistically significant response both among married men and married women the hourly wage rate elasticity with respect to the net of tax rate is estimated to 0 14 0 16 for males and 0 41 0 57 for females in addition we obtain uncompensated taxable labor income elasticities of around 0 21 for men and 0 96 1 44 for women in contrast to earlier studies we also find significant income effects for males accordingly for males the compensated taxable labor income elasticity is about 4 percentage points higher than the uncompensated one

liquidation under moral hazard optimal debt maturity and loan commitments abstract this paper examines the benefits and limitations of loan commitment financing commitments enable firms to adopt more efficient liquidation policies we demonstrate however that the limitations of commitment financing depend on a number of firm characteristics in some circumstances firms find long term debt to be a superior alternative to commitment financing this provides a possible explanation for why loan commitments are not universally utilized by considering both the benefits as well as the limitations of loan commitment financing we are also able to integrate loan commitment contracts into a model of optimal debt maturity

dynamic portfolio choice with deferred annuities abstract we derive the optimal life cycle portfolio choice and consumption pattern for households facing uncertain labor income risky capital market and mortality risk in addition to stocks and bonds the households have access to deferred annuities deferred payout life annuities are financial contracts providing life long income to the annuitant after a specified period of time conditional on survival we find that deferred annuities play an important role in household portfolios and generate significant welfare gains households with high benefits from state pensions moderate risk aversion and moderate labor income risk purchase deferred annuities from age 40 and gradually increase their portfolio share at retirement deferred annuities account for 78 of total financial wealth households with low state pensions and high labor income risk purchase more annuities and earlier uncertainty with respect to future mortality rates has the same effect i e household hedge against longevity risks using deferred annuities

the elasticity of taxable income during the 1990s new estimates and sensitivity analyses author affiliation seth h giertz sgiertz2 unl edu acknowledgment the author wishes to thank david weiner ed harris bob dennis doug hamilton tom woodward emmanuel saez chris bollinger and three anonymous referees for their comments and assistance 1 introductioneconomists have long recognized that taxation creates economic inefficiency by distorting relative prices often between leisure and all other goods in the economy even a broad based income tax can have substantial efficiency costs so long as leisure remains untaxed harberger 1964 uses this as motivation for comparing the efficiency implications of direct versus indirect taxation in so doing he shows how labor supply elasticities can be used to measure the efficiency implications of income taxation 1 harberger s analysis had a profound influence on public and labor economists spurring increased research into labor supply elasticities which were seen as proxies for the efficiency costs from taxation more than two decades after harberger economists began to emphasize the variety of other margins over which taxes can distort behavior in addition to hours worked these economists noted that these other behavioral responses may too have important implications for efficiency an important building block in the evolution of this literature was set forth by slemrod 1990 who presented a hierarchy of behavioral responses to taxation slemrod divided behavior into three categories based on their responsiveness to taxes his least responsive category real responses includes individuals changing consumption and work patterns and businesses altering investment and production decisions second in order of responsiveness is circumvention which includes both illegally evasion and legally avoidance bypassing the tax system 2 in the case of evasion income is concealed from tax authorities or factors that offset tax liabilities such as expenses and deductions are inflated beyond what is legally permitted in the case of avoidance income is shifted in order to receive more favorable tax treatment diverting income into a tax deferred retirement account is an example of avoidance 3 included in circumvention is the expenditure of time and money necessary to avoid or evade taxation third on the hierarchy and the most responsive is the timing of income receipt which includes pulling the receipt of income into the previous year or pushing it into the next in order to take advantage of more favorable tax treatment while not altering real behavior 4 slemrod further recognizes that the type of behavioral response could have implications for both tax revenue and tax incidence and in some cases efficiency predating slemrod s insights lindsey 1987 produced elasticity estimates for taxable income although what lindsey termed taxable income more closely approximates adjusted gross income agi instead of labor supply 5 lindsey s estimated elasticities were much larger than the labor supply literature would have suggested lindsey emphasized the revenue implications of the elasticity of taxable income eti but not its efficiency implications building on slemrod and lindsey feldstein 1995 produced eti estimates but went much further than lindsey in describing the behaviors that could affect taxable income he argued that many of these behaviors were not captured by labor supply elasticities furthermore feldstein posited that income taxation creates economic inefficiency not only by distorting the relative price between labor and leisure but more broadly by distorting the relative price between goods or activities that are taxed and those that are not taxed since leisure is not the only untaxed activity for example in response to taxes not only work hours but also work effort might change

tax avoidance and the deadweight loss of the income tax traditional analyses of the income tax greatly underestimate deadweight losses by ignoring its effect on forms of compensation and patterns of consumption the full deadweight loss is easily calculated using the compensated elasticity of taxable income to changes in tax rates because leisure excludable income and deductible consumption are a hicksian composite good microeconomic estimates imply a deadweight loss of as much as 30 of revenue or more than ten times harberger s classic 1964 estimate the relative deadweight loss caused by increasing existing tax rates is substantially greater and may exceed 2 per 1 of revenue

partially verifiable information and mechanism design in a principal agent model with adverse selection we study the implementation of social choice functions when the agent s message space is a correspondence which depends on this true characteristic we characterize such correspondence for which the revelation principle is valid returns must not contradict easily observable elements of the taxpayer s lifestyle in this paper we present a model of two person organizations in which these considerations are important we ask whether the restrictions on fallacious statements inherent in the system are sufficient to achieve the goals of the organization we show that the optimal way of eliciting the agent s response may not be to establish incentives for truthtelling in all instances in our model there is one player the agent who observes the state of the economic system another player the principal takes an action based on the information presented to him by the agent this class of models is often referred to as the principal agent problem in the extensive and growing literature on this problem it has always been assumed that the agent could lie to the principal and therefore that he had to be properly motivated to act at least partially in the principal s interest our formal way of modelling the partial verifiability of information is to introduce the restriction that the agent s responses must lie in a set m o that varies with the true state 0 it is assumed that this set always admits the possibility of responding with the true state the way in which the allowable response set varies with the true state is known to the principal in other respects we retain the usual principal agent formalization in particular the principal is the stackelberg leader in this game he can commit himself to choose a collective action as a function of the message transmitted by the agent whether the variation of the message space with the true observation is purely technological or whether it is induced by the severity of potential actions of the principal

tax bases tax rates and the elasticity of reported income abstract tax reforms usually change both tax rates and tax bases using a panel of income tax returns spanning the two major u s tax reforms of the 1980s and a number of smaller tax law changes i find that the elasticity of income reported on personal income tax returns depends on the available deductions this highlights that this key behavioral elasticity is not an immutable parameter but rather that it can be to some extent controlled by policy makers one implication is that base broadening reduces the marginal efficiency cost of taxation the results are very similar for all income categories indicating that the rich are more responsive to tax rates because tax rules that apply to them are different their tax base is narrower the point estimates indicate that the tax reform act of 1986 reduced the marginal cost of collecting a dollar of tax revenue with roughly half of this reduction due to the base broadening and the other half due to the tax rate reduction as a by product the analysis in this paper offers a reconciliation of disparate estimates obtained by previous studies of the tax responsiveness of income

reported gross income and marginal tax rates estimation of the behavioural reactions of spanish taxpayers this article estimates for the spanish personal income tax the elasticity of reported gross income to marginal tax rates the identification of this elasticity has been performed using the reform approved by law 35 2006 which came into force in january 2007 the elasticities obtained suggest the existence of important efficiency costs with significant regional differences the average elasticity estimated for spain as a whole is 0 676 however this elasticity is highly dispersed throughout the spanish administrative regions which indicates the unequal power of distortion of the tax thus households whose principal source of income is salary display an elasticity of 0 337 compared to 0 682 for households whose main income source comes from business or savings lastly a positive correlation is also detected between elasticity and income level an elasticity of 3 6 is reached for taxpayers with an annual gross income exceeding 100 000

pension reversions and worker stockholder wealth transfers this paper examines the relative importance of transfers from workers to shareholders in the firm s decision to terminate their overfunded defined benefit pension plans in contrast to earlier studies i find evidence that firms terminate their pension plans to relieve themselves of implicit promises to workers of future compensation in addition financing and tax considerations influence the reversion decision the results suggest that the 1986 excise tax on asset reversions reduced termination for reversion by 36 percent in 1986

asset allocation dynamics and pension fund performance using a data set on more than 300 u k pension funds asset holdings this article provides a systematic investigation of the performance of managed portfolios across multiple asset classes we find evidence of slow mean reversion in the funds portfolio weights toward a common time varying strategic asset allocation we also find surprisingly little cross sectional variation in the average ex post returns arising from the strategic asset allocation market timing and security selection decisions of the fund managers strategic asset allocation accounts for most of the time series variation in portfolio returns while market timing and asset selection appear to have been far less important copyright 1999 by university of chicago press

the elasticity of taxable income evidence and implications abstract a central tax policy parameter that has recently received much attention but about which there is substantial uncertainty is the overall elasticity of taxable income we provide new estimates of this elasticity which address identification problems with previous work by exploiting a long panel of tax returns to study a series of tax reforms throughout the 1980s this identification strategy also allows us to provide new evidence on both the income effects of tax changes on taxable income and on variation in the elasticity of taxable income by income group we find that the overall elasticity of taxable income is approximately 0 4 the elasticity of real income not including tax preferences is much lower we estimate small income effects of tax changes on reported income implying that the compensated and uncompensated elasticities of taxable income are very similar we estimate that this overall elasticity is primarily due to a very elastic response of taxable income for taxpayers who have incomes above 100 000 per year who have an elasticity of 0 57 while for those with incomes below 100 000 per year the elasticity is less than one third as large moreover high income taxpayers who itemize are particularly responsive to taxation our estimates suggest that optimal tax structures may feature tightly targeted transfers to lower income taxpayers and a flat or even declining marginal rate structure for middle and high income taxpayers