regulatory reform in britain regulatory reform in britain john kay and john vickers major sectors of the british economy are currently undergoing far reaching regulatory reform deregulation removal of barriers to competition and the introduction of new methods of regulation are occurring notably in financial services some of the professions and in utility industries such as telecommunications gas and electricity this paper gives an economic assessment of these developments the authors examine the root causes of market failure that call for regulation externalities monopoly and information problems and the pros and cons of various regulatory responses a broad distinction is drawn between structural regulation the determination of which firms or types of firms can engage in which activities and conduct regulation the control of how firms behave in their chosen activities recent examples of deregulation plus re regulation in britain are seen in part as a shift from structural to conduct regulation the relative merits of the two modes of regulation are complex to assess but it is argued that some recent regulatory reforms are placing undue reliance on conduct regulation as well as assessing individual industries the authors draw general conclusions about the desirability of regulatory solutions that make full use of market forces

a sequential theory of decentralization latin american cases in comparative perspective both advocates and critics of decentralization assume that decentralization invariably increases the power of subnational governments however a closer examination of the consequences of decentralization across countries reveals that the magnitude of such change can range from substantial to insignificant in this article i propose a sequential theory of decentralization that has three main characteristics 1 it defines decentralization as a process 2 it takes into account the territorial interests of bargaining actors and 3 it incorporates policy feedback effects i argue that the sequencing of different types of decentralization fiscal administrative and political is a key determinant of the evolution of intergovernmental balance of power i measure this evolution in the four largest latin american countries and apply the theory to the two extreme cases colombia and argentina i show that contrary to commonly held opinion decentralization does not necessarily increase the power of governors and mayors

partisan preferences and skill formation policies new evidence from turkey and argentina summary following a switch to export oriented industrialization reorganization of production in the automobile industry demanded a new worker profile in developing economies like turkey and argentina yet the process of transforming worker skills unfolded differently across industrial clusters the paper explains this variation by highlighting formal political dynamics at the sub national level it finds that when local politicians have limited fiscal capacities they are compelled to build partisan coalitions to advance industrial reform policies evidence from bursa turkey istanbul turkey and cordoba argentina shows that under these circumstances governors who mobilize partisan loyalties can resolve disputes between business and labor while others who are unable to do so cannot implement the proposed changes

emission taxes and optimal refunding schemes with endogenous market structure the purpose of this paper is to investigate optimal schemes for refunding the emission tax in a free entry market where the production process generates emissions we consider the regulation by a three part tax policy the government sets an emission tax a refunding scheme and an entry license tax in contrast to the case of the two part tax refund policy under no entry we show that even if it is impossible to obtain subsidies from outside the first best outcome is always attained further the government s budget constraint is binding under the optimal schemes our result implies that the tax refund system works effectively in a market with endogenous entry

is bitcoin really untethered this paper investigates whether tether a digital currency pegged to the u s dollar influenced bitcoin and other cryptocurrency prices during the 2017 boom using algorithms to analyze blockchain data we find that purchases with tether are timed following market downturns and result in sizable increases in bitcoin prices the flow is attributable to one entity clusters below round prices induces asymmetric autocorrelations in bitcoin and suggests insufficient tether reserves before month ends rather than demand from cash investors these patterns are most consistent with the supply based hypothesis of unbacked digital money inflating cryptocurrency prices

towards a capability theory of innovating firms implications for management and policy author s teece dj abstract the author 2017 business enterprises lie at the core of ecosystems that drive economic development and growth in market economies yet until recently mainstream economics has mostly treated firms like homogeneous black boxes run by opportunistic managers the field of strategic management has developed a more nuanced approach to the understanding of how firms are created organized and grow how they innovate and compete and how managers manage one of the leading paradigms in the field is the dynamic capabilities framework in this paper contrasts and complementarities are drawn between dynamic capabilities and economic theories of the firm including transaction cost economics and agency theory connections to the cambridge school are highlighted including the duality between keynes s animal spirits and the dynamic capabilities entrepreneurial owner manager leibenstein s x inefficiency is juxtaposed here with d ineffectiveness knowledge based theories of the firm consistent with cambridge conventions emerge intellectual exchange between strategic management and economics is encouraged to help improve the intuition behind models of firms and the economy

long run welfare effect of energy conservation regulation we investigate the long run effect of energy conservation regulation which forces firms to raise energy saving investment above the cost minimizing level if pigovian tax is imposed additional regulation always harms social welfare under perfect competition while it can improve welfare under imperfect competition our result under imperfect competition holds regardless of whether strategies are strategic substitutes or complements in contrast to direct entry regulation

competitive outcomes in product differentiated oligopoly structure firms anticipate the competitive effects of market structure when making their entry and product type decisions the market structure variables used to explain the observed outcomes therefore derive from the related entry and product choice stage of the game as a result it is crucial to allow for correlation between unobserved factors that affect the entry and product type decisions of firms and unobservables in the outcome regressions to correct for the potential bias caused by this correlation an econometric model of equilibrium market structure is employed as a selection equation in a two step estimation procedure the second step outcome regressions are modified to reflect the market structure selection this alternative approach emphasizes the logical relationship among firms entry and product choice behavior market structure and price competition following this introduction i provide some background for the analysis of competitive outcomes in motel oligopolies section iii presents the two step estimation procedure developed to measure the effects of concentration and differentiation on outcomes this procedure is used to analyze the observed outcomes of motels located along interstate highways the data are outlined in section iv in section v i present the estimation results evidence from the analysis of these outcomes help demonstrate why motel firms find differentiation a profitable product choice strategy section vi provides some concluding remarks

endogenous quality differentiation in congested markets firms selling a product with congestion externalities to a heterogeneous population of customers have an incentive to offer differentiated levels of quality in a price competitive market differentiation arises endogenously through the prices chosen by firms in equilibrium firms offer a range of prices which induce an efficiency improving range of quality levels and allow customers to self select their preferred price quality combinations additional results suggest that with many firms in the market the choice of prices dominates the choice of service capacities in determining congestion levels copyright 1991 by blackwell publishing ltd

the impact of tether grants on bitcoin abstract in recent years tether issuances or grants have increased significantly which correlated broadly with a significant rise in bitcoin valuation this paper examines the impact of cryptocurrency issuances on subsequent cryptocurrency returns it is argued that as tether is the undisputed stable coin the minting of new tether acts similarly to monetary expansion in cryptocurrency markets inflating the prices of bitcoin we construct a var model and show contrary to investor expectations tether issuances do not impact subsequent bitcoin returns however they do impact traded volumes we also document an increase in tether trading following a subsequent decrease in bitcoin returns

technological leadership and persistence of monopoly under endogenous entry static versus dynamic analysis abstract we build a dynamic oligopoly model with endogenous entry in which a particular firm leader invests in an innovation process facing the subsequent entry of other firms followers we identify conditions that make it optimal for the leader in the initial oligopoly situation to undertake pre emptive r d investment strategic predation eventually resulting in the elimination of all followers compared to a static model the dynamic one provides new insights into the leader s intertemporal investment choice its optimal decision making and the dynamics of the market structure over time we also contrast the leader s investment decisions with those of the social planner

tariffs versus quotas with strategic investment the relative efficiency of tariffs versus quotas is analyzed in a cournot oligopoly with strategic investment introducing quota licence fees to neutralize the international distributional effect when such licence fees remove quota rents from foreign firms then for the case of constrained entry with a sufficiently large number of firms quotas frequently hold a welfare advantage since tariffs relatively aggravate the inefficiency from overinvestment in the case of free entry and exit however tariffs hold a welfare advantage since there is greater benefit of increasing returns to scale to the economy by avoidance of excessive entry of firms

sutton s sunk costs and market structure price competition advertising and the evolution of concentration sunk costs and market structure price competition advertising and the evolution of concentration the third area is critical for policy this has kept our attention focused on the other two areas not until we understand the causes and consequences of concentrated industry structure can we comment on the relevant welfare economics the positive economics of entry exit and the persistence of dominant firms and oligopolies are thus a core research topic the positive questions are very difficult like many posed by the world and not by logic traditional empirical efforts to distinguish among competing hypotheses have made little progress this is due in no small part to the complexity of the question the two main efficiency defenses of concentrated industry structure are scale economies and firm heterogeneity traditional methods use proxies for barriers to entry that could equally plausibly be proxies for the efficiencies recent theoretical work on entry and entry barriers has been very successful in teaching us about the importance of strategy irreversibility and information but it has not emphasized links to observables the observable differences between a theory predicting nearly efficient outcomes and a related theory predicting harmful barriers to entry can be very subtle to use theory in a direct way it seems we must draw dozens

penny wise dollar foolish buy sell imbalances on and around round numbers this paper provides evidence that stock traders focus on round numbers as cognitive reference points for value using a random sample of more than 100 million stock transactions we find excess buying selling by liquidity demanders at all price points one penny below above round numbers further the size of the buy sell imbalance is monotonic in the roundness of the adjacent round number i e largest adjacent to integers second largest adjacent to half dollars etc conditioning on the price path we find much stronger excess buying selling by liquidity demanders when the ask falls bid rises to reach the integer than when it crosses the integer we discuss and test three explanations for these results finally 24 hour returns also vary by price point and buy sell imbalances are a major determinant of that variation across price points buying selling by liquidity demanders below above round numbers yield losses approaching 1 billion per year this paper was accepted by brad barber teck ho and terrance odean special issue editors

the comparison between ad valorem and specific taxation under imperfect competition abstract this paper compares ad valorem and specific taxation in two models of oligopoly with and without free entry predominantly ad valorem taxation implies a relatively low consumer price high tax revenue and when entry is precluded low profits ad valorem taxation dominates specific taxation from the welfare perspective the set of circumstances under which with free entry specific taxation raises welfare is a strict subset of that in which ad valorem taxation is welfare improving and in both models the maximisation of consumer welfare subject to a binding revenue constraint requires maximum reliance on ad valorem taxation

sunk costs windows of profit opportunities and the dynamics of entry abstract this article adds two elements to a standard model of monopolistic competition first the number of potential entrants is limited in each period and increases only over time second the potential entrants differ with respect to the consumers valuation of the variant they could offer the resulting simple model exhibits a rich dynamic structure covering the product life cycle a path dependent equilibrium and the traditional textbook case of entry the welfare analysis confirms the view that there cannot be too much entry even entry of inefficient firms improves welfare

monopoly and soft budget constraint a benevolent government may decide to subsidize an unprofitable monopoly whose profits do not capture all the social surplus from its production anticipating this the firm may underinvest in order to become unprofitable and extract state subsidies the resulting welfare loss may exceed by many times the deadweight cost of monopoly pricing committing the firm to a price ceiling may soften its budget constraint and thus reduce welfare competition can harden budget constraints in industries in which free entry is socially excessive

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

increasing returns path dependence and the study of politics it is increasingly common for social scientists to describe political processes as path dependent the concept however is often employed without careful elaboration this article conceptualizes path dependence as a social process grounded in a dynamic of increasing returns reviewing recent literature in economics and suggesting extensions to the world of politics the article demonstrates that increasing returns processes are likely to be prevalent and that good analytical foundations exist for exploring their causes and consequences the investigation of increasing returns can provide a more rigorous framework for developing some of the key claims of recent scholarship in historical institutionalism specific patterns of timing and sequence matter a wide range of social outcomes may be possible large consequences may result from relatively small or contingent events particular courses of action once introduced can be almost impossible to reverse and consequently political development is punctuated by critical moments or junctures that shape the basic contours of social life

manipulation in the vix at the settlement time of the vix volatility index volume spikes on sp editorial decision june 19 2017 by editor robin greenwood

welfare losses under cournot competition abstract in a market for a homogeneous good where firms are identical compete in quantities and produce with constant returns the percentage of welfare losses pwl is small with as few as five competitors for a class of demand functions which includes linear and isoelastic cases we study markets with positive fixed costs and asymmetric firms we provide exact formulae of pwl and robust constructions of markets were pwl is close to one in these two cases we show that the market structure that maximizes pwl is either monopoly or dominant firm depending on demand finally we prove that pwl is minimized when all firms are identical a clear indication that the assumption of identical firms biases the estimation of pwl downwards

sectoral shocks learning and aggregate fluctuations we present a model in which sectoral shocks have aggregate consequences the model relies on irreversible investment and imperfect information to slow the adjustment of expanding industries we show that this gradual expansion is sub optimal

privacy and personal data collection with information externalities abstract we provide a theoretical model of privacy in which data collection requires consumers consent and consumers are fully aware of the consequences of such consent nonetheless excessive collection of personal information arises in the monopoly market equilibrium which results in excessive loss of privacy compared to the social optimum the main mechanism for this result is information externalities and users coordination failure in which some users decision to share their personal information may allow the data controller to infer more information about non users we also show that the emergence of data brokerage industry can facilitate the collection and monetization of users personal data even in a fragmented market where no individual website has incentives to do so independently due to scale economies in data analytics we discuss policy implications of our analysis in light of the recent eu general data protection regulation gdpr

school decentralization helping the good get better but leaving the poor behind abstract the decentralization of public services is a major feature of institutional innovation the main argument in support of decentralization is that it brings decisions closer to the people thereby alleviating information asymmetries and improving accountability however decentralization can also degrade service provision in poor communities that lack the ability to voice and defend their preferences in this paper we analyze the average and distributional effects of school decentralization on educational quality in argentina we find that decentralization had an overall positive impact on student test scores the decentralization gains however did not reach the poor thus although bringing decisions closer to the people may help the good get better the already disadvantaged may not receive these benefits

oligopolistic competition and economic welfare a general equilibrium analysis of entry regulation and tax subsidy schemes abstract two contributions to the general equilibrium analysis of an oligopolistic economy with free entry are intended first we generalize the excess entry theorem to the effect that a marginal decrease in the number of oligopolistic firms from the free entry equilibrium level improves economic welfare second we explore the pareto improving tax subsidy schemes in an oligopolistic economy several self financing and pareto improving tax subsidy schemes will be identified in contrast with the preceding analysis by atkinson and stiglitz which focused on the long run incidence of corporate taxation we analyse the short run as well as long run welfare implications of various policies under generalized conditions

tax incidence under oligopoly a comparison of policy approaches abstract this paper presents a methodological approach for the analysis of tax incidence that encompasses familiar forms of taxation in a general and analytically convenient model in oligopolistic industries the performance of a tax depends on the sensitivity of the unit tax rate to changes in industry output output elastic tax schedules are less likely to be over shifted and have superior welfare properties relative to regulatory instruments that are less responsive to the equilibrium market quantity for revenue neutral tax reforms the finding of delipalla and keen 1992 that ad valorem taxes welfare dominate specific taxes under oligopoly is derived as a special case of this general result

fiscal decentralization a political theory with latin american cases theories of fiscal federalism explain the efficiency and other economic gains from decentralization but do not explain its extent and nature in practice the authors develop a political theory of decentralization that focuses on the lines of political accountability between politicians at different levels of government the more accountable central level politicians presidents and legislators are to subnational politicians the greater the extent of decentralization and the more it will conform to the preferences of subnational politicians for example with respect to the degree of the center s discretion the model is tested on five latin american countries that although formally decentralized in fact exhibit wide differences in the distribution of spending and revenue responsibilities the theory also helps explain a number of problems governments have encountered in decentralizing including subnational debt crises and a mismatch between responsibilities and resources

estimation of a model of entry in the airline industry this paper considers the effect of an airline s scale of operation at an airport on the profitability of routes flown out of that airport the empirical methodology uses the entry decisions of airlines as indicators of underlying profitability the results extend the empirical literature on airport presence by providing a new set of estimates of the determinants of city pair profitability these estimates imply that city pair profits increase in airport presence and decrease rapidly in the number of entering firms the literature on empirical models of oligopoly entry is also extended via a focus on the role of differences between firms

excess entry vertical integration and welfare this article provides a systematic analysis of the welfare effects of vertical integration by a monopolist input supplier into a monopolistically competitive downstream industry we give sufficient conditions on consumer preferences that lead to pareto improving vertical integration and demonstrate a close relationship between assumptions on preference for variety excess entry in monopolistically competitive markets and the welfare effects of vertical integration excess entry in downstream markets tends to give rise to pareto improving vertical integration we extend the analysis to vertical oligopoly and access price regulation

the economics of casino taxation in this article a model of the costs of a casino is developed that focuses on the implications for economic welfare of different taxation schemes for casinos the situation being considered is in a country where casinos cater exclusively to foreign tourists the goal of the country is to determine the maximum amount of taxes that can be extracted from the activities of this sector under different systems of taxation when the price of gambling is set by regulation above its competitive level the economic losses created by excessive investment in the sector can be reduced by taxation a turnover tax on the amount gambled can maximize both tax revenue and the economic welfare of the country due to administrative constraints a number of countries rely on the taxation of the casinos fixed assets or a combination of a turnover tax and a tax on fixed costs the model is applied to the situation in north cyprus the annual economic efficiency loss from its poorly designed tax policies on casino gambling is

the new industrial organization and small business the small business sector is an important part of the american economic landscape in both absolute and relative terms despite its absolute growth however the sector accounts for a diminishing share of private sector activity but its importance and changes in importance vary across industrial sectors of the economy drawing on the theoretical and empirical insights developed in recent books by john sutton we suggest that the presence or absence of endogenous strategic behaviors of the larger firms with respect to advertising promotion research and development and other sunk cost expenditures may well play an important role in explaining the differing levels of small business importance both cross sectionally and over time we conclude the paper with suggestions for research directions that could shed further light on these ideas copyright 2001 by kluwer academic publishers

producer opportunism in retailing contracts this paper analyzes the role of ex post producer opportunism on the optimal design of vertical restraints it considers vertical contracts as starting points of ex post renegotiation it shows that the alleged room for franchisor opportunism that seems quite important in franchising contracts can be seen as an insurance device when part of the goal of the contract is to provide a stable payoff to the franchisee this conclusion holds for various opportunistic strategies direct eviction of initial retailers excessive entry of new retailers on the market or resale price maintenance used to encourage voluntary exit of initial retailers

endogenous timing with infinitely many firms abstract a model with constant marginal costs is considered where firms choose first a period for production and then the amount to produce when competing in the market according to the resulting timing decisions multiple equilibria arise allowing for infinitely many industry output configurations encompassing one limit output dominant firm and the cournot equilibrium with free entry as extreme cases at each of these equilibria a firm produces a positive amount only if this firm commits to produce at period one both stackelberg and cournot like outcomes are sustainable as equilibria however when the number of leaders is given production at subsequent periods is always prevented and industry output is sometimes larger than the entry preventing level

speculative profits innovation and growth when technological change affects the prices of tradeable assets innovators can obtain speculative profits by exploiting their inside information as to the occurrence of innovations we propose a tractable model of endogenous growth that formalizes this argument originally due to hirshleifer 1971 we then use the model to assess two claims advanced by hirshleifer namely that speculative profits can generate excessive investment in r d when they add to monopoly rents guaranteed by patent protection or else even in a perfectly competitive economy the analysis confirms the first claim but casts doubts on the second one jel o30 o40

the congressional politics of decentralization the case of chile this article explains why legislators in a centralized polity support decentralizing laws using chile as a case study it assesses two standard explanations for this support party nomination procedures which is disregarded and electoral strategies which is accepted a novel finding is that party ideology is also a predictor of support for decentralization with parties of the right less likely to offer it the author also argues that a legislator with a sub national rather than national background is more likely to back such reforms in an attempt to enhance his or her reputation within the constituency the author tests these and other hypotheses by combining qualitative arguments and regression analysis the latter is performed on an original database of legislator biographical information party electoral performance regional gdp figures and individual legislator support for 46 decentralizing laws approved in chile between 1990 and 2006

competition and relational contracts in the rwanda coffee chain how does competition affect market outcomes when formal contracts are not enforceable and parties resort to relational contracts difficulties with measuring relational contracts and dealing with the endogeneity of competition have frustrated attempts to answer this question we make progress by studying relational contracts between upstream farmers and downstream mills in rwanda s coffee industry first we identify salient dimensions of their relational contracts and measure them through an original survey of mills and farmers second we take advantage of an engineering model for the optimal placement of mills to construct an instrument that isolates geographically determined variation in competition conditional on the suitability for mills placement within the catchment area we find that mills surrounded by more suitable areas i face more competition from other mills ii use fewer relational contracts with farmers and iii exhibit worse performance an additional competing mill also iv reduces the aggregate quantity of coffee supplied to mills by farmers and v makes farmers worse off competition hampers relational contracts directly by increasing farmers temptation to default on the relational contract and indirectly by reducing mill s profits

public monopoly and economic efficiency evidence from the pennsylvania liquor control board s entry decisions we estimate a spatial model of liquor demand to analyze the impact of government controlled retailing on entry patterns in the absence of the pennsylvania liquor control board the state would have roughly 2 5 times the current number of stores higher consumer surplus and lower payments to liquor store employees with just over half the number of stores that would maximize welfare the government system is instead best rationalized as profit maximization with profit sharing government operation mitigates but does not eliminate free entry s bias against rural consumers we find only limited evidence of political influence on entry jel d42 d72 l11 l12 l43 l81

an informational externality in a competitive market abstract consider a new competitive market with unknown demand the market price generated by incumbents conveys information that firms including potential entrants use for future decisions yet the incumbents are not rewarded for their assistance suggesting that an inefficiency can exist it has been argued that greater entry generates more information about a new market and should be subsidized a simple model of partial information and learning is developed finding that an informational externality can exist in competitive markets but there may be excessive entry free entry and a public price conditions for competitive market efficiency are conditions for inefficiency

decentralization and inflation commitment collective action or continuity do political and fiscal decentralization make it easier or harder to control inflation statistical analysis of average annual inflation rates in a panel of 87 countries in the 1970s and 1980s found no clear relationship between decentralization and the level of inflation political decentralization however does appear to reduce change in countries relative inflation rates over time by creating additional veto players federal structure may lock in existing patterns of monetary policy whether inflationary or strict among the mostly developed countries that started with low inflation inflation tended to increase more slowly in federations than in unitary states among the mostly developing countries that started with high inflation inflation tended to increase faster in the federations there is evidence that political decentralization locks in a country s degree of practical central bank independence whether high or low and the relative hardness or softness of budget constraints on subnational governments

final and intermediate goods taxation in an oligopolistic economy with free entry abstract optimal tax rules are analyzed in an oligopolistic economy with free entry the initial market allocation has two types of distortion price is set above marginal cost by the oligopolistic behavior and the advantage of increasing returns to scale is left to be unexploited by excessive entry of oligopolists with production subsidy accompanied by a self financing lump sum franchise tax on oligopolistic firms pareto efficient allocation could be restored without a lump sum tax on oligopolists however the second best optimum requires taxing intermediate inputs used in the oligopolistic industry the optimal intermediate goods taxation follows the production side ramsey rule to encourage the use of intermediate inputs elastic to output level and vice versa

regulation competition and liberalization in many countries throughout the world regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries this essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process while stressing the importance of case specific analyses this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are procompetitive from corresponding anticompetitive liberalization policies

endogenous mergers in endogenous sunk cost industries abstract this paper uses an endogenous coalition formation game to derive an upper bound to industry concentration the proposed coalitional stability concept assumes that firms are endowed with foresight in that they look ahead and anticipate the ultimate outcome of their actions it is shown that while in exogenous sunk cost industries the upper bound to concentration falls as the market becomes large in endogenous sunk cost industries regardless of the size of the market arbitrarily concentrated outcomes can arise in equilibrium in addition for this second class of industries if products are sufficiently good substitutes then duopoly coalition structures can only be sustained in equilibrium if composed of sufficiently size asymmetric coalitions the results therefore complement those of sutton sutton j 1991 sunk costs and market structure cambridge ma mit press sutton j 1998 technology and market structure theory and history cambridge ma mit press

welfare optimal patent royalties when imitation is costly we identify welfare optimal patent royalties in a model of costly imitation entry and imperfect competition when the social planner may impose a compulsory license optimal royalties either blockade imitation facilitating unregulated monopoly or yield an aggregate zero profit efficient duopoly when duopoly is optimal the optimal per unit royalty pins the equilibrium price at the aggregate average cost and the optimal fixed royalty shifts surplus so the patentee and imitator break even efficient duopoly yields higher welfare than monopoly for sufficiently low invention cost and may also yield higher welfare than a prize system interestingly royalty payments may be negative because of this efficient duopoly may not be feasible if the planner must instead direct the courts to use such royalties

the costs of free entry an empirical study of real estate agents in greater boston this paper studies the consequences of xed commissions and low entry barriers in greater boston s real estate brokerage industry from 1998 2007 a period with substantial agent turnover we nd that entry is not associated with increased sales probabilities or reduced sales time instead it decreases the market share of experienced agents and reduces average service quality we develop a dynamic empirical model motivated by these patterns to study the extent of ineciency in the current system compared to alternatives to accommodate a large state space we approximate the value function using sieves and impose the bellman equation as an equilibrium constraint if commissions are cut in half there would be 40 fewer agents implying social savings of 23 of industry revenue and the average agent would facilitate 73 more transactions house price appreciation of 50 during our sample period accounts for a 24 increase in the number of agents and a 31 decline in average agent productivity finally improving information about past agent performance can increase productivity and generate signicant social savings

price and volume effects associated with changes in the s p 500 list new evidence for the existence of price pressures attempts to identify price pressures caused by large transactions may be inconclusive if the transactions convey new information to the market this problem is addressed in an examination of prices and volume surrounding changes in the composition of the s p 500 since these changes cause some investors to adjust their holdings of the affected securities and since it is unlikely that the changes convey information about the future prospects of these securities they provide an excellent opportunity to study price pressures the results are consistent with the price pressure hypothesis immediately after an addition is announced prices increase by more than 3 percent this increase is nearly fully reversed after 2 weeks the efficient market hypothesis emh predicts that security prices reflect all publicly available information therefore one corollary of the emh is that you can sell or buy large blocks of stock at close to the market price as long as you can convince other investors that you have no private information 1 this statement assumes that securities are near perfect substitutes for each other if so the excess demand for a single security will be very elastic and the sale or purchase of a large number of shares will have no impact on price in contrast to the emh scholes 8 kraus and stoll 5 hess and frost 4 and others propose two hypotheses which predict that a large stock sale purchase will cause the price to decrease increase even if no new information is associated with the transaction the imperfect substitutes hypothesis ish also known as the distribution effect hypothesis assumes that securities are not close substitutes for each other and hence that long term demand is less than perfectly elastic under this hypothesis equilibrium prices change when demand curves shift to eliminate excess demand price reversals are not expected because the new price reflects a new equilibrium distribution of security holders the price pressure hypothesis pph assumes that investors who accommodate demand shifts must be compensated for the transaction costs and portfolio risks that they bear when they agree to immediately buy or sell securities which they otherwise would not trade these passive suppliers of liquidity are attracted by immediate price drops rises associated with large sales purchases they are compensated for their liquidity service when prices rise drop to their fullinformation levels the pph like the emh assumes that long run demand is

equilibrium product bundling this article offers an equilibrium theory of product bundling by rival firms in several models where a primary good is produced in a duopoly market and one or more other goods is produced under perfectly competitive conditions bundling is shown to emerge as an equilibrium strategy of one or both of the duopolists for its role as a product differentiation device when the rival firms can commit to bundling sales their profits are higher but social welfare is reduced copyright 1997 by university of chicago press

social efficiency of entry in a vertically related industry we provide a new perspective to the literature on social desirability of entry by showing that if the input supplier has market power social desirability of entry of the final goods producers depends on returns to scale entry in the final goods market can be socially insufficient under constant returns to scale technology but it can be socially excessive under decreasing returns to scale technologies if the cost of entry is low so that the final goods market is sufficiently competitive hence the anti competitive entry regulation policies are more justifiable if the final goods market is characterised by decreasing returns to scale technologies

hubs and high fares dominance and market power in the u s airline industry this article estimates the importance of route and airport dominance in determining the degree of market power exercised by an airline the results indicate that an airline s share of passengers on a route and at the endpoint airports significantly influences its ability to mark up price above cost the high markups of a dominant airline however do not create much of an umbrella effect from which carriers with smaller operations in the same markets can benefit the article suggests a number of possible explanations for this asymmetry

price manipulation in the bitcoin ecosystem abstract to its proponents the cryptocurrency bitcoin offers the potential to disrupt payment systems and traditional currencies it has also been subject to security breaches and wild price fluctuations this paper identifies and analyzes the impact of suspicious trading activity on the mt gox bitcoin currency exchange in which approximately 600 000 bitcoins btc valued at 188 million were fraudulently acquired during both periods the usd btc exchange rate rose by an average of four percent on days when suspicious trades took place compared to a slight decline on days without suspicious activity based on rigorous analysis with extensive robustness checks the paper demonstrates that the suspicious trading activity likely caused the unprecedented spike in the usd btc exchange rate in late 2013 when the rate jumped from around 150 to more than 1 000 in two months

market r d allocations when research paths are product specific a compared to the social optimum individual firms undertook too little rd b too many firms entered the competition to undertake rd2 c if the elasticity of demand were sufficiently low aggregate rd

firm entry excess capacity and endogenous productivity abstract we show that sluggish firm entry causes productivity to vary endogenously in response to technology shocks the endogenous productivity effect is caused by incumbent firms utilizing excess capacity as entry adjusts we develop a nonparametric model of endogenous sunk costs and monopolistic competition to show that imperfect competition and dynamic entry are necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for endogenous productivity fluctuations quantitatively we show the endogenous productivity effect is as large as that from a traditional capital utilization effect

the inefficiency of private adaptation to pollution in the presence of endogenous market structure the paper considers an industry where production costs rise due to pollution but where this effect can be partially off set by investing in adaptation as a private good the focus is not on external effects but industries where economies of scale are introduced from adapting to pollution the structure of the resulting oligopolistic market is endogenous since the level of adaptation is chosen by the firms the analysis of externalities usually disregards defensive or adaptation measures with a few exceptions that point to considerable complications the present debate on adaptation to climate change shows the importance of understanding defensive measures i show that the market failure caused by economies of scale leads to production costs above the social optimum i e to under adapation when pollution increases adaptation only increases if demand is price inelastic otherwise welfare loss from market failure decreases with pollution the total welfare loss is only convex if demand is price inelastic and the influence of pollution on production costs is stronger than the influence of adaptation concave welfare loss has crucial implications for abatement policies

product differentiation search costs and competition in the mutual fund industry a case study of s p 500 index funds we investigate the role that non portfolio fund differentiation and information search frictions play in creating two salient features of the mutual fund industry the large number of funds and the sizeable dispersion in fund fees in a case study we find that despite the financial homogeneity of s p 500 index funds this sector exhibits the fund proliferation and fee dispersion observed in the broader industry we show how extra portfolio mechanisms explain these features these mechanisms also suggest an explanation for the puzzling late 1990s shift in sector assets to more expensive and often newly entered funds an influx of highinformation cost novice investors

presidential address asset price dynamics with slow moving capital i describe asset price dynamics caused by the slow movement of investment capital to trading opportunities the pattern of price responses to supply or demand shocks typically involves a sharp reaction to the shock and a subsequent and more extended reversal the amplitude of the immediate price impact and the pattern of the subsequent recovery can reflect institutional impediments to immediate trade such as search costs for trading counterparties or time to raise capital by intermediaries i discuss special impediments to capital formation during the recent financial crisis that caused asset price distortions which subsided afterward after presenting examples of price reactions to supply shocks in normal market settings i offer a simple illustrative model of price dynamics associated with slow moving capital due to the presence of inattentive investors i address the implications for asset price dynamics of the apparent slow movement of investment capital to trading opportunities the arrival of new capital to an investment opportunity can be delayed by fractions of a second in some markets for example an electronic limit order book market for equities or by months in other markets such as that for catastrophe risk insurance accordingly prices respond to supply or demand shocks with a sharp reaction because of the relatively small subset of capital and thus risk bearing capacity that is immediately available to absorb a shock on short notice such a price impact is substantially reversed over time as additional capital becomes available the amplitude of the immediate price impact and the pattern of the subsequent recovery can reflect many sorts of attention costs to trade as well as institutional impediments to capital movement such as search costs for trading

bias in market r d portfolios abstract based on a simple contest model of product innovation we find that in accordance with conventional wisdom and contrary to much of the previous theoretical literature market competition implies an equilibrium level of risk which is too low from society s standpoint the intuition is that the divergence between private and social marginal benefits from rd and this probability is higher for lower risk projects

competition and regulation in vertically related markets in an industry where naturally monopolistic and competitive activities are vertically related should the natural monopolist be allowed also to operate in the deregulated competitive sector unlike much of the literature on vertical integration this paper assumes that monopoly pricing behaviour is regulated and therefore the effect of vertical integration on the task of regulation is central to the analysis in the model there is both imperfect information and imperfect competition when vertical integration by the monopolist is allowed the regulator s task is made harder insofar as the monopolist has anticompetitive incentives to raise rivals costs on the other hand integration may lead to there being fewer firms in the deregulated sector and hence less duplication of fixed costs the overall welfare comparison between separation and integration is ambiguous as two simple examples illustrate various extensions to the analysis are also considered one of the central questions in debates on regulatory reform is how to organize industries that contain both naturally monopolistic and potentially competitive activities electricity transmission and distribution are characterized by natural monopoly cost conditions but electricity generation is not in the gas industry pipeline services may be naturally monopolistic but supply to larger customers is not in telecommunications natural monopoly is more a feature of local network operations than of long distance operations and is not present in apparatus manufacture and supply or in the provision of value added services in railways while the infrastructure of track and stations is naturally monopolistic the supply of train services might not be policy developments notably those associated with privatization in britain and deregulation in the united states have sometimes led to radical structural reform in these industries at t for decades a vertically integrated monopolist was required under the 1982 settlement of its long running antitrust case against the u s government to divest itself of its local network operations the central electricity generating board cegb in england and wales was restructured both vertically transmission grid activities were separated from generation and horizontally before privatization in 1990 1991 by contrast british telecom was privatized as a vertically integrated dominant firm bt now faces competition from mercury and others especially in the long distance market but its dominance of local network operations might affect competition there and in other areas such as apparatus supply the local network monopoly would of course have to be regulated in any event but its link via ownership to vertically related and potentially competitive activities poses additional regulatory questions many of the efforts of the regulatory body oftel notably in relation to interconnection between bt s and rivals 1 for a general account of the theory and british experience of regulatory reform in the utility industries

do demand curves for stocks slope down since september 1976 stocks newly included into the standard and poor s 500 index have earned a significant positive abnormal return at the announcement of the inclusion this return does not disappear for at least ten days after the inclusion the returns are positively related to measures of buying by index funds consistent with the hypothesis that demand curves for stocks slope down the returns are not related to s p s bond ratings which is inconsistent with a plausible version of the hypothesis that inclusion is a certification of the quality of the stock

stackelberg competition with endogenous entry i characterise endogenous market structures where leaders have a first mover advantage and entry is endogenous leaders are always more aggressive than the followers independently from strategic substitutability or complementarity under quantity competition leaders produce more than any follower and i determine the conditions for entry deterrence high substitutability and non increasing marginal costs under price competition leaders set lower prices than the followers the opposite than with an exogenous number of firms in contests leaders invest more than each follower in all these cases a leadership improves the allocation of resources compared to the nash equilibrium with endogenous entry this article studies endogenous market structures where a firm has a first mover advantage in the sense of stackelberg 1934 on the other firms and entry in the market is endogenous the article characterises the equilibrium of these endo genous market structures and provides welfare analysis for some of the applications these market structures emerge in many sectors which are substantially competitive a fringe of firms is ready to enter whenever there is a profitable opportunity but where some incumbent firms have a competitive advantage over the followers because of technological historical or legal reasons or just because entry was not possible at an earlier stage and choose their strategies before them 1 while symmetric models of strategic interactions have been widely studied in the presence of endogenous entry in a marshallian tradition 2 traditional models with incumbent firms facing a competitive fringe of entrants have been mostly limited to the analysis of markets with homogeneous goods and entry deterrence for instance in the theories of limit pricing and of contestable markets baumol et al 1982 more recently vives 1988 has analysed games with sequential entry of multiple firms but without endogenising the entry process see also anderson and engers 1992 1994

price fixing policy abstract the prohibition against price fixing is competition law s most important and least controversial provision yet there is far less consensus than meets the eye on what constitutes price fixing and prevalent understandings cannot be reconciled with principles of oligopoly theory this article 1 presents a fundamental reconceptualization of our understanding of horizontal agreements 2 develops a systematic analysis of price fixing policy that focuses on its deterrence benefits and chilling costs and 3 compares this direct approach to commentators favored formulations that typically involve some sort of formalistic communications based prohibition by targeting a subset of means rather than the illicit ends conventional formulations tend to impose liability in cases with lower deterrence benefits and greater chilling costs than those reached under a direct approach and to incur greater administrative costs as well

advertising s elusive economic rationale public policy and taxation advertising and its effects have been debated for well over a century in the last fewdecades a generally sceptical view of the benefits of advertising has been overturned by a series ofacademic advances in economics that detail a variety of ways in which advertising may affect theeconomy and society this academic work has however been paralleled by a growing popular andpolitical opposition to advertising and its social effects in this paper the positive economic case foradvertising is challenged by an assessment of the main channels of its influence and by a review ofthe associated empirical findings on its economic and wider impact a policy response of limitingthe tax deductibility of business advertising is explored

games economists play a noncooperative view for some thirty years following world war ii most bright young economists did not go into industrial organization it was not hard to see why this was so the quick big payoffs in economics tend to go to theorists and industrial organization was a subject in which theory was not only unsatisfactory but moribund the promise of the chamberlin robinson revolution of the early 1930s had not been fulfilled and while institutional and verbaltheoretic writings on the subject were sometimes illuminating there was no hard analytic theory formalizing the structure conduct performance paradigm oligopoly in particular showed no signs of analytic tractability today the atmosphere is altogether different the profession is full of young theorists whose principal occupation is industrial organization indeed industrial organization has become the hot topic for microtheorists journals meetings and seminars abound in research on oligopoly and judging by the market this is a booming industry of course the principal reason for the change is the rise of game theory and its applications in these areas von neumann and morgenstern s great work was published in 1944 and hailed immediately by theorists von neumann and morgenstern 1944 jacob marschak indeed stated in reviewing it marschak 1946 p 1 15 ten more such books and the progress of economics is assured nevertheless it was not until the last decade that game theory came to the ascendant as the premier fashionable tool of microtheorists that ascendancy appears fairly complete bright young theorists today tend to think of every problem in game theoretic terms including problems that are easier to deal with in other forms every department feels it needs at least one game theorist or at least one theorist who thinks in game theoretic terms oligopoly theory in particular is totally dominated by the game theoretic approach the field appears to be in an exciting stage of ferment to understand why i believe that such excitement is not warranted it is necessary to step back briefly review the history of oligopoly theory before the game theory revolution and consider what it is that one wants theory to deliver

a tale of two market failures technology and environmental policy abstract market failures associated with environmental pollution interact with market failures associated with the innovation and diffusion of new technologies these combined market failures provide a strong rationale for a portfolio of public policies that foster emissions reduction as well as the development and adoption of environmentally beneficial technology both theory and empirical evidence suggest that the rate and direction of technological advance is influenced by market and regulatory incentives and can be cost effectively harnessed through the use of economic incentive based policy in the presence of weak or nonexistent environmental policies investments in the development and diffusion of new environmentally beneficial technologies are very likely to be less than would be socially desirable positive knowledge and adoption spillovers and information problems can further weaken innovation incentives while environmental technology policy is fraught with difficulties a long term view suggests a strategy of experimenting with policy approaches and systematically evaluating their success

dynamic competition and intellectual property rights in a model of product development we study innovation timing and socially optimal intellectual property rights iprs when firms facing market uncertainty invest strategically in product development if demand growth and volatility are high attrition occurs and iprs should ensure the cost of imitation attains a lower bound we identify if demand growth and volatility are low then provided that the private imitation incentive is socially excessive iprs should set the cost of imitation high enough to induce preemption and possibly winner take all preemption moreover the welfare achieved with optimal iprs is then greater with endogenous innovation than if firm roles are predetermined illustrating the importance of fostering dynamic competition in extensions we show how firms benefit from open standards takeovers have ambiguous welfare effects and simple licensing schemes are welfare improving

unemployment insurance and market structure abstract this paper examines the impact of unemployment insurance ui on employment and unemployment in an industry in which the prices can vary due to some market power some non conventional results are obtained it is shown that if there is free entry and exit average industrial employment may be a decreasing function of the experience rating because the number of firms in the industry is itself a decreasing function of this parameter this contradicts the conventional view which was arrived at using models of a perfectly competitive industry with no entry and according to which employment should be an increasing function of the experience rating the general conclusion is that for industries with different degrees of market power the same ui scheme has different impacts on employment and unemployment

market structure and casino taxation in tourist resorts this article examines the association of tax effects with market structure for casino gaming we show that if market structure is uncompetitive much of casino taxation falls on tourists whose demand is inelastic relative to supply the tax is likely to be efficient under strong external demand if imposed on oligopoly casinos with a monopoly location in a cross border market the likelihood of economically good taxation is greater under oligopoly than under competition but lower than under monopoly casino taxes should be lowered in a more competitive market with weaker external demand our prediction is consistent with the evidence found from casino tourism development in macao with high gambling taxes

trade policy with endogenous entry revisited abstract this paper revisits the effects of tariffs and quotas in a competitive setting where three results are thought to hold these are that quotas are equivalent to specific tariffs the form of tariffs specific or ad valorem does not matter and that the way in which a quota is allocated has no real effects as it only affects the allocation of rents not their size we show that all three of these results are false when entry exit is endogenous equivalence holds only if the initial level of entry is set at the long run level under the quota