optimal pricing of intraday liquidity abstract this paper presents a general equilibrium model where intraday liquidity is needed because the timing of payments is uncertain a necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium to be efficient is that the nominal intraday interest rate be zero even when the overnight rate is strictly positive because a market for liquidity may not achieve efficiency this creates a role for the central bank i allow for the possibility of moral hazard and study policies commonly used by central banks to reduce their exposure to risk i show collateralized lending achieves the efficient allocation while for certain parameters caps cannot prevent moral hazard

optimal monetary policy in a cash in advance economy i introduction this paper addresses the issue of optimal monetary policy within a particular general equilibrium model of the monetary transmission mechanism the model analyzed is a member of the recent class of liquidity models of the monetary business cycle 1 these liquidity models are something of a growth industry partly because they are potentially consistent with a monetary equilibrium in which monetary injections drive down nominal rates of interest and stimulate real activity stylized facts supported by evidence presented in for example christiano and eichenbaum 1992 an unexplored question is the role of monetary policy in these models this paper makes an attempt at remedying this deficiency by analyzing optimal monetary policy in a model with liquidity effects as in the liquidity models mentioned above the model analyzed here is constructed by imposing two trading frictions on an otherwise frictionless arrow debreu environment 2 the first is a requirement that all transactions be carried out in a decentralized fashion with the use of cash this friction is the well known cash in advance constraint first suggested by clower 1967 but now quite commonplace in models of monetary equilibrium as in lucas and stokey 1987 and cooley and hansen 1989 i impose this constraint because it is a tractable way of introducing a transactions demand for cash the qualitative results would be unaffected if a more general transactions technology was employed the second friction is unique to the liquidity models i assume that private agents cannot quickly move cash across markets this assumption of sluggish cash flow presumably motivated by transactions costs that are not explicitly modeled implies that cash may not be equally valued across markets with its value in a particular market determined by the amount of cash or liquidity contained in the market this friction introduces the so called liquidity effects on asset prices and real activity the paper proceeds as follows the next section develops the basic model and discusses the effects created by the assumed trading frictions section iii explores optimal monetary policy the nature of the trading frictions introduces a role for activist monetary policy in particular to the extent that the central bank can adjust liquidity more rapidly than the private sector there is a welfare improving role for monetary policy in some cases interest rate smoothing is a good idea while in others optimal policy will increase interest rate variability section iv links the results to the optimum quantity of money literature and offers up a few conclusions ii a model of monetary non neutrality the economy is populated with three types of agents households firms and financial intermediaries there are numerous identical agents of each type so that all behave as atomistic competitors given this assumption i will confine my discussion to a representative agent of each type the representative household is made up of two members a shopper and a worker the shopper s role is to use the household s assets to acquire consumption goods during each period while the worker supplies some portion of the household s time endowment equal to 1 each period to firms in exchange for payment the household s preferences over uncertain consumption and leisure streams are given by e summation of beta sup t u c sub t v 1 l sub t where t 0 to infinity where beta is an element of 0 1 c sub t and l sub t are time t consumption and work effort respectively v is increasing and concave and mathematical expression omitted the expectation is over realizations of the economy wide shocks the expression s sub t is an element of s subset r denotes the state of the world at time t where s is a compact set these states are i i d across time with a distribution function given by

why small centrist third parties motivate policy divergence by major parties plurality based elections between two major parties or candidates sometimes feature small cen trist third parties we modify the standard two party spatial model of policy seeking parties to incorporate a centrist third party and we show that the presence of such a party even if it has no chance of winning motivates the major parties to propose policies that are much more divergent than without the third party we derive explicit formulas for party locations at a three party equilibrium and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for existence ofthat equilibrium we show that over time the major parties can be expected to shift their policies in the same direction relative to each other but in the opposite direction relative to the minor party the predictions of this model are compared with estimates of party policy locations during appropriate periods in postwar britain for the past half century a small british party first the liberals now the liberal demo crats has occupied a policy position in between the two major british parties labour and the con servatives during much of the same period the free democrats in germany have held a similar posi tion between the social democrats and the christian democrats in addition recent american presidential elections have featured the candidates john anderson in 1980 and ross perot in 1992 and 1996 who had no realistic chance of winning and who were arguably located between the democratic and republican nom inees 1 what are the policy consequences of the existence of such small centrist parties or candidates on what political institutions do these consequences depend do these consequences benefit the policy aspirations of the centrist party or do they undermine these goals under proportional representation it is well known that a small centrist party such as the free democrats in germany may hold the balance of power bargaining with each of the major players as they attempt to form governing coalitions but in a plurality based system as in britain or the united states the consequences are far

an irrational party of rational members the collision of legislators reelection quest with party success in the japan socialist party this study presents a new explanation to a puzzle regarding the reluctance of the japan socialist party jsp to moderate its hard liner marxist platform the author does so by focusing on the pref

value function approximation in the presence of uncertainty and inequality constraints an application to the demand for credit cards abstract we present an algorithm for approximating the solution to discrete time stochastic dynamic programs with inequality constraints the algorithm exploits the state preference approach to choice under uncertainty to reduce the dimensionality of the state space and polynomial approximation to improve computational efficiency it is particularly useful in financial applications involving liquidity and credit constraints and more than one asset the algorithm provides information about the derivatives of the value function and therefore risk aversion along with asset demands

centripetal and centrifugal incentives under different electoral systems inaseminalarticle cox 1990 suggestedthatelectoralsystemswithlargerdistrictmagnitudesprovideincentivesforparties to advocate more extreme policy positions in this article we put this proposition to the test informed by recent advances in spatial models of party competition we introduce a design that embeds the effect of electoral rules in the utility function of voters we then estimate the equilibrium location of parties as the weight voters attach to the expected distribution of seats and votes changes our model predicts that electoral rules affect large and small parties in different ways we find centripetal effects only for parties that are favorably biased by electoral rules by contrast smaller parties see their vote share decline and are pushed toward more extreme equilibrium positions evidence from 13 parliamentary democracies supports model predictions along with testing the incentives provided by electoral rules results carry implications for the strategies of vote maximizing parties and for the role of small parties in multiparty competition

labour markets liquidity and monetary policy regimes dans leur etude les auteurs elaborent un modele d equilibre du mecanisme de transmission de la politique monetaire qui fait ressortir les elements de friction relatifs a l acquisition d information sur le marche de la monnaie et a la recherche d emploi

cash burns an inventory model with a cash credit choice abstract a dynamic cash management model is analysed where agents choose whether to pay with cash or credit at every point in time in the model credit usage depends on the current stock of cash a novel result that matches recent micro evidence on households payment choices the optimality of such a decision rule is novel and cannot be obtained by models where cash credit decisions are made at the beginning of each period we discuss how to use the model to account for cross country evidence on the intensity of credit usage and for several statistics on the size and frequency of cash withdrawals the model is used to assess the household s welfare cost of phasing out cash

the benefits and costs of the section 8 existing housing program abstract the demand side section 8 existing housing program begun in 1975 is currently the second largest low income housing program in the united states with over one million units this paper presents estimates of the benefits and costs of the program and examines its allocative and distributive effects the effects of section 8 existing are compared with those under an alternative program of equal subsidy unrestricted cash grants among other things it is found that the average monthly subsidy of 100 is valued by recipients at 83 on average recipients are induced to consume 11 percent more housing and 6 percent less of other goods than they would with the cash grant recipient households near the eligibility income limits do not receive so large a benefit as to become better off than ineligible households the poorest and largest families receive the largest benefit other things equal however most poorer families are excluded while some richer families participate and equally situated families do not receive the same offer of assistance

do barriers to candidacy reduce political competition evidence from a bachelor s degree requirement for legislators in pakistan in the 2002 election candidates for pakistan s federal legislature had to possess at least a bachelor s degree this policy disqualified 60 out of the 207 incumbent legislators from running for election again using a difference in differences approach with panel data on all electoral constituencies in pakistan i find that this ballot access restriction does not affect political competition across all constituencies with disqualified incumbents equally stronger political competition is defined as a larger number of candidates contesting election a smaller vote share and vote margin for the winning candidate and a less concentrated candidate field as measured by a herfindahl hirschman index hhi of vote shares competition declined significantly in constituencies where the disqualified incumbent belonged to a small party and where literacy levels were lower signifying a smaller pool of substitute candidates however political competition increased in areas where the disqualified incumbent was stronger in terms of his winning vote margin

transfers in cash and in kind theory meets the data we review theoretical explanations for in kind transfers in light of the limited empirical evidence after reviewing the traditional paternalistic arguments we consider explanations based on imperfect information and self targeting we then discuss the large literature on in kind programs as a way of improving the efficiency of the tax system and a range of other possible explanations including the samaritan s dilemma pecuniary effects credit constraints asymmetric information amongst agents and political economy considerations our reading of the evidence suggests that paternalism and interdependent preferences are leading overall explanations for the existence of in kind transfer programs but that some of the other arguments may apply to specific cases political economy considerations must also be part of the story

the efficiency of demand oriented housing programs generalizing from experimental findings typical production oriented housing programs offer potential recipients a highly limited set of previously unattainable commodity bundles from the household s viewpoint such programs have been highly inefficient from society s viewpoint such housing programs are generally horizontally inequitable and inefficient given that housing programs are not likely to be fully cashed out and incorporated into general income maintenance could housing programs be restructured to increase their efficiency this paper examines this question results indicate that demand oriented housing programs are substantially more efficient than are production oriented programs in fact in the aggregate the former programs approach unrestricted cash payments in their transfer efficiency

the price effects of cash versus in kind transfers this article examines the effect of cash versus in kind transfers on local prices both types of transfers increase the demand for normal goods in kind transfers also increase supply in recipient communities which could lead to lower prices than under cash transfers we test and confirm this prediction using a programme in mexico that randomly assigned villages to receive boxes of food trucked into the village equivalently valued cash transfers or no transfers we find that prices are significantly lower under in kind transfers compared to cash transfers relative to the control group in kind transfers cause a 4 fall in prices while cash transfers cause a positive but negligible increase in prices in the more economically developed villages in the sample households purchasing power is only modestly affected by these price effects in the less developed villages the price effects are much larger in magnitude which we show is due to these villages being less tied to the outside economy and having less competition among local suppliers

the distribution of federal grants in aid the increasing importance of pacs relative to state and local political parties this paper examines the role of political influence in the distribution of federal grants in aid to state and local governments grants are assumed to be traded for the political capital of state and local politicians and interest groups as the value of the political capital each group has to offer varies the payoff in the form of grants should likewise vary for the ten year period 1974 83 a period of declining relative importance for state and local political parties and of rising relative importance of pacs it is hypothesized that the return to state and local political party capital would be declining while the return to the political capital of pacs would be constant or increasing the empirical evidence presented offers support for this hypothesis

interest rates and inflation a consensus has emerged among practitioners that the instrument of monetary policy ought to be the short term interest rate that policy should be focused on the control of inflation and that inflation can be reduced by increasing short term interest rates at the center of this consensus is a rejection of the quantity theory such a rejection is a difficult step to take given the mass of evidence linking money growth inflation and interest rates increases in average rates of money growth are associated with equal increases in average inflation rates and interest rates these observations need not rule out a constructive role for the use of short term interest rates as a monetary instrument one possibility is that increasing short term rates in the face of increases in inflation is just an indirect way of reducing money growth sell bonds and take money out of the system another possibility is that while control of monetary aggregates is the key to low long run average inflation rates an interest rate policy can improve the short run behavior of interest rates and prices the shortrun connections among money growth inflation and interest rates are very unreliable so there is much room for improvement these possibilities are surely worth exploring but doing so requires new theory the analysis needed to reconcile interest rate policies with the evidence on which the quantity theory of money is grounded cannot be found in old textbook diagrams

do low income housing subsidies increase the occupied housing stock abstract a necessary condition for justifying a policy such as subsidized low income housing either via tenant based rental assistance or construction of public or private projects is that it has a real effect on market outcomes in this paper we examine one aspect of the real effect of subsidized housing does it increase the housing stock if subsidized housing raises the quantity of occupied housing per capita either more people are finding housing or they are being housed less densely on the other hand if subsidized housing merely crowds out equivalent quality low income housing that otherwise would have been provided by the private sector the housing policy may have little real effect on housing consumption using both census place and msa level data from the decennial census and from the department of housing and urban development we ask whether housing markets with more subsidized housing also have more total housing after accounting for housing demand we find that government financed units raise the total number of units in a market although on average one government subsidized unit adds only one third to one half of a unit to the total housing stock there is less crowd out in more populous markets and more crowd out in places where there is less excess demand for subsidized housing as measured by the number of government financed units per eligible person tenant based housing programs such as section 8 certificates and vouchers seem to be more effective than project based programs at targeting subsidized housing units to people who otherwise would not have their own

cash welfare as a consumption smoothing mechanism for divorced mothers abstract while there has been considerable research on the disincentive effects of cash welfare under the aid to families with dependent children afdc program there is little evidence on the benefits of the program for single mothers and their children one potential benefit of this program is that it provides short run consumption insurance for women at the point that they become single mothers this is only true however to the extent that the program is not crowding out other sources of support such as own savings labor supply or transfers from others i assess the importance of this insurance mechanism by measuring the extent to which afdc smooths the consumption of women who transition to single motherhood through marital dissolution i use longitudinal data on family structure and consumption expenditures on food and housing from the panel study of income dynamics psid matched to information on the welfare benefits available in each state and year over the 1968 1985 period i find that raising potential benefits by one dollar raises the food and housing consumption of women who get divorced and their families by 28 cents this estimate implies that for each dollar of afdc received by this population their consumption of these categories of goods rises by up to 51 cents this is roughly the share of food and housing in the consumption bundle of divorced mothers and their families suggesting little crowdout of other sources of support

interpreting a stochastic monetary growth model as a modified social planner s problem abstract using a stochastic cash in advance growth model similar to that studied by cooley and hansen 1989 it is demonstrated that the competitive monetary equilibrium can be expressed as the solution to a modified social planner s problem hence by employing standard dynamic optimization techniques and the second welfare theorem to the modified social planner s problem the equilibrium of the monetary economy can be studied

electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters i present a model of electoral competition in which candidates raise campaign contributions by choosing policies that benefit interest groups and then expend those contributions to influence voters who are uninformed about the policies informed voters however vote based on those policies so candidates face a trade off between choosing a policy to generate funds to attract the uninformed vote and choosing a policy to attract the informed vote electoral equilibria are characterized for two categories of policies particularistic and collective in the case of particularistic policies the equilibrium policies of the candidates are separated if the proportion of uninformed voters is sufficiently high and the degree of separation is an increasing function of that proportion the model is extended to include the public financing of elections and incumbency advantages for the case of collective policies the candidates locate at the median of the ideal points of the informed voters and contributions are zero

the optimum quantity of money in a stochastic economy individuals in a monetary economy face both economy wide and individualspecific risks friedman s 1969 assertion that the price level should fall at the rate of time preference must be modified when such risks are present bewley s 1983 conjecture that the modified deflation should proceed at a rate greater than the rate of time preference is demonstrated to be true in special cases but false in general moreover the indeterminacy of equilibrium bewley found is eliminated by the inclusion of a transactions demand for money

an economic model of welfare stigma perhaps the most basic assumption of the economic theory of consumer demand is that more is better than less virtually all of the major propositions of consumer theory can in a certain sense be derived from the assumption that goods are good interestingly however this tenet seems to be violated by the behavior of many individuals in the low income population for many turn out to be eligible for a positive welfare benefit but do not in fact join the welfare rolls for example it has been estimated that in 1970 only about 69 percent of the families eligible for afdc aid to families with dependent children participated in the program see richard michel 1980 the corresponding percentage for afdc u the program for which families with an unemployed male are eligible was only 43 percent and the participation rate in the food stamp program was only 38 percent see maurice mcdonald 1977 this phenomenon has puzzled many investigators because such individuals do not locate on the boundaries of their budget sets consequently most investigators ignore the problem when studying the effects of welfare programs on behavior in this paper this seemingly irrational rejection of an increase in income is modeled as resulting from welfare stigma that is from disutility arising from participation in a welfare program per se 1 the existence of stigma has been amply documented in the sociological literature patrick horan and patricia austin 1974 lee rainwater 1979 where interviews of recipients have often uncovered feelings of lack of self respect and negative self characterizations from participation in welfare nevertheless this phenomenon has not been modeled and many questions consequently remain when is the disutility of participation strong enough to prevent participation shouldn t we expect individuals to weigh the disutility of participation against the potential benefit in their decisions what is the elasticity of participation with respect to the potential benefit also in a slightly different vein how are the work disincentives of welfare affected by stigma these questions have been given scant attention by economists yet they are crucial for our ability to predict the impact of various welfare programs on the lowincome population here these questions are addressed by modeling nonparticipation as a utility maximizing decision the model is developed and estimated for the afdc program 2 the model posits an individual utility function containing not just disposable income but

optimal monetary policy what we know and what we don t know in this article i examine the current state of knowledge about optimal monetary policy i distinguish between two literatures basic and applied the basic literature is explicit about the frictions that generate a positive value for money and make it socially beneficial the applied literature is not i describe the recent lessons about monetary policy that we have learned from each literature and discuss how the two distinct approaches may be usefully combined

the effects of housing assistance on labor supply evidence from a voucher lottery this study estimates the effects of means tested housing programs on labor supply using data from a randomized housing voucher wait list lottery in chicago economic theory is ambiguous about the expected sign of any labor supply response we find that among working age able bodied adults housing voucher use reduces labor force participation by around 4 percentage points 6 percent and quarterly earnings by 329 10 percent and increases temporary assistance for needy families program participation by around 2 percentage points 15 percent we find no evidence that the housing specific mechanisms hypothesized to promote work such as neighborhood quality or residential stability are important empirically jel i38 j22 r23 r38

equilibrium strategies for final offer arbitration there is no median convergence final offer arbitration is a procedure for settling disputes between two parties in which an arbitrator chooses the final offer of the party closest to what he considers a fair settlement this procedure is modeled as a two person zero sum game of imperfect information in which the parties are assumed to know the probability distribution of the arbitrator s fair settlements and to make bids in an infinite strategy space that maximize their expected payoffs necessary and sufficient conditions for there to be local and global equilibria in pure strategies are derived and necessary conditions for mixed strategies in a particular case are found such equilibria when they exist in pure strategies represent bids which are symmetric about the median and for most common distributions are separated from one another by two or more standard deviations this finding suggests that final offer arbitration may not accomplish its avowed purpose of inducing the two parties to converge on what they perceive to be t

observational equivalence of the overlapping generations and the cash in advance economies abstract this paper demonstrates that any equilibrium in an overlapping generations economy a la grandmont 1985 can be supported as an equilibrium in a cash in advance economy a la lucas and stokey 1987 and vice versa thus business cycles could occur at real life frequencies

globalization party positions and the median voter the authors argue that the effects of economic globalization on social democratic parties in western europe are conditional on the position of the median voter if the median is far enough to the right such parties will adopt business friendly policies because they are required to win office only when the median is relatively far to the left will globalization constrain social democratic parties forcing them to adopt policies further to the right in order to retain credibility it is on this basis the authors argue that empirical studies are misspecified unless they include an interaction between measures of globalization and the position of the median in addition to presenting formal theoretical arguments the article reports empirical findings from fifteen countries in the period from 1973 to 2002 that support the conclusion that the effects of globalization are indeed contingent on the median the authors find that the effects of globalization are significant for social democratic parties only in circumstances in which the median is relatively far to the left

equilibrium in multicandidate probabilistic spatial voting this paper presents a multicandidate spatial model of probabilistic voting in which voter utility functions contain a random element specific to each candidate the model assumes no abstentions sincere voting and the maximization of expected vote by each candidate we derive a sufficient condition for concavity of the candidate expected vote function with which the existence of equilibrium is related to the degree of voter uncertainty we show that under concavity convergent equilibrium exists at a minimum sum point at which total distances from all voter ideal points are minimized we then discuss the location of convergent equilibrium for various measures of distance in our examples computer analysis indicates that non convergent equilibria are only locally stable and disappear as voter uncertainty increases

targeting with in kind transfers evidence from medicaid home care making a transfer in kind reduces its value to recipients but can improve targeting we develop an approach to quantifying this tradeoff and apply it to home care using randomized experiments by medicaid we find that in kind provision significantly reduces the value of the transfer to recipients while targeting a small fraction of the eligible population that is sicker and has fewer informal caregivers than the average eligible under a wide range of assumptions within a standard model the targeting benefit exceeds the distortion cost this highlights an important cost of recent reforms toward more flexible benefits

the welfare cost of inflation in a cash in advance economy with costly credit the paper presents a modification of the lucas stokey 1983 cash in advance economy in which the representative consumer decides based on relative prices which goods to buy with cash and which with costly credit an explicit baumol 1952 condition emerges that guides this consumer choice deriving and estimating a closed form welfare cost function in an example economy the paper shows that the welfare cost of inflation depends on the margins of substitution the consumer avoids inflation through costly credit and faces higher welfare costs of inflation than in standard cash in advance economies

a model of candidate location when one candidate has a valence advantage that under some fairly weak assumptions for all levels of the valence advantage the advantaged candidate chooses a more moderate position than the disadvantaged candidate empirical studies of congressional elections by fiorina 1973 and ansolabehere snyder and stewart 2001 support this result d owns 1957 seminal work presents a puzzle for scholars of u s elections why do candidates not converge to the median voter one of the best explanations is that the candidates themselves have ideological preferences as calvert 1985 and wittman 1977 1983 have shown when candidates have such preferences and they are sufficiently uncertain about the preferences of the median voter then they do not converge although they may moderate their positions from their ideal point the basic version of the calvert wittman model however does not account for another basic fact of u s elections often one of the candidates has an advantage due to a nonpolicy factor such as incumbency greater campaign funds better name recognition superior charisma superior intelligence and so on stokes has dubbed such factors valence factors and he has noted their importance in u s elections stokes 1963 1992 1 in this article i extend the basic calvert wittman model by giving one candidate a valence advantage over the other i show that if the valence characteristics of the candidates are approximately equal then when a candidate s valence advantage increases this causes her to move toward the

money and output a test of reverse causation this paper attempts to explain the correlation between money and output at various leads and lags with a model in which money is largely neutral and endogenously responds to output money is endogenous because both monetary policy and deposit creation are endogenous parameters are selected according to the simulated moments estimation technique while the estimated model succeeds along some dimensions in matching properties of postwar u s data its failure to match key patterns of lead lag correlations seems to cast doubt on the ability of endogenous money determination by itself to quantitatively account for the observed money output correlations copyright 1996 by american economic association

monetary growth innovations in a simple cash in advance asset pricing model abstract this paper contributes to the existing literature in the rational expectations cash in advance asset pricing general equilibrium model in two directions first we show that by allowing a variable velocity of circulation an increase in the conditional variance of the money growth process triggers an increase in the demand for money relative to stocks and bonds with a consequent reduction in stock and bond prices which is the opposite of the current result in the literature with constant unitary velocity second we explicitly show how the sequential markets and specific timing of information fits exactly into the notion of irreversibility in the sense that when faced with uncertainty agents might find optimal to delay decisions in order to wait for the arrival of new information

optimal random monetary policy with nominal rigidity abstract this paper studies a money in the utility function model with imperfect competition and one period ahead nominal price setting under standard assumptions on preferences friedman s rule setting the money growth rate equal to the household time discount factor generates an equilibrium that is optimal within the class of deterministic policies we then provide conditions under which a random monetary policy increases ex ante expected welfare relative to friedman s rule the result obtains because random policy can reduce the distortion associated with imperfect competition our result exhibits original features relative to existing cases of welfare improving random monetary policy such as polemarchakis and weiss j econom theory 15 1977 345

does money explain asset returns theory and empirical analysis a cash in advance model of a monetary economy is used to derive a money based capm m capm which allows us to implement tests of asset pricing restrictions without consumption data a test as in fama and macbeth of the model suggests that the money betas have some explanatory power for the cross sectional variation of expected returns however the model is rejected using conditional information consistent with our predictions estimates of the curvature parameter are lower than those of the consumption capm c capm and pricing errors of the m capm tend to be smaller than those of the c capm while the relation between asset prices and real macroeconomic variables such as aggregate consumption has been extensively investigated less attention has been devoted to the relation between monetary aggregates and asset prices that arises from models which incorporate a monetary sector it is often argued that one possible reason for the rejection of the consumption oriented capm c capm is the absence of monetary considerations this paper takes a step towards encompassing money into the c capm and proposes a moneybased capm m capm that can be tested without using consumption data this m capm is interesting in the way it captures the time series and crosssectional variation in stock returns and it provides insights in the possible misspecification of existing c capm models the setup is based on the cash in advance model of lucas and stokey 1987 in which some consumption goods are financed with outside money i e cash and some are financed with inside money e g bank deposits the pricing results of this paper differ from those of other monetary models such as those considered by finn hoffman and schlagenauf 1990 or singleton 1985 which focus on the role of outside money in affecting the marginal utility of consumption instead we concentrate on inside money in asset pricing the focus on inside money is appealing because inside money reflects conditions in

money and interest in a cash in advance economy the authors analyze an aggregative general equilibrium model in which the use of money is motivated by a cash in advance constraint applied to purchases of a subset of consumption goods the system is subject to both real and monetary shocks which are economy wide and observed by all they develop methods for verifying the existence of characterizing and explicitly calculating equilibria copyright 1987 by the econometric society

the impact of housing assistance on child outcomes evidence from a randomized housing lottery one long standing motivation for low income housing programs is the possibility that housing affordability and housing conditions generate externalities including on children s behavior and long term life outcomes we take advantage of a randomized housing voucher lottery in chicago in 1997 to examine the longterm impact of housing assistance on a wide variety of child outcomes including schooling health and criminal involvement in contrast to most prior work focusing on families in public housing we focus on families living in unsubsidized private housing at baseline for whom voucher receipt generates large changes in both housing and nonhousing consumption we find that the receipt of housing assistance has little if any impact on neighborhood or school quality or on a wide

electoral rule disproportionality and platform polarization despite common perception existing theoretical literature lacks a complete for mal argument regarding the relationship between the electoral rule disproportionality and platform polarization in this paper we build a model that incorporates the disproportionality of the electoral system in a standard downsian electoral competition setup with mainly but not necessarily purely policy motivated parties we first show that in equilibrium platform polarization is decreasing in the level of the electoral rule disproportionality we then argue that the number of parties has a positive effect on platform polarization when polarization is measured by the distance between the two most distant platforms this effect does not hold when polarization is measured by the widely used dalton index constructing a dataset covering more than 300 elections our main theoretical findings are empirically supported pointing towards the electoral rule disproportionality as a major determinant of polarization

the return of the liquidity effect a study of the short run relation between money growth and interest rates in this article i use band pass filters to investigate the short run relationship between money growth and interest rates i find a negative correlation between short run movements in money growth and interest rates which i interpret as evidence that the liquidity effect dominates the anticipated inflation effect

theory and estimation in the economics of housing demand the main purpose of this paper is to review recent theoretical and empirical developments in the economics of housing demand in particular we ask what is known concerning the permanent income elasticity of housing demand vis a vis the current or measured income elasticity what is known concerning price elasticities what is the appropriate functional form for housing demand equations what is the role of demographic variables what is known concerning dynamic aspects of housing demand what appear to be the major sources of bias in existing estimates of demand equations

on optimal taxation of housing abstract this paper studies the question of optimal taxation of housing when the set of tax instruments at the government s disposal is not artificially restricted there are two groups of persons who differ in earning abilities and in tastes and two types of housing goods high and low quality the paper characterizes the pareto efficient allocations that are attainable through the tax policy it demonstrates that optimality calls for differential tax treatment of housing and that the required tax rates are nonlinear it derives conditions under which consumption of housing by the poor must be subsidized it also notes the circumstances under which taxation rather than subsidization is the required policy

nominal rigidity and monetary uncertainty in a small open economy temporary nominal rigidity is introduced into a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of a small open economy the foreign country is also modelled and is the closed economy counterpart of the domestic country we examine whether a small open economy is more vulnerable than a closed economy to uncertainty over its monetary policy a signal of an increase in future variability which was not previously foreseen as a risk by agents is shown to weaken the current exchange rate and boost current output in the small open economy in the equivalent closed economy it has no effect on current variables

classifying monetary economics fields and methods from past to future we propose a simple yet sufficiently encompassing classification scheme of monetary economics it comprises three fundamental fields and six recent areas that expand within and across these fields the elements of our scheme are not found together and in their mutual relationships in earlier studies of the relevant literature neither is this an attempt to produce a relatively complete systematization our intention in taking stock is not finality or exhaustiveness we rather suggest a viewpoint and a possible ordering of the accumulating knowledge our hope is to stimulate an improved understanding of the evolving nature and internal consistency of monetary economics at large

the dynamics of inflation with constant deficit under expected regime change a model that describes the dynamics of inflation with a fully anticipated stabilization program is developed it is shown that with a constant deficit an economy tends to stay at the neighborhood of the lower of the two state inflation rates that are compatible with the deficit further increasing inflation rates prior to the stabilization are compatible only with deficits that are lower than the maximal feasible staedy state deficits and with a stabilization program that reduces the demand for real balances if these conditions are not met inflation decreases towards the stabilization date it is argued that the data generated by actual inflationary episodes fit the conditions described above and corroborate the model this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

perils of unconventional monetary policy abstract unconventional monetary policy by relaxing restrictions on the composition of the balance sheet of the central bank compromises control over the stochastic path of inflation or in open economies over the stochastic path of exchange rates if the composition of the balance sheet is unrestricted then the path of inflation is indeterminate this is the case under pure quantitative easing where the target is the size of real money balances in contrast credit easing policies restrict the composition of the portfolio by targeting a specific expansion in the maturity profile of bonds bought and thus can implement a determinate path of inflation the composition of the portfolios traded by monetary fiscal authorities also determines premia in asset and currency markets

interest rate rules vs money growth rules a welfare comparison in a cash in advance economy abstract this paper considers the welfare consequences of two particularly simple rules for monetary policy an interest rate peg and a money growth peg the model economy consists of a real side that is the standard real business cycle model and a monetary side that amounts to imposing cash in advance constraints on certain market transactions the paper also considers the effect of assuming a rigidity in the typical household s cash savings choice the competitive equilibrium of the economy is not pareto efficient partly because of two distortions a distortion on the capital accumulation decision and a distortion on portfolio choice that arises from the assumed rigidity the principal result of the paper is that the interest rate rule but not the money growth rule entirely eliminates these two distortions and is thus the benevolent central banker s policy choice

interest rates in a credit constrained economy when households face credit constraints in an economy with inside as well as outside money stationary equilibrium real interest rates are below the household rate of time preference they also depend significantly upon household risk aversion the demand for inside versus outside money bank costs bank reserves inflation and the marginal productivity of capital and capital depreciation rates in addition changes in financial variables affect per capita capital and output to a greater extent when households are credit constrained copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

a positive theory of foreign currency debt abstract this paper makes a case for foreign currency debt as a hedging device in an open economy subject to stochastic shocks to output a government can reduce uncertainty in wealth and in consumption by issuing foreign or domestic currency debt if unexpected domestic and foreign inflation are negatively correlated with domestic output foreign currency debt is desirable in comparison to domestic currency debt if growth rates of output of both countries are closely related and if domestic inflation is relatively uncertain it has an additional advantage if domestic debt creates time consistency problems