an aggregate consumption function for canada a cointegration approach this study utilizes cointegration theory and error correction models ecms to specify a candidate dynamiac formulation of the aggregate consumption function using quarterly canadian date the variables entering the long run equlibrium relationship are tested for unit roots using a variety of techniques such as the dickey fuller the augemented dickey fuller and the phillips perron test profedures the engle and granger cointegration test and the fully modified consistent and efficient estimator of phillips and hansen are used to estimate the cointegration relationship johansen s maximum likelihood approach is also used to determine the rank of the cointegrating matrix the error correction model which appears to be a tentatively adequate conditional characterization of the date generating process revelas that disposable income wealth government expenditures relative prices and liquidity constraints proxied by the unemployment rate are important variables non nested tests are carried out against

proper risk aversion on introduit et on etudie une condition comportementale significative sur les fonctions d utilite pour les richesses qui signifie qu une loterie indesirable ne peut jamais etre rendue desirable par la presence d une loterie indesirable independante

correlates of narrow bracketing we examine whether different phenomena of narrow bracketing can be traced back to some common characteristic and whether and how different phenomena are related we find that making dominated lottery choices or ignoring the endowment when making risky choices are related phenomena and are both associated with low levels of cognitive reflection in contrast the phenomena of setting narrow goals or narrow mental budgets seem not to reflect choice errors due to low cognitive reflection but are tools to overcome self control problems buying small scale insurance is associated with having narrow mental budgets suggesting that people buy such insurance to insure themselves against the consequences of their own self control strategy

a new method of estimating risk aversion i show existing evidence on labor supply behavior places an upper bound on risk aversion in the expected utility model i derive a formula for the coefficient of relative risk aversion in terms of the ratio of the income elasticity of labor supply to wage elasticity and degree of complementarity between consumption and labor i bound the degree of complementarity using data on consumption choices when labor supply varies across states using labor supply elasticity estimates i find a mean estimate of 1 then show generating 2 requires that wage increases cause sharper labor supply reductions jel d81 j22

what is the economic cost of the investment home bias overinvesting domestically is well known as an investment home bias ihb we define an economic home bias ehb whereby the ihb measures the investment weights and the ehb measures the economic cost induced by the ihb we may have a large ihb and a negligible ehb with the increase in the average correlation between foreign markets from 0 4 for the decade ending in 1988 to about 0 9 for more recent decades the u s ehb is becoming negligible despite the domestic investment of 77 5 since 2009 the correlations have decreased indicating that the hb puzzle is emerging once again

non insurance markets loss size manipulation and competition experimental evidence the common view that buyer power of insurers may effectively counteract provider market power critically rests on the idea that consumers and insurers have a joint interest in extracting price concessions however in markets where the buyer is an insurer the interests of insurers and consumers to reduce prices may be importantly misaligned the positive dependence between loss size and the insurer s expected profits limits the insurer s incentives to reign in loss sizes in markets with small initial loss sizes insurers may try to raise these in order to create demand for insurance after having defined insurance and non insurance markets based on the initial loss size we develop theory to show that insurers with buyer power have incentives to create insurance markets insurer competition will push their profits to zero but markets do not return to the initial non insurance state this constitutes a welfare loss we design experimental insurance markets to test our theory and find support monopolistic insurer subjects in non insurance markets increase loss sizes to establish insurance markets insurer competition eliminates profits but not the loss size to uninsured consumers this provides an additional reason to be careful in granting insurers buyer power jel classification c92 d81 g22 i11 l13

robustness of bidder preferences among auction institutions i introduction the answer to the question of how bidders choose to enter one auction versus an alternative competing auction is important to understand in providing a complete picture of the nature of endogenous entry decisions into auctions the issue of how a bidder chooses which among alternative auctions to enter as well as whether to enter an auction at all is of substantial importance to auctioneers attempting to attract bidders to their auctions there is a growing literature addressing issues in endogenous entry in auctions there are several papers such as engelbrecht wiggans 1993 pevnitskaya 2004 and palfrey and pevnitskaya 2008 that consider the decision of whether to enter an auction or not and study the effect of endogenous entry on bidding behavior there is a much larger group for example harstad 1990 engelbrecht wiggans 1993 levin and smith 1994 mcafee 1993 and mcafee and mcmillan 1987 that considers competition between auctioneers in which the auctioneers are competing along some characteristic such as entry price we consider the case in which auctioneers may be competing with each other based on the choice of auction mechanism our interest is in the degree to which the auction mechanism itself might impact the entry decisions of potential bidders of course there would be a direct pecuniary impact of the mechanism in that bidders should be more likely to enter auction mechanisms that they believe allow them to get lower prices but there may be other cognitive issues in regard to the structure of the mechanism that may also impact the choice behavior in ivanova stenzel and salmon iss 2004a we introduced an experimental design aimed at eliciting and measuring preferences subjects might possess for different auction institutions and applied the design to testing bidder preferences between ascending a dynamic mechanism and sealed bid first price a static mechanism auctions it seems reasonable to expect bidders to have preferences between these two auction mechanisms due to the strategic differences between them in a first price auction the winner pays a price equal to his own bid whereas in the ascending auction he pays a price that is an increment above the second highest bid these differences might result in difficulty of deciding how to bid and in the possibility of experiencing some form of regret 1 the design involved having subjects make a choice between entering into a two bidder sealed bid first price auction versus a two bidder ascending auction each with different entry prices by varying the entry prices we could measure the subjects willingness to pay for either auction our main finding in the paper was that while subjects exhibited strong preferences for the ascending auction at equal entry prices they were not willing to pay up to the expected profit difference between the two auctions to participate in an ascending auction thus they ended up entering the supposedly less preferred sealed bid first price auction even in situations in which they would expect to make a higher net surplus including the cost of the entry fee by entering into the ascending auction instead that paper proposed one possible answer to the puzzle that involved assuming that bidders were risk averse in their bidding behavior and then risk averse to the same degree in their auction choice behavior this explanation worked because neither risk averse nor approximately risk neutral bidders should be expected to pay much to enter into an ascending auction instead of a sealed bid first price auction just as we observed in the experiment for the most risk averse bidders this is because while they bid the highest in the first price auction and therefore expected little surplus in the event that they win they consequently end up winning with higher probability than less risk averse bidders this is a trade off risk a verse bidders are willing to accept and consequently it is easy to show that highly risk averse bidders should not be willing to pay much to get into the more lucrative though risky ascending auction

loss aversion and the demand for index insurance abstract this work analyzes if reference dependence and loss aversion can explain the puzzling low adoption rates of rainfall index insurance we present a model that predicts the impact of loss aversion on index insurance demand to vary with different levels of insurance understanding index insurance demand of farmers who are unaware of the loss hedging benefit that insurance provides decreases with loss aversion in contrast insurance demand of farmers who are aware of the loss hedging benefit increases with loss aversion the model further predicts that farmers who are unaware of the loss hedging benefit will not demand an even highly subsidized index insurance using data from a randomized controlled trial involving a sample of indian farmers we provide empirical support for our core conjecture that insurance understanding mitigates the negative impact of loss aversion on index insurance adoption

first order risk aversion and the equity premium puzzle abstract this paper integrates yaari s dual theory of choice under uncertainty into a multiperiod context and examines its implications for the equity premium puzzle an important property of these preferences is that of first order risk aversion which implies in our model that the risk premium for a small gamble is proportional to the standard deviation rather than the variance since the standard deviation of the growth rate in aggregate consumption is considerably larger than its variance the model can generate both a small risk free rate and a moderate equity premium

the assessment of large compounds of independent gambles the paper gives necessary and sufficient conditions for an expected utility maximizing decision maker to prefer any compound ni 1xi of n independent identically distributed random variables over any other such compound ni 1 i with e i exi provided that n is sufficiently large a sufficient condition is that absolute risk aversion go to zero as the decision maker s wealth becomes unboundedly positive or negative the analysis is applied to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the desirability of max expected log policies in multiperiod choice problems with a distant time horizon journal of economic literature classification numbers d81 g11 g21 g22

the small sample bias of the gini coefficient results and implications for empirical research the gini coefficient is a downward biased measure of inequality in small populations when income is generated by one of three common distributions the paper discusses the sources of bias and argues that this property is far more general this has implications for i the comparison of inequality among subsamples some of which may be small and ii the use of the gini in measuring firm size inequality in markets with a small number of firms the small sample bias has often led to misperceptions about trends in industry concentration a small sample adjustment results in a reduced bias which can no longer be signed this remaining bias rises with the dispersion and falls with increasing skewness of the distribution finally an empirical example illustrates the importance of using the adjusted gini in this example it is shown that controlling for market characteristics larger shipping cartels include a set of firms that is stochastically identical in terms of relative size to those of smaller shipp

loss aversion in a consumption savings model abstract we propose a model of consumption and saving based on kahneman and tversky s prospect theory that implies a fundamental asymmetry in consumption behavior inconsistent with other models of consumption when there is sufficient income uncertainty a person resists lowering consumption in response to bad news about future income this resistance is greater than the resistance to increasing consumption in response to good news we present empirical evidence from five countries that confirms this behavior

individual preferences monetary gambles and stock market participation a case for narrow framing we argue that narrow framing whereby an agent who is offered a new gamble evaluates that gamble in isolation may be a more important feature of decision making than previously realized our starting point is the evidence that people are often averse to a small independent gamble even when the gamble is actuarially favorable we find that a surprisingly wide range of utility functions including many nonexpected utility specifications have trouble explaining this evidence but that this difficulty can be overcome by allowing for narrow framing our analysis makes predictions as to what kinds of preferences can most easily address the stock market participation puzzle

timid choices and bold forecasts decision makers have a strong tendency to consider problems as unique they isolate the current choice from future opportunities and neglect the statistics of the past in evaluating current plans

risk aversion and expected utility theory a calibration theorem within the expected utility framework the only explanation for risk aversion is that the utility function for wealth is concave a person has lower marginal utility for additional wealth when she is wealthy than when she is poor this paper provides a theorem showing that expected utility theory is an utterly implausible explanation for appreciable risk aversion over modest stakes within expected utility theory for any concave utility function even very little risk aversion over modest stakes implies an absurd degree of risk aversion over large stakes illustrative calibrations are provided

hierarchical maximum likelihood parameter estimation for cumulative prospect theory improving the reliability of individual risk parameter estimates an individual s tolerance of risk can be quantified by using decision models with tuned parameters that maximally fit a set of risky choices the individual has made a goal of this model fitting procedure is to identify parameters that correspond to stable underlying risk preferences these preferences can be modeled as an individual difference indicating a particular decision maker s tastes and willingness to accept risk using hierarchical statistical methods we show significant improvements in the reliability of individual risk preference parameter estimates over other common methods for cumulative prospect theory this hierarchical procedure uses population level information in addition to an individual s choices to break ties or near ties in the fit quality for sets of possible risk preference parameters by breaking these statistical ties in a sensible way researchers can avoid overfitting choice data and thus more resiliently measure individual differences in people s risk preferences thi

assessing farmers risk preferences and their determinants in a marginal upland area of vietnam a comparison of multiple elicitation techniques we examine the consistency of risk preference measures based on eight hypothetical elicitation methods and a lottery game applied to smallholder farmers in a marginal upland environment in vietnam using these measures we identify influencing factors of risk aversion via regression analysis whereby unlike previous studies we include several proxies of social capital such as social networks and norms data were collected from household heads and spouses separately in a random sample of 300 households although correlations between most of the various risk preference measures are all statistically highly significant most are weak on average respondents have a high degree of risk aversion and specific characteristics gender age idiosyncratic shocks education social norms network reliance with extended family and connections to local authorities are significant determinants of risk preferences across most elicitation methods whereas others the household s dependency ratio wealth and covariate shocks are significant in a few methods only the explanatory power of the models is limited indicating that other factors are likely to be of greater importance in determining risk preferences the results can help target safety nets encourage investments and lead to the development of more applicable methods for assessing risk preferences of smallholders in developing countries

the value of time ten studies are used to document that time is valued in accordance with a double kinked value function there is a zone of indifference for small time gains losses increasing marginal utility disutility for moderate time gains losses and diminishing marginal utility disutility for large time gains losses moderate amounts of time exhibit increasing marginal utility disutility because larger blocks of time provide a more diverse set of usage opportunities it is only when it is difficult to imagine how more less time would be beneficial detrimental that there is diminishing marginal utility disutility for time thus time valuation shows increasing marginal utility when there is a time deficit but diminishing marginal utility when there is a time surplus these findings have implications for how other resources might be valued

risk preferences and expected utility evidence from labor supply data i introduction why do some people enjoy bungee jumping while others do not why do some individuals hold extensive insurance portfolios it is intuitive to attribute these differences between people to their individual preferences for risk a concept that is appealing but hard to quantify arrow 1965 and pratt s 1964 coefficient of relative risk aversion rra has been the standard risk measure since the mid 1960s it relies on expected utility theory eut and the fact that the utility function is concave over wealth although eut is still widely used in economics theorists are increasingly unsatisfied with its performance this is true when applied specifically to risk aversion as well for example rabin 2000 provides a calibration argument that shows that if an expected utility maximizer is not essentially risk neutral over a modest stakes gamble he will be unrealistically risk averse over a large risk gamble he concludes that aversion to modest stakes risk has nothing to do with the diminishing marginal utility of wealth 1282 a frequent argument for continuing to use eut despite failures of its axioms is that it adequately explains behavior an empirical measure of risk aversion that explains behavior is very desirable as risk preference plays an important role in many decisions of interest to economists using a labor supply regression and information on each individual s income and hours of work i compute a measure of risk aversion gamma sub ls that is the curvature of utility over wealth and compare this measure of risk aversion to one based on the individual s willingness to accept gambles over lifetime income go both should measure an individual s preferences for large scale risk while it has been well established that an individual s risk preferences with respect to both large and small scale risk cannot be adequately explained by eut comparing gamma sub g and gamma sub ls affords an opportunity to see how eut performs over gambles of the same scale if eut is a good predictive model for behavior under uncertainty individuals who have a very concave utility function as measured by gamma sub ls should be less willing to gamble with lifetime income than those with smaller values of gamma sub ls i find no correlation between the two measures implying that eut does not explain the variation in risk preferences as measured by a hypothetical gambling frame many economists have questioned whether hypothetical choices are a good proxy for actual decisions in the context of risk and perhaps the discrepancy in the two measures stems from this from a preliminary look at how these measures vary with actual risky choices it appears that the measure of the curvature of utility over wealth does a better job of explaining actual risky choices such as smoking and binge drinking and the hypothetical gambling frame does a better job explaining people s responses to other hypothetical risky situations this is of interest for theorists who are trying to find the new direction for choices under uncertainty but also for empiricists who wish to use risk preferences to explain decision making and behavior ii measuring risk aversion with labor supply data aside from concerns as to the validity of eut risk aversion can be difficult to measure as it requires specific information on an individual s utility function chetty 2006 uses the fact that rra is directly related to the ratio of the income and compensated wage elasticities of labor supply and presents a formula that allows for the estimation of the coefficient of rra using labor supply data recall that rra is proportional to u sub cc u sub c where u sub c is the first partial derivative of the utility function with respect to consumption and u sub cc is the second derivative an agent s compensated wage elasticity is directly related to u sub c the larger the marginal utility of consumption the more benefit the agent gets from an additional dollar of income so the more willing he is to work when his wage increases

consistency of risk premium measures this research uses the results of a series of within sample experiments to elicit risk premium measures from agricultural producers results show that there is little consistency between measures in different contexts and using different elicitation methods suggesting that underlying risk preferences are not consistent these results highlight some of the difficulty with expected utility theory and risk measurement

prospect theory in a dynamic game theory and evidence from online pay per bid auctions abundant evidence exists that expected utility theory does not adequately describe decision making under risk although prospect theory is a popular alternative it is rarely applied in strategic situations in which risk arises through individual interactions this study fills this research gap by incorporating prospect theory preferences into a dynamic game theoretic model using a large field data set from multiple online pay per bid auction sites the authors empirically show that their proposed model with prospect theory preferences makes a better out of sample prediction than a corresponding expected utility model prospect theory also provides a unified explanation for two behavioral anomalies average auctioneer revenues above current retail prices and the sunk cost fallacy the empirical results indicate that bidders are loss averse and overweight small probabilities such that the expected revenue of the auction exceeds the current retail price by 25 46 the authors illustrate and empirically confirm a managerial implication for how an auctioneer can increase revenue by changing the details of the auction design

the motivating uncertainty effect uncertainty increases resource investment in the process of reward pursuit can a reward of an uncertain magnitude be more motivating than a reward of a certain magnitude this research documents the motivating uncertainty effect and specifies when this effect occurs people invest more effort time and money to qualify for an uncertain reward e g a 50 chance at 2 and a 50 chance at 1 than a certain reward of a higher expected value e g a 100 chance at 2 this effect arises only when people focus on the process of pursuing a reward not when they focus on the outcome the reward itself when the focus is on the process of reward pursuit uncertainty generates positive experience such as excitement and hence increases motivation four studies involving real rewards lend support to the motivating uncertainty effect this research carries theoretical implications for research on risk preference and motivation and practical implications for how to devise cost efficient consumer incentive systems

cognitive imprecision and small stakes risk aversion observed choices between risky lotteries are difficult to reconcile with expected utility maximization both because subjects appear to be too risk averse with regard to small gambles for this to be explained by diminishing marginal utility of wealth as stressed by rabin 2000 and because subjects responses involve a random element we propose a unified explanation for both anomalies similar to the explanation given for related phenomena in the case of perceptual judgments they result from judgments based on imprecise and noisy mental representations of the decision situation in this model risk aversion results from a sort of perceptual bias but one that represents an optimal decision rule given the limitations of the mental representation of the situation we propose a quantitative model of the noisy mental representation of simple lotteries based on other evidence regarding numerical cognition and test its ability to explain the choice frequencies that we observe in a laboratory experiment

are risk preferences stable across contexts evidence from insurance data using a unique dataset we test whether households deductible choices in auto and home insurance reflect stable risk preferences our test relies on a structural model that assumes households are objective expected utility maximizers and claims are generated by household coverage specific poisson processes we find that the hypothesis of stable risk preferences is rejected by the data our analysis suggests that many households exhibit greater risk aversion in their home deductible choices than their auto deductible choices our results are robust to several alternative modeling assumptions jel d11 d83

optimal choice and beliefs with ex ante savoring and ex post disappointment we propose a new decision criterion under risk in which individuals extract both utility from anticipatory feelings ex ante and disutility from disappointment ex post the decision maker chooses his degree of optimism given that more optimism raises both the utility of ex ante feelings and the risk of disappointment ex post we characterize the optimal beliefs and the preferences under risk generated by this mental process and apply this criterion to a simple portfolio choice insurance problem we show that these preferences are compatible with first degree and second degree stochastic dominance and yield a preference for early resolution of uncertainty furthermore they are consistent with observed violations of the independence axiom such as the preference reversal in the allais paradox and predict that the decision maker takes on less risk compared to an expected utility maximizer our decision criterion can thus help explain the equity premium puzzle and the preference for low deductibles in insurance contracts

time to change what to sow risk preferences and technology adoption decisions of cotton farmers in china this paper examines the role of individual risk attitudes in the decision to adopt a new form of agricultural biotechnology in china i conducted a survey and a field experiment to elicit the risk preferences of chinese farmers who faced the decision of whether to adopt genetically modified bt cotton a decade ago in my analysis i expand the measurement of risk preferences beyond expected utility theory to incorporate prospect theory i find that farmers who are more risk averse or more loss averse adopt bt cotton later farmers who overweight small probabilities adopt bt cotton earlier

choice under uncertainty problems solved and unsolved ffifteen years ago the theory of choice under uncertainty could be considered one of the success stories of economic analysis it rested on solid axiomatic foundations it had seen important breakthroughs in the analytics of risk risk aversion and their applications to economic issues and it stood ready to provide the theoretical underpinnings for the newly emerging information revolution in economics 1 today choice under uncertainty is a field in flux the standard theory is being challenged on several grounds from both within and outside economics the nature of these challenges and of our profession s responses to them is the topic of this paper

an index of loss aversion to a considerable extent risk aversion as it is commonly observed is caused by loss aversion several indexes of loss aversion have been proposed in the literature the one proposed in this paper leads to a clear decomposition of risk attitude into three distinct components basic utility probability weighting and loss aversion the index is independent of the unit of payment the main theorem shows how the indexes of different decision makers can be compared through observed choices

contingent portfolio programming for the management of risky projects methods for selecting a research and development r d project portfolio have attracted considerable interest among practitioners and academics this notwithstanding the industrial uptake of these methods has remained limited partly because of the difficulties of capturing relevant concerns in r d portfolio management motivated by these difficulties we develop contingent portfolio programming cpp which extends earlier approaches in that it i uses states of nature to capture exogenous uncertainties ii models resources through dynamic state variables and iii provides guidance for the selection of an optimal project portfolio that is compatible with the decision maker s risk attitude although cpp is presented here in the context of r d project portfolios it is applicable to a variety of investment problems where the dynamics and interactions of investment opportunities must be accounted for

loss aversion under prospect theory a parameter free measurement agrowing body of qualitative evidence shows that loss aversion a phenomenon formalized in prospect theory can explain a variety of field and experimental data quantifications of loss aversion are however hindered by the absence of a general preference based method to elicit the utility for gains and losses simultaneously this paper proposes such a method and uses it to measure loss aversion in an experimental study without making any parametric assumptions thus it is the first to obtain a parameter free elicitation of prospect theory s utility function on the whole domain our method also provides an efficient way to elicit utility midpoints which are important in axiomatizations of utility several definitions of loss aversion have been put forward in the literature according to most definitions we find strong evidence of loss aversion at both the aggregate and the individual level the degree of loss aversion varies with the definition used which underlines the need for a commonly accepted definition of loss aversion