winners and losers in housing markets this paper is a quantitatively oriented theoretical study into the interaction between housing prices aggregate production and household behaviour over a lifetime we develop a life cycle model of a production economy in which land and capital are used to build residential and commercial structures we find that in an economy where the share of land in the value of structures is large housing prices react more to an exogenous change in expected productivity or the world interest rate causing large redistribution effects between net buyers and net sellers of houses changing the financing constraint however has limited effects on housing prices

the second best core an economy with a single output and input is considered for the case of economies of scale in production equilibria are studied for a cooperative game of joint production in which goods are allocated by a price system the paper proposes a second best core in which allocations that are feasible for a coalition must be attainable by a price system existence is examined and properties of second best core allocations are analyzed copyright 1989 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

a theory of retail pricing until recently the retail enterprise the shop has been comparatively neglected by economic theorists partly because they assigned little role to retailing the growth of interest in the problem in recent years reflects the development of models of imperfect information and the revival of interest in location theory pricing theory for the retail enterprise however remains a neglected area after surveying existing models of retailing the paper concentrates on the idea that the shop saves its customers costs by assembling goods in one place this introduces an essential non convexity and importantly affects the conditions under which shops compete with each other and the constraints on their price setting under the admittedly unrealistic assumption of full buyer information a theory of retail pricing is developed retail prices are frequently regarded as exceptions both to the law of costs and generally to every rational process of price formation which is all the more remarkable since these prices are the only ones which are of direct interest to the consumer and which are directly influenced by consumption knut wickselt

can entry or exit event studies inform horizontal merger analysis evidence from grocery retailing this study estimates how prices change following the entry and exit of grocery retailers we estimate the effects of entry exit by comparing affected markets to a set of unaffected markets using both a difference in difference estimator and a synthetic control estimator we find that entry typically results in reduced prices more surprisingly we find that exit is frequently associated with falling prices our estimated effects of entry on grocery prices are similar in magnitude to estimates of merger price effects in the supermarket industry this finding suggests that entry event studies may be a useful tool for horizontal merger analysis jel l11 l4 l81

the ramsey problem for congestible facilities abstract in recent years a new set of models drawing on vickrey 1969 has been developed to analyze the economics of congestible facilities these models are structural in that they derive the cost function from consumers time of use decisions and the congestion technology standard models in contrast simply assume the general form of the cost function we apply the new approach to analyze the ramsey problem for a congestible facility and show that the solution generally entails cost inefficiency standard models have failed to reveal this result because they treat the cost function as completely determined by technology

price dispersion and loss leader pricing evidence from the online book industry in this paper we develop a theoretical model to analyze the pricing strategies of competing retailers with asymmetric cross selling capabilities when product demand changes our results suggest that retailers with better opportunities for cross selling have higher incentives to adopt loss leader pricing on high demand products than retailers with low cross selling capabilities as a result price dispersion of a product across retailers rises when its demand increases the predictions of our model are consistent with the empirical evidence from the online book retailing industry using product breadth as a proxy for cross selling capability we find that retailers with high cross selling capabilities reduce prices on best sellers more aggressively than retailers with low cross selling capabilities as a result price dispersion increases when a book makes it to the best seller list and the increase is mainly driven by the difference in pricing behavior between retailers with different cross selling capabilities our empirical results are robust against a number of alternative explanations

the welfare effects of different pricing schemes for electricity distribution in finland the main components of electricity prices can be divided into the wholesale price the price of network operations and taxes even if the wholesale price is determined efficiently total welfare can be significantly disturbed if network operations are priced inefficiently in this study we calculate network prices based on four alternative methods these are marginal cost pricing ramsey pricing fdc pricing and optimal two part tariffs the welfare effects on the prevailing pricing system are compared we show that potentially significant improvements in welfare can be achieved by using marginal cost prices or optimal two part tariffs also ramsey pricing indicates that prevailing prices are inefficient

the measurement of retail output and the retail revolution the computerization of retailing has made price dispersion a norm in the united states so that any given list price or transactions price is an increasingly imperfect measure of a product s resource cost as a consequence measuring the real output of retailers has become increasingly difficult food retailing is used as a case study to examine data problems in retail productivity measurement crude direct measures of grocery store output suggest that the cpi for food at home may have been overstated by 1 4 percentage points annually from 1978 to 1996 this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

learning in expectation formation with applications to cattle and beef exports the paper briefly considers problems associated with rational expectations and formulates a more general model which allows for situations where economic agents do not immediately arrive at a fully rational solution it incorporates a learning mechanism whereby agents can provisionally adopt hypothetically derived expectations as a basis for comparison with the actual outturns utilizing the resultant past expectational errors as indicators of the likelihood of prospective future outcomes agents make explicit allowance a rational solution thus in situations where complete information is not freely available rationality would be approximated over time by means of a dynamic learning process which is founded on a firm empirical approach this essential empiricism requires that the problem be examined on the basis of direct observation of applied situations therefore the method is implemented and analysed with reference to irish foreign trade in fat cattle carcase and processed beef simultaneous equati

neighborhood externality risk and the homeownership status of properties in contrast to corporate and institutional investors single owner occupiers cannot adequately diversify housing investment risk consequently homeownership should be relatively less likely in places with higher housing investment risk using the american housing survey it is documented that neighborhood externality risk a major component of housing investment risk substantially reduces the probability that a housing unit is owner occupied even when controlling for housing type and numerous location and household specific characteristics the effects are quantitatively meaningful and change in change estimates suggest that the effects are causal

income distribution and housing prices an assignment model approach we present a framework for studying the relation between the distributions of income and house prices that is based on an assignment model where households are heterogeneous by incomes and houses by quality each household owns one house and wishes to live in one house thus everyone is potentially both a buyer and a seller in equilibrium the distribution of prices depends on both distributions in a tractable but nontrivial manner we show how the impact of increased income inequality on house prices depends on the shapes of the distributions and can be inferred from data in our empirical application we find that increased income inequality between 1998 and 2007 had a negative impact on average house prices in 6 us metropolitan areas jel d31 r21

international portfolio nondiversification and exchange rate variability abstract incomplete international portfolio diversification is implied by an equilibrium models of exchange rates with nontraded goods the model can also explain the greater correlation between consumption and income within a country than between consumption across countries nontraded goods make more stringent the elasticity conditions required to explain exchange rate variability resulting from current productivity disturbances though not from disturbances to fiscal policies or the prospective return to investment the model is also consistent with international real interest rate differentials changes over time in the current account and relative wealth across nations and observed time series properties of exchange rates

optimum tariffs for vertically differentiated products with an application to indian tea exports optimum export tariffs are typically related to the elasticity of demand for exports in homogeneous goods markets in this paper we set up a simple model for large exporters of quality differentiated products and estimate optimum tariffs based on the quality of the good restrictions on demand parameters implied by the theoretical model are used in estimating demands for different qualities of indian tea exports we use the estimated model to find optimum tariffs for two qualities of indian tea exports and find that optimum export tariffs for high quality teas should on average be 14 higher than the tariff on low quality tea exports

urban decline and durable housing urban decline is not the mirror image of growth and durable housing is the primary reason the nature of decline is so different this paper presents a model of urban decline with durable housing and verifies these implications of the model 1 city growth rates are skewed so that cities grow more quickly than they decline 2 urban decline is highly persistent 3 positive shocks increase population more than they increase housing prices 4 negative shocks decrease housing prices more than they decrease population 5 if housing prices are below construction costs then the city declines and 6 the combination of cheap housing and weak labor demand attracts individuals with low levels of human capital to declining cities

price discrimination by a many product firm determining the optimal selling strategy for a multiproduct firm facing consumers with unknown tastes is a difficult task this paper aims to show how almost optimal nonlinear tariffs can often be found when the number of products becomes large

unplanned purchases and retail competition i propose a framework in which consumers have biased beliefs about their future purchase probabilities leading them to make unplanned purchases us ing this framework i examine the phenomenon of below cost pricing and the welfare eects of banning it when the market is covered a ban on below cost pricing raises social surplus although consumers need not gain they are only guaranteed to ben et if the market is perfectly competitive when the market is not covered a ban always hurts at least some consumers also there is a pro competitive justica tion for the observation that larger rms sometimes charge below cost on the core product lines of smaller rms consumer bias is crucial for this justication multi product retailers sometimes sell certain products beneath cost with the hope of at tracting additional customers who will also buy other higher margin items this practice often referred to as loss leading is controversial with below cost pricing having been banned in a number of countries including belgium germany france and ireland and in approximately half of all us states 1 many us cities also have such prohibitions in this article i examine the welfare consequences of prohibitions on below cost pricing in a market where multi product retailers compete for boundedly rational consumers who practice one stop shopping that is visit at most one store when rivals are symmetric and the market is covered so that all consumers shop a ban on loss leading raises social surplus but when the market is not covered a ban presents a social welfare tradeo fewer consumers choose to shop although those who do generate higher levels of social surplus perhaps surprisingly for those consumers who shop both before and after a ban a ban is guaranteed to make them better o if the market is perfectly competitive but otherwise may harm them taken together these results indicate that it is simplistic to argue that by limiting the scope of competition below cost pricing bans must hurt consumers and society but i also assess below cost pricing laws in the presence of asymmetric competition as when a large rm with a full product line competes against a small rm with a limited product

two part tariffs as regulatory constraints abstract this paper introduces a regulatory two part monopoly pricing mechanism with desirable properties assuming that firm managers are informed about cost and demand functions no detailed prior information of the regulator about the regulated firm and its environment is required also subsequent observations of the regulator are restricted to verifiable bookkeeping data nevertheless the pricing formula is simple and easily interpreted the firm may freely choose the variable price of the two part tariff as long as the fixed part obeys a constraint the firm will then in every period receive an approximation to the welfare change caused by its price changes over the last period contrary to most other suggestions for incentive pricing the current approach requires no government subsidies

multiproduct pricing made simple we study pricing by multiproduct firms in the context of unregulated monopoly regulated monopoly and cournot oligopoly using the concept of consumer surplus as a function of quantities rather than prices we present simple formulas for optimal prices and show that cournot equilibrium exists and corresponds to a ramsey optimum we then present a tractable class of demand systems that involve a generalized form of homothetic preferences as well as standard homothetic preferences this class includes linear and logit demand within the class profit maximizing quantities are proportional to efficient quantities we discuss cost passthrough including cases where optimal prices do not depend on other products costs finally we discuss optimal monopoly regulation when the firm has private information about its vector of marginal costs and show that if the probability distribution over costs satisfies an independence property then optimal regulation leaves relative price decisions to the firm

in store spending dynamics how budgets invert relative spending patterns the authors conduct four controlled lab experiments and one field study in a brick and mortar grocery store to demonstrate that relative spending the price of the purchased item relative to the mean price of the product category evolves nonlinearly and distinctly for budget and nonbudget shoppers while the relative spending of budget shoppers evolves in a concave manner the relative spending of nonbudget shoppers evolves inversely in a convex manner thus budget nonbudget shoppers spend relatively more less in the middle than at the beginning and toward the end of their shopping trip mediation analyses confirm that the pain of paying experienced while shopping drives price salience which then drives relative spending moreover manipulating shoppers pain of paying by altering the opportunity costs associated with their spending or drawing shoppers attention to their spending via real time spending feedback is shown to influence these spending patterns the research offers theoretical contributions to the in store decision making budgeting and pain of paying literature and has important implications for marketing and promotion strategies in retail and mobile technology environments as it suggests when a shopper may be more sensitive to price related factors

the welfare effects of distribution regulations in oecd countries i introduction the distribution sector plays a crucial and large role in most economies 1 in the g 7 united states japan germany france united kingdom italy and canada distribution s share of gross domestic product gdp ranges from 8 to 15 and its share in employment ranges from 11 to 19 pilat 1997 table 2 1 because almost all goods in an economy pass through this sector distribution can heavily influence prices for consumer goods in particular these price effects can be large in organisation for economic cooperation and development oecd countries consumer prices for final goods exceed the corresponding producer prices by 40 and more in addition to indeed because of its economic importance distribution producers enjoy substantial political clout and have won many favorable regulations from the political process see kalirajan 2000 and pilat 1997 these regulations may impose large welfare costs and may exert a large influence on trade flows nonetheless relatively few publications rigorously analyze the potential overall welfare and trade effects of deregulating distribution this study seeks to fill some of that void i first provide a brief overview of distribution regulations then i present new internationally comparable distribution margins data for a sample of eight oecd countries these data are used to infer the extent to which distribution regulations reduce efficiency for four of these countries i conduct an applied general equilibrium age analysis of the welfare effects of high margins and find that they impose large costs rivaling those of protection it appears that efforts to increase economic welfare should not ignore the potentially large gains from liberalizing distribution this article also examines the relationship between restricted distribution and imports ii distribution regulations several studies have described a variety of distribution regulations in oecd countries nicoletti 2001 boylaud 2000 kalirajan 2000 and pilat 1997 provide excellent overviews these studies imply that despite some liberalization many impediments remain the most burdensome regulations include restrictions on large stores onerous business set up rules restrictive zoning laws and other real estate regulations limits on product ranges store hours and pricing and monopoly distributors for certain products such as pharmaceuticals liquor and tobacco in addition many local regulations work under the radar of studies such as these the limited literature on the subject implies that distribution regulations reduce welfare pellegrini 2000 estimates that deregulating retail trade would increase italian gdp by more than 1 japan s economic planning agency 1996 finds that loosening restrictions on large retailers has increased japanese gdp by 1 pilat 1997 cites a european commission study that finds that liberalizing store hours has greatly increased consumer welfare carree and nijkamps 2001 find efficiency gains after entry barrier removal in the netherlands nicoletti 2001 concludes both simulation and econometric studies point unequivocally to potentially large welfare gains from the liberalization of retail trade also burda 2000 and studies cited in nicoletti 2001 find that employment would increase not decrease with liberalization these studies provide valuable information but none simulate the effect of a country s total package of distribution regulations on welfare i do so by exploiting age modeling which takes account of links among industries and nations to produce broad brushed estimates of inflated margins effects in multiple countries distribution s widespread influence on an economy makes an age approach especially important 2 iii measuring margins the underlying data the distribution margins data grow out of protection data developed in bradford 1998 2003

direct test of the rational expectation hypothesis in this paper we examine the possibility of testing the rational expectation hypothesis from simultaneous observations of some variables y and of their expectation y the test procedures are related to the sort of data available generally obtained from tendency surveys we distinguish between qualitative and quantitative data we define in each case the notion of rational expectation then it is possible to characterize the rational expectation hypothesis and to develop adapted test procedures

the regulation of multiproduct firms part i theory abstract this paper develops a normative model of the regulation of a multiproduct firm with private information about its technology and cost reducing activity it first characterizes the optimal regulatory scheme and illustrates it through examples it then derives necessary and sufficient conditions for the pricing incentive dichotomy to hold i e conditions under which the cost reimbursement rule but not pricing is used to provide incentives last the paper studies the regulation of the multiproduct firm in a general equilibrium framework both to assess the validity of the partial equilibrium approach and to formalize the notion of taxation by regulation

the simple economics of extortion evidence from trucking in aceh this paper tests whether the behavior of corrupt officials is consistent with standard industrial organization theory we designed a study in which surveyors accompanied indonesian truck drivers on 304 trips during which they observed over 6 000 illegal payments to police soldiers and weigh station attendants using plausibly exogenous changes in the number of checkpoints we show that market structure affects the level of illegal payments we further show that corrupt officials use complex pricing schemes including third degree price discrimination and a menu of two part tariffs our findings illustrate the importance of considering the market structure for bribes when designing anticorruption policy

a model of housing in the presence of adjustment costs a structural interpretation of habit persistence building on the model of sanford j grossman and guy laroque 1990 this paper provides a model of household consumption and portfolio allocation which incorporates the role of housing as both a consumption good and as a component of wealth the model captures the following features of the household s problem a utility depends probably nonseparably on two distinct goods nondurable consumption and housing b nondurable consumption can be adjusted cost lessly but housing is subject to an adjustment cost c households face housing price risk in the sense that the relative price of housing varies over time and d in addition to the house the household can invest in a wide variety of financial assets this single reasonably tractable model generates testable implications for portfolio allocation risk aversion asset pricing and the dynamics of nondurable consumption because the original grossman and laroque model considers a utility function in which the durable good is the sole argument and thus abstracts completely from nondurable consump tion their analysis cannot address either the potential spillover effects of the adjustment costs of the durable good on the dynamics of nondurable consumption or the implications for portfolio allocation of housing risk arising from variation in the relative price of housing in addition to generating implications for issues on which the original grossman and laroque model was silent the housing model delivers a strikingly different message concerning asset pricing that is in contrast to the grossman and laroque result that the consumption based capital asset pricing model consumption capm fails the housing model implies that the consumptioncapm holds we assume that the household incurs an adjustment cost when altering the holding of the dura ble good or house although financial assets can be bought and sold costlessly consumption of the nondurable good can also be adjusted costlessly when choosing a new house the consumer takes into account the fact that the consumption of housing services will be constant at the new level until the subsequent stopping time when it is again worthwhile to incur the adjustment cost thus the home purchase decision is endogenous and fully rational but because of the adjustment cost infrequent in this continuous time setting the household s decision process has a recursive structure at each instant the household first decides whether it is optimal to sell the house immediately on those rare occasions that it is optimal to incur the adjustment cost the household sells the old house and buys a new one instantaneously if the household decides that it is not optimal to sell the house immediately it then determines its optimal holdings of financial assets and optimal level of nondurable consumption conditional on the current housing stock in essence because of the adjustment costs associated with the durable good the current

shadow prices consistency and the value of life this paper examines the consequences of inconsistent shadow pricing the principal example of such inconsistency is the value of life safety second best shadow pricing policy is shown to depend upon how public sector budgets are allocated and the principle that public sector decision makers should agree to a consistent shadow price is shown to require information unlikely to be available a weaker consistency principle requiring minimal information is then developed

retail price fixity as a facilitating mechanism previous theoretical explanations for retail price fixity show that fixed retail prices can be consistent with either competitive or imperfectly competitive behavior we develop a conceptual model of retail pricing wherein fixed price points are facilitating mechanisms for tacit collusion a non cooperative equilibrium in fixed retail prices is supported through credible threats to revert to nash pricing if cheating is suspected we test the implications of this model using a two stage ordered probit approach in weekly supermarket pricing data the results show that price fixity does support collusive equilibria among retailers but other factors may also explain retail price behavior

wages rents and the quality of life this study focuses on the role of wages and rents in allocating workers to locations with various quantities of amenities the theory demonstrates that if the amenity is also productive then the sign of the wage gradient is unclear while the rent gradient is positive the theory is extended to include the housing market and nontraded goods these extensions require little modification of the conclusion the empirical work on wages shows that the regional wage differences can be explained largely by these local attributes with the use of site price data implicit prices are estimated and quality of life rankings for the cities are computed

optimal two part pricing in a carbon offset market a comparison of organizational types author affiliation murray fulton johnson shoyama graduate school of public policy diefenbaker building university of saskatchewan saskatoon sk s7n 5b8 canada e mail murray fulton usask ca corresponding author james vercammen food and resource economics and sauder school of business 2053 main mall university of british columbia vancouver bc v6t 1z2 canada e mail james vercammen ubc ca acknowledgment the authors would like to thank tom ross and ralph winter for valuable comments on an early version of this article as well as the southern economic journal editor and two anonymous reviewers the usual caveats apply 1 introductionone of the consequences of the kyoto protocol kp and the increased focus on the role of greenhouse gases ghgs in climate change is that market based approaches to reducing ghg emissions are being actively developed in europe the european union eu operates an emissions trading scheme ets 1 while in the united states the chicago climate exchange ccx trades carbon offsets among exchange members 2 in canada a number of provinces have announced plans for carbon trading schemes four of them have joined the western climate initiative wci a consortium of canadian provinces and states developing a regional cap and trade system wci 2008 the wci and the regional greenhouse gas initiative rggi a consortium of northeastern and mid atlantic states see rggi 2008 are part of the international carbon action partnership a group of countries and regions from around the world that has formed to actively pursue the development of mandatory cap and trade systems in carbon 3the agriculture and forestry sectors are likely to be important suppliers of carbon offsets to the carbon market both through carbon sequestration activities for example the storing of carbon in the soil or in trees and through activities that reduce ghg emissions for instance estimates made by the united states at the time the kp was being negotiated projected that forest cropland and grazing land management sinks could have accounted for about half of u s reduction commitments u s department of state 2002 in canada the federal government estimated that agricultural and forestry sinks could provide in the order of 15 20 million metric tons of carbon offsets relative to a total of 270 300 million metric tons of reductions required under the kp government of canada 2005 food and agricultural organization fao estimates indicate that dryland soils in the world could sequester somewhere in the range of 12 000 16 000 million metric tons of carbon fao 2004 in the case of agriculture since carbon offsets are sold in units that are much larger than most individual farmers can supply carbon sequestration from a number of producers must be aggregated to fulfill contracts 4 as a consequence market intermediaries or aggregators as they are known are emerging to perform this economic function some of these aggregators are organized as for profit firms while others are organized by farmers associations examples of for profit firms are as follows c green aggregators ltd a privately owned company that contracts with farmers in manitoba saskatchewan and alberta for carbon sequestration the carbon they acquire is sold on the ccx c green aggregators 2008 and agcert international an irish company founded to generate emission reductions from livestock farms agcert international 2008 much of agcert s sales of carbon credits has been direct to individual emitters on the producer association side the iowa farm bureau has created agragate climate credits corporation to aggregate carbon credits for sale on the ccx agragate climate credits corporation 2008 agragate administers the project transacts trades on the exchange and distributes earnings to project participants

accounting profits versus marketing profits a relevant metric for category management retailers have long recognized that some categories are more important than others in consumers store choice decisions the overall profitability of a store requires careful category level merchandising decisions to draw the most desirable consumers into the store however the traditional accounting measure of category profits offers imperfect help making these decisions since it does not take into account the effect of merchandising one category on the profits of other categories in the store a profit measure which takes into account these important cross effects is the most relevant performance metric for category management we call this new construct marketing profits as it focuses on consumers and their store choice behavior and is particularly pertinent to the calculus of marketing decision making despite its practical importance the total impact of merchandising a specific product category on a store s profitability is difficult to measure and in practice managers can only rely on intuitive calibration of marketing profits in making many retailing decisions the difficulty arises from the fact that to directly observe the marketing profits of a category one has to know how consumer store shopping behavior would change and hence what a store s profit would be if the category were to disappear from the consumers store choice decision furthermore it is difficult to devise a demand structure that is rich enough to capture bundled purchases on the part of consumers in a reasonable manner but is simple enough to allow estimation on the basis of commonly observed variables these two technical difficulties explain the conspicuous lack of research that systematically examines how to quantify what we call marketing profits this paper builds a formal model of marketing profits we start by formalizing shopper types and then establish the implied relationship between accounting profits and marketing profits by examining shelf space allocations by a retailer on the consumer side we assume that some consumers pay attention to the assortments offered by different retailers when making their store choice decisions this assumption allows us to establish the demand side linkage between accounting profits and marketing profits consumer store choice decisions put pressure on the retailer to carry wide assortments in categories which are particularly critical to the store choice decisions of the most desirable consumers thus the allocation of shelf space gives rise to the supplyside linkage between accounting profits and marketing profits by examining the outcome of the supermarket s shelf space decision we can merge these two linkages and determine the exact relationship between the accounting and marketing profits central to our theoretical structure is our assumption on retailers shelf space allocation decisions because of the well documented pressure that retailers face in making shelf space allocation decisions we assume that they are acting in a reasonably close to optimal fashion by using either an automated planogram or simply by trial and error optimization requires that returns on shelf space allocated to any category in the store must be identical on the margin and equate to the shadow price of shelf space it is this outcome of shelf space allocation that allows us to uncover the implied relationship between accounting and marketing profits this theoretical structure allows us to construct a measure of marketing profits which can be estimated with data commonly available to retailers we demonstrate this measurement technique by using publicly available data provided by marsh supermarkets and show how marketing profits can improve merchandising decisions in our particular application we find many categories where the marketing profits of a category are very different from the traditional accounting profits further we nd that using this new marketing profits metric to make category level feature advertising space decisions significantly improves the profitability of the retailer the paper concludes by discussing how our measure of marketing profits might be improved by additional research particularly if the researcher has data across many stores

labor income housing prices and homeownership abstract this paper tests the intuition that households whose incomes covary relatively strongly with housing prices should own relatively little housing among us households a one standard deviation in covariance between income and home prices is associated with a decrease of approximately 7500 in the value of owner occupied housing this result arises in the presence of controls for the level and distribution of home prices the generally positive correlations between income and home prices suggests that households enter financial markets with a greater exposure to risk than is typically modeled

entry deterrence by non horizontal merger we study when and how pure non horizontal mergers whether cross product or vertical can deter new entry organizational mergers implicitly commit firms to more aggressive price competition because heightened competition deters entry mergers can occur in equilibrium even when absent entry considerations they do not we show that in order to prevent a flood of entrants mergers arise even when a marginal merger costs incumbent firms more than does a marginal entrant

price discrimination in grocery trade evidence from italy this paper investigates the determinants of price dispersion between staple and non staple goods in grocery retailing as the result of pricing decisions by multiproduct firms theoretical predictions about the nature of supermarkets pricing behaviour are compared and tested empirically using disaggregated data from the italian grocery trade over the period 1990 1992 the empirical results provide evidence for the existence in all types of retail organization of the form of price discrimination suggested by bliss particularly for specialist shops the results are consistent with discrimination due to the exploitation of consumers switching costs

why has house price dispersion gone up we calibrate a dynamic general equilibrium island model to investigate the 30 year increase in the level of house prices and their dispersion across u s metropolitan areas the model is based on two main assumptions households o w in and out metropolitan areas in response to local productivity shocks and the housing supply cannot adjust instantly because of technological and regulatory constraints the calibration reveals that the observed tightening of housing supply regulation cannot quantitatively account for the rise in the level and dispersion of house prices in equilibrium workers o w out of tightly regulated towards less regulated metropolitan areas undoing most of the price impact of local supply restrictions in contrast the observed increase in wage dispersion across metropolitan areas does create the observed increase in the level and dispersion of house prices workers o w towards exceptionally productive metropolitan areas and drive house prices up the calibration also suggests that the welfare eects of housing supply regulation are large when wages become more dispersed

equilibrium price communication and unadvertised specials by competing supermarkets this paper is concerned with how retailers supermarkets in particular communicate price discounts and use unadvertised specials a common practice for supermarkets is to communicate price deals on some products through newspaper advertisements while communicating discounts on other products through in store mechanisms such as shelf talkers this raises the question so far as store choice is concerned how might consumers take into account not only advertised prices at competing stores but also expected prices of unadvertised goods it also begs the question of why stores have unadvertised specials since their effect on store choice is not quite the same as the advertised discounts further competing supermarkets advertise the same products part of the time and different products at other times they also tend to sometimes advertise a product in consecutive weeks but sometimes not can these actions be part of a strategy we formulate a game theoretic model of retail competition by first extending the work of lal and matutes 1994 and then developing an alternative framework to answer these questions our model has two retailers each of whom carries two goods to simplify exposition we assume that the stores are symmetric the two goods are symmetric in their reservation prices and are neither substitutes nor complements consumers are identical in their preferences and consumer heterogeneity is in the convenience that each store presents to a representative consumer the stores may advertise the price of one good reflecting the reality that stores do not advertise their whole assortment they compete through advertising and prices to maximize profits we thus recognize the strategic role of advertised prices and furthermore we investigate the strategic role of unadvertised prices in retail competition for this model we derive a rational expectations nash equilibrium in which each store randomly advertises the price of one good following a mixed strategy consumer expectations of the prices of the unadvertised goods are rational we obtain three kinds of results first unadvertised specials occur in equilibrium and induce temporal and cross sectional variation in the identity of advertised goods consistent with casual observation in this equilibrium the two stores advertise the same good part of the time and different goods at other times when they advertise the same good they do not offer any unadvertised discount on the other good however when they advertise different goods they offer an unadvertised discount on the good that they do not advertise intuitively unadvertised discounts come about because stores randomize the identity of the advertised good in the mixed strategy equilibrium if retailers were to advertise the same good at all times they would have to compete intensely for store traffic and therefore discount the advertised good very deeply and having done so they would find it optimal to set the unadvertised good at the reservation price and offer no discount on it however if stores randomize the advertised good as shown in this paper both stores advertise the same good some of the time and at other times they advertise different goods because they advertise different goods some of the time they do not fight intensely for store traffic on just one good but rather they find it optimal to offer a discount on the unadvertised good also as a result an implication of our equilibrium for consumer choice is that unadvertised discounts affect store choice and in equilibrium some consumers may shop around second we obtain managerial insights into the role of unadvertised specials they affect store choice prevent consumer shopping around either fully or partly and reduce head to head competition on the price of the advertised good the most salient strategic implication of retailers offering unadvertised discounts is to reduce competition among stores and this is again due to the randomization strategy of the stores in fact stores can reduce head to head competition further by increasing the number of products in their assortment and randomizing on the advertised good from this assortment third we provide a resolution of the diamond 1971 paradox which says that prices at competing stores approach the monopoly price in our equilibrium expected prices of both advertised and unadvertised goods are always below the monopoly price

diversification as a public good community effects in portfolio choice within a rational general equilibrium model in which agents care only about personal consumption we consider a setting in which due to borrowing constraints individuals endowed with local resources underparticipate in financial markets as a result investors compete for local resources through their portfolio choices even with complete financial markets and no aggregate risk agents may herd into risky portfolios this yields a pareto dominated outcome as agents introduce community risk unrelated to fundamentals moreover if some agents are behaviorally biased or cannot completely diversify their holdings rational agents may choose more extreme portfolios and amplify the effect

pricing efficiency under rate of return regulation some empirical evidence for the electric utility industry the authors test quasi optimal pricing rules for rate of return regulation for a sample of electric utilities they estimate the regulated cost function and demand equations by class of customer for the sample to yield the cost and demand parameters required to assess the utility rate structures the results indicate that the price structure of electricity by class of customer is not quasi optimal and that welfare improvement might be possible under alternative prices searching for the price structure which satisfies the criteria they find that commercial users rates have been too high relative to residential and to a lesser extent industrial rates they note that commercial uses tend to be less organized and more poorly represented in the rate making process 16 references 8 tables

spatial asset pricing a first step people choose where to live and how much to invest in housing traditionally the first decision has been the domain of spatial economics while the second has been analyzed in finance spatial asset pricing is an attempt to combine equilibrium concepts from both disciplines in the finance context we show how spatial decisions can be framed as an expanded portfolio problem within spatial economics we identify the consequences of hedging motives for location decisions we characterize a number of observable deviations from standard predictions in finance e g the definition of the relevant market portfolio for the pricing of risk includes homeownership rates and in spatial economics e g hedging considerations and the pricing of risk affect the geographic allocation of human capital

first and second best pricing with uncertain demand as has been well known since at least the work of hotelling 6 marginal cost pricing is the ideal regulatory policy in a simple certainty setting however when economies of scale exist in production such a policy will in general entail a revenue shortfall for the firm ideally the regulator should meet such a short fall by raising lump sum taxes but that solution is liable to prove infeasible ramsey pricing popularized by baumol and bradford 4 examines the second best pricing policy when firms receive no tax subsidy so prices must exceed marginal costs the celebrated inverse elasticity rule shows that with demands for the various goods independent goods whose elasticity of demand is proportionately less should have their price exceed marginal cost proportionately more further complications arise when one takes into account the uncertainty involved in economic decisions in recognition of this there has recently been considerable discussion of first best pricing with stochastic demand 5 the general conclusion of this discussion is that marginal cost pricing continues to be the first best policy in order to reach this conclusion however the literature has in effect assumed that regulators are risk neutral compared to this large literature on stochastic first best pricing the only two papers known to us that treat second best pricing with stochastic demand are by sherman visscher 11 and by wecker upton 15 both these treatments assume the marginal utility of income of the regulator is constant and so also require that there be risk neutrality in this work on the other hand we will consider both first and second best pricing policies when the regulator is explicitly allowed to be risk averse in the former case we will be interested in whether marginal cost pricing will continue to be the first best policy whereas in the latter case we will examine whether the simple inverse elasticity rule can hold despite considerations of risk and the risk behavior of regulators finally we will directly relate the results of our first best analysis to our study of the second best problem in much of the paper the source of demand uncertainty will be arbitrary we will

government organization and power i introduction economists have systematically examined the economics of government finance and long ago established that the means of financing government creates inefficiencies in the market for instance see baumol and bradford 1970 and diamond and mirrlees 1971a 1971b what may be less well examined and understood is that apart from the distortions that arise from the means of government finance government officials can have an incentive to provide a combination of services and taxes that are nonoptimal as in niskanen 1997 the ability of government to exercise coercive and pricing power creates these incentives a growing number of articles explore the effect of government power on its size for example anderson and tollison 1988 and rogers and rogers 1995 examine the implications of pricing power for government size in his work on bureaucracy niskanen 1971 considered the implications of coercive power for government size olson 1991 mcguire and olson 1996 niskanen 1997 and mcguire 2001 examine the implications of the joint exercise of coercive and pricing powers by an autocratic government to our knowledge however no previous work explicitly distinguishes between the coercive and pricing powers of government and none systematically examines all the possible combinations of coercive and pricing powers in the present analysis we develop a simple theoretical framework that allows us to examine on an integrated basis the exercise of government power the framework abstracts from any distortions in the means of government finance and separates government power into two dimensions pure coercive power and pure pricing power pure coercive power is the ability of a government to compel consumers to accept more of the public good than they desire at each tax price through fiat coercive power typically arises when citizens are unable to exit a jurisdiction costlessly and the government is able to push citizens beyond what they would accept in a voluntary relationship pure pricing power is the government s ability to restrict output along a given demand curve and earn rents by doing so pricing power typically arises when the government has limited competition and faces a downward sloping demand curve for its services we consider four polar combinations of coercive and pricing power in comparison to the social optimum lindahl democracy monopoly niskanen bureaucracy and autocracy as shown in figure 1 the government in lindahl democracy exercises neither coercive nor pricing power a monopoly government is able to restrict its output and exercise pricing power to earn rents in a traditional monopolistic fashion but it cannot engage price discrimination or expropriation to obtain any remaining consumer surplus from its citizens a niskanen bureaucracy can exact all of the surplus that consumers obtain from the public goods it provides but it must use the surplus in the production of public goods it cannot exercise pricing power and restrict output to obtain rents as a monopoly would an autocracy exercises both coercive and pricing power in practice democratic governments are likely to have both coercive and pricing powers rather than to conform to the lindahl ideal our analytical framework allows us to clarify and reconcile the differences between some of the previous contributions to the literature on government power and size in democracy a government can simultaneously use its coercive power to grow too large and its pricing power to restrict its output and earn rents furthermore government size or rents alone may be poor indicators of the extent to which government fails to achieve optimality in its provision of services government power may be used to generate rents provide too much government service or a combination of both ii social optimum consider a jurisdiction or economy with n identical individuals and two goods a purely public good and a purely private good

multiproduct pricing in major league baseball a principal components analysis the empirical analysis of multiproduct pricing suffers from a lack of clear theoretical guidance and appropriate data limitations which often render traditional regression based analyses impractical this paper analyzes ticket parking and concession pricing in major league baseball for the period 1991 2003 using a new methodology based on principal components which allows inferences to be formed about the factors underlying price variation without strong theoretical guidance or abundant information about costs and demand while general demand shifts are the most important factor they explain only half of overall price variation also important are price interactions that derive from demand interrelationships between goods and the desire to maximize the capture of consumer surplus in the presence of heterogeneous demand

continuous cross subsidies and quantity restrictions this article provides a model of loss leader pricing and quantity restrictions for a competitive multiproduct industry when individual consumers have continuous and independent demands for the set of available goods utilizing a generalization of the model proposed by bliss 1988 we demonstrate the importance of consumer heterogeneity for the existence of cross subsidies when there is complete information and individual consumers have smooth downward sloping demands continuous cross subsidies arising from consumer heterogeneity are also shown to exist in hotelling models our use of continuous rather than unit demands allows us to analyze issues related to welfare which in turn exposes a strong incentive for the firm to place binding quantity restrictions on consumers we also show how the presence of quantity restrictions can be used to distinguish between continuous cross subsidies arising from heterogeneous consumers versus those arising from classic demand complementarity with homogeneous agents

existence of a spatial equilibrium we prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium in a simple canonical model of spatial economics we emphasize the single difficulty introduced by the use of a continuum of agents to convexify the fundamental locational nonconvexity individual consumption bundles are not bounded above by the aggregate boundedness of initial resources

optimal departures from marginal cost pricing focuses on departures from marginal cost pricing optimal allocation or resources level of tax revenue that will be collected by the government theorems developed for resource allocation ebsco

do house prices drive consumption growth the coincident cycles of house prices and consumption in the uk this paper uses a realistic structural lifecycle model of consumption and housing decisions to understand how data might distinguish different mechanisms that explain the correlation between house prices and consumption the model includes price and earnings shocks estimated from data the latter including aggregate and idiosyncratic components and incorporates realistic features of the uk mortgage market we simulate the model using more than 30 years of realized shocks and under counterfactual scenarios our results confirm the intuition of earlier studies house price shocks should have a larger effect on the consumption of older households and earnings shocks on young households

exclusive contracts and market dominance we propose a new theory of exclusive dealing the theory is based on the assumption that a dominant firm has a competitive advantage over its rivals and that the buyers willingness to pay for the product is private information in this setting the dominant firm can impose contractual restrictions on buyers without necessarily compensating them implying that exclusive dealing contracts can be both profitable and anticompetitive we discuss the general implications of the theory for competition policy and illustrate by examples its applicability to antitrust cases jel d21 d43 d82 d86 k21 l13 l40