budget processes and commitment to fiscal discipline abstract we present a framework of investigation into the political economy of the budget process our model suggests that institutional rules governing the budget process can be found to limit the importance of fiscal illusion empirical evidence supports that proposition the choice of rules depends on the political environment as well as the dominant source of uncertainty in the budget process

fiscal federalism and interstate risk sharing empirical evidence from germany abstract using an approach developed by asdrubali et al quarterly journal of economics 111 1996 1081 the paper estimates the extent of smoothing of state specific income shocks to west german states from 1970 to 1997 by federal fiscal institutions the results show that despite the existence of substantial interregional transfer mechanisms the share of shocks to state income absorbed by fiscal flows is roughly at the same level as in the us

candidate reputations and the incumbency effect abstract a major shortcoming of the classical median voter model is that its central prediction convergence of platforms to the median voter s ideal is seldom observed one reason is that the classical model neglects the importance of voter expectations as a determinant of votes here we associate voters expectations about candidates with past as well as current candidate pronouncements and assume that incumbents whose actions are consistent with their reputations are perceived as less risky than challengers in equilibrium candidates choose distinct platforms typically neither adopts the median voter s ideal point either candidate may win depending on how well the incumbent s reputation reflects current voter tastes and how relatively risky the electorate perceives the challenger to be

equal votes equal money court ordered redistricting and the distribution ofpublic expenditures in the american states a study of the effects of legislative re districting in the states during the 1960 s also contains data file

intergovernmental transfers and fiscal behavior insurance versus aggregate discipline abstract this paper evaluates the trade off between the advantages of risk sharing and the perils of common pool problems in federal fiscal arrangements under the assumption of asymmetric information we evaluate two alternative regimes of intergovernmental transfers in one regime the central government pre commits to a certain level of transfers that compensate vertical fiscal imbalances and provide some limited ex ante insurance in the other regime it accommodates ex post the fiscal needs of the different provinces in this second case full insurance results but the economy is subject to a tragedy of the fiscal commons with excessive subnational spending insufficient local taxation and reduced production of federal public goods we find the range of parameters for which one or the other institutional regime will be preferable the result is a fiscal federalism version of the usual trade off between rules and discretion

state responses to fiscal crises the effects of budgetary institutions and politics this paper explores the dynamics of state taxes and spending during the late 1980s when regional economic downturns and increased expenditure demands led to substantial state budget deficits more restrictive state fiscal institutions such as no deficit carryover rules and tax and expenditure limitations are correlated with more rapid fiscal adjustment to unexpected deficits political factors are also important when a single party controls the state house and the governorship deficit adjustment is much faster than when party control is divided in gubernatorial election years tax increases and spending cuts are both significantly smaller than at other times

regional state capacity and the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization abstract we study the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization in a federation regional governments are characterized by their abilities to deliver public goods administrative capacity and to raise tax revenues fiscal capacity two regimes are compared on efficiency grounds under partial decentralization regional governments rely on central bailouts to complete local projects in financing needs under full decentralization marginal financing is achieved via local capital taxes we show that the presence of sufficiently low levels of administrative capacity is a necessary condition for full decentralization dominance this condition may also be sufficient depending on the projects characteristics some extensions are presented

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

budget institutions and fiscal policy in the u s states this paper summarizes state balanced budget requirements and the available empirical evidence on the effect of these rules on state fiscal policies existing state rules differ from many current proposals at the federal level they are typically restricted to part of the state budget they frequently permit short term borrowing and they lack formal enforcement mechanisms the paper also surveys previous research on how anti deficit provisions affect state fiscal policy the available evidence indicates that stringent anti deficit provisions lead to more rapid adjustment of state taxes and expenditures when fiscal deficits emerge this suggests that changing the federal budget process has the potential to affect federal fiscal policy this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

government spending and budget deficits in the industrial economies fiscal policy nouriel roubini and jeffrey sachs this paper examines the evolution of the size of government and of budget deficits in oecd economies we highlight the rapid increase in government spending in the 1970s the sharp rise in budget deficits and public debt after 1973 and the reversal in these trends in the 1980s the increase in the size of government was associated in part with the slowdown in growth after 1973 but also reflected gradual adjustment of the ratio of spending to output towards a long run target which depends on political and institutional characteristics of the economy the political orientation of the government the degree of wage indexation and the degree of stability of the political system such factors also explain the size of budget deficits when faced with an adverse shock subsequent deficit reduction requires a measure of political consensus we note that such consensus is hard to achieve in multi party coalitions in consequence countries with such a political structure tended in consequence countries with such a political structure tended toin consequence countries with such a political structure tended to experience much more rapid increases in their debt gnp ratios

second generation fiscal federalism political aspects of decentralization and economic development summary this essay contributes to second generation fiscal federalism sgff which traces the implications of incentives created by political and fiscal institutions the approach explores how various forms of fiscal federalism work in the presence of political officials who rather than being benevolent social planners face various forms of political incentives the paper focuses on three sets of positive models first it explores self enforcing federalism that is how federal systems are held together given various tendencies for federal systems to become centralized or fall apart second it considers how specific political institutions such as democracy interact with decentralization finally it studies various political impediments to economic growth again highlighting the interaction with decentralization 2013 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

monetary policy in a heterogeneous monetary union the australian experience australia is a monetary union with strong regional specialization manufacturing and service industries are located in the population centres on the south eastern seaboard and mining and pastoral activities take place in the interior and north of the continent monetary policy affects the interior and north more strongly than the south eastern seaboard because australian primary goods are mostly exported and the exchange rate provides the main transmission channel for monetary policy the reserve bank of australia must consider the economic interests of the interior and north and the south eastern seaboard since monetary policy cannot differentiate between regions there is a need for interregional macroeconomic risk sharing

how much a symmetry in europe evidence from industrial sectors abstract to what extent do european countries differ with respect to the sources of cyclical fluctuations of industrial output we look at output data disaggregated by industry for 11 european countries and on the basis of a cointegrated vector autoregression model we examine the correlation of output innovations at the industry and country levels we also discuss to what extent output innovations can be considered symmetric or asymmetric our results point to the fact that on average more variance of output innovations is explained at the country rather than the industry level we also find that the importance of asymmetric disturbances is quite varied among the 11 countries and we identify a core of countries with a higher degree of symmetry

optimal regional redistribution under asymmetric information this paper studies optimal redistribution among two different regions in a federal state regional governments supply local public goods financed with distorting local taxes they have better information on their tax bases than the federal government we model this both as an adverse selection problem on the size of local tax bases and or as moral hazard problem on local tax enforcement moral hazard alone does not affect the first best redistribution rule which is a lump sum transfer from the rich to the poor region in all other cases the optimal transfer rule involves a lump sum tax on the rich regions and a premium for fiscal effort by the poor regions with the transfer falling short of the first best level in the equilibrium with moral hazard and adverse selection tax evasion occurs only in the poor region even though the possibility of lax tax enforcement benefits the rich and harms the poor region because it reduces equilibrium redistribution this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

endogenous oca analysis and the early euro experience some have argued that the endogenous responses to the formation of a currency area are so strong that one need not worry about optimum currency area conditions ex ante we argue that this is much too strong a conclusion we draw on a number of recent studies to evaluate the endogeneity experiences of the eurozone in three major areas trade flows business cycle synchronisation and structural reforms to improve labour and product market flexibility simple before and after comparisons are insufficient for analysis of endogeneity the experiences of non euro western european economies suggest that broader trends also had considerable influence on trade and business cycle patterns while trade rose substantially within the eurozone it also rose with and among other european economies we argue that political economy considerations tend to dampen the magnitude of endogeneity efforts on structural reforms and that meeting conditions for entry may be a more powerful mechanism in this than are subsequent endogenous responses we also discuss a number of areas for further research

channels of interstate risk sharing united states 1963 1990 we develop a framework for quantifying the amount of risk sharing among states in the united states and construct data that allow us to decompose the cross sectional variance in gross state product into several components which we refer to as levels of smoothing we find that 39 percent of shocks to gross state product are smoothed by capital markets 13 percent are smoothed by the federal government and 23 percent are smoothed by credit markets the remaining 25 percent are not smoothed we also decompose the federal government smoothing into subcategories taxes transfers and grants to states

ricardian equivalence for local government bonds a utility maximization approach abstract we show that ricardian equivalence holds for local public finance if and only if subnational units use property taxes however for other tax bases the unique equilibrium has the same economic outcome as in models where districts may not issue debt

divided government fiscal institutions and budget deficits evidence from the states does partisan control of american state government have systematic effects on state spending and taxing levels does divided control affect the government s ability to make hard decisions do institutional rules like legal deficit carryover restrictions matter using a formal model of fiscal policy to guide empirical analysis of data covering the american states from 1968 to 1987 we conclude that 1 aggregate state budget totals are driven by different factors under democrats and republicans the net result being that democrats target spending and taxes to higher shares of state level personal income 2 divided government is less able to react to revenue shocks that lead to budget deficits particularly where different parties control each chamber of the legislature and 3 unified party governments with restricted ability to carry deficits into the next fiscal year outside the south have sharper reactions to negative revenue shocks than those without restrictions

taxation and the tiebout model the differential effects of head taxes taxes on land rents and property taxes on the theory of state and local public finance is the seminal paper by charles tiebout 1956 tiebout constructed a multijurisdictional model in which independent local governments offer a wide variety of expenditure and tax policies and perfectly mobile consumers reveal their preferences for local public goods through their choice of residential community he argued that under such circumstances local public service provision would be efficient the tiebout model has formed the basis of a vast number of subsequent articles in the state and local public finance literature and has also been very influential in urban and regional economics the efficiency properties of various tiebout type models of local public good provision have been examined and the role of politics in these models has been debated at length in this literature of more direct relevance to this paper however is the fact that although tiebout had little to say directly about taxation simply assuming the existence of head taxes subsequent analyses have used adaptations of this model to examine the effects of local head taxes land taxes and property taxes it is the literature on the efficiency and distributional effects of alternative local taxes that is the subject of this survey 1

uncertain income and redistribution in a federal system abstract this paper considers income redistribution in a federal system where regions experience random shocks federal redistribution serves as insurance against jurisdiction specific shocks but provides a uniform assistance to the poor and cannot suit individual jurisdictions demands for redistribution consequently whether the federal government should redistribute depends on the advantage of pooling the risk and the disadvantage of compromising different preferences for redistribution with mobile individuals federal redistribution loses its advantage because migration ensures the equalization of factor incomes between regions and because even local redistribution serves as insurance however local redistribution creates fiscal externalities and distorts the allocation of labor

ricardian equivalence for local government bonds abstract it is shown that if consumers own land the free rider problem does not occur because a change in local government financing is completely reflected in the price of land this means that the ricardian equivalence theorem holds not only for national government bonds but also for local government bonds

pricing and regulating affect environmental ethics effluent charges and tradeable permits are economically efficient but rarely used a new explanation for this discrepancy is offered pricing may crowd out environmental ethics in the pricing and via spillovers also in non pricing sectors pricing may therefore increase pollution providing a reason why decision makers tend to reject environmental pricing five propositions showing the conditions for counterproductive effects are advanced they are consistent with available empirical evidence regulation by setting standards and subsidies damage environmental ethics less than pricing because pollution is condoned damaging environmental ethics may prevent political action in favor of the environment

federalism equalization and risk aversion abstract what causes a group of countries to agree to form a federation other alternative arrangements which often are chosen instead are to form a unitary state or to remain autonomous federations usually allow for considerable freedom of movement among constituent regions they also provide a fairly limited redistribution of any rents earned in these regions these two features together imply that residents of poor regions can share in the rents in rich regions by migration this fiscal migration may waste resources why not simply share the rents equally among residents of all regions such a unitary arrangement although efficient would not appeal to residents of a country which is likely to be the best off region in a federation complete autonomy may expose residents of the separate countries to considerable idiosyncratic risk here i demonstrate that federation may be chosen by a group of countries even though it is a more wasteful arrangement than either other alternative if asymmetries among countries and the degree of risk aversion are large federal states also often implement transfers among the regions these transfers can be viewed as substitutes for fiscal migration i also show that the possibility of transfers even without any commitment to specifics makes federalism a more attractive option a federal constitution which requires transfers in excess of what would be made voluntarily may make federalism more attractive still

politics institutions and fiscal performance in a federal system an analysis of the argentine provinces abstract we posit that the fiscal behavior of argentine provinces is determined by a common pool game at two levels within each province and across political units in the latter game the national government has a greater incentive than the provincial governments to internalize the negative externality of fiscal imprudence given relatively strong party discipline the president is able to induce governors from his party to internalize a portion of the externality to a greater extent than opposition governors in argentina party matters for fiscal behavior but it does so for reasons different from those identified in studies of oecd countries

labour market institutions and household consumption insurance within oecd countries this paper tests empirically whether the effect of idiosyncratic income shocks on aggregate consumption depends on institutional features of national labour markets the results show that in a sample of 15 oecd countries institutional heterogeneity is a significant determinant of the response of household consumption to country specific income shocks this is consistent with the idea that institutionally provided social insurance may help increase income stability when people differ in their ability to access financial markets and smooth consumption fluctuations

the economics of split ticket voting in representative democracies in u s elections voters often vote for candidates from different parties for president and congress voters also express dissatisfaction with the performance of congress as a whole and satisfaction with their own representative the authors develop a model of split ticket voting in which government spending is financed by uniform taxes the benefits from this spending are concentrated while the model generates split ticket voting overall spending is too high only if the president s powers are limited overall spending is too high in a parliamentary system the authors model can be used as the basis of an argument for term limits copyright 1997 by american economic association

economic prescriptions for environmental problems how the patient followed the doctor s orders o ne of the dangers with ivory tower theorizing is that it is easy to lose sight of the actual set of problems which need to be solved and the range of potential solutions as one who frequently engages in this exercise i can attest to this fact in my view this loss of sight has become increasingly evident in the theoretical structure underlying environmental economics which often emphasizes elegance at the expense of realism in this paper i will argue that both normative and positive theorizing could greatly benefit from a careful examination of the results of recent innovative approaches to environmental management the particular set of policies examined here involves two tools which have received widespread support from the economics community marketable permits and emission charges pigou 1932 dales 1968 kneese and schultze 1975 both tools represent ways to induce businesses to search for lower cost methods of achieving environmental standards they stand in stark contrast to the predominant command and control approach in which a regulator specifies the technology a firm must use to comply with regulations under highly restrictive conditions it can be shown that both of the economic approaches share the desirable feature that any gains in environmental quality will be obtained at the lowest possible cost baumol and oates 1975 until the 1960s these tools only existed on blackboards and in academic journals as products of the fertile imaginations of academics however some countries have recently begun to explore using these tools as part of a broader strategy for managing environmental problems

school decentralization helping the good get better but leaving the poor behind abstract the decentralization of public services is a major feature of institutional innovation the main argument in support of decentralization is that it brings decisions closer to the people thereby alleviating information asymmetries and improving accountability however decentralization can also degrade service provision in poor communities that lack the ability to voice and defend their preferences in this paper we analyze the average and distributional effects of school decentralization on educational quality in argentina we find that decentralization had an overall positive impact on student test scores the decentralization gains however did not reach the poor thus although bringing decisions closer to the people may help the good get better the already disadvantaged may not receive these benefits

federal fiscal constitutions risk sharing and redistribution the paper studies the political and economic determinants of regional public transfers specifically it focuses on how such transfers are shaped by alternative fiscal constitutions where a constitution is an allocation of fiscal instruments across different levels of governments plus a procedure for the collective choice of these instruments realistic restrictions on fiscal instruments introduce a tradeoff between risk sharing and redistribution different constitutions produce very different results in particular a federal social insurance scheme chosen by voting provides overinsurance whereas an intergovernmental transfer scheme chosen by bargaining provides underinsurance

random errors dirty information and politics rational voters assessments of candidates and policy proposals are unbiased but affected by random errors clean information decreases these errors while dirty information increases them in politics most voting procedures weigh random individual errors asymmetrically thus such errors do not counterbalance one another in the aggregate they systematically affect politics this illuminates the roles of political propaganda and interest groups it helps to explain various puzzles in public choice e g the frequent use of inefficient policy instruments institutional conditions are identified that shape the aggregate impact of individual errors and the politicians incentives to produce dirty information

federalism fiscal restraints and european monetary union a prominent feature of the maastricht treaty on european union is the restrictions it places on fiscal policy under the provisions of the excessive deficit procedure or edp the success of member states in avoiding excessive deficits during the transition to economic and monetary union emu is one of four criteria governing admission to the monetary union once monetary union has begun member states are unconditionally required to avoid excessive deficits a state has an excessive deficit when it is so declared by the european council upon a report by the european commission and a judgment by the monetary committee the edp is set in motion if a country s deficit and general government debt respectively exceed 3 percent and 60 percent of gdp the justification for these procedures is that member states participating in the monetary union must be restrained from overborrowing to avoid destabilizing the common currency if excessive deficits cause a debt crisis the european central bank ecb will come under pressure to bail out the imperiled government the bailout could be ex post in which case the ecb would monetize the government s debt or ex ante in which case it would keep interest rates low to lighten the debt service burden either way unfettered fiscal policies could create inflationary pressures that the ecb will find difficult to resist

the politics of ambiguity politicians face a trade off between the policies that maximize their chances of reelection and their most preferred policies or the policies most preferred by the constituency which they represent this paper analyzes this trade off in a dynamic electoral model in which the voters are not fully informed about the preferences of the incumbent first we show that the incumbent follows a policy which is intermediate between the other party s ideal policy and his own ideal policy second we show that often the incumbent has an incentive to choose procedures which make it difficult for voters to pinpoint his preferences with absolute precision thus politicians may prefer to be ambiguous

the use and effect of political propaganda in democracies this paper examines the influence of political propaganda on voters and analyses the behavior of the interest groups in the face of the influence being exercised by propaganda semi truths are distributed among the electorate the decision taken by a voter results from his basic opinion and from the parts of information he receives the analysis shows that the greater the likelihood of a certain decision being reached by a fully informed electorate the more probable it is that the same decision will be reached by a rationally uninformed electorate the pecuniary interest of an interest group is however also positively correlated with the probability that the electorate reaches a decision which is agreeable to that interest group it has finally become appar ent that the results of the approach concur well with empirical studies

the political economy of benefits and costs a neoclassical approach to distributive politics this essay offers a rational political explanation for the notorious inefficiency of pork barrel projects with an optimization model of legislative behavior and legislative institutions the model emphasizes the economically arbitrary from a welfare point of view importance of the geographic incidence of benefits and costs owing to the geographic basis for political representation we explore the implications of a legislator s objective function and derive conditions under which a representative legislature will select an omnibus of projects each of which exceeds the efficient scale

tax effort and oil royalties in the brazilian municipalities abstract this paper estimates a stochastic production frontier to investigate whether municipalities covered by oil royalties in the last decade have reduced their tax effort in brazil the issue is relevant to the prospect of a substantial increase in these revenues and the new rules for distribution of the funds established by law no 12 734 2012 the inputs were provided by personnel and capital expenditures whereas the product was defined as the municipal tax collection with the purpose of overcoming the endogeneity problems due to reverse causality of output on inputs we used the lagged independent variable as instruments in the inefficiency equation the data set is composed of a panel of brazilian municipalities from 2002 to 2011 the results indicate that oil revenues have a negative impact on the estimated efficiencies signaling reduced fiscal effort by the benefiting municipalities

information and economic analysis a perspective ten years ago i delivered a paper before this group with the title information and economic analysis i chose the title deliberately i did not call the subject on which i was speaking the economics of information because to do so would have been to suggest that my topic like the economics of agriculture or the economics of industry or the economics of labour represented another branch of specialisation within economics i wanted to suggest that informational considerations were in fact central to the analysis of a wide variety of phenomena that they constituted a central part of the foundations of economic analysis at the time though economists had long paid lip service to the importance of information there was little formal literature the last decade has seen a burgeoning of the literature it has become to the late 7o s and early 8o s what growth theory was to the early 6o s and it has been greeted with some of the same scepticism there seems to be a myriad ofspecial cases and few general principles the little examples are often contrasted unfavourably with the generality of general equilibrium theory what have we learned have diminishing returns set in are there fruitful directions for future research and if so what are they these are the questions which i wish to address here the work of the past decade has made i think a fundamental and lasting contribution to economic analysis the contributions have been both negative and positive we have learned that much of what we believed before is of only limited validity that the traditional competitive equilibrium analysis though having the superficial appearance of generality in terms of superscripts and subscripts is indeed not very general the theory is not robust to slight alterations in the informational assumptions it is but a special and not very plausible example among the possible set of informational assumptions which can be employed to characterise an economy at the same time the theory has been able to provide insights into phenomena about which the traditional model had nothing to say or which seemed inconsistent or inexplicable within the competitive paradigm it has provided some of the micro foundations for macro economics it has provided the basis of a new theory of the firm of a new new welfare economics and of a theory of economic organisation including a comparison of economic

systematically biased beliefs about economics robust evidence of judgemental anomalies from the survey of americans and economists on the economy differences between the general public s positive economic views and economists resemble other judgemental anomalies laypeople and experts systematically disagree i analyse this puzzle using data from the survey of americans and economists on the economy the paper first tests and decisively rejects the hypothesis that the differences solely reflect economists self serving bias then it examines whether economists political ideology and party loyalties explain the disagreement if anything this slightly increases their magnitude the effect of economic training clearly falls but remains large after adding education to the set of control variables apparent biases robustness suggests that the anomaly is real

party politics and fiscal discipline in a federation evidence from the states of india theoretical and empirical analysis suggests that federations are prone to fiscal indiscipline because of intergovernmental bargaining over the allocation of national resources what role do political parties play in mediating this bargain if the national government is dominated by a single political party does the party discipline those states where its affiliates are in power if the national government consists of a coalition of political parties do states ruled by coalition partners bargain for higher deficits this article provides evidence on these questions from india a large federation in the developing world that serves as a valuable laboratory for this purpose the authors find that those state governments that belong to the same party as that leading the national government run higher than average deficits correspondingly states governed by rival political parties have lower deficits even if these parties are members of a coalition government at the center

note on ricardian equivalence abstract discussions of the ricardian equivalence concept have generally centered on the notion of a dynastic extended family in which the utility of each generation depends on its own consumption and on the utilities of its descendants this paper shows that there are other reasons why we could observe the ricardian result either exactly or approximately one reason is the capitalization of property taxes into property values the other reason is that the bequest itself could be a variable in parents utility functions

time inconsistency and free riding in a monetary union in monetary unions a time inconsistency problem in monetary policy leads to a novel type of free rider problem in the setting of non monetary policies the free rider problem leads union members to pursue lax non monetary policies that induce the monetary authority to generate high inflation free riding can be mitigated by imposing constraints on non monetary policies without a time inconsistency problem the union has no free rider problem then constraints on non monetary policies are unnecessary and possibly harmful this theory is here detailed and applied to several non monetary policies labor market policy fiscal policy and bank regulation

rational moralists the role of fairness in democratic economic politics in this paper we empirically test for the influence of fairness considerations on the willingness to redistribute income in private and in democratic decisions in contrast to standard explanations of income redistribution our theory takes into account that prices shift decisively as we move from the sphere of private contributions to politics at the polls it is nearly costless to observe social norms therefore we expect individuals to behave more fairly in the political sphere than in the market place we present experimental evidence which is consistent with this hypothesis in distributive struggles social norms moderate the inclination of human beings to behave like gangsters

subnational fiscal balance interregional redistribution and risk sharing in italy abstractthis paper provides new estimates of redistribution and risk sharing across regional territories accomplished by the italian public sector for the first time subnational governments fisc

political manipulations and market reforms failures economists have recently underscored that the failure of market reforms in producing sustained growth in emerging markets is the result of poor advice from the international monetary fund as well as of erroneous macroeconomic policies of domestic decision makers this article proposes a complementary hypothesis if market reforms are enacted in a political system with weak accountability institutions then one should expect the executive to manipulate such reforms in pursuit of such old fashioned practices as collusion between government and business political patronage and corruption this in turn ends up depriving a given economy of potential advantages that could have accrued had the reforms promoted true competition rather than reallocating monopolistic rents and squandering a large amount of resources

inter regional insurance this paper considers the problem facing a central government which can insure regional governments by use of intergovernmental grants against region specific and privately observed shocks either to income or demand for or cost of the public good notable results are i depending on the source of the shock the grant may induce over or undersupply of the public good relative to the samuelson rule ii with public good spillovers between regions there is two way distortion of public good supply that is qualitatively different distortions relative to the samuelson rule for different values of the shock iii the solution to the central government s problem may depend qualitatively on whether regional taxation is lump sum or distortionary 1999 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

fiscal decentralization fiscal rules and fiscal discipline fiscal decentralization fd and fiscal rules fr are institutional mechanisms that are implemented by varying degrees in increasing number of countries this paper investigates empirically the effect of fr on the effectiveness of fd in achieving fiscal discipline panel evidence strongly supports that balanced budget and expenditure rules help fd to achieve this goal while debt rule has a direct disciplinary effect

interest groups campaign contributions and probabilistic voting this essay develops a simple model to analyze the impact of campaign contributions on electoral policy decisions of candidates for office interest groups here are firms that select contributions under the assumption that candidates policies and opposing groups donations remain unaltered candidates however recognize that their policy choices affect contributions campaign contributions are used by candidates to affect policy oriented voters perceptions of candidates positions in this framework the introduction of campaign contributions may affect candidates electoral policies and if they do then they benefit surely exactly one of the two interest groups

a stylized model of overrepresentation and quality in the congress abstract traditionally overrepresentation has been used to explain the distribution of benefits across jurisdictions leaving aside quality components we present a model that demonstrates that in the dispute of limited federal benefits although quantity is important at the margin quality matters

accountability and decentralisation in government an incomplete contracts model this paper approaches the question of the appropriate level of decentralisation of power in government as a problem in the allocation of control rights under incomplete contracts the model of the paper compares allocations of power to local central and regional government as alternative means of motivating governments to act in the interests of citizens centralisation allows benefits from policy coordination but has costs in terms of diminished accountability which can be precisely defined as the reduced probability that the welfare of a given region can determine the re election of the government the model is extended to allow for conflicts of interest within regions and externalities between central and local governments in a federation it is also applied to determining levels of fiscal transfer between localities and to circumstances where governments may act as leviathans appropriating resources for their own use

beyond the fiction of federalism macroeconomic management in multitiered systems recent research on federalism is extremely divided while some tout the benefits of market preserving federalism others point to the fragmentation and incoherence of policy in federal states this research bridges the divide by analyzing the political and fiscal structures that are likely to account for the highly divergent economic experiences of federal systems around the world to test these propositions the authors use an original data set to conduct analyses of budget balance and inflation in fifteen federations around the world from 1978 through 1996 the empirical research suggests that the level of fiscal decentralization the nature of intergovernmental finance and vertical partisan relations all influence macroeconomic outcomes the findings have broad implications for the widespread move toward greater decentralization and for the theoretical literatures on federalism and macroeconomics

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

on the need for fiscal constraints in a monetary union the desirability of fiscal constraints in monetary unions depends critically on whether the monetary authority can commit to following its policies if it can commit then debt constraints can only impose costs if it cannot commit then fiscal policy has a free rider problem and debt constraints may be desirable this type of free rider problem is new and arises only because of a time inconsistency problem

political alternation and the fiscal deficits abstract this paper proposes the index of political alternation as a long run measure of political competition it expands the empirical literature on political determinants of fiscal performance and presents evidence for argentina that amplifications of governments planning horizon enhance fiscal performance

the competitive externalities and the optimal seignorage this study analyzes the inflation tax in an economy with several competing decisionmakers who can effectively print more money via the central bank the author derives the sequential rational expectation equilibrium and shows that the presence of competing decisionmakers increases the inflation rate and may put the economy on the wrong side of the inflation tax laffer curve the analysis is interpreted for a country consisting of several states or provinces where the centralized government system is weak similar results apply to the case of competing ministers in an economy where the central bank is weak copyright 1992 by ohio state university press

fiscal federalism in argentina policies politics and institutional reform argentine fiscal federalism is considered to be very inefficient by all specialists its allocation of tax and spending authorities and its system of intergovernme ntal transfers do not correspond to any economic criteria and provide all sorts of perverse incentives and obstacles for sound economic policies agreeing with the above diagnostic we attempt to take a step further and to provide an explanation for the many inefficient features of argentine fiscal federalism in order to do that we apply and further develop an approach presented in spiller and tommasi 2000 that tries to explain public policies as the outcome of political transactions these approach argues that the nature and characteristics of the observed policies will be conditioned by the rules of the political game under which those t policies are made hence it re focuses policy recommendations from the level of policy reform to the level of institutional reforms with emphasis on political institutions

devolving fiscal policy migration and tax yields abstractdevolution of taxes to sub national jurisdictions could reduce expected tax revenue if some households move to lower tax regimes constraining devolved government policy this paper develop

securitization of mortgage debt domestic lending and international risk sharing securitization makes mortgage related risks internationally tradeable and thus contributes considerably to the international diversification of macroeconomic risk in the years 2003 2008 the increase in international cross holdings of securitized mortgage debt has lowered industrialized countries conditional consumption volatility relative to the united states by about 10 15 percentage points we turn to the role of domestic credit in explaining this result domestic credit leads to better international risk sharing only if debt is securitized and traded internationally conversely the risk sharing benefits from securitization seem to evaporate if credit dries up as it did in the recent financial crisis la titrisation fait que les risques attaches aux hypotheques peuvent etre transiges internationalement voila qui contribue de maniere significative a la diversification internationale des risques macroeconomiques dans les annees 2003 2008 l accroissement dans la dette hypothecaire titrisee detenue dans d autres pays a reduit la volatilite de la consommation relative par rapport aux etats unis des pays industrialises de 10 15 points de pourcentage on examine le role du credit domestique dans l explication de ce resultat on montre que le credit domestique entraine un meilleur partage international du risque seulement si la dette est titrisee et negociee internationalement a contrario les avantages de la titrisation semblent s evaporer si le credit s asseche comme ce fut le cas dans la recente crise financiere

second generation fiscal federalism the implications of fiscal incentives abstract first generation fiscal federalism fgff studies the performance of decentralized systems under the assumption of benevolent social planners second generation fiscal federalism sgff studies performance based on the fiscal and political incentives facing subnational officials the paper focuses on three aspects of sgff first it considers the design of intergovernmental transfers while fgff emphasizes correcting vertical and horizontal equity sgff emphasizes the importance of fiscal incentives for producing local economic prosperity sgff extends fgff approaches by showing how non linear transfer systems can produce both equalization and high marginal fiscal incentives to produce local economic growth second the paper raises the fiscal incentive approach showing how different tax systems produce different fiscal incentives for political officials to choose policies third the paper discusses the interaction of democracy and fiscal federalism

independent and competing agencies an effective way to control government controlling government is a primary focus of the politico economic literature recently various political institutions have been analyzed from this perspective most importantly balanced budget rules fiscal federalism and direct democracy however one type of institution has been neglected so far elected competitors to the government such institutional competition between the government and an independent agency can be found at the swiss local level where finance commissions compete with the government in some parts of switzerland local finance commissions can ex ante criticize government projects and bring alternative policy proposals onto the political agenda which are then voted on by the citizens thus they become strong competitors to the government we econometrically investigate this institutional setting by comparing the 26 swiss cantons we find the power of the local finance commission to have an economically relevant statistically significant and robust negative effect on the tax burden and on public expenditures

drowned by numbers stabilization properties of an eu wide unemployment insurance system the recent crisis has given rise to proposals for the creation of a european unemployment insurance system we simulate an eu wide mechanism under various scenarios varying methods of financing common or country specific contribution rates and triggers for pay outs all time or contingent clauses we analyse the impact of the system using different measures of stabilization under different fiscal multipliers a system operating during bad times periods where the increase in unemployment is large would reduce gdp growth variability but also growth correlation among member countries hence there is a trade off between stabilization and synchronization of national business cycles

fiscal devolution and dependency public spending devolution in practice is widely seen as more appropriate for addressing varied political aspirations within state boundaries than is tax devolution a drawback is that devolved public spending may be subject to irresistible upward pressure as illustrated by formula drift of the united kingdom devolved administrations by crowding out the private sector such public spending can exacerbate the problem it was originally intended to alleviate when taxpayers do not value increases in government output at least as highly as the private goods and services they must forgo to finance them then the public sector is too large this article estimates a three sector hecksher ohlin model of the economy with the greatest relative rise of the public spending ratio in the united kingdom wales simulation of the model shows a net gain in employment from a 1 cut in income tax matched by a corresponding reduction in government spending this result is consistent with the current level of intergovernme

risk sharing and industrial specialization regional and international evidence the authors provide empirical evidence that risk sharing enhances specialization in production to the best of their knowledge this well established and important theoretical proposition has not been tested before the empirical procedure is summarized as follows first the authors construct a measure of specialization in production and calculate an index of specialization for each of the european community ec and non ec oecd countries u s states canadian provinces japanese prefectures latin american countries and regions of italy spain and the united kingdom then they estimate the degree of capital market integration a measure of risk sharing within each of these groups of regions the ec countries the non ec oecd countries the united states canada japan italy spain and the united kingdom and rely on another author s estimate for latin america finally they perform a regression of the specialization index on the degree of risk sharing controlling for relevant economic variables they find a positive and significant relation between the degree of specialization of individual members of a group of countries provinces states or prefectures and the amount of risk that is shared within the group the authors perform regressions using variables such as shareholder rights and the size of the financial sector relative to gdp as instruments for the amount of inter regional risk sharing these regressions confirm that risk sharing facilitated by a favorable legal environment and a developed financial system is a direct causal determinant of industrial specialization this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

why does capital flow to rich states abstract the magnitude and the direction of net international capital flows do not fit neoclassical models the fifty u s states comprise an integrated capital market with very low barriers to cap

government spending entry and the consumption crowding in puzzle this article documents empirically that net firm entry robustly rises after a u s government spending expansion we use this new finding to test the empirical validity of various model features that have been proposed to generate consumption crowding in after positive expenditure shocks endogenous entry models typically fail to generate the observed joint increase in consumption and entry model features that dampen the wealth effect such as rule of thumb households or complementarity between labor and consumption in preferences tend to reduce entry we show that utility or productivity enhancing public spending can reconcile the model with our documented fact and performs well empirically

debt bailouts and constitutions a demand based theory of sub national debt bailouts is presented it is shown that revenue sharing rs arrangements alter the demand for bailouts among politicians with regional constituencies as a bailout usually implies a shift of taxation to the federal tier automatic rs may lead to the formation of pro bailout coalitions formed by indebted states and states that are net recipients of the rs arrangement also rs can act as a commitment device for compensating payments among state representatives making a bailout politically rational the model shows that the state debt bailouts approved by the brazilian senate prior to the enactment of the fiscal responsibility act were fully consistent with politicians that maximize the proceeds accruing to their constituencies

is it is or is it ain t my obligation regional debt in a fiscal federation this article studies the repayment of regional debt in a multiregion economy with a central authority who pays the obligation issued by a region with commitment the central government will use its economy wide taxation power in support of its objective to smooth distortionary taxes and consumption across regions absent commitment this tool of the central government may be exploited to induce it to bail out regional government deficits we characterize the conditions under which bailouts occur and their welfare implications in particular we show when the gains from a federation may outweigh the welfare costs of a bailout we use these insights to comment on actual fiscal relations in three quite different federations the united states the european union and argentina

the populist road to market reform policy and electoral coalitions in mexico and argentina governing parties face two fundamental tasks they must pursue policies effectively and they must win elections their national coalitions therefore generally include two types of constituencies those that are important for policy making and those that make it possible to win elections in effect governing parties must bring together a policy coalition and an electoral coalition this distinction sheds light on how the transitional costs of major economic policy shifts can be made sustainable in electoral terms it also provides a starting point for analysis of how two of latin america s most important labor based parties the peronist party in argentina and the partido revolucionario institucional pri in mexico maintained electoral dominance while pursuing free market reforms that adversely affected key social constituencies peronism and the pri are conceived of as having encompassed historically two distinctive and regionally based subcoalitions a metropolitan coalition that gave support to the parties development strategies and a peripheral coalition that carried the burden of generating electoral majorities this framework permits a reconceptualization of the historic coalitional dynamics of peronism and the pri and sheds light on the current process of coalitional change and economic reform

does financial globalization promote risk sharing article i nfo in theory one of the main benefits of financial globalization is that it should allow for more efficient international risk sharing in this paper we provide an empirical evaluation of the patterns of risk sharing among different groups of countries and examine how international financial integration has affected the evolution of these patterns using a variety of empirical techniques we conclude that there is at best a modest degree of international risk sharing and certainly nowhere near the levels predicted by theory in addition only industrial countries have attained better risk sharing outcomes during the recent period of globalization developing countries have by and large been shut out of this benefit even emerging market economies many of which have reduced capital controls and all of which have witnessed large increases in cross border capital flows have seen little change in their ability to share risk we find that the composition of flows may help explain why emerging markets have not been able to realize this presumed benefi to f financial globalization in particular our results suggest that portfolio debt which had dominated the external liability stocks of most emerging markets until recently is not conducive to risk sharing