prices and the winner s curse we usually assume that increases in supply allocation by rationing and exclusion of potential buyers reduce prices but all these activities raise the expected price in an important set of cases when common value assets are sold furthermore when we make the assumptions needed to rule out these anomalies for symmetric buyers small asymmetries among the buyers necessarily cause the anomalies to reappear our results help explain rationing in initial public offerings and outcomes of spectrum auctions we illustrate our results in the wallet game and in another new game we introduce the maximum game

search platforms showrooming and price parity clauses we provide a model in which consumers can search for rms directly or through a platform the platform lowers search costs and provides convenience benets but charges rms for the transactions it facilitates in equilibrium we show consumers buy through the platform despite rms setting higher prices on the platform higher prices on the platform give rise to the possibility of showrooming in which consumers search on the platform but then switch and buy directly to take advantage of lower direct prices in settings like this search platforms like amazon s marketplace and booking com have adopted price parity clauses requiring rms oer their best prices on the platform arguing this is needed to prevent showrooming we use our model to evaluate the implications of showrooming and price parity clauses

on the dynamics of demand for leisure and the production of health our article develops and estimates a structural model of household health production that jointly determines the demand for leisure and the demand for consumption for elderly males we use a stochastic dynamic programming framework based on the assumption that an individual maximizes lifetime utility subject to budget and time constraints and a health production function by choosing hours of leisure and levels of consumption of health related and health neutral goods and services moreover we use a very comprehensive health index that combines four scales measuring a variety of dimensions in the quality of life the euler equations derived from our model are estimated using data from six biennial panels of the retirement history survey

price coherence and excessive intermediation suppose an intermediary provides a benefit to buyers when they purchase from sellers using the intermediary s technology we develop a model to show that the intermediary would want to restrict sellers from charging buyers more for transactions it intermediates with this restriction an intermediary can profitably raise demand for its services by eliminating any extra price buyers face for purchasing through the intermediary we show that this leads to inflated retail prices excessive adoption of the intermediaries services over investment in benefits to buyers and a reduction in consumer surplus and sometimes welfare competition among intermediaries intensifies these problems by increasing the magnitude of their effects and broadening the circumstances in which they arise we discuss applications to payment card systems travel reservation systems rebate services and various other intermediaries jel codes d40 l11 l14 l42

first party content and coordination in two sided markets the strategic use of first party content by two sided platforms is driven by two key factors the nature of buyer and seller expectations favorable versus unfavorable and the nature of the relationship between first party content and third party content complements or substitutes platforms facing unfavorable expectations face an additional constraint their prices and first party content investment need to be such that low zero participation equilibria are eliminated this additional constraint typically leads them to invest more less in first party content relative to platforms facing favorable expectations when first and third party content are substitutes complements these results hold with both simultaneous and sequential entry of the two sides with two competing platforms incumbent facing favorable expectations and entrant facing unfavorable expectations and multi homing on one side of the market the incumbent always invests weakly more in first party content relative to the case in which it is a monopolist this paper was accepted by bruno cassiman business strategy

platform competition in two sided markets many if not most markets with network externalities are two sided to succeed platforms in industries such as software portals and media payment systems and the internet must get both sides of the market on board accordingly platforms devote much attention to their business model that is to how they court each side while making money overall this paper builds a model of platform competition with two sided markets it unveils the determinants of price allocation and end user surplus for different governance structures profit maximizing platforms and not for profit joint undertakings and compares the outcomes with those under an integrated monopolist and a ramsey planner jel l5 l82 l86 l96

evaluation of the subjective probabilities of survival in the health and retirement study in the health and retirement study respondents were asked about the chances they would live to 75 or to 85 we analyze these responses to determine if they behave like probabilities of survival if their averages are close to average probabilities in the population and if they have correlations with other variables that are similar to correlations with actual mortality outcomes we find that generally they do behave like probabilities and that they do aggregate to population probabilities most remarkable however is that they covary with other variables in the same way actual outcomes vary with the variables for example respondents with higher socioeconomic status give higher probabilities of survival whereas respondents who smoke give lower probabilities we conclude that these measures of subjective probabilities have great potential use in models of intertemporal decision making under uncertainty

platform intermediation in a market for differentiated products we study a two sided market where a platform attracts firms selling differentiated products and buyers interested in those products in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game the platform fully internalises the network externalities present in the market and firms and consumers all participate in the platform with probability one the monopolist intermediary extracts all the economic rents generated in the market except when firms and consumers can trade outside the platform in which case consumers obtain a rent that corresponds to the utility they would get if they did trade outside the platform the market allocation is constraint efficient in the sense that the monopoly platform does not introduce distortions over and above those arising from the market power of the differentiated product sellers an increase in the number of retailers increases the amount of variety in the platform but at the same time increases competition as a result the platform lowers the firm fees and raises the consumer charges in contrast an increase in the extent of product differentiation raises the value of the platform for the consumers but weakens competition in this case the platform raises both the charge to the consumers and the fee for the firms

expanding the life cycle model precautionary saving and public policy one of the key puzzles in understanding saving behavior is not so much why people save the title of this session but why people don t save according to the familiar life cycle model households should accumulate wealth to provide for their retirement consumption the surprising result from the data is the sizable fraction of the population who have accumulated so little even among those nearing retirement given that earnings will almost surely decline when households retire such behavior can imply poor living standards for the elderly some might interpret the low wealth accumulation as being evidence of myopia irrationality or a failure of households to enforce mental accounting richard thaler 1994 while others might view the low level of wealth accumulation as evidence of high individual rates of time preference determining the underlying causes of low wealth is crucial for public policies that seek to alleviate low aggregate saving rates in the united states as well as policies that seek to buttress the adequacy of financial resources for the elderly in this paper we outline what we believe to be the causes of why many people do not save we conclude by speculating about government policies that may be most effective at encouraging saving much of the research examining levels of consumption saving and wealth as well as their responsiveness to policy has been done using a life cycle model with the simplifying assumption of perfect certainty alan auerbach and laurence kotlikoff 1987 for example developed a model with 55 overlapping generations of individual lifecycle households each with empirically plausible age earnings profiles and utility parameters and used the model to address tax policy and demographic issues in a regime in which all households are identical within a generation and all generations know future earnings and interest rates more recently a line of inquiry has examined the effects of uncertainty on saving generally in the context of highly stylized models this research has shown that in these models uninsured earnings uncertainty can alter optimal saving behavior in a variety of important ways for a partial review of this precautionary saving literature see hubbard et al 1994 in two recent papers hubbard et al 1993 1994 we have combined these two strands of the literature by examining the implications of a life cycle model of consumption saving and wealth accumulation subject to what we think are the three most important sources of uninsured idiosyncratic risk facing households uncertainty about earnings medical expenses and length of life our intent has been to create a realistic model in which families live for many periods working for part of their lives and retiring later in life to parameterize the uncertainty facing families we estimate tdiscussants christopher carroll federal reserve board john b shoven stanford university laurence kotlikoff boston university

life cycle responses to health insurance status this paper studies the lifetime effects of exogenous changes in health insurance coverage e g medicare ppaca termination of employer provided plans on the dynamic optimal allocation consumption leisure health expenditures status health and wealth and welfare we solve simulate and structurally estimate a parsimonious life cycle model with endogenous exposure to morbidity and mortality risks and exogenous health insurance by varying coverage we identify the marginal effects of insurance when young and or when old on allocations statuses and welfare our results highlight positive effects of insurance on health wealth and welfare as well as mid life substitution away from healthy leisure in favor of more health expenses caused by peaking wages and accelerating health issues

price and variety in the spokes model the spokes model of nonlocalized spatial competition provides a new analytical tool for dierentiated oligopoly and a representation of spatial monopolistic competition an increase in the number of rms leads to lower equilibrium prices when consumers have relatively high product valuations but surprisingly to higher equilibrium prices for in termediate consumer valuations new entry alters consumer and social welfare through price market expansion and matching eects with free entry the market may pro vide too many or too few varieties from a social welfare perspective and the equilibrium price remains above marginal cost even when the number of rms is arbitrarily large

monopolistic competiton on the pyramid the purpose of this paper is to develop a model of monopolistic competition that has a simple locational interpretation and which allows for multifirm competition one of the major weaknesses of the standard circular road model is the fact that it allows only localized competition this creates problems when one wishes to analyze problems of international trade where one often has to work with firms with different production costs one of the major advantages of the pyramid model presented here is that one can easily compute the firms equilibrium profits even when their production costs differ copyright 1991 by blackwell publishing ltd

economic status and health in childhood the origins of the gradient the well known positive association between health and income in adulthood has antecedents in childhood not only is children s health positively related to household income but the relationship between household income and children s health becomes more pronounced as children age part of the relationship can be explained by the arrival and impact of chronic conditions children from lower income households with chronic conditions have worse health than do those from higher income households the adverse health effects of lower income accumulate over children s lives part of the intergenerational transmission of socioeconomic status may work through the impact of parents income on children s health

uncertain medical expenses and precautionary saving near the end of the life cycle this paper introduces a dynamic structural model of household consumption decisions in which elderly families consider the effects of uncertain future medical expenses when deciding current levels of consumption the model with uncertain medical expenses implies a potentially important role for precautionary saving incentives to explain slow rates of dissaving among elderly americans during retirement rather than just simulating the stochastic dynamic model preference parameters are estimated using panel data on health wealth and expenditures for retired families the health uncertainty model predicts consumption levels closer to observed expenditures than a life cycle model with uncertain longevity however elderly families typically dissave their financial assets more slowly than even the baseline health uncertainty model predicts is optimal

chicken and egg competition among intermediation service providers we analyze a model of imperfect price competition between intermediation service providers we insist on features that are relevant for informational intermediation via the internet the presence of indirect network externalities the possibility of using the nonexclusive services of several intermediaries and the widespread practice of price discrimination based on users identity and on usage efficient market structures emerge in equilibrium as well as some specific form of inefficient structures intermediaries have incentives to propose non exclusive services as this moderates competition and allows them to exert market power we analyze in detail the pricing and business strategies followed by intermediation services providers copyright 2003 by the rand corporation

equilibrium with product differentiation tive consumer formulations is used to examine the properties of single and multiple price equilibria conditions under which decreases in the intensity of consumer preferences reduce price are given it is shown that with certain types of demand curves entry can eliminate price cost markups even given product differentiation if competition is localized it is demonstrated that entry does not affect the markup finally the effect of spurious product differentiation on price is examined

platform competition and seller investment incentives many products and services are not sold on open platforms but on competing for profit platforms which charge buyers and sellers for access what is the effect of for profit intermediation on seller investment incentives since for profit intermediaries reduce the available rents in the market one might naively suspect that sellers have weaker investment incentives with competing for profit platforms however we show that for profit intermediation may lead to overinvestment when free access would lead to underinvestment because investment decisions affect the strength of indirect network effects and thus access prices we characterize the effect of for profit intermediation on investment incentives depending on the nature of the investment and on which side of the market singlehomes

debt and the marginal tax rate abstract do taxes affect corporate debt policy this paper tests whether the incremental use of debt is positively related to simulated firm specific marginal tax rates that account for net operating losses investment tax credits and the alternative minimum tax the simulated marginal tax rates exhibit substantial variation due to the dynamics of the tax code tax regime shifts business cycle effects and the progressive nature of the statutory tax schedule using annual data from more than 10 000 firms for the years 1980 1992 i provide evidence which indicates that high tax rate firms issue more debt than their low tax rate counterparts

education and family health care spending michael grossman s seminal work on the demand for health extended the concept of a household production function to the commodity good health in this framework education represents an environmental variable that enhances the monetary returns to investments in health through the use of time and medical care in health production using data from the 2004 to 2012 medical expenditure panel survey meps we examine the association between parental education and family health care spending in single mother and two parent families we estimate one and two part expenditure models for total family health care spending for specific components of such spending and also examine the impact of parental education on selected measures of family health controlling for family income and health insurance status we find consistent evidence that parental education beyond 12 years of schooling is associated with increases in family health care spending and with reductions in the likelihood of adverse health conditions

competition through commissions and kickbacks in markets for retail financial products and health services consumers often rely on the advice of intermediaries to decide which specialized offering best fits their needs product providers in turn compete to influence the intermediaries advice through hidden kickbacks or disclosed commissions motivated by the controversial role of these widespread practices we formulate a model to analyze competition through commissions from a positive and normative standpoint the model highlights the role of commissions in making the advisor responsive to supply side incentives we characterize situations when commonly adopted policies such as mandatory disclosure and caps on commissions have unintended welfare consequences jel d21 d82 d83 g21 l15 l25

contracting with externalities the paper studies inefficiencies arising in contracting between one principal and n agents when the utility of each agent depends on all agents trades with the principal when the principal commits to a set of publicly observable bilateral contract offers the arising inefficiency is due entirely to the externalities imposed on non signers in contrast when the principal s offers are privately observed the distortion is due to the externalities given agents equilibrium trades comparison of the two externalities determines the relative efficiency of the two contracting regimes in both cases we show that when n is large each agent can be treated as non pivotal provided that appropriate continuity assumptions are satisfied we also study the case in which the principal can condition each agent s trade on other agents messages we characterize the set of such mechanisms in which each agent s participation is voluntary when the principal can commit to any such mechanism she implements the first best outcome while threatening each deviator with the harshest possible punishment however in the presence of noise that goes to zero slower than n goes to infinity in the limit we obtain a generally inefficient outcome in which each agent feels non pivotal

cooperation among competitors some economics of payment card associations we analyze platforms in two sided markets with network externalities using the specific context of a payment card association we study the cooperative determination of the interchange fee by member banks the interchange fee is the access charge paid by the merchants banks the acquirers to cardholders banks the issuers we develop a framework in which banks and merchants may have market power and consumers and merchants decide rationally on whether to buy or accept a payment card after drawing the welfare implications of a cooperative determination of the interchange fee we describe in detail the factors affecting merchant resistance compare cooperative and for profit business models and make a first cut in the analysis of system competition

investment incentives and corporate tax asymmetries abstract recent facts on the importance of corporate losses motivate more careful study of the impact of tax incentives for investment on firms that lose money i model firm investment decisions in a setting featuring financing constraints and carrybacks and carryforwards of operating losses i estimate investment responses to tax incentives allowing effects to vary with cash flows and taxable status results suggest that asymmetries in the corporate tax code could have made recent bonus depreciation tax incentives at most 4 less effective than they would have been if all firms were fully taxable cash flows have more important effects on the impact of tax incentives recent declines in cash flows would predict a 24 decrease in the effectiveness of bonus depreciation results thus suggest that tax incentives have the smallest impact on investment exactly when they are most likely to be put in place during downturns in economic activity when cash flows are low

the demand for episodes of treatment in the health insurance experiment abstract this paper analyzes claims data from the rand health insurance experiment which were grouped into episodes of treatment the insurance plans in the experiment have coinsurance and a cap on out of pocket spending using new statistical techniques to adjust for the increased sickliness of those who exceed the cap the effects of coinsurance on cost per episode and number of episodes are estimated cost sharing reduced the number of episodes but had little effect on cost per episode people in the experiment responded myopically as their current insurance status changed through the year the price elasticity of spending was about 0 2 throughout the range of coinsurance studied when data permit it the study of episodes complements analyses of annual medical spending by revealing more about how decisions to spend are made within the year

missed sales and the pricing of ancillary goods firms often sell a basic good as well as ancillary ones hold up concerns have led to ancillary good regulations such as transparency and price caps the hold up narrative however runs counter to evidence in many retail settings where ancillary good prices are set below cost e g free shipping or limited card surcharging in countries where the no surcharge rule was lifted we argue that the key to unifying these conflicting narratives is that the seller may absorb partly or fully the ancillary good s cost so as not to miss sales on the basic good a supplier with market power on the ancillary good market then takes advantage of cost absorption and jacks up its wholesale price hold ups occur only when consumers are initially uninformed or naive about the drip price and shopping costs are high the price of the basic good then acts as a signal of the drip price since a high markup on the basic good makes the firm more wary of missed sales regardless of whether consumers are informed uninformed but rational or naive mandating price transparency and banning loss making on the ancillary good leads to i an efficient consumption of the ancillary good and ii a reduction of its wholesale price generating strict welfare gains

the agency model and mfn clauses i provide an analysis of vertical relations in markets with imperfect competition at both layers of the supply chain and where exchange is intermediated either with wholesale prices or revenue sharing contracts revenue sharing is extremely attractive to firms that are able to set the revenue shares but often makes the firms that set retail prices worse off this is so whether revenue sharing lowers or raises industry profits these results are strengthened when a market moves from the wholesale model of sales to the agency model of sales which results in retailers setting revenue shares and suppliers setting retail prices i also show that retail price parity restrictions raise industry prices these results provide a potential explanation for why many online retailers have adopted the agency model and retail price parity clauses

the effects of health wealth and wages on labour supply and retirement behaviour this paper estimates a life cycle model of labour supply retirement and savings behaviour in which future health status and wages are uncertain individuals face a fixed cost of work and cannot borrow against future labour pension or social security income the method of simulated moments is used to match the life cycle profiles of labour force participation hours worked and assets that are estimated from the data to those that are generated by the model the model establishes that the tax structure of the social security system and pensions are key determinants of the high observed job exit rates at ages 62 and 65 removing the tax wedge embedded in the social security earnings test for individuals aged 65 and older would delay job exit by almost one year by contrast social security benefit levels health and borrowing constraints are less important determinants of job exit at older ages for example reducing social security benefits by 20 would cause workers to delay exit from the labour force by only three months

the distribution of lifetime medicare benefits taxes and premiums evidence from individual level data abstract the absence of individual level data linking earnings histories to the receipt of medicare benefits has hampered the study of the program s distributional properties data developed by the social security administration for an early cohort of medicare beneficiaries includes both earnings records and medicare payment records and thus overcomes this limitation for this early cohort lifetime benefits and taxes are found to rise with lifetime earnings but taxes rise more rapidly resulting in redistribution from higher to lower earning beneficiaries lifetime benefits in the top decile of the earnings distribution are 19 higher than in the bottom decile but taxes and premiums are four times higher in the top than in the bottom decile once taxes and premiums are subtracted net benefits in the top decile are 79 of net benefits in the bottom decile

the demand for health and health concerns after 30 years michael grossman s seminal model stressed that health production requires both goods and time yet recent empirical health research focuses primarily on personal medical care to the exclusion of other inputs to health future research should place greater emphasis on the roles of non medical consumption goods population level inputs and time in producing health capital improved information technology will allow researchers to dissect how education promotes efficiency in combining goods and time to produce health economic analyses of child health which is the antecedent of adult health must proceed in tandem with medical advances in understanding health development in childhood

two sided network effects a theory of information product design how can firms profitably give away free products this paper provides a novel answer and articulates trade offs in a space of information product design we introduce a formal model of two sided network externalities based in textbook economics a mix of katz and shapiro network effects price discrimination and product differentiation externality based complements however exploit a different mechanism than either tying or lock in even as they help to explain many recent strategies such as those of firms selling operating systems internet browsers games music and video the model presented here argues for three simple but useful results first even in the absence of competition a firm can rationally invest in a product it intends to give away into perpetuity second we identify distinct markets for content providers and end consumers and show that either can be a candidate for a free good third product coupling across markets can increase consumer welfare even as it increases firm profits the model also generates testable hypotheses on the size and direction of network effects while offering insights to regulators seeking to apply antitrust law to network markets

healthy bodies and thick wallets the dual relation between health and economic status there is abundant evidence of a quantitatively large association between many measures of economic status including income and wealth and a variety of health outcomes such as mortality or morbidity however considerable and often heated debate remains especially across disciplines about the direction of causation and about why the association arises although medical scientists are often convinced that the dominant if not exclusive pathway is that variation in socioeconomic status produces health disparities they are increasingly debating among themselves about why low economic status might lead to poor health at least for modern industrial countries 1 the old standby arguments the less well to do have access to less or lower quality medical care or a stronger pattern of deleterious personal behaviors have been rejected as insufficient instead a series of intriguing competing theories have arisen that emphasize long term impacts of early childhood or even inter uterine environmental factors the cumulative effects of prolonged exposures to individual stressful events or reactions to macro societal factors such as rising levels of income inequality a common link is that each theory attempts to document the physiological processes through which low economic status leads to poorer health while these scientific questions are extremely important this research has taken place with little input from economists economists are now making contributions about the alternative pathway the impact poor health may have on economic resources poor health may restrict a family s capacity to earn income or to accumulate assets by limiting work or by raising medical expenses at a minimum this work should provide a caution against exaggerating the magnitude of causation from economic status to health outcomes but the potential contribution runs deeper as people age the evolving variation in individual health outcomes may offer additional statistical information to estimate parameters of household savings and consumption behavior that so far have proven to be somewhat elusive thus incorporating health uncertainty and risk into economic models should eventually enrich our understanding of basic tenets of household behavior the first section of this paper documents the size of the association between health and one prominent economic status measure household wealth section two deals with how health influences economic status by sketching out reasons why health may alter household savings and eventually wealth and then providing estimates of the empirical magnitude of these effects section three shifts attention to the alternative pathway the links between economic status and health and summarizes 2major controversies and evidence surrounding these issues

tax reform and adjustment costs the impact on investment and market value this paper provides an effective tax rate measure that is valid in the presence of adjustment costs and anticipated tax changes and a measure of the impact of tax changes on market value that may be decomposed into the effects on discounted pure profits and normal returns to capital changes in the value of capital may in turn be decomposed further into changes in the marginal value of new capital and changes in the relative value of new and existing capital these new measures are used to evaluate tax changes similar to those introduced by the recent u s tax reform copyright 1989 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

must take cards merchant discounts and avoided costs antitrust authorities often argue that merchants cannot reasonably turn down payment cards and therefore must accept excessively high merchant discounts the paper attempts to shed light on this must take cards view from two angles first the paper gives some operational content to the notion of must take card through the avoided cost test or tourist test would the merchant want to refuse a card payment when a non repeat customer with enough cash in her pocket is about to pay at the cash register it analyzes its relevance as an indicator of excessive interchange fees second it identifies four key sources of potential social biases in the payment card systems determination of interchange fees internalization by merchants of a fraction of cardholder surplus issuers per transaction markup merchant heterogeneity and extent of cardholder multi homing it compares the industry and social optima both in the short term fixed number of issuers and the long term in which issuer offerings and entry respond to profitability

what did medicare do the initial impact of medicare on mortality and out of pocket medical spending abstract we study the impact of the introduction of one of the major pillars of the social insurance system in the united states the introduction of medicare in 1965 our results suggest that in its first 10 years the establishment of universal health insurance for the elderly had no discernible impact on elderly mortality however we find a substantial reduction in the elderly s exposure to out of pocket medical expenditure risk specifically we estimate that the introduction of medicare was associated with a 40 decline in out of pocket spending for the top quartile of the out of pocket spending distribution a stylized expected utility framework suggests that the welfare gains from such reductions in risk exposure alone may be sufficient to cover almost two fifths of the costs of medicare these findings underscore the importance of considering the direct insurance benefits from public health insurance programs in addition to any indirect benefits from an effect on health

market failures and public policy industrial organization studies the exercise and control of market power to this purpose it builds models that capture the essence of the situation the predictions of the model can then be tested econometrically and possibly in the lab or the field in the end the reasonableness of and robustness to modeling assumptions and the quality of empirical fit determine how confident economists are in making recommendations to public decision makers for intervention and to companies for the design of their business model industrial organization has a long tradition first theoretical with the work of french engineer economists antoine augustin cournot 1838 and jules dupuit 1844 then policy oriented with the enactment of the sherman act 1890 and subsequent legislation then descriptive with the studies of the harvard school structure conduct performance comforting and refining the antitrust drive and finally skeptical with the chicago school the chicago school correctly pointed out the lack of underlying theoretical doctrine and went on to cast doubt on the whole edifice it however did not develop an alternative antitrust doctrine perhaps because

information gatekeepers on the internet and the competitiveness of homogeneous product markets we examine the equilibrium interaction between a market for price information controlled by a gatekeeper and the homogenous product market it serves the gatekeeper charges fees to firms that advertise prices on its internet site and to consumers who access the list of advertised prices gatekeeper profits are maximized in an equilibrium where a the product market exhibits price dispersion b access fees are sufficiently low that all consumers subscribe c advertising fees exceed socially optimal levels thus inducing partial firm participation and d advertised prices are below unadvertised prices introducing the market for information has ambiguous social welfare effects

temporary investment tax incentives theory with evidence from bonus depreciation even modest reductions in the after tax cost of capital purchases provide strong incentives for increased investment indeed for tax subsidies that are temporary and for capital goods that are very long lived the incentive to invest when the after tax price is temporarily low is essentially infinite firms that would have purchased new capital equipment in the future instead make their purchases during the period of the subsidy for tax increases the effects are the opposite firms that would have normally invested now delay until the tax rate returns to normal we present a model of the equilibrium effects of temporary investment tax incentives the model reveals a simple relationship between the shadow price of investment goods and the size of a temporary investment tax incentive specifically for sufficiently long lived capital goods goods with very low rates of economic depreciation and for sufficiently short lived investment tax subsidies the shadow value of capital should be nearly unchanged and thus the pre tax shadow price of capital goods should fully reflect the magnitude of the tax subsidy this result holds regardless of the elasticity of investment supply and regardless of the underlying demand for capital instead it relies only on the firm s ability to arbitrage predictable movements in the after tax price of long lived capital over time two conclusions immediately follow first observ ing price increases following a temporary tax incentive is not evidence that investment supply is relatively inelastic a temporary investment tax subsidy can substantially affect investment even if it bids up the price of investment sharply second because economic theory dictates that the shadow price of investment moves one for one with a temporary tax subsidy the elasticity of supply can be inferred from quantity data alone recent changes in us tax law allow us to use the model and its implications to estimate struc tural parameters that govern the supply of investment the 2002 and 2003 tax bills provided temporarily accelerated tax depreciation called bonus depreciation for certain types of qualified capital goods under the 2002 bill firms could immediately deduct 30 percent of investment purchases and then depreciate the remaining 70 percent under standard depreciation schedules

the impact of depreciation savings on investment evidence from the corporate alternative minimum tax over the past decade the united states has offered investment incentives in the form of larger depreciation savings namely bonus depreciation the neoclassical investment model implies that investment responds to changes in depreciation savings but there have been few direct attempts to investigate this implication this paper examines investment patterns surrounding the 1999 shortening of the alternative minimum tax amt depreciation recovery periods finding strong evidence that firms subject to the amt increase investment in response to the amt reform the empirical results show that firms subject to the amt increase their investment measured as the ratio of capital expenditures to capital stock by around 0 0418 to 0 0622 compared to firms subject to the regular tax given their average annual investment rate of approximately 0 27 during this period the results imply a relative increase in investment of 15 23 by contrast i find that the 2002 introduction of bonus depreciation available both for firms subject to the regular tax and for firms subject to the amt affects both groups of firms similarly the estimation uses an empirical specification developed from the summers 1981 tax adjusted q model and the results imply that the responsiveness of investment to the tax term is somewhat larger than previously estimated

platform monopolization by narrow ppc bpg combination booking et al abstract the price parity clauses ppcs that online booking platforms impose have come under antitrust scrutiny wang and wright 2017 show how by preventing showrooming a narrow ppc can reduce search costs and benefit consumers under between platform competition in response to having to give up its wide ppc to hotels booking com emphasized its best price guarantee bpg to customers we observe that a narrow ppc combined with a low hassle costs bpg leaves only wang and wright s price parity and monopoly equilibrium ppme in which consumers are worse off than with no platform operating at all a more efficient incumbent platform can deter entry with the bpg while the narrow ppc eliminates competition from direct sales channels an equally efficient platform could enter and compete consumer prices down because of the existence of hassle costs yet this equilibrium is fragile to network effects if sellers have incentives not to price differentiate between platform s and their direct sales channel a narrow ppc alone suffices to sustain the ppme in both cases the detrimental pricing contract combination that we point out calls for different platform competition policy