geographic mobility race and wage differentials abstract this paper analyzes the relationship between geographic mobility and earnings we present an equilibrium search model that yields differences between the reservation wages of mobile and immobile workers the expected wages of mobile workers exceed those of immobile workers due to partial sorting across high and low paying firms an extension to visibly distinct groups with different immobile proportions yields statistical discrimination against immobile group members using combined displaced workers files we find that mobility positively affects earnings and partially explains racial and ethnic earnings differentials to test for statistical discrimination we estimate separate earnings functions for union and nonunion workers

districting and government overspending theories of government spending driven by a common pool problem in the fiscal revenues pool predict that greater districting of a political jurisdiction raises the scale of government this paper presents evidence on this and related predictions from a cross section of city governments in the united states the main finding is that when other plausible determinants of government spending are controlled for greater districting leads to a considerably greater scale of government activity the results also show that at large electoral systems do not and forms of government that concentrate powers in the office of the executive do break this relationship

supermajority voting requirements for tax increases evidence from the states abstract this paper measures the effect of state level supermajority requirements for tax increases on tax rates unobserved attitudes towards taxation tend to influence both the adoption of supermajority requirements and tax policy consequently one cannot distinguish between the effect of these requirements and their correlation with these unobserved attitudes a model is presented in which legislatures controlled by a pro tax party adopt a supermajority requirement to reduce the majority party agenda control the propensity of pro tax states to adopt supermajority requirements results in an underestimate of the true effect of these requirements on taxes to correct this identification problem the paper first uses fixed effects to control for unobserved attitudes and then employs instruments that measure the difficulty of amending state constitutions the paper concludes that supermajority requirements have significantly reduced taxes

the effect of initial lease periods on price discovery in laboratory tradable fishing allowance markets abstract newly established tradable fishing allowance markets are often accompanied by a period of high price volatility these fluctuations complicate capital investment decisions and play a significant role in determining outcomes for the traders involved this paper reports an evaluation of two market design features that may reduce volatility during price discovery a uniform price auction in which all trades within a period take place at the same price and an initial lease period which prohibits permanent allowance transfers at the beginning of the program we find that initial lease periods effectively reduce volatility once permanent trading is introduced

is unemployment lower if unions bargain over employment would there be more employment if unions bargained over employment and not only over wages most economists seem to answer yes 1

the effect of legislature size on public spending evidence from a regression discontinuity design what is the effect of legislature size on public spending an answer to this question is provided by weingast et al j polit econ 89 4 642 664 1981 whose law of 1 n posits that an increase in the number of elected representatives always leads to an increase in public spending because elected politicians regard the tax base as a common pool from which they can finance specific projects for their constituencies and these specific constituencies internalize the full benefits of the projects but only bear a fraction of the costs projects are financed from the common tax base fiscal inefficiency will increase with the number of representatives in this paper i test the validity of the law of 1 n using a dataset of 9325 german municipalities between 2008 and 2010 through the application of a regression discontinuity design many of the methodological pitfalls of previous studies can be avoided and a valid estimation of the causal effect of legislature size on public spending for german municipalities can be determined the results do not corroborate the positive findings of previous studies which generally supported the implications of the law of 1 n for the years 2008 2010 i find a negative effect of legislature size on public spending in german municipal councils

supermajority rule and the law of 1 n this paper investigates the impact of a supermajority rule on the law of 1 n which posits that a larger number of districts increases the size of government our analysis suggests that supermajority rule despite the claim that it restrains excessive spending increases the 1 n effect because qualified majorities require logrolling to attract additional members using data from us states from 1970 to 2007 we find that the adoption of a supermajority rule has a robust worsening effect on the fiscal commons problem identified by the law of 1 n

evaluating the evidence on union employment and wages using current population survey data for the years 1973 86 this study tests the hypothesis that the steep decline of union employment shares since 1973 is related to increases in union wages relative to nonunion wages the authors show that although the aggregate union wage premium has changed little since 1973 some industry specific premiums have risen substantially and the industries with the rising premiums are those experiencing declines in union employment shares the increase in the premium explains from 21 to 64 of the decline in union shares depending on the equation specification the paper also presents a detailed set of union wage premiums and employment shares for the sample period

the impact of the threat of bankruptcy on the structure of compensation this article builds and tests a model of the impact of a firm s bank ruptcy probability on its propensity to offer deferred compensation schemes using 1983 current population survey data we find that ceteris paribus lower failure rates raise the incidence of pensions for nonunion workers outside manufacturing further we find some evidence that among those workers with a pension a higher industry failure rate steepens tenure earnings profiles jointly controlling for union nonunion and pension no pension selectivity such a result suggests that workers discount implicit promises of future earnings increases by the likelihood that the firm will not survive

paying to queue a theory of locational differences in nonunion wages abstract traditional theories of the effect unions have on nonunion wages are difficult to reconcile with firm and worker mobility we show how differences in nonunion wages can persist in a two city search model nonunion wage differences across cities are driven by transition rates into the union sector should union queues form in the nonunion sector union power decreases nonunion wages as workers are willing to take lower wages to line up for union jobs however if queues are formed in the unemployed sector union power increases nonunion wages as nonunion firms pay premiums to induce workers to leave the queue

optimal taxation and fiscal constitution abstract assuming a world with excessive taxes the focuses of this paper are political mechanisms that ensure efficiency enhancing restraints on taxes in particular it is shown that supermajority requirements to approve tax increases as currently used in some us states is the means of attaining this objective their relationship to another such mechanism prevalent in earlier centuries that of franchise restrictions is discussed

supermajority rule the law of 1 n and government spending a synthesis i develop models in which a minimum winning coalition decides on the level of government spending where the coase theorem holds amongst members of the winning coalition an increase in the supermajority requirement has potentially conflicting effects on spending a higher requirement increases the tax price internalized by the minimum winning coalition but also increases the number of districts included in this coalition i develop separate models in which the spending in question consists of i a nonexcludable good ii a distributive consumption good iii infrastructure spending and iv a transfer payment a supermajority rule has no effect on spending for nonexcludable goods and ambiguous effects on spending for distributive projects and infrastructure spending an increased supermajority requirement does unambiguously reduce transfer spending i also relate the supermajority rule to the law of 1 n if the coase theorem holds and a minimum winning coalition forms an increase in the number of districts n has precisely the same effect on overall expenditure as a decrease in the supermajority requirement thus the ambiguous spending effects stemming from supermajority rule carry over into this version of the law of 1 n

local intergovernmental competition and the law of 1 n this article proposes an empirical framework based on a synthesis of the seminal law of 1 n and leviathan theories which models the relationship between government spending and the number of jurisdictions in a federal system as determined by the interplay of the costs related to centralized government which fall as the number of jurisdictions increases and the costs of distributive politics which rise as the number of jurisdictions increases using a panel of u s state and local government spending data empirical tests based on this combined framework show that the effect of intergovernmental competition predicted by the leviathan model is partially offset by the law of 1 n this result helps explain the inconsistent findings in the previous empirical literature

minimum information management in fisheries this paper deals with problems of optimal management of common property fisheries it advances the proposition that many fisheries management schemes which are theoretically capable of generating efficiency are actually not practicable owing to their huge informational requirements this applies for instance to management by means of corrective taxes subsidies the paper proceeds to show that there exists under fairly unrestrictive conditions market based management systems that require minimal information for their operation but lead nevertheless to efficiency in common property fisheries one such system is the individual transferable share quota system

endogenous enfranchisement when groups preferences conflict in their seminal paper aumann kurz and neyman found the surprising result that the choice of levels of public goods in a democracy is not affected by the distribution of voting rights this implies that groups of individuals may not value the franchise this conclusion however does not correspond to what we commonly observe we propose a new model to address the question of enfranchisement the main feature of our model is that it takes into account natural affinities such as religion or class that may exist between voters this allows us to show that while individuals may not value the vote they nonetheless value the franchise we also show that in the presence of nonconvexities it is more likely that the group in power will grant the franchise when preferences are severely opposed

unionization and the pattern of nonunion wage supplements negotiated standard wage policies reduce dispersion in the log earnings of union members when compared to those of otherwise equal nonunion members 5 6 as large as these dispersion differences are they may underestimate the true influence of union wage policy kahn and curme 14 have suggested that high degrees of unionization actually result in reduced nonunion wage dispersion this follows from a particular model of the union threat effect in which nonunion employers tilt induced wage increases toward low wage workers such tilting makes sense because lower paid workers are assumed to be more likely to support unions ceteris paribus this assumption fails to emphasize that low wage workers may be the least likely to be retained by a newly unionized employer and that this also influences their ultimate decision to support unionization in the face of union avoidance strategies that routinely imply the possibility of job loss low wage employees may recognize that the employer faces greater costs of bringing them up to a standard union wage and thus their chances for retention are lower including this realization results in ambiguous predictions about the influence of unionization on nonunion dispersion not only should the ambiguity of the proper theoretical prediction be highlighted but it should be recognized that the relevant prediction from theoretical models has not yet been tested previous tests are inappropriate because the threat induced wage increases could be tilted toward low wage workers without a necessary reduction in the typical measures of wage dispersion similarly those measures of wage dispersion may actually decline without a general tilt of wages toward low wage workers this possibility exists because of the sensitivity of the usual variance measures to outliers and because of aggregation and endogeneity problems affecting previous methodologies this paper uses 1983 and 1988 current population survey cps data to directly estimate the impact of unionization on the earnings of lowand high wage nonunion workers after controlling for traditional human capital locational and occupational variables unionization increases the log earnings of low wage nonunion workers significantly more than those of high wage nonunion workers this result is found with the very data belman and heywood 2 used to demonstrate that

the law of 1 n revisited distributive politics legislature size and the costs of collective action the foundational model of distributive politics predicts a positive relationship between the number of legislative districts and the level of inefficiency of projects approved by the legislature weingast shepsle and johnsen s law of 1 n this relationship has been tested extensively in the empirical literature with mixed results this article presents a model wherein passing the omnibus legislation typical of distributive politics is a costly process the model predicts a nonlinear relationship between legislature size and spending as increasing the size of the legislature also increases the costs of collective action results from an empirical exercise based on u s state legislatures 1962 2014 are consistent with the proposed model showing a 1 n effect which diminishes at the margin as the legislature s size increases especially in the lower chamber

union effects on nonunion wages evidence from panel data on industries and cities the authors test for threat and crowding effects of unions on non union wages at the industry and city levels using panel data on the percent organized and nonunion industry and city wage differentials constructed from current population surveys over the period 1973 89 at the industry level increases in the percent organized were associated with decreases in the nonunion industry wage differential suggesting that crowding effects were the predominant union effect on nonunion industry wage differentials in contrast at the city level increases in the percent organized were associated with increases in the nonunion city wage differential suggesting that threat effects predominated the authors also find evidence of negative cross occupation union effects on nonunion industry wage differentials supporting their hypothesis that the industry level results were partly driven by complementarity between union and nonunion labor

the law of k n the effect of chamber size on government spending in bicameral legislatures recent work in political economics has examined the positive relationship between legislative size and spending which weingast et al 1981 formalized as the law of 1 n however empirical tests of this theory have produced a pattern of divergent findings the positive relationship between seats and spending appears to hold consistently for unicameral legislatures and for upper chambers in bicameral legislatures but not for lower chambers we bridge this gap between theory and empirics by extending weingast et al s model to account for bicameralism in the context of a baron ferejohn bargaining game our comparative statics predict and empirical data from u s state legislatures corroborate that the size of the upper chamber n is a positive predictor of expenditure whereas the ratio of lower to upper chamber seats k exhibits a negative effect we refer to these relationships as the law of k n as the two variables influence spending in opposite directions

power and public goods abstract a game theoretic analysis using the harsanyi shapley nontransferable utility value indicates that the choice of public goods in a democracy is not affected by who has voting rights this is corroborated by an independent economic argument based on the implicit price of a vote

the union threat this paper studies the impact of unions on wage inequality output and unemployment to do so it proposes a search and matching model of union formation in which unions arise endogenously through a voting process within firms in a union firm workers bargain their wages collectively in a nonunion firm each worker bargains individually with the firm because of this wage setting asymmetry a union lowers the profit of a firm and compresses the wage distribution of the workers furthermore to prevent unionization nonunion firms distort their hiring decisions in a way that also lowers the dispersion of wages after being calibrated on the united states the model shows that even though a partial equilibrium estimate would predict a small impact of unions on inequality removing the threat of unionization increases the variance of wages substantially completely outlawing unions increases wage inequality further moreover outlawing unions increases welfare and output and lowers unemployment these results suggest that even with a small membership unions might have a significant impact on the economy through general equilibrium mechanisms and the way they distort firms decisions i am greatly indebted to nobuhiro kiyotaki esteban rossi hansberg and oleg itskhoki for their invaluable advice and support throughout this project special thanks go to esteban for suggesting the title i also wish to thank manuel amador orley ashenfelter francisco buera jeff campbell pablo fajgelbaum henry farber baris kaymak david lee thomas lemieux benjamin moll justinas pelenis edouard schaal andrew shephard christopher sims liz tennant as well as seminar participants at princeton university and the chicago fed rookie seminar for helpful comments and suggestions i gratefully acknowledge financial support from the fonds quebecois de recherche sur la societe et la culture email mtascher princeton edu address 001 fisher hall department of economics princeton university princeton nj 08544 for the most recent version go to http sites google com site mathtd

unions and nonunion wage dispersion previous research has found that union standard rate policies lower the dispersion of union wages and that unions indirectly raise nonunion wage levels as firms weigh the probability of unionizing and wage costs these two findings imply that unions lower the dispersion of nonunion wages since for a given payroll a nonunion firm can achieve the greatest reduction in the probability of unionism by giving raises to those who would benefit most from a union this hypothesis is confirmed on current population survey data taking into account the endogeneity of unionism ceteris paribus nonunion wage dispersion is lower in more highly unionized industries copyright 1987 by mit press

minimum information management systems and itq fisheries management abstract in 1986 new zealand reformed its fisheries management regime with the introduction of a rights based system of management at the beginning of each fishing season a government agency sets an allowable commercial catch individual firms hold an entitlement to harvest a share of the allowable commercial catch to date the government agency has relied almost exclusively on the results of stock assessment research when setting the allowable harvest excessive reliance on biological data in fisheries management has attracted criticism an alternative a minimum information management system uses information contained in quota prices as a guide to set limits on commercial harvest this paper examines price formation in one quota market we find evidence in the data that supports the use of quota prices to guide the setting of limits to commercial harvest furthermore time series analysis provides a basis for studying the temporal response of changes in asset prices to perturbations in the allowable harvest the results illustrate how information summarized in quota prices can complement the findings of stock assessment research in fisheries management

wage differentials across labor markets and workers does cost of living matter wage differentials studies rarely account for interarea differences in cost of living owing both to data limitations and theoretical ambiguity this study develops a price index for 185 metropolitan areas comprising about 70 of the u s labor force current population survey data for 1985 95 and data on sitespecific amenities are used to estimate earnings differentials based on nominal wages wages fully adjusted for measured cost of living and a simple approximation of real wages with partial adjustment for pricelevel differences dispersion in approximate real wages across 185 labor markets and differentials by region and city size are substantially lower than dispersion in nominal or full adjustment wages estimates of racial and ethnic differentials display moderate sensitivity to choice of a wage measure whereas other standard differentials do not both nominal wages and wages fully adjusted for cost of living may provide misleading estimates of real wage differentials absent data on interarea prices and amenities researchers should include detailed controls for region and city size in nominal wage equations jel j31 r23

union effects on white collar compensation this paper uses two new data sources each of which combines information on worker and establishment characteristics with detailed information on the components of employee compensation to examine union nonunion pay differentials for white collar workers estimates reveal that nonunion wages and total compensation are more responsive than union pay levels to worker productivity differences such as education and work experience also large firms pay 10 to 15 percent more to their white collar employees than small firms in the nonunion sector but only 5 percent or less in the union sector overall the white collar union wage differential appears to be 3 5 to 4 0 percent rising to 7 1 percent when fringe benefits are included in the dependent variable significant spillovers to nonunion white collar workers which appear to erode the measured union nonunion pay differentials are also found

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

public spending and the paradox of supermajority rule this article examines the paradox that a supermajority rule in a legislature promotes excessive government spending we propose a simple conjecture if rent seeking coalitions dominate legislative politics and if individual legislators demands for rent seeking activities are price inelastic a change of legislative rules from simple majority to a supermajority will lead to greater public spending other things equal using data from u s state legislatures 1970 to 2007 we find that the adoption of a supermajority rule has a robust positive impact on various types of tax revenues and government expenditures

the political economy of benefits and costs a neoclassical approach to distributive politics this essay offers a rational political explanation for the notorious inefficiency of pork barrel projects with an optimization model of legislative behavior and legislative institutions the model emphasizes the economically arbitrary from a welfare point of view importance of the geographic incidence of benefits and costs owing to the geographic basis for political representation we explore the implications of a legislator s objective function and derive conditions under which a representative legislature will select an omnibus of projects each of which exceeds the efficient scale

does the size of the legislature affect the size of government evidence from two natural experiments this paper makes use of regression discontinuity designs to estimate the effect of the number of legislators on the size of government the results indicate a negative effect i e the larger the size of the legislature the smaller is the size of government this runs counter to conventional wisdom one potential explanation is that more legislators can better control a budget maximizing bureaucracy i present evidence that is consistent with the proposed mechanism

public sector earnings and the extent of unionization many studies have examined the influence of union density union members as a percentage of all workers on earnings in the private sector but few such studies have looked at the public sector using data from the 1991 current population survey this study estimates the determinants of earnings for state and local government employees in both the union and nonunion sectors the extent of public sector unionization appears to be positively correlated with earnings for both state and local government workers and for those covered and not covered by collective agreements although the effect for non covered employees is smaller than that for covered employees both effects are larger than those typically found in similar estimates for the private sector the authors also find that bargaining structure has some influence on earnings with the most consistent effect being a positive influence of arbitration on the earnings of local government workers

wage effects of increased union coverage methodological considerations and new evidence although many studies show a positive relationship between extent of unionization and union members wages some analysts suggest that this relationship could reflect a concentration of labor organization in industries with potentially high wage gains rather than unions efficacy in raising wages consistent with that speculation studies across occupations or geographic areas generally show a much weaker relationship between unionization and wages than do studies across industries the authors of this study argue however that the weakness of the relationship found in some empirical research is due to the use of data sets mixing local market industries characterized by local bargaining with national market industries characterized by national bargaining an empirical analysis supports this hypothesis wages are positively correlated with the extent of unionization in a local market industry supermarkets but not in a national market industry aerospace

the dynamic implications of search discrimination abstract blacks have both lower employment rates and lower earnings than whites further the earnings gap increases as workers age this paper focuses on explaining differences in black white earnings profiles and how government interventions work in a dynamic environment three contributions are made firstly multiple equilibria may exist solely because of a coordination failure by firms even without taste discrimination blacks may play no role in their poor labor market outcomes secondly search discrimination leads to economic discrimination against the non discriminated group reverse discrimination finally in response to a quota program whites may find it optimal to subsidize black investment

the effect of unionism on fringe benefits this study analyzes the impact of unionism on fringes paid to production workers using data on individual establishments it compares fringe expenditures in establishments having the same level of compensation per hour and finds that unionism raises the share of compensation allotted to fringes particularly to pensions vacation pay and life accident and health insurance in addition since unionism also raises the straight time wage rate itself a prime determinant of expenditures on fringes unionism has a very sizeable impact on total fringe expenditures as well as on the fringe share of compensation the union fringe effect exceeds in percentage terms the union wage effect and is sufficiently large to suggest that standard union wage studies understate the union effect on total compensation the study also compares the fringe expenditures of production and non production workers within the same establishment controlling for within establishment pay policies the findings suggest that the pres

fishing quota markets abstract in 1986 new zealand responded to the open access problem by establishing the world s largest individual transferable quota itq system using a 15 year panel dataset from new zealand that covers 33 species and more than 150 markets for fishing quotas we assess trends in market activity price dispersion and the fundamentals determining quota prices we find that market activity is sufficiently high in the economically important markets and that price dispersion has decreased we also find evidence of economically rational behavior through the relationship between quota lease and sale prices and fishing output and input prices ecological variability and market interest rates controlling for these factors our results show a greater increase in quota prices for fish stocks that faced significant reductions consistent with increased profitability due to rationalization overall this suggests that these markets are operating reasonably well implying that itqs can be effective instruments for efficient fisheries management

a model of regulated open access resource use abstract this paper develops a model of regulated open access resource exploitation the regulatory model assumes that regulators are goal oriented choosing target harvest levels according to a safe stock concept these harvest quotas are implemented by setting season lengths conditioned on the industry fishing capacity the industry enters until rents are dissipated conditioned on season length regulations harvest levels fishing capacity season length and biomass are determined jointly using parameter estimates from the long regulated north pacific halibut fishery predictions of these variables from the regulated open access model are compared to predictions that arise from the gordon model

a new econometric model of union threat effects the union threat effect is the propensity of non union employers to resist union organization by raising wages this study introduces an empirical model of the non union employer s optimal wage in the presence of threat effects estimates of an equation of a firm s unionization probability provide key variables unlike previous models this specification dervies directly from a theoritical model separstes threat effects from the influence of other union non union spillovers and efficiency wages and includes many factors affecting the probability of unionization wage equation estimates reveal that the predicted threat of unionization did not significantly raise non union wages in the united states in 1980

unionism and employment behaviour although there exists a large literature on the effects of trade unions upon wages there is no published work that uses microeconomic data on establishments to examine the employment consequences of unionism this paper addresses this issue with a recent british data set and shows that even after the addition of a substantial set of control variables there is a strong association between poor employment performance and the presence of trade unions the union employment growth differential is estimated at approximately 3 percent per annum copyright 1991 by royal economic society

nominal and real union wage differentials and the effects of industry and smsa density 1973 83 many studies have examined the influence of union density union members as a percentage of all workers on earnings in the private sector but few such studies have looked at the public sector using data from the 1991 current population survey this

legislative organization and government spending cross country evidence abstract the law of 1 n posits that an increase in the number of elected representatives fuels excessive government spending despite its wide acceptance as a stylized fact the law of 1 n has received only limited empirical scrutiny and the existing evidence for the american states provides mixed support for the thesis this paper examines the law of 1 n in bicameral and unicameral legislative structures using a cross section of democratic countries the results indicate that legislative size matters under both legislature structures but bicameralism dampens the 1 n effect relative to unicameralism

unionized construction workers are more productive this paper presents evidence on the effect of unionism on productivity in construction the linkages are distinct from those studied previously in industrial settings apprenticeship training and hiring halls probably raise union productivity while jurisdictional disputes and restrictive work rules lower it using brown and medoff s methodology union productivity measured by value added per employee is 44 to 52 percent higher than nonunion the estimate declines to 17 to 22 percent when estimates of interarea construction price differences are used to deflate value added occupational mix differences and possibly apprenticeship training account for 15 to 27 percent of this difference

non compliance and the quota price in an itq fishery this paper examines the effects of non compliance on quota demands and the equilibrium quota price in an itq fishery i show that whereas lower quota prices are implied unambiguously by expected penalties which are a function of the absolute violation size the expectation of penalties based upon relative violations of quota demands can under certain conditions produce higher quota prices than in a compliant quota market if there are both compliant and non compliant firms in the fishery the result would then be a shift in quota demand from compliant to non compliant firms rather than the reverse the findings are generally applicable to quota markets in other industries including pollution permit markets

supermajority rule and bicameral bargaining this paper revisits the claim that supermajority rules and bicameral legislative structures restrain excessive government spending and taxation our analysis suggests that the extension effect of a supermajority rule that requires logrolling across additional members increases with the ratio of seats in the house relative to seats in the senate using a panel of us states 1970 2008 we find that the ratio of house to senate seats has a robust positive impact on the tendency of a supermajority rule to inflate the budget our finding implies that a supermajority rule can have a perverse effect on budget outcomes in bicameral legislatures owing to two factors the geographic overlap between chambers and the low price elasticity of demand for public goods

the impact of industrial and occupational structure on black white employment allocation this research focuses on the factors associated with the differential distribution of black and white men across labor market positions hypotheses concerning the effects of industrial and occupational characteristics are derived using an eclectic approach which draws heavily on the labor market segmentation literature incorporated as it ell are ideas from neoclassical and institutional economics and from the occupational segregation and class approaches in sociology the results raise some intriguing puzzles in terms of the contrasting effects of occupational versus industrial unionization and the opposite signed effects of market power and size overall the results provide a mixed evaluation of both the neoclassical approach and the dual economy approach to the explanation of black white employment differences perhaps the most important result from this research is the demonstration of the existence and form of the systematic patterning of the allocation of blacks and whites to labor market positions net of the influence of their individual wtork related characteristics

racial differences in residential and job mobility evidence concerning the spatial mismatch hypothesis abstract the spatial mismatch hypothesis asserts that job decentralization adversely impacts the labor market outcomes of african americans this paper tests whether race and job access have an independent effect on the probability of a joint residential move and job change no evidence is found to indicate that race directly influences the joint probability the paper finds however that poor job access has an independent negative effect on the probability of a joint residential move and job change because african american residences are heavily concentrated in american central cities these results suggest that african american workers may not be able to fully adjust as new jobs are created in the suburbs

individual heterogeneity and interindustry wage differentials estimates of interindustry wage differentials are obtained using a fixed effects estimator on a long panel the national longitudinal survey of young men nls after controlling for observable worker characteristics 84 percent of the residual variance of log wages across industries is explained by individual fixedeffects only 16 percent of the residual variance is explained by industry dummies since no controls for specific job characteristics are used job characteristics that vary across industries could potentially explain this rather small residual across industry log wage variance that is not attributable to individual effects clearly then these data do not force us to resort to noncompetitive explanations of interindustry wage differentials such as efficiency wage theory furthermore efficiency wage theories predict that wages in efficiency wage paying or primary industries should be relatively rigid therefore industry wage differentials should widen in recessions however no such tendency is found in the data

unions and the labor market status of white and minority youth this paper presents data showing that unions have a very substantial effect on the wages of young union workers particularly young blacks but that they also have a negative effect on the wages of young blacks who are not unionized the effects of unions on employment are negative for both groups and especially for blacks in addition the data indicate that young blacks within the labor force have union membership rates that are roughly comparable to those of young whites but rates for young blacks are lower after accounting for differences in the rate of labor force participation of young blacks and whites young blacks also continue to be underrepresented in strongly unionized crafts and in the construction industry while being overrepresented in the weakly organized and low wage service sector these results suggest the need to improve further the access of blacks to unionized employment

the effect of wage bargains on the stock market value of the firm the author estimates the change in the value of common stock resulting from an unexpected change in collectively bargained labor costs using bargaining unit wage data and nyse stock returns he estimates a dollar for dollar trade off between these variables this result is consistent with stock valuations based on present value maximizing managerial decisions that is the results are consistent with hotelling s lemma the author also finds support for the hypothesis that collective bargains maximize the sum of shareholder and union member wealth that is the results are consistent with strong efficiency in the contracting environment copyright 1989 by american economic association

optimal governing instrument operation level and enforcement in natural resource regulation the case of the fishery most regulation studies have used industry output or inputs as the control variable s but these are only indirectly controlled by government action through its choice of governing instrument enforcement procedure and penalty structure and the operational level of each a model is developed which demonstrates how profit maximizing firms will react to these control variables taking into account the benefits extra production and costs possible penalties of noncompliance and the ability to avoid detection of noncompliance the optimal operation level for two sets of control variables is derived and discussed

the distributional impacts of minimum wage increases when both labor supply and labor demand are endogenous we develop and estimate a one shot search model with endogenous firm entry and therefore zero expected profits and endogenous labor supply positive employment effects from a minimum wage increase can result as the employment level depends upon both the numbers of searching firms and workers welfare implications are similar to the classical analysis workers who most want the minimum wage jobs are hurt by the minimum wage hike with workers marginally interested in minimum wage jobs benefiting we estimate the model using cps data on teenagers and show that small changes in the employment level are masking large changes in labor supply and demand teenagers from well educated families see increases in their employment probabilities and push out their less privileged counterparts from the labor market this article has supplementary material online

sectoral shifts and interindustry wage differentials the observed differences in wages across industries may arise from a lack of worker mobility particularly among experienced workers allowing the effects of industry shocks to persist for some time although young workers arbitrage wage shocks they will have little effect on the dispersion of experienced workers wages if young and old workers are poor substitutes in production this explanation is investigated using the five censuses of population between 1940 and 1980 the evidence strongly suggests that differences in pay are not temporary phenomena the data provide some support for the role of human capital and ability