theory and behavior of multiple unit discriminative auctions this paper reports the results of controlled experiments designed to test the harrisraviv generalization of the vickrey theory of bidding in multiple unit discriminative auctions the paper also discusses further development of the theory in a way suggested by the experimental results to include bidders with distinct risk preferences in a well known paper vickrey 20 formulated a nash equilibrium model of bidding by risk neutral economic agents in single unit auctions this analysis was subsequently extended in numerous papers vickrey 21 generalized his original model to include multiple unit auctions in which each of n risk neutral bidders can bid on one out of a total of q homogeneous items up for auction where 1 c q n in both of the vickrey papers individual values for the auctioned object s were assumed to be drawn from a uniform distribution holt 12 and riley and samuelson 19 for single unit auctions and harris and raviv 11 for multiple unit auctions have extended the vickrey model to the case in which valuations are from a general distribution function and all agents have identical concave utility functions this paper reports the empirical properties of individual bidding behavior and seller revenue for a group of 28 laboratory experiments designed to test the harris raviv generalization of the vickrey hereafter vhr model of nash equilibrium behavior in multiple unit discriminative auctions in section i we summarize briefly the theoretical results of the vhr model which form the basis for the hypotheses that we test section ii describes the experimental design that we use section iii describes the experimental results and various tests based on the bidding behavior of individual subjects and on aggregate market seller revenue data the results from six of the ten n q parameter designs reported

institutional determinants of power sector reform in pakistan the electricity supply sector in pakistan has performed poorly in recent years reforms were introduced in the mid 1990s to improve the sector but progressed slowly with no significant impacts on pre reform performance this study uses new institutional economics as a theoretical basis to elucidate reasons for the failure of power sector reforms in pakistan to make improvements interviews with 23 experts using q methodology generated 215 statements that were used as a q concourse of these 51 statements were selected for the q sample and ranked by 34 respondents depending on their importance analysis revealed four important discourses on the determinants of power sector reform failure in pakistan these included weak governance structure country and sectoral endowments inefficient regulator and unspecified political institutions or unfriendly political contexts the study recommends establishment of institutions that support a market based power supply sector and improvements to the contractual arrangements between stakeholders to reduce opportunistic behaviour

boundedly rational versus optimization based models of strategic thinking and learning in games harstad and selten s article in this forum performs a valuable service by highlighting the dominance of optimization based models over boundedly rational models in modern microeconomics and questioning whether optimization based models are a better way forward than boundedly rational models this article complements rabin s response to harstad and selten focusing on modeling strategic behavior i consider harstad and selten s examples and proposed boundedly rational models in the light of modern behavioral economics and behavioral game theory commenting on the challenges that remain and the most promising ways forward

market shares and price quality relationships an econometric investigation of the u s automobile market the objective of this paper is to investigate the role of marketing competition in the northamerican automobile market this is accomplished by estimating a market share demand function the main difficulty with the analysis of demand for automobiles is heterogeneity of model types quality differences among different models both at a point in time and through time cannot be ignored since price and sales depend on them one way to remedy this situation is to apply the hedonic method by regressing the price of a model on its characteristics in this way the implicit prices for each of the qualitative attributes are derived and then used free of quality differences in the second stage estimation of a market share demand function there has been considerable interest in estimating demand functions for automobiles however most of the previous research has focused on total automobile demand in this approach equations on total sales are estimated without taking into account differences in quality characteristics of different model types these studies usually relate the depreciation of the service level of the currently held stock of automobiles to the demand for new stock this leads to a very general stock adjustment 7 or generalized acceleration framework 10 the best known time series studies of the aggregate automobile demand using different variants of this approach are those of chow 2 suits 15 wykoff 19 and westin 18 the estimates of price elasticities from these studies are about 1 and income elasticities range from 1 5 to 4 previous research on automobile demand allowing for qualitative differences in characteristics among different models is much less extensive the most important research effort in this direction is the paper by cowling and cubbin 4 they explained market share movements for different car manufacturers by changes in quality adjusted prices using data from england for the period 1957 1968 their quality adjusted price vector is proxied by the residuals from hedonic price regressions using the data on manufacturer s models the idea that the residuals from the regression of prices of differentiated goods on their qualitative attributes are the quality adjusted prices was suggested by griliches 8 cowling and cubbin used as their quality adjusted price for a specific manufacturing firm the mean residual computed by taking into account all the models offered by

loss aversion and learning to bid bidding challenges learning theories even with the same bid experiences vary stochastically the same choice can result in either a gain or a loss in such an environment the question arises of how the nearly universally documented phenomenon of loss aversion affects the adaptive dynamics we analyse the impact of loss aversion in a simple auction using the experienced weighted attraction model of learning our experimental results suggest that individual learning dynamics are highly heterogeneous and affected by loss aversion to different degrees apart from that the experiment shows that loss aversion is not specific to rare decision making

regret and feedback information in first price sealed bid auctions we investigate the effect of regret related feedback information on bidding behavior in sealed bid first price auctions two types of regret are possible in this auction format a winner of the auction may regret paying too much relative to the second highest bid and a loser may regret missing an opportunity to win at a favorable price in theory under very general conditions being sensitive to winning and paying too much should result in lower average bids and being sensitive to missing opportunities to win at a favorable price should result in higher bids for example the u s government s policy of revealing losing bids may cause regret sensitive bidders to anticipate regret and bid conservatively decreasing the government s revenue we test these predictions in the laboratory and find strong support for both

stationary concepts for experimental 2x2 games five stationary concepts for completely mixed 2 x 2 games are experimentally compared nash equilibrium quantal response equilibrium action sampling equilibrium payoff sampling equilibrium martin j osborne and ariel rubinstein 1998 and impulse balance equilibrium experiments on 12 games 6 constant sum games and 6 nonconstant sum games were run with 12 independent subject groups for each constant sum game and 6 independent subject groups for each nonconstant sum game each independent subject group consisted of four players 1 and four players 2 interacting anonymously over 200 periods with random matching the comparison of the five theories shows that the order of performance from best to worst is as follows impulse balance equilibrium payoff sampling equilibrium action sampling equilibrium quantal response equilibrium nash equilibrium

new hedonic technique for estimating attribute demand an application to the demand for automobile fuel efficiency a new hedonic procedure is applied to estimate the effects of gasoline price on the demand for automobile attributes and fuel efficiency direct application of a comparative statics analysis circumvents the problems of identification and severe multicollinearity affecting previous hedonic studies the results indicate that the effect of induced changes in automobile attributes in response to increases in the price of gasoline is to substantially increase fuel efficiency the estimated elasticities of fuel efficiency with respect to the price of gasoline imply that the long run own price elasticity of demand for gasoline is greater than unity 31 references

games with unique mixed strategy equilibria an experimental study abstract the results of an experiment studying the choices of subjects playing mixed extensions of three variants of simple 2 2 non constant sum strictly competitive games of the same form matching pennies are presented subjects exhibited a variety of behavioral adaptive learning strategies this heterogeneity of individual behavior produced aggregate dynamics whose estimated steady states are quite different from those predicted by the nash equilibria of those stage games with asymmetrical payoff functions the observed aggregative dynamics are well accounted for both by a quantal equilibrium model of mckelvey and palfrey and by a learning model of roth and erev journal of economic literature classification number c72

welfare measurement for environmental improvements using the hedonic model the case of nonparametric marginal prices abstract research in environmental and natural resource economics frequently requires the use of hedonic models because of the differentiated products involved this is true for studies of the relationship between environmental quality and property values or wages or between the characteristics of a recreation site and the demand for its services an obvious use of such studies is in estimating willingness to pay for improvements with differentiated products there are usually nonlinear hedonic price schedules and thus nonlinear budget constraints this makes welfare analysis difficult because standard duality results no longer hold this paper develops a technique for estimating a psuedo demand system that can be used to derive exact measures of consumer welfare change similar techniques are developed for producers with a psuedo profit function that can be converted to an exact measure of the change in quasi rents or rents the paper also shows that the distance function can be used to develop an ex ante measure of welfare change

a comparison of buyer determined and price based multiattribute mechanisms reverse auctions are fast becoming the standard for many procurement activities in the past the majority of such auctions have been solely price based but increasingly attributes other than price affect the auction outcome specifically the buyer uses a scoring function to compare bids and the bid with the highest score wins we investigate two mechanisms commonly used for procurement in business to business markets in a setting in which buyers welfare is affected by exogenous nonprice attributes such as the quality service and past relationships under both mechanisms bidders bid based on price but in the buyer determined mechanism the buyer is free to select the bid that maximizes her surplus while in the price based mechanism the buyer commits to awarding the contract to the low price bidder we find both in theory and in the laboratory that the buyer determined mechanism increases the buyer s welfare only as long as enough suppliers compete if the number of suppliers is small and the correlation between cost and quality is low the buyer is better off with the price based mechanism these findings are intended to help procurement managers make better decisions in designing procurement mechanisms for a variety of settings

does feedback really matter in one shot first price auctions does the type of posterior feedback affect how people decide in one shot environments we revisit this question in first price auction markets we consider three feedback types minimal only knowing whether winning or not loser also knowing the winning bid and winner knowing the second highest bid if winning filiz ozbay and ozbay 2007 find that loser as opposed to minimal or winner feedback increases bids we use three novel protocols and additionally replicate theirs using a sample of 624 subjects we find that bidders ex ante knowledge of posterior feedback type has no systematic effect on the average bid value ratios

beyond implicit prices recovering theoretically consistent and transferable values for noise avoidance from a hedonic property price model using a two stage hedonic pricing methodology we estimate a system of structural demand equations for different sources of transport related noise in the first stage we identify market segments using model based clustering techniques and estimate separate hedonic price functions hpfs for each segment in so doing we show how a semiparametric spatial smoothing estimator outperforms other standard specifications of the hpf in the second stage we control for non linearity of the budget constraint and identify demand relationships using techniques that account for problems of endogeneity and censoring of the dependent variable our estimated demand functions provide welfare estimates for peace and quiet that we believe to be the first derived from property market data in a theoretically consistent manner

information disclosure in auctions an experiment we report experimental results on the importance of information disclosure policy in first price sealed bid auctions interaction takes place in 10 periods according to a random matching protocol and we control the level of information feedback bidders receive after each period when bidders are informed about the losing bids in previous periods prices are higher than the theoretical prediction however when this information is not revealed the bidding becomes more competitive and the bids come close to the theoretical prediction we suggest that a signaling phenomenon may be important for explaining these results 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

does displaying probabilities affect bidding in first price auctions abstract overbidding with respect to risk neutral nash predictions in first price auction experiments has been consistently reported in the literature one possible explanation for overbidding is that participants in these experiments do not have a clear perception of probabilities which causes them to bid aggressively we test whether displaying probabilities of winning produces systematic differences in bidding in our design previous auction outcomes are not revealed across treatments no significant differences in behavior across treatments are obtained our results are in contrast to previous experiments which suggest that displaying probabilities could reduce the extent of overbidding

electricity consumption and economic growth exploring panel specific differences abstract in this paper we examine the long and short run dynamics between electricity consumption and economic activities using panel data of per capita electricity consumption and per capita gdp of 160 countries for the period of 1980 2010 accounting for the degree of electricity dependence and the level of urbanization furthermore in order to capture the differences in this relationship the full sample is divided into various subsamples based on countries income levels regional locations and oecd memberships this framework is argued and found to be appropriate since the causal links and inferences arising therefrom differ considerably among the subsamples which led us to conclude that the electricity growth nexus is highly sensitive to regional differences countries income levels urbanization rates and supply risks

impulse balance in the newsvendor game abstract one striking behavioral phenomenon is the pull to center bias in the newsvendor game facing stochastic demand subjects tend to order quantities between the expected profit maximizing quantity and mean demand we show that the impulse balance equilibrium which is based on a simple ex post rationality principle along with an equilibrium condition predicts the pull to center bias and other more subtle observations in the laboratory newsvendor game

strategies and evolution in the minority game a multi round strategy experiment abstract minority games are a stylized description of strategic situations with both coordination and competition these games are widely studied using either simulations or laboratory experiments simulations can show the dynamics of aggregate behavior but the results of such simulations depend on the type of strategies used so far experiments provided little guidance on the type of strategies people use because the set of possible strategies is very large we therefore use a multi round strategy method experiment to directly elicit people s strategies between rounds participants can adjust their strategy and test the performance of possible new strategies against strategies from the previous round strategies gathered in the experiment are subjected to an evolutionary competition the strategies people use are very heterogeneous although aggregate outcomes resemble the symmetric nash equilibrium the strategies that survive evolutionary competition achieve much higher levels of coordination

selection into auctions for risky and ambiguous prospects we study experimentally the selection into first price sealed bid auctions for a risky or an ambiguous prospect most subjects chose to submit a bid for the risky prospect leading to thinner markets for the ambiguous prospect transaction prices for both prospects were equal although subjects expected the ambiguous markets to be smaller evidence of a positive correlation between risk and ambiguity aversion suggests that the ambiguous markets were populated by relatively risk tolerant bidders a control experiment with selection in a simple choice task shows that subjects correctly anticipate the effects of selection on market size and risk attitudes jel c91 d44 d81

independent private value auctions bidder behaviour in first second and third price auctions with varying numbers of bidders the symmetric equilibrium of third price auctions is characterized it makes a number of contrasting predictions relative to firms and second price auctions bids exceed private values the marginal effects on bids of an increase in private values is greater than one increasing numbers of bidders reduces bids and risk aversion requires bidding below the risk neutral nash equilibrium in the experiment bidders do not always satisfy the point predictions of the theory however the game theoretic models correctly anticipate at least directionally the important effects of the price rule changes copyright 1993 by royal economic society

group dynamics in experimental studies the bertrand paradox revisited abstract different information provision in experimental markets can drastically change subjects behavior considering the repeated bertrand duopoly game of dufwenberg and gneezy dufwenberg m gneezy s u 2000 price competition and market concentration an experimental study international journal of industrial organization 18 7 22 we find that population feedback about the prices in other markets outside a subjects own current market causes group dynamics that prevent prices from convergence to nash equilibrium limited information comprising only the decisions of a subject s own opponent in contrast leads to competitive behavior when we extend the number of periods from 10 to 25 in the full information treatment full we observe a very robust cyclical up and down movement of prices we can explain tacit coordination in our experiment with an extended learning direction model and leadership by example

broken dreams unmet expectations of investors in the philippine electricity restructuring and privatization abstract over the last three decades privatization and restructuring of electricity sectors has been a hot topic the expectation was that prices would fall due to increased competition and that generators would become more innovative and efficient however the enthusiasm for deregulation wavered after events such as the debacle in california the fall of enron and the setbacks of ontario in the philippines comprehensive legislation was passed in 2001 but the implementation has been rather slow and controversial this paper looked at the allegation of politicizing power rates and found a logical alternative to the perceived conspiracy angle based on market data it is highly probable that depressed market rates was a result of coping mechanisms of new players trying to adjust to the restructured industry

electricity privatization the case of india abstract privatization is resorted to by developing country governments mainly to augment resource mobilization either on their own initiative or under the dictat of the world bank and less as a recipe for efficiency improvement the present paper discusses the electricity privatization in india as a case study and outlines the practical problems faced when the theoretical issues of privatization come up against the messiness of the real world such as high cost of private power compared to the low cost of public power and the goal conflicts of public and private utilities it suggests a different model to make privatization feasible

risk aversion and overbidding in first price sealed bid auctions new experimental evidence bidding above the risk neutral nash equilibrium in first price sealed bid auctions has traditionally been ascribed to risk aversion later studies however offer other explanations and even argue that risk aversion plays no or a minor role in a novel experimental design we directly test the relationship between risk aversion and overbidding by systematically varying the distribution of risk attitudes in auction markets we find a significant relationship between our measure of risk aversion and overbidding jel d44 c91

power sector reform in south asia why slow and limited so far although south asian developing countries had initiated some form of electric power sector reform in the 1990s often under external lending agency pressures not much progress has been made so far and there is hardly any noteworthy example of a successful reform in the region this paper provides a brief review of power sector reform efforts in five south asian countries and uses an institutional economics framework to identify the factors shaping the success of power sector reforms four factors namely instability of rule makers poor overall acceptance slow adaptation and poor transition management are identified and their effect on the reform process of south asia are analysed the paper finds that political instability has affected the power sector reform of the region making hard decisions difficult to take slow progress of reform has also affected the sector viability as signs of adverse effects on the power sector investment and performance are already visible

stationary concepts for experimental 2 x 2 games comment reinhard selten and thorsten chmura 2008 recently reported laboratory results for completely mixed 2 x 2 games used to compare nash equilibrium with four other stationary concepts quantal response equilibrium action sampling equilibrium payoff sampling equilibrium and impulse balance equilibrium we reanalyze their data correct some errors and find that nash clearly fits worst while the four other concepts perform about equally well we also report new analysis of other previous experiments that illustrate the importance of the loss aversion hardwired into impulse balance equilibrium when the other non nash concepts are augmented with loss aversion they outperform impulse balance equilibrium

a cross country analysis of electricity market reforms potential contribution of new institutional economics abstract the paper explores whether the question of why some countries are able to implement more extensive reforms is closely related to the question of why some countries have better institutions than others we analyze this question by using an empirical econometric model based on poisson regression with cross section data covering 51 states in the us 13 provinces in canada and 51 other countries in the course of the study we check the validity of three important arguments of new institutional economics nie for the power market liberalization process the first argument is the path dependency to test its impact on the reform progress we try to explain whether the background of the chairperson of the regulatory agency when reforms started or that of the governor minister responsible for energy policy at that time has an impact on the subsequent reform progress the second argument is the impact of democracy as an institution on the reform progress we look at the effect of two important indicators of democracy i e civil liberties and political rights on the reform progress the final argument of nie is about transaction costs we concentrate on the level of corruption in a country as one of the key factors that determine transaction costs and try to explore its impact on the reforms the results show that the backgrounds of the chairperson and the minister governor the level of democracy and corruption in a country are significantly correlated with how far reforms have gone in that country the negative relationship between reform progress and civil liberties may indicate that reforms may be limited in democratic countries with strong civil society institutions such as trade unions or other organized structures in the society that may consider reforms as harmful to their self interest

a firm level analysis of outage loss differentials and self generation evidence from african business enterprises abstract this study examines the outage loss differential between firms that engage in backup generation and those that do not unmitigated outage losses were estimated to be us 2 01 23 92 per kwh for firms engaging in self generation and range from us 1 54 to 32 46 per kwh for firms without self generation we also find that firms engaging in self generation would have suffered additional 1 183 outage losses had they not invested in self generation on the other hand firms without self generation would have reduced their outage losses by around 6 46 if they had engaged in self generation further analyses however reveal that although engagement in self generation reduced outage losses a firm engaging in self generation may still suffer a greater unmitigated outage loss relative to a firm without a backup generator the relative outage losses depend on the relative vulnerability of the operations of the two sets of firms to power interruption and the relative generating capacity of a self generating firm to its own required electricity loads policy reforms that allow firms whose operations are highly vulnerable to outages to make a binding contract with utilities in order to get preferential supply are recommended

impact of reform and privatization on consumers a case study of power sector reform in orissa india abstract orissa is the first state in india to have undergone reform in the power sector with the government withdrawing its control the model of this reform is known as the wb orissa model the goal of this paper is to examine the impact of this reform on consumers of electricity which has been measured using multiple regression models the variables represent the parameters that consumers are most interested in and the regression coefficients represent the weights of the corresponding variables the data were collected using a survey methodology the impact of reform was found to be mixed some groups of consumers saw benefits while others felt a negative impact a focus group study was conducted to identify the variables of interest to consumers of electricity the model was used to estimate consumer benefit and was validated using primary data and structural equation modeling the study revealed beneficial aspects of reform and areas with no benefits

departure times in y shaped traffic networks with multiple bottlenecks we study the departure time decisions of commuters traversing a traffic network with the goal of arriving at a common destination at a specified time there are costs associated with arriving either too early or too late and with delays experienced at bottlenecks our main hypothesis based on the nash equilibrium distribution of departure times implies that for certain parameter values expanding the capacity of an upstream bottleneck can increase the total travel costs in the network we report the results of a large group laboratory experiment which are strongly supportive of this counterintuitive hypothesis and we discuss the implications jel d85 r41

bounded rationality models tasks to become intellectually competitive abstract research in experimental economics has cogently challenged the fundamental precept of neoclassical economics that economic agents optimize the last two decades have seen elaboration of boundedly rational models that try to move away from the optimization approach in ways consistent with experimental findings nonetheless the collection of alternative models has made little headway supplanting the dominant paradigm we delineate key ways in which neoclassical microeconomics holds continuing and compelling advantages over bounded rationality models and suggest via a few examples the sorts of further difficult pushes that would be needed to redress this state of affairs closer collaboration between theoretic modeling and experiments is clearly seen to be necessary jel b40 c72 c90 d01 d21

getting reforms done in inhospitable institutional environments untying a gordian knot in india s power distribution sector when grand institutional reforms based on idealized models are stalled by the poor institutional environments and difficult politics which often surround large infrastructure systems in developing countries partial reforms whose design and implementation take into account the different interests of the key stakeholders can provide valuable and immediate benefits while moving these systems from low towards higher level equilibria strategically negotiated experimentally partial and purposefully hybrid these reforms are based on careful stakeholder analysis and strategic coalition building that avoid rigid positions based on idealized models our findings are based on a study of power sector reforms in india where we performed a micro level and in depth analysis of a partial and innovative experiment which has allowed private sector participation in electricity distribution within a hostile institutional environment

electricity privatization revisited a commentary on the case for new initiatives in india abstract normally privatization is resorted to by different economies for different reasons resource mobilization introducing efficiency by promoting competition and for achieving commercial orientation often these are assumed to be independent objectives the indian experience is showing that they are quite interdependent and unless all the three objectives are tackled simultaneously privatization will not succeed specifically the poor financial performance of the state electricity boards and their lack of commercial orientation is applying a brake on investment in the power sector by foreign ipps similarly the government s approach to privatization without promoting competition through the so called memorandum of understanding is leading to high cost solutions and acrimonious public debates demanding transparency in decision making and review of those already made

anticipated loser regret in third price auctions abstract losing the auction at an affordable price generates loser regret in third price auctions if bidders anticipate loser regret then in line with the experimental findings in a symmetric equilibrium the bids are more than the risk neutral nash equilibrium

stationary concepts for experimental 2x2 games a reply this is a reply to stationary concepts for experimental 2 x 2 games comment by brunner camerer and goeree which corrects some computational errors in selten and chmura 2008 and extends the comparison of five stationary concepts to data from previous experimental studies we critically discuss their new findings and relate them to the data of selten and chmura 2008 we conclude that the parametric concepts of action sampling equilibrium and payoff sampling equilibrium perform better than quantal response equilibrium and that the non parametric concept of impulse balance equilibrium performs at least as well as quantal response equilibrium

features of experimentally observed bounded rationality abstract on the basis of experimental evidence reported in the literature the paper draws conclusions about the bounded rationality exhibited by human economic behaviour among the topics discussed are presentation effects caused by superficial analysis strategic reasoning and strategy construction based on reciprocity and fairness avoidance of circular concepts in step by step strategic reasoning ex post rationality and learning direction theory presence of both adaptive and analytic approaches to repeated decision tasks and the absence of quantitative expectations and optimization in typical repeated game strategies

price formation in single call markets this paper reports a laboratory experiment designed to examine the price formation process in a simple market institution the single call market the experiment features random values and costs each period so each period generates a new price formation observation other design features are intended to enhance the predictive power of the bayesian nash equilibrium bne theory developed recently for this trading institution we find that the data support several qualitative implications of the bne but that subjects bid and ask behavior is not as responsive to changes in the pricing rule as the bne predictions bids and asks tend to reveal more of the underlying values and costs than predicted particularly when subjects are experienced nevertheless observed trading efficiency falls below the bne prediction the results offer more support for the bne when subjects compete against nash robot opponents a simple learning model accounts for several of the deviations from bne

demand equations for individual new car models estimated using transaction prices with implications for regulatory issues the economic impact of the automobile industry on the u s economy hardly needs to be emphasized taking into account related and feeder industries such as rubber steel zinc it has been estimated that one business in six is automobile related over the last 20 years the auto industry has been subject to increasing regulation laws have been passed which require manufacturers to install certain safety equipment and pollution control equipment and recently have mandated that fuel efficiency cafe standards be met on average by the fleet of cars sold by each manufacturer 2 the impact of these cafe standards is enormous currently the domestic auto manufacturers have plans to spend over 40 billion dollars to essentially redesign all of their models 3 the effects all these regulations have had and will have on the health and structure of the u s automobile industry has been the subject of much debate auto manufacturers have argued that 1 consumers do not value the safety and pollution control equipment and that therefore the expense of such equipment merely hurts their sales 4 and 2 due to the differential ability of the four major auto companies to meet any given standard the imposition of them disrupts the competitive market relationships which exist between the companies advocates of these regulations on the other hand view the u s auto industry as resisting change in order to protect its profits

information feedback in first price auctions i apply the notion of a self confirming equilibrium sce to study how feedback in first price auctions influences bidders perceptions about their strategic environment and consequently their bidding behavior in a private values setting revealing the two highest bids at the end of each auction is sufficient for bidders to have correct beliefs justifying the assumption of nash equilibrium in contrast in every symmetric sce of a symmetric affiliated private values model bidding strategies and revenue are weakly higher if only the highest bid is revealed i also consider interdependent valuations and discuss implications for the empirical auction literature

rent seeking with regretful agents theory and experiment abstract we investigate both theoretically and experimentally the role that information disclosure has on behavior in all pay environments in which all agents must exert costly effort but only the winner is rewarded through the lens of all pay auctions we show that bidders who have regret concerns when they lose an auction may alter their bids whether or not information about the winning bid is disclosed all losing bidders regret not bidding 0 however when feedback on the winning bid is provided those bidders who lost at an affordable price may regret not bidding more we show that the former effect causes bidders to lower their bids while the latter effect causes bidders to raise their bids our experimental results indicate overbidding whether or not the winning bid is disclosed to losing bidders however disclosing the winning bid leads to even more aggressive bidding increases revenues decreases the frequency of dropouts and also leads to more efficient allocations thus our results show that information disclosure is a powerful tool that mechanism designers may wish to exploit to extract more rents in all pay environments

information and conspiracy in sealed bid auctions abstract this paper examines the allocative properties of the sealed bid institution when different aspects of the available information to bidders are considered specifically we examine a the effect on price determination in repeated sealed bid auctions of post auction revelation of losing bids and b the effect on price determination when conspiratorial discussions are allowed

the institutions and governance of economic development and reform why are the ambitions of economic development practitioners and reformers so often disappointed one answer is that development policymakers and reformers are congenital optimists another answer is that good plans are regularly defeated by those who occupy strategic positions an intermediate answer is that institutions are important yet are persistently neglected in the planning process the article takes a bottom up microanalytical approach to economic development and reform it examines the governance of contract investment and private ordering through the lens of transaction cost economizing and it assesses the efficacy of the de facto as against the de jure institutional environment with respect to credible commitments in effect institutional economists are cast in the role of archaeologists of economic reform and development with the task of unpacking the lessons of the past to inform choices and programs for the future

out of equilibrium bids in first price auctions wrong expectations or wrong bids deviations from risk neutral equilibrium bids in auctions can be related to inconsistent expectations with correct best replies or correct expectations but deviant best replies e g because of risk aversion regret quantal response mistakes to distinguish between these two explanations we use a novel experimental procedure and study expectations together with best replies in symmetric and asymmetric auctions we extensively test the internal validity of this setup we find that deviations from equilibrium bids do not seem to be because of to wrong expectations but because of deviations from a risk neutral best reply

risk averse behavior in generalized matching pennies games in experimental studies of behavior in 2 2 games with unique mixed strategy equilibria observed choice frequencies are systematically different from mixed strategy nash predictions this paper examines experimental results for a variety of such games and shows that a structural econometric model which incorporates risk aversion into a quantal response equilibrium explains the data very well moreover risk aversion estimates are stable across the different games and are close to those obtained from laboratory and field auction data as well as from individual lottery choice experiments

the transaction costs driving captive power generation evidence from india the 2003 indian electricity act incentivizes captive power production through open access in an attempt to harness all sources of generation yet we observe that only some firms self generate while others do not in this paper we give a transaction cost explanation for such divergent behavior using a primary survey of 107 firms from india we construct a distinct variable to measure the transaction specificity of electricity use the make or buy decision is then econometrically tested using probit model results are highly responsive to transaction specificity and the likelihood of captive power generation is positively related to it at the industrial level this explains why food and chemical firms are more likely to make their own electricity since the burden of poor grid supply is highest on smaller sized and high transaction specific firms the grid access policies need to account for firm level characteristics if government wants to incentivize captive power generation

energy consumption carbon emissions and economic growth nexus in bangladesh cointegration and dynamic causality analysis abstract the paper investigates the possible existence of dynamic causality between energy consumption electricity consumption carbon emissions and economic growth in bangladesh first we have tested cointegration relationships using the johansen bi variate cointegration model this is complemented with an analysis of an auto regressive distributed lag model to examine the results robustness then the granger short run the long run and strong causality are tested with a vector error correction modelling framework the results indicate that uni directional causality exists from energy consumption to economic growth both in the short and the long run while a bi directional long run causality exists between electricity consumption and economic growth but no causal relationship exists in short run the strong causality results indicate bi directional causality for both the cases a uni directional causality runs from energy consumption to co 2 emission for the short run but feedback causality exists in the long run co 2 granger causes economic growth both in the short and in the long run an important policy implication is that energy electricity as well can be considered as an important factor for the economic growth in bangladesh moreover as higher energy consumption also means higher pollution in the long run policy makers should stimulate alternative energy sources for meeting up the increasing energy demand

competitive burnout theory and experimental evidence abstract we examine equilibrium selection in a two stage sequential elimination contest in which contestants compete for a single prize this game has a continuum of equilibria only one of which satisfies the coalition proof nash equilibrium cpne refinement that equilibrium involves burning out by using all of one s resources in the first stage it is pareto dominated by many other equilibria we find that cpne predicts well when four people compete but not when eight people compete for two second stage spots using a cognitive hierarchy ch framework we show that when the number of players and the mean number of thinking steps are large the ch prediction involves burning out this provides a partial explanation of our results we also develop a formal argument as to why cpne logic is more compelling with more players we conclude that more competition leads to higher bids and that burning out is indeed a competitive phenomenon

economic performance through time prize lecture to the memory of alfred nobel december 9 1993 this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

regulation institutions and commitment in telecommunications a comparative analysis of five country studies within any system of utility regulation there is a tension between the ability to commit to a stable set of rules and the ability to respond flexibly to changing circumstances countries differ in their institutional endowments and hence in the ways in which they can resolve this tension a first group of countries can design regulatory systems that afford the regulator substantial formal discretion to respond to changing circumstances and can use process to restrain arbitrary action a second group of countries can restrain arbitrary action only by calling on specific substantive rules and may have to sacrifice some flexibility to achieve credible commitment a third group may lack the domestic institutions to put in place a credible and workable regulatory system of any kind

the effects of payoff magnitude and heterogeneity on behavior in 2 2 games with unique mixed strategy equilibria the logit version of quantal response equilibrium predicts that equilibrium behavior in games will vary systematically with payoff magnitudes if all other factors are held constant including the nash equilibria of the game we explore this in the context of a set of asymmetric 2x2 games with unique totally mixed strategy equilibria the data provide little support for the payoff magnitude predictions of the logit equilibrium model we extend the theoretical quantal response equilibrium model to allow for heterogeneity and find that the data fit the heterogeneous version of the theory significantly better

individual behavior of first price auctions the importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets abstract this article reports the results of an individual choice experiment designed to test the nash equilibrium predictions of the first price sealed bid auction a subject faced in 100 auctions always the same resale value and competed with computer simulated bids the design used between subjects variation and involved information feedback as the treatment variable earlier experimental work on first price auctions has frequently reported an overbidding relative to the risk neutral nash equilibrium our data provide evidence that overbidding can be fostered by the standard information feedback in auction experiments which after each auction reveals the winning bid only by means of learning direction theory we explain the individual bidding dynamics in our experiment finally we apply impulse balance theory and make long run predictions of individual bidding behavior

hedonic prices for cars an application to the spanish car market 1981 2005 in this article we provide a comparison of different formulations for hedonic regression analysis in order to construct a quality adjusted price index for the spanish car market over the period 1981 to 2005 specifically we address the issue of instability of coefficients over time and propose two alternative estimation procedures based firstly on a moving sample of observations and secondly on a moving average of estimated coefficients in single period equations the statistical tests applied support the proposed methodologies on empirical grounds two conclusions can be emphasized firstly our study concludes that taking quality changes into account car prices in spain deflated by consumer price index cpi declined by 40 between 1981 and 2005 this result is robust to the alternative estimation procedures employed in the study secondly an analysis of convergence shows that for quality adjusted prices a clear trend in convergence emerges between 1986 and 1992 whereas such a trend does n

nonlinear budget constraints and consumer demand an application to public programs for residential housing abstract this study presents a methodology for exploiting the nonlinear hedonic nature of housing prices to estimate the compensated demands of households for particular housing attributes the methodology is employed to provide hicksian benefit measures of a particular housing subsidy program typical of those undertaken recently in developing countries

impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions abstract experimental sealed bid first price auctions with private values in which feedback on the losing bids is provided yield lower revenues than auctions where this feedback is not given the concept of weighted impulse balance equilibrium which is based on a principle of ex post rationality and incorporates a concern for social comparison captures the data

efficient estimation of hedonic inverse input demand systems this article is concerned with efficient estimation of characteristics demand we derive and estimate an inverse input demand system for quality characteristics by using 172 946 observations over 881 trading days in the icelandic fish auctions an improved estimation method based on an expanded random coefficient model is suggested as an alternative to the currently used two stage method of brown and rosen the estimates demonstrate the improved efficiency of the suggested method a number of empirical results emerge including a general increase in the demand for quality the purpose of hedonic price analysis is to determine how the price of a unit of a commodity varies with its characteristics that is to estimate the hedonic price function some recent examples of the estimation of hedonic price functions are nerlove combris lecocq and visser and mcconnell and strand however theory predicts that shifts in supply or demand affect the implicit price relationships between the overall price of the good and its individual characteristics and so we need to estimate the underlying demand and supply functions for the characteristics rosen developed a two stage method for analyzing hedonic markets in the first stage of this method the hedonic price function is estimated and in the second stage a system of demand and supply functions for characteristics is estimated using the shadow prices of the characteristics from the first stage as variables brown and rosen showed that this procedure could yield estimates of demand and supply functions that are mere transformations of the coefficients in the hedonic function they suggested the currently used two stage method using data from multiple markets this method utilizes the within market variation to iden

characteristics and hedonic pricing of differentiated beef demands we estimate a cbs system model of u s derived demand for meat we use this model 1 to examine relationships between three quality categories of beef and three other meats and 2 to simulate how taste shifts have affected demands for meats over time we extend previous studies by disaggregating wholesale beef production into three quality categories 1 usda choice grade or higher 2 usda select or lower and 3 cow and bull beef innovative features of our empirical model include a breakout of table cuts into choice and select and the use of a hedonic characterization of the two breakouts to value choice ness and beef ness our model demonstrates important shifts in separate demands for choice and select beef we show that separately the demand for choice grade beef declined in the 1980s and 1990s and the demand for select beef increased a departure from the relatively stable demand characterizations of more aggregated measures of combined choice and select beef jel classification q11 q13

efficiency assessment and benchmarking of thermal power plants in india abstract per capita consumption 1 of electricity in india is many folds lesser than canada usa australia japan chaina and world average even though total energy shortage 2 and peaking shortage 3 were recorded as 11 2 and 11 85 respectively in 2008 09 reflecting non availability of sufficient supply of electricity performance improvement of very small amount can lead to large contribution in financial terms which can be utilized for capacity addition to reduce demand supply gap coal fired thermal power plants are main sources of electricity in india in this paper relative technical efficiency of 60 coal fired power plants has been evaluated and compared using ccr and bcc models of data envelopment analysis target benchmark of input variables has also been evaluated performance comparison includes small versus medium versus large power plants and also state owned versus central owned versus private owned result indicates poor performance of few power plants due to over use of input resources finding reveals that efficiency of small power plants is lower in comparison to medium and large category and also performance of state owned power plants is comparatively lower than central and privately owned study also suggests different measures to improve technical efficiency of the plants

automobiles and implicit markets an estimate of a structural demand model for automobile characteristics economists have always found it difficult to investigate the demand for the automobile good due to its heterogeneity in this paper the automobile is treated as a differentiated product and a two step approach is used to estimate a system of structural demand equations for automobile attributes the obtained results are statistically sound and in conformity with theoretical expectations this should be taken as an indication of the validity and robustness of the procedure used in this analysis

hedonic prices and implicit markets estimating demand and supply functions for differentiated products in choosing the level of quality to purchase the buyer of a differentiated product also chooses a point on the marginal price schedule for that product hence in general the demand functions for product characteristics cannot be consistently estimated by ordinary least squares market equilibrium results in a matching of characteristics of demanders and suppliers this matching restricts the use of buyer and seller characteristics as instruments when estimating demand and supply functions for product characteristics the paper develops these issues a stochastic structure for hedonic equilibrium models is then proposed identification results are presented and estimation procedures are outlined

theory and misbehavior of first price auctions recent experimental evidence appears to reject simple nash equilibrium models of bidding behavior in first price auctions the author presents a methodological critique of this evidence existing tests have concentrated on deviations of subjects from predictions in the message space of the action bid deviations the author suggests that it is more natural to evaluate subject behavior in expected payoff space he concludes that the evidence against the simple models is not significant enough to warrant their rejection copyright 1989 by american economic association

power sector reform in orissa an ex post analysis of the causal factors abstract from the early 1990s dramatic changes have been taking place in the structure of electricity supply industry esi worldwide the primary reasons for electricity sector reform has however been different for industrialised and developing countries the objective of this paper is to study and identify various factors leading to power sector reform in developing countries the restructuring of orissa state electricity board in india was used as a case study in identifying the various factors the factors that result in implementation of restructuring are a contextual factors they are the primary drivers for initiating reform the performance of the utility and the conditionalities of the lending agencies are contextual factors b trigger factor it is the determining factor that creates a compelling necessity to undergo restructuring the inability of the government to continue to support the utility acts as the trigger factor c facilitating factors they act as facilitators for initiating reform support of the government absence of a powerful lobby and the support of the top management are facilitating factors

subsidy policy and the enlargement of choice abstract development is the enlargement of people s choices optimal subsidy policy is intended to create the right incentives for each of the value chain participants this paper contends that the interest subsidy offered by the indian federal ministry of new and renewable energy for solar thermal systems through mainstream banking channels is superior in intent and outcome compared to the capital subsidy as currently offered for solar pv systems routed through government controlled delivery channels the interest subsidy enhances innovation improves service delivery and expands the range of product available to consumers enjoying a wide range of endowments thus leading to more inclusive development the simple monopoly model developed by atkinson atkinson ab capabilities exclusion and the supply of goods in basu k pattanaik p suzumura k editor choice welfare and development oxford university press 1995 is applied to the context of solar home systems to demonstrate price reduction and choice expansion in a liberalized market facilitated by an interest subsidy scheme

reforming small electricity systems under political instability the case of nepal this paper assesses the issues and options in reforming small electricity sector systems in general while citing nepal as a specific case political instability and increasing electricity demand are two major complicating factors in power sector reform of small systems such as that of nepal lessons from international experience suggest that measures such as cost reflecting pricing restructuring and independent regulation are important for the success of reforms in small systems the creation of an independent regulatory authority is more important than unbundling of the sector in the present context of nepal accounting separation of the main activities may be a pragmatic restructuring approach given the present political and market condition as the systems gradually grow larger vertical separation of the system and horizontal splitting of the generation segment and competition in organised wholesale market followed by privatisation remains an option in the long run