making the same mistake again or is this time different the world faces an economic crisis of unprecedented proportions but much of the policy response has certainly not lacked for precedent national governments and international organisations including the international monetary fund imf have looked to crises of the past for solutions to the present and austerity has become a familiar theme the inability to effectively resolve the current crisis however gives rise to the question is this time different this article provides a broad overview to the origins and development of the recent economic crisis and the resort to policies of austerity although there is historical precedent for the resort to austerity such as the uk treasury view during the 1920s and 1930s this time things are different many of the current problems are deeply rooted and reflect the impact of the shift towards free market economics that started in the 1970s 2 the origins of the crisis since the beginning of the 1970s the private sector finance in particular has reorganised on an increasingly global scale it has innovated in terms of both structure and products and it has experienced significant growth as tridico 2012 this issue shows this financialisation was characterised by a ballooning of stock exchanges as many firms decided not only to list their shares but also to become involved in speculative finance in response to pressures on firms to maximise shareholder value together with the progressive erosion of worker and trade union rights and influence labour markets became more flexible and real wages stagnated concurrently profits rebounded leading to burgeoning inequality in this context aggregate demand and consumption were bolstered by easy credit and the wealth effects of speculative bubbles first in stocks and shares and then in housing

ppp and structural breaks the peseta sterling rate 50 years of a floating regime abstract this paper aims to illustrate the relevance of considering structural breaks in purchasing power parity ppp tests to that end we examine the peseta sterling real exchange rate between 1870 and 1935 this is an interesting series given that the peseta was not part of the gold standard yet maintained a floating rate regime during most of that period when breaks are not considered it is impossible to reject the existence of a unit root in the series however if two breaks are allowed with these capturing the particular events that occurred in the monetary history of these currencies at the beginning and end of the period then the null hypothesis can be rejected and ppp emerges as a good approximation of the behavior of the peseta sterling exchange rate even if that rate was predominantly a floating regime

the crash of the knowledge economy this paper advances the hypothesis that some of the roots of the present crisis are to be found in the present institutions of the knowledge economy while protectionism is seen as a possible dangerous outcome of the crisis the extent of protectionism inherent to the strengthening and globalisation of intellectual property rights iprs associated in particular with the signing of the trade related aspects of intellectual property rights agreement is not generally perceived as one of its possible causes indeed iprs have acted as super tariffs they have particularly raised the cost of investments for countries that had neither abundant cheap labour nor high amounts of intellectual property resources moreover iprs may have later exerted negative effects even on ip rich firms as the proliferation of conflicting rights has led firms to increasingly inhibit each other s investments the resulting investment strike has manifested itself as a saving glut and has mainly affected the usa in a situation aggravated by inadequate regulations if intellectual monopolies are one of the causes of the crash the remedies should not only focus on monetary policy financial regulations or even on standard keynesian policies aggregate demand stimulus should be coupled with policies that decrease the level of intellectual monopolisation of the economy

explaining patterns of candidate competition in congressional elections the low probability of defeating incumbent members of congress deters potentially strong rivals from challenging them yet almost all incumbents are challenged usually by opponents who lack previous experience in office and run underfinanced ineffectual campaigns but if strong challengers are deterred from challenging incumbents why are not weak challengers who have even less chance of unseating an incumbent the model developed in this paper indicates that there is a simple reason why weak candidates choose to run against incumbents they do so in order to maximize their probability of getting elected to congress together with the findings of previous researchers the results of our analyses of congressional primary data from 1980 through 1984 provide strong support for the major hypotheses derived from our model

the limits of central bank policy economic crisis and the challenge of effective solutions the paper examines the development of central bank policy prior to and during the recent financial crisis the argument is made that it contained multiple failures that not only generated constraints on adequately identifying and addressing the crisis but also contributed to that crisis those failures derived from a combination of theory and institutional practice specifically the use of forms of inflationary targeting based on broad adherence to the taylor rule framework and the use of versions of a conventional theoretical macro model ctmm were both problematic this was particularly so in the way policy was focused through issues of the primacy of price stability the institutional arrangements of the central banks were also problematic the division of labour between the central banks and other regulatory bodies and the limited information available within a liberalised finance system hampered efforts to fully appreciate the gravity of the situation partly due to the constraints imposed by the thinking and strategies that had been developed the central banks never got to grips with the fundamental problems of the crisis interest rate policy and liquidity provision were undertaken in ways that steadily radicalised the approaches of the banks but always in a way that was event led and always in ways that could not resolve those fundamental problems the nature of the crisis highlights the importance of transforming the approach and institutional framework of the central banks relatedly it highlights the need for a more keynesian and heterodox approach to economics within decision making bodies at central banks

the specification of models of campaign finance simultaneous models exist in the literature with specifications preferable to those used in either of these papers the more complete models are of course still subject to improvement the measure of ideology used by poole and romer would probably be such an improvement identification of a variable which would remove the anomalous result discussed by jacobson would also greatly improve our understanding of the political process it may be that a radically new approach to estimation will supplant these models however as long as scholars continue to perform estimations of equations such as those presented in 1a 1c above it is incumbent upon them to use the most complete specification available in the literature using less complete specifications may sometimes enable us to answer specific relatively narrow questions but such specifications will not advance our fundamental understanding of the political process

entry barriers in politics and uncontested elections abstract lott 1986 1987a argues that brand names can be barriers to entry in political markets because political brand names cannot be sold our empirical model examines the effect of inalienability of political capital on entry into nineteenth century british political markets we test the hypothesis that since county races were more expensive than borough races owing to greater costs of information the level of non transferable investment produced by a given number of past campaigns was greater in the rural districts and produced more significant entry barriers

are asian real exchange rates stationary by applying the newly developed nonlinear stationary test advanced by kapetanios et al journal of econometrics 112 2003 359 in examining the stationary property of 11 asian real exchange rates this paper rejects unit root in 8 us dollar based and 6 japanese yen based rates whereas the augmented dickey fuller adf test has led to no rejection at all

too big to manage us megabanks competition by innovation and the microfoundations of financialization disagreements over the systemic implications the future of financialization can be traced in part to the absence of sustained attention to the role of banking firms in driving this secular shift forward that is the financialization literature lacks an adequate microfoundation accounting for the drivers of financialization processes solely at the macro level overlooks the problems of how these processes came about and whether they are sustainable this paper addresses this explanatory gap arguing that a key independent microeconomic driver of increasing financialization did exist the incessant efforts by money centre banks in the usa to break out of depression era restrictions on their size activities and markets these banks growth strategies in turbulent times led to an institutional meso shift the rise of a megabank centred shadow banking system that now shapes global financial architecture even while operating in ways that are unsustainable in short too big to manage megabanks are at the heart of the fragility and instability of the economy today

structural causes of the global financial crisis a critical assessment of the new financial architecture we are in the midst of the worst financial crisis since the great depression this crisis is the latest phase of the evolution of financial markets under the radical financial deregulation process that began in the late 1970s this evolution has taken the form of cycles in which deregulation accompanied by rapid financial innovation stimulates powerful financial booms that end in crises governments respond to crises with bailouts that allow new expansions to begin as a result financial markets have become ever larger and financial crises have become more threatening to society which forces governments to enact ever larger bailouts this process culminated in the current global financial crisis which is so deeply rooted that even unprecedented interventions by affected governments have thus far failed to contain it in this paper we analyse the structural flaws in the financial system that helped bring on the current crisis and discuss prospects for financial reform

meaning and credibility in cheap talk games i define neologism proofness a refinement of perfect bayesian equilibrium in cheap talk games it applies when players have a preexisting common language so that an unexpected message s literal meaning is clear and only credibility restricts communication i show that certain implausible equilibria are not neologism proof in some games no equilibrium is journal of economic literature classification numbers d83 d82 c73

brand names and barriers to entry in political markets the most obvious implication of this discussion is that barriers to entry in politics will raise the costs of governments transferring wealth more generally it will raise the cost of public provision of goods and services in the case of transfers the inefficiency created by barriers depends on whether one values government transfers the total transfer the transfer to the beneficiaries plus the politician s commission is maximized by the politician who can create support the most efficiently for other governmental services which are viewed as efficiency creating e g national defense these barriers reduce the amount of a valuable output we desire to purchase this result also supplies a possible efficiency explanation for the limitation on the number of terms imposed on the presidency and many governorships brand names are not really the barriers information costs are what cause brand name to be used and are the more fundamental barrier to entry what we are arguing is that private and not public organizations can in certain respects better overcome these information costs

extended generalized purchasing power parity and optimum currency area in east asian countries this article extends the theory of generalized purchasing power parity g ppp by developing a model including foreign variables such as the real money supply output and interest rate a cointegration rank test with two structural breaks in the deterministic trend was adopted to selected asian countries with japan as the base country there were two cointegrating vectors and six common stochastic trends in the model the cointegrating vectors were estimated by the same approach used by pesaran et al 2000 the first cointegrating vector is interpreted as g ppp and the second one is interpreted as the extended g ppp according to g ppp these countries could form a single currency area the first stochastic trend is primarily driven by japan s real money supply the second third and fourth by the real exchange rates of the philippines singapore and thailand respectively the fifth by japan s output and the sixth by japan s government bond yields

income distribution and the size of the financial sector a sraffian analysis the recent expansion of the financial sector has been accompanied by deregulation an acceleration of financial innovation and changes in income distribution the size of these phenomena has attracted the attention of the literature a large part has analysed the relationship between financial development and inequality arguing that the former tends to reduce the latter for a review of this literature see demirguc kunt and levine 2009 it moves from the claim that perfect credit markets reduce inequality by bringing about the efficient exploitation of personal qualities material endowments and the growth potentials of the economy credit market imperfections hold back the achievement of these results but are counteracted by deregulation and financial innovation which tend to eliminate rent positions

campaign finance reform and electoral competition using state senate data from 1984 through the beginning of 2002 this paper finds that campaign donation regulations clearly reduce the competitiveness in political races this is reflected in several dimensions conservative estimates indicate that different donation limits are associated with anywhere from a 4 to over a 23 percentage point increase in win margins the regulations increase the probability that only one candidate will run for office and they increase the probability that incumbents win re election campaign finance regulations also tend to reduce the number of candidates who run for office by an average of about 20 percent

the analysis of committee power an application to senate voting on the minimum wage a widely noted empirical regularity of congressional behavior is that standing committees exert disproportionate influence on congressional choices the observed phenomenon has a number of labels committee influence committee power and from the parent chamber s perspective deference to committees and a large body of theoretical and empirical research has sought to determine when and why it exists this paper takes as given only the weakest form the observation namely that committee power exists sometimes it does not directly address the questions of when and why committee power exists although much of the relevant literature is reviewed rather it focuses on a prerequisite to the resolution of disputes about committee power how can committee power be assessed empirically section i reviews three classes of explanations and identifies obstacles to convincing empirical tests of the accounts section ii introduces an econometric approach for analyzing committee power section iii applies the technique to a sequence of votes on minimum wage legislation in the senate in 1977 section iv extends the technique to multi dimensional choice spaces section v is a discussion and summary

a developing country view of the current global crisis what should not be forgotten and what should be done macroeconomic theory will surely be affected by the current global crisis there are signs that some old theories and insights will have a comeback this paper argues that among them economists should not forget the lessons that have been learnt from three decades of several financial crises in developing countries we emphasise two important lessons first preventing crises in developing countries requires not only the regulation of domestic financial systems but also a consistent set of macroeconomic policies in particular we stress the need for consistency between the exchange rate rule the capital account regime and the domestic financial market regulations second financial crises in developing countries tend to worsen both the balance of payments and the fiscal balance traditional adjustment policies tend to exacerbate the recessive trends in output and employment this is just the opposite of what is required and what governments in developed countries are able to do developing countries should push for an agenda that helps them deal with these problems

some talk money in politics a partial review of the literature the financing of political campaigns is an area of active scholarly study i review some of the recent literature and discuss important methodological issues that arise in empir ical research on campaign expenditures and campaign contributions the effects of campaign expenditures and advertising on candidate and ballot measure elections are summarized as are the impacts of contributions on contributors welfare many states have changed their campaign finance laws in the past few years and i describe work that exploits variations in these laws a discussion of the strategies used by interest groups to allocate their campaign contributions provides insights into contributors motives

real and nominal effective exchange rates for 22 ldcs 1971 1 1990 4 the international monetary fund constructs and publishes the real and nominal effective exchange rates mostly for developed but not less developed countries this paper employs a method of constructing real and nominal effective exchange rate from the literature to produce quarterly data over the 1971 1990 period for 22 developing nations as an application the stationarity of real effective exchange rates are determined to establish the empirical validity of the purchasing power parity theory ppp the results reveal that ppp fails to hold for most countries

capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics the economic theory of regulation long ago put public interest theories of politics to rest these theories have correctly been viewed as normative wishings rather than explanations of real world phenomena they have been replaced by models of political behavior that are consistent with the rest of microeconomics anthony downs 1957 james buchanan and gordon tullock 1965 george stigler 1971 sam peltzman 1976 recently however debate has arisen over whether some version of a public interest theory of regulation will have to be readmitted to our thinking about actions and results in the political arena what is at issue is the empirical importance of the altruistic publicly interested goals of rational actors in determining legislative and regulatory outcomes james kau and paul rubin 1979 kalt 1981 peltzman 1982 this study assesses the nature and significance of publicly interested objectives in a particular instance of economic policymaking u s senate voting on coal strip mining regulations the existence of such objectives is of course no contradiction of the economic view of human behavior kenneth arrow 1972 gary becker 1974 and may well be rooted in genetic biological history becker 1976 jack hirshleifer 1978 generally however individuals altruistic publicly interested goals have been given little attention this reflects the judgment that such goals are so empirically unimportant as to allow the use of occam s razor in positive models or well founded apprehensions that these goals are unusually difficult to identify measure and analyze notwithstanding the latter problem we find that approaches which confine themselves to a view of political actors as narrowly egocentric maximizers explain and predict legislative outcomes poorly the tracking and dissecting of the determinants of voting on coal strip mining policy suggest that the economic theory of politics has been prematurely closed to a broader conception of political behavior

new evidence on purchasing power parity from 17 oecd countries there is a large literature that investigates whether or not real exchange rates are stationary in an attempt to unravel support for purchasing power parity ppp at best the empirical results are mixed this paper applies a unit root test that allows for a simultaneous structural break in the intercept and slope shown by sen 2003 to minimize power distortions to examine ppp for 17 oecd countries our results on ppp are mixed when the real exchange rate is based on the us dollar evidence is found of ppp for only france portugal and denmark when the real exchange rate is based on the deutschmark we find evidence of ppp for austria belgium norway spain netherlands switzerland and denmark

deviations and mean reversion to purchasing power parity in the asian currency crisis of 1997 this study analyses the process of mean reversion towards purchasing power parity ppp for a sample of asian countries around the 1997 crisis it is found that appreciation relative to ppp is evident prior to the 1997 crash period correction occurs from 1997 onwards a period marked by extreme movements in exchange rates with both appreciation and depreciation relative to the ppp rate over relatively short periods the key result of this paper is that although reversion towards ppp is apparent for mean though not statistically significant it is clear that there is a substantial statistically significant change in variance from 1997 onwards this result has implications both for economic modelling of crash periods and for appropriate choice of statistical tests

competition policy for elections do campaign contribution limits matter this paper examines whether campaign contribution restrictions have consequences for election outcomes states are a natural laboratory to examine this issue we analyze elections to assemblies from 1980 to 2001 and determine whether candidates vote shares are altered by changes in state campaign contribution restrictions we find that limits on giving narrow the margin of victory of the winning candidate limits lead to closer elections for future incumbents but have less effect on the margin of victory of incumbents who passed the campaign finance legislation we also find some evidence that contribution limits increase the number of candidates in the race

committee assignments constituent preferences and campaign contributions committee assignments constituent preferences and campaign constributions the familiar economic model of regulation as developed by stigler 1971 peltzman 1976 and becker 1983 posits an essentially frictionless market process for regulatory policy formation in which a single regulator legislator chooses policy to maximize net support from competing groups in this paper we extend the supply side of this model by considering the effect of legislative institutions and unorganized constituent preferences on the ability of incumbents in the house of representatives to serve specific interest groups we then test this formulation by examining the recent history of interest group campaign contributions to these legislators our theoretical model concentrates on how a legislator allocates time between serving specific interest groups outside his district and serving his constituency we do not model interest group decisions directly assuming simply that they purchase their desired amount of service from the lowest cost suppliers our model sorts legislators by the supply price at which they can serve a particular group this price depends on the preferences of the voters in the legislators district and the productivity of the legislator in producing policy service for each group 1 the empirical section tests the model by examining the pattern of interest group campaign contributions to house incumbents from 1978 through 1984 our regression analysis tends to confirm both implications of the theory first the pattern of campaign contributions from specific interest groups to legislators is shaped by the division of substantive legislative and regulatory jurisdictions represented by the system of house standing committees second voter preferences influence the pattern of contributions by affecting the supply price at which a legislator can offer policy to interest groups legislators with sympathetic or indifferent constituencies are able to offer a lower price and are therefore able to attract larger sums than those with hostile constituencies these results are important for two reasons first the influence of congressional institutions such as committees on policy is not widely accepted while several studies faith levins and tollison 1982 weingast and moran 1983 weingast 1984 grier 1989 and robert 1990 have documented the effects of changes in a particular committee on policies under its jurisdiction this work considers the jurisdiction of only a single committee in each case 2 by examining the linkages between congressional committees and political action committees pacs we investigate whether interest groups act as if committees have power second while the chicago model of regulation emphasizes correctly in our view that policy is the result of vote maximizing calculations and the incremental balancing nature of any equilibrium the model is imprecise about which sets of preferences are most important in determining the levels of policy or the size of changes in policies focusing on committees promotes a parsimonious specification of both the political players members of the relevant committee rather than the entire congress and the pivotal voters committee members constituencies more than the nation determining specific policy outcomes the paper is organized as follows section i reviews some issues on the nature and sources of committee influence in the u s congress the second section incorporates committee assignments into a theory of decision making by interest group investors sections iii and iv describe our data and estimation technique and present the empirical results the fifth and final section discusses some implications and conclusions of this research i committee power in congress legislators differ substantively by virtue of their committee assignments committees in congress and particularly in the house of representatives possess disproportionate power over the policy areas in their respective jurisdictions have the right to hold hearings and recommend budget allocations for the bureaus in their jurisdiction goodwin 1970

an unproductive labour view of finance the present paper discusses the role of the financial sector in a capitalist economy arguing that the huge increase in its weight economic and otherwise in the last decades is not justified by the importance of its contribution to economic growth the point is developed going back to the classical concepts of productive and unproductive labour there are two dimensions of these concepts that we discuss the first links the social efficiency of the financial sector to its role in the reproduction process crucially distinguishing basic from non basic uses we argue that many financial services usually seen as services to production really consist of the provision of gambling facilities and thereby have to be considered at best as luxury goods when evaluated according to its reproductive capability the service of arranging a gambling house cannot be seen as producing social value a second sense in which the discussion of productive and unproductive labour casts light on the nature of some financial services is that connected to the conception of pure circulation costs as different from costs of production proper the amount of circulation costs varies with the varying intensity of the realisation problem they are not defined by the production technique and are in this sense arbitrary copyright oxford university press

are real exchange rates nonstationary evidence from a panel data test it is well documented that real exchange rates between the united states and many industrialized countries in the post bretton woods period are integrated this result implies that purchasing power parity ppp does not hold even as a long run relationship this paper demonstrates that the failure to reject the unit root hypothesis may result from the low power of existing univariate test procedures i test for unit roots in real exchange rates by employing a more powerful panel based procedure using both cpi and wpi real dollar exchange rate data i strongly reject the null hypothesis of a unit root my results provide overwhelming support for the long run ppp under the current float copyright 1996 by ohio state university press

purchasing power parity and country characteristics evidence from panel data tests abstract we examine long run purchasing power parity ppp using panel data methods to test for unit roots in us dollar real exchange rates of 84 countries we find stronger evidence of ppp in countries more open to trade closer to the united states with lower inflation and moderate nominal exchange rate volatility and with similar economic growth rates as the united states we also show that ppp holds for panels of european and latin american countries but not for african and asian countries our findings demonstrate that country characteristics can help explain both adherence to and deviations from long run ppp

money and votes reconsidered congressional elections 1972 1982 the evolution of congressional campaign finance over the past decade is characterized by steady growth in campaign spending and other notable changes in campaign finance practices the main purpose of the research reported here was to determine whether these changes have altered the effects of campaign spending on election outcomes this required reexamination of auxiliary questions concerning how sending effects operate and can be measured it also required facing the limits of what analysis of aggregate campaign spending data can tell us about money in elections replication of ols and 2sls analyses of campaign spending effects produced solidly consistent results over the six congressional elections held between 1972 and 1982 taken at face value the evidence is overwhelming that the challenger s level of spending has a strong impact on the vote whereas that of the incumbent has virtually no impact at all but the evidence remains open to doubt on two grounds one is the probable inadequacy of the 2sls model or perhaps any possible model leaving the issue of simultaneity bias unsettled if bias remains the estimates exaggerate the electoral effects of the challenger s campaign expenditures the issue cannot be resolved with more of the same data but rather requires data of a different sort surveys taken over the course of a sample of campaigns would do the trick meanwhile i think it would be foolish to make policy on the assumption that bias is in fact substantial the greatest likelihood remains that restrictions on campaign money will have the general effect of hurting challengers jacobson 1979 the other doubtful albeit equally stable finding is that incumbents do not gain votes by spending in campaigns no incumbent seems to believe it and there is at least circumstantial evidence from for example the 1982 elections that their skepticism is quite justified if so the problem lies in the limits of what aggregate data of the kind analyzed here can tell us few incumbents do not spend heavily when they are strongly challenged if both candidates spend beyond the point needed to become thoroughly familiar to voters then the substance of the campaigns the contents of campaign messages become the dominant factors incumbents may need to spend money in order to change the message as new circumstances arise to frame new issues that would help them most or damage them least to win the battle of establishing the real issues like nonincumbents sitting members may sometimes need to spend beyond a certain threshold to remain competitive but nearly all of them do so when the necessity arises so aggregate spending data are largely uninformative how the money is spent rather than how much is what matters the two most notable developments in congressional campaign finance have opposing implications national party organizations particularly the republican have assumed an increasingly important role in financing campaigns greater central control leads to a more efficient distribution of the party s collective campaign resources which among other things promises to raise the overall level of electoral competition it also leads to more coordinated campaigning with greater emphasis on national themes and programs thus it should foster more cooperation and loyalty among fellow partisans in congress but pacs have also grown in numbers and in financial importance because most concentrate on gaining access to incumbents they do little to make elections more competitive because they usually pursue narrowly defined interests their influence fragments the congress and weakens party coalitions in this and other ways parties and pacs are natural rivals the most consequential decisions taken in the next round in campaign finance policy will be those which affect the relative importance of parties and pacs see u s congress 1984 for comments on this and other current campaign finance issues

the current economic crisis its nature and the course of academic economics the current crisis has triggered significant debate concerning economic theory and policy largely absent from this debate is an informed discussion of the methods used by economists in analysing the economy and formulating their proposals but method matters here i argue that current academic research practices need to be transformed before real insight can be achieved specifically i indicate why and how a more grounded framework than that presupposed by current research practices facilitates a potentially more fruitful approach to understanding the crisis

purchasing power parity in less developed and transition economies a review paper abstract the concept of purchasing power parity ppp has been the subject of numerous studies many of which have been unable to prove conclusively this core principle of international finance although industrialized countries have received most of the attention studies that focus on less developed and transition economies have also attained mixed results this study surveys trends in this branch of the literature highlighting the econometric advances that have sought to solve this puzzle while pointing out that more needs to be done to address the reasons that might cause ppp not to hold

electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters i present a model of electoral competition in which candidates raise campaign contributions by choosing policies that benefit interest groups and then expend those contributions to influence voters who are uninformed about the policies informed voters however vote based on those policies so candidates face a trade off between choosing a policy to generate funds to attract the uninformed vote and choosing a policy to attract the informed vote electoral equilibria are characterized for two categories of policies particularistic and collective in the case of particularistic policies the equilibrium policies of the candidates are separated if the proportion of uninformed voters is sufficiently high and the degree of separation is an increasing function of that proportion the model is extended to include the public financing of elections and incumbency advantages for the case of collective policies the candidates locate at the median of the ideal points of the informed voters and contributions are zero

introduction the global financial crisis there cannot now be a shadow of a doubt that the flaw in his ideology admitted by alan greenspan in response to a question by henry a waxman chairman of the us house of representatives committee on oversight and government reform whether he felt that your ideology pushed you to make decisions that you wish you had not made is both significant and permanent the current financial and economic crisis that has forced the likes of greenspan to question the coherence of dominant conceptual frameworks is unprecedented in global reach and systemic gravity some basic figures speak for themselves according to mckinsey s mapping global financial markets october 2008 global financial assets rose from us 12 trillion in 1980 to us 196 trillion in 2007 the international monetary fund s global financial stability report imf 2009a estimate for the latter figure is considerably higher at us 241 trillion global cross border capital flows more than doubled between 2002 and 2007 with foreign investors holding one in four debt securities and one in five equities while in 2000 only 11 countries had financial assets of more than 350 of gross domestic product gdp 25 countries had deepened their financial markets to the same extent by 2007 as early as 1990 money managers had increased their control of us corporate equities from 8 in 1950 to 60 porter 1992 p 6 whalen 2002 p 402 similarly pension funds had extended their share of total business equities from less than 1 to just short of 39 and their fraction of corporate debt from 13 to 50 ghilarducci 1992 p 117 whalen 2002 p 402 in the period from 1986 to 2006 the us financial sector as a whole increased its share of corporate profits from 10 to 30 while its outstanding debts grew from 20 of gdp in 1980 to 116 in 2007 fed 2009 according to gillian tett from the financial times outstanding credit defaults swaps cds today amount to no less than us 60 trillion with the risk embodied after discounting mutually off setting contracts still as high as us 14 trillion tett 2009 p 264 as we know the curtains have now come down on this dance of the trillions palma 2009 the immediate hang over in the form of a pile of toxic debt is surreal not only in its

the double bubble at the turn of the century technological roots and structural implications this paper argues that the two boom and bust episodes of the turn of the century the internet mania and crash of the 1990s and the easy liquidity boom and bust of the 2000s are two distinct components of a single structural phenomenon they are essentially the equivalent of 1929 developed in two stages one centred on technological innovation the other on financial innovation hence the frequent references to that crash to the 1930s and to bretton woods are not simple journalistic metaphors for interpreting the credit crunch and its solution but rather the intuitive recognition of a fundamental similarity between those events and the current ones the paper holds that such major boom and bust episodes are endogenous to the way in which the market economy evolves and assimilates successive technological revolutions it will discuss why it occurred in two bubbles on this occasion it examines the differences and continuities between the two episodes and presents an interpretation of their nature and consequences

bureaucratic discretion or congressional control regulatory policymaking by the federal trade commission this paper extends stigler and peltzman s approach to regulation by incorporating a legislature the model yields comparative statics results and hence testable implications the paper then tests between two opposing approaches about regulatory agency behavior the first assumes agencies operate independently of the legislature and hence exercise discretion the second assumes that congress controls agency decisions the recent behavior of the federal trade commission provides the empirical setting substantial evidence is found for the specific predictions of the model including the hypothesis of systematic congressional influence over ftc decisions

the industrial organization of congress or why legislatures like firms are not organized as markets this paper provides a theory of legislative institutions that parallels the theory of the firm and the theory of contractual institutions like market institutions legislative institutions reflect two key components the goals or preferences of individuals here representatives seeking reelection and the relevant transactions costs we present three conclusions first we show how the legislative institutions enforce bargains among legislators second we explain why given the peculiar form of bargaining problems found in legislatures specific forms of nonmarket exchange prove superior to market exchange third our approach shows how the committee system limits the types of coalitions that may form on a particular issue

latin america and the global financial crisis the current world economic crisis has hit latin america very hard although financial conditions have deteriorated particularly since september 2008 the financial shock has been less severe than during the two previous crises thanks to improvements in external balance sheets there has been room for counter cyclical credit and monetary policies the decision to absorb large capital inflows during the boom as foreign exchange reserves is one of the major sources of the increased room to manoeuvre however these strengths have been insufficient in the face of a strong trade shock the region s economies should therefore seriously think again in the domestic market with regional integration and active production sector policies as engines of growth copyright the author 2009 published by oxford university press on behalf of the cambridge political economy society all rights reserved oxford university press

a critical review and an extension of the political shirking literature after substituting actual and real changes for proposed and nominal changes in budgetary and employment levels it is clear that the size and scope of the federal leviathon had not been reduced over 1982 83 it is also clear that the agencies which witnessed real budget cuts over this period were of minor importance in terms of the total u s budget future research on why only small agencies receive real budget cuts will provide us with a better understanding of the budgetary process

the choice of numeraire currency in panel tests of purchasing power parity we investigate the implications of the choice of numeraire currency on panel tests of purchasing power parity under the current regime of flexible exchange rates by conducting panel unit root tests with twenty one different base currencies we show that the conditions necessary for numeraire irrelevancy are not supported empirically and that the choice of numeraire currency can and does matter for ppp the evidence of ppp is stronger for european than for non european base currencies distance between the countries and volatility of the exchange rates are the most important determinants of the results

money talks deterring quality challengers in congressional elections j 4t e examine the role of incumbent fundraising in deterring strong challengers we construct vf v a signaling model in which incumbents can use fundraising strategically to ward off w v quality challengers we show however that only under very limited circumstances will there be an observable relationship between fundraising and challenger quality therefore previous empirical tests for deterrence have systematically underestimated the effects of fundraising in decreasing electoral competition our analysis also suggests that by making fundraising easily observable federal election commission regulations may encourage candidates to overinvest time and resources accumulating large war chests instead of governing

are asian real exchange rates mean reverting evidence from univariate and panel lm unit root tests with one and two structural breaks there are a number of studies that examine the purchasing power parity ppp hypothesis the empirical findings from the extant literature for the ppp hypothesis are mixed this article applies univariate and panel lagrange multiplier lm unit root tests with one and two structural breaks to real exchange rates for 15 asian countries the univariate lm unit root tests find evidence of ppp for two thirds of the sample the results from the panel lm unit root test support long run ppp for the asian countries in the sample the results from the lm panel unit root tests differ from those of existing panel unit root tests of ppp for asian countries that have not allowed for the existence of structural breaks

the determinants of campaign spending the role of the government jackpot a slave has but one master the ambitious man has as many masters as there are persons whose aid may contribute to the advancement of his fortune jean de labruyere des ouvrages de l esprit i introduction this paper builds a model of elections in which contributors give money to candidates in return for promises of government favors each candidate spends to increase his chances of victory the candidate s probability of winning and the value of government resources that would be his to distribute if he won the jackpot determine the amount he can raise the model suggests a way to measure the influence of the jackpot on spending while controlling for other effects such as the probability of winning the search for this result is interesting because we wish to know what influences the resources devoted to courting politicians is the growth of government truly to blame why if government is for sale do contributors give so little relative to the size of government to control so much and why as abrams and settle 1978 found does campaign spending sometimes not grow even though government grows do official limits on public debt reduce the politician s discretionary control over government resources and hinder his ability to sell favors how does ideology interfere with the candidate s demand for contributions empirical models of contributions that can serve as a guide have been of two sorts abrams 1981 following the work of crain and tollison 1977 crain deaton and tollison 1977 and gifford and santoni 1978 regressed campaign spending on several proxies for the jackpot and found a positive effect a more popular approach to explaining campaign outlays pioneered by jacobson 1978 has been to regress spending or contributions on the candidate s probability of victory and to ignore the role of the jackpot the implicit assumption in such models is that the candidate s net worth to contributors determines spending the candidate cares only about winning and raises as much as he can the greater his chances of winning the more he can raise and the more he will spend i call this the supply side view because spending depends only on the supply of contributions this approach goes some way to explaining contributions but neglects the role of the jackpot and cannot explain why some strong candidates who are sought after by contributors accept little or nothing such as former senator william proxmire of wisconsin the present study takes something from both approaches but argues that candidates may not wish to spend all they can raise because contributions do not come free of charge as baron 1989 pointed out the candidate s demand albeit bounded by potential supply determines contributions candidates probably run for election to control government wealth and must ponder how much of the jackpot to auction for contributions the candidate s demand for contributions can be derived from a utility function that rises with his probability of victory but diminishes with the contributions he accepts how much a candidate demands depends on the size of the bernoulli variance of the outcome which i call closeness and the size of the jackpot the greater the closeness and the larger the jackpot the greater the candidate s demand a close race is defined here not by the number of rivals or the margin of victory but as one in which the outcome is very uncertain the typical candidate does not spend all he is able to raise but the effect of closeness fades if the candidate wishes to win greatly the model describes the simultaneous relationship between spending and closeness and imposes identifying restrictions i carry out tests on samples drawn from the 1978 and 1986 contests for u s state governorships and find that jackpots affect election spending but that closeness is less important in addition i find that in states where the legislature is constitutionally required to balance the budget governors sell less of the jackpot

campaign contributions as investments the u s house of representatives 1980 1986 this paper treats the market for special interest campaign contributions and political favors as a simple asset market the model yields a simple equilibrium relationship among three variables the total amount of investor contributions a candidate receives the monetary value of the favors he has promised and his probability of winning using data on open seat races for the u s house of representatives i confront the model with a series of tests despite the starkness of the model the results of these tests are highly supportive

the revenge of the market on the rentiers why neo liberal reports of the end of history turned out to be premature starting from the perspective of heterodox keynesian minskyian kindlebergian financial economics this paper begins by highlighting a number of mechanisms that contributed to the current financial crisis these include excess liquidity income polarisation conflicts between financial and productive capital lack of appropriate regulation asymmetric information principal agent dilemmas and bounded rationalities however the paper then proceeds to argue that perhaps more than ever the macroeconomics that led to this crisis only makes analytical sense if examined within the framework of the political settlements and distributional outcomes in which it had operated taking the perspective of critical social theories the paper concludes that ultimately the current financial crisis is the outcome of something much more systemic namely an attempt to use neo liberalism or in us terms neo conservatism as a new technology of power to help transform capitalism into a rentiers delight in particular into a system without compulsions on big business i e one that imposes only minimal pressures on big agents to engage in competitive struggles in the real economy while doing the opposite to workers and small firms a key component in the effectiveness of this new technology of power was its ability to transform the state into a major facilitator of the ever increasing rent seeking practices of oligopolistic capital the architects of this experiment include some capitalist groups in particular rentiers from the financial sector as well as capitalists from the mature and most polluting industries of the preceding techno economic paradigm some political groups as well as intellectual networks with their allies including many economists and the new left although rentiers did succeed in their attempt to get rid of practically all fetters on their greed in the end the crisis materialised when markets took their inevitable revenge on the rentiers by calling their blatant bluff

are bilateral real exchange rates stationary evidence from lagrange multiplier unit root tests for india the paper examines the stationarity of india s real exchange rate vis a vis 16 of its major trading partner countries for the period 1960 2000 application of the conventional adf unit root test the lagrange multiplier lm unit root test with one structural break and the lm unit root test with two structural breaks provides evidence that india s exchange rate vis a vis 15 out of 16 countries is stationary implying support for purchasing power parity

independent candidates and political representation in india we estimate the causal effect of independent candidates on voter turnout and election outcomes in india to do this we exploit exogenous changes in the entry deposit candidates pay for their participation in the political process changes that disproportionately excluded candidates with no affiliation to established political parties a one standard deviation increase in the number of independent candidates increases voter turnout by more than 6 percentage points as some voters choose to vote rather than stay home the vote share of independent candidates increases by more than 10 percentage points as some existing voters switch who they vote for thus independents allow winning candidates to win with less vote share decrease the probability of electing a candidate from the governing coalition by about 31 percentage points and ultimately increase the probability of electing an ethnic party candidate altogether the results imply that the price of participation by independents is constituency representation in government

the congressional budget process aggregate spending and statutory budget rules abstract this paper compares the congressional budget process instituted in 1974 and the piecemeal appropriations process that preceded it previous theoretical analysis using spatial models of legislator preferences finds no systematic difference in relative spending levels under the two regimes this paper instead uses a model of interest group lobbying a legislature determines spending on a national public good and on subsidies to sector specific interest groups in the appropriations process the appropriations committee proposes a budget that because of interest group influence involves overspending on subsidies in the budget process the budget committee proposes an aggregate level of spending the budget resolution then the appropriations committee proposes a budget a free rider problem among the interest groups inhibits the lobbying of the budget committee to increase the aggregate budget if each group is sufficiently small it takes the budget resolution as given and lobbies the appropriations committee aggregate spending is lower and social welfare is higher under the budget process however provision of the national public good is suboptimal the paper also analyzes statutory budget rules that limit spending levels but can be revised by a simple majority vote here the free rider problem prevents the groups from securing the required changes to budget rules

the fat years the structure and profitability of the us banking sector in the pre crisis period bank profitability in the usa was extremely high in the pre crisis period yet this did not prevent the current crisis it has become clear that these profits were on shaky grounds and also that bank profits were not used to buttress banks capital bases this paper analyses the effects of structure on profitability from 1994 to 2005 banklevel panel data are used to test the effects of concentration market power bank size and operational efficiency on profitability efficiency is not found to be a strong determinant of profitability suggesting that banks high profits during this period were not earned through efficient performance robust evidence is found that concentration increases bank profitability this holds even when the largest banks are excluded from the sample suggesting that the relationship between concentration and profitability acts in a generalised structural way and that the higher profits arising from concentration are at the expense of the rest of the economy the analysis points to various policy implications relevant to the current crisis in particular in terms of the legitimacy of expectations of the restoration of pre crisis profit rates and the need for much stronger regulation of the banking sector especially in terms of the structure of the sector pricing behaviour and use of profits

the last period problem in politics do congressional representatives not subject to a reelection constraint alter their voting behavior this study of roll call voting behavior in the u s house of representatives empirically documents the existence of an important simultaneity bias in the heretofore much investigated relationship between legislator ideological shirking and the security with which a legislator holds office the results indicate that while greater security allows a policymaker more leeway for ideological consumption increases in ideological on the job consumption also diminish a policymaker s security in office

challenger entry and voter learning we develop a model of strategic interaction between voters and potential electoral challengers to sitting incumbents in which the very fact of a costly challenge conveys relevant information to voters given incumbent failure in office challenger entry is more likely but the threat of entry by inferior challengers creates an incentive for citizens to become more politically informed at the same time challenges to incumbents who perform well can neutralize a voter s positive assessment of incumbent qualifications how a voter becomes politically informed can in turn deter challengers of different levels of competence from running depending on the electoral environment the model permits us to sharpen our understanding of retrospective voting the incumbency advantage and the relationship between electoral competition and voter welfare while pointing to new interpretations of and future avenues for empirical research on elections

campaign spending in congressional elections campaign spending in congressional elections i introduction empirical studies of the effects of campaign spending on the outcome of congressional elections have found that campaign spending by incumbents is not as effective as that of their challengers indeed kau and rubin 1982 and jacobson 1985 1987 find that incumbent spending reduces the number of votes they receive and netter 1983 that it increases the challenger s votes incumbents seeking reelection however are very successful winning nine times out of ten in the postwar era if their campaign spending is so inefficient why do incumbents continue to outspend their challengers in a majority of elections we argue that these researchers counterintuitive findings are the result of using models which do not adequately correct for the simultaneous determination of the election outcome and campaign contributions and which do not include an electoral check on incumbent behavior 1 in their studies jacobson and netter as well as lott 1986 and laband and lentz 1985 assume the incumbent s ability to repel challengers is independent of his or her behavior while in office few would agree that the electoral check is so ineffective we develop a simultaneous model to correct these deficiencies it captures the effects of campaign expenditures tenure the consistency of the incumbent s votes with his constituents preferences and the size of the voter turnout on the votes received by incumbents and challengers in four congressional elections between 1978 and 1984 the model is very robust over these four elections the use of primary election data insures model identification ii model and empirical measures we assume that the platforms of any two candidates for a political office can be measured along a single left right spectrum voters know their preferred position on the dimension but cannot observe the positions of the two candidates with certainty because of rational ignorance a theory accepted since downs 1957 following congleton 1986 we assume voters are risk averse and receive more utility from candidates with positions closer to the voters preferred position but lose utility as the candidate s position becomes more uncertain voters compare the candidates and vote for the one that provides them greater expected utility voters can observe the incumbent s performance and are thus less uncertain of his views and credibility uncertainty should decrease with an incumbent s tenure in office tenure provides voters with knowledge of the incumbent s position and the incumbent with political capital this accumulation of political capital may make it more difficult for challengers to mount a successful campaign in this sense tenure acts as a barrier to entry 2 if all incumbents were at the same point on the spectrum as the median voter of their districts all incumbents would win reelection if all potential challengers were aware of this fact they would not challenge since campaigns are costly but one observes many challengers and some defeated incumbents so we proceed from the hypothesis that challengers enter the race when they perceive a gap between the position of the incumbent and that of the median voter and assume this position as their platform a large difference between the incumbent s position and the median voter s position increases the likelihood of a successful challenge if voters were certain of the positions of both candidates and the challenger s assessment was correct the challenger would win but challengers are usually less well known than incumbents and this additional uncertainty gives incumbents an advantage thus the challenger must convince the voters that his or her position is closest to the median voter s position and advertising is the primary means to that end 3 repetition of the message reduces the voters uncertainty over a challenger s position

why don t the bailouts work design of a new financial system versus a return to normalcy the innovative support measures introduced by the us central bank and treasury in response to the current crisis to bolster bank balance sheets have had little success in restoring liquidity to financial markets these policies mirror similar policies employed in the 1930s in the usa and the 1990s in japan in both cases with little impact this paper identifies three policies impacting incomes rather than prices the assessment of system failure and proposals for system design that were employed in dealing with prior financial crises that they have not been introduced in response to the present crisis may explain why current measures have not yet had their intended impact of restoring bank lending to the productive economy

some new stylized facts of floating exchange rates abstract this paper re examines real exchange rate behavior of oecd currencies under the current float using the more extensive dataset that an additional decade s worth of experience has made available what emerges is a new set of stylized facts which suggest that the problems of the current float were not as commonly believed generic to that system but in fact rather specific being largely confined to one sub period the early and mid 1980s and one currency the us dollar this dollar behavior ranks as one of the important puzzles of the past 25 years

the costs of coupling the global crisis and the indian economy the view that the indian economy would be less adversely affected by the global economic crisis because of limited integration and other inherent strengths has proved to be wrong the economic boom in india that preceded the current downturn was dependent upon greater global integration in three ways greater reliance on exports particularly of services increased dependence on capital inflows especially of the short term variety and the role these played in underpinning a domestic credit fuelled consumption and investment boom these in turn made the growth process more vulnerable to internally and externally generated crises as is now becoming clear

interest groups campaign contributions and probabilistic voting this essay develops a simple model to analyze the impact of campaign contributions on electoral policy decisions of candidates for office interest groups here are firms that select contributions under the assumption that candidates policies and opposing groups donations remain unaltered candidates however recognize that their policy choices affect contributions campaign contributions are used by candidates to affect policy oriented voters perceptions of candidates positions in this framework the introduction of campaign contributions may affect candidates electoral policies and if they do then they benefit surely exactly one of the two interest groups

electoral and financial effects of changes in committee power the gramm rudman hollings budget reform the tax reform act of 1986 and the money committees in the house most rational choice theories of legislatures locate the source of committee power in the restrictive procedural rules that enforce committee jurisdictions however there is no empirical support for this claim further there is little evidence for the natural implication that membership on more powerful committees confers electoral benefits i address these puzzles by exploiting the occurrence of major budget and tax reforms in the mid eighties these reforms provide a natural experiment for measuring the electoral and financial consequences of changes in committee power i show that the procedural rule changes instituted by the gramm rudman hollings budget reform caused an increase in campaign contributions to members of the budget committee and led to a reduction in the vote share of members of the appropriations committee this heretofore unrecognized effect of the gramm rudman hollings budget reform on the welfare of members of the house rivals that of a more widely recognized policy shock th

using repeat challengers to estimate the effect of campaign spending on election outcomes in the u s house previous studies of congressional spending have typically found a large positive effect of challenger spending but little evidence for effects of incumbent spending those studies however do not adequately control for inherent differences in vote getting ability across candidates high quality challengers are likely to receive a high fraction of the vote and have high campaign expenditures even if campaign spending has no impact on election outcomes to avoid that bias this paper examines elections in which the same two candidates face one another on more than one occasion differencing eliminates the influence of any fixed candidate or district attributes estimates of the effects of challenger spending are an order of magnitude below those of previous studies campaign spending has an extremely small impact on election outcomes regardless of who does the spending campaign spending limits appear socially desirable but public financing of campaigns does not

legislator voting and shirking a critical review of the literature we set out to critically review the progress in answering two related questions what determines how legislators vote and how can shirking by legislators be measured in the first category the hypothesis that legislators shirk in order to indulge their personal ideological preferences has led researchers astray the theoretical underpinning is shaky on two counts first legislators who indulge their preferences at the expense of their constituents preferences put themselves at a competitive electoral disadvantage second the original two stage procedure used to measure ideological shirking is severely flawed among many other problems the residual measure of shirking implicitly assumes that the median voter is the relevant constituent principal for the legislator agent

politician preferences law abiding lobbyists and caps on political contributions the effect of a contribution cap is analyzed in a political lobbying game where the politician has a policy preference in contrast to the previous literature without politician policy preferences more restrictive binding caps always reduce expected aggregate contributions however the initial imposition of a cap increases contributions if the politician mildly favors the low valuation lobbyist s policy the introduction of policy preferences permits analysis of monied interests policy influence a more restrictive cap makes it more likely that the politician enacts the policy he would have enacted in the absence of lobbying even in cases where expected aggregate contributions increase

partisan cycles in congressional elections and the macroeconomy in the postwar united states the president s party has always done worse in the midterm congressional elections than in the previous congressional election republican administrations exhibit below average and democratic administrations above average economic growth in the first half of each term whereas in the latter halves the two see equal growth our rational expectations model is consistent with these two regularities in presidential elections voters choose between two polarized candidates they then use midterm elections to counterbalance the president s policies by strengthening the opposition in congress since presidents of different parties are associated with different policies our model predicts a spurious correlation between the state of the economy and elections our predictions contrast with those of retrospective voting models in which voters reward the incumbent if the economy is doing well before the election our model performs empirically at least as well as and often better than alternative models

the effects of campaign spending in house elections new evidence for old arguments the question of how campaign spending affects election results remains open because the simultaneity problem has proven so intractable green and krasno s 1988 recent attempt to solve the problem and to demonstrate that marginal returns on spending are as great for incumbents as for challengers again comes up short a panel feature of the abc newslwashington post congressional district poll conducted during the 1986 elections offers a fresh perspective on the question analysis of changes in voting intentions during the final six weeks of the campaign shows that as the tainted ols studies have invariably suggested the amount spent by the challenger is far more important in accounting for voter s decisions than is the amount spent by the incumbent

a simple explanation for why campaign expenditures are increasing the government is getting bigger abstract this paper shows that most of the large recent increases in campaign spending for federal and state offices can be explained by higher government spending this result holds for both federal and state legislative campaigns and gubernatorial races and across many different specifications the irony is that those who seem most concerned about the level of campaign expenditures are also frequently the ones who most strongly support increasing the size of government evidence is also examined on whether it is the composition and not just the level of expenditures that determines campaign expenditures and whether higher government expenditures similarly results in more candidates competing for office finally by focusing on the symptoms and not the root causes of ever higher campaign expenditures this paper argues that the current public policy debate risks changing the form in which payments are made rather than actually restricting the level of competition

political shirking opponent quality and electoral support several recent papers in the public choice literaturesuggest that legislators shirk or vote in a mannercontrary to constituent interest this paper exploresthe relationship between senatorial shirking andelectoral consequences i model political shirking opponent quality and election outcomes assimultaneous and find significant evidence of arelationship between shirking over the senatorial termand electoral outcomes however i find that voterspunish recent shirking much more than they punishearly term shirking and that senators apparently actconsistently with this relationship

checking out the effects of bank overdrafts on the 1992 house elections the revelation that hundreds of house members had regularly overdrawn their checking accounts with the house bank without penalty injected a new and unanticipated issue into the 1992 elections the consequences were profound the scandal was a major reason for the unusually high turnover of house seats in 1992 bank overdrafts contributed significantly to exit by all routes retirement defeat in the primary election and defeat in the general election overdrafts did not automatically spell disaster for incumbents however a record of bad checks was far more damaging when exploited by an experienced wellfinanced challenger

the purchasing power parity debate originally propounded by the 16th century scholars of the university of salamanca the concept of purchasing power parity ppp was revived in the interwar period in the context of the debate concerning the appropriate level at which to re establish international exchange rate parities broadly accepted as a long run equilibrium condition in the post war period it first was advocated as a short run equilibrium by many international economists in the first few years following the breakdown of the bretton woods system in the early 1970s and then increasingly came under attack on both theoretical and empirical grounds from the late 1970s to the mid 1990s accordingly over the last three decades a large literature has built up that examines how much the data deviated from theory and the fruits of this research have provided a deeper understanding of how well ppp applies in both the short run and the long run since the mid 1990s larger datasets and nonlinear econometric methods in particular have improved estimation as deviations narrowed between real exchange rates and ppp so did the gap narrow between theory and data and some degree of confidence in long run ppp began to emerge again in this respect the idea of long run ppp now enjoys perhaps its strongest support in more than 30 years a distinct reversion in economic thought

legislators and interest groups how unorganized interests get represented this paper derives a supply price for public policy using a constrained maximization model in the model three sets of agents each have preferences over outcomes organized interest groups offer campaign contributions to improve their own wealth voters offer votes to obtain outcomes closer to their most preferred outcomes and legislators seek both campaign contributions and votes to obtain reelection a given legislator s supply price for policy is shown to depend on the productivity of his effort as determined by committee assignments priority and ability and by the preferences of his unorganized constituency in the home district two extreme assumptions about the effectiveness of campaign spending in eliciting votes are used to illustrate the comparative statics properties of the model the prediction of the model is that interest groups will in general seek out legislators whose voters are indifferent to the policy the interest group seeks thus voters who do have preferences over policy are in effect represented even though they are not organized

from global imbalances to global reorganisations the world feels itself to be in transition but to what is unclear will the liberal market model retain its normative primacy once some semblance of normality is restored or will other varieties of capitalism with a bigger role of the state acquire more legitimacy the answer depends partly on one s explanation for the current crisis this essay argues first that global imbalances had too important a role to ignore in contrast to a mainstream view that focuses on mistakes in monetary policy and financial regulation it argues second that in light of global dynamics the crisis is likely to become worse by early 2010 which on the face of it makes significant reorganisations of capitalism more likely the third section lays out what should be done to reconfigure capitalism at national and international levels the final section discusses the political economy of policy reforms in terms of the difficult translation from what should be done to what can be done the broad conclusion is that in five years from now the liberal market model will have been restored to normative primacy and we must have more globalization will again be the elite rallying cry but the crisis will have left behind sufficient doubts about factual propositions and value priorities that political parties and economists advocating alternatives will have more scope than they have had for the past three decades

are contributors rational untangling strategies of political action committees empirical public choice literature and casual observation suggest that the behavior of political action committees is remarkably unsophisticated meaning that pacs give to those legislators who would support their interests anyway thus it is suggested that contributor behavior deviates from rational behavior which is a cornerstone of economic analysis in this paper a switching regression model is estimated that allows for strategies of pacs to vary for different contribution recipients i analyze the behavior of farm pacs over three election cycles in contrast to previous findings i find that contributor behavior is not inconsistent with rational behavior contributors who attempt to influence the voting behavior of members of congress give the most money to legislators whose constituency interest suggests that they are likely to be undecided on how to vote and pacs give less money to legislators who represent districts with larger farm populations because those legislators are likely to vote in con

estimating the value of proposal power this paper investigates the role of proposal power in the allocation of transportation projects across u s congressional districts in 1991 and 1998 the evidence supports the key qualitative prediction of legislative bargaining models members with proposal power those sitting on the transportation authorization committee secure more project spending for their districts than do other representatives support for the quantitative restrictions on the value of proposal power is more mixed i then empirically address several alternative models of legislative behavior including partisan models informational roles for committees models with appropriations committees and theories of committees as preference outliers

the electoral effects of incumbent wealth abstract the absence of limits on own source campaign contributions is widely thought to give wealthy candidates an advantage in congressional elections we employ a unique data set on the wealth of house incumbents running for reelection in 1992 we find that wealthy incumbents do not raise or spend more campaign funds and do not win greater vote shares in their reelection bids further incumbent wealth does not deter high quality challengers

service induced campaign contributions and the electoral equilibrium candidates for office are modeled as promising services such as support for legislation and intervention in the bureaucracy to interest groups in exchange for campaign contributions an electoral equilibrium is characterized in which candidates choose service contribution offers and interest groups choose whether to contribute the model provides several explanations of congressional incumbents success in over 90 percent of their reelection contests a recognition advantage a high personal valuation of the office a lower cost of providing services and policy alignment with high demand interest groups the model yields predictions that are consistent with empirical findings on the relation between campaign contributions and election outcomes

does additional campaign spending really hurt incumbents the theoretical importance of past investments in political brand name the existing literature ignores the fact that the marginal return to current campaign expenditures depends on the candidate s stock of brand name this simple observation is then used to provide a possible explanation for the negative empirical relationship observed between an incumbent s campaign spending and how well he does

out of the corridor keynes and the crisis we should learn from keynes to focus on the macroproblems of our day today s problem is the financial crisis and the resulting great recession neither the standard keynesian policies of decades past nor the monetary policy doctrine of recent years provides useful solutions dynamic stochastic general equilibrium theory is part of the crisis wreckage but turning to old or to new keynesian theory will be of little use a balance sheet recession requires that policy address the problems in the private sector s capital as well as its income accounts we need serious theoretical work on problems of system stability using for example agent based methods monetary theory needs to develop analysis of processes in which intertemporal budget constraints are violated network theory will be useful in that quest

campaign war chests as a barrier to entry in congressional races i introduction issues surrounding the nature and degree of competition in political races have been examined extensively in both the economic and political science literature with most attention focused on the interplay between incumbent and challenger expenditures and electoral success this study extends our understanding of political competition by investigating the impact of an incumbent s war chest on a challenger s decision to mount a campaign 1 for this purpose a war chest is defined as a pool of unencumbered funds accumulated prior to the start of a campaign for elective office 2 sorauf 1988 182 has observed that early receipts even without early spending discourage competition in the primary and attractive challengers in the general election jacobson 1985 26 has argued the most effective strategy for keeping a seat in congress is to avoid serious opposition contemporary critics and reformers of campaign financing practices use such words as frighten intimidate and overpower to describe the role of an incumbent s war chest 3 despite this kind of attention little is actually known about the degree to which war chests diminish entry or reduce the quality of a challenge we present three alternative mechanisms to explain how an incumbent s war chest might deter entry each is based upon a war chest serving as a credible commitment to spend heavily if challenged specifically war chests may either represent excess capacity in financing a campaign or serve as a signal of non observable incumbent characteristics that define a formidable opponent aside from determining whether an incumbent is challenged a war chest might also affect the quality of the challenger for example potential candidates with prior political experience may be unwilling to risk their political capital on a long shot proposition to test for these effects on entry into house races a trichotomous logit model is estimated the choices are uncontested race contested by an ordinary challenger and contested by an experienced challenger although the empirical model is not sufficiently rich to fully distinguish among competing mechanisms the regression results are robust incumbent war chests negatively affect the likelihood of a contested race and the quality of the challenger ii war chests as a barrier to entry becker 1958 106 in comparing economic and political competition observed i n an ideal political democracy competition is free in the sense that no appreciable costs or artificial barriers prevent an individual from running for office in the theory of the firm entry occurs when the expected postentry stream of profits minus the cost of entry is positive analogously an individual will enter a political race when the expected gain from holding office is positive expected gain as defined by baron 1989 is a function of campaign costs the probability of winning and the personal valuation placed by the candidate on the office the first two determinants are partly endogenous depending upon the strategic interplay of the candidates the third aside from its direct effects indirectly affects the first two for example persons hungry for office may be committed to expending greater effort and funds on their campaigns thus increasing their probability of winning similarly as lott has emphasized nontransferable brand name capital would be another factor creating a commitment to aggressively pursue office thereby affecting campaign costs and the probability of winning 4 that some challengers are deterred however need not imply the existence of a political market failure in a contestability sense the lack of a viable challenger on the ballot does not imply a lack of competition good representation will discourage entry similarly the fact that some incumbents will aggressively seek re election frightening away potential challengers is not a sign that competition is lacking

the rise and fall of money manager capitalism a minskian approach we are in the midst of a global financial crisis accompanied by a deep and probably long lasting economic downturn indeed some analysts are already calling this the first depression of the post world war ii era in this article i argue that this is a systemic crisis a crisis of what hyman minsky called money manager capitalism i link this to the analyses of hilferding and veblen of an earlier period finance capitalism and argue that this is in effect the second failure of this type of capitalism the essential characteristics of early finance capitalism are relatively small government use of external finance for investment and growing concentration of economic power in the hands of trusts or what we might today call megacorporations with varied interests and diverse affiliations across industry finance and insurance unlike the first phase the second phase of finance capitalism took place in the context of a big government neoconservative model minsky s analysis helps us to understand how the new deal and big government created a paternalistic capitalism after world war ii which favoured high consumption high employment greater equality and financial stability however that stability was destabilising because it permitted the rise of managed money over time innovation and deregulation increased fragility which generated increasingly frequent and severe financial crises while previous crises were resolved quickly enough to prevent it another debt deflation from happening again this crisis appears to be sufficiently severe that the very survival of money manager capitalism is thrown into question the article examines the contributing factors to the current crisis including the real estate boom and bust the rise of risky financial instruments such as securitised debts and credit default swaps the commodities market bubble and the fiscal squeeze the article concludes with some suggestions concerning the possible outcome of the failure of this form of finance capitalism copyright the author 2009 published by oxford university press on behalf of the cambridge political economy society all rights reserved oxford university press

time series evidence on shirking in the u s house of representatives this paper presents time series evidence on the voting behavior of members of the u s house of representatives from 1975 to 1990 the empirical results indicate that voting behavior of individual congressmen is remarkably stable over time we find no evidence of economically significant last term effects on voting behavior nor are there important effects of legislative tenure on voting patterns the most significant deviations in voting behavior occur for congressmen who failed to win their reelection bid suggesting that sizable deviations from previous policy positions may result in swift retribution by constituents in the district

mean reversion in bilateral real exchange rates evidence from the malaysian ringgit this study examines behaviour of the consumer price index cpi based real exchange rates rers of the ringgit against the currencies of malaysia s major trading partners the empirical results which are derived from newly developed tests advocated by lee and strazicich ls 2003 and narayan and popp np 2010 that allow for two breaks in the series provide conflicting results we obtain weaker support for purchasing power parity ppp using the narayan and popp 2010 test by truncating the sampling period into two sub periods we find that ppp holds for majority of the malaysia s bilateral exchange rate vis a vis its major trading partners during the pre crisis period the 1997 currency crisis however has weakened the evidence in favour of ppp hypothesis in the strict sense