do mergers improve the x efficiency and scale efficiency of u s banks evidence from the 1980s a central issue currently debated among bank analysts and economists is whether mergers enhance the efficiency of surviving banks this paper investigates the postmerger performance of acquiring banks that participated in a merger during the period 1980 90 the evidence suggests that acquirers failed to improve x efficiency after the merger acquiring banks however experienced moderate gains in scale efficiency relative to a control sample the second part of the paper uses regression analysis to identify factors influencing the performance of merging banks the regression results suggest that improvements in postmerger performance depend on the ability of the bank to strengthen asset quality the author finds no evidence to support the theory that in market mergers lead to significant improvements in efficiency copyright 1997 by ohio state university press

global warming policy a public finance perspective in the last few years a substantial volume of research has considered the design of taxes to slow greenhouse gas emissions as well as the economic effects of such policies in this paper i summarize the insights that have emerged from this work i begin by explaining that while efficiency considerations create a presumption for using coordinated international policies to alter greenhouse gas emissions the prospects for such action are bleak then i focus on the public finance of carbon taxes at the national level considering the design of such taxes as well as their incidence across and within nations next i focus on greenhouse gas emission policies that could be enacted in less developed countries such as the elimination of fossil fuel subsidies and other policies to slow deforestation finally i suggest several promising directions for future study

a tale of two collectives sulphur versus nitrogen oxides emission reduction in europe a theoretical model of emission reductions is specified that accounts for voluntary and non voluntary behaviour regarding the adherence to the helsinki and sofia protocols which mandated emission reductions for sulphur s and nitrogen oxides nox respectively from this model we derive an econometric specification for the demand for emission reductions that adjusts for the spatial dispersion of the pollutant when tested for 25 european nations the model performs well for sulphur cutbacks less satisfying results are obtained for nox because the model s assumption of a unitary actor at the national level is less descriptive collective action considerations indicate that sulphur emissions are easier to control than those of nox

international environmental agreements the role of foresight the present paper attempts to bridge the gap between the cooperative and the non cooperative approach employed to examine the size of stable coalitions formed to address global environmental problems we do so by endowing countries with foresightedness that is by endogenizing the reaction of the coalition s members to a deviation by one member we assume that when a country contemplates withdrawing or joining an agreement it takes into account the reactions of other countries ignited by its own actions we identify conditions under which there always exists a unique set of farsighted stable ieas the new farsighted ieas can be much larger than those some of the previous models supported but are not always pareto efficient

climate policy under technology spillovers we study climate policy when there are technology spillovers between countries as there is no instrument that directly corrects for these externalities without an international climate agreement the non cooperative equilibrium depends on whether countries use tradable quotas or carbon taxes as their environmental policy instruments all countries are better off in the tax case than in the quota case two types of international climate agreements are then studied one is a kyoto type of agreement where each country is assigned a specific number of internationally tradable quotas in the second type of agreement a common carbon tax is used domestically in all countries none of the cases satisfy the conditions for the social optimum even if the quota price is equal to the pigovian level r d investments will be lower than what is socially optimal in the quota case it is also argued that the quota agreement gives higher r d expenditures and more abatement than the tax agreement

farsighted coalitional stability abstract i define the largest consistent set a solution concept which applies to situations in which coalitions freely form but cannot make binding contracts act publicly and are fully farsighted in that a coalition considers the possibility that once it acts another coalition might react a third coalition might in turn react and so on without limit i establish weak nonemptiness conditions and apply it to strategic and coalitional form games and majority rule voting i argue that it improves on the von neumann morgenstern stable set as it is usually defined but is consistent with a generalization of the stable set as in the theory of social situations journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c71

an agenda for the design and study of international environmental agreements abstract the combination of a general greening of international political debate and the events of 1992 at the rio earth summit have led to great interest in the question of global environmental protection while it is recognized that international environmental agreements ieas are the means by which the earth s fragile environment is most likely to be protected this recognition has been recent hence there is very little formal research on the design and study of ieas as such in this paper i propose and describe a research agenda for the design and study of ieas very generally i propose that we frame the iea design question as a problem in mechanism design we will then be able to use inter alia the theory of common agency and the theory of hierarchies to generate interesting new theoretical and practical insights into the workings of ieas

economics of alliances the lessons for collective action this essay provides an up to date summary of the findings of the literature on the economics of alliances we show that the study of the economics of alliances has played a pivotal role in understanding and applying public good analysis to real world applications we establish that the manner in which alliances address burden sharing and allocative issues is related to strategic doctrines weapon technology perceived threats and membership composition past contributions are evaluated and areas needing further development are identified the theoretical and empirical knowledge gained from the study of alliances is shown to be directly applicable to a wide range of international collectives

identifying relationship lending in the interbank market a network approach abstract relationship lending is broadly interpreted as a strong partnership between a lender and a borrower nevertheless we still lack consensus regarding how to quantify the strength of a lending relationship while simple statistics such as the frequency and volume of loans have been used as proxies in previous studies here we propose statistical tests to identify relationship lending as a significant tie between banks application of the proposed method to the italian interbank networks reveals that the fraction of relationship lending among all bilateral trades has been quite stable and that the relationship lenders tend to impose high interest rates at the time of financial distress

climate cooperation with technology investments and border carbon adjustment a central question in climate policy is whether early investments in low carbon technologies are a useful first step towards a more effective climate agreement in the future we introduce a climate cooperation model with endogenous r d investments where countries protect their international competitiveness via border carbon adjustments bca bca raises the scope for cooperation and leads to a non trivial relation between countries prior r d investments and participation in the coalition we find that early investments in r d render free riding more attractive therefore with delayed cooperation on emission abatement and ex ante r d investments the outcome is often characterized by high participation but inefficiently low technology investments and abatement

subgame perfect cooperative agreements in a dynamic game of climate change abstract we model climate change as a dynamic game and prove existence of a unique subgame perfect nash equilibrium spne that is also markov perfect we interpret this unique spne as the business as usual bau equilibrium and show that if the countries are not sufficiently symmetric then the familiar trigger strategy equilibria may not be pareto improvements over the bau equilibrium and may even lack efficiency properties we then motivate and introduce a subgame perfect cooperative agreement as an improvement over the bau equilibrium in the sense that every country or coalition of countries is better off in every subgame irrespective of the extent of heterogeneity of the countries we characterize subgame perfect cooperative agreements and identify sufficient conditions for their existence we show that direct or indirect transfers between countries to balance the costs and benefits of controlling climate change are a necessity and not a matter of approach

the problem of global environmental protection what distinguishes global common property problems and global unidirectional externalities from the ones that arise under a single jurisdiction is that there is no global authority empowered to intervene and regulate use of global environmental resources cooperation is needed the paper discusses when cooperation is most needed and how it might be obtained cooperation might emerge from a noncooperative setting if supergames are played if the actions of any one country are explicitly contingent on the actions undertaken by other countries or if moral concerns lead countries to consider the consequences of their actions for others cooperation emerges in an explicit though limited form when countries commit to regulate themselves in signing international agreements in these cases the signatories cooperate but the agreements are self enforcing an attempt is made to relate these theoretical concepts to the practice of global environmental protection copyright 1990 by oxford university press

the time varying garch in mean model i propose an estimation strategy for the stochastic time varying risk premium parameter in the context of a time varying garch in mean tvgarch in mean model a monte carlo study shows that the proposed algorithm has good finite sample properties using monthly excess returns on the crsp index i document that the risk premium parameter is indeed time varying and shows high degree of persistence

management of transnational commons coordination publicness and treaty formation this paper focuses on the formation of treaties to manage transnational commons when efforts must be coordinated among a minimal sized group so as to make cooperation worthwhile by focusing on mixed strategy equilibria we are con cerned with instances where the intentions of others are uncertain the number of required participants the pattern of payoffs transaction costs and the underlying technology of public supply aggregation are key factors behind the achievement of coordina tion we apply our analysis to explain the outcome of negotiations on stratospheric ozone depletion global warming acid rain and tropical deforesta tion jel q20 d70

explaining bank market to book ratios evidence from 2006 to 2009 abstract this paper examines the market price to book value ratio for 6604 bank stock observations from december 31 2006 through june 30 2009 we relate each bank s market price to book value ratio to several fundamental ratios and whether the bank took funds from the us treasury under the troubled asset relief program tarp the results of this study show that banks who took tarp funds have lower market price to book value ratios in addition lower relative costs higher non interest income and lower assets in non accrual or foreclosed status are associated with higher market price to book value ratios while controlling for size and other bank attributes

international environmental agreements with mixed strategies and investment abstract we modify a canonical participation game used to study international environmental agreements iea considering both mixed and pure strategies at the participation stage and including a prior cost reducing investment stage the use of mixed strategies at the participation stage reverses a familiar result and also reverses the policy implication of that result with mixed strategies equilibrium participation and welfare are higher in equilibria that involve higher investment

estimating the dynamics and persistence of financial networks with an application to the sterling money market summary we propose a novel methodology for dynamic econometric modelling of large financial networks subject to persistence structural changes and sparsity we estimate bivariate dynamic tobit type models for each pair of banks allowing for deterministic or stochastic time varying parameters and then aggregate across all bank pairs to tackle the high dimensionality of the model we construct a few lagged variables that efficiently summarize the position of a bank pair in the network we propose a simple and computationally easy kernel based local maximum likelihood estimator of the time varying parameters of the model and establish its asymptotic properties we then apply the model to the time series of daily overnight money market network in the uk 2003 2012 the results show that our model can successfully accommodate the numerous structural breaks arising from changes to the monetary framework and captures well the dynamics of the interbank lending relationships in this period copyright 2015 john wiley sons ltd

capital budgeting for interrelated projects a real options approach this paper explores the effect of project interrelationships on investment decisions and project values in a real options framework we examine in detail the mutually exclusive case where a firm may invest in the development stage of two projects and then may select only a single project to implement the firm can develop the projects in parallel or in sequence the choice of development policy depends on the relative values of the embedded options for each strategy sequential development is shown to be superior to parallel development when projects have highly correlated values and when they require a large commitment of capital for development are short term in nature and have relatively low volatility we also show that the optimal ordering of sequential projects does not always begin with the most profitable project

a time varying parameter structural model of the uk economy abstract we estimate a time varying parameter structural macroeconomic model of the uk economy using a bayesian local likelihood methodology this enables us to estimate a large open economy dsge model over a sample that comprises several different monetary policy regimes and an incomplete set of data our estimation identifies a gradual shift to a monetary policy regime characterised by an increased responsiveness of policy towards inflation alongside a decrease in the inflation trend down to the two percent target level the time varying model also performs remarkably well in forecasting and delivers statistically significant accuracy improvements for most variables and horizons for both point and density forecasts compared to the standard fixed parameter version

international environmental agreements as evolutionary games this paper applies evolutionary game theory to international environmental agreements ieas contrary to stage game models barrett in j theor politics 11 519 541 1999 eur econ rev 45 1835 1850 2001 in an evolutionary equilibrium ee no signatory prefers to be outside the iea and the ee is robust to trembles with two populations there is a unique interior ee when there is decreasing returns to abatement and small asymmetry in the externality differences across populations at the interior ee transfers from the poor to the rich can increase payoffs for all nations but come at the expense of greater payoff inequality transfers can also eliminate the basin of attraction for the payoff inferior ee with decreasing returns to abatement and large asymmetry thus ieas such as the kyoto treaty predicated on the polluter pays and ability to pay principles may result in pareto inferior outcomes

the effect of options on stock prices 1973 to 1995 i show that the effect of option introductions on underlying stock prices is best described by a two regime switching means model whose optimal switch date occurs in 1981 in accordance with previous studies i find positive abnormal returns for options listed during 1973 to 1980 by contrast i find negative abnormal returns for options listed in 1981 and later possible causes for this switch include the introduction of index options in 1982 the implementation of regulatory changes in 1981 and the possibility that options expedite the dissemination of negative information an increasingly important issue in the study of financial markets is the extent to which options interact with their underlying stocks although black and scholes 1973 view options as redundant securities ross 1976 theorizes that stock prices in incomplete markets are generally affected by the

a study on long run inefficiency levels of a panel dynamic cost frontier under the framework of forward looking rational expectations abstract this paper aims to provide a theoretical underpinning of the dynamic efficiency model pioneered by ahn s c good d h sickles r c 2000 estimation of long run inefficiency levels a dynamic frontier approach econometric reviews 19 461 492 in the context of a quadratic loss function this paper formulates a multi period forward looking rational expectations model on the evolution of the technical inefficiency level which correctly produces a dynamic panel data model the model is illustrated using panel data of 112 french banks encouraging evidence of superiority in favor of the model is reached substantial cost inefficiency prevails in this industry where the constituent banks are characterized as having volatile adjustment speeds toward their long run steady states the sample banks exhibit increasing returns to scale and product mix economies

providing global public goods under uncertainty abstract we study how uncertainty and risk aversion affect international agreements to supply global public goods we consider a benchmark model with homogeneous countries and linear payoffs when countries directly contribute to a public good uncertainty tends to lower signatories efforts but may increase participation despite risk aversion uncertainty may improve welfare in contrast when countries try to reduce a global public bad uncertainty tends to increase signatories efforts and decrease participation in that case an ex ante reduction of uncertainty may have a large positive multiplier effect on welfare

dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements abstract in terms of the number of signatories one observes both large and small international environmental agreements the theoretical literature based on game theory discusses different concepts and mechanisms regarding stability of coalitions the conclusion has been reached that in all circumstances under farsightedness both large and small stable coalitions can occur this theory is based on behavioural reaction patterns but does not take account of the interaction with the dynamics of emission adjustments this paper shows that when these two dynamical processes are integrated large and small stable coalitions can still occur but only if the costs of emissions are relatively unimportant as compared with the costs of abatement

development aid and climate finance this paper discusses the implications of climate change for official transfers from rich countries the north to poor countries the south when the motivation for transfers is ethical rather than strategic traditional development transfers to increase income and reduce poverty are complemented by new financial flows to reduce greenhouse gas emissions mitigation transfers and become climate resilient adaptation transfers we find that in the absence of barriers to adaptation mitigation or development climate change will make isolated transfers less efficient a large part of their intended effect to increase income reduce emissions or boost climate resilience dissipates as the south reallocates its own resources to achieve the mitigation adaptation and consumption balance it prefers only in the case of least developed countries which are unable to adapt fully due to income constraints will adaptation support lead to more climate resilience in all other cases if the north wishes to change the balance between mitigation adaptation and consumption it should structure its transfers as matching grants which are tied to the south s own level of funding alternatively the north could provide an integrated climate compatible development package that recognizes the combined climate and development requirements of the south if the aim is to increase both mitigation and adaptation in the south development assistance that increases the income level can be an effective measure but only if there is an international agreement and the recipient country is not income constrained if the recipient country is very poor development aid may reduce adaptation effort

a network analysis of the italian overnight money market the objective of this paper is to analyse the network topology of the italian segment of the european overnight money market through methods of statistical mechanics applied to complex networks we investigate differences in the activities of banks of different sizes and the evolution of their connectivity structure over the maintenance period the main purpose of the analysis is to establish the potential implications of the current institutional arrangements on the stability of the banking system and to assess the efficiency of the interbank market in terms of absence of speculative and preferential trading relationships

bank competition efficiency in europe a frontier approach abstract there are numerous ways to indicate the degree of banking competition across countries antitrust authorities rely on the structure conduct performance paradigm while academics prefer price mark ups lerner index or correlations of input costs with output prices h statistic these measures are not always strongly correlated within or across countries frontier efficiency analysis is used to devise an alternative indicator of competition and rank european countries by their dispersion from a competition frontier the frontier is determined by how well payment and other costs explain variations in loan deposit rate spread and non interest activity revenues overall differences in competition appear to be small

coalition formation in international environmental agreements and the role of institutions abstract the aim of this paper is to discuss the role played by international institutions in achieving effective international environmental agreements we emphasise the strategic nature of environmental negotiations and use a game theoretic model of coalitional bargaining to illustrate the main issues we argue that international institutions can intervene in the framing of the strategic interactions between countries i e setting the rules of the negotiation game and can influence the actual agreement reached when different outcomes of the negotiation game can be equilibria

differential impact of korean banking system reforms on bank productivity abstract we study the impact of banking system reforms during a crisis following a period of undisciplined lending regulatory changes aimed at strengthening the banks capital structure and risk management practices do not have a uniform impact on bank productivity but rather favor financially sound or strategically privileged banks we present evidence documenting the differential impact of regulatory reforms on korean commercial bank productivity over the period 1995 2005 average technical efficiency of banks decreased during the financial crisis of 1997 1998 it improved following the subsequent bank restructuring and continued to improve through 2005 the capital adequacy ratio is positively associated with banks technical efficiency the non performing loans ratio is negatively associated with technical efficiency both relationships are accentuated during the crisis but attenuated after the reforms

a sketch of the economics of the greenhouse effect over the last decade scientists have studied extensively the greenhouse effect which holds that the accumulation of carbon dioxide co2 and other greenhouse gases ghgs is expected to produce global warming and other significant climatic changes over the next century see stephen schneider 1989 the present study presents an economic approach for analyzing policies to slow climate change

global environmental risks the need to manage climate risks is not a new it has shaped social institutions for many centuries in medieval england a peasant farmer s land was broken into many widely dispersed parcels economic historians interpret this as a way of hedging climate risk see references in bromley 9 land in different locations would be affected differently by droughts floods and frosts by spreading land holdings over different locations as well as by organizing agricultural cooperatives and buying insurance farmers have managed climate risk for many centuries

value versus growth stocks book to market growth and beta 1994 value versus growth stocks book to market growth and beta financial analysts journal vol 50 no 5 pp 18 24

developing countries and environmental protection the effects of budget balance and pollution ceiling constraints abstract i analyze the problem faced by an asymmetrically informed supra national governmental authority snga with limited financial resources who wishes to design an international environmental agreement iea the snga cannot contract directly with polluting firms in the various ldcs and he must deal with such firms through their governments i study this tripartite hierarchical interaction and focus on the properties of the optimal ex post contracts ieas which can be implemented by the snga in turn in the case where governments and firms in each nation do not collude and then in the case where governments and firms do collude i find that the monetary transfers necessary to induce optimal behavior by governments and firms are not very sensitive to the presence of collusion however because the optimal contracts satisfy budget balance and because there is a ceiling on the amount of pollution reduction that an iea can require the level and pattern of pollution abatement are typically not ideal my analysis suggests that ieas are not inherently doomed due to a basic monitoring and enforcement problem arising from national sovereignty however the success of ieas is fundamentally contingent on the funds available for environmental protection and the pollution reduction ceiling negotiated by the snga and the ldc government

climate treaties and breakthrough technologies an effective climate change treaty must promote the joint supply of two global public goods climate change mitigation and knowledge of new technologies that can lower mitigation costs r d is especially needed to bring about substantial long term reductions in atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases for this will require the development and diffusion of revolutionary breakthrough technologies martin i hoffert et al 2002 in principle such an outcome could be realized by the kyoto protocol approach if that agreement were strengthened over time however that response may be inadequate kyoto makes no provision for r d and as i shall demonstrate unlikely to succeed can a treaty system relying directly on targeted r d and the adoption of breakthrough technologies perform better in this same setting of anarchic international relations i will show that as a general rule the answer is no essentially the same forces that undermine kyoto also challenge the r d and technology approach there is one exception to this rule r d leading to breakthrough technologies exhibiting increasing returns can improve dramatically on the kyoto approach even when these technologies are otherwise inferior to the alternatives available this suggests that our approach to treaty design should be strategic

cheap talk coordination and entry we show how costless nonbinding nonverifiable communication cheap talk can achieve partial coordination among potential entrants into a natural monopoly industry where the payoffs are qualitatively like the battle of the sexes the analysis would apply equally in other economic situations with such payoffs for example bargaining under complete information or choosing compatibility standards while cheap talk helps achieve asymmetric coordination in a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium it cannot achieve complete coordination if the game involves even a small amount of conflict

changes in cash persistence and pricing implications this paper decomposes the cash component of earnings and analyzes persistence characteristics and pricing implications of various subcomponents with particular attention to changes in cash changes in underlying fundamentals might dictate changes in cash to new optimal levels alternatively suboptimal changes in cash might result from agency costs allowing managers actions to diverge from the best interests of shareholders we predict and find that both suboptimal increases and decreases in cash bode poorly for future earnings in fact we find that suboptimal increases decreases in cash have less greater persistence than any of the earnings components we study including accruals and net distributions to both shareholders and debt holders market efficiency tests indicate that the market severely punishes firms with suboptimal decreases in cash but we find no evidence to support the hubris hypothesis that the market overreacts to the earnings implications of unwarranted increases in cash

federal acid rain games abstract federal environmental policy designed to control acid rain is shaped after the hierarchy of the system and is controlled simultaneously by regional and central governments each governmental level controls one of two policy instruments pollution abatement production and pollution tax in a two stage game where regional governments are stackelberg leaders and control pollution taxes the subgame perfect equilibrium is socially efficient but the subgame perfect equilibrium for a two stage game where the central government is the stackelberg leader and controls pollution taxes is inefficient it corresponds to the nash equilibrium for a game where regional governments control both policy instruments

information manipulation and climate agreements it appears that news media and some pro environmental organizations have the tendency to accentuate or even exaggerate the damage caused by climate change this article provides a rationale for this tendency by using a modified international environmental agreement iea model with asymmetric information we find that the information manipulation has an instrumental value as it ex post induces more countries to participate in an iea which will eventually enhance global welfare from the ex ante perspective however the impact that manipulating information has on the level of participation in an iea and on welfare is ambiguous

earnings acceleration and stock returns abstract we document that earnings acceleration defined as the quarter over quarter change in earnings growth has significant explanatory power for future excess returns these excess returns are robust to a wide range of previously documented anomalies and a battery of risk controls the future return predictability appears to be consistent with investors assuming a seasonal random walk model for quarterly earnings and missing predictable implications of earnings acceleration for future earnings growth finally the excess returns from the basic earnings acceleration strategy can be enhanced further by focusing on profit firms low earnings volatility firms and on specific patterns of earnings acceleration

the co2 abatement game costs incentives and the enforceability of a sub global coalition abstract this paper studies the economic incentives and the institutional issues governing the outcomes of a short term climate change policy package guided by the united nations framework convention on climate change and the berlin mandate initiatives game theoretic tools and the global trade environment interface are explored within a 26 region 13 commodity computable general equilibrium framework to characterize the incentives of oecd regions to comply with a non binding agreement in a carbon abatement coalition the results showed that in the absence of side payments the achievement of such a coalition might require the design of suitable trade instruments

the participation decision versus the level of participation in an environmental treaty a spatial probit analysis abstract this paper represents treaty participation as a two stage game for which nations first decide whether or not to participate and then they choose their level of participation the resulting subgame perfect equilibrium is used to derive a reduced form equation for estimating and separating the influences of the variables at the two decision stages this spatial probit equation forms the basis for a full information maximum likelihood estimator that accounts for the simultaneity bias associated with public good spillins at both stages when the procedure is applied to the helsinki protocol we find that the strategic influence of a variable may drastically differ depending upon which stage is scrutinized

participation games and international environmental agreements a non parametric model abstract we examine the size of stable coalitions in a participation game that has been used to model international environmental agreements cartel formation rd based on these examples a consensus has emerged that in this kind of game the equilibrium coalition size is small except possibly when the potential benefits of cooperation are also small in this paper we develop a non parametric approach to the problem and demonstrate that the conventional wisdom is not robust in a general setting we identify conditions under which the equilibrium coalition size can be large even when potential gains are large contrary to previously examined leading special cases we show that reductions in marginal abatement costs in an international environmental game can increase equilibrium membership and we provide a measure of the smallest reduction in costs needed to support a coalition of arbitrary size

how loan portfolio diversification affects risk efficiency and capitalization a managerial behavior model for austrian banks abstract the aim of this paper is to analyze how diversification of banks across size and industry affects risk cost and profit efficiency and bank capitalization for large austrian commercial banks over the years 1997 2003 employing a unique dataset provided by the austrian central bank we test for several different types of managerial hypotheses formalized according to a modified version of the berger and deyoung model berger a n deyoung r 1997 problem loans and cost efficiency in commercial banks journal of banking and finance 21 849 870 we find that although diversification negatively affects cost efficiency it increases profit efficiency and reduces banks realized risk finally diversification seems to have a positive impact on banks capitalization

participation and duration of environmental agreements we analyze participation in international environmental agreements in a dynamic game in which countries pollute and invest in green technologies if complete contracts are feasible participants eliminate the holdup problem associated with their investments however most countries prefer to free ride rather than participate if investments are noncontractible countries face a holdup problem every time they negotiate but the free rider problem can be mitigated and significant participation is feasible participation becomes attractive because only large coalitions commit to long term agreements that circumvent the holdup problem under well specified conditions even the first best outcome is possible when the contract is incomplete

event studies in economics and finance the event study is an important research tool in economics and finance the goal of an event study is to measure the effects of an economic event on the value of firms event study methods exploit the fact that given rationality in the marketplace the effects of an event will be reflected immediately in security prices thus the impact can be measured by examining security prices surrounding the event in this paper event study methods are described including some of the potential complications an example is included to illustrate the approach

does voluntary participation undermine the coase theorem abstract the coase theorem states that costless enforcement of voluntary agreements yields efficient outcomes we argue that previous treatments fail to recognize the full meaning of voluntary it requires a two stage game a non cooperative participation decision followed by coaseian bargaining only among those who choose to participate we illustrate this in a simple public goods model and find outcomes ranging from extremely inefficient to fully efficient however the efficient equilibrium is not robust to even very small transaction costs thus we cast doubt on coaseian claims of universal efficiency finally we outline a kind of coercion that restores efficiency

the design of stable international environmental agreements economic theory and political economy international environmental agreements typically strive for the solution of a common property resource dilemma since the sovereignty of states precludes external enforcement international environmental agreements must be self enforcing game theoretical models explain why rewards and punishments imposed through the environmental externality generally fail to enforce full cooperation therefore environmental treaties incorporate provisions that enhance the incentives for participation such as transfers sanctions and linkage to other negotiation topics in international politics moreover interaction with markets and governments as well as the rules and procedures adopted in the negotiation process influence the design and the effectiveness of an international environmental agreement