asset specificity and the fear of exploitation if asset specificity renders the investing party dependent ex post why would the ex ante willingness to make relationship specific investments vary we show how specific investments generate both positive and counter negative cooperative incentives we also observe the influences of trust and time horizon on these incentives which are aggregated to derive the specific investments effect sie our result suggests that while the fear of exploitation increases proportionally to the magnitude of specific investments and the attendant quasi rents it grows exponentially with the deterioration of inter personal trust and or inter temporal time horizon contexts

policy watch infrastructure investment and economic growth in the late 1980s david aschauer 1989 triggered a long overdue dialogue among economists and political leaders when he published a study arguing that much of the decline in u s productivity that occurred in the 1970s was precipitated by declining rates of public capital investment my own work confirmed these results munnell 1990a spending advocates seized on these findings as support for increased public investment the enthusiasm among policymakers for the early aschauer results was matched if not surpassed by skepticism on the part of many economists critics of these studies charged that the methodology was flawed that the direction of causation between public investment and output growth is unclear and that even if the historical empirical relationships were estimated correctly they provide no clear indications for current policy who s right what do we know and not know about the link between public infrastructure and productivity and what are the implications of these results for policy

government capital and the production function for u s private output abstract theoretical and policy discussions make unsupported assumptions about the productivity of capital which governments own estimates of an aggregate production function for u s private business 1949 1973 show government capital to be significant statistically and in economic terms

electricity fuel contracting relationships with coal and gas suppliers the growth of competition in the electricity generation industry along with changes in natural gas and coal regulation have led to renewed interest in the nature of efficient transactional arrangements for procuring coal and gas this study examines the evolution of major influences on the incentives for choosing among different transactional forms we find that the asset specificity hypothesis continues to be an important explanation for transactional arrangements in fuel acquisition the degree of asset specificity in a fuel supply arrangement is a function of technological factors of inherent market characteristics and of regulatory rules the expanding role of more flexible fuel supply arrangements in gas and to a lesser extent coal markets is a natural response to current regulatory and technological trends

monetary policy matters abstract this paper addresses hoover and perez s comments on our 1989 paper we first show that the estimated impact of monetary policy shifts remains large and ranges from marginally to strongly significant when oil shocks are controlled for we then extend our previous work by expanding the sample period and identifying an additional policy shift in december 1988 with this extension the estimated effects of monetary policy shifts are large and highly significant for all reasonable specifications of oil shocks we also demonstrate that hoover and perez s other objections have little bearing on our conclusions

multitask agency and contract choice an empirical exploration the multitask agency problem is examined empirically using contracts between private integrated oil companies and their service stations in the city of vancouver the empirical tests assess how variations in the characteristics of one task affect the choice of agent compensation scheme for another comparative statics from the model predict that higher powered incentives will be offered for gasoline sales when the secondary activity is not highly complementary with gasoline retailing where complementarity is measured by the cross price demand effect the covariation in uncertainty and the degree of effort substitutability copyright 1996 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the role of public capital in production the impact of the stock of public capital on costs of production in the private sector is examined using annual data over the period 1958 89 a translog cost function is estimated and public capital is found to be a significant input the estimates indicate that public capital has positive marginal product and that private and public capital are complements in production rather than substitutes copyright 1992 by mit press

contract renewal under uncertainty abstract the incentive to adjust prices is considered from a bilateral perspective in a setting where changes in outside opportunities drive the incentive to renew contracts and costs preclude continuous renewal a model encompassing several contract forms is formulated and the existence of an equilibrium to the bilateral renewal game is established prices display inertia and the incumbent contract is found to be more resistant to changes in outside opportunities the larger the costs of contract renewal the variability of outside opportunities and the lower the discount rate the model is shown to match a number of empirical observations on contracts

timing problems in contract breach decisions in contracts susceptible to efficient breach each party has an american option to breach and pay damages rather than perform she will repudiate early if the expected decrease in damages liability resulting from her partner s mitigation exceeds the expected value of the terminated contract including the option to breach in the future we show that each party has the incentive to repudiate earlier than socially optimal because expectation damages compensate the nonrepudiating party only for the loss of the completed exchange and not the value of its lost breach option this inefficiency is particularly acute in long term fixed price contracts in which the cost of performance to the promisor and the value to the promisee are volatile and uncorrelated we explore various responses to this problem including vertical integration changes in contract remedies including specific performance flexible price provisions and the capital structure of each party

the public capital stock needs trends and performance the condition of america s roads bridges mass transit systems and water and sewer facilities has become an issue of increasing controversy one view holds that deterioration of this public infrastructure capital has reached alarming proportions and that a significant fraction of future national savings will be needed to reverse the damage of past neglect another view argues that there has been no sudden acceleration of decay in capital stock performance that better facility management can often substitute for capital investment and that attempts to greatly increase the size and condition of the public capital stock would place unsustainable pressure on financial markets state and local government budgets and the federal system of grants in aid how extensive is the capital infrastructure problem how did it arise given the many federal government subsidies available for state local capital expenditure how much of the national capacity for capital formation should be allocated to solving the problem if there is a divergence between actual and desired infrastructure capital can the gap be closed without disrupting the growth of other sectors and governmental objectives these questions are unfortunately much easier to pose than to answer there is only limited information about the size and condition of the stock of public infrastructure capital and much of the available information has been assembled from the perspective of engineering or planning needs standards needs assessments typically indicate the fraction of the infrastructure stock that falls below a specified and somewhat arbitrary level of performance or indicate how much spending would be required to bring the existing stock up to the specified standard while sometimes appropriate as a management tool infrastructure needs estimates are formulated in isolation from other public and private capital needs and are thus ill suited to the policy debate over national priorities despite significant data problems some general conclusions about the infrastructure dilemma are possible as a backdrop for these conclusions the first section of this paper presents an overview of the historical trends in public sector capital formation and infrastructure condition the following section discusses the factors shaping these trends with particular attention to the supply and demand components of the capital spending decision we then consider the question of whether existing trends will insure an adequate supply of public capital and address the issue of whether a reduced quantity and quality of infrastructure capital may be expected to reduce private sector productivity growth

contracting in the shadow of the law economic models of contract typically assume that courts enforce obligations based on verifiable events corresponding to the legal rule of specific performance as a matter of law this is not the case this leaves open the question of optimal contract design given the available remedies used by the courts this article shows that american standard form construction contracts can be viewed as an efficient mechanism for implementing building projects given existing legal rules it is shown that a central feature of these contracts is the inclusion of governance covenants that shape the scope of authority and regulate the ex post bargaining power of parties our model also implies that the legal remedies of mistake impossibility and the doctrine limiting damages for unforeseen events developed in the case of hadley v baxendale are efficient solutions to the problem of implementing complex exchange

price formats for branded components in industrial markets an integration of transaction cost economics and the resource based view in this paper we propose an approach to show how the capability based perspective of the resource based view of the firm can be integrated with the comparative governance approach of transaction cost economics to shed light on governance issues in interfirm relationships we argue that transacting parties create value not only through the employment of partner specific investment and coordination activities but also through the employment of heterogeneous firm specific resources that each firm brings to the relationship and that in turn governance structures reflect a discriminating alignment with these two distinct forms of value creating activities and resources our thesis is empirically tested in the context of industrial original equipment manufacturers employing branded component contracts with independent component vendors specifically we investigate the conditions under which the price terms for branded components are agreed upon more fixed ex ante versus negotiated more flexible ex post our results offer two insights first the chosen governance form reflects a trade off between safeguarding and adaptation motives even among parties engaged in cooperative relationships second valuable firm specific resources that preexist outside of the exchange relationship are at stake in these cooperative yet contractually incomplete relationships they together with relationship specific investments and activities have a significant impact on governance design

local government grants and income tax revenue redistributive politics in norway 1900 1990 an important aspect of the welfare state is public provision of private goods primarily education and health care in norway the provision of these services has been organized through the local public sector the development of the welfare state has to a large extent been the development of welfare communes the important revenue sources of the local and county governments grants and income tax revenue have been controlled nationally and the paper addresses the determinants of these revenues during 1900 1990 the approach combines a demand model of local public services emphasizing price and income elasticities with a political economy model of central government ideology and strength the decision making is understood as bargaining between the government and interest groups and the political structure consequently is of importance for the policy outcome the analysis shows how politics matter and the results indicate that a minority coalition government implies 30 more grant and income tax revenue to local and county governments than one party majority in the long run

congestion function specification and the publicness of local public goods abstract this paper is about the measurement of congestion within the median voter demand framework the model of congestion traditionally used in the literature and four others are compared and tested in a median voter framework the results show that a more flexible functional form which imposes fewer a priori restrictions on the data does at least as good a job of explaining variations in local government expenditures furthermore it is shown that measured publicness of local public goods depends entirely on the a priori restrictions imposed on the congestion function

relational contracts and the theory of the firm relational contracts informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships are prevalent within and between firms we develop repeated game models showing why and how relational contracts within firms vertical integration differ from those between nonintegration we show that integration affects the parties temptations to renege on a given relational contract and hence affects the best relational contract the parties can sustain in this sense the integration decision can be an instrument in the service of the parties relationship our approach also has implications for joint ventures alliances and networks and for the role of management within and between firms

the electoral budget cycle on municipal waste collection expenditure abstractthis article analyses the determinants of municipal waste collection expenditure specifically the effects of electoral cycles on municipal waste collection expenditure we use a database with information on spanish municipalities with more than 1000 inhabitants for the period 2002 2011 our results reveal that incumbents adopt an opportunistic behaviour increasing spending on waste in the preelection year and reducing it in the election and post election years therefore we confirm an electoral budget cycle on waste collection expenditures in spain additionally we find that the levels of income unemployment and upper level governments transfers have a positive impact on waste collection spending finally population density level of urbanization average age of the population of the municipality and less fragmented governments negatively influence waste collection spending

taxation with costly administration the concept of a tax technology is used here as providing a unified framework for analyzing both administrative activity by tax authorities and tax resisting activity by taxpayers this framework provides a simple formalization of adam smith s four components of tax costs administration substitution active noncompliance and passive compliance the model is used to derive policy implications concerning the proper measurement of the cost of public funds and concerning the criterion for optimal administration

no taxation without information deterrence and self enforcement in the value added tax abstract claims that the vat facilitates tax enforcement by generating paper trails on transactions between firms contributed to widespread vat adoption worldwide but there is surprisingly little evidence this paper analyzes the role of third party information for vat enforcement through two randomized experiments among over 400 000 chilean firms announcing additional monitoring has less impact on transactions that are subject to a paper trail indicating the paper trail s preventive deterrence effect this leads to strong enforcement spillovers up the vat chain these findings confirm that when taking evasion into account significant differences emerge between otherwise equivalent forms of taxation jel d83 h25 h26 k34 o17

strategic default in the international coffee market this article studies strategic default on forward sale contracts in the international coffee market to test for strategic default we construct contract specific measures of unanticipated changes in market conditions by comparing spot prices at maturity with the relevant futures prices at the contracting date unanticipated rises in market prices increase defaults on fixed price contracts but not on price indexed ones we isolate strategic default by focusing on unanticipated rises at the time of delivery after production decisions are sunk and suppliers have been paid estimates suggest that roughly half of the observed defaults are strategic we model how strategic default introduces a trade off between insurance and counterparty risk relative to indexed contracts fixed price contracts insure against price swings but create incentives to default when market conditions change a model calibration suggests that the possibility of strategic default causes 15 8 average losses in output significant dispersion in the marginal product of capital and sizable negative externalities on supplying farmers

business cycle models aggregation and real wage cyclicality a substantial literature has developed to estimate the true cyclicality of real wages that is composition bias free two major issues are addressed in this article aggregation of heterogeneous workers and potential bias in the measurement of the labor input a general analysis of the biases is presented and alternative approaches in the literature are nested in a single framework estimates based on an efficiency units concept that avoids the usual aggregation problems are presented composition bias underestimates the usual parameters of interest unless both the price and the quantity of the labor input are adjusted appropriately

reducing evasion through self reporting evidence from charitable contributions abstract in absence of third party reporting taxpayers are required to self report information with various degrees of detail ranging from uncorroborated claims to comprehensive records with receipts using a quasi experimental design applied to noncash charitable contribution deductions i show that even basic self reporting requirements are effective at reducing evasion but impose large compliance costs on taxpayers i find that simplified reporting requirements reduce reporting costs by 55 per person and substantially increase claimed donations however half of the new donations are due to evasion thus information reporting should only be imposed on total reported donations above a pre specified threshold

productivity change in state and local governments a model is developed in this paper which allows the growth rate of public sector productivity to be estimated without an explicit measure of sectoral output in this model communities are regarded as generalized households and the goods and services provided by the community s government are interpreted as internally produced household goods the model is then fitted to quarterly data from the u s national income and product accounts and the rate of productivity change is found to average 0 50 per year for the period 1959 1979 the sources of growth approach to productivity measurement distinguishes between the growth in real output due to the growth in factor inputs capital labor materials and the growth in output due to advances in technology managerial practice and other factors related to productive efficiency the former are collectively associated with the movement along an aggregate or sectoral production function while the latter are associated with the shift in that function 2 in practice the shift in the production function is measured by the residual real output not attributed to the growth of the share weighted inputs and termed total factor productivity the sources of growth model is based on the underlying assumption that real output and real input can be measured with a reasonable degree of accuracy while this presumption is correct for many types of economic activity it is essentially incorrect for those sectors which produce services as kendrick 1982 has recently noted approximately one third of the real gross product originating in the service sector of u s private business economy is estimated using employment manhours or labor earnings such procedures systematically misstate the true growth of real output and thus systematically bias the estimated growth in total factor productivity the situation is even worse in the public sector in the u s national income and product accounts the output of general government is defined to be equal to labor input implying that the growth of total factor productivity exactly offsets the effect of nonlabor inputs a model is developed in this paper which allows the growth rate of public sector productivity to be estimated without an explicit measure of sectoral output in this model communities are regarded as generalized households and the goods and services provided by the community s government are interpreted as internally produced household goods this interpretation allows us to appropriate the analytical apparatus of the household production model and thereby permits us to estimate the key parameters of the model including a government total factor productivity parameter without first having to measure the output of the govern

government capital and private output in the united states additional evidence abstract aggregate production functions for private output are estimated from annual u s data for the period 1948 1985 the estimates indicate government capital has an important positive effect on private output the effect of state and local governments capital is large and significant whereas the effect of federal capital appears small and statistically insignificant

infrastructure investment a review essay economists try not to be faddists but they often cannot help themselves while work on a topic should mirror the prospective importance of the topic that situation seems to occur with disappointing frequency instead the usual pattern is that some reasonably important topic will be totally ignored for the longest time then recognized and then the subject of a flurry of work all out of proportion to its likely long run importance nowhere has this speculative bubble of economic research been more clearly illustrated than with infrastructure investment macroeconomists havelong felt that the stock of public capital is an important factor input in the production of total output macroeconomists have known that u s productivity growth slowed dramatically in about 1973 and macroeconomists should have known that united states investment in public capital has been down since the late 1960s yet analysis of the u s productivity slowdown completely ignored infrastructure investment for the first fifteen years of this slowdown concentrating instead on energy prices social regulation the composition of the work force research and development different rates of obsolescence of the private capital stock and any number of other matters the public capital stock was hardly ever even mentioned as a potential factor in the productivity slowdown aschauer changed all that he wrote a series of papers 1989a 1989b 1989c that put these two movements together econometrically infrastructure investment turned down and aggregate productivity turned down slightly later both in the united states and in some other developed countries his work hit the magic button those who had worried about the productivity puzzle for fifteen years welcomed a new suspect those who were worried about low rates of u s national saving welcomed a new way to make their argument even more forcefully than with official figures on saving and investment which do not count infrastructure investment as investment political liberals and liberal politicians saw a way to rescue government spending and projects from the assaults of reaganism and even a way to avoid oth

transaction costs and contractual incompleteness the case of electricite de france abstract this paper explores the incompleteness of inter firm contracts through the lens of recent developments in transaction cost economics we built a non truncated contract database representing all the relationships of electricite de france edf with its coal carriers over the period 1977 1997 we tested and corroborated most propositions derived from transaction cost theory relating contractual incompleteness to transaction characteristics even when we considered the complete set of the theory s propositions by endogeneizing the asset specificity at stake in transactions to our knowledge this kind of test has never been conducted before

why can modern governments tax so much an agency model of firms as fiscal intermediaries we develop an agency model explaining why third party information reporting by firms makes tax enforcement successful while third party reporting would be ineffective with frictionless collusion between firms and employees collusive evasion is impossible to sustain in firms with many employees and accurate business records as any single employee may reveal evasion we embed our agency model into a macro model where the number of employees grows with development showing that the tax take evolves as an s shape driven by changes in third party information we show that our model is consistent with a set of stylized facts on taxation and development

public capital and the factor intensity of the manufacturing sector numerous studies have examined the effect of local fiscal policy on business activity few have emphasised local public services and fewer still have examined the effect of local fiscal policy on the composition of business activity using newly derived estimates of regional public infrastructure the effect of public capital on the factor intensity of the manufacturing sector of 36 smsas during the 1970 78 period is examined the findings of this study indicate that public investment can play an important role in determining the composition of a region s industrial sector

public capital and total factor productivity this paper examines the impact of the stock of public capital on output levels and productivity growth rates in the united states the analysis is based on the estimation of parameters in a translog profit function prices of intermediate goods are introduced into a quasiproduction function for value added recently developed econometric techniques for dealing with nonstationary time series are used in the estimation the authors find that the services of public capital are an important part of the production process and that about 40 percent of the productivity decline is explained by a fall in the public capital labor ratio copyright 1993 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the market for tradable renewable energy credits abstract as states seek to foster the development of renewable energy resources some have introduced renewable portfolio standards rpss which require retailers of electricity to derive a specified amount of their energy supply from renewable energy resources rpss in texas arizona wisconsin and nevada allow for or require the use of tradable renewable energy credits the price of such credits is expected to reflect the cost premium for generating electricity from renewable resources relative to the market price of conventionally generated electricity using the market to trade renewable energy credits exposes buyers and sellers to risks of imperfect information poor performance and opportunism these risks can be managed through contractual arrangements and regulatory requirements pertaining to property rights in credits pricing term of the contract and assurance of performance

specific investments flexible adaptation and requirement contracts i introduction in bilateral procurement relationships ex post opportunism may cause underinvestment in relationship specific investments as is shown by klein et al 1978 and williamson 1985 in such situations long term contracts can help to mitigate this so called hold up problem in a world of positive transaction costs long term contracts are necessarily incomplete 1 an inflexible incomplete contract may lead to ex post maladaptation in the presence of uncertainty as in williamson 1985 therefore a transaction cost economizing contract needs to provide both incentives for efficient relationship specific investments and flexibility for efficient adaptation 2 in a simple hold up model with contractible cost related variables i show that efficient adaptation and investments can be achieved through a requirement contract which gives the buyer the right to decide on how much to buy ex post and contains a price provision with a two part tariff structure including a fixed component and a unit charge that may vary with quantities and cost related variables this result provides a formal explanation of contractual arrangements observed in vertical procurement relationships formally my result can be viewed as an extension of williamson s 1983 hostage model in which only the seller makes investments the procurement quantity is fixed and there is no cost uncertainty my result is also related to previous formal studies on the take or pay contracts as in hubbard and weiner 1986 crocker and masten 1988 and masten 1988 in a simpler model without cost uncertainty and specific investments they show that a unilateral options contract with a take or pay feature gives the buyer the right incentives to make efficient quantity decisions particularly crocker and masten 1988 and masten 1988 emphasize the take or pay contract s ability to induce efficient adaptation another related paper is by bos 1996 who shows that when the production cost is contractible a target cost pricing contract that requires the seller to share a portion of the cost overrun can achieve the first best outcome the rest of the article is organized as follows section ii provides the background of the issue studied section iii lays out the model and characterizes the first best benchmark section iv derives the optimal contract section v concludes ii background a growing recent literature has attempted to find contractual solutions to the hold up problem most of the papers in the literature use hart and moore s 1988 classical model or its variation in that model there are two risk neutral firms a buyer and a seller of an intermediate good each firm can before production make a relationship specific investment to enhance the future value of the good in the case of the buyer or to reduce the production cost of the good in the case of the seller neither the investments nor the value nor the cost of the intermediate good are contractible ex ante in the absence of a contract there will generally be underinvestment some of the contractual solutions to the underinvestment problem rely on complex direct revelation mechanisms that utilize private or unverifiable information to implement efficient investments as in for example rogerson 1992 and maskin and tirole 1999 but they are not robust to renegotiation several articles have focused on contracts that make explicit use of ex post renegotiation to achieve efficiency particularly aghion et al 1994 chung 1991 and edlin and reichelstein 1996 show that simple fixed price fixed quantity contracts may suffice to achieve the first best outcome such contracts are in general not efficient ex post but as long as mutually beneficial renegotiation of the initial contract is allowed both ex ante and ex post efficiency can be achieved either by a properly designed renegotiation game as in aghion et al

mitigating contractual hazards unilateral options and contract length in this article we consider the ways in which the desire for efficient low cost adaptation to change influences the tradeoff between the design and duration of long term contractual relationships we examine the distortions in contract terms occasioned by nonprice competition for natural gas in the presence of wellhead price regulation deviations from optimal contract incentives significantly raise the cost of being bound to long term agreements and shorten the duration of contracts the approach we adopt suggests a method for empirically assessing the efficiency of alternative contracting practices and legal standards

the productivity slowdown the oil shocks and the real cycle f ive facts stand out about economic performance in the united states since world war ii the first is that for most of the postwar period the u s has had a slower rate of economic growth than the other major developed democracies except great britain and much lower rates of growth than germany japan and italy the gap between the growth of per capita income of the united states and comparable countries has however tended to diminish over time and the united states has lately grown at about the same rate as most other developed countries the second outstanding fact is that the united states has fallen far behind in many mass production industries in which it used to lead the world whereas it is ahead of other nations in many new and especially high technology industries in automobiles steel tires household appliances and earth moving and farm equipment for example u s production has fallen dramatically in relation to output in most comparable countries and the country has become a net importer of most such products by contrast in newer industries such as computers jet aircraft sophisticated weaponry and high technology in general the united states is often dominant both as producer and exporter the third outstanding fact is that most of the older heartland of american industry roughly the area north and east of an arc drawn from baltimore to st louis to milwaukee has declined dramatically in comparison with the south and the west this change in regional fortunes has been due in large part to migration motivated by differences in economic prospects from the declining to the advancing

valuation of path dependent contingent claims with multiple exercise decisions over time the case of take or pay hull and white 1993 introduced a method to extend lattice based contingent claim val uation techniques to problems with path dependent payoffs this paper builds upon their method in the process of valuing two types of commodity purchase contracts that ex hibit a form of timing flexibility not previously analyzed in the literature the techniques demonstrated take advantage of characteristics of claims that simplify incorporation of path dependencies possible uses for the methods demonstrated include the valuation of port folios of mortgages capital projects where intensity of use affects productivity ofthe asset and capital projects with storage characteristics

symposium on the slowdown in productivity growth tthe growth slowdown that began in the late 1960s or early 1970s is the most significant macroeconomic development of the last two decades table 1 presents the basic facts for the big seven members of the oecd the significance of the slowdown derives from the power of compound interest when per capita income is growing at 4 percent it doubles every 18 years when it grows at only 2 percent it doubles every 35 years the permanent income defined as the annuity value of expected income of a 25 year old german citizen basing her expectations of income growth on average performance in the period 1955 73 would be 80 percent above her current income that of a 25 year old basing her expectations on the growth rate of income in the 1973 1986 period would be only 22 percent above her current income equivalently taking a generation as 33 years children in italy who might have expected to start out with a standard of living nearly five times the level at which their parents began would on the basis of the lower output growth from 1973 to 1986 expect to start out at less than double the material standard at which their parents began the four papers in this symposium address the question of the causes of the growth slowdown and to a lesser extent what might be done about it the classic empirical result in this area for which among other results robert solow received the 1987 nobel prize in economic science is that technological progress accounts for about half the growth of per capita output correspondingly most of the growth

why hold ups occur the self enforcing range of contractual relationships one of my most enjoyable intellectual experiences was working with armen alchian on the klein crawford and alchian 1978 hold up paper in this paper i extend the basic framework presented in that paper pointing out what i now consider to be its shortcomings and providing insights into the nature of hold ups and the form of contracts chosen by transactors to avoid hold ups the major analytical extension entails combining hold up analysis with my work on private enforcement because private enforcement capital is limited and written contract terms are necessarily imperfect transactors must optimally combine court enforced written terms together with privately enforced unwritten terms to define what i call the self enforcing range of their contractual relationship hold ups occur when unanticipated events place the contractual relationship outside the self enforcing range this probabilistic framework where transactors enter contractual relationships knowing that a hold up may take place but believing that the expected gains from trade outweigh the expected rent dissipating costs associated with the hold up risk is shown to have important implications for understanding the structure of contracts adopted by transactors in the marketplace i why do hold ups occur i begin with a simple example that illustrates the basic economic forces involved in a hold up assume that a builder constructs a house on a piece of land the builder does not own but rather only leases short term after the initial land lease expires the landowner could hold up the builder by raising the land rent to reflect the costs of moving the house to another lot this example illustrates all the hold up factors emphasized in klein crawford and alchian a the builder has made an investment that is highly specific to a particular piece of land and b the landowner has taken advantage of the incompleteness of the contract that governs the relationship in particular the fact that the lease does not cover future years to c expropriate the quasi rents on the builder s specific investment the obvious question is why anything like this would ever occur that is why would someone be so naive as to build a house on land for which they had only a short term lease our primary goal in klein crawford and alchian was not to explain the existence of hold ups but rather the institutions adopted by transactors to avoid hold ups for example we would expect that builders anticipating a potential hold up problem would decide to purchase the land or at least to sign a long term ground lease before starting construction however we do present some examples in the paper of hold ups that actually occurred the implicit reason we give for the occurrence of these hold ups is transactor ignorance apparently transactors are not always smart enough to choose the contractual arrangement that would eliminate the hold up problem oliver williamson provides a similar but much more explicit answer to the question of why hold ups occur when defining opportunism he states by opportunism i mean self interest seeking with guile this includes but is scarcely limited to more blatant forms such as lying stealing and cheating opportunism more often involves subtle forms of deceit more generally opportunism refers to the incomplete or distorted disclosure of information especially to calculated efforts to mislead distort obfuscate or otherwise confuse 1 for example the hold up may have occurred in our illustrative house construction example because the landowner deceived the builder with a low up front land rental price and vague promises about the future relying on the ability of one transactor to take advantage of the naivete or ignorance of another transactor is a highly unsatisfactory way to explain the incidence of hold ups simple examples of deception such as a builder constructing a house on land that is only rented short term rarely if ever occur

municipal capital maintenance and fiscal distress this paper formalizes and empirically tests the hypothesis that the deficient maintenance of public infrastructure is caused by fiscal distress the authors utilize a production decision framework in which public officials combine maintenance and new capital to produce a desired level of capital services the behavior implied in the fiscal distress hypothesis is treated as perverse deviations from the optimal production path the empirical findings from cross sectional expenditures data give support to the fiscal distress hypothesis copyright 1991 by mit press

aggregate local public sector investment and shocks norway 1946 1990 local public sector investment is determined in an environment of shifting economic conditions investments are investigated using an intertemporal decision model allowing for tests of forward looking behaviour and adjustments to expected and unexpected shocks the econometric analysis of the aggregate local public sector over the period 1946 1990 indicates that local and county governments are forward looking and have small adjustment costs to investment in a full investment demand model only unexpected changes of gross domestic product and unemployment are shown to be important in the short run the central government has arranged stable revenue growth of the local public sector but greater volatility in macroeconomic conditions has led to fluctuations in local public investment

firm types price setting strategies and consumption tax incidence abstract we analyze price responses to large restaurant vat rate reductions in two different european countries our results show that responses in the short and medium run were clustered around two focal points of zero pass through and full pass through differences between independent restaurants and chains is the key explanation for this pattern while nearly all independent restaurants effectively ignored the tax reductions and left consumer prices unchanged a substantial fraction of restaurants belonging to chains chose a rapid and complete pass through in the longer run prices converged but primarily through a price reversion among chain restaurants the stark difference in price responses does not appear to arise because of different market characteristics such as location initial price levels meal types and restaurant segment

is public capital really productive a methodological reappraisal abstract we present an evaluation of the main empirical approaches used in the literature to estimate the contribution of public capital stock to growth and private factors productivity based on a simple stochastic general equilibrium model built as to reproduce the main long run relations observed in us post war historical data we show that the production function approach may not be reliable to estimate this contribution our analysis reveals that this approach largely overestimates the public capital elasticity given the presence of a common stochastic trend shared by all non stationary inputs

retail contracting theory and practice we summarize a number of regularities that arise in the empirical literature on contractual relationships between manufacturers and their exclusive resellers we do this using studies of traditional and business format franchise relationships as well as studies of salesforce integration decisions some of the patterns that we uncover are consistent with a standard incentive cum insurance theory of organization while others are not we brie y review some theoretical extensions that seem promising in terms of reconciling seeming con icts between theory and practice i introduction manufacturers of retail products must decide whether to sell their products to consumers themselves vertical integration or to sell via independent retailers vertical separation when manufacturers do not perform the sales function internally but want exclusive retailers they usually choose some form of franchising 1 many theories attempt to explain the choice of retail organizational form moreover a considerable body of empirical evidence concerning this choice is accumulating we attempt to evaluate this econometric evidence and relate it to the theories to accomplish this task we assess studies of franchising arrangements as well as studies of sales force organization in industrial settings the paper is organized as follows in the next section we highlight a number of regularities that arise in the empirical literature on retail contracting in particular we nd that i risk is positively related to the use of high powered incentives vertical separation ii the importance of the agent s eiort in production is positively related to the use of high powered incentives

holdups simple contracts and information acquisition abstract in a typical procurement setup several recent papers have shown that when complete contracting is not possible simple noncontingent contracts may suffice to solve the under investment problem this paper points out that a noncontingent contract offer such as a fixed price contract may induce the seller to acquire information on the future course of costs and only to accept the offer if the cost is low it is shown that sometimes the buyer prefers to wait and buy on the spot market than to offer a long term contract when the seller rejects a contract offer or the buyer chooses not to make one the seller will not make efficient investments because he expects to be held up on the spot market

what do facilitating practices facilitate an empirical investigation of most favored nation clauses in natural gas contracts long term contracts often include most favored nation clauses mfns which are nondiscrimination guarantees that obligate a buyer or seller to treat all trading partners symmetrically in pricing decisions recent theoretical work has shown that such clauses can facilitate tacit collusion by increasing the cost of selective price changes aimed at attracting new business an alternative view is that mfns serve to facilitate efficient price adjustment in extended exchange relationships we test these competing hypotheses using data from long term natural gas contracts many of which employ mfns our conclusion is that the pattern of mfn adoption in conjunction with the structure of the nondiscrimination regions and the parallels with other nonstrategic price escalation provisions lends strong support to the efficiency rationale

regulation and contract design the impact of relationship specific investment a primary explanation for variation in contract structure is the extent to which contracting parties make investments specific to their transaction investment decisions are typically endogenous in contract choice however frustrating attempts at causal verification i analyze the impact of a major environmental regulation the clean air act amendment of 1990 on coal procurement strategies of u s utilities i exploit a key feature of the amendment s design to define a difference in difference model that is arguably less susceptible to endogeneity concerns i find wide support for the theoretical prediction reduced specificity leads to shorter length fixed price contracts

disentangling the demand function from the production function for local public services the case of public safety abstract in this paper we develop a theoretical framework and an econometric model which allow us to separate the effect of income and other socioeconomic variables on the demand for publicly provided goods from their effect on the price of those goods we apply our approach in a study of expenditures for police protection in a cross section of 73 u s cities and counties our results suggest that studies of public expenditures which fail to incorporate community characteristics in production and cost functions can yield very misleading results

contracting on time the paper shows how the time considerations especially those concerning contract duration affect incomplete contract theory time is not only a dimension along which the relationship unfolds but also a continuous verifiable variable that can be included in contracts we consider a bilateral trade setting where contracting investment trade and renegotiation take place in continuous time we show that efficient investment can be induced either through a sequence of constantly renegotiated fixed term contracts or through a renegotiation proof evergreen contract a perpetual contract that allows unilateral termination with advance notice we provide a detailed analysis of properties of optimal contracts

cheating ourselves the economics of tax evasion no government can announce a tax system and then rely on taxpayers sense of duty to remit what is owed some dutiful people will undoubtedly pay what they owe but many others will not over time the ranks of the dutiful will shrink as they see how they are being taken advantage of by the others thus paying taxes must be made a legal responsibility of citizens with penalties attendant on noncompliance but even in the face of those penalties substantial tax evasion exists and always has the history of taxation is replete with episodes of evasion often notable for their inventiveness during the third century many wealthy romans buried their jewelry or stocks of gold coin to evade the luxury tax and homeowners in eighteenth century england temporarily bricked up their fireplaces to escape notice of the hearth tax collector webber and wildavsky 1986 p 141 this essay reviews what is known about the magnitude nature and determinants of tax evasion with an emphasis on the u s income tax alm 1999 andreoni erard and feinstein 1998 and slemrod and yitzhaki 2002 offer more comprehensive recent reviews of the literature it then places this information into a conceptual and policy context

contractual flexibility rent seeking and renegotiation design an empirical analysis of information technology outsourcing contracts this paper examines renegotiation design in contracts for outsourced information technology it services whereas prior literature in information systems has highlighted the likelihood of ex post rent seeking engendered by renegotiation we build upon literature on incomplete contracts to posit that renegotiation can be pareto improving by incorporating contingencies revealed ex post research on contract renegotiation has been hampered by two sets of challenges the lack of appropriate data and empirical challenges in identification we circumvent this problem both by appropriate data collection and by employing an identification strategy to address alternate causal explanations we propose a measure pareto improving amendments to assess renegotiation outcomes that enhance the value from outsourcing by hazard equilibration and by incorporating learning using a unique sample of 141 it outsourcing contracts we examine the role of decision rights delineated ex ante in enabling pareto improving amendments and in resolving the trade off between adaptation and rent seeking we find that flexibility provisions termination for convenience rights and contractual rights whereby vendors are granted rights to reuse know how are associated with pareto improving amendments the results are robust to potential endogeneity of contractual provisions when parties have feasible foresight and to the possibility of adverse selection in the sample we also examine alternate explanations from the literature on contractual breach implications for practitioners and researchers are discussed this paper was accepted by sandra slaughter information systems

putting firms into optimal tax theory firms are for the most part absent from the modern theory of optimal taxation their disappearance dates from the foundational models developed by peter a diamond and james a mirrlees 1971 in which firms are simply mechanical vehicles for combining productive inputs into output in cost minimizing proportions in contrast firms play a central role in all modern tax systems mostly for a reason stated by richard m bird 1996 the key to effective taxation is information and the key to information in the modern economy is the corporation in most countries firms remit the majority of tax revenues to the government either with regard to taxes legally owed by businesses or through withholding of taxes legally owed by employees or other businesses even when businesses are not required to remit taxes they are often required to file information reports that can facilitate monitoring of tax liabilities the lack of a theoretical framework that features firms impedes rigorous welfare analysis of a number of important policy issues one such example is the comparative evaluation of a uniform retail sales tax rst versus a value added tax vat in the standard model these two taxes both remitted entirely by businesses are equivalent consumption taxes but most experts consider the vat to be clearly superior on administrative grounds a view echoed in the recent report of the president s advisory panel on federal tax reform 2005 we propose a simple framework in which these and other issues can be analyzed the new framework recognizes that a tax code must be backed up by an administrative and enforcement structure

is public expenditure productive abstract this paper considers the relationship between aggregate productivity and stock and flow government spending variables the empirical results indicate that i the nonmilitary public capital stock is dramatically more important in determining productivity than is either the flow of nonmilitary or military spending ii military capital bears little relation to productivity and iii a core infrastructure of streets highways airports mass transit sewers water systems etc has most explanatory power for productivity the paper also suggests an important role for the net public capital stock in the productivity slowdown of the last fifteen years

optimal environmental taxation in the presence of other taxes general equilibrium analyses this paper examines the optimal setting of environmental taxes in economies where other distortionary taxes are present we employ analytical and numerical models to explore the degree to which in a second best economy optimal environmental tax rates differ from the rates implied by the pigovian principle according to which the optimal tax rate equals the marginal environmental damages both models indicate contrary to what several analysts have suggested that the optimal tax rate on emissions of a given pollutant is generally less than the rate supported by the pigovian principle moreover the optimal rate is lower the larger are the distortions posed by ordinary taxes numerical results indicate that previous studies may have seriously overstated the size of the optimal carbon tax by disregarding pre existing taxes this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

revenue sharing in movie exhibition and the arrival of sound i introduction at least since adam smith economists have been intrigued by share contracts there has been a proliferation of models most of which tend to explain the share contract as resulting from some mix of optimal risk bearing and optimal effort motivation 1 a large number of researchers have attempted to test these models empirically sharecropping contracts not surprisingly are the most intensively examined the bibliography in knoeber 2000 but similar studies have been conducted in many other areas for example martin 1988 and lafontaine 1992 examine franchise arrangements hallagan 1978 investigates contracts used to lease gold claims leffler and rucker 1991 analyze a sample of private timber sale contracts goldberg and erickson 1987 study long term contracts for the sale of petroleum coke aggarwal and samwick 1999 investigate incentive contracts between firms and their executives and chisholm 1997 goldberg 1997 and weinstein 1998 all examine profit sharing contracts between fi lm companies and the talent this article differs in an important respect from most previous studies which analyze a cross section of contracts in an attempt to determine how or whether they vary according to the attributes of the contracting parties or the products being contracted for instead it investigates an area where a sudden technology shock led to the rapid and widespread replacement of one form of contracting by another the industry is the motion picture business and the shock was the arrival of sound during the silent film era the vast majority of first run feature films were rented to cinemas for flat daily or weekly payments within two years of the release of the first sound picture revenue sharing contracts were the norm and they remain the norm to this day 2 my goal is to investigate the degree to which the standard economic concerns moral hazard risk sharing and measurement problems can explain this change because the contracting parties remained the same the question becomes what was altered in the nature of the product or in its provision so as to have altered correspondingly the incentives faced i conclude the following first the advent of sound fundamentally changed the inputs live music and other acts supplied by the exhibitor and central to the show were replaced by a soundtrack and short sound films supplied by the film company the benefit of deterring exhibitor shirking through the use of flat rental fees which made the exhibitor full residual claimant declined accordingly the party whose effort makes the largest contribution to marginal product generally receives the largest proportion of the residual claims and in the decades following the arrival of sound the proportion of residual claims collected by film companies rose steadily in addition average revenue per film increased with sound whereas the cost of ensuring that exhibitors reported attendance revenue honestly done by locating a film company s representative in the theater remained the same the ex post division of revenue necessary for revenue sharing thus became cheaper on a per film basis finally uncertainty ab out the value in terms of expected attendance revenue of the early sound films appears to have raised the cost of negotiating lump sum rental fees and thus promoted experiments with revenue sharing however although this may have contributed initially it cannot explain the practice s persistence uncertainty about film values declined as talking films became better known ii the nature of the problem a film company contracts with an exhibitor so that they may jointly produce the final good a movie presentation 3 to that end each supplies essential inputs the film company provides the movie itself assembled from a variety of inputs and some sort of national advertising support the exhibitor provides the theater which consists of seating projection equipment a refreshment stand and other support activities and some form of local advertising

four formal izable theories of the firm in this essay i define and compare elemental versions of four theories of the firm these elemental theories are distilled from important contributions by hart holmstrom klein williamson and others although these contributions have been widely cited and much discussed i have found it difficult to understand the commonalities distinctions and potential combinations of these seemingly familiar contributions in this essay therefore i attempt to clarify these issues in three steps i begin with informal summaries of the theories then turn to simple but formal statements of each elemental theory and finally nest the four elemental theories in an integrative framework

learning to contract evidence from the personal computer industry organizational forms involving more detailed contracts than are found in traditional spot market exchanges appear to be increasingly prevalent there has been relatively little analysis however of the extent to which firms learn how to use contracts to manage their interfirm relationships over time in this paper we conduct a detailed case study of a time series of 11 contracts concluded during 1989 1997 between the same two partners both of whom participate in the personal computer industry to explore whether and how firms learn to contract we find many changes to the structure of the contracts that cannot be fully explained by changes in the assets at risk in the relationship and evidence that these changes are largely the result of processes in which the firms were learning how to work together including learning how to contract with each other the nature of this learning appears to have been quite incremental and local that is not very far sighted we suggest how and when contracts might serve as repositories for knowledge about how to govern collaborations and suggest some boundary conditions for this phenomenon our findings also provide implications for the debate about whether contracts have a positive or negative effect on interorganizational trust we conclude with suggestions for future research

public capital and private productivity this paper uses three different approaches to investigate whether the declining provision of public capital is a major cause of declining labor productivity the juxtaposition of approaches removes

efficiency adjusted public capital and growth summary this paper constructs an efficiency adjusted public capital stock series and re examines the public capital and growth relationship the paper also examines the effects of four specific stages of the public investment process appraisal selection implementation and evaluation on capital accumulation and growth the results show that public capital is a significant contributor to economic growth the quality of public investment as measured by variables capturing the adequacy of project selection and implementation is statistically significant in explaining variations in economic growth a result mainly driven by low income countries

measuring the contribution of public infrastructure capital in sweden the authors purpose is to examine ways of evaluating and measuring the contribution of public infrastructure capital to private sector output and productivity growth in sweden they do this by specifying and implementing empirically a number of alternative econometric models using annual data for sweden from 1960 to 1988 applying a dual cost function approach they find that increases in public infrastructure capital ceteris paribus reduce private sector costs the authors compute that amount of public infrastructure capital that would rationalize the cost savings incurred by the private business and manufacturing sectors and find that the amount that can be rationalized in this manner is less than what was in fact available in 1988 but that the extent of excess public infrastructure capital has been falling in the 1980s copyright 1992 by the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

tax policy and economic growth lessons from the 1980s the past seven years of u s economic policy and performance constitute a truly remarkable if confusing experiment few would have guessed in 1980 that inflation would fall rapidly to 4 percent and hold pretty steady during a lengthy recovery that productivity growth would partially rebound the national debt more than double capital imports reach 150 billion in a single year or that employment would continue to expand at rates envied by other advanced economies perhaps fewer still would have predicted two major and two minor tax reforms would be passed in six years a flip flop in depreciation schedules and a top personal tax rate below 30 percent while it is always easier to draw inferences concerning economic growth its determinants and policies affecting the determinants with long historical hindsight this paper will attempt to provide information evaluation and conjecture to draw some tentative lessons about the effects of tax policies in the 1980s on long run economic growth the good news from the 1980s is the remarkable achievement of substantially lower marginal tax rates making the government a much smaller silent partner in many economic decisions for example the tax advantage of debt finance is reduced substantially with the much lower marginal tax rates the bad news is that the nation could not afford all of the good news the very large budget deficits add to the instability in the tax code in addition to whatever other problems they cause moreover in a country with the lowest saving and investment rates in the advanced world the consequence of which may be to decrease our long run growth potential and short run trade competitiveness the remaining anti saving and investment features of our tax law while probably less important in the long run than the u s

will destination based taxes be fully exploited when available an application to the u s commodity tax system abstract we develop a tax competition model that allows for the setting of both an origin based and a destination based commodity tax rate in the presence of avoidance and evasion in the presence of evasion jurisdictions will give cross border shoppers tax preferential treatment thus not fully exploiting the potential of destination based taxation moreover the divergence between origin based and destination based taxes is stronger when the incentives for consumers tax arbitrage opportunities increase the united states is one example of many such systems while sales taxes are due at the point of sale use taxes are due on goods purchased out of state we document that when able to set both rates a majority of jurisdictions levy destination based use taxes at a lower rate than origin based sales taxes in response to changes in state level policies that increase tax avoidance opportunities the results of the empirical model broadly confirm our theory

public capital maintenance and congestion long run growth and fiscal policies abstract in this paper we study an endogenous growth model in which public maintenance expenditures affect the depreciation rate of public capital and the latter is subject to congestion we find that economies with low congestion in public infrastructure will require a threshold level of public capital maintenance for ongoing growth we also examine the fiscal implications of public capital maintenance policies and we find that the composition of public capital expenditures under congestion is a crucial determinant of optimal and growth maximizing fiscal policies the government can affect the return of public capital by re allocating public expenditures between new public investment and maintenance and hence avoid excessive taxation that is required under increasing congestion

production versus revenue efficiency with limited tax capacity theory and evidence from pakistan to fight evasion many developing countries use production inefficient tax policies this includes minimum tax schemes whereby firms are taxed on either profits or turnover depending on which tax liability is larger such schemes create nonstandard kink points which allow for eliciting evasion responses to switches between profit and turnover taxes using a bunching approach using administrative data on corporations in pakistan we estimate that turnover taxes reduce evasion by up to 60 70 percent of corporate income incorporating this in a calibrated optimal tax model we find that switching from profit to turnover taxation increases revenue by 74 percent without reducing aggregate profits

explaining differences in productive efficiency an application to belgian municipalities the purpose of this paper is to measure and explain variations in productive efficiency of municipal governments in belgium technical efficiency is evaluated using a non parametric method based on the free disposal hull fdh reference technology we first calculate input output and graph farrell efficiency measures for a cross section of all 589 belgian municipalities in a second stage of the analysis we explain the calculated differences in efficiency in terms of variables related to the structural characteristics of municipalities and to the institutional environment

optimal self employment income tax enforcement abstract most models of optimal income tax enforcement assume that income is either random or solely remunerates labor neglecting that auditing strategies may depend on observable inputs this paper outlines a model to optimally monitor self employed entrepreneurs when in addition to reported profits the tax collection agency also observes the number of workers employed or any other input variable at each firm we show that by conditioning the monitoring strategy only on labor input it is optimal for the irs to audit firms in a way that generates some empirical regularities like the missing middle we also show that the optimal direct mechanism can be implemented by an indirect monitoring strategy that is consistent with actual irs practices in particular the irs calculates inputted income as function of labor whenever an entrepreneur reports profits that are lower than inputted income she is randomly monitored finally we formalize a model of optimal presumption taxation in which inputted income is the tax base to compare revenue collection across tax systems

public infrastructure and productivity growth in greek agriculture recent research has focused on the effect of public infrastructure on economic performance in this paper a model of greek agriculture s technology and behaviour is constructed based on the dual cost function framework the model provides a decomposition of productivity growth into the components technical change returns to scale and public infrastructure the empirical estimates indicate that public infrastructure investment provides a significant return to agriculture and augments productivity growth over the period 1960 1995 the impact of public infrastructure on productivity growth in livestock and crop production is found to be positive although it has been declining since the late 1970s these results strongly suggest that a decline in public infrastructure investment can partly explain the observed decline in the productivity growth of greek agriculture in the 1980s

the economics of governance the economics of governance is an effort to implement the study of good order and workable arrangements where good order includes both spontaneous order in the market which is a venerated tradition in economics adam smith 1776 friedrich hayek 1945 kenneth a arrow and gerard debreu 1954 and intentional order of a conscious deliberate purposeful kind chester irving barnard 1938 p 9 also i interpret workable arrangements to mean feasible modes of organization all of which are flawed in comparison with a hypothetical ideal avinash dixit 1996 pp 4 9 the object is to work out the efficiency logic for managing transactions by alternative modes of governance principally spot markets various long term contracts hybrids and hierarchies interest among social scientists economists included in the study and practice of good order and workable arrangements has been steadily growing in contrast with the orthodox lens of choice prices and output supply and demand the economics of governance is a lens of contract construction broadly in the spirit of james buchanan s 2001 p 29 observation that mutuality of advantage from voluntary exchange is the most fundamental of all understandings in economics the economics of governance as herein described is principally an exercise in bilateral private ordering by which i mean that the immediate parties to an exchange are actively involved in the provision of good order and workable arrangements to be sure the need for private ordering varies with the rules of the game as provided by the state distinctions between lawlessness where the state provides limited or unreliable protection for property and contract dixit 2004 and lawfulness where the state undertakes to protect property and enforce contracts in a principled way are pertinent the first of these applies mainly to primitive and transition economies the second is commonly associated with western democracies recourse to private ordering under conditions of lawlessness is altogether understandable given the absence of state support the walter a haas school of business university of california berkeley ca 94720 1900 the paper has benefited from workshop presentations at the university of california berkeley the university of valencia insead fountainebleau and the 2004 annual conference of the international society for new institutional economics an abbreviated version was also given as the horst claus recktenwald lecture at nuremburg on 4 november 2004 comments and suggestions from fred balderston ernesto dalbo avinash dixit robert gibbons witold henisz ian larkin steven tadelis and dean williamson are especially acknowledged 1 lon fuller s 1954 p 477 definition of eunomics as the science theory or study of good order and workable arrangements is very much in the spirit of what i refer to as governance 2 one of the immediate ramifications of insistently comparing feasible alternatives all of which are flawed is that the purported inefficiencies that are ascribed to failures to achieve first best optimality are not dispositive but invite the query as compared with what i return to this issue in section iv 3 excluding corporate governance the numbers of articles that used the word governance during the period 1998 2000 as compared with the period 1977 1979 in selected economics business management sociology organization and political science journals were 60 vs 1 76 vs 4 79 vs 18 and 60 vs 25 where the journals surveyed were the american economic review journal of political economy quarterly journal of economics rand journal of economics and journal of economic perspectives in economics strategic management journal management science academy of management journal and academy of management review in business management administrative science quarterly organization science american journal of sociology american sociological review and annual review of sociology in sociology organization and american political science review political science quarterly journal of politics and political research quarterly in political science combining these four categories articles using the word governance increased from 48 to 275 over this 20 year interval dixit 2004 pp 149 50 reports that the number of web pages that turn up under the search for governance is huge

complementarity and evolution of contractual provisions an empirical study of it services contracts an increasing volume of business activity appears to be occurring via alliances or other interfirm arrangements in which complex contracts are featured yet there has been relatively little study of contract design in the strategy or management literatures the economics literature on contracting has been extensive but it has been less concerned with learning and evolution phenomena in which strategy and organization scholars are deeply interested in this paper we investigate the relationship between two types of contractual provisions that are important in high technology contracts or contracts for which environmental uncertainty or technological complexity are significant namely contingency planning and task description previous research suggests that contracts can vary significantly in the degree of detail with which such key provisions are written and that they are each subject to learning in this paper we find evidence from a sample of 386 contracts that contingency planning and task description behave as complements in contractual design we argue that this complementarity reflects patterns of learning to contract we also find that repeated exchange between two firms leads to greater effort at contingency planning in subsequent contracts a finding that is also consistent with learning effects but not with frequently made claims that contracts and trust are substitutes

what have we learned from three decades of research on the productivity of public capital the last three decades have witnessed a great deal of research effort devoted to measuring the private output elasticity of public capital the wide range of available estimates have precluded any consensus so far however this paper reconciles the empirical findings of the literature by quantitatively analyzing a sample of 578 estimates collected from 68 studies for the 1983 2008 period using meta regression analysis we show how study design characteristics and publication bias can explain a large fraction of the variation across estimates we find a short run output elasticity of public capital supplied at the central government level of 0 083 which increases to 0 122 in the long run if in addition only core infrastructure at a regional local level of government is considered these estimates are almost doubled the average output elasticity of public capital amounts to 0 106 our results suggest that public capital is undersupplied in oecd economies

market price uncertainty risk aversion and procurement combining contracts and open market sourcing alternatives abstract we evaluate the implications of concurrent utilization of contracts and open market arrangements by a risk averse buyer in continuous procuring of a standardized product of known demand over a specified time period the buyer being risk averse is concerned about the magnitude and uncertainty of expenses the contract price is deterministic and the market price is stochastic cases when the two price processes are exogenous and when the contract price is endogenously linked to volume of procurement and market price are examined models are developed to determine the optimal pattern of procurement from the two arrangements for specified price risk aversion and contract duration parameters the study finds that optimal procurement from market increases with contract price premium but decreases with degree of risk aversion and market price uncertainty usefulness of alternate forms of contracts when contract and market alternatives are used concurrently is discussed application of the models to hypothetical datasets compares the relative usefulness of alternate forms of integrating contract and market alternatives and of complete reliance on contract or market alternatives

court efficiency and procurement performance disputes over penalties for breaching a contract are often resolved in court a simple model illustrates how inefficient courts can sway public buyers from enforcing a penalty for late delivery in order to avoid litigation therefore inducing sellers to delay contract delivery by using a large dataset on italian public procurement we empirically study the effects of court inefficiency on public work performance we find that where courts are inefficient i public works are delivered with longer delays ii delays increase for more valuable contracts iii contracts are more often awarded to larger suppliers and iv a higher share of the payment is postponed after delivery other interpretations receive less support from the data