variable returns to scale in production and patterns of specialization this paper discusses some trade and welfare implications of the two sector model based on increasing returns to scale irs in one industry and decreasing returns to scale drs in the other it has been shown by horst herberg and murray kemp that given homothetic production functions with irs in one industry and drs in the other the production possibilities frontier ppf is strictly concave to the origin near the irs axis and strictly convex to the origin near the drs axis while this result constitutes an important finding and is contrary to the general impression among economists even twelve years after the publication of herberg and kemp s paper no attempt has been made to analyze its implications for welfare and patterns of specialization in this paper i consider a simple twocommodity model with irs in one industry and drs in the other and discuss some interesting implications of variable returns to scale vrs first i demonstrate that in this model if a small open economy specializes completely in production it will do so in the drs commodity and not in the irs commodity as is generally believed second if at a given price ratio an internal production equilibrium exists a welfaremaximizing small open economy will never specialize completely in production even though the ppf exhibits decreasing opportunity costs over a part of its range third given output generated economies and diseconomies of scale welfare maximization for a small country requires a permanent tax subsidy scheme encouraging expansion of the irs industry and contraction of the drs industry finally in a two country model with identical tastes and technology across the countries free trade equilibrium may result in incomplete specialization by the exporter of the irs commodity and complete specialization by the exporter of the drs commodity in the course of the analysis i argue that tinbergen s formulation of frank graham s case for protecting the irs industry is incorrect i then present a possible reformulation of it in section i the basic production model is introduced in section ii the model is analyzed and in section iii it is argued that all the results continue to hold in the multifactor case

risk sharing and internal migration over the past two decades more than half the population in rural tanzania migrated within the country profoundly changing the nature of traditional institutions such as informal risk sharing mass internal migration has created geographically disperse networks on which the authors collected detailed panel data by quantifying how shocks and consumption co vary across linked households they show how migrants unilaterally insure their extended family members at home this finding contradicts risk sharing models based on reciprocity but is consistent with assistance driven by social norms migrants sacrifice 3 to 7 percent of their very substantial consumption growth to provide this insurance which seems too trivial to have any stifling effect on their growth through migration

specific experience household structure and intergenerational transfers farm family land and labor arrangements in developing countries data from indian rural household survey was used to test th hypothesis that the coexistence in traditional rural societies of extended intergenerational families infrequent land sales and high reliance on family members as farm laborers is the result of the economic advantages which accrue from the knowledge gained by farming a particular ploy of land over a long period of time the land specific experience of elderly members of a intergenerational household who farmed the land as a child and then as an adult are expecially critical in adverse weather years most previous investigators attributed the existence of multigenerational households the use of family members rather than hired laboreds and the infrequency of land sales to deficiencies in the market i e labor market imperfections and an absence of capital insurance and asset markets in the present investigations these same characteristics are viewed as having an economic advantages a model for estimating the contribution of the experience of the elderly household members to agricultural profits was developed and applied to data from a 3 year panel study of 2900 indian rural farm households the data was collected between 1968 71 by the national council of applied economic research the survey collected information on farm profits farm inputs demographic characteristics and the effects of weather conditions on profits a major limitation of the study was a lack of information on the duration of land ownership age of household members was substituted as a proxy for duration of ownership findings were consistent withe the hypothesis in poor agricultural years gross returns for households which contained an elderly household member were greater than the gross returns for comparable households which did not contain an elderly member the economic advantages of specific knowledge embodied in the experienced elderly farmer were comparable to the economic advantages which accrued to households whose members were more educated the hypothesis cannot fully explain the existence of intergenerational families since there is a relatively large proportion of such families among nonfarm families in many countries including india findings suggest that intergenerational families may provide for more occupational diversity and thereby reduce income risks the specific experience hypothesis has policy implications if technological changes are introduced the value of specific experience may be lost and the frequency of intergenerational households may decline the hypothesis may also explain why farmers are reluctant to agree to land redistribution and consolidation schemes this reluctance may disappear after sufficient technological change has occurred

labour migration and social networks participation in southern mozambique this paper investigates how social networks in poor developing settings are affected by migration using a unique household survey from southern mozambique we test the role of labour mobility in shaping participation in groups and interhousehold cooperation by migrant sending households in village economies at origin we find that migration cum remittances boosts household engagement in community based social networks our findings are robust to alternative definitions of social interaction and to endogeneity concerns suggesting that stable migration ties and higher income stability through remittances may decrease participation constraints and increase household commitment in cooperative arrangements in migrant sending communities

child fostering in africa when labor and schooling motives may coexist abstract the paper proposes a theoretical framework for understanding purposive child fostering in africa whereby a non orphaned child is sent to live temporarily with relatives in the model adults decide whether to foster in or out a child in conjunction with other household choices e g own time allocation between market and non market activities children s amount of work and schooling by allowing for positive externalities from fostering and thus asymmetric motives for fostering in labor and out human capital the proposed framework predicts that school age children are sent to better off households and that some families may foster in and out simultaneously the model identifies the conditions under which all actors involved children included may benefit from fostering arrangements but also points to situations where fostering may become an opportunity to marginalize a subset of children the paper aims to provide a sound theoretical foundation that sheds light on why there exists mixed empirical evidence on the effects of fostering on children s well being and cautions against demonizing non parent residence as unequivocally detrimental to children

remittances and household wealth after conflict a case study on urban burundi few studies have researched the use of remittances in conflict affected contexts this study analyzes unique data from burundi testing three hypotheses relative deprivation investment and insurance derived from new economics of labor migration studies employing propensity score matching results show that remittances are common among wealthier households rejecting the relative deprivation hypothesis remittances have strong effects on non productive assets such as living conditions and food security and weak effects on productive assets such as asset ownership poorer households invest mostly in non productive assets suggesting that remittances are insurance for the poor whereas wealthier households seem largely unaffected by remittances

can group incentives alleviate moral hazard the role of pro social preferences abstract incentivizing unobservable effort in risky environments such as in insurance credit and labor markets is vital as moral hazard may otherwise cause significant welfare losses including the outright failure of markets ensuring incentive compatibility through state contingent contracts between principal and agent however is undesirable for risk averse agents we provide a theoretical intuition on how pro social preferences between agents in a joint liability group contract can ensure incentive compatibility two independent large scale behavioral experiments framed in an insurance context support the hypotheses derived from our theory in particular effort decreases when making agents payoff less state dependent but this effect is mitigated with joint liability in a group scheme where agents are additionally motivated by pro social concerns activating strategic motives slightly increases effort further particularly in non anonymous groups with high network strength the results support existing evidence on joint liability groups and further suggest that even if peer pressure to ensure effort provision is absent such group policies can improve efficiency when agents are pro social

precautionary behavior migrant networks and household consumption decisions an empirical analysis using household panel data from rural china abstract we develop a test of precautionary behavior in the consumption decisions of rural agricultural households among surveyed households facing a median level of consumption risk 10 of savings can be attributed to a precautionary motive and this increases to 15 for households with consumption per capita below the poverty line we next use distant lags of local rainfall shocks uncorrelated with current consumption growth to identify the size of migrant networks outside the village and then present evidence that both poor and nonpoor households engage in less precautionary saving as the size of the village migrant network increases

informal insurance arrangements with limited commitment theory and evidence from village economies recent work on consumption allocations in village economies finds that idiosyncratic variation in consumption is systematically related to idiosyncratic variation in income thus rejecting the hypothesis of full risk pooling we attempt to explain these observations by adding limited commitment as an impediment to risk pooling we provide a general dynamic model and completely characterise efficient informal insurance arrangements constrained by limited commitment and test the model using data from three indian villages we find that the model can fully explain the dynamic response of consumption to income but that it fails to explain the distribution of consumption across households

who gets the job referral evidence from a social networks experiment we use recruitment into a laboratory experiment in kolkata india to analyze how job networks select individuals for employment opportunities we present evidence that individuals face a tradeoff between choosing the most qualified individual for the job and the individual who is ideal from the perspective of their social network the experiment allows randomly selected subjects to refer members of their social networks to subsequent rounds of the experiment and varies the incentive schemes offered to these participants we find that when faced with performance pay individuals are more likely to refer co workers and less likely to refer family members high ability participants who are offered performance pay recruit referrals who perform significantly better on a cognitive ability task and also prove to be more reliable as evidenced by their choices in the trust game and performance on an effort task

risk and insurance in a rural credit market an empirical investigation in northern nigeria credit contracts play a direct role in pooling risk between households in northern nigeria repayments owed by borrowers depend on realizations of random shocks by both borrowers and lenders the paper develops two models of state contingent loans the first is a competitive equilibrium in perfectly enforceable contracts the second permits imperfect information and equilibrium default estimates of both models indicate that quantitatively important state contingent payments are embedded in these loan transactions but that a fully efficient risk pooling equilibrium is not achieved the research is based on a year long survey in zaria nigeria conducted by the author

the crowding out effect of formal insurance on informal risk sharing an experimental study abstract this paper investigates the crowding out effect of formal insurance on informal risk sharing arrangements via theory and laboratory experiment our model and simulation predict that the crowding out of private transfers is often more than one for one and will reduce the total risk coverage furthermore the existence of a moderate degree of altruism exaggerates the crowding out effect especially when there is an ex ante income inequality these predictions are mostly supported by the laboratory experiment except that the crowding out effect is not more than one for one and hence the total risk coverage is not significantly reduced by formal insurance

storm damage and risk preferences panel evidence from germany individuals risk preferences may change after experiencing external socio economic or natural shocks theoretical predictions and empirical studies suggest that risk taking may increase or decrease after experiencing shocks so far the empirical evidence is sparse especially when it comes to developed countries we contribute to this literature by investigating whether experiencing financial and health related damage caused by storms affects risk preferences of individuals in germany using unique panel data we find that household heads were more risk seeking after they experienced storm damage we do not find evidence of exposure to storm per se regardless of damage experience which suggests that household heads have to suffer damage for their risk preferences to be affected these results are robust across a battery of alternative model specifications and alternative storm damage measures magnitude of financial damage we rule out other potential explanations such as health related and economic shocks the self reported storm damage data is broadly confirmed by regional storm damage data provided by the insurance industry while we cannot identify the channels through which experiencing storm damage affects risk preferences from our data we suggest and discuss some potential channels the results may have important policy implications as risk preferences affect for instance individuals savings and investment behaviour adoption of self protection and self insurance strategies and technology adoption

assortative matching and risk sharing abstract this paper explores the sorting patterns in a two sided matching market where agents facing different risks match to share them when preference belongs to the class of harmonic absolute risk aversion hara the risk premium is perfectly transferable within each partnership thus a stable match minimizes the social cost of risk in the systematic risk model where agents are ranked by their holdings of a common risky asset the convexity of the joint risk premium in joint risk size leads to negative assortative matching nam in the idiosyncratic risk model where agents are ranked by their independent riskiness in the sense of second order stochastic dominance ssd nam arises when preference exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion dara in the sense of ross and riskier background risk leads to more risk averse behavior however nam may fail to arise when riskier background risk leads to more risk tolerant behavior

household consumption smoothing through ethnic ties evidence from cote d ivoire abstract this paper investigates the hypothesis that households in cote d ivoire take part in spatially diversified risk sharing arrangements with members of their own ethnic group empirical tests are presented using several estimation methods to deal with heteroscedasticity measurement error and extreme value problems to examine whether results are robust across estimation procedures the hypothesis of complete risk sharing within ethnic groups is rejected however there appears to be some partial insurance performed by individual households with other members of the same ethnic group particularly for the households residing in the regions least likely to have access to formal financial arrangements

periodic high risk as a cause of fertility decline in a changing rural environment survival strategies in the 1980 1983 south indian drought in the attempt to explain persistent high fertility in much of the third world attention has been drawn both to current returns from child labor and to the mitigation or avoidance of future risks the latter can be subdivided into meeting emergencies while the parental generation is still of working age and providing for old age or even safeguarding the transmission of family property on parental death the problems of old age have recently received most attention and they may well be of paramount importance in many societies yet in a research program that we have conducted in rural south india since 1979 the reasons given for demographic behavior have more frequently emphasized the need to plan strategies to meet periodic crisis than to ensure old age support 2 nevertheless one should not underemphasize the latter merely because the problem is predictable and the solutions understood in the study area for the great majority of the aged the support system still worked well 3 in contrast in our investigations of marriage fertility control and education we repeatedly discovered that a fundamental consideration with regard to parental decisions in these areas was to strengthen the ability of the family to withstand periodic crises 4 by far the most important type of crisis in this dry drought prone area was recurrent famines resulting

on the economics of nonmarket transfers the role of altruism abstract we examine altruistically motivated consumption transfers in an effort to account for nonmarket transfers we find that altruistic linkages lead to autonomous negotiation free transfers and that such transfers positively respond to stronger altruism we also find that given fairly natural assumptions concerning the altruism parameters mutual altruism does not necessarily result in group social harmony even though its rise narrows the conflict range in spite of enhanced transfers prompted by such a rise both parties may end up worse off these results help explain why in some social environments a shift toward market oriented transfers and exchanges may be quicker than in others as the disadvantages decline in utility associated with intragroup altruistic linkages outweigh the advantages

social security in a moral economy an empirical analysis for java private transfer payments are modeled as outcomes of a constrained social choice pro blem facing donors the approach is applied to a large household leve l data set for java and hypotheses are tested concerning the performa nce of the moral economy as a social security system transfer be havior is found to be very different between rural and urban areas w hile transfer receipts and outlays are income inequality reducing in rural areas this is not the case in urban areas there is also evidence of transfers being targeted to disadvantaged households such as the sick elderly and for urban areas the unemployed copyright 1988 by mit press

extended families and child well being studies of household behavior have established the distribution of resources among household members predicts spending and savings patterns however there is a paucity of evidence on the relationship between the well being of individual family members and the distribution of resources within an extended family including non co resident family members given the central role the family plays in many models of economic behavior this is an important gap in the literature using rich longitudinal survey data from the indonesia family life survey ifls evidence is presented on the relationship between three measures of health and education related human capital of children and the distribution of resources among extended family members ifls is ideally suited for this research since the survey collects detailed information about income and wealth from both coresident and non co resident family members the empirical model is founded on a natural extension of the collective model of household decision making chiappori 1988 1992 to the extended family the model is particularly appealing in this context because it places few restrictions on preferences of individual family members and does not specify a specific bargaining mechanism that underlies negotiations the collective model yields empirical tests of whether the behavior of family members is pareto efficient a special case of the model allows all family members to be completely altruistic which is observationally equivalent to a unitary model of family behavior that special case is rejected by the data however the restrictions of the efficient model are not rejected indicating that non co resident family members are able to co ordinate allocation decisions with respect to child human capital investments in such a way as to make no family member better off without another member being worse off

motivations to remit evidence from botswana in this article a theory of motivations to send remittances is described and tested with data from botswana altruism is one of the motivations tested and found to be an insufficient explanation for remittances among migrants in botswana a refinement of the model stipulates a modified altruism or enlightened self interest in this model the relationship between the migrant and family is tempered by an implicit understanding of mutual benefit the household strategy may be to encourage some members to migrate as a means of spreading risk and sharing gains the household strategy is similar to an insurance policy where migration is to places where market potential is high the risks incurred might be high the example is given of migration during a drought in botswana migrant remittances were greater in households with more cattle or households with more to lose drought alone was not statistically related to remittances increases in remittances were related to increased levels of education it is suggested that repayment was the motive for parents investment in migrants education migrants gains are identified as the potential for an inheritance the security of channeling investments through a trusted family member and security in having a home to return to it is pointed out that the altruism and family remittances from urban migration were strategies that bridged the simple dynamic of either urban development or rural development impacting on family welfare it is suggested that household models of economy adopt some measure to express the relationship of household wealth to remittances from urban migrants

the impact of violence on individual risk preferences evidence from a natural experiment this study estimates the impact of kenya s post election violence on individual risk preferences because the crisis interrupted a longitudinal survey of more than five thousand kenyan youth this timing creates plausibly exogenous variation in exposure to civil conflict by the time of the survey the study measures individual risk preferences using hypothetical lottery choice questions which are validated by showing that they predict migration and entrepreneurship in the cross section the results indicate that the post election violence sharply increased individual risk aversion immediately after the crisis the fraction of subjects who are classified as either risk neutral or risk loving dropped by roughly 26 percent the findings remain robust to an iv estimation strategy that exploits random assignment of respondents to waves of surveying

no toilet no bride intrahousehold bargaining in male skewed marriage markets in india abstract haryana state in india is characterized by widespread discrimination against women including a severe population level sex imbalance in this context an innovative social marketing campaign which targeted pro sanitation messages to households active in local marriage markets was implemented with the goal of increasing toilet ownership this paper estimates the impact of this program known colloquially as no toilet no bride on household level latrine ownership private sanitation coverage in haryana increased by 21 specifically among households with boys active on the marriage market this effect is larger and concentrated in marriage markets where women are relatively scarce and absent when women are relatively abundant which together suggest the program operated by successfully linking sanitation outcomes with marriage market competition induced by local scarcities of women due to male biased sex ratios

informal risk sharing in an infinite horizon experiment author s charness gary b genicot garance abstract this paper presents the first laboratory study of risk sharing without commitment our experiment captures the main features of a simple model of voluntary insurance between two agents in the model two individuals interact over a potential infinite horizon and suffer random income shocks risk averse individuals have incentives to smooth consumption by making transfers to each other these transfers being voluntary only self enforcing risk sharing arrangements are possible transfers can never be so large as to tempt individuals to renege on them this constraint when binding has strong implications for the shape of the constrained optimal risk sharing arrangement in our experiment participants are matched in pairs each period one of them randomly drawn receives a given amount in addition to its regular income after observing both incomes each person in a pair chooses a non negative transfer to make to the other person two features of the experimental design are crucial first it is common information that all pairs will be dissolved at the end of each period with a given probability participants are informed when this occurs and randomly re matched this replicates the effect of infinite horizon and discounting in the model second at the end of the experiment a single period is randomly drawn to count for cash payment this feature is essential for individuals to care about the utility outcome of each period we find evidence generally consistent with risk sharing with most transfers coming from individuals who received h in the period moreover in support of the theory transfers are much higher with a higher continuation probability and they also are highly correlated with the individual s degree of risk aversion however while the model predicts an increase in transfers with ex ante inequality we observe the opposite effect this may reflect considerations of identity or group membership

does africa need a rotten kin theorem experimental evidence from village economies this paper measures the economic impact of social pressure to share income with kin and neighbors in rural kenyan villages the authors conduct a lab experiment in which they randomly vary the observability of investment returns the goal is to test whether subjects reduce their income in order to keep it hidden the analysis finds that women adopt an investment strategy that conceals the size of their initial endowment in the experiment although that strategy reduces their expected earnings this effect is largest among women with relatives attending the experiment parameter estimates suggest that women behave as though they expect to be pressured to share four percent of their observable income with others and substantially more when close kin can observe income directly although this paper provides experimental evidence from a single african country observational studies suggest that similar pressure from kin may be prevalent in many rural areas throughout sub saharan africa

explaining the swollen middle why most transactions are a mix of market and hierarchy why are firms sometimes more efficient than markets at organizing transactions why are most transactions arrayed neither at the pure market nor at the pure hierarchy end of the continuum but rather in the swollen middle incorporating features of both market and hierarchy why don t firms make greater use of price incentives this paper addresses these three questions by developing a model of the choice of institution one key building block is the distinction between organizing methods hierarchy and the price system and institutions firms and markets hierarchy and the price system are two distinct methods for organizing transactions each with particular costs and benefits markets and firms are institutions which use one or both of these methods although markets predominantly use prices and firms rely principally on hierarchy there is not a one to one correspondence between prices and markets or between hierarchy and firms indeed the paper argues that it is generally more efficient to use a mix of both methods than to specialize in either the paper focuses on the enforcement properties of prices and hierarchy hierarchy controls individuals directly by constraining their behavior by imposing behavior constraints while prices do it indirectly by measuring their outputs through price constraints under hierarchy individuals receive a salary to do as told while self employed individuals governed by the price system are rewarded on the basis of their output each system has its own biases using prices maximizes effort minimizes shirking but incites individuals to inflate the price and or reduce the quality of their output it encourages cheating relying on hierarchy results in the opposite bias under hierarchy individuals are not paid in function of their output but instead are rewarded for following directives they have thus strong incentives to minimize effort to shirk unless properly supervised but being paid a fixed sum to follow orders they have few incentives to cheat hence the price system experiences low shirking but potentially high cheating costs while hierarchy faces low cheating but high shirking costs organizing costs are the sum of shirking and cheating costs any given transaction will be organized by the mix of price and hierarchy i e by the mix of price and behavior constraints that minimizes organizing costs a transaction will be organized within a firm if the reduction in cheating costs achieved by replacing price constraints by behavior constraints exceeds the resulting increase in shirking costs and by the market in the opposite case the paper shows that cheating and shirking costs increase more than proportionately as one concentrates in either pure price or behavior constraints hence using a mix of both methods generally minimizes the sum of cheating and shirking costs this explains why most transactions exhibit features of both markets and hierarchy the paper shows clearly the tradeoff involved between price and behavior constraints it explains the costs and benefits of using two types of price incentives in firms piecework and profit centers and predicts when they will be used

risk aversion and expected utility theory a calibration theorem within the expected utility framework the only explanation for risk aversion is that the utility function for wealth is concave a person has lower marginal utility for additional wealth when she is wealthy than when she is poor this paper provides a theorem showing that expected utility theory is an utterly implausible explanation for appreciable risk aversion over modest stakes within expected utility theory for any concave utility function even very little risk aversion over modest stakes implies an absurd degree of risk aversion over large stakes illustrative calibrations are provided

competition within the firm theory plus some evidence from medical group practice recent work on the economics of the firm and other organizations has emphasized the importance of internal organization and incentives the issue of competition within the firm has not arisen however in this article i construct a model of nonprice competition among members of a professional partnership and test the model with data on medical group practice the empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis of nonprice competition among members of the firm

consumption smoothing migration and marriage evidence from rural india a significant proportion of migration in low income countries particularly in rural areas is composed of moves by women for the purpose of marriage we seek to explain these mobility patterns by examining marital arrangements among indian households in particular we hypothesize that the marriage of daughters to locationally distant dispersed yet kinship related households is a manifestation of implicit interhousehold contractual arrangements aimed at mitigating income risks and facilitating consumption smoothing in an environment characterized by information costs and spatially covariant risks analysis of longitudinal south indian village data lends support to the hypothesis marriage cum migration contributes significantly to a reduction in the variability of household food consumption farm households afflicted with more variable profits tend to engage in longer distance marriage cum migration the hypothesized and observed marriage cum migration patterns are in dissonance with standard models of marriage or migration that are concerned primarily with search costs and static income gains

intrafirm competition and charter evolution in the multibusiness firm we develop a theoretical framework for a specific form of intrafirm competition namely the extent of overlap between the charters of two or more units in a single organization this phenomenon is commonly seen in large organizations e g cases of two business units producing competing products or two product development groups trying to solve the same technological problem but the existing academic literature provides little insight into the forms intrafirm competition takes or the conditions under which it is beneficial or harmful to the organization building on the concept of an organization charter galunic and eisenhardt 2001 we identify two generic forms of intrafirm competition the dynamic community model has fluid and frequently changing charter boundaries and it emerges through the creation of strategic options in the face of a changing environment the coexistence model has fixed and relatively static charter boundaries and it owes its existence to economies of scope and differentiation of unit charters to cover multiple market segments in the body of the paper we develop a theoretical framework to specify the environmental and organizational conditions under which each form of intrafirm competition is expected to occur

broader product line a necessity to achieve success strategic product line breadth decisions evoke differential responses from the manufacturing and the marketing areas manufacturing prefers keeping process disruptions to a minimum and as a result discourages product proliferation however marketing in its attempt to match products to heterogeneous consumer needs and gain market share emphasizes a broader product line we systematically investigate the market benefits and cost disadvantages of broader product lines on a large sample of over 1 400 business units our results indicate significant market share benefits and increases in firms profitability with broader product lines moreover widely held beliefs of increases in production costs are not empirically supported american manufacturing firms may indeed be flexible enough to accommodate product variety without significant detrimental effects on costs

the evolution of intracorporate domains divisional charter losses in high technology multidivisional corporations modern corporations have become synonymous with the multidivisional form of organization variously interdependent divisions are chartered to look after one or more business areas in effect defining the turf of the division and its purpose within the corporation and collectively defining the corporate domain however once created these divisional charters should not be regarded as rigid they are susceptible to change particularly in fast paced environments such as in high technology industries divisional charters are liable to change as divisions add or subtract businesses to their charter responsibilities these charter changes are seen as an adaptive device for large multidivisional corporations in fast paced environments this paper presents a process model of how divisions change their domains in hypercompetitive contexts focusing on the specific question of how divisions lose all or portions of their business charters the paper is based on a larger inductive study of charter changes in

risk sharing across communities this paper studies cross community risk sharing there is now a large body of theoretical and empirical work on informal insurance where people mitigate risk by sharing income a consistent empirical finding is that risk sharing is not complete within villages often the observed sets of individuals 2 one reason researchers suspect is that risk sharing does not take place at the village level but between individuals and families 3 we build a theoretical model where risksharing takes place between pairs of agents there are idiosyncratic shocks to individual income and community level shocks we consider how the opportunity for cross community links affects the shape and efficiency of risk sharing arrangements we find that when links across villages form there can be less risk sharing within a village welfare is higher for those directly or indirectly connected across villages but lower for those with no path connecting them to the other village overall welfare can be higher thus empirical findings that insurance within a village is not complete is not necessarily evidence of an inefficient pattern of risk sharing relations rather the finding is consistent with risk sharing patterns that involve cross community relations and such patterns may yield higher aggregate welfare despite incomplete insurance within a village this paper makes two contributions first it demonstrates the importance of a network analysis by examining pairwise incentives to form relations and the resulting pattern we can see new risk sharing outcomes second with this network model we show how informal risk sharing across communities has both aggregate and distributional effects to study network outcomes we posit a simple two stage model first we provide a benchmark model for risk sharing for a given network then working backwards we consider incentives to form risk sharing links 4 to illustrate consider a rural population and ask how people might link

pollution havens and industrial agglomeration abstract this paper examines the pollution haven hypothesis using a spatial economy model of two countries and two sectors the manufacturing sector generates cross border pollution which reduces cross sectoral productivity of agricultural goods and lowers local income we derive a demand reducing effect that discourages firms to move to the country with laxer environmental regulations in the absence of any comparative advantage our analysis also demonstrates that manufacturing agglomeration forces can alleviate the pollution haven effect a pollution haven may not arise if environmental regulation is slightly more stringent in the larger country

eating your own lunch protection through preemption recent discussions of management practices among successful high technology companies suggest that one key strategy for success is to eat your own lunch before someone else does the implication is that in intensely competitive or hypercompetitive markets firms with a leading position should aggressively cannibalize their own current advantages with next generation advantages before competitors step in to steal the market given the pace of technological and other types of change such strategy often requires creating next generation advantages while the current advantages are still profitable that is trading current profits for future market leadership we capture the tradeoff between a market leader s willingness to reap profits with its current set of advantages and its desire to maintain market leadership by investing in the next generation using a competitive model that determines the equilibrium launch time of a next generation advantage we find that in absence of lower launch costs for an

regional versus multilateral trade liberalization environmental taxation and welfare the paper considers trade between identical countries with imperfectly competitive markets and compares the impacts of regional and multilateral tariff reduction on strategic environmental taxation and welfare while both forms of trade liberalization increase production and consumption in tariff reducing countries regionalism also reduces production in a non participating country and may decrease its consumption consequently regionalism and multilateralism change pollution tax and welfare in the tariff reducing countries in similar ways when pollution is local but in dissimilar ways for global pollution when pollution is global regionalism is likely to be preferred to multilateralism for the establishment of free trade among countries liberalisation du commerce regional versus celle du commerce multilateral fiscalite environnementale et bien etre ce memoire considere le commerce entre des pays identiques avec des marches de concurrence imparfaite et compare les impacts d une reduction regionale et multilaterale de tarifs sur la fiscalite environnementale strategique et le bien etre meme si les deux formes de liberalisation accroissent la production et la consommation dans les pays qui reduisent les tarifs le regionalisme reduit aussi la production dans un pays non participant et peut reduire sa consommation consequemment regionalisme et multilateralisme changent la taxe sur la pollution et le bien etre dans les pays qui reduisent leur tarif d une maniere similaire quand la pollution est locale mais de maniere dissimilaire quand la pollution est globale quand la pollution est globale le regionalisme est susceptible d etre prefere au multilateralisme pour l etablissement du libre commerce entre pays

on the costs of food price fluctuations in low income countries abstract conventional welfare measures of the costs of food price fluctuations in low income countries are extended to allow for both economic growth and food security effects the analysis reveals that growth and food security effects may dominate more conventional welfare costs of food price fluctuations although estimating the empirical magnitude of the effects is hampered by the lack of consensus on the extent to which food price fluctuations actually reduce economic growth and food security even if the welfare costs of food price fluctuations are high there are many challenges to the design and successful implementation of price stabilization schemes

cross border externalities and trade liberalization the strategic control of pollution the authors examine international trade in a commodity whose production creates a negative externality for the importing country and they consider the nations strategic policy choices when they can restrict trade and when they are bound by a free trade agreement when pollution abatement technology is available the exporting country induces its adoption despite national indifference to the externality in order to reduce the tariff in a free trade agreement environmental policy is used to exploit monopoly power in trade an alternative policy instrument a process standard is introduced national competition in controlling emissions leads to very restrictive antipollution measures we examine international trade in a commodity whose production creates a negative externality for the importing country and we consider the nations strategic policy choices when they can restrict trade and when they are bound by a free trade agreement when pollution abatement technology is available the exporting country induces its adoption despite national indifference to the externality in order to reduce the tariff in a free trade agreement environmental policy is used to exploit monopoly power in trade an alternative policy instrument a process standard is introduced national competition in controlling emissions leads to very restrictive anti pollution measures

behavioral foundations of microcredit experimental and survey evidence from rural india microcredit is an innovative financial tool designed to reduce poverty and fix credit market imperfections we use experimental measures of time discounting and risk aversion for villagers in south india to highlight behavioral features of microcredit conditional on borrowing from any source women with present biased preferences are more likely than others to borrow through microcredit institutions microcredit contracts require loan repayments in regular fixed installments and they harness peer pressure to encourage discipline these innovations mirror mechanisms highlighted in behavioral approaches to saving suggesting that microcredit s popularity stems partly from modes of encouragement and self discipline absent in typical lending mechanisms

risk sharing commitment and information an experimental analysis this paper describes and analyzes the results of a unique field experiment especially designed to test the eects of the level of commitment and information available to individuals when sharing risk we find that limiting exogenously provided commitment is associated with less risk sharing while limiting information on defections can be associated with more risk sharing these results can be understood by distinguishing between intrinsic and extrinsic incentives and by recognizing that social sanctions are costly to inflict or that individuals suer from time inconsistent preferences comparing the groups formed within our experiment with the real life risk sharing networks in a few villages allows us to test the external validity of our experiment and suggests that the results are salient to our understanding of risk sharing arrangements observed in developing countries jel classification numbers c93 d71 d81 o12

risk and insurance in village india comment the protection of poor households in high risk agrarian economies from shocks to their incomes has often been seen as a compelling motive for various forms of policy intervention including transfers of cash or food credit subsidies and public employment schemes for a survey see lipton and ravallion 1995 the desirability of such safety net policies clearly depends on how well pre existing risk sharing arrangements work while it is commonly thought that without effective policy intervention rural households are vulnerable to village wide shocks such as adverse prices or poor rains it is less clear to what extent risk sharing institutions within the village mitigate the effects of idiosyncratic income risk stemming for instance from ill health or localized crop damage 2 several recent papers have used household level data to implement tests of risk sharing that might inform such concerns 3 these tests are based on the proposition that with perfect risk sharing consumption at the household level should be insured against idiosyncratic risks and thus depend solely on the realization of the aggregate risk wilson 1968 diamond 1967 townsend 1994 tests this implication of perfect intra village risk sharing using longitudinal household data on consumptions and incomes for three villages in india he reports that the full insurance hypothesis provides a surprisingly good benchmark in that household consumptions co move and do not appear to be much influenced by contemporaneous own income our aim here is to examine the robustness of this potentially important finding we have two main concerns the first is that the specification townsend adopts potentially biases his test towards the null hypothesis of full insurance because it yields inconsistent estimates of the key test parameter under a plausible alternative we therefore estimate a different specification that generates consistent estimates under both the null and the alternative our second concern is that a particular form of measurement error in the consumption data townsend uses may have further biased his results toward the null hypothesis of full insurance to address this concern we use an instrumental variables procedure when we implement the test of consumption insurance with townsend s consumption data we also re estimate the test equations with a measure of consumption derived from the same underlying primary data by an alternate method finally townsend reports 1discussions with robert townsend stimulated our interest in this investigation the staff of the

migration risk and liquidity constraints in el salvador abstract this article utilizes panel data from el salvador to investigate the use of transnational migration as an ex post risk management strategy i show that adverse agricultural conditions in el salvador increase both migration to the united states and remittances sent back to el salvador i show that in the absence of any agricultural shocks the probability that a household sent members to the united states would have decreased on average by 24 26 i also show that the 2001 earthquakes reduced net migration to the united states a one standard deviation increase in earthquake damage reduced the average probability of northward migration by 37 11 the evidence suggests that the effects of the earthquakes had more to do with households retaining labor at home to cope with the effects of the disaster than with the earthquakes disrupting migration financing

charitable bequests and taxes on inheritances and estates aggregate evidence from across states and time this paper examines the impact of wealth transfer taxes on charitable bequests we exploit the fact that federal and state taxes on estates and inheritances vary over time states and real wealth levels the effects of taxes are estimated using pooled cross sectional data spanning several decades based on aggregated information from federal estate tax returns under several different specifications we find evidence of a strong incentive effect of estate and inheritance taxes on charitable bequests

risk attitudes and economic well being in latin america abstract a common conjecture in both the theoretical and policy literatures on development is that people remain poor because they are too impatient and risk averse to accumulate the resources needed to improve their well being the empirical literature however suggests that this conjecture is far from proven we sample more than 3000 participants drawn representatively from six latin american cities and find little correlation between baseline risk aversion and well being measured as an index of eight outcomes we do however find that measures of ambiguity aversion loss aversion and the willingness to take advantage of a risk pooling scheme all correlate with well being participants who are ambiguity averse loss averse and who react conservatively in the risk pooling condition all have significantly lower scores on our well being index these results are robust to the inclusion of a variety of important controls like human capital accumulation and access to credit

credit constraints job mobility and entrepreneurship evidence from a property reform in china this paper provides new evidence on the impact of private property rights on entrepreneurship i explore this issue in the context of a housing reform in urban china that allowed state employees renting state owned housing the opportunity to buy their homes at subsidized prices using the reform as an exogenous change in the capital constraints and mobility costs that inuence individuals entry

behind the market stage where real societies exist part i the role of public and private order institutions this two part article is an attempt to clarify the social conditions upon which the viability and efficiency of the market system rest it strives to show that the embeddedness thesis that is an explanation based upon the existence of long run personal ties involving the use of reputation mechanisms among transactors cannot fully elucidate the question as to how the problem of trust is solved in market societies as explained in part i there are difficulties of both theoretical and empirical historical kinds and these explain why the market order needs to be sustained by private and public order institutions in part ii the role of generalised morality in backing or supplementing such institutions is discussed in the light of game theory and particular emphasis is put on the ability of moral norms to sustain honest behaviour by generating the right kind of preferences and establishing trust the vexed problem of the dynamics of norm emergence and erosion is then addressed with a view to showing

inequality reciprocity and credit in social networks while informal insurance and social networks are important in all societies networks are critical in rural areas of developing countries townsend 1994 was one of the first to document the importance of risk sharing within villages more recently theorists have begun to model sharing as taking place within a network rather than within the village as a whole bramoulle and kranton 2007 bloch genicot and ray 2008 ambrus mobius and szeidl 2010 empirical studies have also shown the importance of risk sharing within social networks rosenzweig 1988 udry 1994 de weerdt and dercon 2006 given this local nature of risksharing within networks it is important to analyze who forms links with whom and the types of relationships formed the effects of development policies will depend on the operation of social networks and the features that cause individuals to form links research on the determinants of risk sharing links has found contradictory results experimental studies such as attanasio et al 2009 find that risk sharing groups are assortative on consumption survey based evidence such as de weerdt 2004 and fafchamps and gubert 2007 find laura schechter is an assistant professor of economics at michigan state university alex yuskavage is a financial economist in the office of tax analysis at the u s treasury schechter thanks the wisconsin alumni research foundation the russell sage foundation and the delta foundation for funding we are grateful to idelin molinas and instituto desarrollo for their support in paraguay jennifer alix garcia joachim de weerdt garance genicot paul niehaus mark rosenzweig and guanming shi gave helpful comments

dynamic capabilities what are they this paper focuses on dynamic capabilities and more generally the resource based view of the firm we argue that dynamic capabilities are a set of specific and identifiable processes such as product development strategic decision making and alliancing they are neither vague nor tautological although dynamic capabilities are idiosyncratic in their details and path dependent in their emergence they have significant commonalities across firms popularly termed best practice this suggests that they are more homogeneous fungible equifinal and substitutable than is usually assumed in moderately dynamic markets dynamic capabilities resemble the traditional conception of routines they are detailed analytic stable processes with predictable outcomes in contrast in high velocity markets they are simple highly experiential and fragile processes with unpredictable outcomes finally well known learning mechanisms guide the evolution of dynamic capabilities in moderately dynamic markets the evolutionary emphasis is on variation in high velocity markets it is on selection at the level of rbv we conclude that traditional rbv misidentifies the locus of long term competitive advantage in dynamic markets overemphasizes the strategic logic of leverage and reaches a boundary condition in high velocity markets copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

a two season agricultural household model of output and price uncertainty abstract this paper presents a two season model of a household s production consumption labor supply and storage decisions in an environment of output and price risk the analytical results in this study are markedly different from those of models prevalent in the mainstream of the agricultural household literature the empirical analysis that uses panel data from a village in india provides support for the theoretical results and underscores the seasonal dimension of the farmers choice problems the results also show that ignoring risk or risk averse preferences may introduce substantial downward bias in optimal response estimates

climate and international trade policies when emissions affect production possibilities abstract in this paper we develop a model of international trade and climate change in which emission discharges arising from production have a feedback effect on national production sectors by impacting upon effective factor endowments with this context the objectives are first to provide a general characterization of pareto efficient climate and trade policies and second to examine the possibility starting from non pareto efficient equilibria for pareto improving environmental policies we provide conditions under which several particular reforms of carbon taxes are welfare improving

trade spatial separation and the environment we develop a simple two sector dynamic model to show how pollution can provide a motive for trade by spatially separating incompatible industries we assume that the production of smokestack manufactures generates pollution which lowers the prod uctivity of an environmentally sensitive sector farming two identical unregulated countries will gain from trade if the share of world income spent on smokestack goods is high in contrast when the share of world income spent on the dirty good is low trade can usher in a negatively reinforcing process of environmental degradation and real income loss for the exporter of smokestack goods 1999 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

choice under uncertainty evidence from ethiopia india and uganda we review experimental evidence collected from risky choice experiments using poor subjects in ethiopia india and uganda using these data we estimate that just over 50 of our sample behaves in accordance with expected utility theory and that the rest subjectively weight probability according to prospect theory our results show that inferences about risk aversion are robust to whichever model we adopt when we estimate each model separately however when we allow both models to explain portions of the data simultaneously we infer risk aversion for subjects behaving according to expected utility theory and risk seeking behaviour for subjects behaving according to prospect theory

group formation in risk sharing arrangements we study informal insurance within communities explicitly recognizing the possibility that subgroups of individuals may destabilize insurance arrangements among the larger group we therefore consider self enforcing risk sharing agreements that are robust not only to single person deviations but also to potential deviations by subgroups however such deviations must be credible in the sense that the subgroup must pass exactly the same test that we apply to the entire group it must itself employ some self enforcing risk sharing agreement we observe that the stability of subgroups is inimical to the stability of the group as a whole two surprising consequences of this analysis are that stable groups have uniformly bounded size a result in sharp contrast to the individual deviation problem and that the degree of risk sharing in a community is generally non monotonic in the level of uncertainty or need for insurance in the community

directed giving evidence from an inter household transfer experiment abstract we investigate the determinants of giving in a lab in the field experiment with large stakes study participants in urban mozambique play dictator games where their counterpart is the closest person to them outside their household when given the option dictators do a large fraction of giving in kind in the form of goods rather than cash in addition they share more in total when they have the option of giving in kind compared to giving that can only be in cash qualitative post experiment responses suggest that this effect is driven by a desire to control how recipients use gifted resources standard economic determinants such as the rate of return to giving and the size of the endowment also affect giving but the effects of even large changes in these determinants are significantly smaller than the effect of the in kind option our results support theories of giving where the utility of givers depends on the composition not just the level of gift recipient expenditures and givers thus seek control over transferred resources

female migration for marriage implications from the land reform in rural tanzania summary using the longitudinal household panel data drawn from rural tanzania 1991 2004 this study investigates impacts of the land reform on women s marriage motivated relocation during the period under study several villages that initially banned a widow s land inheritance abolished this discrimination taking a differences in differences approach this study finds that the probability of males marrying in a village increased by altering its customary land inheritance rule in favor of widows in the light of the traditional system favoring exogamous and patrilocal marriage this finding indicates that females relocate at marriage in response to the favorable land tenure system at the destination

a dark side of social capital kinship consumption and savings abstract we explore whether traditional sharing norms in kinship networks affect consumption and accumulation decisions of poor black households in kwazulu natal south africa using a proxy for the number of family dependents our results are consistent with the interpretation that households try to evade their sharing obligations by i accumulating durables that are non sharable at the expense of durables that may be shared and ii reducing savings in liquid assets by attenuating accumulation incentives kinship sharing may come at the expense of income growth if so a culturally induced poverty trap can possibly eventuate we demonstrate tentative evidence that more extensive kinship networks are associated with lower incomes

theft gift giving and trustworthiness honesty is its own reward in rural paraguay in developing countries lacking legal enforcement villagers may use implicit contracts to minimize crime i construct a dynamic limited commitment model in which a thief cannot commit to forego stealing but is induced to steal less by the promise of future gifts combining survey data on production theft gifts and trust with experiments measuring trustworthiness i provide supporting evidence farmers living near more relatives or with plots that are difficult to steal from give fewer gifts and trust more and those living near more relatives also experience less theft giving increases when trust is lower and the threat of theft is greater

a behavioral resource based view of the firm the synergy of cyert and march 1963 and penrose 1959 cyert and march s 1963 seminal behavioral theory is one of the two major economics based theories of the firm that goes inside the black box the firm the other being the contribution of edith penrose the two theories have differences but also similarities and substantial scope for cross fertilization that has gone unnoticed in the literature in this paper we try to integrate important ideas from both books paying particular attention to the issue of excess resources slack and intrafirm conflict we then build on the integrated framework by delving into the nature of intrafirm conflict and its relationship to the degree of intrafirm rivalry as they may impact the possible use of slack by firms we derive propositions common to the two theories and new ones of importance to our understanding of organizational growth and change

demand for insurance and within kin group marriages evidence from a west african country abstract we ask whether parents have incentives to marry their children to a member of the kin group in order to better insure against adverse idiosyncratic income shocks exploiting original panel data from a household survey collected in senegal in 2006 2007 and 2011 2012 we find that daughters within kin group marriage helps their parents household to better smooth food consumption when a parent has fallen ill this better smoothing is notably driven by the fact that households having married a daughter within the kin group receive relatively more transfers our results indicate that parents demand for insurance can explain part of their demand for marrying within the kin group their daughter and extend the literature on inter linkages between marriage decisions and demand for insurance

letting the market work for you an evolutionary perspective on product strategy managers must choose to allocate scarce resources either to the maintenance of a range of products tailored to heterogeneous consumer preferences or to the efficient production of a small number of products in addition managers must choose the degree to which they periodically cull the product line vigorous selection removes poor performers from the product line but this action simultaneously impairs the firm s ability to monitor changes in consumer preferences empirical evidence from the computer workstation industry reveals that the ideal choice of product variety depends on the competitive ecology of the industry product variety becomes less valuable as the total number of products on the market increases but it increases in value as uncertainty makes the accurate prediction of demand difficult copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

risk sharing and information in village economies arrangements for achieving efficient risk sharing vary depending on the information available to agents in the economy the usual euler equation restricts efficient allocations in an economy which obeys the permanent income hypothesis while efficient allocations in an economy with private information and long term contracts satisfy a symmetric restriction but not the euler equation full insurance arrangements are unique in that they satisfy both restrictions we look at an environment in which it seems likely that long term contracts play a role in mitigating the effects of private information three village economies in south india the evidence that consumption allocations satisfy the private information restriction is quite strong for households in two of the three villages the evidence for the third village suggests that while consumption for some households satisfies the private information restrictions other households consumption obey the permanent income hypothesis

collective agricultural production a solution for transition economies abstract the paper examines theoretical reasons and provides examples for productivity differences between agricultural service cooperatives and collectives service cooperatives can utilize economies of scale enhance competitiveness and provide technical information advantages that often outweighed problems of free riding low investment and excessive political intervention agricultural collectives while not adding substantial advantages are in addition associated with problems of supervision and effort supply tendencies to substitute casual workers or mechanization for regular members and low investment incentives while collective forms of organization in transition economies respond to high risk and market imperfections they do so inefficiently policies that create conditions for service cooperatives to compete may lead to large productivity gains

behavioral equilibrium in economies with adverse selection i propose a new solution concept behavioral equilibrium to study environments with players who are naive in the sense that they fail to account for the informational content of other players actions a behavioral equilibrium requires that i players have no incentives to deviate given their beliefs about the consequences of deviating ii these beliefs are consistent with the information obtained from the actual equilibrium play of all players and iii when processing this information naive players fail to account for the correlation between other players actions and their own payouncertainty i apply the framework to certain adverse selection settings and show that contrary to the received literature the adverse selection problem is exacerbated when naive players fail to account for selection more generally the main distinguishing feature of the framework is that in equilibrium beliefs about both fundamentals and strategies are jointly restricted consequently whether a bias may arise or not is determined endogenously in equilibrium jel c72 d82 a large literature presents evidence that psychological and cognitive biases aect people s be havior this evidence raises some questions what are the eects of these biases and can they persist at all in economic settings where people strategically interact with each other and have the opportunity to learn from their experience 1 in this paper i introduce a game theoretic equilibrium framework to study these questions in the context of a particular bias people s failure to take into account the informational content of other people s actions i apply the framework to a class of games that arises naturally in adverse selection settings and then show that the adverse selection

pollution content tariffs environmental rent shifting and the control of cross border pollution this paper considers the optimal unilateral policy for a country that imports a good from a neighbouring country and is harmed by pollution generated during the production of that good if the foreign country has a variable abatement technology then home has an incentive to impose a tax on the pollution content of imports a pollution content tariff foreign regulation of pollution does not eliminate home s incentives to intervene but instead may create rent shifting opportunities by making the right to pollute a scarce asset foreign pollution quotas create rents that the home government can try to extract

transboundary pollution and the gains from trade we analyse the effects of transboundary pollution on trade patterns and welfare in a general equilibrium trade model production in a dirty industry generates pollution that negatively effects productivity both at home and abroad in a clean industry trade may lead to the spatial separation of production but the existence of transboundary pollution can offset the benefits from specialization we present a general model in which the effects of a country s pollution is country specific we analyse particular cases that correspond to an acid rain problem and a problem in which one country has a cleaner technology than the other we also present some results for small open economies to examine the effects of transboundary pollution in the absence of terms of trade effects

an exogeneity test for a simultaneous equation tobit model with an application to labor supply a test of weak exogeneity in the simultaneous equation tobit model is proposed and illustrated using a female labour supply model estimated using cross section data the test statistic can be simply output from any standard tobit maximum likelihood package and is asymptotically efficient the procedure provides consistent estimators for the simultaneous tobit model whose asymptotic covariance matrix is a simple extension of the usual tobit formula we also provide the lagrange multiplier test of weak exogeneity this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

imperfect commitment altruism and the family evidence from transfer behavior in low income rural areas in this paper we examine empirically whether risk pooling is more advantageous among altruistic compared to selfish agents in a framework where individuals cannot make binding commitments in particular we incorporate altuism into a model of risk sharing under imperfect commitment and use simulation methods to establish tests of the roles of both altruism and commitment problems in determining the extent of insurance and the intertemporal movements in interhousehold transfers the tests are carried out using three panel data sets from two countries of rural south asia that provide detailed information on transfers and enable the measurement of income shocks the estimates provide strong support for the notion that imperfect commitment substantially constrains informal transfer arrangements whether kin based or not but also provide evidence that altruism plays an important role in ameliorating commitment constraints and thus in increasing the gains from income pooling

lab and life does risky choice behaviour observed in experiments reflect that in the real world risk preferences play a crucial role in a great variety of economic decisions measuring risk preferences reliably is therefore an important challenge in this paper we ask the question whether risk preferences observed in economic experiments reflect real life risky choice behaviour we investigate in a sample representative for a rural region of eastern uganda whether pursuing farming strategies with both a higher expected profit and greater variance of profits is associated with willingness to take risks in an experiment controlling for other determinants of risk taking in agriculture we find that risky choice behaviour in the experiment is correlated with risky choice behaviour in real life in one domain i e the purchase of fertiliser but not in other domains i e the growing of cash crops and market orientation more broadly our findings suggest that economic experiments may be good at capturing real world risky choice behaviour that is narrowly bracketed