efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

put call parity and arbitrage bounds for options on grain futures many arbitrage opportunities have become available for market participants since the inception of trading in options central to many of these is the put call parity relationship if this condition is violated arbitrage profits could be earned this paper examines arbitrage possibilities between put and call options on grain futures using two different tests one is a test of market efficiency over the duration of trading and the other evaluates arbitrage bounds on individual trading days in general the results suggest that the options markets on grain futures are not completely efficient however violations varied substantially across contracts and through time

simple contracts renegotiation under asymmetric information and the hold up problem abstract in this article it is demonstrated that voluntary bargaining over a collective decision under asymmetric information may well lead to ex post efficiency if the default decision is non trivial it is argued that the default decision may be interpreted as a simple contract that the parties have written ex ante this result is used in order to show that simple unconditional contracts which are renegotiated may allow the hold up problem to be solved even if the parties valuations are private information

externalities and asymmetric information a reconsideration of the pigovian theory of regulating externalities via taxation is undertaken for environments with private information the presence of private information may have no effect on the social optimum but when it has an impact it is to cause a group of different agents to share the same production or consumption levels the model developed provides an appealing characterization of when such situations transpire they occur when the individuals who desire most to engage in some activity are the ones who society least wants to participate since such instances could potentially be regulated by the imposition of quantity controls this may explain authorities apparent predilection for quantity limits rather than tax cum subsidy schemes to manage many externalities

input demand under yield and revenue insurance previous studies disagree on the effects of insurance on fertilizer application rates the effect of increased fertilizer on the probability of low yields primarily determines whether fertilizer and insurance are substitutes or complements we estimate conditional distributions of corn yields to determine if the technical relationship between yields and fertilizer supports the hypothesis that insurance increases optimal application rates our results indicate no support for this hypothesis at all nitrogen fertilizer rates and reasonable levels of risk aversion nitrogen fertilizer and insurance are substitutes suggesting that those who purchase insurance are likely to decrease nitrogen fertilizer applications

pollution claim settlements under private information abstract the classical problem of resolving a nuisance dispute between a pollution generating firm and nearby residents is modelled here as a mechanism design problem we assume that the designer of the mechanism is the firm that it is uncertain about the actual losses suffered by residents and that the initial assignment of property rights is one where each resident is entitled to prevail we derive a profitmaximizing scheme under the individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints and examine its properties it is shown that the outcomes it yields are sometimes inefficient moreover when many residents are affected by pollution and the degree of uncertainty with respect to the losses they suffer is large these inefficiencies become rampant

conflict and the social contract we consider social contracts for resolving conflicts between two agents who are uncertain about each other s fighting potential applications include international conflict litigation and elections even though only a peaceful agreement avoids a loss of resources if this loss is small enough then any contract must assign a positive probability of conflict we show how the likelihood of conflict outbreak depends on the distribution of power between the agents and their information about each other

pollution claim settlements reconsidered hidden information and bounded payments abstract a principal s production decision imposes a negative externality on an agent the principal may be a pollution generating firm the agent may be a nearby town the principal offers a contract to the agent who has the right to be free of pollution then the agent privately learns the disutility of pollution finally a production level and a transfer payment are implemented suppose there is an upper bound possibly zero on payments that the agent can make to the principal in the second best solution there is underproduction for low cost types while there is overproduction for high cost types in contrast to standard adverse selection models of pollution claim settlements there may thus be too much pollution compared to the first best solution

refinancing and decentralization evidence from china abstract decentralization can complement market liberalization by strengthening incentives of agents to respond to market signals however in china banks centralized lending authority following financial reforms in the mid 1990s we present a new theory of financial decentralization in which centralization provides a credible commitment not to refinance bad projects by reducing available information using data from chinese rural financial institutions we empirically assess the determinants of decentralization and the likelihood of collateral seizure strongly confirming the predictions of the refinancing model we conclude that weak institutional environments may limit the efficiency of financial intermediation despite financial market liberalization

the econometrics of damage control why specification matters the contribution of damage control agents to production differs fundamentally from that of standard inputs lands labor capital this paper develops an econometric model based on the key characteristics of damage control agents and examines its properties it demonstrates that standard production function specifications overestimate damage control agent productivity and have erroneous implications for the evolution of damage control agent productivity and use in response to changing environments e g the spread of pest resistance it also proposes several alternative specifications and discusses methods for estimating them

the price of advice we develop a model of consulting advising where the role of the consultant is to reveal signals to her client that refine the client s original private estimate of the profitability of a project although the client can perfectly observe and evaluate these signals the consultant may only be able to do the same imperfectly or not at all this captures the idea that the expert may not fully understand the impact of her advice on the client we characterize the optimal contract between the consultant and her client it is a menu consisting of pairs of transfers specifying payments between the two parties in case the project is undertaken by the client and in case it is not the main result of the article is that in the optimal mechanism the consultant obtains the same profit as though she could perfectly observe and evaluate the impact of the signals whose release she controls on the client s profit estimate

communication in federal politics universalism policy uniformity and the optimal allocation of fiscal authority the paper presents a positive model of policy formation in federal legislatures when delegates engage in the strategic exchange of policy relevant information depending on the type of policy under consideration communication between delegates generally suffers from a bias that makes truthful communication difficult and sometimes impossible this generates inefficient federal policy choices that are often endogenously characterized by overspending universalism and uniformity building on these findings i develop a theory of fiscal de centralization which revisits the work of oates in a world of incomplete information and strategic communication empirical results from a cross section of us municipalities are consistent with the predicted pattern of spending

insurance moral hazard and chemical use in agriculture this paper examines how crop insurance affects corn farmers fertilizer and pesticide use in the u s midwest crop insurance might be expected to affect chemical use because of moral hazard insured farmers may undertake riskier production than do uninsured farmers results suggest that insurance exerts considerable influence on corn farmers chemical use decisions those purchasing insurance applied significantly more nitrogen per acre 19 spent more on pesticides 21 and treated more acreage with both herbicides and insecticides 7 and 63 than did those not purchasing insurance these results suggest that both fertilizer and pesticides may be risk increasing inputs

is public r d a complement or substitute for private r d a review of the econometric evidence is public r d spending complementary and thus additional to private r d spending or does it substitute for and tend to crowd out private r d conflicting answers are given to this question we survey the body of available econometric evidence accumulated over the past 35 years a framework for analysis of the problem is developed to help organize and summarize the findings of econometric studies based on time series and cross section data from various levels of aggregation laboratory firm industry country the findings overall are ambivalent and the existing literature as a whole is subject to the criticism that the nature of the experiment s that the investigators envisage is not adequately specified we conclude by offering suggestions for improving future empirical research on this issue

r d and subsidies at the firm level an application of parametric and semi parametric two step selection models this paper analyzes the effects of public r d subsidies on r d expenditure in the german manufacturing sector the focus is on the question whether public r d funding stimulates or crowds out private investment cross sectional data at the firm level is used by apllying parametric and semiparametric selection models it turns out that public funding increases firms r d expenditure altough the magnitude of the treatment effect depends on the assumpions imposed by the particular selection model

contract renegotiation a simple framework and implications for organization theory this paper provides a unifying framework for studying renegotiation of contracts in the presence of asymmetric information we show that interim renegotiation does not constrain the set of contracts attainable with full commitment regardless of whether renegotiation offers are made by the informed or the uninformed agent ex post renegotiation however does constrain the set of attainable contracts these constraints depend on the identity of the agent making the renegotiation offer we then show how the theory of contract renegotiation can provide insights for organization theory specifically we show how decentralization of decision making can be an optimal response to the threat of ex post renegotiation finally we show that our framework can be used to analyse the trade off between internal and external markets

on countervailing incentives abstract this paper extends and unifies previous work on optimal contracts under countervailing incentives shedding light in particular on the relation between countervailing incentives and pooling inflexible rules our main result is that the nature of the optimal contract depends crucially on whether the agent s utility is quasiconcave or quasiconvex in the private parameter the optimal contract is separated in the former case and it may entail pooling in the latter case journal of economic literature classification number d82

central governance or subsidiarity a property rights approach to federalism abstract we consider a model where one region in a federation can realize a public project after undertaking value increasing investments while negotiations on the federal level ensure that an efficient project size is implemented in equilibrium non contractibility of investments causes the overall outcome to differ across regimes if the region bears the entire implementation costs of its policies underinvestment prevails and subsidiarity centralized governance is superior when spillovers are weak strong conversely if linear cost sharing arrangements are feasible decentralized authority often admits a socially optimal outcome while centralized authority with majority or unanimity rule does not

government versus private ownership of public goods there has been a dramatic change in the division of responsibility between the state and the private sector for the delivery of public goods and services in recent years with an increasing trend toward contracting out to the private sector and public private partnerships this paper analyzes how ownership matters in public good provision we show that if contracts are incomplete then the ownership of a public good should lie with a party that values the beneets generated by it relatively more this is true regardless of whether this party is also the key investor or other aspects of the technology

impacts of federal crop insurance on land use and environmental quality this article integrates economic and biophysical models to assess how federal crop revenue insurance programs affect land use cropping systems and environmental quality in the u s corn belt region the empirical framework includes econometric models that predict land conversion and crop choices at the parcel level based on expectation and variance of crop revenues land quality climate conditions and physical characteristics at each site the predictions are then combined with site specific environmental production functions to determine the effect of revenue insurance on nitrate runoff and leaching soil water and wind erosion and carbon sequestration results suggest that federal crop insurance has on average a small effect on conversions of non cropland to cropland and somewhat more significant impacts on crop choice and crop rotation these changes in cropping systems have on average small impacts on agricultural pollution

crop insurance acreage decisions and nonpoint source pollution the redirection of farm policy in the 1996 farm bill has generated much interest in seeking environmentally friendly and economically viable ways to protect farm income agricultural insurance has been suggested as such an instrument this article estimates the effect of crop insurance on crop mix and the resulting change in chemical use in the central nebraska basin providing corn insurance will shift land from hay and pasture to corn which will increase chemical use at the extensive margin this extensive margin effect dominates the effect of crop insurance on the application rate leading to an increase in total chemical use

eliminating price supports a political economy perspective abstract this paper characterizes information and politically constrained government programs for eliminating price supports the issues which we examine in this model include i to what extent is it possible to reduce the size of oversubscribed industries in light of the information and political constraints that exist is a complete decoupling of a worker s compensation from her output possible or desirable ii which type of workers as characterized by their skill levels and outside employment opportunities remain in the industry iii which type of worker is harmed by the relocation program which coalitions of workers will oppose the reorganization

assessing the policy mix of public support to business r d abstract this paper investigates whether the effectiveness of public support to business r d increases or decreases when firms benefit from different support schemes data on the amount received by individual firms in the available support schemes in belgium over the period 2003 2011 are matched with other firm level data estimations of this panel of firms permit to account for the time dimension and selection mechanism in public support as well as for observed and unobserved firm heterogeneity results on the impact of public support appear to depend on the econometric specification and estimation procedure that is considered robust results indicate that the effectiveness of r d support decreases when firms benefit from different schemes at the same time especially when firms combine subsidies with several tax benefits

correlated information and mechanism design in models of asymmetric information possession of private information leads to rents for the possessors this induces mechanism designers to distort away from efficiency the authors show that this is an artifact of the presumption that information is independently distributed rent extraction in a large class of mechanism design games is analyzed and a necessary and sufficient condition for arbitrarily small rents to private information is provided additionally the two person bargaining game is shown to have an efficient solution under first order stochastic dominance and a hazard rate condition similar conditions allow full rent extraction in milgrom weber auctions

depressed demand for crop insurance contracts and a rationale based on third generation prospect theory when actuarially fair insurance for a major risk is available then standard economic theory posits that those subject to the risk should insure in agriculture it is common for producers to decline contract offers where presubsidy premiums just cover average losses and subsidies are substantial this paper seeks to shed light on why demand is curtailed in a mail survey of u s corn and soybean producers we solicited willingness to pay wtp for actuarially fair insurance at different coverage levels we find demand to be so low that median wtp is no larger than fair premium when adjusted down by current subsidy rates which pay for one half or more of most premium charges wtp as a share of the fair rate is especially low when risk of loss is high there is limited evidence that respondents appreciate the convex relationship between coverage level and expected indemnity payoff third generation prospect theory is shown to be consistent with observed findings in particular a strong distaste for paying premium can be rationalized by loss aversion furthermore when high revenue outcomes are more likely than not that is negative skewness then higher loss aversion greater decision weight distortions and greater risk aversion will decrease wtp

the relationship between federal contract r d and company r d according to recent estimates federal budget outlays for research and development rd this component will rise 28 percent and absorb 70 percent of all federal r d spending in 1984 compared to under 50 percent in 1980 since work corresponding to about one half of the dollar value of the federal r d program is generally performed by private industrial firms under contract with federal agencies the rapid increase in federal r d outlays will presumably be reflected in a similar increase in the value of commitments by industrial firms to perform government r d one of the most important economic questions posed by the large prospective increase in resources allocated to federal contract r d concerns its consequences for the economy s rate of technical progress of productivity growth in the next section i argue that the ultimate impact on productivity depends on how company decisions to finance r d are affected by the availability of federal contract r d funds i then provide a brief review and critique of previous studies of the relationship between companyand federalfinanced r d performed in industry and present new estimates which differ from existing ones with respect to both methodology and implications these estimates are consistent with the hypothesis that increases in federal r d activity tend to be associated with significant reductions in companyfinanced r d a number of studies have attempted to determine the ceteris paribus effects of company and federal r d on the rate of productivity growth p by estimating variants of the equation

decentralization externalities and efficiency in the competitive model externalities lead to inefficiencies and inefficiencies increase with the size of externalities however as argued by coase these problems may be mitigated in a decentralized system through voluntary coordination we show how coordination is limited by the combination of two factors respect for individual autonomy and the existence of private information together they imply that efficient outcomes can only be achieved through coordination when external effects are relatively large moreover there are instances in which coordination cannot yield any improvement at all despite common knowledge that social gains from agreement exist this occurs when external effects are relatively small and this may help to explain why coordination is so seldom observed in practice when improvements are possible we describe how simple subsidies can be used to implement second best solutions and explain why standard solutions such as pigovian taxes cannot be used possible extensions to issues arising in the structure of research joint ventures assumptions in the endogenous growth literature and the location of environmental hazards are also described

regulating nitrogen pollution with risk averse farmers under hidden information and moral hazard we consider a model of pollution regulation for a risk averse farmer involving hidden information moral hazard and risk sharing the representative farmer faces a production risk originating from nitrogen leaching and privately observes the soil capacity in retaining nitrogen only after the regulation contract is signed the latter specifies a transfer and a nitrogen quota whose decomposition by the farmer among different production stages is unknown to the regulator we first characterize the optimal solution to the regulator s problem the sequential decision model is estimated on french crop production data and the results are used to calibrate and simulate the optimal contract

do the effects of r d tax credits vary across industries a meta regression analysis this paper presents a survey of the micro econometric literature on the effects of r d tax credits on firms innovation activities we focus on one specific aspect that has not received sufficient attention in previous research the sectoral dimension our meta regression analysis mra sets up a new database collecting a large number of firm level studies on the effects of r d tax credits and investigates the factors that may explain differences in the estimated effects that are reported in the literature the main result of the mra analysis is indeed that sectors matter specifically the additionality effect of r d tax credits is on average stronger for smes firms in the service sectors and firms in low tech sectors in countries with an incremental scheme the paper proposes a simple framework to investigate why the innovation and economic effects of r d tax credits vary across sectors and points out new directions and hypotheses for future research

futures hedging under price basis and production risk we consider the hedging problem of a firm that has three sources of risk price basis and yield uncertainty an exact solution for the optimal futures hedge is derived under the assumption that the three random variables are jointly normally distributed and that utility is of the cara type unlike the mean variance approximation applied in previous research we show that the optimal hedge does depend on risk attitudes even when the agent perceives the futures price as being unbiased the theoretical results are applied empirically to the problem of hedging soybean production in iowa the exact solution relying on cara and normality is compared with numerical solutions under lognormal distributions and crra utility

assessing the effect of public subsidies on firm r d investment a survey this survey examines the empirical literature on the relationship between public r d subsidies and private r d investment over the past five decades the survey reveals a considerable heterogeneity of empirical results that cannot be explained fully by methodological issues we aim to provide further explanations of the possible causes of that heterogeneity in particular we emphasise a set of issues that in our view are critical to understanding the potential effect of public r d subsidies on private r d spending special attention is paid to the dynamic aspects and composition of firm r d the constraints faced by the firm such as financial constraints and the amount and source of public subsidies none of these issues have been investigated in depth we formulate a set of research assumptions to guide future empirical research in this field

countervailing incentives in agency problems abstract we analyze countervailing incentives in agency problem countervailing incentives exist when the agent has an incentive to understate his private information for some of its realizations and to overstate it for others when countervailing incentives arise pooling generally characterizes the equilibrium contract furthermore performance is distorted both above and below efficient levels in addition the agent s rents generally increase with the realization of his private information over some ranges and decrease over other ranges we demonstate that the creation of countervailing incentives can enhance aggregate welfare

asymmetric information bargaining problems with many agents a yes or no decision must be made about some issue all agents must agree the coase theorem asserts that the efficient outcome will always result suppose the value positive or negative that an individual attaches to an affirmative decision is privately known to that individual it is proved under very mild conditions that with independent types as the number of agents increases the probability of an affirmative efficient decision goes to zero an example in which it is common knowledge that an affirmative decision is efficient and yet the probability of such a decision goes to zero is given

coordination and externalities abstract we analyze the gains of coordinating decisions in a regulatory framework in which agents are sovereign and tax inducements are socially costly we consider a general multi agent situation with externalities among agents incomplete information and type dependent reservation utilities when the regulator optimally leaves informational rents to the most efficient agents centralized coordination reduces global activity coordination induces more activity when the principal optimally leaves rents to the most inefficient agents last if we impose budget balance our mechanism can also be interpreted as the optimal auction of a public good with congestion externalities journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d62 d82 l51

harmonization and side payments in political cooperation for two districts or countries that try to internalize externalities i analyze a bargaining game under private information i derive conditions for when it is efficient with uniform policies across regions with and without side payments and when it is efficient to prohibit side payments in the negotiations while policy differentiation and side payments allow the policy to better reflect local conditions they create conflicts between the regions and thus delay the results also describe when political centralization outperforms decentralized cooperation and they provide a theoretical foundation for the controversial uniformity assumption traditionally used by the fiscal federalism literature

estimating the benefits of targeted r d subsidies we study the expected welfare effects of targeted r d subsi dies using project level data from finland we model the application and r d investment decisions of firms and the subsidy granting decision of the public agency in charge of the program our model and institutional environment allow us to identify different benefits and costs of the r d subsidy program we find that expected effects of subsidies are very het erogeneous and estimated application costs low on average the social rate of return on targeted subsidies is 30 to 50 but spillover effects of subsidies are smaller than effects on firm profits

ex post moral hazard in prevented planting this article analyzes the existence of moral hazard in prevented planting pp in the united states the pp provision is defined as the failure to plant an insured crop by the final planting date due to adverse events if the farmer decides not to plant a crop the farmer receives a pp indemnity late planting lp is an option for farmers to plant a crop while maintaining crop insurance after the final planting date crop insurance may alter farmers behavior in selecting pp or lp and could increase the likelihood of pp claims even though farmers can choose lp this study finds evidence that a farmer with higher insurance coverage tends to choose pp more often ex post moral hazard spatial panel models attest to the existence of the ex post moral hazard in pp empirically empirical results show that the pp ratio has a positive relationship with insurance coverage in the case of corn production

demand side vs supply side technology policies hidden treatment and new empirical evidence on the policy mix this paper provides new empirical evidence about the impact of various technological policies upon firms innovative behaviour we take into consideration the role of policies for innovative activities and we focus on their interaction while supply side policies such as r d subsidies and tax credits have been both extensively discussed in the literature and empirically investigated the analysis of innovative public procurement is a growing trend in the literature which still lacks robust empirical evidence in this paper we replicate the existing results on supply side policies surmise fresh empirical evidence on the outcome of innovative public procurement and address the issue of possible interaction among the various tools when controlling for the interaction with other policies supply side subsidies cease to be as effective as reported in previous studies and innovative public procurement seems to be more effective than other tools the preliminary evidence suggests that technology policies exert the highest impact when different policies interact

full extraction of the surplus in bayesian and dominant strategy auctions we consider auctions for a single indivisible object in the case where the bidders have information about each other which is not available to the seller we show that the seller can use this information to his own benefit and we completely characterize the environ ments in which a well chosen auction gives him the same expected payoff as that obtainable were he able to sell the object with full information about each bidder s willingness to pay we provide this characterization for auctions in which the bidders have dominant strate gies and for those where the relevant equilibrium concept is bayesian nash in both set ups the existence of these auctions hinges on the possibility of constructing lotteries with the correct properties we consider the situation in which an agent the seller possesses one indivisible unit of a good to which he attaches no value but the good has value to a number of potential buyers and its transfer to one of them would increase social welfare in particular the transfer to the buyer with the highest valuation maximizes social welfare in this paper we completely characterize environments in which the seller can design an auction that will enable him to capture for himself the full increase in social welfare induced by the transfer of the good to the bidder with the highest willingness to pay if the seller had full information about the reservation prices of potential buyers his optimal selling strategy would be very simple he would announce a price equal or very close to the highest reservation value the optimal strategy for the bidder with the highest evaluation would be to accept the offer note that we are treating a situation in which the seller can commit himself to a price as a result of the exchange the utility of the seller increases by the full amount of the increase in social welfare and he has been able to fully extract the surplus in many circumstances however a seller has only imperfect knowledge of the buyers willingnesses to pay in this case he must find some mechanism or auction which will enable him to maximize his benefit from the sale of the object the auction literature starts with this observation and shows how the seller can by an astute choice of auction extract the largest possible fraction of the surplus in general the literature has shown that this proportion is strictly less than one in some circumstances the bidders will have information about each other which is not available to the seller for instance in auctions for petroleum drilling rights bidders know the results of geological tests which they have

local pollution in federal systems it is widely accepted that decentralized control of local pollution is inefficient if the central and the local authorities are imperfectly informed this paper shows how the central authority can introduce a flexible grant in aid system that induces the local authority to use a weighted combination of local and central information when the local authority suffers from confirmatory bias if the central authority is highly uncertain about the environmental effects of a specific pollutant the tax subsidy scheme can be designed to allow local information to play an essential role in the environmental policy if the central authority is certain that a pollutant must not exceed a specific limit the tax subsidy scheme can be designed to allow local information little influence on the environmental policy

the effectiveness of r d subsidies a meta regression analysis of the evaluation literature widespread and increasing public subsidy for research and development r d has given rise to a large and growing number of evaluation studies while economic theory identifies market failures that justify public support theory also suggests reasons why returns might be disappointing similarly the empirical literature investigated 52 micro level studies published since 2000 on either input or output r d reports a wide range of findings the lack of conclusiveness both of theory and of the evaluation literature motivate this meta regression analysis mra this study contributes to policy debate by identifying a representative subsidy effect after controlling for publication selection bias and for a wide range of sample and study heterogeneities mra findings reject crowding out of private investment by public subsidy but reveal no evidence of substantial additionality in addition among the research practices explaining the heterogeneous effects reported in this literature those related to the treatment of unobservable firm heterogeneity are particularly important