on the existence of markov consistent plans under production uncertainty strotz 1956 and pollak 1968 were among the first to study the behaviour of an economic agent whose preferences change over time they suggested that such an agent would choose a consistent plan which they described as the best plan that he would actually follow a markov consistent plan has a particularly simple structure current decisions are independent of past decisions except insofar as past decisions affect the current values of state variables unfortunately markov consistent plans do not generally exist in this paper we demonstrate that the existence problem dissappears for finite horizon problems when one introduces even a small amount of smooth uncertainty into production

banking panics information and rational expectations equilibrium this paper shows that bank runs can be modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon we demonstrate that some aspects of the intuitive story that bank runs start with fears of insolvency of banks can be rigorously modeled if individuals observe long lines at the bank they correctly infer that there is a possibility that the bank is about to fail and precipitate a bank run however bank runs occur even when no one has any adverse information extra market constraints such as suspension of convertibility can prevent bank runs and result in superior allocations banking panics were a recurrent phenomenon in the united states until the 1930s they have re emerged as a source of public concern and much theoretical research recently in this paper we provide an information theoretic rationale for bank runs the traditional story is that contagion is an important aspect of bank runs the idea seems to be that when the general public observes large withdrawals from the banking system fears of insolvency grow resulting in even larger withdrawals of deposits in our model some individuals withdraw because they get information that future returns are likely to be low uninformed individuals observing this also have an incentive to liquidate their investments in addition some individuals need to withdraw deposits for other than informationally based reasons thus if the random realization of such a group of individuals is unusually large then the uninformed individuals will be misled and will precipitate a run on the bank the technology is such that a large volume of withdrawals involves liquidation costs consequently runs on the bank do impose social costs a mechanism that may reduce these costs in our model is to suspend convertibility if withdrawals are high however those individuals who need to withdraw their assets for liquidity reasons are worse off ex post our model provides a rationalization for restrictions in demand deposits that were widespread prior to 1929 friedman and schwartz 7 suggest that restrictions of payments ensured

corruption and government size a disaggregated analysis using annual state level data over 1983 1987 this paper examines the effect of government size on corruption by public officials by including both demand and supply side incentives for engaging in corrupt practices our objectives are twofold first we assess the relationship between the incidence of corruption and overall measures of the size of the federal government and the state local sector in each state second we explore what kinds of government activities are more likely to be successful in deterring abuse of public office our results are generally supportive of becker s crime and punishment model regarding the primary focus of the paper our results show that government size in particular spending by state governments does indeed have a strong positive influence on corruption

trade costs and deviations from the law of one price the link between relative prices across countries and trade costs requires a theoretical foundation that is absent in the literature to date empirical tests on the law of one price are based on an arbitrage equation which is of very limited relevance in understanding this link the application of a new set of arbitrage equations to the tin trade market yields results that are consistent with our theoretical expectations we find evidence in favor of the law of one price between the united states and japan however evidence of price discrimination is also found for the los angeles market

on the transmission of world agricultural prices two questions are asked about the relationship between domestic prices and world prices of agricultural commodities are variations in world prices transmitted to domestic prices domestic prices are regressed on world prices in various forms taking into account the possible effects of exchange rates and inflation the empirical analysis is based on data from the food and agriculture organization of the united nations for 58 countries from 1968 78 and for the countries of the european community from 1961 85 the results show that most of the variations in world prices are transmitted and that they constitute the dominant component in the variations of domestic prices

purchasing power parity yet again evidence from spatially separated commodity markets abstract this paper examines the empirical validity of the law of one price by exploiting the non stationarity of prices set in us dollars of varieties of wheat that are traded simultaneously in the usa rotterdam and japan we demonstrate the crucial role of transport costs in achieving cointegration long run ppp although systematic short run deviations from ppp occur we show that this does not imply profitable arbitrage opportunities jel c5 f3 g1

existence of stationary bargaining equilibria abstract this paper addresses the question of existence of stationary markov perfect equilibria in a class of dynamic games that includes many known bargaining models and models of coalition formation general sufficient conditions for existence of equilibria are currently lacking in a number of interesting environments e g models with non convexities consumption lower bounds or an evolving state variable the main result establishes existence of equilibrium under compactness and continuity conditions without the structure of convexity or strict comprehensiveness used in the extant literature the proof requires a precise selection of voting equilibria following different proposals using a generalization of fatou s lemma

does competition kill corruption corrupt agents officials or gangsters exact money from firms corruption affects the number of firms in a free entry equilibrium the degree of deep competition in the economy increases with lower overhead costs relative to profits and with a tendency toward similar cost structures increases in competition may not lower corruption the model explains why a rational corrupt agent may extinguish the source of his bribe income by causing a firm to exit assessing the welfare effect of corruption is complicated by the fact that exit caused by corruption does not necessarily reduce social welfare

challenges of existing in a market as a small low quality producer this paper explores the strategy of a small firm entering a monopolist s market thereby creating a duopoly market the small firm avoids competing with the larger incumbent firm by producing a lower quality product at a lower price the model here establishes an equilibrium under a specific set of assumptions and examines how exogenous factors affect prices qualities and profits although the strategy might allow the firm to enter and earn a profit the market conditions may make this position much less desirable to that of the large firm for several reasons in the case explored here where tastes for the product are uniformly distributed the small firm s profit is about six percent of that of the larger firm the smaller firm is more severely threatened by the entrance of a third firm furthermore even if the smaller firm can cut costs its position is not well suited for exploiting such increases in efficiencies

profit efficiency among basmati rice producers in pakistan punjab farm specific profit inefficiency among basmati rice producers was estimated from a variable coefficient profit frontier the mean level of inefficiency at farm resources and price levels was 28 with a wide range 5 87 average loss of profit was rs 1 222 per hectare socioeconomic factors related to profit loss were the farm household s education nonagricultural employment and a credit constraint institutional determinants of profit loss were a water constraint and the late application of fertilizer punjab wide benefits of increasing farmer s profit efficiency are large a 25 reduction in profit loss among basmati rice producers may generate over rs 240 million in extra profits each rice season rice is a major export commodity for pakistan generating about 2 5 billion pakistan rupees rs annually or 20 of foreign exchange earnings from commodity trade in the early 1980s two varieties dominate in pakistan s international trade in rice basmati 370 a high quality long grained aromatic variety and the medium long grained irri 6 distinct export markets exist for these rices over 90 of the basmati is exported to oil rich middle eastern nations while the mediumlong varieties are mainly marketed in southeast asia in 1983 the export price of basmati was about rs 7 900 per ton while the price of medium long grained varieties averaged rs 2 700 per ton pakistan has a comparative advantage in the international market for basmati but probably not for medium long grained rices azhar and mamhud historically pakistan had a near monopoly in international trade in basmati but now faces increased competition from thailand and the united states efferson therefore pakistan must strive to increase the efficiency of basmati production to retain its comparative advantage and competitive edge in foreign rice markets basmati 370 is a pure line selection made in

local government type and municipal bond ratings what s the relationship abstractthere is an extensive literature analysing the executive branch within local u s government jurisdictions this has largely revolved around the differences between elected mayors and appointed city managers much of the academic work has considered the potential efficiency gains that may be associated with either form of government and comparative analyses between the two however the empirical literature has been divided regarding the relative efficiency of either form this article attempts to add to that literature by considering how bond markets may perceive potential efficiencies that emerge from one executive type over the other by evaluating bond ratings for a sample of large municipal governments in the united states overall the results suggest that municipalities headed by a city manager are associated with increased bond ratings and thus lower borrowing costs which may lend support that this form of administration is on some margin relatively more efficient than others these re

causes and effects of corruption what has past decade s empirical research taught us a survey corruption has fierce impacts on economic and societal development and is subject to a vast range of institutional jurisdictional societal and economic conditions it is this paper s aim to provide a reassessment and a comprehensive state of the art survey of existing literature on corruption and its causes and effects a particularly strong focus is put on presenting and discussing insights resulting from empirical research and contrasting recent with older findings

on the possibility of informationally efficient markets this paper presents conditions for a resolution of the grossman stiglitz paradox of informationally efficient markets we display a market with asymmetric information where a privately revealing equilibrium obtains in a competitive framework and where incentives to acquire information are preserved as long as the correlation in traders valuations is not too large the equilibrium is efficient and the problems associated with fully revealing rational expectations equilibria are precluded without resorting necessarily to noise traders the robustness of the results to general information structures is established and the effect of market power is examined in a large market approximation to the competitive economy the model is applied to explain changes in bidding behavior in central bank liquidity auctions in the crisis period jel d82 d84 g14 e59

markov perfect equilibria in intergenerational games with consistent preferences abstract this paper considers the subgame perfect equilibria in markov strategies of an abstract intergenerational game in which the generations preferences are consistent in the sense that they admit recursive aggregators given biconvergence i show that such equilibria exist and are equivalent both to the solutions of bellman s recursive optimality equations and to the optima of the first generation s utility function these results are then applied to a simple model casting new light on the neutrality of government debt and to another accommodating impure altruism finally two new examples crisply illustrate how the paper s equivalences fail when biconvergence fails

corruption is bad for growth even in the united states we estimate the impact of corruption on growth of output per worker in u s states we improve on existing studies of the cost of corruption by using a better specified empirical model focusing on a study population that is less likely to be affected by parameter heterogeneity and controlling for endogeneity using political variables to instrument for corruption we find that corruption plays a significant and causal role in lowering growth and investment across the states

equilibrium price formation and the value of private information an economy is analyzed in which agents first choose whether to acquire costly information about the return to a risky asset and then choose demand functions that determine the allocation of assets it is a well known paradox that if agents are price takers and prices are fully revealing then an equilibrium with costly information acquisition does not exist it is shown that if the price formation process is modeled explicitly and agnets are not price takers then it is possible to have an equilibrium with fully revealing prices and costly information acquisition article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

markov perfect equilibria in altruistic growth economies with production uncertainty this paper concerns the existence of markov perfect equilibria in altruistic growth economies previous work on deterministic models has established existence only under extremely restrictive conditions we show that the introduction of production uncertainly yields an existence theorem for aggregative infinite horizon models with very general forms of altruism journal of economic literature classification numbers

aggregation determinacy and informational efficiency for a class of economies with asymmetric information abstract we identify and analyze a class of economies with asymmetric information that we call quasi complete for quasi complete economies we determine equilibrium trades show that the set of fully informative equilibria is a singleton and give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partially informative equilibria besides unifying some familiar settings such as those of grossman 1976 and milgrom and stokey 1982 the following new results are proved a the same restrictions that deliver gorman aggregation under symmetric information are sufficient for gorman aggregation under asymmetric information even under partially informative prices b the traditional assumptions of quadratic utilities and endowment spanning that result in the capm under symmetric information deliver a conditional capm under asymmetric information with prices that need not be fully informative c the linear equilibrium in grossman s 1976 model is the only equilibrium linear or not while minor changes in the normality assumptions result in indeterminacy and partially informative equilibria and d if there is no aggregate endowment risk asymmetrically informed agents with common priors sell the risky part of their endowment in every equilibrium journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 g14 c62

discounted stochastic games with no stationary nash equilibrium two examples we present two examples of discounted stochastic games each with a continuum of states finitely many players and actions that possess no stationary equilibria the first example has deterministic transitions an assumption undertaken in most of the early applications of dynamics games in economics and perfect information and does not possess even stationary approximate equilibria or markovian equilibria the second example satisfies in addition to stronger regularity assumptions that all transitions are absolutely continuous with respect to a fixed measure an assumption that has been widely used in more recent economic applications this assumption has been undertaken in several positive results on the existence of stationary equilibria in special cases and in particular guarantees the existence of stationary approximate equilibria

institutional adjustment and transaction costs product and inputs markets in the tanzanian coffee system abstract commodity market liberalization can improve incentives for production of export crops by reducing the total costs of transforming products through space form and time or by reducing the costs of arranging and completing transactions while liberalization often leads to reduced costs in output exchange it can remove opportunities for linked input output transactions that sometimes lowered the costs of providing finance in state controlled markets assessments of liberalization that focus on output exchange alone obscure the impact of rising transaction costs in finance this study of liberalization in the tanzanian coffee market documents declining costs in output marketing rising transaction costs for financing farm activities and differential but generally positive net impacts on growers

economic growth with intergenerational altruism in this paper we study the properties of equilibria in an aggregative growth model with intergenerational altruism in this model each generation is active for a single period at the beginning of this period it receives an endowment of a single homogeneous good which is the output from a bequest investment made by the previous generation it divides the endowment between consumption and investment the return from this investment constitutes the endowment of the next generation each generation derives utility from its own consumption and that of its immediate successor however since altruism is limited in the sense that no generation cares about later successors the interests of distinct agents come into conflict models of this type have been used to analyze a number of issues concerning intergenerational altruism one line of research pursued by arrow 1973 and dasgupta 1974a elucidates the implications of rawls principle of just savings others beginning with phelps and pollak 1968 have addressed the question of how an altruistic growth economy might actually evolve over time topics of subsequent investigation have included the efficiency and optimality of equilibrium programs and the implications of intergenerational altruism for the distribution of wealth unfortunately the positive features of equilibrium programs have received little attention from previous authors aside from a few comments by kohlberg 1976 virtually nothing is known about the asymptotic behaviour of capital stocks in these models in particular will the long run capital stock which arises from intergenerational conflict be higher or lower than the turnpike associated with the solution to the optimal planning problem on a priori grounds the answer is not clear agents who take only a limited interest in the future will tend to bequeath less than those who are far sighted however since each generation views its children s bequest as pure waste it must bequeath a larger sum to obtain the same consumption value in this paper we obtain steady state results for equilibrium capital stocks completely analogous to the well known optimal planning results by comparing steady states we

the latte revolution regulation markets and consumption in the global coffee chain abstract coffee is a truly global commodity and a major foreign exchange earner in many developing countries the global coffee chain has changed dramatically as a result of deregulation new consumption patterns and evolving corporate strategies from a balanced contest between producing and consuming countries within the politics of international coffee agreements power relations shifted to the advantage of transnational corporations a relatively stable institutional environment where proportions of generated income were fairly distributed between producing and consuming countries turned into one that is more informal unstable and unequal through the lenses of global commodity chain analysis this paper examines how these transformations affect developing countries and what policy instruments are available to address the emerging imbalances

perfect equilibrium timing of a backstop technology limit pricing induced by trigger zones this paper considers strategic use of r d in the context of an exhaustible resource market where the consuming countries control r d and a cartel controls the resource it is shown that r d investments to develop a backstop technology can be used as a credible threat to induce a low price profile for the resource the price path associated with the unique perfect equilibrium exhibits limit pricing the backstop is eventually introduced but in a period before this event the cartel keeps the price sufficiently low to make delayed investment the preferred alternative for the consuming nations

bargaining without a common prior an immediate agreement theorem in sequential bargaining models without outside options each player s bargaining power is ultimately determined by which player will make an offer and when this paper analyzes a sequential bargaining model in which players may hold different beliefs about which player will make an offer and when excessive optimism about making offers in the future can cause delays in agreement the main result states that despite this if players will remain sufficiently optimistic for a sufficiently long future then in equilibrium they will agree immediately this result is also extended to other canonical models of optimism

contract negotiation and the coase conjecture a strategic foundation for renegotiation proof contracts what does contract negotiation look like when some parties hold private information and negotiation frictions are negligible this paper analyzes this question and provides a foundation for renegotiation proof contracts in this environment the model extends the framework of the coase conjecture to situations in which the quantity or quality of the good is endogenously determined and to more general environments in which preferences are nonseparable in the traded goods as frictions become negligible all equilibria converge to a unique outcome which is separating efficient and straightforward to characterize

corporate financial hedging with proprietary information abstract if a firm has information pertinent to its own dividend stream that is not made available to its shareholders it may be in the interests of the firm and its shareholders to adopt a financial hedging policy this is in contrast with the modigliani miller theorem which implies that with informational symmetry such financial hedging is irrelevant in certain cases hedging policies are identified that are unanimously supported by shareholders

measuring investment performance in a rational expectations equilibrium model much research has been concerned with evaluating the performance of managed portfolios e g mutual funds and examining whether portfolio managers display in some sense superior performance superior performance would seemingly turn on the possession of superior information that is utilized in managing portfolios in general a fund s asset holdings or portfolio weights might not be observable to an outsider whether they are or not however they are likely to change over time this happens especially when better performance is a result of superior information since managers will change their portfolio composition on obtaining private information since such changes must be taken into account the problem of measuring performance of managed portfolios is inherently different from that of evaluating the performance of individual assets groups of assets or generally portfolios with constant and known composition

rational behavior and rational expectations abstract this paper presents a new definition of rational expectations equilibrium in security markets characterized by a rigorous treatment of the decision problem facing each agent a rational expectations equilibrium is one in which it is common knowledge among the agents that all of them are rational and that the price observed is the market clearing price the paper shows that such equilibria always exist and that they need not have the property that for generic economies the equilibrium price reveals all economically relevant information the paper also shows that the new definition generalizes existing definitions of rational expectations equilibrium

the timing of contracting with externalities abstract this paper endogenizes the timing of bilateral contracting between one principal and multiple agents in the presence of externalities contracting simultaneously with all agents is optimal for the principal if externalities become weaker the more an agent trades if instead externalities become stronger sequential negotiations might benefit the principal as they lower the agents outside options under some linearity conditions the principal s preferences with respect to different timings of contracting are opposed to their efficiency ranking

coffee value chains on the move evidence in ethiopia abstract important changes have happened to the upstream segment of the coffee sector in ethiopia africa s biggest in the last decade as illustrated by the increasing adoption of improved production harvest and post harvest practices upstream marketing has also improved and there have been large investments in processing capacity shown by the extended coverage of wet mills these improved practices are shown to be associated with positive impacts on coffee productivity and prices changes appear to be linked with multiple factors including local market reform greater presence of public extension agents high international prices and a push for certification by international buyers on the other hand a combination of production lack of improved seedlings weather and disease shocks as well as institutional issues saving constraints and lack of vertical integration and traceability have seemingly impeded more widespread uptake of improved practices and therefore better farm performance the study illustrates the significant complexity in obtaining transformation at the farm level in these settings

nonpaternalistic intergenerational altruism abstract the paper develops a concept of equilibrium behaviour and establishes its existence in a model of nonpaternalistic intergenerational altruism each generation derives utility from its own consumption and the utilities of its successors equilibrium capital stocks are time monotone and therefore converge to a steady state finally when each generation s utility depends on that of at least two successors equilibria may be inefficient this is shown by an example where feasible programs exist providing greater consumption compared to the equilibrium path for every generation

poverty and self control we argue that poverty can perpetuate itself by undermining the capacity for self control in line with a distinguished psychological literature we consider modes of self control that involve the self imposed use of contingent punishments and rewards we study settings in which consumers with quasi hyperbolic preferences confront an otherwise standard intertemporal allocation problem with credit constraints our main result demonstrates that low initial assets can limit self control trapping people in poverty while individuals with high initial assets can accumulate indefinitely thus even temporary policies that initiate accumulation among the poor may be effective we examine implications concerning the effect of access to credit on saving the demand for commitment devices the design of financial accounts to promote accumulation and the variation of the marginal propensity to consume across income from different sources we also explore the nature of optimal self control demonstrating that it has a simple and behaviorally plausible structure that is immune to self renegotiation

the revelation of information and self fulfilling beliefs abstract at a rational expectations equilibrium ree individuals are assumed to know the map from states to prices this hypothesis has two components that agents agree consensus and that they have point expectations degeneracy we consider economies where agents beliefs are described by a joint distribution on states and prices and these beliefs are fulfilled at equilibrium beliefs are self fulfilling if every price in the support of the distribution is an equilibrium price the corresponding equilibria are beliefs equilibria be the further restriction that agents have the same beliefs results in common beliefs equilibria cbe we study the relationship between be cbe and ree thus isolating the role of consensus and of degeneracy in achieving rational expectations journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d51 d82

dynamic allocation in an altruistic overlapping generations economy abstract this paper is concerned with the issue does there exist a social security program which can be maintained period after period to address this issue the paper considers dynamic allocation in an altruistic overlapping generations economy the altruism is intergenerational nonpaternalistic and two sided it is assumed that generations coexisting in the same period agree on a social welfare function which evaluates the consumption of various generations and play a game against those living in different periods a perfect equilibrium of this game is shown to exist and its properties are examined journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d62 h55

on the existence of rational expectations equilibrium abstract we prove a theorem on the existence of rational expectations general economic equilibrium when agents condition on prices as well as on private information and maximize the expectation of a state dependent utility function the key to the result is a new idealization of what it means for a set of empirical distributions to support agents expectations this idealization depends on the notion that agents compare their expectations with continuous versions of the random empirical distributions that are generated by the workings of the economy the existence theorem covers all strictly concave utility functions arbitrary distributions of the state variable and situations in which the dimension of the state variable is large relative to the number of commodities

the existence of fully rational expectations approximate equilibria with noisy price observations abstract nonrevealing fully rational expectations approximate equilibria exist in microeconomic pure exchange economies in which uninformed agents have suitably dispersed noisy price observations such traders maximize a state dependent expected utility conditional on the price vector they observe the distributions of noisy price observations and the correct equilibrium relationship between states of the world and prices in equilibrium aggregate excess demand is small with high probability in every state of the world and its expectation is also small this magnitude diminishes as the noisy price observations become more accurate equilibria are obtained by applying a fixed point argument to state dependent excess demand functions which are smooth because of the noisy price observations

fiscal consequences of public corruption empirical evidence from state bond ratings empirical analyses of public corruption focus predominantly on international differences regional differences in public corruption within a single country receive little attention we empirically investigate the effect of public corruption in the united states on state bond ratings which previous research shows are inversely related to net interest costs on public debt after controlling for various economic influences on bond ratings we find that more corrupt states have lower bond ratings which implies that taxpayers in more corrupt states face a negative pecuniary externality by paying a premium for debt

ex post regret and the decentralized sharing of information abstract firms reveal private information about the value of investment through their investment decisions as a consequence they may have ex post regret once they see other firms investments we define a notion of rational expectations equilibrium for games which imposes a no regret property in this equilibrium all firms make the same investment decision but despite the absence of ex post regret the investment herd can be inefficient in addition equilibrium might not exist we introduce a notion of probabilistic existence and identify conditions under which if the number of firms is large enough information comes out so that investment herds are first best efficient with high probability and equilibrium exists with high probability journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c7 d8

international commodity agreements an obituary notice abstract it is widely believed that international commodity agreements have lapsed because they have failed the reality is more complex the tin agreement did collapse but for sugar and cocoa adverse market conditions and lack of general support made stabilization impractical control of the coffee market ceased largely because of disagreements both between and within the producing countries on the division of the benefits resulting from higher prices overall commodity control fits uneasily in an increasingly globalized and competitive world and this perception has resulted in a diminished willingness to resolve the practical difficulties of price stabilization

vertical product differentiation with entry abstract this paper examines the non cooperative behaviour of established firms that compete in product quality and prices while foreseeing the effects of their rivalry on the decisions made by the later entrants we prove an existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium and show that the dominant firms engage in maximal product differentiation i e select the highest and lowest technologically feasible qualities later entrant however always selects an intermediate quality moreover we show that the equilibrium configuration is identical to that generated by perfect foresight equilibrium in a model of sequential entry furthermore the profits earned by each firm are ranked in the same order as the qualities implifying that the later entrant despite being the last mover ends up with higher profits and larger market share than one of the incumbents

how does corruption affect public debt an empirical analysis summary this paper investigates the relationship between corruption the shadow economy and public debt it additionally examines whether the shadow economy increases the adverse effects of corruption on public debt the model is empirically tested for 126 countries over 1996 2012 using ordinary least squares ols fixed effects system generalized method of moments gmm and instrumental variable estimation and two measures of corruption the transparency international corruption perceptions index and the kaufmann et al corruption index results confirm that increased corruption and a larger shadow economy lead to an increase in public debt results additionally indicate that the shadow economy magnifies the effect of corruption on public debt suggesting that they act as complements results also suggest that a larger shadow economy reduces tax revenues and thus increases public debt similarly higher government expenditure enhances the effects of corruption on government debt hence reducing corruption should be a primary policy goal of governments given the complementarity detected between corruption and the shadow economy reducing corruption would also lead to a fall in the size of the shadow economy and public debt reducing corruption will also minimize the adverse effects of corruption on government debt through government expenditure

psychological expected utility theory and anticipatory feelings we extend expected utility theory to situations in which agents experience feelings of anticipation prior to the resolution of uncertainty we show how these anticipatory feelings may result in time inconsistency we provide an example from portfolio theory to illustrate the potential impact of anticipation on asset prices

coffee market liberalisation and the implications for producers in brazil guatemala and india the standard approach to modelling the relationship between world and producer prices of coffee does not incorporate the effects of changing government policies and market structures these changes have led to large structural breaks in the relationship between the prices implying the standard estimates are biased we model coffee prices in brazil guatemala and india allowing for the structural breaks and show that the liberalisation of coffee markets has benefited producers substantially both in terms of a higher share of the world price of coffee and higher real prices this suggests that calls to re regulate coffee markets may be misplaced

the existence of perfect equilibria in a model of growth with altruism between generations an intertemporal model of consumption and bequest behaviour is specified and analysed as a game between generations the main feature of this game is that no a priori restrictions like linearity are placed on the strategy choice of generations the paper gives an existence proof for perfect nash equilibria in finite and infinite horizon versions of the model and determines characteristic properties of equilibrium strategies the main result is to demonstrate existence of stationary perfect equilibrium if the time horizon is infinite

inducing efficiency externalities missing markets and the coase theorem the capacity of side payments to induce an efficient outcome as predicted by the coase theorem is studied side payments are formally introduced in a bimatrix game involving externalities and the resulting equilibrium is called an induced equilibrium when induced equilibria exist they weakly pareto dominate a nash equilibrium of the original game without side payments when because of externalities one market is missing an induced equilibrium always exists is uniquely valued and is pareto efficient when more than one market is missing induced equilibria may not exist may be pareto inefficient and may be pareto ranked copyright 1993 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

competitive procurement with corruption we study competitive procurement administered by a corrupt agent who is willing to manipulate his evaluation of contract proposals in exchange for bribes with complete information and no corruption the efficient firm will win the contract for sure if the agent is corrupt and has large manipulation power however bribery makes it costly for the efficient firm to secure a sure win so in equilibrium the efficient firm loses the contract with positive probability the optimal scoring rule for the buyer deemphasizes quality relative to price and does not fully handicap and may even favor the efficient firm

responding to the coffee crisis what can we learn from price dynamics an econometric model of coffee price dynamics is specified and estimated to capture the evolution of coffee prices at the farm wholesale and retail levels it investigates the historical influence of the international coffee agreement ica through its effects on yield and planting decisions in the short run the ica caused brazilian farm prices to become disconnected from international prices the ica helped coffee producers to better incorporate current world price information into planting decisions this created a price cycle that did not exist in non ica periods the low coffee prices experienced since the disintegration of the ica are consistent with low supply response to price information asymmetric price transmission at the retail level helped roasters and retailers benefit from upstream price interventions our results urge caution when considering future coffee price interventions

rational expectations equilibrium with econometric models we prove the existence of general economic equilibrium under uncertainty when agents form econometric models of the relationship among their private information prices and the state of the environment the functional form of each agent s model is specified in advance with a finite number of parameters to be determined agents are then thought of as performing linear least squares estimation of the parameters equilibrium requires not only that markets clear but also that each agent be using the vector of parameter values which within a compact convex set of parameters gives the least squares best fit to the data that is generated by the working of the economy when agents adhere to their models

coalition formation with binding agreements we study coalition formation in real time a situation in which coalition formation is intertwined with the ongoing receipt of pay offs agreements are assumed to be permanently binding they can only be altered with the full consent of existing signatories for characteristic function games we prove that equilibrium processes whether or not these are history dependent must converge to efficient absorbing states for three player games with externalities each player has enough veto power that a general efficiency result can be established however there exist four player games in which all markov equilibria are inefficient from every initial condition despite the ability to write permanently binding agreements copyright 2007 wiley blackwell

do prices transmit rationally expected information a simple model with asymmetric information in which inventory holders or traders submit demand curves to an auctioneer has a unique partially revealing equilibrium we wonder whether the agents can plausibly coordinate on this equilibrium through eductive reasoning relying on common knowledge the analysis stresses the role of two effects sensitivity and amplification whose product should be small enough the property is obtained whenever the equilibrium excess demand is steep enough i e when the search for information does not distort demand too much neither the influence of the number of informed agents nor that of noise trading are monotonic real time learning has strikingly different features jel d82 d84

sequential nonzero sum blotto allocating defensive resources prior to attack abstract the strategic allocation of resources across multiple fronts has long been studied in the context of blotto games in which two players simultaneously select their allocations however many allocation problems are sequential for example a state trying to defend against a terrorist attack generally allocates some or all of its resources before the attacker decides where to strike this paper studies the allocation problem confronting a defender who must decide how to distribute limited resources across multiple sites before an attacker chooses where to strike unlike many blotto games which only have very complicated mixed strategy equilibria the sequential nonzero sum blotto game always has a very simple pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium further the defender always plays the same pure strategy in any equilibrium and the attacker s equilibrium response is generically unique and entails no mixing the defender minmaxes the attacker in equilibrium even though the game is nonzero sum and the attacker strikes the site among its best replies that minimizes the defender s expected losses

endogenous games and mechanisms side payments among players we characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding offers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played this does not always lead to efficient outcomes despite complete information and costless contracting the characterizations are illustrated in a series of examples including voluntary contribution public good games cournot and bertrand oligopoly principal agent problems and commons games among others

does the law of one price really hold for commodity prices in spite of the empirical failure of the law of one price it is usually assumed that commodity prices are perfectly arbitraged at least in the long run this paper argues that this assumption is counterfactual and that much of the empirical evidence provided to support it is flawed and affected by econometric shortcomings spurious regressions nonstationarity in the data inappropriate use of first differences an alternative methodology co integration by which a long run relationship between nonstationary series can be tested is proposed tests of nonstationarity and co integration for a group of commodities show quite uniformly that the law of one price as a long run relationship fails and that deviations from the pattern are permanent

market reforms and commodity price volatility the case of east african coffee market the goal of this paper is to examine the impact of commodity market reforms on producer price volatility using evidence from the east african coffee market the results based on time varying volatility models and key summary statistics show that coffee market reforms in the east african community eac are associated with changes in producer price volatility and volatility persistence at both country and regional levels however reforms were not the only cause of changes in price volatility the study further shows that reforms had different effects on prices volatilities of arabica and robusta varieties of coffee grown in individual eac countries these findings have wider implication for commodity market reforms and producer price stabilisation policies in the eac and coffee producing countries in sub sahara africa

implementation of walrasian expectations equilibria in an exchange economy with differentially informed traders non exclusivity of information nei is the condition that each trader s private information be perfectly predictable by an outside observer who has observed the private information of all other traders nei is one of a set of conditions which taken together are sufficient for the implementability of fully revealing expectations equilibria here we show that this condition is in fact necessary for the weak implementation of a much broader class of walrasian equilibria herein called expectations equilibria

industrial targeting experimentation and long run specialization abstract this paper emphasizes the experimental nature of industrial targeting policies under uncertainty in a small open economy a government promotes entry of new firms in selected industries and updates its beliefs about the country s comparative advantage in a bayesian way this selective targeting policy is analyzed in the framework of a special type of statistical decision problem known as the multi armed bandit the paper analyzes how the costs and benefits of learning about a country s comparative advantage depend on the characteristics of the targeted industries the framework suggests that even an optimally designed industrial targeting policy may eventually steer the country away from specializing according to its true comparative advantage

do corrupt governments receive less foreign aid critics of foreign aid programs argue that these funds often support corrupt governments and inefficient bureaucracies supporters argue that foreign aid can be used to reward good governments this paper documents that there is no evidence that less corrupt governments receive more foreign aid on the contrary according to some measures of corruption more corrupt governments receive more aid also we could not find any evidence that an increase in foreign aid reduces corruption in summary the answer to the question posed in the title is no

partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium in a competitive economy abstract a class of pure exchange economies is considered in which some agents are informed of private information and others are uninformed existence of a partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium ree is proved without restricting attention to particular functional forms for utility functions and probability distributions without introducing noise into the model and without departing from the standard definition of ree the equilibrium is robust in the sense that if the primitives of the economy are slightly perturbed the economy continues to have a qualitatively similar ree with somewhat stronger assumptions placed on the economy the equilibrium is also the unique measurable ree

bureaucratic corruption and endogenous economic growth there appears to be significant diversity in the incidence of bureaucratic corruption across countries at different stages of economic development and under different political and economic regimes little theoretical or empirical analysis has been offered however on the link between corruption government and growth the paper attempts to fill the void through equilibrium models of endogenous growth balanced growth is derived as a balancing act between accumulating human capital which engenders growth and accumulating political capital which mainly assures bureaucratic power the analysis focuses on the interplay between investment in these two types of capital and its implications for long term growth under alternative political regimes some propositions are tested and confirmed empirically

interest yields credit ratings and economic characteristics of state bonds an empirical analysis note carosio giovanni and ignazio visco nota sulla costruzione di un tasso di interesse reale estratto dal bollettino della banca d italia 32 ottobre dicembre 1977 797 811 fama eugene f short term interest rates as predictors of inflation american economic review 65 june 1975 269 82 fama eugene f and andre farber money bonds and foreign exchange american economic review 69 september 1979 639 49 fischer stanley the demand for index bonds journal of political economy 83 june 1975 509 34 hartman richard and john h makin inflation uncertainty and interest rates theory and empirical tests national bureau of economic research working paper no 906 june 1982 hess patrick j and james l bicksler capital asset prices vs time series models as predictors of inflation journal of financial economics 2 december 1975 341 60 mundell robert a inflation and real interest journal of political economy 71 june 1963 280 83 nelson charles r and william g schwert short term interest rates as predictors of inflation on testing the hypothesis that the real rate of interest is constant american economic review 67 june 1977 478 86 papadia francesco forward exchange rates as predictors of future spot rates and the efficiency of the foreign exchange market journal of banking and finance s june 1981 217 40 papadia francesco and vittorio basano eec dg ii inflationary expectations surveybased inflationary expectations for the eec countries economic papers of the commission of the european communities directorate general for economic and firlancial affairs no 1 may 1981 pearce douglas k comparing survey and rational measures of expected inflation forecast performance and interest rate effects journal of money credit and banking 11 november 1979 447 56 visco ignazio the measurement and analysis of inflation expectations the case of italy economic papers barik of italy research department june 1979 149 242