technology and transaction cost economics a reply abstract i argue here as i have previously that technology is neither fully determinative of nor irrelevant to economic organization transaction cost economizing occupies a prominent position in any effort to assess the efficacy of alternative forms of economic organization

learning by doing vs learning from others in a principal agent model abstract we introduce learning in a principal agent model of output sharing under moral hazard we use social evolutionary learning to represent social learning and reinforcement experience weighted attraction ewa and individual evolutionary learning iel to represent individual learning learning in the principal agent model is difficult due to the stochastic environment the discontinuity in payoffs at the optimal contract and the incorrect evaluation of foregone payoffs for iel and ewa social learning is much more successful in adapting to the optimal contract than standard individual learning algorithms a modified iel using realized payoffs evaluation performs better but still falls short of social learning

organizational governance and ethical systems a covenantal approach to building trust american businesses and corporate executives are faced with a serious problem the loss of public confidence public criticism increased government controls and growing expectations for improved financial performance and accountability have accompanied this decline in trust traditional approaches to corporate governance typified by agency theory and stakeholder theory have been expensive to direct and have focused on short term profits and organizational systems that fail to achieve desired results we explain why the organizational governance theories are fundamentally inadequate to build trust we advance a conceptual framework based on stewardship theory characterized by covenantal relationships and argue that design of governance mechanisms using a covenantal approach is more effective in building trust in organizations a covenantal relationship is a specialized form of a relational contract between an employee and his or her organization we argue that regardless of incentives and control mechanisms carefully designed through contractual mechanisms in the absence of covenantal relationships it is extremely difficult to build trust within organizations we propose that organizations are more likely to build trust both at the organizational level and at the interpersonal level when they create reinforcing and integrated systems that honor implied duties of covenantal relationships

cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection abstract we study cooperation dynamics in repeated games with markovian private information after any history signaling reveals information that helps players coordinate their future actions but also makes the problem of coordinating current actions harder in equilibrium players may play aggressive or uncooperative actions that signal private information and partners tolerate a certain number of such actions we discuss several applications of our results we explain the cycles of cooperation and conflict observed in trench warfare during world war i show that price leadership and unilateral price cuts can be part of an optimal signaling equilibrium in a repeated bertrand game with incomplete information and show that communication between cartel members may be socially efficient in a repeated cournot game finally we show that the welfare losses disappear as the persistence of the process of types increases and the interest rate goes to zero

communication networks knowledge and decisions that communication pervades the everyday life of organizations is a statement of the obvious how this widespread communication affects organization s performance is less clear another truism about organizations is that their members are seldom fully knowledgeable of the exact state of the world in which they operate to overcome this information uncertainty burden organizations tend to devote a substantial amount of resources to retrieve information about their environment individual experimentation is a natural way to obtain superior information when the nature and the consequences of the prevailing uncertainty is common to all organization members a natural substitute for replications of individual experiments is to have agents communicate their private information among themselves communication is then a means to save on experimentation costs when they display diminishing returns in another vein shared information fosters coordination between individual agents which is beneficial to the organization as a whole when coordinated actions lead to higher benefits for everyone altogether when each organization member individually ascertains that both uncertainty and coordination are the main driving networked interactions

temporary income taxes and consumer spending both economic theory and casual empirical observation of the u s economy suggest that spending propensities from temporary tax changes are smaller than those from permanent ones but neither provides much guidance about the magnitude of this difference this paper offers new empirical estimates of this difference and finds it to be quite substantial the analysis is based on an amendment of the standard distributed lag version of the permanent income hypothesis that distinguishes temporary taxes from other income on the grounds that the former are more transitory this amendment which is broadly consistent with rational expectations leads to a nonlinear consumption function though the standard error is unavoidably large the point estimate suggests that a temporary tax change is treated as a 50 50 blend of a normal income tax change and a pure windfall over a 1 year planning horizon a temporary tax change is estimated to have only a little more than half the impact of a permanent tax change of equ

the price quantity sealed bid offer auction with pro rata rationing experimental evidence this study examines a price quantity sealed bid offer auction with pro rata rationing in risky and riskless settings an asset with a known distribution of possible values is traded in the risky setting results include prices and quantities less consistent with the competitive equilibrium than with other nash equilibria frequent overrevelation of quantities a 0 73 correlation between inferred and induced risk coefficients lower forgone profits for the nonrationed side of the market and relatively low efficiencies the riskless setting in which asset values are known exhibits many of the same characteristics but to a lesser degree coauthors are ann martin david senkow and galen sevcik copyright 1993 by royal economic society

coordination of internal supply chains in vertically integrated high tech manufacturing organizations htmos abstract this paper uses economic mechanisms to coordinate supply chains within high tech manufacturing organizations htmos it models the one shot initial production and allocation decisions involved in the production and marketing of new technologies these decisions are driven by the economic objectives of the firm and of the employees with private information the experts it analyzes and compares the efficiency of three coordination policies centralized command and control centralized revelation and decentralized revelation it shows that decentralized policies introduce an additional cost and it proposes rules of thumb for coordinating supply chains within firms that use many experts

asset specificity and economic organization abstract this paper examines the optimization problem of firm and market organization in which both production cost and transaction cost differences are expressed as a function of asset specificity in general markets enjoy advantages by aggregating the demands of many buyers thereby realizing economies of scale or scope such production cost savings need to be assessed in relation to the transaction cost advantages that internal organization sometimes enjoys over markets in adapting to changed circumstances as it turns out both production cost economies and the transaction cost differences between firm and market organization vary systematically with the characteristics of the investments this paper employs a unified framework to assess the choice of organization form the condition of asset specificity is featured

another look at the radner stiglitz nonconcavity in the value of information abstract this paper revisits the well known result of r radner and j stiglitz 1984 in bayesian models of economic theory elsevier amsterdam which shows that under certain conditions the value of information exhibits increasing marginal returns over some range their result assumes that both the number of states and the number of signal realizations are finite assumptions which preclude most analyses of optimal information acquisition we provide sufficient conditions that yield this nonconcavity in the value of information in a general framework the role that these conditions play is clarified and illustrated with several examples we also discuss the robustness of the nonconcavity result and the difficulties involved in getting the value of information to be globally concave journal of economic literature classification number d83

rational expectations and the aggregation of diverse information in laboratory security markets the idea that markets might aggregate and disseminate information and also resolve conflicts is central to the literature on decentralization hurwicz 1972 and rational expectations lucas 1972 we report on three series of experiments all of which were predicted to have performed identically by the theory of rational expectations in two of the three series one in which participants trade a complete set of arrow debreu securities and a second in which all participants have identical preferences double auction trading leads to efficient aggregation of diverse information and rational expectations equilibrium failure of the third series to exhibit such convergence demonstrates the importance of market institutions and trading instruments in achievement of equilibrium

the formation of price forecasts in experimental markets this study utilizes laboratory experimental methods to evaluate the empirical validity of 1 muthian rational expectations assumptions 2 an adaptive expectations model and 3 an extrapolative expectations model over 5 00 price forecasts from 146 participants in twelve experimental double auction m arkets with a cash reward structure are analyzed the forecasting objective is t hemean price over a sequence of trading periods governed by stationary market parameters the price forecasts are found to be inconsistent with strict muthian rational expectations and the extrapolative modelis not supported by the data however the forecasts generally support the adaptive expectations model copyright 1987 by ohio state university press

peddling influence through intermediaries a sender may communicate with a decision maker through intermediaries in this model an objective sender and intermediary pass on information truthfully while biased ones favor a particular agenda but also have reputational concerns i show that the biased sender and the biased intermediary s reporting truthfulness are strategic complements the biased sender is less likely to use an intermediary than an objective sender if his reputational concerns are low but more likely to do so if his reputational concerns are moderate moreover the biased sender may be more likely to use an intermediary perceived to be more biased

do fiscal variables affect fiscal expectations experiments with real world and lab data we generate observable expectations about fiscal variables through laboratory experiments using real world data from several european countries as stimuli we compare a var model of expectations for data which is presented in a fiscal frame with one for neutrally presented data we measure the degree to which participants use fiscal data for their forecasts agents expectations are found neither to be consistent with rational nor with purely adaptive expectations but instead follow an augmented adaptive scheme methodological implications of the present approach for experiments in macroeconomics are also discussed

why and when do governments initiate public enterprise reform initiating public enterprise reform is a complex decision influenced by economic factors as well as the ideological biases and personalities of political leaders nevertheless the use of a contracting framework yields important generalizations about what drives the decision this article argues that the decision depends fundamentally on the potential efficiency gains from the reform and its associated transactions costs costs arise because of asymmetries in information and opportunism problems that usually plague contract negotiations the article identifies observable variables that may affect either the potential gains or the transactions costs uses them to construct a simple probit decision making model and tests the model using data from fifteen developing countries over a twenty year period

entrepreneurial universities and overt opportunism entrepreneurial universities are a catalyst for regional economic development and growth yet the entrepreneurial university may not always capture the full gains made by the broader economy due to opportunistic behavior by its faculty scientists we expand agency theory to address conditions when opportunistic behavior persists in the face of substantial information symmetry and where principals appear to tolerate opportunism despite the authority to sanction their agents using a sample of 105 us research universities and 73 603 scientists we demonstrate that some scientists privately leak discoveries invented while working for their universities counter to prior prediction we find that universities acting as principals often do not retaliate even when having knowledge of such opportunistic behavior and the capability to punish non complying agents to extend theory we examined contexts that exacerbate and alleviate such overt opportunism high value discoveries and sizable entrepreneurial activity are associated with greater opportunistic behavior whereas efforts to empower those who have close professional ties with scientists their departments and technology commercialization offices are related to reduced opportunism to complement our empirical analyses we provide a stylized mathematical model that shows how agency theory can improve its predictive power once it formally recognizes certain conditions under which agents wield substantial bargaining power over their principals who in turn seem to tolerate agents overt opportunistic behavior

tax uncertainty and investment a cross country empirical examination i introduction spanning a period of nearly 100 years of economic research a substantial body of literature has developed with the goal of explaining the behavior of investment over time 1 although many of these studies have considered the implications of tax policy for investment in an uncertain world most have also implicitly assumed that the tax policy itself does not contribute to the uncertainty the problem is that tax policy can be very uncertain in many cases 2 and to date we know little about the consequences especially from an empirical standpoint more generally empirical evaluations of uncertainty and investment are very limited compared with the development of theoretical analyses calcagnini and saltari 2000 and the case of tax uncertainty is no exception this article sets out to fill part of the intellectual void by empirically investigating the impact of volatility in effective tax rates on investment in a cross section of countries namely the 15 countries of the european union eu the united states and japan in doing so i first estimate tax rate volatility using an arch specification with data on effective capital tax rates i then provide panel regression results using the system generalized method of moments gmm sys estimator of arellano and bover 1995 see also blundell and bond 1998 which suggest that the volatility of effective tax rates on capital have a significant negative impact on investment per worker in these countries the remainder of the article proceeds as follows section ii briefly reviews the existing literature on tax policy uncertainty and investment as well as existing empirical studies of uncertainty in general and investment section iii develops the empirical model i employ to estimate the relationship between tax volatility and investment section iv then presents an analysis of effective tax rates in the eu countries the united states and japan followed by a discussion of the data and econometric issues in section v and an examination of the effects of tax rate volatility on investment in section vi section vii provides concluding remarks ii theoretical foundations tax policy uncertainty and investment although most of the voluminous literature on tax policy and investment under uncertainty ignores observed randomness in tax policy a recent set of literature has begun to explore these issues in some detail mostly through simulation 3 the basic premise underlying these studies is that because output price uncertainty tends to retard investment pindyck 1988 4 tax uncertainty might be expected to harm investment as well hassett and metcalf 1999 further credence to a negative relationship between tax uncertainty and investment is given by the business community s mantra that they cannot make plans if they don t have confidence in the tax structure bizer and judd 1989 223 these simulation studies however demonstrate that the impact of tax uncertainty depends crucially on the source and nature of the uncertainty contrary perhaps to conventional wisdom in some cases increased uncertainty can be shown to have positive effects on investment growth or welfare bizer and judd 1989 simulate the economic effects of introducing random tax policy in a dynamic general equilibrium model they find that if random tax rates or credits are serially correlated the target capital stock falls when taxes are high and rises when taxes are low their more interesting case considers independently and identically distributed random tax shocks in this case the authors find that randomness in investment tax credits generates large fluctuations in investment which have the effect of reducing both utility and production because both are concave functions as well revenue 5 they find that variance in future tax rates however is not important for long term investments and in fact raises nontrivial mounts of revenue at a welfare cost that is never more than the cost associated with raising an equivalent amount of revenue with a permanent increase in a deterministic tax rate

efficiency of experimental security markets with insider information an application of rational expectations models the study reports on the ability of competing models of market information integration and dissemination to explain the behavior of simple laboratory markets for a one priced security returns to the security depended upon a randomly drawn state of nature some agents insiders whose identity was unknown to other agents knew the state before the markets opened with replication of market conditions the predictions of a fully revealing rational expectations model are relatively accurate prices adjusted immediately to near rational expectations prices profits of insiders were virtually indistinguishable from non insiders and efficiency levels converged to near 100 percent

investment tax incentives and frequent tax reforms despite the frequency of tax changes and their potential importance to investors almost all of the analysis of tax based investment incentives assumes investors never anticipate any tax changes we depart from this approach by analyzing the historical pattern of u s corporate investment incentives over the period 1953 86 incorporating the feature of investor awareness that the tax code may change our analysis incorporates a predictive equation for future tax variables into a model of optimal investment subject to adjustment costs and uncertainty we find that expectations of future tax changes significantly affect the incentive to invest only if adjustment costs are low in this case the incentive to invest in 1986 was strong as investors are estimated to have anticipated the coming reduction in investment incentives this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

rational expectations and tax policy experimental market evidence abstract experimental markets are used to test whether 1 1 subjects forecasts of future and unknown policy conform to the rational expectations hypothesis and 2 2 subjects purchases of commodities are made in anticipation of such policy forecast results confirm previous studies that support adaptive expectations on the other hand subjects exhibited a type of as if rationality by learning to alter their commodity purchases intertemporally in anticipation of fiscal changes this ability was only slightly diminished when policy was stochastic or when the micro economies were in disequilibrium and in chaos

tests of the rational expectations hypothesis this paper reviews evidence on the structure of anticipation from a number of empirical studies jack muth s rational expectations hypothesis is compared with a variety of alternative models including ferber s law the implicit expectations model of edwin mills and muth s new errors in the variables model the cumulative evidence is of such strength as to compel the suspension of belief in the concept of rational expectations this implies that it is a mistake to proceed under the maintained hypothesis that expectations are rational instead it is necessary to test the sensitivity of empirical and theoretical results to alternative assumptions about the structure by which anticipations are generated copyright 1986 by american economic association

optimal market intelligence strategy when management attention is scarce this paper extends the theoretical literature on firms optimal information strategies to the situation when a firm s management attention capacity to process available data is scarce in this case a firm s optimal market intelligence strategy must trade off learning a little about a broad range of markets a broad strategy with gaining a very deep understanding of one or a few markets a focused strategy this trade off is not present when data are scarce an assumption made in most of the existing literature on optimal information search strategies however in data rich environments which are of increasing relevance given technology changes we show a focused market intelligence strategy is always best when managers need to process a substantial amount of data before beginning to gain insights i e there are increasing returns to attention interestingly this focused strategy can also be best with decreasing returns to attention when a managers are sufficiently efficient in processing the available data and b managers have sufficiently strong initial priors on the unknown market parameters we show a broad market intelligence strategy is only optimal when new data points are sufficiently redundant i e when the learning rate is sufficiently decreasing with the allocation of more attention our results also indicate that advances in information technology can account for the pressure on firms to become more focused and that competition increases the likelihood of a focused strategy competition can lead to asymmetric outcomes where firms focus on different markets finally we note that a focused market intelligence strategy and thus an asymmetric allocation of attention does not require a priori differences between firms markets or market specific core capabilities consequently a focused market intelligence strategy can result in market specific core competencies and produce firm differences from equivalent starting conditions