the informational role of prices we consider a dominant firm with a competitive fringe in order to address the informational role of prices the fringe is necessary for the existence of a unique fully revealing equilibrium in which the price reveals the quality of the good to uninformed buyers a higher price triggers more sales on the part of the competitive fringe reducing both residual demand and profits we find that a larger share of uninformed buyers increases the price reduces the quantity sold by the dominant firm but increases the quantity sold by the competitive fringe this in turn reduces consumer surplus and welfare this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

consumer information and providers reputations an empirical test in the market for psychotherapy this paper estimates the price effects of provider specific reputations measured as the percent of each provider s clients who are referred by informed community sources such as other health professionals school counselors businesses clergy and attorneys using data on the prices of outpatient psychotherapy visits to private practice social workers in massachusetts the results suggest that social workers with established reputations for high quality care charge higher prices in addition the results suggest that intra and inter professional competition can constrain the pricing decisions of psychotherapists and that increasing consumer information increases the effectiveness of this competition

frictionless commerce a comparison of internet and conventional retailers there have been many claims that the internet represents a new nearly frictionless market our research empirically analyzes the characteristics of the internet as a channel for two categories of homogeneous products books and cds using a data set of over 8 500 price observations collected over a period of 15 months we compare pricing behavior at 41 internet and conventional retail outlets we find that prices on the internet are 9 16 lower than prices in conventional outlets depending on whether taxes shipping and shopping costs are included in the price additionally we find that internet retailers price adjustments over time are up to 100 times smaller than conventional retailers price adjustments presumably reflecting lower menu costs in internet channels we also find that levels of price dispersion depend importantly on the measures employed when we compare the prices posted by different internet retailers we find substantial dispersion internet retailer prices differ by an average of 33 for books and 25 for cds however when we weight these prices by proxies for market share we find dispersion is lower in internet channels than in conventional channels reflecting the dominance of certain heavily branded retailers we conclude that while there is lower friction in many dimensions of internet competition branding awareness and trust remain important sources of heterogeneity among internet retailers

earnings and ratings at google answers i introduction most research on internet transactions considers online markets as forums to facilitate the sale of physical goods ellison and fisher ellison 2009 goolsbee and chevalier 2003 sometimes the internet is analyzed as a market for matching workers and firms for an ordinary real world employment relationship kuhn 2004 but certain web sites can also supplement or even replace in person employment relationships this is the approach at google answers a web based service that facilitates paid matches between answerers who have answers or research skills and askers who offer payment for answers to their respective questions i analyze all questions and answers from the inception of the google answers service through november 2003 and i find notable trends in answerer behavior more experienced answerers provide answers with the characteristics askers most value receiving higher ratings as a result answerer earnings increases in experience consistent with learning on the job answerers who focus on particular question categories provide answers of higher quality but earn lower pay per hour perhaps reflecting a lack of versatility answers provided during the business day receive higher payments per hour a compensating differential for working when outside options are most attractive but more experienced answerers tend to forego these opportunities ii literature and context google answers is distinctive in that its entire service and entire employment relationship occur online in contrast most online sales processes anticipate offline functions such as packing and sending merchandise in some respects this online only environment eases analysis a researcher may see the answerer s entire service letting the researcher fully assess quality in contrast an ebay seller s quality generally is unobservable or only partially observer to a researcher nonetheless google answers does not provide all data researchers might seek for example although google answers receives answerers resumes and geographic locations as part of the application process google answers does not share this data with the general public chen ho and kim 2008 address these constraints through field experiments that pay google answers answerers to address questions posed by the authors allowing measurement of the effects of varying prices and gratuities parameters on answerers responses beyond chen ho and kim others have also examined google answers rafaeli raban and ravid 2005 present summary statistics of 2002 2004 answers regner 2005 finds that social preferences and reputation influence askers choice to provide optional gratuities to answerers adamic et al 2008 study answer quality and reputation at the competing though unpaid service yahoo answers iii methodology and data set all data for my analysis comes from the google answers web site http answers google com as it stood in november 2003 i wrote software to extract questions answers and profiles from the answers site forming a database of more than 40 000 questions and answers with only a few exceptions 1 i observe all google answers questions and answers posted through november 2003 2 for each question asked i observe the question itself text and title the question s categorization within google answers taxonomy the time at which the question was asked the payment amount offered by asker to answerer and the asker s username for answered questions i observe the time at which the question was answered the answer including length in characters and number of included urls and the answerer s username when the asker rated the answer i observe the rating when the asker offered a gratuity to the answerer i observe the amount of the gratuity google answers allows an answerer to lock a question obtaining the temporary exclusive fight to answer it for the following 4 8 hours depending on question price

endogenous market segmentation for lemons information asymmetry between sellers and buyers often prevents socially desirable trade this article presents a new mechanism that mitigates the inefficiencies caused by information asymmetry i consider decentralized markets under adverse selection and show that such markets can be endogenously segmented in a way that improves social welfare endogenous segmentation is driven by low quality sellers incentive to attract more buyers by separating from high quality sellers the mechanism helps us understand the roles of several real world institutions such as multiple marketplaces costless advertisements and nonbinding list prices

the impact of unemployment insurance on job search evidence from google search data job search is a key choice variable in theories of labor markets but is difficult to measure directly we develop a job search activity index based on google search data the google job search index gjsi we validate the gjsi with both survey and web based measures of job search unlike those measures the gjsi is high frequency geographically precise and available in real time we demonstrate the gjsi s utility by using it to study the effects of unemployment insurance policy changes between 2008 and 2014 we find no evidence of an economically meaningful effect of these changes on aggregate search

the market for quacks a group of n quacks plays a price competition game facing a continuum of patients who recover with probability whether or not they acquire a quack s treatment if patients chose rationally the market would be inactive i assume however that patients choose according to a boundedly rational procedure which re ects anecdotal reasoning this element of bounded rationality has signi cant

information market incentives and student performance evidence from a regression discontinuity design in brazil abstract we use a discontinuity on the test score disclosure rule for the national secondary education examination in brazil to test whether test score disclosure affects student performance in public and private schools we find that the impact of test score disclosure on student performance differs between public and private schools our results suggest that this difference is driven by differences in the market incentives faced by these two types of school

unleashing animal spirits self control and overpricing in experimental asset markets one explanation for overpricing on asset markets is a lack of traders self control we implement the first experiment to address the causal relationship between self control and systematic overpricing on financial markets our setup detects some of the channels through which low individual self control could transmit into irrational exuberance in markets our data indicate a large direct effect of reduced self control on market overpricing low self control traders report stronger emotions after the market

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

raising awareness and signaling quality to uninformed consumers a price advertising model the objective of this paper is to investigate the firm s optimal advertising and pricing strategies when introducing a new product we extend the existing signaling literature on advertising spending and price by constructing a model in which advertising is used both to raise awareness about the product and to signal its quality by comparing the complete information game and the incomplete information game we find that the high quality firm will reduce advertising spending and increase price from their respective complete information levels in the separating equilibrium the high quality firm will actually spend less on advertising than the low quality firm resulting in a negative correlation between product quality and advertising spending what sets our analysis apart from previous studies is that we consider advertising spending not only as a signaling device but also as an informational device when advertising spending is just a signaling device it is purely a dissipative expense it can be an effective signal of quality because only the high quality firm can afford it thus consumers can infer the product s quality by its advertising spending in this case advertising spending and product quality are positively correlated however when advertising also serves the purpose of raising awareness it endogenizes the size of the market for the firm so it is not just a dissipative expense any more consider the low quality firm s mimicking strategy in this case when the low quality firm is believed to be a highquality one it can charge a much higher price than if its true quality were known given that its marginal cost is lower than the high quality firm s its profit margin will be much larger in mimicry than in revealing its true quality indeed its profit margin will be even greater than the high quality firm s therefore the low quality firm in mimicry has a strong incentive to increase its advertising spending from its optimal level when its true quality is known to deter the low quality firm s mimicking tendency the high quality firm should decrease its advertising spending so that mimicry is not as appealing to the low quality firm as revealing its true quality indeed the high quality firm should reduce its advertising spending so much that it advertises less than the low quality firm in equilibriummany have interpreted signaling as burning money or throwing money down the drain in the case of advertising the claim is that its purpose is simply to show consumers that the firm can afford to squander money on advertising to signal its quality hence the advertising content need not be informative however our results show that simply burning money is not enough to signal quality how the money is burned is also important when advertising raises awareness as well as signals quality saving money rather than burning money is the correct signaling approach although ultimately the high quality firm will sacrifice some profit by reducing its market size the intuition behind this result is that when information is incomplete the high quality firm cannot fully exploit its advantages whenever its advantages in quality and or marginal costs are lessened a firm will want to spend less on advertising

money and product quality under asymmetric information this article examines the effects of money on product quality as well as the price pattern of heterogeneous quality goods in a search theoretical monetary model with divisible money and divisible commodities we establish the existence and uniqueness multiplicity of monetary equilibrium in several different cases the steady state equilibrium of our model displays several properties that are absent or distinct from those of previous studies in particular we find that under egalitarian bargaining the friedman rule cannot achieve socially efficient allocation due to asymmetric information we find that the price of informed high quality goods is higher than the price of uninformed quality goods we also find that an increase in inflation can improve product quality jel e40

strategic pricing signalling and costly information acquisition abstract consider a market where an informed monopolist sets the price for a good or asset with a value unknown to potential buyers upon observing the price buyers may pay some cost for information about the value before deciding on purchases under a belief restriction which generalizes the idea of the cho kreps intuitive criterion we establish a version of the grossman stiglitz paradox there is no separating equilibrium with fully revealing prices yet we also resolve the paradox there is a unique equilibrium and as the cost of information becomes small the equilibrium approaches the full information outcome and prices become perfectly revealing

a latent structure approach to measuring reputation the present study provides estimates of reputation as a dynamic latent variable that is determined by price premiums and market data further it analyzes the effect of extrinsic factors on reputation specifically this study seeks to i quantify the reputation of washington apples over time ii study the dynamic nature of reputation and iii analyze the effect of the label washington apple the model adopted in this study is the dynamic multiple indicator multiple cause dymimic modeling approach which is a special case of the general latent variable modeling scheme called state space models both dymimic and hedonic approaches are applied to the data on washington apples and results from the two approaches are compared reputation plays an important role in assuring product quality in markets where consumers can only imperfectly judge the product quality until after consumption if reputation effects are absent in these types of markets there is an incentive for producers to reduce quality and take short run gains before buyers catch on in order to avoid such quality cutting products with good reputations will sell for premium prices shapiro 1983 showed theoretically that price premiums are necessary for producers to invest in quality and reputation there is an extensive theoretical literature on reputation but empirical studies are limited empirical studies on the impact of firm reputation on shareholder wealth or product demand include jarrell and peltzman 1985 borenstein and zimmerman 1988 and karpoff and lott 1993 caves and green 1996 showed that factors that may affect a firm s reputation influence the relationship between price and quality gorton 1996 analyzed how a bank s reputation for default affects the discount rate on its debt the measurement of the value of reputation to producers in terms of price premiums and how a reputation can be built up and destroyed are important issues that have not been empirically analyzed the current study provides estimates of reputation as a dynamic latent variable that is determined by price premiums and market data further it analyzes the effect of extrinsic factors on reputation steenkamp 1990 points out that consumers observe at the moment of purchase the intrinsic and extrinsic product quality cues but not the quality attributes intrinsic cues are characteristics of the product such as color freshness texture and flavor while extrinsic

consumer information and competition between nonprofit and for profit nursing homes this paper develops implications of arrow s hypothesis that nonprofit organizations are prevalent in health care because of quality uncertainty the model analyzes the ability of nonprofits to mitigate market failures created by asymmetric information in an environment characterized by potential competition from both explicitly for profit firms and for profits in disguise profit motivated firms who obtain nonprofit status in order to exploit the perceived trustworthiness of the nonprofit sector under certain conditions it is shown that nonprofit status can serve as a credible signal of quality and that nonprofits can decrease the underprovision of quality both by providing high quality services and indirectly via a spillover effect on quality in the for profit sector applicability to long term care and implications for empirical research and policy towards nonprofits in health care are discussed

price advertising and the deterioration of product quality arguments in favour of self enforced bans on advertising by professionals often rely on the stylized fact that advertising can communicate information about price but not about quality this being the case it is argued that allowing professionals to advertise runs the risk that firms will compete vigorously over price at the expense of the quality of their product this paper shows that even if price can communicate no information directly about quality it can do so indirectly because price will be a signal of quality because of this allowing advertising is shown to improve consumer welfare

signaling quality through prices in an oligopoly firms signal quality through prices even if the market structure is very competitive and price competition is severe in a symmetric bertrand oligopoly where products may differ only in their quality and each firm s product quality is private information unknown to consumers and to other firms there exist symmetric fully revealing perfect bayesian equilibria where low quality firms randomize over an interval of prices and high quality firms charge high prices signaling requires that the market power and rent of low quality firms be large enough and often this requires that high quality firms exercise sufficient market power there is a unique symmetric fully revealing equilibrium satisfying the d1 criterion in this equilibrium too both low and high quality firms may exhibit considerable market power market power of high quality firms may persist even as the number of firms becomes arbitrarily large every d1 equilibrium involves some revelation of information

bonding and nonbonding signals of product quality this article examines the essential role of bonding in most signaling models where quality is subject to moral hazard problems an advertising model in which advertising is a durable asset whose value is reduced by cheating illustrates how the bonding capacity of a signal determines its cost characteristics of the market that govern how well a signal is targeted to relevant consumers and how information about cheating is spread are critical to determining bonding capacity and hence to the choice among potential signals this bonding perspective explains the literature s widely divergent predictions about the conditions necessary for quality signals copyright 1990 by the university of chicago

competitive price and quality under asymmetric information we present an analysis of equilibrium in markets with asymmetrically informed consumers some consumers know both price and quality of all sellers whereas others know neither but may search among sellers the equilibrium correlation between price and quality generally increases with the level of information in the market and can be negative when this level is sufficiently small a meta analysis of the available empirical studies strongly supports the model s predictions

oligopolistic competition in price and quality abstract we consider an oligopolistic market where firms compete in price and quality and where consumers have heterogeneous information some consumers know both the prices and quality of the products offered some know only the prices and some know neither we show that if there are sufficiently many uninformed consumers then there exists a unique equilibrium where price is a perfect indicator of quality this equilibrium is characterized by dispersion and pareto inefficiency of the price quality offers where better price quality combinations are associated with lower prices

certification under oligopolistic competition in a symmetric duopolistic market where each firm s choice regarding certain quality attributes such as the environmental friendliness of its product is its own private information the extent of horizontal differentiation between firms plays a crucial role in a certifier s optimal certification policy under a non profit certifier it is always the case that both firms produce the highest quality and opt for certification this is also the case under a for profit certifier but only when the degree of horizontal differentiation is sufficiently high when horizontal differentiation is low the for profit certifier by charging a very high certification fee creates maximum vertical differentiation between firms as a result only one firm produces the highest quality and opts for certification whereas the other firm produces the lowest quality and does not opt for certification this asymmetry under a for profit certifier makes the market inefficient which provides one possible explanation for the existence of mostly non profit certifiers in such markets

does demand for product quality increase worker training abstract we uniquely examine the relationship between firm organized training and the sensitivity of consumer demand to product quality cross section panel fixed effect and instrumental variable estimates confirm that british workplaces provide more intensive training when their product demand is more sensitive to product quality robustness checks including using alternative key variable definitions and a counterfactual analysis examining the importance of competing on price support this confirmation

causes and consequences of price premiums existing literature that argues for the prevalence of price premiums is examined an evaluation of an extant model identifies several possible boundary conditions that limit the applicability of the model a set of propositions is developed based on these boundary conditions linking buyer seller and market factors to the magnitude of price premiums that should be available alternative means for empirical testing of the propositions are offered and some implications and applications of this line of thinking for pricing and brand management are described copyright 1996 by university of chicago press

quality uncertainty and informative advertising we present a price signalling model with informative advertising a costly advertisement informs of the good s quality directly and therefore the seller determines the fraction of informed buyers endogenously we show that informative advertising only occurs in pooling equilibria for an advertising pooling equilibrium to exist consumer valuation for high quality advertising cost prior probability that quality is high and inaccuracy of the buyers pre purchase information must be sufficiently high for some parameters there is a unique undefeated advertising pooling equilibrium if advertising is used in equilibrium the adverse selection problem is mitigated

an objective measure of search versus experience goods i introduction search goods and experience goods have been part of the lexicon of economics for twenty years now during this time a substantial body of research has been influenced by nelson s 1970 and 1974 papers which enlarged upon stigler s 1961 seminal paper despite the appeal of the search versus experience dichotomy to members of the economics profession empirical development and application of the concepts involved has not been impressive 1 stigler 1961 argued that consumers efforts to acquire information about the quality or performance of products and vendors are a function of expected benefits and costs nelson s 1970 1974 work attempted to measure the expected benefits and to a lesser extent expected costs to consumers of acquiring product and vendor information unfortunately although this search versus experience dichotomy now is part of economists conventional wisdom it has led to little empirical analysis beyond nelson s investigations the root problem seems to be a lack of agreement over the definition of a search good versus an experience good to nelson 1970 the latter is one whose qualitative characteristics are not ascertainable by buyer inspection prior to purchase thus information about the product s quality or performance can be obtained only through buying and using the item we can however ascertain performance information about search goods prior to purchase porter s 1976 analysis of the acquisition of product information by consumers classified items as convenience and non convenience goods the former are characterized by low unit price and high frequency of purchase the opposite holds for non convenience goods the low unit price of convenience goods implies that relevant performance information will be acquired via sampling experience even though one might be able to acquire the information from other sources but at higher cost an experience good is not such by design rather by virtue of consumer choice in the face of varying informational costs thus porter s measure of the incentive to acquire product vendor information is product price as opposed to nelson s ad hoc search experience dichotomy using porter s classification meisel 1979 argues that the degree to which consumers efforts to acquire information take the form of search rather than sampling experience depends on the expected costs and benefits for any given product similarly laband 1986 argues that consumer demand for product and vendor information in advance of purchase is affected by both price and frequency of purchase nelson s classification scheme is at odds with his definitions for example he regards food as an experience item although much relevant information about it is available prior to purchase 2 product classification is admittedly ambiguous e g jewelry and silverware in fact the search vs experience classification more logically represents the two extremes of product classification with most items falling somewhere in between by subdividing experience goods into durable and nondurable categories nelson 1974 validates this assertion given this ambiguity it is understandable that empirical research in this nexus of producer consumer interaction has been limited to use the search experience classification for empirical analysis one must either borrow nelson s existing scheme which is limited in product coverage or create new product classifications which are of dubious merit on the other hand the porter meisel analyses which do provide the micro foundations of consumer behavior in the face of uncertain product vendor quality have never supplanted or integrated nelson s work into their broader framework the purpose of this paper is to bridge these two strands of the advertising as information literature i argue that the discussion of search versus experience goods and more importantly the behavior of buyers and sellers is driven by the cost to the buyer of a disappointing purchase

reliability pricing and quality control abstract the purpose of this paper is to construct a theoretical framework which allows a manufacturer to examine the tradeoffs between pricing reliability design and quality control issues in particular the paper investigates effects of risk aversion on the relative prominence of one or the other policy instruments in addition the results of extensive numerical analyses are presented relating basic managerial guidelines with price reliability and quality control

how changes in labor demand affect unemployed workers this study analyzes the manner in which certain favorable shifts in labor demand affect job search although all shifts increase reservation wages they do not necessarily decrease expected unemployment spell durations and increase expected post unemployment wages so that upward sloping short run phillips curves may occur a result due to chamberlain is used to demonstrate that if the wage offer distribution is restricted to be logconcave two of the shifts guarantee downward sloping phillips curves for one of these two shifts previous research by flinn and heckman used logconcavity in a different manner to achieve properly shaped phillips curves

certification and market transparency we provide elementary insights into the effectiveness of certification to increase market transparency in a market with opaque product quality sellers use certification as a signaling device while buyers use it as an inspection device this difference alone implies that seller certification yields more transparency and higher social welfare under buyer certification profit maximizing certifiers further limit transparency but because seller certification yields larger profits active regulation concerning the mode of certification is not needed these findings are robust and widely applicable to for instance patents automotive parts and financial products

using game theory to model competition the article is an exposition of the basic concepts of noncooperative game theory and their application to advertising product and price competition

intercountry comparisons of labor force trends and of related developments an overview this paper is a survey of analyses of women s labor force growth in 12 industrialized countries originally presented at a conference in sussex england in june 1983 the main focus of the conference papers and of the current survey is on growth of the labor force of married women in the years 1960 80 trends in fertility wages and family instability also receive attention as related developments married women s labor force growth is observed in all countries except for the ussr after 1970 where labor force rates of women reached the level of men growth rates differ among countries they apparently respond to growth in real wages and to growth in education but response elasticities differ among countries estimates of these elasticities contained in the country papers were helpful in predicting the trends other findings include ubiquitous declines in fertility and growth of divorce in the 1970s both developments are related to long run labor force growth in all countries wages of women were lo

quality indicators in theory and in fact abstract in recent literature it has been suggested that consumers need have no knowledge of product quality as a number of quality indicators or signals may be used as substitutes very little attention has been paid to the empirical verification of these studies the present paper is devoted to the issue of how well these indicators perform using market data provided by consumer magazines from 3 countries the results strongly indicate that price is a poor quality indicator the paper also presents some evidence which suggests that seller reputation and easily observable characteristics are also poor indicators

eliciting and utilizing willingness to pay evidence from field trials in northern ghana we utilize the becker degroot marschak 1964 mechanism to estimate the willingness to pay for clean drinking water technology in northern ghana the bdm mechanism has attractive properties for empirical research allowing us to directly estimate demand compute heterogeneous treatment effects and study the screening and causal effects of prices with minor modifications to a standard field experiment setting we demonstrate the implementation of bdm along these three dimensions compare it to the standard take it or leave it method for eliciting willingness to pay and discuss practical issues for implementing the mechanism in true field settings jel classifications c93 d12 d82 l11 l31

welfare gains from quality certification of infant foods results from a market experiment in mali in low income countries malnutrition is often most severe among infants of six to twenty four months they need higher density foods than the family diet but density is a credence attribute we hypothesize that the premium now paid for heavily advertised brands reflects demand for quality assurance which could be provided at lower cost to competing firms through third party certification we use a new market experiment to find that mothers average willingness to pay for certification is about 1 75 kg or four times its cost so that total economic surplus gains from introducing certification to mali would be on the order of 1 million annually

fishing in different pools job search strategies and job finding success in canada in the early 1980s this article examines the job search methods of jobless workers and emphasizes sample selectivity in choice of job search strategies especially use of public employment agencies longitudinal data from the labour force survey of canada for 1981 1983 and 1986 indicate that job search methods change with the business cycle and that many people find jobs without any reported search the determinants of job search success also vary substantially over the business cycle implying a substantial social return to public employment agencies at the 1983 trough of the recession but no noticeable benefits when aggregate unemployment is relatively low

public employment agencies and unemployment spells reconciling the experimental and nonexperimental evidence econometric evidence strongly suggests that unemployed job seekers who use the services of a public employment agency pea have longer unemployment spells than those choosing alternative search methods yet in some well designed u s experiments increased use of pea services has been associated with faster transitions intojobs the author argues that the nonexperimental studies may be biased toward finding a positive relationship between unemployment spell duration and pea use because they ignore the possibility that peas are chosen by manyjobseekers only after other search methods have been tried unsuccessfully and a period of unemployment has elapsed an analysis of u k survey data with information on the timing of pea use in 1987 88 supports that hypothesis

price quality and reputation evidence from an online field experiment we examine the link between price quality seller claims and seller reputation in internet auctions after purchasing actual baseball cards and having them professionally graded we find that some buyers in the online graded market are misled by incredible claims of quality they pay higher prices but do not receive better quality and in fact are defrauded more often online seller reputation is effective for identifying good faith sellers but conditional on completed auctions reputable sellers do not provide better quality evidence also suggests that high claim sellers target less experienced buyers we attribute these patterns to two loopholes in the ebay rating system we benefited from the comments of austan goolsbee raphael thomadsen john shea dan vincent david reiley larry ausubel peter cramton v joseph hotz jeff smith jimmy chan vincent crawford mark duggan and attendees at numerous seminars and conferences we are particularly grateful to seth sanders and john list for their constructive advice at the early stage of the research to timothy bresnahan rachel kranton and thomas hubbard for their detailed suggestions in reshaping earlier versions and to editor ariel pakes and two anonymous referees for their careful readings special thanks to eight friends who acted as our agents in purchasing baseball cards in retail markets and to numerous sports card store owners who shared their insights on the sportscard industry excellent research assistance from randy alexander moore and krzysztof fizyta is gratefully acknowledged any remaining errors are ours

experience dependent information diffusion and product quality in a monopoly market for an experience good the diffusion of product quality information may depend on whether or not the information is favorable to capture this asymmetry our model uses as its information source a quality survey which suffers from response bias consumers may attempt to adjust for bias but are not required to do so correctly as a result quality under perfect information need not be and usually will not be higher than quality under imperfect information in addition the externality exerted by informed consumers on uninformed consumers may not be the traditional beneficial externality jel l15

on the informational role of quantities durable goods and consumers word of mouth communication a dynamic incomplete information game is set up to study the introduction of a durable good when consumers can learn its quality from previous buyers high sales today imply fewer potential buyers tomorrow but each buyer will have better information about the good consumers are fully rational and can update their beliefs even when they do not directly receive information in equilibrium no news is bad news a low quality firm follows a fly by night strategy randomizing over the timing of sales a high quality firm spreads out its sales more smoothly solving a stochastic dynamic programming problem copyright 1997 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

informal job search and black youth unemployment in this paper i analyze how young black and white unemployed jobseekers use various methods of search and the employment outcomes which result from their use the focus is on distinguishing informal search methods i e friends and relatives or direct application without referral from more formal ones in analyzing racial differences the results show that the two informal methods of search account for about 90 of the difference in employment probabilities between white and black youth this also accounts for 57 71 of the difference in unemployment rates between the two furthermore most of these results reflect differences in the ability of these methods to generate job offers as opposed to differences in search effort or job acceptance rates however our ability to explain these differences through personal family and household characteristics was generally quite limited this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

prices as signals of product quality this paper is concerned with the provision of quality in markets in which consumers have only imperfect information the analysis focuses on a market for a product that can be produced at different quality levels all consumers prefer higher to lower quality but they may differ in their willingness to pay for quality producers can produce any quality they like but higher qualities are more costly to produce the information in this market is imperfect in the sense that the exact quality chosen by a firm is known only to the firm itself some information about the quality of a firm s product will however reach its potential customers even if they do not make any special effort to acquire it within the framework suggested here two conclusions are drawn first prices may serve as signals which exactly differentiate the available quality levels that is there exists a fulfilledexpectations equilibrium at which each price signals a unique quality level second the pricesignals are not arbitrary each price signal exceeds the marginal cost of producing the quality it signals such a mark up depends on the nature of the product specific information received by consumers the poorer the information the higher the mark up

a note on the strategic transmission of endogenous information abstract crawford and sobel 1982 discuss the role of the transmission of unverifiable information it is shown that when the information is about the players actions this kind of communication does not affect the outcome of the game

information transmission in regulated markets the seminal papers of vincent p crawford and joel sobel 1982 and jerry green and nancy stokey 1980 study models in which a signal about the state of the world is transmitted from a perfectly informed sender to an uninformed receiver the authors study a model in which multiple signalers compete for consumers the authors ask how much information is revealed how consumers shopping around affects this information and how each is affected by incentives an implication of the model is that in a price regulated market for health care patients should not be prohibited from gathering more than one opinion

price and quality in a new product monopoly in a signal extraction model of consumer behaviour higher prices signal higher quality products for a new product monopoly even without cost asymmetries across different qualities moreover higher quality products earn greater expected profits and the monopolist has an incentive to provide even transient improvements in quality finally the monopolist has a positive incentive to conduct market research about quality and produces more information than is socially optimal

flexible parametric estimation of duration and competing risk models in this paper we specify and estimate a flexible parametric proportional hazards model the model specification is flexibly parametric in the sense that the baseline hazard is non parametric while the effect of the covariates takes a particular functional form we also add parametric heterogeneity to the underlying hazard model specification we specify a flexible parametric proportional competing risks model which permits unrestricted correlation among the risks unemployment duration data are then analysed using the flexible parametric duration and competing risks specifications we find an important effect arising from the exhaustion of unemployment insurance and significantly different hazards for the two types of risks new jobs and recalls

information in cournot signaling with incomplete control abstract we embed signaling in the classical cournot model in which several firms sell a homogeneous good the quality is known to all the firms but only to some buyers the quantity setting firms can manipulate the price to signal quality because there is only one price in a market for a homogeneous good each firm incompletely controls the price signal through the quantity decision we characterize the unique signaling cournot equilibrium in which the price signals quality to the uninformed buyers we then compare the signaling cournot equilibrium with the full information cournot equilibrium signaling is shown to increase the equilibrium price moreover under certain conditions regarding the composition of buyers the number of firms and the distribution of costs across firms the effects of signaling and market externality cancel each other in other words the profits under signaling cournot equal the profits of a cartel in a full information environment

report cards the impact of providing school and child test scores on educational markets this paper studies study the impact of providing school and child test scores on subsequent test scores prices and enrollment in markets with multiple public and private providers a randomly selected half of the sample villages markets received report cards this increased test scores by 0 11 standard deviations decreased private school fees by 17 percent and increased primary enrollment by 4 5 percent heterogeneity in the treatment impact by initial school quality is consistent with canonical models of asymmetric information information provision facilitates better comparisons across providers improves market efficiency and raises child welfare through higher test scores higher enrollment and lower fees

indexing product quality issues theory and results jn the concept of quality and the efficiency of markets for consumer products hjorth andersen 1984 strongly condemns the use of overall productquality rankings such as those published by consumer reports as a basis for scientific research his primary criticism is that creating an index of quality as a weighted average of subscores is usually misleading he claims that this averaging process is unjustified except for brands that occupy approximately the same rank position on each attribute this article reviews hjorth andersen s arguments and identifies several important related questions on the use of published quality ratings in academic research statistical theory is developed to demonstrate that hjorth andersen s conclusions are limited and to examine the precise conditions under which his conclusions hold empirical evidence is presented that reveals the statistical frequency in real markets of the logical conditions deduced using our theory our conclusions differ significantly from those drawn by hjorthandersen a debate about the efficacy of quality indices is relevant not only to academic research but also to consumer welfare and strategic marketing planning consumer welfare and choice is affected by published quality ratings archibald haulman and moody 1983 beales et al 1981 thorelli and thorelli 1977 commercial importance is evident from the widespread distribution of magazines like consumer reports the consumer testing movement started in 1927 by chase and schlink has spread to agencies in more than 50 nations these agencies are members of the international organization of consumers unions iocu and the combined circulation of their magazines is in the millions published quality ratings also influence academic research our literature review identified more than 30 studies that use objective quality ratings as data from which to draw inferences about price versus quality tradeoffs advertising versus quality interactions price versus quality changes over product life cycles brand switching market efficiency and rational consumer judgments since this review concentrated on the marketing and economics literature it is likely that the role of published quality ratings in academic research has been underestimated in any case academic researchers can and should assist product testing agencies in understanding sources of potential error in their quality scales strategic research such as that conducted by the strategic planning institute at harvard university has focused management attention on the influence of product quality on market performance measures like market share and rate of return on investment for example phillips chang and buzzell 1983 indicate that product quality influences a firm s market share directly and its rate of return on investment indirectly through market share see also day 1986 farris and reibstein 1979 urban et al 1984 it is important that future research define coherently and measure accurately the construct of quality

inattentive consumers and product quality this paper studies a model in which some consumers shop on the basis of price alone without attention to potential differences in product quality a firm may offer a low quality product to exploit these inattentive consumers in the unique symmetric equilibrium of the model firms choose prices with mixed strategies similarly to varian 1980 in which some consumers purchase from a random seller without attention to market prices in our model though firms also choose quality stochastically and there is both price and quality dispersion two stylized policy interventions are considered competition policy which acts to increase the number of sellers and market transparency reforms which act to increase the fraction of attentive consumers with fewer inattentive consumers firms are less likely to cheat i e cut quality which therefore improves welfare but profit and consumer surplus can either increase or decrease when there is a large number of sellers approximately half the sellers cheat regardless of the fraction of inattentive consumers and introducing more sellers boosts consumers surplus and reduces profit while the impact on welfare is ambiguous

response to competitive entry a rationale for delayed defensive reaction empirical studies examining responses to new product entries come to the puzzling conclusion that in general an incumbent reacts to a new entrant after a significant delay even easy to implement price cuts are observed after significant lag following entry these findings seem to contradict the existing literature that either implicitly assumes or strongly advocates immediate defensive responses to limit competitive encroachment when a competing firm enters the market consumers may be uncertain about the entering firm s product quality the incumbent firm through rigorous tests may fully know the entrant s quality suppose the incumbent aggressively lowers price this may cause the consumers to wonder if indeed the entrant s quality is high in other words an incumbent s reaction may cause the consumers to make inferences about the entrant s quality such strategic implications of the incumbent s reactions have to be carefully analyzed before determining the optimal response by the incumbent in this paper we propose a conceptual framework for understanding differences in the magnitude and timing of incumbents responses to competitive entries we consider a model in which a monopolist incumbent firm faces competitive entry the incumbent firm knows the true quality of the entrant with certainty although consumers are aware of the incumbent s product quality through their prior experience they are initially uncertain of the entrant s product quality in such a situation a high quality entrant has the incentive to signal her true quality through her strategic price choice however the uncertainty about the entrant s quality is favorable to the incumbent in the sense that consumers believe with a high probability that the entrant s quality is low as a result the strategic incentives facing the incumbent and the entrant oppose each other while the entrant wants to signal her high quality the incumbent wants to prevent her from doing so we demonstrate that one way the incumbent can prevent the quality signaling is to select a higher than his optimal competitive duopoly price in other words the incumbent can prevent or jam the entrant s quality signaling by choosing a price higher than his optimal competitive price when consumers are fully informed about the entrant s true quality though the signal jamming price is lower than the monopoly price the price is substantially higher than the competitive price this marginal reduction in the incumbent s price from the pre entry monopolistic price represents a muted or lack of response by the incumbent to the competitive entry however once the entrant s quality gets revealed in subsequent periods through consumer usage and word of mouth the entrant has no incentive to engage in quality signaling and the incumbent has no incentive to jam it therefore the market reverts to the complete information competitive prices and the incumbent lowers his price considerably this temporal pattern of muted price reduction in the first period followed by a sharp price reduction in the second period corresponds to a delayed defensive reaction in our model although the empirical studies suggest that the delayed reaction may arise due to factors such as managerial inertia or indecision we demonstrate that such a behavior is indeed an optimal strategy for a profit maximizing firm thus our model reconciles empirical results with the equilibrium outcome of a strategic analytical framework furthermore in an experimental setting we test the predictive power of our framework and establish that consumers indeed form conjectures about the entrant s quality based on the incumbent s reactions in the first experimental study we find strong support for the notion that the incumbent s price reaction may indicate entrant s quality in a follow up study we observe that whenever the incumbent lowers prices respondents judge the quality of the entrant to be higher as compared to the case when prices are the same or increased the managerial implication of this paper is that well established incumbent firms should be cautious in the implementation of their defensive responses to product introductions of uncertain quality by competitors of particular concern are situations where the reactions are easily observable by consumers a strong reaction may suggest that the incumbent takes the competitive threat seriously leading consumers to believe in the quality of the competitor s product

contextual inference in markets on the informational content of product lines context can influence decisions this malleability of choice is usually invoked as evidence that people do not maximize stable preference orderings in a market equilibrium however context conveys payoff relevant information to consumers consequently these consumers rationally violate naive formulations of standard choice theoretic principles i identify informational asymmetries under which apparently anomalous behaviors namely the compromise effect and choice overload arise as market equilibria firms respond to consumers contextual inference in case of the compromise effect a firm may introduce premium loss leaders expensive goods of overly high quality that increase the demand for other goods

selective reporting of factual content by commercial media the authors study the market for factual content and examine whether competition increases or decreases its provision factual content is supplied by commercial media firms which observe a set of facts depicting the state of the world and selectively decide how to report them consumers value content that matches their opinion which incentivizes media firms to slant their reports by omitting certain facts novel features in the authors model include consumers ability to anticipate the media s incentives for slant and the requirement that all media stances must be supported by facts furthermore consumers find reports with more facts to be more convincing despite consumers ability to detect slant and their demand for factual support the research shows that competition results in consumers reading fewer facts and being unable to update their prior beliefs about the state of the world the authors also find that a monopoly medium may be more polarizing than competitive media and that polarized report

reconciling quantile autoregressions of firm size and variance size scaling the aim of this paper is to understand what economic mechanisms may cause the law of proportionate effect to break down for fast growing and shrinking firms recent evidence has highlighted that the first order coefficients of quantile auto regression of firm size decline across quantiles our theoretical results show that negative variance size scaling is sufficient to yield a decline in quantile auto regression coefficients if firm log size is laplace distributed conditional on size one period ahead however it is sufficient only for declining auto regression coefficients for fast growing firms under asymmetric laplace conditional log size if skewness is decreasing with size in other words if the growth of large firms is less dispersed and more left skewed size is a disadvantage for the growth of fast growers but not necessarily an advantage for fast decliners thus size related determinants of negative growth skewness such as diseconomies of growth market power and managerial attention issues impact on how the lpe is violated using data on dutch manufacturing companies from the business register of enterprises observed between 1994 and 2004 our empirical estimates of quantile regression models confirm the evidence of declining quantile regression coefficients for small medium firms 20 199 employees mainly in the right most quantiles and for the same subsample we find that growth rates variance and skewness are decreasing with size the theoretical propositions of the paper are thus corroborated

sweet lemons illusory quality self deceivers advertising and price the author s study suggests that competition can lead to low quality advertisers competing against and gaining market shares from lower priced high quality non advertisers evidence in support of

internet job search and unemployment durations after decades of stability the technologies used by workers to locate new jobs began to change rapidly with the diffusion of internet access in the late 1990 s which types of persons incorporated the internet into their job search strategy and did searching for work on line help these workers find new jobs faster we address these questions using measures of internet job search derived from the december 1998 and august 2000 cps computer and internet supplements matched with job search outcomes from subsequent cps files we find that internet searchers are positively selected on observables but negatively selected on unobservables a beneficial unemployment duration reducing causal effect of internet job search is consistent with our estimates only if negative selection on unobservables is especially strong in other words only if the population of on line resumes is strongly adversely selected

search method use by unemployed youth this article presents a search model which shows that search method choices should be related to their costs and expected productivities as well as to nonwage income and wage offer distributions the empirical evidence then shows that the most frequently used search methods i e friends and relatives and direct applications without referral are also the most productive in generating offers and acceptances the number of methods used is affected by factors that presumably reflect opportunities as well as income sources and needs specific methods are chosen in a manner that generates positive average effects on outcomes for those using them

unemployment insurance and unemployment spells this paper tests the effects of the level and length of unemployment insurance benefits on unemployment durations the paper particularly studies individual behavior during the weeks just prior to when benefits lapse higher unemployment insurance benefits are found to have a strong negative effect on the probability of leaving unemployment however the probability of leaving unemployment rises dramatically just prior to when benefits lapse individual data are used with accurate information of spell durations and the level and length of benefits the semiparametric estimation techniques used in the paper yield more plausible estimates than conventional approaches and provide useful diagnostics copyright 1990 by the econometric society

price signals quality the case of perfectly inelastic demand abstract this paper considers the pricing decision by a seller who has private information about quality demand is perfectly inelastic rectangular for example there may be a single buyer who wants exactly one unit and whose valuation is known by the seller it is noted that contrary to widespread belief separating equilibria do exist in this model allowing some trade of high quality products even when the average quality is low moreover by slightly perturbing demand we can use standard equilibrium refinements to uniquely select the best separating equilibrium outcome since the chosen outcome has a very simple structure regardless of the number of quality levels this model could be a useful workhorse in applications

gender differences in displacement cost evidence and implications this paper uses a unique and newly available data set on displaced workers to estimate differences in the wage costs of displacement between women and men while predisplacement wages rise at about the same rate with tenure for women as men in this data set women lose more from displacement than men and the magnitude of this loss increases with tenure overall we interpret our results as not supportive of the specific capital hypothesis that women accumulate less firmspecific human capital than men and we suggest that future attempts to explain our result focus on gender differences in the process of search for a new job

revolutionary effects of new information technologies in markets with imperfect information and heterogeneity the information technology affects the rate at which agents meet which affects the distribution of production technologies across firms multiple equilibria may arise because the reservation utility and the lowest production technology in use affect each other the adoption of novel information technologies may then entail a revolution in the sense of a move from an inefficient to equilibrium inefficient production technologies are swiftly moved even in sectors where the new information technology has only recently been introduced the results apply to consumer products labour intermediates and institutions royal economic society 2006

exploiting naivete about self control in the credit market we develop a model of the credit market where competitive lenders oer long term contracts specifying a non linear schedule of possible repayment schedules to borrowers who may dier both in their taste for immediate gratication and their prior beliefs about that taste the equilibrium contract to a borrower with given beliefs is discontinuous it features an advantageous option involving fast repayment and a penalty for deviating and repaying later these predictions seem to resemble some salient features of many credit card and mortgage contracts for fully sophisticated borrowers the discontinuity acts as a commitment device and yields fast repayment but all other borrowers even those with an arbitrarily small amount of naivete end up delaying repayment despite the penalty and receive little benet from commitment furthermore because they believe they will repay early they underestimate the cost of credit and hence borrow too much non sophisticated borrowers cross subsidize sophisticated borrowers while sophisticated borrowers discipline rms by preventing very exploitative contracts we identify natural conditions under which the above results obtain even if

upskilling do employers demand greater skill when workers are plentiful using a proprietary database of online job postings we find that education and experience requirements rose during the great recession these increases were larger in states and occupations that e

modeling competitive marketing strategies the impact of marketing mix relationships and industry structure this paper empirically analyzes the formulation of competitive marketing strategies consisting of product quality levels promotional expenditures and prices using a simultaneous equation model we examine the use of prices and promotional spending as signals or indications of product quality the impact of promotional spending on prices and the impact of industry structure on the formulation of the complete marketing mix the structural equations are developed using a theoretical model of optimal competitive marketing mix and are estimated using business level pims data which consists largely of industrial durable goods producers for a cross section of 1 100 of these businesses three results of the estimation are especially interesting price cost margins are high for high quality products suggesting that high prices indicate or signal high quality promotional intensity is unrelated to product quality suggesting that promotional effort provides no reliable signals of quality intensely promoted products earn low price cost margins however indicating that promotional spending is associated with high price sensitivity quality levels promotional intensity and price cost margins vary significantly with competitive and market conditions such as the concentration of competitors and the stability of market shares although these relationships are generally weaker than relationships between quality promotion and price cost margins quality levels are high and margins low in markets with unstable shares or unconcentrated competitors

strategic pricing with rational inattention to quality this paper studies both theoretically and experimentally the pricing strategy of a rm that faces a consumer who is rationally inattentive to product quality sims 2003 in a standard sequential pricing game rational inattention to quality produces two types of mixed strategy perfect bayesian equilibria one where sellers pool at a low price and buyers are fully inattentive to quality and one where there is semi pooling at a high price and buyers are selectively attentive to quality i characterize these

signaling private choices for many applications of signalling senders rather than nature choose unobserved features such as their private choices of quality capacity investment contract or price along with other actions that are partially observed by receivers despite the large number of different applications these games have not been studied in any systematic way we identify and study a general class of such games which we call endogenous signalling games these games normally suffer from a plethora of equilibria to focus on reasonable equilibria we propose to solve such games by requiring that the solution be invariant to a particular reordering of the senders moves for a class of single sender monotone endogenous signalling games we show that the sender s private choice can still have some commitment value even though it is not observed and that the sender s signals must be exaggerated in equilibrium applications to loss leader pricing costly announcements limit pricing advertising corporate financing and private contracting are given

pricing and signaling with frictions abstract we study a market where each seller chooses the quality and price of goods and the number of selling sites observing sellers choices of prices and sites but not quality buyers choose which site to visit a seller s choices of prices can direct buyers search and signal quality a unique equilibrium exists and is separating when the quality differential is large the equilibrium implements the efficient allocation with public information otherwise the quality of goods and or the number of sites created is inefficient due to a conflict between the search directing and signaling roles of prices