efficiency considerations and the exemption of food from sales and value added taxes we evaluate efficiency considerations underlying the widespread exemption of food from sales and value added taxes and the implications for tax policy household and restau rant meals and both constant and increasing returns cases are examined higher taxes on food offset the non taxation of time inputs into household production even under constant returns to scale with increasing returns gains from taxing food are higher and amplified by subsidizing restaurant food and all marginal cost components of restaurant meals on effi ciency grounds exemption of food from sales and value added taxes emerges as socially costly policy especially under increasing returns

eco labelling by a for profit certifier countervailing power and its consequences for profit certifier s eco labelling is common in industries where firms have some countervailing power on sharing gains from labelling we show that the certification standard for an environmental quality is lowered when firms have strong power a certifier with too low bargaining power will prefer to sell to the best offer rather than bargain this switch in the selling mechanism also thwarts his incentives in setting the standard this is consequential for evaluating policies the dimensions and even signs of welfare changes induced by taxes and subsidies depend upon the mechanism used and ultimately upon firms countervailing power

environmental quality competition and eco labeling abstract a three stage game of investment environmental quality provision and price competition is developed to study the impact of green technology investment eco labeling in a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation the firms incentives to invest in green technologies depend on their relative cost structure when firms are identical with respect to fixed costs both firms will always invest but if one firm is more efficient in investing then the other firm may or may not invest depending on the level of unit cost of investment quality competition will be tighter when the low quality firm is more efficient and looser when the high quality firm is more efficient in investing socially optimal investment for both firms is always positive but lower than in the duopoly solution in the absence of environmental externalities the quality dispersion chosen by profit maximizing firms may be too high or too low while environmental externalities increase the possibility low quality dispersion that is too low within the market solution finally and importantly ecolabeling can be used as a means of reducing excessive investment and increasing environmental quality that is too low

trade gmos and environmental risk are current policies likely to improve welfare food with inputs from genetically modified organisms gmos has met considerable skepticism among european union eu consumers the eu import ban on gm food has triggered a great deal of controversy and has been partly replaced by a mandatory labeling scheme although there is no measure in the general agreement on tariffs and trade that directly addresses the use of product labeling wto and others have been skeptical to mandatory product labeling on the grounds that they may be used as hidden protectionism hampering global welfare this study has two foci first we examine how different policies for the production and use of gmos might influence the market outcome in consumer food markets second we evaluate the welfare effects of the policy measures we find that mandatory labeling often increases domestic welfare and may also enhance global welfare on the other hand a trade ban is more likely to decrease global welfare

new perspectives on public finance recent achievements and future challenges abstract the advances in the economics of the public sector during the past quarter century have been as pronounced as in any field within economics public finance has become a rigorous branch of applied microeconomics incorporating the best thinking and most advanced tools of both theoretical economics and econometrics in the remarks below i will focus on a few key areas in applied and theoretical tax and expenditure policy drawing both upon the academic work of myself and others and my experiences in the policy arena both as chairman of the council of economic advisers and as chief economist of the world bank i shall address both the questions of what we have learned in the past few decades as well as the questions where further research is needed

optimal tax policy under environmental quality competition this paper studies the socially optimal emission and commodity tax policy when consumers are willing to pay a price premium for environmentally friendlier variants of a commodity vertically differentiated in environmental quality the first best levels of quality can be obtained by a combination of a uniform ad valorem tax and an emission tax or a subsidy for buying green products the first best emission tax is higher than the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality regardless of environmentally conscious consumers if only one instrument is available the second best emission tax is equal to the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality a uniform ad valorem tax increases welfare only if the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality is low enough

how should commodities be taxed a supergame theoretic analysis abstract this paper studies the impact of commodity taxes on the sustainability of collusion in imperfectly competitive markets we consider both a cournot and a bertrand supergame with discounting with collusion being supported by either grim trigger strategies or stick and carrot optimal punishments we show that irrespective of firms choice variable and under both punishment schemes increased reliance on ad valorem taxation makes it easier for firms to sustain a collusive agreement contrary to the conventional wisdom according to which ad valorem taxation should be preferred on welfare grounds we find that welfare under specific taxation might be higher than welfare under ad valorem taxation the main conclusion of our analysis is that traditional welfare results on the comparison between ad valorem and specific taxation based on static models do not necessarily survive in a dynamic setting where the possibility of collusion among firms is taken into account in response to an increase in the ad valorem tax rate sufficiently patient firms might find it rational to form an implicit cartel which would not have existed otherwise

the scope of imf conditionality international organizations are governed by two parallel sets of rules formal rules which embody consensual procedures and informal rules which allow exceptional access for powerful countries a new data set drawn from the imf s records of conditionality provides an opportunity to study the bargaining process within an important international organization and answer questions about the institution s autonomy i find evidence of u s influence which operates to constrain condition ality but only in important countries that are vulnerable enough to be willing to draw on their influence with the united states in ordinary countries under ordinary circumstances broad authority is delegated to the imf which adjusts conditionality to accommodate local circumstances and domestic political opposition the imf has refrained from exploiting the vulnerability of particular countries to maximize the scope of conditionality international organizations have become increasingly important actors in inter national politics they have proliferated have expanded in membership have acquired new legal enforcement powers and have extended their reach into the details of domestic political economy in their member states af ew including the international monetary fund imf or simply the fund command significant resources and wield considerable authority some critics have argued that these international organizations are sufficiently autonomous to create a democratic def icit at the international level as they pursue a vision of undemocratic liberal ism 1 other critics have argued that international organizations are nothing more than instruments in the hands of powerful states 2 these critiques of course cannot simultaneously be true and both run into difficulties the puzzle that the rogue agency view cannot explain is why the principals have chosen to delegate so much authority in principal agent terms this view posits that both screening and monitoring have failed the principals are unable to select agents with preferences similar to their own and are unable

environmental tax in a green market we examine the impact of an emission tax in a green market characterized by consumers environmental awareness and competition between firms for both environmental quality and product prices the unique aspect of this model comes from the assumption that the cost for an increase in quality is fixed we show that the emission tax improves welfare thanks to a decline in pollution and despite an accentuation of product differentiation the higher the marginal environmental damage is the higher the optimal tax will be the optimal tax however becomes lower than the marginal damage when the market is not too large finally when marginal environmental damage is not too low the optimal tax leads to a green product monopoly

extended producer responsibility and green marketing an application to packaging assuming a duopoly market where the producers use packaging recyclability to vertically differentiated their product we analyse the efficiency of an extended producer responsibility epr to deliver optimal choices of packaging in this paper the epr means that the producers bear the social disposal cost of packaging waste resulting from households consumption of their product disposal of household packaging waste comprises sorting and treatment operations therefore the social disposal cost is the sum of both the sorting and the dumping costs we confirm that an epr is not an optimal policy and then we show that an optimal policy couples an epr to two bonus penalty systems the first one reduces the sorting cost borne by the producers the second one affects the dumping cost borne by the producers this optimal policy entails that the producers bear a disposal cost higher respectively lower than the social disposal cost when improving packaging recyclability is cost reducing respectively costly

commodity taxation in a differentiated oligopoly the authors introduce commodity taxation into a vertical differentiation model with endogenous product selection they show that a uniform ad valorem tax lowers both qualities distorts the allocation of consumers between firms and lowers the consumer prices of both variants a small uniform tax is always welfare improving over the no tax equilibrium a differentiation of tax rates may or may not be desirable on welfare grounds if a welfare improvement is possible through a nonuniform tax it is always the high quality variant that must be taxed at a higher rate copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

capital distribution and macroeconomics core beliefs and theoretical foundations the paper suggests an alternative benchmark model or microfoundations for theorising about macroeconomic phenomena in the case of competitive equilibria this alternative reflects a classical sraffian explanation of relative prices this approach also provides a coherent framework for the analysis of the choice of technique in a multi commodity setting in turn it leads to results which throw into question a number of key propositions of conventional macro theory including the notion of a long run self correcting mechanism for involuntary unemployment in the presence of wage and price flexibility the paper argues that a classical sraffian approach provides a means of reconciling keynesian results with competitive outcomes copyright 2004 oxford university press

on commodity taxation in vertically differentiated markets abstract we examine the impact of commodity taxation on vertically differentiated product markets when entry is allowed we show that an ad valorem tax may have a dramatic effect on market structure by inducing the entry of a large number of firms in what was previously a natural monopoly the producers of high quality products reduce market share after an increase in their unit production cost leaving more room for lower quality products while within a given market structure aggregate quality decreases monotonically with the tax rate quality jumps upwards at tax rates that cause a change in market structure

on the taxation of polluting products in a differentiated industry this paper studies the provision of environmental quality in an imperfectly competitive market it uses a vertical differentiation model in which the free entry equilibrium results in an under provision of quality the following main results are obtained first a commodity tax may have a significant impact on the market structure in this setting it tends to increase the number of active firms second through its impact on market structure a commodity tax may be welfare improving even though quality creates a positive externality third a commodity tax may bring about an equilibrium that is arbitrarily close to a pareto efficient allocation

quality and quantity competition in a multiproduct duopoly author affiliation yi ling cheng ylcheng thu edu twshin kun peng speng econ sinica edu tw acknowledgment we are most grateful to three anonymous referees who generously offered a number of insightful comments to improve this article we have also benefited much from fruitful discussions with takatoshi tabuchi hong hwang and toshihiro matsumura which led to significant improvements in this article we are especially indebted to takatoshi tabuchi for his contributive comments and suggestions finally we would like to thank conference participants at 2010 association for public economic theory in istanbul society for the advancement of economic theory in singapore as well as seminar participants at institute of economics academia sinica and national taiwan university financial support from academia sinica and the national science council taiwan is gratefully acknowledged the usual disclaimer applies 1 introductionmost of the literature dealing with vertical product differentiation such as bonanno 1986 and motta 1993 assumes that each firm can produce only one product however multiproduct firms abound in the real world firms in various industries produce multiple quality differentiated goods for example mercedes benz provides three different classes of sedans namely its c class e class and s class and bmw has its 3 series 5 series and 7 series in addition both lenovo and sony supply around 20 kinds of laptops ranked in accordance with their central processing units and outfits 1a casual survey of the empirical evidence also suggests that any two multiproduct oligopolies usually differentiate the qualities of their products and the patterns of their quality differentiation can be classified into the segmented type and the nonsegmented type the former type implies that the products of one firm are always of higher quality and more highly priced than those of the other firm such as the sedans of bmw and honda all the sedans sold by bmw are more expensive and of higher quality than those of honda the latter type denotes completely different patterns where the products produced by the two firms have interlacing patterns of their prices qualities for example the prices of the mercedes benz c e and s classes are respectively 32 900 52 700 and 87 800 while the prices of bmw s 3 5 and 7 series are given as 33 600 45 800 and 80 300 respectively 2 the prices of their sedans are interlaced and it is inferred that their qualities are interlaced and nonsegmented other examples include the whiskey offered by johnnie walker and edrington and the plasma televisions provided by samsung and sony the nonsegmented patterns of differentiation between the multiproduct firms with similar technological capabilities are very common in reality however the related literature has not shed enough light studying them while the segmented type of quality differentiation has been characterized by champsaur and rochet 1989 1990 with a quality then price competition of multiproduct duopolists the nonsegmented one so far has not been captured and explained in the literature 3therefore this article intends to examine the equilibrium qualities as well as the number of products chosen by the multiproduct firms with identical similar technological capabilities such as mercedes benz and bmw our main purpose is to characterize the patterns of vertical product differentiation and to reveal the properties of quality differentiation between them the contributive articles gal or 1983 de fraja 1996 johnson and myatt 2003 2006 examine a variety quality and quantity competition between multiproduct firms 4 gal or 1983 de fraja 1996 and johnson and myatt 2003 proposition 6 conclude that firms with equal technological capabilities will compete head to head by producing identical products qualities

environmental quality competition and taxation in the presence of green network effect among consumers we examine the impact of a green network effect in a market characterized by consumers environmental awareness and competition between firms in terms of both environmental quality and product prices the unique aspect of this model comes from the assumption that an increase in the number of consumers of green brown product increases the satisfaction of each green brown consumer we show that paradoxically when the network effect of a green product is higher than that of a brown product this externality reduces product environmental quality and raises consumption of the green product conversely when the network effect of the brown product is higher the externality improves product environmental quality and raises consumption of the brown product in both cases the network effect does not affect the overall pollution level the externality correction requires the use of three optimal fiscal policies an ad valorem tax on products an emission tax and a subsidy or a tax on the green purchase a second best optimum can also be reached through the green taxation

estimating tax incidence market power and market conduct the european cigarette industry abstract recent theoretical work has shown that the incidence of ad valorem and specific taxes may differ and each may be over or under shifted onto consumers in the presence of imperfect competition these results are used to derive a method of estimating market power and conduct an application is made to the european cigarette industry previous empirical comparison of the incidence of ad valorem and specific taxes is limited for a group of countries with broadly similar cigarette industries there is evidence of undershifting of both taxes with the specific tax having a significantly greater impact on price the extremes of both perfect competition and monopoly can be rejected behaviour is no less competitive than the equivalent of cournot

incumbent positioning as a determinant of strategic response to entry existing research has identified different firm characteristics that determine an incumbent s reaction toward market entrants this study widens the perspective from a firm s absolute attributes to its relative positioning within its competitive environment the hypotheses for the empirical analysis are derived from game theoretic models with either vertical or horizontal product differentiation in each of the two theoretical models two incumbents initially choose very different quality and variety levels respectively and move closer to the center when faced by entry of a competitor from the vertical differentiation model we predict a stronger price reduction by high quality firms in our empirical analysis we are using a novel dataset of the high quality restaurant market in germany to test the theoretical findings while the hypotheses with respect to adjustments of prices and varieties are supported we do not find empirical evidence for the predicted quality adjustment

the perils of unearned foreign income aid remittances and government survival given their political incentives governments in more autocratic polities can strategically channel unearned government and household income in the form of foreign aid and remittances to finance patronage which extends their tenure in political office i substantiate this claim with duration models of government turnover for a sample of 97 countries between 1975 and 2004 unearned foreign income received in more autocratic countries reduces the likelihood of government turnover regime collapse and outbreaks of major political discontent to allay potential concerns with endogeneity i harness a natural experiment of oil price driven aid and remittance flows to poor non oil producing muslim autocracies the instrumental variables results confirm the baseline finding that authoritarian governments can harness unearned foreign income to prolong their rule finally i provide evidence of the underlying causal mechanisms that governments in autocracies use aid and remittances inflows to reduce their expenditures on welfare goods to fund patronage

the new keynesian view of aggregate demand some reflections from a classical sraffian standpoint the paper argues that the derivation of the aggregate demand curve in the new keynesian literature is insufficient to provide the theoretical ground for the use to which it is usually put namely as a theoretical basis for the claim that long run wage and price flexibility would push a capitalist economy to the full employment or natural level of output it is argued that the derivation solely on the basis of the propositions about optimising household consumption expenditures is insufficient to guarantee a decreasing aggregate demand function without circular reasoning this point is clarified by use of a very simple two commodity production model of long run steady states due to spaventa and nell to guarantee a decreasing aggregate demand function the new keynesian approach must invoke the kinds of propositions used in more traditional derivations propositions which themselves are in question on capital theoretic grounds

did aid promote democracy in africa the role of technical assistance in africa s transitions did foreign aid impede or catalyze democratization in africa in the 1990s we argue that after the cold war donors increased their use of technical assistance in aid packages improving their monitoring capacity and thus reducing autocrats ability to use aid for patronage to remain in power autocrats responded by conceding political rights to their opponents from legalizing opposition parties to staging elections we test our theory with panel data for all sub saharan african countries while other factors played pivotal roles in africa s political liberalization we find technical assistance helps to explain the timing and extent of africa s democratization

information and the provision of quality differentiated products governments often enact information provision policies to overcome asymmetric information of product qualities we show that increasing awareness among consumers of the quality of a good can but will not always encourage firms to produce goods with higher levels of quality even if product qualities increase social welfare may fall as information provision results in too much product differentiation we show that the effectiveness of emission taxes and output subsidies are affected by the level of consumer knowledge of product quality and we identify conditions under which information provision is welfare enhancing relative to these price instruments jel l15 q58 i introduction in the past 20 years consumers have become increasinglyconscious ofthe undesirable health and safety attributes of the products they consume and surveys suggest that a growing percentage of consumers are willing to pay more for higher quality products such as organic foods and household cleaners and detergents that contain less toxic ingredients guber 2003 other high quality products facing higher demand include energy efficient products like extended life lightbulbs and improved home insulation often these highquality products provide private benefits that are excludable to buyers as well as public benefits that are nonrival and nonexcludable for example reduced pesticide and chemical residue on food may lower the risk of cancer while also reducing contaminated run off that degrades ground and surface water quality extended life lightbulbs and improved home insulation may reduce an individual s utility bill while also reducing greenhouse gas emissions from lower energy consumption although interest in these types of high quality productsisgrowing demand isoften relatively small market shares of organic produce for

monopolistic competition and the effects of aggregate demand how important is monopolistic competition to an understanding of the effects of aggregate demand on output we ask the question at three levels can monopolistic competition by itself explain why aggregate demand movements affect output can it together with other imperfections generate effects of aggregate demand in a way that perfect competition cannot if so can it give an accurate account of the response of the economy to aggregate demand movements the answers are no yes and yes

minimum quality standards and market dominance in vertically differentiated duopoly abstract the paper establishes conditions for low quality dominance within a vertically differentiated duopoly and studies the consequences for minimum quality standard policies gross surplus from unit consumption consists of a benefit from quality and a baseline benefit consumers are heterogeneous homogeneous with regard to the former latter marginal cost increases in quality the quality then price equilibrium exhibits low quality dominance first in market share and then in profit as baseline benefit increases relative to the willingness to pay for quality the preference structure determines the effect of a minimum quality standard in a way related to the pattern of dominance the standard reduces increases welfare under conditions that lead to low high quality dominance

optimal fiscal regime in a spatial duopoly abstract we investigate a horizontally differentiated duopoly in which a public authority can either tax or subsidize firms in order to induce duopolists to choose the socially optimal locations the policy proposed here is such that welfare maximization is achieved by directly affecting firms location without explicitly modifying their price behavior

welfare in differentiated oligopolies with more than two firms abstract excessive differentiation in the quality or location dimension in order to soften price competition is a well established conclusion concerning duopolistic markets this has inspired authors to discuss policy measures that may improve welfare in a differentiated market in the present paper a general welfare analysis is conducted for a varying number of firms it is shown that outcomes are almost optimal when three or more competitors are in the market in light of this a laissez faire policy should be adopted for a range of entry costs market outcomes entail insufficient entry therefore a subsidy to entry may improve welfare

energy efficiency subsidies with price quality discrimination abstract we compare various designs of energy efficiency subsidies in a market subject to both energy use externalities and price quality discrimination by a monopolist we find that differentiated subsidies can establish the social optimum unlike per quality regimes ad valorem regimes generate downstream interferences subsidising of the high end good leads the monopolist to reduce the quality of the low end good for this reason ad valorem differentiated rates should always decrease with energy efficiency a result seemingly at odds with actual practice in contrast with per quality differentiated subsidies the rates can increase if the externality is large enough relative to the market share of low type consumers contrary to differentiated subsidies what we shall call single instrument subsidies only achieve second best outcomes a uniform ad valorem subsidy should have a rate higher than that needed to specifically internalise energy use externalities lastly if as is often observed in practice only the high end good is to be incentivised a per quality regime should be preferred to an ad valorem one an ad valorem tax on the high end good may even be preferred to an ad valorem subsidy if the externality is small enough and low end consumers dominate the market

fighting corruption to improve schooling evidence from a newspaper campaign in uganda what are the most effective ways to increase primary school enrollment and student learning we argue that innovations in governance of social services may yield the highest return since social service delivery in developing countries is often plagued by inefficiencies and corruption we illustrate this by using data from an unusual policy experiment a newspaper campaign in uganda aimed at reducing capture of public funds by providing schools parents with information to monitor local officials handling of a large education grant program the campaign was highly successful and the reduction in capture had a positive effect on enrollment and student learning jel d73 i22 o12

small menu costs and large business cycles a macroeconomic model of monopoly i introduction the conflict between modern neoclassical and traditional keynesian theories of the business cycle centers upon the pricing mechanism in neoclassical models prices are fully flexible they represent the continuous optimization of economic agents and the continuous intersection of supply and demand in keynesian models prices are often assumed to be sticky they do not necessarily equilibrate all markets at all times one of the reasons for the resurgence of the equilibrium approach to macroeconomics has been the absence of a theoretical underpinning for this keynesian price stickiness this note shows that sticky prices can be both privately efficient and socially inefficient the business cycle results from the suboptimal adjustment of prices in response to a demand shock to the extent that policy can stabilize aggregate demand it can mitigate the social loss due to this suboptimal adjustment in some keynesian models prices are simply exogenously fixed 2 in others agents must set their prices in advance of the transaction date the act of altering a posted price is certainly costly these costs include such items as printing new catalogs and informing salesmen of the new price yet these menu costs are small and therefore generally perceived as providing only a weak foundation for these fixed price models however this inference is flawed small menu costs can cause large welfare losses the claim that price adjustment costs are small does not rebut the claim that they are central to understanding economic fluctuations

estimating the effect of tax reform in differentiated product oligopolistic markets abstract the incidence of taxation has been extensively discussed in the public finance literature but mainly within a competitive market setting or within a homogenous good cournot type oligopoly in a differentiated product oligopoly the effect of taxation can be more complex as the rate of taxation may affect not only the prices but also the profile and quality of products that are sold in the market in this paper we examine the effects of changing tax regimes in a differentiated product oligopoly in order to illustrate our approach we employ data from one such market the automobile market in israel

environmental policy and the energy efficiency of vertically differentiated consumer products we analyse optimal environmental policies in a market that is vertically differentiated in terms of the energy efficiency of products considering energy taxes subsidies to firms for investment in more eco friendly products and product standards we are particularly interested in how distributional goals in addition to environmental goals shape the choice of policy instruments we ond that an industry friendly government levies an energy tax to supplement a lax product standard but shies away from subsidies to firms by contrast a consumer friendly government relies heavily on a strict product standard and additionally implements a moderate subsidy to firms but avoids energy taxes

on production costs in vertical differentiation models abstract we analyze the effects of the introduction of a unit production cost in a vertical differentiation model with fixed costs of quality improvement for a low high unit cost a rise in cost reduces increases product differentiation and prices

trade policy and quality leadership in transition economies trade policy and quality leadership in transition economies are analyzed in a duopoly model of trade and vertical product differentiation we first show that the incidence of trade liberalization is sensitive to whether firms in transition economies are producers of low or high quality second we find that neither free trade nor the absence of a domestic subsidy are optimal both a tariff and a subsidy increase price competition and while the former extracts foreign rents the latter results in quality upgrading third there exists a rationale for a government to commit to a socially optimal policy to induce quality leadership by the domestic firm when cost asymmetries are low finally we establish an equivalence result between the effects of long run exchange rate changes and those of trade policy on price competition but not on social welfare

fiscal games and public employment a theory with evidence from russia why do some governments both in different countries and in regions within those countries employ more workers than others existing theories focus on the level of economic development political redistribution and social insurance but they raise additional puzzles and do not account for all evidence or for a global trend toward decentralization of public employment the authors propose a new theory inspired by russia s recent experience that locates one motive for subnational public employment growth in a political and fiscal game between central and subnational governments in countries with weak legal systems local and regional officials may deliberately set their employment levels beyond their fiscal capacity prompting bailouts from the central government which fears the political cost to it if wage arrears accumulate and provoke strikes the authors model the logic of such brinkmanship derive several propositions and show that they and the model s assumptions fit empirical evidence from russia in the 1990s deficiencies of that country s overstaffed underequipped irregularly paid ineffective and strike prone public sector appear to result in part from a system of dysfunctional incentives created by the interaction of electoral pressures with the system of fiscal federalism the authors suggest parallels with latin american countries such as argentina and brazil