on partial contracting this paper investigates contracting situations where giving away some control rights enhances both the donor s and the receiver s incentives to cooperate in the future we define a partial contracting framework with nonverifiable actions for which either control is contractible contractible control actions or the right to transfer control ex post to another party is contractible transferable control actions under incomplete information when control over particular actions is transferable but not contractible it can be optimal to give one party the right to transfer control over a particular action to the other party in order for that party to build a reputation regarding her willingness to cooperate in the future c 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

on the design of hierarchies coordination versus specialization we consider an economy that has to decide how assets are to be used agents have ideas but these ideas conflict we suppose that decision making authority is determined by hierarchy each asset ha

complexity and renegotiation a foundation for incomplete contracts the paper considers a hold up model where only one of n future trading opportunities will prove to be efficient and where ex post renegotiation of the ex ante contract cannot be prevented as the environment becomes more complex n the outcome under any message contingent long term contract converges to that of the incomplete contracting model where trade is contractible ex post but not ex ante when trades are costly to describe both ex ante and ex post the incomplete contracting result is extended to a broader class of environments

a theory of credibility this paper presents models in which one agent must decide whether to trust another whose motives are uncertain reliability can only be communicated through actions in this context it pays for people to build a reputation based on reliable behaviour someone becomes credible by consistently providing accurate and valuable information or by performing useful services the theory provides a justification for long term arrangements without binding contracts it also describes those situations where it pays an agent to cash in on his reputation many decisions depend on trusting someone consumers must decide whether to believe advertisements banks need to judge the reliability of loan applicants and employers must decide how much responsibility to delegate to their employees this paper attempts to model situations that arise when someone is uncertain about whether to trust the people he deals with in this context reputations for reliability are valuable an agent becomes credible by consistently providing accurate valuable information or by always acting responsibly i analyse a series of simple abstract models of information transmission in the basic model there are two agents the sender s and the receiver r who are to play the game a known finite number of times at each stage both players learn the value of a parameter measuring the importance of that period s play of the game that is the value of making a correct decision and s obtains payoff relevant information s then sends a signal to r who makes a decision that affects the welfare of both players after both players learn the consequences of r s decision the process repeats at each stage r must decide what action to take in order to do that he must assess the credibility of s the difficulty arises because r is uncertain about s s preferences when play begins i model this by assuming that with positive probability s has identical preferences to r s is a friend and with positive probability s has completely opposed preferences to r s is an enemy this uncertainty creates a trade off for enemy senders at each stage providing honest information enhances s s reputation but only at the expense of foregoing an opportunity for immediate gain by duping r the possibility that s is a friend lends credibility to what he says but this credibility may also be exploited by an enemy s the principal equilibrium has the following form in the basic model where s has no control over the importance of a given play s typically conveys accurate information for the first several periods r raises the probability he places on s being friendly after receiving accurate information if he believes that an enemy would have lied to him with positive probability the more important the information the more likely an enemy will attempt to deceive r an enemy will eventually take advantage of r by misleading him when this happens the sender loses all opportunities for deception in the future i

dynamic multilevel modelling of industrial energy demand in europe previous studies of industry level energy demand have not accounted for the hierarchical nesting of industries within a system that also adequately allows for country specific determinants of energy demand the principal contribution of this paper is therefore to analyse energy demand for european industries over the period 1995 2009 using a dynamic multilevel model that accounts for this hierarchical data structure among other things we find firstly that our dynamic multilevel model suggests that if industry income and the industry energy price increase by 10 long run energy demand will increase by 8 1 and fall by 6 8 respectively secondly we find that the corresponding long run income and price elasticities are substantially larger in a standard dynamic model of industry level energy demand which does not account for the hierarchical data structure our results therefore suggest that not accounting for the hierarchical data structure results in unreliable estimates of energy demand elasticities from a policy perspective we argue that it is imperative that future industry level energy demand studies account for the hierarchical structure of the data this is to prevent energy policy making being based on industry level evidence that substantially inflates the responsiveness of long run energy demand to income and price changes

reputation and discretion in financial contracting the authors explain the use of legally unenforceable discretionary financial contracts in circumstances where legally enforceable contracts are feasible a discretionary contract allows a contracting party to choose whether or not to honor the contract it is shown that such a contract liquefies reputational capital by permitting it to be depreciated in exchange for the preservation of financial capital and information reusability in financially impaired states in addition discretionary contracts foster the development of reputation this explains discretion among highly confident letters holding company relationships mutual fund contracts bank loan commitments and other financial and nonfinancial contracts copyright 1993 by american economic association

two remarks on the property rights literature we first point out that the recent property rights literature is based on three assumptions 1 that contracts are always subject to renegotiation 2 that the exercise of a property right confers a private benefit and 3 that parties are risk neutral building on hart moore 1999 we provide conditions under which an optimal contract consists of nothing more than an assignment of property rights we also examine the robustness of some of the literature s standard predictions about asset ownership to the introduction of mechanisms for eliciting parties ex post willingness to pay for the assets such as options or financial markets to illustrate the issue we revisit the hart moore 1990 proposition that joint ownership is suboptimal and argue that ownership by a single party is dominated by joint ownership with put options

the theory of moral hazard and unobservable behaviour part i principal agent models are studied in which outcomes conditional on the agent s action are uncertain and the agent s behaviour therefore unobservable for a model with bounded agent s utility conditions are given under which the first best equilibrium can be approximated arbitrarily closely by contracts relating payment to observable outcomes for general models it is shown that the solution may not always be obtained by using the agent s first order conditions as constraint general conditions of lagrangean type are given for problems in which contracts are finite dimensional 1 the moral hazard situation

subgame perfect implementation this paper examines the use of stage mechanisms in implementation problems and provides a partial characterization of the set of subgam e perfect implementable choice rules it is shown that in many economic environments virtually an y choice rule can be implemented to illustrate the power of this approach the paper discusses a number of models in which it is possible to implement the first best although it wouldn t have been possible to do so without using stage mechanisms the diversity of these models suggests that subgame perfect implementation may find wide application copyright 1988 by the econometric society

unforeseen contingencies and incomplete contracts we scrutinize the conceptual framework commonly used in the incomplete contract literature this literature usually assumes that contractual incompleteness is due to the transaction costs of describing or of even foreseeing the possible states of nature in advance we argue however that such transaction costs need not interfere with optimal contracting i e transaction costs need not be relevant provided that agents can probabilistically forecast their possible future payoffs even if other aspects of the state of the nature cannot be forecast in other words all that is required for optimality is that agents be able to perform dynamic programming an assumption always invoked by the incomplete contract literature the foregoing optimality result holds very generally provided that parties can commit themselves not to renegotiate moreover we point out that renegotiation may be hard to reconcile with a framework that otherwise presumes perfect rationality however even if renegotiation is allowed the result still remains valid provided that parties are risk averse

electoral bias and policy choice theory and evidence this paper develops an approach to studying how bias in favor of one party due to the pattern of electoral districting affects policy choice we tie a commonly used measure of electoral bias to the theory of party competition and show how this affects party strategy in theory the usefulness of the approach is illustrated using data on local government in england the results suggest that reducing electoral bias leads parties to moderate their policies

incomplete contracts specific investments and risk sharing an optimal contract design problem is considered contracts which are incomplete and simple are used to investigate the extent to which constrained revisions can mitigate inefficiencies resulting from contractual incompleteness an optimal contract is characterized in two cases first when a contract is being used to facilitate trade between two risk neutral parties who must make relationship specific investments it is possible to implement the first best by a simple contract second when a contract is being used to share risk it is generally not possible to implement the first best when one party is risk neutral however it is possible to implement the first best by assigning all the ex post decision rights to that party

reputation effects and the limits of contracting a study of the indian software industry this paper examines evidence of the role that reputation plays in determining contractual outcomes we conduct an empirical analysis of the indian customized software industry using a data set we collected containing detailed information on 230 projects carried out by 125 software firms we propose a model ofthe industry where reputation determines contractual outcomes the evidence supports the view that reputation matters ex ante contracts as well as the outcome after ex post renegotiation vary with firms characteristics plausibly associated with reputation this holds after controlling for project client and firm characteristics

a theory of debt and equity diversity of securities and manager shareholder congruence this paper shows how the optimal financial structure of a firm complements incentive schemes to discipline managers and how the securities return streams determine the claim holders incentives to intervene in management the theory rationalizes 1 the multipucity of securities 2 the observed correlation between return streams and control rights of securities and 3 the partial congruence between managerial and equity holder preferences over policy choices and monetary rewards as well as the low level of interference of equity in management the theory also offers new prospects for a reappraisal of the earlier corporate finance literature

renegotiation design with unverifiable information this paper considers a buyer seller relationship with observable but unverifiable investments and or random utility parameters in such situations it is known that contract renegotiation may prevent the implementation of first best outcomes in this paper we show however that efficient investments and optimal risk sharing can typically be achieved provided the initial contract is able to monitor the ex post renegotiation process specifically we focus on the following two features of renegotiation design first default options in case renegotiation breaks down second the allocation of all bargaining power to either contracting party moreover we show that these two features can be obtained in standard rubinstein bargaining games through contractual provisions such as specific performance clauses and penalties for delay or equivalently financial hostages refundable without interest

nash equilibrium and welfare optimality if is a set of social alternatives a social choice rule scr assigns a subset of a to each potential profile of individuals preferences over a where the subset is interpreted as the set of welfare optima a game form or mechanism implements the social choice rule if for any potential profile of preferences 1 any welfare optimum can arise as a nash equilibrium of the game form implying in particular that a nash equilibrium exists and 2 all nash equilibria are welfare optimal the main result of this paper establishes that any scr that satisfies two properties monotonicity and no veto power can be implemented by a game form if there are three or more individuals the proof is constructive

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

on indescribable contingencies and incomplete contracts abstract i examine the theoretical foundations underlying the incomplete contracts literature a common justification for the assumption that contracts are not fully contingent on the state of nature is to point out that some aspects of the state may be unforeseen or indescribable to the contracting partners at the time the contract is written i argue however that as long as risk averse parties can foresee the probabilities of their possible payoffs then the fact that they cannot describe the possible physical states does not matter even with renegotiation the parties can attain the same welfare as when full description is possible