the optimal mechanism for selling to a budget constrained buyer abstract this paper finds an optimal mechanism for selling a good to a buyer who may be budget constrained we consider a seller with one unit of a good facing a buyer with a quasilinear utility function if the buyer does not face a binding budget constraint textbook monopoly pricing is optimal by contrast the possibility of a binding budget constraint can make it optimal for the seller to use nonlinear pricing to commit to a declining price sequence to require the buyer to disclose his budget or to offer financing journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 d42 d45 d89 l12

bank loan portfolios and the monetary transmission mechanism abstract we study the portfolio behavior of bank loans following a monetary tightening and find that real estate and consumer loans sharply decrease while commercial and industrial c i loans increase these responses are compared with responses following non monetary shocks which also reduce output but keep interest rates roughly unchanged during such a non monetary downturn c i loans sharply decrease while real estate and consumer loans show no substantial response these responses together with the responses of relevant lending rates are hard to reconcile with a decline in the supply of c i bank loans during a monetary downturn as stressed by the bank lending channel several arguments are presented explaining why the supply of c i loans may actually increase after a monetary contraction

inventory dynamics and business cycles what has changed to what extent can information technology led improvements in inventory management account for the apparent moderation of economic fluctuations in the united states since the mid 1980s we argue that changes in inventory dynamics played a reinforcing rather than a leading role in the reduction of output volatility since the mid 1980s inventory dynamics have changed in a manner consistent with a faster resolution of inventory imbalances however these changes appear to be a consequence of changes in the response of industry level sales and aggregate economic activity to monetary policy shocks our results suggest that it is the interaction between the changes in inventory behavior at the industry level and the macroeconomic environment where the latter likely includes changes in the conduct of monetary policy and the responses of the economy to policy disturbances rather than any single factor that has contributed importantly to the observed decline in economic volatility

limits of exact equilibria for capacity constrained sellers with costly search abstract this paper studies finite versions of competitive matching models in which sellers announce prices and buyers understand the relationship between price and probability of trade two equilibrium concepts are studied for finite games subgame perfect equilibrium and rational expectations equilibrium it is shown that the distribution of prices offered by sellers under both equilibrium concepts converges weakly to the same competitive equilibrium distribution of prices furthermore the payoffs that sellers face in both kinds of equilibrium have the market utility property in the limit journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 d41 d45

is protection for sale evidence on the grossman helpman theory of endogenous protection grossman and helpman 1994 present a theory of endogenous protection by explicitly modeling government industry interactions for which mere black box models previously existed they obtain a ramsey pricing type solution to the provision of protection which emphasizes the role of inverse import penetration ratios and import elasticities on the lobbying side the model makes predictions about lobbying competition and lobbying spending according to deadweight costs from protection the model not only makes for richer theory in terms of rigor and elegance but its predictions are directly testable whether the grossman helman model stands up to real world data is investigated in this paper predictions from both the protection side and lobbying side are tested using cross sectional u s nontariff barrier data we also compare the second generation grossman helpman model with a more traditional specification our results call for serious consideration of this model in the political economy literature

import penetration and the politics of trade protection abstract in this paper we reconsider a key empirical prediction generated by an important class of political economy models of trade policy namely that trade protection should be higher in sectors characterized by lower import penetration we call this the standard prediction the existing empirical evidence offers little support for this prediction in this paper we argue that the standard prediction depends critically on the assumptions that trade taxes are the only policy instruments and that the government has access to non distortionary taxation we analyze a model in which the government can use quotas and vers in addition to trade taxes and raising public funds may be costly under a simple sufficient condition our model predicts that the protection level increases with import penetration both in sectors that are protected with tariffs and in sectors that are protected with quantitative restrictions

the political economy of international factor mobility we model the endogenous determination of policy towards international factor mobility in a common agency setting domestic interest groups bid for protection from the government and the incumbent politicians maximize a welfare function that depends both on domestic voters welfare and contributions collected we characterize equilibrium policies in the price space and show how the degree of complementarity among inputs determines the outcome we establish a similar result for quotas allowing for partial rent capturing for the strategic environment under consideration we also establish a general equivalence result between tariffs and quotas if capturing is complete d 2004 elsevier b v all rights reserved

a near pareto optimal auction with budget constraints abstract in a setup where a divisible good is to be allocated to a set of bidders with budget constraints we introduce a mechanism in the spirit of the vickrey auction in the mechanism we propose understating budgets or values is weakly dominated since the revenue is increasing in budgets and values all kinds of equilibrium deviations from true valuations turn out to be beneficial to the auctioneer we also show that ex post nash equilibrium of our mechanism is near pareto optimal in the sense that all full winners values are above all full losers values

liquidity effects and the monetary transmission mechanism several recent papers provide strong empirical support for the view that an expansionary monetary policy disturbance generates a persistent decrease in interest rates and a persistent increase in output and employment existing quantitative general equilibrium models which allow for capital accumulation are inconsistent with this view there does exist a recently developed class of general equilibrium models which can rationalize the contemporaneous response of interest rates output and employment to a money supply shock however a key shortcoming of these models is that they cannot rationalize persistent liquidity effects this paper discusses the basic frictions and mechanisms underlying this new class of models and investigates one avenue for generating persistence we argue that once a simplified version of the model in christiano and eichenbaum 1991 is modified to allow for extremely small costs of adjusting sectoral flow of funds positive money shocks generate long lasting quantitatively significant liquidity effects as well as persistent increases in aggregate economic activity

equivalence of auctions and posted prices abstract we determine the equilibrium in two transaction mechanisms auctions and posted prices agents choose whether to participate in markets where trades are consummated by auctions or in markets where sellers post prices we show that the selling mechanisms are practically equivalent previous studies have shown that auction markets emerge as a unique evolutionary stable equilibrium when compared to bargaining markets posted price markets dominate bargaining markets similarly journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 c73 d44

academic earmarks and the returns to lobbying abstract in this paper we estimate the returns to lobbying by universities to motivate our empirical work we develop a simple theoretical model of university lobbying for academic earmarks our statistical analysis shows that universities represented by a house appropriations committee hac or senate appropriations committee sac member spend less money on lobbying than those that are not represented in addition using instrumental variables estimations we show that universities without hac or sac representation may receive some benefit to lobbying for earmarks although in many estimations this benefit is not statistically different from zero however for universities with hac or sac representation a 10 percent increase in lobbying yields an additional 2 8 percent or 3 5 percent increase in earmarks respectively this suggests that there are large returns to lobbying for academic earmarks if a university is represented by a member of one the hac or sac but little or no return if not

measuring and explaining cross country immigration policies summary the intensified international migration pressures of the recent decades prompted many developed countries to revise their immigration regulations and increase border controls however the development of these reforms as well as their effectiveness in actually managing immigration flows remain poorly understood the main reason is that migration regulations are hard to quantify which has prevented the construction of a universal measure of migration policy to fill this gap in the literature we construct an indicator of the restrictiveness of immigration entry policy across countries as well as a more comprehensive indicator of migration policy that also accounts for staying requirements and regulations to foster integration specifically we estimate a bayesian state space model to combine all publicly available data sources that are informative on migration policy this methodology allows us to account for measurement errors in the underlying indicators and increases data availability without imputations or other ad hoc manipulations the indexes that we obtain are then used to disentangle the factors determining the toughness of migration regulations our empirical framework accounts for cross country correlation in migration policies and combines elements from the median voter and interest group approach we find strong evidence of spatial correlation in particular in entry restrictiveness yet substantially less in overall immigration policy this suggests that there still remains a substantive national margin in immigration policies in particular in the less visible segments such as staying conditions and integration rights we also find indications of a global trend of increasing restrictiveness in migration entry policy after the financial crisis of 2007 08

the clash of liberalizations preferential versus multilateral trade liberalization in the european union there has been an explosion in the number of preferential trade agreements in the past decade preferential trade agreements are characterized by liberalization with respect to only a few partners and thus they can potentially clash with and retard multilateral trade liberalization despite this important concern with preferential trade agreements there is almost no systematic evidence on whether they actually affect multilateral trade liberalization the authors model the effect of preferential trade agreements on multilateral trade liberalization and show that preferential trade agreements slow down multilateral trade liberalization unless they have a common external tariff and allow for internal transfers next they use detailed data on product level tariffs negotiated by the european union in the past two multilateral trade rounds to structurally estimate their model the authors confirm the main prediction the european union s preferential trade agreements have clashed with its multilateral trade liberalization and find that the effect is quantitatively significant moreover they also confirm several auxiliary predictions of the model and provide new evidence on the political economy determinants of multilateral liberalization in the european union

public pensions and immigration policy in a democracy the paper analyzes the link between the public pension system and the immigration policy in a pay as you go system the incentives for immigration vary significantly between individuals at different lifetime periods in the framework of an overlapping generations model we show that the median voter s choice in general leads to inefficient levels of immigration the median voter neglects the effects of the externalities within the pension system on other generations an immigration policy that is not affected by the median voter s choice but instead is constitutionally determined will avoid welfare losses the expected lifetime income of each generation can be increased by applying a rule of steady immigration

protection for sale the case of oligopolistic competition and interdependent sectors in grossman helpman s 1994 canonical protection for sale pfs model political competition among industry lobbies is driven purely by their interests as consumers this paper introduces demand linkages and oligopolistic competition into the pfs framework to address the rivalry among lobbies stemming from product substitutability it shows that increased substitutability weakens the interest groups incentives to lobby and reduces tariff distortions this may explain why empirical tests of pfs find surprisingly little impact of lobbies on the government s trade policy decision the paper also analyzes endogenous lobby formation suggesting that demand linkages may adversely affect the industry decision to organize resume proteger les ventes le cas de la concurrence oligopolistique et des secteurs interdependants dans le modele canonique de grossman helpman 1994 protection for sale pfs la concurrence politique entre lobbyistes est purement alimentee par leurs interets en tant que consommateurs ce texte presente dans ce cadre d analyse les enchainements de la demande et la concurrence oligopolistique pour prendre en compte la rivalite entre lobbyistes qui derive de la substituabilite des produits on montre qu une substituabilite accrue reduit l incitation des groupes d interets a faire du lobbying et reduit les distorsions tarifaires cela peut expliquer pourquoi les tests empiriques du modele pfs ont decouvert un impact etonnamment faible des lobbies sur les decisions des gouvernements dans le monde des politiques commerciales le texte analyse aussi la formation endogene des lobbies suggerant que les enchainements de la demande peuvent affecter negativement la decision de s organiser

rain agriculture and tariffs this paper examines whether and how rainfall shocks affect tariff setting in the agricultural sector in a model of strategic trade policy the authors show that the impact of a negative rainfall shock on optimal import tariffs is generally ambiguous depending on the weight placed by the domestic policy maker on tariff revenue profits and the consumer surplus the more weight placed on domestic profits the more likely it is that the policy maker will respond to a rainfall shortage by reducing import tariffs these findings are robust to alternative assumptions about market structure and the timing of the game using detailed panel data on applied tariffs and rainfall for 70 nations the authors find robust evidence that rainfall shortages generally induce policy makers to set lower tariffs on agricultural imports

dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders the theory of rent seeking with its origins in the observations of gordon tullock 1967 or to use jagdish bhagwati s 1982 proposed term the theory of directly unproductive profit seeking activities is concerned with the potentially adverse effects on resource allocation of incentives to cap ture and defend artificially contrived rents and transfers the scope for so cial loss proposed by the theory derives from the relation between the value of a contestable prize and the value of the resources attracted into the con test to determine the beneficiary of the prize underlying this social loss is a specification of how rational behavior by optimizing agents links the value of the prize sought to the resources expended it has been traditional to assume competitive behavior in describing the activities of lobbying and influence seeking then if some further condi tions are satisfied l the total value of the resources expended precisely equals the value of the prize sought so dissipation is complete 2 conse quently the social cost associated with contestability of a rent can be in ferred from the value of the rent itself and the detailed and hard to come by information on individual outlays made in the course of the contest be comes unnecessary by basing their analyses on competitive dissipation contributors to the rent seeking literature see the review by robert tollison 1982 have been able to presume that the observed value of a contested rent is an exact measure of the associated social cost of monopoly power or regu lation similarly in the trade theoretic literature where the rights contested are to quota premia or revenues from trade taxes krueger 1974 bhagwati

standard auctions with financially constrained bidders we develop a methodology for analyzing the revenue and efficiency performance of auctions when buyers have private information about their willingness to pay and ability to pay we then apply the framework to scenarios involving standard auction mechanisms in the simplest case where bidders face absolute spending limits first price auctions yield higher expected revenue and social surplus than second price auctions the revenue dominance of first price auctions over secondprice auctions carries over to the case where bidders have access to credit these rankings are explained by differences in the extent to which financial constraints bind in different auction formats

preferential versus multilateral trade liberalization and the role of political economy abstract in this paper we analyze the effect of the freedom to pursue preferential trade liberalization permitted by article xxiv of the gatt on country s incentives to participate in multilateral negotiations and on feasibility of global free trade we present a model in which countries choose whether to participate in preferential or multilateral trade agreements under political pressures from domestic special interest groups we show that heterogeneity in political preferences across countries plays an important role in determining the relative merits of preferential and multilateral approaches to trade liberalization on one hand the opportunity to liberalize preferentially may be necessary to induce countries with strong political motivations to participate in multilateral free trade negotiations on the other hand when countries share similar political preferences multilateral free trade that would have been politically supported otherwise becomes unattainable if countries can pursue preferential liberalization

the myth of financial innovation and the great moderation financial innovation is widely believed to be at least partly responsible for the recent financial crisis at the same time there are empirical and theoretical arguments that support the view that changes in financial markets in particular innovations in consumer credit and home mortgages played a role in the great moderation this article questions empirical evidence supporting this view especially the behaviour of aggregate home mortgages changed less during the great moderation than is typically believed a remarkable change we do find is that monetary tightenings became episodes during which financial institutions other than banks increased their mortgages holdings

expected revenue of all pay auctions and first price sealed bid auctions with budget constraints we show that all pay auctions dominate first price sealed bid auctions when bidders face budget constraints this ranking is explained by the fact that budget constraints bind less frequently in the all pay auctions which leads to more aggressive bidding in that format

price dispersion with directed search we model a market where identical buyers direct their search to identical capacity constrained sellers sellers cannot fully commit to the list price so strategic bargaining may determine the sale price we study search and pricing behavior in symmetric equilibrium sale prices exhibit equilibrium dispersion as they respond naturally to local demand conditions uncoordinated search decisions lead to equilibrium demand heterogeneity so sellers realizing large demand bargain prices up we characterize the sale price distribution parametrically studying how different commitment limitations and market features affect pricing and surplus shares we also determine endogenously

trading mechanism selection with directed search when buyers are risk averse we endogenize the trading mechanism selection in a model of directed search with risk averse buyers and show that the unique symmetric equilibrium entails all sellers using fixed price trading mechanisms that prescribe the sale price as a function of the realized demand auctions bargaining discount pricing etc expose buyers to the price risk the uncertainty of not knowing how much to pay in advance fixed price trading eliminates the price risk which is why risk averse customers accept paying more to shop at such stores

the political economy of immigration in a direct democracy the case of switzerland abstract in this paper we analyze the determination of immigration policy in a direct democracy setting we formulate a model of voting and participation behavior integrating instrumental and expressive motivations the model is estimated using data drawn from a survey carried out after a vote in switzerland in 2000 on a popular initiative proposing to implement immigration restrictions the model enables us to recover estimates of participation costs and preferences towards immigration and analyze how these preferences are translated into actual voting outcomes the results reveal a substantial gap participation bias between attitudes towards immigration in the general population 43 favorable to restrictions and the outcome of the vote 26

are global trade negotiations behind a fragmented world of gated globalization abstract we show that global trade negotiations can prevent global free trade in a simple model where global tariff negotiations precede sequential free trade agreements ftas we show fta formation can expand all the way to global free trade in the absence of global tariff negotiations but global free trade never emerges when global tariff negotiations precede fta formation this result arises precisely because global tariff negotiations successfully elicit concessions from negotiating countries moreover global tariff negotiations can produce a fragmented world of gated globalization where some countries form ftas that eliminate tariff barriers among themselves while outsiders continue facing higher tariffs

do interest groups affect us immigration policy while anecdotal evidence suggests that interest groups play a key role in shaping immigration policy there is no systematic empirical analysis of this issue in this paper we construct an industry level dataset for the united states by combining information on the number of temporary work visas with data on lobbying activity associated with immigration we find robust evidence that both pro and anti immigration interest groups play a statistically significant and economically relevant role in shaping migration policy across sectors barriers to migration are lower in sectors in which business interest groups incur larger lobbying expenditures and higher in sectors where labor unions are more important

union membership in the united states 1973 1981 this paper reports estimates of union membership gathered from may current population surveys from 1973 to 1981 the authors present data by occupation industry selected states and smsas race gender and educational attainment the paper both extends and differs from that by freeman and medoff which presents unionism estimates for the private sector for 1968 75 to facilitate longitudinal analysis this paper reports three year moving averages of occupational and industry data and annual estimates of demographic classifications the data include public sector as well as private sector workers and they exclude workers not covered by the national labor relations act also the authors provide only union membership estimates not estimates on workers covered by union contracts this paper suggests that the percentage of all workers that are unionized in the united states remained fairly constant over the 1973 81 period

bridging trade theory and labour econometrics the effects of international migration this paper surveys current theoretical and empirical research on international migration with a particular emphasis on the links between trade theory and labour empirics

the role of importers and exporters in the determination of the u s tariff preferences granted to latin america abstract this paper investigates the role played by domestic importers and foreign exporters in improving preferential access to the domestic market to this end the framework used in this paper extends the protection for sale analysis to explicitly model the role of domestic importers and foreign exporters in the determination of preferential trade treatment the predictions of the model are tested using data on preferential trade between the united states and latin american countries the results suggest that latin american exporters and us importers lobbying efforts have a significant and important role in determining the extent of preferential access granted by the united states more interestingly these findings also show that u s importers capture a very substantial share of the rents generated by tariff preferences these results therefore shed a pessimistic view on preferential trade schemes as a reliable source of gains for developing countries

credit and economic activity credit regimes and nonlinear propagation of shocks in this paper we examine empirically whether credit plays a role as a nonlinear propagator of shocks this propagation takes the form of a threshold vector autoregression in which a regime change occurs if credit conditions cross a critical threshold using nonlinear impulseresponse functions we evaluate the dynamics implied by the threshold model these suggest that shocks have a larger effect on output in the tight credit regime than is normally the case and that contractionary monetary shocks typically have a larger effect than expansionary shocks finally using a nonlinear version of historical decompositions we attempt to determine the relative contribution to output growth of shocks and the nonlinear structure

mechanism design by competing sellers a dynamic model with many sellers and buyers is constructed agents failing to trade may trade in the next period an equilibrium is found where sellers hold identical auctions and buyers randomize over the sellers they visit the distribution of buyer valuations is endogenous an auction with efficient reserve is an optimal mechanism from each seller s point of view in spite of the ability of any seller to alter the distribution of buyer types participating in the seller s mechanism by altering the mechanism copyright 1993 by the econometric society

competition for foreign direct investments abstract this paper models international competition for foreign direct investment as a common agency problem using the theory of menu auctions developed by bernheim and whinston in the model national governments act as principals and a multinational corporation as the single agent governments are assumed to maximize the net wage income generated by the corporation s investment it is shown that in the equilibrium of this game a high wage country may be able to attract investment even though all countries use subsidies furthermore it is shown that a country may choose to pay the highest subsidies even if it attracts less investment than in the unsubsidized regime our framework can also be used to study interregional subsidy competition within a country

us non tariff barriers as privately provided public goods abstract the endogenous theory of protection is empirically investigated in a different light rather than emphasizing the determinants of the supply of protection the present study emperically investigates the micro level demand side behavior of firms predictions from bergstrom et al journal of public economics 1986 2 25 49 about the private provision of public goods provide a theoretical foundation for such a demand side econometric investigation if rational lobbies are observed to behave in a manner consistent with the theory of the private provision of public goods then it must be the case that they are able to influence trade policy the econometric specification is also consistent with the special interest models of olson the logic of collective action public goods and the theory of groups harvard university press 1965 stigler bell journal of economics and management science 1971 2 137 146 baron quarterly journal of economics 1989 1 45 72 and grossman and helpman american economic review 1994 84 833 850 hence evidence presented in this study from the demand side behavior of firms has the deeper implication that it validates the theory of endogenous protection an issue that is still controversial among trade theorists

how does financial liberalisation affect the influence of monetary policy on the current account abstract does the current account improve or deteriorate following a monetary policy expansion we examine this issue theoretically and empirically we show that a standard open economy dsge model predicts that the current account response to a monetary policy shock depends on the degree of financial regulation in particular financial liberalisation makes it more likely that the current account deteriorates following a monetary expansion we test this theoretical prediction with a varying coefficient bayesian panel var model where the coefficients are allowed to vary as a function of the degree of financial product and labour market regulation on data from 1976q1 2006q4 for 19 oecd countries our empirical results support the theory we therefore conclude that following a monetary policy expansion the current account is more likely to go into deficit in countries with more liberalised financial markets

liquidity loanable funds and real activity abstract this paper develops a general equilibrium model of two traditional explanations of the monetary black box linking money and real activity the liquidity effect and the loanable funds effect these effects are modeled with a monetary production economy in which central bank injections of cash are funnelled into the economy through the credit market since only borrowers have direct access to the newly injected cash monetary injections cause nominal interest rates to fall if firms are borrowers then monetary injections also increase current and future real activity

brain drain taxes for non benevolent governments abstract this paper investigates the welfare effects of brain drain taxes levied by non benevolent governments whereby a country collects a tax from skilled emigrants but potentially wastes a sizable portion of the revenue using a model in which taxes are chosen to maximize expected political rents i show that the availability of a brain drain tax increases a weighted sum of citizen utilities however the government s optimal brain drain tax is found to be higher than the level that maximizes this weighted sum in another model a brain drain tax is found to be desirable when governments use public good expenditures to compete for mobile residents

deposit interest rate ceilings as credit supply shifters bank level evidence on the effects of regulation q abstract how did deposit interest rate ceilings an important feature of the u s regulatory regime until the mid 1980s affect individual banks lending and the transmission of monetary policy to credit i estimate the effect of deposit rate ceilings inscribed in regulation q on commercial banks credit growth using a historical bank level data set starting in 1959 banks credit growth contracted sharply when legally fixed deposit rate ceilings were binding interaction terms with monetary policy suggest that the policy impact on bank level credit growth was non linear and significantly larger when rate ceilings were in place bank size and capitalization mitigate these effects at the bank level short term interest rates exceeding the legally fixed deposit rate ceilings identify policy induced credit supply shifts that disappeared with deposit rate deregulation and thus weakened the bank lending channel substantially since the early 1980s

sorting versus screening search frictions and competing mechanisms in a market where sellers compete by posting trading mechanisms we allow for a general search technology and show that its features crucially affect the equilibrium mechanism price posting prevails when meetings are rival i e when a meeting by one buyer reduces another buyer s meeting probability under price posting buyers reveal their type by sorting ex ante only if the meeting technology is sufficiently non rival price posting is not an equilibrium multiple buyer types then visit the same sellers who screen ex post through auctions

how to solve the price puzzle a meta analysis the short run increase in prices following an unexpected tightening of monetary policy constitutes a frequently reported puzzle yet the puzzle is surprisingly easy to explain away when all published models are quantitatively reviewed we collect about 1 000 point estimates of impulse responses from 70 articles using vector autoregressive models and present a simple method of research synthesis for graphical results our ndings indicate publication selection in favor of the intuitive response of prices to a tightening the estimates depend systematically on study design when misspecications are

politicians decision making with re election concerns abstract we study the impact of elected officials re election concerns on their decisions on whether to undertake new projects the value of a project to a jurisdiction depends in part on its elected official s uncertain ability at providing some public goods our main result is that the elected official s willingness to pay for the project differs from voters willingness to pay if the incumbent official expects to lose win the election then she is willing to pay more less than the project s total value to voters we show how our analysis can be applied to bidding wars among jurisdictions for firms

the economics of special interest politics the case of the tariff this paper investigates the interaction of politicians and special interest lobbies the goal is to model the equilibrium levels of redistributive policies such as taxes subsidies tariffs and regulatory decisions the model is applied throughout to the setting of tariffs by contributing to political campaigns special interest lobbies generate economic returns higher tariffs generate revenue for import competing industries through higher product prices higher milk support prices raise dairy farm income and so forth the lobby invests to maximize these net economic returns in evaluating their chances of election politicians weigh the favorable effects of special interest money against the unfavorable association with the lobby and the social cost of the redistributive policy section i explores the lobby s problem it describes a formalization of mancur olson s discussion of the voluntary provision of public goods and optimal contributions by lobbies to political campaigns section ii describes determination of the equilibrium tariff positions of each politician in a political campaign

business loans and the transmission of monetary policy we study the transmission mechanism of monetary policy through business loans and illustrate subtle aspects of its functioning that relate to the contractual characteristics and the borrower lender types of loans we show that the puzzling increase in business loans in response to monetary tightening documented before the great recession is largely driven by drawdowns from existing commitments at large banks spot loans also rise and take a considerable amount of time to adjust banks nonetheless do curtail credit supply by shortening maturities of new loans following the great recession the mechanism has worked differently with loan responses to monetary tightening displaying a significant downward shift

protection for sale with imperfect rent capturing we extend the protection for sale framework to non tari barriers introducing partial rent capturing leads to a testable specification that bridges the gap between the grossman and helpman 1994 model and its empirical implementation where coverage ratios have been used to measure protection the econometric analysis supports our augmented specification and leads to more realistic estimates for the structural parameters of the model jel classification f13

substitutability and protectionism latin america s trade policy and imports from china and india this article examines the trade policy response of latin american governments to the rapid growth of chinese and indian exports in world markets to explain more protection in sectors where a large share of imports originates in china and india the protection for sale model is extended to allow for region specific degrees of substitutability between domestic and imported varieties of a good the results suggest that more protection toward chinese and indian goods can be explained by the higher substitutability of chinese and indian goods with domestic varieties the data support the model which performs better than the original protection for sale framework in explaining latin america s structure of protection

on the political economy of immigration the authors study how immigration policies that impose capital and skill requirements would be determined under majority voting when native agents differ in their wealth holdings and vote to maximize their income the results of the model calculations indicate that the native population will be polarized between those who would like an immigration policy to maximize the domestic capital labor ratio and those who would like an immigration policy that would minimize it

auctions vs fixed pricing competing for budget constrained buyers abstract we investigate price mechanism selection in a setting where sellers compete for budget constrained buyers by adopting either fixed pricing or auctions first or second price we show that first and second price auctions are payoff equivalent when some bidders are financially constrained so sellers are indifferent to adopt either format we characterize possible equilibria and show that if the budget is high then sellers compete via fixed pricing if it is low then they compete via auctions and if it is moderate then they mix so both mechanisms coexist the budget constraint becomes less binding if sellers use entry fees interestingly an improvement of the budget e g letting customers pay in installments may lead to fewer trades and a loss of efficiency

tax burden and migration a political economy theory and evidence abstract the extent of taxation and redistribution policy is generally determined as a political economy equilibrium by a balance between those who gain from higher taxes transfers and those who lose the standard theory of the size of government in a representative democracy links the tax burden to measures of the pre tax income inequality we develop in this paper a theory which encompasses the existing literature and provides a complementary channel linking the tax burden in the presence of migration to the fiscal leakage from native born to the migrants in a stylized model of migration and human capital formation we show somewhat against the conventional wisdom that low skill immigration can lead to a lower tax burden and less redistribution than would be the case with no immigration even though migrants naturally join the pro tax transfer coalition data on 11 european countries over the period 1974 1992 are consistent with the implications of the theory a higher share of low education immigrants in the population leads to a lower tax rate on labor income and less generous social transfers

deposit rate ceilings and monetary transmission in the us abstract establishing the existence and nature of changes in the conduct and transmission of monetary policy is key in understanding the remarkable macroeconomic performance of the us since the mid 1980s this paper presents evidence on a phenomenon of disintermediation occurring during the major recessions in the 1960s and 1970s but absent ever since and shows that disintermediation is closely linked to the existence of deposit rate ceilings under regulation q in a monetary dsge model that incorporates deposit rate ceilings as occasionally binding constraints the regulation alters the behavior of money aggregates and exacerbates the drop in economic activity following a monetary tightening the results of a threshold var lend support to the main theoretical predictions of the model

the assignment of workers to jobs in an economy with coordination frictions this paper studies the assignment of heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous jobs owing to the anonymity of a large labor market workers use mixed strategies when applying for jobs this randomness generates coordination frictions two workers may apply for a particular job whereas an identical job gets no applications the model generates assortative matching with a positive but imperfect correlation between matched workers and firms types it predicts that a worker s wage is increasing in her job s productivity and a firm s profit is increasing in its employees productivity the model also yields a version of the welfare theorems

migration and pension with international capital mobility abstract being relatively low earners migrants are net beneficiaries of the welfare state therefore in a static set up migration may be resisted by the entire native born population however it is shown that in a dynamic set up with a pension system which is an important pillar of any welfare state migration is beneficial to all income high and low and all age old and young groups

the demand for currency in the united states the idea of totally deregulating the financial system and implementing monetary policy through currency control has received renewed attention an important aspect concernin g the desirability of using currency as the instrument of policy is t he behavior of the demand for currency this paper investigates the d emand for currency over the period 1921 80 and finds that currency be haves in a systematic and explainable manner over this period copyright 1988 by ohio state university press

electoral competition and special interest politics have fixed positions on some issues but vary their positions on others in order to attract votes and campaign contributions in this context we examine whether special interest groups are governed by an electoral motive or an influence in their campaign giving and how their contributions affect the equilibrium platforms we show that each party is induced to behave as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of informed voters and members of special interest groups the party that is expected to win a majority of seats caters more to the special interests

who is against a common market this paper develops a theory of the endogenous formation of a common market in a three country two factor political economy model in the status quo home and foreign implement nondiscriminatory policies toward international factor flows in order to maximize the domestic median voter s welfare then the two countries simultaneously hold referenda on a common market initiative leading to the removal of the pre existing policies for factor flows between the member countries while no coordination is imposed on policies vis a vis the rest of the world several interesting results emerge in a common market the returns on factors moving between the members are more likely to increase the larger is the import demand of one country relative to the factor supply of the exporting partner factors that do not relocate are more likely to see their returns decrease when flows are large and import demands are inelastic importantly for the common market to emerge as an equilibrium some factors must continue to experience enhanced protection when the integration process is completed this result highlights the potential tension between social desirability and the political feasibility of the integration process jel f1 f2 p16

directed search and optimal production abstract i consider a model of directed search where strategic sellers advertise general trading mechanisms a mechanism determines the number of buyers that will get served and the side payments as a function of ex post realized demand buyers observe these advertisements and visit one seller without being able to coordinate their visiting strategies despite the oligopolistic nature of the model all symmetric equilibria are constrained efficient in small markets multiple equilibria exist that are not payoff equivalent this indeterminacy vanishes as the market grows large i provide closed form solutions for equilibrium prices profits and the matching function under any parameter values

endogenous lobby formation and endogenous protection a long run model of trade policy determination this paper provides a theory of lobby formation within a framework in which trade policy is determined through political contributions under certain conditions free trade turns out to be an equilibrium outcome either when the government has a high affinity for political contributions or when it cares a great deal about social welfare moreover greater inequality in asset distribution results in a greater number of lobbies and in most cases more protection for each of these lobbies furthermore industries with higher levels of capital stock fewer capitalists more inelastic demand and smaller geographical dispersion are the ones that get organized

pricing and matching with frictions suppose that n buyers each want one unit and m sellers each have one or more units of a good sellers post prices and then buyers choose sellers in symmetric equilibrium similar sellers all post one price and buyers randomize hence more or fewer buyers may arrive than a seller can accommodate we call this frictions we solve for prices and the endogenous matching function for finite n and m and consider the limit as n and m grow the matching function displays decreasing returns but converges to constant returns we argue that the standard matching function in the literature is misspecified and discuss implications for the beveridge curve

the role of interbank markets in monetary policy a model with rationing the empirical research on monetary transmission has reported a number of puzzles challenging extant theoretical models of the transmission mechanism in this paper we argue that asymmetric information in the interbank market may be important to have a better understanding of the mechanisms at work in the transmission process we show that asymmetric information may induce an equilibrium with rationing this in turn has two major implications first it reconciles the apparent irresponsiveness of business investment to the user cost of capital with the large impact of monetary policy magnitude puzzle and second it shows that this impact will not be limited to short term credit supply but will also affect long term lending even if the corresponding interest rate is unaffected composition puzzle

were there regime switches in u s monetary policy working paper 2004 14 june 2004 abstract a multivariate model identifying monetary policy and allowing for simultaneity and regime switching in coefficients and variances is confronted with u s data since 1959 the best fit is with a model that allows time variation in structural disturbance variances only among models that also allow for changes in equation coefficients the best fit is for a model that allows coefficients to change only in the monetary policy rule that model allows switching among three main regimes and one rarely and briefly occurring regime the three main regimes correspond roughly to periods when most observers believe that monetary policy actually differed and the differences in policy behavior are substantively interesting though statistically ill determined the estimates imply monetary targeting was central in the early 80s but was also important sporadically in the 70s the changes in regime were essential neither to the rise in inflation in the 70s nor to its decline in the 80s jel classification e52 e47 c53 key words counterfactuals lucas critique policy rule monetary targeting simultaneity volatility model comparison i the debate over monetary policy change in an influential paper clarida gali and gertler 2000 cgg presented evidence that us monetary policy changed between the 1970 s and the 1980 s indeed that in the 70 s it was drastically worse they found that the policy rule apparently followed in the 70 s was one that when embedded in most stochastic general equilibrium models would imply non uniqueness of the equilibrium and hence vulnerability of the economy to sunspot fluctuations of arbitrarily large size their estimated policy rule for the later period on the other hand eliminated this indeterminacy these results are a possible explanation of the volatile and rising inflation of the 70 s and of its subsequent decline the cgg analysis has two important weaknesses one is that it fails to account for stochastic volatility us macroeconomic variables and particularly the federal funds rate have gone through periods of tranquility and of agitation with forecast error variances varying greatly from period to period ignoring such variation does not lead to inconsistent estimates of model parameters when the forecasting equations themselves are constant but it strongly biases toward a finding of changed parameters tests of the stability of the forecasting equations the other weakness is that the cgg analysis rests on powerful and implausible identifying assumptions they require that we accept that the response of the monetary authority to expected future inflation and output does not depend on the recent history of inflation money growth or output it is hard to understand why this should be so especially in the 70 s when monetarism was a prominent theme in policy debates congress was requiring reports from the fed of projected time paths of monetary aggregates and financial markets were reacting sensitively to weekly money supply numbers the requirement for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in dynamic models is that the monetary policy rule show a more than unit response of interest rates to the sum of the logs of all nominal variables that appear on the right hand side of the reaction function if we force a particular measure of expected future inflation to proxy for all the nominal variables that actually appear independently in the reaction function we are bound to get distorted conclusions on the one hand because expected future inflation will be a noisy measure of the full set of nominal influences on policy we might get downward bias in our estimates from the usual errorsin variables effect on the other hand to the extent that expected future inflation like most expected future values shows less variation than current nominal variables we could find a mistaken scaling up of coefficients

the political economy of international trade and factor mobility abstract free trade in goods and factors is efficient when we move away from economic theory and consider the policies actually followed by governments we observe distortions being implemented both on goods and factors trades it is natural then to question the relative merits of the two types of intervention and the normative literature has provided only partial answers we ask then why is the international flow of goods and factors not free and the political economy literature has looked at the two issues only separately in studying the determination of trade policy a theoretical paradigm has emerged focusing on the role of influence driven contributions this approach has also found strong empirical support the literature on the political economy of factor mobility on the other hand is fragmented distortions in labor and capital flows are typically the subject of different studies and only recently a unified framework has been proposed more work has to be done in this area as well as in integrating the political economy of trade and factor movements

coordination failures in immigration policy abstract we propose a theoretical framework for analyzing the problems associated to unilateral immigration policy in receiving countries and for evaluating the grounds for reform of international institutions governing immigration we build a model with multiple destination countries and show that immigration policy in one country is influenced by measures adopted abroad as migrants choose where to locate in part in response to differences in immigration policy this interdependence gives rise to a leakage effect of immigration policy an international externality well documented in the empirical literature in this environment immigration policy becomes strategic and unilateral behavior may lead to coordination failures where receiving countries are stuck in welfare inferior equilibria we then use an equilibrium refinement to show that the selected equilibrium differs from the pareto dominant one and argue that multilateral institutions that help receiving countries make immigration policy commitments would address this inefficiency

high bids and broke winners abstract this paper analyzes auctions where budget constrained bidders have options to declare bankruptcy it predicts a bidding equilibrium that changes discontinuously in a borrowing rate available to bidders when the borrowing rate is above a threshold high budget bidders win and the likelihood of bankruptcy is low when the borrowing rate is below the threshold the winner is the most budget constrained bidder and is most likely to declare bankruptcy this result explains the high bids and broke winners anomaly in the c block fcc spectrum auction based on its equilibrium analysis the paper proves that a seller can profit from offering to finance the highest bidder at a below market interest rate even with default risk journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 d45 d82 g33 l96

do countries free ride on mfn abstract the most favored nation mfn clause has long been suspected of creating a free rider problem in multilateral trade negotiations to address this issue we model multilateral negotiations as a mechanism design problem with voluntary participation we show that an optimal mechanism induces only the largest exporters to participate in negotiations over any product thus providing a rationalization for the principal supplier rule we also show that through this channel equilibrium tariffs vary according to the herfindahl hirschman index of export shares higher concentration in a sector reduces free riding and thus causes a lower tariff estimation of our model using sector level tariff data for the u s provides strong support for this relationship

protectionism versus risk in screening for invasive species abstract i examine the extent to which enforcement of a biosecurity import restriction us border inspections for foreign pests and diseases is used as a protectionist trade barrier the parameters of a structural model of border inspection are estimated using a detailed dataset documenting the outcome of us agricultural border inspections i find that inspections are conducted in a manner that places an implied welfare weight on domestic producers relative to consumers ranging from 1 to 1 63 i also find evidence that the inspection agency takes terms of trade into account when inspecting agricultural imports these results suggest that border inspections are used as a protectionist non tariff barrier

an exogeneity test for a simultaneous equation tobit model with an application to labor supply a test of weak exogeneity in the simultaneous equation tobit model is proposed and illustrated using a female labour supply model estimated using cross section data the test statistic can be simply output from any standard tobit maximum likelihood package and is asymptotically efficient the procedure provides consistent estimators for the simultaneous tobit model whose asymptotic covariance matrix is a simple extension of the usual tobit formula we also provide the lagrange multiplier test of weak exogeneity this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

a political economic analysis of labor migration and income redistribution we present a two country political economic model of income redistribution with internationally mobile labor migration can be exogenous and or endogenous i e determined by labor income differentials political influence is determined by the size and homogeneity of the groups where the latter can be affected by immigration we show that immigration can increase the transfers to and the income of the mobile group we also investigate the possibility of migration regulation tax transfer policy competition and coordination and finally coordination of regulation policies it is shown that the selection of any of those regimes will depend on the particular distribution of political influence among the relevant social groups in the two countries

what drives u s immigration policy evidence from congressional roll call votes abstract immigration is today one of the most hotly debated policy issues in the united states despite marked divergence of opinion even within political parties several important reforms have been introduced in the post 1965 era the purpose of this paper is to carry out a systematic analysis of the drivers of the voting behavior of us representatives on immigration policy in the period 1970 2006 and in particular to assess the role of economic factors at the district level our findings suggest that representatives from more skilled labor abundant districts are more likely to support an open immigration policy towards the unskilled whereas the opposite is true for representatives from more unskilled labor abundant districts this evidence is robust to the introduction of an array of additional economic and non economic characteristics of the districts and suggests that a simple factor analysis model can go a long way in explaining voting on immigration policy