the impact of institutional and social context on corporate environmental social and governance performance of companies committed to voluntary corporate social responsibility initiatives abstract using a neo institutional framework this paper discusses the role of national specific social cultural legal regulatory and economic differences when determining the way that companies committed to a specific voluntary corporate social responsibility csr initiative operate in different sustainability dimensions the differences between companies environmental social and governance esg performance of the companies operating in the three countries with highest number of firms committed to the united nations global compact ungc spain france and japan is assessed through a multidimensional hj biplot technique which is a statistical technique that provides a joint graphical representation in a low dimensional euclidean space usually a plane of a multivariate data matrix this research contributes to the existing literature providing quantitative evidence of how different country specific social and institutional schemes influence companies esg performance the main results reveal the existence of two clusters of companies behaving in different ways with regard of sustainability issues first spanish and french companies exhibit similar levels of social and corporate governance performance higher than those of japanese firms second japanese firms seem more committed to environmental issues than spanish and french companies these results confirm that the different countries with different institutional backgrounds induce different priorities among their firms in terms of esg performance even under a common commitment to the same principles of adopted csr initiative

buying votes vs supplying public services political incentives to under invest in pro poor policies this paper uses unique survey data to provide for the first time in the literature direct evidence that vote buying in poor economies is associated with lower provision of public services that disproportionately benefit the poor various features of the data and the institutional context allow the interpretation of this correlation as the equilibrium policy consequence of clientelist politics ruling out alternate explanations such as for example poverty driving both vote buying and health outcomes the data come from the philippines a country context that allows for measuring vote buying during elections and services delivered by the administrative unit controlled by winners of those elections the data reveal a significant robust negative correlation between vote buying and the delivery of primary health services in places where households report more vote buying government records show that municipalities invest less in basic health services for mothers and children and quite strikingly as a summary measure of weak service delivery performance a higher percentage of children are severely under weight

vote buying supermajorities and flooded coalitions in a recent paper banks 2000 adopting the framework of our model groseclose and snyder 1996 derives several new and noteworthy results in addition he provides a counterexample to our proposition 4 here we explain the error in our proposition but note that we can correct it easily if we invoke an additional assumption in equilibrium the winning vote buyer constructs a nonflooded coalition that is she does not bribe every member of her coalition we conclude with a brief discussion of the substantive implications of banks s proposition 1 we note that it provides additional support for our general claim that minimal winning coalitions should be rare in a vote buying game

buy now and price later supply contracts with time consistent mean variance financial hedging abstract we consider a two stage supply chain comprising one risk neutral manufacturer he and one risk averse retailer she where the manufacturer procures consumption commodities in spot market as major inputs for production and sells the final products to the retailer the retailer then sells the final products to the market at a stochastic clearance price we investigate a flexible price contract that allows the manufacturer to determine the product wholesale price and the retailer to determine the order quantity based on the future spot price of consumption commodities compared with the simple wholesale price contract a win win situation can be achieved under the flexible price contract when the manufacturer s postponed processing cost is lower than a threshold however under this flexible price contract the retailer may suffer from the commodity price volatility even if she does not procure the commodities directly we further investigate how the risk averse retailer conducts mean variance financial hedging by purchasing consumption commodity futures contracts we formulate the problem using a dynamic programming model and derive a closed form time consistent financial hedging policy through numerical experiments we show that the commodity price risk from the manufacturer to the retailer is effectively mitigated with the hedging and the benefits of the flexible price contract are maintained

flexible and risk sharing supply contracts under price uncertainty we study supply contracts for deterministic demand but in an environment of uncertain prices we develop valuation methodologies for different types of supply contracts a time inflexible contract requires the firm to specify not only how many units it will purchase but also the timing of the purchase a time flexible contract allows the firm to specify the purchase amount over a given period of time without specifying the exact time of purchase other than time flexibility the suppliers may offer quantity flexibility to the firm as well i e purchase quantities could be within a prespecified quantity window finally risk sharing features can be incorporated in the contract in terms of the purchase price that the firm eventually pays to a supplier within a prespecified price window the firm pays the realized price but outside of it the firm shares in an agreed way added costs or benefits given the structure of a supply contract we study the firm s decision when to purchase and how many units in each purchase such that the expected net present value of the purchase cost plus inventory holding cost is minimized we discuss optimal purchasing strategies for both time flexible and time inflexible contracts with risk sharing features other interesting results include the analysis of two supplier sourcing environments and the exploitation of quantity flexibility in such contracts our discussion illustrates how time flexibility quantity flexibility supplier selection and risk sharing when carefully exercised can effectively reduce the sourcing cost in environments of price uncertainty

vote trading with and without party leaders two groups of voters of known sizes disagree over a single binary decision to be taken by simple majority individuals have different privately observed intensities of preferences and before voting can buy or sell votes among themselves for money we study theoretically and experimentally the implication of such trading for outcomes and welfare when trades are coordinated by the two group leaders and when they take place anonymously in a competitive market the theory has strong predictions in both cases trading falls short of full efficiency but for opposite reasons with group leaders the minority wins too rarely with market trades the minority wins too often as a result with group leaders vote trading improves over no trade with market trades vote trading can be welfare reducing the theoretical predictions are strongly supported by the experimental data

power brokers middlemen in legislative bargaining abstract we study a model of decentralized legislative bargaining over public decisions with transfers we establish the emergence of middlemen in legislative bargaining as a robust equilibrium phenomenon we show that legislative intermediation can impact policy outcomes and can be inefficient to fulfill this role the middleman s policy preferences and bargaining position must be such that its role of intermediary is credible but the political middleman must also directly benefit from policy change the results highlight fundamental differences between the role of intermediaries in politics and exchange economies

or forum blotto politics this paper considers abstract election games motivated by the united states electoral college there are two political parties and the electoral votes in each state go to the party that spends the most money there with an adjustment for a head start that one party or the other may have in that state the states have unequal numbers of electoral votes and elections are decided by majority rules each party has a known budget and much depends on the information that informs how that budget is spent three situations are considered 1 one party s spending plan is known to the other 2 spending is gradually revealed as the parties spend continuously in time and 3 neither side knows anything about the other s spending the last situation resembles a blotto game hence the title

incentives to cultivate favored minorities under alternative electoral systems a simple model is used to compare under different electoral systems the incentives for candidates to create inequalities among otherwise homogeneous voters by making campaign promises that favor small groups rather than appealing equally to all voters in this game model each candidate generates offers for voters independently out of a distribution that is chosen by the candidate subject only to the constraints that offers must be nonnegative and have mean 1 symmetric equilibria with sincere voting are analyzed for two candidate elections and for multicandidate elections under rank scoring rules approval voting and single transferable vote voting rules that can guarantee representation for minorities in multiseat elections generate in this model the most severely unequal campaign promises

the political value of land political reform and land prices in chile in this article we argue that when patron client relations are grounded in economic relationships such as between landlord and worker we should expect clientelism to influence not just how public policy the state and the political system work but also how the economy works we develop a simple model of the economic consequences of electoral clientelism when voting behavior can be observed landlords patrons provide economic rents to workers and in exchange workers vote for parties favored by landlords as votes are used by the landlords to accumulate political rents vote control increases the demand for labor and for land the model implies that the introduction of the australian ballot which destroys this form of clientelism should lead to a fall in the price of land in those areas where patron client relationships are strongest we test the predictions of the model by examining in detail the evolution of land prices in chile around may 31 1958 for which we collected original data a characteristic of rural chile at this time were patron client relations based on the inquilinaje system by which a worker the inquilino entered into a long term often hereditary employment relationship with a landlord and lived on his landlord s estate we show that the introduction of the australian ballot in 1958 led to a fall of about 26 in land prices in the areas where these patron client relationships were predominant

optimal commodity trading with a capacitated storage asset this paper considers the so called warehouse problem with both space and injection withdrawal capacity limits this is a foundational problem in the merchant management of assets for the storage of commodities such as energy sources and natural resources when the commodity spot price evolves according to an exogenous markov process this work shows that the optimal inventory trading policy of a risk neutral merchant is characterized by two stage and spot price dependent basestock targets under some assumptions these targets are monotone in the spot price and partition the available inventory and spot price space in each stage into three regions where it is respectively optimal to buy and inject do nothing and withdraw and sell in some cases of practical importance one can easily compute the optimal basestock targets the structure of the optimal policy is nontrivial because in each stage the merchant s qualification of high selling and low buying commodity prices in general depends on the merchant s inventory availability this is a consequence of the interplay between the capacity and space limits of the storage asset and brings to light the nontrivial nature of the interface between trading and operations a computational analysis based on natural gas data shows that mismanaging this interface can yield significant value losses moreover adapting the merchant s optimal trading policy to the spot price stochastic evolution has substantial value this value can be almost entirely generated by reacting to the unfolding of price uncertainty that is by sequentially reoptimizing a model that ignores this source of uncertainty

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

integrated optimization of procurement processing and trade of commodities we consider the integrated optimization problem of procurement processing and trade of commodities in a multiperiod setting motivated by the operations of a prominent commodity processing firm we model a firm that procures an input commodity and has processing capacity to convert the input into a processed commodity the processed commodity is sold using forward contracts while the input itself can be traded at the end of the horizon we solve this problem optimally and derive closed form expressions for the marginal value of input and output inventory we find that the optimal procurement and processing decisions are governed by price dependent inventory thresholds we use commodity markets data for the soybean complex to conduct numerical studies and find that approximating the joint price processes of multiple output commodities using a single composite output product and using the approximate price process to determine procurement and processing decisions is near optimal compared to a myopic spread option based heuristic the optimization based dynamic programming policy provides significant benefits under conditions of tight processing capacities and high price volatilities finally we propose an approximation procedure to compute heuristic policies and an upper bound to compare the heuristic against when commodity prices follow multifactor processes

optimal inventory policies when purchase price and demand are stochastic in this paper we consider the problem of a firm that faces a stochastic poisson demand and must replenish from a market in which prices fluctuate such as a commodity market we describe the price evolution as a continuous stochastic process and we focus on commonly used processes suggested by the financial literature such as the geometric brownian motion and the ornstein uhlenbeck process it is well known that under variable purchase price a price dependent base stock policy is optimal using the single unit decomposition approach we explicitly characterize the optimal base stock level using a series of threshold prices we show that the base stock level is first increasing and then decreasing in the current purchase price we provide a procedure for calculating the thresholds which yields closed form solutions when price follows a geometric brownian motion and implicit solutions under the ornstein uhlenbeck price model in addition our numerical study shows that the optimal policy performs much better than inventory policies that ignore future price evolution because it tends to place larger orders when prices are expected to increase

democracy undone systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets we study the competitive equilibrium of a market for votes where the choice is binary and it is known that a majority of the voters supports one of the two alternatives voters can trade votes for a numeraire before making a decision via majority rule we identify a sufficient condition guaranteeing the existence of an ex ante equilibrium in equilibrium only the most intense voter on each side demands votes and each demands enough votes to alone control a majority the equilibrium strongly resembles an all pay auction for decision power it makes clear that votes are only a medium for the allocation of power the probability of a minority victory is always higher than efficient and converges rapidly to one half as the electorate increases for any minority size the numerical advantage of the majority becomes irrelevant democracy is undone by the market

taking sides in wars of attrition third parties often have a stake in the outcome of a conflict and can affect that outcome by taking sides this article studies the factors that affect a third party s decision to take sides in a civil or interstate war by adding a third actor to a standard continuous time war of attrition with two sided asymmetric information the third actor has preferences over which of the other two actors wins and for being on the winning side conditional on having taken sides the third party also gets a flow payoff during the fighting which can be positive when fighting is profitable or negative when fighting is costly the article makes four main contributions first it provides a formal framework for analyzing the effects of endogenous intervention on the duration and outcome of the conflict second it identifies a boomerang effect that tends to make alignment decisions unpredictable and coalitions dynamically unstable third it yields several clear comparative static results finally the formal analysis has implications for empirical efforts to estimate the effects of intervention showing that there may be significant selection and identification issues

violence bribery and fraud the political economy of elections in sub saharan africa post soviet african democratization has introduced elections into contexts that often lack restraints upon the behavior of candidates resulting in the emergence of voter intimidation vote buying and ballot fraud we propose a model of electoral competition where although some voters oppose violence it is effective in intimidating swing voters we show that in equilibrium a weak challenger will use violence which corresponds to a terrorism strategy similarly a nationally weak incumbent will use repression however a stronger incumbent facing local competition will prefer to use bribery or ballot fraud we discuss the applicability of the model to several african elections

capacitated inventory problems with fixed order costs some optimal policy structure abstract almost 40 years ago h scarf the optimality of s s policies in dynamic inventory problems in k arrow s karlin p suppes eds mathematical models in the social sciences stanford university press stanford 1960 established the optimal s s policy structure for the periodic review inventory problem with fixed ordering costs and no capacity constraint since then the capacitated problem has resisted characterization in the present paper we partially bridge this gap using a generalization of scarf s k convexity we show that the optimal capacitated policy has an s s like structure to do so we divide the parameter space into four regions in two of these regions the optimal policy is completely specified while in the other two it is partially specified we complement these findings with a computational study this study suggests that a still simpler optimal policy structure exists

optimal inventory policy with two suppliers we analyze a periodic review inventory model where the decision maker can buy from either of two suppliers with the first supplier the buyer incurs a high variable cost but negligible fixed cost with the second supplier the buyer incurs a lower variable cost but a substantial fixed cost consequently ordering costs are piecewise linear and concave we show that a reduced form of generalized s s policy is optimal for both finite and discounted infinite horizon problems provided that the demand density is log concave this condition on the distribution is much less restrictive than in previous models in particular it applies to the normal truncated normal gamma and beta distributions which were previously excluded we concentrate on the situation in which sales are lost but explain how the policy cost assumptions and proofs can be altered for the case where excess demand is backordered in the lost sales case the optimal policy will have one of three possible forms a base stock policy for purchasing exclusively at the high variable cost hvc supplier an slvc slvc policy for buying exclusively from the low variable cost lvc supplier or a hybrid s shvc slvc policy for buying from both suppliers

stockpiling under price uncertainty and storage capacity constraints abstract a model is presented for the operation of an agent whose responsibility is to purchase and perhaps stockpile sufficient quantities of a certain commodity in order to satisfy an exogenous constant demand per time period this is the situation faced by a state agency which is responsible for the purchasing of oil products to satisfy the demand of a country in which demand for energy has stabilized at a certain level an important feature of the model is that the price of the commodity is described by a stochastic process this reflects the volatility of prices of oil products furthermore the model takes storage capacity constraints explicitly into account and thus can help to assess the optimal level of storage capacity expansion the relevant stochastic dynamic programming equations are derived and solved for the least cost function which turns out to be piecewise linear in the inventory level the storage capacity enters only in the computation of the constant term of the value function the solution of the dynamic programming equation leads also to the optimal purchasing strategy of agencies with different levels of flexibility in their policy in the model an agency can be allowed or not to resell from the stock and it can have finite or infinite storage capacity

competing for loyalty the dynamics of rallying support abstract we consider a class of dynamic collective action problems in which either a single principal or two competing principals vie for the support of members of a group we focus on the dynamic problem that emerges when agents negotiate and commit their support to principals sequentially we show that competition reduces agents welfare with public goods or if and only if there are positive externalities on uncommitted agents and increases agents welfare with public bads we apply the model to the study of corporate takeovers vote buying and exclusive deals jel d42 d62 d72 d82 g34 h41

competitive lobbying and supermajorities in a majority rule institution this paper presents a complete information model of competitive lobbying in a majority rule institution where lobbying consists of providing politically valuable resources to legislators legislators have three roles first they act as allies or opponents in deciding whether to consider a lobbyist s offer second they act as agenda setters in deciding whether to bring a policy alternative to a vote third they vote on the agenda the stationary equilibria include minimal majorities and supermajorities and involve unilateral counteractive and preemptive lobbying supermajorities are recruited either to influence agenda formation or to preempt the opposing lobbyist

can a corrupt ruling party win a re election through vote buying abstractin many developing countries it is common for electoral candidates to use embezzled money to buy votes we develop a dynamic model to analyse the trade off between economic performance and free handouts resulting from corruption on an incumbent party s chances of being re elected the results show because voters anticipate handouts from the politicians politicians engage in corrupt behaviour early in the election cycle while minimizing unemployment and maximizing vote buying at the end of the election cycle

value for money vote buying and politician accountability abstract the prevalence of vote buying is widely identified as a cause of poor governance in the developing world potential mechanisms for this relationship include the selection of lower quality politicians and the reduced accountability experienced by politicians once elected in this paper we present the first experimental evidence in support of the second channel of reduced accountability using data from laboratory experiments conducted in the u s and kenya we find that vote payments reduce voters willingness to hold politicians accountable holding fixed politician identity voters who receive payments are less willing to punish the politician for rent seeking and this reduction in punishment is larger in magnitude when payments are widely targeted unsurprisingly the politician then engages in a higher level of rent seeking a simple model of multi faceted social preferences encompassing reciprocity and inequality aversion is consistent with these findings

vote buying general elections we examine the consequences of vote buying assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up front binding payments and or campaign promises platforms that are contingent on the outcome of the election we analyze the role of the parties and voters preferences in determining the winner and the payments to voters

equilibrium and efficiency in an organized vote market we study an organized market for votes in which trade is directed by a market specialist this market mechanism always produces an equilibrium outcome and whenever vote buying occurs the alternative chosen is pareto superior to the alternative that would be chosen without trade we then characterize the equilibrium outcomes in a one dimensional policy space and show that if the distribution of ideal points is skewed enough then the equilibrium with vote buying differs from the equilibrium without vote buying the median ideal point this difference reflects the ability of an intense minority to obtain a policy it prefers in exchange for side payments

backward induction in the wild evidence from sequential voting in the us senate in the us senate roll calls are held in alphabetical order we document that senators early in the order are less likely to vote with the majority of their own party than those whose last name places them at the end of the alphabet to speak to the mechanism behind this result we develop a simple model of sequential voting in which forward looking senators rely on backward induction in order to free ride on their colleagues estimating our model structurally we find that this form of strategic behavior is an important part of equilibrium play we also consider but ultimately dismiss alternative explanations related to learning about common values and vote buying

interest group size and legislative lobbying abstract we develop a model of legislative decision making in which lobbying and public policy are jointly determined we examine how policy outcomes depend on the sizes of the interest groups while a larger size typically involves favorable effects on policy we also identify threshold levels of interest group size where a lobby will be harmed if it becomes larger this may provide another rationale as to why some interests do not or not fully organize spending limits can remove adverse policy effects of interest group size however this is not necessarily welfare improving moreover we find that endogenous proposal making may turn a second mover advantage in standard legislative lobbying models into a second mover disadvantage

technical note optimal inventory policy in the presence of a long term supplier and a spot market we consider a stochastic inventory control problem in which a buyer makes procurement decisions while facing periodic random demand and two supply sources namely a long term contract supplier and a spot market the contract between the buyer and the supplier partially shields the latter from the vicissitudes of the spot market in that the price paid by the buyer to the supplier is only partially linked to the spot price at the moment after fulfilling the minimum order commitment with the supplier the buyer has the full freedom to source from both the supplier and the market procurement from the spot market also incurs a fixed setup cost we show that an optimal policy consists of three different policy forms with the realization of each depending on the buyer s inventory level and the prevalent spot price certain conditions are identified under which monotone trends exist between policy parameters and the current spot price

integrating long term and short term contracting in beef supply chains this paper analyzes the optimal procurement processing and production decisions of a meat processing company hereafter a packer in a beef supply chain the packer processes fed cattle to produce two beef products program premium boxed beef and commodity boxed beef in fixed proportions but with downward substitution of the premium product for the commodity product the packer can source input fed cattle from a contract market where long term contracts are signed in advance of the required delivery time and from a spot market on the spot day contract prices are taken to be of a general window form linear in the spot price but capped by upper and lower limits on realized contract price our analysis provides managerial insights on the interaction of window contract terms with processing options we show that the packer benefits from a low correlation between the spot price and product market uncertainties and this is independent of the form of the window contract although the expected revenues from processing increase in spot price variability the overall impact on profitability depends on the parameters of the window contract using a calibration based on the report by the gipsa grain inspection packers and stockyards administration 2007 gipsa livestock and meat marketing study vol 3 fed cattle and beef industries report u s department of agriculture washington dc this paper elucidates for the first time the value of long term contracting as a complement to spot sourcing in the beef supply chain our comparative statics results provide some rules of thumb for the packer for the strategic management of the procurement portfolio in particular we show that higher variability higher spot price variability product market variability and correlation increases the profits of the packer but decreases the reliance on the contract market relative to the spot market this paper was accepted by yossi aviv operations management

analysis of batch ordering inventory models with setup cost and capacity constraint abstract stochastic periodic review batch ordering inventory problems appear in many industrial settings however few literature deals with the optimal ordering polices for such problems no mention to the inclusion of the fixed ordering cost and the production capacity in this paper we consider a single item periodic review batch ordering inventory system with the consideration of the setup cost and the capacity constraint for each order over a finite planning horizon by proposing several new convex notions we show that a batch based s s policy is optimal for the unlimited ordering capacity case while for the limited ordering capacity case a modified r q policy is optimal for the setting with zero ordering setup cost and a batch based x y band policy for the setting with positive ordering setup cost moreover we analytically study the sensitivity of the policy parameters with respect to the capacity and batch order size and derive the bounds on the optimal policy parameters we further extend our analysis to the infinite horizon setting and show that the structure of the optimal policy remains similar finally the numerical experiments provide some insights into the impact of model parameters on the benefit of reducing the batch size and increasing the ordering capacity and indicate that ignoring batch requirement may lead to a significant cost increment

redistributive politics with distortionary taxation abstract this paper proposes a first step towards a positive theory of tax instruments we present a model of redistributive politics that extends those of myerson r myerson incentives to cultivate minorities under alternative electoral systems amer polit sci rev 87 1993 856 869 and lizzeri and persico a lizzeri n persico the provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives amer econ rev 91 2001 225 239 two politicians compete in terms of targeted redistributive promises financed through distortionary taxes we solve for the case of both targetable and non targetable taxes we prove that there is an imperfect efficiency targetability trade off on the tax side politicians prefer targetable taxes over non targetable ones especially when the latter are less efficient yet targetable taxation is always used even when it is very inefficient compared to non targetable taxes

corporate governance social responsibility information disclosure and enterprise value in china abstract social responsibility information disclosure relates to the long term development of enterprises all social layers pay increasing attention to social responsibility of enterprises especially those in heavy pollution industries that are listed on stock exchanges this study takes chinese companies in heavy pollution industries that were listed during 2008 2014 as objects of study to test the relationships among corporate governance social responsibility information disclosure and enterprise value the study finds that there is a declining level of social responsibility information disclosure of listed enterprises in heavy pollution industries in addition different corporate governance factors affect the social responsibility information disclosure of listed companies in heavy pollution industries to a certain extent furthermore we find that social responsibility information disclosure is not beneficial for the short term profit of an enterprise but can increase its long term value generally a high level of corporate governance is favorable for legitimacy management as well as disclosure of social responsibility information

distributive politics and electoral competition abstract within the framework of pure redistribution dividing one unit of a homo geneous good among identical individuals the paper analyses the redistribution that arises from downsian two party electoral competition it appears that the strategic behavior of vote maximizing parties leads them to propose divisions which are not far from the egalitarian one journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d63 d72

suspiciously timed trade disputes abstract this paper shows that electoral incentives crucially affect the initiation of trade disputes focusing on wto disputes filed by the united states during the 1995 2014 period we find that u s presidents are more likely to initiate a dispute in the year preceding their re election moreover u s trade disputes are more likely to involve industries that are important in swing states to explain these regularities we develop a theoretical model in which re election motives can lead an incumbent politician to file trade disputes to appeal to voters motivated by reciprocity

distributive politics with vote and turnout buying the objective of this paper is to model the incumbent s allocation of efforts that maximize his electoral chances in the presence of both vote buying persuasion and turnout buying mobilization the existing literature on distributive politics concludes that political candidates should concentrate their campaigning efforts either on safe districts or on swing districts this paper shows that when candidates can use both persuasion and mobilization strategies and the ideology of voters is unknown to the incumbent party a third option should be taken into account in fact the optimal allocation of resources rather than focusing on safe or swing districts should target opposition strongholds that is the incumbent should try to sway voters in those districts in which the challenger is favored the intuition for this result is simple since the incumbent does not know individual preferences he only observes the distribution of preferences in the districts all voters in a given district look identical to him hence when approaching voters in a district to buy their vote the incumbent always faces the risk of buying the vote of his supporters who would have voted for him anyway

foreign aid and voting in international organizations evidence from the iwc i use a unique dispute between major aid donors in the international whaling commission iwc to investigate whether donor nations change their aid giving in response to changes in aid recipients voting behavior inside international organizations ios this relationship is difficult to pin down in most ios because agenda items constantly change and donor coalitions fluctuate with them i exploit the fact that the iwc has on the one hand seen two fixed aid donor blocs opposing each other for three decades over a single issue but has on the other hand seen rich variation in both membership and voting behavior of aid recipient countries using an identification strategy that relates changes in bilateral aid to within recipient variation in iwc voting bloc affiliation and fixed cross sectional variation in donors voting bloc the evidence suggests that japan rewards joining the pro whaling bloc and that countries who recently experienced aid reductions from the three big anti whaling donors the u s the u k and france are more likely to join the pro whaling bloc

multiechelon procurement and distribution policies for traded commodities we consider a firm that procures and distributes a commodity from spot and forward markets under randomly fluctuating prices the commodity is distributed downstream to a set of nonhomogeneous retailers to satisfy random demand we formulate a model that allows one to compute approximate but near optimal procurement and distribution policies for this system and we explore the value of the commodity s market in providing managers with a additional flexibility in procurement and b information on price dynamics generated through the trading of futures contracts our results indicate that the presence of the commodity market and the information that it conveys may lead to significant reductions in inventory related costs however to obtain these benefits both the spot procurement flexibility and the term structure of prices generated by the commodity market must be incorporated in the formulation of the operating policy managerial insights on the procurement strategy as a function of variability in prices and demand are also discussed this paper was accepted by john birge focused issue editor

capacity acquisition subcontracting and lot sizing the fundamental question encountered in acquiring capacity to meet nonstationary demand over a multiperiod horizon is how to balance the trade off between having insufficient capacity in some periods and excess capacity in others in the former situation part of the demand is subcontracted while in the latter capacity that has been paid for is rendered idle capacity and subcontracting decisions arise in many economic activities ranging from production capacity planning in semiconductor fabs to leasing communication networks from transportation contracts to staffing of call centers in this paper we investigate the trade offs between acquiring capacity subcontracting production and holding inventory to satisfy nonstationary demand over a finite horizon we present capacity acquisition models with holding and without holding inventory and identify forecast robust properties of the models that restrict the dependence of optimal capacity decisions on the demand forecasts we develop algorithms for numerous practical cost structures involving variable and fixed charges and prove that they all have polynomial time complexity for models with inventory we solve a sequence of constant capacity lot sizing and subcontracting subproblems which is also of independent interest

beyond chopsticks symmetric equilibria in majority auction games majority auction games are simultaneous sealed bid auctions of identical objects among identical bidders who each want to win a specified fraction more than a half of the objects each bidder receives no benefit from winning less than the specified fraction and no additional benefit from winning more than it symmetric equilibria having simple intuitive forms are shown to exist in first price second price and all pay versions of such games when the number of bidders is sufficiently large this contrasts with earlier results for the two bidder pure chopstick majority auction games where the only known equilibria are more complicated

sequential nonzero sum blotto allocating defensive resources prior to attack abstract the strategic allocation of resources across multiple fronts has long been studied in the context of blotto games in which two players simultaneously select their allocations however many allocation problems are sequential for example a state trying to defend against a terrorist attack generally allocates some or all of its resources before the attacker decides where to strike this paper studies the allocation problem confronting a defender who must decide how to distribute limited resources across multiple sites before an attacker chooses where to strike unlike many blotto games which only have very complicated mixed strategy equilibria the sequential nonzero sum blotto game always has a very simple pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium further the defender always plays the same pure strategy in any equilibrium and the attacker s equilibrium response is generically unique and entails no mixing the defender minmaxes the attacker in equilibrium even though the game is nonzero sum and the attacker strikes the site among its best replies that minimizes the defender s expected losses

clientelism and aid abstract using a model of probabilistic voting we analyze the impact of aid on the political equilibrium in the recipient country or region we consider politicians with mixed motives they are interested in promoting social welfare but also value the benefit of holding office we label as clientelistic the politician who most values the benefit of being in power we find that the impact of aid on the political equilibrium and therefore on the quality of policy in the recipient country using utilitarian social welfare as a benchmark ultimately depends on the value of the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption when elasticity is low the expected policy outcome gets further away from the socially desirable policy set this substitution of policy quality for aid can help to explain the poor performance of aid in improving policy perhaps more surprising is the opposite case which arises for high values of elasticity of marginal utility an increase in aid tilts the equilibrium policy towards the welfare maximizing policy set

buying shares and or votes for corporate control we explore how allowing votes to be traded separately of shares may affect the efficiency of corporate control contests our basic set up and the nature of the questions continue the work of grossman and hart 1980 harris and raviv 1988 and blair golbe and gerard 1989 we consider three cases with respect to the allowable price offers for shares and for votes when they can be traded separately unrestricted price offers quantity restricted price offers and price offers contingent on winning our main results are characterizations of the equilibria and of the circumstances under which vote buying is harmful we show that allowing votes to be traded separately of shares results in inefficiencies in all the cases we study similarly allowing quantity restricted offers is also harmful but allowing conditional offers is not in itself detrimental to efficiency the paper also makes a methodological contribution to the analysis of takeover games with atomless shareholders it provides a way of dealing with asymmetric equilibria that must be dealt with for a complete analysis and it proves existence of an equilibrium copyright 2012 oxford university press

race and the politics of close elections abstract elections between black and white candidates tend to involve close margins and high turnout using a novel dataset of municipal vote returns during the rise of black mayors in u s cities this paper establishes new facts about turnout and competition in close interracial elections in the south but not the north close black victories were more likely than close black losses involved higher turnout than close black losses and were more likely than close black losses to be followed by subsequent black victories these results are consistent with a model in which the historical exclusion of southern blacks from politics made them disproportionately sensitive to mobilization efforts by political elites leading to a black candidate advantage in close elections

all or nothing ordering under a capacity constraint we consider a special case of the single item periodic review inventory control problem with fixed plus linear ordering costs and an upper bound on production capacity we assume that the fixed cost is large relative to the variable cost and restrict our analysis to full capacity orders we show that the optimal policy is a threshold policy with respect to the inventory position for a class of cost to go functions that include the class of convex functions

clientelism and vote buying lessons from field experiments in african elections electoral clientelism and vote buying are widely perceived as major obstacles to economic development this is because they may limit the provision of public goods in this paper we review the literature on clientelism and vote buying and propose the use of field experiments to evaluate empirically the consequences of these phenomena we provide an overview discuss implementation and interpret the main results of recent field experiments conducted by the authors in west african countries clientelism and vote buying seem to be effective and to enjoy widespread electoral support the results suggest that increased access to information and political participation by women may limit clientelism in addition voter education campaigns may undermine the effects of vote buying on voting behaviour we argue that our findings may inform the design of development aid interventions as a way effectively to increase public good political accountability we also discuss directions for fruitful future research copyright 2009 oxford university press