prices or quantities can dominate banking and borrowing the possibility of intertemporal banking and borrowing of tradable permits is often viewed as tilting the various policy debates about optimal pollution control instruments towards favoring such time flexible quantities this paper shows that this view can be misleading at least for the simplest dynamic extension of the original prices versus quantities information structure the model of this paper allows firms to know and act upon the realization of uncertain future costs two full periods ahead of the regulators for any given circumstance the paper shows that either a fixed price or a fixed quantity is superior in expected welfare to time flexible banking and borrowing furthermore the standard original formula for the comparative advantage of prices over quantities contains sufficient information to completely characterize the regulatory role of intertemporal banking and borrowing the logic and implications of these results are analyzed and discussed

linking permit markets multilaterally we formally study the determinants magnitude and distribution of efficiency gains generated in multilateral linkages between permit markets we provide two novel decomposition results for these gains characterize individual preferences over linking groups and show that our results are largely unaltered with strategic domestic emissions cap selection or when banking and borrowing are allowed using the paris agreement pledges and power sector emissions data of five countries which all use or considered using both emissions trading and linking we quantify the efficiency gains we find that the computed gains can be sizable and are split roughly equally between effort and risk sharing

an econometric analysis of exploration and extraction of oil in the u k continental shelf this paper develops an econometric model for the analysis of exploration and production policies of price taking suppliers and derives theoretically consistent exploration and output equations for oil which explicitly take account of the oil discovery process and the intertemporal nature of exploration and production decision the model is then applied to an empirical analysis of oil exploration and extraction on the united kingdom continental shelf ukcs over the period 1978 1 1986 4 the analysis explicitly takes account of the available engineering information concerning the pressure dynamics of the petroleum reserves and the geological knowledge pertinent to the discovery process and presents formal statistical tests of the significance of these factors for the explanation of output and exploration in the north sea copyright 1990 by royal economic society

bankable permits for the control of environmental pollution abstract intertemporal trading of emission permits banking is often identified as one of three promising market mechanisms for controlling pollution along with averaging and trading surprisingly the efficiency properties of permit banking systems have not been investigated using a simple optimal control model this paper investigates firms incentives for banking or borrowing emission permits and compares the emission and output streams firms would choose with the socially optimal solution we find that in many cases firms will suboptimally choose excessive damage and output levels in early periods and correspondingly too few in later periods if given the opportunity to freely move emissions between time periods we propose a simple alternative trading scheme we term modified banking that counters this problem and should be no more difficult for an environmental authority to implement than a straigth banking system

regulating stock externalities under uncertainty abstract using a simple analytical model incorporating benefits of a stock costs of adjusting the stock and uncertainty in costs we uncover several important principles governing the choice of price based policies e g taxes relative to quantity based policies e g tradable permits for controlling stock externalities as in weitzman rev econom stud 41 4 1974 477 the relative slopes of the marginal benefits and costs of controlling the externality continue to be critical determinants of the efficiency of prices relative to quantities with flatter marginal benefits and steeper marginal costs favoring prices but some important adjustments for dynamic effects are necessary including correlation of cost shocks across time discounting stock decay and the rate of benefits growth applied to the problem of greenhouse gases and climate change we find that a price based instrument generates several times the expected net benefits of a quantity instrument

collateral avoids ponzi schemes in incomplete markets without introducing either debt constraints or transversality conditions to avoid the possibility of ponzi schemes we show the existence of equilibrium in an infinite horizon incomplete markets economy with a collateral structure

on the policy ineffectiveness proposition and a keynesian alternative a rejoinder i the basis of rush and waldo s rw results is the introduction of a war dummy variable in the dg equation this is however difficult to justify in the context of a rational expectations model under incomplete learning wars by their very nature are unique events and it is not clear how the public are supposed to learn the quantitative effects that the ending of three totally different wars may have had upon the growth of real government expenditure the fact that in i946 the public knew that world war ii was over does not mean that they could also estimate its precise quantitative effect on government expenditure rw estimate their dg equation using data for the whole of the period i943 73 and i943 85 thus implicitly assuming that all these data were available to the public in i946 for the computation of the coefficient of the war dummy in the dg equation but in i946 the public could not possibly have known about the timing and the intensities of the korean or the vietnam wars the assumption of complete learning that underlies the rational expectations hypothesis in general and rw s version of the nc model in particular is especially troublesome when the model contains dummy variables that correspond to unique events

climate policy design with correlated uncertainties in offset supply and abatement cost emission offsets within cap and trade systems are widely believed to contain system costs and stabilize allowance prices however trends in offsets supply are uncertain may be persistent and may be correlated with other sources of uncertainty in a dynamic stochastic model we find total costs increase as does variability in allowance prices and emissions as uncertainty in offsets becomes more persistent and to a lesser extent becomes negatively correlated with uncertainty in abatement costs these results are amplified with risk sensitivity larger annual offset limits and competitive offset purchasing imposing an allowance price collar can mitigate cost increases and price variability jel q54 q58

horizontal and vertical intra industry trade in australian manufacturing does trade liberalization have any impact this paper contributes to the literature on intra industry trade iit by disentangling such trade into horizontally and vertically differentiated products and investigating their determinants in the context of trade liberalization in australia iit in australian manufacturing has increased following trade liberalization in 1980s and is increasingly dominated by vertically differentiated products industry level evidence confirms that the failure to segregate iit into horizontally and vertically differentiated products produces misleading results as their determinants differ also structural changes brought about by the policy liberalization appear to have an impact on total as well vertical iit

a critique of the proposed tests of the natural rate rational expectations hypothesis the failure of the governments of most industrialised countries over the past decade to deal successfully with the problems of rising unemployment and high and often accelerating rates of price and wage inflation has revived interest in the pre keynesian macro economics of sound money and has renewed the controversy of the 1930 s over what governments should or should not do if they wish to achieve full employment with reasonable price stability in democratic societies keynesian economics has come under attack both by those who primarily oppose interventionist policies on ideological grounds and by the so called new classical macro economists who adhere to the natural rate of unemployment hypothesis nrh advanced by phelps i967 and friedman i 968 and the hypothesis of rational formation of expectations reh originally due to muth i96i armed with this joint natural rate rational expectations nr re hypothesis the new classical macro economists have argued that in a world capable of being represented by linear or log linear relations with a unique and stable equilibrium and no information discrepancy between the government and the private sector no government macro economic policy whether monetary or fiscal no matter how ingeniously formulated and how effectively implemented can have any systematic or lasting impact upon the level of output or the rate of unemployment 2 clearly this fundamental policy

an emission saved is an emission earned an empirical study of emission banking for light duty vehicle manufacturers abstract this paper presents results of an empirical study of emission banking for light duty vehicle manufacturers an intertemporal model of manufacturers choices is combined with econometrically estimated abatement cost functions to simulate the cost savings and emission effects of an averaging trading and banking marketable permit system relative to command and control regulations while the cost savings of such a system are estimated to be modest the intertemporal emission effects may be sizable the sensitivity of the results to discount rates abatement cost functions and model specifications is also explored

incentives for investment in advanced pollution abatement technology in emission permit markets with banking we examine the incentives that firms have to invest in cleaner abatementtechnology when the banking of permits is allowed in emission permittrading schemes we show that under certainty permit banking can distortincentives for investment and lead to a sub optimal amount of investmentspending under imperfect information aggregate abatement costuncertainty and investment irreversibility provide arguments for allowingbanking we generalize the model to consider these showing that somebanking is desirable but that it need not be the case that the privatebanking solution is optimal

intraindustry trade sources and effects on protection this paper provides an empirical analysis of the determinants of intraindustry trade we demonstrate that two way trade flows occur where conditions are favorable to international specialization consistent with the stigler williamson analysis of the division of labor the results are inconsistent with the prevailing product differentiationcum scale economies model of intraindustry trade in addition we show that intraindustry trade has a significant impact on protectionist pressures exports of closely related products have the effect of mitigating the tariff raising effects that imports would otherwise exert

regulation by prices quantities or both a review of instrument choice choosing appropriate policy instruments is an important part of successful regulation once objectives are agreed and suitable targets adopted policy makers can employ command and control regulation and or economic instruments and choose between fixing a price or a quantity this paper examines the relative advantages of price quantity and hybrid instruments according to their efficiency under uncertainty the trade off between credible commitment and flexibility implementation international considerations and political economy various illustrations of the theory are provided with two detailed applications to climate change and transport policy specifically congestion and safety pricing

the economics of pollution permit banking in the context of title iv of the 1990 clean air act amendments abstract this paper presents a model of the collective emission permit banking behavior of electricity generating units affected by title iv of the clean air act amendments of 1990 a rigorous treatment of the constraint that pollution permits cannot be borrowed from future allocations is introduced this approach enables an analysis of the impact of future changes in electricity demand regulations and technologies on the present permit price and emissions level the effect of uncertainty on the banking behavior is also explored

combining price and quantity controls under partitioned environmental regulation abstract this paper analyzes hybrid emissions trading systems etss under partitioned environmental regulation when firms abatement costs and future emissions are uncertain we show that hybrid policies that introduce bounds on the price or the quantity of abatement provide a way to hedge against differences in marginal abatement costs across partitions price bounds are more efficient than abatement bounds as they also use information on firms abatement technologies while abatement bounds can only address emission uncertainty using a numerical stochastic optimization model with equilibrium constraints for the european carbon market we find that introducing hybrid policies in eu ets reduces expected excess abatement costs of achieving targeted emission reductions under eu climate policy by up to 89 we also find that under partitioned regulation there is a high likelihood for hybrid policies to yield sizeable ex post cost reductions

intertemporal permit trading for the control of greenhouse gas emissions this paper integrates two themes in the intertemporal permitliterature through the construction of an intertemporal bankingsystem for a pollutant that creates both stock and flow damages a permit banking system for the special case of a pollutant thatonly causes stock damages is also developed this latter simpler case corresponds roughly to the greenhouse gas emissionreduction regime proposed by the u s department of state as ameans of fulfilling the u s commitment to the frameworkconvention on climate change this paper shows that environmentalregulators can achieve the socially optimal level of emissionsand output through time by setting the correct total sum ofallowable emissions and specifying the correct intertemporaltrading ratio for banking and borrowing for the case ofgreenhouse gases we show that the optimal growth rate of permitprices and therefore the optimal intertemporal trading rate hasthe closed form solution equal to the ratio of current marginalstock damages to the discounted future value of marginal stockdamages less the decay rate of emissions in the atmosphere given a non optimal negotiated emission path we then derive apermit banking system that has the potential to lower net socialcosts by adjusting the intertemporal trading ratio taking intoaccount the behavior of private agents we use a simplenumerical simulation model to illustrate the potential gains fromvarious possible banking systems

a model of intertemporal emission trading banking and borrowing abstract this paper provides a general treatment of emission trading banking and borrowing in an intertemporal continuous time model using optimal control theory the decentralized behavior of firms is shown to lead to the least cost solution attainable under joint cost minimization explicit solutions for the time paths of emissions and permit prices are derived when firms are allowed to both bank and borrow and when firms are only allowed to bank emission permits the policy implications of emission banking and borrowing are discussed

carbon emission permit price volatility reduction through financial options we develop a stylized model to investigate the impact of financial options on reducing carbon permit price volatility under a cap and trade system the existence of an option market provides a mechanism to hedge the uncertainty of future spot prices and is a stimulus for investment in carbon emission abatement technologies we show that both the spot price level and the price volatility of carbon permits can be reduced via the trading of financial options while achieving the emission reduction target we also show that introducing financial options in a banking environment offers more flexibility to risk management in carbon permit trading

commercial policy and intra industry trade abstract this paper constructs a model of intra industry trade within a multi product industry whose output range is limited to that obtainable from a particular type of capital intra industry trade is a natural outcome in this structure without requiring increasing returns to scale or imperfectly competitive markets and with its pattern determined along traditional relative factor abundance lines the volume of this trade will vary inversely with the level of trade restrictions as observed empirically other policies are then considered for their influence on the range rather than the level of domestic production since the former is the more likely policy objective under these circumstances

econometric issues in macroeconomic models with generated regressors the paper critically reviews the literature on the econometric issues raised by the use of generated regressors gr in empirical models the economic rationale for the use of gr is considered with examples being drawn from several macroeconomic examples including new classical macroeconomic ncm models which postulate monetary neutrality various estimation methods are discussed for models which include surprise or unexpected terms and the strengths and weaknesses of each approach are investigated drawing upon the work of mcaleer and mckenzie 1991 situations where the typically inefficient two step estimation 2se method will be efficient are highlighted problems of model misspecification and measurement errors are also investigated an empirical section highlights some of the dangers of using uncorrected 2se estimation results through a careful consideration of many recent attempts to test the ncm monetary neutrality hypothesis copyright 1993 by blackwell publishers ltd

soft and hard price collars in a cap and trade system a comparative analysis we use a stochastic dynamic framework to compare price collars price ceilings and floors in a cap and trade system with uncertainty in the level of baseline emissions and costs we consider soft collars which provide limited volume of additional emission allowances a reserve at the price ceiling and hard collars which provide an unlimited supply of additional allowances thereby preventing allowance prices from exceeding the price ceiling conversely allowances are removed from the market if prices fall to the floor we find that increasing the size of the reserve strictly lowers expected net present values of compliance costs however there is a diminishing effect as the allowance reserve is expanded most of the expected cost savings are achieved with a modest reserve consequently a rather limited soft price collar could provide considerable assurance about cost while preventing the possibility that emissions could spiral out of control

permit banking in emission trading competition arbitrage and linkage abstract several existing or proposed climate policies have considered bankable permits in a cap and trade c t program that covers beyond a single sector e g electric power or allows the program to link to external c t programs in other regions this paper develops a model of permit banking under imperfect competition and imperfect inter temporal arbitrage in which the firms in one dominant sector can exert market power in both product and permit markets while those in other sectors or linked programs are perfectly competitive a simple analytical model is developed to generate contestable hypothesis we further extend the model to account for the physical power system institutional rules and market conditions and then apply it to the pennsylvania jersey maryland pjm market we show that if the dominant firm has market power then the permit price rises at a higher rate than the discount rate contrary to perfectly competitive permit market where the permit price rises at the discount rate following the classic hotelling s rule furthermore under a declining emissions cap system with the permits front loaded in early time periods the dominant firm has an incentive to suppress the permit prices monopsony when buying the permits in early periods and then inflate the permit prices monopoly when selling them in later periods numerical results of the pjm case are consistent with the analytical conclusion

statistical arbitrage with default and collateral abstract this paper studies the implications of the absence of statistical arbitrage opportunities in a two period incomplete market economy where default is allowed but there are collateral requirements modified versions of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing are obtained

business cycles and emission trading with banking abstract we propose an emission cap adjustment policy for an emission trading system ets that allows banking of allowances for later use and faces business cycle uncertainty the forward looking banking decisions cause a commitment problem with respect to regulator s next period allowance supply decision we tackle the commitment problem by focusing on the markov equilibrium of the policy the equilibrium policy has a surprisingly simple structure combining features from both price and quantity instruments the regulator s ability to choose a new cap for each period does not render banking obsolete but on the contrary makes banking an integral part of the equilibrium policy using data from the eu ets to calibrate the model we solve the markov equilibrium policy for the case of carbon emissions regulation and compare markov policies with and without the possibility to bank allowances a counterfactual analysis of the eu ets during the period of 2009 2013 shows that the optimal markov policy would have led to a steadier allowance price level and a stricter emission regulation than what was actually observed in the eu ets

pollution permit markets with intertemporal trading and asymmetric information abstract we consider the problem of determining the permit discount rate in pollution permit markets in which permits may be traded over time and polluting firms have better information about their abatement costs than does the regulator we show that the preferred permit discount rate may be greater than or less than the money discount rate we also consider whether or not the regulator should allow intertemporal trading to take place allowing intertemporal trading lowers social costs when the slope of the marginal damage function is less than the slope of the aggregate marginal abatement cost function

risk aversion and co2 regulatory uncertainty in power generation investment policy and modeling implications abstract we consider a simulation of risk averse producers when making investment decisions in a competitive energy market who face uncertainty about future regulation of carbon dioxide emissions investments are made under regulatory uncertainty then the regulatory state is revealed and producers realize returns we consider anticipated taxes grandfathered permits and auctioned permits and show that some anticipated policies increase investment in the relatively dirty technology beliefs about the policy instrument that will be used to price carbon may be as important as certainty that carbon will be priced more generally a failure to consider risk aversion may bias policy analysis for the power sector

environmental policy a la carte letting firms choose their regulation under uncertainty the optimal choice between price and quantity instruments depends on the technology of the regulated firms which is often private information we consider an environmental policy that delegates the prices versus quantities decision to the firms by offering them the choice between an emissions tax and permit trading such an approach is currently used in swiss climate policy we provide a detailed characterization of the optimal policy and show that this approach reduces expected social costs compared to a pure tax or permit trading regime we demonstrate that an optimal allocation of firms to instruments can be achieved despite substantial informational constraints and that all firms gain from the introduction of the instrument choice compared to optimally designed single instrument policies furthermore we discuss the conditions under which this approach is likely to be preferable to a hybrid regulation

an intertemporal carbon emissions trading system with cap adjustment and path control abstract cap adjustment with shocks and cost effectiveness in cap and trade system has been an area of concern for regulators by a simple two period model of such system with banking and borrowing we examine how emission reduction technological changes affect the cap in three cases i e pure flow externality pure stock externality and mixed externality and identify the efficiency properties in such system with banking and borrowing we show that the effects of technological changes on cap are negative in both pure flow and pure stock externality cases in the mixed externality case the effects are uncertain which depend on the decayed rate of co2 stock the discounted rate and functions of marginal abatement costs and marginal damage in general cases the social optimum is not attainable via the cap and trade system since firms sub optimally distribute emissions across periods in a particular case if the ratio of marginal damage in period 1 to the discounted marginal damage in period 2 is exactly equal to the decayed rate the decentralized emissions of firms will lead to the social optimum finally a hybrid quantity price policy is proposed to rectify the paths of firms to be socially desirable with an effective quantity control

taxes and quotas for a stock pollutant with multiplicative uncertainty we compare taxes and quotas when firms and the regulator have asymmetric information about the slope of firms abatement costs damages are caused by a stock pollutant we calibrate the model using cost and damage estimates of greenhouse gasses taxes dominate quotas as with additive uncertainty this model with multiplicative uncertainty allows us to compare expected stock levels under the two policies and to investigate the importance of stock size and the magnitude of uncertainty on the policy ranking

intra industry trade and protection which way does the causation go abstract this paper analyses the simultaneous determination of intra industry trade iit and tariffs the results demonstrate that which iit is influenced by tariffs reverse relationship does not hold our results indicate the single equation models can suffer from simultaneity bias

carbon markets 15 years after kyoto lessons learned new challenges abstract carbon markets are substantial and they are expanding there are many lessons from market experiences over the past eight years there should be fewer free allowances better management of market sensitive information and a recognition that trading systems require adjustments that have consequences for market participants and market confidence moreover the emerging market architecture features separate emissions trading systems serving distinct jurisdictions and a variety of other types of policies exist alongside the carbon markets this situation is in sharp contrast to the top down integrated global trading architecture envisioned 15 years ago by the designers of the kyoto protocol and raises a suite of new questions in this new architecture jurisdictions with emissions trading have to decide how whether and when to link with one another stakeholders and policymakers must confront how to measure the comparability of efforts among markets as well as relative to a variety of other polic

a cap and trade commitment policy with allowance banking we examine the planner s dynamic regulation problem in an emission trading system ets with allowance banking the planner sets the emissions cap for the next period after the current period allowance market has cleared but before knowing the next period s abatement cost realization this creates a time consistency problem when banking is possible we examine two policies to overcome the consistency problem a commitment solution and the markov perfect solution we show that the endogenous price floor generated by the banking demand becomes an integral feature of the two policies hence they can be best described as hybrid policies that combine elements from emissions taxes and tradable allowances this reveals new welfare implications that have an influence on instrument choice in the traditional prices versus quantities setup we compare the expected welfare outcomes of four different policy instruments the commitment policy the markov policy a pigouvian tax and a no banking ets we show that allowing banking can yield welfare gains compared to tax and quantity regulation with or without commitment

u s protection and intra industry trade the message to developing countries the purpose of this article is twofold first i provide recent evidence on the characteristics of u s intra industry trade with individual countries and regions which can be compared and contrasted with earlier work intra industry trade is defined as the cross hauling of similar goods between trading partners for example the united states exports automobiles to germany and imports automobiles from germany at the same time in the empirical work that follows i use a simple index that equals zero when there is no two way trade in a product and one when exports and imports of a product are equal 2 the present study provides an analysis of recent trade data 1984 and of u s intra industry trade at the four digit sic level that includes intraindustry trade between the united states and other industrialized countries canada japan the european community ec newly industrialized countries brazil mexico and developing regions caribbean basin south america second i examine the possibility that the trade liberalizing effects of intra industry trade are likely to extend to u s trade with developing countries this second issue is particularly important since recent work makes it clear that post kennedy round and post tokyo round protectionism among the industrial countries remains biased against manufactured exports from developing countries 3 the results are significant in three respects first there was consistent evidence that intra industry trade is dominated by cross flows of intermediate goods 4 more specifically intra industry trade occurs primarily in made to order intermediate goods furthermore intraindustry trade occurs predominantly in product lines in which efficient production is small scale production those findings hold not only for

dynamic commitment and incomplete policy rules considering the dynamics of commitment highlights some neglected features of time inconsistency problems we modify the standard rules versus discretion question in three ways 1 a government that does not commit today retains the option to do so tomorrow 2 the government s commitment capability is restricted to a class of simple rules and 3 the government s ability to make irrevocable commitments is restricted three results stand out first the option to wait makes the incumbent regime rules or discretion relatively more attractive second the option to wait means that increased uncertainty makes the incumbent regime more attlwactive third because the commitment decision takes place in real time policy choice displays hysteresis when monetary policy is subject to dynamic inconsistencies optimal policy requires some precommitment by the central bank despite a proliferation of mechanisms designed to address this problem work in this area has continued to assume a once and for all choice between rules and discretion this paper asks two closely related questions first what happens if commitment decisions are made in real time so that failure to commit today does not rule out the possibility of commitment tomorrow second if governments can make only commitments that are difficult but not impossible to reverse what determines the dynamics of commitment and reversal the assumption of once and for all choice enforces simplistic dynamics on the policy process if the standard models are interpreted literally for example the commitment problem for u s monetary policy is moot having been resolved with the founding of the federal reserve system in 1914 if not at the constitutional convention of 1789 much of the interest in dynamic inconsistency however arises pre

designing carbon markets part ii carbon markets in space this paper analyses the design of carbon markets in time i e intertemporally it is part of a twin set of papers that ask starting from first principles what an optimal global carbon market would look like by around 2030 our focus is on firm level cap and trade systems although much of what we say would also apply to government level trading and carbon offset schemes we examine the first principles of temporal design that would help to maximise flexibility and to minimise costs including banking and borrowing and other mechanisms to provide greater carbon price predictability and credibility over time

on a fundamental advantage of permits over taxes for the control of pollution we extend the tax versus permits literature by considering permit supply functions and pollution tax functions that are generalizations of the usual constant permit supply and constant pollution tax rate in our model pollution is not uniformly mixed and the regulator is uncertain about the polluting firms abatement costs we determine the optimal permit supply functions and the optimal pollution tax functions using these functions we show that permits lead unambiguously to lower total expected costs than taxes we analyze the magnitude of this difference for a simple model of climate change by relating the optimal permit supply functions to weitzman am econ rev 68 683 691 1978 we provide a new interpretation of his results

non nested tests of three competing theories of business cycles this paper tests the keynesian new classical and real business cycle theories against each other as non nested hypotheses using quarterly data for the us covering the period 1959 1 1989 2 the results indicate that no one theory stands out as the dominant explanation of the business cycle this contrasts with the findings of earlier work which is mostly concerned with testing the keynesian against the new classical theory we find that the introduction of a third theory the real business cycle theory which accounts of real factors blurs the distinction between the demand sided keynesian and the new classical theories

econometric analysis of aggregation in the context of linear prediction models this paper deals with the problem of aggregation where the focus of the analysis is whether to predict aggregate variables using macro or micro equations the grunfeldgriliches prediction criterion for choosing between aggregate and disaggregate equations is generalized to allow for contemporaneous covariances between the disturbances of micro equations and the possibility of different parametric restrictions on the equations of the disaggregate model a new test is proposed of the hypothesis of perfect aggregation which tests the validity of aggregation either through coefficient equality or through the stability over time of the composition of the regressors across the micro units the tools developed in the paper are then applied to employment demand functions for the uk economy disaggregated by 40 industries firstly a set of unrestricted log linear dynamic specifications are estimated for the disaggregate equations and then linear parameter restrictions are imposed as appropriate corresponding unrestricted and restricted aggregate equations are estimated two different levels of aggregation are considered aggregation over the 23 manufacturing industries and aggregation over all 40 industries of the economy in both cases the hypothesis of perfect aggregation is firmly rejected for the manufacturing industries the prediction criterion marginally favors the aggregate equation but over all industries the disaggregated equations are strongly preferred

banking and borrowing in the eu ets a review of economic modelling current provisions and prospects for future design this article deals with the issue of banking and borrowing in the context of the european union emissions trading scheme eu ets by attempting to provide a policy oriented unifying theoretical framework after describing the main features of the eu ets the core part of the article consists of variations of an inter temporal continuous time optimization model additional elements include flexibility measures currently discussed and proposed in other emissions trading systems usa australia which include the use of safety valves minimum price auctioning or offsets from domestic or international projects

collateral once again abstract this paper shows how collateral is used to prove the second part of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing in a collateral default setting which connects the concept of an arbitrage free price with the solution of the individual utility maximization problem

the role of markets and policies in delivering innovation for climate change mitigation this paper identifies market incentives and international and domestic policies that could technologically alter energy systems to achieve greenhouse gas stabilization targets while also meeting other societal goals i consider the conceptual basis and empirical evidence on the effectiveness and efficiency of climate technology policies the paper reviews the literature on trends and prospects for innovation in climate change mitigation and examines the evidence on induced innovation and the implications for the choice of technology policy i then consider the impact of technological advances on the environment the role of direct government support for r d and the complementarities between policies internalizing

the revolving door external debt and capital flight a philippine case study abstract in recent decades the private citizens of a number of third world countries accumulated substantial external assets via capital flight at the same time their governments incurred large external debts this paper proposes a classification of hypothetical linkages between capital flight and external debt disbursements and examines the strength of these linkages in the philippines during 1962 86 econometric analysis and anecdotal evidence indicate that large sums of capital flowed into and out of the philippines through a financial revolving door on this basis i conclude that there is scope for political and legal challenges to the legitimacy of a substantial fraction of the country s external debt

on the policy ineffectiveness proposition and a keynesian alternative one of the most controversial macroeconomic developments of the last decade has been the rise of the so called new classical nc approach to macroeconomic theory and policy lucas i972 sargent and wallace i975 and barro i 976 have presented models which combine the friedman i968 phelps i970 natural rate theory with assumptions of market clearing and rational expectations as is well known these models deliver the striking result that the mean values of real variables cannot be affected by the government s monetary policy the publication of the theoretical work establishing the impotency result led to much empirical testing of the nc models one of the most successful approaches from the point of view of nc advocates is contained in a series of papers by barro i977 i978 i98i barro and rush i980 and rush i986 recently pesaran i982 has questioned barro s results and claimed that once an implausible assumption is discarded barro s work can be rejected in favour of a keynesian alternative because pesaran has put forth an explicit counter model to barro s work his results are potentially quite important this paper examines in detail pesaran s work and conclusions

the nature of the adas model based on the islm model the aggregate demand and supply model adas is interpreted as a synthesis of the keynesian and neoclassical models it uses the islm model without explaining its nature to derive aggregate demand ad it is combined with an aggregate supply as curve to explain price inflation and output dynamics this paper argues that neither the ad nor as curve is conceptually the same as its microeconomic counterpart and adas is not a synthesis in fact adasimplies that discretionary policy is necessary and that price changes do not perform their traditional negative feedback function

a tradable permit system in an intertemporal economy it is known that in an intertemporal competitive economy a tradable permit system may not achieve efficiency without setting appropriate permit interest rates i e rewards for holding permits to find the rates however we need to know in advance the path of efficient permit prices which is difficult to obtain this study intends to solve this problem in two ways first we analyze a special case in which the permit interest rates are given by a simple rule for example if the marginal abatement cost of pollution emission is constant then the appropriate rate is to equal the monetary interest rate as is the case for global warming if the damage is caused in the future far beyond the planning period of the environmental program the appropriate rate coincides with the marginal self recovery of environmental stock under certain conditions as a second approach we propose a tradable permit system with a permit bank as a mechanism by which the permit interest rates are generated endogenously without governmental intervention other than the issuance of permits however we also show that this approach raises the problem of indeterminacy of the equilibrium

alternative approaches to cost containment in a cap and trade system we compare several emissions reduction instruments including quantity policies with banking and borrowing price policies and hybrid policies safety valve and price collar using a dynamic model with stochastic baseline emissions the instruments are compared under the design goal of obtaining the same expected cumulative emissions across all options based on simulation analysis with the model parameterized to values relevant to proposed us climate mitigation policies we find that restrictions on banking and borrowing including the provision of interest rates on the borrowings can severely limit the value of the policy depending on the regulator chosen allowance issuance path although emissions taxes generally provide the lowest expected abatement costs a cap and trade system combined with either a safety valve or a price collar can be designed to provide expected abatement costs near those of a tax but with lower emissions variance than a tax consistently a price collar is more cost effective than a safety valve for a given expected cumulative emissions outcome because it encourages inexpensive abatement when abatement costs decline

the role of collateral in a model of debt renegotiation this paper studies the effect of debt renegotiation on the design of optimal loan arrangements in a model of borrowing and lending with asymmetric information renegotiation may occur because bankruptcy involves costly asset liquidation which is ex post inefficient the author shows that the extent of the entrepreneur s liabilities in the optimal loan contract depends upon the creditor s commitment to impose bankruptcy should default ever occur a limited liability arrangement is optimal whenever the creditor is precommited not to forgive any portion of the outstanding debt otherwise debt may efficiently be secured by outside collateral copyright 1994 by ohio state university press

managing permit markets to stabilize prices the political economy of environmental policy favors the use of quantity based instruments over price based instruments e g tradable permits over green taxes at least in the united states with cost uncertainty however there are clear efficiency advantages to prices in cases where the marginal damages of emissions are relatively flat such as with greenhouse gases the question arises therefore of whether one can design flexible quantity policies that mimic the behavior of price policies namely stable permit prices and abatement costs we explore a number of quantity plus policies that replicate the behavior of a price policy through rules that adjust the effective permit cap for unexpectedly low or high costs they do so without necessitating any monetary exchanges between the government and the regulated firms which can be a significant political barrier to the use of price instruments

pricing emission permits in the absence of abatement abstract if emissions are stochastic and firms are unable to control them through abatement the cap in a permit market may be exceeded or not be reached i derive a binary options pricing formula that expresses the permit price as a function of the penalty for noncompliance and the probability of an exceeded cap under the assumption of no abatement i apply my model to the eu ets where the rapid introduction of the market made it difficult for firms to adjust their production technology in time for the first phase the model fits the data well implying that the permit price may have been driven by firms hedging against stochastic emissions

policy shocks and market based regulations evidence from the renewable fuel standard the renewable fuel standard mandates large increases in u s biofuel consumption and is implemented using tradable compliance credits known as rins in early 2013 rin prices soared causing the regulator to propose reducing future mandates we estimate empirically the effect of three policy shocks that reduced the expected mandates in 2013 we find that the largest of these shocks decreased the value of the fuel industry s 2013 compliance obligation by 7 billion we then study the effects of the shocks on commodity markets and the market value of publicly traded biofuel firms results show that the burden of the mandate reductions fell primarily on advanced biofuel firms and commodity markets of the marginal compliance biofuel we argue that the policy shocks reduced the incentive to invest in the technologies required to meet the future objectives of the rfs and discuss alternative policy designs to address the problems that arose in 2013

the role of stocks and shocks concepts in the debate over price versus quantity recent literature showed that the choice between a price or quantity control depends in part on the dynamic structure of cost uncertainty temporary shocks to abatement cost favors the use of a price control while permanent shocks favor a quantity control unfortunately the importance of this assumption to the optimal choice has not yet received wide attention among economists we analyze the regulatory sproblem in an alternative setting and reproduce these results our contribution is the simplicity of the model and the accessibility of the results which reinforce the critical role played by the assumed structure of uncertainty

stationary equilibria in asset pricing models with incomplete markets and collateral we consider an infinite horizon exchange economy with incomplete markets and collateral constraints as in the two period model of geanakoplos and zame 2002 households can default on their liabilities at any time and financial securities are only traded if the promises associated with these securities are backed by collateral we examine an economy with a single perishable consumption good where the only collateral available consists of productive assets in this model competitive equilibria always exist and we show that under the assumption that all exogenous variables follow a markov chain there also exist stationary equilibria these equilibria can be characterized by a mapping from the exogenous shock and the current distribution of financial wealth to prices and portfolio choices we develop an algorithm to approximate this mapping numerically and discuss ways to implement the algorithm in practice a computational example demonstrates the performance of the algorithm and shows some quantitative features of equilibria in a model with collateral and default

a model of income unemployment and inflation for the usa a simple three equation macroeconomic model is developed to explain the dynamics of output umemployment and inflation for the usa the model is estimated with the annual data for 1946 1989 insights gained through some recent developments are used to specify and estimate the model

ex post efficient permit markets a detailed analysis this paper provides a detailed analysis of ex post efficient permit markets after a short review of institutional designs that can achieve ex post efficiency under uncertainty and asymmetric information we analyze the effects of an ex post efficient regulation on the expected costs of the regulated firms on their investment behavior and on the incentives for strategic behavior on imperfectly competitive permit markets also we inquire about the budget effects of the regulation our results show that ex post efficient permit markets have considerable benefits beside the direct increase in expected social welfare