financial markets and growth the last five years have witnessed a resurgence of interest in the relationship between financial intermediation and economic growth this issue had been extensively studied nearly two decades earlier by goldsmith 1969 mckinnon 1973 shaw 1973 and others who produced considerable evidence that financial development correlates with growth but their work though insightful lacked analytical foundations in traditional growth theory financial intermediation could be related to the level of the capital stock per worker or to the level of productivity but not to their respective growth rates the latter were ascribed to exogenous technical progress the recent revival of interest in the link between financial development and growth stems mainly from the insights and techniques of endogenous growth models which have shown that there can be self sustaining growth without exogenous technical progress and that the growth rate can be related to preferences technology income distribution and institutional arrangements this provides the theoretical underpinning that early contributors lacked tinancial intermediation can be shown to have not only level effects but also growth effects the resulting models have offered important insights into the effect of financial development on growth and vice versa they have also provided new impetus to empirical research on these issues this paper reviews the ground covered so far on the theoretical and empirical front and points to some still unresolved issues

limited commitment and crowding out of private transfers evidence from a randomised experiment this paper studies some empirical implications of models with limited risk sharing due to the imperfect enforceability of contracts we test whether the amount by which public transfers reduce private transfers is affected by features of the economy such as the variance of income and its persistence these implications are unique to models with imperfect enforceability we use data from mexico collected to evaluate a public transfer programme it included a randomised component that we exploit as a source of exogenous variation our results support the theoretical model in that the crowding out of private transfers is larger in villages where the variance of income is smaller

financial intermediation and endogenous growth an endogenous growth model with multiple assets is developed agents who face random future liquidity needs accumulate capital and a liquid but unproductive asset the effects of introducing financial intermediation into this environment are considered conditions are provided under which the introduction of intermediaries shifts the composition of savings toward capital causing intermediation to be growth promoting in addition intermediaries generally reduce socially unnecessary capital liquidation again tending to promote growth

the introduction of formal insurance and its effect on redistribution abstract transfers motivated by altruism guilt and norms of giving play an important role in supporting individuals who suffer losses due to risk we present empirical evidence from an artefactual field experiment in ethiopia in which we introduce formal insurance in a setting where donors make redistributive transfers to recipients who experience losses we find that donors tend to reduce their transfers to recipients who are offered insurance whether or not they take it up when insurance is rejected by a recipient transfer reductions are larger for donors who firmly expect that the recipient would take up insurance the results are consistent with a framework in which the introduction of insurance erodes norms of giving by revealing differences in the extent to which individuals value precautionary behavior with respect to risk taking welfare calculations show that when formal insurance is introduced the welfare of those who fail to take it up may be reduced

bank liquidity and stability in an overlapping generations model in an infinitely repeated version of the diamond and dybvig 1983 model intergenerational transfers enable a bank to achieve interest rate smoothing and to provide depositors with liquidity insurance without diamond and dybvig s assumption of no side trades the bank is subject to runs that may result from either excessive withdrawals or the lack of new deposits the latter cause which cannot occur in diamond and dybvig s one generation model implies that suspension of convertibility may not prevent bank runs government intervention may be necessary to maintain bank stability article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

financial structure and capital investment this article studies the effects of financial structure on the growth of physical capital accumulation several theoretical works have proposed that banks are better than stock markets in funding capital investment we test these theories with panel data for 62 industrial and developing countries using generalized method of moments dynamic panel techniques results show that bank based financial systems are indeed associated with faster capital growth this effect is especially strong in countries where banks can have close links to nonfinancial firms

informal insurance arrangements with limited commitment theory and evidence from village economies recent work on consumption allocations in village economies finds that idiosyncratic variation in consumption is systematically related to idiosyncratic variation in income thus rejecting the hypothesis of full risk pooling we attempt to explain these observations by adding limited commitment as an impediment to risk pooling we provide a general dynamic model and completely characterise efficient informal insurance arrangements constrained by limited commitment and test the model using data from three indian villages we find that the model can fully explain the dynamic response of consumption to income but that it fails to explain the distribution of consumption across households

risk and insurance in a rural credit market an empirical investigation in northern nigeria credit contracts play a direct role in pooling risk between households in northern nigeria repayments owed by borrowers depend on realizations of random shocks by both borrowers and lenders the paper develops two models of state contingent loans the first is a competitive equilibrium in perfectly enforceable contracts the second permits imperfect information and equilibrium default estimates of both models indicate that quantitatively important state contingent payments are embedded in these loan transactions but that a fully efficient risk pooling equilibrium is not achieved the research is based on a year long survey in zaria nigeria conducted by the author

the crowding out effect of formal insurance on informal risk sharing an experimental study abstract this paper investigates the crowding out effect of formal insurance on informal risk sharing arrangements via theory and laboratory experiment our model and simulation predict that the crowding out of private transfers is often more than one for one and will reduce the total risk coverage furthermore the existence of a moderate degree of altruism exaggerates the crowding out effect especially when there is an ex ante income inequality these predictions are mostly supported by the laboratory experiment except that the crowding out effect is not more than one for one and hence the total risk coverage is not significantly reduced by formal insurance

formal and informal risk sharing in ldcs theory and empirical evidence in village economies limited commitment models have been proposed as theoretical alternatives to the complete markets hypothesis and have been shown to be empirically relevant yet village institutions might be able to enforce some contracts we construct a theoretical model which shows how households can insure through both formal and informal contracts when some verifiable production takes place in an environment of incomplete markets this theoretical setting nests the case of complete markets when all risks can be insured by formal contracts because all states of nature would be verifiable and the case where only informal agreements are available agreements specifying informal transfers that needs to be self enforceable we derive two equations of interest the income equation which is partially determined by the formal contract and an euler type equation where consumption growth is affected by lagged consumption instead of being a martingale using semi parametric specifications we derive testable restrictions of our model we estimate both equations using data of village economies in pakistan empirical results are consistent with the model the estimation and allows to show that the incentive constraints due to selfenforcement bind and that formal contracts are used to reduce the probability of binding the constraint

uncertain liquidity and interbank contracting we study a version of the diamond and dybvig journal of political economy 1983 91 401 419 model where banks would like to obtain insurance against shocks on returns on liquid assets through an interbank borrowing and lending program we show that if investments in liquid assets and their realized returns are private information to individual banks the first best allocation is not incentive compatible we then characterize the second best interbank contract

the welfare costs of self fulfilling bank runs we study the welfare implications of self fulfilling bank runs and liquidity require ments in a neoclassical growth model where banks facing long lasting possible runs can choose in any period a run proof asset portfolio in this framework runs distort banks insurance provision against idiosyncratic liquidity shocks and liquidity requirements re solve this distortion by forcing a credit tightening quantitatively the welfare costs of self fulfilling bank runs are equivalent to a constant consumption loss of up to 2 5 percent of u s gdp depending on fundamentals liquidity requirements might generate small welfare gains but also increase the welfare costs by up to 1 8 percent

distinguishing panics and information based bank runs welfare and policy implications in this paper we contrast panics and information based bank runs in an effort to provide a robust and empirically plausible model of how bank runs are triggered the model of information based runs is characterized by two sided asymmetric information the bank cannot observe the true liquidity needs of the depositors while depositors are asymmetrically informed about bank asset quality we also examine the relative degrees of risk sharing provided by bank deposit contracts and traded equity contracts we show that the choice of deposit or equity depends on the attributes of and information about the underlying investment returns

jeea fbbva lecture 2019 consumption insurance in networks with asymmetric information evidence from tanzania this paper uses a dataset from tanzania with information on consumption income and income shocks within and across family networks crucially and uniquely it also contains data on the degree of information existing between each pair of households within family networks we use these data to construct a novel measure of the quality of information both at the level of household pairs and at the level of the network we also note that the individual level measures can be interpreted as measures of network centrality we study risk sharing within these networks and explore whether the rejection of perfect risk sharing that we observe can be related to our measures of information quality we show that households within family networks with better information are less vulnerable to idiosyncratic shocks furthermore we show that more central households within networks are less vulnerable to idiosyncratic shocks these results have important implications for the characterisation of the empirical failure of the perfect risk sharing hypothesis and point to the importance of information frictions

does africa need a rotten kin theorem experimental evidence from village economies this paper measures the economic impact of social pressure to share income with kin and neighbors in rural kenyan villages the authors conduct a lab experiment in which they randomly vary the observability of investment returns the goal is to test whether subjects reduce their income in order to keep it hidden the analysis finds that women adopt an investment strategy that conceals the size of their initial endowment in the experiment although that strategy reduces their expected earnings this effect is largest among women with relatives attending the experiment parameter estimates suggest that women behave as though they expect to be pressured to share four percent of their observable income with others and substantially more when close kin can observe income directly although this paper provides experimental evidence from a single african country observational studies suggest that similar pressure from kin may be prevalent in many rural areas throughout sub saharan africa

international business cycles with endogenous incomplete markets backus kehoe and kydland 1992 baxter and crucini 1995 and stockman and tesar 1995 find two major discrepancies between standard international business cycle models with complete markets and the data in the models cross country correlations are much higher for consumption than for output while in the data the opposite is true and cross country correlations of employment and investment are negative while in the data they are positive this paper introduces a friction into a standard model that helps resolve these anomalies the friction is that international loans are imperfectly enforceable any country can renege on its debts and suffer the consequences for future borrowing to solve for equilibrium in this economy with endogenous incomplete markets the methods of marcet and marimon 1999 are extended incorporating the friction helps resolve the anomalies more than does exogenously restricting the assets that can be traded

financial intermediaries and liquidity creation trading losses associated with information asymmetries can be mitigated by designing securities which split the cash flows of underlying assets these securities which can arise endogenously have values that do not depend on the information known only to informed agents bank debt deposits is an example of this type of liquid security which protect relatively uninformed agents and we provide a rationale for deposit insurance in this content high grade corporate debt and government bonds are other examples implying that a money market mutual fund based payments system may be an alternative to one based on insured bank deposits

financial intermediaries markets and growth we build a model in which financial intermediaries provide insurance to households against idiosyncratic liquidity shocks households can invest in financial markets directly if they pay a cost in equilibrium the ability of intermediaries to share risk is constrained by the market from a growth perspective this can be beneficial because intermediaries invest less in the productive technology when they provide more risk sharing our model predicts that bank oriented economies can grow more slowly than more market oriented economies which is consistent with some recent empirical evidence

financial development and economic growth abstract this paper examines the empirical relationship between long run growth and financial development proxied by the ratio between bank credit to the private sector and gdp we find that this proxy is positively correlated with growth in a large cross country sample but its impact changes across countries and is negative in a panel data for latin america we argue that the latter findings is the result of financial liberalization in a poor regulatory environment our findings also show that the main channel of transmission from financial development to growth is the efficiency rather than the volume of investment

liquidity provision banking and the allocation of interest rate risk abstract the paper studies the efficient allocation of technology induced interest rate risk and the implications of such risk for efficient liquidity provision complete immunization against interest rate risk is shown to be undesirable as it precludes the exploitation of favourable reinvestment opportunities under the assumptions of diamond dybvig 1983 interest induced valuation risks of long term assets should be born by early withdrawers reinvestment opportunity risks of short term assets by late withdrawers efficient liquidity provision thus entails no shifting of interest rate risk in the absence of additional moral hazard second best allocations can be implemented through unregulated competition among banks

capital markets financial intermediaries and liquidity supply abstract we study a dynamic economy endowed with a sequence of overlapping generations of consumers and production processes and where productive assets are illiquid and consumption preferences are subject to uninsurable demand for liquidity we characterize the steady states that can be achieved with alternative financial systems we show that infinitely lived financial intermediaries offering a liability with age dependent restrictions may implement a social optimum with full insurance if instead they offer anonymous unrestricted contracts then only second best consumption allocations with partial insurance obtain we also examine the consumption allocations available when agents can trade shares in competitive stock markets while allowing for trade across generations may or may not improve upon generational autarky we show that this competitive equilibrium is not a social optimum and is dominated by a system of infinitely lived unrestricted intermediaries

on corporate governance a study of proxy contests abstract this paper examines a sample of firms experiencing proxy contests for seats on their board of directors dissident shareholders usually fail to obtain a majority of board seats nevertheless they capture some seats via mechanisms such as cumulative voting in over half of the sample contests regardless of proxy contest outcome positive and statistically significant share price performance is associated with the contest that finding is predicted by the standard economic analysis of proxy contests in which the challenges benefit shareholders by improving corporate performance the finding runs counter to the claim of berle 1962 that the economists view of proxy contests is a wholly imaginary picture a portion of the positive share price changes taking place in the early stages of some proxy contests is not permanent however and as suggested by manne 1962 is at least partially attributable to temporary increases in the market value of the vote attached to corporate shares

the costs of antimerger lawsuits abstract this paper presents tests of the hypothesis that the relief imposed in antimerger cases is costly for defendant firms stockholders previous research on this subject suggests that defendants case related losses are due entirely to legal expenses and the disruption of productive activity in this paper it is shown that two out of five portfolios of defendant firms earn abnormal losses when final decisions in antimerger cases are announced these losses are consistent with the imposition of costly constraints on some defendants by government antitrust enforcers the tests also show that when acquisitions are canceled following antimerger complaints the losses to the target firms are substantial and completely offset the gains generated when the acquisitions are proposed

oportunidades program effect on consumption low participation and methodological issues abstract in this paper we estimate the effect of the mexican conditional cash transfer program oportunidades on consumption and we explore some issues related to participation in the program and to the estimation of treatment effects we discuss the comparability of treatment and control areas provide evidence that the expected transfer may not be sufficiently high to induce many eligible households to participate and find positive effects on consumption

the limits of equality insights from the israeli kibbutz what limits the capacity of society to redistribute what determines the structure of compensation in organizations striving for income equality this paper addresses these questions by investigating the economic and sociological forces underlying the persistence of the israeli kibbutzim communities based on the principle of income equality to do this i exploit newly assembled data on kibbutzim and a financial crisis in the late 1980s that affected them differentially the main findings are that 1 productive individuals are the most likely to exit and a kibbutz s wealth serves as a lock in device that increases the value of staying 2 higher wealth reduces exit and supports a high degree of income equality and 3 ideology facilitates income equality using a simple model i show that these findings are consistent with a view of the kibbutz as providing optimal insurance when members have the option of leaving more generally these findings contribute to an understanding of how mobility limits redistribution and to an understanding of the determinants of the sharing rule in other types of organizations such as professional partnerships cooperatives and labor managed firms

consumption smoothing in island economies can public insurance reduce welfare abstract in this paper we study the effects of certain types of public compulsory insurance arrangements for aggregate shocks on private allocations in environments with limited commitment we show that this type of insurance can improve the wellbeing of private situations but it can also deteriorate it we also describe how different characteristics of the environment affect the role of public insurance using data on the mexican progresa program we document the impact that some government programs have in crowding out private transfers

group insurance and lending with endogenous social collateral abstract we construct a dynamic model of self enforcing insurance provision and lending to a community of borrowers who are connected by risk sharing arrangements that are themselves subject to enforcement problems as in kocherlakota 1996 we show that an outside lender offering constant consumption contracts can earn a higher profit if he conditions his repeated interactions with each borrower on the history of his interactions with all the group members a joint liability contract rather than on his history with that borrower only individual liability contracts this result holds even in the absence of informational asymmetries the observation driving it is that with individual liability contracts a joint welfare maximizing group may prefer to have one or more group members default on their contracts so that the group can consume a mix of outside funds and the defaulters stochastic income one contribution of our work is to give precise economic content to the concept of social collateral as the per agent surplus from group risk sharing over autarky the group can deter its members from defaulting on their contracts with the principal by threatening to reduce that surplus

financial system design and liquidity provision by banks and markets in a dynamic economy this paper contributes to the literature on financial system design by comparing markets and banks in a dynamic economy investors trade off their liquidity needs against the high returns on illiquid investments both the banking system and the market can provide partial liquidity insurance to investors we consider full market participation as well as limited market participation we demonstrate that the full participation market with intergenerational trading can provide more liquidity than one without insurance is provided through wealth transfer across generations instead of cross subsidization across contemporaneous types as is the case in the finite economy given a full participation market that allows trading across generations only banks with initial capital can provide additional liquidity in a limited participation market with uncertainty about trading types an intergenerational bank with or without initial capital provides additional insurance to investors the need for trade is eliminated finally if there is no uncertainty about trading types then an intergenerational bank with initial capital eliminates the need for trading and improves welfare for all an intergenerational bank without initial capital improves welfare for people who do not trade

financial markets intermediaries and intertemporal smoothing in an overlapping generations economy with incomplete financial markets but no intermediaries there is underinvestment in safe assets in an economy with intermediaries and no financial markets accumulating reserves of safe assets allows returns to be smoothed nondiversifiable risk to be eliminated and an ex ante pareto improvement compared to the allocation in the market equilibrium to be achieved in a mixed financial system however competition from financial markets constrains intermediaries so that they perform no better than markets alone

consumption and investment in resource pooling family networks this paper examines a novel motive for resource pooling in family networks in rural economies to relax credit constraints and facilitate investment in non collateralizeable assets for which credit market imperfections are most binding we thus complement established literatures examining risk sharing motives for resource transfers within family networks as well as motives based on kinship tax obligations we do so exploiting the progresa program data in which family networks can be identified households are subject to large exogenous resource inflows and detailed responses on consumption and an array of investments can be tracked in a household panel over five years we find that for every dollar that accrues to the family network through progresa transfers food consumption expenditures increase by around 65c for both households eligible for progresa and ineligible members of the same family network hence the marginal propensity of families to invest save out of every dollar is around 35 and we document how this is channelled towards easing credit constraints poorer network members face in financing non collateralizable investments into their children s human capital we show these consumption and investment benefits of being embedded within a family network are sustained five years after households first experience resource transfers from progresa hence the interplay between resource inflows and resource pooling by family networks can place network members on sustained paths out of poverty this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

financial intermediation in an overlapping generations model with transaction costs abstract we analyze an overlapping generations economy where agents interact to share liquidity risk we show that a pure exchange economy has excessive trade in equilibrium because agents interact to rebalance their portfolios intergenerational financial intermediaries reduce the number of interactions because agents only transact when they face liquidity needs in the absence of asset risk intermediaries match redemptions with deposits and dividends and never sell assets if the economy is subject to transaction costs the intermediated economy can sustain higher stationary investment and welfare we also find that dead weight transaction costs can increase welfare because it protects banks from interbank arbitrage and dampens the inherent cyclicality of market economies

family networks and school enrolment evidence from a randomized social experiment we present evidence on whether and how a household s behavior is influenced by the presence and characteristics of its extended family using data from the progresa program in mexico we exploit information on the paternal and maternal surnames of heads and spouses in conjunction with the spanish naming convention to identify the inter and intra generational family links of each household to others in the same village we then exploit the randomized research design of the progresa evaluation data to identify whether the treatment effects of progresa transfers on secondary school enrolment vary according to the characteristics of extended family we find progresa only raises secondary enrolment among households that are embedded in a family network eligible but isolated households do not respond the mechanism through which the extended family influences household schooling choices is the redistribution of resources within the family network from eligibles that receive de facto unconditional cash transfers from progresa towards eligibles on the margin of enrolling children into secondary school

conditional cash transfers adult work incentives and poverty conditional cash transfer cct programs aim to alleviate poverty through monetary and in kind benefits as well as reduce future levels of poverty by encouraging investments in education health and nutrition the success of cct programs at reducing poverty depends on whether and the extent to which cash transfers affect adult work incentives the authors examine whether the progresa program of mexico affects adult participation in the labor market and overall adult leisure time and they link these effects to the impact of the program on poverty using the experimental design of progresa s evaluation sample the authors find that the program does not have any significant effect on adult labor force participation and leisure time their findings on adult work incentives are reinforced further by the result that progresa leads to a substantial reduction in poverty the poverty reduction effects are stronger for the poverty gap and severity of poverty measures

conditional cash transfers the case of progresa oportunidades conditional cash transfer cct programs innovate by conditioning transfers to poor families on investments in the human capital of children and other family members the mexican cct program progresa oportunidades began in 1997 and has served as a model for many of the now over sixty countries with ccts around the world in large part due to its initial evaluation with an experimental design and numerous follow up studies this article reviews the literature on the development evaluation and findings of progresa oportunidades summarizing what is known about program effects taking into account corrections for multiple hypothesis testing

banking and insurance abstract this paper studies the economic role of financial institutions in economies where agents incomes are subject to privately observable idiosyncratic random events the information structure precludes conventional insurance arrangements however a financial institution perhaps best viewed as a savings bank can provide partial insurance by generating a time pattern of deposit returns that redistributes wealth from agents with high incomes to those with low incomes resulting in a level of expected utility higher than that achievable in simple security markets insurance is incomplete because the bank faces a tradeoff between provision of insurance and maintenance of private incentives

security price reactions around corporate spin off announcements abstract we examine security price reactions around the announcements of 123 voluntary spin offs by 116 firms between 1963 and 1981 involving a pro rata distribution of the common stock of a subsidiary to the stockholders of the parent firm the median spin off in the sample is 6 6 of the original equity value and is associated with an abnormal return of 7 0 from 50 days prior to the announcement through completion of the spin off no evidence is found to indicate the gains to stockholders represent wealth transfers from senior securityholders over the entire event period we find positive gains for firms engaging in spin offs to facilitate mergers or to separate diverse operating units but negative returns to firms responding to legal and or regulatory difficulties in the two day interval surrounding the first press announcement we find positive average excess returns for all groups

theft gift giving and trustworthiness honesty is its own reward in rural paraguay in developing countries lacking legal enforcement villagers may use implicit contracts to minimize crime i construct a dynamic limited commitment model in which a thief cannot commit to forego stealing but is induced to steal less by the promise of future gifts combining survey data on production theft gifts and trust with experiments measuring trustworthiness i provide supporting evidence farmers living near more relatives or with plots that are difficult to steal from give fewer gifts and trust more and those living near more relatives also experience less theft giving increases when trust is lower and the threat of theft is greater

an inquiry into quasi credit contracts the role of reciprocal credit and interlinked deals in small scale fishing communities in agrarian village societies beset with many hazards and uncertainties people evolve various means of coping with risk what is perhaps less known is that credit transactions can sometimes serve the function of reducing risk in such societies this article is concerned with examining several insurance motivated credit arrangements in small scale fishing communities a hunger insurance mechanism of reciprocal credit and a system of interlinked contracts aimed at insuring against risks in the spheres of labour and marketing relations will be extensively dealt with moreover the concept of triadic relationships will be shown to have special relevance in the case of traditional insurance arrangements aiming at controlling problems of moral hazard

imperfect commitment altruism and the family evidence from transfer behavior in low income rural areas in this paper we examine empirically whether risk pooling is more advantageous among altruistic compared to selfish agents in a framework where individuals cannot make binding commitments in particular we incorporate altuism into a model of risk sharing under imperfect commitment and use simulation methods to establish tests of the roles of both altruism and commitment problems in determining the extent of insurance and the intertemporal movements in interhousehold transfers the tests are carried out using three panel data sets from two countries of rural south asia that provide detailed information on transfers and enable the measurement of income shocks the estimates provide strong support for the notion that imperfect commitment substantially constrains informal transfer arrangements whether kin based or not but also provide evidence that altruism plays an important role in ameliorating commitment constraints and thus in increasing the gains from income pooling

financial development and economic growth views and agenda this critique argues that the preponderance of theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence suggests a positive first order relationship between financial development and economic growth the body of work would push even most skeptics toward the belief that the development of financial markets and institutions is a critical and inextricable part of the growth process and away from the view that the financial system is an inconsequential sideshow responding passively to economic growth many gaps remain however and the paper highlights areas in acute need of additional research