equilibrium selection in an experimental macroeconomy author affiliation vivian lei department of economics university of wisconsin milwaukee milwaukee wi 53201 usa vlei uwm edu corresponding authorcharles n noussair department of economics faculty of economics and business tilburg university p o box 90153 5000 le tilburg the netherlands c n noussair uvt nl acknowledgment we are grateful to the college of letters and science and center for research on international economics at the university of wisconsin milwaukee for financial support we thank colin camerer katarina kellar lutz hendricks nazrul islam tomomi tanaka filip vesely and two anonymous referees for helpful comments 1 introductionone of the most influential literatures in economics is the theory of growth for surveys see azariadis 1993 barro and sala i martin 1995 romer 1996 sala i martin 2002 the basis of much of the literature is the ramsey 1928 cass 1965 koopmans 1965 growth model in this model the economy is assumed to behave like a benevolent social planner who chooses capital stock and consumption levels over an infinite time horizon with the goal of maximizing the discounted utility of the consumption stream the principal result of the model is that consumption and capital stock converge to unique optimal steady state levels that are independent of the initial endowment and the utility function of the social planner an implication of the model therefore is that different countries would converge toward a common income level even if their initial endowment of capital differed provided that they have access to the same production technology relatively poor countries would exhibit higher growth rates than richer ones these two predictions are testable with field data however field studies have generally failed to support the hypothesis of convergence toward a common income level see durlauf and quah 1999 temple 1999 and islam 2003 for surveys rather the data are more consistent with the alternative hypothesis of club convergence baumol 1986 which postulates that a small number of steady states exist and that each country has a tendency to converge toward one of them 1 such a framework can explain the observed pattern over time of an increase in income differences between the organisation for economic cooperation and development countries and the developing world as well as a decrease in the differences within each of the two groups the empirical support for club convergence has encouraged the development of theoretical models with multiple equilibria while some countries may reach optimal equilibria unfortunate countries might find themselves in low income equilibria which are often labeled as poverty traps these countries are unable to reach a better equilibrium without coordination originally due to rosenstein rodan 1943 the insight that the existence of multiple equilibria might provide an explanation of international income differences has led to a literature that considers a variety of growth models with multiple equilibria for example azariadis and drazen 1990 construct an overlapping generations model with two stable pareto rankable equilibria in the inferior equilibrium no agent trades with members of other generations murphy shleifer and vishny 1989 build a model with synergies between industries each industry is profitable only if other industries are operating and there are equilibria where all of the industries operate and other pareto dominated equilibria where none operate galor and zeira 1993 and banerjee et al 2001 show that inequality and differential access to credit can keep an economy in a pareto dominated equilibrium recognizing whether or not an economy has multiple equilibria is important because policy prescriptions differ depending on whether an economy is in an inferior equilibrium or whether it is in an equilibrium that is unique

the impact of the national minimum wage on the pay distribution employment and training britain s first ever national minimum wage nmw came into force in april 1999 covering some 5 of workers between 1999 and 2002 the nmw rose in line with the growth in average earnings but for 2003 6 the nmw will be ratcheted up relative to median pay the evidence shows that between 1998 and 2002 the bottom decile of the pay distribution experienced above average pay rises with no spillover effects further up the distribution there was no overall employment effect but a small negative impact in the care home sector the nmw boosts the probability and intensity of training

efficiency wages interfirm comparison and unemployment the paper presents an efficiency wage model where worker effort depends on own wages relative both to wages of other workers in the firm and to similar workers in other firms first we show how the solow conditions are modified if internal comparison effects are at work second we discuss the effect of internal wage comparison on wage inequality within firms third we study unemployment and relative wage determination within a general equilibrium model and analyze the effect of technological change and various tax policies on equilibrium unemployment and relative wages finally the short run effects of aggregate demand shocks are analyzed a popular argument for the existence of involuntary unemployment is that a worker s effort rises with wages giving employers incentives to set wages above market clearing levels it is often assumed that the worker s effort is a function of the wage level with no reference to the size of the wage in comparison with that received by other workers yet such comparisons are likely to influence an individual in his effort choice if this is the case then it seems equally likely that workers compare themselves with others both internal and external to their place of work this paper contributes to the efficiency wage literature by providing an understanding of wage setting and unemployment determination within a model where workers efforts depend on their wage relative to both the wages of other workers at the same firm and to the wages of similar workers at other firms

sick pay provision in experimental labor markets sick pay is a common provision in most labor contracts this paper employs an experimental gift exchange environment to explore two related questions using both managers and undergraduates as subjects first do workers reciprocate sick pay in the same way as they reciprocate wage payments second do firms benefit from offering sick pay firms may benefit in two different ways directly from workers reciprocating higher sick pay with higher efforts and indirectly from self selection of reciprocal workers into contracts with higher sick pay our main finding is that the direct effect is rather weak in terms of effort and negative in terms of profits however when there is competition among firms for workers sick pay can become an important advantage consequently competition leads to a higher provision of sick pay relative to a monopsonistic labor market

the minimum wage as a redistributive tool most analyses of the minimum wage focus on its unintended employment consequences the goal of a minimum wage is not of course to reduce employment but to redistribute earnings to low paid workers under what conditions can a minimum accomplish this are those conditions met in economies which otherwise rely extensively on markets to set wages such as the united states which in i994 rejected mandating health benefits that would have effectively raised the minimum or the united kingdom where in i995 the labour party promised a national minimum upon election who pays for the redistribution who benefits the redistributive effects of a minimum wage depend on the labour market and redistributive system in which it operates on the level of the minimum and on its enforcement at best an effective minimum wage will shift the earnings distribution in favour of the low paid and buttress the bottom tiers of the distribution from erosion at worst minimum wages reduce the share of earnings going to the low paid by displacing many from employment neither outcome is certain so that enacting a minimum is a risky but potentially profitable investment in redistribution it is the balancing of risk against gain that makes a minimum so controversial until the i980s i99os competitive labour markets in the united states and united kingdom produced rising real earnings for the low paid and falling earnings inequality so the risk of enacting a national minimum united kingdom or of raising substantially the national minimum united states seemed unnecessary why interfere with the competitive market when it produces socially desirable trends in earnings albeit a bit slower than one might accomplish with a legislated minimum two decades of falling real wages for lower decile workers in the united states and of rising earnings inequality in the united kingdom1 have however put the minimum back in play the job market is not doing much for lower paid workers in the united kingdom virtually all social groups accept the need for some redistribution though they differ on the best way to accomplish such in the united states pressures for tax cuts can be interpreted as a way for employees to gain real wage increases unavailable through the market the consensus favouring redistribution through the earned income tax credit disappeared in the midi 990s rush to reduce federal budget deficits this paper takes as its operating premise the goal of redistributing earnings

minimum wage restrictions and employee effort in incomplete labor markets an experimental investigation abstract a minimum wage raises average wages along with modest increases in employees average effort levels generating a pareto improvement in social welfare the minimum wage reduces effort in the neighborhood of the minimum but has no systematic effect on effort levels at higher wages as a consequence average effort increases modestly with a minimum wage as it raises average wages similar results are reported within groups both when introducing and eliminating a minimum wage although the within group effects of introducing a minimum wage are stronger than dropping it

labour markets social justice and economic efficiency in conventional economic theory a trade off supposedly exists between social justice and economic efficiency in reality market and other economic institutions are dominated by power relations so that the sponsorship of social justice is a productive factor neo liberal economic policies by lifting the constraints on the exercise of unequal power increased injustice and triggered a downward economic and social spiral reversing this requires a revolution in economic theory and policy focused on full employment the working of labour markets the organisation of work and household organisation social provision and self sufficiency in conventional economic theory the initial resource endowments of individuals are taken as given and although these may be unequal they are essentially external to the market labour markets are assumed to be more or less competitive and within them real wages reflect the quality of workers resource endowments mainly human capital and their personal efficiency and energy that these result in a wide dispersion of labour market rewards some of which may be insufficient to sustain a reasonable standard of life is a demonstration it is argued of how widely dispersed are individual resource endowments and capabilities hirsch and addison 1986 from this perspective any idea of social justice designed to reduce income inequalities risks damaging incentives and lowering overall economic well being this is the basis of okun s 1975 thesis that there exists an inverse trade off between social equality and economic efficiency that greater social income equality can only be purchased at the cost of lowering economic efficiency the alternative perspective explored in this special issue recognises the central import ance of relative power in determining outcomes this focuses attention on the external and internal forces structuring markets and how these differentially affect the incomes and opportunities of individuals from this perspective social justice requires the removal of the obstacles that inhibit individuals and groups from developing their potential and from deploying their resources to full advantage thus contrary to the orthodox view increasing

partial gift exchange in an experimental labor market impact of subject population differences productivity differences and effort requests on behavior we report a gift exchange experiment firms make wage offers workers respond by determining an effort level higher effort is more costly to workers and firms have no mechanism for punishing or rewarding workers consistent with the gift exchange hypothesis workers provide more effort at higher wages but undergraduates provide substantially less effort than mbas evidence suggests this results from differences in prior work experience firms nonbinding effort requests are at least partially honored resulting in increased overall effort for undergraduates although higher wages are relatively more costly for lower productivity firms workers do not provide them with more effort

zero as a special price the true value of free products when faced with a choice of selecting one of several available products or possibly buying nothing according to standard theoretical perspectives people will choose the option with the highest cost benefit difference however we propose that decisions about free zero price products differ in that people do not simply subtract costs from benefits but instead they perceive the benefits associated with free products as higher we test this proposal by contrasting demand for two products across conditions that maintain the price difference between the goods but vary the prices such that the cheaper good in the set is priced at either a low positive or zero price in contrast with a standard cost benefit perspective in the zero price condition dramatically more participants choose the cheaper option whereas dramatically fewer participants choose the more expensive option thus people appear to act as if zero pricing of a good not only decreases its cost but also adds to its benefits after documenting this basic effect we propose and test several psychological antecedents of the effect including social norms mapping difficulty and affect affect emerges as the most likely account for the effect

relative wages wage growth and quit behavior using italian social security records for male workers from a sample of firms in turin from 1981 to 1983 we show that conditional on the worker s own wage the average wage in the establishment for similar workers is negatively related to quits we also find that this variable predicts future wage growth this is consistent with an economic model in which workers compare the longrun value of employment opportunities when making quit decisions

are workers paid their marginal products status is like coase s social costs a reciprocal phenomenon given that one person s gain in status can occur only at the expense of a loss in status for others and that workers are free to choose their coworkers it follows that the competitive wage structure within a firm must be one in which individual wage differences understate individual differences in marginal products the purpose of this paper is to examine a variety of empirical evidence that relates to this proposition about the firm s internal wage structure the paper is organized as follows section i briefly summarizes the theoretical considerations that govern competitive wage determination when status matters to people and firms are viewed as voluntary associations of workers section ii then confronts the predictions of section i by examining pay and productivity schedules for a group of sales occupations for which these schedules are relatively easily observed section ii also examines the relationship between wages and productivity for a sample of university professors an occupation in which individual productivity differences are for a variety of obvious reasons relatively more difficult to measure all of the evidence examined is consistent with the hypothesis that within firms wage rates vary substantially less than do individual productivity values section iii discusses additional observations and evidence that bear on this same hypothesis it suggests that the implicit market for status may strongly influence the ways in which firms are organized to carry out the tasks they perform section iv concludes by considering the claim that egalitarian internal wage structures arise because of equity considerations it argues that the concept of equity appears very closely linked to the concept of status and suggests a strategy for assigning monetaty value to the equity considerations that so often dominate public policy decisions

the role of targeted communication and contagion in product adoption the two main influences leading to adoption at the individual consumer level are marketing communication and interpersonal communication although evidence of the effect of these two influences is abundant at the market level there is a paucity of research documenting the simultaneous effect of both influences at the individual consumer level thus the primary objective of this paper is to fill the gap in the literature by documenting the existence and magnitude of both influences at the individual customer level while controlling for unobserved temporal effects the pharmaceutical industry provides an appropriate context to study this problem it has been conjectured that adoption and usage patterns of a new drug by physicians contagion acts as a consumption externality as it allows a given physician to learn about the efficacy and use of the drug in addition pharmaceutical companies target individual physicians via marketing activities such as detailing sampling and direct to consumer adverti

microenterprise growth and the flypaper effect evidence from a randomized experiment in ghana standard models of investment predict that credit constrained firms should grow rapidly when given additional capital and that how this capital is provided should not affect decisions to invest in the business or consume the capital we randomly gave cash and in kind grants to male and female owned microenterprises in urban ghana for women running subsistence enterprises we find no gain in profits from either treatment for women with larger businesses we strongly reject equality of the cash and in kind grants only in kind grants cause growth in profits suggesting a flypaper effect whereby capital coming directly into the business sticks there but cash does not the results for men also suggest a lower impact of cash but differences between cash and in kind grants are less robust there is suggestive evidence that the difference in the effects of cash and in kind grants is associated more with lack of self control than with external pressure

labor market dynamics with search frictions and fair wage considerations fairness considerations in wage setting can improve the ability of the diamond mortensen pissarides search and matching model to account for u s labor market dynamics firms production is influenced by workers effort input which depends on whether workers consider the employment relation as fair a typical worker s effort is determined in a comparison of individual current wage with wage norms including the outside option the individual past wage and the wage level in the steady state the fairness considerations in the search framework give rise to endogenous real wage rigidity and realistic volatilities of unemployment vacancies and labor market tightness jel e24 e32 j64

pay reference points and police performance several theories suggest that pay raises below a reference point will reduce job performance final offer arbitration for police unions provides a unique opportunity to examine these theories as the police officers either receive their requested wage or receive a lower one in the months after new jersey police officers lose in arbitration arrest rates and average sentence length decline and crime reports rise relative to when they win these declines in performance are larger when the awarded wage is further from the police union s demand the findings support the idea that considerations of fairness disappointment and more generally reference points affect workplace behavior

peer effects in medical school abstract using data on the universe of students who graduated from us medical schools between 1996 and 1998 we examine whether the abilities and specialty preferences of a medical school class affect a student s academic achievement in medical school and his choice of specialty we mitigate the selection problem by including school specific fixed effects and show that this method yields an upper bound on peer effects for our data we estimate positive peer effects that disappear when school specific fixed effects are added to control for the endogeneity of a peer group we find no evidence that peer effects are stronger for blacks that peer groups are formed along racial lines or that students with relatively low ability benefit more from their peers than students with relatively high ability however we do find some evidence that peer groups form along gender lines

expanding credit access using randomized supply decisions to estimate the impacts expanding access to commercial credit is a key ingredient of financial development strategies there is less consensus on whether expanding access to consumer credit helps borrowers particularly when loans are extended at high interest rates popular skepticism about unproductive usurious lending is fueled by research highlighting behavioral biases that may induce overborrowing we estimate the impacts of expanding access to consumer credit at a 200 annual percentage rate apr using a field experiment and follow up data collection the randomly assigned marginal loans produced significant net benefits for borrowers across a wide range of outcomes there is also some evidence that the loans were profitable the author 2009 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oxfordjournals org oxford university press

effort and comparison income experimental and survey evidence the authors test the hypothesis that individual effort on the job depends both on one s own income and on the individual s position in the relevant income distribution combining experimental evidence from a gift exchange game with multi country issp survey data they analyze the extent to which relative income affects an individual s effort finding that an individual s rank in the income distribution more strongly determines effort than does others average income which suggests that comparisons are more ordinal than cardinal their experiment also reveals that comparisons over time affect effort individuals who received higher income offers or enjoyed higher income rank in the past exerted lower levels of effort for a given current income and rank

social comparison and effort provision evidence from a field experiment social comparison has potentially far reaching consequences in many economic domains we conducted a field experiment to examine how social comparison affects workers effort provision if their own wage or that of a co worker is cut workers were assigned to groups of two performed identical individual tasks and received the same performance independent hourly wage cutting both group members wages caused a decrease in performance but when only one group member s wage was cut the affected workers decreased their performance more than twice as much as when both workers wages were cut this finding indicates that social comparison among workers affects effort provision because the only difference between the two wage cut treatments is the other group member s wage level in contrast workers whose wage was not cut but who witnessed their group member s pay being cut displayed no change in performance relative to the baseline treatment in which both workers wages remained unchanged this indicates that social comparison exerts asymmetric effects on effort jel c93 j33 m53

wage transparency and performance a real effort experiment abstract without transparency about peer wages in a real effort experiment a change of wages does not affect performance with transparency however higher paid workers tend to work more accurately and lower paid workers shirk more under piece rates

risk attitudes randomization to treatment and self selection into experiments randomization to treatment is fundamental to statistical control in the design of experiments however randomization implies some uncertainty about treatment condition and individuals differ in their preferences towards taking on risk since human subjects often volunteer for experiments or are allowed to drop out of the experiment at any time if they want to it is possible that the sample observed in an experiment might be biased because of the risk of randomization on the other hand the widespread use of a guaranteed show up fee that is non stochastic may generate sample selection biases of the opposite direction encouraging more risk averse samples into experiments we directly test these hypotheses that risk attitudes play a role in sample selection our results suggest that randomization bias does affect the overall level of risk aversion in the sample we observe but that it does not affect the demographic mix of risk attitudes in the sample we show that the common use of non stochastic show up fees can generate samples that are more risk averse than would otherwise have been observed

crime and social interactions the high variance of crime rates across time and space is one of the oldest puzzles in the social sciences this variance appears too high to be explained by changes in the exogenous costs and benefits of crime we present a model where social interactions create enough covariance across individuals to explain the high cross city variance of crime rates this model provides an index of social interactions which suggests that the amount of social interactions is highest in petty crimes moderate in more serious crimes and almost negligible in murder and rape

tournaments without prizes evidence from personnel records we use a quasi experimental research design to study the effect of giving workers feedback on their relative performance the setting is a firm in which workers are paid piece rates and where for exogenous reasons management begins to reveal to workers their relative position in the distribution of pay and productivity we find that merely providing this information leads to a large and long lasting increase in productivity that is costless to the firm our findings are consistent with the interpretation that workers incipient concerns about their relative standing are activated by information about how they are performing relative to others this paper was accepted by olav sorenson organizations

do your online friends make you pay a randomized field experiment on peer influence in online social networks demonstrating compelling causal evidence of the existence and strength of peer to peer influence has become the holy grail of modern research in online social networks in these networks it has been consistently demonstrated that user characteristics and behavior tend to cluster both in space and in time there are multiple well known rival mechanisms that compete to be the explanation for this observed clustering these range from peer influence to homophily to other unobservable external stimuli these multiple mechanisms lead to similar observational data yet have vastly different policy implications in this paper we present a novel randomized experiment that tests the existence of causal peer influence in the general population one that did not involve subject recruitment for experimentation of a particular large scale online social network we utilize a unique social feature to exogenously induce adoption of a paid service among a group of randomly selected users and in the process develop a clean exogenous randomization of treatment and control groups a variety of nonparametric semiparametric and parametric approaches ranging from resampling based inference to ego level random effects to logistic regression to survival models yield close to identical statistically and economically significant estimates of peer influence in the general population of a freemium social network our estimates show that peer influence causes more than a 60 increase in odds of buying the service due to the influence coming from an adopting friend in addition we find that users with a smaller number of friends experience stronger relative increase in the adoption likelihood due to influence from their peers as compared to the users with a larger number of friends our nonparametric resampling procedure based estimates are helpful in situations of networked data that violate independence assumptions we establish that peer influence is a powerful force in getting users from free to premium levels a known challenge in freemium communities this paper was accepted by sandra slaughter information systems

on the role of social wage comparisons in gift exchange experiments this study extends a bilateral gift exchange experiment by clark et al 2010 we investigate how the provision of either quantitative or qualitative information on the average wage paid in all worker employer relationships impacts the wage set by employers and worker performance we find that information on the average wage reduces increases both wage offers and effort levels in one shot repeated relationships

the impact of the minimum wage if workers can adjust effort abstract in traditional models a binding minimum wage creates a excess supply of low skilled workers for minimum wage jobs employment falls and some jobs are reallocated from high to low rent workers this disequilibrium cannot persist competition to secure the property rights to now scarce jobs undoes most of the effects of the minimum wage workers who attach the highest value to the jobs are willing to work harder to keep them marginal workers are squeezed out of the market as high rent workers ratchet up effort level this process erodes the rent conferred by the minimum wage but also increases the value of marginal product which reduces the size of the employment effect the minimum wage confers more money income on low skilled workers and creates some distortion in the optimum combination of wage rate and effort level under plausible conditions the minimum wage has little effect on rent employment output and profits

are wages habit forming evidence from micro data although utility functions play a central role in economics the axiom that utility depends only on the absolute levels of its arguments is rarely tested this paper uses panel data on 2000 british employees who remain with the same employer and who are not promoted from one wave to the next it is shown that one important measure of well being overall job satisfaction is strongly positively correlated with the change in the worker s pay between waves but is unrelated to the current level of pay empirical tests suggest that a reference dependent satisfaction function where individual well being depends on current pay relative to past pay is more consistent with these regression results than are productivity or agency explanations of increasing wage profiles some evidence is presented of greater job satisfaction effects of pay rises for lower paid less well educated and younger workers these results provide some micro evidence consistent with the theory widespread in social science of habituation individuals may become used to any given level of consumption or income as such they tie in with the finding that a country s well being as measured by the average happiness of its citizens is only weakly correlated with its per capita gnp

involuntary unemployment and non compensating wage differentials in an experimental labour market in this paper the authors report the results of a series of efficiency wage experiments some of the key predictions of the efficiency wage hypothesis are qualitatively confirmed by the data higher wages caused a reduction in shirking firms offered contracts which exhibited positive job rents firms offered systematically different wages and job rents which gave rise to noncompensating income differentials and endogenous involuntary unemployment occurred copyright 1996 by royal economic society

pricing network effects the increase in the information that firms can collect or purchase about network effects across consumers motivates two important questions how does a firm s pricing strategy react to detailed information on network effects are the availability and use of such information beneficial or detrimental to consumer surplus we develop a model in which a monopoly sells a network good and price discriminates based on information about consumers influence and consumers susceptibility to influence the monopoly optimally offers consumers price discounts for their influence and charges price premia for their susceptibility the price premia and the price discounts are simple functions of the pattern of network effects we determine under which conditions relative to uniform price consumer surplus increases and we characterize the value of information on network effects for the monopoly

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

rational turnout the neglected role of groups rational choice theories have difficulty accounting for individual participation in collective action voting is among the acts hardest to explain consumption benefits have been proposed to account for nonzero turnout the model presented here establishes a political investment basis for these benefits i argue that voters often act not in isolation but as part of groups with shared interests while individuals still vote because of consumption benefits arising from the act of voting some of these consumption benefits are provided by group leaders out of collective benefits received by the group in return for its votes the collective benefit comes from a candidate adopting policy positions closer to those of the group in passing i show that the widespread availability of public opinion polling increases the candidate s incentive to shift position finally some data from recent off year elections are shown to be consistent with the model

when does money make money more important survey and experimental evidence the authors investigate how the amount and source of income affects the importance placed on money using a longitudinal analysis of the british household panel survey and evidence from two laboratory experiments they found that larger amounts of money received for labor were associated with individuals placing greater importance on money but this effect did not hold for money not related to work the longitudinal survey analysis demonstrated these differential effects of the source of income on money s importance while holding constant stable individual differences the experiments provide causal evidence that the source of income has an effect on the importance of money as well as on the effort expended to earn more money the authors results suggest that even as individual differences in the importance placed on money may affect peoples income depending on its source income can also affect the importance people place on money

social contagion and income heterogeneity in new product diffusion a meta analytic test standard diffusion models capture social contagion only coarsely and do not allow one to operationalize different contagion mechanisms moreover there is increasing skepticism about the importance of contagion and as has long been known s shaped diffusion curves can also result from heterogeneity in the propensity to adopt we present hypotheses about conditions under which specific contagion mechanisms and income heterogeneity are more pronounced and test these hypotheses using a meta analysis of the q p ratio in applications of the bass diffusion model the ratio is positively associated with the gini index of income inequality in a country supporting the heterogeneity in thresholds interpretation the ratio also varies as predicted by the gamma shifted gompertz diffusion model but the evidence vanishes after controlling for national culture as to contagion the q p ratio varies with the four hofstede dimensions of national culture for three of them in a direction consistent with the social contagion interpretation furthermore products with competing standards have a higher q p ratio which is again consistent with the social contagion interpretation finally we find effects of national culture only for products without competing standards suggesting that technological effects and culturally moderated social contagion effects might not operate independently from each other

a theory of dual labor markets with application to industrial policy discrimination and keynesian unemployment this paper develops a model of dual labor markets based on employers need to motivate workers in order to elicit effort from their workers employers may find it optimal to pay more than the going wage this changes fundamentally the character of labor markets the model is applied to a wide range of labor market phenomena it provides a coherent framework for understanding the claims of industrial policy advocates it also can provide the basis for a theory of occupational segregation and discrimination that will not be eroded by market forces finally the model provides the basis for a theory of involuntary unemployment

returns to capital in microenterprises evidence from a field experiment small and informal firms account for a large share of employment in developing countries the rapid expansion of microfinance services is based on the belief that these firms have productive investment opportunities and can enjoy high returns to capital if given the opportunity however measuring the return to capital is complicated by unobserved factors such as entrepreneurial ability and demand shocks which are likely to be correlated with capital stock the authors use a randomized experiment to overcome this problem and to measure the return to capital for the average microenterprise in their sample regardless of whether they apply for credit they accomplish this by providing cash and equipment grants to small firms in sri lanka and measuring the increase in profits arising from this exogenous positive shock to capital stock after controlling for possible spillover effects the authors find the average real return to capital to be 5 7 percent a month substantially higher than the market interest rate they then examine the heterogeneity of treatment effects to explore whether missing credit markets or missing insurance markets are the most likely cause of the high returns returns are found to vary with entrepreneurial ability and with measures of other sources of cash within the household but not to vary with risk aversion or uncertainty

positive and negative reciprocity in the labor market abstract traditional gift exchange experiments were designed with corner equilibria so that evidence of positive reciprocity could not be disentangled from one sided errors our first treatment replicates the traditional design and finds that effort is an increasing function of wage for mid range wage offers but this relationship is not significant for high and low offers the second treatment has an interior equilibrium asymmetric marginal costs of reciprocity positive and negative and lower efficiency gains there is evidence of a decrease in the deviations from the subgame perfect nash equilibrium however there is still significant reciprocal behavior positive and negative

participation and investment decisions in a retirement plan the influence of colleagues choices abstract this paper investigates whether peer effects play an important role in retirement savings decisions we use individual data from employees of a large university to study whether individual decisions to enroll in a tax deferred account plan sponsored by the university and the choice of the mutual fund vendor for people who choose to enroll are affected by the decisions of other employees in the same department to overcome the identification problems we divide the departments into sub groups along gender status age and tenure lines and we instrument the average participation of each peer group by the salary or tenure structure in this group our results suggest that peer effects may be an important determinant of savings decisions

social network structure and status competition in status competition studies the utility of heterogeneous individuals typically depends on an economy wide average indicator of status in our model emulative and jealous agents are embedded in an exogenous network where agent specific reference group is determined by the direct link emanating from the agent similarly to ghiglino and goyal 2010 but in a somewhat different framework we show that individual consumption is proportional to the agent s outbound katz bonacich network centrality measure and equilibrium is generally inefficient more important the negative externality associated with each agent depends on her inbound centrality measure the conspicuousness index a tax based on this index combined with a uniform lump sum transfer attains efficiency

identifying interdependent behaviour in an empirical model of labour supply in this paper we test a particular form of interdependent behavior namely the hypothesis that individuals choices of hours of work are influenced by the average hours of work in a social reference group there are problems to empirically disentangle the effects of interdependent behavior and preference variation across groups we show that panel data or data from several points in time are needed in the empirical analysis we combine cross section data from 1973 1980 and 1990 our results support the hypothesis of interdependent behavior the implication is that conventional tax policy predictions in which preference interdependencies are neglected will tend to underestimate the effect of a tax reform on hours of work our point estimates suggest that conventional calculations would capture only about a third of the actual change in hours of work

production trade prices exchange rates and equilibration in large experimental economies we study market equilibration in laboratory economies that are larger and more complex than any that have been studied experimentally to date complexity is derived from the fact that the economies are international in economic structure with multiple input output and foreign exchange markets in operation the economies have twenty one markets and due to the fact that they have roughly fifty agents the economies are characterized by several hundred equations in spite of the complexity and interdependence of the economy the results demonstrate the substantial power of the general equilibrium model of perfect competition to predict the direction of movement of market level variables empirical patterns in the convergence process are explored and described

reducing crime and violence experimental evidence from cognitive behavioral therapy in liberia abstract we show that a number of noncognitive skills and preferences including patience and identity are malleable in adults and that investments in them reduce crime and violence we recruited criminally engaged men and randomized one half to eight weeks of cognitive behavioral therapy designed to foster self regulation patience and a noncriminal identity and lifestyle we also randomized 200 grants cash alone and therapy alone initially reduced crime and violence but effects dissipated over time when cash followed therapy crime and violence decreased dramatically for at least a year we hypothesize that cash reinforced therapy s impacts by prolonging learning by doing lifestyle changes and self investment jel d12 d83 h23 i32 k42 o15 o17

minimum wages for ronald mcdonald monopsonies a theory of monopsonistic competition recent empirical work on the effects of minimum wages has called into question the conventional wisdom that minimum wages invariably reduce employment we develop a model of monopsonistic competition with free entry to analyse the effects of minimum wages and our predictions fit the empirical results closely under monopsonistic competition we find that a rise in the minimum wage raises employment per firm causes firm exit and may increase or reduce industry employment minimum wages increase welfare if they raise industry employment but welfare effects are ambiguous if employment falls

veblen effects political representation and the reduction in working time over the 20th century abstract we explain the substantial decline in work hours over the 20th century by the joint influence of the employees pecuniary emulation of the conspicuous consumption of top income earners and the balance of political power of employers and employees in the presence of conflicts of interest over the issue of working time we present a new labor discipline model incorporating veblen effects in which hours are determined by employers and subject to complete contracts but employee work effort is not we show that while veblen effects increase the hours sought by employees the hours selected by profit maximizing employers may exceed that preferred by employees who may then seek to reduce work hours by means of collective bargaining or governmental intervention we also identify conditions under which employees will prefer longer hours than offered by employers using newly available data on top income shares and on work hours from 10 major industrial economies and covering the entire past century we test two hypotheses that increases in the relative incomes of the very rich are associated with increased hours while increases in the political representation of workers have the opposite effect the estimated effects are large in economic magnitude highly significant and robust to alternative econometric specifications including country and time fixed effects using an alternative data set covering the last third of the past century we show that these results are robust to the inclusion of a measure of taxation and find that decentralized trade union bargaining but not centralized bargaining may raise working hours

consulting and capital experiments with microenterprise tailors in ghana abstract we conducted a randomized trial in urban ghana in which tailoring microenterprises received advice from an international consulting firm cash both or neither we designed the study with a hypothesis that large infusions of financial and managerial capital could be transformative we find that all three treatments led to their immediate intended effects changed business practices and increased investment however no treatment led to higher profits on average and certainly not to the large effects hypothesized in fact each treatment at some point led to lower profits then in the long run we find that the microentrepreneurs in either consulting treatment group reverted back to their prior business practices and that microentrepreneurs in the cash treatment group reverted back to their prior scale of operations

social interactions and habit formation in a model of female labour supply this paper investigates the influence of habit formation and preference interdependence on labour supply behaviour of married females a novelty of the paper is that we incorporate direct survey information on reference groups of individuals in a neoclassical labour supply model for that purpose we first estimate a latent variables model relating the direct information to the true but unobserved reference groups one of the most interesting features of the model is that the presence of young children becomes an insignificant factor in the hours equation while it remains a significant factor in the participation decision in addition the labour supply curve is much flatter in a model with habit formation and preference interdependence than in a model without it both habit formation and preference interdependence contribute significantly to the explanation of female labour supply 1998 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

relative wages efficiency wages and keynesian unemployment while modern economic theorists have produced a variety of explanations for the failure of wages to fall in the face of unemployment keynes emphasis on relative wages has not been reflected in most contemporary discussions this short paper suggests that relative wage theories in which workers productivity depends primarily on their relative wage provide the best available apparatus for understanding actual unemployment and its fluctuations such theories are very closely related to the efficiency wage theories that have received widespread attention in recent years this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

identification of endogenous social effects the reflection problem this paper examines the reflection problem that arises when a researcher observing the distribution of behaviour in a population tries to infer whether the average behaviour in some group influences the behaviour of the individuals that comprise the group it is found that inference is not possible unless the researcher has prior information specifying the compisition of reference groups if this information is available the prospects for inference depend critically on the population relationship between the variables defining reference groups and those directly affecting outcomes inference is difficult to implossible if these variables are functionally dependent or are statistically independent the prospects are better if the variables defining reference groups and those directly affecting outcomes are moderately related in the population

overconfidence and excess entry an experimental approach psychological studies show that most people are overconfident about their own relative abilities and unreasonably optimistic about their futures e g shelly e taylor and j d brown 1988 neil d weinstein 1980 when assessing their position in a distribution of peers on almost any positive trait like driving ability ola svenson 1981 income prospects or longevity a vast majority of people say they are above the average although of course only half can be if the trait is symmetrically distributed this paper explores whether optimistic biases could plausibly and predictably influence economic behavior in one particular setting entry into competitive games or markets many empirical studies show that most new businesses fail within a few years for example using plant level data from the u s census of manufacturers spanning 1963 1982 timothy dunne et al 1988 estimated that 61 5 percent of all entrants exited within five years and 79 6 percent exited within 10 years most of these exits are failures see also dunne et al 1989a 1989b d shapiro and r s khemani 1987

social comparison and performance experimental evidence on the fair wage effort hypothesis we investigate the impact of wage comparisons for worker productivity we present three studies which all use three person gift exchange experiments consistent with akerlof and yellen s 1990 fair wage effort hypothesis we find that disadvantageous wage discrimination leads to lower efforts while advantageous wage discrimination does not increase efforts on average two studies allow us to measure wage comparison effects at the individual level we observe strongly heterogeneous wage comparison effects we also find that reactions to wage discrimination can be attributed to the underlying intentions of discrimination rather than to payoff consequences

the reemergence of segmented labor market theory according to dual labor market theory the labor market can be usefully described as consisting of two sectors a high wage primary sector with good working conditions stable employment and substantial returns to human capital variables such as education and experience and a low wage secondary sector with the opposite characteristics moreover primary jobs are rationed that is not all workers who are qualified for primary sector jobs and desire one can obtain one finally the sector of the labor market in which an individual is employed directly influences his or her tastes behavior patterns and cognitive abilities thus the dual labor market model or more generally segmented labor market models is simultaneously a description of the income distribution a claim about the absence of market clearing and a radical departure from the standard neoclassical assumption of fully rational actors and exogenously determined preferences while this last element is potentially the most interesting even its proponents fail to give it the attention it deserves and related work has not been incorporated into the segmented labor market model in this paper we therefore concentrate on the first two elements of the model segmented labor market theory was sufficiently popular in the late 1960 s and early 1970 s to be taken seriously by prominent mainstream labor economists however two influential and largely negative reviews glenn cain 1976 michael wachter 1974 portrayed the segmented labor market hypothesis as largely atheoretical and based at best on questionable statistical analysis it seems fair to say that even sympathetic mainstream critics felt that key insights from the segmented labor model could be incorporated into neoclassical analysis and that the remaining elements of the model did not form a sufficiently coherent theory to pose a challenge to the neoclassical model whatever the merits of this perception it is clear that advocates of the segmented labor market approach did not develop a formal theory which conformed to the standards of mainstream economists with some notable exceptions michael piore 1975 david gordon 1972 the work was atheoretical moreover the empirical methods used tended to fall outside the norm for example interviews observational studies and historical and institutional analysis advocates of the segmented labor market perspective mostly radical political economists chose instead to develop their own research program outside the mainstream the reemergence of segmented labor market theory is linked with the reversal of these two tendencies the theory has been pursued by economists using modern tools of imperfect information theory and state of the art econometrics as a result the approach has again attracted the attention of the mainstream even a few years ago it would have been a clairvoyant observer who predicted that lawrence summers would be working on a theoretical model of labor market duality with jeremy bulow 1986 that robert solow would count among his recent work a dual market model with ian mcdonald 1985 and that james heckman would publish an article in which he undertook an empirical test of a dual market model failed to reject the model and then devoted much of the rest of the article to attacking his and other tests of the dual labor market view see his article with v joseph hotz 1986 since the theoretical developments are largely associated with efficiency wage and departments of economics university of california berkeley ca 94720 and nber and boston university 270 bay state road boston ma 02215 and nber respectively this study was supported in part by nsf grant no ses 8606139 lang acknowledges support from a sloan faculty research fellowship dickens acknowledges support from the institute of industrial relations at berkeley

pay secrecy and effort provision i introduction pay secrecy norms are widespread in many organizations a survey of 2 700 u s employees conducted in autumn 2010 found that almost 1 out of 2 employees face limitations to the extent to which they can access information about other employees compensation 1 similarly a recent survey of u s employers found that over one third of private sector organizations have in place formal rules prohibiting employees to discuss their pay with co workers reported in gely and bierman 2003 a common argument used to justify the adoption of pay secrecy is that it helps minimize the negative effects arising when employees compare their pay with the pay of their co workers colella et al 2007 2 pay comparisons are in fact thought to be a key factor in employees judgments of the fairness of their pay e g akerlof and yellen 1990 discovering the existence of pay differentials between oneself and co workers who are in comparable positions within the firm may spur perceptions of unfairness and reduce job satisfaction card et al 2012 this may ultimately lead to reduced work morale and lower effort whereas this conjecture finds considerable support among managers and compensation executives e g agell and lundborg 1995 bewley 1999 campbell iii and kamlani 1997 there is limited direct evidence that the availability of pay comparison information has detrimental effects on effort behavior 3 in this paper i use laboratory experiments to provide a controlled test of this proposition the experiments reported in this paper are based on a multilateral version of the gift exchange game fehr kirchsteiger and riedl 1993 in the standard bilateral gift exchange game a first mover the employer decides on the size of the gift wage she sends to a second mover the employee who can in turn reciprocate by choosing costly actions effort that reward the first mover a typical result of bilateral gift exchange game experiments is that employees are often willing to incur costs in order to reward employers who have treated them favorably for reviews of the experimental literature see fehr goette and zehnder 2009 and charness and kuhn 2011 in the multilateral version of the game used in this study described in detail in section ii the employer interacts with two employees at the same time and pays a wage to each of them employees receive their wage and then independently choose an effort level i observe effort choices in three different conditions in a first condition employees only learn their own wage while coworkers wages remain undisclosed i use this benchmark condition to assess how employees respond to given levels of the own wage under a wage secrecy regime in two other conditions i remove any limitation on the availability of information about other workers wages in these treatments employees are fully informed of the wage paid to co workers when they choose effort by comparing these public wages treatments with the wage secrecy treatment i can test whether the availability of pay comparison information is detrimental for effort provision the two public wages treatments differ in how wages are determined in one treatment the employer can choose the two wages she pays to the employees while in the other treatment the wage paid to one employee is mandated exogenously by the experimenter this allows to study the effect of pay comparisons in settings where the employer has full discretion on the firm s wage structure as well as in settings where an employer s wage policy is partly constrained by exogenous labor market regulations such exogenous constraints to firms wage policies are commonplace in natural workplaces e g minimum wage laws centralized pay regulations etc and previous experiments have shown that they can affect pay fairness considerations and effort behavior in important ways 4 differently from previous studies which either focused on bilateral labor relations or studied multilateral relations where workers received no information about the treatment of co workers in this experiment i study how employees effort is influenced by labor market regulations that affect the wage of their co workers

tax evasion and social interactions the paper extends the standard tax evasion model by allowing for social interactions in manski s manski c f 1993 identification of endogenous social effects the reflection problem review of economic studies 60 3 531 542 nomenclature our model takes into account endogenous interactions i e social conformity effects exogenous interactions i e fairness effects and correlated effects our model is tested using experimental data participants must decide how much income to report given individual and group tax rates and audit probabilities and given a feedback on the other members reporting behavior myopic and self consistent expectations are considered in the analysis in the latter case the estimation is based on a two limit simultaneous tobit with fixed group effects a unique social equilibrium exists when the model satisfies coherency conditions in line with brock and durlauf brock w a durlauf s n 2001b interactions based models in j heckman and e leamer eds handbook of econometrics 5 elsevier science b v 3297 380 the intrinsic nonlinearity between individual and group responses helps identify the model our results provide evidence of fairness effects but reject social conformity

experimental labor markets and policy considerations incomplete contracts and macroeconomic aspects this survey focuses on experimental labor markets investigating two aspects that are important for a better understanding of labor market relations and their consequences for labor market policies the first part of the survey is dedicated to papers that assess the prevalence of reciprocal considerations in incomplete labor contracts the second part summarizes the relatively small but growing experimental literature exploring labor market issues in macroeconomics and public finance studying the interaction between taxation and labor market outcomes

human and financial capital for microenterprise development evidence from a field and lab experiment microenterprises constitute an important source of employment and developing such enterprises is a key policy concern in most countries but what is the most efficient tool for microenterprise development we study this question in a developing country context tanzania where microenterprises are the source of employment for more than half of the labor force and we report from a field experiment that jointly investigated the importance of a human capital intervention business training and a financial capital intervention business grant using data from three survey rounds a lab experiment and administrative records of the microfinance institution we present evidence on business performance management practices happiness business knowledge and noncognitive abilities our study demonstrates strong effects of the combination of the two interventions on male entrepreneurs while the effects on female entrepreneurs are much more muted the results suggest that long term finance is an important constraint for microfinance entrepreneurs but that business training is essential to transform financial capital into productive investments our study also points to the need for more comprehensive measures to promote the businesses of female entrepreneurs data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2014 1933 this paper was accepted by john list behavioral economics

agricultural decisions after relaxing credit and risk constraints the investment decisions of small scale farmers in developing countries are conditioned by their financial environment binding credit market constraints and incomplete insurance can limit investment in activities with high expected profits we conducted several experiments in northern ghana in which farmers were randomly assigned to receive cash grants grants of or opportunities to purchase rainfall index insurance or a combination of the two demand for index insurance is strong and insurance leads to significantly larger agricultural investment and riskier production choices in agriculture the binding constraint to farmer investment is uninsured risk when provided with insurance against the primary catastrophic risk they face farmers are able to find resources to increase expenditure on their farms demand for insurance in subsequent years is strongly increasing with the farmer s own receipt of insurance payouts with the receipt of payouts by others in the farmer s social network and with recent poor rain in the village both investment patterns and the demand for index insurance are consistent with the presence of important basis risk associated with the index insurance imperfect trust that promised

labor supply of new york city cabdrivers one day at a time life cycle models of labor supply predict a positive relationship between hours supplied and transitory changes in wages because such changes have virtually no effect on life cycle wealth previous attempts to test this hypothesis empirically with time series data have not been supportive estimated elasticities are typically negative or nonsignificant such analyses however are vulnerable to measurement error and other estimation problems we use data on daily observations of wages and hours for new york city cab drivers to estimate the supply response to transitory fluctuations in wages cab drivers decide daily how many hours to supply and face wages that are positively correlated within days but largely uncorrelated between days using these data our central finding is that wage elasticities are persistently negative from 5 to 1 in three different samples even after correcting for measurement error using instrumental variables these negative wage elasticities challenge the notion that cab drivers trade off labor and leisure at different points in time and question the empirical adequacy of life cycle formulations of labor supply

tie strength embeddedness and social influence a large scale networked experiment we leverage the newly emerging business analytical capability to rapidly deploy and iterate large scale microlevel in vivo randomized experiments to understand how social influence in networks impacts consumer demand understanding peer influence is critical to estimating product demand and diffusion creating effective viral marketing and designing network interventions to promote positive social change but several statistical challenges make it difficult to econometrically identify peer influence in networks though some recent studies use experiments to identify influence they have not investigated the social or structural conditions under which influence is strongest by randomly manipulating messages sent by adopters of a facebook application to their 1 3 million peers we identify the moderating effect of tie strength and structural embeddedness on the strength of peer influence we find that both embeddedness and tie strength increase influence however the amount of physical interaction between friends measured by coappearance in photos does not have an effect this work presents some of the first large scale in vivo experimental evidence investigating the social and structural moderators of peer influence in networks the methods and results could enable more effective marketing strategies and social policy built around a new understanding of how social structure and peer influence spread behaviors in society this paper was accepted by alok gupta special issue on business analytics

competition and relational contracts the role of unemployment as a disciplinary device when workers are faced with the threat of unemployment their relationship with a particular firm becomes valuable as a result a worker may comply with the terms of a relational contract that demands high effort even when performance is not enforceable by a third party but can relational contracts motivate high effort when workers can easily find alternative jobs we examine how competition for labor affects the emergence of relational contracts and their effectiveness in overcoming moral hazard in the labor market we show that effective relational contracts do emerge in a market with excess demand for labor long term relationships turn out to be less frequent when there is excess demand for labor than they are in a market characterized by exogenous unemployment however stronger competition for labor does not impair labor market efficiency higher wages induced by competition lead to higher effort out of concerns for reciprocity

the effect of production technology on trust and reciprocity in principal agent relationships with team production we introduce differently sized teams rather than a single worker and three production technologies to an otherwise standard gift exchange environment to study experimentally whether and to what extent trust and reciprocity is affected moving to a team of workers introduces new motivations such as free riding and coordination burden that are likely to intensify with team size and the technology used by the firm we find that the positive relationship between wages and effort although affected still holds workers reduce their efforts when coordination for efficiency is more difficult using a particular production technology results also suggest that for any given technology firms react to their relevant outcome profitability and not just to workers efforts

migration incentives migration types the role of relative deprivation the authors explore the role of relative deprivation versus absolute income as an incentive for migration in developing countries in section i of this paper we outline the relative deprivation model of migration and present an illustration of the divergent policy implications of a relative deprivation model versus an absolute income model an attempt is made to identify distinct empirical implications of relative and absolute income motives for migrating in section ii a migration decision model is estimated and is used to explore absolute and relative income motives for internal and international migration in a sample of rural mexican households as well as to test the extent to which discontinuity in labour markets shapes the choice of migrant destination in section iii we present our conclusions excerpt