recommender systems as mechanisms for social learning this article studies how a recommender system may incentivize users to learn about a product collaboratively to improve the incentives for early exploration the optimal design trades off fully transparent disclosure by selectively overrecommending the product or spamming to a fraction of users under the optimal scheme the designer spams very little on a product immediately after its release but gradually increases its frequency she stops it altogether when she becomes sufficiently pessimistic about the product the recommender s product research and intrinsic naive users seed incentives for user exploration and determine the speed and trajectory of social learning potential applications for various internet recommendation platforms and implications for review ratings inflation are discussed

cooperation in social dilemmas through position uncertainty abstract we propose a simple mechanism that sustains full cooperation in one shot social dilemmas among a finite number of self interested agents players sequentially decide whether to contribute to a public good they do not know their position in the sequence but observe the actions of some predecessors position uncertainty provides an incentive to contribute in order to induce potential successors to also do so full contribution can then emerge in equilibrium our mechanism also leads to full cooperation in the prisoners dilemma

financial development and financing constraints international evidence from the structural investment model this article provides evidence that financial development impacts growth by reducing financing constraints that would otherwise distort efficient allocation of investment the financing constraints are inferred from the investment euler equation by assuming that the firm s stochastic discount factor is a function of the firm s financial position specifically the stock of liquid assets the magnitude of the changes in the cost of capital is twice as large in a country with a low level of financial development as in a country with an average level of financial development the size effect business cycles and legal environment effects are also considered copyright 2003 oxford university press

progressive screening long term contracting with a privately known stochastic process we examine a model of long term contracting in which the buyer is privately informed about the stochastic process by which her value for a good evolves in addition the realized values are also private information we characterize a class of environments in which the profit maximizing long term contract offered by a monopolist takes an especially simple structure we derive sufficient conditions on primitives under which the optimal contract consists of a menu of deterministic sequences of static contracts within each sequence higher realized values lead to greater quantity provision however an increasing proportion of buyer types are excluded over time eventually leading to inefficiently early termination of the relationship moreover the menu choices differ by future generosity with more costly up front plans guaranteeing greater quantity provision in the future thus the seller screens process information in the initial period and then progressively screens across realized values so as to reduce the information rents paid in future periods copyright oxford university press

optimal auctions with information acquisition this paper studies optimal auction design in a private value setting with endogenous information acquisition first we develop a general framework for modeling information acquisition when a seller wants to sell an object to one of several potential buyers who can each gather information about their valuations prior to participation we then show that under certain conditions standard auctions with a reserve price remain optimal but the optimal reserve price lies between the mean valuation and the standard reserve price in myerson 1981 we provide sucient conditions under which the value of information to the seller is positive and also characterize the necessary and sucient conditions under which equilibrium information acquisition in private value auctions is socially excessive the key to the analysis is the insight that buyer incentives to acquire information become stronger as the reserve price moves toward the mean valuation

financial constraints and investment decisions evidence from a highly unstable emerging economy this study analyses the role of financial constraints on the investment decisions of 497 brazilian firms we use panel data with firm specific information for different years allowing for the abandonment of the representative firm model information on capital intensity at the firm level is used to group firms we estimate different models and the results suggest the presence of financial restrictions especially for capital intensive firms

the value of recommendations abstract many markets without repeated seller buyer relations feature third party monitors that sell recommendations we analyze the profit maximizing recommendation policies of such monitors in an infinitely repeated game with seller moral hazard and short lived consumers a monopolistic monitor with superior information about the seller s past effort decisions sells recommendations about the seller to consumers we show that the monitor has an incentive to make its recommendations hard to predict which in general leads to inefficient effort provision by the seller these results hold under perfect and imperfect monitoring and in a variety of informational setting when there are multiple competing sellers the conflict between the monitor s profit maximization objective and efficient effort provision is mitigated

optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition a group of individuals with identical preferences must make a decision under uncertainty about which decision is best before the decision is made each agent can privately acquire a costly and imperfect signal we discuss how to design a mechanism for eliciting and aggregating the collected information so as to maximize ex ante social welfare we first show that of all mechanisms a sequential one is optimal and works as follows at random one agent at a time is selected to acquire information and report the resulting signal agents are informed of neither their position in the sequence nor of other reports acquiring information when called upon and reporting truthfully is an equilibrium we next characterize the ex ante optimal scheme among all ex post efficient mechanisms in this mechanism a decision is made when the precision of the posterior exceeds a cut off that decreases with each additional report the restriction to ex post efficiency is shown to be without loss when the available signals are sufficiently imprecise on the other hand ex post efficient mechanisms are shown to be suboptimal when the cost of information acquisition is sufficiently small

information aggregation rationality and the condorcet jury theorem the condorcet jury theorem states that majorities are more likely than any single individual to select the better of two alternatives when there exists uncertainty about which of the two alternatives is in fact preferred most extant proofs of this theorem implicitly make the behavioral assumption that individuals vote sincerely in the collective decision making a seemingly innocuous assumption given that individuals are taken to possess a common preference for selecting the better alternative however in the model analyzed here we find that sincere behavior by all individuals is not rational even when individuals have such a common preference in particular sincere voting does not constitute a nash equilibrium a satisfactory rational choice foundation for the claim that majorities invariably do better than individuals therefore has yet to be derived

minority voting rights can maximize majority welfare i use condorcet s information aggregation model to show that sometimes the best possible decision procedure for the majority allows the minority to enforce its favored outcome even when overruled by a majority special voting power gives the minority an incentive to participate meaningfully and more participation means more information is aggregated which makes the majority better off this result can be understood as a mathematical corroboration of lani guinier s arguments that voting procedures can be designed to encourage minority participation benefitting everyone

information aggregation and optimal structure of the executive we model two aspects of executives in parliamentary democracies decision making authority is assigned to individuals and private information is aggregated through communication when information is relevant to all policies and communication is private all decisions should be centralized to a single politician a government that holds cabinet meetings where information is made available to all decision makers outperforms one where communication is private a multimember cabinet can be optimal it need not be single peaked around the most moderate politician or ideologically connected centralization is nonmonotonic in the degree of ideological divergence in a large cabinet all power should be given to the most moderate politician even when uncertainty is policy specific and a single politician is informed on each policy power should never be fully decentralized our model provides a justification for centralized authority and cabinet meetings that enhance the quality of policy

voting behavior and information aggregation in elections with private information we analyze two candidate elections in which voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters each voter has noisy private information about the state variable we show that the fraction of voters whose vote depends on their private information goes to zero as the size of the electorate goes to infinity nevertheless elections fully aggregate information in the sense that the chosen candidate would not change if all private information were common knowledge equilibrium voting behavior is to a large extent determined by the electoral rule i e if a candidate is required to get at least x percent of the vote in order to win the election then in equilibrium this candidate gets very close to x percent of the vote with probability close to one finally if the distribution from which preferences are drawn is uncertain then elections will generally not satisfy full information equivalence and the fraction of voters who take informative action does not converge to zero

labour productivity in the british and south wales coal industry 1874 1914 naked to the waist hot and grimy with labour they squatted on their heels for a few minutes and talked seeing each other dimly by the light of the safety lamps while the black coal rose jutting around them and the props of wood stood like little pillars in the low black very dark temple the day passed pleasantly enough there was an ease a go asyou please about the day underground a delightful camaraderie of men shut off alone from the rest of the world in a dangerous place and a variety of labour holing loading timbering and a glamour of mystery and adventure in the atmosphere d h lawrence 1955 the above quote from d h lawrence while perhaps over emphasizing glamour and adventure illustrates one important aspect of colliery work the intensity of a collier s effort was primarily self imposed it was the work intensity combined with other factors that determined labour productivity in the coal mines a number of articles have addressed the problem of labour productivity in coalmining during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries two of the most important being a j taylor s 1961 examination of productivity and technological change in britain and r h walters 1975 analysis of the same topic for south wales 1 in addition there is a rich and growing literature on the broader problem of the existence of a climacteric a downward shift in the performance of the british economy in the late nineteenth century often attributed to the failure of british entrepreneurs as represented by their seeming unwillingness to adopt the best available techniques of production 2 the purpose of this paper is to specify and estimate an empirical model of labour productivity in coalmining as well as to provide some suggestive evidence regarding the performance of entrepreneurs in this major industry 3 we believe our results provide added insight into the determination of labour productivity during this period lending support to those who argue that the failure of british entrepreneurs has yet to be proved while providing mixed evidence regarding conclusions drawn by economic historians

endogenous information and stochastic contracts abstract a growing literature analyzes revenue maximizing contracts for situations in which agents can acquire private information before they decide whether to join the contract it is conjectured that the results also apply to the more natural scenario where information can be acquired either before or after signing this paper shows that in fact the latter scenario is more favorable for the principal using stochastic contracts she can induce information acquisition with some probability and yet appropriate the generated surplus

a conversational war of attrition we explore costly deliberation by two differentially informed and possibly biased jurors a hawk lones and a dove moritz alternately insist on a verdict until one concedes debate assumes one of two genres depending on bias a juror say lones is intransigent if he wishes to prevail and reach a conviction for any type of moritz next to concede in contrast lones is ambivalent if he wants the strongest conceding types of moritz to push for acquittal both jurors are ambivalent with small bias or high delay costs as lones grows more hawkish he argues more forcefully for convictions mitigating wrongful acquittals if dovish moritz is intransigent then he softens strategic substitutes leading to more wrongful convictions ambivalent debate is new and yields a novel dynamic benefit of increased polarization for if moritz is ambivalent then he toughens strategic complements and so surprisingly a more hawkish lones leads to fewer wrongful acquittals and convictions so more polarized but balanced debate can improve communication unlike in static cheap talk we also show that patient and not too biased jurors vote against their posteriors near the end of the debate optimally playing devil s advocate we shed light on the adversarial legal system peremptory challenges and cloture rules

an optimal voting procedure when voting is costly abstract we study optimal dynamic voting procedures when voting is costly for a highly stylized specification of our model with private values two alternatives and binary equally likely types we show the optimality of a voting procedure that combines two main elements i there is an arbitrarily chosen default decision and abstention is interpreted as a vote in favor of the default ii voting is sequential and is terminated when a supermajority requirement which declines over time is met we show the optimality of such a voting procedure by arguing that it is first best that is it maximizes welfare when equilibrium constraints are ignored and by showing that individual incentives and social welfare are sufficiently aligned to make a first best procedure incentive compatible we also provide counterexamples where no first best procedure is incentive compatible when voters binary types are not equally likely

work environment and individual background explaining regional shirking differentials in a large italian firm the prevalence of shirking within a large italian bank appears to be characterized by significant regional differentials in particular absenteeism and misconduct episodes are substantially more prevalent in the south we consider a number of potential explanations for this fact different individual backgrounds group interaction effects sorting of workers across regions differences in local attributes different hiring policies and discrimination against southern workers our analysis suggests that individual backgrounds group interaction effects and sorting effects contribute to explaining the north south shirking differential none of the other explanations appears to be of first order importance i introduction whether individual behavior is determined by group interactions or by individual background is undoubtedly a fundamental question for the social sciences this question presented itself forcefully when we stumbled onto the following piece of evidence there appear to be significant regional differentials in the prevalence of shirking among the employees of a large italian bank in particular absenteeism and misconduct episodes are considerably more frequent in the southern branches of the bank in this paper we examine several potential explanations for this fact first individual preferences for shirking versus working may differ according to one s region of hirth we will refer to this hj othesis as one of different individual hackgrounds the second possibility is one of locational sorting low shirking types may tend to migrate to the north high shirking types may tend to migrate to the south or hoth third the northern and southern

wage rates and work intensity in the south wales coalfield 1874 1914 in a recent article in this journal hirsch and hausman 1983 attempt to identify and measure the influences determining labour productivity in the british and especially the south wales coalfield during the 40 years before the first world war in particular attention is focused on the idea commonly expressed by contemporary coal owners that the upturn in wage rates both nominal and real during the 1880s exerted a major depressing influence on labour productivity the findings of hirsch and hausman are largely consistent with the views of traditional economic historians notably taylor 1961 and walters 1975 while less emphasis is placed by hirsch and hausman upon the effects of diminishing returns they find strong support for the contention that rising wage rates played a major role in explaining decreased productivity essentially hirsch and hausman claim to offer a firm empirical foundation for the persuasive but far from conclusive arguments of taylor and walters by using regression analysis to isolate the separate influences determining labour productivity if the estimates presented by hirsch and hausman are considered legitimate their results are striking for south wales elasticities of labour productivity with respect to both nominal and real wages of approximately 0 27 are reported juxtaposition of this parameter with the nominal wage index employed by walters which rises around 55 per cent between 1888 and 1914 suggests that over 60 per cent of the 24 per cent fall in labour productivity during the same period was accounted for by rising wage rates a consistent though moderately less strong interpretation is produced if the real wage index which increases some 40 per cent in the same period is preferred the contention of this paper is that the inverse association between wages and productivity postulated by hirsch and hausman for the south wales coalfield between 1874 and 1914 is without statistical foundation the basis for this assertion is that hirsch and hausman replicate unacceptable elements in the framework albeit without the qualifications offered by walters indeed this is done by intent we employ a somewhat ad hoc model reflecting the discussion by economic historians it will be argued that this desire to test the literature leads hirsch and hausman to estimate a model for which the results are difficult to interpret and to reach conclusions that are implausible specification problems are compounded by the choice of data particularly by the adoption of the wage rate index employed by walters but also by the use of proximate indicators to measure the balance between technical progress and diminishing returns

asymmetric information financing constraints and investment the results of a number of theoretical papers lead to the hypothesis that financial variables affect capital sp ending because of asymmetric information in capital markets the auth ors review the relevant theory and test this hypothesis with a large sample of firm data the results show that financial variables such a s cash flow and interest expense add significant explanatory power to investment equations based on dale jorgenson s neoclassical model w ith a capm specification for the firm s cost of capital and a sales accelerator model the analysis therefore links recent theoretical work on capital markets to long standing empirical debates in the inv estment literature copyright 1987 by mit press

threshold effects of financial status on the cost frontiers of financial institutions in nondynamic panels this article applies hansen s 1999 2000 threshold regression model to estimate translog cost frontiers in the hope of shedding light on the banking industry s production processes and the extent of its technical efficiency te the threshold technique allows for the existence of multiple technologies of production distinguished by an exogenous threshold variable strong evidence of multiple technologies is found in the industry irrespective of which financial indicator as constructed by factor analysis defines the threshold variable cost savings and scale economies among the various underlying technologies are compared herein we also highlight the differences between the threshold results and the conventional cost frontier

rational expectations information acquisition and competitive bidding most rational expectations market equilibrium models are not models of price formation and naive mechanisms leading to such equilibria can be severely manipulable in this paper a bidding model is developed which has the market like features that bidders act as price takers and that prices convey information higher equilibrium prices convey more favorable information about the quality of the objects being sold than do lower prices bidders can benefit from trading only if they have a transactions motive or if they have access to inside information apart from exceptional cases prices are not fully revealing a two stage model is developed in which bidders may acquire information at a cost before bidding and for which the equilibrium price is fully revealing resolving a well known paradox

correlated information and mechanism design in models of asymmetric information possession of private information leads to rents for the possessors this induces mechanism designers to distort away from efficiency the authors show that this is an artifact of the presumption that information is independently distributed rent extraction in a large class of mechanism design games is analyzed and a necessary and sufficient condition for arbitrarily small rents to private information is provided additionally the two person bargaining game is shown to have an efficient solution under first order stochastic dominance and a hazard rate condition similar conditions allow full rent extraction in milgrom weber auctions

on the effect of high energy prices on investment empirical analyses of firm behaviour typically assume that there is a stable relationship between investment on the one hand and changes in the relative prices of inputs output demand and other determinants on the other hand however because of the lumpy nature and irreversibility of investments and the presence of uncertainty about future economic developments a specific percentage change in relative prices and output demand may not always lead to the same percentage change in capital stocks that means that different regimes may exist in investment behaviour we test whether such regimes exist using high quality data on eight manufacturing industries in the netherlands three different regimes can be identified that are characterized by differences in the relative input price levels and we find that if relative prices take on extreme values the propensity to adjust the scale of production to changes in demand is very low

conflicts and common interests in committees committees improve decisions by pooling members independent information but promote manipulation obfuscation and exaggeration of private information when members have conflicting preferences committee decision procedures transform continuous data into ordered ranks through voting this coarsens the transmission of information but controls strategic manipulations and allows some degree of information sharing each member becomes more cautious in casting the crucial vote than when he alone makes the decision based on own information increased quality of one member s information results in his casting the crucial vote more often committees make better decisions for members than does delegation

the effect of financial liberalization on the capital structure and investment decisions of indonesian manufacturing establishments this article analyzes the consequences of financial liberalization using a large panel of indonesian manufacturing establishments it discusses whether financial reforms have had an impact on investment and on the allocation of credit and whether the effects differ depending on the type of firms the overall conclusion is that shifting from administrative toward market based allocation of credit has increased borrowing cost particularly for smaller firms but at the same time has benefited firms by giving them widened access to finance

costly participation and heterogeneous preferences in informational committees informational committees are groups of people who are designated to gather information this article develops a simple model of committee size based on costly participation and preference heterogeneity in a setting in which the information structure and policy preferences are both represented by normal random variables i characterize an equilibrium under the mean decision rule and derive the optimal committee size i show that when effort costs are sufficiently high preference heterogeneity can provide members additional incentives to gather information and thus the optimal committee size and the principal s expected payoff can increase in the heterogeneity of committee members policy preferences

committee design with endogenous information this paper is concerned with the arrangements for collective decision making in a world where agents must be motivated to acquire information the analysis identifies some basic forces shaping the design of panels of decision makers referees managers jurors etc in situations where decision makers are useful only in so far as they expend some effort to gain information about the alternatives at hand these situations are common one being the refereeing process where an editor requires the opinions of a number of experts who must read the paper acquire information in order to give an opinion as to publication analogously in committees which screen applicants to a programme the committee members must gain information about the applicant s qualifications and likelihood of success in order to evaluate whether to admit him her finally in trial juries it is important that jurors pay attention to the evidence in order to make an informed judgement 1 we focus on environments where information is a public good in the sense that the social benefits of one decision maker acquiring information exceed the private benefits a good mechanism in this environment must not only aggregate information efficiently but also induce the decision makers to acquire information we analyse the design of voting mechanisms our problem is to choose two parameters which determine both the incentive to acquire information and the efficiency with which information is aggregated the first parameter is the size of the decision making unit the number of committee members the second is the plurality required to overturn the status quo the voting rule our main result is this a voting rule that requires a large plurality in the extreme unanimity to upset the status quo can be optimal only if the information available to each committee member is sufficiently accurate when individual information is noisy the drawback

would rational voters acquire costly information abstract we analyze an election in which voters are uncertain about which of two alternatives is better for them voters can acquire some costly information about the alternatives in agreement with downs s rational ignorance hypothesis individual investment in political information declines to zero as the number of voters increases however if the marginal cost of information is near zero for nearly irrelevant information there is a sequence of equilibria such that the election outcome is likely to correspond to the interests of the majority for arbitrarily large numbers of voters thus rationally ignorant voters are consistent with a well informed electorate

investment and the banking system a kaleckian approach for regions in brazil this paper analyzes the effects of the regional distribution of the banking system on investment rates in brazil the investigation relies on a perspective whereby the role of external funds in ind

imperfect information and the meltzer richard hypothesis standard majority voting models predict that redistribution is positively linked to the mean to median income ratio but empirical evidence is mixed this paper shows that the different empirical reactions to rising mean to median income ratios can be rationalized in a simple romer roberts meltzer richard framework with imperfect information in such a model it is important to consider the source of rising mean to median ratios income growth of the poor can lead to less redistribution as more agents perceive themselves to be rich which tends to reduce the support for redistribution an empirical application reveals that the model can explain a substantial part of the first reagan tax cut

the impact of cross ownership on the reaction of corporate investment and financing constraints a panel threshold model this paper studies whether or not investment decisions are financially constrained in a cross ownership system of taiwan different from the financial structure in the usa subsidiaries in taiwan are allowed to buy stocks of the parent companies hence the conventional debt to equity ratio is inappropriate to divide firms into high and low debt firms instead a new threshold variable the adjusted debt equity ratio ade is employed to divide the sample into high debt firms and low debt firms a panel of 115 taiwan listed firms for the period 1991 1997 is used evidence supports the cash flow hypothesis and ade has a notable significant influence on the financial constraints

eliciting information from a large population abstract this paper studies information transmission in social surveys where a welfare maximizing decision maker communicates with a random sample of individuals from a large population who have heterogeneous preferences the population distribution of preferences is unknown and has to be estimated based on answers from the respondents the decision maker cannot identify the true distribution of preferences even if the sample size becomes arbitrarily large since the respondents have incentive to exaggerate their preferences especially as the sample size becomes larger and each respondent has weaker influence on the decision the quality of communication with each respondent may improve as the sample size becomes smaller and thus we identify the trade off between the quality and quantity of communication we show that the decision maker may prefer to sample a smaller number of individuals when the prior is weaker

working capital and fixed investment new evidence on financing constraints this article presents new tests for finance constraints on investment by emphasizing the often neglected role of working capital as both a use and a source of funds the coefficient of endogenous working capital investment is negative in a fixed investment regression as expected if working capital competes with fixed investment for a limited pool of finance this finding addresses a criticism of previous research on finance constraints that cash flows may simply proxy shifts in investment demand in addition previous studies may have underestimated the impact of finance constraints on growth and investment because firms smooth fixed investment in the short run with working capital

the curse of uninformed voting an experimental study we study majority voting over two alternatives in small groups individuals have identical preferences but are uncertain about which alternative can better achieve their common interest before voting each individual can obtain information by buying a valuable but imperfect signal about the better alternative voting is either voluntary or compulsory in the compulsory mode each individual must vote between the two alternatives while in the voluntary mode they can also abstain an uninformed random vote generates a negative externality since it may override an informative group decision in pivotal events in our experiments participants in randomly re matched groups obtain information more often with compulsory than voluntary voting and the average number of signals is greater in larger than smaller groups surprisingly uninformed voting is common even in the voluntary mode finally group performance is poor in all treatments indicating the need to reconsider current practice of jury and committee voting

a theory of conservatism a free rider problem arises when a group choice between two alternatives has to be made on the basis of privately collected evidence leading to insufficient effort in gathering evidence and an ex ante welfare loss for the group to alleviate the free rider problem the group can commit to a conservative rule whereby the decision is made against the alternative favored by the group s preference or prior when evidence supports it but is not preponderant optimal conservatism increases private incentives to gather evidence and improves the quality of the group decision my result explains why sometimes groups appear overly cautious toward favored alternatives

evidence on the role of cash flow for investment abstract recent work in macroeconomics argues that imperfections in capital markets may lead to business cycle fluctuations by propagating relatively modest shocks evidence for such a mechanism also known as the financial accelerator consists largely of firm level studies showing that cash flow is an important predictor of investment but this evidence is often viewed with skepticism because cash flow is also a good indicator of investment opportunities in this paper we develop a framework for estimating the extent to which the predictive power of cash flow can be attributed to its role as a fundamental versus its role in alleviating credit frictions for firms with access to commercial paper and bond markets we find that the perfect capital markets model of investment can fully account for the role of cash flow for firms with only limited access to capital markets as indicated by lack of participation in public debt markets however investment appears to be excessively sensitive to fluctuations in cash flow these results thus clarify the role of cash flow in investment equations and provide support for the existence of a financial accelerator

corporate structure liquidity and investment evidence from japanese industrial groups this paper presents evidence suggesting that information and incentive problems in the capital market affect investment we come to this conclusion by examining two sets of japanese firms the first set has close financial ties to large japanese banks that serve as their primary source of external finance and are likely to be well informed about the firm the second set of firms has weaker links to a main bank and presumably faces greater problems raising capital investment is more sensitive to liquidity for the second set of firms than for the first set the analysis also highlights the role of financial intermediaries in the investment process

labouring over productivity estimates a comment on hirsch and hausman s model of coal miners productivity 1874 1914 an article by hirsch and hausman economica 1983 rekindled a long standing debate concerning the causes of falling labour productivity in the british coal mining industry during the four decades before the first world war this paper provides results which correct the econometric estimates of the model presented in the article two corrections are made one relates to a value for the dependent variable in the south wales case the other allows for the two year lag which is required by the fiml system specified in the article

when collective ignorance is bliss theory and experiment on voting for learning abstract when do groups and societies choose to be uninformed we study a committee that needs to vote on a reform which will give every member a private state dependent payoff the committee can vote to learn the state at no cost we show that the committee votes not to learn the state whenever independent voters are more divided than partisans this implies that groups with conflicting preferences tend to seek less information a laboratory experiment shows that committees are substantially more likely to vote against acquiring information when the theory predicts them to do so we also observe deviations from theory that are largely explained by cognitive limitations at the same time subjects with more experience or with greater strategic competence are more likely to vote in line with the theory providing evidence for external validity of the model

full extraction of the surplus in bayesian and dominant strategy auctions we consider auctions for a single indivisible object in the case where the bidders have information about each other which is not available to the seller we show that the seller can use this information to his own benefit and we completely characterize the environ ments in which a well chosen auction gives him the same expected payoff as that obtainable were he able to sell the object with full information about each bidder s willingness to pay we provide this characterization for auctions in which the bidders have dominant strate gies and for those where the relevant equilibrium concept is bayesian nash in both set ups the existence of these auctions hinges on the possibility of constructing lotteries with the correct properties we consider the situation in which an agent the seller possesses one indivisible unit of a good to which he attaches no value but the good has value to a number of potential buyers and its transfer to one of them would increase social welfare in particular the transfer to the buyer with the highest valuation maximizes social welfare in this paper we completely characterize environments in which the seller can design an auction that will enable him to capture for himself the full increase in social welfare induced by the transfer of the good to the bidder with the highest willingness to pay if the seller had full information about the reservation prices of potential buyers his optimal selling strategy would be very simple he would announce a price equal or very close to the highest reservation value the optimal strategy for the bidder with the highest evaluation would be to accept the offer note that we are treating a situation in which the seller can commit himself to a price as a result of the exchange the utility of the seller increases by the full amount of the increase in social welfare and he has been able to fully extract the surplus in many circumstances however a seller has only imperfect knowledge of the buyers willingnesses to pay in this case he must find some mechanism or auction which will enable him to maximize his benefit from the sale of the object the auction literature starts with this observation and shows how the seller can by an astute choice of auction extract the largest possible fraction of the surplus in general the literature has shown that this proportion is strictly less than one in some circumstances the bidders will have information about each other which is not available to the seller for instance in auctions for petroleum drilling rights bidders know the results of geological tests which they have

the swing voter s curse the authors analyze two candidate elections in which some voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters they demonstrate the existence of a swing voter s curse less informed indifferent voters strictly prefer to abstain rather than vote for either candidate even when voting is costless the swing voter s curse leads to the equilibrium result that a substantial fraction of the electorate will abstain even though all abstainers strictly prefer voting for one candidate over voting for another copyright 1996 by american economic association

ignorance and bias in collective decisions we study theoretically and experimentally a committee with common interests committee members do not know which of two alternatives is the best but each member can acquire privately a costly signal before casting a vote under either majority or unanimity rule in the experiment as predicted by bayesian equilibrium voters are more likely to acquire information under majority rule and attempt to counter the bias in favor of one alternative under unanimity rule as opposed to bayesian equilibrium predictions however many committee members vote when uninformed moreover uninformed voting is strongly associated with a lower propensity to acquire information we show that an equilibrium model of subjective prior beliefs can account for both these phenomena and provides a good overall fit to the observed patterns of behavior both in terms of rational ignorance and biases

pessimistic information gathering an agent gathers information on productivity shocks and accordingly produces on behalf of a principal information gathering is imperfect and whether it succeeds or not depends on the agent s effort contracting frictions come from the fact that the agent is pessimistic on the issue of information gathering and there are both moral hazard in information gathering private information on productivity shocks and moral hazard on operating effort an optimal menu of linear contracts mixes high powered productivity dependent screening options following good news with a fixed low powered option otherwise

abstention ideology and information acquisition we consider an election in which each voter can collect information of different precision voters have asymmetric information and preferences that vary both in terms of ideology and intensity in contrast to all other models of voting with endogenous information in equilibrium voters collect information of different qualities we show that information and abstention are not necessarily negatively correlated some voters are more likely to abstain the more informed they are we also discuss the manner in which incentives to acquire information are non monotonic in terms of both ideology and the level of intensity

the impact of cash flows and firm size on investment the international evidence abstract this paper examines the degree to which cash flow availability influences firm investment in six oecd countries in particular we are interested in the extent to which the reliance on internal funds is affected by firm size since there is general agreement that smaller firms have less access to external capital markets and thus should be more affected by the availability of internal funds earlier work has concluded that the documented positive relationship between cash flow and investment is evidence of the existence of financial constraints we first examine all firms regardless of size in each country and we find that the amount of corporate investment is affected by internal resources in all six countries that is internal financing affects firm investment we then repeat the analysis segmenting the sample using three measures of firm size contrary to our a priori expectations we find that the cash flow investment sensitivity is generally highest in the large firm size group and smallest in the small firm size group we deduce that the explanations for these findings are grounded in managerial agency considerations and in the greater flexibility enjoyed by large firms in timing their investments thus we conclude that the degree of sensitivity of a firm s investments to its cash flows cannot be interpreted as an accurate measure of its access to capital markets as do kaplan s zingales l 1997 the quarterly journal of economics 169 215 since small firms are known to have less access to external markets

why does liquidity matter in investment equations that liquidity variables affect investment spending is widely accepted despite important recent empirical work questions remain concerning the interpretation of liquidity variables in investment equations and the sources and economic importance of finance constraints these questions are addressed by estimating a variety of econometric models that exploit distinctive canadian institutional features to identify firms that face relatively severe information problems the initial econometric evidence confirms the existence of finance constraints and identifies their source as the problems faced by firms in credibly communicating private information to outsiders this conclusion is robust to biases from the capitalization of finance constraints into asset prices scale economies or imperfect competition which are accounted for directly in the econometric specifications copyright 1995 by ohio state university press