financial contracting theory meets the real world an empirical analysis of venture capital contracts we compare the characteristics of real world financial contracts to their counterparts in financial contracting theory we do so by studying the actual contracts between venture capitalists vcs and entrepreneurs the distinguishing characteristic of vc financings is that they allow vcs to separately allocate cash flow rights board rights voting rights liquidation rights and other control rights we describe and measure these rights we then interpret our results in relation to existing financial contracting theories we also describe the interrelation and the evolution across financing rounds of the different rights query 1 query 2

inconsistent preferences in environmental protection investment and the central government s optimal policy environmental protection plans cannot succeed without full cooperation among related units however inconsistent investment preferences toward environmental protection increase the damage to the environment this article employs the contract mechanism to analyse environmental protection effects when the central government directly subsidizes the local governments the results reveal that subsidies from the central government are not only unable to solve the problem of the inconsistent investment preferences among the central and local governments but also induce the free riding behaviour of local governments because of the free riding behaviour of the local governments there is no such equilibrium in which the central government prefers the sequential investment mode while the local governments prefer the simultaneous investment mode

the quantitative analytics of the basic neomonetarist model this paper constructs a dynamic macroeconomic model with less than perfect price flexibility which has a classical side consistent with real business cycle theory augmented by investment adjustment costs increasing returns to scale and a new flexible formalization of imperfect competition something akin to the classical dichotomy is justified by a mode of approximation appropriate for a model in which one state variable adjusts quickly while another state variable adjusts slowly even with investment adjustment costs monetary expansions are found to raise the real interest rate the determinants of real rigidity and the macroeconomic rate of price adjustment are investigated copyright 1995 by ohio state university press

how the baby boomers retirement wave distorts model based output gap estimates hours per capita measures based on the private sector as usually included in the set of observables for estimating macroeconomic models are affected by low frequent demographic trends and sectoral shifts that cannot be explained by standard models further model based output gap estimates are closely linked to the observable hours per capita series hence hours per capita that are not measured in concordance with the model assumptions can distort output gap estimates this paper shows that sectoral shifts in hours and the changing share of prime age individuals in the working age population lead indeed to erroneous output gap dynamics regarding the aftermath of the global financial crisis model based output gaps estimated using standard hours per capita series are persistently negative for the us economy this is not caused by a permanently depressed economy but by the retirement wave of baby boomers which lowers aggregate hours per capita after adjusting hours for changes in the age composition to bring them in line with the model assumptions the estimated output gap gradually closes in the years following the global financial crisis

technological progress downsizing and unemployment this paper presents a model where the form of innovations is endogenous it is shown that with labour market imperfections which raise the wage above the shadow price of labour firms over invest in innovations cutting labour costs and under invest in increasing quality as a result the market outcome features lower long run growth higher unemployment and lower welfare than the social optimum it is further shown that a firm s incentives to cut labour costs are increased as wages rise and as the firm declines finally a rise in competition increases incentives to downsize for firms with below average quality performance

the natural rate of interest and its usefulness for monetary policy we estimate a state of the art dsge model to study the natural rate of interest in the united states over the last 20 years the natural rate is highly procyclical and fell substantially below zero in each of the last three recessions although the drop was of comparable magnitude across the three recessions the decline was considerably more persistent in the great recession we discuss the usefulness and limitations particularly due to the zero lower bound of the natural rate for the conduct of monetary policy

determinants of long run unemployment this paper investigates the determinants of long run unemployment and growth by extending the endogenous growth model of howitt and aghion 1998 to allow for a more general treatment of the labor market in the spirit of pissarides 1990 we find that i both long run growth and unemployment depend not only on factors that affect long run growth as identified in endogenous growth models with full employment but also on certain labor market parameters ii long run unemployment may rise or fall with growth depending on the model s parameters and iii though government policies that promote growth indirectly through improvement in labor market efficiency always reduce the long run unemployment rate policies that directly encourage investment in research and development may increase the unemployment rate

venture capital staged financing and optimal funding policies under uncertainty abstract our paper presents a dynamic model of entrepreneurial venture financing under uncertainty based on option exercise games between an entrepreneur and a venture capitalist vc in particular we analyze the impact of multi staged financing and both economic and technological uncertainty on optimal contracting in the context of vc financing our novel approach combines compound option pricing with sequential non cooperative contracting allowing us to determine whether renegotiation will improve the probability of coming to an agreement and proceed with the venture it is shown that both sources of uncertainty positively impact the vc investor s optimal equity share specifically higher uncertainty leads to a larger stake in the venture and renegotiation may result in a dramatic shift of control rights in the venture preventing the venture from failure moreover given ventures with low volatility situations might occur where the vc investor loses his first mover advantage based on a comparative static analysis new testable hypotheses for further empirical studies are derived from the model

selection of entrepreneurs in the venture capital industry an asymptotic analysis we study a model of entrepreneurs who compete in an auction like setting for venture capital vc funding in a setting where limited capital dictates that the vc can only finance the best entrepreneurs with asymmetric information vcs can only assess entrepreneurs by the progress of development which in equilibrium reveals the quality of the new technology using an asymptotic analysis we prove that in attractive industries having a large number of entrepreneurs competing for vc funding could lead to underinvestment in technology by entrepreneurs as the effort exerted by losing entrepreneurs is wasted the study then proceeds to characterize the conditions under which a greater number of competing entrepreneurs is better the model also demonstrates that vcs could possibly increase their payoff by concentrating on a single industry in addition the study also provides some insights on the effects of multiple investments by vcs and the effects of competition among vcs on the same investments

a method for taking models to the data abstract this paper develops a method for combining the power of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with the flexibility of a vector autoregressive time series model to obtain a hybrid that can be taken directly to the data it estimates this hybrid model via maximum likelihood and uses the results to address a number of issues concerning the ability of a prototypical real business cycle model to explain movements in aggregate output and employment in the postwar us economy the stability of the real business cycle model s structural parameters and the performance of the hybrid model s out of sample forecasts

a multi period game theoretic model of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs abstract this study examines the relationship between a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur and follows it from its inception to the exit stage the model we use is a multi period game theoretic model with moral hazard where the contract is set in the first period the contribution of the study lies in the insights it provides on optimal contracts and its characterization of an endogenous exit point specifically the paper shows that the optimal incentive scheme should backload all incentive payments to the entrepreneur as much as possible consequently a straight debt contract would be optimal in venture financing

bridging dsge models and the raw data abstract a method to estimate dsge models using the raw data is proposed the approach links the observables to the model counterparts via a flexible specification which does not require the model based component to be located solely at business cycle frequencies allows the non model based component to take various time series patterns and permits certain types of model misspecification applying standard data transformations induces biases in structural estimates and distortions in the policy conclusions the proposed approach recovers important model based features in selected experimental designs two widely discussed issues are used to illustrate its practical use

non stationary hours in a dsge model the time series fit of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge models often suffers from restrictions on the long run dynamics that are at odds with the data using bayesian methods we estimate a stochastic growth model in which hours worked are stationary and a modified version with permanent labor supply shocks if firms can freely adjust labor inputs the data support the latter specification once we introduce frictions in terms of labor adjustment costs the overall time series fit improves and the model specification in which labor supply shocks and hours worked are stationary is preferred

timing of investments holdup and total welfare abstract we explore holdup with simultaneous and sequential investment with simultaneous investment both investors are held up with sequential investment contracting becomes possible after the project has commenced so the second investor avoids being held up if the investments are independent sequential investment increases cost of delay reduces the incentive for the first player to invest and increases the second player s incentive to invest the paper shows the timing of investment can act as an additional form of holdup if they have the option when to invest a party may choose the regime that does not maximize total welfare

the diminishing signaling value of patents between early rounds of venture capital financing a long stream of research has documented the positive effects that patents bring about to emerging firms in high technology industries the general consensus is that patents contribute to firm growth because they confer monopolistic market rights offer protection from competitors increase the negotiating position of patent holders and other benefits what has received relatively less attention in the literature is whether patents act as a signal that attracts investors such as venture capital firms the handful of studies that have addressed that question has not analyzed whether the signaling function of patents decreases after the initial attraction of venture capital as information asymmetries between investors and target firms reduce in this study we hypothesize that patent activity has a signaling value that diminishes once information asymmetries between investors and funded firms lessen to study our proposition we draw upon a longitudinal dataset of more than 580 u s based biotechnology firms to empirically demonstrate that biotechnology firms that have submitted patent applications substantially increase the level of funding they receive for their first round of financing in line with a reduction of information asymmetries once the initial investment has materialized patent applications and granted patents have no effect on the growth of venture capital funds raised during the second round of financing we conclude the study with a discussion of avenues for new research implications for policy makers that consider the usefulness of the current patent system and with insights that can be employed by managers of firms in knowledge intensive areas such as biotechnology

contracting signaling and moral hazard a model of entrepreneurs angels and venture capitalists abstract investment by wealthy individuals known as angels in startup firms is quite significant and has taken off in the last few years angels invest in the company at an earlier stage than venture capitalists vcs do this paper examines the relationship between an entrepreneur an angel and a vc from the seed investment made by the angel to the exit stage the study characterizes the equilibrium contracts among the players and provides insights into the related institutional arrangements next the study examines the signaling aspects of the game the paper also analyzes the moral hazard problems of the entrepreneur and the vc it shows that the outcome in a startup firm is not efficient because of the free rider phenomenon

measures of per capita hours and their implications for the technology hours debate structural vector autoregressions give conflicting results on the effects of technology shocks on hours the results depend crucially on the assumed data generating process for hours per capita we show that the standard measure of hours per capita and productivity have significant low frequency movements that are the source of the conflicting results hodrick prescott hp filtered hours per capita produce results consistent with those obtained when hours are assumed to have a unit root we show that important sources of the low frequency movements in the standard measure are sectoral shifts in hours and the changing age composition of the working age population when we control for these low frequency components to determine the effect of technology shocks on hours using long run restrictions we get one consistent answer hours decline in the short run in response to a positive technology shock we further extend the analysis by examining the effects of demographic controls on the impulse responses to investment specific technology shocks our results are less conclusive

stage financing and the role of convertible securities venture capital financing is characterized by extensive use of convertible securities and stage financing in a model where a venture capitalist provides staged financing for a project we illustrate an advantage of convertible debt or warrants over a mixture of debt and equity essentially when the venture capitalist retains the option to abandon the project the entrepreneur has an incentive to engage in window dressing and bias positively the short term performance of the project reducing the probability that it will be liquidated an appropriately designed convertible security prevents such behaviour because window dressing also increases the probability that the venture capitalist will exercise the conversion option becoming the owner of a substantial fraction of the project s equity

do firms underinvest in long term research evidence from cancer clinical trials we investigate whether private research investments are distorted away from long term projects our theoretical model highlights two potential sources of this distortion short termism and the fixed patent term our empirical context is cancer research where clinical trials and hence project durations are shorter for late stage cancer treatments relative to early stage treatments or cancer prevention using newly constructed data we document several sources of evidence that together show private research investments are distorted away from long term projects the value of life years at stake appears large we analyze three potential policy responses surrogate non mortality clinical trial endpoints targeted r d subsidies and patent design jel d92 g31 i11 l65 o31 o34

staged financing an agency perspective this paper investigates the structure of outside investment in a profitable entrepreneurial venture though efficient financing the venture up front may be infeasible because the entrepreneur cannot commit to not renegotiate down the outside investor s claim once she s sunk her investment staging the investment over time helps to mitigate this commitment problem the early rounds of investment create collateral that support the later rounds we characterize the optimal staged investment path and show how it is affected by various features of the venture the predictions of the model are consistent with observations on staged financing in venture capital

what do economists tell us about venture capital contracts venture capital markets are characterized by multiple incentive problems and asymmetric information in an uncertain environment all kinds of agency problems are present moral hazard adverse selection hold up problems window dressing etc entrepreneurs and venture capitalists enter into contracts that influence their behavior and mitigate the agency costs in particular they select an appropriate kind and structure of financing and specify the rights as well as the duties of both parties the typical features of venture capital investments are an intensive screening and evaluation process an active involvement of venture capitalists in their portfolio companies a staging of capital infusions the use of special financing instruments such as convertible debt or convertible preferred stock syndication among venture capitalists or a short investment horizon

robust financial contracting and the role of venture capitalists we derive a role for inside investors such as venture capitalists in resolving various agency problems that arise in a multistage financial contracting problem absent an inside investor the choice of securities is unlikely to reveal all private information and overinvestment may occur an inside investor however always makes optimal investment decisions if and only if he holds a fixed fraction contract where he always receives a fixed fraction of the project s payoff and finances that same fraction of future investments this contract also eliminates any incentives of the venture capitalist to misprice securities issued in later financing rounds in this article we develop a model of financial contracting with multiple investment decisions and show how conflicts of interest and informational asymmetries can be effectively resolved by an inside investor i e an investor who not only provides capital but also works closely with the firm monitors it frequently and is generally very well informed about the firm s prospects and investment opportunities venture capitalists are obvious examples of inside investors and their function has been an important motivation for this article banks especially in japan and germany are also involved in monitoring and can be viewed as playing the role of inside investors in this article we examine the potential benefits of inside investors in a context where there are no restrictions beyond limited liability on the type of financial contracts that can be written we address a basic financial contracting problem involving an entrepreneur who has an idea for a project but does not have sufficient capital to fund it an important assumption is that there are several stages in the project s development and that a decision must be made at each stage whether the project should be continued or abandoned if the project is continued the amount of additional capital to be invested must also be determined we assume that the entrepreneur as an insider observes private information about the project s profitability at each stage this information is not

financial freedom and bank efficiency evidence from the european union this paper investigates the dynamics between the financial freedom counterparts of the economic freedom index drawn from the heritage foundation database and bank efficiency levels we rely on a large sample of commercial banks operating in the 27 european union member states over the 2000s after estimating bank specific efficiency scores using data envelopment analysis dea we develop a truncated regression model combined with bootstrapped confidence intervals to test our main hypotheses results suggest that the higher the degree of an economy s financial freedom the higher the benefits for banks in terms of cost advantages and overall efficiency our results also show that the effects of financial freedom on bank efficiency tend to be more pronounced in countries with freer political systems in which governments formulate and implement sound policies and higher quality governance

staging of venture capital investment a real options analysis this paper uses contingent claims analysis to investigate the staging decision of venture capitalist vc in a principal agent framework venture capital investment opportunities are modeled as real options with multiple volatilities and the entrepreneur s incentive is assumed to maximize the probability of getting funded in the next financing round two celebrated formulae in the option pricing literature are generalized to evaluate these real options we find that staging not only gives the vc a waiting option but also mitigates the agency problem of the entrepreneur undertaking too conservative activities moreover we find that the vc tends to stage her investment when the expected growth rate of the venture s market value is lower however the risk free interest rate is not an important factor in the staging decision our model also provides a good explanation for existing empirical evidence on the staging of venture capital investment

entrepreneurial manipulation with staged financing abstract finance is staged in entrepreneurial settings it has been argued that staging has a drawback entrepreneurs manipulate short term appearances to keep funds flowing in contrast this paper finds that staging can lead to either more or less manipulation than non staged finance finally behavior in early rounds induces a kind of manipulation persistence so that total manipulation is path dependent the model makes predictions regarding crowdsourced finance switching of vcs and lifecycle issues in entrepreneurial finance

union bargaining power subcontracting and innovation we show that if a firm can subcontract production to an informal sector an increase in union power may either increase or decrease innovation an increase in union power makes the firm worse off irrespective of its effect on innovation however in contrast to the usual belief an increase in union power may increase consumer surplus and decrease union utility by affecting innovation thus suggesting that a union may not want to be too powerful an increase in union power may create an ambiguous effect on social welfare our analysis provides new insights to the relation between union power and innovation

trend breaks long run restrictions and contractionary technology improvements abstract structural vector autoregressions with long run restrictions are extraordinarily sensitive to low frequency correlations recent literature finds that the estimated effects of technology shocks are sensitive to how one treats hours per capita however after allowing for statistically and economically significant trend breaks in productivity results are much less sensitive hours fall when technology improves the issue is that the common high low high pattern of productivity growth and hours i e the low frequency correlation inevitably leads to a positive estimated response the trend breaks control for this correlation this example suggests a practical need for care in using long run restrictions

early stage financing and firm growth in new industries this paper shows that active investors such as venture capitalists can affect the speed at which new ventures grow in the absence of product market competition new ventures financed by active investors grow faster initially though in the long run those financed by passive investors are able to catch up by contrast in a competitive product market new ventures financed by active investors may prey on rivals that are financed by passive investors by strategically overinvesting early on resulting in long run differences in investment profits and firm growth the value of active investors is greater in highly competitive industries as well as in industries with learning curves economies of scope and network effects as is typical for many new economy industries for such industries our model predicts that start ups with access to venture capital may dominate their industry peers in the long run

incentives in university technology transfers there are two main ways in which the knowledge created in universities has been transferred to firms licensing agreements and the creation of spin offs in this paper we describe the main steps in the transfer of university innovations the main incentive issues that appear in this process and the contractual solutions proposed to address them

on the application and use of dsge models abstract a large literature discusses the theory and fit of dsge models however comparatively little has been written on the application and use of dsge models especially on the communication of analysis based on such models to policymakers we argue that this issue deserves more attention to put our claim in context we describe the core non core approach used in the bank of england s quarterly model and compare it with two others the measurement error approach of ireland and the shocks in parameters approach utilised by smets and wouters and others using a mock forecast scenario for illustration we argue that each of these approaches would present model users with difficulties in communicating with policymakers we conjecture that it is this problem not theory or fitting the data that currently hinders more widespread influence of dsge type models on policy making

the bright and dark side of staging investment performance and the varying motivations of private equity firms previous papers that examined investment decisions by private equity funds are divided on whether staging has a positive or negative effect on returns we believe these opposing views can be reconciled by studying when staging is used during the life of the investment relationship we find that staging has a positive effect on investment returns in the beginning of the investment relationship consistent with the notion that staging helps mitigate information asymmetry however staging appears to be negatively associated with returns when used prior to the exit decision our unique dataset allows us to measure these intertemporal effects precisely

the shifts in lead lag properties of the u s business cycle we document shifts in the lead lag properties of the u s business cycle since the mid 1980s specifically 1 the well known inverted leading indicator property of real interest rates has completely vanished 2 labor productivity switched from positively leading to negatively lagging output and labor inputs over the cycle and 3 the unemployment rate shifted from lagging productivity negatively to leading positively many contemporary business cycle models produce counterfactual cross correlations revealing that popular frictions and shocks provide an incomplete account of business cycle comovement determining the underlying sources of these shifts in the lead lag properties and their consequences for macroeconomic forecasts is therefore a promising direction for future research jel e24 e32 e43

motivating wealth constrained actors we examine how owners of productive resources e g public enterprises or financial capital optimally allocate their resources among wealth constrained operators of unknown ability optimal allocations exhibit 1 shared enterprise profit the resource owner always shares the operator s profit 2 dispersed enterprise ownership resources are widely distributed among operators of varying ability 3 limited benefits of competition the owner may not benefit from increased competition for the resource and sometimes 4 diluted incentives for the most capable more capable operators receive smaller shares of the returns they generate implications for privatizations and venture capital arrangements are explored

ownership access and sequential investment we extend the property rights framework to allow for a separation of the ownership rights of access and veto and sequential investment parties investing first ex ante do so before contracting is possible parties that invest second ex post can contract on at least some of their investment costs along with this cost sharing effect the incentive to invest is affected by a strategic effect generated by sequential investment together these effects can overturn some of the predictions of the property rights literature for example the most inclusive ownership structure might not be optimal even if all investments are complementary

gradualism in aid and reforms abstract dynamic strategic interaction between an international donor and a recipient government is analyzed to review the efficacy of aid conditionality for governance reforms in ldcs it is shown that irrespective of whether the donor can fully commit to the aid program or not for maximal improvement in governance the aid should be disbursed in increments with each subsequent tranche being conditional on prior reforms demonstrating aid gradualism while the attraction of future aid incentivizes authorities to push through reforms these reforms in turn also make aid diversion less feasible further under full commitment the optimal aid package may involve offering scope for interim aid diversion to the elite for long term improvement in governance with such aid diversion being more likely to happen when the total aid budget is large with only partial commitment so that time consistency requires the donor to reconfigure aid in each round it is shown that a interim aid diversion is no longer viable and b both aid and reforms exhibit strong gradualism or what is known as the starting small and grow later principle in commitment models

posturing and holdup in innovation we show that the need to posture can help solve the holdup problem inherent in many multistage relationships including those between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists posturing arises when an informed party needs to send a strong signal to induce skeptical third parties like employees suppliers customers or competitors to develop maintain relationships with the firm or take other actions that increase firm value in the venture capital context this can be credibly achieved if the vc publicly invests at high prices in later rounds this tempers holdup by shifting ex post bargaining power toward the entrepreneur inducing him to exert greater effort

on the demographic adjustment of unemployment the unemployment rate is one of the most important business cycle indicators but its interpretation can be difficult because slow changes in the demographic composition of the labor force affect the level of unemployment and make comparisons across business cycles difficult to purge the unemployment rate from demographic factors labor force shares are routinely used to control for compositional changes this paper shows that this approach is ill defined because the labor force share of a demographic group is mechanically linked to that group s unemployment rate as both variables are driven by the same underlying worker flows we propose a new demographic adjustment procedure that uses a dynamic factor model for the worker flows to separate aggregate labor market forces and demographic specific trends using the u s labor market as an illustration our demographic adjusted unemployment rate indicates that the 2008 2009 recession was much more severe and generated substantially more slack than the early 1980s recession

agency and strategic contracts theory and evidence from r d agreements in the pharmaceutical industry we examine the use of strategic rights in research and development r d agreements between a client and an agent when an entrant may compete with the client for the license of non contracted discoveries developed by the agent the agent puts effort either in the contracted project or into other r d activities which can result in non contracted discoveries strategic rights help the client and the agent extract rent from the entrant and also motivate the agent to place effort into the contracted project accordingly firms are more likely to adopt strategic rights when the likelihood of entry is larger moreover strategic rights and termination rights are substitutes in mitigating agency problems by investigating r d agreements between pharmaceutical clients and bio tech agents we find consistent evidence of the positive impact of entry threat on the use of strategic rights as well as evidence of the substitution between strategic rights and termination rights

collateral relationship lending and family firms prior research suggested that relationship lending could play a role in solving asymmetric information problems between borrower and lender other studies suggest a relationship between family ownership and the shareholder bondholder agency conflict the present paper investigates the impact of relationship characteristics family ownership and their interaction effects upon the use of collateral in sme lending we examine the determinants of collateral as well as the determinants of the choice between business and personal collateral using decision tree analysis the results reveal that relationship characteristics have a significant influence but not always in the direction as expected moreover they do not seem to be the primary determinants in our classification models the most important determinants in both classification models seem to be the loan amount total assets and the family versus non family firm distinction in addition we differentiate between line of credit and non line of credit loans and find significant differences between these decision trees

the us bankruptcy law and private equity financing empirical evidence the generous personal bankruptcy law in the united states is important to entrepreneurs because failed entrepreneurs can resort to this system to shelter part of their wealth against negative consequences of business failure fan and white journal of law and economics xlvi 543 567 2003 documented that high bankruptcy exemptions provide incentives for entrepreneurs to start own new businesses the partial wealth insurance effect provided by the bankruptcy exemptions also has a significant and negative impact on the entrepreneurs access to bank credits berkowitz and white the rand journal of economics 35 1 69 84 2004 gropp scholz and white the quarterly journal of economics 112 1 217 251 1997 in this article we investigate whether and to what extent the us bankruptcy law has any effect on venture capital vc investment making use of company level information we document that the amount of venture financing received is negatively related to the bankruptcy exemption levels and the number of rounds of financing as well as the number of vc funds involved is negatively associated with bankruptcy exemptions further we report consistent evidences based on state level data with regard to the effects of the us personal bankruptcy law

the effects of technology shocks on hours and output a robustness analysis we analyze the effects of neutral and investment specific technology shocks on hours and output long cycles in hours are removed in a variety of ways hours robustly fall in response to neutral shocks and robustly increase in response to investment specific shocks the percentage of the variance of hours output explained by neutral shocks is small large the opposite is true for investment specific shocks news shocks are uncorrelated with the estimated technology shocks copyright 2009 john wiley sons ltd

hold up and sequential specific investments we explore the hold up problem when parties can make investments simultaneously or sequentially sequencing of investments can allow some projects to proceed that would not be feasible with a simultaneous regime however a cost of sequencing is that it can disadvantage some parties reducing their incentive to invest the mere possibility of sequential investment can prevent trade from occurring this can be interpreted as a new form of hold up if both parties prefer to invest second as the number of potential investment periods is increased the subgame perfect equilibrium can switch between a prisoners dilemma and a coordination game