re examination of uniform commodity taxes under a non linear income tax system and its implication for production efficiency abstract this paper shows that the result of uniform commodity tax under nonlinear income taxation by atkinson and stiglitz 1976 no longer holds if the production side of an economy is taken into the consideration in particular imposing a non uniform commodity tax can pareto improve welfare even under nonlinear income taxation in addition the paper shows that if the government uses a nonlinear income tax system for income redistribution then the introduction of distortions in the public sector can pareto improve welfare contrary to the results in diamond and mirrlees 1971

the empirical content of the roy model this paper clarifies and extends the classical roy model of self selection and earnings inequality the original roy model based on the assumption that log skills are normally distributed is shown to imply that pursuit of comparative advantage in a free market reduces earnings inequality compared to the earnings distribution that would result if workers were randomly assigned to sectors aggregate log earnings are right skewed even if one sectoral distribution is left skewed most major implications of the log normal roy model survive if differences in skills are log concave however few implications of the model survive if skills are generated from more general distributions we consider the identifiability of the roy model from data on earnings distributions the normal theory version is identifiable without regressors or exclusion restrictions sectoral distributions can be identified knowing only the aggregate earnings distribution for general skill distributions the model is not identified and has no empirical content with sufficient price variation the model can be identified from multimarket data cross sectional variation in regressors can substitute for price variation in restoring empirical content to the roy model

social insurance and occupational mobility this paper studies how insurance from progressive taxation improves the matching of workers to occupations we propose an equilibrium dynamic assignment model to illustrate how social insurance encourages mobility workers experiment to find their best occupational fit in a process filled with uncertainty risk aversion and limited earnings insurance induce workers to remain in unfitting occupations we estimate the model using microdata from the united states and germany higher earnings uncertainty explains the u s higher mobility rate when workers in the united states enjoy germany s higher progressivity mobility rises output and welfare gains are large

taxation in matching markets what is the impact of taxation in matching markets in matching markets because agents have heterogeneous preferences over potential partners welfare depends on which agents are matched to each other in equilibrium taxes in matching markets can generate inefficiency by changing who is matched to whom even if the number of workers at each firm is unaffected for markets in which workers refuse to match without a positive wage higher taxes decrease match efficiency however in more balanced matching markets where transfers may flow in either direction such as the student college market lowering taxes may decrease match efficiency because an agent can transfer enough to buy an inefficient partner only to be bought back when taxes are lowered further simulations show that in matching markets traditional deadweight loss estimates based on the change in taxable income can be substantially biased in either direction jel classification h20 j24 c78 d13

taxing top ceo incomes we use a firm ceo assignment framework to model the market for ceo effective labor in the model s equilibrium more talented ceos match with and supply more effort to larger firms taxation of ceo incomes affects the equilibrium pricing of ceo effective labor and hence spills over and affects firm profits absent the ability to tax profits or a direct concern for firm owners a standard prescription for high marginal income taxes emerges however given such an ability or concern the optimal marginal tax rates are much lower

de gustibus non est taxandum heterogeneity in preferences and optimal redistribution abstract the prominent but unproven intuition that preference heterogeneity reduces redistribution in a standard optimal tax model is shown to hold under the plausible condition that the distribution of preferences for consumption relative to leisure rises in terms of first order stochastic dominance with income given familiar functional form assumptions on utility and the distributions of ability and preferences a simple statistic for the effect of preference heterogeneity on marginal tax rates is derived numerical simulations and suggestive empirical evidence demonstrate the link between this potentially measurable statistic and the quantitative implications of preference heterogeneity for policy

common trends the government s budget constraint and revenue smoothing abstract the requirement that the government s budget be balanced in present value terms is shown to be equivalent to the condition that government expenditures inclusive of interest tax receipts and seignorage be cointegrated the condition is in fact stronger requiring that the deficit inclusive of interest be stationary stationarity of the net of interest deficit is neither necessary nor sufficient for intertemporal budget balance however it does have implications for barro s tax smoothing hypothesis data for the period 1890 1986 are consistent with intertemporal budget balance but not with tax smoothing

time series dynamics of us state unemployment rates this paper examines the time series properties of state and national unemployment rates based upon unit root variance ratio and cointegration tests as well as granger causality and error correction model results several important conclusions can be made first forecasting models that include only levels of unemployment rates may produce spurious regression results second in the vast majority of cases there is no long run co movement between the aggregate us unemployment rate and individual state unemployment rates third models that are specified in first differences generally yield reliable insights into state national unemployment relationships

positive and normative judgments implicit in u s tax policy and the costs of unequal growth and recessions calculating the welfare implications of changes to economic policy or shocks requires economists to decide on a normative criterion one approach is to elicit the relevant moral criteria from real world policy choices converting a normative decision into a positive inference as in the recent surge of inverse optimum research we find that capitalizing on the potential of this approach is not as straightforward as we might hope we perform the inverse optimum inference on u s tax policy from 1979 through 2010 and argue that the results either undermine the normative relevance of the approach or challenge conventional assumptions upon which economists routinely rely when performing welfare evaluations

taking versus taxing an analysis of conscription in a private information economy most countries currently man their militaries through conscription i e a draft conventional wisdom suggests that by lowering the budgetary cost of the military a draft reduces distortionary taxation especially when military needs are large we find that this intuition is misguided when income taxes are set optimally voluntary enlistments lead to less distortionary taxation than a draft because the tax base left behind by a volunteer army tends to be more productive than that after a draft for reasonable parameter values drafts are more distortionary and less socially desirable when military needs are large

optimal taxation and firm formation abstract this paper analyzes non linear optimal taxation under asymmetric information in a general equilibrium model with endogenous firm formation it first shows under a weak separability assumption on technologies that output and input taxes are not necessary if profits are optimally taxed it then examines the progressivity or lack of it of the optimal profit tax and describes the corresponding effects on the structure of the production sector relative to the first best solution finally the paper investigates conditions under which the provision of public goods can be decentralized

using elasticities to derive optimal income tax rates this paper derives optimal income tax formulas using compensated and uncompensated elasticities of earnings with respect to tax rates a simple formula for the high income optimal tax rate is obtained as a function of these elasticities and the thickness of the top tail of the income distribution in the general non linear income tax problem this method using elasticities shows precisely how the different economic effects come into play and which are the key relevant parameters in the optimal income tax formulas of mirrlees the optimal non linear tax rate formulas are expressed in terms of elasticities and the shape of the income distribution these formulas are implemented numerically using empirical earning distributions and a range of realistic elasticity parameters

income maintenance and labor force participation the paper studies the optimal tax subsidy schedules in an economy where the only decision of the agents is to work or not with an application to the case of france given an income guarantee provided by the welfare state the tax schedule that maximizes government revenue provides a benchmark the laffer bound above which it is inefficient to tax in fact under mild conditions a feasible allocation is second best optimal if and only if the associated taxes are lower than the laffer bound the only restriction that efficiency puts on the shape of the tax scheme is this upper laffer bound the laffer tax scheme itself can be computed from the joint distribution of the agents productivities and work opportunity costs depending on the economy it can take widely different forms and exhibit for instance negative marginal tax rates after estimating the joint distribution of productivities and work opportunity costs on french data i compute the laffer bound for two subpopulations single women and married women with two children or more quite surprisingly the actual incentives to work appear to be very close to the bound

optimal taxation under regional inequality abstract we study how regional productivity differences and labor mobility shape optimal mirrleesian tax transfer schemes when tax schedules are not allowed to differ across regions productivity enhancing inter regional migration exerts a downward pressure on optimal marginal tax rates when regionally differentiated taxation is allowed marginal tax rates in high low productivity regions should be corrected downwards upwards relative to the benchmark without migration simulations of the productivity differences between metropolitan and other areas of the us indicate that migration affects the optimal tax transfer schedule more strongly in the regionally differentiated rather than in the undifferentiated case

optimal wage redistribution in the presence of adverse selection in the labor market in this paper we highlight a novel role played by the non linear income tax in the presence of adverse selection in the labor market due to asymmetric information between workers and firms relying on the rothschild and stiglitz equilibrium concept we show that an appropriate choice of the tax schedule enables the government to affect the wage distribution by controlling the transmission of information in the labor market this represents an additional channel through which the government can foster the pursuit of its redistributive goals

optimal taxation in theory and practice the optimal design of a tax system is a topic that has long fascinated economic theorists and flummoxed economic policymakers this paper explores the interplay between tax theory and tax policy it identifies key lessons policymakers might take from the academic literature on how taxes ought to be designed and it discusses the extent to which these lessons are reflected in actual tax policy we begin with a brief overview of how economists think about optimal tax policy based largely on the foundational work of ramsey 1927 and mirrlees 1971 we then put forward eight general lessons suggested by optimal tax theory as it has developed in recent decades 1 optimal marginal tax rate schedules depend on the distribution of ability 2 the optimal marginal tax schedule could decline at high incomes 3 a flat tax with a universal lump sum transfer could be close to optimal 4 the optimal extent of redistribution rises with wage inequality 5 taxes should depend on personal characteristics as well as income 6 only final goods ought to be taxed and typically they ought to be taxed uniformly 7 capital income ought to be untaxed at least in expectation and 8 in stochastic dynamic economies optimal tax policy requires increased sophistication for each lesson we discuss its theoretical underpinnings and the extent to which it is consistent with actual tax policy to preview our conclusions we find that there has been considerable change in the theory and practice of taxation over the past several decades although the two paths have been far from parallel overall tax policy has moved in the y n gregory mankiw is professor of economics matthew weinzierl is assistant professor of business administration and danny yagan is a ph d candidate in economics all at harvard university cambridge massachusetts their e mail addresses are ngmankiw

twister employment responses to the 3 may 1999 oklahoma city tornado this research examined the impact of the 3 may 1999 tornado on the oklahoma city labour market we estimated time series models that allow for time varying variance in employment growth the models include intervention variables designed to capture the tornado s effect at initial impact as well as over the post tornado period in terms of total employment growth the oklahoma city metropolitan statistical area msa experienced an increase in employment growth and a reduction in labour market risk in the sample period following the tornado the analysis also examined the effect of the weather event on eight industrial sectors five of eight sectors experienced significant decreases in labour market risk after the tornado our evidence suggests that oklahoma city and surrounding communities that make up the metropolitan statistical area survived the disaster without suffering any extended adverse labour market effects our results indicate that at least in the aggregate the labour market improved what

technical change wage inequality and taxes this paper considers the normative implications of technical change for tax policy design a task to talent assignment model of the labor market is embedded into an optimal tax problem technical change modifies equilibrium wage growth across talents and the substitutability of talents across tasks the overall optimal policy response is to reduce marginal income taxes on low to middle incomes while raising those on middle to high incomes the reform favors those in the middle of the income distribution reducing their average taxes while lowering transfers to those at the bottom jel d31 h21 h23 h24 j31 o33

the dynamics of regional unemployment in the uk 1974 89 this paper investigates the relationship between regional and national unemployment for the uk for the period 1974 1989 this problem is approached by using the time series methods of cointegration and causality tests the main conclusions are that regional and national unemployment are not as closely related as might have been supposed although any causation may as previously assumed run from the national to the regional level some regions are seen to be changing their position in the hierarchy of relative regional unemployment while most retain their relative status

the taxation of superstars how are optimal taxes affected by the presence of superstar phenomena at the top of the earnings distribution to answer this question we extend the mirrlees model to incorporate an assignment problem in the labor market that generates superstar effects perhaps surprisingly rather than providing a rationale for higher taxes we show that superstar effects provide a force for lower marginal taxes conditional on the observed distribution of earnings superstar effects make the earnings schedule convex which increases the responsiveness of individual earnings to tax changes we show that various common elasticity measures are not sufficient statistics and must be adjusted upwards in optimal tax formulas finally we study a comparative static that does not keep the observed earnings distribution fixed when superstar technologies are introduced inequality increases but we obtain a neutrality result finding tax rates at the top unaltered

the cyclical sensitivity of regional unemployment an assessment byers j d 1990 the cyclical sensitivity of regional unemployment an assessment reg studies 24 447 453 the slope coefficient obtained by regressing a regional unemployment rate on the national rate is often interpreted as a measure of the sensitivity of the regional economy to cyclical shocks in the national economy this paper discusses the procedures used to estimate cyclical sensitivity employing recent developments in econometric modelling of time series it is suggested the ols regressions actually reveal the equilibrium relationship between the two rather than the cyclical relationship byers j d 1990 la sensibilite cyclique du chomage regionale une evaluation reg studies 24 447 453 le coefficient de la pente calcule a partir d une regression du taux de chomage regional par rapport au taux national est souvent interprete comme mesure de la sensibilite de l economie regionale aux chocs cycliques dans l economie nationale cet article discute des demarches suivies afin d evaluer la

optimal linear income taxation in models with occupational choice the purpose of this paper is to investigate the implication of occupational choice for linear income taxation occupational choice is restricted to entrepreneurship versus wage earning different settings are considered concerning the introduction of uncertainty and that of individuals heterogeneity in ability or risk aversion for each setting an optimal tax formula is derived and shown to be made up of various components pertaining to insurance redistribution and efficiency

optimal linear income taxation with general equilibrium effects on wages abstract the paper argues that the endogeneity of wages may make a considerable difference to optimal linear tax rates in this case there is not only the usual direct redistribution via the fiscal system but also the general equilibrium redistribution due to the change in wages depending on the elasticity of substitution of the production function and the labour supply elasticities these may be reinforcing or opposing it is shown that the general equilibrium effect may plausibly outweigh the direct effect so that net redistribution to the lower paid involves a wage subsidy financed by a lump sum tax

two views of the geographic distribution of unemployment this paper investigates the extent to which equilibrium and disequilibrium explanations can account for unemployment rate differentials between cities it shows that shocks that disturb the steady state relationship among the unemployment rates of metropolitan areas tend to be eliminated by mobility within a single year it also shows that high unemployment areas tend to be those with attractive climates and amenities high wages and high unemployment insurance it argues that the main effect of government programs that create jobs in high unemployment areas will be to lure additional job seekers to those areas

self confirming equilibrium and the lucas critique we examine the role of off path superstitions in macro economics and show how a false belief about off path play is the key element underlying both the lucas critique and the game theoretic concept of self confirming equilibrium however the impact of false beliefs in these two cases is different in the lucas case a policy maker s incorrect beliefs about off path play can lead to the adoption of mistaken policy innovation however the consequences of such an innovation provide evidence that the belief that motivated them was wrong in contrast play may never escape an undesirable self confirming equilibrium as the action implied by the mistaken belief does not generate data that contradicts it escape from the self confirming equilibrium requires that players do a sufficient amount of experimentation with off path actions

income shifting as income creation abstract income shifting arises as one of the key questions when thinking about the design of a tax system as a whole we study a simple economy involving a benevolent policy maker and a population of agents differing in terms of productivities labor supply elasticities and shifting costs paying special attention to the cost structure of income shifting we highlight that when people who shift easily along the extensive margin are also more elastic in labor supply giving them a lower tax rate is a good thing and the government should not necessarily combat income shifting this mechanism may be compared to third degree price discrimination in industrial organization and works as a form of endogenous tagging we explore this possibility numerically before showing that our results derived for a policy maker optimally adjusting two linear tax instruments carry over when two fully non linear taxes are potentially available

financing education using optimal redistributive taxation abstract in this article the joint use of an income tax and public provision of education as instruments to achieve the government s distributional objectives is considered individuals differ in innate labour productivity and in aptitude to acquire skills through education actual labour productivity depends on both innate skill and the amount of education received using a generalized version of the mirrlees tax problem that incorporates these features qualitative properties of an optimal tax schedule are investigated

the optimal income taxation of couples this paper analyzes the general nonlinear optimal income tax for couples a multidimensional screening problem each couple consists of a primary earner who always participates in the labor market but makes an hours of work choice and a secondary earner who chooses whether or not to work if second earner participation is a signal of the couple being better worse off we prove that optimal tax schemes display a positive tax subsidy on secondary earnings and that the tax subsidy on secondary earnings decreases with primary earnings and converges to zero asymptotically we present calibrated microsimulations for the united kingdom showing that decreasing tax rates on secondary earnings is quantitatively significant and consistent with actual income tax and transfer programs

mobility and the return to education testing a roy model with multiple markets self selected migration presents one potential explanation for why observed returns to a college education in local labor markets vary widely even though u s workers are highly mobile to assess the impact of self selection on estimated returns this paper first develops a roy model of mobility and earnings where workers choose in which of the 50 states plus the district of columbia to live and work available estimation methods are either infeasible for a selection model with so many alternatives or place potentially severe restrictions on earnings and the selection process this paper develops an alternative econometric methodology that combines lee s 1983 parametric maximum order statistic approach to reduce the dimensionality of the error terms with more recent work on semiparametric estimation of selection models e g ahn and powell 1993 the resulting semiparametric correction is easy to implement and can be adapted to a variety of other polychotomous choice problems the empirical work which uses 1990 u s census data confirms the role of comparative advantage in mobility decisions the results suggest that self selection of higher educated individuals to states with higher returns to education generally leads to upward biases in ols estimates of the returns to education in state specific labor markets while the estimated returns to a college education are significantly biased correcting for the bias does not narrow the range of returns across states consistent with the finding that the corrected return to a college education differs across the u s the relative state to state migration flows of college versus high school educated individuals respond strongly to differences in the return to education and amenities across states

differential taxation and occupational choice we develop a framework to study optimal sector specific taxation where each agent chooses an occupation by comparing her skill differential with the tax burden differential across sectors because skills are not perfectly transferable the diamond mirrlees theorem according to which the second best entails production efficiency fails social welfare can be increased by inducing some agents to join the sector in which their productivity is not the highest at the optimum income taxes balance the marginal losses from inter sector migration with the marginal gains from tailoring tax schedules to the distribution of productivities in each sector tagging a calibrated model indicates that sector specific taxation generates substantive welfare gains when skill transferability decreases with income as it enables the government to increase average taxes on high earners with large wage premia

on the optimal provision of social insurance progressive taxation versus education subsidies in general equilibrium in this paper we compute the optimal tax and education policy transition in an economy where progressive taxes provide social insurance against idiosyncratic wage risk but distort the education decision of households optimally chosen tertiary education subsidies mitigate these distortions we highlight the quantitative importance of general equilibrium feedback effects from policies to relative wages of skilled and unskilled workers subsidizing higher education increases the share of workers with a college degree thereby reducing the college wage premium which has important redistributive benefits we also argue that a full characterization of the transition path is crucial for policy evaluation we find that optimal education policies are always characterized by generous tuition subsidies but the optimal degree of income tax progressivity depends crucially on whether transitional costs of policies are explicitly taken into account and how strongly the college premium responds to policy changes in general equilibrium

redistributive taxation in the roy model we consider optimal redistribution in a model where individuals can self select into one of several possible sectors based on heterogeneity in a multidimensional skill vector we show that when the government does not observe the sectoral choice or underlying skills of its citizens the constrained pareto frontier can be implemented with a single non linear income tax we derive formulas for this optimal tax schedule if sectoral inputs are complements a many sector model with self selection leads to optimal income taxes that are less progressive than the corresponding taxes in a standard single sector model under natural conditions however they are more progressive than in a multi sector model without occupational choice or without overlapping wage distributions as in stiglitz 1982

regional unemployment disparities and their dynamics martin r 1997 regional unemployment disparities and their dynamics reg studies 31 237 252 unemployment in the united kingdom has doubled every decade since the 1960s regional unemployment trends during this period are shown to have been characterized by a high degree of synchronicity and regional unemployment disparities by a remarkable persistence this persistence or stability of the regional unemployment structure or what can be termed co integration of the regional labour market system is argued to be an equilibrium phenomenon although the unusual recession of the early 1990s appears to have disturbed this stable pattern of regional disparities whether this change represents a temporary shock or marks a shift to a new equilibrium geography of unemployment is as yet unclear martin r 1997 les ecarts du chomage regional et leur dynamique reg studies 31 237 252 au royaume uni le chomage a doubletoutes les decennies depuis les annees 60 pendant cette periode ce qui caracterise les

self selection and the earnings of immigrants this paper analyzes the way in which the earnings of the immigrant population may be expected to differ from the earnings of the native population because of the endogeneity of the decision to migrate the empirical study shows that differences in the u s earnings of immigrants with the same measured skills but from different home countries are attributable to variations in political and economic conditions in the countries of origin at the time of migration excerpt

optimal taxation with rent seeking we develop a framework for optimal taxation when agents can earn their income both in traditional activities where private and social products coincide and in rent seeking activities where private returns exceed social returns either because they involve the capture of pre existing rents or because they reduce the returns to traditional work we characterize pareto optimal income taxes that do not condition on how much of an individual s income is earned in each of the two activities these optimal taxes feature an externality corrective term the magnitude of which depends both on the pigouvian correction that would obtain if rent seeking incomes could be perfectly targeted and on the relative impact of rent seeking externalities on the private returns to traditional and to rent seeking activities if rent seeking externalities primarily affect other rent seekers for example the optimal correction lies strictly below the pigouvian correction a calibrated model indicates that the gap between the pigouvian and optimal correction can be quantitatively important our results thus point to a hefty informational requirement for correcting rent seeking externalities through the income tax code

consumption puzzles and precautionary savings abstract when marginal utility is convex agents accumulate savings as a precautionary measure against labor income eventualities this paper shows that precautionary savings can go a long way in making the excess growth excess smoothness and excess sensitivity features of consumption consistent with the stochastic processes of labor income observed in the u s at the microeconomic level

optimal income taxation and job choice in this paper we study optimal income taxation when different job types exist for workers of different skills each job type has some feasible range of incomes from which workers choose by varying labor supply workers are more productive than others in the jobs that suit them best the model combines features of the classic optimal tax literature with labor variability along the intensive margin with the extensive margin approach where workers make discrete job choices and or participation decisions we find that first best maximin utility can be achieved in the second best and marginal tax rates below the top can be negative or zero

the cyclical sensitivity of regional employment and unemployment differentials gordon i r 1985 the cyclical sensitivity of regional employment and unemployment differentials reg studies 19 95 110 this paper examines inter regional variations in the cyclical sensitivity of employment and unemployment in the uk over the past thirty years it shows that the patterns for employment and for unemployment are quite different the cyclical sensitivity of unemployment is greatest in the high unemployment regions while that for employment is greatest in the more industrial regions it is argued that the primary reason for differences in the sensitivity of unemployment is not demand side factors but cyclical variations in labour mobility between regions lower mobility in periods of high unemployment reduces the effectiveness of inter regional supply adjustments and increases the variance of unemployment rates

optimal tax mix with income tax non compliance abstract although developing countries face high levels of income inequality they rely more on consumption taxes which tend to be linear and are less effective for redistribution than a non linear income tax one explanation for this pattern is that the consumption taxes are generally more enforceable in these economies this paper studies the optimal combination of a linear consumption tax with a non linear income tax for redistributive purposes in our model households might not comply with the income tax code by reporting income levels that differ from their true income however the consumption tax is fully enforceable we derive a formula for the optimal income tax schedule as a function of the consumption tax rate the recoverable elasticities and the moments of the taxable income distribution our equation differs from those of mirrlees 1971 and saez 2001 because households face a consumption tax and they respond to income tax not only through labor supply but also through mis reporting their incomes both aspects are empirically relevant to our calibration of the optimal top rate in the russian economy we then characterize the optimal mix between a linear consumption tax rate and a non linear income tax schedule finally we find that the optimal consumption tax rate is non increasing in the redistributive motives of the social planner

self selection and the distribution of hourly wages this article formulates and estimates alternative equilibrium models of industrial wage determination and self selection in explaining industrial wage differentials we find that it is important to account for heterogeneous sector specific skills and self selection decisions by agents concerning their sector of employment the classical roy model is rejected so is an efficiency units model of the labor market a revised roy model that accounts for comparative advantage in the choice of industrial sectors and choice between market and nonmarket work is much more successful in explaining cross section wage distributions and their evolution over time

an investigation of ricardian equivalence in a common trends model abstract to empirically discriminate between ricardian and non ricardian behaviour we have to use a method that distinguishes between expected and unexpected as well as permanent and transitory changes in taxes and government consumption one method that provides these distinctions between different types of changes is the common trends framework used in this paper which is a var model with cointegrating constraints in the empirical study of us data there is some support for the ricardian hypothesis but there are also some deviations from its predictions however the differences do not lend support to a keynesian view of budget deficits but rather to the view of expansionary fiscal contractions this can be motivated theoretically by uncertainty about future taxes in combination with prudent households

negative marginal tax rates and heterogeneity the bulk of the theory of optimal taxation recommends that the marginal tax rate be everywhere positive labor supply is distorted downwards compared with laissez faire the conditions under which the result holds continuous labor supply or intensive margin unobserved productivity constant opportunity cost of work utilitarian planner with a redistributive motive towards lower incomes have been thoroughly investigated jesus seade 1977 1982 ivan werning 2000 martin f hellwig 2007 the purpose of the present paper is to describe how negative marginal tax rates can be optimal keeping with the intensive set up largely studied in the literature when there are multiple dimensions of heterogeneity indeed james a mirrlees 1976 in its section iv indicates along a line that will be pursued further here that the sign of the marginal tax rate cannot be predicted when the agents in the economy differ along several dimensions of heterogeneity workers differ in both their productivities and opportunity costs of work under utilitarianism heterogeneity comes into play through its impact on cardinal utilities how social weights or marginal utilities of income vary with income determines the shape of the optimal tax scheme conditionally on income utility and more importantly its derivative with respect to income may either decrease or increase with work opportunity costs this may vary according to circumstances depending on whether the cost is associated with poor living conditions i e a handicap or reflects a taste for leisure or opportunities outside the labor market such as gardening at home or black market activities for a given income the social weight is proportional to the expected marginal utilities where the expectation is taken over the distribution of work opportunity costs at this income level therefore the social weight curve depends on both the specification of the cardinal utility function and on how the distribution of work opportunity costs changes with income the fact that heterogeneity can blur the redistribution motive through the possible correlation between ability and onerousness of work has been discussed in models where agents have a finite number of types a pioneer work is that of joseph e stiglitz 1982 who shows that the high skilled individual should face a negative marginal tax rate if the low skilled individual s upward incentive constraint binds which is the case if social weights are increasing in type the importance of this observation for policy was pointed out in katherine cuff 2000 who is the first to explicitly link social weights to the opportunity cost of work using alternative choices of cardinal utilities in a model with four types combining two values for productivity and two values for the cost of work robin boadway et al 2002 showed how it can be optimal to have binding upward incentive constraints when high opportunity costs are associated with small social weights

equality under threat by the talented evidence from worker managed firms does workplace democracy engender greater pay equality are high ability individuals more likely to quit egalitarian organisational regimes the article revisits this long standing issue by analysing the interplay between compensation structure and quit behaviour in the distinct yet underexplored institutional setting of worker managed firms the analysis is based on novel administrative data sources which allow constructing a simple ordinal measure of the workers ability type the article s key findings are that worker managed firms have a more compressed compensation structure than conventional firms and high ability members are more likely than other members to exit

debt and distortionary taxation in a simple perfect foresight model abstract we examine the real effects of a temporary substitution of debt for distortionary income taxation we find that such a policy may reduce consumption increase investment and reduce interest rates these results arise even though we examine the same model used by barro where temporary substitution of debt for lump sum taxes was shown to have no real effects we show that these anti keynesian effects on consumption are as significant as various pro keynesian effects such as finite lives hence the impact of debt is an empirical issue and ricardian neutrality appears to be a reasonable benchmark

constrained efficient equilibria in selection markets with continuous types abstract we prove the existence of the constrained efficient miyazaki 1977 wilson 1977 spence 1978 equilibrium in competitive markets with adverse selection when the distribution of unobservable types is continuous our existence proof applies under extremely general assumptions about individual preferences when we restrict preferences to have the widely used in the selection markets literature quasilinear form we characterize the properties of this equilibrium by developing a simple and computationally efficient numerical method for constructing it applying this method we show in a natural setting how one would compute the equilibrium allocation potentially facilitating empirical work using the mws equilibrium we illustrate this empirical application in the context of policy interventions and show that the welfare implications of a coverage mandate critically hinge on whether the market implements a constrained efficient allocation like the mws equilibrium or a constrained inefficient allocation like in azevedo and gottlieb 2017

persistent deficits and the market value of government debt summary this paper investigates whether postwar canadian public financial policy satisfies a borrowing constraint direct tests of the present value relation suggested by this constraint shed light on the sustainability of current policy we examine monthly data on canadian federal government finances using tests for cointegration the finding is that the joint behaviour of real debt and real surpluses is inconsistent with intertemporal budget balance for the government one interpretation of this finding is that the government is systematically paying real returns to bondholders by issuing further debt alternatively bondholders may expect the government to finance future interest payments from a source other than primary surpluses e g the sale of physical assets much empirical macroeconomics is concerned with the effects of public financial policies numerous studies have examined whether such policies affect interest rates inflation or national income and its components these examinations raise the question of the efficacy of government budget deficits they generally assume that a borrowing constraint holds in the public finances some positive theories of public debt creation also make this assumption examples include barro s 1979 history of us federal deficits and sargent s 1986 rationalizations of recent us budgetary policy lucas and stokey s 1983 discussion of optimal taxation also involves this assumption hansen roberds and sargent 1987 outline the testable implications of present value budget balance and hamilton and flavin 1986 investigate the feasibility of recurring deficits by directly testing the us federal government s borrowing constraint such tests seem natural given both the recent boom is testing more complicated first order difference equations in macroeconomics and the widespread discussion of current deficits this paper tests the present value borrowing constraint using recently constructed data on the market value of outstanding canadian federal government debt we use monthly rather than annual as in hamilton and flavin data and conduct tests of univariate integration and of bivariate cointegration to investigate the joint time series properties of debt and deficits one finding is that real debt and real surpluses are integrated processes evidence of their cointegration is mixed and point estimates of the cointegrating vector suggest that the expected real rate of return on debt is negative moreover the surplus measured to include interest payments as government spending is nonstationary these findings are inconsistent

identifying var models under rational expectations abstract this paper shows that the exclusion restrictions used to identify structural vector autoregressions svars generally yield inconsistent parameter estimates under rational expectations i develop an alternative method of identifying rational expectations models within the svar framework that circumvents the need of imposing stringent identifying restrictions on the dynamic processes for technologies preferences and other mechanisms e g adjustment costs these strong restrictions may explain why rational expectations models are frequently rejected by the data two empirical examples demonstrate the feasibility and potential advantages of this alternative modeling strategy

the optimal linear taxation of employment and self employment incomes abstract this paper models optimal linear taxation when occupational choice and labour supply are endogenous workers choose between paid employment self employment and unemployment self employment incomes are risky and employees may be involuntarily laid off calibrating the model to the uk economy the optimal tax solution involves relatively high taxation with substantial redistribution and a higher nominal but not effective marginal tax rate imposed on the self employed than on employees the implications of making unemployment benefits as well as tax rates endogenous are also analysed and robustness checks are performed

self selection and pareto efficient taxation abstract this paper analyses the set of pareto efficient tax structures the formulation of the problem as one of self selection not only shows more clearly the similarity between this problem and a number of other problems such as the optimal pricing of a monopolist which have recently been the subject of extensive research but also allows the derivation of a number of new results we establish i under fairly weak conditions randomization of tax structures is desirable ii if different individuals are not perfect substitutes for one another in production then the general equilibrium effects until now largely ignored in the literature of changes in the tax structure may be dominant in determining the optimal tax structure in particular if the relative wage of high ability and low ability individuals depends on the relative supplies of labor the optimal tax structure entails a negative marginal tax rate on the high ability individuals and a positive marginal tax rate on the low ability individuals the marnitude of which depends on the elasticity of substitution iii if individuals differ in their preferences pareto efficient taxation may entail negative marginal tax rates for high incomes while iv if wage income is stochastic the marginal tax rate at the upper end may be 100 our analysis thus makes clear that the main qualitative properties of the optimal tax structure to which earlier studies called attention are not robust to these attempts to make the theory more realistic