how do market reforms affect china s responsiveness to environmental policy a large percentage of total investment in china is allocated by the central government at below market interest rates in pursuit of non economic objectives this has resulted in low rates of return and a high number of non performing loans threatening the future health of the chinese economy as a result reform of capital markets is a high priority of the chinese government at the same time the country is implementing various environmental policies to deal with serious pollution issues in this paper we ask how reforms of the capital market will affect the functioning of a carbon tax this allows us to assess how china s willingness to join global efforts to reduce carbon emissions is influenced by china s current efforts to reduce investment subsidies we compare the costs of a carbon tax in a reformed economy with the costs of a carbon tax in the current subsidized economy we find that in the subsidized economy the tax interaction effect dampens the effect of a carbon tax resulting in smaller reductions in emissions than what would result in a reformed economy importantly we also find that the effect on economic welfare from a carbon tax is lower in the subsidized economy in fact for lower levels of reductions the carbon tax is actually welfare improving these results have important implications for an economy undergoing economic transition the carbon tax rate required to achieve a certain level of emission reductions will be higher in an economy with capital subsidies however the welfare implications of the tax indicate that the current system with capital subsidies is highly distorting implying that there is a high efficiency cost for the non economic objectives the government is pursuing by maintaining this system of subsidies

are environmental taxes a free lunch issues in modelling the macroeconomic effects of carbon taxes applied analysis of output and employment effects from revenue neutral environmental taxation depends critically on how the supply side of the economy is modelled despite the long history of theoretical and computable general equilibrium supply side models the empirical basis of much of this work has been quite weak until recently however most econometric attempts to capture factor substitution effects have not been based on theoretically consistent structures this paper examines the methodological issues that underlie these problems and compares the results of imposing environmental taxes in two different econometric modelling structures the implications of theories of endogenous technical progress on the simulation properties of such models are discussed and a simple empirically based model that embodies some of these features is presented

unequal vulnerability to climate change and the transmission of adverse effects through international trade in this paper we consider the unequal distribution of climate change damages in the world and we examine how the underlying costs can spread from a vulnerable to a non vulnerable country through international trade to focus on such indirect effects we treat this topic in a north south trade overlapping generations model in which the south is vulnerable to the damages entailed by global pollution while the north is not we show that the impact of climate change in the south can be a source of welfare loss for northern consumers in both the short and the long run in the long run an increase in the south s vulnerability can reduce the welfare in the north economy even in the case in which it improves its terms of trade in the short run the south s vulnerability can also represent a source of intergenerational inequity in the north therefore we emphasize the strong economic incentives for non vulnerable and a fortiori less vulnerable economies to reduce the climate change damages on more vulnerable countries

attitudes toward risk and the risk return paradox prospect theory explanations this study attempted to explain bowman s risk return paradox in terms of recent research in behavioral decision theory and prospect theory the research emphasized the role of reference or target

prospect theory and the risk return association another look abstract in a seminal study fiegenbaum 1990 attempted to set down parameters of relationship between risk and return for firms and related it to two piece von neumann morgenstern utility function first explored empirically by fishburn and kochenberger 1979 i re examine the estimated relationship specifically i perform a meta analysis of the above and below median returns to show that the relationship between risk and return is weaker above median than below median i also show that the relationship between below median returns and above median returns is very small exhibiting compartmentalization of decision making by the firms similar to individual decision makers

commuting transport tax reform and the labour market employer paid parking and the relative efficiency of revenue recycling instruments in this paper the welfare effects of a budget neutral increase in taxes on car commuters are studied in a model that takes into account the presence of employer paid parking at the workplace it is found that the presence of employer paid parking substantially increases the welfare effect of such a tax reform independent of the use of the revenues congestion taxes not only correct congestion externalities they also reduce the inefficiency caused by employer paid parking moreover different congestion effects of alternative recycling instruments and the presence of employer paid parking jointly imply that recycling the tax revenues via higher public transport subsidies may yield much more favourable welfare effects than previously believed it can easily outperform recycling the tax revenues via lower labour taxes finally cashing out parking costs to public transport users is found to generate substantial positive welfare effects numerical analysis confirms the theory

discount rate changes stock market returns volatility and trading volume evidence from intraday data and implications for market efficiency we examine the eaect of discount rate changes on stock market returns volatility and trading volume using intraday data equity returns generally respond negatively and significantly to the unexpected announcements however the eaect of expected changes on equity returns is insignificant furthermore our results indicate that equity prices respond to announcements within the trading period hour after the information release an indication of a return reversal is too small to cover the full transaction costs unexpected discount rate changes also contribute to higher market volatility although the volatility is short lived similarly unexpected changes in discount rates induce larger trading volume while expected changes do not abnormal trading volume occurs only in period t our results also support the notion that unexpected changes in the discount rates impact market returns irrespective of the federal reserve operating procedures 1999 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

environmental tax policy and intergenerational distribution abstract we study the effects of environmental taxation within the context of an overlapping generations model the quality of the environment is modelled as a durable consumption good introduction of the environmental tax harms old existing generations and benefits young existing generations as well as all future generations increasing the tax in a pareto improving manner is easier the higher the pre existing tax the reverse holds if tax policy is decided by majority rule a suitably designed bond policy can be used to redistribute the efficiency gains due to the internalisation of environmental externalities across the generations

equity effects of alternative assignments of global environmental rights abstract through a thought experiment in which members of different generations trade with each other in a virtual market we examine the effects of alternative assignments of global environmental rights on prices interest rates and the global distribution of income the model is semi calibrated to current and projected levels of the output of produced goods and to present and future quantities of global environmental goods income classes in each country are disaggregated to the quintile level multiple equilibria are possible for some rights assignments with implications for intergenerational equity the model projects bounds on the degree of future economic inequality depending on how the environmental rights are assigned a policy that assigns the environmental rights in such a way as to leave the present day distribution of income unchanged while moving in the direction of equal per capita endowments of environmental rights can result in future inequality comparable to today s average within country inequality

carbon taxation when climate affects productivity optimal carbon taxation is evaluated in a model where climate change affects productivity with a numerical us economy model with preexisting taxes the optimal carbon tax is found to exceed marginal social damage by 53 percent and marginal private damage the sum of households marginal willingness to pay by 73 percent the welfare gain from optimal carbon taxation is estimated at 3 58 billion per year when marginal damages are 40 ton employment also increases setting the carbon tax at the pigouvian rate raises welfare by only 3 17 billion the contrasting results in the tax interaction literature are due to the use of marginal private damage when applied to amenity externalities

the political economy of environmental policy with overlapping generations a two sector overlapping generations model illuminates the intergenerational effects of a tax that protects an environmental stock a traded asset capitalizes the economic returns to future tax induced environmental improvements benefiting the current asset owners the old generation absent a transfer the tax harms the young generation by decreasing their real wage future generations benefit from the tax induced improvement in environmental stock the principal intergenerational conflict arising from the tax is between generations alive at the time society imposes the policy not between generations alive at different times a pareto improving tax can be implemented under various political economy settings

ethics and the economist what climate change demands of us abstract climate change is changing not only our physical world but also our intellectual social and moral worlds we are realizing that our situation is profoundly unsafe interdependent and uncertain what then does climate change demand of economists as human beings and as professionals a discipline of economics based on enlightenment notions of mechanism and disembodied rationality is not suited to present problems this essay suggests three major requirements first that we take action second that we work together and third that we focus on avoiding the worst rather than obtaining the optimal the essay concludes with suggestions of specific steps that economists should take as researchers teachers and in our other roles

welfare and optimum dynamic taxation of consumption and income abstract this paper estimates that the us could attain large welfare gains by implementing an optimal ramsey tax policy that taxes consumption and income it is also found that the welfare implications associated with taxing consumption are quantitatively more important than those associated with dynamically taxing income indeed replacing income taxes with a constant consumption tax leads to a welfare gain that is only slightly lower than that attained by a dynamic policy that taxes consumption and income in computing these welfare gains careful attention is given to the dynamic path of tax rates and the transitional dynamics associated with how the economy responds to a new tax policy

choosing the right instrument the role of public revenues for environmental policy this paper analyses the optimal choice of second best optimal environmental policies using a partial equilibrium model the paper first reconfirms the well known result that the existence of a double dividend in its weak definition favours environmental policy instruments which maximise tax revenues for a given improvement in environmental quality additional revenues can be used to reduce the distortion of existing taxes such as taxes on labour and capital income without uncertainty environmental taxes and auctioned permits are equally appropriate in the presence of uncertainty however the optimal choice of taxes or tradable permits depends on the relative magnitudes of the marginal environmental damage and the marginal benefit from consuming a polluting good in the second part the paper therefore analyses how the revenue capacity affects the optimal choice of environmental policy instruments in the presence of uncertainty the paper shows that the first best choice rule between price and quantity regulation weitzman 1974 remains valid in a second best world with distortionary taxation

is aging harmful to the environment how does aging affect the environment we analyze this question using anoverlapping generations model featuring uncertain lifetimes andenvironmental externalities we show that whether aging is harmful to theenvironment depends on the curvature of utility function which ismeasured by the degree of relative risk aversion we also explore theimplication of the results for environmental policy in an aging society

the macroeconomic effects of distortionary taxation abstract prescott 1986 estimates that technology shocks account for 75 of the fluctuations in the postwar u s economy this paper reestimates the contribution of technological change for a standard business cycle model that includes a public sector and fiscal disturbances i find that a significant fraction of the variance of aggregate consumption investment output capital stock and hours of work can be explained by disturbances in labor and capital tax rates and government consumption i also use the model to quantify the welfare costs of capital and labor taxation for both the time series and welfare calculations maximum likelihood estimates of taste technology and policy parameters are used

sustainable development of forest resources in industrialized countries abstract there is no general consensus about what sustainable development means we seek to clarify the meaning and utility of the concept by focusing on forest resources in countries possessing higher levels of per capita incomes the meaning of sustainable development becomes complex when one asks what social goals are being pursued what types of stability are permitted whether amenities and commodities should receive equal consideration and to what landbase the concept should be applied a simulation linear programming model of california s private forest resource is used to demonstrate that strict decade to decade even flow stability of production may result in lower aggregate levels of output over a prolonged planning period with ending levels of the stock resource that are scarcely greater than when output is permitted to vary over the planning period the model was also used to show that greater levels of output and ending stocks are possible when the land base for sustainability assessment is not a restrictively small geographical area or a single class of ownership in the case of national forests and other public lands the application of the sustainable development concept is significantly more complex because of the importance of amenity values and because of the inherent conflict between development and the preservation of ecosystems in a pristine state

environmental levies and distortionary taxation pigou taxation and pollution i note an important distinction between the optimal price of environmental quality in a second best world and the optimal level of environmental quality using an analytical general equilibrium model i show that for reasonable parameter values an increase in tax distortions arising from an increase in required tax revenues leads to a fall in the optimal pigouvian tax rate even while environmental quality improves in general knowledge of the direction of changes in optimal environmental tax rates due to changes in the economy is not sufficient for understanding the impact on environmental quality 2003 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

environmental responsibility versus taxation taxation as a tool of environmental economic policy traditionally aims at generating a discouraging effect upon both the consumer and producer environmental degradation should finally stabilize itself the mechanism of taxation replies to a behavioural stimulus taxes versus subsidies recent economic analyses have not aimed at focusing their studies concerning the very responsibility of economic actors on anything else other than the mechanism of taxation taxes thus imply responsible behaviour we shall attempt to highlight that responsibility could be defined independently from taxation and that the affirmation of responsibility is inversed to taxation technically speaking we shall demonstrate that the taxation extolled by the legislator induces a certain crowding out effect as regards to responsibility in the first part of this article we shall therefore insist that economic policies in terms of taxation drive away the sentiment of individual responsibility we shall reason in terms of production and consumption to demonstrate this fact finally we shall insist that a high degree of responsibility could substitute taxation

energy taxes in the netherlands what are the dividends in this paper the environmental and economic effects of the introduction of a unilateral energy tax in the netherlands are analysed using an applied general equilibrium age model the effects of a small user energy tax and a general energy tax are compared while taking into account different tax recycling mechanisms the model contains a great level of detail with respect to emissions and environmental indicators greenhouse effect acidification eutrophication and waste which is helpful for assessing environmental quality the results show that the introduction of a small environmental tax reform not only improves the environment but also raises non environmental welfare which is due to an improvement of the efficiency of the tax structure

resolving intergenerational conflict over the environment under the pareto criterion abstract climate change policies create intergenerational winners and losers because the costs come first and the benefits later in such cases kaldor hicks cost benefit analysis seeks potential pareto improvements by showing the hypothetical potential for the winners to compensate the losers via lump sum transfers in their absence once a costly climate policy is actually implemented it unleashes distortions and general equilibrium effects rendering unclear whether kaldor hicks potential improvements lead to actual improvements we study policies which once implemented would pass the pareto test that no generation subsequent to policy action be made worse off than before we develop a stylized climate economy model in which production by the current generation generates pollution which damages production for future generations over time the business as usual bau economy gets increasingly polluted consumption falls and generational welfare levels decline a government introduces costly pollution abatement and finances it via distorting taxes and the sale of debt green bonds pollution levels start to decline generating downstream welfare gains which may be taxed without hurting anyone in a pareto sense to help finance the policy and pay off the debt along the transition every generation faces less pollution consumes more and is happier than if life had continued in the bau world

environmental abatement and intergenerational distribution this paper employs an overlapping generations model to explore the impact of public abatement on private investment and the intergenerational distribution of welfare whereas public abatement benefits old generations in terms of non environmental welfare future generations gain most in terms of environmental welfare the overall benefits tend to be smallest for generations born at the time of the unanticipated policy shock public debt policy however can be employed to ensure that welfare gains are distributed more equally across the various generations such a policy implies that natural capital crowds out man made capital

on environmental taxation under uncertain environmental damage this paper addresses optimal taxation when therelationship between the consumption of a dirty good and the resulting environmentaldamage is uncertain and treated as a randomvariable by policy makers the main purpose isto analyze how increased uncertainty measuredas a mean preserving increase in the spread ofthis random variable affects the optimalcommodity tax on the dirty consumption good incase the only task of government is to correctthe environmental externality and if thepreferences are characterized by nondecreasingabsolute risk aversion we find that thecommodity tax on the dirty consumption goodincreases in response to additionaluncertainty if on the other hand thegovernment provides a public good and uses alump sum tax in addition to the commodity tax it is possible that the commodity tax decreasesas a response to additional uncertainty evenif the preferences are characterized bynondecreasing absolute risk aversion a similarresult emerges although for different reasons if the lump sum tax is replaced by a laborincome tax

labor supply and the double dividend abstract a series of recent articles have argued that environmental taxes and cap and trade permit systems generate large distortions in the labor market the claim is made that the higher prices for dirty goods induced by these incentive based systems generate a tax interaction effect leading to reductions in labor supply that are generally on net welfare reducing for this reason it is argued a double dividend seldom exists however price level increases both by lowering family income and by reducing cross spousal wage substitution effects will tend to have offsetting positive impacts on labor supply these effects are large enough to convert negative labor supply responses to rising prices into positive ones the empirical literature also supports a positive relationship between price level increases and labor supply these observations cast doubt on a central critical assumption underlying the critique of the double dividend in the tax interaction effect literature

the paretian liberal paradox and ecological economics abstract two of the most basic considerations in collective choice are the pareto principle and some minimal protection of individual rights in his impossibility theorem sen 1970 shows that there is a potential inconsistency between preference sovereignty as expressed by the pareto condition and the protection of minimal rights a liberal or liberty condition the paretian liberal paradox plp and the extensive debate surrounding it prompts serious reconsideration of the traditional welfare economics approach the critique of welfarism made by the plp is of central importance for environmental issues given pervasive externalities missing markets uncertainty and potential irreversibilities making collective choice decisions on these issues may require using explicit non utility information and restricting individual preference sovereignty we explore the implications of the plp for long term environmental policy and the transdisciplinary field of ecological economics as a simple pedagogical device relying on sparse principles the plp stimulates an increased awareness of the potential conflict between preferences and rights recognition of the plp focuses attention on what counts as admissible information in collective choice rules for example consideration of the plp illuminates differences in the informational requirements of alternative sustainability concepts

a note on optimal taxation in the presence of externalities abstract i consider the problem of optimal taxation with externalities in a general setup encompassing most of optimal taxation models found in the literature it is demonstrated that when direct taxation of externalities is possible optimal taxes can be expressed as the sum of the optimal pigouvian taxes and the optimal taxes in a related problem without externalities regardless of what other tax instruments are available this result generalizes the so called principle of targeting

revenue raising vs other approaches to environmental protection the critical significance of pre existing tax distortions using analytical and numerical general equilibrium models we show that preexisting factor taxes produce a tax interaction effect that increases the costs of pollution taxes and quotas under policies that raise revenue and recycle it through cuts in marginal factor tax rates this effect is partially offset by a revenue recycling effect grandfathered pollution quotas such as those used under the 1990 clean air act amendments to regulate electric utilities so2 emissions do not benefit from this offset preexisting taxes raise this regulation s cost by over 70 more than half of this additional cost could be avoided by auctioning quotas and exploiting the revenue recycling effect

pollution as a source of endogenous fluctuations and periodic welfare inequality in olg economies this article examines the conditions under which endogenous fluctuations and periodic welfare inequality can emerge in olg economies having an environmental dimension

green taxation and individual responsibility the current article aims at studying the effects of taxation on environmental quality in an economy where its agents are responsible individual responsibility towards nature is modelized by the voluntary effort to which the households have agreed insofar as the improvement of environmental quality is concerned it is an original way to show that the individuals may feel committed towards the environment and assume obligations towards it as well as towards environmental public policy given that in our model such effort is taken from one s allocated time for leisure its opportunity cost is that of the sacrificed time for leisure and is therefore equal to the individual s wage we shall highlight that state intervention through the introduction of a green tax always crowds out individual responsibility however the intensity of this crowding out depends on the performance of the state moreover state intervention could depending on the amount of crowding out reduce the overall quality of the environment in a general equilibrium setting we show that the crowding out effect is not systematic this is because there will then be an interaction between effort or work time and the cost of that effort linked to the individual s wage and therefore to production and finally to work effort in this article we shall discuss the conditions under which public policy crowds out individual responsibility within this context

comment on m hoel emission taxes versus other environmental policies the choice of the appropriate instrument in environmental policy is not only a question of theoretical importance it is also of considerable political relevance while environmental taxes are sometimes used to control pollution quotas and direct controls dominate in practice if this observed bias is only due to the nature of policymaking and not supported by economic reasoning politicians are not well advised to use quotas and direct controls instead of environmental taxes hoel discusses popular arguments that are often used by politicians in favour of direct controls and concludes that the results are typically not clear cut in this comment i would like to focus on the employment effects of revenue raising and nonrevenue raising instruments politicians as well as special interest groups often claim that emission taxes increase the cost of production thereby harming employment clearly in the face of high rates of unemployment in many industrialized countries potentially negative employment effects of environmental regulation raise political resistance to green policy the ongoing debate has put

optimal tax rules and public sector efficiency with an externality in an overlapping generations model abstract this paper examines optimal tax rules and public sector efficiency integrating them in a second best world with pollution by using an overlapping generations model the second best world is characterized by the comparative statics of green preferences the main results obtained are as follows first the marginal cost of public funds may be reduced by the externalities regardless of the choice of taxes second optimal environmental and non environmental tax rules are additively and directly affected by the dynamic efficiency of capital accumulation per unit labour decal and indirectly by it through the efficiency of the public sector environmental taxes going beyond pigovian ones may be welfare improving if the decal is improved by the environmental tax even optimal non environmental tax rules should additively and directly counter the dynamics of pollution to consider the income effects of the optimal tax system for the future third the additivity property or the principle of targeting does not hold even in the absence of incentive compatibility constraints the essential reasons for this are clarified as follows distortions that should be countered by taxes that is the income effects of the optimal tax system and the decal in this model break the equality between optimal environmental taxes and the externalities measured by governments finally growing environmental concerns may in fact increase pollution the inverse relationship between environmental and labour income taxes may not hold

how robust is the uniform emissions pricing rule to social equity concerns abstract this paper examines pollution tax differentiation across industries in light of social equity concerns using theoretical and numerical general equilibrium analyses in an optimal tax framework we characterize the drivers for non uniform optimal taxes stemming from the interaction of household heterogeneity with social preferences quantitatively assessing the case of price based co2 emissions control in the u s economy we find that uniform emissions pricing is approximately optimal when social concerns are defined over inequity induced by the environmental tax the deviation from uniform emissions pricing however becomes non negligible when pollution tax rebates deviate much from optimal transfer schemes or when social concerns are defined over both policy induced impacts and inequity unrelated to environmental policy our results are robust to a number of model extensions including the stringency of the environmental target downstream vs upstream taxation pre existing distortionary taxes and parametric uncertainty in firms and households equilibrium tax responses

optimal gasoline tax in developing oil producing countries the case of mexico this paper uses the methodology of parry and small 2005 to estimate the optimal gasoline tax for a less developed oil producing country the relevance of the estimation relies on the differences between less developed countries ldcs and industrial countries we argue that lawless roads general subsidies on gasoline poor mass transportation systems older vehicle fleets and unregulated city growth make the tax rates in ldcs differ substantially from the rates in the developed world we find that the optimal gasoline tax is 1 90 per gallon at 2011 prices and show that the estimate differences are in line with the factors hypothesized in contrast to the existing literature on industrial countries we show that the relative gasoline tax incidence may be progressive in mexico and more generally in ldcs

what exactly is corporate responsibility towards nature ecological responsibility or management of nature abstract the paper analyses the motives and consequences of including environmental protection in good managerial practices driven by a concern of responsible corporate behaviour corporate social responsibility is increasingly discussed in economics and management studies today this idea is fairly recent and stems from a philosophical school of thought attributed to hans jonas which says that nature must be preserved for anthropocentric as well as biocentric reasons in this respect the consequences that these two visions imply for men and companies will be developed corporate leaders often make use of this concept which finds its origins in philosophy in order to analyse the normative behaviour of their companies in this respect we shall favour a jonasian interpretation hans jonas will help us question the fundamental meaning of responsibility we will attempt to investigate this meaning using csr more specifically this article tries to answer the question what exactly is corporate responsibility is it a mere concept currently in fashion or is it a new structural approach which could indeed take responsibility into account in so far as long term environmental preservation is concerned in order to answer this question we shall first propose a reading of stakeholders this approach poses several problems when dealing with corporate responsibility regarding the preservation of nature secondly we shall present a more detailed analysis of such corporate social responsibility and the problems it poses the debate regarding action with the interest of its outcome and action in the interest of the action itself shall be the focal point of our discussion this article will adopt a narrative and critical methodology so as to achieve this goal we propose to critically analyse theoretical paradigms and test them through case studies

distortionary taxation and labor supply this paper examines empirically the effects of distortionary taxation on labor supply using a general equilibrium framework the long term relations predicted by the model are derived and tested using data from canada united states germany and japan in all these countries labor tax changes are found to be persistent and to have played an important role in the observed downward trend in hours worked

the effects of ageing and an environmental trust fund in an overlapping generations model on carbon emission reductions most currently employed integrated assessment models for climate change are of a dynastic nature they employ the ramsey rule linking the interest rate economic growth and the rate of pure time preference this paper argues that although a dynastic framework might be convenient for economic analysis it is restrictive and can be misleading overlapping generations models which do not employ the ramsey rule are more flexible and may give results different from those derived from dynastic models with the integrated assessment model alice 2 0 it is shown how various assumptions on demographic change and public institutions can affect the interest rate thereby influencing the efficient greenhouse gas emission reductions it is concluded that dynastic integrated assessment models are in many respects inappropriate for providing policy makers with quantitative figures about the costs of carbon dioxide emissions and their desirable reduction levels 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

energy taxation and the double dividend effect in taiwan s energy conservation policy an empirical study using a computable general equilibrium model abstract faced with pressure from greenhouse gas reductions and energy price hikes the taiwan government is in the process of developing an energy tax regime to reflect environmental external costs and effectively curb energy consumption as well as mitigate co2 emissions through an adequate pricing system this study utilizes a cge model to simulate and analyze the economic impacts of the draft energy tax bill and its complementary fiscal measures under the assumption of tax revenue neutrality the use of energy tax revenue generated for the purpose of reducing income tax is the best choice with double dividend effects since it will effectively stimulate domestic consumption and investment and consequently mitigate the negative impacts of the distortionary tax regime the double dividend effect is less significant however when the supplementary measures being used are for government expenditure nevertheless all supplementary measures have effectively reduced energy consumption which means they have delivered at least the first dividend in the sense of co2 emissions control it has been verified in this study that having adequate public finance policy measures is the key to realizing the double dividend effect

biofuel subsidies versus the gas tax the carrot or the stick abstract this paper provides an analytical framework to examine the relative efficiencies of a revenue neutral biofuel subsidy and a gas tax in the presence of pre existing distortions and growing substitutability between fuels both policies are set to achieve a targeted reduction in gasoline use at the state level the model is then calibrated for a small open economy such as illinois which is one of the largest producers of biofuels such as ethanol in the u s the main result of the paper shows that raising the biofuel subsidy use reduces overall welfare by more than a higher gas tax both aimed to achieve a targeted reduction in pure gasoline the relative efficiency of the higher gas tax is primarily due to it exacerbating the pre existing distortion in the biofuel market by less than the subsidy moreover for current parameter estimates welfare improving policy combinations for achieving a targeted amount of energy security are higher gas taxes combined with lower biofuel subsidies and a lower tax on income however the preference for a gasoline labor tax swap shrinks as the elasticity of substitution between the two fuels rises

regulator selection and endogenous systematic risk a major issue in the financial literature of regulated industries is whether the cost of capital is endogenous to the regulatory process cross spectral estimates of the market model are used to determine if the method of regulator selection contributes to either frequency dependence or phase shift lead lag in electric utility systematic risk it is determined here that electric utilities regulated by elected commissions experience frequency dependence in systematic risk this finding lends support to the assertion that the cost of capital is endogenous to the regulatory process

optimal control of externalities in the presence of income taxation optimal control of externalities a substantial literature examines second best environmental policy focusing particularly on how the pigouvian directive that marginal taxes should equal marginal external harms needs to be modified in light of the preexisting distortion due to labor income taxation additional literature is motivated by the possibility that distributive concerns should amend the internalization prescription it is demonstrated however that simple first best rules unmodified for labor supply distortion or distribution are correct in a natural basic formulation of the problem specifically setting all commodity taxes equal to marginal harms and subsidies equal to marginal benefits can generate a pareto improvement likewise a marginal reform in the direction of the first best can yield a pareto improvement for other reforms a simple efficiency test characterizing when a pareto improvement is possible is offered qualifications and explanations for the substantial departure from results in previous work are also elaborated

the incremental cost principle and the conservation of globally important habitats a critical examination abstract this paper examines the application of the incremental cost ic principle for the conservation of globally important habitats it first describes the characteristics of the ic and how it became an important financial modality in multilateral conservation efforts the application of the ic is then examined taking into account characteristics of successful collaboration efforts for the global environment the paper finds that as currently applied the ic fails to be a robust financial mechanism for protection of globally important habitats it also heavily skews the bulk of conservation costs from developed to developing countries the paper concludes with a description of suggested changes to make the ic an effective tool in global conservation efforts

optimal environmental taxation in the presence of other taxes general equilibrium analyses this paper examines the optimal setting of environmental taxes in economies where other distortionary taxes are present we employ analytical and numerical models to explore the degree to which in a second best economy optimal environmental tax rates differ from the rates implied by the pigovian principle according to which the optimal tax rate equals the marginal environmental damages both models indicate contrary to what several analysts have suggested that the optimal tax rate on emissions of a given pollutant is generally less than the rate supported by the pigovian principle moreover the optimal rate is lower the larger are the distortions posed by ordinary taxes numerical results indicate that previous studies may have seriously overstated the size of the optimal carbon tax by disregarding pre existing taxes this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

an overlapping generations model of climate economy interactions a numerically calibrated overlapping generations model of climate change and the world economy is examined in this paper in the absence of intergenerational transfers efficient rates of greenhouse gas emissions abatement rise from 16 in the present to 25 in the long run while mean global temperature increases by 7 40c relative to the preindustrial norm a utilitarian optimum which attaches equal weight to each generation s life cycle utility yields abatement rates that rise from 48 to 89 with a long run temperature increase of 3 40c a second best utilitarian path in which intergenerational transfers are by assumption institutionally infeasible also supports stringent abatement measures i introduction the infinitely lived agent framework pioneered by frank ramsey 1928 has emerged as a central structure in the economics of climate change as characterized by ipcc 1996 working group iii climate change occurs when anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases principally carbon dioxide but also chlorofluorocarbons methane nitrous oxide and water vapor contribute to long term increases in mean global temperature potentially disrupting ecological systems and climate dependent production activities the best known study on the economics of this subject is nordhaus 1994 dynamic model of climate and the economy dice which incorporates assumptions regarding the costs and benefits of greenhouse gas emissions in a standard one sector growth model in nordhaus analysis a 50 reduction in greenhouse gas emissions would reduce gross world output by 0 93 a doubling of greenhouse gas concentrations relative to the preindustrial norm which is expected to occur by the middle of the twenty first century would reduce output by

optimal environmental taxes under relative consumption effects abstract this paper explores the interactions between carbon dioxide emissions taxes and a pre existing income tax in a numerically calibrated model of climate change and the world economy based on evidence from the recent empirical literature the model allows for the presence of relative consumption effects in the specification of preferences in the absence of relative consumption effects optimal emissions taxes would rise from us 44 to us 229 per tonne of carbon in year 2000 dollars over the course of the next century these tax rates which arise when emissions tax revenues are used to reduce taxes on personal income are slightly above the present value marginal benefits of emissions control given realistic assumptions concerning the empirical magnitude of relative consumption effects the optimal emissions tax rises from us 63 per tonne in 2005 and us 384 per tonne in 2105 accounting for relative consumption effects reduces the perceived social benefits of consumption thus increasing social willingness to pay for environmental quality while reducing both the costs of tax interaction effects and the benefits of efficient revenue recycling taken together these factors support the implementation of comparatively high environmental taxes in the face of relative consumption effects

irreversibility and uncertainty cause an intergenerational equity efficiency trade off abstract two important policy goals in intergenerational problems are pareto efficiency and sustainability i e intergenerational equity we demonstrate that the pursuit of these goals is subject to an intergenerational equity efficiency trade off our analysis highlights two salient characteristics of intergenerational problems and policy i temporal irreversibility i e the inability to revise one s past actions and ii uncertainty of future consequences of present actions in human environment systems we employ a two non overlapping generations model that combines an intragenerational production decision on the use of circulating capital and a non renewable resource with a negative intergenerational externality as an unforeseen contingency if initially unknown problems become apparent and policy is enacted after irreversible actions were taken policy making faces a fundamental trade off between ex post pareto efficiency and sustainability that is one can achieve either one of these two goals but not both

the salomon brothers electric utility model another challenge to market efficiency in each year from 1977 to 1981 portfolios of stocks identified as undervalued by salomon brothers inc s electric utility model outperformed portfolios identified as overvalued furthermore monthly returns on the undervalued portfolios ranked in the top three deciles in 34 of 58 months whereas the most overvalued portfolios ranked in the lowest three deciles in 31 of the 58 months the performance of the portfolios cannot be explained in terms of traditional risk measures the two most undervalued portfolios fall in the middle of the sample in terms of beta and offer excess returns after adjustment for systematic risk the most overvalued portfolio has the highest beta and negative risk adjusted returns tests of the portfolios using arbitrage pricing theory risk factors yield similar results could risk factors other than the market wide variables captured by the capital asset pricing model and arbitrage pricing theory affect the model s results undervaluation by the salomon model does appear to be associated with small firm size and large investment in uncompleted nuclear plant even when these variables are taken into account however significant association between undervaluation and high return remains finally inclusion of transaction costs diminishes the returns on the most undervalued portfolios but does not destroy their return advantage the evidence indicates that the model distinguishes between over and undervalued stocks and suggests that investors may make profitable use of this information

environmental economics and ecological economics where they can converge abstract environmental economics and ecological economics share the common objective of understanding the human economy environment interaction in order to redirect the economies towards sustainability in pursuing this objective these two perspectives utilise different types of analytical framework and are opposed to each other on many of the fundamental theoretical and methodological issues while the environmental economics has progressed within a narrowly but sharply focused neoclassical analytical approach the ecological economics has expanded by adopting a diversified approach which led to widen the gap between the two this article makes an attempt to highlight the divergence between these two perspectives on different issues and identifies certain research avenues that would potentially bring convergence between these two perspectives

sustainability policy and environmental policy a theoretical representative agent economy with a depletable resource stock polluting emissions and productive capital is used to contrast environmental policy which internalises externalised environmental values with sustainability policy which achieves some form of intergenerational equity the obvious environmental policy comprises an emissions tax and a resource stock subsidy each equal to the respective external cost or benefit sustainability policy comprises an incentive affecting the choice between consumption and investment and can be a consumption tax capital subsidy or investment subsidy or a combination thereof environmental policy can reduce the strength of the sustainability policy needed more specialised results are derived in a small open economy with no environmental effects on utility

capital taxation and accumulation in a life cycle growth model almost all of the serious economic work on savings decisions within the past decade has relied on some variant of the life cycle hypothesis in which savings arise out of individual choices of an optimum lifetime consumption path this paper reexamines the incidence and welfare consequences of capital income taxes within a realistic life cycle model the results suggest that the elimination of capital income taxation would have very substantial economic effects for example a complete shift to consumption taxation might raise steady state output by as much as 18 percent and consumption by 16 percent the long run welfare gain from such a shift would for plausible parameter values exceed 150 billion annually stated somewhat differently shifting to consumption taxation would raise the lifetime utility of the representative consumer by the equivalent of about six years income in the new steady state these estimates dwarf estimates of the static welfare cost of taxation and significantly exceed even extreme previous estimates of the dynamic loss this study departs from earlier analyses of the effects of taxes on capital income in several respects probably the most important difference between this treatment and most preceding ones lies in the assumptions about the interest elasticity of saving it is shown below that the common two period formulation of saving decisions yields quite misleading results a more realistic model of life cycle savings demonstrates that for a wide variety of plausible parameter values savings are very interest elastic this implies that shifting away from capital income taxation would significantly increase capital formation making possible long run increases in consumption many studies of the welfare effects of capital income taxation have ignored the general equilibrium effects of increased capital formation in an economy with life cycle savings there is no presumption that the undistorted growth path corresponds to any sort of social optimum as peter diamond has shown life cycle savings can lead to a steady state capital intensity either greater or less than the golden rule level more generally it is clear that there is no reason to believe that a life cycle economy will maximize any particular intertemporal social welfare function a fundamental tenet of welfare evaluation is that preexisting distortions must be considered in evaluating the consequences of tax changes the results presented in this paper take explicit account of the nonoptimal character of the no tax steady state this explains in large part why such a sizeable welfare effect of capital taxes is found in an economy far from the golden rule level of capital intensity there are substantial gains in steady state consumption achievable through increased capital formation section i of the paper examines the aggregate savings function in a continuous time life cycle framework the second section clarifies the differences between wage and consumption taxes an aggregate production function is added to complete the model in the third section the effects of changes in capital taxes on both steady state incidence and welfare are considered within a general equilibrium framework the final section of the paper discusses some implications of the results and suggests areas which appear to warrant further study assistant professor of economics massachusetts institute of technology and research analyst national bureau of economic research i am grateful to alan auerbach martin feldstein laurence kotlikoff to the participants in the nber workshop on business taxation and to the harvard public finance seminar for useful discussions james poterba and james buchal performed the numerical calculations

financial risk perception are individuals variance averse or loss averse abstract finance theory tends to see risk as related to variance in expected returns whereas the psychology literature tends to link risk to probability or size of potential losses this paper investigates whether individuals perceptions of risk are linked to variance aversion or loss aversion and finds that a link to loss aversion is supported

environmental quality public debt and economic development this article analyzes the consequences on capital accumulation and environmental quality of environmental policies financed by public debt a public sector of pollution abatement is financed by a tax or by public debt we show that if the initial capital stock is high enough the economy monotonically converges to a long run steady state on the contrary when the initial capital stock is low the economy is relegated to an environmental poverty trap we also explore the implications of public policies on the trap and on the long run stable steady state in particular we find that government should decrease debt and increase pollution abatement to promote capital accumulation and environmental quality at the stable long run steady state finally a welfare analysis shows that there exists a level of public debt that allows a long run steady state to be optimal

second best taxation of emissions and polluting goods abstract this paper studies the problem of the design of an integrated system of second best emission and output taxes in a model where production costs are negatively correlated with their emissions it shows that i the first best pigouvian rule of equating the marginal private benefit of emissions in production to the marginal social damage of emissions must be modified in the second best ii implementation of the modified pigouvian rule requires all firms to face the same marginal emission tax equal to the marginal social damage of emissions plus an adjustment term reflecting optimal tax objectives iii it may not be necessary to directly tax the polluting goods the latter taxes can be subsumed in the emission tax function iv output taxes must be set solely on the basis of optimal tax objectives no pigouvian adjustment is required v if emission taxes are restricted to be proportional and commodity taxes are constrained the modified pigouvian rule will no longer be optimal vi if preferences are weakly separable in emissions and other goods the pigouvian rule remains valid the marginal emission tax is pigouvian and emission and commodity tax instruments can be set separately to address different objectives a proportional emission tax corrects for externalities while commodity taxes are determined solely on the basis of optimal tax considerations

intergenerational transfers and the social discount rate this paper investigates the relationship between intergenerational asset transfers and the choice of the discount rate for use in cost benefit analysis in a model of a competitive overlapping generations economy constrained by a socially managed exhaustible resource provided that there are no distortions in capital markets and that all agents hold perfect foresight cost benefit techniques will result in a pareto efficient resource allocation if the discount rate is set equal to the market rate of interest but since the path of the interest rate depends on the level of intergenerational transfers cost benefit techniques do not ensure a socially desirable distribution of welfare between generations a social optimum will result only if intergenerational transfers are properly chosen and enforced decentralized private altruism may result in intergenerational transfers that both present and future individuals would agree are too small if members of the present generation attach positive weight to the general welfare of future generations not simply their personal descendants in a world where intergenerational transfers are non optimal second best policy making may imply a constrained optimum that is inefficient together these findings suggest that cost benefit analysis is at best a partial criterion to policy formulation that should be used only in conjunction with ethical principles that define the proper distribution of welfare between present and future generations

the present value criterion and environmental taxation the suboptimality of first best decision rules this paper examines the links between environmental taxes and distortionary taxation in a dynamic model of climate change and economic growth under first best conditions labor and capital would remain untaxed and carbon dioxide emissions would be taxed at a rate equal to the present value marginal cost they impose on future society setting the discount rate equal to the marginal productivity of capital under secondbest conditions however this decision rule substantially understates optimal emissions taxes when the resulting revenues are used to provide targeted cuts in distortionary taxes conversely relatively low emissions taxes are economically justified given lump sum revenue recycling

the welfare effects of environmental taxation recent literature has investigated whether the welfare gains from environmental taxation are larger or smaller in a second best setting than in a first best setting this question has mainly been addressed indirectly by asking whether the second best optimal environmental tax is higher or lower than the first best pigouvian rate even this indirect question has itself been approached indirectly comparing the second best optimal environmental tax to a proxy for its first best value marginal social damage msd on closer examination however msd becomes ambiguously defined and variable in a second best setting making it an unreliable proxy for the pigouvian rate given these observations the current analysis reevaluates these welfare questions and finds that when compared directly to its first best value the second best optimal environmental tax generally rises with increased revenue requirements even in cases where the second best environmental tax is lower than its first best value the welfare gains may be greater than in a first best setting these results suggest that the marginal fiscal benefit revenue recycling effect exceeds the marginal fiscal cost tax base effect over a range of environmental tax rates that for benchmark models extends above the first best pigouvian rate these findings reinforce the intuition that environmental policy complements rather than competes with the provision of other public goods

overlapping generations or infinitely lived agents intergenerational altruism and the economics of global warming do we need an overlapping generations model for the economics of global warming to answer this question an infinitely lived agent ila approach and an overlapping generations olg model are contrasted ila and olg can be viewed as polar representations of intergenerational altruism with ila an immortal agent acts through his investment savings decisions as trustee on the behalf of the future generations with olg agents need not behave altruistic they simply save during working years and dissave completely during retirement nevertheless ila and olg must not differ in their implication for greenhouse policy greenhouse gas abatement is a straightforward alternative to physical capital formation and even without altruism each age cohort has an incentive to provide current abatement in order to reduce future damages attributable to climate change indeed under reasonable assumptions and parameter values our simulations reveal such an invariance result provided carbon taxes are the only policy tool and tax revenues are recycled through socially mandated rules projections of economic growth climate change and energy consumption are only insignificantly affected by the choice of approach

a measure of sustainable national income for the netherlands abstract we present calculations on the sustainable national income sni indicator first proposed by hueting which corrects net national income nni for the costs to bring back environmental resource use to a sustainable level using an applied general equilibrium age model specifying 27 production sectors we calculate different variants of sni for the netherlands in 1990 given a set of pre determined sustainability standards the age model is extended with emissions and abatement cost curves based on large data sets for nine environmental themes the model combines the advantages of a top down approach the age model with the information of a bottom up approach the environmental data and data on emissions reductions costs the presented numerical results show that in 1990 dutch sni is about 50 below nni though many uncertainties are still present in the data and the model the enhanced greenhouse effect is the most expensive environmental theme

optimal dynamic carbon taxes in a climate economy model with distortionary fiscal policy how should carbon be taxed as a part of fiscal policy the literature on optimal carbon pricing often abstracts from other taxes however when governments raise revenues with distortionary taxes carbon levies have fiscal impacts while they raise revenues directly they may shrink the bases of other taxes e g by decreasing employment this article theoretically characterizes and then quantifies optimal carbon taxes in a dynamic general equilibrium climate economy model with distortionary fiscal policy first this article establishes a novel theoretical relationship between the optimal taxation of carbon and of capital income this link arises because carbon emissions destroy natural capital they accumulate in the atmosphere and decrease future output consequently this article shows how the standard logic against capital income taxes extends to distortions on environmental capital investments second this article characterizes optimal climate policy in sub optimal fiscal settings where income taxes are constrained to remain at their observed levels third this article presents a detailed calibration that builds on the seminal dice approach but adds features essential for a setting with distortionary taxes such as a differentiation between climate change production impacts e g on agriculture and direct utility impacts e g on biodiversity existence value the central quantitative finding is that optimal carbon tax schedules are 8 24 lower when there are distortionary taxes compared to the setting with lump sum taxes considered in the literature

limits and cycles of environmental policy the olg model analyzes emissions of an accumulative pollutant in a laissez faire economy and an economy regulated through a government controlled license market the government either takes the price on the license market as given or sells the licenses demanded at the cournot price the first type of regulation is called a liberal environmental policy and the second type a monopolistic environmental policy the forward looking temporary and the stationary equilibria as well as the pollution boundaries of the mechanisms are studied if people can choose between laissez faire and regulation or between the liberal and the monopolistic environmental policy regime then in general no steady state exists instead endogenous policy cycles can alternate between laissez faire and regulation or between liberal and monopolistic regulation

ecosystem services from eye opening metaphor to complexity blinder abstract what started as a humble metaphor to help us think about our relation to nature has become integral to how we are addressing the future of humanity and the course of biological evolution the metaphor of nature as a stock that provides a flow of services is insufficient for the difficulties we are in or the task ahead indeed combined with the mistaken presumption that we can analyze a global problem within a partial equilibrium economic framework and reach a new economy project by project without major institutional change the simplicity of the stock flow framework blinds us to the complexity of the human predicament the ecosystem services approach can be a part of a larger solution but its dominance in our characterization of our situation and the solution is blinding us to the ecological economic and political complexities of the challenges we actually face

efficient environmental taxation under worker firm bargaining we study an economy with free firm entry and unemployment due to firm worker bargaining over each firm s surplus and where firms cause pollution that can be reduced by initial investments an uncompensated increase in the pollution tax reduces pollution but increases unemployment implying a tradeoff between the two when tax revenues are used to subsidize either firms hiring or investments employment may also increase creating a double dividend from the pollution tax a pollution tax increase used to subsidize current employment is always less effective than a hiring subsidy and is totally ineffective when subsidies equal pollution tax revenues for each individual firm we show that the hypothetical pollution tax implementing the first best solution exceeds the pigouvian tax the second best tax exceeds this first best tax when we have a double dividend and is below it when we do not

light duty vehicles and external impacts product and policy performance assessment abstract in order to demonstrate that welfare theory can be put into practice mathematical programming methods are used here which can handle the aggregation problems facing us when information concerning the relative valuation of external factors emissions safety risks non renewable energy use noise etc is highly uncertain product and policy performance measures are presented and then applied to one time period real data on the single perhaps most welfare affecting man made consumer product of the 20th century light duty vehicles ldvs the focus when examining costs imposed on society due to individuals or other economic units purchase and use of ldvs is here the total external cost from the choice of ldv technology the relative weights of the external factors are then determined endogenously by first using for each ldv model the unconstrained set of weights most favorable to itself the flexibility of the relative weights is then constrained according to assumed knowledge about true external relative costs by this procedure it is possible to aggregate the multiple societal impact factors of ldvs and thus to measure the total external impact of individual ldv models relative to current best practice technology

the double dividend second best worlds and real world environmental policy abstract the recent series of papers by bovemberg goulder parry and others argue that the double dividend is unlikely to exist because of second best problems they argue that the imposition of environmental tax in an economy already distorted by income taxes will further distort the economy by reducing incentives to supply labor our paper argues that this is not likely to be the case because of the restrictive assumptions made by these models and because of the role of the environment as a factor of production

prospect theory and the risk return relation some belgian evidence in this study fiegenbaum and thomas s application of prospect theory to empirically derived risk return relations was replicated and extended with belgian accounting data four profitability varia

tax disturbances and real economic activity in the postwar united states abstract this paper investigates the macroeconomic effects of cyclical fluctuations in marginal tax rates it finds that systematically including tax variables in a standard real business cycle model substantially improves the model s ability to reproduce basic facts about postwar u s business cycle fluctuations in particular modeling fluctuations in personal and corporate income tax rates increases the model s predicted relative variability of hours and decreases its predicted correlation between hours and average productivity fluctuations in tax rates produce large substitution effects that alter the leisure labor supply decision

an overlapping generations model with exhaustible resources and stock pollution this paper analyzes the nexus between resource exhaustion and pollution externality using an overlapping generations framework where each generation lives only for a finite period for a finite horizon model with production where there are many agents per generation the pareto inefficiency arises due to lack of intragenerational coordination and is propagated across generations the tax rates necessary for correcting this externality are characterized we also derive a modified hotelling rule according to which the equilibrium resource price rises slower than the rate of interest in order to account for the damages due to the pollution stock generated by the resource used for the case where the externality induced damage acts on production rather than the utility function pareto inefficiency is shown to persist even when there is intragenerational coordination

environmental valuation under sustainable development environmentalism has evolved since the 1960 s from a concern with the preservation of wilderness in the american experience to a concern over pollution of human habitat throughout the industrialized world northern anxiety spread to the loss of tropical rainforests and biodiversity in the south where environmentalism evolved further in an encounter with indigenous interpretations conditions and priorities by the late 1980 s climate change emerged as a central issue in a now global discourse on the relationship between environment and development the principle of sustainable development that current needs are to be met as fully as possible while ensuring that the life opportunities of future generations are undiminished relative to present is now widely accepted this paper illustrates that incorporating environmental values per se in decision making will not bring about sustainability unless each generation is committed to transferring to the next sufficient natural resources and capital assets to make development sustainable 11 refs 3 figs

pollution permits and environmental innovation abstract this paper starts with a warning about the negative impact of plain pollution allowance markets on environmental pollution innovation stand alone spot markets enable the government to expropriate an innovation by offering a competing technology pollution permits that puts an arbitrary downward pressure on the licensing price advance allowances reduce expropriation but still create suboptimal incentives for innovation they have the further drawback that permits are inefficiently used when the innovation occurs options to pollute at a given striking price fare better than allowances because they create private incentives to phase out pollution in the case of innovation we characterize the social optimum and show that it can be implemented by issuing options to pollute inter alia finally the paper compares ex ante and ex post government procurement surprisingly ex post licensing by the innovator to the government may yield a higher licensing fee than an ex ante contract

prospect theory and the risk return association an empirical examination in 85 industries a new sample of 85 industries about 3 300 firms defined in terms of homogenous products provides strong evidence that prospect theory can explain the tradeoff between two of the most researched parameters in evaluating organizations namely risk and return in particular organizations below their target level are found to be risk takers hl while organizations above their target level are risk averters h2 moreover the below target tradeofl was generally steeper than the above target with a median below to above slope ratio of about 3 l h3 risk and return are probably the two single parameters most researched by the various and related disciplines of economics finance and management although each one of them has looked at these two parameters from different aspects and for different purposes they have provided a wide understanding of these two factors in the contest of the theory of the firm the purpose of this study is to look closely at the relationship between these two important parameters in order to understand firm s competitive behavior using the recent development in behavioral decision theory namely prospect theory kahneman and tversky 1979 although march 1988 has criticized the discipline of management for its later adaptation in considering risk elements for evaluating organization performance and decision making processes recent studies e g bettis 1981 rumelt 1974 singh 1986 jemison 1987 and baird and thomas 1986 have paid considerable attention to risk aspects in evaluating the performance of firms in general these studies have concluded that the characteristics of the firms environment strategy and implementation processes have significant and important influence on the firm s risk level and its associated rate of return bowman 1980 has looked closely at 85 u s industries and explored the

is sustainability optimal examining the differences between economists and environmentalists abstract this paper examines a number of possible explanations for the apparent differences between economists and environmentalists concerning economic growth and sustainable development some of the differences are well known and relate to issues such as resource scarcity intergenerational equity and the composition of social capital however our analysis finds that while economic notions of optimal growth and the techniques of benefit cost analysis have important advantages for evaluating complex tradeoffs because they are quantifiable they may have potentially serious drawbacks as well the paper focuses on two potential sources of bias in the use of welfare economics for social choice first there is a conservative reinforcement in benefit cost analysis which is likely to produce biases against policy interventions to protect a degraded environment second and perhaps more importantly the aggregation of individual willingness to pay as a measure of social benefits is shown to be invalid in the case of positional goods where the demand for the good reflects the desire of individuals to raise their own relative standing this error may cause the economic calculus to be biased against non positional goods including non rival goods such as environmental resources these biases further complicate the already strained assumptions in utilitarian based welfare economics that by relying on revealed preference and consumer sovereignty are unable to distinguish between or apply different weights to the satisfaction of different categories of preferences furthermore because the dynamic consequences of even small biases in judging social optimality may give rise to large social costs or advance an unsustainable path there is a danger in relying solely on a potentially biased measure of welfare as a basis for guiding social choice the paper concludes by suggesting that efforts to correct these drawbacks of economic analysis are likely to result in approaches to sustainable development that narrow the apparent differences between economists and environmentalists

optimal differentiation of international environmental taxes in the presence of national labor market distortions we explore the implication of the doubledividend debate for international environmentaltaxes in our scenario small open economies withdifferent labor market distortions follow a commonenvironmental policy and use national environmentaltax revenues to finance labor tax cuts since thedouble dividend hypothesis does not hold a high labortax implies a low environmental tax relative to othercountries the optimal differentiation ofinternational environmental taxes is proven to be afunction of the national labor tax rates and theuncompensated elasticities of labor supply

intergenerational competitive equilibria under technological uncertainty and an exhaustible resource constraint abstract this paper presents a model of competitive intertemporal equilibrium in a finite horizon overlapping generations economy facing technological uncertainty and an exhaustible resource constraint individuals form rational expectations regarding future prices and economic conditions and income is redistributed from one generation to the next through government mandated lump sum transfers under uncertainty the relationship between resource price appreciation and the interest rate is mediated by consumers risk aversion with respect to consumption in alternative states of nature the intuitively appealing proposition that the expected resource price rises at the expected rate of interest holds only as a special case if future generations are taken to be state contingent in the sense that their composition depends on the states of nature prevailing when they are born then equilibria are generally pareto efficient but if future generations are state independent so that the set of individuals born at a given date is independent of the prevailing state of nature then equilibria may be inefficient because markets do not exist where successive generations may equilibrate their marginal rates of substitution across consumption in alternative contingent states such inefficiencies may be remedied through the implementation of appropriate intergenerational transfers an optimal intergenerational welfare distribution may be supported as a competitive equilibrium if the income transfer regime is properly selected and enforced the social optima that result for a simple version of the model under the maximin welfare criterion indicate that greater sacrifices are required on the part of the present generation when future generations are taken to be state contingent than when they are regarded as state independent this finding provides a possible explanation for the extreme risk aversion of conservationists with respect to the welfare of future generations

efficiency of conservationist measures an optimist viewpoint abstract we consider an economy with a consumer good capital a natural resource that provides amenity values and heterogeneous overlapping generations we compare a benchmark grandfathering policy that ensures efficiency through privatization with a policy of enforced resource conservation it is shown that i conservationist measures do not cause any pareto inefficiency irrespective of whether they pass a cost benefit test moreover it is shown that ii there exist pareto optimal allocations that can only be reached through resource conservation and not through competitive markets irrespective of compensating income transfers finally iii equivalence is demonstrated between strict resource conservation and non dictatorship of the present generations over future generations as formalized in chichilnisky s sustainable welfare function the results are shown to hold in both a first best and a second best setting

when can carbon abatement policies increase welfare the fundamental role of distorted factor markets abstract this paper employs analytical and numerical models to assess the welfare effects of a revenue neutral carbon tax and nonauctioned carbon emissions permits taking into account preexisting tax distortions in factor markets the presence of preexisting taxes significantly raises the general equilibrium costs of both policies this cost increase is much greater under emissions permits since this policy does not generate revenues to reduce distortionary taxes under our central estimates emissions permits cannot increase welfare unless environmental damages exceed about 18 per ton of carbon in contrast an appropriately scaled carbon tax is welfare improving so long as environmental damages are positive

trust law sustainability and responsible action abstract the problem of managing for sustainability is marked by the need to make decisions on behalf of others and by the uncertainties that attend such decisions however the economic literature on sustainability has paid scant attention to how decisions on behalf of others might differ from decisions on behalf of oneself and when risk has been modeled explicitly the expected utility hypothesis has generally been used a generation acts sustainably if the expected value of the next generation s utility is not less than the present s this paper investigates how we think about responsibly acting on another s behalf by looking to the united states law of trusts because in important respects the current generation views its responsibility to the future as a trust relationship trust law illuminates responsible decision making under both risk and uncertainty even under conditions of risk more conservative action than would be suggested by the expected utility hypothesis is warranted because it emphasizes preservation of trust principal and disavows profit maximization trust doctrine indicates that special caution should be exercised in conditions of uncertainty finally resource economic concepts of strong sustainability the precautionary principle and the safe minimum standard of conservation are interpreted according to trust principles

optimal taxation of capital income in general equilibrium with infinite lives this paper analyzes the optimal tax on capital income in general equilibrium models of the second best agents have infinite lives and utility functions which are extensions from the koopmans form the population is heterogeneous the important property of the models is the equality between the social and the private discount rates in the long run i find that the optimal tax rate is zero in the long run for a special case of additively separable utility functions i then determine the tax rates along the dynamic path and conditions that are sufficient for the local stability of the steady state

on sustainability and social welfare abstract this paper proposes to define sustainability in terms of leaving it possible for future generations to sustain certain defined targets it is shown that variants of genuine savings and the ecological footprint can then serve as indicators of sustainability the link between sustainability and intergenerational welfare is examined and it is shown how to incorporate indicators of sustainability into a social welfare measure including risk in the analysis