municipal solid waste market competition and the eu policy two of the main pillars of the eu solid waste policy are the proximity principle and the self sufficiency principle according to those waste should be disposed as close as possible to where it has been produced a likely effect of such provision is to prevent competition from neighbouring areas and increase the market power of local disposers with possible undesirable consequences for other firms in the vertical chain we show through a simple spatial model that one additional effect of the proximity principle and of the self sufficiency principle is to provide an incentive to collectors and waste producers to increase the amount of separated waste

coal overcapacity in china multiscale analysis and prediction gaining a quantitative understanding of the causes of coal overcapacity and accurately predicting it are important for both government agencies and coal enterprises following the decomposition reconstruction prediction concept a combined ensemble empirical mode decomposition least square support vector machine autoregressive integrated moving average eemd lssvm arima model is proposed for quantitatively analyzing and forecasting coal overcapacity in china the results show that the main causes of coal overcapacity in china include insufficient demand market failure and institutional distortion institutional distortion with an influence degree of 73 75 is the most fundamental and influential factor from 2017 to 2019 the scale of coal overcapacity in china will reach between 1 721and 1 819 billion tons suggesting that coal overcapacity will remain a serious problem the rate of coal overcapacity caused by insufficient demand will fluctuate slightly while coal overcapacity caused by market failure will trend downward but the impact of institutional distortion on coal overcapacity will be exacerbated a statistical analysis demonstrates that the eemd lssvm arima model significantly outperformed other widely developed baselines e g arima lssvm eemd arima and eemd lssvm

nonrenewable resources with switching costs abstract this paper considers a firm s decision to commence or to suspend extraction of a nonrenewable resource when there are start up or shut down costs for a given level of reserves the critical price that would cause an inactive mine to be opened exceeds the price that would induce an active mine to be closed as one would expect greater switching costs cause firms to be less inclined to change status this impact can be substantial even for modest switching costs possible implications of switching costs are considered including the potential for firms to abandon mines with economically valuable remaining reserves

tax induced emissions estimating short run emission impacts from carbon taxation under different market structures abstract this article finds that the introduction of a carbon tax increased short run carbon emissions in an imperfectly competitive wholesale electricity market the unique feature of the western australian setting is that the same carbon tax was introduced and later repealed but the market structure differed at each event at the repeal event the dominant firm had less incentive to exercise unilateral market power then the opposite result is observed emissions were lower with the tax i show how the short run impact of pollution taxation in imperfect markets depends on production technologies market structure and the size of the tax

semicollusion in the norwegian cement market abstract a model of semicollusion where firms collude on prices and compete on capacities is tailor made to the characteristics of the norwegian cement market and tested on this particular market for the period 1927 1982 the results indicate that the rapid increase in capacity and thereby in exports in the period 1956 1967 the late phase of the price cartel best can be explained by the market sharing agreement each firm overinvested in capacity to receive a large quota in the domestic market

opec market failure or power failure abstract the actions of opec and saudi arabia are discussed in terms of their objectives and their technical and social constraints it is concluded 1 that opec does not act as a cartel and 2 that hotelling s rule is not an important feature of pricing or production opec s more specifically saudi arabia s ideal policy is to keep price moderate to try to assure a market for their high reserves over the long run such an action would require heavy investments in capacity including in excess capacity for times of interruption of supply from other countries as in the 1990s and for times of high demand as in the 2000s the action may be inconsistent with other objectives and in any case may be too difficult to achieve

limit pricing and the in effectiveness of the carbon tax we present a theory of limit pricing monopoly in non renewable resource production facing a very inelastic demand an oil monopoly seeks to induce the highest price that does not destroy its demand unlike the conventional hotellian analysis the monopoly tolerates some ordinary substitutes to its oil but deters high potential ones with limit pricing policy induced extraction changes do not obey the usual logic for example oil taxes have no effect on current oil production extraction increases when high potential substitutes are promoted but can be effectively reduced by supporting ordinary substitutes the carbon tax not only applies to oil it also penalizes its ordinary carbon substitutes whose market shares are taken over by the monopoly thus the carbon tax ambiguously affects current and long term oil production and carbon emissions

an oligopoly fringe non renewable resource game in the presence of a renewable substitute abstract in accordance with recent empirical evidence we model the oil market as an oligopoly facing a fringe as well as competition from renewable resources within this framework we fully characterize i e for all vectors of initial resource stocks the equilibrium extraction paths of the fringe and the oligopolists we show that i the sequence of extraction in equilibrium crucially depends on the oligopolists market power ii there always exists a phase of simultaneous supply of the oligopolists and the fringe iii the oligopolists pursue a limit pricing strategy near the end of the extraction horizon and iv an increase in the reserves of the fringe may lead to a decrease in their initial supply

strategic investment in merchant transmission the impact of capacity utilization rules abstract in this paper we look at the relative merits of two capacity utilization regimes in the merchant electricity transmission network must offer mo where the entire capacity installed has to be made available for transmission and non must offer nmo where some capacity could be withheld we look at two specific cases i demand for transmission varies across time and ii vertical integration is allowed between investors in transmission network and electricity generators in the case of time varying demand under mo we find that a monopolist may underinvest in transmission when compared to nmo although nmo may lead to more capacity withholding in the case of vertical integration we find that when the market power is with the generators of the exporting node without vertical integration no welfare enhancing merchant investment would occur neither under mo nor nmo further if the generators in the importing node have market power in case vertical integration is allowed mo is better than nmo finally we also argue that the incentive to collude among various transmission network investors is mitigated with mo in place

outsourcing and capacity planning in an uncertain global environment firms employing offshore outsourcing strategies may face both exchange rate and demand uncertainties in this paper we show that the firms may benefit from operational option to switch production by keeping capacities with both domestic and foreign suppliers the value of the operational option increases as the exchange rate uncertainty or demand uncertainty increases in addition when the firms become risk averse they may use domestic capacity to hedge against offshore capacity as a result the firms may choose to hold local capacity even if it exhibits negative marginal contribution to the profit furthermore risk averse firms may keep more total capacity than risk neutral firms

valuing flexibility as a complex option this paper develops an approach for valuing flexible production systems using contingent claims pricing demand curves for our model s underlying assets output products may be downward sloping in contrast with the standard option pricing assumption also our marginal production exercise costs may be increasing in addition we allow for multiple products and a production capacity constraint these elements of the model result in complex exercise decisions for the contingent claims which comprise the production system s value we illustrate our approach by valuing a flexible system that produces two products which have profit margin functions with stochastic parameters

strategic resource dependence we consider a situation where an exhaustible resource seller faces demand from a buyer who has a substitute but there is a time to build delay for the substitute we find that in this simple framework the basic implications of the hotelling model 1931 are reversed over time the stock declines but supplies increase up to the point where the buyer decides to switch under such a threat of demand change the supply does not reflect the current resource scarcity but it compensates the buyer for delaying the transition to the substitute the analysis suggests a perspective on costs of oil dependence

natural resource economics under the rule of hotelling abstract natural resource stocks held in situ are physical assets equilibrium in the assets market requires that their rates of return be such that their owners are just willing to hold on to them rather than invest elsewhere i discuss a number of factors relating to the evolution of extraction costs to the durability of the resource to market structure and to uncertainty that are important in correctly characterizing the rate of return on holding exhaustible natural resource stocks the emphasis is put on how those factors can potentially help bridge the gap between the basic hotelling s rule of natural resource exploitation and the historical behaviour of the flow price of a number of resources i also highlight some theoretical and empirical issues that need further attention

excess capacity and collusion in this paper the authors analyze a restricted class of equilibria in the dynamic model of j p benoit and v krishna 1987 in which firms choose their scale of operation before engaging in a repeated game of price competition benoit and krishna established that all firms carry excess capacity in all collusive equilibria as the authors are interested in the relationship between excess capacity and collusion in price they examine equilibria in which firms tacitly collude in price but not in investment decisions copyright 1990 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

carbon taxation opec and the end of oil abstract i develop a differential game between an oil cartel and an importer investing in research and development r d to reduce the cost of a green substitute to oil in equilibrium the cartel is forced to deter the substitute which thus imposes a price ceiling falling over time credible carbon taxes are below the pigovian level implying the importer cannot internalise the full pollution externality much less capture resource rents without carbon pricing the importer curtails long run pollution using a costly r d programme normatively climate policy will be more expensive if relying on green r d programmes only

a post consumer waste management model for determining optimal levels of recycling and landfilling the present study examines the optimal recycling rate for municipal solid waste first an optimal control model is developed to account for the physical costs of recycling the social costs of landfilling and consumers environmental preferences second an optimal solution is simulated using waste disposal data from the helsinki region in finland the benefits from recycling are included in the simulation using the results of a recent contingent valuation study the results of the present research suggest that mandates for achieving 50 recycling in municipalities are not far fetched and are both economically and environmentally justified

reconsidering the european regulation of merchant transmission investment in light of the third energy package the role of dominant generators the regulation of merchant transmission investment mti has become an important issue in the eu electricity sector subsequent to the granting of authorizations by european authorities to five merchant projects britned estlink t heeast west cables norger and recently a merchant line connecting italy and austria the creation of a new agency for the cooperation of energy regulators acer at the eu level which has decision making powers on mti therefore presents a unique opportunity to question and re design the current european policy this paper shows that the recent decisions concerning mti may suffer a strong bias against dominant electricity generators while incumbent transmission system operators tsos or new entrant tsos are generally favored by national regulators and the european commission ec this strategy is misguided as it fails to recognize both the new incentives of generators to develop mti and the conflict of interest between the regulated and non regulated activities of incumbent tsos letting dominant generators undertake mti is indeed generally beneficial as long as potential abuses of dominance are mitigated to deter possible anti competitive effects we propose a new and feasible allocation of regulatory powers based on a clear demarcation between the market monitoring powers of acer and the antitrust powers of the ec 2011 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

optimal transmission planning under the mexican new electricity market abstract this paper addresses electricity transmission planning under the new industry and institutional structure of the mexican electricity market which has engaged in a deep reform process after decades of a state owned vertically integrated non competitive closed industry under this new structure characterized by a nodal pricing system and an independent system operator iso we analyze welfare optimal network expansion with two modeling strategies in a first model we propose the use of an incentive price cap mechanism to promote the expansion of mexican networks in a second model we study centrally planned grid expansion in mexico by an iso within a power flow model we carry out comparisons of these models which provide us with hints to evaluate the actual transmission planning process proposed by mexican authorities prodesen we obtain that the prodesen plan appears to be a convergent welfare optimal planning process

to commit or not to commit revisiting quantity vs price competition in a differentiated industry previous studies have shown that quantity commitment by all firms in an industry mitigates price competition this paper shows that when firms have a choice asymmetric outcomes can arise with some firms choosing to commit to a quantity and other firms choosing not to to study the commitment decision we analyze a multistage game within a duopoly of differentiated firms a la hotelling in the first stage of the game firms choose whether or not to commit to a quantity in the second stage each firm that chose to commit sets a quantity which represents an upper bound on how much it can sell to consumers in the third stage both firms set prices strategically regardless of whether or not they committed in the final stage demand is allocated as consumers maximize their utilities firm s that chose not to commit to a quantity in the first stage can fulfill any quantity that consumers demand at the equilibrium prices we find that if product differentiation is sufficiently low both firms choose to co

is there really a green paradox abstract in the absence of a co2 tax the anticipation of a cheaper renewable backstop increases current emissions of co2 since the date at which renewables are phased in is brought forward and more generally future emissions of co2 will decrease the effect on global warming is unclear green welfare falls if the backstop is relatively expensive and full exhaustion of fossil fuels is optimal but may increase if the backstop is sufficiently cheap relative to the cost of extracting the last drop of fossil fuels plus marginal global warming damages as then it is attractive to leave more fossil fuels unexploited and thus limit co2 emissions we establish these results by analyzing depletion of non renewable fossil fuels followed by a switch to a clean renewable backstop paying attention to timing of the switch and the amount of fossil fuels remaining unexploited we also discuss the potential for limit pricing when the non renewable resource is owned by a monopolist finally we show that if backstops are already used and more backstops become economically viable as the price of fossil fuels rises a lower cost of the backstop will either postpone fossil fuel exhaustion or leave more fossil fuel in situ thus boosting green welfare however if a market economy does not internalize global warming externalities and renewables have not kicked in yet full exhaustion of fossil fuel will occur in finite time and a backstop subsidy always curbs green welfare

iso net surplus collection and allocation in wholesale power markets under lmp this study uses five bus and 30 bus test cases to explore iso net surplus congestion rent collections and allocations in wholesale power markets with grid congestion managed by locational marginal prices lmps price sensitivity of demand and generator learning capabilities are taken as experimental treatment factors a key finding is that conditions resulting in greater generator capacity withholding hence higher and more volatile lmps also result in greater iso net surplus collections that can be substantial in size a key conclusion is that iso net surplus collections should be used pro actively to mitigate the conditions encouraging generator capacity withholding and hence high and volatile lmps rather than to provide ex post support for lmp payment offsets and lmp volatility risk hedging as is currently the norm

ordering the extraction of polluting nonrenewable resources energy markets are often characterized by the use of multiple nonrenewable resources such as coal and natural gas with different pollution characteristics the same resource may have different qualities as when high and low sulfur coal is used to generate electricity multiple resources are used in providing transportation services such as cars running on gasoline or plug in hybrids that may be fueled by electricity produced from coal when these nonrenewable resources contribute differentially to pollution what is the opti mal sequence of extraction over time harold hotelling 1931 developed the classical theory of extraction of a nonrenewable resource orris c herfindahl 1967 extended the hotelling model by considering many resources with different unit costs of extraction and proposed the least cost first principle extraction must be ordered by cost with the cheapest resource used first others have examined whether herfindahl s model remains valid in a variety of situations in a general equilibrium setting see murray kemp and ngo v long 1980 tracy r lewis 1982 in the presence of setup costs g rard gaudet moreaux and stephen w salant 2001 under het erogeneous demands chakravorty and darrell l krulce 1994 and when the extraction rate is constrained jean pierre amigues et al 1998 stephen p holland 2003 in these studies following hotelling and herfindahl resources were differentiated by cost alone in this paper we abstract from cost considerations and focus on how the sequence of extraction may be affected when resources are differentiated only by their pollution character istics we consider two resources one more polluting than the other without loss of generality consider coal to be the dirty resource and natural gas the clean one both may be used to generate electricity environmental regulation is imposed through a cap on the stock of pollution this may be a stylized approximation of an international agreement such as the kyoto protocol which aims to stabilize the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere 1 with heterogeneity in pollution the results are nonintuitive and do not depend on the emis sion rates of the resources when the economy is already at its allowable stock of pollution the clean natural gas is used first and use of the dirty coal is postponed to the future this is what one would expect armed with insights from the herfindahl model however when the economy starts from below the ceiling and accumulates pollution coal may be used first and use of the clean natural gas is postponed the optimal strategy is to benefit from natural dilution by build ing the stock of pollution as quickly as possible this is done by burning coal rather than natural

extraction of a resource with a substitute for some of its uses important resources e g oil may be used for several purposes there may exist good substitutes for such a resource in some of its uses but no substitute in other uses the price and extraction paths for the resource are analysed for several market structures some of these paths differ substantially from the corresponding paths for the case of no substitute and for the case of a substitute for all the resource s uses in particular a jump in the resource price may occur l extraction d une ressource quand il existe un substitut pour certains des usages qu on peut en faire certaines ressources importantes comme 1 huile par exemple peuvent etre utilisees a plusieurs fins dans certains cas il se peut qu il existe des substituts pour certains usages qu on peut en faire alors que dans d autres cas il n existe pas de substituts l auteur examine la tarification et les diverse strategies d extraction dans des structure de marches differentes certaines de ces strategies d extraction different substantiellement de celles qui auraient ete utilisees soit dans le cas oiu aucun substitut n existe soit dans le cas ou substitut existe pour tous les usages qu on peut faire de la ressource en particulier on peut observer un saut dans le prix de la ressource

the problem of the commons still unsettled after 100 years the problem of the commons is more important to our lives and thus more central to economics than a century ago when katharine coman led off the first issue of the american economic review as the us and other economies have grown the carrying capacity of the planet in regard to natural resources and environmental quality has become a greater concern particularly for commonproperty and open access resources the focus of this article is on some important unsettled problems of the commons within the realm of natural resources there are special challenges associated with renewable resources which are frequently characterized by open access an important example is the degradation of openaccess fisheries critical commons problems are also associated with environmental quality a key contribution of economics has been the development of market based approaches to environmental protection these instruments are key to addressing the ultimate commons problem of the twenty first century global climate change jel q15 q21 q22 q25 q54

double limit pricing abstract we study oil extraction by a monopolist who faces demand from a climate aware and a climate ignorant region a renewable perfect substitute for oil is available at constant unit cost the climate aware region uses a carbon tax and a renewables subsidy as policy instruments due to heterogeneity in climate policies between regions the oil price path possibly contains two limit pricing phases we specify conditions under which a tightening of climate policies results in lower initial carbon emissions a renewables subsidy and a carbon tax effectively force the monopolist to sell more oil to the climate ignorant region during the stage when demand from the climate aware region has already vanished we calibrate the model and numerically investigate climate damage and welfare effects of the policies of the climate aware region we find that both the carbon tax and a renewables subsidy lower climate damage even though cumulative emissions are fixed

optimal pricing of depletable replaceable resources the case of landfill tipping fees abstract we develop a general model for pricing a depletable replaceable asset and discuss its application in determining optimal tipping fees for a sanitary landfill we show that the optimal fee includes a component that grows at the real interest rate as space in the landfill is depleted and then drops when a new landfill is built because the scarcity cost of landfill space increases as the landfill is filled it may be optimal to delay a waste reduction program such as recycling composting or incineration until the landfill is partially full

fixed versus flexible production systems a real options analysis in this work we address investment decisions in production systems by using real options as is standard in literature the stochastic variable is assumed to be normally distributed and then approximated by a binomial distribution resulting in a binomial lattice the methodology establishes a discrete valued lattice of possible future values of the underlying stochastic variable demand in our case and then computes the project value we have developed and implemented stochastic dynamic programming models both for fixed and flexible capacity systems in the former case we consider three standard options the option to postpone investment the option to abandon investment and the option to temporarily shut down production for the latter case we introduce the option of corrective action in terms of production capacity that the management can take during the project by considering the existence of one of the following i a capacity expansion option ii a capacity contraction option or iii an option considering both expansion and contraction the full flexible capacity model where both the contraction and expansion options exist leads as expected to a better project predicted value and thus investment policy however we have also found that the capacity strategy obtained from the flexible capacity model when applied to specific demand data series often does not lead to a better investment decision this might seem surprising at first but it can be explained by the inaccuracy of the binomial model the binomial model tends to undervalue future decreases in the stochastic variable demand while at the same time tending to overvalue an increase in future demand values

monopoly unilateral climate policies and limit pricing abstract we examine the behavior of a fossil fuel monopolist who faces demand from two regions a climate club and the rest of the world row each region is able to produce a perfect substitute for fossil energy at constant marginal costs the climate club uses a carbon tax and a renewables subsidy as policy instruments the row is policy inactive we fully characterize the market equilibrium and show that due to differences in climate policies between the climate club and the row the monopolistic fossil fuel supplier may choose for two limit pricing phases to postpone entry of renewables producers first in the climate club and later in the row as soon as energy demand from the climate club shifts from fossil fuels to renewables the monopolist abruptly increases the fossil price for the row

sequential development and exploitation of an exhaustible resource do monopoly rights promote conservation this paper explores the problem of sequential exploitation of exhaustible resources by a monopolist when a setup cost must be incurred to access the next pool under certain circumstances the monopolist will always follow a more conservationist path of extraction and delay the introduction of new resource pools compared to a social planner however with other forms of consumer demand the monopolist may exhaust the resource more quickly especially if many new options will follow these results may apply especially to depletable resources like antibiotics or biotech products for which significant research and development costs are required followed by monopoly rights conferred by patents

what is the value of the option to defer an investment in transmission expansion planning an estimation using real options abstract in deregulated markets transmission expansion planning tep is usually performed by a central network planner seeking to maximize social welfare in doing that the network planner commonly follows a traditional project valuation considering a discounted cash flow dcf methodology although incorporating uncertainty and reliability considerations accordingly once the optimal transmission expansion plan is determined the network planner frequently auctions the needed investments obligating the investor to execute the expansion in the fixed inflexible terms defined in the bidding process a key problem is that dcf does not take into account the responses of the planner when uncertainties are resolved because dcf evaluates the project with the information available today in tep managerial flexibility may be valuable because optimal decisions may change over time with the release of new information transmission investors may want to defer or expand according to such information the aim of this article is to estimate the value of adding some flexibility in tep through real options in particular by means of using a real option approach with binomial trees we study the benefits for a social network planner of having the option to defer some transmission investments our results suggest that incorporating flexibility in tep may increase social welfare

collusive pricing with capacity constraints in the presence of demand uncertainty we explore the response of collusive prices to changing demand conditions when firms operate under capacity constraints in the presence of demand uncertainty we find support for the conventional view that periods of low demand lead through the emergence of excess capacity to a breakdown of collusive pricing we also find that the nature of price wars depends on the degree of excess capacity in the industry while small amounts of excess capacity can lead firms to engage in mild price wars characterized by uniform price reductions and market share stability more severe price wars characterized by price undercutting and market share instability can emerge if excess capacity is sufficiently great finally our results lend support to the view that market share instability is a symptom of ineffective collusion

strategic incentives in dynamic duopoly abstract we compare steady states of open loop and locally stable markov perfect equilibria mpe in a general symmetric differential game duopoly model with costs of adjustment strategic incentives at the mpe depend on whether an increase in the state variable of a firm hurts or helps the rival and on whether at the mpe there is intertemporal strategic substitutability or complementarity a full characterization is provided in the linear quadratic case then with price competition and costly production adjustment static strategic complementarity turns into intertemporal strategic substitutability and the mpe steady state outcome is more competitive than static bertrand competition

the process of negotiating settlements at ferc interstate gas pipelines and their customers presently settle about 90 of the rate cases set for hearing before the federal energy regulatory commission ferc the conventional regulatory litigation process is now only an occasional means of dispute resolution this paper explains the settlement process illustrating with the 12 section 4 rate cases brought by pipelines from 2008 and 2009 the paper also discusses and illustrates why parties prefer settlement to litigation what difference it makes which cases tend to settle what might account for the increasing frequency of settlements over time the recent phenomenon of pre filing settlements and the recent settlement of section 5 cases brought by ferc in contrast to many other regulatory jurisdictions ferc trial staff play an active role in facilitating negotiation and settlement they make an initial analysis 3 months after a pipeline files for a tariff rate increase thereafter the regulatory aim is to bring the parties into agreement not to determine an outcome and impose it upon them this is a different role for the regulatory body than was previously apparent

on monopoly power in extractive resource markets abstract potential monopoly power in extractive resource markets is reduced by the depletability of reserves this paper examines the dependence of monopoly power on resource rent and on uncertainty over future reserve levels a model is developed that treats reserves as inventories that fluctuate stochastically over time as a result of exploration development and production activities solutions of the model illustrate how output and monopoly power vary with the elasticity of demand rent as a fraction of price and the variance of reserve fluctuations it is shown that uncertainty over future reserves can speed up production and by reducing resource rent restore part of the monopoly power otherwise lost because of depletion antitrust implications are discussed with reference to several resources

the role of feed in tariff in the curtailment of wind power in china abstract while china s wind power initiative has experienced rapid growth serious curtailment issues persist though some studies have investigated this matter we explain this phenomenon from the novel perspective of excess capacity we first set up a theoretical model to explore the mechanism behind excess investment and find that the sticky feed in tariff fit and declining costs of wind power generate high mark up for wind power investors leading to a higher probability of excessive investment the theoretical prediction is empirically tested with a probit and tobit model using provincial level data between 2009 and 2016 the estimation results show that a 0 1 yuan increase in the mark up leads to a 2 3 increase in the rate of curtailed wind power based on the estimation results we simulate several scenarios to assess quantitatively how an improved policy design could have alleviated the curtailment issue simply increasing the frequency of the fit rate adjustment while maintaining the same subsidy reduction level between 2009 and 2016 could have reduced the curtailed wind power by 23 to 27 billion kwh accounting for 15 17 of actual curtailed wind power if the policy were better designed to reflect the declining trend of wind power costs more accurately the curtailment rates could have been further reduced by 2 81 corresponding to a reduction in wasted wind energy of 43 billion kwh or 28 of actual curtailment although accepting curtailment for a certain period could help to accelerate renewable energy deployment our analysis shows that the fit policy design could have been improved to reduce welfare loss these findings can not only assist the chinese government in framing effective policies but also may be applied to other emerging technologies or industries that require subsidy support

the economic value of transmission lines and the implications for planning models abstract many connections between economic efficiency regulation the environment and energy markets are evident in the planning for transmission upgrades in an electricity network transmission owners have to make decisions about investing in new assets while facing uncertainty in the generation plans regulatory and environmental constraints and current system endowments in this paper we demonstrate an analytical method for determining the economic value of individual transmission lines in a meshed network by calculating the total welfare effects for the system while many regulators believe that traditional congestion rents provide the correct incentives for investing in transmission upgrades we show that the uncertainty in system conditions breaks down this paradigm the analysis uses an existing security constrained optimal power flow scopf model and a test network to demonstrate how the method can be used to determine the welfare effects of changing the capacity of selected transmission lines the results show that a substantial portion of the economic benefits for an individual line may come from maintaining system reliability when equipment failures occur furthermore these benefits can change dramatically when inherently intermittent sources of renewable generation are added to a network and the changes in benefits are not captured effectively by changes in the expected congestion rents

equal access to the energy infrastructure as a precondition to promote competition in the energy market the case of european union abstract in many eu countries the infrastructures for supplying electricity and gas electricity networks gas pipelines and storage facilities are still properties of the so called vertically integrated undertakings viu responsible for the extraction or generation supply and transmission and distribution of the energy while competition can be promoted in the generation production and supply side of the vertical integration transmission and distribution segments remain natural monopolies that hinder market mechanisms vertical integration simply raises the possibility for incumbents to favor their own divisions and to block new entrants as a result non discriminatory and equal access to the electricity and gas transmission and distribution networks also lng and storage facilities is crucial to foster competition in politically delicate structures of the electricity and gas markets

opec behavior a test of alternative hypotheses since interpretations of past and future oil price patterns depends on the model chosen the author tests and compares alternative theories of opec as a first step in validating the choice on any one model the results show that among opec countries the partial market sharing cartel model is the only model not rejected by at least some of the 11 members and gives the best explanation of production in comparison with 11 non opec countries the competitive model could not be rejected for 10 of the 11 non opec producers this raises the question of why if opec is a cartel friedman s predictions have not come true and introduces new questions for future research 19 references 3 tables

equilibrium vertical differentiation in a bertrand model with capacity precommitment both quality differentiation and capacity commitment have been shown to relax price competition however their joint influence on the outcome of price competition has not yet been assessed in this article we consider a three stage game in which firms choose quality then commit to capacity and finally compete in price when the cost of quality is negligible we show that firms do not differentiate their products in a subgame perfect equilibrium in other words capacity precommitment completely eliminates the incentive to differentiate by quality

voluntary import expansions and voluntary export restraints in an oligopoly model with capacity constraints in a three country generalization of the kreps scheinkman 1983 duopoly model with price competition and capacity constraints the author analyzes the effects of discriminatory voluntary import expansions and voluntary export restraints on equilibrium capacity and pricing decisions voluntary export restraints are shown to be bad for the exporting country contradicting recent results in the literature by r harris 1985 and k krishna 1989 voluntary import expansions are shown to decrease competition cases are analyzed where voluntary import expansions may actually lead to import contraction or to increases in efficiency in the home country

judo economics reconsidered capacity limitation entry and collusion abstract the capacity investment by a new firm into an established market is explored in a repeated price game if the entrant expects collusion to prevail upon entry it may not practice judo economics but instead choose to install enough capacity to serve the entire market this occurs when collusion involves optimal punishment paths if instead collusion is based upon the static nash equilibrium punishment and the incumbent has excess capacity and the entrant is at a cost disadvantage the entrant will strategically limit its capacity so as to restrain the incumbent s price response to entry

firm size inequality and market power abstract in this paper we reexamine the relationship between firm size inequality fsi and market power in light of modern oligopoly theory using a model with capacity constraints and endogenous conduct we show that the market power fsi relationship is more complex than the positive link traditionally predicted we show that two separate effects are at work leading to a u shaped relationship between market power and fsi we also show that prices should be more unstable in markets where fsi is high we test these predictions on data for the u s airline industry and find results that support them

opec vs us shale analyzing the shift to a market share strategy abstract in november 2014 opec announced a new strategy geared towards improving its market share oil market analysts interpreted this as an attempt to squeeze higher cost producers notably us shale oil out of the market over the next year crude oil prices crashed with large repercussions for the global economy we present a simple equilibrium model that explains the fundamental market factors that can rationalize such a regime switch by opec i the growth of us shale oil production ii the slowdown of global oil demand iii reduced cohesiveness of the opec cartel and iv production ramp ups in other non opec countries while v reductions in us shale costs act against these factors we show that these qualitative predictions are broadly consistent with oil market developments during 2014 2015 the model is calibrated to oil market data it predicts accommodation up to 2014 and a market share strategy thereafter and explains large oil price swings as well as realistically high levels of opec output

optimal taxes on fossil fuel in general equilibrium we analyze a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model with an externality through climate change from using fossil energy our central result is a simple formula for the marginal externality damage of emissions or equivalently for the optimal carbon tax this formula which holds under quite plausible assumptions reveals that the damage is proportional to current gdp with the proportion depending only on three factors i discounting ii the expected damage elasticity how many percent of the output flow is lost from an extra unit of carbon in the atmosphere and iii the structure of carbon depreciation in the atmosphere thus the stochastic values of future output consumption and the atmospheric co2 concentration as well as the paths of technology whether endogenous or exogenous and population and so on all disappear from the formula we find that the optimal tax should be a bit higher than the median or most well known estimates in the literature we also formulate a parsimonious yet comprehensive and easily solved model allowing us to compute the optimal and market paths for the use of different sources of energy and the corresponding climate change we find coal rather than oil to be the main threat to economic welfare largely due to its abundance we also find that the costs of inaction are particularly sensitive to the assumptions regarding the substitutability of different energy sources and technological progress

impact of the regulatory framework for transmission investments on the cost of renewable energy in the eu abstract under the current regulatory frame in the eu transmission planning is done at the national level to maximize national welfare rather than european welfare in this paper we develop a competitive equilibrium model that calculates the impact of this imperfect regulatory framework on the cost of renewable energy we apply the model to a power system with two interconnected zones and find that the impact is case specific but significant we also find that the negative impact of national transmission planning on the cost of renewable energy is more significant in a state of the world in which member states trade renewable energy but that this negative effect is much smaller than the positive effect of renewable energy trade between member states we conclude that the imperfect regulatory framework for transmission investment is a significant cost for renewable energy in the eu but that it should not stop member states from trading renewable energy

deregulating with no regulator is the german electricity transmission regime institutionally correct abstract from 1998 to 2005 the german transmission grid has been put under a self regulated arrangement it seems hard to believe that transmission lines can be opened to third party access only with a negotiated access regime and no regulator supervision it seems contradictory with the notion of ex post contractual hazards promoted by v goldberg and o williamson if a weak institutional arrangement is implemented one might assume that it has to be harmful to network and market access if it is not to be inefficient why and how could it work when looking at rules and prices for accessing the transmission network and the corresponding wholesale markets in germany the club arrangement for transmission opening does not appear so harmful accordingly we have to reconsider the ex ante and ex post institutional mechanism of such a club arrangement ex ante we first reconsider skills and strengths of industrial consumers and german business associations in defining and assessing rules of transmission access we underline that incomplete vertical and horizontal integration of german electricity companies impeded extensive cartel collusion ex post we first look at a strong competition authority backing then we discover that ex ante and ex post dimensions are much more mixed and reinforced in an open cumulative pro competition process framed by the competition authority

efficiency inducing taxation for a monopolistically supplied depletable resource author s bergstrom ted cross john porter dick abstract we show that for a depletable resource if the competitive time path of prices is known and if the profit function is concave then there is an easily described time path of taxes and or subsidies that would induce a monopolist to follow an efficient time path of extraction

impact of intermittent non conventional renewable generation in the costs of the chilean main power system abstract chile has recently approved a law aiming a target for electricity generation with non conventional renewable energy ncre of 20 by year 2025 it is anticipated that most of this ncre generation will be provided by intermittent energy sources wind and solar photovoltaic pv the economic consequences of intermittent ncre penetration in the chilean central interconnected system sic are assessed the ncre penetration is simulated with a 10 year horizon 2017 2027 considering four scenarios of ncre penetration 10 15 20 and 30 of total generation the authors model the hydro thermal operation of the power system and analyze spot prices total operation costs and capacity factors results show that the average spot price in the sic when having an optimal minimum cost generation mix is 89 7 us mwh as intermittent ncre penetration increases some thermal base load units capacity factors change producing an increase in the generation cost additional transmission capacity is also needed elevating the total cost the average incremental cost of integrating intermittent ncre generation is 65 8 us mwh when increasing ncre penetration from 10 to 30 the effect of fossil fuel price fluctuation is also addressed two policy guidance elements are presented intermittency should be reduced by diversifying the renewable portfolio and penetration costs of intermittent ncre generation have to be incorporated into their investment or operation costs

cartel pricing dynamics in the presence of an antitrust authority cartel pricing is characterized when firms are concerned about creating suspicions that a cartel has formed balancing concerns about maintaining the stability of the cartel with those of avoiding detection the cartel may either i gradually raise price to its steady state level or ii gradually raise price and then have it decline to its steady state level antitrust laws may have a perverse effect as they make cartel stability easier and thus allow for higher cartel prices

on efficiency inducing taxation for a non renewable resource monopolist the problem of using taxes to induce a monopolist supplier of a non renewable resource to extract efficiently has been solved under the assumption that the government has perfect information about the monopolist s cost function and reserves and is able to precommit to an entire sequence of taxes over time we extend this literature by constructing an efficiency inducing tax mechanism that does not require the government to have any information about the cost function or reserves and which does not require it to precommit to a sequence of taxes over time

impact of sourcing flexibility on the outsourcing of services under demand uncertainty abstract this paper investigates the relationship between market conditions and the value and use of sourcing flexibility for service processes we develop and analyze a series of models and we derive expressions for the optimal switching decision the value of the option to outsource the value of the option to backsource and the probability and timing of switches between the alternative sources one contribution is the models and associated derivations which are largely new to the literature and may serve as a tool to support service sourcing plans and decisions the second contribution is a series of results with managerial implications 1 the probability of outsourcing is generally increasing in volatility for high skill process and decreasing in volatility for low skill processes earlier work has found that the hysteresis band is increasing in volatility which is interpreted as an indicator of increasing organizational inertia we also find that the hysteresis band is increasing in volatility but interestingly for the case of high skill processes organizational inertia tends to be decreasing in volatility 2 the option to backsource is generally more valuable for high skill processes than for low skill processes this result suggests that investments to make it easier to backsource should have a higher priority for high skill processes 3 the value of the option to backsource a high skill service process can be decreasing in volatility the result suggests that a rather nuanced consideration of volatility is in order when considering investments in the flexibility to backsource a high skill process

landfilling versus backstop recycling when income is growing the paper considers a dynamic model in which an income stream growing over time is optimally divided into consumption andexpenditures on waste disposal the latter being optimally dividedbetween recycling and landfilling recycling is thoughtof as a backstop waste disposal technology it does notrequire landfill space but is a relatively expensive method ofwaste disposal landfilling uses up scarce landfill capacity while conserving landfill space is the major reason themunicipality recycles another motive for recycling might be thatrecycling itself generates utility our analysis suggests thatthe optimal recycling program varies considerably with bothlandfill capacity and initial income for example richermunicipalities are likely to introduce recycling much earlier inthe planning period than poorer municipalities thus whenlegislating recycling national or regional governments must besensitive to the differences between municipalities

a welfare analysis of electricity transmission planning in germany we analyze the electricity transmission planning process in germany netzentwicklungsplan which separates transmission expansion decisions from generation dispatch we employ an economic modeling approach to analyze two different network planning settings in the first setting there is no trade off between transmission network development and generation dispatch as is currently the case in germany a second setting alternatively allows for such a trade off and thus represents a welfare superior way of transmission network planning applications with the two model variants are carried out for the german electricity system in 2035 the results illustrate overinvestment in transmission capacity and decreased welfare associated with the netzentwicklungsplan

garbage and recycling with endogenous local policy abstract this paper estimates the impact of garbage fees and curbside recycling programs on garbage and recycling amounts without correction for endogenous policy a price per bag of garbage has a negative effect on garbage and a positive cross price effect on recycling correction for endogenous local policy increases the effect of the user fee on garbage and the effect of curbside recycling collection on recycling introducing a fee of 1 per bag is estimated to reduce garbage by 412 pounds per person per year 44 but to increase recycling by only 30 pounds per person per year

fixed fee liscensing of innovations and collusion unlike other types of licensing agreements such as those with output restrictions market division clauses or output royalties licensing contracts with only a fixed fee have been perceived as having no anticompetitive consequences this paper illustrates that fixed fee licensing may facilitate collusion by enhancing the licensee s ability to credibly punish deviations from the collusive outcome on the part of the licenser antitrust implications of the result and potential ways of detecting collusion motivated licenses are discussed copyright 1996 by blackwell publishing ltd

flexible waste management under uncertainty in this paper we use stochastic dynamic programming to model the choice of a municipality which has to design an optimal waste management program under uncertainty about the price of recyclables in the secondary market the municipality can by undertaking an irreversible investment adopt a flexible program which integrates the existing landfill strategy with recycling keeping the option to switch back to landfilling if profitable we determine the optimal share of waste to be recycled and the optimal timing for the investment in such a flexible program we find that adopting a flexible program rather than a non flexible one the municipality i invests in recycling capacity under circumstances where it would not do so otherwise ii invests earlier and iii benefits from a higher expected net present value c 2013 elsevier b v all rights reserved less

review of grid tie micro generation systems without energy storage towards a new approach to sustainable hybrid energy systems linked to energy efficiency abstract this paper reviews the literature on the subject albeit approaching hybrid micro generation power systems from a systems thinking st and cybernetics standpoint viewing them as dynamically complex adaptive systems cas coupled with and supplying to a set of homes termed a sustainable block in a rural setting here homeostatic regulation hr and control play a vital role in reaching efficient equilibrium towards reconciling power supply and demand response management unlike most of the work reviewed in the literature the focus here is on supervisory control of grid connected micro generation systems without energy storage aiming towards building energy efficiency thriftiness and sustainability in energy consumption building on homeostatic control hc principles first introduced by f c schweppe in 1979 the paper explores the concepts of sustainability and sustainable hybrid energy systems shes applied to micro generation focusing on operational aspects rather than on socio economic environmental or regulatory ones a concrete theoretical model for building a shes is presented for a proposed grid connected renewable microgrid the model seeks to reconcile power supply and demand towards efficient equilibrium homeostasis proposing reward based criteria for controlling renewable electricity supply and consumption in rural communities in chile discussion and recommendations are also offered stating that energy sustainability es is essentially a systems issue and one where es is first and foremost a structural organizational and operational property which is in the very nature of the system itself it is built into it rather than explained by exogenous factors

an anatomy of cartel contracts we study cartel contracts using data on 18 contract clauses of 109 legal finnish manufacturing cartels one third of the clauses relate to raising profits the others deal with instability through incentive compatibility cartel organization or external threats cartels use three main approaches to raise profits price market allocation and specialization these appear to be substitutes choosing one has implications on how cartels deal with instability simplifying we find that large cartels agree on prices cartels in homogenous goods industries allocate markets and small cartels avoid competition through specialization

managerial incentives and collusive behavior abstract i characterize the effects of empirically observed managerial incentives on long run oligopolistic competition when managers have a preference for smooth time paths of profits as revealed by the empirical literature on income smoothing manager led firms can sustain collusive agreements at lower discount factors capped bonus plans and incumbency rents with termination threats make collusion supportable at any discount factor independent of contracts duration when managers have these preferences incentives and demand fluctuates price wars during booms need not occur the most collusive price may then be pro cyclical

investments in flexible production capacity abstract we examine the technology and capacity choice problem of a multi output firm facing stochastic demands in a continuous time framework the firm can install output specific capital or at greater cost flexible capital that can be used to produce different outputs investment is irreversible the firm must choose a technology and decide how much capital to install knowing it can add more later as demand evolves we formulate the capacity choice problem as a singular stochastic control problem show that the value of the firm equals the value of its installed capital plus the value of its options to add capacity in the future and derive an optimal investment rule that maximizes the firm s market value we also address the analogous problem for a multi input firm that faces stochastically evolving factor costs and can install input specific or flexible capital

on comparing monopoly and competition in exhaustible resource exploitation abstract it is widely believed that exhaustible resource monopolies do not enjoy as much market power as standard non resource monopolies and may even produce in a socially optimal way we argue that this paradoxical result arises from an inappropriate comparison methodology when similar assumptions are applied to the resource and the conventional cases we show that the resource monopoly behaves as expected i e restricts supply

sustainable transmission planning in imperfectly competitive electricity industries balancing economic and environmental outcomes abstract we explore the role of a transmission system operator tso that builds a transmission line to accommodate renewable energy in order to lower emissions as required by government policy in contrast to central planning a tso in a deregulated electricity industry can only indirectly influence outcomes through its choice of the transmission line capacity via a bi level model we show that this results in less transmission capacity and with limited emissions control in a perfectly competitive industry vis a vis a benchmark centrally planned system a carbon charge on industry that fully accounts for the cost of pollution damage leads to a perfect alignment of incentives and maximised social welfare only under perfect competition by contrast a carbon charge may actually lower social welfare under a cournot oligopoly as the resulting reduction in consumption facilitates the further exercise of market power

transmission and generation investment in electricity markets the effects of market splitting and network fee regimes abstract we propose an equilibrium model that allows to analyze the long run impact of the electricity market design on transmission line expansion by the regulator and investment in generation capacity by private firms in liberalized electricity markets the model incorporates investment decisions of the transmission system operator and private firms in expectation of an energy only market and cost based redispatch in different specifications we consider the cases of one vs multiple price zones market splitting and analyze different approaches to recover network cost in particular lump sum generation capacity based and energy based fees in order to compare the outcomes of our multilevel market model with a first best benchmark we also solve the corresponding integrated planner problem using two test networks we illustrate that energy only markets can lead to suboptimal locational decisions for generation capacity and thus imply excessive network expansion market splitting heals these problems only partially these results are valid for all considered types of network tariffs although investment slightly differs across those regimes

a dynamic oligopoly with collusion and price wars we provide a collusive framework with heterogeneity among jirms investment entry and exit it is a symmetric information model in which it is hard to sustain collusion when there is an activejim that is likely to exit in the near future numerical analysis is used to compare a collusive to a noncollusive environment only the collusive industry generates price wars also the collusive industry offers both more and higherquality products to consumers albeit often at a higher price the positive effect of collusion on variety and quality more than compensates consumers for the negative effect of collusive prices so that consumer surplus is larger with collusion

do generation firms in restructured electricity markets have incentives to support social welfare improving transmission investments this paper examines the incentives that generation firms have in restructured electricity markets for supporting long term transmission investments in particular we study whether generation firms which arguably play a dominant role in the restructured electricity markets have the incentives to fund or support incremental social welfare improving transmission investments we examine this question in a two node network and explore how such incentives are affected by the ownership of financial transmission rights ftrs by generation firms in the analyzed two node network we show both i that the net exporter generation firm has the correct incentives to increase the transmission capacity incrementally up to a certain level and ii that although a policy that allocates ftrs to the net exporter generation firm can be desirable from a social point of view such a policy would dilute the net importer generation firm s incentives to support transmission expansion moreover if all ftrs were allocated or auctioned off to the net exporter generation firm then it is possible to increase both consumer surplus and social welfare while keeping the net exporter generation firm revenue neutral

nonparametric estimation of exact consumers surplus and deadweight loss we apply nonparametric regression models to estimation of demand curves of the type most often used in applied research from the demand curve estimators we derive estimates of exact consumers surplus and deadweight loss which are the most widely used welfare and economic efficiency measures in areas of economics such as public finance we also develop tests of the symmetry and downward sloping properties of compensated demand we work out asymptotic normal sampling theory for kernel and series nonparametric estimators as well as for the parametric case the paper includes an application to gasoline demand empirical questions of interest here are the shape of the demand curve and the average magnitude of welfare loss from a tax on gasoline in this application we compare parametric and nonparametric estimates of the demand curve calculate exact and approximate measures of consumers surplus and deadweight loss and give standard error estimates we also analyze the sensitivity of the welfare measures to components of nonparametric regression estimators such as the number of terms in a series approximation

the determination of price and output quotas in a heterogeneous cartel applying a selection criterion that uses both subgame perfection and the nash bargaining solution this paper investigates the relationship between firms cost functions and collusive behavior it is found that the optimal collusive price exceeds the price that the low cost firm would set if it was a monopolist comparative statics reveal that the optimal collusive price is increasing in the low cost firm s unit cost but is decreasing in the high cost firm s unit cost when the cost differential between firms is sufficiently large copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

growth renewables and the optimal carbon tax optimal climate policy is investigated in a ramsey growth model of the global economy with exhaustible oil reserves an infinitely elastic supply of renewables stock dependent oil extraction costs and convex climate damages four regimes can occur depending on the initial social cost of oil being larger or smaller than that of renewables and depending on the initial oil stock being large or small we also offer some policy simulations for the first and second regime which illustrate that with a lower discount rate more oil is left in situ and renewables are phased in more quickly we identify the conditions under which the optimal carbon tax rises or decreases subsidizing renewables without a carbon tax induces more oil to be left in situ and a quicker phasing in of renewables but oil is depleted more rapidly initially the net effect on global warming is ambiguous abstract from author

tacit collusion in the presence of cyclical demand and endogenous capacity levels abstract we analyze tacit collusion in an industry characterized by cyclical demand and long run scale decisions firms face deterministic demand cycles and choose capacity levels prior to competing in prices our focus is on the nature of prices we find that two types of price wars may exist in one collusion can involve periods of mixed strategy price wars in the other consistent with the rotemberg and saloner 1986 definition of price wars we show that collusive prices can also become counter cyclical we also establish pricing patterns with respect to the relative prices in booms and recessions if the marginal cost of capacity is high enough holding current demand constant prices in the boom are generally lower than the prices in the recession this reverses the results of haltiwanger and harrington 1991 in contrast if the marginal cost of capacity is low enough then prices in the boom are generally higher than the prices in the recession for costs in an intermediate range numerical examples are calculated to show specific pricing patterns

imperfect cartelization in opec a model of global oil production is applied to study cartelization by opec countries we define a measure for the degree of cooperation analogous to the market conduct parameter of cyert et al 1973 geroski et al 1987 lofaro 1999 and symeonidis 2000 this parameter is used to assess the incentives of different opec members to collude we find that heterogeneity in opec and the supplies of the non opec fringe create strong incentives against collusion more specifically opec s supply strategy although observed to be substantially more restrictive than that of a cournot nash oligopoly is found to still be more accommodative than that of a perfect cartel the strategy involves allocating larger than proportionate quotas to smaller and relatively costlier producers as if to bribe their participation in the cartel this is in contrast to predictions of the standard cartel model that such producers should be allocated relatively more stringent quotas furthermore we demonstrate that cartel collusion is more likely to be sustained for elastic than for inelastic demand since global oil demand is well known to be inelastic this observation provides another structural explanation for why opec behavior is inconsistent with that of a perfect cartel our study points to multiple headwinds that limit opec s ability to mark up the oil price 2016 elsevier b v

consumer choice and cournot behavior in capacity constrained duopoly competition in a two stage model of duopolistic capacity choice and subsequent price competition consumer switching costs can deter some consumers from seeking service at a low price firm that lacks sufficient capacity to serve the entire market in this setting firms residual demand functions are aggregatedfrom thefirm selection decisions of individual consumers based on firms prices and their induced degrees of service reliability if consumers are approximately risk neutral with respect to service reliability then capacity constrained duopoly competition has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which firms choose cournot capacities and prices the equilibrium robustness of cournot behavior extends to duopoly markets in which consumer switching costs are induced by subscription pricing