pension profile preferences the influence of trust and expected expenses this paper studies the influence of people s expectations about expenses during retirement and trust in pension funds on preferences for different pension arrangements although most workers prefer

temptation and social security in a dynastic framework abstract we investigate welfare and aggregate implications of a pay as you go payg social security system in a dynastic framework in which individuals have self control problems the presence of self control problems induces individuals to save less because of their urge for temptation towards current consumption individuals efforts to balance between the short term urge for temptation and the long term commitment for consumption smoothing result in self control costs in this environment payg social security works as a self control cost reducing device in contrast the presence of altruism induces individuals to save more this in turn mitigates the adverse effects of self control problems and payg social security on savings but magnifies the self control costs we find that in our environment the adverse welfare effects of a payg system are further mitigated relative to the environments that incorporate altruism and self control issues separately however the level of mitigation is quite modest

coworker influence on annuitization decisions evidence from defined benefit plans abstract we investigate the role of coworker influence on an individual s annuitization decision using rich data on payout options and decisions in defined benefit plans we find that past payout choices of coworkers significantly affect an employee s decision to annuitize at retirement and that the coworkers payout choices have a larger economic effect on annuitization than recent stock market returns we also find that coworker effects are greater for employees who have a similar level of benefit amounts those who share geographic proximity same zip code and those who retire at a norm modal retirement age of their workplace robustness tests show that estimated coworker effects are unlikely to be driven by unobserved common environments or similar preferences

selection effects in the united kingdom individual annuities market this paper explores adverse selection in the voluntary and compulsory individual annuity markets in the united kingdom two empirical regularities support standard models of adverse selection first annuitants are longer lived than non annuitants these mortality differences are more pronounced in the voluntary than in the compulsory annuity market we estimate that the amount of adverse selection in the compulsory market is about one half of that in the voluntary market second the pricing of different types of annuity products within each annuity market is consistent with individuals selecting products based in part on private information about their mortality prospects the aging of populations in many developed nations has generated substantial interest in the way households finance consumption in their retirement years annuities insurance products that provide a payment stream for as long as the insured individual is alive offer one way to spread an accumulated stock of resources over a retirement period of uncertain length theoretical research beginning with yaari 1965 suggests substantial utility gains from annuitisation in the presence of stochastic length of life public policy discussions have also generated substantial current interest in the operation of annuity markets the decline in long term interest rates in the united kingdom since the early 1990s has coincided with a decline in annuity payouts relative to annuity premia this has sparked a debate

cognitive constraints on valuing annuities this paper documents consumers difficulty valuing life annuities using a purpose built experiment in the american life panel we show that the prices at which people are willing to buy annuities are substantially below the prices at which they are willing to sell them we also find that buy values are negatively correlated with sell values and that the sell buy valuation spread is negatively correlated with cognition this spread is larger for those with less education weaker numerical abilities and lower levels of financial literacy our evidence contributes to the emerging literature on heterogeneity in financial decision making abilities particularly regarding retirement payouts jel d14 d91 g11 h55

cooperation and competition in intergenerational experiments in the field and the laboratory there is economic pressure towards the postponement of the retirement age but employers are still reluctant to employ older workers we investigate the comparative behavior of juniors and seniors in experiments conducted both onsite with the employees of two large firms and in a conventional laboratory environment with students and retirees we show that seniors are no more risk averse than juniors and are typically more cooperative both juniors and working seniors respond strongly to competition the implication is that it may be beneficial to define additional incentives near the end of the career to motivate and retain older workers

defined benefit pension plan distribution decisions by public sector employees abstract studies examining pension distribution choices have found that the tendency of private sector workers is to select lump sum distributions instead of life annuities resulting in leakage of retirement savings in the public sector defined benefit pensions usually offer lump sum distributions equal to employee contributions not the present value of the annuity thus for terminating employees that are younger or have shorter tenures the lump sum distribution amount may exceed the present value of the annuity we discuss the factors that may influence the choice to withdraw funds or not in this environment using administrative data from the north carolina state and local government retirement systems we find that over two thirds of public sector workers under age 50 separating prior to retirement from public plans in north carolina left their accounts open and did not request a cash distribution from the pension system within one year of separation furthermore the evidence suggests many separating workers particularly those with short tenure may be forgoing substantial monetary benefits due to lack of knowledge understanding or accessibility of benefits we find no evidence of a bias toward cash distributions for public employees in north carolina

vertical product differentiation network externalities and compatibility decisions abstract we analyse the subgame perfect equilibrium of a four stage game in a model of vertical product differentiation where the consumer s evaluation of a product depends on its inherent quality and on its network s size first two firms choose their product s inherent quality then they may mutually agree on providing an adapter before competing in prices finally consumers buy we find that despite the high quality firm s preference for incompatibility an adapter is always provided in equilibrium social welfare is greater than without an adapter and can be improved by regulating compatibility only in those cases where qualities are differentiated too much

precautionary savings and the self employed this work focuses on the impact of uncertainty on savings under bequest form specifically we estimate whether and to what extent income variability does have an effect on post mortem savings we approximate the post mortem savings with the closest dedicated savings which is savings in term insurance a lump sum inherited at the death of the subscriber furthermore we test whether the intensity of the income variance or the riskiness of the job type such as self employment matters more in the choice our results show that self employment status is one of the most relevant variables affecting term insurance ownership

an investigation of time preferences life expectancy and annuity versus lump sum choices can smoking harm long term saving decisions abstract we exploit the fact that israeli pension insurance policies do not take health conditions or smoking status into account in annuity pricing to investigate the potential effect of being a smoker on retirement payout choices contrary to the idea that smokers have higher discount rates and thus should prefer the lump sum option and even though the insurance pricing mechanism means that smokers would be offered the same annuity as nonsmokers all else equal we find that smokers do not prefer the lump sum option we offer and test several potential explanations for our findings illusions regarding life expectancy self control and advantageous selection

chicken and egg competition among intermediation service providers we analyze a model of imperfect price competition between intermediation service providers we insist on features that are relevant for informational intermediation via the internet the presence of indirect network externalities the possibility of using the nonexclusive services of several intermediaries and the widespread practice of price discrimination based on users identity and on usage efficient market structures emerge in equilibrium as well as some specific form of inefficient structures intermediaries have incentives to propose non exclusive services as this moderates competition and allows them to exert market power we analyze in detail the pricing and business strategies followed by intermediation services providers copyright 2003 by the rand corporation

health and mortality delta assessing the welfare cost of household insurance choice we develop a pair of risk measures health and mortality delta for the universe of life and health insurance products a life cycle model of insurance choice simplifies to replicating the optimal health and mortality delta through a portfolio of insurance products we estimate the model to explain the observed variation in health and mortality delta implied by the ownership of life insurance annuities including private pensions and long term care insurance in the health and retirement study for the median household aged 51 to 57 the lifetime welfare cost of market incompleteness and suboptimal choice is 3 2 of total wealth

monopoly pricing with network externalities abstract how should a monopolist price a durable good or a new technology that is subject to network externalities in particular should the monopolist set a low introductory price to attract a critical mass of adopters in this paper we provide intuition as to when and why introductory pricing might occur in the presence of network externalities incomplete information about demand or asymmetric information about costs is necessary for introductory pricing to occur in equilibrium when consumers are small

optimal annuitization with stochastic mortality and correlated medical costs the conventional wisdom since yaari 1965 is that households without a bequest motive should fully annuitize their investments numerous frictions do not break this sharp result we modify the yaari framework by allowing a household s mortality risk itself to be stochastic due to health shocks a lifetime annuity still helps to hedge longevity risk but the annuity s remaining present value is correlated with medical costs such as those for nursing home care thereby reducing annuity demand even without ad hoc liquidity constraints we find that most households should not hold a positive level of annuities and many should hold negative amounts jel d14 d82 g23 i12 j14 j26

heavily skewed pricing in two sided markets a common feature in two sided markets is the prevalence of heavily skewed pricing strategies in which price markups are much higher on one side of the market than the other we show that maximal skewed pricing is profit maximizing under constant elasticity of demand the most elastic side of the market is used to generate maximum demand by providing it with platform services at the lowest possible price full participation of the high elasticity low price side of the market attracts the other side as this side is less price elastic the platform is able to extract high prices

family ties and the crowding out of long term care insurance insurance for long term care ltc has developed only moderately compared to other areas of welfare which has been explained variously as the result of market failures public misconceptions of the risk of ltc needs and intergenerational contracts this paper offers a cultural explanation for the limited ltc insurance development in europe it argues that family ties by enhancing informal care giving duties inhibit individuals expected public and private insurance coverage the empirical analysis of the paper exploits cross country and sub group variability of a representative database of european union member states containing records on ltc coverage and family structure drawing upon two measures of familistic culture or family ties we find a negative association between family ties and expected coverage of ltc for different sub samples these results are robust to a set of checks for different definitions of family ties and controls and for a sub sample of first and second generation migrants policy implications suggest that widespread expansion of ltc coverage might need to accommodate existing familistic cultural norms to avoid insurance crowding out

coordinating adoption decisions under externalities and incomplete information abstract a monopolist sells a good whose value depends on the number of buyers who adopt it as well as on their private types the seller coordinates the buyers adoption decisions based on their reported types and charges them the price based on the number of adoptions we study ex post implementable sales schemes that are collusion proof and show that under the revenue maximizing scheme more buyer types are willing to adopt when there are more adoptions and the number of adoptions is maximized subject to the participation constraints

intergenerational transfers production and income distribution abstract we consider an overlapping generations economy where the aggregative production process uses physical capital and human capital intergenerational transfers from parents to their children are motivated by altruism we distinguish between two types of transfers investment of parents in the education of their offspring and capital transfer the gift bequest motive we show that the intensity of each type of altruism and hence the composition of the two types of transfers affect significantly the equilibrium output and the intragenerational income distributions comparing competitive equilibria from the same initial distributions of capital transfers and human capital we derive a the economy with the higher education inclined altruism attains lower output and more equal intragenerational income distributions if either the production function s elasticity of substitution is not large or the altruism is weak b for more bequest inclined altruism the effects are usually reversed c under public provision of education higher bequest inclined altruism results in lower output and less equal distribution of income in all dates

the annuity puzzle remains a puzzle abstract we examine incomplete annuity menus background risk bequest motives and default risk as possible drivers of divergence from full annuitization contrary to what is often suggested in the literature we find that full annuitization remains optimal if saving is possible after retirement this holds irrespective of whether real or only nominal annuities are available whenever liquidity is desired individuals save sizeable amounts out of their annuity income to smooth consumption shocks similarly adding equity linked annuities to the menu does not increase welfare significantly since individuals can invest in stocks in order to get the desired equity exposure

trading networks with price setting agents abstract in a wide range of markets individual buyers and sellers trade through intermediaries who determine prices via strategic considerations typically not all buyers and sellers have access to the same intermediaries and they trade at correspondingly different prices that reflect their relative amounts of power in the market we model this phenomenon using a game in which buyers sellers and traders engage in trade on a graph that represents the access each buyer and seller has to the traders we show that the resulting game always has a subgame perfect nash equilibrium and that all equilibria lead to an efficient allocation of goods finally we analyze trader profits in terms of the graph structure roughly a trader can command a positive profit if and only if it has an essential connection in the network thus providing a graph theoretic basis for quantifying the amount of competition among traders

demand for annuities price sensitivity risk perceptions and knowledge abstract the demand for voluntary individual lifetime annuities is low as merely 10 of soon to be retired canadians care to buy such contracts to assess the reasons why we design a stated preference experiment in which we vary characteristics of annuity contracts to estimate individuals sensitivity to an annuity s money s worth that is the value to cost ratio using different measures of longevity risk and survival expectations we investigate how knowledge of annuity products and mortality risk misperceptions affect the take up and the sensitivity of the demand for annuities we find that annuities are objectively actuarially neutral in general meaning that annuity premiums are equal to their expected payment and can appear to offer great value for the money given an individual s subjective mortality risk we also find that demand is somewhat price inelastic so that lowering the price of annuities could increase demand by at most 2 percentage points for a base of 10 lack of knowledge of annuities explains another 0 8 percentage points we find limited additional interest for deferred annuities compared to immediate annuities although respondents are less sensitive to deferred annuity prices

the role of life insurance in an emerging economy human capital protection assets allocation and social interaction abstract in this paper we provide micro econometric evidence on the determinants of life insurance demand in china the largest emerging market in the world we employ the china household income project chip dataset for the year 2002 in the analysis the timing is ideal because of the nature of the less well developed capital markets and social security systems in china in 2002 which sets a suitable stage to study the insurance demand behavior of emerging markets the results indicate that both the human capital protection motive and the asset allocation motive are important in explaining the purchase of life insurance in china in addition we present three empirical regularities 1 the positive correlation between the returns to human capital and the returns to market portfolio decrease the demand for life insurance 2 both the current wealth and future income of a household exert curvilinear impacts on life insurance demand 3 the breadth of a households social connections has substantial impacts on life insurance demand

adoption externalities as public goods abstract a public good problem arises naturally in situations characterized by positive externalities or negative externalities for positive externalities agents furnish a public good by taking an action similarly for negative externalities agents furnish a public good by not taking an action we examine these externalities in a binary choice problem i e adoption externalities in each case there is a potential role for government intervention even when equilibrium transfers are not allowed since one equilibrium pareto dominates all others we analyze the positive and normative features of equilibria in these models and we explore the possibility of useful government intervention

stock market returns and annuitization abstract i investigate the strong negative relation between recent stock returns and the annuitization of retirement savings using a novel data set with over 100 000 actual payout decisions after controlling for several standard explanations e g wealth effects i present evidence supporting naive beliefs and extrapolation from past returns the effect of recent returns on annuitization dramatically increases with age confirming that the elderly rely most heavily on recent information my results provide insights into how beliefs are formed in old age and have implications for the design of public policies seeking to promote annuitization

the choice to cash out pension rights at job change or retirement abstract most pension plans allow a lump sum distribution upon job separation enabling a subsequent cash out in the 1992 2000 hrs 13 of entitlements were cashed out representing 5 3 of entitlement dollars among plans with a lump sum option 20 were cashed out cash outs can be rational and we broadly confirm hypotheses for cash out determinants but not that individuals with short expected longevity should wish to disproportionately cash out fears of adverse selection into the pool of pensioners with annuity income thus appear unfounded while we find only limited leakage it is concentrated among individuals vulnerable to poverty in old age

the effect of inheritance receipt on retirement abstract this paper provides new evidence on how wealth shocks influence retirement behavior economic theory generally posits that leisure is a normal good yet it is difficult to obtain reliable empirical estimates of the wealth effect because wealth is correlated with numerous unobservable characteristics that affect labor supply we use inheritance receipt as a wealth shock and find that it is associated with a significant increase in the probability of retirement especially when the inheritance is unexpected this evidence has important implications for how public policies such as pension or tax reform may influence retirement behavior through the wealth effect

network competition ii price discrimination our companion article developed a clear conceptual framework of negotiated or regulated interconnection agreements between rival operators and studied competition between interconnected networks under the assumption of nondiscriminatory pricing this article relaxes this assumption and allows networks to charge different prices for calls terminating on the subscriber s network and those terminating on a rivals network this creates a price differential between services that are identical for the consumer and generates network externalities despite network interconnection we show that in both the mature and entry phases of the industry the nature of competition is substantially affected by such price discrimination

pricing in social networks we analyze the problem of optimal monopoly pricing in social networks where agents care about consumption or prices of their neighbors we characterize the relation between optimal prices and consumers centrality in the social network this relation depends on the market structure monopoly vs oligopoly and on the type of externalities consumption versus price we identify two situations where the monopolist does not discriminate across nodes in the network linear monopoly with consumption externalities and local monopolies with price externalities we also analyze the robustness of the analysis with respect to changes in demand and the introduction of bargaining between the monopolist and the consumer

pricing network effects the increase in the information that firms can collect or purchase about network effects across consumers motivates two important questions how does a firm s pricing strategy react to detailed information on network effects are the availability and use of such information beneficial or detrimental to consumer surplus we develop a model in which a monopoly sells a network good and price discriminates based on information about consumers influence and consumers susceptibility to influence the monopoly optimally offers consumers price discounts for their influence and charges price premia for their susceptibility the price premia and the price discounts are simple functions of the pattern of network effects we determine under which conditions relative to uniform price consumer surplus increases and we characterize the value of information on network effects for the monopoly

adverse selection in insurance markets policyholder evidence from the u k annuity market in this paper we investigate the importance of adverse selection in insurance markets we use a unique data set consisting of all annuity policies sold by a large u k insurance company since the early 1980s to analyze mortality differences among individuals who purchased different types of policies we find systematic relationships between ex post mortality and annuity policy characteristics such as whether the annuity will make payments to the estate in the event of an untimely death and whether the payments from the annuity rise over time these mortality patterns are consistent with the presence of asymmetric information in the annuity market we find no evidence of substantive mortality differences however across annuities of different size even though models of insurance market equilibrium with asymmetric information would predict such differences we also find that the pricing of various features of annuity contracts is consistent with the self selection patterns we find in mortality rates our results therefore suggest that selection may occur across many specific features of insurance contracts and that the absence of selection on one contract dimension does not preclude its presence on others this highlights the importance of considering the detailed features of insurance contracts when testing theoretical models of asymmetric information

controlling preferences for lotteries on units of experimental exchange in an experimental setting when outcomes are stochastically related to actions predictions of equilibrium behavior depend not only on the participants preference orderings of outcomes but also on their orderings of lotteries on outcomes as well we introduce and test a reward structure that can be utilized in any experimental setting to allow the experimenter to decree beforehand the subjects preferences for lotteries on experimental outcomes we show analytically that the proposed reward structure can induce subjects to behave as if they have the decreed preference function defined on experimental outcomes empirical tests using two different choice settings provide evidence to support this ability to control preferences

an experimental test for risk aversion abstract this paper evaluates an experimental method to measure attitudes to risk in individual subjects the method is applied to study the degree of risk aversion of 46 subjects the results lead us to reject a working hypothesis of risk neutrality for such experimental subjects

two sided network effects a theory of information product design how can firms profitably give away free products this paper provides a novel answer and articulates trade offs in a space of information product design we introduce a formal model of two sided network externalities based in textbook economics a mix of katz and shapiro network effects price discrimination and product differentiation externality based complements however exploit a different mechanism than either tying or lock in even as they help to explain many recent strategies such as those of firms selling operating systems internet browsers games music and video the model presented here argues for three simple but useful results first even in the absence of competition a firm can rationally invest in a product it intends to give away into perpetuity second we identify distinct markets for content providers and end consumers and show that either can be a candidate for a free good third product coupling across markets can increase consumer welfare even as it increases firm profits the model also generates testable hypotheses on the size and direction of network effects while offering insights to regulators seeking to apply antitrust law to network markets

new evidence on the money s worth of individual annuities this paper presents new information on the expected present discounted value of payouts on individual life annuities the annuity we examine is the single premium immediate life annuity an insurance product that pays out a nominal level sum as long as the covered person lives in exchange for an initial lump sum premium this annuity offers protection against the risk of someone outliving his saving given uncertainty about longevity for reasonable estimates of behavioral parameters we calculate that individual annuities are currently priced so that retirees without bequest motives should find these policies of substantial value in configuring their portfolios to smooth retirement consumption we also find that the expected present discounted value of payouts relative to the initial cost of the annuity has increased over the last decade these findings bear on the policy debate regarding the role of individual choice and self reliance in retirement planning this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

inter vivos transfers and exchange most parents divide their bequests equally among their children whereas inter vivos transfers are usually unequal we propose that exchange is better for inducing inter vivos transfers than bequests inter vivos transfers can be adjusted quickly to the amount of care are less costly than writing a will and can be kept secret from other family members and the public the results from national longitudinal data show that as expected if a parent gives any inter vivos transfers she is more likely to give to children who provide informal care informal care has no effect on the equality of intended bequests

bequest motives and determinants of micro life insurance in sri lanka this paper emphasizes bequest motives by evaluating participation patterns in micro life insurance against insurance demand and supply side factors based on household survey data from sri lanka it presents evidence on the determinants of micro life insurance participation of low income households using probit and tobit models the results provide evidence that micro life insurance is positively correlated with measures of bequest motives such as the number of children or dependents besides better off households are less excluded from micro life insurance markets than their poorer counterparts the study finds a convincing need for the microinsurance sector to be more responsive to the needs of the poor with a key role in providing financial education to understand the need for microinsurance

optimal pricing in networks with externalities we study the optimal pricing strategies of a monopolist selling a divisible good service to consumers who are embedded in a social network a key feature of our model is that consumers experience a positive local network effect in particular each consumer s usage level depends directly on the usage of her neighbors in the social network structure thus the monopolist s optimal pricing strategy may involve offering discounts to certain agents who have a central position in the underlying network our results can be summarized as follows first we consider a setting where the monopolist can offer individualized prices and derive a characterization of the optimal price for each consumer as a function of her network position in particular we show that it is optimal for the monopolist to charge each agent a price that consists of three components i a nominal term that is independent of the network structure ii a discount term proportional to the influence that this agent exerts over the rest of the social network quantified by the agent s bonacich centrality and iii a markup term proportional to the influence that the network exerts on the agent in the second part of the paper we discuss the optimal strategy of a monopolist who can only choose a single uniform price for the good and derive an algorithm polynomial in the number of agents to compute such a price third we assume that the monopolist can offer the good in two prices full and discounted and we study the problem of determining which set of consumers should be given the discount we show that the problem is np hard however we provide an explicit characterization of the set of agents who should be offered the discounted price next we describe an approximation algorithm for finding the optimal set of agents we show that if the profit is nonnegative under any feasible price allocation the algorithm guarantees at least 88 of the optimal profit finally we highlight the value of network information by comparing the profits of a monopolist who does not take into account the network effects when choosing her pricing policy to those of a monopolist who uses this information optimally

hypothetical intertemporal consumption choices the paper extends and replicates part of the analysis by barsky juster kimball and shapiro 1997 which exploits hypothetical choices among different consumption streams to infer intertemporal substitution elasticities and rates of time preference we use a new and much larger dataset than barsky et al furthermore we estimate structural models of intertemporal choice while parameterizing the parameters of interest as a function of relevant individual characteristics we also consider lobehaviorallc extensions like habit formation models with habit formation appear to be superior to models with intertemporally additive preferences

behavioral impediments to valuing annuities complexity and choice bracketing this paper examines two behavioral factors that diminish people s ability to value a lifetime income stream or annuity drawing on a randomized experiment with about 4 000 adults in a u s national

inter vivos transfers and bequests in three oecd countries reforms reducing the generosity of pensions have distributional effects on future generations if individuals care about their descendants welfare but only affect elderly individuals if bequests are the unintentional result of precautionary savings and safety net programmes such as unemployment insurance may displace sources of private help such as that provided by living parents to their children in need this paper provides comparable measures of how expected bequests and transfers vary with cumulated parental earnings in the united states west germany and the united kingdom the strength of bequest motives is empirically very weak in the available data private inter vivos transfers which appear to depend on the recipients economic situation are partly crowded out by public unemployment insurance programmes together involuntary bequests and intentional inter vivos transfers appear to be an important channel of intergenerational inequality transmission and strengthen substantially the relationship between an individual s and his parents economic status ernesto villanueva

the tenure transition decision for elderly homeowners abstract there exists evidence of a sizable shift of elderly households away from homeownership the paper explores two sets of potential determinants of this decision one set derives from the life cycle hypothesis a second set is intended to apply to households that do not conform to the predictions of life cycle theory the results from estimating a tenure transition likelihood function provide some support for each set of explanations in particular they suggest that it is premature to dismiss the role of life cycle hypothesis behavior in explaining the decision of elderly households to terminate homeownership

hotelling bertrand duopoly competition under firm specific network effects abstract social pressure plays a crucial role in consumer choices the impact of network social effects has also been largely recognised in the context of market competition in this paper we consider a duopoly where competing firms are differentiated solely by the level of social or network externality they induce on consumers perceived utility we fully characterise nash equilibria in locations prices and market shares under a scenario of weak social externality firms opt for maximum differentiation and the firm with the highest social recognition enjoys a relative advantage in terms of profit this outcome is not the only possible we formally prove that large values of social recognition may lead to adverse coordination among consumers and move the strongest firm out of the market with positive probability this scenario is related to a pareto inefficient trap of no differentiation

new evidence on altruism a study of tiaa cref retirees this paper investigates the role in household wealth accumulation of saving for bequests it employs data from a 1988 survey of tiaa cref annuitants designed to measure pension and other net worth as well as lifetime earnings about half of the households in the data plan to leave estates and the authors find that their behavior conforms with theoretical altruistic models for the same families the amount of wealth that the authors attribute to estate building is large nevertheless altruism towards one s children does not seem to be the major explanation of saving in the overall sample copyright 1996 by american economic association

adverse selection in the annuity market and the role for social security i study the role of social security in providing insurance when there is adverse selection in the annuity market i calculate welfare gain from mandatory annuitization in the social security system relative to a laissez faire benchmark using a model in which individuals have private information about their mortality i estimate large heterogeneity in mortality using the health and retirement study despite that i find small welfare gain from mandatory annuitization social security has a large effect on annuity prices because it crowds out demand by high mortality individuals welfare gain would have been significantly larger in the absence of this effect

market games as social dilemmas abstract in an experimental exchange market based on shapley and shubik 1977 two types of players with different preferences and endowments independently submit quantities of the goods they wish to exchange in this context although the nash equilibria of the game involve zero or minimum trade we obtain intense trade close to levels that maximize social welfare going a step forward we implement communication within pairs of traders from the same horizontal and opposite vertical sides of the market overall we find that horizontal communication tends to reduce bids whereas vertical communication has no effect

to own or not to own your life insurance policy abstract life insurance proceeds are generally subject to the estate tax an exception is when the policy is owned by the beneficiaries and the insured gives up ownership and control including the ability to change beneficiaries should the insured strategically own the policy contract and potentially subject proceeds to estate and inheritance taxes or relinquish control with the beneficiaries owning the policy and escape such transfer taxes this paper addresses how the estate tax influences the choice of life insurance ownership using samples of estate tax returns the empirical evidence suggests that those facing high estate tax rates are more likely to forgo ownership and have proceeds excluded from their estates and provides further evidence on the incentive effect of taxes and in support of the strategic bequest motive

education social security and growth abstract we study the role of government s allocation of tax revenues between two outlays public investment in education a transfer to the young generation and social security benefits to the older generation in an overlapping generations economy with pay as you go social security and altruistically motivated transfers from parents to children we analyze how the allocation of the tax revenues between the two outlays affects growth and welfare in competitive equilibria a we obtain comparative dynamics results for nonstationary equilibria subject to a change in the allocation profile b for stationary equilibria we show that for a given allocation profile of the tax revenues educational subsidies can either increase the growth rate or decrease it depending on the parameters of the model preferences production function and the tax rate c if government seeks to allocate funds in a way that maximizes the growth rate we demonstrate that under some plausible conditions it is not optimal to maintain pay as you go social security however if parents preferences combine strong concern for their retirement with significant degree of altruism towards their children then pay as you go social security system does enhance growth and welfare

what makes annuitization more appealing we conduct and analyze two large surveys of hypothetical annuitization choices we find that allowing individuals to annuitize a fraction of their wealth increases annuitization relative to a situation where annuitization is an all or nothing decision very few respondents choose declining real payout streams over flat or increasing real payout streams of equivalent expected present value highlighting the effects of inflation increases demand for cost of living adjustments frames that highlight flexibility control and investment significantly reduce annuitization a majority of respondents prefer to receive an extra bonus payment during one month of the year that is funded by slightly lower payments in the remaining months concerns about later life income spending flexibility and counterparty risk are the most important self reported motives that influence the annuitization decision

local network externalities and market segmentation this paper models interaction between groups of agents by means of a graph where each node represents a group of agents and an arc represents bilateral interaction it departs from the standard katz shapiro framework by assuming that network benefits are restricted only amongst groups of linked agents it shows that even if rival firms engage in bertrand competition this form of network externalities permits strong market segmentation in which firms divide up the market and earn positive profits the analysis also shows that some graphs or network structures do not permit such segmentation while for others there are easy to interpret conditions under which market segmentation obtains in equilibrium c 2009 elsevier b v all rights reserved

household response to government debt evidence from life insurance holdings we use state level panel data on life insurance in force in the united states and find that a 1 increase in government debt at either the state or federal level is associated with a 0 96 increase in the face value of the average life insurance holdings per capita for a household in the average state this increase represents an intention to save that would almost completely offset the government debt in specific states of the world i e if the insured dies because this state of the world is rare the immediate increase in actual savings is only about 0 03 the cost of the additional insurance we find in addition that this response occurs mainly on the intensive margin meaning that the size of the average life insurance policy increases when government debt increases along the extensive margin we find the number of policies in force falls slightly with federal debt and rises slightly with state debt increases the results show altruistic planning in response to changes in government debt that are consistent with ricardian equivalence and the long run neutrality of government debt

dynamic price competition with network effects i consider a dynamic model of competition between two proprietary networks consumers die and are replaced with a constant hazard rate and firms compete for new consumers to join their network by offering network entry prices i derive a series of results pertaining to a existence and uniqueness of symmetric equilibria b monotonicity of the pricing function e g larger networks set higher prices c network size dynamics increasing dominance vs reversion to the mean and d firm value how it varies with network effects finally i apply my general framework to the study of termination charges in wireless telecommunications i consider various forms of regulation and examine their impact on firm profits and market share dynamics

discounting cognition and financial awareness new evidence from a change in the military retirement system the choice given military personnel between an immediate cash payment of 30 000 or a more generous retirement pension permits us to estimate individuals personal discount rates pdrs the resulting pdrs about 7 for enlisted personnel and 2 4 3 for officers are precise and are correlated with a variety of other financial behaviors the pdr is negatively related to educational attainment and the armed forces qualification test but cognition seems to operate through channels other than being better informed better informed individuals were not always measured to be more patient jel d91 d14

what accounts for the variation in retirement wealth among u s households even among households with similar socioeconomic characteristics saving and wealth vary considerably life cycle models attribute this variation to differences in time preference rates risk tolerance exposure to uncertainty relative tastes for work and leisure at advanced ages and income replacement rates these factors have testable implications concerning the relation between accumulated wealth and the shape of the consumption profile using the panel study of income dynamics and the consumer expenditure survey we find little support for these implications the data are instead consistent with rule of thumb mental accounting or hyperbolic discounting theories of wealth accumulation jel di d91 e21

anticipation and the valuation of delayed consumption this paper presents a model of intertemporal choice that incorporates savoring and dread i e utility from anticipat ion of delayed consumption the model explains why an individual with positive time preference may delay desirable outcomes or get unpleas ant outcomes over with quickly contrary to the prediction of convent ional formulations of intertemporal choice implications of savoring and dread for savings behavior empirical estimation of discount rate s and public policy efforts to combat myopic behavior are explored the model provides an explanation for common violations of the indepe ndence axiom as applied to intertemporal choice copyright 1987 by royal economic society

network interconnection in telecommunications this paper discusses industries such as telecommunications where firms each have their own customers and must interconnect with other firms to provide a comprehensive service two scenarios are considered i the case of a symmetric unregulated industry and ii the case of an industry with a dominant regulated incumbent in the first provided there is sufficient product differentiation it is shown that firms agree to set interconnection charges above associated costs in order to obtain the joint profit maximising outcome in the second a formula for the welfare maximizing interconnection charge is derived relations with the efficient component pricing rule are discussed

rationalizability learning and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities we study a rich class of noncooperative games that includes models of oligopoly competition macroeconomic coordination failures arms races bank runs technology adoption and diffusion r d competition pretrial bargaining coordination in teams and many others for all these games the sets of pure strategy nash equilibria correlated equilibria and rationalizable strategies have identical bounds also for a class of models of dynamic adaptive choice behavior that encompasses both best response dynamics and bayesian learning the players choices lie eventually within the same bounds these bounds are shown to vary monotonically with certain exogenous parameters we study the class of noncooperative supermodular games introduced by topkis 1979 and further analyzed by vives 1985 1989 who also pointed out the importance of these games in industrial economics supermodular games are games in which each player s strategy set is partially ordered the marginal returns to increasing one s strategy rise with increases in the competitors strategies so that the game exhibits strategic complementarity 2 and if a player s strategies are multidimensional marginal returns to any one com ponent of the player s strategy rise with increases in the other components this class turns out to encompass many of the most important economic applications of noncooperative game theory in macroeconomics diamond s 1982 search model and bryant s 1983 1984 rational expectations models can be represented as supermodular games in each of these models more activity by some members of the economy raises the returns to increased levels of activity by others in oligopoly theory some models of bertrand oligopoly with differentiated products qualify as supermodu lar games in these games when a firm s competitors raise their prices the marginal profitability of the firm s own price increase rises a similar structure is present in games of new technology adoption such as those of dybvig and spatt 1983 farrell and saloner 1986 and katz and shapiro 1986 when more users hook into a communication system or more manufacturers adopt an interface standard the marginal return to others of doing the same often rises similarly in some specifications of the bank runs model introduced by diamond and dybvig 1983 when more depositors withdraw their funds from a bank it is more worthwhile for other depositors to do the same in the warrant exercise

private pensions mortality risk and the decision to annuitize abstract this paper examines household decisions about whether or not to annuitize retirement resources a life cycle model of consumption implemented with the use of dynamic programming techniques is used to construct a utility based measure of annuity value for individuals and couples in the health and retirement survey variation in the calculated annuity equivalent wealth arises from differences in mortality risk marital status risk aversion and the presence of pre existing annuities such as social security i find that a one percentage point increase in the annuity equivalent wealth leads to nearly a one percentage point increase in the ex ante probability of annuitizing balances in defined contribution pension plans however because much of the variation in the expected annuity decision is left unexplained by the life cycle model other factors are also analyzed health status and an individual s time horizon for financial decision making are significant determinants of the decision there is no evidence that bequest motives are an important factor in making marginal annuity decisions

the choice between an annuity and a lump sum results from swiss pension funds this paper uses unique micro data from swiss employer based pension plans to study the annuitization decision at retirement the administrative nature of our data though limited with respect to individual background characteristics allows us to analyze real choices over large retirement balances rather than subjectively reported intentions to annuitize we find a strong and robust impact of a utility based measure of the annuity s value computed within a life cycle framework on individual annuitization rates low accumulation of retirement assets is strongly associated with the choice of the lump sum presumably due to the availability of means tested social assistance the sponsor s default option in most cases the annuity is also found to be highly influential in the decision to annuitize

time inconsistent preferences and the annuitization decision good news can involve difficult decisions for example winning a lottery jackpot can go along with the decision whether to have the jackpot paid out immediately as a lump sum or as periodic annual payments also when entering retirement most people face the decision whether they want their defined contribution account balance paid as a lump sum or to annuitize that amount the fact that people tend to choose the lump sum even if economic reasons suggest that they should choose the annuity is called the annuity paradox in a large online survey we find that people behave time inconsistent older people have a stronger tendency to choose the lump sum than younger people when they are asked to predict today what to choose when they retire this effect is considerably stronger for participants that answer simple time preference questions inconsistently our findings suggest to think about precommitment devices for the annuitization decision in the retirement case already at the time when the defined benefit plan is started

optimal annuitization uncertain survival probabilities and maxmin preferences we consider a life cycle model with bequest motives and assume that the individual does not know his her survival probability and has maxmin utility preferences we show that it is optimal not to annuitize but to purchase pure life insurance policies instead

how deep is the annuity market participation puzzle using microeconomic data for the united kingdom we analyze the empirical determinants of voluntary annuity market demand we find that annuity market participation increases with financial wealth life expectancy and education and decreases with other pension income and a possible bequest motive for surviving spouses we then show that these empirically motivated determinants of annuity market participation have the same quantitatively important effects in a life cycle model of annuity and life insurance demand saving and portfolio choice moreover reasonable preference parameters predict annuity demand levels comparable to the data for stockholders a strong bequest motive can simultaneously generate balanced portfolios and low annuity demand

personal traits and individual choices taking action in economic and non economic decisions abstract in a large number of decisions the option that does not require a specific action such as filling in a form is chosen frequently it is a stylized fact that opt in or opt out designs for otherwise identical choices lead to vastly different outcomes choice options are chosen more frequently simply because they are the no action alternative or default option however direct empirical evidence on the reasons for the popularity of defaults is scarce we devised a special survey module for the dutch dnb household survey to study potential explanations for default choices we find that the popularity of the default option is related to different personal traits in economic and non economic decisions financially literate individuals are more likely to take action and opt out the default option in economic decision making in non economic decisions procrastination increases the popularity of the default while individuals who care much about the opinion of others are more inclined to deviate from the default

pay as you go social security and the distribution of altruistic transfers this paper studies the impact of an unfunded social security system on the distribution of altruistic transfers in a framework where savings are due to both life cycle and random altruistic motivations we show that the effect of social security on the distribution of these transfers depends crucially on the strength of the bequest motive in explaining savings behaviour we measure this strength by the expected weight that individuals attach to the utility of future generations on the one hand if the bequest motive is strong then an increase in the social security tax raises the bequests left by altruistic parents on the other hand when the importance of altruism in motivating savings is sufficiently low the increase in the social security tax could result in a reduction of the bequests left by altruistic parents under some conditions on the attitude of individuals toward risk and on the relative returns associated with private saving and social security some implications concerning the transitional effects of introducing an unfunded social security scheme are also discussed

how strong are bequest motives evidence based on estimates of the demand for life insurance and annuities this paper presents new empirical evidence in support of the view that a significant fraction of total saving is motivated by the desire to leave bequests specifically i find that social security annuity benefits significantly raise life insurance holdings and depress private annuity holdings among elderly individuals these patterns indicate that the typical household would choose to maintain a positive fraction of its resources in bequeathable forms even if insurance markets were perfect evidence on the relationship between insurance purchases and total resources reinforces this conclusion

bertrand competition under network externalities abstract two firms engage in price competition to attract buyers located on a network the value of the good of either firm to any buyer depends on the number of neighbors on the network who adopt the same good when the size of externalities increases linearly with the number of adoptions we identify the set of pricing strategies that are consistent with an equilibrium in which one of the firms monopolizes the market the set includes marginal cost mc pricing as well as bipartition pricing which offers discounts to some buyers and charges markups to others we show that mc pricing fails to be an equilibrium under non linear externalities in a general network but identify conditions for an equilibrium with bipartition pricing to be robust against perturbations in the externalities from linearity the analysis is applied to platform competition in a two sided market under local and approximately linear externalities

bequests as signals an explanation for the equal division puzzle in the united states more than two thirds of decedents with multichild families divide their estates exactly equally among their children in contrast gifts given before death are usually unequal these findings challenge the validity of existing theories regarding the determination of intergenerational transfers in this paper we develop a theory that accounts for this puzzle based on the notion that the division of bequests provides a signal about a parent s altruistic preferences the theory can also explain the norm of unigeniture which prevails in other societies

annuities and individual welfare advancing annuity demand theory we present suffcient conditions for the optimality of full annuitization under market completeness that are substantially less restrictive than those used by yaari 1965 we examine demand with market incompleteness finding that positive annuitization remains optimal widely but complete annuitization does not how uninsured medical expenses affect demand for illiquid annuities depends critically on the timing of the risk a new set of calculations with optimal consumption trajectories very different from available annuity income streams still shows a preference for considerable annuitization suggesting that limited annuity purchases are plausibly due to psychological or behavioral biases

coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities divide and conquer abstract the paper studies bilateral contracting between n agents and one principal whose trade with each agent generates externalities on other agents it examines the effects of prohibiting the principal from i coordinating agents on her preferred equilibrium and ii making different contracts available to different agents these effects depend on whether an agent is more or less eager to trade when others trade more the prohibitions reduce the aggregate trade in the former case and have little or no effect in the latter case the inefficiencies under different contracting regimes are linked to the sign of the relevant externalities and are shown to be typically reduced by both prohibitions

how much does annuity demand react to a large price change in this paper we present new evidence for the effect of changes in annuity prices on the decision to annuitize we exploit an unprecedented change in policy in several swiss occupational pension plans there is an implied 8 percent reduction in the rate at which retirement capital is translated into an annuity and this represents a net present value loss of chf 18 500 around us 20 000 to estimate the impact of this change we use data from companies that changed their prices and from one large company that did not we find that the price change reduces the propensity to annuitize among affected individuals by 16 8 percentage points

life expectancy and claiming behavior in a flexible pension system we study the relationship between early claiming of pensions and incentives in the highly flexible norwegian public pension system measuring incentives to claim based on an estimated model for expected longevity despite a strong correlation between incentives and claiming decisions the additional costs to public budgets arising from this selection turn out to be modest based on analyses exploiting only variation in expected pensions generated by variation in parental longevities and only claiming of pensions not in conjunction with retirement we conclude that part of the selection is active some individuals claim pensions early because they gain from doing so this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

the effects of pensions on household wealth a reevaluation of theory and evidence this paper examines the extent to which households offset pension wealth with reductions in other wealth systematic econometric biases imply that the estimated offsets in previous empirical studies are smaller than the true offset and may even have the wrong sign new empirical estimates that do not correct for the biases generate little offset between pensions and other wealth estimates that correct for the biases show substantially more offset a smaller impact of pensions on overall saving than in most previous studies the estimates also indicate that the effects of pensions on wealth vary significantly across households

the cost of annuities implications for saving behavior and bequests the fact that most elderly u s individuals maintain a flat age wealth profile rather than buy individual life annuities contradicts the standard life cycle consumption model average expected yields on individual life annuities in the united states during 1968 1983 were lower by 4 21 6 13 percent or 2 43 4 35 percent after allowing for adverse selection than yields on plausible alternative investments simulations of a model of saving and portfolio allocation show that during the early retirement years such yield differentials can account for the absence of annuity purchases even without a bequest motive at older ages the combination of such yield differentials and a bequest motive can do so it is common experience that as we grow older and nearer to eternity we become more not less anxious about money derek brewer chaucer and his world p 213

should i default on my mortgage even if i can pay experimental evidence abstract we study strategic default in the laboratory i e in a controlled experiment subjects are initially endowed with a house and a mortgage we use neutral wording in the experiment and must decide at each period in which their mortgage is alive among three options making the mortgage payment selling the house or walking away from their house and defaulting on their mortgage at each point in time we can observe whether defaulters can afford to make the mortgage payment and thus directly compute the number of strategic defaulters subjects default in the right periods and quite fast learn what they should consume we find experimental support for the double trigger hypothesis individuals faced with low income and low house prices are more likely to default we observe that subjects default less than optimal and this decision is significantly affected by social norm concerns in the context of the experiment individuals under consume in the first periods of life they are cautious when indebted both introducing a 50 probability of recourse and a responsible homeowner reward are very effective in preventing default in the lab especially by individuals receiving a bad shock to income when house prices are low

risk aversion and rent seeking an extension and some experimental evidence theoretical investigations indicate that the risk attitudes of individuals will effect the amount of rent that can be assumed to be dissipated by rent seeking activities following this line of investigation we extend hillman and katz s work to a small numbers case and demonstrate that the degree to which a monopoly rent is dissipated is dependent upon the structure of the risk attitudes of two risk averse individuals

network competition i overview and nondiscriminatory pricing we develop a model of unregulated competition between interconnected networks and analyze the mature and transition phases of the industry in this deregulated environ ment networks pay negotiated or regulated access charges to each other and com pete in prices for customers we show that a competitive equilibrium may fail to exist for large access charges or for large network substitutability and that freely negotiated access charges may prevent effective competition in the mature phase of the industry and erect barriers to entry in the transition toward competition last we examine the meaning and impact of policies such as the efficient component pricing rule

accounting for risk aversion in repeated prisoners dilemma games an experimental test we apply experimental methods to study the role of risk aversion on players behavior in repeated prisoners dilemma games faced with quantitatively equal discount factors the most risk averse players will choose nash strategies more often in the presence of uncertainty than when future profits are discounted in a deterministic way overall we find that risk aversion relates negatively with the frequency of collusive outcomes

intergenerational transfers and the accumulation of wealth h t ouseholds acquire wealth from two sources they save out of income they have earned and they receive transfers from other people the first method of wealth accumulation goes under the name of life cycle saving in which people save during their working lives and dissave after retirement the second involves either an inter vivos transfer that is a transfer between living people or a bequest a transfer that occurs at the death of the donor while inter vivos transfers and bequests will arise in dynastic models where preferences include a taste for the well being of one s descendents few empirical life cycle models reflect these concerns indeed a sharp debate has arisen over the ability of the simple life cycle model to explain observed wealth accumulation understanding the relative sizes of these sources of wealth accumulation affects a variety of issues for example the effects of government debt social insurance public transfer programs estate taxes and incentives for charitable giving depend to some extent on the magnitude and nature of private saving and transfers of wealth analyses of the inequality of wealth may depend on whether most of wealth is earned or received as transfers appropriate policies for encouraging private saving may look rather different depending on whether most saving is to be consumed later in life or passed along to the next generation finally evidence on transfer patterns relates to more fundamental