a theory of the cross sectional fertility differential job heterogeneity approach this article presents a theory of the cross sectional fertility differential which produces the negative wage fertility relationship based on job heterogeneity although evidence suggests the importance of job heterogeneity in the labor market it has largely been ignored in theories of fertility choice i show that a theory incorporating job heterogeneity requires only standard conditions on preferences to generate the negative wage fertility relationship and the negative relationship derived from the model is robust to changes in economic environments e g public policy and technology furthermore the theory reconciles the negative cross sectional wage fertility relationship with various time series variations in aggregate fertility

inter industry wage differentials evidence from sweden and a comparison with the united states inter industry wage differentials evidence from sweden and a comparison with the united states

effort and wages evidence from the payroll tax this is a pre copy editing author produced pdf file of an article accepted for publication canadian journal of economics following peer review this accepted manuscript is being archived under the conditions specified in the bu open access policy

cooperative and noncooperative r d in duopoly with spillovers contrary to the usual assumption made in most oligopoly models relations among firms are seldom of a wholly cooperative or noncooperative type in many situations they compete in some fields while they cooperate in others an important example is the case of cooperative research efforts bringing fierce competitors together two types of agreement are observed first r d cooperation can take place at the so called precompetitive stage companies share basic information and efforts in the r d stage but remain rivals in the market place 1 a second type of agreement involves an extended collusion between partners creating common policies at the product level the usual justifications of this extension are the difficulties of protecting intellectual property the idea is then to allow partners who have achieved inventions together to also control together the processes and products which embody the results of their collaboration in order to recuperate jointly their r d investments 2 what could be expected from these types of agreement is a reduction in r d expenditures because of less wasteful duplication and a reduction of total production because of more reprinted from the american economic review 78 5 1133 1137 1988 center for operations research econometrics 1348 louvain la neuve belgium we are grateful to jean

an empirical analysis of wage dispersion and efficiency wages the main purpose of this study is to examine inter industry wage differentials in sweden after controlling for individual and job characteristics the results indicate that these differentials are substantial the ranking of the differentials was stable over time while the dispersion of wage premiums fell by 50 per cent during the period 1968 81 a period of strong efforts to reduce wage dispersion in sweden the relation between industry wage premiums and a number of industry characteristics is also examined along with new evidence which is in line with the shirking model hypothesis on the relation between wages and worker control

a unified bilevel programming framework for price based market clearing under marginal pricing market clearing in restructured power systems is mostly implemented through an offer based setting with the goal of maximizing social welfare this approach leads to sound results from an economic viewpoint when generation offers reflect true production costs however offers may significantly differ from actual costs in practice thus yielding undesired distortion under a marginal pricing scheme this paper presents a general bilevel programming framework for alternative market clearing procedures dependent on market clearing prices rather than on offers the resulting nonlinear mixed integer bilevel programming formulation is transformed into an equivalent single level mixed integer linear program suitable for efficient off the shelf software the bilevel formulation is investigated through a particular instance of price based market clearing driven by consumer payment minimization this problem has recently received considerable attention due to the open challenges posed from both modeling and computational perspectives numerical results are provided to illustrate the performance of the proposed approach

sources of intra industry wage dispersion how much do employers matter observed human capital explains less than half of wage variation in bls industry wage surveys establishment based wage differentials controlling for occupation account for 20 70 percent of intra industry wage variation this corresponds to a standard deviation in wages of 14 percent of the mean almost as large as interindustry wage variation investigation suggests that establishment wage differentials are not random variations or returns to usual measures of human capital

equilibrium incentive contracts and efficiency wages we analyze the optimal efficiency wage contract when output is contractible but firms neither observe the workers effort nor their match specific productivity firms offer wage contracts that optimally trade off effort and wage costs as a result employed workers enjoy rents which in turn creates unemployment nonetheless the incentive power of the equilibrium wage contract is constrained efficient in the absence of taxes and unemployment benefits we also show that more high powered incentive contracts tend to be associated with higher equilibrium unemployment rates jel e24 j30 j41

methods of pay and earnings a longitudinal analysis using data from the national longitudinal survey of youth 1988 90 the author investigates the relationship between methods of pay including piece rates and bonuses and the level and variance of wages among men piece rate workers earned a premium compared to other workers but the evidence on bonuses is mixed the author finds evidence that female piece rate workers earned more than other female workers once a control variable for the presence of dependents is interacted with the piece rate variable with controls for the wage effects of schooling and experience unobserved worker productivity is found to have accounted for most of the wage variance among both male and female piece rate workers wage variance among workers not having explicit pay for performance schemes in contrast was predominantly due to other factors

efficiency and equilibria in complementary teams abstract this paper considers a team or partnership where the partners effort levels enter as strict complements in the production function the existence of a linear budget balancing sharing mechanism is demonstrated which implements the team s efficient outcome as a nash equilibrium this result is in contrast to a result derived in holmstrom 1982

simultaneous clearing of energy and reserves in multi area markets under mixed pricing rules the integration of the spot electricity markets in europe shall lead to multi area power exchanges that will substitute the local markets in such scheme market prices are affected by physical e g network constraints yet they should sometimes follow regulatory policy rules which do not necessarily reflect or depend on physical characteristics in some cases complex pricing rules should be implemented which impose price discrimination for supply and demand entities within the same area the methodology presented in this paper enables the balancing of supply and demand in a multi area market considering energy and reserve bids under complex pricing rules which mix energy and reserve prices a demand bid corresponds to the whole cost a demand entity is willing to pay for its participation in the energy market including the cost for the procurement of the necessary reserves the approach attains price integration of energy and reserves markets simultaneous settlement of energy and reserves and significant decrease of the payments through the uplift accounts the main principle is the formulation of a mixed complementarity problem for the system equilibrium conditions in which supply and demand are associated to explicitly or implicitly defined prices which may be different even in the same zone

efficiency wages and local wage bargaining in the literature on wage drift it is often argued that strikes or work to rule practices are used to force employers to pay a wage rate that exceeds the contract wage here we introduce the efficiency wage argument as a foundation for bargaining about wage drift contrary to the view in most bargaining models where firms and unions struggle to divide a fixed pie given employment we take the relation between wages and revenues explicitly into account the implications for wages and employment appear to differ not only with respect to the order of magnitude but also in a qualitative sense

unequal treatment of identical agents in cournot equilibrium oligopoly models where prior actions by firms affect subsequent marginal costs have been useful in illuminating policy debates in areas such as antitrust regulation environmental protection and international competition we discuss properties of such models when a cournot equilibrium occurs at the second stage aggregate production costs strictly decline with no change in gross revenue or gross consumer surplus if the prior actions strictly increase the variance of marginal costs without changing the marginal cost sum therefore unless the cost of inducing second stage asymmetry more than offsets this reduction in production costs the private and social optima are asymmetric

european electricity market integration with mixed market designs part ii solution algorithm and case studies this paper presents the solution algorithm and test results of the market splitting approach proposed in the first part of this two paper series for the clearing of the forthcoming internal electricity market the market splitting approach is implemented in a europe wide level indicatively defining three power pools and 22 power exchanges comprising 42 bidding areas in total with each local national market respecting the standard market regulatory framework of power pools and power exchanges pxs the performance and computational requirements of this implementation is presented the model is tested in terms of problem solvability to its limits considering a day ahead market clearing time threshold equal to one hour the results demonstrate that a viable solution to the clearing of the internal electricity market can be attained with the current state of the art of computers processing power further discussion is made concerning the viability of the proposed approach and other harmonization issues that should be considered for successful market integration

efficiency wages and industry wage differentials a comparison across methods of pay efficiency wage considerations should be less important for piece rate pay than for time wages therefore if industry wage differentials reflect efficiency wage factors then these pay differences should be less sizable and have less explanatory power for piecework than for timework we test this proposition using wage data for male production workers employed in the swedish metalworking industries in 1985 the data are partitioned into two groups of workers in our preferred sub sample of workers who received pay under both piece rates and time wages our results are uniformly consistent with efficiency wage implications for industry wage differentials for the subsample of workers who received pay under either piece rates or time wages industry wage differentials are of equal importance under either pay scheme these latter results however may also be influenced by unaccounted for sorting of workers and employers across methods of pay overall our examination of industry wage differentials across m

cooperative r d with moral hazard abstract in cooperative r d a noncontractible input is underprovided due to participants moral hazard problem however the first best outcome can be approached as two inputs one contractible and the other noncontractible become more complementary to each other

low inflation targeting and long run unemployment the model of akerlof dickens and perry 2000 adp predicts that low inflation may cause unemployment to persist at high levels when applied to u s data their results strongly rejected the conventional nairu model we apply the adp model to swedish data the fact that our swedish data also reject the nairu model has a number of interesting implications for the swedish economy and potentially for other european countries as well the results indicate that raising the swedish inflation target from 2 to 4 percent would bring longrun unemployment down by several percentage points the possibility of adp type long run phillips curves also across the euro countries may raise some concern about the emu project while detailed studies on other countries are needed there is nothing to suggest that these non vertical phillips curves would not differ considerably across the euro countries any single inflation level targeted by the ecb would then generate excess unemployment in individual member states

an optimization model for the electricity market clearing problem with uniform purchase price and zonal selling prices electricity markets can be designed in different ways one rule that is sometimes enforced is the uniform purchase price under this pricing method all the consumers pay the same price regardless of the zone they belong to by contrast each producer receives its zonal price this asymmetry in the price paid and received makes the clearing process not easily treatable through standard optimization techniques within the framework of marginal pricing this paper shows how it is possible to formulate the market clearing problem with uniform purchase price and zonal selling prices as a computationally tractable mixed integer linear programming problem the proposed approach is tested using real data from the italian day ahead market which is actually based on the aforementioned rule

unobserved ability efficiency wages and interindustry wage differentials interindustry wage differentials in wage regressions estimated for individuals have been interpreted as evidence consistent with efficiency wage models a principal competing explanation is that these differentials are generated by differences across workers in unobserved ability this paper tests the unobserved ability hypothesis by incorporating test scores into standard wage regressions as error ridden indicators of unobserved ability the results indicate that differences in unobserved ability explain relatively little of interindustry or interoccupation wage differentials this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

disclosure of know how in research joint ventures abstract research joint ventures rjvs usually face technical uncertainty their expected cost typically depending on the know how disclosed by the partners however the partners have little incentive to share their know how when they are simultaneously competitors in other markets in this setting we show that sometimes profitable rjvs do not start when the disclosure of know how is not contractible and characterize the incentive contracts when they exist we also analyze rjvs as an alternative to licensing contracts for the transmission of know how finally we show that the eec s technology policy based on cost subsidies has negative consequences on firms incentives to share know how

balancing supply and demand under mixed pricing rules in multi area electricity markets market clearing has always been an issue of great interest and research as liberalized electricity markets evolved over time in many countries as trading in electricity evolves rapidly multi area power exchanges appear to substitute the local markets the tie lines constitute a significant parameter in multi area power exchanges since congestion leads to price differentiation prices are affected by physical e g network constraints yet they should sometimes follow regulatory policy rules which do not necessarily reflect or depend on physical characteristics until now all approaches in clearing a multi area power dispatch or a multi area market are based on a zonal or nodal pricing model which is applied uniformly to both production and demand within the same zone or at each node these approaches are not able to deal with complex pricing rules which impose price discrimination for supply or demand entities within the same area this paper presents a mathematical approach for the solution of a multi area dispatch in which production and demand of the same area may be cleared in different prices the main principle is the formulation of a mixed complementarity problem for the system equilibrium conditions in which supply and demand are associated to explicitly or implicitly defined prices illustrative implementations and test results for a simple five zone system and the 73 bus ieee rts 96 are presented

earnings productivity and performance related pay jobs with performance related pay prp attract workers of higher ability and induce workers to provide greater effort we construct an integrated model of effort and sorting that clarifies the distinction between observable and unobservable ability and the relationship between earnings and productivity predictions are tested against data from the british household panel survey bhps the prp raises wages by 9 for men and 6 for women theoretical calculations show that these estimated earnings differentials represent average productivity differentials net of monitoring costs at the marginal firm using prp but not of the disutility of additional effort expended by workers

moral hazard and optimal contract form for r d cooperation abstract this paper aims to explain the use of different governance modes for r d cooperation we argue that ex ante cross licensing agreements are preferred to r d joint ventures if potential synergy effects are negligible and the double moral hazard problem caused by unobservable r d effort can be solved by an appropriate royalty scheme it is shown that the first best effort decisions are implementable by a cross licensing agreement if royalty payments are based on r d success however if the payments have to be based on actual know how transfer because r d success is not verifiable there are cases where joint ventures are necessary to induce optimal r d effort

optimal technology policy under asymmetric information in a research joint venture abstract we analyze the optimal technology policy to solve a free riding problem between the members of an rjv assuming that government intervention is subject to an additional adverse selection problem caused by its inability to distinguish the value of the potential innovation although subsidies and monitoring may be equivalent policy tools to solve firms free riding problem they imply different social losses if the government is not able to distinguish perfectly the value of the potential innovation the advantage of monitoring tools relative to subsidies is proved to depend on which type of information the government can obtain about firms r d performance

subsidizing research programs with if and when uncertainty in the face of severe informational constraints we study government optimal subsidy policies for research programs in the face of servere information asymmetry when firms have private information about the likelihood of project viability but the government cannot form a unique prior belief about this likelihood the paper makes two contributions first we show that the way in which rd under r d competition the first best outcome can also be achieved through a simple combination of a matching subsidy and an unrestricted subsidy if the shadow cost of public funds is positive an ex post equilibrium in general does not exist either under monopoly or competition we then consider two alternative policy decision criteria that are appropriate for belief free games rationalizability and max min criteria we argue that the max min criteria is preferable in our context and by way of doing so establish that the set of max min subsidy policies under either monopoly or competitive r d consists entirely of simple pure matching subsidies we further establish that allowing firms to form an r d consortium reduces the matching rate for the highest max min subsidy suggesting that cooperative r d has the potential to economize on the shadow costs of public funding of subsidies

multi area power generation dispatch in competitive markets in competitive electric energy markets the power generation dispatch optimization is one of the most important missions among generation companies how to respond to the markets dispatch their units and maximize profits this paper proposes an approach to incorporate power contracts which include call and put options forward contracts and reliability must run contracts into multi area unit commitment and economic dispatch solutions the proposed solution algorithm is based on adaptive lagrangian relaxation unit decommitment and lambda iteration methods the problem formulation consists of three stages 1 the incorporation of the power contracts 2 the multi area unit commitment and 3 the multi area economic dispatch the proposed algorithm has been successfully implemented and its testing results on modified ieee test cases are promising

contractual incompleteness and the optimality of equity joint ventures firms engaged in the pooling of complementary skills often choose the equity joint venture ejv over alternative profit sharing arrangements this paper addresses the issue of how equity shares are different from profit shares it is shown that in settings of contractual incompleteness marketable equity ownership when compared to non transferable profit sharing contracts provides better ex ante incentives to the parties involved by mitigating ex post hold up problems among other things the prevalence of the 51 49 or 50 50 ejv in which one party has 51 percent or 50 percent equity shares is explained

supervision and wages across industries this paper uses supervision data from a supplement to the 1977 wave of the panel survey of income dynamics to examine differences in supervision and wages across industries and to evaluate relationships between supervision practices and interindustry wage differentials the results demonstrate that workers in high wage industries are supervised with equal or greater stringency than secondary sector workers further the results offer no evidence that interindustry differences in monitoring contribute to interindustry wage differentials such findings appear to contradict explanations for industry wage premiums that are motivated by efficiency wage models of shirking copyright 1993 by mit press

on the solution of revenue and network constrained day ahead market clearing under marginal pricing part i an exact bilevel programming approach the first of this two paper series addresses a practical day ahead auction model where generation revenue constraints are explicitly incorporated in the problem formulation as routinely done in several national electricity markets across europe the revenue constrained market clearing procedure includes the effect of the transmission network inter temporal constraints associated with generation scheduling demand side bidding and marginal pricing this auction design is an instance of price based market clearing which features two major complicating factors first locational marginal prices become decision variables of the optimization process in addition producer revenues are formulated as bilinear and highly nonconvex products of power outputs and market clearing prices the resulting problem is formulated as a mixed integer nonlinear bilevel program with bilinear terms for which available solution techniques rely on heuristics approximations or modeling simplifications this paper presents a novel and exact methodology whereby the original problem is recast as an equivalent single level mixed integer linear program as a consequence finite convergence to optimality is guaranteed and the use of standard commercial software is allowed the proposed transformation is based on duality theory of linear programming karush kuhn tucker optimality conditions and integer algebra results in the second part of this two paper series numerical results from several case studies illustrate the effective performance of the proposed solution approach

salaries and piece rates compensation can take many forms remuneration can come as pecuniary payments as fringes such as health and pension benefits or as a nonpecuniary reward such as plush office furniture that costs the firm less than it benefits the worker a significant literature has examined the trade offs between pecuniary and nonpecuniary compensation the modern work having been pioneered by rosen 1974 more recently another body of literature has examined the selection of method of total compensation ignoring the distinction between pecuniary and nonpecuniary payment this work has focused on risk and incentive factors it has resulted in comparisons of compensation based on absolute output levels to that based on relative performance it has also led to explorations of the relation of compensation to experience over the work life 2 little attention has been paid to what may be among the most important and obvious distinction in methods of compensation namely the choice between a fixed salary for some period of time that is paying on the basis of input and some workers receive compensation that is specified in advance and not directly contingent on performance instead it depends on an input measure such as hours worked for others compensation is directly related to output this essay is an attempt to predict a firm s choice of compensation method piece rates are defined more rigorously among the more important factors discussed are worker heterogeneity incentives sorting considerations monitoring costs and asymmetric information one result is that salary workers tend to be of lower quality and more homogeneous than are their piece rate counterparts numerous additional results are provided helpful comments by victoria lazear and yoram weiss are gratefully acknowledged support was provided by the department of labor and the national science foundation 1 see lazear and rosen 1981 stiglitz 1981 holmstrom 1982 green and stokey 1983 2 see lazear 1979 1981 and harris and holmstrom in press

piece rates fixed wages and incentive effects statistical evidence from payroll records we develop and estimate an agency model of worker behavior under piece rates and fixed wages the model implies optimal decision rules for the firm s choice of a compensation system as a function of working conditions our model also implies an upper and lower bound to the incentive effect the productivity gain realized by paying workers piece rates rather than fixed wages that can be estimated using regression methods using daily productivity data collected from the payroll records of a british columbia tree planting firm we estimate these bounds to be an 8 8 and a 60 4 percent increase in productivity structural estimation which accounts for the firm s optimal choice of a compensation system suggests that incentives caused a 22 6 percent increase in productivity however only part of this increase represents valuable output because workers respond to incentives in part by reducing quality

optimal contracts for teams in a team subject to both adverse selection each member s ability is known only to himself and moral hazard effort cannot be observed optimal contracts are under certain conditions linear in the team s output the outcome is the same whether the principal observes just the total output or each individual s contribution thus monitoring is not needed to prevent shirking by team members instead the role of monitoring is to discipline the monitor production is a collective enterprise by workers in a firm or firms in a joint venture the synergy that is the reason for the team s existence may mean that an individual s contribution to the team s output is not distinguishable so that it is impossible to pay him according to his own productivity how should the principal remunerate the team members so as to maximize his own profit in this paper we analyze incentives in teams with asymmetric information both adverse selection each member s ability is known only to himself and moral hazard effort cannot be observed directly holmstrom 1982 showed that in a team model with moral hazard the principal can ensure an outcome arbitrarily close to the full information ideal by using a contract that punishes each team member arbitrarily severely whenever team output falls below some target however this seems to be an unrealistically drastic way of solving the moral hazard problem in our model we in effect prevent the principal from using such a contract by introducing adverse selection in addition to moral hazard and by assuming that ability and effort interact in such a way that the principal is unable to disentangle an agent s effort from his ability under the assumption that the principal and the team members are risk neutral we shall show that the principal can implement his information constrained optimum simply by offering each agent a payment linear in the team s output although the essential feature of our analysis is the interaction between adverse selection and moral hazard this result can be understood by first considering the special case in which the agents abilities are common knowledge in this case the moral hazard problem can be completely solved the principal can do as well as he

does unmeasured ability explain inter industry wage differentials this paper provides empirical assessments of the two leading explanations of measured inter industry wage differentials 1 true wage differentials exist across industries and 2 the measured differentials simply reflect unmeasured differences in workers productive abilities first we summarize the existing evidence on the unmeasured ability explanation second we construct a simple model which shows that if matching is important then endogenous job change decisions can create important self selection biases even in first differenced estimates of industry wage differentials third we analyze a sample that approximates the experiment of exogenous job loss we find that i the wage change experienced by a typical industry switcher closely resembles the difference in the relevant industry differentials estimated in a cross section and ii pre displacement industry affiliation plays an important role in post displacement wage determination

energy and reserve dispatch in a multi zone electricity market competitive bidding for ancillary services a s in addition to bidding for energy is increasingly recognized as an important part of electricity markets in this paper an lp based approach is presented for solving the multi product i e energy and a s products multi zone area physical market dispatch problem the approach can explicitly represent various constraints such as reserve requirement constraints network security limits and sharing of constrained resource capacity e g maximum unit generation between energy and reserve the joint dispatch method which dispatches energy and reserve market concurrently is extended to allow inter zonal reserve trading in a multi zone competitive pool numerical examples are included to demonstrate the salient characteristics of the joint dispatch solution

aspects of r d subsidization it is well known that the market fails to provide the socially optimal level of r d expenditure because of the public properties of information see arrow 1963 and usher 1964 in the frictionless perfectly competitive market with no barriers to the use of information the market will provide no r d investment one widely used policy approach to deal with this appropriability problem is patent protection which temporarily assigns the property right to the patented information for some period of time investment in r d can be further stimulated through subsidization though issues in patent protection have been extensively discussed in the literature see nordhaus 1967 1972 scherer 1972 stiglitz 1969 and romano forthcoming the economics of r d subsidization have been largely ignored in spite of its frequent use as a policy tool 1 the purpose of this paper is to explore the usefulness of r d subsidization in markets where patent protection is available with the opportunity to secure a patent firms will have an incentive to invest in r d however only in exceptional circumstances will the market produce the socially optimal r d outlay subsidization can be a useful supplemental policy tool the usefulness of r d subsidization depends on a number of variables including the length of the patent life the character of competition for the patent and on the extent of any excess burdens associated with subsidization our focus is on how optimal subsidization is affected by these variables it is shown that when there is monopoly in the research market the optimal subsidy is always positive no matter how long is the finite patent life or how high is any finite excess burden associated with subsidization in contrast when there are no barriers to entering the research market the optimal subsidy is zero if the patent life is long or the excess burden is high moreover

information learning and wage rates in low income rural areas in this essay we present evidence that employers in rural areas of developing countries have imperfect information with regard to the productivity of heterogeneous workers in addition to obtaining direct measures of the completeness of employer information we consider the implications of information asymmetries for the structure of casual labor markets we then evaluate the extent to which casual labor markets do in fact exhibit these attributes we find that 1 there is adverse selection out of the time rate labor market 2 employers discriminate statistically given two workers with different observed characteristics but the same actual productivity the worker from the group with the higher average productivity will have a higher wage 3 employers exhibit learning over time the extent of employer ignorance is negatively related to labor market exposure on the part of the workers and 4 calorie consumption affects productivity but is not rewarded in the time rate labor market in concluding we argue that an analysis of wage and employment patterns and the implications of these patterns for human capital investment in rural areas of developing countries that ignored the role of information problems could yield misleading conclusions

tax revenue and the marginal cost of public funds in sweden abstract we assess the welfare cost of raising a marginal unit of tax revenue in a balanced budget general equilibrium framework the calculated social cost of an increment of public funds is sensitive to both the specific type of tax increase and the type of public spending used on the margin best guess assumptions on labor supply elasticities yield marginal costs of public funds for different fiscal mixes of between 0 67 and 4 51 at prevailing tax rates in sweden alternative labor supply assumptions well within the range of current estimates substantially affect the results and can imply infinite marginal welfare costs marginal welfare costs are also sensitive to assumptions about both the income and substitution effects of labor supply

coordinating research through research joint ventures abstract in a simple model we show that a joint venture can implement the rates of investment that maximize joint profit when firms research abilities are private information this can be done with budget balance even though there are participation constraints there is no conflict between budget balance and participation constraints because firms payoffs can depend on ex post signals of abilities the conflict between budget balance and participation constraints is restored when both abilities and rates of investment are unobservable we give a condition under which the profit maximizing rates of investment can be implemented if we relax budget balance

technology policy and the organization of r d abstract in this study we examine how technology policy in the form of r d subsidies and encouragement of research joint ventures rjvs affects the investment incentives of firms in various types of imperfectly competitive markets we find that joint ventures yield lower research intensities in the absence of subsidies in the presence of optimal subsidy policy higher expected welfare is obtained with rjvs but the optimal policy may also involve a more costly subsidy program the analysis also identifies possible difficulties in implementing socially optimal policies arising from private incentives conflicting with the public interest

security constrained unit commitment for simultaneous clearing of energy and ancillary services markets this paper introduces a security constrained unit commitment scuc model with emphases on the simultaneous optimization of energy and ancillary services markets benders decomposition is used to decouple the scuc into a unit commitment uc master problem and hourly network security checking subproblems lagrangian relaxation is used to decouple the uc problem into individual single unit commitment problems dynamic programming is used to find the optimal commitment decision a simultaneous marginal curve algorithm is proposed to find the optimal values of energy and ancillary services a six bus system with three units and the ieee 118 bus system with 54 units are analyzed to illustrate the proposed model

strategic bidding under uncertainty a binary expansion approach this work presents a binary expansion be solution approach to the problem of strategic bidding under uncertainty in short term electricity markets the be scheme is used to transform the products of variables in the nonlinear bidding problem into a mixed integer linear programming formulation which can be solved by commercially available computational systems the be scheme is applicable to pure price pure quantity or joint price quantity bidding models it is also possible to represent transmission networks uncertainties scenarios for price quantity plant availability and load financial instruments capacity reinforcement decisions and unit commitment the application of the methodology is illustrated in case studies with configurations derived from the 80 gw brazilian system

price maker self scheduling in a pool based electricity market a mixed integer lp approach this paper addresses the self scheduling problem faced by a price maker to achieve maximum profit in a pool based electricity market an exact and computationally efficient mixed integer linear programming milp formulation of this problem is presented this formulation models precisely the price maker capability of altering market clearing prices to its own benefits through price quota curves no assumptions are made on the characteristics of the pool and its agents a realistic case study is presented and the results obtained are analyzed in detail

international r d rivalry and industrial strategy this paper presents a theory of government intervention which provides an explanation for industrial strategy policies such as r d or export subsidies in imperfectly competitive international markets domestic net welfare is improved by the capture of a greater share of the output of rent earning industries although the subsidy ridden noncooperative international equilibrium is jointly suboptimal behaviour of governments and firms is modelled as a three stage subgame perfect nash equilibrium the assumption that the government is the first player in this game allows it to influence equilibrium outcomes by altering the set of credible actions open to firms

multiperiod auction for a pool based electricity market this paper presents a market clearing tool for the market operator of a pool based electricity market for energy this tool is transparent and fair for the market participants and simple to implement and to interpret it preserves the privacy of the corporate information of the participants and provides the right signals to achieve economic efficiency furthermore it recognizes and properly models the technical physical and inter temporal constraints of the participant thermal power generators from a mathematical point of view the proposed tool results in a mixed integer linear programming problem that can be efficiently solved using currently available branch and cut software to illustrate the adequate functioning of the proposed market clearing procedure different realistic case studies are analyzed in detail

market power assessment and mitigation in hydrothermal systems the objective of this paper is to investigate market power issues in bid based hydrothermal scheduling initially market power is simulated with a single stage nash cournot equilibrium model market power assessment for multiple stages is then carried through a stochastic dynamic programming scheme the decision in each stage and state is the equilibrium of a multi agent game thereafter mitigation measures specially bilateral contracts are investigated case studies with data taken from the brazilian system are presented and discussed