the optimal allocation of prizes in tournaments of heterogeneous agents tournaments are widely used in organizations explicitly or implicitly to reward the best performing employees for example by promotion or bonuses and or to penalize the worst performing employees for example by demotion withholding bonuses or unfavorable job assignments these incentive schemes can be interpreted as various prize allocations based on the employees relative performance while the optimal prize allocation in tournaments of symmetric agents is relatively well understood little is known about the impact of the allocation of prizes on the effectiveness of tournament incentive schemes for heterogeneous agents we show that while multiple prize allocation rules are equivalent when agents are symmetric in their ability the equivalence is broken in the presence of heterogeneity under a wide range of conditions loser prize tournaments that is tournaments that award a low prize to relatively few bottom performers are optimal for the firm the reason is that low ability agents are discouraged less in such tournaments as compared to winner prize tournaments awarding a high prize to few top performers and hence can be compensated less to meet their participation constraints jel m52 j33 j24

information competition and markets one of the dominant characteristics of modern capitalist economies is the important role played by competition not the peculiar static form of pure price competition embodied in the arrow debreu model but rather a dynamic competition more akin to the kind of competition represented by sports contests and other races including patent races in recent years there have been several attempts to explain why firms often base the pay of their workers and managers on relative performance see for example edward lazear and sherwin rosen 1981 such compensation schemes become desirable when three conditions are satisfied a the input effort of workers managers must not be directly observable at least without cost thus firms must either expend resources to monitor inputs or devise reward structures in which compensation is a function of variables such as output or profits which are themselves functions of inputs but are less costly to observe b the relationship between input and output must be stochastic so that by observing output one cannot perfectly infer what the input was c finally the stochastic disturbances which affect the relationship between input and output of different firms must be correlated by looking at the performance of one worker relative to that of others one can make better inferences about his effort than one can make without using this information not only can competition provide a basis of comparison which enables the design of reward structures that can simultaneously provide a high level of incentives with relatively low level risk but compensation schemes based on relative performance have the further advantage of automatically adjusting incentives to changes in the economic environment we refer to this as built in flexibility in a first best world with perfect information concerning the nature of the technology but where it is still costly to monitor individuals activities the compensation scheme would vary from time to time as the environment changed such changes in the compensation scheme are costly to implement and the information required to do so is seldom available when a task is easier the individual s rewards for performing the task should be reduced if pay is based on relative performance although all individuals perform better when they exert the same level of effort their compensation is automatically adjusted thus teachers frequently grade on the curve and a significant fraction of the pay of successful salesmen often consists of bonuses based on relative performance

self selection and the efficiency of tournaments when exogenously imposed rank order tournaments have incentive properties but their overall efficiency is reduced by a high variance in performance bull schotter and weigelt 1987 however since the efficiency of performance related pay is attributable both to its incentive effect and to its selection effect among employees lazear 2000 it is important to investigate the ex ante sorting effect of tournaments this paper reports results from an experiment analyzing whether allowing subjects to self select into different payment schemes helps in reducing the variability of performance in tournaments we show that when the subjects choose to enter a tournament the average effort is higher and the between subject variance is substantially lower than when the same payment scheme is imposed sorting is efficiency enhancing since it increases the homogeneity of the contestants we suggest that the flexibility of the labor market is an important condition for a higher efficiency of relative performance pay

climate damages in the fund model a disaggregated analysis abstract we examine the treatment of climate damages in the fund model by inserting software switches to turn individual features on and off we obtain fund s estimates for 15 categories of damages and for components of the agricultural category fund as used by the u s government to estimate the social cost of carbon projects a net benefit of climate change in agriculture offset by a slightly larger estimate of all other damages within agriculture there is a large benefit from co 2 fertilization a moderate cost from the effect of temperature on yields and a much smaller impact of the rate of change in fund s agricultural modeling the temperature yield equation comes close to dividing by zero for high probability values of a monte carlo parameter the range of variation of the optimal temperature exceeds physically plausible limits with 95 confidence intervals extending to 17 c above and below current temperatures moreover fund s agricultural estimates are calibrated to research published in 1996 or earlier use of estimates from such models is arguably inappropriate for setting public policy but as long as such models are being used in the policymaking process an update to reflect newer research and correct modeling errors is needed before fund s damage estimates can be relied on

efficiency gains from organizational innovation comparing ordinal and cardinal tournament games in broiler contracts abstract we analyze the contract settlement data of a poultry company who contracts the production of broiler chickens with a group of independent growers the company originally used rank order ordinal tournaments to compensate their contract growers and later switched to cardinal tournaments based on the observed payment mechanism we construct an empirical model of a rank order tournament game and estimate structural parameters of the symmetric nash equilibrium and then simulate growers performance under the observed cardinal tournament contract we found that the model with risk averse agents fits the data better than the model with risk neutral agents and that switching from a rank order tournament to a cardinal tournament while keeping the growers ex ante expected utility constant improved efficiency the principal company gains from the switch whereas some of the agents growers gain and others lose depending on their realized productivity shocks

how to split the pie optimal rewards in dynamic multi battle competitions abstract multi battle competitions are ubiquitous in real life in this paper we examine the effort maximizing reward design in sequentially played multi battle competitions between two players the organizer has a fixed prize budget and rewards players contingent on the number of battles they win in a three battle contest a full spectrum of contest technologies in the tullock family is accommodated we find that the optimal design varies with the discriminatory power of the contest technology in particular when it is in the low range winner take all is optimal for the intermediate range as discriminatory power increases the optimal prize structure evolves continuously from winner take all to the proportional division rule due to the need to mitigate the growing momentum discouragement effect for the high range a wide span of prize structures extracts full surplus and is thus optimal several robustness checks confirm that mitigating the momentum discouragement effect is essential for effort maximizing prize design in dynamic multi battle contests

a designer s choice between single prize and parallel tournaments in this article i theoretically and experimentally compare a designer s profits from two tournament designs the first design is a standard winner take all tournament with a single prize the second design features two winner take all parallel tournaments with different prizes where individuals choose which tournament to enter before competing i develop a simple model that illustrates how the relative performances of these designs change as contestants abilities differ the theoretical model shows that the designer s profit is higher lower in the parallel tournament when contestants abilities differ greatly are similar i complement these findings with experimental evidence the experiments show that the parallel tournament is more profitable under high heterogeneity whereas under low heterogeneity the designer is better off with the single prize tournament furthermore high ability agents under participate and low ability agents over participate in the high prize tournament relative to the theoretical prediction jel c72 d82 j33 m51 m52

environmental valuation under sustainable development environmentalism has evolved since the 1960 s from a concern with the preservation of wilderness in the american experience to a concern over pollution of human habitat throughout the industrialized world northern anxiety spread to the loss of tropical rainforests and biodiversity in the south where environmentalism evolved further in an encounter with indigenous interpretations conditions and priorities by the late 1980 s climate change emerged as a central issue in a now global discourse on the relationship between environment and development the principle of sustainable development that current needs are to be met as fully as possible while ensuring that the life opportunities of future generations are undiminished relative to present is now widely accepted this paper illustrates that incorporating environmental values per se in decision making will not bring about sustainability unless each generation is committed to transferring to the next sufficient natural resources and capital assets to make development sustainable 11 refs 3 figs

economic contests comparative reward schemes contests are situations in which an individual s reward depends on his performance relative to others students are graded on a curve the candidate with the most votes gets the political office the underling who performs best is promoted to the executive position contests are useful in dealing with indivisible rewards reducing monitoring costs and minimizing risks from common uncertainties they are employed to sort potential participants and once they have entered to induce appropriate effort from them with monitoring precision and prize spreads as potential choice variables optimal contest structures are derived for fair and unfair contests among equal and unequal participants the converse problems of climbing low ability individuals enter the contest designed for high ability candidates and slumming are shown to be manageable

competitive blind spots and the cyclicality of investment experimental evidence we report laboratory experiments investigating the cyclicality of profit enhancing investment in a competitive environment in our setting optimal investment is counter cyclical when investment costs fall following market downturns however we do not observe counter cyclical investment instead we see much less strategic behavior than our rational investment model anticipates our participants exhibit what porter 1980 terms a competitive blind spot and heuristic investment models where individuals invest a fixed percentage of their liquidity or a fixed percentage of anticipated market demand better fit our data than does optimal investment we also report a control treatment without cost changes and a treatment with asymmetric investment liquidity both of these extensions support our main result

does ecological economics have a future contradiction and reinvention in the age of climate change abstract this paper addresses the role of neoclassical methodologies in ecological economics and the contradictions these methodologies pose to the field s critical founding principles we first consider robert costanza s treatment of nicholas stern s global deal and then survey climate change related articles published in this journal over the past five years this survey reveals how mainstream neoclassical methodologies dominate discourse and do so by marginalizing more critical political economy analyses this situation imperils the field s founding vision of a no growth steady state it also fails to address the related growth dynamics of capitalism without such a critical treatment the field s formal embrace of methodological pluralism actually entails an ideological empiricism that renders ecological economics theoretically incoherent this situation undermines the field s historical promise as an alternative economic paradigm ecological economics now faces a problematic future its survival in a form faithful to its founding vision will require an explicit choice to address its internal contradictions and reinvent itself in ways relevant to our contemporary context without such a choice ecological economics will likely succumb to an implicit acceptance of the hegemony of mainstream economic methodologies and their pro growth imperatives

the importance of being confident gender career choice and willingness to compete abstract this study investigates the extent to which gender differences in choosing to enter competitive tournaments are due to women s lower taste for competition or differences in confidence we examine three types of confidence and find that confidence measured by expected ranking is the most important determinant of decisions to enter tournaments conditional on ability this measure eliminates gender differences in winner take all tournaments and when entered with risk measures eliminates differences in ranked compensation tournaments when the sample is split by career choice there are no gender differences for students in stem fields and in the humanities and the social sciences differences can be explained by confidence however for business school students gender differences in willingness to compete in winner take all tournaments persist even after accounting for risk aversion and confidence men in business set themselves apart from the rest of the population men and women alike with the highest levels of tournament entry and the most positive performance responses to competition

selective recognition how to recognize donors to increase charitable giving recognizing donors by revealing their identities is important for increasing charitable giving we conducted a field experiment to examine how different recognition methods impact giving and found that all forms of recognition that we examined had a positive impact on increasing donations whereby recognizing only highest donors positive recognition and recognizing only lowest donors negative recognition had the most pronounced effect we argue that selective recognition both positive and negative creates tournament like incentives recognizing the highest donors activates the desire to seek a positive prize of prestige thus increasing the proportion of donors who contribute large amounts recognizing the lowest donors activates the desire to avoid a negative prize of shame thus decreasing the proportion of donors who do not contribute or contribute very little therefore selective recognition is an effective tool that can be used in the field by charities to increase donations

income inequality in the united states 1913 1998 this paper presents new homogeneous series on top shares of income and wages from 1913 to 1998 in the united states using individual tax returns data top income and wages shares display a u shaped pattern over the century our series suggest that the large shocks that capital owners experienced during the great depression and world war ii have had a permanent effect on top capital incomes we argue that steep progressive income and estate taxation may have prevented large fortunes from fully recovering from these shocks top wage shares were flat before world war ii dropped precipitously during the war and did not start to recover before the late 1960s but are now higher than before world war ii as a result the working rich have replaced the rentiers at the top of the income distribution

ethics and the economist what climate change demands of us abstract climate change is changing not only our physical world but also our intellectual social and moral worlds we are realizing that our situation is profoundly unsafe interdependent and uncertain what then does climate change demand of economists as human beings and as professionals a discipline of economics based on enlightenment notions of mechanism and disembodied rationality is not suited to present problems this essay suggests three major requirements first that we take action second that we work together and third that we focus on avoiding the worst rather than obtaining the optimal the essay concludes with suggestions of specific steps that economists should take as researchers teachers and in our other roles

asymmetric tournaments equal opportunity laws and affirmative action some experimental results this paper assesses whether affirmative action programs and equal opportunity laws affect the output of economic agents more precisely we find that equal opportunity laws and affirmative action programs always benefit disadvantaged groups equal opportunity laws also increase the effort levels of all subjects and hence the profits of the tournament administrator usually the firm the effects of affirmative action programs depend on the severity of a group s cost disadvantage when the cost disadvantage is severe these programs significantly increase effort levels and hence profits the opposite is true when the disadvantage is slight

how many winners are good to have on tournaments with sabotage abstract from an employer s perspective a tournament should induce agents to exert productive activities but refrain from destructive ones we experimentally test the predictive power of a tournament model which suggests that within a reasonable framework productive and destructive activities are influenced neither by the number of agents taking part in the tournament nor by the fraction of the winner prizes our results clearly confirm that sabotage in tournaments indeed occurs while tournament size has virtually no effect on behavior a balanced fraction of winner and loser prizes appears to enhance productive activities

do women shy away from competition do men compete too much we examine whether men and women of the same ability differ in their selection into a competitive environment participants in a laboratory experiment solve a real task first under a noncompetitive piece rate and then a competitive tournament incentive scheme although there are no gender differences in performance men select the tournament twice as much as women when choosing their compensation scheme for the next performance while 73 percent of the men select the tournament only 35 percent of the women make this choice this gender gap in tournament entry is not explained by performance and factors such as risk and feedback aversion only playa negligible role instead the tournament entry gap is driven by men being more overconfident and by gender differences in preferences for performing in a competition the result is that women shy away from competition and men embrace it

selection tournaments and dishonesty we conduct a real effort experiment in which performance is not monitored and participants are paid according to their reported performance participants are paid according to a piece rate and a winner take all tournament and then select between the two schemes before performing the task one more time competition increases dishonesty and lowers output when the payment scheme is exogenously determined participants with a higher propensity to be dishonest are more likely to select into competition however after selection we find no output difference between piece rate and tournament this is attributable to a handful of honest individuals who select competition

overbidding and overspreading in rent seeking experiments cost structure and prize allocation rules we study experimentally the effects of cost structure and prize allocation rules on the performance of rent seeking contests most previous studies use a lottery prize rule and linear cost and find both overbidding relative to the nash equilibrium prediction and significant variation of efforts which we term overspreading we investigate the effects of allocating the prize by a lottery versus sharing it proportionally and of convex versus linear costs of effort while holding fixed the nash equilibrium prediction for effort we find the share rule results in average effort closer to the nash prediction and lower variation of effort combining the share rule with a convex cost function further enhances these results we can explain a significant amount of non equilibrium behavior by features of the experimental design these results contribute towards design guidelines for contests based on behavioral principles that take into account implementation features of a contest

on modeling and interpreting the economics of catastrophic climate change with climate change as prototype example this paper analyzes the implications of structural uncertainty for the economics of low probability high impact catastrophes even when updated by bayesian learning uncertain structural parameters induce a critical tail fattening of posterior predictive distributions such fattened tails have strong im plications for situations like climate change where a catastrophe is theoretically possible because prior knowledge cannot place sufficiently narrow bounds on overall damages this paper shows that the economic consequences of fat tailed structural uncertainty along with unsureness about high temperature damages can readily outweigh the effects of discounting in climate change policy analysis

risk averse rent seeking with shared rents this paper presents a nash equilibrium model of rent seeking behavior in which risk averse players expend resources to obtain a share of a rent as for example in contests for import quota licences results are obtained relating the equilibrium level of lobbying effort by each player to the value of the rent in particular reduced individual lobbying effort is associated with higher rents contested if players are sufficiently risk averse the question of whether the value of rents is a good measure of the resource cost of rent seeking is also considered a simple approximation involving risk and risk aversion parameters is derived for the proportion of rents dissipated in long run equilibrium risk and risk aversion are seen to reduce the rent dissipation ratio below unity copyright 1987 by royal economic society

rent seeking with regretful agents theory and experiment abstract we investigate both theoretically and experimentally the role that information disclosure has on behavior in all pay environments in which all agents must exert costly effort but only the winner is rewarded through the lens of all pay auctions we show that bidders who have regret concerns when they lose an auction may alter their bids whether or not information about the winning bid is disclosed all losing bidders regret not bidding 0 however when feedback on the winning bid is provided those bidders who lost at an affordable price may regret not bidding more we show that the former effect causes bidders to lower their bids while the latter effect causes bidders to raise their bids our experimental results indicate overbidding whether or not the winning bid is disclosed to losing bidders however disclosing the winning bid leads to even more aggressive bidding increases revenues decreases the frequency of dropouts and also leads to more efficient allocations thus our results show that information disclosure is a powerful tool that mechanism designers may wish to exploit to extract more rents in all pay environments

the optimal allocation of prizes in contests we study a contest with multiple not necessarily equal prizes contestants have private information about an ability parameter that affects their costs of bidding the contestant with the highest bid wins the first prize the contestant with the second highest bid wins the second prize and so on until all the prizes are allocated all contestants incur their respective costs of bidding the contest s designer maximizes the expected sum of bids our main results are 1 we display bidding equlibria for any number of contestants having linear convex or concave cost functions and for any distribution of abilities 2 if the cost functions are linear or concave then no matter what the distribution of abilities is it is optimal for the designer to allocate the entire prize sum to a single first prize 3 we give a necessary and sufficient conditions ensuring that several prizes are optimal if contestants have a convex cost function

pay equality and industrial politics personnel managers often argue that equitable pay treatment manifested as wage compression is useful because it reduces disharmony among workers but it is far from obvious that a compressed salary structure is morale improving since better workers may feel disenchanted by this scheme however when workers rewards are based on relative comparisons salary compression reduces uncooperative behavior that is detrimental to the firm relative comparisons imply that some reference group must be selected the major result is that within the relevant groups some wage compression is efficient

auctionin entry into tournaments a research tournament model with heterogeneous contestants is presented for a large class of contests the optimal number of competitors is two this insight makes designing the tournament easier and highlights the importance of selecting highly qualified contestants while customary uniform price and discriminatory price auctions are intuitively appealing mechanisms for solving this adverse selection problem in practice they generally will not be efficient mechanism for selecting contestants instead we propose an alternative auction format that is equally simple to implement and efficiently selects the most qualified contestants to compete regardless of the form of contestant heterogeneity

difference form contests and the robustness of all pay auctions abstract in much of the existing literature on rent seeking games the outcome of the contest is either infinitely sensitive or relatively insensitive to contestants efforts the current paper presents a family of contest games that permit characterization of equilibrium for all levels of sensitivity of the outcome to contestants efforts specifically the outcome of the contest depends on the difference between efforts which encompass the lottery and the all pay auction as polar cases the equilibrium converges to that of the all pay auction as the probability of winning the prize grows infinitely sensitive to one s effort and the main qualitative features of equilibrium persist over a large parameter region journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 d72

entry into winner take all and proportional prize contests an experimental study this experiment compares the performance of two contest designs a standard winner take all tournament with a single fixed prize and a novel proportional payment design in which that same prize is divided among contestants by their share of total achievement we find that proportional prizes elicit more entry and more total achievement than the winner take all tournament the proportional prize contest performs better by limiting the degree to which heterogeneity among contestants discourages weaker entrants without altering the performance of stronger entrants these findings could inform the design of contests for technological and other improvements which are widely used by governments and philanthropic donors to elicit more effort on targeted economic and technological development activities

optimal design of research contests procurement of an innovation often requires substantial effort by potential suppliers motivating effort may be difficult if the level of effort and quality of the resulting innovation are unverifiable if innovators cannot benefit directly by marketing their innovations and if the buyer cannot extract up front payments from suppliers we study the use of contests to procure an innovation in such an environment an auction in which two suppliers are invited to innovate and then bid their prizes is optimal in a large class of contests if contestants are asymmetric it is optimal to handicap the most efficient one

selection bias demographic effects and ability effects in common value auction experiments inexperienced women along with economics and business majors are much more susceptible to the winner s curse as are subjects with lower sat act scores there are strong selection effects in bid function estimates for inexperienced and experienced subjects due to bankruptcies and bidders who have lower earnings returning less frequently as experienced subjects these selection effects are not identified using standard econometric techniques but are identified through experimental treatment effects ignoring these selection effects leads to misleading estimates of learning

rigging the lobbying process an application of the all pay auction textabstractin a world where a politician can explicitly auction off a prize to the high bidder the standard auction literature can be used to analyse political behavior the justice system however precludes politicians from explicitly selling the prize to the highest bidder thus politicians cannot let it become public knowledge that they are in the business of selling political favors an institution has emerged in political markets to overcome this constraint which are termed as lobbying lobbyists make implicit payments to the politician through campaign contributions if these up front payments were rebated to those failing to receive the prize it would be clear that the politician was selling favors this article has examined an interesting principle arising in all pay auctions this principle states that a politician wishing to maximize political rents may find it in his best interest to exclude certain lobbyists from participating in the lobbying process particularly lobbyists valuing most the political prize

industrial location in post reform india patterns of inter regional divergence and intra regional convergence where do new industrial investments locate and what factors drive the industrial location decisions do these investments follow the model of divergence followed by convergence suggested by the cumulative causation agglomeration economies and transport costs approaches these questions are examined with district level data from india for the pre and post reform periods using first tables and maps of concentration and clustering aggregated for all industry and disaggregated into five sectors heavy industries chemicals and petroleum textiles agribusiness and utilities and second logistic and ols heckman selection regression models for these six elements the data provide solid evidence both of inter regional divergence and intra regional convergence and suggest that concentrated decentralisation is the appropriate framework for understanding industrial location in post reform india

between a rock and a soft place ecological and feminist economics in policy debates abstract the field of ecological economics includes both economic analysis on the one hand and discussions of normative values and visions for society on the other using feminist insights into cultural beliefs about the relative hardness and softness of these two sides this essay discusses how ecological economists can use this unique between space in order to better inform policy the current crisis of global climate change it is argued requires that economists move beyond modeling and measurement while ecological thinkers need to re examine beliefs about markets and profit

economists value judgments and climate change a view from feminist economics abstract a number of recent discussions about ethical issues in climate change as engaged in by economists have focused on the value of the parameter representing the rate of time preference within models of optimal growth this essay examines many economists antipathy to serious discussion of ethical matters and suggests that the avoidance of questions of intergenerational equity is related to another set of value judgments concerning the quality and objectivity of economic practice using insights from feminist philosophy of science and research on high reliability organizations this essay argues that a more ethically transparent real world oriented and flexible economic practice would lead to more reliable and useful knowledge

gender effects in private value auctions abstract in a two stage auction women are significantly more likely to go bankrupt than men bidding more aggressively than the men in both phases of the auction process

adaptive policy framework through the lens of the viability theory a theoretical contribution to sustainability in the anthropocene era the earth is an evolutionary system that can be viewed as a social ecological system built around money sesm because of the coupling of the anthropocene era with globalization given the simultaneous environmental economic risks of total uncertainty and systemic aftermath several paradigmatic turns are required ecological economics is a cutting edge field that tackles this issue an integrative framework involving co evolutionary modelling offers methods for addressing the regulation issue that arises from the significant uncertainty driven by global economic and ecological risks we tackle the issue of adaptive policy for sesm regulation by answering the call for paradigmatic turns which leads us to support tychastic vs stochastic uncertainty in time adaptation vs optimal belated solutions viability vs stationary equilibrium and interdisciplinarity and participatory processes in modelling and policy action we describe step by step how to conceive sesm modelling through the lens of the mathematical viability theory mvt and we argue that this lens when adjusted for anticipatory and adaptive governance aag is relevant to examining sustainability for complex adaptive sesms from a local or global perspective

overconfidence and excess entry an experimental approach psychological studies show that most people are overconfident about their own relative abilities and unreasonably optimistic about their futures e g shelly e taylor and j d brown 1988 neil d weinstein 1980 when assessing their position in a distribution of peers on almost any positive trait like driving ability ola svenson 1981 income prospects or longevity a vast majority of people say they are above the average although of course only half can be if the trait is symmetrically distributed this paper explores whether optimistic biases could plausibly and predictably influence economic behavior in one particular setting entry into competitive games or markets many empirical studies show that most new businesses fail within a few years for example using plant level data from the u s census of manufacturers spanning 1963 1982 timothy dunne et al 1988 estimated that 61 5 percent of all entrants exited within five years and 79 6 percent exited within 10 years most of these exits are failures see also dunne et al 1989a 1989b d shapiro and r s khemani 1987

k william kapp s theory of social costs a luhmannian interpretation in developing his famous theory of social costs k william kapp claimed to draw inspiration from the theory of open systems the present paper reconstructs the notion of social costs from the perspective of the luhmannian theory of autopoietic social systems an alternative systems theoretic paradigm according to luhmann these systems build up their internal complexity at the cost of lowering their sensitivity to the complexity of their environment both societal and ecological from the luhmannian perspective social costs can be understood as those segments of environmental feedback that are thus ignored by social systems this perspective is not only consistent with kapp s own vision of social costs as a systematic outcome of private business enterprise but also even more radical as it traces these costs back to the regime of functional differentiation of society and thus to human civilization generally it follows from the luhmannian perspective that social costs can be reduced by improving the coordination between the individual functional systems such as economy law politics and science

do gender variant preferences for competition persist in the absence of performance the well established gender gap in preferences for competition has been attributed to gender variant feelings about performing in competitive environments using a novel task with agency in which subjects experience competition but cannot perform we find evidence that performing may be sufficient but not necessary to generate gender variant preferences for competition this suggests that the gender gap cannot be eliminated by correcting beliefs alone that eliminating performance for example routinizing tasks may not eliminate the gender gap and that there may be heretofore unidentified determinants of preferences for competition for example men may prefer payment schemes that are based on social comparison jel j16 c91 j24

lottery versus all pay auction models of lobbying i first provide a complete characterization of the unique equilibrium of the lottery game by n lobbyists with asymmetric valuations and then compare the lottery and the all pay auction models of lobbying i show that the exclusion principle discovered by baye kovenock and de vries 1993 for all pay auction does not apply to lottery i also show that the perverse effect that an exogenous cap may increase the total lobbying expenditure in a two bidder all pay auction discovered by che and gale 1998 does not apply to lottery

personnel economics past lessons and future directions presidential address to the society of labor economists san francisco may 1 1998 in 1987 the journal of labor economics published an issue on the economics of personnel since then personnel economics defined as the application of labor economics principles to business issues has become a major part of labor economics now accounting for a substantial proportion of papers in this and other journals much of the work in personnel economics has been theoretical in large part because the data needed to test these theories have not been available in recent years a number of firm based data sets have surfaced that allow personnel economics to be tested using two such data sets i give support to the implications of theories that relate to life cycle incentives tournaments piecework incentives pay compression and peer pressure i conclude that personnel economics is real it is far more than a set of clever theories it has relevance to the real world additionally firm based data make asking and answering new kinds of questions feasible the value of research in this area is h

selection into self improvement and competition pay gender stereotypes and earnings volatility abstract we examine whether men and women differ in their willingness to select into a contract that pays upon improving one s past performance experiment participants choose to perform a task under either a regular piece rate or a larger piece rate provided they improve relative to a previous round women are less willing than men to select into self improvement pay and this gender gap is largely explained by higher risk aversion and to a smaller extent lower self confidence high earnings volatility widens the gender gap and makes self improvement pay less attractive than competition pay we find no effect of gender stereotypes in the willingness to sort into self improvement the results provide insight into the feasibility and potential of using self improvement contracts as gender neutral incentive mechanisms