does one soros make a difference a theory of currency crises with large and small traders do large investors increase the vulnerability of a country to speculative attacks in the foreign exchange markets to address this issue we build a model of currency crises where a single large investor and a continuum of small investors independently decide whether to attack a currency based on their private information about fundamentals even abstracting from signaling the presence of the large investor does make all other traders more aggressive in their selling relative to the case in which there is no large investors small investors attach the currency when fundamentals are stronger yet the difference can be small or null depending on the relative precision of private information of the small and large investors adding signaling makes the influence of the large trader on small traders behaviour much stronger

a two person dynamic equilibrium under ambiguity this paper describes a pure exchange continuous time economy with two heterogeneous agents and complete markets a novel feature of the economy is that agents perceive some security returns as ambiguous in the sense often attributed to frank knight the equilibrium is described completely in closed form after identifying agents as countries the model is applied to address the consumption home bias and equity home bias puzzles 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved jel classi cation d81 g11 g12 g15

trying to explain home bias in equities and consumption investors hold a substantially larger proportion of their wealth portfolios in domestic assets than standard portfolio theory would suggest a phenomenon called equity home bias in the absence of this bias investors would optimally diversify domestic output risk using foreign equities therefore consumption growth rates would tend to co move across countries even when output growth rates do not empirically however consumption growth rates tend to have a lower correlation across countries than do output growth rates a phenomenon i call consumption home bias in this paper i discuss these two biases and their potential relationship as suggested by the literature

currency unions and trade the effect is large the impact of a common currency on trade can be grossly mismeasured if countries that belong to currency unions are systematically different from those that do not and if the relationship between trade and its observable determinants is complex i argue that such complications are plausible and likely to distort the empirical results of a recent economic policy paper by andrew rose issue 30 2000 pp 7 45 using techniques designed to be robust in this situation i find that the effects of common currency on international trade are considerably less dramatic and much less precisely estimated copyright cepr ces msh 2001

constructing polities and markets an institutionalist account of european integration as institutions and governance structures develop in modern markets they tend to feed back onto economic activity through such feedback loops market and political arenas can develop symbiotically into relatively coherent fields that gradually embed actors orientations and activities using these insights this article develops and tests a theory of european integration focusing on the case of the european community the first pillar of the european union traders organized interests courts and the ec s policy making organs over time have produced a self sustaining causal system that has driven the construction of the european market and polity the generality of this explanation to a sociology of markets and polity building projects is discussed in the conclusion

the determinants of cross border equity flows abstract we explore a new panel data set on bilateral gross cross border equity flows between 14 countries 1989 1996 we show that a gravity model explains international transactions in financial assets at least as well as goods trade transactions gross transaction flows depend on market size in source and destination country as well as trading costs in which both information and the transaction technology play a role distance proxies some information costs and other variables explicitly represent information transmission an information asymmetry between domestic and foreign investors and the efficiency of transactions the geography of information is the main determinant of the pattern of international transactions while there is weak support in our data for the diversification motive once we control for the informational friction we broaden the scope of our results by presenting some evidence linking the results on equity transactions to equity holdings

tests of competing theories of consumer choice and the representative consumer hypothesis tests of competing theories of consumer choice and the representative consumer hypothesis in this paper the authors estimate demand functions for individual agents they test if commonly used functions are consisten t with the data and if parameters are the same across subjects the y examine decision rules based on random choice psychological and bi ological models of choice and utility functions commonly employed in the economics literature a generalized minimum needs hypothesis per forms well across experimental conditions and individual subjects st atistically significant differences in tastes across subjects were id entified in the data copyright 1987 by royal economic society

equity home bias and corporate disclosure abstract i show that more comprehensive corporate disclosure reduces investors uncertainty about domestic companies payoffs at no cost thereby decreasing investors equity home bias toward a country since investors should base their investment decisions on valid and easily interpretable company information only more comprehensive disclosure will reduce the home bias only if domestic securities law is sufficiently stratified and domestic companies use international accounting standards using panel data for 38 countries from 2003 to 2008 i find that more comprehensive disclosure reduces investors home bias though significantly only for countries that sufficiently enforce their securities law and implement international accounting standards

the effect of national culture on the choice of entry mode characteristics of national cultures have frequently been claimed to influence the selection of entry modes this article investigates this claim by developing a theoretical argument for why culture should influence the choice of entry two hypotheses are derived which relate culture to entry mode choice one focusing on the cultural distance between countries the other on attitudes towards uncertainty avoidance using a multinomial logit model and controlling for other effects the hypotheses are tested by analysing data on 228 entries into the united states market by acquisition wholly owned greenfield and joint venture empirical support for the effect of national culture on entry choice is found

information immobility and the home bias puzzle many argue that home bias arises because home investors can predict home asset payoffs more accurately than foreigners can but why does global information access not eliminate this asymmetry we model investors endowed with a small home information advantage who choose what information to learn before they invest surprisingly even when home investors can learn what foreigners know they choose not to investors profit more from knowing information others do not know learning amplifies information asymmetry the model matches patterns of local and industry bias foreign investments portfolio outperformance and asset prices finally we propose new avenues for empirical research

imperfect financial integration and asymmetric information competing explanations of the home bias puzzle this paper shows that imperfect financial integration and informational asymmetries are not competing theories but rather complementary ideas to a single explanation of the home bias puzzle we develop a rational expectations model of asset prices with investors that face informational constraints and find that informational advantages arise endogenously as a response to small financial frictions we also present empirical evidence that i international financial frictions are correlated to observed patterns of us investors attention and that ii the attention us investors allocate to foreign stocks helps explain home bias towards those countries even after controlling for financial integration levels ce memoire montre que l integration financiere imparfaite et l information asymetrique ne sont pas des theories concurrentes mais plutot des idees complementaires a l interieur d une resolution unifiee de l enigme du biais en faveur du marche domestique on developpe un modele d anticipations rationnelles des prix des actifs face a des investisseurs confrontes a des contraintes informationnelles et on decouvre que les avantages informationnels emergent de maniere endogene en reponse a de petites frictions financieres on montre empiriquement que i les frictions financieres internationales sont co reliees aux patterns d attention observes des investisseurs des etats unis et que ii l attention portee par les investisseurs americains aux marches financiers etrangers aide a expliquer le biais en faveur du marche domestique de ces pays meme apres avoir pris en compte les niveaux d integration financiere

reversal of fortunes democratic institutions and foreign direct investment inflows to developing countries does increased democracy promote or jeopardize foreign direct investment fdi inflows to less developed countries we argue that democratic institutions have conflicting effects on fdi inflows on the one hand democratic institutions hinder fdi inflows by limiting the oligopolistic or monopolistic behaviors of multinational enterprises facilitating indigenous businesses pursuit of protection from foreign capital and constraining host governments ability to offer generous financial and fiscal incentives to foreign investors on the other hand democratic institutions promote fdi inflows because they tend to ensure more credible property rights protection reducing risks and transaction costs for foreign investors hence the net effect of democracy on fdi inflows is contingent on the relative strength of these two competing forces our argument reconciles conflicting theoretical expectations in the existing literature empirical analyses of fifty three developing countries from 1982 to 1995 substantiate our claims we find that both property rights protection and democracy related property rights protection encourage fdi inflows after controlling for their positive effect through property rights protection democratic institutions reduce fdi inflows these results are robust against alternative model specifications statistical estimators and variable measurements

public information private information and the multiplicity of equilibria in coordination games abstract i study coordination games with incomplete public and private information and relate equilibrium convergence to convergence of higher order beliefs as the players signals become more and more precise the equilibrium manifold converges to the correspondence of common knowledge equilibria whenever the variance of the public signal converges to 0 at a rate faster than one half the rate of convergence of the variance of private signals the same condition also determines the convergence of common p belief to common knowledge which leads to a simple intuition for its origin and an immediate generalization of the former results about equilibrium convergence journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d82

transactions cost economics and the multinational enterprise an assessment abstract this paper applies transactions cost principles to the multinational enterprise in order to ascertain its distinctive properties as a mode of economic organization the analysis helps identify just when and where contractual alternatives to the multinational firm are likely to be viable this turns out to depend upon the nature of the technology the regime of appropriability within which the firm operates and the characteristics of the markets in question transactions cost analysis is also extended to the multinational enterprise host country relationship implications for management and public policy are derived

endogenous acquisition of information and the equity home bias this paper investigates the extent to which differences in information costs can explain the equity home bias puzzle in a model where information costs are higher for the foreign asset than for the home asset i show that if cost functions are convex and the assets have identical return characteristics the expected size of the home bias in terms of differences in expected demands is positive and increasing in expected excess returns and risk but decreasing in risk aversion however a calibration to us data suggests that information costs can explain only a small fraction of the observed home bias

globalization pressures and the state the worldwide spread of central bank independence the authors examine the impact of globalization on state structures in the specific instance of the central bank following the world system world society and neoinstitutional perspectives in sociology they assume that states are in cultural political and economic competition with each other thereby seeking to maintain their position and status frequently by adopting organizational forms or practices that make them isomorphic with their environment the authors predict that countries boost the independence of their central bank from the political power as their exposure to foreign trade investment and multilateral lending increases they also model the cross national dynamic process of diffusion of central bank independence by examining the impact of cohesive and role equivalent trade relationships between countries they find support for their hypotheses with information on 71 countries between 1990 and 2000

spanning the institutional abyss the intergovernmental network and the governance of foreign direct investment global economic transactions such as foreign direct investment fdi must extend over an institutional abyss between the jurisdiction and therefore protection of the states involved intergovernmental organizations igos represent an important attempt to span this abyss the authors use a network approach to demonstrate that the connections between two countries through joint membership in the same igos are associated with a large positive influence on the fdi that flows between them moreover they show that this effect occurs not only in the case of connections through economic igos but also through those with social and cultural mandates this demonstrates that relational governance is important and feasible in the global context even for the most risky transactions the authors also examine the interdependence between the igo network and the domestic institutions of states social and cultural igo connections do more and economic igo connections less to increase fdi when the target country is mo

choice under uncertainty problems solved and unsolved ffifteen years ago the theory of choice under uncertainty could be considered one of the success stories of economic analysis it rested on solid axiomatic foundations it had seen important breakthroughs in the analytics of risk risk aversion and their applications to economic issues and it stood ready to provide the theoretical underpinnings for the newly emerging information revolution in economics 1 today choice under uncertainty is a field in flux the standard theory is being challenged on several grounds from both within and outside economics the nature of these challenges and of our profession s responses to them is the topic of this paper

an institutional approach to cross national distance cross national distance is a key concept in the field of management previous research has conceptualized and measured cross national differences mostly in terms of dyadic cultural distance and has used the euclidean approach to measuring it in contrast our goal is to disaggregate the construct of distance by proposing a set of multidimensional measures including economic financial political administrative cultural demographic knowledge and global connectedness as well as geographic distance we ground our analysis and choice of empirical dimensions on institutional theories of national business governance and innovation systems in order to overcome the methodological limitations of the euclidean approach we calculate dyadic distances using the mahalanobis method which is scale invariant and takes into consideration the variance covariance matrix we empirically analyze four different foreign expansion choices of us companies to illustrate the importance of disaggregating the distance construct and the usefulness of our distance calculations which we make freely available to managers and scholars

animals choices over uncertain outcomes further experimental results the betweenness axiom of expected utility theory which is not required under several nonexpected utility formulations is examined choices are checked for independence axiom violations in the allais direction and for fanning out in little explored areas of the unit probability triangle as predicted by machina s hypothesis ii the data show allais type violations of the independence axiom systematic failure of the fanning out hypothesis in the northwest portion of the unit probability triangle and consistent violations of the betweenness axiom in favor of folded orderings results are related to findings from human choice experiments exploring similar phenomena copyright 1991 by royal economic society

wealth information acquisition and portfolio choice i solve with an approximation a grossman stiglitz economy under general preferences thus allowing for wealth effects because information generates increasing returns decreasing absolute risk aversion in conjunction with the availability of costly information is sufficient to explain why wealthier households invest a larger fraction of their wealth in risky assets one no longer needs to resort to decreasing relative risk aversion an empirically questionable assumption furthermore i show how to distinguish empirically between these two explanations finally i find that the availability of costly information exacerbates wealth inequalities copyright 2004 oxford university press

three variants on the allais example three variants on the famous allais example were administered to student subjects two variants involved small changes in the example yet greatly diminished the qualitative behavior known as the allais paradox the third variant is almost a direct test of daniel kahneman and amos tversky s certainty effect against mark machina s fanning out hypothesis the results favor the certainty effect over the fanning out hypothesis for at least the case of straight line indifference curves copyright 1989 by american economic association

crises and prices information aggregation multiplicity and volatility crises are volatile times when endogenous sources of information are closely monitored we study the role of information in crises by introducing a financial market in a coordination game with imperfect information the asset price aggregates dispersed private information acting as a public noisy signal in contrast to the case with exogenous information our main result is that uniqueness may not obtain as a perturbation from perfect information multiplicity is ensured with small noise in addition we show that a multiplicity may emerge in the financial price itself b less noise may contribute toward nonfundamental volatility even when the equilibrium is unique and c similar results obtain for a model where individuals observe one another s actions highlighting the importance of endogenous information more generally

information aggregation in a noisy rational expectations economy abstract this paper analyzes a general equilibrium model of a competitive security market in which traders possess independent pieces of information about the return of a risky asset each trader conditions his estimate of the return both on his own private source of information and price which in equilibrium serves as a noisy aggregator of the total information observed by all traders a closed form characterization of the rational expectations equilibrium is presented a counter example to the existence of fully revealing equilibrium is developed