understanding the effect of technology shocks in svars with long run restrictions this paper studies the statistical properties of impulse response functions in structural vector autoregressions svars with a highly persistent variable as hours worked and long run identifying restrictions the highly persistent variable is specified as a nearly stationary persistent process such process appears particularly well suited to characterized the dynamics of hours worked because it implies a unit root in finite sample but is asymptotically stationary and persistent this is typically the case for per capita hours worked which are included in svars theoretical results derived from this specification allow to explain most of the empirical findings from svars which include u s hours worked simulation experiments from an estimated dsge model confirm theoretical results

optimal dynamic pricing of inventories with stochastic demand over finite horizons in many industries managers face the problem of selling a given stock of items by a deadline we investigate the problem of dynamically pricing such inventories when demand is price sensitive and stochastic and the firm s objective is to maximize expected revenues examples that fit this framework include retailers selling fashion and seasonal goods and the travel and leisure industry which markets space such as seats on airline flights cabins on vacation cruises and rooms in hotels that become worthless if not sold by a specific time we formulate this problem using intensity control and obtain structural monotonicity results for the optimal intensity resp price as a function of the stock level and the length of the horizon for a particular exponential family of demand functions we find the optimal pricing policy in closed form for general demand functions we find an upper bound on the expected revenue based on analyzing the deterministic version of the problem and use this bound to prove that simple fixed price policies are asymptotically optimal as the volume of expected sales tends to infinity finally we extend our results to the case where demand is compound poisson only a finite number of prices is allowed the demand rate is time varying holding costs are incurred and cash flows are discounted the initial stock is a decision variable and reordering overbooking and random cancellations are allowed

analysis of seat allocation and overbooking decisions with hybrid information abstract we investigate a single leg airline revenue management problem where an airline has limited demand information and uncensored no show information to use such hybrid information for simultaneous overbooking and booking control decisions we combine expected overbooking cost with revenue then we take a robust optimization approach with a regret based criterion while the criterion is defined on a myriad of possible demand scenarios we show that only a small number of them are necessary to compute the objective we also prove that nested booking control policies are optimal among all deterministic ones we further develop an effective computational method to find the optimal policy and compare our policy to others proposed in the literature

do too many cooks always spoil the stew an experimental analysis of rent seeking and the role of a strategic buyer laboratory methods are used to evaluate the effects of institutional arrangements and rent defending activity on rent seeking auction outcomes in part nash equilibrium predictions are a useful behavioral guide as predicted more rents are dissipated in perfectly discriminating auctions where the high bidder wins than in lotteries where relative bids determine the chance of winning also as predicted the introduction of a rent defending buyer reduces social costs nevertheless the social costs of rent seeking consistently exceed predicted levels moreover individual bidding especially by buyers deviates markedly from nash predictions

tracking the new economy using growth theory to detect changes in trend productivity abstract the acceleration of productivity after 1995 prompted a debate over whether the economy s underlying growth rate would remain high in this paper we draw on growth theory to identify variables other than productivity namely consumption and labor compensation to help estimate trend productivity growth we treat that trend as a common factor with two regimes high and low growth our analysis picks up striking evidence of a return in 1997 to the high growth regime nearly 25 years after a switch from high to low growth we find that both the common factor and regime switching aspects of the model are important for identifying changes in trend productivity and also show that the trend breaks are more difficult to detect with per capita as opposed to per hour based data because of persistent labor supply shifts finally we argue that our methodology is effective in detecting changes in trend in real time in the case of the 1990s the methodology would have signaled the regime switch by 1999 or within roughly six quarters of when it occurred according to the full sample

what do interest rates reveal about the functioning of real business cycle models abstract this paper begins by documenting the extent to which the predictions of standard real business cycle rbc models are incompatible with observed movements in real interest rates the main finding of the paper is that extending the baseline model to include habit persistence in consumption and adjustment costs to capital significantly improves the model s empirical performance in our evaluation of the model s performance we take special care of estimating and testing predictions of the model using both moments drawn directly from the data and moments calculated after identifying shocks to the stochastic trend

skill biased technological change and the business cycle over the past two decades technological progress in the united states has been biased towards skilled labor what does this imply for business cycles we construct a quarterly skill premium from the cps and use it to identify skill biased technology shocks in a var with long run restrictions hours fall in response to skill biased technology shocks indicating that at least part of the technology induced fall in total hours is due to a compositional shift in labor demand investment specific technology shocks reduce the skill premium indicating that capital and skill are not complementary in aggregate production

market structure and the value of overselling under stochastic demands in the operations management literature traditional revenue management focused on pricing and capacity allocation strategies in a two period model with stochastic demand inspired by travel and lodging industries we examine a two period model in which each seller may also adopt the overselling strategy to customers whose valuations are differentiated by timing of arrivals widely seen as a popular hedge against consumers skipping reservations we extend the stylized approaches of biyalogorsky carmon fruchter and gerstner 1999 and lim 2009 to understand the value of overselling under various market structures we find that contrary to existing literature the impact of period two pricing competition from overselling spills over to period one such that overselling may not always be a weakly dominant strategy once unlimited early demand ceases to hold in a duopoly regime we provide some numerical studies on the existence of multiple equilibria at the capacity allocation level which actually lead to different selling strategies at the equilibrium despite identical market conditions and firm characteristics

when do long run identifying restrictions give reliable results many recent articles have identified behavioral disturbances in vector autoregressions by imposing restrictions on the long run effects of shocks this article demonstrates that this approach will be unreliable unless the underlying economy satisfies three types of strong restrictions although many aspects of these issues have been raised before this article draws out and illustrates the implications for inferences under the long run scheme furthermore it provides strategies for dealing with the problems

a theoretical analysis of altruism and decision error in public goods games abstract we formalize an equilibrium model in which altruism and decision error parameters determine the distribution of contributions for linear and quadratic public goods games the equilibrium density is exponential for linear games and normal for quadratic games our model implies i contributions increase with the marginal value of the public good ii total contributions increase with the number of participants iii mean contributions lie between the nash prediction and half the endowment these predictions which are not implied by a nash analysis are consistent with laboratory data maximum likelihood estimates of altruism and error parameters are significant and plausible

the medium is the measure technical change and employment 1909 1949 abstract new indicators based on technology titles are used to measure the impact of innovative activity on the u s labor market between 1909 and 1949 we find that positive technology shocks raised productivity employment vacancies and labor turnover and lowered unemployment and business failures moreover automotive and electrical innovations quintessential general purpose technologies had a greater positive impact on employment than those in mechanical innovations the overall results compatible with the predictions of the real business cycle model raise questions about the anemic recovery in employment after 1934 since the strong upsurge in technical change failed to be accompanied by vigorous job expansion

on the optimal pricing policy of a monopolist the paper presents a simple explanation of price dispersion by a monopolist assuming only that consumers arrive in a random order and are served on a first come first served basis a firm can sometimes increase its profits by charging two different prices for the same good and rationing sales at the lower price however it is never necessary to charge more than two prices and a single price is sufficient as long as either the marginal revenue curve is everywhere downward sloping or the marginal cost of production is constant

the competitive newsboy we consider a competitive version of the classical newsboy problem in which a firm must choose an inventory or production level for a perishable good with random demand and the optimal solution is a fractile of the demand distribution and investigate the impact of competition upon industry inventory a splitting rule specifies how initial industry demand is allocated among competing firms and how any excess demand is allocated among firms with remaining inventory we examine the relation between equilibrium inventory levels and the splitting rule and provide conditions under which there is a unique equilibrium our most general result is that if all excess demand is reallocated i e there is perfect substitutability then competition never leads to a decrease in industry inventory

it s what you say not what you pay an experimental study of manager employee relationships in overcoming coordination failure we study manager employee interactions in experiments set in a corporate environment where payoffs depend on employees coordinating at high effort levels the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak link game in the absence of managerial intervention subjects invariably slip into coordination failure to overcome a history of coordination failure managers have two instruments at their disposal increasing employees financial incentives to coordinate and communication with employees we find that communication is a more effective tool than incentive changes for leading organizations out of performance traps examining the content of managers communication the most effective messages specifically request a high effort point out the mutual benefits of high effort and imply that employees are being paid well

reciprocity matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games experimental and empirical evidence identifies social preferences and proposes competing models of such preferences we find that participants match the contributions of others in the voluntary contribution mechanism vcm we also examine a game with different equilibria the weakest link mechanism wlm here in contrast participants match the minimum contribution of others

rule of thumb consumers productivity and hours in this paper we study the transmission mechanism of productivity shocks in a model with rule of thumb consumers in the literature this nancial friction has been studied only with reference to scal shocks we show that the presence of rule of thumb consumers is also very helpful in accounting for recent empirical evidence on productivity shocks rule of thumb agents together with nominal and real rigidities play an important role in reproducing the negative response of hours and the delayed responses of output and

transparency efficiency and the distribution of economic welfare in pass through investment trust games we design an experiment to examine behavior and welfare in a multi level trust game representing a pass through investment in an intermediated market in a repeated game an investor invests via an intermediary who lends to a borrower a pre experiment one shot version of the game serves as a baseline and to type each subject we alter the transparency of exchanges between non adjacent parties we find transparency of the exchanges between the investor and intermediary does not significantly affect welfare however transparency regarding exchanges between the intermediary and borrower promotes trust on the part of the investor increasing welfare further this has asymmetric effects borrowers and intermediaries achieve greater welfare benefits than investors we discuss implications for what specific aspects of financial market transparency may facilitate more efficiency

cooperation and distributive conflict if either property rights or institutions are weak agents who create wealth by cooperating will later have an incentive to fight over the distribution of it in this paper we investigate theoretically and experimentally the circumstances under which welfare losses from investment in distributional contests destroy welfare gains from voluntary cooperation we find that in situations where the return to cooperation is high subjects cooperate strongly and welfare exceeds the predicted non cooperation levels if returns to cooperation are low then subjects still cooperate but the resources wasted in the distributional conflict lead to lower welfare than if subjects had followed the theoretical prediction of not cooperating

an experimental study of price dispersion in an optimal search model with advertising abstract this paper reports a laboratory experiment to study pricing and advertising behavior with costly buyer search sellers simultaneously post prices and may incur a cost to advertise this price in the unique symmetric equilibrium sellers either charge a high unadvertised price or randomize in an interval of lower advertised prices increases in search or advertising costs raise equilibrium prices and equilibrium advertising intensity decreases with lower search costs and higher advertising costs our experimental results support these comparative static predictions and sellers also post high unadvertised prices as predicted in all treatments however sellers advertise more intensely than in equilibrium

using yield management to shift demand when the peak time is unknown traditional peak load and stochastic peak load models assume firms have prior information about when peak demand occurs however price dispersion such as is typically used by firms practicing yield management can achieve some of the same efficient demand shifting even when the peak time is unknown equilibrium price dispersion arises because of stochastic demand and price rigidities but a previously unexplored benefit of price dispersion is its ability to reduce equilibrium capacity costs through demand shifting the model also suggests how yield management now more commonly called revenue management might actually benefit business travellers contrary to the popular prejudice

egalitarianism and competitiveness competition is a cornerstone of economic life some environments are however more competitive than others and individuals are often confronted with the decision whether to self select into a competitive environment an important example is occupational choice a self employed lawyer is in constant competition for clients whereas a lawyer working as a civil servant in a public authority is not likewise some people vigorously compete for promo tion to better paid jobs associated with a high prestige while others don t understanding who self selects into competitive environments and who shies away from them is thus important in this paper we test the hypothesis that individu als with a preference for egalitarian outcomes are more reluctant to self select into competitive environments our hypothesis is based on i the observation that payoff inequalities among winners and losers arise as a natural by product of competition and ii the empirical literature showing that a nonnegligible share of children and adults is willing to incur costs to reduce earnings inequalities see e g christopher dawes et al 2007 ernst fehr helen bernhard and bettina rockenbach 2008 we analyze data from several economic experiments implemented in a household survey study with mothers of preschool children we

behavior in group contests a review of experimental research group contests are ubiquitous some examples include warfare between countries competition between political parties team incentives within firms group sports and rent seeking in order to succeed members of the same group have incentives to cooperate with each other by expending individual efforts however since effort is costly each member also has an incentive to abstain from expending any effort and instead free ride on the efforts of other members contest theory shows that the intensity of competition between groups and the amount of free riding within groups depend on the group size sharing rule group impact function contest success function and heterogeneity of players we review experimental studies testing these theoretical predictions almost all studies of behavior in group contests find significant over expenditure of effort relative to the theory we discuss potential explanations for such over expenditure including the utility of winning bounded rationality relative payoff maximization parochial altruism and social identity despite over expenditure most studies find support for the comparative statics predictions of the theory with the exception of the group size paradox finally studies show that there are effective mechanisms that can promote within group cooperation and conflict resolution mechanisms that can de escalate and potentially eliminate between group conflict

the flipside of comparative payment schemes comparative payment schemes and tournament style promotion mechanisms are pervasive in the workplace we test experimentally whether they have a negative impact on people s willingness to cooperate participants first perform in a simple task and then participate in a public goods game the payment scheme for the task varies across treatment groups compared with a piece rate scheme individuals in a winner takes all competition are significantly less cooperative in the public goods game a lottery treatment where the winner is decided by luck has the same effect in a competition treatment with feedback winners cooperate as little as participants in the other treatments whereas losers cooperate even less all three treatments lead to substantial losses in the realised social surplus from the public good while having no significant impact on performance in a complementary experiment we aim to shed light on the psychological mechanisms behind our results data as supplemental material are available

the dynamic effects of aggregate demand and supply disturbances we interpret fluctuations in gnp and unemployment as due to two types of disturbances disturbances that have a permanent effect on output and disturbances that do not we interpret the first as supply disturbances the second as demand disturbances demand disturbances have a hump shaped mirror image effect on output and unemployment the effect of supply disturbances on output increases steadily over time peaking after two years and reaching a plateau after five years

investment specific news shocks and u s business cycles we provide robust evidence that news shocks about future investment specific technology ist constitute a significant force behind u s business cycles positive ist news shocks induce comovement that is raise output consumption investment and hours these shocks account for 70 of the business cycle variation in output hours and consumption and 60 of the variation in investment and have played an important role in 9 of the last 10 u s recessions our findings provide strong support for shifting focus to ist news shocks when investigating the role of news in driving u s business cycles

monitoring rent seeking managers advantages of diffuse ownership this paper demonstrates that a one owner firm tends to overmonitor its employees because monitoring is imperfect and penalities imposable on detected rent seekers are limited by the opportunity cost wage employees have incentives to engage in rent seeking activities that both reduce and redistribute the firm s residual since owner monitoring will be partly motivated by concerns over the distribution of the firm s residual a sole owner tends to monitor beyond the level that maximizes a firm s residual appropriately diffuse ownership can reduce monitoring effort to efficient levels by diluting incentives for monitoring activities

simultaneous decision making in competitive and cooperative environments we experimentally investigate simultaneous decision making in two contrasting environments a competitive environment a contest and a cooperative environment a voluntary contribution mechanism we find that the cooperative nature of the voluntary contribution mechanism spills over to the contest decreasing sub optimal overbidding in the contest however contributions to the public good are not affected by simultaneous participation in the contest there is a significant negative correlation between decisions made in competitive and cooperative environments i e more cooperative subjects tend to be less competitive and vice versa this correlation can be rationalized by heterogeneous social preferences towards inequality but not by bounded rationality theory

stochastic trends and economic fluctuations are business cycles mainly the result of permanent shocks to productivity this paper uses a long run restriction implied by a large class of real business cycle models identifying permanent productivity shocks as shocks to the common stochastic trend in output consumption and investment to provide new evidence on this question econometric tests indicate that this common stochastic trend cointegration implication is consistent with postwar u s data however in systems with nominal variables the estimates of this common stochastic trend indicate that permanent productivity shocks typically explain less than half of the business cycle variability in output consumption and investment copyright 1991 by american economic association

comparing dsge var forecasting models how big are the differences abstract i generate priors for a vector autoregression var from a standard real business cycle rbc model an rbc model with capital adjustment costs and habit formation and a sticky price model with an unaccommodating monetary authority the response of hours worked to a tfp shock differs sharply across these models i compare the accuracy of forecasts made from each of the resulting dynamic stochastic general equilibrium vector autoregression dsge var models despite having different structural characteristics the dsge vars are comparable in terms of forecasting performance as in previous work dsge vars compare favorably with atheoretical vars

measures of per capita hours and their implications for the technology hours debate structural vector autoregressions give conflicting results on the effects of technology shocks on hours the results depend crucially on the assumed data generating process for hours per capita we show that the standard measure of hours per capita and productivity have significant low frequency movements that are the source of the conflicting results hodrick prescott hp filtered hours per capita produce results consistent with those obtained when hours are assumed to have a unit root we show that important sources of the low frequency movements in the standard measure are sectoral shifts in hours and the changing age composition of the working age population when we control for these low frequency components to determine the effect of technology shocks on hours using long run restrictions we get one consistent answer hours decline in the short run in response to a positive technology shock we further extend the analysis by examining the effects of demographic controls on the impulse responses to investment specific technology shocks our results are less conclusive

can long run restrictions identify technology shocks gali s innovative approach of imposing long run restrictions on a vector autoregression var to identify the effects of a technology shock has become widely utilized in this paper we investigate its reliability through monte carlo simulations using calibrated business cycle models overall gali s methodology appears to be fruitful the impulse responses derived from the artificial data generally have the same sign and qualitative pattern as the true responses and the approach can be informative in discriminating between alternative models however our results reveal some important quantitative shortcomings including considerable estimation uncertainty about the impact of technology shocks on macroeconomic variables more generally the conditions under which the methodology performs well appear considerably more restrictive than implied by the key identifying assumption this underscores the importance of using economic models to guide in the implementation of the approach in interpreting the results and in assessing its limitations jel c32 e32 o33

technology shocks and monetary policy assessing the fed s performance abstract the purpose of the present paper is twofold first we characterize the fed s systematic response to technology shocks and its implications for u s output hours and inflation second we evaluate the extent to which those responses can be accounted for by a simple monetary policy rule including the optimal one in the context of a standard business cycle model with sticky prices our main results can be described as follows first we detect significant differences across periods in the response of the economy as well as the fed s to a technology shock second the fed s response to a technology shock in the volcker greenspan period is consistent with an optimal monetary policy rule third in the pre volcker period the fed s policy tended to overstabilize output at the cost of generating excessive inflation volatility our evidence reinforces recent results in the literature suggesting an improvement in the fed s performance

broken trend stationarity of hours worked the estimated impact of a technology shock on hours worked using structural vector autoregressions svars depends to a great extent on whether or not hours worked is considered to be integrated of first order it is shown in this article that the widely analysed time series of hours worked per capita in the us business sector evolves around a broken linear trend when this fact is taken into account the unit root null is rejected by recently proposed tests therefore it can be stated that empirical specifications with hours in first differences are not recommended it seems more appropriate to control for the presence of this shift in the deterministic component we also draw this conclusion from a bivariate model for both productivity growth and hours worked our results suggest that technology improvements have a negative but nonsignificant effect on hours only in the very short run this impact later becomes positive and statistically significant after five periods

collusive pricing with capacity constraints in the presence of demand uncertainty we explore the response of collusive prices to changing demand conditions when firms operate under capacity constraints in the presence of demand uncertainty we find support for the conventional view that periods of low demand lead through the emergence of excess capacity to a breakdown of collusive pricing we also find that the nature of price wars depends on the degree of excess capacity in the industry while small amounts of excess capacity can lead firms to engage in mild price wars characterized by uniform price reductions and market share stability more severe price wars characterized by price undercutting and market share instability can emerge if excess capacity is sufficiently great finally our results lend support to the view that market share instability is a symptom of ineffective collusion

the dynamo and the computer an historical perspective on the modern productivity paradox the dynamo and the computer an historical perspective on the modern productivity paradox author s paul a david source the american economic review vol 80 no 2 papers and proceedings of the hundred and second annual meeting of the american economic association may 1990 pp 355 361 published by american economic association stable url http www jstor org stable 2006600 accessed 08 12 2010 01 40

conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to public goods we compare a partners condition where the same small group of subjects plays a repeated publi c good game to a strangers condition where subjects play this game in changing group formations subjects in the partners conditi on contribute from t he first period on significantly more to the publi c good than subjects in the strangers conditi on in the strangers conditi on contributions show a continual decay whil e in the partners conditi on contributions fluctuate on a high level until t hey decrease in the final periods we interpret subjects behavior in terms of conditional cooperation which is characterized by both future oriented and reactive behavior

investment shocks and business cycles abstract the origins of business cycles are still controversial among macroeconomists this paper contributes to this debate by studying the driving forces of fluctuations in an estimated new neoclassical synthesis model of the u s economy in this model most of the variability of output and hours at business cycle frequencies is due to shocks to the marginal efficiency of investment imperfect competition and to a lesser extent technological frictions are the key to their transmission although labor supply shocks explain a large fraction of the fluctuations in hours at very low frequencies they are irrelevant over the business cycle this finding is important because the microfoundations of these disturbances are widely regarded as unappealing

what really accounts for the fall in hours after a technology shock abstract the paper asks how state of the art dsge models that account for the conditional response of hours following a positive neutral technology shock compare in a marginal likelihood race to that end we construct and estimate several competing small scale dsge models that extend the standard real business cycle model in particular we identify from the literature six different hypotheses that generate the empirically observed decline in hours worked after a positive technology shock these models alternatively exhibit i sticky prices ii firm entry and exit with time to build iii habit in consumption and costly adjustment of investment iv persistence in the permanent technology shocks v labor market friction with procyclical hiring costs and vi leontief production function with labor saving technology shocks in terms of model posterior probabilities impulse responses and autocorrelations the model favored is the one that exhibits habit formation in consumption and investment adjustment costs a robustness test shows that the sticky price model becomes as competitive as the habit formation and costly adjustment of investment model when sticky wages are included

trend breaks long run restrictions and contractionary technology improvements abstract structural vector autoregressions with long run restrictions are extraordinarily sensitive to low frequency correlations recent literature finds that the estimated effects of technology shocks are sensitive to how one treats hours per capita however after allowing for statistically and economically significant trend breaks in productivity results are much less sensitive hours fall when technology improves the issue is that the common high low high pattern of productivity growth and hours i e the low frequency correlation inevitably leads to a positive estimated response the trend breaks control for this correlation this example suggests a practical need for care in using long run restrictions

what do technology shocks tell us about the new keynesian paradigm abstract researchers have used unanticipated changes to monetary policy to identify preference and technology parameters of macroeconomic models this paper uses changes in technology to identify the same set of parameters estimates based on technology shocks differ substantially from those based on monetary policy shocks in the post world war ii united states a positive technology shock reduces inflation and increases hours worked significantly and rapidly in both cases relative to policy shock identification technology shock identification implies i long duration durability in preferences instead of short duration habit ii built in inflation inertia disappears and price flexibility increases in response to technological improvement consumption durability increases hours worked because households temporarily increase labor supply to accumulate durables towards a new higher steady state level limited nominal rigidities allow inflation to fall because firms are able to immediately cut prices when households labor supply increases finally we consider alternative data constructions and econometric specifications we find that i and or ii hold in nearly every case

cooperation spillovers and price competition in experimental markets i introduction both competition and cooperation are important for the successful functioning of many economic systems for example firms compete in markets but they also cooperate with one another through arrangements such as research joint ventures lobbying cooperative marketing agreements and strategic alliances in this paper we use experiments to examine how competitive interactions affect agents propensity to cooperate we are interested in studying spillovers that may involve cooperation in one domain such as a research joint venture and competition in another such as in a market 1 cooperation could weaken competition perhaps promoting collusion or market competition could reduce incentives for non market cooperation these behavioral spillovers could go in either direction they are distinct from another type of spillover through knowledge externalities that occur in research and development r d when the innovator cannot fully appropriate the gains to innovation leading potentially to a socially inefficient level of research debondt 1996 2 as discussed below behavioral spillovers have been shown in experiments to increase cooperation in otherwise competitive environments for example through establishing cooperative precedents a large body of theoretical research has focused on firms cooperating in research joint ventures and how this impacts competition in output markets for example cooper and ross 2009 examine the mechanism by which agreements to cooperate in one market can have negative effects on competition in other markets even in situations when these markets are not linked via costs or demand cabral 2000 shows that product market prices are affected by r d agreements between firms caloghirou ioannides and vonortas 2003 lambertini poddar and sasaki 2003 and poyago theotoky 2007 also discuss the impact of forming research joint ventures on product markets and cartel formation 3 empirical work using field data has provided creative indirect evidence on the collusive potential of research joint ventures by exploiting natural policy experiments although the extent of this evidence is limited goeree and helland 2010 for example show that research joint ventures facilitate collusion because they became less popular following an enforcement policy change leniency that made collusion less attractive policy experiments such as these are often required since systematic collusion often goes undetected by authorities duso roller and seldeslachts 2010 also examine the link between research joint ventures and collusion using data from the u s national cooperation research act that granted certain research joint ventures milder antitrust scrutiny they find that horizontal research joint ventures lead to more collusion than vertical joint ventures our work provides complementary and more direct evidence since in the laboratory we can observe the level and sustainability of tacit and explicit collusion and can therefore circumvent the measurement and endogeneity issues that are often prevalent in field data the specific research goals of this study are the following first we wish to examine if agents take advantage of available gains from cooperation in the presence of payoff uncertainties that arise from stochastic innovation success second we are interested in learning if a behavioral spillover of cooperation can lead to collusion in markets or whether competition in markets reduces non market cooperation these notions of cooperation concern contributions to joint r d projects or collusion in price setting and are defined independently of any communication opportunities therefore our third goal is to determine how this interaction between cooperation and competition is affected by the introduction of non market communication opportunities finally we will measure the externalities from r d cooperation to non innovators in the market

experimental comparison of multi stage and one stage contests this article experimentally studies a two stage elimination contest and compares its performance with a one stage contest contrary to the theory the two stage contest generates higher revenue than the equivalent one stage contest there is significant over dissipation in both stages of the two stage contest and experience diminishes over dissipation in the first stage but not in the second stage our experiment provides evidence that winning is a component in a subject s utility a simple behavioral model that accounts for a non monetary utility of winning can explain significant over dissipation in both contests it can also explain why the two stage contest generates higher revenue than the equivalent one stage contest

nominal and real wage rigidities in new keynesian models a critical survey the labour market is receiving increasing attention in the new keynesian literature in this paper i critically survey this literature in order to highlight the role played by wage rigidities in the explanation of fluctuations caused by technology shocks to this aim i present a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with sticky prices nominal wage rigidities and hiring costs the comparison between this model and that of blanchard and gali highlights the non trivial differences which exist in the way nominal wage and real wage rigidities drive the economy s dynamics my conclusion is that models incorporating nominal wage rigidities and some degree of price stickiness provide a better account of macroeconomic dynamics than models with real wage rigidities copyright 2009 blackwell publishing ltd

roads to prosperity assessing the link between public capital and productivity does the positive correlation between infrastructure and productivity reflect causation if so in which direction the author finds that when growth in roads the largest component of infrastructure changes productivity growth changes disproportionately in u s industries with more vehicles that vehicle intensive industries benefit more from road building suggests that roads are productive at the margin however road investments do not appear unusually productive intuitively the interstate system was highly productive but a second one would not be road building thus explains much of the productivity slowdown through a one time unrepeatable productivity boost in the 1950s and 1960s

optimal pricing with speculators and strategic consumers this paper studies a monopolist firm selling a fixed capacity the firm sets a price before demand uncertainty is resolved speculators may enter the market purely with the intention of resale which can be profitable if demand turns out to be high consumers may strategically choose when to purchase and they may also choose to purchase from the firm or from the speculators we characterize equilibrium prices and profits and analyze the long run capacity decisions of the firm there are three major findings first the presence of speculators increases the firm s expected profits even though the resale market competes with the firm second by facilitating resale the firm can mimic dynamic pricing outcomes and enjoy the associated benefits while charging a fixed price third speculative behavior may generate incentives for the seller to artificially restrict supply and thus may lead to lower capacity investments we also explore several model extensions that highlight the robustness of our results

do exchange rate shocks have asymmetric effects on reserve accumulation evidence from emerging markets it is generally argued that central banks in emerging market countries motivated by a desire to defend export competitiveness tend to intervene in foreign exchange markets to limit currency appreciations rather than depreciations using panel data from 13 emerging market countries for the period 1998 m1 to 2016 m12 we find that exchange rate shocks play an important role in determining the accumulation of international reserves moreover we find evidence that central banks in emerging markets tend to follow a leaning against the depreciation wind policy rather than the appreciation wind i e we provide evidence of a fear of depreciation

competitive promotional strategies this article analyzes the equilibrium pricing strategies of brands engaged in a pricing game each brand has a monopoly market loyal consumers and competes with others in a common market called brand switchers in the case of a duopoly it is shown that the behavior of the brand switchers characterizes the equilibrium behavior of the duopolists this article focuses on two key comparative statics namely the depth of discounts away from a regular high price and the probability of giving a deal or the frequency of deals how these properties vary with the size of the loyal markets and the behavior of the brand switching population is discussed copyright 1988 by the university of chicago

combined pricing and inventory control under uncertainty this paper addresses the simultaneous determination of pricing and inventory replenishment strategies in the face of demand uncertainty more specifically we analyze the following single item periodic review model demands in consecutive periods are independent but their distributions depend on the item s price in accordance with general stochastic demand functions the price charged in any given period can be specified dynamically as a function of the state of the system a replenishment order may be placed at the beginning of some or all of the periods stockouts are fully backlogged we address both finite and infinite horizon models with the objective of maximizing total expected discounted profit or its time average value assuming that prices can either be adjusted arbitrarily upward or downward or that they can only be decreased we characterize the structure of an optimal combined pricing and inventory strategy for all of the above types of models we also develop an efficient value iteration method to compute these optimal strategies finally we report on an extensive numerical study that characterizes various qualitative properties of the optimal strategies and corresponding optimal profit values

overselling in a competitive environment boon or bane in this paper we study the practice of overselling in a competitive environment where late arriving consumers value the good higher than early arriving ones but the former s arrival is uncertain we show that overselling is a dominant strategy for the firms however it can lead to a prisoners dilemma situation in which all firms are worse off overselling we further show that only when demand from the late consumers far exceeds the supply and there is a sufficiently high profit margin from reselling does overselling result in a pareto dominant outcome for the firms

the response of hours to a technology shock a two step structural var approach the response of hours to a technology shock is a controversial issue in macroeconomics part of the difficulty lies in that the estimated response is sensitive to the specification of hours in structural vector autoregressions svars this paper uses a simple two step approach to consistently estimate the response of hours the first step considers a svar model with a relevant stationary variable but excluding hours given a consistent estimate of technology shocks in the first step the response of hours to this shock is estimated in a second step simulation experiments from an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model show that this approach outperforms standard svars when applied to u s data the two step approach predicts a short run decrease followed by a hump shaped positive response this result is robust to other specifications and data

macroeconomic expectations and time varying heterogeneity evidence from individual survey data the goal of this paper is to investigate forecast heterogeneity and time variability in the formation of expectations using disaggregated monthly survey data on macroeconomic indicators provided by

optimal service speeds in a competitive environment this is a study of the economic behavior of vendors of service in competition a simple model with two competing exponential servers and poisson arrivals is considered each server is free to choose his own service rate at a cost per time unit that is strictly convex and increasing there is a fixed reward to a server for each customer that he serves the model is designed to study one specific aspect of competition namely competition in speed of service as a means for capturing a larger market share in order to maximize long run expected profit per time unit a two person strategic game is formulated and its solutions are characterized depending on the revenue per customer served and on the cost of maintaining service rates the following three situations may arise i a unique symmetric strategic nash equilibrium in which expected waiting time is infinite ii a unique symmetric strategic equilibrium in which expected waiting time is finite and iii several nonsymmetric strategic equilibria with infinite expected waiting time an explicit expression for the market share of each server as a function of the service rates of the two servers is also given

cross game learning experimental evidence from first price and english common value auctions abstract experience in first price auctions improves performance in english auctions but experience in english auctions has no transfer value to first price auctions these results are discussed in terms of psychologists models of learning generalizability and the learning literature in economics

dynamic pricing in the presence of inventory considerations research overview current practices and future directions the benefits of dynamic pricing methods have long been known in industries such as airlines hotels and electric utilities where the capacity is fixed in the short term and perishable in recent years there has been an increasing adoption of dynamic pricing policies in retail and other industries where the sellers have the ability to store inventory three factors contributed to this phenomenon 1 the increased availability of demand data 2 the ease of changing prices due to new technologies and 3 the availability of decision support tools for analyzing demand data and for dynamic pricing this paper constitutes a review of the literature and current practices in dynamic pricing given its applicability in most markets and its increasing adoption in practice our focus is on dynamic intertemporal pricing in the presence of inventory considerations

an experimental investigation of efficient rent seeking the debate about the measurement of the amount of rent dissipated in rent seeking activities is unable to be answered by observations from the naturally occurring environment current theoretical investigations have indicated that a number of factors will affect the amount of rent that can be assumed to be dissipated by rent seeking the theory of efficient rent seeking predicts that the number of rent seekers their risk posture their ability to enter and exit the rent seeking process and the manner in which the probability of receiving a rent is determined will affect the amount of rent that is dissipated

do technology shocks lead to a fall in total hours worked this paper contributes to the debate initiated by gali in 1999 i provide a theory with capital income taxation labor hoarding as well as long run shifts in the social attitudes to the workplace modelled as leisure at the workplace to argue that there are other shocks that may influence labor productivity in the long run i introduce medium run identification and show it to be superior to long run identification or standard short run identification when applied to artificial data with u s data and medium run identification i find the robust result that technology shocks lead to a hump shaped response of total hours worked which is mildly positive following a near zero initial response jel e32 e24 c32 c15 copyright c 2004 the european economic association

learning and shifts in long run productivity growth abstract an extensive literature has analyzed the macroeconomic effects of shocks to the level of aggregate productivity however there has been little corresponding research on sustained shifts in the growth rate of productivity in this paper we examine the effects of shocks to productivity growth in a dynamic general equilibrium model where agents do not directly observe whether shocks are transitory or persistent we show that an estimated kalman filter model using real time data describes economists long run productivity growth forecasts in the united states extremely well and that filtering has profound implications for the macroeconomic effects of shifts in productivity growth

a taxonomy and research overview of perishable asset revenue management yield management overbooking and pricing this paper proposes the term perishable asset revenue management to denote the field that combines the areas of yield management overbooking and pricing for perishable assets after summarizing the characteristics common to problems in this field the paper discusses the objectives and constraints faced by decision makers then it offers a comprehensive taxonomy with 14 different elements and reviews the research that has been done related to each element finally it suggests some important areas of future research that can help bridge the gap between theory and application

information feedback and contest structure in rent seeking games we investigate the effects of information feedback in rent seeking games with two different contest structures in the share contest a contestant receives a share of the rent equal to her share of rent seeking expenditures while in the lottery contest a contestant wins the entire rent with probability equal to her share of rent seeking expenditures in share contests average expenditures converge to equilibrium levels when subjects only get feedback about own earnings and additional feedback about rivals choices and earnings raises average expenditures in lottery contests information feedback has an opposite and even stronger effect when subjects only get feedback on own earnings we observe high levels of rent dissipation usually exceeding the value of the rent and additional feedback about rivals choices and earnings has a significant moderating influence on expenditures in a follow up treatment we make information feedback endogenous by allowing contestants in a lottery contest to make public or private expenditures subjects make the vast majority of expenditures privately and overall excess expenditures are similar to the lottery contest with own feedback

the new keynesian phillips curve and staggered price and wage determination in a model with firm specific labor we develop a dsge model with rm speci c labor where rm level wage bargaining and price setting are subject to calvo type staggering this is in general an intractable problem due to complicated intertemporal dependencies between price and wage decisions however the problem is signi cantly simpli ed if we in line with empirical evidence assume that prices can be changed whenever wages are we show that the price and wage setting relationships are substantially altered by the introduction of rm speci c labor speci cally the in ation response is substantially dampened whereas the wage in ation response is increased as compared to models with freely mobile labor these distinctive features of the model with rm speci c labor is supported by empirical evidence from a structural var

on the role of technology shocks as a source of business cycles some new evidence i provide some new evidence that reinforces the conclusion in gal o 1999 that exogenous variations in technology play a very limited role if any as sources of the business cycle first i provide evidence that supports the identie cation of technology shocks proposed in that paper second i show that similar e ndings obtain when the same approach is implemented for the euro area using a newly available data set jel e32 e24

the cost of rent seeking evidence from cellular telephone license lotteries the inventors of the theory of rent seeking used an analogy with competitive markets to conclude that all monopoly rents would be dissipated in the competition to obtain the property rights to them 23 29 subsequent theorists showed that this conclusion is quite sensitive to assumptions about foresight risk aversion conjectures and bias 15 21 30 since little quantitative information about actual rent seeking competitions is available the theory has developed in an empirical vacuum in this paper we attempt to fill that vacuum with an estimate of rent seeking expenditure by applicants in the federal communications commission s fcc cellular telephone license lotteries held between 1986 and 1989 we go on to compare expenditures with estimates of the value of the licenses at stake these lotteries constitute a unique natural experiment any u s citizen was eligible to enter each geographic lottery once and only once for an expense which we calculate as modest the lotteries were widely publicized and heavily entered there were over 320 000 applications one per market filed for 643 cellular licenses and third party application preparers entered the market rapidly because licenses were awarded sequentially prospective participants in later lotteries could find out that expected net returns from earlier lotteries were positive because of undersubscription the value of the prize was known because sales of previously awarded licenses had begun to take place before later lotteries were held and market analysts were using such sale prices to value licenses not yet awarded the later lotteries seem almost optimally contrived to maximize the dissipation of rents yet comparing the resources invested in entry the price of a fully prepared application with the rents available the market value of cellular telephone licenses shows that dissipation was far short of complete

hours per capita and productivity evidence from correlated unobserved components models recent studies debate the effect of a permanent productivity shock on hours per capita within a structural var context this paper examines the issue using a correlated unobserved components uc framework the estimates show that permanent shocks to productivity are negatively correlated with transitory shocks to hours this result is robust for non stationary or levels stationary specifications of hours model comparisons indicate that the data do not favor imposing var type restrictions on the uc models copyright 2008 john wiley sons ltd

risk aversion and rent seeking an extension and some experimental evidence theoretical investigations indicate that the risk attitudes of individuals will effect the amount of rent that can be assumed to be dissipated by rent seeking activities following this line of investigation we extend hillman and katz s work to a small numbers case and demonstrate that the degree to which a monopoly rent is dissipated is dependent upon the structure of the risk attitudes of two risk averse individuals

price versus production postponement capacity and competition this article presents a comparative analysis of possible postponement strategies in a two stage decision model where firms make three decisions capacity investment production inventory quantity and price typically investments are made while the demand curve is uncertain the strategies differ in the timing of the operational decisions relative to the realization of uncertainty we show how competition uncertainty and the timing of operational decisions influence the strategic investment decision of the firm and its value in contrast to production postponement price postponement makes the investment and production inventory decisions relatively insensitive to uncertainty this suggests that managers can make optimal capacity decisions by deterministic reasoning if they have some price flexibility under price postponement additional postponement of production has relatively small incremental value therefore it may be worthwhile to consider flexible ex post pricing before production postponement reengineering while more postponement increases firm value it is counterintuitive that this also makes the optimal capacity decision more sensitive to uncertainty we highlight the different impact of more timely information which leads to higher investment and inventories and of reduced demand uncertainty which decreases investment and inventories our analysis suggests appropriateness conditions for simple make to stock and make to order strategies we also present technical sufficiency and uniqueness conditions under price postponement these results extend to oligopolistic and perfect competition for which pure equilibria are derived interestingly the relative value of operational postponement techniques seems to increase as the industry becomes more competitive

research note overselling with opportunistic cancellations in many business sectors such as airlines hotels trucking and media advertising customers arrivals and willingness to pay are uncertain managers must decide whether to quote a price low enough to guarantee early sales or to quote a higher price and risk that some units remain unsold in allocating capacity they face a trade off between two types of potential losses 1 yield loss selling at a low price and losing a better price later and 2 spoilage loss waiting in vain to sell at a high price and losing the opportunity of an earlier low price offer yield loss means that consumers who value the product most do not get to use it and spoilage loss means that valuable products are wasted because no consumers get to use them sellers typically hedge against the risk of spoilage loss by selling some units early at low prices and against the risk of yield loss by blocking some units in hope of selling them later at a high price in this paper we show that the use of overselling with opportunistic cancellations can increase expected profits and improve allocation efficiency under this strategy the seller deliberately oversells capacity if high paying consumers show up even when capacity is already fully booked the seller then cancels the sale to some low paying customers while providing them with appropriate compensation we derive a new rule to optimally allocate capacity to consumers when overselling is used and show that overselling helps limit the potential yield and spoilage losses yield loss is reduced because the seller can capture more high paying customers by compensating low paying customers who give up their right to the product spoilage loss is reduced because the compensation decreases the price spread perceived by the seller and as a result the seller is less anxious to speculate and block units overselling with opportunistic cancellations assures that the product will be sold to consumers who value it most this means that everybody wins and resources are allocated more efficiently than in conventional selling

the cost of business cycles under endogenous growth robert e lucas jr argued that the welfare gains from reducing aggregate consumption volatility are negligible subsequent work that revisited his calculation continued to find small welfare benefits further reinforcing the perception that business cycles do not matter this paper argues instead that fluctuations can affect welfare by affecting the growth rate of consumption i show that fluctuations can reduce growth starting from a given initial consumption which can imply substantial welfare effects as lucas himself observed empirical evidence suggests the welfare effects are likely to be substantial about two orders of magnitude greater than lucas original estimates

identification of technology shocks in structural vars the usefulness of svars for developing empirically plausible models is actually subject to controversies in macroeconomics we propose a two step svars based procedure which consistently estimates the effect of permanent technology shocks on aggregate variables simulation experiments from a standard business cycle model and a sticky prices model show that our approach outperforms standard svars the two step procedure when applied to actual data predicts a significant short run decrease of hours after a technology improvement followed by a hump shaped positive response additionally the rate of inflation and the nominal interest rate displays a significant decrease after this shock

the dynamic effects of neutral and investment specific technology shocks the neoclassical growth model is used to identify the short run effects of neutral technology shocks which affect the production of all goods homogeneously and investment specific shocks which affect only investment goods the real equipment price crucial for identifying the investment shocks experiences an abrupt increase in its average rate of decline in 1982 so the analysis is based on a split sample on the basis of the preferred specification the two technology shocks account for 73 percent of hours and 44 percent of output s business cycle variation before 1982 and 38 percent and 80 percent afterward the shocks also account for more than 40 percent of hours and 58 percent of output s forecast errors over a three to eight year horizon in both samples the majority of these effects are driven by the investment shocks

disinflation shocks in the eurozone a dsge perspective we investigate the effects of disinflation policies on key macroeconomic variables using euro area data and structural vector autoregressions svars we identify disinflation shocks as the only shocks that drive nominal variables to a lower long run level we find that in the immediate aftermath of a disinflation shock the euro area enters in a persistent recession we use these dynamic responses to estimate a dsge model with imperfect information about the disinflation shock we find that both nominal and real frictions and monetary policy gradualism have played a prominent role in the recessionary effect of disinflation shocks conversely allowing for imperfect credibility does not yield a better fit except when we shut key model s frictions down

identifying the sources of instabilities in macroeconomic fluctuations abstract this paper investigates the sources of the substantial decrease in output growth volatility in the mid 1980s by identifying which of the structural parameters in a representative new keynesian and structural var models changed overturning conventional wisdom we show that the great moderation was due not only to changes in shock volatilities but also to changes in monetary policy parameters as well as in the private sector s parameters the great moderation was previously attributed to good luck because the alternative sources of instabilities appear to have offsetting effects on output volatility and therefore were impossible to detect using existing techniques

revenue management under customer choice behaviour with cancellations and overbooking abstract in many application areas such as airlines and hotels a large number of bookings are typically cancelled explicitly taking into account cancellations creates an opportunity for increasing revenue motivated by this we propose a revenue management model based on talluri and van ryzin 2004 that takes cancellations into account in addition to customer choice behaviour moreover we consider overbooking limits as these are influenced by cancellations we model the problem as a markov decision process and propose three dynamic programming formulations to solve the problem each appropriate in a different setting we show that in certain settings the problem can be solved exactly using a tractable solution method for other settings we propose tractable heuristics since the problem faces the curse of dimensionality numerical results show that the heuristics perform almost as good as the exact solution however the model without cancellations can lead to a revenue loss of up to 20 percent lastly we provide a parameter estimation method based on newman et al 2014 this estimation method is fast and provides good parameter estimates the combination of the model the tractable and well performing solution methods and the parameter estimation method ensures that the model can efficiently be applied in practice

attention in games an experimental study abstract a common assumption in game theory is that players concentrate on one game at a time however in everyday life we play many games and make many decisions at the same time and have to decide how best to divide our limited attention across these settings in this paper we ask how players solve this attention allocation problem we find that players attention is attracted to particular features of the games they play and how much attention a subject gives to a given game depends on the other game that the person is simultaneously attending to