time orientation and asset prices we analyze a general equilibrium asset pricing model where a small subset of the consumers investors have a short run urge to save that is their attitude toward consumption in the long run is a standard one f they do place zero weight on consumption far enough out in the future f but their short run effective rates of discount may be negative our model which is an elaboration on the framework proposed by faruk gul and wolfgang pesendorfer does not feature time inconsistencies thus we view consumers as fully rational but subject to specific internal frictions in the form of temptation and self control problems the model nests the mehra prescott model and we use it as a way of interpreting the wealth and asset pricing data some aspects of these data we argue can possibly be better understood using our model than the standard one r 2002 published by elsevier science b v

disentangling the college wage premium estimating a model with endogenous education choices this article proposes and empirically implements a structural model of education choices and wage determination to quantitatively evaluate the contributions of productivity enhancement and ability signaling in the college wage premium the model is estimated under various distributional parameterizations using 1990 u s census 5 public use micro sample under these parameterizations i find that college education enhances attendees productivity by about 40 and productivity enhancement accounts for close to two thirds of the college wage premium

temptation and social security in a dynastic framework abstract we investigate welfare and aggregate implications of a pay as you go payg social security system in a dynastic framework in which individuals have self control problems the presence of self control problems induces individuals to save less because of their urge for temptation towards current consumption individuals efforts to balance between the short term urge for temptation and the long term commitment for consumption smoothing result in self control costs in this environment payg social security works as a self control cost reducing device in contrast the presence of altruism induces individuals to save more this in turn mitigates the adverse effects of self control problems and payg social security on savings but magnifies the self control costs we find that in our environment the adverse welfare effects of a payg system are further mitigated relative to the environments that incorporate altruism and self control issues separately however the level of mitigation is quite modest

economics of leadership and hierarchy this paper explores leadership within hierarchical organizations for each hierarchy i consider a dynamic signaling game in which each player observes only the actions of his direct superiors before choosing his action at the top of the hierarchy are the leaders who learn the state from nature the hierarchy controls the flow of information and the timing of the game and determines the equilibrium output and welfare i show that the welfare optimal hierarchy is the chain because it maximizes the incentive of players to lead by example for their subordinates the chain remains optimal even in the presence of verifiable or unverifiable costly information acquisition by the leaders

a new year a new you within individual variation in food purchases abstract we document that within individual variation in food choices is substantial and has potentially important consequences for nutrition and hence well being we develop an approach that allows us to study the determinants of this within individual variation within an economic framework and allow for across individual preference heterogeneity we show that around one fifth of within individual fluctuations in diet quality is explained by standard economic variables prices and budgets along with advertising and weather the residual fluctuations are important and are larger for lower income and younger people and individuals who state they are impulsive we propose a two selves model of food purchase behavior to structurally interpret these empirical patterns we use nonparametric revealed preference techniques to show that this model rationalizes our food purchase data

perpetual signalling with imperfectly correlated costs in many imperfect information models in industrial organization a firm is induced to take an action that does not maximize its first period profit because other firms view this action as a signal about the firm s private information in these models because the opponent firms can correctly invert the firm s strategy all information is revealed after play in the first period and in subsequent periods all firms play their single period profit maximizing strategies thus behavior like limit pricing is observed only in the first period and not in any subsequent period the empirical importance of such signalling behavior however depends on its being perpetuated through time rather than being a single period phenomenon in this article such perpetual signalling is obtained by allowing the variable about which firms have private information to vary through time in a separating equilibrium while a firm s action will perfectly reveal its private information in a period it will not perfectly reveal the firm s private information in subsequent periods thus the incentive to signal perpetuates through time

wealth accumulation over the life cycle and precautionary savings this article constructs and simulates a life cycle model of wealth accumulation and estimates the parameters of the utility function the rate of time preference and the coefficient of risk aversion by matching the simulated median wealth profiles with those observed in the panel study of income dynamics and in the survey of consumer finances the estimates imply a low degree of patience and a high degree of risk aversion the results are used to study the importance of precautionary savings in explaining wealth accumulation they imply that wealth accumulation is driven mostly by precautionary motives at the beginning of the life cycle whereas savings for retirement purposes become significant only closer to retirement

selling an asset to a competitor a seller decides whether to allocate an item among two potential buyers the seller and buyer 1 interact ex post in such a way that each of them suffers a negative externality if the other possesses the item we show that the optimal allocation rule favors buyer 2 who does not interact ex post with the seller and in particular bidder 1 may not obtain the good even if his valuation is highest the auction is therefore subject to resale when resale is possible the seller must distort the original auction we show that the mechanism depends crucially on the way resale is organized ex post the seller may decide to always allocate the good to the agent with the highest valuation when rents are fully extracted by an intermediary on the resale market however she may resort to a stochastic mechanism when the winner of the primary auction has full bargaining power in the resale stage

status seeking income taxation and efficiency abstract it is well known that status seeking produces distortions in consumption competition to achieve status leads to over consumption of those goods which confer status it has been found that taxing such goods may even lead to pareto improvements in this paper we extend a model of status which relies on a signalling equilibrium approach to include the individual labour supply decision and an income tax we show that a pareto improving income tax can exist even with the simplest tax benefit scheme a number of results follow the model is extended to a two period analysis to accommodate the reputation building element of status achievement without altering the conclusions

job market signaling and returns to education we compare two partially separating equilibria in a job market signaling model with unproductive education we find that in one of the two equilibria the fraction of the population with a threshold education level is higher even though the cost of education is higher moreover compared to the other equilibrium the population faces a higher threshold education level yet the educated attain lower wages the reason for this result is that the gross return to education can be higher despite the higher cost of education and a higher threshold

the hyperbolic consumption model calibration simulation and empirical evaluation ur preferences for the long run tend to conflict with our short run behavior when planning for the long run we intend to meet our deadlines exercise regularly and eat healthfully but in the short run we have little interest in revising manuscripts jogging on the stairmaster and skipping the chocolate souffleala mode delay of gratification is a nice long term goal but instant gratification is disconcertingly tempting this gap between long run intentions and short run actions is apparent across a wide range of behaviors including saving choices a 1997 survey found that 76 percent of respondents believe they should be saving more for retirement looking only at respondents who believed they were at an age where you should be seriously saving already the survey found that 55 percent reported being behind in their savings and only 6 percent reported being ahead farkas and johnson 1997 the report on the survey concluded t he gaps between people s atti tudes intentions and behavior are troubling and threaten increased insecurity and dissatisfaction for people when they retire americans are simply not doing what logic and their own reasoning suggests they should be doing a 1993 luntz webber merrill lynch survey found similar answers when baby boomers were asked what percentage of your annual household income do you think you should save for retirement and what percentage of your annual

the licensing of patents under asymmetric information abstract this paper seeks to explain the use of royalty payments rather than fixed fees in the licensing of patents by the presence of asymmetric information the licensee is assumed to know the value of the patent and makes a single offer of a contract to the licensor it is shown that there is a unique equillibrium satisfying cho and kreps intuitive criterion qualitative properties of the equilibrium contract are derived by considering a continuum of types

the nature of precautionary wealth abstract this paper uses the panel study of income dynamics to provide some of the first direct evidence that wealth is systematically higher for consumers with predictably greater income uncertainty however the apparent pattern of precautionary wealth is not consistent with a standard parameterization of the life cucle model in which consumers are patient enough to begin saving for retirement early in life wealth is estimated to be far less sensitive to uncertainty than implied by that model instead our results suggest that over most of their working life time consumers behave in accordance with the buffer stock models of saving described in carroll 1992 1997 or deaton 1991 in which consumers hold wealth principally to insulate consumption against near term fluctuations in income

monopoly provision of product quality and warranties an exploration in the theory of multi dimensional screening we address the monopoly problem of designing and pricing a product line of goods distinguished by different quality and warranty levels consumers vary in their evaluations of these attributes so that the problem is one of screening it is sufficiently complex that the local approach commonly used does not work instead we use new techniques for dealing with incentive constraints between nonadjacent consumer types these techniques allow us to characterize optimal allocations that may not be monotonic in particular although the more eager types of buyer do pay higher prices and yield the monopoly higher profit they may receive lower quality or lower warranty coverage we find preference restrictions that restore monotonicity concave risk tolerance implies that warranty coverage increases in type and constant absolute risk aversion implies that quality increases in type

estimating temptation and commitment over the life cycle this paper estimates the importance of temptation gul and pesendorfer 2001 for consumption smoothing and asset accumulation in a structural life cycle model we use two complementary estimation strategies rst we estimate the euler equation of this model and second we match liquid and illiquid wealth accumulation using the method of simulated moments we nd that the utility cost of temptation is one quarter of the utility bene t of consumption further we show that allowing for temptation is crucial for correctly estimating the elasticity of intertemporal substitution estimates of the eis are substantially higher than without temptation finally our method of simulated moments estimation is able to match well the life cycle accumulation pro les for both liquid and illiquid wealth only if temptation is part of the preference speci cation our ndings on the importance of temptation are robust to the di erent estimation strategies revised july 2020

buffer stock saving in retirement accounts abstract we use a dynamic programming model to explore the possibility and extent of precautionary saving in tax sheltered accounts such as the 401 k the main policy experiment examines the behavior of saving for different levels of unemployment insurance ui which is a perfect substitute for precautionary saving against job loss our results indicate that increasing the generosity of ui crowds out 401 k contributions made by younger workers who save primarily for precautionary reasons at the aggregate level we find that 401 k s increase national saving and that the magnitude of the effect depends on the generosity of ui

human capital versus sorting the effects of compulsory attendance laws under the educational sorting hypothesis a state compulsory school attendance law will increase the educational attainment of high ability workers who are not directly affected hy the law under the human capital hypothesis such laws affect only those individuals whose hehavior is directly constrained we find that compulsory attendance laws do increase enrollment rates in age groups they do not affect directly thus our results contradict the human capital hypothesis and are consistent with the sorting hypothesis i introduction the last decade has seen considerable debate between supporters of the human capital and sorting models of education the former assert that the effect of education on wages reflects increased productivity the latter maintain that it reflects at least in part correlation between education and unobserved ability workers use education to signal their ability while employers use education to screen workers despite the importance of the debate no fully convincing tests of the hypotheses have been developed in fact many members of the profession maintain at least privately that these hypotheses cannot be tested against each other and that the debate must therefore be relegated to the realm of ideology in this paper we show that the models can be tested against each other by examining the effects of state compulsory school attendance laws we show that under the human capital hypotheis such laws will affect the educational attainment only of those who in the absence of the law would have left school prior to the minimum school leaving age on the other hand under the sorting hypothesis the effects of the law will percolate through the system increasing educational attainment even among workers not directly constrained by the law our results are consistent with the predictions of the sorting model

incentive compatibility and differentiability new results and classic applications this note provides several generalizations of mailath s 1987 result that incentive compatibility plus separation implies differentiability the new results extend the theory to classic models in finance such as leland and pyle 1977 glosten 1989 and demarzo and duffie 1999 that were not previously covered

optimal income tax in the presence of status effects abstract the existence of distortions from individuals competing to attain social status by using consumption signals justifies some measure of income tax as a counter acting distortion the question posed here is whether it also constitutes a reason for a more progressive income tax schedule the answer is found to be broadly negative if progressiveness is interpreted as a more convex tax schedule unless the rich are more concerned with status seeking than the poor on the other hand status seeking makes the optimal tax schedule steeper so that redistribution is increased essentially the analysis of status seeking based on a signaling approach confirms and strengthens the existing view of an optimal tax schedule and can be incorporated into the diamond american economic review 88 1998 83 95 approach

the impact of asymmetric information on entry deterrence an example abstract a simple non pathological example demostrates that when an incumbent firm has private information about the state of demand an entrant s profits and the likelihood of entry may be decreasing in the state of demand

the politics of redistributive social insurance this paper analyses the political support for a social insurance that includes elements of redistribution when there exists an imperfect private insurance alternative individuals differ both in their income and risk the social insurance is compulsory and charges an income related contribution with pooling of risks the private insurance is voluntary and charges a contribution based on individual risks however due to the adverse selection problem private insurance companies provide only partial insurance adopting a non expected utility model we show that there is a general majority support for social insurance and that this support is increasing with risk aversion we also show that a mixed insurance is politically impossible regardless of the degree of redistribution of social insurance and the joint distribution of risk and income in the population lastly we analyse how the political support for social insurance is affected by any change in its redistributive component and the possibility of using genetic tests

harmful competition in insurance markets there is a general presumption that competition is a good thing in this paper we show that competition in the insurance markets can be bad and that adverse selection is in general worse under competition than under monopoly the reason is that monopoly can exploit its market power to relax incentive constraints by cross subsidization between different risk types cream skimming behavior on the contrary prevents competitive firms from using implicit transfers in effect monopoly is shown to provide better coverage to those buying insurance but at the cost of limiting participation to insurance performing simulation for different distributions of risk we find that monopoly in general performs much better than competition in terms of the realization of the gains from trade across all traders in equilibrium

expectations based reference dependent life cycle consumption this study incorporates a recent preference specification of expectations based loss aversion which has been applied broadly in microeconomics into a classic macro model to offer a unified explanation for three empirical observations about life cycle consumption first loss aversion explains excess smoothness and sensitivity that is the empirical observation that consumption responds to income shocks with a lag intuitively such lagged responses allow the agent to delay painful losses in consumption until his expectations have adjusted secondly the preferences generate a hump shaped consumption profile early in life consumption is low due to a first order precautionary savings motive however as uncertainty resolves over time this motive is dominated by time inconsistent overconsumption that eventually leads to declining consumption towards the end of life thirdly consumption drops at retirement prior to retirement the agent wants to overconsume his uncertain income before his expectations catch up post retirement however income is no longer uncertain and overconsumption is associated with a sure loss in future consumption as an empirical contribution i structurally estimate the preference parameters using life cycle consumption data my estimates match those obtained in experiments and other micro studies and generate the degree of excess smoothness observed in macro consumption data

strategic commitments for an optimal capacity decision under asymmetric forecast information we study the important problem of how to assure credible forecast information sharing between a supplier and a manufacturer the supplier is responsible for acquiring the necessary capacity before receiving an order from the manufacturer who possesses private forecast information for her end product we address how different contracts affect the supplier s capacity decision and hence the profitability of the supplier and the manufacturer we fully develop two contracts and provide explicit formulae to enable credible forecast information sharing the first is a nonlinear capacity reservation contract under which the manufacturer agrees to pay a fee to reserve capacity the second is an advance purchase contract under which the manufacturer is induced to place a firm order before the supplier secures the component capacity used to build the end product these contracts serve a strategic role in information sharing the capacity reservation contract enables the supplier to detect the manufacturer s private forecast information while the advance purchase contract enables the manufacturer to signal her forecast information we show that channel coordination is possible even under asymmetric forecast information by combining the advance purchase contract with an appropriate payback agreement through our structural and numerical results we also show that the degree of forecast information asymmetry and the risk adjusted profit margin are two important drivers that determine supply chain efficiency and which contract to adopt

signaling and the design of delegated management contracts for public utilities this article analyzes the shape of contracts between local governments and the contractors they hire to run public facilities on their behalf governments are privately informed about the quality of the facility while risk neutral contractors undertake a non verifiable operating eort the design of the contract signals the quality of the facility in such a way that the better this quality the greater the share of operating risk kept by the government this feature reduces the agent s marginal incentives creating a trade o between signaling and moral hazard we provide extensions of our framework in several directions allowing for risk aversion on the agent s side double moral hazard and political delegation the model is supported by some stylized facts from the water industry

the role of intergenerational transfers and life cycle saving in the accumulation of wealth he purpose of this paper is to review what economists know at present about the following question how large a portion of the existing wealth is the result of a bequest motive that is of accumulation for the specific purpose of leaving bequests i will also endeavor to clarify why an answer to this question is of interest in the early keynesian period when the study of national saving first attracted wide interest relatively little attention was paid to what led people to save though it was generally understood that the main systematic reason was to leave bequests j m keynes in the famous chapter 9 of the general theory of employment interest and money 1936 had listed seven distinct motives for saving besides the leaving of bequests but five of these which include to increase one s future income or to insure one s independence and power implied that all or nearly all the accumulation would finally wind up as bequeathed wealth this in turn meant that most private wealth originated through bequests that is it either had been received through bequests or was destined to be bequeathed and indeed how else could society accumulate wealth however keynes 1936 p 107 also mentioned two further motives precaution that is to build up a reserve against unforeseen contingencies and foresight that is to provide for an anticipated future relation between the income and the needs of the individual or his family different from that which exists in the present as for example in relation to old age family education or the maintenance of dependents these motives in contrast to most of the previous ones have the

student abilities during the expansion of us education abstract the us experienced two dramatic changes in the structure of education in a 50 year period the first was a large expansion of educational attainment the second an increase in test score gaps between college bound and non college bound students this paper documents the impact of these two trends on the composition of school groups by ability and the importance of these composition effects for wages the main finding is that there is a growing gap between the abilities of high school and college educated workers that accounts for one half of the college wage premium for recent cohorts and for the entire rise of the college wage premium between the 1910 and 1960 birth cohorts

temptation and self control some evidence and applications this paper studies the empirical relevance of temptation and self control using household level data from the consumer expenditure survey we construct an infinite horizon consumption savings model that allows but does not require temptation and self control in preferences in the presence of temptation a wealth consumption ratio in addition to consumption growth becomes a determinant of the asset pricing kernel and the importance of this additional pricing factor depends on the strength of temptation to identify the presence of temptation we exploit an implication of the theory that a more tempted individual should be more likely to hold commitment assets such as individual retirement account ira or 401 k accounts our estimation provides empirical support for temptation preferences based on our estimates we explore some quantitative implications of this class of preferences for capital accumulation in a neoclassical growth model and the welfare cost of the business cycle

class systems and the enforcement of social norms abstract we analyze a model in which there is socially inefficient competition among people in this model self enforcing social norms can potentially control the inefficient competition however the inefficient behavior often cannot be suppressed in equilibrium among those with the lowest income due to the ineffectiveness of sanctions against those in the society with the least to lose we demonstrate that in such cases it may be possible for society to be divided into distinct classes with inefficient behavior suppressed in the upper classes but not in the lower

incentive compatibility in signaling games with a continuum of types on donne deux resultats utiles pour demontrer l existence et pour caracteriser des equilibres de separation dans des jeux de signalement

saving and liquidity constraints this paper is concerned with the theory of saving when consumers are not permitted to borrow and with the ability of such a theory to account for some of the stylized facts of saving behavior the models presented in the paper seem to account for important aspects of reality that are not explained by traditional life cycle models copyright 1991 by the econometric society

social security and self control preferences abstract we analyze the welfare effects of an unfunded social security system we do so using an overlapping generations economy wherein agents have self control preferences face mortality risk individual income risk and borrowing constraints given our specification of preferences unfunded social security helps reduce the agents temptation to consume in every period consequently the welfare costs it otherwise entails are substantially mitigated while both social security and self control when considered separately reduce welfare their combination renders this effect considerably less severe moreover if the cost of resisting temptation is very high the introduction of social security might even improve welfare

measuring self control problems we develop a survey instrument to measure self control problems in a sample of highly educated adults this measure relates in the manner that theory predicts to liquid wealth accumulation and personality measures yet while self control problems are typically seen as resulting in overconsumption and low wealth we identify a significant group who underconsume and thereby accumulate high levels of wealth in addition self control problems are smaller in scale for older than for younger respondents those who put money aside in retirement accounts may be delaying access to a point at which self control problems are no longer important jel d12 d14

the perverse impact of calling for energy conservation abstract in periods of high energy demand utilities frequently issue emergency appeals for conservation over peak hours to reduce brownout risk we estimate the impact of such appeals using high frequency data on actual and forecasted electricity generation pollutant emission measures and real time prices our results suggest a perverse impact while there is no significant reduction in grid stress over superpeak hours such calls lead to increased off peak generation co 2 emissions and price volatility we postulate that consumer attempts at load shifting lead to this result

equal sacrifice and incentive compatible income taxation abstract the concepts of equal sacrifice and incentive compatibility in income taxation have been of interest to economists for some time here we attempt to integrate the two literatures in a model that offers a labor leisure choice to consumers while imposing an equal relative or absolute sacrifice tax system the main result is that equal sacrifice incentive compatible income tax systems generally exist and are locally unique examples are presented where this tax system is easy to compute comparative statics are calculated finally some remarks about the welfare properties of these tax systems are made

are americans saving optimally for retirement we solve each household s optimal saving decisions using a life cycle model that incorporates uncertain lifetimes uninsurable earnings and medical expenses progressive taxation government transfers and pension and social security benefits with optimal decision rules we compare household by household wealth predictions from the life cycle model using a nationally representative sample we find making use of household specific earnings histories that the model accounts for more than 80 percent of the 1992 cross sectional variation in wealth fewer than 20 percent of households have less wealth than their optimal targets and the wealth deficit of those who are undersaving is generally small

quality choice trade policy and firm incentives quality choice is examined in a duopoly with one foreign and one domestic firm where consumers have similar preferences for quality but different preferences for brands firms make quality commitments prior to choosing price and policy intervention assumes several forms the policy conclusions depend on whether firms face set up costs in raising product quality in the absence of set up costs both domestic and foreign firms make socially optimal quality choices in the presence of set up costs the foreign firm and often the domestic firm sets quality below the socially optimal level incomplete information alters these conclusions however copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

tariffs for a foreign monopolist under incomplete information when the domestic government is better informed about demand in the domestic market than a foreign monopolist that exports to the domestic market the domestic government can use its tariff to signal about demand in the signalling equilibrium the domestic government uses a tariff which is larger than the optimal tariff under complete information however it is possible that welfare in the signalling equilibrium is lower than welfare when the domestic government is uncertain about demand the domestic government can avoid the cost of signalling by delegating tariff setting to a revenue maximising agent

on limiting the market for status signals abstract in many societies individuals care how others view them in their efforts to impress such individuals engage in consumption signals which attempt to establish higher levels of status than their true status type this leads to an inefficiency which offers the possibility of a pareto improving tax policy the impacts of tax policy and benefits on the signalling equilibrium are considered

inequality and risk taking behaviour this paper investigates social in uences on attitudes to risk and ofiers an evolutionary explanation of risk taking by young low ranked males becker murphy and werning 2005 found that individuals about to participate in a status tournament may take fair gambles even though they are risk averse in both wealth and status here their model is generalised by use of the insight of hopkins and kornienko 2010 that in a tournament or status competition one can consider equality in terms of the status or rewards available as well as in initial endowments while becker et al found that risk taking is increasing in the equality of initial endowments it is found here that it is increasing in the inequality of rewards in the tournament further it is shown that the poorest will be risk loving if the lowest level of status awarded is su ciently low thus the disadvantaged in society rationally engage in risky behavior when social rewards are su ciently unequal finally as greater inequality in terms of social status induces gambling it can cause greater inequality of wealth

measuring self control problems a structural estimation we perform a structural estimation of the preference parameters in a buffer stock consumption model augmented with temptation disutility we adopt a two stage method of simulated moments methodology to match our simulated moments with those observed in the us survey of consumer finances to identify the parameters we use liquid and quasi liquid retirement wealth holdings at different ages as target moments we find evidence of a significantly positive degree of temptation and estimates under the unrestricted model are more precise than estimates under the restricted model with no temptation overall a model with temptation preferences explains better the observed target moments

schooling as human capital or a signal a new way is proposed to distinguish between the human capital and the signaling theories of the value of education if education is a signal then the essence of the signal should be distilled in the position of an individual in the distribution of education for his cohort estimating earnings equations that include both absolute years and relative percentile measures of education provides a test of the two competing theories analyzing two separate panel data sources under a range of alternative specifications we find that the years measure of schooling has a consistently significant positive effect on earnings but that the rank measure rarely does this evidence supports the conclusion that human capital rather than signaling is the predominant explanation of schooling s value

knowledge is less power experimental evidence from residential energy use abstract imperfect information about product attributes inhibits efficiency in many choice settings but can be overcome by providing simple low cost information we use a randomized control trial to test the effect of high frequency information about residential electricity usage on the price elasticity of demand informed households are three standard deviations more responsive to temporary price increases an effect that is not attributable to price salience conservation extends beyond pricing events in the short and medium run providing evidence of habit formation and implying that the intervention leads to greenhouse gas abatement survey evidence suggests that information facilitates learning jel d12 d83 l11 l94 q41 q54

are treble damages neutral sequential equilibrium and private antitrust enforcement a sequential equilibrium model of private antitrust enforcement is presented consumers have incomplete information about cartel costs and cannot accurately estimate a priori the damage recovery from an antitrust action consumers are able to infer cartel costs from the equilibrium pricing strategy of firms the universal divinity criterion is used to characterize the sequential equilibrium it is shown that for a sufficiently large damage multiple antitrust enforcement effectively increases social welfare copyright 1990 by american economic association

social security reform with self control preferences abstract this paper analyzes a fully funded social security system under the assumption that agents face temptation issues agents are required to save through individually managed personal security accounts without and with mandatory annuitization when the analysis is restricted to crra preferences our results are congruent with the literature in indicating that the complete elimination of social security is among the reform scenarios that maximize welfare however when self control preferences are introduced and as the intensity of self control becomes progressively more severe the social security elimination scenario loses ground very rapidly in fact in the case of relatively severe temptation the elimination of social security becomes the least desirable alternative under the light of the above findings any reform proposal regarding the social security system should consider departures from standard preferences to preference specifications suitable for dealing with preference reversals

is transparency about central bank plans desirable a central bank with private information about its preferences has an incentive to reduce its planned inflation to increase the public s perception of its inflation aversion and lower expected future inflation a regime is said to be transparent if planned inflation is observable and reveals the central bank s preferences and to be non transparent if planned inflation is unobservable and can be only imperfectly inferred from actual inflation a central bank in the non transparent regime is said to become more transparent when actual inflation becomes a better signal of planned inflation i find several results about transparent and non transparent regimes some are novel and some contrast with the results of earlier papers in particular i demonstrate that in a non transparent regime increased transparency need not improve the public s ability to infer a central bank s private information i show that society and central banks are better off with more transparency my numerical results suggest that society and central banks prefer the transparent to the non transparent regimes

temptation and forward guidance abstract motivated by the extensive experimental and empirical evidence on preference reversal in consumption choices we introduce temptation with self control preferences into a new keynesian model to study the effects of forward guidance in monetary policy and the related forward guidance puzzle in our set up the representative agent faces a trade off between the temptation for immediate satisfaction liquidate wealth with his long run best smooth consumption which he manages by exerting cognitive effort or self control for higher risk aversion in temptation than in commitment utility there is discounting in the linearized euler equation the latter makes the response of current real activity to the announcement of a future policy change declining in the forward guidance horizon which then helps solving the puzzle our framework delivers testable aggregate and policy implications that distinguish it from alternative microfoundations for discounting in the euler equation previously used to solve the puzzle

should sellers prefer auctions a laboratory comparison of auctions and sequential mechanisms when bidders incur a cost to learn their valuations bidder entry can impact auction performance two common selling mechanisms in this environment are an english auction and a sequential bidding process theoretically sellers should prefer the auction because it generates higher expected revenues whereas bidders should prefer the sequential mechanism because it generates higher expected bidder profits we compare the two mechanisms in a controlled laboratory environment varying the entry cost and find that contrary to the theoretical predictions average seller revenues tend to be higher under the sequential mechanism whereas average bidder profits are approximately the same we identify three systematic behavioral deviations from the theoretical model 1 in the auction bidders do not enter 100 of the time 2 in the sequential mechanism bidders do not set preemptive bids according to the predicted threshold strategy and 3 subsequent bidders tend to overenter in response to preemptive bids by first bidders we develop a model of noisy bidder entry costs that is consistent with these behaviors and we show that our model organizes the experimental data well data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2013 1800

news droughts news floods and u s disaster relief this paper studies the influence of mass media on u s government response to approximately 5 000 natural disasters occurring between 1968 and 2002 these disasters took nearly 63 000 lives and affected 125 million people per year we show that u s relief depends on whether the disaster occurs at the same time as other newsworthy events such as the olympic games which are obviously unrelated to need we argue that the only plausible explanation of this is that relief decisions are driven by news coverage of disasters and that the other newsworthy material crowds out this news coverage

persuasion with communication costs this paper studies strategic transmission of verifiable information with reporting costs that continuously increase in the precision of the report contrary to previous literature it is shown that the unraveling result first derived by milgrom 1981 is relatively robust to costly reporting a separating equilibrium exists even with arbitrarily high reporting costs intuitively the costs work as a signaling device and a combination of disclosure of information and costly signaling accomplishes full separation with reporting costs there are typically multiple equilibria for example a pooling equilibrium exists if and only if the reporting costs are high finally a separating equilibrium exists when the receiver has to make a costly effort in order to access the information in a report as long as this cost is not too high

the persistence of treatment effects with norm based policy instruments evidence from a randomized environmental policy experiment during a 1977 fireside chat president jimmy carter famously appealed to american hom eowners to set their thermostats at 65 degrees to help conserve supplies of natural gas and fuel oil norm based strategies are commonly used to influence a range of private behaviors with public consequences including alcohol and drug use gambling and resource consump tion in the last decade these strategies increas ingly emphasize the use of social comparisons to motivate behavioral changes efforts to use such comparisons build upon leon festinger s 1954 social comparison theory which posits that individuals validate the appropriateness of an action or thought through comparison to others a subsequent literature in social psychol ogy argues that strategies based on this theory provide an effective means to promote environ mental conservation see e g tim kurz ngaire donaghue and ian walker 2005 p wesley schultz et al 2007 noah j goldstein robert b cialdini and vladas griskevicius 2008 jessica m nolan et al 2008 in this literature the work by schultz et al 2007 has proven most influential and forms the basis of opower s well cited social comparison approach for

two sided altruism and signaling abstract when donors and recipients care about each other two sided altruism asymmetry of information about the donor s income or about the donor s altruism leads naturally to a signaling game the desire to signal income or altruism puts upward pressure on transfers

a procedure for testing the signalling hypothesis abstract this paper develops a procedure for testing the signalling hypothesis as advanced by spence et al the approach used is to examine directly the question of whether employers use education for purely informational purposes in their hiring decisions an application of the method to a recruitment by the swedish auto manufacturer volvo is presented

self control and the theory of consumption to study the behavior of agents who are susceptible to temptation in infinite horizon consumption problems under uncertainty we define and characterize dynamic self control dsc preferences dsc preferences are recursive and separable in economies with dsc agents equilibria exist but may be inefficient in such equilibria steady state consumption is independent of initial endowments and increases in self control increasing the preference for commitment while keeping self control constant increases the equity premium removing nonbinding constraints changes equilibrium allocations and prices debt contracts can be sustained even if the only feasible punishment for default is the termination of the contract

on allocative distortions in problems of self selection this article considers the general structure of self selection models by imposing conditions which permit the ordering of agents by their preferences we provide a characterization of the distortions inherent in the sorting process

crime and conspicuous consumption we study how property crime distorts consumption decisions using an incomplete information model we argue that consuming conspicuous goods reveals information to criminals seeking bountiful victims and increases the likelihood of being victimized thus property crime reduces the consumption of visible goods even when these cannot be directly stolen but simply carry information about a potential victim s wealth we exploit the large decline in property crime in the u s during the 90s to test this mechanism using data from the u s consumer expenditure survey from 1986 to 2003 we find that households located in states experiencing sharper reductions in property crime increased significantly their consumption of visible goods even when these goods are not generally stolen both in absolute terms and relative to other consumption goods our findings hold when we instrument the decline in property crime during the 90s using a variety of strategies

globalization outsourcing and wage inequality there is considerable debate over whether international trade has contributed to the declining economic fortunes of less skilled workers one issue that has become lost in the current discussion is how firms respond to import competition and how these responses in turn are transmitted to the labor market in previous work we have argued that outsourcing by which we mean the import of intermediate inputs by domestic firms has contributed to an increase in the relative demand for skilled labor in the united states if firms respond to import competition from low wage countries by moving non skill intensive activities abroad then trade will shift employment towards skilled workers within industries in this paper we extend our previous work by combining new import data from the revised nber trade database with disaggregated data on input purchases from the census of manufactures we construct industry by industry estimates of outsourcing for the period 1972 1990 and reexamine whether outsourcing has contributed to an increase in relative demand for skilled labor our main finding is that outsourcing can account for 31 51 of the increase in the relative demand for skilled labor that occurred in u s manufacturing industries during the 1980s compared to our previous estimate of 15 33 this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

patents as signals for startup financing patents as signals for startup financing we examine the role of patents as signals used to reduce information asymmetries in entrepreneurial finance a theoretical model gives conditions for a unique separating equilibrium in which startup founders file for patents to signal invention quality to investors as well as appropriating value the theory allows for heterogeneous investors and examine the optimal match of different types of startups as defined by the quality of their technology to investors who differ in the amount of non financial capital they provide the empirical analysis is consistent with the model s predictions using a novel dataset of israeli startups that received external funding during the period 1994 2011

human capital vs signalling explanations of wages increases wages by directly increasing the worker s productivity this learning explanation is usually associated with human capital theory however it seems unlikely that learning explains all the wage differences associated with schooling and work history better educated workers are not a random sample of workers they have lower propensities to quit or to be absent are less likely to smoke drink or use illicit drugs and are generally healthier it is unlikely that employers make full use of differences in propensities to quit or to be absent or sick when hiring workers these characteristics are often not directly observed and the americans with disabilities act precludes firms from using either poor health or the likelihood of future sickness as a hiring criterion unless it is directly related to job performance however if low levels of education are associated with these unfavorable employee characteristics and employers are allowed to take education into account when hiring workers we would expect employers to favor better educated workers as a means of reducing their costs of sickness and job turnover in turn students will take these hiring criteria into account when deciding how long to stay in school students will choose a length of schooling to signal their ability to employers and employers will demand a minimum level of schooling

the rising college premium in the eighties return to college or return to unobserved ability the changes in the distribution of earnings during the 1980s have been studied extensively the two most striking characteristics of the decade are a a large increase in the college high school wage gap and b a substantial rise in the variance of wage residuals while this second phenomenon is typically implicitly attributed to an increase in the demand for unobserved skill most work in this area fails to acknowledge that this same increase in demand for unobserved skill could drive the evolution of the measured college premium in its simplest form if higher ability individuals are more likely to attend college then the increase in the college wage premium may be due to a increase in the relative demand for high ability workers rather than an increase in the demand for skills accumulated in college this paper develops and estimates a dynamic programming selection model in order to investigate the plausibility of this explanation the results are highly suggestive that an increase in the demand for unobserved ability could play a major role in the growing college premium the changes in the distribution of earnings during the 1980s have been studied extensively the two most striking characteristics of the decade are a a large increase in the college high school wage gap and b a substantial rise in the variance of wage residuals while this second phenomenon is typically implicitly attributed to an increase in the demand for unobserved skill most work in this area fails to acknowledge that this same increase in demand for unobserved skill could drive the evolution of the measured college premium in its simplest form if higher ability individuals are more likely to attend college then the increase in the college wage premium may be due to an increase in the relative demand for high ability workers rather than an increase in the demand for skills accumulated in college this paper develops and estimates a dynamic programming selection model in order to investigate the plausibility of this explanation the results are highly suggestive that an increase in the demand for unobserved ability could play a major role in the growing college premium there are at least two reasons to be interested in this topic first for policy makers intent on helping the american workforce adjust to the changing wage structure this distinction is crucial if the value added of attending college truly rises they may consider policies aimed at subsidizing the skills learned in college however if it results from an increase in the payoff to other types of skills then policies focused on skill acquisition earlier in life would be more appropriate second it will also aid in understanding the

tying odysseus to the mast evidence from a commitment savings product in the philippines we designed a commitment savings product for a philippine bank and implemented it using a randomized control methodology the savings product was intended for individuals who want to commit now to restrict access to their savings and who were sophisticated enough to engage in such a mechanism we conducted a baseline survey on 1777 existing or former clients of a bank one month later we offered the commitment product to a randomly chosen subset of 710 clients 202 28 4 percent accepted the offer and opened the account in the baseline survey we asked hypothetical time discounting questions women who exhibited a lower discount rate for future relative to current trade offs and hence potentially have a preference for commitment were indeed significantly more likely to open the commitment savings account after twelve months average savings balances increased by 81 percentage points for those clients assigned to the treatment group relative to those assigned to the control group we conclude that the savings response represents a lasting change in savings and not merely a short term response to a new product

a signaling explanation for charity this article examines a novel but plausible motive for charitable giving charitable donations which are observable can signal wealth or income the signaling equilibrium of charitable donations has attractive properties donations increase proportionally with population size governmental funding for public goods affects private charity only through an income effect crowding out need not be complete income redistribution is generically nonneutral increasing the spread between the poorest and richest person in a community tends to increase private donations our theory are based on the assumption that people are willing to make charitable donations even if they will not increase provision of the public good the data on charitable giving support the hypothesis that donors donate at least partly for signaling purposes rather than only to aid the recipient or to obtain satisfactions unrelated to status though charitable organizations usually report donations within categories thus not allowing perfect revelation for analytical tractability we shall consider an equilibrium with perfect revelation and a continuum of types as characterized in george j mailath 1987 and norman j ireland 1994

do small pecuniary incentives motivate residential peak energy reductions experimental evidence this article evaluates demand side interventions aimed at reducing residential consumption during the peak energy periods the interventions were applied to a sample of high income households and i

energy conservation nudges and environmentalist ideology evidence from a randomized residential electricity field experiment nudges are being widely promoted to encourage energy conservation we show that while the electricity conservation nudge of providing feedback to households on own and peers home electricity usage works with liberals it can backfire with conservatives our regression estimates predict that a democratic household that pays for electricity from renewable sources that donates to environmental groups and that lives in a liberal neighborhood reduces its consumption by 3 percent in response to this nudge a republican household that does not pay for electricity from renewable sources and that does not donate to environmental groups increases its consumption by 1 percent

monotone equilibria in signaling games abstract we examine the monotonicity of the sender s equilibrium strategy with respect to her type in signaling games we show that when the sender s return from the receiver s action depends on her type the spence mirrlees condition cannot rule out equilibria in which a higher type sender chooses a strictly lower action than a lower type we provide sufficient conditions under which all equilibria are monotone which require that the sender s payoff is decreasing in her action is increasing in the receiver s action and has strictly increasing differences between her type and the action profile we apply our sufficient conditions to education signaling advertising and warranty provision

temptation driven behavior and taxation a quantitative analysis in a life cycle model i introduction a central research question in the dynamic fiscal policy literature during the last 30 years or so is whether under fairly general modeling choices the government should impose a positive tax on capital income in the long run the original answer to this question is negative and is due to the seminal papers by chamley 1986 and judd 1985 who established that in the context of a standard neoclassical growth model with infinitely lived individuals an optimal income tax policy entails taxing capital at confiscatory rates in the short run and setting capital income taxes equal to zero in the long run only labor income should be taxed in the long run since then several modeling choices that cast doubt on the validity of this result were identified in the literature imrohoroglu 1998 showed that the optimal capital income tax rate is strictly positive in an overlapping generations olg setting where individuals face idiosyncratic earnings risk borrowing constraints and life span uncertainty conesa kitao and krueger 2009 extended imrohoroglu 1998 by adding a labor leisure choice they demonstrated that the optimal capital income tax rate is equal to 36 and concluded that this high rate is mainly driven by the life cycle structure of the model in contrast krusell kuruscu and smith 2010 analytically showed that within a class of ramsey tax schemes the optimal capital income tax rate should be negative that is savings should be subsidized when agents have self control problems moreover in the special case where consumers succumb completely to temptation ramsey taxes deliver first best welfare outcomes and in contrast to the chamley judd result the optimum calls for a subsidy to savings however an integrated assessment of the combined effects of the relevant trade offs both along the dimension of differences in preferences and along the dimension of the scope of capital income taxation versus labor income taxation is missing from all previous studies in both social security and capital taxation literature and this paper aims to bridge the gap in the literature and contribute in this aspect to the best of our knowledge this paper is the first study that introduces temptation driven preferences in a quantitative model aiming to tackle the question on the optimal capital income tax before proceeding to specifically articulate this paper s contribution to the literature we consider critical to address a question that lies at the very core of our line of research namely why fiscal policy models with time inconsistent or self control preferences are relevant in the first place initially the literature pioneered by strotz 1956 and phelps and poliak 1968 corroborated evidence coming from both introspection and experiments that agents exhibit preference reversals as time passes different strands within this literature have suggested that these preference reversals could be induced by either time inconsistent preferences see laibson 1997 or self control preferences gul and pesendorfer 2004 time inconsistent preferences typically assume that agents have sequences of different selves each valuing consumption streams in a unique way in contrast gul and pesendorfer 2004 provide a dynamically consistent model suitable for addressing preference reversals that does not necessitate splitting up the consumer in multiple selves that is self control preferences these preferences describe an individual that in every period is tempted to consume his entire endowment when he consumes less than his endowment he incurs a disutility cost that stems from exercising self control that is self control cost optimal behavior trades off the temptation to consume vis a vis the long run self interest of the individual 1 alongside these theoretical underpinnings there is sound empirical and experimental evidence that agents suffer from self control problems