the optimal indexation of asymmetric information contracts the indexation of labour contracts is examined in a setting from which the hedging motive for partial indexation has been excluded since firms have better information than workers contracts must satisfy an incentive compatibility constraint the optimal degree of indexation depends on the incentives generated by the best fully indexed contract if firms would understate overstate the productivity of labour under this contract the optimal contract is partially more than fully indexed l indexation optimale des contrats quand l information est asymetrique l auteur examine l indexation de contrats de travail dans un monde dont on a elimine l indexation partielle dans le simple but de se couvrir comme les firmes ont une meilleure information que les travailleurs les contrats doivent satisfaire une contrainte de compatibilite le degre optimal d indexation depend des incitations engendrees par le meilleur contrat pleinement indexe si les firmes sous evaluent sur evaluent la productivte des travailleurs dans le contrat le contrat optimal est partiellement plus que pleinement indexe

the production process in a competitive economy comment in his recent paper in this review samuel bowles 1985 argues that involuntary unemployment in a competitive capitalist economy is an outcome of the marxian notion of class conflict between the firm capitalist and workers the purpose of this comment is not to question the marxian framework but simply to argue that the model and examples in bowles though very interesting do not in any cogent way reflect class conflict let me list the major points made by bowles in the context of a competitive capitalist economy 1 involuntary unemployment leading to reserve army of the unemployed is a reflection of class conflict 2 capitalist technology may be profit maximizing but inefficient and 3 discrimination among identical workers may be profit maximizing i will focus primarily on the first observation which is the heart of the paper the other two can be deduced from the first

tripartite income employment contracts and coalition incentive compatibility tripartite contracts between workers a firm and an insurance broker pareto dominate the usual bilateral arrangements if coalitions are not feasible they do this by allowing the broker to run surpluses over a reservation expected utility in some states and deficits in others we show that these contracts are manipulable by coalitions this motivates our main contribution the definition and characterization of coalition incentive compatible tripartite contracts we then ask whether broker intermediation can still be useful the answer is that not every coalition incentive compatibility requirement annuls the critical budget breaking property specifically if firm broker coalitions are feasible there is no three party contract that is coalition incentive compatible and pareto superior to bilateral firm worker contracts except in the extreme case where the workers demand for leisure is income inelastic but if only a firm worker coalition can form the addition of a broker to a bilateral arrangement does reduce the welfare losses caused by the existence of asymmetric information

wage employment contracts this paper studies the efficient agreements about the dependence of workers earnings on employment when the employment level is controlled by firms the firms superior information about profitability conditions is responsible for this form of contract governance under plausible assumptions such agreements will cause employment to diverge from efficiency as a byproduct of their attempt to mitigate risk it is shown that if leisure is a normal good and firms are risk neutral employment is always above the efficient level such a one period implicit contracting model cannot therefore be used to explain unemployment as a rational byproduct of risk sharing between workers and a risk neutral firm under conditions of asymmetric information

an examination of the structure of governance in california school districts before and after proposition 13 this paper explores the structure of governance in california school districts two alter native models are considered the decisive voter benevolent dictator model and a model that al lows for rent seeking behavior on the part of district decision makers a formal test between these two models is proposed and implemented the decisive voter model is found wanting as an expla nation of school district decision making both before and after the passage of proposition 13 there is however some evidence that the constraints imposed on some districts by proposition 13 have forced decision makers to act in a manner more consistent with the preferences of their constituents

strategic labour contracts labor contracts affect a firm s cost function and for this reason they can be used as a recommitment device to gain a strategic advantage against other firms in a model that is otherwise neutral it is found that if firms compete in prices then strategic considerations alone yield results similar to those obtained by c azariadis 1983 workers are underemployed and worse off in more adverse states of nature on the other hand if firms compete in quantities then the equilibrium contracts resemble those of j green and c kahn 1983 workers are overemployed and better off in more adverse states

underemployment and normal leisure abstract a combined worksharing layoff wage severance pay contract is shown to imply inter alia that normal leisure and underemployment do coexist provided the elasticity of substitution between employment and hours is sufficiently low as defined rigorously in the text

wage profiles and imperfect capital markets a positive analysis this paper examines the structure of long term employment contracts when labor is mobile and risk averse employers are unable to monitor workers outside job offers workers cannot borrow against future income and workers productivity is increasing in the length of service with the long term employer workers are then liquidity constrained and the contract trades off consumption smoothing against efficiency in turnover in contrast to previous papers which have examined this problem this paper provides a continuous time formulation that permits a detailed characterization of the properties of the wage profile

a test for efficiency in the supply of public education this paper devises and applies a statistical test for efficient provision of local public education the test is based on the samuelson condition of equality between the sum of marginal rates of substitution and marginal cost the econometric method is a micro based approach to the estimation of the marginal rate of substitution function this method accounts for possible tiebout bias caused by the fact that individuals may choose their school districts in accordance with their tastes for education

information revelation and principal agent contracts in an environment in which effort is private information to the worker agreements between a risk neutral principal and a risk averse agent are likely to be risk sharing and information revealing mechanisms it is shown that principal agent contracts have significant implications for both compensation and employment rules in a simple work sharing model in general such contracts involve incomplete income insurance and involuntary or excessive underemployment this supports the view that models of worker specific information particularly with moral hazard provide a natural explanation of underemployment

unions and strikes with asymmetric information strikes seem to be a pareto inefficient outcome of bargaining between a union and a firm however this paper shows that strikes can be the outcome of rational behavior by both agents if the firm has more information than the union concerning the state of nature the union can use strikes as a way of gaining information the paper uses an asymmetric information model where the firm has information about the state i e profitability that the union does not know the schedule of wage offers by the union then depends on the probability that a given state will occur

dynamic responses to changing demand a model of the reallocation process in small and large municipalities in norway local government priorities between local services are analysed in a community preference model emphasizing income effects and demographic factors the model is built into a partia adjustment framework with endogenous speed of adjustment to study the dynamic responses of local governments to shifting demand the empirical analysis of the reallocation process separates between small and large municipalities in terms of population size serious sluggishness of the adjustment is documented with large municipalities experiencing stronger inertia than the small the small authorities have been able to respond more effectively to the restructuring pressure from demographic shift

optimal employment contracts with bankruptcy constraints abstract consider the optimal incentive compatible contract offered by a firm with private information to its risk averse employees if the firm is subject to a binding limited liability or bankruptcy constraint then the contract will yield underemployment in low productivity states relative to full information efficiency such contracts either yield underemployment in all states or excessively high variability in employment

labor contracts and business cycles this paper investigates the claim often put forth by real business cycle proponents that the poor performance of their models in matching real world aggregate labor market behavior is due to the fact that observed real wage payments do not correspond to the actual marginal productivity of labor but contain an insurance component that cannot be accounted for by the walrasian pricing mechanism to test this idea we dispense with the walrasian description of the labor market and introduce contractual arrangements between employees and employers assuming that employees are prevented from accessing capital markets and are more risk averse than employers we use the theory of optimal contracts to derive an equilibrium relation between aggregate states of the economy and wage labor outcomes this contractual arrangement is then embedded into a standard one sector stochastic neoclassical growth model in order to look at the business cycle implications of the contractual hypothesis the resulting dynamic equi

the role of options in the resolution of agency problems a comment the aim of the contracting literature in economics is to explain observed contractual arrangements or organizations as minimizing the costs of incentive conflicts in the agency cost literature of financial economics the contractual arrangement at issue is the mix of securities held by inside management of a firm and outside suppliers of capital the ownership structure of the firm in jensen and meckling s 8 terminology in explaining the ownership structure of a corporation jensen and meckling focus on two sources of agency or incentiveconflict costs a the manager s tendency to consume excessive perquisites and b the manager s tendency to invest in prospects of high risk so as to effect an ex post transfer from bondholders to stockholders a recent article in this journal by haugen and senbet 61 examines the role of stock options in resolving these agency problems and claims to show in particular that a call option in the insider portfolio can eliminate the first type of agency costs this article re examines the role of options in the resolution of agency problems we argue in section i that options cannot eliminate the agency problem of excessive perquisite consumption contrary to haugen and senbet the essential point is that unless outside financing can be provided entirely by riskless debt then outsiders must have a residual claim on the net income of the firm in some states of the world outsiders therefore share in the costs of increased perquisite consumption whatever the ownership structure of the firm this negative externality means that excessive perquisite consumption is inevitable the question remains do call options nonetheless have a role in the mitigation of agency costs an insider portfolio consisting only of equity leaves the manager with the same proportion of residual claim in each state of the world we show using a formal principal agent model that the efficient insider s share of profits is relatively high in favorable high profit states of the world insider call options arise as means of transferring residual claim to the manager in favorable states of the world relative to low profit states the basic agency model has been solved in substantial generality by holmstrom 7 and others we employ here a more specific model that draws on the techniques developed by green and kahn 4 and that is an extension to continuous states of the finite state model of sappington 12 the extension allows a simple characterization of the optimal contract a characterization that

two sided uncertainty and up or out contracts a bilateral moral hazard problem provides a rationale for up or out employment contracts the employer sets a wage higher than opportunity cost to induce the worker to invest in firm specific capital if the individual does not make the grade it is in the firm s interest ex post to fire him had the initial arrangement not included provisions for firing individuals the firm would underreport the value of the employee wrecking the incentive scheme the basic model permits both firm and worker to be risk neutral therefore it admits a straightforward multiperiod extension which we also investigate

can the risk shifting employment model explain fluctuating employment it is shown by numerical examples that for the simple two states of the world version of azariadis original model of implicit labour contracts enormous fluctuations in output price are required to generate layoffs the paper then modifies the simple model replacing the perfectly competitive product market specification with a sales constraint this modification makes a significant difference the combination of sales constraints and risk shifting is shown to have the potential to explain layoffs since this sales constraint is unmotivated by micro analysis its inclusion does not satisfy the original aim of the risk shifting employment model to explain layoffs as based on micro foundations a secondary aim of the paper is to make the workings of the risk shifting employment model easier to understand by introducing a new diagrammatic analysis based on a contract curve

strikes as the random enforcement of asymmetric information contracts a two state model of strikes in which both the entrepreneur and the worker randomize their behavior is developed the entrepreneur always asks for a wage reduction unaccompanied by a cut in labor services if the state is bad and he sometimes makes the same request in the good state the worker sometimes agrees to this request and sometimes threatens to strike the strike threat is only carried out in the bad state this equilibrium can pareto dominate that found in the standard asymmetric information contracting model

efficiency wage models of unemployment one view h lorne carmichael persistent wage rigidity and involuntary unemployment appear to be recurrent problems in most economies what could be preventing the wage adjustment necessary to clear the labor market many recent papers claim to have found the answer in efficiency wage models this paper surveys this literature and attempts to evaluate its accomplishments it concludes that the efficiency wage models fail to explain wage rigidity or persistent involuntary unemployment persistent involuntary unemployment of workers is a recurrent problem in labor markets all over the world unemployed workers seem unable to find work even though they are willing to accept lower wages than those being paid employed workers with similar skills what could be preventing wages from adjusting to clear these markets many recent papers known collectively as the efficiency wage literature now claim to have the answer this paper will survey the efficiency wage literature and critically evaluate some of its accomplishments efficiency wage models have already been examined by yellen 1984 katz 1986 and stiglitz 1987 and have received generally favorable reviews this paper is more critical its overall conclusion is that efficiency wage models provide some useful insights into the workings of the labor market but they do not provide a satisfactory account of wage rigidity or involuntary unemployment there are at least five separate versions of the efficiency wage model they share a common structure however and this is outlined in the first section of the paper this section also attempts to relate efficiency wage models to other recent models of unemployment section ii examines and criticizes the different approaches in detail section iii evaluates the achievements of this approach and suggests some directions for future work i a general efficiency wage model efficiency wage models as the name suggests are first of all models of wages they generate unemployment by showing that firms will sometimes want to set wages at non market clearing levels it is useful to begin therefore by reviewing how wages and employment are determined in some related models in a perfectly competitive labor market the wage for each type of labor is adjusted constantly to maintain equality of supply and demand overall employment fluctuates in response to demand changes as workers move up and down their labor supply curves unemployment is voluntary in that anyone who is not working prefers that state to employment at the going wage for people of his skills as well the value of a worker s marginal product is equal to the marginal value of his leisure so there are no unexploited wage bargains between unemployed workers and firms this model is successful in predicting the long term response of wages to shifts in demand and supply but it is clear that in the short run its depiction of voluntary unemployment and flexible wages is unrealistic a natural way to generate more realism is to assume that wages are inflexible in the short run in this case a reduction in demand away from a long run equilibrium will lead to rationing of jobs by employers as they attempt to stay on their labor demand curves the unemployment here is involuntary in that the unemployed would prefer to be working at the going wage and is inefficient in that there are lost gains from trade between these workers and firms the weakness of this model is that it is silent about the mechanism that keeps wages rigid unemployed workers who offer to work for less than the fixed wage ought to find work the early implicit contract models of azariadis 1975 baily 1974 and gordon 1974 provide one explanation for wage rigidity these models introduced the idea that wages can do more than just clear the market for labor wages in an implicit contract model are used to shift the risk generated by uncertain output market conditions from risk averse workers to the risk neutral firm

bumping layoffs and worksharing this paper deals with an interesting but often neglected labor practice prevalent in large north american firms with well developed internal labor markets large north american firms typically respond to a decline in demand for their products by first reducing the number of hours worked or worksharing as the demand continues to fall however they begin to make skilled workers bump onto unskilled jobs displacing unskilled workers skilled workers are laid off only after a considerable number have bumped i develop an implicit contract model and explain the practice

liquidity constrained employment contracts abstract kahn and scheinkman 1985 have shown that optimal contracting between risk averse workers and risk neutral but liquidity constrained firms results in underemployment if firms have better information than workers this result is extended here by allowing the firm to divide its wealth between capital and liquid assets so that liquidity is a choice variable the firm generally chooses a portfolio under which it is optimal not to choose the risk neutral i e expected profit maximizing employment contract the underemployment result is thereby shown not to be strongly dependent on the choice of parameters

a welfare analysis of employment contracts with and without asymmetric information this paper provides a complete characterization of the welfare economics of employment contracts when workers are immobile in the ex post period necessary and sufficient conditions for constrained pareto optimality are derived for economies with incomplete risk markets two consumption goods and random production technologies in which a workers can cannot observe realizations of their employers revenue function symmetric vs asymmetric information and in which b employment contracts allow preclude contingent wages and or employment levels flexible vs rigid contracts this taxonomic approach serves to identify the welfare implications of exogenous and endogenous contractual rigidities and to isolate a class of externalities that is unique to economies with asymmetric information the latter market failure is also present with indexed contracts when workers alone can observe realizations of their consumption goods prices another form of asymmetric information

involuntary employment in contracts with risky job search involuntary employment in contracts with risky job search the implications of partially insurable job search risk for incentive compatibility in a standard contracting framework are explored when unemployment spells provoke job search workers face risk in spell duration and reemployment wages when search effort is not variable contracts including unemployment insurance will yield involuntary employment when search effort is diminished by ui benefits firms shift some compensation back to wages increasing the relative attractiveness of employment the analysis begins with a theorem on incomplete insurance by imai geanakoplos and ito 1981 for which a simple proof and economic intuition are provided i introduction in seminal models of contingent labor contracts azariadis 1975 and baily 1974 sought to explain the behavior of wages and employment over the business cycle much of the subsequent literature for example grossman and hart 1983 and hart 1983 has been devoted to exploring the impact of asymmetric information on such properties of contracting equilibria as over or underemployment wage flexibility and whether or not utility falls when a worker is fired this paper looks at the effects on contingent labor contracts of the asymmetry in risk faced on the one hand by workers who being laid off when the contract is implemented experience job search risk which is partially uninsured due to asymmetric information and on the other hand by workers who retaining their jobs return to a known status quo for the rest of the period in most contingent contracting models all relevant information about the prevailing state of nature is revealed at once and wage and employment levels are then determined once the contract is implemented there is no residual uncertainty this sequence of events agreement upon a contingent contract resolution of uncertainty determination of wages and employment is a reasonable approximation to the experience of workers who retain their jobs since they know their wages and their working conditions workers who are laid off however often face considerable risk over the effectiveness of job search and the terms of future employment this creates an asymmetry in the riskiness of the ex post outcomes of the contract job retention means no more uncertainty within the period while layoff entails further within period risk associated with job search and reemployment while severance pay or unemployment benefits can reduce some of the uncertainty associated with job loss they will not generally provide complete insurance this is because the intensity of job search and the arrival of job offers are private information since the firm cannot verify for example the intensity of job search it will insist that the worker bear some of the risk associated with the search s outcome this is a standard principal agent problem see for example shavell 1979 equilibrium labor contracts will therefore offer workers a gamble between job retention with no residual risk and layoff with some uninsured job search risk 1 this asymmetry in residual risk affects the contingent contracts workers enter into for example if workers feel more comfortable facing a given risk when their incomes are higher the residual risk associated with layoff may lead them to accept lower contingent wages in the employed state in exchange for greater severance pay when laid off a problem with this kind of modification of the standard contract i e one with no residual risk is that if enough compensation is shifted into the unemployed state expected utility may actually be higher for laid off workers than for those who are retained this is a situation with voluntary layoffs and involuntary employment at prevailing wages retained workers would rather be laid off if workers can increase their chances of being fired by behaving unproductively involuntary employment contracts may be unenforceable

specific human capital and sorting mechanisms in labor markets three major avenues of research on employment contracts which incorporate asymmetric information have been pursued first researchers have considered contracts in which the supply of employee effort is costly to monitor 3 8 9 12 second the allocation of labor has been examined when innate person specific characteristics are unobservable 4 5 14 15 third employment contracts have been designed when economic agents are uncertain about the state of nature concerning the worker s marginal product and the employee s reservation wage 6 7 this research agenda has provided an elaborate array of models which yield employment contracts that reduce the distortionary effects of asymmetric information however these models have two major short comings first under uncertainty concerning personspecific information employers have an incentive to screen employees the existing literature has analyzed two distinct screening mechanisms guasch and weiss 4 5 consider screening through wages while white 15 has considered screening through specific human capital however each mechanism has been analyzed in isolation the present paper combines these screening mechanisms and examines the impact of each upon the optimal employment contract second although the existing literature on employment contracts offers a general framework for analysis it is not directly amenable to empirical verification the present paper rectifies these short comings by developing a model which incorporates both screening mechanisms under asymmetric information and thereby provides a model conducive to empirical verification in our analysis three major simplifying assumptions are made first because we assume employees have no choice regarding the effort they supply we abstract from the agency problem discussed in the literature cited above second we assume employees differ in their innate person specific characteristics the latter is assumed to be observed by

unemployment insurance and labor contracts under asymmetric information theory and facts the paper provides evidence to show that many u s labor contracts havelittle or no private unemployment insurance provision a model of an optional contract under asymmetric information with no private unemployment insurance is presented underemployment and involuntaryunemployment may coexist copyright 1986 by american economic association

self enforcing contracts shirking and life cycle incentives he labor market is a rich and complicated place when a worker takes a job he expects to earn a wage but will also care about rates of wage growth fringe benefits levels of risk retirement practices pensions promotion and layoff rules seniority rights and grievance procedures in return the worker must give up some time but he is also asked to upgrade his skills train other workers provide effort and ideas and defer to authority in questions of how his time is spent great changes are occurring in the way labor market institutions such as these are modelled central to the new approach is the concept of a self enforcing implicit contract this is the latest in a series of variations on the ideas of azariadis 1975 baily 1974 and gordon 1974 and is one of the more exciting new developments in the theory of labor markets this essay will outline this approach and evaluate some of its accomplishments the ideas will be presented in the context of an incentive model that is of some independent interest the model was introduced by becker and stigler 1974 and was extended by lazear 1979 to account for wage growth and mandatory retirement in these papers the workers retire at a fixed age lending the name life cycle incentives to the approach more recently shapiro and stiglitz 1984 have used a version without a fixed retirement date to account for unemployment this version is often called the shirking model these models have generated some controversy but much of it can be resolved when the models are presented in the framework of self enforcing contracts in fact this simple incentive model can do even more it can provide a rationale for competitive hierarchies where firms place their workers in competition with

optimal at will labour contracts an at will employment rule allows parties to sever their employment relationship for a good reason a bad reason or no reason at all schawb s 1993 life cycle justice accommodating just cause and employment at will michigan law review 92 8 62 a specific performance employment rule allows any party to force the other party to perform as specified in the contract although the theory of labour contracting generally assumes enforcement by specific performance in practice the vast majority of non union employment relationships are mediated by an at will rule when employment contracts are enforced by an at will rule i show that the standard counter intuitive predictions generated by standard labour contracting models disappear

contracting with endogenous entry we analyze entry in markets where a principal contracts with a privately informed agent before learning his production cost the agent knows his probability of having a low cost his ex ante type and decides whether to pay an entry fee to contract with the principal there are two cut off equilibria that determine the possible types of an agent who actually enters the market and neither equilibrium can be discarded by standard selection criteria contrasting with standard intuition in the equilibrium with the highest cut off an increase in the entry fee reduces the marginal type of the agent who enters thus increasing entry and the expected cost of an entrant this equilibrium is selected by a criterion based on robustness to equilibrium risk even though the equilibrium with the lowest cut off is pareto dominant for the agent public policies that increase entry barriers may be welfare improving

voluntary provision of a pure public good as the game of chicken abstract the voluntary exchange model where the amount of a public good and contributions to its cost are simultaneously determined is treated as a 2 2 non cooperative non constant sum game three conceptually different types of games emerge one of them is chicken each player can gain by pre emptively threatening to pay nothing unless the other player acts likewise zero public goods is thus a possible outcome of voluntary exchange even though it is pareto inferior

renegotiation and information revelation over time the case of optimal labor contracts the paper analyzes the issue of commitment in grossman and hart s model of optimal labor contracts under asymmetric information about firm profitability we extend their framework by allowing employment to vary over time at equidistant intervals when both parties can precommit ex ante not to renegotiate the contract this replicates the grossman hart outcome each subperiod when precommitment is not possible information revealed through the contract can create pareto improving renegotiation opportunities and the issue of optimal information revelation arises the paper analyzes the impact of ex post pareto improving renegotiations on the optimal contract

optimal labour contracts under asymmetric information an introduction the review of economic studies has instituted a new series of lectures to be given annually by a younger british economist at the association of university teachers of economics meetings the choice of lecturer is determined by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay this paper is a revised version of the first lecture in the series it was presented at the aute meeting held at the university of surrey in april 1982 and was refereed in the usual way mak

efficient labor contracts with employment risk this article analyzes efficient employment agreements where the demand for consumption insurance can be satisfied by noncontractual means we assume that workers can save and that consumption is determined by a strong form of the permanent income hypothesis under conditions of asymmetric information about exogenous shocks to labor demand we derive a unique compensation schedule that efficiently guides decisions by both workers and employers efficient employment outcomes are generated without a need for third party enforcement or monitoring and workers choose a consumption policy that leaves them indifferent among realizations of labor demand within this solution it is both costless and efficient for workers to delegate employment decisions to the firm within the context of the model we analyze implications for the equilibrium distribution of wages and for empirical studies of labor supply

estimating a public school expenditure model under binding spending limitations abstract a model explaining desired expenditure on education is estimated for a sample of new jersey school districts because the limit on annual increases in school spending is binding for a subsample of jurisdictions the tobit estimation procedure is used we test for equality of the pre and postlimitation structures and find substantial similarity the cap on expenditure increases was part of a court ordered reform of new jersey school finance law the results can be used to explain the failure of the existing school finance laws in lessening expenditure disparities at the lower end of the distribution

a nonuniform pricing model of union wages and employment unlike implicit contracts models the nonuniform pricing model of unions assumes that firms can always shut down ex post to avoid any payments to the union under this restriction employment can differ from a first best even if both workers and firms are risk neutral in general the union chooses to offer quantity discounts on labor and needs to use a seniority rule that regulates the order in which workers are hired to implement these discounts unions lower almost all workers employment probabilities and increase the cyclical volatility of employment and the union nonunion average wage differential will move countercyclically workers preferences over union wage profiles conditional on their seniority exhibit within limits a convenient unanimity property

modeling government behavior in collective bargaining a test for self interested bureaucrats this paper tests for self interested behavior by local government bureaucrats engaged in collective bargaining with public employee unions a theoretical model is developed that shows the effect of niskanen style bureaucratic self interest in the two standard bargaining models the demand constrained model and the efficient bargain model these predictions are then tested using national cross section data on unionized police fire and sanitation workers

planning stochastic shocks and labour contracts of female workers and their welfare implications in this paper we analyse labour contracts for female workers when there are planned shifts or stochastic shocks to their leisure preference which arise as a result of planned or unplanned pregnancy it will be shown that when female workers plan their pregnancy contract firms can induce self selection among workers through a contract that stipulates a wage profile steeper than the spot wage profile so that self selected workers who accept the contract will not quit even though information on shifts in leisure preference is asymmetric first best efficiency can be achieved through self selection when female workers do not plan childbirths however self selection contracts are not possible when the stochastic shocks are realized there will be quits planning is pareto superior to no planning at equilibrium workers will be allocated optimally workers who have low marginal value of home time will join contract firms and make specific investments while those who have high marginal value will seek employment in the walrasian market and make no specific investments some implications of these results are also discussed in the paper

unemployment insurance and involuntary unemployment the case of adverse selection abstract this paper studies the private and public provision of unemployment insurance in a model where equilibrium unemployment results from the use of the wage as a worker selection device it is shown that private provision will not occur essentially because those workers most desired by a firm place least value on such coverage respecting the same informational constraints public provision necessarily gives rise to some distortions in participation decisions but nonetheless is welfare improving in the aggregate

training and worker effort a signalling perspective this paper analyzes the interaction between firms investment in general skills training and workers incentives it shows that when a firm has an informational advantage over its workers its provision of free general skills training can serve as a signal that there will be a long term relationship between the firm and its workers this signal induces the workers to exert more effort in learning firm specific skills which enhances the firm s profits in contrast with most of the existing literature the model implies that firms may provide free general skills training even if there is no labour market friction ce memoire analyse l interaction entre l investissement des entreprises dans l acquisition d habiletes generales de leurs employes et les incitations des travailleurs a fournir un effort on montre que quand une firme a un avantage informationnel sur ses travailleurs le fait de fournir gratuitement de la formation qui permette aux employes d acquerir des habiletes generales peut servir de signal qu il va y avoir une relation a long terme entre la firme et ses travailleurs ce signal incite les travailleurs a investir plus d effort dans l acquisition d habiletes specifiques a la firme ce qui augmente les profits de l entreprise ce modele en porte a faux par rapport au gros de la litterature existante suggere que les entreprises peuvent fournir gratuitement de la formation permettant aux employes d acquerir des habiletes generales meme s il n y a pas de friction dans le marche du travail

optimal wage bargains recent attempts to provide a theoretical framework for macroeconomics have focused on the nature of wage employment agreements between firms and workers workers are in general unable to purchase insurance against future income fluctuations on grounds of for example moral hazard and consequently firms may find it profitable to offer workers a contract that provides them with partial insurance as well as employment compensation the seminal papers are those of azariadis 1975 and baily 1974 henceforth a b and a useful survey is provided by azariadis 1981 in their model hiring decisions must be made before uncertainty about product market conditions is resolved if firms are risk neutral and severance payments to the unemployed are disallowed then the optimal contract entails a state invariant real wage and the possibility of ex post involuntary unemployment while this model provides important insights it has been criticized on a number of grounds first akerlof and miyazaki 1980 and pissarides 1981 have pointed out that unemployment can occur in the simple a b model only when the marginal revenue product of labour falls below the reservation wage so that unemployment would also occur in a walrasian model and that in general the level of unemployment will be less than would be experienced in spot markets although it does provide a clue to the involuntary nature of that unemployment second the ad hoc exclusion of payments by the firm to the unemployed can be criticized if these are allowed then the optimal contract involves a topping up of the reservation wage to provide complete income rather than wage stabilization and the ex post efficient level of employment will be sustained these criticisms have prompted a number of authors to examine the implications of assuming asymmetric information about the state of nature an early example of this literature is provided by calvo and phelps 1977 who note that under an a b contract because there is a tendency to overemployment in bad states there will be an incentive for firms to misrepresent the state of nature and lay off more workers than previously agreed but that this incentive may be attenuated by making the wage schedule contingent on the level of employment that is assumed to be observed by workers the properties of these contracts usually depend on the precise assumptions of the model however in some versions unemployment may be greater than would occur in the walrasian model hart 1983 for instance considers a model in which severance payments are allowed but firms as well as workers are risk averse then the optimal contract will involve lower wages in bad states of nature in order to spread risk but the only way this information can be conveyed to workers is by lowering the level of employment the papers by grossman and hart 1981 and by azariadis chari green and kahn and grossman and hart in the symposium in the quarterly journal of economics

implicit contracts with asymmetric information and bankruptcy the effect of interest rates on layoffs this paper develops a model in which a firm writes labour contracts with workers and debt contracts with creditors firms have more information than do the owners of the factors of production and they are also subject to limited liability we show that if the limited liability constraint is binding then the employment level is inefficient relative to a situation of symmetric information the firm is then embedded into a partial equilibrium model in which the real rate of interest is exogenously determined we show that increases in the real rate of interest increase the inefficiency of the optimal employment contract and lead to layoffs in more states of nature than would occur at lower real interest rates recent literature in the area of implicit contracts has shown considerable interest in the assumption of asymmetric information henceforth a i papers by azariadis 1982 green and kahn 1982 and grossman and hart 1981 have all shown that a i will interfere with optimal risk sharing but although these models produce non walrasian outcomes it is not clear that they are capable of explaining the observed variations in employment over the business cycle in the absence of a link between the level of employment and other macroeconomic variables these new versions of contract theory are open to the charge that they are presenting a complicated explanation of frictional unemployment one potential link between variations in output and variations in intertemporal prices is suggested by models which explicitly allow for the possibility of bankruptcy sappington 1983 has shown that bankruptcy will generate inefficient outcomes even between risk neutral agents and farmer 1984 has shown that if sappington type contracts are incorporated into a macroeconomic structure then the resulting model predicts that bankruptcies will vary countercyclically over the business cycle although bankruptcy is important however it is unlikely that bankruptcies alone will account for all of the output loss during a recession the purpose of this paper is to show that the assumptions of a i and limited liability will generate a model in which the employment level is inefficient and in which the magnitude of this inefficiency varies systematically with the expected real rate of interest this model predicts that the observed increase in the incidence of layoffs during recessions is directly attributable to the effects of high interest rates on aggregate supply some evidence of the phenomenon to be explained is presented below

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

other people s taxes nonresident voters and statewide limitation of local government abstract why would voters resort to a statewide tax limitation to force change in their own local government this paper develops and tests the hypothesis that property tax limitations succeeded because they allowed voters to lower tax rates in other communities statewide limitations effectively extend the voting franchise to individuals who have no standing in local elections voters may have preferences for tax and expenditure levels in other jurisdictions because they receive rents from employment in those jurisdictions because they directly own taxable assets in those jurisdictions or because changes in other jurisdictions might influence their own residential location choice empirical tests of this hypothesis focus on the massachusetts experience with proposition 2 documentclass aastex usepackage amsbsy usepackage amsfonts usepackage amssymb usepackage bm usepackage mathrsfs usepackage pifont usepackage stmaryrd usepackage textcomp usepackage portland xspace usepackage amsmat

optimal labour contracts and involuntary unemployment under costly and imperfect monitoring this paper provides an explanation for the concurrence of rigid wages and involuntary unemployment we consider cases in which a firm monitors its workers but at some cost a key assumption in the model is that the firm cannot perfectly distinguish shirkers from nonshirkers thus the firm has to rely on negotiated compensation and work effort as well as monitoring to reduce the incentive to shirk we find that rigid wages and involuntary unemployment arise simultaneously when monitoring costs are large and the effectiveness of monitoring is low

labor contracts and the role of monetary policy in an overlapping generations model abstract this paper characterizes labor contracts in a dynamic economy subject to both real and nominal shocks in this environment we compare alternative means of trading labor services spot markets fixed nominal wage contracts and price contingent contracts the welfare ordering of these market structures is shown to depend on the relative variability of the real and nominal shocks and the costs of contingent contracts the paper also investigates the role of monetary policy and the neutrality of feedback rules finally we demonstrate that the optimal policy is nonstochastic

you can take it with you proposition 13 tax benefits residential mobility and willingness to pay for housing amenities abstract the endogeneity of prices has long been recognized as the main identification problem in the estimation of marginal willingness to pay mwtp for the characteristics of a given product this issue is particularly important in the housing market since a number of housing and neighborhood features are unobserved by the econometrician this paper proposes the use of a well defined type of transaction costs moving costs generated by property tax laws to deal with this type of omitted variable bias california s proposition 13 property tax law is the source of variation in transaction costs used in the empirical analysis beyond its fiscal consequences proposition 13 created a lock in effect on housing choice because of the implicit tax break enjoyed by homeowners living in the same house for a long time its importance to homeowners is estimated from a natural experiment created by two amendments that allow households headed by an individual over the age of 55 to transfer the implicit tax benefit to a new home indeed 55 year old homeowners have 25 higher moving rates than those of comparable 54 year olds these transaction costs from the property tax laws are then incorporated into a household sorting model the key insight is that because of the property tax laws different potential buyers may have different user costs for the same house the exogenous property tax component of this user cost is then used as an instrumental variable i find that mwtp estimates for housing characteristics are approximately 100 upward biased when the choice model does not account for the price endogeneity

pareto optima and competitive equilibria with adverse selection and moral hazard this paper explores the extent to which standard general equilibrium analysis of pareto optima and of competitive equilibria can be applied to environments with moral hazard and adverse selection problems allowing for lotteries contracts with random components we first establish that an adverse selection insurance economy a moral hazard insurance economy a signaling economy and a private information labor market economy are all special cases of a simple general structure we then show that techniques for characterizing pareto optimal contracts as solutions to concave programming problems are useful and nice and appear to be broadly applicable allowing for lotteries we show how to characterize the optimal allocations for the adverse selection insurance and labor market economies we then show that standard existence and optimality theorems for competitive equilibria apply in the linear space containing lotteries if agents with characteristics which are distinct and privately observed at the time of initial trading enter the economy wide resource constraints in a homogeneous way other kinds of diversity are not critical for economies with moral hazard which satisfy the homogeneity condition competitive contract markets single out a subset of the optima and thus can be consistent with apparent unemployment and with a random allocation of labor supplied though all households are averse to risk the adverse selection insurance and signaling economies however do not satisfy the homogeneity condition and are difficult to decentralize efficiently with a price system

what is a liquidity crisis abstract this paper investigates the role of liquidity it is argued that the firm holds money as a guarantee of solvency to its contractual partners by holding liquid assets the firm is able to increase the efficiency of its contracts variations in the opportunity cost of holding money cause variations in the firm s demand for money and consequent variations in the frequency of contract failures this mechanism is suggested as an alternative explanation of the observed relationship between money income and interest rates

labor contracts with voluntary quits this paper considers labor contracts between the risk neutral firm and risk averse workers with heterogeneous outside opportunities alternative wages which become known to the worker after a costly on the job search in the case of a deterministic alternative wage self selection over a menu of contract wages would achieve the first best contract if the alternative wages are stochastic the second best contract emerges as a trade off between productive efficiency and risk sharing workers who voluntarily search are fewer and workers who search are less likely to quit if the search effort is not monitored even fewer workers search

short time work some long run implications this paper outlines a simple model to examine some long run implications of short time work schemes stws on labor market performance and welfare it is not clear that stws reduce unemployment as the induced wage push discourages job creation

a characterization of employment distortions in labor contracts with asymmetric information abstract employment distortions are characterized for different combinations of firm s risk aversion and the degree of normality of leisure in worker s preferences using a novel method all previously established results are derived and the previously unresolved cases are worked out

insiders and outsiders and efficient asymmetric information contracts abstract the employment levels implied by an efficient contract with asymmetric information are shown to deviate from walrasian levels if a distinction if drawn between insiders and outsiders if insiders alone negotiate the contract there will be over employment for low levels of demand and there may be either over or under employment for high levels

dynamic contractual enforcement a model of strikes this paper provides a theory of strikes as part of a constrained efficient enforcement mechanism for an implicit contractual agreement a firm possessing contemporaneously private information about demand engages in an enduring relationship with its workforce if the information becomes perfectly observable subsequently then modulo discounting the first best is implementable but strikes are always off the equilibrium path if the observations of the workforce are imperfect strikes occur in equilibrium the dynamic contracting problem is modeled as a repeated game with imperfect monitoring the equilibrium exhibits production inefficiency and incomplete insurance to mitigate the inefficiencies caused by strikes

do trade unions reduce job opportunities of non members this paper examines the structure of the optimal contract that would be chosen by a self interested trade union that represents the interests of some set of m members when it is assumed that there exists a pool of unemployed workers outside the union whose opportunity cost of working is such that they would at least in some states of demand have been employed in a competitive labor market the authors compare wage and employment levels under such a contract with those that would be observed in competitive markets in particular focusing on the impact of the union on the employment opportunities and welfare of non union members copyright 1989 by royal economic society

managerial incentives investment and aggregate implications scale effects we explore a managerial model of investment behaviour in which an incentive problem arises because one input factor managerial effort is not publicly observed we show that an optimal incentive contract leads to investment levels which are below first best in low states and that this phenomenon can account for greater cyclical variability in aggregate production and investment from the perspective of incentive scheme design a special feature of the model is that screening takes place over two variables investment and output rather than one as is customary

a note on long term contracts abstract the purpose of this paper is three fold i to interpret townsend s 1982 long term contract model as a labor contract model where a value of job matching for a worker is a private information ii to contrast townsend s long term contract model with holmstrom s 1983 long term contract model in a common framework and iii to explore the effect of workers mobility on the contract configuration of the two models both holmstrom and townsend construct models in which a single period contract is not viable but a long term contract is however reasons for this characteristic in the two models are quite different this paper proposes a simple framework of labor contracts with illustrates the essential difference of the two models and the role of mobility costs mobility costs in the two types of long term contracts are shown to be beneficial for both workers and the firm results of comparative statics show how contract configurations in two models are influenced by changes in mobility costs

a note on overemployment underemployment in labor contracts under asymmetric information abstract models of labor contracts under asymmetric information may predict either overemployment or underemployment this paper shows that this result depends crucially on whether or not leisure is a normal good if firms are risk neutral

labor contracts under asymmetric information when workers are free to quit this paper examines the impact of workers ability to quit on the performance of labor contracts between workers and privately informed firms while the need to induce workers to remain with the firm necessarily lowers total welfare the effect on employment levels is to reduce the magnitude of the inefficiency due to asymmetric information whether this inefficiency is under or overemployment the model predicts that employment distortions increase with the strength of lock in effects on workers a prediction which contrasts with the results of efficiency wage models and which may help in empirical testing of labor contract theory

bargaining and the determinants of teacher salaries this study examines the impact of collective bargaining on salary setting in public school districts using a 1969 82 sample of oregon school districts the author focuses particularly on the roles

economic and political determinants of fee income in norwegian local governments this paper presents an empirical analysis of the determinants of fee income in norweigan local governments the point of departure is a representative voter model emphasizing the effects of pure economic variables the benchmark model is extended by including two aspects of the political system ideology and strength it is evident that increased socialist influence increases the size of the local public sector while a strong political leadership has an advantage in opposing pressure to increase spending