risk aversion in contests in a contest participants spend money or effort to increase their chances of winning a prize the authors examine primarily the following question could the timid the more risk averse have a better chance of winning in contests under limited liability the answer is always positive in the absence of limited liability there is no single answer whereas when the prize is shared as a function of effort the outcome is independent of the contestants risk aversion the authors also relate their results to self protection and examine some other implications of risk aversion copyright 1995 by royal economic society

who benefits from local job growth migrants or the original residents bartik t j 1993 who benefits from local job growth migrants or the original residents reg studies 27 297 311 this paper surveys research on whether the new jobs resulting from growth in a local economy e g a metropolitan area go to inmigrants or the original local residents the empirical evidence suggests that around one quarter of the new jobs from local growth increases the labour force participation rates of local residents in the long run these long run effects may occur because local growth provides residents with valuable employment experience research also suggests that minorities benefit most from growth and that higher wage industries provide greater employment benefits for local residents bartik t j 1993 qui est ce qui beneficie de la croissance d emploi locale les migrants ou la population autochtone reg studies 27 297 311 cet article etudie la recherche effectuee dans le but d evaluer si les nouveaux emplois dus a la croissance d une economic locale par exemple une

caps on political lobbying the cost of political campaigns in the u s has risen substantially in recent years for example real spending on congressional election campaigns doubled between 1976 and 1992 steven d levitt 1995 there are many reasons why increased campaign spending might be socially harmful first increased spending means increased fund raising which may keep politicians from their legislative duties 1 second a lobbyist who makes a large campaign contribution may have undue influence on electoral outcomes on the shaping of legislation or on the outcome of regulatory proceedings 2 that is the socially preferred candidate or legislation may not prevail likewise a lobbyist involved in a regulatory matter or a competition for a government contract may benefit unduly from a legislator s intervention 3 third a perception that campaign contributions purchase influence may lead to increased tolerance of corruption in the private sector a desire to control campaign spending has spawned many initiatives to limit both campaign contributions and spending beginning with the passage of the federal election campaign act feca political action committees pacs can contribute at most 5 000 per election to a candidate while individuals can contribute at most 1 000 restrictions have also been put on in kind contributions making it more difficult to circumvent these limits 4 while direct restrictions on campaign spending have proven difficult to implement recent initiatives aim to impose voluntary spending limits and stricter limits on contributions 5 despite the existing legislation and the proposals to limit contributions little is known about the impact of contribution limits on aggregate expenditures while it is intuitively appealing that aggregate expenditures would drop we challenge that intuition here we study a lobbying game and show that a cap on individual lobbyists expenditures may have the perverse effect of increasing aggregate expenditures and loweri this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

sent seeking with private values we study a rent seeking contest in which the players valuations of the prize are private information we determinea bayesian equilibrium and give conditions under which theequilibrium exists although players are ex ante symmetric increased possibilities for ex post lopsidedness lead toless aggressive bidding lopsidedness increases as players values become less positively correlated or as the variationin possible values increases we also compare theprivate information contest to a related public informationcontest in which the realizations of values are commonknowledge the contests are equally efficient and players areindifferent between the two but risk averse sellers of theprize are not

auctions with a stochastic number of bidders abstract auction theory is generalized by allowing the number of bidders to be stochastic in a first price sealed bid auction with bidders having constant absolute risk aversion the expected selling price is higher when the bidders do not know how many other bidders there are than when they do know this thus the seller should conceal the number of bidders if he can moreover a bidder s ex ante expected utility is the same whether or not there is a policy of concealing the number of bidders concealment therefore pareto dominates announcement with risk neutral bidders the optimal auction is the same whether or not the bidders know who their competitors are

the strategic equivalence of rent seeking innovation and patent race games abstract we establish the strategic equivalence of a variety of rent seeking contests innovation tournaments and patent race games the results allow us to disentangle negative and positive externalities and to apply theorems and results intended for rent seeking games to other games and vice versa we conclude with several examples that highlight the practical utility of our results

evolutionary equilibrium in contests with stochastic participation entry effort and overdissipation this paper examines the evolutionary stability of behaviour in contests where players participation can be stochastic we find for exogenously given participation probabilities players exert more effort under the concept of a finite population evolutionarily stable strategy fpess than under nash equilibrium ne we show that there is ex ante overdissipation under fpess for sufficiently large participation probabilities if and only if the impact function is convex with costly endogenous entry players enter the contest with a higher probability and exert more effort under fpess than under ne importantly under endogenous entry overdissipation can occur for all tullock contest success functions in particular those with concave impact functions

equilibrium bid functions for auctions with an uncertain number of bidders abstract the number of rivals may be unknown when a bidding strategy is formulated in an auction in a symmetric model with risk neutral bidders holding independent information we obtain explicit equilibrium bidding functions for first price and second price auctions with uncertainty about the number of rivals five auctions are revenue equivalent first price and second price auctions each with the number of bidders known or uncertain and english auctions

union effects on nonunion wages evidence from panel data on industries and cities the authors test for threat and crowding effects of unions on non union wages at the industry and city levels using panel data on the percent organized and nonunion industry and city wage differentials constructed from current population surveys over the period 1973 89 at the industry level increases in the percent organized were associated with decreases in the nonunion industry wage differential suggesting that crowding effects were the predominant union effect on nonunion industry wage differentials in contrast at the city level increases in the percent organized were associated with increases in the nonunion city wage differential suggesting that threat effects predominated the authors also find evidence of negative cross occupation union effects on nonunion industry wage differentials supporting their hypothesis that the industry level results were partly driven by complementarity between union and nonunion labor

a note on poisson contests we apply the environmental equivalence property of poisson games myerson in int j game theory 27 375 392 1998b to show that in contests in which the number of contestants is a poisson random variable with at least two expected contestants and a non increasing return to effort ex ante aggregate effort is less than in a corresponding contest wherein the number of participants is equal to the expected number of contestants under uncertainty uncertainty about the number of participants in a rent seeking contest seems natural with rent seeking contests attracting socially wasteful investments of effort or scarce resources uncertainty generates a social benefit

disclosure policy in tullock contests with asymmetric stochastic entry we examine how disclosure policy can be optimally designed to incentivize contestants when their participation is exogenously stochastic in a generalized tullock contest setting with two players who are asymmetric in both their values and entry probabilities we fully characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions under which no disclosure dominates full disclosure we find that the comparison depends solely on a balance effect exercised by entry probabilities on the expected total effort the optimal disclosure policy must better balance the competition these conditions continue to hold when the precision r of tullock contests is endogenously chosen by the designer

learning the structure of a simple rent seeking game this paper considers a form of the tullock imperfectly discriminating rent seeking game in which the contestants are uncertain about the value of a bias parameter in the probability of winning function beliefs about this unknown parameter are not constrained to be static we consider two methods by which the players prior beliefs on this parameter can be updated first we allow for information to emerge by considering the case in which the game is played twice with the outcome of the first game known before the second begins the identity of the winner of the first contest represents information which emerges endogenously that can be used to revise beliefs on the unknown bias parameter second information can be produced outside of the model by an external agency this gives rise to exogenous learning we consider the consequences for rent seeking in each of these two cases

differences in wage levels among metropolitan areas less educated workers in the united states easton t and king m c 2000 differences in wage levels among metropolitan areas less educated workers in the united states reg studies 34 21 27 this work investigates the causes of low wages for workers with a high school education or less in the us using a sample of 241 metropolitan areas drawn from the 1990 census it examines the influence of five labour market characteristics on between metropolitan area wage differences labour demand the minimum wage unionization industry mix and the race gender composition of the labour force the first four factors seem to affect both men s and women s wages but the relative importance differs for example the evidence suggests that unionization is the most important influence on men s wages while for women industry mix matters most easton t et king m c 2000 des ecarts de salaire dans les zones metropolitaines les salaries moins instruits aux etats unis reg studies 34 21 27 a partir d un echantillon de 241 zones metropolitaines tirees du

information in conflicts abstract we consider two player contests for a prize of common but uncertain value for settings where one player knows the value of the prize while the other only knows its prior distribution we give conditions for when the uninformed agent is ex ante strictly more likely to win the prize than is the informed agent in the special case of a lottery contest equilibrium expenditures are lower under asymmetric information than if either both agents are informed or neither agent is informed

betrayal aversion versus principled trustfulness how to explain risk avoidance and risky choices in trust games abstract are decisions in a trust game more or less sensitive to changes in risk than decisions in a purely financial non social decision making task participants in a binary trust game they could either keep 5 for sure or give it to a trustee with the chance of getting 10 back were informed that their chance of interacting with a trustworthy person was either 46 percent or 80 percent and then were asked to decide whether to trust that other person in addition participants made a decision in a lottery i e whether to gamble 5 to win 10 with the same probabilities in the 46 percent condition participants were significantly more willing to choose the risky option in the trust game than in the lottery overall the difference in probability of receiving money back had a significantly higher impact on the lottery decision than on the decision to trust possible interpretations of the present study and its relation to previous findings are discussed

risk averse rent seekers and the social cost of monopoly power there is now quite general recognition that the social cost of monopoly power encompasses the resources expended by individuals seeking to become the beneficiaries of monopoly rents however since the activity of rent seeking is generally not observable direct estimates of resources expended in quests to acquire monopoly power are usually impossible to come by 1 as a consequence the indirect approach of taking the observed value of monopoly rents as indicative of the unobserved value of the resources expended in rent seeking is quite generally adopted in approaches to evaluation of the social cost of such activity

rent dissipation when rent seekers are budget constrained in the original tullock 1975 1980 game an individual bidder s probability of winning with a bid b is proportional to br where the exponent reflects economies of scale in rent seeking different interpretations can be given to these probabilities first one may view r as a reflection of the political culture alternatively one may view r as a choice variable for a politician intuition suggests that a society with a high tolerance for the selling of political favors and politicians who are receptive to rent seeking would both induce greater rent seeking expenditures than other societies all else equal this paper shows that a lower value of r can actually lead to more rent dissipation than a higher value this paper also reinforces two points concerning rent seeking first the analysis confirms the robustness of under dissipation of rents even in the face of entry second it points out the importance of distinguishing between rent seeking expenditures and rent dissipation when bidders must borrow for example total expenditure may understate rent dissipation

contests with an unknown number of contestants this paper studies rent seeking contests where the contestants do not know the number of actively competing contestants two models are compared in the first all players are risk neutral in the second all have constant absolute risk aversion if the expected fraction of active contestants is low an increase in the number of potential contestants increases individual rent seeking efforts this effect is in contrast to the complete information case where individual rent seeking efforts decrease in the number of contestants the effect is more likely under risk neutrality but also possible under risk aversion equilibrium rent seeking efforts are lower under risk aversion if and only if the expected fraction of active contestants is low

risk aversion heterogeneity and contests we introduce a novel method of modellingcontests that avoids the complexitiesencountered by the best response function approach we analyse contests in which i there are many risk averse players ii attitudes to risk may differ acrossindividuals and iii the technology thattransforms rent seeking effort intoprobability of winning may also differacross individuals we establish that ifevery player has a constant degree ofabsolute risk aversion a uniqueequilibrium exists we also establishcomparative static results and examine howthe level of rent dissipation is affectedby the heterogeneity of attitudes towardsrisk and the precise nature of the technology

urban attributes and wage disparities in brazil a multilevel hierarchical model fontes g g simoes r f and hermeto camilo de oliveira a m urban attributes and wage disparities in brazil a multilevel hierarchical model regional studies this paper examines the effects of urban scale and productive structure on individual wage levels in brazilian cities and metropolitan areas in 1990 and 2000 the estimation through hierarchical linear models enabled the inclusion of variables in different levels individual and urban and the decomposition of total wage variance the results showed significant and huge wage disparities among workers who share similar personal attributes but live in different regions of the country in addition the disparities persisted from 1990 to 2000 finally the results provided evidence that local economic and labour market factors played an important role in wage determination

risk aversion in rent seeking and rent augmenting games the effects of risk aversion are examined for two types of expenditures in rent seeking contests a rent seeking expenditures which improve the probability that the rent is obtained and b rent augmenting expenditures which increase the size of the rent to be awarded risk aversion is shown to reduce expenditures of type b unambiguously while having an indeterminate effect on those of type a these two contrasting results are shown to derive from the very different effects rent seeking and rent augmenting expenditures have on the riskiness of a player s position

bertrand competition under uncertainty we look at a bertrand model in which each firm may be inactive with a known probability so the number of active firms is uncertain the model has a mixed strategy equilibrium in which industry profits are positive and decline with the number of firms the same features which make the cournot model attractive unlike those in a cournot model with similar uncertainty bertrand profits always increase in the probability that firms are inactive profits decline more sharply than in the cournot model the pattern found empirically in bresnahan and reiss 1991

effort levels in a cournot nash contest with asymmetric information abstract many contests exist where one player does not know his opponent s value of a fixed prize e g unobservable non market preferences for preservation this paper explores how changes in the nature of a one sided information asymmetry affect effort levels in a cournot nash contest the results indicate that the uninformed player s effort is an uncertain input such that his effort is inversely related to risk this reduces his average odds of success comparative static results are driven by the perceived odds of success and risk for the uninformed player and the actual odds of success for the informed player