the effect of income on child development this study presents estimates of the effect of parental income on children s cognitive social and emotional development the effect of current income is small especially when income is treated as endogenous the effect of permanent income is substantially larger but relatively small when compared to the magnitude of recent policy induced changes in income family background characteristics play a more important role than income in determining child outcomes policies that affect family income will have little direct impact on child development unless they result in very large and permanent changes in income

induced innovation in american agiculture a reconsideration this paper investigates the role of induced innovation in the development of american agriculture from 1880 to 1980 the induced innovation hypothesis most closely associated with the work of hayami and ruttan argues that successful economies develop technologies in accordance with market price signals to loosen constraints on growth imposed by factor scarcities our analysis employing new state and regional level data fails to find support for hayami and ruttan s hypothesis this paper suggests that many of the fundamental generalizations about american agricultural development need to be reconsidered and redirects attention to the role of settlement changing crop patterns and biological investments in explaining changes in factor utilization in american agriculture

intergenerational economic mobility in the united states 1940 to 2000 we estimate trends in intergenerational economic mobility by matching men in the census to synthetic parents in the prior generation we find that mobility increased from 1950 to 1980 but has declined sharply since 1980 while our estimator places greater weight on location effects than the standard intergenerational coefficient the size of the bias appears to be small our preferred results suggest that earnings are regressing to the mean more slowly now than at any time since world war ii causing economic differences between families to become more persistent however current rates of positional mobility appear historically normal

public versus private investment in human capital endogenous growth and income inequality in this paper we present an overlapping generations model with heterogeneous agents in which human capital investment through formal schooling is the engine of growth we use simple functional forms for preferences technologies and income distribution to highlight the distinction between economies with public education and those with private education we find that income inequality declines more quickly under public education on the other hand private education yields greater per capita incomes unless the initial income inequality is sufficiently high we also find that societies will choose public education if a majority of agents have incomes below average

commitment and fairness in a dynamic regulatory relationship this paper considers a multiperiod model of a regulated firm that has stationary private information which may be revealed through performance if it cannot make commitments to future policies the regulator has an incentive to exploit any information the firm reveals and laffont and tirole show that there is no regulatory policy that is separating over any closed interval a fairness arrangement is proposed in which the firm agrees not to quit if in future periods the regulator allows it to earn a nonnegative profit given the type it revealed in earlier periods the properties of such arrangements are studied and an example is presented in which both the firm and the regulator prefer a fairness arrangement to a policy feasible without commitment

regulatory attitudes and environmental innovation in a model combining internal and external r d the extent to which environmental regulatory institutions are either green or brown impacts not just the intensity of regulation at any moment but also the incentives for the development of new pollution control technologies we set up a strategic model of r d in which a polluter can deploy technologies developed in house or license technologies developed by specialist outsiders an eco industry polluters exert r d effort and may even develop redundant technologies to improve the terms on which they procure technology from outside we find that while regulatory bias has an ambiguous impact on the best available technology strategic delegation to systematically biased regulators can improve social welfare

catching the agent on the wrong foot ex post choice of monitoring abstract in a principal agent model with multiple performance measures we show that the principal benefits by choosing ex post which variables will be monitored if it is too costly for one type of agent to mimic all performance measures expected from another type the principal can hope to catch the agent on the wrong foot if the agent tries to misrepresent his type for cases of small asymmetry of information the principal can implement the first best contract for more serious asymmetries of information the first best is not implementable then the low type may be required to overproduce which is in contrast to the traditional result of second best contracting we also obtain a ranking of monitoring instruments according to the frequency of their use

the impact of parental income on early schooling transitions a re examination using data over three generations abstract this paper applies new semi parametric techniques to estimate the effects of parental income on the probability of being held back in elementary school in france we use information on grandparents past socioeconomic status and parents education level to separate the parental income effects from the effects of the unmeasured determinants of children s performance at school that are correlated with parental income when considering the probability of being held back in elementary school we find that the effects of parental poverty are much larger than the effects of a child s sex or age age within his her class or of the parents education level our findings suggest that policy decisions that increase income transfers to relatively poor families have a potentially very large impact on children s early performance at school

partial monitoring adverse selection and the internal efficiency of the firm abstract the paper investigates an adverse selection model with monitoring of managerial effort in contrast to the literature we assume that the manager can be punished only if his effort is below a certain level that is monitored by the principal surprisingly the optimal labor contract may induce an equilibrium effort which is lower than in the standard model without monitoring this result holds for any discrete distribution of managerial types in the continuous type case the optimal contracts for high quality low quality managers are purely output dependent effort dependent

the nature and nurture of economic outcomes this paper uses data on adopted children to examine the relative importance of biology and environment in determining educational and labor market outcomes i employ three long term panel data sets which contain information on adopted children their adoptive parents and their biological parents in at least two of the three data sets the mechanism for assigning children to adoptive parents is fairly random and does not match children to adoptive parents based on health race or ability i find that adoptive parents education and income have a modest impact on child test scores but a large impact on college attendance marital status and earnings in contrast with existing work on iq scores i do not find that the influence of adoptive parents declines with child age this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

x inefficiency competition and market information whether competition forces firms toward efficient behaviour is an open question we consider a duopoly with firms run by managers and affected by adverse selection on costs in contrast to recent literature we point out that to have a genuine effect on firm x inefficiency competition must change managerial incentives by introducing the availability of some signal on the rivals behaviour we show that if costs are correlated the contractual use of that signal can render private managerial information uninfluential this result stresses the informational role of the market and suggests scope for future work

coexistence of strategic vertical separation and integration abstract this paper gives conditions under which vertical separation is chosen by some upstream firms while vertical integration is chosen by others in the equilibrium of a symmetric model a vertically separating firm trades off fixed contracting costs against the strategic benefit of writing a two part tariff exclusive dealing contract with its retailer coexistence emerges when more than two vertical cournot oligopolists supply close substitutes when vertical integration and separation coexist welfare could be improved by reducing the number of vertically separating firms the scope for coexistence diminishes when assumptions on contract observability and commitment are relaxed

the induced innovation hypothesis and u s public agricultural research applicability of the induced innovation hypothesis that a change in relative input prices induces innovation to economize use of the increasingly expensive input hicks 1932 is examined for u s public agricultural research a reduced form test is developed using input prices from the agricultural production sector expenditures from the public research sector aimed at developing new technology to save specific agricultural inputs and variables to control for innovation marginal cost differences and nonhomotheticity unlike recent demand side studies that soundly reject the induced innovation hypothesis for agriculture support for the hypothesis is found for several input pairings through these tests of public agricultural research using state level panel data

the economics of crime and punishment an analysis of optimal penalty this paper demonstrates the optimality of a non maximal penalty in a hierarchical enforcement structure the penalty is chosen by the social planner to maximize the probability of monitoring and to minimize the probability of transgression we compare the optimal penalty levels with and without ex post flexibility wherein the players are allowed to alter their decision after they observe the social planner s choice 2000 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

sources of lifetime inequality is lifetime inequality mainly due to differences across people established early in life or to differences in luck experienced over the working lifetime we answer this question within a model that features idiosyncratic shocks to human capital estimated directly from data as well as heterogeneity in ability to learn initial human capital and initial wealth we find that as of age 23 differences in initial conditions account for more of the variation in lifetime earnings lifetime wealth and lifetime utility than do differences in shocks received over the working lifetime jel d31 d91 j24 j31 to what degree is lifetime inequality due to differences across people established early in life as opposed to differences in luck experienced over the working lifetime among the individual differences established early in life which ones are the most important a convincing answer to these questions is of fundamental importance first and most simply an answer serves to contrast the potential importance of the myriad policies directed at modifying or at providing insurance for initial conditions e g public education against those directed at shocks over the working lifetime e g unemployment insurance second a discussion of lifetime inequality cannot go too far before discussing which specific type of initial condition is the most critical for determining how one fares in life third a useful framework for answering these questions should also be central in the analysis of a wide range of policies considered in macroeconomics public finance and labor economics we view lifetime inequality through the lens of a risky human capital model agents differ in terms of three initial conditions initial human capital learning ability and financial wealth initial human capital can be viewed as controlling the intercept of an agent s mean earnings profile whereas learning ability acts to rotate

delegation and the regulation of risk political principals typically use low cost fire alarm signals transmitted by the media interest groups and disaffected constituents to monitor the activities of regulatory agencies we argue that regulatory decision making is biased and inconsistent if the instruments of political oversight are simple and the information flows to the principal are coarse relative to the complexity of the regulatory environment

is public r d a complement or substitute for private r d a review of the econometric evidence is public r d spending complementary and thus additional to private r d spending or does it substitute for and tend to crowd out private r d conflicting answers are given to this question we survey the body of available econometric evidence accumulated over the past 35 years a framework for analysis of the problem is developed to help organize and summarize the findings of econometric studies based on time series and cross section data from various levels of aggregation laboratory firm industry country the findings overall are ambivalent and the existing literature as a whole is subject to the criticism that the nature of the experiment s that the investigators envisage is not adequately specified we conclude by offering suggestions for improving future empirical research on this issue

tax evasion and the optimum general income tax abstract this paper incorporates tax evasion into an optimum general income tax problem with endogenous labor supply it posits a two group model with high and low wage individuals to investigate the properties of optimal audit and tax structures the following main results are obtained first high wage persons are never audited while low wage persons are audited with a probability strictly less than one secondly high wage persons should face a zero marginal tax rate thirdly low wage individuals who have been audited and found innocent should pay a lower tax than those who are not audited fourthly there are two possible tax regimes low wage persons face a positive marginal tax rate under one regime and a zero rate under the other fifthly even if honesty cannot be rewarded the other results of the paper continue to hold

delegation in a general equilibrium model of customs unions abstract a difference in the objectives of members of a customs union may be a unifying rather than a divisive force if countries outside the union behave strategically one union member may want to delegate to its partner the ability to set the common external tariff we demonstrate these results in the context of a pure exchange general equilibrium trade model we show that if tariffs are strategic substitutes the union country which is relatively less well endowed in the exported good may be willing to delegate to its partner which behaves more aggressively in setting the union s policy the delegation decision is reversed if tariffs are strategic complements the model extends the standard results on the appropriate level of the union policy by adding another dimension that of the optimal decision making agent

hierarchical design and enforcement of income tax policies abstract a hierarchical model of tax compliance is studied in which the government selects a tax policy and then delegates the responsibility to collect taxes to the irs there is a fixed distribution of income in the economy individuals differ by their income which is known niether to the government nor to the irs we completely characterize the solution to the irs s revenue maximizing problem when taxpayers are risk neutral the optimal auditing policy divides the reported incomes into at most three groups we show that the government provides a smaller budget to the irs than the irs would wish

optimal auditing with scoring theory and application to insurance fraud this article makes a bridge between the theory of optimal auditing and the scoring methodology in an asymmetric information setting our application is meant for insurance claims fraud but it can be applied to many other activities that use the scoring approach fraud signals are classified based on the degree to which they reveal an increasing probability of fraud we show that the optimal auditing strategy takes the form of a red flags strategy which consists in referring claims to a special investigative unit siu when certain fraud indicators are observed the auditing policy acts as a deterrence device and we explain why it requires the commitment of the insurer and how it should affect the incentives of siu staffs the characterization of the optimal auditing strategy is robust to some degree of signal manipulation by defrauders as well as to the imperfect information of defrauders about the audit frequency the model is calibrated with data from a large european insurance company we show that it is possible to improve our results by separating different groups of insureds with different moral costs of fraud finally our results indicate how the deterrence effect of the audit scheme can be taken into account and how it affects the optimal auditing strategy

intergenerational income mobility in the united states social scientists and policy analysts have long expressed concern about the extent of intergenerational income mobility in the united states but remarkably little empirical evidence is available the few existing estimates of the intergenerational correlation in income have been biased downward by measurement error unrepresentative samples or both new estimates based on intergenerational data from the panel study of income dynamics imply that the intergenerational correlation in long run income is at least 0 4 indicating dramatically less mobility than suggested by earlier research copyright 1992 by american economic association

observable contracts strategic delegation and cooperation the role of commitments in noncooperative games is well acknowledged and documented one way to achieve commitments is by letting delegates represent the players of a game in this paper the authors study a delegation game in which the players can use agents strategically to play on their behalf and the contracts they sign with them are common knowledge they show that in such cases every pareto optimal outcome of the game can become the unique subgame perfect nash equilibrium of the delegation game the authors demonstrate this result by discussing the cournot type duopolistic game copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

guilty until proven innocent regulation with costly and limited enforcement abstract we consider optimal regulations for a polluting firm when regulators cannot observe emission control costs and can only observe emissions via costly monitoring fines or subsidies for enforcing compliance are also limited the optimal regulations resemble a deposit refund system the firm reports its emissions and pays an initial tax based on this report if the firm is monitored it receives a rebate when actual and reported emissions coincide the enforcement constraints and the firm s rights determine whether the incentives to reduce emissions are optimally provided by varying the rebate for compliance the monitoring probability or the initial tax

evading auditing and taxing the equity compliance tradeoff tax evasion and auditing are analyzed in a model of linear income taxation taxpayers minimize expected tax payments including penalty for underreporting while the tax administration sets its audit policy to maximize expected net revenue under the restriction of only two audit rates per class of taxpayers given the reaction of taxpayers and tax administration we derive the optimal income tax that the government should adopt to maximize social welfare there are several classes of taxpayers each characterized by a given distribution of pretax income and specific audit policy parameters

regulatory errors optimal fines and the level of compliance abstract this paper shows that with a hierarchical structure of enforcement regulatory errors cause the optimal penalty to be non maximal even if offenders are risk neutral and fines are pure transfers and the private benefit from violation is strictly less than the social cost for all individuals in contrast with error free monitoring no finite fine is optimal within the same hierarchical structure also full compliance is an equilibrium outcome in the presence of errors whereas in the absence of errors the regulator can achieve only partial compliance

child care choices and children s cognitive achievement the case of single mothers we evaluate the effect of child care versus maternal time inputs on child cognitive development using single mothers from the nlsy79 to deal with nonrandom selection of children into child care we exploit the exogenous variation in welfare policy rules facing single mothers in particular the 1996 welfare reform and earlier state level policy changes generated substantial increases in their work child care use we construct a comprehensive set of welfare policy variables and use them as instruments to estimate child cognitive ability production functions in our baseline specification we estimate that a year of child care reduces child test scores by 2 1

the new economics of organization over the last ten years or so an important new approach to the study of organizations has emerged within economics it is perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a theoretical focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this paper provides political scientists with an overview of the new economics of organization and explores its implications for the study of public bureaucracy so far positive political theory has not contributed much to our understanding of public bureaucracy in part this is due to the unsympathetic treatment that rational modeling and most other modes of quantitative analysis have long received from students of public administration the other side of the coin however is that positive theorists have not made much of an effort to develop theories of bureaucracy their concerns have centered around two basic mechanisms of social choice voting and markets and they have devoted little systematic attention to a third mechanism that is clearly important for understanding how societies and other aggregates make collective decisions this third and relatively unexplored mechanism is hierarchy movement toward a positive theory of hierarchies would fill a serious gap in the social choice literature while at the same time making a theoretical contribution that strikes to the essence of public bureaucracy indeed of all organizations in fact significant steps toward a positive theory of hierarchies have very recently been taken but by economists not political scientists in small numbers of course economists made contributions to the study of public bureaucracy some time ago with the pioneering works of downs 1967 tullock 1965 and niskanen 1971 but this new wave of theoretical work is different it is already a large complex body of literature that is the focus of innovation and excitement among a growing number of economists and it reflects an unusual degree of theoretical coherence and cumulative effort work in this tradition tends to receive orientation from a distinctive economic approach to the analysis of organizations an approach perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this approach has emerged from recent attempts to move beyond the neoclassical theory of the firm which assumes away all organizational considerations to a theory of economic organizations that can explain why firms corporations and other enterprises behave as they do propo

bureaucrats legislators and the size of government some recent theories have blamed the growth of government on budget maximizing bureaucrats who are assumedly capable of imposing their most preferred budget output combination on legislatures subject to cost and demand constraints however theoretical examination of the range of bargaining outcomes that might occur between bureau and legislature shows that budget maximizing behavior does not necessarily lead to super optimal levels of production nor do the suggested reforms of competition and privatization necessarily improve the situation in this bargaining model the central determinants of governmental growth are not budget maximizing bureaucrats but the legislature s decisions regarding mode of oversight and form of internal organization

decentralization and transfer pricing under oligopoly this paper presents a simple model of a partially decentralized multinational firm mnf in competition with a rival firm it is shown that transfer pricing can be used as a rent shifting device by the mnf to compete with the rival this arises because the mnf headquarters uses the transfer price to manage different subsidiaries the specific value of the transfer price chosen by the mnf depends on whether the rival firm produces the intermediate good the final good or both and whether the rival is integrated or not in particular both decentralization and competition with a fully integrated rival result in lower transfer prices

why the apple doesn t fall far understanding intergenerational transmission of human capital parents with higher education levels have children with higher education levels however is this because parental education actually changes the outcomes of children suggesting an important spillover of education policies or is it merely that more able individuals who have higher education also have more able children this paper proposes to answer this question with a unique dataset from norway using the reform of the education system that was implemented in different municipalities at different times in the 1960s as an instrument for parental education we find little evidence of a causal relationship between parents education and children s education despite significant ols relationships we find 2sls estimates that are consistently lower than the ols estimates with the only statistically significant effect being a positive relationship between mother s education and son s education these findings suggest that the high correlations between parents and children s education are due primarily to family characteristics and inherited ability and not education spillovers

is schooling mostly in the genes nature nurture decomposition using data on relatives we modify r a fisher s model by incorporating measures of the environment that may be correlated across kin groups we estimate a model of schooling attainment using data on eight kin groups and find a large contribution of genetic endowments to the variance in schooling though certain aspects of the environment matter

the social welfare implications of industry self auditing the environmental protection agency s epa s audit policy authorizes reduced penalties for firms that voluntarily undertake compliance audits and then correct and report any discovered violations to the agency while the epa claims the policy is a success this paper joins a growing literature in questioning that claim a game theoretic model of the audit policy is developed where the goal of enforcement is remediation and the agency is unable to commit to a pre announced inspection policy self auditing is beneficial because it permits both self reporting and self policing to occur however additional costs are imposed on firms self auditing is more likely to be socially beneficial when the damages caused by violations are large the current audit policy explicitly excludes violations that result in serious actual or potential harm when violations are small as most current disclosures under the audit policy are firm self auditing is likely to increase social costs

an information rationale for the power of special interests political decisions are often biased in favor of special interests at the expense of the general public and they are frequently inefficient in the sense that the losses incurred by the majority exceed the gains enjoyed by the minority this article explains the bias in terms of information asymmetries and the free rider problem first incumbents increase their reelection prospects by biasing policy toward groups that are better able to monitor their activities second because smaller groups are better able to overcome the free rider problem of costly monitoring policy will be biased in their favor third the effect of asymmetric monitoring on voter welfare is ambiguous the inefficiencies created by the policy bias are offset by a positively valued selection bias incumbents of above average quality are more likely to survive voter scrutiny than are low quality types

does parents money matter abstract this paper asks whether parents income per se has a positive impact on children s abilities previous research has established that income is positively correlated across generations this does not prove that parents money matters however since income is presumably correlated with ability this paper estimates the impact of parents income by focusing on income variation due to factors union industry and job loss that arguably represent luck i find that changes in parents income due to luck have a negligible impact on children s human capital for most families although parents money does matter for families whose father has low education

sample audit tax assessment for businesses what s fair how should a revenue agency assess a business taxpayer s income on the basis of a sample audit of transactions the agency would like to maximize revenue while minimizing the risk that the taxpayer will be assessed more than he really owes the taxpayer reasons that overassessment is worse than underassessment as far as he is concerned and therefore the taxpayer might reasonably argue that the lower bound of a one sided confidence interval should be used by the assessor the revenue agency might understandably take a different point of view the revenue agency might argue that overassessment is really no worse than underassessment from its point of view so the midpoint of such a confidence interval should be used in fact it is this latter position that is currently in use most commonly by state agencies but such practice is being challenged the courts will have to make a decision

contract design and costly verification games abstract in this paper the signalling subgame in costly verification models is studied in the context of the investor entrepreneur contract without assuming the possibility of commitment to verification it is shown that the game has a unique perfect bayesian equilibrium in mixed strategies implying that truth telling and deterministic verification are not an equilibrium behavior when the entire game starting from the stage of contract design is considered it is shown that the contract designed by the informed entrepreneur results in less verification cost than the one designed by the uninformed investor this could be taken as a normative criterion based upon which institutional arrangements as regards the distribution of bargaining initiative are to be designed

the dynamics of incentive contracts the paper studies a simple two period principal agent model in which the principal updates the incentive scheme after observing the agent s first period performance the agent has superior information about his ability the principal offers a first period incentive scheme and observes some measure of the agent s first period performance cost or profit which depends on the agent s ability and unobservable first period effort the relationship is entirely run by short term contracts in the second period the principal updates the incentive scheme and the agent is free to accept the new incentive scheme or to quit the strategies are required to be perfect and updating of the principal s beliefs about the agent s ability follows bayes rule the central theme of the paper is that the ratchet effect leads to much pooling in the first period first for any first period incentive scheme there exists no separating equilibrium second when the uncertainty about the agent s ability is small the optimal scheme must involve a large amount of pooling the paper also gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partition equilibria and looks at the effect of cost uncertainty

corruption in tax administration abstract we extend the game theoretic model of graetz reinganum and wilde 1986 to allow for corruption in tax administration in the presence of corruption audit rates are generally higher than in its absence in fact in the presence of corruption it is possible to sustain equilibria in which all returns are audited moreover when some auditors accept bribes it is possible for increases in the fine rate or the tax rate to reduce expected government revenue

a general characterization of optimal income tax enforcement this paper develops a general approach to characterizing optimal income tax and enforcement schemes our analysis clarifies the nature of the interplay between tax rates audit probabilities and penalties for misreporting in particular it is shown that for a variety of objective functions for the principal the optimal tax schedule is in general concave at least weakly and monotonic the marginal tax rates determine the audit probabilities and less harsh penalties lead to higher enforcement costs our results imply that there exists a tradeoff between equity and efficiency considerations in the enforcement context which is similar to that in the moral hazard context for tax policy it is well accepted by now that informational asymmetries generate important constraints on the formulation of economic policy an early and classic example is given by mirrlees 1971 who considers the problem of optimal income taxation when individuals differ in their ability to transform effort into income it is assumed that ability and effort of an individual cannot be observed at any cost whereas income which is the product of these two unobservables is perfectly and costlessly observable taxes can thus depend only on final income under these informational conditions the equity efficiency tradeoffs that constrain the choice of tax policy arise only because of the presence of moral hazard associated with taxation of income if there were no moral hazard i e individual efforts and therefore incomes were exogenous the problem of optimal income taxation would be a trivial one since by assumption individual incomes are perfectly and costlessly observable in much of the recent literature on optimal income taxation in the presence of costly enforcement reinganum and wilde 1985 border and sobel 1987 and others on the other hand individual incomes are treated as exogenous i e there is no moral hazard however informational constraints arise from another important consideration namely an individual s income cannot be directly observed it can only be verified through a costly

on monitoring and collusion in hierarchies abstract this paper studies a stylized three layer agency framework in which a principal hires a supervisor to monitor an agent s productive effort it is demonstrated that the possibility of collusion imposes no additional cost on the principal if the supervisor s report is hard information i e monitoring evidence can only be concealed and not forged this result holds irrespective of the nature of the penalty that can be imposed on the agent the findings suggest that it is strictly better for the principal to monitor the agent s action rather than to audit the agent s private information journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 l23

costly state verification with varying risk preferences and liability abstract in the scenario of loan contracts with costly state verification we examine how the properties of the set of states different risk preferences of debtors and varying liability of lenders affect the structure of optimal repayments in particular we show that with risk averse debtors a general set of states a constant observation cost and both unlimited and limited lender liability the debtor is strictly better off revealing the true state of nature when his realized revenue is low which implies that optimal debtor consumption has a downward jump around the single switch from observed to unobserved states if the debtor can destroy revenue or if the debtor is risk neutral this non monotonicity of consumption disappears moreover given the loan size there is more monitoring under debtor risk aversion than risk neutrality we present simulations showing that a contract with unlimited lender liability and debtor risk aversion has a higher expected observation cost but a lower variance of consumption than a contract with limited lender liability finally we discuss the problems of commitment to verification and contract renegotiation in this framework

honesty and evasion in the tax compliance game conventional models of tax compliance emphasize that taxpayers make strategic tax reports underreporting income to the extent that this behavior is functionally rewarded in contrast to this view considerable empirical evidence suggests that many taxpayers are inherently honest reporting truthfully regardless of the incentive to cheat in this article we build a game theoretic model of tax compliance that includes both honest and potentially dishonest taxpayers we show that including honest taxpayers significantly alters the model leading to much improved empirical predictions and somewhat different and novel policy implications

intergenerational persistence of earnings the role of early and college education recent empirical evidence from the united states indicates a high degree of persistence in earnings across generations designing effective public policies to increase social mobility requires identifying and measuring the major sources of persistence and inequality in earnings we provide a quantitative model of intergenerational human capital transmission that focuses on three sources innate ability early education and college education we find that approximately one half of the intergenerational correlation in earnings is accounted for by parental investment in education in particular early education we show that these results have important implications for education policy

loan size as a commitment device the authors model risky lending with costly state verification but without commitment to an audit strategy the borrower underreports with a positive probability in the successful state and the lender audits with a positive probability after a report of failure under lack of commitment to audit probabilities an increase in loan size convinces the borrower that the lender has a high stake in an audit this reduces the probability of underreporting and leads to overinvestment relative to the commitment case however there is underinvestment relative to the level under full information copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

non cognitive child outcomes and universal high quality child care exploiting a rich panel data child survey merged with administrative records along with a pseudo experiment generating variation in the take up of pre school across municipalities we provide evidence of the effects on non cognitive child outcomes of participating in large scale publicly provided universal pre school programs and family day care vis a vis home care we find that compared to home care being enrolled in pre school at age three does not lead to significant differences in child outcomes at age seven no matter the gender or mother s level of education family day care on the other hand seems to significantly deteriorate outcomes for boys whose mothers have a lower level of education finally increasing hours in family day care from 30 40 hours per week to 40 50 hours per week and hours in pre school from 20 30 hours per week to 30 40 hours per week leads to significantly poorer child outcomes

fraudulent claims and nitpicky insurers insurance fraud is a major source of inefficiency in insurance markets a self justification of fraudulent behavior is that insurers are bad payers who start nitpicking if an opportunity arises even in circum stances where the good faith of policyholders is not in dispute we relate this nitpicking activity to the inability of insurers to commit to their auditing strategy reducing the indemnity payments acts as an incentive device for the insurer since auditing is profitable even if the claim is not fraudulent we show that optimal indemnity cuts are bounded above and that nitpicking remains optimal even if it induces adverse effects on policyholders moral standards

induced innovation and energy prices this paper uses u s patent data from 1970 to 1994 to study the impact of energy prices on energy efficient innovations theories of technological change have focused both on demand side factors which spur innovative activity by increasing the value of new innovations and supply side factors such as scientific advancements that make new innovations possible data on demand side factors are easily obtained but data on supply side factors that influence innovation are not readily available this paper uses patent citations as a measure of the usefulness of the existing base of scientific knowledge citations to previous patents are used to construct productivity estimates which measure the usefulness of the existing stock of knowledge to inventors in a given energy field for any given year these estimates are then combined with data on demand side factors to estimate a model of induced innovation in energy technologies the results indicate that both energy prices and the supply of knowledge have strongly significant positive effects on innovation the paper concludes with a discussion of the implication of this work for environmental policy

income tax compliance in a principal agent framework previous analyses have modeled income tax evasion as a portfolio problem deriving the optimal consumption of the risky asset unreported income under the assumption of a fixed probability of detection the purpose of this paper is to examine some of these issues in tax compliance starting from a different set of assumptions in particular we compare alternative audit policies to the standard random audit policy we focus on an audit cutoff policy in which an agent triggers an audit if his or her reported income is too low and is not audited if reported income is sufficiently high this paper establishes two major results first random audit rules are weakly dominated by audit cutoff rules it can be shown given lump sum taxes and fines that these audit cutoff rules are the least cost policies which induce truthful reporting of income second the dominance of audit cutoff rules over random audit rules holds for lump sum as well as proportional taxation in fact the equilibrium consequences of the two are equivalent

parental childcare and children s educational attainment evidence from china this paper examines the determinants of child educational attainment in addition to those examined in previous studies it is found that maternal childcare is another important determinant of child educational attainment the results are robust after controlling for endogeneity the iv estimates show that once childcare time is controlled for child health does not have an effect on school enrolment age this finding suggests that omitting the childcare time may have biased the estimated effect of child health on school enrolment in previous studies

inter generational effect of parental time and its policy implications abstract motivated by the empirical fact that parents with more human capital spend more time teaching and taking care of their children we develop and estimate a theoretical model in which altruistic parents pass their human capital on in two ways goods investment and time investment based on the estimated model we quantitatively assess how the two types of investment affect wage inequality and inter generational mobility using the model to study the impacts of a public policy that taxes income to finance public schooling we find significantly different policy effects in our model than in a model where time investment does not respond endogenously to the policy

utilitarianism and horizontal equity the case for random taxation this paper establishes that far from being able to derive the principle of horizontal equity from utilitarianism the principle is actually in consistent with utilitarianism in a variety of circumstances we derive conditions under which a it is optimal to impose random tax schedules ex post randomization and b it is optimal to randomize the tax schedules imposed on a set of otherwise identical individuals ex ante randomization the implications for optimal tax theory are discussed more generally it is shown that there are a number of potentially important economic situations with which the principle of horizontal equity may be inconsistent not only with utilitarianism but even with pareto optimality this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

public r d private r d and u s agricultural productivity growth dynamic and long run relationships if accelerated productivity growth is to be an effective policy response for reducing greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture the appropriate means for raising productivity needs to be addressed previous research has shown a close correlation between investments in public agricultural research and total factor productivity tfp growth in agriculture huffman and evenson 2006 alston et al 2010 wang et al 2012 among the most recent comprehensive studies largely neglected from this framework however has been the role of the private sector private sector spending on agricultural research and development r d has grown more rapidly than public agricultural r d and is now greater than that of the public sector fuglie et al 2011 while it is widely perceived that both public and private r d make significant contributions to agricultural productivity growth private r d because of data limitations has rarely been included in empirical models of agricultural tfp growth this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

divided government and u s trade policy theory and evidence if different parties control the u s congress and white house the united states may maintain higher import protection than otherwise this proposition follows from a distributive politics model in which congress can choose to delegate trade policymaking to the president when the congressional majority party faces a president of the other party the former has an incentive to delegate to but to constrain the president by requiring congressional approval of trade proposals by up or down vote this constraint forces the president to provide higher protection in order to assemble a congressional majority evidence confirms that 1 the institutional constraints placed on the president s trade policymaking authority are strengthened in times of divided government and loosened under unified government and 2 u s trade policy was significantly more protectionist under divided than under unified government during the period 1949 90

partially verifiable information and mechanism design in a principal agent model with adverse selection we study the implementation of social choice functions when the agent s message space is a correspondence which depends on this true characteristic we characterize such correspondence for which the revelation principle is valid returns must not contradict easily observable elements of the taxpayer s lifestyle in this paper we present a model of two person organizations in which these considerations are important we ask whether the restrictions on fallacious statements inherent in the system are sufficient to achieve the goals of the organization we show that the optimal way of eliciting the agent s response may not be to establish incentives for truthtelling in all instances in our model there is one player the agent who observes the state of the economic system another player the principal takes an action based on the information presented to him by the agent this class of models is often referred to as the principal agent problem in the extensive and growing literature on this problem it has always been assumed that the agent could lie to the principal and therefore that he had to be properly motivated to act at least partially in the principal s interest our formal way of modelling the partial verifiability of information is to introduce the restriction that the agent s responses must lie in a set m o that varies with the true state 0 it is assumed that this set always admits the possibility of responding with the true state the way in which the allowable response set varies with the true state is known to the principal in other respects we retain the usual principal agent formalization in particular the principal is the stackelberg leader in this game he can commit himself to choose a collective action as a function of the message transmitted by the agent whether the variation of the message space with the true observation is purely technological or whether it is induced by the severity of potential actions of the principal

the optimal deterrence of tax evasion the trade off between information reporting and audits abstract despite the widespread recognition of the effectiveness of information reporting to increase tax compliance existing tax theory considers tax audits to be the only tool to prevent evasion this paper extends tax theory by modeling information reporting as an additional enforcement instrument that allows a tax authority to acquire signals about taxpayers income the paper rigorously characterizes the optimal strategy to maximize tax revenue when enforcement resources are limited it determines the optimal allocation of resources between audits and information reporting which is governed by how effectively the signals facilitate audit targeting the model demonstrates that the value of information reporting declines with audit coverage because of the corresponding decline in the value of audit targeting the optimal level of information reporting is an inverse u shaped function of the budget allocated to enforcement while the optimal audit coverage always increases with the budget this finding implies that at some point it may not be optimal to expand information reporting

endogenous punishments in agency with verifiable ex post information the article studies an adverse selection model in which a contractible imperfect signal on the agent s type is revealed ex post the agent is wealth constrained which implies that the maximum penalty depends on the contracted transaction e g the volume of trade first we show that the qualitative effects of the signal can be unambiguously tied to the nature of the problem e g whether the agent is in a buyer or a seller position second the distortions caused by informational asymmetries may become more severe although more information is now available finally the signal can actually serve to increase the agent s informational rents

corruption tax evasion and the laffer curve in a corrupt tax administration a rise in tax ratesets off complicated strategic moves by both taxpayersand administrators it is shown that in somecircumstances this may bring about laffer likebehavior of overall tax revenue i e a higher taxrate results in smaller net revenue for thegovernment further a more intense tax effort byincreasing the number of returns audited may alsoreduce net revenues finally if tax and fine ratespositively influence the level of corruption in theadministration these outcomes become more likely

induced bias of technical change in agriculture the united states and japan 1880 1980 because of extreme differences in factor endowments and price ratios among factors between the united states and japan both countries have experienced sharply different patterns of factor use and productivity growth in agriculture for the past 100 years of modern economic growth in this study the method of testing the hicksian hypothesis of induced innovation was developed using the two level ces production function the model was applied to the historical data of u s and japanese agricultural development for 1880 1980 the results were consistent with the hypothesis that different patterns of technical change in the two countries were induced by differences in the levels and the movements in relative factor prices

performance based wages in tax collection the brazilian tax collection reform and its effects we use panel data from the brazilian tax collection authority to examine the effects of a major incentive reform instituted in 1989 to improve tax enforcement beforehand fine collections per inspection were relatively stable however a striking trend break occurred afterwards which we attribute to the incentive reform not to changes in the macroeconomy or personal and corporate income tax rates our estimates suggest the growth in fines per inspection after the reform is about 75 above what it would have been without it and that there is substantial heterogeneity in the impact of the reform across tax regions

induced innovation and marginal cost of new technology abstract lacking data on development and implementation costs for input saving technologies we develop a nonparametric procedure to estimate relative differences in marginal technology costs for technical change to be consistent with the induced innovation hypothesis we apply it to u s agriculture

self reporting investigation and evidentiary standards abstractself reporting schemes have become a substantial part of law enforcement this paper analyzes the optimal use of such schemes when the authority cannot commit to an ex post investigation effort i show that this leads to a negative relationship between self reporting incentives and investigation effort three main conclusions arise first violators self report with a probability of 1 if and only if full amnesty is offered second self reporting schemes are not efficient when the level of harm of the act is high finally authorities can increase the incentives to self report when they convict without hard evidence however a hard evidence standard provides more deterrence and is weakly welfare superior

auditing claims in the insurance market with fraud the credibility issue abstract this paper characterizes the equilibrium of an insurance market where opportunist policyholders may file fraudulent claims we assume that insurance policies are traded in a competitive market where insurers cannot distinguish honest policyholders from opportunists the insurer policyholder relationship is modelled as an incomplete information game in which the insurer decides to audit or not the market equilibrium depends on whether insurers can credibly commit or not to their audit strategies we show that a no commitment equilibrium results in a welfare loss for honest individuals which may even be so large that the insurance market completely shuts down we also show that transferring monitoring costs to a budget balanced common agency would mitigate the commitment problem

avoiding tax avoidance a repeated game theoretic approach abstract we propose an optimal auditing scheme for the tax authorities who face a given tax and penalty functions and a given budget constraint under our proposed strategy individuals can be classified into one of three groups each group is characterized by two parameters i the probability of being audited in that group and ii into which group will an individual move if ii a he reported truthfully ii b he cheated it is then shown that there is a choice of these parameters so that in equilibrium i e when every individual maximizes his payoff given the auditing strategy the percentage of individuals that cheat is arbitrarily small

correlated default and financial intermediation financial intermediation naturally arises when knowledge about the aggregate state is valuable for managing investments and lenders cannot easily observe the aggregate state i show this using a costly enforcement model in which lenders need ex post incentives to enforce payments from defaulted loans and borrowers payoffs are correlated when projects have correlated outcomes learning the state of one project via enforcement provides information about the states of other projects a large correlated portfolio provides ex post incentives for enforcement as a result intermediation dominates direct lending intermediaries are financed with risk free deposits earn positive profits and hold systemic default risk

induced innovation in u s agriculture time series direct econometric and nonparametric tests the hypothesis of induced innovation is tested for u s agriculture using a high quality state level panel data set and three disparate testing techniques time series direct econometric and nonparametric we find little support for the hypothesis that conclusion is robust across testing techniques however as with all empirical tests of this hypothesis conducted to date ours focus only on the demand side of the hypothesis the hypothesis could have been rejected simply because the marginal cost of developing and implementing input saving technologies for the relatively expensive inputs is greater than for the relatively cheap inputs copyright 2009 oxford university press

r d competition between public and private sectors abstract we investigate a mixed market where a welfare maximizing public research institute competes against profit maximizing private firms we investigate r d competition by using a standard model of patent races where each firm chooses both its innovation size and r d expenditure we find that the innovation size r d expenditure chosen by the public institute is too small too large from the viewpoint of social welfare respectively and so the government should control the public institute appropriately we also discuss the welfare implications of privatization of public research institutes

an analysis of the source and nature of technical change the case of u s agriculture this paper proposes a methodology to investigate the process of technical change with a focus on the dynamic effects of r d investments on productivity and on the induced innovation hypothesis for both inputs and outputs the approach builds on a nonparametric representation of the underlying technology an application to u s agriculture is presented by distinguishing between private and public r d investments the analysis provides useful insights into the source and the dynamic nature of technical progress

changes in the wage structure family income and children s education abstract we exploit the changes in the distribution of family income to estimate the effect of parental resources on college education our strategy exploits the fact that families at the bottom of the income distribution were much poorer in the 1990s than they were in the 1970s while the opposite is true for families in the top quartile of the distribution our estimates suggest large effects of family income on enrollments for example we find that a 10 percent increase in family income is associated with a 1 4 percent increase in the probability of attending a four year college

samurai accountant a theory of auditing and plunder a risk neutral principal wishes to exact a payment from a risk neutral agent whose wealth he does not know but may verify through a costly auditing procedure we characterize efficient schemes for the principal when he is allowed to choose schedules for preaudit and postaudit payments and audit probabilities subject to the constraint that only monetary incentives can be used and that the principal may never make a net payment to the agent the main results are that efficient schemes involve preaudit payments which are increasing in the agent s wealth audit probabilities are decreasing in the agent s wealth and also satisfy certain constraints as equalities in general such schemes involve stochastic auditing and rebates after an audit in this paper we analyse the problem of a principal extracting wealth from an agent who is reluctant to part with it and is also better informed than the principal as to the amount he owns we assume that the principal has a costly means of discovering the agent s

role dependent social preferences bargaining results emerge from the interplay of strategic options and social preferences for every bargaining game however the advantage of a player having certain preferences in terms of negotiated equilibrium revenues might differ we explore the hypothesis that preferences change according to the players strength combination simple 1 1 bargaining experiments from the literature are discussed and 2 2 as well as 2 3 assignment market experiments with possible renegotiations are investigated the assumption that players adopt preferences for two to five roles defined by strength combinations of the two bargainers explains the experimental results better than individually constant preferences

busy voters agenda control and the power of information t he correspondence between individual preferences and electoral outcomes is often affected by the existence of information asymmetries among electoral participants and the presence of individuals or groups who exercise some form of agenda control while the effects of agenda control in political decision making are widely recognized the effects of information asymmetries are not as well understood since information asymmetries are fundamental characteristics of most elections a deep understanding of the correspondence between individual preferences and electoral outcomes requires a serious consideration of the effects of information i develop a generalizable agenda control model that takes as given the observation that most voters are not naturally inclined to invest in political information the model allows me to provide a dynamic description of how voters and political elites can adapt to the information problems that characterize political decision making it also allows me to demonstrate the effect of these adaptations on electoral outcomes

a strategic theory of bureaucratic redundancy do redundant bureaucratic arrangements represent wasteful duplication or a hedge against political uncertainty previous attempts at addressing this question have treated agency actions as exogenous thus avoiding strategic issues such as collective action problems or competition i develop a game theoretic model of bureaucratic policy making in which a political principal chooses the number of agents to handle a given task importantly agents have policy preferences that may be opposed to the principal s and furthermore may choose their policy or effort levels among the results are that redundancy can help a principal achieve her policy goals when her preferences are not aligned with the agents but redundancy is less helpful if even a single agent has preferences relatively close to the principal s in this environment collective action problems may cause multiple agents to be less effective than a single agent redundancy can also be unnecessary to the principal if the agent s jurisdiction can be terminated

patterns of state productivity growth in the u s farm sector linking state and aggregate models this article focuses on agricultural productivity growth at both sector and state levels it does so in a way that preserves the economic integrity of national and state production accounts a model accounting for interstate transactions in farm goods links sectorwide and state specific measures of total factor productivity growth an interesting conclusion is that the smooth persistently positive trend typically observed for farm sector productivity growth masks considerable variation across states and regions the results also indicate that farm sector productivity growth is wholly a function of productivity trends in the individual states interstate shifts in production activity and resource reallocations have had little impact

delegation as commitment the case of income tax audits in this article we study the value of delegating authority over income tax audit policy arising from the incompleteness of contracts consider a utilitarian government whose ability to commit is limited to aggregate dimensions of its audit policy as publicly verifiable information about detailed allocations of audit budgets is not available we show that the welfare level associated with the full commitment solution can be attained by delegating authority over audit policy to a manager the latter is offered a simple incentive scheme based only on the aggregate variables which are publicly observable in contrast if the government retains authority direct commitment to these same variables does not allow the full commitment welfare level to be achieved thus despite sharing a common informational basis delegation may perform better than centralized arrangements in the presence of incomplete contracts