irreversible investment with regime shifts under the real options approach to investment under uncertainty agents formulate optimal policies under the assumption that firms growth prospects do not vary over time this paper proposes and solves a model of investment decisions in which the growth rate and volatility of the decision variable shift between different states at random times a value maximizing investment policy is derived such that in each regime the firm s investment policy is optimal and recognizes the possibility of a regime shift under this policy investment is intermittent and increases with marginal q moreover investment typically is very small but in some states the capital stock jumps implications for marginal q and the user cost of capital are also examined

fiscal paradise foreign tax havens and american business the tax haven affiliates of american corporations account for more than 20 percent of u s foreign direct investment and nearly a third of the foreign profits of u s firms american companies report extraordinarily high profit rates on their tax haven investments in 1982 this behavior implies that the revenue maximizing tax rate for a typical haven is around 5 8 percent american and foreign investment in tax havens has an uncertain effect on u s tax revenue but since low tax rates encourage american companies to shift profits out of high tax foreign countries it is possible that low foreign tax rates ultimately enhance u s tax collections

evaluating natural resource investments notwithstanding impressive advances in the theory of finance over the past 2 decades practical procedures for capital budgeting have evolved only slowly the standard technique which has remained unchanged in essentials since it was originally proposed see dean 1951 bierman and smidt 1960 derives from a simple adaptation of the fisher 1907 model of valuation under certainty under this technique expected cash flows from an investment project are discounted at a rate deemed appropriate to their risk and the resulting present value is compared with the cost of the project this standard textbook technique reflects modern theoretical developments only insofar as estimates of the discount rate may be obtained from crude application of single period asset pricing theory but see brennan 1973 bogue and roll 1974 turnbull 1977 constantinides 1978 the inadequacy of this approach to capital budgeting is widely acknowledged although not widely discussed its obvious deficiency is its the evaluation of mining and other natural resource projects is made particularly difficult by the high degree of uncertainty attaching to output prices it is shown that the techniques of continuous time arbitrage and stochastic control theory may be used not only to value such projects but also to determine the optimal policies for developing managing and abandoning them the approach may be adapted to a wide variety of contexts outside the natural resource sector where uncertainty about future project revenues is a paramount concern

investment under uncertainty with price ceilings in oligopolies abstract we study the impact of price cap regulation on the level and timing of investment in an oligopolistic cournot industry facing stochastic demand we find that a price ceiling affects investment decisions in two mutually competing ways it makes the option to defer investment more valuable but at the same time it reduces the incentive for firms to strategically underinvest in order to raise prices we show that while sensible price cap regulation speeds up investment a low price cap can be a disincentive for investment there exists an optimal price cap independent of market concentration the competitive investment price trigger that maximizes investment incentives and in the long term increases industry installed capacity this optimal price cap becomes less effective and less robust as the market becomes more competitive and as demand volatility increases errors in estimation of the optimal price cap have asymmetric effects underestimation has more dire consequences than overestimation

warrant valuation and exercise strategy abstract this paper demonstrates that warrant valuation and exercise strategy differ fundamentally from call option valuation simultaneous exercise of warrants is shown to be suboptimal and a monopolist owning all warrants can achieve a higher value unless warrants are perfectly divisible no satisfactory equilibrium exists for the valuation and exercise of widely held warrants the problems encountered appear to be quite general and stem from necessary assumptions about future corporate dividend policy and capital structure such assumptions are necessary for any model of corporate security valuation

warrant exercise and bond conversion in competitive markets abstract we develop a theory of warrants held by competitive warrantholders not constrained to exercise their warrants as one block the theory also applies to convertible bonds held by competitive bondholders not constrained to convert their bonds as one block we prove that the warrant bond price in each of the competitive equilibria is less than or equal to the price in an economy with the block constraint and for at least one competitive equilibrium the warrant bond price equals the warrant bond price in the block constrained economy we illustrate the paths of competitive warrant exercise and bond conversion and conclude that under realistic assumptions they can be long

investment under uncertainty and time inconsistent preferences abstract while standard real options models assume that agents possess a constant rate of time preference there is substantial evidence that agents are impatient about choices in the short term but are patient when choosing between long term alternatives we extend the real options framework to model the investment timing decisions of entrepreneurs with time inconsistent preferences the impact on investment timing depends on such factors as whether entrepreneurs are sophisticated or naive in their expectations regarding their future time inconsistent behavior and whether the payoff from investment occurs all at once or over time the model is extended to the case of a competitive equilibrium

asset returns and measured inflation this paper analyzes the inverse relationship between estimated real returns on assets and estimates of the expected rate of inflation that is commonly noted in the literature the authors suggest that this puzzling relationship may be produced by an inappropriate application of currently published price indices to the problem of measuring asset returns copyright 1994 by ohio state university press

strategic investment under uncertainty a synthesis abstract investment is a central theme in economics finance and operational research traditionally the focus of analysis has been either on assessing the value of flexibility investment under uncertainty or on describing commitment effects in competitive settings industrial organization research contributions addressing the intersection of investment under uncertainty and industrial organization have become numerous in recent years in this paper we provide an overview aimed at categorizing and relating these research streams we highlight managerial insights concerning the nature of competitive advantage first versus second mover advantage the manner in which information is revealed firm heterogeneity capital increment size and the number of competing firms

a pseudo bayesian model in financial decision making with implications to market volatility under and overreaction abstract this paper develops a model of weight assignments using a pseudo bayesian approach that reflects investors behavioral biases in this parsimonious model of investor sentiment weights induced by investors conservative and representative heuristics are assigned to observations of the earning shocks of stock prices such weight assignments enable us to provide a quantitative link between some market anomalies and investors behavioral biases the seriousness of an anomaly can be quantitatively assessed by investigating into its dependency on weights new results other than the short run underreaction and long run overreaction can be derived and new hypotheses can be formed

optimal capital structure and bankruptcy choice dynamic bargaining versus liquidation abstract we model a firm s optimal capital structure decision in a framework in which it may later choose to enter either chapter 11 reorganization or chapter 7 liquidation creditors anticipate equityholders ex post reorganization incentives and price them into the ex ante credit spreads using a realistic dynamic bargaining model of reorganization we show that the off equilibrium threat of costly renegotiation can lead to lower leverage even with liquidation in equilibrium if reorganization is less efficient than liquidation the added option of reorganization can actually make equityholders worse off ex ante even when they liquidate on the equilibrium path

an equilibrium model of investment under uncertainty this paper analyzes the optimal investment decisions of heterogeneous rms in a competitive uncertain environment we characterize rms optimal investment strategy explicitly and derive a closed form solution for rm value we show that in the strategic equilibrium real option premia are signi cant as a result rms delay investment choosing optimally not to undertake some positive npv projects the model predicts that rm returns vary over the business cycle with returns negatively skewed during expansions but positively skewed in recessions

information revelation through option exercise in many real world situations agents must formulate option exercise strategies with imperfect information in such a setting agents may infer the private signals of other agents through their observed exercise strategies the building of an office building the drilling of an exploratory oil well and the commitment of a pharmaceutical company toward the research of a new drug all convey private information to other market participants this article develops an equilibrium framework for option exercise games with asymmetric private information many interesting aspects of the patterns of equilibrium exercise are analyzed in particular informational cascades where agents ignore their private information and jump on the exercise bandwagon may arise endogenously article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

considering the investment decisions with real options games approach abstract the mix of games theory with the real options has been a dynamic range of exploration in the most recent decade the engaging quality of the specialists for displaying aggressive speculation choices by blending ideas from both hypotheses is on account of a venture choice in a focused business sector can be seen in its substance as a game between firms in this paper we expand a model to consider finite horizon real option games under incomplete information with various parameters in incomplete information games firms actions express significant information about profitability to contestants the encapsulation of this information proposed original blocks in models with strategic interactions this is because of circularity where best exercise decisions are based on previous decisions taken which at a given time are quiet to be mentioned because about the dynamic programming principle we expand an extended version of the least squares monte carlo algorithm to confront these results the model can aid in understanding the relation between strategic optionality and information besides how this influences the best decision policy and its value results we find the informational feature is of great significance for firms best decision policy and optimization of project values

what does an oligopoly maximize a monopolist maximizes a well defined objective function monetary profit in a competitive industry although each individual pursues selfish objectives the market behaves as if an agent was maximizing an objective function social welfare can we say the same for an oligopoly do firms pursuing selfish objectives and behaving strategically act as if an agent was maximizing a fictitious objective function necessary and sufficient conditions for nash equilibria of static and state space games to be observationally equivalent to single optimization problems are derived nash equilibria of the game that are not maxima of the function are shown to be generically unstable copyright 1994 by blackwell publishing ltd

measuring the agency cost of debt we adapt a contingent claims model of the firm to reflect the incentive effects of the capital structure and thereby to measure the agency costs of debt an underlying model of the firm and the stochastic features of its product market are analyzed and an optimal operating policy is chosen we identify the change in operating policy created by leverage and value this change the model determines the value of the firm and its associated liabilities incorporating the agency consequences of debt the optimal capital structure for a firm is now widely regarded to be determined by a broad range of factors including a mix of tax effects the various agency problems associated with different securities and the various costs of issuing securities including the costs created by adverse selection while the existence of a theoretical optimum has been demonstrated in a variety of papers a less explored area has been the construction of detailed models that enable us to measure each of the relevant factors for a particular company and thereby to determine the actual optimal mix for that firm this gap in our understanding is particularly glaring in the case of agency costs in order to allow a careful modelling of strategic relations the parameters of most agency models are either so simplified that it is impossible to associate them with measurable parameters of a real world case or else the models simply abstract from certain critical factors such as a robust measure of price risk that must be incorporated into any real application for example although we now understand that sinking funds dividend restrictions and other bond covenants help to resolve the conflict of interest between bondholders and equity we do not yet have much in the way of models with which to determine the optimal parameters of these very covenants contingent claims models can provide a consistent framework for multiperiod valuation that properly accounts for risk but they usually abstract from the agency factors entering capital structure decisions when using a contingent claims model to value a firm s securities it is common to take the value of the firm itself as governed by an exogenously defined stochastic process the value of the firm s securities are then derived from this underlying value and as merton 1974 points out in his paper on the pricing of risky debt the modigliani miller theorem obtains so that the value of the firm is independent of the value and the type of debt in order to apply the contingent claims techniques to a setting in which agency problems are central some adaptation is necessary in this paper we

valuing flexibility as a complex option this paper develops an approach for valuing flexible production systems using contingent claims pricing demand curves for our model s underlying assets output products may be downward sloping in contrast with the standard option pricing assumption also our marginal production exercise costs may be increasing in addition we allow for multiple products and a production capacity constraint these elements of the model result in complex exercise decisions for the contingent claims which comprise the production system s value we illustrate our approach by valuing a flexible system that produces two products which have profit margin functions with stochastic parameters

market concentration macroeconomic uncertainty and monetary policy abstract this paper studies the effect of market structure and macroeconomic uncertainty on the transmission of monetary policy we motivate our analysis with a simple model which predicts that 1 investment and production in more concentrated sectors are more affected by demand shocks and 2 high uncertainty makes investment and production more sensitive to demand shocks the empirical analysis estimates the effect of monetary shocks on sectoral output for different sectors in the us using a structural vector autoregressive var approach the results are generally consistent with the theoretical predictions

negative uncertainty sensitivity of investment and market structure this paper examines how industry competition changes the sensitivity of investment to uncertainty using japanese firm data a switching regression model is employed to test the predictions of the real options theory regarding the uncertainty investment relationship under different industry competition attributes we find that the negative uncertainty sensitivity of investment is increased by industry concentration but decreased by market share the latter finding supports the view of strategic investment behavior of rival firms under uncertainty rather than the erosion of option values by competition

a patent race in a real options setting investment strategy valuation capm beta and return volatility abstract in this paper we study financial properties of r d intensive firms through a continuous time real options patent race model numerical analysis in this study shows that intense competition drives a firm to invest more aggressively which then pushes up its cost of capital and return volatility while introducing negative return correlation with its competitor furthermore we find that a firm s position in competition has important impacts on its financial properties for instance a firm s cost of capital is a non monotonic function of its relative position in the race in addition the relationship between cash flow uncertainty and investment can be negative when a firm is far ahead or far behind or positive when firms are close in the race

the impact of voluntary disclosure on a firm s investment policy in this paper we provide a model which describes how voluntary disclosure impacts on the timing of a firm s investment decisions a manager chooses a time to invest in a project and a time to disclose the investment return in order to maximise his monetary payoff we assume that this payoff is linked to the level of the firm s stock price prior to investing the profitability of the project and the market reaction to the disclosure of the investment return are uncertain but the manager receives signals at random points in time which assist in resolving some of this uncertainty we find that a manager whose objective can only be achieved through voluntarily disclosing the return is motivated to invest at a time that would be sub optimal for an identical manager with a profit maximising objective

interactions between investment timing and management effort under asymmetric information costs and benefits of privatized firms abstract in this paper we examine the interactions between investment timing and management effort in the presence of asymmetric information between the owner and the manager where the manager has an informational advantage we find that investment timing is later under asymmetric information than under full information implying a decrease in the value of equity option however in order to minimize any distortion under underinvestment management effort is greater under asymmetric information than under full information we show that there are trade offs in the efficiencies of investment timing and management effort under asymmetric information these results fit well with the findings of past empirical studies concerning the costs and benefits of privatized firms

strategic growth options we provide a strategic rationale for growth options under uncertainty and imperfect competition in a market with strategic competition investment confers a greater capability to take advantage of future growth opportunities this strategic advantage leads to the capture of a greater share of the market either by dissuading entry or by inducing competitors to make room for the stronger competitor as a result of this strategic effect payoffs are in a rough sense more convex than in the case of no investment in a growth option when the strategic advantage is strong increased uncertainty encourages investment in growth options higher uncertainty means more opportunity rather than simply larger risk if the strategic effect is weak the reverse is true on the other hand an increase in systematic risk discourages the acquisition of growth options our results contradict the view that volatility is a strong disincentive for investment

oil futures prices in a production economy with investment constraints we document a new stylized fact that the relationship between the volatility of oil futures prices and the slope of the forward curve is nonmonotone and has a v shape this pattern cannot be generated by standard models that emphasize storage we develop an equilibrium model of oil production in which investment is irreversible and capacity constrained investment constraints affect firms investment decisions and imply that the supply elasticity changes over time since demand shocks must be absorbed by changes in prices or changes in supply time varying supply elasticity results in time varying volatility of futures prices estimating this model we show it is quantitatively consistent with the v shape relationship between the volatility of futures prices and the slope of the forward curve in recent years commodity markets have experienced dramatic growth in trad

real options theory in international business the last quarter century has witnessed substantial growth in applications of real options theory rot to international business ib research in this review we explicate the core rot concepts in the ib context and discuss the contributions of rot based research to three core ib issues timing and scale of market entry or exit entry mode and governance form and the role of multinational networks based on our review we propose a holistic rot view of the multinational enterprise that synthesizes the insights of existing studies finally to move the field forward we highlight key questions and challenges in current rot based work provide a more precise definition of exogenous and endogenous uncertainty suggest empirical designs to test unique rot predictions and explore areas where rot can be combined with other theoretical perspectives to better understand ib phenomena

the effect of uncertainty on investment evidence from texas oil drilling this paper estimates the response of investment to changes in uncertainty using data on oil drilling in texas and the expected volatility of the future price of oil using a dynamic model of firms investment problem i find that i the response of drilling activity to changes in price volatility has a magnitude consistent with the optimal response prescribed by theory ii the cost of failing to respond to volatility shocks is economically significant and iii implied volatility data derived from futures options prices yields a better fit to firms investment behavior than backward looking volatility measures such as garch jel c58 d92 g13 g31 l71 q31 the real options literature beginning with marschak 1949 and arrow 1968 and developed in bernanke 1983 pindyck 1991 and dixit and pindyck 1994 explains how firms should make decisions about investments that involve sunk costs real options theory views such investments as options in that at any point in time a firm may choose to either invest immediately or delay and observe the evolution of the investment s payoff a key insight is that the option to delay has value when future states of the world with positive returns to investing and states with negative returns are both possible even holding the expected future return constant at its present level thus in the presence of irreversibility and uncertainty a naive investment timing rule proceed with an investment if its expected benefit even slightly exceeds its cost is suboptimal because it does not account for the value of continuing to hold the option instead firms should delay irreversible investments until a significant gap develops between the investments expected benefits and costs moreover as uncertainty increases real options theory tells us that the incentive to delay should grow stronger and the gap between the expected benefit and cost necessary to trigger investment should widen while real options theory therefore prescribes how firms should carry out irreversible investments in uncertain environments it is not empirically well known

project selection commitment and competition we examine project selection decisions of firms constrained in the number of projects they can handle at once a new project opportunity arises every period taking on a project requires a commitment of uncertain duration preventing the firm from selecting another project in subsequent periods until the commitment ends in our dynamic game when two firms are free of commitment they move sequentially in random order symmetric pure strategy markov perfect equilibria always exist in equilibrium the first mover strategically rejects some projects that are then selected by the second mover even when the value of the project is the same for both firms a monopolist rejects more projects and adopts ones of higher average quality compared to the duopolist duopolists select too few projects compared to their jointly optimal behavior we extend the model to allow for externalities asymmetry and n 2n 2 firms

technology choice under emission regulation uncertainty in international container shipping abstract we present a real options approach to evaluate technology and capacity choices under regulatory uncertainty our two phase regime switching model includes the option of investing in different technologies as well as a charter and layup option respectively for a base case version of this model we derive an analytical solution before studying the effect of regulatory uncertainty in a numerical extension that relaxes certain restrictive assumptions we then describe three regulatory regimes an emissions cap an emissions tax and a cap and trade market and compare how effectively each reduces emissions applying the model to maritime container shipping we develop insights on the optimal technology choice for reducing sox emissions we find that regulatory uncertainty can increase not only project values but also owned capacity from a regulatory perspective an emissions cap reduces emissions more effectively whereas an emissions tax reduces the cost of regulation the cap and trade market emerges in many respects as superior to an emissions tax finally we show that setting the emissions cap level or deciding on the level above which an emissions tax or emissions trade apply is critical because reduction in total industry emissions are not necessarily continuous

is ambiguity aversion bad for innovation abstract not necessarily i consider two firms that compete both on the research market and on the product market assuming the product market outcome is ambiguous i e uncertainty is described by multiple distribution of outcomes i show that an increase in firms ambiguity aversion increases the ex ante likelihood that they invest in r d an increase in their risk aversion on the other hand decreases innovation the result holds when the innovation has a business stealing effect as in a cournot duopoly with vertical differentiation the key intuition is that ambiguity aversion exacerbates the competitive threat whereas risk aversion diminishes the profit incentive to invest in addition to showing that an increase in ambiguity aversion leads to more projects being pursued i show that an increase in ambiguity aversion can lead to an increase in investment for incremental projects in the case of more radical projects an increase in ambiguity aversion can but not necessarily lead to lower investment in equilibrium overall ambiguity aversion has a positive effect on most innovative projects but can sometimes have a negative effect on some of the more radical game changing ones

entry deterrence and hidden competition abstract this paper studies strategic investment behavior of firms facing an uncertain demand in a duopoly setting firms choose both investment timing and the capacity level while facing additional uncertainty about market participants which is introduced via the concept of hidden competition we focus on the analysis of possible strategies of the market leader in terms of its capacity choice and on the influence of hidden competition on these strategies we show that due to hidden competition the follower is more eager to invest as a result an entry deterrence strategy of the leader becomes more costly and it can only be implemented for smaller market size leaving additional room for entry accommodation the leader has incentives to prevent entry of the hidden competitor stimulating simultaneous investment if the hidden firm has a large capacity and has more incentives to apply entry deterrence in the complementary case of a small capacity of the hidden player in the first case overinvestment aimed to deter the follower s entry does not occur for a wide range of parameters values

the impact of lead time on capital investments abstract we study equilibrium investment strategies of firms competing in stochastic dynamic market settings and facing two types of investment structures investment with significant lead time or time to build and investment without or minor lead time we investigate how investment behavior changes when investment is subject to time to build versus when it is not we characterize equilibrium investment strategies under several information structures and compare results to the social optimum we offer some new results the model predicts that controlling for demand and production and investment costs investments and outputs can be higher in progressive industries which often exhibit time to build than in fast paced industries where time to build is insignificant furthermore for both investment types investment with or without time to build we offer a novel equilibrium in which firms incrementally invest this behavior is driven by demand uncertainty and capacity constraints also expected outputs are lower than cournot outputs as firms face uncertainty moreover the amount of uncertainty has different effects over investment types

international capital structure equilibrium this paper develops a theory of capital structure in an international setting with corporate and personal taxes we generalize the miller analysis to an international equilibrium characterized by differential international taxation and inflation in otherwise perfect international capital markets our analysis highlights the key role that corporate tax arbitrage plays in generating an international capital structure equilibrium and we set forth a number of mechanisms for tax arbitrage transactions we close the paper by outlining some implications of our analysis for national differences in capital structure the international fisher effect and international tax effects on yield differentials among major questions regarding corporate capital structure which arise in an international setting are how or whether multiple tax jurisdictions and multiple currencies affect firm financing decisions and the international bond market equilibrium we examine some of these questions by way of generalizing miller s 1977 debt and taxes model into an international setting this setting allows for different tax regimes across countries as well as the possibility of differential inflation across currencies with consequent exchange rate movements in the first part of this paper we find that an international miller type equilibrium obtains under differential international taxation with capital market conditions which are otherwise analogous to those required for a domestic miller equilibrium our analysis particularly highlights the role that corporations play in miller s analysis as vehicles for tax arbitrage we show that if corporations engage in international tax arbitrage transactions on an equal footing no optimal capital structure exists for individual firms consequently without further restrictions differences in international tax rates alone are incapable of dictating a particular capital structure for an individual firm in the second part of the paper we extend the analysis to consider differential inflation rates with a consequent exchange rate movement and draw additional implications for the international analog of the miller equilibrium with differential inflation and taxation we begin by showing the existence of the international fisher effect for both equity and bonds although inflation and or exchange rate movements may affect real corporate tax subsidy rates and real

a bayesian approach to real options the case of distinguishing between temporary and permanent shocks traditional real options models demonstrate the importance of the option to wait due to uncertainty over future shocks to project cash flows however there is often another important source of uncertainty uncertainty over the permanence of past shocks adding bayesian uncertainty over the permanence of past shocks augments the traditional option to wait with an additional option to learn the implied investment behavior differs significantly from that in standard models for example investment may occur at a time of stable or decreasing cash flows respond sluggishly to cash flow shocks and depend on the timing of project cash flows during the past two decades the real options approach to valuation of irreversible investment opportunities has become part of the mainstream literature in financial economics the central idea is that the opportunity to invest is equivalent to an american call option on the underlying investment project as a consequence the problem of optimal investment timing is analogous to the optimal exercise decision for an american option applications of the real options approach are now numerous 1 one feature that is common to virtually all real options models is that the underlying uncertainty pertains only to future shocks since future cash flows are uncertain there is an important opportunity cost of investing today the value of the asset might go up so that tomorrow will be an even better time to invest this opportunity cost is often referred to in the literature as the option

irreversible investment under uncertainty in oligopoly abstract an oligopoly is studied where firms facing a stochastic inverse demand curve use capacity as strategic variable capacity may be adjusted continuously over time with linear cost the analysis uses the technique of a fictitious social planner and the theory of irreversible investment under uncertainty examples indicate that qualitatively the price process will be similar in oligopoly and competitive equilibrium when firms are nonidentical e g in initial size and even if they are alike in other respects substantial time may pass until they are all the same size much of that time one firm may dominate the market

evaluation of firm s loss due to incomplete information in real investment decision abstract we investigate the effect of incomplete information in a model where a start up with a unique idea and technology pioneers a new market but will eventually be expelled from the market by a large firm s subsequent entry we evaluate the start up s loss due to incomplete information about the large firm s behavior we clarify conditions under which the start up needs more information about the large firm the proposed method of evaluating the loss due to incomplete information could also be applied to other real options models involving incomplete information

interactions of corporate financing and investment decisions a dynamic framework this article analyzes the interaction between a firm s dynamic investment operating and financing decisions in a model with operating adjustment and recapitalization costs using numerical analysis we solve the model for cases that highlight interaction effects we find that higher production flexibility due to lower costs of shutting down and reopening a production facility enhances the firm s debt capacity thereby increasing the net tax shield value of debt financing while higher financial flexibility resulting from lower recapitalization costs has a similar effect production flexibility and financial flexibility are to some extent substitutes we find that the impact of debt financing on the firm s investment and operating decisions is economically insignificant

an integrated model of multinational flexibility and financial hedging abstract we construct a model of a multinational firm with flexibility in sourcing its production and with the ability to use financial markets to hedge exchange rate risk agency costs generated by the firm s capital structure create a link between the firm s financial policy and its production decisions the firm s need for hedging is directly related to the degree of flexibility and the production plan it chooses is a function of the hedging strategy it employs consequently the firm s ability to exploit its competitive position depends upon the degree to which its flexibility is matched by the construction of an appropriate hedging strategy

strategic entry in a triopoly market of firms with asymmetric cost structures abstract this paper examines the strategic investment timing decision in a triopoly market comprising firms with asymmetric cost structures we present three novel results first in the case where there are relatively small cost asymmetries between firms and a relatively small first mover advantage the firm with the lowest cost structure is not always the first investor in other cases the firm with the lowest cost structure is the first investor second an increase in volatility increases the possibility that a firm without the lowest cost structure is the first investor finally even in the three asymmetric firm model we show that the first investor threshold is larger in a triopoly than in a duopoly although it is smaller in a duopoly than in a monopoly

option exercise games an application to the equilibrium investment strategies of firms under the standard real options approach to investment under uncertainty agents formulate optimal exercise strategies in isolation and ignore competitive interactions however in many real world asset markets exercise strategies cannot be determined separately but must be formed as part of a strategic equilibrium this article provides a tractable approach for deriving equilibrium investment strategies in a continuous time cournot nash framework the impact of competition on exercise strategies is dramatic for example while standard real options models emphasize that a valuable option to wait leads firms to invest only at large positive net present values the impact of competition drastically erodes the value of the option to wait and leads to investment at very near the zero net present value threshold copyright 2002 oxford university press

investment in competitive equilibrium the optimality of myopic behavior there is an extensive literature on the optimal irreversible investment strategy of a solitary firm facing an exogenous price process this paper shows that the investment strategies that this literature derives may be optimal in competitive equilibrium even though the price process is now endogenous this provides a simple means for computing equilibrium investment strategies

going multinational under exchange rate uncertainty abstract we analyze a model where an exporting firm competes a la cournot in a foreign market the firm faces exchange rate uncertainty and has the option to invest abroad the paper contributes four results first real option pricing techniques are used to derive the optimal timing rule of the investment and the price of the firm and foreign competitors second the sunk cost of entry into the foreign market introduces hysteresis in direct investment flows we find that the degree of hysteresis grows with the number of firms in the industry third we determine the conditions under which dumping may appear and the role of fdi in precluding this type of dumping fourth tariffs have the well known fdi inducing effect more so in less competitive markets and are more effective at deterring delocation furthermore a tariff might have the effect of triggering dumping

the strategic perils of delayed differentiation the value of delayed differentiation also known as postponement for a monopolist has been extensively studied in the operations literature we analyze the case of imperfectly competitive markets with demand uncertainty wherein the choice of supply chain configuration i e early or delayed differentiation is endogenous to the competing firms we characterize firms choices in equilibrium and analyze the effects of these choices on quantities sold profits consumer surplus and welfare we demonstrate that purely strategic considerations not previously identified in the literature play a pivotal role in determining the value of delayed differentiation in the face of either entry threats or competition these strategic effects can significantly diminish the value of delayed differentiation in fact under plausible conditions these effects dominate the traditional risk pooling benefits associated with delayed differentiation in which case early differentiation is the dominant strategy for firms even under cost parity with delayed differentiation we extend the main model to study the effects of alternate market structures asymmetric markets and inventory holdback our results in particular that for a broad range of parameter values early differentiation is a dominant strategy even under cost parity with delayed differentiation are robust to these relaxations

real options and preemption under incomplete information abstract this paper introduces incomplete information and preemption into an equilibrium model of firms facing real investment decisions the optimal investment strategy may lie anywhere between the zero npv trigger level and the optimal strategy of a monopolist depending on the distribution of competitors costs and the implied fear of preemption our model implies that the equity returns of firms which hold real options and are subject to preemption will contain jumps and positive skewness

equilibrium and options on real assets in aggregate options on real and financial assets can have very different properties typically the good or service produced by a real asset has a finite elasticity of demand and developers have finite capacities also the supply of options can be limited and developers can be less than perfectly competitive in a subgame perfect nash equilibrium with these properties the optimal exercise policy and resulting values of developed and undeveloped assets are calculated explicitly the novel comparative statics are discussed in detail article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

multinational capital structure and financial flexibility abstract we address multinational capital structure decisions when firms have varying degrees of financial flexibility for shifting income and or tax shields between subsidiaries we find 1 firms can use leverage to dramatically reduce negative valuation effects from operating in a high tax country 2 financial flexibility is a key determinant of optimal capital structure acting as both a substitute and a complement for leverage 3 multinational firms derive a synergistic effect from financial flexibility which can enhance their value beyond that for a single country firm from a low tax jurisdiction and 4 optimal capital structure typically differs substantially across subsidiaries with each having positions in multiple currencies

an empirical examination of the timing of land conversions in the presence of farmland preservation programs using a panel of parcel level data we estimate a hazard model and find strong evidence that the mere existence of an option to preserve farmland delays decisions to convert farmland to developed uses by about six years a reduction in median conversion time of 12 to 43 depending on parcel size where such delays allow local governments to improve infrastructure or implement stricter growth control measures benefits of a preservation option may be even more long term also increases in the variance of returns to development tended to slow conversion for parcels with all but the highest lot capacities copyright 2008 oxford university press

the economic policy uncertainty and firm investment in australia this paper examines the impact of economic policy uncertainty epu on the australian firm investment activity we find a significant positive relationship between the epu and the firm investment o

debt taxes and international equilibrium abstract this paper employs an extended miller model to analyze capital structure decisions of individual firms in a two country setting miller equilibria are generally not consistent with an international equilibrium if the tax subsidy of debt differs across countries the most obvious reason for differential tax subsidies is differences between national corporate tax rates we also identify differential tax subsidies of debt if inflation rates differ across countries for both cases we examine the adjustment process from national equilibria to an international equilibrium without and with barriers to international investment we derive the relationship between the equilibrium yields on debt and equity in the two countries and discuss the fisher hypothesis that real returns do not depend upon inflation in a two country miller world

armen alchian s contribution to macroeconomics i introduction this essay examines alchian s contribution to the theory and practice of macroeconomics we have the task of reviewing alchian s contributions in an area that represents only a tiny fraction of his body of work citations to his work on the theory of the firm greatly outnumber those on money and inflation nevertheless we find that many of the major developments in macroeconomics in the last two decades follow paths that were pointed out in the late 1950s and early 1960s by armen alchian much of it in collaboration with reuben kessel alchian s ideas about macroeconomics were developed in a fertile environment at ucla in conversations with colleagues such as karl brunner and jack hirshleifer as well as with graduate students such as allan meltzer and rachael and ted balbach a signature of alchian s work was his great ability to clarify the issues he was careful to distinguish the effects of money versus real shocks of anticipated versus unanticipated inflation and to work through the impact of an event to the general equilibrium consequences he understood that real world problems such as incomplete information might explain apparently noneconomic behavior but unlike many macroeconomists of that time he did not abandon microeconomic principles when explaining nominal real interactions alchian s views were a clear contrast to those of prominent macroeconomists of the day who argued that aggregate monetary policies could not be used to stabilize the price level at full employment because of asymmetric rigidities in markets that prevented the downward adjustment of any nominal price as part of the process of adjusting relative prices 1 the conventional wisdom of the day led to policies that ultimately caused two decades of accelerating and costly inflation both the rational expectations revolution and developments in modeling the microfoundations of business cycles were a reaction to this experience and to the apparent failure of standard macroeconomic analysis alchian s 1970 work on the effect of private information was one of the original articles in this microfoundation literature although he used a narrative approach rather than the highly structured mathematical models available to researchers today alchian was more than two decades ahead of the real business cycle economists in asking researchers to explore economic explanations fully before adopting explanations based on market failure money illusion and irrational behavior this paper is organized in four parts the first part describes alchian s work involving the fundamental role of money in society king and plosser 1986 93 wrote but in the explosion of formal modeling of monetary economies in the postwar period brunner and meltzer 1971 and alchian 1977 stand nearly alone in stressing the idea that monetary arrangements economize on the information production that would otherwise be necessary to mitigate problems of moral hazard in the exchange of commodities the second part discusses alchian and klein s work on the measurement of inflation this measurement problem appears to be more obvious when inflation is low and the variance of price indexes is dominated by real factors this work was generally neglected at the time it was written perhaps because inflation accelerated so rapidly that the real factors became less important now that inflation has declined to moderate levels the measurement problems are resurfacing the third part of the paper documents alchian s insight into the problems and intellectual developments that followed the erratic inflation policies of the u s government in the 1960s and 1970s in a 1962 journal of political economy article he and reuben kessel set forth a description of the events that occur as an economy shifts from one steady state inflation regime to another this work revealed an understanding of the importance of credibility for the policymaker that was missing from much of the writing about macro policymaking in the subsequent three decades

two remarks on cournot equilibria abstract we describe two simple results in the theory of cournot equilibria the first has to do with the effect of taxation in a cournot industry and the second describes under what conditions a cournot equilibrium will implicity maximize an objective function these results are probably known but are not well known and they seem useful enough to be worth spelling out

production and spatial distribution of switchgrass and miscanthus in the united states under uncertainty and sunk cost abstract the u s cellulosic biofuel mandate has not been enforced in recent years uncertainty surrounding the enforcement of the mandate in addition to high production and harvest cost have contributed to a delay in the widespread planting of bioenergy crops such as switchgrass and miscanthus previous literature has shown that under uncertainty and sunk cost an investment threshold is further increased due to the value associated from holding the investment option in this paper we extend the previous literature by applying a real option switching model to bioenergy crop production first we calculate the county level break even price which triggers a switching away from traditional field crops corn soybeans and wheat to bioenergy crops under various scenarios differing by commodity prices production cost and biomass price expectations we show that the resulting break even prices at the county level can be substantially higher than previously estimated due to the inclusion of the option value in a second step we identify counties that are most likely to grow switchgrass or miscanthus by simulating a stochastic biomass price over time our results highlight two issues first switchgrass or miscanthus are not grown in the midwest under any scenario under low agricultural residue removal rates biomass crops are mostly grown in the southeast second under the assumption of a high removal rates bioenergy crops are not grown anywhere in the u s since the cellulosic biofuel mandate can be covered by agricultural residues

irreversible investment financing and bankruptcy decisions in an oligopoly this paper examines a firm s debt level investment timing and investment scale choices in a continuous time model where the output price of a good that the firm produces depends on a stochastic demand shift variable and the total industry supply of the good using the simple symmetric cournot nash equilibrium assumption that all firms are identical and therefore follow the same financing and investment strategies we show that competition decreases the output price and hence encourages a firm to wait for a higher demand level before it is profitable to invest we also demonstrate how uncertainty bankruptcy costs and corporate taxation affect the firm s financing and investment decisions

the effect of taxes and depreciation on corporate investment and financial leverage this paper provides an analysis of the effect of corporate and personal taxes on the firm s optimal investment and financing decisions under uncertainty it extends the deangelo aad masulis capital structure model by endogenizing the firm s investment decision the authors results indicate that when investment is allowed to adjust optimally the existing predictions about the relationship between investment related and debt related tax shields must be modified in particular the authors show that increases in investment related tax shields due to changes in the corporate tax code are not necessarily associated with reductions in leverage at the individual firm level in cross sectional analysis firms with higher investment related tax shields normalized by expected earnings need not have lower debt related tax shields normalized by expected earnings unless all firms utilize the same production technology differences in production technologies across firms may thus explain why the empirical results of recent cross sectional studies have not conformed to the predictions of deangelo and masulis

explicit investment rules with time to build and uncertainty abstract we establish explicit socially optimal rules for an irreversible investment decision with time to build and uncertainty assuming a price sensitive demand function with a random intercept we provide comparative statics and economic interpretations for three models of demand arithmetic brownian geometric brownian and the cox ingersoll ross committed capacity that is the installed capacity plus the investment in the pipeline must never drop below the best predictor of future demand minus two biases the discounting bias takes into account the fact that investment is paid upfront for future use the precautionary bias multiplies a type of risk aversion index by the local volatility relying on the analytical forms we discuss in detail the economic effects for example the impact of volatility on the optimal investment is negligible in some cases it vanishes in the cir model for long delays and in the gbm model for high discount rates

open loop equilibria and perfect competition in option exercise games the investment boundaries defined by grenadier 2002 for an oligopoly investment game determine equilibria in open loop strategies as closed loop strategies they are not equilibria because any firm by investing sooner can preempt the investments of other firms and expropriate the growth options the perfectly competitive outcome is produced by closed loop strategies that are mutually best responses in this equilibrium the option to delay investment has zero value and the simple npv rule is followed by all firms the author 2009 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oxfordjournals org oxford university press

irreversible investment real options and competition evidence from real estate development abstract we examine the extent to which uncertainty delays investment and the effect of competition on this relationship using a sample of 1214 condominium developments in vancouver canada built from 1979 1998 we find that increases in both idiosyncratic and systematic risk lead developers to delay new real estate investments empirically a one standard deviation increase in the return volatility reduces the probability of investment by 13 percent equivalent to a 9 percent decline in real prices increases in the number of potential competitors located near a project negate the negative relationship between idiosyncratic risk and development these results support models in which competition erodes option values and provide clear evidence for the real options framework over alternatives such as simple risk aversion

supply demand and the value of green buildings attention to sustainability and energy efficiency rating schemes in the commercial property sector has increased rapidly during the past decade in the uk commercial properties have been certified under the breeam rating scheme since 1999 offering fertile ground to investigate the economic dynamics of green certification in the commercial property market this paper documents that over the 2000 09 period the expanding supply of green buildings within a given london neighbourhood had a positive impact on average rents and prices but reduced rents and prices for environmentally certified real estate the results suggest that there is a gentrification effect from green buildings however each additional green building decreases the marginal effect of certification in the rental and transaction markets by 2 per cent and 5 per cent respectively in addition controlling for lease contract features like contract length and the rent free period modifies the impact of environmental certification on

warrant exercise dividends and reinvestment policy in this paper we examine sequential exercise strategies by warrantholders and the gain from hoarding warrants we analyze several obstacles to acquiring large blocks in order to exploit sequential strategies first we identify several reinvestment policies for which sequential exercise is not advantageous thereby eliminating the gain from hoarding however sequential exercise strategies may be advantageous for monopoly or oligopoly warrantholders even absent dividends because using exercise proceeds to repurchase stock or to expand the firm s scale increases the riskiness of an equity share second oligopoly warrantholders can receive a smaller warrant value than perfectly competitive warrantholders suggesting a potential cost to unsuccessful hoarding

developing real option game models by mixing concepts from both game theoretic analysis and real options theory an investment decision in a competitive market can be seen as a game between firms as firms implicitly take into account other firms reactions to their own investment actions we review two decades of real option game models suggesting which critical problems have been solved by considering game theory and which significant problems have not been yet adequately addressed we provide some insights on the plausible empirical applications or shortfalls in applications to date and suggest some promising avenues for future research

entry into the electricity market uncertainty competition and mothballing options the present paper analyzes the entry strategies into the electricity market of two firms that have power plants under price uncertainty and competition we consider the symmetric and asymmetric two firms which have either a thermal power plant or a nuclear power plant the differences between the thermal power plant and the nuclear power plant such as the cost structure and operational flexibility are modeled the threshold values of market entry are calculated for each firm with either the thermal power plant or the nuclear power plant as the leader or the follower we show the dependence of cost structures on entry thresholds of the leader and the follower into the electricity market for various market and cost conditions the diagrams of the leader are also shown

irreversible investment with price ceilings a model of irreversible investment in a competitive industry under demand uncertainty is developed in the absence of restrictions investment by itself will keep the price from rising above a natural ceiling that exceeds the long run average cost by an option value factor when a lower ceiling is imposed investment is triggered only by the observation of an even higher shadow price as the imposed ceiling is reduced to the long run average cost this shadow price goes to infinity and investment ceases completely because investment is depressed a tighter price ceiling generally leads to a higher long run average price

preemption games under levy uncertainty abstract we study a stochastic version of fudenberg tirole s preemption game two firms contemplate entering a new market with stochastic demand firms differ in sunk costs of entry if the demand process has no upward jumps the low cost firm enters first and the high cost firm follows if leader s optimization problem has an interior solution the leader enters at the optimal threshold of a monopolist otherwise the leader enters earlier than the monopolist if the demand admits positive jumps then the optimal entry threshold of the leader can be lower than the monopolist s threshold even if the solution is interior simultaneous entry can happen either as an equilibrium or a coordination failure the high cost firm can become the leader we characterize subgame perfect equilibrium strategies in terms of stopping times and value functions analytical expressions for the value functions and thresholds that define stopping times are derived

preemption and rent equalization in the adoption of new technology we study the adoption of a new technology to illustrate the effects of preemption in games of timing we show that the threat of preemption equalizes rents in a duopoly but that this result does not extend to the general oligopoly game if the gain to preemption is sufficiently small then the optimal symmetric outcome which involves late adoption is an equilibrium this contrasts with reinganum s result that in precommitment equilibria there must be diffusion we develop a new and richer formalism for modeling games of timing which permits a continuoustime representation of the limit of discrete time mixed strategy equilibria

strategic investment in technological innovations abstract the aim of this paper is to determine the optimal timing of technology investment of a single firm in a duopoly framework as time passes different technologies are invented which after sometime become available for the firm to adopt the question here is not only when a firm should invest but also which technology should be adopted for different scenarios the optimal technology investment decision is determined outcomes range from pre emption equilibria to equilibria with second mover advantages

time to build option value and investment decisions abstract investment decisions and outlays are often made sequentially for example the rate at which construction proceeds is usually flexible and can be adjusted with the arrival of new information traditional discounted cash flow methods which treat the pattern of investment as fixed ignore this flexibility and understate the value of the project this paper uses contingent claims analysis to derive optimal decision rules and to value such investments we determine the effects of time to build opportunity cost and uncertainty on the investment decision for reasonable parameter values we show how a simple npv rule can lead to gross errors

investment and competition this paper examines how industry structure affects corporate investment patterns real options theory shows that deferring irreversible investment in the face of uncertainty is valuable theory also shows that the value of waiting to invest falls if investment opportunities are contestable consistent with these theories we find that firms in monopolistic industries exhibit lower investment q sensitivity and are slower to invest than firms in competitive industries however we find that investment q sensitivity and investment speed are highest in oligopolistic industries suggesting that the value of investing strategically can outweigh the value of waiting indeed oligopolistic industries experience less entry and more exit than other industries