uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the baron ferejohn model abstract we consider a multilateral sequential bargaining model in which the players may differ in their probability of being selected as the proposer and the rate at which they discount future payoffs for games in which agreement requires less than unanimous consent we characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs with this characterization we establish the uniqueness of the equilibrium payoffs for the case where the players have the same discount factor we show that the payoff to a player is nondecreasing in his probability of being selected as the proposer for the case where the players have the same probability of being selected as the proposer we show that the payoff to a player is nondecreasing in his discount factor journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c78 d70

why has u s inflation become harder to forecast we examine whether the u s rate of price inflation has become harder to forecast and to the extent that it has what changes in the inflation process have made it so the main finding is that the univariate inflation process is well described by an unobserved component trend cycle model with stochastic volatility or equivalently an integrated moving average process with time varying parameters this model explains a variety of recent univariate inflation forecasting puzzles and begins to explain some multivariate inflation forecasting puzzles as well

determination of safety stocks for cyclic schedules with stochastic demands abstract this paper considers the problem of scheduling the production of multiple items each with random demand on a single facility we show how the variance in demand during lead time can be estimated and present a model for determination of safety stocks and order up to levels for a fixed cyclic sequence both with and without idle time for systems with idle time we present a control model to make the decision to produce next item in sequence or idle the facility the performance of the model is tested in a simulation study

trend fundamentals and exchange rate dynamics we estimate a multivariate unobserved components stochastic volatility model to explain the dynamics of a panel of six exchange rates against the us dollar the empirical model is based on the assumption that both countries monetary policy strategies may be well described by taylor rules with a time varying inflation target a time varying natural rate of unemployment and interest rate smoothing the estimates closely track major movements along with important time series properties of real and nominal exchange rates across all currencies considered the model generally outperforms a benchmark model that does not account for changes in trend inflation and trend unemployment authors abstract

an eoq model for perishable products with fixed shelf life under stochastic demand conditions abstract the paper presents a mathematical stochastic model for perishable open dating foods including shortage and outdating costs the demand fluctuations have been taken into account modeling them through a normal distribution and their impact on the storage time has been studied considering the stochastic nature of such a parameter in turn the quantification of perished products has been also addressed determining the probability for a product of remaining in stock beyond the end of its shelf life on the basis of such premises the optimal set of parameters that minimize the total unit cost has been determined a numerical application and a sensitivity analysis show the practical applicability of the proposed model in the context of warehouse management underlining managerial insights

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

macroeconomic forecasting and structural change the aim of this paper is to assess whether explicitly modeling structural change increases the accuracy of macroeconomic forecasts we produce real time out of sample forecasts for inflation the unemployment rate and the interest rate using a time varying coefficients var with stochastic volatility tv var for the us the model generates accurate predictions for the three variables in particular for inflation the tv var outperforms in terms of mean square forecast error all the competing models fixed coefficients vars time varying ars and the na ove random walk model these results are also shown to hold over the period commonly referred to as the great moderation

the power of the last word in legislative policy making we examine legislative policy making in institutions with two empirically relevant features agenda setting occurs in real time and the default policy evolves we demonstrate that these institutions select condorcet winners when they exist provided a sufficient number of individuals have opportunities to make proposals in policy spaces with either pork barrel or pure redistributional politics where a condorcet winner does not exist the last proposer is effectively a dictator or near dictator under relatively weak conditions

a new model of trend inflation this article introduces a new model of trend inflation in contrast to many earlier approaches which allow for trend inflation to evolve according to a random walk ours is a bounded model which ensures that trend inflation is constrained to lie in an interval the bounds of this interval can either be fixed or estimated from the data our model also allows for a time varying degree of persistence in the transitory component of inflation in an empirical exercise with cpi inflation we find the model to work well yielding more sensible measures of trend inflation and forecasting better than popular alternatives such as the unobserved components stochastic volatility model this article has supplementary materials online

unemployment equilibria and input prices theory and evidence from the united states the paper develops an efficiency wage model where input prices affect the equlibrium rate of unemployment we show that a simple framework based on only two prices the real price of oil and the real rate of interest is able to explain the main post war movements in the rate of u s joblessnss the equations do well in forecasting unemployment many out of sample and provide evidence that the oil price spike associated with iraq s invasion of kuweit appears to be a component of the mystery recession which followed

a bargaining model of collective choice we present a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo is an arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space in contrast to other bargaining models the status quo is not assumed to be bad and delay may be pareto efficient we prove existence of stationary equilibria the possibility of equilibrium delay depends on four factors risk aversion of the legislators the dimensionality of the policy space the voting rule and the possibility of transfers across districts if legislators are risk averse if there is more than one policy dimension and if voting is by majority rule for example then delay will almost never occur in one dimension delay is possible if and only if the status quo lies in the core of the voting rule and then it is the only possible outcome this core selection result yields a game theoretic foundation for the well known median voter theorem our comparative statics analysis yield two noteworthy insights i if the status quo is close to the core t hen equilibrium policy outcomes will also be close to the core a moderate status quo produces moderate policy outcomes and ii if legislators are patient then equilibrium proposals will be close to the core legislative patience leads to policy moderation

uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining we study a model of sequential bargaining in which in each period before an agreement is reached the proposer s identity is randomly determined the proposer suggests a division of a pie of size one each other agent either approves or rejects the proposal and the proposal is implemented if the set of approving agents is a winning coalition for the proposer the theory of the fixed point index is used to show that stationary equilibrium expected payoffs of this coalitional bargaining game are unique this generalizes eraslan 34 insofar as a there are no restrictions on the structure of sets of winning coalitions b different proposers may have different sets of winning coalitions c there may be a positive probability that no proposer is selected

proposal rights and political power in a canonical model of sequential collective bargaining over a divisible good we show that equilibrium expected payoffs are not restricted by players voting rights or their impatience for all monotonic voting rules and discount factors and for all divisions of the good among players there exists a stationary proposal making rule such that this division represents players expected payoffs in a stationary subgame perfect nash equilibrium in pure strategies the result highlights the significance of proposal rights in determining political power in collective deliberations t he purpose of this article is to further our understanding of political power in a committee environment we consider the problem of a group of two or more agents who must split a fixed divisible good agents cannot use physical force to divide this good our goal is to clarify the role and relative significance of other features of the political environment such as voting rights proposal rights agents patience etc in determining political power following shapley and shubik 1954 we gauge political power in terms of expected outcomes rather than a priori equate it with individual prerogatives 1 in that spirit political power is the share of the divisible good that agents can expect to obtain when their behavior conforms to an appropriately defined equilibrium notion 2 we model committee interaction using a canonical sequential bargaining game in each period a member of the committee is recognized with some probability that is fixed across periods and proposes a division of the good committee members then vote on the proposal if the proposal is approved in accordance with the underlying voting rule the proposed division is implemented and the

non cooperative bargaining theory an introduction the paper provides an informal introduction to some of the main themes of the recent literature on non cooperative or sequential bargaining models it focuses in particular on the relationship between the new approach and the traditional axiomatic approach exemplified by nash bargaining theory it illustrates the new insights offered by the non cooperative approach by reference to a detailed analysis of the manner in which the presence of an outside option available to one of the parties will affect the negotiated outcome finally the difficulties which arise in extending this analysis to two person bargaining with incomplete information and to n person bargaining are discussed this is a revised version of the fourth review of economic studies lecture presented in april 1985 at the joint meeting of the association of university teachers of economics and the royal economic society held in oxford the choice of lecturer is made by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay and the paper is refereed in the usual way this paper aims to provide an informal and elementary introduction to an approach to bargaining which has received a great deal of attention over the past few years the approach involves writing down some particular sequence of moves offers and replies to be made over time in the course of negotiations and then looking for a non cooperative equilibrium in the game thus specified in practice a perfect equilibrium or in games of incomplete information a sequential equilibrium while the approach appears at first sight to be very different in spirit from the traditional axiomatic approach in which a bargaining solution is specified by appealing to a number of general requirements which are deemed appropriate on the basis of some a priori considerations the two approaches are in fact complementary while the

changes in the federal reserve s inflation target causes and consequences this paper estimates a new keynesian model to draw inferences about the behavior of the federal reserve s unobserved inflation target the results indicate that the target rose from 1 1 4 percent in 1959 to over 8 percent in the mid to late 1970s before falling back below 2 1 2 percent in 2004 the results also provide some support for the hypothesis that over the entire postwar period federal reserve policy has systematically translated short run price pressures set off by supply side shocks into more persistent movements in inflation itself although considerable uncertainty remains about the true source of shifts in the inflation target jel e31 e32 e52

a three player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game this file contains two sets of calculations first we report the calculations of demands and continuation values of proposition 1 second the mixing probabilities of proposition 1 are shown to be well defined

voting and vetoing the consequences of veto power in committees is analyzed using the appro ach of noncooperative bargaining theory it is first shown that in equilibrium nonveto players do not share in the benefits gained by the decision making of the committee that is in every equilibrium outcome of the bargaining game nonveto players earn zero some measures for reducing the excessive power of veto members in committees are analyzed specifically i study the effects of imposing a deadline on negotiations and of expanding the committee by increasing the number of nonveto players quantitative results are given for the case of the un security council

the dynamics of political compromise we characterize efficient self enforcing divisions of political or economic surplus between two parties that interact repeatedly the party in power can decide the allocation and the parties political strength changes according to a markov process we find that the share of the party currently in power depends not only on its current strength but also on whether it had previously been even stronger since it last came to power we find that the constitutional supermajority requirements that attempt to constrain the use of power can counterproductively create less compromise

testing for time variation in an unobserved components model for the u s economy abstract this paper analyzes the amount of time variation in the parameters of a reduced form empirical macroeconomic model for the u s economy we decompose output inflation and unemployment in their stochastic trend and business cycle gap components with the latter linked through the phillips curve and okun s law a novel bayesian model selection procedure is used to test which parameters vary over time and which components exhibit stochastic volatility using data from 1959q2 to 2014q3 we find substantial time variation in okun s law while the phillips curve slope appears to be stable stochastic volatility is found to be important for cyclical shocks to the economy while the volatility of permanent shocks remains stable

numerical computation of inventory policies based on the eoq σx value for order point systems abstract this paper examines the numerical computation of two control parameters order size and order point in the well known inventory control model an s q system with a safety stock strategy the aim of the paper is to show that the eoq x value is both sufficient for controlling the system and essential for the economic consequences of using approximations in computations of optimal policies in view of the evidence from a number of studies showing that firms use of statistical inventory control lags far behind academic interest in the area this is also an important aspect the determination of optimal values for the control variables even in this very simple inventory control system is a complex task and therefore not suited to practical implementation where one or more of the following issues are neglected the interdependence of order size and order point the difference between stock on hand and net stock and the excess stockout included in the next period we use the determination of optimal values for the control variables as a framework to evaluate the economic consequences of these approximations applied in pratical inventory control

an eoq model with ramp type demand rate time dependent deterioration rate unit production cost and shortages an order level inventory system for deteriorating items has been developed with demand rate as a ramp type function of time the finite production rate is proportional to the demand rate and deterioration rate is time proportional the unit production cost is inversely proportional to the demand rate the model with no shortage case in inventory is first solved the inventory shortage is discussed next results are illustrated with two numerical examples for two models along with its sensitivity

proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition this paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which agents expend efforts to be the proposer in equilibrium agents effort choices are influenced by the prize and cost effects the endogenous prize is 9

a new model of inflation trend inflation and long run inflation expectations a knowledge of the level of trend inflation is key to many current policy decisions and several methods of estimating trend inflation exist this paper adds to the growing literature which uses survey based long run forecasts of inflation to estimate trend inflation we develop a bivariate model of inflation and long run forecasts of inflation which allows for the estimation of the link between trend inflation and the long run forecast thus our model allows for the possibilities that long run forecasts taken from surveys can be equated with trend inflation that the two are completely unrelated or anything in between by including stochastic volatility and time variation in coefficients it extends existing methods in empirically important ways we use our model with a variety of inflation measures and survey based forecasts for several countries we find that long run forecasts can provide substantial help in refining estimates and fitting and forecasting inflation the same evidence indicates it is less helpful to simply equate trend inflation with the long run forecasts

distribution of surplus in sequential bargaining with endogenous recognition i examine a sequential bargaining situation in which agents contest the right to propose an allocation the contest can either take place at a pre bargaining stage yielding persistent recognition to propose or recur throughout the bargaining yielding transitory recognition equilibrium analysis reveals that surplus is distributed more unequally under persistent recognition social cost is higher under persistent recognition if and only if it attracts a sufficient number of active bargainers and individual s incentive to propose under transitory recognition may actually increase in the number of agents while this incentive always diminishes under persistent recognition

an inflation predicting measure of the output gap in the euro area using a small bayesian dynamic factor model of the euro area we estimate the deviations of output from its trend that are consistent with the behavior of inflation we label these deviations the output gap in order to pin down the features of the model we evaluate the accuracy of real time inflation forecasts from different model specifications the version that forecasts inflation best implies that after the 2011 sovereign debt crisis the output gap in the euro area has been much larger than the official estimates versions featuring a secular stagnation like slowdown in trend growth and hence a small output gap after 2011 do not adequately capture the inflation developments

a bounded model of time variation in trend inflation nairu and the phillips curve joshua chan would like to acknowledge financial support bythe australian research council via a discovery early career researcher award de150100795

bargaining over new ideas the distribution of rents and the stability of innovative firms we develop a theory of the rent distribution and stability of innovative firms our theory is based on a model of bargaining over new ideas the model accounts for the problem of information leakage namely the diffusion of information about new ideas among the agents that participate in the bargaining our main results draw a link between the strength of intellectual property rights enforcement and the distribution of rents in firms as well as between the size and organization of firms and their stability our theory explains why small firms are advantaged in introducing innovation into the market and why spin outs tend to emerge from large established firms jel l1 l2 c7

optimal inventory policy for a perishable item with demand function sensitive to price and time abstract we formulate a model for determining the optimal pricing order quantity and replenishment period for perishable items with price dependent and time dependent demand the items have a fixed shelf life and the demand rate decreases linearly in the selling price and polynomially over the time after replenishment until it vanishes either at the reservation price or at expiration time we prove that the three variable profit maximization problem can be reduced into a single variable problem in which the variable is the duration of the replenishment period we show that the profit function is strictly pseudo concave and provide means of obtaining the optimal policy three numerical examples are presented to demonstrate the model accompanied by a sensitivity analysis

some unpleasant bargaining arithmetic abstract it is commonly believed that voting rules that are relatively more inclusive e g unanimity or supermajority are likely to yield relatively more equitable outcomes than simple majority rule we show that this is not necessarily the case in bargaining environments we study a multilateral bargaining model a la baron and ferejohn 1989 where players are heterogeneous with respect to the potential surplus they bring to the bargaining table we show that unanimity rule may generate equilibrium outcomes that are more unequal or less equitable than under majority rule in fact as players become relatively more patient we show that the more inclusive the voting rule the less equitable the equilibrium allocations

the nairu unemployment and monetary policy this paper examines the precision of conventional estimates of the nairu and the role of the nairu and unemployment in forecasting inflation the authors find that although there is a clear empirical phillips relation the nairu is imprecisely estimated forecasts of inflation are insensitive to the nairu and there are other leading indicators of inflation that are at least as good as unemployment this suggests deemphasizing the nairu in public discourse about monetary policy and instead drawing on a richer variety of leading indicators of inflation