collusion under asymmetric information when applied to groups the revelation principle postulates a bayesian nash behavior between agents their binding agreements are unenforceable or the principal can prevent them at no cost we analyze instead a mechanism design problem in which the agents can communicate between themselves and collude under asymmetric information we characterize the set of implementable collusion proof contracts both when the principal offers anonymous and nonanonymous contracts after having isolated the nexi and the stakes of collusion we proceed to a normative analysis perform some comparative statics discuss our concept of collusion proofness and provide some insights about transaction costs in side contracting

foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture subgame perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period assume zero costs positive interest rate continuum of buyers and some technical conditions if buyers valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique buyers strategies are stationary and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist but at most one with analytic strategies coase s conjecture is verified for stationary strategies reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation connections to bargaining models are described journal qf economic literature classification

negotiation under possible third party resolution abstractthe effect of a possible third party resolution on negotiation behavior is studied in an economic bargaining experiment the bargaining phase is preceded by a production phase that allows for different fairness principles to guide the division of the total production value the experimental results show that a possible third party resolution lowers the dispute costs by reducing the number of rounds of alternating offers in the presence of a third party negotiators make first offers that are more strongly related to their production which reduces the number of bargaining rounds the production phase has an effect on the distributional property of the agreements in negotiations in which third party resolution is an option the negotiation outcome shifts toward a more unequal outcome more in line with each person s contribution

political economy information and incentives abstract this paper shows how the instruments of incentive theory can be used to develop some views about the proper design of governments to avoid the capture of politicians and bureaucrats by interest groups first treating politicians as informed supervisors to whom economic policy is delegated we show the usefulness of the separation of powers to increase the transaction costs of collusion the relevance of asymmetric control for avoiding reciprocal favors the incompleteness of the constitutional contract leaves discretion to politicians who become residual decision makers we study the trade offs between greater efficiency obtained by allowing powerful instruments to politicians and less discretion by restricting on the contrary those instruments determinants of those trade offs are the variability of the environment the extent of asymmetric information about tastes and technologies and the size of majorities finally we show the new theory of incentives for group behavior can be used to determine the transaction costs of collusion under asymmetric information and to which extent these costs relax the constraints imposed on government by collusive behavior

contracts for venture capital financing with double sided moral hazard using a nash bargaining approach we analyze the financing contract between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist with double sided moral hazard in a start up enterprise our results show that there exists an optimal contract set between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist in which all contracts achieve an identical second best social state within the optimal contract set there exists continuum of joint debt equity financing the pure equity financing contract exists in the optimal contract set when the ratio of total social surplus to the amount of investment is greater than a threshold

the organization and scope of agents regulating multiproduct industries abstract a mechanism design problem with two dimensional uncertainty is solved to derive the optimal policy for regulating a monopolist with private information about the marginal cost of producing two different goods the paper establishes that informational economies of scope or incentive complementarities arise when one firm produces both goods the regulator should weigh these economies against the benefits of relative performance incentives when choosing between integrated and decentralized organizations unless the marginal costs of the two products are sufficiently positively correlated the optimal ex ante policy gives control of both markets to a single firm journal of economic literature classification number s d82 l22 l51

commercialization of patents and external financing during the r d phase abstract using a unique database on swedish patents owned by small firms and individuals survival models estimate how different factors influence the decision to commercialize the patents such an analysis has seemingly never previously been undertaken since the owners know more about the patents than potential external financiers problems related to asymmetrical information are present to overcome these problems when inventors and small technology based firms need financing sweden has for a long time relied on government support rather than private venture capital firms the empirical results show that the larger is the share of patent owners costs covered by government financial support during the r d phase the lower is the probability of patents being commercialized this lower degree of commercialization is likely to depend on 1 the soft terms of the government loans where the patent owner can avoid paying back the loan if the patent is never commercialized and or 2 that the government is not able to select promising projects the first explanation is related to moral hazard and the second one to adverse selection the policy suggestion is for government to change the design of the loans to base them on firms rather than projects

a comparison of conventional final offer and combined arbitration for dispute resolution two widely used forms of arbitration are conventional arbitration in which the arbitrator makes an unconstrained settlement choice and final offer arbitration in which the arbitrator must choose between disputants final offers under an innovative as yet unused approach called combined arbitration if the arbitrator s notion of a fair settlement lies between the disputants final offers final offer arbitration rules are used otherwise conventional arbitration rules are used theoretically by combining the risks that the two standard forms of arbitration pose for disputants who do not voluntarily settle combined arbitration should generate convergent final offers the results of this controlled laboratory study show however that dispute rates are highest in combined arbitration and lowest in conventional arbitration these results challenge the theoretical predictions for combined arbitration as well as claims that final offer arbitration should reduce disputes compared to conventional arbitration the results are however consistent with a simple theory of disputant optimism

committees and rent seeking effort abstract this paper explores the extent to which administrative structures may influence the extent of rent seeking effort within the environments explored relatively smaller efforts tend to be invested to influence the deliberations of commitees than those of single administrators to the extent that these efforts may be considered unproductive rent seeking the widespread use of committees may reflect the fact that savings from reduced rent seeking more than offset the greater decision costs of committees

venture capital and the macroeconomy i develop a model of venture capital vc intermediation that quantitatively explains central empirical facts about vc activity and can evaluate its macroeconomic relevance the impact of vc backed innovations is significantly larger than suggested by observed aggregate venture exit valuations even after accounting for large exposures to systematic and uninsurable idiosyncratic risks the risk properties of venture capital play a quantitatively important role in both explaining empirical regularities and shaping the value of ventures contributions to economic growth the model is analytically tractable and yields exact solutions despite the presence of matching frictions imperfect risk sharing and endogenous growth received january 16 2018 editorial decision november 7 2018 by editor stijn van nieuwerburgh

coordination and the provision of incentives to a common regulated firm abstract this paper considers the problem faced by two regulators in providing incentives to a common privately informed regulated firm under various degrees of coordination in the model the firm exerts effort toward cost reduction and self dealing and incentives can be input based monitoring and output based demanded cost targets full coordination between the regulators leads to the second best allocation a setting in which the regulators do not fully coordinate leads to i higher overall monitoring more aggressive input based incentives and ii higher demanded cost targets i e more lenience in terms of output based incentives as a consequence of i in all possible equilibria the effort toward cost reduction will be smaller when the agent reports to two regulators who do not coordinate i and ii imply that the impact on the effort toward self dealing activities is ambiguous in our leading example self dealing will be larger if the regulators coordinate on monitoring levels but smaller if they choose monitoring levels independently

the bright and dark side of staging investment performance and the varying motivations of private equity firms previous papers that examined investment decisions by private equity funds are divided on whether staging has a positive or negative effect on returns we believe these opposing views can be reconciled by studying when staging is used during the life of the investment relationship we find that staging has a positive effect on investment returns in the beginning of the investment relationship consistent with the notion that staging helps mitigate information asymmetry however staging appears to be negatively associated with returns when used prior to the exit decision our unique dataset allows us to measure these intertemporal effects precisely

reinterpreting arbitration s narcotic effect an experimental study of learning in repeated bargaining field evidence suggests that arbitration increases negotiation dispute rates we study repeated bargaining in a laboratory to understand the reasons why our results represent a reinterpretation of an explanation known as the narcotic effect the standard interpretation assumes that the probability of dispute without arbitration is constant across negotiations but field evidence suggests that experienced bargainers have fewer disputes to properly assess arbitration s impact we compare bargainer learning with and without arbitration under otherwise comparable laboratory conditions and develop a model to measure learning we find strong evidence that learning occurs in both cases but is slower with arbitration journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 c92 d77 j52 q 1998 academic press

is effective junior equity market regulation possible the authors examined canada s capital pool company cpc program a regulated blind pool program since its inception in 1986 they found that the cpc regulations increased the quality of both the junior equity companies going public and the underwriters taking those companies public and significantly reduced the incidence of fraud in that market overall the authors found that effective regulation can help create a viable junior equity market that facilitates the development of smaller companies

the making of economic policy a transaction cost politics perspective economic policymaking as a political process the normative approach to policy analysis the positive view of political economy a synthesis the policy process in real time a theme transaction costs the transaction cost politics framework political outcomes and economic efficiency transaction cost analysis in politics mechanisms to cope with transaction costs in politics national differences two case studies to illustrate transaction cost politics tax and expenditure reform in the united states the gatt and national trade politics some reflections and suggestions some lessons for the policy process the role of the economist concluding comments appendix multiprincipal multitask agencies

private equity returns and disclosure around the world to obtain more funds from the institutional investors private equity pe fund managers may report inflated valuations of private investee companies that are not yet sold however such overvaluations may result in a reputational cost when those investments are realized using evidence from 39 countries we show that there are significant systematic biases in managers reporting of fund performance we find that these biases depend on the accounting and legal environment in a country and on proxies for the degree of information asymmetry between institutional investors and pe fund managers

default and renegotiation a dynamic model of debt we analyze the role of debt in persuading an entrepreneur to pay out cash e ows rather than to divertthem in the e rstpartof the paper we study the optimal debt contract specie cally the trade off between the size of the loan and the repayment under the assumption that some debt contract is optimal in the second part we consider a more general class of nondebt contracts and derive sufficient conditions for debt to be optimal among these

a theoretical analysis of optimal financing strategies for different types of capital constrained entrepreneurs in this paper we compare two alternative financing strategies that capital constrained entrepreneurs can adopt they can either wait until they raised enough money to complete their project the more conservative strategy or use limited resources to achieve some intermediate milestone before contacting large outside investors such as venture capitalists the more adventurous strategy we examine how the choice of financing strategy is affected by entrepreneurial types life style serial and pure profit maximizing entrepreneur we show that specific entrepreneurial characteristics may ultimately affect the shape of firms as they may pursue different strategies to achieve similar goals the paper generates a number of empirical predictions on security design the interplay between angel and venture capital finance and the professionalization of the venture capital market c 2006 elsevier inc all rights reserved

collective bargaining in the public sector the effect of legal structure on dispute costs and wages this paper examines the impact of collective bargaining legislation on dispute costs and wages using a panel of canadian public sector contracts the authors results suggest that policymakers designing collective bargaining legislation face a trade off between reducing dispute costs and increasing wages dispute costs are lower under compulsory arbitration than under the right to strike or when no collective bargaining legislation exists hence a switch to compulsory arbitration could potentially make both the union and the employer better off by reducing dispute costs however the authors find that wages are higher under compulsory arbitration than under other legal structures copyright 1991 by american economic association

determinants and welfare of the environmental regulatory stringency before and after regulatory capture abstract the enforcement of environmental regulation relies on the willingness and capacity of the regulator the willingness could be disabled by regulatory capture which is widespread and that how many public resources should be invested in environmental regulation is always debatable we develop a 3 stage game to analyze the nonlinear effects and mechanism of regulatory capture and regulatory capacity on environmental regulatory welfare our model suggests that the importance of the regional economy to government the firm size and the customer s disutility on pollution emissions will influence the possibility of regulatory capture furthermore the dynamic research suggests that when the regulatory capture is controlled with the improvement of governmental regulatory capacity the regulator s and customer s welfare continues to grow until the capacity achieves a threshold beyond the threshold the regulatory capacity will be redundant

does fact finding promote settlement theory and a test nonbinding recommendations such as provided by fact finders are shown to significantly increase voluntary settlements in bargaining theoretically it is unclear whether recommendations will increase settlement rates a recommendation may reduce outcome uncertainty thereby chilling bargaining and increasing dispute rates on the other hand a recommendation may give the parties a focal point around which an agreement is made which of these effects dominates is a question that we consider using theory and data from controlled bargaining experiments the data show the dominance of a focal point effect for suggestions highlighting their potential role in improving dispute settlement procedures

does resorting to online dispute resolution promote agreements experimental evidence abstract this paper presents an experiment performed to test the properties of an innovative bargaining mechanism called automated negotiation used to resolve disputes arising from internet based transactions the main result shows that the settlement rule tends to chill bargaining as it creates incentives for individuals to misrepresent their true valuations which implies that automated negotiation is not able to promote agreements however this perverse effect depends strongly on the conflict situation when the threat that a disagreement occurs is more credible the strategic effect is reduced since defendants are more interested in maximizing the efficiency of a settlement than their own expected profit the implications of these results are then used to discuss the potential role of public regulation and reputation mechanisms in cyberspace

publicly funded r d programs and survival of patents i apply a survival model to a detailed data set of swedish patents to estimate how different financing factors affect the likelihood of patent renewal since the owners know more about the patents than potential external financiers there is a problem of asymmetric information to overcome this sweden has for a long time relied on government support rather than private venture capital pvc in the empirical analysis two kinds of government loans are unbundled the empirical results show that patents which have received soft government loans in the r d phase have a higher probability of expiring than patents without such financing but patents that have received more market oriented government loans during the commercialization phase are renewed for as long as other commercialized patents this finding suggests that rather than bad choices of projects it is the nature of the contract terms that explains the low renewal of some patents with government financing

determinants of the incidence and scale of seed capital investments by venture capital firms employing both behavioral decision making and agency theories our study seeks to identify those factors that influence a venture capital vc firm s decision to undertake seed capital investments and subsequently the scale of such activity using data on the investments made by 2949 vc funds raised worldwide between 1962 and 2002 we find investor age timing of investment and fund location to be of importance in addition the size of the fund and the existing number of portfolio firms exert opposite influences on the level of seed capital activity of the vc firm these results suggest that seed activity is a valuable source of market intelligence for leading vc firms seeking proactively to identify and invest in novel technologies

an incomplete contract perspective on public good provision abstract this paper surveys what can be learned from recent advances in the incomplete contract literature to understand how public goods are or should be provided the paper starts with a section on the full information case that presents and discusses the classical samuelson condition on the optimal provision of public goods the rest of the paper presents results under asymmetric information it is constituted of two main parts in the first one the social planner has complete contracting ability we discuss the basic setting and assumptions of this comprehensive contracting approach and study the trade offs it generates the second part of the paper is devoted to the study of contracting incompleteness such incompleteness can emerge from various sources which we present and discuss we then study the case of a politically chosen decision maker and the consequences of its inability to commit for more than one period and of the ability for individuals to form groups finally we address the problem of the choice between public and private forms of public good provision the concluding section summarizes the main policy lessons

dispute resolution or escalation the strategic gaming of feedback withdrawal options in online markets many online markets encourage traders to make good after an unsatisfactory transaction by offering the opportunity to withdraw negative reputational feedback in a dispute resolution phase motivated by field evidence and guided by theoretical considerations we use laboratory markets with two sided moral hazard to show that this option contrary to the intended purpose produces an escalation of dispute the mutual feedback withdrawal option creates an incentive to leave negative feedback independent of the opponent s behavior to improve one s bargaining position in the dispute resolution phase this leads to distorted reputation information and less trust and trustworthiness in the trading phase buyers who refuse to give feedback strategically even when it comes at a personal cost mitigate the detrimental impact it is also mitigated in markets with one sided moral hazard and a unilateral feedback withdrawal option the supplementary appendix is available at https doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2017 2802 t

competition and corruption in an agency relationship abstract the paper reconsiders the relationship between competition and corruption in a model where corruption has solid informational foundations and where the regulatory response to the possibility of corruption is taken into account it is shown that the effect of greater competition on corruption depends on the complementarity or substitutability of the two instruments available to decrease information rents namely low powered incentives and greater competition the paper concludes with a brief empirical exploration of the relationship between competitiveness and corruption on african data

the effect of capital market characteristics on the value of start up firms we develop an equilibrium model of contracting bargaining and search in which the relative scarcity of venture capital affects the bargaining power of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists this in turn affects the pricing contracting and value creation in start ups the relative scarcity of venture capital is endogenous and depends on the profitability of venture capital investments entry costs and transparency of the venture capital market supply and demand conditions also affect the incentives of venture capitalists to screen projects ex ante we characterize both the short and long run dynamics of the venture capital industry which provides us with a stylized picture of the internet boom and bust periods our model is consistent with existing evidence and provides a number of new empirical predictions

noncooperative regulation of a nonlocalized externality with a nonlocalized pollution externality different groups bear the costs and benefits of abatement in the case of acid rain these groups are respectively consumers in the midwest and pollutees in the northeast these groups have conflicting interests that are represented respectively by a public utilities commission and an environmental regulator we analyze a model in which the environmental protection agency acting as a von stackelberg leader regulates pollution and the public utility commission regulates the price for a monopolist that has private information about the effectiveness of its abatement alternatives we characterize a noncooperative equilibrium and compare it with a cooperative equilibrium a nonlocalized pollution externality poses special regulatory problems when the benefits and the costs of abatement are borne by distinct groups whose interests are represented by different regulatory agencies a relevant example is acid rain which is believed to be caused in part by coal fired electricity generating plants these emit sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide which upon contact with moisture in the atmosphere form acid that falls with rain measures to reduce these emissions are of concern to the residents of the states in which the coal fired generating plants are located because abatement costs increase the prices they pay for electricity a number of plans have been proposed for distributing those costs more broadly but the costs of reducing the emissions of generating plants located in ohio will likely be borne in large part by ohio consumers and utilities while the benefits from abatement will largely be realized by the residents of the northeast and canada the control of a nonlocalized externality such as acid rain raises the issue of the relationship between the environmental regulator the environmental protection agency epa and the public utility commission the former is responsible for achieving an acceptable balance between the damage from pollution and the cost of abatement the latter is responsible for pricing electricity on the basis of the costs of production and pollution control one possibility is that cooperation between the two regulators leads to the joint regulation of emissions and prices cooperation would internalize the conflicting interests and mandates of the regulators but the distributive consequences of the regulatory alternatives inhibit cooperation the public utility commission for example has an interest in avoiding abate

public private partnerships and government spending limits abstract we consider public private partnerships in which a public official selects a project that is then developed and operated by a private contractor we derive optimal public accounting rules when the official s choice among projects is biased by ideology or social ties or because of pandering to special interests we give particular emphasis to how the rules should constrain the official s incentive to understate the costs of her pet projects in the basic model we show that the optimal accounting rule takes the form of a budget cap with a project s expected cost modified to reflect the official s distortionary incentives if the project can be partially financed privately then fixed price contracts can serve to curb political misbehavior by securitizing public sector liabilities we also consider the possibility that development and operations are each handled by different contractors such unbundling deprives public accountants of forward information about future costs but can prevent the official from funneling hidden future rents to contractors

the firm strikes back non compete agreements and the mobility of technical professionals this study explores how firms shape labor markets and career paths using employee non compete agreements the sociology of work has overlooked non competes but data indicate that nearly half of technical professionals in the united states are asked to sign such employment contracts fearing loss of investments in talent and trade secrets firms use non competes to strike back against technical professionals increased mobility following the decline of internal labor markets in depth interviews with 52 randomly sampled patent holders in a single industry coupled with a survey of 1 029 engineers across a variety of industries reveal that ex employees subject to non competes are more likely to take career detours that is they involuntarily leave their technical field to avoid a potential lawsuit moreover firms strategically manage the process of getting workers to sign such contracts waiting for workers bargaining position to weaken these findings inform our understanding of the social organizati

using stock price information to regulate firms this paper examines the role of the information contained in stock prices in the regulation of privatized firms stock prices contain noisy but unbiased information about firm s future prospects that regulators can use to decide on some regulatory policies the main argument developed is that the observation of stock price movements reduces the incentives of regulators to develop their own monitoring technologies and can allow them to commit to relatively lighthanded regulations this protects firm s investments in cost reduction activities and can increase ex ante welfare this article is concerned with the analysis of the interactions between the public listing of regulated companies and their regulation the central idea is that public listing modifies the information structure of regulators and thus the regulation implemented some evidence can motivate this view

product market competition and the financing of new ventures this paper examines the interaction between venture risk product market competition and the entrepreneur s choice between bank financing and venture capital vc financing under bank financing a debt type contract emerges as optimal which allows the entrepreneur to retain full control of the venture and thus yields strong effort incentives as long as the entrepreneur can service the debt repayment however this leads to liquidation in the case of default making the venture s success quite sensitive to exogenous even temporary shocks that may hinder debt repayment under vc financing an equity type contract emerges as optimal although it is not sensitive to exogenous shocks this contract requires the entrepreneur to share a fraction of the rents with the financier thus yielding lower effort incentives for the entrepreneur there exists a threshold level of venture risk such that bank financing is optimal if and only if venture risk is below that threshold product market competition increases the value of stronger entrepreneurial incentives and thus increases the maximum level of risk the entrepreneur is willing to take before switching from bank financing to vc financing this is a robust result that is shown to hold in various models of competition including the hotelling salop dixit stiglitz and cournot to bertrand switch this paper was accepted by lee fleming entrepreneurship and innovation

accounting information in financial contracting the incomplete contract theory perspective this paper reviews theoretical and empirical work on financial contracting that is relevant to accounting researchers its primary objective is to discuss how the use of accounting information in contracts enhances contracting efficiency and to suggest avenues for future research we argue that incomplete contract theory broadens our understanding of both the role accounting information plays in contracting and the mechanisms through which efficiency gains are achieved by discussing its rich theoretical implications we expect incomplete contract theory to prove useful in motivating future research and in offering directions to advance our knowledge of how accounting information affects contract efficiency

estimating the narcotic effect of public sector impasse procedures this paper first describes in a relatively nontechnical fashion several econometric techniques that the authors believe should be useful to industrial relations researchers those techniques are then applied to an analysis of whether public sector impasse procedures create a narcotic effect that is a tendency for the bargaining parties once they use the procedures to become increasingly reliant on them in future negotiations the authors reanalyze data from thomas kochan and jean baderschneider s study of the impasse experience of police and firefighters under new york state s taylor law during the 1968 76 period and find that while a narcotic effect did exist as kochan and baderschneider argued that relationship lasted only during the early years of the period and was actually reversed in later years the authors conclude by explaining how such a pattern of results could occur tracing the implications of their findings for public policy and suggesting other research questions that could be anal

early stage financing and firm growth in new industries this paper shows that active investors such as venture capitalists can affect the speed at which new ventures grow in the absence of product market competition new ventures financed by active investors grow faster initially though in the long run those financed by passive investors are able to catch up by contrast in a competitive product market new ventures financed by active investors may prey on rivals that are financed by passive investors by strategically overinvesting early on resulting in long run differences in investment profits and firm growth the value of active investors is greater in highly competitive industries as well as in industries with learning curves economies of scope and network effects as is typical for many new economy industries for such industries our model predicts that start ups with access to venture capital may dominate their industry peers in the long run

factors that determine the reputation of private equity managers in developing markets abstract this paper analyzes the relationship between investors and private equity managers in order to identify the factors that affect the latter s reputation since there are no individual references about their past returns in developing private equity markets the reputation of such players is thought to be linked to their capacity for obtaining new funds results provide evidence of the volume of investments recorded in the past the ratio of portfolio companies to investment manager the percentage of divestments carried out through initial public offerings and trade sales the membership of the national private equity association and the size of funds under management as characteristics of the highest importance in raising funds

venture capital and new business creation abstract using a comprehensive database of firms from 21 european countries over the period 1998 2008 we find that venture capital investment has a positive effect on the rate of new business creation this is especially true in countries with higher entry costs higher protection of intellectual property rights and lower taxes on capital gains our results suggest that controlling for country and industry characteristics venture capital is beneficial to bringing new ideas to the marketplace in the shape of new companies

regulatory capture a review this article reviews both the theoretical and empirical literatures on regulatory capture the scope is broad but utility regulation is emphasized i begin by describing the stigler peltzman approach to the economics of regulation i then open the black box of influence and regulatory discretion using a three tier hierarchical agency model under asymmetric information in the spirit of laffont and tirole 1993 i discuss alternative modelling approaches with a view to a richer set of positive predictions including models of common agency revolving doors informational lobbying coercive pressure and influence over committees i discuss empirical work involving capture and regulatory outcomes i also review evidence on the revolving door phenomenon and on the impact that different methods for selecting regulators appear to have on regulatory outcomes the last section contains open questions for future research copyright 2006 oxford university press

start ups venture capitalists and the capital gains tax a model of start up finance with double moral hazard is proposed entrepreneurs have ideas and technical competence but lack own resources as well as commercial experience venture capitalists vcs provide start up finance and managerial support both types of agents thus jointly contribute to the firm s success but neither type s effort is verifiable we find that the market equilibrium is biased towards inefficiently low entrepreneurial effort and venture capital support in this situation the capital gains tax is particularly harmful the introduction of a small tax impairs effort and advice and leads to a first order welfare loss several other policies towards venture capital and start up entrepreneurship are also investigated

a theory of strategic venture investing some venture capital investors seek purely financial gains while others such as corporations also pursue strategic objectives the paper examines a model where a strategic investor can achieve synergies but can also face a conflict of interest with the entrepreneur if the start up is a complement to the strategic partner it is optimal to obtain funding from the strategic investor if the start up is a mild substitute the entrepreneur prefers an independent venture capitalist with a strong substitute syndication becomes optimal such that the independent venture capitalist is the active lead investor and the strategic partner a passive co investor the expected returns for the entrepreneur are nonmonotonic lowest for a mild substitute and higher for a strong substitute as well as for a complement the paper also explains why a strategic investor often pays a higher valuation than an independent venture capitalist

specialist versus generalist investors trading off support quality investment horizon and control rights abstract we model an entrepreneur s selection of either an active specialist or a passive generalist investor for an innovative venture that requires external equity for startup and expansion financing we assume that the specialist investor provides better support but has a shorter investment horizon than the generalist we particularly focus on the entrepreneur s net present value npv maximizing contract taking into account the specialist s potential moral hazard this latter might try selling his claim in a secondary transaction to an uninformed outside investor even though the project is unsuccessful and should be abandoned we show that the entrepreneur may trade off crucial contract parameters when seeking external financing either type of investor may be preferable contingent on the allocation of control rights the investor s support quality and investment horizon the chances of success and the venture s expected liquidation value

in search of complementary assets the determinants of alliance formation of high tech start ups abstract why do new technology based firms ntbfs cooperate starting from teece s teece d j 1986 profiting from technological innovation implications for integration collaboration licensing and public policy research policy 15 285 305 conceptual framework and taking advantage of subsequent literature on alliance formation in the resource and competence based tradition and in the social structure perspective we derive an empirical model that aims at highlighting the inducements and obstacles that these firms face in alliance formation according to firm specific characteristics and the nature of the alliance in particular a distinction is made between exploitative commercial alliances and explorative technological alliances the econometric estimates based on a large sample of italian young high tech firms that are observed from 1994 to 2003 provide strong evidence supporting two key intuitions of teece s work first the combination of specialized complementary assets appears to be a key driver of the formation of exploitative commercial alliances by ntbfs more specifically patent holding affects positively the likelihood to establish commercial alliances but this propensity is found to rapidly decrease with firm size suggesting that as long as ntbfs become larger and possess specialized commercial assets their urge for commercial alliances diminishes second following the parallelism set forth by teece between search for alliance partners and access to external financing the analysis indicates that potentially beneficial alliances may not take place because of the high transaction costs faced by smaller ntbfs in this respect our results clearly support the view that sponsor institutions as public research organizations venture and corporate venture capitalists may sensibly reduce these costs and that their role crucially depends on both the identity of the sponsor and the type of alliance

does acquiring venture capital pay off for the funded firms a meta analysis on the relationship between venture capital investment and funded firm financial performance abstract researchers and practitioners frequently propose that venture capital vc is an important resource to increase the performance of funded firms especially in environments of uncertainty in this paper we scrutinize these theoretical propositions following an evidence based research approach we synthesize 76 empirical samples on 36 567 firms we find a small positive performance effect of vc investment on funded firm performance however the effect vanishes if researchers control for industry selection effects furthermore we find that the performance effect mainly relates to firm growth while profitability is unaffected we also uncover that performance effects are reduced when the funded firms are very young or very mature in addition studies focusing on ipo events which constitute the majority of studies determine a substantially smaller performance effect we discuss theoretical implications and offer suggestions for future research on vc

managerial incentives and the role of advisors in the continuous time agency model we explore a continuous time agency model with double moral hazard using a venture capitalist vc entrepreneur relationship where the vc both supplies costly effort and chooses the optimal timing of the initial public offering ipo we show that optimal ipo timing is earlier under double moral hazard than under single moral hazard our results also indicate that the manager s compensation tends to be paid earlier under double moral hazard we derive several comparative static results notably that ipo timing is earlier when the need for monitoring by the vc is smaller and when the volatility of cash flows is larger the author 2013 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

an experimental comparison of dispute rates in alternative arbitration systems this paper reports the results of a systematic experimental comparison of the effect of alternative arbitration systems on dispute rates the key to our experimental design is the use of a common underlying distribution of arbitrator fair awards in the different arbitration systems this allows us to compare dispute rates across different arbitration procedures where we hold fixed the amount of objective underlying uncertainty about the arbitration awards there are three main findings first dispute rates are inversely related to the monetary costs of disputes dispute rates were much lower in cases where arbitration was not available so that the entire pie was lost in the event of a dispute this confirms the empirical importance of the so called chilling effect on bargaining that has been conjectured is produced by the adoption of arbitration systems second the dispute rate in a final offer arbitration system is at least as high as the dispute rate in a comparable conventional arbitration system contrary to the usual argument we find no evidence that final offer arbitration eliminates the chilling effect third dispute rates are inversely related to the uncertainty costs of disputes dispute rates were lower in conventional arbitration treatments where the variance of the arbitration award was higher and imposed greater costs on risk averse negotiators our results can also be interpreted as providing tentative evidence that the negotiators were risk averse on average finally we find general agreement between the dispute rates in our experiment and dispute rates found in the field in comparable settings

the us bankruptcy law and private equity financing empirical evidence the generous personal bankruptcy law in the united states is important to entrepreneurs because failed entrepreneurs can resort to this system to shelter part of their wealth against negative consequences of business failure fan and white journal of law and economics xlvi 543 567 2003 documented that high bankruptcy exemptions provide incentives for entrepreneurs to start own new businesses the partial wealth insurance effect provided by the bankruptcy exemptions also has a significant and negative impact on the entrepreneurs access to bank credits berkowitz and white the rand journal of economics 35 1 69 84 2004 gropp scholz and white the quarterly journal of economics 112 1 217 251 1997 in this article we investigate whether and to what extent the us bankruptcy law has any effect on venture capital vc investment making use of company level information we document that the amount of venture financing received is negatively related to the bankruptcy exemption levels and the number of rounds of financing as well as the number of vc funds involved is negatively associated with bankruptcy exemptions further we report consistent evidences based on state level data with regard to the effects of the us personal bankruptcy law

renegotiation design with multiple regulators abstract one striking feature of the internal organization of governments is the existence of multiple regulators this paper explains this organizational choice as coming from the government s limited ability to commit the separation of powers between two regulators is modeled as a stackelberg common agency game with respect to the case of a single regulator the allocative efficiency and the regulated firm s informational rent are both reduced in the unique equilibrium of this game however when regulators have a limited ability to commit this static cost of regulators separation becomes a dynamic benefit separation makes renegotiation harder and improves commitment journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 l51

financial contracting theory meets the real world an empirical analysis of venture capital contracts we compare the characteristics of real world financial contracts to their counterparts in financial contracting theory we do so by studying the actual contracts between venture capitalists vcs and entrepreneurs the distinguishing characteristic of vc financings is that they allow vcs to separately allocate cash flow rights board rights voting rights liquidation rights and other control rights we describe and measure these rights we then interpret our results in relation to existing financial contracting theories we also describe the interrelation and the evolution across financing rounds of the different rights query 1 query 2

separation of powers and development abstract we model separation of powers as an instrument against corruption more specifically as a way to decrease the costs of collusion proofness then we show that the value of this institutional design is higher in developing countries unfortunately the same reasons which are behind this higher value also increase the implementation cost of this institution

toward a theory of regulation for developing countries following jean jacques laffont s lead the efficient operation and expansion of infrastructures in developing countries is crucial for growth and poverty reduction however recent reforms aimed at improving the performance of these sectors have had limited success evidence suggests that in many instances this was because the traditional regulatory theory relied on by policymakers was not suitable for the institutional context in developing countries this article surveys more recent theoretical work focusing on problems with regulation in these countries at the heart of the survey is the work of jean jacques laffont who in the last decade of his life set about developing a theoretical framework for regulation in developing countries we consider the implications of his work which focused on the key institutional limitations faced in developing countries we then discuss where experience suggests that there are important omissions from this modeling bringing in extensions and alternative approaches pursued by other authors we conclude by summarizing the key ways in which regulatory policy will be different when institutions are weak overall we find that an understanding of the institutional context and its implications are crucial when designing a regulatory framework for developing countries

credit mismatch and breakdown abstract this paper studies the phenomenon of mismatch in a decentralized credit market where borrowers and lenders must engage in costly search to establish credit relationships our dynamic general equilibrium framework integrates incentive based informational frictions with a matching process highlighted by i borrowers endogenous market entry and exit decision entry frictions and ii time and resource costs necessary to locate credit opportunities search frictions a key feature of the incentive compatible loan contract negotiated between borrowers and lenders is the interaction of informational frictions in the form of moral hazard with entry and search frictions we find that the removal of entry barriers can eliminate incentive based equilibrium credit rationing more generally entry and incentive frictions are important in understanding the extent of credit rationing and credit mismatch while search and incentive frictions are important for understanding credit market breakdown

separation of regulators against collusive behavior we show that the separation of powers in regulation may act as a commitment against the threat of regulatory capture splitting regulatory tasks and monitoring technologies among several nonbenevolent regulators may reduce their discretion in engaging in socially wasteful activities when regulators make collusive offers that are accepted by the agent whatever his characteristics competition between regulators relaxes collusion proofness constraints and improves social welfare this result is robust to different specifications of the agent s preferences and to the timing of the game as long as one insists on safe side contracting offers we also discuss how separation affects both allocative efficiency and the distribution of rents in the economy

deal structuring in philanthropic venture capital investments financing instrument valuation and covenants philanthropic venture capital phvc is a financing option available for social enterprises that like traditional venture capital provides capital and value added services to portfolio organizations differently from venture capital phvc has an ethical dimension as it aims at maximizing the social return on the investment this article examines the deal structuring phase of phvc investments in terms of instrument used from equity to grant valuation and covenants included in the contractual agreement by content analyzing a set of semi structured interviews and thereafter surveying the entire population of phvc funds that are active in europe and in the united states findings indicate that the non distribution constraint holding for non profit social enterprises is an effective tool to align the interests of both investor and investee this makes the investor behaving as a steward rather than as a principal conversely while backing non profit social ventures philanthropic venture capitalists structure their deal similarly as traditional venture capital as the absence of the non distribution constraint makes such investments subject to moral hazard risk both in terms of perks and stealing and social impact focus

agency risk control through reprisal abstract we study agency risk control by venture capital vc firms to highlight the importance of vc reprisal ability the central thesis of this paper is that a vc firm s due diligence effort as an ex ante screening for agency risk is contingent upon its ex post reprisal ability applying to the context of emerging markets we develop a testable hypothesis and empirically test it using data from singapore market it is found that foreign vc firms that are relatively weak in reprisal ability spend more effort in due diligence screening compared to local vc firms

the politics of government decision making a theory of regulatory capture the paper develops an agency theoretic approach to interest group politics and shows the following 1 the organizational response to the possibility of regulatory agency politics is to reduce the stakes interest groups have in regulation 2 the threat of producer protection leads to low powered incentive schemes for regulated firms 3 consumer politics may induce uniform pricing by a multiproduct firm 4 an interest group has more power when its interest lies in inefficient rather than efficient regulation where inefficiency is measured by the degree of informational asymmetry between the regulated industry and the political principal congress

credit and efficiency in centralized and decentralized economies we study a credit model where because of adverse selection unprofitable projects may nevertheless be financed indeed they may continue to be financed even when shown to be low quality if sunk costs have already been incurred we show that credit decentralization offers a way for creditors to commit not to refinance such projects thereby discouraging entrepreneurs from undertaking them initially thus decentralization provides financial discipline nevertheless we argue that it puts too high a premium on short term returns the model seems pertinent to two issues soft budget constraint problems in centralized economies and differences between anglo saxon and german japanese financing practices

the subsidiarity bias in regulation abstract we study the choice of the regulatory structure when a firm engages in different activities for different countries under decentralization regulatory contracts suffer from two opposite distortions the competition between regulatory authorities leads to too high powered contracts however with a dispersed ownership structure contracts tend to be too low powered for sufficiently substitutable activities decentralization always leads to an inefficient drift towards fixed price contracts nonetheless when regulators have private agendas and possess the discretion to distort their policy to gain the support of some interest groups decentralization may be preferred to centralization as competition between regulatory authorities mitigates their discretionary power

regulation competition and liberalization in many countries throughout the world regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries this essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process while stressing the importance of case specific analyses this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are procompetitive from corresponding anticompetitive liberalization policies

regulating complementary products a comparative institutional analysis optimal regulation subject to informational constraints is analyzed for industries for which production requires complementary inputs an issue for regulatory policy is whether supply in these industries should be bundled or unbundled bundled supply calls for regulation of an integrated industry unbundled supply has each component regulated separately a main result is that unbundling introduces into regulation an additional component of information cost that is similar to double marginalization in the monopoly pricing of complementary products unbundling may be advantageous if it allows sufficient competition in nonmonopoly services but the information cost can exceed the benefits of competition

on the market for venture capital we propose a theory of the market for venture capital that links the excess return to venture equity to the scarcity of venture capitalists vcs high returns make the vcs more selective and eager to terminate nonperforming ventures because they can move on to new ones the scarcity of vcs enables them to internalize their social value and the competitive equilibrium is socially optimal moreover the bilaterally efficient contract is a simple equity contract we estimate the model for the period 1989 2001 and compute the excess return to venture capital which turns out to be 8 6 percent finally we back out the return of solo entrepreneurs which is increasing in their wealth and ranges between zero and 3 5 percent

production in entrepreneurial firms the effects of financial constraints on labor and capital i model the contrasting capital labor decisions of financially constrained and unconstrained firms i show that financially restricted firms use relatively more labor than physical capital because informed employees provide more efficient financing than uninformed capital suppliers i demonstrate that constrained firms cannot easily attract new employees to replace existing staff their greater employee retention aligns owner worker incentives and encourages workers to make firm specific investments constrained firms however gradually suffer from their inability to replace low quality workers such that their relative labor productivity decreases over time empirical tests utilizing instrumental variables confirm several implications of the theory

information sharing price negotiation and management buy outs of private family owned firms perspectives relating to agency theory information asymmetries and game theory were utilized to explore two outcomes associated with the management buy out mbo or management buy in mbi of former private firms whether information was shared equally between vendors i e family firm owners and purchasers i e mbo i management teams and whether a mutually agreed price was achieved with reference to the themes of company ownership structure governance structure and company objectives several hypotheses were derived survey evidence was gathered from the managers of 114 former private family owned firms located across europe that recently reported an mbo i multiple logistic regression analysis detected that respondents in founded first generation family firms and those reporting a high focus on the strategic importance of the market value increment were more likely to report that information was shared equally between vendors and purchasers respondents reporting no suitable family successor had been identified a high focus on the strategic importance of the market value increment and the involvement of venture capitalists in succession planning were more likely to report that a mutually agreed sale price had been achieved implications for practitioners and researchers are discussed

compulsory arbitration arbitral risk and negotiated settlements a case study in bargaining under imperfect information the effect of conventional and final offer compulsory arbitration on negotiated settlements is characterized using nash s variable threats bargaining solution with particular attention to the interaction between arbitral risk and bargainers risk preferences when there is no arbitral risk both schemes are shown to have the same effect on negotiated settlements under very general conditions even when bargaining is over several issues whether or not there is arbitral risk negotiated settlements favour a bargainer more if his opponent is more risk averse on the other hand increases in arbitral risk need not improve the position of the less risk averse bargainer as a by product of the analysis kihlstrom roth and schmeidler s risk sensitivity results for the nash and raiffa kalai smorodinsky solutions are generalized from fixed threats to variable threats bargaining

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

collective bargaining in the public sector comment in a recent paper janet currie and sheena mcconnell 1991 hereafter cm provide evidence from the canadian public sector suggesting that requiring binding wage arbitration as opposed to granting the right to strike reduces dispute costs but increases wage costs disputes are defined as either an arbitration or a strike this leads them to conclude that compulsory arbitration pareto dominates other forms of legal structure both parties could potentially be made better off from the reduction in dispute costs associated with compulsory arbitration and those responsible for designing collective bargaining legislation face a trade off between reducing dispute costs and changing the division of the rent p 714 they base these important policy conclusions on their empirical evidence on the following relationships

made for each other perfect matching in venture capital markets abstract this paper studies bargaining power allocation and stable matching between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs with double sided moral hazard in venture capital markets we find that the optimal bargaining power allocation is determined by the output elasticities of effort by the two parties the higher the output elasticity for one s effort the greater her bargaining power we show that efficient and stable matching follows the principle of positive assortative matching suggesting that strong entrepreneurs vcs match with strong partners and weak ones match with weak counterparts using a large sample from the chinese venture capital market we empirically confirm that entrepreneurs and vcs with similar standing in their peer groups are more likely to match

what do entrepreneurs pay for venture capital affiliation this study empirically evaluates the certification and value added roles of reputable venture capitalists vcs using a novel sample of entrepreneurial start ups with multiple financing offers i analyze financing offers made by competing vcs at the first professional round of start up funding holding characteristics of the start up fixed offers made by vcs with a high reputation are three times more likely to be accepted and high reputation vcs acquire start up equity at a 10 14 discount the evidence suggests that vcs extra financial value may be more distinctive than their functionally equivalent financial capital these extra financial services can have financial consequences a central issue for early stage high tech entrepreneurs is obtaining external resources when the assets of their start up are intangible and knowledge based particularly for entrepreneurs without an established reputation convincing external resource providers such as venture capitalists vcs to provide financial capital may be challenging the literature contains two main lines of research for overcoming this problem one research stream has concentrated on designing institutional structures to permit financing early stage ventures this contractual and monitoring based approach is aimed at solving potential agency problems between investors and entrepreneurs e g admati and pfleiderer 1994 lerner 1995 hellmann 1998 and kaplan and str omberg 2001 2002 2003 a second research stream has suggested that when the quality of a start up cannot be directly observed external actors rely on the quality of the start up s affiliates as a signal of the start up s own quality

activism separation of powers and development we consider a model of constitutional mechanism design with separation of powers where different institutions are assigned different tasks in this context we define activism as an institution extending its mechanism of decision making into the domain of other institution s tasks when members of the institutions are likely to be benevolent as well as non benevolent such activism in a limited form reduces the cost of achieving collusion proofness and raises welfare hence the value of such activism can be potentially very high in the context of developing economies but as the fraction of non benevolent member increases such activism turns excessive and reduces welfare it is argued that developing economies are likely to get caught in the excessive activism trap because of the high levels of corruption and bribery

venture capitalists as principals contracting screening and monitoring there is a large academic literature on the principal agent problem in financial contracting this literature focuses on the conflicts of interest between an agent who is an entrepreneur with a venture that needs financing and a principal who is the investor providing the funds for the venture theory has identified a number of ways that the investor principal can mitigate these conflicts first the investor can structure financial contracts i e the allocation of cash flow and control rights between the entrepreneur and investor to provide incentives for the entrepreneur to behave optimally second the investor can engage in information collection before deciding whether to invest in order to screen out ex ante unprofitable projects and bad entrepreneurs and third the investor can engage in information collection and monitoring once the project is under way despite the large volume of theory empirical work has lagged behind in comparing the contracts and actions of real world principals to their counterparts in financial contracting theory in this paper we describe recent empirical work and its relation to theory for one prominent class of such principals venture capitalists vc s in our view vc s are real world entities that closely approximate the investors of theory vc s invest in entrepreneurs who need financing to fund a promising project or company vc s have strong incentives to maximize value but at the same time receive few or no private benefits of control although they are intermediaries vc s typically receive at least 20 percent of the profits on their portfolios see paul gompers and josh lerner 1999 in addition to being interesting from a theoretical perspective vc actions and contracts of are interesting from a practical perspective vc s have been extremely successful in the last several years i they have been associated with a number of the prominent corporate successes like ariba cisco ebay and yahoo ii they have generated substantial returns and wealth for their investors and iii they have raised and invested record amounts of money

regulatory responses to large format transnational retail in south east asian cities aggressive internationalisation by transnational chains is changing the face of the urban environment in much of emerging asia in south east asia the period following the asian financial crisis o

after the big bang obstacles to the emergence of the rule of law in post communist societies when russia launched mass privatization it was widely believed that it would create a powerful constituency for the rule of law that didn t happen we present a dynamic equilibrium model of the political demand for the rule of law and show that beneficiaries of mass privatization may fail to demand the rule of law even if it is the pareto efficient rule of the game the reason is that uncertainty about the legal regime can lead to asset stripping and stripping can give agents an interest in prolonging the absence of the rule of law this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

salaries and piece rates compensation can take many forms remuneration can come as pecuniary payments as fringes such as health and pension benefits or as a nonpecuniary reward such as plush office furniture that costs the firm less than it benefits the worker a significant literature has examined the trade offs between pecuniary and nonpecuniary compensation the modern work having been pioneered by rosen 1974 more recently another body of literature has examined the selection of method of total compensation ignoring the distinction between pecuniary and nonpecuniary payment this work has focused on risk and incentive factors it has resulted in comparisons of compensation based on absolute output levels to that based on relative performance it has also led to explorations of the relation of compensation to experience over the work life 2 little attention has been paid to what may be among the most important and obvious distinction in methods of compensation namely the choice between a fixed salary for some period of time that is paying on the basis of input and some workers receive compensation that is specified in advance and not directly contingent on performance instead it depends on an input measure such as hours worked for others compensation is directly related to output this essay is an attempt to predict a firm s choice of compensation method piece rates are defined more rigorously among the more important factors discussed are worker heterogeneity incentives sorting considerations monitoring costs and asymmetric information one result is that salary workers tend to be of lower quality and more homogeneous than are their piece rate counterparts numerous additional results are provided helpful comments by victoria lazear and yoram weiss are gratefully acknowledged support was provided by the department of labor and the national science foundation 1 see lazear and rosen 1981 stiglitz 1981 holmstrom 1982 green and stokey 1983 2 see lazear 1979 1981 and harris and holmstrom in press

financing and advising optimal financial contracts with venture capitalists this paper analyses the joint provision of effort by an entrepreneur and by an advisor to improve the productivity of an investment project without moral hazard it is optimal that both exert effort with moral hazard if the entrepreneur s effort is more efficient less costly than the advisor s effort the latter is not hired if she does not provide funds outside financing arises endogenously this explains why investors like venture capitalists are value enhancing the level of outside financing determines whether common stocks or convertible bonds should be issued in response to incentives

transaction costs institutional design and the separation of powers abstract the internal organization of the government can be used as a constraint on the capture of political decision makers in a setting where multiple interest groups try to influence policy outcomes centralization i e the choice of a single agency dealing with all interest groups is costly because it induces a better coordination of their influences the choice of specialized agencies is better because it increases the overall transaction costs of capture making agencies more immune to capture by interest groups more generally we discuss how an institutional design relying on separation of powers among specialized agencies may improve policy outcomes

credible communication in dynastic government abstract this paper studies information disclosure in a model of dynastic government when information about past policy choices comes exclusively from the reports of previous administrations each administration has an incentive to choose its suboptimal one shot expenditure policy and then misrepresent its choice to its successor consequently it has been suggested that horizontal accountability i e a system of governance where auditing functions lie outside the executive branch can ensure credible disclosure of a government s activities this paper suggests a cautious approach to that view the baseline model examines the reporting incentives of an external auditor who can independently verify the information each period even with auditing credible disclosure is shown to be problematic various extensions to this baseline model are examined in one extension liberal i e those prefering larger government expenditures and conservative those prefering smaller expenditures regimes and auditors evolve over time it is shown that conservative liberal auditors are not credible when the current regime is also conservative liberal moreover because information transmission stops when the auditor s and the regime s biases coincide effective deterrents even in the good periods when the auditor s and the administration s biases differ are difficult to construct in all periods the equilibrium requirement of auditor neutrality constrains the dynamic incentives for efficient policy choices these constraints are shown to bind away from optimal policies in standard constructions of equilibrium various ways in which auditing protocols can overcome these problems are discussed

inconsistent regulators evidence from banking we find that regulators can implement identical rules inconsistently due to differences in their institutional design and incentives and this behavior may adversely impact the effectiveness with which regulation is implemented we study supervisory decisions of u s banking regulators and exploit a legally determined rotation policy that assigns federal and state supervisors to the same bank at exogenously set time intervals comparing federal and state regulator supervisory ratings within the same bank we find that federal regulators are systematically tougher downgrading supervisory ratings almost twice as frequently as do state supervisors state regulators counteract these downgrades to some degree by upgrading more frequently under federal regulators banks report worse asset quality higher regulatory capital ratios and lower return on assets leniency of state regulators relative to their federal counterparts is related to costly outcomes such as higher failure rates and lower repayment rates of government assistance funds the discrepancy in regulator behavior is related to different weights given by regulators to local economic conditions and to some extent differences in regulatory resources we find no support for regulator self interest which includes revolving doors

corruption and inefficiency theory and evidence from electric utilities we investigate the determinants of the efficiency of firms with a focus on the role of corruption we construct a simple theoretical model where corruption increases factor requirements of firms because it diverts managerial effort away from factor coordination we then exploit a unique dataset comprising firm level information on 80 electricity distribution firms from 13 latin american countries for the years 1994 to 2001 as predicted by the model we find that more corruption in the country is strongly associated with more inefficient firms in the sense that they employ more inputs to produce a given level of output the economic magnitude of the effects is large the results hold both in models with country and firm fixed effects the results survive several robustness checks including different measures of output and efficiency and instrumenting for corruption other elements associated with inefficiency are public ownership inflation and lack of law and order but corruption appears to play a separate and more robust role

a theory of debt and equity diversity of securities and manager shareholder congruence this paper shows how the optimal financial structure of a firm complements incentive schemes to discipline managers and how the securities return streams determine the claim holders incentives to intervene in management the theory rationalizes 1 the multipucity of securities 2 the observed correlation between return streams and control rights of securities and 3 the partial congruence between managerial and equity holder preferences over policy choices and monetary rewards as well as the low level of interference of equity in management the theory also offers new prospects for a reappraisal of the earlier corporate finance literature