what determines female autonomy evidence from bangladesh abstract this paper examines the determinants of female autonomy within households in a developing country in particular we investigate the relative contributions of earned versus unearned income in enhancing women s autonomy and the role of employment outside of their husband s farm in a simple theoretical model it is demonstrated that earned income could be more important than unearned income in empowering women using data from rural bangladesh empirical estimations confirm this prediction and also reveal the surprising fact that it is not employment per se but employment outside their husbands farms that contributes to women s autonomy the data also point to the importance of choosing the correct threat point in theoretical analyses of female autonomy

political cycles in oecd economies this paper studies whether the dynamic behaviour of gnp growth unemployment and inflation is systematically affected by the timing of elections and of changes of governments the sample include the last three decades in 18 oecd economies we explicitly test the implication of several models of political cycles both of the opportunistic and of the partisan type also we confront the implication of recent rational models with more traditional approaches our results can be summarized as follows a the political business cycle hypothesis as formulated in nordhaus 1975 on output and unemployment is generally rejected by the data b inflation tends to increase immediately after elections perhaps as a result of pre electoral expansionary monetary and fiscal policies c we find evidence of temporary partisan differences in output and unemployment and of long run partisan differences in the inflation rate as implied by the rational partisan theory by alesina 1987 d we find virtually no evidence of permanent partisan differences in output growth and unemployment

do two earner households base their choice of residential location on both incomes this article focuses on the role of individual incomes in the residential location decisions of two earner households conventional studies often treat households as a black box and describe them by a single utility function the article raises the question is the household utility paradigm an adequate framework for understanding the location decisions of two earner households it tests an implication of the household utility paradigm the income pooling hypothesis for location decisions the results provide evidence for rejecting the hypothesis among childless families but fail to provide evidence for rejecting it when children are present the results raise the need to address intrahousehold dynamics in modelling location decisions

labor supply of husbands and wives a simultaneous equations approach labor supply functions for married men and women are formulated as a dynamic simultaneous equations system which is estimated using panel data controlling for fixed individual effects allows marginal labor supply responses to be disentangled from permanent patterns in hours worked due to assortative mating the results suggest that the labor supply of husbands and wives without pre school children is not jointly determined in the short run while families with young children exhibit strong interactions in work hours and negative cross earnings effects neither the joint utility model of family labor supply nor an ad hoc traditional family model is supported by these results the data are for the united states and concern 381 couples from the denver income maintenance experiment excerpt

domestic violence a nonrandom affair in this paper we develop and estimate a model of domestic violence we extend a noncooperative model of the family to include violence as a source of gratification and an instrument for controlling behavior we estimate the model by robust methods since the violence process appears to have a heavy tailed nonnormal error distribution we find that the properties of the equilibria depend on family income for low middle income families our results indicate an equilibrium in which one person s reservation utility constraint is binding whereas for higher income families both individuals may gain from the relationship

budgetary units a weberian approach to consumption1 established consumption theory relies heavily on application of individualistic frames and market models of behavior a framework built around consumption oriented groups would facilitate progress toward a more general theory of consumption this article reintroduces and extends weber s budgetary unit concept to address this gap correcting key problems dogging the consumption literature the budgetary unit concept 1 offers a new framework for theorizing and better accounting for observed consumption patterns 2 reveals how consumption units have organizational logics preferences strengths and vulnerabilities that are consequentially distinct from market logic of production and profit and 3 focuses attention on social processes and features enabling theorization of general social patterns of consumption across diverse contexts this article highlights the explanatory power and broad applicability of weber s budgetary unit approach using the conventionally dissimilar cases of russian organized

control and ownership of assets within rural ethiopian households this article investigates how the control and devolution of productive assets are allocated among husband and wife theory predicts that bargaining power within marriage depends on the division of assets upon divorce and on control over assets during marriage using detailed household data from rural ethiopia we show that assets brought to marriage ownership of assets control within marriage and disposition upon death or divorce are only partly related productive resources are controlled by the household head disposition upon death or divorce only loosely depends on individual ownership during marriage but control is associated with larger claims upon divorce assets brought into marriage have little impact on disposition upon death but matter in case of divorce

mommy tracks and public policy on self fulfilling prophecies and gender gaps in hiring and promotion abstract consider a model with two types of jobs the profitability of hiring a worker to a fast track job depends not only on his or her observable talent but also on incontractible effort we investigate whether self fulfilling expectations may lead to higher hiring or promotion standards for women if employers expect women to do more household work than men thereby exerting less effort in their paid job then women must be more talented to make it profitable to hire them specialization in the family will then result in women doing most of the household work such self fulfilling prophecies can be defeated by affirmative action or family policy however it is unlikely that temporary policy can move the economy to a symmetric equilibrium policy must be made permanent anti discrimination policy need not enhance efficiency and from a distribution viewpoint this is a policy with both winners and losers

endogenous gender power household labor supply and the demographic transition abstract we present a microeconomic model of the household in which there exists no difference in spousal preferences but childrearing is more time costly for women bargaining between the wife and the husband forms the basis of household decisions marital bargaining power is determined according to the incomes of the spouses which in turn help to determine their reservation utility levels outside the marriage the endogeneity of bargaining power introduces a non cooperative element to the couples decision making problem because both the husbands and the wives take into account how their pre marital education decisions affect their marital power and the share they extract from household resources in the future the model predicts that wives invest more than is pareto efficient in their education in order to increase their bargaining power in marriage as a consequence couples have fewer children and consume more when exogenous structural changes lead women to invest more in education a corollary of the model is that empowering women directly through social reforms such as a lower gender wage gap leads to lower fertility and higher spousal consumption and leisure

bargaining over babies theory evidence and policy implications it takes a woman and a man to make a baby this fact suggests that for a birth to take place the parents should first agree on wanting a child using newly available data on fertility preferences and outcomes we show that indeed babies are likely to arrive only if both parents desire one and there are many couples who disagree on having babies we then build a bargaining model of fertility choice and match the model to data from a set of european countries with very low fertility rates the distribution of the burden of child care between mothers and fathers turns out to be a key determinant of fertility a policy that lowers the child care burden specifically on mothers can be more than twice as effective at increasing the fertility rate compared to a general child subsidy

intergenerational household formation female labor supply and informal caregiving a bargaining approach children s provision of in kind services to their elderly parents informal caregiving represents an important form of economic transfers to the elderly in this paper we develop and estimate a joint model of informal caregiving and labor force participation decisions of adult daughters who have a frail elderly parent in a broader framework of intergenerational household formation parent and daughter agree to a nash bargaining rule as the solution to the household formation and intrahousehold decision making process however rather than severed relationships the threat point is given by a noncooperative equilibrium defined in terms of voluntary contributions toward a public good the parental well being maximum likelihood parameter estimates derived from the simultaneous multiequation endogenous switching model are generally consistent with expectations our results indicate that competing demands on daughters time reduce both coresidence and informal caregiving we also find that intergenerational coresidence is an important mode of assistance to elderly persons a simulation based on the estimated parameters suggests that public programs designed to meet the long term care needs of elderly persons by subsidizing formal home care services may have substantial effects on intergenerational living and care arrangement decisions

a framework for the analysis of moderate inflations abstract optimal monetary policy is studied in a model with no contractual restrictions or physical costs of changing prices nevertheless the price level is sticky in a range of mark up indeterminacy and inflation occurs only when employment presses against capacity under full information the monetary authority can exploit price level stickiness to minimize the mark up and keep employment at a constrained optimum without inflation under uncertainty negative aggregate demand shocks produce real contractions and positive shocks raise the price level the monetary authority can raise the likelihood that aggregate demand will maximize employment but at the cost of higher expected inflation

domestic violence and divorce law when divorce threats become credible the cost of divorce influences the bargaining position of spouses and thus their behavior within the marriage this study takes advantage of a major and unexpected reduction in divorce costs in spain to estimate the causal effects on domestic violence results suggest a 30 decline in spousal conflict as a consequence of the reform spousal violence is found to have decreased among couples who remained married after the modification in the law which suggests an important role for changes in bargaining within the marriage when divorce becomes a more credible cheaper option

recovering individual preferences for non market goods a collective travel cost model traditional recreation demand models do not make a distinction between a household and an individual as the reference decision making unit thus assuming that a family maximizes a single utility function even if the family consists of different individuals such models ignore the possibility of family members divergent preferences for non market goods this study proposes a novel approach the collective travel cost model ctcm to eliciting individual preferences for a non market good such as a recreation site by using revealed preference data this approach accounts for the intra household resource allocation and the role of each household member s preferences we show that the collective travel cost model can be applied to estimating a recreation demand model that yields individual welfare estimates appropriate for policy analysis of non market goods such as the willingness to pay to access a recreation site we find that how resources are distributed within the household reflects significant differences in welfare measures

child labor school attendance and intrahousehold gender bias in brazil an extensive survey data set of brazilian households is used to test whether intrahousehold gender bias affects the decisions of mothers and fathers to send their sons and daughters to work and to school an intrahousehold allocation model is examined in which fathers and mothers may affect the education investment and the child labor participation of their sons and daughters differently because of differences in parental preferences or differences in how additional schooling affects son s and daughter s acquisition of human capital brazilian household survey data for 1998 are used to estimate the impact of each parent s education on the labor market participation and school attendance of their sons and daughters for labor market participation the father s education has a greater negative impact than the mother s education on the labor status of sons the father s education also has a greater impact on son s labor status than on daughter s for schooling decisions the mother s education has a greater positive impact than the father s education on daughter s school attendance but fathers have a greater positive impact on sons school attendance than on daughter s

marriage specialization and the gender division of labor we consider why the gender division of labor is so often enforced by custom and why customary gender divisions of labor generally involve both direction and prohibition in our formal model agents first learn skills and then enter the marriage market we show that wasteful behavior may emerge due to strategic incentives in specialization choice and human capital acquisition and that both problems may be mitigated through a customary gender division of labor this division is not pareto improving both the distributional effects and welfare gains of a customary gender division of labor decrease as opportunities for market exchange increase

gender differentials in farm productivity implications for household efficiency and agricultural policy abstract within many african households agricultural production is simultaneously carried out on many plots controlled by different members of the household detailed plot level agronomic data from burkina faso provides striking evidence of substantial inefficiencies in the allocation of factors of production across the plots controlled by different members of the household production function estimates imply that the value of household output could be increased by 10 15 by reallocating currently used factors of production across plots this finding contradicts standard models of agricultural households a richer model of behaviour which recognizes that the individuals who comprise a household compete as well as co operate has important implications for the structure of agricultural production and for the design of agricultural policy

the impact of conditional cash transfers on marriage and divorce abstracta growing number of less developed countries have introduced conditional cash transfer programs in which funds are targeted to women economic models of the family suggest that these transfer programs may lead to marital turnover among program beneficiaries data from the experimental evaluation of the progresa program in mexico is used to provide new evidence on the short run impacts of targeted transfers on couples union dissolution and individuals new union formation decisions we find that although the overall share of women in union does not change as a result of the program marital turnover increases intact families eligible for the transfers experienced a modest 0 32 percentage points increase in separation rates with most of the effect concentrated among young and relatively educated women households in contrast young single women with low educational attainment levels experienced a substantial increase in new union formation rates the marital transition patterns are consistent

extended families and child well being studies of household behavior have established the distribution of resources among household members predicts spending and savings patterns however there is a paucity of evidence on the relationship between the well being of individual family members and the distribution of resources within an extended family including non co resident family members given the central role the family plays in many models of economic behavior this is an important gap in the literature using rich longitudinal survey data from the indonesia family life survey ifls evidence is presented on the relationship between three measures of health and education related human capital of children and the distribution of resources among extended family members ifls is ideally suited for this research since the survey collects detailed information about income and wealth from both coresident and non co resident family members the empirical model is founded on a natural extension of the collective model of household decision making chiappori 1988 1992 to the extended family the model is particularly appealing in this context because it places few restrictions on preferences of individual family members and does not specify a specific bargaining mechanism that underlies negotiations the collective model yields empirical tests of whether the behavior of family members is pareto efficient a special case of the model allows all family members to be completely altruistic which is observationally equivalent to a unitary model of family behavior that special case is rejected by the data however the restrictions of the efficient model are not rejected indicating that non co resident family members are able to co ordinate allocation decisions with respect to child human capital investments in such a way as to make no family member better off without another member being worse off

elections and capital flows this paper investigates the extent to which elections affect capital flows i find little evidence of political capital flow cycles in advanced economies in emerging and developing countries however presidential elections significantly lower preelection foreign direct investment fdi inflows but have no effect on other types of capital flows furthermore i find evidence that these cycles are not caused by economic crises related to elections or preelection manipulation of policy variables these results suggest that uncertainty about future government policies which should have greater impact on more irreversible forms of capital flows like fdi may be an important factor in generating this cycle

public good provision in indian rural areas the returns to collective action by microfinance groups self help groups shgs are the most common form of microfinance in india the authors provide evidence that shgs composed of women only undertake collective actions for the provision of public goods within village communities using a theoretical model this paper shows that an elected official whose aim is to maximize re election chances exerts higher effort in providing public goods when private citizens undertake collective action and coordinate their voluntary contributions towards the same goods this effect occurs although government and private contributions are assumed to be substitutes in the technology of providing public goods using first hand data on shgs in india the paper tests the prediction of the model and shows that in response to collective action by shgs local authorities tackle a larger variety of public issues and are more likely to tackle issues of interest to shgs the findings highlight how the social behavior of shgs can influence the governance of rural indian communities

desperate housewives communication difficulties and the dynamics of marital un happiness this paper develops a model of marital dissolution based on communication difficulties the quality of a marriage depends on the proximity of an action to a target the target is unknown and must be learned over time each individual receives private signals about the target and can communicate them only imperfectly to his or her spouse because of imperfect communication spouses may hold different beliefs about the optimal action the action actually chosen is a compromise of the spouses distinct beliefs if a couple s beliefs diverge too widely one or both of them may prefer to dissolve the marriage the paper explores how poor communication contributes to marital unhappiness as well as its implications for the dynamics of divorce risk the welfare properties of divorce decisions and the role of counseling when the distribution of decision making power in the household favors men wives but not husbands can find themselves trapped for prolonged periods in a marriage that leaves them as unhappy as it is possible to be without seeking relief through divorce

a cournot nash model of family decision making this paper models a two person family each family member is utility maximising yet family members are interdependent because of caring and public goods within the family the two family members interdependent utility maximisation problems are first solved using a non cooperative or cournot nash game theoretic framework the cournot nash equilibrium is then used as a threat point in a bargaining game the paper provides a rigorous derivation of the properties of household demands a full analysis of the determinants of intra household resource allocation including the effect of varying household bargaining power and consideration of policy implications

export subsidies as signals of competitiveness in a cournot duopoly model of international competition between a domestic and foreign firm it is shown that when the foreign firm has incomplete information about the marginal cost of the domestic firm then the domestic government can use an export subsidy to signal the competitiveness of its firm this signalling effect strengthens the usual profit shifting argument for an export subsidy the optimal export subsidy in the signalling equilibrium may be twice as large as the optimal profit shifting export subsidy under complete information

static and intertemporal household decisions we discuss the most popular static and dynamic models of household behavior our main objective is to explain which aspects of household decisions different models can account for using this insight we describe testable implications identification results and estimation findings obtained in the literature particular attention is given to the ability of different models to answer various types of policy questions

watta satta bride exchange and women s welfare in rural pakistan in a setting where husbands wield considerable coercive power forms of marriage should adapt to protect the interests of women and their families the authors study the pervasive marriage custom of watta satta in rural pakistan a bride exchange between families coupled with a mutual threat of retaliation they show that watta satta may be a mechanism to coordinate the actions of two sets of in laws each of whom wish to restrain their sons in law but who only have the ability to restrain their sons the authors empirical results support this view the likelihood of marital inefficiency as measured by estrangement domestic abuse and wife s mental health is significantly lower in watta satta arrangements as compared with conventional marriages but only after properly accounting for selection

yours mine and ours do divorce laws affect the intertemporal behavior of married couples divorce laws establish spouses individual property rights over household resources and determine when divorce is allowed this paper examines how such laws inuence the intertemporal behavior and the welfare of u s married couples i build a model of household choice about consumption labor supply and divorce under multiple divorce law regimes and i estimate it using exogenous variation in u s divorce laws from the 1970s to the 1990s couples responded to equal division of property and unilateral divorce by increasing tangible assets up to 19 which suggests the presence of a strong income eect for the primary earner and by reducing female employment by over 5 percentage points because the threat of divorce granted additional bargaining power to married woman the bargaining weight of women implied by these responses in the model corresponds to a third of the weight of men this indicates that equal division of assets beneted women when it was

economics and the well being of canadian children the basic argument of this paper is that as economists we need to pay more attention to how policy affects the well being of children as individuals not just as members of families except with reference to programs explicitly designed for children e g the child tax benefit the issue of how economic policy in general affects the well being of the children themselves is relatively missing in the economics literature though children constitute nearly 25 per cent of the canadian population for example discussions of monetary policy are unlikely to consider the impact of alternative choices for children s well being debates about the merits of labour market mobility do not pay much attention to the impact of mobility on children discussions of optimal tax structures do not look at the issue from the perspective of the child 2

who marries whom and why this paper proposes and estimates a static transferable utility model of the marriage market the model generates a nonparametric marriage matching function with spillover effects it rationalizes the standard interpretation of marriage rate regressions and points out its limitations the model was used to estimate u s marital behavior in 1971 72 and 1981 82 the marriage matching function estimates show that the gains to marriage for young adults fell substantially over the decade unlike contradictory marriage rate regression results the marriage matching function estimates showed that the legalization of abortion had a significant quantitative impact on the fall in the gains to marriage for young men and women

for better or worse the roles of power in models of distribution within marriage writers from diverse intellectual traditions inside and outside the social sciences criticize neoclassical economics for neglecting power their criticisms focus on economists analyses of labor markets and of distribution within families marxists and feminists are among the leading critics the classic definitions of power come from sociology and political science and not surprisingly resonate more for sociologists and political scientists than for economists instead of discussing lofty abstract definitions i stay near the ground and focus on a concrete application specifically distribution within marriage and more generally distribution between women and men economists have three alternative models of distribution within marriage gary becker s altruist model cooperative bargaining models and noncooperative bargaining models the altruist model remains the leader becker s model implies that the equilibrium distribution maximizes the utility of the altruist the husband father dictator patriarch subject to the family s resource constraint becker does not describe the altruist model in game theoretic terms but i have argued elsewhere pollak 1985 that his model can be interpreted as a twostage bargaining game in which the altruist moves first and confronts other family members with take it or leave it choices the game theoretic interpretation makes it clear that the crucial postulate of the model is not the altruism of becker s altruist but his position in the game one is tempted to say his power altruism does play a role in becker s model the altruism of the altruist the assumption that his utility is an increasing function of his wife s utility or consumption allows the model to have an equilibrium in which the wife receives more than her reservation level of utility within the past 15 years becker s altruist model has been challenged by models that explicitly view distribution within marriage as the solution to a cooperative or a noncooperative game cooperative bargaining models are exemplified by the divorcethreat models of marilyn manser and murray brown 1980 and of marjorie b mcelroy and mary j horney 1981 and by the separate spheres model of shelly lundberg and myself 1993 all of these models use the nash bargaining solution or a similar axiomatic solution concept to obtain a unique equilibrium corresponding to a threat point which specifies the payoffs the players receive if they fail to reach an agreement in divorce threat models the threat point is the utility each spouse would receive in the event of divorce thus the threat point is external to the marriage in the separate spheres model the threat point is internal to the marriage and more specifically is the equilibrium of a noncooperative game in which the quantities of household public goods are determined by voluntary contributions by the spouses noncooperative models of distribution within marriage aside from becker s altruist model are less common than cooperative models ravi kanbur and l awrence haddad 1994 analyze intrahousehold allocation using a rubinstein alternating offer game lundberg and i 1994 discuss a repeated game in which the voluntary contri department of economics university of washington seattle wa 98195 this paper is based on a longer manuscript entitled taking power seriously i am grateful to jere r behrman douglas h blair paula england nancy folbre margaret levi shelly lundberg jane j mansbridge julie a nelson mark rosenzweig dick startz and diana strassmann for helpful conversations and to judith goff for editorial assistance

taxes and transfers their effects on the decision to end a marriage abstract the transfer system typically has large marriage disincentives while the income tax system is likely to subsidize marriage for many low income families in other words the tax system may offset an increase in transfer benefits associated with marital separation the interaction of the transfer system with the income tax system has largely been overlooked the income tax system has become more relevant for low income families with the recent expansion of the earned income tax credit which filers may be eligible for even if their tax liability is zero this paper uses family level measures of the change in transfer benefits and tax liability associated with a change in family structure to consider the effect of these financial incentives on separation decisions

a direct test of the efficient marriage market hypothesis this paper takes gary becker s theory of marriage seriously in his seminal paper becker 1973 proposes an invisible hand theorem for the marriage market he argues that the competition for spouse leads men and women to be matched in such a way that maximizes the sum total of marital output applications of the economic approach to marriage are now commonplace becker et al 1977 study the effect of imperfect information on divorce benham 1974 scully 1979 and wong 1986 estimate the effect of wife s education on husband s earnings grossbard shechtman 1993 and rao 1993 focus on the effect of sex ratio on implicit or explicit bride prices or dowries the literature however has virtually ignored becker s hypothesis that marriage markets maximize total marital output i e that marriage markets are efficient mistakes are no doubt made in marriage decisions the marriage market is not a text book example of perfect competition because of elaborate social norms substantial search costs and room for bargaining and opportunistic behavior nevertheless we intend to push becker s efficient marriage market model at face value and directly confront it with data the hypothesis that the marriage market maximizes marital output provides a framework that allows estimating a model of spouse selection which recovers some of the parameters of the production function for marital output using the estimated parameters we can use programming techniques to find the optimal male female pairing that maximizes the sum of marital output the degree to which the actual pairing of husbands and wives corresponds to the optimal pairing provides a goodness of fit test of the efficient marriage market hypothesis our method is applied to census data in hong kong a model of spouse selection and other matching models differs from a discrete choice model e g mcfadden 1984 in two important ways first the choice of a spouse is mutual not only does each man choose a woman that yields him the highest net utility but each woman also picks a man that gives her the highest net utility second in a discrete choice model several individuals can choose the same alternative in marriage markets this is prohibited under monogamy thus new methods have to be developed to analyze choice in marriage markets although marital output and the shadow price of husbands and wives are not observable the theory of optimal matching allows us to write down the likelihood function for the observed choice of marital partners it turns out that this model of spouse selection reduces to a version of the tobit model under the assumption that error terms are independently and identically normal in multinomial logit models the interpretation of parameters is cumbersome especially when the number of alternatives is large in our model of spouse selection the estimated parameters are directly related to the production function of marital output the signs of these parameters can be used to address the issue of positive versus negative assortative mating the model can also be used to test marginal product pricing in the marriage market with the estimated production function from the model of spouse selection we can impute the marital output for all possible male female pairs using these imputed output figures the optimal pairing between men and women that maximizes the sum of marital output can be found using an algorithm that solves the assignment problem the degree to which this optimal pairing corresponds to the observed pairing then provides a natural way of assessing marriage market efficiency given the limited range of information contained in the census we find that our model of spouse selection fits the observed choices better than other models such as one based on ranking method following varian s 1990 proposal for goodness of fit tests for optimizing models we derive a measure of efficiency which is based on the distance between total imputed marital output under observed matching and that under optimal matching

changing the rules midway the impact of granting alimony rights on existing and newly formed partnerships this article analyses the effect of a reform granting alimony rights to cohabiting couples in canada a collective household model with a matching framework predicts that changes in alimony laws would affect existing couples and couples to be differently for existing couples it benefits the intended beneficiary but for couples not yet formed it generates offsetting intra household transfers and lower intra marital allocations for the beneficiary our empirical analyses confirm these predictions among couples united before the reform obtaining the right to petition for alimony led women to lower their labour force participation but not among newly formed cohabiting couples

gender biased redistribution and intra household distribution abstract this paper examines the implications of income redistribution from men to women for the welfare of married women and children we develop a cournot model of a two person household where agents provide market labor and allocate their spending between a private consumption good and goods for children we show that under plausible restrictions on individual preferences small redistributions to married women reduce their welfare this happens because the income redistribution induces men to reduce their own spending on children by more than the amount redistributed a relative increase in women s independent earnings may however improve children s welfare

elections capital flows and politico economic equilibria we study an open economy where a pro labor and a pro business candidate compete in an election the winner chooses taxes which affect investment returns electoral outcomes depend on the size of the foreign debt but the debt itself reflects expectations about the election the resulting interaction is novel and has several implications elections are associated with increased volatility politico economic crises can occur inefficiencies vanish if the candidates commit to an appropriate tax policy but such commitments have predictable effects on the election empirical evidence supporting the theory is discussed jel d72 f34 o17 o19

preference heterogeneity power and intrahousehold decision making in rural malaysia abstract this paper examines conjugal household responsibilities roles preference heterogeneity and intrahousehold power relations in rural malay families its three major contributions are to provide an effective initial indicator of separate spheres within the family develop and implement a method for measuring the extent of conjugal preference heterogeneity and illustrate the value of combining this direct measure of preference heterogeneity with a measure of power in estimating household expenditure patterns for three major items food schooling and housing improvement these three measurement innovations applied to the rural malaysia context demonstrate the potential for more direct efforts to model and measure intrahousehold decisions

rearranging the family income support and elderly living arrangements in a low income country this study examines the link between income and living arrangements our identification comes from exploiting a discontinuity in age in the benefit formula for the social pension in south africa in contrast to previous literature we find no association between pension income and elderly independence we do find that potential beneficiaries alter their household structure when they become pension eligible prime working age women depart and the presence of children younger than five and young women of childbearing age increase these shifts in coresidence patterns are consistent with a setting where prime age women have comparative advantage in work away from extended family relative to younger women the additional income from old age support may induce a change in living arrangements to exploit this advantage

household bargaining power and agricultural supply response evidence from ethiopian coffee growers summary this paper investigates whether preference heterogeneity between spouses contributes to limited cash crop production in southern ethiopia using the value of livestock each spouse would take in the event of divorce as a measure of bargaining power this paper shows a significant negative correlation between the bargaining power proxies and coffee output livestock ownership during marriage does not have a significant impact on coffee production in contrast to the case in commercial production women s exit options have a weak positive effect on production of the staple crop enset

is there an intrahousehold flypaper effect evidence from a school feeding programme are public transfers targeted toward children neutralised by the household as the theory of altruism implies or is there an intrahousehold flypaper effect whereby such transfers stick to the child this paper studies the impact of a school feeding programme on child caloric intake in the philippines using a quasi experimental methodology the empirical results confirm an intrahousehold flypaper effect indeed they indicate virtually no intrahousehold reallocation of calories in response to the feeding programme in poorer households however children s gains from the programme appear to be taxed more heavily

divorce and the cognitive achievement of children children of divorced parents exhibit lower test scores and educational attainment have these correlations a causal interpretation parents who divorce may be less likely to invest in their children while together or they may divorce to shield their children from the effects of marital conflict i study the relationship between children s achievement and the marital status of their parents within a dynamic framework in which partners decide on whether to remain married how to interact with or without conflict and child investments i then assess whether a child whose parents divorced would have been better off had divorce not occurred

intra household resource allocation an inferential approach if household income is pooled and then allocated to maximize welfare then income under the control of mothers and fathers should have the same impact on demand with survey data on family health and nutrition in brazil the equality of parental income effects is rejected unearned income in the hands of a mother has a bigger effect on her family s health than income under the control of a father for child survival probabilities the effect is almost twenty times bigger the common preference or neoclassical model of the household is rejected if unearned income is measured with error and income is pooled then the ratio of maternal to paternal income effects should be the same equality of the ratios cannot be rejected there is also evidence for gender preference mothers prefer to devote resources to improving the nutritional status of their daughters fathers to sons

canadian contributions to family economics canadian scholars have made substantial contributions to the relatively new field of family economics these include new models of how men and women match in marriage markets and of how decisions are made in multi person households several were early contributors to the literature on married women s labour supply and labour supply in a family context and helped to develop empirical methods in this area a particular focus has been on the impacts of policy relevant parameters such childcare costs on family labour supply and child well being new work on child development the impact of early life conditions and the processes of intergenerational transmission also highlight the importance of family context in determining economic well being

testing the neoclassical model of family labor supply and fertility the mcelroy horney nash bargaining model of family demand behavior relaxes the restriction that nonearned income of husband and wife has the identical effect on family labor supply and commodity demands this restriction of the neoclassical model offamily behavior is tested for the determination of husband and wife labor supply andfertility based on the 1981 socioeconomic survey of thailand the neoclassical restriction is rejected for female labor supply andfertility another unexplored limitation offamily demand studies due to the sample self selection of intact marriages is empirically treated through alternative estimation strategies in this case a more sharply focused theory of marital behavior is needed to identify family demand models

household bargaining and excess fertility an experimental study in zambia we posit that household decision making over fertility is characterized by moral hazard due to the fact that most contraception can only be perfectly observed by the woman using an experiment in zambia that varied whether women were given access to contraceptives alone or with their husbands we find that women given access with their husbands were 19 less likely to seek family planning services 25 less likely to use concealable contraception and 27 percent more likely to give birth however women given access to contraception alone report a lower subjective well being suggesting a psychosocial cost of making contraceptives more concealable

the impact of central bank independence on political monetary cycles in advanced and developing nations this paper examines the extent to which monetary policy is manipulated for political purposes during elections we do not detect political monetary cycles in advanced countries or developing nations with independent central banks we do find evidence however in developing countries that lack central bank independence furthermore we find some evidence that these cycles are not caused by monetization of election related fiscal expansions this suggests that pressure by politicians on the central bank to exploit the phillips curve may be an important factor in generating political monetary cycles

separate spheres bargaining and the marriage market this paper introduces the separate spheres bargaining model a new model of distribution within marriage it differs from divorce threat bargaining models e g manser brown mcelroy horney in that the threat point is not divorce but a noncooperative equilibrium within marriage this noncooperative equilibrium reflects traditional gender roles the predictions of our model thus differ from those of divorce threat bargaining models in the separate spheres model cash transfer payments to the mother and payments to the father can but need not imply different equilibrium distributions in existing marriages in the long run the distributional effects of transfer policies may be substantially altered by changes in the marriage market equilibrium

public good valuation and intra family allocation i derive values of marginal changes in a public good for two person households measured alternatively by household member i s willingness to pay wtp for the good on behalf of the household wtp i h or by the sum of individual wtp values across family members wtp c households are assumed to allocate their resources in efficient nash bargains over private and common household goods wtp i h is then defined by trade offs between the public good and the household good and wtp c by trade offs of between the public good and private goods wtp i h is found to be higher lower than wtp c when member i has a relatively high low marginal valuation of the public good but tends on average to equal wtp c as a consequence individuals tend to represent households correctly on average when questioned about the household s wtp for a public good even when they are purely selfish and answer truthfully adding all members wtp answers on behalf of the household then leads to double counting pure and paternalistic altruism the latter attached to consumption of the public good move each member s wtp on behalf of the household closer to the true sum of individual wtp but only paternalistic altruism raises this sum

family policy with non cooperative families we consider a non cooperative model of a family s time allocation between market work and providing a home produced family public good such as child care or care for the elderly the model predicts underprovision of the public good because of crowding out this does not necessarily warrant public provision in contrast to other approaches in family economics we find that attempts to redistribute between spouses may alter the final distribution within the marriage and that such a policy may be pareto improving we also find that some degree of progressivity of the income tax can be welfare improving

the economics of the marriage contract theories and evidence abstract we analyze the role of the marriage contract we first formalize three prominent hypotheses on why people marry marriage provides an exogenous payoff to married partners it serves as a commitment device and it serves as a signaling device for each theory we analyze how a reduction in the costs of divorce affects the propensity to divorce for couples at any given duration of marriage we then use individual marriage and divorce certificate data from the united states to bring these alternative views of the marriage contract to bear on the data we exploit variations in the timing of the adoption of unilateral divorce laws across states to proxy a one off and permanent reduction in divorce costs the results suggest that the dominant reason that couples enter into a marriage contract is that it serves as a commitment device

universal decentralisation a demand system for collective and unitary models with household public goods the paper defines demand systems that exhibit universal decentralisation we argue that this concept is important in household consumption and labour supply models we show that the concept nests many approaches to the analysis of individual and family behaviour we find conditions for demand with universal decentralisation to be the result of an individual utility maximisation process and also for such demands to be the result of a household welfare maximisation procedure we explore the link between universal decentralisation and quasi separability there are connections between universal decentralisation and a nonlinear idea of the rank of a demand system

the effects of in work benefit reform in britain on couples theory and evidence this paper examines the effects of the working families tax credit wftc on couples in britain we develop a simple model of household decisions which explicitly accounts for the role played by the tax and benefit system its main implications are then tested using panel data from the british household panel survey collected between 1991 and 2002 overall the financial incentives of the reform had negligible effects on a wide range of married mothers decisions such as eligible working at least 16 hours per week and full time employment working at least 30 hours per week employment transitions childcare use and divorce rates women s responses however were highly heterogeneous depending on their partners labour supply and earnings mothers married to low income men showed larger responses in employment especially if they had younger children they were more likely to remain in the labour force and had higher rates at which they entered it while more likely to receive the tax credit they also experienced a greater risk of divorce we find virtually no effect for women with higher income husbands likewise there are no statistically significant responses among married men