control of accumulating stock pollution by heterogeneous producers abstract this paper presents a framework to determine optimal resource allocation over time for the production of a good by heterogeneous producers who generate a stock externality we analyze the optimal intertemporal and quality specific combination of abatement strategies at the source source abatement given by a change in the intensity intensive margin of production and in the chosen technology extensive margin and or removal of existing pollution stock stock abatement the results show how the specifications of the production and the emission functions affect technology adoption and the design of the optimal intertemporal combination of source and stock abatement strategies moreover the paper shows that regulation at the intensive margin cannot be considered as a substitute for a regulation at the extensive margin the paper employs the so called two stage solution approach for solving the resulting quality distributed intertemporal optimal control problem

quick job entry or long term human capital development the dynamic effects of alternative training schemes this study evaluates and compares the eectiveness of two alternative training schemes for the unemployed short job search oriented training and long human capital oriented training we investigate the impact dynamics of these pro grams considering both unemployment and employment duration our analysis uses a rich administrative longitudinal data set for germany where both programs were implemented at the same time our estimation strategy flexibly accounts for dy namic selection on observables and unobservables as well as heterogeneous treatment eects the results indicate that short term training schemes can be an eective tool to reduce unemployment in the long run in particular if participation occurs early during unemployment long term training schemes increase the average du ration of employment spells more strongly than short term training however they increase the expected unemployment duration if they are started early during un employment this negative short run impact of long term training is an important driver of its overall eectiveness

optimum management and environmental protection in the aquaculture industry abstract the sustainability of the aquaculture industry has recently been the object of social and scientific debate due to the contamination caused by the culture to the surrounding environment as a contribution to the debate this paper analyses the effect of adopting a pigovian tax to internalise the environmental costs on the optimal management of farms to do so we make use of dynamic stochastic models of fish growth and contamination diffusion farms can also implement some measures to abate pollution which are divided into two types those applied continuously managerial measures and those once in a culture cycle structural measures the results reveal that the tax imposition lowers the optimum size in the farm the type of abatement strategy plays a central role in the determination of the optimum harvest size a need for caution in internalisation policies is emphasized as negative consequences could arise in certain cases putting the farms survival at risk

job durations with worker and firm specific effects mcmc estimation with longitudinal employer employee data we study job durations using a multivariate hazard model allowing for worker specific and firm specific unobserved determinants the latter are captured by unobserved heterogeneity terms or random effects one at the firm level and another at the worker level this enables us to decompose the variation in job durations into the relative contribution of the worker and the firm we also allow the unobserved terms to be correlated in a model that is primarily relevant for markets with small firms for the empirical analysis we use a portuguese longitudinal matched employer employee dataset the model is estimated with a bayesian markov chain monte carlo mcmc estimation method the results imply that unobserved firm characteristics explain almost 40 of the systematic variation in log job durations in addition we find a positive correlation between unobserved worker and firm characteristics 2012 american statistical association

optimizing an emission trading scheme for local governments a stackelberg game model and hybrid algorithm this study investigates a policy making problem for a local government to implement an emission trading scheme by considering the interactive production decisions of firms in its administrative region the market based allowance trading price formed freely among the firms in the region is investigated by taking into account regional environmental bearing capacities under the scheme the government sets the emission reduction target of the region and allocates tradable initial allowances to firms and firms plan their production according to their allowances on hand a stackelberg game model is formulated to analyze the decisions of the government and firms aiming to maximize the social welfare of the region and maximize the profit of each firm in view of the non concavity and discreteness of the decision model for the government we propose a hybrid algorithm to solve the game model efficiently this algorithm consists of a polynomial time dynamic programming binary search and genetic algorithm results reveal that i the stackelberg game model greatly supports local governments policy making on the market driven emission allowance trading scheme and that ii the social welfare is a great metric for policy making decisions on environmental regulations the market driven emission trading scheme is an effective mechanism for local governments to induce emission reduction through green technology adoption by firms however governments should set their emission reduction targets appropriately because a tight or easy regulation policy significantly affects the environmental and economic benefits as well as the social welfare

budget balancing incentive mechanisms abstract a p xepapadeas j environ econom management20 113 26 1991 developed a pollution abatement incentive mechanism that both reduces the information requirements of a regulator and is budget balancing drawing only on the social gains from pollution abatement to encourage firm compliance this paper demonstrates that contrary to xepapadeas the budget balancing system of random penalties cannot be used to induce compliance with the regulator s objectives if firms are risk neutral however the mechanism can be successfully applied if firms are sufficiently risk averse e rasmusen rand j econom 18 428 435 1987

nonpoint pollution control inducing first best outcomes through the use of threats abstract this paper develops an economic model to analyze the use of a policy that combines a voluntary approach to controlling nonpoint source pollution with a background threat of an ambient tax if the voluntary approach is unsuccessful in meeting a pre specified environmental goal we show that such a policy can be designed to induce cost minimizing abatement without actually imposing the tax because the threat of imposition of the tax is sufficient to induce voluntary compliance thus the combined policy approach can not only be more effective in protecting environmental quality than a pure voluntary approach but can also be less costly than a pure ambient tax approach however whether the cost minimizing choices are a unique equilibrium or not depends on the design of the tax policy and whether or not it can be applied retroactively all results still hold if the background threat takes the form of a reducing in government subsidies

competition in interregional taxation the case of western coal markets for many products are dominated by small group of states or countries with a natural advantage in the marketplace because of some initial endowment of resources favorable climate or location the purpose of this paper is to explore how such markets involving a few political jurisdictions interact noncooperatively we examine how such a market might be structured and operate and the extent of monopoly rent that can be extracted in the absence of collusion we answer these questions for an empirically estimated model of western u s coal in which two states montana and wyoming dominate production we demonstrate that in this market the amount of rent that can be extracted is greatly reduced through competition relative to a cartel nevertheless even with two producing states competing against each other significant rents can be captured significant enough to refute the contention that little rent can accrue without a cartel

incentive based policy design for pollution control and biodiversity conservation a review this paper provides a succinct review of the main developments in the literature on incentive based policy mechanisms in the contexts of pollution control and biodiversity conservation dating from the early beginnings of the science in the 1960s a focal point in the review is on the design features of these policy mechanisms key developments in policy design were originally established in controlling externalities arising from pollution and have since been extended to policy design tailored towards biodiversity conservation special emphasis is given to the spatial characteristics of the environmental problems underlying both pollution control and biodiversity conservation the paper concludes by drawing some lessons and setting out elements of a future research agenda in both policy domains

rebound effects of new irrigation technologies the role of water rights we study how institutions such as water rights can complement new irrigation technologies in promoting the sustainability of u s agriculture using data from the ogallala high plains aquifer region of kansas we find that water extraction moderately increases after adopting low energy precise application lepa irrigation and this rebound effect is in general higher for farmers with larger water rights about half of the lepa s rebound effects arise because adopters tend to irrigate more land and grow more water intensive crops with the remaining half attributable to more intensive irrigation farmers with greater water rights use more water with two thirds of the effects arising from irrigating larger land areas and one third of the effects attributable to more intensive irrigation a 10 reduction of water rights will reduce water use by 5 in the long run and if the reduction targets the majority of the water rights which lie between 100 and 500 af lepa s rebound effect decreases by 15 4 finally we find that farmers have an incentive to apply a small amount of water in order to preserve their water rights but the associated water waste is insignificant

some neglected social costs of government spending in farm programs economic welfare analyses of farm programs typically assume that the direct social opportunity cost of subsidy payments is one dollar per dollar of government spending recent literature suggests that the marginal opportunity cost of a dollar of u s federal government spending is more likely to be in the range of 1 20 to 1 50 this implies that the net social costs of farm programs that involve government spending are significantly greater than the typical estimates in addition the normative efficiency ranking of alternative policies is sensitive to the marginal opportunity cost of government spending

transaction costs communication and spatial coordination in payment for ecosystem services schemes agricultural producer participation and spatial coordination of land use decisions are key components for enhancing the effective delivery of ecosystem services from private land however inducing participation in payment for ecosystem services schemes for coordinating land management choices is challenging from a policy design perspective owing to transaction costs associated with participation this paper employs a laboratory experiment to investigate the impact of such costs on participation and land use in the context of an agglomeration bonus ab scheme the ab creates a coordination game with multiple nash equilibria related to alternative spatially coordinated land use patterns the experiment varies transaction costs between two levels high and low which affects the risks and payoffs of coordinating on the different equilibria additionally an option to communicate is implemented between neighbors arranged on a local network to facilitate spatial coordination results indicate a significant difference in participation and performance under high and low transaction costs with lower uptake and performance when transaction costs are high these effects are however impacted by transaction costs faced in the past communication improves both ab participation rates and performance with the effect being greater for participants facing high transaction costs

discretionary policy and multiple equilibria in lq re models we study discretionary equilibria in dynamic linear quadratic rational expectations models in contrast to the assumptions that pervade this literature we show that these models do have multiple equilibria in some situations we demonstrate the existence of multiple discretionary equilibria by example we investigate general properties of discretionary equilibria and discuss implications for numerical algorithms

the conservation reserve program as a least cost land retirement mechanism mechanism design theory is used to characterize the properties of a least cost crp if marginal land rents decrease with acres farmed then a least cost crp is a set of nonlinear price schedules if marginal land rents are independent of acres farmed then an offer system constitutes a least cost crp the least cost offer system gives a useful estimate of the upper bound of a least cost crp empirical results suggest that a 34 million acre crp should have cost no more than 1 billion per year

performance of the ambient tax does the nature of the damage matter the ambient tax is often considered as an efficient instrument to achieve a first best outcome of ambient pollution when the regulator cannot observe individual emissions or when monitoring costs are prohibitive while this view is supported to a large extent by experimental findings there remains several hurdles that hinder the implementation of the ambient tax in the field one of these hurdles is the nature of the damage experimental findings suggest that the efficiency of the ambient tax is higher under external damage i e if ambient pollution affects non polluters spraggon in j public econ 84 427 456 2002 than under internal damage i e if ambient pollution affects polluters themselves cochard et al in environ resour econ 30 393 422 2005 but this result rests on very different experimental settings therefore we designed a new experiment that allows to compare external and internal damage within a common setting our main finding is that the ambient tax is equally efficient under internal and external damage

self selecting agri environmental policieswith an application to the don watershed we consider a model of regulation for nonpoint source water pollution through non linear taxation subsidization of agricultural production farmers are heterogenous along two dimensions their ability to transform inputs into final production and the available area they possess asymmetric information and participation of farmers to the regulation scheme put constraints on the optimal policy that we characterize we show that a positive relationship between size of land and ability may exacerbate adverse selection effects we calibrate the model using data on a french watershed and we simulate the optimal second best policy and characterize the allocation of the abatement effort among the producers

on the design of agricultural policy mechanisms the fact that different agricultural policy mechanisms have emerged for different commodities suggests that the choice of policy instrument may reflect the goals of agricultural policy makers this paper uses the principles of mechanism design under asymmetric information to examine the motivations underlying the choice of agricultural policy mechanisms it is found that supply control mechanisms favor high cost producers and the budget while mechanisms resulting in overproduction favor low cost producers

can voluntary approaches ever be efficient abstract despite their growing use only a few theoretical descriptions on the efficiency of voluntary approaches can be found this paper summarises the findings in this field so far it analyses the efficiency of voluntary approaches in three different ways 1 voluntary approaches as a bargaining process over abatement levels 2 voluntary approaches as a way to diminish informational asymmetries and 3 voluntary approaches as a voluntary over compliance mechanism from the models it seems as if the efficiency of voluntary approaches depends on several factors public supply of information auditing and the exchange of information between the negotiating parties are important elements further positive and negative inducements by the regulator can create incentives for the industry to engage in voluntary approaches also consumers demand for environmental quality can affect the environmental performance by industry either by the lobbying of interest groups or by a demand for products produced under environmental considerations

administrative costs and instrument choice for stochastic non point source pollutants this paper extends the empiricalanalysis of non point source pollution to thecase where the pollutant is stochastic andalternative regulatory instruments havedifferent administrative costs it also appliesa method of stochastic programming whereemissions are log normally distributed forthe kennet catchment in south west england werank a range of policies in terms of abatementcosts alone and total costs abatement andadministrative costs on the basis ofabatement costs alone a uniform emission taxis the cost minimising policy but on the basisof total cost a nitrogen input tax is theleast cost policy furthermore the policyranking based on total costs changes as thereliability standard increases

duration dependence versus unobserved heterogeneity in treatment effects swedish labor market training and the transition rate to employment summary the effect of a treatment on the hazard rate of a duration outcome may depend on the elapsed time since treatment in addition treatment effects may be heterogeneous across agents the former gives rise to duration dependence of the treatment effect whereas unobserved heterogeneity gives rise to spurious duration dependence of the observable hazard rate we develop a model allowing for duration dependence and unobserved heterogeneity in the treatment effect the model incorporates a timing of events model and allows for selectivity on unobservables we prove identification exploiting variation in the timing of treatment and outcome in the application we analyze the effects of the swedish vocational employment training program on the individual transition rate from unemployment to work we demonstrate the appropriateness of the approach by studying the enrollment process the data cover the population and include multiple unemployment spells for many individuals the results indicate a large significantly positive effect on exit to work shortly after exiting the program the effect at the individual level diminishes after some weeks when taking account of the time spent in the program the effect on the mean unemployment duration is small copyright 2012 john wiley sons ltd

the gains from differentiated policies to control stock pollution when producers are heterogeneous we derive optimal input taxes to control stock pollution problems generated by heterogeneous agents the taxes vary over time and in response to differences of asset quality and technology choice we also derive second best policies and compare them to the efficient policy and also among themselves different policies will affect the timing for when and the extent to which conservation technologies are adopted a numerical example based on the california drainage problem shows significant efficiency gains from the optimal policy compared to no intervention but much of the gains are lost with second best interventions the gains from optimal policies do not always increase with the degree of heterogeneity copyright 2008 oxford university press

enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted in the united states empirical studies of the enforcement of continuous compliance with environmental regulations especially air and water pollution regulations have repeatedly demonstrated the following i for most sources the frequency of surveillance is quite low ii even when violations are discovered fines or other penalties are rarely assessed in most states iii sources are nonetheless thought to be in compliance a large part of the time the evidence for the apparently low level of enforcement activity is found in a number of case studies of state and local enforcement of air and water quality regulations conducted jointly by the environmental protection agency epa and council on environmental quality ceg together with periodic surveys of implementation of air and water quality legislation conducted by the general accounting office gao these surveys show

agricultural runoff as a nonpoint externality a theoretical development the purpose of this paper is to develop and explore a theory dealing with an important facet of agricultural runoff problems agricultural runoff is a nonpoint externality with notable implications for both research and policy a nonpoint externality exists whenever the externality contributions of individual economic agents cannot be practically measured by direct monitoring without monitoring regulations on emissions cannot be enforced and charges or subsidies cannot be assessed thus policies which are usually suggested for pollution abatement are not available there is great need for a theoretical base that can adequately capture these facts such a theory yields some important implications even before specific empirical applications the economic problem of agricultural runoff can be separated into three distinct categories first the sediment nutrients and chemicals removed by runoff represent a loss of resources to the individual farmer these costs are borne privately by farmers second if the discount rate of the individual farmer is greater than the social discount rate or if the farmer has a planning horizon which is shorter than society s the farmer will mine the soil resource at a rate which is more depletive than is socially optimal this is a temporal externality a third category involves the conservation of mass physical resources lost by the individual farm must appear elsewhere in the environment in sufficient quantities these resources are pollutants since water is the primary transport media for these resources it is water that is polluted by soil nutrients and agricultural chemicals this spatial externality has been the focus of much research here we intend to develop a theory for these issues to employ it to suggest a revised research methodology and to provide some important conclusions about alternative runoff policies only two of the three categories of agricultural runoff problems involve externalities and only the spatial externality is considered here

efficiency of nonpoint source pollution instruments an experimental study in nonpoint source pollution problems the regulator does not observe each polluter s individual emission which prevents him from using the conventional policy instruments therefore new instruments have been designed to regulate this type of pollution in an experiment we compare the efficiency of some of these instruments an input based tax an ambient tax subsidy an ambient tax and a group fine we assume that polluters themselves are affected by environmental damages a control session without any regulation is also carried out in order to study the status quo situation our experimental data show that the input tax and the ambient tax are very efficient and reliable and the group fine is fairly efficient and reliable these instruments improve social welfare with respect to the status quo on the contrary the ambient tax subsidy decreases social welfare with respect to the status quo and its effect is very unreliable

ghg registries participation and performance under the canadian voluntary climate challenge program between 1994 and 2004 the voluntary challenge and registry vcr played an important role in canadian climate change policy in this paper we examine the decision of firms to participate in the vcr the extent of their involvement and then ask if greenhouse gas emissions are related to past vcr participation as an information provision program we find evidence that firms may participate in vcr to signal their environmental responsibility to regulators and to some extent investors but not to consumers we also find that past involvement in the vcr is a strong and significant determinant of current involvement in the registry greenhouse gas emissions reported to the mandatory greenhouse gas reporting program in 2004 however do not appear to be different between vcr reporters and non reporters ghg emissions are observed to be significantly lower among firms that are smaller emit fewer toxic releases use more renewable energy sources are intermediate good producers and are located in quebec ontario and manitoba

the effects of pricing policies on water conservation and drainage a general model of adoption of input conserving technologies by competitive firms is introduced using drip irrigation as an example an environmental regulation such as a drainage effluent charge is shown to influence adoption early adopters are likely to be producers with less efficient fixed assets land of low quality or antiquated capital higher input costs higher water prices or greater depth to groundwater and in more environmentally sensitive regions simulations show that drainage regulations can be expected to play a major role in adoption of more efficient irrigation technologies in california thus conservation may be a key to solving resource scarcity problems and reducing external environmental costs

incentive payments to encourage farmer adoption of water quality protection practices farmers can be encouraged to voluntarily adopt environmentally sound management practices through the use of incentive payments this paper uses both a bivariate probit with sample selection model and a double hurdle model on data from a survey of farmers to predict farmer adoption of the practices as a function of the payment offer the five management practices addressed here are integrated pest management legume crediting manure testing split applications of nitrogen and soil moisture testing also estimated are models that predict the acreage on which these practices would be applied given the decision to accept the incentive payments estimated

an evaluation of the swedish system of active labour market programmes in the 1990s we investigate the presence of short and long term effects from joining a swedish labor market program vis a vis more intense job search in open unemployment overall the impact of the program system is found to have been mixed joining a program has increased employment rates among participants a result robust to a misclassification problem in the data on the other hand it has also allowed participants to remain significantly longer on unemployment benefits and more generally in the unemployment system this being particularly the case for those entitled individuals entering a program around the time of their unemployment benefits exhaustion

rational conjectures in the theory of oligopoly abstract the paper employs the notion of rational conjectural equilibrium to remove the arbitrary nature of conjectures about rivals reactions which characterises the traditional non cooperative theory of oligopoly a general definition of these equilibria is given and the concept is then applied to a simple duopoly model the standard models of perfect competition monopoly limit price dominant firms are shown to emerge as special cases of rational conjectural equilibria

irrigation technology adoption and gains from water trading under asymmetric information we develop a water allocation and irrigation technology adoption model under the prior appropriation doctrine with asymmetric information among heterogeneous farmers and between farmers and water authorities we find that adverse selection reduces the adoption of modern irrigation technology we also show that even with asymmetric information incentives for water trade exist and lead to additional technology adoption with gains to all parties this suggests that under asymmetric information a thin secondary market improves the allocation of water resources and induces additional adoption of modern irrigation technologies

tax progressivity income distribution and tax non compliance this article examines the determinants of tax non compliance when we recognise the existence of an imperfectly competitive tax advice industry supplying schemes which help taxpayers reduce their tax liability we apply a traditional industrial organisation framework to model the behaviour of this industry this tells us that an important factor determining the equilibrium price and hence the level of noncompliance is the convexity of the demand schedule we show that in this context this convexity is affected by the distribution of pre tax income the progressivity of the tax schedule and the way in which monitoring and penalties vary with income it is shown that lower pre tax income inequality as well as a less progressive tax code may cause more tax minimisation activities therefore the frequently advocated policy of reducing the highest tax rate may fail as a policy directed at improving tax discipline one way of offsetting the possible harm to tax compliance from a less progressive tax could be an adjustment of the penalty and monitoring functions

political consumerism and public policy good complements against market failures political consumerism has become over the past years an ever growing phenomenon by which citizens express through their consumption their political environmental and ethical opinions this paper discusses political consumerism from an economic science perspective focusing on the link between political consumerism and public policies it wonders to what extent political consumerism may represent an effective and fair instrument against market failures overall it seems that it would be better to consider it as a complement to conventional public policies

nonpoint source pollution taxes and excessive tax burden if a regulator is unable to measure firms individual emissions an ambient tax can be used to achieve the socially desired level of pollution with this tax each firm pays a unit tax on aggregate emissions in order for the tax to be effective firms must recognize that their decisions affect aggregate emissions when firms behave strategically with respect to the tax setting regulator under plausible circumstances their tax burden is lower under an ambient tax relative to the tax which charges firms on the basis of individual emissions firms may prefer the case where the regulator is unable to observe individual firm emissions even if this asymmetric information causes the regulator to tax each firm on the basis of aggregate emissions

the regulation of non point source pollution under imperfect and asymmetric information abstract this paper develops a bayesian framework for discussing the role of information in the design of non point source pollution control mechanisms an ambient concentration tax is examined allowing for spatial transport among multiple zones imposition of the tax requires costly measurement of concentrations in selected zones and the selection of zones for measurement must be undertaken without perfect information regarding several parameters of the problem potentially crucial information issues discussed include a the impact of asymmetric priors regarding fate and transport b the cost of measuring ambient concentration and c the optimal acquisition of information regarding fate and transport

cost effectiveness of alternative green payment policies for conservation technology adoption with heterogeneous land quality this paper quantitatively analyses the cost effectiveness of alternative green payment policies designed to achieve a targeted level of pollution control by heterogeneous microunits these green payment policies include cost share subsidies that share the fixed costs of adoption of a conservation technology and or input reduction subsidies to reduce the use of a polluting input the paper shows that unlike a pollution tax that achieves abatement through three mechanisms a negative extensive margin effect a negative intensive margin effect and a technology switching effect a cost share subsidy and an input reduction subsidy are much more restricted in the types of incentives they provide for conservation of polluting inputs and adoption of a conservation technology to control pollution moreover they may lead to varying levels of expansion of land under production costs of abatement with alternative policies and implications for production and government payments are compared using a simulation model for controlling drainage from irrigated cotton production in california with drip irrigation as a conservation technology

conjectural variation and the indeterminancy of duopolistic equilibria the purpose of this article is to investigate the basic premise that the various oligopoly models result in an unacceptable divergence in market equilibria in the first half of the paper a theoretical model of a static conjectural variation duopoly with symmetric costs is presented using this model we define the coefficient of dispersion of equilibria and show that it is solely a function of the basic conditions of the market costs and demand this result is of empirical significance because it is possible to determine ex ante from easily observable information the extent to which conjectural variation market conduct will influence market equilibrium variation conjecturale et indetermination des equilibres duopolistiques l objectif de cet article est d analyser la proposition fondamentale que les divers modeles d oligopole se resolvent en une divergence inacceptable d equilibres de marche dans la premiere partie du m6moire on presente un modele theorique de duopole avec variation conjecturale statique et couits symmetriques avec l aide de ce modele on definit le coefficient de dispersion des equilibres et on montre qu il est seulement fonction des conditions du marche cofits et demande ce resultat a une importance empirique significative parce qu il devient possible de determiner ex ante a partir de renseignements facilement observables jusqu a quel point la variation conjecturale la conduite sur le marche va influencer l equilibre du marche

incentives precision technology and environmental protection abstract this paper calls for a reevaluation of the pollution problem in order to devise efficient strategies for its control it contends that a fundamental cause of pollution is inefficiency in input use during the production process this inefficiency manifests itself as input waste and polluting residues precision technologies can increase the effectiveness of inputs used in production and reduce pollution generation despite their potential economic and ecological benefits adoption of precision technologies has been slow this paper presents a conceptual framework to identify and analyze the specific factors that affect their diffusion among microunits these include various heterogeneous characteristics of microunits prices which do not reflect the relevant scarcities due to distortionary regulatory policies and lack of institutional mechanisms for efficient allocation of inputs and outputs it rationalizes the observed variations in the appropriate choice of technology across microunits and argues for the need to broaden the range of incentive based instruments for environmental protection beyond pollution taxes

environmental policy under imperfect information incentives and moral hazard abstract when net emissions of individual polluters cannot be efficiently monitored then emissions charges controls on emissions levels or subsidies for emissions reduction are not effective as environmental policy instruments this paper proposes instruments that can be applied in such limited information situations these instruments take the form of contracts between a pollution control agency and individual polluters the contracts include a combination of fines and subsidies that induces dischargers to follow optimal environmental policies in the absence of individual monitoring

the relative efficiency of voluntary vs mandatory environmental regulations abstract increased use of voluntary programs for environmental protection as an alternative to mandatory approaches raises the issue of the relative efficiency of the two approaches this paper analyzes the efficiency of voluntary programs relative to mandatory programs in agriculture under the voluntary program producers adopt a land conservation practice and in turn the government provides technical and financial assistance the voluntary program is more efficient than a program that mandates adoption if and only if the deadweight losses of government expenditures under the voluntary program are less than the difference between private and public costs of government services plus the additional implementation costs of the mandatory program this necessary and sufficient condition is more likely to be satisfied when a the deadweight loss from raising government revenue is zero or small b government services are less rival c the costs of government services are lower than what farmers would have to pay for equivalent private services d the number of farms in the program is large and e the saving in implementation costs under the voluntary program is large and increases rapidly with program acreage

strategy and market structure in western coal taxation this paper analyzes the potential market power of western states in setting coal severance taxes and the emphasis placed by these states on the development of their coal resources vs obtaining tax revenues three market structures are analyzed one involves a western regional cartel setting taxes collectively the other cases are noncooperative tax equilibria with montana and wyoming competing against each other we conclude that the western states seem to be primarily concerned with revenue collection and are very efficient extractors of economic rent

water quantity management in a heterogeneous landscape with farsighted farmers agricultural production contributes to many environmental problems in semi arid areas agricultural irrigation causes the so called waterlogging phenomenon this phenomenon is both spatial and dynamic since percolation depends on soil quality summed up in landscape heterogeneity and evolves along time furthermore farmers can be farsighted with respect to their contribution to percolation we study regulation schemes to be implemented to restore the socially optimal spatial and temporal production plan of farmers in such a context we show that both a temporal tax on percolation and a spatio temporal tax on inputs both at the extensive and at the intensive margin are efficient for the restoration of the socially optimal solution furthermore a numerical example demonstrates that the consequences of implementing a fiscal scheme designed for myopic farmers whereas they are farsighted depends on the distribution of soil quality

regulating nitrogen pollution with risk averse farmers under hidden information and moral hazard we consider a model of pollution regulation for a risk averse farmer involving hidden information moral hazard and risk sharing the representative farmer faces a production risk originating from nitrogen leaching and privately observes the soil capacity in retaining nitrogen only after the regulation contract is signed the latter specifies a transfer and a nitrogen quota whose decomposition by the farmer among different production stages is unknown to the regulator we first characterize the optimal solution to the regulator s problem the sequential decision model is estimated on french crop production data and the results are used to calibrate and simulate the optimal contract

ambient taxes when polluters have multiple choices economic research on environmental policy design has largely been concerned with the merits of emissions based economic incentives e g emissions charges emissions reduction subsidies transferable discharge permits ambient based tax subsidy schemes have drawn considerable interest in nonpoint pollution literature as alternatives to emissions based instruments expanding especially on segerson s seminal article this article examines the optimal design and budget balancing properties of ambient tax subsidy schemes under more realistic assumptions about the dimensions of firms choice sets than prior research

biofuel economics in a setting of multiple objectives unintended consequences this paper examines biofuels from an economic perspective and evaluates the merits of promoting biofuel production in the context of the policies multiple objectives life cycle implications pecuniary externalities and other unintended consequences the policy goals most often cited are to reduce fossil fuel use and to lower greenhouse gas emissions but the presence of multiple objectives and various indirect effects complicates normative evaluation to address some of these complicating factors we look at a several combinations of policy alternatives that achieve the same set of incremental gains along the two primary targeted policy dimensions making it possible to compare the costs and cost effectiveness of each combination of policies for example when this approach is applied to u s produced biofuels they are found to be 14 31 times as costly as alternatives like raising the gas tax or promoting energy efficiency improvements the analysis also finds the scale of the potential contributions of biofuels to be extremely small in both the u s and eu mandated u s corn ethanol production for 2025 reduces u s petroleum input use by 1 75 and would have negligible net effects on co2 emissions and although eu imports of brazilian ethanol may look better given the high costs of other alternatives this option is equivalent at most to a 1 20 reduction in eu gasoline consumption

slippage in conservation cost sharing we examine whether subsidies for conservation on working farmland induce farmers to expand cultivation on more vulnerable land potentially offsetting reductions in environmental spillovers using a switching regression model with endogenous switching and censored endogenous variables applied to maryland farm level data we find no indication that cost share awards are targeted toward water quality improvements receipt of cost sharing increases conservation practice adoption but not the shares of land allocated to conservation implying little adverse selection in awards cost sharing decreases the share of land allocated to vegetative cover so that environmental quality improvements from conservation are likely offset to some degree

information shocks and the empirical evaluation of training programs during unemployment spells we study the role of notifications in the evaluation of training programs for unemployed workers using a unique administrative data set containing the dates when information is exchanged between job seekers and caseworkers we address three questions do information shocks such as notification of future training have an effect on unemployment duration what is the joint effect of notification and training programs on unemployment can ignoring information shocks lead to a large bias in the estimation of the effect of training programs we discuss these issues through the lens of a job search model and then conduct an empirical analysis following a random effects approach to deal with selectivity we find that notification has a strong positive effect on the training probability but a negative one on the probability of leaving unemployment this attraction effect highlights the importance of accounting for notifications in the evaluation of active labor market policies

the economics of a public fund for environmental amenities a study of crp contracts the problem of targeting crp purchases to buy environmental amenities under productivity and environmental heterogeneity is considered gini coefficients and lorenz curves are used to measure the effectiveness of spending under alternative targeting criteria the environmental benefits considered are water erosion wind erosion surface water quality and wildlife habitat the three alternative targeting criteria examined include purchasing land according to i the benefit to cost ratio ii the level of benefits and iii the level of cost results indicate that the degree of variability and correlation determine the extent to which suboptimal targeting achieves a significant portion of available environmental benefits

the effectiveness of public sponsored training revisited the importance of data and methodological choices this article revisits the effectiveness of public sponsored training programs for germany accounting for dynamic selection into heterogeneous programs we carefully assess to what extent various aspects of our empirical strategy such as conditioning flexibly on employment and benefit histories the availability of rich data handling of later program participations and further methodological choices affect our estimates our results imply pronounced negative lock in effects in the short run and positive medium run effects on employment and earnings when job seekers enroll after having been unemployed for some time we find that data and specification issues can have a large effect

how effective are unemployment benefit sanctions looking beyond unemployment exit this paper provides a comprehensive evaluation of benefit sanctions i e temporary reductions in unemployment benefits as punishment for noncompliance with eligibility requirements in addition to the effects on unemployment durations we evaluate the effects on post unemployment employment stability on exits from the labor market and on earnings in our analysis we use a rich set of swiss register data which allow us to distinguish between ex ante effects the effects of warnings and the effects of enforcement of benefit sanctions adopting a multivariate mixed proportional hazard approach to address selectivity we find that both warnings and enforcement increase the job finding rate and the exit rate out of the labor force warnings do not affect subsequent employment stability but do reduce post unemployment earnings actual benefit reductions lower the quality of post unemployment jobs both in terms of job duration as well as in terms of earnings the net effect of a benefit sanction on post unemployment income is negative over a period of two years after leaving unemployment workers who got a benefit sanction imposed face a net income loss equivalent to 30 days of full pay due to the ex post effect in addition to that stricter monitoring may reduce net earnings by up to 4 days of pay for every unemployed worker due to the ex ante effect

voluntary conservation of endangered species when does no regulatory assurance mean no conservation abstract voluntary conservation agreements are becoming increasingly important in implementing the endangered species act on private land we analyze when such agreements arise and what level of conservation they generate in the presence of uncertainty about future conservation benefits and irreversibility of habitat loss and species extinction our results suggest that the likelihood of an agreement and the resulting conservation levels depend on the background threat of regulation the cost advantage offered by voluntary agreements and the availability of assurances regarding future regulation under conditions likely to hold in practice conservation agreements that offer assurances may generate higher levels of conservation and higher net social benefits than agreements that do not offer assurances however the resulting level of conservation will not be optimal and may be lower than that attainable under regulation

measuring the marginal cost of nonuniform environmental regulations a method is presented for measuring the marginal welfare cost of environmental regulations affecting agriculture the method incorporates output market effects and recognizes diversity in production conditions among crops regions and seasons an important advantage of the method is that only regional outputs and changes in regional production costs are needed to calculate deadweight loss thus simplifying the measurement of welfare changes this feature of the model is significant since the complexity and substantial data requirements of most existing impact models cause many environmental regulations to be enacted with inadequate analysis of their economic impacts the method also disaggregates welfare impacts by crop place and time thus encouraging the implementation of nonuniform interventions that achieve a given level of environmental quality more efficiently than uniform policies

research issues in nonpoint pollution control research on nonpoint pollution control instruments has focused primarily on incentives applied either to production inputs that affect nonpoint pollution or to ambient pollution concentrations both approaches may in theory yield an efficient solution however input based incentives will generally have to be second best to make implementation practical design issues include which inputs to monitor and the rates to apply to them the limited research indicates that second best input based incentives can be effective in adjusting input use in environmentally desirable ways alternatively ambient based incentives have theoretical appeal because efficient policy design appears to be less complex than for input based incentives these incentives have no track record nor close analogues that demonstrate potential effectiveness however research on how households and firms might react in response to ambient based incentives is needed before these instruments can be seriously considered

contract design for the purchase of environmental goods from agriculture an environmental stewardship program whereby farmers are paid directly for the environmental goods they provide is developed by combining the microparameter distribution model with mechanism design principles the program overcomes the information asymmetry between farmers and governments and accounts for the deadweight losses from distortionary taxes the characteristics of optimal input and payment schedules of the program are derived these optimal schedules are determined by the tradeoffs between farming profits environmental benefits and deadweight losses from taxes and are second best except under restrictive conditions on deadweight losses from taxes and on the marginal product of inputs and marginal pollution costs

technology as an agricultural pollution control policy in this paper we consider the market level impacts of factor augmenting innovations designed to reduce the use of fertilizers and pesticides first within the context of a simple two factor model and then through a simulation model of the u s corn market in both models the impacts depend on the output demand elasticity and input substitution elasticities the principal conclusion of the simulation analysis is that the potential for new techniques to reduce the use of agricultural chemicals is limited capital augmenting innovations would actually raise fertilizer and pesticide usage land augmenting innovations would also tend to increase pesticide usage

incentives for wetland creation abstract when information about soil quality is complete wetland creation with a take it or leave it contract which specifies wetland size and transfer yields higher social benefits than if a uniform contract which offers a payment proportional to the wetland size had been used this result points to a paradox because uniform contracts have been used a lot in practice this article concentrates on the presence of asymmetric information about soil quality as a possible explanation for this paradox it shows that the choice of instrument for wetland creation has welfare implications different contracts typically yield quite different social welfare surpluses and distribution between interest groups it is not obvious which of four contracts studied dominates when a farm characteristic affecting costs is unknown to the social planner the probability distribution of the characteristic the size of the excess burden the elasticity of costs and benefits to wetland size and the cost of acquiring missing information influence the outcome

uniform and non uniform second best input taxes we investigate second best input based taxes foragricultural nonpoint pollution control when marketprices are endogenous and production isheterogeneous theoretically we derive the optimalforms of taxes which take account of heterogeneity non uniform taxes and a tax which does not auniform tax empirically we use a multi factor market equilibrium simulation model to determineoptimal tax rates and associated equity effects particularly differences in landowner gains lossesacross a heterogeneous region when market prices areendogenous second best tax policies result inpecuniary externalities that affect existingenvironmental externalities in particular thepecuniary externalities amplify the effect of producerheterogeneity on determination of sub regionaldifferences in tax rates and returns to land particularly for the uniform policy with endogenousprices the uniform tax rate is considerably higherthan any of the non uniform rates and ironically thenon uniform taxes result in less dispersion oflandowner gains across sub regions than the uniformtax

cost effective and stochastic dominance approaches to stochastic pollution control most economic studies of pollution externalities focus on the relative efficiency or cost effectiveness of alternative pollution control instruments much less attention has been paid to policy goals and objectives however a comprehensive pollution control strategy depends on all of these choices this paper examines several efficiency properties of cost effective pollution control strategies in a stochastic setting when economic damages from pollution are unknown a number of policy goals are considered in this setting and under a primal approach it is found that certain stochastic dominance conditions must be satisfied for the strategies to exhibit desirable efficiency properties a dual approach to cost effective pollution control which is based on a stochastic dominance objective is also considered

active labor market policy effects in a dynamic setting this paper develops and implements a method to identify and estimate treatment effects in a dynamic setting where treatments may occur at any point in time by combining the standard matching approach to the timing of events approach it demonstrates that the effect of the treatment on the treated at a given date can be identified although non treated may be treated later in time the approach builds on a no anticipation assumption and the assumption of conditional independence between the duration before treatment and the duration before exit to illustrate the approach the paper studies the effect of training for unemployed workers in france using a rich register data set training has little impact on unemployment duration the contamination of the standard matching estimator due to later entries into treatment is large if the treatment probability is high

under and over use of pesticides an international analysis abstract this paper analyzes the economic political and environmental factors that contribute to the consumption and under or over use of pesticides using unbalanced panel data analysis we study how pesticide over or under use varies for countries with different per capita gross domestic product gdp and foreign direct investment fdi stock we begin by controlling for climatic and agricultural variables that should lead to variation in pesticide application rates the residual from the regression provides an indication of a nation s deviation in pesticide use relative to the mean the more negative the residual the more likely it is that that nation is under using pesticides the more positive it is the more likely it is that pesticides are being over used we study the correlation of this residual with important economic and political variables we find that at low levels of per capita gdp there is evidence of pesticide under use and that at the highest income levels there may be increasing over use we also look at the correlation of pesticide use with foreign direct investment stock farm size mechanization and democracy and in most cases find significant correlation with these variables

economic incentives for managing filterable biological pollution risks from trade infectious livestock disease problems are biological pollution problems prior work on biological pollution problems generally examines the efficient allocation of prevention and control efforts but does not identify the specific externalities underpinning the design of efficiency enhancing policy instruments prior analyses also focus on problems where those being damaged do not contribute to externalities we examine a problem where the initial biological introduction harms the importer and then others are harmed by spread from this importer here the externality is the spread of infection beyond the initial importer this externality is influenced by the importer s private risk management choices which provide impure public goods that reduce disease spillovers to others making disease spread a filterable externality we derive efficient policy incentives to internalize filterable disease externalities given uncertainties about introduction and spread we find efficiency requires incentivizing an importer s trade choices along with self protection and abatement efforts in contrast to prior work that targets trade alone perhaps surprisingly we find these incentives increase with importers private risk management incentives and with their ability to directly protect others in cases where importers can spread infection to each other we find filterable externalities may lead to multiple nash equilibria

nonparametric instrumental variable methods for dynamic treatment evaluation we develop a nonparametric instrumental variable approach for the estimation of average treatment effects on hazard rates and conditional survival probabilities without model structure we derive constructive identification proofs for average treatment effects under noncompliance and dynamic selection exploiting instrumental variation taking place during ongoing spells we derive asymptotic distributions of the corresponding estimators this includes a detailed examination of noncompliance in a dynamic context in an empirical application we evaluate the french labor market policy reform pare which abolished the dependence of unemployment insurance benefits on the elapsed unemployment duration and simultaneously introduced additional active labor market policy measures the estimated effect of the reform on the survival function of the duration of unemployment duration is positive and significant neglecting selectivity leads to an underestimation of the effects in absolute terms

voluntary environmental agreements good or bad news for environmental protection abstract there has been growing interest in the use of voluntary agreements vas as an environmental policy tool this article uses a simple model to determine whether vas are likely to lead to efficient environmental protection we consider cases where polluters are induced to participate either by a background threat of mandatory controls the stick approach or by cost sharing subsidies the carrot approach the results suggest that the overall impact on environmental quality could be positive or negative depending on a number of factors including the allocation of bargaining power the magnitude of the background threat and the social cost of funds

non mandatory approaches to environmental protection the approach to environmental protection has been evolving from a regulation driven adversarial government push approach to a more proactive approach involving voluntary and often business led initiatives to self regulate their environmental performance this has been accompanied by increasing provision of environmental information about firms and products to enlist market forces and communities in creating a demand for corporate environmental self regulation by signaling their preferences for environmentally friendly firms this paper provides an overview of the non mandatory approaches being used for environmental protection and surveys the existing theoretical literature analyzing the economic efficiency of such approaches relative to mandatory approaches it also discusses empirical findings on the factors motivating self regulation by firms and its implications for their economic and environmental performance it examines the existing evidence on the extent to which information disclosure is effective in generating pressures from investors and communities on firms to improve their environmental performance