velocity futures markets does the fed need a structural model i introduction during the 1990s the concept of inflation targeting caught on among both monetary theorists and monetary policy makers this interest took several forms some advocated a backward looking approach as exemplified by the taylor rule which would require central bankers to offset shocks that had driven inflation away from its target path others advocated a forward looking approach whereby the central bank would target the forecast that is set policy in such a way that the optimal forecast of inflation was exactly equal to its target value this forward looking strategy could use either central bank or private forecasts of inflation some of those who advocated a forward looking strategy based on private forecasts went so far as to suggest that such a policy would eliminate any need for the central bank to develop a structural model of the economy bernanke and woodford 1997 criticized this line of analysis by suggesting that due to problems related to circularity and indeterminacy or solution multiplicity 1 a policy of targeting the forecast was not likely to be effective in this article we argue that because the circularity problem can be easily remedied a private forecast based policy is feasible and central banks do not need a structural model of the economy ii the circularity problem because monetary policy impacts the price level with a long and variable lag it is not surprising that many economists have looked for ways of incorporating private sector forecasts into the monetary policy making process taken to its logical extreme such an approach would require the central bank to adjust its policy instrument until the private sector s forecast of inflation for instance was equal to the target value at first glance the idea of replacing a bureaucratic decision making process with a simple rule based on rational expectations and efficient markets theory has great intuitive appeal bernanke and woodford however showed that there is a circularity problem associated with attempts to target private sector forecasts of inflation or any other goal variable if a policy of targeting the forecast were credible and effective then at each and every point in time the market would expect the future price level to be equal to its target value but in that case private sector forecasts would be uninformative that is they would be unable to provide the monetary authority with information about economic shocks that might impact the price level and thus would provide no guidance as to how the monetary authority could use its tools to offset those shocks on closer inspection it turns out that there are a number of distinct issues entangled in the general circularity problem for instance does the problem apply only to private sector forecasts or to central bank forecasts as well and are there ways of developing private sector forecast based policy rules that are not susceptible to the circularity problem if the answer is yes what does this imply about the widely held view that monetary authorities need to base policy on their own internal structural models of the economy svensson 1997 suggested that his inflation forecast targeting proposal was not susceptible to the circularity problem because it relied on internal central bank forecasts not private sector forecasts bernanke and woodford however showed that the effectiveness of svensson s proposal was based on the fact that central bank forecasts were derived from a structural model of the economy and that the distinction between internal and external forecasts was essentially meaningless for the circularity problem if the problem is not private sector forecasts per se then the next question is whether it is possible to set up a policy targeting rule based on private sector forecasts that avoids the circularity problem and also minimizes the need for the central bank to rely on a structural model of the economy

dynamic predictor selection in a new keynesian model with heterogeneous expectations abstract this paper introduces dynamic predictor selection into a new keynesian model with heterogeneous expectations and examines its implications for monetary policy we extend branch and mcgough 2009 by incorporating endogenous time varying predictor proportions along the lines of brock and hommes 1997 we find that periodic orbits and complex dynamics may arise even if the model under rational expectations has a unique stationary solution the qualitative nature of the non linear dynamics turns on the interaction between hawkishness of the government s policy and the extrapolative behavior of non rational agents

monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a new keynesian model with capital accumulation and non ricardian consumers the paper examines simple monetary and fiscal policy rules consistent with determinate equilibrium dynamics in the absence of ricardian equivalence under this assumption government debt turns into a relevant state variable which needs to be accounted for in the analysis of equilibrium dynamics the key analytical finding is that without explicit reference to the level of government debt it is not possible to infer how strongly the monetary and fiscal instruments should be used to ensure determinate equilibrium dynamics specifically we identify bifurcations associated with threshold values of steady state debt leading to qualitative changes in the local determinacy requirements

how forward looking is optimal monetary policy we calculate optimal monetary policy rules for several variants of a simple optimizing model of the monetary transmission mechanism with sticky prices and or wages we show that robustly optimal rules can be represented by interest rate feedback rules that generalize the celebrated proposal of taylor 1993 optimal rules however require that the current interest rate operating target depend positively on the recent past level of the operating target and its recent rate of increase in a way that is characteristic of estimated central bank reaction functions but not of taylor s proposal we furthermore find that a robustly optimal policy rule is almost inevitably an implicit rule that requires the central bank to use a structural model to project the economy s evolution under the contemplated policy action however calibrated examples suggest that optimal rules place less weight on projections of inflation or output many quarters in the future than do rules often discussed in the literature on inflation targeting or in the current practice of inflation forecast targeting central banks

the taylor principle fights back part ii abstract the existing literature holds that the taylor principle often leads to indeterminacy in new keynesian models that allow for capital accumulation and limited asset market participation this conclusion is special however to the case of continuous full employment when the assumption of perfect wage flexibility is relaxed very slightly so that the labor market clears quickly but not instantaneously determinacy is the norm the threat of indeterminacy is limited to a tiny irrelevant corner of the parameter space where the elasticity of labor supply is unusually high and real wage adjustment is unbelievably fast everywhere else the taylor principle guarantees a unique rational expectations equilibrium the dramatic difference in results reflects the sensitivity of the monetary transmission mechanism to the speed of adjustment in the labor market

using a long term interest rate as the monetary policy instrument abstract using a short term interest rate as the monetary policy instrument can be problematic near its zero bound constraint an alternative strategy is to use a long term interest rate as the policy instrument we find when taylor type policy rules are used by the central bank to set the long rate in a standard new keynesian model indeterminacy that is multiple rational expectations equilibria may often result however a policy rule with a long rate policy instrument that responds in a forward looking fashion to inflation expectations can avoid the problem of indeterminacy

in defense of health based standards abstract this paper explores the utilitarian ethical foundations underlying two standards for pollution control an efficiency standard and a health based standard the main point is that a health based standard can be defended quite easily on utilitarian grounds safety proponents need not be self serving irrational nor ignorant criticism of health based standards as too costly is not always persuasive since material consumption is not the only component of social welfare nor do consumption increases necessarily increase social welfare

interest rate policy debt and indeterminacy with distortionary taxation abstract the interest rate setting policy of the central bank influences the amount of funds the government must raise to pay the interest on its existing debt with distortionary taxation fiscal adjustments feed back on the model s endogenous variables the conditions under which interest rate and tax policies are compatible with a uniquely determined stable equilibrium are derived for an optimizing sticky price model if the fiscal government continuously balances its budget active interest rate policy easily leads to indeterminacy if there is a positive steady state stock of public debt when short run deficits are allowed active interest rate policy and determinacy are compatible unless the tax rate is too strongly increasing in response to changes in debt the real interest rate or output

learning in a misspecified multivariate self referential linear stochastic model this paper introduces a general method to study stability under learning of equilibria resulting from agents with misspeci ed perceptions of the law of motion of the economy this is done by transforming the actual and perceived laws of motion into the form of seemingly unrelated regressions and then linearly projecting the actual law of motion into the same class as the perceived law of motion i study the new keynesian is lm model with inertia under all possible classes of restricted perceptions it turns out that the results found in bullard and mitra 2002 2003 are robust under misspeci ed expectations

desirability of nominal gdp targeting under adaptive learning nominal gdp targeting has been advocated by a number of authors since it produces relative stability of inflation and output however all of the papers assume rational expectations on the part of private agents in this paper i provide an analysis of this assumption i use stability under recursive learning as a criterion for evaluating nominal gdp targeting in the context of a model with explicit micro foundations which is currently the workhorse for the analysis of monetary policy

using futures prices to control inflation reply to garrison and white in a recent paper garrison and white g w 1997 offered a thoughtful and skeptical assessment of several recent proposals to use price index futures contracts to achieve price level targets their main focus is a scheme put forward by sumner 1995 but they also addressed a scheme that i suggested dowd 1994 1995 and made substantial criticisms of price index futures schemes in general sumner 1997 has already replied to those that pertain to his scheme and this reply responds to those that pertain to mine 1 the objective of my scheme is to achieve price stability whilst also making the monetary system fully automatic and so doing away with discretionary monetary policy this objective would be achieved by the central bank pegging the price of price index futures contracts and then relying on private sector arbitrage to ensure that the money supply is consistent with a stable expected price level the actual price level would then be equal to this expected price level plus or minus a hopefully small random error

on the optimal monetary policy response to noisy indicators abstract we describe a behavior of a central bank when its measures of current inflation and output are subject to measurement errors in a framework of optimizing models with nominal price stickiness in our model a central bank sets the interest rate equal to its current estimate of the so called wicksellian natural rate of interest this is shown to imply that the interest rate responds to the central bank s estimates of both current inflation and output gap as advocated by taylor 1993 it is also shown that the noise contained in the indicators justifies a degree of policy cautiousness a reduced form representation of optimal policy should exhibit interest rate smoothing which is often found in the empirical literature on monetary policy reaction functions

the perils of taylor rules abstract since john taylor s 1993 carnegie rochester conf ser publ policy39 195 214 seminal paper a large literature has argued that active interest rate feedback rules that is rules that respond to increases in inflation with a more than one for one increase in the nominal interest rate are stabilizing in this paper we argue that once the zero bound on nominal interest rates is taken into account active interest rate feedback rules can easily lead to unexpected consequences specifically we show that even if the steady state at which monetary policy is active is locally the unique equilibrium typically there exist an infinite number of equilibrium trajectories originating arbitrarily close to that steady state that converge to a liquidity trap that is a steady state in which the nominal interest rate is near zero and inflation is possibly negative journal of economic literature classification numbers e52 e31 e63

optimal interest rate smoothing this paper considers the desirability of the observed tendency of central banks to adjust interest rates only gradually in response to changes in economic conditions it shows in the context of a simple model of optimizing private sector behaviour that assignment of an interest rate smoothing objective to the central bank may be desirable even when reduction of the magnitude of interest rate changes is not a social objective in itself this is because a response of policy to irrelevant lagged variables may be desirable owing to the way it steers private sector expectations of future policy

limited asset markets participation monetary policy and inverted aggregate demand logic abstract this paper incorporates limited asset markets participation in dynamic general equilibrium and develops a simple analytical framework for monetary policy analysis aggregate dynamics and stability properties of an otherwise standard business cycle model depend nonlinearly on the degree of asset market participation while moderate participation rates strengthen the role of monetary policy low enough participation causes an inversion of results dictated by conventional wisdom the slope of the is curve changes sign the taylor principle is inverted optimal welfare maximizing discretionary monetary policy requires a passive policy rule and the effects and propagation of shocks are changed however a targeting rule implementing optimal policy under commitment delivers equilibrium determinacy regardless of the degree of asset market participation our results may justify fed s behavior during the great inflation period

a general theory and some evidence of expectation traps in monetary policy i show that multiple equilibria are a general property of economies under full monetary policy discretion three simple conditions are sufficient to rule out generically a unique equilibrium in a static economy the key departure from barro and gordon 1983 is to consider bounded welfare costs of inflation i also show that in a two markov equilibrium economy the inflation response to certain perturbations is generically qualitatively different in each equilibrium finally i discuss some evidence on inflation dynamics that supports the hypothesis that u s monetary policy was caught in an expectation trap during the high inflation episode of the 1970s

explicit and implicit targets in open economies under a flexible inflation targeting regime should policymakers avoid any reaction to movements in the foreign exchange market using data for six advanced open economies explicitly targeting inflation this article examines empirically whether real exchange rate disequilibria systematically affect the conduct of monetary policy estimates indicate that monetary policy responses in inflation targeting open economies have changed significantly as the institutional framework for the conduct of monetary policy has evolved in particular an explicit target for core inflation and a greater use of the expectation channel of monetary policy appear to be the key features of the newest policy framework in this context central banks are unlikely to react to regular fluctuations in the exchange rate

interest rate rules and transitional dynamics in an endogenously growing open economy abstract this paper sets up an endogenous growth model of an open economy in which the monetary authority implements a gradualist interest rate rule with targets for both inflation and economic growth we show that under a passive rule a monetary equilibrium exists and is unique moreover the equilibrium is locally determinate by contrast an active rule implies either two equilibria one high growth and one low growth or none in the case of two equilibria the high growth equilibrium is locally determinate while the low growth equilibrium is a source besides the stabilization and growth effects of alternative target policies are also explored in this study moreover in departing from the existing literature we turn to focus on the analysis of transition with a particular emphasis on the case of imperfect credibility

identifying the influences of nominal and real rigidities in aggregate price setting behavior we formulate a generalized price setting framework that incorporates staggered contracts of multiple durations and that enables us to directly identify the influences of nominal vs real rigidities we estimate this framework using macroeconomic data for germany 1975 1998 and for the u s 1983 2003 in each case we find that the data are well characterized by nominal contracts with an average duration of about two to three quarters we also find that new contracts exhibit very low sensitivity to marginal cost corresponding to a relatively high degree of real rigidity finally our results indicate that backward looking price setting behavior such as indexation to lagged inflation is not needed in explaining the aggregate data at least in an environment with a stable monetary policy regime and a transparent and credible inflation objective

does it matter for equilibrium determinacy what price index the central bank targets what inflation rate should the central bank target we address determinacy issues related to this question in a two sector model in which prices can differ in equilibrium we assume that the degree of nominal price stickiness can vary across the sectors and that labor is immobile the contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that a modified taylor principle holds in this environment if the central bank elects to target sector one and if it responds with a coefficient greater than unity to price movements in this sector then this policy rule will ensure determinacy across all sectors the results of this paper have at least two implications first the equilibrium determinacy criterion does not imply a preference to any particular measure of inflation second since the taylor principle applies at the sectoral level there is no need for a taylor principle at the aggregate level

determinacy and learnability of monetary policy rules in small open economies this paper evaluates under which conditions different taylor type rules lead to determinacy and expectational stability e stability of rational expectations equilibrium in a simple new keynesian small open economy model developed by gali and monacelli 2005 in particular we extend the bullard and mitra 2002 results of determinacy and e stability in a closed economy to this small open economy framework our results highlight an important link between the taylor principle and both determinacy and learnability of equilibrium in small open economies more importantly the degree of openness coupled with the nature of the policy rule adopted by the monetary authorities might change this link in important ways a key finding is that contrary to bullard and mitra expectations based rules that involve the cpi and or the nominal exchange rate limit the region of e stability and the taylor principle does not guarantee e stability we also show that some forms of managed exchange rate rules can help to alleviate problems of both indeterminacy and expectational instability yet these rules might not be desirable since they promote greater volatility in the economy

performance of monetary policy with internal central bank forecasting abstract recent models of monetary policy have analyzed the desirability of different optimal and ad hoc interest rules under the restrictive assumption that forecasts of the private sector and the central bank are homogeneous this paper studies the implications of heterogeneity in forecasting by the central bank and private agents for the performance of interest rules in a framework of econometric learning

taylor principle and inflation stability in emerging market countries abstract the goal of this paper is to evaluate the validity of the taylor principle for inflation control in 12 developing countries that use inflation targeting regimes brazil chile colombia hungary israel mexico peru philippines poland south africa thailand and turkey the test is based on a state space model to determine when each country has followed the principle then a threshold unit root test is used to verify if the stationarity of the deviation of the expected inflation from its target depends on compliance with the taylor principle the results show that such compliance leads to the stationarity of the deviation of the expected inflation from its target in all cases furthermore in most cases non compliance with the taylor principle leads to nonstationary deviation of the expected inflation

does inflation targeting affect the dispersion of inflation expectations in this paper we examine the effect of having an inflation targeting framework on the dispersion of inflation forecasts from professional forecasters we use a panel data set of 25 countries including 14 inflation targeters with 16 years of monthly information we find that the dispersion of long run inflation expectations is smaller in targeting regimes after controlling for country specific effects time specific effects the level and the variance of inflation disinflation periods and global inflation on average the full effect is not observed until the third year after implementation of inflation targeting when we differentiate between developed and developing countries the dispersion of inflation expectations after inflation targeting is smaller and statistically significant only in developing countries

how the ecb and the us fed set interest rates monetary policies of the european central bank ecb and us fed can be characterized by taylor rules that is both central banks seem to be setting rates by taking into account the output gap and inflation we also set up and tested taylor rules which incorporate money growth and the euro dollar exchange rate thereby improving the fit between actual and taylor rule based rates in general taylor rules appear to be a much better way of describing fed policy than ecb policy simulations suggest that the ecb s short term interest rates have been at a much lower level in the last 2 years compared with what a taylor rule would suggest

bias in federal reserve inflation forecasts is the federal reserve irrational or just cautious abstract inflation forecasts of the federal reserve seem to have systematically under predicted inflation from the fourth quarter of 1968 until volcker s appointment as chairman and to systematically over predict it afterwards until the second quarter of 1998 furthermore under quadratic loss commercial forecasts seem to have information not contained in those forecasts to investigate the cause of this apparent irrationality this paper recovers the loss function implied by federal reserve s inflation forecasts the results suggest that the cost of having inflation above an implicit time varying target was larger than the cost of having inflation below it for the period since volcker and that the opposite was true for the pre volcker era once these asymmetries are taken into account the federal reserve s inflation forecasts are found to be rational

the design of monetary and fiscal policy a global perspective abstract we study the emergence of multiple equilibria in models with capital and bonds under various monetary and fiscal policies we show that the presence of capital is indeed another independent source of local and global multiplicities even under active policies that yield local determinacy we also show how a very similar mechanism generates multiplicities in models with bonds and distortionary taxation we then explore the design of monetary policies that avoid multiple equilibria we show that interest rate policies that respond to the output gap while potentially a source of significant inefficiencies may be effective in preventing multiple equilibria and costly oscillatory equilibrium dynamics

is the central bank s publication of economic forecasts influential abstract we examine how a central bank s economic forecasts affect forecasts by professional forecasters and vice versa results show that while central bank forecasts are not significantly influenced by those of professional forecasters the latter are however notably affected by the former

the informational content of prices when policy makers react to financial markets abstract when can policy makers use policy relevant information from financial market prices and how does policy affect price informativeness i analyze a novel setting with noise where a policy maker tries to infer information about a state variable from prices to improve policy decisions and policy in turn affects asset values i derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the possibility of information revelation in equilibrium which might not be possible if the policy reaction to prices punishes traders for revealing their information if the policy maker is uninformed then policy objectives do not change price informativeness but they do if the policy maker has independent information about the state i also analyze policy maker transparency and find that policy makers with objectives having a large impact on asset values should publish their information before trading to make prices more informative in other cases intransparency can be optimal

inflation forecasts and monetary policy proposals for inflation targeting as a strategy for monetary policy leave open the important operational question of how to determine whether current policies are consistent with the long run inflation target an interesting possibility is that the central bank might target current private sector forecasts of inflation either those made explicitly by professional forecasters or those implicit in asset prices we address the issue of existence and uniqueness of rational expectations equilibria when the central bank uses private sector forecasts as a guide to policy actions in a dynamic model which incorporates both sluggish price adjustment and shocks to aggregate demand and aggregate supply we show that strict targeting of inflation forecasts is typically inconsistent with the existence of rational expectations equilibrium and that policies approximating strict inflation forecast targeting are likely to have undesirable properties we also show that economies with more general forecast based policy rules are particularly susceptible to indeterminacy of rational expectations equilibria we conclude that although private sector forecasts may contain information useful to the central bank ultimately the monetary authorities must rely on an explicit structural model of the economy to guide their policy decisions this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

testing for forecast consensus a panel of forecasts may be defined to be in consensus when individual forecasters place identical weights on a common latent variable we suggest this definition and formulate a dynamic latent variable model to test for consensus this method also tests whether it is valid to use the mean forecast as the consensus forecast in applications to surveys of u s macroeconomic forecasters there is greater consensus in forecasts for output growth than for inflation or unemployment but idiosyncratic forecast autocorrelation from year to year is present for most forecasters

inflation targeting some extensions previous analyses of the implementation of inflation targeting are extended to monetary policy responses to different shocks consequences of model uncertainty and effects of interest rate smoothing and stabilization model uncertainty output stabilization and interest rate stabilization or smoothing all call for a more gradual adjustment of the conditional inflation forecast toward the inflation target the conditional inflation forecast is the natural intermediate target during inflation targeting the optimal way of reacting to shocks is hence to check how they affect the inflation forecast and then take the appropriate action jel classification e42 e52 e58

monetary policy indeterminacy and learning abstract forward looking monetary models with taylor type interest rate rules are known to generate indeterminacies with a potential dependence on extraneous sunspots for some structural and policy parameters we investigate the stability of these solutions under adaptive learning focusing on common factor or resonance frequency representations in which the observed sunspot has a suitable time series structure we consider specifications incorporating both lagged and expected inflation in the phillips curve and both expected and inertial elements in the policy rule we find that some policy rules can indeed lead to learnable sunspot solutions and we investigate the conditions under which this phenomenon arises

learning and the central bank abstract it is well known that sunspot equilibria may arise under an interest rate operating procedure in which the central bank varies the nominal rate with movements in future inflation a forward looking taylor rule this paper demonstrates that these sunspot equilibria may be learnable in the sense of e stability

inflation targeting and exchange rate management in less developed countries abstract we analyze coordination of monetary and exchange rate policy in a two sector model of a small open economy featuring imperfect substitution between domestic and foreign financial assets our central finding is that tight management of the exchange rate greatly enhances the efficacy of inflation targeting in a flexible exchange rate system inflation targeting incurs a high risk of indeterminacy moreover small inflation shocks may escalate into much larger increases in inflation ex post both problems disappear when the central bank fixes the path of the nominal exchange rate or leans heavily against the wind in a managed float

inflation targeting makes the difference novel evidence on inflation stabilization abstract though svensson 1997 svensson 2003 provides theoretical evidence that the introduction of inflation targeting is consistent with an inflation stabilizing monetary policy empirical evidence that the introduction of inflation targeting actually changes central bank s behavior is still missing this paper aims to close this gap and estimates forward looking monetary policy rules for 20 inflation targeting countries to this end we use a data set which is available to the central bank in real time published on a frequently basis comparable among all countries and which includes the periods before and after the introduction of inflation targeting we find that the introduction of inflation targeting significantly shifts the central bank s reaction function toward inflation stabilizing we also provide evidence of time varying effects and find that central banks stabilize inflation once inflation targeting is introduced we take our results as strong evidence that the introduction of inflation targeting makes the difference for monetary policy strategies

monetary policy with signal extraction from the bond market monetary policy is conducted in an environment of uncertainty this paper presents a model where the central bank uses real time data from the bond market together with standard macroeconomic indicators to infer the current state of the economy more efficiently while taking into account that its own actions influence the bond market and therefore what it observes that the central bank uses the information in the term structure to set policy creates a link between the bond market and the macroeconomy that is novel to the literature the estimated model suggests that there is some information in us yields of maturities of less than 1 year that can help the federal reserve to identify shocks to the economy on a timely basis

does trade openness matter for aggregate instability abstract this paper presents a cash in advance model of a small open economy and shows that whether an inflation targeting interest rate rule introduces aggregate instability depends in general on the degree of openness to international trade this result emerges regardless of whether prices are sticky or flexible in a closed economy as the monetary authority responds to movements in inflation the resulting changes in interest rates affect aggregate consumption through an intertemporal substitution effect and an inflation tax effect in a small open economy this policy also induces changes in the terms of trade which depending on the degree of openness can generate counteracting effects on consumption as a consequence the implications of interest rate rules on macroeconomic stability in an open economy differ from those in a closed economy

monetary policy expectations and commitment commitment in monetary policy leads to equilibria that are superior to those from optimal discretionary policies a number of interest rate reaction functions and instrument rules have been proposed to implement or approximate commitment policy we assess these rules in terms of whether they lead to a rational expectations equilibrium that is both locally determinate and stable under adaptive learning by private agents a reaction function that appropriately depends explicitly on private sector expectations performs particularly well on both counts

accountability transparency and inflation targeting inflation targeting regimes define a performance measure for the central bank a regime that places a large small weight on achieving the target is analogous to a high low powered incentive scheme high powered incentive structures promote accountability but may distort stabilization policy the optimal power under inflation targeting is derived under perfect and imperfect information the fundamental trade off between accountability and stabilization depends on the degree of transparency defined as the ability to monitor the central bank s performance multiplicative uncertainty increases the optimal weight to place on achieving an inflation target

simple monetary policymaking without the output gap several research contributions have argued that information about the output gap is essential for a good monetary policy rule however as pointed out by orphanides 2001 there is considerable real time uncertainty about the size of the output gap the paper argues that simple monetary policy rules that rely exclusively on survey based information about future and past inflation rates may be more efficient than optimized taylor rules once realtime output gap uncertainty is accounted for even when only information about historical inflation rates is available a very simple policy rule may be constructed that improves on the taylor rule

do central bank forecasts influence private agents forecasting performance versus signals focusing on a set of central banks that publish their internal macroeconomic forecasts in real time enables one to shed light on the expectations channel of monetary policy the main contribution of this paper is to assess whether central bank forecasts influence private forecasts the response is positive for inflation forecasts in sweden the uk and japan to disentangle the sources of influence of central banks two concepts are proposed endogenous influence which is due to more accurate central bank forecasts and exogenous influence which is due to central bank signals on either future policy decisions or private information original empirical evidence on the central bank forecasting performance relative to private agents is provided and estimates show that in sweden more accurate inflation forecasts generate specific central bank influence that is different from the influence from signals the publication of forecasts may therefore refer to two central banking strategies that aim to shape private expectations forecasting or policymaking

taylor rules in a model that satisfies the natural rate hypothesis the authors analyze the restrictions necessary to ensure that the interest rate policy rule used by the central bank does not introduce real indeterminacy into the economy they conduct this analysis in a flexible price economy and a sticky price model that satisfies the natural rate hypothesis a necessary and sufficient condition for real determinacy in the sticky price model is that there must be nominal and real determinacy in the corresponding flexible price model this arises if and only if the taylor rule responds aggressively to lagged inflation rates

information acquisition dissemination and transparency of monetary policy this paper examines the role of transparency in a benevolent monetary author ity s policies each firm s payoff depends on unobservable macroeconomic conditions and firms may incur a cost to acquire private information about macroeconomic conditions the policy authority attempts to infer the underlying macroeconomic conditions from a noisy measure of aggregate actions and makes a public announcement to inform firms of this inference high quality announcements provide firms the incentive not to gather private information and base actions solely on information contained in policy announce ments however this makes the observed actions of firms less informative to the policy authority jel classification e52 e58

optimal constrained interest rate rules we show that if policymakers compute the optimal unconstrained interest rate rule within a taylor type class they may be led to rules that generate indeterminacy and or instability under learning this problem is compounded by uncertainty about structural parameters since an optimal rule that is determinate and stable under learning for one calibration may be indeterminate or unstable under learning under a different calibration we advocate a procedure in which policymakers restrict attention to rules constrained to lie in the determinate learnable region for all plausible calibrations and that minimize the expected loss computed using structural parameter priors subject to this constraint

the butterfly effect of small open economies abstract the rational expectations equilibrium of a small open economy can be subject to indeterminacy if foreign monetary policy does not satisfy the taylor principle we study the implications of foreign induced indeterminacy in the two country version of the sticky price small open economy model our main finding is that smallness is a property of the unique rational expectations equilibrium of the large economy and not a general property of the small open economy model if the large economy fails to anchor expectations shocks to the small economy can affect the large one this form of indeterminacy gives rise to a butterfly effect additional assumptions are required to preserve the smallness of the small economy

monetary policy learning and the speed of convergence under the assumption of bounded rationality economic agents learn from their past mistaken predictions by combining new and old information to form new beliefs the purpose of this paper is to investigate how the policy maker by affecting private agents learning process determines the speed at which the economy converges to the rational expectation equilibrium i find that by reacting strongly to private agents expected inflation a central bank increases the speed of convergence and shortens the length of the transition to the rational expectation equilibrium i use speed of convergence as an additional criterion for evaluating alternative monetary policies i find that a fast convergence is not always desirable

unconventional government debt purchases as a supplement to conventional monetary policy abstract in response to the great financial crisis the federal reserve the bank of england and many other central banks have adopted unconventional monetary policy instruments we investigate if one of these purchases of long term government debt could be a valuable addition to conventional short term interest rate policy even if the main policy rate is not constrained by the zero lower bound to do so we add a stylised financial sector and central bank asset purchases to an otherwise standard new keynesian dsge model asset quantities matter for interest rates through a preferred habitat channel if conventional and unconventional monetary policy instruments are coordinated appropriately then the central bank is better able to stabilise both output and inflation

adaptive learning and the use of forecasts in monetary policy abstract this paper investigates monetary policy design when central bank and private sector expectations differ private agents learn adaptively the central bank has a possibly misspecified model of the economy successful implementation of optimal policy using inflation targeting rules requires the central bank to have complete knowledge of private agents learning behavior if the central bank mistakenly assumes private agents to have rational expectations when in fact they are learning then policy rules frequently lead to divergent learning dynamics however if the central bank does not correctly understand agents behavior stabilization policy is best implemented by controlling the path of the price level rather than the inflation rate

what drives inflation expectations in brazil an empirical analysis this study examines the macro economic determinants of survey inflation expectations in brazil since the adoption of inflation targeting in 1999 the results suggest that the inflation targeting framework has helped anchor expectations with the dispersion of inflation expectations declining considerably particularly during periods of high uncertainty we also find that apart from the inflation target the stance of fiscal policy as proxied by the ratio of the consolidated primary surplus to gdp has been instrumental in shaping expectations the importance of past inflation in determining expectations appears to be relatively low and the overall empirical evidence does not suggest the presence of substantial inertia in the inflation process

learning about monetary policy rules abstract we study macroeconomic systems with forward looking private sector agents and a monetary authority that is trying to control the economy through the use of a linear policy feedback rule we use stability under recursive learning a la evans and honkapohja learning and expectations in macroeconomics princeton university press princeton new jersey 2001 as a criterion for evaluating monetary policy rules in this context we find that considering learning can alter the evaluation of alternative policy rules

reaction of british bank share prices to citicorp s announced 3 billion increase in loan loss reserves abstract this study assesses the impact of citicorp s announcement of a 3 billion increase in loan loss reserves on may 19 1987 on the share prices of british banks the announcement may have had an impact on british banks because like citicorp the major british ones have a high degree of exposure to the debt of less developed countries ldcs musumeci and sinkey detected a favorable reaction of u s money center banks to the announcement because of disparate bank characteristics and regulations between the u s and the united kingdom share prices of british banks may be affected in a different manner than u s banks the results of our study indicate that british bank share prices were adversely affected by the announcement our findings confirm that 1 the strategy of a bank in one country may not only influence other banks in that country but foreign banks as well and 2 the effects on banks can be dependent on the country of origin

distinguished lecture on economics in government what central bankers could learn from academics and vice versa academic writing about monetary policy has been useful to practical central bankers but more of certain aspects of the economists way of thinking could profitably be imported on the other hand academics could improve their analysis and make it more useful to policymakers if they would pay more attention to certain real world aspects of monetary policy the author draws on his experience at the federal reserve board to point out a number of specific lessons for each side

distortionary taxation debt and the price level this paper considers the nominal and real determinacy of equilibria under an exogenously specifi ed path of interest rates in an economy in which taxation is either lump sum or distortionary under lump sum taxation we confirm the well known finding that equilibria display nominal in determinacy if the primary surplus is exogenous endogenous under distortionary taxation this classification is no longer relevant nominal determinacy is always ensured since distortionary taxes establish a link between the allocation and the sequences of taxes and debt and hence the price level regardless of whether the primary surplus is exogenous or endogenous distortionary taxation however increases the scope for real indeterminacy as a general feature the real in determinacy of equilibria depends on the interaction of fiscal and monetary policies i e on the sequences of taxes debt and interest rates if for example fiscal policy runs a balanced budget the central bank should set the nominal interest rate in a way consistent with long run deflation in order to ensure real determinacy this finding is different from a balanced budget policy under lump sum taxes where no such qualification with respect to the interest rate needs to be made

the predictability of fomc decisions evidence from the volcker and greenspan chairmanships this paper examines whether there is a systematic relationship between fomc decisions and publicly available data that would potentially allow the public to anticipate fomc policy changes we characterize each fomc decision as a move to tighten ease or leave policy unchanged and use ordered probit to estimate models of the probabilities of each choice we find a statistically significant relationship between fomc decisions and measures of inflation and real activity but this relationship does not accurately predict the directions of fomc decisions while short term interest rate changes prior to fomc meetings have predictive power suggesting that the financial market can anticipate fomc decisions somewhat other financial variables such as stock price movements appear unrelated to fomc policy changes overall fomc decisions are not highly predictable using publicly available data and adding the private information contained in the fomc s greenbook does not significantly increase the predictive accuracy

monetary policy and stable indeterminacy with inertia abstract we examine existence and stability under learning of sunspot equilibria in a new keynesian model incorporating inertia indeterminacy remains prevalent stable sunspots abound and inertia in is and aggregate supply as relations do not significantly impact the policy region containing stable sunspots

robust inflation forecast based rules to shield against indeterminacy abstract this paper provides a first attempt to quantify and at the same time utilize estimated measures of uncertainty for the design of robust interest rate rules we estimate several variants of a linearized form of a new keynesian model using quarterly us data both our theoretical and numerical results indicate that inflation forecast based ifb rules are increasingly prone to the problem of indeterminacy as the forward horizon increases as a consequence the stabilization performance of optimized rules of this type worsens too robust ifb rules can be designed to avoid indeterminacy in an uncertain environment but at an increasing utility loss as rules become more forward looking

asset prices and expected monetary policy evidence from daily data this article explores the relationships among libor gold prices the exchange rate oil prices fed funds futures prices and stock prices at a daily frequency this article examines whether expected monetary policy measured by changes in the prices of fed funds futures contracts reacts to high frequency changes in asset prices and in turn whether asset prices respond to changes in expected monetary policy the article reveals that there are statistically significant relationships between expected us monetary policy and shocks to libor and exchange rates it also reveals that there is no evidence of a systematic relationship between stock prices and expected monetary policy changes splitting the data into expansionary and recessionary periods using nber dating we find results for the expansionary periods that are very similar to the results for the entire period for the periods of recession we find little evidence of significant linkages between markets

augmenting the taylor rule monetary policy and the bond market i show that augmenting the taylor rule with bond yields observed at the start of the quarter significantly improves the in sample and out of sample fit moreover the augmented rule produces lower forecast errors than those of linear and non linear policy models

bounded interest rate feedback rules in continuous time this paper analyzes the dynamic consequences of interest rate feedback rules in a flexible price model where money enters the utility function two alternative rules are considered based on past or predicted inflation rates the main feature is to consider inflation rates that are selected over a bounded time horizon we prove that if the central bank s forecast horizon is not too long an active and forward looking monetary policy is not destabilizing the equilibrium trajectory is unique and monotonic this is an advantage with respect to active and backward looking policies that are shown to lead to a unique but fluctuating dynamic

why money growth determines inflation in the long run answering the woodford critique woodford 2007 argues that it is not appropriate to regard inflation in the steady state of new keynesian models as determined by steady state money growth woodford instead argues that the intercept term in the monetary authority s interest rate policy rule determines steady state inflation in this paper i offer an alternative interpretation of steady state behavior according to which it is appropriate to regard steady state inflation as determined by steady state money growth the argument relies on traditional interpretations of the central bank s power in the long run and appeals to model properties that are common to textbook and new keynesian analysis according to this argument the only way the central bank can control interest rates in the long run is via affecting inflation and its only means available for determining inflation is by determining the money growth rate

targeting inflation by forecast feedback rules in small open economies abstract we argue that in practice the inflation targeting strategy can be approximated by the interest rate responding to the unchanged interest rate forecast of inflation a method is developed to derive unchanged interest rate forecasts in forward looking models and evaluate the performance of the policy rule in an optimizing new keynesian model due to monacelli european central bank working paper series 227 estimated on uk data we find that the policy rule is less prone to generate a determinate rational expectations equilibrium if based on an unchanged interest rate compared to the rule consistent forecast both rules approximate the optimal commitment policy if the central bank attaches sufficient weight to inflation as opposed to output gap stabilization the optimal forecast feedback horizon is close to a year and a half and is largely independent of how much the central bank prefers inflation to output gap stability

inflation forecast contracts we introduce a new type of incentive contract for central bankers inflation forecast contracts which make central bankers remunerations contingent on the precision of their inflation forecasts we show that such contracts enable central bankers to influence inflation expectations more eectively thus facilitating more successful stabilization of current inflation inflation forecast contracts improve the accuracy of inflation forecasts but have adverse consequences for output on balance paying central bankers according to their forecasting performance improves welfare

investment and interest rate policy a discrete time analysis this paper analyzes the restrictions necessary to ensure that the interest rate policy rule used by the central bank does not introduce local real indeterminacy into the economy it conducts the analysis in a calvo style sticky price model a key innovation is to add investment spending to the analysis in this environment local real indeterminacy is much more likely in particular all forward looking interest rate rules are subject to real indeterminacy

are non fundamental equilibria learnable in models of monetary policy abstract recent models of monetary policy can have indeterminacy of equilibria which is often viewed as a difficulty of these models we consider the significance of indeterminacy using the learning approach to expectations formation we employ expectational stability as a selection criterion for different equilibria and derive the expectational stability and instability conditions for forward looking multivariate models both without and with lags the results are applied to several monetary policies

inflation targeting and switch of fiscal regime in new zealand monetary policy cannot be adequately addressed without also specifying fiscal policy i interpret the economic reforms in new zealand in the 1980s using a simple model that includes reaction functions of both monetary and fiscal policy the interpretation is based on the wealth effects of the government debt the successful and sustainable shift in monetary policy regime in new zealand was supported by a compatible switch in fiscal policy

multiple solution indeterminacies in monetary policy analysis abstract a sizeable fraction of recent research on monetary policy has been concerned with issues relating to analytical indeterminacies i e multiple solutions in rational expectations re models most of the literature features sophisticated re analysis conducted within dynamic models that reflect optimizing behavior by individual agents and incorporate taylor style policy rules a few papers have suggested that some of the particular indeterminacy arguments are misleading or irrelevant for the most part however there has been little dissent from the position that these indeterminacies present a genuine problem for monetary policy makers the purpose of the present paper by contrast is to argue that conclusions based on multiple solution indeterminacy findings are of dubious merit rather generally

policy rule nash equilibria we study how different types of instrument rules affect the outcome of a monetary policy game between the central bank and the private sector policy rules can be independent of output and a shock functions of the shock or functions of output we rank the nash equilibria generated by different types of policy rules according to the central bank s ex ante expected loss if both players can condition on output then the following is true no equilibrium exists if the central bank cares much about output stability and little about price stability and infinitely many equilibria exist otherwise

the ups and downs of capitalism ben bernanke is a leading macroeconomist who has contributed extensively to the literature on business cycles monetary policy the role of financial markets in economic fluctuations inflation targeting and the economics of the great depression he is one of the six economists who form the nber business cycle dating committee a group that determines the dates of recessions in the us in this article interview professor bernanke discusses issues relating to the great depression of the 1930s and problems relating to inflation in the latter half of the twentieth century

inflation targeting as a monetary policy rule the purpose of the paper is to survey and discuss in ation targeting in the context of monetary policy rules the paper provides a general conceptual discussion of monetary policy rules attempts to clarify the essential characteristics of in ation targeting compares in ation targeting to other monetary policy rules and draws some conclusions for the monetary policy of the european system of central banks jel classi cation e42 e52

the value of interest rate stabilization policies when agents are learning we examine the expectational stability e stability of rational expectations equilibrium under optimal interest rate rules in the context of the standard new keynesian model of the monetary transmission mechanism we focus on the case where the monetary authority adds interest rate stabilization to its other objectives of inflation and output stabilization we consider both the case where the monetary authority lacks a commitment technology and as well as the case of full commitment we show that for both cases optimal interest rate rules yield rational expectations equilibria that are e stable for a wide range of empirically plausible parameter values this finding stands in contrast to the findings of evans and honkapohja 2002 2003ab for optimal monetary policy rules in environments where interest rate stabilization is not part of the central bank s objective function

determinacy learnability and monetary policy inertia we show how monetary policy inertia can help alleviate problems of indeterminacy and non existence of stationary equilibrium observed for some commonly studied monetary policy rules we also find that inertia promotes learnability of equilibrium the context is a simple forward looking model of the macroeconomy widely used in the rapidly expanding literature in this area we conclude that this might be an important reason why central banks in the industrialized economies display considerable inertia when adjusting monetary policy in response to changing economic conditions

money and inflation in the euro area a case for monetary indicators abstract this paper examines inflation indicators for the euro area by studying the relationship between inflation output money and interest rates using data spanning 1980 2001 the central finding is that both the output gap and the real money gap the difference between the real money stock and the long run equilibrium real money stock contain considerable information regarding future inflation in contrast the eurosystem s money growth indicator the difference between nominal money growth and a reference value the prominent first pillar in its monetary strategy contains little information about future inflation and no information beyond that contained in the output and real money gaps the predictive performance of the output gap has improved compared to that in a previous version of this paper most likely because of better estimation methods

a new keynesian model with heterogeneous expectations abstract within a new keynesian model we incorporate bounded rationality at the individual agent level and we determine restrictions on expectations operators sufficient to imply aggregate is and as relations of the same functional form as those under rationality this result provides dual implications the strong nature of the restrictions required to achieve aggregation serve as a caution to researchers imposing heterogeneous expectations at an aggregate level may be ill advised on the other hand accepting the necessary restrictions provides for tractable analysis of expectations heterogeneity as an example we consider a case where a fraction of agents are rational and the remainder are adaptive and find specifications that are determinate under rationality may possess multiple equilibria in case of expectations heterogeneity

do real balance effects invalidate the taylor principle in closed and open economies this paper examines the determinacy implications of forecast based monetary policy rules that set the interest rate in response to expected future inflation in a neo wicksellian model that incorporates real balance effects we show that the presence of such effects in closed economies restricts the ability of the taylor principle to prevent indeterminacy of the rational expectations equilibrium the problem is exacerbated in open economies particularly if the policy rule reacts to consumer price rather than domestic price inflation however determinacy can be restored in both closed and open economies with the addition of monetary policy inertia

a new keynesian model with staggered price and wage setting under learning abstract this paper provides a study of the implications for economic dynamics when the central bank sets its nominal interest rate target in response to variations in wage inflation i provide results on the existence uniqueness and stability under learning of rational expectations equilibrium for alternative specifications of the manner in which monetary policy responds to economic shocks when nominal rigidities are present monopolistically competitive producers set prices via staggered price contracts and households set nominal wages in the same fashion in this setting the conditions for determinacy and learnability of rational expectations equilibrium differ from a model where only prices are sticky i find that when the central bank responds to wage and price inflation and to the output gap a taylor principle for wage and price inflation arises that is related to stability under learning dynamics in other words a moderate reaction of the interest rate to wage inflation helps to avoid instability under learning and indeterminacy

does government ideology matter in monetary policy a panel data analysis for oecd countries this paper examines whether government ideology has influenced monetary policy in oecd countries we use quarterly data in the 1980 1 2005 4 period and exclude emu countries our taylor rule specification focuses on the interactions of a new time variant index of central bank independence with government ideology the results show that leftist governments have somewhat lower short term nominal interest rates than rightwing governments when central bank independence is low in contrast short term nominal interest rates are higher under leftist governments when central bank independence is high the effect is more pronounced when exchange rates are flexible our findings are compatible with the view that leftist governments in an attempt to deflect blame of their traditional constituencies have pushed market oriented policies by delegating monetary policy to conservative central bankers

market based corrective actions many economic agents take corrective actions based on information inferred from market prices of firms securities examples include directors and activists intervening in the management of firms and bank supervisors taking actions to improve the health of financial institutions we provide an equilibrium analysis of such situations in light of a key problem if agents use market prices when deciding on corrective actions prices adjust to reflect this use and potentially become less revealing we show that market information and agents information are complementary and discuss measures that can increase agents ability to learn from market prices the author 2009 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please email journals permissions oxfordjournals org oxford university press

the performance of forecast based monetary policy rules under model uncertainty we investigate the performance of forecast based monetary policy rules using five macroeconomic models that reflect a wide range of views on aggregate dynamics we identify the key characteristics of rules that are robust to model uncertainty such rules respond to the one year ahead inflation forecast and to the current output gap and incorporate a substantial degree of policy inertia in contrast rules with longer forecast horizons are less robust and are prone to generating indeterminacy in light of these results we identify a robust benchmark rule that performs very well in all five models over a wide range of policy preferences