the demand for lotto the role of conscious selection this article presents estimates of the elasticity of demand for lottery tickets using time series data in which there is variation in the expected value of a lottery ticket induced by rollovers an important feature of our data is that there are far more rollovers than expected given the lottery design we find strong evidence that individuals do not choose their lottery numbers uniformly from a uniform distribution that is conscious selection we use our estimates to derive the inverse supply function for the industry and this enables us to identify the demand elasticity we find the price elasticity to be close to unity which implies that the operator is revenue maximizing which is the regulator s objective

state lotteries and consumer behavior abstract this paper investigates two central issues regarding state lotteries first analyses of multiple sources of micro level data demonstrate that household lottery spending is financed primarily by a reduction in non gambling expenditures not by a reduction in expenditures on other forms of gambling the introduction of a state lottery is associated with an average decline of 46 per month or 2 4 percent in household non gambling expenditures low income households reduce non gambling household expenditures by 2 5 percent on average 3 1 percent when the state lottery includes instant games these households experience statistically significant declines in expenditures on food and on rent mortgage and other bills second consumer demand for lottery products responds positively to the expected value of the gamble controlling for other statistical moments and product characteristics including the nominal top prize amount this finding is consistent with informed choice among consumers of lottery products although other forms of irrational or misinformed choice cannot be ruled out

the who and why of lottery empirical highlights from the seminal economic literature lotteries operate today in many countries around the world this type of gambling is usually run by governments and is sometimes described as regressive lottery is an unfair bet so explaining the purchase of lottery tickets by risk averse consumers has been a challenge for economic theory lotteries can be analysed from either of two economic perspectives as a source of public revenue or as a consumer commodity in this paper the state of economic research on lotteries is reviewed focusing on its main empirical findings

corruption a review as is increasingly recognised in academic literature and by international organisations corruption acts as a major deterrent to growth and development the aim of this survey is to organise and summarise existing theoretical and empirical work on corruption with a view to identifying opportunities for further research the paper begins with a brief overview of key definitions of corruption and then turns to a review of the factors that favour or deter the growth of corruption together with a brief look at related models this is followed by an examination of the consequences of corruption for society and the consideration of measures that might help to reduce corruption the paper ends with suggestions for future research and includes summaries of data sources and key variables for use in this research

correlation neglect in belief formation many information structures generate correlated rather than mutually independent signals the news media being a prime example this article provides experimental evidence that many people neglect the resulting double counting problem in the updating process in consequence beliefs are too sensitive to the ubiquitous telling and re telling of stories and exhibit excessive swings we identify substantial and systematic heterogeneity in the presence of the bias and investigate the underlying mechanisms the evidence points to the paramount importance of complexity in combination with people s problems in identifying and thinking through the correlation even though most participants in principle have the computational skills that are necessary to develop rational beliefs many approach the problem in a wrong way when the environment is moderately complex thus experimentally nudging people s focus towards the correlation and the underlying independent signals has large effects on beliefs

capture and governance at local and national levels 135 despite the importance of this issue not much systematic research appears to have been devoted to assessing the relative susceptibility of national and local governments to interestgroup capture here we describe a model of two party electoral competition with probabilistic voting behavior and lobbying by specialinterest groups based on david baron 1994 and gene grossman and elhanan helpman 1996 that helps identify determinants of relative capture at different levels of government these include relative levels of voter awareness and interest group cohesiveness electoral uncertainty electoral competition heterogeneity of districts with respect to inequality and the electoral system while some of these uphold the traditional madisonian presumption others are likely to create a tendency for lower capture at the local level so the net effect is theoretically ambiguous this suggests that the extent of relative capture may be context specific and needs to be assessed empirically

using electoral cycles in police hiring to estimate the effect of police on crime comment previous empirical studies have uncovered little evidence that police reduce crime possibly due to simultaneity problems this paper uses the timing of mayoral and gubernatorial elections as an instrumental variable to identify a causal effect of police on crime increases in the size of police forces are shown to be disproportionately concentrated in mayoral and gubernatorial election years increases in police are shown to substantially reduce violent crime but have a smaller impact on property crime the null hypothesis that the marginal social benefit of reduced crime equals the costs of hiring additional police cannot be rejected

economic shocks and lottery sales an examination of maine state lottery sales most u s states earn significant amount of revenues from lottery sales however they are also criticized for promoting the lotteries because they have been seen as taking advantage of poor popula

brazilian policies that encourage deforestation in the amazon this paper shows that general tax policies special tax incentives the rules of land allocation and the agricultural credit system all accelerate deforestation in the amazon these policies increase the size of land holdings and reduce the chances of the poor to become farmers the following are the key provisions i the virtual exemption of agricultural income from income taxation makes agriculture a tax shelter ii rules of public land allocation provide incentives for deforestation because the rules used in determining the security of a claim and its land area encourage land clearing iii the progressive land tax contains provisions that encourage the conversion of forest to crop land or pasture iv the tax credit scheme aimed toward corporate livestock ranches subsidizes inefficient ranches established on cleared forest land and v subsidized credit is available for sudam approved ranches

buying a dream alternative models of demand for lotto existing lotto demand models utilize effective price computed as the face value of a ticket minus the expected value of prize money per ticket as their primary explanatory variable by contrast this article proposes a key role for consumption benefit or fun in the demand for gambling in general and lotto demand in particular it develops an alternative model of lotto demand that focuses on the maximum possible prize when this is tested against the traditional model using data from the u k national lottery we find that jackpot considerations exert an influence over and above that of variations in effective price

communication networks in common pool resource games field experimental evidence abstract we explore the role of communication networks and message types on behavior in a common pool resource game in an artefactual field experiment we introduce two network structures allowing participants to transmit non binding suggestions to the other players with whom they were connected we study the effect of these networks on subjects payoffs in a centralized network bad self regarding suggestions have a negative and permanent effect whereas good cooperative suggestions have a null or even negative effect due to their limited credibility in a decentralized network the positive effect of good suggestions is permanent although smaller than in the centralized network while bad suggestions have a more limited effect although allocation to positions in the network is exogenous we find a positive correlation between network centrality and other regarding behavior when transmitting good and bad messages

election cycles and electricity provision evidence from a quasi experiment with indian special elections abstract we present evidence from india showing that state governments induce electoral cycles in electricity service provision our data and research strategy allow us to build on models of political business cycles and targeted distribution in two important ways first we demonstrate that by manipulating the flow of critical inputs into economic activity like electricity elected leaders can influence economic outcomes even in contexts where they have constrained fiscal capacity second we identify the effect of elections on electricity provision by focusing on special elections held for exogenous reasons our results show that state governments induce substantive increases in electricity service to constituencies that hold special elections manipulation of the power supply is stronger in contested constituencies and during special elections held in states where the government commands only a small majority overall we find no evidence of positive welfare effects from the electoral manipulation of electricity supply

opportunistic and partisan election cycles in brazil new evidence at the municipal level this article tests the hypothesis of opportunistic and partisan cycle models using a new large data set of brazilian municipalities over the 1989 2005 period the results show an increase in total and current expenditures and a decrease in municipal investments local tax revenues and budget surplus in election years they also show that partisan ideology exerts a relative influence on the performance of the local public accounts these results confirm that both opportunistic and partisan cycles have occurred in the management of the budgets of brazilian municipalities after the end of the military government

the peculiar scale economies of lotto the best selling lottery game in the united states is lotto a parimutuel game of long odds and large jackpots unlike in the other popular lottery games numbers and instant there is a strong tendency for per capita lotto sales to increase with the size of the population base the fact that the jackpot also tends to increase with population size is not a complete explanation since the probability of winning tends to be inversely proportional to state population our explanation for why the games are more successful in large states is that players tend to judge the likelihood of winning based on the frequency with which someone wins then a larger state can offer a game at longer odds but the same perceived probability of winning as a smaller state this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices evidence from gubernatorial term limits this paper analyzes the behavior of u s governors from 1950 to 1986 to investigate a reputation building model of political behavior we argue that differences in the behavior of governors who face a binding term limit and those who are able to run again provides a source of variation in discount rates that can be used to test a political agency model we find evidence that taxes spending and other policy instruments respond to a binding term limit if a democrat is in office the result is a fiscal cycle in term limit states which lowers state income when the term limit binds

aggregate information cascades abstract we introduce a new model of aggregate information cascades where only one of two possible actions is observable to others agents make a binary decision in sequence the order is random and agents are not aware of their own position in the sequence when called upon they are only informed about the total number of others who have chosen the observable action before them this informational structure arises naturally in many applications our most important result is that only one type of cascade arises in equilibrium the aggregate cascade on the observable action a cascade on the unobservable action never arises

on lottery sales jackpot sizes and irrationality a cautionary note jackpot size has a greater impact than expected price as a determinant of lottery sales suggesting that agents exhibit irrational lotto mania we demonstrate why this conclusion is problematical by considering the reduced form obtained if agents are described by cumulative prospect theory

recentralizing while decentralizing how national governments reappropriate forest resources summary decentralization initiatives have been launched in the majority of developing countries but these rarely lay the foundations necessary to reach decentralization s purported efficiency and equity benefits this paper uses a comparative empirical approach to show how central governments in six countries senegal uganda nepal indonesia bolivia and nicaragua use a variety of strategies to obstruct the democratic decentralization of resource management and hence retain central control effective decentralization requires the construction of accountable institutions at all levels of government and a secure domain of autonomous decision making at the local level

learning from neighbours when payoffs from different actions are unknown agents use their own past experience as well as the experience of their neighbours to guide their decision making in this paper we develop a general framework to study the relationship between the structure of these neighbourhoods and the process of social learning we show that in a connected society local learning ensures that all agents obtain the same payoffs in the long run thus if actions have different payoffs then all agents choose the same action and social conformism obtains we develop conditions on the distribution of prior beliefs the structure of neighbourhoods and the informativeness of actions under which this action is optimal in particular we identify a property of neighbourhood structures local independencewhich greatly facilitates social learning simulations of the model generate spatial and temporal patterns of adoption that are consistent with empirical work

state lotteries as a source of revenue a re examination most of the academic literature that has examined state lotteries has had a negative assessment of them studies of lotteries as a source of revenue have reported that even under the best circumstances they generate only a tiny proportion of a state s revenues and the lottery revenues are so volatile that states cannot and should not be dependent on them in addition the general consensus is that lotteries have high administrative costs and that they may reduce other sources of state revenue 1 in contrast to this negative view prevalent in the academic literature lotteries have been exceedingly popular with policymakers in state capitals and among the general public most of the literature which casts a negative light on lotteries as a revenue source looked at data through the mid 1980s since then the number of states operating lotteries has grown from 17 in 1985 to 33 in 1992 in only one state north dakota during the past 30 years has a lottery referendum failed to achieve a majority of votes 2 why are lotteries so popular is it because voters are ill informed and unsophisticated do proponents mistakenly believe that they will help cure government revenue shortfalls or is it possible that lotteries really do have a significantly favorable fiscal impact that lottery revenues are not as small and destabilizing as the academic literature maintains

on portfolio choice with savoring and disappointment we revisit the model proposed by gollier and muermann gollier c muermann a 2010 optimal choice and beliefs with ex ante savoring and ex post disappointment management sci 568 1272 1284 hereafter gm in the gm model for a given lottery agents form anticipated expected payoffs and the set of possible anticipations is assumed to be exogenously fixed we propose sets of possible anticipations that are endogenously determined this permits us to compare and evaluate in a consistent manner lotteries with different supports and to revisit the portfolio choice problem we obtain new conclusions and interesting insights our extended model can rationalize a variety of empirically observed puzzles such as a positive demand for assets with negative expected returns preference for skewed returns and underdiversification of portfolios this paper was accepted by rakesh sarin decision analysis

should european gamblers play lotto in the usa abstract any jackpot building game is designed to have a negative expected return for the gambler but it can be profitable under certain circumstances previous studies have shown that the purchase of a single ticket of us american state lotteries is sometimes a gamble with a positive expected value lottery winnings are not taxed in europe which suggests that the profitability of european games may be even higher we present an exact formula for the calculation of the expected value of a single lotto ticket and find european lottery drawings to be far less profitable for the gambler compared to the us american lotto market those us lotteries that generate profitable drawings are not characterized by higher redistribution rates or by their specific rules but by the purchasing behavior of the gamblers these gamblers buy far fewer tickets per capita and they barely react to increasing jackpots even though the jackpots are large enough to cause positive expected winnings

an economist s guide to lottery design this paper outlines the issues relevant to the design of pari mutuel lottery games and makes inferences about game design effects from estimates of how rollovers affect sales lottery tickets sales depend positively on the proportion of revenue returned as prizes positively on the skewness of the prize distribution which depends largely on how much of the prize money goes to the jackpot and negatively on the variance in the prize distribution which depends largely on how much goes on smaller prizes we simulate the effects of envisaged game design changes on sales revenue and find potentially large effects

habit and long memory in uk lottery sales long memory processes can occur as a consequence of aggregation over heterogeneous agents we examine the uk lottery and by estimating the level of fractional differencing find evidence of the long memory property in lottery sales a result that has broader implications on the estimation of demand models for lotteries

the value of democracy evidence from road building in kenya ethnic favoritism is seen as antithetical to development this paper provides credible quantification of the extent of ethnic favoritism using data on road building in kenyan districts across the 1963 2011 period guided by a model it then examines whether the transition in and out of democracy under the same president constrains or exacerbates ethnic favoritism across the post independence period we find strong evidence of ethnic favoritism districts that share the ethnicity of the president receive twice as much expenditure on roads and have five times the length of paved roads built this favoritism disappears during periods of democracy jel d72 h54 j15 o15 o17 o22 r42

the role of dutch auctions and lotteries in shaping the art market s of 17th century holland abstract this article examines institution formation in the nascent art markets of 17th century amsterdam and haarlem in response to external and internal pressures on artists guilds in amsterdam poor quality imports often copies were touted as originals and sold in clandestine dutch auctions the deliberate confusion about quality imparted to the market features similar to those of akerlof s lemons model and a need for quality guarantees gave occasion to dealers in haarlem and other towns demand was viewed as fixed and guilds toughened restrictions on the supply side dissenters successfully used lotteries to show that demand can be engendered promotion was to become a key feature of later art markets

property rights and deforestation in the brazilian amazon this paper focuses on the impact of property rights insecurity on deforestation in the brazilian legal amazon deforestation is considered as a risk management strategy property rights insecurity reduces the present value of forests and fosters forest conversion into agricultural and pasture lands moreover deforestation is the consequence of strategic interactions between landowners and squatters landowners clear the forest preventively in order to assert the productive use of land and to reduce the expropriation risk squatters invade land plots clear the forest and may afterwards gain official recognition with formal property titles a particular attention is paid to the measure of land property rights insecurity in the brazilian context it is assumed that property rights insecurity has a multidimensional character taken into account by the number of homicides related to land conflicts and expropriation procedures principal component analysis allows synthesising such information an econometric model of deforestation is estimated on a panel dataset on the 1988 2000 period and the nine states of the brazilian legal amazon the hypothesis that insecure land property rights contribute to higher rates of deforestation is not rejected when the simultaneity bias between insecure property rights and deforestation is addressed this result questions the modality of the brazilian land reform that considers forested areas as unproductive and thus open for expropriation procedures

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

word of mouth communication and social learning this paper studies the way that word of mouth communication aggregates the information of individual agents we find that the structure of the communication process determines whether all agents end up making identical choices with less communication making this conformity more likely despite the players naive decision rules and the stochastic decision environment word of mouth communication may lead all players to adopt the action that is on average superior these socially efficient outcomes tend to occur when each agent samples only a few others i introduction economic agents must often make decisions without knowing the costs and benefits of the possible choices given the frequency with which such situations arise it is understandable that agents often choose not to perform studies or experiments but instead rely on whatever information they have obtained via casual word of mouth communication reliance on this sort of easily obtained information appears to be common in circumstances ranging from consumers choosing restaurants or auto mechanics to business managers evaluating alternative organizational structures this paper studies two related environments in arguing that individuals reliance on word of mouth communication has interesting implications for their aggregate behavior first motivated by the diffusion of new technologies we consider a choice between two competing products with unequal qualities or payoffs and show that the structure of communication is important in determining whether the population as a whole is likely to learn to use the superior product second we consider a choice between two products or practices that are equally good and ask whether consumers are likely to herd onto a single choice or whether diversity will obtain even in the long run we explore the implications of word of mouth communication in a simple nonstrategic environment there is a large population of identical players each of whom repeatedly chooses between two possible actions each player s payoff is determined by his own

the welfare effects of lotto evidence from the uk abstract this paper estimates the demand for lottery tickets using pooled cross section data that contain individual incomes and extensive information about characteristics one of the cross sections corresponded to a draw which was a double rollover the jackpot was enhanced by adding the two previous draws jackpots which had not been won together these datasets provide sufficient observations facing different prices to allow us to estimate the price elasticity as well as the income elasticity of demand we estimate tobit and other specifications and use the estimates to evaluate the welfare effects arising from the introduction of the lottery

re election incentives and deforestation cycles in the brazilian amazon abstract despite expansive research on amazonian deforestation and its drivers the role of local politics is not well understood using a panel data set that combines municipal level deforestation and election data from 2002 to 2012 i estimate the effect of an incumbent mayor running for re election on deforestation rates in election periods i find that deforestation rates increase 8 10 in election years when an incumbent mayor runs for re election an amount equivalent to four percent of the total forest lost since the 2004 elections electoral deforestation cycles do not appear to be driven by changes in agricultural policy implementation and activity but are linked to corruption and campaign finance suggesting that weak institutional constraints facilitate electoral manipulation of forest resources this phenomenon is not likely limited to amazonian forests re election incentives could very well lead to misallocation of other natural resources in alternate geographies

boundedly rational opinion dynamics in social networks does indegree matter abstract this paper investigates opinion dynamics and social influence in directed communication networks we study the theoretical properties of a boundedly rational model of opinion formation in which individuals aggregate the information they receive from their neighbors by using weights that are a function of neighbors indegree we then present the results of a laboratory experiment explicitly designed to test the causal effect of indegree on social influence we find that the social influence of an agent is positively affected by the number of individuals she listens to when forming their opinions agents take into account the structure of their communication network although only to a limited extent

beating irrationality does delegating to it alleviate the sunk cost effect we investigate the impact of delegating decision making to information technology it on an important human decision bias the sunk cost effect to address our research question we use a unique data set containing actual market transaction data for approximately 7 000 pay per bid auctions in contrast with the laboratory experiments of previous related studies our research presents the unique advantage of investigating the effects of it enabled automated bidding agents on the occurrence of a decision bias in real market transactions we identify normatively irrational decision scenarios and analyze consumer behavior in these situations our findings show that participants with a higher behavioral investment are more likely to violate the assumption of normative economic rationality because of the sunk cost effect more importantly we observe that the delegation of auction participation i e actual bidding to it significantly reduces the occurrence of the sunk cost effect in subsequent decisions made by the same individual we can attribute this reduction to the comparably lower behavioral investments incurred by auction participants who delegate their bidding to it in particular by mitigating different contributors of behavioral investments delegating to it reduces the likelihood of the occurrence of the sunk cost effect by more than 50 this paper was accepted by sandra slaughter information systems

an experimental study of persuasion bias and social influence in networks abstract in many areas of social life individuals receive information about a particular issue of interest from multiple sources when these sources are connected through a network then proper aggregation of this information by an individual involves taking into account the structure of this network the inability to aggregate properly may lead to various types of distortions in our experiment four agents all want to find out the value of a particular parameter unknown to all agents receive private signals about the parameter and can communicate their estimates of the parameter repeatedly through a network the structure of which is known by all players we present results from experiments with three different networks we find that the information of agents who have more outgoing links in a network gets more weight in the information aggregation of the other agents than under optimal updating our results are consistent with the model of persuasion bias of demarzo et al 2013 q j econ 909 and at odds with an alternative heuristic according to which the most influential agents are those with more incoming links

theories of choice under risk insights from financial markets abstract to date the plausibility of theories of choice under risk hinges are mainly on experimental evidence this paper devises and implements an approach amenable of assessing the performance of three families of models expected utility rank dependent expected utility and the cumulative prospect theory using information from financial asset markets our findings unequivocally support reference point dependence diminishing marginal sensitivity loss aversion and nonlinear weighting of gain and loss physical probabilities the empirical observations are found to be robust to inter alia the parameterization of the utility and probability weighting functions day of the week effects the choice of a reference point and the introduction of possible low probability market crashes peso component

observational learning under imperfect information abstract we explore bayes rational sequential decision making in a game with pure information externalities where each decision maker observes only her predecessor s binary action under perfect information the martingale property of the stochastic learning process is used to establish convergence of beliefs and actions under imperfect information in contrast beliefs and actions cycle forever however despite the stochastic instability over time the private information is ignored and decision makers become increasingly likely to imitate their predecessors consequently we observe longer and longer periods of uniform behavior punctuated by increasingly rare switches

information cascades in the laboratory when a series of individuals with private information announce public predictions initial conformity can create an information cascade in which later predictions match the early announcements this paper reports an experiment in which private signals are draws from an unobserved urn subjects make predictions in sequence and are paid if they correctly guess which of two urns was used for the draws if initial decisions coincide then it is rational for subsequent decisionmakers to follow the established pattern regardless of their private information rational cascades formed in most periods in which such an imbalance occurred copyright 1997 by american economic association

the economics of casino taxation in this article a model of the costs of a casino is developed that focuses on the implications for economic welfare of different taxation schemes for casinos the situation being considered is in a country where casinos cater exclusively to foreign tourists the goal of the country is to determine the maximum amount of taxes that can be extracted from the activities of this sector under different systems of taxation when the price of gambling is set by regulation above its competitive level the economic losses created by excessive investment in the sector can be reduced by taxation a turnover tax on the amount gambled can maximize both tax revenue and the economic welfare of the country due to administrative constraints a number of countries rely on the taxation of the casinos fixed assets or a combination of a turnover tax and a tax on fixed costs the model is applied to the situation in north cyprus the annual economic efficiency loss from its poorly designed tax policies on casino gambling is

taking the road less traveled by does conversation eradicate pernicious cascades abstract we offer a model in which sequences of individuals often converge upon poor decisions and are prone to fads despite communication of the payoff outcomes from past choices this reflects both direct and indirect action based information externalities in contrast with previous cascades literature cascades here are spontaneously dislodged and in general have a probability less than one of lasting forever furthermore the ability of individuals to communicate can reduce average decision accuracy and welfare

positional concerns and social network structure an experiment abstract we experimentally study the positional concerns of individuals embedded in social networks in the game individuals compete for positional advantage with their direct neighbors by purchasing a positional good the nash equilibrium consumption is determined by the katz bonacich centrality of the individual s network position while the efficient outcome requires a lower consumption level for most network positions the gameplay converged to the nash equilibrium except for local centers that consumed less of the positional good than the nash prediction despite this the consumption of the positional good increased in the individual s centrality the evolution of the gameplay was explained by the myopic best response dynamics model

opinion dynamics and wisdom under conformity abstract we study a dynamic model of opinion formation in social networks in our model boundedly rational agents update opinions by averaging over their neighbors expressed opinions but may misrepresent their own opinion by conforming or counter conforming with their neighbors we show that an agent s social influence on the long run group opinion is increasing in network centrality and decreasing in conformity concerning efficiency of information aggregation or wisdom of the society it turns out that misrepresentation of opinions need not undermine wisdom but may even enhance it given the network we provide the optimal distribution of conformity levels in the society and show which agents should be more conforming in order to increase wisdom

bayesian learning in social networks we study the perfect bayesian equilibrium of a sequential learning model over a general social network each individual receives a signal about the underlying state of the world observes the past actions of a stochastically generated neighbourhood of individuals and chooses one of two possible actions the stochastic process generating the neighbourhoods defines the network topology we characterize pure strategy equilibria for arbitrary stochastic and deterministic social networks and characterize the conditions under which there will be asymptotic learning convergence in probability to the right action as the social network becomes large we show that when private beliefs are unbounded meaning that the implied likelihood ratios are unbounded there will be asymptotic learning as long as there is some minimal amount of expansion in observations we also characterize conditions under which there will be asymptotic learning when private beliefs are bounded

influential listeners an experiment on persuasion bias in social networks abstract this paper presents an experimental investigation of persuasion bias a form of bounded rationality whereby agents communicating through a social network are unable to account for repetitions in the information they receive we find that after repeated communication within a social network social influence depends not only on being listened to by many others but also on listening to many others we show that persuasion bias can be viewed as an extreme case of a generalized boundedly rational updating rule in which agents receive more or less attention depending on how many other agents they listen to the results indicate that behavior in the experiment is consistent with an updating rule according to which agents social influence is proportional to their indegree

willingness to pay and the demand for lotto why do many bettors participate in an unfair gamble in particular a lotto game while at the same time purchase insurance the willingness to pay for lotto is analysed to find a rational explanation for a local risk averter s participation in an unfair bet a reasonable case is found where bettors preference can be approximately characterized as a locally risk averse and sufficiently prudent cubic function such bettors dislike risk but prefer standard third moment of the payoff the result suggests that the traditional effective price for lotto demand may omit important explanatory variables we thus propose an alternative method to examine the demand for lotto by incorporating the second and the third moments of lotto s payoff evidence from taiwan lotto data supports that lotto bettors could be both locally risk averse and rational

testing for rational expectations in the uk national lottery the concept of rational expectations has typically been assumed without testing in the analysis of consumer demand and market efficiency in betting markets including betting on lottery games lottery games offer an excellent opportunity to test how participants process the information that is available to them using the uk national lottery as our particular case we find that participants in general efficiently process available information specifically they act as if they can on average forecast the level of sales for a given drawing

the economic analysis of lotteries lotteries determinants of ticket sales and the optimal payout rate this paper considers policy issues arising in the design regulation and taxation of lotteries focusing on the market for an on line lottery game demand determines who buys lottery tickets and in what quantities the design of lotteries affects the terms on which tickets are supplied uk data suggest that its lottery may be priced too high to maximize lottery revenue more revenue might be raised if the proportion of sales allocated to tax and other levies were smaller having established the positive economics of lotteries the paper then assesses their welfare implications pari mutuel lotteries enjoy scale economies and as natural monopolies are invariably run either by government agencies or a regulated licensee i estimate consumer surplus and identify the excess burden that arises from existing over taxation of lotteries the large price elasticity of demand implies that revenue raised from the lottery is raised very inefficiently moreover the demand for lottery tickets is inferior and there is some evidence that such games are contagious and addictive so using lotteries as a vehicle for raising revenue is extremely regressive finally i consider other policy implications induced effects on charitable giving and on other forms of gambling the impact on the government budget perceptions of risk and distributional considerations ian walker

the market for sweepstakes this paper studies the market for monopolistically supplied sweepstakes we derive equilibrium demands for fixed prize and variable prize sweepstakes and determine the profit maximizing prize level and pay out ratio respectively it can be profitable to offer each type of sweepstake when there is a large enough number of weighted utility consumers who have constant absolute risk attitudes are strictly averse to small as well as symmetric risks and display longshot preference behaviour moreover for the variable prize sweepstake the supplier will generally find it profitable to combine sweepstakes targeting two smaller populations and offer a single sweepstake to the combined population this implication is corroborated by the recent spate of mergers of smaller state lotteries into larger ones

investigating efficiency in betting markets evidence from the greek 6 49 lotto abstract in this paper we investigate the existence of profit opportunities in the greek market for the 6 49 lotto under the assumption of random number selection we find evidence suggesting that the market is efficient because number selection is found to deviate from randomness we further investigate the existence of profit opportunities due to number unpopularity the evidence suggests that although unpopular numbers exist they are not sufficiently unpopular so as to generate positive expected payoffs

political foundations of the resource curse in this paper we argue that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse we show 1 politicians tend to over extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they discount the future too much and 2 resource booms improve the efficiency of the extraction path however 3 resource booms by raising the value of being in power and by providing politicians with more resources which they can use to influence the outcome of elections increase resource misallocation in the rest of the economy 4 the overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends critically on institutions since these determine the extent to which political incentives map into policy outcomes countries with institutions that promote accountability and state competence will tend to benefit from resource booms since these institutions ameliorate the perverse political incentives that such booms create countries without such institutions however may suffer from a resource curse

electoral accountability and corruption evidence from the audits of local governments we show that political institutions affect corruption levels we use audit reports in brazil to construct new measures of political cor ruption in local governments and test whether electoral account ability affects the corruption practices of incumbent politicians we find significantly less corruption in municipalities where mayors can get reelected mayors with reelection incentives misappropriate 27 percent fewer resources than mayors without reelection incentives these effects are more pronounced among municipalities with less access to information and where the likelihood of judicial punish ment is lower overall our findings suggest that electoral rules that enhance political accountability play a crucial role in constraining politician s corrupt behavior jel d72 k42 017

the political resource curse this paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of politicians both with theory and data the theory is based on a political agency model with career concerns and endogenous entry of candidates the data refer to brazil where federal transfers to municipal governments change exogenously at given population thresholds allowing us to implement a regression discontinuity design the empirical evidence shows that larger transfers increase observed corruption and reduce the average education of candidates for mayor these and other more specific empirical results are in line with the predictions of the theory jel d72 d73 h77 o17 o18

electoral manipulation via voter friendly spending theory and evidence abstract we present a model of the political budget cycle in which incumbents try to influence voters by changing the composition of government spending rather than overall spending or revenues rational voters may support an incumbent who targets them with spending before the election even though such spending may be due to opportunistic manipulation because it may also reflect sincere preference of the incumbent for types of spending voters favor classifying expenditures into those which are likely targeted to voters and those that are not we provide evidence supporting our model in data on local public finances for all colombian municipalities our findings indicate both a pre electoral increase in targeted expenditures combined with a contraction of other types of expenditure and a voter response to targeting

political cycles in a developing economy effect of elections in indian states the author studies the effect of state legislative assembly elections on the policies of state governments in 14 major states of india from 1960 to 1996 she identifies the effect of the timing of elections using an instrument for the electoral cycle that distinguishes between constitutionally scheduled elections and midterm polls she contrasts two levers of policy manipulation fiscal policy and public service delivery to distinguish between alternative models of political cycles the predictions of three models are tested 1 populist cycles to woo uninformed and myopic voters 2 signaling models with asymmetric information 3 a moral hazard model with high discounting by political agents the empirical results for fiscal policy show that election years have a negative effect on some commodity taxes a positive effect on investment spending but no effect on deficits primarily because consumption spending is reduced with regard to public service delivery elections have a positive and large effect on road construction by state public works departments strikingly the fiscal effects are much smaller than the effect on roads the author argues that the pattern of evidence is inconsistent with the predictions of models of voter myopia and asymmetric information she explores an alternative moral hazard model in which the cycle is generated by high political discounting and career concerns persuade politicians to exert greater effort in election years on the management of public works

market structure and casino taxation in tourist resorts this article examines the association of tax effects with market structure for casino gaming we show that if market structure is uncompetitive much of casino taxation falls on tourists whose demand is inelastic relative to supply the tax is likely to be efficient under strong external demand if imposed on oligopoly casinos with a monopoly location in a cross border market the likelihood of economically good taxation is greater under oligopoly than under competition but lower than under monopoly casino taxes should be lowered in a more competitive market with weaker external demand our prediction is consistent with the evidence found from casino tourism development in macao with high gambling taxes

opportunistic political cycles test in a young democracy setting this paper tests the theory of opportunistic cycles in a decade old democracy russia finds strong evidence of cycles and provides an explanation for why previous literature often found weaker evidence using regional monthly panel data we find that 1 the budget cycle is sizable and short lived public spending shifts toward direct monetary transfers to voters 2 the magnitude of the cycle decreases with democracy government transparency media freedom voter awareness and over time and 3 preelectoral manipulation increases incumbents chances for reelection the short length of the cycle explains underestimation of its size by previous literature because of low frequency data used in previous studies