control of accumulating stock pollution by heterogeneous producers abstract this paper presents a framework to determine optimal resource allocation over time for the production of a good by heterogeneous producers who generate a stock externality we analyze the optimal intertemporal and quality specific combination of abatement strategies at the source source abatement given by a change in the intensity intensive margin of production and in the chosen technology extensive margin and or removal of existing pollution stock stock abatement the results show how the specifications of the production and the emission functions affect technology adoption and the design of the optimal intertemporal combination of source and stock abatement strategies moreover the paper shows that regulation at the intensive margin cannot be considered as a substitute for a regulation at the extensive margin the paper employs the so called two stage solution approach for solving the resulting quality distributed intertemporal optimal control problem

modeling international climate change negotiations more responsibly can highly simplified game theory models provide reliable policy insights abstract in a recent article in this journal entitled game theory and climate diplomacy decanio and fremstad 2013 provide an interesting treatment of a range of simple game theoretic characterizations of international climate negotiations the authors use the nash and maxi min stability definitions to analyze 25 two by two ordinal games which they recognize as possible game theoretic characterizations of climate negotiations between two players e g great powers or coalitions of states the authors main conclusion that the prisoner s dilemma might not be the best description of climate negotiations game is consistent with the findings of others who have studied two by two conflicts over natural commons bardhan 1993 madani 2010 sandler 1992 taylor 1987 nevertheless given the importance of the climate change issue as well as the potential effects of our actions on the state of the environment and the well being of future generations i would like to address some gaps in their analysis which result in it having limited usefulness for policy purposes of course all models are simplified representations of reality full of limitations essentially all models are wrong but some are useful box and draper 1987 so the practical question is how wrong do they have to be to not be useful box and draper 1987 models limitations need to be carefully considered when interpreting them or applying their results to policy but some models are too simple to provide useful policy advice

pigou coase common law and environmental policy implications of the calculation debate the implications of the calculation debate are explored for pigouvian coasean and common law liability approaches to externality problems there is no escaping hayekian misean information problems but the institutional setting within which environmental policies are resolved affects the domain of third party calculation the calculation required is likely to be significantly less under common law arrangements than under administrative processes the primary implication for environmental policy is that increased reliance on competitive market processes and the common law in copying with externality problems may be more effective than attempts to improve current administrative approaches

meta paradigm change and the theory of the firm many seemingly unrelated debates on the theory of the firm are in fact part of a single deeper transformation of the social sciences as the foundational assumptions of 20th century social science have slowly been shown by science to be false new sub paradigms have emerged which cumulatively drop i theoretical assumptions about markets to explain firms ii epistemological assumptions about knowledge to explain diversity and iii metaphysical assumptions about causality to explain technical change debates occur across each of these levels

game theory and climate diplomacy abstract starting with the new periodic table npt of 2 2 order games introduced by robinson and goforth 2005 we provide an exhaustive treatment of the possible game theoretic characterizations of climate negotiations between two players e g great powers or coalitions of states of the 144 distinct 2 2 games in which the players have strict ordinally ranked utilities 25 are potentially relevant to climate problem the negotiations may be characterized as a no conflict game prisoner s dilemma coordination game chicken type game or cycle depending on the payoff matrix which game corresponds to the actual state of the world depends both on the severity of risks associated with climate change and the perceptions of the governments engaged in the negotiations nash equilibrium or maxi min equilibrium or neither may be the outcome achieving universal abatement of greenhouse gas emissions may require side payments or enforcement mechanisms outside the game framework but we show how the negotiations themselves may offer opportunities to select between nash equilibria or alter the payoff rankings and strategic choices of the players in particular scientific information pointing to the severity of the risks of climate change suggests characterization of the negotiations as a coordination game rather than a prisoner s dilemma

the role of the state in evolutionary economics from an evolutionary perspective the role of public policy extends far beyond the mere correction of market failures emphasised by neoclassical economics public policy may facilitate the market process it may also guide the market process in the case of multiple equilibria the state can finally play a more creative role by allowing private agents to satisfy individually or collectively certain goals unattainable through market forces alone however this paper shows that although the scope of useful public policies is broader in an evolutionary approach than in neoclassical economics the government s ability to direct the evolution of the economic system is highly limited this paper also tries to formulate certain normative criteria which could act as public policy guidelines in an evolutionary perspective copyright 2004 oxford university press

pollution prevention strategy a study of indian firms abstract strategy that targets pollution prevention shall be the first one among sustainability strategies to be implemented to achieve early cost advantages and mitigate litigation risk this article aims to isolate pollution prevention strategy pps from other similar sustainability strategies and provides an independent scope of pps a questionnaire based survey was conducted among 689 managers of 60 indian firms known for their orientation towards sustainability factorial analysis delivered five factors highlighting the composition of associated variables descriptive statistics was used to understand the relative importance of various aspects of pps and status of implementation of this strategy in indian firms the results show that firms are paying higher attention to structured waste management and the priority is early cost advantages hence prefer less investment prone processes modifications the initiatives are geared mainly due to short term advantages than top management commitment and pro activeness to comply with environmental regulations firms believe in developing expertise and deploying standard practices it is evident that firms specifically train employees for pps implantation but lags in empowerment of employees resources allocation cross functional team formations and rewards for the employees also pps strategy is implemented as stand alone strategy and lacks the integration with core corporate strategy the study adds to existing literature by segregating pps from other similar strategies like product stewardship and cleaner technology tested measure of pps shall help managers to assess their performance to achieve pollution prevention goals further the paper discusses some important managerial implications

shared producer and consumer responsibility theory and practice abstract over the past decade an increasing number of authors have been examining the nexus of producer versus consumer responsibility often dealing with the question of how to assign responsibility for internationally traded greenhouse gas emissions recently a similar problem has appeared in drafting the standards for the ecological footprint while the method traditionally assumes a full life cycle perspective with full consumer responsibility a large number of producers businesses and industry sectors have started to calculate their own footprints see www isa org usyd edu au adding any producer s footprint to other producers footprints or to population footprints which all already cover the full upstream supply chain of their operating inputs leads to double counting the sum of footprints of producers and consumers is larger than the total national footprint the committee in charge of the footprint standardisation process was hence faced with the decades old non additivity problem posing the following dilemma for the accounting of footprints or any other production factor if one disallows double counting but wishes to be able to account for producers and consumers then one cannot impose the requirement of full life cycle coverage the supply chains of actors have to be curtailed somehow in order to avoid double counting this work demonstrates and discusses a non arbitrary method of consistently delineating these supply chains into mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive portions of responsibility to be shared by all actors in an economy

an analysis of the climate change architecture abstract this paper examines the complexity of the current negotiations to avert climate change under the united nations framework convention on climate change drawing on economic game theory modelling it interprets the latest developments within the international negotiations and provides a political economy analysis of the climate change architecture it places the pursuit of international co operation via the kyoto protocol s second commitment period in the context of a country s maintenance of national interest and a flexible emissions abatement strategy accepting that countries will reject an international agreement or obligation that is seen as inimical to their economic competitiveness it incorporates a new game theory model considers how learning from such models can influence agreement design and proposes a new approach from a non monotonic polluting payoff function attention is placed on enabling conditions that entice countries to ratify a climate agreement thereby encouraging participation and accelerating a near term deployment of low carbon technologies

valuing life experimental evidence using sensitivity to rare events global environmental phenomena like climate change major extinction events or flutype pandemics can have catastrophic consequences by properly assessing the outcomes involved especially those concerning human life economic theory of choice under uncertainty is expected to help people take the best decision however the widely used expected utility theory values life in terms of the low probability of death someone would be willing to accept in order to receive extra payment common sense and experimental evidence refute this way of valuing life and here we provide experimental evidence of people s unwillingness to accept a low probability of death contrary to expected utility predictions this work uses new axioms of choice defined by chichilnisky 2000 especially an axiom that allows extreme responses to extreme events and the choice criterion that they imply the implied decision criteria are a combination of expected utility with extreme responses and seem more consistent with observations

the role of public policy in emerging green power markets an analysis of marketer preferences abstract green power marketing has been heralded by some as a means to create a private market for renewable energy that is driven by customer demand for green products this article challenges the premise sometimes proffered in debates over green markets that profitable sizable credible markets for green products will evolve naturally without supportive public policies relying primarily on surveys and interviews of us green power marketers the article examines the role of specific regulatory and legislative policies in enabling the green market and searches for those policies that are believed by marketers to be the most conducive or detrimental to the expansion of the green market we find that marketers 1 believe that profitable green power markets will only develop if a solid foundation of supportive policies exists 2 believe that establishing overall price competition and encouraging customer switching are the top priorities 3 are somewhat leery of government sponsored or mandated public information programs and 4 oppose three specific renewable energy policies that are frequently advocated by renewable energy enthusiasts but that may have negative impacts on the green marketers profitability the stated preferences of green marketers shed light on ways to foster renewables by means of the green market because the interests of marketers do not coincide perfectly with those of society however this study also recognizes other normative perspectives and highlights policy tensions at the heart of current debates related to green markets by examining these conflicts we identify three key policy questions that should direct future research to what extent should price competition and customer switching be encouraged at the expense of cost shifting what requirements should be imposed to ensure credibility in green products and marketing how should the green power market and broader renewable energy policies interact

differences in pollution levels among civil law countries a possible interpretation abstract the aim of this paper is to shed light on the way the legal systems of different countries can explain the discrepancies in their pollution levels in particular we underline the factors of capital accumulation and the financial market development that are driven among other things by the various levels of protection accorded by the legal system to both shareholders and creditors the research develops in two directions firstly we supply a theoretical analysis to explain how constraints on the process of capital accruement affect the pollution level in the model a crucial role is assigned to the rate of interest and its relationship with discount rates which constitutes an important variable in decisions to implement anti pollution devices secondly we perform an econometric analysis using the data of eighty five countries belonging to the legal family of civil law for the period from 1992 to 2003 adopting four pollution indicators as dependent variables our main findings are that legal families and financial market development can help to explain the differences in environmental indicators observed among nations

transaction cost economics the natural progression abstract this manuscript provides the nobel laureate s reflections on transaction cost economics the overview section frames governance as the overarching concept and transaction cost economics as the means by which to breathe operational content into governance and organization the vertical integration section identifies efficiency factors associated with determining when a firm produces a good or service to its own needs rather than outsource a discussion of the rudiments of transaction cost analysis is subsequently provided puzzles and challenges that require pushing the logic of efficient governance to completion are examined and followed by concluding remarks

competition among officials and the abuse of power traditional economic theory suggests that competition among officials providing government goods tends to reduce corruption however empirical evidence does not yet support this view in this paper i show that a corrupt and powerful central authority can use competition among officials to amass resources for itself while competition reduces corruption at the lower level of government corruption at the higher level of government is increased to avoid widespread theft from the central authority competing officials are monitored more intensively than a monopolist hence even though competition among officials generates more consumer surplus it may reduce welfare

the underdetermined knowledge based theory of the mnc in this note we revisit two core propositions of the knowledge based view of the firm found in the seminal work of kogut and zander 1 that multinational corporations mncs exist because transfers and re combinations of knowledge occur more efficiently inside mncs than between mncs and third parties and 2 that the threat of opportunism is not necessary although it may be sufficient to explain the existence of the mnc their knowledge based view shifted the conceptualization of the firm from an institution arising from market failure and transaction costs economizing to a progeny of superior knowledge governance we question these conclusions arguing that firms are but one of the many types of epistemic communities possessing and nurturing procedural norms identity and the cognitive linguistic and reflexive attributes conducive to efficient exchange and re combination of knowledge among their members important insights may be gained by applying the concept of epistemic communities implicit in the knowledge based perspective beyond firm level hierarchies journal of international business studies 2011 42 427 435

a policy agenda for pro poor agricultural growth abstract sub saharan africa and parts of south asia are likely to hold large numbers of very poor rural people into the foreseeable future although both history and theory suggest a pre eminent role for agricultural growth in poverty reduction in poor agrarian economies such growth today faces new difficulties many of these difficulties are endogenous to today s poor rural areas others result from broader processes of global change but some are due to changes in the dominant policy environment emphasizing liberalization and state withdrawal examination of 20th century green revolutions suggests that active state interventions were important in supporting critical stages of agricultural market development unfortunately such interventions benefits in institutional development are easily overlooked whereas their high costs are much more visible policy implications are discussed

aggregation in variance of shared responsibility a case study of australia abstract this article deals with shared producer and consumer responsibility a concept aimed at overcoming the non additivity or double counting problem in corporate and national sustainability reporting it reports on the potentially distorting effects that varying sector and business classifications could have on the apportioning of emissions or other sustainability measures amongst producers and consumers in an economy a quantitative in variance analysis is provided which shows that shared responsibility formulations are remarkably stable under extreme aggregation of the underlying input output data value added pegging of the sharing parameters generally reduces variance in comparison to constant sharing parameters these results help in substantiating the robustness of the shared responsibility concept a feature which is critically important if shared responsibility were to become corporate and national reporting practice

breaking the mould an institutionalist political economy alternative to the neo liberal theory of the market and the state the paper criticises the currently dominant neo liberal discourse on the role of the state and proposes an alternative approach that will allow us to overcome its shortcomings especially its inadequate analyses of the role of institutions and politics it argues that the central problem with the neo liberal framework lies not in its excessively anti interventionist policy conclusions as some of its critics believe but in the very ways it envisages the modus operandi of the market the state institutions and their interrelationships the paper then discusses how we may construct the alternative approach of institutionalist political economy

business incentives for sustainability a property rights approach abstract public and private demands for sustainable development put pressure on firms to develop strategies that include environmental concerns environmental effects from products often appear as externalities outside the legal boundary of the producing company these companies often possess the best competence to optimise the total life cycle environmental performance of its products they are however neither obliged nor stimulated enough by policy incentives to do so from a sustainable development perspective the policy instruments used today are mostly of a control and demand type i e they do not create sufficient incentives to go further than hedging over set requirements environmental concerns and tightened environmental policy parameters have mostly been associated with the notion of additional costs and thus a restriction on economic performance however since the mid 1990s several papers have called for corporate win win situations as well as instruments giving up stream incentives for change but not enough abatement of environmental impacts has emerged in reality perhaps this is due to the lack of proper connection between economic theory on the one hand and incentive advocating articles and instruments on the other we propose a concept for trading of product life cycle plc emission rights based on property rights and transaction cost theories considering the problem with asymmetric information over the value chain the initial financial impacts from such plc instruments are shown to be significant for the system provider since emissions and resource use become production costs this provides economic incentives to take an increased responsibility for information flow as well as initiatives for product innovations

tightening environmental standards the benefit cost or the no cost paradigm ms ff ichael porter and claas van der linde have written a paper that is interesting and to us at least somewhat astonishing it is a defense of environmental regulation indeed an invitation to more stringent regulation that makes essentially no reference to the social benefits of such regulation this approach contrasts starkly with the methods that economists and other policy analysts have traditionally used when assessing environmental or other regulatory programs the traditional approach consists of comparing the beneficial effects of regulation with the costs that must be borne to secure these benefits for environmental regulation the social benefits include the reductions in morbidity or premature mortality that can accompany cleaner air the enhanced recreational opportunities that can result from water quality improvements the increased land values that might attend the cleanup of a hazardous waste site the enhanced vitality of aquatic ecosystems that might follow reductions in agricultural pesticide use or any of the other potentially significant benefits associated with tighter standards from this benefit cost approach emerges the standard tradeoff discussed in virtually every economics textbook porter and van der linde deny the validity of this approach to the analysis of environmental regulation claiming it to be an artifact of what they see as a static mindset in their view economists have failed to appreciate the capacity of

markets as institutions versus organizations as markets disentangling some fundamental concepts abstract this paper argues that ambiguities in concepts as important as institutions markets and organizations undermine progress of research programs intending to take these components seriously into account after a short review of some current confusions section i section ii discusses recent literature to arrive at definitions that encapsulate fundamental characteristics into pure categories in section iii exceptions and qualifications are introduced so as to operationalize the concepts in the real world 1 i organizations and markets are embedded in an institutional framework and 2 ii they overlap giving birth to hybrid forms however the conclusion contends that it is essential to maintain distinct concepts in order to understand these complex arrangements

toward a new conception of the environment competitiveness relationship accepting a fixed trade off between environmental regulation and competitiveness unnecessarily raises costs and slows down environmental progress studies finding high environmental compliance costs have traditionally focused on static cost impacts ignoring any offsetting productivity benefits from innovation they typically overestimated compliance costs neglected innovation offsets and disregarded the affected industry s initial competitiveness rather than simply adding to cost properly crafted environmental standards can trigger innovation offsets allowing companies to improve their resource productivity shifting the debate from pollution control to pollution prevention was a step forward it is now necessary to make the next step and focus on resource productivity

assessing the relative merits of development charges and transferable development rights in an uncertain world traditionally regulatory instruments have been used to achieve planning objectives however emerging market based policy instruments such as transferable development rights a quantity based app

the economics and politics of regulation this article provides a critical survey of the literature on the economics and politics of regulation after some conceptual clarifications the article surveys the evolution of perspectives on regulation during the post second world war period emphasizing especially the interactions between intellectual changes and real world economic and political developments it then looks at some themes that are neglected in the current literature the inevitability of regulation the need to create and not simply regulate markets distributional issues dynamic considerations and the politics of regulation and suggests that incorporating these themes more closely into the discussion will improve our understanding in this area copyright 1997 by oxford university press

hierarchies markets and power in the economy an economic perspective this paper adopts the transaction cost economics perspective for purposes of examining hierarchies markets and power in the economy transaction cost economics works out of an economizing perspective in which markets and hierarchies are alternative modes of governance and the object is to ascertain which transactions go where and why the role of power in this setup is strictly limited partly because power tends to be myopic transactions are not examined in their entirety and partly because it is tautological power needs to be operationalized whereupon the refutable implications that accrue to this perspective can be derived copyright 1995 by oxford university press

the extent of the market and the supply of regulation we present a model in which setting up and running a regulatory institution takes a fixed cost as a consequence the supply of regulation is limited by the extent of the market we test three implications of this model first jurisdictions with larger populations affected by a given regulation are more likely to have it second jurisdictions with lower incremental fixed costs of introducing and administering new regulations should regulate more this implies that regulation spreads from higher to lower population jurisdictions and that jurisdictions that build up transferable regulatory capabilities should regulate more intensely consistent with the model we find that higher population u s states have more pages of legislation and adopt particular laws earlier in their history than do smaller states we also find that the regulation of entry the regulation of labor and the military draft are more extensive in countries with larger populations as well as in civil law countries where we argue that the incremental fixed costs are lower

a reason for quantity regulation in a variety of situations governments regulate undesirable activities by controlling quantities rather than charging taxes blue laws prohibit all liquor sales on sundays rather than impose higher taxes on that day zoning restrictions limit commercial construction in residential areas rather than charge for nuisance to neighbors anti smoking and anti trust laws restrict rather than tax particular conduct fishing and hunting rules allow hunting during particular time periods rather than tax the catch pollution controls impose limits rather than tax emissions quantity regulations are common in the financial sphere as well in the united states banking regulations for many years prohibited interstate banking as well as ownership of investment banks by commercial banks in many countries commercial banks are limited in the amount of various activities they can pursue such as real estate investments or borrowing in foreign currency in some countries banking laws prohibit all lending to the parties related to the owners of the bank the so called related lending rather than impose liability rules on loans to related parties that are found to be fraudulent or unsafe rafael la porta et al 2000 despite this common practice economists generally prefer taxes and liability rules to quantity controls and property rights rules robert ellickson 1973 louis kaplow and steven shavell 1996 1997 nathaniel keohane et al 1998 as the instrument for reducing undesirable conduct when explaining why quantity regulations are so pervasive they first make the political economy argument that quantity restrictions are favored by incumbent firms that wish to deter entry james buchanan and gordon tullock 1975 but this argument is not general it does not explain such quantity restrictions as blue laws and hunting and fishing regulations which affect all market participants equally some academics also argue that because certain activities such as smoking are seen as morally wrong by the community their level is regulated at zero in other instances however such as pollution and hunting positive but limited levels of activity are allowed inconsistent with the moral argument that the reason for quantity regulation is the special attraction of zero in this paper we present an alternative reason for quantity regulations one from the perspective of a benevolent government we begin with the observation of gary becker and george stigler 1974 that law enforcement is not free but is fundamentally an economic problem throughout human history and throughout the world today there are chronic problems of under enforcement witness the low level of tax compliance in much of the developing world and over enforcement by politically motivated prosecutors or regulators an analysis of pigouvian taxes versus quantity restrictions must recognize that in reality neither policy is free and automatic to enforce in general the choice of policies itself can facilitate or discourage enforcement in two ways first policies can shape the incentives for enforcement second policies can influence the costs of enforcement in our earlier work glaeser and sheifer 2000 glaeser et al 2001 we have focused on incentives and shown that quantity regulations can be used as an optimal instrument to raise the rewards to law enforcers for identifying violations here we focus not on the incentives for the enforcers but on the costs of finding violations these costs are often lower in the case of quantity restrictions we show that even when quantity regulations unlike taxes restrict some socially efficient conduct the reduced costs of identifying violations can enhance enforcement and overall efficiency such reliance of quantity regulation is especially important when private enforcement is crucial as in the case of enforcing department of economics harvard university cambridge ma 02138 we thank the national science foundation for financial support and louis kaplow for extremely helpful comments

internalization and the mne a note on the spread of ideas this paper examines the reasons for the impact of buckley and casson s the future of the multinational enterprise 1976 on research in international business ib earlier work concentrated on ownership specific advantages or locational determinants rather than the central concept of internalization the few exceptions were incomplete or not well known internalization as applied to the mne spread rapidly because of the appeal to ib researchers of an analytically powerful idea that was based on institutional economics and involved an accessible methodology the spread was also helped by the parallel growth of transaction costs in the domestic theory of the firm and the publication activity of the authors and their associates

addressing global environmental externalities transaction costs considerations is there a way to understand why some global environmental externalities are addressed effectively whereas others are not the transaction costs of defining the property rights to mitigation benefits and costs is a useful framework for such analysis this approach views international cooperation as a contractual process among country leaders to assign those property rights leaders cooperate when it serves domestic interests to do so the demand for property rights comes from those who value and stand to gain from multilateral action property rights are supplied by international agreements that specify resource access and use assign costs and benefits including outlining the size and duration of compensating transfer payments and determining who will pay and who will receive them four factors raise the transaction costs of assigning property rights i scientific uncertainty regarding mitigation benefits and costs ii varying preferences and perceptions across heterogeneous populations iii asymmetric information and iv the extent of compliance and new entry these factors are used to examine the role of transaction costs in the establishment and allocation of property rights to provide globally valued national parks implement the convention on the international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora execute the montreal protocol to manage emissions that damage the stratospheric ozone layer set limits on harvest of highly migratory ocean fish stocks and control greenhouse gas emissions jel d23 p14 q22 q51 q54 q58

quota prices as indicators of comparative advantage in supply managed industries the canadian farm products agencies act 2012 requires that comparative advantage be used to guide the allocation of new quota under supply management this requirement however has not been met in practice agricultural economists have proposed several ways of making this legal requirement operational we review and evaluate these proposed approaches and find that quota prices are the only direct measure of comparative advantage in supply managed industries we develop an agent based general equilibrium model of quota exchange to illustrate the use of quota prices as indicators of comparative advantage our approach complements the proposal by meilke 2009 to use quota prices as indicators of comparative advantage in supply managed industries and also addresses the concerns of larue and gervais 2008 that quota prices may not be theoretically consistent with comparative advantage we also discuss potential practical challenges of using quota prices as indicators of comparative advantage in the canadian supply managed industries finally we provide an example of calculating provincial shares of new quota using recent quota price data according to two prototype decision rules this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

successful leadership in global public good provision incorporating behavioural approaches in the standard model of voluntary public good provision and other game theoretic models climate friendly leadership of a country is not successful a unilateral increase of this country s greenhouse gas abatement measures i e contributions to the global public good of climate protection will not lead to a positive reaction by the other countries but instead trigger a reduction of their abatement efforts and thus a crowding out effect in this paper it is shown how this undesired consequence need no longer occur when elements of behavioral economics are incorporated in the otherwise standard model of public good provision in particular strategic complementarities between the public good contribution of the leading country and those of the follower may result either if the follower has specific non egoistic or other regarding preferences or if the leader s contribution positively affects the follower s beliefs i e his conjectural variations about the leader s behaviour

revisiting legal realism the law economics and organization perspective the contrast between american legal realism which ran itself into the sand schlegel 1979 p 459 and the law and economics movement which is perhaps the most important development in legal thought in the last quarter century posner 1986 p xix is dramatic that the one foundered while the other flourished is explained in large measure by the absence of an intellectual framework for legal realism and the use by law and economics of the powerful framework of neoclassical economics

pigou and coase a mathematical reconciliation abstract this paper provides a rigorous statement of the coase theorem and establishes a formal equivalence between abstract allocative mechanisms attributed to coase and pigou the model proceeds from output functions that reduce to production functions in special cases thereby capturing effects that are obscured by conventional production and cost functions the model also emphasizes fundamental differences in the characteristics of inputs particularly land that are implied in the construction of externality stories finally the model embodies a clear distinction between local e g nuisance and global e g pollution externalities the coase theorem as stated is valid only in the former case

2 the institutional structure of production 1 prize lecture to the memory of alfred nobel december 9 1991 this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

green investment and coordination failure an investors perspective abstract to achieve the goal of keeping global warming well below 2 c private investors have to shift capital from brown to green infrastructures and technologies and provide additional green investment in this paper we present a game theoretic perspective on the challenge of triggering such investments the question of climate change mitigation is often related to the prisoner s dilemma a game with one nash equilibrium however the authors perceive investment for mitigation and adaptation as a coordination problem of selecting among multiple equilibria to illustrate this we model a non cooperative coordination game related to the stag hunt with a brown equilibrium with lower payoffs that can be achieved single handedly and a green equilibrium with higher payoffs that requires coordination as multiple experiments show in such games actors often fail to coordinate on a payoff dominant equilibrium due to uncertainty thus we discuss how uncertainty could be reduced along two options one that concerns a change in the payoff structure of the game and another that concerns subjective probabilities

appropriation violent enforcement and transaction costs a critical survey this paper focuses on the extension of transaction costs to appropriative activity and coercive power in the property rights approach it has been argued that including the costs of appropriation and violent enforcement in transaction costs is based on the assumption that coaseian bargaining can be extended to any institutional scenario i e voluntary as well as coercive exchange however voluntary transactions cannot capture the logic of coercive power this means that the assumption of an efficient political market is not valid and that the political coase theorem lacks the logical consistency to provide a cornerstone for political theory

theories of institutions and economic reform in africa abstract the paper presents and critically examines the theories of institutions that can be used as a guide to economic reform in africa three approaches to institutions are initially discussed the model of structural adjustment new institutional economics and the old institutionalist tradition five institutions related to the development of markets in africa are examined from the three perspectives the institutions include property rights including their role in agriculture money and financial institutions prices and markets firms and industrial organization and markets and states the main conclusion of the paper is that structural adjustment due to its neoclassical roots is basically ainstitutional and therefore ill equipped to promote the development of markets in africa while new institutionalism provides interesting insights it is also limited by its neoclassical economic foundations thus if african governments desire to promote market reform they would be best advised to consult the old institutionalist literature particularly the very interesting recent work of proponents of this tradition

contracting for environmental property rights the case of vittel based on a real case of contracting for environmental property rights we explore several implications of coase s insights the case study adds empirical content to basic transaction costs concepts by analysing the design and implementation of a contractual arrangement between a pollutee a bottler of mineral water and several polluting farmers we analyse the bargaining between the two parties to determine how transaction cost issues valuation disputes bilateral monopoly conditions and third party effects were overcome and how they succeeded in contracting for environmental property rights we compare the vittel case with other similar cases to draw lessons for environmental rights negotiations

a review of the recent literature on the institutional economics analysis of the long run performance of nations this paper reviews the recent post 2000 literature which assesses the importance of institutions as a factor determining cross country differences in growth rates or in the contemporary level of prosperity it first sketches how institutional economics has evolved it then examines critically the methods of analysis employed in the recent literature the paper finds that this literature has made a major contribution to the analysis of the causes of economic growth but the relative importance of institutions as a determinant of long run growth and prosperity is still a wide open question

a game theory framework for cooperative management of refillable and disposable bottle lifecycles abstract firms engaged in industrial ecology hope to reduce environmental impacts and costs improve resource efficiency and create symbiotic relationships that reduce transaction costs and enhance information flow however current lca tools do not explain firms incentives to implement the principles of industrial ecology or how an individual or firm can affect the products and processes at other firms game theory on the other hand allows investigation of the willingness of producers and consumers to seek strategies that promote the common interest of the system while not harming their own interests this paper applies game theory to the lifecycle of bottle packaging and presents a framework for analysis of the choice between refillable and disposable bottles although refillable bottles may be more cost effective in the long run bottlers only have incentive to use refillable bottles when they are sure that consumer return rates will be reasonably high it has been found that consumers who keep or dispose of refillable bottles or respond to deposit refund return incentives by reducing their demand may drive costs up and encourage adoption of disposables a simple model is provided which finds the optimal bottler strategy as a function of the bottler s expectations for consumer cooperation

libertad para competir en el mercado recursos procesos y resultados freedom to compete in the market resources processes and resultsherein we analyze three concepts of market competition although the different aspects of freedom can be appreciated in each one of them they make an especial contribution to some of them we propose that the neoclassical general equilibrium chiefly contributes to the discussion of the outcomes of an economic activity the barriers to entry approach calls for a study of the resources necessary to compete and the competition as a process approach emphasizes the competitive activity itself moreover as we move from the first onwards enriching the meaning of competition the possibility of losing opportunities to participate in the market becomes more evident entry and exit are part of the competitive process each concept of competition responds to theories that specify or allude to certain types and distribution of economic agents freedoms to manoeuvre throughout this study we often quote amartya sen with the purpose of buildingbridges between the study of competition and the approach of development as freedom

presidential address does finance benefit society academics view of the benefits of finance vastly exceeds societal perception this dissonance is at least partly explained by an underappreciation by academia of how without proper rules finance can easily degenerate into a rent seeking activity i outline what finance academics can do from a research point of view and from an educational point of view to promote good finance and minimize the bad

the effects of political connections and state ownership on corporate litigation in china abstractwe examine the effects of corporate lawsuits in china and find that litigation announcements depress the stock prices of both defendant and plaintiff firms financially distressed defendants suffer lower stock returns we find that politically connected defendants are favored in the judicial process they have higher stock returns and are more likely to appeal against adverse outcomes and to obtain a favorable appeal result state controlled defendants fare better than privately controlled defendants when it comes to appeals but do not have higher stock returns the evidence suggests that there is bias in the judicial process

the theory of the firm as governance structure from choice to contract the propositions that organization matters and that it is susceptible to analysis were long greeted by skepticism by economists one reason why this message took a long time to register is that it is much easier to say that organization matters than it is to show how and why the prevalence of the science of choice approach to economics has also been an obstacle as developed herein the lessons of organization theory for economics are both different and more consequential when examined through the lens of contract this paper examines economic organization from a science of contract perspective with special emphasis on the theory of the firm

allocation and pricing at the water district level efficient water pricing schemes are introduced for nonprofit water agencies where members have property rights based upon historical usage the existing average cost rate design is compared with the proposed designs active trading and passive trading both schemes lead to efficiency but passive trading has operational advantages since it generates less transaction costs than active trading block rate pricing is shown to be suboptimal and inferior to passive trading an example from the israeli water economy is used as an empirical illustration

a naturalistic approach to the theory of the firm the role of cooperation and cultural evolution one reason why firms exist this paper argues is because they are suitable organizations within which cooperative production systems based on human social predispositions can evolve in addition we show how an entrepreneur given these predispositions can shape human behavior within a firm to illustrate these processes we will present a model that depicts how the biased transmission of cultural contents via social learning processes within the firm influence employees behavior and the performance of the firm these biases can be traced back to evolved social predispositions humans lived in tribal scale social systems based on significant amounts of intra and even intergroup cooperation for tens if not a few hundred thousand years before the first complex societies arose firms rest upon the social psychology originally evolved for tribal life we also relate our conclusions to empirical evidence on the performance and size of different kinds of organizations modern organizations have functions rather different from ancient tribes leading to friction between our social predispositions and organization goals firms that manage to reduce this friction will tend to function better

local governments as industrial firms an organizational analysis of china s transitional economy despite widespread skepticism about government ownership in transitional economies china s rapid industrial growth has been led by public enterprises kornai s theory of soft budbet constraints born of the failure of earlier hungarian reforms fosters such skepticism but it assumes as fixed organizational characteristics that in fact vary widely across government jurisdictions local governments with smaller industrial bases have clearer financial incentives and constraints fewer nonfinancial interests in enterprises and a greater capacity to monitor them in china s vast public sector the fastest growth in output and productivity has occurred where government ownership rights are clearest and most easily enforced which enables officials to manage public industry as a diversified market oriented firm

bringing economic opportunity into line with environmental influence a discussion on the coase theorem and the porter and van der linde hypothesis environmental concerns and tightened environmental policy parameters have been associated with the notion of additional costs of compliance rather than with innovation and sustainability the contrary has also been suggested claiming that strict environmental legislation merely serves as a catalyst for firms to retain obvious economic and environmental mutual gains so called win wins laying around waiting to be collected such implications can be seen from the porter and van der linde writings heavily criticised by palmer et al as being built on faulty examples this paper supports that conclusion and uses property rights and transactions costs theories to find private incentives to explore the win wins for those actors who have the largest potentials to diminish the pressure on our environment by applying the coase theorem emphasising transaction costs and property rights this paper argues that strong public support is needed to create private incentives for exploring economic and environmental win win innovations the public support suggested is to a extend producer responsibilities where the same costs which may be neglected by the end consumers will if transferred to the design owner be viewed as a production cost and to b enforce environmental public procurement both may be combined with a support to c actors such as non governmental organisations and consumer agencies positioning themselves as information bridges by informing the consumers the negative effects of asymmetric information among actors can thereby be diminished as well as the low interest to primarily care for the environment among common consumers

the consequences of voluntary traceability system for supply chain relationships an application of transaction cost economics this paper analyses the effects of voluntary traceability on vertical relationships within food supply chains using a transaction cost perspective the analysis makes reference to the italian situation where the national standard organization has introduced a private standard for traceability that provides a higher degree of information associated with the individual product than the european mandatory traceability system a survey was conducted by questionnaire to assess changes in transaction characteristics costs and governance after the introduction of voluntary traceability the sample represents all italian firms applying this standard factorial and cluster analyses were applied to find the different reorganizations of transactions the results highlight an increase in asset specificity and a decrease in the uncertainty level throughout the supply chains the introduction of voluntary traceability shows increased vertical coordination for firms that previously used oral agreements and variation in transactions conditions for firms using contracts instead vertically integrated firms do not reveal any variation in the governance of transactions as they are already internally safeguarded

an analysis of economic warfare in times of conflict an adversary s resources are a source of potential harm many geopolitical tactics are thus quite explicitly economic as they seek either to deter an adversary s worst intentions or reduce its capacity to inflict damage richardson 1960 tullock 1974 relevant policies include trade limiting sanctions galtung 1967 pape 1997 and direct attacks on an adver sary s military infrastructure or personnel 1 this paper explores a third example namely efforts to undermine an adversary s source of income i focus on us efforts to reduce the resources of taliban loyal insurgents by suppressing the afghan opium trade with additional applications to conflicts involving oil producing nations the taliban historically profited from the opium trade through a 10 percent tax on farmers known locally as ushr and by providing traffickers with protection services this link between opium income and taliban resources coupled with concerns about a narcoticsinsecurity cycle motivates the view that the united states should suppress the afghan opium trade blanchard 2009 caution is warranted

the political economy of technological innovation and employment building on the varieties of capitalism thesis of comparative advantages in technological innovation the authors theorize the effect of sociopolitical coordination from a dynamic perspective and then apply the dynamic theories to the political economy of employment in comparison to the existing employment literature situated in a constant technology context based on cross sectional survey as well as pooled time series aggregate data the authors argue that new technologies not only increase productivity through process innovation but also generate rents through product innovation by preventing opportunistic behavior between firms sociopolitical coordination intensifies reciprocal sharing of innovation which increases productivity returns but dilutes rents leading to comparative advantage in process over product innovation because process innovation is labor saving but product innovation is employment friendly interfirm coordination further leads to comparative disadvantage in job creation from in

shifting chinese organizational responses to evolving greening pressures organizations are facing various evolving pressures to green their practices these pressures range from obligatory forces to voluntary measures environmental pressures traditionally influenced organizations to seek reactive and internal practices the adopted environmental management em practices have evolved to be more proactive and external as the focus has shifted to supply chains this paper aims to further understand the driving mechanisms for em practices under various external pressures to meet this research goal this study extends the theory of dynamic incentives of environmental policies and institutional theory to develop environmental pressures using an empirical study of 422 chinese manufacturers covering all 31 provinces and provincial cities an exploratory factor analysis reveals four em practices factors and four pressures drivers factors results of a hierarchical regression analysis show that coercive pressures positively relate to more reactive internal em practices less coercive pressures positively relate to more proactive external and green supply chain management practices the empirical findings provide further support that voluntary regulatory measures can help motivate companies in extending their em efforts to supply chains the work also provides insights into how organizations may respond to evolving regulatory regimes dynamic incentives of environmental regulatory policy and various institutional pressures

taxes institutions and innovation theory and international evidence we develop an international model of the design of institutions for regulating innovative activities of private corporations informational limitations faced by the social planner preclude complete contracting with private firms corporate innovation creates positive and negative externalities the social planner in each country takes into account the legal system in place and designs an umbrella of institutions that include a menu of organizational forms liability structures corporate taxes and subsidies we show that limited liability may be accompanied by excessive innovation however when the nonmonetized benefits are very high private firms may be too conservative in innovation policies firms choose their organizational form and level of innovation consistent with private optimality with the optimal institutional design for each country we demonstrate that private innovation choices are aligned with social optimality in particular we show that the optimally designed corporate tax rate in each country is a decreasing function of its legal effectiveness using data from 63 countries over 2003 2018 we document supporting evidence mncs can take advantage of differential liability and corporate tax structures across national boundaries to circumvent institutional design constraints however when mncs generate positive externalities to host countries their governments may provide subsidies and incentives

on modeling and interpreting the economics of catastrophic climate change with climate change as prototype example this paper analyzes the implications of structural uncertainty for the economics of low probability high impact catastrophes even when updated by bayesian learning uncertain structural parameters induce a critical tail fattening of posterior predictive distributions such fattened tails have strong im plications for situations like climate change where a catastrophe is theoretically possible because prior knowledge cannot place sufficiently narrow bounds on overall damages this paper shows that the economic consequences of fat tailed structural uncertainty along with unsureness about high temperature damages can readily outweigh the effects of discounting in climate change policy analysis

soft budget constraints and regional industrial policy reinterpreting the rise and fall of delorean the rise and fall of delorean motor cars limited has traditionally been interpreted as either the result either of john delorean s psychological flaws or as confirming the supposed limitations of activist industrial policy however when the episode is examined in greater historical detail neither of these interpretations is compelling the reinterpretation outlined here draws on institutional analysis as well as a range of archival sources much of it previously unreleased the inefficiencies within the original contractual agreement are highlighted the lack of credibility associated with this agreement was in turn traceable to the institutional environment with its associated risk reward implications under which industrial policy operated this environment had a political element it had been distorted by the troubles and the resulting fears policymakers had of a cumulative causation relationship between violence and unemployment officials in belfast against treasury opposition advocated state led entrepreneurship as a policy response

inside the coasean firm why variations in competence and taste matter abstractronald coase s signal achievement relates to the role of transactions costs in two contexts the formation and maintenance of the firm and the systematic analysis of social costs these transaction cost explanations however do not offer a complete explanation of the variations observed in the internal structures of firms which are elucidated by noting the irreducible role of variations in individual competence temperament and taste in explaining both why firms are formed and how they are structured thus some firms are organized as partnerships and others as straight employment arrangements with many permutations in between sometimes these differences are driven by tax and regulatory considerations that coase well understood but these differences remain prominent even in wholly unregulated markets understanding the internal construction helps explain the difficulties faced by regulation in areas as diverse as employment discrimination law capital markets and tort liability

coase versus the coasians who should enforce laws or contracts judges or regulators many coasians though not coase himself advocate judicial enforcement we show that the incentives facing judges and regulators crucially shape this choice we then compare the regulation of e nancial markets in poland and the czech republic in the 1990s in poland strict enforcement of the securities law by a highly motivated regulator was associated with a rapidly developing stock market in the czech republic hands off regulation was associated with a moribund stock market i introduction at the heart of economists traditional skepticism about government regulation is the coase theorem coase 1960 the theorem states that when property rights are well dee ned and transaction costs are zero market participants will organize their transactions in ways that achieve efe cient outcomes when they can do so it is not necessary for the government to engage in corrective actions through taxes regulations or even legal rules financial markets are often used to demonstrate the coase theorem s case against regulation advocates of the regulation of these markets point to a variety of potential failures such as the ability of security issuers to expropriate both potential and existing investors through misrepresentation or proe t diversion investors fear of such expropriation prevents e rms from raising external funds and keeps efe cient projects from being undertaken not so reply the coasians they point out that most securities transactions take place between sophisticated adults and that both the buyers and the issuers of securities have available to them a vast range of private arrangements to achieve efe ciency including contracts such as corporate charters certie cation by intermediaries and various forms of bonding such contracts render most laws and regulations unnecessary stigler 1964 easterbrook and fischel 1991

infrastructure incentives and institutions abstract expensive infrastructure is ineffective if it doesn t travel the last mile in nineteenth century new york and modern africa disease has spread when urbanites chose not to use newly built sanitation infrastructure to save money either subsidies or pigouvian fines can internalize the externalities that occur when people don t use sanitation infrastructure but with weak institutions subsidies generate waste and fines lead to extortion our model illustrates the complementarity between infrastructure and institutions and shows how institutional weaknesses determine whether fines subsidies both or neither are optimal contrary to becker 1968 the optimal fine is often mild to reduce extortion