campaign contributions and congressional voting a simultaneous probit tobit model m any citizens and scholars have been troubled by the influence that special interest groups appear to exert over policymaking as a result of their roles in the financing of political campaigns these concerns inspired the enactment of a number of election law reforms in the 1970s and have led to increasing popular support for public financing of electoral campaigns despite the public attention these issues have attracted few social scientists have attempted to analyze the financial relationships between interest groups and policymakers empirically 1 one such study was reported by durden and silberman 1976 who included contributions from the afl cio political action committee as an independent variable in an equation explaining congressional voting on minimum wage legislation their results indicated that campaign contributions significantly affected voting on that issue the work i have done differs substantially from that of durden and silberman in two ways first i have chosen to examine issues which were of considerably narrower concern than the minimum wage issue in the interest of simplicity i examine issues of concern to just one or a few groups i have also used a different econometric technique if campaign contributions are actually endogenous as seems plausible the single equation estimation technique employed by durden and silberman is subject to a possible simultaneous equations bias for each issue studied i have therefore jointly estimated a two equation system explaining both votes on the bill and contributions from an associated interest group the simultaneous probit tobit model which i use takes into account the dichotomous nature of the variable indicating a congressman s vote the non negativity constraint imposed on the contribution variable and the possibility of correlation between the error terms for the equations explaining these two variables 2 full information maximum likelihood fiml estimates for the model are consistent and asymptotically efficient

tax collection with agency costs private contracting or government bureaucrats historically governments contracted with private agents known as tax farmers to collect taxes this paper develops a theoretical framework for determining when a welfare maximizing government should choose tax farmers over bureaucratic tax collectors while bureaucratic collectors have an incentive to shirk and raise collection costs above least costs profit maximizing private collectors tend to reduce tax evasion below the optimal level generally the choice of collection methods depends on a comparison of the welfare loss associated with monitoring in the bureaucratic setting and the welfare loss associated with overdetection of evasion in the private setting copyright 1992 by the london school of economics and political science

street level political controls over federal bureaucracy local partisan activities of legislators and their electoral coalitions systematically influence field office activities of federal bureaucracies in their electoral districts this alternative to centralized democratic controls over bureaucracy occurs because discretionary policy decisions made at the field office level are influenced by local resources generated through partisan activities our study of county level occupational safety and health administration enforcement in new york 1976 85 finds that county state and federal elected officials influence local enforcement activities with liberal democratic legislators associated with more active enforcement the county political parties are most influential for activities with the most local discretion while members of congress are more influential for local activities more readily controlled by the national office

political pluralism public policies and organizational choices banking branch expansion in india 1948 2003 data on the expansion of 94 commercial banks in india from 1948 to 2003 were analyzed to test the proposition that political pluralism wherein competing parties control the state and national governments of a nation can promote business expansion the results confirm that such political pluralism reduces the power of either government to constrain business decision making but that pluralism might at times lead to unhealthy competition between parties harming local expansion opportunities the data show that in india banks selectively exploit political pluralism to guide their expansion decisions

academic earmarks and the returns to lobbying abstract in this paper we estimate the returns to lobbying by universities to motivate our empirical work we develop a simple theoretical model of university lobbying for academic earmarks our statistical analysis shows that universities represented by a house appropriations committee hac or senate appropriations committee sac member spend less money on lobbying than those that are not represented in addition using instrumental variables estimations we show that universities without hac or sac representation may receive some benefit to lobbying for earmarks although in many estimations this benefit is not statistically different from zero however for universities with hac or sac representation a 10 percent increase in lobbying yields an additional 2 8 percent or 3 5 percent increase in earmarks respectively this suggests that there are large returns to lobbying for academic earmarks if a university is represented by a member of one the hac or sac but little or no return if not

savings and loan and finance industry pac contributions to incumbent members of the house banking committee this paper examines the relationship between campaign contributions from savings and loan and finance industry pacs and membership on the house banking committee the distinguishing features of this paper are that we focus on campaign contributions at an industry level and we use regression analysis to determine whether membership on the house banking committee the committee with oversight responsibility for the savings and loan industry influences the level of contributions received by an individual legislator we find that members of the house banking committee do receive significantly greater contributions from the savings and loan and finance pacs than do other members of congress and that being chairman of the house banking committee also pays a dividend

the role of corporate donations in chinese political markets many corporations actively engage in political activities to enhance their relationships with politicians facilitating access to scarce resources and creating competitive advantages we investigate corporate donations to explore how they initiate interactions between firms and new local leaders in china specifically we propose that political turnover creates unique opportunities for firms to win over new officials via corporate donations especially in competitive markets moreover we find that firms that make generous donations at the beginning of a new city secretary s tenure receive more attention from representatives of new local leaders especially firms that were politically disadvantaged under a predecessor s governance empirical studies on the turnover of city secretaries between 2001 and 2012 in china strongly support our hypotheses consequently this study improves our understanding of how corporate donations initiate social exchanges between firms and politicians

institutional work and climate change corporate political action in the swedish electricity industry this paper utilises qualitative methods to examine factors that influence corporate political actions cpa linked to climate policy in the swedish electricity industry cpa strategies are examined in connection to two policy instruments the eu emission trading scheme and the swedish electricity certificate scheme these instruments are the main drivers of climate related investments in the sector the study treats cpa as a form of institutional work and examines reasons for companies to seek to maintain disrupt institutions the study finds that cpa is driven primarily by the need to manage external resource dependencies and that where risks are more acute companies are more likely to seek to disrupt regulative institutions however the study also shows that respondents appraisals of policy instruments are based on a convergent set of shared values cognitive institutions that form the basis of cpa and which actors do not seek to disrupt despite resource based risks cpa is thus characterised as a means to transmute cognitively held values and beliefs into regulative institutions the study concludes with implications for policymakers and theory

does competition reduce price dispersion new evidence from the airline industry we analyze the effects of competition on price dispersion in the airline industry using panel data from 1993 q1 through 2006 q3 competition has a negative effect on price dispersion in line with the textbook treatment of price discrimination this effect is pronounced for routes with consumers characterized by relatively heterogeneous elasticities of demand on routes with a homogeneous customer base the effects of competition on price dispersion are smaller our results contrast with those of borenstein and rose who found that price dispersion increases with competition we reconcile the different results by showing that the cross sectional estimator suffers from omitted variable bias

a test of the structure of pac contracts an analysis of house gun control votes in the 1980s enactment of the bill was a major victory for the national rifle association which had worked for years to win relaxation of the landmark gun control act of 1968 congressional quarterly almanac 1986 p 82 i introduction every election the same political action committees pacs contribute millions of dollars to candidates for office well informed participants in the political process surely must get value for their money yet empirical research fails to provide systematic evidence that campaign contributions influence congressional roll call votes 1 a mischaracterization of the exchange between pacs and politicians may produce these contradictory results empirical studies of roll call voting typically use pac contributions from only one election cycle earlier studies generally assume prepayment in the prior congress while more contemporary studies assume a spot exchange recent empirical work however suggests another possibility interest groups may buy current influence with money spent over multiple election cycles stratmann 1995 shows that contributions from both the current and the previous election cycles influence floor votes on agricultural price supports snyder 1990 1992 presents evidence that interest groups make long term investments in politicians previous studies by arbitrarily imposing a payment structure may have produced erroneous estimates of the influence of pac money on legislative votes we examine roll call votes on gun control in the u s house of representatives during the 1980s to determine whether pacs make spot market purchases prepay for votes in the prior election cycle or make long term investments we investigate whether pac contributions have a durable long term investment effect as snyder 1992 suggests we consider two types of evidence concerning the campaign contribution contract first we examine the pattern of expenditures by the two dominant interest groups concerned with gun control the national rifle association nra and hand gun control hgc their expenditures provide strong evidence against the spot market exchange hypothesis both groups made significant expenditures in sessions of congress in which no floor vote occurred nor were these expenditures purchasing services such as committee work in a spot market exchange further 1986 nra expenditures are significantly higher for first term representatives which is consistent with long term investments but contradicts a spot exchange since freshmen have the least influence to sell second we include expenditures from both the current and the five previous election cycles as separate independent variables in a model of roll call voting to date no empirical paper tests whether pac money from more than two cycles influences roll call voting and only stratmann 1995 and grenzke 1989 use a model that specifies money from more than one cycle in an equation explaining roll call votes our probit estimates indicate that nra expenditures in the three most recent election cycles and hgc expenditures in the two most recent cycles buy votes the independent effect of expenditures from different cycles suggests that contributions are neither an unqualified one session prepayment nor a spot exchange the influence of nra expenditures two sessions prior to the roll call votes is evidence of a long term investment the literature on the determinants of roll call voting assumes that pac contributions alter representatives votes interest groups might instead simply provide campaign assistance to their supporters to affect the composition of congress stratmann 1991 bronars and lott 1997 if a difficult to quantify variable and thus omitted from regressions signals a representative s true position and interest groups make campaign contributions on the basis of this variable pac contributions might appear to influence votes the pattern of contributions and votes on gun control however indicates attempts by the nra and hgc to influence votes not merely the composition of congress

nonmarket performance evidence from u s electric utilities building on a framework that assesses the attractiveness of political markets where firms transact over public policies with government policy makers we develop hypotheses regarding the success or performance of firms nonmarket strategies we propose that the ability of firms to gain more favorable policy outcomes is increasing in the degree of rivalry among elected politicians the firm s recent experience with policy makers and the opportunity to learn from other firms recent experiences and is decreasing in the degree of rivalry from competing interest groups and the resource base of regulatory agencies using data on regulatory filings for rate increases made by the population of u s privately owned electric utilities over a 13 year period we find empirical support for our arguments

the structure of political institutions and effectiveness of corporate political lobbying this paper investigates how the structure of political institutions influences the effectiveness of corporate political lobbying by shaping the veto points and entry points that lobbying firms encounter and require respectively when attempting to influence public policies in so doing this study deepens our understanding of the strategic implications of institutional environments using large sample and cross country firm level data we find that the influence of firms lobbying activities on public policies is weakened when there are tighter constraints generated as a result of greater political partisan competition and more subnational government tiers we find that the negative association between the effectiveness of lobbying and political partisan competition is particularly pronounced in countries with lower electoral accountability and that the negative association between the effectiveness of lobbying and subnational government tiers is particularly pronounced in more centralized politi

race and gender discrimination in bargaining for a new car more than three hundred paired audits at new car dealerships reveal that dealers quoted significantly lower prices to white males than to black or female test buyers using identical scripted bargaining strategies ancillary evidence suggests that the dealerships disparate treatment of women and blacks may be caused by dealers statistical inferences about consumers reservation prices but the data do not strongly support any single theory of discrimination copyright 1995 by american economic association

consumer search and dynamic price dispersion an application to gasoline markets this article studies the role of imperfect information in explaining price dispersion we use a new panel data set on the u s retail gasoline industry and propose a new test of temporal price dispersion to establish the importance of consumer search we show that price rankings vary significantly over time however they are more stable among stations at the same street intersection weestablishtheequilibriumrelationshipsbetweenpricedispersionandkeyvariables from consumer search models price dispersion increases with the number of firms in the market decreases with the production cost and increases with search costs

constituency opinion and pac contributions a case of the national abortion and reproductive rights action league to test whether interest group politics doharm to a representative democracy thispaper simulates congressionaldistrict level constituency opinion onabortion analyzing the relationshipbetween the constituency opinion andnaral s contributions in the 102nd and103rd congresses this paper presentsempirical evidence that naral scontribution decision is influenced byconstituency opinion the evidence however is mixed constituency opinioninfluences naral s decision on who will getits money constituency opinion however does not influence naral s decision on whowill get more money according to theseresults financial representation byinterest groups does not seriously causeharm to a representative democracy but itcan still bias the representativeness tosome extent an interest group may selectlegislators whose districts support itsposition less strongly and contribute agreater amount of money to the legislators

competing commitments technocracy and democracy in the design of monetary institutions in this article i refine and expand the agenda for research on monetary institutions first i evaluate the analyses and research designs presented in this special issue of international organization out of this evaluation several ideas about how to produce a third generation of research on this topic emerge specific ideas include how to create a better synthesis with certain branches of economics such as information economics broaden the welfare criteria on which institutional choices are made deepen the analyses of coalitional and other political processes on which the choice of institutions are based and strengthen the tests that are offered in support of these choices in the second part of this article i explore questions of how popular sovereignty over economic policy and institutional choice are achieved i show that the institutional regimes proposed in the special issue are in a sense democratic as long as the public s perceived consensus about economic policies and macroeconomic outcomes is real however if as new work suggests there is genuine dissensus about policy and macroeconomic objectives it is no longer clear that the regimes proposed in the special issue are democratic in the conclusion i briefly discuss a possible crisis of imagination in institutional design

the dynamics of political bureaucratic adaptation through the 1980s political science research produced a more dynamic view of how bureaucracies respond to changing political conditions however much of this research ignored the complex stimulus environment within which bureaucracies operate as well as the potentially rich bureaucratic response dynamic that can exist we extend our previous work on the dynamics of political control of the bureaucracy by developing a model of political bureaucratic adaptation themodel is tested with output data from four environmental protection agency programs between 1979 and 1988 the results show that politicalbureaucratic adaptation is indeed a more complex phenomenon than suggested by earlier research stimuli to bureaucratic behavior include discrete events event progressions and tonal shifts in the policy environment bureaucratic responses can be immediate delayed or distributed through time in probabilistic fashion substantively the results offer new insights on how political institutions affect bureaucratic behavior they also suggest how why and to what bureaucracy responds

first branch or root the congress the president and the federal reserve much of the literature on the power of elected officials and bureaucratic agencies argues from an empirical perspective that bureaus appears to exercise autonomy in this paper a theoretical model sets out the conditions under which the congress the president and one agency we use the u s federal reserve as an extended example can dictate policy outcomes the results of the paper include the congressional dominance theorem if more than 2 3 of house members and more than 2 3 of senate members agree on something they get it the theorem is obvious the proof is in the u s constitution but often forgotten in the substantive literature more realistic results are derived for situations where the preferences of members of congress are more diverse powers of the president to influence policy with and without appointments are also analyzed

committee assignments constituent preferences and campaign contributions committee assignments constituent preferences and campaign constributions the familiar economic model of regulation as developed by stigler 1971 peltzman 1976 and becker 1983 posits an essentially frictionless market process for regulatory policy formation in which a single regulator legislator chooses policy to maximize net support from competing groups in this paper we extend the supply side of this model by considering the effect of legislative institutions and unorganized constituent preferences on the ability of incumbents in the house of representatives to serve specific interest groups we then test this formulation by examining the recent history of interest group campaign contributions to these legislators our theoretical model concentrates on how a legislator allocates time between serving specific interest groups outside his district and serving his constituency we do not model interest group decisions directly assuming simply that they purchase their desired amount of service from the lowest cost suppliers our model sorts legislators by the supply price at which they can serve a particular group this price depends on the preferences of the voters in the legislators district and the productivity of the legislator in producing policy service for each group 1 the empirical section tests the model by examining the pattern of interest group campaign contributions to house incumbents from 1978 through 1984 our regression analysis tends to confirm both implications of the theory first the pattern of campaign contributions from specific interest groups to legislators is shaped by the division of substantive legislative and regulatory jurisdictions represented by the system of house standing committees second voter preferences influence the pattern of contributions by affecting the supply price at which a legislator can offer policy to interest groups legislators with sympathetic or indifferent constituencies are able to offer a lower price and are therefore able to attract larger sums than those with hostile constituencies these results are important for two reasons first the influence of congressional institutions such as committees on policy is not widely accepted while several studies faith levins and tollison 1982 weingast and moran 1983 weingast 1984 grier 1989 and robert 1990 have documented the effects of changes in a particular committee on policies under its jurisdiction this work considers the jurisdiction of only a single committee in each case 2 by examining the linkages between congressional committees and political action committees pacs we investigate whether interest groups act as if committees have power second while the chicago model of regulation emphasizes correctly in our view that policy is the result of vote maximizing calculations and the incremental balancing nature of any equilibrium the model is imprecise about which sets of preferences are most important in determining the levels of policy or the size of changes in policies focusing on committees promotes a parsimonious specification of both the political players members of the relevant committee rather than the entire congress and the pivotal voters committee members constituencies more than the nation determining specific policy outcomes the paper is organized as follows section i reviews some issues on the nature and sources of committee influence in the u s congress the second section incorporates committee assignments into a theory of decision making by interest group investors sections iii and iv describe our data and estimation technique and present the empirical results the fifth and final section discusses some implications and conclusions of this research i committee power in congress legislators differ substantively by virtue of their committee assignments committees in congress and particularly in the house of representatives possess disproportionate power over the policy areas in their respective jurisdictions have the right to hold hearings and recommend budget allocations for the bureaus in their jurisdiction goodwin 1970

politics and the rescue of insolvent savings and loans before 1989 the results presented in this paper are consistent with those predicted by public choice economists who believe that regulatory agencies represent the interests of their controlling congressional committees membership on committees is not random congressmen seek committee assignments where they can represent the interests of their constituency congressmen from states where financial institutions are significant will seek membership on their respective banking committees once on those committees congressmen will seek to protect and promote their own constituency in the case of the savings and loan industry insolvent savings and loans received benefits from staying in operation these savings and loans gained another chance to gamble for resurrection being shut down or placed in a management consignment program did not give this option the results presented in our paper indicate that participation in one of the rescue programs is not random savings and loans in states with political power representation on the senate banking committee are less likely to be resolved

who loses when prices are negotiated an analysis of the new car market we establish that there are large and persistent differences in final transaction prices for identical new cars and that demographic characteristics explain at least 20 of the observed variation older consumers perform progressively worse in negotiations and the age premium is greater for women than for men our results suggest that the complex nature of vehicle transactions leads to price dispersion in this market and that the worst performing groups older women have the lowest rates of market participation we conjecture that the results are driven by the sharp increases in women s education and labor force participation in recent decades

will bounty hunting revenue agents increase enforcement while the final version of the 1986 tax reform act retained budget funding of the irs the senate proposal to finance spending from audit revenues represented a seriously debated alternative that continues to receive attention as a method for increasing enforcement at one level the ultimate failure of the proposal is puzzling given congress s unwillingness to raise tax rates to cover spending the budget deficits of the 1980s must be financed from some other source inflation borrowing or increased enforcement turning the irs into a bounty hunting agency would seem to be a straightforward way of producing extra revenue

rent seeking and market structure comment if the firms in an industry are to be successful in raising money to influence government two conditions must be met 1 there must be sufficient rents available from government decisions regarding that industry to make such expenditures worthwhile and 2 the industry must be sufficiently concentrated to avoid a free rider problem in fund raising this argument though seemingly intuitively appealing has been under recent empirical attack this paper seeks to restore the parapets

from unemployed to entrepreneur the role of the absolute bequest motive abstract using the british household panel survey this paper finds that inheritance has a concave effect on the hours worked by male entrepreneurs receiving an inheritance increases the labor supply of unemployed male entrepreneurs however this effect becomes smaller for higher inheritances

a simultaneous model of consumer brand choice and negotiated price in this paper we develop a simultaneous model of consumer brand choice and negotiated price in the highly relevant marketing context of automobile transactions consumer brand choice is modeled as a multinomial probabilistic outcome and the individual consumer level transaction price is modeled to be consistent with the nash bargaining solution our simultaneous model introduces a natural way to account for price endogeneity in a microlevel choice setting when the price paid is individual specific and correlated with the idiosyncratic preference of a buyer it also accounts for the potential selectivity bias in studying the negotiated price by integrating consumer brand choice modeling we apply the proposed model to a data set of 4 795 consumer automobile purchases the empirical results show that the proposed approach not only better fits the data of consumer choice and negotiated price but it also provides additional insights into buyers and sellers behaviors in comparison with models that study only consumer choice or the negotiated price but not both simultaneously

constituency interests and delegation in european and american trade policy trade policy in the eu and the united states is to a large extent delegated to executive agents existing explanations claim that legislators delegate because they wish to liberalize but are unable to achieve this on their own the authors show that legislators delegate powers to obtain foreign market access for exporters and protection for import competing interests confronted with heterogeneousdemands from both groups principals delegate to two sets of agents to confer concentrated benefits on these constituencies and install control to avoid concentrated losses while maintaining the flow of resources from lobbying the authors derive the empirically observable implication that with the increase in the share of tradables in the overall economy delegation as well as control should steadily increase with time they then test the validity of this proposition for u s trade policy since 1916 and for european trade policy since 1958

bureaucratic discretion or congressional control regulatory policymaking by the federal trade commission this paper extends stigler and peltzman s approach to regulation by incorporating a legislature the model yields comparative statics results and hence testable implications the paper then tests between two opposing approaches about regulatory agency behavior the first assumes agencies operate independently of the legislature and hence exercise discretion the second assumes that congress controls agency decisions the recent behavior of the federal trade commission provides the empirical setting substantial evidence is found for the specific predictions of the model including the hypothesis of systematic congressional influence over ftc decisions

capital rules the domestic politics of international regulatory harmonization in the past fifteen years financial regulators from the developed world have attempted to create international regulatory standards in a variety of financial issue areas their negotiations are notable for the stark variation in the preferences of regulators toward international regulatory harmonization certain regulators actively resist any attempts at regulatory harmonization while others are vocal in their advocacy for an international agreement when will regulators seek to harmonize their rules with their foreign counterparts i propose a principal agent framework for analyzing regulator behavior that views international harmonization as a means of satisfying domestic political pressures the framework predicts that regulators are more likely to seek international regulatory harmonization when confidence in the stability of financial institutions is declining and when competitive pressures are increasing from foreign firms facing less stringent regulations i explore the consistency of the framework with two important cases in the history of international financial regulation the negotiations among bank regulators leading up to the 1988 basel accord on bank capital adequacy and the negotiations among securities regulators over capital adequacy for securities firms between 1988 and 1992 i thank gabe aguilera david bach ethan bueno de mesquita dan carpenter bill clark mark copelovitch jeff frieden dan gingerich dan ho devesh kapur joseph n r sanberg ross schaap allan stam matt stephenson two anonymous reviewers and the editors of io for helpful comments discussions and feedback i am also indebted to the thirty current and former regulators and financial industry executives who participated in interviews to advance this project finally i thank the weatherhead center for international affairs and the center for european studies for research funding

determinants of automobile pac contributions to house incumbents own versus rival effects this paper examines pac contributions by the big threeu s automakers and japanese auto dealers to houseincumbents a regression model is estimated where paccontributions are a function of a firm s own ties toan incumbent s district as measured by firmemployment and those of rivals for the big three own and u s rival effects are positive further theresults do not indicate the presence of a free ridereffect employment by a foreign subsidiary has no neteffect on u s contributions for the japanesedealers japanese plant employment has a positiveimpact on contributions and that of the big three anegative

the new economics of organization over the last ten years or so an important new approach to the study of organizations has emerged within economics it is perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a theoretical focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this paper provides political scientists with an overview of the new economics of organization and explores its implications for the study of public bureaucracy so far positive political theory has not contributed much to our understanding of public bureaucracy in part this is due to the unsympathetic treatment that rational modeling and most other modes of quantitative analysis have long received from students of public administration the other side of the coin however is that positive theorists have not made much of an effort to develop theories of bureaucracy their concerns have centered around two basic mechanisms of social choice voting and markets and they have devoted little systematic attention to a third mechanism that is clearly important for understanding how societies and other aggregates make collective decisions this third and relatively unexplored mechanism is hierarchy movement toward a positive theory of hierarchies would fill a serious gap in the social choice literature while at the same time making a theoretical contribution that strikes to the essence of public bureaucracy indeed of all organizations in fact significant steps toward a positive theory of hierarchies have very recently been taken but by economists not political scientists in small numbers of course economists made contributions to the study of public bureaucracy some time ago with the pioneering works of downs 1967 tullock 1965 and niskanen 1971 but this new wave of theoretical work is different it is already a large complex body of literature that is the focus of innovation and excitement among a growing number of economists and it reflects an unusual degree of theoretical coherence and cumulative effort work in this tradition tends to receive orientation from a distinctive economic approach to the analysis of organizations an approach perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this approach has emerged from recent attempts to move beyond the neoclassical theory of the firm which assumes away all organizational considerations to a theory of economic organizations that can explain why firms corporations and other enterprises behave as they do propo

nonmarket strategy performance evidence from u s electric utilities this paper develops and tests a theory of the performance determinants of a firm s nonmarket strategy in shaping public policy outcomes building on the concept of political market attractiveness we argue that nonmarket performance is influenced by both the characteristics of a firm s regulatory and political environment especially rivalry among interest groups or politicians and by internal capabilities that enable a firm to mitigate political transaction costs using data on regulatory filings for rate increases made by u s electric utilities over a 13 year period we find empirical support for our approach

dealer price discrimination in new car purchases evidence from the consumer expenditure survey this paper documents the variation in dealer discounts for new cars using transactions price data from the consumer expenditure survey consumer specific characteristics fail to explain dealer discounts whereas model market specific and purchase transaction variables e g first time purchase trade in and financing through dealer do explain them the results contradict earlier findings of race and gender discrimination based on a controlled experiment this contradiction is reconciled by examining the higher moments of the empirical discount distribution while mean and median markups do not vary by race and gender minority purchases are characterized by higher dispersion this may rationalize the disparate treatment of minorities by dealers documented in the controlled experiment

is the effect of competition on price dispersion nonmonotonic evidence from the u s airline industry we investigate the effect of competition on price dispersion in the airline industry using panel data from 1993 to 2008 we find a nonmonotonic effect of competition on price dispersion an increase in competition is associated with greater price dispersion in concentrated markets but with less price dispersion in competitive markets an inverse u relationship our empirical findings are consistent with an oligopolistic second degree price discrimination model and encompass contradictory findings in the literature

the limits of independence and the policy of the ecb it is argued that the european central bank s independence is not as secure as it seems and that as a result it has appreciable institutional incentives to protect and enhance its position it follows that its behaviour should not be understood as being solely determined by the pursuit of price stability one consequence is that certain points on which it has been criticised on the basis that its approach makes for ineffective monetary policy might be better understood as often effective attempts to protect its position another is that making a central bank or any other institution completely independent may be much harder than it seems and failed attempts which come close are not necessarily to be preferred even by the advocates of independence to less ambitious designs

conflicts interest groups and politics in structural reforms abstract the present study is to my knowledge the first to examine the balance of power among all players influencing the adoption of structural reforms politicians regulators and interest groups special attention is devoted to the effect of conflicts between regulators professional conflicts signal to politicians that there is a high level of risk in implementing a given reform thereby weakening their confidence in it conflicts also benefit interest groups increasing their effectiveness vis a vis politicians using a unique data set on 32 attempts to reform israel s financial market i find that the greater the extent of conflicts among regulators and the greater the intensity of the opposition of interest groups the lower the probability that a reform will be approved these conflicts together with the strength of interest groups have led to repeated attempts to introduce reforms so that it takes on average 10 years for a reform to be adopted

finite lifetimes and growth abstract in this paper we study the long run growth property of overlapping generations models it is shown that in one sector models with convex technologies the asymptotic growth rate must be zero this results because the young do not have sufficient income to purchase a large capital stock thus a policy of income redistribution to the young can generate growth even if financed by income taxation additionaly it is shown that two sector models and one sector models with nonconvex technologies are consistent with growth

the limits of tax and expenditure limits tel implementation as a principal agent problem previous scholarship has shown that tax and expenditure limits tels often fail to constrain government growth this paper views the implementation of tels as a principal agent problem agency theory predicts that delegation is affected by the preferences of agents and the costs of monitoring those agents using panel data for the us states from 1970 through 2008 i conduct an empirical test of the validity of the principal agent model for tels i find that state spending limitations are only effective at cutting the growth of state and local spending under the direction of agents who have a preference for limited government additionally state property tax limitations are only effective when monitoring does not require costly coordinated action these findings contradict an alternative theory of tel implementation that looks towards the policy s origin my research suggests that the arrangements of delegation determine when and under what conditions tels effectively reduce government growth

doctors with borders occupational licensing as an implicit barrier to high skill migration research on the political economy of immigration overlooks the specificity of human capital in skilled occupations and its implications for immigration preferences and policymaking conclusions that skilled americans are unconcerned about labor market competition from skilled migrants build on a simple dichotomy between high and low skill migrants in this article we show that natives turn to occupational licensing regulations as occupation specific protectionist barriers to skilled migrant labor competition in practice high skill natives face labor market competition only from those high skill migrants who share their occupation specific skills licensure regulations ostensibly serve the public interest by certifying competence but they can simultaneously be formidable barriers to entry by skilled migrants from a collective action perspective skilled natives can more easily secure sub national occupation specific policies than influence national immigration policy we exploit the unique structure of the american medical profession that allows us to distinguish between public interest and protectionist motives for migrant physician licensure regulations we show that over the 1973 2010 period states with greater physician control over licensure requirements imposed more stringent requirements for migrant physician licensure and as a consequence received fewer new migrant physicians by our estimates over a third of all us states could reduce their physician shortages by at least 10 percent within 5 years just by equalizing migrant and native licensure requirements this article advances research on the political economy of immigration and highlights an overlooked dimension of international economic integration regulatory rent seeking as a barrier to the cross national mobility of human capital and the public policy implications of such barriers

the institutional dynamics of policy administration bureaucratic influence over securities regulation theory a dynamic systems model of administrative politics that 1 relaxes restrictive causal assumptions among the president congress and an administrative agency 2 emphasizes aggregate institutional behavior and 3 analyzes both anticipated and unanticipated policy behavior is set forth as a more general means to investigate agency political relationships hypotheses the main set of hypotheses focus on the aggregate institutional relationships among the president congress and administrative agency these four possible hypotheses include bureaucratic influence bureaucratic autonomy mutual influence and political influence the purpose here is to assess the relative merits of competing explanations for bureaucratic behavior securities regulation is a perfect area of inquiry to investigate these competing perspectives since the findings of existing research on this topic are disparate methods vector autoregressive time series statistical methods are used to empirically test the dynamic systems model of administrative politics by examining three empirical models of sec enforcement behavior in relation to presidential and congressional budgetary preference signals for the 1949 92 annual period results the sec sends potent signals of their own via their changes in regulatory outputs that will affect the budgetary preferences of its political principles however the sec s administrative outputs are shown to be somewhat less sensitive to political budgetary preference signals than what one would expect presidential and congressional budgetary preference signals with respect to the sec are interdependent to a sizeable extent thus raising doubts about the separate independent effect democratic institutions have over the bureaucracy the implications of this study suggest that conventional theories of agency political relations serve as an oversimplified way to study administrative behavior future research on this topic

political authority expertise and government bureaucracies by applying the revelation principle we focus on how a sponsor who possesses political authority could minimise the efficiency losses when bureaucrats are experts that is when they control information about the true costs of public services production our results come in striking contrast to those in the literature on bureaucracies and public procurement in a two types setting and in the absence of monitoring and control mechanisms we find that the agency is productively efficient under certain conditions the agency is also allocatively efficient while under others the low cost bureau oversupplies and the high cost agency undersupplies its output

effective interim collaboration how firms minimize transaction costs and maximise transaction value this study of automotive transaction relationships in the u s a and japan offers abta which indicate that transaction costs do not necessarily increase with an increase in reiation specijk investments we empirically examine the conditions under which transactors can simultaneously achieve the twin benejits of high asset specificity and low transaction costs this is possible because the dtfferent safeguards which can be employed to control opportunism have different set up costs and result in different transaction costs over dl erent time horizons we examine in detail the ractices of javanese firms which result in effective inteq n collaboration 1997 by john wiley sons ltd

market structure and campaign contributions does concentration matter a reply economic rents may be obtained through the process of market competition or be obtained by resorting to governmental protection rational firms choose the least costly alternative collusion to obtain governmental protection will be less costly the higher the concentration ceteris paribus however high concentration in itself is neither necessary nor sufficient to induce governmental protection

determinants of the amount and type of corruption in state fiscal bureaucracies an analysis of late imperial china a principal agent model of relations between rulers and state officials is used to derive several propositions concerning the amount and type of corruption in state bureaucracies the model is appl

the impact of monetary regime changes some exchange rate evidence abstract lucas has argued that coefficient changes can be explained by changing expectations caused by the policy regime shifts this paper provides evidence consistent with the lucas critique using an efficient markets news framework kalman filter results show that surprise relative u s monetary expansion is associated both with periods of u s depreciation and appreciation i show that variables representing changes in monetary policy regimes can explain a substantial fraction of the movements in the time varying parameter

one discriminatory rent or double jeopardy multicomponent negotiation for new car purchases about half of new car transactions actually consist of two transactions one in which the customer buys a new car from a dealer and the other in which the customer sells his or her existing car to the dealer as a trade in at most dealerships both the price of the new car and the price of the trade in are negotiated in such negotiations as a general rule car dealers are willing to trade off profits made on the new car versus profits made on the trade in to an economist this suggests that the dealer may see the new car customer as the source of a certain amount of extractable profit one discriminatory rent that can be subdivided into two arbitrary buckets the new car margin and the trade in margin economic models of bargaining tend to use a similar paradigm modeling the amount of total economic surplus created by the transaction and supposing that each party will get a share of that surplus that is determined by the party s bargaining power it is usually recognized that there are multiple price mechanisms that could convey the same division of surplus to the two parties if this is indeed a good description of how new car negotiations unfold then an observer comparing a similar set of transactions should expect new car and trade in profit margins to be negatively correlated the better the deal the customer gets on a new car the less good the deal one should expect the customer to get on the trade in an alternative view of this multicomponent negotiation is that customers or dealers or competition and market structure

why is there so little money in u s politics in this paper we argue that campaign contributions are not a form of policy buying but are rather a form of political participation and consumption we summarize the data on campaign spending and show through our descriptive statistics and our econometric analysis that individuals not special interests are the main source of campaign contributions moreover we demonstrate that campaign giving is a normal good dependent upon income and campaign contributions as a percent of gdp have not risen appreciably in over 100 years if anything they have probably fallen we then show that only one in four studies from the previous literature support the popular notion that contributions buy legislators votes finally we illustrate that when one controls for unobserved constituent and legislator effects there is little relationship between money and legislator votes thus the question is not why there is so little money politics but rather why organized interests give at all we conclude by offering potential answers to this question this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the market for congressional votes is timing of contributions everything this study utilizes the timing of campaign contributions to identify whether the objective of political action committees pacs is to influence congressional votes or solely to elect a preferred candidate the results show that pac behavior is consistent with an attempt to purchase congressional votes and to influence elections contributions increase in the weeks surrounding legislative events of importance to pacs and elections the magnitude of increased contributions is examined the article also addresses the lack of legal enforcement mechanisms in vote for contribution agreements it develops hypotheses regarding the timing of contributions as an inexpensive mechanism to assure contractual performance hypotheses are tested regarding pacs incentives to mitigate potential cheating by legislators on such agreements results show that pacs use the timing of contributions as a mechanism to prevent legislators from reneging on vote for contribution trades

estimating bargaining power in the market for existing homes although bargaining is common in markets for heterogeneous goods it has largely been ignored in the hedonic literature in a break from that tradition we establish sufficient conditions that permit one to identify the effect of buyer and seller bargaining on hedonic models our model is estimated using a previously overlooked feature of the american housing survey that permits us to observe characteristics of both buyers and sellers results suggest that household wealth gender and other demographic traits influence bargaining power in addition variation in bargaining power arising from the presence of school age children accounts for anomalous seasonal patterns reported in various widely cited indices of quality adjusted house prices

bargaining power in apartment sales in corsica a latent class approach this paper extends the bargaining model of harding et al harding j rosenthal s and sirmans cf 2003 estimating bargaining power in the market for existing homes review of economics and statist

national capital city location and subsidiary portfolio expansion the negative effect of geographic distance to the capital city at inception on the speed of subsequent investments a multinational enterprise develops its subsidiary portfolio by investing in new foreign markets and subsequently pursuing further investments within these host countries we find that firms which locate their first equity investment closer to the national capital city can subsequently expand their subsidiary portfolio within the host country at a higher speed this effect is particularly strong in emerging economies further analyses of various contingencies support the robustness of our findings we discuss different theoretical mechanisms which could cause these effects in particular face to face interactions with governmental actors and opportunities to develop political connections our research contributes to the literature on internationalization processes by analyzing how the initial location choice affects the development of the subsidiary portfolio

tax incidence with endogenous quality and costly bargaining theory and evidence from hybrid vehicle subsidies abstract endogenous quality and bargaining are important features of many markets but are typically omitted from studies of incidence we develop a model with product upgrades and costly bargaining and find that tax rate pass through only partially characterizes the welfare impact of taxation consumers may respond to a tax or subsidy by changing product quality or by changing their bargaining effort we apply the insights of our theory to the study of subsidies for green goods specifically hybrid electric vehicles in canada we utilize highly detailed transaction data and leverage panel variation in subsidies across provinces for identification our baseline estimate finds that prices rises by 570 for every 1000 increase in the subsidy but this pass through estimate substantially underestimates consumer gains because a majority of this price increase 459 80 is due to increased product quality in the form of additional options and features

a political theory of regulation with some observations on railway abandonments one of the main themes of partisan dispute in the recent past and doubtless in the foreseeable future is whether or not the value of detailed governmental regulation of the economy exceeds the cost this is exactly the kind of dispute that might be resolved by raising it from the level of mere partisan interest to the level of economic and political science unfortunately however it has not been raised because we do not have the necessary intellectual apparatus namely a theory about the motivation for the operation of and the consequences of regulation as a result most of the discussion consists of biased ad hoc explanations of particular cases with little effort to formulate and test alternative generalizations we have therefore nothing but unresolved and unresolvable disputes about a more or less random collection of stories and some contradictory recipes about cause and effect

identifying a distinctive competence forecasting ability in the money fund industry testing the causal link between a firm specific competence and its antecedents or consequences has become a key objective for strategy research over the past decade on one hand case studies can identify a competence but with their small sample size their retrospective research design and their tendency toward sampling on the dependent variable they can not reliably test the causal connection between a competence and its antecedents or its consequences on the other hand variance decomposition studies demonstrate the existence of firm specific performance differentials but have not identified which particular competencies are responsible for them the present paper avoids both of these problems by measuring a particular competence across a large sample of organizations over a long period of time so that a test of statistical causality can be applied to the relationship of this competence to both its antecedents and its consequences the particular competence studied is the ability of money market mutual funds to forecast changes in short term interest rates a competence known from prior research to be both valuable and rare in particular we test the effect of forecasting ability on the economic surplus generated by the fund and its growth conversely we also test the effect of growth on the subsequent development of forecasting ability copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

a political model of monetary policy with application to the real fed funds rate abstract we construct an empirical model of u s monetary policy assuming that the federal reserve is an ordinary federal bureaucracy we use the real federal funds rate as our policy measure and show the existence of significant executive legislative and bureaucratic influence on the real rate of interest from 1961 to 1996 we find that presidential party is an adequate statistical measure of executive influence and that the voting scores of the senate banking committee leadership best represent legislative influence we argue that political changes cause systematic and predictable changes in monetary policy

perspective explaining influence rents the case for an institutions based view of strategy research in strategy has identified and tried to explain four types of rents monopolistic rents efficiency rents quasi rents and schumpeterian rents building on previous work on political and institutional strategies we add a fifth type of rent influence rents influence rents are the extra profits earned by a firm because the rules of the game laws regulations and informal rules are designed or changed to suit it to aid the analysis of the relationship between institutional context and firm performance and to provide a structure to guide research we develop a framework with five key components a an identification of the five fundamental problems of a market economy b a typology that describes the five different types of institutions that emerge to solve these problems c the market ordering mechanisms used by institutions to solve these problems d the common causes of weak institutional performance and e generic strategies used by firms to exploit these weaknesses of an institutional context to enhance firm performance we highlight potential applications of the framework as well as an illustrative research agenda that can advance the development of theory to explain the emergence and persistence of influence rents

balancing environmental protection and energy production in the federal hydropower licensing process the u s federal energy regulatory commission ferc must balance environmental protection of riverine resources with the nation s growing demand for power production every time it issues a hydroelectric license this paper models the bureaucratic agency s decision making process in issuing these licenses data on nearly 500 hydro power licenses issued from 1983 to 2005 are utilized it is discovered that legislative and institutional constraints are by far the largest influences on ferc s regulatory decisions implying that if the current allocation of surface water in the united states is considered inefficient the most effective way to alter this allocation is by passing new legislation or by implementing institutional reform at ferc

businesspeople in elected office identifying private benefits from firm level returns do businesspeople who win elected office use their positions to help their firms business leaders become politicians around the world yet we know little about whether their commitment to public service trumps their own private interests using an original dataset of 2 703 firms in russia i employ a regression discontinuity design to identify the causal effect of firm directors winning seats in subnational legislatures from 2004 to 2013 first having a connection to a winning politician increases a firm s revenue by 60 and profitability by 15 over a term in office i then test between different mechanisms finding that connected firms improve their performance by gaining access to bureaucrats and not by signaling legitimacy to financiers the value of winning a seat increases in more politically competitive regions but falls markedly when more businesspeople win office in a convocation politically connected firms extract fewer benefits when faced with greater competition from other rent seekers

the impact of consumer advocates on regulatory policy in the electric utility sector we examine the effect of consumer advocate participation in administrative procedures on regulatory policy we use a unique panel database of rate reviews conducted for us electric utilities from 1980 to 2007 to assess how state consumer advocates affect public utility commission decisions on utilities allowed financial returns and rate structures we find first that utilities experience fewer rate reviews in states with consumer advocates consistent with utilities strategically postponing requests for rate increases second after controlling for observed and unobserved state characteristics we find that pucs in states with consumer advocates permit returns on equity that are on average 0 45 percentage points lower than states without advocates equivalent to a 7 9 million 3 7 reduction in average utility operating income all else equal third consumer advocates are associated with lower residential rates relative to other customer classes our findings provide statistical support for the thesis that institutionalizing interest group representation in administrative procedures is one way for legislatures indirectly to influence agency determined policies

growth with unintended bequests abstract in an overlapping generations model with finite lifetimes sustained growth is possible if there is a positive risk of death a redistribution occurs when non altruistic parents leave unintended bequests to their children

economic growth with finite lifetimes abstract finite lifetimes do not preclude sustained growth with a convex technology when agents are finitely lived and formulate their bequeathing decisions in terms of an absolute bequest motive in this model the presence of government debt adversely affects the equilibrium rate of growth of the capital stock

government organization and power i introduction economists have systematically examined the economics of government finance and long ago established that the means of financing government creates inefficiencies in the market for instance see baumol and bradford 1970 and diamond and mirrlees 1971a 1971b what may be less well examined and understood is that apart from the distortions that arise from the means of government finance government officials can have an incentive to provide a combination of services and taxes that are nonoptimal as in niskanen 1997 the ability of government to exercise coercive and pricing power creates these incentives a growing number of articles explore the effect of government power on its size for example anderson and tollison 1988 and rogers and rogers 1995 examine the implications of pricing power for government size in his work on bureaucracy niskanen 1971 considered the implications of coercive power for government size olson 1991 mcguire and olson 1996 niskanen 1997 and mcguire 2001 examine the implications of the joint exercise of coercive and pricing powers by an autocratic government to our knowledge however no previous work explicitly distinguishes between the coercive and pricing powers of government and none systematically examines all the possible combinations of coercive and pricing powers in the present analysis we develop a simple theoretical framework that allows us to examine on an integrated basis the exercise of government power the framework abstracts from any distortions in the means of government finance and separates government power into two dimensions pure coercive power and pure pricing power pure coercive power is the ability of a government to compel consumers to accept more of the public good than they desire at each tax price through fiat coercive power typically arises when citizens are unable to exit a jurisdiction costlessly and the government is able to push citizens beyond what they would accept in a voluntary relationship pure pricing power is the government s ability to restrict output along a given demand curve and earn rents by doing so pricing power typically arises when the government has limited competition and faces a downward sloping demand curve for its services we consider four polar combinations of coercive and pricing power in comparison to the social optimum lindahl democracy monopoly niskanen bureaucracy and autocracy as shown in figure 1 the government in lindahl democracy exercises neither coercive nor pricing power a monopoly government is able to restrict its output and exercise pricing power to earn rents in a traditional monopolistic fashion but it cannot engage price discrimination or expropriation to obtain any remaining consumer surplus from its citizens a niskanen bureaucracy can exact all of the surplus that consumers obtain from the public goods it provides but it must use the surplus in the production of public goods it cannot exercise pricing power and restrict output to obtain rents as a monopoly would an autocracy exercises both coercive and pricing power in practice democratic governments are likely to have both coercive and pricing powers rather than to conform to the lindahl ideal our analytical framework allows us to clarify and reconcile the differences between some of the previous contributions to the literature on government power and size in democracy a government can simultaneously use its coercive power to grow too large and its pricing power to restrict its output and earn rents furthermore government size or rents alone may be poor indicators of the extent to which government fails to achieve optimality in its provision of services government power may be used to generate rents provide too much government service or a combination of both ii social optimum consider a jurisdiction or economy with n identical individuals and two goods a purely public good and a purely private good

is there a free rider problem in lobbying endogenous tariffs trigger strategies and the number of firms there are two reasons we expect moreconcentrated industries to have advantages over less concentrated industries in playing the lobbying game one is that in a noncooperative setting as the number firms rises we expect the free rider problem to become worse this is the finding of rodrik 1986 the second is that we expect that the ability to maintain a cooperative outcome deteriorates as the number of firms in the industry rises the classic reference is mancur olson 1965 also see russell hardin 1982 and todd sandler 1992 among others in contrast with the second intuition this paper shows that there is no general presumption that maintaining cooperation becomes more difficult as the number of firms in the industry rises the ability of an industry to overcome the free rider problem is analyzed in a re peated tariff lobbying game where cooperation may be maintained through the use of a simple trigger strategy 2 the difficulty of maintaining cooperation is measured by the critical value of the discount parameter all values above this critical value are consistent with cooperation and all values below the critical value imply that cheating will prevent maintenance of the cooperative outcome there is no presumption that this critical value rises with the number of firms a separate but related question involves asymptotic results standard intuition suggests that as industry structure approaches perfect competition it becomes impossible to maintain cooperation in the context of this paper this intuition corresponds to the critical value of the discount factor converging to i as the number of firms increases to infinity in the general case it is shown that the critical value of the discount parameter converges to a value less than 1 in the limit as the number of firms becomes arbitrarily large if the actual discount parameter lies above this value then cooperation may be maintained even with an infinite number of firms though the framework here is quite simple it provides results which contrast sharply to our standard intuition about how industry structure affects the ability to maintain cooperation there are two ways to interpret the results of this paper one is to assert that standard intuition is wrong and that there is in fact no presumption that maintaining cooperation becomes more difficult as the number

legislators and interest groups how unorganized interests get represented this paper derives a supply price for public policy using a constrained maximization model in the model three sets of agents each have preferences over outcomes organized interest groups offer campaign contributions to improve their own wealth voters offer votes to obtain outcomes closer to their most preferred outcomes and legislators seek both campaign contributions and votes to obtain reelection a given legislator s supply price for policy is shown to depend on the productivity of his effort as determined by committee assignments priority and ability and by the preferences of his unorganized constituency in the home district two extreme assumptions about the effectiveness of campaign spending in eliciting votes are used to illustrate the comparative statics properties of the model the prediction of the model is that interest groups will in general seek out legislators whose voters are indifferent to the policy the interest group seeks thus voters who do have preferences over policy are in effect represented even though they are not organized

are contributors rational untangling strategies of political action committees empirical public choice literature and casual observation suggest that the behavior of political action committees is remarkably unsophisticated meaning that pacs give to those legislators who would support their interests anyway thus it is suggested that contributor behavior deviates from rational behavior which is a cornerstone of economic analysis in this paper a switching regression model is estimated that allows for strategies of pacs to vary for different contribution recipients i analyze the behavior of farm pacs over three election cycles in contrast to previous findings i find that contributor behavior is not inconsistent with rational behavior contributors who attempt to influence the voting behavior of members of congress give the most money to legislators whose constituency interest suggests that they are likely to be undecided on how to vote and pacs give less money to legislators who represent districts with larger farm populations because those legislators are likely to vote in con

political solutions to market problems for some market failures serve as a rationale for public intervention however the fact that self interested market behavior does not always produce felicitous social consequences is not sufficient reason to draw this conclusion it is necessary to assess public performance under comparable conditions and hence to analyze self interested political behavior in the institutional structures of the public sector our approach emphasizes this institutional structure warts and all and thereby provides specific cautionary warnings about optimistic reliance on political institutions to improve upon market performance

a public choice theory of the great contraction the conventional chicago wisdom about the great contraction is that it was the result of a massive policy failure according to this view the collapse of the economy was brought about mostly by the fact that the monetary policymakers of the day were more concerned with internal power struggles than with supplying reserves to member banks an explanation which with apologies to professor stigler must have elicited uproarious laughter at the bankers club it has been our purpose in this paper to suggest an alternative theory briefly stated the restrictive monetary policy pursued by the fed from 1929 to 1933 was motivated by the economic interests of member banks the fed s policy produced a massive differential failure rate between member and nonmember banks in which the latter were eliminated at a rate at least five times higher than the former fed member banks faced substantially less competition in the banking market after the house cleaning than before although all banks suffered net losses in the short run in the long run member bank profitability was enhanced by the reduction in the number of nonmember competitors at the same time the fed itself benefitted from a substantial increase in the proportion of the total banking system within its bureaucratic jurisdiction and from a change in its method of finance putting the great contraction in interest group terms we suggested that the fed was acting as the agent of congressmen serving on important oversight committees who in turn were representing the interests of the member banks in their states due to interstate branching restrictions the state is the relevant geographic market within which banks compete we tested this hypothesis using bank failure rate data across states and found that holding other things equal the failure rates of nonmember banks in the early 1930s were significantly higher in states with representation on the house banking and currency committee of course not even friedman and schwartz 1963 299 301 argue that fed policy was the sole direct cause of the great contraction but instead maintain that the fed acted in such a way as to take a relatively severe contraction and turn it into by far the most severe business cycle contraction in the whole of u s history but to the extent that the great contraction was worsened by fed policy and this in turn led to the succession of events called the great depression the latter was a side effect of economically rational interests of federal reserve member banks to say the least this would appear to have been an enormously inefficient method of obtaining the postulated benefits certainly there were other less costly methods available by which member banks could have reduced the number of their nonmember rivals this is perhaps the most difficult problem our theory of the great contraction confronts we can offer two responses first although the literature on the great depression tends to focus on fluctuations in national macroeconomic aggregates e g the money supply unemployment and so on it is clear that the severity of the depression differed radically across states states with relatively large agricultural sectors tended to be especially hard hit suffering the highest rates of unemployment and the most significant numbers of bank failures by contrast states in some other areas most notably new england and the southeast seemed to be less seriously affected we note that in some of our regressions the number of nonmember bank failures was negatively and significantly related to state unemployment rates in 1934 this is certainly not conclusive evidence but it does suggest a pattern of differential costs associated with the great contraction that is the costs of providing benefits to federal reserve member banks in states with representation on the relevant oversight committees may have fallen more heavily on the economies of states not so represented if so this would cast a very different light on the actual costs of these policies to the relevant political decision makers second the potential dilemma in this case is no worse than that encountered in the application of the economic theory of politics to many other kinds of government behavior economists since adam smith have ascribed protectionist trade policies to the influence of special interest groups who benefit modestly at the cost of relatively huge economic inefficiencies many other government actions that might be plausibly explained from an interest group perspective would similarly seem to involve costs to the economy which grossly outweigh the benefits special interests might reasonably expect presumably even in such seemingly extreme cases marginal benefits equal marginal costs to the relevant actors some writers have suggested that the political marketplace in modern democracies is characterized by much larger transactions costs than are normally encountered in ordinary markets see demsetz 1982 this might help explain the seemingly huge discrepancies we observe between apparent concentrated benefits and diffused costs in depression era monetary policy in any event this problem is not peculiar to our theory but is shared by many applications of the interest group model of government it is worth emphasizing that the events we have described do fall into the interest group model s stylized depiction of concentrated benefits versus diffuse costs moreover without having a complete picture of all of the options available to the monetary policymakers we cannot be sure that any of the alternatives was in fact more efficient we do know the path that was chosen and that contrary to the conventional wisdom this path had a rationally motivated interest group basis

competing for global capital or local voters the politics of business location incentives the competition for global capital has led to interjurisdictional competition between countries states and cities as to who can offer the most attractive incentives to firms in this study we examine the domestic politics of this competition by focusing on incentive use in the united states from 1999 to 2012 we define incentives as the targeted tax deductions or exemptions that are used to lure businesses into a locality drawing on data from municipal incentive programs we examine how electoral competition shapes the use and oversight of targeted incentives we find evidence that cities with elected mayors provide larger incentives than non elected city managers by taking advantage of exogeneity in the assignment of city government institutions and a database of over 2000 investment incentives from 2010 to 2012 we also find that elected mayors enjoy more lax oversight of incentive projects than their appointed counterparts our results have important implications for the study of interjurisdictional competition and the role of electoral institutions in shaping economic policy

the determinants of industry political activity 1978 1986 c ampaign contributions made by corporate political action committees pacs are increasingly important and controversial in u s elections influence purchasing is often alleged by pundits and campaign finance reform is continually debated in congress in the academy social scientists have analyzed the allocation of interest group monies and have looked for possible impacts on legislation few however have tried to explain the total contributions of economic interest groups we shall analyze variations in contributions across industries and over time with an empirical model based on organizationally constrained profit maximizing behavior we assume that corporate pac contributions in an industry are raised to enhance industry profits subject to the constraints of organization costs and freeriding incentives our empirical work covers 124 industries over five election cycles from 1978 through 1986 both the costs and benefits of political activity vary across industries we argue that the benefits of political action are determined by direct contact with the government as a regulator or purchaser of industry output by government s ability to ameliorate adverse market conditions and by the industry s ability to solve collective action problems without government assistance the costs of industry political action arise mainly from collective action problems because effective political activity often requires concerted action by the constituent firms in each industry we also make a methodological contribution previous studies use statistical techniques that suffer from sample selectivity bias or else force the probability of acting politically to be explained by the same set of coefficients as is the amount of action taken we explain and employ a technique that accounts for both problems the results are consistent with the theses that industries follow investment oriented goals in deciding the amount of political action to undertake and that collective action problems are important constraints on industry political activity we can explain between 60 and 80 of the variation in contributions in our sample first we review existing work on corporate political activity particularly papers examining patterns of aggregate pac spending by industry then we present an organization cost constrained industryprofit maximizing model based on a comparison between an idealized zero organization cost industry and the more realistic case where organizing collective action is difficult the independent variables used in the analysis are also discussed and defined next we discuss the dependent variable and total industry contributions and explain our statistical method then the results are presented followed by a discussion of industry structure and political activity to make clear how our results can explain different contribution patterns we give examples using five actual industries

u s politics and greater regulation of inward foreign direct investment an analyst of u s foreign economic policy observes that each wave of antiforeign sentiment associated with the surge of foreign direct investment fdi coming into the united states washes ashore a flotsam of restrictive and exclusionary laws that recedes slightly or becomes buried and forgotten in the sand only to advance again with a new wave during the late 1980s the controversy generated by the sharp rise of japanese acquisitions in the united states washed ashore the latest flotsam of regulatory measures and further advanced the tangle of rules and regulations targeting inward foreign direct investment ifdi of the various types of fdi the present study is concerned mainly with the policy change toward foreign investment in an already established domestic business this type of investment often involves merger or acquisition and is distinct from a greenfield investment where the foreign investor establishes from scratch a new business in the host economy

firm and country level trade offs and contingencies in the evaluation of foreign investment the semiconductor industry 1994 2002 this paper examines the joint impact of firm and country level factors on the international plant location decisions of semiconductor firms from 1994 2002 we find that these factors interact to influence the location decisions of firms investing abroad in a given host country firms with more advanced technological capabilities are more likely to make investments in countries with greater technological sophistication but not in politically hazardous countries where they face greater expropriation hazards firms with less advanced technology are more willing to accept a trade off between country level political hazards and technological sophistication firms also trade off own versus other firm experience as sources of critical knowledge regarding the foreign investment environment

testing theories of agency behavior evidence from hydropower project relicensing decisions of the federal energy regulatory commission theories of agency behavior are examined via an application to hydropower project relicensing by the federal energy regulatory commission ferc in the relicensing of each project fish and wildlife agencies submit recommendations to ferc ferc then enters a twostage deliberation process for each recommendation econometric analysis of these decisions covers 933 recommendations made for 72 projects relicensed during 1980 96 a new law the electric consumers protection act substantially altered ferc s decisions while a new administration the clinton administration exerted a mixed effect both events influenced the number of recommendations per project made by the fish and wildlife agencies

consumer capture of regulatory institutions the creation of public utility consumer advocates in the united states we examine the conditions under which state legislatures in the united states orga nized public utility consumers during the 1970s and 1980s by creating independent consumer advocates with resources and authority to intervene in public utility rate making procedures while economic factors notably utility fuel cost increases were important predictors state political conditions were estimated to have a larger impact on the probability of implemen tation we find that the pattern of adoption is consistent with the hypothesis that legislatures deploy institutions as a mechanism for insulating regulatory policies against future reform in general democrat controlled governments were significantly more likely to implement con sumer advocates when they were less certain about being re elected to office during this period we find also that the effect of political re election expectations was particularly acute for the creation of advocates representing solely residential consumers a relatively disorganized in terest group our results suggest that legislatures organize and publicly fund interest groups to protect supportive but vulnerable groups against adverse future political environments

automobile prices in market equilibrium with unobserved price discrimination in markets where sellers are able to price discriminate or the buyers to bargain individuals receive discounts over the posted prices that are usually not observed by the econometrician this paper considers the structural estimation of a demand and supply model a la berry et al 1995 when only posted prices are observed we consider that heterogeneous discounts occur due to price discrimination by firms on observable characteristics of consumers within this framework identification is achieved by assuming that the marginal costs of producing and selling the goods do not depend on the characteristics of the buyers we also require a condition relating the posted prices to the prices actually paid for instance we can assume that at least one group of individuals pays the posted prices under these two conditions the demand and supply parameters as well as the exact discounts corresponding to each type of consumers can be identified we apply our methodology to estimate the demand and supply in the new automobile market in france results suggest that discounting arising from price discrimination is important the average discount is estimated to be 10 5 with large variation depending on the buyers characteristics and cars specifications our results are in line with discounts generally observed in european and american automobile markets

bargaining versus posted price selling abstract two popular selling methods bargaining and posted price selling are compared here in a dynamic model when bargaining costs no more than posted price selling we find that bargaining is always optimal when bargaining costs more however bargaining is still preferred if and only if the common cost for both selling methods is large enough we also find that an increase in the discount rate or the seller s bargaining power favors bargaining finally we find that if the distribution becomes more dispersed and the increase in a buyer s valuation is sufficiently large bargaining is more likely to be adopted

do women pay more for new vehicles evidence from transaction price data recently there has been a debate concerning whether price discrimination by new vehicle dealers results in systematically higher prices for minority and female buyers ian ayres and peter siegelman 1995 and pinelopi koujianoi goldberg 1996 use different methodologies and different data sets and come to different conclusions ayres and siegelman use testergenerated paired audits and find that black and female test buyers were quoted higher prices than white males goldberg uses consumer expenditure survey ces data and finds no systematic evidence of price discrimination in transaction price discounts by race or sex but greater variation in discounts for blacks our paper contributes to the debate on price discrimination in new car purchases using a new j d power and associates database that reports gross profit directly from dealer financial software systems although our data set does not distinguish the race of the buyer we do get direct evidence on dealer profit for male and female buyers in a sample reflecting over 4 000 new vehicle transactions our paper addresses the previously obtained contradictory results and differs from the previous studies in several ways the database we use permits us to measure directly dealers self reported gross profit per vehicle the best measure of differential treatment the database reflects contemporaneously collected dealer data it comes from the same financial software programs that are used to automatically report data to the franchiser manufacturer financial institutions and motor vehicle bureaus as well as being used to calculate sales tax liabilities further the data set allows us to test for price discrimination in the profit contributions of ancillary tie ins such as service contracts credit life insurance and dealer residuals from financing the vehicle purchase in the ayres and siegelman study black auditors received initial offers or negotiated prices that were much higher than those for the paired white male auditors at the same dealerships 400 more for black females and 1 060 more for black males white female auditors received offers or negotiated prices that were 55 to 129 more than those for white males but the effect was not statistically significant ayres 1995 combined the paired audit data with additional unpaired data gathered in the same study and finds that final offers to white women were 216 higher than to white men and with a p value 0 06 approaching conventional significance levels under the audit technique no tester ever consummated a transaction so ayres and siegelman have no measure of vehicle profit from any sale goldberg 1996 argues that the offers obtained by the auditors do not reflect transaction prices in part because the protocol for the ayres and siegelman study called for auditors to adopt one of two bargaining strategies seller behavior should be different across classes of consumers if the classes have different demands e g different variances of reservations prices or different bargaining strategies goldberg maintains that since different classes of buyers may use different bargaining strategies the offers obtained by the auditors reveal information about seller behavior but not about transaction prices goldberg 1996 uses ces data from 1983 to 1987 to test for price discrimination by new vehicle dealers controlling for a number of variables she was unable to find reliable evidence that blacks or white females received smaller discounts on the manufacturer s suggested retail price msrp than white males the estimation results suggested that white females received discounts that were 130 smaller than those received by white males but the effect was statistically insignificant the gold department of economics virginia commonwealth university box 844000 richmond va 23284 we thank glenn mercer of mckinsey and company for providing us with access to the j d power and associates database