delegating climate policy to a supranational authority a theoretical assessment abstract this paper studies the delegation of climate policy to a supranational environmental authority we develop a simple model of a world consisting of a large number of countries which derive utility from energy consumption countries suffer from global warming and local air pollution both caused by the combustion of fossil fuels and decide individually on investments in clean technologies for energy production a supranational environmental authority decides for each country on the maximally permitted amount of greenhouse gas emissions we demonstrate that the authority faces a dynamic inconsistency problem that leads to welfare losses but these losses can be kept small if the authority is endowed with an optimally designed mandate the optimal mandate penalizes the cost of local air pollution very heavily relative to the cost of global warming however delegation of climate policy faces a further difficulty as countries have a recurrent incentive to change the authority s mandate over time

climate agreements in a mitigation adaptation game abstract we analyze the strategic interaction between mitigation public good and adaptation private good strategies in a climate agreement we show the fear that adaptation will reduce the incentives to mitigate carbon emissions may be unwarranted adaptation can lead to larger self enforcing agreements associated with higher global mitigation levels and welfare if it causes mitigation levels between different countries to be no longer strategic substitutes but complements we argue that our results extend to many public goods the well known problem of easy riding may turn into easy matching if the marginal utility of public good consumption is strongly influenced by private consumption

incomplete contracts and strategic ambiguity why are observed contracts so often incomplete in the sense that they leave contracting parties obligations vague or unspecified traditional answers to this question invoke transaction costs or bounded rationality in contrast the authors argue that such incompleteness is often an essential feature of a well designed contract specifically once some aspects of performance are unverifiable it is often optimal to leave other verifiable aspects of performance unspecified the authors explore the conditions under which this occurs and investigate the structure of optimal contracts when these conditions are satisfied copyright 1998 by american economic association

farsighted coalitional stability abstract i define the largest consistent set a solution concept which applies to situations in which coalitions freely form but cannot make binding contracts act publicly and are fully farsighted in that a coalition considers the possibility that once it acts another coalition might react a third coalition might in turn react and so on without limit i establish weak nonemptiness conditions and apply it to strategic and coalitional form games and majority rule voting i argue that it improves on the von neumann morgenstern stable set as it is usually defined but is consistent with a generalization of the stable set as in the theory of social situations journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c71

financial development economic growth and banking sector controls evidence from india this paper uses newly collected data from the reserve bank of india to examine the effects of various types of banking sector controls on the process of financial deepening with the exception of a lending rate ceiling these controls are found to influence financial deepening negatively independently of the well known effect of the real interest rate exogeneity tests suggest that financial deepening and economic growth are jointly determined thus policies which affect financial deepening may also have an influence on economic growth the role of banking sector controls in the process of economic development has received considerable attention in the literature the traditional approach due to mckinnon i973 and shaw i973 postulates that government intervention in the pricing and allocation of loanable funds dubbed financial repression inhibits financial development by depressing real interest rates see

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

climate cooperation with technology investments and border carbon adjustment a central question in climate policy is whether early investments in low carbon technologies are a useful first step towards a more effective climate agreement in the future we introduce a climate cooperation model with endogenous r d investments where countries protect their international competitiveness via border carbon adjustments bca bca raises the scope for cooperation and leads to a non trivial relation between countries prior r d investments and participation in the coalition we find that early investments in r d render free riding more attractive therefore with delayed cooperation on emission abatement and ex ante r d investments the outcome is often characterized by high participation but inefficiently low technology investments and abatement

international environmental agreements with mixed strategies and investment abstract we modify a canonical participation game used to study international environmental agreements iea considering both mixed and pure strategies at the participation stage and including a prior cost reducing investment stage the use of mixed strategies at the participation stage reverses a familiar result and also reverses the policy implication of that result with mixed strategies equilibrium participation and welfare are higher in equilibria that involve higher investment

inefficiency in legislative policymaking a dynamic analysis this paper develops an infinite horizon model of public spending and taxation in which policy decisions are determined by legislative bargaining the policy space incorporates both productive and distributive public spending and distortionary taxation the productive spending is investing in a public good that benefits all citizens e g national defense and the distributive spending is district specific transfers e g pork barrel spending investment in the public good creates a dynamic linkage across policymaking periods the analysis explores the dynamics of legislative policy choices focusing on the efficiency of the steady state level of

buy coal a case for supply side environmental policy free riding is at the core of environmental problems if a climate coalition reduces its emissions world prices change and nonparticipants typically emit more they may also extract the dirtiest type of fossil fuel and invest too little in green technology the coalition s second best policy distorts trade and is not time consistent however suppose that the countries can trade the rights to exploit fossil fuel deposits as soon as the market clears the above mentioned problems vanish and the first best is implemented in short the coalition s best policy is to simply buy foreign deposits and conserve them

dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements abstract in terms of the number of signatories one observes both large and small international environmental agreements the theoretical literature based on game theory discusses different concepts and mechanisms regarding stability of coalitions the conclusion has been reached that in all circumstances under farsightedness both large and small stable coalitions can occur this theory is based on behavioural reaction patterns but does not take account of the interaction with the dynamics of emission adjustments this paper shows that when these two dynamical processes are integrated large and small stable coalitions can still occur but only if the costs of emissions are relatively unimportant as compared with the costs of abatement

equity development and climate change control the paper analyzes the effects of different equity principles on the decision of developing countries to join a world coalition whose aim is to control greenhouse gas emissions a game theoretic framework is proposed to assess the incentives for different countries to sign an international treaty on climate change control then the effects of different equity rules on these incentives are evaluated by using a dynamic integrated growth and climate model policy proposals based on transfers from developed to developing countries are also analyzed jel c7 h0 h3 q38

exploring the variability of patient costs in disease management programs a hierarchical modelling approach disease management programs include a wide variation of patients with different chronic diseases and different health care utilization the aim of this article was to identify factors on patient level and organizational level that explain the variability in costs of patients with different chronic diseases enrolled in a dmp by employing a rigorous analytical model a generalized linear mixed model glmm was specified to perform a multi level analysis of cross sectional hierarchical data from 16 dmps in the netherlands multiple imputation sub group analysis per disease and analysis from both the health care and the societal perspectives were also performed our model showed that age the presence of cardiovascular disease multi morbidity and payments on top of the payment for the usual care had positive relation with costs while better quality of life was associated with lower health care costs in the copd sample physical activity and employment were associated with health care costs our study show

cooperation on climate change mitigation abstract we analyze conditions under which it is possible to achieve efficient mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions with a self enforcing international agreement in which all countries find it in their self interest to abide by the agreement we model the choice of emissions by countries as a dynamic game we use a two part punishment scheme for deviations from an agreement that is renegotiation proof and show when this scheme supports the efficient outcome as a subgame perfect equilibrium using numerical examples we show that an efficient subgame perfect equilibrium exists for a range of reasonable parameter values the existence of such equilibrium may be non monotonic in the discount rate and the ratio of slope of marginal abatement cost and marginal damages

a dynamic theory of public spending taxation and debt this paper presents a dynamic political economy theory of public spending taxation and debt policy choices are made by a legislature consisting of representatives elected by geographically defined districts the legislature can raise revenues via a distortionary income tax and by borrowing these revenues can be used tofinance a national public good and district specific transfers interpreted as pork barrel spending the value of the public good is stochastic reflecting shocks such as wars or natural disasters in equilibrium policy making cycles between two distinct regimes business as usual in which legislators bargain over the allocation of pork and responsible policy making in which policies maximize the collective good transitions between the two regimes are brought about by shocks in the value of the public good in the long run equilibrium tax rates are too high and too volatile public good provision is too low and debt levels are too high in some environments a balanced budget requirement can improve citizen welfare

after kyoto alternative mechanisms to control global warming after more than a decade of negotiations and planning under the framework convention on climate change fccc the first binding international agreement to control the emissions of greenhouse gases has come into effect in the kyoto protocol the first budget period of 2008 2012 is at hand moreover the scientific evidence on greenhouse warming strengthens steadily as observational evidence of warming accumulates the institutional framework of the protocol has taken hold solidly in the european union s emissions trading scheme ets which covers almost half of europe s carbon dioxide emissions notwithstanding this apparent success the kyoto protocol is widely seen as somewhere between troubled and terminal early troubles came with the failure to include the major developing countries along with lack of an agreedupon mechanism to include new countries and extend the agreement to new periods the major blow came when the united states withdrew from the treaty in 2001 by 2002 the protocol covered only 30 percent of global emissions while the hard enforcement mechanism in the ets accounts for about 8 percent of global emissions even if the current protocol is extended models indicate that it will have little impact on global temperature change unless there is a dramatic breakthrough or a new design the protocol threatens to be seen as a monument to institutional overreach nations are now beginning to consider the structure of climate change policies for the period after 2008 to 2012 some countries states cities companies and even universities are adopting their own climate change policies are there in fact alternatives to the scheme of tradable emissions permits embodied in the protocol the fact is that alternative approaches have not had a serious hearing among natural scientists or among policymakers what are some alternatives for global public goods there are three potential approaches command and control regulation quantity oriented market approaches and taxor price based regimes of these only the tradable quantity and the price like regimes have any hope of being reasonably efficient under a tradable quantity approach an agreement proceeds by setting limits on emissions by different countries the limits are partially or wholly transferable among countries this is the approach taken under the kyoto protocol this approach has very limited international experience under existing protocols such as the cfc chlorofluorocarbon mechanisms and somewhat broader experience under national trading regimes such as the u s sulfur dioxide regime a radically different approach is to use harmonized prices fees or taxes as a method of coordinating policies among countries this approach has no international experience in the environmental area although it has modest experience nationally in such areas as the u s tax on ozone depleting chemicals on the other hand the use of harmonized price type measures has extensive international experience in fiscal and trade policies such as with the harmonization of taxes in the european union and harmonized tariffs in international trade these thoughts on the structure of international agreements to control global warming should not be regarded as negotiating strategies

domestic policies national sovereignty and international economic institutions to what extent must nations cede control over their economic and social policies if global efe ciency is to be achieved in an interdependent world this question is at the center of the debate over the future role of the wto formerly gatt in the realm of labor and environmental standards in this paper we establish that the market access focus of current wto rules is well equipped to handle the problems associated with choices over labor and environmental standards in principle with relatively modest changes that grant governments more sovereignty not less these rules can deliver globally efe cient outcomes i introduction to what extent must nations cede control over their economic and social policies if global efe ciency is to be achieved in an interdependent world at a broad level this question probes the limits of any international economic institution whether geared toward real or e nancial concerns that is designed to promote global efe ciency while respecting national sovereignty naturally the answer depends upon the particular problem that the institution is meant to solve in other words the answer depends upon the inefe ciency that would arise under unilateral policy choices at a more specie c level this question is at the center of the debate concerning the appropriate scope of the world trade organization wto formerly gatt recently member countries have considered ways to broaden the wto s orientation beyond conventional trade policy measures to include labor and environmental standards there are now initiatives to introduce the issue of labor standards directly onto the negotiating agenda of the wto with the purpose of creating a wto social clause the social clause would specify a set of minimum international labor standards and then permit restrictions to be placed against imports from countries not complying with these minimum standards with regard to environmental policies a wto committee on trade and environment has been established to identify the relationships between trade and environmental measures and to

climate contracts a game of emissions investments negotiations and renegotiations the paper presents a dynamic game where players can contribute to a public bad invest in technologies and write incomplete contracts despite the n 1 stocks in the model the analysis is tractable and the symmetric markov perfect equilibrium unique the framework helps to analyze emissions investments and international environmental agreements if only the emission levels are contractible then investments are suboptimally small if the contract is short term or close to its expiration date to encourage investments the optimal contract is more ambitious if it is short term and it is tougher to satisfy close to its expiration date and for countries with small investment costs if renegotiation is possible such an incomplete contract implements the rst best the results have important lessons for how to design a climate treaty

contracting on time the paper shows how the time considerations especially those concerning contract duration affect incomplete contract theory time is not only a dimension along which the relationship unfolds but also a continuous verifiable variable that can be included in contracts we consider a bilateral trade setting where contracting investment trade and renegotiation take place in continuous time we show that efficient investment can be induced either through a sequence of constantly renegotiated fixed term contracts or through a renegotiation proof evergreen contract a perpetual contract that allows unilateral termination with advance notice we provide a detailed analysis of properties of optimal contracts

climate treaties and breakthrough technologies an effective climate change treaty must promote the joint supply of two global public goods climate change mitigation and knowledge of new technologies that can lower mitigation costs r d is especially needed to bring about substantial long term reductions in atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases for this will require the development and diffusion of revolutionary breakthrough technologies martin i hoffert et al 2002 in principle such an outcome could be realized by the kyoto protocol approach if that agreement were strengthened over time however that response may be inadequate kyoto makes no provision for r d and as i shall demonstrate unlikely to succeed can a treaty system relying directly on targeted r d and the adoption of breakthrough technologies perform better in this same setting of anarchic international relations i will show that as a general rule the answer is no essentially the same forces that undermine kyoto also challenge the r d and technology approach there is one exception to this rule r d leading to breakthrough technologies exhibiting increasing returns can improve dramatically on the kyoto approach even when these technologies are otherwise inferior to the alternatives available this suggests that our approach to treaty design should be strategic

estimating strategic models of international treaty formation this article develops an empirical framework for analysing the timing of international treaties a treaty is modelled as a dynamic game among governments that decide on participation in every period the net benefit of treaty membership increases over time spillovers among members and non members accelerate or delay treaty formation by transforming participation into a strategic complement or substitute respectively the predictions of the model inform the estimation of the structural parameters based on a cross section of treaty ratification dates with this approach i estimate the sign and magnitude of strategic interaction in the ratification of the montreal protocol in the formation of europe s preferential trade agreements and in the growth of germany s network of bilateral investment treaties through a series of counterfactual experiments i explore different mechanisms that give rise to strategic interaction in the formation of these treaties

participation games and international environmental agreements a non parametric model abstract we examine the size of stable coalitions in a participation game that has been used to model international environmental agreements cartel formation rd based on these examples a consensus has emerged that in this kind of game the equilibrium coalition size is small except possibly when the potential benefits of cooperation are also small in this paper we develop a non parametric approach to the problem and demonstrate that the conventional wisdom is not robust in a general setting we identify conditions under which the equilibrium coalition size can be large even when potential gains are large contrary to previously examined leading special cases we show that reductions in marginal abatement costs in an international environmental game can increase equilibrium membership and we provide a measure of the smallest reduction in costs needed to support a coalition of arbitrary size

the private provision of excludable public goods an inefficiency result abstract does voluntary contracting suffice for the efficient provision of excludable public goods even in a complete information environment we find that the answer is negative the reason is that some agents may profit from not participating at the provision stage but instead negotiate access ex post

participation and duration of environmental agreements we analyze participation in international environmental agreements in a dynamic game in which countries pollute and invest in green technologies if complete contracts are feasible participants eliminate the holdup problem associated with their investments however most countries prefer to free ride rather than participate if investments are noncontractible countries face a holdup problem every time they negotiate but the free rider problem can be mitigated and significant participation is feasible participation becomes attractive because only large coalitions commit to long term agreements that circumvent the holdup problem under well specified conditions even the first best outcome is possible when the contract is incomplete

does voluntary participation undermine the coase theorem abstract the coase theorem states that costless enforcement of voluntary agreements yields efficient outcomes we argue that previous treatments fail to recognize the full meaning of voluntary it requires a two stage game a non cooperative participation decision followed by coaseian bargaining only among those who choose to participate we illustrate this in a simple public goods model and find outcomes ranging from extremely inefficient to fully efficient however the efficient equilibrium is not robust to even very small transaction costs thus we cast doubt on coaseian claims of universal efficiency finally we outline a kind of coercion that restores efficiency

international aspects of pollution control pollution is a by product of production is only gradually dissolved by the environment and crosses national borders the market outcome ignores the adverse effects of pollution and thus yields higher levels of output and pollution than would prevail under a supranational social planner which does care about pollution in practice governments often do not cooperate and this leads to outcomes of pollution and production in between the market outcomes and the outcomes under supra national social planning absence of precommitment leads to lower emission charges less cleaning up activities and more pollution appropriate levels of emission charges under the various outcomes are a result of this analysis attention is also paid to investment in clean technology the debate between optimists who believe that higher production is compatible with sound environmental policy and pessimists can be analysed in this way