the effect of financial repression and enforcement on entrepreneurship and economic development abstract a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents with respect to wealth and ability shows that differences across countries in intermediation costs and enforcement generate differences in occupational choice firm size credit output and income inequality counterfactual experiments are performed for latin american european transition and high growth asian countries with empirical estimates of each country s financial frictions and united states values for all other parameters the results isolate the quantitative effect of these financial frictions in explaining the performance gap between each country and the united states and depend critically on whether a general equilibrium factor price effect is operative

r d investments under endogenous cluster formation abstract we provide an innovative theory based explanation for the positive relationship between firms r d intensity and their degree of r d cooperation we show that when oligopolistic firms decide on long term r d investment before forming research clusters among competitors investment incentives are increased by the desire to become a member of an attractive cluster this can result in over investment compared to the welfare optimum and compared to a scenario where research clusters are ex ante fixed thereby as a theoretical contribution we fully characterize the equilibria of the unanimity game on cluster formation with heterogeneous firms

hybrid r d we develop a model of r d collaboration in which individual firms carry out in house research on core activities and undertake bilateral joint projects on non core activities with other firms we develop conditions on the profit functions of the firm under which r d investments in different projects of a firm are complementary we show that this condition is met by standard price and quantity setting oligopoly models we then study the relation between the number of joint projects and investments and profits in this context we identify a second aspect of complementarity equilibrium investments in in house as well as in each joint project are increasing in the number of projects however we find that an increase in number of joint projects of all firms lowers collective profits suggesting the presence of excessive incentives for conducting research

occupational choice and the process of development this paper models economic development as a process of institutional transformation by focusing on the interplay between agents occupational decisions and the distribution of wealth because of capital market imperfections poor agents choose working for a wage over self employment and wealthy agents become entrepreneurs who monitor workers only with sufficient inequality however will there be employment contracts otherwise there is either subsistence or self employment thus in static equilibrium the occupational structure depends on distribution since the latter is itself endogenous we demonstrate the robustness of this result by extending the model dynamically and studying examples in which initial wealth distributions have long run effects in one case the economy develops either widespread cottage industry self employment or factory production employment contracts depending on the initial distribution in the other example it develops into prosperity or stagnation

cooperative and noncooperative r d in duopoly with spillovers contrary to the usual assumption made in most oligopoly models relations among firms are seldom of a wholly cooperative or noncooperative type in many situations they compete in some fields while they cooperate in others an important example is the case of cooperative research efforts bringing fierce competitors together two types of agreement are observed first r d cooperation can take place at the so called precompetitive stage companies share basic information and efforts in the r d stage but remain rivals in the market place 1 a second type of agreement involves an extended collusion between partners creating common policies at the product level the usual justifications of this extension are the difficulties of protecting intellectual property the idea is then to allow partners who have achieved inventions together to also control together the processes and products which embody the results of their collaboration in order to recuperate jointly their r d investments 2 what could be expected from these types of agreement is a reduction in r d expenditures because of less wasteful duplication and a reduction of total production because of more reprinted from the american economic review 78 5 1133 1137 1988 center for operations research econometrics 1348 louvain la neuve belgium we are grateful to jean

the heterogeneous effect of finance on international trade is the impact of financial development on international trade heterogeneous being positive negative or null across manufacturing sectors and is it dependent on the level of sectoral requirement on external finance for capital need to examine these questions this article uses a panel trade database on 21 manufacturing sectors in 80 countries between 2000 and 2009 the analysis demonstrates that the effect of financial development on trade is indeed heterogeneous by estimating a coefficient for each sector and showing that the signs and significance levels vary across them the article also demonstrates that sectors with strong reliance on external finance export higher volume from countries with developed financial system and that financial development reduces trade in industries with low financial dependence level

endogenous structures of association in oligopolies the formulation of associations of firms in an oligopoly with linear demand is analyzed as a two stage noncooperative game in the first stage firms form associations in order to decrease their costs and in the second stage they compete on the market examples of associations include r d joint ventures and groups of firms adopting common standards in equilibrium the associations formed exhibit two general features they are asymmetric and inefficient

the effect of entry on r d networks we investigate the effect of potential entry on the formation and stability of r d networks considering farsighted firms we show that the presence of a potential entrant often alters the incentives of incumbent firms to establish an r d link in particular incumbent firms may choose to form an otherwise undesirable r d collaboration in order to deter the entry of a new firm moreover an incumbent firm may refrain from establishing an otherwise desirable r d collaboration expecting to form a more profitable r d link with the entrant finally potential entry may lead an inefficient incumbent to exit the market we also perform a welfare analysisand show that market and societal incentives are often misaligned

a model of the interactions between banking crises and currency crises abstract a second generation model of currency crises is combined with a standard banking model in a pegged exchange rate regime after funds have been committed to the banks news arrives about the quality of the banks assets and about the exchange rate fundamentals a run on the banks may cause a currency crisis or vice versa there are multiple equilibria with either twin crises or no crisis depending on depositors expectations of other depositors actions suspension of deposit convertibility can prevent a speculative attack on the currency but last resort lending to solvent banks can induce one

speculative currency attacks with endogenously induced commercial bank crises abstract to date all models of exchange rate crises ignore the existence of a commercial banking sector however if deposit money internal drain is used to purchase foreign exchange external drain then an external drain may give rise to a banking crisis the paper illustrates how an internal drain alters the dynamics of a speculative attack when it results in a cash payments restriction by interrupting the external drain such a restriction postpones devaluation and reduces the size of the initial devaluation the us internal and external drains of 1893 are discussed to provide motivation and support for the model

domestic bank runs and speculative attacks on foreign currencies abstract the paper extends the international transmission of financial crisis literature by illustrating how a domestic bank run can cause a speculative attack on foreign currencies the idea is that when domestic banks invest abroad a domestic bank run will give way to a repatriation of foreign capital if the repatriation causes a depletion of the foreign central bank s foreign exchange reserves then the foreign currency will be devalued as such a devaluation will render domestic banks insolvent in the rational equilibrium domestic bank runs will 1 cause a speculative attack on the foreign currency and 2 be self justified

income distribution and macroeconomics this paper analyzes the role of wealth distribution in macroeconomics through investment in human capital it is shown that in the presence of credit markets imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital the initial distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and investment both in the short and in the long run as there are multiple steady states this paper therefore provides an additional explanation for the persistent differences in per capita output across countries furthermore the paper shows that cross country differences in macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate shocks can be attributed among other factors to differences in wealth and income distribution across countries

financial constraints the distribution of wealth and international trade we develop a simple theoretical model to examine the impact of the distribution of wealth on the patterns of trade when capital markets are imperfect our model predicts that the dispersion of wealth can be a determinant of comparative advantage for low income countries with poor financial institutions we find support for these prediction using export and financial panel data from a large sample of countries

cooperative and noncooperative r d in an oligopoly with spillovers this paper examines the positive and normative effects of cooperative r d whereby member firms commit themselves to the joint profit maximizing level of r d in a precompetitive stage but remain fierce competitors in the product market vis a vis noncooperative r d socially first best r d and socially second best r d in the presence of sufficiently large r d spillovers neither noncooperative nor cooperative equilibria achieve even second best r d levels in the absence of spillover effects however while the cooperative r d level remains socially insufficient the noncooperative level may overshoot first and second best levels of r d copyright 1992 by american economic association

financial crises and balance of payments crises a simple model of the southern cone experience abstract this paper starts from a simple model of the domestic banking sector and develops the potentially destabilizing macroeconomic consequences of its role in intermediating foreign capital inflows both financial and balance of payments crises may result reminiscent of the southern cone experience

a theory of buyer seller networks this paper introduces a new model of exchange networks rather than markets of buyers and sellers it begins with the empirically motivated premise that a buyer and seller must have a relationship a link to exchange goods networks buyers sellers and the pattern of links connecting them are common exchange environments this paper develops a methodology to study network structures and explains why agents may form networks in a model that captures characteristics of a variety of industries the paper shows that buyers and sellers acting strategically in their own self interests can form the network structures that maximize overall welfare

endogenous formation of research coalitions with spillovers abstract we examine the endogenous formation of research coalitions with high spillovers among symmetric firms members of a research coalition set their r and d investments in order to maximize the aggregate profits of members of their coalition the exclusive membership rule supports a more concentrated coalition structure and thus leads to higher industry r and d investments for high spillovers than the open membership rule does however due to free riding problems the grand research coalition which is the socially efficient outcome is rarely an equilibrium outcome under either rule our results suggest that government subsidies to research consortia for basic research with high spillovers can improve social welfare by encouraging wider participation to a research consortium that is by alleviating free rider problems in coalition formation from a more theoretical viewpoint our results on stable coalition structures are applicable to a wide variety of economic coalitions with positive externalities

r d networks we develop a model of strategic networks that captures two distinctive features of interfirm collaboration bilateral agreements and nonexclusive relationships our analysis highlights the relationship between market competition firms incentives to invest in r d and the architecture of collaboration networks in the absence of firm rivalry the complete network where each firm collaborates with all others is uniquely stable industry profit maximizing and efficient by contrast under strong market rivalry the complete network is stable but intermediate levels of collaboration and asymmetric networks are more attractive from a collective viewpoint this suggests that competing firms may have excessive incentives to form collaborative links

talent growth and income distribution a model with heterogeneous individuals and bequests between generations is constructed to analyze income distribution and educational choice the introduction of an imperfection in the credit market is shown to influence the allocation of talent both ability and bequest are of relevance in deciding whether or not to invest in education with learning by doing between generations the allocation of talent affects not only the level of production but also the growth rate copyright 1993 by the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

choosing organizational modes of strategic technology partnering international and sectoral differences this paper focuses on international strategic technology partnerships and the choice that companies have in terms of the organizational mode either through complex inter organizational modes involving equity sharing or contractual non equity alliances the empirical results show that the choice of particular mode of cooperation varies with the technological characteristics of sectors of industry joint ventures are disproportionately represented in relatively mature industries contractual alliances dominate strategic technology partnering in so called high tech industries

wealth as a determinant of comparative advantage abstract this paper shows that a country s wealth can be an important determinant of comparative advantage when access to credit differs across sectors of the economy wealthier nations exhibit a comparative advantage toward goods produced in sectors facing more severe financial imperfections these sectors are typically populated by small firms empirically this paper documents that these sectors are also labor intensive consequently this theory partially offsets traditional sources of comparative advantage and offers an explanation for trefler s missing trade mystery and the leontief paradox furthermore the theory makes the relation between trade and income distribution endogenous

from exogenous to endogenous economic networks internet applications economic agents behaviour is affected by their position in a network either exogenous or endogenous in which they interact with a sub set of neighbours only the network s links which may be generated by vertical and or horizontal relations or by more complex morphologies may explain the transition between dynamic equilibria and the instability of economic aggregates moreover networks shape strategic interaction among agents by determining their strategies the problem of access and interconnection particularly relevant in the internet is perhaps the best example a two way feedback between strategies and network structures arises instead when links are endogenous those features are clearly shown in the mechanism underlying the formation of peering links an dr d networks

capital market imperfections international credit markets and nonconvergence abstract we consider a two country growth model with international capital markets these markets fund capital investment in both countries and operate subject to a costly state verification csv problem investors in each country require some external finance but also provide internal finance which mitigates the csv problem when two identical except for their initial capital stocks economies are closed they necessarily convergemonotonicallyto the same steady state output level unrestricted international financial tradeprecludesotherwise identical economies from converging and poor countries are necessarily net lenders to rich countries oscillation in real activity and international capital flows can occur journal of economic literatureclassification numbers e00 f00 f34 g14

central bank reactions to banking crises in fixed exchange rate regimes abstract until recently speculative attacks and banking crises have been largely treated as separate phenomena however the recent experiences of several southern cone countries indicates that banking difficulties can lead to a currency crises if in combatting them the central bank adopts policies which are inconsistent with the fixed exchange rate regime the paper illustrates how this can be the case and discusses what are the policy responses available to central banks that face banking crises in fixed exchange rate regimes

cross licensing and competition we study bilateral cross licensing agreements between n 2 firms that engage in competition after the licensing phase it is shown that the most collusive cross licensing royalty i e the one that allows the industry to achieve the monopoly profit is sustainable as the outcome of bilaterally efficient agreements in a symmetric setting if the terms of the cross licensing agreements are not observable to third parties the monopoly royalty is the unique symmetric bilaterally efficient royalty however when the terms of the agreements are public the most competitive royalty i e zero can also be bilaterally efficient policy implications regarding the antitrust treatment of cross licensing agreements are derived from these results

the leontief paradox continued according to leamer 1980 the leontief paradox is based on a simple conceptual misunderstanding in a multifactor version of the heckscher ohlin model he argues that a capital abundant country need not have its exports more capital intensive than its importsprovided that the country s commodity trade embodies a net export of both labor and capital services as was the case for the united states in leontief s 1954 data for such a country however the model does imply that capital per worker be greater in net exports than in consumption leamer finds that this implication is indeed consistent with leontief s data this note shows however that there is another feature of the trade data which is not so easily explained the fact that the united states exported labor services is in itself paradoxical as discussed below sec ii the model which leamer uses to explain the paradox implies that a country is a net exporter of labor services if and only if its aggregate expenditure per worker is less than that in the rest of the world this implication is clearly inconsistent with the evidence reviewed below in sec iii which shows that expenditure per worker was substantially greater in the united states than the rest of the world and yet the united states exported labor services therefore a modified version of the leontief paradox continues to stand

strong and weak links many of the interesting issues in the economics of networks information transmission individual incentives with local externalities investments in connections and the structure of complex networks have to do with the quality of links between individuals entities however most of the research to date has assumed a one zero formulation of connections i argue that it is possible to write down tractable models of quality of links and that analyzing such models yields fresh insights into these issues jel c72 d85 z13

enterprise inequality and economic development we characterize an equilibrium development process driven by the interaction of the distribution of wealth with credit constraints and the distribution of entrepreneurial skills when efficient entrepreneurs are relatively abundant a traditional development process emerges in which the evolution of macroeconomic variables accord with empirical regularities and income inequality traces out a kuznets curve if instead efficient entrepreneurs are relatively scarce the model generates long run distributional cycles driven by the endogenous interaction between credit constraints entrepreneurial efficiency and equilibrium wages

financial development growth and the distribution of income a paradigm is presented in which both the extent of financial intermediation and the rate of economic growth are endogenously determined financial intermediation promotes growth because it allows a higher rate of return to be earned on capital and growth in turn provides the means to implement costly financial structures thus financial intermediation and economic growth are inextricably linked in accord with the goldsmith mckinnon shaw view on economic development the model also generates a development cycle reminiscent of the kuznet hypothesis in particular in the transition from a primitive slow growing economy to a developed fast growing one a nation passes through a stage in which the distribution of wealth across the rich and poor widens

a model of the joint distribution of banking and currency crises abstract we develop a simple framework for studying the joint distribution of banking and currency crises we make two points first banking and currency crises are related but they are not the same thing viewing crises in isolation or as joint events biases estimates of the likelihood of crises second the proliferation of government promises such as adding a promise to bail out bank depositors to the promise of fixing the exchange rate reduces the likelihood of keeping any individual promise when the resources devoted to keeping the promises are fixed

equity and efficiency in human capital investment the local connection a general model of community formation and human capital accumulation with social spillovers and decentralized school funding is used to analyse the causes of economic segregation and its consequences for equity and efficiency significant polarization arises from minor differences in endowments preferences or access to capital markets this makes income inequality more persistent across generations but the same need not be true for wealth equilibrium stratification tends to be excessive resulting in low aggregate surplus whether state equalization of school resources can remedy these problems hinges on how purchased social and family inputs interact in education and in mobility decisions

uncertainty networks and real options abstract two pervasive features of industries experiencing rapid technological progress are uncertainty with regard to the technological feasibility and marketabilility of an innovation and networks the dense web of research alliances and joint ventures linking firms to each other this paper connects the two disparate phenomena using the notion of real options it visualizes firms as nodes and the links connecting them as call options that give each pair of interlinked firms the right but not the obligation to sink additional resources into a project at some future date conditional on favorable technical market information the formation of networks is endogenous as firms establish links with others by appraising their value using option pricing methods our model explains the following why networks are particularly ubiquitous in industries that are subject to high uncertainty why networks often display an interconnected hubs and spokes architecture why small or peripheral spoke firms often sink resources into relatively higher risk higher return investment projects and those too with only large or hub firms and why so many research alliances are continuously formed and dissolved our paper also outlines the conditions under which ex ante symmetric firms end up ex post forming complex asymmetric networks

trade and capital flows a financial frictions perspective the classical heckscher ohlin mundell paradigm states that trade and capital mobility are substitutes in the sense that trade integration reduces the incentives for capital to ow to capital scarce countries in this paper we show that in a world with heterogeneous nancial development the classic conclusion does not hold in particular in less nancially developed economies south trade and capital mobility are complements within a dynamic framework the complementarity carries over to nancial capital ows this interaction implies that deepening trade integration in south raises net capital in ows or reduces net capital out ows it also implies that at the global level protectionism may back re if the goal is to rebalance capital ows when these are already heading from south to north our perspective also has

a strategic model of social and economic networks we study the stability and efficiency of social and economic networks when self interested individuals can form or sever links first for two stylized models we characterize the stable and efficient networks there does not always exist a stable network that is efficient next we show that this tension persists generally to assure that there exists a stable network that is efficient one is forced to allocate resources to nodes that are not responsible for any of the production we characterize one such allocation rule the equal split rule and another rule that arises naturally from bargaining of the players

when is quality of financial system a source of comparative advantage abstract dominant theories of trade tend to ignore the role of finance as a source of comparative advantage on the other hand the finance literature places financial institutions as a driver of economic growth this paper unites these two competing schools of thought in a general equilibrium framework for economies with high quality institutions defined by the competitiveness of the financial sector the quality of corporate governance and the level of property rights protection finance is passive on the other hand for economies with low quality institutions the quality of the financial system is an independent source of comparative advantage interestingly the conventional measure of financial development the size of the financial market relative to gdp does not adequately capture the underlying quality of financial institutions in addition free trade may reduce the aggregate income in south financial capital tends to flow from south to north

the collapse of the mexican peso what have we learned the collapse of the mexican peso what have we learned in the first quarter of 1995 mexico found itself in the grip of an intense financial panic foreign investors fled the country despite very high interest rates an undervalued currency and financial indicators that pointed to long term solvency the fundamental conditions of the mexican economy cannot account for the extent of the crisis the crisis was not the result of irresponsible fiscal behaviour the crisis was due to unexpected shocks that occurred in 1994 the inadequate policy response to those shocks the increased vulnerability to panic and finally panic itself in the aftermath of the march assassination the exchange rate experienced a nominal devaluation of around 10 and interest rates increased by 7 percentage points however capital outflows continued the policy response was to maintain the exchange rate rule and to prevent further increases in interest rates interest rates were held down by expanding domestic credit and by converting short term peso denominated government liabilities cetes falling due into dollar denominated bonds tesobonos a fall in international reserves and an increase in short term dollar denominated debt resulted the government simply ended up illiquid and therefore financially vulnerable illiquidity exposed mexico to a self fulfilling panic jeffrey sachs aaron tornell and andres velasco

the timing and size of bank financed speculative attacks abstract the recent epidemic of banking and currency crises has led researchers to consider the role that unhealthy banks may have in currency crises the present paper in contrast investigates the anatomy of a currency crisis when banks are healthy enough to finance it it is shown that when banks finance the crisis an anticipated collapse occurs sooner and an unanticipated collapse is worse than when banks do not increase credit during the crisis the findings imply that restrictions on bank loan activities and careful management of bank balance sheet risks may lessen the severity of or even prevent a currency crisis

bank runs and currency peg credibility abstract it is shown that as a currency peg constrains a government s ability to finance a bailout bank runs are more likely in credible fixed exchange rate regimes than in those in which the central bank is less committed to its exchange rate within the context of the model and given the government responses to their respective banking crises during the period 1994 1995 the bank runs in argentina and lack thereof in mexico seem to be rational responses of depositors

currency crises and the stock market empirical evidence for another type of twin crisis we explore the dependency between currency crises and the stock market in emerging economies our focus is two fold first the risk of a currency crisis rises as the foreign stake in the domestic stock market increases successful economies with high capital flows into their booming stock markets especially are prone to stock market induced currency crises second we apply the dividend growth model to show that stock markets crash in the run up to a currency crisis this new type of twin crisis is empirically tested by employing a logit framework using quarterly data for 33 emerging economies for 1994q1 2007q4

a theory of trickle down growth and development this paper develops a model of growth and income inequalities in the presence of imperfect capital markets and it analyses the trickle down effect of capital accumulation moral hazard with limited wealth constraints on the part of the borrowers is the source of both capital market imperfections and the emergence of persistent income inequalities three main conclusions are obtained from this model first when the rate of capital accumulation is sufficiently high the economy converges to a unique invariant wealth distribution second even though the trickle down mechanism can lead to a unique steady state distribution under laissez faire there is room for government intervention in particular redistribution of wealth from rich lenders to poor and middle class borrowers improves the production efficiency of the economy both because it brings about greater equality of opportunity and also because it accelerates the trickle down process third the process of capital accumulation initially has the effect of widening inequalities but in later stages it reduces them in other words this model can generate a kuznets curve

income distribution in the dynamic two factor trade model the issue of the effects of trade on personal income distribution has remained largely unexamined this paper describes an overlapping generations 2 x 2 model with a bequest motive and heterogeneous agents in order to examine the problem in this dynamic setting trade leads to both short run and long run reductions increases in inequality in labor capital abundant countries if the investment good is capital intensive if the consumption good is capital intensive the short run effects continue to hold but the long run effects are ambiguous copyright 1992 by the london school of economics and political science

the dynamics of the wealth distribution and the interest rate with credit rationing are uniquely determined and wealth dispersion among individuals or firms is irrelevant introducing credit rationing into the solow model modifies these conclusions multiple stationary interest rates and wealth distributions can exist because higher initial rates can be self reinforcing through higher credit rationing and lower capital accumulation the wealth accumulation process is ergodic in every steady state but wealth mobility is lower with higher steady state interest rates aggregate output is higher in steady states with lower interest rates because credit is better allocated short run interest rate or distribution shocks can be self sustaining and can have long run effects on output through the induced dynamics of the wealth distribution and credit rationing

exchange rate crises with domestic bank runs evidence from the 1980s abstract the sherman silver purchase act of 1890 led to inflation fears and a series of flights from the dollar in spite of these runs the dollar was never devalued the question remains why grilli 1990 argues that it was the treasury s ability to borrow that prevented collapse while this explains why the gold standard endured from 1894 to 1896 it does not explain why there was no successful attack before that time the paper argues that the gold standard endured during 1893 because an internal drain of commercial bank funds stopped the external drain a revised series of collapse probabilities is provided and shown to be zero during the internal drain

exchange rate expectations and the pricing of chinese cross listed stocks abstract i show that the price discounts of chinese cross listed stocks american depositary receipts adrs and h shares to their underlying a shares indicate the expected yuan us dollar exchange rate the forecasting models reveal that adr and h share discounts predict exchange rate changes more accurately than the random walk and forward exchange rates particularly at long forecast horizons using panel estimations i find that adr and h share investors form their exchange rate expectations according to standard exchange rate theories such as the harrod balassa samuelson effect the risk of competitive devaluations relative purchasing power parity uncovered interest rate parity and the risk of currency crisis

does the ecb act as a lender of last resort during the subprime lending crisis evidence from monetary policy reaction models abstract we investigate whether the ecb aligns its monetary policy with financial crisis risk in emu member countries we find that since the outbreak of the subprime crisis the ecb has significantly increased net lending and reduced interest rates when banking and sovereign debt crisis risk in vulnerable emu countries greece ireland italy portugal and spain increases while no significant effect is identified for the pre crisis period and relatively tranquil emu countries austria belgium france germany and the netherlands these findings suggest that the ecb acts as a lender of last resort for vulnerable emu countries

when zero interest rate differentials signal a lack of currency peg credibility abstract a negative shock to bank insolvency fears causes a positive domestic foreign interest rate differential if the currency peg is credible and a differential equal to zero if it is not this is contrary to what is expected from interest rate parity

heterogeneity stratification and growth macroeconomic implications of community structure and school finance this paper examines how socioeconomic stratification and alternative systems of education finance affect inequality and growth agents interact through local public goods or externalities school funding neighborhood effects and economywide linkages complementary skills knowledge spillovers sorting families into homogeneous communities often minimizes the costs of existing heterogeneity but mixing reduces heterogeneity faster integration therefore tends to slow down growth in the short run yet raise it in the long run a move to state funding of education presents society with a similar intertemporal trade off local and global complementarities play major roles in determining the efficient social and educational structures copyright 1996 by american economic association

networks of knowledge among unionized firms we develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability of r d networks through which knowledge is transmitted in an oligopolistic industry whenever firms settle wages the partially connected network is likely to emerge in the long run if and only if knowledge spillovers are large enough however when unions settle wages the complete network is the unique stable network in other words the stronger the union bargaining power is the more symmetric stable r d networks will be in terms of network efficiency the partially connected network when firms settle wages does not pareto dominate the complete network when unions settle wages and vice versa

public policy towards r d in oligopolistic industries the importance of determining optimal policy towards r d cannot be exaggerated given the worldwide interest in fostering r d and given the significant differences between european and u s policies towards interfirm cooperation on r d moreover the problem is an inherently difficult one because of the complex nature of the r d process since r d is a component of fixed costs industries where it is important tend to be concentrated hence r d policy must go hand in hand with competition policy at the same time r d is like any form of investment in that it precedes the production stage hence issues of time consistency and strategic commitment inevitably arise in considering the choice of r d policy finally r d by one firm typically leads to spillovers wbich benefit other firms so that r d exhibits many of the character department of economics university college dublin belfield dublin 4 ireiatid for helpful discussions and comments we are grateful to two anonymous referees to pedro bartos steve martin massimo motta and damien neven and to participants at seminars in birmingham st andrew s and warwick at a cepr workshop on r d spillovers in lausanne at erwit 94 in caslel gandolfo eea 95 in prague the 1996 conference on industrial economics at universidad carlos iii de madrid and a meeting of the dublin economics workshop this paper was produced as part of the international economic performance programme of the centre for economic performance london school of economics supported by the u k esrc an earlier version was circulated as cepr discussion paper no 1243 see alexis jacquemin 1988 and stephen martin 1996 istics of a public good albeit one that is mostly privately produced tbe degree to which such spillovers occur and can be internalized is another crucial influence on the desirable pattem of intervention