revenue maximizing dutch auctions with discrete bid levels abstract this paper is concerned with setting a predetermined number of bid levels in a dutch auction to maximize the auctioneer s expected revenue as a departure from the traditional methods used by applied economists and game theorists a novel approach is taken in this study to tackle the problem by formulating the auctioning process as a constrained nonlinear program and applying standard optimization techniques to solve it aside from proposing respective closed form formulae for computing the optimal bid levels and the auctioneer s maximum expected revenue we also show that the bid decrements should be increasing if there are two or more bidders in the dutch auction additionally the auctioneer s maximum expected revenue increases with the number of bidders as well as the number of bid levels finally managerial implications of the key findings as well as limitations of this research work are discussed

optimal nonparametric estimation of first price auctions this paper proposes a general approach and a computationally convenient estimation procedure for the structural analysis of auctioni data considering first price sealed bid auction models within the independent private value paradigm we show that the underlying distribution of bidders private values is identified from observed bids and the number of actual bidders without any parametric assumptions using the theoiy of minimax we establish the best rate of uniform convergence at which the latent density of private values can be estimated nonparametrically from available data we then propose a two step kernel based estimator that converges at the optimal rate

multiple round timber auction design and simulation this paper presents a multiple round timber auction simulation developed in order to study various configurations of auction design in this study simultaneous sequential timber auctions are modelled and analysed using agent based simulation technology as there are many individual items in the auction to be sold the auction designer defines several rounds that are sequential at pre defined intervals at each round the auction designer announces several simultaneous auctions since bidders are offered different items at each round a mathematical linear programing model for selecting the best set of items to bid for is presented different bidding patterns are simulated and compared in various setup configurations the most advanced of these strategies are adaptive and use agent learning capability the comparisons include the success rate of winning the auction and the winning price per m3 this study suggests an efficient bidding pattern for bidders to bid in order to achieve to their goal and increase their profit similarly in order to increase profit the auctioneer i e the government needs to control several auction parameters including the number of auctions per year the lot size the auction periodicity and the number of bidders this study also suggests parameters configurations that to maximise revenue for the auctioneer

quality improvements and the incentive to leapfrog abstract in a model of an uncovered market of vertically differentiated products incentives of non identical duopolists to improve the technological maximum quality are analyzed it is assumed that initially firms offer products with different qualities and that the r d cost function changes exogenously this induces a reconsideration of firms quality decisions both firms have the same r d costs for improving the maximum quality quality changes within the existing quality range are assumed to incur only fixed adjustment costs it is shown that the firm which initially is in the low quality position always has a higher incentive to improve industry s quality than its rival if adjustments costs are sufficiently high persistence of dominance may occur for a low degree of initial differentiation low adjustment costs and r d cost functions with a high slope

identification and estimation of bidders risk aversion in first price auctions risk aversion is a fundamental concept in economics used to explain agents behavior under uncertainty risk aversion in auctions has been justified through the many uncertainties faced by bidders and through the large value of bids relative to bidders assets in first price auctions risk aversion renders more aggresssive bidding while bidding in ascending auctions is not affected leading to the dominance of the sealed bid mechanism over the ascending one risk aversion has been tested extensively on experimental data as overbidding relative to the nash equilibrium is frequently observed in view of recent developments in the structural estimation of auction models patrick bajari and ali hortacsu 2005 show that the risk aversion model provides the best fit for experimental data given larger financial stakes it is likely that bidders risk aversion is present in field auction data as well the theoretical auction literature does not provide simple implications that can be tested on bidding data consequently detecting risk aversion in auctions is difficult if not impossible more generally with microeconomic data risk aversion can be detected only when diversification occurs such as in portfolio management and in auctions with diversification across species as in susan athey and jonathan levin 2001 this calls for the necessity of structural modeling to evaluate bidders risk aversion in the structural approach observed bids are assumed to be the outcome of the bayesian nash equilibrium of a particular model though a tight structure is imposed to explain observed bids empirical industrial organization

econometrics of ascending auctions by quantile regression this paper suggests an identification and estimation approach based on quantile regression to recover the underlying distribution of bidders private values in ascending auctions under the ipv paradigm the quantile regression approach provides a flexible and convenient parameterization of the private values distribution with an estimation methodology easy to implement and with several specification tests the quantile framework provides a new focus on the quantile level of the private values distribution in particular the seller s optimal screening level which can be very useful for bidders and seller an empirical application using data from the usfs timber auctions illustrates the methodology

disruption costs learning by doing and technology adoption abstract we study technology adoption in a dynamic model of price competition adoption involves disruption costs and learning by doing because of disruption costs the adopting firm begins in a market disadvantage which may persist if its rival captures the customers that the adopting firm needs to learn the technology the prospect of future rents by the rival results in i a failure to adopt socially efficient technologies ii an equilibrium preference for technologies that are learned faster but have lower social value and iii more technologies being adopted if more firms enter the market

rising r d intensity and economic growth over the past decades private r d spending in the us and other developed countries has been growing faster than gdp at the same time the growth rates of per capita and aggregate output have been rather stable possibly declining slightly this paper proposes a growth model that can account for the observed phenomenon by explicitly describing competition among technological leaders and followers in individual markets in a way that is consistent with existing studies on firms motivation to invest in r d the model shows the possibility that the unsustainable trend of rising r d intensity persists for a very long time

does sticky information affect the locus of innovation evidence from the japanese convenience store industry abstract scholars have long discussed the locus of innovation and its determinants there is empirical evidence that innovations can be developed by those holding any of a number of functional relationships to them such as manufacturers users or materials suppliers past studies have considered two factors important in predicting the functional locus of innovation one is expected profit of a player involved in the innovation and the other is stickiness of innovation related information although some studies have shown empirically the link between an innovator s expected profits and the locus of innovation no research has yet been conducted to test the hypothesized relationship between stickiness of innovation related information and the locus of innovation in the study reported upon here i explore relationships between these two variables via a study of 24 innovations for the japanese convenience store industry my study shows empirically that stickiness of innovation related information does have the hypothesized relationship to the functional locus of innovation i discuss implications of these findings and some directions for future research

competition or predation consumer coordination strategic pricing and price floors in network markets although network effects can make predation more likely to succeed we find that the leading anti predation rules may lower or raise efficiency and consumer welfare in network markets we find that a the extensive debates about the correct measure of cost on which to base price floors are unlikely to be productive b the ordover willig rule that is widely thought to be correct in theory but difficult to apply in practice is in fact incorrect in theory and c efficient price floors would have to depend on consumer expectations and coordination processes that are unlikely to be observable in practice

a model of the evolution of duopoly does the asymmetry between firms tend to increase or decrease this paper is an attempt to identify some of the factors that affect the evolution of market structure in a model of dynamic competition between two firms the stochastic evolution of the state of competition depends on the respective effort rates of the firms the question is whether the current leader works harder than the laggard does the gap between firms tend to increase or decrease we show that several effects are at work the state tends to evolve in the direction where joint payoffs are greater since joint payoffs are related to joint product market profits less joint effort costs there are two classes of effect the joint profit effect and various joint cost effects the latter result in part from the pattern of profits and in part from endpoint effects that give relief from efforts asymptotic expansions illuminate these influences moreover we show by numerical simulation that there is another kind of joint cost effect the pattern of joint effort costs can influence the pattern of evolution of market structure and the evolution of the pattern of market structure can influence the pattern of efforts in a mutually self reinforcing manner in particular there may be equilibria in which this last effect means that the laggard works harder than the leader even though all the other effects work in favour of the leader

a point decision for partially identified auction models this article proposes a decision theoretic method to choose a single reserve price for partially identified auction models such as haile and tamer 2003 using data on transaction prices from english auctions the article employs gilboa and schmeidler 1989 for inference that is robust with respect to the prior over unidentified parameters it is optimal to interpret the transaction price as the highest value and maximize the posterior mean of the seller s revenue the monte carlo study shows substantial gains relative to the revenues corresponding to a random point and the midpoint in the haile and tamer interval

when do auctions ensure the welfare maximizing allocation of scarce inputs we determine when an unfettered auction will ensure the welfare maximizing allocation of a scarce input that enhances product quality and may reduce production costs a supplier values the input for this use value and for its foreclosure value because once the input is acquired it is unavailable to rivals an unfettered auction often ensures the welfare maximizing allocation of an input increment however it can fail to do so when the input would increase relatively rapidly the competitive position of a rival with a moderate competitive disadvantage bidder handicapping that ensures auctions generate welfare maximizing input allocations differ from standard handicapping policies

a shape constrained estimator of bidding function of first price sealed bid auctions this paper is concerned with economic analysis of first price sealed bid auctions with risk averse bidders the identification is based on exogenous variations in the number of bidders across auctions we present a shape constrained estimator of the bidding function which satisfies the theoretical properties of passing through origin positivity and monotonicity the underlying utility function and bidder value distribution are readily obtained from the estimated bidding function monte carlo simulations demonstrate good performance of the proposed estimator

entry and competitive dynamics in the mobile telecommunications market abstract we propose an extension of the gans stern gans j s stern s 2003 the product market and the market for ideas commercialization strategies for technology entrepreneurs research policy 32 2 333 350 framework that includes entry by existing firms an incumbent firm possessing complementary assets and strong appropriability is in a formidable position teece d j 1986 profiting from technological innovation implications for integration collaboration licensing and public policy research policy 15 6 285 305 however a de alio entrant can leverage complementary assets to enter along a new technological trajectory and then develop appropriability we illustrate how several mobile telecommunications firms ericsson nokia and samsung pursued this strategy to catch up with the market leader motorola we also identify several shortcomings in motorola s approach it was too inward looking in developing technologies but ironically not inward looking enough in exploiting its most valuable patents

generic drug industry dynamics both the economics literature and the business press suggest that a typical pattern for a new industry or what jovanovic and macdonald 1994 call an invention i s to have an initial phase in which a small number of firms each earn significant profits followed by a phase in which rapid entry of new firms leads to increased competition and dissipation of some of those profits often accompanied by a shakeout whereby only a few large firms remain especially if subsequent innovations increase the optimal scale although this pattern seems to characterize many industries the length of time during which early movers retain their profits how prices adjust during the entry process and the

nonparametric estimation of utility function in first price sealed bid auctions i propose a simple method to nonparametrically estimate the utility function in first price sealed bid auctions when bidders participation is exogenous using a pair of bid densities each for a different number of bidders i establish a contraction mapping that converges to the true utility function the method employs nonparametric estimates in place of the true bid densities to construct the contraction mapping and computes the utility function by iterating the contraction operator a monte carlo study shows that the method approximates the true utility function and valuation density

comparing open and sealed bid auctions evidence from timber auctions we study entry and bidding patterns in sealed bid and open auctions using data from the u s forest service timber auctions we document a set of systematic effects sealed bid auctions attract more small bidders shift the allocation toward these bidders and can also generate higher revenue a private value auction model with endogenous participation can account for these qualitative effects of auction format we estimate the model s parameters and show that it can explain the quantitative effects as well we then use the model to assess bidder competitiveness which has important consequences for auction design

when do stronger patents increase continual innovation under continual innovation greater patent strength expands innovating firms profit against imitation but also shifts profit from current to past innovators we show how the impact of patents on innovation as determined by these two opposing effects varies with industry characteristics when the discount factor is sufficiently high the negative profit division effect is negligible and innovation monotonically increases in patent strength otherwise innovation has an inverted u relationship with patent strength and stronger patents are more likely to increase innovation when the discount factor or the fixed innovation cost is higher we also show how the impact of patents on innovation may change with firms innovation capability and with the intensity of competition from imitators

innovation imitation and social welfare this paper focuses on the impact of competition by imitation more specifically copying for innovative activity and social welfare in part it is a response to recent empirical work 10 12 that has tried to measure the relationship between innovation and imitation costs these papers include a direct call for theoretical modeling that takes explicit account of such cost relationships and we try to answer this challenge specifically we examine the implications for product quality and social welfare when innovators anticipate that a successful product will be copied by rivals obviously previous empirical research is not the only source of interest in these issues the potential effects of imitation on innovative activity have long been both a theoretical and practical concern in recent years a variety of authors have addressed the appropriability issue raised by imitation and its implications for innovative activity 4 7 2 there has also been work on explicit copying i e photocopying 8 11 in the policy arena the protection of product design and intellectual property rights is the focus of much recent actual and proposed u s legislation and a major issue in the uruguay round of trade talks 1 21 our analysis of this topic differs from that of previous work in a number of important respects first we focus explicitly on product as opposed to process innovations second and perhaps even more important we do not restrict the firm s choice to be to innovate or not to innovate instead we allow the innovator to choose what kind or quality of new good to introduce into the market the higher the quality the higher is the development cost third when the innovating firm decides what kind of new product to market it does so under uncertainty about demand the popularity of the new product is not known until after the innovator has chosen the level of quality and sunk its product development costs fourth at the initial time at which the innovator chooses the quality of product to develop it does so with the knowledge that its innovation if it is popular will be copied by later rival entrants finally in direct response to the empirical work mentioned above we explicitly focus on the ratio of imitation to innovation costs our approach yields a number of insights not the least of which is a more precise identification of the potential gains and losses from imitative competition indeed using a quadratic development cost function we explicitly calculate the impact of copying on social welfare this explicit welfare analysis further distinguishes our analysis from most previous work

environmental and social accounting for brazil an environmentally extendedsocial accounting matrix sam has beenconstructed for brazil for the first time wereview in detail previous studies in thisfield describe the construction structure anddata sources of the brazilian sam anddemonstrate the effect of system closure examining a range of type i and type iimultipliers we show that incomes generated byfinal consumption are highly skewed towardsrich households but energy requirements andcarbon emissions are higher for the consumptionof the poor a significant negative correlationexists between employment and income on onehand and energy requirements and carbonemissions on the other while a significantpositive correlation exists between imports and energy and carbon these correlationsdemonstrate that there is scope for policiesthat pursue imports substitution and reduceenergy consumption and carbon emissions whilstincreasing employment and income

choosing the competition and patent licensing this article examines licensing as a means of choosing the competitors which a patentee monopolist will face in the period after the patent expires the queue of entrants consists of two firms which differ in their relative strengths as competitors for example by size or level of marginal cost by structuring the industry to be composed of weak competitors the incumbent is able to prolong its dominant position in the industry after the patent expires examples are presented in which the evidence suggests that choosing the competition was an important motivation of the licensor s behavior

precautionary bidding in auctions we analyze bidding behavior in auctions when risk averse buyers bid for a good whose value is risky we show that when the risk in the valuations increases dara bidders will reduce their bids by more than the appropriate increase in the risk premium ceteris paribus buyers will be better off bidding for a more risky object in first price second price and english auctions with affiliated common interdependent values this precautionary bidding effect arises because the expected marginal utility of income increases with risk so buyers are reluctant to bid so highly we also show that precautionary bidding behavior can make dara bidders prefer bidding in a common values setting to bidding in a private values one when risk neutral or cara bidders would be indifferent thus the potential for a winner s curse can be a blessing for rational dara bidders

is it a car or a truck managerial beliefs the choice of product architecture and the emergence of the minivan market segment new markets segments are a common setting for studies in technology strategy these studies generally assume that new segments already exist or have formed following the introduction of a product innovation by an entering firm thus theory on the role of established firms in the emergence of new market segments is underdeveloped this study informs current research by explaining the product innovation decisions of established firms during the emergence of a new market segment the results of a case study on the development and commercialization of the minivan at chrysler ford and general motors between 1970 and 1985 indicate that existing theories based on managerial cognition firm capabilities economic incentives and organizational structure are insufficient to explain the decisions this article develops theory based on the interrelationship of these four mechanisms

empirical testing of auction theory given the state of affairs in auction theory there is at least one model for instance to support any position one would care to take concerning the revenue of sealed bid vs open auctions it should not come as a surprise that a fair amount of empirical work in auctions is underway this paper reports the results of some recently completed research i first discuss papers in which the predictions being tested derive directly from the pure theory of auctions and then papers in which the predictions arise out of an application of auction theory to a related institution

innovation and the persistence of monopoly abstract the auction framework enables us to highlight a crucial feature of many r d races the losing firm can recoup part but not the entirety of its r d investments this feature is shown to account for the marked differences in results obtained by gilbert and newbery and by reinganum when the firm investing the largest amount wins with certainty we establish the existence of a unique equilibrium neither firm employs a pure strategy and the incumbent wins more often than the challenger

the british electricity experiment the privatization of the electricity supply industry esi in britain which began 1990 is in itself an unremarkable event much of the esi is privately owned in several european countries and in the united states and the u k privatization program has embraced utilities since 1984 when british telecom was privatized the thing that is remarkable about recent policy toward the industry is the radical nature of the regulatory reform accompanying privatization a vertically integrated administered generation and transmission structure was replaced overnight on march 31 1990 by one that is deintegrated and market based generation and transmission have been separated and there has been an attempt to establish competition in generation a number of countries have been moving gradually in the direction of encouraging competition but nowhere else have such dramatic changes been implemented so quickly

the employment effects of an income redistribution in developing countries the 1970 ilo mission report to colombia first proposed the notion that since the poor tend to consume a more labour intensive basket of commodities than the rich a redistribution of income in their favour will tend to increase employment this proposal gave rise to a host of attempts in the 1970s to demonstrate its empirical validity in a number of developing countries the results however provided only a very limited degree of support to the ilo hypothesis indeed by 1978 the clear conclusion of the general equilibrium macroeconomic models was that income redistribution would have only a tiny effect on employment 1

unbundling the structure of inertia resource versus routine rigidity i work to unbundle the structure of inertia into two distinct categories resource rigidity failure to change resource investment patterns and routine rigidity failure to change organizational p

dynamic inducements in r d investment market signals and network locations this research shows that alliance networks shape how firms respond to uncertainty reducing information generated outside a network product awards signal the potential commercial success of the awa

the affiliation effect in first price auctions we study the monotonicity of the equilibrium bid with respect to the number of bidders n in affiliated private value models of first price sealed bid auctions and prove the existence of a large class of such models in which the equilibrium bid function is not increasing in n we moreover decompose the effect of a change in n on the bid level into a competition effect and an affiliation effect the latter suggests to the winner of the auction that competition is less intense than she had thought before the auction since the affiliation effect can occur in both private and common value models a negative relationship between the bid level and n does not allow one to distinguish between the two models and is also not necessarily only due to bidders taking account of the winner s curse

strategic innovation and technology adoption in an evolving industry abstract we introduce a racing model with multiple product generations product innovation spin outs and licensing industry conditions and innovation characteristics affect who wins the race and who markets the resulting product small firms market their innovations when they pioneer a new generation or improve quality in a young generation and license their innovations in mature generations if old generation leaders ever market improvements in young generation goods they do so early on leadership in mature generations persists tests on the rigid disk drive industry 1977 1997 provide empirical support the results have implications for antitrust policies and policies governing employee non compete agreements

regulation innovation and the introduction of new telecommunications services i examine the effects of fcc regulation on the innovation and introduction of advanced telecommunications services in the united states an interim of lighter regulation provides an experiment to test the regulatory regime s impact the econometric model comprises an arrival process for service innovation followed by a duration process for regulatory delay the number of services the firms created during the interim is 60 99 higher than the model predicts they would have created if the stricter regulation had still been in place overall firms would have introduced 62 more services to consumers during the study period if the regulation had not been in place

persistence of innovation in dutch manufacturing is it spurious this paper studies the persistence of innovation and the dynamics of innovation output in dutch manufacturing using firm data from three waves of the community innovation surveys cis pertaining to the periods 1994 1996 1996 1998 and 1998 2000 we estimate by maximum likelihood a dynamic panel data type 2 tobit model accounting for individual effects and handling the initial conditions problem we find that there is no evidence of true persistence in achieving technological product or process innovations while past shares of innovative sales condition albeit to a small extent current shares of innovative sales

sleeping quotas pre emptive quota bidding and monopoly power abstract we rationalize the puzzling existence of binding quotas that are not fully utilized our model has its roots in bhagwati 1965 in r baldwin et al eds trade growth and the balance of payments essays in honor of g haberler mit press new york on tariffs quotas equivalence and is related to the io literature on preemption we study the conditions that lead a monopolist facing a quota restricted market to buy the quota licenses itself and the conditions under which they may remain unused the divisibility of the quota is crucial for the monopolist to pre emptively buy the quota furthermore we study the implications of use it orlose it clauses commonly imposed on auctioned quotas

nonparametric identification of risk aversion in first price auctions under exclusion restrictions this paper studies the nonparametric identification of the first price auction model with risk averse bidders within the private value paradigm first we show that the benchmark model is nonindentified from observed bids we also derive the restrictions imposed by the model on observables and show that these restrictions are weak second we establish the nonparametric identification of the bidders utility function under exclusion restrictions our primary exclusion restriction takes the form of an exogenous bidders participation leading to a latent distribution of private values that is independent of the number of bidders the key idea is to exploit the property that the bid distribution varies with the number of bidders while the private value distribution does not we then extend these results to endogenous bidders participation when the exclusion restriction takes the form of instruments that do not affect the bidders private value distribution though derived for a benchmark model our results extend to more general cases such as a binding reserve price affiliated private values and asymmetric bidders last possible estimation methods are proposed

competition and growth with step by step innovation an example this paper develops a simple example to analyse the relationship between product market competition and growth in a model with step by step innovations where laggards can never leapfrog the current industry leaders but instead must first catch up with the leaders before battling for technological leadership in the future unlike in existing schumpeterian models of growth more intense product market competition and or imitations may be growth enhancing

existence of monotone equilibrium in first price auctions with private risk aversion and private initial wealth in this paper we study the existence of monotone equilibrium in first price auctions where bidders have a three dimensional private type i e their private values degrees of risk aversion and initial wealth bidders utility functions belong to the class of constant relative risk aversion crra or constant absolute risk aversion cara the bidders types are independent across bidders while a bidder s private value initial wealth and degree of risk aversion are allowed to be correlated we show that a monotone equilibrium always exists in a general setting allowing for asymmetric bidders moreover with symmetric bidders a symmetric monotone equilibrium strategy must exist a bidder s equilibrium strategy increases with bidders private values and degrees of risk aversion when bidders have crra utility equilibrium bids decrease with initial wealth when bidders have cara utility equilibrium bids are invariant to initial wealth

technology choice and income distribution within the context of the agricultural sector one can point to numerous attempts to assess the macro economic effects of alternative technologies on the distribution of income one of the most influential early efforts for example was undertaken mainly in the indian context by john mellor 1 who was seeking to redefine agriculture s role in development strategy and policy in rejecting the then existing capital intensive and industry led development model and advocating instead a rural led employment intensive path to development mellor was concerned among other things with the relationships between increased foodgrain production using alternative technologies and the growth rate of non agricultural employment non agricultural sector capital labour ratios and the course of per capita incomes of the labour force more recently haggblade and hazell2 have used an input output based model to examine how differences in the choice of agricultural technology and farm size influence the indirect or multiplier effects of increases in agricultural output they show for example that the input intensity consumption profile of targeted farms and processing characteristics of the farm output all affect the size and composition of nonfarm spinoffs 3 the finding that consumption linkages generally dominate the total multiplier confirms mellor s emphasis on the importance of this particular type of linkage effect

invention and innovation under alternative market structures the case of natural resources this paper examines the interactions between market structure and resource allocation over time when there is endogenous technical progress the structures considered are a planned economy pure monopoly and competition with patent rights in an efficient allocation the date of invention coincides with the date of innovation the date at which technology is used this is also true with a pure monopoly but monopoly retards technical progress relative to the efficient level competition for patents rights to a new technology results in excessively rapid technical progress if the resource endowment of the economy is sufficiently large also competition may lead to sleeping patents where invention strictly precedes the date of innovation

institutions and the resource curse countries rich in natural resources constitute both growth losers and growth winners we claim that the main reason for these diverging experiences is differences in the quality of institutions more natural resources push aggregate income down when institutions are grabber friendly while more resources raise income when institutions are producer friendly we test this theory building on sachs and warner s influential works on the resource curse our main hypothesis that institutions are decisive for the resource curse is confirmed our results contrast the claims of sachs and warner that institutions do not play a role

bidder collusion at forest service timber sales allegations of bidder collusion at forest service timber sales in the pacific northwest were common in the 1970s of course prices may be low for reasons other than collusion we formulate an empirical model that allows for both bidder collusion and supply effects and in which we control for demand conditions noncooperative behavior in which a single unit is sold the standard auction model is a special case it is found to be definitively outperformed by a model of collusion we also find that supply effects are dominated by collusion in determining the winning bids in the market

price cap regulation and technical change abstract existing analyses of the implications of price cap regulation for the development of cost reducing technologies assume that all r d is done by the regulated industry this is unrealistic we present a simple model of non cooperative r d by a regulated firm and a single external developer under a price cap regime of the sort characterised by cabral and riordan in equilibrium the external developer exerts less r d than is socially optimal the regulated firm may exert more or less a tightening of the regulatory regime impacts the r d incentives of both players though in different ways the optimal regulatory adjustment parameter may be bigger or smaller than that suggested by existing studies despite the scope for duplication of results research by an outsider necessarily enhances welfare

structural path analysis and multiplier decomposition within a social accounting matrix framework the main purpose of this paper is to apply structural path analysis to a social accounting matrix sam framework because the sam is a comprehensive essentially general equilibrium data system the whole network through which influence is transmitted can be identified and specified through structural path analysis the latter provides an alternative and much more detailed way to decompose multipliers as compared with the traditional treatment of stone 1978 and pyatt and round 1979 this paper consists of five sections the first one reviews the sam framework as a basis for multiplier analysis and multiplier decomposition in particular the additive decomposition in terms of transfer open loop and closed loop effects is succinctly presented section ii applies this conventional decomposition to a sam of south korea to illustrate with eleven specific cases the effects of an exogenous injection on the endogenous accounts of the sam i e the incomes of the factors household groups and production activities section iii is devoted to the presentation of the elements of structural analysis and more particularly the transmission of economic influence within a structure finally section iv applies structural path analysis to the south korean sam and compares and contrasts the multiplier decomposition which it yields with the alternative decomposition discussed in section ii the comparison is the more significant in that the two decomposition methods are applied to the same eleven selected cases spanning a variety of sectors i e poles of origin for the injection and sectors poles of destination the empirical analysis in section iv suggests that structural path analysis applied to a sam is a potentially operationally useful technique within which a whole series of policy issues can be addressed the final section is devoted to a brief summary and conclusions

strategic behaviour of incumbent firms in the uk abstract the main purpose of this paper is to examine the incidence of strategic behaviour in the uk by means of a questionnaire study performed across three broad manufacturing industries food electrical engineering and chemicals of the strategies which have received substantial theoretical attention r d and advertising appear widely used patenting pricing and excess capacity much less so vertical instruments such as purchasing policy also stand out as important but possibly only a minority of firms in our sample actively pursue strategic instruments

patent licensing entry and the incentive to innovate abstract we analyze the economic impact of process innovations where the innovator auctions off licenses to both potential entrants and incumbent firms it is shown that opening the market to entrant licensees the incentive to innovate is maximized if the industry is initially a monopoly as was envisioned by schumpeter 1942 this is in contrast to previous literature on licensing of process innovations when entry is excluded the incentive to innovate is maximized in an oligopoly market if licenses are sold by auction sen and tauman 2007 or in a competitive market if licenses are sold by royalty arrow 1962 the post innovation market structure the diffusion of the innovation and the social welfare are analyzed and compared with the case where entry is excluded

estimating risk aversion from ascending and sealed bid auctions the case of timber auction data estimating bidders risk aversion in auctions is a challeging problem because of identification issues this paper takes advantage of bidding data from two auction designs to identify nonparametrically the bidders utility function within a private value framework in particular ascending auction data allow us to recover the latent distribution of private values while first price sealed bid auction data allow us to recover the bidders utility function this leads to a nonparametric estimator an application to the us forest service timber auctions is proposed estimated utility functions display concavity which can be partly captured by constant relative risk aversion

imitation costs and patents an empirical study it has long been recognised that the costs of imitating new products have an important effect on the incentives for innovation in a market economy as arrow i962 and others have pointed out if firms can imitate an innovation at a cost that is substantially below the cost to the innovator of developing the innovation there may be little or no incentive for the innovator to carry out the innovation in their discussions of the innovation process economists frequently have called attention to the major role played by the costs of imitation but there has been little or no attempt to measure these costs to test various hypotheses concerning the factors influencing them or to estimate their effects in this paper we report some findings of what seems to be the first study of this topic in addition we present data regarding the effects of patents on imitation costs and on the rate of innovation

asymmetry in first price auctions with affiliated private values collusion and heterogeneity across firms may introduce asymmetry in bidding games a major difficulty in asymmetric auctions is that the bayesian nash equilibrium strategies are solutions of an intractable system of differential equations we propose a simple method for estimating asymmetric first price auctions with affiliated private values considering two types of bidders we show that these differential equations can be rewritten using the observed bid distribution we establish the identification of the model characterize its theoretical restrictions and propose a two step non parametric estimation procedure for estimating the private value distributions an empirical analysis of joint bidding in ocs auctions is provided copyright 2003 john wiley sons ltd

distorting the direction of technological change abstract this article explores a monopolist s incentive to distort the direction of technological change for strategic reasons the monopolist might invent and employ a socially undesirable technology in so doing he might jeopardize not only the vigor of product market competition but also the development of socially desirable methods of production as a result technological dynamism cannot be considered a social virtue until its direction is compared with the social optimum

asymmetry in procurement auctions evidence from snow removal contracts differences in cost efficiency and productivity across firms may introduce asymmetries in procure ment auctions relying on a structural approach this article investigates potential asymmetry among firms bidding for snow removal contracts in montrthe empirical results show that firms located in close proximity have a cost advantage relative to other firms in the most urbanised part of montrbecause of prohibitive equipment storage costs the extent of inefficiency due to asym metry is empirically assessed various policy experiments are performed a bidding preference policy shows that the city could expect to reduce its costs for allocating snow removal contracts when bidders willingness to pay depends in part on observable variables the princi pal s interest is not best served by creating a level auction playing field this article studies procurement auctions for snow removal contracts in montrit investigates the degree to which companies in disadvantageous locations should win even if they do not submit the lowest bid from the submitted bids a novel empirical methodology estimates the extent of cost variation across firms along with its variation within loca tion although the dispersion is substantial the gain from treating bidders unequally is limited when observed individual characteristics affect the firms costs and their bidding strategies all bidders cannot be treated alike these differences in characteristics or asymmetries among bidders may arise from their size as noted by laffont et al 1995 their capacity constraints as in jofre bonet and pesendorfer 2003 or the possession of better information as in hendricks and porter 1988 and hendricks et al 1994

auctions with selective entry and risk averse bidders theory and evidence we study auctions with selective entry and risk averse bidders our model accounts for risk averse bidders endogenous participation decision and thus encompasses the existing entry models we establish entry and bidding equilibrium in first price auction and ascending auction mechanisms and show that bidders entry behavior differs between these two mechanisms with different forms of risk aversion our approach provides testable implications of risk aversion in terms of entry behavior we analyze a timber auction data set and propose a simple test for the form of bidders risk aversion based on our model implications

semiparametric estimation of first price auctions with risk averse bidders in view of the non identification of the first price auction model with risk averse bidders this paper proposes some parametric identifying restrictions and a semiparametric estimator for the risk aversion parameter s and the latent distribution of private values specifically we exploit heterogeneity across auctioned objects to establish semiparametric identification under a conditional quantile restriction of the bidders private value distribution and a parameterization of the bidders utility function we develop a multistep semiparametric method and we show that our semiparametric estimator of the utility function parameter s converges at the optimal rate which is slower than the parametric one but independent of the dimension of the exogenous variables thereby avoiding the curse of dimensionality we then consider various extensions including a binding reserve price affiliation among private values and asymmetric bidders the method is illustrated on u s forest service timber sales and bidders risk neutrality is rejected

identification and inference in ascending auctions with correlated private values we introduce and apply a new nonparametric approach to identification and inference on data from ascending auctions we exploit variation in the number of bidders across auctions to nonparametrically identify useful bounds on seller profit and bidder surplus using a general model of correlated private values that nests the standard independent private values ipv model we also translate our identified bounds into closed form and asymptotically valid confidence intervals for several economic measures of interest applying our methods to much studied u s forest service timber auctions we find evidence of correlation among values after controlling for a rich vector of relevant auction covariates this correlation causes expected profit the profit maximizing reserve price and bidder surplus to be substantially lower than conventional ipv analysis of the data would suggest

differences in the rates of return to r d for european and us young leading r d firms this paper examines the sources of europe s lagging business r d performance relative to the us particularly the role played by missing young leading innovators in high technology intensive sectors in europe it investigates through econometric analysis differences in the rates of return to r d of european and us large r d firms it finds that while in the us young firms succeed in realizing significantly higher rates of return to r d as compared to their older counterparts including in high tech sectors european firms fail to generate significant rates of return even if they are yollies and even if they are in high tech sectors these findings can at least partly explain why europe has less r d intensive young leading innovators in high technology intensive sectors

preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly this article takes a different tack and inquires whether institutions such as the patent system create opportunities for firms with monopoly power to maintain their monopoly power the results apply to other situations such as brand identification spatial location and capacity expansion which share the characteristic that early or preemptive actions may lower the returns to potential competitors

competition imitation and growth with step by step innovation is more intense product market competition and imitation good or bad for growth this question is addressed in the context of an endogenous growth model with step by step innovations in which technological laggards must first catch up with the leading edge technology before battling for technological leadership in the future in contrast to earlier schumpeterian models in which innovations are always made by outsider firms who earn no rents if they fail to innovate and become monopolies if they do innovate here we find first that the usual schumpeterian effect of more intense product market competition pmc is almost always outweighed by the increased incentive for firms to innovate in order to escape competition so that pmc has a positive effect on growth second that a little imitation is almost always growth enhancing as it promotes more frequent neck and neck competition but too much imitation is unambiguously growth reducing the model thus points to complementary roles for competition anti trust policy and patent policy

not knowing the competition evidence and implications for auction design in a government auction program where first price auctions generate significantly higher revenue than english auctions i document evidence that bidders are uncertain about the number of auction entrants motivated by additional data evidence i estimate a structural model of auctions in which rivals participation is stochastic allowing for bidders risk aversion and asymmetry counterfactual simulations reveal that bidders uncertainty about the number of entrants combined with risk aversion substantially softens the revenue impact of low competition in first price auctions this explains the observed revenue patterns and uncovers an empirically important reason for sellers to favor first price auctions over english auctions

sectoral growth and poverty alleviation a multiplier decomposition technique applied to south africa abstract how does an increase in a sector s output affect poverty alleviation in this paper a multiplier decomposition for a socioeconomic system represented by a social accounting matrix sam is used to study this linkage the decomposition applied to south africa reveals that growth in agriculture services and some manufacturing sectors can alleviate poverty for the black african population for sectoral growth to be effective however the need for appropriate skill acquisition for the poor must be addressed directly only long term policies geared towards improving both economic growth and the human capital stock of the poor can lead to significant poverty alleviation

optimal choice of a reserve price under uncertainty the revenue function for a standard auction is typically asymmetric around the revenue maximizing reserve price thus choosing a reserve price that is smaller than the revenue maximizing reserve price can result in a substantially different loss than choosing one that is larger by the same amount therefore when the revenue function is unknown it is important to consider uncertainty around the revenue function and its asymmetric structure for this purpose i propose a bayesian decision rule and illustrate its typical revenue gains i then apply the rule to the bid data from the u s timber sales

auctions with resale markets an application to u s forest service timber sales when bidders anticipate an opportunity for resale trade the value of winning an auction is determined in part by the option values of buying and selling in the secondary market one implication is that a bidder s willingness to pay at an auction increases with the expected level of competition between resale buyers empirical evidence from auctions of timber contracts supports this prediction and rejects standard models that ignore resale the estimated effect is smaller after policy changes expected to diminish the prevalence of resale additional evidence supports the predicted presence of a common value element introduced by the resale opportunity

competition market selection and growth we study the effect of the competitive selection process on the economy s rate of growth in an extension of standard quality ladder models of endogenous growth we allow for the possibility that in each period several asymmetric firms representing an endogenously determined number of past innovators may be simultaneously active in an industry stronger competitive pressure then has conflicting effects on the incentive to innovate lowering prices but also selecting the more efficient firms we show that the market selection effect of competition always increases the incentive to innovate and find circumstances in which it can outweigh the traditional negative effect of lower prices

production experiences and market structure in r d competition abstract in the rd and ii the likelihood of persistent leadership increases with the value of being the winner and the value of being a loser but decreases with expected waiting time of r d innovation and the flow of monopoly profits however destructive innovations may still occur even when production experiences are allowed to play an important role in the r d competition

second mover advantages in the strategic adoption of new technology under uncertainty abstract this paper introduces technological uncertainty into a timing game of new technology adoption it is shown that the timing neither necessarily involves first mover advantages in precommitment equilibria reinganum review of economic studies xlviii 1981 395 405 nor rent equalization due to the threat of preemption fudenberg and tirole review of economic studies lii 1985 383 401 rather there may be second mover advantages because of informational spillovers furthermore the model predicts that the equilibrium payoffs will typically be discontinuous and non monotonic in the probability that the new technology is profitable a welfare analysis reveals several market failures and suggests that policy intervention should adequately depend on the nature of uncertainty and the rate of technological progress

property rights and wireless license values abstract while extending the scope of spectrum property rights promotes efficiency such reforms are often deterred by equity concerns theoretically however the windfalls may be negative relaxing license restrictions may increase profits by allowing enhanced productivity yet liberalization across a class of licensees can reduce the expected profits by increasing competitiveness this article examines license value changes for regimes that decisively shift toward private property rights in radio spectrum by analyzing the average prices paid in international cellular phone license auctions during 1995 2001 this unique data set encompasses 1 365 licenses assigned by competitive bidding in 38 auctions held in 24 countries licenses awarded by regimes with more expansive spectrum property rights generated winning bids that were 61 percent lower adjusting for other factors this evidence reverses the equity argument against liberalization over the policy margin studied and is consistent with coase s view

identification of standard auction models this paper presents new identification results for models of first price second price ascending english and descending dutch auctions we consider a general specification of the latent demand and information structure nesting both private values and common values models and allowing correlated types as well as ex ante asymmetry we address identification of a series of nested models and derive testable restrictions enabling discrimination between models on the basis of observed data the simplest model symmetric independent private values is nonparametrically identified even if only the transaction price from each auction is observed for richer models identification and testable restrictions may be obtained when additional information of one or more of the following types is available i the identity of the winning bidder or other bidders ii one or more bids in addition to the transaction price iii exogenous variation in the number of bidders iv bidder specific covariates while many private values pv models are nonparametrically identified and testable with commonly available data identification of common values cv models requires stringent assumptions nonetheless the pv model can be tested against the cv alternative even when neither model is identified

monopoly incentives for cost reducing r d abstract it is shown in this paper that there exist cost innovations for which a monopolist has a higher incentive to invest than a social planner this unveils the limits of the claim based on arrow 1959 that a monopoly always has a lower incentive to innovate than a social planner and therefore than is socially desirable in contrast to previous results the comparison of incentives may also depend upon the demand function finally for a restricted domain of analysis a rule for comparing the monopoly and the social planner incentives is derived

and the winner is acquired entrepreneurship as a contest yielding radical innovations new entrants to a market tend to be superior to incumbents in originating radical innovations we provide a new explanation for this phenomenon based on markets for technology it applies in industries where successful entrepreneurial firms or their technologies are acquired by incumbents that then commercialize the innovation to this end we analyze an innovation game between one incumbent and a large number of entrants in the first stage firms compete to develop innovations of high quality they do so by choosing at equal cost the success probability of their rd the bigger the number of entrants the more radical the most radical project generally entrants tend to choose more radical r d approaches and generate the highest value innovation in case of success we illustrate our theoretical findings by a qualitative empirical study of the electronic design automation industry and derive implications for research and management

sealed bid versus open auctions the evidence data from u s forest service timber auctions are used to test vickrey s original proposition that sealed bid and open auctions yield equal revenue models for the high bid in an auction are specified and estimated using three different procedures ordinary least squares two stage least squares and maximum likelihood the second two procedures include a second equation which accounts for the forest service s auction choice and therefore control for selection bias these two procedures which unlike ordinary least squares yield consistent estimators imply a statistically and economically insignificant difference in high bids between sealed bid and open auctions

analyzing literature based innovation output indicators the italian experience abstract this paper presents the results of a study on the product innovations introduced in the italian market in 1989 and reported in a selected number of trade journals the analysis of data collected by means of this literature based counting procedure confirms that r d oriented industries and large firms do not in italy have a marked competitive advantage in innovation the country appears to be instead characterized by a significant presence of consumer goods industries and small firms in innovation our data indicate a statistically significant association between trade competitiveness and strength in product innovation and show the comparatively higher capacity for product innovation of some of the industries in which italy achieves a positive performance in international trade moreover the presence of spillovers at the regional level from both private and public r d expenditures proves to be positively correlated with the development of product innovations finally small firms with fewer than 50 employees appear to be more innovative than is usually believed to be the case

a nonparametric test for comparing valuation distributions in first price auctions this article proposes a nonparametric test for comparing valuation distributions in first price auctions our test is motivated by the fact that two valuation distributions are the same if and only if their integrated quantile functions are the same our method avoids estimating unobserved valuations and does not require smooth estimation of bid density we show that our test is consistent against all fixed alternatives and has nontrivial power against root n local alternatives monte carlo experiments show that our test performs well in finite samples we implement our method on data from u s forest service timber auctions

sequential auctions of endogenously valued objects two completely informed but possibly asymmetric bidders buy or sell identical claims in sequential auctions they subsequently receive monetary prizes that depend upon the final allocation of claims iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies leaves a unique nash equilibrium for any prize schedule prices weakly decline as the auctions progress and points of strict decline have a simple characterization for one class of prize schedules which arises naturally if duopolists bid for a scarce input the equilibrium is completely characterized many initial allocations generate the same final unequal division of claims which may be interpreted as the natural market structure journal of economic literature classification numbers d43 d44 l11

licensees as entry barriers in a more general setting than has been considered hitherto this paper examines how the incumbent in a market threatened by entry can exploit its first mover advantage by licensing its technology not to a potential entrant but to firms that would have remained outside the industry it is shown among other things that the incumbent may subsidize the variable costs of its licensees in order to deter entry even when entry is not deterred it is demonstrated that the incumbent might opt to invite outsiders as licensees

shirking sharing risk and shelving the role of university license contracts abstract in this paper we develop a theoretical model of university licensing to explain why university license contracts often include payment types that differ from the fixed fees and royalties typically examined by economists our findings suggest that milestone payments and annual payments are common because moral hazard risk sharing and adverse selection all play a role when embryonic inventions are licensed milestones address inventor moral hazard without the inefficiency inherent in royalties the potential for a licensee to shelve inventions is an adverse selection problem which can be addressed by annual fees if shelving is unintentional but may require an upfront fee if the firm licenses an invention with the intention to shelve it whether the licensing contract prevents shelving depends in part on the university credibly threatening to take the license back from a shelving firm this supports the rationale for bayh dole march in rights but also shows the need for the exercise of these rights can be obviated by contracts

intellectual property rights and the mode of technology transfer abstract transferring technology in an environment where patent protection is uncertain can pose significant risks to an innovating firm s ability to appropriate rents this paper incorporates asymmetric information in a screening game where the innovating firm has the choices of licensing a new product at arm s length to a foreign firm exporting it or licensing it to a subsidiary subsidiary production avoids the risk of imitation but involves higher costs for the innovating firm the gains to the southern country from the lack of intellectual property right protection may be offset by strategic behavior by northern firms who opt for technology transfer via subsidiary or monopoly production