endogenous timing with incomplete information and with observable delay abstract this paper analyzes endogenous timing in a duopoly model with incomplete information firms announce the period in which they will move before choosing an action and are then committed to their choices endogenous stackelberg equilibria with either the informed or the uninformed firm as the stackelberg leader may emerge for most parameters the cournot equilibrium in the first production period results endogenously journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73 d82 l10

endogenous timing in duopoly games stackelberg or cournot equilibria abstract simultaneous versus sequential play is studied in an extended game in a preplay stage players decide whether to select actions in the basic game at the first opportunity or to wait until observing their rivals first period actions in one extended game players first decide when to select actions without committing to actions in the basic game the equilibrium has a simultaneous play subgame unless payoffs in a sequential play subgame pareto dominate those payoffs in another extended game deciding to select at the first turn requires committing to an action both sequential play outcomes are the equilibria only in undominated strategies

dynamic analysis of consumer response to marketing strategies this paper develops a methodology for modeling consumer response that integrates previous research in stochastic brand selection diffusion of innovation test market analysis and new product design the methodology makes it practical to extend brand selection models to include diffusion phenomena such as awareness trial and information flow purchase timing and brand selection are interdependent and both phenomena depend jointly on managerial controls such as advertising coupons price off promotion product positioning and consumer characteristics within this general structure we provide practical estimation procedures a least squares approximation to the maximum likelihood estimates to determine the parameters which link managerial controls to consumer response closed form solutions are derived for cumulative awareness cumulative trial penetration expected sales and purchases due to promotion all as a function of time we also provide simplified expressions for equilibrium t market share tradeoffs among complexity of the diffusion process number of managerial variables nonstationarity complexity of purchase timing consumer segmentation and sample size are made explicit so that the marketing scientist can customize his analyses to the managerial problems that he faces the effects of sample size data interval frequency and collinearity in the explanatory variables are investigated with simulations based on a five state consumer response process which depends on 8 10 marketing variables the paper closes with a brief description of the application and predictive test of a consumer response model based on the methodology

one leader and multiple follower stackelberg games with private information this study analyzes one leader and multiple follower stackelberg games with demand uncertainty we demonstrate that the weight on public information regarding a follower s estimation of demand uncertainty determines the strategic relationship between the leader and each follower when the relationship is strategic complement the leader can exit from a market the threshold is determined by the intensity of cournot competition among the followers

do reputation feedback systems really improve trust among anonymous traders an experimental study feedback systems are claimed to be a crucial component of the success of electronic marketplaces like ebay or amazon marketplace this article aims to compare the effects of various feedback systems on trust between anonymous traders through a set of experiments based on the trust game our results indicate that trust is significantly improved by the introduction of a reputation feedback system however such mechanisms are far from being perfect and are vulnerable to strategic ratings and reciprocation our findings indicate that some changes in rating rules may significantly improve the efficiency of feedback systems by avoiding strategic rating or reciprocation and hence stimulate trust and trustworthiness among traders in particular a system in which individuals are not informed of their partner s rating decision before making their own decision provides better results both in terms of trust and earnings

endogenous price leadership and the strategic acquisition of information we model a differentiated bertrand duopoly in which a firm s earlier knowledge of market demand than its competitor results in endogenous price leadership with the information advantaged firm leading in such a setting with second mover advantage we then study the firms incentives to acquire information and analyze an information acquisition game both i neither firm acquiring information and ii one firm acquiring information can arise as subgame perfect equilibrium but both firms acquiring information is never an equilibrium outcome even if information is free information may have a negative value if it causes a change in the timing of price competition

first versus second mover advantage with information asymmetry about the profitability of new markets is it better to move first or second to innovate or to imitate we show that if one player s information about the profitability of new markets is only modestly superior the possibility of foreclosing the market can lead to a first mover advantage on the other hand more extreme information superiority can reverse this leading to a second mover advantage knowing more surely what is the best choice the better informed player wants to delay to keep his information private and the less informed player wants to delay to learn because of this more accurate information can actually lead to inefficiency by increasing the incentive to delay and exogenous costs of delay can aid efficiency by neutralizing that strategic incentive in fact in some circumstances a player may purposely coarsen his information to deter imitation

endogenous stackelberg leadership abstract we consider a linear quantity setting duopoly game and analyze which of the players will commit when both players have the possibility to do so to that end we study a two stage game in which each player can either commit to a quantity in stage 1 or wait till stage 2 we show that committing is more risky for the high cost firm and that consequently risk dominance considerations as in harsanyi and selten 1988 allow the conclusion that only the low cost firm will choose to commit hence the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous stackelberg leader journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d43

firms timing of production with heterogeneous consumers i revisit endogenous timing in a quantity setting duopoly game in the basic model i show that given strong heterogeneity in consumers willingness to pay wtp and a moderately small consumer segment with low wtp sequential moving outcomes can appear in equilibrium with the follower enjoying second mover advantage owing to consumer heterogeneity in wtp there is a local property that a firm s aggressive behaviour may lead to a competitor responding more aggressively hence the sequential moves can restrict firms total outputs to avoid a price collapse and result in firms strategic choices that pareto dominate those under the simultaneous move i further generalize my results and show that although firms compete in quantity under some conditions of the demand function features of strategic complements can appear

teaching an old dog new tricks firm learning from environmental regulation abstract we examine a new mechanism by which environmental regulation can increase efficiency intra firm knowledge spillovers due to environmental regulation county level non attainment of the national ambient air quality standards creates spatial variation in the degree of regulatory stringency as states impose stronger environmental regulation in non attainment counties we use this spatial variation to examine how the efficiency of electricity generators responds to increases in regulation we show that in response to increased regulatory stringency electricity generators find technical efficiency enhancements and then transfer these enhancements to other units within their fleet we find that a change in regulatory stringency translates to within firm spillovers of 3 4 and that these gains occur at least 3 years after the increase in regulatory stringency

an examination of consumer heterogeneity in a stochastic model of consumer purchase dynamics with explanatory variables abstract a stochastic model of brand choice and purchase incidence is proposed that relates marketing variables including advertising exposures to brand performance measures such as market share penetration and depth of repeat purchase dynamics over time the approach considers various aspects of consumer heterogeneity including individual differences in brand loyalty levels advertising exposures and purchase rates for a population of consumers a major focus of this study is on the evaluation of the impact of consumer heterogeneity in alternative models on the basis of single source scanner panel data for an actual market situation in particular we demonstrate the critical importance of considering heterogeneity over a consumer population as a means of enhancing descriptive and predictive model fit as well as for allowing the analysis of advertising media schedules

endogenous sequencing of firm decisions abstract when firms are symmetrically informed a stackelberg leader prefers to be leader rather than a cournot duopolist however when the leader has superior information about demand the leader may earn lower ex ante profits than it would earn if it was choosing quantities simultaneously with the follower in this paper i give the firm with superior information the option of delaying its quantity decision until the decision period of the less informed firm so that decisions are made simultaneously surprisingly in the unique stable outcome the informed firm moves first regardless of its private information journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73 d82 l10

a multivariate polya model of brand choice and purchase incidence in this paper we develop an integrated stochastic model of purchase timing and brand selection which incorporates the influence of marketing mix variables seasonality and trend and also allows for various individual choice mechanisms our approach rests on the assumptions of a zero order choice process a poisson timing process and purchase rates following a multivariate gamma distribution over the population the scale parameters of which vary according to marketing activities and time the resulting model is a multivariate polya process and the distribution of brand choice probabilities turns out to be a generalized dirichlet distribution thus most currently used zero order models can be considered to be special cases of this approach furthermore we derive a number of market diagnostics which provide insights into market structure and demonstrate the model s use for marketing strategy simulation based on extensive testing of the underlying hypotheses we finally validate the model using empirical data and show that it fits the market in question

information value under demand uncertainty and endogenous market leadership in an oligopoly model with firms choosing to produce in one of two periods we identify the circumstance under which a firm s having early information regarding stochastic demand results in market leadership high demand volatility leads to stackelberg competition with the information advantaged firm leading in the n firm case an equilibrium with multiple leaders and multiple followers emerges endogenously in a duopoly information acquisition game we identify conditions that determine whether neither one or both firms will pay to acquire early information and note that one firm s obtaining early information may generate a positive externality benefitting its competitor both symmetric and asymmetric outcomes are possible and stackelberg market leadership may occur in equilibrium but only when firms have different costs of information our finding that an information advantage may convey leadership which then affects the value of information to the players applies to other settings exhibiting first mover advantage such as certain public good provision games jel c72 d82 l13

pre commitment and flexibility abstract this paper considers several related strategic duopoly settings in which uncertainty creates an option value from retaining flexibility by delaying investment or output decisions until after uncertainty is resolved this value of flexibility must be weighed against the strategic value of pre commitment yielding a trade off between flexibility and pre commitment we obtain a simple characterization of the timing of output decisions as a consequence of the degree of uncertainty particular attention is paid to the implications for entry deterrence by an incumbent firm and to the possible flexibility enhancing effects of investment in capital

a dynamic it adoption model for the soho market pc generational decisions with technological expectations thesmall office home office soho professionals comprise the fastest growing segment in the labor force today typically being a one person business based at home soho owners mostly rely on office information technology to single handedly run their entire operation despite the segment s ostensibly growing dependence and influence on the information technology it industry still very little is known about the dynamics between soho and it products with the purpose of addressing this void we investigate the soho professionals adoption patterns of multigenerational it products accordingly we develop and empirically estimate an individual soho levelinitial andrepeat purchase logit model that captures the procurement patterns for successive generations of technological products namely the pc category specifically we find that soho professionals procurement choices are influenced by a number of salient dimensions i e income performance price interpurchase time network externalities furthermore some soho owners are found to have a preference for a future expected generation over a currently available one which is explained via their business dispositions i e technology orientation result orientation search orientation toward accepting technological incertitude

reference effects of price and promotion on brand choice behavior when consumers are exposed to pricing and promotional activity by frequently purchased packaged goods they may develop expectations that are used as points of reference in evaluating future activi

determinants of environmental innovation in us manufacturing industries abstract this paper provides new evidence on the determinants of environmental innovation we employ panel data models to study how environmental innovation by us manufacturing industries responded to changes in pollution abatement expenditures and regulatory enforcement during the period 1983 through 1992 we find that 1 environmental innovation as measured by the number of successful environmental patent applications granted to the industry responded to increases in pollution abatement expenditures however 2 increased monitoring and enforcement activities related to existing regulations did not provide any additional incentive to innovate we also find some empirical evidence that environmental innovation is more likely to occur in industries that are internationally competitive

endogenous timing in general rent seeking and conflict models we examine simultaneous versus sequential choice of effort in a two player contest the timing of moves determined in a preplay stage prior to the contest subgame as well as the value of the prize is allowed to be endogenous contrary to endogenous timing models with an exogenously fixed prize the present paper finds the following 1 players may decide to choose their effort simultaneously in the subgame perfect equilibrium spe of the extended game 2 the spe does not need to be unique in particular there is no unique spe with sequential moves if the direct costs of effort are zero 3 symmetry among players does not rule out incentives for precommitment to effort locally away from the cournot nash level 4 finally there may be no correlation between win probability and strategic incentives in our framework a finding most central in the analysis of fixed prize contests

stackelberg leadership as a natural solution under cost uncertainty this paper analyzes a differentiated duopoly model with cost uncertainty in an environment where information sharing is prohibited the duopolists can commit themselves to be a stackelberg leader or follower at the time when they know the distribution but not the actual values of their own and the rival s costs in a natural stackelberg situation the firms agree on the assignment of roles and neither prefers the bayesian nash equilibrium an natural stackelberg situation is shown to be possible under quantity but not price competition total expected welfare is higher in the natural stackelberg situation than in the nash equilibrium copyright 1990 by blackwell publishing ltd