collective action and group heterogeneity voluntary provision versus selective incentives several studies have concluded that heterogeneity within a group facilitates the initiation of collective action however a recent analysis found that heterogeneity can either facilitate or impede collective action depending on factors like the strength of the temptation to free ride reconciling these conclusions is difficult because the earlier studies assumed that public goods are provided voluntarily whereas the later analysis assumed that selective incentives like norms or laws can mandate cooperation i examine the link between group heterogeneity and collective action in three regimes voluntary systems in which actors make unrestricted decisions to participate in collective action compliance systems in which actors create and enforce norms that compel others to participate in public goods production and balanced systems in which actors can create and enforce compliance norms or oppose such norms the analysis reveals a complex link among group heterogeneity collective action and the type of regime by fostering the organization of previously atomized groups and weakening the cohesion of highsolidarity groups heterogeneity in contribution costs and valuation of the public good can reduce social power differentials

the relationship between participation and project outcomes evidence from rural water supply projects in india summary this study examines data collected at the household and village level in 45 villages in two water supply projects in india based upon the results of regression models capital cost contribution and household involvement in decision making are both found to be independently significant predictors of village level measures of household satisfaction equal access and time savings this suggests that projects should continue to encourage both contributions and household involvement in decision making from as many households within a village as possible neither form of participation is a significant predictor of whether households in a village pay tariff

managerial bargaining power in the determination of compensation contracts and corporate investment this paper considers the design of managerial compensation contracts and their impact on corporate investment decisions and the managerial effort decision the model relates the compensation scheme to outside share ownership and managerial bargaining position using the methods of mechanism design under asymmetric information a shift in favor of effort is documented in the case where managerial bargaining strength is weak while a shift toward more use of capital investment results from strong managerial bargaining power the model distinguishes managerial equity holdings from contingent compensation contracts our results are related to the empirical literature on pay performance sensitivities

optimal contracts under adverse selection and moral hazard a continuous time approach this article presents a continuous time agency model in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard with a risk averse agent and a risk neutral principal under the model setup we show that the optimal controls are constant over time and thus the optimal menu consists of contracts that are linear in the final outcome we also show that when a moral hazard problem adds to an adverse selection problem the monotonicity condition well known in the pure adverse selection literature needs to be modified to ensure the incentive compatibility for information revelation the model is applied to a few managerial compensation problems involving managerial project selection and capital budgeting decisions we argue that in the third best world the relationship between the volatility of the outcome and the sensitivity of the contract depends on interactions between the managerial cost and the firm s production functions contrary to conventional wisdom sometimes the higher the volatility the higher the sensitivity of the contract the firm receiving good news sometimes chooses safer projects or invests less than it does with bad news we also examine the effects of the observability of the volatility on corporate investment decisions copyright 2005 oxford university press

price and quality competition under adverse selection market organization and efficiency firms compete with prices and qualities in markets where consumers have heterogeneous preferences and cost characteristics consumers demand two goods which can be supplied jointly or separately by firms we consider two strategy regimes for firms uniform price quality pairs and screening price quality menus for each regime we compare the equilibria under integration each firm supplying both goods and separation each firm supplying one good integrating and separating markets change quality efficiency and welfare the theory illustrates phenomena such as the carveout of mental health and substance abuse coverage from general health insurance and creaming for low cost students in locales with school choices copyright 2003 by the rand corporation

the wisdom of competitive crowds when several individuals are asked to forecast an uncertain quantity they often face implicit or explicit incentives to be the most accurate despite the desire to elicit honest forecasts such competition induces forecasters to report strategically and nontruthfully the question we address is whether the competitive crowd s forecast the average of strategic forecasts is more accurate than the truthful crowd s forecast the average of truthful forecasts from the same forecasters we analyze a forecasting competition in which a prize is awarded to the forecaster whose point forecast is closest to the actual outcome before reporting a forecast we assume each forecaster receives two signals one common and one private these signals represent the forecasters past shared and personal experiences relevant for forecasting the uncertain quantity of interest in a set of equilibrium results we characterize the nature of the strategic forecasts in this game as the correlation among the forecasters priva

estimating the production function for human capital results from a randomized controlled trial in colombia we examine the channels through which a randomized early childhood intervention in colombia led to significant gains in cognitive and socio emotional skills among a sample of disadvantaged children aged 12 to 24 months at baseline we estimate the determinants of material and time investments in these children and evaluate the impact of the treatment on such investments we then estimate the production functions for cognitive and socio emotional skills the effects of the program can be explained by increases in parental investments which have strong effects on outcomes and are complementary to both maternal skills and child s baseline skills

inequality in socio emotional skills a cross cohort comparison abstract we examine changes in inequality in socio emotional skills very early in life in two british cohorts born 30 years apart we construct comparable scales using two validated instruments for the measurement of child behaviour and identify two dimensions of socio emotional skills internalising and externalising using recent methodological advances in factor analysis we establish comparability in the inequality of these early skills across cohorts but not in their average level we document for the first time that inequality in socio emotional skills has increased across cohorts especially for boys and at the bottom of the distribution we also formally decompose the sources of the increase in inequality and find that compositional changes explain half of the rise in inequality in externalising skills on the other hand the increase in inequality in internalising skills seems entirely driven by changes in returns to background characteristics lastly we document that socio emotional skills measured at an earlier age than in most of the existing literature are significant predictors of health and health behaviours our results show the importance of formally testing comparability of measurements to study skills differences across groups and in general point to the role of inequalities in the early years for the accumulation of health and human capital across the life course

regulatory risk vertical integration and upstream investment abstract we investigate the impact of regulatory risk on vertical integration and upstream investment by a regulated firm that provides an essential input to downstream competitors regulatory risk reflects uncertainty about the regulator s commitment to a regulatory policy that promotes the regulated firm s noncontractible investment we show that when the regulator sets the regulatory policy after the vertical industry structure has been established some degree of regulatory risk is ex ante socially beneficial regulatory risk makes vertical integration profitable and stimulates high upstream investment at a lower social cost this occurs for moderate costs of high investment and firms small risk aversion our analysis sheds new light on some relevant empirical patterns in vertically related markets

reservation wage and optimal contract for experts abstract we examine the optimal contract for experts with type dependent reservation wage we show that bhattacharya and pfleiderer 1985 s result the possibility of achieving the truthful revelation of information with full surplus extraction can be achieved with relaxing the restriction on the shape of reservation wage schedules this outcome can be achieved through payoff functions that are affine in a convex transformation of the ex post error our result is applied to the case of multiple experts

from bottom of the barrel to cream of the crop sequential screening with positive selection in a number of interesting environments dynamic screening involves positive selection in contrast with coasian dynamics only the most motivated remain over time the paper provides conditions under which the principal s commitment optimum is time consistent and uses this result to derive testable predictions under permanent or transient shocks it also identifies environments in which time consistency does not hold despite positive selection and yet simple equilibrium characterizations can be obtained

inequality and group participation theory and evidence from rural tanzania abstract this paper investigates the determinants of group membership and in particular the effect of income inequality on individual incentives to join economic groups drawing on a simple model we show that an increase in inequality has an ambiguous effect and that the type of access rule open versus restricted access is key in determining what income categories are represented in the group furthermore the shape of the income distribution can be crucial to determine whether increased inequality leads to more or less group participation using survey data from rural tanzania we find that inequality at the village level has a negative impact on the likelihood that the respondents are members of any group this effect is particularly significant for relatively wealthier people both when relative wealth is objectively measured and when it is subjectively defined however when we disaggregate groups by type of access rule we find that inequality decreases participation in open access groups when there are wide disparities at the bottom of the distribution while it increases participation in restricted access groups when the disparities are around the middle and top part of the distribution finally we assess the impact of inequality on various dimensions of group functioning

from exclusion to participation turning senegal s forestry policy around abstract a century of centralized forestry policies has excluded senegal s forest villagers from charcoal production and marketing policies have given access to marketing and labor opportunities to urbanbased merchants who hire guinean migrant laborers while forest villagers neither produce nor consume charcoal commercial production is cutting forests on which villagers rely in 1993 progressive forestry agents ushered in a new participatory forestry code but this new policy may not be equitable nor beneficial and it risks adding control over village labor for forest management to the long list of forest service controls locally accountable representation local decision making powers and simple local management enabling policies could diminish these risks

negotiating a better future how interpersonal skills facilitate intergenerational investment using a randomized controlled trial we study whether a negotiation skills training can improve girls educational outcomes in a low resource environment we find that a negotiation training given to eighth grade zambian girls significantly improved educational outcomes over the next three years and these effects did not fade out to better understand mechanisms we estimate the effects of two alternative treatments negotiation had much stronger effects than an informational treatment which had no effect a treatment designed to have more traditional girls empowerment effects had directionally positive but insignificant educational effects relative to this treatment negotiation increased enrollment in higher quality schooling and had larger effects for high ability girls these findings are consistent with a model in which negotiation allows girls to resolve incomplete contracting problems with their parents yielding increased educational investment for those who experience sufficiently high returns we provide evidence for this channel through a lab in the field game and follow up survey with girls and their guardians jel codes d13 i24 j16 o15

the regulation of multiproduct firms part i theory abstract this paper develops a normative model of the regulation of a multiproduct firm with private information about its technology and cost reducing activity it first characterizes the optimal regulatory scheme and illustrates it through examples it then derives necessary and sufficient conditions for the pricing incentive dichotomy to hold i e conditions under which the cost reimbursement rule but not pricing is used to provide incentives last the paper studies the regulation of the multiproduct firm in a general equilibrium framework both to assess the validity of the partial equilibrium approach and to formalize the notion of taxation by regulation

procurement policy and contracting efficiency the contracting literature has emphasized the optimality of using certain contracting instruments such as multiple cost observations full commitment self selection and competition a two period procurement model is constructed incorporating all of the instruments and optimal contracts are characterized numerical examples suggest that the marginal benefits of full commitment self selection and multiple cost observations are small while the benefits of competition are larger to obtain some evidence on contracting costs defense contracting is reviewed it indicates that using these instruments is very costly thus calling into question the optimality of using all of the procurement instruments copyright 1993 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

existence of optimal mechanisms in principal agent problems we provide general conditions under which principal agent problems with either one or multiple agents admit mechanisms that are optimal for the principal our results cover as special cases pure moral hazard and pure adverse selection we allow multidimensional types actions and signals as well as both financial and non financial rewards our results extend to situations in which there are ex ante or interim restrictions on the mechanism and allow the principal to have decisions in addition to choosing the agent s contract beyond measurability we require no a priori restrictions on the space of mechanisms it is not unusual for randomization to be necessary for optimality and so it should be and is permitted randomization also plays an essential role in our proof we also provide conditions under which some forms of randomization are unnecessary

procurement and renegotiation parties bound by an incomplete contract have an incentive to renegotiate after acquiring new information the issue of the parties investment in the relationship before renegotiation is analyzed in a simple two period procurement model the firm invests in the first period it then learns its production cost and the sponsor learns its value for the project williamson s underinvestment presumption is shown to hold under very general assumptions about bargaining and about the ex post asymmetry of information as long as the firm s investment is not observable by the sponsor the introduction of a cancellation fee may well lead to even less investment contrary to what is sometimes argued the role of ex ante price fixing as an alternative way to reintroduce some form of commitment and the problem of cost overruns are discussed last it is shown that if investment is observable by the sponsor andthus may become a joint decision variable the two parties may choose to under or overinvest

optimal forecasting incentives an agent of unknown expertise is requested to forecast the mean of an uncertain outcome the agent can refine forecasts at a constant marginal cost per unit precision but neither cost nor precision can be verified by the planner the problem is to induce both truthful revelation and an appropriate degree of learning so as to minimize the expected sum of direct planning losses and agent payments optimal contracts are derived with and without self screening of expertise and with and without competition between agents self screening tends to be much less valuable than competition

the mystery of the vanishing benefits an introduction to impact evaluation this article provides an introduction to the concepts and methods of impact evaluation the author provides an intuitive explanation in the context of a concrete application the article takes the form of a short story about a fictional character s on the job training in evaluation ms speedy analyst is an economist in the ministry of finance in the fictional country of labas in the process of figuring out how to evaluate a human resource program targeted to the poor ms analyst learns the strengths and weaknesses of the main methods of ex post impact evaluation

correlation consumption confusion or constraints why do poor children perform so poorly the economic and social mobility of a generation may be largely determined by the time it enters school given early developing and persistent gaps in child achievement by family income and the importance of adolescent skill levels for educational attainment and lifetime earnings after providing new evidence of important differences in early child investments by family income we study four leading mechanisms thought to explain these gaps an intergenerational correlation in ability a consumption value of investment information frictions and credit constraints in order to better determine which of these mechanisms inf uence family investments in children we evaluate the extent to which these mechanisms also explain other important stylized facts related to the marginal returns on investments and the effects of parental income on child investments and skills

eliciting beliefs proper scoring rules incentives stakes and hedging accurate measurements of probabilistic beliefs have become increasingly important both in practice and in academia introduced by statisticians in the 1950s to promote truthful reports in simple environments proper scoring rules psr are now arguably the most popular incentivized mechanisms to elicit an agent s beliefs this paper generalizes the analysis of psr to richer environments relevant to economists more speci cally we combine theory and experiment to study how beliefs reported with a psr may be biased when i the psr payments are increased ii the agent has a nancial stake in the event she is predicting and iii the agent can hedge her prediction by taking an additional action our results reveal complex distortions of reported beliefs thereby raising concerns about the ability of psr to recover truthful beliefs in general economic environments

regulation asymmetric information and auditing this article analyzes a model of a regulated firm that is better informed about its cost function than is the regulator by auditing at a cost however the regulator is assumed to be able to observe the realized cost of the firm if the regulator finds that the firm had misrepresented its costs at the time at which prices were set he can order a refund to consumers in the optimal policy the regulator audits when the firm reports for pricing purposes that its costs will be high and orders a refund when the auditfinds that realized costs are lower than anticipated given the original report a separation result that obtains for an important case indicates that the initial pricing decision is independent of the auditing decision the auditing decision however depends on the price that was initially set the optimal auditing strategy is characterized and the nature of the welfare gains are identified the methodology used in the analysis involves the characterization of an equilibrium of a revelation game with an ex post observable

simple cost sharing contracts we extend rogerson s 2003 intriguing analysis of the performance of simple procurement contracts to consider settings where the supplier s innate production cost is not necessarily distributed uniformly although the simple contract that rogerson analyzes performs remarkably well when the smaller cost realizations are relatively likely it can perform poorly when the larger cost realizations are relatively likely we show that in all settings under consideration though a fairly simple pair of contracts one that involves linear cost sharing and one that involves full cost reimbursement can always secure more than 73 of the gain achieved with a fully optimal contract

departmentalization and stochastic dissimilarity abstract when activities within the organization are confronted with different types of stochastic environments the owner of the firm has to evaluate the benefits and the costs involved in establishing multiple specialized divisions the benefit from departmentalization is the ability to better match incentives to the extent of uncertainty confronting different activities the cost of departmentalization is the increase in the number of required managerial positions which implies that the owner has to deal with a bigger number of individuals that can assume only limited risk only when the extent of stochastic dissimilarity among activities is significant can the benefit more than outweigh the cost

nonparametric identification of a contract model with adverse selection and moral hazard this paper studies the nonparametric identification of a contract model with adverse selection and moral hazard specifically we consider the false moral hazard model developed by laffont and tirole 1986 we first extend this model to allow for general random demand and cost functions we establish the nonparametric identification of the demand cost deterministic transfer and effort disutility functions as well as the joint distribution of the random elements of the model which are the firm s type and the demand cost and transfer shocks the cost of public funds is identified with the help of an instrument testable restrictions of the model are characterized

the determinants of human capital formation during the early years of life theory measurement and policies in this paper i discuss a research agenda on the study of human capital accumulation in the early years with a particular focus on developing countries i discuss several methodological issues from the use of structural models to the importance of measurement and the development of new measurement tools i present a conceptual framework that can be used to frame the study of human capital accumulation and view the current challenges and gaps in knowledge within such an organizing structure i provide an example of the use of such a framework to interpret the evidence on the impacts of an early years intervention based on randomized controlled trial

determinants and benefits of household level participation in rural drinking water projects in india abstract using data from households in 45 villages in rural india this paper finds that wealth literacy household and village size are often determinants of two measures of participation in community based development projects meeting attendance and capital cost contributions using propensity score matching this study concludes that participation leads to benefits for the households that participate although these benefits are strongest in regions with higher levels of overall participation this study finds no evidence of elite capture with both poor and wealthy households benefiting from their participation

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

the strategy of professional forecasting we develop and compare two theories of professional forecasters strategic behavior the first theory reputational cheap talk posits that forecasters endeavor to convince the market that they are well informed the market evaluates their forecasting talent on the basis of the forecasts and the realized state if the market expects forecasters to report their posterior expectations honestly then forecasts are shaded toward the prior mean with correct market expectations equilibrium forecasts are imprecise but not shaded the second theory posits that forecasters compete in a forecasting contest with pre specified rules in a winner take all contest equilibrium forecasts are excessively differentiated

optimal contracting of separable production technologies abstract we analyze the class of agency problems with a risk neutral principal and a risk averse agent in which hidden actions and hidden information on the agent s efficiency are jointly present technological assumptions such as monotonicity of likelihood are no longer sufficient for the optimal contract to be monotone in the sharing rule we show that these regularity properties obtain for the rather wide class of production technologies that are separable in the agent s inputs together with ordinal properties such as monotone differences and affiliation of inputs separability yields the monotonicity in efficiency of the agent s actions and indirect utility

a complete solution to a class of principal agent problems with an application to the control of a self managed firm this paper considers a class of principal agent problems which have the following features 1 there is adverse selection because the principal ignores the value of one parameter of the agent s true characteristics 2 leaving aside the information parameter the principal s welfare as well as the agent s welfare depend on two types of variables observable to both of them the first ones possibly multidimensional are called action variable s and the second one which is one dimensional has in general the meaning of a money transfer 3 the principal is a stackelberg leader of the two person game he can commit himself to decision rules which are admissible on informational grounds he optimizes within the adequate class taking into account besides the agent s reaction one constraint which has generally the meaning of an individual rationality constraint and sometimes of a feasibility constraint the optimization is limited to the class of non stochastic mechanisms 4 the problem can also receive an alternative interpretation the principal faces a continuum of agents of unknown characteristics the distribution being known however stylized principal agent problems of this type have often been considered in the economic literature in particular the reader will later be able to recognize that the standard income tax model a la mirrlees 1971 the quality or quantity choice model of the monopolist a la mussa and rosen 1978 or maskin and riley 1982 and the model of government regulation of the private monopolist of baron and myerson 1982 all belong to

the economics of clear advice and extreme options i study a principal agent model in which the agent collects information and then chooses a verifiable action i show that the principal can find it desirable to constrain the agent s action set even though there is no disagreement about the ranking of actions ex post the elimination or penalization of intermediate actions which are optimal when information is poor improves incentives for information collection i characterize optimal action sets when the agent is infinitely risk averse with respect to income shocks and optimal incentive schemes when the agent is risk neutral copyright 2005 wiley blackwell

common property and collective action in economic development abstract a fundamental issue in many ldcs is the degree to which natural resource mismanagement is caused by common property arrangements this view has led to widespread attempts to privatize forests rangelands and water resources many of these efforts have failed to stop overuse and have contributed to inequality in resource distribution this paper seriously questions this approach and describes a number of reasons why common property may continue to be both efficient and equitable complementing and combining with private rights in a way consistent with the resource endowments of village economies a theoretical approach is outlined showing that the tragedy of the commons is an unsatisfactory model of common property an alternative model is presented together with a call for research into institutional alternatives in resource management

cartel enforcement with uncertainty about costs what cartel agreements are possible when firms have private information about production costs in order for a cartel agreement to work it must take into account the incentives for firms to misrepresent their cost information and it must provide sufficient reward so that no firm wishes to defect for private cost uncertainty we characterize the set of cartel agreements with side payments that can be supported as bayesian nash equilibria we show that if defection results in either cournot or bertrand competition the incentive problems in large cartels are severe enough to prevent the cartel from achieving the monopoly outcome in contrast with common cost uncertainty the incentive problems become less severe in large cartels allowing perfect collusion

fertility at work children and women s labor market outcomes in urban ghana abstract while it is commonly assumed that fertility decreases female labor supply i show theoretically that fertility can increase female labor supply if returns to financial inputs in children are sufficiently high compared to returns to time investments using six rounds of a panel survey from urban ghana i find evidence of countervailing effects behind a net zero effect of young children on women s hours of work labor supply on the extensive margin drops but women who remain in the labor force increase their hours in response to a child women s labor supply particularly increases in response to a young child if there are older siblings or other adults in the household by contrast men s labor supply does not change in response to young children

does it pay to participate in decision making survey evidence on land co management in jiangsu province china member participation in decision making is a critical part of resource co management however little is known about the welfare consequences of participation this paper analyzes the impact of cooperative member participation in decision making on their incomes using data from 364 members of china s land cooperative program we distinguish two levels of participation in decision making voting and obtaining financial information and use a bivariate probit model and propensity score matching to estimate their impact the results indicate that household head s age gender and education and family size wealth and political affiliation determine participation in decision making participation in either voting or obtaining financial information has a positive impact on cooperative members land income there is also a strong joint effect of voting and obtaining information with an increase in land income of 16 we conclude that broad participation can ensure more equitable access to land income for members

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

a model of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for new issues this paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for the case in which the investment banker is better informed about the capital market than is the issuer and the issuer cannot observe the distribution effort expended by the banker the optimal contract under which the offer price decision is delegated to the better informed banker in order to deal with the adverse selection and moral hazard problems resulting from the informational asymmetry and the observability problem is characterized the model demonstrates a positive demand for investment banking advising and distribution services and provides an explanation of the underpricing of new issues an investment banker performs three functions which may be of value to an issuer of new securities underwriting advising and distribution this paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services based on an informational asymmetry between an issuer of new securities and an investment banker ultimately a theory of the organization of the financial intermediary industry is required that would predict which firms would use which types of financial intermediaries for which purposes and which firms would raise capital without engaging the services of a financial intermediary only a limited set of such predictions are developed here in the context of a model of a fixedprice offering under a negotiated contract in which the investment banker is

competition and regulation in vertically related markets in an industry where naturally monopolistic and competitive activities are vertically related should the natural monopolist be allowed also to operate in the deregulated competitive sector unlike much of the literature on vertical integration this paper assumes that monopoly pricing behaviour is regulated and therefore the effect of vertical integration on the task of regulation is central to the analysis in the model there is both imperfect information and imperfect competition when vertical integration by the monopolist is allowed the regulator s task is made harder insofar as the monopolist has anticompetitive incentives to raise rivals costs on the other hand integration may lead to there being fewer firms in the deregulated sector and hence less duplication of fixed costs the overall welfare comparison between separation and integration is ambiguous as two simple examples illustrate various extensions to the analysis are also considered one of the central questions in debates on regulatory reform is how to organize industries that contain both naturally monopolistic and potentially competitive activities electricity transmission and distribution are characterized by natural monopoly cost conditions but electricity generation is not in the gas industry pipeline services may be naturally monopolistic but supply to larger customers is not in telecommunications natural monopoly is more a feature of local network operations than of long distance operations and is not present in apparatus manufacture and supply or in the provision of value added services in railways while the infrastructure of track and stations is naturally monopolistic the supply of train services might not be policy developments notably those associated with privatization in britain and deregulation in the united states have sometimes led to radical structural reform in these industries at t for decades a vertically integrated monopolist was required under the 1982 settlement of its long running antitrust case against the u s government to divest itself of its local network operations the central electricity generating board cegb in england and wales was restructured both vertically transmission grid activities were separated from generation and horizontally before privatization in 1990 1991 by contrast british telecom was privatized as a vertically integrated dominant firm bt now faces competition from mercury and others especially in the long distance market but its dominance of local network operations might affect competition there and in other areas such as apparatus supply the local network monopoly would of course have to be regulated in any event but its link via ownership to vertically related and potentially competitive activities poses additional regulatory questions many of the efforts of the regulatory body oftel notably in relation to interconnection between bt s and rivals 1 for a general account of the theory and british experience of regulatory reform in the utility industries

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

what determines access to piped water in rural areas evidence from small scale supply systems in rural brazil summary this paper investigates whether small scale water supply systems implemented and operated by water user associations increase access to piped water supply in rural brazil by more than systems by local governments starting from 15 to 16 in the year 2000 access rates in rural areas with water user associations increased to 33 4 in 2010 in areas with local government supply systems access rates only increased to 24 9 based on data from brazilian census and the national water and sanitation survey the empirical analysis in this paper shows that the observed difference is effectively due to project type choice additionally it points toward higher accountability as a potential reason for better results of community based projects in municipalities where social groups requested a new system before the local government started implementation and therefore public awareness for the project was higher the increase in access rates is comparable to the increase in municipalities with water user association projects the same is true if local media is present or political competition in local elections is higher as the effect of project type on access rates might be confounded by simultaneous drivers of project type choice and access rates the quantitative analysis is based on a difference in difference estimator in combination with kernel matching to overcome the endogeneity of project type the treatment effect revealed by this analysis is robust to various specification changes and the robustness checks show no structural differences between treatment and control groups that could bias the results the calculation of matching weights for the kernel matching is informed by semi structured interviews with academics and sector experts in brazil explaining the determinants of project choice the interviews highlight the political economy behind infrastructure expansion in rural brazil