price search and periodic price discounts this paper empirically investigates the interplay between buyer search behavior and firm pricing strategy in a commodity market where many firms compete in price to sell homogeneous products we use the heterogeneity in buyer search cost to rationalize why a firm offers periodic price discounts and enjoys a high profit in such a market an estimation method is proposed to recover the nonparametric distribution of buyer search cost from the price and transaction volume data with both data we show that the search cost distribution can be estimated nonparametrically in a sequential search model and estimation results from a nonsequential search model are robust to the assumption on the maximum number of searches we also show that the commonly observed high low pricing strategy can be an optimal strategy for firms when buyers search for price information sequentially as an empirical application we use the proposed method to estimate the two search models using data on a commodity product sold by a firm

price wars in price setting supergames this paper presents a method of generating price wars in price setting supergames the market is one where symmetric oligopolists produce a differentiated product and use price as a strategic variable prices are posted and can be observed by all there is thus little uncertainty or scope for secret price cutting nevertheless price wars occur they are precipitated by periodic but infrequent demand shocks firms use the wars to learn about changed conditions in the market so that they can calculate the new stationary nash equilibrium learning is modeled in a bayesian fashion via the kalman filter copyright 1989 by the london school of economics and political science

temporary wholesale gasoline price spikes have long lasting retail effects the aftermath of hurricane rita abstract i study u s gasoline prices following hurricane rita to show that short lived geographical differences in the severity of wholesale gasoline price spikes are associated with long lasting geographical differences in retail prices in most u s cities wholesale prices spiked significantly for roughly 2 weeks following the hurricane however in cities where this spike was particularly large retail margins remained higher than in other cities for nearly 2 months high retail margins dissipated more quickly after the hurricane in cities where competition between stations tends to generate cyclical retail price fluctuations independent of wholesale cost movements i discuss why prices may have fallen faster in cities exhibiting retail price cycles and present additional results identifying differences in market characteristics between cities with and without price cycles i find that cycling cities tend to have higher population density and have independent nonrefinery brand stations that are mor

the behavior of prices in the nikkei spot and futures market abstract we examine the relation between the prices of japanese stocks traded on the tokyo stock exchange tse as reflected in the nikkei stock average nsa stock index and the prices of the nsa futures contract traded on the singapore international monetary exchange simex since the inception of trading in september 1986 the nsa futures contract has generally sold at a discount relative to its theoretical value trading restrictions and transaction costs may explain some of this mispricing which has been declining over time as in the u s markets

price setting supergames with capacity constraints this paper examines the role of industry capacity in enforcing collusion in the context of repeated games for a fixed capacity per firm it is shown that changes in the number of firms have a non monotone effect on the best enforceable cartel price this is due to the fact that while an additional firm lowers the share that each of the other firms enjoys at the collusive price it also increases the losses to each firm should the cartel fail

regime switching cointegration tests for the asian stock index futures evidence for msci taiwan nikkei 225 hong kong hang seng and sgx straits times indices this study applies a cointegration system that considers regime shifts in order to study the long run relationship between the stock index and stock index futures markets the msci taiwan nikkei 225 hong kong hang seng and singapore exchange sgx straits times indices are examined the empirical evidence shows that the cointegration system with regime shifts performs better than the usual cointegration system without considering regime shifts

competition and price variation when consumers are loss averse we modify the salop 1979 model of price competition with differentiated products by assuming that consumers are loss averse relative to a reference point given by their recent expectations about the purchase consumers sensitivity to losses in money increases the price responsiveness of demand and hence the intensity of competition at higher relative to lower market prices reducing or eliminating price variation both within and between products when firms face common stochastic costs in any symmetric equilibrium the markup is strictly decreasing in cost even when firms face different cost distributions we identify conditions under which a focal price equilibrium where firms always charge the same focal price exists and conditions under which any equilibrium is focal

bargaining and value we present and analyze a model of noncooperative bargaining among n participants applied to situations describable as games in coalitional form this leads to a unified solution theory for such games that has as special cases the shapley value in the transferable utility tu case the nash bargaining solution in the pure bargaining case and the recently introduced maschler owen consistent value in the general nontransferable utility ntu case moreover we show that any variation in a certain class of our bargaining procedure which generates the shapley value in the tu setup must yield the consistent value in the general ntu setup

retail price cycles and the presence of small firms abstract in many canadian cities retail gasoline prices remain unchanged for weeks at a time while in other cities retail prices cycle increasing sharply and declining slowly in maskin and tirole econometrica 56 1988 571 both price cycles and rigid prices can exist in equilibrium in this article i demonstrate that the existence of these equilibria is dependent on the number of retail outlets operated by the firms constant price equilibria are found to exist only when firms are of similar size however cycle equilibria can be constructed for a wide range of relative sizes

edgeworth cycles with partial price commitment abstract the price commitment model of maskin and tirole 1988 provides an extensively cited foundation for edgeworth cycles we examine the viability of edgeworth cycles when price commitment is partial in the sense that a subset of firms are committed to price in each period if multiple firms are not committed in each period then the existence of edgeworth cycle equilibria requires a demanding convexity condition on the profit function

imperfect information and dynamic conjectural variations this article analyzes oligopoly interaction in an environment where firms are imperfectly informed about the evolution of the market demand curve the analysis develops a two period cournot framework under the assumptions that demand shifts are positively serially correlated that firms never directly observe the demand curve and that firms never observe the previous quantity decisions of rivals firms do draw inferences about the position of the demand curve from past observations on prices consequently the current output of a firm will influence the current market price which will then influence rivals inferences about future demand the future output decisions of rivals will respond accordingly the theory predicts negative dynamic conjectural variations essentially a firm perceives that an increase in its output will lower the current market clearing price which will cause rival firms to think that the demand curve has shifted down and hence induce them to lower their outputs in the future

stationary markov perfect equilibria in discounted stochastic games abstract the existence of stationary markov perfect equilibria in stochastic games is shown under a general condition called decomposable coarser transition kernels this result covers various earlier existence results on correlated equilibria noisy stochastic games stochastic games with finite actions and state independent transitions and stochastic games with mixtures of constant transition kernels as special cases a remarkably simple proof is provided via establishing a new connection between stochastic games and conditional expectations of correspondences new applications of stochastic games are presented as illustrative examples including stochastic games with endogenous shocks and a stochastic dynamic oligopoly model

discounted stochastic games with no stationary nash equilibrium two examples we present two examples of discounted stochastic games each with a continuum of states finitely many players and actions that possess no stationary equilibria the first example has deterministic transitions an assumption undertaken in most of the early applications of dynamics games in economics and perfect information and does not possess even stationary approximate equilibria or markovian equilibria the second example satisfies in addition to stronger regularity assumptions that all transitions are absolutely continuous with respect to a fixed measure an assumption that has been widely used in more recent economic applications this assumption has been undertaken in several positive results on the existence of stationary equilibria in special cases and in particular guarantees the existence of stationary approximate equilibria

intertemporal price discrimination dynamic arrivals and changing values we study the profit maximizing price path of a monopolist selling a durable good to buyers who arrive over time and whose values for the good evolve stochastically the setting is completely stationary with an infinite horizon contrary to the case with constant values optimal prices fluctuate with time we argue that consumers randomly changing values offer an explanation for temporary price reductions that are often observed in practice

coordination need not be a problem abstract in a game of common interest there is one action vector that all players prefer to every other yet there may be multiple pareto ranked nash equilibria in the game and the coordination problem refers to the fact that rational equilibrium play cannot rule out pareto dominated equilibria in this paper i prove that two elements asynchronicity and a finite horizon are sufficient to uniquely select the pareto dominant action vector in subgame perfect equilibrium play asynchronicity may be exogenously specified by the rules of the game alternatively in a game where players choose when to move asynchronicity may emerge as an equilibrium move outcome

shell shocked the impact of foreign entry on the gasoline retail market in china abstract since joining the wto in 2001 restrictions on foreign entry into china s energy sector have been steadily reduced we investigate the impact of royal dutch shell s entry on the pricing behavior of three varieties of gasoline in the retail market of china using a difference in difference pairwise estimator we show that a year after entry the average absolute price differential of gasoline between two cities increased by around 1 4 before falling the following year in other words shell s entry caused prices to diverge but only for a short period of time the largest price effect was found for highly refined fuels in western cities similar results are found when we examine the effect of entry of the top four foreign retailers policy implications are discussed

the pricing of futures and options contracts on the value line index this paper considers the problems peculiar to the value line index because of its use of geometric averaging as regards the pricing of options and futures on that index the value line composite index vlci is an equally weighted geometric average index of nearly 1700 stocks the vlci futures market has existed since 1982 while the vlci options market was established in 1985 this paper provides valuation formulas and analyzes the economic properties of these contracts because of the geometric averaging in the vlci its contingent claims have special properties for example the futures price may fall short of the spot price and the value of a vlci call option may decline when the volatility of the index is increased vlci futures are shown to provide a direct means for duplicating an equally weighted portfolio of the underlying stocks the value line composite index vlci is an unweighted geometric average of stock prices expressed in index form the index on june 30 1961 was set at 100 and subsequent values are compared against it futures contracts on the vlci are traded on the kansas city board of trade kcbt they were the first stock index futures to be traded in the united states starting on february 24 1982 unlike commodity futures contracts no delivery ever takes place instead any open contracts on expiration day are settled in cash according to the actual vlci value 1 more recent market innovations are options on the vlci that have been traded on the philadelphia stock exchange pse since january

a foundation for markov equilibria in sequential games with finite social memory we study stochastic games with an infinite horizon and sequential moves played by an arbitrary number of players we assume that social memory is finite every player except possibly one is finitely lived and cannot observe events that are sufficiently far back in the past this class of games includes games between a long run player and a sequence of short run players and games with overlapping generations of players an equilibrium is purifiable if some close by behaviour is consistent with equilibrium when agents payoffs in each period are perturbed additively and independently we show that only markov equilibria are purifiable when social memory is finite thus if a game has at most one long run player all purifiable equilibria are markov

the temporal price relationship between s p 500 futures and the s p 500 index this paper empirically examines the intraday price relationship between s p 500 futures and the s p 500 index using minute to minute data three stage least squares regression is used to estimate lead and lag relationships with estimates for expiration days of the s p 500 futures compared with estimates for days prior to expiration the results suggest that futures price movements consistently lead index movements by twenty to forty five minutes while movements in the index rarely affect futures beyond one minute

continuous stochastic games of capital accumulation with convex transitions abstract we consider a discounted stochastic game of common property capital accumulation with nonsymmetric players bounded one period extraction capacities and a transition law satisfying a general strong convexity condition we show that the infinite horizon problem has a markov stationary subgame perfect equilibrium and that every finite horizon truncation has a unique markovian equilibrium both in consumption functions which are continuous and nondecreasing and have all slopes bounded above by 1 unlike previous results in strategic dynamic models these properties are reminiscent of the corresponding optimal growth model journal of economic literature classification codes c73 o41 q20

a theory of dynamic oligopoly ii price competition kinked demand curves and edgeworth cycles we provide game theoretic foundations for the classic kinked demand curve equilibrium and edgeworth cycle we analyze a model in which firms take turns choosing prices the model is intended to capture the idea of reactions based on short run commitment in a markov perfect equilibrium mpe a firm s move in any period depends only on the other firm s current price there are multiple mpe s consisting of both kinked demand curve equilibria and edgeworth cycles in any mpe profit is bounded away from the bertrand equilibrium level we show that a kinked demand curve at the monopoly price is the unique symmetric renegotiation proof equilibrium when there is little discounting we then endogenize the timing by allowing firms to move at any time subject to short run commitments we find that firms end up alternating thus vindicating the ad hoc timing assumption of our simpler model we also discuss how the model can be enriched to provide explanations for excess capacity and market sharing keiiwords tacit collusion markov perfect equilibrium kinked demand curve edgeworth cycle excess capacity market sharing endogenous timing

dynamic pricing in the spanish gasoline market a tacit collusion equilibrium abstract during the last twenty years the spanish petrol market has undergone an intensive restructuration process it has changed from being a state owned monopoly to total liberalization and privatization this liberalization process was accompanied by measures that facilitated the creation of a national champion the repsol group which is a huge vertically integrated company with a high market share in all the industry s segments using a dynamic model this paper analyses whether the prices established by companies in the spanish gasoline market after the restructuration process fits with a tacit collusion equilibrium the empirical results show that a strategic behaviour of companies occurs and is compatible with a tacit collusion price strategy so the restructuration process does not seem to have introduced effective competition into the spanish gasoline market

explaining the early discounts on stock index futures the case for disequilibrium 1984 explaining the early discounts on stock index futures the case for disequilibrium financial analysts journal vol 40 no 4 pp 43 47 67

markov puppy dogs and related animals abstract it is shown that steady state markov perfect equilibria of discrete time infinite horizon quadratic adjustment cost games differ from equilibria of their infinitely repeated counterpart games with zero adjustment costs even though no adjustment costs are paid in the steady state in contrast to continuous time games the limit of these equilibria as adjustment costs approach zero is the same as the equilibria of their static counterpart games a classification scheme is presented and it is shown that the taxonomy is identical to that of analogous two stage games such as those analyzed by fudenberg and tirole american economic review papers and proceedings 1984 74 361 366 this classification is useful in that it implies that steady state equilibria need not be explicitly calculated to analyze qualitatively the effects of adjustment costs in strategic environments it is also argued that estimated conjectural variations parameters may capture a well defined property of strategic interaction in a dynamic game

transaction cost influences on the adjustment of industries prices and outputs short run adjustments of prices and outputs in producer goods industries should reflect suppliers continuing quasi contractual relationships with their industrial customers the authors test hypotheses about these relationships by analyzing cross section determinants of time series coefficients showing the rates of adjustment of industries prices and outputs to movements of demand inferred from customers outputs they confirm that price adjustments decrease with the bases for sticky relations with customers the sensitivity of quantity adjustments increases with those bases and decreases with suppliers own adjustment costs they also confirm the standard hypothesis that price flexibility decreases with producer concentration copyright 1987 by mit press

arbitrage in stock index futures the textbook description of arbitrage suggests that it is a straightforward matter of taking offsetting positions in different securities and realizing the arbitrage profit such descriptions however typically ignore the transaction costs that give rise to the arbitrage opportunity in the first place taking proper account of these transactions costs may considerably complicate the problem particularly when as is usually the case the arbitrage potential is restricted this article is concerned withoptimal arbitrage strategies with transaction costs when the arbitrage potential is restricted by position limits the particular case we shall analyze is the standard and poor s sp the corresponding figure for the s p 500 portfolio for the same period was

the perils of unearned foreign income aid remittances and government survival given their political incentives governments in more autocratic polities can strategically channel unearned government and household income in the form of foreign aid and remittances to finance patronage which extends their tenure in political office i substantiate this claim with duration models of government turnover for a sample of 97 countries between 1975 and 2004 unearned foreign income received in more autocratic countries reduces the likelihood of government turnover regime collapse and outbreaks of major political discontent to allay potential concerns with endogeneity i harness a natural experiment of oil price driven aid and remittance flows to poor non oil producing muslim autocracies the instrumental variables results confirm the baseline finding that authoritarian governments can harness unearned foreign income to prolong their rule finally i provide evidence of the underlying causal mechanisms that governments in autocracies use aid and remittances inflows to reduce their expenditures on welfare goods to fund patronage

aggregate pattern of time dependent adjustment rules ii strategic complementarity and endogenous nonsynchronization abstract this paper provides an explanation for an important institutional feature of staggered time dependent adjustment rules assumed in a number of macroeconomic models it identifies strategic complementarity as the crucial factor leading to nonsynchronized decisions in a game theoretic framework the paper first shows that nonsynchronization is the equilibrium outcome in an infinite horizon game in which strategic complementarity is present whether the players choose predetermined or fixed actions by pursuing the interpretation of a nonsynchronized move dynamic game as a series of games with symmetric stackelberg leadership it is further suggested that the relationship between strategic complementarity and the benefit to the stackelberg follower provides the insight to the game theoretic explanation of nonsynchronization the results of this paper reveal a link between strategic complementarity and nonsynchronization two important macroeconomic features journal of economic literature classification numbers e30 l16

bargaining with durable offers and endogenous timing abstract the timing structure of a bargaining game is crucial in the static bargaining model of j nash 1953 econometrica 21 128 140 any division of the surplus is a possible equilibrium in the alternating offer model of a rubinstein 1982 econometrica 50 97 109 there is a unique subgame perfect nash equilibrium spne this paper takes a step toward endogenizing the timing of offers by expanding the strategy space to include the duration of the offer and permitting but not imposing simultaneous moves we find that virtually any division is a possible spne whenever simultaneous accept reject decisions are permitted

ground truthing chinese development finance in africa field evidence from south africa and uganda abstracta new methodology tracking underreported financial flows tuff leverages open source information on development finance by non transparent non western donors if such open source methods prove to be valid and reliable they can enhance our understanding of the causes and consequences of development finance from non transparent donors including but not limited to china but open source methods face charges of inaccuracy in this study we create and field test a replicable ground truthing methodology to verify update and improve open source data with in person interviews and site visits in uganda and south africa ground truthing generally reveals close agreement between open source data and answers to protocol questions from informants with official roles in the chinese funded projects our findings suggest that open source data collection while limited in knowable ways can provide a stronger empirical foundation for research on development finance

corrigendum to discounted stochastic games with no stationary nash equilibrium two examples levy 2013 presented examples of discounted stochastic games that do not have stationary equilibria the second named author has pointed out that one of these examples is incorrect in addition to describing the details of this error this note presents a new example by the first named author that succeeds in demonstrating that discounted stochastic games with absolutely continuous transitions can fail to have stationary equilibria

staggered vs synchronised wage setting in oligopoly abstract this paper analyses the dynamic equilibrium which emerges when wages are bargained upon at different times in the various firms operating in an oligopolistic industry unions set wages the management of the firms the output level and the outcome of this interaction is captured by the game theoretic concept of markov perfect equilibrium the steady state equilibrium is compared with that which would emerge if all wage negotiations occurred simultaneously it is shown that staggered wage setting leads to higher steady state levels of wage and unemployment than synchronised wage setting it is also shown that a longer duration for wage contracts leads other things equal to lower wages and higher employment the final part of the paper shows that allowing for nash bargaining between union and management and for risk averse unions does not alter the conclusions of the paper

kinked norms of behaviour and cooperation this paper revisits a particular norm of behaviour underlying the well known model of kinked demand we show that under some standard regularity conditions this norm of behaviour sustains the efficient outcome in all symmetric games

short sale restrictions implications for stock index arbitrage abstract this paper offers a study of relevant transaction costs when examining the efficiency of stock index futures markets we suggest that a different transaction cost estimate should be used when testing the upper side of the cost of carry model than when testing the lower side of the model empirical evidence indicates that this explains most of the underpricing observed in the finnish stock index futures market

noisy stochastic games this paper establishes existence of a stationary markov perfect equilibrium in general stochastic games with noise a component of the state that is nonatomically distributed and not directly affected by the previous period s state and actions noise may be simply a payoff irrelevant public randomization device delivering known results on the existence of correlated equilibrium as a special case more generally noise can take the form of shocks that enter into players stage payoffs and the transition probability on states the existence result is applied to a model of industry dynamics and to a model of dynamic electoral competition

convergence to symmetry in dynamic strategic models of r d the undiscounted case abstract will r d increase or decrease the asymmetry between firms over time we examine this issue in the context of a dynamic alternate move duopoly model of non cooperative r d the asymmetry we consider is with respect to the initial stocks of technological knowledge which provides one firm a greater potential for current and future profits in the product market utilizing a value loss process constructed from the optimality equation of dynamic programming we show that for the undiscounted case the asymmetry between the firms disappears over time we obtain this convergence to symmetry result by imparting a temporal character to r d through the notion that r d investment cannot be changed instantaneously by allowing research externalities complementarity or substitutability between own and appropriated r d and either increasing decreasing or constant returns to scale in the production of technical knowledge from own and rival r d

conjectural variations strategies in accelerated cournot games abstract a family of constant conjectural variations strategies is defined and examined in the natural context of infinitely repeated cournot duopoly games with discounting it is shown that any pair of linear reaction functions in the family gives rise to a unique pair of quantities in stationary equilibrium as the conjectures and discount parameter vary the sum of the stationary quantities will vary anywhere between the competitive and the monopoly outcomes equilibrium is strongly stable and credible in the sense of exhibiting a variation of selten s subgame perfection provided that firms can react quickly enough to one another s actions

does the european natural gas market pass the competitive benchmark of the theory of storage indirect tests for three major trading points this paper presents the first comparative analysis of the relationship between natural gas storage utilization and price patterns at three major european trading points using two indirect tests developed by fama and french 1987 1988 that are applied in other commodity markets we impose the no arbitrage condition to model the efficiency of the natural gas market the results reveal that while operators of european storage facilities realize seasonal arbitrage profits substantial arbitrage potentials remain we suggest that the indirect approach is well suited to provide market insights for periods with limited data we find that overall market performance differs substantially from the competitive benchmark of the theory of storage

defending against rival innovation we analyze how an incumbent defends its competitive advantage with a focus on the under examined methods of actively defending against the threats posed by rival innovation we describe delineate and analyze the set of such defenses and their likely effects the set of such defenses differs substantially from many standard defenses such as those aimed at defeating the threat of imitation the further study of these pre emptive innovation defenses is important because these defenses are different and because they can substantially affect the sustainability of firm profits and the pace of different of types of innovation

taxes and the pricing of stock index futures stock index futures prices are generally below the level predicted by simple arbitrage models this paper suggests that the discrepancy between the actual and predicted prices is caused by taxes capital gains and losses are not taxed until they are realized as constantinides demonstrates in a recent paper this gives stockholders a valuable timing option if the stock price drops the investor can pass part of the loss on to the government by selling the stock on the other hand if the stock price rises the investor can postpone the tax by not realizing the gain since this option is not available to stock index futures traders the futures prices will be lower than standard no tax models predict on 24 february 1982 the kansas city board of trade began trading futures contracts on the value line average stock index during the next two months both the chicago mercantile exchange and the new york futures exchange also initiated trading in stock index futures although these contracts are actively traded their prices have puzzled both practitioners and academics the observed

cournot and the oligopoly problem cournot s recherches sw les principes mathpmatiques de la thiorie des richesses 1838 contribution to economic theory ranges from the formulation of the concept of demand function to the analysis of price determination in different market structures from monopoly to perfect competition he is credited for being the pioneer in the use of mathematics in economic analysis nevertheless cournot is most known for his theory of oligopoly cournot claimed that prices would also be determined under oligopolistic rivalry he envisioned firms the celebrated mineral water producers competing independently deciding about their production levels and bringing to the market the output where a price emerges from the interaction of supply and demand an equilibrium is reached when the output of any firm is a best response to the other firms outputs that is when each firm chooses an output level that maximizes profits given the outputs chosen by the rivals the equilibrium involves a price above the marginal cost of production cournot thought furthermore that this equilibrium would be stable in the sense that a departure from it would be self correcting through a series of reactions of the firms the disequilibrium dynamics would be governed by the best response functions of the firms that is by the functions that give the optimal output of a firm in terms of the outputs of the rivals cournot also evoked the question of why is it that firms do not come to an understanding and agree on sharing the market at the monopoly price the answer is that from the point of view of a firm if the rivals follow the agreement it is in the interest of the firm to depart from it since this way it can increase its profits in other words there is an incentive to cheat cournot thought that monopoly or cartel type agreements could only be maintained by means of a formal engagement p 83 our author also considered competition of

endogenous price commitment sticky and leadership pricing evidence from the italian petrol market this article studies dynamic pricing strategies in the italian gasoline market before and after the market leader unilaterally announced its commitment to adopt a sticky pricing policy using daily italian firm level prices and weekly average eu prices we show that the effect of the new policy was twofold first it facilitated price alignment and coordination on price changes after the policy change the observed pricing pattern shifted from cost based to sticky leadership pricing second using a dif in dif estimation and a synthetic control group we show that the causal effect of the new policy was to significantly increase prices through sticky leadership pricing our paper highlights the importance of price commitment by a large firm in order to sustain tacit collusion

bertrand edgeworth equilibrium with a large number of firms abstract we examine a model of price competition with strictly convex costs where the firms simultaneously decide on both price and quantity are free to supply less than the quantity demanded and there is discrete pricing if firms are symmetric then for a large class of residual demand functions there is a unique equilibrium in pure strategies whenever for a fixed grid size the number of firms is sufficiently large moreover this equilibrium price is within a grid unit of the competitive price the results go through to a large extent when the firms are asymmetric or they are symmetric but play a two stage game and the tie breaking rule is weakly manipulable

the saga of the first stock index futures contract benchmarks models and learning in the presence of imperfect or perturbed benchmarks pricing based on relative valuation or arbitrage can be affected adversely this study highlights persistent pricing irregularities in the kansas city value line kcvl stock index futures market this contract is especially interesting because the underlying benchmark underwent a midstream change in definition from a complex equally weighted geometric index to an equally weighted arithmetic index empirical analysis reveals that during a four year period the market displayed herd like behavior and priced the kcvl geometric contract using the simple but wrong cost of carry benchmark model a dramatic change occurs around the publication of the eytan harpaz 1986 model when the market turns efficient from the perspective of this new model the market appears to have succumbed initially to a bad information cascade primarily because arbitrage was difficult to understand and carry out under complex benchmarking the evidence provides empirical extension to the observational social learning paradigms of simon 1955 banerjee 1992 and bikhchandani hirshleifer and welch 1992 that lead to behavioral herding and information cascades

a dynamic model of entry and exit in a growing industry the potential demand in a new industry evolves over time demand is initially low but advertising by the industry s early entrants can speed up demand growth however there is intrinsic uncertainty of the demand level in each period and uncertainty of the demand evolution path which can be affected by the underlying economic environment we construct a dynamic model that features the stochastically and endogenously expanding demand of a new industry and we investigate the optimal entry and exit behavior of firms as the industry evolves we find that firms incentive to enter early depends critically on the cost that early entrants have to pay in developing the market when the cost is high and the benefit spills over to potential entrants firms have an incentive to wait and the probability of entry can increase with the number of incumbents under certain circumstances firms entry strategy is also influenced by the transition of economic states firms are more likely to enter under a state that shows the prospect of demand taking off soon we also find that in the early stage of an industry higher demand uncertainty can induce faster entry

more dollars than sense refining our knowledge of development finance using aiddata summary in this introductory essay to the special issue we introduce a new dataset of foreign assistance aiddata that covers more bilateral and multilateral donors and more types of aid than existing datasets while also improving project level information about the purposes and activities funded by aid we utilize that data to provide a brief overview of important trends in foreign aid contributors to this special issue draw on aiddata as well as other sources to analyze aid transparency new donors not previously described or analyzed aid allocation and aid effectiveness our recurring theme in this introductory essay is that aiddata and these initial academic projects refine rather than revolutionize our understanding of aid the database has added significant numbers of new projects dollar amounts donors and details about those projects though there is much more yet to add we worry that aid debates have been driven by too little information and that many claims are based on limited or very poor evidence rectifying these problems will not be instantaneous refining knowledge takes a lot of time and hard work the common feature of the papers in this special issue is their careful attention to nuance and detail in spite of what some recent authors have claimed aid is neither a simple solution nor a sufficient cause of most problems in developing countries its motivations distribution and effects are complex and shifting capturing this complexity requires detailed data careful thought and sophisticated methods that allow scholars to make conditional causal and descriptive inferences 2011 elsevier ltd all rights reserved