why is the market for long term care insurance so small abstract long term care represents one of the largest uninsured financial risks facing the elderly in the united states we present evidence of supply side market failures in the private long term care insurance market in particular the typical policy purchased exhibits premiums marked up substantially above expected benefits it also provides very limited coverage relative to the total expenditure risk however we present additional evidence suggesting that the existence of supply side market failures is unlikely by itself to be sufficient to explain the very small size of the private long term care insurance market in particular we find enormous gender differences in pricing that do not translate into differences in coverage and we show that more comprehensive policies are widely available if seldom purchased at similar loads to purchased policies this suggests that factors limiting demand for insurance are also likely to be important in this market our evidence also sheds light on the likely nature of these demand side factors

learning your earning are labor income shocks really very persistent in this paper we examine the risk situation facing individuals in the labor market the current consensus in the literature is that the labor income process has a large random walk component we argue two points first the estimates of persistence from income data appear to be upward biased due to the omission of heterogeneity in income pro les across the population that would be implied for example by a human capital model with heterogeneity when we allow for dierences in pro les the estimated persistence falls from 0 99 to about 0 8 moreover the main evidence against pro le heterogeneity in the existing literature that the autocorrelations of income changes are small and typically negative is also replicated by the pro le heterogeneity model we estimate casting doubt on the previous interpretation of this evidence second we embed this process in a life cycle model to examine how it alters individuals consumption saving decision we assume that as seems plausible individuals do not know their pro les exactly at the beginning of life but learn in a bayesian way with successive income observations we nd that learning is very slow and aects consumption decision throughout the life cycle the model generates substantial rise in consumption inequality over the life cycle which matches empirical observations deaton and paxson 1994 moreover the shape of the age inequality pro le is non concave as in the data but unlike in a model with very persistent shocks finally the consumption pro les of college graduates are steeper than those of high school graduates in the model consistent with the data because they face a wider dispersion of and hence uncertainty about income growth rates overall this evidence indicates that income shocks may be signi cantly less persistent than what is currently assumed

income inequality in france 1901 1998 this paper uses data from income tax returns 1915 98 wage tax returns 1919 98 and inheritance tax returns 1902 94 in order to compute homogeneous yearly estimates of income wage and wealth inequality for twentieth century france the main conclusion is that the decline in income inequality that took place during the first half of the century was mostly accidental in france and possibly in a number of other countries as well wage inequality has been extremely stable in the long run and the secular decline in income inequality is for the most part a capital income phenomenon holders of large fortunes were badly hurt by major shocks during the 1914 45 period and they were never able to fully recover from these shocks probably because of the dynamic effects of progressive taxation on capital accumulation and pretax income inequality

endogenous trading constraints with incomplete asset markets abstract this paper endogenizes the borrowing constraints on capital in a production economy with incomplete markets we find that these limits get looser with income a property that is consistent with us data on credit limits the framework with endogenous limits is then used to study the effects of a revenue neutral tax reform that eliminates capital income taxes our results illustrate that it is very important to take into account the effects of tax policies on the limits throughout the transition these effects can be big enough to change the overall conclusion about the desirability of a tax reform

foreign ownership and corporate income taxation an empirical evaluation abstract foreign ownership allows countries to effectively export part of their corporate tax burden hence countries with high foreign ownership are expected to impose relatively high corporate taxes the findings of this paper suggest that there indeed is an economically significant positive relationship between foreign ownership and tax burdens in europe already significant foreign ownership levels in europe offer an explanation for the absence of a race to the bottom in corporate tax levels

self enforcing wage contracts we examine long term wage contracts between a risk neutral firm and a risk averse worker when both can costlessly renege and buy or sell labour at a random spot market wage a self enforcing contract is one in which neither party ever has an incentive to renege in the optimum self enforcing contract wages are sticky they are less variable than spot market wages and positively serially correlated they are updated by a simple rule around each spot wage is a time invariant interval and the contract wage changes each period by the smallest amount necessary to bring it into the current interval

wealth distribution in life cycle economies abstract this paper compares the age wealth distribution produced in life cycle economies to the corresponding distribution in the us economy the idea is to calibrate the model economies to match features of the us earnings distribution and then examine the wealth distribution implications of the model economies the findings are that the calibrated model economies with earnings and lifetime uncertainty can replicate measures of both aggregate wealth and transfer wealth in the us furthermore the model economies produce the us wealth gini and a significant fraction of the wealth inequality within age groups however the model economies produce less than half the fraction of wealth held by the top 1 percent of us households

shirking and sorting in a political market with finite lived politicians this paper analyzes principal agent slack in the context of a political market composed of voters challengers and incumbents the introduction of a last period via finite livedness in combination with voters imperfect information about politicians preferences causes time varying shirking behavior on the part of politicians political markets eventually sort out those politicians with significantly deviant policy preferences potentially providing a solution to the last period problem and enabling politicians to make credible commitments in the extreme sorting can insure that it is not worthwhile for potential shirkers to run for office a systematic relationship between political shirking and number of terms in office may exist and depends on how quickly sorting takes place we show that evidence of little if any shirking is quite consistent with politicians having diverse and strongly held policy preferences in addition if sorting is a significant feature of political markets cross sectional studies will tend to oversample little and non shirking politicians compared to longitudinal studies reinterpretations of existing empirical work are also discussed

comparing inequality and mobility in linear models comment abstract this comment shows that peng 2018 s theorem 2 requires amendment a new set of relatively stricter assumptions is provided under which peng 2018 s findings in particular the asymmetric impact of capital and income risk on wealth mobility hold true and the approach developed therein proves suited for comparing stationary distributions of linear stochastic models

labor income and risky assets under market incompleteness evidence from italian data abstract theory suggests that uninsurable income risk induces individuals to accumulate assets as a precautionary reserve of value most assets however bear rate of return risk that can be diversified only if every asset is traded by a large number of individuals and arbitrage is frictionless using italian micro data we find evidence of income and asset risks that affect consumption italian households are particularly well insured against illness but not against job losses moreover we detect a positive yet weak effect of asset holding on the variability of consumption streams across households

structural estimation of stock market participation costs abstract this paper develops and estimates a dynamic model of stock market participation where consumers decisions regarding stock market participation are influenced by participation costs the practical significance of the participation costs is considered as being a channel through which financial education programs can affect consumers investment decisions using household data from the panel study of income dynamics i estimate the magnitude of the participation cost allowing for individual heterogeneity in it the results show the average stock market participation cost is about 4 6 of labor income however it varies substantially over consumers life the model successfully predicts the level of the observed participation rate and the increasing pattern of stock market participation over the consumers life cycle

matching grants and ricardian equivalence this paper investigates the effectiveness of matching grants to correct for interjurisdictional spillovers in the light of bernheim general neutrality result indeed this result suggests that the usual argument that matching grants are needed to internalize the externality arising from the existence of interjuridictional spillovers is an artifact of the assumption that jurisdictions neglect the impact that their decisions have on the federal budget relaxing this assumption and using a classical model where the arbitrage resulting from labor mobility implies that redistribution has the properties of a public good we find that matching grants are relevant although somewhat less ective we also find that optimal matching rates are independent of the number of jurisdictions and their strategic variables contrarily to the case where jurisdictions ignore the impact of their decisions on the federal budget

comparing inequality and mobility in linear models abstract this note shows that income risk and capital risk affect mobility and inequality asymmetrically in the linear model analysed by zhu 2013 inequality responds to changes in both income risk and capital risk while mobility responds to changes in capital risk and may not respond to changes in income risk consequently income tax reduces wealth inequality without affecting wealth mobility while tax on capital returns reduces wealth inequality and increases wealth mobility

has consumption inequality mirrored income inequality we revisit to what extent the increase in income inequality since 1980 was mirrored by consumption inequality we do so by constructing an alternative measure of consumption expenditure using a demand system to correct for systematic measurement error in the consumer expenditure survey our estimation exploits the relative expenditure of high and low income households on luxuries versus necessities this double differencing corrects for measurement error that can vary over time by good and income we find consumption inequality tracked income inequality much more closely than estimated by direct responses on expenditures jel d31 d63 e21

factor mobility and fiscal policy in the eu policy issues and analytical approaches this paper outlines some of the implications of factor market integration for fiscal policy in the countries of the eu and for the eu itself it draws particular attention to the dynamic dimensions of factor market integration and identifies some of the many issues for further research on these topics the past century has seen dramatic growth in the role of the public sector in the countries of western europe both by extensive regulatory as well as fiscal interventions by far the most important reason for the growth of public spending has been the increase in the level of redistributive or social insurance activities of governments these include public pension systems and health care programs as well as a host of other policies tax policies also have the effect of redistributing income among different groups european economic integration including prospective enlargement of the eu contributes to the freer movement of factors of production such as labor and capital both within the eu and between the eu and neighboring regions integration of factor markets affects the distribution of income and factor movements depend on fiscal incentives affecting the benefits and costs of redistributive policies

absentee ownership of immobile factors and environmental policies in a federation this paper studies the effects of absentee ownership of immobile factors on environmental policy of a jurisdiction in a federation an increase in emissions in a jurisdiction increases factor incomes but part of the increased factor incomes goes to absentee owners while only the residents of the jurisdiction bear the full disutility in addition the increase in emissions in a jurisdiction attracts capital and decreases capital in other jurisdictions reducing the incomes that the residents of the jurisdiction earn from owning immobile factors in other jurisdictions absentee ownership thus reduces the marginal benefit of an increase in emissions while it leaves the marginal cost unaffected from the jurisdiction s perspective as a consequence absentee ownership makes environmental policy of a jurisdiction too stringent relative to the efficient level the paper also considers the effects of absentee ownership on environmental policy when goods trade is allowed

cross country evidence on the distributional impact of fiscal policy abstractthis article provides new evidence on the distributional effects of fiscal policy using data on a panel of oecd economies over the last four decades we study how four measures of income in

signaling through obstruction obstruction is a time honored tradition in legislative politics in many cases obstruction can be foreseen to be ultimately unsuccessful and in some of these cases purely costly even to the obstructor in this article i construct a model of obstruction in which the individual obstruction of a fait accompli policy proposal is potentially informative precisely and ironically because it is inefficient the theory based on the legislators reelection motivations offers comparative static predictions about the frequency and length of obstruction as a function of the individual characteristics of the legislator and his or her electoral setting including the legislator s value for reelection the appeal of the legislator s challenger the legislator s individual specific seniority competence and or valence and the visibility of the legislator s obstruction efforts to the voter finally the theory illustrates the potential for transparency of legislators individual actions to be strictly welfare reducing even in the absence of pandering

power laws in economics an introduction paul samuelson 1969 was once asked by a physicist for a law in economics that was both nontrivial and true this is a difficult challenge as many roughly true results are in the end rather trivial for example demand curves slope down while many nontrivial results in economics in fact require too much sophistication and rationality on the part of the agents to actually hold true in practice 1 samuelson answered the law of comparative advantage the story does not say whether the physicist was satisfied the law of comparative advantage is a qualitative law and not a quantitative one as is the rule in physics indeed many of the insights of economics seem to be qualitative with many fewer reliable

severing the electoral connection shirking in the contemporary congress studies of representation focusing on legislative shirking tend to offer an interesting tension when the opportunity presents itself it seems that exiting members do not change their votinq behavior ideological shirking but do reduce their effort level by voting less participatory shirking our analysis avoids the pitfalls of prior studies by defining a simple quasi experimental research design contrasting those certain that they are seeking reelection with those sure that they are departing the house for the102nd 103rd and 104th congresses 1991 1996 we measure changes in ideology and participation using all roll call votes in the last six months of election years controlling for possible member selection effects and short term influences and show that legislators are disposed toward ideological and participatory shirking while selection effects are unimportant thus we reconcile results seemingly at odds and suggest that policies affecting member turnover such as term limits can interfere with representation a fundamental issue concerning political representation is the extent to which the necessity of reelection constrains officeholders if incumbents plan to retire thus freeing themselves of their electoral shackles or if they pursue higher office and face a distinct constituency will they behave differently or do members continue to behave in the same manner even in the absence of an electoral connection to the districts they represent answers to such questions have important implications for how we understand and model the representative process additionally they have ramifications for the likely impact of public policy choices that affect member turnover rates such as the imposition of term limits on the political system a primary means of drawing inferences regarding shirking which we simply define as legislator behavior that differs from what would be observed given perfect monitoring and effective punishment by constituents is to determine if politicians change their behavior when electoral discipline is removed most notably scholars examine members actions during their last period in office on the grounds that those voluntarily departing can behave according to a distinct set of preferences even if they run afoul of their districts or of their electoral coalitions empirical results on final period behavior are voluminous and sometimes contradictory bender and lott 1996 nevertheless two general inferences seem to have gathered support first there is little evidence for shirking in terms of vote choice ideological shirking while as we will discuss shortly there are a variety of potential explanations for such nonfindings one intuitive and frequently offered reason is that they reflect member specific selection effects this implies that

the income and tax share of very high income households 1960 1995 this paper presents new information on the fraction of adjusted gross income and of wages and salaries that is reported by taxpayers in the top one half of one percent of the income distribution this corresponds to roughly five hundred thousand households in the late 1990s this paper relies on data from the treasury s individual income tax model for the period 1960 1995 the definition of adjusted gross income is standardized so that changes in the tax law do not affect the measured concentration of agi the results suggest that the share of agi reported by the highest income households increased significantly between the early 1980s and the mid 1990s with most of the increase taking place in the years immediately following the tax reform act of 1986 while we find some evidence of transitory changes in the concentration of income around major tax changes which may be the result of income retiming by high income taxpayers re timing does not seem to explain most of the changes since 1986 this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

wealth inequality and intergenerational links previous work has had difficulty generating household saving behaviour that makes the distribution of wealth much more concentrated than that of labour earnings and that makes the richest households hold onto large amounts of wealth even during very old age i construct a quantitative general equilibrium overlapping generations model in which parents and children are linked by accidental and voluntary bequests and by earnings ability i show that voluntary bequests can explain the emergence of large estates while accidental bequests alone cannot and that adding earnings persistence within families increases wealth concentration even more i also show that the introduction of a bequest motive generates lifetime savings profiles more consistent with the data

recursive preferences learning and large deviations we estimate the relative contribution of recursive preferences versus adaptive learning in accounting for the tail thickness of price dividends rents ratios we find that both of these sources of volatility account for volatility in liquid stocks but not illiquid housing assets

political accountability and sequential policymaking abstract we develop a model of political accountability with sequential policymaking when a bureaucrat s actions are transparent his overseer faces a political time inconsistency problem she is tempted to revise her retention rule in the middle of the policymaking process as a result the bureaucrat s equilibrium behavior overemphasizes later tasks if the overseer knows the technology by which policies translate into outcomes then she can eliminate these distortions using task specific budget caps however if the overseer is uncertain about this technology such budget caps introduce ex post inefficiency when uncertainty is sufficiently large and consequential the overseer prefers an institutional environment with a fungible budget and no transparency such an environment allows the overseer to exploit the bureaucrat s expertise though at the cost of weaker overall incentives

who bears aggregate fluctuations and how the consumption of high consumption households is more exposed to fluctuations in aggregate consumption and income than that of low consumption households in the consumer expenditure cex survey the exposure to aggregate consumption growth of households in the top 10 percent of the consumption distribution in the cex is about five times that of households in the bottom 80 percent given real aggregate per capita consumption growth about 3 percentage points less than its historical mean during the past year these figures predict that the ratio of consumption of the top 10 percent to the bottom 80 percent has fallen by about 15 percentage points relative to trend using income data from piketty and saez 2003 we show that the income especially the wage income of rich households is more exposed to aggregate fluctuations so their higher income exposure is a likely contributor to their higher consumption exposure finally we find a striking change in the exposure of the incomes of high income households prior to the early 1980 s the incomes of high income households were not more exposed to aggregate fluctuations thus while high income households currently bear an inordinately large share of aggregate fluctuations this is a recent occurrence this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

income inequality in the united states 1913 1998 this paper presents new homogeneous series on top shares of income and wages from 1913 to 1998 in the united states using individual tax returns data top income and wages shares display a u shaped pattern over the century our series suggest that the large shocks that capital owners experienced during the great depression and world war ii have had a permanent effect on top capital incomes we argue that steep progressive income and estate taxation may have prevented large fortunes from fully recovering from these shocks top wage shares were flat before world war ii dropped precipitously during the war and did not start to recover before the late 1960s but are now higher than before world war ii as a result the working rich have replaced the rentiers at the top of the income distribution

accounting for the u s earnings and wealth inequality we show that a theory of earnings and wealth inequality based on the optimal choices of ex ante identical households that face uninsured idiosyncratic shocks to their endowments of efficiency labor units accounts for the u s earnings and wealth inequality almost exactly

understanding consumption smoothing evidence from the u s consumer expenditure data consumption models with endogenous debt constraints differ from standard incomplete markets models in their predictions about an individual household s ability to smooth consumption across time and states of the world in this paper we develop these differences both theoretically and quantitatively we then use data from the us consumer expenditure survey ce to assess along which dimensions the predictions of these models are consistent with the empirical evidence we find that both type models fail to fully account for the data and argue that a model that combines aspects of both might be more succesfull

random walk to innovation why productivity follows a power law abstract this paper examines a search model in which knowledge is created as rational but poorly informed innovators obtain new ideas from combinations of existing ideas we assume that the productivity of an idea is stochastic and depends on the productivity of the parental ideas importantly we assume that the contribution of these parents to the productivity of the final idea is enhanced by prior use of these in knowledge creation we identify conditions on the search costs leading to two properties 1 the tail of the distribution of the productivity of innovations is a power law and 2 the number of citations i e times an idea is used in the process of innovation follows a displaced power law both these properties are consistent with the available empirical evidence on the productivity of innovations and on patent citations

on the heterogeneous welfare gains and losses from trade how are the gains and losses from trade distributed across individuals within a country first we document that tradable goods constitute a larger fraction of expenditures for poor households second we build a trade model with nonhomothetic preferences to generate the documented relationship between tradable expenditure shares income and wealth and uninsurable earnings risk to generate heterogeneity in income and wealth third we use the calibrated model to quantify the differential welfare gains and losses from trade along the income and wealth distribution in a numerical exercise we permanently reduce trade costs so as to generate a rise in import share of gdp commensurate with that seen in the data from 2001 to 2014 we find that households in the lowest wealth decile experience welfare gains over the transition measured by permanent consumption equivalents that are 67 percent larger than those in the highest wealth decile

the effects of congressional appropriation committee membership on the distribution of federal research funding to universities i introduction in 1994 members of the republican party pledged to seek legislation to impose term limits on members of congress this pledge stemmed from the popular belief that senior members of congress tend to promote personal interests or are more influenced by lobbying efforts that may not be representative of their constituents today term limits continue to be discussed but have not been enacted instead many members have focused their energies toward minimizing the time spent on any particular committee of congress believing that tenure on a committee is a more serious concern than simple tenure in congress implicit in these concerns is the issue whether as incumbent politicians plan to retire they will behave differently and if so whether tenure on a congressional committee exacerbates this behavior this article explores the role of membership on the appropriations committee on the distribution of federal research funding to universities specifically it explores whether funding is diverted to these universities because politicians use their position on a committee to promote personal or constituent interests previous research on shirking compares the voting records of politicians on certain issues with demographic and economic characteristics of the politicians constituents this article explores the issue of shirking differently i explore how membership on congressional appropriations committees affects the distribution of federal research funding to universities i look at two types of relationships between the members and the universities first i consider the relationship between members and the universities that are located in the members districts states in the case of senators second i examine the relationship between members and their undergraduate alma mater i use district representa tion to proxy favoritism that reflects a politician s constituents given that in most instances an alma mater affiliation is not the same as district representation i use alma mater affiliation to proxy favoritism that reflects the politician s personal interests federal research funding accounts for more than 60 of research funding received by research universities previous research has shown a positive impact of federal funding on research outcomes see adams and griliches 1998 arora and gambardella 1997 connolly 1997 payne and siow 2002 and payne 2001 except for payne and siow 2002 however these articles do not consider that political diversion of funds may promote or detract from research productivity as with any other federal program this article concentrates on the impact of membership on the house and senate appropriations committees because they wield the greatest power in the allocation of funding 1 using a panel data set spanning 26 years i explore how changes in the composition of the appropriations committees affects the distribution of research funding after controlling for the heterogeneity that exists across different universities the results suggest that both district representation and alma mater affiliation matter thus there is evidence of shirking for personal interests and evidence of members representing their constituents with respect to the representation of one s constituents the strongest results suggest that public universities benefit from representation on both the senate and house committees private universities however only benefit from representation in the senate with respect to alma mater affiliations the results suggest again that public universities benefit from representation on both the senate and house committees private universities also benefit from representation on both the senate and house committees the results also suggest that the tenure of the member on the committee matters as does whether the member is a part of the majority party in power in the congressional chamber

on the existence and uniqueness of stationary equilibrium in bewley economies with production abstract i prove existence of stationary recursive competitive equilibrium in bewley economies with production under specifications in which i the utility function is allowed to be unbounded and ii the underlying discrete idiosyncratic productivity process can take any form aside from mild restrictions some of the intermediate results provide theoretical basis for assumptions often made in the quantitative macroeconomics literature by providing an example i illustrate that the equilibrium is not necessarily unique even under typical specifications of the model and discuss the underlying reasons for multiplicity

inferring labor income risk and partial insurance from economic choices this paper uses the information contained in the joint dynamics of individuals labor earnings and consumption choice decisions to quantify both the amount of income risk that individuals face and the extent to which they have access to informal insurance against this risk we accomplish this task by using indirect inference to estimate a structural consumption savings model in which individuals both learn about the nature of their income process and partly insure shocks via informal mechanisms in this framework we estimate i the degree of partial insurance ii the extent of systematic differences in income growth rates iii the precision with which individuals know their own income growth rates when they begin their working lives iv the persistence of typical labor income shocks v the tightness of borrowing constraints and vi the amount of measurement error in the data in implementing indirect inference we find that an auxiliary model that approximates the true structural equations of the model which are not estimable works very well with negligible small sample bias the main substantive findings are that income shocks are moderately persistent systematic differences in income growth rates are large individuals have substantial amounts of information about their income growth rates and about one half of income shocks are smoothed via partial insurance putting these findings together the amount of uninsurable lifetime income risk that individuals perceive is substantially smaller than what is typically assumed in calibrated macroeconomic models with incomplete markets

barriers to competition and the effect on political shirking 1953 1992 economists and political scientists have offered a variety of explanations for why legislators might rationally choose to ignore the preferences of their constituents political parties and presidents the broad conclusion of this literature is that there is an element of shirking in congressional voting the objective of this paper is to suggest that the effects of shirking in congressional voting may have increased over time largely in response to the raising of barriers to competition in congressional elections thereby enabling legislators to vote their own preferences without fear of losing reelection we use a quasi experimental design that controls for the effects of party region electoral safety presidential control of the white house and constituency factors in isolating the causal effects of barriers to entry on a continuous series of roll calls regarding the raising of the debt limit between 1953 and 1992 we find that shirking in legislative voting on debt limit legislation is a post 1970s phenomenon

pareto and piketty the macroeconomics of top income and wealth inequality abstract since the early 2000s research by thomas piketty emmanuel saez and their coauthors has revolutionized our understanding of income and wealth inequality in this paper i highlight some of the key empirical facts from this research and comment on how they relate to macroeconomics and to economic theory more generally one of the key links between data and theory is the pareto distribution the paper describes simple mechanisms that give rise to pareto distributions for income and wealth and considers the economic forces that influence top inequality over time and across countries for example it is in this context that the role of the famous r g expression is best understood

nonparametric methods and local time based estimation for dynamic power law distributions summary this paper introduces nonparametric econometric methods that characterize general power law distributions under basic stability conditions these methods extend the literature on power laws in the social sciences in several directions first we show that any stationary distribution in a random growth setting is shaped entirely by two factors the idiosyncratic volatilities and reversion rates a measure of cross sectional mean reversion for different ranks in the distribution this result is valid regardless of how growth rates and volatilities vary across different economic agents and hence applies to gibrat s law and its extensions second we present techniques to estimate these two factors using panel data third we describe how our results imply predictability as higher ranked processes must on average grow more slowly than lower ranked processes we employ our empirical methods using data on commodity prices and show that our techniques accurately describe the empirical distribution of relative commodity prices we also show that rank based out of sample forecasts of future commodity prices outperform random walk forecasts at a 1 month horizon

inheritance and wealth inequality evidence from population registers we use new population wide register data on inheritances and wealth in sweden to estimate the causal impact of inheritances on wealth inequality we find that inheritances reduce relative wealth inequality e g the gini coefficient falls by 5 10 percent but that absolute dispersion increases examining different parts of the wealth distribution we find that the top decile s wealth share decreases substantially whereas the wealth share of the bottom half increases from a negative to a positive share in essence wealthier heirs inherit larger amounts but less wealthy heirs inherit more relative to their pre inheritance wealth we also find that post inheritance behavioral adjustments mitigate the equalizing effect of inheritances because less wealthy heirs consume larger shares of their inheritances moreover we find that the swedish inheritance tax reduced the equalizing inheritance effect but that the redistribution of tax revenues could reverse this result finally we show that inheritances increase wealth mobility

risk uncertainty and the dynamics of inequality abstract the dynamics of wealth inequality are studied in a continuous time blanchard yaari model investment returns are idiosyncratic and subject to knightian uncertainty in response agents formulate robust portfolio policies these policies are nonhomothetic wealthy agents invest a higher fraction of their wealth in uncertain assets yielding higher mean returns this produces a feedback mechanism that amplifies inequality it also produces an accelerated rate of convergence which helps resolve a puzzle recently identified by gabaix et al 2016 an empirically plausible increase in uncertainty can account for about half of the recent increase in top wealth shares

income and wealth heterogeneity in the macroeconomy how do movements in the distribution of income and wealth affect the macroeconomy we analyze this question using a calibrated version of the stochastic growth model with partially uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and movements in aggregate productivity our main finding is that in the stationary stochastic equilibrium the behavior of the macroeconomic aggregates can be almost perfectly described using only the mean of the wealth distribution this result is robust to substantial changes in both parameter values and model specification our benchmark model whose only difference from the representative agent framework is the existence of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk displays far less cross sectional dispersion and skewness in wealth than u s data however an extension that relies on a small amount of heterogeneity in thrift does succeed in replicating the key features of the wealth data furthermore this extension features aggregate time series that depart significantly from permanent income behavior

earnings inequality and other determinants of wealth inequality abstract we study the relation between the distribution of labor earnings and the distribution of wealth we show theoretically as well as empirically that while labor earnings and precautionary savings are important determinants of wealth inequality factors they cannot by themselves account for the thick tail of the large top shares in the observed distribution of wealth other determinants like stochastic returns to wealth as well as savings rates and rates of returns increasing in wealth need to be accounted for

the distribution of wealth and fiscal policy in economies with finitely lived agents we study the dynamics of the distribution of wealth in an overlapping generation economy with finitely lived agents and intergenerational transmission of wealth financial markets are incomplete exposing agents to both labor and capital income risk we show that the stationary wealth distribution is a pareto distribution in the right tail and that it is capital income risk rather than labor income that drives the properties of the right tail of the wealth distribution we also study analytically the dependence of the distribution of wealth of wealth inequality in particular on various fiscal policy instruments like capital income taxes and estate taxes and on different degrees of social mobility we show that capital income and estate taxes can significantly reduce wealth inequality as do institutions favoring social mobility finally we calibrate the economy to match the lorenz curve of the wealth distribution of the u s economy

dynamic estimation of ideal points for the us congress theories of candidate positioning suggest that candidates will respond dynamically to their electoral environment because of the difficulty of obtaining bridge votes most existing approaches for estimating the ideal points of members of congress generate static ideal points or ideal points that move linearly over time we propose an approach for dynamic ideal point estimation using project vote smart s national political awareness test to construct bridge votes we use our dynamic estimates to measure aggregate change to measure individual level change and to study the institutional and structural factors that explain the changing positions of house candidates and members of congress we demonstrate that while the republican party has been selecting increasingly extreme candidates democratic incumbents have become more extreme while in office we also find that the congruence between elected members of congress and their constituents is mostly explained by the selection as opposed to the responsiveness of the candidate nonetheless we find evidence of dynamic responsiveness of incumbents in specific circumstances we find that competitiveness midterm elections and sharing the president s party affiliation are associated with greater responsiveness conversely retirement is not associated with a change in responsiveness we find no evidence of responsiveness of challengers finally we find that close elections draw challengers who are more in line with the district s ideology

measuring consumption smoothing in cex data this paper proposes and implements a new method of measuring the degree of consumption smoothing using data from the consumer expenditure survey the structure of this survey is such that estimators previously used in the literature are inconsistent simply because income is measured annually and consumption is measured quarterly we impose an ar 1 structure on the income process to obtain a proxy for quarterly income through a projection on annual income by construction this proxy gives rise to a measurement error which is orthogonal to the proxy itself as opposed to the unobserved regressor leading to a consistent estimator we contrast our estimates with the output of two estimators used in the literature we show that while the flrst ols estimator tends to overstate the degree of risk sharing the second iv estimator grossly understates it

full insurance in the presence of aggregate uncertainty this paper tests implications of full consumption insurance the object is to determine how much mileage can be obtained from a model with complete markets with such features as private information or liquidity constraints omitted the implication exploited is that individual consumption responds to aggregate risk but not to idiosyncratic risk the test involves regressing the change in household consumption onto the change in aggregate consumption and other right hand side variables such as the change in household income and change in employment status all variables other than the change in aggregate consumption are predicted to be insignificant in explaining the change in household consumption with observations on consumption and income for 10 695 households from the consumer expenditure survey the results are mixed the results for one specification exponential utility are mostly consistent with full consumption insurance the results for the other specification power utility are not

legislator voting and shirking a critical review of the literature we set out to critically review the progress in answering two related questions what determines how legislators vote and how can shirking by legislators be measured in the first category the hypothesis that legislators shirk in order to indulge their personal ideological preferences has led researchers astray the theoretical underpinning is shaky on two counts first legislators who indulge their preferences at the expense of their constituents preferences put themselves at a competitive electoral disadvantage second the original two stage procedure used to measure ideological shirking is severely flawed among many other problems the residual measure of shirking implicitly assumes that the median voter is the relevant constituent principal for the legislator agent

a simple test of consumption insurance are consumers effectively insured against idiosyncratic shocks to income or wealth either by formal institutions such as charities private insurance and government programs or by informal mechanisms such as gifts and loans from relatives friends and neighbors under full insurance consumption growth should be cross sectionally independent of idiosyncratic variables that are exogenous to consumers this proposition is tested by cross sectional regressions of consumption growth on a variety of exogenous variables full insurance is rejected for long illness and involuntary job loss but not for spells of unemployment loss of work due to strike and an involuntary move

endogenous borrowing constraints with incomplete markets this article develops ways to endogenize the borrowing constraints used in a class of computable incomplete markets models we allow the constraints to depend on an investor s characteristics such as time preference risk aversion and income streams the proposed constraint can be interpreted as a borrowing limit within which an investor has no incentive to default using a numerical algorithm we find that for an array of structural parameters the endogenous borrowing constraints can be much less stringent than the ad hoc borrowing constraints adopted by the existing studies

a schumpeterian model of top income inequality top income inequality rose sharply in the united states over the last 40 years but increased only slightly in france and japan why we explore a model in which heterogeneous entrepreneurs broadly

the dynamics of inequality the past forty years have seen a rapid rise in top income inequality in the united states while there is a large number of existing theories of the pareto tail of the long run income distributions almost none of these address the fast rise in top inequality observed in the data we show that standard theories which build on a random growth mechanism generate transition dynamics that are too slow relative to those observed in the data we then suggest two parsimonious deviations from the canonical model that can explain such changes scale dependence that may arise from changes in skill prices and type dependence that is the presence of some high growth types these deviations are consistent with theories in which the increase in top income inequality is driven by the rise of superstar entrepreneurs or managers

term limitation in a dynamic model of partisan balance in november 1992 voters in fourteen states considered ballot propositions to adopt term limits for members of congress all fourteen propositions passed ten received more than 60 support bringing the total number of states with congressional term limits to fifteen much of the discussion of term limitation has focused on issues of representation the strength of parties and the functioning of congress after the adoption of limits benjamin and malbin 1992 will 1992 this paper explores an important but less discussed consequence of term limitation its impact on the partisan balance of legislatures we inquire how electoral dynamics incumbent advantage and voluntary retirement interact with a term limit to produce a new balance between parties in a two party legislature which party is favored by the introduction of term limits how does the length of the term limit matter are there conditions such that one party will be favored by any limit regardless of how restrictive

local deficits and local jobs can u s states stabilize their own economies abstract using a sample of the 48 mainland us states for the period 1973 2009 we study the ability of us states to expand their own state employment through the use of state deficit policies the analysis allows for the facts that us states are part of a wider monetary and economic union with free factor mobility across all states and that state residents and firms may purchase goods from neighboring states those purchases may generate economic spillovers across neighbors estimates suggest that states can increase their own state employment by increasing their own deficits there is evidence of spillovers to employment in neighboring states defined by common cyclical patterns among state economies for large states aggregate spillovers to its economic neighbors are approximately two thirds of the large state s job growth because of significant spillovers and possible incentives to free ride there is a potential case to actively coordinate i e centralize the management of stabilization policies finally the job effects of a temporary increase in state own deficits persist for at most one to two years and there is evidence of a negative impact on state jobs when these deficits are scheduled for repayment

the wealth distribution in bewley economies with capital income risk abstract we study the wealth distribution in bewley economies with idiosyncratic capital income risk we show analytically that under rather general conditions on the stochastic structure of the economy a unique ergodic distribution of wealth displays a fat tail

thomas piketty and the rate of time preference using a standard model in which the individual consumption path is computed solving an optimal control problem we investigate central claims of piketty 2014 rather than r g confirmed in the data r g with being the rate of time preference matters if this condition holds and the elasticity of substitution in the production function is larger than one the capital share converges to one in the long run nevertheless this does not have major impact on the distribution of wealth the latter however converges to maximum inequality for heterogeneous time preferences or rates of interest either persistent or stochastic for the latter the presence of finite life times leads to a distribution with finite wealth inequality featuring fat tails

endogenous partial insurance and inequality in this paper we propose a model of endogenous partial insurance and we investigate its implications for macroeconomic outcomes such as wealth inequality asset accumulation interest rate and consumption smoothing to this end we include participation costs to state contingent asset markets into an otherwise standard aiyagari 1994 model we highlight the resulting nonmonotonic relationship between wealth and insurance market participation when insurance is costly poor households remain uninsured middle class households participate in the insurance market whereas rich households decide to self insure by only purchasing risk free assets after theoretically characterizing the endogenous partial insurance equilibrium we quantify its effect emphasizing the roles of a participation channel and an interest rate channel

the horizontally s shaped laffer curve in a neoclassical growth model with incomplete markets and heterogeneous liquidity constrained agents the properties of the laffer curve depend on whether debt or transfers are adjusted to balance the government budget constraint the laffer curve conditional on public debt is horizontally s shaped two opposing forces explain this result first when government wealth increases the fiscal burden declines calling for lower tax rates second because the interest rate decreases when government wealth increases fiscal revenues may also decline calling for higher taxes for sufficiently negative government debt the second force dominates leading to the odd shape of the laffer curve conditional on debt

human capital investment and globalization in extortionary states abstract this paper considers education investment and public education policy in closed and open economies with an extortionary government the extortionary government in a closed economy chooses an education policy in order to overcome a hold up problem of time consistent taxation similar to benevolent governments the two types of government differ in their education policies if highly productive labor is mobile extortionary governments incentives for a policy that stimulates higher private education efforts vanish instead they have incentives to prevent individuals from mobility increasing education investment tax competition therefore reduces hold up problems of time consistent extortionary taxation but introduces other distortions that reduce workers utility

the risk free rate in heterogeneous agent incomplete insurance economies abstract why has the average real risk free interest rate been less than one percent the question is motivated by the failure of a class of calibrated representative agent economies to explain the average return to equity and risk free debt i construct an economy where agents experience uninsurable idiosyncratic endowment shocks and smooth consumption by holding a risk free asset i calibrate the economy and characterize equilibria computationally with a borrowing constraint of one year s income the resulting risk free rate is more than one percent below the rate in the comparable representative agent economy

do stockholders share risk more effectively than nonstockholders abstract this paper analyzes the extent of risk sharing among stockholders and nonstockholders to evaluate the empirical importance of market incompleteness it is essential to determine whether idiosyncratic shocks are important for the wealthy who have access to better insurance opportunities but also face different risks than the average household we study a model where each period households decide whether to participate in the stock market by paying a fixed cost due to this endogenous entry decision the testable implications of perfect risk sharing take the form of a sample selection model which we estimate using a semiparametric gmm estimator proposed by kyriazidou 2001 using data from psid we strongly reject perfect risk sharing among stockholders but perhaps surprisingly do not find evidence against it among nonstockholders this result appears to be robust to several extensions this finding suggests further focus on risk factors that primarily affect the wealthy such as entrepreneu

instability and concentration in the distribution of wealth abstract we consider a setup in which infinitely lived households face idiosyncratic investment risk and show that in this case the equilibrium distribution of wealth becomes increasingly right skewed over time until wealth concentrates entirely at the top the households in our setup are identical in terms of their patience and their abilities and we assume that there are no redistributive mechanisms neither explicit in the form of government tax or fiscal policies nor implicit in the form of limited intergenerational transfers our results demonstrate that the presence of such redistributive mechanisms alone ensures the stability of the distribution of wealth over time

competitive risk sharing contracts with one sided commitment this paper analyzes dynamic equilibrium risk sharing contracts between profit maximizing intermediaries and a large pool of ex ante identical agents that face idiosyncratic income uncertainty that makes them heterogeneous ex post in any given period after having observed her income the agent can walk away from the contract while the intermediary cannot i e there is one sided commitment we consider the extreme scenario that the agents face no costs to walking away and can sign up with any competing intermediary without any reputational losses we demonstrate that not only autarky but also partial and full insurance can obtain depending on the relative patience of agents and financial intermediaries insurance can be provided because in an equilibrium contract an up front payment effectively locks in the agent with an intermediary we then show that our contract economy is equivalent to a consumption savings economy with one period arrow securities and a short sale constraint similar to bulow and rogoff 1989 from this equivalence and our characterization of dynamic contracts it immediately follows that without cost of switching financial intermediaries debt contracts are not sustainable even though a risk allocation superior to autarky can be achieved

heterogeneity in returns to wealth and the measurement of wealth inequality lacking a long time series on the assets of the very wealthy saez and zucman 2015 use us tax records to obtain estimates of wealth holdings by capitalizing asset income from tax returns they document marked upward trends in wealth concentration we use data on tax returns and actual wealth holdings from tax records for the whole norwegian population to test the robustness of the methodology we document that measures of wealth based on the capitalization approach can lead to misleading conclusions about the level and the dynamics of wealth inequality if returns are heterogeneous and even moderately correlated with wealth

heterogeneous life cycle profiles income risk and consumption inequality was the increase in income inequality in the us due to permanent shocks or merely to an increase in the variance of transitory shocks the implications for consumption and welfare depend crucially on the answer to this question we use consumer expenditure survey cex repeated cross section data on consumption and income to decompose idiosyncratic changes in income into predictable life cycle changes transitory and permanent shocks and estimate the contribution of each to total inequality our model fits the joint evolution of consumption and income inequality well and delivers two main results first we find that permanent changes in income explain all of the increase in inequality in the 1980s and 1990s second we reconcile this finding with the fact that consumption inequality did not increase much over this period our results support the view that many permanent changes in income are predictable for consumers even if they look unpredictable to the econometrician consistent with models of heterogeneous income profiles

precautionary saving in the small and in the large the theory of precautionary saving is shown to be isomorphic to the arrow pratt theory of risk aversion making possible the application of a large body of knowledge about risk aversion to precautionary saving and more generally to the theory of optimal choice under risk in particular a measure of the strength of the precautionary saving motive analogous to the arrow pratt measure of risk aversion is used to establish a number of new propositions about precautionary saving and to give a new interpretation of the dreze modigliani substitution effect copyright 1990 by the econometric society

are politicians really paid like bureaucrats abstract we provide the first empirical analysis of gubernatorial pay using u s data for 1950 90 we document substantial variation in the wages of politicians both across states and over time gubernatorial wages respond to changes in state income per capita and taxes we estimate that governors receive a 1 percent pay cut for each 10 percent increase in per capita tax payments and a 4 5 percent increase in pay for each 10 percent increase in income per capita in their states there is evidence that the tax elasticity reflects a form of reward for performance the evidence for the income elasticity of pay is less conclusive but is suggestive of rent extraction motives finally we find that democratic institutions play an important role in shaping pay for example voter initiatives and the presence of political opposition significantly reduce the income elasticity of pay and increase tax elasticities of pay

ageing migration and endogenous public pensions abstract this paper analyses migration behaviour of mobile workers in reaction to population ageing we show that the conventional wisdom that a decrease in fertility will lead to a rise in wages and thus to an inflow of immigrants that mitigates the adverse effects of ageing on public pensions may not hold if labour is heterogeneous moreover we demonstrate that if public pensions are endogenous i e if ageing leads the elderly to successfully lobby for higher taxes it may take several generations before a steady state is reached and the initial migration flow may be opposite to the steady state migration