bounding the labor supply responses to a randomized welfare experiment a revealed preference approach we study the impact of connecticut s jobs first jf welfare reform experiment on the labor supply decisions of a sample of welfare applicants and recipients although the experiment identies the distribution of choices made in the absence and presence of reform each woman s counterfactual choice is unknown we show that economic theory restricts the set of counterfactual choices compatible with each woman s actual choice we use these restrictions to develop bounds on the frequency of intensive and extensive margin responses to reform our results indicate that the jf experiment led some women to work and others to reduce their earnings

garp for kids on the development of rational choice behavior in this paper we examine the extent to which consumption choices by 7 and 11 year old children and college undergraduates satisfy the axioms of revealed preference we find that choices by even the 7 year olds are considerably more likely to obey revealed preference axioms than would be true if they were choosing randomly 11 year olds do better still while college students do no better than 11 year old children we also find that mathematical ability is not correlated with choosing rationally we argue that this evidence suggests that the ability to choose rationally is not innate but that it does develop quickly

anomalies risk aversion economists ubiquitously employ a simple and elegant explanation for risk aversion it derives from the concavity of the utility of wealth function within the expected utility framework we show that this explanation is not plausible in most applications since anything more than economically negligible risk aversion over moderate stakes requires a utility of wealth function that is so concave that it predicts absurdly severe risk aversion over very large stakes we present examples of how the expected utility framework has misled economists and why we believe a better explanation for risk aversion must incorporate loss aversion and mental accounting

innovation and communication signalling with partial disclosure this paper introduces a model of feedback effect equilibrium i e equilibria in which an asymmetrically informed agent is motivated to communicate its privately known attribute but can do so only through channels or signals which convey directly useful information to competing agents this revelation to the competition serves to reduce the value of the private information held by the first agent models of this kind are of obvious relevance to realistic theories of product or financial market disclosure policies of firms patenting and a host of related behavioural and regulatory issues this model is developed in the context of a set of firms engaged in research and development rivalry in which the value of privately held and disclosed information arises from its implications for the likelihood and timing of productive innovation

the money pump as a measure of revealed preference violations we introduce a measure of the severity of violations of the revealed preference axioms the money pump index mpi the mpi is the amount of money one can extract from a consumer who violates the axioms it is also a statistical test for the hypothesis that a consumer is rational when behavior is observed with error we present an application using a panel data set of food expenditures the data exhibit many violations of the axioms mostly the mpi for these violations is small the mpi indicates that the hypothesis of consumer rationality cannot be rejected

bayesian analysis of the two part model with endogeneity application to health care expenditure this paper studies the effect of managed care on medical expenditure using a model in which the insurance status is assumed to be endogenous insurance plan choice is modeled through the multinomial probit model the medical expenditure variable the outcome of interest has a significant proportion of zeros that are handled using the two part model extended to handle endogenous insurance the estimation approach is bayesian based on the gibbs sampler the model is applied to a sample of 20 460 individuals obtained from the medical expenditure panel survey the results provide substantial evidence of selectivity copyright 2006 john wiley sons ltd

financial decision making and cognition in a family context in this paper we studied the association of cognitive traits and in particular numeracy of both spouses on financial outcomes of the family we found significant effects particularly for numeracy for financial and non financial respondents alike but much larger effects for the financial decision maker in the family we also examined who makes these financial decisions in the family and why once again cognitive traits such as numeracy were an important component of that decision with larger effects of numeracy for husbands compared to wives

on testing the utility hypothesis in order to be able to conduct a test of the core utility hypothesis that is not confounded with tests of subsidiary hypotheses that economic agents all have the same preferences and that their preferences are weakly separable it is necessary to use data that are disaggregated and complete in order to carry out a utility hypothesis test with complete data revealed preference theory must first be extended the generalised axiom of revealed preference is extended to include labour supply and portfolio choice then a complete disaggregated data set is used to test the utility hypothesis and two preference separability hypotheses

an experiment on the pure theory of consumer s behaviour by checking whether consumer demand satisfies the axioms of revealed preference one can test the empirical validity of the neoclassical theory of consumer behaviour however applying the axioms to actual consumer purchase data is difficult if not impossible since it poses serious problems of both a methodological and a practical nature after commenting on the few existing empirical studies in this field we summarise the results from an experimental approach to revealed preference theory data were obtained through a controlled experiment that involved real consumption of the goods chosen we find that most subjects violated the axioms

a theory of disappointment aversion an axiomatic model of preferences over lotteries is developed it is shown that this model is consistent with the allais paradox includes expected utility theory as a special case and is only one parameter beta richer than the expected utility model allais paradox type behavior is identified with positive values of beta preferences with positive beta are said to be disappointment averse it is shown that risk aversion implies disappointment aversion and that the arrow pratt measures of risk aversion can be generalized in a straight forward manner to the current framework copyright 1991 by the econometric society

who is behavioral cognitive ability and anomalous preferences in this paper we ask whether variation in preference anomalies is related to variation in cognitive ability evidence from a new laboratory study of chilean high school students with similar schooling backgrounds shows that small stakes risk aversion and short run discounting are less common among those with higher standardized test scores the relationship with test scores survives controls for parental education and wealth we find some evidence that elementary school gpa is predictive of preferences measured at the end of high school two laboratory interventions provide suggestive evidence of a possible causal impact of cognitive resources on expressed preferences jel j24 d14 c91

best nonparametric bounds on demand responses this paper uses revealed preference inequalities to provide the tightest possible best nonparametric bounds on predicted consumer responses to price changes using consumer level data over a finite set of relative price changes these responses are allowed to vary nonparametrically across the income distribution this is achieved by combining the theory of revealed preference with the semiparametric estimation of consumer expansion paths engel curves we label these expansion path based bounds on demand responses as e bounds deviations from revealed preference restrictions are measured by preference perturbations which are shown to usefully characterize taste change and to provide a stochastic environment within which violations of revealed preference inequalities can be assessed

the economic effects of intellectual property right infringements in this article the authors use data from a small but varied sample of u s companies to examine the static welfare consequences of foreign infringement of u s intellectual property rights in five industry sectors they estimate that infringement causes profit losses for the legitimate u s suppliers that are at least one percent as great as their total sales that the static gains to consumers are more than half as great as the losses of legitimate producers and might exceed these losses and that the losses of the legitimate producers exceed the profits of infringers they also find that legitimate producers spend relatively little to combat foreign infringement less than 4 percent as much as their losses from such infringement copyright 1990 by the university of chicago

choosing the competition and patent licensing this article examines licensing as a means of choosing the competitors which a patentee monopolist will face in the period after the patent expires the queue of entrants consists of two firms which differ in their relative strengths as competitors for example by size or level of marginal cost by structuring the industry to be composed of weak competitors the incumbent is able to prolong its dominant position in the industry after the patent expires examples are presented in which the evidence suggests that choosing the competition was an important motivation of the licensor s behavior

full scale real tests of consumer behavior using experimental data abstract this paper reports on the results of three experiments based on the neoclassical theory of consumer behavior all these experiments were carried out with the aim of simulating real world behavior nonparametric tests applying the theory of revealed preference show that a significant number of individuals exhibit inconsistent behavior if nearly optimizing behavior is postulated then most of these inconsistencies disappear but random choices produce almost the same results the hypothesis of a representative consumer statistical average behavior seems a more fruitful approach

heterogeneity in risky choice behaviour in a broad population we analyse risk preferences using an experiment with real incentives in a representative sample of 1 422 dutch respondents our econometric model incorporates four structural parameters that vary with observed and unobserved characteristics utility curvature loss aversion preferences towards the timing of uncertainty resolution and the propensity to choose randomly rather than on the basis of preferences we find that all four parameters contribute to explaining choice behaviour the structural parameters are significantly associated with socio economic variables but it is essential to incorporate unobserved heterogeneity in each of them to match the rich variety of choice patterns in the data

non parametric tests of consumer behaviour the neoclassical model of consumer behaviour postulates that a consumer s choice behaviour can be described as deriving from utility maximization subject to a budget constraint one is then naturally led to ask what this model implies about observed behaviour this question has been addressed from two quite distinct approaches the first approach originating in the work of slutsky 1915 and antonelli 1886 derives necessary and sufficient conditions involving the derivatives of the demand functions the second approach originating in the work of samuelson 1938 1947 1948 derives algebraic conditions on the demand functions implied by maximizing behaviour

exact consumer s surplus and deadweight loss consumer s surplus is a widely used tool in applied welfare economics both economic theorists and cost benefit analysis often use consumer s surplus despite its somewhat dubious reputation the basic idea is to evaluate the value to a consumer or his willingness to pay for a change in price of a good from say pricep to pricep because price changes affect consumer welfare an evaluation of this effect is often a key input to public policy decisions yet consumer s surplus is probably the most controversial of widely used economic concepts both paul samuelson and ian little conclude that the economics profession would be better off without it it is my feeling of the situation that substantial agreement exists on the correct quantities to be measured the amount the consumer would pay or would need to be paid to be just as well off after the price change as he was before the price change the quantities correspond to john hicks compensating variation measures an alternative measure which takes ex post price change utility as the basis of comparison is hicks equivalent variation the controversy arises in the measurement of these quantities the usual measurement procedure is to use the area to the left of the marshallian market demand curve between two price levels jules dupuit originated this measure of welfare change and alfred marshall and hicks derived appropriate conditions for its use the primary condition for the area to the left of the demand curve to correspond to the compensating variation is to have constant marginal utility of income marshall gave this condition and if it holds the same quantity will be derived as the area to the left of the compensated hicksian demand curve this area to the left of the compensated demand curve is exactly what the compensating variation and equivalent variation measure thus the constant marginal utility of income is a sufficient condition for marshallian consumer s surplus to be equal to hicks consumer s surplus in this case arnold harberger s plea to use the welfare triangle as one half times the product of the price change times the quantity change to measure deadweight loss corresponds to the correct theoretical amount of welfare change in a recent paper robert willig derives bounds for the percentage difference between the correct measure of either the compensating or equivalent variation and the marshallian measure derived form the market demand curve his bounds which depend on the income elasticity of demand for the single good in the region of price change being considered as well as the proportion of the consumer s income spent on the good demonstrate that the marshallian consumer s surplus is often a good approximation to hicks consumer s surplus the fact that the proportion of the consumer s income spent matters as well as the income elasticity was first pointed out by harold hotelling willig contends that the approximation error will be less than the errors involved in estimating the demand curve thus he hopes to remove the need for apology that applied economists often need to give to theorists who remark on the inappropriateness of using marshallian consumer s surplus to measure welfare change however in this paper i show that for the case primarily considered by willig of a single price change which is also the situation in which consumer s surplus is often used in applied work no approximation is necessary professor of economics massachusetts institute of technology and research associate national bureau of economic research i would like to thank peter diamond erwin diewert daniel mcfadden robert merton robert solow hal varian joel yellin and the referees for help and comments research support from the national science foundation is acknowledged the reason that we still have two rather than one of samuelson s six measures of consumer s surplus arises from an index number problem of the correct basis for the welfare comparison i will give both measures but plan to concentrate on the compensating variation

who is more rational we report on the results of a large scale field experiment that enables us to test for consistency with utility maximizing behavior and to investigate the correlation between individual behavior and demographic and economic characteristics we conducted the experiment with the centerpanel a representative sample of over 2 000 dutch households using procedures similar to those used by choi et al 2007b in a setting with risk we find a high level of consistency in the individual level decisions there is also considerable heterogeneity in subjects consistency scores high income and high education subjects display greater levels of consistency men are more consistent than women and young subjects are more consistent than those who

licensing in the theory of innovation this article analyzes licensing in a noncooperative r d game we ask two questions what are the incentives for licensing a production technology and what is the impact of licensing on the pattern of innovation and the consequent evolution of industry costs and market structure the gainsfrom trading information through licensing contracts are achieved through the replacement of inefficient production techniques the ex post incentive and the elimination of inefficient research expenditures the ex ante incentive in a duopoly the availability of licensing encourages research when the firms initial production technologies are close in costs and discourages research when initial costs are asymmetric

compulsory licensing evidence from the trading with the enemy act compulsory licensing allows firms in developing countries to produce foreign owned inventions without the consent of foreign patent owners this paper uses an exogenous event of compulsory licensing after world war i under the trading with the enemy act to examine the effects of compulsory licensing on domestic invention difference indifferences analyses of nearly 130 000 chemical inventions suggest that compulsory licensing increased domestic invention by 20 percent jel d45 l24 n42 031 034 compulsory licensing allows firms in developing countries to produce foreign inventions without the consent of foreign patent owners 1 countries such as brazil thailand and india have used the policy to procure life saving drugs for millions of patients and are proposing it as a means to access foreign technologies to combat climate change 2 opponents of compulsory licensing however fear that the policy may reduce access to critical innovations that are invented abroad as it weakens incentives for foreign firms to transfer new technologies into developing countries for example the us pharmaceutical company merck criticized brazil s licensing of its hiv drug efavirenz as an expropriation of intellectual property which will hurt patients who require new life saving therapies http www ip watch org

drastic innovations and multiplicity of optimal licensing policies abstract considering the licensing of a drastic cost reducing innovation by an outside innovator in an n firm cournot oligopoly we show that when the innovator uses combinations of fees and royalties there are either n 1 or n optimal licensing policies

revealing preferences graphically an old method gets a new tool kit because uncertainty is endemic in a wide variety of economic circumstances models of decision making under uncertainty play a key role in every field of economics the standard model of decisions under uncertainty is based on von neumann and morgenstern expected utility theory eut so it is natural that experimentalists should want to test the empirical validity of the savage axioms on which eut is based empirical violations of eut provoke intriguing questions about the rationality of individual behavior and at the same time raise criticisms about the status of the savage axioms as the touchstone of rationality these criticisms have generated the development of various theoretical alternatives to eut and the investigation of these theories has led to new empirical regularities for the most part these experimental investigations use several pairwise choices a la allais to test eut and its various alternatives such as weighted utility implicit expected utility and prospect theory among others each of these theories gives rise to indifference curves with distinctive shapes in some part of the marschak machina probability triangle so each theory can be tested against the others by choosing alternatives that the various theories rank differently in these studies the criterion used to evaluate a theory is the fraction of choices it predicts correctly generally speaking experimental work has on the one hand collected only a few decisions from each subject and on the other presented subjects with a serious of choices designed to compare the predictive abilities of competing theories or discover violations of specific axioms colin f camerer 1995 and chris starmer 2000 review the experimental and theoretical work that focuses on evaluating non eut theories although this practice is understandable given the purposes for which the experiments were designed critics say that it limits the usefulness of the data for other purposes first while these experiments reveal that violations exist they give us little sense of how important they are or how frequently they

selection on observed and unobserved variables assessing the effectiveness of catholic schools in this paper we measure the effect of catholic high school attendance on educational attainment and test scores because we do not have a good instrumental variable for catholic school attendance we develop new estimation methods based on the idea that the amount of selection on the observed explanatory variables in a model provides a guide to the amount of selection on the unobservables we also propose an informal way to assess selectivity bias based on measuring the ratio of selection on unobservables to selection on observables that would be required if one is to attribute the entire effect of catholic school attendance to selection bias we use our methods to estimate the effect of attending a catholic high school on a variety of outcomes our main conclusion is that catholic high schools substantially increase the probability of graduating from high school and more tentatively attending college we find little evidence of an effect on test scores

deterrence by market sharing a strategic incentive for licensing the potential of an incumbent firm to retain its dominant position in a market is a focal point of the modem theory of industrial organization a recent literature examines this issue for markets in which challengers threaten an incumbent s position by engaging in research for a new technology richard gilbert and david newbery 1982 show that an incumbent firm with a firstmover advantage will preempt potential entrants by inventing a new technology slightly earlier than would its rivals in a stochastic r d therefore its introduction does not alter the decision to research when the pre innovation market is characterized by an incumbent and potential entrants stephen salant 1984 shows that licensing ex post to innovation can alter the research decision as anticipation of the returns from future licensing encourages research by the entrant as a counterpoint to the salant result i find that licensing ex ante to research may discourage further research by the entrant indeed this strategic incentive for licensing may be so strong as to persuade the incumbent as well as the entrant to terminate research activity to isolate this incentive for licensing from the one discussed by salant a simple model is constructed in which licensing of future technologies is not desirable anecdotal evidence suggests that the strategic incentive does lead innovators in some markets to license their technologies examples of this information sharing are prevalent in markets where technological change is rapid in the 1940 s standard oil of new jersey discovered a process for synthetic rubber it traded patent rights on this process for a synthetic oil production process discovered by farben a german rubber company in both the synthetic oil and synthetic rubber markets rival companies were department of economics scarsborough college university of toronto toronto ontario canada m5s lal i thank jon cohen and ron saunders for discussions that inspired this paper i am also grateful to yehuda kotowitz andy mclennan jennifer reinganum ralph winter myma wooders two anonymous referees and seminar participants at the university of toronto for helpful comments on earlier drafts

the multinational corporation and monopoly of patents in nigeria abstract this paper examines the effects of foreign monopoly of patents grants in nigeria and the implications for technology development in that country the findings show that multinational corporations mncs own an overwhelming proportion of the patent grants in nigeria and that the nigerian patent system does not positively encourage domestic inventiveness in fact apart from attracting foreign patents in large numbers the nigerian patent system has failed to achieve all the other objectives including the disclosure of patented knowledge and working of patented invention which are explicitly stated in the decree that established the system in 1970 consequently the ultimate objective of the system which is the enhancement of technological development in the country seems centuries away from realization this is attributed to the combined effect of three factors the monopolist practices including restrictive practices of the mncs the abject inefficiencies of the patent system itself and the nature and lack of political willpower of the government of nigeria the paper concludes that the failure of the nigerian government to make advantageous use of the patent system is the greatest handicap

the effects of financial education in the workplace evidence from a survey of households abstract we use a novel household survey to investigate the effects of employer based financial education on personal saving we explore cross sectional relations between the availability of employer based financial education and various measures of asset accumulation and we interpret these patterns in light of various potentially confounding factors our findings favor the hypothesis that employer based financial education stimulates saving both in general and for retirement

sinking swimming or learning to swim in medicare part d under medicare part d senior citizens choose prescription drug insurance offered by numerous private insurers we examine nonpoor enrollees actions in 2006 and 2007 using panel data our sample reduced overspending by 298 on average with gains by 81 percent of them the greatest improvements were by those who overspent most in 2006 and by those who switched plans decisions to switch depended on individuals overspending in 2006 and on individualspecific effects of changes in their current plans the oldest consumers and those initiating medications for alzheimer s disease improved by more than average suggesting that real world institutions help overcome cognitive limitations

poverty and economic decision making evidence from changes in financial resources at payday we study the effect of financial resources on decision making low income u s households are randomly assigned to receive an online survey before or after payday the survey collects measures of cognitive function and administers risk and intertemporal choice tasks the study design generates variation in cash checking and savings balances and expenditures before payday participants behave as if they are more present biased when making intertemporal choices about monetary rewards but not when making intertemporal choices about non monetary real effort tasks nor do we find before after differences in risk taking the quality of decision making the performance in cognitive function tasks or in heuristic judgments

compulsory licensing price controls and access to patented foreign products abstract we analyze how a price control and the threat of compulsory licensing cl affect consumer access in a developing country south to a patented foreign product in the model the southern government sets the level of the price control on a northern patent holder who chooses between entry and voluntary licensing vl while entry incurs a higher fixed cost licensed production is of lower quality if the patent holder does not work its patent locally the south is free to use cl the threat of cl ensures that consumers have access to a lower quality version of the patented good when the patent holder chooses not to work its patent locally improves the terms at which vl occurs can cause the patent holder to switch from vl to entry and can delay consumer access when cl replaces vl or entry we also show that a price control and cl are mutually reinforcing instruments

the optimal patent term under uncertainty this paper investigates the impact of uncertainty and risk aversion on the optimal patent term two types of uncertainty are discussed uncertainty over the size of cost reduction and uncertainty about the output demand of the invention using industry with cost reduction uncertainty and risk neutral inventors the optimal patent term will be shorter than in the certainty case risk aversion increases the optimal patent life vis a vis risk neutrality

nonparametric engel curves and revealed preference this paper applies revealed preference theory to the nonparametric statistical analysis of consumer demand knowledge of expansion paths is shown to improve the power of nonparametric tests of revealed preference the tightest bounds on indifference surfaces and welfare measures are derived using an algorithm for which revealed preference conditions are shown to guarantee convergence nonparametric engel curves are used to estimate expansion paths and provide a stochastic structure within which to examine the consistency of household level data and revealed preference theory an application is made to a long time series of repeated cross sections from the family expenditure survey for britain the consistency of these data with revealed preference theory is examined for periods of consistency with revealed preference tight bounds are placed on true cost of living indices

stochastic dominance in regret theory the regret theory of choice under uncertainty is known to admit intransitivities in preference relations in this paper the stochastic dominance properties of the theory are examined it is shown that the usual definition of first stochastic dominance is not satisfied by regret theoretic preferences and that in general violations of first stochastic dominance are not merely permitted but required an exact characterization of the stochastic dominance rule corresponding to regret theoretic preferences is presented this concept is weaker than the usual definition but stronger than the notion of statewise dominance in which one prospect yields a preferred outcome with probability 1 theories of choice under uncertainty have proliferated in recent years after a long period in which the expected utility eu approach of von neumann and morgenstern 1944 was pre eminent the breakdown of the dominance in eu theory reflects the increasing body of evidence that the choices made by many people systematically violate the predictions of the theory the axiomatic foundations of the theory and in particular the independence axiom have also received severe questioning ever since the famous critique of allais 1953

a household based nonparametric test of demand theory a nonparametric test of demand theory determining the consistency of price expenditure data with the generalized axiom of revealed preference is applied to household macroeconomic data for the first time the fraction of consumption bundle comparisons that violate the generalized axiom of revealed preference is proposed as a summary statistic to indicate the consistency of a data set with revealed preference axioms this violation rate is calculated among consumption pairs with similar expenditures to increase the power of the test the results suggest that similar households consumption choices and budget constraints are generally consistent with the joint hypotheses of optimizing behavior and common preferences copyright 1995 by mit press

beyond revealed preference choice theoretic foundations for behavioral welfare economics we propose a broad generalization of standard choice theoretic welfare economics that encompasses a wide variety of nonstandard behavioral models our approach exploits the coherent aspects of choice that those positive models typically attempt to capture it replaces the standard revealed preference relation with an unambiguous choice relation roughly x is strictly unambiguously chosen over y written xp y iff y is never chosen when x is available under weak assumptions p is acyclic and therefore suitable for welfare analysis it is also the most discerning welfare criterion that never overrules choice the resulting framework generates natural counterparts for the standard tools of applied welfare economics and is easily applied in the context of specific behavioral theories with novel implications though not universally discerning it lends itself to principled refinements

milestone payments or royalties contract design for r d licensing we study how innovators can optimally design licensing contracts when there is incomplete information on the licensee s valuation of the innovation and limited control over the licensee s development efforts a licensing contract typically contains an up front payment milestone payments at successful completion of a project phase and royalties on sales we use principal agent models to formulate the licensor s contracting problem and we find that under adverse selection the optimal contract structure changes with the licensee s valuation of the innovation as the licensee s valuation increases the licensor s optimal level of involvement in the development directly or through royalties should decrease only a risk averse licensor should include both up front and milestone payments moral hazard alone is not detrimental to the licensor s value but may create an additional value loss when combined with adverse selection our results inform managerial practice about the advantages and disadvantages of the different terms included in licensing contracts and recommend the optimal composition of the contract

the role of information and social interactions in retirement plan decisions evidence from a randomized experiment this paper analyzes a randomized experiment to shed light on the role of information and social interactions in employees decisions to enroll in a tax deferred account tda retirement plan within a large university the experiment encouraged a random sample of employees in a subset of departments to attend a benee ts information fair organized by the university by promising a monetary reward for attendance the experiment multiplied by more than e ve the attendance rate of these treated individuals relative to controls and tripled that of untreated individuals within departments where some individuals were treated tda enrollment e ve and eleven months after the fair was signie cantly higher in departments where some individuals were treated than in departments where nobody was treated however the effect on tda enrollment is almost as large for individuals in treated departments who did not receive the encouragement as for those who did we provide three interpretations differential treatment effects social network effects and motivational reward effects to account for these results

firm behavior and the externalities of technological leadership abstract a simple two firm model in which technological knowledge lies in an existing product s attribute is analyzed accordingly the technologically leading firm the firm whose current product is more advanced produces a knowledge externality the technologically less advanced firm may take advantage of the externality by learning the technology and embarking on its own development plan if the follower instead just imitates the leader s product the externality is likely to have an adverse effect on the imitator reflecting the notion that a larger technological gap makes imitation more difficult comparative statistics experiments reveal among other things that greater initial technological gaps encourage technological progress if the follower imitates as a result the introduction of a patent system in this case would inhibit technological progress

welfare optimal patent royalties when imitation is costly we identify welfare optimal patent royalties in a model of costly imitation entry and imperfect competition when the social planner may impose a compulsory license optimal royalties either blockade imitation facilitating unregulated monopoly or yield an aggregate zero profit efficient duopoly when duopoly is optimal the optimal per unit royalty pins the equilibrium price at the aggregate average cost and the optimal fixed royalty shifts surplus so the patentee and imitator break even efficient duopoly yields higher welfare than monopoly for sufficiently low invention cost and may also yield higher welfare than a prize system interestingly royalty payments may be negative because of this efficient duopoly may not be feasible if the planner must instead direct the courts to use such royalties

choosing the wrong calling plan ignorance and learning when a firm offers several tariff options to its customers the possibility arises that they will make an ex post mistake in tariff choice this occurs since consumers cannot commit to a certain purchase level at the time they subscribe to the service option and thus they might find out later that a different choice of tariff could have resulted in a lower payment for their actual level of consumption this is a common feature of increasingly important subscriptions markets in which buyers and sellers maintain long term nonanonymous relations and where learning induces interesting dynamics on the one hand buyers may learn their taste over time thus making the right choice as times goes by on the other hand the seller may design options to identify the type of each buyer and if possible to extract a higher proportion of their consumer surplus by offering tariff options that are better tailored to the profile of the consumer this paper focuses on the first type of learning in turn i document buyer behavior in a subscriptions market using data from a tariff experiment run by south central bell scb in kentucky during the second half of 1986 the most frequently studied case of subscriptions markets is the choice among optional calling plans ocps in the telephone industry this paper shows that contrary to the conven

market structure innovation and optimal patent life m uch work has been directed at determining the relative efficiency of various market structures in the allocation of resources to invention while the conclusions are not entirely clear it seems certain that no single market structure results in a pareto efficient allocation of resources to research and development r d in the light of this certain secondbest procedures must be examined social controls may provide an attractive method of lessening the inefficiencies described above 2 while government research and development subsidies and award programs do exist the most prevalent form of social control is the patent system granting the inventor a monopoly on the use of the discovery for a specified period of time eliminates the free rider problem thus restoring the incentive to invent extension of the duration of protection will increase incentives for private resource allocation toward technical advance unfortunately extension of patent protection by definition brings with it the social inefficiencies recognized in a monopolistic market the

patents and innovation evidence from economic history abstract what is the optimal system of intellectual property rights to encourage innovation empirical evidence from economic history can help to inform important policy questions that have been di

developments in non expected utility theory the hunt for a descriptive theory of choice under risk this article reviews recent developments in the economic theory of individual decision making under risk since the 1950s it has been known that individual choices violate the standard model of expected utility in predictable ways considerable research effort has now been devoted to the project of developing a superior descriptive model following an overview of non expected utility theories which distinguishes between conventional and non conventional approaches the paper seeks to assess these alternative models in terms of empirical success using laboratory and field data and theoretical usefulness the closing sections reflect on some new directions emerging in this literature

on the calculation of marginal effects in the bivariate probit model abstract we examine the effects of marginal changes in continuous variables on the joint conditional and marginal probabilities involved in the bivariate probit model and contrast them with the univariate probit case we provide an empirical application using canadian data

what accounts for the variation in retirement wealth among u s households even among households with similar socioeconomic characteristics saving and wealth vary considerably life cycle models attribute this variation to differences in time preference rates risk tolerance exposure to uncertainty relative tastes for work and leisure at advanced ages and income replacement rates these factors have testable implications concerning the relation between accumulated wealth and the shape of the consumption profile using the panel study of income dynamics and the consumer expenditure survey we find little support for these implications the data are instead consistent with rule of thumb mental accounting or hyperbolic discounting theories of wealth accumulation jel di d91 e21

designing programs for heterogeneous populations the value of covariate information normative judgments embodied in the american legal system mandate that in certain respects public policy should treat all members of the population uniformly nevertheless the legal system permits many forms of disparate treatment of the population the medicare program provides health care benefits to persons age 65 and older but not to younger americans the federal welfare to work program known as tanf permits states to treat welfare recipients differentially placing some in job training and others in basic skills classes judicial sentencing guidelines variously permit or require judges to sentence convicted offenders differentially based on past convictions public high schools track students making class assignments vary with past student achievement in these and other settings where legal constraints do not preclude disparate treatment society may choose among many alternative treatment rules a program could mandate uniform treatment of the population or require that treatment vary in particular ways with observable covariates of the persons treated e g age in the case of medicare past convictions in the case of sentencing or permit agents of society e g judges welfare case managers school counselors to make their own treatment choices subject to specified constraints research on program evaluation can help to inform public policy through efforts to learn the consequences of alternative treatment rules in particular evaluation research should seek to characterize how treatment response varies across the population if we learn that all persons respond to treatment in much the same manner then the best policy may be one that treats all persons uniformly however if we learn that treatment response varies with observable covariates of the persons treated then society may be able to do better by designing programs in which treatment varies appropriately with these covariates for example society may be able to lower recidivism among criminal offenders by sentencing some offenders to prison and others to probation it may be able to increase the life cycle earnings of welfare recipients by placing some in job training and others in basic skills classes in these and many other cases the key to success is to determine which persons should receive which treatments regrettably evaluation research has had little to say about how treatment response varies with observable covariates of the persons treated a common practice especially in observational studies has been to assume that all persons respond to treatment in the same manner studies that are sensitive to possible variation in treatment response may report findings by race or gender or age but they rarely disaggregate the population more finely as a consequence policymakers seeking to design programs for heterogeneous populations have to speculate on the consequences of alternative treatment rules this short article draws on my recent research manski 1997 2000a b to argue that increased attention to observable variation in treatment response would enhance the value of evaluation research

innovation market structure and welfare many writers subscribe to joseph schumpeter s view that while perfectly competitive firms allocate resources efficiently in a static sense they perform poorly when it comes to innovation from this point of view the optimal form of market structure is unlikely to be perfect competition but some other type of dynamic competition which includes significant elements of monopoly recently considerable effort has been focused on modelling schumpeter s notion of competition perhaps best exemplified by the 1980 work of partha dasgupta and joseph stiglitz hereafter d s 2 this approach views free entry to the rd see nelson and winter 1977 3readers will recognize a similarity of this approach with the notion of contestable markets discussed most recently by william baumol 1982 and by baumnol john panzar and robert willig 1982 for an interesting comparison of the schumpeterian with the marxian notion of competition see john elliott 1980 4this was noted for example by robert wilson 1975 5in such industries the long term gains from dynamically efficient innovation become of paramount importance consequently the optimal market structure would consist of a small number of firms the driving force behind such a result is what scherer 1972 has called the lebensraum effect firms performing r d must at least break even they derive their profits from

consistency and heterogeneity of individual behavior under uncertainty by using graphical representations of simple portfolio choice problems we generate a very rich dataset to study behavior under uncertainty at the level of the individual subject we test the data for consistency with the maximization hypothesis and we estimate preferences using a two parameter utility function based on faruk gul 1991 this specification provides a good interpretation of the data at the individual level and can account for the highly heterogeneous behaviors observed in the laboratory the parameter estimates jointly describe attitudes toward risk and allow us to characterize the distribution of risk preferences in the population

optimal patent life vs optimal patentability standards abstract this note considers a new dimension in optimal patent design by treating strategic roles as a policy instrument it is shown that contrary to established wisdom welfare is not always maximized when the patent office optimizes over patent life and plays the role of stackelberg leader when innovations are not difficult leadership is irrelevant and setting a high minimum patentability standard is more valuable than setting patent life

heuristic thinking and limited attention in the car market can heuristic information processing affect important product markets analyzing over 22 million wholesale used car transactions we find evidence of left digit bias in the processing of odometer values whereby individuals focus on the number s leftmost digits the bias leads to discontinuous drops in sale prices at 10 000 mile odometer thresholds along with smaller drops at 1 000 mile thresholds these findings reveal that information processing heuristics matter even in markets with large stakes and easily observed information we model left digit bias in an inattention framework and structurally estimate the inattention parameter empirical patterns suggest the results are driven by final customers rather than professional agents jel d12 d44 d83 l81

optimal patents with compulsory licensing this paper examines the use of compulsory lincensing as a policy to combat the monopoly problem associated with the patent system it introduces the notion of an optimal patent one where the patent life and the licensing royalty rate are both determined optimally under certain simplifying assumptions it is shown that the optimal patent will have an indefinite life for both process and product innovations some preliminary calculations suggest that the use of compulsory licensing may lead to substantial welfare improvements even if the patent life is left unchanged at 17 years

marginal effects of a bivariate binary choice model this paper discusses the copula based approach of a bivariate binary choice model we derive the marginal effects of explanatory variables on an outcome of interest both direct and indirect in the model we also show that the signs of the marginal effects are determined by the signs of the coefficient parameters a real data application is provided