international coordination of trade and domestic policies the past half century has seen a dramatic multilateral reduction in tariff barriers under general agreement on tariffs and trade gatt negotiations however as tariff barriers have fallen attention has shifted to the use of domestic policies as secondary trade barriers a primary concern is that as countries sign trade agreements that constrain their ability to pursue trade goals through trade policy there will be unilateral incentives for governments to distort their domestic policies as a secondary means of protection 1 increasingly international trade disputes revolve around a country s use of internal regulations as a means of restricting trade the united states has successfully challenged the system of liquor taxes in both japan and korea as discriminating against imported liquor while venezuela and brazil have challenged american standards for reformulated and conventional gasoline as trade protection masquerading as environmentalism gatt contains several articles concerning the international regulation of domestic policies but the question of how to fully incorporate domestic policies within gatt negotiations and other international trade agreements remains contentious indeed at both the ministerial meeting in 1994 at the close of the uruguay round and the recent unsuccessful ministerial conference in seattle many gatt delegates renewed demands for the relationship between trade and various domestic policies e g environmental policy labor standards or competition policy to be examined despite the importance that has recently been placed on international cooperation over domestic policies no theoretical basis exists for considering how to cooperate over both trade and domestic policies within an international agreement previous papers on negotiation over two instruments of protection e g copeland 1989 1990 thomas l hungerford 1991 have assumed asymmetric limitations on cooperation i e they assume that one of the two instruments is either nonobservable or nonnegotiable this paper extends such work by investigating cooperation over two negotiable instruments of protection under symmetric limitations on cooperation and provides insight into the design of international trade agreements that incorporate cooperation over domestic policies i adopt the view that enforcement issues are central to the understanding of international cooperation one of the challenges of international cooperation is the absence of a central authority to enforce the terms of an agreement without access to an external enforcement mechanism international agreements are viable only as long as member countries view continued cooperation to be in their own self interest i e the benefits from cooperating outweigh the potential gains from cheating 2 while the gatt department of economics university of miami p o box 248126 coral gables fl 33124 e mail ederington miami edu i would like to thank bob staiger bob baldwin wolfgang keller phillip mccalman jenny minier seminar participants at the nber conference on trade the environment and natural resources and two anonymous referees for comments on earlier versions of this paper any remaining errors are of course my own for example brian r copeland 1990 examined negotiation over one trade barrier leaving a secondary trade barrier e g nontariff barriers domestic legislation etc to be set noncooperatively he shows that trade liberalization will induce substitution toward the less efficient nonnegotiable instrument of protection due to the unilateral incentives to maintain trade protection facing countries thus within a cooperative framework the two types of barriers serve as imperfect substitutes for each other 2 as stated by kenneth w dam in his review of the gatt institution the best guarantee that a commitment of any kind will be kept particularly in an international setting where courts are of limited importance and even more important marshals and jails are nonexistent is that the parties continue to view adherence to their agreement in their mutual interest thus the gatt system unlike most legal systems is not designed to exclude self help in the form of retaliation rather retaliation subjected to established procedures and kept within prescribed bounds is made the heart of the gatt system dam 1970 pp 80 81

β convergence and the cyclical dynamics of uk regional house prices the potential convergence of regional house prices in the uk is examined in contrast to the existing literature which focuses upon stochastic convergence the present paper considers alternative f

the role of multilateral institutions in international trade cooperation the world trade organization wfo lacks the power to directly enforce agreements it is therefore important to understand what role the wto can play to facilitate international cooperation and whether a multilateral institution can offer distinct advantages over a web of bilateral agreements this paper examines two potential benefits of a multilateral trade institution first verifying violations of the agreements and informing third parties thus facilitating multilateral reputation mechanisms second promoting multilateral trade negotiations rather than a web of bilateral negotiations the model suggests that a multilateral approach is particularly important when there are strong imbalances in bilateral trading relationships

self enforcing trade agreements and lobbying abstract in an environment where international trade agreements must be enforced via promises of future cooperation the presence of an import competing lobby has important implications for optimal punishments when lobbies work to disrupt trade agreements a nash reversion punishment scheme must balance two conflicting objectives longer punishments help to enforce cooperation by increasing the government s costs of defecting but because the lobby prefers the punishment outcome this also incentivizes lobbying effort and with it political pressure to break the agreement thus the model generates an optimal length for nash reversion punishments and it depends directly on the political influence of the lobbies trade agreement tariffs are shown to be increasing in the political influence of the lobbies as well as their patience levels

enforcing international trade agreements with imperfect private monitoring to analyse the role that the world trade organization wto plays in enforcing international trade agreements this paper first explores what countries can achieve alone by characterizing optimal private trigger strategies pts under which each country triggers a punishment phase by imposing an explicit tariff based on privately observed imperfect signals of the other country s concealed trade barriers it identifies the condition under which countries can restrain the use of concealed barriers based on pts and establishes that countries will not reduce the cooperative protection level to its minimum attainable level under the optimal pts this paper then considers third party trigger strategies tts under which the wto allows each country to initiate a punishment phase based on the wto s judgement about potential violations by comparing the optimal pts and optimal tts it demonstrates that the wto facilitates a better cooperative equilibrium by changing the nature of punishment triggering signals from private to public which in turn enables countries to use a more efficient punishment such as an asymmetric and a minimum punishment

an empirical analysis of the determination of house prices in the united kingdom between the first quarters of 1970 and 1980 the average price of new houses in the united kingdom increased five fold over the same period building societies grew to become major financial institutions attracting almost 50 per cent of the personal sector s holdings of liquid assets and responsible for more than 85 per cent of house purchase finance this paper sets out to examine the extent to which building societies have been responsible for the rapid acceleration of house prices and indicates the other main determinants of this phenomenon the analysis is extended to a discussion of recent econometric research into house price determination and arrives at a more general specification employing an error correction estimation methodology

is environmental policy a secondary trade barrier an empirical analysis should international trade agreements be extended to include negotiations over environmental policy the answer depends on whether countries distort levels of environmental regulations as a secondary means of providing protection to domestic industries our results suggest that they do previous studies of this relationship have treated the level of environmental regulation as exogenous and found a negligible correlation between environmental regulation and trade flows in contrast we find that when the level of environmental regulation is modelled as an endogenous variable its estimated effect on trade flows is significantly higher than previously reported jel classification fl f14 f18 est ce que la politique environnementale est une barriere commerciale secondaire une analyse empirique est ce que les accords commerciaux internationaux doivent etre etendus pour couvrir la politique environnementale la reponse depend du degre de distorsion que les pays introduisent dans leur politique environnementale pour proteger leurs industries nationales nos resultats suggerent que cet impact est important des etudes anterieures de cette relation ont traite la politique environnementale comme exogene et ont montre qu il existe une co relation negligeable entre politique envir onnementale et flux commerciaux au contraire nous revelons que quand la politique environnementale est consideree comme variable endoge ne son effet sur les flux com merciaux est plus eleve de maniere significative que ce qu on a note anterieurement

is the wto passe the wto has delivered policy outcomes that are very different from those likely to emerge out of the recent wave of preferential trade agreements ptas should economists see this as an efficient institutional hand off where the wto has carried trade liberalization as far as it can manage and is now passing the baton to ptas to finish the job this paper surveys a growing economics literature on international trade agreements and argues on this basis that the wto is not passe rather and subject to some caveats this survey of research to date suggests that the wto warrants strong support while a more cautious view of ptas seems appropriate

trade policy cross border externalities and lobbies do linked agreements enforce more cooperative outcomes abstract we analyze whether linking international cooperation in trade policy to environmental policy or other issues with nonpecuniary externalities promotes more cooperation in both policies or whether cooperation in one is strengthened at the expense of the other in the context of self enforcing agreements we show that if the policies are independent in the government s objective function then linkage promotes cooperation in one policy at the expense of the policy that is easier to enforce under no linkage however if the linked policies are not independent and if these policies are strategic complements then linkage can sustain more cooperation in both issues than no linkage the policies are strategic complements only if i the production externality has cross border effects ii the weight on the externality cost is high iii import competing lobbies are not powerful

the recent slowdown of productivity growth the slowdown of productivity growth in the developed countries during the seventies will in this paper be viewed as a combined effect of three closely interacting forces i a long term deterioration in the efficiency and flexibility of some basic mechanisms of the economic and political systems of these countries ii the fading away of a number of uniquely favourable circumstances for productivity growth during the fifties and sixties and iii the exposure of these economies to unusually severe macroeconomic disturbances in the seventies careful inspection of time series with attempted modifications for cyclical factors suggests that there was hardly any general slowdown of productivity growth among developed countries before approximately i972 4 1 as we know the situation is radically different since then labour productivity growth per year for the entire national economy gdp per man hour seems to have fallen between the periods i960 73 and i973 9 by about i 2 percentage points in the united states 45 by about 24 percentage points in western europe2 45 and by about 5 9 percentage points in japan 6o table i see also fig i the slowdown was of about the same size in the business and manufacturing sectors see table i to calculate the extent of the slowdown of total factor productivity growth is of course a much more hazardous matter to which i will return later if just the various system changes and the fading away of the uniquely favourable factors had been the dominating forces behind the productivity growth slowdown we would expect the slowdown to have been gradual rather than abrupt as it turned out to be this abruptness as well as its timing makes the dramatic macroeconomic disturbances around i972 4 a prime suspect when looking for the villain behind the productivity growth slowdown indeed it is a basic hypothesis of the paper that these macroeconomic disturbances were not only by themselves strongly unfavourable for productivity growth but that they also revealed and accentuated the gradual deterioration of the

energy prices and productivity growth the sharp decline in economic growth since 1973 presents a problem comparable in scientific interest and social importance to the problem of unemployment in the great depression of the 1930s conventional methods of economic analysis have been tried and have been found to be inadequate this paper outlines a new framework for understanding the slowdown in economic growth we find that the fall in u s economic growth since 1973 has been due to the dramatic decline in productivity growth within the new framework we identify higher energy prices as an important determinant of the productivity slowdown

a disaggregated analysis of asymmetrical behaviour in the uk housing market potential asymmetrical adjustment in uk house prices is considered the present analysis extends previous research in a number of crucial ways first a seminal examination of asymmetry in regionally disaggregated uk house prices is undertaken secondly data are examined which are further disaggregated according to the age or vintage of the housing stock however the major development concerns the application of a non parametric testing approach to detect cyclical asymmetry in contrast to previously employed tests in the economics literature the triples test employed possesses high power and is not sensitive to outliers it is found that extensive asymmetry is present in uk house prices with cyclical peaks typically being greater in magnitude than corresponding troughs the implications of these findings for the comparison and construction of economic theories of the housing market the specification of econometric models and the construction and implementation of economic policy are noted

speculation in the housing market this paper presents and tests a model of house price speculation the mechanisms by which price speculation may occur in the housing market are described and formalised a model of house prices is constructed that allows for speculation aspects of this model are tested using time series data for the uk and the greater london area 1969 95 overall the analysis presents some evidence of the process of speculation as a possible determinant of house prices in the london and uk wide housing markets

on the role of retaliation in trade agreements this paper analyzes the role of retaliation in trade agreements it shows that in the presence of private information retaliation can always be used to increase the welfare derived from such agreements by the participating governments in particular it is shown that retaliation is a necessary feature of any efficient equilibrium we argue that retaliation would not be necessary if governments could resort to international transfers or export subsidies to compensate for terms of trade externalities within the current world trading system though in which transfers are seldom observed whereas export subsidies are prohibited the use of the remaining trade instruments in a retaliatory fashion might be optimal the model is used to interpret the retaliatory use of antidumping observed in the last decades and the proliferation of these measures relative to other trade remedies

a theory of managed trade this paper proposes a theory that predicts low levels of protection during periods of normal trade volume coupled with episodes of special protection when trade volumes surge this dynamic pattern of protection emerges from a model in which countries choose levels of protection in a repeated game facing volatile trade swings high trade volume leads to a greater incentive to defect unilaterally from cooperative tariff levels therefore as the volume of trade expands the level of protection must rise in a cooperative equilibrium to mitigate the rising trade volume and hold the incentive to defect in check copyright 1990 by american economic association

an empirical investigation of the pollution haven effect with strategic environment and trade policy abstract using a new dataset on the stringency and enforcement of environmental policy this study is the first to find robust confirmation of a pollution haven effect in a cross country context by accounting for strategically determined environment trade and intellectual property right ipr policies a simple game theoretic approach to policy determination is described which suggests an identification strategy based on other country characteristics it is found that for the top 20th percentile of countries in terms of growth in u s multinational affiliate value added as much as 8 6 of that growth between 1999 and 2003 can be attributed to declining relative stringency and enforcement of environmental policy the results are robust to a number of identification tests weak iv tests and third country spatial effects further evidence is found that relatively footloose industries are more likely to be affected by environmental policy than more traditionally dirty industries and enforcement of environmental policies tends to be a more important deterrent than the stringency of the policy set

modelling uk house prices using cointegration an application of the johansen technique this paper provides an econometric analysis of the long term equilibrium determination of uk house prices using the relatively recent johansen cointegration procedure this long term equilibrium specification is then utilized in order to estimate a parsimonious dynamic model for uk house prices

politically realistic objective functions and trade policy profs and tariffs abstract this paper demonstrates a mathematical correspondence between the deus ex machina tariff formation approach and political economy approach the correspondence implies that the tariff chosen by lobbying influenced policy makers will be equivalent to a tariff chosen by a deus ex machina government that gives too much weight to profits this result allows many political economy issues to be addressed in the simple framework of a deus ex machina government which faces a politically realistic objective function prof

a new perspective on the ripple effect in the uk housing market comovement cyclical subsamples and alternative indices an alternative perspective is provided on the existence of a ripple effect in the uk housing market in contrast to previous studies the analysis involves consideration of information on the changes in house prices to which the hypothesis of house price diffusion posited by the ripple effect relates rather than their levels in an examination of changes in house prices in london relative to other regions of the uk directional forecasting methods are employed to establish the extent of the relationship between geographical proximity and comovement across the three month window provided by quarterly data consequently the analysis provides a direct examination of the ripple effect which refers to changes in prices rather than the convergence of levels which has become a feature of the empirical literature the literature is extended further by both the application of dating techniques to perform the analysis across cycles and phases of cycles recovery and recessionary periods in the uk housing market

domestic policies in self enforcing trade agreements abstract if all cross country externalities travel through the terms of trade efficient trade agreements may simply target the terms of trade and ignore domestic policies this argument has been advanced by several prominent studies simply put it reads terms of trade agreements are efficient i show that this result breaks down if the following two standard conditions are met first a self enforcement requirement constrains the agreement and second production possibilities are intertemporally linked these conditions imply that a country s current policy mix affects future production possibilities and thus impacts payoffs under potential defection since a terms of trade agreement does not specify a country s policy mix it effectively invites countries to manipulate their own defection temptation to be self enforcing terms of trade agreement must ensure that no country while optimizing its policies on the iso terms of trade schedule will abandon its zone of voluntary cooperation this requirement implies that terms of trade agreements are inefficient and can be improved upon by agreements that target policies directly

wto tariff commitments and temporary protection complements or substitutes abstract there is a long held notion in the trade policy literature that traditional tariff instruments and temporary protection tp measures are substitutes despite this prediction there is only mixed empirical evidence for a link between tariff reductions and the usage pattern of antidumping safeguard and countervailing duties based on recent theoretical advances i argue in this paper that the relevant trade policy margin for implementing tp measures is instead tariff overhangs the difference between wto bound and applied tariffs lower tariff overhangs constrain countries to raise their mfn applied rates without legal repercussions independent of past tariff changes using detailed sectoral data for a sample of 30 wto member countries during the period 1996 2014 i find strong evidence for an inverse link between tariff overhangs and tp activity this result implies that tariff overhangs and tp measures are substitutes vindicating the importance of existing tariff commitments as a key determinant of alternative protection instruments

gatt a cooperative equilibrium in a noncooperative trading regime abstract as global tariff rates have fallen the use of nontariff barriers to trade have become more prevalent one incentive for a country to depart from free trade is to levy the optimal tariff in order to maximize domestic welfare the gatt was designed to maintain free trade through a system of managed retaliation as is well known in a game theoretic trade model of tariffs with no uncertainty free trade is an equilibrium outcome however with the introduction of uncertainty and asymmetric information it is shown that the equilibrium outcome s has each country imposing nontariff barriers to trade

trade agreements with domestic policies as disguised protection abstract wto rules prohibit disguised protection in the form of domestic policies how then do governments cooperate over trade and domestic policies when none can verify whether a nation s domestic tax reduction is a protective measure or a reaction to a production externality in this paper each government privately observes whether a production externality associated with its import competing good is high or low this paper finds that in an optimal agreement disguised protection with domestic policies is never used by governments with a high externality and is never commonly realized moreover in an optimal agreement tariffs may be conditional on domestic policies

optimal international agreement and restriction on domestic efficiency the wto s strict treatment of domestic subsidies has not been well received in the existing literature an essential reason is that the consequent restriction on domestic efficiency is hardly compatible with the existing theory of government intervention under which the primary objective of using domestic subsidies domestic efficiency is not sacrificed for another objective we develop a trade agreement model in which the magnitude of a legitimate domestic subsidy with which to address a production externality is private information we find that an optimal agreement substantially restricts domestic efficiency for the international objective of expanding market access

multimarket contact and collusive behavior traditional analyses of industrial behavior typically link the exercise of market power in an industry to internalfeatures such as demand conditions concentration and barriers to entry nevertheless some economists have remained concerned that external factors such as contact across markets may also play a significant role in determining the level of competitiveness in any particular industry in this article we examine the effect of multimarket contact on the degree of cooperation that firms can sustain in settings of repeated competition we isolate conditions under which multimarket contact facilitates collusion and show that these collusive gains are achieved through modes of behavior that have been identified in previous empirical studies of multimarketfirms

trade negotiations domestic policies and the most favored nation clause this paper illustrates how restricting trade instruments to non discrimination links trade agreements to non trade agreements and under certain conditions helps governments further lower tariffs and or domestic standards policies these conditions are i governments objective functions are sufficiently concave with respect to domestic standards policies ii domestic standards are sufficiently valued and iii policies are strategic complements these can then be used as a rationale for restricting safeguard measures to non discrimination ce texte montre comment le fait de restreindre les instruments de politique commerciale a la seule poursuite de liens commerciaux libres de discrimination relie accords commerciaux et non commerciaux et a certaines conditions aide les gouvernements a reduire encore davantage les tarifs douaniers et ou les normes politiques nationales ces conditions sont que i les fonctions objectives soient suffisamment concaves par rapport aux normes politiques nationales ii les normes nationales soient suffisamment valorisees et iii les politiques soient des complements strategiques ces arguments fournissent le rationale pour limiter les mesures de protection a la seule non discrimination

recurrent trade agreements and the value of external enforcement abstract this paper presents a theory of dynamic trade agreements in which external institutions such as the wto play a central role in supporting credible enforcement in our model countries engage in ongoing negotiations and as a consequence cooperative agreements become unsustainable in the absence of external enforcement institutions by using mechanisms such as delays in dispute resolution and direct penalties enforcement institutions can restore incentives for cooperation despite the lack of coercive power the occurrence of costly trade disputes and the feasibility of mechanisms such as escape clauses depend on the degree to which enforcement institutions can verify and condition on events that may lead to trade disputes

domestic policies national sovereignty and international economic institutions to what extent must nations cede control over their economic and social policies if global efe ciency is to be achieved in an interdependent world this question is at the center of the debate over the future role of the wto formerly gatt in the realm of labor and environmental standards in this paper we establish that the market access focus of current wto rules is well equipped to handle the problems associated with choices over labor and environmental standards in principle with relatively modest changes that grant governments more sovereignty not less these rules can deliver globally efe cient outcomes i introduction to what extent must nations cede control over their economic and social policies if global efe ciency is to be achieved in an interdependent world at a broad level this question probes the limits of any international economic institution whether geared toward real or e nancial concerns that is designed to promote global efe ciency while respecting national sovereignty naturally the answer depends upon the particular problem that the institution is meant to solve in other words the answer depends upon the inefe ciency that would arise under unilateral policy choices at a more specie c level this question is at the center of the debate concerning the appropriate scope of the world trade organization wto formerly gatt recently member countries have considered ways to broaden the wto s orientation beyond conventional trade policy measures to include labor and environmental standards there are now initiatives to introduce the issue of labor standards directly onto the negotiating agenda of the wto with the purpose of creating a wto social clause the social clause would specify a set of minimum international labor standards and then permit restrictions to be placed against imports from countries not complying with these minimum standards with regard to environmental policies a wto committee on trade and environment has been established to identify the relationships between trade and environmental measures and to

dynamic tariffs with asymmetric information recent developments in dynamic game theory are applied to determine when two countries can sustain freer trade given that they determine trade policies non cooperatively countries know their own level of protection but not the other country s level of protection using import trigger strategies cooperation in the form of low tariffs can be supported although there are periodic reversionary high tariff episodes however if terms of trade trigger strategies are used cooperation does not occur

is there long run convergence among regional house prices in the uk this paper investigates the long run convergence of regional house prices in the uk existing studies have failed to reach a consensus on whether or not regional house prices exhibit long run convergence with each other the application is proposed of a new test involving unit root testing of the first principal component based on regional national house price differentials using mix adjusted quarterly data for 1973 2006 it is found that the first principal component is stationary this suggests that all uk regional house prices are driven by a single common stochastic trend further analysis suggests that those regions that are more distant from london exhibit the highest degrees of persistence with respect to deviations in house price differentials

optimal remedies in international trade agreements abstract this paper takes a mechanism design approach to characterize a politically optimal trade agreement under the assumption that governments have private information about the fluctuating political pressure they face from domestic interest groups to restrict trade the optimal mechanism under these changing circumstances involves a remedy system for breach of trade agreements that specifies less than proportional retaliations against deviating parties this result is in contrast to the conventional wisdom in the literature regarding the efficiency of the reciprocity principle as a rule of renegotiation in trade agreements i also consider an institutional structure in which only commensurate retaliations are practical but governments can employ a public randomizing device to authorize retaliations i show that it is optimal to authorize retaliations only randomly this suggests a role for the wto dispute settlement process as a public randomizing device

will international rules on subsidies disrupt the world trading system international disputes over subsidies have become a prominent feature of the world trading system the creation of the world trade organization wto as a successor to the general agreement on tariffs and trade gatt was nearly prevented by disputes in the uruguay round of gatt negotiations over the issue of negotiating disciplines on agricultural subsidies an issue which continues to plague the ongoing doha round of wto negotiations and ongoing disputes over subsidies that violate existing wto rules have led to the largest amount of authorized retaliation in gatt wto history yet despite their evident importance the international rules that govern subsidies have received little formal attention

raw materials profits and the productivity slowdown a factor price frontier framework is used to clarify the analogy of an increase decrease in raw material prices with autonomous technological regress progress factor price profiles are estimated for the manufacturing sector of the united states the united kingdom germany and japan the production model in conjunction with estimates obtained from the factor price frontier attributes much of the slowdown in manufacturing productivity to the rise in relative raw material prices part of the apparent productivity riddle may have to do with the use of double deflated national accounting measures of value added which have an inherent measurement bias

towards an explanation of the productivity slowdown an acceleration deceleration hypothesis after two and a half decades of prosperous post war development western industrialised countries recently experienced a slowdown of economic growth and productivity advance together with an increase in the rates of inflation and unemployment in trying to explain this malaise we are looking at a diagnosis that could help us to identify early indicators of a future turnaround or some policy variables which deserve to be included in a therapeutic programme although we shall focus on what can be measured complying with the standards of the guild we shall not refrain from considering complex relationships which can be grasped only intuitively even if they include phenomena which lie beyond the limits of official statistics 2 the outcome may be soft economics but we find some consolation in the dictum that it is better to be vaguely right than to be precisely wrong

tariffs and quotas retaliation and negotiation with two instruments of protection abstract this paper examines the equilibrium level of trade barriers in a two country world when both tariffs and quotas are available as instruments of protection it is shown that the set of efficient equilibria is the same when either tariffs or quotas but not both may be negotiated furthermore it is shown that a trade eliminating quota war will not occur unless bargaining over tariffs is inefficient

do credible domestic institutions promote credible international agreements we examine the relationship between international policy coordination and domestic policy reputation when both are self sustaining we show that domestic policy commitment does not necessarily facilitate international cooperation rather efficient policies may be most easily sustained when governments are unable to pre commit to policy domestically moreover the lack of domestic commitment is more likely to facilitate international cooperation the larger the international spillovers of domestic policies are

negotiated trade restrictions with private political pressure we consider a home government with political pressure to restrict trade the foreign country is compensated with a portion of the tariff revenues or quota rents but cannot directly observe the political pressure abroad in this setting the two countries negotiate over the volume of trade and transfer of rents depending on the level of political pressure we determine globally optimal incentive compatible trade policies in which the home government has no incentive to overstate or understate the pressure for protection

long run technical change and multifactor productivity growth in us manufacturing this study utilizes a translog cost function to produce econometric estimates of the separate influences of technical change versus scale efficiency in contributing to multifactor productivity growth within the us manufacturing sector the analysis generates two digit industry specific parameters that capture the effects of output versus time related shifts in the cost function over the 1949 1991 period thus initial evidence concerning the relative importance of technical progress versus scale cannot be provided as a source of productivity gains within two digit industries the parametric estimates of total factor productivity growth are compared with existing divisia measures to explore the shortcomings of the growth accounting technique these long run patterns hold implications for the productivity convergence hypothesis traced to knowledge spillovers between industries

adjustment costs and the sequencing of trade liberalisation a common feature of trade agreements between countries is that the integration of markets proceeds in stages this paper examin es conceptually the role played by adjustment costs in determining the best way to structure an agreement between two countries when there are multiple sectors to be liberalised adjustment costs to liberalisatio n of industries might influence the timing of liberalisatio n with the analysis bearing similarity to why tariff reductions tend to be phased in over time when two industries have no spillover eff ects trade agreements with sequential liberalisation will be less costly to sustain however if the liberalisation of one in dustry influences permanently the flow of benefits from liberalising the other industry simultaneous liberalisation may be easier to sustain

productivity and cost gaps in manufacturing industries in u s japan and germany abstract the objective of this paper is to measure and explain the development of differences in productivity for five manufacturing industries of the u s japan and germany changes in total factor productivities and differences in technologies and the sources of those changes will be analyzed we extend the framework developed by jorgenson and nishimizu 1978 to the dual cost approach to reflect the efficiency aspect of productivity gaps in terms of cost disadvantages we employ translog cost functions for a description of productivity and cost efficiency gaps and for an econometric analysis of sources of catching up processes