the inflation tax in a real business cycle model money is incorporated into a real business cycle model using a cash in advance constraint the model economy is used to analyze whether the business cycle is different in high inflation and low inflation economies and to analyze the impact of variability in the growth rate of money in addition the welfare cost of the inflation tax is measured and the steady state properties of high and low inflation economies are compared

testing the efficient redistribution hypothesis an application to japanese beef policy we discuss and model the structure of the political economy of japanese beef markets and we apply bullock s statistical test of the efficient redistribution hypothesis to our model to study the pareto efficiency of japanese beef policy in 1990 and 1991 we found that under the hypothesis that our modeled political economy adequately reflects the true japanese beef political economy we could not reject at the 5 significance level that japanese beef policy was inefficient in 1990 and in 1991 however we could reject inefficiency in 1991 at a 7 level of significance

farmers and the u s congress rethinking basic institutional assumptions about agricultural policy abstract an assumption shared by most agricultural economists is that as farm numbers decline in a democratic government farm policy attention from rule makers will decline as well this assumption despite important work to the contrary in institutional economics is often voiced in federated governing units especially the u s where constituents are locally organized and the commitment of rule makers to nationwide policy is limited while significant theoretical literature challenges that majoritarian view from the perspective of interest group theory this is the first empirical test and explanation of the behavior of rule makers the findings of this analysis indicate that classic majoritarian expectations are not met in the u s congress instead unexpectedly large numbers of legislators seek favorable policy action for farmers as distinct minorities within their districts however these same legislators balance their attention to farmers by also taking policy action in agriculture on behalf of other types of contituents legislators explain these actions as the result of their own electoral needs to satisfy vocal minorities from their political districts plus the ease with which they can marginally adjust a large base of u s farm programs thus a kind of neo majoritarianism emerges these results are especially important given the growing attention to federated governance in the european union east europe in north america through free trade agreements and with the gatt they indicate that farmers will continue despite shrinking numbers to be influential in those governing structures that have historically strong farm programs and the capacity to diversify from that policy base

competition in political and economic markets do anomalies play an important role in explaining economic and political choices are political decisions more prone to anomalies irrationality and inefficiency than economic decisions in their integration of results derived from experimental psychology and applied political economy frey and eichenberger 1990 argue that social scientists ought to answer these questions in the affirmative after examining a large body of choice data frey and eichenberger conclude that individuals deviate from the axioms of rational choice in their view the resultant anomalies in individual behavior are unaffected by the aggregation which occurs in the economic marketplace they conclude that political decision making systems correct no larger a proportion of these anomalies than are corrected by the economic market in many institutional settings outlined in their paper decision making systems can be expected to magnify individuals deviations from rational behavior system wide irrational behavior will then produce less frequent trading and a less efficient allocation of resources in this note we examine two components of frey and eichenberger s argument first we reconsider their evidence for irrational behavior in light of a larger body of experimental data which includes choices made in market settings second we argue that competition in political markets will tend to eliminate aggregate anomalies just as it does in economic markets experimental economists often generate data which distinguish between choices individuals indicate in unstructured environments and transactions individuals consummate in markets initial statements regarding choices are often inconsistent with subsequent trading behavior these data indicate that the economist s maximization paradigm based on tenets of rational choice is

promotion of the agricultural sector and political power in austria in most industrialized countries farmers as a small and well orgnized group are ableto influence government decisions to get rent creating proposals enacted two different viewsare presented to explain why the chicagoan view efficient redistribution hypothesis and the virginian view inefficient outcome of political bargaining a vertically structuredempirical model of the austrian farm sector is employed to test both hypotheses quantitativeresults of the welfare transfers from consumers taxpayers to farmers and agribusiness firmsare derived and the political weights of these groups are presented

why has u s inflation become harder to forecast we examine whether the u s rate of price inflation has become harder to forecast and to the extent that it has what changes in the inflation process have made it so the main finding is that the univariate inflation process is well described by an unobserved component trend cycle model with stochastic volatility or equivalently an integrated moving average process with time varying parameters this model explains a variety of recent univariate inflation forecasting puzzles and begins to explain some multivariate inflation forecasting puzzles as well

redistributing income back to european community consumers and taxpayers through the common agricultural policy a multiple policy instrument generalization of gardner s surplus transformation curve analysis is applied to an empirical model of the ec wheat sector to compare welfare effects of policy change proposals a production quota support price combination is estimated as the most efficient means of making relatively small transfers from ec agriculture to consumers taxpayers a coresponsibility levy support price combination is estimated as the most efficient means of making larger transfers the importance of accounting for income transfer size distortions in related markets and the structure of markets when comparing welfare effects of policy change proposals is demonstrated

predatory versus productive government the case of u s agricultural policies this essay will argue that agricultural policy in the united states has led to both the enhancement of efficiency through productive policies and the transfer of wealth and income to special interests through redistributive or predatory policies these two activities can be labeled as pests and perts pest policies or political economic seeking transfers are meant to redistribute wealth from one social group to another and are not explicitly concerned with efficiency in contrast perts or political economic resource transactions are intended to correct market failures or to provide public goods these policies have neutral distributional effects at least in design a review of the history of public policy in agriculture reveals not only tension between the pert and pest roles of the public sector but also some coordination between these two types of activities as different interest groups pressure the political process the government trades off pests and perts in its attempts to acquire balance and secure political power at times this has led to combinations of programs that appear incoherent in such a world the challenge for economists is to design and advocate policies that are both economically productive and politically sustainable

inflation and welfare in a monetary economy it is in everyone s private interest to try to get someone else to hold non interest bearing cash and reserves but someone has to hold it all so these efforts must simply cancel out all of us spend several hours per year in this effort and employ thousands of talented and highly trained people to help us these person hours are simply thrown away wasted on a task that should not have to be performed at all

political economy of public policies insights from distortions to agricultural and food markets the agricultural and food sector is an ideal case for investigating the political economy of public policies many of the policy developments in this sector since the 1950s have been sudden and transformational while others have been gradual but persistent this paper reviews and synthesizes the literature on trends and fluctuations in market distortions and the political economy explanations that have been advanced based on a rich global data set covering a half century of evidence on commodities countries and policy instruments the paper identifies hypotheses that have been explored in the literature on the extent of market distortions and the conditions under which reform may be feasible

economic development institutional change and the political economy of agricultural protection an econometric study of belgium since the 19th century this empirical study uses 100 years of annual data on 11 agricultural commodities from belgium to measure the impact of structural changes coinciding with economic development and changes in political institutions on agricultural protection the analysis shows that changes in agricultural protection are caused by a combination of factors governments have increased protection and support to farmers when world market prices for their commodities fell and vice versa offsetting market effects on producer incomes other economic determinants were the share of the commodities in total consumer expenditures negative effect and in total output of the economy positive effect with belgium a small economy there was no impact of the trade position changes in political institutions have affected agricultural protection democratic reforms which induced a significant shift in the political balance towards agricultural interests such as the introduction of the one man one vote system led to an increase in agricultural protection the integration of belgian agricultural policies in the common agricultural policy in 1968 coincided with an increase in protection ceteris paribus both institutional factors related to changes in access to and information about the decision making at the eu level and structural changes in the agricultural and food economy may explain this effect

measuring the social costs of suboptimal combinations of policy instruments a general framework and an example abstract since most agricultural programs employ two or more policy instruments simultaneously it is notable that little research has attempted to find optimal instrument combinations and no research exists which evaluates the social costs unrealized benefits of combining instruments suboptimally in our paper we report a simple and feasible method to find optimal policy instrument combinations and we provide the first general formal approach to measuring the social costs of suboptimal policy instrument combinations our approach is illustrated in an analysis for five major u s crops corn feed grains wheat rice cotton the simple model we employ for the illustration suggests that except for the feed grains program the observed programs combined policy instruments quite suboptimally we conclude that agricultural economics research now can and should begin placing increased emphasis on studying optimal policy instrument combinations

the political economy of u s wheat legislation bruce a babcock colin a carter and andrew schmitz both taxpayer subsidies to u s wheat producers and domestic deadweight losses increased as a result of the u s wheat program adopted in 1985 a calculation of the costs and benefits of alternative wheat policies shows that mandatory production controls with no taxpayer expense could have made wheat producers as well off as the adopted policy becker s theory of competition among interest groups and peltzman s theory of the equilibrium amount of regulation are shown to be consistent with the observed policy choice if the list of affected interest groups includes agricultural input suppliers and grain marketing firms i introduction every five years congress drafts new farm legislation dictating the provisions of commodity programs for cotton and the major food and feed grains for the subsequent five years from 1973 through 1985 the primary features of the commodity programs were guaranteed farm prices and government stockholding activities deadweight losses from the programs during this time were minimal market prices were generally higher than the government defended price floors because of a booming export market legislated increases in commodity support prices combined with a severe drop off in the demand for agricultural exports beginning in 1982 increased the economic costs of the commodity programs the u s price floor became the world price for wheat cotton and corn grain stocks accumulated while government payments to u s farmers grew to unprecedented levels most agricultural interest groups in 1984 agreed that an overhaul of agricultural policy was necessary supporters of large levels of production and exports wanted to stimulate the demand for exports by eliminating price floors others felt that the united states should reduce budgetary costs by using direct supply controls to raise farm prices the clear winners in the new 1985 farm bill were the proponents of maintained production levels and expanded exports the new policy froze the relatively high supply prices received by farmers while simultaneously lowering price floors becker 1983 argues that two forces mainly determine the outcome of policy debates the first following stigler 1971 and peltzman 1976 is the relative efficiency with which interest groups exert political pressure interest groups that are efficient in exerting political pressure can increase the subsidization or decrease the tax burden of their constituents the second force is the extent of deadweight losses associated with proposed policies those policies with lower deadweight losses are ceteris paribus more likely to be adopted for the simple reason that less tax needs to be collected from losing interest groups for given transfers to winning groups gardner 1987 finds empirical evidence that both the ability to redistribute efficiently and the effectiveness of political organizations help explain which farm commodities have received the most government support since 1930 his study provides little insight however into which force is more important in determining the type of redistribution policies that are ultimately adopted for a given commodity an examination of the wheat program adopted in the 1985 farm bill and alternative policies that were rejected provides an opportunity to determine whether the efficiency of programs or the political prowess of interest groups is more important in determining policy outcomes this task requires a calculation of the magnitudes and the distribution of costs and benefits of the chosen policy and alternative policies costs and benefits are calculated for 1 a continuation of the 1981 farm bill policies through 1986 1990 2 the adopted 1985 farm bill policies and 3 mandatory production controls all three alternatives are examined relative to a laissez faire policy whereby the u s government has no direct involvement in agriculture

consequences of discretion in the formation of commodities policy abstract in a simple model of endogenous primary commodity price support policy i policy is affected by private inventories and ii private inventories are affected by speculative attempts to forecast policy the interaction between these two forces is rich yielding bubbles and extrinsic volatility thus helping to explain some odd episodes observed in commodity markets in addition under some conditions a government that wishes to support the price but is unable to commit to future action may be impotent and a government that does not want to support the price may be trapped into doing so by speculative activity

another look at long run money demand abstract this paper investigates the long run demand for m1 in the postwar united states previous studies based on data ending in the late 1980s are inconclusive about the parameters of postwar money demand this paper obtains precise estimates of these parameters by extending the data through 1996 the income elasticity of money demand is approximately 0 5 and the interest semi elasticity is approximately 0 05 these parameters are significantly smaller in absolute value than the corresponding parameters for the prewar period a caveat is that the analysis assumes there is no trend in money demand resulting from technological change

determinants of the u s wheat producer support price do presidential elections matter the paper s focus is on the determinants of the u s wheat producer support price the results of the time series analysis suggest that this price is largely determined by the previous price the expected u s share in world exports and expected program costs presidential elections also influence u s wheat price policies all other things being equal the support price tends to be lower in election years than in other years this suggests that small interest groups relative political economic power may be less pronounced in election years if they do not succeed in positioning themselves on the political economic market such that they contain the potentially decisive voter

the implications of inflation in an estimated new keynesian model abstract this paper studies the steady state and dynamic consequences of inflation in an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the u s economy it is found that 10 percentage points of inflation entail a steady state welfare cost as high as 13 of annual consumption this large cost is mainly driven by staggered price contracts and price indexation the transition from high to low inflation inflicts a welfare loss equivalent to 0 53 of annual consumption the role of nominal real frictions as well as that of parameter uncertainty is also addressed

stop and go agricultural policies with a land market this article studies the design of farm policy in the presence of asymmetric information about farmers productivity a government objective to insure farmers a minimum parity income an endogenous land rent and diminishing returns on alternative nonprogram crop land uses in this setting acreage set asides are never part of an optimal farm policy although compensated acreage limits are when there are new farmer entrants who cannot be excluded from farm programs optimal policy takes the form of a pure voluntary acreage limitation or buyout program in which high cost producers participate and low cost producers do not copyright 2003 oxford university press

crop insurance in a political economy an alternative perspective on agricultural policy lawmakers often subsidize farmers in times of financial distress this article models this political impulse as a constraint on government farm policy describing how ex ante government farm insurance can deter ex post disaster relief and improve production incentives by countering the moral hazard that otherwise prevails absent ex ante government policy ex post relief takes the form of revenue insurance which prompts excessive entry into farm production and under production by operating farmers ex ante government policy can raise economic and political welfare by buying out low productivity farmers and offering profitable farmers a combination of revenue insurance price supports and a program participation fee copyright 2003 oxford university press

money demand and the effects of fiscal policies this paper reexamines the choice of the scale variable in the money demand function a variety of evidence suggests that consumer spending is a better scale variable than gnp changing the money demand specification along these lines can profoundly affect the standard keynesian analysis of a tax cut copyright 1986 by ohio state university press

on the form of transfers to special interests an important question in political economy concerns the form of transfers to special interests the chicago view is that political competition leads politicians to make such transfers efficiently the virginia position is that lack of information on the part of voters leads politicians to favor inefficient sneaky methods of redistribution this paper analyzes the form of transfers in a model of political competition in which politicians have incentives to make transfers to special interests it shows that when voters have imperfect information about both the effects of policy and the predispositions of politicians inefficient methods of redistribution may be employed

the political ideology of food abstract using data from a survey of over 700 americans we sought to measure and investigate the nature of citizen s political ideologies in relation to food results reveal that a majority of respondents can be classified as food statists desiring more government action in the realm food and agricultural relative to the status quo people s ideologies with regard to food were multidimensional falling along lines related to food health and quality food safety and farm subsidies respondents were most in favor of additional government action related to food safety food ideology was related to conventional measures of political ideology with for example more liberal respondents desiring more government involvement in food than more conservative respondents but the relationship was far from determinative suggesting food ideology represents a unique construct in its own right

causes of u s farm commodity programs this paper i s an attempt to explain variations by commodity in producer protection afforded by farm price support programs since the1930s particularly emphasized are theideas that these programs are essentially income redistributional measures and that given political forces the programs are attempts to redistribute efficiently variables associated with the cost to producers of generating political pressure and the social cost deadweight losses of redistribution are both found to be empirically important copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

what drives china s new agricultural subsidies summary china s agricultural policy has undergone a fundamental transformation in the four decades since the introduction of market reforms in 1978 and now involves a wide array of policy instruments that range from output and input subsidies to public infrastructure expenditures this article analyzes the political economic determinants of china s agricultural subsidy changes using producer subsidy equivalents pses drawn from annual data from 1984 to 2015 on 16 agricultural commodity sectors that include multiple policy instruments empirical results indicate that national factors such as high rates of economic growth and a lower share of agriculture in the economy have been the primary drivers of increases in pses and that larger more geographically concentrated agricultural sectors are more likely to be subsidized at a higher pse rate finally china s joining the world trade organization in december 2001 led to significant increases in pses that were not already explained by internal national or commodity specific factors in essence china s agricultural subsidy programs and levels increasingly resemble those of developed countries primarily as a result of economic transformation and the ability to structure agricultural policies within the wto rules moreover this article predicts that agricultural subsidies will trend slightly upward in the next decade and that the strongest opportunities to export to china will be in animal products or grains that are utilized for feed or processed foods where the levels of subsidies are predicted to increase but remain lower than for traditional food crops

stopping inflations big and small previous studies of disinflation work with models in which firms use time dependent strategies changing nominal prices at intervals of fixed length these models may be criticized for failing to allow pricing behavior to adjust after a large shift in policy regime consequently this paper develops a model that permits firms to adopt strategies that are partially state dependent changing nominal prices whenever they depart sufficiently from their target values the paper uses this model to examine how the welfare costs and benefits of disinflation vary with the initial inflation rate and the speed of disinflation copyright 1997 by ohio state university press

optimal monetary policy under commitment with a zero bound on nominal interest rates we determine optimal monetary policy under commitment in a forwardlooking new keynesian model when nominal interest rates are bounded below by zero the lower bound represents an occasionally binding constraint that causes the model and optimal policy to be nonlinear a calibration to the u s economy suggests that policy should reduce nominal interest rates more aggressively than suggested by a model without lower bound rational agents anticipate the possibility of reaching the lower bound in the future and this amplifies the effects of adverse shocks well before the bound is reached while the empirical magnitude of u s mark up shocks seems too small to entail zero nominal interest rates shocks affecting the natural real interest rate plausibly lead to a binding lower bound under optimal policy however this occurs quite infrequently and does not imply positive average inflation rates in equilibrium interestingly the presence of binding real rate shocks alters the policy response to non binding markup shocks

what do campaign contributions buy deciphering causal effects of money and votes in the 1987 1988 election cycle political action committees pacs spent 176 6 million on candidates who competed for a seat in the house of representatives what do pacs buy when contributing this money if campaign contributions are rational allocations of a contributor s income campaign expenditures could increase both the probability that the contributor s preferred candidate is elected and the likelihood that if elected the candidate will vote in the interest of the contributor most studies do not find that incumbents expenditures have a significant positive effect on the number of votes incumbents receive 11 14 15 17 29 the evidence that contributions influence congressional votes is mixed most studies find weak or no support for this hypothesis for example kau rubin and keenan 17 find that contributions from businesses mattered in only two of the eight votes they analyzed others argue that campaign expenditures play no important role in the voting decision of congressmen 5 9 12 31 the lack of finding of significant effects of money on votes has been explained with the need for better models to explain campaign contributions 5 however the theoretical developments of for example ben zion and eyton 4 bental and ben zion 3 and baron 2 have not been incorporated in the empirical analysis of the effect of campaign contributions on the voting behavior of legislators empirical models that test this relationship must allow for the endogeneity of campaign contributions for the dichotomous nature of the dependent vote variable and the nonnegativity constraint of campaign contributions most empirical work in this area utilize models that do not incorporate these restrictions in this study i plan to incorporate these aspects of the data generating process into a more detailed model of the effects of campaign contributions on congressional votes of all the reported empirical studies on this issue only chappell 5 uses a model which can properly assess the impact of money on votes chappell finds that campaign contributions do not affect votes in congress when his more detailed econometric technique is used the best test of the theory results if votes have a clear economic payoff to contributors benefits of the votes are concentrated and costs are

a critical assessment of the political preference function approach in agricultural economics abstract the policy preference function ppf approach has become popular with economists seeking to explain the origin of government policies in this paper a distinction between positive and normative work with the ppf concept is made positive work is shown to suffer from a variety of shortcomings including the misspecification of traditional ppfs and the failure to consider the importance of institutions constraints and the interaction between different commodity policies these weaknesses are reflected in the counter intuitive results of a simple ppf model designed to reflect the interaction between the ec s wheat and barley policies furthermore it is demonstrated that ppf weights change as a result of both political preferences and market parameters hence changes in ppf weights cannot be attributed to changes in preferences alone test of the axioms of revealed preference theory are used to demonstrate that even though ppf weights derived for the ec s wheat and barley markets have fluctuated considerably since the early 1970s we are not able to conclude that there has been a shift in political preferences the paper concludes with some comments about the use of ppfs in a normative framework the underlying assumption that policy makers optimise seems not surprisingly often to lead practitioners to the conclusion that observed policies are not so bad after all economists should also beware of the tendency to overlook possible differences between the ppf and the social welfare function

a roll call analysis of the endangered species act amendments public choice economics view legislative process as a transaction in the political market interest groups demand regulation in their favor and lobby lawmakers the lawmakers analyze an assortment of factors and supply legislation to the winning group thereby maximizing their rent from the political market this article examines endangered species act esa amendments from a public choice perspective congressional voting on the esa amendments are assessed using a model based on political incentive and ideology the results show that the lawmakers voting behavior is correlated with their party affiliation ideology and several characteristics of their home state such as number of endangered species proportion of urban population contribution of the natural resources and construction sectors in gross state product and geographical location copyright 2001 oxford university press

interest rates and prices in an inventory model of money with credit abstract using a segmented market model that includes state dependent asset market decisions along with access to credit we analyze the impact that transactions credit has on interest rates and prices the availability of credit allows agents to significantly smooth consumption reduce the movements in velocity prices become quite flexible and liquidity effects are dampened as credit costs decline in the model so does the effectiveness of monetary policy we also investigate the recessionary consequences of a shock to the cost of credit and find that the model s predictions align well with the empirical evidence

on the welfare cost of inflation and the recent behavior of money demand post 1980 u s data trace out a stable long run money demand relationship of cagan s semi log form between the m1 income ratio and the nominal interest rate with an interest semi elasticity of 1 79 integrating under this money demand curve yields estimates of the welfare cost of modest departures from friedman s zero nominal interest rate rule for the optimum quantity of money that are quite small the results suggest that the federal reserve s current policy which generates low but still positive rates of inflation provides an adequate approximation in welfare terms to the alternative of moving all the way to the friedman rule jel e31 e41 e52

the effect of technological uncertainty on the optimal location of a competitive firm abstract the purpose of this paper is to analyze the location decision of a competitive firm which is facing technological uncertainty this technological uncertainty could be the result of changes in production methods production machinery or input quality the analysis assumes the firm is risk averse and has decreasing absolute risk aversion using a simple model the results show that a competitive firm will locate closer to its sources under technological uncertainty when it is risk averse

five facts about prices a reevaluation of menu cost models are price decreases 3 the frequency of price increases covaries strongly with inflation whereas the frequency of price decreases and the size of price increases and price decreases do not 4 the frequency of price change is highly seasonal it is highest in the first quarter and then declines 5 we find no evidence of upwardsloping hazard functions of price changes for individual products we show that the first second and third facts are consistent with a benchmark menu cost model whereas the fourth and fifth facts are not

intervention bias in agricultural policy abstract this paper re examines the motivation for government intervention in agriculture to support farm prices and incomes a model is outlined in which the government has a preference for higher farm incomes but fails to provide farmers with the socially optimal level of price support even when one accepts the government s income redistribution goals as a valid reflection of social preference it is shown that agricultural policy has an intervention bias government price supports generally are higher than would be socially optimal the source of the intervention bias is a time inconsistency in optimal agricultural policy formation caused by the government s inability to precommit to a rule for setting future price support levels simulation results indicate that in some circumstances the intervention bias in agricultural policy can be substantial

the political economy of public research investment and commodity policies in agriculture an empirical study the paper tests a political economy theory of simultaneous government decision making on income redistribution through commodity policies and on public research investment in agriculture we use data from 37 countries on agricultural protection and public agricultural research expenditures pari the empirical results are consistent with the political economy hypotheses the analysis suggest that structural changes in the economy have important effects on the political incentives for governments not only to subsidize or tax farmers but also to invest in public agricultural research furthermore the analysis supports the hypotheses that the impact of such structural changes on government decision making on pari is non linear and conditional on other factors regarding the impact of political institutions the results suggest that more democracy neither leads to more distortionary transfers agricultural protection nor to lower investment in public goods pari

the cotton influence index an examination of u s cotton subsidies given the lack of a bill or amendment specific to cotton we introduce a cotton influence index to capture legislators influence in championing the cause of the cotton growers during the hearings of the farm security and rural investment act of 2002 regression analyses reveal a relationship between cotton influence index and campaign contributions cotton farmland party affiliation and ideology tobit analysis indicates a significant relationship between different actions and participations by representatives to advance the interest of cotton that is components of this index and their future cotton political action committees pacs contributions to them copyright 2006 oxford university press

on the production efficiency of a location regulated firm this paper evaluates the effect of location regulation on a monopolist s output and examines the desirability of such regulation it is shown that a location regulation can increase the output if the production functions do not exhibit constant returns to scale and that the output level could be higher than the social welfare maximum without intervention if demand curves are sufficiently convex to the origin

renewable resource policy when distributional impacts matter the standard assumption in bioeconomic resource models is that optimal policies maximize the present value of economic surplus to society this assumption implies that regulatory agencies should not be concerned with the distributional consequences of management strategies both contemporary welfare theoretic and rent seeking approaches suggests distributional issues are important in designing resource management policies this paper explores resource management when the managing agency has preferences defined over the economic welfare of various groups with a direct economic interest in the use of resources policy schemes consistent with this approach are derived and compared with standard results

the time varying volatility of macroeconomic fluctuations we investigate the sources of the important shifts in the volatility of us mac roeconomic variables in the postwar period to this end we propose the esti mation of dsge models allowing for time variation in the volatility of the structural innovations we apply our estimation strategy to a large scale model of the business cycle and find that shocks specific to the equilibrium condition of investment account for most of the sharp decline in volatility of the last two decades jel c51 e32

the evolution of farm programs and their contribution to agricultural land values the economic environment of agricultural producers has been influenced by formal u s agricultural policy for more than seventy years among the first pieces of new deal legislation proposed by incoming president franklin d roosevelt was a farm program designed to address declines in crop prices and net farm income key features of the agriculture act of 1933 included mandatory price support for specified commodities direct subsidy payments to farmers and supply controls farm programs once viewed as temporary and supplementary to agricultural earnings are increasingly viewed as permanent and of major proportion gardner examined the relationships between u s farm commodity programs and u s farm structure while others see sumner for concept evidence and implications have examined farm programs and specific crops gardner 2002 and weersink et al analyzed the effects of farm program programs upon land values these studies examined various aspects of agricultural policy including whether farm program payments have enhanced land prices and landowner wealth rather than the welfare of producers while it would seem logical that revenueenhancing farm programs would increase land values reliably estimating the magnitudes of farm program effects upon land values is an empirically challenging task both statistical and budgeting based methodologies have been used to estimate the share of land prices generated by farm program payments statistically based studies are complicated by the fact that both real per acre crop receipts

the fable of the bees revisited causes and consequences of the u s honey program abstract in his 1973 paper steven cheung discredited the fable of the bees by demonstrating that markets for beekeeping services exist and function well although economists heeded cheung s lessons policy makers did not the honey program has operated for over 50 years supporting the price of honey through a variety of mechanisms its effects were minor before the 1980s but then became important with annual government expenditures near 100 million for several years reforms of the program in the late 1980s reduced its market effects and budget costs returning it to its original role as a minor commodity program although the 1996 farm bill formally eliminated the honey program it was reinstated in the 2002 farm bill we measure the historical welfare effects of the program during its various incarnations examine its frequently stated public interest rationale the encouragement of honeybee pollination and interpret its history in light of economic theories of regulation

a benefit cost analysis of u s agricultural trade promotion subsidies for nonprice export promotion can harm domestic consumers by increasing price in the domestic market and by diverting funds from domestic market promotion taking these consumer impacts into account we find that federal expenditures for nonprice export promotion of farm products may be too high

the economic effects of supply controls the simple analytics of the u s peanut program a gricultural commodity programs employ a wide variety of policy tools to regulate u s agriculture price supports are the most common form of intervention but rights to sell at the supported price are allocated very differently under different commodity programs under recent feed grain programs for example the right to sell at the supported price is linked to acreage set asides agreements not to produce on certain acres in other programs sales by individual farmers are controlled under marketing orders sponsored by the u s department of agriculture usda 2 a third method is through permanent maketing quotas that directly limit output only two major commodity programs those for tobacco and peanuts currently allocate the right to sell in this way the peanut program is the subject of this article 3

revenue neutral tax policies under price uncertainty comment in an interesting paper in this journal holloway investigated the firm s response to revenue neutral taxation under price uncertainty in his analysis revenue neutral policies adjust simultaneously the marginal tax rate and the level of exemptions while keeping expected tax receipts constant using an assumption of nonincreasing absolute risk aversion he concluded that a reduction in the marginal rate would cause the firm to contract output holloway used the 1986 tax reform act as an example of a revenue neutral policy as a matter of fact the act was intended to be revenue neutral while low

a policy preference function for government intervention in the u s wheat market this paper estimates a policy preference function that explains the government s choices of target prices government held wheat stocks and public wheat research funding the policy preference function depends on producers surplus consumers surplus and budget expenditures an important innovation in this paper is the inclusion of interactions between public research expenditures and other public policy variables results indicate that the government places a premium of 25 to 45 on the welfare of wheat producers of relative to budget expenditures while wheat consumers welfare is discounted as much as 50 relative to budget expenditures the purpose of this paper is to provide an explanation of government commodity programs stock accumulations and research expenditures in the u s wheat sector the explanation is based on a policy preference function ppf that depends on producers surplus consumers surplus and budget expenditures it is assumed that target prices reductions in or additions to government stocks and public research expenditures are chosen to maximize the policy preference function the central contribution of the paper is the estimation of a function that is consistent with the observed government interventions in the u s wheat market that is the paper explains the observed target prices government sales and public research expenditures as rational behavior by a government which seeks to maximize the estimated policy preference function the approach in this paper is based on the political interest group theories of peltzman and becker applications of these ideas to agriculture include rausser and freebairn s description of the beef industry gardner s 1985 analysis

efficient redistribution through commodity markets efficiency in redistribution is measured in terms of deadweight loss generated per dollar of economic surplus transferred between consumers and producers of a commodity by means of market intervention the implications of supply and demand elasticities for efficiency in redistribution are examined with special attention to the comparison of production control and deficiency payment programs the results may be used to aid in the evaluation of commodity programs and as a basis for consideration of the hypothesis that observed policies are efficient given the political power of interest groups

environmental regulations transfers and trade theory and evidence abstract this paper develops a theory of compensation of producers for the costs associated with environmental regulations we show that the existence of transfers can give counter intuitive effects of environmental policy on both output and trade flows in particular the compensation obtained by producers neutralizes the effect of environmental policy on output and consequently on trade flows this may help explain why previous empirical research has found weak evidence that environmental regulations affect trade patterns the theory is tested using agricultural sector data the evidence supports the hypothesis that environmental regulations and transfers are positively correlated

production location decision and free entry oligopoly abstract this paper presents a simple oligopolistic model of location in which all firms in an imperfectly competitive industry are assumed to produce a homogeneous output and make cournot conjectures about their rivals input and location decisions within this framework this paper points out that the key difference between oligopoly and monopoly is the following in the case of monopoly a positive shift in demand requires that a monopolist increase his output but in the case of oligopoly an increase in industry output may or may not increase output per firm because of the number of firms at free entry equilibrium is not constant it is shown that in an oligopoly model of location that allows free entry the demand condition plays an important role on the determination of industrial location

location and the theory of the imperfectly competitive firm under demand uncertainty there is a large and growing literature on location and the theory of the firm in a heterogeneous space i e in the space where markets are given at discrete points such as weber 22 isard 7 moses 15 sakashita 18 19 bradfield 3 emerson 5 woodward 23 khalili mathur and bodenhorn 8 miller and jensen 14 mathur 13 eswaran kanemoto and ryan 6 and mai and shieh 11 what is perhaps surprising is that within this large body of literature nothing has been said about how the firm would and should locate theoretically under conditions of uncertainty it only with webber 21 and mai 10 that any real indication is given that uncertainty due to imperfect market information may exert an influence on locational choice in particular mai 10 presented a formal mathematical model to show that the results and implications of the optimum location of the firm under demand uncertainty is different from that applicable to the state of certainty however mai s analytical framework is restricted to the case of pure competition where price is given all buyers are assumed to be concentrated at given market point and each firm seeks to minimize expected cost and is thus risk neutral the purpose of this paper is to extend the location theory of the competitive firm under demand uncertainty to the case where the imperfectly competitive quantity setting firms are not risk neutral and are interested in maximizing expected utility from profit including cost and demand factors 2 this expected utility approach will provide a more general formulation of the firm s attitude toward risk for analyzing its location decisions the basic model evaluating the firm s location and input choices is presented in section ii section iii examines the overall impacts of demand uncertainty on the optimum location and input demands the effect of a marginal increase in demand uncertainty on the optimum location is investigated in section iv section v analyzes the effect on the optimum location of a change in the expected output price section vi then evaluates the

union wage settlements during a disinflation this paper examines the role of union wage contracts in the persistence of inflation and the implication of these contracts for the problem of disinflation in the united states a quantitative model of overlapping con tracts explicitly oriented toward the major union sector is developed the model takes account of expectations of future wage price and employment conditions as in more aggregated models that have been used in macroeconomic research in addition the distribution of workers according to contract length as well as deferred wage increases and escalator clauses are explicitly used in the model the main aim of the model is to determine the constraints which these contracts impose on disinflation paths the model indicates that the maximum speed of disinflation is extremely slow in the early phases if a rise in unemployment is to be avoided but increases considerably before the new lower rate of inflation is reached the disinflation path is considerably slower than that observed after hyperinflation periods however the existence of a path of inflation reduction raises questions about whether the institution of union wage con tracts is really the direct cause of costly disinflations or whether their influence works indirectly by raising credibility problems about a monetary disinflation this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

money demand heterogeneity and the great moderation abstract a forward looking model of the demand for money based on heterogeneous and sluggish portfolio adjustment can simultaneously account for the low short run and high long run semi elasticities reported in the literature the parameter estimates from the model for the short run and long run interest semi elasticities are 1 04 and 13 16 respectively a simulated version of the model suggests that the great moderation can be partially attributed to financial innovations in the late 1970s when moving toward a more flexible portfolio the model can account for almost one third of the observed decline in the volatilities of output consumption and investment

evaluating the behavior of international cartel members some phenomena of interest in international trade can be understood by looking at only one country pushing others into the background sometimes though to preserve the essence of a problem one must attempt to take explicit account of the interaction of nations this viewpoint invites one to treat a collective body in this case a group of countries as a deciding unit there is no shortage of applications that call for such thinking among them are the gatt negotiations and nafta international commodity agreements and international cartels in each of these the idea of treating the collective as an organic decision maker is alluring and to be sure much has been gained in this fashion there are also dangers that attend adopting such a modeling strategy our purpose is to lay out these dangers their source and effects and then to introduce briefly some remedies that have become available lately does a group optimize the essence of the methodology of economics inheres in the treatment of decision makers as optimizers attributing to them an objective criterion and the impulse to behave optimally can this methodology be used in studying group decision making arrow showed that in a certain formal sense it can

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

from senators to the president solve the lumber problem or else we use key events associated in the two decade long u s canada softwood lumber trade dispute to present the dynamic relationship between u s congress and the administration in the formation of international trade policy we find that the executive branch of the u s government responded quickly to several letters from a group of u s senators demanding a solution to the lumber problem a roll call analysis is used to identify factors influencing senators willingness to sign these letters and pressure the president on behalf of the u s lumber industry the results show that the economic importance of the lumber industry in a senator s home state is positively correlated with signatory on these letters and that the presence of a large housing industry in a state makes a senator less likely to sign these letters

market power and cartel formation theory and an empirical test abstract antitrust enforcement makes it difficult to test theories of cartel formation because most attempts to form cartels are blocked or kept secret however federal laws allow u s produce growers to operate marketing cartels through devices called marketing orders these cartels use quantity controls and quality standards to raise prices of fresh produce some growers have adopted marketing orders and others have not this paper develops and tests a positive theory of the adoption of marketing orders the theory suggests that growers in a region are more likely to adopt a marketing order if the demand for fresh produce is inelastic the growers market share in the fresh market is large there are barriers to entry and expansion the fraction of the output the growers ship to the fresh market is not too large or too small growers are homogeneous and large cooperatives exist probit analyses support these hypotheses

agricultural policies in the presence of distorting taxes this article analyzes how distortionary factor taxes affect the welfare impacts of production subsidies production quotas acreage controls subsidies for acreage reductions and cash transfers to farmers pre existing taxes substantially raise the costs of all these policies these additional costs reflect the welfare losses from financing certain policies by distortionary taxes they also reflect interactions with factor markets caused by changes in the costs of producing agricultural output previous studies ignore the latter types of effect consequently they significantly overstate the costs of production subsidies and understate the costs of production quotas acreage controls and subsidies for acreage reductions

were there regime switches in u s monetary policy working paper 2004 14 june 2004 abstract a multivariate model identifying monetary policy and allowing for simultaneity and regime switching in coefficients and variances is confronted with u s data since 1959 the best fit is with a model that allows time variation in structural disturbance variances only among models that also allow for changes in equation coefficients the best fit is for a model that allows coefficients to change only in the monetary policy rule that model allows switching among three main regimes and one rarely and briefly occurring regime the three main regimes correspond roughly to periods when most observers believe that monetary policy actually differed and the differences in policy behavior are substantively interesting though statistically ill determined the estimates imply monetary targeting was central in the early 80s but was also important sporadically in the 70s the changes in regime were essential neither to the rise in inflation in the 70s nor to its decline in the 80s jel classification e52 e47 c53 key words counterfactuals lucas critique policy rule monetary targeting simultaneity volatility model comparison i the debate over monetary policy change in an influential paper clarida gali and gertler 2000 cgg presented evidence that us monetary policy changed between the 1970 s and the 1980 s indeed that in the 70 s it was drastically worse they found that the policy rule apparently followed in the 70 s was one that when embedded in most stochastic general equilibrium models would imply non uniqueness of the equilibrium and hence vulnerability of the economy to sunspot fluctuations of arbitrarily large size their estimated policy rule for the later period on the other hand eliminated this indeterminacy these results are a possible explanation of the volatile and rising inflation of the 70 s and of its subsequent decline the cgg analysis has two important weaknesses one is that it fails to account for stochastic volatility us macroeconomic variables and particularly the federal funds rate have gone through periods of tranquility and of agitation with forecast error variances varying greatly from period to period ignoring such variation does not lead to inconsistent estimates of model parameters when the forecasting equations themselves are constant but it strongly biases toward a finding of changed parameters tests of the stability of the forecasting equations the other weakness is that the cgg analysis rests on powerful and implausible identifying assumptions they require that we accept that the response of the monetary authority to expected future inflation and output does not depend on the recent history of inflation money growth or output it is hard to understand why this should be so especially in the 70 s when monetarism was a prominent theme in policy debates congress was requiring reports from the fed of projected time paths of monetary aggregates and financial markets were reacting sensitively to weekly money supply numbers the requirement for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in dynamic models is that the monetary policy rule show a more than unit response of interest rates to the sum of the logs of all nominal variables that appear on the right hand side of the reaction function if we force a particular measure of expected future inflation to proxy for all the nominal variables that actually appear independently in the reaction function we are bound to get distorted conclusions on the one hand because expected future inflation will be a noisy measure of the full set of nominal influences on policy we might get downward bias in our estimates from the usual errorsin variables effect on the other hand to the extent that expected future inflation like most expected future values shows less variation than current nominal variables we could find a mistaken scaling up of coefficients

optimal monetary policy optimal monetary policy maximizes the welfare of a representative agent given frictions in the economic environment constructing a model with two sets of frictions costly price adjustment by imperfectly competitive firms and costly exchange of wealth for goods we find optimal monetary policy is governed by two familiar principles first the average level of the nominal interest rate should be sufficiently low as suggested by milton friedman that there should be deflation on average yet the keynesian frictions imply that the optimal nominal interest rate is positive second as various shocks occur to the real and monetary sectors the price level should be largely stabilized as suggested by irving fisher albeit around a deflationary trend path since expected inflation is roughly constant through time the nominal interest rate must therefore vary with the fisherian determinants of the real interest rate although the monetary authority has substantial leverage over real activity in our model economy it chooses real allocations that closely resemble those which would occur if prices were flexible in our benchmark model there is some tendency for the monetary authority to smooth nominal and real interest rates

on the fit of new keynesian models this article provides new tools for the evaluation of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge models and applies them to a large scale new keynesian model we approximate the dsge model by a vector autoregression and then systematically relax the implied cross equation restrictions and document how the model fit changes we also compare the dsge model s impulse responses to structural shocks with those obtained after relaxing its restrictions we find that the degree of misspecification in this large scale dsge model is no longer so large as to prevent its use in day to day policy analysis yet is not small enough to be ignored

explaining state bans on corporate farming state laws banning corporate farming present a puzzle for a rent seeking explanation of political outcomes since family farmer proponents may receive no direct benefit from these bans an explanation developed here is that these farmers benefit indirectly forestalling corporate entry preserves the farm political coalition structured around those cooperatives patronized by family farmers and so indirectly preserves federal subsidies and supply restrictions that the incidence of state bans is positively related to the importance of federal farm programs the importance of cooperatives and the homogeneity of farmers within a state is consistent with this indirect rent seeking explanation

the welfare cost of inflation in general equilibrium abstract this paper presents a general equilibrium monetary model in which inflation distorts a variety of marginal decisions although individually none of the distortions is very large they combine to yield substantial welfare cost estimates a sustained 4 percent inflation like that experienced in the us since 1983 costs the economy the equivalent of 0 41 percent of output per year when currency is identified as the relevant definition of money and over 1 percent of output per year when m1 is defined as money the results illustrate how the traditional partial equilibrium approach can seriously underestimate the true cost of inflation

interest group competition over policy outcomes dynamics strategic behavior and social costs this paper analyzes a two period model of interestgroup competition between two groups to affect thepolicy outcome the paper characterizes the subgameperfect equilibrium and considers the welfareimplications of the model the subgame perfectequilibrium to this game is allocatively efficient ifand only if the initial equilibrium is allocativelyefficient and interest groups are equally adept atproducing political pressure when rent seeking isconstitutionally protected the notion of rent seekingconstrained efficiency is defined as the cooperativesolution to the rent seeking game it is shown that arent seeking constrained efficient equilibrium isattainable by forcing winners in political competitionto fully compensate losers

eu agri environmental programs and the restaurant table effect the share of agricultural area enrolled in eu agri environmental programs varies significantly between eu member states these national differences are explained based on a model that reflects both that these programs internalize externalities and the political economy we identify six factors that affect the extent to which agri environmental programs are implemented environmental benefits opportunity costs of participation budgetary pressure the share of program expenditures financed by the eu the political weight attributed to farmers at the national and the political influence of each country at the eu level in addition we demonstrate that if the policy decision making process is noncooperative at the eu level countries that contribute less to the eu budget will ceteris paribus implement more programs using data of four years and feasible generalized least square methods we are able to confirm our theoretical results including a noncooperative behavior of eu member states

an empirical analysis of participation in us government farm programmes factors affecting the participation of individual kansas farms in government programmes are considered a sample drawn from over 1600 kansas farms for nine years is used in the context of a simultaneous equation tobit regression to investigate the effects of various factors on the probability and expected level of participation in farm programmes the results suggest that differences in farm sizes incomes types and farming practices influence participation in government programmes small sole proprietor livestock operations with low debt levels receive the lowest levels of support conversely large corporate crop farms receive the highest levels of government support

stochastic dominance and uncertain price prospects since the seminal and simultaneous publications of hadar and russell 6 and hanoch and levy 8 there has been a virtual explosion of papers investigating implications of stochastic dominance rules for decisions under uncertainty dominance principles have important applications to portfolio choice capital budgeting and financial intermediation stochastic dominance can also be applied to investment and production decision problems under uncertainty in these areas both overall and marginal impacts of uncertainty have received wide attention 2 the emphasis in consumer welfare analysis under uncertainty has been on the ranking of different price prospects ranking of price prospects is more complicated than that of income prospects for two related reasons first due to differences in ordinal preferences among consumers the second degree stochastic dominance rule on price prospects does not yield a unanimous ranking among risk averse consumers thus waugh 17 massell 12 and samuelson 14 have focused on the ranking of price prospects for a single consumer or consumers with identical ordinal preferences second there is no a priori reason for income risk averse consumers to exhibit aversion to fair price risks specifically the indirect utility function of an income risk averse consumer is neither concave nor convex in prices indirect ways of comparing consumer welfare under alternative price prospects via expected consumer surplus expected compensating variation or expected equivalent variation have thus been investigated in the literature expected consumer surplus ecs has been particularly popular for ranking certain and uncertain price prospects 3 however turnovsky shalit and schmitz 16 showed that the ranking

on the political economy of state highway expenditures some evidence of the relative performance of alternative public choice models this paper explores the extent to which the public demand for roads and or power of special interest groups determines road expenditures at the state level using an extension of the methodology developed in congleton and shughart 1990 reduced form models of median voter demand special interest group equilibria and a combined model are estimated using cross sectional state data from the united states we generally find support for the hypothesis that voting matters the pure median voter models have a better fit than the pure special interest group models moreover in our combined model we find that variables from the median voter model can not be dropped without significantly reducing the combined model s fit