legislative district configurations and fiscal policy in american states in accordance with the median voter theorem the median legislator is decisive in representative democracy if the preferences of the median legislator differ from the preferences of the median voter in the polity fiscal policy choices will predictably diverge from those favored by the median voter this paper seeks to identify the median district and therein the preferences driving the median legislator in american state legislatures using economic characteristics of constituents we find substantial differences between the median district and the statewide median as the income of the median district rises above the median income of the polity government expenditures increase in addition the degree to which income is skewed across legislative districts affects spending for redistribution programs finally we find that direct democracy procedures which allow the statewide median voter to check legislative decisions limit the impact of differences between the district and polity medians

the futile quest for a grand explanation of long run government expenditure this paper carries out a critical reappraisal of the two contending theories purporting to explain long run government spending wagner s law and different variants of the ratchet effect we analyze data spanning from the early 19 th century until the present day in sweden and the united kingdom hence in contrast to previous studies we evaluate the validity of wagner s law and the ratchet effect hypothesis over a very long time period starting at the beginning of industrialization cointegration analysis is used to investigate the long run relationships between government expenditure and gdp focusing on sub periods and structural breaks moreover we test the ratchet effect hypothesis by estimating models which allow for asymmetric adjustment according to our main results wagner s law does not hold in the long run although the data are consistent with wagner s law between roughly 1860 and the mid 1970s this can be traced to the formation of the modern public sector including the introduction of public education health care and so forth yet wagner s law did not hold during the initial industrialization phase before 1860 and in recent periods gdp only affects the government spending share when we control for population age structure finally we find some evidence of asymmetric adjustment in the uk particularly in the post wwii period however the ratchet effect is not a general cause of the growth of government spending

inequality and the dynamics of public opinion the self reinforcing link between economic inequality and mass preferences this article assesses the influence of income inequality on the public s policy mood recent work has produced divergent perspectives on the relationship between inequality public opinion and government redistribution one group of scholars suggests that unequal representation of different income groups reproduces inequality as politicians respond to the preferences of the rich another group of scholars pays relatively little attention to distributional outcomes but shows that government is generally just as responsive to the poor as to the rich utilizing theoretical insights from comparative political economy and time series data from 1952 to 2006 supplemented with cross sectional analysis where appropriate we show that economic inequality is in fact self reinforcing but that this is fully consistent with the idea that government tends to respond equally to rich and poor in its policy enactments

expectations about voter choices a comment the only essential differences in the examples analyzed above are in the assumptions that are used to derive or directly specify the choice behavior that the candidates expect from any given voter conditional on his utility function when the central behavioral assumption from the traditional models was used the equilibrium was a median outcome a conclusion directly analogous to what happens in the corresponding unidimensional traditional voting models when the central behavioral assumptions from the probabilistic voting model developed in coughlin and nitzan 1981 were used the equilibrium was at the maximum of the expected log utility function a conclusion directly analogous to what happens in the model in coughlin and nitzan 1981 indeed it was only when the corresponding assumptions from ledyard 1984 were used i e the particular assumptions that ledyard used to derive the choice behavior that the candidates expect from any given voter conditional on his utility function that the conclusions were substantially different from the conclusions derived from earlier models this reflects the important role these assumptions play in making ledyard s conclusions about candidate strategies substantially different from earlier results in the literature on spatial models of elections

financial factors in economic development financial factors have been assigned strategic importance in economic development but very different factors have been isolated in the respective experiences in asia unrepressed financial markets in mobilizing saving and allocating investment have been given prominence in latin america the central question is the role of inflationary finance the scope for deficits to enhance growth and increasingly the feedback from high and unstable inflation to poor economic performance this paper reviews and contrasts the two approaches and concludes that the strong claims for the benefits of financial liberalization are not supported by evidence financial factors are important but probably only when financial instability becomes a dominant force the scope for inflationary finance is small and the risks are larger than commonly accepted when hyperinflation takes over and foreign exchange crises disrupt the price system and shorten the economic horizon to a week or a month normal economic development is suspended moreover difficult to reverse capital flight puts savings outside the home economy attention should focus on these extreme cases and explore deeper the thresholds at which financial factors become dominant and the channels through which this occurs superior growth performance in this perspective may be more a reflection of adaptability than financial deepening this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

inequality in democracies testing the classic democratic theory of redistribution the classic democratic theory of redistribution claims that an increase in the mean to median mm income ratio causes a majority coalition in the electorate to collectively demand more redistribution the functional dependence of redistribution on the mm income ratio is tested in parametric and nonparametric regression frameworks using an oecd panel dataset while the parametric regression model is found to be misspecified rendering subsequent inference invalid the robust nonparametric regression model fails to uncover evidence that the mm income ratio is relevant for predicting redistribution

pressure groups and redistribution abstract the simple pressure group model of political redistribution can predict more with less restrictive assumptions instead of ready made pressure groups composed of individuals who vote their pocketbooks we posit heterogeneous agents each of whom decides which group to join and how much effort to expend on political activity our model then examines social affinity conditions that foster pressure group formation political sympathies based on social affinity imply testable effects of growth rate and income distribution on progressive transfers effects that prove substantial in pooled time series cross section regressions for 13 oecd countries 1960 1981

the political economics of redistribution inequality and tax avoidance a central result in the political economy of taxation is that the degree of redistribution is positively linked to income inequality however empirical evidence supporting such a relationship turns out to be mixed this paper shows how the different empirical reactions can be rationalized within a simple model of tax avoidance and costly tax enforcement by focusing on structure induced equilibrium in which taxpayers vote over the size of the income tax and the level of tax enforcement we show that more inequality may well reduce the extent of redistribution depending on two opposing effects the standard political effect and a negative tax base effect working through increases in the average level of tax avoidance and the share of enforcement expenditures in total tax revenue

a distributional theory of government growth this article presents a closed form solution for time consistent taxation and public spending in a dynamic game between government and median voter extending meltzer and richard s static analysis of government size the article offers a theory of growth of government at low stages of economic development the median voter identified as a relatively poor worker prefers to have no or only small redistributive taxation in order to foster savings through this channel he expects improvements of his labor productivity and wage at higher stages of development however when capital is relatively abundant and prospects of further labor productivity gains through capital accumulation are smaller the incentive to tax and redistribute income rises yet in line with previous work on growth and infrastructure spending the median voter prefers a constant share of productive public spending at all times hence government growth is solely driven by an expanding welfare state

tests of a rational theory of the size of government in many countries the political party holding power changes more frequently than the trend growth rates in government spending and taxes shifts of political power are often preceded by rhetoric about meeting needs or cutting taxes which post election performances rarely match yet changes in the size of government up and down occur on average the size of government measured by the share of taxes or spending to output has increased in many countries during the past century but changes in size occur at diffrent rates and at times the relative size of government declines

an interest group model of direct income redistribution an interest group model of the determinants of policies which directly re distribute income to low income persons is developed and tested the model assum es that altruistic taxpayers nonaltruistic taxpayers and needy beneficiaries f orm separate interest groups from which politicians seek support benefit levels depend on variables such as taxpayer income and the price of benefits but unlike median voter models the model also implies a role for interest group strengt h and competition between political parties the author uses latent variable met hods and data on the aid to families with dependent children program to demonstr ate empirical support forthe model copyright 1986 by mit press

ideology and the growth of government abstract we analyze the impact of ideology on the size of government in a simple model the government sets redistribution and provision of public services according to the preferences of the median voter ideology is defined in terms of preferences for public services and the impact of ideology on the size of government is shown to increase with mean income this idea is tested using measures of ideology based on party manifestos we show that the interaction of ideology and mean income has a major role in explaining the increase and divergence in government size observed across oecd countries

private sector shrinkage and the growth of industrialized economies reply further tests and thoughts on the oecd data lead me to conclude that if anything my 1986 paper underestimated the magnitude of the inverse relation between economic growth and government size if one takes the nominal based measure of government scale as advised by saunders the significance levels coefficient magnitudes and goodness of fits improve over what i found with my initial investigation i would suggest that saunders reconsider his reluctance to believe that the size of the public sector is unrelated to economic growth in oecd countries over this time period

optimal inventory policies when ordering prices are random we consider a single item inventory model with deterministic demands at the beginning of each period a random ordering price is received according to a known distribution function a decision must be made as to how much if any of the item to order in each period so as to minimize total expected costs while satisfying all demands we show that in each period a sequence of critical price levels determines the optimal ordering strategy so that it is optimal to satisfy the demands of the next n periods if and only if the random price falls between the nth and the n 1st levels we derive recursive expressions that describe the critical price numbers and demonstrate the relationship of these expressions to minimal expected cost we study finite horizon as well as infinite horizon models and show that the critical number strategy is also average cost optimal

income inequality size of government and tax progressivity a positive theory abstract i investigate the relationship between income inequality and the composition of public spending in redistributive policies i extend the meltzer richard model of voting over redistribution allowing voters to choose not only the amount of a uniform lump sum transfer but also the level of provision of a public good the governmental budget is balanced thus these two choices determine the tax rate on labor income the multidimensionality of the policy space implies that there is no condorcet winner i adopt a citizen candidate model of electoral competition to tackle this problem i show that the progressivity of the tax system is increasing in the mean to median income ratio while the size of the government need not be this means that higher income inequality implies a more progressive tax system but in contrast with the traditional analysis it may also result in a smaller size of government such results are consistent with the most recent findings in the empirical literature

income distribution political instability and investment abstract this paper successfully tests on a sample of 71 countries for the period 1960 85 the following hypotheses income inequality by fuelling social discontent increases sociopolitical instability the latter by creating uncertainty in the politico economic environment reduces investment as a consequence income inequality and investment are inversely related since investment is a primary engine of growth this paper identifies a channel for an inverse relationship between income inequality and growth we measure socio political instability with indices which capture the occurrence of more or less violent phenomena of political unrest and we test our hypotheses by estimating a two equation model in which the endogenous variables are investment and an index of socio political instability our results are robust to sensitivity analysis on the specification of the model and the measure of political instability and are unchanged when the model is estimated using robust regression techniques

spend it like beckham inequality and redistribution in the uk 1983 2004 a main activity of the state is to redistribute resources standard political economy models predict that a rise in inequality will lead to more redistribution this paper shows that for the uk in the period 1983 2004 a plausibly exogenous rise in income inequality has not been associated with increased redistribution we explore this example of the paradox of redistribution using attitudinal data we show that standard political economy models of the individual demand for redistribution do have explanatory power but that other attitudes and beliefs are also very important moreover these attitudes and beliefs change quite quickly so are very important in explaining variation in the demand for redistribution

relying on the private sector the income distribution and public investments in the poor abstract what drives governments with similar revenues to provide very different amounts of goods with private sector substitutes education is a prime example i use exogenous shocks to brazilian municipalities revenue during 1995 2008 generated by non linearities in federal transfer laws to demonstrate two things first municipalities with higher income inequality or higher median income allocate less of a revenue shock to education and are less likely to expand public school enrollment they are more likely to invest in public infrastructure that is broadly enjoyed like parks and roads or to save the shock second i find no evidence that the quality of public education suffers as a result if anything unequal and high income areas are more likely to improve public school inputs and test scores following a revenue shock given their heavy use of private education i further provide evidence that an increase in public sector revenue lowers private school enrollment

did women s suffrage change the size and scope of government this paper examines the growth of government during this century as a result of giving women the right to vote using cross sectional time series data for 1870 1940 we examine state government expenditures and revenue as well as voting by u s house and senate state delegations and the passage of a wide range of different state laws suffrage coincided with immediate increases in state government expenditures and revenue and more liberal voting patterns for federal representatives and these effects continued growing over time as more women took advantage of the franchise contrary to many recent suggestions the gender gap is not something that has arisen since the 1970s and it helps explain why american government started growing when it did

the effect of the expansion of the voting franchise on the size of government this paper examines the claim that expansion of the voting franchise has been an important factor in the growth of government state government spending and state and local spending are explained using a panel of 46 states for 1950 88 elimination of poll taxes and literacy tests led to higher turnout particularly among the poor and a poorer pivotal voter as predicted we find that these changes a fall in the income of voters relative to state income and the ouster of republicans from state government led to a sharp rise in welfare spending but no change in other spending

the aging population and the size of the welfare state is there a puzzle abstract razin sadka and swagel razin asaf efraim sadka and phillip swagel 2002 the aging population and the size of the welfare state the journal of political economy vol 110 no 4 pp 900 918 unveil a puzzling fact the welfare state appears to be shrinking even as the dependency ratio rises while they formulate an elegant political economy model to explain the coexistence of an aging population and declining transfers the resolution of the puzzle turns out to be much simpler labor tax rates and per capita transfers are negatively correlated with the dependency ratio in advanced economies only because this measure includes children as well as retirees both labor tax rates and per capita transfers in advanced economies are in fact historically positively correlated with the ratio of retirees to the working age population and negatively correlated with the ratio of children to the working age population increasing the number of retirees shifts preferences toward higher taxes and transfers by increasing the fraction of the population that receives transfers in contrast workers with more children prefer to spend more of their lifetime income while raising dependents so they prefer smaller public pension systems these results suggest that fiscal leakage from workers to retirees is not required to explain the broad trends in the transfer policies of advanced economies

inefficient households and the mix of government spending a model is presented in which individuals can vote over government subsidies to a private good and over redistributive taxation the subsidized good is purchased and shared by couples who act noncooperatively while possibly being altruistic towards each other the framework allows a separation of the subsidy policy from redistributive policy in a majority voting equilibrium the subsidy is used exclusively to correct the individuals spending pattern the results suggest that spending on private goods should be an important item in government expenditures when there is strong positive income bias in the political process and or when household decisions are relatively inefficient

excess bias and the nature of budget growth abstract to examine the hypothesis that budget growth has been excessive the concept of correct budget size must first be defined this proves a difficult task for the level of public services but especially so regarding redistribution and transfer payments next potential sources of bias are explored including distortions in voting bureaucracy and political leadership analysis shows that bias may be in either direction making for deficient as well as excess budgets institutional reform therefore should not prejudge the outcome by imposing limitations the goal should be to improve the budget process however this may affect budget size

fiscal decentralization and government size numerous studies have attempted to model the possible factors contributing to universal growth in public sectors this paper analyzes one device that appears capable of controlling some of that growth fiscal decentralization the results reported here also support the use of monopoly government assumptions in models of public policy

government introduced price distortions and growth evidence from twenty nine developing countries from the time adam smith s wealth of nations was published in 1776 until today the role of the state in the economic affairs of nations has been probably one of the most debated subject matters not only among economists but also among other social scientists a free competitive market and pricing system has since been recognized as a crucial factor in the allocation of resources indeed in the economic development of nations at the national as well as international levels there is a growing interest in the role of governmental policies in particular those policies that directly or indirectly influence the working of the market mechanism and the incentive system in the context of nations economic growth an example of the growing interest is the rather unequivocal focus placed in recent years by the world bank and the international monetary fund imf on the need for liberal competitive and outward looking policies in promoting economic growth in developing countries an area of particular concern has been that of the government introduced price distortions in several developing nations historically speaking such policies have grown over time as a part of the so called grand socialistic and planned economic policies and programs undertaken by several developing nations since they attained political independence these nations embarked upon such policies in pursuance of the promises that were made by their political leaders during their freedom movements against the colonial powers the imposition of controls by governments over domestic prices interest rates wages foreign trade and exchange rates for example has caused severe distortions in the economies of these nations and such distortions are not without bearing on economic growth according to the world bank 1983 2 coun

sizing the government is there such a thing as an optimal government size we investigate the so called armey curve which claims an inverted u shaped relationship between government size and economic performance using non parametric data envelopment analysis dea the dea scores are linked to control variables such as initial per capita income openness population density urbanization country size and family size for 23 oecd countries we estimate the country specific efficiency scores which reveal the extent to which a country uses excess public resources to achieve the observed growth rate of gdp

cost function for a periodic reorder point system with time dependent replenishment costs abstract a single item inventory model with probabilistic demand is considered in this paper the replenishment of items is cyclical and occurs every n periods the order for replenishment can be placed at the end of any period during the cycle replenishment costs setup and unit costs are stated as a function of time the units ordered are set equal to an order quantity q the general expression of this inventory system is formulated by developing the stationary distribution of the inventory position units ordered and the probability of placing an order during any period the expression is stated in terms of the reorder point s and the order quantity q and can be used to locate the optimal solution

redistribution in a model of voting and campaign contributions abstract i propose a framework in which individual political participation can take two distinct forms voting and contributing resources to campaigns in a context in which the negligible impact of any individual s actions on aggregate outcomes is fully recognized by all agents i then use the framework to reassess the relationship between inequality and redistribution the model shows that even though each contribution has a negligible impact the interaction between contributions and voting leads to an endogenous wealth bias in the political process as the advantage of wealthier individuals in providing contributions encourages parties to move their platforms closer to those individuals preferred positions this mechanism can in turn explain why the standard median voter based prediction that more inequality produces more redistribution has received little empirical support higher inequality endogenously shifts the political system further in favor of the rich in equilibrium there is a non monotonic relationship in which redistribution is initially increasing but eventually decreasing in inequality i present some empirical evidence supporting the framework using data on campaign contributions from us presidential elections in particular inequality increases contributions to republicans but not to democrats as predicted by the model

decentralized taxation and the size of government evidence from swiss state and local governments according to the leviathan model fiscal federalism is seen as a binding constraint on a revenue maximizing government the competitive pressure of fiscal federalism is supposed to reduce public sector size as compared to unitary states however empirical results concerning the leviathan hypothesis are mixed this study uses a state and local level panel data set of swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998 to empirically analyze the effect of different federalist institutions on the size and structure of government revenue because of the considerable tax autonomy of sub national swiss governments it is possible to investigate different mechanisms by which fiscal federalism may influence government size the results indicate that tax exporting has a revenue expanding effect whereas tax competition favors a smaller size of government fragmentation has essentially no effect on the size of government revenue for swiss cantons the overall effect of revenue decentralization leads to fewer tax revenue but higher user charges thus revenue decentralization favors a smaller size of government revenue and shifts government revenue from taxes to user charges

does the median voter model explain the size of government evidence from the states despite an attempt by its own authors it is difficult to argue that the influential model of the size of government developed by meltzer and richard 1981 has had convincing empirical backing in this paper we adapt that model to a model of state government size the main testable hypothesis is that as income inequality grows government size as measured by the percentage of income devoted to government redistribution grows we test the model using panel data from the us states from 1979 1991 in contrast to the results found by meltzer and richard 1983 we find little evidence to support the model the results are robust to several model specifications and estimation techniques

nonmonotonic demand for income redistribution benefits the case of afdc two different motives are often advanced to explain taxpayer nonrecipient support for income redistribution programs the first motive is the result of interdependent utilities between nonrecipients and the recipients of redistribution program benefits the source of this interdependence could be taxpayer altruism alternatively redistribution might be seen as one way to alleviate the potential for crime or social unrest recent theoretical analyses have suggested a second motiveincome redistribution programs act as protection against the possibility of unforseen loss in personal income 5 6 21 32 researchers using panel data find widespread random and temporary movements in individual income poverty and welfare program use that would seem to suggest a potentially significant insurance demand for redistribution programs 2 the results from one study for example indicate that while four to five percent of the total u s population could be classified as persistent recipients of welfare program benefits between 1969 and 1978 receiving program benefits in at least five of those years over one quarter of the u s population participated in welfare programs at least once over this same ten year period 9 74 in the past researchers estimating nonrecipient support for income transfer programs have considered only one of these two motives while ignoring the other 3 this paper extends the examination of the demand for income redistribution by integrating the public good and social insurance demand motives into one model the first part of the paper sets up the individual s decision model for income redistribution one consequence of interacting the public good and social insurance motives into one model is that support for higher benefit payments is expected to come from the tails of the income distribution low income individuals both recipients and nonrecipients benefit directly from the reduced risk of income randomness while high income

the causes of government expenditure growth a survey of the u s evidence abstract the growth of government budgets can be broken down into a institutional and institutional components the former component the familiar substitution income and population public goods tax sharing effects is estimated to contribute about two fifths of the growth of u s government spending the latter component rent seeking political redistributions bureaucracy and perceptual informational impedimentia is important too but an exact imputation cannot be asserted given the state of the art in empirical public choice theory the cross effects on spending of the growth of regulation and tax preferences or tax expenditures though interesting is not pursued

optimal ordering strategies for announced price increases the familiar model for determining the optimal ordering strategy given an announced price increase assumes that the buyer has an opportunity to place an order at the end of the next economic order quantity cycle before the price increase takes effect this paper extends the price increase model by relaxing the requirement on the timing of the price increase specifically we develop optimal ordering strategies for situations where the price increase becomes effective at any future specified time we also calculate savings for alternate ordering strategies

radio s impact on public spending if informed voters receive favorable policies then the invention of a new mass medium may affect government policies since it affects who is informed and who is not these ideas are developed in a voting model the model forms the basis for an empirical investigation of a major new deal relief program implemented in the middle of the expansion period of radio the main empirical finding is that u s counties with many radio listeners received more relief funds more funds were allocated to poor counties with high unemployment but controlling for these and other variables the effects of radio are large and highly significant

tax competition and tax coordination in a median voter model this paper analyzes the welfare effects of capital tax coordination in a simple model of fiscal competition where fiscal policy is subject to majority voting and households differ with respect to their labor and capital income it turns out that a coordinated capital tax increase may raise or reduce welfare depending on the relative magnitude of i economic distortions induced by a labor tax and ii political distortions resulting from the influence of the median voter on fiscal policy decisions a negative welfare effect is more likely the smaller the marginal excess burden of the labor tax and the smaller the ratio of the median voter s labor income to average labor income we also use empirical estimates of the marginal excess burden of taxation to determine the welfare effects of tax coordination it turns out that a negative welfare effect of coordinated tax increases may emerge in our model for empirically reasonable parameters

voting on income tax exemptions most itemized tax exemptions lead to significant deductions for a minority of the population only this raises the question why the majority does not vote for the abolition of these tax privileges in exchange for lower tax rates in this paper we show that a reform proposal may be voted down even when the majority uses the exemption at stake below the average turning to an empirical application we simulate the voting outcome on the proposal to abolish the tax deductibility of commuting expenses in germany our model predicts that this proposal would be rejected even though a comfortable majority has below average deductions

co movement of public spending in the g7 abstract the size of government in the g7 countries in the last fifty years follows a common pattern see the left panel of fig 1 below it grows in the first three decades and then turns flat at the beginning of the nineties for all countries alike we highlight this common pattern in a dynamic factor model and argue that a satisfactory explanation for it would be desirable

stagflationary effects of stabilization programs in reforming socialist countries enterprise side and household side factors dismantling subsidies could give rise to serious macroeconomic difficulties in the short run this article explores a view based on the enterprise sector as a central source and main channel of the stagflation phenomenon using as an example the stagflation that followed the 1990 stabilization program in poland the stagflation phenomenon is linked to features of the financial market that are somewhat peculiar to reforming socialist economies the weak credit links between households and enterprises and the existence of large interenterprise debt the policy implications of the enterprise side view include more explicit consideration of initial conditions in the credit market implementation of privatization schemes and the development of a domestic banking

ordering policies for the cyclical replenishment problem given leadtime dependent discounts abstract this paper addresses a problem encountered by retailers who experience cyclical replenishment frequently these retailers are provided incentives for placing orders before the end of a cycle and they have to wrestle with the questions of when to order how many times to order and how many units to order the complexity of this problem arises from having to balance the reduction in unit costs with the increases in ordering costs and in some cases deal with storage and shortage costs it is argued that the decrease in unit cost can be directly related to the enhancement of manufacturing efficiency due to longer production leadtimes while the increase in storage and shortage costs is a result of the increase in uncertainty due to a representation and the cost function will be used to derive the parameters i e frequency of orders order level etc that minimize this cost function

bureaucratic corruption as a constraint on voter choice this paper has attempted to explain variations among countries in the tax level in the importance of progressive taxes and transfers and in the after tax share of middle income groups particular attention was paid to the declines in each of these variables which are observable in cross section data in the intermediate ranges of development it was argued that these phenomena are difficult to explain by variations in the demand for public spending or in the degree of tax evasion

costs of taxation and the size of government existing theory on the form of government suggests that a parliamentary system promotes a larger size of government than does a presidential system this paper extends the existing theory by allowing for distortionary taxation a main result is that if taxation is sufficiently distortionary the parliamentary system may promote a smaller size of government than the presidential system the proposed mechanism appears consistent with several empirical patterns in the data that cannot be explained by other theories

voting for income immiserizing redistribution in the meltzer richard model this paper argues that income received via redistributive transfers unlike labor income requires no direct sacrifice of leisure this makes it attractive to many voters even if it leaves them poorer this point is made within the classic meltzer and richard 1981 model wherein heterogeneous voters evaluate an income redistribution program that finances a lump sum transfer to all via a distorting income tax the politicalequilibrium policy under majority rule is the tax most preferred utility wise by the median voter she and many poorer voters may support income redistribution that ironically leaves them poorer in income terms but with higher utility jel h2 e6 d

the volatility of median and supermajoritarian pivots in the u s congress and the effects of party polarization krehbiel s pivotal politics 1998 seminal work on pivotal politics in the us congress emphasizes the importance of supermajoritarian rules and veto players in determining what bills can pass we illustrate empirically that the volatility of the pivot points has increased markedly since the mid 1970s and we link changes in pivot volatility to the degree of party polarization in general median and supermajority pivots shift considerably more than the overall mean and when politics is polarized the congressional median and supermajority pivots can change dramatically when a shift in control occurs the relative volatility of median and supermajoritarian pivots varies with the degree of polarization and the extent to which there is continuity in party control we develop a theoretical model to explain the nature of these relationships

fiscal consequences of electoral institutions abstract there are more than 500 000 elected local government officials in the united states the most electorally dense county has more than 20 times the average number of elected officials per capita this paper offers the first systematic investigation of the link between electoral density and fiscal outcomes electoral density presents a tradeoff between accountability and monitoring costs increasing the number of specialized elected offices promotes issue unbundling reducing slack between citizen preferences and government policy but the costs of monitoring a larger number of officials may offset these benefits producing greater latitude for politicians to pursue their own goals at the expense of citizen interests we predict diminishing returns to electoral density and a documentclass aastex usepackage amsbsy usepackage amsfonts usepackage amssymb usepackage bm usepackage mathrsfs usepackage pifont usepackage stmaryrd usepackage textcomp usepackage portland xspace usepackage

financial structure and reforms in central and eastern europe in the 1980s abstract the paper analyzes the evolution of the financial structure of the countries of central and eastern europe during the 1980s in these countries the financial system is assigned a limited and mostly passive function this needs to be seen in the context of the allocative system of centrally planned economies where the transfer of financial resources between sectors is largely performed directly by the state through the price system taxes and subsidies the analysis focuses specifically on hungary poland and czechoslovakia the development of their financial structure is assessed through a number of quantitative indicators we find that the partial economic and financial reforms introduced in hungary and poland before 1989 did not substantially modify the role and performance of the financial system whose size in relation to the real economy remained modest at the same time however the reforms exacerbated some of the distortions of the planned system and generated larger macroeconomic imbalances the effects of which tend to cloud the interpretation of financial indicators at the end of 1980 the banking systems of hungary and poland although formally decentralized continued to allocate credit mostly according to automatic criteria and had virtually no experience in assessing and monitoring borrowers and investment projects in this respect they differed little from that of czechoslovakia which remained based on the classic model of a single state bank

redistribution and the income of the median voter the income of the median voter has been measured by median income this measure fails to consider the income distribution of both voters and number of adults per family proper measures of the income of the median voter change standard results this income is no longer less than mean income its ratio to mean income is only slightly related to the ratio of median to mean income

deviations from constituent interests the role of legislative structure and political parties in the states this paper investigates the determinants of state spending over 1960 1990 recent empirical studies suggest that state government expenditure is greater than the electorate desires our main finding is that expenditure was positively related to the number of seats in a state s legislature this is consistent with the hypothesis that logrolling leads representatives to spend more than their constituents would like we also find that political parties do not have a pronounced effect on overall levels of expenditure but do influence the composition of spending in particular democratic control of state government is associated with higher levels of welfare spending

women s suffrage and the growth of the welfare state in this paper we test the hypothesis that extensions of the voting franchise to include lower income people lead to growth in government especially growth in redistribution expenditures the empirical analysis takes advantage of the natural experiment provided by switzerland s extension of the franchise to women in 1971 women s suffrage represents an institutional change with potentially significant implications for the positioning of the decisive voter for various reasons the decisive voter is more likely to favor increases in governmental social welfare spending following the enfranchisement of women evidence indicates that this extension of voting rights increased swiss social welfare spending by 28 and increased the overall size of the swiss government

does liberte egalite a survey of the empirical links between democracy and inequality with some evidence on the transition economies the effect of the distribution of political rights on income inequality has been studied both theoretically and empirically the authors review the existing literature and in particular the available empirical evidence the literature suggests that formal exclusion from the political process through restrictions on the voting franchise appears to have caused a high degree of economic inequality and democratization in the form of franchise expansion has typically led to an expansion in redistribution at least in the small sample of episodes studied in a less pronounced way albeit more emphatically compared with the ambiguous results of earlier research recent evidence indicates an inverse relationship between other measures of democracy based on civil liberties and political rights and inequality the transition experience of eastern european countries however seems to some extent go against these conclusions this opens possible new vistas for research namely the need to incorporate the length of democratic experience and the role played by ideology and social values

imperfect information and the meltzer richard hypothesis standard majority voting models predict that redistribution is positively linked to the mean to median income ratio but empirical evidence is mixed this paper shows that the different empirical reactions to rising mean to median income ratios can be rationalized in a simple romer roberts meltzer richard framework with imperfect information in such a model it is important to consider the source of rising mean to median ratios income growth of the poor can lead to less redistribution as more agents perceive themselves to be rich which tends to reduce the support for redistribution an empirical application reveals that the model can explain a substantial part of the first reagan tax cut

operations research in inventory management a review and critique the objectives of inventory management including the relevant related costs are examined in this paper a brief review of standard problems that have been effectively solved is presented however we point out that a serious gap exists between theory and practice in many organizations suggestions are made for bridging this gap finally a list is provided of a number of research problems whose implementable solution would have a major beneficial impact on the practice of inventory management

why don t voters put the gini back in the bottle inequality and economic preferences for redistribution abstract the classic democratic theory of redistribution claims that an increase in market income inequality causes an increase in the size of government through majority voter support for an offsetting expansion of redistribution i argue that the predicted inequality redistribution relationship can break down when voters face uninsurable idiosyncratic risk with respect to future labor income and a timing differential between tax collections and government outlays this is formalized using an incomplete market heterogeneous agent dsge model with majority voting and time to build policy which suggests the collective demand for redistribution will not necessarily increase with growing income or wealth inequality this result implies that even with equal political power among voters democracies do not have a systematic mechanism to offset rising inequality as contrary to popular belief

ideology and the size of us state government this paper theorizes that the impact of ideology on the size of us state governments increases with state income this idea is tested using state level ideology data derived from the voting behavior of state congressional representatives empirically the interaction of ideology and mean income is a key determinant of state government size at 1960s levels of income the impact of ideology is negligible at 1997 levels of income a one standard deviation move towards the left of the ideology spectrum increases state government size by about half a standard deviation estimated income elasticities differentiated by state and time are found to be increasing with ideology and diminishing with income as predicted by the theory

the political economy of centralization and the european community since 1972 the share of central government expenditure in total public expenditure has continued to increase in most industrial countries in an international cross section analysis it has a significant positive effect on the share of government spending in gdp the actors who have an interest in centralization are analyzed the dynamics of centralization are attributed to a response asymmetry and two thresholds popitz law of the attraction of the larger budget is tested with respect to the ec commission high ranking politicians come mainly from the smaller member states the voters attitudes toward european unification are analyzed in a pooled regression

the impact of fiscal decentralization on the composition of public expenditure panel data evidence from italy grisorio m j and prota f the impact of fiscal decentralization on the composition of public expenditure panel data evidence from italy regional studies this paper is an original contribution to the understanding of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and public expenditure composition it studies the effects of the ongoing decentralization process in italy on the share of different categories of public spending in total expenditure of the italian regional administrations over the period 1996 2008 the data used allow one to go beyond the usual distinction between current and capital expenditures and to present a functional classification of public expenditures through a panel data analysis the paper shows that the level of decentralization influences the composition of expenditure

the determinants of off budget activity of state and local governments the primary finding of this paper is that the off budget activity of the public sector is significantly and positively related to on budget activity by state and local governments we suggest the following policy implications one there appears to be evidence that the composition of total government activity is related to the relative costs of the alternative avenues of providing governmental activity future research into determining the nature of the relative cost differences may be one useful means of understanding both the composition of government activity as well as its total size two our ability to measure the true size of public sector participation in the economy must go well beyond our attempt here while we have presented information on one of the important hidden elements of public sector participation we are still a long way from effectively incorporating similar data on legislation regulations and so forth into our empirical tests further research into these issues is clearly warranted

how to get the snowball rolling and extend the franchise voting on the great reform act of 1832 this paper suggests a new approach to analyzing the causes of franchise extension based on a new dataset it provides a detailed econometric study of the great reform act of 1832 in the united kingdom the analysis yields four main results first modernization theory receives limited support second the reform enjoyed some measure of popular support third the threat of revolution had an asymmetric impact on the voting behavior of the pro reform whigs and the anti reform tories while the threat might have convinced reluctant reformers among the whig politicians and among their patrons to support the bill it seems to have hardened the resistance to reform among the tories fourth ideology played a critical role nevertheless it also appears that self interest and political expedience explained the votes of many members of parliament

does government spending affect income inequality a meta regression analysis in this paper findings of a meta regression analysis are presented exploring the effects of government spending on income inequality with a particular focus on low and middle income countries we identify a total of 84 separate studies containing over 900 estimates of the effect of one or more measures of spending on one or more measures of income inequality the results show some evidence of a moderate negative relationship between government spending and income inequality which is strongest for social welfare and other social spending and when using the gini coefficient or the top income share as the measure of inequality however both the size and direction of the estimated relationship between government spending and income inequality is affected by a range of other factors including the control variables and estimation method used we also find evidence of publication bias in that negative estimates of the relationship appear to be under reported in the literature

explaining the growth of government in sweden a disequilibrium approach previous studies aimed at explaining the growth of government in a particular country have failed to distinguish between explanatory variables acting on the supply and demand side respectively alternatively they have tested one explanation at a time implying explanatory equations that are misspecified in addition no allowance has been made for the fact that the interaction between supply and demand can hardly be assumed to be a self equilibrating process where the price of public goods and services adjusts to equate the two instead a framework of disequilibrium seems more appropriate for the analysis of the growth of government

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

the size and composition of government expenditure abstract this paper tests several leading hypotheses on determinants of government expenditure the purpose is to avoid omitted variables bias by testing the prominent theories in a comprehensive specification to identify persistent puzzles for the current set of theories and to explore those puzzles in greater depth by looking at the composition of government expenditure and the level of government at which it takes place as well as its magnitude using government financial statistics data from the imf covering over 100 countries from 1970 2000 i look at cross sectional and inter temporal variation in government expenditure and both individual categories of expenditure such as defense education health care and different levels of government central and local among other results i find a new explanation for wagner s law widespread evidence that preference heterogeneity leads to decentralization rather than outright decreases in expenditures that a great deal of the expenditure associated with increased trade openness is not in categories that explicitly insure for risk and evidence that both political access and income inequality affect the extent of social insurance

the effects of grants in aid on state and local expenditures abstract this paper develops econometric methods to estimate the effect of the piecewise linear budget constraints created by grant formulas in which the subsidy rate is not constant over expenditures e g closed end grants the methods are applied to the afdc program the results show that because of the kinked nature of the grant formula 1 the present federal formula actually increases cross state inequality in afdc benefits 2 several subsidy rates in the formula actually reduce benefits and 3 the so called flypaper effect disappears

deregulation ownership and productivity growth in the banking industry evidence from india this paper analyzes the relationship between deregulation and total factor productivity tfp growth in the indian banking industry using a generalized shadow cost function approach tfp growth is decomposed into a technological change a scale and a miscellaneous component a disaggregated panel data analysis using the population of public and private banks over 1985 96 that covers both pre and post deregulation periods indicates that a significant decline in regulatory distortions and the anticipated increase in tfp growth have not yet materialized following deregulation while private sector banks have improved their performance mainly due to the freedom to expand output public sector banks have not responded well to the deregulation measures

income distribution and tax structure empirical test of the meltzer richard hypothesis abstract the meltzer richard hypothesis that more unequal income distribution will create a majority for more redistribution has generated much research but little empirical support the empirical literature has concentrated on cross country studies and the size of the public sector and the results broadly do not indicate more redistribution with more inequality this analysis suggests that the hypothesis should be investigated in a more homogenous setting with comparable institutions and with an explicit decision about redistribution here tax structure new data on poll tax and property tax in decentralized government in norway are exploited we show how the multi dimensional decision can be analyzed as majority rule assuming intermediate preferences in the econometric analysis instruments are used to account for endogeneity of income level and income distribution the estimated model supports the understanding that more unequal income distribution implies a shift in the tax burden from poll tax to property taxes and thereby gives more redistribution

a positive theory of in kind transfers and the negative income tax normative arguments for restricting redistribution to cash transfers or a negative income tax have not appealed to politicians or their constituents all modern governments redistribute income in kind and provide goods and services that can be produced and distributed privately at times public and private supply coexist housing services medical care and education are examples but so too are safety and many regulatory activities of government

interest groups and the size of government the results of the previous section estimates of a three equation model from 23 observations must obviously be regarded as tentative the consistent positive relationship between number of interest groups and size of government observed with changing sets of included independent variables changing samples of nations and treating the number of interest groups as either exogenous or codetermined does imply rather unequivocally that interest groups are able to influence public policies in such a manner as to lead to increased government size beyond helping to reinforce this conclusion the results of the previous section should be regarded as first steps in the development of a model of the polity that can explain participation in the political process by interest groups and citizens as well as the size of government

inequality is bad for growth of the poor but not for that of the rich the paper assesses the impact of overall inequality as well as inequality among the poor and among the rich on the growth rates along various percentiles of the income distribution the analysis uses micro census data from u s states covering the period from 1960 to 2010 the paper finds evidence that high levels of inequality reduce the income growth of the poor and if anything help the growth of the rich when inequality is deconstructed into bottom and top inequality the analysis finds that it is mostly top inequality that is holding back growth at the bottom

are we witnessing a paradigm shift in the analysis of political competition this presidential address assesses the crisis of the downsian model of political competition in light of the mounting evidence on policy divergence and evaluates the possibility that the new theories of politicians quality and political selection provide an alternative theoretical conceptualization of political competition based on a critical review of the literature and on the author s works on content analysis of policy speeches income redistribution politicians quality and political legislation cycles this address concludes that multidimensional downsian models of political competition are adequate to explain policy divergence and points out the serious theoretical and empirical problems that models of political selection have to solve

evidence on electoral accountability in the u s senate are unfaithful agents really punished many have questioned whether voters are able to hold incumbent officials electorally accountable through a retrospective voting strategy we examine u s senate elections from 1962 to 1990 in forty one states explaining which incumbents ran for reelection and their success in seeking reelection we find that an incumbent s deviation from her state party platform decreases the probability that she will run for reelection and win if she runs furthermore the electoral mechanism is found to be more efficient when voters are better informed finally we find that our divergent party platform model provides a better fit than the median voter model

banking sector and restructuring in eastern europe abstract the paper seeks to achieve a number of objectives first to analyze the underlying causes of east european commercial banks illiquidity problems second to examine the case for public versus private informal approaches to bankruptcy and bank restructurings as general approaches to these problems third to evaluate the different models of restructuring banks in particular eight alternative models are identified fourth to briefly describe the models that have been chosen by a number of east european countries finally to layout the criteria for policymakers choice of a particular restructuring model

an innovatory package for financial sector reforms in eastern european countries abstract this essay sees reform of the financial sector as the key to successful transition to a market economy the analysis generates the following practical proposals first the central bank should be endowed with strong independence accumulating the deposit insurance supervisory and lender of last resort functions second the central bank should host the payments system and impose gross settlement without credit lines in excess of required reserve balances it should also impose suitable capital requirements for credit exposure third universal banking should be accepted to improve corporate governance and to make a well functioning capital market less necessary fourth to reduce moral hazard and provide maximum flexibility an innovatory multi tier bank licensing is proposed fifth when government cannot borrow from the central bank borrowing will contribute to the development of securities markets whose other two pillars are privatisation and mortgage financing to alleviate the burden on public finance and maximise liquidity perpetuals assorted with suitable calls and puts are proposed