dynamic investment and financing under personal taxation this paper examines the effects of capital gains taxation on firms investment and financing decisions we develop a real options model in which the timing of investment the decision to default and the firm s capital structure are endogenously and jointly determined our analysis demonstrates that the asymmetric taxation of capital gains and losses fosters investment by eroding the option value of waiting it also shows that firms controlled by taxable investors employ more equity financing the higher the firm s stock price and the worse the firm s historical performance using a large sample of u s industrial firms that are owned by taxable investors between 1970 and 2008 we present new evidence on corporate investment and financing policies which is supportive of the model s predictions

investment policy with time to build abstract most capital projects have an implementation lag we examine the effect of implementation lag on a levered firm s investment decision the main finding is that implementation lag can potentially have a substantial effect on a levered company s investment trigger and this effect can be significantly different from that of an unlevered company the exact relationship between lag and investment trigger depends on the level of debt used by the firm for an optimally levered firm a crucial determinant of the lag investment relationship is the fraction of investment cost that has to be incurred upfront if this fraction is small investment trigger is a decreasing function of implementation lag and the effect can be economically significant if this fraction is large investment trigger can be either increasing or decreasing in lag depending on parameter values but the magnitude of the effect is not large optimally levering a firm makes the implementation lag more investment friendly relative to an unlevered firm thus it is possible that the lag has a negative effect on investment if the firm is unlevered but a positive effect if the same firm is optimally levered for an optimally levered firm implementation lag generally has a non negative effect on investment

temporary versus permanent shocks explaining corporate financial policies we investigate corporate financial policies in the presence of both temporary and permanent shocks to firms cash flows in our framework cash flows can be negative and are imperfectly correlated with firm value and earnings volatility differs from asset volatility these results are consistent with empirical stylized facts they are also contrary to the implications of existing dynamic capital structure models that allow only for permanent shocks to cash flows temporary shocks increase the importance of financial flexibility and may provide an intuitively simple and realistic explanation of empirically observed financial conservatism and low leverage phenomena the theoretical framework developed in this article general enough to be used in various corporate finance applications jel g12 g32 g33

a contribution to the theory of financial fragility and crisis the paper outlines formally three interrelated facets of a financial crisis of domestic origin i a debt financed consumption boom supported by rising asset prices that ends in debt deflation ii a related process of financial evolution of economic agents towards ponzi finance iii resulting systemic illiquidity afflicting the financial sector as a prelude to crisis being placed in relation to theories of exogenous and endogenous money the models indicate how the co evolution of the real and the financial sector results in financial fragility of different types the paper explores formally the specific features of the fragility of various episode of crisis which share a common pattern of gradual build up followed by a sudden collapse of financial confidence through the interaction between the real and the financial sector and concludes with implications for policy copyright the author 2011 published by oxford university press on behalf of the cambridge political economy society all rights reserved oxford university press

can the trade off theory explain debt structure we examine the optimal mixture and priority structure of bank and market debt using a tradeoff model where banks have the unique ability to renegotiate outside formal bankruptcy flexible bank debt offers a superior tradeoff between tax shields and bankruptcy costs ease of renegotiation limits bank debt capacity however optimal debt structure hinges upon which party has bargaining power in private workouts weak firms have high bank debt capacity and utilize bank debt exclusively strong firms lever up to their lower bank debt capacity augment with market debt and place the bank senior therefore the tradeoff theory offers an explanation for i why young small firms use bank debt exclusively ii why large mature firms employ mixed debt financing and iii why bank debt is senior the tradeoff theory also generates predictions consistent with international evidence in countries where the bankruptcy regime entails soft tough enforcement of contractual priority bank debt capacity is low high implying greater less reliance on market debt

optimal financial policy and firm valuation since the classic work of miller and modigliani 1961 laid down the principles for the valuation of firms under conditions of certainty some two decades ago academic interest in the problem of valuing the individual firm has waned yet in addition to the obvious importance of this problem for security analysts investors and acquirers of corporations the issue of firm valuation is fundamental to much of the theory of corporate finance what determines the risk of the firm how the rate of return required by investors may be inferred from capital market data the influence of financing policy on firm value and other issues of central concern to the theory of financial management this almost total neglect of firm valuation is attributable perhaps to the overwhelming influence of the research programme initiated by the development of the capital asset pricing model only three years after the publication of the above mentioned paper by miller and modigliani in its primary form the capital asset pricing model is a statement about the equilibrium rates of return on securities rather than about the equilibrium values of securities it is straightforward to transform the model into a statement about the dependence of current equilibrium values upon an exogenously specified distribution of end of period values however in this form the model is inherently unsatisfactory since it fails to take account of the fact that in reality the distribution of end of period firm values is not exogenously given but is determined as part of a subsequent capital market equilibrium attempts to iterate the single period capital asset pricing model over several periods in order to avoid the need to take the distribution future security values as exogenous have been unsuccessful for the most part since not being able to derive they have been forced to assume both the requisite normality of the distribution of subsequent security prices and the legitimacy of ignoring endogenously determined shifts in the individual investor s investment

valuation of bankrupt firms this study compares the market value of firms that reorganize in bankruptcy with estimates of value based on management s published cash flow projections we estimate firm values using models that have been shown in other contexts to generate relatively precise estimates of value we find that these methods generally yield unbiased estimates of value but the dispersion of valuation errors is very widethe sample ratio of estimated value to market value varies from less than 20 to greater than 250 cross sectional analysis indicates that the variation in these errors is related to empirical proxies for claimholders incentives to overstate or understate the firm s value

optimal capital structure and bankruptcy choice dynamic bargaining versus liquidation abstract we model a firm s optimal capital structure decision in a framework in which it may later choose to enter either chapter 11 reorganization or chapter 7 liquidation creditors anticipate equityholders ex post reorganization incentives and price them into the ex ante credit spreads using a realistic dynamic bargaining model of reorganization we show that the off equilibrium threat of costly renegotiation can lead to lower leverage even with liquidation in equilibrium if reorganization is less efficient than liquidation the added option of reorganization can actually make equityholders worse off ex ante even when they liquidate on the equilibrium path

measuring the agency cost of debt we adapt a contingent claims model of the firm to reflect the incentive effects of the capital structure and thereby to measure the agency costs of debt an underlying model of the firm and the stochastic features of its product market are analyzed and an optimal operating policy is chosen we identify the change in operating policy created by leverage and value this change the model determines the value of the firm and its associated liabilities incorporating the agency consequences of debt the optimal capital structure for a firm is now widely regarded to be determined by a broad range of factors including a mix of tax effects the various agency problems associated with different securities and the various costs of issuing securities including the costs created by adverse selection while the existence of a theoretical optimum has been demonstrated in a variety of papers a less explored area has been the construction of detailed models that enable us to measure each of the relevant factors for a particular company and thereby to determine the actual optimal mix for that firm this gap in our understanding is particularly glaring in the case of agency costs in order to allow a careful modelling of strategic relations the parameters of most agency models are either so simplified that it is impossible to associate them with measurable parameters of a real world case or else the models simply abstract from certain critical factors such as a robust measure of price risk that must be incorporated into any real application for example although we now understand that sinking funds dividend restrictions and other bond covenants help to resolve the conflict of interest between bondholders and equity we do not yet have much in the way of models with which to determine the optimal parameters of these very covenants contingent claims models can provide a consistent framework for multiperiod valuation that properly accounts for risk but they usually abstract from the agency factors entering capital structure decisions when using a contingent claims model to value a firm s securities it is common to take the value of the firm itself as governed by an exogenously defined stochastic process the value of the firm s securities are then derived from this underlying value and as merton 1974 points out in his paper on the pricing of risky debt the modigliani miller theorem obtains so that the value of the firm is independent of the value and the type of debt in order to apply the contingent claims techniques to a setting in which agency problems are central some adaptation is necessary in this paper we

on the debt capacity of growth options we relate the value of growth options in the firm s investment opportunity set to the level of debt in the firm s capital structure underinestment costs of debt increase and free cash flow benefits fall with additional growth options thus if debt capacity is defined as the amount of debt the firm optimally adds for an incremental project then the debt capacity of growth options is negative this result implies that book leverage should fall with the addition of growth options our tests using a large sample of industrial firms confirm this prediction

debt renegotiation and debt overhang evidence from lender mergers this paper studies whether debt renegotiation mitigates debt overhang and improves investment efficiency using mergers between lenders participated in the same syndicated loans as natural experiments that exogenously reduce the number of lenders and thus make renegotiation easier i find that firms affected by the mergers experience more loan renegotiations and increase capital expenditure investment i also find that the effect is stronger for firms with higher q suggesting improved investment efficiency further evidence suggests that the effect concentrates on loans without performance pricing provisions and unsecured loans providing further support that lender mergers improves investment efficiency for firms suffering from debt overhang ex ante

interactions of corporate financing and investment decisions a dynamic framework this article analyzes the interaction between a firm s dynamic investment operating and financing decisions in a model with operating adjustment and recapitalization costs using numerical analysis we solve the model for cases that highlight interaction effects we find that higher production flexibility due to lower costs of shutting down and reopening a production facility enhances the firm s debt capacity thereby increasing the net tax shield value of debt financing while higher financial flexibility resulting from lower recapitalization costs has a similar effect production flexibility and financial flexibility are to some extent substitutes we find that the impact of debt financing on the firm s investment and operating decisions is economically insignificant

optimal capital structure and investment decisions under time inconsistent preferences based on a continuous time model of quasi hyperbolic discounting this paper provides an analytically tractable framework of entrepreneurial firms capital structure and investment decisions under time inconsistent preferences inefficiency in both investment and default is caused due to time inconsistency if we view the time consistent benchmark as efficient compared to the standard trade off theory in corporate finance we clarify that debt financing under time inconsistent preferences brings a new trade off between the alleviation effect on investment inefficiency and the aggravation effect on default inefficiency the impact of time inconsistent preferences depends on the entrepreneurs belief regarding their future time inconsistent behavior i e sophisticated or naive concretely we find that naive entrepreneurs always choose higher leverages while sophisticated ones are more likely to choose lower leverages compared to the time consistent benchmark therefore time inconsistency can explain the observed leverage puzzle i e why firms choose different leverages even with similar fundamentals moreover we demonstrate that time inconsistent preferences delay investment and hasten default due to the interaction among the three effects option value effect payoff value effect and leverage effect in particular naive entrepreneurs invest later and default earlier than sophisticated ones leading to a shorter operating period these results support the empirical findings in entrepreneurial finance

optimal exercise of jointly held real options a nash bargaining approach with value diversion this paper provides a two stage decision framework in which two or more parties exercise a jointly held real option we show that a single party s timing decision is always socially efficient if it precedes bargaining on the terms of sharing however if the sharing rule is agreed before the exercise timing decision is made then socially optimal timing is attained only if there is a cash payment element in the division of surplus if the party that chooses the exercise timing can divert value from the project then the first best outcome may not be possible at all and the second best outcome may be implemented using a contract that is generally not optimal in the former cases our framework contributes to the understanding of a range of empirical regularities in corporate and entrepreneurial finance

capital structure and debt structure using a novel dataset that records individual debt issues on the balance sheets of public firms we demonstrate that traditional capital structure studies that ignore debt heterogeneity miss substantial capital structure variation relative to high credit quality firms lowcredit quality firms are more likely to have a multi tiered capital structure consisting of both secured bank debt with tight covenants and subordinated non bank debt with loose covenants we discuss the extent to which these findings are consistent with existing theoretical models of debt structure in which firms simultaneously use multiple debt types to reduce incentive conflicts jel g32

structural recovery of face value at default abstract we carefully study the transmission mechanisms from default free rates to corporate bond prices within structural models of endogenous default risk the transmission critically depends on whether the model is value based or cashflow based on the assumptions made for the drift of the state variable and on the way the residual value at default is shared among bondholders the recovery assumption is crucial recovery of face value which entails receiving the same share of residual value at default regardless of the remaining maturity greatly helps explaining the empirical evidence on bond price sensitivities to interest rates

optimal priority structure capital structure and investment we study the interaction between financing and investment decisions in a dynamic model where the firm has multiple debt issues and equityholders choose the timing of investment jointly optimal capital and priority structures can virtually eliminate investment distortions because debt priority serves as a dynamically optimal contract examining the relative efficiency of priority rules observed in practice we develop several predictions about how firms adjust their priority structure in response to changes in leverage credit conditions and firm fundamentals notably financially unconstrained firms with few growth opportunities prefer senior debt while financially constrained firms with or without growth opportunities prefer junior debt moreover lower rated firms are predicted to spread priority across debt classes finally our analysis has a number of important implications for empirical capital structure research including the relations between market leverage book leverage and credit spreads and tobin s q the influence of firm fundamentals on the agency cost of debt and the conservative debt policy puzzle the author 2011 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

internationally mobile firms and tax policy abstract this paper analyses how the government should tax internationally mobile firms the analysis finds that if tax authorities are unable to observe firms true mobility and domestic and foreign profitability are uncorrelated then 1 information rents are acquired by immobile inefficient firms and 2 the optimal policy will stimulate investment in the immobile sector compared to the complete information case another result of the paper is that the optimal allocation is implementable within the framework of a corporate income tax system where mobile firms self select more unfavourable capital allowances than immobile firms

optimal capital structure and investment with real options and endogenous debt costs we examine the joint optimization of financial leverage and irreversible capacity investment in a real options framework with risky debt and endogenous interest costs higher capacity ceteris paribus increases operating leverage and default probability but lowers ex post adjustment costs and generates larger tax shields a key insight is that financial leverage and capacity are substitutes in the debt market equilibrium we develop novel predictions about the effects of capital adjustment costs operating costs and uncertainty on optimal financial leverage and capacity that may potentially help explain ambiguous empirical results in the literature regarding the determinants of capital structure and investment received march 17 2016 editorial decision july 8 2017 by editor itay goldstein

optimal debt and equity values in the presence of chapter 7 and chapter 11 explicit presence of reorganization in addition to liquidation leads to conflicts of interest between borrowers and lenders in the first best outcome reorganization adds value to both parties via higher debt capacity lower credit spreads and improved overall firm value if control of the ex ante reorganization timing and the ex post decision to liquidate is given to borrowers most of the benefits are appropriated by borrowers ex post lenders can restore the first best outcome by seizing this control or by the ex post transfer of control rights reorganization is more likely and liquidation is less likely relative to the benchmark case with liquidation only the u s bankruptcy code which includes a liquidation process chapter 7 and a reorganization process chapter 11 aims to resolve a number of important issues associated with a distressed firm these issues can be classified into information asymmetry problems e g quality of the firm heinkel and zechner 1993 agency problems e g risk shifting jensen and meckling 1976 or coordination problems e g debt of various maturities berglof and von thadden 1994 in this paper we investigate whether there is a place for a reorganization process in the presence of costly financial distress and liquidation these costs capture in reduced form the aforementioned frictions we wish to characterize the states of a borrowing firm relative to its outstanding contractual debt obligations at different stages of financial distress assuming full information and a single issue of debt we also seek to determine the role played by the bankruptcy code in improving the welfare of borrowers and lenders and how its influence depends on the rights given to borrowers and lenders at various stages of financial distress more precisely we build on structural models of debt merton 1974 black and cox 1976 which allows us to determine overall firm value along with the values of equity and debt in line with this literature we assume that liquidation destroys part of the firm s value we then ask the basic and yet important

financial contracting and leverage induced over and under investment incentives this paper investigates the effects of seniority rules and restrictive dividend convenants on the over and under investment incentives associated with risky debt we show that increasing seniority of new debt decreases the incidence of under investment but increases over investment and vice versa under symmetric information the optimal seniority rule is to give new debtholders first claim on a new project without recourse to existing assets i e project financing under asymmetric information the optimal debt contract requires equating the expected return to new debtholders in the default state to the new project s cash flow in the same rate if this is not possible the optimal seniority rule calls for strict subordination of new debt if the expected cash flow in default is small and full seniority if it is large with regard to dividend convenants we show that their effect depends on whether or not dividend payments are conditioned on future investments when they are unconditioned allowing more dividends increases the under investment incentive in contrast conditional dividends decrease the underinvestment incentive and increase the over investment incentive

capital structure investment and fire sales we study a dynamic general equilibrium model in which firms choose their investment level and capital structure trading off the tax advantages of debt against the risk of costly default bankruptcy costs are endogenous as bankrupt firms are forced to liquidate their assets resulting in a fire sale if the market is illiquid when the corporate income tax rate is positive firms have a unique optimal capital structure in equilibrium firms default with positive probability and their assets are liquidated at fire sale prices the equilibrium features underinvestment and is constrained inefficient in particular there is too little debt and default

interactions of corporate financing and investment decisions the effects of agency conflicts abstract we examine interactions between flexible financing and investment decisions in a model with stockholder bondholder conflicts over investment policy we find that financial flexibility encourages the choice of short term debt thereby dramatically reducing the agency costs of under and overinvestment however the reduction in agency costs may not encourage the firm to increase leverage since the firm s initial debt level choice depends on the type of growth options in its investment opportunity set the model has a number of testable predictions for the joint choice of leverage and maturity and how these choices interact with a firm s growth opportunities

the costs of bankruptcy chapter 7 liquidation versus chapter 11 reorganization our paper explores a comprehensive sample of small and large corporate bankruptcies in arizona and new york from 1995 to 2001 bankruptcy costs are very heterogeneous and sensitive to the measurement method used we find that chapter 7 liquidations appear to be no faster or cheaper in terms of direct expense than chapter 11 reorganizations however chapter 11 seems to preserve assets better thereby allowing creditors to recover relatively more our paper also provides a large number of further empirical regularities our paper analyzes the largest sample of corporate bankruptcies to date we research approximately 300 cases from the arizona and new york federal bankruptcy courts from 1995 to 2001 these cases consist of 1 both publicly traded and privately held corporations and 2 both chapter 7 liquidations and chapter 11 reorganizations this sample is practically the entire population of unique corporate bankruptcies in these courts our paper s primary objective is to measure how the two available bankruptcy procedures differ especially but not only in terms of cost we explore four variables namely the change in the estate s value during bankruptcy a measure of indirect costs the time spent in bankruptcy another and more common measure of indirect costs the expenses submitted to and approved by the bankruptcy court a measure of direct costs and the recovery rates for creditors and apr violations our most important findings are that chapter 7 liquidations are not cheaper than chapter 11 reorganizations particularly after we control for endogenous self selection of firms into bankruptcy procedure bankruptcy professionals attorneys accountants trustees regularly end up with most of the post bankruptcy firm s value in chapter 7 arturo bris is at imd yale school of management and ecgi ivo welch is at brown uni

the priority structure of corporate liabilities most discussions of corporate capital structure effectively assume that all debt is the same yet debt differs by maturity covenant restrictions conversion rights call provisions and priority here we examine priority structure across a sample of 4995 compustat industrial firms from 1981 to 1991 we analyze the variation in the use of capital leases secured debt ordinary debt subordinated debt and preferred stock both as a fraction of the firm s market value and as a fraction of total fixed claims our evidence provides consistent support for contracting cost hypotheses mixed support for tax hypotheses and little support for the signaling hypothesis