bidding behavior in the longer term refinancing operations of the european central bank evidence from a panel sample selection model abstract this paper analyzes individual bidding data of the longer term refinancing operations ltros of the european central bank we investigate how banks bidding behavior is related to a series of exogenous variables including collateral costs interest rate expectations market volatility and to individual bank characteristics like country of origin size and experience a specific feature of these auctions is that the number and composition of bidders varies over time therefore we estimate panel sample selection models to control for a bank s endogenous participation decision we find that bidding strategies depend on the banks attributes yet different bidding behavior generally does not translate into differences concerning bidder success there is evidence for the winner s curse effect in ltros indicating a common value component in banks demand for longer term refinancing

occupational choice and the process of development this paper models economic development as a process of institutional transformation by focusing on the interplay between agents occupational decisions and the distribution of wealth because of capital market imperfections poor agents choose working for a wage over self employment and wealthy agents become entrepreneurs who monitor workers only with sufficient inequality however will there be employment contracts otherwise there is either subsistence or self employment thus in static equilibrium the occupational structure depends on distribution since the latter is itself endogenous we demonstrate the robustness of this result by extending the model dynamically and studying examples in which initial wealth distributions have long run effects in one case the economy develops either widespread cottage industry self employment or factory production employment contracts depending on the initial distribution in the other example it develops into prosperity or stagnation

did the elimination of mandatory retirement affect faculty retirement a special exemption from the 1986 age discrimination act allowed colleges and universities to enforce mandatory retirement of faculty at age 70 until 1994 we construct a survey that permits us to compare faculty turnover rates before and after the law changed at a large sample of institutions with defined contribution pension plans after the elimination of compulsory retirement the retirement rates of 70 and 71 year olds fell by two thirds and were comparable to rates of 69 year olds these findings indicate that u s colleges and universities will experience a rise in the number of older faculty over the coming years jel j26 i21

uniform vs discriminatory auctions with variable supply experimental evidence in the variable supply auction considered here the seller decides how many customers with unit demand to serve after observing their bids bidders are uncertain about the seller s cost we experimentally investigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory price auction is better for the seller in this setting exactly as predicted by theory it turns out that the uniform price auction produces substantially higher bids and consequently yields higher revenues and profits for the seller furthermore again as predicted by theory the uniform price auction yields a higher number of transactions which makes it also the more efficient auction format

cash by any other name evidence on labelling from the uk winter fuel payment standard economic theory implies that the labelling of cash transfers or cash equivalents e g child benefits food stamps should have no effect on spending patterns the empirical literature to date does not contradict this proposition we study the uk winter fuel payment wfp a cash transfer to older households exploiting sharp eligibility criteria in a regression discontinuity design we find robust evidence of a behavioural effect of the labelling on average households spend 41 of the wfp on fuel if the payment was treated as cash we would expect households to spend approximately 3 of the payment on fuel

salomon brothers and the may 1991 treasury auction analysis of a market corner abstract in may 1991 the treasury sold 12 29 billion in two year notes through improper bidding salomon brothers gained control of at least 86 percent of the issue this study investigates the impact of salomon s attempted corner by examining the postauction price behaviour of the two year note based on a no arbitrage relation the results show that the two year note was substantially overpriced for approximately six weeks following the auction the typical mispricing during this period is estimated at 0 16 to 0 25 percent of par in dollar terms the aggregate misvaluation averaged 20 30 million and by controlling the supply of the issue salomon stood to gain substantially from the squeeze

the illusory effects of saving incentives on saving the authors evaluate research on how tax based saving incentives iras and 401 k s affect saving previous research overstates the impact of the incentives on saving by failing to account for several issues households with saving incentives have stronger tastes for saving than others saving incentives have interacted with debt nonfinancial assets financial markets and pensions and saving incentives represent pretax balances whereas taxable accounts represent posttax balances accounting for these issues essentially eliminates the impact of saving incentives on saving the authors conclude that little if any of the contributions to existing saving incentives have raised saving

is there a demand for income tax progressivity recently marhuenda and ortuno ortin economics letters 48 1995 319 have provided a popular support for progressivity theorem that says that a marginal progressive tax always defeats a marginal regressive tax as long as individuals vote for the tax scheme minimizing their tax liabilities and the median income is less than the mean income in this paper we provide under similar circumstances a popular support for regressivity theorem according to which for any existing tax scheme there is always a majority support for a regressive reform reducing marginal progressivity or increasing marginal regressivity this regressive reform is supported by both extremes of the income distribution combining this result with marhuenda and ortuno ortin s result implies that vote cycling between regressive and progressive tax reform is inevitable and thus that the demand for progressivity cannot be established in the standard downsian framework with self interested voters

auctions with a stochastic number of bidders abstract auction theory is generalized by allowing the number of bidders to be stochastic in a first price sealed bid auction with bidders having constant absolute risk aversion the expected selling price is higher when the bidders do not know how many other bidders there are than when they do know this thus the seller should conceal the number of bidders if he can moreover a bidder s ex ante expected utility is the same whether or not there is a policy of concealing the number of bidders concealment therefore pareto dominates announcement with risk neutral bidders the optimal auction is the same whether or not the bidders know who their competitors are

pension plan characteristics and framing effects in employee savings behavior abstract defined contribution pensions in many postsecondary institutions are funded by a combination of an employer premium and a mandatory employee premium individuals can also contribute to a supplemental savings account holding constant total compensation standard reasoning suggests that supplemental savings should depend negatively on the sum of the employer and employee pension contributions contrarily we find that the supplementary savings of professors are significantly more sensitive to employee contributions than to employer contributions this asymmetry is consistent with different marginal propensities to save out of the salary and pension components of compensation nevertheless impacts on lifetime utility are relatively modest

compensating for the winner s curse experimental evidence abstract we conduct experiments on common value auctions with rationing in each auction the good is randomly allocated to one of the k highest bidders at the k 1 st highest price when k 1 bidders are rationed as the degree of rationing increases the equilibrium bid function increases consistent with prior literature we find that bidders suffer from the winner s curse and lose money on average however bids in the experiments do adjust in the appropriate direction as the degree of rationing changes providing support for the comparative statics implications of the theory our results are consistent with subjects having an intuitive understanding of the winner s curse but being unable to compute the equilibrium bid levels

why did the banks overbid an empirical model of the fixed rate tenders of the european central bank abstract this paper tests two alternative hypotheses for the overbidding behavior of the banks in the fixed rate tenders conducted by the european central bank ecb from january 1999 until june 2000 one hypothesis attributes the overbidding to the expectations of a future tightening of monetary policy while the other attributes it to the liquidity allotment decisions of the ecb the model is estimated with individual bidding data of the spanish banks and also with aggregate bidding data of all spanish banks and all banks in the euro area the empirical results provide support for the second hypothesis

the repo auctions of the european central bank and the vanishing quota puzzle until june 2000 the european central bank ecb used fixed rate tenders for its weekly repo auctions a switch to variable rate tenders became necessary due to massive overbidding by banks in this paper we introduce a stylized game among banks to investigate this overbidding phenomenon our results confirm the weakness of the fixed rate tender format and indicate that the ecb s liquidity management has significantly improved since the switch to the variable rate system yet recent episodes of rate cut expectations suggest that the ecb s practice of setting a minimum bid rate should be abandoned in favor of a more symmetric interest rate target

on the possibility of informationally efficient markets this paper presents conditions for a resolution of the grossman stiglitz paradox of informationally efficient markets we display a market with asymmetric information where a privately revealing equilibrium obtains in a competitive framework and where incentives to acquire information are preserved as long as the correlation in traders valuations is not too large the equilibrium is efficient and the problems associated with fully revealing rational expectations equilibria are precluded without resorting necessarily to noise traders the robustness of the results to general information structures is established and the effect of market power is examined in a large market approximation to the competitive economy the model is applied to explain changes in bidding behavior in central bank liquidity auctions in the crisis period jel d82 d84 g14 e59

paying not to go to the gym how do consumers choose from a menu of contracts we analyze a novel dataset from three u s health clubs with information on both the contractual choice and the day to day attendance decisions of 7 752 members over three years the observed consumer behavior is difficult to reconcile with standard preferences and beliefs first members who choose a contract with a flat monthly fee of over 70 attend on average 4 3 times per month they pay a price per expected visit of more than 17 even though they could pay 10 per visit using a 10 visit pass on average these users forgo savings of 600 during their membership second consumers who choose a monthly contract are 17 percent more likely to stay enrolled beyond one year than users committing for a year this is surprising because monthly members pay higher fees for the option to cancel each month we also document cancellation delays and attendance expectations among other findings leading explanations for our findings are overconfidence about future self control or about future efficiency overconfident agents overestimate attendance as well as the cancellation probability of automatically renewed contracts our results suggest that making inferences from observed contract choice under the rational expectation hypothesis can lead to biases in the estimation of consumer preferences

how retirement saving programs increase saving this paper summarizes the authors work on the effect of ira and 401 k contributions on net personal saving they consider many different nonparametric approaches to controlling for heterogeneity in individual saving behavior and conclude that the weight of the available evidence suggests that contributions to both iras and 401 k s largely represent new saving the authors devote particular attention to reconciling their results with the findings in other studies that reach different conclusions sometimes using the same databases that the authors analyze methodological limitations that undermine the reliability of results in other studies explain many of these disparities

repo auctions and the market for liquidity what is the nature of imperfections in the market for liquidity studying bidder level data from european central bank ecb repo auctions we find that this market appears to be informationally efficient in the sense that participants do not have private information about future short term rates however auction allocations affect banks subsequent behavior in a way that is consistent with a degree of allocational and operational inefficiency also large bidders appear to have better access to the interbank market than small ones finally the evidence suggests that the ecb uses collateral haircuts that do not equilibrate opportunity costs

household saving micro theories and micro facts in this survey we review the recent theoretical and empirical literature on household saving and consumption the discussion is structured around a list of motives for saving and how well the standard theory captures these motives we show that almost all of the motives for saving that have been suggested in the informal saving literature can be captured in the standard optimizing model particular attention is given to recent work on the precautionary motive and its implications for saving and consumption behavior we also discuss the behavioral or psychological approach that eschews the use of standard optimization techniques and focuses instead on direct consideration on saving we provide a section on facts who save and how much we then discuss informally the recent decline in the u s saving rate and whether the theory is of much use in understanding this and other changes in aggregate saving rates over time we do not find any convincing explanation for the change in saving rates we also discuss some analyses of saving behavior over the life cycle addressing such questions as whether households save enough for retirement and whether the consumption patterns of older households can be rationalized within a simple life cycle model we also review a great number of studies of the consumption euler equations based on our analysis of the studies cited we conclude that there is still mixed evidence that consumption is excessively sensitive to income we also examine in depth the recent empirical literature on the precautionary motive we conclude that although some households do seem to have a significant precautionary motive at some points in their life cycle this motive is not so strong empirically as some investigators suggest

are the rich too rich to be expropriated economic power and the feasibility of constitutional limits to redistribution why is it that in democracies the poor do not expropriate the rich even though they outnumber them in this paper we analyze the commonly held belief that the rich escape expropriation because they are economically powerful we demonstrate that the economically powerful i e the above average income earners are indeed in a position to bribe the small segment of the voters with incomes between the median and the mean to resist the temptation of supporting confiscatory taxation this is true even if compensation payments in cash are politically unfeasible and therefore need to be made in terms of an evenly distributed private good and it may even be true if only pure public goods are available to swing the middle class

dualism and macroeconomic volatility this paper develops a simple macroeconomic model that shows that combining capital market imperfections together with unequal access to investment opportunities across individuals can generate endogenous and permanent euctuations in aggregate gdp investment and interest rates reducing inequality of access may be a necessary condition for macroeconomic stabilization moreover countercyclical escal policies have a role to play in our model savings are underutilized in slumps because of the limited debt capacity of potential investors therefore the government should issue public debt during recessions in order to absorb those idle savings and enance investment subsidies or tax cuts for investors the most important single fact about saving and investment activities is that in our industrial society they are generally done by different people and for different reasons for years there might tend to be too little investment leading to deeation losses excess capacity and unemployment for other years there might tend to be too much investment leading to periods of chronic ineation unless prudent and proper public policies in the escal and monetary eelds are followed paul a samuelson economics 8th edition 1970 pp 196 198

income distribution and macroeconomics this paper analyzes the role of wealth distribution in macroeconomics through investment in human capital it is shown that in the presence of credit markets imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital the initial distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and investment both in the short and in the long run as there are multiple steady states this paper therefore provides an additional explanation for the persistent differences in per capita output across countries furthermore the paper shows that cross country differences in macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate shocks can be attributed among other factors to differences in wealth and income distribution across countries

auctions with variable supply uniform price versus discriminatory abstract we examine an auction in which the seller determines the supply after observing the bids we compare the uniform price and the discriminatory auction in a setting of supply uncertainty where uncertainty is caused by the interplay of two factors the seller s private information about marginal cost and the seller s incentive to sell the profit maximizing quantity given the received bids in every symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium bidders submit higher bids in the uniform price auction than in the discriminatory auction in the two bidder case this result extends to the set of rationalizable strategies as a consequence we find that the uniform price auction generates a higher expected revenue for the seller and a higher trade volume

how much income redistribution an explanation based on vote buying and corruption this paper studies how income tax rates are determined and how they are related to government corruption in the form of fund capture a model is presented where rich voters can block redistribution by buying the votes of some poor voters in equilibrium there is only limited redistribution and income tax rates are a negative function of government corruption when rich voters can bribe the government an additional equilibrium with zero taxation is possible the link between corruption and tax rates is tested using cross country data the empirical evidence is fully consistent with the predictions of the model

a theory of the consumption function with and without liquidity constraints fifteen years ago milton friedman s 1957 treatise a theory of the consumption function seemed badly dated dynamic optimization theory had not been employed much in economics when friedman wrote and utility theory was still comparatively primitive so his statement of the permanent income hypothesis never actually specified a formal mathematical model of behavior derived explicitly from utility maximization instead friedman relied at crucial points on intuition and verbal descriptions of behavior although these descriptions sounded plausible when other economists subsequently found multiperiod maximizing models that could be solved explicitly the implications of those models differed sharply from friedman s intuitive description of his model furthermore empirical tests in the 1970s and 1980s often rejected these rigorous versions of the permanent income hypothesis in favor of an alternative hypothesis that many households simply spent all of their current income today with the benefit of a further round of mathematical and computational advances friedman s 1957 original analysis looks more prescient than primitive it turns out that when there is meaningful uncertainty in future labor income the optimal behavior of moderately impatient consumers is much better described by friedman s original statement of the permanent income hypothesis than by the later explicit maximizing versions furthermore in a remarkable irony much of the empirical evidence that rejected the permanent income hypothesis as specified in tests of the 1970s and 1980s is actually consistent both with friedman s original description of the model and with the new version with serious uncertainty there are four key differences between the explicit maximizing models

the price of liquidity the effects of market conditions and bank characteristics we study the prices that individual banks pay for liquidity captured by borrowing rates in repos with the central bank and benchmarked by the overnight index swap as a function of market conditions and bank characteristics these prices depend in particular on the distribution of liquidity across banks which is calculated over time using individual bank level data on reserve requirements and actual holdings banks pay more for liquidity when positions are more imbalanced across banks consistent with the existence of short squeezing we also show that small banks pay more for liquidity and are more vulnerable to squeezes healthier banks pay less but contrary to what one might expect banks in formal liquidity networks do not state guarantees reduce the price of liquidity but do not protect against squeezes

consumption versus expenditure previous authors have documented a dramatic decline in food expenditures at the time of retirement we show that this is matched by an equally dramatic rise in time spent shopping for and preparing meals using a novel data set that collects detailed food diaries for a large cross section of u s households we show that neither the quality nor the quantity of food intake deteriorates with retirement status we also show that unemployed households experience a decline in food expenditure and food consumption commensurate with the impact of job displacement on permanent income these results highlight how direct measures of consumption distinguish between anticipated and unanticipated shocks to income whereas measures of expenditures obscure the distinction

market performance and bidders bidding behavior in the new york transmission congestion contract market abstract using publicly available bidder level bids data for transmission congestion contracts tccs and the realized awards of tccs in the nyiso monthly reconfiguration auctions from june 2000 to december 2004 we examine both market performance and bidders bidding behavior in the auctions the data show significant under pricing in the realized awards of tccs theories suggest that under pricing may arise from risk aversion monopsonistic market power or winner s curse our empirical analysis illustrates that all of the three effects play a role in the nyiso tccs market both market performance and bidders bidding strategies can be best explained by the theoretical model with asymmetric information and risk averse bidders

on strategic quantity bidding in multiple unit auctions standard studies of multiple unit auctions generally overlook the strategic role of bidders quantity decisions using a simple equilibrium model of bidding the author analyzes bidders incentives to choose quantities in discriminatory and competitive auctions the main result is that bidders have a stronger strategic incentive to bid for fewer units in competitive auctions since under competition a bidder pays the lowest accepted price for each unit she gets she may benefit from dropping her quantity to let lower valuing bidders enter the set of winners this prediction is consistent with empirical observations from foreign currency and spectrum auctions copyright 1997 by blackwell publishing ltd

social mobility what is it and why does it matter the definition of social mobility is a matter of debate in the following discussion conceptual issues in the literature on mobility are commented this paper defines social mobility as a situation in which the relative economic status of an agent is not dependent on starting conditions such as parental income or family background analyzing the determinants of mobility involves exploring the channels through which offspring s income is correlated to its parents such as inherited bequest education skills among many others this survey explores in an analytical framework the relation between social mobility and inequality among other important dimensions of income distribution that are jointly determined the focus is on the relevance of social mobility as it affects variables determining welfare and economic efficiency and therefore on policies to promote it

an empirical study of auction revenue rankings the case of municipal bonds using a novel dataset of 386 rst price municipal bond auctions held in california i perform counterfactual revenue comparisons based on the theoretical result of milgrom and weber 1982 i show that the revenue in the second price auction is non parametrically identi ed and the counterfactual revenue in the english auction can be bounded in an informative way these results form a

procrastination and obedience in this lecture i shall focus on situations involving repeated decisions with time inconsistent behavior although each choice may be close to maximizing and therefore result in only small losses the cumulative effect of a series of repeated errors may be quite large thus in my examples decision makers are quite close to the intelligent well informed individuals usually assumed in economic analysis but cumulatively they make seriously wrong decisions that do not occur in standard textbook economics this lecture discusses and illustrates several pathological modes of individual and group behavior procrastination in decision making undue obedience to authority membership of seemingly normal individuals in deviant cult groups and escalation of commitment to courses of action that are clearly unwise in each case individuals choose a series of current actions without fully appreciating how those actions will affect future perceptions and behavior the standard assumption of rational forwardlooking utility maximizing is violated the nonindependence of errors in decision making in the series of decisions can be explained with the concept from cognitive psychology of undue salience or vividness for example present benefits and costs may have undue salience relative to future costs

retirement security in an aging population abstract elderly individuals exhibit wide disparities in their sources of income for those in the bottom half of the income distribution social security is the most important source of support program changes would directly affect their well being income from private pensions assets and earnings are relatively more important for higher income elderly individuals who have more diverse income sources the trend from private sector defined benefit to defined contribution pension plans has shifted responsibility for retirement security to individuals a significant subset of the population is unlikely to be able to sustain their standard of living in retirement without higher pre retirement saving

intergenerational earnings mobility inequality and growth abstract we examine a model in which per capita income inequality intergenerational mobility and returns to education are all determined endogenously individuals earn wages depending on their ability which is a random variable they purchase an education with transfers received from their parents and are subject to liquidity constraints in the model multiple steady state equilibria are possible countries with identical tastes and technologies can reach differing rates of mobility inequality and per capita income equilibria with higher levels of output also have lower inequality higher mobility and more efficient distribution of education

humps and bumps in lifetime consumption in this article we argue that the life cycle model that allows demographics to affect household preferences and relaxes the assumption of certainty equivalence can generate hump shaped consumption profiles over age that are very similar to those observed in household level data sources and in particular match the differences in shape across different education groups liquidity constraints or myopia are not required to explain the empirical features of observed life cycle patterns

opening and closing the market evidence from the london stock exchange we investigate the performance of call markets at the open and close using a unique natural experiment provided by the london stock exchange where traders can choose between a call and an off exchange dealership system although the call market dominates dealers in terms of price discovery it suffers from a high failure rate to open and close trading especially when trading conditions are difficult the call s trading costs increase with asymmetric information slow trading order flow imbalances and uncertainty traders resort to use of call auctions is negatively correlated with firm size implying that the call may not be the optimal method for opening and closing trading of medium and small sized stocks

hedging winner s curse with multiple bids evidence from the portuguese treasury bill auction auctions of government securities typically permit bidders to enter multiple price quantity bids despite the widespread adoption of this institutional feature and its use by bidders the motivations behind its use and its effects on auction outcomes are not well understood theoretically and have been little explored empirically this paper proposes that bidders use multiple bids to adjust for winner s curse by spreading her bids a bidder aligns her outcome more closely to the aggregate outcome of the auction this hypothesis is tested using bidding data from treasury bill auctions in portugal i find that ceteris paribus a bidder submits a greater number of bids and disperses prices on these bids more widely when there is a greater potential for winner s curse in particular both these measures of bid spreading increase with the volatility of market interest rates and the expected number of participating well informed bidders

an efficient ascending bid auction for multiple objects when bidders exhibit multi unit demands standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes this article proposes a new ascending bid auction for homogeneous goods such as treasury bills or telecommunications spectrum the auctioneer announces a price and bidders respond with quantities items are awarded at the current price whenever they are clinched and the price is incremented until the market clears with private values this dynamic auction yields the same outcome as the sealed bid vickrey auction but has advantages of simplicity and privacy preservation with interdependent values this auction may retain efficiency whereas the vickrey auction suffers from a generalized winner s curse

bidding behavior in sequential cattle auctions the objectives of this study are to investigate the institutional speciflcs of sequential cattle auctions and their role as determinants of prices institutional speciflcs are the order of sale according to quality a secret reserve price bidders multi unit demand and difierent types of bidders prices decline and bidders with a higher demand pay on average lower prices the estimation results show that declining prices are caused by the order of sale according to quality and the secret reserve price the results further show that bidders take the strategic efiect of sequential auctions and multi unit demand into account

mechanism choice and strategic bidding in divisible good auctions an empirical analysis of the turkish treasury auction market we propose an estimation method to bound bidders marginal valuations in discriminatory auctions using individual bid level data and apply the method to data from the turkish treasury auction market using estimated bounds on marginal values we compute an upper bound on the inefficiency of realized allocations as well as bounds on how much additional revenue could have been realized in a counterfactual uniform price or vickrey auction we conclude that switching from a discriminatory auction to a uniform price or vickrey auction would not significantly increase revenue moreover such a switch would increase bidder expected surplus by at most 0 02 percent

erratum to the uniform price auction with endogenous supply abstract this paper shows that low price equilibria in the uniform price auction with endogenous supply do not exist if the seller employs the proportional rationing rule and is consistent when selecting among profit maximizing quantities in a consistent subgame perfect equilibrium the walrasian quantities are traded at the walrasian price

strategic trading behavior and price distortion in a manipulated market anatomy of a squeeze abstract this paper investigates an attempted delivery squeeze in a bond futures contract traded in london using cash and futures trades of dealers and customers we analyze their strategic trading behavior price distortion and learning in a market manipulation setting we argue that marked differences in settlement failure penalties in the cash and futures markets create conditions that favor squeezes we recommend that regulators require special flagging of forward term repurchase agreements on the key deliverables that span futures contract maturity dates and that exchanges mark to market their contract specifications more frequently or consider a cash settled contract on a basket of bonds

individual financial decisions in retirement saving plans the role of participant direction abstract workers with individual retirement saving accounts often make decisions about contribution rates and asset allocation that affect ultimate retirement income this paper presents econometric evidence from two data sets on the role that participant investment choice plays in asset allocation contributions and account balances my preferred estimates indicate that participants with investment choice are 36 percent more likely to make an annual contribution these participants are estimated to invest 13 percentage points more in stocks contribute between one and three percentage points more of salary and have at least 9000 more in their account than comparable participants without investment choice

eating the rich vs feeding the poor borrowing constraints and the reluctance to redistribute this paper offers an explanation why most democracies arecharacterized by moderate taxation of wealth although thewealth distribution is persistently skewed to the right wemodel an economy in which agents have to acquire highereducation to qualify for skilled work and in which capitalmarket imperfections prevent poor individuals from making sucha profitable human capital investment if these borrowingconstraints do not bind for members of the middle class theymay rationally reject redistribution although both the currentand the future median of the wealth distribution are below themean

social mobility and the demand for redistribution the poum hypothesis this paper examines the often stated idea that the poor do not support high levels of redistribution because of the hope that they or their offspring may make it up the income ladder this prospect of upward mobility poum hypothesis is shown to be fully compatible with rational expectations and fundamentally linked to concavity in the mobility process a steady state majority could even be simultaneously poorer than average in terms of current income and richer than average in terms of expected future incomes a e rst empirical assessment suggests on the other hand that in recent u s data the poum effect is probably dominated by the demand for social insurance in the future everyone will be world famous for e fteen minutes andy warhol 1968

quantitative easing auctions of treasury bonds abstract the federal reserve uses reverse auctions to implement its purchases of treasury bonds in quantitative easing qe to evaluate dealers offers across multiple bonds the fed relies on its internal yield curve model fitted to secondary market bond prices from november 2010 to september 2011 a one standard deviation increase in the cheapness of a treasury bond how much the market price of the bond is below a model implied value increases the fed s purchase quantity of that bond by 276 million and increases the auction costs on that bond by 2 6 cents per 100 par value controlling for standard covariates our results suggest that the fed harvests gains from trades by purchasing undervalued bonds but strategic dealers extract some profits because the fed s relative values can be partly inferred from price data

prompting microfinance borrowers to save a field experiment from guatemala abstractcan microfinance borrowers use the discipline of regular loan repayments in order to accumulate savings if prompted to do so in an experiment we offered commercial savings products to the microfinance borrowers of guatemala s largest public sector bank we find that giving these borrowers the opportunity to develop a savings plan and be reminded of saving at the time of loan repayment caused no increase in the opening of savings accounts but led to balances among savers that were two and a half times those in the control a second treatment arm that proposed a default savings contribution of 10 of the loan payment caused the fraction of clients using linked savings accounts to double as well as elevated deposits among savers leading to final savings balances that were more than five times the control the savings treatments also generate faster pay down of debt and weakly better overall repayment performance suggesting that simultaneous saving and borrowing can be complementary activities a

on the asset allocation of a default pension fund we characterize the optimal default fund in a dened contribution dc pension plan using detailed data on individuals and their holdings inside and outside the pension system we nd substantial heterogeneity among default investors in terms of labor income nancial wealth and stock market participation we build a life cycle consumption savings model incorporating a dc pension account and realistic investor heterogeneity we examine the optimal asset allocation for dierent realized equity returns and investors and compare it with age based investing the optimal asset allocation leads to less inequality in pensions while it moderates the risks through active rebalancing

bidder behavior in multiunit auctions evidence from swedish treasury auctions we analyze a unique data set on multiunit auctions which contains the actual demand schedules of the bidders as well as the auction awards in over 400 swedish treasury auctions first we document that bidders vary their prices bid dispersion and the quantity demanded in response to increased uncertainty at the time of bidding second we find that bid shading can be explained by a winner s curse driven model in which each bidder submits only one bid despite the fact that the bidders in our data set use much richer bidding strategies third we explore the extent to which the received theories of multiunit auctions are able to offer insights into the bidder behavior we observe our empirical evidence is consistent with some of the predictions of the models of auctions that emphasize private information the winner s curse and the champion s plague while the models of multiunit auctions serve as useful guideposts our empirical findings also point to several new areas of research in multiunit auctions

the uniform price auction with endogenous supply abstract this paper shows that low price equilibria in the uniform price auction with endogenous supply do not exist if the seller employs the proportional rationing rule and is consistent when selecting among profit maximizing quantities in a consistent subgame perfect equilibrium the walrasian quantities are traded at the walrasian price

auctions and bidding a primer maybe the contractor was right to think bid jobs are different but it is more likely that he suffered from too simple a view of what is involved in preparing a competitive bid our analysis will show that even an experienced estimator working in familiar terrain can lose money if he doesn t understand the subtleties of competitive bidding the phenomenon experienced by the painting contractor known as the winner s curse is just one of the surprising and puzzling conclusions that have been turned up by modern research into auctions another is the theoretical proposition supported also by some experimental evidence that for example a sealed bid treasury bill auction in which each buyer pays a price equal to the highest rejected bid would yield more revenue to the treasury than the current procedure in which the winning bidder pays the seemingly higher amount equal to his own bid there are also subtle results that demonstrate the equivalence of such apparently different institutions as the standard sealed bid auction in which the auctioneer seller sells the goods to the highest bidder for a price equal to his bid and the dutch auction in which the auctioneer seller begins by asking a high price and gradually lowers the price until

financial asset demand is elastic evidence from new issues of federal home loan bank debt abstract we estimate the slope of the demand curve for newly auctioned fhlb discount notes and investigate the impacts of arbitrage risk and heterogeneity of investor beliefs on demand elasticity our unique dataset of roughly 2900 observations of two price quantity pairs the first from a pre auction dealer survey the second from actual auction results provides the quantity shift necessary to identify demand in contrast to previous findings of downward sloping demand curves for equities we show that demand for newly issued fhlb notes is nearly perfectly elastic during normal market conditions we find however that frictions like arbitrage risk and to a lesser extent heterogeneity of investor beliefs negatively affect elasticity and explain the nearly 50 drop in elasticity observed during the recent financial crisis

what accounts for the variation in retirement wealth among u s households even among households with similar socioeconomic characteristics saving and wealth vary considerably life cycle models attribute this variation to differences in time preference rates risk tolerance exposure to uncertainty relative tastes for work and leisure at advanced ages and income replacement rates these factors have testable implications concerning the relation between accumulated wealth and the shape of the consumption profile using the panel study of income dynamics and the consumer expenditure survey we find little support for these implications the data are instead consistent with rule of thumb mental accounting or hyperbolic discounting theories of wealth accumulation jel di d91 e21

the effects of pensions on household wealth a reevaluation of theory and evidence this paper examines the extent to which households offset pension wealth with reductions in other wealth systematic econometric biases imply that the estimated offsets in previous empirical studies are smaller than the true offset and may even have the wrong sign new empirical estimates that do not correct for the biases generate little offset between pensions and other wealth estimates that correct for the biases show substantially more offset a smaller impact of pensions on overall saving than in most previous studies the estimates also indicate that the effects of pensions on wealth vary significantly across households

cost benefit analyses versus referenda we consider a planner who chooses between two public policies and ask whether a referendum or a cost benefit analysis leads to higher welfare we find that a referendum leads to higher welfare than a cost benefit analysis in a common value environment cost benefit analysis is better in a private value environment

iras and household saving this paper examines the effects of individual retirement accounts iras on private and national saving the authors construct a formal model of dynamic utility maximization that generates closed form equations for ira and other saving their empirical estimates indicate that raising the annual ira contribution limit between 1983 and 1986 would have resulted in little if any increase in national saving results from sensitivity analysis imply substantially smaller effects on national saving than most previous researchers have estimated the authors results are consistent with new evidence they present indicating considerable potential among ira holders to shift taxable forms of saving into iras copyright 1994 by american economic association

the labeling effect of a child benefit system child benefit systems exist in many countries while they show a lot of differences in terms of eligibility rules amounts involved and implementation tax deduction tax credit or direct benefit the common motivation for their existence is to increase children s welfare in the dutch child benefit system the case i focus on in this paperone of the parents usually the mother is entitled to an untaxed child benefit amount which only depends on the child s age and the number of children in the household thus child support does not depend on household income marital status or labor market status as a result child benefit is exogenous to the household given the presence of children this is in contrast with the situation in many other countries including germany france the united kingdom and the united states where government provided child support is partly means tested see jonathan bradshaw et al 1993 in the netherlands child benefit is generally a nonnegligible addition to the household income the median share of child benefit in the total net income of households with children is 8 percent on the national level expenditures on child benefits amount to 1 2 percent of gnp the use of the child benefit is completely at the discretion of the parent there are no legal requirements that a certain amount be spent on particular goods or services nor does the government provide any guidelines regarding expenditure on children a policy question that arises is to what extent children benefit from child benefits standard microeconomic demand theory allows no role for effects of the composition of income given the fungibility of income sources it is only the sum of income components that is relevant in explaining expenditure patterns thus within that framework the answer would be that the marginal propensity to consume child goods from one guilder of child benefits is no different than from one guilder of any other income source in the more general class of gametheoretic models of household behavior however the composition of household income will generally affect expenditure patterns see e g shelly j lundberg and robert a pollak 1993 and martin browning et al 1994 if fathers and mothers have different preferences and mothers have control over child benefits the effect of child benefits on expenditures will differ from the effect of other income sources lundberg et al 1997 provide empirical evidence showing that a transfer of control over child benefits from fathers to mothers in the united kingdom due to a change in legislation resulted in a significant increase in expenditures on child clothing daniela del boca and christopher j flinn 1994 have analyzed the effect of income composition on expenditure decisions of divorced mothers they find that the coefficients associated with child support and alimony income differ from those for other income in engel curves for expenditures on childspecific goods their results can be explained in terms of a noncooperative nash model in which the child support transfer decisions of the noncustodial father and the expenditure decisions of the mother are determined simultaneously in contrast to del boca and flinn s analysis in which child support is a decision variable the present paper focuses on the possible differential effect of government provided child support which is truly exogenous in this paper i analyze the effects of child benefits on expenditures by running regressions in which child benefit enters as a separate explanatory variable the enipirical analysis is based on a time series of 17 cross section consumer expenditure surveys in the netherlands covering the period 1978 through 1994 it is important to note that in a single cross section it department of economics university of groningen p o b 800 9700 av groningen the netherlands e mail p kooreman eco rug nl i am indebted to two anonymous referees for constructive comments helpful comments were also provided by rob alessie maarten allers chris bojke werner de bondt bert schoonbeek and tom wansbeek i thank vincent linderhof for organizing the data financial support was provided by the dutch organization for scientific research nwo homes project grant

discriminatory versus uniform treasury auctions evidence from when issued transactions abstract we use when issued transactions data to assess the treasury s current experiment with uniform auctions when issued volume is higher under uniform as compared to discriminatory auctions suggesting a higher information release which should reduce pre auction uncertainty and the winner s curse under uniform auctions when issued volatility falls after the auction and again after the outcome announcement the pattern is the opposite for discriminatory auctions this is further evidence that uniform auctions increase pre auction information and lower the short squeeze a direct comparison of markups in uniform and discriminatory auctions yields mixed results

the impact of public information on bidding in highway procurement auctions a number of papers in the theoretical auction literature show that the release of information regarding the seller s valuation of an item can cause bidders to bid more aggressively this widely accepted result in auction theory remains largely untested in the empirical literature recent theoretical work has also shown that this effect can be more pronounced in auctions with larger common cost uncertainty we examine the impact of a policy change by the oklahoma department of transportation that led to the release of the state s internal estimate of the costs to complete highway construction projects we perform a differences in differences analysis comparing bidding in texas a state that had a uniform policy of revealing the same information all throughout the period of analysis to bidding in oklahoma our results show that in comparison to texas auctions the average bid in oklahoma fell after the change in engineers cost estimate ece policy this decline in bids was even larger for projects where the common uncertainty in costs is greater moreover the within auction standard deviation of bids fell after the change in ece policy with the most significant decline observed again in projects with greater common cost uncertainty

nonresponse in panel data the impact on estimates of a life cycle consumption function if missing observations in a panel data set are not missing at random many widely applied estimators may be inconsistent in this paper we examine empirically several ways to reveal the nature and severity of the selectivity problem due to nonresponse as well as a number of methods to estimate the resulting models using a life cycle consumption function and data from the expenditure index panel from the netherlands we discuss simple procedures that can be used to assess whether observations are missing at random and we consider more complicated estimation procedures that can be used to obtain consistent or efficient estimates in case of selectivity of attrition bias finally some attention is paid to the differences in identification consistency and efficiency between inferences from a single wave of the panel a balanced sub panel and an unbalanced panel

banks demand for reserves when future monetary policy is uncertain abstract the extensive use of revolving securities repurchase agreements has increased the flexibility of the money market management of many european central banks using an extended reserve management model this paper shows that a flexible central bank can influence money market conditions just by being more or less vague or determined about its future course of monetary policy employing arch in mean models for german money market rates confirms that more uncertainty reduces banks demand for borrowed reserves and thereby leads to decreasing interest rates in the interbank money market

some evidence on the winner s curse comment the theory of auctions has developed extensively since robert b wilson s 1977 seminal paper due to the complexity of equilibrium strategies however empirical researchers have been slow to incorporate and test the most basic theoretical precepts typical empirical studies estimate ad hoc bidding models with no attempt to ascertain whether the implied behaviors are theoretically plausible the recent paper by stuart e thiel 1988 attempts to bridge this gap thiel obtains closed form equilibrium bidding functions that are theoretically motivated and linear in parameters and which facilitate empirical estimation and testing if widely applicable thiel s empirical approach would constitute a major methodological breakthrough unfortunately thiel s approach applies only in special cases that are of limited practical interest linear bidding strategies emerge only under circumstances that are unlikely in the real world the limited range of thiel s approach may not be apparent to casual readers of his paper even when linear strategies do exist they are not unique under the special assumptions of thiel s model for each nash equilibrium in linear strategies there exists a related family of nonlinear strategies thus further justification must be found for basing empirical research on the linear specification we also note a significant error in thiel s work the symmetric strategies he derives on the basis of order statistics do not constitute a nash equilibrium we derive proper expressions for the symmetric nash strategies and discuss a specification error in thiel s regression analysis that would account for the mixed results obtained in his application to the highway construction industry

forward looking behavior in ecb liquidity auctions evidence from the pre crisis period abstract using data from the pre crisis period we investigate banks joint bidding behavior in the ecb s main refinancing operations mro and longer term refinancing operations ltro we test whether banks bid at lower rates in mros before the ltro and at higher rates after the ltro compared to other operations we motivate this by findings from the auction literature suggesting that agents bidding behavior is forward looking and takes sequences of future auctions into account we offer two findings first we find that in general banks bid in the mro before the ltro at lower rates as compared to other mros moreover mro participants that also bid in the following ltro bid at even lower rates compared to peers not bidding in the ltro these findings support the hypothesis that banks view obtaining liquidity from the two operations as a substitute second we find that banks generally bid more aggressively in the mro after the ltro banks that participated also in the ltro preceding the mro bid at substantially higher rates these findings reflect that short banks with potentially large net liquidity needs in the mro after the ltro bid more aggressively although size plays a considerable role for bidding behavior the conclusions are valid for banks of different sizes

active vs passive decisions and crowd out in retirement savings accounts evidence from denmark using 41 million observations on savings for the population of denmark we show that the effects of retirement savings policies on wealth accumulation depend on whether they change savings rates by active or passive choice subsidies for retirement accounts which rely on individuals to take an action to raise savings primarily induce individuals to shift assets from taxable accounts to retirement accounts we estimate that each 1 of government expenditure on subsidies increases total saving by only 1 cent in contrast policies that raise retirement contributions if individuals take no action such as automatic employer contributions to retirement accounts increase wealth accumulation substantially we estimate that approximately 15 of individuals are active savers who respond to tax subsidies primarily by shifting assets across accounts 85 of individuals are passive savers who are unresponsive to subsidies but are instead heavily influenced by automatic contributions made on their behalf active savers tend to be wealthier and more financially sophisticated we conclude that automatic contributions are more effective at increasing savings rates than subsidies for three reasons i subsidies induce relatively few individuals to respond ii they generate substantial crowd out conditional on response and iii they do not increase the savings of passive individuals who are least prepared for retirement jel codes h2 h3

anomalies the winner s curse abstract next time that you find yourself a little short of cash for lunch try the following experiment in your class take a jar and fill it with coins noting the total value of the coins now a

information returns and bidding behavior in ocs auctions 1954 1969 this paper examines federal auctions for leases on the outer continental shelf in the light of the predictions of the first price sealed bid common values model of auctions the authors find that the data strongly support the model for auctions in which one bidder is better informed than the other bidders the evidence for auctions in which bidders have noisy but qualitatively similar information is less conclusive but is consistent with a model in which each bidder does not know either the actual or potential number of bidders on a lease copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

optimal defaults and active decisions defaults often have a large influence on consumer decisions we identify an overlooked but practical alternative to defaults requiring individuals to make an explicit choice for themselves we study such active decisions in the context of 401 k saving we find that compelling new hires to make active decisions about 401 k enrollment raises the initial fraction that enroll by 28 percentage points relative to a standard opt in enrollment procedure producing a savings distribution three months after hire that would take 30 months to achieve under standard enrollment we also present a model of 401 k enrollment and derive conditions under which the optimal enrollment regime is automatic enrollment i e default enrollment standard enrollment i e default non enrollment or active decisions i e no default and compulsory choice active decisions are optimal when consumers have a strong propensity to procrastinate and savings preferences are highly heterogeneous financial illiteracy however favors default enrollment over active decision enrollment