a model of candidate location with endogenous valence this work gives a theoretical explanation for the increase in campaign spending and party polarization in u s politics i assume that the effectiveness of persuasive advertising and of costly valence campaigning in general positively depends on the share of nonpartisan voters a decline in the number of partisan voters in a constituency results in greater campaign spending by the candidates if the voters are risk averse the candidates who maximize their expected office rents minus the cost of campaigning will choose divergent policy platforms strategically in order to reduce the costs of subsequent campaign spending the degree of policy divergence positively depends on the share of nonpartisan voters for a broad class of voter disutility and candidate cost of valence functions

an empirical investigation of coalitional bargaining procedures abstract models of government formation processes in multi party democracies are usually highly sensitive to the rules that govern the selection of formateurs i e the parties selected to propose a potential government the theoretical literature has focused on two selection rules selection proportional to seat share and selection in order of seat share in this paper we use a new data set on government formations in 11 parliamentary democracies to empirically assess which selection rule most closely approximates the data we find that while there is little empirical support for selection in order of seat share proportional selection fits the data well however we also find that a simple alternative that combines the insights of the two selection rules outperforms both of them in their ability to explain the data

the logic of institutional preferences german electoral law as a social choice outcome institutions determine the results of social decision processes yet institutions are themselves endogenous products of earlier social choices this paper explores the hypothesis that participants in the choice of institutions seek alternatives that favor their desired policies the choice of institutions can be analyzed in terms of bargaining between individuals or parties where preferences derive from preferences over policy and bargaining is structured by existing institutions this approach is used to study the choice of an electoral system in germany after world war ii the hypothesis that parties choose electoral institutions to maximize their future policy influence explains both the adoption of proportional representation in 1949 and the switch to a two vote ballot in 1953

did bank distress stifle innovation during the great depression we find a negative relationship between bank distress and the level quality and trajectory of firm level innovation during the great depression particularly for r d firms operating in capital intensive industries however we also show that because a sufficient number of r d intensive firms were located in counties with lower levels of bank distress or were operating in less capital intensive industries the negative effects were mitigated in aggregate although depression era bank distress was associated with the stifling of innovation our results also help to explain why technological development was still robust following one of the largest shocks in the history of the u s banking system

candidate reputations and the incumbency effect abstract a major shortcoming of the classical median voter model is that its central prediction convergence of platforms to the median voter s ideal is seldom observed one reason is that the classical model neglects the importance of voter expectations as a determinant of votes here we associate voters expectations about candidates with past as well as current candidate pronouncements and assume that incumbents whose actions are consistent with their reputations are perceived as less risky than challengers in equilibrium candidates choose distinct platforms typically neither adopts the median voter s ideal point either candidate may win depending on how well the incumbent s reputation reflects current voter tastes and how relatively risky the electorate perceives the challenger to be

a theory of voting equilibria a voting equilibrium arises when the voters in an electorate acting in accordance with both their preferences for the candidates and their perceptions of the relative chances of various pairs of candidates being in contention for victory generate an election result that justifies their perceptions voting equilibria always exist and the set of equilibria can vary substantially with the choice of voting system we compare equilibria under the plurality rule approval voting and the borda system we consider a candidate positioning game and find that the plurality rule imposes little restriction on the position of the winning candidate in three candidate races while approval voting leads to a winner positioned at the median of the voter distribution we contrast campaign activities intended to influence voter preferences with activities meant to influence only perceptions of candidate viability

electoral outcomes with probabilistic voting and nash social welfare maxima abstract this paper provides unexpected support to nash s view of how bargaining determines the social choice we first present a spatial model of electoral competition with probabilistic voting and a very close relation between voters preferences and their choice probabilities the outcome of the electoral competition game is then shown to be precisely the social alternative that maximizes a nash type social welfare function theorem 1 this electoral outcome is also interpreted as a unanimity likelihood maximum corollary 1 within our framework existence and uniqueness of such an outcome are guaranteed corollaries 2 and 3

explaining party ideological stances we apply the iterative algorithm by merrill and adams political analysis 9 347 361 2001 to compute the optimal positions of vote maximizing parties along a one dimensional space for a large number of elections this allows us to systematically evaluate factors that push parties toward more centrifugal locations in equilibrium our findings largely corroborate expectations suggested by the theoretical literature albeit with one notable exception the relative size of a partisan constituency reduces rather than enhances the likelihood of a party having an extreme optimal position we then compare derived equilibrium positions with actual party positions with the aim of understanding the nature of electoral incentives and offering insights about party system competition in particular we show that the age of a party the party family to which it belongs post election expectations and internal rules for candidate and leader selection are all factors that increase the probability of a party approaching the position predicted by pure vote maximizing considerations

why small centrist third parties motivate policy divergence by major parties plurality based elections between two major parties or candidates sometimes feature small cen trist third parties we modify the standard two party spatial model of policy seeking parties to incorporate a centrist third party and we show that the presence of such a party even if it has no chance of winning motivates the major parties to propose policies that are much more divergent than without the third party we derive explicit formulas for party locations at a three party equilibrium and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for existence ofthat equilibrium we show that over time the major parties can be expected to shift their policies in the same direction relative to each other but in the opposite direction relative to the minor party the predictions of this model are compared with estimates of party policy locations during appropriate periods in postwar britain for the past half century a small british party first the liberals now the liberal demo crats has occupied a policy position in between the two major british parties labour and the con servatives during much of the same period the free democrats in germany have held a similar posi tion between the social democrats and the christian democrats in addition recent american presidential elections have featured the candidates john anderson in 1980 and ross perot in 1992 and 1996 who had no realistic chance of winning and who were arguably located between the democratic and republican nom inees 1 what are the policy consequences of the existence of such small centrist parties or candidates on what political institutions do these consequences depend do these consequences benefit the policy aspirations of the centrist party or do they undermine these goals under proportional representation it is well known that a small centrist party such as the free democrats in germany may hold the balance of power bargaining with each of the major players as they attempt to form governing coalitions but in a plurality based system as in britain or the united states the consequences are far

strategic extremism why republicans and democrats divide on religious values party platforms differ sharply from one another especially on issues with religious content such as abortion or gay marriage given the high return to attracting the median voter why do vote maximizing politicians take extreme positions in this paper we find that strategic extremism depends on an intensive margin where politicians want to induce their core constituents to vote or make donations and the ability to target political messages toward those core constituents our model predicts that the political relevance of religious issues is highest when around one half of the voting population attends church regularly using data from across the world and within the united states we indeed find a nonmonotonic relationship between religious extremism and religious attendance

multiparty electoral competition in the netherlands and germany a model based on multinomial probit a typical assumption of electoral models of party competition is that parties adopt policy positions so as to maximize expected vote share here we use euro barometer survey data and european elite study data from 1979 for the netherlands and germany to construct a stochastic model of voter response based on multinomial probit estimation for each of these countries we estimate a pure spatial electoral voting model and a joint spatial model the latter model also includes individual voter and demographic characteristics the pure spatial models for the two countries quite accurately described the electoral response as a stochastic function of party positions we use these models to perform a thought experiment so as to estimate the expected vote maximizing party positions we go on to propose a model of internal party decision making based both on pre election electoral estimation and post election coalition bargaining this model suggests why the various parties in the period in question did not adopt vote maximizing positions we argue that maximizing expected vote will not in general be a rational party strategy in multiparty political systems which are based on proportional representation

does proportional representation foster closer congruence between citizens and policy makers this article assesses the claim that proportional representation pr fosters a closer correspondence between the views of citizens and the positions of the government the study uses the comparative study of electoral systems data set and compares respondents self placements on a left right scale with placements of cabinet parties locations in 31 election studies the authors argue that pr has two contradictory consequences on one hand pr leads to more parties and more choice for voters but these parties are less centrist and this increases the overall distance between voters and parties on the other hand pr increases the likelihood of coalition governments this pulls the government toward the center of the policy spectrum and reduces the distance between the government and voters these two contradictory effects of pr wash out and the net overall impact of pr on congruence is nil the data support the authors interpretation

electoral politics interest groups and the size of government electoral politics interest groups and the size of government i introduction interest groups have been considered main actors in the political drama for some time now by political scientists as in bentley 1908 schattschneider 1935 and truman 1951 and more recently by economist also such as olson 1965 and stigler 1975 despite the widespread consensus on their importance there have been few formal attempts to analyze their impact on public policies thus borooah and van der ploeg 1983 90 were moved to declare that theory based on the importance of different interest groups is badly needed in economics an important exception is becker s 1983 1985 analysis of interest group competition becker draws insights about the nature of the trade offs that occur when interest groups compete for political influence but becker consciously avoids incorporating into his model political institutions such as voting voting rules and candidates 1983 391 4 1985 330 rather he assumes that the political process operates as a veil through which the underlying strengths and demands of various interest groups are revealed this paper takes a different tack but one complementary to becker s approach the analysis is based on an explicit model of the political process that includes interest groups in the model interest group influence is a potential supply of votes for which parties or candidates compete each party seeks a winning coalition of voters and thus engages in implicit logrolling tullock 1959 572 an equilibrium exists in the competition for the support of interest groups and the nature of the equilibrium electoral platforms is identified below embodied in the characterization of the equilibria is a set of parameters that can be said to measure the strengths of the various interest groups and which enable one to identify how candidates change their policy positions in response to a change in the strength of an interest group it is therefore possible to analyze simultaneously the existence of an electoral equilibrium its nature including its normative properties and changes in equilibrium due to shifts in the balance of forces between competing groups 1 in contrast to becker 1983 1985 these analytical features are not assumed outright rather they are based on an underlying model of elections the theoretical underpinnings for this model are discussed in section ii interest groups are often alleged to be responsible in part for recent increases in the size of government in western democracies 2 therefore in sections iii and iv a model of the political process is used to study the impact of an increase in the influence of a particular interest group on government size in the simple models of the public sector considered here increasing group influence per se does not cause the size of the government to increase but an increase in the government s size does result when i there are constraints on the government s ability to change tax shares in response to a shift in group power or ii there is a publicly provided good which benefits one untaxed group and that group s sole concern with government policy is to maximize the amount of the good that it gets the paper concludes by considering some of the normative implications of the results ii interest groups in the electoral process there are two sets of actors in the model parties and interest groups and two sets of relationships which must be analyzed the relationships between interest groups and the parties and the relationship between the parties themselves with respect to the first question this paper investigates the determinants of each interest group s influence on the platforms proposed by the parties with respect to the second it explores whether the competition for votes between the parties produces an equilibrium and if so what its properties are

coevolution of capitalism and political representation the choice of electoral systems protocorporatist west european countries in which economic interests were collectively organized adopted pr in the first quarter of the twentieth century whereas liberal countries in which economic interests were not collectively organized did not political parties as marcus kreuzer points out choose electoral systems so how do economic interests translate into party political incentives to adopt electoral reform we argue that parties in protocorporatist countries were representative of and closely linked to economic interests as electoral competition in single member districts increased sharply up to world war i great difficulties resulted for the representative parties whose leaders were seen as interest committed they could not credibly compete for votes outside their interest without leadership changes or reductions in interest influence proportional representation offered an obvious solution allowing parties to target their own voters and their organized interest to continue effective influence in the legislature in each respect the opposite was true of liberal countries data on party preferences strongly confirm this model kreuzer s historical criticisms are largely incorrect as shown in detail in the online supplementary appendix

the alternative vote and interethnic moderation a reply to fraenkel and grofman the alternative vote av is a preferential electoral system that tends to reward political moderation and compromise fraenkel and grofman have modeled the likely effects of av in severely divided societies in order to impugn av as a tool of interethnic accommodation in this response i show that fraenkel and grofman s model is based on extreme assumptions that bear no relation to party and voter behavior in such societies models based on realistic assumptions about strategic behavior and cross national experience with av both demonstrate that av generally provides centripetal incentives that can contribute to interethnic coalition building and accommodation

centripetal and centrifugal incentives under different electoral systems inaseminalarticle cox 1990 suggestedthatelectoralsystemswithlargerdistrictmagnitudesprovideincentivesforparties to advocate more extreme policy positions in this article we put this proposition to the test informed by recent advances in spatial models of party competition we introduce a design that embeds the effect of electoral rules in the utility function of voters we then estimate the equilibrium location of parties as the weight voters attach to the expected distribution of seats and votes changes our model predicts that electoral rules affect large and small parties in different ways we find centripetal effects only for parties that are favorably biased by electoral rules by contrast smaller parties see their vote share decline and are pushed toward more extreme equilibrium positions evidence from 13 parliamentary democracies supports model predictions along with testing the incentives provided by electoral rules results carry implications for the strategies of vote maximizing parties and for the role of small parties in multiparty competition

electoral origins of japanese socialists stagnation why did the japan socialist party jsp cling to its original leftist policies for so long traditionally the jsp s failure to become a credible alternative to the liberal democratic party ldp has been explained in terms of either the legacy of its disastrous coalition experience in the early postwar years the party s organizational reliance on unionized labor or its nervousness about the reactionary element in the ldp none of these existing explanations is convincing given that the adherence to its leftist policies had self defeating electoral consequences for the jsp this article explores an alternative explanation and provides empirical evidence which illustrates the link between the jsp s misfortune and the japanese electoral system existing from 1947 to 1994

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

elections coalitions and legislative outcomes predictions of electoral behavior in a multiparty setting should be a function of the voters beliefs about how parties will perform following an election similarly party behavior in a legislature should be a function of electoral promises and rewards we develop a multistage game theoretic model of three party competition under proportional representation the final policy outcome of the game is generated by a noncooperative bargaining game between the parties in the elected legislature this game is essentially defined by the vote shares each party receives in the general election and the parties electoral policy positions at the electoral stage parties and voters are strategic in that they take account of the legislative implications of any electoral outcome we solve for equilibrium electoral positions by the parties and final policy outcomes

intertemporal budget constraint and public debt sustainability the case of italy the theory of intertemporal budget constraint is applied to test italian public debt sustainability with the finding that current fiscal policy has not been following a sustainable path in the 1980s in particular we find that i while primary surplus is stationary public debt is not ii permanent shocks explain about 90 of forecast error variance of public debt while playing a minor role in primary surplus and iii debt is not sustainable even if stochastic discount rates are accounted for

multicandidate equilibrium in american elections the united states presidential election of 1992 is anexample of a multicandidate contest involving bothdemocratic and republican candidates using a spatialmodelling approach i analyze candidate policystrategy for such elections under the assumption thatvoters choose according to the multivariate votingmodel of behavioral research this model representsvoters decisions as probabilistic functions of theirpolicy preferences and political partisanship isuggest reasons why partisan voting motivatescandidates to locate near their party s partisans inthe policy space and illustrate this argument withrespect to the 1992 presidential election the resultsof computer simulations suggest that these motivationslead to multicandidate spatial equilibria which arerobust to changes in the model s parameters partisanship appears to be an important source ofstability in multicandidate electoral competition

a downsian spatial model with party activism a unidimensional spatial model is proposed in this article although its formal structure parallels the spatial model of electoral competition this model examines the decisions of individuals as they choose whether or not to become activists in one of two political parties an individual calculus of participation is developed that is similar to the spatial interpretation of the calculus of voting this calculus is then generalized by examining conditions that may hold for aggregate activism probabilities and the relationship between the two forms is investigated some results are then presented which concern the distributions of activists in the two parties these results in general conform to the existence of party cleavages in which there are two stable equilibrium distributions of activists such that the two parties activists are relatively cohesive internally and relatively distinctive externally finally some suggestions are offered about how this model can be combined with the spatial model of candidate competition to provide a more complete model of elections

when politics and models collide estimating models of multiparty elections theory the spatial model of elections can better be represented by using conditional logit models which consider the position of the parties in issue spaces than by multinomial logit models which only consider the position of voters in the issue space the spatial model and random utility models in general suffer from a failure to adequately consider the substitutability of parties sharing similar or identical issue positions hypotheses multinomial logit is not necessarily better than successive applications of binomial logit conditional logit allows for considering more interesting political questions than does multinomial logit the spatial model may not correspond to voter decision making in multiple party settings multinomial probit allows for a relaxation of the iia condition and this should improve estimates of the effect of adding or removing parties methods comparisons of binomial logit multinomial logit conditional logit and multinomial probit on simulated data and survey data from multiparty elections results multinomial logit offers almost no benefits over binomial logit conditional logit is capable of examining movements by parties whereas multinomial logit is not multinomial probit performs better than conditional logit when considering the effects of altering the set of choices available to voters estimation of multinomial probit with more than three choices is feasible

the competitive road to proportional representation partisan biases and electoral regime change under increasing party competition one of the most noteworthy political regularities in the early twentieth century was the shift away from majoritarian electoral rules in western europe the conventional wisdom suggests that proportional representation pr was introduced by elites who believed that under the existing majoritarian rules simple plurality block vote two ballot rules they would soon lose power to rapidly growing socialist parties but this does not explain why many electoral reforms were carried out in countries with weak or nonexistent socialist parties the author shows that increasing the number of parties distorts the seat vote properties of electoral rules to a larger degree than previously anticipated under increasing party competition electoral regimes display larger partisan biases than those observed in two party races and crowd out minority parties that have territorially dispersed constituencies in favor of minority parties that have territorially concentrated constituencies using a dynamic bayesian model for seats and votes the author measures the partisan biases brought about by the expansion of voting rights in the late nineteenth century to explain the drive to reform majoritarian electoral systems

campaign allocations under probabilistic voting we develop a probabilistic voting model where candidates compete by advertising in different media markets ads are viewed by everyone within a market and cannot be targeted to subgroups such as one candidate s partisans candidates estimate the distribution of voter preference intensities in a market and campaign ads then shift this distribution individuals with any intensity vote with some probability for each candidate we derive comparative static implications of changes in a variety of factors on the advertising decisions of each candidate using campaign advertising data from 2002 we find these results to be consistent with actual campaign allocation behavior

electoral equilibrium in double member districts the median voter result and the issue of stability in electoral competition generally have been examined from a number of different perspectives out of all these examinations however only a few focus on institutional variables this essay demonstrates that the median voter result is robust under a significant institutional change that entails altering the basic assumption of single member districts after developing a model of electoral competition in a two member first two past the post district i show that if there are three candidates the set of nash equilibria is the set of strategy triples x1 x2 x3 with x1 x2 x3 x and such that x lies between the quantiles of order 1 3 and 2 3 if there are four candidates i show that a unique nash equilibrium exists with all candidates adopting a position at the medianvoter s ideal point

covering dominance and institution free properties of social change this paper shows that different institutional structures for aggregation of preferences under majority rule may generate social choices that are quite similar so that the actual social choice may be rather insensitive to the choice of institutional rules specifically in a multidimensional setting where all voters have strictly quasi concave preferences it is shown that the uncovered set contains the outcomes that would arise from equilibrium behavior under three different institutional settings the three institutional settings are two candidate competition in a large electorate cooperative behavior in small committees and sophisticated voting behavior in a legislative environment where the agenda is determined endogenously because of its apparent institution free properties the uncovered set may provide a useful generalization of the core when a core does not exist a general existence theorem for the uncovered set is proven and for the downsian case bounds for the uncovered set are computed these bounds show that the uncovered set is centered around a generalized median set whose size is a measure of the degree of symmetry of the voter ideal points

the politics of inequality voter mobilization and left parties in advanced industrial states why is it that some countries have witnessed significant increases in inequality since the 1960s while at the same time experiencing very little change in the way politics is conducted and why is it that in other countries where inequality has increased much less the left has become substantially more redistributive the answer the authors argue has to do with the interaction between inequality and political mobilization of low income voters the authors make two points in this article first high levels of inequality move left parties to the left second although increasing inequality pushes the core constituencies of left parties to the left it also makes some individuals less likely to be involved in politics the authors argue that left parties will respond to an increase in inequality only when low income voters are politically mobilized they explore these claims through a comparative analysis of left party programs in 10 organisation for economic cooperation and development countries over the period 1966 to 2002

the causes of welfare state expansion deindustrialization or globalization an influential line of argument holds that globalization causes economic uncertainty and spurs popular demands for compensatory welfare state spending this article argues that the relationship between globalization and welfare state expansion is spurious and that the engine of welfare state expansion since the 1960s has been deindustrialization based on cross sectional time series data for fifteen oecd countries the authors show that there is no relationship between globalization and the level of labor market risks in terms of employment and wages whereas the uncertainty and dislocations caused by deindustrialization have spurred electoral demands for welfare state compensation and risk sharing yet while differential rates of deindustri alization explain differences in the overall size of the welfare state its particular character in terms of the share of direct government provision and the equality of transfer payments is shaped by government partisanship the argument has implications for the study and the future of the welfare state that are very different from those suggested in the globalization literature

inflation targeting monetary and fiscal policies in a two country stock flow consistent model this paper develops a simple two country stock flow consistent model based on that of godley and lavoie in order to motivate the use of stabilisation policies persistent inflationary pressure and endogenous economic cycles are introduced into the model three scenarios are then simulated a step decrease in real exports from country b increased wage pressure in country b and an income tax cut in country a in all cases monetary and fiscal policies in isolation enjoy little success but a combined monetary and fiscal approach to stabilisation proves highly effective moreover the model suggests that the pursuit of autonomous inflation targeting in each country introduces excessive exchange rate volatility relative to an alternative rule in which one central bank takes a leading role in interest rate setting

would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation abstract we investigate whether letting people vote for multiple candidates would yield policy moderation we do so in a setting that takes three key features of elections into account namely strategic voting endogenous candidacy and policy motivation on the part of the candidates we consider two classes of voting rules one class consists of the voting rules where each voter casts several equally weighed votes for the different candidates the other class consists of the voting rules where each voter rank orders the candidates we identify conditions under which these voting rules yield policy moderation we also show that these voting rules may yield policy extremism instead of policy moderation if one or several of the conditions is not satisfied finally we find that amongst these voting rules the extent of policy moderation is maximal under the borda count if we consider only equilibria where all candidates are serious contenders however this result does not carry over to spoiler equilibria where approval voting can yield more moderate policy outcomes than the borda count

equilibrium strategies for final offer arbitration there is no median convergence final offer arbitration is a procedure for settling disputes between two parties in which an arbitrator chooses the final offer of the party closest to what he considers a fair settlement this procedure is modeled as a two person zero sum game of imperfect information in which the parties are assumed to know the probability distribution of the arbitrator s fair settlements and to make bids in an infinite strategy space that maximize their expected payoffs necessary and sufficient conditions for there to be local and global equilibria in pure strategies are derived and necessary conditions for mixed strategies in a particular case are found such equilibria when they exist in pure strategies represent bids which are symmetric about the median and for most common distributions are separated from one another by two or more standard deviations this finding suggests that final offer arbitration may not accomplish its avowed purpose of inducing the two parties to converge on what they perceive to be t

electoral markets party strategies and proportional representation closeness of its dialogue with historical knowledge kreuzer 2010 383 kreuzer also insists on the role that historical research plays in generating and testing theoretical propositions however in what i judge to be a more ambitious move he maintains that historical work when properly conducted may be a particularly suitable method to test the causal structures of a large swath of the theoretical work currently done in political science the crux of this position can be stated succinctly although still crucial for testing many causal propositions standard statistical methods may be inadequate to capture the underlying strategic structure that characterizes most if not all political and for that matter social events that is they may be insufficient to fully identify the players of the game inspect their beliefs payoffs and alternative strategies properly examine the sequence of decisions and verify the equilibrium conditions of the final outcome 2

the u s national innovation system origins and prospects for change in recent years the concept of national innovation systems has attained considerable currency and interest although a precise definition of a national innovation system is difficult analyses of the japanese and u s national innovation systems have implicitly defined them as the array of public and private institutions and organizations within an economy that fund and perform rd nelson 1993 interest in national innovation systems stems in part from a growing acknowledgment of the contributions to national economic welfare of superior performance in the commercialization and adoption of new technologies this awareness in turn has been heightened by the innovative and economic strength of postwar japan

three candidate spatial competition when candidates have valence stochastic voting we study the effects of stochastic probabilistic voting on equilibrium locations equilibrium vote shares and comparative statics in a setup with three heterogeneous candidates and a single dimensional issue space comparing the equilibria with and without stochastic voting we find that under an appropriate level of uncertainty about voter behavior the model has a pure strategy nash equilibrium psne that is free from several non plausible features of the psne under deterministic voting this result is robust to extensions to asymmetric density and plurality maximization

the economics and politics of the structure of public expenditure the paper derives a complete system ofdemand equations for public consumptionexpenditures as the outcome of rationalbehaviour in a model where governmentmaximizes expected electoral support theallocation of expenditures is found todepend not only on the prices of publicservices and total expenditure and tosatisfy the constraints of demand theory which have been the focus of attention ofprevious empirical studies of theallocation of public expenditures but inaddition on the prices of privateconsumption goods the distribution ofvoter incomes and the expected change invoter support from varying the levels ofpublic provision

modernizing the business of health pharmaceuticals in britain in comparison with germany and the united states 1890 1940 the pharmaceutical industry adopted technology in markedly different ways in germany the united states and britain during the early 20th century useful knowledge became a commercial asset but british intellectual property and drug regulation laws created neither pressures nor rewards for growth key differences emerged in the ways in which intellectual property was used in the development of testing and standardization and in the links between researchers and industry we show how firms sought to control the new knowledge assets that built the business of health this also helps to explain the choices made in the three countries as to what forms of investments best further industry goals

equilibrium in multicandidate probabilistic spatial voting this paper presents a multicandidate spatial model of probabilistic voting in which voter utility functions contain a random element specific to each candidate the model assumes no abstentions sincere voting and the maximization of expected vote by each candidate we derive a sufficient condition for concavity of the candidate expected vote function with which the existence of equilibrium is related to the degree of voter uncertainty we show that under concavity convergent equilibrium exists at a minimum sum point at which total distances from all voter ideal points are minimized we then discuss the location of convergent equilibrium for various measures of distance in our examples computer analysis indicates that non convergent equilibria are only locally stable and disappear as voter uncertainty increases

strategic electoral rule choice under uncertainty we study electoral rule choice in a multi party model with office motivated parties and electoral outcome uncertainty we show that when all dominant parties parties with positive probability of winning the election have sufficiently good chances of winning they agree to switch from the pr rule to a more majoritarian one in order to increase their chances of forming a single party government we identify the exact degree of disproportionality of the new rule and we prove that it is increasing in the expected vote share of the smaller parties parties with zero probability of winning otherwise the necessary and sufficient conditions for such collusion in favor of a majoritarian rule are a the high rents from a single party government and b sufficient uncertainty over the electoral outcome our theoretical predictions regarding the degree of the disproportionality of the electoral rule are supported by empirical evidence

electoral rules strategic entry and polarization abstract how does electoral rule disproportionality affect the structure of the party system i e the number and the policy platforms of the competing parties by studying a model where both party entry and platform choice are endogenous we are able to provide a unified theory an increasing electoral rule disproportionality exhibits a a first order negative effect on platform polarization b a second order negative effect on the number of parties as polarization decreases centrist parties are squeezed between other contenders and prefer not to enter and c an additional third order negative effect on polarization via the reduction of the number of parties we then conduct a laboratory experiment and strongly confirm the theoretical predictions of the model

predicting the number of parties a quantitative model of duverger s mechanical effect iby means of a quantitative model the model predicts the range within which the effective number of parties in a district should fall for a given magnitude number of seats of the district at the national level a related model predicts the effective number of parties based on the effective magnitude and the number of seats in the national assembly the institutional variables considered magnitude and assembly size define a great portion of the structural constraints within which a given country s politics must take place the model developed provides a good fit to data in spite of its having been developed from outrageously simple starting assumptions tf one had to give a single number to characterize the politics of any country that employs competitive elections it would be the number of parties active in its national assembly this number would not tell the whole story by any means but it tells us more than any other single number or term could the number of parties directly or indirectly affects other important aspects of how a political system functions including how long its cabinets last if the system is parliamentary lijphart 1984 and how elections translate into citizen control of policymakers powell 1989 the number of parties is a most important feature in a country s politics and therefore in comparative studies also we shall discuss the ways of defining this number operationally further on what determines the number of parties history present issues and institutions all intervene but if one had to give a single major factor it would have to be the district magnitude m that is the number of seats allocated in an electoral district rae 1967 the well known duverger rule says that one seat districts tend to lead to two party systems while multiseat districts tend to go with multiparty systems duverger 1951 1954 see also riker 1982 one can be more precise since even within the multiseat category a larger m tends to go with a larger number of parties but before we can attempt to define a relationship between district magnitude and the number of parties we need to establish a means to measure the number of parties

a model of candidate location when one candidate has a valence advantage that under some fairly weak assumptions for all levels of the valence advantage the advantaged candidate chooses a more moderate position than the disadvantaged candidate empirical studies of congressional elections by fiorina 1973 and ansolabehere snyder and stewart 2001 support this result d owns 1957 seminal work presents a puzzle for scholars of u s elections why do candidates not converge to the median voter one of the best explanations is that the candidates themselves have ideological preferences as calvert 1985 and wittman 1977 1983 have shown when candidates have such preferences and they are sufficiently uncertain about the preferences of the median voter then they do not converge although they may moderate their positions from their ideal point the basic version of the calvert wittman model however does not account for another basic fact of u s elections often one of the candidates has an advantage due to a nonpolicy factor such as incumbency greater campaign funds better name recognition superior charisma superior intelligence and so on stokes has dubbed such factors valence factors and he has noted their importance in u s elections stokes 1963 1992 1 in this article i extend the basic calvert wittman model by giving one candidate a valence advantage over the other i show that if the valence characteristics of the candidates are approximately equal then when a candidate s valence advantage increases this causes her to move toward the

electoral institutions hometowns and favored minorities evidence from japanese electoral reforms this article presents evidence that electoral institutions affect the geographic distribution of both candidate electoral support and government resources the author exploits two electoral reforms in japan to identify the effect of institutional incentives 1 the 1994 electoral reform from a multimember single nontransferable vote sntv system to a mixed member majoritarian mmm system with a single member district smd component and a proportional representation component and 2 the 1925 electoral reform from a predominantly smd system to a multimember sntv system using several new data sets the two main findings of this article are that 1 japanese representatives competing in multimember sntv districts had more geographically concentrated electoral support than those competing in smds and that 2 intergovernmental transfers appear to be more concentrated around liberal democratic party ldp incumbents home offices under the multimember sntv system than under the mmm system the findings in this article highlight the connection between institutions and geographic patterns of representation

austrian and swedish social democrats in crisis party strategy and organization in corporatist regimes socialists and social democrats have probably nowhere been better entrenched than in austria and sweden yet in both countries they have suffered electoral defeats in the 1980s and early 1990s ju

policy divergence in multicandidate probabilistic spatial voting existing models of multicandidate spatial competition with probabilistic voting typically predict a high degree of policy convergence yet in actual elections candidates advocate quite divergent sets of policies what accounts for this disparity between theory and empirical observation i introduce two variations on the basic probabilistic vote model which may account for candidate policy divergence 1 a model which incorporates candidate specific variables so that candidates may enjoy nonpolicy related electoral advantages or disadvantages 2 a model which allows nonzero correlations between the random terms associated with voters candidate utilities thereby capturing situations where voters view two or more candidates as similar on nonpolicy grounds i report candidate equilibrium analyses for each model which show far greater policy divergence than exists under the standard probabilistic vote model i then analyze the strategic logic which underlies these results

the domestic politics of banking regulation this article seeks to ground financial regulatory choices in domestic politics based on evidence from twenty two industrialized countries we argue that electoral rules specifically the extent to which they are centrifugal or centripetal have a significant effect on whether the banks or their consumers pay for the security of the banking system moreover despite the homogenizing effects of global financial integration the political dynamics generated by these electoral rules continue to shape the nature and extent of prudential regulations that countries adopt in the place of banking cartels

one money for europe lessons from the us currency union currency union barry eichengreen the creation of a monetary union in europe is often justified by the desire to reap the full benefits of economic integration the complete removal of capital controls raises a large number of issues the case for free capital mobility is strong but not overwhelming it hinges on issues of technology transport costs market structure and labour mobility and in the end is an empirical matter for which us experience may provide useful information policy making institutions differ in important respects however the us tradition of fiscal federalism for example has no ec wide counterpart yet its functions seem a desirable feature of a monetary union in particular it is shown to play an important role in absorbing regional disturbances mostly via the tax system us experience also suggests that a currency union creates pressure for fiscal policy harmonization affecting both taxes and spending although a currency union fundamentally alters the balance of payments adjustment process the potential problem of depressed regions remains a serious one given the increased tightness of the external constraint the limited extent of labour mobility and other features of european labour markets solutions based on us experience include extensive swap facilities and a european version of fiscal federalism

electoral rule disproportionality and platform polarization despite common perception existing theoretical literature lacks a complete for mal argument regarding the relationship between the electoral rule disproportionality and platform polarization in this paper we build a model that incorporates the disproportionality of the electoral system in a standard downsian electoral competition setup with mainly but not necessarily purely policy motivated parties we first show that in equilibrium platform polarization is decreasing in the level of the electoral rule disproportionality we then argue that the number of parties has a positive effect on platform polarization when polarization is measured by the distance between the two most distant platforms this effect does not hold when polarization is measured by the widely used dalton index constructing a dataset covering more than 300 elections our main theoretical findings are empirically supported pointing towards the electoral rule disproportionality as a major determinant of polarization

voters private valuation of candidates quality abstract different voters might have different valuations of candidates qualitative features we argue that this intuitive fact acts as a strong stabilizing force in electoral competition dynamics when candidates are office motivated pure strategy equilibria may exist unlike when all voters favor the same candidate perhaps more importantly it affects candidates platform moderation incentives in a rather intriguing manner when voters are evenly split in terms of their candidates quality valuations then both candidates have incentives to locate sufficiently near but not necessarily exactly at the center of the policy space however as the number of voters who favor the same candidate rises maximum equilibrium differentiation follows a non trivial u shaped pattern it is first decreasing and then increasing in the fraction of voters who prefer the more popular candidate

bipolar multicandidate elections with corruption the goals of democratic competition are not only to implement a majority s preference on policy questions but also to provide a deterrent against corrupt abuse of power by political leaders we consider a simple model of multicandidate elections in which different electoral systems can be compared according to these two criteria among a wide class of single winner scoring rules only approval voting is found to satisfy both effectiveness against corruption and majoritarianism for this model

multidimensional electoral competition between differentiated candidates it is known that multidimensional downsian competition fails to admit an equilibrium in pure strategies unless very stringent conditions on the distribution of voters bliss points are imposed plott 1967 this paper revisits this problem considering that the two vote share maximizing candidates are dierentiated that is candidates strategically decide po sitions only in some of the n dimensions while in the rest their positions are assumed to be xed these xed dimensions may be viewed as candidates immutable characteristics race religion culture etc we nd that if candidates are su ciently dierentiated if in the xed dimensions their positions are su ciently dierent then a unique nash equilibrium in pure strategies is guaranteed to exist for any distribution of voters bliss points perhaps more importantly we show that this is true even if there exists a unique xed dimension and candidates instrumentally decide their positions in all other n 1 dimensions

continuity and change in the chilean party system on the transformational effects of electoral reform the party system consequences of chile s binomial two member district legislative electoral formula have been the subject of much debate for some analysts the binomial system limits party system fractionalization and encourages centripetal competition enhancing the prospects for democratic stability others emphasize elements of continuity within the country s historic multiparty system and contend that the electoral formula may prove destabilizing this article arguing that limited electoral reform has limited party system consequences provides comparative empirical measures showing that neither the degree of party system fractionalization nor the competitive dynamic of the party system has been substantially transformed however the binomial formula does increase the incentives for coalition formation and maintenance the article concludes that the ultimate consequences of electoral reform depend on whether these new incentives for coalition formation can overcome the elements of continuity wi

electoral competition and agricultural support in oecd countries agricultural trade protectionism in developed countries remains a politically charged issue yet few studies have attempted to explain the political dynamics behind this important trade issue we consider agricultural subsidies as a type of distributive policy that targets the agricultural sector at the expense of consumers and taxpayers based on cox 1987 1990 and myerson 1993 we argue that electoral systems that encourage politicians to appeal to a narrow constituency tend to have a higher level of agricultural support we test this theoretical hypothesis using oecd agricultural support data disaggregated by commodity and country a cross classified multilevel model is employed to account for complex variation of agricultural support across countries commodities and time our empirical results show that electoral systems that encourage politicians to target narrow broad constituencies are associated with relatively high low levels of agricultural subsidies

the mean voter theorem necessary and sufficient conditions for convergent equilibrium formal models of elections have emphasized the convergence of party leaders towards the centre of the electoral distribution this paper attempts to resolve the apparent disparity between the formal result and the perception of political divergence by considering a model incorporating valence valence can be interpreted as the non policy basis of political judgement made by the electorate concerning the quality of political contenders the theorem presented here shows that there is a necessary condition for convergence the condition involves the difference in party valences and the electoral variance when the condition fails the low valence parties will be forced to adopt policy positions far from the electoral centre the inference appears to be substantiated by an empirical model of the israel election in 1996 copyright 2007 wiley blackwell

centripetal and centrifugal incentives in electoral systems this paper investigates how electoral laws affect the position taking incentives of parties and candidates it seeks to extend the finding presented in the classical median voter theorem to a wide class of electoral systems or to show the limits of such extension the factors examined are the district magnitude the electoral formula the number of votes each voter is allowed to cast whether voters can cumulate their votes and whether voters can partially abstain i suggest a crude division of electoral systems into those producing predominantly centripetal incentives and those producing predominantly centrifugal incentives among the factors found to produce centripetal incentives at least in noncumulative systems are the following increases in the number of votes per voter outlawry of partial abstention and decreases in the district magnitude in systems allowing the cumulation of votes matters are a bit different

a spatial analysis of candidate competition in dual member districts the 1989 chilean senatorial elections this study uses empirical spatial theory to evaluate candidate and voter behavior in senate elections contested during the 1989 chilean general election the study evaluates whether senatorial candidates competing in dual member districts under chilean d hondt locate near the periphery or interior of the electoral space spatial analyses demonstrate the chilean senatorial electoral system is characterized by centrifugal forces in particular candidates of the right locate on the periphery of the space and face few incentives to pursue moderate electoral strategies the study also characterizes bases of party and candidate support and the underlying dimensions of political competition spatial analysis reveals both change and continuity in the pre and post authoritarian electoral universes

spatial voting in the 2004 presidential election the theory of spatial voting has played a large role in the development of important results across many areas of political science directly testing the foundational assumptions of spatial voting theory however has not been possible with existing data using a novel survey design this article obtains estimates of voter ideology on the same scale as candidate positions the results of this scaling demonstrate that voters possess meaningful ideologies and furthermore that these beliefs are strongly related to the sorts of policy proposals considered in congress these ideology estimates are then used to uncover the actual relationships between ideology and vote choice for citizens of various types in the 2004 presidential election although the choices of independent voters are shown to be largely consistent with the assumptions of spatial voting theory the decision rules used by partisans differ strongly from what unbiased spatial voting would imply although partisans do converge toward the behavior of independents and hence toward the assumptions of spatial voting theory as information levels increase we see that even highly informed partisans show significant differences from what would be implied by unbiased spatial voting theory

unpacking logm toward a more general theory of party system density the standard model of political party system density combines two traditions to explain why some countries have more political parties than others one tradition that emphasizes social cleavages and another that emphasizes electoral institutions especially district magnitude despite its considerable success there are several reasons to be less than fully satisfied with the standard model we examine two of these problems associated with the scope of strategic voting and the functional form of the specification used to test the model in doing so we contrast the standard interpretation with an organizational ecology model that accounts for what the standard model did so well but also accounts for important anomalies it ignores we reexamine some of the key analyses that have been used to test the standard model to assess the severity of its limitations and the utility of the rival organizational ecology account

does innovation cause stock market runups evidence from the great crash this article examines the stock market s changing valuation of corporate patentable assets between 1910 and 1939 it shows that the value of knowl edge capital increased significantly during the 1920s compared to the 1910s as investors responded to the quality of technological inventions innovation was an important driver of the late 1920s stock market runup and the great crash did not reflect a significant revaluation of knowledge capital relative to physical capital although substantial quantities of influential patents were accumulated during the post crash recovery high technology firms did not earn significant excess returns over low technology firms for most of the 1930s

are we witnessing a paradigm shift in the analysis of political competition this presidential address assesses the crisis of the downsian model of political competition in light of the mounting evidence on policy divergence and evaluates the possibility that the new theories of politicians quality and political selection provide an alternative theoretical conceptualization of political competition based on a critical review of the literature and on the author s works on content analysis of policy speeches income redistribution politicians quality and political legislation cycles this address concludes that multidimensional downsian models of political competition are adequate to explain policy divergence and points out the serious theoretical and empirical problems that models of political selection have to solve

the effects of alternative power sharing arrangements do moderating institutions moderate party strategies and government policy outputs advocates of consensual political institutions i e institutions that promote compromise and powersharing among political parties claim that these institutions promote moderation in government policy outputs to date however there exists little research either theoretical or empirical that evaluates whether consensual institutions promote moderation in parties policy declarations we develop a multiparty spatial model with policy seeking parties operating under proportional representation in which we vary the extent to which government policies reflect power sharing among all parties as opposed to being determined by a single party we determine parties optimal nash equilibrium policy positions and conclude that power sharing does not typically motivate parties to moderate their policy declarations in fact policy positioning under power sharing appears to be similar to or more extreme than under single party dominance consistent with previous research however we find that power sharing does promote moderation in government policy outputs our results have implications for parties election strategies for the design of political institutions and for representative government

vote trading in power sharing systems a laboratory investigation in theory decentralized vote trading in power sharing systems promotes a efficiency by assigning greater decision making power to individuals that care a lot about the election s outcome and b dispersion of benefits since even individuals that have little interest about the electoral result can profit by selling their votes we experimentally test these intuitions in the laboratory and find that indeed allowing real subjects to trade votes for money in such systems increases collective welfare and substantially redistributes it towards those that are less concerned about the election importantly these findings hold true under alternative trading institutions thus reinforcing their empirical relevance

electoral systems and institutional choice a case study of the 1988 korean elections this article shows how the ruling party of korea the djp chose and implemented a strategy to win the 13th national assembly election of 1988 and explains why that strategy failed in addition this election is analyzed in a more general context the authors find for example that the preference of a party over electoral systems is determined by the spatial distribution of its votes and that the choice of an electoral system is the outcome of a bargaining process among the parties in the context of democratization the korean experience shows that the democratic reform policies of an authoritarian government are shaped by the interplay between the ruling party s desire to create a political system wherein they maintain power and the constraints to create a system that would channel the opposition s activities into electoral or institutional outlets

democracy and markets the case of exchange rates the relationships between the workings of democratic institutions and currency markets are studied severa competing propositions about how political re equilibration affects currency markets are derived and tested the results support the view that democratic politics affects currency markets expectations and uncertainty about electoral outcomes and government survival affect the probability of switching between currency market equilibria additionally opinion polls about chief executive performance have a direct effect on the probabilities of switches between currency regimes suggesting that these polls cause currency traders to revise their expectations about the stability of governments and or the contents of public policies electoral institutions mitigate the impact of politics on currency market equilibria political effects are weaker in countries with proportional representation electoral systems than in countries with majority plurality systems there is less evidence that central bank independence consensual corporatist systems or political coherency reduces the effect of politics on currency markets he study of democracy and markets is at the heart of political economy understanding how political equilibration and economic equilibration are related is one of the main challenges facing this field the size and nature of currency markets make them especially important cases substantively with globalization currency markets have become important constraints on elected governments reducing their room to maneuver analytically in comparison to most goods markets currency markets are informationally efficient asset markets with distinctive equilibria today s exchange rate is determined by currency traders fully informed expectations about tomorrow s exchange rate the sensitivity of these markets to the arrival of new information therefore makes them particularly well suited for studying the effects of political news and uncertainty on economic equilibration 1 this article demonstrates there are informationally relevant political factors insofar as exchange rate determination is concerned factors that directly affect the transition probabilities between currency market equilibria moreover these factors vary in important ways across democracies some electoral institutions lessen the effects of politics on currency

ideology and candidate evaluation how does the expressed political ideology of voters influence their evaluation of presidential candidates the classic answer to this question is provided by the spatial theory of electoral choice in which utility for a candidate is a function of the proximity between the voter and candidate positions on the liberal conservative continuum we have argued elsewhere that spatial theory while intellectually appealing is inadequate as an empirical model of mass behavior we have developed a directional theory of issue voting that we believe provides a more realistic accounting of how specific policy issues influence utility for a candidate directional theory is based on the view that for most voters issues are understood as a dichotomous choice between two alternative positions while ideology is widely understood as a continuum of positions the directional model can be applied to the relationship between ideology and candidate evaluation in this paper we compare the two theories using national election study data from 1972 to 1988 the results tend to favor the directional model over the traditional proximity model we conclude by briefly tracing out the implications of this finding

electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters i present a model of electoral competition in which candidates raise campaign contributions by choosing policies that benefit interest groups and then expend those contributions to influence voters who are uninformed about the policies informed voters however vote based on those policies so candidates face a trade off between choosing a policy to generate funds to attract the uninformed vote and choosing a policy to attract the informed vote electoral equilibria are characterized for two categories of policies particularistic and collective in the case of particularistic policies the equilibrium policies of the candidates are separated if the proportion of uninformed voters is sufficiently high and the degree of separation is an increasing function of that proportion the model is extended to include the public financing of elections and incumbency advantages for the case of collective policies the candidates locate at the median of the ideal points of the informed voters and contributions are zero

multiparty spatial competition with probabilistic voting i develop a general model of multiparty competition in which parties model voters choices by means of probabilistic choice rules the model is specified in terms of an issue salience coefficient which varies with the importance voters attach to issues as opposed to unmeasured nonissue motivations i show that when the policy salience coefficient is sufficiently low then both vote maximizing and rank maximizing parties have a dominant strategy to adopt the most popular platform which maximizes voter utilities over the entire electorate this most popular platform therefore represents a convergent equilibrium when all parties are vote or rank maximizing numerical estimates suggest that this equilibrium result holds for degrees of issue voting which exceed the parameters behavioral researchers have estimated for various historical elections

a tournament theory of pork barrel politics the case of japan how do politicians motivate voters to turn out and support them we posit that incumbents construct tournaments between groups and distribute rewards to groups based on the levels of electoral supp

a theory of voting in large elections this paper provides a game theoretic model of probabilistic voting and then examines the incentives faced by candidates in a spatial model of elections in our model voters strategies form a quantal response equilibrium qre which merges strategic voting and probabilistic behavior we first show that a qre in the voting game exists for all elections with a finite number of candidates and then proceed to show that with enough voters and the addition of a regularity condition on voters utilities a nash equilibrium profile of platforms exists when candidates seek to maximize their expected margin of victory this equilibrium 1 consists of all candidates converging to the policy that maximizes the expected sum of voters utilities 2 exists even when voters can abstain and 3 is unique when there are only 2 candidates