the political economy of clientelism in this paper we argue that the political commitment problem provides an explanation for why much income redistribution takes an inefficient form particularly employment in the public sector a job is a credible way of redistributing when it provides rents such as in situations with moral hazard and employment is optimal ex post moreover a job is selective and reversible and thus ties the continuation utility of a voter to the political success of a particular politician we show that the need to make offers of employment incentive compatible leads to inefficiencies in the supply of public goods we also show that such inefficient redistribution becomes relatively attractive in situations with high inequality and low productivity inefficiency is increased when the stakes from politics are high when inequality is high and when money matters less than ideology in politics

how does political connection affect firm financial distress and resolution in china we examine the impact of political connections on firm performance financial distress and its resolution in china a country where government influence over stock markets has been demonstrated to

buying votes vs supplying public services political incentives to under invest in pro poor policies this paper uses unique survey data to provide for the first time in the literature direct evidence that vote buying in poor economies is associated with lower provision of public services that disproportionately benefit the poor various features of the data and the institutional context allow the interpretation of this correlation as the equilibrium policy consequence of clientelist politics ruling out alternate explanations such as for example poverty driving both vote buying and health outcomes the data come from the philippines a country context that allows for measuring vote buying during elections and services delivered by the administrative unit controlled by winners of those elections the data reveal a significant robust negative correlation between vote buying and the delivery of primary health services in places where households report more vote buying government records show that municipalities invest less in basic health services for mothers and children and quite strikingly as a summary measure of weak service delivery performance a higher percentage of children are severely under weight

vote buying supermajorities and flooded coalitions in a recent paper banks 2000 adopting the framework of our model groseclose and snyder 1996 derives several new and noteworthy results in addition he provides a counterexample to our proposition 4 here we explain the error in our proposition but note that we can correct it easily if we invoke an additional assumption in equilibrium the winning vote buyer constructs a nonflooded coalition that is she does not bribe every member of her coalition we conclude with a brief discussion of the substantive implications of banks s proposition 1 we note that it provides additional support for our general claim that minimal winning coalitions should be rare in a vote buying game

sources of bias in retrospective decision making experimental evidence on voters limitations in controlling incumbents are citizens competent to assess the performance of incumbent politicians observational studies cast doubt on voter competence by documenting several biases in retrospective assessments of performance however these studies are open to alternative interpretations because of the complexity of the real world in this article we show that these biases in retrospective evaluations occur even in the simplified setting of experimental games in three experiments our participants 1 overweighted recent relative to overall incumbent performance when made aware of an election closer rather than more distant from that event 2 allowed an unrelated lottery that affected their welfare to influence their choices and 3 were influenced by rhetoric to give more weight to recent rather than overall incumbent performance these biases were apparent even though we informed and incentivized respondents to weight all performance equally our findings point to key limitations in voters ability to use a retrospective decision rule

how do budget deficits and economic growth affect reelection prospects evidence from a large panel of countries conventional wisdom is that good economic conditions and expansionary fiscal policy help incumbents get reelected but this has not been tested in a large cross section of countries we test these arguments in a sample of 74 countries over the period 1960 2003 we find no evidence that deficits help reelection in any group of countries developed and less developed new and old democracies countries with different government or electoral systems and countries with different levels of democracy in developed countries and in old democracies election year deficits actually reduce the probability that a leader is reelected with similar although smaller negative electoral effects of deficits in the earlier years of an incumbent s term in office higher growth rates of real gdp per capita raise the probability of reelection only in the less developed countries and in new democracies but voters are affected by growth over the leader s term in office rather than in the election year itself and apparently only by growth not attributed to global growth low inflation is rewarded by voters only in the developed countries the effects we find are not only statistically significant but also quite substantial quantitatively we also suggest how the absence of a positive electoral effect of deficits can be consistent with the political deficit cycle found in new democracies

the determinants of aggregate creditors voluntary liquidations this article investigates the determinants of creditors voluntary liquidations cvls an area of research that has received comparatively scant attention in the literature despite the fact that at least in the uk this form of insolvency has consistently comprised the majority of company failures it develops an equilibrium correction model ecm to explain variations in the aggregate number of cvls in england and wales between 1963 and 1995 this is then subjected to out of sample testing over the subsequent 10 year period the results indicate that in both the short run and the long run changes in the level of liquidations can be explained by two main explanatory variables namely the nominal after tax cost of borrowing and changes in the overall level of economic activity in addition confirmatory evidence is provided for the dampening effect of the 1986 insolvency act on the number of liquidations the model retains its forecasting accuracy in the out of sample period although there is possibly s

voters as fiscal conservatives voters penalize federal and state spending growth this is the central result of my analysis of voting behavior in presidential senatorial and gubernatorial elections from 1950 1988 the composition of federal spending growth seems irrelevant the vote loss to the president s party from an extra dollar of defense or nondefense spending is the same however in gubernatorial elections expansion of state welfare spending exacts a disproportionate political price deficit financing of federal or state spending does not appear to matter politically i conclude by discussing the obvious question of why government budgets have grown in the face of this voter hostility

self enforcing trade agreements evidence from time varying trade policy the bagwell and staiger 1990 theory of cooperative trade agreements predicts new tariffs i increase with imports ii increase with the inverse of the sum of the import demand and export supply elasticities and iii decrease with the variance of imports the authors find us import policy during 1997 2006 to be consistent with this theory a one standard deviation increase in import growth the inverse of the sum of the import demand and export supply elasticity and the standard deviation of import growth changes the probability that the us imposes an antidumping tariff by 35 percent by 88 percent and by 76 percent respectively

substituting the end for the whole why voters respond primarily to the election year economy according to numerous studies the election year economy influences presidential election results far more than cumulative growth throughout the term here we describe a series of surveys and experiments that point to an intriguing explanation for this pattern that runs contrary to standard political science explanations but one that accords with a large psychological literature voters we find actually intend to judge presidents on cumulative growth however since that characteristic is not readily available to them voters inadvertently substitute election year performance because it is more easily accessible this end heuristic explanation for voters election year emphasis reflects a general tendency for people to simplify retrospective assessments by substituting conditions at the end for the whole the end heuristic explanation also suggests a remedy a way to align voters actions with their intentions providing people with the attribute they are seeking cumulative growth eliminates the election year emphasis

incentives to cultivate favored minorities under alternative electoral systems a simple model is used to compare under different electoral systems the incentives for candidates to create inequalities among otherwise homogeneous voters by making campaign promises that favor small groups rather than appealing equally to all voters in this game model each candidate generates offers for voters independently out of a distribution that is chosen by the candidate subject only to the constraints that offers must be nonnegative and have mean 1 symmetric equilibria with sincere voting are analyzed for two candidate elections and for multicandidate elections under rank scoring rules approval voting and single transferable vote voting rules that can guarantee representation for minorities in multiseat elections generate in this model the most severely unequal campaign promises

an empirical approach to distributive justice abstract this paper starts from the idea that it would be interesting to complement the deductive reasoning about economic justice with an empirical approach which tries to describe and interpret the actual value judgements held by the economic agents we present results from a pilot study with 180 subjects factor analysis indicates that it makes sense to work with desert and compensation criteria as most economists and philosophers do we then illustrate that it is possible to operationalise equity judgements estimating for each subject separately an equation describing his perception of the equitable compensatory income variation we use the factor analysis results to construct a compensation and a desert index all coefficients can be nicely interpreted and interesting patterns of interindividual variation emerge

import protection business cycles and exchange rates evidence from the great recession this research estimates the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations on import protection policies over 1988 q1 2010 q4 for five industrialized economies the united states european union australia canada and south korea there is evidence of a strong countercyclical trade policy response in the pre great recession period of 1988 q1 2008 q3 during which increases in domestic unemployment rates real appreciations in bilateral exchange rates and declines in the gdp growth rates of bilateral trading partners led to substantial increases in new temporary trade barriers it then applies this pre great recession empirical model to realized macroeconomic data from 2008 q4 2010 q4 and find it predicts a surge of new import protection during the great recession e g for the us and eu the model predicts new trade barriers would cover an additional 15 percentage points of nonoil imports well above the baseline level of 2 3 percent of import coverage immediately preceding the crisis finally the research examines why the realized trade policy response differed from model predictions while exchange rate movements played an important role in limiting new import protection during the great recession there is also evidence of one particularly important change in trade policy responsiveness i e in this period governments refrained from imposing new temporary trade barriers against foreign trading partners experiencing their own weak or negative economic growth

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

distributive justice theoretical foundations and empirical findings abstract the first part of this paper discusses various theories of distributive justice such as utilitarianism rawlsianism approaches within cooperative bargaining theory and the notion of fair allocations the focus is on the different informational bases used in these solution concepts the second part reports some results from empirical investigations where a particular distributive problem had to be solved by undergraduate students of economics and business administration the question we are posing is whether the respondents behaviour can to some extent at least be rationalized in terms of utilitarian ethics

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

policymakers horizon and trade reforms the protectionist effect of elections this paper shows that electoral incentives deter politicians from supporting trade liberalization we focus on all major trade liberalization bills introduced since the early 1970s in the u s congress in which house and senate members serve respectively two and six year terms and one third of senators face elections every two years we show that senators are more likely to support trade liberalization than house representatives however this result does not hold for the last generation of senators who face elections at the same time as house members suggesting that inter cameral differences are driven by term length considering senators alone we find that the last generation is less likely to support trade liberalization than the previous two this result is pervasive and holds both when comparing the behavior of different senators voting on the same bill and that of individual senators voting on different bills the protectionist effect of election proximity disappears for senators who are retiring or hold safe seats

how the electoral college influences campaigns and policy the probability of being florida this paper analyzes how us presidential candidates should allocate resources across states to maximize the probability of winning the election by developing and estimating a probabilistic voting model of political competition under the electoral college system actual campaigns act in close agreement with the model there is a 0 9 correlation between equilibrium and actual presidential campaign visits across states both in 2000 and 2004 the paper shows how presidential candidate attention is affected by the states number of electoral votes forecasted state election outcomes and forecast uncertainty it also analyzes the effects of a direct national popular vote for president

violence bribery and fraud the political economy of elections in sub saharan africa post soviet african democratization has introduced elections into contexts that often lack restraints upon the behavior of candidates resulting in the emergence of voter intimidation vote buying and ballot fraud we propose a model of electoral competition where although some voters oppose violence it is effective in intimidating swing voters we show that in equilibrium a weak challenger will use violence which corresponds to a terrorism strategy similarly a nationally weak incumbent will use repression however a stronger incumbent facing local competition will prefer to use bribery or ballot fraud we discuss the applicability of the model to several african elections

competing for loyalty the dynamics of rallying support abstract we consider a class of dynamic collective action problems in which either a single principal or two competing principals vie for the support of members of a group we focus on the dynamic problem that emerges when agents negotiate and commit their support to principals sequentially we show that competition reduces agents welfare with public goods or if and only if there are positive externalities on uncommitted agents and increases agents welfare with public bads we apply the model to the study of corporate takeovers vote buying and exclusive deals jel d42 d62 d72 d82 g34 h41

moral hypocrisy power and social preferences abstract we study how individuals adjust their judgment of fairness and unfairness when they are in the position of spectators before and after making real decisions and how this adjustment depends on the actions they take in the game we find that norms that appear universal instead take into account the players bargaining power also individuals adjust their judgments after playing the game for real money when they behaved more selfishly and only in games where choices have no strategic consequence we interpret this possibly self deceptive adjustment of judgments to actions as moral hypocrisy this behavior appears produced by the attempt to strike a compromise between self image and payoffs so as to release oneself of one s responsibility for selfish behavior

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

the role of dispute settlement procedures in international trade agreements although disputes are typically treated as synonymous with concerns about enforcement in economic models of trade agreements in reality most wto disputes seem to concern the interpretation of vague provisions or instances where the agreement is silent and some have suggested that the wto s dispute settlement body dsb could usefully grant exceptions to rigid contractual obligations these activist dsb roles could help complete an incomplete contract but how activist should the dsb be should dsb rulings set precedent we address these questions by characterizing the optimal choice of contract form and dsb mandate under various contracting conditions jel codes d02 d78 d86 f13 k12 k33

a swing state theory of trade protection in the electoral college this paper analyzes trade policy determination in the electoral college in the presence of swing voters it determines the circumstances under which incumbent politicians have an incentive to build a reputation for protectionism thus swaying voting decisions and improving their re election probability strategic trade protection is shown to be more likely when protectionist swing voters have a lead over free trade supporters in states with relatively strong electoral competition and in states representing a larger proportion of electoral college votes an empirical test using a measure of industrial concentration in swing and decisive u s states lends support to the theoretical findings

strategic ignorance and the robustness of social preferences participants in dictator games frequently avoid learning whether their choice to maximize their own earnings will help or hurt the recipient and then choose selfishly exploiting the moral wiggle room provided by their ignorance however this is found in an environment in which the dictator must actively learn the true payoffs so inaction means ignorance does this effect persist when one must actively choose either to be ignorant or to be informed or when one must actively choose to remain ignorant in fact whereas 45 of dictators remain ignorant when one must click to become informed this drops to 25 when one must click in either case and to 3 when one must click to remain ignorant although the exploitation of moral wiggle room is not merely an artifact it is much like social behavior itself subject to environmental and psychological factors that may reinforce or undermine its impact data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2014 1989 this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behavioral economics

social motives in bilateral bargaining games how power changes perceptions of fairness abstract power a fundamental characteristic of social interactions characterizes one s ability to influence others fairness inherently a type of social preference impacts distributive decision making how does power shape the perceptions of fairness in economic interactions while previous research finds that power holders tend to take more it remains unclear whether they are driven by selfish motives to exploit weaker counterparts or act upon the belief that powerful individuals deserve more with an innovative modified ultimatum game we analytically and experimentally study how power interplays with fairness consideration to affect bilateral bargaining we concentrate on behaviors by the responders to elicit their fairness preferences in response to shifts in power we find strong evidence that changes in power can modify what is perceived as a fair division in the modified ultimatum game and thus influence the distributive behaviors and outcomes however such an effect only arises when there is common knowledge about the power distribution between the two parties prior to their decision making in addition we find that while feedback on past decisions and outcomes can help players fine tune their choices to avoid money left on the table in bargaining learning from experience is not required for power to take effect

competitive lobbying and supermajorities in a majority rule institution this paper presents a complete information model of competitive lobbying in a majority rule institution where lobbying consists of providing politically valuable resources to legislators legislators have three roles first they act as allies or opponents in deciding whether to consider a lobbyist s offer second they act as agenda setters in deciding whether to bring a policy alternative to a vote third they vote on the agenda the stationary equilibria include minimal majorities and supermajorities and involve unilateral counteractive and preemptive lobbying supermajorities are recruited either to influence agenda formation or to preempt the opposing lobbyist

the political economy of benefits and costs a neoclassical approach to distributive politics this essay offers a rational political explanation for the notorious inefficiency of pork barrel projects with an optimization model of legislative behavior and legislative institutions the model emphasizes the economically arbitrary from a welfare point of view importance of the geographic incidence of benefits and costs owing to the geographic basis for political representation we explore the implications of a legislator s objective function and derive conditions under which a representative legislature will select an omnibus of projects each of which exceeds the efficient scale

inverted u relationship between r d intensity and survival evidence on scale and complementarity effects in uk data existing evidence on the relationship between rd ii rd and iii creative destruction as proxied by median r d intensity in the industry and the premium on business lending have negative effects on firm survival other findings concerning age size productivity relative growth pavitt technology classes and the macroeconomic environment are in line with the existing literature the results are strongly or moderately robust to different samples stepwise estimations and controls for frailty and left truncation

the effect of the thatcher government on company liquidations an econometric study the findings from an econometric study of company liquidations in teh uk economy are presented the aim is to build on previous macroeconomic analysis of business failure in order to explore to what extent the impact of the thatcher government did represent a clear break in the determination of company liquidations while it is possible to construct a model which performs reasonably well in statistical terms prior to 1980 clear evidence is found of a structural break associated with the new attitude towards business failure brought in by the conservative government there is also strong evidence that company liquidations have become much more sensitive to the state of the business cycle the model estimated gives a prominent role to the current level of company profitability and to the growth in liquidity liquidity is measured by two alternative proxy variables the rate of growth of broad money and the flow of bank lending to the company sector the model is consistent with a cash flow that short term

can a corrupt ruling party win a re election through vote buying abstractin many developing countries it is common for electoral candidates to use embezzled money to buy votes we develop a dynamic model to analyse the trade off between economic performance and free handouts resulting from corruption on an incumbent party s chances of being re elected the results show because voters anticipate handouts from the politicians politicians engage in corrupt behaviour early in the election cycle while minimizing unemployment and maximizing vote buying at the end of the election cycle

vote buying general elections we examine the consequences of vote buying assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up front binding payments and or campaign promises platforms that are contingent on the outcome of the election we analyze the role of the parties and voters preferences in determining the winner and the payments to voters

inflation bankruptcy default premia and the stock market in this paper we explore some of the possibilities and argue that in the absence of index linked loans higher inflation implies higher liquidation rates and default premia this would also be one possible reason why higher inflation would depress share values our evidence also suggests that the modigliani and cohn 1979 valuation errors hypothesis is extremely important in order to see why higher inflation might lead to more bankruptcies consider the following example suppose that the real interest rate p is i and that a firm has borrowed iooo if there is no inflation the firm s interest payments are io now suppose that inflation p rises to io and that the nominal interest rate r is given by the formula i r i p i fi then r rises to i i i and total interest payments to i i i hence at a time when revenue has risen by only io interest payments rise elevenfold and this creates cashflow problems for the firm index linked debt would avoid this problem because the principal could be indexed and would rise to i ioo leaving the firm to only pay li i in interest

equilibrium and efficiency in an organized vote market we study an organized market for votes in which trade is directed by a market specialist this market mechanism always produces an equilibrium outcome and whenever vote buying occurs the alternative chosen is pareto superior to the alternative that would be chosen without trade we then characterize the equilibrium outcomes in a one dimensional policy space and show that if the distribution of ideal points is skewed enough then the equilibrium with vote buying differs from the equilibrium without vote buying the median ideal point this difference reflects the ability of an intense minority to obtain a policy it prefers in exchange for side payments

value for money vote buying and politician accountability abstract the prevalence of vote buying is widely identified as a cause of poor governance in the developing world potential mechanisms for this relationship include the selection of lower quality politicians and the reduced accountability experienced by politicians once elected in this paper we present the first experimental evidence in support of the second channel of reduced accountability using data from laboratory experiments conducted in the u s and kenya we find that vote payments reduce voters willingness to hold politicians accountable holding fixed politician identity voters who receive payments are less willing to punish the politician for rent seeking and this reduction in punishment is larger in magnitude when payments are widely targeted unsurprisingly the politician then engages in a higher level of rent seeking a simple model of multi faceted social preferences encompassing reciprocity and inequality aversion is consistent with these findings

the effect of monetary policy on corporate bankruptcies evidence from the united states in this article we study the relationship between monetary policy and corporate bankruptcies in the usa the main hypothesis is that an increase in the monetary base or a decrease in the federal f

the exchange rate and company failure in a macro micro model of the uk company sector a macro micro model is presented which is used to predict company failure it bridges the gap between previous macroeconomic models and the microeconomic approach to company failure in the finance literature it can trace the probable effects of exogenous macroeconomic shocks upon the finances and the viability of individual members of the company sector a series of simulation exercises using this model quantifies the impact of variations in the exchange rate upon the failure rate among the top one hundred u k companies this impact is shown to be substantial asymmetric and at times nonlinear copyright 1991 by royal economic society

redistributive politics with distortionary taxation abstract this paper proposes a first step towards a positive theory of tax instruments we present a model of redistributive politics that extends those of myerson r myerson incentives to cultivate minorities under alternative electoral systems amer polit sci rev 87 1993 856 869 and lizzeri and persico a lizzeri n persico the provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives amer econ rev 91 2001 225 239 two politicians compete in terms of targeted redistributive promises financed through distortionary taxes we solve for the case of both targetable and non targetable taxes we prove that there is an imperfect efficiency targetability trade off on the tax side politicians prefer targetable taxes over non targetable ones especially when the latter are less efficient yet targetable taxation is always used even when it is very inefficient compared to non targetable taxes

distributive politics and electoral competition abstract within the framework of pure redistribution dividing one unit of a homo geneous good among identical individuals the paper analyses the redistribution that arises from downsian two party electoral competition it appears that the strategic behavior of vote maximizing parties leads them to propose divisions which are not far from the egalitarian one journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d63 d72

suspiciously timed trade disputes abstract this paper shows that electoral incentives crucially affect the initiation of trade disputes focusing on wto disputes filed by the united states during the 1995 2014 period we find that u s presidents are more likely to initiate a dispute in the year preceding their re election moreover u s trade disputes are more likely to involve industries that are important in swing states to explain these regularities we develop a theoretical model in which re election motives can lead an incumbent politician to file trade disputes to appeal to voters motivated by reciprocity

distributive politics with vote and turnout buying the objective of this paper is to model the incumbent s allocation of efforts that maximize his electoral chances in the presence of both vote buying persuasion and turnout buying mobilization the existing literature on distributive politics concludes that political candidates should concentrate their campaigning efforts either on safe districts or on swing districts this paper shows that when candidates can use both persuasion and mobilization strategies and the ideology of voters is unknown to the incumbent party a third option should be taken into account in fact the optimal allocation of resources rather than focusing on safe or swing districts should target opposition strongholds that is the incumbent should try to sway voters in those districts in which the challenger is favored the intuition for this result is simple since the incumbent does not know individual preferences he only observes the distribution of preferences in the districts all voters in a given district look identical to him hence when approaching voters in a district to buy their vote the incumbent always faces the risk of buying the vote of his supporters who would have voted for him anyway

audience features and the strategic timing of trade disputes if international institutions are such potent alarm mechanisms that mobilize procompliance domestic audiences as many existing theories argue why do countries wait so long before sounding the alarm world trade organization wto members often wait months or even years before objecting to their trading partners wto illegal barriers to turn a phrase trade cooperation delayed is trade cooperation denied so why wait to explain this variation i develop a theory of institutional alarm mechanisms in which 1 the preferences and strength of the audience hearing the alarm vary and 2 the decision to sound the alarm is strategic sounding the alarm is most valuable when strong audiences in the defendant country support compliance i test this prediction using competing risks models analyzing the timing of wto disputes against us tariff barriers consistent with the theory disputes are more likely during election years when macroeconomic indicators suggest broader support for free trade

measurement of income inequality experimental test by questionnaire abstract we reconsider some of the basic assumptions of the literature on inequality analysis students views on the meaning of inequality comparisons were elicited by means of a questionnaire involving both numerical and verbal questions the responses suggest that two important axioms the principle of transfers and decomposability are not universally accepted

beyond chopsticks symmetric equilibria in majority auction games majority auction games are simultaneous sealed bid auctions of identical objects among identical bidders who each want to win a specified fraction more than a half of the objects each bidder receives no benefit from winning less than the specified fraction and no additional benefit from winning more than it symmetric equilibria having simple intuitive forms are shown to exist in first price second price and all pay versions of such games when the number of bidders is sufficiently large this contrasts with earlier results for the two bidder pure chopstick majority auction games where the only known equilibria are more complicated

macroeconomic determinants of corporate failures evidence from the uk previous studies on the relationship between macroeconomic aggregates and business failures have been restricted to the description of the short run relationships among the variables this paper uses an error correction model ecm to investigate the determinants of uk corporate failures by modelling the short run and long run behaviours of corporate failure rates in relation to macroeconomic phenomena over the period 1966 1999 the findings indicate that failure rates are associated with interest rates credit profits price and corporate birth rates both in the short run and in the long run of these macroeconomic variables interest rate appears to be an important factor influencing failure rates and can be used as a feasible policy instrument to reduce the incidence of corporate failures the impact of the insolvency act 1986 has also been examined and its mitigating effect on corporate failures has been identified

buying shares and or votes for corporate control we explore how allowing votes to be traded separately of shares may affect the efficiency of corporate control contests our basic set up and the nature of the questions continue the work of grossman and hart 1980 harris and raviv 1988 and blair golbe and gerard 1989 we consider three cases with respect to the allowable price offers for shares and for votes when they can be traded separately unrestricted price offers quantity restricted price offers and price offers contingent on winning our main results are characterizations of the equilibria and of the circumstances under which vote buying is harmful we show that allowing votes to be traded separately of shares results in inefficiencies in all the cases we study similarly allowing quantity restricted offers is also harmful but allowing conditional offers is not in itself detrimental to efficiency the paper also makes a methodological contribution to the analysis of takeover games with atomless shareholders it provides a way of dealing with asymmetric equilibria that must be dealt with for a complete analysis and it proves existence of an equilibrium copyright 2012 oxford university press

deception the role of uncertain consequences abstract we study how decisions to lie extend to risky environments we provide experimental evidence from a sender receiver game where there is uncertainty over the amount by which a sender s lie reduces its receiver s payoff which is known only to potential liar even though all reduction amounts are equiprobable ex post beliefs elicited from senders suggest that unlike truth tellers most liars underestimate the extent of the actual reduction in the receiver s payoff and appear to exploit this self serving bias resulting in substantially more lying relative to a baseline treatment without the uncertainty subsequent treatments confirm the bias by either providing additional evidence or by removing possible confounds an intervention treatment nudging senders toward correcting the bias reduces lying

the political value of land political reform and land prices in chile in this article we argue that when patron client relations are grounded in economic relationships such as between landlord and worker we should expect clientelism to influence not just how public policy the state and the political system work but also how the economy works we develop a simple model of the economic consequences of electoral clientelism when voting behavior can be observed landlords patrons provide economic rents to workers and in exchange workers vote for parties favored by landlords as votes are used by the landlords to accumulate political rents vote control increases the demand for labor and for land the model implies that the introduction of the australian ballot which destroys this form of clientelism should lead to a fall in the price of land in those areas where patron client relationships are strongest we test the predictions of the model by examining in detail the evolution of land prices in chile around may 31 1958 for which we collected original data a characteristic of rural chile at this time were patron client relations based on the inquilinaje system by which a worker the inquilino entered into a long term often hereditary employment relationship with a landlord and lived on his landlord s estate we show that the introduction of the australian ballot in 1958 led to a fall of about 26 in land prices in the areas where these patron client relationships were predominant

clientelism and vote buying lessons from field experiments in african elections electoral clientelism and vote buying are widely perceived as major obstacles to economic development this is because they may limit the provision of public goods in this paper we review the literature on clientelism and vote buying and propose the use of field experiments to evaluate empirically the consequences of these phenomena we provide an overview discuss implementation and interpret the main results of recent field experiments conducted by the authors in west african countries clientelism and vote buying seem to be effective and to enjoy widespread electoral support the results suggest that increased access to information and political participation by women may limit clientelism in addition voter education campaigns may undermine the effects of vote buying on voting behaviour we argue that our findings may inform the design of development aid interventions as a way effectively to increase public good political accountability we also discuss directions for fruitful future research copyright 2009 oxford university press