buyer initiated vs seller initiated information revelation sales presentations are the core of the selling process where salespeople provide information to prospects one challenge is that the amount of information available to be potentially communicated may exceed salespeople s ability to communicate or customers ability to process there is limited bandwidth between the firm and customers one important decision then is which information should customers see what the firm chooses to tell customers may be informative in itself when constrained to a seller initiated information revelation format where the firm chooses which feature to show the firm never finds it optimal to offer more features than it is able to inform customers about consequently customers never find credible a claim that the product has all features the important implication is that price alone cannot serve as a signal of quality in this setting in contrast a buyer initiated information revelation format where customers decide which information to receive increases the probability of a sale and also results in the production of higher quality products in a competitive setting by adopting buyer initiated information revelation firms are able to attain positive profits this is due to the fact that customers infer the product s quality from the price along with the information revelation format customers know that at some prices firms find it profitable to produce high quality products and at other lower prices this is not the case thus customer empowerment leads to higher profits

the informational role of prices we consider a dominant firm with a competitive fringe in order to address the informational role of prices the fringe is necessary for the existence of a unique fully revealing equilibrium in which the price reveals the quality of the good to uninformed buyers a higher price triggers more sales on the part of the competitive fringe reducing both residual demand and profits we find that a larger share of uninformed buyers increases the price reduces the quantity sold by the dominant firm but increases the quantity sold by the competitive fringe this in turn reduces consumer surplus and welfare this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

signaling quality with a money back guarantee the role of transaction costs direct marketing is witnessing explosive growth as consumers increasingly purchase products from their homes their ability to judge the quality of products they buy is significantly reduced in this paper we study how money back guarantees can signal product quality in such environments we interpret product quality broadly to mean both the level of attributes promised as well as the firm s consistency in delivering on those promises key aspects of our formulation are the explicit consideration of transaction costs and alternative signals of product quality transaction costs are the costs the seller or buyer faces when redeeming a money back guarantee we show that money back guarantees signal quality by exploiting the higher probability of returns for a lower quality product and the attendant higher transaction costs however if the seller s transaction costs are very large then there are less costly ways to signal namely charging a high price we compare the signaling performance of 1 price 2 price with uninformative advertising and 3 price with a money back guarantee whereas uninformative advertising does not work at all in our model under certain conditions a money back guarantee is necessary to signal and under other conditions a money back guarantee is a useful supplement to price

strategic pricing signalling and costly information acquisition abstract consider a market where an informed monopolist sets the price for a good or asset with a value unknown to potential buyers upon observing the price buyers may pay some cost for information about the value before deciding on purchases under a belief restriction which generalizes the idea of the cho kreps intuitive criterion we establish a version of the grossman stiglitz paradox there is no separating equilibrium with fully revealing prices yet we also resolve the paradox there is a unique equilibrium and as the cost of information becomes small the equilibrium approaches the full information outcome and prices become perfectly revealing

the stability of price dispersion under seller and consumer learning in many markets it is possible to find rival sellers charging different prices for the same good earlier research has attempted to explain this phenomenon by demonstrating the existence of dispersed price equilibria when consumers must make use of costly search to discover prices we ask whether such equilibria can be learned when sellers adjust prices adaptively in response to current market conditions with consumer behavior fixed convergence to a dispersed price equilibrium is possible in some cases however once consumer learning is introduced the monopoly outcome first found by diamond journal of economic theory3 1971 156 68 is the only stable equilibrium

agricultural development and the size distribution of personal income the tropical african experience abstract we use data from a sample of countries in tropical africa to investigate the relationship between relative income and growth rate of the agricultural sector and income inequality we find that an increase in the income of the agricultural sector relative to that of the non agricultural sector decreases income inequality the growth rate of agricultural production and the proportion of the labor force in the non agricultural sector were also found to be negatively correlated with income inequality

evolving market structure an ace model of price dispersion and loyalty we present an agent based computational economics ace model of the wholesale sh market in marseille two of the stylized facts of that market are high loyalty of buyers to sellers and persistent price dispersion although it is every day the same population of sellers and buyers that meets in the same market hall in our ace model sellers decide on quantities to supply prices to ask and how to treat loyal customers while buyers decide which sellers to visit and which prices to accept learning takes place through reinforcement the model explains both stylized facts price dispersion and high loyalty in a coevolutionary process buyers learn to become loyal as sellers learn to o er higher utility to loyal buyers while these sellers in turn learn to o er higher utility to loyal buyers as they happen to realize higher gross revenues from loyal buyers the model also explains the e ect of heterogeneity of the buyers we analyze how this leads to subtle di erences in the shopping patterns of the di erent types of buyers and how this is

the effect of ethics on labor market success evidence from mbas abstract this paper empirically investigates the link between ethics earnings and gender using a self reported measure from a longitudinal survey of registrants for the graduate management admission test we find that ethical character is negatively associated with males wages for females however this relationship does not hold in addition using measures of the degree to which ethics is emphasized in business school curricula as an indicator for enhancement of individual ethical standards of graduates we investigate variation in the returns to an mba degree we find that the larger the degree to which males report that business education enhanced their ethical character the lower their wages holding other aspects of their education constant for females however enhanced ethics through business school is positively and significantly associated with returns to the mba degree more objective measures of ethics emphasis in business school curricula provide further support of these findings

learning and risk aversion we study how learning shapes behavior towards risk when individuals are not assumed to know or to have beliefs about probability distributions in any period the behavior change induced by learning is assumed to depend on the action chosen and the payoff obtained we characterize learning processes that in expected value increase the probability of choosing the safest actions and provide sufficient conditions for them to converge to the choices of risk averse expected utility maximizers we provide a learning theoretic motivation for long run risk choices such as those in expected utility theory with known payoff distributions

heterogeneous human capital occupational choice and male female earnings differences human capital models have mainly focused on the rate of return to investment in a homogeneous stock of capital yet individuals have different initial attributes that determine comparative advantage in producing different types of human capital we find that mathematical ability is an important determinant of field choice for college students and that differences in earnings across fields are largely explained as a return to the use of scarce quantitative abilities in the production of each type of human capital the model successfully accounts for the observed male female differences in earnings and occupational choices of recent college graduates

high and declining prices signal product quality high and declining prices signal a high quality product high prices are the efficient means of signaling because the consequent loss of sales volume is most damaging for lower cost lower quality products as time passes and the number of informed consumers increases the signaling distortion lessens resulting in a declining price profile the prediction of high and declining prices is robust across a variety of dynamic models and is consistent with recent empirical findings copyright 1991 by american economic association

market organisation and trading relationships in this paper we give a theoretical model of buyers behaviour on a market for a perishable good where no prices are posted we show that if buyers learn from their own previous experience there is a sharp division between those who learn to be loyal to certain sellers and those who continue to shop around this feature remains in more general models which are simulated and is consistent with empirical data from the marseille fish market

multi period competition with switching costs an overlapping generations formulation i examine an infinite period duoply market with positive consumer switching costs and overlapping generations of consumers when consumers have a finite time horizon then unlike beggs and klemperer 1992 the two firms may alternate dominance from one period to the next alternately charging high and low prices this agrees with the intuition that firms with a high locked in market share may set price so as to exploit that market share which causes a subsequent low market share among the new cohort of buyers leading to lower prices etc jel codes l13 d21 d43 d92

dynamic pricing of new experience goods we develop a dynamic model of experience goods pricing with independent private valuations we show that the optimal paths of sales and prices can be described in terms of a simple dichotomy in a mass market prices are declining over time in a niche market the optimal prices are initially low followed by higher prices that extract surplus from the buyers with a high willingness to pay we consider extensions of the model to integrate elements of social rather than private learning and turnover among buyers

a dynamic model of differentiated oligopoly with capital accumulation abstract we consider a dynamic model of differentiated oligopoly with capital accumulation we prove that the model may converge to either a steady state replicating the optimum of the static problem or a steady state driven by capital accumulation alone in the latter case the same steady state equilibrium is observed under both cournot and bertrand competition as well as social planning journal of economic literature classifications numbers c73 l13

wage setting institutions and economic growth abstract wage setting institutions in several asian and latin american economies are compared and contrasted the asian economies have relied more on market wage determination whereas the latin american economies have encouraged institutions which push wages in key sectors up above market clearing levels market wage determination combined with exportled growth has resulted in rapidly rising real wages in the context of full employment in the asian

changing labor market conditions and economic development in hong kong the republic of korea singapore and taiwan china in the newly industrializing economies nies of hong kong the republic of korea singapore and taiwan china the entire working population has benefited from labor market institutions the east asian nies attained and maintained generally full employment improved their job mixes raised real earnings and lowered their rates of poverty this article reaches two principal conclusions first labor market conditions continued to improve in all four economies in the 1980s at rates remarkably similar to their rates of aggregate economic growth second labor market repression was not a major factor in the growth experiences of these economies in the 1980s it thus appears that labor market repression is neither necessary nor desirable for outward oriented economic development

a reapraisal of the capital goods sector in hong kong the case for free trade abstract this paper was provoked by an earlier one by fransman 1982 in which he examined the functioning of the capital goods sector in hong kong and came to the conclusion that it needed special protection by the government to allow it to reap the benefits of externalities essential for increasing its design and production capabilities statistical evidence is provided indicating that the capital goods sector as conventionally defined is prospering even following fransman 1982 and equating the capital goods sector with the machine producing sector the latest survey of production indicates considerable dynamism his case for infant industry protection is further weakened by consideration of the nature of the particular industrial structure of hong kong and the quality of the social relations that prevail between entrepreneurs it is argued that the costs of singling out the capital goods sector for special treatment in terms of the impact of the highly competitive export oriented manufacturing sector are likely to be high while the theoretical benefits from externalities are liable to be illusory in a small economy

advertising and coordination when market information such as price is difficult to communicate consumers and firms may be unable to take advantage of mutually beneficial scale economies so that coordination failures arise ostensibly uninformative advertising expenditures can be used to eliminate coordination failures by allowing an efficient firm to communicate implicitly that it offers a low price this provides a theoretical explanation for benham s 1972 empirical association of the ability to advertise with lower prices and larger scale advertising becomes necessary for optimal coordination when the identity of the efficient firm is uncertain an application to loss leader pricing is developed

payoff assessments without probabilities a simple dynamic model of choice abstract we develop a model which reflects the tendency of people to simplify the decision problems they face the decision maker chooses among alternate strategies only on the basis of the payoff she assesses she would obtain from them and these assessments do not explicitly take into account her subjective judgements regarding the likelihood of alternate states of the world at each stage the decision maker chooses the strategy that she assesses to give the highest payoff she updates her assessments adaptively we show that such behavior leads to maxmin choices we also consider the decision maker who experiences shocks journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 d8

two part pricing for experience goods in the presence of adverse selection abstract because customers learn something when they purchase an experience good for the first time a firm selling experience goods may face different demand curves from new and repeat customers the firm can exploit these differences by using a two part pricing strategy to price discriminate between new and repeat customers the firm may also use a two part pricing strategy to mitigate the information problems of adverse selection when its quality is uncertain the analysis is particularly applicable to service markets where customers and firms seek long term relationships and firms maintain customer records which facilitate price discrimination

credible signals of the release of new versions i introduction many products are marketed some time after they have been developed for instance a new smartphone may be developed and tested well before it is available for purchase a new car might be prototyped and driven months before it comes to the market indeed a firm will often have several products concurrently in a development pipeline consumers may know a product is in that pipeline without knowing its progress towards the market because the outcome of such development and testing is not visible to outsiders the firm knows whether it can market a product before consumers do consumers are uninformed about when and if the new product will be marketed to them economists have long recognized that the present demand for durable goods depends on future prospects such as the future price or the introduction of an improved version 1 the existence of such an improved version is often the seller s private information if consumers anticipate a new version some will defer purchases until the new version is available and the seller will face low demand for the present version disclosing the new version is not in a monopoly seller s interest a seller whose good does not have a new version would also like to communicate that fact to consumers while a firm with a successful product innovation can credibly disclose the new version with relative ease a firm that has failed to develop a new product could have great difficulty convincing consumers that the product has no new version in such situations it is important to examine whether prices can inform consumers whether a new version will be marketed in the near future in a recent paper choi et al 2010 developed a model with a risky product development process in which reputation effects allow cheap talk announcements to signal successful product development to consumers an announcement induces consumers to delay or divert purchases to the announcer s coming product which increases the announcer s profit and can improve welfare 2 in their model the announcer and her non innovative rivals supply the original good competitively because of this an announcement does not reduce profit on the current version this paper will focus on markets where the seller has substantial market power before innovating so announcing a successful product development has a cost in terms of current revenue further because we attend to prices as signals this model may also apply to markets where a long run relationship between consumers and firms may not be sustainable another objective of this paper is to examine the welfare effects of mandatory disclosure a government policy mandating disclosure of any new version is an alternative means of informing consumers 3 as long as firms are not willing to lie to the government such a policy would credibly communicate whether a new version of a durable is coming mandatory disclosure would bring about full information as consumers are informed about any improved future version before observing the price of the current version in this paper we explore a two period model of a durable good monopoly in which consumers are initially uninformed about whether there will be a new version of the current good the monopoly seller is privately informed if he will be able to market an improved version in the second period in the first period consumers must decide whether to purchase the good now or wait for an upgraded version they may be able to infer from the price of the current version whether the seller will bring a new version to the market it is important to see first whether prices can serve as signals and second how welfare compares between any signaling outcome and a full information benchmark corresponding to mandatory disclosure we will show that there is a unique equilibrium supported by intuitive beliefs in this equilibrium the seller s private information about an improved version is completely revealed to consumers

consumer demand for fair trade evidence from a multistore field experiment abstract we provide new evidence on consumer demand for ethical products from experiments conducted in a u s grocery store chain we find that sales of the two most popular coffees rose by almost 10 when they carried a fair trade label as compared to a generic placebo label demand for the higher priced coffee remained steady when its price was raised by 8 but demand for the lower priced coffee was elastic a 9 price increase led to a 30 decline in sales while consumers attach value to ethical sourcing there is significant heterogeneity in willingness to pay for it

quality uncertainty and informative advertising we present a price signalling model with informative advertising a costly advertisement informs of the good s quality directly and therefore the seller determines the fraction of informed buyers endogenously we show that informative advertising only occurs in pooling equilibria for an advertising pooling equilibrium to exist consumer valuation for high quality advertising cost prior probability that quality is high and inaccuracy of the buyers pre purchase information must be sufficiently high for some parameters there is a unique undefeated advertising pooling equilibrium if advertising is used in equilibrium the adverse selection problem is mitigated

causes and consequences of price premiums existing literature that argues for the prevalence of price premiums is examined an evaluation of an extant model identifies several possible boundary conditions that limit the applicability of the model a set of propositions is developed based on these boundary conditions linking buyer seller and market factors to the magnitude of price premiums that should be available alternative means for empirical testing of the propositions are offered and some implications and applications of this line of thinking for pricing and brand management are described copyright 1996 by university of chicago press

word of mouth communication and social learning this paper studies the way that word of mouth communication aggregates the information of individual agents we find that the structure of the communication process determines whether all agents end up making identical choices with less communication making this conformity more likely despite the players naive decision rules and the stochastic decision environment word of mouth communication may lead all players to adopt the action that is on average superior these socially efficient outcomes tend to occur when each agent samples only a few others i introduction economic agents must often make decisions without knowing the costs and benefits of the possible choices given the frequency with which such situations arise it is understandable that agents often choose not to perform studies or experiments but instead rely on whatever information they have obtained via casual word of mouth communication reliance on this sort of easily obtained information appears to be common in circumstances ranging from consumers choosing restaurants or auto mechanics to business managers evaluating alternative organizational structures this paper studies two related environments in arguing that individuals reliance on word of mouth communication has interesting implications for their aggregate behavior first motivated by the diffusion of new technologies we consider a choice between two competing products with unequal qualities or payoffs and show that the structure of communication is important in determining whether the population as a whole is likely to learn to use the superior product second we consider a choice between two products or practices that are equally good and ask whether consumers are likely to herd onto a single choice or whether diversity will obtain even in the long run we explore the implications of word of mouth communication in a simple nonstrategic environment there is a large population of identical players each of whom repeatedly chooses between two possible actions each player s payoff is determined by his own

revisiting dynamic duopoly with consumer switching costs abstract the degree of collusiveness of a market with consumer switching costs is analyzed in an infinite horizon model of duopolistic competition in contrast with previous analyses we assume that firms compete for the demand for a homogeneous good by setting prices simultaneously in each period this problem is formulated as a simple stochastic game and a symmetric stationary markovian perfect equilibrium with distinctive economic features is studied we show that switching costs unambiguously relax price competition in equilibrium but that on the contrary they may make tacit collusion more difficult to sustain journal of economic literature classification numbers c73 d43 l13

experimentation and competition abstract this paper examines the effect of competition on firms efforts to experiment and learn about market demand consumers are assumed to know prices only at sellers they have actually visited but must bear search costs to find the prices of other sellers under these conditions we show that firms incentives to experiment are diluted by comparison with the monopoly case and that this effect is stronger the smaller the search cost the learning environment we portray gives rise to several time paths which have been empirically documented including penetration pricing cream skimming and cyclical pricing journal of economic literature classification numbers c73 d43 d83

pricing strategies in a dynamic duopoly a differential game model we formulate a differential game model for dynamic pricing in a duopolistic market firms demand functions are derived from utility maximizing behavior of consumers with the demand for a brand given by the logit model preferences for brands are assumed to evolve over time in the market in a manner akin to learning models postulated in the marketing literature we derive the differential equations governing the equilibrium open loop price paths over time and show that in steady state the brand with the higher preference level charges the higher price the formulation is extended to include the effects of consumer heterogeneity and equilibrium steady state prices are compared with those obtained when heterogeneity is ignored a comparison of steady state dynamic prices with myopic prices is provided an empirical example is discussed to show how steady state model predictions may be obtained from actual longitudinal purchase data

co evolution of firms and consumers and the implications for market dominance consider a setting in which rms randomly discover new ideas that a ect their products or services and implement favorable ones at the same time that rms are adapting their o erings consumers are searching among rms for the best match it is shown that implicit in these dual dynamics is an increasing returns mechanism which can result in one rm dominating the market in the long run the conditions under which there is sustained market dominance are characterized

strategic pricing of new pharmaceuticals this paper provides empirical evidence on the leading factors affecting the prices of new pharmaceuticals both at introduction and after 4 6 and 8 years most important is the extent of therapeutic advance embodied in a new product for drugs which represent important therapeutic gains launch prices can be two or three times those of existing drugs used for the same purposes while drugs that largely duplicate the actions of currently available products are typically priced at comparable levels in addition the number of branded substitutes has a substantial negative effect on launch prices which reflects the importance of competitive pressures duplicate products thereby play an important economic role in pharmaceutical markets

employment income distribution and economic growth in seven small open economies resurgent interest has been manifested among development economists in trickle down i e the view that the more rapid the rate of economic growth the more rapid the improvement in employment and income distribution throughout this paper the term income distribution will refer to the location and dispersion of the pattern of incomes i e to absolute incomes and poverty and to relative income inequality empirical evidence supports trickle down in some cases but the evidence is contrary to trickle down in others the evidence from my own study of six countries experiences2 is summarised in tables i and 2

price quality and reputation evidence from an online field experiment we examine the link between price quality seller claims and seller reputation in internet auctions after purchasing actual baseball cards and having them professionally graded we find that some buyers in the online graded market are misled by incredible claims of quality they pay higher prices but do not receive better quality and in fact are defrauded more often online seller reputation is effective for identifying good faith sellers but conditional on completed auctions reputable sellers do not provide better quality evidence also suggests that high claim sellers target less experienced buyers we attribute these patterns to two loopholes in the ebay rating system we benefited from the comments of austan goolsbee raphael thomadsen john shea dan vincent david reiley larry ausubel peter cramton v joseph hotz jeff smith jimmy chan vincent crawford mark duggan and attendees at numerous seminars and conferences we are particularly grateful to seth sanders and john list for their constructive advice at the early stage of the research to timothy bresnahan rachel kranton and thomas hubbard for their detailed suggestions in reshaping earlier versions and to editor ariel pakes and two anonymous referees for their careful readings special thanks to eight friends who acted as our agents in purchasing baseball cards in retail markets and to numerous sports card store owners who shared their insights on the sportscard industry excellent research assistance from randy alexander moore and krzysztof fizyta is gratefully acknowledged any remaining errors are ours

learning and the capital goods sector under free trade the case of hongkong abstract attention is focused on technological change and attendant learning processes in the more industrialized third world countries the importance of relatively simple learning processes is stressed and the conditions necessary for facilitating more complex forms of learning particularly protection and promotion are examined here it is shown that the capital goods sector is of central importance the case study material deals with the machine producing sector in hong kong chosen as the representative case of free trade and minimal government intervention and comparison is made with learning processes in a number of other more industrialized third world countries including india argentina and taiwan in the final section the implications of the discussion of learning for theories and techniques of investment allocation including social cost benefit analysis the effective rate of protection and the related domestic cost of foreign exchange are examined

when cheaper is better fee determination in the market for equity mutual funds abstract in this paper we develop a model of the market for equity mutual funds that captures three key characteristics of this market first there is competition among funds second fund managers ability is not observed by investors before making their investment decisions third some investors do not make optimal use of all available information the main results of the paper are that 1 price competition is compatible with positive mark ups in equilibrium and 2 worse performing funds set fees that are greater or equal to those set by better performing funds these predictions are supported by available empirical evidence

adaptive learning models of consumer behavior abstract in a model of dynamic duopoly optimal price policies are characterized assuming consumers learn adaptively about the relative quality of the two products a contrast is made between belief based and reinforcement learning under reinforcement learning consumers can become locked into the habit of purchasing inferior goods such lock in permits the existence of multiple history dependent asymmetric steady states in which one firm dominates in contrast belief based learning rules must lead asymptotically to correct beliefs about the relative quality of the two brands and so in this case there is a unique steady state

international competitiveness technical change and the state the machine tool industry in taiwan and japan abstract it is widely accepted that the growth performance of japan and the asian newly industrialized countries hong kong singapore south korea and taiwan is partly the result of the international competitiveness they have achieved in a number of export industries it remains however to explain how this competitiveness was achieved in the first part of the paper an attempt at such an explanation based on the theory of comparative advantage is critically examined it is argued that while this explanation does have some explanatory power it does not deal adequately with a the role of technical and productivity change b the causal mechanisms underlying economic growth and c the role of the state the rest of the paper examines the case of machine tools in taiwan and japan showing the importance of these three factors as well as a number of others as determinants of international competitiveness the paper ends with a discussion of policy dilemmas relating to international competitiveness in the taiwanese machine toot industry

naive reinforcement learning with endogenous aspirations this article considers a simple model of reinforcement learning all behavior change derives from the reinforcing or deterring effect of instantaneous payoff experiences payoff experiences are reinforcing or deterring depending on whether the payoff exceeds an aspiration level or falls short of it over time the aspiration level is adjusted toward the actually experienced payoffs this article shows that aspiration level adjustments may improve the decision maker s long run performance by preventing him or her from feeling dissatisfied with even the best available strategies however such movements also lead to persistent deviations from expected payoff maximization by creating probability matching effects

learning and strategic pricing we consider the situation where a single consumer buys a stream of goods from different sellers over time the true value of each seller s product to the buyer is initially unknown additional information can be gained only by experimentation for exogeneously given prices the buyer s problem is a multi armed bandit problem the innovation in this paper is to endogenize the cost of experimentation to the consumer by allowing for price competition between the sellers the role of prices is then to allocate intertemporally the costs and benefits of learning between buyers and sellers we examine how strategic aspects of the oligopoly model interact with the learning process all markov perfect equilibria mpe are efficient we identify an equilibrium which besides its unique robustness properties has a strikingly simple seemingly myopic pricing rule prices below marginal cost emerge naturally to sustain experimentation intertemporal exchange of the gains of learning is necessary to support efficient experimentation we analyze the asymptotic behavior of the equilibria

multidimensional separating equilibria and moral hazard an empirical study of national football league contract negotiations this paper empirically tests for a multidimensional separating equilibrium in contract negotiations and tests for evidence of the moral hazard inherent in many contracts using contract and performance data on players drafted into the national football league from 1986 through 1991 we find evidence that players use delay to agreement and incentive clauses to reveal their private information during contract negotiations in addition our empirical tests of the moral hazard issue indicate that a player s effort level is influenced by the structure of his contract

the gender pay gap beyond human capital heterogeneity in noncognitive skills and in labor market tastes abstract focused on human capital economists typically explain about half of the gender earnings gap for a national sample of mbas we account for 82 percent of the gap by incorporating noncognitive skills for example confidence and assertiveness and preferences regarding family career and jobs those two sources of gender heterogeneity account for a quarter of the explained pay gap with half due to human capital variables and the other quarter due to hours worked and current job characteristics female mbas appear to pay a penalty for good citizen behavior choosing jobs that contribute to society and characteristics higher ethical standards

price endings when prices signal quality this paper provides a theoretical explanation for why firms behave as though they use round prices to signal quality by replacing the linear demand curve in bagwell and riordan s 1991 price as a signal of quality model with a kinked demand curve and analyzing what price endings firms are most likely to use the following observations can be made 1 firms that are using high prices to signal quality are more likely to set those prices at round numbers and 2 price endings themselves are not necessarily signals of quality a simulation was conducted to demonstrate that these findings generally hold true even in the presence of demand spikes at 9 ending prices e g schindler and kibarian 1996 finally empirical evidence is provided to demonstrate that firms tend to use more round prices for higherquality products and that this relationship is even stronger for product categories where consumers are less able to detect the true level of quality prior to purchase

on the evolution of market institutions the platform design paradox we study competition among market designers who create new trading platforms when boundedly rational traders learn to select among them we ask whether walrasian platforms leading to market clearing trading outcomes will dominate the market in the long run if several market designers compete we find that traders learn to select non market clearing platforms with prices systematically above the market clearing level provided at least one such platform is introduced by a market designer this in turn leads market designers to introduce non market clearing platforms hence platform competition induces non competitive market outcomes

learning and communication in sender receiver games an econometric investigation this paper compares the performance of stimulus response sr and belief based learning bbl using data from game theory experiments the environment extensive form games played in a population setting is novel in the empirical literature on learning in games both the sr and bbl models fit the data reasonably well in common interest games with history while the test results accept sr and reject bbl in games with no history and in all but one of the divergent interest games estimation is challenging since the likelihood function is not globally concave and the results may be subject to convergence bias

information and the provision of quality differentiated products governments often enact information provision policies to overcome asymmetric information of product qualities we show that increasing awareness among consumers of the quality of a good can but will not always encourage firms to produce goods with higher levels of quality even if product qualities increase social welfare may fall as information provision results in too much product differentiation we show that the effectiveness of emission taxes and output subsidies are affected by the level of consumer knowledge of product quality and we identify conditions under which information provision is welfare enhancing relative to these price instruments jel l15 q58 i introduction in the past 20 years consumers have become increasinglyconscious ofthe undesirable health and safety attributes of the products they consume and surveys suggest that a growing percentage of consumers are willing to pay more for higher quality products such as organic foods and household cleaners and detergents that contain less toxic ingredients guber 2003 other high quality products facing higher demand include energy efficient products like extended life lightbulbs and improved home insulation often these highquality products provide private benefits that are excludable to buyers as well as public benefits that are nonrival and nonexcludable for example reduced pesticide and chemical residue on food may lower the risk of cancer while also reducing contaminated run off that degrades ground and surface water quality extended life lightbulbs and improved home insulation may reduce an individual s utility bill while also reducing greenhouse gas emissions from lower energy consumption although interest in these types of high quality productsisgrowing demand isoften relatively small market shares of organic produce for

interindustry wage differentials and the gender wage gap using data from the march 1988 current population survey the authors find that the wages of female workers differ significantly by industry even when the analysis controls for workers productivity related characteristics although these interindustry wage differentials are at least as large as men s and are highly correlated with them as well there are statistically significant differences between the two of the overall gender wage gap the average female worker earns about 65 as much as the average male worker 12 22 can be explained by differences between the patterns of interindustry wage differentials of men and women and 15 19 by differences in the distribution of male and female workers across industries thus the combined industry effects explain about one third of the overall gender wage gap

price and advertising signals of product quality we present a signaling model based on ideas of phillip nelson in which both the introductory price and the level of directly uninformative advertising or other dissipative marketing expenditures are choice variables and may be used as signals for the initially unobservable quality of a newly introduced experience good repeat purchases play a crucial role in our model a second focus of the paper is on illustrating an approach to refining the set of equilibria in signalling games with multiple potential signals

the economic returns to an mba because mba programs require work experience before admittance prior wages can be exploited to disentangle the return to the degree from unobserved productivity we find that controlling for individual fixed effects generally reduces the estimated returns to an mba particularly for those in top programs however for full time mba students attending schools outside of the top 25 the estimated returns are higher when we control for individual fixed effects we show that there is some evidence that those who take the gmat but do not obtain an mba are stronger in dimensions such as workplace skills that are not easily measured

demand signalling under unobservable effort in franchising linear and nonlinear price contracts we study the signalling strategy of a principal who is privately informed about its high demand potential to an uninformed risk neutral agent we analyze the model in the context of a contract between a franchisor and a franchisee we examine the distortions of a two part pricing scheme necessary to credibly inform the franchisee agent we also study whether the inability of the franchisor principal to observe the agent s effort moderates or exaggerates the distortions from the first best two part pricing scheme a surprising outcome is that even though the principal incurs greater signalling cost the magnitude of distortion in the two part scheme is smaller when service is unobservable than when it is not thus a signalling strategy employing the fixed and variable fees is harder to detect under moral hazard empirical studies failing to control for moral hazard may incorrectly conclude that signalling strategy does not occur we later consider a three part scheme to verify whether or not the schem

strategic it investments the impact of switching cost and declining it cost the declining cost of information technology it over time provides the later entrant in information intensive industries a cost advantage on the other hand the earlier entrant has the potential to build and retain its market share if consumers incur a cost in switching to the later entrant we investigate the impact of a decline in the it cost and the switching cost on it investment strategies of firms we find that a declining it cost always hurts the early entrant s profit the early entrant may assume an aggressive investment strategy or a defensive investment strategy in response to a decline in the it cost depending on whether the switching cost relative to the extent of decline in the it cost is high or low respectively a decline in it cost also hurts the later entrant s profit if the switching cost is high a surprising result is that when the decline in the it cost is higher than a critical value a higher switching cost increases consumer surplus when firms control the switching cost the early entrant increases its investment in quality and switching cost and maintains its quality and its market share leadership irrespective of the extent of decline in the it cost

adaptive learning vs equilibrium refinements in an entry limit pricing game signalling models are studied using experiments and adaptive learning models in an entry limit pricing game even though high cost monopolists never play dominated strategies the easier it is for other players to recognise that these strategies are dominated the more likely play is to converge to the undominated separating equilibrium and the more rapidly limit pricing develops this is inconsistent with the equilibrium refinements literature including cho kreps intuitive criterion and pure bayesian adaptive learning models an augmented adaptive learning model in which some players recognise the existence of dominated strategies and their consequences predicts these outcomes

the dynamics of business ethics and economic activity the authors model the agency relationship between managers and investors through socialization ethical managers develop internalized norms that prevent them from acting opportunistically unethical managers lack these norms higher ethical standards on the part of managers increase economic activity in the short run however increased economic activity increases opportunities to profit from unethical behavior eroding ethical standards over the long run when this rate of erosion is high cycling of ethics and economic activity emerges otherwise ethics and economic activity converge to a stable long run limiting value

transitions career and family life cycles of the educational elite among life s most vital transitions are those concerning family and career we decide when and whom to marry how many children to have whether to further our education and which occupations and jobs to pursue fundamental aspects of these transitions began to change around the early 1970s for the college educated generally and for women in particular the median age at first marriage among college graduate women which had been stable at about 22 5 years old from the 1950s to the early 1970s for birth cohorts from the 1930s to about 1950 increased by 2 5 years between 1972 and 1979 for birth cohorts from about 1950 to 1955 the fraction of women not having a first birth by around 40 years old increased from 20 percent for those graduating in the early 1960s to 28 percent for those graduating in the 1970s college graduate women greatly increased their education in professional schools the fraction female among first year law and medical school students for example was 10 percent in 1970 but rose to 40 percent by 1990

the developmental state government and singapore s economic development since 1960 abstract government interventionism is widely acknowledged to characterize less developed countries but consensus is lacking as to whether it promotes economic development and if so how the present article analyzes the nature of government involvement in the singapore model of economic development and emergence of a developmental state closely associated with this model it compares singapore s experience with south korea s and taiwan s where government also contributed to development success and with other asian countries where government failed to play a strong developmental role

aggregation and imperfect competition on the existence of equilibrium we present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products the central result provides general conditions under which there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products this includes products with multi dimen sional attributes in addition to the proof of existence we provide conditions for uniqueness our analysis covers location models the characteristics approach and probabilistic choice together in a unified framework to prove existence we employ aggregation theorems due to prekopa 1971 and borell 1975 our companion paper caplin and nalebuff 1991 introduces these theorems and develops the application to super majority voting rules we present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products the central result is that there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products in addition to the proof of existence we provide conditions for uniqueness our model both unites diverse strands of the earlier literature and opens up uncharted areas for future analysis in particular we expand the traditional one dimensional framework to allow for multi dimen sional product differentiation our approach involves twin restrictions on consumer preferences one on individuals preferences the other on the distribution of preferences across society these are generalizations of the restrictions supporting 64 majority rule presented in caplin and nalebuff 1988 to prove existence we apply a new technique of aggregation this technique is valuable in a variety of other problems in the companion paper we use the aggregation result to generalize our earlier work on 64 majority rule and to characterize the relationship between the distribution of human capital and the distribution of income caplin and nalebuff 1991 there are additional applications in statistics and in search theory we begin with a brief review of the early literature on imperfect competition describing in more detail the existence problem and previous solutions section 3 presents our twin assumptions and shows that they cover many standard cases in section 4 we introduce the aggregation theorem and use it in the analysis of demand functions the proof of existence of equilibrium is in section

swimming upstream trends in the gender wage differential in the 1980s using michigan panel study of income dynamics data for 1979 and 1988 we analyze how a falling gender wage gap occurred despite changes in wage structure unfavorable to low wage workers the decrease is traced to gender specific factors which more than counterbalanced changes in measured and unmeasured prices working against women supply shifts net of demand were unfavorable for women generally and hurt high skilled more than middle and low skilled women by analyzing wages we find support for the notion of a gender twist in supply and demand having its largest negative effect on high skilled women

quality uncertainty and price in monopoly markets this paper examines a monopoly firm s pricing strategy in a market in which consumers have varying and imprecise estimates of the quality of the firm s product it is shown that the firm s price declines in response to an increase in the level of consumer uncertainty about quality when consumer tastes for the product are sufficiently similar and their uncertainty about quality is sufficiently small when one or both of these conditions fails to hold however it is shown that the monopoly firm s price is positively related to the level of consumer uncertainty about quality copyright 1996 by blackwell publishing ltd