collateral in credit rationing in markets with imperfect information note in their 1981 article joseph stiglitz and andrew weiss analyze adverse selection and incentive effects in the loan market the models considered are based on two crucial assumptions borrowers are subject to limited liability and lenders cannot distinguish borrowers projects of different risk stiglitz and weiss show that a bank that raises its interest rate may suffer adverse selection because only risky borrowers will be willing to borrow at the higher rate thus lenders may choose not to raise the interest rate to eliminate excess demand resulting in the possibility of a credit rationing equilibrium stiglitz and weiss also consider briefly the role of collateral in such credit rationing models they conclude that lenders may choose not to use collateral requirements as a rationing device an increase in collateral requirements like an increase in the interest rate potentially leads to a decrease in the lender s expected return on loans because of resulting adverse incentive and selection effects the purpose of this note is to further investigate the role of collateral in these models stiglitz and weiss discussion in section iii establishes that adverse selection effects can result from increases in collateral when borrowers are risk averse i will show by returning to a model they discussed earlier in section i that the adverse selection effects can also occur when borrowers are risk neutral stiglitz and weiss outline a model to consider the use of collateral as a rationing device section iii in that model all potential borrowers face the same array of risky projects each potential borrower chooses at most one of those projects to undertake the individuals are by assumption risk averse with decreasing absolute risk aversion and possess different amounts of initial wealth thus choice of project if any to undertake and the method of finance selffinance from initial wealth or loan finance will differ from one individual to the next stiglitz and weiss show that among those who undertake risky projects and who choose borrowing as the method of finance wealthier individuals undertake riskier projects an increase in collateral has two effects on the market for loans those individuals who remain in the market will choose to undertake less risky projects and those individuals who drop out of the market are less wealthy low risk borrowers if the second effect is sufficiently strong then increased collateral requirements will mean decreased expected returns for the lender thus a credit rationing equilibrium may occur since lenders may not choose to use collateral requirements or the interest rate to eliminate excess demand the adverse selection effect just described does not occur in this model if the individuals are risk neutral consequently the potential for a credit rationing equilibrium is limited to cases where borrowers are risk averse to see that increases in collateral requirements can also result in adverse selection if borrowers are risk neutral consider the model stiglitz and weiss used to analyze the adverse selection effects of increases in the interest rate section i pp 395 99 it differs from the section iii model discussed above in three ways first borrowers are risk neutral second all projects ar loan financed the analogy to the section iii model is that no individuals have sufficient wealth to self finance projects third in the section

grain transport and rural credit in mozambique solving the space time problem this paper shows how credit market failures can lead to large welfare losses in grain markets by inducing increased transport for seasonal storage in locations with low credit costs the burden of these welfare losses falls primarily on rural households these conclusions are obtained from a spatial temporal model solved using a mixed complementarity formulation that easily handles interest rate differentials across space efforts to address credit market failures and to improve the efficiency of rural storage should be given priority as opposed to the creation of large formal sector grain collection centers

the impact of transport and transaction cost reductions on food markets in developing countries evidence for tempered expectations for burkina faso reductions in transport and transaction costs are expected to have a major effect on the functioning of food markets in developing countries for burkina faso this is a relevant issue as it may have important consequences for the food markets in urban and rural deficit areas a partial equilibrium model is presented to analyze the short term effects of reduced costs on price formation inter regional cereal trade and farmers and traders storage strategies our results show that the high expectations with regard to the direct effects of cost reductions on food prices and food availability require some nuance the effects of a reduction of transport costs will be small moreover also the unintended negative consequences on the competitive position of farmers and traders in other regions that do not profit from road construction should be taken into account finally it is concluded that only if transport and transaction costs are reduced simultaneously will both the consumers and farmers benefit significantly c 2004 elsevier b v all rights reserved

guaranteed lowest prices do they facilitate collusion abstract the effects of a policy guaranteeing lowest price are analyzed in a two stage game where firms first decide whether to adopt such a policy and then choose prices symmetric and asymmetric games are solved to examine the extent to which prices can rise to collusive levels

equilibrium loan pricing under the bank client relationship abstract we determine the loan interest rate policy of a lender who is better informed about a client than other potential lenders the informational advantage possessed by the informed lender derives from the durability of information acquired as a result of an extant relationship given heterogeneous potential loan rate offers to the client by competitive lenders and client search costs the incumbent lender s policy of loan interest rate offers is examined we show that the optimal loan rate will exceed the incumbent lender s cost of funds and will exceed the average offer of competing lenders the potential lenders will offer loan rates that are exceeded by their cost of funds implying immediate losses in order to attract the client and to thereby earn expected profits in the future finally we show that the expected remaining duration of a lender client relationship is decreasing in the existing length of the relationship thus clients that have been with a particular lender longer will be more likely to leave and establish a relationship with another lender

symbiosis vs crowding out the interaction of formal and informal credit markets in developing countries abstract it is a common observation in many developing countries that enterprises are active borrowers in both formal and informal credit markets we propose a model in which the formal sector s superior ability in deposit mobilization is traded off against the informational advantage that lenders in the informal sector enjoy the formal sector can screen borrowers by providing only partial financing for projects thereby forcing borrowers to resort to the informal sector for the remainder of the loan we use the model to predict how the market structure responds to changes in the environment and we consider the policy implications of various forms of government intervention

what s different about banks abstract negotiable certificates of deposit cd s trade in the capital market in competition with other securities like commercial paper and bankers acceptances if cd s must pay lenders competitive monetary interest the reserve tax on cd s is borne by bank borrowers viability of the tax means there must be something special about bank loans that makes some borrowers willing to pay higher interest rates than those on other securities of equivalent risk moreover there must be something special about banks that prevents other intermediaries from competing to assure that it never pays to finance loans with cd s

endogenous communication among lenders and entrepreneurial incentives if banks have an informational monopoly about their clients borrowers may curtail their effort level for fear of being exploited via high interest rates in the future banks can correct this incentive problem by committing to share private information with other lenders the fiercer competition triggered by information sharing lowers future interest rates and future profits of banks but provided banks retain an initial informational advantage their current profits are raised by the borrowers higher effort this trade off determines the banks willingness to share information their decision affects credit market competition interest rates volume of lending and social welfare article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

repossession and the democratization of credit we exploit a 2004 credit reform in brazil that simplified the sale of repossessed cars used as collateral for auto loans we show that the reform expanded credit to riskier self employed borrowers who purchased newer more expensive cars the legal change has led to larger loans with lower spreads and longer maturities although the credit reform improved riskier borrowers access to credit it also led to increased incidences of delinquency and default our results shed light on the consequences of a credit reform and highlight the crucial role that collateral and repossession play in the liberalization and democratization of credit

endogenous entry exit as an alternative explanation for the disciplining role of independent analysts abstract gu and xue 2008 the superiority and disciplining role of independent analysts journal of accounting and economics this issue doi 10 1016 j jacceco 2008 02 002 study the disciplining effect of independent analysts on the accuracy and forecast relevance of the forecasts of non independent analysts one of the intriguing results is that while independent analysts issue inferior forecasts their presence appears to reduce the forecast bias improve the forecast accuracy and increase the forecast relevance of forecasts issued by non independent analysts we explore alternative explanations for the gu xue results our evidence of endogenous entry and exit of independent analysts provides a more compelling explanation for the reported results

introduction funding gaps theoretical and empirical foundations of government policies to plug alleged business funding gaps are highly controversial but rarely subject to wide ranging in depth debate this symposium from major scholars in the field provides a counterbalance topics addressed cover the theory of lending under asymmetric information its implications for overlending relationship lending as a market solution to information asymmetries government emulation of private sector decision making to eliminate underprovision of high tech equity and theoretically based empirical work testing for funding deficiencies in the high tech sector despite the very different and potentially contradictory contributions the result is surprisingly a set of mutually agreed policy conclusions

how low is a guaranteed lowest price a game based on the bertrand duopoly model is constructed to study the effects of price guarantee policies before it chooses a list price a firm can make a binding commitment to match or beat its competitor s price the effectiveness of these price guarantee policies in facilitating price collusion depends on the solution concept used furthermore there exists an equilibrium in which neither firm offers any price guarantees and each firm sets price equal to marginal cost

peasant household behaviour with missing markets some paradoxes explained a model of peasant household behavior under varying degrees of household specific food and labor market failures is constructed to show that these structural features can explain several well known patterns of peasant response which have often been attributed to peculiar motives presumed specific to peasants the model explains sluggish response to cash crops prices and high instability in perceived food and labor scarcities the key role of manufactured consumer goods prices in stimulating peasants effort in cash crops production the effectiveness of taxation as opposed to incentives in stimulating cash crops production and the key role of technological change in food production to enhance cash crop production results are obtained analytically in the case of one market failure and by numerical simulation with more than one

information and bank credit allocation abstract private information obtained by lenders leads to borrower capture to the extent that such information cannot be communicated credibly to outsiders we analyze how this capture affects the loan portfolio allocation of informed lenders first we show that banks charge higher interest rates and finance relatively less creditworthy borrowers in market segments with greater information asymmetries second when faced with greater competition from outside lenders banks reallocate credit toward more captured borrowers flight to captivity third if borrower quality and captivity are sufficiently correlated an increase in the competitiveness of uninformed lenders can worsen the informed lender s overall loan portfolio the model explains observed consequences of financial liberalizations

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

determinants and effects of income diversification amongst farm households in burkina faso using four years of household data from three agroecological zones in burkina faso sahelian sudanian and guinean the article examines the determinants and effects of household income diversification harvest shortfalls and terms of trade are found to drive diversification but land constraints do not income diversification is associated with higher incomes and food consumption and more stable income and consumption over years

the seasonal and spatial dimensions of sorghum market liberalization in mexico mexico s attempt to deregulate its sorghum market in 1990 was unsuccessful because policy analysts failed to consider the seasonal and spatial dimensions of trade in this paper i present a detailed seasonal and spatially dissaggregated nonlinear programming model of the mexican sorghum market calibrated with survey data of storage and transport costs in mexico and compare the results obtained with models that ignore these characteristics the comparison demonstrates that the failure to incorporate these costs in trade models may lead to misleading conclusions and inappropriate policies

a spatial analysis of maize marketing policy reforms in zambia in this study we analyze recent and proposed maize marketing reforms in zambia to capture the effects of changing transport systems we use a continuous space model in place of the traditional point representation model of takayama and judge this method permits us to use prereform data on supply demand and transport costs to infer both intra and interregional effects of liberalization and shows that the welfare gains from liberalization are larger than commonly thought these results provide policy makers with estimates of the magnitude of change associated with alternative reform programs beyond what would be available from a conventional approach

self selection and analyst coverage this paper examines the relation between analysts information about a stock s future prospects and their decisions to issue investment recommendations and earnings forecasts for that stock and the implications of this relation for the observed distribution of recommendations and earnings forecast errors articles in the financial press have long argued that analysts are reluctant to issue unfavorable investment information perhaps because they fear jeopardizing potential investment banking

relationship lending under asymmetric information a case of blocked entry abstract a national bank with a low cost of capital can choose to enter a two period credit market and compete with incumbent banks to supply relationship loans to de novo entrepreneurs under short term contracting the terms on loan contracts are determined by market competition in the current period in this setting we find that the second period competitive pressure the national bank exerts on the incumbent banks turns out to give the incumbent banks a first period advantage when trying to attract new clients as a result the low cost bank may be blocked from entering the market

inventory dynamics under transaction costs a conceptual model of storage behavior is developed optimal intertemporal pricing is derived to analyze the effects of transaction costs on storage andarbitrage pricing it is shown how transaction costs can rationalize the existence of an inverse carrying charge for inventory the model is applied to u s soybeans stocks for the period 1960 95 the empirical results suggest that transaction costs have a significant influence on storage behavior andintertemporal arbitrage pricing copyright 2000 oxford university press

government spending growth and poverty in rural india using state level data for 1970 93 a simultaneous equation model was developed to estimate the direct and indirect effects of different types of government expenditure on ruralpoverty and productivity growth in india the results show that in order to reduce rural poverty the indian government shoul d give highest priority to additionalinvestments in ruralroads and agricul turalresearch these types of investment not only have much larger poverty impacts per rupee spent than any other government investment but also generate higher productivity growth apart from government spending on education which has the third l argest marginalimpact on ruralpoverty and produc

different selling strategies in bertrand oligopoly abstract i analyse a bertrand oligopoly game where firms can choose between selling strategies i price announcements ii price announcements and offers to price match i establish the set of nash equilibria and show that only the monopoly price nash equilibrium satisfies iterative dominance

a theory of commodity price fluctuations this paper studies the price fluctuations of storable commodities that are traded in open markets and are subject to random shocks to demand or more particularly to supply it relaxes the common assumption that the shocks are identically and independently distributed in favor of temporally dependent and periodic disturbances the existence of a unique stationary rational expectations equilibrium is demonstrated for each of the models analyzed and testable implications of the models are derived an illustrative empirical investigation is then undertaken for the model with periodic disturbances using monthly time series observations for seven commodities over the period 1960 93

the superiority and disciplining role of independent analysts abstract we show that although forecasts of independent analysts are less accurate ex post they yield forecast errors that are more strongly associated with abnormal stock returns this suggests that forecasts of independent analysts are superior to those of nonindependent analysts in representing ex ante market expectations we also show that forecasts of nonindependent analysts become more accurate and less biased and produce forecast errors more strongly associated with abnormal stock returns when independent analysts are following the same firms than when they are not this suggests that the presence of independent analysts disciplines the behavior of nonindependent analysts

competitive storage and commodity price dynamics by buying cheap and selling dear risk neutral commodity speculators can smooth commodity prices and induce serial dependence in price even when none would exist under a simple process of supply and demand commodity prices are variable and strongly positively correlated from one year to the next the variability is often explained by supply factors and the autocorrelation by the activities of speculators we show that this explanation is not consistent with the evidence speculation can substantially increase autocorrelation for prices that are weakly autocorrelated in its absence but not to the high levels that are observed in the data

soft information in insurer lending and reinsurance under capital regulation the paper develops a capped call option framework explicitly integrating the borrowing firm credit risk moreover modelling the structural breaks in assets and volatility captures soft informatio

the benefits of lending relationships evidence from small business data this paper empirically examines how ties between a firm and its creditors affect the availability and cost of funds to the firm we analyze data collected in a survey of small firms by the small business administration the primary benefit of building close ties with an institutional creditor is that the availability of financing increases we find smaller effects on the price of credit attempts to widen the circle of relationships by borrowing from multiple lenders increases the price and reduces the availability of credit in sum relationships are valuable and appear to operate more through quantities rather than prices

raising offtake from cattle grazed on natural rangelands in sub saharan africa a transaction cost economics approach farmers in sub saharan africa are constrained by large transaction costs associated with marketing of their livestock however transaction costs are often not taken into account in the analysis of factors hampering the development of livestock marketing in this region this article empirically measures the influence of transaction costs on the offtake from cattle grazed on natural rangelands in uganda the study is based on the monitoring of 696 cattle transactions in three districts of uganda from august 2004 to august 2005 the estimated models suggest that proportional transaction costs represented by the state of roads distance to markets and time taken to reach the market are important variables constraining market participation in order to raise offtake from the national herd it is essential to explicitly address these costs one potential solution is collective action in marketing of livestock in which proportional and fixed transaction costs are reduced and shared among the group members

informal barriers and agricultural trade does monetary integration matter eu enlargement and the recent sovereign debt crisis of euro zone countries have revived the debate around the european monetary union emu in this article we ask how informal barriers to agricultural and food trade have changed since the introduction of the common european currency and whether this evolution can be attributed to monetary integration we focus on the foreign trade of the 11 emu founder countries over a nine year period covering the creation of the emu and find a diminishing marginal trade impact of both information and institutional barriers we find a lower level of trade barriers but cannot attribute this outcome to the introduction to the euro