estimating treatment effects from spatial policy experiments an application to ugandan microfinance abstract this paper demonstrates a method for estimating treatment effects in spatial tests utilizing a second control group to measure unexplained spatial phenomena the technique is implemented on two innovations in ugandan microfinance and we measure the ways in which concurrent shocks such as an ebola outbreak and a contentious presidential election altered outcomes differentially across regions by correcting for this spatial heterogeneity we measure the impact of the policies a program that increased borrowers control over the terms of their loans improved outcomes while the results of a program that bundled health insurance into the lending contract were more mixed

analysts interim earnings forecasts evidence on the forecasting process existing empirical evidence indicates that analyst forecasts of corporate earnings do not meet the strict rationality standards prescribed by econometric tests of the rational expectations hypothesis 1 in this paper we address the question of whether the expectation formation process underlying analyst forecasts is adaptive or whether these forecasts are influenced by noninformational factors such as incentives arising from the market for their forecasts o brien 1988 lin and mcnichols 1993 francis and philbrick 1993 and dugar and nathan 1992 and interaction between judgmental and or statistical forecasting methods bunn and wright 1991 fan 1990 and hoerl and kennard 1970 the rejection of rational expectations gives rise to two views of the forecasting process of analysts the first based on an informational argument is that the forecasting process is adaptive marcet and sargent

investment and financing activity following calls of convertible bonds abstract the staged financing hypothesis of mayers mayers d 1998 why firms issue convertible bonds the matching of financial and real investment options journal of financial economics 47 83 102 predicts that investment and financing activity will increase following in the money convertible bond calls the prediction for out of the money convertible calls is different no increase is expected we study the rate of both corporate investment and external financing around forced conversions using benchmarks that are analogous to those recommended by barber and lyon barber b lyon j 1996 detecting abnormal operating performance the empirical power and specification of test statistics journal of financial economics 41 359 400 we also examine the cross section of changes in investment and financing activity conversion forcing firms exhibit an increase in both capital expenditures and debt financing around the year of the convertible bond call however the same result holds for the sample firms that conducted out of the money convertible calls further there is no relation between changes in investment activity and changes in debt issuance at the firm level the evidence is inconsistent with the notion that forced conversions serve as a catalyst for staged financing and investment

measuring the default risk of small business loans a survival analysis approach in this paper we report that although medium maturity loans originated under the sba 7 a loan guarantee program are targeted to small firms that fail to obtain credit through conventional channels the default experience is comparable to that of a large percentage of loans held by larger commercial banks we establish that the default behavior of these loans is time sensitive as a loan seasons the likelihood of default increases initially peaks in the second year and declines thereafter using a discrete time hazard framework we show that the likelihood of default is conditional on borrower lender and loan characteristics and changes in economic conditions

joint liability versus individual liability in credit contracts abstract i offer an explanation for the coexistence of joint liability and individual liability microcredit contracts i show that both contracts maximize welfare when credit is rationed due to limited liability but for different borrowers borrowers monitor each other when liability is joint while the lender monitors individual loans joint liability offers poorer borrowers larger loans with less monitoring effort than would have to be exerted by the lender individual liability offers the wealthier among credit constrained borrowers larger loans even without monitoring the theory explains why individual loans serve the wealthier among poor borrowers and are larger and why businesses funded with individual loans grow more

approximating a cost of living index from demand functions a retrospect abstract this paper discusses several methods for approximating a cost of living index that are based on knowledge of the demand functions centered around a recently discovered article by malmquist it discusses the mean of over and undercompensation frisch s double expenditure method and some proposals of vartia

convertible bonds are not called late starting with ingersoll 1977b the academic literature has repeatedly sought to explain why convertible bonds are called late the findings here demonstrate there is no call delay to explain this paper finds that most convertible bonds given their call protection are called as soon as possible for those that are not there are significant cash flow advantages to delaying the median call delay for all convertible bonds is less than four months if a safety premium is desired to assure the conversion value will exceed the call price at the end of call notice period the median call period is less than a month the question of what is the optimal call policy for convertible bonds has attracted considerable attention since brennan and schwartz 1977 and ingersoll s 1977a seminal work that work suggests that the optimal call policy is to call the bond when the conversion value first exceeds the call price since forcing conversion eliminates the bondholders premium or option value however empirical studies e g ingersoll 1977b and constantinides and grundy 1987 claim that firms consistently deviate from this call policy and delay calls this claim is based on ingersoll s finding that firms wait on average until the conversion value exceeds the call price by 43 9 a result confirmed in mikkelson 1985 trying to explain this call delay phenomenon has generated an impressive literature to date however no one has actually documented whether there is a delay or measured how long the delay is in addition the existing empirical work has focused either on a subsample of called bonds or on a subsample of bonds remaining uncalled at a given point in time these partial samples are not adequate to empirically determine average call delays for convertible bonds or to distinguish between the various hypotheses proposed for call

liquidity costs and stock price response to convertible security calls firms announcements to call in the money convertible securities for redemption essentially force their conversion into common stock and such announcements are generally met with significant reductions in the calling firms equity values an explanation based on liquidity costs is advanced and tested the explanation implies that investors who choose to sell their shares early in the conversion period bear liquidity costs by selling at reduced prices consistent with the explanation the average share price decline is short lived lasting most of the conversion period thus a component of the call announcement effect appears to be due to liquidity costs copyright 1992 by university of chicago press

stock reaction to dividend savings of convertible preferred calls free cash flow or price pressure effects abstract calls of in the money convertible preferred stock typically induce dividend savings for the firm since preferred dividends exceed common stock dividends prior research finds that these savings are negatively related to stock returns at call announcement and argues that the market expects managers to abuse the increased free cash flow this paper finds that dividend savings are closely related to call size suggesting other explanations larger calls experience a more negative announcement reaction consistent with temporary liquidity effects there is a price reversal during the conversion period which is greater for larger calls

tax shields sample selection bias and the information content of conversion forcing bond calls the information content of conversion forcing bond calls depends on the after tax cash flow to bondholders if the dividend after conversion exceeds the after tax coupon but is less than the before tax coupon the call reveals unanticipated decreases in dividends and or earnings that reduce the tax shield from interest payments in contrast a call when the dividend is less than the after tax coupon reveals the timing of an anticipated shift from exceptional firm specific positive growth to the industry norm efforts to document properties of convertible calls are subject to sample selection bias because calls are disproportionately associated with positive pre call firm specific growth brennan and schwartz 1977 1980 and ingersoll 1977a show that if capital markets are perfect the optimal policy is to call and force conversion the first time the bond s conversion value exceeds its cash redemption value however ingersoll 1977b 1 and constantinides and grundy 1987 provide evidence that firms delay calling convertible debt and mikkelson 1980 1981 ofer and natarajan 1987 and singh cowan and nayar 1990 document a statistically significant negative return to equity at the call announcement to explain these results which are inconsistent with the optimal call policy and its predicted effect on equity value in a perfect capital market several asymmetric information hypotheses have been put forth mikkelson 1981 1985 hypothesizes that the negative market reaction results from the market inferring that management expects a decline in the present value of the debt s tax shield possibly due to a decline in future earnings this suggests that managers refrain from calling due to the tax shields provided by the debt harris and raviv 1985 present a signaling model in which a

the return to capital in ghana we show that the real return to capital in ghana s informal sector is high for farmers we find annual returns ranging from 205 350 in the new technology of pineapple cultivation and 30 50 in well established food crop cultivation we also examine the relative prices of durable goods of varying durability and estimate a lower bound to the opportunity cost of capital of 60 this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

is a convertible bond call really bad news we test and reject the hypothesis that managers call in the money convertibles when they view a decline in the value of the firm as likely inconsistent with this view we find that insiders generally buy equity before conversion forcing calls also analysts tend to raise their earnings forecasts following a call thus our evidence supports the alternative hypothesis that the price decline immediately following conversion forcing calls is a purely transitory decline caused by the anticipated increase in the supply of equity indeed our evidence confirms that the initial price decline is reversed in the weeks following the announcement

the role of group size in group lending abstract this paper explores group size in joint liability lending primarily in the adverse selection framework with local borrower information a single standardized contract that imposes full joint liability subject to a limited liability cap is optimal further if gross returns to borrowing are moderately high this contract results in perfectly efficient lending if groups are large enough however raising group size accomplishes nothing if there is no local borrower information these results show that more is required for efficient lending than full within group insurance and highlight a complementarity between group size and social capital very similar results are shown in two different settings ex ante and ex post moral hazard though the type of social capital that complements group size varies across the settings taking a step toward modeling drawbacks of larger groups it is shown that if information deteriorates sufficiently with group size an intermediate group size does better than either extreme simulations suggest that most of the efficiency gains from larger groups are realized in group sizes below ten and that outreach and efficiency can increase dramatically when a moderate group size threshold is crossed

does the classic microfinance model discourage entrepreneurship among the poor experimental evidence from india do the repayment requirements of the classic microfinance contract inhibit investment in high return but illiquid business opportunities among the poor using a field experiment we compare the classic contract which requires that repayment begin immediately after loan disbursement to a contract that includes a two month grace period the provision of a grace period increased short run business investment and long run profits but also default rates the results thus indicate that debt contracts that require early repayment discourage illiquid risky investment and thereby limit the potential impact of microfinance on microenterprise growth and household poverty jel a21 g32 i32 l25 l26 o15 o16

observing unobservables identifying information asymmetries with a consumer credit field experiment information asymmetries are important in theory but difficult to identify in practice we estimate the presence and importance of hidden information and hidden action problems in a consumer credit market using a new field experiment methodology we randomized 58 000 direct mail offers to former clients of a major south african lender along three dimensions i an initial offer interest rate featured on a direct mail solicitation ii a contract interest rate that was revealed only after a borrower agreed to the initial offer rate and ii a dynamic repayment incentive that was also a surprise and extended preferential pricing on future loans to borrowers who remained in good standing these three randomizations combined with complete knowledge of the lender s information set permit identification of specific types of private information problems our setup distinguishes hidden information effects from selection on the offer rate via unobservable risk and anticipated effort from hidden action effects via moral hazard in effort induced by actual contract terms we find strong evidence of moral hazard and weaker evidence of hidden information problems a rough estimate suggests that perhaps 13 to 21 of default is due to moral hazard asymmetric information thus may help explain the prevalence of credit constraints even in a market that specializes in financing high risk borrowers

a reexamination of analysts earnings forecasts for takeover targets abstract we examine analysts earnings forecasts for a sample of takeover targets and document that the announcement month forecasts are systematically revised upward supporting the hypothesis that a takeover announcement conveys favorable information about the target firm in addition we find that abnormal forecast revisions of future stand alone earnings are significantly greater for targets with low tobin s q ratios relative to targets with high q ratios lending further support to the information hypothesis finally we provide evidence that managerial resistance to the takeover does not destroy value our results are in direct contrast to pound 1988

returns to capital in microenterprises evidence from a field experiment small and informal firms account for a large share of employment in developing countries the rapid expansion of microfinance services is based on the belief that these firms have productive investment opportunities and can enjoy high returns to capital if given the opportunity however measuring the return to capital is complicated by unobserved factors such as entrepreneurial ability and demand shocks which are likely to be correlated with capital stock the authors use a randomized experiment to overcome this problem and to measure the return to capital for the average microenterprise in their sample regardless of whether they apply for credit they accomplish this by providing cash and equipment grants to small firms in sri lanka and measuring the increase in profits arising from this exogenous positive shock to capital stock after controlling for possible spillover effects the authors find the average real return to capital to be 5 7 percent a month substantially higher than the market interest rate they then examine the heterogeneity of treatment effects to explore whether missing credit markets or missing insurance markets are the most likely cause of the high returns returns are found to vary with entrepreneurial ability and with measures of other sources of cash within the household but not to vary with risk aversion or uncertainty

repayment frequency and default in microfinance evidence from india in stark contrast to bank debt contracts most micro finance contracts require that repayments start nearly immediately after loan disbursement and occur weekly thereafter even though economic theory suggests that a more flexible repayment schedule would benefit clients and potentially improve their repayment capacity micro finance practitioners argue that the fiscal discipline imposed by frequent repayment is critical to preventing loan default in this paper we use data from a field experiment which randomized client assignment to a weekly or monthly repayment schedule and find no significant effect of type of repayment schedule on client delinquency or default our findings suggest that among micro finance clients who are willing to borrow at either weekly or monthly repayment schedules a more flexible schedule can significantly lower transaction costs without increasing client default jel 012 016 022

executive compensation and the maturity structure of corporate debt executive compensation influences managerial risk preferences through executives portfolio sensitivities to changes in stock prices delta and stock return volatility vega large deltas discourage managerial risk taking while large vegas encourage risk taking theory suggests that short maturity debt mitigates agency costs of debt by constraining managerial risk preferences we posit and find evidence of a negative positive relation between ceo portfolio deltas vegas and short maturity debt we also find that short maturity debt mitigates the influence of vega and delta related incentives on bond yields overall our empirical evidence shows that short term debt mitigates agency costs of debt arising from compensation risk

contract structure risk sharing and investment choice few microfinance funded businesses grow beyond subsistence entrepreneurship this paper considers one possible explanation that the structure of existing microfinance contracts may discourage risky but high expected return investments to explore this possibility i develop a theory that unifies models of investment choice informal risk sharing and formal financial contracts i then test the predictions of this theory using a series of experiments with clients of a large microfinance institution in india the experiments confirm the theoretical predictions that joint liability creates two potential inefficiencies first borrowers free ride on their partners making risky investments without compensating partners for this risk second the addition of peer monitoring overcompensates leading to sharp reductions in risk taking and profitability equity like financing in which partners share both the benefits and risks of more profitable projects overcomes both of these inefficiencies and merits further testing in the field

adverse selection and convertible bonds informational asymmetries between a firm and investors may lead to adverse selection in capital markets this paper demonstrates that when the market obtains noisy information about a firm over time this adverse selection problem can be costlessly solved by issuing callable convertible bonds with restrictive call provisions such securities can be designed to make the payoff to new claimholders independent of the private information of the manager this eliminates the possibility of any dilution of equity or underinvestment and implements the symmetric information outcome in either a pooling or a separating equilibrium the same first best efficient outcome can also be implemented by issuing floating price and mandatory convertibles

bond rating agencies and stock analysts who knows what when both bond rating agencies and stock analysts evaluate publicly traded companies and com municate their opinions to investors comparing the timeliness of each we find that granger causality flows both ways while most bond downgrades are preceded by declines in actual and forecast earnings both actual earnings and forecasts of future earnings tend to fall following downgrades although part of this post downgrade forecast revision can be attributed to negative news regarding actual earnings most appears to be reaction to the downgrade itself we find little change in actual earnings following upgrades analysts however tend to increase their forecasts of future earnings

corporate bankruptcy and insider trading the authors document significant sales by the insiders of firms filing bankruptcy petitions prior to the filing date they also find that selling is more intense for top executives and officers and that insiders in general systematically sell stock before prices fall and buy stock after prices have fallen although this trading pattern may simply reflect an implicit compensation arrangement between insiders and stockholders the significant sell off does raise potential questions regarding managements incentives to maximize shareholder wealth throughout the chapter 11 process copyright 1997 by university of chicago press

mosak s equality and the theory of duality slutsky in the interpretation of the substitution matrix in the fundamental equation of value theory 2 slutsky s interpretation involves a compensation of the change in real income caused by a price change that makes possible the purchase of the same quantities of all the goods that had formerly been bought 13 while hicks compensation keeps the consumer on the same utility level as before the price change 4 it is known that when the price change is infinitesimal the hicks substitution matrix is equal to the slutsky matrix we will call this mosak s equality mosak s equality has played an important role in index number theory the price index that truly reflects the welfare change should be based on the hicksian compensation such an index is difficult to compute however because utility levels are not observable instead the laspeyres index is widely adopted in practice this index is based on the slutsky compensation since it indicates the change in income that would be needed in the current year in order to buy the commodity bundle bought in the base year mosak s equality reveals that for small price changes the laspeyres index is a good approximation to the ideal index 5 despite its practical importance mosak s equality has been given only a rather cumbersome proof 6 the aim of the present paper is to give a new proof of mosak s equality based on the principles of duality theory like the duality proofs of many other theorems this proof is simpler and more transparent than the traditional one

measuring microfinance assessing the conflict between practitioners and researchers with evidence from nepal summary what accounts for the discrepancy between microfinance impact claims of development practitioners and the far smaller impacts found in experimental studies we demonstrate in a simple theoretical framework why before and after observations of practitioners overstate microfinance impacts and why estimations in some recent randomized trials understate the average treatment effect on the treated att our empirical study uses a unique data set from eastern nepal to study the impact of microfinance in villages where microfinance did not previously exist we find that approximately three fourths of the apparent impact of microfinance observed by practitioners is an illusion driven by correlated unobservable factors

convertible call policies an empirical analysis of an information signaling hypothesis abstract this paper tests an information signaling hypothesis as a potential explanation for corporate convertible bond call policies and for the negative share price reaction to the announcement of the calls we test this hypothesis by trying to ascertain whether the information signaled is realized our results show an unexpected decline in the firm s performance subsequent to the call we also find significant negative cumulative returns during a sixty month period following the calls

the maturity structure of corporate debt we provide an empirical examination of the determinants of corporate debt maturity our evidence offers strong support for the contracting cost hypothesis firms that have few growth options are large or are regulated have more long term debt in their capital structure we find little evidence that firms use the maturity structure of their debt to signal information to the market the evidence is consistent however with the hypothesis that firms with larger information asymmetries issue more short term debt we find no evidence that taxes affect debt maturity

experimental evidence on returns to capital and access to finance in mexico a strong theoretical argument for focusing on access to finance is that financial market imperfections can result in large inefficiencies as firms with productive investment opportunities underinvest lack of access to finance is a frequent complaint of microenterprises which account for a large share of employment in developing countries however assessing the extent to which a lack of capital affects their business profits is complicated by the fact that business investment is likely to be correlated with a host of unmeasured characteristics of the owner and firm such as entrepreneurial ability and demand shocks in a randomized experiment that gave cash and in kind grants to small retail firms providing an exogenous shock to capital the shock generated large increases in profits with the effects concentrated among firms that were more financially constrained the estimated return to capital was at least 20 33 percent a month three to five times higher than market interest rates

group versus individual liability short and long term evidence from philippine microcredit lending groups abstract group liability in microcredit purports to improve repayment rates through peer screening monitoring and enforcement however it may create excessive pressure and discourage reliable clients from borrowing two randomized trials tested the overall effect as well as specific mechanisms the first removed group liability from pre existing groups and the second randomly assigned villages to either group or individual liability loans in both groups still held weekly meetings we find no increase in short run or long run default and larger groups after three years in pre existing areas and no change in default but fewer groups created after two years in the expansion areas