optimal taxation in models of endogenous growth we study the problem of optimal taxation in three infinite horizon representative agent endogenous growth models the first model is a convex model in which physical and human capital are perfectly symmetric our second model incorporates elastic labor supply through a lucas style technology analysis of these two models points out the danger of assuming that government expenditures are exogenous in our third model we include government expenditures as a productive input in capital formation showing that the limiting tax rate on capital is no longer zero in numerical simulations we find similar effects on growth and welfare in all three models

a positive theory of environmental quality regulation this paper demonstrates that environmental quality regulation may enhance producer wealth while simultaneously reducing an externality problem by restricting access to common property regulation not only corrects a resource misallocation but it creates a scarcity rent as well in the recent history of environmental quality the common access problem has been addressed by federal and state agencies through a standards based approach rather than through the enforcement of tradable property rights as a consequence rents from the right to use these assets have accrued to producers the data are convincing that there is a strong interplay between producers consumers and the victims of pollution each party has some influence on the outcome and one sided analysis neglects many important aspects of regulation environmental quality regulation is complicated but many of the observed perplexities are consistent with a rent seeking self interest theory of government 46 references 1 figure 7 tables

toward a theoretical model of voluntary overcompliance abstract we explain why some firms voluntarily overcomply with environmental regulation in our model all consumers value environmental quality but differ in their willingness to pay which depends on their income levels publicly available information on environmental performance of firms enables consumers to identify clean firms firms participate in a two stage duopoly game where they first choose their levels of cleaning technology and next engage in price competition the market gets segmented by income levels a minimum standard binding on the dirty firm has the effect of improving the performance of the cleaner firm a subsidy obtains the same competitive outcome

uniqueness and indeterminacy on the dynamics of endogenous growth abstract in this paper we study the dynamics of endogenous growth both in the model of lucas and in a generalization that incorporates a labor leisure choice we characterize the regions of the parameter space that give rise to unique equilibria as well as the regions that yield a continuum of equilibria with positive growth rates we find that such multiple equilibria exist for empirically very plausible parameters in particular when the lucas model is modified to incorporate endogenous labor journal of economic literature numbers e00 e3 o40

marginal income tax rates in the united states a non parametric approach abstract the objective of this paper is to estimate both the u s federal marginal income tax rate and the state and local marginal income tax rates we use the non parametric regression method and data on income and tax extracted from u s individual tax model files for the period 1985 1995 the flexibility of the non parametric approach and the information at the individual level enable us to construct a more reliable time series of the average federal marginal income tax rates and that of the average state and local marginal income tax rates our results suggest that the average federal marginal income tax rate varies from 18 2 to 21 8 and the average state and local marginal income tax rate varies from 4 7 to 5 6 we also find that the state and local income tax accounts for roughly 18 of the total income taxes paid during 1985 1995 moreover our analysis shows that stephenson journal of monetary economics 41 1998 pp 389 409 provides the most consistent tax rate series for use in applications that require estimates of tax rates for years prior to 1985

growth effects of flat rate taxes recent estimates of the potential growth effects of tax reform vary wildly ranging from zero to eight percentage points using an endogenous growth model we assess which model features and parameter values are important for determining the quantitative impact of tax reform we find that the critical parameters are factor shares depreciation rates the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the elasticity of labor supply the elasticities of substitution in production on the other hand are relatively unimportant the quantitative estimates in several recent papers are compared with each other and with some of the evidence from u s experience we find that robert lucas s conclusion that tax reform would have little or no effect on the u s growth rate is theoretically robust and consistent with the evidence

the welfare effects of environmental taxation on a green market where consumers emit a pollutant this paper examines the welfare impact of emission taxes and subsidies in a green market where consumers emit a pollutant through their usage of products produced by duopolists for this purpose we employ a discrete continuous model including both consumer choice and usage of an environmentally differentiated product in a utility consistent framework the findings indicate that an emission tax is always welfare dominant over a subsidy on consumer purchases of the clean product because of its contribution to a reduction in environmental damage it does this by both inducing firms to improve the environmental qualities of their products and by constraining consumer usage of these products

quality leadership when regulatory standards are forthcoming in many markets governments set minimum quality standards while some sellers compete on the basis of quality by exceeding them such quality leadership strategies often win public acclaim especially when they involve environmental attributes using a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation we show that if the high quality firm can commit to a quality level before regulations are promulgated it induces the regulator to weaken standards and welfare falls our results raise doubts about the social benefits of corporate self regulation and highlight the dangers of lengthy delays between legislative mandates for new regulations and their implementation

growth effect of taxes in an endogenous growth model to what extent do taxes affect economic growth abstract this paper presents an endogenous growth model comprising of financial human and physical capital and incorporating major features of a general tax system technology and preference parameter values in the model are chosen to fit the actual growth experiences of the united states and a rapidly growing east asian nic using the calibrated model i assess the role of differences in taxes and other variables in explaining the difference in growth rates the main findings are i the difference in tax systems across countries explains a significant proportion around 30 of the difference in growth rates ii the difference in preferences explains at most 4 and iii differences in labor income tax debt equity ratio and inflation can be important in explaining the growth difference further i evaluate the contribution of the monetary factor to the growth rate gap and the growth effect of us tax reforms e g revenue neutral changes in relative tax structure

macroeconomic policies growth and welfare in a stochastic economy an integrated stochastic equilibrium growth model is constructed and directed to various questions pertaining to monetary and tax policy two main issues addressed include 1 the tradeoff between the rate of capital accumulation and inflation in a stochastic environment and 2 economic welfare and optimal policy making the key result is that policy variables impact on welfare through their effect on the after tax nominal interest rate which therefore serves as an intermediate policy target the welfare maximizing interest rate target is derived and the author discusses its attainment through appropriate monetary and tax policies tradeoffs between policy instruments are also addressed copyright 1993 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted in the united states empirical studies of the enforcement of continuous compliance with environmental regulations especially air and water pollution regulations have repeatedly demonstrated the following i for most sources the frequency of surveillance is quite low ii even when violations are discovered fines or other penalties are rarely assessed in most states iii sources are nonetheless thought to be in compliance a large part of the time the evidence for the apparently low level of enforcement activity is found in a number of case studies of state and local enforcement of air and water quality regulations conducted jointly by the environmental protection agency epa and council on environmental quality ceg together with periodic surveys of implementation of air and water quality legislation conducted by the general accounting office gao these surveys show

monopoly product differentiation and economic welfare abstract this paper discusses the pricing behavior of a monopolistic producer supplying several quality differentiated goods by using a model of a lancasterian characteristic approach with consumer s taste pattern dispersed it examines how finer product differentiation which is made by the producer by means of the introduction of a new good changes the price structure and consumer s welfare it will be establised that the entry of a new good imposes quite different impacts on the price of the goods of higher quality and on those of lower quality goods

economic incentives for environmental protection integrating theory and practice for decades economists have been extolling the virtues of market based or economic incentive approaches to environmental protection some 70 years ago arthur cecil pigou 1920 suggested corrective taxes to discourage activities that generate externalities a half century later j dales 1968 showed how the introduction of transferable property rights could work to promote environmental protection at lower aggregate cost than conventional standards from these two seminal ideas corrective taxes and transferable property rights a substantial body of research has developed both environmental taxes and marketable permits are coming of age in the policy arena examples include the introduction of marketable permits in the united states to control acid rain the use of changes in europe to limit air and water pollution and the employment of deposit refund schemes for products ranging from beverage containers to batteries the introduction of these tools on a large scale provides a unique opportunity to extend the frontiers of knowledge this essay strives to identify prominent issues that merit investigation 8 refs

the net benefits of incentive based regulation a case study of environmental standard setting economists interested in environmental safety and health regulation have long argued that decentralized incentive based or ib policies are more efficient than centralized command and control or cac approaches see charles schultze 1977 for instance these arguments generally have been based on the assumption that ib policies will accomplish the same goals as their cac counterparts but at less cost to society however some of those touting ib policies have overlooked an important point environmental workplace or even productsafety standards typically take the form of maximum permissible concentrations of harmful substances so that compliance only requires that all monitoring points or samples register readings below these critical levels for this reason ib policies typically assign a shadow price of zero to improvements that exceed the standard s while more crude cac policies generally result in overcontrol beyond the standards if there is no value to this overcontrol cac policies will not improve at all on ib approaches and will indeed be more expensive if however reduced concentrations below the level of the standards bring with them further improvements in health or the environment cac approaches will produce greater benefits than ib approaches thus a fair comparison between the two necessitates that any additional benefits associated with cac policies be offset against the cost advantages enjoyed by their ib counterparts although this possibility has been recognized by others scott atkinson and t h tietenberg 1982 for instance it is little appreciated and its empirical significance has never been ascertained that is our purpose here we do so by developing data on the costs and benefits of controlling a common air pollutant total suspended particulates or tsp in baltimore by comparing the tsp levels likely under both ib and cac approaches we are able to estimate the marginal costs and benefits associated with a variety of alternative air quality standards which take the form of maximum permissible concentrations this in turn allows us to determine the net benefits arising from the two kinds of regimes in the next section we present a simple conceptual framework for our analysis section ii describes the estimation of the costs and benefits of our hypothesized air pollution controls in baltimore section iii presents our somewhat surprising findings and section iv discusses those findings and their potential significance for regulation in the real world

the manufacturing sector s environmental motives a game theoretic analysis what motivates manufacturing companies to make costly investments in producing in an environmentally clean manner the traditional argument is that such behaviour is value reducing and that therefore firms must be forced by regulation to invest in green production processes a counter argument is that firms have an incentive to make environmental investments in an attempt to attract green consumers and investors hence gaining competitive advantage over their rivals in this paper we employ a game theoretic approach that demonstrates that competing firms incentives to make voluntary investments in environmental clean up are affected by the size of the investment costs and the extent of consumer and investor green awareness we argue that an increase in green behaviour can be induced by a combination of governmental subsidies for firms that invest in environmentally clean production processes together with an education program that promotes green awareness amongst consumers investors and the managers themselves

information and the provision of quality differentiated products governments often enact information provision policies to overcome asymmetric information of product qualities we show that increasing awareness among consumers of the quality of a good can but will not always encourage firms to produce goods with higher levels of quality even if product qualities increase social welfare may fall as information provision results in too much product differentiation we show that the effectiveness of emission taxes and output subsidies are affected by the level of consumer knowledge of product quality and we identify conditions under which information provision is welfare enhancing relative to these price instruments jel l15 q58 i introduction in the past 20 years consumers have become increasinglyconscious ofthe undesirable health and safety attributes of the products they consume and surveys suggest that a growing percentage of consumers are willing to pay more for higher quality products such as organic foods and household cleaners and detergents that contain less toxic ingredients guber 2003 other high quality products facing higher demand include energy efficient products like extended life lightbulbs and improved home insulation often these highquality products provide private benefits that are excludable to buyers as well as public benefits that are nonrival and nonexcludable for example reduced pesticide and chemical residue on food may lower the risk of cancer while also reducing contaminated run off that degrades ground and surface water quality extended life lightbulbs and improved home insulation may reduce an individual s utility bill while also reducing greenhouse gas emissions from lower energy consumption although interest in these types of high quality productsisgrowing demand isoften relatively small market shares of organic produce for

anticipated tax reforms and temporary tax cuts a general equilibrium analysis macroeconomic studies of tax policy in dynamic general equilibrium usually assume that reforms hit the economy unexpectedly and last forever here we explore how previous results change when we allow policy changes to be pre announced and of finite duration and when these facts are anticipated by households and firms quantitatively we demonstrate a headstart advantage from pre announcement that is never caught up by a surprising reform the welfare gain stemming from a 5 year announcement phase of a corporate tax cut for example is estimated to be around 10 percent of the total gain from the reform we show that impulse responses of important variables like firm value dividends and investment differ qualitatively depending on whether the reform comes expected or not we are also able to demonstrate a genuine welfare gain from temporary tax cuts impulse responses generated by our numerical method can be retraced by phase diagram analysis which facilitates explanation and interpretation of the produced results

growth effects of shifting from a graduated rate tax system to a flat tax i introduction recently the debate concerning fundamental u s tax reform has led to a number of proposals that involve a shift toward a consumption based system 1 one such proposal is the so called flat tax of hall and rabushka 1995 the flat tax would apply a single tax rate to all labor income above a given threshold and to all capital income after fully expensing investment expenditures hall and rabushka 1995 argue that the adoption of their proposal would provide an enormous boost to the u s economy by dramatically improving incentives to engage in productive activities and would save taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars in compliance and administration costs 2 in this article we develop a quantitative general equilibrium model to assess the growth effects of adopting a flat tax plan similar to the one proposed by hall and rabushka 1995 the model captures many of the features of the current u s tax code such as graduated personal tax rates a standard personal deduction separate tax rates applied to personal and business income double taxation of business income and differential tax treatment of physical and human capital under appropriate parameter settings the model can exhibit either endogenous or exogenous long run growth our choice of functional forms facilitates a closed form solution to the model this allows us to characterize explicitly the economy s transition path following the reform a central issue in the debate over fundamental tax reform is the effect that such a reform would have on economic growth the present analysis builds on the work of stokey and rebelo 1995 who use an endogenous growth framework to identify the key model features and parameters that are important for determining the quantitative impacts of distortionary taxes on long run growth 3 our study differs from theirs and the bulk of the dynamic tax literature in one fundamental respect here we evaluate the growth effects of shifting from a graduatedrate tax system to a flat rate system stokey and rebelo 1995 consider only flat rate systems in which the marginal tax rate is equal to the average tax rate we approximate the graduated rate tax system in the u s economy by an empirical tax rate function that allows the personal tax rate to depend positively on household taxable income in equilibrium household decisions are influenced by both the level and slope of the tax schedule to implement the flat tax reform we shift the parameters of the tax rate function to flatten the marginal tax schedule while maintaining revenue neutrality our methodology treats the hall rabushka proposal as one that in effect moves a representative household from one tax rate schedule to another we view this setup as a reasonable approximation to gauge the growth effects of tax reform at the macro level a more elaborate setup would of course allow for household heterogeneity at a given point in time in this regard we note that caucutt et al 2003 have recently examined the growth effects of graduated rate taxes in a two period overlapping generations model that includes both skilled and unskilled agents in their model a flatter tax schedule increases the fraction of skilled agents in the economy the share of total output devoted to education rises accordingly and the economy s long run growth rate is observed to increase the quantitative implications of their model are difficult to compare to ours however because their two period framework implies a very long time horizon between household decisions about 30 years moreover their model abstracts from many of the features of the u s tax code that we include here in addition to examining the consequences of flattening the marginal tax schedule we investigate the growth effects attributable to other parts of the flat tax proposal such as allowing full investment expensing eliminating the double taxation of business income and increasing the standard personal deduction

the mexican electricity sector policy analysis and reform 1992 2009 this article analyses the cause effect relation of the structural reform in the mexican electricity sector called the public electricity service act from 1992 to 2009 one of the main arguments of the reform is to attract private investment in order to reduce the financial load of the government in infrastructure for the development of the national electric power system by means of six modalities power self supply cogeneration small power production independent power production power export and power import the article presents the global context of reforms adopted in 1990 the major policies and events are presented in chronological order before and after reform in addition it analyses the new institutional framework the evolution of modalities technologies of electricity generation and tariffs the main conclusion is that the result of reform could be considered a partial progress the independent power production modality shows greater participation while power self supply and cogeneration are lower the subsidy policy is maintained progress is needed in policies and strengthening and also in updating regulatory and normative frameworks

a theory of consumer boycotts under symmetric information and imperfect competition this article models strategic interactions between non identical duopolistic firms and a public interest environmental organisation eo that promotes green production practices by threatening consumer boycotts against brown producers the article describes when boycotts are deterred by prior firm commitments to be green and also when a boycott arises in equilibrium despite symmetric information when a boycott arises it is either a small persistent boycott against the small firm in the industry or a large transitory boycott against the large firm in the industry that prompts the target firm to accede to the boycott demands quickly

capital tax reform corporate finance and economic growth and welfare abstract recent empirical studies have revealed a strong impact of tax changes on corporate finance yet models of economic growth usually neglect financial structure of the representative firm in order to investigate whether the consideration of firm finance modifies the estimated outcome of capital tax reforms a corporate sector is introduced in three popular models of economic growth the paper explores analytically the impact of taxation on structures of finance and production and gives a quantitative reassessment of growth and welfare effects of tax reforms in the u s economy a general result is that standard models of exogenous and endogenous growth overestimate the growth effect and underestimate the welfare gain from tax reform

factor taxation and labor supply in a dynamic one sector growth model abstract this paper studies a class of ak type growth models with factor income taxes public capital stock and labor leisure trade offs while a higher capital tax rate reduces economic growth in the short run the long term growth effect is ambiguous and remains ambiguous even if the level of tax rate is larger than the degree of government externality a higher labor income tax rate has ambiguous growth effects both in the short and long runs however if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for labor supply is sufficiently small a higher labor tax rate always lowers economic growth in the long run despite the existence of productive government taxation

voluntary disclosure and investment in environmental technology abstract i examine the role of voluntary disclosure programs in creating market incentives for competing firms to invest in environmentally cleaner technology in an industry subject to environmental regulation such as emission taxes such programs may allow firms to credibly disclose their progress in achieving compliance cost reduction through investments in internal rd the outcome of the investment is private information i show that the ex ante incentive to invest is always higher in the presence of the voluntary disclosure program than without it in particular the opportunity to credibly disclose progress in cost reduction allows a successful firm to convey its true position of competitive advantage to the rival firm and realize higher market share and profit thus voluntary disclosure programs increase the efficacy of traditional forms of environmental regulation in creating incentives for green technological change even when buyers have no preference for greener technology i show that such programs generally increase social welfare

exploring new ways of assessing the effect of regulation on environmental management abstract studies indicate that while a variety of factors positively influence voluntary environmental management regulatory pressures are among the most important however most research examines samples representing large manufacturers or single industries essentially assuming a level of regulatory constraint using a sample of heterogeneous facilities this study finds that facilities can be classified according to the level of regulatory constraint and that group membership impacts the choice of environmental management strategy when assessed within a utility maximization framework more extensively regulated facilities implement more individual environmental management practices but participate in fewer formal voluntary environmental programs veps compared to other facilities

optimal tax debt and expenditure policies in a growing economy abstract this paper employs an endogenous growth model to analyze the role of a consumption tax in enhancing growth and welfare provided government expenditure impacts directly on the decisions of private agents two fiscal instruments are necessary to replicate the first best optimum the tradeoff between consumption and income taxes to achieve this outcome is discussed and shown to depend upon the degree of congestion associated with the public good and the level of government expenditure relative to its social optimum in general the analysis suggests a potentially important role for a consumption tax as part of an overall optimal fiscal package

individual firm and market dynamics of csr activities this paper investigates how firms should plan corporate social responsibility short csr this dynamic analysis starts with a firm s intertemporal optimization problem and proceeds to analyze interactions with other firms which are crucial if csr is profitable for firm a then it is most likely also profitable for competitors b and c and these simultaneous decisions affect the gain each would achieve from trying to advance its own position we find that multiple equilibria exist irrespective of whether interactions with other firms are taken into account interactions can eliminate or create additional steady states and can lead to a situation in which history is insufficient to determine the long run outcome among multiple steady states so that coordination is beneficial

pollution accumulation and firm incentives to accelerate technological change under uncertain private benefits the paper explores the relationships between the design of public incentives and the policy maker s desired timing of abandonment of a polluting technology when this requires an irreversible private investment and the firm faces uncertain appropriable benefits from the technological change two regulatory approaches are examined firstly we consider the quite common one of lowering the private investment cost through a subsidy in order to bridge the gap between the private and the policy maker s desired timing of environmental innovation secondly we consider a policy scenario where the regulator instead of simply lowering the investment s rental price also stimulates abandonment of the polluting technology by reducing through appropriate announcements the uncertainty surrounding the technological switch s private profitability we then compare the two approaches and show the latter s benefits in terms of the policy s effectiveness and or budgetary savings

voluntary environmental agreements good or bad news for environmental protection abstract there has been growing interest in the use of voluntary agreements vas as an environmental policy tool this article uses a simple model to determine whether vas are likely to lead to efficient environmental protection we consider cases where polluters are induced to participate either by a background threat of mandatory controls the stick approach or by cost sharing subsidies the carrot approach the results suggest that the overall impact on environmental quality could be positive or negative depending on a number of factors including the allocation of bargaining power the magnitude of the background threat and the social cost of funds