political cycles in oecd economies this paper studies whether the dynamic behaviour of gnp growth unemployment and inflation is systematically affected by the timing of elections and of changes of governments the sample include the last three decades in 18 oecd economies we explicitly test the implication of several models of political cycles both of the opportunistic and of the partisan type also we confront the implication of recent rational models with more traditional approaches our results can be summarized as follows a the political business cycle hypothesis as formulated in nordhaus 1975 on output and unemployment is generally rejected by the data b inflation tends to increase immediately after elections perhaps as a result of pre electoral expansionary monetary and fiscal policies c we find evidence of temporary partisan differences in output and unemployment and of long run partisan differences in the inflation rate as implied by the rational partisan theory by alesina 1987 d we find virtually no evidence of permanent partisan differences in output growth and unemployment

when is stabilization expansionary evidence from high inflation countries which stabilize from high inflation here defined as an annual rate above 40 usually have output expansions in the first and subsequent years of stabilization these expansions occur in both exchange rate based and money based stabilizations the paper reaches these conclusions after examining a sample of all 28 episodes in the international data that meet a pre defined criterion for stabilization from high inflation the results do not change with alternative growth and stabilization definitions the paper documents similar expansionary stabilizations in historical data and in the recent experience of the former communist economies expansionary stabilizations may be an indirect confirmation of recent theories of political economy that predict that stabilization will not occur until the gains are very large william easterly

who minimum wage increases bite an analysis using monthly data from the sipp and the cps 1 introduction neoclassical competitive models of firm behavior predict that wage increases reduce the quantity of labor demanded by firms and holding the wage rate constant that the least valued workers are the first fired or the last hired minimum wage legislation exogenously increases the price of labor and data from periods when the minimum wage changes can be used to empirically test its effect on the employment of vulnerable workers however a new body of research using such data suggests that minimum wage increases do not reduce employment and may even increase it card 1992a b katz and krueger 1992 card katz and krueger 1994 card and krueger 1994 1995 from a theoretical perspective this new economics of the minimum wage has been characterized as an assault on the law of demand ehrenberg 1995 if modest increases in the minimum wage have no employment effects then the appropriateness of this method in helping the working poor is strictly a distributional issue 2 however if minimum wage increases reduce employment and if the jobs lost are concentrated among the vulnerable groups the policy claims to assist then policy makers must consider this unintended consequence hence estimating the elasticity of employment with respect to minimum wage increases is more than simply an empirical test of economic theory in this paper we use monthly data from the survey of income and program participation sipp and the current population survey cps to examine the effect of raising the minimum wage on employment in contrast to much of the new minimum wage literature we find that minimum wage increases significantly reduce employment moreover we find that the elasticity of demand for labor with respect to increases in the minimum wage is greatest for the most vulnerable groups in the working age population young adults who have low levels of education young black adults and teenagers and teenagers we also find that minimum wage increases reduce the overall employment of young adults and teenagers though the estimated elasticities are smaller 2 the new economics of the minimum wage the new minimum wage literature is dominated by studies that find that minimum wage increases have an insignificant or in some cases a positive and significant effect on the employment of young adults and teenagers aged 16 24 or on other subgroups within that population card 1992a b katz and krueger 1992 card katz and krueger 1994 card and krueger 1994 1995 most of these studies have now generated replies arguing that raising the minimum wage significantly decreases employment in these populations neumark and wascher 1992 1994 1996 in press deere murphy and welch 1995 taylor and kim 1995 burkhauser couch and wittenburg in press because these new studies of the minimum wage vary widely in their techniques we focus our discussion on those that use cps data and employ an estimation strategy related to the one we use in this paper neumark and wascher 1992 1994 1996 card katz and krueger 1994 card and krueger 1995 deere murphy and welch 1995 burkhauser couch and wittenburg in press 3 specifically we review studies that use a pooled time series cross sectional approach to estimate the employment effects of minimum wage increases on vulnerable groups such as teenagers with cps data deere murphy and welch 1995 also use pooled repeated cross sectional data from the cps to estimate the impact of minimum wage increases but their specification differs in some important ways from the studies discussed above deere murphy and welch 1995 estimate the effect of minimum wage increases over the period from 1985 through 1993 they construct intervals of monthly data from 1985 through 1993 that begin on the first day of april of each year and end on the last day of match during the following year for each interval they create annual averages of variables

the political economy of inflation and stabilization in developing countries the traditional literature on inflation in developing countries has focused on three main determinants of inflationary pressures a money creation b fiscal imbalances and c cost push elements while the first two factors have been emphasized by authors of a monetarist persuasion cost factors have played a crucial role in the structuralist theories developed during the 1950s and 1960s however more recent analyses on inflation and stabilization have shifted their attention away from traditional direct economic causes of inflation such as money creation toward political and institutional determinants of inflationary forces this new literature which has come to be known as the political economy approach to macroeconomic policy has built on some important insights of game theory and the theory of public choice trying to explain why some governments decide to run large fiscal deficits and to rely heavily on the inflation tax typically in answering these questions this recent strand of the literature has emphasized the role of political instability credibility reputation and political cycles 2 in spite of providing some important new insights into the determinants of inflation this new literature is subject to two limitations first until recently most of the contributions have been theoretical without providing empirical tests on their most important implications and second the emphasis has been almost exclusively on the industrialized countries ignoring the developing nations the purpose of this article is to discuss selectively some of the most important insights of this new literature on policy making from the developing countries perspective i will emphasize the policy implications of this approach to inflationary analysis and discuss some of the limited empirical results

the argentine stabilization plan of december 20th abstract in this paper an analytical model is developed to incorporate the essential characteristics of the stabilization plan implemented in argentina in january 1979 the model is based upon a set of simplifying assumptions that only approximate the complexity of the real world it is assumed that the expectations of inflation and the degree of excess demand or supply in the non traded goods market are the main intermediate determinants of the rate of inflation in that market the rate of change of prices of traded goods being determined by the external inflation together with the rate of devaluation treating thus the external rate of inflation as exogenous the only instrument available for influencing the rate of inflation in the long run is the rate of devaluation since the model assumes a fixed exchange rate regime the money supply is endogenous and hence unsuitable as an instrument of economic policy

on becoming more flexible exchange rate regimes in latin america and the caribbean abstract this paper examines the shift from fixed to more flexible exchange rate regimes among countries in latin america and the caribbean in contrast to most traditional approaches the one followed here recognizes that fixed rates can be and often are adjusted but argues that policy makers incur a political cost from devaluation at the same time flexible exchange rates even managed ones may be very volatile with persistent misalignment a stylized model of regime choice is developed based on the perceived losses from exchange rate misalignment incurred under fixed versus more flexible regimes the model is estimated for a sample of 24 countries over the period 1978 1992 and empirical results are quite supportive misalignments proxied by current account deficits and moderate to high rates of inflation were associated with a move to more flexible rates during 1978 1986 misalignment indicators appear to have mattered less during 1987 1992 however there appears to have been a major reduction in the perceived difficulty of managing flexible rates during this period the paper then cautions against attributing differences in economic growth between groups of countries to their exchange regime the central point here is that the endogeneity of regime choice introduces selection biases into the samples of countries with fixed and with more flexible exchange regimes

who gets what from minimum wage hikes a re estimation of card and krueger s distributional analysis in myth and measurement the new economics of the minimum wage i ve studied the arguments and the evidence for and against a minimum wage increase i believe that the weight of the evidence is that a modest increase does not cost jobs and may even lure people into the job market but the most important thing is you can t make a living on 4 25 an hour president clinton state of the union address 1995

a positive theory of discretionary policy the cost of democratic government and the benefits of a constitution we offer an explanation of government s preference for discretionary policy action the main elements are asymmetric information and the ability and desire of governments to maximize reelection prospects discretionary policy imposes a social cost we show that the cost is eliminated if all voters have the same information as the government an optimal state contingent policy rule that precommits government through a constitution eliminates the cost by removing government s opportunities to exploit its informational advantage rules of this kind and constitutional restrictions are difficult to enforce in the presence of uncertainty and different information available to government and the public

the distributional and efficiency effects of increasing the minimum wage a simulation the generally accepted goal of minimum wage laws is to alter the distribution of income in favor of low income households however since a minimum wage will also disrupt low wage labor markets causing inefficiencies and imposing costs on some of the same workers the law is intended to help an evaluation of the policy requires a weighing of the distributional benefits against the efficiency costs quantification of these benefits and costs is clearly important to this evaluation while much effort has been devoted to estimating the employment effects of minimum wage laws relatively little work has been done to estimate the distributional benefits our simulations focus on this efficiency equity tradeoff by developing estimates of the impact of an increase in the minimum wage on the level and distribution of real income across households previous work has concluded that minimum wages are not as beneficial in their distributional impact as generally supposed

democratic institutions and exchange rate commitments since the collapse of the bretton woods system countries have been able to choose from a variety of exchange rate arrangements we argue that politicians incentives condition the choice of an exchange rate arrangement these incentives reflect the configuration of domestic political institutions particularly electoral and legislative institutions in systems where the cost of electoral defeat is high and electoral timing is exogenous politicians will be less willing to forgo their discretion over monetary policy with a fixed exchange rate in systems where the costs of electoral defeat are low and electoral timing is endogenous politicians are more likely to adopt a fixed exchange rate regime consequently differences in domestic political systems can help account for variations in the choice of exchange rate arrangements we test this argument using constrained multinomial logit and binomial logit on a sample of twenty democracies over the period 1974 95 domestic political institutions have a significant effect on exchange rate regime choice even after controlling for systemic macroeconomic and other political variables

temporary stabilization predetermined exchange rates the paper analyzes the impact of a stabilization policy based on a temporary reduction in the rate of devaluation against a background in which a constant rate of devaluation has no real effects it is shown that the temporary policy does and furthermore that the real effects tend to become bigger in absolute value as the horizon of the temporary policy is shortened the central discussion is carried out in terms of a one good cash in advance model with perfect capital mobility and ramsey type consumers results are extended to account for home goods and variable velocity the roles of capital mobility and banking liberalization are briefly discussed

political cycles and exchange rate based stabilization fixed exchange rates implemented to increase credibility and attract foreign investment or as an alternative approach to stabilization in high inflation economies have been shown to be successful in expanding economic activity and correcting inflation in the short term but often lead to undesirable outcomes in the medium to long term although there is a wealth of literature documenting the boom bust cycles associated with the adoption of a nominal anchor no adequate explanation has been proffered as to governments repeatedly choosing policies that are self defeating the authors address this question with a political economy explanation based on the notion of a self interested government for which short term stabilization is attractive in the face of incentives posed by the electoral cycle if the election coincides with the boom phase of an exchange rate based stabilization incumbent governments increase the likelihood of gaining reelection and the bust phase will develop if at all only after the contest the authors thus suggest a modified version of the traditional political business cycle from the standpoint of a self interested office seeking government exchange rate based stabilizations can make good political sense empirical results based on an analysis of eighteen latin american countries from 1970 to 1999 support the insights of the argument movements towards a more fixed exchange rate are greater than three times more likely in a preelection period than in other stages of the electoral cycle

excessive deficits sense and nonsense in the treaty of maastricht maastricht s fiscal rules willem buiter giancarlo corsetti and nouriel roubini the maastricht treaty on economic and monetary union in the ec has specified limits on both government debt and fiscal deficits satisfying these criteria is necessary for getting into emu once inside violating these limits will also incur penalties the fiscal requirements especially the debt criterion are much tougher than is required to ensure public sector solvency trying to attain these targets will force the ec initially into substantial deflation and recession failure to correct for real growth inflation and the business cycle makes the nominal deficit a poor basis for any policy or target ambiguity about how fiscal targets will in fact be interpreted might provide a way out but cannot today be relied upon to do so supranational fiscal rules are sometimes claimed to be justified by externalities in national fiscal policies we find this justification wanting both in theory and empirically a better case might be built on the imposition of external commitments to offset domestic political distortions that systematically induce excessive deficits even so we conclude that the fiscal convergence criteria on balance are harmful and should be disregarded or applied very loosely to avoid the risk of serious fiscal overkill

minimum wages and household poverty general equilibrium macro micro simulations for south africa summary the poverty reducing effects of minimum wages depend on its effectiveness in targeting the poor and the extent to which job losses and price increases offset income gains we develop a general equilibrium microsimulation model to simulate the economywide effects of minimum wages in south africa we find minimum wages lead to a marginal decline in poverty and overall inequality however job losses are more likely to affect the poorest among minimum wage workers while rising production costs reduce overall household welfare the policy is not an effective anti poverty tool in south africa given poor targeting and adverse price effects which are often unaccounted for in policy simulations

the effects of the minimum wage in brazil on the distribution of family incomes 1996 2001 abstract the brazilian economy has long relied on the minimum wage having first implemented a minimum in 1940 shortly after taking office in 2003 brazil s president raised the minimum wage by 20 and promised to double the value of the minimum wage before his term ends in 2006 the usual rationale for minimum wage increases is to bring about beneficial changes in the income distribution by raising incomes of poor and low income families the goal of this paper is to evaluate the efficacy of the minimum wage in brazil in bringing about these changes in the income distribution we examine data drawn from brazil s major metropolitan areas studying the years after brazil s hyper inflation ended the estimates provide no evidence that minimum wages in brazil lift family incomes at the lower points of the income distribution if anything some of the evidence points to adverse effects on lower income families

phoenix risen the resurrection of global finance of all the many changes of the world economy since world war ii few have been nearly so dramatic as the resurrection of global finance a review of five recent books suggests considerable diversity of opinion concerning both the causes and the consequences of financial globalization leaving much room for further research competing historical interpretations stressing the contrasting roles of market forces and government policies need to be reexamined for dynamic linkages among the variables they identify likewise impacts on state policy at both the macro and micro levels should be explored more systematically to understand not just whether constraints may be imposed on governments but also how and under what conditions and what policymakers can do about them finally questions are also raised about implications for the underlying paradigm conventionally used for the study of international political economy and international relations more generally

the advantage of tying one s hands ems discipline and central bank credibility abstract it is often argued that the ems is an effective disciplinary device for inflation prone countries in europe since it forces the respective policy makers to pursue more restrictive monetary policies than they would otherwise it is not clear however why these countries should submit themselves to such discipline this paper argues that to answer this question appropriately one must consider that ems membership brings potentially large credibility gains policy makers in inflation prone countries the reason is that not only it attaches an extra penalty to inflation in terms of real appreciation but makes the public aware that the policy maker is faced with such penalty and thus helps to overcome the inefficiency stemming from the public s mistrust of the authorities

the effects of minimum wages on the distribution of family incomes a nonparametric analysis an oft stated goal of the minimum wage is to raise incomes of poor or low income families we present nonparametric estimates of the effects of minimum wages on the distribution of family income relative to needs in the united states although minimum wages increase the incomes of some poor families the evidence indicates that their overall net effect is if anything to increase the proportions of families with incomes below or near the poverty line it would appear that reductions in the proportions of families that are poor or near poor should not be counted among the potential benefits of minimum wages

do minimum wages fight poverty i introduction one of the most compelling rationales for a national minimum wage floor is to raise the incomes of poor or near poor families with members in the workforce this general point however is often missed in the debates over the merits of a higher minimum wage in contrast to these oft stated distributional goals much of the focus in such debates has been on the employment effects of minimum wages especially among the teenage population in large part this focus is probably attributable to the extensive body of economic research on the effects of minimum wages on employment of low skilled workers however although negative employment effects represent a cost of minimum wages such costs do not necessarily imply that minimum wages constitute bad social policy in particular the employment losses associated with a higher minimum wage may be more than offset by positive effects on low income families especially if minimum wages are a significant factor in helping move families out of poverty 1 this is not to argue that research on employment effects of minimum wages is irrelevant but such research may be more important as a test of the theory of labor demand and as a method of learning how employers and individuals adjust to exogenous wage increases than as a method of assessing the wisdom of the policy in addition we do not mean to suggest that the short run effects of minimum wages on the incomes of poor families should be the sole criterion for evaluating such policies other studies have found evidence suggesting for example that minimum wage increases reduce school enrollment rates and training neumark and wascher 1996a hashimoto 1982 factors that may affect longer run earnings or earnings growth these deleterious longer run effects might offset the benefits of shorter run effects of minimum wages on family incomes nonetheless our perception is that potential increases in the incomes of poor families provide the main motivation for raising the minimum wage making it important to assess the evidence on whether minimum wage increases achieve this goal in this regard there are two questions that pertain to the influence of minimum wages on family incomes generally and on poverty in particular first there is the question of the effects of minimum wages on low wage workers that is do the wage gains received by employed workers more than offset the lost earnings suffered by those who lose or cannot find jobs 2 second there is the question of how minimum wages affect workers in different parts of the family income distribution because many roughly speaking a large minority of minimum wage workers are in relatively affluent families gramlich 1976 card and krueger 1995 burkhauser et al 1996 which workers gain and which lose will have an important influence on the effects of minimum wages on the distribution of family incomes in this article we present evidence on the effects of minimum wages on family incomes focusing in particular but not solely on the effectiveness of minimum wages in reducing poverty using matched march current population surveys cpss we estimate the effects of minimum wages on the probabilities of various transitions in the family income distribution such as transitions into and out of poverty given that federal changes in minimum wages may be confounded with other aggregate level shocks influencing family income we rely heavily on state level changes in minimum wages to identify minimum wage effects in a nutshell our empirical strategy is to compare rates of transition through the family income distribution in states in which minimum wages do and do not increase for example if poor families are more likely to escape from poverty when minimum wages increase in their states of residence we would infer that minimum wage hikes help families move out of poverty on the other hand if transitions in to poverty are more common when minimum wages increase we would infer that the disemployment effects of minimum wages play a dominant role among the low income population

real exchange rate variability and the choice of exchange rate regime by developing countries abstract this paper draws together two distinct strands of the exchange rate literature it proposes that real exchange rate variability and the choice of exchange rate regime are jointly determined i test this claim by estimating a simultaneous limited dependent variable model with data from a cross section of developing countries during the recent floating period drawing on the relevant exchange rate literature the paper examines a number of exogenous determinants of exchange rate variability and the choice of exchange rate regime

minimum wages globalization and poverty in honduras summary we test whether minimum wage legislation is an effective poverty reduction tool in a poor country trying to stay competitive in the global economy in honduras increases in relatively high minimum wages lead to reductions in poverty especially extreme poverty however the impact is felt only in households with workers in large firms and felt more strongly among those with low wage workers increases in the minimum do not affect poverty in sectors where minimum wages are not enforced or do not apply hence minimum wages can be a poverty reduction tool in the formal sector which competes globally

political stabilization cycles in high inflation economies abstract high inflation economies often exhibit stop go cycles of inflation rather than smooth inflationary processes this paper relates these stop go episodes of inflation to a political cycle the government can try to repress inflation until after the elections in order to increase the chances of being reelected this is modeled as a two period game of incomplete information where voters try to pick the most competent government and inflation which signals lack of competency can be lowered by the government in the short run through foreign debt accumulation several stabilization episodes such as the primavera plan in argentina and the cruzado plan in brazil are used to motivate the model

what causes the failure of inflation stabilization plans abstract the paper discusses the causes of failure of inflation stabilization plans following a description of stylized facts of inflation stabilization a model of balance of payments crises is presented highlighting some of the main factors leading to the collapse of stabilizations empirical results obtained when estimating a binary probit model over a panel of 34 stabilizations identify real exchange rate appreciation lack of foreign reserves and government budget deficits as the main causes of failure of inflation stabilization plans this is consistent with the model presented in this paper with the stylized facts of stabilizations and with some of the models found in the literature

modern hyper and high inflations since 1947 hyperinflations by cagan s definition in market economies have been rare much more common have been longer inflationary processes with inflation rates above 100 percent per annum based on a sample of 133 countries and using the 100 percent threshold as the basis for a definition of very high inflation episodes this paper examines the main characteristics of such inflations among other things we find that i close to 20 percent of countries have experienced inflation above 100 percent per annum ii higher inflation tends to be more unstable iii in high inflation countries the relationship between the fiscal balance and seigniorage is strong both in the short and long run iv inflation inertia decreases as average inflation rises v high inflation is associated with poor macroeconomic performance and vi stabilizations from high inflation that rely on the exchange rate as the nominal anchor are expansionary

disinflation programs under policy uncertainty abstract this paper uses a model with endogenous labor supply to study exchange rate based inflation stabilization programs under uncertainty regarding the duration of the program the paper finds that the output and consumption dynamics induced by these programs are extremely sensitive to whether the programs are perceived to have a chance of continuing permanently or whether they are expected to end in finite time it is shown that the business cycle dynamics for output that are typically associated with these programs arise only when the policy is expected to collapse in finite time furthermore for the purposes of rationalizing the stylized facts the uncertain duration channel appears to induce a fundamental tension between the consumption dynamics and the current account dynamics these results raise doubts regarding the explanatory power of the uncertain duration channel in particular and the credibility channel in general

mobile capital domestic institutions and electorally induced monetary and fiscal policy the literature on global integration and national policy autonomy often ignores a central result from open economy macroeconomics capital mobility constrains monetary policy when the exchange rate is fixed and fiscal policy when the exchange rate is flexible similarly examinations of the electoral determinants of monetary and fiscal policy typically ignore international pressures altogether we develop a formal model to analyze the interaction between fiscal and monetary policymakers under various exchange rate regimes and the degrees of central bank independence we test the model using data from oecd countries we find evidence that preelectoral monetary expansions occur only when the exchange rate is flexible and central bank independence is low preelectoral fiscal expansions occur when the exchange rate is fixed we then explore the implications of our model for arguments that emphasize the partisan sources of macroeconomic policy and for the conduct of fiscal policy after economic and monetary union in europe

export expansion and economic growth testing for cointegration and causality this paper develops a multivariate error correction model to test the causality between exports and growth in 15 asian countries 1967 91 the underlying series are tested as non stationary in levels but stationary in first differences the causal factors are cointegrated in five of these countries only causality test results indicate that export expansion causes growth in two third of these countries corrected for simultaneity between the causal factors a country with a large public sector higher level of economic development and which is less vulnerable to external economic shocks is more likely to reap the benefits of export promotion strategies the causal inferences are fairly stable over the sample period

inflation stabilisation and the consumption of durable goods exchange rate based stabilisations in chronic inflation countries have often been characterised by an initial consumption boom which is most evident in the behaviour of durable goods followed by a later contraction this paper provides an explanation for such a boom recession cycle based on the timing of purchases of durable goods the initial fall in inflation results in a wealth effect which induces many consumers to bring forward their purchases of durable goods thus generating an aggregate consumption boom since most consumers replenish their stock of durable goods at the beginning of the programme a later slowdown follows

fixed versus flexible exchange rates which provides more fiscal discipline abstract conventional wisdom holds that fixed rates provide more fiscal discipline than do flexible rates in this paper we show that this wisdom need not hold in a standard model in which fiscal policy is endogenously determined by a maximizing fiscal authority the claim that fixed rates induce more discipline stresses that sustained adoption of lax fiscal policies must eventually lead to an exhaustion of reserves and thus to a politically costly collapse of the peg hence under fixed rates bad behavior today leads to punishment tomorrow under flexible rates bad behavior has costs as well the difference is in the intertemporal distribution of these costs flexible rates allow the effects of unsound fiscal policies to manifest themselves immediately through movements in the exchange rate hence bad behavior today leads to punishment today if fiscal authorities are impatient flexible rates by forcing the costs to be paid up front provide more fiscal discipline and higher welfare for the representative private agent the recent experience of sub saharan countries supplies evidence that matches the predictions of the model