special interest group perspective before and after the clayton and federal trade commission acts the performance of prices and output is explored for the period 1904 1925 the 11 years before and after passage of the clayton and federal trade commission acts hereinafter clayton ftc acts in the usa in 1914 and compared with performance for 1890 1901 the 11 year period prior to and following the passage of the sherman act while proponents of the sherman act and the clayton ftc acts claim that they serve the public interest the empirical results suggests that they appear as susceptible to the influence of special interest groups as any other public policy

information competition and markets one of the dominant characteristics of modern capitalist economies is the important role played by competition not the peculiar static form of pure price competition embodied in the arrow debreu model but rather a dynamic competition more akin to the kind of competition represented by sports contests and other races including patent races in recent years there have been several attempts to explain why firms often base the pay of their workers and managers on relative performance see for example edward lazear and sherwin rosen 1981 such compensation schemes become desirable when three conditions are satisfied a the input effort of workers managers must not be directly observable at least without cost thus firms must either expend resources to monitor inputs or devise reward structures in which compensation is a function of variables such as output or profits which are themselves functions of inputs but are less costly to observe b the relationship between input and output must be stochastic so that by observing output one cannot perfectly infer what the input was c finally the stochastic disturbances which affect the relationship between input and output of different firms must be correlated by looking at the performance of one worker relative to that of others one can make better inferences about his effort than one can make without using this information not only can competition provide a basis of comparison which enables the design of reward structures that can simultaneously provide a high level of incentives with relatively low level risk but compensation schemes based on relative performance have the further advantage of automatically adjusting incentives to changes in the economic environment we refer to this as built in flexibility in a first best world with perfect information concerning the nature of the technology but where it is still costly to monitor individuals activities the compensation scheme would vary from time to time as the environment changed such changes in the compensation scheme are costly to implement and the information required to do so is seldom available when a task is easier the individual s rewards for performing the task should be reduced if pay is based on relative performance although all individuals perform better when they exert the same level of effort their compensation is automatically adjusted thus teachers frequently grade on the curve and a significant fraction of the pay of successful salesmen often consists of bonuses based on relative performance

product market competition and managerial slack this article analyzes the effect of product market competition on managerial incentives in contrast to hart 1983a i show that competition may actually exacerbate the incentive problem the difference in results derives from our different assumptions about managerial preferences the importance of assumptions about preferences suggests that we do not yet understand the precise mechanism through which competition affects incentives

toward a political theory of the emergence of environmental incentive regulation this article makes some steps toward a formal political economy of environmental policy economists quasi unanimous preference for sophisticated incentive regulation is reconsidered we recast the question of instrument choice in the general mechanism design literature within an incomplete contract approach to political economy we show why constitutional constraints on the instruments of environmental policy may be desirable even though they appear inefficient from a standard economic viewpoint their justification lies in the limitations they impose on the politicians ability to distribute rents insights are provided on the emergence of incentive mechanisms in environmental regulation

an institutional critique of intergovernmentalism most intergovernmentalist analyses of european integration focus on treaty bargaining among european union member governments recent articles also have examined everyday decision making through power index analysis an approach that asserts that a government s ability to influence policy is a function of all possible coalitions in the council of ministers to which it is pivotal this approach suffers from two major weaknesses first it fails to take into account the policy preferences of governments it overestimates the influence of governments holding extreme preferences and underestimates that of more centrist governments second power index analysis fails to consider the important roles of the commission of the european communities and the european parliament in legislative processes today s procedures affect the mix of agenda setting and veto power and this has systematic effects on policy outcomes if intergovernmentalism is to explain choices made during treaty rounds it must take into account these legislative dynamics

voting power in the ec decision making and the consequences of two different enlargements abstract in this paper we study the voting power in the council of ministers of the ec the purpose of this paper is twofold first to evaluate the voting power for the member states of today s community and second to analyse the balance of power after two different enlargements of the community the analysis is based on the shapley shubik and the banzhaf power indices of simple cooperative games the modified version of the shapley shubik index is used to analyse how the sub systems of the ec can change the distribution of power in the decision making process

optimal contracts with public ex post information abstract we are concerned with the value of public ex post information about a seller s costs to an initially uninformed buyer we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a public ex post signal s s that is correlated with the risk neutral seller s costs to render the initial information asymmetry inconsequential to the buyer the first best outcome for the buyer is shown to be feasible if 1 the dimension of s is at least that of or 2 the conditional likelihood function of s given is for one of its realizations sj a strictly increasing function of and more concave in than is the seller s cost function

auctioning incentive contracts this paper draws a remarkably simple bridge between auction theory and incentive theory it considers the auctioning of an indivisible project among several fi rms the firms have private information about their future cost at th e bidding stage and the selected firm ex post invests in cost reduct ion the authors show that 1 the optimal auction can be implemented by a dominant strategy auction that uses information about both the first bid and the second bid 2 the winner faces a linear incenti ve contract 3 the fixed transfer to the winner decreases with his announced expected cost and increases with the second lowest announce d expected cost and 4 the share of cost overruns borne by the winn er decreases with the winner s announced expected cost copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

lies defection and the pattern of international cooperation this article characterizes how incentives to lie affect international cooperation and the design of cooperation agreements i study the optimal structure of cooperation agreements in an environment where the costs of cooperation fluctuate over time cooperation is complicated by the fact that the costs of cooperation are private information and participants can benefit from lying about them when the extent of asymmetries of information between the cooperating governments can be measured in terms of the transparency of the political process democracies face greater contracting opportunities than authoritarian regimes however this article shows that even under asymmetries of information a limited extent of cooperation can be achieved when the design of cooperation agreements recognizes incentives to lie

what determines eu decision making needs power or both this paper examines the determinants of power in the council of the european union it argues that quantitative power indices stemming from voting theory provide a good description of the actual distribution of power among eu members of course we cannot directly verify the accuracy of such indices since it is impossible to measure power directly instead we evaluate whether these power measures explain a quantifiable manifestation of the exercise of power namely members shares of eu budget allocation as an alternative explanation of the eu budget we also consider a needs view of the budget where members allocations are determined by principles of solidarity our empirical analysis is based on 1976 2001 data on the patterns of the eu budget shares and on measures of each member state s needs and political power our results indicate that at least 60 of the budget expenditures can be attributed to selfish power politics and the remaining 40 to the declared benevolent eu budget policies however when we apply specific voting power measures that allow correlated preferences and cooperative voting patterns between the member states our estimates indicate that the power politics view can explain as much as 90 of the budget shares we conclude that power politics can explain a major part of the council decisions and that correlated preferences and voting cooperation between eu countries potentially play significant roles in eu decision making heikki kauppi and mika widgren

enlargement processes and distributional conflicts the politics of discriminatory membership in the european union this paper examines discriminatory membership in the european union from a game theoretical perspective i argue that discriminatory membership enables the enlargement of international organizations with heterogenous member states eu members impose discriminatory measures on new members to redistribute enlargement gains from new members to particularly negatively affected eu members as to render expansion pareto efficient the empirical findings of a probit analysis on the eu accession negotiations and outcomes of all five eu enlargement rounds support the theoretical claim the eu grants acceding states restricted membership rights if distributional conflicts emerge moreover the candidate s bargaining power and the possibility of alternative compensation schemes influence the enlargement outcomes

competition and the reform of incentive schemes in the regulated sector abstract we consider a regulation problem with complete contracting in a principal agent model with adverse selection and review within this model the various channels by which external competition parameters affect incentives within the regulated firm the channels are the principal s information the principal s objective function the agent s incentive constraint the agent s participation constraint we consider in particular a better information structure a threat of liquidation a fight for talent a more efficient private sector and the existence of better substitutes we characterize in each case the conditions under which the effect on incentives is positive

competition and corruption in an agency relationship abstract the paper reconsiders the relationship between competition and corruption in a model where corruption has solid informational foundations and where the regulatory response to the possibility of corruption is taken into account it is shown that the effect of greater competition on corruption depends on the complementarity or substitutability of the two instruments available to decrease information rents namely low powered incentives and greater competition the paper concludes with a brief empirical exploration of the relationship between competitiveness and corruption on african data

designing a private industry government auctions with endogenous market structure abstract this paper considers government mechanisms for auctioning production rights in which both the winners and the market structure doupoly dual sourcing monopoly sole sourcing or government owned production are a function of the bids in designing the optimal mechanism the government considers the tradeoffs among consumer surplus producer surplus and revenue under incomplete information doupoly is implemented less frequently and government production more frequently than under complete information when bidders are symmetric the optimal mechanism can be implemented as a modified second price auction applications to privatization deregulation and defense procurement are discussed

a principal agent approach to transmission expansion part i regulatory framework different regulatory frameworks have implemented competitive mechanisms to increase efficiency in transmission a natural monopoly conflicts of interest and hidden costs make necessary to define methods to obtain an appropriate valuation of new transmission assets this paper is the first one of a two paper series and presents the fundamentals of transmission project valuation and cost allocation we show the fundamentals of non cooperative game theory different concepts of game equilibria nash stackelberg and berge and solutions to the bilateral negotiation problem nash bargaining solution kalai smorodinsky and rubinstein in addition the design of mechanisms the information revelation principles and incentive compatibility issues are described we propose a model composed of three elements valuation of a transmission project based on a linear contract a principal agent model to determine the optimal effort of an agent developing the transmission project and the optimal bilateral negotiation of right of way costs we define a method to evaluate the offers to build a transmission line project as a function of the number of agents bidding for it the value of the project is a function of both the incentives and the valuation of the right of way costs in part two of this series we present two case studies the ieee 24 bus rts and the sistema interconectado central sic in chile where we apply the methodology to a real network

computing power indices for large voting games voting power indices enable the analysis of the distribution of power in a legislature or voting body in which different members have different numbers of votes although this approach to the measurement of power has been known for a long time its application to large games has been limited by the difficulty of computing these indices this paper presents a new method for computing power indices that combines exact methods with an approximate method due to owen this method is of most utility in situations where the number of players is large and the voting weights are concentrated in the hands of a small number of members

legislative bargaining under weighted voting organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting we analyze this setting using a non cooperative bargaining game based on the baron ferejohn 1989 model unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory we find that each voter s expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight an exception occurs when many high weight voters exist as low weight voters may expect disproportionately high payoffs due to proposal power the model also predicts that ex post the coalition formateur the party chosen to form a coalition will receive a disproportionately high payoff using data from coalition governments from 1946 to 2001 we find strong evidence ofsuch formateur effects

managing the evolution of multilateralism author s downs george w rocke david barsoom peter n abstract in the past five years a relatively extensive literature has emerged that explores the demand for multilateral cooperation that is those factors that motivate states to develop or resist developing formal institutions that operate to increase interstate economic military or environmental cooperation 1 these factors include the transaction costs associated with ad hoc and multiple bilateral arrangements increased interstate trade the diffusion of liberal trade theory information about the costs of environmental degradation and trends in elite ideology to date however our understanding of the supply side of multilateralism the standards that are set for admission the order and speed with which candidate states are admitted and the impact of expansion on cooperation and future evolution has been relatively undeveloped 2 partly as a result theorists have had little to say about how multilateral institutions are likely to evolve or what the policy consequences of their expansion will be 3 supply side issues are important because multilateral organizations usually do not spring forth full blown they grow instead of forming an inclusive agreement that is one that covers nearly all of the states that its designers eventually hope to include many multilateral organizations start out with substantially smaller memberships and generally expand over time we argue that among the many possible explanations for the choice of this design strategy there is a rational choice argument

a theory of yardstick competition in the typical regulatory scheme a franchised monopoly has little incentive to reduce costs this article proposes a mechanism in which the price the regulatedfirm receives depends on the costs of identical firms in equilibrium each firm chooses a socially efficient level of cost reduction the mechanism generalizes to cover heterogeneous firms with observable differences medicare s prospective reimbursement of hospitals by using diagnostically related groups is a scheme very similar to the one outlined here

constitutional political economy in the european union this article surveys recent research in constitutional political economy in europe although not all of theworks discussed necessarily focus only on european constitutional issues or are written by europeans european constitutional issues figure importantly in each area surveyed the article examines the literatures linking constitutional institutions to economic growth government size government deficits and corruption bicameralism direct democracy and federalism three exclusively european topics also are covered constitutional issues in the transition countries the structure of the european union and the draft constitution for the european union

the relationship between shareholding concentration and shareholder voting power in british companies a study of the application of power indices for simple g ames this paper reports an analysis of the relationships between shareholding and voting power distributions in a sample of british companies it applies two standard approaches to the measurement of power in simple games the shapley shubik and the banzhaf power indices the results indicate that power is more concentrated than ownership in every case a comparison of the two indices reveals that typically the banzhaf index gives a more concentrated power distribution for the shapley shubik index the power ratio for the largest shareholder is accurately described in terms of the size of holding and the concentration of the remainder the corresponding banzhaf power ratio is less dependent on these variables there is no association between power concentration and company size

managerial incentives and product market competition are imperfectly competitive leibenstein 1966 claims that there may be a substantial amount of x inefficiency where x inefficiency measures the degree to which actual profits depart from the maximum of profits that could be obtained if all operations in the firm were carried out at minimal costs he offers empirical evidence from case studies showing that the welfare loss due to organizational slack is of an order of magnitude bigger than the welfare loss due to monopolistic price distortions on imperfectly competitive markets these results support the common presumption that increasing competition reduces organizational and in particular managerial slack however this early literature does not offer a theoretical explanation for the link between competition and managerial incentives in particular it ignores the fact that managerial incentives can be affected by the design of an incentive scheme in this paper i derive the optimal incentive scheme for a manager as a function of the competitiveness of the environment in which his firm operates the basic impact of increased competition is that it reduces the profits of a firm this has two effects in the model first if a firm has high costs then the reduction of profits may be sufficient to render the firm unprofitable so the probability that it has to be liquidated goes up this unambiguously induces the manager of the firm to work harder for a cost reduction in order to avoid liquidation and to keep his job second the reduction in profits may affect

coordination in split award auctions we analyze split award procurement auctions in which a buyer divides full production between two suppliers or awards all production to a single supplier and suppliers have private cost information an intriguing feature of split awards is that the equilibrium bids are implicitly coordinated because a split award price is the sum of offered split prices each supplier can unilaterally veto a split award by bidding very high for the split the need to coordinate is reflected in a split price that does not vary with private information we also explore conditions under which split award auctions may be preferred to winner take all auctions

flexible integration emu and relative voting power in the eu this paper studies the implications offlexible integration in the european union itanalyses the voting power of member states in thecouncil of ministers when differently sized subgroupsof the eu are set up european monetary union isreferred to as the most important example of flexibleintegration the banzhaf index is calculated to studythe distribution of voting power in the decisionmaking process according to the stability and growthpact the results show considerable fluctuations especially for smaller countries in relative votingpower the latter being defined as the relationbetween voting power and relative voting weight

designing the voting system for the council of the european union this paper examines the system of qualified majority voting used by the council of the european union from the perspective of enlargement of the union it uses an approach based on power indices due to penrose 1946 banzhaf 1965 and coleman 1971 to make two analyses 1 the question of the voting power of member countries from the point of view of fairness and 2 the question of how the threshold number of votes required for qmv should be determined it studies two scenarios for change from 2005 onwards envisaged by the nice treaty 1 no enlargement the eu comprising 15 member countries and 2 full enlargement to 27 members by the accession of all the present twelve candidates the proposal is made that fair weights be determined algorithmically as a technical or routine matter as the membership changes the analysis of how the threshold affects power shows the trade offs that countries face between their blocking power and the power of the council to act the main findings are 1 that the weights laid down in the nice treaty are close to being fair the only significant discrepancies being the under representation of germany and romania and the over representation of spain and poland 2 the threshold required for a decision is set too high for the council to be an effective decision making body

split awards procurement and innovation in many procurement settings it is possible for a buyer to split a production award between suppliers in this article we develop a model of split award procurement auctions in which the split choice is endogenous we characterize the set of equilibrium bids and allocations for optimizing agents in an environment in which suppliers are fully informed about each other s costs split award equilibria simultaneously exhibit strong collusive features and cost efficiency properties despite the former property of the equilibria upstream investment considerations may lead a buyer to prefer a split award auction format to a winner take all auction format

full extraction of the surplus in bayesian and dominant strategy auctions we consider auctions for a single indivisible object in the case where the bidders have information about each other which is not available to the seller we show that the seller can use this information to his own benefit and we completely characterize the environ ments in which a well chosen auction gives him the same expected payoff as that obtainable were he able to sell the object with full information about each bidder s willingness to pay we provide this characterization for auctions in which the bidders have dominant strate gies and for those where the relevant equilibrium concept is bayesian nash in both set ups the existence of these auctions hinges on the possibility of constructing lotteries with the correct properties we consider the situation in which an agent the seller possesses one indivisible unit of a good to which he attaches no value but the good has value to a number of potential buyers and its transfer to one of them would increase social welfare in particular the transfer to the buyer with the highest valuation maximizes social welfare in this paper we completely characterize environments in which the seller can design an auction that will enable him to capture for himself the full increase in social welfare induced by the transfer of the good to the bidder with the highest willingness to pay if the seller had full information about the reservation prices of potential buyers his optimal selling strategy would be very simple he would announce a price equal or very close to the highest reservation value the optimal strategy for the bidder with the highest evaluation would be to accept the offer note that we are treating a situation in which the seller can commit himself to a price as a result of the exchange the utility of the seller increases by the full amount of the increase in social welfare and he has been able to fully extract the surplus in many circumstances however a seller has only imperfect knowledge of the buyers willingnesses to pay in this case he must find some mechanism or auction which will enable him to maximize his benefit from the sale of the object the auction literature starts with this observation and shows how the seller can by an astute choice of auction extract the largest possible fraction of the surplus in general the literature has shown that this proportion is strictly less than one in some circumstances the bidders will have information about each other which is not available to the seller for instance in auctions for petroleum drilling rights bidders know the results of geological tests which they have

the effects of competition on executive behavior economists presume that competition spurs a firm to be more efficient by forcing it to reduce its agency problems this article investigates this presumption it finds that the effects of competition on executive behavior can be decomposed into four effects each of which is of potentially ambiguous sign theory thus offers no definitive defense of this presumption this article also derives sets of conditions under which increased competition has the presumed effect of reducing agency problems in some sets important conditions are that increased competition reduce the executive s expected income and that agency goods e g shirking be normal goods for the executive the article shows that an increase in the shareholder bargaining strength can both reduce the agency problem and make it more sensitive to competition

bargaining power at europe s intergovernmental conferences testing institutional and intergovernmental theories this article examines how european union member states make choices about political institutions at intergovernmental conferences the grand negotiations where many key institutional changes are made using data on member state preferences from the intergovernmental conference leading to the treaty of amsterdam i test competing bargaining theories institutionalism and intergovernmentalism and present strong evidence that institutionalism better captures negotiations compared to intergovernmentalism i present a formal model to discern between these competing theories of bargaining power derive a statistical model directly from this formal model and then use data from the european union s treaty of amsterdam to test these theories and corresponding power sources veto power associated with institutional models better explains intergovernmental conference outcomes compared to power from size and economic might often associated with intergovernmental analyses i would like to thank kathy bawn julia gray tim groseclose james honaker joe jupille thomas konig jeff lewis sven oliver proksch george tsebelis and the participants in ucla s graduate student formal theory and statistical methods workshops for their insightful comments on various drafts of this article i am also grateful for the comments from several anonymous reviewers and the editors at international organization an earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the midwest political science association april 2006 data and replication material are available at http faculty unlv edu jslapin

the efficient mechanism for downsizing the public sector this article analyzes the efficient mechanism for downsizing the public sector focusing on adverse selection in productive efficiency each worker is assumed to have two type dependent reservation utilities the status quo utility in the public sector before downsizing and the utility that the worker expects to obtain by entering the private sector the efficient mechanism consists of a menu of probability of remaining in the public sector and transfer pairs that induces self selection a worker s full cost is defined by the sum of production cost in the public sector and reservation utility in the private sector it is optimal to start by laying off the agents with higher full cost when the public sector before downsizing is discriminating as the differential of private information about productive efficiency suggests there are countervailing incentives this makes the size of downsizing smaller under asymmetric information than under complete information

does competition kill corruption corrupt agents officials or gangsters exact money from firms corruption affects the number of firms in a free entry equilibrium the degree of deep competition in the economy increases with lower overhead costs relative to profits and with a tendency toward similar cost structures increases in competition may not lower corruption the model explains why a rational corrupt agent may extinguish the source of his bribe income by causing a firm to exit assessing the welfare effect of corruption is complicated by the fact that exit caused by corruption does not necessarily reduce social welfare

product market competition and organizational slack under profit target contracts in a framework a la martin 1993 we introduce a common component in the managers private information in order to address three related questions what is the impact of contracts that reward managers on the basis of realized profits on firms productive and allocative efficiency relative to cost target contracts how do these contracts shape the relationship between competition and organizational slack can we then explain the existing evidence of an inverted u shaped relationship between competition and cost reducing activities as documented in aghion et al aghion p bloom n blundell r griffith r howitt p competition and innovation an inverted u relationship the quarterly journal of economics 120 pp 701 728 2005 we show that profit target contracts introduce a horizontal contractual externality between the competing firms that mitigates organizational slack and improves upon productive efficiency relative to cost plus mechanisms moreover when executive compensations are conditioned on profits an inverted u shaped relationship between product market competition and managerial effort obtains finally we also show that when contractual instruments are endogenous i e when shareholders can choose between profit and cost target rules the equilibrium with profit target contracts always exists and is the only one that survives to standard refinements