the most popular tax in europe lessons from the irish plastic bags levy there have been occasional ad hoc efforts to influence consumer behaviour by the imposition of product taxes that reflect external costs imposed by such products that are not initially included in their price in the spirit of this idea in 2002 ireland introduced a 15 euro cent tax on plastic shopping bags previously provided free of charge to customers at points of sale the effect of the tax on the use of plastic bags in retail outlets has been dramatic a reduction in use in the order of 90 and an associated gain in the form of reduced littering and negative landscape effects costs of administration have been very low amounting to about 3 of revenues because it was possible to integrate reporting and collection into existing value added tax reporting systems response from the main stakeholders the public and the retail industry has been overwhelmingly positive central to this acceptance has been a policy of extensive consultation with these stakeholders the fact that a product tax can influence consumer behaviour significantly will be of interest to many policymakers in this area this paper analyses the plastic bag levy success story and provides insights and general guidelines for other jurisdictions planning similar proposals

executive compensation strategic competition and relative performance evaluation theory and evidence we examine compensation contracts for managers in imperfectly competitive product markets we show that strategic interactions among firms can explain the lack of relative performance based incentives in which compensation decreases with rival firm performance the need to soften product market competition generates an optimal compensation contract that places a positive weight on both own and rival performance firms in more competitive industries place greater weight on rival firm performance relative to own firm performance we find empirical evidence of a positive sensitivity of compensation to rival firm performance that is increasing in the degree of competition in the industry

rational expectations analysts forecasts of earnings and sources of value gains for takeover targets abstract value gains to target firm shareholders in takeover bids may be due to potential synergy between bidder and target and or potential target restructuring based on new information released by the bid since these two models have different implications for the anticipated earnings of the target as a stand alone entity analysts earnings forecast revisions afr for the target during the bid may provide evidence for the new information hypothesis for 326 uk targets of takeover bids during 1987 1993 we estimate analysts earnings forecast revisions using the institutional brokers estimate system ibes and relate them to bid premia paid to target shareholders analysts revise their forecasts significantly up on bid announcement for failed especially failed hostile bids the earnings forecast revision and bid premium are more positively correlated than for successful and friendly bids this is consistent with the rational expectations behaviour of target shareholders modelled by grossman and hart s j grossman o d hart bell journal of economics 11 1 1980 42 s j grossman o d hart journal of finance 36 1981 253

reflections on some unsettled problems of irrigation it is instructive to read the article that katharine coman published in the first issue of the american economic review to gain insight into the problems of collective action related to irrigation in the american west one gains further understanding of the problems coman identifies by using a social ecological system ostrom 2007 2009 to organize the diverse variables identified by coman one gains a general lesson from this analysis that changing the formal governance structure of irrigation is not sufficient to ensure efficient investment in facilities or that farmers are able to acquire property and make a reasonable living building knowledge and trust are however essential for solving collective action problems jel b31 n51 q15 q25 katharine coman wrote a fascinating article in the first issue of the american economic review dealing with the challenge of organizing effective irrigation systems in the united states west of the one hundredth meridian in the late nineteenth

bargaining search and outside options abstract this paper studies a two sided incomplete information bargaining model between a seller and a buyer the buyer has an outside option which is modeled as a sequential search process during which he can choose to return to bargaining at any time two cases are considered in regime i both agents have symmetric information about the search parameters we find that in contrast to bargaining with complete information the option to return to bargaining is not redundant in equilibrium however the no delay result still holds in regime ii where agents have asymmetric information about the outside option delay is possible the solution characterizes the parameters for renegotiation and those for search with no return to the bargaining table

some unsettled problems of irrigation 1911 a reprint of the lead article in the inaugural issue of the american economic review some unsettled problems of irrigation by katharine coman who examined the common property resource problem as applied to water in the western united states

estimating product market competition methodology and application abstract in oligopolies firms behave strategically and commit to actions that elicit favorable responses from rivals firm actions consequently are a function of the nature of these strategic interactions in this paper we develop a methodology for the empirical estimation of strategic interactions in product markets we then apply our measure of strategic interactions to ceo compensation we use quarterly data on profits and sales from compustat to estimate the slope of firm s reaction function when the slope is negative and marginal profits decrease with an increase in the rival s actions the firm is classified as a strategic substitute when the slope is positive and marginal profits increase with an increase in the rival s actions the firm is classified as a strategic complement as predicted by theory we find significant evidence that strategic substitutes decrease the pay for performance incentives of their ceos on the other hand strategic complements significantly increase ceo pay for performance incentives the empirical measure developed can be used to test a wide variety of strategic models

state government expenditure determinants and tax revenue determinants revisited the primary aim of the research was to test the general hypothesis that many institutional and political variables affect fiscal outcomes that the preferences of public officials and the decision processes used to act on those preferences matter state government data state only not state and local from 1980 1985 and 1990 were used to specify state tax revenue and expenditure models a previous merrifield 1991 state tax revenue model identified many significant institutional and political variables but it was based only on 1985 data 49 observations the larger data set 147 observations including better data for some of the variables indicated that most of merrifield s 1991 findings are robust the state expenditure models facilitated a second test of the general institutional and political variable hypothesis as well as the hypotheses about specific variables the expenditure model also facilitated comparisons of expenditure and tax determinants and comparisons with results published in the literature though there are some noteworthy differences between the expenditure and tax models the expenditure models also supported many of the institutional and political variable hypotheses

what s my line a comparison of industry classification schemes for capital market research this study compares four broadly available industry classification schemes in a variety of applications common to capital market research standard industrial classification sic codes have been available since 1939 but are being replaced by north american industry classification system naics codes the global industry classifications standard gics sm system jointly developed by standard poor s and morgan stanley capital international msci is popular among financial practitioners whereas the fama and french 1997 algorithm is used primarily by academics our results show that gics classifications are significantly better at explaining stock return comovements as well as cross sectional variations in valuation multiples forecasted and realized growth rates research and development expenditures and various key financial ratios the gics advantage is consistent from year to year and is most pronounced among large firms the other three methods differ little from each other in most applications

who wants to redistribute the tunnel effect in 1990s russia abstract support for governmental redistribution tended to be greater for the poor than the rich in a representative sample of russian adults in 1996 however support for redistribution is higher amongst those who expect their welfare to fall and this effect is strongest amongst the currently well off a rising trajectory inhibits demand for redistribution support is also stronger in rural areas amongst those with less schooling those who fear losing their job the elderly and amongst women our results are consistent with albert hirschman s idea of a tunnel effect whereby prospects of mobility in both directions influence demand for governmental redistribution

bribing votes a new explanation to the inequality redistribution puzzle in ldc s the recent empirical literature on redistribution and developmentemphasizes two main evidences i more redistribution generallyinduces higher growth rates and ii more inequality does notnecessarily increase the political demand for redistribution these stylized facts are at odds with the correlations observedin developed countries several theoretical arguments can beadvanced to explain these puzzles in this paper it is shownthat vote purchases may be seen as an additional argument toexplain puzzle ii we formalize this idea and examine theconditions under which vote bribes may be an obstacle toredistribution and thus to growth in a developing economy

water markets design and evidence from experimental economics market mechanisms are gaining increasing acceptance all over the world as a way of making more efficient use of scarce water resources designing regulatory frameworks that ensure both inter and intra temporal efficient allocations is a daunting task especially if supply is stochastic and there is ample storage capacity in addition to defining tradable rights specific provisions must regulate the use of reservoirs commonly water statutes include provisions that establish asymmetries regarding the allocation of water and market restrictions that ban water trading across different users in this article we use data collected in a laboratory to test two specific market regulations included in the 1999 water reform in spain first junior right holders are not allowed to buy water from senior users second the law does not explicitly define water rights over units left in reservoirs for the following season results suggest that trading restrictions among water right holders lead to welfare losses for senior users it is shown that removing this restriction would increase senior right holders benefits without reducing those of junior users results show that defining water rights over saved units across periods would increase the average stock levels of reservoirs and reduce market price instability the lessons learned from the spanish experience are applicable to settings characterized by unstable natural water supply and the availability of large storage facilities

are the rich too rich to be expropriated economic power and the feasibility of constitutional limits to redistribution why is it that in democracies the poor do not expropriate the rich even though they outnumber them in this paper we analyze the commonly held belief that the rich escape expropriation because they are economically powerful we demonstrate that the economically powerful i e the above average income earners are indeed in a position to bribe the small segment of the voters with incomes between the median and the mean to resist the temptation of supporting confiscatory taxation this is true even if compensation payments in cash are politically unfeasible and therefore need to be made in terms of an evenly distributed private good and it may even be true if only pure public goods are available to swing the middle class

the advantage of resource queues over spot resource markets decision coordination in experiments under resource uncertainty farmers have to make key decisions such as which crops to plant or whether to prepare the soil before knowing how much water they will get they face losses if they make costly decisions but do not receive water and they may forego profits if they receive water without being prepared we consider the coordination of farmers decisions such as which crops to plant or whether to prepare the soil when farmers must divide an uncertain water supply we compare ex ante queues pre decision to an ex post spot market post decision post rain in experiments in rural brazil and a university in england queues have greater coordination success than does the spot market

vote buying in a stylized setting as we noted in the introduction we do not propose to discuss possible implications for the real world of democratic politics that may be drawn from the highly stylized models of vote buying that we have analyzed in this paper to the extent that economic legal or moral thresholds prevent the emergence of the purchase and sale of votes among persons who initially possess property rights in the collective franchise our whole analysis is simply inapplicable if however such thresholds serve only to inhibit but not to prevent totally the emergence of such markets there should be some value in an analysis that embodies the zero transactions costs assumption

how much income redistribution an explanation based on vote buying and corruption this paper studies how income tax rates are determined and how they are related to government corruption in the form of fund capture a model is presented where rich voters can block redistribution by buying the votes of some poor voters in equilibrium there is only limited redistribution and income tax rates are a negative function of government corruption when rich voters can bribe the government an additional equilibrium with zero taxation is possible the link between corruption and tax rates is tested using cross country data the empirical evidence is fully consistent with the predictions of the model

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

the politics of public provision of education public provision of education is usually viewed as a form of redistribution in kind however does it arise when income redistribution is feasible as well i analyze a two dimensional model of political decision making with endogenous political parties society chooses both the tax rate and the allocation of the revenues between income redistribution and public education agents differ in their income and in their age where young agents prefer public education and the old prefer income redistribution i find that when the cohort size of the young is not too large then public education arises as a political compromise between the rich and the young segment of the poor they collude in order to reduce the size of government which benefits the rich and target some of its resources to education which benefits the young poor when the cohort size of the young is too large however income redistribution crowds out public provision of education in the political equilibrium

social mobility and redistributive politics just like economists voters have conflicting views about redistributive taxation because they estimate its incentive costs differently we model rational agents as trying to learn from their dynastic income mobility experience the relative importance of effort and predetermined factors in the generation of income inequality and therefore the magnitude of these incentive costs in the long run left wing dynasties believing less in individual effort and voting for more redistribution coexist with right wing dynasties this allows us to explain why individual mobility experience and not only current income matters for political attiitudes and how persistent differences in perceptions about social mobility can generate persistent differences in redistribution across countries

lobbying and welfare in a representative democracy this paper studies the impact of lobbying on political competition and policy outcomes in a framework which integrates the citizen candidate model of representative democracy with the menu auction model of lobbying positive and normative issues are analysed on the positive side lobbying need have little or no effect on policy outcomes because voters can restrict the influence of lobbyists by supporting candidates with offsetting policy preferences on the normative side coordination failure among lobbyists can result in pareto inefficient policy choices in addition by creating rents to holding office lobbying can lead to excessive entry into electoral competition

the impact of strategic interaction on earnings expectations associated with corporate product strategies abstract we examine how strategic interaction in an industry influences the earnings expectations of financial analysts with regard to new product strategies we find that following announcement of new products analysts revise earnings forecasts upward more for announcing firms competing in low strategic interaction industries than for firms competing in high strategic interaction industries for value enhancing value reducing product strategies earnings forecast revisions are more favorable for rivals competing under a high low degree of strategic interaction than for rivals competing under a low high degree of strategic interaction overall empirical evidence indicates that the nature of strategic competition within the industry is important in assessing the market expectations of earnings for new product announcers and their rivals

land and power theory and evidence from chile many employment relationships concede rents to workers depending on the political institutions the presence of such rents allows employers to use the threat of withdrawing them to control their workers political behavior such as their votes in the absence of secret ballot we examine the effects of the introduction of the secret ballot in chile in 1958 on voting behavior before the reforms localities with more pervasive patron client relationships tended to exhibit a much stronger support for the right wing parties traditionally associ ated with the landed oligarchy after the reform however this difference across localities completely disappeared jel d72 n46 o13 o15 o17

corruption and the costs of redistribution micro evidence from indonesia this paper examines the degree to which the corruption in developing countries may impair the ability of governments to redistribute wealth among their citizens specifically i examine a large antipoverty program in indonesia that distributed subsidized rice to poor households i estimate the extent of corruption in the program by comparing administrative data on the amount of rice distributed with survey data on the amount actually received by households the central estimates suggest that on average at least 18 of the rice appears to have disappeared ethnically heterogeneous and sparsely populated areas are more likely to be missing rice using conservative assumptions for the marginal cost of public funds i estimate that the welfare losses from this corruption may have been large enough to offset the potential welfare gains from the redistributive intent of the program these findings suggest that corruption may impose substantial limitations on developing countries redistributive efforts and may help explain the low level of transfer programs in developing countries d 2005 elsevier b v all rights reserved

risk aversion and expected utility theory a calibration theorem within the expected utility framework the only explanation for risk aversion is that the utility function for wealth is concave a person has lower marginal utility for additional wealth when she is wealthy than when she is poor this paper provides a theorem showing that expected utility theory is an utterly implausible explanation for appreciable risk aversion over modest stakes within expected utility theory for any concave utility function even very little risk aversion over modest stakes implies an absurd degree of risk aversion over large stakes illustrative calibrations are provided

investment opportunities and market reaction to capital expenditure decisions abstract in this study we argue that share price reaction to a firm s capital expenditure decisions depends critically on the market s assessment of the quality of its investment opportunities we postulate that announcements of increases decreases in capital expenditures positively negatively affect the stock prices of firms with valuable investment opportunities contrarily we predict that announcements of increases decreases in capital spending negatively positively affect the share prices of firms without such opportunities our empirical results are generally consistent with these predictions overall empirical evidence supports our conjecture that it is the quality of the firm s investment opportunities rather than its industry affiliation which determines the share price reaction to its capital expenditure decisions

emissions trading with shares and coupons when control over discharges is uncertain abstract two important decisions in designing markets for tradable emissions permits are whether to allow banking of permits coupons and whether to allow trading in entitlements to future permits shares banking is predicted to reduce price instability when firms trade in a reconciliation market after the quantity of emissions has been determined tradable shares are a common feature in proposals for emissions trading in canada we conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate how bankable coupons and tradable shares affect efficiency and prices under uncertainty cognitive demands on the subjects are reduced by computerized advice on the optimal allocation of coupons across periods and the implied marginal values of coupons and shares banking share trading and uncertainty conditions are introduced in a complete factorial design with three observations per cell high efficiencies are observed across all treatments uncertainty in the control of emissions leads to substantial price instability when banking is not allowed banking virtually eliminates the instability but reduces the efficiency of the market institution share trading reduces trading volumes increases price stability and improves efficiency

product market pricing power industry concentration and analysts earnings forecasts this is the first study to establish a link between product market power and analysts earnings forecast accuracy and bias relating two different dimensions of market power to earnings forecastability we document that a a firm s relative pricing power and b its industry concentration are strong positive determinants of analysts earnings forecast accuracy we find that forecasting earnings of higher market power firms is less complex due to their ability to withstand cost shocks as well as greater informational efficiency enjoyed by such firms further forecast optimism increases with weakening product market pricing power and with lower industry concentration the knowledge derived from this study will hopefully improve the accuracy of equity valuation and thereby engender better buy side stock selections and sell side recommendations by analysts our analysis also suggests that brokerage firms compensating analysts based on forecast accuracy need to adjust for the differential in the information complexity of different industries

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

eating the rich vs feeding the poor borrowing constraints and the reluctance to redistribute this paper offers an explanation why most democracies arecharacterized by moderate taxation of wealth although thewealth distribution is persistently skewed to the right wemodel an economy in which agents have to acquire highereducation to qualify for skilled work and in which capitalmarket imperfections prevent poor individuals from making sucha profitable human capital investment if these borrowingconstraints do not bind for members of the middle class theymay rationally reject redistribution although both the currentand the future median of the wealth distribution are below themean

an analysis of the implications of uncertainty and agency problems on the wealth effects to acquirers of private firms abstract extensive empirical work shows that bidders do not gain from the acquisition of publicly traded targets but experience positive excess returns in the acquisition of privately held firms this study investigates how two important differences between private and public firms namely informational uncertainty and ownership characteristics impact the returns to acquirers a sample of targets that were acquired shortly after filing for an ipo was collected to circumvent the lack of information on private firms in spite of the special characteristics of these targets the listing effect is still prevalent in this sample the results of the analysis are consistent with the hypothesis that acquirers gain in the acquisition of private firms because these targets have a relatively weaker bargaining position due to informational and agency problems and costly access to external capital markets to finance growth opportunities

the limitations of industry concentration measures constructed with compustat data implications for finance research industry concentration measures calculated with compustat data which cover only the public firms in an industry are poor proxies for actual industry concentration these measures have correlations of only 13 with the corresponding u s census measures which are based on all public and private firms in an industry also only when u s census measures are used is there evidence consistent with theoretical predictions that moreconcentrated industries which should be more oligopolistic are populated by larger and fewer firms with higher price cost margins further the significant relations of compustatbased industry concentration measures with the dependent variables of several important prior studies are not obtained when u s census measures are used one of the reasons for this occurrence is that compustat based measures proxy for industry decline overall our results indicate that product markets research that uses compustat based industry concentration measures may lead to incorrect conclusions jel g10 g30 l10 a growing number of studies that consider the effects of product markets on financial economics related phenomena use industry concentration measures calculated with compustat data which cover only the public firms in an industry these studies examine issues related to asset pricing hou and robinson 2006 informed trading tookes 2008 idiosyncratic stock return volatility gaspar and massa 2006 mergers and acquisitions song and walkling 2000 fee and thomas 2004 shahrur 2005 corporate governance defond and park 1999 engel hayes andwang2003 rennie2006 karuna2007 capitalstructure lang and stulz 1992 kaleand shahrur 2007 corporate disclosurepolicy

the effect of leverage on bidding behavior theory and evidence from the fcc auctions this is an exploration of how bidding behavior of firms in various auctions is affected by their capital structure the theoretical model considers a first price sealed bid and an english auction we find that as debt levels increase firms tend to reduce their bids the lower bids give the competition incentives to reduce their bids as well these results are investigated empirically using data from the 1994 1995 fcc spectrum auctions consistent with the theoretical model higher debt levels of the bidding firm and of the competition tend to lead to lower bids additional determinants of bidding behavior in these auctions are also analyzed copyright 2002 oxford university press

corruption tax evasion and the laffer curve in a corrupt tax administration a rise in tax ratesets off complicated strategic moves by both taxpayersand administrators it is shown that in somecircumstances this may bring about laffer likebehavior of overall tax revenue i e a higher taxrate results in smaller net revenue for thegovernment further a more intense tax effort byincreasing the number of returns audited may alsoreduce net revenues finally if tax and fine ratespositively influence the level of corruption in theadministration these outcomes become more likely

an empirical analysis of strategic competition and firm values the case of r d competition abstract we operationalize a firm s competitive strategy through a new empirical measure and develop a framework for empirical analysis of the market value of strategic behavior using this framework we study announcement effects of r d spending the announcing firm s stock prices are positively influenced by a change in spending and negatively by our competitive strategy measure csm competitors stock prices are positively influenced by the interaction between the market s reaction to the announcing firm and the csm our results are consistent with positive effects of accommodating competition with strategic substitutes and nonpositive effects of tough competition with strategic complements

diversity and redistribution abstract in this paper we analyze the interaction of income and preference heterogeneity in a political economy framework we ask whether the presence of preference heterogeneity arising for example from different ethnic groups or geographic locations affects the ability of the poor to extract resources from the rich we study the equilibrium of a game in which coalitions of individuals form parties parties propose platforms and all individuals vote with the winning policy chosen by plurality political parties are restricted to offering platforms that are credible in that they belong to the pareto set of their members the platforms specify the values of two policy tools a general redistributive tax which is lump sum rebated or used to fund a general public good and a series of taxes whose revenue is used to fund specific targeted goods tailored to particular preferences or localities our analysis demonstrates that taste conflict first dilutes but later reinforces class interests when the degree of taste diversity is low the equilibrium policy is characterized by some amount of general income redistribution and some targeted transfers as taste diversity increases in society the set of equilibrium policies becomes more and more tilted towards special interest groups and against general redistribution as diversity increases further however the only policy that can emerge supports exclusively general redistribution

institutional path dependence in climate adaptation coman s some unsettled problems of irrigation districts that emerged in the american west in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in response to aridity to facilitate agricultural water delivery use and trade raise the transaction costs today of water markets these markets are vital for smooth reallocation of water to higher valued uses elsewhere in the economy and for flexible response to greater hydrological uncertainty this institutional path dependence illustrates how past arrangements to meet conditions of the time constrain contemporary economic opportunities they cannot be easily significantly modified or replaced ex post

appropriative water rights and the efficient allocation of resources this paper investigates the allocative efficiency of the appropriative system of water rights within the context of a simplified model of a water using industry at a long run competitive equilibrium for the industry and with a prohibition on the transfer of water rights among firms it is shown that 1 senior appropriators claim and use more water than junior appropriators 2 senior appropriators bear less risk than junior appropriators 3 the allocation of water and diversion capacitie 6among firms is inefficient being dominated by an equal sharing among firms the equal sharing allocation which is pareto optimal when diversion capacities are supplied by a competitive leasing industry can be achieved under the appropriative system if there are competitive markets in water rights and in leases for the use of diversion capacities an application of the coase theorem