tax competition and the creation of redundant products there are products that are assembled from kits but that once assembled are identical to other products an example is the roll your own cigarette because the kit requires time to assemble it is more costly than the assembled product in the absence of tax competition the kit is not bought or is redundant i show that tax competition between regions supports strategies that tax the redundant product at a lower tax rate than its assembled counterpart and it is bought a welfare loss is thereby created jel classification h71 bien des produits peuvent etre assembles a partir de trousses une fois assembles ces produits sont identiques a d autres produits un exemple est le fait de rouler ses propres cigarettes parce que la trousse reclame du temps pour l assemblage le produit coute plus cher que le produit deja assemble en l absence de concurrence fiscale on n achete pas la trousse ou elle est redondante on montre que la concurrence fiscale entre regions supporte des strategies qui taxent le produit redondant a un taux plus bas que sa contrepartie assemblee et que ce produit redondant est achete une perte de bien etre s ensuit

financing and funding health care optimal policy and political implementability health care financing and funding are usually analyzed in isolation this paper combines the corresponding strands of the literature and thereby advances our understanding of the important interaction between them we investigate the impact of three modes of health care financing namely optimal income taxation proportional income taxation and insurance premiums on optimal provider payment and on the political implementability of optimal policies under majority voting considering a standard multi task agency framework we show that optimal health care policies will generally differ across financing regimes when the health authority has redistributive concerns we show that health care financing also has a bearing on the political implementability of optimal health care policies our results demonstrate that an isolated analysis of optimal provider payment rests on very strong assumptions regarding both the financing of health care and the redistributive preferences of the health authority

occupational choice and the process of development this paper models economic development as a process of institutional transformation by focusing on the interplay between agents occupational decisions and the distribution of wealth because of capital market imperfections poor agents choose working for a wage over self employment and wealthy agents become entrepreneurs who monitor workers only with sufficient inequality however will there be employment contracts otherwise there is either subsistence or self employment thus in static equilibrium the occupational structure depends on distribution since the latter is itself endogenous we demonstrate the robustness of this result by extending the model dynamically and studying examples in which initial wealth distributions have long run effects in one case the economy develops either widespread cottage industry self employment or factory production employment contracts depending on the initial distribution in the other example it develops into prosperity or stagnation

borrowing constraints human capital accumulation and growth abstract borrowing constraints increase aggregate savings and therefore may increase growth this paper argues however that by reducing human capital accumulation borrowing constraints also have negative effects on growth these effects are discussed in an overlapping generations model with endogenous growth empirical evidence for oecd and developing countries lend support to the main predictions of the model

fairness self interest and the politics of the progressive income tax all advanced democracies have adopted income taxes with considerable progression in marginal tax rates to explain this we examine the nature of individual and collective preferences over alternative tax schedules in the context of a simple two sector model we first consider the case of altruistic or sociotropic citizens who view the income tax as a means of achieving a fairer or more egalitarian distribution of income we show that greater marginal rate progressivity may well be less fair that a fairest tax however defined is always a linear or flat rate schedule in which all incomes are taxed at the same marginal rate and that with a purely sociotropic electorate there exists a flat rate schedule which is a majority equilibrium we then show that with self interested voters who seek to minimize their own tax burdens greater marginal rate progression may well be preferred by middle and upper income voters that for middle income citizens the optimal schedule is a sharply progressive one and that within the set of individually optimal schedules there exists a majority equilibrium which is a progressive schedule which minimizes the burden on median income or middle class citizens at the expense of lower and upper income taxpayers

predicting the effects of in kind transfers on labor supply few empirical questions in economics have received the degree of attention that has been directed at measuring the impact of income transfers on work incentives the labor market effects of cash assistance have been carefully examined by numerous investigators while in kind programs have received relatively scant treatment despite that over the past twenty years the composition of federal antipoverty expenditures has dramatically shifted in favor of in kind aid two arguments are frequently offered in support of this change in approach to combatting poverty the first expresses concern over the competence of the poor to make wise decisions regarding their own consumption activity restricted transfers are a means of helping the poor while ensuring that the assistance is used in accordance with society s views on what will best improve the lot of recipients the second argument is that in kind transfers are less attractive to the poor than unrestricted cash grants and as such offer greater incentives for the poor to work and leave the welfare rolls this is a question for which little direct evidence exists given the absence of explicit studies to draw upon it has been natural to consider the disincentive effects of in kind transfer programs within conventional models by treating the transfers as if they had taken the form of cash this is a valid approach only if these programs induce the same consumption patterns as do money transfers existing evidence indicates that this is often not so a sizeable literature has evolved concerning recipient valuation of in kind assistance studies that entail computation of cash equivalent values for food stamps 6 7 18 20 22 24 public housing 7 8 15 and medicaid 20 24 provide evidence that these transfers are frequently valued well below market cost this indicates that many current and prospective recipients of in kind assistance are by the nature of the programs forced to consume a different mix of commodities and leisure than they would have had they received cash in terms of economic theory this means that the appropriate model should incorporate quantity constrained commodity demand and labor

ideology and the growth of government abstract we analyze the impact of ideology on the size of government in a simple model the government sets redistribution and provision of public services according to the preferences of the median voter ideology is defined in terms of preferences for public services and the impact of ideology on the size of government is shown to increase with mean income this idea is tested using measures of ideology based on party manifestos we show that the interaction of ideology and mean income has a major role in explaining the increase and divergence in government size observed across oecd countries

tax evasion across italy rational noncompliance or inadequate civic concern the paper suggests anexplanation for the geographical dimensionof tax evasion that focuses on thestructure of territorial government taxesadministered by the central government arenot differentiated by regions poor areasmay prefer a combination of lower taxes andlower levels of public services at both thecentral and the local level this isespecially true when income and wealthlevels differ among the areas and thedemand for publicly provided goods iscorrelated to these levels but the use ofnationally uniform tax schedules imposes awelfare burden on poorer areas while thetax rates of local taxes can be adjusted tolocal preferences tax evasion may betacitly accepted as a compensation for thewelfare loss deriving from too highcentrally set tax rates

distributional effects of public education in an economy with public pensions we study how the allocation of government expenditures between two major outlays education and pay as you go social security affects human capital distribution in an economy with heterogeneous agents we consider an overlapping generations economy where the government maintains both programs and allocates tax revenues to finance them in our model human capital is one of the factors of production it is itself produced as a combined result of public inputs and private inputs parents decisions to invest time and material resources in education of their children are motivated by altruism heterogeneous in its strength across the population which leads to heterogeneity of incomes we investigate the effect of an increase in public funding for education on the human capital distribution we show that in this framework contrary to some earlier results increased spending on public education may lead to higher inequality our results depend crucially on the interaction of education funding with the social security budget and on the elasticity of substitution in the learning technology

inequality redistribution and growth a challenge to the conventional political economy approach abstract this paper reconsiders the conventional political economy view that 1 1 more unequal societies tend to make more redistribution and 2 2 more redistribution is harmful to growth we present a number of theoretical arguments suggesting that the two previous implications are not necessarily true and that the empirically observed negative correlation between inequality and growth might just come from the fact that more unequal societies tend to redistribute less which in turn is actually detrimental to growth

income inequality size of government and tax progressivity a positive theory abstract i investigate the relationship between income inequality and the composition of public spending in redistributive policies i extend the meltzer richard model of voting over redistribution allowing voters to choose not only the amount of a uniform lump sum transfer but also the level of provision of a public good the governmental budget is balanced thus these two choices determine the tax rate on labor income the multidimensionality of the policy space implies that there is no condorcet winner i adopt a citizen candidate model of electoral competition to tackle this problem i show that the progressivity of the tax system is increasing in the mean to median income ratio while the size of the government need not be this means that higher income inequality implies a more progressive tax system but in contrast with the traditional analysis it may also result in a smaller size of government such results are consistent with the most recent findings in the empirical literature

nature of transfers income tax function and empirical estimation of elasticity of taxable income for brazil abstractthis article aims to estimate the elasticity of taxable income eti taking into account the nature of transfers and their use as a redistribution package involving cash and in kind transfers to households in brazil our contributions are twofold first we provide a simple model with balanced budget government that reveals the role played by cash and in kind transfers on the labour supply and income tax revenues thereof next in order to estimate eti in the presence of cash and in kind transfers brazilian population surveys pesquisa nacional por amostra de domicilios pnad are used to explore a limited tax reform that was implemented between 1997 and 1998 this reform only affected the higher income tax bracket our findings suggest that in kind cash transfers are positively negatively associated with reported taxable income and precise estimation of eti requires estimates of both types of transfers last we estimate the eti for brazil in the range from 0 4 to 1 3 not different fro

relying on the private sector the income distribution and public investments in the poor abstract what drives governments with similar revenues to provide very different amounts of goods with private sector substitutes education is a prime example i use exogenous shocks to brazilian municipalities revenue during 1995 2008 generated by non linearities in federal transfer laws to demonstrate two things first municipalities with higher income inequality or higher median income allocate less of a revenue shock to education and are less likely to expand public school enrollment they are more likely to invest in public infrastructure that is broadly enjoyed like parks and roads or to save the shock second i find no evidence that the quality of public education suffers as a result if anything unequal and high income areas are more likely to improve public school inputs and test scores following a revenue shock given their heavy use of private education i further provide evidence that an increase in public sector revenue lowers private school enrollment

mixed markets and crime abstract this paper specifies and solves a two stage game theoretic model of a mixed market for crime control in the first stage of the model private targets and the government choose levels of policing in the second stage criminals choose targets and the severity of the crimes that they commit the paper s key results are as follows first private policing can both divert crime to targets that lack private protection and also increase the severity of the crime that these less protected targets suffer second an increase in private policing reduces the aggregate expenditure on traditional policing this is an instance of a political incentive externality where private policing affects the objective function of the government specifically it reduces the level of traditional policing that is consistent with the samuelson condition for efficient provision of a public good third the substitution of private for public policing carries with it a change in the technology of policing in effect private policing leads to a shift from enforcement and punishment towards monitoring and target hardening this in turn may lead to an increase in the severity of crime fourth the mixed policing equilibrium is inefficient and in some situations mixing may reduce the utility of all targets

support for public provision of a private good with top up and opt out a controlled laboratory experiment abstract this paper presents the results of a revealed choice experiment testing the theoretical predictions of political economy models regarding public support for a publicly provided private good financed with proportional income taxes when individuals can purchase the good privately and either continue to consume public provision top up or forego public provision opt out but in each case continue to pay income taxes our laboratory results confirm behavior is consistent with the predicted majority preferred tax rate under mixed financing with top up but we identify preferences for significantly higher rates of public provision than predicted under mixed financing with opt out using non parametric regression analysis we explore the relationship between individuals top up and opt out decisions and both their income levels and the implemented tax rates

the politics of redistributive social insurance this paper analyses the political support for a social insurance that includes elements of redistribution when there exists an imperfect private insurance alternative individuals differ both in their income and risk the social insurance is compulsory and charges an income related contribution with pooling of risks the private insurance is voluntary and charges a contribution based on individual risks however due to the adverse selection problem private insurance companies provide only partial insurance adopting a non expected utility model we show that there is a general majority support for social insurance and that this support is increasing with risk aversion we also show that a mixed insurance is politically impossible regardless of the degree of redistribution of social insurance and the joint distribution of risk and income in the population lastly we analyse how the political support for social insurance is affected by any change in its redistributive component and the possibility of using genetic tests

is the median voter decisive evidence from referenda voting patterns abstract this paper examines whether the voter with the median income is decisive in local spending decisions previous tests have relied on cross sectional data while we make use of a pair of california referenda to estimate a first difference specification the referenda proposed to lower the required vote share for passing local educational bonding initiatives from 67 to 50 and 67 to 55 respectively we find that voters rationally consider future public service decisions when deciding how to vote on voting rules however the empirical evidence strongly suggests that an income percentile below the median is decisive for majority voting rules especially in communities that have a large share of high income voters with attributes that suggest low demand for public services based on a model that explicitly recognizes that each community contains voters with both high and low demand for public school spending we also find that an increase in the share of low demand voters is associated with a lower decisive voter income percentile for the high demand group this two type model implies that our low demand types individuals over age 45 with no children have demands that are 45 lower than other voters collectively these findings are consistent with high income voters with weak preferences for public educational services voting with the poor against increases in public spending on education

unequal societies income distribution and the social contract this paper develops a theory of inequality and the social contract aiming to explain how countries with similar economic and political fundamentals can sustain such different systems of social insurance fiscal redistribution and education finance as those of the united states and western europe with imperfect credit and insurance markets some redistributive policies can improve ex ante welfare and this implies that their political support tends to decrease with inequality conversely with credit constraints lower redistribution translates into more persistent inequality hence the potential for multiple steady states with mutually reinforcing high inequality and low redistribution or vice versa

selective versus universal vouchers modelling median voter preferences in education under the majority voting rule a system of universally available vouchers uv is politically less feasible than a system of selective vouchers sv confined to families with incomes equal to or less than median voter income after the introduction of uv public expenditure on education will have to be shared with previous private school users per capita expenditure will then drop and or tax will increase since these events will injure the median voter he will reject uv he will be indifferent between the status quo and sv indifference will turn into enthusiasm however if as can be expected the new regime sv brings effective new competition this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

optimal redistribution with productive social services publicly provided private goods are conventionally considered consumer goods departing from this perspective we analyze the public provision of inputs that improve household productivity e g education and childcare in a two class economy with distorting taxation public provision is always welfare improving with respect to pure taxation given that the public input directly affects household productivity moreover the case for public provision strengthens as households heterogeneity in input demand fades out contrary to consolidated results in the literature the features of optimal provision schemes depend on the nature of publicly provided input namely if it substitutes household productive capacity or just helps households to exploit it

income distribution and macroeconomics this paper analyzes the role of wealth distribution in macroeconomics through investment in human capital it is shown that in the presence of credit markets imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital the initial distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and investment both in the short and in the long run as there are multiple steady states this paper therefore provides an additional explanation for the persistent differences in per capita output across countries furthermore the paper shows that cross country differences in macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate shocks can be attributed among other factors to differences in wealth and income distribution across countries

the 1929 stock market irving fisher was right many stock market analysts think that in 1929 at the time of the crash stocks were overvalued irving fisher argued just before the crash that fundamentals were strong and the stock market was undervalued in this article we use growth theory to estimate the fundamental value of corporate equity and compare it to actual stock valuations our estimate is based on values of productive corporate capital both tangible and intangible and tax rates on corporate income and distributions the evidence strongly suggests that fisher was right even at the 1929 peak stocks were undervalued relative to the prediction of theory

the political economy of social security we consider a two period overlapping generations model in which individual voters differ by age and by productivity in such a setting a redistributive pay as you go system is politically sustainable even when the interest rate is higher than the rate of population growth the workers with medium wages not those with the lowest wages and the retirees form a majority which votes for a positive level of social security this level depends on the difference between the rates of population growth and interest as well as on the redistributiveness of the benefit rule

structure induced equilibria and perfect foresight expectations this paper extends the work on structure induced equilibria by explicitly considering voters expectations the standard assumption of myopic expectations is contrasted with the alternative assumption of perfect foresight expectations in the institutional setting examined perfect foresight means voters know how the outcome on the first issue in a sequence of two issues conditions majority rule outcomes on the second issue if voters act on this knowledge when voting on the first issue then several important results follow first voters may possess multipeaked preferences defined over the first issue with a majority cycle resulting so that there is no equilibrium to the whole sequence of elections second even if cycling does not result the exact location of the equilibrium involves a broader conspiracy than previously thought a conspiracy of not only preferences and institutional structure but also voters expectations as conditioned by that structure

political equilibrium income distribution and growth this paper analyzes the impact of income distribution on growth when investment in human capital is the source of growth and individuals vote over the degree of redistribution in the economy the model has three main features first very different patterns of income distribution are conducive to high growth at different levels of per capita income second growth is associated with an externality whereby investment in human capital by one group increases the productivity of other groups thus potentially enabling them to invest in human capital third the initial pattern of income distribution and the resulting political equilibrium are crucial in determining whether the transmission of this externality is promoted in which case growth is enhanced or prevented in which case growth is stopped using a non overlapping generations model with voting i derive several empirical implications in particular the model implies an inverted u relation between levels of inequality and levels of income in cross sections but not necessarily in time series a result that seems consistent with a number of empirical studies

the politics of public provision of education public provision of education is usually viewed as a form of redistribution in kind however does it arise when income redistribution is feasible as well i analyze a two dimensional model of political decision making with endogenous political parties society chooses both the tax rate and the allocation of the revenues between income redistribution and public education agents differ in their income and in their age where young agents prefer public education and the old prefer income redistribution i find that when the cohort size of the young is not too large then public education arises as a political compromise between the rich and the young segment of the poor they collude in order to reduce the size of government which benefits the rich and target some of its resources to education which benefits the young poor when the cohort size of the young is too large however income redistribution crowds out public provision of education in the political equilibrium

sequential voting with endogenous voter forecasts we investigate a sequential voting model in which voters forecasts of outcomes on future issues are determined endogenously voters are assumed to make decisions in an environment in which future outcomes are uncertain the uncertainty arises from two possible sources voters may be uncertain of other voters preferences in addition events that occur before future issues are decided may affect voters preferences on future votes information available to voters at each point in time is characterized an equilibrium to the voting problem if one exists is one for which the outcome on the issue currently being decided and voters forecasts of outcomes on future issues are determined simultaneously we show that an equilibrium exists under a particular voting institution and characterize voters forecasts for this equilibrium

non existence of equilibria in multicommunity models abstract this paper reconsiders equilibrium existence in models with migration and voting over local public goods we show that under some straightforward assumptions on preferences and income distributions the basic structure of multicommunity models i e perfect mobility majority rule single crossing property implies that no equilibrium with jurisdictions conducting different policies can exist stratification equilibria with sorting of the population according to income classes are therefore not as natural as is sometimes suggested mechanisms that can serve to support stratification i e tight housing markets returns to scale in the provision of publicly consumed goods are discussed

voting under ignorance of job skills of unemployed the overtaxation bias abstract usual models on voting over basic income flat tax schedules rest on the assumption that voters know the whole distribution of skills even if at equilibrium some individuals do not work if individuals productivity remains unknown until they work it may be more convincing to assume that voters have only beliefs about the distribution of skills and that a learning process takes place in this paper at each period individuals vote according to their beliefs which are updated when getting new information from the job market the voting process converges towards some steady state equilibrium that depends on both the true distribution of skills and the initial beliefs the equilibrium tax rate is higher than or equal to the tax rate achieved in the perfect information framework an illustration is provided on french data if voters are over pessimistic as to the potential productivity of unemployed people majority voting may lock the economy in an informational trap with a high tax rate and a high level of inactivity

labor income taxation human capital and growth the role of childcare in this paper we examine the effects of labor income taxation on growth in an overlapping generations model in which schooling and childcare play a role in the production of human capital we compare such effects with those obtained in a model in which only schooling matters for skill formation we show that the omission of childcare from the technology of skill formation can bias the results related to the impact of labor income taxation on growth

the political economy of sin taxes we analyse the determination of taxes on harmful goods when consumers have self control problems we show that under reasonable assumptions the socially optimal corrective tax exceeds the average distortion caused by self control problems further we analyse how individuals with self control problems would vote on taxes on the consumption of harmful goods and show that the equilibrium tax is typically below the socially optimal level when the redistributive effects of sin taxes are taken into account the difference between the social optimum and equilibrium is small at low levels of harm but becomes more pronounced when consumption is more harmful

two tier public provision comparing public systems abstract the paper considers a two tier institution in which government provides public services but individuals can opt out of public provision but not taxes funding for the public service is chosen endogenously by majority vote and we first provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a majority vote equilibrium in line with existing results the equilibrium tax rate usually falls below the one found in a one tier system opting out of public consumption is prohibited as the public system loses the political support of the rich who exit we prove that when the two tier system majority dominates a purely private system a majority in society always welcomes a transition from a one tier public system to a two tier system it is the only system that is stable in an evolutionary sense otherwise a majority consisting of the middle class may be in favor of staying in a one tier system prohibiting exit because of a slippery slope argument

education democracy and growth abstract this note presents a model of endogenous growth where redistribution determined by a political equilibrium is in the form of public education it is shown that there need not be a negative relationship between growth and redistribution as public education increases the level of human capital in the conomy and at the same time tends to produce a more even income distribution

public private mix of health expenditure a political economy and quantitative analysis this paper constructs a simple model to examine decisions on public and private health spending under majority voting in the model agents with heterogeneous incomes choose how much to consume and spend on health care and vote for public health expenditure the health status of an agent is determined by a ces composite of public and private health expenditure the existence and uniqueness of the voting equilibrium are established a quantitative exercise reveals the importance of the relative effectiveness of public and private health expenditure and their substitutability in determining the public private mix of health expenditure and in accounting for the observed differences across a sample of 22 advanced democratic countries

a new data set measuring income inequality this article presents a new data set on inequality in the distribution of income the authors explain the criteria they applied in selecting data on gini coefficients and on individual quintile groups income shares comparison of the new data set with existing compilations reveals that the data assembled here represent an improvement in quality and a significant expansion in coverage although differences in the definition of the underlying data might still affect inter temporal and international comparability based on this new data set the authors do not find a systematic link between growth and changes in aggregate inequality they do find a strong positive relationship between growth and reduction of poverty

one dollar one vote this paper revisits the relationship between inequality and redistribution in a panel of advanced oecd countries using panel data methods that hold constant a variety of determinants of redistributive spending i find a non monotonic relationship between pre tax and transfer distribution of income and redistribution relative to mean income a more affluent rich and middle class are associated with less redistribution and a richer poor class is associated with more redistribution these results are consistent with a one dollar one vote politico economic equilibrium when the income of a group of citizens increases aggregate redistributive policies tilt towards this group s most preferred policies

the new deal and modern memory summary economists and other social scientists may never be able to explain fully why the greatdepression happened when it did or why it initially was so severe numerous hypotheses havebeen advanced as we have seen and each of them contributes important insights into thecauses of the macroeconomic calamity in which most of the world was mired in 1929 1933 if however one is forced to adopt a monocausal theory it must center on the actions of america scentral bank which presided over an extraordinary expansion in bank credit in the mid to late1920s and then took the punch bowl off the table for the purposes of this article though the key question is why did the great depressionlast longer in the united states than it did in any other nation the answer as laid out in thenext section is presidential politics 23 there will come seven years of great plenty throughout all the land of egypt but after them will arise seven years offamine and all the plenty will be forgotten in the land of egypt the famine will consume the land genesis 41 29 30 nkjv

on pareto improving commodity tax changes under fiscal competition this paper shows that when a noncooperative fiscal equilibrium of the mintz tulkens 1986 model of tax competition is inefficient pareto improving changes are positive for the taxes of both regions under concavity of the regions welfare functions it also identifies a class of such equilibria that are always efficient

estimating price elasticities when there is smuggling the sensitivity of smoking to price in canada a central parameter for evaluating tax policies is the price elasticity of demand for cigarettes but in many countries this parameter is difficult to estimate reliably due to widespread smuggling which significantly biases estimates using legal sales data an excellent example is canada where widespread smuggling in the early 1990s in response to large tax increases biases upwards the response of legal cigarette sales to price we surmount this problem through two approaches excluding the provinces and years where smuggling was greatest and using household level expenditure data on smoking these two approaches yield a tightly estimated elasticity in the range of 0 45 to 0 47 we also show that the sensitivity of smoking to price is much larger among lower income canadians in the context of recent behavioral models of smoking whereby higher taxes reduce unwanted smoking among price sensitive populations this finding suggests that cigarette taxes may not be as regressive as previously suggested finally we show that price increases on cigarettes do not increase and may actually decrease consumption of alcohol as a result smuggling of cigarettes may have raised consumption of alcohol as well

reforming an asymmetric union on the virtues of dual tier capital taxation the tax competition for mobile capital in particular the reluctance of small countries to agree on measures of tax coordination has ongoing political and economic fallouts within europe we analyse the effects of introducing a two tier structure of capital taxation where the asymmetric member states of a union choose a common federal tax rate in the first stage and then non cooperatively set local tax rates in the second stage we show that this mechanism effectively reduces competition for mobile capital between the members of the union moreover it distributes the gains across the heterogeneous states in a way that yields a strict pareto improvement over a one tier system of purely local tax choices we also discuss the effects of diverging capital endowments within the union and capital flows to third countries

ends against the middle determining public service provision when there are private alternatives abstract public provision of a service coexists with private market provision the quality of public provision is determined by majority vote preferences are not single peaked owing to the presence of private alternatives we identify two cases in one majority voting equilibrium always exists and the median income voter is pivotal in the other a necessary condition for equilibrium indentifies the pivotal voter who must have income below the median when equilibrium exists a coalition of middle income households who consume the public alternative will be opposed by a coalition of rich and poor households with the rich choosing private consumption

why the poor do not expropriate the rich an old argument in new garb we consider a political economy with two partisan parties each party represents a given constituency of voters if one party labour represents poor voters and the other christian democrats rich voters if a redistributive tax policy is the only issue and if there are no incentive considerations then in equilibrium the party representing the poor will propose a tax rate of unity if however there are two issues tax policy and religion for instance then this is not generally the case the analysis shows that if a simple condition on the distribution of voter preferences holds then as the salience of the non economic issue increases the tax rate proposed by labour in equilibrium will fall possibly even to zero even though a majority of the population may have an ideal tax rate of unity 1998 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

should i stay or should i go exit options within mixed systems of public and private health care finance abstract mixed public private finance is widespread in health care systems internationally in one variant of mixed finance some countries e g germany allow eligible beneficiaries to fully exit from the public social insurance system and purchase private insurance using a controlled laboratory experiment we empirically investigate the predictions of a political economy model of mixed systems of public and private finance with two types of exit universal exit when all individuals can choose to exit the public system and conditional exit when only individuals with an income at or above a threshold income level can choose to exit we find that high income individuals are less likely to exit under universal exit than under conditional exit despite having the same incentive to exit in both treatments sensitivity treatments suggests that a number of factors may be at play in explaining this result including learning effects a priming effect and a framing effect but that other regarding preferences do not appear to be an important factor

public education spending and private substitution in urban china abstract this paper documents robust evidence that increases in public spending on basic education are associated with significant reductions in household private tutoring spending in urban china this reduction comes primarily from the top and bottom income households suggesting multi dimensional demands for private tutoring it concentrates on households with an only boy and is larger for middle school than primary school children increases in public education spending are associated with significant reduction in school tuition which is homogeneous across households of different income levels changes in household spending on textbooks in response to more public education spending are modest but statistically insignificant

the impact of idiosyncratic uncertainty when investment opportunities are endogenous this paper develops a general equilibrium model to study the impact of aggregate fluctuations in idiosyncratic volatility that incorporates the endogenous determination of investment opportunities by making investment options more valuable an increase in volatility encourages the creation of new investment options i find the response of the economy to a volatility shock depends on how investment opportunities are obtained if potential entrants are allowed to invest in new idiosyncratic technologies thereby acquiring options for further investment the volatility shock increases overall investment and results in an economic boom on the other hand if such an investment in option creation is precluded and investment opportunities are exogenously given the volatility shock decreases aggregate investment

forecasting the depression harvard versus yale was the depression forecastable after the crash how long should it have taken contempo rary forecasters to realize how severe the downturn was going to be these questions are addressed by studying the predictions of the harv ard economic service and yale s irving fisher during 1929 and the ear ly 1930s the data assembled by the harvard and yale forecasters tog ether with modern historical data are subjected to statistical analy sis to learn whether their verbal pronouncements were consistent with the data both the harvard and yale forecasters were systematically too optimistic yet nothing in the data suggests that the optimism w as unwarranted copyright 1988 by american economic association

social mobility and the demand for redistribution the poum hypothesis this paper examines the often stated idea that the poor do not support high levels of redistribution because of the hope that they or their offspring may make it up the income ladder this prospect of upward mobility poum hypothesis is shown to be fully compatible with rational expectations and fundamentally linked to concavity in the mobility process a steady state majority could even be simultaneously poorer than average in terms of current income and richer than average in terms of expected future incomes a e rst empirical assessment suggests on the other hand that in recent u s data the poum effect is probably dominated by the demand for social insurance in the future everyone will be world famous for e fteen minutes andy warhol 1968

the demand for episodes of treatment in the health insurance experiment abstract this paper analyzes claims data from the rand health insurance experiment which were grouped into episodes of treatment the insurance plans in the experiment have coinsurance and a cap on out of pocket spending using new statistical techniques to adjust for the increased sickliness of those who exceed the cap the effects of coinsurance on cost per episode and number of episodes are estimated cost sharing reduced the number of episodes but had little effect on cost per episode people in the experiment responded myopically as their current insurance status changed through the year the price elasticity of spending was about 0 2 throughout the range of coinsurance studied when data permit it the study of episodes complements analyses of annual medical spending by revealing more about how decisions to spend are made within the year

voluntary donations and public expenditures in a federal system proponents of the new federalism argue that nonprofit organizations and local governments will fully offset federal social service expenditure cutbacks the author analyzes this proposition as a competitive game in which donations are motivated by private and public good considerations the author characterizes the response of political economic equilibrium to exogenous changes in federal expenditures when local voters are cognizant of donor reactions partial replacement is the most likely outcome though others are possible copyright 1987 by american economic association

commodity tax competition between member states of a federation equilibrium and efficiency we first describe regional market equilibria whereupon consumers of each region allocate their purchases of private goods between domestic and nondomestic ones according to the structure of relative prices taxes and transportation costs next regional optimal tax levels and public good quantities are derived the tax of the other region being held constant fiscal competition arises from the ability of one region in choosing its tax to alter the tax base of the other

political complements in the welfare state health care and social security abstract all oecd countries target a large majority of their welfare spending to the elderly through public pensions and health care programs spending in both programs has largely increased in the past decades often more than the share of elderly in the population we suggest that these phenomena may be due to political complementarities between these two transfer programs we show that these two programs may coexist because public health care may increase the political constituency in favor of social security and vice versa specifically public health decreases the absolute longevity differential between low and high income individuals therefore rising the retirement period and the total pension benefits of the former relatively to the latter this effect increases the political support for social security among the low income young we show that in a political equilibrium of a two dimensional majoritarian election a voting majority of low income young and retirees supports a large welfare state the composition between public health and social security is determined by intermediate median income types who favor the contemporaneous existence of these two programs since public health increases their longevity enough to make social security more attractive technological improvements in health care strengthens this complementarity and lead to more welfare spending

on the public choice critique of welfare economics the public choice literature urges the welfare economist to anticipate how political forces will shape the levels of new policy instruments when government intervenes in a new way this paper argues that the welfare economist should also recognize that new interventions may impact the politically determined levels of existing policy instruments it shows how the introduction of a new instrument can lead to shifts in political coalitions or compromises in existing areas of conflict that can produce significant changes in existing policies such spillover effects can provide new arguments for introducing particular policy interventions even a policy instrument without an obvious welfare economic rationale can change voter coalitions and shift the policy equilibrium in a welfare improving direction

assigning resources to budget constrained agents this article studies different methods of assigning a good to budget constrained agents schemes that assign the good randomly and allow resale may outperform the competitive market in terms of utilitarian efficiency the socially optimal mechanism involves random assignment at a discount an in kind subsidy and a cash incentive to discourage low valuation individuals from claiming the good copyright oxford university press

financial market imperfections and home ownership a comparative study abstract we explore the determinants of the distribution of owner occupancy rates across age groups using a collection of microeconomic data on 14 oecd countries in most the survey is repeated over time this allows us to construct an international dataset merging data on 39 national household surveys with aggregate data on down payment ratios we find strong evidence that the availability of mortgage finance as measured by down payment ratios affects the distribution of owner occupancy rates across age groups especially at the young end the results are consistent with previous theoretical models and have important implications for the debate on the relation between saving and growth

why don t voters put the gini back in the bottle inequality and economic preferences for redistribution abstract the classic democratic theory of redistribution claims that an increase in market income inequality causes an increase in the size of government through majority voter support for an offsetting expansion of redistribution i argue that the predicted inequality redistribution relationship can break down when voters face uninsurable idiosyncratic risk with respect to future labor income and a timing differential between tax collections and government outlays this is formalized using an incomplete market heterogeneous agent dsge model with majority voting and time to build policy which suggests the collective demand for redistribution will not necessarily increase with growing income or wealth inequality this result implies that even with equal political power among voters democracies do not have a systematic mechanism to offset rising inequality as contrary to popular belief

to segregate or to integrate education politics and democracy how is the quality of public education affected by the presence of private schools for the rich theory and evidence suggest that the link depends crucially on the political system we develop a theory that integrates private education and fertility decisions with voting on public schooling expenditures we find that the presence of a large private education sector benefits public schools in a broad based democracy where politicians are responsive to low income families but crowds out public education spending in a society that is politically dominated by the rich the main predictions of the theory are consistent with state level data and micro data from the u s as well as cross country evidence from the programme for international student assessment study

taxation smuggling and demand for cigarettes in canada evidence from time series data abstract this study analyzes canadian cigarette consumption and taxation between 1980 and 1994 a period in which there have been large price rises and declines and a dramatic increase in the consumption of contraband tobacco products we examine elasticities of legal cigarette sales and total sales including contraband with respect to the price of legal cigarettes and various other factors the growth of the contraband market since 1987 appears to have created two classes of cigarette taxed and untaxed with responses to changes in the legal price that are respectively higher and lower than was previously the case the sensitivity of total cigarette sales to the taxation instrument is much lower than it would appear from sales of taxed cigarettes alone

poverty and the political economy of public education spending evidence from brazil a large body of literature has emphasized the elite capture of democratic institutions as the explanation for the low levels of spending on public education in many low income democracies this paper provides an alternative to that longstanding hypothesis motivated by new cross country facts and evidence from brazilian municipalities we hypothesize that many democratic developing countries might invest less in public education spending because poor decisive voters prefer the government to allocate resources elsewhere one possible explanation is that low income voters could instead favor redistributive programs that increase their incomes in the short run such as cash transfers to test for this possibility we design and implement an experimental survey and an incentivized choice experiment in brazil the findings from both interventions support our hypothesis

public provision of private goods government may provide a good that can if legally permitted be supplemented by private purchases policy is determined by majority rule under standard assumptions on preferences a majority voting equilibrium exists a regime of positive government provision with no restriction on private supplements is shown to be majority preferred to a regime of either only market provision or only government provision combined public and private expenditure on the good is higher under this dual provision regime than under either of the alternatives under some preference configurations the median income voter is pivotal under others a voter with income below the median is pivotal

income distribution borrowing constraints and redistributive policies this paper sheds light on the relationship between income inequality and redistributive policies and provides possible guidance in the specification of empirical tests of such a relationship we model a two period economy where capital markets are imperfect and agents vote over the level of taxation to finance redistributive policies that enhance future productivity in this context we show that the pivotal voter is not necessarily the agent class with median income in particular the poor who are more likely to be liquidity constrained may form a coalition with the rich and vote for low redistribution the effects of an increase in income inequality on the level of redistribution turn out to depend on whether the increase in inequality is concentrated among the poor or the middle class empirical results from a panel of 22 oecd countries provide preliminary evidence consistent with our main theoretical implications

latent tastes incomplete stratification and the plausibility of vertical sorting models this paper uses the 2011 phoenix area social survey to evaluate the plausibility of the assumptions made with pure characteristics sorting models to rationalize incomplete stratification of households across local communities by income the analysis with the new ecological paradigm a well recognized index of environmental attitudes confirms the correlations in equilibrium outcomes implied by these models as a result it provides the first empirical support for the role of differences in the tastes for public goods as one explanation that provides the rationale for the commonly observed sorting outcomes

private and public health insurance in the uk abstract this paper investigates the interaction between state health provision and private medical insurance in the uk regional data on private insurance and national health service waiting lists are used to assess whether higher levels of private insurance can affect performance of the public health sector

tiebout sorting and neighborhood stratification tiebout s classic 1956 paper has strong implications regarding stratification across and within jurisdictions predicting in the simplest instance a hierarchy of internally homogeneous communities ordered by income typically urban areas are less than fully stratified and the question arises how much do departures from standard tiebout assumptions contribute to observed within neighborhood mixing this paper quantifies the separate effects of employment geography via costly commuting and preferences for housing attributes on neighborhood stratification it does so using an equilibrium sorting model estimated with rich census micro data simulations based on the model and credible preference estimates show that counterfactual reductions in commuting costs lead to marked increases in racial and education segregation and to a lesser degree increases in income segregation given that households now find it easier to locate in neighborhoods with like households while turning off preferences for housing characteristics increases racial segregation especially for blacks doing so reduces income segregation indicating that heterogeneity in the housing stock serves to stratify households based on ability to pay further we show that differences in housing help to accentuate differences in the consumption of local amenities

voluntary public health insurance we look at the consequences of allowing public health insurance puhi to be voluntary when its coverage can be supplemented in the market puhi redistributes with respect to risk and income and the market is affected by adverse selection we argue that making puhi voluntary does not lead to its collapse since individuals always participate in it additionally in some cases a voluntary puhi scheme increases market efficiency because participation in it sends a signal to private insurers of an individual s health risk type the welfare consequences depend on the status quo if in the status quo no political support exists for a compulsory puhi making it voluntary constitutes a pareto improvement and in some cases all individuals are strictly better off if instead the status quo implements compulsory puhi making it voluntary then results in less redistribution

does innovation cause stock market runups evidence from the great crash this article examines the stock market s changing valuation of corporate patentable assets between 1910 and 1939 it shows that the value of knowl edge capital increased significantly during the 1920s compared to the 1910s as investors responded to the quality of technological inventions innovation was an important driver of the late 1920s stock market runup and the great crash did not reflect a significant revaluation of knowledge capital relative to physical capital although substantial quantities of influential patents were accumulated during the post crash recovery high technology firms did not earn significant excess returns over low technology firms for most of the 1930s

a theory of trickle down growth and development this paper develops a model of growth and income inequalities in the presence of imperfect capital markets and it analyses the trickle down effect of capital accumulation moral hazard with limited wealth constraints on the part of the borrowers is the source of both capital market imperfections and the emergence of persistent income inequalities three main conclusions are obtained from this model first when the rate of capital accumulation is sufficiently high the economy converges to a unique invariant wealth distribution second even though the trickle down mechanism can lead to a unique steady state distribution under laissez faire there is room for government intervention in particular redistribution of wealth from rich lenders to poor and middle class borrowers improves the production efficiency of the economy both because it brings about greater equality of opportunity and also because it accelerates the trickle down process third the process of capital accumulation initially has the effect of widening inequalities but in later stages it reduces them in other words this model can generate a kuznets curve

asymmetric commodity tax competition comment on de crombrugghe and tulkens abstract a widely noticed result by de crombrugghe and tulkens journal of public economics 41 1990 335 350 states that asymmetric commodity tax competition always leads to tax rates being too low in both countries even though there are counteracting private and public consumption effects for the high tax region this note argues that the result depends crucially on the assumption that welfare in the high tax region is concave in the tax rate of the low tax country and shows that this assumption cannot generally be met in the underlying mintz and tulkens journal of public economics 29 1986 133 172 model it is also shown that a tax increase in the low tax country will hurt the high tax region when the marginal transaction cost schedule is sufficiently elastic with respect to the level of cross border shopping

distributive politics and economic growth a crude distinction between economics and politics would be that economics is concerned with expanding the pie while politics is about distributing it in this paper we analyze the relationship between the two we focus on how an economy s initial configuration of resources shapes the political struggle for income and wealth distribution and how that in turn affects long run growth our main conclusion is that inequality is conducive to the adoption of growth retarding policies we derive this result from a simple political economy model of growth and present cross country evidence consistent with it the key feature of our model is that individuals differ in their relative factor endowments we distinguish between two types of factors an accumulated factor called capital and a nonaccumulated factor called labor growth is driven by the expansion of the capital stock which is in turn determined by individual saving decisions long run growth is endogenous as the aggregate production function is taken to be linearly homogeneous in capital and productive government services taken together the provision of government services is financed by a tax on capital because government services are productive a small tax on

education finance reform and investment in human capital lessons from california abstract this paper examines the effect of different education financing systems on the level and distribution of resources devoted to public education we focus on california which in the 1970 s was transformed from a foundation system of mixed local and state financing to one of effectively pure state finance and subsequently saw its funding of public education fall between 10 and 15 relative to the rest of the us we show that a simple political economy model of public finance can account for the bulk of this drop we find that while the distribution of spending became more equal this was mainly at the cost of a large reduction in spending in the wealthier communities with little increase for the poorer districts our calibrated model implies that there is no simple trade off between equity and resources we show that if california had moved to the opposite extreme and abolished state aid altogether funding for public education would also have dropped by almost 10

capital taxation during the u s great depression previous studies of the u s great depression find that increased government spending and taxation contributed little to either the dramatic downturn or the slow recovery these studies include only one type of capital taxation a business profits tax the contribution is much greater when the analysis includes other types of capital taxes a general equilibrium model extended to include taxes on dividends property capital stock excess profits and undistributed profits predicts patterns of output investment and hours worked that are more like those in the 1930s than found in earlier studies the greatest effects come from the increased taxes on corporate dividends and undistributed profits jel codes e13 e32 h25 copyright 2012 oxford university press

the political economy of long term care we build a two dimensional political economy model to explain the provision and financing of long term care and income redistribution voting agents differ in need and income opening up two conflicts one sets families with disabled parents who are in favor of a public long term care program against the ones without such parents who oppose public financing the other sets the poor against the rich with the former preferring heavier income taxation than the latter we show that a structure induced equilibrium always exists and that it is unique if informal care is provided in equilibrium the equilibrium not only explains the negative association of income inequality and long term care financing but also allows predictions about how demographic change might impact long term care arrangements and expenses

the dynamics of the wealth distribution and the interest rate with credit rationing are uniquely determined and wealth dispersion among individuals or firms is irrelevant introducing credit rationing into the solow model modifies these conclusions multiple stationary interest rates and wealth distributions can exist because higher initial rates can be self reinforcing through higher credit rationing and lower capital accumulation the wealth accumulation process is ergodic in every steady state but wealth mobility is lower with higher steady state interest rates aggregate output is higher in steady states with lower interest rates because credit is better allocated short run interest rate or distribution shocks can be self sustaining and can have long run effects on output through the induced dynamics of the wealth distribution and credit rationing

inequality and redistribution revisited abstract as inequality rises taxation can be less efficient in the sense that a given tax rate produces a smaller tax base if this tax base effect outweighs the conventional political effect then increasing inequality can induce less public spending or redistribution contrarily to alesina and rodrik and persson and tabellini

jeux sans frontieres tax competition and tax coordination when countries differ in size closer international integration is putting increasing pressure on existing national tax structures this paper uses a simple two country model to address a range of consequent policy concerns focusing particularly on the role of country size differences in size exacerbate the inefficiency from noncooperative behavior harming both countries the smaller country loses from harmonization to any tax rate between those set in the noncooperative equilibrium but both countries gain from the imposition of a minimum tax anywhere in that range the fully optimal response to freer cross border trade however may be to do nothing jel h20 h77

on the economics of philanthropy friedman says that he accepts this argument as justifying governmental action to alleviate poverty economists will be familiar with this kind of argument someone takes as a premise that a particular activity is the subject of altruistic concern by individuals he shows that if matters are left to unco ordinated private philanthropy a free rider problem will arise and then he claims that this problem can be solved by some kind of intervention by government this strategy has been used to justify many kinds of intervention including compulsory transfers of income through the tax system hochman and rodgers i969 public policy to stimulate saving and investment marglin i963 sen i967 and the subsidisation or public provision of health care arrow i963 lindsay i969 culyer i976 this whole line of argument rests on a particular theory of private philanthropy which in turn relies on three principal assumptions first there is the publicness assumption the charitable activity in question say the relief of poverty or the provision of health care is a common argument in many individuals utility functions and so is a public good in the theoretical sense samuelson i954 in some cases of private philanthropy it is indisputable that the charitable activity is a public good from which donors derive utility consider for example the case of yachtsmen contributing to the royal national lifeboat institution or potential cancer victims contributing to the cancer research campaign in other cases the assumption takes on a rather different character rich britons contribute towards famine relief in cambodia childless old age pensioners contribute towards the care of handicapped children in such cases one would have to be extremely cynical to believe that the charitable activity furthers the self interest of the donor in any significant way but one might suggest that for purely altruistic reasons the donor derives utility from knowing that less fortunate people are being made better off such an effect will be called an altruistic externality friedman along with all of the other writers quoted in the first paragraph of this paper relies on altruistic externalities to justify the publicness assumption the second assumption is that of utility maximisation each individual s decisions concerning his philanthropic