designing self reporting regimes to encourage truth telling an experimental study abstract we report results from an experiment that investigates truthfulness in self reporting under different reporting regimes the experiment involves a production task with self reporting of accidents with reporting compulsory for some participants but only voluntary for others we find that dishonesty is prevalent but accident reporting is more frequent with compulsory reporting compared with voluntary our results suggest that the lie aversion effect is stronger than any potential crowding out of intrinsic motivation to voluntarily report and that careful design of self reporting regimes is necessary by enforcement agencies to achieve satisfactory compliance outcomes our results are relevant for areas beyond regulatory compliance including dishonesty in social security claims insurance claims workplace expense claims income tax returns and financial reporting

lying and reciprocity abstract we extend the literature on the determinants of lying to the impact of reciprocity in strategic interactions we study a theoretical model with reciprocity by assuming that a player s degree of altruism depends on her perception of the other player s altruism towards herself specifically we consider a sequential two player contest and vary the second mover s degree of information on the first movers lying behavior this yields predictions on the second mover s behavior which we study in a largescale online experiment and the laboratory surprisingly the second mover s lying propensity does not depend on her information on the first mover s lying behavior to investigate whether this is specific to lying we consider an additional treatment with the same payoff structure where subjects can increase their chances of winning by simple statements without lying as we do find evidence for reciprocity there the lack of reciprocity cannot solely be attributed to the contest structure

representative evidence on lying costs abstract a central assumption in economics is that people misreport their private information if this is to their material benefit several recent models depart from this assumption and posit that some people do not lie or at least do not lie maximally these models invoke many different underlying motives including intrinsic lying costs altruism efficiency concerns or conditional cooperation to provide an empirically validated microfoundation for these models it is crucial to understand the relevance of the different potential motives we measure the extent of lying costs among a representative sample of the german population by calling them at home in our setup participants have a clear monetary incentive to misreport misreporting cannot be detected reputational concerns are negligible and altruism efficiency concerns or conditional cooperation cannot play a role yet we find that aggregate reporting behavior is close to the expected truthful distribution suggesting that lying costs are large and widespread further lab experiments show that this result is not driven by the mode of communication

confronting the environmental kuznets curve t he environmental kuznets curve posits an inverted u relationship between pollution and economic development kuznets s name was apparently attached to the curve by grossman and krueger 1993 who noted its resemblance to kuznets s inverted u relationship between income inequality and development in the first stage of industrialization pollution in the environmental kuznets curve world grows rapidly because people are more interested in jobs and income than clean air and water communities are too poor to pay for abatement and environmental regulation is correspondingly weak the balance shifts as income rises leading industrial sectors become cleaner people value the environment more highly and regulatory institutions become more effective along the curve pollution levels off in the middle income range and then falls toward pre industrial levels in wealthy societies the environmental kuznets curve model has elicited conflicting reactions from researchers and policymakers applied econometricians have generally accepted the basic tenets of the model and focused on measuring its parameters their regressions typically fitted to cross sectional observations across countries or regions suggest that air and water pollution increase with development until per capita income reaches a range of 5000 to 8000 when income rises beyond that level pollution starts to decline as shown in the conventional ekc line in figure 1 in developing countries some policymakers have interpreted such results as conveying a message about priorities grow first then clean up numerous critics have challenged the conventional environmental kuznets curve both as a representation of what actually happens in the development process and as a policy prescription some pessimistic critics argue that crosssectional evidence for the environmental kuznets curve is nothing more than a

club convergence in carbon dioxide emissions we examine convergence in carbon dioxide emissions among 128 countries for the period 1960 2003 by means of a new methodology introduced by phillips and sul econometrica 75 6 1771 1855 2007a contrary to previous studies our approach allows us to examine for evidence of club convergence i e identify groups of countries that converge to different equilibria our results suggest convergence in per capita co2 emissions among all the countries under scrutiny in the early years of our sample however there seem to be two separate convergence clubs in the recent era that converge to different steady states interestingly we also find evidence of transitioning between the two convergence clubs suggesting either a slow convergence between the two clubs or a tendency for some countries to move from one convergence club to the other

do tournaments have incentive effects much attention has been devoted to studying models of tournaments or situations in which an individual s payment depends only on his or her output or rank relative to that of other competitors academic interest derives from the fact that under certain sets of assumptions tournaments have desirable normative properties because of the incentive structures they provide our paper uses nonexperimental data to test whether tournaments actually elicit effort responses we focus on professional golf tournaments because information on the incentive structure prize distribution and measures of individual output players scores are both available we find strong support for the proposition that the level and structure of prizes in pga tournaments influence players performance

tournaments and office politics evidence from a real effort experiment in many environments tournaments can elicit more effort from workers except perhaps when workers can sabotage each other because it is hard to separate effort ability and output in many real workplace settings the empirical evidence on the incentive effect of tournaments is thin there is even less evidence on the impact of sabotage because real world acts of sabotage are often subtle manifestations of subjective peer evaluation or office politics we discuss a real effort experiment in which effort quality adjusted output and office politics are compared under piece rates and tournaments our results suggest that tournaments increase effort only in the absence of office politics competitors are more likely to sabotage each other in tournaments and as a result workers actually provide less effort simply because they expect to be the victims of sabotage adjusting output for quality with the rating of an independent auditor shrinks the incentive effect of the tournament even further since output tends to become more slipshod

does the barro gordon model explain the behavior of us inflation a reexamination of the empirical evidence abstract this paper tests the predictions of the barro gordon model using us data on inflation and unemployment to that end it constructs a general game theoretical model with asymmetric preferences that nests the barro gordon model and a version of cukierman s model as special cases likelihood ratio tests indicate that the restriction imposed by the barro gordon model is rejected by the data but the one imposed by the version of cukierman s model is not reduced form estimates are consistent with the view that the federal reserve weights more heavily positive than negative unemployment deviations from the expected natural rate

convergence in carbon dioxide emissions among industrialised countries revisited this paper examines the existence of stochastic and deterministic convergence of carbon dioxide co2 emissions in 23 countries over the period 1960 2002 for that purpose we conduct unit root testing by employing the recently developed panel stationarity test of carrion i silvestre et al carrion i silvestre j l del barrio castro t lopez bazo e 2005 breaking the panels an application to the gdp per capita econometrics journal 8 159 175 which assumes a highly flexible trend function by incorporating an unknown number of structural breaks we accommodate general forms of cross sectional dependence as well as control for finite sample bias through bootstrap methods overall our analysis provides strong evidence supporting both stochastic and deterministic convergence in co2 emissions thus confirming strazicich and list strazicich m c list j a 2003 are co2 emission levels converging among industrial countries environmental and resource economics 24 263 271 and westerlund and basher westerlund j basher s a 2007 testing for convergence in carbon dioxide emissions using a century of panel data environmental and resource economics forthcoming findings of convergence

selection tournaments and dishonesty we conduct a real effort experiment in which performance is not monitored and participants are paid according to their reported performance participants are paid according to a piece rate and a winner take all tournament and then select between the two schemes before performing the task one more time competition increases dishonesty and lowers output when the payment scheme is exogenously determined participants with a higher propensity to be dishonest are more likely to select into competition however after selection we find no output difference between piece rate and tournament this is attributable to a handful of honest individuals who select competition

how many winners are good to have on tournaments with sabotage abstract from an employer s perspective a tournament should induce agents to exert productive activities but refrain from destructive ones we experimentally test the predictive power of a tournament model which suggests that within a reasonable framework productive and destructive activities are influenced neither by the number of agents taking part in the tournament nor by the fraction of the winner prizes our results clearly confirm that sabotage in tournaments indeed occurs while tournament size has virtually no effect on behavior a balanced fraction of winner and loser prizes appears to enhance productive activities

do women shy away from competition do men compete too much we examine whether men and women of the same ability differ in their selection into a competitive environment participants in a laboratory experiment solve a real task first under a noncompetitive piece rate and then a competitive tournament incentive scheme although there are no gender differences in performance men select the tournament twice as much as women when choosing their compensation scheme for the next performance while 73 percent of the men select the tournament only 35 percent of the women make this choice this gender gap in tournament entry is not explained by performance and factors such as risk and feedback aversion only playa negligible role instead the tournament entry gap is driven by men being more overconfident and by gender differences in preferences for performing in a competition the result is that women shy away from competition and men embrace it

economic growth and environmental degradation the environmental kuznets curve and sustainable development abstract in this paper we critically examine the concept of the environmental kuznets curve ekc it proposes that there is an inverted u shape relation between environmental degradation and income per capita so that eventually growth reduces the environmental impact of economic activity the concept is dependent on a model of the economy in which there is no feedback from the quality of the environment to production possibilities and in which trade has a neutral effect on environmental degradation the actual violation of these assumptions gives rise to fundamental problems in estimating the parameters of an ekc the paper identifies other econometric problems with estimates of the ekc and reviews a number of empirical studies the inference from some such ekc estimates that further development will reduce environmental degradation is dependent on the assumption that world per capita income is normally distributed when in fact median income is far below mean income we carry out simulations combining ekc estimates from the literature with world bank forecasts for economic growth for individual countries aggregating over countries to derive the global impact within the horizon of the bank s forecast 2025 global emissions of so 2 continue to increase forest loss stabilizes before the end of the period but tropical deforestation continues at a constant rate throughout the period

an experiment on risk taking and evaluation periods does the period over which individuals evaluate outcomes influence their investment in risky assets results from this study show that the more frequently returns are evaluated the more risk averse investors will be the results are in line with the behavioral hypothesis of myopic loss aversion which assumes that people are myopic in evaluating outcomes over time and are more sensitive to losses than to gains the results have relevance for the equity premium puzzle and also for the marketing strategies of fund managers

a test for parameter homogeneity in co2panel ekc estimations this paper casts doubt on empirical results based on panel estimations of an inverted u relationship between per capita gdp and pollution using a new dataset for oecd countries on carbon dioxide emissions for the period 1960 1997 we find that the crucial assumption of homogeneity across countries is problematic decisively rejected are model specifications that feature even weaker homogeneity assumptions than are commonly used furthermore our results challenge the existence of an overall environmental kuznets curve for carbon dioxide emissions

have air pollutant emissions converged among u s regions evidence from unit root tests previous studies of income distribution have found evidence indicating that incomes across u s regions have converged supporting the prediction of the neoclassical growth model a potential shortcoming in these studies is that only one measure of well being is considered a measure of wealth linked to incomes or production this paper examines whether income convergence was accompanied by air pollutant emission convergence results from unit root tests provide some evidence that indicators of environmental quality have converged across u s regions during the 1929 1994 period

measuring lying aversion abstract we introduce a new method for measuring the decision to lie in experiments in the game the decision to lie increases own payment independent of the counterpart s decision but potentially at a cost for the counterpart we identify at the individual level the decision to lie and measure how individuals react to different incentives to lie furthermore we investigate how lying behavior changes over time our method allows us to classify people into types including those who never lie those who always lie and those who react to incentives to lie we suggest this method as a useful instrument for examining factors that influence the decision to lie

entry into winner take all and proportional prize contests an experimental study this experiment compares the performance of two contest designs a standard winner take all tournament with a single fixed prize and a novel proportional payment design in which that same prize is divided among contestants by their share of total achievement we find that proportional prizes elicit more entry and more total achievement than the winner take all tournament the proportional prize contest performs better by limiting the degree to which heterogeneity among contestants discourages weaker entrants without altering the performance of stronger entrants these findings could inform the design of contests for technological and other improvements which are widely used by governments and philanthropic donors to elicit more effort on targeted economic and technological development activities

loss aversion and lying behavior abstract we theoretically show that loss averse agents are more likely to lie to avoid receiving a low payoff after a random draw the lower the ex ante probability of this bad outcome the ex ante expected payoff increases as the bad outcome becomes less likely and hence the greater is the loss avoided by lying we demonstrate robust support for this theory by reanalyzing the results from the extant literature and with a new experiment that varies the outcome probabilities and is run double anonymous

incentives for dishonesty an experimental study with internal auditors we conduct an experiment with professional internal auditors and evaluate their performance and objectivity measured as the extent to which they truthfully report the performance of other participants in a real effort task in line with our hypotheses we find that incentive based compensation increases dishonest behavior competitive incentives lead to under reporting of other participants performance while collective incentives lead to over reporting of performance we replicate these results with a student sample in addition we find that moving from an environment with objective performance evaluation toward a peer evaluation scheme reduces performance among internal auditors but not among students jel c93 m42 m52

are co2 emission levels converging among industrial countries time paths of carbon dioxide emissions intwenty one industrial countries are examinedfrom 1960 1997 to test for stochastic andconditional convergence both panel unit roottests and cross section regressions areperformed overall we find significantevidence that co2 emissions haveconverged

energy intensity in the iron and steel industry a comparison of physical and economic indicators abstract energy consumption of the iron and steel industry is examined in seven countries brazil china france germany japan poland and the united states for the period 1980 1991 using a decomposition analysis based on physical indicators for process type and product mix we decompose intra sectoral structural changes and efficiency improvements specific energy consumption decreased in all countries except poland efficiency improvement played a key role in brazil china germany and the us while structural changes were the main driver for energy savings in france and japan we also compare the use of various economic indicators to physical indicators and find that they do not track physical developments well in poland or the developing countries we studied in the industrialized countries value added based energy intensity indicators generally reflect the specific energy consumption better than other economic indicators although large differences occur in individual years we found a smaller correlation between other economic indicators gross output and value of shipments and specific energy consumption we conclude that use of physical energy intensity indicators improves comparability between countries provides greater information for policy makers regarding intra sectoral structural changes and provides detailed explanations for observed changes in energy intensity

how costly is diversity affirmative action in light of gender differences in competitiveness affirmative action is often criticized for causing reverse discrimination and lowering the qualifications of those hired under the policy however the magnitude of such adverse effects depends on whether the best suited candidate is hired absent the policy indeed affirmative action may compensate for the distortion discrimination imposes on the selection of candidates this paper asks whether affirmative action can have a similar corrective impact when qualified individuals fail to apply for a job we evaluate the effect of introducing a gender quota in an environment where high performing women fail to enter competitions they can win we show that guaranteeing women equal representation among winners increases their entry the response exceeds that predicted by the change in probability of winning and is in part driven by women being more willing to compete against other women the consequences are substantial as the boost in supply essentially eliminates the anticipated costs of the policy this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behavioral economics

sabotage in tournaments evidence from a laboratory experiment although relative performance schemes are pervasive in organizations reliable empirical data on induced sabotage behavior are almost nonexistent we study sabotage in repeated tournaments in a controlled laboratory experiment and observe that effort and sabotage are higher for higher wage spreads additionally we find that also in the presence of tournament incentives agents react reciprocally to higher wages by exerting higher effort destructive activities are reduced by explicitly calling them by their name sabotage communication among principal and agents can curb sabotage when they agree on flat prize structures and increased output if sabotage is not possible the principals choose tournament incentives more often this paper was accepted by peter wakker decision analysis

distribution dynamics of co2 emissions this paper uses nonparametric methods to examine the convergence in co2 emissions per capita on a sample of 100 countries for the period 1966 1996 industrial countries show a convergence pattern however there is little evidence of convergence for the whole sample

performance in competitive environments gender differences even though the provision of equal opportunities for men and women has been a priority in many countries large gender differences prevail in competitive high ranking positions suggested explanations include discrimination and differences in preferences and human capital in this paper we present experimental evidence in support of an additional factor women may be less effective than men in competitive environments even if they are able to perform similarly in non competitive environments in a laboratory experiment we observe as we increase the competitiveness of the environment a significant increase in performance for men but not for women this results in a significant gender gap in performance in tournaments while there is no gap when participants are paid according to piece rate this effect is stronger when women have to compete against men than in single sex competitive environments this suggests that women may be able to perform in competitive environments per se

how control system design influences performance misreporting this paper investigates reporting honesty when managers have monetary incentives to overstate their performance we argue that managers who report about their performance will take into account how their report affects their peers i e other managers at the same hierarchical level this effect depends on the design of the organization s control system in particular on the reward structure and the information policy regarding individual performance reports the reward structure determines if peers monetary payoff is increased or decreased when managers claim a higher level of performance the information policy determines if managers will be able to link individual peers to their reports and affects the nonmonetary costs of breaking social norms we present the results of a laboratory experiment as predicted we find that participants are more likely to overstate their performance if this increases the monetary payoff of others than if their reported performance decreases others monetary gains in addition overstatements are lower under an open information policy where each individual s reported performance is made public compared to a closed information policy where participants only learn the average performance of the other participants our findings have several important implications for management accounting research and practice

testing for convergence in carbon dioxide emissions using a century of panel data this paper tests the convergence in per capita carbon dioxide emissions for a collection of developed and developing countries using data spanning the period 1870 2002 for this purpose three recently developed panel unit root tests that permit for dependence among the individual countries are employed the results lend strong support in favor of convergence for the panel as a whole estimates of the speed of this convergence is also provided

the aversion to lying abstract we experimentally investigate the effect of cheap talk in a bargaining game with one sided asymmetric information a seller has private information about her skill and is provided an opportunity to communicate this information to a buyer through a written message four different treatments are compared one without communication one with free form communication and two treatments with pre specified communication in the form of promises of varying strength our results suggest that individuals have an aversion towards lying about private information and that the aversion to lying increases with the size of the lie and the strength of the promise freely formulated messages lead to the fewest lies and the most efficient outcomes