dynamic employment and hours effects of government spending shocks in this paper we analyze the dynamic behaviour of employment and hours worked per worker in a stochastic general equilibrium model with a matching mechanism between vacancies and unemployed workers the model is estimated for the united states using the generalized methods of moments gmm estimation technique an increase in government spending raises hours worked

federal borrowing and short term interest rates this paper is an empirical study of the effects of federal government borrowing on short term interest rates it is often taken for granted that increases in federal borrowing cause higher short term rates but little empirical support exists for this assumption in fact this paper demonstrates that federal borrowing is a relatively unimportant and insignificant determinant of short term rates an implication of this result is that financial crowding out effects of government deficit spending may not be overly large postulates about interest rate behavior are the driving force behind many hypotheses of the crowding out literature however these interest rate effects have received relatively little direct attention in this literature this is surprising since as a general rule the stronger the interest rate effect is the stronger the crowding out effect will be an empirical determination of the size of the deficit spending interest rate effect gives some empirical content to the crowding out controversy in section ii of this paper the relationship between federal borrowing interest rates and crowding out is discussed and a loanable funds model of short term interest rates is developed in section iii the regression model is generated and tested the essential result is that variation in three month treasury bill rates is caused by expected inflation changes in the monetary base and by changes in the level of economic activity there is no statistically significant relation between short term interest rates and federal borrowing in section iv additional regression tests are performed which confirm the results in section iii and the problem of simultaneous equation bias is discussed the final part of the paper is a discussion of some implications of the results reported in sections iii and iv

the politics of financial development evidence from trade liberalization incumbents in various industries have different incentives to promote or oppose financial development changes in the relative strength of promoter and opponent industries thus result in changes in the political equilibrium level of financial development we conduct an event study using a sample of 41 countries that liberalized trade during 1970 to 2000 and show that the strengthening of promoter relative to opponent industries resulting from liberalization is a good predictor of subsequent financial development the benefits of developing the financial system are insufficient for financial development and rents in particular hands appear to be necessary to achieve it copyright c 2008 by the american finance association

real effects of collapsing exchange rate regimes an application to mexico this paper examines the impact of a collapsing exchange rate regime on output in an open economy in which shocks to capital flows and exports predominate a sticky price rational expectations model is used to compare the variability of output under the collapsing regime to that under alternative fixed and flexible regimes output is found to

crises and exchange rate regimes time to break down the bipolar view we revisit the link between crises and exchange rate regimes err using a panel of 90 developed and developing countries over the period 1980 2009 we find that corner err are not more prone to crises compared to intermediate err this finding holds for different types of crises banking currency and debt and is robust to a wide set of alternative specifications consequently we clearly break down the traditional bipolar view countries that aim at preventing crisis episodes should focus less on the choice of the err and instead implement sound structural macroeconomic policies

collusion and overlending i introduction for a long time have korean companies been engaged in unbridled expansionism financed through loans inefficient octopus style management and over and duplicate investment thus expediting the structural failure of the economy this failure to concentrate on profits consolidation and efficiency provided the fuse to the bankruptcy bombs that triggered the foreign exchange and economic crises the collusion between the conglomerates financial sector and politicians made this financial monopoly possible chosun ilbo december 26 1997 collusion and overlending in the korean financial sector may be best illustrated by the above editorial highlight of chosun ilbo the most read newspaper in korea its 1997 financial crisis is primarily triggered by continual bankruptcies of chaebols conglomerates which with assistance from politicians had borrowed heavily from financial institutions in financing their investment projects 1 unlike some other asian countries experiencing problems in their financial sector due to shifts in investment projects toward real estates such as japan hong kong and thailand chaebols in korea concentrated mostly on manufacturing activities 2 in this study we establish a tractable model of overlending with three key players namely chaebols financial institutions and politicians as highlighted in chosun ilbo the model is designed to achieve two primary goals that are crucial for matching some key observations during the korean turmoil first we illustrate how overlending can be an equilibrium outcome with collusion between chaebols and politicians when the economic environment is favorable this occurs despite that such a collusion distorts normal borrowing lending operation by causing a discernible shift in loan composition from more to less productive investment projects second we show that as the economic environment gradually deteriorates there can be a shift from a collusion to a no collusion equilibrium the combination of deterioration in fundamentals and expectations of an equilibrium shift can trigger economy wide financial crisis more specifically we construct a simple principal supervisor agent model of corruption and overlending the principal is the formal authority of loan decision making of a financial institution or in short the financial institution the supervisor is a politician who serves as the informational intermediary in the borrowing lending arrangement via his her connections and networking 3 the agent is a chaebol of an unknown type which seeks for external financing of a set of risky projects a politician s favorable signal about the borrowing chaebol s overall performance would grant the approval of the loan to finance an array of risky projects whose returns depend on idiosyncratic shocks that cannot be washed out in aggregation within the chaebol as an outside alternative to making the loan the financial institution can invest in the world capital market where a fixed rate of return is guaranteed this portfolio decision depends on a comparison of the expected average returns on the given set of risky projects with the safe returns on investments in the world capital market while both the chaebol s type and the state of nature are unobservable to the financial institution we for simplicity assume that politician s connections and networking can fully uncover the true type of the chaebol this valuable information possessed by the politician is one that the financial institution has an incentive to purchase but a low type chaebol has an incentive to conceal whether the politician ends up revealing truthfully this information depends on how much to obtain from the lender in terms of general support versus how much to gain from the borrower in terms of bribes or side payments when a low type chaebol has the politician on its side information is distorted and a collusion equilibrium arises

chronicle of currency collapses re examining the effects on output abstract the impact of currency collapses i e large nominal depreciations or devaluations on real output remains unsettled in the empirical macroeconomic literature this paper provides new empirical evidence on this relationship using a dataset for 108 emerging and developing economies over the period 1960 2006 we provide estimates of how these episodes affect growth and output trend our main finding is that currency collapses are associated with a permanent output loss relative to trend which is estimated to range between 2 and 6 of gdp however we show that such losses tend to materialize before the drop in the value of the currency which suggests that the costs of a currency crash largely stem from the factors leading to it taken on its own i e ceteris paribus we find that currency collapses tend to have a positive effect on output more generally we also find that the likelihood of a positive growth rate in the year of the collapse is over two times more likely than a contraction and that positive growth rates in the years that follow such episodes are the norm finally we show that the persistence of the crash matters i e one time events induce exchange rate and output dynamics that differ from consecutive episodes

real aspects of exchange rate regime choice with collapsing fixed rates abstract typical evaluations of the choice of exchange rate regime examine the performance of the real economy and assume that the regimes last indefinitely in contrast actual regimes are quite transitory this paper examines how the predictions of two popular models for the determination of some real economic variables must be modified when agents rationally perceive that a fixed rate regime will be transitory the models studied are simple stochastic versions of the models in dornbusch 1976 and flood and marion 1982

the politics of speculative attacks in industrial democracies recent models of speculative currency crises contend that market expectations of policy behavior can trigger a speculative attack we argue that political processes and partisan objectives inform expectations about the government s commitment to the exchange rate first market actors anticipate periods when the partisan identity of a government may change through an election or a cabinet collapse second party labels provide information to currency traders about the policy objectives of a potential government consequently we contend that the probability of a speculative attack will be higher when markets expect the cabinet to end and when the cabinet dissolution is likely to produce a leftward shift in policy a discrete timesurvival model is used to estimate the probability that a cabinet will dissolve in any given month for sixteen parliamentary democracies from 1970 to 1995 the predicted values are then used as a proxy for market expectations in a model of speculative currency crises

on becoming more flexible exchange rate regimes in latin america and the caribbean abstract this paper examines the shift from fixed to more flexible exchange rate regimes among countries in latin america and the caribbean in contrast to most traditional approaches the one followed here recognizes that fixed rates can be and often are adjusted but argues that policy makers incur a political cost from devaluation at the same time flexible exchange rates even managed ones may be very volatile with persistent misalignment a stylized model of regime choice is developed based on the perceived losses from exchange rate misalignment incurred under fixed versus more flexible regimes the model is estimated for a sample of 24 countries over the period 1978 1992 and empirical results are quite supportive misalignments proxied by current account deficits and moderate to high rates of inflation were associated with a move to more flexible rates during 1978 1986 misalignment indicators appear to have mattered less during 1987 1992 however there appears to have been a major reduction in the perceived difficulty of managing flexible rates during this period the paper then cautions against attributing differences in economic growth between groups of countries to their exchange regime the central point here is that the endogeneity of regime choice introduces selection biases into the samples of countries with fixed and with more flexible exchange regimes

the differing effects of pre and post 1981 federal budget deficits on tax adjusted real interest rates this paper employs an estimating equation relating tax adjusted real interest rates to deficits and other economic variables to examine the differing effects of pre and post 1981 federal budget deficits on ex ante and ex post real tax adjusted short term interest rates over the period 1961 1 1992 2 the results for the 1961 1 1992 2 period taking into account a shift in the linkage between the ratio of alternative measures of the deficit to potential gdp occurring in 1981 1 indicate that the ratio of both the nipa deficit and the cyclically adjusted deficit to potential gdp have a significant effect on ex ante and ex post real tax adjusted interest rates for the post 1981 period but no significant effect before 1981

seigniorage revenue deficits and self fulfilling currency crises abstract this paper examines potential resolutions to the conflict between a fixed exchange rate and seigniorage revenue requirement of a stylized developing economy that gives rise to a currency crisis the government has an informational advantage and can decide when it is optimal to invoke an escape clause i e to drop the peg and float speculators must guess when the crisis will happen based on their assessment of the probability of collapse and this makes pegged exchange rate equilibria unstable

purchasing power parity for developing and developed countries what can we learn from non stationary panel data models the aim of this paper is to apply recently developed panel cointegration techniques proposed by pedroni 1999 2004 and generalized by banerjee and carrion i silvestre 2006 to examine the robustness of the ppp concept for a sample of 80 developed and developing countries we find that strong ppp is verified for oecd countries and weak ppp for mena countries however in african asian latin american and central and eastern european countries ppp does not seem relevant to characterize the long run behavior of the real exchange rate further investigations indicate that the nature of the exchange rate regime doesn t condition the validity of ppp which is more easily accepted in countries with high than low inflation

wall street capitol hill and k street political influence and financial regulation abstractthis paper explores the link between the political influence of the financial industry and financial regulation in the run up to the global financial crisis we construct a detailed database documenting the lobbying activities campaign contributions and political connections of the financial industry from 1999 to 2006 in the united states we find evidence that spending on lobbying by the financial industry and network connections between lobbyists and legislators were positively associated with the probability of a legislator changing positions in favor of deregulation the evidence also suggests that hiring lobbyists who had worked for legislators in the past enhanced this link

the mirage of fixed exchange rates this paper discusses the profound difficulties of maintaining fixed exchange rates in a world of expanding global capital markets contrary to popular wisdom industrialized country monetary authorities easily have the resources to defend exchange parities against virtually any private speculative attack but if their commitment to use those resources lacks credibility with markets the costs to the broader economy of defending an exchange rate peg can be very high the dynamic interplay between credibility and commitment is illustrated by the 1992 swedish and british crises and the 1994 95 mexican collapse we also discuss the small number of successful fixers

mexico s balance of payments crisis a chronicle of a death foretold this paper claims that the roots of mexico s balance of payments crisis are found in the prevailing high degree of capital mobility and financial globalization under these circumstances shifts in foreign capital flows and anticipation of a banking system bailout may produce large imbalances between stocks of financial assets and foreign reserves threatening the sustainability of currency pegs econometric analysis suggests that half of mexico s reserve losses could be accounted for by these phenomena large financial imbalances are also fertile ground for self fulfilling prophesy crises which lead devaluations to produce deep recessions these difficulties can be partly remedied by appropriate policies

collapsing exchange rate regimes shocks and biases abstract patterns in domestic credit creation stemming from inconsistent fiscal policies have received widespread attention for their role in aggrevating speculative attacks on central bank foreign exchange reserves and contributing to the collapse of exchange rate regimes this paper acknowledges the importance of monetary and fiscal discipline but also emphasizes the importance of other random shocks to the domestic money market most notably shocks from external credit supplies and relative prices policies of the domestic fiscal authorities are only partial catalysts for speculative attacks on a currency expansion of domestic credit stemming from the monetization of fiscal imbalances may be dominated by involuntary domestic credit expansions which are necessitated by surprise shortages in supplies of external capital further the unexpected availability of external capital translates into a lower net critical reserve floor making the depletion of central bank reserves by a speculative attack more difficult to accomplish relative price shocks also randomize the demand for nominal money balances and therefore may also have a strong direct influence on the probability of an exchange regime collapse empirical studies of exchange rate crises that neglect these considerations will produce biased estimates of both expected collapse probabilities and anticipated post collapse exchange rates

learning large deviations and recurrent currency crises this article studies a version of obstfeld s journal of international economics 43 1997 61 77 escape clause model the model is calibrated to produce three rational expectations equilibria two of these equilibria are e stable and one is unstable dynamics are introduced by assuming that agents must learn about the government s decision rule it is assumed they do this using a stochastic approximation algorithm it turns out that as a certain parameter describing the sensitivity of beliefs to new information gets small the algorithm converges to a small noise diffusion process the dynamics of exchange rate changes are then characterized using large deviation techniques from freidlin and wentzell random perturbations of dynamical systems second edition berlin springer verlag 1998 these methods describe the sense in which the limiting distribution of exchange rate changes is approximated by a two state markov switching process where the two states correspond to the two e stable equilibria the model is calibrated to the exchange rate histories of argentina brazil and mexico currency crises in these countries resemble the predicted escape routes of the model a key feature of these escape routes is that expectations of a devaluation erupt suddenly without large contemporaneous shocks this is consistent with evidence showing that crises are often poorly anticipated by financial markets

the role of social capital in financial development to identify the effect of social capital on financial development we exploit social capital differences within italy in high social capital areas households are more likely to use checks invest less in cash and more in stock have higher access to institutional credit and make less use of informal credit the effect of social capital is stronger where legal enforcement is weaker and among less educated people these results are not driven by omitted environmental variables since we show that the behavior of movers is still affected by the level of social capital of the province where they were born

aid policies and growth the authors of this paper use a new database on foreign aid to examine the relationships among foreign aid economic policies and growth of per capita gdp in panel growth regressions for 56 developing countries and 6 four year periods 1970 93 they find that the policies that have a great effect on growth are those related to fiscal surplus inflation and trade openness they construct an index for those three policies and have that index interact with foreign aid they have instruments for both aid and aid interacting with policies they find that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal monetary and trade policies in the presence of poor policies aid has no positive effect on growth this result is robust in a variety of specifications which include or exclude middle income countries include or exclude outliers and treat policies as exogenous or endogenous they examine the determinants of policy and find no evidence that aid has systematically affected policies either for good or for ill they estimate an aid allocation equation and show that any tendency for aid to reward good policies has been overwhelmed by donors pursuit of their own strategic interests in a counterfactual they reallocate aid reduce the role of donor interests and increasing the importance of policy such a reallocation would have a large positive effect on developing countries growth rates

interest rates and expected future budget deficits in the united states several recent empirical studies have found no evidence of a positive association between interest rates and current and past budget deficits one possible explanation for this finding is that interest rates are related much more to the expectation of future budget deficits than to current and past budget deficits in this paper i investigate whether this explanation is valid finding no evidence that it is section ii briefly formulates and discusses the hypothesis under consideration stating some of its implications section iii presents the results of regressing the commercial paper rate moody s aaa bond rate and the ex post real commercial paper rate on current and past government spending budget deficits and real money supplies the regressions have been fitted to the entire sample of monthly data spanning the period between june 1908 and march 1984 and to 11

a new database on the structure and development of the financial sector this article introduces a new database of indicators of financial structure and financial development across countries and over time the database is unique in that it combines a wide variety of indicators that measure the size activity and efficiency of financial intermediaries and markets it improves on previous efforts by presenting data on the public share of commercial banks introducing indicators of the size and activity of nonbank financial institutions and constructing measures of the size of bond and primary equity markets this article introduces a new database the first to provide comprehensive measures of the development structure and performance of the financial sector this database is the first to define and construct indicators of the size and activity of nonbank financial intermediaries such as insurance companies pension funds and non deposit money banks it is also the first to include indicators of the size of primary equity markets and primary and secondary bond markets in constructing the database authors carefully deflate measures and match stock and flow variables

government debt government spending and private sector behavior a current period tax reduction financed by issuing government debt shifts the timing of tax collection from the current period to the future if the future taxes implied by government debt are not fully perceived and discounted by the private sector there will be a net wealth effect that increases private sector consumption thus reducing capital accumulation and growth if on the other hand the implied future taxes are perceived and discounted by the private sector the current period tax reduction will be used to increase private saving to pay for the future taxes and government debt will be absorbed without any real effects on the economy the effects of government spending financed by current period taxation also depend upon private sector perceptions 2 if the benefits of government spending are ignored private sector consumption will decrease in accordance with the reduction in permanent disposable income to the extent that government spending is on consumption type goods that are perceived as substitutes for privately provided consumption goods there will be a relatively greater reduction in private sector consumption to the extent that government spending is on investment type goods yielding future goods and services that are perceived as substitutes for future privately provided consumption goods there will be a relatively smaller reduction in private sector consumption the standard approach to modeling private sector consumption saving behavior involves a rather asymmetric set of assumptions as to how the private sector perceives the various elements of government fiscal policy 3 current period taxes are assumed to be fully perceived but current period government spending is implicitly assumed to be completely ignored by the private sector in considering permanent personal disposable income the private sector is assumed to be forward looking in its assessment of income and taxation the stock of government debt is nevertheless included as part of the stock of private wealth the implicit assumption associate professor of economics graduate school of business university of chicago 1101 east 58th street chicago il 60637 i thank eugene fama levis kochin michael mussa paul evans and an anonymous referee for helpful comments i am particularly grateful to daniel benjamin for contributing many hours of discussion and laura lahaye who was a research assistant and valuable adviser on earlier drafts the theoretical debate on the burden of the debt has been long standing gerald o driscoll 1977 documents ricardo s nineteenth century position robert barro 1974 reopened the debate by introducing the fundamental issue of intergenerational transfers also discussed in merton miller and charles upton 1974 the empirical side of the debate was initiated by levis kochin s 1974 attempt to test for the effects of deficits on consumption and by martin feldstein s 1974 attempt to test for the effects of social security wealth on consumption other empirical contributions include jess yawitz and laurence meyer 1976 myself 1978 and j earnest tanner 1978 1979 with respect to the effects of government deficits and debt and barro 1978 michael darby 1979 and dean leimer and selig lesnoy 1982 with respect to social security wealth see also interesting recent papers by john seater 1982 who generates detailed tests of the effects of deficits and debt on consumption charles plosser 1982 who explores the effects of government spending and debt shocks on interest rates and feldstein 1982 who attempts tests similar to some in this paper see fn 29 2martin bailey s 1962 1971 development of the effects of government spending on private consumption and aggregate economic activity is the seminal contribution paul david and john scadding 1974 extend bailey s ideas and provide some supporting empirical evidence more recently willem buiter 1977 and myself 1978 developed models based on bailey s earlier work barro 1981 has an interesting paper on related issues see also david aschauer 1982 3the standard approach incorporates fiscal policy through the concept of personal disposable income and by including the stock of government debt as part of personal wealth see for example the empirical specification of albert ando and franco modigliani 1963 which has been the basis of most empirical consumption studies since and feldstein 1974 for one of the more influential papers based on the ando modigliani specification

gold monetization and gold discipline gold and its price have emerged as frequent topics of both academic and government debate 2 public attention focused on the gold market since gold s price began fluctuating violently in 1980 and 1981 has turned to gold as a possible means of removing some discretion inherent in the current fiat money system since lack of adherence to monetary rules can lead to problems of dynamic policy inconsistency academic economists have begun seriously to reconsider monetary standards based either on gold or on some other commodity as politically feasible methods of establishing rules 3

why is there so little money in u s politics in this paper we argue that campaign contributions are not a form of policy buying but are rather a form of political participation and consumption we summarize the data on campaign spending and show through our descriptive statistics and our econometric analysis that individuals not special interests are the main source of campaign contributions moreover we demonstrate that campaign giving is a normal good dependent upon income and campaign contributions as a percent of gdp have not risen appreciably in over 100 years if anything they have probably fallen we then show that only one in four studies from the previous literature support the popular notion that contributions buy legislators votes finally we illustrate that when one controls for unobserved constituent and legislator effects there is little relationship between money and legislator votes thus the question is not why there is so little money politics but rather why organized interests give at all we conclude by offering potential answers to this question this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

do lenders favor politically connected firms rent provision in an emerging financial market corruption by the politically connected is often blamed for economic ills particularly in less developed economies using a loan level data set of more than 90 000 rms that represents the universe of corporate lending in pakistan between 1996 and 2002 we investigate rents to politically connected rms in banking classifying a rm as political if its director participates in an election we examine the extent nature and economic costs of political rent provision we nd that political rms borrow 45 percent more and have 50 percent higher default rates such preferential treatment occurs exclusively in government banks private banks provide no

reserve accumulation and financial crises from individual protection to systemic risk abstract this paper provides a new perspective on the relationship between countries international reserve holdings and financial crises while the local view holds that reserves may prevent domestic crises it overlooks that the accumulation of reserves relaxes the financing constraint of the reserve currency country and may cause a financial crisis in the centre which is transmitted globally according to this global view reserve accumulation might destabilize the international financial system since the crisis affects all countries alike the accumulation of reserves imposes a negative externality on non accumulating countries we integrate this idea in a theoretical model of the optimal amount of reserves and illustrate the gap between local and global optimality the consideration of systemic risk lowers the demand for reserves moreover if a supranational authority determines the optimal level of reserves it internalizes the negative externality and accumulates fewer reserves a macroprudential tax on reserve hoardings might implement the socially optimal solution our calibration analysis shows that these considerations are economically significant they lower the optimal amount of reserves in the benchmark case by 45

banking on politics when former high ranking politicians become bank directors new data are presented for a large number of countries on how frequently former high ranking politicians become bank directors politician banker connections at this level are relatively rare but their frequency is robustly correlated with many important characteristics of banks and institutions at the micro level banks that are politically connected are larger and more profitable than other banks despite being less leveraged and having less risk at the country level this connectedness is strongly negatively related to economic development controlling for this the analysis finds that the phenomenon is more prevalent where institutions are weaker and governments more powerful but less accountable bank regulation tends to be more pro banker and the banking system less developed where connectedness is higher a benign public interest view is hard to reconcile with these patterns banking sector development institutions political economy

is a military really a luxury good an international panel study of ldcs this paper introduces country specific fixed effects into a theoretical and empirical model of military expenditure contrary to the existing literature the model indicates that the share of military expenditure decreases with a country s income

regulatory capture a review this article reviews both the theoretical and empirical literatures on regulatory capture the scope is broad but utility regulation is emphasized i begin by describing the stigler peltzman approach to the economics of regulation i then open the black box of influence and regulatory discretion using a three tier hierarchical agency model under asymmetric information in the spirit of laffont and tirole 1993 i discuss alternative modelling approaches with a view to a richer set of positive predictions including models of common agency revolving doors informational lobbying coercive pressure and influence over committees i discuss empirical work involving capture and regulatory outcomes i also review evidence on the revolving door phenomenon and on the impact that different methods for selecting regulators appear to have on regulatory outcomes the last section contains open questions for future research copyright 2006 oxford university press

the international monetary system forty years after bretton woods review essay in may 1984 a distinguished group of central bankers and economists gathered for a conference at bretton woods to consider the evolution of the world monetary system that was born at that location forty years earlier this volume contains nine essays with accompanying discussion on issues of performance and reform of current international monetary arrangements these papers deal with problems facing the industrialized and the lessdeveloped countries and assess the institutions that have been set up to accommodate these problems the major accomplishments of the original bretton woods conference were of course the establishment of the system of payments based on fixed exchange rates and the organization of the world bank and the international monetary fund as the order developed in the late 40 s and early 50 s each central bank saw it as its duty to intervene in foreign exchange markets to ensure an essentially fixed parity of their currency with respect to the dollar the role of the u s was to guarantee the dollar price of gold at 35 an ounce the system has been called a dollar standard because the dollar played the role of a reserve currency one of the paradoxes of the system as robert triffin pointed out in the early 60 s is that in order to produce a continuing and rapid enough expansion of world reserves the u s had to run balance of payments deficits yet continued deficits by the u s threatened the convertibility of the dollar into gold as it happened the system of fixed parities broke down in the early 70 s not because of a lack of reserves but because a glut of dollars made the bretton woods dollar exchange rates untenable the system eventually evolved into one in which most of the industrialized countries currencies more or less are determined by the market while the currencies of most second and third world countries are pegged to a major currency the floating period has been

collapsing exchange rate regimes some linear examples abstract we construct a pair of linear examples to study the collapse time of a fixed exchange rate regime the first example is a perfect foresight continuous time model which allows calculation of the exact collapse time and the tracking of reserves the second example is a discrete time stochastic model which yields an endogenous probability distribution over the collapse time and produces a forward discount of the exchange rate

culture openness and finance abstract differences in culture proxied by differences in religion and language cannot be ignored when examining why investor protection differs across countries we show that a country s principal religion predicts the cross sectional variation in creditor rights better than a country s natural openness to international trade its language its income per capita or the origin of its legal system catholic countries protect the rights of creditors less well than protestant countries a country s natural openness to international trade mitigates the influence of religion on creditor rights culture proxies are also helpful in understanding how investor rights are enforced across countries

do budget deficits raise nominal interest rates evidence from six countries abstract it is widely believed that budget deficits raise nominal interest rates this paper shows that the belief has no empirical support for six countries ricardian equivalence may explain the lack of a positive association between budget deficits and nominal interest rates