sunk costs windows of profit opportunities and the dynamics of entry abstract this article adds two elements to a standard model of monopolistic competition first the number of potential entrants is limited in each period and increases only over time second the potential entrants differ with respect to the consumers valuation of the variant they could offer the resulting simple model exhibits a rich dynamic structure covering the product life cycle a path dependent equilibrium and the traditional textbook case of entry the welfare analysis confirms the view that there cannot be too much entry even entry of inefficient firms improves welfare

a model of the political economy of the united states we develop and test a model of joint determination of economic growth and national election results in the united states the formal model which combines developments in the rational choice analysis of the behavior of economic agents and voters leads to a system of equations in which the dependent variables are the growth rate and the vote shares in presidential and congressional elections our estimates support the theoretical claims that growth responds to unanticipated policy shifts and that voters use both on year and midterm elections to balance the two parties on the other hand we find no support for rational retrospective voting we do reconfirm in a fully simultaneous framework the naive retrospective voting literature s finding that the economy has a strong effect on presidential voting we find congressional elections unaffected by the economy except as transmitted by presidential coattails

welfare losses under cournot competition abstract in a market for a homogeneous good where firms are identical compete in quantities and produce with constant returns the percentage of welfare losses pwl is small with as few as five competitors for a class of demand functions which includes linear and isoelastic cases we study markets with positive fixed costs and asymmetric firms we provide exact formulae of pwl and robust constructions of markets were pwl is close to one in these two cases we show that the market structure that maximizes pwl is either monopoly or dominant firm depending on demand finally we prove that pwl is minimized when all firms are identical a clear indication that the assumption of identical firms biases the estimation of pwl downwards

international trade foreign investment and the formation of the entrepreneurial class in this paper i examine the argument that free trade may be harmful to less developed countries because such international competition inhibits the formation of a local entrepreneurial class i view the entrepreneur as the manager of the industrial enterprise as well as the agent who bears the risks associated with industrial production a two sector model of a small open economy is developed in which the size of the entrepreneurial class is endogenous it is shown that the entrepreneurial class is smaller under free trade than would be first best optimal in the presence of efficient risk sharing institutions such as stock markets nonetheless there are potential gains from trade and any protectionist policy that increases the number of entrepreneurs will have deleterious welfare consequences this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

tax incidence under oligopoly a comparison of policy approaches abstract this paper presents a methodological approach for the analysis of tax incidence that encompasses familiar forms of taxation in a general and analytically convenient model in oligopolistic industries the performance of a tax depends on the sensitivity of the unit tax rate to changes in industry output output elastic tax schedules are less likely to be over shifted and have superior welfare properties relative to regulatory instruments that are less responsive to the equilibrium market quantity for revenue neutral tax reforms the finding of delipalla and keen 1992 that ad valorem taxes welfare dominate specific taxes under oligopoly is derived as a special case of this general result

a theory of divided government this paper extends the spatial theory of voting to an institutional structure in which policy choices depend upon not only the executive but also the composition of the legislature voters have incentives to be strategic since policy reflects the outcome of a simultaneous election of the legislature and the executive and since the legislature s impact on policy depends upon relative plurality to analyze equilibrium in this game between voters we apply coalition proof type refinements the model has several testable implications which are consistent with voting behavior in the united states for instance the model predicts a split tickets where some voters vote for one party for president and the other for congress b for some parameter values a divided government with different parties controlling the executive and the majority of the legislature and c the midterm electoral cycle with the party holding the presidency always losing votes in midterm congressional elections

the impact of firm entry regulation on long living entrants what is the impact of firm entry regulation on sustained entry into self employment how does firm entry regulation influence the performance of long living entrants in this paper i address these questions exploiting a natural experiment in firm entry regulation after german reunification east and west germany faced different economic conditions but fell under the same law that imposes a substantial mandatory standard on entrepreneurs who want to start a legally independent firm in one of the regulated occupations the empirical results suggest that the entry regulation suppresses long living entrants not only entrants in general or transient short lived entrants this effect on the number of long living entrants is not accompanied by a counteracting effect on the performance of long living entrants as measured by firm size several years after entry

entry barriers and economic welfare the relationship between economic welfare and the number of firms in a quasi cournot market is examined in the first place we presuppose the existence of a strong first best government that can enforce the marginal cost principle to the firms along with regulating the number of firms it is shown that there exist excessive number of firms at the free entry quasicournot equilibrium vis a vis the first best welfare maximizing number of firms the thrust of this result essentially survives even if we replace a utopian first best government by a secondbest government that leaves the firms to pursue their respective profit maximization freely and engages solely in regulating the number of firms it can be shown that the excess entry prevails again in this second best world recent studies in the theoretical industrial organization literature have uncovered several instances which cast serious doubt on the reasonableness of a widespread belief that increasing competition will increase welfare stiglitz 1981 p 184 it has been shown that there are cases which are not altogether unreasonable where social welfare will be increased by strengthening rather than weakening the protection of incumbent firms from the threat of potential entry this is in sharp contrast with the traditional belief 2 what is not known however is how robust these pathologies in fact are we intend to settle this problem by proving two excess entry theorems in the quasi cournot parametric conjectural variations homogeneous oligopoly model seade 1980a b in the first place we presuppose the existence of a strong first best government that could costlessly enforce the marginal cost pricing principle by firms in an oligopolistic market and regulate entry in pursuit of first best social welfare optimization it is shown that the number of firms at the free entry equilibrium exceeds the first best welfare optimizing number of firms the result has already been noted by von weizsacker 1980a b and others in terms of numerical examples our theorem 1 asserts that this phenomenon always holds true for the family of quasi cournot models at hand an implication of this result is that the existence of entry barriers which protect incumbent firms from potential competitors is not necessarily welfare decreasing in sharp contrast with the traditional belief a problem remains with theorem 1 however in that an omnipotent first best government does not exist in reality and the first best ideal is unrealizable in the actual economy therefore even if the intervention by a first best government with a view to restricting the number of firms within an industry may be welfare improving it does

foreign direct investment and the relative wage in a developing economy abstract this paper examines the issue of the effect of foreign direct investment on the relative wage in the context of a developing economy recognizing that competing domestic entrepreneurs are potentially skilled workers foreign investment in skilled labor intensive sectors is shown to lower the relative wage moreover a general lump sum subsidy to foreign and domestic firms is shown to lower aggregate welfare whereas a discriminatory subsidy only to foreign firms may raise welfare

market r d allocations when research paths are product specific a compared to the social optimum individual firms undertook too little rd b too many firms entered the competition to undertake rd2 c if the elasticity of demand were sufficiently low aggregate rd

product differentiation search costs and competition in the mutual fund industry a case study of s p 500 index funds we investigate the role that non portfolio fund differentiation and information search frictions play in creating two salient features of the mutual fund industry the large number of funds and the sizeable dispersion in fund fees in a case study we find that despite the financial homogeneity of s p 500 index funds this sector exhibits the fund proliferation and fee dispersion observed in the broader industry we show how extra portfolio mechanisms explain these features these mechanisms also suggest an explanation for the puzzling late 1990s shift in sector assets to more expensive and often newly entered funds an influx of highinformation cost novice investors

competition and regulation in vertically related markets in an industry where naturally monopolistic and competitive activities are vertically related should the natural monopolist be allowed also to operate in the deregulated competitive sector unlike much of the literature on vertical integration this paper assumes that monopoly pricing behaviour is regulated and therefore the effect of vertical integration on the task of regulation is central to the analysis in the model there is both imperfect information and imperfect competition when vertical integration by the monopolist is allowed the regulator s task is made harder insofar as the monopolist has anticompetitive incentives to raise rivals costs on the other hand integration may lead to there being fewer firms in the deregulated sector and hence less duplication of fixed costs the overall welfare comparison between separation and integration is ambiguous as two simple examples illustrate various extensions to the analysis are also considered one of the central questions in debates on regulatory reform is how to organize industries that contain both naturally monopolistic and potentially competitive activities electricity transmission and distribution are characterized by natural monopoly cost conditions but electricity generation is not in the gas industry pipeline services may be naturally monopolistic but supply to larger customers is not in telecommunications natural monopoly is more a feature of local network operations than of long distance operations and is not present in apparatus manufacture and supply or in the provision of value added services in railways while the infrastructure of track and stations is naturally monopolistic the supply of train services might not be policy developments notably those associated with privatization in britain and deregulation in the united states have sometimes led to radical structural reform in these industries at t for decades a vertically integrated monopolist was required under the 1982 settlement of its long running antitrust case against the u s government to divest itself of its local network operations the central electricity generating board cegb in england and wales was restructured both vertically transmission grid activities were separated from generation and horizontally before privatization in 1990 1991 by contrast british telecom was privatized as a vertically integrated dominant firm bt now faces competition from mercury and others especially in the long distance market but its dominance of local network operations might affect competition there and in other areas such as apparatus supply the local network monopoly would of course have to be regulated in any event but its link via ownership to vertically related and potentially competitive activities poses additional regulatory questions many of the efforts of the regulatory body oftel notably in relation to interconnection between bt s and rivals 1 for a general account of the theory and british experience of regulatory reform in the utility industries

stackelberg competition with endogenous entry i characterise endogenous market structures where leaders have a first mover advantage and entry is endogenous leaders are always more aggressive than the followers independently from strategic substitutability or complementarity under quantity competition leaders produce more than any follower and i determine the conditions for entry deterrence high substitutability and non increasing marginal costs under price competition leaders set lower prices than the followers the opposite than with an exogenous number of firms in contests leaders invest more than each follower in all these cases a leadership improves the allocation of resources compared to the nash equilibrium with endogenous entry this article studies endogenous market structures where a firm has a first mover advantage in the sense of stackelberg 1934 on the other firms and entry in the market is endogenous the article characterises the equilibrium of these endo genous market structures and provides welfare analysis for some of the applications these market structures emerge in many sectors which are substantially competitive a fringe of firms is ready to enter whenever there is a profitable opportunity but where some incumbent firms have a competitive advantage over the followers because of technological historical or legal reasons or just because entry was not possible at an earlier stage and choose their strategies before them 1 while symmetric models of strategic interactions have been widely studied in the presence of endogenous entry in a marshallian tradition 2 traditional models with incumbent firms facing a competitive fringe of entrants have been mostly limited to the analysis of markets with homogeneous goods and entry deterrence for instance in the theories of limit pricing and of contestable markets baumol et al 1982 more recently vives 1988 has analysed games with sequential entry of multiple firms but without endogenising the entry process see also anderson and engers 1992 1994

durable goods and conformity a consumer s demand for a durable good is governed not only by his individual preferences but also by preferences of other market participants this interdependence of preferences arises from the inevitable resale of durable goods if most people prefer goods with certain features original buyers conform and choose goods with these features even if they do not like them using a matching model we show there is always conformity in equilibrium the incentive to conform is strongest for long lived durables and for people who trade frequently if average preferences are sufficiently strong there is always too little conformity in equilibrium

the effects of structures and power on state bargaining strategies when and why will states adopt more or less cooperative bargaining strategies standard answers to this question focus on the role of state power other scholars highlight socialization effects i argue that in most international negotiations the institutional bargaining structure will mitigate the effects of power and socialization and drive state bargaining behavior factors highlighted by formal models of international bargaining should therefore best explain the variation in the strategies states adopt i introduce empirical measures of these abstract concepts and test their effects against those of power and socialization using an original dataset of state bargaining strategies in the european union eu the results show that structural factors best explain variation in the eu states bargaining strategies i conclude by highlighting the conditions under which these effects should explain state bargaining behavior in other international negotiations and discuss the implications of this argument for the study of international bargaining

the impact of federal spending on house election outcomes while it is widely believed by academics politicians and the popular press that incumbent members of congress are rewarded by the electorate for bringing federal dollars to their district the empirical evidence supporting that claim is extremely weak one explanation for the failure to uncover the expected relationship between federal spending and election outcomes is that incumbents who expect to have difficulty being reelected are likely to exert greater effort in obtaining federal outlays since it is generally impossible to adequately measure this effort the estimated impact of spending is biased downward because of an omitted variable bias we address this estimation problem using instrumental variables for each house district we use spending outside the district but inside the state containing the district as an instrument for spending in the district federal spending is affected by a large number of actors e g governors senators mayors and other house members in the state delegation

emission taxes and optimal refunding schemes with endogenous market structure the purpose of this paper is to investigate optimal schemes for refunding the emission tax in a free entry market where the production process generates emissions we consider the regulation by a three part tax policy the government sets an emission tax a refunding scheme and an entry license tax in contrast to the case of the two part tax refund policy under no entry we show that even if it is impossible to obtain subsidies from outside the first best outcome is always attained further the government s budget constraint is binding under the optimal schemes our result implies that the tax refund system works effectively in a market with endogenous entry

coordination moderation and institutional balancing in american presidential and house elections outcome in the theoretical equilibrium the proportion of voters who split their ticket in order to balance the house with the president has been small but large enough to affect election outcomes moderation has usually been based on voters expectations that the president will be at least an equal of the house in determining postelection policy d o americans coordinate their votes for president and for congress suppose a voter knows that policy outcomes are compromises between the positions taken by the president and congress and believes the two political parties push for distinct policy alternatives then the voter believes that different combinations of party control of the presidency and congress will produce different policy outcomes if the voter cares about the policy outcomes then the voter s choices among candidates should depend on the combination of party control the choices will help bring

multilateral negotiations a spatial analysis of the arab israeli dispute a model for forecasting political choices and for explaining the perceptual conditions that lead to those choices is delineated the model based on the median voter theorem and on the axioms of expected utility maximization is applied to the prospects for a multilateral peace conference in the middle east the analysis helps provide insights into the motivations behind recent actions by leaders in the soviet union the united states jordan the palestine liberation organization and israel

long run welfare effect of energy conservation regulation we investigate the long run effect of energy conservation regulation which forces firms to raise energy saving investment above the cost minimizing level if pigovian tax is imposed additional regulation always harms social welfare under perfect competition while it can improve welfare under imperfect competition our result under imperfect competition holds regardless of whether strategies are strategic substitutes or complements in contrast to direct entry regulation

tariffs versus quotas with strategic investment the relative efficiency of tariffs versus quotas is analyzed in a cournot oligopoly with strategic investment introducing quota licence fees to neutralize the international distributional effect when such licence fees remove quota rents from foreign firms then for the case of constrained entry with a sufficiently large number of firms quotas frequently hold a welfare advantage since tariffs relatively aggravate the inefficiency from overinvestment in the case of free entry and exit however tariffs hold a welfare advantage since there is greater benefit of increasing returns to scale to the economy by avoidance of excessive entry of firms

regulating bidder participation in auctions regulating bidder participation in auctions can potentially increase efficiency compared to standard auction formats with free entry we show that the relative performance of two such mechanisms a standard first price auction with free entry and an entry rights auction depends nonmonotonically on the precision of information that bidders have about their costs prior to deciding whether to participate in a mechanism as an empirical application we estimate parameters from first price auctions with free entry for bridge building contracts in oklahoma and texas and predict that an entry rights auction increases efficiency and reduces procurement costs significantly

an empirical equilibrium model of a decentralized asset market i estimate a search and bargaining model of a decentralized market to quantify the effects of trading frictions on asset allocations and asset prices and to quantify the effects of intermediaries that facilitate trade using business aircraft data i find that relative to the walrasian benchmark 12 4 percent of the assets are misallocated and prices are approximately 27 3 percent lower dealers play an important role in reducing frictions in a market with no dealers 15 7 percent of the assets would be misallocated perhaps surprisingly in a market with no dealers prices would increase by 2 8 percent because sellers outside options improve relative to buyers thus counteracting the effects of higher search costs and slower trade on asset prices

wage and competition channels of foreign direct investment and new firm entry using a rich data set of the dutch manufacturing sector between 1995 and 2010 we investigate the effect of foreign direct investment fdi on domestic new firm entry the emerging empirical literature has focused on the direct relationship between fdi and entry but has not explored the mechanisms behind the observed effect drawing on a simultaneous equations model our analysis features both the direct effect of fdi as well as indirect effects through two channels industry competition and wages we estimate the parameters through 3sls and take into account the endogeneity of competition and wages with respect to entry our results show that there is a significant negative direct effect of fdi on entry at the same time fdi decreases competition and increases wage levels which then impact entry positively and negatively respectively the total effect of fdi is negative but small and virtually disappears after one year policy implications are discussed

privacy and personal data collection with information externalities abstract we provide a theoretical model of privacy in which data collection requires consumers consent and consumers are fully aware of the consequences of such consent nonetheless excessive collection of personal information arises in the monopoly market equilibrium which results in excessive loss of privacy compared to the social optimum the main mechanism for this result is information externalities and users coordination failure in which some users decision to share their personal information may allow the data controller to infer more information about non users we also show that the emergence of data brokerage industry can facilitate the collection and monetization of users personal data even in a fragmented market where no individual website has incentives to do so independently due to scale economies in data analytics we discuss policy implications of our analysis in light of the recent eu general data protection regulation gdpr

coattail voting in recent presidential elections this article presents a method for analyzing the extent and strength of coattail voting in presidential elections this method allows the authors to estimate the magnitude of coattail voting and then to decompose this estimate into more basic elements estimates are given for presidential elections beginning with 1956 the determination of the coattail vote and its decomposition depend on the theory of the voting decision that is assumed in this article we present a model of vote determination that is similar in most respects to the traditional src model the vote for congressional representation in a presidential election year is determined jointly by partisan affiliation attitudes toward the presidential candidates and local forces unique to the congressional race such as may be captured by an incumbency variable this model permits the separate estimation of the strength of short term forces and of the efficiency of the presidential coattails application of the model to survey data since 1956 indicates that efficiency of presidential coattails has declined during this period furthermore the 1980 election does not appear to be an exception to this trend on the other hand there has not been any particular trend in the strength of short term forces during this period instead events peculiar to the context of a specific election generate short term forces at the level of the presidential election but the degree to which these forces are carried over to local races seems to have declined

does issue linkage work evidence from european alliance negotiations 1860 to 1945 though scholars widely claim that issue linkage the simultaneous negotiation of multiple issues for joint settlement can help states conclude international agreements there exist some notable skeptics resolving this debate requires empirical evidence however beyond a few case studies there exists no direct and systematic evidence that issue linkages actually increase the probability of agreement i address this lack of direct and systematic evidence by combing original data on failed alliance negotiations with data from the alliance treaty obligations and provisions atop database using matching techniques i find that for alliance negotiations between 1860 to 1945 offers of trade linkage did substantially increase the probability of agreement besides confirming issue linkage s ability to help clinch an agreement this article s research design and evidence have far reaching implications for the study of negotiations and alliances the research design illustrates the value of considering the dogs that didn t bark as it identifies both successful and failed negotiations the article s evidence explains the high rate of alliance compliance identified by previous scholars and highlights a need to rethink the alliance formation process

trade and relative wages the role of supervisory function by skilled workers abstract the effect of trade on relative wages is examined taking into consideration some aspects of internal organization of firms namely the twin function of production and supervision by skilled workers when trade is based on endowment differences the effect of trade is greater than is predicted by the stolper samuelson theorem when trade is based on technological differences freer trade tends to reduce the relative wages in each country in a two country world economy

speculative profits innovation and growth when technological change affects the prices of tradeable assets innovators can obtain speculative profits by exploiting their inside information as to the occurrence of innovations we propose a tractable model of endogenous growth that formalizes this argument originally due to hirshleifer 1971 we then use the model to assess two claims advanced by hirshleifer namely that speculative profits can generate excessive investment in r d when they add to monopoly rents guaranteed by patent protection or else even in a perfectly competitive economy the analysis confirms the first claim but casts doubts on the second one jel o30 o40

using repeat challengers to estimate the effect of campaign spending on election outcomes in the u s house previous studies of congressional spending have typically found a large positive effect of challenger spending but little evidence for effects of incumbent spending those studies however do not adequately control for inherent differences in vote getting ability across candidates high quality challengers are likely to receive a high fraction of the vote and have high campaign expenditures even if campaign spending has no impact on election outcomes to avoid that bias this paper examines elections in which the same two candidates face one another on more than one occasion differencing eliminates the influence of any fixed candidate or district attributes estimates of the effects of challenger spending are an order of magnitude below those of previous studies campaign spending has an extremely small impact on election outcomes regardless of who does the spending campaign spending limits appear socially desirable but public financing of campaigns does not

final and intermediate goods taxation in an oligopolistic economy with free entry abstract optimal tax rules are analyzed in an oligopolistic economy with free entry the initial market allocation has two types of distortion price is set above marginal cost by the oligopolistic behavior and the advantage of increasing returns to scale is left to be unexploited by excessive entry of oligopolists with production subsidy accompanied by a self financing lump sum franchise tax on oligopolistic firms pareto efficient allocation could be restored without a lump sum tax on oligopolists however the second best optimum requires taxing intermediate inputs used in the oligopolistic industry the optimal intermediate goods taxation follows the production side ramsey rule to encourage the use of intermediate inputs elastic to output level and vice versa

social efficiency of entry in a vertically related industry we provide a new perspective to the literature on social desirability of entry by showing that if the input supplier has market power social desirability of entry of the final goods producers depends on returns to scale entry in the final goods market can be socially insufficient under constant returns to scale technology but it can be socially excessive under decreasing returns to scale technologies if the cost of entry is low so that the final goods market is sufficiently competitive hence the anti competitive entry regulation policies are more justifiable if the final goods market is characterised by decreasing returns to scale technologies

bias in market r d portfolios abstract based on a simple contest model of product innovation we find that in accordance with conventional wisdom and contrary to much of the previous theoretical literature market competition implies an equilibrium level of risk which is too low from society s standpoint the intuition is that the divergence between private and social marginal benefits from rd and this probability is higher for lower risk projects

dynamic competition and intellectual property rights in a model of product development we study innovation timing and socially optimal intellectual property rights iprs when firms facing market uncertainty invest strategically in product development if demand growth and volatility are high attrition occurs and iprs should ensure the cost of imitation attains a lower bound we identify if demand growth and volatility are low then provided that the private imitation incentive is socially excessive iprs should set the cost of imitation high enough to induce preemption and possibly winner take all preemption moreover the welfare achieved with optimal iprs is then greater with endogenous innovation than if firm roles are predetermined illustrating the importance of fostering dynamic competition in extensions we show how firms benefit from open standards takeovers have ambiguous welfare effects and simple licensing schemes are welfare improving

a tale of two market failures technology and environmental policy abstract market failures associated with environmental pollution interact with market failures associated with the innovation and diffusion of new technologies these combined market failures provide a strong rationale for a portfolio of public policies that foster emissions reduction as well as the development and adoption of environmentally beneficial technology both theory and empirical evidence suggest that the rate and direction of technological advance is influenced by market and regulatory incentives and can be cost effectively harnessed through the use of economic incentive based policy in the presence of weak or nonexistent environmental policies investments in the development and diffusion of new environmentally beneficial technologies are very likely to be less than would be socially desirable positive knowledge and adoption spillovers and information problems can further weaken innovation incentives while environmental technology policy is fraught with difficulties a long term view suggests a strategy of experimenting with policy approaches and systematically evaluating their success

market structure and casino taxation in tourist resorts this article examines the association of tax effects with market structure for casino gaming we show that if market structure is uncompetitive much of casino taxation falls on tourists whose demand is inelastic relative to supply the tax is likely to be efficient under strong external demand if imposed on oligopoly casinos with a monopoly location in a cross border market the likelihood of economically good taxation is greater under oligopoly than under competition but lower than under monopoly casino taxes should be lowered in a more competitive market with weaker external demand our prediction is consistent with the evidence found from casino tourism development in macao with high gambling taxes

regulatory reform in britain regulatory reform in britain john kay and john vickers major sectors of the british economy are currently undergoing far reaching regulatory reform deregulation removal of barriers to competition and the introduction of new methods of regulation are occurring notably in financial services some of the professions and in utility industries such as telecommunications gas and electricity this paper gives an economic assessment of these developments the authors examine the root causes of market failure that call for regulation externalities monopoly and information problems and the pros and cons of various regulatory responses a broad distinction is drawn between structural regulation the determination of which firms or types of firms can engage in which activities and conduct regulation the control of how firms behave in their chosen activities recent examples of deregulation plus re regulation in britain are seen in part as a shift from structural to conduct regulation the relative merits of the two modes of regulation are complex to assess but it is argued that some recent regulatory reforms are placing undue reliance on conduct regulation as well as assessing individual industries the authors draw general conclusions about the desirability of regulatory solutions that make full use of market forces

occupational choice and the process of development this paper models economic development as a process of institutional transformation by focusing on the interplay between agents occupational decisions and the distribution of wealth because of capital market imperfections poor agents choose working for a wage over self employment and wealthy agents become entrepreneurs who monitor workers only with sufficient inequality however will there be employment contracts otherwise there is either subsistence or self employment thus in static equilibrium the occupational structure depends on distribution since the latter is itself endogenous we demonstrate the robustness of this result by extending the model dynamically and studying examples in which initial wealth distributions have long run effects in one case the economy develops either widespread cottage industry self employment or factory production employment contracts depending on the initial distribution in the other example it develops into prosperity or stagnation

trade liberalization and wage inequality abstract this paper studies empirically the link between trade liberalization and wage inequality in chile within the context of the heckscher ohlin samuelson hos model we use cointegration techniques to estimate the long run relationship between the skill premium in chile and product prices openness and factor endowments we find that the fall in the relative price of labor intensive goods helps explaining the increase in wage inequality in chile during the last two decades the increase in proportion of the labor force with college degree on the other hand tends to reduce wage inequality in chile openness measured as the volume of trade over gdp widens the wage gap between skilled and unskilled labor we offer some hypothesis on the elements that are behind this positive relationship between wage openness and inequality but no empirical work is done this area may be an interesting subject of research

surge and decline negative voting and the midterm loss phenomenon a simultaneous choice analysis campbell s surge and decline and kernell s negative voting theories have been employed most frequently by researchers who seek to explain the invariable pattern of administration party vote loss in midterm house elections despite the original emphasis placed on voting as the act of selecting jointly from among the three options of abstention democratic choice or republican choice all efforts to corroborate the theories have inappropriately treated the decisions of whether and how to vote as independent questions for investigation applying the more suitable technique of nested multinomial logit analysis i find little support for negative voting s two key contentions that negative presidential evaluations hurt white house party candidates more than positive appraisals help or that the president s backers have disproportionately low turnout however a rational basis for abstention emerges that differs from the one postulated by negative voting in contrast on year defections to presidential party candidates by regular voters who normally favor the opposition do seem a cause of the biennial electoral cycle as surge and decline indeed would have us to believe

turnout across democracies world democracies widely differ in legislative executive and legal institutions different institutional environments induce different mappings from electoral outcomes to the distribution of power we explore how these mappings affect voters participation in an election we show that the effect of such institutional differences on turnout depends on the distribution of voters preferences we uncover a novel contest effect given the preferences distribution turnout increases and then decreases when we move from a more proportional to a less proportional power sharing system turnout is maximized for an intermediate degree of power sharing moreover we generalize the competition effect common to models of endogenous turnout given the institutional environment turnout increases in the ex ante preferences evenness and more so when the overall system has lower power sharing these results are robust to a wide range of modeling approaches including ethical voter models voter mobilization models and rational voter models

how does state owned shares affect double externalities and industrial performance evidence from china s exhaustible resources industry abstract excessive entries of business into resource industries can cause allocation inefficiency and externality problems such as resource depletion and environmental pollution these problems have been existed in china s resources industry for many years after opening up to the world china has even begun to lose some critical strategic resources theoretical studies suggest that state owned shares as an indirect form of entry regulation could help the government reduce costs and control risk this paper first empirically analyzed the co integration relationship between double externalities and state owned shares using a seemingly unrelated regression based on china s coal ferrous metal and non ferrous metal resources panel data for 1999 to 2015 the results showed that state owned shares significantly reduced the intergenerational 0 760 and environmental externalities 0 265 however higher state owned shares might reduce industrial effectiveness thus this paper further tested the effect of state owned shares under different threshold degrees of externality the results showed that the effect of indirect regulation was the best when it was associated with a medium degree of intergenerational externality and high degree of environmental externality

a new approach to the spatial theory of electoral competition in his unidimensional model of electoral competition downs argues that voters use party ideology as an informational short cut for forecasting the policies that a party will pursue if elected parties are perceived by voters as points on an ideological axis in the davis hinich multidimensional model on the other hand the axes are real issues and the principal actors are politicians who are modeled as points in the multi issue space this paper reformulates spatial voting theory in terms of a model that connects what we call predictive dimensions with political issues that are salient during a given election campaign this model is both a synthesis and an extension of the downs and davis hinich spatial models we obtain a median voter result for one predictive dimension that is similar to the downs result but with important differences we also obtain results showing the electoral advantage of incumbency and the tendency for incremental change when there is a great deal of heterogeneity in voter perceptions about the candidates

contracting with endogenous entry we analyze entry in markets where a principal contracts with a privately informed agent before learning his production cost the agent knows his probability of having a low cost his ex ante type and decides whether to pay an entry fee to contract with the principal there are two cut off equilibria that determine the possible types of an agent who actually enters the market and neither equilibrium can be discarded by standard selection criteria contrasting with standard intuition in the equilibrium with the highest cut off an increase in the entry fee reduces the marginal type of the agent who enters thus increasing entry and the expected cost of an entrant this equilibrium is selected by a criterion based on robustness to equilibrium risk even though the equilibrium with the lowest cut off is pareto dominant for the agent public policies that increase entry barriers may be welfare improving

the comparison between ad valorem and specific taxation under imperfect competition abstract this paper compares ad valorem and specific taxation in two models of oligopoly with and without free entry predominantly ad valorem taxation implies a relatively low consumer price high tax revenue and when entry is precluded low profits ad valorem taxation dominates specific taxation from the welfare perspective the set of circumstances under which with free entry specific taxation raises welfare is a strict subset of that in which ad valorem taxation is welfare improving and in both models the maximisation of consumer welfare subject to a binding revenue constraint requires maximum reliance on ad valorem taxation

monopoly and soft budget constraint a benevolent government may decide to subsidize an unprofitable monopoly whose profits do not capture all the social surplus from its production anticipating this the firm may underinvest in order to become unprofitable and extract state subsidies the resulting welfare loss may exceed by many times the deadweight cost of monopoly pricing committing the firm to a price ceiling may soften its budget constraint and thus reduce welfare competition can harden budget constraints in industries in which free entry is socially excessive

sectoral shocks learning and aggregate fluctuations we present a model in which sectoral shocks have aggregate consequences the model relies on irreversible investment and imperfect information to slow the adjustment of expanding industries we show that this gradual expansion is sub optimal

producer opportunism in retailing contracts this paper analyzes the role of ex post producer opportunism on the optimal design of vertical restraints it considers vertical contracts as starting points of ex post renegotiation it shows that the alleged room for franchisor opportunism that seems quite important in franchising contracts can be seen as an insurance device when part of the goal of the contract is to provide a stable payoff to the franchisee this conclusion holds for various opportunistic strategies direct eviction of initial retailers excessive entry of new retailers on the market or resale price maintenance used to encourage voluntary exit of initial retailers

endogenous timing with infinitely many firms abstract a model with constant marginal costs is considered where firms choose first a period for production and then the amount to produce when competing in the market according to the resulting timing decisions multiple equilibria arise allowing for infinitely many industry output configurations encompassing one limit output dominant firm and the cournot equilibrium with free entry as extreme cases at each of these equilibria a firm produces a positive amount only if this firm commits to produce at period one both stackelberg and cournot like outcomes are sustainable as equilibria however when the number of leaders is given production at subsequent periods is always prevented and industry output is sometimes larger than the entry preventing level

regulation competition and liberalization in many countries throughout the world regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries this essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process while stressing the importance of case specific analyses this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are procompetitive from corresponding anticompetitive liberalization policies

the costs of free entry an empirical study of real estate agents in greater boston this paper studies the consequences of xed commissions and low entry barriers in greater boston s real estate brokerage industry from 1998 2007 a period with substantial agent turnover we nd that entry is not associated with increased sales probabilities or reduced sales time instead it decreases the market share of experienced agents and reduces average service quality we develop a dynamic empirical model motivated by these patterns to study the extent of ineciency in the current system compared to alternatives to accommodate a large state space we approximate the value function using sieves and impose the bellman equation as an equilibrium constraint if commissions are cut in half there would be 40 fewer agents implying social savings of 23 of industry revenue and the average agent would facilitate 73 more transactions house price appreciation of 50 during our sample period accounts for a 24 increase in the number of agents and a 31 decline in average agent productivity finally improving information about past agent performance can increase productivity and generate signicant social savings

equilibrium product bundling this article offers an equilibrium theory of product bundling by rival firms in several models where a primary good is produced in a duopoly market and one or more other goods is produced under perfectly competitive conditions bundling is shown to emerge as an equilibrium strategy of one or both of the duopolists for its role as a product differentiation device when the rival firms can commit to bundling sales their profits are higher but social welfare is reduced copyright 1997 by university of chicago press

globalization outsourcing and wage inequality there is considerable debate over whether international trade has contributed to the declining economic fortunes of less skilled workers one issue that has become lost in the current discussion is how firms respond to import competition and how these responses in turn are transmitted to the labor market in previous work we have argued that outsourcing by which we mean the import of intermediate inputs by domestic firms has contributed to an increase in the relative demand for skilled labor in the united states if firms respond to import competition from low wage countries by moving non skill intensive activities abroad then trade will shift employment towards skilled workers within industries in this paper we extend our previous work by combining new import data from the revised nber trade database with disaggregated data on input purchases from the census of manufactures we construct industry by industry estimates of outsourcing for the period 1972 1990 and reexamine whether outsourcing has contributed to an increase in relative demand for skilled labor our main finding is that outsourcing can account for 31 51 of the increase in the relative demand for skilled labor that occurred in u s manufacturing industries during the 1980s compared to our previous estimate of 15 33 this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the inefficiency of private adaptation to pollution in the presence of endogenous market structure the paper considers an industry where production costs rise due to pollution but where this effect can be partially off set by investing in adaptation as a private good the focus is not on external effects but industries where economies of scale are introduced from adapting to pollution the structure of the resulting oligopolistic market is endogenous since the level of adaptation is chosen by the firms the analysis of externalities usually disregards defensive or adaptation measures with a few exceptions that point to considerable complications the present debate on adaptation to climate change shows the importance of understanding defensive measures i show that the market failure caused by economies of scale leads to production costs above the social optimum i e to under adapation when pollution increases adaptation only increases if demand is price inelastic otherwise welfare loss from market failure decreases with pollution the total welfare loss is only convex if demand is price inelastic and the influence of pollution on production costs is stronger than the influence of adaptation concave welfare loss has crucial implications for abatement policies

a political agency model of coattail voting abstract this paper provides a theoretical model for the coattail effect where a popular candidate for one branch of government attracts votes to candidates from the same political party for other branches of government i assume a political agency framework with moral hazard in order to analyze the coattail effect in simultaneous presidential and congressional elections i show that coattail voting is the outcome of the optimal reelection scheme adopted by a representative voter to motivate politicians efforts in a retrospective voting environment i assume that an office motivated politician executive or member of congress prefers her counterpart to be affiliated with the same political party this correlation of incentives leads the voter to adopt a joint performance evaluation rule which is conditioned on the politicians belonging to the same party or to different parties two sided coattail effects then arise on the one hand an executive s success props up while failure drags down her partisan ally in the congressional election which implies a presidential coattail effect on the other hand the executive s reelection itself is affected by a congress member s performance which results in a reverse coattail effect

firm entry excess capacity and endogenous productivity abstract we show that sluggish firm entry causes productivity to vary endogenously in response to technology shocks the endogenous productivity effect is caused by incumbent firms utilizing excess capacity as entry adjusts we develop a nonparametric model of endogenous sunk costs and monopolistic competition to show that imperfect competition and dynamic entry are necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for endogenous productivity fluctuations quantitatively we show the endogenous productivity effect is as large as that from a traditional capital utilization effect

innovation and wage effects of international outsourcing abstract we investigate the effects of increased outsourcing of production to a low wage country such international outsourcing lowers the marginal cost of production and thus increases profits creating greater incentives for innovation a reduction in the resource requirement in adapting technology relative to improving products or an expansion in the portion of production that can be outsourced generates a greater extent of international outsourcing a lower relative wage and a faster rate of innovation an increase in production taxes in the north production subsidies in the south or a subsidy to adapting technologies has similar effects

a spatial model of international conflict 1 he model presented here assumes that nations initiate conflict to change the international status quo across one or more issues to an outcome they prefer their preferences for different issue outcomes are represented by a classical spatial utility function international coalitions are formed both to enhance the chance of a successful challenge and to counter existing challenges disputes are modeled as periods of competition between two coalitions through the recruitment of additional members erosion of support for the opposing coalition and escalation of the crisis the two nation model is analyzed in detail and the existence of the core for the resulting game is proved the two main conclusions of the two nation model are that nations have a general incentive to exaggerate their issue positions in disputes and that the possibility of issue trades enhances the likelihood of compromise because scientific understanding arises from theories the explication of theories is essential for the development of scientific understanding to understand international conflictthat is the resolution of disputes between nations by coercion or the threat of coercion a theory that can explain such conflict is needed this paper will present a model drawn from rational choice theory specifically game theory that explains national actions in conflicts as strategic choices made in order to gain preferred resolutions of the international issues in dispute compared to existing game theory models of international conflict the model presented here provides an explicit description of how each nation s evaluation of the issues in dispute affects its desire to pursue compromise or conflict a more detailed sequence of escalation allowing for the detailed study of escalation strategies and a framework that can explain the timing and extent of third party interventions into ongoing crises

endogenous quality differentiation in congested markets firms selling a product with congestion externalities to a heterogeneous population of customers have an incentive to offer differentiated levels of quality in a price competitive market differentiation arises endogenously through the prices chosen by firms in equilibrium firms offer a range of prices which induce an efficiency improving range of quality levels and allow customers to self select their preferred price quality combinations additional results suggest that with many firms in the market the choice of prices dominates the choice of service capacities in determining congestion levels copyright 1991 by blackwell publishing ltd

technological leadership and persistence of monopoly under endogenous entry static versus dynamic analysis abstract we build a dynamic oligopoly model with endogenous entry in which a particular firm leader invests in an innovation process facing the subsequent entry of other firms followers we identify conditions that make it optimal for the leader in the initial oligopoly situation to undertake pre emptive r d investment strategic predation eventually resulting in the elimination of all followers compared to a static model the dynamic one provides new insights into the leader s intertemporal investment choice its optimal decision making and the dynamics of the market structure over time we also contrast the leader s investment decisions with those of the social planner

issue linkages in international crisis bargaining students of international relations have long been concerned with questions regarding the impact of issue linkages on bargaining outcomes unfortunately the body of theory attempting to provide a systematic and rigorous analysis of issue linkages is woefully underdeveloped in this study i contribute to the development of this theory with a particular emphasis on accounting for cases in which issue linkage fails in international crisis bargaining the spatial model of crisis bargaining which is a formal model constituting a synthesis of the spatial theory of voting and traditional utility based bargaining theory is used to develop a theory of issue linkages and to address a number of points regarding linkage strategy that are found in the literature after demonstrating how linking issues can affect the outcome of an international crisis i argue that existing explanations for linkage failure are inadequate the majority of the paper is devoted to determining what characteristics of the issues involved and of the disputants determine the likelihood that a linkage attempt will be successful i conclude with a brief discussion relating these results to the literature on crisis management

efficiency and surplus bounds in cournot competition we derive bounds on the ratios of deadweight loss and consumer surplus to producer surplus under cournot competition to do so we introduce a parameterization of the degree of curvature of market demand using the parallel concepts of concavity and convexity the more concave is demand the larger the share of producer surplus in overall surplus the smaller is consumer surplus relative to producer surplus and the lower the ratio of deadweight loss to producer surplus deadweight loss over total potential surplus is at rst increasing with demand concavity then eventually

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

transactions costs inflation and the variety of intermediation services a general equilibrium model with fixed costs of financial intermediation and costs of transacting with intermediaries is constructed this model is used to show that ignoring fixed costs of in termediation is not innocuous in tobin baumol type transactions cost models of money demand deflation is optimal in spite of the fact that an increase in inflation reduces nominal interest rates and may increase the transactions costs incurred by all groups of economic agents changes in reserve requirements have ambiguous effects the authors obtain novel results due to the fact that the variety of intermediation services is affected by government intervention copyright 1987 by ohio state university press

oligopolistic competition and economic welfare a general equilibrium analysis of entry regulation and tax subsidy schemes abstract two contributions to the general equilibrium analysis of an oligopolistic economy with free entry are intended first we generalize the excess entry theorem to the effect that a marginal decrease in the number of oligopolistic firms from the free entry equilibrium level improves economic welfare second we explore the pareto improving tax subsidy schemes in an oligopolistic economy several self financing and pareto improving tax subsidy schemes will be identified in contrast with the preceding analysis by atkinson and stiglitz which focused on the long run incidence of corporate taxation we analyse the short run as well as long run welfare implications of various policies under generalized conditions

excess entry vertical integration and welfare this article provides a systematic analysis of the welfare effects of vertical integration by a monopolist input supplier into a monopolistically competitive downstream industry we give sufficient conditions on consumer preferences that lead to pareto improving vertical integration and demonstrate a close relationship between assumptions on preference for variety excess entry in monopolistically competitive markets and the welfare effects of vertical integration excess entry in downstream markets tends to give rise to pareto improving vertical integration we extend the analysis to vertical oligopoly and access price regulation

divided government versus incumbency externality effect quasi experimental evidence on multiple voting decisions abstract this paper explores the causal relationship between vote outcomes in different elections we ask 1 does the partisan identity of the mayor influence the voter s decision in subsequent town council elections 2 do voters condition their vote for the mayor on the result of the last council election the analysis mainprod type flply relies on a regression discontinuity design focusing on close election outcomes based on municipal level data for germany we find that the party of the mayor can receive a significant bonus in the next town council election moreover voters punish mayor candidates of parties that performed strongly in earlier council elections throughout the paper we highlight how these findings can be related to an incumbency externality effect and to the theory of divided government

the economics of casino taxation in this article a model of the costs of a casino is developed that focuses on the implications for economic welfare of different taxation schemes for casinos the situation being considered is in a country where casinos cater exclusively to foreign tourists the goal of the country is to determine the maximum amount of taxes that can be extracted from the activities of this sector under different systems of taxation when the price of gambling is set by regulation above its competitive level the economic losses created by excessive investment in the sector can be reduced by taxation a turnover tax on the amount gambled can maximize both tax revenue and the economic welfare of the country due to administrative constraints a number of countries rely on the taxation of the casinos fixed assets or a combination of a turnover tax and a tax on fixed costs the model is applied to the situation in north cyprus the annual economic efficiency loss from its poorly designed tax policies on casino gambling is

competition and relational contracts in the rwanda coffee chain how does competition affect market outcomes when formal contracts are not enforceable and parties resort to relational contracts difficulties with measuring relational contracts and dealing with the endogeneity of competition have frustrated attempts to answer this question we make progress by studying relational contracts between upstream farmers and downstream mills in rwanda s coffee industry first we identify salient dimensions of their relational contracts and measure them through an original survey of mills and farmers second we take advantage of an engineering model for the optimal placement of mills to construct an instrument that isolates geographically determined variation in competition conditional on the suitability for mills placement within the catchment area we find that mills surrounded by more suitable areas i face more competition from other mills ii use fewer relational contracts with farmers and iii exhibit worse performance an additional competing mill also iv reduces the aggregate quantity of coffee supplied to mills by farmers and v makes farmers worse off competition hampers relational contracts directly by increasing farmers temptation to default on the relational contract and indirectly by reducing mill s profits

public monopoly and economic efficiency evidence from the pennsylvania liquor control board s entry decisions we estimate a spatial model of liquor demand to analyze the impact of government controlled retailing on entry patterns in the absence of the pennsylvania liquor control board the state would have roughly 2 5 times the current number of stores higher consumer surplus and lower payments to liquor store employees with just over half the number of stores that would maximize welfare the government system is instead best rationalized as profit maximization with profit sharing government operation mitigates but does not eliminate free entry s bias against rural consumers we find only limited evidence of political influence on entry jel d42 d72 l11 l12 l43 l81

an informational externality in a competitive market abstract consider a new competitive market with unknown demand the market price generated by incumbents conveys information that firms including potential entrants use for future decisions yet the incumbents are not rewarded for their assistance suggesting that an inefficiency can exist it has been argued that greater entry generates more information about a new market and should be subsidized a simple model of partial information and learning is developed finding that an informational externality can exist in competitive markets but there may be excessive entry free entry and a public price conditions for competitive market efficiency are conditions for inefficiency

who supports free trade in latin america this paper examines individual trade policy preferences across 17 countries in latin america the focus is on whether skilled or unskilled workers are more likely to support liberalised trade and on whether country characteristics such as factor endowments alter the preferences of skilled and unskilled workers based on the standard heckscher ohlin model and the stolper samuelson theorem wage inequality in developing countries will decrease under free trade and unskilled workers will benefit we find that on average skilled workers are more likely than unskilled workers to support free trade in latin american countries separate country regressions reveal that this pattern is only statistically significant in 8 out of 17 latin american countries however there are no countries in our sample in which unskilled workers are statistically more likely to support free trade than skilled workers not even in the lowest skill endowed country in the sample we also find that people from latin american countries with higher gdp faster growth more cropland and a longer period of time since reform were more likely on average to support free trade

welfare optimal patent royalties when imitation is costly we identify welfare optimal patent royalties in a model of costly imitation entry and imperfect competition when the social planner may impose a compulsory license optimal royalties either blockade imitation facilitating unregulated monopoly or yield an aggregate zero profit efficient duopoly when duopoly is optimal the optimal per unit royalty pins the equilibrium price at the aggregate average cost and the optimal fixed royalty shifts surplus so the patentee and imitator break even efficient duopoly yields higher welfare than monopoly for sufficiently low invention cost and may also yield higher welfare than a prize system interestingly royalty payments may be negative because of this efficient duopoly may not be feasible if the planner must instead direct the courts to use such royalties

price fixing policy abstract the prohibition against price fixing is competition law s most important and least controversial provision yet there is far less consensus than meets the eye on what constitutes price fixing and prevalent understandings cannot be reconciled with principles of oligopoly theory this article 1 presents a fundamental reconceptualization of our understanding of horizontal agreements 2 develops a systematic analysis of price fixing policy that focuses on its deterrence benefits and chilling costs and 3 compares this direct approach to commentators favored formulations that typically involve some sort of formalistic communications based prohibition by targeting a subset of means rather than the illicit ends conventional formulations tend to impose liability in cases with lower deterrence benefits and greater chilling costs than those reached under a direct approach and to incur greater administrative costs as well

negotiation arithmetic adding and subtracting issues and parties students of international negotiations often examine strategic interactions among a given set of parties dealing with a specified group of issues the issues and parties themselves are often choice variables whose ultimate configuration can have decisive effects on a bargain s outcome using a variety of international cases i investigate the properties of several classes of moves that are intended to alter the issues and parties of an original negotiation a unified approach to the analysis of such situations suggests numerous distinct means by which the addition or subtraction of issues can yield one sided gains to the use of power can yield joint gains that create or enhance a zone of possible agreement and can reduce or destroy a zone of possible agreement the effects of adding or subtracting parties are similarly analyzed however unintended complexity unforeseen interrelationships organizational considerations transactions costs and informational requirements may alter the analysis of such moves

trade policy with endogenous entry revisited abstract this paper revisits the effects of tariffs and quotas in a competitive setting where three results are thought to hold these are that quotas are equivalent to specific tariffs the form of tariffs specific or ad valorem does not matter and that the way in which a quota is allocated has no real effects as it only affects the allocation of rents not their size we show that all three of these results are false when entry exit is endogenous equivalence holds only if the initial level of entry is set at the long run level under the quota

unemployment insurance and market structure abstract this paper examines the impact of unemployment insurance ui on employment and unemployment in an industry in which the prices can vary due to some market power some non conventional results are obtained it is shown that if there is free entry and exit average industrial employment may be a decreasing function of the experience rating because the number of firms in the industry is itself a decreasing function of this parameter this contradicts the conventional view which was arrived at using models of a perfectly competitive industry with no entry and according to which employment should be an increasing function of the experience rating the general conclusion is that for industries with different degrees of market power the same ui scheme has different impacts on employment and unemployment