the evolving landscape of banking the structure of the financial services industry is in flux liberalization deregulation and advances in information technology have changed the financial landscape dramatically interbank competition has heated up and banks face increasing competition from nonbanking financial institutions and the financial markets the predictability of the industry with low levels of financial innovation little innovation in distribution channels and well defined and rigid institutional structures is gone product innovations new distribution channels and emerging new competitors are in abundance moreover the subprime crisis that has hit the financial sector in 2007 2008 appears to have a major impact on the structure of the industry this article emphasizes the importance of understanding the economics of banking for assessing the changes in the industry in particular we point at relationship banking as a prime source of the banks comparative advantage the proliferation of transaction oriented banking trading and financial market activities does however seriously challenge relationship banking in order to focus on these issues in a rigorous way we will evaluate the key insights from the relationship banking literature including the potential complementarities and conflicts of interest between intermediated relationship banking activities and financial market underwriting securitization etc activities we also address the issue of the optimal conglomeration of bank activities including the empirical evidence on scope and scale economies we analyze the strategic positioning of banks in the currently highly uncertain competitive arena and link this to the theory of the firm and particularly firm boundaries and learning

systemic risk in financial systems a feedback approach abstract we develop an innovative framework to estimate systemic risk that accounts for feedback effects between the real and financial sectors we model the feedback effects through successive deterioration of borrowers creditworthiness and illiquidity spreading thus giving rise to a micro level financial accelerator between firms and banks we demonstrate that the model converges to a unique fixed point and the key role that centrality plays in shaping the level of amplification of shocks we also provide a mathematical framework to explain systemic risk variations in time as a function of the network characteristics of economic agents finally we supply empirical evidence on the economic significance of the feedback effects on comprehensive loan level data of the brazilian credit register our results corroborate the importance of incorporating new contagion channels besides the traditional interbank market in systemic risk models

history dependence in concave economies abstract this paper investigates concave intertemporal optimization problems and derives two mechanisms either growth or control state interactions e g due to endogenous preferences that allow for multiple steady states including an unstable one therefore history dependence is possible in a perfectly governed economy subject to the law of diminishing returns if one of these two mechanisms is present this result complements a large amount of literature that attributes history dependence to convexities as a consequence lock ins into undesired evolutions are possible beyond the familiar case of increasing returns

bank runs liquidity costs and investment distortions abstract in this paper we extend the diamond and dybvig 1983 model of intermediation to study further the conditions under which bank runs can occur and to consider how private parties might adjust to the existence of bank run equilibria we provide weaker necessary conditions for runs we then characterize how banks respond to the possibility of runs in their design of deposit contracts and investment decisions banks might choose to offer contracts that prevent runs but under some conditions the second best contracts will involve accepting some risk of runs in order to achieve higher expected returns from their investments

a model of liquidity hoarding and term premia in inter bank markets financial crises are associated with reduced volumes and extreme levels of rates for term inter bank loans reflected in one month and three month libor we explain such stress by modeling leveraged banks precautionary demand for liquidity asset shocks impair a bank s ability to roll over debt because of agency problems associated with high leverage in turn banks hoard liquidity and decrease term lending as their rollover risk increases over the term of the loan high levels of short term leverage and illiquidity of assets lead to low volumes and high rates for term borrowing in extremis inter bank markets can completely freeze

nonconvexities in optimal pollution accumulation abstract with a few exceptions the analysis of optimal pollution accumulation or detrimental stock externalities rests on the assumptions that the level of damage is unbounded and that pollution decay increases monotonically with the level of pollution stock we show that these assumptions are restrictive and that their generalization alters the basic economic properties of optimal pollution control we specify a decay function which is concave with low stock levels and convex when pollution is higher we show that although multiple steady states may exist the globally optimal solution may be independent of the initial pollution level it is also possible that there are cutoff levels which determine the optimal long run equilibrium implying that the feedback control law is discontinuous and nonmonotonic bounded damage may have similar implications but in contrast to concave convex decay they may occur even with zero discounting

banking panics information and rational expectations equilibrium this paper shows that bank runs can be modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon we demonstrate that some aspects of the intuitive story that bank runs start with fears of insolvency of banks can be rigorously modeled if individuals observe long lines at the bank they correctly infer that there is a possibility that the bank is about to fail and precipitate a bank run however bank runs occur even when no one has any adverse information extra market constraints such as suspension of convertibility can prevent bank runs and result in superior allocations banking panics were a recurrent phenomenon in the united states until the 1930s they have re emerged as a source of public concern and much theoretical research recently in this paper we provide an information theoretic rationale for bank runs the traditional story is that contagion is an important aspect of bank runs the idea seems to be that when the general public observes large withdrawals from the banking system fears of insolvency grow resulting in even larger withdrawals of deposits in our model some individuals withdraw because they get information that future returns are likely to be low uninformed individuals observing this also have an incentive to liquidate their investments in addition some individuals need to withdraw deposits for other than informationally based reasons thus if the random realization of such a group of individuals is unusually large then the uninformed individuals will be misled and will precipitate a run on the bank the technology is such that a large volume of withdrawals involves liquidation costs consequently runs on the bank do impose social costs a mechanism that may reduce these costs in our model is to suspend convertibility if withdrawals are high however those individuals who need to withdraw their assets for liquidity reasons are worse off ex post our model provides a rationalization for restrictions in demand deposits that were widespread prior to 1929 friedman and schwartz 7 suggest that restrictions of payments ensured

who borrows from the lender of last resort understanding why banks borrow from the lender of last resort lolr during a nancial crisis is crucial to understanding the macroeconomic impact of such largescale interventions we document a strong divergence among banks take up of lolr assistance during the nancial crisis in the euro area as banks which borrowed heavily also used increasingly risky collateral we propose four explanations for this divergence

the concept of natural capital the natural environment is now commonly viewed as a form of capital asset or natural capital also included are ecosystems that provide important goods and services to the economy managing natural capital has consequences for sustainable development however there are contrasting weak versus strong sustainability views which in turn have implications for green accounting natural resource based sovereign wealth funds have emerged as key financial instruments for compensating resource depreciation with greater economy wide investments recent scientific evidence recommends demarcating safe operating spaces to limit exploitation of critical global biophysical subsystems or processes these challenges suggest that the concept of natural capital is pivotal to sound policy

measuring liquidity mismatch in the banking sector this paper constructs a liquidity mismatch index lmi to gauge the mismatch between the market liquidity of assets and the funding liquidity of liabilities for 2 882 bank holding companies over 2002 to 2014 the aggregate lmi decreases from 4 trillion precrisis to 6 trillion in 2008 we conduct an lmi stress test revealing the fragility of the banking system in early 2007 moreover lmi predicts a bank s stock market crash probability and borrowing decisions from the government during the financial crisis the lmi is therefore informative about both individual bank liquidity and the liquidity risk of the entire banking system

microfoundations of macroeconomic fluctuations and the laws of probability theory the principle of large numbers versus rational expectations arbitrage abstract the principle of large numbers shows that the relative deviation for a macro system with n independent elements is of the order of 1 n lucas approach to a microfoundations for macroeconomic fluctuations is thus not capable of explaining the magnitude of observed macroeconomic fluctuations arbitrage activity would largely eliminate correlations created by rational expectations among economic agents when they face counter movements in relative prices the complex nature of many body problems and the statistical feature of aggregate indexes cannot be ignored in a micro macro modeling intermediate structures such as financial markets and industrial organizations are more important than households and firms in generating business cycles

optimal and open access harvesting of multi use species in a second best world expansion of human populations and activities has caused increased conflicts between wildlife and humans as a result the distinction between resource and pest species has become blurry we propose an economically based classification of species based on a multi use bioeconomic model the classification of the steady state population of a species is shown to depend on both species density and economic factors we extend earlier work on multi use resource pest species by applying the theoretical model to a developing country context where property rights to wildlife are imperfectly enforced so that second best trade measures are often applied by the international community to promote conservation upon calibrating the model using data for the african elephant we derive three further results first when comparing the optimal stock of a multi use species to the open access stock we find that the ranking in terms of abundance is ambiguous second and consistent with existing literature on resource management in a second best world our case study supports the idea that trade bans have ambiguous effectson wildlife abundance third due to a bifurcation effect characterizing the multi use model s solution strategic and temporary subsidizing by the north may enable them to free ride on conservation efforts of the south henceforth

greenhouse gas emissions from power generation and consumption in a nordic perspective during the last decade there has been an intensive debate on going in sweden about how power generation and use affect global warming more precisely the discussion has considered how electricity shall be assessed from an environmental and climate perspective in different situations this article gives a critical analysis on the main viewpoints a number of environmental impact assessment principles are outlined and critically examined concepts like average electricity and marginal electricity are discussed and electricity disclosure as a basis for evaluation is addressed the impact from emission trading and tradable green certificates is also considered recommendations to concerned stakeholders are given the clash points in the swedish debate are highlighted and thus made available to a broader audience outside scandinavia

a real options approach to bankruptcy costs evidence from failed commercial banks during the 1990s literature identifies three main aspects of liquidation costs firm size asset specificity and industry concentration this paper unifies the theory behind these aspects of bankruptcy costs by treating them as components of a broader option valuation problem faced by the liquidating trustee testing the hypothesized asset price relationships on fdic failed bank liquidation data yields the appropriate results furthermore it appears that liquidation time alone can be used as an effective second order proxy for asset value growth where market value estimates are unavailable

deposit insurance and money market freezes in the presence of deposit insurance a rise in counterparty risk may cause a freeze in interbank money markets we show this in a general equilibrium model with regionally segmented bank based retail financial markets in which money markets facilitate the reallocation of funds across banks from different regions counterparty risk creates an asymmetry between banks in savings rich regions which remain marginally financed by the abundant regional insured deposits and in savings poor regions which have to pay large spreads in money markets this asymmetry distorts the aggregate allocation of credit and in the presence of demand externalities can cause large output losses

a consistent stochastic model of the term structure of interest rates for multiple tenors abstract starting from the observation that single currency swap basis spreads contradict classical arbitrage arguments we construct a framework where this basis arises due to the presence of roll over risk this risk consists of two components 1 facing a higher credit spread e g due to a credit downgrade when rolling over short term borrowing 2 heightened borrowing costs due to an absence of market liquidity the model simultaneously fits ois interest rate swap and basis swap market quotes including cds market quotes allows the two components of roll over risk to be explicitly separated this is highly relevant to the current libor transition illustrating why alternative benchmarks are fundamentally different from the rates they may be replacing

the control of invasive species on private property with neighbor to neighbor spillovers invasive pests cross property boundaries property managers may have private incentives to control invasive species despite not having sufficient incentive to fully internalize the external costs of their role in spreading the invasion each property manager has a right to future use of his own property but his property may abut others properties enabling spread of an invasive species the incentives for a foresighted property manager to control invasive species have received little attention we consider the efforts of a foresighted property manager who has rights to future use of a property and has the ability to engage in repeated discrete control activities we find that higher rates of dispersal associated with proximity to neighboring properties reduce the private incentives for control controlling species at one location provides incentives to control at a neighboring location control at neighboring locations are strategic complements and coupled with spatial heterogeneity lead to a weaker link public good problem in which each property owner is unable to fully appropriate the benefits of his own control activity future use rights and private costs suggest that there is scope for a series of coase like exchanges to internalize much of the costs associated with species invasion pigouvian taxes on invasive species potentially have qualitatively perverse behavioral effects a tax with a strong income effect e g failure of effective revenue recycling can reduce the value of property assets and diminish the incentive to manage insects on one s own property

lender screening and the role of securitization evidence from prime and subprime mortgage markets this article examines the link between mortgage securitization and lender screening during the boom and bust of the u s housing market using comprehensive data on both prime and subprime securitized and bank held loans we provide evidence that securitization affected lenders screening decisions in the subprime market for low documentation loans through two channels the securitization rate and the time it takes to securitize a loan the change in decision making by subprime lenders occurs on dimensions that are unreported to investors examining the time series evolution of the securitization market further reinforces these findings we exploit heterogeneity across subprime and prime markets to illustrate that the potential for moral hazard may be reduced with greater collection of hard information and increased monitoring of lenders our results suggest that the policy debate regarding securitization and lenders underwriting standards should separately evaluate the agency and non agency markets with special attention toward the extent of soft information in assets being securitized the author 2012 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

precautionary reserves and the interbank market large excess reserve balances are held by banks in the u s despite the ability of large banks to closely target end of day balances close to zero we show that the friction faced by small banks to participate in the fed funds market leads to all banks holding precautionary reserves the precautionary motive for reserves can explain that small banks hold relatively large amounts of excess reserves overnight while at the same time lending large amounts to large banks small banks are large net lenders despite their reluctance to lend as large of a percentage of available balances during the day as large banks we also explain an increase in the volatility of the fed funds rate late in the day

the impact of contingent liability on commercial bank risk taking abstract from 1863 1935 regulators imposed contingent liability on bank shareholders to discourage risk taking using data from 1900 to 1915 i find that banks subject to stricter liability rules have lower equity and asset volatility hold a lower proportion of risky assets and are less likely to increase their investment in risky assets when their net worth declines consistent with the hypothesis that stricter liability discourages commercial bank risk taking these findings provide lessons for current bank regulatory policy and show that the shape of the residual claimant s payoff function has a significant impact on managerial incentives and firm performance

the interbank network across the global financial crisis evidence from italy abstract this study examines the effects of the global financial crisis gfc on interbank market connectivity using network analysis more specifically using data on italian banks bilateral interbank positions between 1998 and 2013 we analyze the impact of the following events on each bank s network centrality the liquidity crisis in august 2007 the collapse of lehman brothers in september 2008 eurosystem s long term refinancing operations ltros between 2009 and 2012 the sovereign debt crisis in july 2011 and the announcement of outright monetary transactions omt in 2012 the results show that the 2007 liquidity crisis and especially the collapse of lehman brothers are associated with a marked reduction of the relative interconnectedness of the italian banking sector i e a shift in the distribution of banks centrality to the left away from the most connected bank in the following years the system progressively recovered its initial patterns of integration among banks which coincided with the main eurosystem s monetary policy interventions however the average outcome conceals different results across banks depending on their characteristics and initial positions within the system

thresholds in concave renewable resource models abstract a number of renewable resource models some of them just recently published e g about shallow lakes refer to convexities with respect to the resource stock as the source for multiple steady states and associated thresholds this short paper draws attention to the fact that multiple steady states and thresholds are possible in well behaved i e concave models too the ecological consequence is that renewable resource management is sensitive to initial conditions in more cases than so far suggested in the literature

distinguishing panics and information based bank runs welfare and policy implications in this paper we contrast panics and information based bank runs in an effort to provide a robust and empirically plausible model of how bank runs are triggered the model of information based runs is characterized by two sided asymmetric information the bank cannot observe the true liquidity needs of the depositors while depositors are asymmetrically informed about bank asset quality we also examine the relative degrees of risk sharing provided by bank deposit contracts and traded equity contracts we show that the choice of deposit or equity depends on the attributes of and information about the underlying investment returns

the effects of business models on bank risk before during and after financial crisis evidence from china using chinese data from 2004 to 2016 we investigate the effects of business models on bank risk before during and after financial crisis three main results emerge first insolvency risk and roa

the fragile capital structure of hedge funds and the limits to arbitrage abstract during a financial crisis when investors are most in need of liquidity and accurate prices hedge funds cut their arbitrage positions and hoard cash the paper explains this phenomenon we argue that the fragile nature of the capital structure of hedge funds combined with low market liquidity creates a risk of coordination in redemptions among hedge fund investors that severely limits hedge funds arbitrage capabilities we present a model of hedge funds optimal asset allocation in the presence of coordination risk among investors we show that hedge fund managers behave conservatively and even abstain from participating in the market once coordination risk is factored into their investment decisions the model suggests a new source of limits to arbitrage

reflections on northern rock the bank run that heralded the global financial crisis in september 2007 television viewers and newspaper readers around the world saw pictures of what looked like an old fashioned bank run that is depositors waiting in line outside the branch offices of a united kingdom bank called northern rock to withdraw their money the previous u k bank run before northern rock was in 1866 at overend gurney a london bank that overreached itself in the railway and docks boom of the 1860s bank runs were not uncommon in the united states up through the 1930s but they have been rare since the start of deposit insurance backed by the federal deposit insurance corporation in contrast deposit insurance in the united kingdom was a partial affair funded by the banking industry itself and insuring only a part of the deposits at the time of the run u k bank deposits were fully insured only up to 2 000 pounds and then only 90 percent of the deposits up to an upper limit of 35 000 pounds when faced with a run the incentive to withdraw one s deposits from a u k bank was therefore very strong for economists the run on northern rock at first seemed to offer a rare opportunity to study at close quarters all the elements involved in their theoretical models of bank runs the futility of public statements of reassurance the mutually reinforcing anxiety of depositors as well as the power of the media in galvanizing and channeling that anxiety through the power of television images however the storyline of the northern rock bank run does not fit the conventional narrative on september 13 2007 the bbc s evening television news broadcast first broke the news that northern rock had sought the bank of england s support the next morning the bank of england announced that it would provide emergency liquidity support it was only after that announcement that is after the

financial regulation and securitization evidence from subprime mortgage loans we examine the consequences of existing regulations on the quality of mortgage loans originations in the originate to distribute otd market the information asymmetries in the otd market can lead to moral hazard problems on the part of lenders we find using a plausibly exogenous source of variation in the ease of securitization that the quality of loan origination varies inversely with the amount of regulation more regulated lenders originate loans of worse quality we interpret this result as a possible evidence that the fragility of lightly regulated originators capital structure can mitigate moral hazard in addition we find that incentives which require mortgage brokers to have skin in the game and stronger risk management departments inside the bank partially alleviate the moral hazard problem in this setting finally having more lenders inside a mortgage pool is associated with higher quality loans suggesting that sharper relative performance evaluation made possible by more competition among contributing lenders can also mitigate the moral hazard problem to some extent overall our evidence suggests that market forces rather than regulation may have been more effective in mitigating moral hazard in the otd market the findings caution against policies that impose stricter lender regulations which fail to align lenders incentives with the investors of mortgage backed securities 2009 elsevier b v all rights reserved

optimal financial crises empirical evidence suggests that banking panics are related to the business cycle and are not simply the result of sunspots panics occur when depositors perceive that the returns on bank assets are going to be unusually low we develop a simple model of this in this setting bank runs can be first best efficient they allow efficient risk sharing between early and late withdrawing depositors and they allow banks to hold efficient portfolios however if costly runs or markets for risky assets are introduced central bank intervention of the right kind can lead to a pareto improvement in welfare from the earliest times banks have been plagued by the problem of bank runs in which many or all of the bank s depositors attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously because banks issue liquid liabilities in the form of deposit contracts but invest in illiquid assets in the form of loans they are vulnerable to runs that can lead to closure and liquidation a financial crisis or banking panic occurs when depositors at many or all of the banks in a region or a country attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously prior to the twentieth century banking panics occurred frequently in europe and the united states panics were generally regarded as a bad thing and the development of central banks to eliminate panics and ensure financial stability has been an important feature of the history of financial systems it has been a long and involved process the first cerntral bank the bank of sweden was established more than 300 years ago the bank of england played an especially important role in the development of effective stabilization policies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by the end of the nineteenth century banking panics had been eliminated in europe the last true panic in england was the overend gurney company crisis of 1866

do banks have a future abstract are banks special intermediaries do they play any unique role in the economy and if so will they retain their specialness in the ever faster changing world of finance the rapid evolution of finance over the last two decades and the breathtaking e age revolution have persuaded many that eventually banks will be indistinguishable from other financial intermediaries since all their functions can at least as efficiently be carried out by nonbanks this study re explores the issue of the specialness of banks in light of the large existing literature on the subject and presents an approach which identifies the banks specialness with their unique capacity to lend out claims on their own debt which the public accepts and uses as money the study discusses various structural and policy implications deriving from the approach and draws on it to point to the continuing relevance of banking in a world where nonbanks are taking business away from banks lending to production has become relatively less important and the use of e money may soon be dominating financial transactions

monetary policy transmission with interbank market fragmentation this paper shows how interbank market fragmentation disrupts the transmission of monetary policy fragmentation is the fact that banks depending on their country of location have different probabilities of default on their interbank borrowings once fragmentation is introduced into standard theoretical models of monetary policy implementation excess liquidity arises endogenously this leads short term interest rates to depart from the central bank policy rates using data on monetary policy operations i show that this mechanism has been at work in the euro area since 2008 the model is used to analyze conventional and unconventional monetary policy measures

has the financial system become safer after the crisis the changing nature of financial institution risk abstract six years after the collapse of lehman brothers the question of whether the u s financial system has become less risky remains unanswered on the one side new regulations including dodd frank and basel iii have made improvements by requiring higher bank capital and financial institutions themselves have reduced risk taking activities on the other side it has been argued that the fundamental risks remained and the efforts of regulators and politicians were simply rearranging the deckchairs on the titanic baily and elliott 2013 this paper highlights the changing nature of financial institution risk from 2005 to 2011 it finds that while these institutions have become less risky individually after the crisis the financial market has become more vulnerable to systemic contagion the causal inference that the crisis and the post crisis legislation have gradually changed the nature of financial institution risk is drawn from a quasi experimental design this finding suggests that the ever more integrated financial system might experience more synchronized contractions in future crises providing empirical support for the proposals of the inter bank collective regulation of banks by acharya 2009 in addition to the intra bank collective regulations as in froot and stein 1998 and bis 1996 1999

capital investment for optimal exploitation of renewable resource stocks in the age of global change abstract the world is rapidly changing and biotic resources and their users are adapting determining how ecological and economic interactions determine the outcomes of this adaptation is critical to understanding the future of natural resources we model a two species fisheries as a stylized system to investigate the adaptation strategies of a harvester faced with shifting species composition in an ecological community we explore how interspecies interactions and pricing effects jointly determine the optimal adaptation strategy we consider two interacting species that are harvested jointly but where the harvester may exert effort towards each species differentially provided she invests in reproducible capital that allows targeting the possible adaptation strategies comprise changes in how people interact with natural capital for example changing harvest levels and investment in reproducible or human capital which may be a substitute or complement for natural capital stocks we find that the market price of the harvested species exerts a particularly strong impact on the adaptation strategy all else equal unequal prices tends to drive extreme targeting or avoidance of a new species economic and ecological factors can necessitate investment at equilibrium and early transient management decisions for beneficial species may like with nuisance species produce large benefits

what factors drive systemic risk during international financial crises abstract we analyze the determinants of the contribution of international banks to both global and local systemic risk during prominent financial crises we find no empirical evidence supporting conjectures that bank size leverage non interest income or the quality of the bank s credit portfolio are persistent determinants of systemic risk across financial crises in contrast our results show that global systemic risk in particular is predominantly driven by characteristics of the regulatory regime we also confirm for the subprime crisis that the banks contribution to moderately bad tail events in the past predicts the financial sector s crash risk

biology as a source of non convexities in ecological production functions generating ecological production functions including harvest yield functions is a high priority research area most yield functions used in economics and ecology rely on convexity properties of species growth functions but convexity is shown here to depend on whether realistic biology is incorporated optimizing behavior by individual organisms is connected with species population dynamics in order to derive growth functions in a general equilibrium ecosystem model non convexities are shown to be an inherent property of the growth functions owing to familiar biological processes including predator prey and competitive relations predator satiation and prey substitution the growth functions generate yield functions that are problematic for management because they exhibit kinked average revenue curves discontinuous marginal revenue curves and knife edge optimum effort levels where a small increase above the optimum effort can rapidly deplete the stock these phenomena can be explained entirely by the underlying biological processes

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

uninsured deposits as a monitoring device their impact on bond yields of banks abstract we empirically analyze the impact of uninsured deposits on a bank s cost of public debt uninsured depositors can exert market discipline over a bank and potentially reduce its agency cost of debt through informed monitoring we use a sample of public bond issues by u s bank holding companies from 1994 to 2013 and find statistically strong evidence that banks with more uninsured deposits relative to their assets issue bonds with a lower interest rate findings suggest a one standard deviation increase in uninsured deposits is associated with a 46 64 basis point decrease in bond yield in addition we find that bonds issued by banks with higher default risk or lower reputation benefit more from uninsured savers our paper contributes to the literature that explores market discipline and provides evidence that banks can benefit from it through a lower borrowing cost

ecosystems externalities and economies this paper incorporates an ecosystem model into a model of a simple economy the decisionmaking agents in the ecosystem are individual organisms aggregated to the species level a species may provide utility directly to humans or it may provide utility indirectly because it is used either as a raw material in goods fabrication or as sustenance for other species we describe a comparative static equilibrium of the ecosystem where species demands for other species are equal to the supplies of those other species and energy is conserved the ecosystem is then embedded in the economy so that the effects of human intervention can be traced through both the ecosystem and the economy human intervention creates ecosystem externalities such that ecosystem equilibria are shifted and the new equilibria affect the utility or the production processes of other humans this framework allows us to describe in principle which ecosystem services can be efficiently usurped by humans which waste flows can be efficiently allowed into ecosystems and which ecosystem organisms and physical attributes can be efficiently maintained

spatial and temporal variations of marginal electricity generation the case of the finnish nordic and european energy systems up to 2030 abstract assumptions related to energy generation often play a decisive role in abatement studies for estimating the effects of demand side interventions however there can be significant geographical and temporal variation in the emission intensities of electricity generation in different regions the aim of this article is to describe how spatial and temporal variations related to a particular energy system may affect an electricity generation unit operating on the margins the approach takes the generation mix within interconnected electricity markets and the exchange of electricity between these markets into account the short term 2009 2010 and long term until 2030 hour by hour marginal electricity generation unit and marginal emission intensities are identified for electricity use using the finnish nordic and european energy systems as actual cases the estimated marginal electricity generation technology and marginal emission intensities for electricity use differed significantly within the studied time horizon and between the studied countries and energy systems furthermore due to the projected structural changes in the energy systems i e changes in the fuel mix and electricity generation technologies the carbon dioxide co 2 intensity of marginal electricity generation will decrease in the nordic countries and in the eu in the long term however the approach used for calculating the effect of change in electricity exchange on the margin increased the variability of the results considerably for some nordic countries such as sweden and norway whose export of electricity was high and whose marginal generation mix differed significantly from the european system furthermore the spatial and temporal variations of marginal electricity generation will increase in the future this variation combined with the interconnections between market areas for exchanging electricity in the eu will require improved understanding of the impacts of exchanged marginal electricity generation on the possible emission leakage between eu countries to better inform policy decisions

the term structure of interbank risk we infer a term structure of interbank risk from spreads between rates on interest rate swaps indexed to the london interbank offered rate libor and overnight indexed swaps we develop a tractable model of interbank risk to decompose the term structure into default and non default liquidity components from august 2007 to january 2011 the fraction of total interbank risk due to default risk on average increases with maturity at short maturities the non default component is important in the first half of the sample period and is correlated with measures of funding and market liquidity the model also provides a framework for pricing hedging and risk management of interest rate swaps in the presence of significant basis risk

delegated monitors large and small germany s banking system 1800 1914 banks play a greater role in the german financial system than in those of the united states or britain germany s large universal banks are admired by those who advocate bank deregulation in the united states others admire the universal banks for their supposed role in corporate governance and industrial finance many discussions distort the german banking system by overstressing one of several types of banks and ignore the competition and cooperation between the famous universal banks and other banking groups tracing the historical development of the german banking system from the early nineteenth century places the large universal banks in context

the role of demandable debt in structuring optimal banking arrangements demandable debt finance by banks warrants explanation because it entails costs of bank suspension liquidation and idle reserve holdings an explanation is developed in which demandable debt provides incentive compatible intermediation where the banker has comparative advantage in allocating investment funds but may act against the interests of uninformed depositors demandable debt attracts funds by giving depositors an option to force liquidation its usefulness in transacting follows from information sharing between monitors and nonmonitors copyright 1991 by american economic association

optimal ecosystem management when species compete for limiting resources abstract resource based models of species competition have been introduced recently as an alternative to the classical theory based on the lotca volterra methodological approach to species competition we consider economic management of an ecosystem for a tilman model of mechanistic resource based species competition where the growth of species is limited by resource availability we analyze the equilibrium ecosystem state resulting from nature s equilibrium and two basic management problems the privately optimal management problem and the socially optimal management problem under private optimization agents do not take into account externalities associated with the effects of their management practices on ecosystem service flows while these effects are accounted for at the socially optimal management we show that in general three different equilibrium species specialization patterns emerge we completely characterize these patterns for the ecological economic model with linear structure and we provide policy rules so that the privately optimal state could be driven toward the socially optimal or the natural equilibrium we also develop an approach for unifying equilibrium price theory with tilman ecological modeling and we prove the existence and analyze the stability of a price equilibrium for a stochastic discrete choice model of species specialization finally we discuss equilibrium specialization and policy issues for a generalized model where species and resources interact among themselves as a conceptual basis for incorporating detailed ecological modeling into economic management

the economics of non convex ecosystems introduction the word convexity is ubiquitous in economics but absent from economics in this paper we explain why and show what difference it makes to economic analysis if ecosystem non convexities are taken seriously a simple proof is provided of the connection between self similarity and power laws we also provide an introduction to each of the papers in the symposium and draw out the way in which they form a linked set of contributions

the shadow costs of repos and bank liability structure making use of a structural model that allows for optimal liquidity management we study the role that repos play in a bank s financing structure in our model the bank s assets consist of illiquid loans and liquid reserves and are financed by a combination of repos long term debt deposits and equity repos are a cheap source of funding but they are subject to an exogenous rollover risk we show that the use of repos inflicts two types of indirect shadow costs on the bank s shareholders first it induces the bank to maintain higher liquid reserves in order to alleviate the additional default risk second it adds to the cost of long term debt financing these shadow costs limit the bank s appetite for cheap but unstable repo funding this effect is however weakened under poor returns on risky assets access to deposit funding and the depositor preference rule we also analyze the impact of a liquidity coverage ratio payout restrictions and a leverage ratio on the bank s financing choices and show that all these tools are able to curb the bank s reliance on repos

non convexities in continuous time investment theory that non convex preferences or technologies cause problems for economic theory is well known in recent years there have been numerous contributions to the nonconvexity problem in the context of models with a finite dimensional commodity space in the capital theory context non convexities have received explicit treatment in a few papers in two distinguishable ways the problem is cast either in a discrete time framework aoki 1971 rothschild 1971 or in a continuous time framework in which there are implicitly unbounded economies of scale in investment the latter formulation leads to jumps in the state variable or lumpy investment the standard problem treated is one of decreasing costs in the installation of new capacity contributions include chenery 1952 dixit mirrlees and stern 1975 hartwick 1976 manne 1967 srinivasan 1967 starrett 1978 and weitzman 1970 these types of analysis unfortunately ignore some of the most interesting problems associated with non convexities in investment theory in a discrete time framework the important distinction between stocks and flows is blurred while the capacity installation problem by admitting unbounded scale economies excludes the smoothing of state variables that follows by allowing for eventually increasing costs of adjustment in this paper we undertake a systematic examination of non convexities or sometimes non concavities in the context of a classic problem in continuous time investment theory the optimal accumulation of capital by a firm maximizing its present value over an infinite horizon while the results obtained are specific to this particular model we feel that they can be qualitatively extended to any capital theory problem which can be cast in a continuous time optimal control theory framework there are various sorts of non2 convexities which can arise in these problems first there can be either stock or flow non convexities that is non convexities which are introduced into the net benefit function the measure of the flow of benefits at each moment through changes in the capital stock state variable on the one hand or changes in the flow of investment control variable on the other if the benefit and transition functions are not concave in both these variables then necessary conditions are no longer sufficient for optimality and conventional marginal analysis fails non convexities can also be introduced into the value functional which has a stock dimension in order to examine these different sorts of non convexity problems we shall now present the basic economic problem a firm is faced with the problem of maximizing the present value of discounted cash flow over an infinite horizon hence it chooses an investment programme i t to maximize 00

along the way back from the brink abstract an optimal control model of wildlife management is developed to analyze the transitory dynamics set forth by the reintroduction of animals that provide benefits but can also come into conflict with humans the shadow price of these resources can be positive or negative potentially creating a nonconvexity the conditions under which reintroduction is not desirable are determined and those characterizing the initiation of costly population control are investigated an application to deer management illustrates the relevance of the nonconvexity and the magnitude of losses stemming from delays in implementing optimal management the impact of distributional concerns on efficiency is discussed

the effectiveness of non standard monetary policy in addressing liquidity risk during the financial crisis the experiences of the federal reserve and the european central bank abstract a number of studies sought to measure the effects of non standard policy on bank funding markets this paper carries those estimates a step further by looking at the effects of bank funding market stress on the volume of bank lending by separately modeling loan supply and demand we determine how non standard central bank measures affected bank lending by reducing stress in bank funding markets our results suggest that non standard policy measures lowered bank funding volatility in the us and the euro area lower bank funding volatility in turn increased loan supply in both regions contributing to sustained lending activity

a prudential stable funding requirement and monetary policy in a small open economy abstract the basel iii net stable funding requirement introduced in january 2018 requires banks to use a minimum share of long term wholesale funding and deposits to fund their assets a similar regulation has been in place in new zealand since 2010 we introduce the stable funding requirement sfr into an open economy dsge model featuring a banking sector with richly specified liabilities and estimate the model for new zealand we then evaluate the impact of the new prudential instrument on monetary policy trade offs a higher steady state sfr level amplifies the effects of shocks to the spread on long term bond financing in the banking sector adding to macroeconomic volatility conditional on these shocks however the sfr plays a passive role in the transmission of all other shocks to the real economy hence in the overall picture the monetary policy trade off between inflation stabilisation and output stabilisation is only slightly worsened by the sfr we note that the trade off can be improved when monetary policy responds systematically to credit growth

intertemporal diversification in financial intermediation abstract this paper examines the incentive problem between a bank and depositors or deposit insurer limited liability makes risk shifting lucrative we show how intertemporal diversification of lending decisions i e bank s loan portfolio consists of overlapping long term loans and is thus gradually renewed may solve the incentive problem of risk shifting a new or expanding bank sets a high equity level and acquires depositors confidence subsequently it can allow its equity to depreciate to a permanently lower level depositors can control the bank by monitoring equity and realized credit losses ex post they do not have to monitor bank s lending choices ex ante maturity mismatch illiquidity of long term loans and liquidity of deposits is optimal the analysis can be extended more generally to the borrower lender relationship

interbank liquidity crunch and the firm credit crunch evidence from the 2007 2009 crisis we study the credit supply effects of the unexpected freeze of the european interbank market using exhaustive portuguese loan level data we find that banks that rely more on interbank borrowing before the crisis decrease their credit supply more during the crisis the credit supply reduction is stronger for firms that are smaller with weaker banking relationships small firms cannot compensate the credit crunch with other sources of debt furthermore the impact of illiquidity on the credit crunch is stronger for less solvent banks finally we find no overall positive effects of central bank liquidity but instead higher hoarding of liquidity

access policy and money market segmentation abstract deviations between interest rates paid in the swiss franc unsecured money market and the respective libor rate are analysed for a period spanning the financial crisis first banks that have access to sources of secured central bank and interbank funding pay less than other banks second foreign banks not chartered in switzerland pay more than domestic banks third both lines of segmentation are economically relevant but limited due to open access to sources of secured funding thus access policy matters for monetary policy implementation and financial stability

the hazards of debt rollover freezes incentives and bailouts we investigate the trade o between incentive provision an di ne ient rollover freezes for a firm financed with short term debt first debt maturity that is too short term is ine cient even with incentive provision th eo ptimal maturity is an interior solution that avoids excessive rollover risk whil ep roviding su ient incentives for the manager to avoid risk shifting when the firm is in good health second allowing the manager to risk shift during a freeze actually increase sc reditor conf idence debt policy should not prevent the manager from holding what may appear to be otherwise low mean strategies that have option value during a freeze third a limited but not perfectly reliable form of emergency financing during a freeze a bailout may improve the terms of the trade o and increase total ex ante va lue by instilling confidence in the creditor markets our conclusions highlight the endogenous interaction between risk from the asset and liability sides of the balance sheet

fear of fire sales illiquidity seeking and credit freezes is there any need to clean up a banking system in the midst of a crisis for instance by closing some weak banks and forcing others to sell bad assets or can one wait till the crisis is over we argue that an overhang of impaired banks that may be forced to sell assets in the future can increase the private returns to holding illiquid assets sufficiently that weak banks have no interest in selling them anticipating a potential future fire sale cash rich buyers have high expected returns to holding cash which also reduces their incentive to lock up money in term loans the potential for a worse fire sale than necessary as well as the associated decline in credit origination could make the crisis worse which is one reason it may make sense to clean up the system even in the midst of the crisis we discuss alternative ways of cleaning up the system and the associated costs and benefits

free banking and information asymmetry a traditional argument against free banking is that it will collapse because of information externalities it is impossible for depositors to tell whether a high deposit rate offered by a bank is due to its high efficiency or risky lending strategy this paper shows that in a separating equilibrium a higher quality bank offers a lower deposit rate and holds a smaller proportion of risky loans than a lower quality bank to signal its underlying quality hence free banking is not inherently unstable the empirical results for the hong kong banking system during 1964 65 are consistent with the hypothesis of a separating equilibrium

building an incentive compatible safety net abstract bank safety nets originally proposed as a means of stabilizing financial systems have become an important destabilizing influence government protection of bank debts encourages banks to undertake excessive risk particularly in response to adverse shocks to asset values reforms that would remove the destabilizing moral hazard consequences of government protection are considered both from the perspective of economic desirability and political feasibility requiring banks to maintain a minimal proportion of subordinated debt finance and restricting the means by which government recapitalization of insolvent banks occurs are the central features of promising reforms to the safety net

the role of interbank markets in monetary policy a model with rationing the empirical research on monetary transmission has reported a number of puzzles challenging extant theoretical models of the transmission mechanism in this paper we argue that asymmetric information in the interbank market may be important to have a better understanding of the mechanisms at work in the transmission process we show that asymmetric information may induce an equilibrium with rationing this in turn has two major implications first it reconciles the apparent irresponsiveness of business investment to the user cost of capital with the large impact of monetary policy magnitude puzzle and second it shows that this impact will not be limited to short term credit supply but will also affect long term lending even if the corresponding interest rate is unaffected composition puzzle

liquidity shortages and banking crises we show in this article that bank failures can be contagious unlike earlier work where contagion stems from depositor panics or contractual links between banks we argue that bank failures can shrink the common pool of liquidity creating or exacerbating aggregate liquidity shortages this could lead to a contagion of failures and a total meltdown of the system given the costs of a meltdown there is a possible role for government intervention unfortunately liquidity and solvency problems interact and can cause each other making it hard to determine the cause of a crisis we propose a robust sequence of intervention banks are often found at the center of systemic financial crises the causes of these crises have long been debated do they stem from depositor panics or do they arise because bank balance sheets are exposed to common factors if it is the latter then is there any sense in which bank failures can be contagious can anything be done to prevent these crises or stop them from propagating once they begin our purpose in this paper is to reexamine whether bank failures can start and propagate systemic crises even if we assume that depositors do not panic that is even if depositors actions are coordinated and they do not run simply because they fear others will run our focus is not because we think that panics are empirically unimportant the jury is still out on that instead we show that contagion can stem from an underlying real general equilibrium problem rather than just from lack of coordination among depositors from a policy perspective attempts to reassure investors through confidence building measures will not work if panic and lack of coordination are not the reasons for a crisis we begin in this paper with a model of a bank that we developed in diamond and rajan 2001 assets in this model are illiquid they cannot be borrowed against or sold for the full value of resources they will generate in their best use because the human capital necessary to generate that full value cannot

the life cycle of a microfinance institution the irish loan funds abstract ireland s loan funds were a long lived self sustaining large scale microfinance organization that made millions of loans without collateral to the poor during the first 100 years of their life cycle a period of growth ending in the 1840s they adapted constantly and obtained improvements to their legal structure because they were complementary to the banking system and seen as effective in relieving poverty in their 2nd century they became ossified in part because of competition with commercial banks the loan funds provide an example of sustainable microfinance under harsh economic conditions and illustrate how organizations change incrementally and when successful alter their institutional framework

bank runs deposit insurance and capital requirements diamond and dybvig provide a model of intermediation in which deposit insurance can avoid socially undesirable bank runs we extend the diamond dybvig model to evaluate the costs and benefits of deposit insurance in the presence of moral hazard by banks and monitoring by depositors we find that complete deposit insurance alone will not support the first best outcome depositors will not have adequate incentives for monitoring and banks will invest in excessively risky projects however an additional capital requirement for banks can restore the first best allocation

rollover risk and market freezes the debt capacity of an asset is the maximum amount that can be borrowed using the asset as collateral we model a sudden collapse in the debt capacity of good collateral we assume short term debt that must be frequently rolled over a small transaction cost of selling collateral in the event of default and a small probability of meeting a buy to hold investor we then show that a small change in the asset s fundamental value can be associated with a catastrophic drop in the debt capacity the kind of market freeze observed during the crisis of 2007 to 2008 one of the many striking features of the crisis of 2007 to 2008 was the sudden freeze in the market for the rollover of short term debt from an in stitutional perspective the inability to borrow overnight against high quality but long term assets was a market failure that effectively led to the demise of a substantial part of investment banking in the united states more broadly it led to the collapse in the united states the united kingdom and other countries of banks and other financial institutions that had relied on signifi cant maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities and in particular on the rollover of short term wholesale debt in the asset backed commercial paper abcp and overnight sale and repurchase repo markets in this paper we are interested in developing a model of a sudden collapse in the ability to borrow short term against long lived assets in the absence of obvious problems of asymmetric information or fears about the value of col lateral we refer to this phenomenon as a market freeze more precisely a market freeze occurs when the debt capacity the maximum amount of collat eralized borrowing that can be supported by an asset is a small fraction of the fundamental value the economic value measured by the net present value npv of the stream of future returns an extreme form of a market freeze occurs when the fundamental value is close to the maximum possible value of the asset whereas the debt capacity is close to the minimum possible value of the asset

tinbergen and tipping points could some thresholds be policy induced abstract thresholds and tipping points that are characteristic of dynamic multi stability are increasingly prominent touchstones of the science policy interface prior economic work has shown thresholds arising in convex concave ecological models that exclude humans may disappear in models of coupled economic ecological systems when economic agents are included as part of the system less well understood is how this result may depend on the ability of humans to manage complex systems we examine the role of institutions that condition the available management choices we find institutional restrictions do not generate non convexities when the ecological system is well behaved but that these restrictions may generate non convexities when the ecological system is convex concave these results are tied to the concept of path controllability which is when managers have sufficient controls to guide the system across the state space path controllability is the dynamic version of the tinbergen rule and generally requires separate controls to manage each possible ecological externality we link the concepts of ecosystem externalities thresholds and path controllability to provide new economic insights into problems with the potential for multi stability and we illustrate the importance of institutions for managing convex concave systems

financial crises payment system problems and discount window lending in a developed economy financial crises are rapidly conveyed to the payment system which tends to rely on private credit extensions in most countries while many authors recommend that the central bank do no more than provide adequate aggregate liquidity during a crisis this policy requires well functioning private credit markets to channel liquidity to solvent but illiquid firms this paper presents a model of private lending which defines a crisis as a time when lenders become uncertain about how to assess financial risks and therefore rationally withdraw from making new loans in such an environment a government lender of last resort can improve social welfare copyright 1996 by ohio state university press

strategic loan defaults and coordination an experimental analysis this paper experimentally studies the impact of bank and borrower fundamentals on loan repayment we find that solvent borrowers are more likely to default strategically when the bank s expected strength is low although loan repayment is a pareto dominant nash equilibrium borrowers are also less likely to repay when other borrowers expected repayment capacity is low regardless of banks fundamentals we show that changes in expectations about bank and borrower fundamentals change the risk dominance properties of the borrowers coordination problem and that these changes subsequently explain strategic defaults for the individual borrower loss aversion and negative past experiences reduce repayment suggesting that bank failure can be contagious in times of distress

debt financing in asset markets short term debt such as overnight repurchase agreements and commercial paper was heavily used by financial institutions to fund their investment positions during the asset market boom preceding the financial crisis of 2007 2008 and later played a major role in leading to the distress of these institutions during the crisis what explains the popularity of short term debt in financing asset market investments geanakoplos 2010 presents a dynamic model of the joint equilibrium of asset markets and credit markets in which optimistic buyers of a risky asset use the asset as collateral to raise debt financing from less optimistic creditors the asset s collateral value depends on the marginal creditor s asset valuation and determines the buyers purchasing capacity to bid up the asset price geanakoplos posits that short term debt allows the asset buyers to maximize riskless leverage 1 short term debt however exposes the asset buyers to rollover risk e g acharya gale and yorulmaker 2011 and he and xiong 2012 forthcoming which is reflected in the fact that the asset buyers in geanakoplos model may not be able to obtain refinancing after a negative fundamental shock as a result they are forced to transfer their asset holdings to the

hourly based greenhouse gas emissions of electricity cases demonstrating possibilities for households and companies to decrease their emissions abstract greenhouse gas emissions from electricity production are a crucial part of the environmental impact assessments of any kind of product service or consumption usually average annual emissions are used but lately there has been increased interest in the daily based and hourly based emission coefficients for electricity in such markets where the technology mix in the production process includes technologies with different emission factors there is potential for large variation in hourly based emission factors and consequently this offers potential for decreasing the emissions by real time based demand management however in real life the timing of electricity use in households and companies has restrictions in this paper we show illustrative household and company cases with realistic shifts in the timing of electricity use we determine hourly based emission factors and give examples of how emissions may be decreased in households and companies by changing usage patterns and consequently the timing of electricity use with the total amount of electricity consumed remaining unchanged the examples show decreases of emissions in the range 3 8 due to optimised timing indicating that there is important potential for managing hourly based demand loads and the resulting emissions even with realistic assumptions of the timing of consumption