the nonparametric risk adjusted efficiency measurement an application to taiwan s major rural financial intermediaries in this article a nonparametric approach is used to incorporate risk into the measurement of technical efficiencies of the major financial intermediaries in rural taiwan risk is treated as a joint but undesirable output given the fact that various regulatory actions may prevent its free disposability three risk indicators nonperforming loans allowance for loan losses and risky assets are employed alternatively in the empirical work results suggest that all three risk constraints are binding regulations on controlling risky assets and loan loss reserves are effective but more burdensome than those on controlling loan quality

blame game politics in a coalition government abstract delays in the adoption of reforms is an important question in political economics this paper explores this issue in the context of a representative democracy where the government is a coalition and citizens observe neither the decision making process nor politicians preferences for a reform we show that a coalition member who favors a reform may nonetheless choose to veto its adoption thus delaying it until after the next election and let his coalition partners share the blame for the non adoption we refer to this strategy as blame game politics we then identify three reasons for a politician to play the blame game one is to make an issue salient in the next election a second reason is to avoid a split in his electorate which is accomplished by hiding his stance on an issue a third reason is to enhance bargaining power during the formation of the next government

why democracies produce efficient results by applying the standard tools of microeconomic analysis i argue that democratic markets work as well as economic markets in particular i show that previous work has greatly exaggerated the existence of principal agent and informational problems in electoral markets and has drawn incorrect conclusions

an economic model of representative democracy this paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office the approach has a number of attractive features first it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by as well as of the people second the model is analytically tractable being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally third it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy

economic efficiency and downside risk this article investigates the impact of downside risk on cost and revenue efficiency re for a sample of farms downside risk or loss below a certain level of return is a concern regardless of producer risk preferences and thus a suitable measure of risk to use downside risk was measured as the weighted summation of net farm income below the amount needed for unpaid labour during the previous 10 years cost and re were estimated using traditional input and output measures and then re estimated including each farm s downside risk comparisons were made between the efficient farms with and without downside risk and the average for all farms as expected downside risk plays an important role in explaining farm inefficiency failure to account for downside risk overstates inefficiency and can lead to unrealistic expectations in potential efficiency improvements

managing channel profits a channel of distribution consists of different channel members each having his own decision variables however each channel member s decisions do affect the other channel members profits and as a consequence actions a lack of coordination of these decisions can lead to undesirable consequences for example in the simple manufacturer retailer consumer channel uncoordinated and independent channel members decisions over margins result in a higher price paid by the consumer than if those decisions were coordinated in addition the ensuing suboptimal volume leads to lower profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer this paper explores the problems inherent in channel coordination we address the following questions what is the effect of channel coordination what causes a lack of coordination in the channel how difficult is it to achieve channel coordination what mechanisms exist which can achieve channel coordination what are the strengths and weaknesses of these mechanism what is the role of nonprice variables e g manufacturer advertising retailer shelf space in coordination does the lack of coordination affect normative implications from in store experimentation can quantity discounts be a coordination mechanism are some marketing practices actually disguised quantity discounts we review the literature and present a simple formulation illustrating the roots of the coordination problem we then derive the form of the quantity discount schedule that results in optimum channel profits this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 3 pages 239 272 in 1983

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

resistance to reform status quo bias in the presence of individual specific uncertainty comment why do governments so often fail to adopt policies which economists consider to be efficiency enhancing our answer to this question relies on uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses from reform we show that there is a bias towards the status quo and hence against efficiency enhancing reforms whenever some of the individual gainers and losers from reform cannot be identified beforehand there are reforms which once adopted will receive adequate political support but would have failed to carry the day ex ante the argument does not rely on risk aversion irrationality or hysteresis due to sunk costs jel d72 f13 why do governments so often fail to adopt policies that economists consider to be efficiency enhancing this is one of the fundamental questions of political economy the answer usually relies on what may be

a study of bank efficiency taking into account risk preferences abstract i use the stochastic cost frontier approach to investigate efficiency of banks operating in the third federal reserve district accounting for the quality and riskiness of bank output in addition to the mean and mode of the conditional distribution of the one sided error term i calculate confidence intervals for the inefficiency measures based on the conditional distribution the results indicate that third district banks are operating at cost efficient output levels and product mixes but are not efficiently using their inputs the second part of the article relates the inefficiency measures to several correlates

vertical cooperative advertising and pricing decisions in a manufacturer retailer supply chain a game theoretic approach abstract manufacturers can increase the advertising expenditures of their retailers by bearing a fraction of the occurring costs within the framework of a vertical cooperative advertising program we expand the existing research which deals with advertising and pricing decisions in a manufacturer retailer supply chain contemporaneously by means of game theory four different relationships between the channel members are considered firstly three non cooperative games with either symmetrical distribution of power or asymmetrical distribution with one player being the leader in each case and one cooperative game where both players tend to maximize the total profit the latter is complemented by a bargaining model which proposes a fair split of profit on the basis of the players risk attitude and bargaining power our main findings are as follows a in contrast to previous analyses we do not limit the ratio between manufacturer s and retailer s margin which provides more general insights into the effects of the underlying distribution of power within the channel b the highest total profit is gained when both players cooperate this behavior puts also the customers in a better position as it produces the lowest retail price as well as the highest advertising expenditures compared to the other configurations

compensations as signaling devices in the political economy of reforms we propose an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers can block their implementation and compensations are feasible in our model a government tries to sequentially implement two efficient reforms by bargaining with interest groups the organization of interest groups is endogenous compensations are distortionary and different governments care differently about distortions governments use low compensations to discourage losers who just want to receive transfers from organizing this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses resulting in a bias against payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms

on the form of transfers to special interests an important question in political economy concerns the form of transfers to special interests the chicago view is that political competition leads politicians to make such transfers efficiently the virginia position is that lack of information on the part of voters leads politicians to favor inefficient sneaky methods of redistribution this paper analyzes the form of transfers in a model of political competition in which politicians have incentives to make transfers to special interests it shows that when voters have imperfect information about both the effects of policy and the predispositions of politicians inefficient methods of redistribution may be employed

redistributive politics and economic efficiency the political process often compensates the losers from technical change or international competition in an economically inefficient way namely by subsidizing or protecting declining industries instead of encouraging the movement of resources to other more productive uses we find that a dynamic inconsistency in the game of redistributive politics contributes to this outcome to achieve economically efficient outcomes it is necessary that those making economically inefficient choices not be given offsetting transfers but the political process distributes income on the basis of political characteristics which are in general different from the economic characteristics that are rewarded by the market we identify circumstances in which the inefficient choosers have desirable political characteristics and are therefore immune from threats of having to face the economic consequences of their choices

a cooperative incentive equilibrium for a resource management problem abstract a two country dynamic game model of whaling is considered it is assumed that the countries have exact information possibly with some time delay about each other s whaling efforts measured by the number of vessels involved in whaling it is shown how to construct equilibrium strategies which are affine in the available information and which when jointly carried out realize a given pareto optimal decision numerical results suggest that some of these strategies are credible i e the countries do believe that the announced strategies will be followed

channel coordination over time incentive equilibria and credibility abstract the paper studies a channel of distribution consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer in a dynamic game of pricing and advertising the carry over effects of channel member s advertising efforts are summarized in a stock of advertising goodwill each channel member has perfect information about the other channel member s price and advertising effort if each firm employs marketing strategies that are linear functions of the other member s actions and these strategies are jointly carried out a pareto optimal joint profit maximization outcome can be realized the paper also addresses the question of credibility of the incentive strategies

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

how cynical can an incumbent be strategic policy in a model of government spending abstract when parties with different preferences compete for election strategic manipulation of state variables for electoral purposes can occur even with rational voters this paper presents a model in which government resources can be used productivity for the benefit of everybody or unproductively for the benefit of the ruling party s constituency a government more inclined to unproductive spending may choose to collect public resources inefficiently in order to produce the importance of spending decisions in the election the model highlights the strategic role of policy decisions that affect incentives and constraints faced by future governments and their impact on election results

on a cooperative advertising model for a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer abstract huang and li 2001 huang et al 2002 li et al 2002 xie and ai 2006 yue et al 2006 recently studied a game theoretic model for cooperative advertising in a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer however the sales volume demand function considered in this model can become negative for some values of the decision variables and in fact this does happen for the proposed stackelberg and nash equilibrium solutions yue et al 2006 acknowledge the negativity problem and suggest two constraints to fix it however they do not incorporate these constraints into their mathematical analysis in this paper we show that the results obtained by analyzing the advertising model under the constraints suggested by yue et al can differ significantly from those obtained in the previous papers

coordinating advertising and pricing in a manufacturer retailer channel abstract cooperative advertising is a practice that a manufacturer pays retailers a portion of the local advertising cost in order to induce sales cooperative advertising plays a significant role in marketing programs of channel members nevertheless most studies to date on cooperative advertising have assumed that the market demand is only influenced by advertising expenditures but not by retail price this paper addresses channel coordination by seeking optimal cooperative advertising strategies and equilibrium pricing in a two member distribution channel we establish and compare two models a non cooperative leader follower game and a cooperative game we develop propositions and insights from the comparison of these models the cooperative model achieves better coordination by generating higher channel wide profits than the non cooperative model with these features a the retailer price is lower to consumers and b the advertising efforts are higher for all channel members we identify the feasible solutions to a bargaining problem where the channel members can determine how to divide the extra profits

asset allocation in a downside risk framework 1991 asset allocation in a downside risk framework financial analysts journal vol 47 no 5 pp 28 40

var seductive but dangerous value at risk var has gained rapid acceptance as a valuable approach to risk management not all vars are equal however a study of var techniques used by dealers and end users reveals that var calculations differ significantly for the same portfolio vars are extremely dependent on parameters data assumptions and methodology calculation of eight common vars for three hypothetical portfolios demonstrates the potentially seductive but dangerous nature of any single approach to risk management in sum although var and other quantitative techniques are necessary aspects of an effective risk management program they are not sufficient to control risk

why a stubborn conservative would run a deficit policy with time inconsistent preferences a conservative government in favor of a low level of public consumption knows that it will be replaced by a government in favor of a larger level of public consumption we show that the resulting level of public consumption is in between the levels the two governments would choose if each were in power both in the present and in the future in particular we show that if the conservative government is more stubborn in a particular sense than the succeeding government the conservative government will borrow more than it would had it remained in power in the future

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

the design of reform packages under uncertainty the authors present a model of large scale economic reforms modeled on the transition process in eastern europe with aggregate and individual uncertainty concerning the outcome of reforms the government is assumed to choose the speed and sequencing of reforms the authors compare big bang strategies with gradualist reform packages they show that gradualist reform packages may be easier to get started optimal sequencing of reforms should aim at creating constituencies for further reforms and gradualism may generate a higher investment response because of a lower option value of waiting than would a big bang approach copyright 1995 by american economic association

note channel of distribution profits when channel members form conjectures it is well known that lower channel profits are achieved in the bilateral manufacturer reseller monopoly if manufacturer and reseller independently optimize their respective profits they take each other s decisions as given i e adopt decision rules that ignore their influence on the other channel member higher profits are achieved if they coordinate their profit maximizing decisions consequently there is an economic justification for 1 vertical integration that by definition prevents conflicting profit objectives or 2 contracts that change channel members incentives to the compatible objectives of shares of total channel profits this paper investigates the possibility that coordination might take place without formal arrangements like vertical integration or contracts the reason for this contention is the casual observation that channel members are often acutely aware of the interdependencies between channel participants we might thus expect that they will form conjectures about other channel members reactions to their own actions we show that rational conjectures lead profit maximizing channel members to adopt modified decisions rules can such conjectural decision making create at least partially channel coordination or cooperation in other words can channel members deviate from the nash equilibrium and thus achieve greater profits the answer given in this paper is a conditional yes

a game theoretic approach to coordinate pricing and vertical co op advertising in manufacturer retailer supply chains vertical cooperative co op advertising is a marketing strategy in which the retailer runs local advertising and the manufacturer pays for a portion of its entire costs this paper considers vertical co op advertising along with pricing decisions in a supply chain this consists of one manufacturer and one retailer where demand is influenced by both price and advertisement four game theoretic models are established in order to study the effect of supply chain power balance on the optimal decisions of supply chain members comparisons and insights are developed these embrace three non cooperative games including nash stackelberg manufacturer and stackelberg retailer and one cooperative game in the latter case both the manufacturer and the retailer reach the highest profit level subsequently the feasibility of bargaining game is discussed in a bid to determine a scheme to share the extra joint profit

the optimal speed of transition a general equilibrium analysis we present a benchmark model for the optimal speed of transition from a state owned to a private market economy based on the consumption savings decision in a closed economy we abstract from frictions to focus on the macroeconomic conditions for accumulation of private capital and closure or restructuring of state owned enterprises it is shown that hard budget constraints compensate for too slow speed of enterprise closure but that an excess speed of closure may slow down transition because of output contraction effects this will especially be the case if such a deviation occurs at early stages of transition

sources of inefficiency in a representative democracy a dynamic analysis this paper studies the efficiency of policy choice in representative democracies it extends the citizen candidate model of democratic policy making to a dynamic environment equilibrium policy choices are shown to be efficient in the sense that in each period conditional on future policies being selected through the democratic process there exists no alternative current policy choices which can raise the expected utilities of all citizens however policies that would be declared efficient by standard economic criteria are not necessarily adopted in political equilibrium the paper argues that these divergencies are legitimately viewed as politicalfailures

comment managing channel profits comment in a recent paper in this journal jeuland and shugan jeuland a s shugan 1983 managing channel profits marketing sci 2 summer 239 272 proposed a quantity discount schedule as a way of coordinating a channel as they put it on p 253 of their paper a quantity discount schedule which would fix the retailer s and hence the manufacturer s profits to some fixed linear function of total channel profits would lead the channel to maximize profits the purpose of this note is to show that a quantity discount schedule is not necessary for channel coordination

economic reform and dynamic political constraints in this paper we examine the impact of political constraints on economic reform plans with special reference to the transition from centrally planned to market economies we analyse the problem of an agenda setting reform minded government facing a bureaucracy or industrial sector for which allocative efficiency requires redundancies and an increase in work intensity the government also tries to minimize the rents conceded to its heterogeneous workforce we examine two types of political constraints unanimity rule and majority rule both in a one period and a two period horizon the main results are the following first of all we show how adverse selection and time consistency may generate the widely observed feature of gradualism as an ingredient of an optimal reform second under a majority rule it is shown to be possible for the government to obtain a majority vote for a reform scheme that intertemporally hurts majority interests indeed the government can improve rent extraction through the strategic use of the threat of future proposals the group which expects to be in the minority tomorrow may accept concessions while its votes can be used to extract rents from another group these results suggest that in a dynamic context democratic constraints should not be overestimated as an obstacle against efficiency enhancing economic reforms the results of this paper may throw some light on the political economy of current reforms in eastern europe governments and political decision makers in general always face political constraints when elaborating reform proposals they know that the need to overcome potential opposition from various groups of the population constrains proposals for change political constraints vary depending on the specific institutional structure of society and are clearly different under a military dictatorship than under a parliamentary democracy the role of political constraints seems particularly important in eastern europe today where new democratic governments face the huge task of achieving the transition to a market economy while the introduction of democracy may have removed some important obstacles to economic change namely the veto power of a powerful nomenclatura under communist one party rule fears are expressed that it could potentially jeopardize economic reforms which may during the transition period hurt a majority of the population what can economic theory tell us about optimal economic reform under political constraints this paper starts addressing this ambitious question by looking at structural reform focusing on a restructuring of economic sectors which requires massive redundancies and a significant rise in labour productivity our model illustrates the case of planning

the effect of risk based capital requirements on profit efficiency in banking the purpose of this paper is twofold to show how to measure profit efficiency in banking using a newly developed technique and to use that technique to determine the effect of risk based capital requirements on the profit performance of us banks the measure of profit efficiency used captures deviations from profit maximization arising from technical inefficiency caused by a lack of managerial oversight and allocative inefficiency which is caused by managers choosing a nonoptimal mix of inputs and outputs a leverage ratio constraint and a risk weighted capital ratio constraint are explicitly included in the model which allows identification of the effect on profits of those constraints the techniques are applied to random samples of us banks for 1990 1992 and 1994 the results indicate that allocative inefficiency is a larger source of profit loss than technical inefficiency and that the risk based capital standards have a significant effect on bank allocative efficiency

cooperative advertising models in supply chain management a review this paper reviews articles on cooperative advertising a topic which has gained substantial interest in recent years thereby we first briefly distinguish five different definitions of cooperative advertising which can be found in operations research literature after that we concentrate on vertical cooperative advertising which is the most common object of investigation it is understood as a financial agreement where a manufacturer offers to pay a certain share of his retailer s advertising expenditures in total we identified 58 scientific papers considering mathematical modeling of vertical cooperative advertising these articles are then analyzed with regard to their general model setting e g the underlying supply chain structure and design of the cooperative advertising program after that we explain the different demand and cost functions that are employed whereupon we distinguish between static and dynamic models the last dimension of our review is dedicated to the game theoretic concepts which are mostly used to reflect different forms of distribution of power within the channel

vested interests in a positive theory of stagnation and growth we study a positive theory of stagnation and growth aimed at understanding the large variations in growth outcomes across actual economies the theory points to the fundamental role played by vested interests in determining policies which are key to the growth process some agents seek to prevent the adoption of new technologies we develop a model of technology adoption and show how technological innovation may sow the seeds of its own destruction in particular we find that the equilibrium is characterized by a long cycle of stagnation and growth over this cycle incumbents are phased out of the economy will new innovation occur in formalizing our theory we make a methodological contribution by characterizing dynamic voting equilibria when voters must forecast the effects of different current policies on future prices and policy outcomes

factor shares and savings in endogenous growth in models of steady investment driven growth an individual s propensity to save depends on how much of his income is drawn from accumulated factors of production capital rather than from nonaccumulated factors when agents are heterogeneous in this respect growth oriented policies have distributional consequences and in the absence of lump sum redistribution their implementation faces political constraints if the median voter is capital poor relative to the economy s representative agent political interactions tend to slow down growth when policy acts on capital s income share and tend to accelerate it when investment subsidies are the policy instrument of choice copyright 1993 by american economic association

gradualism versus big bang speed and sustainability of reforms a beneficial reform may be blocked by a majority if it is implemented by a big bang but the same reform may succeed with an optimally designed gradualist approach a gradualist approach can sometimes split opposition force and is in this sense more politically sustainable on the other hand if both approaches are politically preferred to no reform a big bang is often preferred to gradualism in terms of both political support as well as economic efficiency

distributive politics and economic growth a crude distinction between economics and politics would be that economics is concerned with expanding the pie while politics is about distributing it in this paper we analyze the relationship between the two we focus on how an economy s initial configuration of resources shapes the political struggle for income and wealth distribution and how that in turn affects long run growth our main conclusion is that inequality is conducive to the adoption of growth retarding policies we derive this result from a simple political economy model of growth and present cross country evidence consistent with it the key feature of our model is that individuals differ in their relative factor endowments we distinguish between two types of factors an accumulated factor called capital and a nonaccumulated factor called labor growth is driven by the expansion of the capital stock which is in turn determined by individual saving decisions long run growth is endogenous as the aggregate production function is taken to be linearly homogeneous in capital and productive government services taken together the provision of government services is financed by a tax on capital because government services are productive a small tax on

the making of economic policy a transaction cost politics perspective economic policymaking as a political process the normative approach to policy analysis the positive view of political economy a synthesis the policy process in real time a theme transaction costs the transaction cost politics framework political outcomes and economic efficiency transaction cost analysis in politics mechanisms to cope with transaction costs in politics national differences two case studies to illustrate transaction cost politics tax and expenditure reform in the united states the gatt and national trade politics some reflections and suggestions some lessons for the policy process the role of the economist concluding comments appendix multiprincipal multitask agencies

voting on the budget deficit this paper analyzes a model in which a group of rational individuals votes over the composition and time profile of public spending all voters agree that a balanced budget is ex ante optimal however if there is disagreement between current and future majorities a balanced budget is not a political equilibrium under majority rule under certain conditions a majority of the voters favors a budget deficit and the equilibrium deficit is larger the greater is the polarization among voters copyright 1990 by american economic association

market share pioneering advantage a theoretical approach in this paper we present an industry in which a pioneer has entered accumulated capital in the form of goodwill and in his monopoly period has also reduced his cost of production as a result of some form of learning by doing at some later date a newcomer enters his production cost is higher than that of the monopolist at that date however due to diffusion of information the costs of the two firms equate at some future date once the new firm enters the market a duopolistic game begins in which the firms choose prices and investment rates analyzing this game we discover the conditions under which the final market shares no longer depend on the order of entry the initial cost advantage the length of the monopoly period or the length of time it took the newcomer to overcome the pioneer s cost advantage we analyze the speed and pattern of convergence to the final market shares and the capital path of the pioneer in his monopoly period depending on his beliefs concerning the possibility of entry

recent developments in dynamic advertising research a variety of continuous time differential functions have been developed to investigate dynamic advertising problems in business and economics fields since major dynamic models appearing before 1995 have been reviewed by a few survey papers we provide a comprehensive review of the dynamic advertising models published after 1995 which are classified into six categories i nerlove arrow model and its extensions ii vidale wolfe model and its extensions iii lanchester model and its extensions iv the diffusion models v dynamic advertising competition models with other attributes and vi empirical studies for dynamic advertising problems for each category we first briefly summarize major relevant before 1995 models and then discuss major after 1995 models in details we find that the dynamic models reviewed in this paper have been extensively used to analyze various advertising problems in the monopoly duopoly oligopoly and supply chain systems our review reveals that the diffusion models have not been used to analyze advertising problems in supply chain operations which may be a research direction in the future moreover we learn from our review that very few publications regarding dynamic advertising problems have considered the supply chain competition we also find that very few researchers have used the diffusion model to investigate the dynamic advertising problems with product quality as a decision variable and the pricing decision has not been incorporated into any extant lanchester model the paper ends with a summary of our review and suggestions on possible research directions in the future

a model of political competition with citizen candidates the authors develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates a winner implements her favorite policy the equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of running and positively on the benefits of winning for some parameter values all equilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates whose positions are distinct two candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule than under a runoff system the candidates positions are less differentiated under a runoff system there exist equilibria under both systems in which some candidates have no chance of winning

could myopic pricing be a strategic choice in marketing channels a game theoretic analysis abstract we identify the conditions under which a myopic pricing behavior could be a profit enhancing tool in the distribution channel a channel member is myopic when he ignores the evolution of the retail prices when actual and past retail prices affect consumers purchasing decisions a differential game is formulated where channel members control transfer and retail prices we start by examining a bilateral monopoly and then introduce competition at the manufacturing level the competing manufacturers play a la nash and can be both myopic both farsighted or one myopic while the other is farsighted we show that for a bilateral monopoly myopia enhances total channel profit when the effect of the reference price is small enough this remains true under competition at the manufacturing level when products are differentiated enough

public policies pressure groups and dead weight costs abstract this paper presents a model of competition among special interest groups for political influence each active group exerts pressure to affect its taxes and subsidies where activities of different groups are related by the equality between total tax collections and total tax subsidies the dead weight costs and benefits of taxes and subsidies play a major role in our model an increase in the dead weight cost of taxation encourages pressure by taxpayers while an increase in the dead weight costs of subsidies discourages pressure by recipients various applications of the analysis are discussed