a dynamic theory of collective goods programs a collective goods program such as an entitlement program distributes benefits and costs according to constituents characteristics this paper presents a dynamic theory of the legislative choice of collective goods programs based on a sequential model of proposal making and voting in a majority rule legislature where the status quo in a session is given by the program last enacted a stationary markov perfect equilibrium is characterized for a unidimensional collective goods program and yields a generalized median voter theorem comparative statics on preferences and legislative procedures and a characterization of the dynamics of such programs equilibrium programs can expand or contract over time but they ultimately converge to the median on the path to that point legislators may act strategically to address the durability problem that a future legislature can undo the actions of the present legislature by strategically positioning the status quo to limit the changes that future legislatures can make

artificial adaptive agents in economic theory economic analysis has largely avoided questions about the way in which economic agents make choices when confronted by a perpetually novel and evolving world as a result there are outstanding questions of great interest to economics in areas ranging from technological innovation to strategic learning in games this is so despite the importance of the questions because standard tools and formal models are ill tuned for answering such questions however recent advances in computer based modeling techniques and in the subdiscipline of artificial intelligence called machine learning offer new possibilities artificial adaptive agents aaa can be defined and can be tested in a wide variety of artificial worlds that evolve over extended periods of time the resulting complex adaptive systems can be examined both computationally and analytically offering new ways of experimenting with and theorizing about adaptive economic agents many economic systems can be classified as complex adaptive systems such a system is complex in a special sense i it consists of a network of interacting agents processes elements ii it exhibits a dynamic aggregate behavior that emerges from the individual activities of the agents and iii its aggregate behavior can be described without a detailed knowledge of the behavior of the individual agents an agent in such a system is adaptive if it satisfies an additional pair of criteria the actions of the agent in its environment can be assigned a value performance utility payoff fitness or the like and the agent behaves so as to increase this value over time a complex adaptive system then is a complex system containing adaptive agents networked so that the environment of each adaptive agent includes other agents in the system complex adaptive systems usually operate far from a global optimum or attractor such systems exhibit many levels of aggregation organization and interaction each level having its own time scale and characteristic behavior any given level can usually be described in terms of local niches that can be exploited by particular adaptations the niches are various so it is rare that any given agent can exploit all of them as rare as finding a universal competitor in a tropical forest moreover niches are continually created by new adaptations it is because of this ongoing evolution of the niches and the perpetual novelty that results that the system operates far from any global attractor improvements are always possible and indeed occur regularly the everexpanding range of technologies and products in an economy or the everimproving strategies in a game like chess provide familiar examples adaptive systems may settle down temporarily at a local optimum where performance is good in a comparative sense but they are usually uninteresting if they remain at that optimum for an extended period a theory of complex adaptive systems based on aaa makes possible the development of well defined yet flexible models that exhibit emergent behavior such models can capture a wide range of economic phenomena precisely even though the development of a general mathematical theory of complex adaptive systems is still in its early stages the aaa models complement current theoretical directions they are

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

bicameralism and its consequences for the internal organization of legislatures theories of organization of legislatures have mainly focused on the u s congress explaining why committee systems emerge there but not explaining variance in organization across legislatures of different countries to analyze the effects of different constitutional features on the internal organization of legislatures we adopt a vote buying model and consider the incentives to delegate decision rights in a game among legislative chambers we show how presidential veto power and bicameral separation can encourage a legislative chamber to create internal veto players or supermajority rules while a unicameral structure can encourage legislators to delegate power to a leader

information institutions and constitutional arrangements this paper develops a theory of optimal institutional structure for staggered term overlapping generations organizations such as legislative bodies our model is a simple stochastic game of multi principal multi agent dynamic relationships our results emphasize two key features that are determined by legislative founders at the constitutional moment first they will agree to institute a mechanism that endows imperfectly informed legislators with information about the history of play second we provide conditions in which legislative founders will be indifferent to the structure of legislative procedures

firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control reply abstract the process of technological change in pollution control is broken into three basic steps innovation diffusion and optimal agency response firm incentives to promote these steps are then examined under five regulatory regimes direct controls emission subsidies emission taxes free marketable permits and auctioned marketable permits on a relative basis emission taxes and auctioned permits provide the highest firm incentives to promote technological change at times free permits generate lower incentives direct controls which are common regulatory tools usually provide the lowest relative firm incentives to promote technological change

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

political selection and persistence of bad governments we study dynamic selection of governments under different political institutions with a special focus on institutional flexibility a government consists of a subset of the individuals in the society the competence level of the government in office determines collective utilities e g by determining the amount and quality of public goods and each individual derives additional utility from being part of the government e g rents from holding office we characterize the dynamic evolution of governments and determine the structure of stable governments which arise and persist in equilibrium in our model perfect democracy where current members of the government do not have veto power over changes in governments always leads to the emergence of the most competent government however any deviation from perfect democracy to any regime with incumbency veto power destroys this result there is always at least one other less competent government that is also stable and can persist forever and even the least competent government can persist forever in office we also show that there is a nonmonotonic relationship between the degree of incumbency veto power and the quality of government in contrast in the presence of stochastic shocks or changes in the environment a regime with less incumbency veto power has greater flexibility and greater probability that high competence governments will come to power this result suggests that a particular advantage of democratic regimes with a limited number of veto players may be their greater adaptability to changes rather than their performance under given conditions finally we show that royalty like dictatorships may be more successful than junta like dictatorships because in these regimes veto players are less afraid of change

signaling through obstruction obstruction is a time honored tradition in legislative politics in many cases obstruction can be foreseen to be ultimately unsuccessful and in some of these cases purely costly even to the obstructor in this article i construct a model of obstruction in which the individual obstruction of a fait accompli policy proposal is potentially informative precisely and ironically because it is inefficient the theory based on the legislators reelection motivations offers comparative static predictions about the frequency and length of obstruction as a function of the individual characteristics of the legislator and his or her electoral setting including the legislator s value for reelection the appeal of the legislator s challenger the legislator s individual specific seniority competence and or valence and the visibility of the legislator s obstruction efforts to the voter finally the theory illustrates the potential for transparency of legislators individual actions to be strictly welfare reducing even in the absence of pandering

rational choice a survey of contributions from economics and philosophy this paper looks at the philosophical foundations of rational choice theory it is argued that l savage s expected utility axioms cannot be defended as requirements of instrumental rationality in part because of their implications for the description of consequences then it is argued that common knowledge of rationality does not imply that rational game players must be in nash equilibrium and for some games is an incoherent concept finally the suggestion that rational choice theory is self defeating is examined in relation to coordination games where the theory cannot explain the role of salience and the concept of resolute choice copyright 1991 by royal economic society

inequity aversion may increase inequity inequity aversion models have been used to explain equitable payoff divisions in bargaining games i show that inequity aversion can actually increase the asymmetry of payoff division if unanimity is not required this is because responders may be willing to accept a lower share rather than risk being left out inequity aversion may also affect comparative statics the advantage of being the proposer can decrease as players become more impatient game theory usually assumes that players care only about their own material payoffs this hypothesis is clearly refuted by the experimental evidence in the ultimatum and related games see camerer 2003 for a recent survey inequity aversion theories have been developed in order to account for the stylised facts observed in the laboratory see fehr and schmidt 1999 and bolton and ockenfels 2000 inequity aversion means that people are willing to give up some material payoffs in order to achieve more equitable outcomes inequity averse responders prefer to reject small offers in the ultimatum game and the proposers anticipating this make higher offers in this article i examine the implications of inequity aversion for bargaining games in which unanimity is not required e g legislative bargaining games and show that it may lead to a more inequitable outcome than would occur with selfish preferences the leading model of legislative bargaining is due to baron and ferejohn 1989 in this model n symmetric players must divide a budget by simple majority each player has an equal chance of being chosen to propose a division of the budget once a proposal is made the remaining players vote yes or no if a majority of the players supports the proposal it is implemented and the game ends otherwise the procedure is repeated this model predicts that minimal winning coalitions will form and that the proposer will receive a disproportionate share of the proceedings thus the equilibrium of the baron ferejohn model with selfish preferences exhibits a substantial amount of inequity some players are excluded almost half of them if the decision rule is simple majority and the proposer receives a substantial share more than half of the total payoff if the decision rule is simple majority the advantage of the proposer increases as players become more impatient or more risk averse the baron ferejohn model has led to many applications and extensions 1 in its simplest form it assumes that parties are selfish risk neutral and only concerned with their share of cabinet posts as opposed to policy the predictions of the model under these assumptions have been tested by ansolabehere et al 2005 using data on the

elections coalitions and legislative outcomes predictions of electoral behavior in a multiparty setting should be a function of the voters beliefs about how parties will perform following an election similarly party behavior in a legislature should be a function of electoral promises and rewards we develop a multistage game theoretic model of three party competition under proportional representation the final policy outcome of the game is generated by a noncooperative bargaining game between the parties in the elected legislature this game is essentially defined by the vote shares each party receives in the general election and the parties electoral policy positions at the electoral stage parties and voters are strategic in that they take account of the legislative implications of any electoral outcome we solve for equilibrium electoral positions by the parties and final policy outcomes

innovations and the economics of new technology spreading within and across users gaps and way forward r d subsidies are often considered the main policy tool to stimulate the competitiveness and the innovativeness of firms this is especially true for innovations designed to produce greener products or cleaner and more energy efficient technologies however a consistent literature has now shown that even when a clean or a cost reducing technology is ready available in the market its spreading within intra or across inter households or firms takes several years and in some cases decades therefore it is not only important to generate innovations via investments in r d but it is also important that such innovations are adopted and used by firms this paper briefly illustrates the main theoretical approaches to the analysis of the factors leading to inter firm diffusion and emphasise the existing gap led by the paucity of literature on intra firm diffusion a final section briefly discusses some methodological issues surrounding the diffusion of consumer non durable technologies within and across households and how ad hoc models can be used to test the validity of environmental policies

thorstein veblen and post darwinian economics thorstein veblen is noted for his view that economics should be an evolutionary science however although the term evolutionary has been adopted in general terms by subsequent institutional economists there has been remarkably little detailed exploration informed by biology of what veblen meant by an evolutionary science and the character of the post darwinian economics that he attempted to build this essay explores the reasons for veblen s attachment to darwinism informed by developments in biology itself and identifies some distinctive and enduring features of veblen s evolutionary theory copyright 1992 by oxford university press

environmental policy incentives to adopt advanced abatement technology abstract we investigate incentives through environmental policy instruments to adopt advanced abatement technology first we study the case where the regulator makes long term commitments to policy levels and does not anticipate arrival of new technology we show that taxes provide stronger incentives than permits auctioned and free permits offer identical incentives and standards may give stronger incentives than permits second we investigate scenarios where the regulator anticipates new technologies we show that with taxes and permits the regulator can induce first best outcomes if he moves after firms have invested whereas this does not always hold if he moves first

inefficiency in legislative policymaking a dynamic analysis this paper develops an infinite horizon model of public spending and taxation in which policy decisions are determined by legislative bargaining the policy space incorporates both productive and distributive public spending and distortionary taxation the productive spending is investing in a public good that benefits all citizens e g national defense and the distributive spending is district specific transfers e g pork barrel spending investment in the public good creates a dynamic linkage across policymaking periods the analysis explores the dynamics of legislative policy choices focusing on the efficiency of the steady state level of

uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining we study a model of sequential bargaining in which in each period before an agreement is reached the proposer s identity is randomly determined the proposer suggests a division of a pie of size one each other agent either approves or rejects the proposal and the proposal is implemented if the set of approving agents is a winning coalition for the proposer the theory of the fixed point index is used to show that stationary equilibrium expected payoffs of this coalitional bargaining game are unique this generalizes eraslan 34 insofar as a there are no restrictions on the structure of sets of winning coalitions b different proposers may have different sets of winning coalitions c there may be a positive probability that no proposer is selected

dynamic incentives of environmental regulations the effects of alternative policy instruments on technology diffusion abstract we develop a framework for comparing empirically the effects of alternative environmental policy instruments on the diffusion of new technology market based and command and control approaches can he quantitatively compared by estimating the economic penalty that firms through their actions reveal to be associated with violation of standards in the context of concerns about global climate change we empirically examine the likely effects of pigouvian taxes technology adoption subsidies and technology standards we employ state level data on the diffusion of thermal insulation in new home construction comparing the effects of energy prices insulation cost and building codes

environmental policy stringency and technological innovation evidence from survey data and patent counts this article uses patent data to examine the impact of public environmental policy on innovations in environment related technology the analysis is conducted using data on an unbalanced panel of 77 countries between 2001 and 2007 drawing upon data obtained from the european patent office epo world patent statistical patstat database and the world economic forum s wef executive opinion survey the results support our hypotheses concerning the positive role of both general innovative capacity and environmental policy stringency on environment related innovation a subsequent two stage model assesses the factors which drive innovation in general and uses the fitted values to estimate environmental innovation while the analysis is conducted on a smaller sample they confirm the findings of the reduced form model

analysis of democratic institutions structure conduct and performance t s ahe structure of a democratic political system consists of the offices that politicians may seek the constitutional powers associated with these offices and the procedures by which candidates are elected to these offices these structures together form a complex incentive system for politicians determining what kinds of political decisions and strategies will be rewarded thus the constitutional structure of a democracy may influence the conduct of its politicians and the performance of its government in this way political theory confronts a set of questions that have much in common with the classic economic questions of structure conduct and performance in industrial organization this paper develops this economic perspective on political theory as a guide to some problems and directions of current research economic and political interpretations of a classic model

commitment deference and legislative instutions j nformational theories of legislative institutions have demonstrated the potential collective gains from committee specialization due to the use of restrictive amendment procedures for these 5 benefits to be realized however the floor majority must overcome a commitment problem i demonstrate that in a multistage game majority rule combined with the fact that generations of legislators overlap allows the legislature to solve the commitment problem and to sustain legislative norms and institutions even if legislators are finitely lived the model suggests that rather than restrictive amendment procedures it is the committee s expectation of floor deference that sustains committee specialization as a consequence legislative norms may collapse due to an unexpected influx of new members even if the distribution of preferences in the legislature does not change finally i discuss consequences for a comparative study of legislative institutions

proposal rights and political power in a canonical model of sequential collective bargaining over a divisible good we show that equilibrium expected payoffs are not restricted by players voting rights or their impatience for all monotonic voting rules and discount factors and for all divisions of the good among players there exists a stationary proposal making rule such that this division represents players expected payoffs in a stationary subgame perfect nash equilibrium in pure strategies the result highlights the significance of proposal rights in determining political power in collective deliberations t he purpose of this article is to further our understanding of political power in a committee environment we consider the problem of a group of two or more agents who must split a fixed divisible good agents cannot use physical force to divide this good our goal is to clarify the role and relative significance of other features of the political environment such as voting rights proposal rights agents patience etc in determining political power following shapley and shubik 1954 we gauge political power in terms of expected outcomes rather than a priori equate it with individual prerogatives 1 in that spirit political power is the share of the divisible good that agents can expect to obtain when their behavior conforms to an appropriately defined equilibrium notion 2 we model committee interaction using a canonical sequential bargaining game in each period a member of the committee is recognized with some probability that is fixed across periods and proposes a division of the good committee members then vote on the proposal if the proposal is approved in accordance with the underlying voting rule the proposed division is implemented and the

the intra firm diffusion of new process technologies the study of intra firm diffusion has largely been neglected and the limited extant literature overwhelmingly relies upon uncertainty reduction via information spreading or epidemic learning as the main driver in this paper an alternative approach is taken whereby the intra firm diffusion of new process technologies reflects the profitability of new technology adoption as proxied by firm characteristics the approach is tested using data relating to the diffusion of computer numerically controlled machine tools within firms in the uk engineering and metalworking sectors the empirical analysis does not reject the hypothesis that profitability considerations are important with a number of firm characteristics being isolated as of special relevance including firm size and the use of complementary technologies and managerial techniques however there is little support for the traditional epidemic effect

demand commitment in legislative bargaining morelli 1999 provides a model of government formation in which the parties make payoff demands and the order of moves is chosen by the leading party morelli s main proposition states that the ex post distribution of payoffs inside the coalition that forms is proportional to the distribution of relative ex ante bargaining power we provide a counterexample in which the leading party is able to obtain the entire payoff furthermore there are coalitions for which proportional payoff division does not occur for any order of moves

interest groups and the electoral control of politicians abstract we develop a model of interest group influence in the presence of repeated electoral competition in each period of the game an interest group attempts to buy an incumbent s policy choice and a voter chooses whether to replace the incumbent with an unknown challenger the voter faces a tension between retaining good politician types and rewarding past performance the model predicts that above average incumbents face little discipline but others are disciplined increasingly and re elected at a higher rate as the interest group becomes more extreme extensions of the model consider term limits long lived groups and multiple groups

presidential pork executive veto power and distributive politics mitigated to the extent that the president prefers spending in some districts over others the model also generates new insights and predictions about fiscal policy under the separation of powers including the effects of divided government electoral rules and term limitations for the executive

procrastination and obedience in this lecture i shall focus on situations involving repeated decisions with time inconsistent behavior although each choice may be close to maximizing and therefore result in only small losses the cumulative effect of a series of repeated errors may be quite large thus in my examples decision makers are quite close to the intelligent well informed individuals usually assumed in economic analysis but cumulatively they make seriously wrong decisions that do not occur in standard textbook economics this lecture discusses and illustrates several pathological modes of individual and group behavior procrastination in decision making undue obedience to authority membership of seemingly normal individuals in deviant cult groups and escalation of commitment to courses of action that are clearly unwise in each case individuals choose a series of current actions without fully appreciating how those actions will affect future perceptions and behavior the standard assumption of rational forwardlooking utility maximizing is violated the nonindependence of errors in decision making in the series of decisions can be explained with the concept from cognitive psychology of undue salience or vividness for example present benefits and costs may have undue salience relative to future costs

does energy policy hurt international competitiveness of firms a comparative study for germany switzerland and austria this paper investigates the impact of energy policies on the export performance of firms there has been a long policy debate on potentially negative impacts of cost increasing energy policies on international competitiveness we use firm level data from three countries with similar industry structure but different energy policies germany switzerland and austria we rely on firm manager assessments on the relevance of energy policy in terms of taxes regulations standards subsidies and demand stimulation for their firm operation and link data on the adoption and development of new energy technologies regression analyses and matching approaches both show very few impacts of energy policy on export performance suggesting that either policy impacts on firms cost are negligible in the period of study 2012 to 2014 or likely negative impacts are balanced by the adoption of new technology

persistence of power repeated multilateral bargaining with endogenous agenda setting authority abstract we extend a simple repeated multilateral bargaining model to allow successful agenda setters to hold on to power as long as they maintain the support of a majority of other committee members theoretically and experimentally we compare this endogenous power environment with a standard random power environment in which agenda setters are appointed randomly each period although the theoretical analysis predicts that the two environments are outcome equivalent the experimental analysis shows substantial differences in behavior and outcomes across the games the endogenous power environment results in the formation of more stable coalitions less equitable budget allocations the persistence of power across periods and higher long run inequality than the random power environment we present evidence that the stationary equilibrium refinements traditionally used in the literature fail to predict behavior in either game

the source of optimality in action it is well known that the nature of the information set and the axioms of rational choice are critical in determining the type of ranking on which agents are held to act in economic theory this paper argues that the concept of the optimising agent is also sensitive to the conception of the relation between a ranking of options facing an agent and concrete action what is termed the realisation process three conceptions of the realisation process are examined which are seen to lead to three quite distinct views on the role of agency the enabling conditions under which the concept of the optimising agent may be legitimately applied and the resulting domain of application of optimisation

legislative bargaining under weighted voting organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting we analyze this setting using a non cooperative bargaining game based on the baron ferejohn 1989 model unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory we find that each voter s expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight an exception occurs when many high weight voters exist as low weight voters may expect disproportionately high payoffs due to proposal power the model also predicts that ex post the coalition formateur the party chosen to form a coalition will receive a disproportionately high payoff using data from coalition governments from 1946 to 2001 we find strong evidence ofsuch formateur effects

the president and the distribution of federal spending scholarship on distributive politics focuses almost exclusively on the internal operations of congress paying particular attention to committees and majority parties this article highlights the president who has extensive opportunities both ex ante and ex post to influence the distribution of federal outlays we analyze two databases that track the geographic spending of nearly every domestic program over a 24 year period the largest and most comprehensive panels of federal spending patterns ever assembled using district and county fixed effects estimation strategies we find no evidence of committee influence and mixed evidence that majority party members receive larger shares of federal outlays we find that districts and counties receive systematically more federal outlays when legislators in the president s party represent them

the behavioral life cycle hypothesis self control mental accounting and framing are incorporated in a behavioral enrichment of the life cycle theory of saving called the behavioral life cycle blc hypothesis the key assumption of the blc theory is that households treat components of their wealth as nonfungible even in the absence of credit rationing specifically wealth is assumed to be divided into three mental accounts current income current assets and future income the temptation to spend is assumed to be greatest for current income and least for future income considerable empirical support for the blc theory is presented primarily drawn from published econometric studies

the congressional budget process aggregate spending and statutory budget rules abstract this paper compares the congressional budget process instituted in 1974 and the piecemeal appropriations process that preceded it previous theoretical analysis using spatial models of legislator preferences finds no systematic difference in relative spending levels under the two regimes this paper instead uses a model of interest group lobbying a legislature determines spending on a national public good and on subsidies to sector specific interest groups in the appropriations process the appropriations committee proposes a budget that because of interest group influence involves overspending on subsidies in the budget process the budget committee proposes an aggregate level of spending the budget resolution then the appropriations committee proposes a budget a free rider problem among the interest groups inhibits the lobbying of the budget committee to increase the aggregate budget if each group is sufficiently small it takes the budget resolution as given and lobbies the appropriations committee aggregate spending is lower and social welfare is higher under the budget process however provision of the national public good is suboptimal the paper also analyzes statutory budget rules that limit spending levels but can be revised by a simple majority vote here the free rider problem prevents the groups from securing the required changes to budget rules

on the effect of high energy prices on investment empirical analyses of firm behaviour typically assume that there is a stable relationship between investment on the one hand and changes in the relative prices of inputs output demand and other determinants on the other hand however because of the lumpy nature and irreversibility of investments and the presence of uncertainty about future economic developments a specific percentage change in relative prices and output demand may not always lead to the same percentage change in capital stocks that means that different regimes may exist in investment behaviour we test whether such regimes exist using high quality data on eight manufacturing industries in the netherlands three different regimes can be identified that are characterized by differences in the relative input price levels and we find that if relative prices take on extreme values the propensity to adjust the scale of production to changes in demand is very low

legislative representation bargaining power and the distribution of federal funds evidence from the us congress this article investigates the relationship between representation in legislatures and the geographic distribution of federal funds in a legislative bargaining model we demonstrate that funds are concentrated in high representation areas and two channels underlie this result the proposal power channel reflects the role of representation in committee assignments and the vote cost channel reflects the role of representation in coalition formation in our empirical analysis we find that small states relative to large states receive more funding in the us senate relative to the house we also find empirical support for the two channels underlying this relationship throughout the history of federations and international organisations a key consti tutional design question involves how jurisdictions of different sizes are represented in legislative bodies and how their votes will ultimately be weighted large jurisdictions typically argue for delegation sizes or voting weights that are roughly proportional to population whereas small jurisdictions typically argue for an equal number of delegates or votes for each jurisdiction this conflict over representation is presumably driven at least in part by a belief that increased representation strengthens bargaining power in the battle over the geographic distribution of funds authorised by these legislative bodies in this article i analyse the relationship between legislative representation bar gaining power and the geographic distribution of federal funds from both a theoretical and empirical perspective in addition to investigating the existence of a relationship between representation and federal funds i also explore the underlying mechanisms that is i ask which political institutions such as agenda control provided to commit tees and the formation of coalitions under majority rule shape the bargaining power of jurisdictions in central legislatures and thus facilitate the relationship between repre sentation and the distribution of federal spending to provide a framework for analysing these issues i begin by developing a simple theoretical model of a central legislature that determines the crossjurisdiction distri bution of local public goods which are financed by a national tax base both delegation sizes and population are variable allowing me to consider a variety of institutional arrangements for jurisdictional representation legislators represent local interests and given the common pool problem associated with concentrated benefits and dis persed tax costs attempt to increase ownjurisdiction spending but to restrain spending elsewhere the model follows a recent literature on legislative bargaining in which a proposer must secure a majority of votes in order to pass legislation and due to the

the right type of legislator a theory of taxation and representation abstract we develop a theory of taxation and the distribution of government spending in a citizen candidate model of legislatures individuals are heterogeneous in two dimensions productive ability in the private sector and negotiating ability in politics when these are positively correlated rich voters always prefer a rich legislator but poor voters face a trade off a rich legislator will secure more pork for the district but will also prefer lower taxation than the poor voter our theory organizes a number of stylized facts across countries about taxation and redistribution parties and class representation in legislatures we demonstrate that spending does not necessarily increase when the number of legislators increases as the standard common pool intuition suggests and that many policies aimed at increasing descriptive representation may have the opposite effect

intra firm diffusion of green energy technologies and the choice of policy instruments environmental benefits only unfold if green environmentally friendly technologies are widely diffused and intensively deployed within a firm we investigate how different types of policies directly and in combination affect the number of different green energy technologies adopted by a single firm intra firm diffusion using data from a dedicated survey on the diffusion of green energy technologies of 1200 swiss firms and applying well identified econometric models we found that energy taxes are a very effective policy instrument for the intra firm diffusion of green energy technologies even more important however are non political measures that show the largest effect among all tested instruments additional analyses show that a time consistency in policy making is more important for energy tax regimes than for regulations and b no evidence for complementarities between the policy types could be identified

proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition this paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which agents expend efforts to be the proposer in equilibrium agents effort choices are influenced by the prize and cost effects the endogenous prize is 9

incentives for advanced pollution abatement technology at the industry level an evaluation of policy alternatives abstract in this research we evaluate the incentive effects of five environmental policy instruments to promote the development and adoption of advanced pollution abatement technology in a heterogenous industry from most to least incentive the policy instruments can be rank ordered as follows i auctioned permits ii emissions taxes and subsidies iii issued marketable permits iv performance standards including performance standards in this list necessitates the assumption that they are differentiated between heterogeneous firms before the technology adoption in a way which replicates the initial emissions control distribution of the efficient incentive based instruments with the starting point normalized in this fashion the instrument rankings are invariant with respect to the size of firms the size of the industry or the industry s abatement cost structure

voting weights and formateur advantages in the formation of coalition governments over the last two decades a large and important literature has emerged that uses game theoretic models of bargaining to study legislative coalitions to test key predictions of these models we examine the composition of coalition governments from 1946 and 2001 these predictions are almost always expressed in terms of parties minimal integer voting weights we calculate such weights for all parliamentary parties in addition we develop a statistical model that nests the predictions of many of these models of the distribution of posts we find that for parties that join but did not form the government there is a linear relationship between their share of the voting weight in parliament and their share of cabinet posts the party that forms the government the formateur receives a substantial bonus relative to its voting weight the latter finding is more consistent with proposal based bargaining models of coalition formation and suggests that parties gain disproportionate power not because of their size but because of their proposal power

legislative bargaining and coalition formation abstract the finite horizon version of d p baron and j ferejohn s 1989 amer polit sci rev 83 1181 1206 legislative bargaining model is investigated with three or more periods a continuum of divisions is supportable as subgame perfect equilib ria there exist equilibria where coalitions larger than a minimal winning coalition receive strictly positive shares with sufficiently patient players and a sufficiently long horizon any interior distribution is supportable as an equilibrium in contrast a generic uniqueness result applies when introducing heterogenous time preferences the unique backwards induction equilibrium in the perturbed game is nonstationary and neither the original symmetric nor the perturbed game provides guidance for equilibrium selection in the infinite game journal of economic literature classification numbers c73 c78 d72 d78 h49

estimating the value of proposal power this paper investigates the role of proposal power in the allocation of transportation projects across u s congressional districts in 1991 and 1998 the evidence supports the key qualitative prediction of legislative bargaining models members with proposal power those sitting on the transportation authorization committee secure more project spending for their districts than do other representatives support for the quantitative restrictions on the value of proposal power is more mixed i then empirically address several alternative models of legislative behavior including partisan models informational roles for committees models with appropriations committees and theories of committees as preference outliers

a noncooperative theory of legislative coalitions this noncooperative theory is based on a model that incorporates an institutional structure that reflects the sequential process of agenda formation and voting in a legislature that has the task of allocating particularistic benefits among legislative districts the theory is intended to identify the incentives for the formation of proposal coordinating coalitions as a function of characteristics of the political system and the rules that govern agenda formation coalition proposals allocate all the benefits to their districts and whenever the coalition has discipline or controls the chair it will be of minimal winning size when proposals are governed by a closed rule when coalition discipline is absent and the chair is neutral the coalition will be comprised of approximately 70 of the legislature a legislative rule that allows amendments may result in larger coalitions coalition composition is also considered

e business usage across and within firms in the uk profitability externalities and policy using data from the third uk community innovation survey we model the usage of e business across and within firms in the uk in the year 2000 as a single observation upon an integrated process of inter and intra firm diffusion the intra firm dimension is a significant extension to standard analysis the model estimates indicate that the pattern of e business usage reflects the heterogeneity of firms in terms of size other innovative activity and labour force skills generating differences in the payoffs to use as well as market and non market intermediated externalities the policy implications of the findings are discussed c 2008 elsevier b v all rights reserved

recognition for sale abstract i examine the consequences of letting players compete for bargaining power in a multilateral bargaining game in each period the right to propose an offer is sold to the highest bidder and all players pay their bids if players vote according to any rule in which no player has veto power then the first proposer captures the entire surplus if a full consensus is needed for an offer to be accepted then the first proposer shares the surplus with at most one other player and as the period length between offers vanishes one player may capture virtually the entire surplus in settings with a stochastic or an endogenous surplus players are unwilling to efficiently delay agreement or invest in the surplus

the price of pork the seniority trap in the u s house abstract using data on federal outlays and u s house elections i estimate the effect of the pork barrel on the quality of officeholders taking into account the fact that seniority creates a dynamic linkage across periods after estimating the parameters governing the influence of seniority on federal outlays and the parameters governing the distributions of candidate quality i conduct several policy experiments to uncover the size of the welfare loss created by the seniority system i find that the seniority system negatively impacts the quality of representatives but has little effect on the outcomes of elections furthermore the most commonly proposed solution to the distortion term limits may have a significant negative effect on the quality of sitting representatives instead of a quantity constraint term limits i propose a change in the relative price of seniority by way of a pigouvian tax on seniority such a policy achieves the first best outcome

a note on participatory decision making and rationality this paper addresses a particular issue of institutional choice it is concerned with one aspect of the argument for participatory decision making structures how to make sense of the claim that participation can raise productivity because it produces a change in motivation the argument of the paper turns first on distinguishing between the rational choice account of behaviour and a norm guided one and second on the thought that participatory structures give scope for norm guided behaviour to flourish in ways not found in hierarchies

electoral rules and political selection theory and evidence from a field experiment in afghanistan voters commonly face a choice between competent candidates and those with policy preferences similar to their own this article explores how electoral rules such as district magnitude mediate this trade off and affect the composition of representative bodies and the quality of policy outcomes we show formally that anticipation of bargaining over policy causes voters in elections with multiple single member districts to prefer candidates with polarized policy positions over more competent candidates results from a unique field experiment in afghanistan are consistent with these predictions specifically representatives selected by elections with a single multi member district are better educated and exhibit less extreme policy preferences

seniority in legislatures we construct a stochastic game model of a legislature with an endogenously determined seniority system we model the behavior of the legislators as well as their constituents in an infinitely repeated divide the dollar game each legislative session must make a decision on redistributional issues modeled as a divide the dollar game however each session begins with a vote in which the legislators decide by majority rule whether or not to impose on themselves a seniority system legislative decisions on the redistributional issues are made by the baron ferejohn rule an agenda setter is selected by a random recognition rule which in our model is a function of the seniority system selected the agenda setter makes a proposal on redistributional issues and the legislature then votes whether to accept or reject the agenda setters proposal if the legislature rejects the proposal another agenda setter is randomly selected and the process is repeated if the legislature accepts the proposal the legislative session ends and the voters in each legislative district vote whether to retain their legislator or throw it out of office the voters verdict determines the seniority structure of the next period legislature we find a stationary equilibrium to the game having the property that the legislature imposes on itself a non trivial seniority system and that legislators are always reelected