testing informational assumptions in common value bidding models this paper provides an example of a means of linking mathematical theory laboratory experiments and standard empirical work theory by necessity abstracts from the naturally occurring world and experiments designed to test theory must incorporate the same abstractions on the other hand empirical tests are generally performed on naturallyoccurring data which may not reflect those same abstractions given this possible divergence naturally occurring data should be tested for consistency with theoretical assumptions whenever possible on the basis of standard symmetric bidding theory this paper reports on a preliminary version of such a test for off shore oil bidding data

currency and credit in a private information economy in an environment with private information spatial separation and limited communication a currency like object and more standard named credits can be distinguished the credit objects can be used among agents in an enduring relationship that is among agents with known trading histories whereas the currency like object must be used among relative strangers in this environment collectively determined pareto optimal rules make the level of the currency like object and the mix of currency to named credits responsive to individual needs and to economywide states total indebtedness is determined by the number of lenders that is by preference or demand shocks and the mix of currency to credits is determined by transaction patterns among the agents

characterization of a class of moral hazard adverse selection games abstract studying a principal agent game in which the agent alone observes the state of the world and reports it but the moral hazard is not reducible shows that if the principal uses all signals then no solution exists i e there is no contract that elicits truth telling and motivates the agent to exert effort when the principal does not use signals on the state of the world that seem irrelevant a solution exists in which some of the ex post signals on outcome are not used even though they obey the informativeness condition of holmstrom bell journal of economics 1979 10 74 91

local context academic entrepreneurship and open science publication secrecy and commercial activity among japanese and us scientists abstract like the us before it japan has adopted a series of policy initiatives designed to encourage the commercialization of academic science however such initiatives may also adversely affect open science based on matched surveys of almost 1000 researchers in japan and over 800 in the us the paper examines rates of commercial activity reasons to patent and secrecy related to research results in particular it examines the extent to which participation in commercial activity is associated with publication secrecy the results show that patenting rates are higher in japan while industry funding is more common in the us in addition the overall level of publication secrecy is greater in japan and in both countries individuals who are commercially active are less likely to share their research results through publication but patents are less directly linked to commercial activity in japan than in the us and have less impact on academic secrecy the results suggest that academic entrepreneurship is associated with reduced participation in open science but that the extent of adverse effects depends significantly on institutional context

revisiting minimum quality standards abstract this paper revisits the issue of minimum quality standards in a model of quality uncertainty different from leland s minimum quality standards are shown to conflict with the revelation principle s truthtelling requirements thus minimum quality standards in that model cannot be a component of the constrained paretian solution outcome

optimal redistribution and monitoring of labor supply this paper extends the mirrlees 1971 model of optimal non linear income taxation with a monitoring technology that allows the government to verify labor supply at a positive but non infinite cost we analyze the joint determination of the non linear monitoring and tax schedules and the conditions under which these can be implemented monitoring of labor supply reduces the distortions created by income taxation and raises optimal marginal tax rates possibly above 100 the optimal intensity of monitoring increases with the marginal tax rate and the labor supply elasticity our simulations demonstrate that monitoring strongly alleviates the trade off between equity and efficiency welfare gains of monitoring are around 2 8 of total output the optimal intensity of monitoring follows a u shaped pattern similar to that of optimal marginal tax rates our paper can explain why large welfare states optimally rely on work dependent tax credits active labor market policies benefit sanctions and work bonuses in welfare programs

sequential procurement auctions abstract two auctions are held in sequence with the possibility of learning between the second and the first the buyer optimally chooses to discriminate against the winner of the first auction in the second the optimal mechanism has a discontinuity in the winner s second bid this strictly dominates a sequence of independent sealed bid auctions

market equilibrium with private knowledge the effect of asymmetric information between buyers and sellers on product quality was first explored by akerlof 1970 in his pathbreaking paper on the market for lemons he showed that if all purchasers have imperfect information on quality then a market for the product may not exist or if it does function it may not be efficient these results have led to a number of papers concerning insurance and labor markets under different assumptions regarding how agents discriminate between products of varying quality see pauly 1974 rothschild and stiglitz 1976 wilson 1977 miyasaki 1977 and spence 1978

the role of options in the resolution of agency problems a comment the aim of the contracting literature in economics is to explain observed contractual arrangements or organizations as minimizing the costs of incentive conflicts in the agency cost literature of financial economics the contractual arrangement at issue is the mix of securities held by inside management of a firm and outside suppliers of capital the ownership structure of the firm in jensen and meckling s 8 terminology in explaining the ownership structure of a corporation jensen and meckling focus on two sources of agency or incentiveconflict costs a the manager s tendency to consume excessive perquisites and b the manager s tendency to invest in prospects of high risk so as to effect an ex post transfer from bondholders to stockholders a recent article in this journal by haugen and senbet 61 examines the role of stock options in resolving these agency problems and claims to show in particular that a call option in the insider portfolio can eliminate the first type of agency costs this article re examines the role of options in the resolution of agency problems we argue in section i that options cannot eliminate the agency problem of excessive perquisite consumption contrary to haugen and senbet the essential point is that unless outside financing can be provided entirely by riskless debt then outsiders must have a residual claim on the net income of the firm in some states of the world outsiders therefore share in the costs of increased perquisite consumption whatever the ownership structure of the firm this negative externality means that excessive perquisite consumption is inevitable the question remains do call options nonetheless have a role in the mitigation of agency costs an insider portfolio consisting only of equity leaves the manager with the same proportion of residual claim in each state of the world we show using a formal principal agent model that the efficient insider s share of profits is relatively high in favorable high profit states of the world insider call options arise as means of transferring residual claim to the manager in favorable states of the world relative to low profit states the basic agency model has been solved in substantial generality by holmstrom 7 and others we employ here a more specific model that draws on the techniques developed by green and kahn 4 and that is an extension to continuous states of the finite state model of sappington 12 the extension allows a simple characterization of the optimal contract a characterization that

multi period insurance contracts this paper examines the form of insurance contracts in the presence of asymmetric information about consumers accident probabilities our goal is to understand the adjustment in contract terms as a function of accident histories in a finite horizon model we also compare these adjustments between alternative market structures our principal findings indicate that history dependent insurance contracts serve a useful sorting role individuals who declare themselves low risks to insurance companies face adverse contracturai terms if they subsequently have many accidents these adjustments are strongest in the case of a single insurance seller but are present in the competitive model as well

a revelation scheme for allocating organizational resources abstract efficient resource allocation in a hierarchical organization frequently requires top management to obtain information from division managers but division managers may place personal interests above those of the organization and communicate distorted information designing simple and robust optimal game theoretic revelation schemes is difficult instead of making another attempt at this we analyze a project valuation scheme actually used by several us government agencies under certain environments the scheme encourages managers to truthfully reveal the relative benefits of alternative projects while some aspects of these environments do not have nice mathematical properties we argue that they may well represent better characterizations of the way managers actually view their situation

money as the mechanism of exchange abstract the existence and use of money remained an embarrassing puzzle for monetary analysis we observe over man s history that social groups without generally accepted media of exchange exhibit poor survival characteristics most social groups do not use assets or commodities at random in the execution of exchanges one observes that a small subset of assets is dominantly used in transactions these transaction dominating assets are usually referred to as money the literature contains many suggestive attempts to explain the emergence and role of money the classic writers made passing references in somewhat pictorial language to the extension markets and increasing labor productivity induced by the use of a general medium of exchange this idea has never been systematically developed however karl brunner 1971

a patent system for both diffusion and exclusion public policy analysis of optimal patent regimes is often framed as a tradeoff between static and dynamic efficiency in this analytical framework weak patent protection and strict antitrust policy are taken to be directed toward static concerns while protection of intellectual property through strong patent laws is taken as a reflection of broader social concerns for long run growth and technological progress this characterization has some truth but the magnitude of the conflict between static and dynamic efficiency can easily be exaggerated in this article i want to argue that weak patent protection need not be inimical to economic growth and conversely that strong patent protection need not be an enemy of diffusion appropriately structured patent law and antitrust rules can together ensure incentives for r d and also induce cooperation among firms in diffusing r d results through licensing and other means at the same time cooperation among firms at the r d stage can counterbalance weak patent protection by internalizing spillovers from ongoing r d programs and such cooperation may also produce additional spillovers from the existing knowledge

commercial paper bank reserve requirements and the informational role of loan commitments abstract an explanation is provided of the often observed purchase of back up bank loan commitments by corporations immediately preceding their sale of dealer placed commercial paper since loan commitments are typically viewed as hedging instruments our paper explains why a risk neutral corporation would purchase this type of instrument and how it is priced it is assumed that while firms know their own credit risks neither banks nor the paper market can distinguish between some credit applicants we show that the purchase of a commitment can identify these firms to the market the equilibrium is partially revealing of the firms with unobservable quality those with higher quality identify themselves by purchasing commitments while those with lower quality sell unbacked paper and are pooled together unbacked paper is sold also by firms whose quality is observable unidentified firms in the lowest quality range do not sell commercial paper

balanced bayesian mechanisms in the transferable utility case a number of authors have identified conditions on beliefs that guarantee the existence of bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with balanced transfers we present a new easy to interpret condition and we show that it is strictly more general than all the other conditions found in the literature we also study conditions guaranteeing the bayesian implementability of all social decision rules with balanced budget mechanisms

imperfect price discrimination and welfare we develop a model in which a monopolist uses differences across consumers in their valuation of time to imperfectly price discriminate though it is customary to analyse price discrimination problems by the calculus of variations after postulating a continuum of types we assume a finite number of types and exploit the geometry and duality of the contract set and the structure of the programming specification we analyse in detail the qualitative properties of the model s solution and show by construction that our results exhaust the implications of the model for equilibrium contract pairs we show that imperfect discrimination is not bounded in welfare terms between perfect discrimination and single price monopoly and that the deadweight loss consumer surplus and output comparisons between single price monopoly and imperfect discrimination are ambiguous

on governing multilateral transactions with bilateral contracts bilateral contracts while neither negotiated nor enforced in an integrated way are nevertheless often interrelated both economically and strategically owing to production or consumption complementarities and to asymmetric information a set of bilateral contracts forms a mechanism with special properties this mechanism forms a contract equilibrium if there is no joint incentive for a supplier and any individual customer unilaterally to alter the terms of their contract if agents preferences are risk neutral in money income and if their private information is independent then there exists a contract equilibrium that implements efficient transactions if in addition preferences are strictly concave and differentiable in goods and services and technologically feasible sets are suitably convex then this equilibrium is essentially unique

optimal contracts with public ex post information abstract we are concerned with the value of public ex post information about a seller s costs to an initially uninformed buyer we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a public ex post signal s s that is correlated with the risk neutral seller s costs to render the initial information asymmetry inconsequential to the buyer the first best outcome for the buyer is shown to be feasible if 1 the dimension of s is at least that of or 2 the conditional likelihood function of s given is for one of its realizations sj a strictly increasing function of and more concave in than is the seller s cost function

the efficiency of competitive equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information abstract this paper addresses the relationship between competitive equilibria and efficient allocations in an insurance market with asymmetric information using the definition of second best efficiency proposed by harris and townsend 1981 for environments characterized by informational assmmetry the efficiency properties of several proposed market equilibria are examined we find an analogue to the first optimality theorem a miyazaki wilson equilibrium always results in a second best allocation

the dynamic structure of optimal debt contracts abstract in a two period model of costly state verification the optimal contract is characterized and shown to exist the optimal contract is interpreted as a bond contract the model extends the result of one period models that the verification region must be a left tail interval to a multi period setting conditions are identified for the optimal contract to exhibit features such as call prepayment option coupon payment or sinking fund the optimality of certain bond covenants such as refinancing covenants and dividends covenants is also studied

optimal environmental regulation under asymmetric information abstract a market model of environmental regulation with interdependent production and pollution abatement costs and heterogeneous firms is developed firms have private information about costs which have a quadratic form firms pursue bayes nash strategies in communication with the regulator the full information optimum cannot be attained unless gains from trade in the product market net of external damages exceed the information rents earned by firms aggregate output and externality levels are lower at the regulated equilibrium than at the full information social optimum

a house of her own old age assistance and the living arrangements of older nonmarried women abstract i investigate the factors that fostered the rise in separate living quarters for older nonmarried women since mid century by examining the impact of old age assistance on living arrangements in 1940 and 1950 i find that old age assistance substantially increased demand for separate living quarters but that demand depended upon the rules of the program in particular whether children were held legally responsible for the care of their aged parents i argue that more than half of the decline in the fraction of older nonmarried women living with kin from 1950 to 1990 can be attributed to rising social security benefits and expanded eligiblity and to the fact that social security benefits were given with no strings attached

price stabilization as a bonding mechanism in new equity issues abstract underwriters have an incentive to overstate investor interest in order to persuade some investors to purchase shares at a price in excess of their initial estimate of the fair value we show that this incentive is eliminated when the underwriter commits to secondary market price stabilization destroying the underwriter s incentive to overstate interest reduces the total surplus captured by initial investors in initial public offerings further efficiency gains are associated with penalty bid systems that permit the underwriter to make the stabilization commitment selectively price stabilization can thus be viewed as a bonding mechanism that improves the efficiency of the primary equity market

imperfect substitutes the local political economy of informal finance and microfinance in rural china and india abstract banking authorities in both china and india have attempted to limit most forms of informal finance by regulating them banning them and allowing certain types of microfinance institutions the latter policy aims to increase the availability of credit to low income entrepreneurs and eliminate their reliance on usurious financing nonetheless the intended clients of microfinance continue to draw on informal finance in both rural china and india this article argues that the persistence of informal finance may be traced to four complementary reasons the limited supply of formal credit limits in state capacity to implement its policies the political and economic segmentation of local markets and the institutional weaknesses of many microfinance programs

labor market outcomes and reforms in china over the past few decades of economic reform china s labor markets have been transformed to an increasingly market driven system china has two segregated economies the rural and urban understanding the shifting nature of this divide is probably the key to understanding the most important labor market reform issues of the last decades and the decades ahead from 1949 the chinese economy allowed virtually no labor mobility between the rural and urban sectors rural urban segregation was enforced by a household registration system called hukou individuals born in rural areas receive agriculture hukou while those born in cities are designated as nonagricultural hukou in the countryside employment and income were linked to the commune based production system collectively owned communes provided very basic coverage for health education and pensions in cities state assigned life time employment centrally determined wages and a cradle to grave social welfare system were implemented in the late 1970s china s economic reforms began but the timing and pattern of the changes were quite different across rural and urban labor markets this paper focuses on employment and wages in the urban labor markets the interaction between the urban and rural labor markets through migration and future labor market challenges despite the remarkable changes that have occurred inherited institutional impediments still play an important role in the allocation of labor the hukou system remains in place and 72 percent of china s population is still identified as rural hukou holders china must continue to ease its restrictions on rural urban migration and must adopt policies to close the widening rural urban gap in education or it risks suffering both a shortage of workers in the growing urban areas and a deepening urban rural economic divide

information acquisition in an incomplete information model of business cycle abstract this paper studies the consequences of allowing information acquisition in a version of lucas barro incomplete information model of business cycle we apply the information equilibrium concept to show that an agent s information acquisition is not invariant to fluctuations of price level and that it has a significant effect on the size of output inflation tradeoff using the optimality criteria developed by muench we find that a change in mean money growth rate does not have any real consequences and that a constant money growth rule is superior to any monetary policy that induces all the agents to be fully informed

monitoring of performance in organizational contracting the case of defense procurement this paper contains an agency theoretic analysis of procurement contracts in which the government designs optimal linear contracts for a risk averse supplier in the presence of moral hazard private information and imperfect monitoring optimal contracts deviate from first best risk sharing the direction of the deviation depends on the relative severity of the moral hazard and private information problems and on the precision of the monitor in contrast to the usual result in the moral hazard literature the government may in some cases prefer that the effort of the supplier be taxed choice of the precision of the monitor and the categories of costs covered by the monitor are also studied

incentives in academics why is there tenure this paper models ancademic department as an internal labor market the major problem facing the university administration is to ensure that members of its departments are willing to hire the best possible candidates academic tenure is seen to be a necessary condition for this the analysis is also consistent with other aspects of the academic environment including tenure track appointments contract buy outs early retirement plans and when a budget crunch hits the elimination of entire departments the results extend in a simple way to other organizations in which members have an input into overall decisions

contracts and asymmetric information in the theory of the firm abstract this paper extends the coase notation of firms as intermediaries between consumers and input owners to incorporate asymmetric information we show that in some cases it is optimal for consumers to pay a fixed price for a product and to ignore how the firm operates and the profit that it makes if firms have private information that consumers cannot cheaply obtain however we demonstrate that the optimal contract may require constraints on firms internal operations and profits our work provides conditions under which cost plus contracts are optimal and demonstrates when nonprofit firms are the preferred organization structure

planning stochastic shocks and labour contracts of female workers and their welfare implications in this paper we analyse labour contracts for female workers when there are planned shifts or stochastic shocks to their leisure preference which arise as a result of planned or unplanned pregnancy it will be shown that when female workers plan their pregnancy contract firms can induce self selection among workers through a contract that stipulates a wage profile steeper than the spot wage profile so that self selected workers who accept the contract will not quit even though information on shifts in leisure preference is asymmetric first best efficiency can be achieved through self selection when female workers do not plan childbirths however self selection contracts are not possible when the stochastic shocks are realized there will be quits planning is pareto superior to no planning at equilibrium workers will be allocated optimally workers who have low marginal value of home time will join contract firms and make specific investments while those who have high marginal value will seek employment in the walrasian market and make no specific investments some implications of these results are also discussed in the paper

noncooperative regulation of a nonlocalized externality with a nonlocalized pollution externality different groups bear the costs and benefits of abatement in the case of acid rain these groups are respectively consumers in the midwest and pollutees in the northeast these groups have conflicting interests that are represented respectively by a public utilities commission and an environmental regulator we analyze a model in which the environmental protection agency acting as a von stackelberg leader regulates pollution and the public utility commission regulates the price for a monopolist that has private information about the effectiveness of its abatement alternatives we characterize a noncooperative equilibrium and compare it with a cooperative equilibrium a nonlocalized pollution externality poses special regulatory problems when the benefits and the costs of abatement are borne by distinct groups whose interests are represented by different regulatory agencies a relevant example is acid rain which is believed to be caused in part by coal fired electricity generating plants these emit sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide which upon contact with moisture in the atmosphere form acid that falls with rain measures to reduce these emissions are of concern to the residents of the states in which the coal fired generating plants are located because abatement costs increase the prices they pay for electricity a number of plans have been proposed for distributing those costs more broadly but the costs of reducing the emissions of generating plants located in ohio will likely be borne in large part by ohio consumers and utilities while the benefits from abatement will largely be realized by the residents of the northeast and canada the control of a nonlocalized externality such as acid rain raises the issue of the relationship between the environmental regulator the environmental protection agency epa and the public utility commission the former is responsible for achieving an acceptable balance between the damage from pollution and the cost of abatement the latter is responsible for pricing electricity on the basis of the costs of production and pollution control one possibility is that cooperation between the two regulators leads to the joint regulation of emissions and prices cooperation would internalize the conflicting interests and mandates of the regulators but the distributive consequences of the regulatory alternatives inhibit cooperation the public utility commission for example has an interest in avoiding abate

a dual characterization of incentive efficiency we show that incentive efficient allocations in economies with adverse selection and moral hazard problems can be determined as optimal solutions to a linear programming problem and we use duality theory to obtain a complete characterization of the optima our dual analysis identifies welfare effects associated with the incentives of the agents to truthfully reveal their private information because these welfare effects may generate non convexities incentive efficient allocations may involve randomization other properties of incentive efficient allocations are also derived

incentive contracting with asymmetric and imperfect precontractual knowledge abstract the pareto optimal contract between principal and risk neutral agent is analyzed for the case in which the agent s information is initially imperfect but better than that of the principal in contrast to the case where precontractual information is symmetric the final contract between principal and agent will not always guarantee an efficient outcome however in contrast to the case where the agent s information is initially perfect the agent may be unable to command rents from his superior information and the outcome will always be efficient the conditions under which efficient or inefficient outcomes are guaranteed differ qualitatively according to whether the random stete of nature follows a continuous or a discrete distribution journal of economic literature classification numbers 022 026 611

adverse selection private information and lowballing in insurance markets recent contributions to the adverse selection literature have focused on a multiperiod competitive environment in this setting a clean distinction arises between the predictions of competing models cooper and hayes extend the model of rothschild and stiglitz to multiple periods the result is a self selecting equilibrium characterized by price highballing or systematically overcharging new business kunreuther and pauly suggest that information asymmetries between competing insurance firms render such price quantity policies infeasible their model results in a pooling equilibrium that is characterized by price lowballing or systematically undercharging new business our evidence is consistent with the kunreuther and pauly model and reveals the persistence of adverse selection in the automobile insurance market copyright 1990 by the university of chicago

does medicare save lives health insurance characteristics shift at age 65 as most people become eligible for medicare we measure the impacts of these changes on patients who are admitted to hospitals through emergency departments for conditions with similar admission rates on weekdays and weekends the age profiles of admissions and comorbidities for these patients are smooth at age 65 suggesting that the severity of illness is similar on either side of the medicare threshold in contrast the number of procedures performed in hospitals and total list charges exhibit small but statistically significant discontinuities implying that patients over 65 receive more services we estimate a nearly 1 percentage point drop in 7 day mortality for patients at age 65 equivalent to a 20 reduction in deaths for this severely ill patient group the mortality gap persists for at least 9 months after admission

on imperfect evaluation and earning differentials this paper investigates the relationship between the technology for evaluating performance and optimal contract choice specifically the paper examines the different compensation packages that arise when occupations differ in evaluation technology workers are risk averse work effort is endogenous and there exists asymmetric information in occupations in which it is less difficult to measure output it is shown that compensation is more closely tied to output the implications for work effort the sorting of workers by ability and average compensation are developed analysis of a new data set confirms our predictions concerning earning differentials and wage growth the powerful 1 6 million member national education association and other teacher organizations have traditionally fought the notion of rewarding better teachers with more money arguing that there is no objective way to measure a teacher s competence and that it would lead to favoritism and bad morale time june 20 1983

salesforce compensation plans in environments with asymmetric information in this paper we present a theory of salesforce compensation plans to provide insights into why it may be advantageous for a profit maximizing firm to offer members of its salesforce the opportunity to choose from a menu of compensation plans although such contractual arrangements are not commonly used in the industry they have been introduced and implemented by firms such as ibm and st regis paper as in our previous work on salesforce compensation plans basu lal srinivasan and staelin basu a k r lal v srinivasan r staelin 1985 salesforce compensation plans an agency theoretic perspective marketing sci 4 fall 267 291 we use an agency theory framework in this paper we relax the assumptions of information symmetry and salesforce homogeneity and show the conditions under which it is optimal to offer a menu of compensation plans we also show that even when these assumptions are relaxed there are situations where offering a single plan characterized by basu lal srinivasan and staelin basu a k r lal v srinivasan r staelin 1985 salesforce compensation plans an agency theoretic perspective marketing sci 4 fall 267 291 is still optimal insights gained from the analyses are discussed in the context of an existing compensation scheme

implicit contracts with asymmetric information and bankruptcy the effect of interest rates on layoffs this paper develops a model in which a firm writes labour contracts with workers and debt contracts with creditors firms have more information than do the owners of the factors of production and they are also subject to limited liability we show that if the limited liability constraint is binding then the employment level is inefficient relative to a situation of symmetric information the firm is then embedded into a partial equilibrium model in which the real rate of interest is exogenously determined we show that increases in the real rate of interest increase the inefficiency of the optimal employment contract and lead to layoffs in more states of nature than would occur at lower real interest rates recent literature in the area of implicit contracts has shown considerable interest in the assumption of asymmetric information henceforth a i papers by azariadis 1982 green and kahn 1982 and grossman and hart 1981 have all shown that a i will interfere with optimal risk sharing but although these models produce non walrasian outcomes it is not clear that they are capable of explaining the observed variations in employment over the business cycle in the absence of a link between the level of employment and other macroeconomic variables these new versions of contract theory are open to the charge that they are presenting a complicated explanation of frictional unemployment one potential link between variations in output and variations in intertemporal prices is suggested by models which explicitly allow for the possibility of bankruptcy sappington 1983 has shown that bankruptcy will generate inefficient outcomes even between risk neutral agents and farmer 1984 has shown that if sappington type contracts are incorporated into a macroeconomic structure then the resulting model predicts that bankruptcies will vary countercyclically over the business cycle although bankruptcy is important however it is unlikely that bankruptcies alone will account for all of the output loss during a recession the purpose of this paper is to show that the assumptions of a i and limited liability will generate a model in which the employment level is inefficient and in which the magnitude of this inefficiency varies systematically with the expected real rate of interest this model predicts that the observed increase in the incidence of layoffs during recessions is directly attributable to the effects of high interest rates on aggregate supply some evidence of the phenomenon to be explained is presented below

elderly care and intrafamily resource allocation when children migrate this paper considers the intrafamily allocation of elderly care in the context of international migration where migrant children may be able to provide financial assistance to their parents but are unable to offer physical care to investigate sibling interaction i estimate best response functions for individual physical and financial contributions as a function of siblings contributions after addressing the endogeneity of siblings contributions and selection into migration i find evidence that siblings financial contributions function as strategic complements while time contributions operate as strategic substitutes this suggests that contributions may be based on both strategic bequest and public good motivations

limited liability contracts between principal and agent abstract the optimal strategy of the principal is examined in an environment where there are ex post limitations on the maximum penalty that can be imposed on a riskneutral agent contrary to the case in which such limitations are not imposed it is in the principal s interest to deliberately forego the opportunity to induce socially efficient behavior and to instead design a contract that induces the agent to realize an efficient outcome only in the most productive state of nature and perhaps in certain very unproductive states the properties of the contract are examined in detail

reconsidering the bayh dole act and the current university invention ownership model abstract the bayh dole act of 1980 provided u s universities with the right to commercialize employees inventions made while engaged in government funded research this paper argues that the current university invention ownership model in which universities maintain de jure ownership of inventions is not optimal either in terms of economic efficiency or for advancing the social interest of rapidly commercializing technology and encouraging entrepreneurship we argue that this model is plagued by ineffective incentives information asymmetries and contradictory motivations for the university the inventors potential licensees and university technology licensing offices tlos these structural uncertainties can lead to delays in licensing misaligned incentives among parties and obstacles to the flow of scientific information and the materials necessary for scientific progress the institutional arrangements within which tlos are embedded have encouraged some of them to become revenue maximizers rather than facilitators of technology dissemination for the good of the entire society we suggest two alternative invention commercialization models as superior alternatives the first alternative is to vest ownership with the inventor who could choose the commercialization path for the invention for this privilege the inventor would provide the university an ownership stake in any returns to the invention the inventor would be free to contract with the university tlo or any other entity that might assist in commercialization the second alternative is to make all inventions immediately publicly available through a public domain strategy or through a requirement that all inventions be licensed non exclusively both alternatives would address the current dysfunctional arrangements in university technology commercialization

a collective tournament abstract traditional tournaments among workers yield suboptimal levels of helping efforts while collective incentives generate free riding or lack incentive compatibility we confront these problems using a tournament between workplaces under fairly restrictive conditions the collective tournament is first best and incentive compatible

the relationship between credit and productivity in chinese agriculture a microeconomic model of disequilibrium credit is an important element in agricultural production systems it allows producers to satisfy the cash needs induced by the production cycle which characterizes agriculture preparation planting cultivation and harvesting of the crops are typically done over a period of several months in which very little cash revenue is earned while expenditures on materials purchased inputs and consumption must be made in cash cash income is received a short time after the harvest in the absence of credit markets farmers would have to maintain cash reserves so as to facilitate production and consumption in the next cycle the availability of credit allows both greater consumption and greater purchased input use and thus increases welfare of the farmers

rearranging the family income support and elderly living arrangements in a low income country this study examines the link between income and living arrangements our identification comes from exploiting a discontinuity in age in the benefit formula for the social pension in south africa in contrast to previous literature we find no association between pension income and elderly independence we do find that potential beneficiaries alter their household structure when they become pension eligible prime working age women depart and the presence of children younger than five and young women of childbearing age increase these shifts in coresidence patterns are consistent with a setting where prime age women have comparative advantage in work away from extended family relative to younger women the additional income from old age support may induce a change in living arrangements to exploit this advantage

optimal forestry contracts under asymmetry of information in this paper i analyze optimal royalty contracts in forestry when the harvesting firm has private information on the cost of harvesting this infinite horizon forest rotation model with asymmetry of information on the cost parameter results in a dynamic incentive problem depending on whether the costs are correlated over time or not the firm either receives rent or receives no rent associated with the continuation part of the rotation choice i characterize the optimal contract explicitly in both cases i also examine the loss in expected welfare surplus resulting from the use of a linear contract instead of the more general non linear contract

structuring international cooperative ventures we examine the effect of bargaining power and informational asymmetry on the design of international cooperative ventures in the presence of restrictions on equity participation and investment when the bargaining advantage rests with the multinational equity participation restrictions can increase the profits to domestic firms and encourage sub optimal investment policies overinvestment occurs when the multinational s bargaining advantage is reinforced by an informational advantage while underinvestment occurs when the domestic firm possesses the informational advantage in contrast when the bargaining advantage rests with the domestic firm equity participation restrictions do not affect investment levels

what is a liquidity crisis abstract this paper investigates the role of liquidity it is argued that the firm holds money as a guarantee of solvency to its contractual partners by holding liquid assets the firm is able to increase the efficiency of its contracts variations in the opportunity cost of holding money cause variations in the firm s demand for money and consequent variations in the frequency of contract failures this mechanism is suggested as an alternative explanation of the observed relationship between money income and interest rates

monetary policy and policy credibility theories and evidence within the past decade there has been a significant shift in attitude by many western industrialized countries toward the objectives and conduct of national economic policy the events of the 1970s accelerating inflation and stagnant economic growth motivated the view that inflation had created its own stubborn self sustaining momentum that either was not amendable to the influences of conventional macroeconomic policy or else would yield to such influences only at unacceptable costs this led to the development of a program aimed at reestablishing control over prices while minimizing any adverse consequences of anti inflationary policies on output and employment seen as a new monetary experiment the essential ingredients included prudent financial management abstinence from discretionary intervention commitment to intermediate targets and above all prior announcement of these policies evidence of this program and its effects can be found oni the continents of europe north america and latin america and provide further important lessons in anti inflationary management this paper is a survey of recent theoretical developments in monetary policy which among other issues attempt to explain one rationale for this program and the likely consequences thereof to the extent that the new program of monetary and fiscal reform was deliberately made public and impressed upon citizens as an overriding commitment of governments in advance of its execution reflects a prevailing opinion that economic policies are more effective if they are credible to private economic agents this view emphasized forcefully by william fellner 1976 1979 may be seen as being mainly due to the assimilation of the rational expectations hypothesis

public policy and extended families evidence from pensions in south africa how are resources allocated within extended families in developing economies this question is investigated using a unique social experiment the south african pension program under that program the elderly receive a cash transfer equal to roughly twice the per capita income of africans in south africa the study examines how this transfer affects the labor supply of prime age individuals living with these elderly in extended families it finds a sharp drop in the working hours of prime age individuals in these households when women turn 60 years old or men turn 65 the ages at which they become eligible for pensions it also finds that the drop in labor supply is much larger when the pensioner is a woman suggesting an imperfect pooling of resources the allocation of resources among prime age individuals depends strongly on their absolute age and gender as well as on their relative age the oldest son in the household reduces his working hours more than any other prime age household member

efficient contracting with reliance and a damage measure this article reexamines the problem of breach of contract studied by shavell 1980 1984 and rogerson 1984 by considering explicitly the incentive problems that arise from asymmetric information and transaction specific investment we derive the optimal contract which consists of variable price and damage payment schedules each of which is set before any private information is observed we show that the optimal contract attains full classical efficiency

selling university technology patterns from mit many research universities engage in efforts to license inventions developed by university affiliated inventors however no systematic explanation of the conditions under which university inventions will be licensed or commercialized has been provided drawing on transaction cost economics i provide a conceptual framework to explain which university inventions are most likely to be licensed commercialized and generate royalties and who will undertake that commercialization i test this framework on data on the 1 397 patents assigned to the massachusetts institute of technology during the 1980 1996 period the results showthat 1 university inventions are more likely to be licensed when patents are effective 2 when patents are effective university technology is generally licensed to noninventors 3 when patents are effective licensing back to inventors increases the likelihood of license termination and reduces the likelihood of invention commercialization and 4 the effectiveness of patents increases royalties earned for inventions licensed to noninventors the implications of these findings for innovation management and strategy entrepreneurship and university technology commercialization are discussed

r d spillovers patents and the incentives to innovate in japan and the united states national surveys of r d labs across the manufacturing sectors in the us and japan show that intraindustry r d knowledge flows and spillovers are greater in japan than in the us and the appropriability of rents due to innovation less patents in particular are observed to play a more central role in diffusing information across rivals in japan and appear to be a key reason for greater intraindustry r d spillovers there suggesting that patent policy can importantly affect information flows uses of patents differ between the two nations with strategic uses of patents particularly for negotiations being more common in japan

on delegating price authority to a regulated firm this article models a regulatory environment in which the regulated firm possesses better information about demand conditions than does the regulator the regulator would like to tie prices to the firm s private information in a socially optimal way to do so the regulator must induce the firm either truthfully to reveal private information or equivalently unilaterally to set socially optimal prices this is accomplished by assessing lump sum subsidies or taxes that depend in an appropriate way on the prices announced by the firm this mechanism can be reinterpreted as a two part tariff scheme whereby both the service fee and price per unit respond to shifting demand conditions

dynamic labor contracts under asymmetric information abstract this paper discusses the distortion of employment within a two period asymmetric information contracting model in which an exogenous demand shock is serially correlated and is known only to firms the obtained results show that serial correlations of the state of nature can cause not only underemployment but also overemployment even when overemployment never occurs in the context of a static asymmetric information contracting model

a model of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for new issues this paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for the case in which the investment banker is better informed about the capital market than is the issuer and the issuer cannot observe the distribution effort expended by the banker the optimal contract under which the offer price decision is delegated to the better informed banker in order to deal with the adverse selection and moral hazard problems resulting from the informational asymmetry and the observability problem is characterized the model demonstrates a positive demand for investment banking advising and distribution services and provides an explanation of the underpricing of new issues an investment banker performs three functions which may be of value to an issuer of new securities underwriting advising and distribution this paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services based on an informational asymmetry between an issuer of new securities and an investment banker ultimately a theory of the organization of the financial intermediary industry is required that would predict which firms would use which types of financial intermediaries for which purposes and which firms would raise capital without engaging the services of a financial intermediary only a limited set of such predictions are developed here in the context of a model of a fixedprice offering under a negotiated contract in which the investment banker is

a note on overemployment underemployment in labor contracts under asymmetric information abstract models of labor contracts under asymmetric information may predict either overemployment or underemployment this paper shows that this result depends crucially on whether or not leisure is a normal good if firms are risk neutral

a rationalization of bonuses penalties and kinked payment functions within an agency model abstract the optimal payment schedule of the simplest principal agent problem can be continuous smooth or kinked or semicontinuous depending on the specifications of objective functions of the principal and or of the agent using the nonsmooth mathematical analysis this article determines a mapping from classes of objective functions into classes of optimal payment functions examples provide illustrations

informational diversity over time and the optimality of monetary equilibria abstract the temporal realizations of a random state variable in an overlapping generations model create an informational diversity between members of different generations and require a reexamination of the optimality that competitive equilibria might display in such an environment using an optimality criterion that reflects this informational diversity we prove the optimality of competitive equilibrium in a model with a fixed stock of fiat money a single spot market and good endowments that follow a markov process the need for an optimality criterion that incorporates informational diversity is further motivated by studying the same model with the operation of complete contingent commodities markets

rules or discretion in public sector decision making rules and discretion in public sector decision making are compared in a macroeconomic setting where there is a potential role for an active stabilization policy when the policymaker has private information about nominal shocks the credibility of announcements about the state of nature is shown to depend critically on both the policymaker s preferences over output and inflation and on the institutional setting rules or discretion the issue of rules versus discretion is found to depend on the flexibility lost under a rule relative to the timeinconsistency problem arising under discretion

the design of supply contracts as a problem of delegation we consider the design of a supply contract as a problem of delegation in a buying firm in general the agent who acts on behalf of a principal in the firm cannot be assumed to transform her information in probability estimates like the principal would do possessing the same information in the investigated case of incomplete information the design of contracts is affected by the beliefs about characteristics of the supplier therefore it is important to analyze in which way the expected profit depends on these probabilities in order to find the principal s optimal instruction the best instruction is determined by a trade off between the costs due to the time the principal spends on dealing with the problem and formulating the instructions and the costs due to a suboptimal menu of contracts offered by the agent

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

the impact of rural pensions in china on labor migration we study the impact of china s new rural pension program on promoting migration of labor by applying a regression discontinuity analysis to this new pension program the results reveal a perceptibl

delegation as commitment the case of income tax audits in this article we study the value of delegating authority over income tax audit policy arising from the incompleteness of contracts consider a utilitarian government whose ability to commit is limited to aggregate dimensions of its audit policy as publicly verifiable information about detailed allocations of audit budgets is not available we show that the welfare level associated with the full commitment solution can be attained by delegating authority over audit policy to a manager the latter is offered a simple incentive scheme based only on the aggregate variables which are publicly observable in contrast if the government retains authority direct commitment to these same variables does not allow the full commitment welfare level to be achieved thus despite sharing a common informational basis delegation may perform better than centralized arrangements in the presence of incomplete contracts

credibility of policy announcements the output and inflation costs of disinflationary policies abstract the paper analyses the credibility problem related to policy announcements specifically the incentives related to announcements of disinflationary policies are considered and conditions are given for credible and non credible announcements moreover the implications for output and inflation of a non credible disinflationary policy are analysed

agricultural markets as relative performance evaluation relative performance schemes such as tournaments are commonly used in markets for a variety of livestock and processing commodities while explicit versions of these schemes are rarely used in markets for fresh fruits and vegetables and specialty grains we show how contracts for these latter commodities do in fact provide relative performance incentives albeit indirectly via a payment mechanism that depends on market prices in such contracts compensation is often an increasing function of revenue this implements a relative performance scheme by making each grower s payment an increasing function of his own output but a decreasing function of other s output in an important 1982 article holmstr om models the problem facing a group of agents each of whom produces an observable quantity of some good by taking an unobservable action a rather robust conclusion from this line of inquiry is that when the production of one agent is not independent of the production of another then the compensation awarded to the first agent should depend not only on his own production but also on the output of others in particular if agents production is positively correlated because of some common shock for example then an agent s compensation should be larger when other agents output is smaller a phenomenon which holmstr om terms relative performance evaluation relative performance evaluation ought to be particularly important for agricultural producers and the various intermediaries who purchase their output these producers face considerable common risk from aggregate production shocks and so one would expect that relative performance evaluation could improve efficiency in fact certain types of agricultural intermediaries do use explicit relative performance schemes as predicted by