the valuation of american options with stochastic interest rates a generalization of the geske johnson technique the geske johnson approach provides an efficient and intuitively appealing technique for the valuation and hedging of american style contingent claims here we generalize their approach to a stochastic interest rate economy the method is implemented using options exercisable on one of a finite number of dates we illustrate how the value of an american style option increases with interest rate volatility the magnitude of this effect depends on the extent to which the option is in the money the volatilities of the underlying asset and the interest rates as well as the correlation between them

excise taxes with multiproduct transactions i examine excise taxes levied on multiproduct retailers excise taxes reduce equilibrium output and decrease equilibrium product variety in the short run but taxes can raise output per product in the long run and induce entry excise taxes are overshifted into prices in a wide range of cases including under linear and concave demand conditions and excise taxes shift less than one for one into prices only when demand is highly convex multiproduct transactions substantively alter the efficiency of ad valorem and specific forms of excise taxes and affect the comparison of relative tax performance over short run and long run time horizons jel h25 h32 l11 l13 l81

stochastic equilibria existence spanning number and the no expected financial gain from trade hypothesis stochastic equilibria under uncertainty with continuous time security trading and consumption are demonstrated in a general setting a common question is whether the current price of a security is an unbiased predictor of the future price of the security plus intermediate dividends this is the hypothesis of no expected financial gains from trade the relevance of this hypothesis in multi good economies is called into question by the following demonstrated fact for each set of probability assessments there exists a corresponding equilibrium one with the original agents original equilibrium allocations and no expected financial gains from trade under the given probability assessments the spanning number of the economy is defined as the fewest number of security markets required to sustain a complete markets equilibrium in a dynamic sense made precise in the paper the spanning number is linked directly to agent primitives in particular the manner in which new information resolves uncertainty over time the spanning number is shown to be invariant under bounded changes in expectations several examples are given in which the spanning number is finite even though the number of potential states of the world is infinite

do big countries win tariff wars yes it is widely believed that tariffs invite retaliation and that the postretaliation equilibrium l eaves all countries worse off than they would be at free trade the a uthors present a simple pure exchange model with two countries and t wo goods and show which endowment patterns are consistent with this belief they find that if one country is substantially bigger than th e other it can expect to gain from a tariff war despite retaliation the model can be extended to show that the advantage obtained by bei ng part of a large trading unit can help explain the formation of cus toms unions copyright 1988 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

foreign investment in the exporting sector welfare enhancing or welfare reducing there has been a considerable amount of debate on whether structural adjustment policies suggested by the imf and the world bank to many primary product exporting nations may be selfdefeating the terms of trade deterioration due to export expansion by any one country may be small enough to be ignored however if several exporters engage in simultaneous export expansion all of them can suffer welfare losses diakosavvas and scandizzo 5 231 64 among others find that the terms of trade of primary commodities have indeed exhibited a downward trend in this century panagariya and schiff 8 address this issue in a partial equilibrium simulation model of the cocoa market they provide examples whereby productivity increases in one exporting country lead to welfare losses for other exporting countries despite the imposition of unilaterally optimal export taxes bhagwati 2 481 85 had shown that optimal trade taxation rules out the possibility of immiserizing growth bandyopadhyay 1 shows that this result does not generalize to the case where two or more exporters have market power hence productivity increases in the exporting sector can be immiserizing even in the presence of optimal export taxes rodrik 11 provides an excellent survey of these issues the concerns expressed in the elasticity pessimism literature the classic papers by prebisch 10 251 73 and singer 12 473 85 addresses these issues have been largely alleviated by the experience of the east asian countries however these concerns remain alive in the context of some primary product exports like cocoa and coffee using a two country free trade model brecher and choudhri 4 181 90 show that the singer prebisch concerns are specially relevant in the context of foreign investment in the exporting sector of primary product exporters the value of the marginal product of foreign capital has to be repatriated to the foreign nation hence a decline in the terms of trade for the host nation is sufficient to guarantee its immiserization the traditional two country models that have been employed to analyze issues in optimal trade taxation do not address the issue of interdependence among different exporting nations in a two country model there is only one exporter of a particular commodity however in reality several nations export the same commodity for instance cote d ivoire ghana and brazil are all

nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition abstract this paper analyzes nash equilibria in a simple model of an economy with jurisdictions engaging in fiscal competition small number nash equilibria in which tax rates are the strategic variables are shown not to coincide with nash equilibria in which public expenditure levels are the strategic variables

option prices and the underlying asset s return distribution this work examines the relation between option prices and the true as opposed to risk neutral distribution of the underlying asset if the underlying asset follows a diffusion with an instantaneous expected return at least as large as the instantaneous risk free rate observed option prices can be used to place bounds on the moments of the true distribution an illustration of the paper s results is provided by the analysis of the information concerning the mean and standard deviation of market returns contained in the prices of s p 100 index options although it seems natural that the prices of claims to various parts of the underlying asset s distribution should contain information about the shape of that distribution cox and ross 1976 established that an option s price equals its expected payoff discounted at the risk free rate where the expectation is taken over the risk neutral rather than the true distribution of the underlying asset linking the risk neutral distribution implicit in option prices to the true distribution remains a comparative mystery a necessary condition for the risk neutral pricing methodology to be applicable is that the true and the risk neutral distribution share a common support the only information about the true distribution that can be obtained from observed option prices alone is information about that support this paper demonstrates though that observed option prices when used in conjunction with simple assume d restrictions on the true distribution do contain information about the noncentral moments of the true distribution not directly implied by those assumed restrictions alone the intuition for the result that option prices can be useful in placing bounds on the moments of the true distribution is straightforward first we generalize the results in lo 1987 to show how the expected payoff to a call can be bounded above in terms of any chosen set of the noncentral moments of the return on the underlying asset second we establish restrictions on the

on the recoverability of preferences and beliefs we examine the extent to which an investor s tastes and beliefs can be jointly recovered from knowledge of his her consumption choice more precisely we assume that the investor s preferences admit an expected utility representation but with subjective unknown probabilities and investigate what joint restrictions can be placed on utility functions and beliefs if the investor draws utility from intertemporal consumption we show that the set of utility functions and beliefs that are consistent with a given consumption choice can be characterized by a martingale condition in the markovian case this characterization can be restated in terms of a riccati differential equation that must be satisfied by the investor s relative risk aversion function to each solution of this differential equation is associated a unique utility function and a unique set of beliefs supporting the given consumption choice moreover we show that the differential equation has at most one solution in the class of utility functions displaying infinite absolute risk aversion at the origin thus preferences and associated beliefs can be uniquely recovered within this class article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

investor heterogeneity asset pricing and volatility dynamics abstract we provide an explicit characterization of the equilibrium when investors have heterogeneous risk preferences given market completeness investors can achieve full risk sharing thus a representative agent can be constructed though this agent s risk aversion changes over time as the relative wealths of the individual investors change we show that volatility depends on the covariance of aggregate risk aversion and stock returns we find that heterogeneity increases volatility produces volatility clustering arch effects and leverage like effects option prices exhibit implied volatility skews there is predictability and we assess the magnitude of investors hedging demands and trading volume further diversity is beneficial to all agents and entails welfare gains that can be substantial

the efficiency of indirect taxes under imperfect competition abstract this paper considers the relative efficiency of ad valorem and unit taxes in imperfectly competitive markets we provide a simple proof that ad valorem taxes are welfare superior to unit taxes in the short run when production costs are identical across firms the proof covers differentiated products and a wide range of market conduct cost asymmetries strengthen the case for ad valorem taxation under cournot competition but unit taxation may be welfare superior under bertrand competition with product differentiation ad valorem taxation is superior with free entry under cournot competition but not necessarily under price competition when consumers value variety

endogenous trade policy under foreign direct investment abstract using bernheim and whinston 1986 common agency game we endogenize trade policy in a duopoly composed of a domestic firm and a foreign firm where both firms influence the domestic government s trade policy via their contributions the foreign firm can jump over trade restrictions by undertaking foreign direct investment fdi in the domestic market the government prefers a voluntary export restraint ver to a tariff for two reasons first a ver leads to higher contributions from the foreign firm than a tariff second a ver provides a higher level of protection to the domestic firm without generating fdi by the foreign firm

on viable diffusion price processes of the market portfolio the assumption that the market portfolio follows a specified diffusion process implies in a simple equilibrium framework that the representative individual must have a certain utility function which is identified in the paper not every diffusion process is viable i e can be endogenized to be the market portfolio s price process in such an equilibrium model the paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for viability which imply that viable diffusion processes constitute a rather restricted family it is common in financial economics especially in the option pricing literature to take a certain price dynamics of an underlying asset as a primitive assumption the results are then seemingly preference free but it is known that if one wishes to embed such a partial equilibrium model in a general equilibrium framework this can be obtained only with certain individuals preferences for example the black scholes 1973 model in which the underlying asset follows a geometric brownian motion is known to be consistent with utility functions which exhibit constant proportional risk aversion cpra see rubinstein 1976 breeden and litzenberger 1978 brennan 1979 stapleton and subrahmanyam 1984 and bick 1987 by this we mean that if the market portfolio follows a geometric brownian motion then necessarily the utility function of the representative individual exhibits cpra conversely one can construct a simple economy with a stock and a riskless bond where identical individuals have cpra type utility functions and where the endogenous stock price enumerated by the bond follows a prespecified geometric brownian motion however the utility function which corresponds in equilibrium to a general diffusion process has never been identified this was the initial motivation for this paper the problem loosely stated is as follows suppose we are told that in a simple equilibrium model as above the market portfolio follows a given diffusion process what does it imply regarding individuals preferences it is clear that the problem is not well formulated if a dividend process is also postulated e g as in merton 1973 1977 in this case consistency with two processes the price process and the dividend process is to be required this

a theory of interregional tax competition a general equilibrium model is constructed to study tax competition where local governments compete for capital by holding down property tax rates and public expenditure levels an exact definition of tax competition is provided and both the existence and nonexistence of tax competition are shown to be theoretically possible it is argued however that tax competition must occur under empirically reasonable conditions inefficiency in public production is also explicitly modeled the amount of capital used to produce a given level of public service output is shown to be greater than that which is required to minimize costs evaluated at the prices facing private firms

on the consistency of the black scholes model with a general equilibrium framework we construct a simple economy with consumption only at the final date in which we endogenize the stochastic behavior of prices assumed in the black scholes model certain preferences constant proportional risk aversion and beliefs are shown to be sufficient and necessary in certain respects for the existence of such an equilibrium the analysis is then generalized to a continuous consumption framework in which we embed the merton proportional dividend model

a pareto comparison of ad valorem and unit taxes in noncompetitive environments abstract a literature that began with wicksell 1896 has shown that an ad valorem tax is welfare superior to an equal yield unit tax in both monopoly and oligopoly markets this paper proves a stronger result for any unit tax imposed on a monopoly there exists an ad valorem tax that pareto dominates it that produces larger profit tax revenue and consumer surplus the paper then considers whether this pareto result generalizes to all cournot nash oligopolies the paper shows that pareto dominance holds in such markets whenever the tax level exceeds a critical value that depends on various market parameters

the generalized theory of transfers and welfare bilateral transfers in a multilateral world paul samuelson s 1952 1954 classic papers on the transfer problem addressed two separate analytical issues the positive effect of a transfer on the terms of trade and the welfare effect of the transfer on the donor and the recipient since then a considerable body of literature has grown up on the positive analysis while samuelson 1954 himself had extended the 2 x 2 x 2 free trade analysis to allow for tariffs and transport costs subsequent writers have analyzed other extensions of the model for example to allow for nontraded goods as with leisure in samuelson 1971 or general nontraded goods in john chipman 1974 and ronald jones 1970 1975 remarkably however the welfare analysis of transfers has not paralleled these developments since wassily leontief 1936 produced an example of immiserizing transfer from abroad and samuelson 1947 argued that the example required market instability the proposition that has monopolized attention has been that a transfer in the conventional 2 x 2 x 2 model in its free trade version cannot immiserize the recipient or enrich the donor as long as world markets are stable in the walras sense interestingly samuelson 1954 who did extend the positive analysis to include tariffs did not go on to ask whether immiserization of the transfer recipient and hence symmetrically enrichment of the donor in a two country model could now arise consistent with market stability recently the welfare analysis of transfers has been extended in two different directions both apparently unconnected and both yielding the conclusion that transfers from abroad can be immiserizing and that the donor may improve its welfare despite market stability one route to this conclusion has been the introduction of a third economic agent or country that is outside of the transfer process in the appendix of his 1960 paper analyzing the interaction between trade policy and income distribution harry johnson discussed the possibility of welfareparadoxical redistribution between two factor income classes capital and labor in an open economy thereby providing what can be interpreted as a treatment of the threeagent transfer problem for the case in which donor and recipient are both completely specialized in the ownership of a single different factor an independent analysis of the three agent transfer problem using a restrictive model with given endowments of goods and fixed coefficients in consumption was also undertaken in an important paper by david gale 1974 2 brecher and bhagwati bhagwati department of economics columbia university new york ny 10027 brecher department of economics carleton university ottawa on kis 5b6 hatta department of political economy the johns hopkins university baltimore md 21218 we thank the national science foundation grant no 524718 for partial financial support of the research underlying this paper the paper was written when brecher and hatta were visiting columbia university 1981 82 gratefully acknowledged are helpful comments and suggestions from john chipman avinash dixit jacques dreze robert feenstra jacob frenkel ronald jones murray kemp andreu mas colell michael mussa john riley lars svensson and robert willig from anonymous referees and from seminar participants at berkeley harvard minnesota rochester chicago and the university of california los angeles after the present paper was submitted for publication and following its presentation at rochester our attention was drawn to this appendix which was noticed by a student of ronald jones subsequently we learned from makoto yano that motoshige itoh had pointed out an important related paper by ryuotaro komiya and t shizuki 1967 whose condition 11 for the johnson case anticipated our equation 12 below we are grateful for having both of these references brought to our attention 2 gale constructs an example in which the donor is enriched along with the recipient furthermore this immediately implies that a reverse transfer will immis

competition for aid and trade policy this paper considers the optimal allocation of a given amount of foreign aid between two recipient countries it is shown that given consumer preferences a country following a more restrictive trade policy would receive a smaller share of the aid if the donor country maximises its own welfare in allocating aid if on the other hand the donor country allocates aid in order to maximize the sum of the welfare of the two recipient countries the result is just the opposite finally we analyze the situation where the recipient countries compete with each other for the given amount of aid it is shown that this competition tends to lower the level of optimal tariffs in the recipient countries

demand and distance evidence on cross border shopping while many studies have documented deviations from the law of one price in international settings evidence is scarce on the extent to which consumers take advantage of price differentials and engage in cross border shopping we use data from 287 swedish municipalities to estimate how responsive alcohol sales are to foreign prices and relate the sensitivity to the location s distance to the border typical results suggest that the elasticity with respect to the foreign price is around 0 4 in the border region moving 200 400 kilometers inland reduces it to 0 2 0 1 given that cross country price differences for alcohol and other products are often caused by taxes our evidence has implications for the debate on tax competition harmonization

welfare ranking ad valorem and specific tariffs under monopolistic competition actual trade and tariff policy prefers ad valorem tariffs to specific tariffs yet in this paper we show that in a setting of monopolistic competition realizing a given restriction on imports via a specific tariff would generate more consumer utility than obtaining the same restriction via an ad valorem tariff jel classification f12 un classement en terme de bien etre des droits de douane ad valorem et specifiques quand on est en regime de concurrence monopolistique les politiques commerciales en vigueur pref rent les droits de douane ad valorem aux droits de douane specifiques or ce memoire montre que dans un contexte de concurrence monopolistique reduire les importations par le truchement d un droit de douane specifique genere plus d utilite pour le consommateur que les memes restrictions obtenues par le truchement d un droit de douane ad valorem

income taxes and the destination of movers to multistate msas abstract we examine how differences in state income tax rates as well as other state and local taxes and public service expenditures influence the choice of state of residence for households federal tax filers moving into multistate metropolitan areas msas using data from the irs on the migration of taxpayers msas that are on borders provide a spatial discontinuity discrete differences in state tax rates within a single labor market these msas allow residents to live in one state and work in another state we find that differences in state income tax rates have a significant impact on the relative rate of migration to the states within an msa however contrary to what would be expected this impact is only significant in msas in which the filing state is based on employment states without reciprocity and not for those states in which the filing state is the state of residence states with reciprocity in msas where states do not have reciprocity agreements a difference of ten percent in tax rates leads to a 4 1 percent difference in the relative rate of incoming taxpayers analogously we find that a ten percent difference in state tax rates in these msas results in a 3 3 percent difference in the rate of tax base inflow agi our results suggest that one reason that differences in state income taxes appear to have more impact in multistate msas without reciprocity is that only relatively large differences in state income tax rates have any impact on migration and these differences are much more pronounced in msas without reciprocity

patient mobility and health care quality when regions and patients differ in income we study the effects of cross border patient mobility on health care quality and welfare when income varies across and within regions we use a salop model with a high middle and low income region in each region a policy maker chooses health care quality to maximise the utility of its residents when health care costs are financed by general income taxation in equilibrium regions with higher income offer better quality which creates an incentive for patient mobility from lower to higher income regions assuming a prospective payment scheme based on drg pricing we find that lower non monetary administrative mobility costs have i no effect on quality or welfare in the high income region ii a negative effect on quality but a positive effect on welfare for the middle income region and iii ambiguous effects on quality and welfare for the low income region lower monetary mobility costs copayments might reduce welfare in both the middle and low income region thus health policies that stimulate cross border patient mobility can be counterproductive when regions differ in income

an intertemporal general equilibrium model of asset prices this paper develops a continuous time general equilibrium model of a simple but complete economy and uses it to examine the behavior of asset prices in this model asset prices and their stochastic properties are determined endogenously one principal result is a partial differential equation which asset prices must satisfy the solution of this equation gives the equilibrium price of any asset in terms of the underlying real variables in the economy in this paper we develop a general equilibrium asset pricing model for use in applied research an important feature of the model is its integration of real and financial markets among other things the model endogenously determines the stochastic process followed by the equilibrium price of any financial asset and shows how this process depends on the underlying real variables the model is fully consistent with rational expectations and maximizing behavior on the part of all agents our framework is general enough to include many of the fundamental forces affecting asset markets yet it is tractable enough to be specialized easily to produce specific testable results furthermore the model can be extended in a number of straightforward ways consequently it is well suited to a wide variety of applications for example in a companion paper cox ingersoll and ross 7 we use the model to develop a theory of the term structure of interest rates many studies have been concerned with various aspects of asset pricing under uncertainty the most relevant to our work are the important papers on intertemporal asset pricing by merton 19 and lucas 16 working in a continuous time framework merton derives a relationship among the equilibrium expected rates of return on assets he shows that when investment opportunities are changing randomly over time this relationship will include effects which have no analogue in a static one period model lucas considers an economy with homogeneous individuals and a single consumption good which is produced by a number of processes the random output of these processes is exogenously determined and perishable assets are defined as claims to all or a part of the output of a process and the equilibrium determines the asset prices our theory draws on some elements of both of these papers like merton we formulate our model in continuous time and make full use of the analytical tractability that this affords the economic structure of our model is somewhat similar to that of lucas however we include both endogenous production and

the comparison between ad valorem and specific taxation under imperfect competition abstract this paper compares ad valorem and specific taxation in two models of oligopoly with and without free entry predominantly ad valorem taxation implies a relatively low consumer price high tax revenue and when entry is precluded low profits ad valorem taxation dominates specific taxation from the welfare perspective the set of circumstances under which with free entry specific taxation raises welfare is a strict subset of that in which ad valorem taxation is welfare improving and in both models the maximisation of consumer welfare subject to a binding revenue constraint requires maximum reliance on ad valorem taxation

interjurisdictional capital mobility fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy abstract recent studies emphasize that local property taxation may result in inefficiently small amounts of local public spending this paper shows that the inefficiency can be traced to a fiscal externality when one jurisdiction increases its taxes it causes a flow of capital to other jurisdictions that increases their tax revenues the inefficiency can be corrected with a subsidy that internalizes the externality key empirical parameters determining the magnitude of the externality are identified illustrative calculations indicate that subsidy rates on the order of 40 might be required to achieve efficiency

the pricing of stock index options in a general equilibrium model this paper analyzes the pricing of stock index options in a simple general equilibrium model in this model the volatility of the stock index and the spot rate of interest are functions of a stochastic variable the paper investigates the biases that arise when using the black scholes model with the assumed volatility and interest rate dynamics it is shown that the model can in principle explain the biases observed in empirical work on stock index options

equilibrium interest rates and multiperiod bonds in a partially observable economy this paper analyzes the market for financial assets in a production and exchange economy with several realized outputs and a single unobservable source of nondiversifiable risk the paper demonstrates that for a large class of diffusion outputs and preferences optimizing consumers first estimate the realizations of the unobservable factor and then use these estimates to determine portfolio and consumption rules moreover the explicit consideration of this unobservable productivity factor affects equilibrium demands and prices the equilibrium spot rate of interest emerges as the best estimate of the unobservable factor and multiperiod default free bonds arise as the optimal hedge for the unobservable changes of the stochastic investment opportunity set this paper analyzes the market for financial assets in a production and exchange economy with several realized outputs and a single unobservable source of nondiversifiable risk the paper poses and answers three questions 1 how do consumers determine equilibrium demands and prices when their investment opportunities are unobservable 2 in equilibrium what financial assets provide an optimal hedge for the

revenue sharing and information exchange under non discriminatory taxation the international exchange of tax information and its merits compared to withholding taxes is the central topic in current debates in international tax policy the purpose of this paper is to characterize and compare the tax regimes that emerge with and without information exchange under the assumption that countries are unable to differentiate between the taxes they apply to residents and non residents it focuses in particular on the role of asymmetries in country size capturing a key feature of tax havens and on the impact and potential desirability of schemes to share the revenue raised by withholding as under the new eu savings tax arrangements or more innovatively as a consequence of information exchange it is shown that irrespective of country size difference pareto efficiency requires that all revenue collected from nonresidents be transferred to the residence country which would require taking the eu practice even further from the norm but is currently the norm in relation to information exchange a withholding scheme with revenue fully reallocated in this way pareto dominates information sharing whatever the allocation under the latter comparing schemes in which there is no revenue sharing however shows that information exchange pareto dominates simple withholding

comments on the valuation of derivative assets abstract this paper presents an alternative approach to derive the breeden litzenberger valuation formula which expresses the price of an arbitrary derivative security in terms of call options prices this valuation formula follows from the observation that a continuous derivative security can be replicated by a portfolio including a bond and call options with all possible exercise prices discrete terms are added to the original breeden litzenberger formula to reflect possible discontinuities of the call option price s derivative with respect to the exercise price these discontinuities are subsequently shown to correspond to mass points of the probability distribution of the stock price several applications of the breeden litzenberger valuation formula are demonstrated

non marketability and the value of employee stock options abstract we adapt the benninga et al 2005 framework to value employee stock options esos the model quantifies non diversification effects is computationally simple and provides an endogenous explanation of eso early exercise using a proprietary dataset of eso exercise events we measure the non marketability eso discount we find that the eso value on the grant date is approximately 45 of a similar plain vanilla black scholes value the model is aligned with empirical findings of esos gives an exercise boundary of esos and can serve as an approximation to the fair value estimation of share based employee and executive compensation using the model we give a numerical measure of non diversification in an imperfect market

a spatial model of tax competition with multiple tax instruments abstract this paper presents a model of tax competition with two local jurisdictions in each metropolitan area located along a line segment and many metropolitan areas in the world economy the residents in each local jurisdiction are allowed to commute at a constant cost per mile to work in the other jurisdiction if a lump sum tax can be used then other taxes are not used if source based wage and business capital taxes can both be used then only the former is used in this case or if only a business capital tax can be used the local public good is underprovided

on pareto improving commodity tax changes under fiscal competition this paper shows that when a noncooperative fiscal equilibrium of the mintz tulkens 1986 model of tax competition is inefficient pareto improving changes are positive for the taxes of both regions under concavity of the regions welfare functions it also identifies a class of such equilibria that are always efficient

the valuation of multivariate contingent claims in discrete time models there are several examples in the literature of contingent claims whose payoffs depend on the outcomes of two or more stochastic variables familiar cases of such claims include options on a portfolio of options options whose exercise price is stochastic and options to exchange one asset for another this paper derives risk neutral valuation relationships rnvrs in a discrete time setting that facilitate the pricing of such complex contingent claims in two specific cases joint lognormally distributed underlying variables and constant proportional risk aversion on the part of investors and joint normally distributed underlying variables and constant absolute risk aversion preferences respectively this methodology is then applied to the valuation of several interesting complex contingent claims such as multiperiod bonds multicurrency option bonds and investment options

securities markets diffusion state processes and arbitrage free shadow prices this paper develops the parametric restrictions imposed on diffusion state processes by the requirement of arbitrage free asset pricing using the equivalent martingale measure as a starting point the diffusion property is exploited to specify the shadow pricing func tion which takes conditional state variable probabilities under the reference measure into arbitrage free contingent claim prices the main results of the paper provide differential equations associated with the shadow price function that are used to identify restrictions on the parameters of assumed diffusion processes the paper concludes with an application to the cir model where the state variable the instantaneous interest rate is assumed to follow a square root process calculations are also provided for the parametric restrictions imposed on the brownian bridge and ou state variable processes

the political economy of regional integration projects at borders where poor and rich meet the role of cross border shopping and community sorting abstract at borders between poor and rich countries huge service price differentials could be exploited to mutual benefit offering better paid job opportunities to the poor as well as better shopping opportunities to the rich however cross border shopping is often limited by the substantial transaction costs of crossing the border moreover countries and regions frequently fail to cut these transaction costs even when they have the opportunity to do so we provide a politico economic analysis of cross border integration projects more specifically we show how the political outcome depends on i intra country mobility ii decision making and housing ownership regimes and iii federal grants and international border regulations our analysis builds on two key characteristics in which individuals differ interregional mobility and intercultural ability

tax evasion fiscal competition and economic integration abstract this paper examines the implications of tax evasion for fiscal competition and tax harmonization policies in an economic union first for symmetric countries it proves that the equilibrium values of the tax and audit rates are less than optimal tax harmonization alone will also lead to a less than optimal audit rate second for asymmetric countries the paper shows that integration may turn an honest country into an evading one it argues that tax harmonization alone may be a bad policy in that it can make both countries worse off it may also cause an otherwise honest country to turn to evasion

multilateral transfers export taxation and asymmetry abstract it has been established that under free trade transfers that are proportional to the trade volumes of recipient nations cannot immiserize them we investigate this result in the context of a three country model of export taxation by recipient nations proportional transfers can be immiserizing in the presence of fixed export taxes under nash welfare maximizing export taxes proportional transfers cannot immiserize the recipients consequences of asymmetry in size and in nash equilibrium tax rates are also explored the findings are relevant for developing nations who use export taxes and also receive foreign aid

on the tying of aid to tariff reform this paper considers the welfare effects of foreign aid that is tied to changes in the recipient s tariff by constructing a three country model with tariffs and by allowing for changes both in the amount of aid and in the tariff rates we are able to consider the welfare implications of two different rules of aid conditionality i a rule which leaves the donor s welfare unchanged and ii a rule which leaves the recipient government s total revenue unchanged it is shown that the tying of aid to a tariff reform can inter alia be used to ensure pareto improvement

international tax coordination regionalism versus globalism tax competition for mobile capital can undermine the attempts of governments to redistribute income from rich to poor i study whether international tax coordination can alleviate this problem using a general equilibrium model synthesizing recent contributions to the tax competition literature the model highlights the crucial distinction between global tax coordination and regional coordination with high capital mobility between the tax union and the rest of the world the welfare gain from regional capital income tax coordination is only a small fraction of the gain from global coordination even if the tax union is large relative to the world economy

reforming an asymmetric union on the virtues of dual tier capital taxation the tax competition for mobile capital in particular the reluctance of small countries to agree on measures of tax coordination has ongoing political and economic fallouts within europe we analyse the effects of introducing a two tier structure of capital taxation where the asymmetric member states of a union choose a common federal tax rate in the first stage and then non cooperatively set local tax rates in the second stage we show that this mechanism effectively reduces competition for mobile capital between the members of the union moreover it distributes the gains across the heterogeneous states in a way that yields a strict pareto improvement over a one tier system of purely local tax choices we also discuss the effects of diverging capital endowments within the union and capital flows to third countries

taxing an independent scotland if scotland were to become independent it would gain considerably more control over its tax system than it currently enjoys in this paper we consider the consequences of independence for the optimal design of a new scottish tax system an analysis which would also be of some relevance for considering the consequences for tax design of independence of other smaller nations scotland is different from the rest of the uk in some ways that are important for tax system design incomes are more equally distributed for example that is one reason why the progressive income tax currently raises less per head in scotland than in the rest of the uk it also suggests that there is less to be gained in terms of redistribution from sharply progressive taxation independence would create additional complexity for individuals and firms working or trading across borders it could also put downward pressure on tax rates and our analysis suggests that optimal tax rates in an independent scotland are likely to be lower than optimal rates in the uk as a whole at the same time the context of a substan tial budget deficit will continue to put upward pressure on tax rates

policy competition for foreign direct investment between asymmetric countries the present paper analyses policy competition for foreign direct investment between countries of different size and different market structure we demonstrate how policy competition affects the location decision of the foreign investor and derive welfare implications the key variables in our analysis are intra regional trade costs differences in market size and minimum wages

how large are the benefits from using options the paper explores the economic value of being able to span market outcomes through the use of options we model an economy with a single risky asset consumption takes place at one date corresponding to the horizon of all investors options on the consumption good are not redundant securities in the economy because volatility is uncertain the model enables us to examine the benefits to investors of using options to optimize their investments within this model the gains from the use of options appear to be relatively minor

a simple model of commodity taxation and cross border shopping this paper sets up a simple model in which two countries differing in geographical extent engage in commodity tax competition originating in opportunities for cross border shopping the non cooperative tax equilibrium and various coordination initiatives are examined in the benchmark model and in two model extensions incorporating i costs of transportation for goods and ii border inspection among the more surprising results are the following with i pure profits accrue to sellers near the border but subjecting them to tax may lower the country s total tax revenue with ii the volume of cross border shopping may well increase jel classification h20 h87 h26

commodity tax competition between member states of a federation equilibrium and efficiency we first describe regional market equilibria whereupon consumers of each region allocate their purchases of private goods between domestic and nondomestic ones according to the structure of relative prices taxes and transportation costs next regional optimal tax levels and public good quantities are derived the tax of the other region being held constant fiscal competition arises from the ability of one region in choosing its tax to alter the tax base of the other

an intertemporal general equilibrium asset pricing model the case of diffusion information this paper provides sufficient conditions for the equilibrium price system and a vector of exogenously specified state variable processes to form a diffusion process in a pure exchange economy the conditions involve smoothness of agents utility functions and certain nice properties of the aggregate endowment process and the dividend processes of traded assets in place of the dynamic programming a martingale representation technique is utilized to characterize equilibrium portfolio policies this technique is useful even when there does not exist a finite dimensional markov structure in the economy and thus the markovian stochastic dynamic programming is not applicable a gents are shown to hold certain hedging mutual funds and the riskless asset in contrast to earlier results the market portfolio does not have a special role in hedging since the markets are dynamically complete when there exists a finite dimensional markov system in the economy the dimension of the hedging demand identified through the markovian dynamic programming may be much larger than that identified by the martingale method copyright 1987 by the econometric society

a spatial tax harmonization model abstract policies to harmonize value added tax rates are controversial in the european union this paper formulates a multi country model over a one dimensional space as a non cooperative nash game in which each country aims at maximizing its tax revenue subject to the constraint that its tax rate lies within a given common band then we examine the effects of changes in the common band on tax rates tax revenues and the number of cross border shoppers at nash equilibrium we also analyze the effects of geographical variation in country size and location

unit tax versus ad valorem tax a tax competition model with cross border shopping abstract within the framework of spatial tax competition with cross border shopping we examine the choice of tax method between ad valorem tax and unit specific tax this study shows that governments endogenously choose the ad valorem tax method not because of a classic welfare reason but because it is a good strategy to compete for mobile consumers another key finding is that while governments are committed to the ad valorem tax method the choice leads to inferior outcome tax cutting competition becomes more serious when countries adopt ad valorem tax and competition in ad valorem tax results in smaller tax revenue than competition in unit tax

the effects of a shift in monetary policy regime on the profitability and risk of commercial banks abstract this paper examines the effects of the fed s october 6th 1979 change in monetary policy regime on the profitability and risk of commercial banks using capital market data and an event study methodology it was found that bank stocks exhibited significant abnormal returns during the announcement week of the policy change when these abnormal returns were decomposed into a part related to unexpected interest rate changes and a part assumed to reflect increased rate variability the results were consistent with a negative relationship between bank returns and interest rate surprises as well as between bank returns and rate variability

interstate commodity tax differentials and the distribution of residents abstract this paper considers the manner in which an unequal distribution of consumers affects the commodity tax policies of neighboring jurisdictions the paper uses a spatial model in which the residents of two states are distributed non uniformly and employs a variety of assumptions about the behavior of governments and firms throughout the paper shows that at a nash equilibrium in tax levels the sparsely populated state imposes a lower tax than does its densely populated neighbor the paper also demonstrates how equilibrium state taxes differ depending on whether firms employ marginal cost or profit maximizing pricing

the simple analytics of tobacco taxation with illegal supply this paper examines the impact of tobacco excise taxes where legal and illegal supplies coexist the government s objective is to minimize cigarettes smoked in the economy or to maximize revenue or to minimize illegal activity it reacts to a competitive illegal supply in an adjoining jurisdiction a model of consumer choice is used to demonstrate how demand response to tax changes can yield counterintuitive results while the model mimics the canadian market similar situations characterize the us and european markets a novel element of the paper is the treatment of externalities on the supply side rather than the demand side resume analytique simple des taxes sur le tabac quand il y a offre illegale ce memoire examine l impact des taxes sur la vente de tabac quand des offres legale et illegale coexistent l objectif du gouvernement est de minimiser les cigarettes fumees dans l economie ou de maximiser le revenu fiscal ou de minimiser l activite illegale il doit prendre en compte l offre concurrentielle illegale dans une juridiction contigue on utilise un modele de choix du consommateur pour montrer comment la reaction de la demande aux changements dans les taxes peut engendrer des resultats contre intuitifs bien que le modele soit concu pour le marche canadien on trouve des situations avec des caracteristiques similaires dans les marches americain et europeens un element novateur du memoire est sa prise en compte des externalites du cote de l offre plutot que du cote de la demande

the valuation of options when asset returns are generated by a binomial process this paper values options on assets whose returns over a finite interval of time are generated by a binomial process it shows that a simple valuation relationship between the option and the underlying stock obtains if investors have preference functions that belong to a particular class even if opportunities to hedge do not exist one particular application of the theory is in the case where the stock price over a finite interval could increase by an amount fall by the same amount or stay at the same level the results in this paper may be viewed as the foundation of the preference based approaches to obtaining a risk neutral valuation relationship in this paper we value options on assets whose returns over a single period of time are generated by a multi stage binomial process of the additive and multiplicative types the market is open only at the beginning and end of the single period and consequently the risks involved in holding options cannot be hedged the case of a single stage binomial process in such a setting has been

nash equilibrium tariffs for the united states and canada the roles of country size scale economies and capital mobility a theoretical analysis of optimal nash equilibrium tariff rates is presented a numerical general equilibrium model is then used to find nash equilibrium tariff rates for the united states and canada the nash equilibrium tariffs are small relative to partial equilibrium estimates 18 percent for the united states and 6 percent for canada the united states is essentially indifferent between the nash equilibrium and free trade while canada is better off at the latter by 4 billion empirical results support theoretical predictions that the optimal tariff is smaller when the country is smaller there are scale economies and free entry and capital is internationally mobile

optimal export taxes in a multicountry framework abstract this paper extends the optimum export tax analysis to multicountry partial pe and general equilibrium ge frameworks using a computable general equilibrium cge model of the global cocoa market analyzing myopic optimum nash optimum and nash revenue maximizing taxes we show that optimum and revenue maximizing taxes obtained in the ge framework differ from their pe counterparts as they are determined not only by the elasticity of the residual demand curve facing the country but by domestic supply conditions as well second not only are nash revenue maximizing taxes higher than nash optimum taxes in the ge but paradoxically the society attains a higher level of welfare under nash revenue maximizing taxes than under nash optimum taxes finally we show that the frequent use of lerner symmetry lerner a p 1936 the symmetry between import and export taxes economica 11 306 313 in the policy oriented analysis of optimum export taxes is not warranted

who benefits from partial tax coordination in this paper we investigate whether partial tax coordination is beneficial to countries within and outside a tax union in which countries are supposed to compete in taxes and infrastructure our results demonstrate that a subgroup of countries agreeing on a common tax rate can harm both member and nonmember states this is in contrast to the classical findings that partial tax harmonisation is pareto improving when a minimum tax rate is imposed within a tax union we demonstrate that it does not necessarily improve the welfare of the member countries moreover both the high tax and low tax countries can be worse off this conclusion is at odds with the classical result that a high tax country benefits from the imposition of a lower tax bound

a theory of involuntary unrequited international transfers the theory of involuntary international transfers war indemnities has been constructed on the assumption that the donor and recipient are completely indifferent to each other s well being the assumption is hard to justify since usually the transfers closely follow periods during which the countries have been dropping bombs on each other in the present paper we rework the theory on the more plausible assumption that the well being of each country is negatively influenced by the well being of the other country it is shown that contrary to the conventional theory the donor might benefit at the expense of the recipient even when local walrasian stability is imposed

endogenous timing in the presence of non monotonicities the aim of this paper is to generalize the endogenous timing game proposed by hamilton and slutsky games and economic behavior 1990 2 pp 29 46 by allowing the payoff or the marginal payoff of a player to become non monotonic with respect to the strategy of the opponent we propose a taxonomy of the subgame perfect nash equilibria based on the characteristics of the payoff functions proposed by eaton canadian journal of economics 2004 37 pp 805 29 we determine under which conditions of the initial payoff functions commitment has a social value and when the simultaneous move nash equilibrium is commitment robust and discuss its pareto efficiency

commodity tax competition under destination and origin principles abstract this paper studies the effect of switching from the destination to the origin principle of taxation on non cooperative commodity tax equilibrium when taxes are constrained to be uniform across commodities the switch has no effect when differentiated taxes are allowed the effects of the switch depend on whether countries are small or large in both cases the switch imposes the requirement that taxes must be uniform across commodities within each country in the second case there are two further effects of the switch i negative spillover effects from tax policy are introduced ii incentives to manipulate the terms of trade are changed the switch does not necessarily lead to a fall in all tax rates

the spatial incidence of local retail taxation this paper examines the effects of local retail taxation in two simple models of spatial competition suppose that a suburb or central city imposes an excise tax or subsidy on a particular commodity such as gasoline liquor restaurant meals or groceries or imposes a general sales tax that affects many commodities simultaneously to what extent does this lead to higher prices within the jurisdiction and in neighboring jurisdictions section ii presents the basic model of spatial competition that forms a component of the fixed locations model of section iii and the entry model of section iv infinitely many stores are located along an infinite line and demand density is completely inelastic and uniform along the line the main endogenous variables of interest are the prices charged by the different stores throughout the paper a nash equilibrium in prices is assumed section iii presents the fixed locations model in which the tax is imposed after stores have already established themselves store locations are fixed due to location specific sunk costs if a suburb containing a single store imposes an excise tax on a commodity the store that is taxed and its first second and third nearest neighbors on each side increase their prices by 57 7 percent 15 5 percent 4 2 percent and 1 1 percent of the tax respectively this result is independent of the spacing of the stores and independent of whether or not they are evenly spaced if a suburb containing several stores imposes an excise tax the changes in price follow directly by adding the effects of taxes on several adjacent stores if a central city taxes all stores on the right half line the results are given by 12 the taxed and untaxed stores closest to the boundary

growth welfare and optimal trade taxes a fallacy of composition abstract optimal export taxation rules out the possibility of immiserizing growth in a two country world thus productivity increases in the exporting sector must be welfare improving this paper shows that in a multicountry world such reasoning commits a fallacy of composition simultaneous growth of exporting nations can lead to welfare losses in the presence of unilaterally optimal export taxes also optimal export taxes can decline in response to such growth this result further strengthens the possibility of perverse welfare movements thus standard policy recommendations of increasing productivity in the exporting sector may lead to unintended and self defeating outcomes

prices taxes and automotive fuel cross border shopping abstract the aim of the present paper is to determine whether differences in automotive fuel prices among neighboring autonomous communities i e spanish political administrative regions affect the decisions taken by individuals regarding the region in which to purchase fuel in particular the intention is to discover if price increases in certain autonomous communities as a result of the application of the regional tranche of the hydrocarbon retail sales tax hrst has affected fuel purchases in neighboring communities in order to achieve the above mentioned objectives the monthly purchases of automotive diesel in aragon between january 2001 and march 2007 is estimated from the fuel price in aragon the relation between prices in each of the bordering communities and aragon weighted by density of traffic the number of vehicles registered in that community and three dummy variables representative of the implementation of the regional tranche of the hrst in madrid catalonia and valencia the paper finds empirical evidence to demonstrate a positive effect of the relative prices in the neighboring communities and vehicle registrations and also a negative effect of prices in aragon upon the acquisition of diesel in this region in the case of catalonia some evidence suggests that the price effect may have been strengthened following the introduction of the regional tranche of the hrst in august 2004

endogenous choice of trade policy instruments abstract recently developed theories of endogenous trade policy formation have attempted to explain tariffs as the result of economic interest seeking by individuals or groups this note demonstrates that tariffs will not emerge as a policy choice if income is redistributed solely through trade policy induced factor price changes a production tax cum subsidy will be adopted as both gainers and losers are better off than with a tariff

unit versus ad valorem taxes monopoly in general equilibrium abstract we show that if a monopoly sector is imbedded in a general equilibrium framework and profits are taxed at one hundred percent then unit specific taxation and ad valorem taxation are equivalent on the set of pareto optima

cross border shopping from small to large countries abstract contrary to predictions of theoretical models there are many examples in the real world of cross border shopping from small to large countries we demonstrate that a sufficient wedge between marginal costs of public funds in small and large countries can explain this phenomenon

on revenue and welfare dominance of ad valorem taxes in two sided markets abstract a benchmark result in public economics is that it is possible to increase both tax revenue and welfare by making a monopoly subject to ad valorem taxes rather than unit taxes we show that such revenue and welfare dominance does not hold in two sided markets

immiserizing transfers from abroad abstract this paper shows that an international transfer payment may paradoxically immiserize the recipient country or increase the donor country s welfare even when world markets are stable despite the traditional view that such a paradox theoretically requires market instability to demonstrate this paradoxical possibility the paper extends the conventional trade theoretic analysis to admit exogenous distortions created by tax cum subsidies in domestic production or endogenous distortions due to additionality requirements imposed by the donor on the recipient this analysis of immiserizing transfers from abroad immediately suggests significant implications for important policy issues including the evaluation of real benefits from foreign aid

eu regional policy and tax competition the european union eu provides coordination and financing of trans european transport infrastructures i e roads and railways which link the eu member states and reduce the cost of transport and mobility this raises the question of whether eu involvement in this area is justified by inefficiencies of national infrastructure policies moreover an often expressed concern is that policies enhancing mobility may boost tax competition we analyze these questions using a model where countries compete for the location of profitable firms we show that a coordination of investment in transport cost reducing infrastructures within union countries enhances welfare and mitigates tax competition in contrast with regard to union periphery infrastructure the union has an interest in a coordinated reduction of investment expenditures here the effects on tax competition are ambiguous our results provide a rationale for eu level regional policy that supports the development of intra union infrastructure

jeux sans frontieres tax competition and tax coordination when countries differ in size closer international integration is putting increasing pressure on existing national tax structures this paper uses a simple two country model to address a range of consequent policy concerns focusing particularly on the role of country size differences in size exacerbate the inefficiency from noncooperative behavior harming both countries the smaller country loses from harmonization to any tax rate between those set in the noncooperative equilibrium but both countries gain from the imposition of a minimum tax anywhere in that range the fully optimal response to freer cross border trade however may be to do nothing jel h20 h77

specific and ad valorem tariffs are not equivalent in trade wars abstract this note argues that when two countries choose optimal tariffs in a trade war specific tariffs are not equivalent to ad valorem tariffs even if all markets are competitive in particular it shows that if a country s trading partner switches from a specific tariff to an ad valorem tariff that yields the same revenue at the initial trade point the former country has an incentive to lower its tariff when two identical countries choose the types and magnitudes of tariffs in a two stage game they will choose ad valorem tariffs making the trade war less severe

a three input model of the spatial effects of a central city wage tax abstract this paper considers the short run and long run spatial effects on wages employment and business capital as functions of location of a localized increase in wage tax rates the model is most applicable to a central city that has a higher wage tax rate than the surrounding suburbs the inclusion of land as a third input in production significantly reduces the long run effects of a central city wage tax on employment near the central city boundary as compared with a model in which labor and capital are the only two inputs the short run effects are significantly less than the long run effects

spatial competition between jurisdictions which tax perfectly competitive retail or production centers abstract this paper examines the taxes that jurisdictions choose to impose on perfectly competitive retail centers or production centers within their boundaries retail centers are located on a line and jurisdictions are segments of the line a jurisdiction maximizes the sum of tax revenues and residents consumer surplus the tax chosen by a jurisdiction is a function of the spacing between retail centers the locations of interjurisdictional boundaries and the taxes imposed by neighboring jurisdictions an exporting jurisdiction chooses a positive tax an importing jurisdiction chooses a zero tax even if neighboring jurisdictions have taxes or subsidies if all jurisdictions with retail centers use endogenous fiscal policy then each imposes a positive or zero tax

voluntary export restraints antidumping procedure and domestic politics a voluntary export restraint ver is preferred to a tariff by a government concerned about electoral returns when the influence of industry profits is large relative to the losses to consumers from higher prices if the foreign firm is uncertain of these pressures the antidumping code facilitates the complete transfer of the relevant information and generates a ver rather than a tariff in equilibrium the choice across instruments is determined by the political attributes domestic and foreign profits rise with the antidumping generated ver and the ver lowers the volume of trade by more than the expected duty copyright 1996 by american economic association

multinational firms political competition and international trade policy this paper considers how the presence of multinational firms influences international trade policy that is determined as the outcome of political competition multinational firms have plants to protect in all policy jurisdictions and hence are more protectionist than national firms that at least have an interest in free trade in export markets nonetheless because of changed incentives for firms to provide political support for free trade and protectionist candidates an increased multinational presence via either merger or direct foreign investment has a liberalizing influence on trade policy copyright 1993 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association