war peace and the size of countries this paper studies the relationship between international con ict and the size distribution of countries in a model in which both peaceful bargaining and non peaceful confrontations are possible we show how the size distribution of countries depends on the likelihood bene ts and costs of con ict and war we also study the role of international law and show how better de ned international property rights may lead to country breakup and more numerous local con icts

turnout across democracies world democracies widely differ in legislative executive and legal institutions different institutional environments induce different mappings from electoral outcomes to the distribution of power we explore how these mappings affect voters participation in an election we show that the effect of such institutional differences on turnout depends on the distribution of voters preferences we uncover a novel contest effect given the preferences distribution turnout increases and then decreases when we move from a more proportional to a less proportional power sharing system turnout is maximized for an intermediate degree of power sharing moreover we generalize the competition effect common to models of endogenous turnout given the institutional environment turnout increases in the ex ante preferences evenness and more so when the overall system has lower power sharing these results are robust to a wide range of modeling approaches including ethical voter models voter mobilization models and rational voter models

optimal simple monetary and fiscal rules under limited asset market participation the combination of limited asset market participation and consumption habits generates indeterminacy for empirically plausible calibrations of a business cycle model characterized by price and nominal wage rigidities equilibrium determinacy is restored by demand management policies based on simple fiscal rules in this regard fiscal control of nominal income growth is particularly effective in addition the complementarity between the taylor rule and the fiscal feedback on nominal income growth produces relatively large welfare gains limiting both aggregate and intragroup volatilities

conditional cash transfers civil conflict and insurgent influence experimental evidence from the philippines abstract conditional cash transfer cct programs are an increasingly popular tool for reducing poverty in conflict affected areas despite their growing popularity there is limited evidence on how cct programs affect conflict and theoretical predictions are ambiguous we estimate the effect of conditional cash transfers on civil conflict in the philippines by exploiting an experiment that randomly assigned eligibility for a cct program at the village level we find that cash transfers caused a substantial decrease in conflict related incidents in treatment villages relative to control villages in the first 9 months of the program using unique data on local insurgent influence we also find that the program reduced insurgent influence in treated villages an analysis of possible spillovers yields inconclusive results while we find no statistical evidence of spillovers we also cannot rule out that the village level effect was due to displacement of insurgent activity from treatment to control villages

tax reform and automatic stabilization an income tax provides implicit insurance by dampening the variability of disposable income and consumption using an empirical framework derived from the consumption insurance literature and data from the panel study of income dynamics we examine the effect of federal income tax reforms of the 1980 s on automatic stabilization of consumption overall erta and tra86 reduced consumption stability by about 50 percent recently increased eitc generosity restored or enhanced consumption insurance the welfare cost of moving to the post tra86 system is sizable for relatively risk averse households facing large income risk but is much more modest for the typical household jel h21

consumer response to the timing of income evidence from a change in tax withholding in 1992 the income tax withholding tables were adjusted so that withholding was reduced a typical worker received an extra 28 80 in take home pay per month in march through december 1992 to be offset by a lower tax refund in 1993 the change in withholding amounted to 0 5 percent of gdp president bush who proposed this change in his state of the union address intended that it provide a temporary stimulus to demand but the policy change involved only the timing of income so under the life cycle permanent income model it would be predicted to have a negligible effect on consumption and aggregate demand this paper reports consumers responses to the change in withholding the results are based on a survey taken shortly after it went into effect forty three percent of consumers report spending the extra take home pay substantially more than the zero percent predicted by the standard models but substantially less than the one hundred percent upon which the policy was predicated the decision to save the income is not explained by expected income growth therefore while behavior of many households is not fully consistent with the life cycle permanent income model liquidity constraints do not appear to account for this behavior this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

vulnerable trade the dark side of an edgeworth box abstract we examine incentives to seize and defend goods offered for trade in an edgeworth box economy appropriation possibilities generate equilibrium of coerced redistribution and voluntary trade in a reduced box potential mutual gains remain untaken because the prospect of piracy creates a price wedge wherein the effective relative price is lowered for the exporter and raised for the importer as the vulnerability of one or both goods increases the price wedge widens causing trade to diminish if vulnerability becomes sufficiently high then equilibrium with trade ceases to exist in the edgeworth box economy

dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders the theory of rent seeking with its origins in the observations of gordon tullock 1967 or to use jagdish bhagwati s 1982 proposed term the theory of directly unproductive profit seeking activities is concerned with the potentially adverse effects on resource allocation of incentives to cap ture and defend artificially contrived rents and transfers the scope for so cial loss proposed by the theory derives from the relation between the value of a contestable prize and the value of the resources attracted into the con test to determine the beneficiary of the prize underlying this social loss is a specification of how rational behavior by optimizing agents links the value of the prize sought to the resources expended it has been traditional to assume competitive behavior in describing the activities of lobbying and influence seeking then if some further condi tions are satisfied l the total value of the resources expended precisely equals the value of the prize sought so dissipation is complete 2 conse quently the social cost associated with contestability of a rent can be in ferred from the value of the rent itself and the detailed and hard to come by information on individual outlays made in the course of the contest be comes unnecessary by basing their analyses on competitive dissipation contributors to the rent seeking literature see the review by robert tollison 1982 have been able to presume that the observed value of a contested rent is an exact measure of the associated social cost of monopoly power or regu lation similarly in the trade theoretic literature where the rights contested are to quota premia or revenues from trade taxes krueger 1974 bhagwati

free entry and efficient rent seeking this paper concerns rent seeking and the extent to which rents are dissipated under various circumstances gordon tullock s 1967 insight that expenditures made to capture an artificially created transfer represent a social waste suggested that the cost to the economy of monopoly and regulation is greater than the simple harberger 1954 deadweight loss indeed under tullock s original formulation and in the extensions of his work by krueger 1974 and posner 1975 rents are exactly dissipated at the social level 1 is spent to capture 1 so that the total welfare loss from such activities is equal to the harberger triangle plus the rectangle of monopoly profits

aggregate comparative statics abstract in aggregative games each player s payoff depends on her own actions and an aggregate of the actions of all the players many common games in industrial organization political economy public economics and macroeconomics can be cast as aggregative games this paper provides a general and tractable framework for comparative static results in aggregative games we focus on two classes of games 1 aggregative games with strategic substitutes and 2 nice aggregative games where payoff functions are continuous and concave in own strategies we provide simple sufficient conditions under which positive shocks to individual players increase their own actions and have monotone effects on the aggregate the results are illustrated with applications to public good provision contests cournot competition and technology choices in oligopoly

disaggregating the effect of the business cycle on the distribution of income this paper disaggregates total household income into a complete set of components and studies the comparative cyclicality of these com ponent to economic growth comparisons of the relative responsiveness to gnp growth of wages hours of work and total labor market income of heads and wives and transfer income sources of households are made across income race sex and age groups this provides a picture of the channels by which economic growth produces income change significant differences in elasticities are found to exist both between different income components and between different population groups for the same component the narrowing income distribution in times of high growth occurs primarily because of large elasticities on head s labor market income among the poor both wages and hours show evidence of cycli cality the labor market earnings of women both wives and household heads is far less responsive to growth cyclicality in transfer income varies enormously between population groups and by type of transfer

food stamp caseloads over the business cycle 1 introduction the onset of the current economic downturn following the longest expansion in u s history has renewed interest in the role of automatic stabilizers designed to insure households against negative cyclical income shocks this system of income and consumption stabilizers includes among others the individual income tax and the panoply of social insurance programs such as unemployment insurance and the food stamp program while the income tax and unemployment insurance have received recent attention gruber 1997 auerbach and feenberg 2000 kniesner and ziliak 2002a b little is known about the role of food stamps as an automatic stabilizer even though the program served over 27 million americans at its peak in 1994 this gap in the literature is particularly acute in light of passage of the personal responsibility and work opportunity reconciliation act of 1996 welfare reform act which introduced new rules on cash assistance recipients and thus the nearly half of food stamp recipients who also receive cash welfare moreover the 1996 welfare reform also had a direct administrative effect on the food stamp program by ending the eligibility of some recipients reducing average benefit levels and requiring states to replace paper coupons with electronic benefit transfer cards importantly the welfare reform act also eliminated the entitlement status of the main cash welfare program aid to families with dependent children afdc thus positioning food stamps as a more prominent countercyclical consumption stabilizer a first task in assessing the possible stabilization role of food stamps in the era of welfare reform is to identify the cyclical sensitivity of food stamp caseloads if food stamp caseloads are acyclical then we would expect no role for food stamps in smoothing consumption over the business cycle if however food stamp caseloads are highly cyclical then food stamps may function as an important antirecessionary tool by the same token the new welfare policies may independently affect food stamp caseload movements and interact with the business cycle thereby altering the possible stabilization role of the program in this paper we specify a dynamic model of food stamp caseloads to estimate the responsiveness of the caseload to the business cycle to welfare policies and to interactions between the business cycle and welfare policies unlike cash welfare there has been scant research on the cyclicality of food stamp caseloads 1 wallace and blank 1999 are a recent exception in their use of both static annual and dynamic monthly food stamp caseload models based on state level panel data for the 1980 to 1998 federal fiscal years with annual data food stamp caseloads were strongly countercyclical and reform of afdc led to weak declines in total caseloads 2 specifically they attribute up to 44 of the 1994 to 1998 food stamp caseload decline to economic conditions and about 6 of the decline to welfare reform they reach broadly similar conclusions with monthly data however wallace and blank calculate that upward of 85 of the post 1996 decline in food stamp caseloads can be attributed to welfare reform if one is willing to ascribe all the unexplained residual to welfare reform which as the authors note is undoubtedly an overestimate of welfare reform s effect on food stamp caseloads p 85 in their static models figlio gundersen and ziliak 2000 reached conclusions similar to wallace and blank s estimates with annual level data in their preferred dynamic models they attribute about 35 of the 1994 to 1998 caseload decline to the macroeconomy and virtually nothing to welfare reform we improve on this previous research on food stamp caseloads along several dimensions first we not only follow other research in estimating the impact of afdc policy changes on food stamp caseloads but also examine the impact of policies that are focused directly on food stamps

income volatility and household consumption the impact of food assistance programs the impact offood assistance programs food stamps in a period of rising income inequality in the united states is analyzed using 1978 92 psid data we assess to what extent food assistance can be viewed as an effective insurance to permanent shocks to income the results show that the program has a substantial consumption smoothing effect in the lowincome population the response of food consumption to a permanent income shock is a third lower after accounting for the monetary value of food stamps

automatic stabilizers and economic crisis us vs europe this paper analyzes the effectiveness of the tax and transfer systems in the eu and the us to provide income insurance through automatic stabilization in the recent economic crisis we find that automatic stabilizers absorb 38 of a proportional income shock in the eu compared to 32 in the us in the case of an unemployment shock 47 of the shock is absorbed in the eu compared to 34 in the us this cushioning of disposable income leads to a demand stabilization of up to 30 in the eu and up to 20 in the us there is large heterogeneity within the eu automatic stabilizers in eastern and southern europe are much lower than in central and northern european countries we also investigate whether countries with weak automatic stabilizers have enacted larger fiscal stimulus programs

discretionary fiscal responses to the covid 19 pandemic we analyse discretionary fiscal responses to the covid 19 pandemic we distinguish policies for three phases of the pandemic 1 acute overall disruption 2 initial recovery phase and 3 the longer term we analyse measures already taken in 1 and consider measures relevant for 2 we distinguish between lump sum subsidies such as deferral of tax payments which may ease financial constraints and measures which intentionally affect incentives we also identify factors that are important given the short term nature of the measures

transfer seeking and avoidance on the full social costs of rent seeking we would like to thank gordon tullock and an anonymous referee of this journal for their helpful comments and suggestions this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the reaction of household consumption to predictable changes in social security taxes the key implication of rational expectations and the basic life cycle permanent income hypothesis that predictable changes in income have no effect on the growth rate of consumption expenditures is examined this implication is important for understanding the effectiveness and optimal timing of fiscal policy the causes and propagation of business cycles and the effects of income fluctuations on the growth rate of the economy using household level consumption data from the consumer expenditure survey whether expenditures on nondurable goods increase contemporaneously with predictable changes in social security tax withholding is tested it is found that households do change their consumption expenditures in response to the predictable fluctuations in income induced by the social security tax system

government size and business cycle volatility how important are credit constraints in this paper we analyse how the availability of credit influences the relationship between government size as a proxy for fiscal stabilization policy and the amplitude of business cycle fluctuations in a sample of advanced oecd countries interpreting relatively low loan to value ratios as an indication of tight credit constraints we find that government size exerts a stabilizing effect on output and consumption growth fluctuations only when credit constraints are relatively tight our results provide support for the hypothesis that credit market frictions play a crucial role in the transmission of fiscal policy

countercyclical taxes in a monopolistically competitive environment in the context of a neoclassical growth model with monopolistic competition this paper studies the stabilizing effects of countercyclical tax policy when the income tax rate has an additional role of financing government budget deficits consistent with the conventional wisdom countercyclical taxes generally reduce aggregate volatility unless the fiscal response to debt accumulation is weak the presence of monopoly power enhances these effects even when automatic stabilizers successfully stabilize business cycle fluctuations countercyclical taxes are welfare inferior due to reduced precautionary saving motives while if the fiscal response to debt is weak and countercyclical tax policy destabilizing the increased precautionary saving motive is not welfare enhancing as the asset accumulated is government debt rather than capital these results are generally robust nominal inertia may however dominate the precautionary saving mechanism

allocation of fixed costs in distribution networks with distributed generation in this paper we propose a method for the allocation of fixed capital and nonvariable operation and maintenance costs at the medium voltage mv distribution level the method is derived from the philosophy behind the widely used mw mile methodology for transmission networks that bases fixed cost allocations on the extent of use that is derived from load flows we calculate the extent of use by multiplying the total consumption or generation at a busbar by the marginal current variations or power to current distribution factors pidfs that an increment of active and reactive power consumed or generated in the case of distributed generation at each busbar produces in each circuit these pidfs are analogous to power transfer distribution factors ptdfs unlike traditional tariff designs that average fixed costs on a per kwh basis across all customers the proposed method provides more cost reflective price signals and helps eliminate possible cross subsidies that deter profitable in the case of competition or cost effective in the case of a fully regulated industry deployment of dg by directly accounting for use and location in the allocation of fixed costs an application of this method for a rural radial distribution network is presented

illegal markets and the social costs of rent seeking this paper argues that making goods or services illegal results in an increase in the social costs associated with rent seeking the increased social cost is in the form of negative externalities that result from market participants use of coercion and violence in attempts to control trade in the illegal good consequently the social costs of rent seeking will exceed the value of resources dissipated in rent seeking competition and where the external costs exceed the undissipated portion of the tullock cost the social cost of rent seeking is greater than the sum of tullock and harberger costs

conflict and rent seeking success functions ratio vs difference models of relative success the rent seeking competitions studied by economists fall within a much broader category of conflict interactions that also includes military combats election campaigns industrial disputes lawsuits and sibling rivalries in the rent seeking literature each party s success pi which can be interpreted either as the probability of victory or as the proportion of the prize won has usually been taken to be a function of the ratio of the respective resource commitments alternatively however pi may instead be a function of the difference between the parties commitments to the contest the contest success function csf for the difference from is a logistic curve in which as is consistent with military experience increasing returns apply up to an inflection point at equal resource commitments a crucial flaw of the traditional ratio model is that neither onesided submission nor two sided peace between the parties can ever occur as a cournot equilibrium in contrast both of these outcomes are entirely consistent with a model in which success is a function of the difference between the parties resource commitments

the significance of federal taxes as automatic stabilizers using the taxsim model for the period 1962 95 we consider the federal tax system s impact as an automatic stabilizer despite the many changes in the tax system there has been relatively little change in its role as an automatic stabilizer we estimate that individual federal taxes offset perhaps as much as 8 percent of initial shocks to gdp we also suggest that the progressive income tax may help to stabilize output via its effect on the supply of labor an additional effect that may even be of similar magnitude to the more traditional path of stabilization through aggregate demand

macroeconomic externalities are pigovian taxes the answer basic welfare economics tells us that many types of externalities can be remedied by proper use of corrective taxes and subsidies this paper shows that this notion also extends to the macroeconomi

social spending and automatic stabilizers in the oecd the macroeconomic literature on automatic stabilization tends to focus on taxes and dismiss the relevance of government expenditure except for unemployment compensation our results go sharply contrary to this view we engage in an empirical analysis of 21 oecd countries from 1982 to 2003 and find that age and health related social expenditure as well as incapacity and sick benefits all react to the cycle in a stabilizing manner while possibly new in the macro literature this conforms to many results in studies in labour economics the policy implications are broad since much previous analysis of discretionary fiscal policy rests on official figures for automatic stabilization there are also major implications for efforts to incorporate automatic fiscal policy in simulation models julia darby and jacques melitz

efficient rents 1 rent seeking behavior in the long run we have analyzed long run behavior in rent seeking under several conditions and behavioral hypotheses the question of interest is whether or not the long run expenditures will exactly equal the value of the rents our results depend on the type of competitive response which is assumed to exist in the long run and on the r value governing the probability of winning

risk averse rent seekers and the social cost of monopoly power there is now quite general recognition that the social cost of monopoly power encompasses the resources expended by individuals seeking to become the beneficiaries of monopoly rents however since the activity of rent seeking is generally not observable direct estimates of resources expended in quests to acquire monopoly power are usually impossible to come by 1 as a consequence the indirect approach of taking the observed value of monopoly rents as indicative of the unobserved value of the resources expended in rent seeking is quite generally adopted in approaches to evaluation of the social cost of such activity

how much would us style fiscal integration buffer european unemployment and income shocks a comparative empirical analysis we examine the degree to which federal fiscal integration smoothes income and unemployment shocks across us states we find that roughly 25 cents of every dollar of income shock at the state level is offset by federal fiscal policy this stabilization comes entirely through the federal tax system not through spending stabilizers automatic or otherwise if we apply a comparable amount of cross country stabilization to european union countries as exists across us states greece and spain would be receiving additional transfers of 2 5 percent of gdp

implementing the new fiscal policy activism to many observers the current recession provides compelling circumstances for renewed fiscal policy activism but the strong support for fiscal policy intervention reflects a renewed belief in policy activism that had already appeared before the present crisis however the recent debate about possible fiscal policy interventions suggests that we are still relying on the approaches to discretionary policy used in past periods of policy activism it is not surprising that there have been few advances in discretionary policy design given the lack of favor such policy suffered over many years but if we are going to practice fiscal discretionary policy on a large scale then more attention to policy design is sorely needed this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

personal income tax progressivity and output volatility evidence from oecd countries this paper investigates empirically the effect of personal income tax progressivity on output volatility using macro data from a sample of oecd countries over the period 1982 2009 our measure of progressivity is based on the difference between the marginal and the average personal income tax rate for the average production worker we find supportive empirical evidence for the hypothesis that higher personal income tax progressivity leads to lower output volatility this effect comes in addition to the stabilizing impact of government size and it is equally important in economic terms all other factors constant countries with more progressive personal income tax systems seem to benefit from stronger automatic stabilizers

do in work tax credits serve as a safety net we test the eitc s response to economic need using irs data we exploit differences in timing and severity of economic cycles across states because the eitc requires earned income there is a theoretical ambiguity in the credit s cyclicality we find higher unemployment leads to increased likelihood of eitc recipiency and in credit amounts received for married couples but has insignificant effects for single individuals the eitc s protective effects are concentrated among skilled workers the eitc mitigates income shocks for married couples with children and groups likely to have moderate earnings but does not for most recipients single parents with children

the response of household consumption to income tax refunds a central implication of the life cycle or permanent income theory is that consumption should not respond to predictable fluctuations in income tests of this implication have yielded mixed results especially on micro data angus deaton 1992 martin browning and annamaria lusardi 1996 in large part this might be due to the difficulties of isolating the predictable component of income at the micro level most tests proceed by instrumenting for income but since the available instruments are typically poor such tests might be prejudiced against finding significant excess sensitivity of consumption to income john shea 1995 also it is not clear how closely the resulting econometric predictions of income coincide with agents actual expectations of income to avoid these difficulties this paper examines the response of household consumption to a particular type of income that is both predictable and transitory income tax refunds since a refund depends on events in the previous calendar year it is predictable income as regards consumption in the year of its receipt consequently under the life cycle theory consumption should not increase on receipt of a refund 2 in addition to testing the canonical model of consumption this paper provides estimates interpretable as the marginal propensity to consume mpc out of refunds since federal tax refunds now amount to over 80 billion per year averaging well over 1 000 per refund these estimates are of interest in themselves more generally they bear on the impact of even preannounced and temporary changes in fiscal policy the paper begins by surveying related studies in section i section ii describes the data the consumer expenditure survey cex which of the leading u s micro data sets has the most comprehensive coverage of expenditure the empirical specification is set out in section hi section iv reports the results and section v concludes

unemployment insurance as a housing market stabilizer this paper studies the impact of unemployment insurance ui on the housing market exploiting heterogeneity in ui generosity across us states and over time we find that ui helps the unemployed avoid mortgage default we estimate that ui expansions during the great recession prevented more than 1 3 million foreclosures and insulated home values from labor market shocks the results suggest that policies that make mortgages more affordable can reduce foreclosures even when borrowers are severely underwater an optimal ui policy during housing downturns would weigh among other benefits and costs the deadweight losses avoided from preventing mortgage defaults

the effect of income taxation on consumption and labor supply we estimate the incentive effects of income taxation in a life cycle model of consumption and labor supply without intratemporal strong separability we find that consumption and hours worked are direct complements in utility both increase with a compensated increase in the net wage the compensated net wage elasticity is about 0 3 nearly double estimates for u s men from a linear labor supply specification estimated intertemporal elasticities indicate significant intertemporal smoothing of utility the estimated marginal welfare cost of government revenue is 6 20 which is about half the estimated welfare cost when additivity between consumption and leisure is incorrectly imposed

group contests with internal conflict and power asymmetry we investigate simultaneous inter and intra group conflict in the shadow of within group power asymmetry and complementarity in members group conflict efforts a more symmetric group faces a higher degree of internal conflict and might expend more effort in external conflict when the group conflict effort technology is highly complementary depending on the degree of complementarity the stronger player s relative contribution to external conflict might be higher in a more asymmetric group and as a result it is possible for the weaker player to earn a higher payoff in the absence of any complementarity the rent dissipation is non monotonic with the within group power asymmetry

the role of food stamps in consumption stabilization although the food stamp program is the largest universal entitlement program in the social safety net little is known about its stabilizing role in household income and consumption using data from the panel study of income dynamics spanning 1980 99 we estimate the volatility of income with and without food stamps coupled with a variance decomposition of consumption among families at high ex ante risk of food stamp participation food stamps reduced income volatility by about 12 percent and food consumption volatility by about 14 percent there was however a marked decline in consumption smoothing benefits of the program in the early 1990s relative to the 1980s

the role of automatic stabilizers in the u s business cycle most countries have automatic rules in their tax and transfer systems that are partly intended to stabilize economic uctuations this paper measures how eective they are at lowering the volatility of u s economic activity we identify seven potential stabilizers in the data and include four theoretical channels through which they may operate in a business cycle model calibrated to the u s data the model is used to compare the volatility of output in the data with counterfactuals where some or all of the stabilizers are shut down our rst nding is that proportional taxes like sales property and corporate income taxes contribute little to stabilization our second

the effects of discretionary fiscal policy on macroeconomic aggregates a reappraisal fiscal stimuli to recover a cascade of academic and layman articles debate the effectiveness of fiscal policy in stimulating the economy backed up by different economic models and empirical support this essay surveys the theoretical predictions and recent empirical vector autoregression var evidence on the short run effects of discretionary fiscal policy on macroeconomic aggregates

the macroeconomic stabilisation effects of social security and 401 k plans this paper investigates how various retirement institutions impact the macroeconomy we find that for every 1 percentage point increase in the output gap net flows of various government programmes including social security decrease by 0 34 percentage points while net flows of 401 k plans increase by 0 05 percentage points in levels for every 1 increase in real gross domestic product net flows from various government programmes shrink by 45 cents whereas net flows from 401 k plans increase by 4 6 cents in other words 401 k plans reduce the automatic stabilisation impact of government programmes by 10 15 moreover we find that social security has a net negative effect on household consumption while 401 k retirement accounts work the opposite way in fact the destabilising effect of 401 k plans on consumption is twice as strong as the one attributed to social security these results highlight a significant problem with 401 k retirement plans and any retirement plan that is dependent on financial markets copyright the author 2012 published by oxford university press on behalf of the cambridge political economy society all rights reserved oxford university press

monetary policy and automatic stabilizers the role of progressive taxation we study the effects of progressive labor income taxation in an otherwise standard new keynesian nk model we show that progressive taxation i introduces a trade off between output and inflation stabilization and affects the slope of the phillips curve ii acts as automatic stabilizer changing the responses to technology shocks and demand shocks and iii alters the prescription for the optimal monetary policy the welfare gains from commitment decrease as labor income taxes become more progressive quantitatively the model reproduces the observed negative correlation between the volatility of output hours and inflation and the degree of progressivity of labor income taxation

efficient rents 2 free entry and efficient rent seeking in the competition for a monopoly right in which the number of bidders is fixed tullock and others have found the value of the resources spent in the aggregate to capture the transfer to be sometimes less than and sometimes greater than the value of the monopoly we think this approach to be incomplete since it leaves unanswered the question of what determines the number of individuals who will vie for the right to be the monopolist it is unsatisfactory to imagine for example that the franchisor sets the number of contestants one could then foresee that rent seeking would arise to influence the permissible number of bidders and this merely moves the rent seeking dissipation question one step back