dynamic price competition with fixed capacities in this paper we study price competition for an oligopoly in a dynamic setting where each of the sellers has a fixed number of units available for sale over a fixed number of periods demand is stochastic and depending on how it evolves sellers may change their prices at any time this reflects the fact that firms constantly and almost costlessly change their prices reacting to updates in their estimates of market demand competitor prices or inventory levels in a setting with demand uncertainty we show that there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium for a duopoly in which all states sellers engage in bertrand competition and the seller with the lower equilibrium reservation value sells a unit at a price equal to the competitor s equilibrium reservation value this structure therefore extends the marginal value concept of bid price control used in many revenue management implementations to a competitive model we give a closed form solution to the equilibrium price paths for a duopoly and extend all the results to an n firm oligopoly we then study extensions to multiple customer types uncertain valuations and differentiated products this paper was accepted by martin lariviere operations management

convergence to efficiency in a simple market with incomplete information a model of trade with m buyers and m sellers is considered in which price is set to equate revealed demand and supply in a bayesian nash equilibrium each trader acts not as a price taker but instead misrepresents his true demand supply to influence price in his favor this causes inefficiency we show that in any equilibrium the amount by which a trader misreports is o 1 m and the corresponding inefficiency is o 1 m2 the indeterminacy and the inefficiency that is caused by the traders bargaining behavior in small markets thus rapidly vanishes as the market increases in size

equilibrium in hotelling s model of spatial competition we study hotelling s two stage model of spatial competition in which two firms first simultaneously choose locations in the unit interval then simultaneously choose prices under hotelling s assumptions uniform distribution of consumers travel cost proportional to distance inelastic demand of one unit by each consumer the price setting subgames possess equilibria in pure strategies for only a limited set of location pairs because of this problem pointed out independently by vickrey 1964 and d aspremont et al 1979 hotelling s claim that there is an equilibrium of the two stage game in which the firms locate close to each other is incorrect a result of dasgupta and maskin 1986 guarantees that each price setting subgame has an equilibrium in mixed strategies we first study these mixed strategy equilibria we are unable to provide a complete characterization of them although we show that for a subset of location pairs all equilibria are of a certain type we reduce the problem of finding an equilibrium of this type to that of solving three or fewer highly nonlinear equations at each of a large number of location pairs we have computed approximate solutions to the system of equations next we use our analytical results and computations to study the equilibrium location choices of the firms there is a unique up to symmetry subgame perfect equilibrium in which the location choices of the firms are pure in it the firms locate 0 27 from the ends of the market at this equilibrium the support of the subgame equilibrium price strategy is the union of two short intervals most of the probability weight is in the upper interval so that this strategy is reminiscent of occasional sales by the firms we also find a subgame perfect equilibrium in which each firm uses a mixed strategy in locations in fact in the class of strategy pairs in which the firms use the same mixed strategy over locations and this strategy is symmetric about 0 5 there is a single equilibrium in this equilibrium most of the probability weight of the common strategy is between 0 2 and 0 4 and between 0 6 and 0 8 there is a wide range of pure nash as opposed to subgame perfect equilibrium location pairs the subgame strategies in which each firm threatens to charge a price of zero in response to a deviation support all but those location pairs in which the firms are very close

disadvantageous collusion and government regulation abstract the semi collusion model indicates that when firms collude on outputs and compete on capacities cartel members may be worse off why do rational firms choose such kind of disadvantageous collusion in order to solve the puzzle this article uses taiwan s flour cartel case to investigate firms incentives and finds that government regulation seems to be the primary reason to create such a predicament

asymmetric price adjustments a supply side approach using a model of dynamic price competition we provide an explanation from the supply side for the well established observation that output prices react faster in response to input cost increases than to decreases when costs decline the opportunity of profitable storing in anticipation of higher future costs allows competitive firms to coordinate on prices above current marginal costs the initial price response is only partial and profitable storing relaxes competition conversely when costs rise storing is not beneficial in anticipation of lower future costs and firms immediately adjust their prices to current marginal costs which entails the standard bertrand outcome our results shed new light on the empirical evidence about asymmetric pricing and can stimulate further empirical investigation on this puzzle

aggregation of information in large cournot markets consider a homogeneous product market where firms have private information about an uncertain demand parameter and compete in quantities we examine the convergence properties of bayesian cournot equilibria as the economy is replicated and conclude that large cournot or almost competitive markets do not aggregate information efficiently except possibly when the production technology exhibits constant returns to scale even in a competitive market there is a welfare loss with respect to the first best outcome due to incomplete information in general nevertheless a competitive market is efficient taking as given the decentralized private information structure of the economy endogenous and costly information acquisition is examined and seen to imply that the market outcome always falls short of the first best level with decreasing returns to scale the results are also shown to be robust to the addition of extra rounds of competition which allows firms to use the information revealed by past prices explicit closed form solutions yielding comparative static results are obtained for models characterized by quadratic payoffs and affine information structures

a note on bertrand competition with asymmetric fixed costs abstract we consider a model of bertrand competition with fixed costs of entry or production we show that contrary to most of the existing literature that focuses on symmetric firms and hence symmetric equilibria if we allow these fixed costs to be different for each firm competition may prevent higher cost firms from entering this market even if the differences in cost are small specifically all firms except for the two with the lowest fixed cost find entry blockaded and the two firms with the lowest fixed costs compete ignoring the threat of potential entry

industrial organization and public policy competition policy has been dominated by politics industrial organization can expect to exert an influence only insofar as it commands superior knowledge that is true with respect to the long run since economies of scale are limited to the short run competition is feasible in the long run therefore a trade off approach seeking to identify optimal market structures is misleading competition policy should instead be directed at prohibiting protective strategies of incumbents to deter entry competition being a process of creative destruction political viability of a competitive order requires competition policy to be supplemented by a social welfare policy

dynamic cournot duopoly with intertemporal capacity constraints this paper studies a dynamic cournot duopoly in which suppliers have a limited amount of products available for two consecutive periods we derive optimal sales strategies and analyze welfare effects with and without commitment under commitment strategies do not depend on the rival s realized sales in this case there is a unique nash equilibrium for any allocation of initial supplies and prices increase over time absent commitment sellers can adjust their supply decision after the first period in this case a subgame perfect nash equilibrium does not always exist and prices may decline over time a more asymmetric allocation of stocks generally leads to higher first period prices whereas the impact on second period prices is ambiguous the larger firm typically prefers not to commit whereas the smaller firm is better off under commitment commitment generates a higher total surplus and almost always a higher consumer surplus our findings thus suggest that market transparency or flexible supply contracts can adversely affect welfare in situations where production precedes sales and firms face an intertemporal capacity constraint

long run competition in capacity short run competition in price and the cournot model in this article we investigate the nature of equilibrium in markets in which firms choose the scale of operation before they make pricing decisions we analyze a duopoly model in which firms choose their capacities before engaging in bertrand like price competition we demonstrate that the cournot outcome is unlikely to emerge in such markets and that the equilibrium tends to be more competitive than the cournot model would predict in addition our results indicate a tendency toward asymmetric firm sizes and price dispersion that results from the mixed strategies firms use in equilibrium

signaling quality through prices in an oligopoly firms signal quality through prices even if the market structure is very competitive and price competition is severe in a symmetric bertrand oligopoly where products may differ only in their quality and each firm s product quality is private information unknown to consumers and to other firms there exist symmetric fully revealing perfect bayesian equilibria where low quality firms randomize over an interval of prices and high quality firms charge high prices signaling requires that the market power and rent of low quality firms be large enough and often this requires that high quality firms exercise sufficient market power there is a unique symmetric fully revealing equilibrium satisfying the d1 criterion in this equilibrium too both low and high quality firms may exhibit considerable market power market power of high quality firms may persist even as the number of firms becomes arbitrarily large every d1 equilibrium involves some revelation of information

voting over income taxation abstract a major problem of the positive theory of income taxation is to explain why statutory income tax schedules in practice are marginal rate progressive while it is commonly believed that this is but a simple consequence of the fact that the number of relatively poor voters exceeds that of richer voters in general putting this contention in a voting equilibrium context is not a trivial task we do this here in the context of nonlinear taxation and attempt to provide a formal argument in support of this heuristic claim we first establish the existence of mixed strategy equilibria and identify certain cases in which marginal rate progressive taxes are chosen almost surely by the political parties unfortunately we also find that if the tax policy space is not artificially constrained the support of at least one equilibrium cannot be contained within the set of marginal rate progressive taxes

the rate of convergence to efficiency in the buyer s bid double auction as the market becomes large a trader who privately knows his preferences may misrepresent them in order to influence the market price this strategic behaviour may prevent realization of all gains from trade in this paper trade in a simple market with an explicit rule for price formation is modelled as a bayesian game we show that the difference between a trader s bid and his reservation value is maximally 0 1 m where m is the number of traders on each side of the market competitive pressure as m increases thus quickly overcomes the inefficiency private information causes and f ces the market towards an efficient allocation

existence of equilibrium in large double auctions abstract we show the existence of a pure strategy symmetric increasing equilibrium in double auction markets with correlated conditionally independent private values and many participants the equilibrium we find is arbitrarily close to fully revealing as the market size grows our results provide strategic foundations for price taking behavior in large markets

the all pay auction with nonmonotonic payoff i model innovation contests as an all pay auction in which it is possible not to achieve successful innovation despite costly r d investments and as a result there is no winner in such a case the winning payoff turns out to be nonmonotonic in own bid i derive the sufficient conditions for the existence of pure strategy equilibria and fully characterize the nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibrium in the mixed strategy equilibrium the support of the low value bidder is not continuous and both the high value and the low value bidders place an atom in the distinct lower bound of their respective support under symmetric valuation both bidders place an atom at zero these results can explain why one does not observe very low quality innovation in real life or why even symmetric firms may stay out of an innovation contest

a dynamic model of differentiated oligopoly with capital accumulation abstract we consider a dynamic model of differentiated oligopoly with capital accumulation we prove that the model may converge to either a steady state replicating the optimum of the static problem or a steady state driven by capital accumulation alone in the latter case the same steady state equilibrium is observed under both cournot and bertrand competition as well as social planning journal of economic literature classifications numbers c73 l13

product selection by quantity setting firms abstract hotelling suggested that competition between oligopolistic sellers would result in consumers with inelastic demands being offered products with an excessive sameness smithies extended the hotelling result to the case of elastic demand while these results are intuitively appealing it has subsequently been shown that both the two stage and simultaneous price location games suffer from fundamental non existence problems when firms do not price discriminate in this paper we investigate the smithies analysis assuming that firms compete in quantities rather than prices we show that a tendency to agglomeration is characteristic of quantity location competition but when locations and quantities are chosen simultaneously problems of non existence of equilibrium do not arise and the principle of minimum differentiation does not hold by contrast when firms play a two stage game choosing locations in the first stage and quantities in the second stage the non existence problems that characterize price location games whether simultaneous or two stage extend to the two stage quantity location game for certain parameter values

china s changing energy intensity trend a decomposition analysis china experienced a dramatic decline in energy intensity from the onset of economic reform in the late 1970s until 2000 but since then the rate of decline slowed and energy intensity actually increased in 2003 most previous studies found that most of the decline was due to technological change but disagreed on the role of structural change to the best of our knowledge no decomposition study has investigated the role of inter fuel substitution in the decline in energy intensity or the causes of the rise in energy intensity since 2000 in this paper we use logarithmic mean divisia index lmdi techniques to decompose changes in energy intensity in the period 1980 2003 we find that 1 technological change is confirmed as the dominant contributor to the decline in energy intensity 2 structural change at the industry and sector sub industry level actually increased energy intensity over the period of 1980 2003 although the structural change at the industry level was very different in the 1980s and in the post 1990 period 3 structural change involving shifts of production between sub sectors however decreased overall energy intensity 4 the increase in energy intensity since 2000 is explained by negative technological progress 5 inter fuel substitution is found to contribute little to the changes in energy intensity

the loser s curse and information aggregation in common value auctions we consider an auction in which k identical objects of unknown value are auctioned off to n bidders the k highest bidders get an object and pay the k 1st bid bidders receive a signal that provides information about the value of the object we characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of this auction we then consider a sequence of auctions a r with n r bidders and k r objects we show that price converges in probability to the true value of the object if and only if both k r and n r k r i e both the number of objects and the number of bidders who do not receive an object go to infinity

energy intensity and its determinants in china s regional economies abstract this paper contributes to the existing literature as well as policy debates by examining energy intensity and its determinants in china s regional economies the analysis is based on a comprehensive database of china s regional energy balance constructed for this project through its focus on regional china this study extends the existing literature which mainly covers nationwide studies it is found in this paper that energy intensity declined substantially in china the main contributing factor is the improvement in energy efficiency changes in the economic structure have so far affected energy intensity modestly thus there is considerable scope to reduce energy intensity through the structural transformation of the chinese economy in the future

bertrand competition for inputs and walrasian outcomes market making by merchants who obtain stock from suppliers and resell it to con sumers is modeled as a two stage pricing game with winner take all c ompetition for the inputs in contrast to fixed capacity models the re is a unique subgame perfect nash equilibrium spne which is walr asian for elastic demand and non walrasian for inelastic demand alte rnatively when merchants first sell forward contracts to consumers a nd then compete for supplies the unique spne is always walrasian th us the author has an equilibrium model in which walrasian price aris es not from the benevolent actions of a fictitious auctioneer but fr om optimal price setting behavior of merchants copyright 1988 by american economic association

the provision of information in a bertrand oligopoly a two stage model of a homogeneous good oligopoly is constructed that is composed of a first stage determining costless information provision to consumers and then a second stage of price setting a perfect equilibrium is found that is characterized by les s than full information and by positive expected profits an alternati ve interpretation of the model is of firms deciding the proportion of contracts to tender for and then the prices at which the tenders wil l be made copyright 1993 by blackwell publishing ltd

collusive equilibrium in the great salt duopoly this paper uses data presented in a report of the monopolies and mergers commission on the market for white salt to test the implications of some recent developments in oligopoly theory the market in question is a homogeneous price setting duopoly where firms are subject to capacity constraints we find that the conclusions of models based on one shot non cooperative games do not hold collusion in the market is readily explained by the types of threat strategies underlying abreu s simple penal codes possible explanations of the collusive equilibrium in terms of joint profit maximization are not supported by the data indeed the explanation of the equilibrium remains an open question copyright 1993 by royal economic society

bargaining under incomplete information this paper presents and analyzes a bargaining model of bilateral monopoly under uncertainty under the bargaining rule proposed the buyer and the seller each submit sealed offers that determine whether the good in question is sold and the transfer price the nash equilibrium solution of this bargaining game implies an offer strategy of each party that is monotonic in its own reservation price and depends on its assessment of the opponent s reservation price issues of relative bargaining advantage and efficiency are examined for a number of special cases finally we discuss the appropriateness of the nash solution concept

the lmdi approach to decomposition analysis a practical guide in a recent study ang energy policy 32 2004 compared various index decomposition analysis methods and concluded that the logarithmic mean divisia index method is the preferred method since the literature on the method tends to be either too technical or specific for most potential users this paper provides a practical guide that includes the general formulation process summary tables for easy reference and examples

consumer rationing and cournot outcomes experimental evidence author affiliation jason j lepore department of economics orfalea business college california polytechnic state university san luis obispo ca 93407 usa e mail jlepore calpoly edu aric p shafran dagger department of economics orfalea business college california polytechnic state university san luis obispo ca 93407 usa e mail ashafran calpoly edu corresponding author acknowledgment the authors acknowledge the orfalea college of business for financial support we thank blake allison for assistance running the experiments and the anonymous reviewers and conference participants at the north american economic science association meetings for helpful comments 1 introductionthis article reports the results of duopoly market experiments where firms first commit to capacities and then compete in prices the theoretical literature pertaining to these duopoly models suggests that the way residual demand is rationed is fundamental to the character of equilibrium outcomes the goal of this study is to test the impact of residual demand rationing on the behavior of subjects in an experimental environment in a two stage game where firms first commit to capacities and then compete in prices kreps and scheinkman 1983 hereafter k s prove that the unique nash equilibrium outcome coincides with the cournot equilibrium outcome with efficient rationing of residual demand efficient rationing means that the higher priced firm is left with the worst possible residual demand curve if demand is composed of many similar consumers that each demand multiple units and we construct aggregate demand by way of a representative consumer then efficient rationing is imposed by the model on the other hand if demand is instead composed of a mass of consumers with unit demand and varied willingness to pay then the efficient rationing rule imposes the restriction that the highest valued consumers buy from the firm with the lower price davidson and deneckere 1986 make a compelling argument that proportional rationing is a more appropriate assumption in the latter case proportional rationing means that a uniform distribution of possible consumers buy from the firm with the lower price davidson and deneckere show that under proportional rationing as well as any rationing rule other than the efficient rule the cournot outcome is not necessarily the unique equilibrium of the two stage game the davidson and deneckere result is problematic for the k s model because it deflates the generality of their theoretical result 1lepore 2009 further clarifies the relationship between proportional rationing and the cournot outcome in the k s game with proportional rationing the cournot outcome is the unique nash equilibrium only when capacity cost is greater than a threshold level the purpose of our experiments is to assess if the play of experimental subjects in the two stage game is sensitive to the rationing scheme in the way that theory predicts to do this we construct an experimental design with four treatments the treatments vary by two controls the demand rationing scheme and the cost of capacity we conduct two efficient rationing treatments one with a high capacity cost and one with a low cost for both costs theory predicts that the outcome coincide with the cournot model we also conduct two treatments using proportional rationing one with each of the capacity costs used in the efficient rationing treatments with a high cost theory predicts the outcome should coincide with the cournot model as in the case of efficient rationing however theory predicts that the cournot outcome should not occur when the cost of capacity is low and prices should not clear the market recently several authors have used laboratory experiments as a means to empirically test the predictions of the k s model

it takes two to tango equilibria in a model of sales we show that the varian model of sales with more than two firms has two types of equilibria a unique symmetric equilibrium and a continuum of asymmetric equilibria in contrast the 2 firm game has a unique equilibrium that is symmetric for the n firm case the asymmetric equilibria imply mixed strategies that can be ranked by first order stochastic dominance this enables one to rule out asymmetric equilibria on economic grounds by constructing a metagame in which both firms and consumers are players the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this metagame is symmetric

bertrand edgeworth competition demand uncertainty and asymmetric outcomes abstract we analyze investment and pricing incentives in a symmetric bertrand edgeworth framework with uncertain demand firms choose production capacities before observing demand prices are chosen after demand is observed if the extent of demand variation exceeds a threshold level then a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies for capacities does not exist a smaller firm has no incentive ex ante to expand its capacity because capacity expansion would reduce its expected revenue in the event that demand is lower than expected output prices are predicted to have positive variance when demand is low and zero variance when demand is high journal of economic literature classification numbers d43 l13

consumer choice and cournot behavior in capacity constrained duopoly competition in a two stage model of duopolistic capacity choice and subsequent price competition consumer switching costs can deter some consumers from seeking service at a low price firm that lacks sufficient capacity to serve the entire market in this setting firms residual demand functions are aggregatedfrom thefirm selection decisions of individual consumers based on firms prices and their induced degrees of service reliability if consumers are approximately risk neutral with respect to service reliability then capacity constrained duopoly competition has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which firms choose cournot capacities and prices the equilibrium robustness of cournot behavior extends to duopoly markets in which consumer switching costs are induced by subscription pricing

on the failure of monotonicity in uniform price auctions except for well studied special cases in which bidders have single unit demand or bidders are risk neutral with independent private values equilibria of uniform price auctions with private values need not possess familiar monotonicity properties in particular equilibria in weakly undominated strategies may exist in which some bidders bid strictly less on some units when they have strictly higher values for every unit

toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium a step toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium is taken by considering a double auction with n buyers and m sellers with interdependent values and affiliated private information if there are sufficiently many buyers and sellers and their bids are restricted to a sufficiently fine discrete set of prices then generically there is an equilibrium in nondecreasing bidding functions that is arbitrarily close to the unique fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium of the limit market with unrestricted bids and a continuum of agents in particular the large double auction equilibrium is almost efficient and almost fully aggregates the agents information

innovative activity and sunk cost abstract we analyze innovative activity in a general framework with time dependent rewards and sunk costs when firms are identical innovation is delayed by an increase in the number of firms or a decrease in the size of the reward when one firm has higher profit potential it is more likely to innovate first our framework generalizes an all pay auction however we show that under certain conditions there is qualitatively different equilibrium behavior

collusion with capacity constraints over the business cycle this paper investigates the efiect of capacity constraints on the sustainability of collusion in markets subject to cyclical demand uctuations in the absence of capacity constraints i e a limiting case of our model haltiwanger and harrington 1991 show that flrms flnd it more di cult to collude during periods of decreasing demand we flnd that this prediction can be overturned if flrms capacities are su ciently small capacity constraints imply that punishment proflts move procyclically so that periods of increasing demand may lead to lower losses from cheating even if collusive proflts are rising haltiwanger and harrington s main prediction remains valid for su ciently large capacities

price competition in a capacity constrained duopoly abstract this paper characterizes the set of nash equilibria in a model of price setting duopoly in which each firm has limited capacity and demand is continuous and decreasing in general there is a unique equilibrium so that comparative static exercises are meaningful the properties of the equilibrium conform with a number of stylized facts the equilibrium prices are lower the smaller is demand relative to capacity when demand is in an intermediate range the firms use mixed strategies they randomly hold sales if capacities are chosen simultaneously before prices the set of equilibrium capacities coincides with the set of cournot quantities

collusive pricing with capacity constraints in the presence of demand uncertainty we explore the response of collusive prices to changing demand conditions when firms operate under capacity constraints in the presence of demand uncertainty we find support for the conventional view that periods of low demand lead through the emergence of excess capacity to a breakdown of collusive pricing we also find that the nature of price wars depends on the degree of excess capacity in the industry while small amounts of excess capacity can lead firms to engage in mild price wars characterized by uniform price reductions and market share stability more severe price wars characterized by price undercutting and market share instability can emerge if excess capacity is sufficiently great finally our results lend support to the view that market share instability is a symptom of ineffective collusion

equilibria existence and characterization in auctions achievements and open questions establishing existence and characterizing equilibria is a fundamental step in the study of auctions theoretical characterizations and empirical predictions are well accepted only to the extent that they are based on equilibria however despite the fact that auctions have been extensively studied there are still many problems regarding equilibrium existence and characterization waiting for resolution in this survey we review the landmark results and highlight open questions in addition we review the standard assumptions underlying these results and discuss the suitability of the nash equilibrium solution concept we focus our review on single object auctions but also review results in multi unit divisible combinatorial and double auctions

retrospective and prospective decomposition analysis of chinese manufacturing energy use and policy implications abstract aims the industrial sector dominates the china s total energy consumption accounting for about 70 of energy use in 2010 hence this study aims to investigate the development path of china s industrial sector which will greatly affect future energy demand and dynamics of not only china but the entire world scope this study analyzes energy use and the economic structure of the chinese manufacturing sector the retrospective 1995 2010 and prospective 2010 2020 decomposition analyses are conducted for manufacturing sectors in order to show how different factors production growth structural change and energy intensity change influenced industrial energy use trends in china over the last 15 years and how they will do so up to 2020 conclusions the forward looking prospective decomposition analyses are conducted for three different scenarios the scenario analysis indicates that if china wants to realize structural change in the manufacturing sector by shifting from energy intensive and polluting industries to less energy intensive industries the value added average annual growth rates aagrs to 2015 and 2020 should be more in line with those shown in scenario 3 the assumed value added aagrs for scenario 3 are relatively realistic and are informed by possible growth that is foreseen for each subsector

rational expectations information acquisition and competitive bidding most rational expectations market equilibrium models are not models of price formation and naive mechanisms leading to such equilibria can be severely manipulable in this paper a bidding model is developed which has the market like features that bidders act as price takers and that prices convey information higher equilibrium prices convey more favorable information about the quality of the objects being sold than do lower prices bidders can benefit from trading only if they have a transactions motive or if they have access to inside information apart from exceptional cases prices are not fully revealing a two stage model is developed in which bidders may acquire information at a cost before bidding and for which the equilibrium price is fully revealing resolving a well known paradox

controlling opportunism in vertical contracting when production precedes sales in a make to stock vertical contracting setting with private contracts when retailers do not observe each other s stocks before choosing their prices an opportunism problem always exist in contract equilibria but public market wide resale price maintenance rpm can restore monopoly power however other widely used tools which do not fall under antitrust scrutiny and require only private bilateral contracts such as buyback contracts also allow the producer to fully exercise his monopoly power we conclude that a more lenient policy toward rpm is unlikely to affect the producer s ability to control opportunism

approximate bertrand equilibria in a replicated industry this paper considers the existence and properties of approximate bertrand equilibria in a replicated industry price setting firms produce a homogeneous product with weakly convex costs the main results are that a given e 0 an e equilibrium exists if the industry is large enough b if the e is small enough and the industry large enough any e equilibrium is approximately competitive these results depend on how contingent demand is specified

decoupling economic growth from carbon emissions growth in the united states the role of research and development abstract the united states has achieved economic growth compatible with carbon reduction since 2007 this work is addressed to understand the eight effects especially effects related to research development rd whereas economic scale was the primary inhibitor to the drop of carbon emission followed by investment intensity population size and sectoral energy structure the results of decoupling efforts analysis uncover that energy intensity r d intensity r d efficiency and sectoral carbon intensity contributed to decoupling economic growth from carbon emission whereas investment intensity population size and sectoral energy structure did not contribute to the decoupling finally some policy implications are proposed

generic existence of completely revealing equilibria for economies with uncertainty when prices convey information conditions which imply the existence of strict rational expectations equilibria for most static pure exchange economies where prices convey information about the state of the world are analyzed information is aggregated and transmitted by prices because agents have different initial information and maximize the conditional expectation of state dependent utility functions major results state that if with probability one agents characteristics do not vary too much as the state of the world varies then generically there exist equilibrium price functions which reveal all initial information more precisely if the support of the image measure is contained in a compact c1 manifold satisfying some technical conditions which is of sufficiently low dimension relative to the number of commodities then existence of completely revealing equilibria is generic any economy satisfying these assumptions can be approximated by a sequence of economies which also obey these assumptions and have completely revealing equilibrium price functions slight perturbations do not destroy the existence property

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games i theory the article presents information about the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games in this paper and its sequel presents study the existence of nash equilibrium in games where agents payoff functions are discontinuous the enquiry is motivated by a number of recent studies that have uncovered serious existence problems in seemingly innocuous economic games in the sequel to this paper authors have explained the utility function in the economic games referred to earlier are neither continuous nor quasi concave however they demonstrate that the payoff functions in mildly modified versions of these constructs exhibit two weaker forms of continuity which together with the requirement of quasi concavity suffice for the existence of an equilibrium from this one may conclude that at least in the modified versions of these models discontinuities in the payoff functions are not the real source of the problem rather it is the failure of the payoff functions to the quasi concave which is responsible for the non existence of equilibrium these observations bear on the existence of nash equilibrium in pure strategies

the existence of mixed strategy equilibria in a price setting oligopoly with convex costs this paper shows that a mixed strategy equilibrium will exist in an industry producing a homogeneous product with perfectly informed consumers if firms are identical and have weakly convex costs this generalises an earlier result by dasgupta and maskin

dynamic price competition with capacity constraints and a strategic buyer we analyze a simple dynamic durable good model two incumbent sellers and potential entrants choose their capacities at the start of the game we solve for equilibrium capacity choices and the necessarily mixed pricing strategies in equilibrium the buyer splits the order with positive probability to preserve competition making it possible that a high and low price seller both have sales sellers command a rent above the value of unmet demand by the other seller a buyer benefits from either a commitment not to make future purchases or by hiring an agent to always buy from the lowest priced seller

uncertainty resolution private information aggregation and the cournot competitive limit a cournot model of oligopoly in which otherwise identical firms have private differential information about the common cost of production and a shared but unknown demand curve is examined a bayesian equilibrium of the corresponding game of incomplete information is solved for explicitly and analysed in the symmetric equilibrium different firms produce at different output levels because they have different information because the information individual firms have is random total output and hence market price is also random for any finite number of firms the main result of the paper relates to the asymptotic properties of the equilibrium when the number of firms becomes large under fairly general conditions on the joint distribution of demand and individual firms information about demand the random equilibrium price converges almost surely to a constant in the limit more importantly this price equals the perfectly competitive price in other words in large markets even if no firm knows the true market demand curve and firms are not price takers and do not use price as a signal to improve their information the competitive price will prevail with certainty in the limit aggregate outcomes are as if all firms shared their private information with each other

characterization of the support of the mixed strategy price equilibria in oligopolies with heterogeneous consumers abstract this paper revisits the theory of oligopoly pricing and shows that for a large class of demand and cost functions a mixed strategy equilibrium necessarily implies that each firm s equilibrium strategy is a discrete distribution over a finite number of prices

price dispersion in duopolies with heterogeneous consumers abstract in this paper i modify varian s varian h r 1980 a model of sales american economic review 70 4 651 659 model of sales to allow for heterogeneity in consumer preferences i show that in mixed strategy equilibria each firm charges a finite number of prices using this characterization i examine the effect of consumer heterogeneity on firms optimal pricing strategies

market making oligopoly this paper analyzes price competition between market makers who set costly capacity constraints before they intermediate between producers and consumers the unique equilibrium outcome with pure strategies at the capacity stage is the cournot outcome the paper thus provides a rationale for cournot type competition between market makers this contrasts with previous findings in the literature where due to the absence of capacity constraints that are set ex ante the bertrand result typically obtains

game theoretic models of mixed oligopoly abstract in this paper we review various models that have been proposed for the study of mixed oligopoly that is markets in which private and public firm compete on equal basis using only market instruments

price setting merchants in a simple trade model abstract in lieu of a fictitious walrasian auctioneer price determination in a simple two country two good trade model is explicitly modelled as the strategic price setting behavior of merchants the results depend on the order in which countries are visited and whether or not the supply is backward bending theorem 1 establishes sufficient conditions for the walrasian outcome to be the unique subgame perfect nash equilibrium spne theorem 2 shows when the unique spne is non walrasian

prisoners dilemma in duopoly super games abstract the choice between quantity and price in order to stabilize collusion is modeled here it is shown that this relocates the prisoners dilemma backward from the market stage to the stage where the market variable is chosen in order to sustain collusion and where discount rates appear as the payoffs likewise a prisoners dilemma arises also when both the market variable and the type of behavior cooperative or non cooperative are simultaneously chosen journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d43 l13

on the instability of mixed strategy nash equilibria abstract what behavior processes will lead to a nash equilibrium of an n person game two very general processes are examined for finite games with finite horizon generalized fictitious play strict mixed strategy nash equilibria are shown to be unstable for almost all finite games with discrete or continuous time generalized gradient processes mixed strategy nash equilibria are shown to be unstable

nonuniform bertrand competition the feasibility of bertrand undercutting with nonuniform prices is established and properties are derived for bertrand equilibrium in nonuniform price strategies with free entry equilibrium entails zero profit minimum average cost production if there is more than one producing firm all prices collapse to a minimum average cost uniform price an existence condition is compared to conditions from uniform price theory without free entry equilibrium prices may not collapse to a uniform price positive profit may occur but all firms earn equal profit and incur equal marginal cost while consumers pay average outlay no greater than marginal cost copyright 1992 by the econometric society

energy intensity in the iron and steel industry a comparison of physical and economic indicators abstract energy consumption of the iron and steel industry is examined in seven countries brazil china france germany japan poland and the united states for the period 1980 1991 using a decomposition analysis based on physical indicators for process type and product mix we decompose intra sectoral structural changes and efficiency improvements specific energy consumption decreased in all countries except poland efficiency improvement played a key role in brazil china germany and the us while structural changes were the main driver for energy savings in france and japan we also compare the use of various economic indicators to physical indicators and find that they do not track physical developments well in poland or the developing countries we studied in the industrialized countries value added based energy intensity indicators generally reflect the specific energy consumption better than other economic indicators although large differences occur in individual years we found a smaller correlation between other economic indicators gross output and value of shipments and specific energy consumption we conclude that use of physical energy intensity indicators improves comparability between countries provides greater information for policy makers regarding intra sectoral structural changes and provides detailed explanations for observed changes in energy intensity

equilibrium price dispersion under demand uncertainty the roles of costly capacity and market structure when capacity is costly and prices are set in advance firms facing uncertain demand will sell output at multiple prices and limit the quantity available at each price i show that the optimal price strategy of a monopolist and the unique pure strategy nash equilibria of oligopolists both exhibit intrafirm price dispersion moreover as the market becomes more competitive prices become more dispersed a pattern documented in the airline industry while generating similar predictions the model differs from the revenue management literature because it disregards market segmentation and fare restrictions that screen customers

production in advance versus production to order abstract we use a theoretical framework to compare production in advance type and production to order type environments carrying out our analysis in the framework of a symmetric capacity constrained bertrand edgeworth duopoly game we prove that the equilibrium profits are the same in case of production in advance and production to order in addition advance production results in higher prices than production to order if both games have an equilibrium in nondegenerated mixed strategies

dynamic duopoly prices and quantities we study a dynamic model of duopoly in which firms choose both prices and quantities if quantity capacity choices are relatively inflexible firms generally carry excess idle capacity in equilibrium because of this enforcement cost firms are unable to achieve monopoly levels this contrasts with models in which which firms compete in either prices or quantities alone on the other hand if capacities are flexible firms may be able to sustain monopoly behaviour

mixed pricing in oligopoly with consumer switching costs abstract in this paper we develop an alternative and more natural two period model of duopolistic competition with switching costs we find that overall competition is always less severe when consumers find switching suppliers expensive however the relationship between the strength of competition and the importance of switching costs is not monotonic interestingly competition between ex ante identical firms naturally results in firms having asymmetric market shares in equilibrium

analyzing online b2b exchange markets asymmetric cost and incomplete information this research applies the discriminating auction to analyze the online b2b exchange market in which a single buyer requests multiple items and several suppliers having equal capacity and asymmetric cost submit bids to compete for buyer demand in the present model we examine the impact of asymmetric cost and incomplete information on the participants in the market given the complete cost information each supplier randomizes its price and the lower bound of the price range is determined by the highest marginal cost in addition the supplier with a lower marginal cost has a larger considered pricing space but ultimately has a smaller equilibrium one than others with higher marginal costs when each supplier s marginal cost is private information the lowest possible price is determined by the number of suppliers and the buyer s reservation price comparing these two market settings we find whether it is beneficial to buyers or suppliers depends on the scale of the bid process and the highest marginal cost when the number of suppliers and the difference between the highest marginal cost and the buyer s reservation price are sufficiently large each supplier can gain a higher profit if the marginal costs are private information on the contrary when the highest marginal cost approaches the buyer s reservation price complete cost information benefits the suppliers

bertrand edgeworth equilibrium with a large number of firms abstract we examine a model of price competition with strictly convex costs where the firms simultaneously decide on both price and quantity are free to supply less than the quantity demanded and there is discrete pricing if firms are symmetric then for a large class of residual demand functions there is a unique equilibrium in pure strategies whenever for a fixed grid size the number of firms is sufficiently large moreover this equilibrium price is within a grid unit of the competitive price the results go through to a large extent when the firms are asymmetric or they are symmetric but play a two stage game and the tie breaking rule is weakly manipulable

efficiency of large double auctions we consider large double auctions with private values values need be neither symmetric nor independent multiple units may be owned or desired participation may be stochastic we introduce a very mild notion of a little independence we prove that all nontrivial equilibria of auctions that satisfy this notion are asymptotically efficient for any alpha 0 inefficiency disappears at rate 1 n 2 alpha

capacity precommitment as an entry barrier for price setting firms abstract for a bertrand edgeworth framework this paper considers whether investmentin capacity may serve as a barrier to entry when firms are identical except for the first mover precommitment possibilities that the incumbent enjoys subgame perfect nash equilibria are examined for a three stage non cooperative game in which the incumbent sets a capacity level the potential entrant chooses its capacity and then firms set prices using mixed strategies for some parameter values entry is blockaded positive profits for the entrant are precluded for other parameter values the incumbent may increase its capacity to prevent entry and maintain non negative profits

the snowball effect abstract many economists think that dominant positions unprotected by strategic or operating advantages will tend to decay i demonstrate that that intuition is flawed by devising a model of noncooperative duopoly in which the initially larger competitor monopolizes all investment opportunities even though it is no more efficient than its smaller rival as part of an effort to push up output prices i also present an apparent example of this mechanism at work and discuss the implications for public policy

bertrand edgeworth oligopoly in large markets the relation between perfectly competitive and monopolistically competitive equilibria is analysed for a bertrand edgeworth model of a single market in which capacity constrained firms choose prices as strategies the market always has a nash equilibrium in pure or mixed strategies as the number of firms increases the corresponding equilibria converge in distribution to a perfectly competitive price this result provides a justification for perfect competition that is based on an explicit account of price formation however monopoly prices persist with a positive but vanishing probability regularity or well defined inverse demand functions are not required

informed speculation with imperfect competition competitive rational expectations models have the unsatisfactory property dubbed the schizophrenia problem by hellwig that each trader takes the equilibrium price as given despite the fact that he influences that price an examination of information aggregation in a non competitive rational expectations model using a nash equilibrium in demand functions shows that the schizophrenia problem is avoided by having each trader take into account the effect his demand has on the equilibrium price given a distribution of private information across traders prices reveal less information than in the competition equilibrium and prices no longer become fully informative in the limit as noise trading vanishes or as traders become risk neutral with small traders the model may become one of monopolistic competition not perfect competition in contrast to the competitive model a reasonable model of endogenous acquisition of costly private information is obtained even when traders are risk neutral

tacit collusion in the presence of cyclical demand and endogenous capacity levels abstract we analyze tacit collusion in an industry characterized by cyclical demand and long run scale decisions firms face deterministic demand cycles and choose capacity levels prior to competing in prices our focus is on the nature of prices we find that two types of price wars may exist in one collusion can involve periods of mixed strategy price wars in the other consistent with the rotemberg and saloner 1986 definition of price wars we show that collusive prices can also become counter cyclical we also establish pricing patterns with respect to the relative prices in booms and recessions if the marginal cost of capacity is high enough holding current demand constant prices in the boom are generally lower than the prices in the recession this reverses the results of haltiwanger and harrington 1991 in contrast if the marginal cost of capacity is low enough then prices in the boom are generally higher than the prices in the recession for costs in an intermediate range numerical examples are calculated to show specific pricing patterns

monotone equilibrium in multi unit auctions in two sided multi unit auctions having a variety of payment rules including uniform price and discriminatory auctions a monotone pure strategy equilibrium mpse exists when bidders are risk neutral with independent multi dimensional types and interdependent values in fact all mixed strategy equilibria are ex post allocation and interim expected payment equivalent to mpse thus for standard expected surplus revenue analysis there is no loss restricting attention to monotone strategies