a short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets we provide a short proof for the following characterization of the core in housing markets first proved by ma 1994 the core is the only rule that satisfies strategy proofness pareto efficiency and individual rationality

group incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods abstract in a market where each trader has one unit of an indivisible good there are procedures for exchanging goods which result in competitive allocations one of these procedures the top trading cycle has the property that it is in each trader s best interest to report his true preferences over the set of goods this note shows that no subset of traders can misrepresent their preferences and improve the allocation for all members of the subset additionally if there are no indifferences in the preferences then some traders in a subset that misrepresents preferences do worse

efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

two models of bid taker cheating in vickrey auctions vickrey second price sealed bid auctions have attractive theoretical properties but standard first price sealed bidding is far more common explanations of the rarity of vickrey auctions rely on concern about revelation of private information and on fear of cheating the authors present two models of bid taker cheating a static game theoretic model and a reputation based model of repeated auctions in the first an honest bid taker will not choose a vickrey auction in the second a trusted bid taker who cheats when it pays eventually destroys his or her reputation and the trust on which the use of vickrey auctions depends copyright 1995 by university of chicago press

games of fair division abstract we consider the problem of fairly allocating an indivisible good to one of several agents equally entitled to it when monetary compensations to the others are possible our primary normative concept is no envy first we show that there is no non manipulable selection from the no envy solution then we study the direct revelation games associated with subsolutions of the no envy solution the set of equilibrium allocations of any one of them coincides with the set of envy free allocations for the true preferences journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d63 d7l d82

boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting an experimental investigation abstract while much of the school choice literature advocates strategyproofness recent research has aimed to improve efficiency using mechanisms that rely on non truthtelling equilibria we address two issues that arise from this approach we first show that even in simple environments with ample feedback and repetition agents fail to reach non truthtelling equilibria we offer another way forward implementing truth telling as an ordinal bayes nash equilibrium rather than as a dominant strategy equilibrium we show that this weaker solution concept can allow for more efficient mechanisms in theory and provide experimental evidence that this is also the case in practice in fact truth telling rates are basically the same whether truthtelling is implemented as an ordinal bayes nash equilibrium or a dominant strategy equilibrium this provides a proof of concept that ordinal bayes nash design might provide a middle path achieving efficiency gains over strategy proof mechanisms without relying on real life agents playing a non truth telling equilibrium

public good provision mechanisms and reciprocity this paper determines optimal public good provision mechanisms in an environment where agents are motivated by reciprocity in a two agent economy we show that the standard pivot mechanism is not strategy proof if at least one agent cares strongly enough about reciprocity truthful reporting maximises a player s own payoff and hence is viewed as selfish by his opponent who retaliates by understating demand for the public good incentive compatibility is restored if the mechanism is implemented sequentially when agents are asked to report their demands in turn a high report by the first mover he may result in him paying an unfairly large share of the provision cost should the second mover she understate her demand hence truthful reporting is not judged as selfish by the second mover who reciprocates by stating her true demand our results alert the institutional designer to the importance of game dynamics when agents are non selfish

a solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good a benevolent planner wishes to assign an indivisible private good to n claimants each valuing the object differently individuals have quasi linear preferences therefore the possibility of transfers is allowed a second best efficient mechanism is a strategy proof and anonymous mechanism that is not pareto dominated by another strategy proof and anonymous mechanism in this context we identify three conditions that are necessary and together with voluntary participation sufficient for a mechanism to be second best efficient this set includes mechanisms that destroy the good at certain profiles for domains comprising two individuals we provide an explicit characterization of the family of second best efficient mechanisms

internet advertising and the generalized second price auction selling billions of dollars worth of keywords we investigate the generalized second price gsp auction a new mechanism used by search engines to sell online advertising although gsp looks similar to the vickrey clarke groves vcg mechanism its properties are very different unlike the vcg mechanism gsp generally does not have an equilibrium in dominant strategies and truth telling is not an equilibrium of gsp to analyze the properties of gsp we describe the generalized english auction that corresponds to gsp and show that it has a unique equilibrium this is an ex post equilibrium with the same payoffs to all players as the dominant strategy equilibrium of vcg

scale effects in multi unit auctions abstract we argue that auctions with multi unit demand can be used to experimentally conduct new and novel tests of auction theory the focus of the paper is on changes in bidding behavior as the auction is scaled up by adding more bidders and increasing both the demand per bidder and supply of the auctioned good we identify uniquely tractable environments and obtain clear cut theoretical comparative statics in these settings this leads to the construction of uniform price auctions of different scales where the prediction is that risk neutral bidders bids on the last unit they demand are independent of scale in our experiment bidders on average bid much more aggressively than predicted by theory there is also evidence of a scale effect with more aggressive bidding in the small scale treatment compared to the large scale treatment it is argued that these features are consistent with joy of winning and anticipated regret

the monetary approach to the exchange rate in this paper the monetary approach to the exchange rate is re examined for three key currencies using data for the recent experience with flexible exchange rates two important findings are reported in the paper first it is demonstrated using a multivariate cointegration technique that an unrestricted monetary model is a valid framework for analysing the long run exchange rate second we find inter alia that the proportionality of the exchange rate to relative money supplies is valid for the german mark

independent private value auctions bidder behaviour in first second and third price auctions with varying numbers of bidders the symmetric equilibrium of third price auctions is characterized it makes a number of contrasting predictions relative to firms and second price auctions bids exceed private values the marginal effects on bids of an increase in private values is greater than one increasing numbers of bidders reduces bids and risk aversion requires bidding below the risk neutral nash equilibrium in the experiment bidders do not always satisfy the point predictions of the theory however the game theoretic models correctly anticipate at least directionally the important effects of the price rule changes copyright 1993 by royal economic society

strategy proof assignment on the full preference domain we consider the problem of efficiently allocating several indivisible objects between agents who are to receive at most one object and whose preferences are private information we examine this standard assignment problem from the perspective of mechanism design giving up the usual assumption of linear preferences and instead using a full preference domain with indifferences permitted we characterize two classes of mechanisms i bi polar serially dictatorial rules by essential single valuedness pareto indifference strategy proofness and non bossiness and ii all selections from bi polar serially dictatorial rules by single valuedness efficiency strategy proofness and weak non bossiness we compare the outcomes from the bi polar serially dictatorial rules with the outcomes obtained using a market based approach namely the core of the market we show that all strongly efficient outcomes in the core can be generated using serially dictatorial rules moreover we argue that serially dictatorial rules have an advantage over the market based approach in that they yield strongly efficient solutions for all preference profiles making it possible to use randomization to restore equity when preferences are private information this type of ex ante equity cannot be implemented using the market based approach

strategy proof house allocation with price restrictions abstract this paper considers a house allocation problem with no initial ownership and where prices are bounded from below and above by exogenously given price restrictions this type of housing market contains e g the assignment market and the student placement problem as special cases a mechanism called the minimal rpe mechanism is defined and two main results are obtained first it is demonstrated that the mechanism is manipulable at some profile in the full preference domain r second it is proved that there is a subset r r of the full domain containing almost all profiles in r such that the minimal rpe mechanism is strategy proof in that subset

elicitation of honest preferences for the assignment of individuals to positions the problem of eliciting honest preferences from individuals who must be assigned to a set of positions is considered individuals know that they will be charged for the positions to which they are assigned a set of prices that provide no incentive for the individual to misrepresent his preferences is suggested it is shown that these prices constitute an element of the optimal solution to the dual of a linear programming assignment problem both the optimal allocation and the prices to be charged can be derived by solving two linear programming problems once preferences have been elicited the procedure can usefully be viewed as a simulation of a competitive market under conditions where such a market cannot be expected to function well it results in an efficient allocation where all resources are valued at their opportunity costs and consumer surplus is maximized its outcome thus has the desirable properties of competitive market equilibria

the equitable top trading cycles mechanism for school choice the equitable top trading cycles mechanism a particular adaptation of gale s top trading cycles ttc procedure applied to school choice the so called ttc mechanism has attracted much attention both in theory and practice due to its superior efficiency and incentive features we discuss and introduce alternative adaptations of gale s original procedure that can offer improvements over ttc in terms of equity along with various other distributional considerations instead of giving all the trading power to those students with the highest priority for a school we argue for the distribution of the trading rights of all slots of each school this allows them to trade in a thick market where additional constraints can be accommodated by choosing an appropriate pointing rule we propose a particular mechanism of this kind the equitable top trading cycle ettc mechanism which is also pareto efficient and group strategy proof just like ttc and eliminates avoidable justified envy situations ettc generates significantly fewer justified envy situations than ttc both in simulations and the lab

real exchange rates and macroeconomics a selective survey the paper discusses real exchange rate issues of industrial and of developing countries for real exchange rates among the key industrial countries we ask what is the best conceptual framework to shed light on this question we look at alternative theoretical approaches and at empirical evidence on the relation among interest rates expectations and depreciation the discussion of developing countries real exchange rates focuses on the link between real exchange rates real wages and the profitability of capital the model highlights the discrepancy between the mobility of capital including in the long run physical capital and

large indivisibles an analysis with respect to price equilibrium and fairness an exchange economy is considered in which there are a finite number of individuals the same number of indivisibles and a fixed amount of a divisible good each individual consumes exactly one of the indivisibles and a certain quantity of the divisible good the existence of prices corresponding to pareto efficient allocations is proved it is also shown that this economy possesses fair allocations income fair allocations coalition fair allocations and pareto efficient egalitarian equivalent allocations in this study the effect of including large indivisibles in an exchange economy will be analyzed the analysis will be carried out with respect to the existence of price equilibrium and with respect to the existence of different forms of fairness the economy consists of a finite number of individuals the same number of indivisibles and a fixed amount of a divisible good it is assumed that each individual consumes exactly one of the indivisibles and some quantity of the divisible good we may interpret the indivisibles as being professions or houses the relationship between price equilibrium and a pareto efficient allocation is well known and proved in a number of cases under different assumptions about preferences and commodities for a standard economy see e g debreu 5 in case of nonconvexities which may also describe a certain type of indivisibility we may have an exact relationship in economies with a continuum of individuals see e g hildenbrand 11 but otherwise an approximate relationship obtains the degree of approximation depends on the degree of nonconvexities in preferences and not on the number of individuals see e g arrow and hahn 1 we will prove the existence of prices characterizing a pareto efficient allocation in a case where the indivisibles play an essential role and where approximate results would be too approximate the indivisibles may be considered large for the individual compared to his total consumption the theory of fairness has developed considerably during the seventies different kinds of concepts of fairness have been introduced and analyzed see daniel 41 foley 81 pazner and schmeidler 121 and schmeidler and vind 141 among others normally these authors have considered models with divisible goods or an infinite number of individuals for exchange economies the existence of fair allocations an envy free and pareto efficient allocation has been proved in

strategy proofness and essentially single valued cores revisited abstract we consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents preferences possibly exhibit externalities in such contexts many different core notions were proposed one is the individually rational core ir core whereby blocking is only allowed via allocations where the non blocking agents receive their endowments we show that if there exists an allocation rule satisfying individual rationality efficiency and strategy proofness then for any problem for which the ir core is non empty the allocation rule must choose an ir core allocation and all agents are indifferent between all allocations in the ir core we further show that the result cannot be generalized to supersets of the ir core we apply our result to housing markets coalition formation and networks

choosing your pond location choices and relative income do individuals care about their relative income while this is a long standing hypothesis revealed preference evidence remains elusive we provide a unique test by studying residential choices in

transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants a market design approach this paper explores a housing market with an existing tenant in each house and where the existing tenants initially rent their houses the idea is to identify equilibrium prices for the housing market given the prerequisite that a tenant can buy any house on the housing market including the one that he is currently possessing or continue renting the house he is currently occupying the main contribution is the identification of an individually rational equilibrium selecting and group non manipulable price mechanism in a restricted preference domain that contains almost all preference profiles in this restricted domain the identified mechanism is the minimum price equilibrium selecting mechanism that transfers the maximum number of ownerships to the existing tenants we also relate the theoretical model and the main findings to the u k housing act 1980 whose main objective is to transfer ownerships of houses to existing tenants

maximal manipulation of envy free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money abstract we consider the problem of the fair allocation of indivisible goods and money with non quasi linear preferences the purpose of the present study is to examine strategic manipulation under envy free solutions we show that under a certain domain richness condition each individual obtains the welfare level of his optimal envy free allocation by maximally manipulating the solutions this maximal manipulation theorem is helpful in analyzing the set of nash equilibrium allocations in the direct revelation games associated with a given envy free solution if an envy free solution satisfies a mild condition the set of nash equilibrium allocations in its associated direct revelation game coincides with that of envy free allocations

was it real the exchange rate interest differential relation over the modern floating rate period in this paper we explore the relationship between real exchange rates and real interest rate differentials in the united states germany japan and the united kingdom contrary to theories based on the joint hypothesis that domestic prices are sticky and monetary disturbances are predominant we find little evidence of a stable relationship between real interest rates and real exchange rates we consider both in sample and out of sample tests one hypothesis that is consistent with our findings is that real disturbances such as productivity shocks may be a major source of exchange rate volatility this paper investigates the empirical relationship between major currency real exchange rates and real interest rates over the modern post march 1973 flexible rate experience the exchange rates examined here include the dollar mark dollar yen and dollar pound rates our two major findings are as follows first the data do not indicate a strong correspondence between real interest rate differentials short term or long term and real exchange rates this finding appears to conflict with the predictions of most monetary and portfolio balance models of exchange rate determination though the conflict can be substantially reconciled if aggregate disturbances are primarily real in nature i e changes in productivity tastes etc it is true that in many cases the sign of the estimated exchange rate interest rate differential relationship is consistent with the possible predominance of financial market disturbances but the relationship is not stable enough to be statistically significant second although one does find some evidence of a unit root in both real exchange rates and long term but not shortterm real interest differentials these two series do not appear to be linearly cointegrated hence the nonstationarity or near nonstationarity in the two series cannot be attributed to the same factor in section i we briefly describe a class of small scale monetary models of exchange rate determination the importance of this class of models for empirical work derives from its strong predictions about how the exchange rate will move

5 information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values a laboratory study in affiliated private value auctions each bidder has perfect information regarding his her own value for the object at auction but higher values of the item for one bidder make higher values for other bidders more likely we report on a series of experiments examining three key implications of these auctions i in a first price auction public information about rivals values increases expected revenue ii an english auction increases expected revenue compared to a first price auction and iii a second price auction is isomorphic to an english auction in examining these issues we compare predictions of some ad hoc bidding models with nash equilibrium predictions in the first price auction experiments nash equilibrium bidding theory organizes the data better than either of two ad hoc bidding models public information about others valuations does increase average revenue but the increase in revenue is smaller and less reliable than predicted under risk neutral nash equilibrium bidding lower average revenue might be attributed to risk aversion while the high variability is attributed to a sizable frequency of individual bidding errors relative to the theory bidding theory precisely organizes english auction outcomes after a brief initial learning period the dominant strategy equilibrium does not organize second price auctions nearly as well as market prices persistently exceed predicted prices the difference between english and second price outcomes is attributed to effects of different information flows inherent in the structure of the two institutions on eliminating bidding errors revenue impacts of these two institutions relative to a first price auction are examined in light of observed bidding patterns

house allocation with transfers we consider the shapley scarf house allocation problem where monetary transfers are allowed we characterize the class of mechanisms that are strategy proof ex post individually rational ex post budget balanced and collusion proof in these mechanisms the price of each object is fixed in advance and the objects are reallocated according to the unique core assignment of the shapley scarf economy associated with the prices the special case in which all prices are zero is the core mechanism studied by shapley and scarf our mechanisms are compelling alternatives to the groves mechanisms which satisfy neither budget balance nor our condition of collusion proofness journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 c78 d71 d78 d89

house allocation with existing tenants an equivalence abstract we analyze two mechanisms designed to eliminate inefficiencies in house allocation problems where there are both existing tenants and newcomers the first mechanism chooses the unique core allocation of a sister exchange economy constructed by endowing each existing tenant with her current house and each newcomer with a random vacant house the second mechanism chooses an ordering from a given distribution and determines the final outcome as follows assign the agents the best available house one at a time following their ordering in the queue and whenever an agent demands the house of an existing tenant who is still in the line modify the queue by inserting the existing tenant at the top whenever a loop of existing tenants forms assign each of them the house she demands and proceed we show that the first mechanism is equivalent to an extreme case of the second which favors the newcomers

personalized prices and uncertainty in monopsony abstract we analyze personalized pricing by a monopsonist facing a finite number of ex ante identical capacity constrained suppliers with privately known costs when the distribution of costs is sufficiently smooth and regular the buyer chooses to make the same offer to all suppliers leading to a posted price when demand is sufficiently concave convex this price is lower higher than the classical monopsony price in the limit as the seller capacities tend to zero we obtain the classical monopsony price therefore our model provides a decentralized micro foundation for monopsony

on the generic nonoptimality of dominant strategy allocation mechanisms a general theorem that includes pure exchange economies it is shown that if an economy s participants cannot be separated into groups across which there are no potentially conflicting interests i e if the economy is indecomposable then every continuous truth dominant allocation mechanism will attain nonoptimal allocations on an open dense set of preference profiles classical edgeworth box exchange economies economies with no externalities and no production but with arbitrary numbers of consumers and goods as well as economies with public goods and economies with other kinds of externalities are all shown via simple arguments to be indecomposable the results are extended to cover nonrevelation mechanisms copyright 1990 by the econometric society

manipulation through bribes we consider allocation rules that choose outcomes and transfers based on agents reported valuations of the outcomes a bribing situation exists when one agent could pay another to misreport his valuations resulting in a net gain to both a bribe proof rule eliminates such opportunities we show that under a bribe proof rule each agent s payoff is a continuous function of other agents reported valuations furthermore on connected domains if the set of outcomes is finite or the domain is smoothly connected each agent s payoff is a constant function of other agents reports finally under a domain richness condition a bribe proof rule must be constant the results apply to a broad class of economies journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 d70

strategyproof assignment by hierarchical exchange we give a characterization of the set of group strategyproof pareto optimal and reallocation proof allocation rules for the assignment problem where individuals are assigned at most one indivisible object without any medium of exchange although there are no property rights in the model the rules satisfying the above criteria imitate a trading procedure with individual endowments in which individuals exchange objects from their hierarchically determined endowment sets in an iterative manner in particular these assignment rules generalize gale s top trading cycle procedure the classical rule for the model in which each individual owns an indivisible good

an efficient ascending bid auction for multiple objects when bidders exhibit multi unit demands standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes this article proposes a new ascending bid auction for homogeneous goods such as treasury bills or telecommunications spectrum the auctioneer announces a price and bidders respond with quantities items are awarded at the current price whenever they are clinched and the price is incremented until the market clears with private values this dynamic auction yields the same outcome as the sealed bid vickrey auction but has advantages of simplicity and privacy preservation with interdependent values this auction may retain efficiency whereas the vickrey auction suffers from a generalized winner s curse

private behaviour and government policy in interdependent economies this is a comprehensive survey of the macroeconomic co ordination of international economies subjects covered include monetary policies and exchange rates abolishing exchange controls policy co ordination and the international monetary system assessing monetary shocks and exchange rate variability ems stability economic interactions and fiscal policies the contributors are anthony s courakis ronald macdonald mark p taylor peter n smith michael r wickens jeffrey a frankel kenneth a froot michael j artis giorgio radaelli shaziye gazioglu michael j moore neil rankin s mansoob murshed somnath sen paul r masson malcolm knight patrick minford emanuel pikoulakis david currie ullrich hoffmeyer and frederick van der ploeg this book is intended for international monetary economists and macroeconomists graduate and third year undergraduate students

the monetary model in the presence of i 2 components long run relationships short run dynamics and forecasting of the greek drachma this paper re examines the long run properties of the monetary exchange rate model using data for the drachma dollar and drachma mark exchange rates under the hypothesis that the system contains variables that are i 2 using the recent i 2 test by paruolo on the determination of integration indices in i 2 systems j economet 72 1996 313 356 to examine the presence of i 2 and i 1 components in a multivariate context we find that the system contains two i 2 variables in both cases and this finding is reconfirmed by the estimated roots of the companion matrix do purchasing power parity and uncovered interest rate parity hold in the long run an example of likelihood inference in a multivariate time series model juselius j economet 69 1995 211 240 the i 2 component led to the transformation of the estimated model by imposing long run but not short run proportionality between domestic and foreign money two statistically significant cointegrating vectors were found and by imposing linear restrictions on each vector as suggested by johansen and juselius identification of the long run and the short run structure an applicaion to the islm model j economet 63 1994 7 36 and johansen identifying restrictions of linear equations with applications to simultaneous equations and cointegration j economet 69 1995b 111 132 the order and rank conditions for identification are satisfied but the test for overidentifying restrictions was not significant only for the case of the drachma mark rate the main findings suggest that we reject the forward looking version of the monetary model for the drachma dollar case but not when the drachma mark rate is used a result that is attributed to the monetary and exchange rate policy followed by the greek authorities since greece s joining of the european union furthermore we test for parameter stability using the tests developed by hansen and johansen recursive estimation in cointegrated var models working paper 1993 university of copenhagen and it is shown that the dimension of the cointegration rank is sample independent while the estimated coefficients do not exhibit instabilities in recursive estimations finally it is shown that the monetary model outperforms the random walk model in an out of sample forecasting contest

market behavior in a clearing house one of the most fundamental market mechanisms is the clearing house where orders are accumulated over time and the market is cleared periodically the issue addressed in this study is the statistical behavior of the market under this neutral mechanism in the framework of a tractable stochastic model which captures the underlying uncertainties and indivisibilities in the demand and supply schedules applying renewal theory we derive closed form results for the behavior of prices and quantities and pursue the implications of the possibility of no trade and the multiplicity of market clearing prices

strategy proofness and essentially single valued cores in this paper we search for solutions to various classes of allocation problems we hand results pertaining to housing markets are much more encouraging roth 1982b shows that in the context of housing markets the core correspondence which is shown to be single valued by roth and postlewaite 1977 is strategy proof moreover ma 1994 shows that it is the only solution that is pareto efficient individually rational and strategy proof

integrated production planning and order acceptance under uncertainty a robust optimization approach abstract the aim of this paper is to formulate a model that integrates production planning and order acceptance decisions while taking into account demand uncertainty and capturing the effects of congestion orders customers are classified into classes based on their marginal revenue and their level of variability in order quantity demand variance the proposed integrated model provides the flexibility to decide on the fraction of demand to be satisfied from each customer class giving the planner the choice of selecting among the highly profitable yet risky orders or less profitable but possibly more stable orders furthermore when the production stage exceeds a critical utilization level it suffers the consequences of congestion via elongated lead times which results in backorders and erodes the firm s revenue through order acceptance decisions the planner can maintain a reasonable level of utilization and hence avoid increasing delays in production lead times a robust optimization ro approach is adapted to model demand uncertainty and non linear clearing functions characterize the relationship between throughput and workload to reflect the effects of congestion on production lead times illustrative simulation and numerical experiments show characteristics of the integrated model the effects of congestion and variability and the value of integrating production planning and order acceptance decisions

dynamic kidney exchange we study how barter exchanges should be conducted through a centralized mechanism in a dynamically evolving agent pool with time and compatibility based preferences we derive the dynamically efficient two way and multi way exchange mechanisms that maximize total discounted exchange surplus recently several live donor kidney exchange programs were established to swap incompatible donors of end stage kidney disease patients since kidney exchange can be modeled as a special instance of our more general model dynamically efficient kidney exchange mechanisms are derived as corollaries we make policy recommendations using simulations

obviously strategy proof mechanisms what makes some strategy proof mechanisms easier to understand than others to address this question i propose a new solution concept a mechanism is obviously strategy proof osp if it has an equilibrium in obviously dominant strategies this has a behavioral interpretation a strategy is obviously dominant if and only if a cognitively limited agent can recognize it as weakly dominant it also has a classical interpretation a choice rule is osp implementable if and only if it can be carried out by a social planner under a particular regime of partial commitment i fully characterize the set of osp mechanisms in a canonical setting with one dimensional types and transfers a laboratory experiment tests and corroborates the theory

why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments we consider the problem of randomly assigning n indivisible objects to n agents recent research introduced a promising mechanism the probabilistic serial that has superior e ciency properties than the most common real life mechanism random priority on the other hand mechanisms based on gale s celebrated top trading cycles method have long dominated the indivisible goods literature with the exception of the present context thanks to their outstanding e ciency features we present an equivalence

bounded rationality and robust mechanism design an axiomatic approach abstract we propose an axiomatic approach to study the superior performance of mechanisms with obviously dominant strategies to those with only dominant strategies guided by the psychological inability to reason state by state we develop obvious preference as a weakening of subjective expected utility theory we show that a strategy is an obviously dominant if and only if any obvious preference prefer it to any deviating strategy at any reachable information set applying the concept of nash equilibrium to obvious preference we propose obvious nash equilibrium to identify a set of mechanisms that are more robust than mechanisms with only nash equilibria

exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms there is a wide range of economic problems that involve the exchange of indivisible goods with no monetary transfers starting from the housing market model of the seminal paper by shapley and scarf 1974 to problems such as the kidney exchange or the school choice problem the classical solution to many of these models is to apply a mechanism called top trading cycles attributed to david gale which satisfies good properties for the case of strict preferences in this paper we propose a family of mechanisms called top trading absorbing sets mechanisms which generalize the top trading cycles to the general case in which individuals are allowed to report indifferences while preserving a maximal possible set of its desirable properties

eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation abstract we describe strategy proof rules for economies where an agent is assigned a position e g a job plus some of a divisible good for the 2 agent 2 position case we derive a robust characterization for the multi agent position case many arbitrary such rules exist so we consider additional requirements by also requiring coalitional strategy proofness or nonbossiness the range of a solution is restricted to the point that such rules are not more complex than those for the shapley scarf housing model no divisible good third we show that essentially only constant solutions are immune to manipulations involving bribes finally we demonstrate a conflict between efficiency and strategy proofness the results extend to models without externalities in which agents share positions journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d70

a robust optimization approach to inventory theory we propose a general methodology based on robust optimization to address the problem of optimally controlling a supply chain subject to stochastic demand in discrete time this problem has been studied in the past using dynamic programming which suffers from dimensionality problems and assumes full knowledge of the demand distribution the proposed approach takes into account the uncertainty of the demand in the supply chain without assuming a specific distribution while remaining highly tractable and providing insight into the corresponding optimal policy it also allows adjustment of the level of robustness of the solution to trade off performance and protection against uncertainty an attractive feature of the proposed approach is its numerical tractability especially when compared to multidimensional dynamic programming problems in complex supply chains as the robust problem is of the same difficulty as the nominal problem that is a linear programming problem when there are no fixed costs and a mixed integer programming problem when fixed costs are present furthermore we show that the optimal policy obtained in the robust approach is identical to the optimal policy obtained in the nominal case for a modified and explicitly computable demand sequence in this way we show that the structure of the optimal robust policy is of the same base stock character as the optimal stochastic policy for a wide range of inventory problems in single installations series systems and general supply chains preliminary computational results are very promising

the use of technical analysis in the foreign exchange market abstract technica or chartist analysis of financial markets involves providing forecasts or trading advice on the basis of largely visual inspection of past prices without regard to any underlying economic or fundamental analysis this paper reports the results of a questionnaire survey conducted on behalf of the bank of england among chief foreign exchange dealers based in london in november 1988 amongst other findings it is revealed that at least 90 per cent of respondents place some weight on this form of non fundamental analysis when forming views at one or more time horizons there is also a skew towards reliance on technical as opposed to fundamentalist analysis at shorter horizons which becomes steadily reversed as the length of horizon considered is increased a very high proportion of chief dealers view technical and fundamental analysis as complementary forms of analysis and a substantial proportion suggest that technical advice may be self fulfilling jel f31

leveling the playing field sincere and sophisticated players in the boston mechanism empirical and experimental evidence suggests different levels of sophistication among families in the boston public school student assignment plan we analyze the preference revelation game induced by the boston mechanism with sincere players who report their true preferences and sophisticated players who play a best response we characterize the set of nash equilibrium outcomes as the set of stable matchings of a modified economy where sincere students lose priority to sophisticated students any sophisticated student weakly prefers her assignment under the pareto dominant nash equilibrium of the boston mechanism to her assignment under the recently adopted student optimal stable mechanism jel d82 i21

strategy proofness and the core in house allocation problems abstract we study house allocation problems introduced by l shapley and h scarf 1974 j math econ 1 23 28 we prove that a mechanism a social choice function is individually rational anonymous strategy proof and nonbossy but not necessarily pareto efficient if and only if it is either the core mechanism or the no trade mechanism where the no trade mechanism is the one that selects the initial allocation for each profile of preferences this result confirms the intuition that even if we are willing to accept inefficiency there exists no interesting strategy proof mechanism other than the core mechanism journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 c78 d71 d78 d89

the probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments abstract a random assignment is ordinally efficient if it is not stochastically dominated with respect to individual preferences over sure objects when there are no private endowments the set of ordinally efficient random assignments is characterized by the eating algorithm bogomolnaia and moulin 2001 when there are private endowments the main requirement is individual rationality however the eating algorithm fails to deliver this property our contribution is the natural generalization of the eating algorithm for this general class of problems the family of this generalized eating algorithm characterizes the set of individually rational and ordinally efficient random assignments a special solution in this family the individually rational probabilistic serial ps ir also achieves a new fairness axiom no justified envy however it is not immune to strategic manipulation we show that individual rationality no justified envy and strategy proofness are incompatible

auction institutional design theory and behavior of simultaneous multiple unit generalizations of the dutch and english auctions historically english and dutch auctions have been used for the exchange of single objects such as works of art or single lots of a good such as produce fish or cut flowers where these institutions have been used for the exchange of multiple units such as the australian wool auction using english rules successive lots of the good are sometimes sold sequentially at auction in some but not all instances this is because the goods are not identical even though the various lots may be close substitutes see penny burns 1985 where the goods are accepted universally as being homogeneous as in the securities markets multiple units are often commonly auctioned simultaneously in the securities industry orders are batched for simultaneous execution in multiple unit auctions in what are referred to as call markets that is the security is called for auction at a particular point in time this type of market is used on the stock exchanges of austria belgium france germany and israel some of these are verbal and some are sealed bid auctions although the u s organized exchanges are predominantly continuous rather than call markets except that call markets are used each day to open trading in each listed security there is a growing number of exceptions such as the proliferation since 1984 of auction preferred stock goldman sachs and co october 1984 and money market preferred stock lehman brothers july 1984 we now have dutch auction rate transferable securities called darts stated rate auction preferred stock or straps and many more after the initial subscription offering of this type of security the market is called every 49 days to reset the preferred dividend rate using a multiple unit auction the exchange of shares and the dividend determination is based on the array of stated dividend rates at which existing holders and potential new holders are willing to sell and or buy corresponding quantities the dividend rate and exchange of shares every 49 days is executed using the uniform price or competitive sealed bid mechanism vernon l smith et al 1980 the discussion to follow will be confined to this sealed bid form of the call market call markets provide temporal consolidation of trade orders or other forms of expressing the desire to buy and sell by comparison with continuous trading call markets offer both advantages and disadvantages robert a schwartz 1988 pp 442 6 the cited advantages include low cost of operating the exchange information aggregation and presumed pricing efficiency price stability individual trades which are thought to have a small impact on price reduced price uncertainty and finally nondiscriminatory pricing however there are offsetting disadvantages 1 the market is inaccessible except at the time of call 2 no bid offer contract or price information is available until the results of the call are announced and 3 there is transaction uncertainty because a submitted bid offer may be too low high to execute inside the supply demand cross these conditions are only partially alleviated if there is a secondary market between calls these disadvantages may be significant in september 1988 the wall street journal published an article on the failure of a call market for the auction rate preferred stock economic science laboratory university of arizona tucson arizona this material is based upon work supported by the national science foundation under grant no ses 8320121

obvious ex post equilibrium abstract i propose a new solution concept obvious ex post oxp equilibrium this is a formal standard of cognitive simplicity for mechanisms in settings with interdependent values under some standard assumptions the ascending auction has an efficient oxp equilibrium i discuss a decision theoretic foundation for oxp mechanisms

group strategy proofness in private good economies many salient rules to allocate private goods are not only strategyproof but also group strategy proof in appropriate domains of definition hence diminishing the traditional conflict between incentives and efficiency that is so for solutions to matching division cost sharing house allocation and auctions in spite of the substantive disparity between these cases in a general framework encompassing all of them we prove that the equivalence between the two forms of strategy proofness is due to an underlying common structure that transcends the many differences between the contexts and the mechanisms for which it holds jel c78 d44 d63 d71 d82

requirements planning with pricing and order selection flexibility past requirements planning research has typically assumed that the firms demands are determined prior to production planning in contrast we explore a single stage planning model that implicitly decides through pricing decisions the demand levels the firm should satisfy in order to maximize contribution to profit we briefly discuss solution methods and properties for these problems when production capacities are unlimited the key result of this work is a polynomial time solution approach to the problem under time invariant finite production capacities and piecewise linear and concave revenue functions in price

exchange in a general market with indivisible goods abstract we show how to restrict trades in exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods so that the resulting restricted exchange markets the fixed deal exchange markets have a unique core allocation our results on fixed deal exchange markets generalize classical results on the shapley scarf housing market in which each agent owns one good only furthermore we define the class of fixed deal exchange rules for general exchange markets and prove that these are the only exchange rules that satisfy strategyproofness individual rationality and a weak form of efficiency

opportunity cost inattention and the bidder s curse abstract auction winners sometimes suffer a bidder s curse paying more for an item at auction than the fixed price charged for an identical item by other sellers this seemingly irrational behavior is puzzling because the information necessary to avoid overpaying would appear to be readily available to bidders yet they seem to ignore it to understand this behavior we consider the bidders decisions whether to acquire information about the fixed price before bidding in the presence of opportunity costs our theory introduces costly information acquisition into an auction model with a fixed price aftermarket selling an identical good when information about the fixed price is costly bidders sometimes remain rationally ignorant and overbid in the auction generating the bidder s curse to assess the empirical validity of our proposed explanation we study the model s predictions in an experiment where subjects have an opportunity cost of looking up a fixed price and bid in an auction we find that information acquisition decreases and overbidding increases with opportunity cost as predicted most observed lookup behavior is rationalizable and rational ignorance reliably generates the bidder s curse

maskin monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods and money abstract we consider the problem of allocating indivisible objects with monetary transfers we show that any maskin monotonic allocation rule exhibits strong asymmetry in treating agents even on finitely restricted preference domains

tests of exchange market efficiency fragile evidence from cointegration tests abstract several recent papers have employed engle and granger 1987 cointegration tests to determine whether or not markets are efficient we use a new test for cointegration due to johansen 1988 to examine market efficiency with respect to the us dollar exchange rates for canadian japanese and west german currencies the fragile nature of the test indications suggests that cointegration methodologies cannot be relied upon to provide reliable evidence on market efficiency

impossibility of strategy proof mechanisms in economies with pure public goods this paper investigates the structures of strategy proof mechanisms in general models of economies with pure public goods under the assumptions that the set of allocations is a subset of some finite dimensional euclidean space and that the admissible preferencees are continuous and convex i establish that any strategy proof mechanism is dictatorial whenever the decision problem is of more than one dimension furthermore i establish a similar result when preference relations also satisfy the additional assumption of monotonicity these results properly extend the gibbard satterthwaite theorem to economies with pure public goods

the stability of long run money demand in five industrial countries abstract this study provides strong evidence for the stability of long run demand functions for narrowly defined money m1 in five industrial countries u s japan canada u k and west germany using post war quarterly data evidence of stability is examined using two different estimation techniques and through a formal test of parameter constancy designed specifically for cointegrating vectors in the majority of these countries the key to stability is the imposition of a unitary long run income elasticity that is rarely rejected by the data

common and conflicting interests in two sided matching markets abstract this paper reviews and synthesizes some of what is now known about what i will call two sided matching markets a number of such models which arise naturally in the study of certain labor markets have been shown to have surprising implications about the common and conflicting interests of the agents and about the incentives they face

the strategy structure of two sided matching markets we study two sided markets in which agents are buyers and sellers or firms and workers or men and women the agents are to form partnerships which provide them with satisfaction and at the same time make monetary transfers e g salaries or dowries the core of this market game is shown to have a particularly nice structure so that precise answers can be given to questions concerning comparative statics and manipulability the idea of using walrasian equilibrium as a mechanism for making allocations with desirable properties of fairness and efficiency has been studied extensively the scheme involves having agents specify their supply and demand functions the competitive equilibria are then calculated and allocations are made accordingly in general this procedure may run into two difficulties first nonuniqueness if there are several equilibria there may be no fair way to decide which one should be implemented and second manipulability if there is only one equilibrium an informed agent may be able to influence it by suitably falsifying his demand data however as we will show here using the walrasian mechanism does work remarkably well for a certain class of important markets these are the matching markets of our title and they include markets for single items like houses where it is assumed that traders do not wish to acquire more than one item they also include labor markets in which it is desired to match workers with jobs at suitable salaries academic markets in which students are to be assigned to educational institutions marriage markets where men and women are matched through negotiating of dowries it turns out that in these markets both the problems of nonuniqueness and manipulability can be resolved in a

no envy and consistency in economies with indivisible goods we consider the problem of fair allocation in economies with indivisible goods our main objective is to identify appealing subsolutions of the no envy solution we formulate desirable properties of solutions and look for solutions satisfying them given an allocation chosen by a solution for some economy and given a subgroup of the agents consider the problem of fairly distributing among its members the resources that this group has collectively received the solution is consistent if it recommends that the same bundle be attributed to each of these agents as initially we show that there is no proper subsolution of the no envy solution that satisfies consistency however many subsolutions satisfy bilateral consistency or the converse of consistency but again there is no proper subsolution satisfying these two properties together

using a mathematical programming model to examine the marginal price of capacitated resources accurate information on dual prices of capacitated resources is of interest in a number of applications such as cost allocation and pricing to gain insight we focus on the dual prices of capacity and demand in a single stage single product production inventory system and discuss their interpretation in particular we examine the behavior of two different production planning models a conventional linear programming model and a nonlinear model that captures queuing behavior at resources in an aggregate manner using nonlinear clearing functions the classical linear programming formulation consistently underestimates the dual price of capacity due to its failure to capture the effects of queuing the clearing function formulation in contrast produces positive dual prices even when utilization is below one and exhibits more realistic behavior such as holding finished inventory at utilization levels below one

efficient dynamic barter exchange we study dynamic matching policies in a stochastic marketplace for barter with agents arriving over time each agent is endowed with an item and is interested in an item possessed by another agent homogeneously with probability p independently for all pairs of agents three settings are considered with respect to the types of allowed exchanges a only two way cycles in which two agents swap items b two way or three way cycles c unbounded chains initiated by an agent who provides an item but expects nothing in return we consider the average waiting time as a measure of efficiency and find that the cost outweighs the benefit from waiting to thicken the market in particular in each of the above settings a policy that conducts exchanges in a greedy fashion is near optimal further for small p we find that allowing three way cycles greatly reduces the waiting time over just two way cycles and conducting exchanges through a chain further reduces the waiting time significantly thus a centra

economic engineering and the design of matching markets the contributions of alvin e roth alvin roth s research on and design of new economic systems has had a wide and large impact on human welfare from the matching of residents to medical programs to the assignment of students to schools to the manner in which kidneys are allocated to patients needing transplants this article discusses his important contributions to the understanding and improvement of matching markets highlighting roth s key roles in some of the most prominent successes of market design and the ascension of economic engineering

a structured var for denmark under changing monetary regimes using recently developed statistical tools for analyzing cointegrated 1 2 data this article models money income prices and interest rates in denmark the final model describes the dynamic adjustment to short run changes of the process to deviations from long run steady states and to several political interventions it provides new insights about the effects of the liberalization of trade and capital in a small open european economy

top trading with fixed tie breaking in markets with indivisible goods abstract we study markets with indivisible goods where monetary compensations are not possible each individual is endowed with an object and a preference relation over all objects when preferences are strict gale s top trading cycles algorithm finds the unique core allocation when preferences are not necessarily strict we use an exogenous profile of tie breakers to resolve any ties in individuals preferences and apply gale s top trading cycles algorithm for the resulting profile of strict preferences we provide a foundation of these simple extensions of gale s top trading cycles algorithm from strict preferences to weak preferences we show that gale s top trading cycles algorithm with fixed tie breaking is characterized by individual rationality strategy proofness weak efficiency non bossiness and consistency our result supports the common practice in applications to break ties in weak preferences using some fixed exogenous criteria and then to use a good and simple rule for the resulting strict preferences

robustly optimal auctions with unknown resale opportunities the standard revenue maximizing auction discriminates against a priori stronger bidders so as to reduce their information rents we show that such discrimination is no longer optimal when the auction s winner may resell to another bidder and the auctioneer has non bayesian uncertainty about such resale opportunities we identify a worst case resale scenario in which bidders values become publicly known after the auction and losing bidders compete bertrand style to buy the object from the winner with this form of resale misallocation no longer reduces the information rents of the high value bidder as he could still secure the same rents by buying the object in resale under regularity assumptions we show that revenue is maximized by a version of the vickrey auction with bidder specific reserve prices first proposed by ausubel and cramton 2004 the proof of optimality involves constructing lagrange multipliers on a double continuum of binding non local incentive constraints

cognitive ability and bidding behavior in second price auctions an experimental study behavioral biases are more pronounced for individuals with lower cognitive abilities this paper examines what connection if any there is between cognitive ability and bidding strategy in second price auctions despite truthful revelation being a weakly dominant strategy previous experiments have consistently observed overbidding which makes use of such auctions for inferring homegrown value problematic examining the effect of cognitive ability is important as it may help identify when one can reliably recover values from bids the results indicate that more cognitively able subjects behave in closer accordance with theory and that cognitive ability partially explains heterogeneity in bidding behavior

loss aversion and competition in vickrey auctions money ain t no good we present results from an experiment with a within subject design aimed at testing a unique prediction of expectations based reference dependent preferences and loss aversion in private value second price vickrey auctions if bidders have expectationsbased reference dependent preferences the total number of participants in an auction should affect bids in auctions for real objects but not in auctions with induced monetary values our findings are consistent with expectations based reference dependent preferences and loss aversion in real object auctions subjects bids are affected by the number of competitors and on average they decline with the intensity of competition in induced value auctions instead bids are unaffected by the intensity of competition we also successfully replicate an experiment from sprenger 2015 aimed at distinguishing expectations based loss aversion from models of disappointment aversion this provides additional evidence that our findings in the auction experiments are due to expectations based loss aversion

the monetary model of the exchange rate long run relationships short run dynamics and how to beat a random walk abstract the monetary model is re examined for the sterling dollar exchange rate first it is demonstrated using a multivariate cointegration technique that an unrestricted monetary model is a valid framework for analyzing the long run exchange rate second we find once proper account has been taken of the short run data dynamics that an unrestricted monetary model outperforms the random walk and other models in an out of sample forecasting contest jel f31

reclaim proof allocation of indivisible objects abstract we study desirability axioms imposed on allocations in indivisible object allocation problems the existing axioms in the literature are various conditions of robustness to blocking coalitions with respect to agents ex ante individual rationality and group rationality and ex post pareto efficiency endowments we introduce a stringent axiom that encompasses and strengthens the existing ones an allocation is reclaim proof if it is robust to blocking coalitions with respect to any conceivable interim endowments of agents this is an appealing property in dynamic settings where the assignments prescribed by an allocation to be implemented need to be made in multiple rounds rather than all in one shot we show that an allocation is reclaim proof if and only if it is induced by a yrmh igyt mechanism introduced by abdulkadiroglu and sonmez 1999 and if and only if it is a competitive allocation

auctions versus negotiations which is the more profitable way to sell a company an auction with no reserve price or an optimally structured negotiation with one less bidder we show under reasonable assumptions that the auction is always preferable when bidders signals are independent for affiliated signals the result holds under certain restrictions on the seller s choice of negotiating mechanism the result suggests that the value of negotiating skill is small relative to the value of additional competition the paper also shows how the analogies between monopoly theory and auction theory can help derive new results in auction theory jel d44 g34 there are close analogies between standard price theory and the theory of auctions in an absolute english auction in which the price rises continuously until only one bidder remains and the seller is required to accept the final bid the sale price equals the lowest competitive price at which supply equals demand in the theory of optimal auctions the seller is treated as a monopolist who can choose any

identifying linear restrictions on the monetary exchange rate model and the uncovered interest parity cointegration evidence from the canadian u s dollar in this paper the long run validity of the monetary model for the canadian u s dollar is reexamined the time series properties of the variables are examined with the use of nonseasonal and seasonal unit root and stationarity tests and it is shown that they are i 1 processes with no seasonal effects two significant cointegration vectors are discovered using johansen s methodology but the system is found to be overidentified and hence the authors are unable to assign the monetary model with either vector parameter stability of johansen s results is tested using the recursive methodology developed by h hansen and s johansen 1993

behavioral equilibrium in economies with adverse selection i propose a new solution concept behavioral equilibrium to study environments with players who are naive in the sense that they fail to account for the informational content of other players actions a behavioral equilibrium requires that i players have no incentives to deviate given their beliefs about the consequences of deviating ii these beliefs are consistent with the information obtained from the actual equilibrium play of all players and iii when processing this information naive players fail to account for the correlation between other players actions and their own payouncertainty i apply the framework to certain adverse selection settings and show that contrary to the received literature the adverse selection problem is exacerbated when naive players fail to account for selection more generally the main distinguishing feature of the framework is that in equilibrium beliefs about both fundamentals and strategies are jointly restricted consequently whether a bias may arise or not is determined endogenously in equilibrium jel c72 d82 a large literature presents evidence that psychological and cognitive biases aect people s be havior this evidence raises some questions what are the eects of these biases and can they persist at all in economic settings where people strategically interact with each other and have the opportunity to learn from their experience 1 in this paper i introduce a game theoretic equilibrium framework to study these questions in the context of a particular bias people s failure to take into account the informational content of other people s actions i apply the framework to a class of games that arises naturally in adverse selection settings and then show that the adverse selection

incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods abstract in a market in which each trader s initial endowment is one unit of an indivisible good there exists an incentive compatible procedure for reaching a competitive allocation this contrasts with some recent results for similar problems

fair allocation of indivisible goods and criteria of justice a set of n objects and an amount m of money is to be distributed among m people example the objects are tasks and the money is compensation from a fixed budget an elementary argument via constrained optimization shows that for m sufficiently large the set of efficient envy free allocations is nonempty and has a nice structure in particular various criteria of justice lead to unique best fair allocations that are well behaved with respect to changes of m this is in sharp contrast to the usual fair division theory with divisible goods