the international monetary fund and developing countries a review of the evidence and policy options as its systemic role evaporated with the collapse of the bretton woods system so the international monetary fund imf became drawn into a much more specific role in the context of the balance of payments bop problems that developing countries were encountering at its inception the imf had been seen as having no specific role in developing countries but now it became exclusively these countries that formed its clientele while during the 1970s the imf had continued to make a few relatively large loans to a limited number of industrial countries italy and the united kingdom beyond the mid 1970s industrial countries ceased to draw any resources from it

time inconsistent preferences and the annuitization decision good news can involve difficult decisions for example winning a lottery jackpot can go along with the decision whether to have the jackpot paid out immediately as a lump sum or as periodic annual payments also when entering retirement most people face the decision whether they want their defined contribution account balance paid as a lump sum or to annuitize that amount the fact that people tend to choose the lump sum even if economic reasons suggest that they should choose the annuity is called the annuity paradox in a large online survey we find that people behave time inconsistent older people have a stronger tendency to choose the lump sum than younger people when they are asked to predict today what to choose when they retire this effect is considerably stronger for participants that answer simple time preference questions inconsistently our findings suggest to think about precommitment devices for the annuitization decision in the retirement case already at the time when the defined benefit plan is started

coworker influence on annuitization decisions evidence from defined benefit plans abstract we investigate the role of coworker influence on an individual s annuitization decision using rich data on payout options and decisions in defined benefit plans we find that past payout choices of coworkers significantly affect an employee s decision to annuitize at retirement and that the coworkers payout choices have a larger economic effect on annuitization than recent stock market returns we also find that coworker effects are greater for employees who have a similar level of benefit amounts those who share geographic proximity same zip code and those who retire at a norm modal retirement age of their workplace robustness tests show that estimated coworker effects are unlikely to be driven by unobserved common environments or similar preferences

the longevity annuity an annuity for everyone as of 2005 u s individuals had an estimated 7 4 trillion invested in iras and employer sponsored retirement accounts many retirees will thus face the difficult problem of turning a pool of assets into a stream of retirement income purchasing an immediate annuity is a common recommendation for retirees trying to maximize retirement spending the vast majority of retirees however are unwilling to annuitize all their assets this research demonstrates that a longevity annuity which is distinct from an immediate annuity in that payouts begin late in retirement is optimal for retirees unwilling to fully annuitize for a typical retiree allocating 10 15 percent of wealth to a longevity annuity creates spending benefits comparable to an allocation to an immediate annuity of 60 percent or more

making retirement income last a lifetime to enable investors to spend down the assets in their defined contribution accounts more easily the authors propose a decumulation benchmark comprising a laddered portfolio of tips for the first 20 years consuming 88 percent of available capital and a deferred life annuity purchased with the remaining 12 percent this portfolio can be used directly by the investor akin to indexing or as a benchmark for evaluating the performance of a more aggressive strategy

effectiveness of imf supported stabilization programs in developing countries abstract this paper examines the effectiveness of fund supported stabilization programs by investigating whether the imf achieves its own objectives in such programs even though the fund s conditionality prescribes fiscal and monetary discipline in program countries the results of the empirical analysis show that the imf cannot impose its conditionality even during program years furthermore when successive interprogram periods are considered program countries enter a new program in a worse macroeconomic condition than they entered the previous program these results and the fact that stabilization programs have a revolving nature are inconsistent with the effectiveness of imf supported stabilization programs and may signal the existence of moral hazard

why don t people insure late life consumption a framing explanation of the under annuitization puzzle rational models of risk averse consumers have difficulty explaining limited annuity demand we posit that consumers evaluate annuity products using a narrow investment frame that focuses on risk and return rather than a consumption frame that considers the consequences for lifelong consumption under an investment frame annuities are quite unattractive exhibiting high risk without high returns survey evidence supports this hypothesis whereas 72 percent of respondents prefer a life annuity over a savings account when the choice is framed in terms of consumption only 21 percent of respondents prefer it when the choice is framed in terms of investment features

guaranteeing individual accounts global aging is prompting workers and taxpayers everywhere to recognize their vulnerability to the inherent uncertainty of unfunded social security systems this has generated an international wave of social security reforms over the last two decades prompting more than 20 countries to establish individual account ia plans in the united states the idea of individual accounts has attracted recent interest with the release of the final report of the president s commission to strengthen social security csss here voluntary individual accounts were proposed as a key element of a reformed national old age system see commission to strengthen social security 2001 john f cogan and mitchell 2003 strengths of ia s include the fact that participants gain ownership in their accounts and diversify their pension investments nevertheless ia participants also must bear capital market risk recent market volatility has reminded investors of the importance of capital market fluctuations and their potential impact on retirement income in response some policymakers have suggested that guarantees be designed to help protect ia investments abroad such guarantees have been adopted in several latin american countries undergoing reform and most recently in japan and germany mitchell and kent smetters 2003 sensible public policy recommending the adoption of guarantees must identify their costs and who will pay for them in this paper we discuss how to evaluate such costs in the context of a social security reform that includes ia s along with ways to finance them

an experimental test of the under annuitization puzzle with smooth ambiguity and charitable giving abstract in a life cycle model with a bequest motive we study the impact of smooth ambiguity aversion to uncertain survival probabilities on the optimal demand for annuities we implement a theory driven laboratory experiment first a subject s ambiguity attitude is elicited in a simple experimental setting able to make the smooth ambiguity model operational then in a two period annuity bequest decision problem the subject s bequest in the second period is presented as a donation to a previously chosen charity contingent to the subject being active after the first period in line with the theoretical predictions we find that ambiguity averse resp loving subjects invest less resp more in annuities than ambiguity neutral ones furthermore subjects contingent donation to the chosen charity increases in their investment in annuities only for sufficiently high levels of warm glow altruism

is it really good to annuitize although rational consumers without bequest motives are better off investing exclusively with annuitized instruments in partial equilibrium we demonstrate the welfare effect of annuitization is ambiguous in general equilibrium on account of pecuniary externalities absent institutional constraints like prices and budgets the optimal consumption rule would have marginal utility increase at the preferential discount rate in a rational competitive equilibrium where households fully annuitize the growth rate of marginal utility will be the discount rate minus the interest rate resulting in a consumption profile that is too flat accidental bequests transfer wealth from the old to the young steepening the consumption profile and yielding a better equilibrium if households are restricted to keynesian consumption functions the optimal irrational equilibrium with standard preferences can replicate observed consumption and macroeconomic behavior and the equilibrium without annuities delivers higher utility than the equilibrium with annuities whereas preceding papers have merely hypothesized that households might engage in socially optimal yet irrational behavior the failure of households to annuitize is a real world example of this policymakers should not take steps to encourage more annuitization by the public

behavioral obstacles in the annuity market as baby boomers enter retirement they will look to the investment industry for ways to generate income from accumulated savings why most retirees do not purchase longevity insurance in the form of lifetime annuities is a long standing puzzle mental accounting and loss aversion can explain the unpopularity of annuities by framing them as risky gambles where potential losses loom larger than potential gains moreover behavioral anomalies can explain the prevalence of period certain annuities which guarantee a minimum number of payouts finally investors may prefer longevity annuities purchased today to begin payouts in the future to immediate annuities because investors overweight the small probability of living long enough to receive large future payouts

upping the ante for political economy analysis of the international financial institutions public choice analysis has clearly demonstrated the need to consider the roles of rent seeking and bureaucratic self interest in influencing the international economic policies of national governments and the behaviour of international organisations we have reached a stage however where more attention needs to be paid to the nature of bureaucratic incentives and the degree of discretion that bureaucracies have under different circumstances it is suggested that the incentives for budget maximisation are likely to vary substantially from one institution to another specifically such incentives seem likely to be much stronger for the world bank than fot the imf the evidence presented by rolanf vaubel for budget maximisation by the imf is critically examined and it is argued that much of this evidence is equally constant with other hypotheses thus there is a need for more research on the political economy of the international financial institutions

the high politics of imf lending analysts have long suspected that politics affects the lending patterns of the international monetary fund imf but none have adequately specified or systematically tested competing explanations this paper develops a political explanation of imf lending and tests it statistically on the developing countries between 1985 and 1994 it finds that political realignment toward the united states the largest power in the imf increases a country s probability of receiving an imf loan a country s static political alignment position has no significant impact during this period suggesting that these processes are best modeled dynamically an analysis of two subsamples rejects the hypothesis that the imf has become less politicized since the end of the cold war and suggests that the influence of politics has actually increased since 1990 the behavior of multilateral organizations is still driven by the political interests of their more powerful member states

annuities and individual welfare advancing annuity demand theory we present suffcient conditions for the optimality of full annuitization under market completeness that are substantially less restrictive than those used by yaari 1965 we examine demand with market incompleteness finding that positive annuitization remains optimal widely but complete annuitization does not how uninsured medical expenses affect demand for illiquid annuities depends critically on the timing of the risk a new set of calculations with optimal consumption trajectories very different from available annuity income streams still shows a preference for considerable annuitization suggesting that limited annuity purchases are plausibly due to psychological or behavioral biases

the catalytic effect of lending by the international financial institutions for many less developed countries ldcs and countries in transition cits external financing is frequently an effective constraint on economic growth and development capital inflows may be used to overcome shortages of domestic saving thereby permitting higher levels of investment as well as shortages of foreign exchange thereby permitting larger quantities of imports

health cost risk a potential solution to the annuity puzzle we find that health cost risk lowers optimal annuity demand at retirement if medical expenses can be sizeable early in retirement full annuitisation at retirement is no longer optimal because agents do not have enough time to build a liquid wealth buffer furthermore large deviations from optimal annuitisation levels lead to small utility differences our results suggest that health cost risk can explain a large proportion of empirically observed annuity choices finally allowing additional annuitisation after retirement results in welfare gains of at most 2 5 when facing health cost risk and negligible gains without this risk

don t lapse into temptation a behavioral explanation for policy surrender abstract many policyholders surrender their life insurance policies early leading to substantial monetary losses for private households surrender can be explained rationally if it constitutes the last resort providing liquidity in the event of an urgent need of cash yet we find clear evidence in german panel data that for more than half of all surrendered contracts investors had cheaper options available to provide the required liquidity this finding demonstrates that there must be other factors influencing this important life decision we provide a behavioral explanation focusing on the role of individual decision heuristics financial literacy and financial advice in particular we show that financial literacy and financial advice can mitigate the behavioral temptation to lapse while the tendency to rely on heuristics increases lapse probability

perspectives from the president s commission on social security reform recently we were asked to serve on the president s commission to strengthen social security csss along with 14 other members drawn equally from both major political parties the commission s charge was to provide recommendations to modernize the social security system restore its fiscal soundness and develop a workable system of personal retirement accounts this paper explains how the commission arrived at some of its recommendations and the role that economics played in contributing to these recommendations we describe the key institutional constraints confronting efforts to reform social security and how these constraints influenced commission decisions we also illustrate how economics research influenced the commission s analysis of how to structure personal accounts ways to enhance traditional social security program finances and means of measuring the extent of financial progress achieved through reform

the annuity puzzle remains a puzzle abstract we examine incomplete annuity menus background risk bequest motives and default risk as possible drivers of divergence from full annuitization contrary to what is often suggested in the literature we find that full annuitization remains optimal if saving is possible after retirement this holds irrespective of whether real or only nominal annuities are available whenever liquidity is desired individuals save sizeable amounts out of their annuity income to smooth consumption shocks similarly adding equity linked annuities to the menu does not increase welfare significantly since individuals can invest in stocks in order to get the desired equity exposure

on the risk of stocks in the long run a familiar proposition is that investing in common stocks is less risky the longer an investor plans to hold them if this proposition were true then the cost of insuring against earning less than the risk free rate of interest should decline as the investment horizon lengthens this paper shows that the opposite is true even if stock returns are mean reverting in the long run the case for young people investing more heavily than older people in stocks cannot therefore rest solely on the long run properties of stock returns for guarantors of money fixed annuities the proposition that stocks in their portfolios are a better hedge the longer the maturity of their obligations is unambiguously wrong

do lottery payments induce savings behavior evidence from the lab this paper presents the results of a laboratory experiment designed to investigate whether the option of a prize linked savings pls product alters the likelihood that subjects choose to delay payment by comparing pls and standard savings products in a controlled way we nd strong evidence that a pls payment option leads to greater rates of payment deferral than does a straightforward interest payment option of the same expected value the appeal of the pls option is strongest among men and selfreported lottery players we use the results of our experiment to structurally estimate the parameters of the decision problem governing time preference risk aversion and probability weighting we employ the parameter estimates in a series of policy simulations that compare the relative eectiveness of pls products as compared to standard

the international monetary fund in a time of crisis a review of stanley fischer s imf essays from a time of crisis the international financial system stabilization and development stanley fischer was deputy managing director of the imf from 1994 to 2001 and perhaps more than any other individual he personifies the international rapid response to financial crises in the 1990s this book is a collection of essays written during his tenure at the imf taken together the essays represent the strongest and most logical defense of imf initiatives in the 1990s in print my review essay comprises six parts in parts 2 through 4 i provide an overview of fischer s arguments in three central areas of contention stabilization policy the impact of imf programs on poverty and the imf s anticipation of and response to international financial crisis i then compare fischer s arguments to those raised by the imf s critics during that period the controversial issues of these parts can be resolved only through empirical investigation but on the issues of greatest importance from the financial crises of the 1990s both fischer and the imf s critics make logically consistent arguments with little empirical support in part 5 i review the recent empirical literature to illuminate what evidence has been found in support of or counter to the assertions of fischer and the imf s critics part 6 provides conclusions and suggestions for follow on empirical research

the personal discount rate evidence from military downsizing programs the military drawdown program of the early 1990s provides an opportunity to obtain estimates of personal discount rates based on large numbers of people making real choices involving large sums the program offered over 65 000 separatees the choice between an annuity and a lump sum payment despite break even discount rates exceeding 17 percent most of the separatees selected the lump sum saving taxpayers 1 7 billion in separation costs estimates of discount rates range from 0 to over 30 percent and vary with education age race sex number of dependents ability test score and the size of payment