a conference on postcrisis banking this essay provides an introduction to the special issue we focus on four themes which are important for policymakers and researchers alike in view of the experiences of the global financial crisis of 2007 2009 and the ensuing sovereign debt crisis in the euro area the relevance of the banking sector for the real economy the future structure and regulation of the banking sector the efficacy of past and current regulatory reforms and the impact of crossborder banking on economic stability and financial development

too big to be efficient the impact of implicit subsidies on estimates of scale economies for banks we examine whether too big to fail tbtf factors affect estimates of scale economies for large banks from a standard model of bank production that does not control for any tbtf factors we find evidence of scale economies for our sample of large banks we then control for tbtf factors by using a measure of the implicit subsidy that emerges from a reduction in tbtf banks funding costs due to investor expectations of government support we do this in two ways first we estimate scale economies from an augmented model of bank production that employs a proxy for the counterfactual price of debt that banks would face in the absence of any tbtf funding cost advantage second we estimate scale economies from a model of bank production that is estimated only for a sample of banks considered unlikely to be tbtf after controlling for tbtf factors using either method we no longer find evidence of scale economies for our sample of large banks these results suggest that estimated scale economies for large banks are affected by tbtf factors

can financial intermediation induce endogenous fluctuations abstract this paper studies the possibility of endogenous fluctuations caused by activities of financial intermediaries risk averse agents borrow from banks and invest in a risky two state capital technology the probability of success with the technology is assumed to be decreasing in the amount of capital invested in a complete information setting with intermediation the efficient loan contract achieves complete risk sharing but the amount invested in the risky project is smaller than the loan size this income effect is responsible for the endogenous generation of complex dynamics in the absence of intermediation the economy studied cannot exhibit any cyclical fluctuations

existence and fairness of value allocation without convex preferences abstract shafer econometrica 48 1980 467 476 proved that in a finite exchange economy value allocations exist provided that each agent has convex complete transitive compact and monotone preferences however if preferences are not convex then value allocations may not exist to remedy this difficulty we enlarge the set of value allocations by introducing the concept of approximate value allocations and show that in a finite exchange economy approximate value allocations exist even if preferences are not convex or compact or monotone this value existence result can be used to provide a very general value existence theorem for a sequence of finite economies further we show that value allocations may discriminate in favor of or against a coalition of agents

entrepreneurship financiership and selection we develop an equilibrium model of the market for entrepreneurial finance in which all agents have some personal wealth and a project whose quality is their private information all agents choose whether to invest either as entrepreneurs or financiers or to invest in storage technology we find that a binding economy level wealth constraint which renders credit scarce can create advantageous selection where productive agents become entrepreneurs and unproductive agents become their financiers if funding is easier to obtain entrepreneurship also attracts unproductive agents in our model individual wealth and entrepreneurship are positively negatively correlated if financial market participation is complete incomplete

non symmetric cardinal value allocations it is shown that cardinal value allocations may fail to be symmetric specifically agents with identical preferences and identical endowments can be treated very differently at a cardinal value allocation this casts further doubt on the interpretation of the weights as endogenous utility comparisons

discussion of presbitero udell and zazzaro the paper by presbitero udell and zazzaro henceforth puz aims to investigate whether the financial crisis that in italy really hit after lehman brothers in september 2008 actually led to a credit crunch there and which types of firms suffered most puz start from the quarterly editions of a monthly survey of about 3 800 italian manufacturing firms by isae now istat to analyze credit access by 3 623 firms between 2008 q1 to 2009 q3 i e 23 140 firm quarter observations of which 12 734 came after lehman puz find suggestive evidence that there was a credit crunch in italy post lehman that firms in provinces with bank branches located further from their bank s headquarter i e with banks that are more functionally distant suffered relatively more and that in those provinces especially high quality firms were affected these findings are consistent with a home bias but not with a flight to quality interpretation this nice paper by puz is truly thought provoking as the home bias in banking that is documented is occurring within one country but before pointing out a possible broader avenue for further investigation i want to discuss a few limitations of this study most of which the authors are also aware of and candidly highlight and in this way also indicate more immediate directions for follow up research

banks liquidity and the cost of liquidity to corporations we consider the liquidity shock banks experienced following the collapse of the asset backed commercial paper abcp market in the fall of 2007 to investigate whether banks liquidity conditions affect their ability to provide liquidity to corporations we find that banks that borrowed more from the federal home loan bank system or the federal reserve s discount window following that liquidity shock passed a larger portion of their borrowing costs onto corporations seeking access to liquidity when compared to the precrisis period this increase is larger among banks with a bigger exposure to the abcp market credit lines that pose more liquidity risk to banks and borrowers that are likely dependent on the credit line provider our findings show that the crisis that affected the banking system had a negative effect not only on the price of credit to corporations but also on the price corporations pay to guarantee access to liquidity

outside enterpreneurial capital this article investigates factors that affect rejection rates in applications for outside finance among different types of investors banks venture capital funds leasing firms factoring firms trade customers and suppliers partners and working shareholders private individuals and other sources taking into account the non randomness in a firm s decision to seek outside finance the data support the traditional pecking order theory further the data indicate that firms seeking capital are typically able to secure their requisite financing from at least one of the different available sources however external finance is often not available in the form that a firm would like this article engages with four interrelated empirical questions first what are the characteristics of privately held entrepreneurial firms that seek external outside finance and what drives the request for capital from the different potential sources of external finance banks venture capitalists private individuals leasing factoring suppliers customers partners working shareholders among other sources second what are the factors that lead to rejection or acceptance of requests for external finance given this non randomness in the types of firms that seek external finance in the spirit of heckman 1976 1979 third as various forms of financing are far from being perfect substitutes are there differences in the ability of firms to obtain capital from the different available sources fourth can firms obtain all of their desired capital from the different available sources even if it is not in the form they would like it is widely recognised that the decision to seek external finance and the type of financing sought is related to information asymmetries faced by investors regarding the entrepreneurial firm s quality see for example jensen and meckling 1976 1 where

bank bonuses and bail outs this paper shows that bonus contracts may arise endogenously as a response to agency problems within banks and analyzes how compensation schemes change in reaction to anticipated bailouts if there is a risk shifting problem bailout expectations lead to steeper bonus schemes and even more risk taking if there is an effort problem the compensation scheme becomes flatter and effort decreases if both types of agency problems are present a sufficiently large increase in bailout perceptions makes it optimal for a welfare maximizing regulator to impose caps on bank bonuses in contrast raising managers liability can be counterproductive

approximate equilibria with bounds independent of preferences authors prove the existence of approximate equilibria in exchange economies giving bounds on the excess demand in terms of the number of traders and norms of the endowments but independent of the preferences

wealth enterprise and credit policy empirical evidence suggests that capital market constraints prevent low wealth individuals from setting up in business this paper shows this finding to be consistent with socially excessive lending and an interest rate tax being welfare improving one feature of the model banks inability to identify entrepreneurial quality leads to excessive bank lending and investment in low return projects the reduction in the probability of bankruptcy lowers the cost of borrowing and eliminates deadweight costs and hence promotes entry if the incentive effects are sufficiently large wealth and the volume of entrepreneurial activity move together a key result of the paper is to show that a market equilibrium in which there is a positive relationship between entry and the level of wealth is consistent with either subsidies to inactivity or taxes on interest raising welfare

does macro prudential regulation leak evidence from a uk policy experiment the regulation of bank capital as a means of smoothing the credit cycle is a central element of forthcoming macro prudential regimes internationally for such regulation to be effective in controlling the aggregate supply of credit it must be the case that i changes in capital requirements affect loan supply by regulated banks and ii unregulated substitute sources of credit are unable to offset changes in credit supply by affected banks this paper examines micro evidence lacking to date on both questions using a unique data set in the uk regulators have imposed time varying bank specific minimum capital requirements since basel i it is found that regulated banks uk owned banks and resident foreign subsidiaries reduce lending in response to tighter capital requirements but unregulated banks resident foreign branches increase lending in response to tighter capital requirements on a relevant reference group of regulated banks this leakage is substantial amounting to about one third of the initial impulse from the regulatory change

investor heterogeneity market segmentation leverage and the equity premium puzzle abstract financial economists for the past two decades have attempted to explain why the equity premium is so high now known as the equity premium puzzle epp we model investor heterogeneity market segmentation and optimal leverage using the time separable standard power utility market completeness and ignoring transaction costs to explain the epp we explain both the epp and the related risk free rate puzzle without resorting to preference modification furthermore we show a unique interior equilibrium for the debt ratio contrary to the work by f modigliani m h miller the cost of capital corporation finance and the theory of investment american economic review 48 1958 261 297 corporate income taxes and the cost of capital american economic review 53 1963 433 443 and s c myers presidential address the capital structure puzzle journal of finance 39 1984 575 592 our simulations show the relevance of our models

the poor are twice cursed wealth inequality and inefficient credit market abstract this paper investigates the role of unobservable wealth differences on credit market equilibrium given there is also asymmetric information concerning effort preferences and choices in equilibrium poor but able entrepreneurs may subsidise the rich and incompetent or be excluded as a result investment may exceed or fall short of the optimal level low inequality may deliver conditions for perfect screening and an efficient level of investment the equilibrium with cross subsidisation is consistent with otherwise puzzling empirical observations

asymmetric information occupational choice and government policy a model of credit markets under asymmetric information is proposed in which individuals differ in abilities that are valued in both entrepreneurship and paid employment unlike the heterogeneous ability model of de meza and webb 1987 over investment is not inevitable under investment and credit rationing can occur instead this result depends on the novel possibility of there being greater separation of types in paid employment than in entrepreneurship the model allows individuals to be monitored in both occupations and permits derivation of the conditions under which the novel possibility holds the role of corrective government policies is also discussed

new ventures and their credit terms using uk bank data for 466 new venture loan applications we explore the determinants of interest margin the sanctioning decision and the amount borrowed when these factors are considered simultaneously collateral levels greatly influence the size of credits to new ventures a finding consistent with existing work on firm foundation rates and assets black et al economic journal 106 60 75 1996 de meza and webb the economic journal 109 153 163 1999 evans and jovanovic journal of political economy 97 4 808 827 1989 holtz eakin et al 1994 consistent with the rand journal of economics 25 334 347 diversionary models of debt firms with larger credits enjoy discounted interest margins even when we have controlled for firm size

approximate equilibria in markets with indivisible commodities abstract this paper presents results on the existence of approximate equilibria in large but finite exchange economies in which all the traders have non convex consumption sets as such the paper gives a natural extension to the finite economy of mas colell s results on existence with indivisible commodities and a continuum of agents it also presents an approximate equilibrium theorem without any assumption of compactness or bounded non convexity of preferences

the nature of credit market failure abstract hidden knowledge gives rise to over lending if as evidence suggests the returns distributions preferred by borrowers are also favoured by lenders even the stiglitz weiss model yields over lending when entrepreneurs are sufficiently risk averse

does more mean worse three decades of enterprise policy in the tees valley this paper argues that there have been three distinct phases of enterprise policy in the uk in the past 30 years the 1970s saw no effective enterprise policy policy off the 1980s witnessed an attempt to increase the number of start ups and the 1990s saw a concentration on business quality this paper looks at how enterprise has evolved in cleveland tees valley over the past three decades it suggests and finds that businesses in the 1980s were more numerous but of lower quality even if the influence of unemployment is accounted for than those from the 1970s and 1990s this implies that we should be cautious about the value of policy attempts to increase business formation rates in areas such as cleveland tees valley

the performance of universal banks evidence from switzerland abstract this paper examines the performance of swiss banks from 1996 to 1999 using a broad definition of bank output we find evidence of large relative cost and profit inefficiencies in swiss banks a more narrow definition that focuses on only traditional activities leads to efficiency estimates that are even lower we also find evidence of economies of scale for small and mid size banks but little evidence that significant scale economies remain for the very largest banks finally evidence on scope economies is weak for the largest banks that are involved in a wide variety of financial activities taken together these results suggest few obvious benefits from the trend toward larger universal banks in switzerland

too much investment a problem of asymmetric information this paper shows that under plausible assumptions the inability of lenders to discover all of the relevant characteristics of borrowers results in investment in excess of the socially efficient level raising the rate of interest above the free market level will restore optimality this conflicts with generally held views and is contrasted with the stiglitz weiss model it is shown that the assumptions which yield overinvestment support debt as the equilibrium method of finance however under the stiglitz weiss assumptions used to derive an underinvestment result equity is shown to be the equilibrium method of finance

unfair credit allocations this article investigates the impact of credit allocation on heterogeneous wealth entrepreneurs we show that with decreasing risk aversion and unobservable wealth poorer borrowers exert more effort as a consequence of endogenous adverse selection they are either excluded from the market or necessarily subsidize richer borrowers in a pooling equilibrium resulting in a paradoxical and inequitable redistribution alternatively a less likely separating equilibrium may occur in which poor types bear the entire weight of separation in the form of excess risk taking

foreign banks trends and impact over the past two decades foreign banks have become much more important in domestic financial intermediation heightening the need to understand their behavior we introduce a new comprehensive database made publicly available on bank ownership including the home country of foreign banks for 5 324 banks in 137 countries over the period 1995 2009 we document large increases in foreign bank presence in many countries but with substantial heterogeneity in terms of host and banks home countries bilateral investment patterns and bank characteristics in terms of impact we document that the relation between private credit and foreign bank presence importantly depends on host country and banks characteristics specifically foreign banks only seem to have a negative impact on credit in low income countries in countries where they have a limited market share where enforcing contracts is costly and where credit information is limited available and when they come from distant home countries this shows that accounting for heterogeneity including bilateral ownership is crucial to better understand the implications of foreign bank ownership

classical competitive analysis of economies with islands arrow debreu competitive equilibrium analysis is extended to environments with information sets differing in space as well as in time and with people moving between locations equilibrium is shown to exist and to be optimal and the equilibrium price system is characterized such environments include many of those studies in the sectoral reallocation literature

should courts enforce credit contracts strictly the intimate linkages between law and nance are currently the centre of wide rangingempirical investigations this article presents a simple banking model with informationasymmetries concerning borrowers entrepreneurial talent it is shown that improvements inthe enforcement of contract by courts reduce agency problems but can also reduce the bank sincentive to screen borrowers adequately thus worsening credit allocation a stricterenforcement of credit contracts therefore may be socially harmful even if costlessly achieved improvements in accounting standards however always make bank screening of borrowers lesscostly and improve credit allocation and social welfare

financial contracting under risk neutrality limited liability and ex ante asymmetric information this paper derives equilibrium financial contract forms in a risk neutral capital market with asymmetrically informed borrowers entrepeneurs and investors in doing so the analysis generalizes the work of demeza and webb 1987 by allowing for arbitrary profit distributions arbitrary contract forms and variable investment choices the main result of this inquiry is as follows when higher quality entrepreneurs have better ex post profit distributions in the sense of the monotone likelihood ratio property equilibrium contracts take a standard debt form so long as admissible investor payoff functions are monotone non decreasing in firm profit without the monotonicity constraint contracts often take a different live or die form

the value allocation of an economy with differential information we analyze the shapley value allocation of an economy with differential information since the intent of the shapley value is to measure the sum of the expected marginal contributions made by an agent to any coalition that he she belongs to the value allocation of an economy with differential information provides an interesting way to measure the information advantage of an agent this feature of the shapley value allocation is not necessarily shared by the rational expectation equilibrium thus we analyze the informational structure of an economy with differential information from a different and new viewpoint

multinational banks and the global financial crisis weathering the perfect storm we use data on the 48 largest multinational banking groups to compare the lending of their 199 foreign subsidiaries during the great recession with lending by a benchmark group of 202 domestic banks contrary to earlier more contained crises parent banks were not a significant source of strength to their subsidiaries during the 2008 09 crisis as a result multinational bank subsidiaries had to slow down credit growth about twice as fast as domestic banks this was particularly the case for subsidiaries of banking groups that relied more on wholesale market funding domestic banks were better equipped to continue lending because of their greater use of deposits a relatively stable funding source during the crisis we conclude that while multinational banks may contribute to financial stability during local bouts of financial turmoil they also increase the risk of importing instability from abroad

financial sector in flux financial sector in flux is an understatement several years after the 2008 09 banking crisis we are still confronted with a weak financial sector and as i will argue a limited understanding of the functioning of the financial system and causes of financial instability we also seem very uncertain about the desired structure of the industry which complicates the design and implementation of effective remedies in europe problems seem even more acute the deadly embrace of weak governments and struggling domestic financial institutions endangers economic growth for many years to come my reading is that fundamental changes related to information technology and the proliferation of financial markets have created a financial landscape that is highly opportunistic transaction driven and prone to destabilizing herding behavior in particular information technology has deepened markets and created trading opportunities that allow for excessive changeability via transactions that undermine the stability of highly leveraged institutions such as banks such a transaction oriented landscape is subjected to the boom and bust nature of financial markets and hence is more opportunistic than the more stable longer term oriented relationship focus that existed before i will argue that this has created a very fluid financial landscape that is beyond the control of supervisors contains enormous systemic risk and hence is fundamentally unstable i will also argue that market forces market discipline in particular may well be ineffective in containing instability actually my point will be that market forces are often at the root of financial instability structural remedies via a fundamental redesign of the financial system might be needed to restore stability

efficiency technical change and returns to scale in large us banks panel data evidence from an output distance function satisfying theoretical regularity abstract this paper provides parametric estimates of technical change efficiency change economies of scale and total factor productivity growth for large banks those with assets in excess of 1 billion in the united states over the period from 2000 to 2005 this is done by estimating an output distance function subject to theoretical regularity within a bayesian framework we find that failure to incorporate theoretical regularity conditions results in mismeasured shadow revenue and or cost shares which in turn leads to perverse conclusions regarding productivity growth our results from the regularity constrained model show that total factor productivity of the large us banks grew at an average rate of 1 98 over the sample period however our estimates also show a clear downward trend in the growth rate of total factor productivity and our decomposition of the primal divisia total factor productivity growth index into its three components technical change efficiency change and economies of scale indicates that technical change is the driving force behind this decline