aid for the poorest some early lessons of uk experience the paper presents an interim review of recent attempts to reach the poorest people in developing countries through aid policy from the viewpoint of one donor the united kingdom it concludes that the uk has achieved a modest increase in the proportion of aid aimed at the poorest between 1974 and 1979 that poverty focused projects are in general more local cost intensive and have lower rates of return than others and that the principal difficulties in the way of successful implementation of poverty focused projects are excessive size an over rapid rate of disbursement inadequate local cost provisions and failure to specify the target group or the repayment strategy with sufficient precision it is argued that there are political obstacles to removing the second and third of these obstacles in donor countries and to removing the fourth in recipient countries also

an analysis of the impact of negative csr forced labour parameter on the profitability of supply chain contracts abstract this paper provides a mathematical model to analyse the impact of a negative corporate social responsibility csr parameter that for forced labour on supply chain profitability based on coordination contracts four types of supply chain coordination contract are developed and benchmarked against set performance indices employing sensitivity analysis and non linear optimization techniques nash static and stackelberg dynamic models are employed to represent the gameplay between the manufacturer and retailer in a supply chain the key inputs are average demand and forced labour ratios whereas key performance indicators are advertising inventory and pricing costs our results indicate that by reducing the proportion of forced labour for both members of the supply chain the overall profitability increases in a nash static gaming context however the contractual relationships in a stackelberg dynamic situation provide a different picture here if the retailer assumes the leadership role cost sharing contracts increase the profitability for both partners however if the manufacturer assumes the leader the profit sharing contract leads to the highest overall profit furthermore sensitivity analysis confirms that an ideal situation is one in which the forced labour ratio approaches zero where the profitability of the retailer is usually higher than that of the manufacturer previous researchers have used survey based methods to develop proportional or mediating relationships to measure the impact of csr on supply chain profitability this paper addresses the associated gap by providing a game theoretic based non linear mathematical model to assess the direct impact of negative csr on supply chain profitability and benchmarks the performance of different supply chain contracts

channel coordination and profit distribution in a social responsible three layer supply chain abstract this paper analyzes coordination of a manufacturer distributer retailer supply chain where the manufacturer exhibits corporate social responsibility csr in manufacturer stackelberg game setting the paper proposes a contract bargaining process to resolve channel conflict and to distribute surplus profit among the channel members the contract bargaining process consists of two wholesale price discount nash bargaining one between the distributer and the retailer based on the outcome of that between the distributer and the manufacturer although the contract bargaining process cuts out channel conflict and distributes surplus profit the wholesale prices are quite different from those of a pure profit maximizing supply chain the wholesale price of the manufacturer is less than its marginal production cost above a threshold of csr even it is negative for the manufacturer s heavy csr practice so the manufacturer s profit may be negative the behavior of the wholesale price of the distributer is same as that of the manufacturer but for higher threshold of csr

efficient inventory control for imperfect quality items in this paper we present a general eoq model for items that are subject to inspection for imperfect quality each lot that is delivered to the sorting facility undertakes a 100 per cent screening and the percentage of defective items per lot reduces according to a learning curve the generality of the model is viewed as important both from an academic and practitioner perspective the mathematical formulation considers arbitrary functions of time that allow the decision maker to assess the consequences of a diverse range of strategies by employing a single inventory model a rigorous methodology is utilised to show that the solution is a unique and global optimal and a general step by step solution procedure is presented for continuous intra cycle periodic review applications the value of the temperature history and flow time through the supply chain is also used to determine an efficient policy furthermore coordination mechanisms that may affect the supplier and the retailer are explored to improve inventory control at both echelons the paper provides illustrative examples that demonstrate the application of the theoretical model in different settings and lead to the generation of interesting managerial insights

the recurrent cost problem in the least developed countries the manifestation of the recurrent cost problem at the micro and macro levels is continuing if not worsening least development the article examines the causes of the recurrent cost problem and shows that there is no one simple cause and that responsibility lies in varying degrees between the least developed country governments and their aid partners given the diversity of the possible causes of the recurrent cost problem a broad package of measures including domestic policy changes and international support measures are proposed

how could the south respond to secular stagnation in the north developed countries face the risk of a sustained lack of aggregate demand i e secular stagnation demand oriented growth models emphasizing the balance of payments constraint raise concerns about attendant adverse growth impacts on developing countries from reduced export growth these concerns are well founded albeit less serious than the simplest version of these models would imply relaxing their assumptions and emphasizing cumulative causation forces from domestic demand growth and relative price effects indicates how changed policies can maintain rapid growth while reducing the import content of demand crucial is investment that reduces gaps between the composition of domestic production and domestic demand and emphasizes sectors with cumulative causation effects combined with incomes policy and capital account management drawing down excessive foreign exchange reserves and obtaining concessionary loans from development banks can finance required capital goods imports enhanced south south integration may be an important complement for small countries

beneficial or detrimental ignorance the straw man fallacy of flyvbjerg s test of hirschman s hiding hand summary in a recent paper in this journal the fallacy of beneficial ignorance a test of hirschman s hiding hand professor bent flyvbjerg claims that there is no such thing as beneficial ignorance and that ignorance is detrimental to project success moreover he argues that if hirschman s principle of the hiding hand were correct then benefit overruns would exceed cost overruns thus with a statistical test he demonstrates that the hiding hand is in fact less common than its evil twin the planning fallacy in this rejoinder the author shows that flyvbjerg s test is built on a straw man fallacy and that he fails to refute the hiding hand contrary to flyvbjerg who focuses on the narrow costs and benefits this paper provides evidence that while the hiding hand is found among projects that are project management failures but project successes the planning fallacy fits with projects that are both project management and project failures on that basis the author analyzes a sample of 161 world bank funded projects of different types and finds that the hiding hand prevails while future research should ascertain this finding the author then points out the methodological limitations of flyvbjerg s test indeed it is ironic that the hiding hand a principle crafted against the very idea of cost benefit analysis is refuted on that very basis even worse flyvbjerg in his cost benefit analysis ignores the full life cycle project costs and benefits the unintended project effects the difficulties and problem solving abilities so dear to hirschman and thus treats the management of projects as a kind of black box finally the author submits that hirschman was a behavioral project theorist and argues that it is more important to shed light on the circumstances where the hiding hand works than to question whether the principle of the hiding hand is right

demand and defective growth patterns the role of the tradable and non tradable sectors in an open economy developing countries in the post war period provide a wide range of case studies on successful and unsuccessful or defective growth patterns there are two classes of defective growth patterns the first class fail to generate strong growth at their start a country isolated by policy from the global economy may grow very slowly but high growth is unattainable without the enabling features of the global economy inbound technology transfer and sizeable external demand the second class of defec

an economic order quantity model with defective items and shortages abstract the fundamental assumption of an economic order quantity eoq model is that 100 of items in an ordered lot are perfect this assumption is not always pertinent for production processes because of process deterioration or other factors this paper develops an eoq model for that each ordered lot contains some defective items and shortages backordered it is assumed that 100 of each lot are screened to separate good and defective items which are collection of imperfect quality and scrap items the effect of percentage defective on optimal solution is studied while numerical examples are provided for the developed model

optimal ordering policies in response to a discount offer abstract sometimes supplier offers a temporary price discount to increase cash flow or decrease the inventory level of certain items thus the manufacturer may be able to improve the effectiveness of his inventory system by ordering a special quantity at this sale period in this paper economic order quantity eoq models with a discounted price are developed to obtain the optimal ordering policy during the sale period for five different cases a coincidence of sale period with replenishment time b non coincidence of sale period with replenishment time c sale period is longer than a cycle d discounted price as a function of the special ordering quantity and e incremental discount each case has its own characteristics of the sale period and the discounted price the objective is to take the maximum possible advantage from the discounted price by ordering a special quantity during the sale period the optimal ordering policy is obtained by maximizing the difference between the two costs regular eoq cost and special quantity cost during the sale period moreover a comparison of different discount scenarios is developed to sense the effect of different parameters on the ordering policies the annual gain obtained is linearly related to the discount and the on hand remnant inventory numerical analyses are provided to illustrate and testify the values of the optimal special quantity the analysis showed an impressive improvement in the effectiveness of the inventory system when a special order is placed during the sale period the optimal special quantity is driven for each case to visualize real life problems sensitivity analysis is also initiated to study the change in the total savings with respect to the variation of the special optimal quantity

does foreign aid promote the expansion of government building on the literature on public finance i seek to advance our understanding of variations in government size by exploring the impact of official development assistance on fiscal policy i hypothesize that foreign aid operates in accordance with the flypaper effect systematically generating incentives and opportunities for the expansion of government spending results from a time series cross sectional regression analysis of growth in government spending over the 1970 99 time period are consistent with the hypothesis for middle and lower income nations aid represents an important determinant of government expansion looking at the tax and revenue side of the equation however reveals a more perverse pattern of response aid promotes not only increased spending but also reduced revenue generation the results have important implications from both a theoretical and policy perspective inter alia they point to the potentially self defeating nature of efforts to promote market oriented programs of state retrenchment via development assistance as well as to the importance of incorporating international transfers into future research on government spending

trade as the engine of growth in developing countries revisited economic growth in developed countries since the mid 1970s the only way to keep the engine of ldc growth beating at a satisfactory rate so the argument goes is to turn to an alternative source of fuel this lewis argues lies in trade among the developing countries which he asserts can take up the slack left by mdcs more developed countries as mdcs slow down 1980 p 560 pessimism about demand for ldc exports in developed countries markets is a recurrent theme in the development literature also familiar is the approach taken by lewis to dismiss past successes of ldcs in world trade by declaring the alleged engine of past growth to be no longer operating satisfactorily the intellectual foundations of the import substitution strategy laid in the 1950s by prebisch myrdal and most importantly nurkse rested on similar grounds arguing that the demand for periphery countries exports in the 20th century is far weaker than it was in the 19th century trade was dismissed as an engine of growth a function nurkse alleged it had served in the 19th century the solution prescribed in the 1950s was to look inward in effect to scrap the trade engine altogether lewis remedy coming two decades later when most importsubstitution possibilities in many ldcs have been all but exhausted retains the trade engine but seeks an alternative source of fuel to drive it the classic critique by irving kravis 1970 of nurkse s thesis of trade as a faltering engine of growth showed that export expansion did not serve in the nineteenth century to differentiate successful from unsuccessful countries p 850 this followed from two findings first that successful 19th century countries showed few signs of export dominated growth second that unsuccessful periphery countries enjoyed export expansion in the second half of the 19th century of the same order of magnitude as the temperate regions of recent settlement this led kravis to conclude that a more warranted metaphor

does foreign aid distort incentives and hurt growth theory and evidence from 75 aid recipient countries foreign aid transfers can distort individual incentives and hence hurt growth by encouraging rent seeking as opposed to productive activities we construct a model of a growing small open economy that distinguishes two effects from foreign transfers i a direct positive effect as higher transfers allow the financing of infrastructure ii an indirect negative effect as higher transfers induce rent seeking competition by self interested individuals in this framework the growth impact of aid is examined jointly with the determination of rent seeking behavior we test the main predictions of the model for a cross section of 75 aid recipient countries there is evidence that aid has a direct positive effect on growth which is however significantly mitigated by the adverse indirect effects of associated rent seeking activities this is especially the case in recipient countries with relatively large public sectors

analyzing structure of two echelon closed loop supply chain for pricing quality and recycling management abstract this paper analyzes the effects of recycling and product quality level on pricing decision in a two echelon closed loop supply chain clsc where demand is sensitive with price and quality level of the product under stackelberg game setting this paper considers three possible collection activities of used product for recycling viz retailer led collection manufacturer led collection and third party led collection it is found that third party s involvement in used product collection activity is always disadvantageous in this proposed model cost parameters of the reverse channel play an important role in determining best channel structure quality level and price of the product directly vary with recycling a threshold of collection effort determines which party between manufacturer and retailer can provide the best quality product at least price to resolve channel conflict and to distribute surplus profit the concepts of sub game perfect equilibrium and alternative offer bargaining strategy are used the analysis reveals that the subgame perfect equilibrium retail price cuts out channel conflict and depicts particular profit split irrespective of the offering party the proposed model is also justified by illustrating numerical examples

exploring the robustness of the balance of payments constrained growth idea in a multiple good framework this paper derives the balance of payments constrained growth bpcg model as a special case of a three good framework that incorporates exportables importables and non tradables the conditions under which the canonical form of the bpcg rate can be derived are made explicit and the assumptions scrutinized it is shown that the presence of nontradables substitutability between exportables and importables and incomplete specialization in expenditure generally dampen the externallyconstrained growth rate these ndings help explain why empirical estimates tend to overestimate the bpcg rate overall our ndings underscore the observation that tests of the bpcg hypothesis are as much a test of the internal structure of the economy under consideration

aid the public sector and the market in less developed countries a reply the article in this journal by mosley et al i987 concludes its analysis of aid effectiveness as demonstrating inability of development aid over more than twenty years to provide a net increment to overall growth in the third world p 636 this note purports to show that this conclusion which is ostensibly distressing as the authors claim is not warranted the section of the study which is the basis of the conclusion cited and the subject of this note is a cross section regression analysis full details of which are shown in mosley et al table 3 the note is concerned with the relation between the dependent variable specified as the growth rate of real gdp per cent per annum hereafter gdp and aid specified as a percentage of gdp hereafter aid the aid results with only two significant positive coefficients in one subsample certainly give no basis for claiming aid effectiveness in terms of gdp growth the intention in this note is to interpret the results which are assumed to be valid this is made possible by the fact that the authors have helpfully provided the full input set of mean values derived from the raw data from this it is possible to calculate the gdp aid relationship for each country for the second and third period the procedure for deriving these relationships is as follows for each country the mean values of the time series of gdp and aid are extracted from the data for i 960 70 and for i 970 80 using i 960 70 as the base the signs of the change in the levels of the gdp and aid mean values between periods are recorded this is repeated for i980 4 with i970 80 mean values as the base the relationship between the two signs is an indication of the effect of aid on gdp in the period in which the change in levels is effected thus in the case of an increase in aid being combined with a decrease in gdp the latter must have fallen relatively to the former and aid effectiveness is negative mutatis mutandis for the other three sign combinations thus generating the appropriate gdp aid relationship for each country in each period a frequency distribution of the four sign combinations relating to the full sample is presented in table i since the signs of the changes in the levels of gdp and aid are derived by making explicit the arithmetic relationship implicit in the data they form a valid base from which to draw conclusions without requiring any test of

the political economy of foreign aid a model of the market for a public good what determines the type and quantity of overseas aid given by individual donor countries answers to this question in the existing literature are polarized into two groups one of them offers a theoretical treatment based on the theory of public goods which is not consistent with the available data and the other offers empirical correlations without any explanatory theory the first group for example pincus and olson and zeckhauser treats aid like defense as an international public good small countries on this approach are free riders spending relatively little themselves while deriving benefits from the expenditures of larger countries but this approach is not consistent with even a casual scrutiny of the oecd aid community in which broadly speaking the smallest countries are the most generous donors 2 the second group for example hoadley and beenstockdiscover correlations between a country s ratio of aid to gnp and certain independent variables which may be expected to influence it e g that country s gnp its dependence on foreign trade its government s position in the ideological spectrum and the state of the domestic economy 3 however these findings are not fitted into any theoretical framework so that it is difficult to work out what they really mean 4 the approach of this paper is to treat foreign aid as a public good for which there is a market albeit a highly imperfect one because the consumers donor country taxpayers are ignorant about the very nature let alone the price of the commodity they are buying on this view factors on the demand side i e taxpayers response to their country s aid program will help to determine the quantity of aid disbursed as well as factors on the supply side such as the donor government s desire to obtain strategic or trading benefits from aid this view

coordinated supply chain management abstract historically the three fundamental stages of the supply chain procurement production and distribution have been managed independently buffered by large inventories increasing competitive pressures and market globalization are forcing firms to develop supply chains that can quickly respond to customer needs to remain competitive these firms must reduce operating costs while continuously improving customer service with recent advances in communications and information technology as well as a rapidly growing array of logistics options firms have an opportunity to reduce operating costs by coordinating the planning of these stages in this paper we review the literature addressing coordinated planning between two or more stages of the supply chain placing particular emphasis on models that would lend themselves to a total supply chain model finally we suggest directions for future research

the aid effectiveness literature the sad results of 40 years of research abstract the aid effectiveness literature ael consists of empirical macroeconomic estimates of the effects of development aid by the end of 2004 it comprised 97 econometric studies of three families of related effects each family has been analyzed in a separate meta analysis the ael is an ideal subject for meta analysis as it uses only a few formally similar models to estimate the same underlying effects it is also an area with strong beliefs often generated by altruism when this whole literature is examined a clear pattern emerges after 40 years of development aid the preponderance of the evidence indicates that aid has not been effective we show that the distribution of results is significantly asymmetric reflecting the reluctance of the research community to publish negative results the dutch disease effect on exchange rates provides a plausible explanation for the observed aid ineffectiveness

channel coordination when retailers compete this paper explores channel coordination by a manufacturer that sells through competing retailers and that treats these retailers equally as required by the robinson patman act the authors show that in general there exists no single two part tariff with a constant per unit charge that will duplicate the behavioral results i e prices quantities and channel profits that are obtained by a vertically integrated system that is the channel cannot be coordinated except in the trivial cases of identical or noncompeting retailers however an appropriately specified quantity discount schedule will enable the channel to earn the same profits generated by a vertically integrated system conditions are derived under which a manufacturer will prefer to offer various two part tariffs with constant per unit charges instead of the channel coordinating quantity discount schedule the authors also establish the existence of a menu of two part tariffs that mimics all results of a vertically integrated system however only under stringent conditions will retailers select the appropriate tariff from the menu when these conditions are not satisfied the channel is worse off than in the case of a single second best tariff it is also demonstrated that under a wide range of parametric values the manufacturer will prefer to offer the second best two part tariff rather than a menu of two part tariffs that could maximize channel profits

a bargaining model for a first time interaction under asymmetric beliefs of supply reliability we consider the case of a first time interaction between a buyer and a supplier who is unreliable in delivery the supplier declares her estimate of the ability to meet the order obligations but the buyer may have a different estimate which may be higher or lower than the suppliers estimate we derive the nash bargaining solution and discuss the role of using a down payment or nondelivery penalty in the contract for the case of buyer overtrust the down payment contract maximizes channel profits when the suppliers estimate is public information if the suppliers estimate is private information a nonsymmetric contract is shown to be efficient and incentive compatible for the case of buyer undertrust the contract structure is quite different as both players choose not to include down payments in the contract when delivery estimates are public information a nondelivery penalty contract is able to maximize channel profits if the buyer uses the suppliers estimate in making the ordering decision if estimates are private information channel profits are maximized only if the true estimates of both players are not far part we also discuss the effect of different risk profiles on the nature of the bargaining solution in three extensions of the model we consider the following variants of the basic problem first we analyze the effect of early versus late negotiation on the bargaining solution then we study the case of endogenous supply reliability and finally for the case of repeated interactions we discuss the impact of updating delivery estimates on the order quantity and negotiated prices of future orders

sub supply chain coordination in a three layer chain under demand uncertainty and random yield in production abstract one of the major objectives of modern supply chain management is to deal with the growing decentralization among the involved entities and hence minimizing the double marginalization effect inside the chain especially when the end customers demand is not deterministic to address this a three layer supply chain with one raw material supplier one manufacturer and one retailer is developed and studied in this paper effects of both supply chain coordination as well as sub supply chain coordination are examined optimal order and production quantities are obtained for the centralized system which depicts the scenario under coordination optimal order quantities and expected profits of the individual channel actors are maximized locally in the decentralized system under commonly used price only contract semi integrated models are also studied under price only contract the optimal strategies under different power structures are compared and the effects of the channel parameters on the optimal strategies are also examined numerical example is given to illustrate the developed model

a paradox of redistribution in international aid the determinants of poverty oriented development assistance summary donors differ in the amount of official development assistance dedicated to poverty reduction we investigate the causes of variation over time and donors by employing both a regression approach with aggregate data on bilateral aid and two short country studies on germany and the united kingdom we find that there is a trade off between the total amount of money given and the amount of money given to poor countries the trade off is similar to the paradox of redistribution of targeting vs redistribution in rich welfare states case study evidence illustrates how countries have managed this tradeoff

a cooperative game theory model of quantity discounts quantity discounts offered by a monopolist are considered in the context of a bargaining problem in which the buyer and the seller negotiate over the order quantity and the average unit price all units and incremental quantity discounts that permit transaction at a negotiated outcome are described the effects of risk sensitivity and bargaining power on quantity discounts are discussed for alternative bargaining models

a single vendor single manufacturer integrated inventory model with stochastic demand and variable production rate abstract this paper investigates an alternative way to react to demand uncertainty in an integrated inventory model namely the variation of the production rate that enables the manufacturer to reduce lead times and the corresponding demand uncertainty to investigate the impact of variable production rates on the supply chain this paper considers a single vendor single manufacturer integrated inventory model where the vendor ships finished products in multiples of full truckloads to the manufacturer the objective of the model is to coordinate both production and distribution of the product in such a way that the total costs of the supply chain are minimized a solution procedure is suggested and the behaviour of the model is analysed in numerical examples obviously the total supply chain cost is reduced when the manufacturer s production rate is included as a decision variable in the model these savings can generally benefit both the vendor and the manufacturer however in situations where coordinated decision making is initially not beneficial to the vendor the supply chain members can benefit from a revenue sharing contract that supports the sharing of the total savings the model proposed in the paper at hand supports both the determination of an optimal production rate as well as the distribution of coordination benefits among the supply chain members

economic production quantity model for items with imperfect quality abstract the assumptions necessary to justify the use of economic production quantity epq eoq models are rarely met to provide mathematical models that more closely conform to actual inventories and respond to the factors that contribute to inventory costs the models must be extended or altered this paper hypothesizes a production inventory situation where items received or produced are not of perfect quality items of imperfect quality not necessarily defective could be used in another production inventory situation that is less restrictive process and acceptance control the electronics industry gives good examples of such situations this paper extends the traditional epq eoq model by accounting for imperfect quality items when using the epq eoq formulae this paper also considers the issue that poor quality items are sold as a single batch by the end of the 100 screening process a mathematical model is developed and numerical examples are provided to illustrate the solution procedure

optimal ordering policies in response to a discount offer corrections abstract recently sarker and kindi 2006a optimal ordering policies in response to a discount offer international journal of production economics 100 2 195 211 presented an inventory model from the purchaser s perspective to determine the optimal ordering policies in response to a discount offer established by the supplier for five possible cases this study presents some practical extensions to the optimal ordering policies developed by sarker and kindi 2006a optimal ordering policies in response to a discount offer international journal of production economics 100 2 195 211

politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid abstract critics of foreign aid programs have long argued that poverty reflects government failure in this paper i test predictions for aid effectiveness based on an analytical framework that relates aid effectiveness to political regimes i find that aid does not significantly increase investment nor benefit the poor as measured by improvements in human development indicators but it does increase the size of government the impact of aid does not vary according to whether recipient governments are liberal democratic or highly repressive but liberal political regimes and democracies ceteris paribus have on average 30 lower infant mortality than the least free regimes this may be due to greater empowerment of the poor under liberal regimes even though the political elite continues to receive the benefits of aid programs an implication is that short term aid targeted to support new liberal regimes may be a more successful means of reducing poverty than current programs

two echelon pharmaceutical reverse supply chain coordination with customers incentives in the pharmaceutical industry leftover medications that have not been properly disposed not only damage the environment but also might turn into a peril to people s health if being redistributed illegally in undeveloped countries in contrary if they are returned to the pharmaceutical producer before their expiry dates they can be sold at subsidized prices or donated in such countries in this research we explore the role of providing incentives to customers in order to facilitate leftover returns and improve the sustainability for a real pharmaceutical reverse supply chain rsc moreover this research investigates the effect of having a proper coordination method between a producer of medications and third party logistics 3pl companies responsible for collecting unwanted medications from customer zones finally a technique is also proposed to share the rsc s saving among the producer and the 3pl companies the experimental results on a real case study indicate that introducing incentives to customers could decrease the amount of uncollected medications from 18 up to 6 5 furthermore having a proper coordination with 3pl companies could guarantee a full medication recovery

three echelon supply chain coordination considering duopolistic retailers with perfect quality products abstract this paper explores channel coordination and profit division issues of a manufacturer distributer duopolistic retailers supply chain for a product where the manufacturer supplies lotsize of the product that contains a random portion of imperfect quality item in manufacturer stackelberg vertical game setting the duopolistic retailers three behaviours cournot collusion and stackelberg are discussed besides analyzing the effect of imperfect quality product on optimal decisions the paper depicts the hybrid contract mechanism so that all units quantity discount with franchise fee resolves channel conflict though unable to provide win win outcome for surplus profit division the paper proposes two sequential bargaining processes backward and forward where outcome of a nash bargaining is dependent on the previous it is found that for channel coordinated win win profit the manufacturer prefers collusion stackelberg and cournot while the retailer prefers the reverse and both prefer backward sequential bargaining but the distributers preference depends on the target profit that it sets during the bargaining process the proposed mechanisms are illustrated by a numerical example

aid and growth regressions this paper examines the relationship between foreign aid and growth in real gdp per capita as it emerges from simple augmentations of popular cross country growth specifications it is shown that aid in all likelihood increases the growth rate and this result is not conditional on good policy there are however decreasing returns to aid and the estimated effectiveness of aid is highly sensitive to the choice of estimator and the set of control variables when investment and human capital are controlled for no positive effect of aid is found yet aid continues to impact on growth via investment we conclude by stressing the need for more theoretical work before this kind of cross country regressions are used for policy purposes

the fungibility of u s military and non military assistance and the impacts on expenditures of major aid recipients abstract this paper examines the impact of u s military and non military assistance on the allocation of public and private sector spending for eight major recipients over the 1972 1987 period the model assumes that an aid recipient s effective post assistance budget constraint is a priori unknown and must be estimated two versions of the model are tested in version a the data is converted into real u s dollars using official exchange rates in version b the data is converted using purchasing power parity exchange rates provided by summers and heston 1991 major findings are the same for both versions u s aid is highly fungible with a significant portion channeled to the private sector where it finances current consumption relatively more than investment