engendering foreign direct investment family structure labor markets and international capital mobility abstract in this paper i develop a theoretical foundation for analyzing how gender roles in the household affect foreign direct investment in a developing country context it is argued that the extent to which women and men share the costs of social reproduction at the household level is a central determinant of women s labor supply and the profitability of investment i combine a model of family structure with a structuralist macroeconomic model to investigate the effects of various public policies on women s wages and employment a major goal is to specify the constraints imposed by international capital mobility on the prospects for increased equality and living standards for women

strategic behavior in contests comment almost by definition contests involve strategy this is especially true in contests between unevenly matched contenders in a recent article avinash dixit 1987 explored strategic commitment in contests between a favorite and an underdog the favorite is defined as the player whose chance of victory exceeds one half at the nash equilibrium an underdog s chance is less than one half dixit concludes that if the favorite has the opportunity to move first then he will overcommit effort compared with the nash equilibrium an important implication of the favorite overcommitting effort is that strategic behavior leads to greater social costs see gordon tullock 1980 the opposite holds if the underdog has the opportunity to move first this paper demonstrates that the favorite will never overcommit effort given endogenous order of moves the favorite finds it advantageous to wait until the underdog moves surprisingly the underdog s best strategy is not to wait but to make the first move throwing the first punch the equilibrium order of play is for the underdog to move before the favorite in this equilibrium one never observes overcommitment of effort consequently extending dixit s model to allow for endogenous order of moves suggests that strategic behavior in contests will lead to undercommitment compared with nash behavior

multinationals and the developing countries in multinational enterprise and economic analysis caves provides a summary of economic research on multinationals and developing countries yet for policy makers major questions remain unanswered the gaps can be grouped into four categories the impact of the widespread change in development strategies on multinationals the net impact of foreign direct investment on host countries the causes of declining tensions between developing countries and foreign investors and links between our economic knowledge and the decisions that face private and government managers

production and conflict models versus rent seeking models a production and conflict p c model and a rent seeking rs model are compared for one group two groups and k groups adding a new agent enlarges the pie in the p c model but causes the fixed size pie to be allocated on one more rent seeker in the rs model the total production or rent is distributed within and between groups according to the within group and between group decisiveness productive and fighting efficiencies and group sizes play a role the collective action problem is more severe for the rs model as group size increases the ratio of within group to between group fighting increases marginally toward a constant for the p c model while it increases convexly for the rs model adding an additional agent to each of two groups is more detrimental to the utilities in rs groups than in p c groups while adding a second group of agents when there is already one group of agents gives the reverse result the severe between group fighting in the p c model for many groups causes the p c model to be preferable for few groups while the rs model is preferable for many groups applications are considered to intergroup migration inside versus outside ownership divestitures mergers and acquisitions multidivisional versus single tier firms and u form versus m form of economic organization

two player asymmetric contests with ratio form contest success functions i examine players equilibrium effort levels in two player asymmetric contests with ratio form contest success functions i first characterize the nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move game i show that the equilibrium effort ratio is equal to the valuation ratio and that the prize dissipation ratios for the players are the same i also show that the prize dissipation ratio for each player is less than or equal to the minimum of the players probabilities of winning at the nash equilibrium and thus never exceeds a half then i examine how the equilibrium effort ratio the prize dissipation ratios and the players equilibrium effort levels respond when the players valuations for the prize or their abilities change jel d72 c72 i introduction a contest is a situation in which players compete with one another by expending irreversible effort to win a prize typical examples are various types of rent seeking contests competition among firms to win a monopoly rent secured under government protection or by a government procurement contract competition between domestic and foreign firms to obtain governmental trade policies favorable to them competition among firms to acquire a rent generated by rights of ownership to an import quota and competition among firms to capture rents created by governmental decisions to establish tariffs or other trade barriers other examples of contests include auctions patent races research and development r d competition among firms litigation competition for jobs among job candidates competition among candidates to win promotion to higher ranks election campaigns between political candidates and competition between local governments to invite business firms government institutions or government owned corporations into their districts naturally due to their prevalence and importance in economies such contests have been studied by many economists loury 1979 lee and wilde 1980 tullock 1980 rogerson 1982 rosen 1986 appelbaum and katz 1987 dixit 1987 hillman and riley 1989 hirshleifer 1989 ellingsen 1991 nitzan 1991 1994 krishna and morgan 1997 che and gale 1998 hurley and shogren 1998 and konrad 2000 to name a few in this vast literature on the theory of contests one of the main issues is how much effort do the players exert in pursuit of the prize indeed it is of great interest because the players effort levels determine the profitability of the players engaging in the contest and in some cases they are revenues collected by the contest organizer or bribes given to government officials furthermore they account for other important outcomes of the contest for example in a rent seeking contest efforts expended by the players are viewed as social costs due to rent seeking activities so that total effort level is a measure of economic efficiency in an r d contest effort levels expended by the players these are r d expenditures of the firms determine the expected date of invention this article also addresses the issue how much effort do the players exert in pursuit of the prize but it differs from previous research by dealing with contests with ratio form contest success functions 1 specifically the novelty of this article is to consider two player asymmetric contests in which each player s probability of winning is a function of the ratio of the two players effort levels two player contests with ratio form contest success functions or two player contests that can be best modeled with ratio form contest success functions are easily observed in the real world examples include various types of two player rent seeking contests litigation between a plaintiff and a defendant election campaigns between two parties or candidates and r d competition between two firms consider for example a rent seeking contest in which two firms potential monopolists compete with each other to win a government monopoly franchise contract

the rebirth of the liberal creed paths to neoliberalism in four countries1 since the 1970s market based economic policies have been institutionalized as a nearly global policy paradigm using four national case studies this article shows that economic and financial globalization played a critical role in fostering the transition to neoliberal policies but that local institutional conditions were decisive in shaping the nature and meaning of the shift while the analysis finds that developing countries appear more dependent upon direct external pressures than developed ones it also shows that institutionalized patterns of state society relations determined the way in which neoliberal transitions were carried out somewhat irrespectively of the level of economic development in chile and britain poorly mediated distributional conflict created the ideological conditions for a monetarist revolution in mexico and france on the other hand neoliberalism was understood mainly as a necessary step to adapt the country to the international economy

asymmetric two stage group rent seeking comparison of two contest structures two variations of a two stage rent seeking contest areconsidered in the first stage of the between groupmodel groups compete through the expenditure of resources bytheir members based on group expenditures one winning groupis probabilistically determined on the second stage membersof the winning group compete with one another for an exogenousprize in the semi finals model a player is chosen fromeach group and then these players compete for the prize groups differ in size or in their valuation of the prize subgame perfect equilibrium solutions are constructed forthese two contest structures

endogenous sharing rules in collective group rent seeking this paper examines the possibility of endogenous determination of intra group sharing rules in a collective group rent seeking game collective group rent seeking is considered as a two stage nash cournot game in which sharing rules are determined prior to individual decision on voluntary contribution the solution is subgame perfect and is obtained by backward induction in competition between two groups of the same size the nash equilibrium sharing rule of each group is to distribute rent to each according to relative effort total rent seeking outlays in this case are equal to those obtained by tullock 1980 when more than two groups compete for a rent the sharing rule based on relative effort is again likely to be the nash equilibrium strategy of each group the amount of total rent seeking outlays is also equal to that in tullock 1980 in a nutshell the rent is substantially dissipated if sharing rules are endogenously determined

collective rent dissipation the theory of rent seeking was initiated by tullock 1967 1980 followed by krueger 1974 and posner 1975 and more recently extended in various directions by allard 1988 appelbaum and katz 1986a b c gradstein and nitzan 1989 hillman and katz 1984 1987 hillman and samet 1987 hillman and riley 1989 katz et al 1990 long and vousden 1987 ursprung 1990 and varian 1989 the purpose of this paper is to extend this theory by introducing the possibility of collective group rent seeking with voluntary individual decisions regarding their extent of participation in the collective rent seeking efforts

the economics of organization the transaction cost approach the transaction cost approach to the study of economic organization regards the transaction as the basic unit of analysis and holds that an understanding of transaction cost economizing is central to the study of organizations applications of this approach require that transactions be dimensionalized and that alternative governance structures be described economizing is accomplished by assigning transactions to governance structures in a discriminating way the approach applies both to the determination of efficient boundaries as between firms and markets and to the organization of internal transactions including the design of employment relations the approach is compared and contrasted with selected parts of the organization theory literature

strategic ignorance and the robustness of social preferences participants in dictator games frequently avoid learning whether their choice to maximize their own earnings will help or hurt the recipient and then choose selfishly exploiting the moral wiggle room provided by their ignorance however this is found in an environment in which the dictator must actively learn the true payoffs so inaction means ignorance does this effect persist when one must actively choose either to be ignorant or to be informed or when one must actively choose to remain ignorant in fact whereas 45 of dictators remain ignorant when one must click to become informed this drops to 25 when one must click in either case and to 3 when one must click to remain ignorant although the exploitation of moral wiggle room is not merely an artifact it is much like social behavior itself subject to environmental and psychological factors that may reinforce or undermine its impact data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2014 1989 this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behavioral economics

homeward bound interest identity and investor behavior in a third world export platform1 are indigenous investors in third world export platforms more stable than their allegedly footloose foreign rivals while mainstream economists hold that investor behavior is independent of investor identity and therefore call for the parallel treatment of domestic and foreign firms their critics hold that indigenous investors are more dedicated than their foreign counterparts and therefore call for industrial policies designed to cultivate and defend native entrepreneurs who is correct the author uses a unique combination of qualitative and quantitative data to document and account for the relative stability and dynamism of indigenous investors in the dominican republic s largest export processing zone and thereby brings economic sociology back from the margins of development theory and development theory back into the heartland of sociology

the strategic choice of managerial incentives do firms with separate owners and managers maximize profits we address this question for an oligopoly where managers compete in quantities or prices as in the cournot or bertrand models and owners choose their managers incentives we find that there is a strategic aspect in the problem of selecting incentives and that profit maximizing behavior does not result in particular in the oligopoly we study the behavior of firms competing in quantity price more closely resembles perfectly competitive collusive behavior than cournot bertrand behavior

network linkages and location choice in foreign direct investment this paper shows that network linkage is an important determinant of location choice in foreign direct investment fdi network linkages are divided into internal intra firm and external inter firm linkages external linkages are further separated into strategic and relational linkages we found that taiwanese firms are keen on making external linkages but are indifferent to or incapable of making internal linkages through fdi strategic linkages motivate taiwanese fdi in the united states while relational linkages facilitate taiwanese fdi in southeast asia and china small firms are more sensitive to relational linkages than large firms in their choice of fdi location

export processing zones in the dominican republic transforming manufactures into commodities this paper examines the performance of export processing zones in the dominican republic it shows that in specializing in unskilled labor intensive export processing in the context of competitive devaluations between central american countries the dominican republic has experienced immiserizing employment growth in these circumstances the export of labor intensive manufactures is akin to that of primary commodities exporting countries which rely on unskilled labor and which fail to make the transition to higher value added production exports are thus likely to experience declining terms of trade the conclusions of this case study are considered to have wider relevance to world bank and international monetary fund inspired structural adjustment programs in the region

rent seeking for pure public goods in this paper we present a formal analysis of rent seeking for public goods by two or more groups with different numbers of individuals we begin by considering equally wealthy groups under risk neutrality a case which constitutes our basic model several surprising and interesting results emerge from the analysis of this basic case the problem is then extended to deal with a groups with different wealth levels and b risk aversion this last extension brings about a further crop of interesting and useful results

risk averse rent seekers and the social cost of monopoly power there is now quite general recognition that the social cost of monopoly power encompasses the resources expended by individuals seeking to become the beneficiaries of monopoly rents however since the activity of rent seeking is generally not observable direct estimates of resources expended in quests to acquire monopoly power are usually impossible to come by 1 as a consequence the indirect approach of taking the observed value of monopoly rents as indicative of the unobserved value of the resources expended in rent seeking is quite generally adopted in approaches to evaluation of the social cost of such activity

risk aversion in rent seeking and rent augmenting games the effects of risk aversion are examined for two types of expenditures in rent seeking contests a rent seeking expenditures which improve the probability that the rent is obtained and b rent augmenting expenditures which increase the size of the rent to be awarded risk aversion is shown to reduce expenditures of type b unambiguously while having an indeterminate effect on those of type a these two contrasting results are shown to derive from the very different effects rent seeking and rent augmenting expenditures have on the riskiness of a player s position

industrial policy and the wto this paper reviews the objectives and instruments of industrial policy in a changing global context and multilateral rules and discipline the authors provide an analytical review of the objective and justification for industrial policy pursued by countries the importance of having an analytical framework is that it becomes the benchmark against which objectives instruments and outcomes can be measured the use of different instruments for industrial policy is reviewed the paper assesses whether changes have been due to compliance to multilateral and or regional commitments and whether due to unilateral reform efforts the authors focus on the role of industrial policy in the post uruguay round era with a view to the next round of wto negotiations the research examines both the theoretical and applied aspects of industrial policy before surveying the extent to which existing wto rules affect a member s ability to pursue industrial policy objectives the possibilities and implications of revising rules that affect the use of industrial policy instruments in the next round are examined the paper concludes with a final section to review the implications for developing economies

rent seeking with non identical sharing rules an equilibrium rescued nitzan s 1991 analysis of differential sharing rules in a collective rent seeking setting is reconsidered two groups each with more than one member are presumed to use different linear combinations of two sharing rules one based on an equal division of the prize and the other on each member s relative effort we show that an equilibrium always exists for this type of game and then characterize the equilibrium our result is contrary to nitzan s claims that a in the general case an equilibrium often does not exist and b an equilibrium never exists when the groups use the polar extreme rules

growth effects of foreign and domestic investment over tha past few years numerous studies in sociology have concluded that foreign investment harms poor nations these studies have focused on the coefficient for foreign capital stock controlling for flow new investment and defying logic have inferred that a negative coefficient for stock reflects dependency effects that retard economic growth since capital stock is the denominator for investment rate the greater the stock the lower the investment rate for a given level of new investment hence the negative coefficient for capital stock found in dependency studies indicates a beneficial investment effect not a harmful effect this point is demonstrated by reanalysis of the data used in dependency studies in these data foreign investment spurs growth earlier analysts have concluded otherwise only because their conclusions have belied their findings

the volatility of offshore investment abstract offshore investment often bears the image of footloose industry with little to hinder movement to the most favorable environment an effort to describe this particular segment of u s direct investment supports some elements of the colorful anecdotal portrait painted by critics in the third world semiconductor assemblers are moderately sensitive to wage rates and adjust quite rapidly in maintaining what they perceive as a diversified portfolio of risky ldc production locations on the other hand this reaction is small enough to guarantee that modest increases in wages will not send all investment fleeing from an export platform new methods of modelling direct foreign investment when risk diversification is important in explaining industrial location decisions are introduced in this paper

do rent seeking groups announce their sharing rules i introduction rent seeking can be seen all around us firms or coalitions of firms expend resources to influence government officials who have authority to award monopoly rights self interested pressure groups lobby for government subsidies foreign producers exert effort to avoid imposing tariffs or quotas on their products interest groups or lobbyists contribute to the election of politicians who promise to advance favorable legislation research and development rd then the groups announce their decisions simultaneously before choosing their sharing rules we examine the groups decisions on releasing sharing rule information their sharing rules and the effort levels and payoffs of the individual players in equilibrium we formally consider the following three stage game in the first stage each group decides and announces whether it will release to the rival group the information about its sharing rule which will be determined in the second stage in the second stage the players in each group jointly choose their sharing rule and then each group releases the information about its sharing rule if it decided to do so in the first stage in the third stage all the players in both groups choose their effort levels simultaneously and independently at the end of this third stage the winning player is chosen and the winner shares the prize with the other players in his group according to the sharing rule on which they agreed in the second stage solving the game we find the following first the case where both groups release their sharing rule information never occurs in equilibrium second the case where neither group releases its sharing rule information occurs only if the players are evenly matched third when the players are unevenly matched one group releases its sharing rule information and the other does not