is the long run relationship between economic growth electricity consumption carbon dioxide emissions and financial development in gulf cooperation council countries robust the relationship between carbon dioxide emissions economic growth electricity consumption and financial development in the gulf cooperation council gcc countries is investigated in this study using panel data for the period of 1980 2012 a number of econometric techniques dynamic ordinary least squares dols fully modified ordinary least squares fmols and the dynamic fixed effect model dfe are applied in order to estimate the long run relationship between the variables the long run relationship is found to be robust across these different econometric specifications no significant short run significant relationship was observed electricity consumption and economic growth have a positive long run relationship with carbon dioxide co2 emissions whilst a negative and significant relationship was found between co2 emissions and financial development the findings imply that electricity consumption and economic growth stimulate co2 emissions in gcc countries while financial development reduces it granger causality results reveal that there is a bidirectional causal link between economic growth and co2 emissions and a unidirectional causal link running from electricity consumption to co2 emissions however there is no causal link between financial development and co2 emissions also impulse response and variance decomposition analysis outline forecasted impacts of economic growth and electricity consumption on future co2 emissions

some models for estimating technical and scale inefficiencies in data envelopment analysis in management contexts mathematical programming is usually used to evaluate a collection of possible alternative courses of action en route to selecting one which is best in this capacity mathematical programming serves as a planning aid to management data envelopment analysis reverses this role and employs mathematical programming to obtain ex post facto evaluations of the relative efficiency of management accomplishments however they may have been planned or executed mathematical programming is thereby extended for use as a tool for control and evaluation of past accomplishments as well as a tool to aid in planning future activities the ccr ratio form introduced by charnes cooper and rhodes as part of their data envelopment analysis approach comprehends both technical and scale inefficiencies via the optimal value of the ratio form as obtained directly from the data without requiring a priori specification of weights and or explicit delineation of assumed functional forms of relations between inputs and outputs a separation into technical and scale efficiencies is accomplished by the methods developed in this paper without altering the latter conditions for use of dea directly on observational data technical inefficiencies are identified with failures to achieve best possible output levels and or usage of excessive amounts of inputs methods for identifying and correcting the magnitudes of these inefficiencies as supplied in prior work are illustrated in the present paper a new separate variable is introduced which makes it possible to determine whether operations were conducted in regions of increasing constant or decreasing returns to scale in multiple input and multiple output situations the results are discussed and related not only to classical single output economics but also to more modern versions of economics which are identified with contestable market theories

the role of exclusive territories in producers competition reprinted in cartels stephen salant ed the international library of critical writings in economics edward elgar reference collections

multifirm unions and the incentive to adopt pattern bargaining in oligopoly abstract this paper develops a model of wage bargaining between an industry wide trade union and firms in an oligopoly and considers the circumstances under which the union prefers pattern bargaining that is negotiating contracts in a sequential manner to simultaneous bargaining with the firms the paper goes on to consider the importance of the bargaining order in pattern bargaining when the firms are asymmetric the analysis shows that the union gains by first targeting a firm which is in a relatively weak bargaining position i e impatient to settle or a firm with relatively large profits

resale price maintenance an empirical analysis of uk firms compliance empirical evidence on resale price maintenance rpm is scarce this paper provides novel empirical evidence based on a unique database of rpm complaints lodged in the uk to the office of fair trading oft between 2007 and 2009 we describe the characteristics of the commodity being traded and of the relevant upstream and downstream firms and their sectors we then present an econometric analysis to assess how the probability of compliance to the oft request to withdraw the rpm can be affected by the specific features of the relevant economic context in which this restraint has taken place

models of vertical market relations abstract i contrast various models of vertical contracting that view upstream interactions either through the lenses of bilateral contracting and negotiations or through the lenses of a market interface with uniform contractual terms existing models contrast starkly in their policy implications in particular when imperfect horizontal competition on either the upstream or the downstream level interacts with differential buyer power depending on industry characteristics different assumptions on contracting may be appropriate even though the quest for an all encompassing modelling framework seems vain existing models can still be made more flexible so as to be of greater practical usage

resale price maintenance and interlocking relationships dampening of interbrand as well intrabrand competition is often advanced to justify per se illegality of rpm we analyze this argument in a context where rival manufacturers distribute their products through the same competing retailers we show that rpm indeed limits the exercise of competition at both levels and can generate industry wide monopoly pricing the impact on prices depends on the extent of potential competition at either level as well as on the parties influence in determining the terms of the contracts our analysis sheds a new light on ongoing legal developments and is supported by recent empirical studies

successive oligopolies with differentiated firms and endogeneous entry we develop a model of successive oligopolies with endogenous entry allowing for varying degrees of product differentiation and entry costs in both markets we show that downstream conditions dominate the overall profitability of the two tier structure while upstream conditions mainly affect the distribution of profits we analyze how two part tariffs and resale price maintenance shape the endogenous market structure and study their welfare effects in contrast to previous literature we find that welfare under linear prices can be larger than under twopart tariffs although the latter avoids double marginalization this is because linear prices induce more downstream market entry

resale price maintenance and restrictions on dominant firm and industry wide adoption abstract we consider a model in which firms use resale price maintenance rpm to dampen competition we find that even though the motive for using rpm is thus anti competitive market forces may limit the overall adverse impact on consumers indeed we find that when there are a large number of firms in the market consumer welfare under a laissez faire policy might be as high or almost as high as it would be under an alternative policy in which rpm is banned government interventions that put an upper limit on the extent of industry wide adoption of rpm can have adverse welfare effects in the model we further show that proposed guidelines in the united states and europe may come close to minimizing welfare

bilateral monopolies and incentives for merger the paper presents a model of duopoly in which firms acquire inputs through bilateral monopoly relations with suppliers it combines a bargaining model with a duopoly model to examine how input pri

non cooperative bargaining and union formation we study a union formation decision problem when workers consist of two groups distinguished by different productivities workers may form either a joint union or two separate unions the whole decision process is modelled as an extensive form bargaining game workers form a joint union when the sizes or productivities of the groups are similar in the first case there is a wage differential which is more less than proportional to the productivity difference if the size of the more productive is smaller larger than that of the less productive in the second case there is no wage differential in this paper we study a union formation decision problem when workers consist of two groups distinguished by different productivities they may form either a joint union or two separate unions depending on the relative size and productivity of the two groups the whole decision process is modelled as an extensive form bargaining game in which the two groups of workers bargain with each other as well as with a firm the labour market is sharply distinguished from the goods market by the widespread practice of collective bargaining usually several groups of workers with different characteristics for example skill level or geographical location are represented as a single unit and or several employers form a single bargaining unit against a giant union this multiplicity of bargaining units creates a complicated bargaining structure and makes the outcome hard to analyse the purpose of this paper is to provide a model which captures this complexity and at the same time clarifies the underlying structure of bargaining power although economists have been aware of the multiplicity problem for a long time it has been received little rigorous theoretical treatment until recently davidson 1985 examined the possible gains that can be obtained by trade unions through joint bargaining in an oligopolistic industry there is a positive externality due to the fact that a higher wage rate in one firm generates a larger demand hence a higher wage in competing firms when a joint union is organized these externalities are internalized to the benefit of workers horn and wolinsky 1985 investigated the equilibrium pattern of unionization in an industry where a firm employs two types of workers they found that workers tend to form a single union when the two types are substitutes in the sense that the incremental contribution of one group to the firm s revenue is decreasing with respect to the size of the other group since workers bargaining power comes from the loss that they can

economic growth energy consumption financial development international trade and co2 emissions in indonesia this study examines the linkages among economic growth energy consumption financial development trade openness and co2 emissions over the period of 1975q1 2011q4 in the case of indonesia the stationary analysis is performed by using zivot andrews structural break unit root test and the ardl bounds testing approach for a long run relationship between the series in the presence of structural breaks the causal relation between the concerned variable is examined by the vecm granger causality technique and robustness of causal analysis is tested by innovative accounting approach iaa our results confirm that the variables are cointegrated it means that the long run relationship exists in the presence of structural break stemming in the series the empirical findings indicate that economic growth and energy consumption increases co2 emissions while financial development and trade openness compact it the vecm causality analysis has shown the feedback hypothesis between energy consumption and co2 emissions economic growth and co2 emissions are also interrelated i e bidirectional causality financial development granger causes co2 emissions the study opens up a new policy insights to control the environment from degradation by using energy efficient technologies financial development and trade openness can also play their role in improving the environmental quality

buyer power and exclusion in vertically related markets suppliers and consumer organizations have become increasingly concerned by the build up of buyer power of retailers in many markets a major concern is that strong retailers will abuse their power to exclude products and rival retailers from the market to be able to increase prices to consumers as a consequence remedies to limit buyer power are discussed and implemented in many countries in this paper we compare the incentives for exclusion and the effect on consumers prices under both buyer and seller power we study a model with a dominant upstream manufacturer and a competitive fringe of producers offering their products to two differentiated downstream retailers we compare the equilibrium outcome of this model when i the dominant supplier holds all the bargaining power and ii the retailers have all the bargaining power we show that full or partial exclusion of either the competitive product or downstream retailers occurs when inter and intrabrand competition are strong this is true both under seller and buyer power however in contrast to the received literature we find that buyer power weakly enhances welfare compared to seller power because buyer power will lead to both more product variety less exclusion and lower retail prices

interlocking relationships and quantity rationing as shown by rey and verge 2010 resale price maintenance can be used to maximize industry profit when competing manufacturers sell their brands through the same competing retailers the present article shows how quantity rationing non linear tariffs can be used to achieve the same outcome

the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination in intermediate good markets the case of bargaining this article examines the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination by a monopolist selling to downstream firms with bargaining power one of the downstream firms the chain store can integrate backward at lower cost than rivals bargaining powers also depend on disagreement profits bargaining weights and concession costs if the chain s integration threat is not credible price discrimination reduces the input price charged symmetric downstream firms and often reduces the average input price charged asymmetric downstream firms

investigating the validity of pollution haven hypothesis in the gulf cooperation council gcc countries this study investigated the validity of the pollution haven hypothesis in the gulf cooperation council gcc countries using a multivariate framework to achieve the goal of this study the non stationary panel techniques were used to examine the hypothesis from 1980 to 2009 based on the pedroni cointegration test results it was found that the variables are cointegrated moreover the fully modified ols results showed that energy consumption and gdp growth increase co2 emission while foreign direct investment inflows have a long run negative relationship with co2 emission furthermore based on the short run granger causality test results fdi has no short run causal relationship with co2 emission and energy consumption while energy consumption and gdp growth have a positive causal relationship with co2 emission thus the results of this study indicate that energy consumption and gdp growth are the source of pollution in the gcc countries and not the foreign direct investment inflows thus the study recommended that these countries should utilize policies to encourage inward foreign investment since it plays an important role in stimulating gdp growth

the co2 emissions income nexus evidence from rich countries the paper attempts to test the environment kuznets curve ekc hypothesis for 36 high income countries for the period 1980 2005 the test is based on the suggestion of narayan and narayan 2010 various panel data unit root and co integration tests are applied carbon dioxide co2 emissions and gdp series are integrated of order one and co integrated especially after controlling for cross sectional dependence additionally the blundell bond system generalised methods of moments gmm is employed to conduct a panel causality test in a vector error correction mechanism vecm setting unidirectional causality running from real per capita gdp to per capita co2 emissions is uncovered in both the short run and the long run the empirical analysis based on individual countries provides evidence of an ekc for greece malta oman portugal and the united kingdom however it can be observed that for the whole panel a 1 increase in gdp generates an increase of 0 68 in co2 emissions in the short run and 0 22 in the long run the lower long run income elasticity does not provide evidence of an ekc but does indicate that over time co2 emissions are stabilising in the rich countries

a theory of hub and spoke collusion abstract we develop a model of hub and spoke collusion between a manufacturer and two retailers demand is stochastic and collusion between retailers is difficult the best collusive equilibrium is inefficient rotemberg and saloner 1986 in the hub and spoke collusive agreement retailers transmit their information about the state of demand to the supplier the supplier uses this information to adjust the wholesale price by organizing the collusion the supplier increases profits of the vertical chain we show that surprisingly this type of collusive agreement can under some conditions improve consumer welfare

countervailing power and consumer prices this paper considers the importance of countervailing power manifested as the effects of increased retail concentration on consumer prices and welfare within a market setting where imperfectly competitive retailers negotiate intermediate prices with a monopoly supplier only when retailer services are regarded as very close substitutes do final prices fall following a reduction in the number of retailers even in these circumstances the social benefits of countervailing power may not be realised as the supplier may seek to protect its profits by using a refusal to supply restraint to engage in exclusive trading

multiunit bargaining in oligopolistic industries a model of wage determination in unionized oligopolistic industries is developed and used to compare the outcome of collective bargaining under two different bargaining structures one in which the workers of each firm are represented by separate and independent unions local bargaining and one in which a national union represents all workers in the industry in both cases the bargaining problem has a unique outcome with industrywide bargaining resulting in higher wages in addition industrywide unions are inherently stable in that there are no incentives for independent unions to attempt to cheat on the collusive agreement

opportunism in multilateral vertical contracting nondiscrimination exclusivity and uniformity comment an input supplier selling to competing downstream firms would benefit from publicly committing at the outset to all contracts efficient commitment however would require complete contracts the authors study instead bilateral contracting without commitment regarding others terms each firm then fears that the supplier might opportunistically renegotiate another s contract to increase bilateral profit at the firm s expense the authors show that nondiscrimination clauses generally cannot curb such third party opportunism even with symmetric firms to reassure firms crude forms of commitment may be adopted this could explain the pervasiveness of exclusivity arrangements and the striking uniformity and intertemporal rigidity of franchise contracts copyright 1994 by american economic association

measuring the efficiency of digital convergence abstract the paper suggests the use of data envelopment analysis dea and malmquist productivity index for keeping up with the trends in digital economy development effectiveness in the european countries we show that central and eastern europe countries converge to the eu average concerning the level of digital economy development while digital divide exists between the eu and the western balkan countries

does higher economic and financial development lead to environmental degradation evidence from bric countries abstract a vast number of studies addressed the environmental degradation and economic development but not financial development moreover as argued by stern 2004 the rise and fall of the environmental kuznets curve world development 32 1419 1439 they present important econometric weaknesses using standard reduced form modeling approach and controlling for country specific unobserved heterogeneity we investigate the linkage between not only economic development and environmental quality but also the financial development panel data over period 1992 2004 is used we find that both economic and financial development are determinants of the environmental quality in bric economies we show that higher degree of economic and financial development decreases the environmental degradation our analysis suggests that financial liberalization and openness are essential factors for the co 2 reduction the adoption of policies directed to financial openness and liberalization to attract higher levels of r d related foreign direct investment might reduce the environmental degradation in countries under consideration in addition the robustness check trough the inclusion of us and japan does not alter our main findings

the competition effects of industry wide vertical price fixing in bilateral oligopoly this paper examines the competition and welfare effects of vertical price fixing through industry wide resale price maintenance rpm arrangements such as those benefiting from exemption from a general prohibition against rpm a bilateral oligopoly framework is employed incorporating differentiation between manufacturer products and between retailer services transactions between the stages involve prices being determined through bargaining we do not find rpm to be universally undesirable however where retailer power is strong the social effects of rpm are likely to be adverse since the practice can assist in coordinating final price levels and prevent socially desirable countervailing power arising

the gains from agricultural groundwater trade and the potential for market power theory and application this article models and estimates the efficiency gains from using market based instruments relative to command and control to manage groundwater a theoretical model of an imperfectly competitive groundwater market is developed to show how the magnitude and distribution of the gains from trade change as market structure varies market structure is a key consideration because future groundwater markets will likely feature geographic limitations to trade large agricultural players and a legal environment that is conducive to forming cartel like coalitions application of the model to a groundwater dependent agricultural region in southern california shows the existence of large gains from trade despite the potential for market power with benefits up to 36 greater than that under command and control distributional impacts however can be sizable even for small degrees of market power simulations that vary market conditions show that results likely generalize to other groundwater basins

energy consumption carbon emissions and economic growth in china abstract this paper investigates the existence and direction of granger causality between economic growth energy consumption and carbon emissions in china applying a multivariate model of economic growth energy use carbon emissions capital and urban population empirical results for china over the period 1960 2007 suggest a unidirectional granger causality running from gdp to energy consumption and a unidirectional granger causality running from energy consumption to carbon emissions in the long run evidence shows that neither carbon emissions nor energy consumption leads economic growth therefore the government of china can purse conservative energy policy and carbon emissions reduction policy in the long run without impeding economic growth

vertical bargaining and retail competition what drives countervailing power this article investigates the effects of changes in market concentration on the equilibrium prices in a supply chain results are derived from a theoretical model of bilateral bargaining between upstream and downstream firms which allows for general forms of demand and retail competition whether countervailing buyer power arises in the form of lower input prices following greater concentration downstream depends on the pass through rate of input prices to retail prices countervailing buyer power generally does not translate into lower retail prices because of heightened market power at the retail level

the welfare effects of upstream mergers in the presence of downstream entry barriers we examine the incentives for upstream firms to consolidate horizontally and the impact of this process on industry performance when there are downstream entry barriers and firms negotiate bilaterally in the short run consumers are not worse off with upstream mergers since consolidation only results in a redistribution of industry rents in the long run consumers are better off after upstream mergers since they induce more entry into that segment when social welfare is evaluated a limit on upstream consolidation may prevent excessive entry but upstream entry can be sometimes insufficient if the retailers intrinsic bargaining power is excessive

productivity growth technical progress and efficiency change in industrialized countries this paper analyzes productivity growth in 17 oecd countries over the period 1979 1988 a nonparametric programming method activity analysis is used to compute malmquist productivity indexes these are decomposed into two component measures namely technical change and efficiency change we find that u s productivity growth is slightly higher than average all of which is due to technical change japan s productivity growth is the highest in the sample with almost half due to efficiency change jel c43 d24 in this paper we apply recently developed

vertical separation and horizontal mergers the author considers a duopoly setting consisting of two manufacturer retailer pairs in which the observable contract between each manufacturer retailer pair specifies a two part tariff without intraband competition the author shows that an upstream merger is anticompetitive under very general demand and cost conditions downstream merger is analyzed using linear demand and constant marginal cost and is shown not to be anticompetitive both with and without intraband competition and for both price and output competition between retailers in the premerger regime copyright 1995 by blackwell publishing ltd

bilateral control with vertical contracts when a manufacturer contracts secretly with competing retailers he is subject to opportunism and linear or non linear tariffs may not allow the manufacturer to maintain monopoly prices to analyse the effects of rpm o brien shaffer 1992 use a concept of contract equilibrium which concentrates on pairwise deviations thereby questioning the robustness of the analysis this paper emphasises the distinction between the contract equilibrium and standard non cooperative concepts we advocate for some caution in the use of the former concept as if overlooks an inexistence problem we then confirm the intuition that rpm can help solve the manufacturer s commitment problem this confirms that o brien shaffer s insight is robust and validates the courts reluctance against rpm