hot stuff index insurance for indian pepper growers summary we simulate the impact of a joint price and yield index insurance on the basis of a small representative panel data set of indian smallholder pepper growers affordable and feasible index insurance reduces crop revenue risk to around 68 of its original level while a reduction to 50 of this level can be achieved with ideal insurance basis risk is large for only a small fraction of farm households depending on risk aversion 5 30 of farm households is willing to pay for index insurance increasing to 12 50 with a 50 premium reduction opportunity costs of consumption smoothing in the form of lower productivity levels suggest potential welfare gains of specialization with insurance

developing variable unit structure premium rate differentials in crop insurance federal crop insurance programs offer producers the option of insuring farm units individually or as an aggregate unit existing programs offer a fixed 10 discount for most growers taking coverage at the aggregate level this article describes an analysis of risk changes when units are aggregated the methods described here which base unit aggregation discounts on observable farm characteristics are approved for implementation into the federal crop insurance program

decomposing input adjustments under price and production uncertainty a decomposition of input adjustments for stochastic technologies is developed and applied to the case of actuarially fair production insurance the decomposition consists of a pure risk effect and an expansion effect which are analagous to the hicks allen decomposition familiar from consumer theory

evolution of the economics of agricultural policy agricultural economists helped develop farm programs to respond to the dire economic situation of the 1920s and 1930s some early authors appreciated that such policies created problems in markets for commodities and inputs over time our understanding of agricultural issues and policies has deepened through the application of improved models and tools of analysis to more extensive data we have developed better answers to old questions and have responded to changing policy instruments market contexts and policy concerns this article traces the evolution of our deepening economic understanding of the causes and consequences of agricultural policy

constrained efficient contracts for area yield crop insurance with area yield crop insurance indemnification occurs when area yield falls below a yield trigger that is chosen by the producer the maximum value for this yield trigger is generally restricted e g 80 of the long term area average yield the impact of this trigger constraint on the optimal design of an area yield insurance contract is examined within the constrained efficient contract indemnities consist of both a lump sum payment and a payment that is proportional to the yield shortfall because lump sum payments may not be feasible to implement efficiency enhancing modifications to standard contracts are also proposed copyright 2000 oxford university press

does market competitiveness significantly affect public intervention in agricultural insurance the case in italy analyses of agricultural insurance failures often assume the existence of competitive supply tracing the reasons for high insurance cost and limited farmer participation to informational problems and suggesting the need for premium subsidization in order to increase participation however in countries such as spain and italy where agricultural insurance is most highly subsidized it could be that supply is not fully competitive in this article we explore the incidence of public subsidies to agricultural insurance premia when supply is noncompetitive through the use of a simple empirical model of an insurance market it is shown that while in the case of a competitive supply subsidies to insurance would benefit farmers a monopolistic supply would capture most of the subsidy thus eliminating the potential incentive towards wider participation by farmers the model is applied to a panel of italian farms for different levels of risk aversion to demonstrate the limited effect that a subsidy to a hyp

changes in returns to education in latin america the role of demand and supply of skills using micro data for the urban areas of argentina brazil chile colombia and mexico the authors document trends in men s returns to education during the 1980s and the 1990s and estimate the role of supply and demand factors in explaining the changes in skill premia they propose a model of demand for skills with three production inputs corresponding to workers with primary secondary and university level education further the authors demonstrate that an unprecedented rise in the supply of workers having completed secondary level education depressed their wages relative to workers with primary level education throughout latin america this supply shift was compounded by a generalized shift in the demand for workers with tertiary education

crop prices and the demand for titled land evidence from uganda abstract i investigate how agricultural prices affect demand for titled land using panel data on ugandan farmers and a price index that weighs international crop prices by the structure of land use at the sub county level higher prices increase farmers share of titled land i also present evidence of a positive impact of prices on agricultural incomes the effect of prices on land tenure is stronger when farmers have access to roads and markets when they have undertaken investment on the land and when households fear land grabbing

optimum area yield crop insurance cet article determine le contrat optimal d assurance dont l indemnite depend du rendement agrege sur recoltes d un bassin de production le schema optimal d assurance est base sur le coefficient individuel de regression qui mesure la sensibilite du rendement agrege a des variations du rendement agrege une indemnite est versee lorsque le rendement agrege est inferieur superieur a un rendement critique si le coefficient de regression est positif negatif le contrat optimal contient une franchise evanescente si le coefficient de regression est superieur a l unite

poverty traps and index based risk transfer products summary a growing literature suggests that in low income countries households with few assets can be trapped in chronic poverty this article reviews relevant threads of the poverty traps literature to motivate a description of the opportunities presented by innovative index based risk transfer products these products can be used to address some insurance and credit market failures that contribute to the persistence of poverty among households in low income countries applications are considered at the micro meso and macro levels 2008 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

social networks and the dynamics of labour market outcomes evidence from refugees resettled in the u s recent theoretical work suggests that social networks may play an important role in the dynamics of employment and wages across groups of individuals this paper provides empirical evidence of job information flows within social networks and the non linear relationship between social network size and labor market outcomes an extended version of the model developed by calvo armengol and jackson 2004 shows that competition can exist between network members for job referrals and investigates the dynamics between the size of a social network the tenure of network members and labor market outcomes the predictions of the model are tested empirically using a unique data set of refugees resettled in the u s from 2001 2005 the empirical strategy exploits the special institutional environment of refugee resettlement i find that a one standard deviation increase in the number of network members who have arrived in the u s one year ago lowers the probability of employment by 4 9 and the average hourly wage by 70 conversely as predicted by the model more tenured network members improve labor market outcomes for recently arrived refugees

a century of research on agricultural markets this article provides a perspective on major innovations in research on agricultural markets over the past century we review research on market structure and performance vertical coordination arrangements and institutions for producer collective action contributions to empirical modeling of agricultural price determination and marketing margins are also evaluated as are innovations in research on spatial market relationships and the role of storage finally we discuss contributions to understanding market information systems and the functioning of market based mechanisms for agri

who pays for the minimum wage this paper analyzes the eects of a large 60 and persistent increase in the minimum wage instituted in hungary in 2001 we propose a new approach to estimating the employment eects of a minimum wage increase that exploits information on the distribution of wages before and after the policy change we infer the number of jobs destroyed by comparing the number of pre reform jobs below the new minimum wage to the excess number of jobs paying at and above the new minimum wage our estimates imply that the higher minimum wage had at most a small negative eect on employment and so the main eect was pushing up wages we then use data on a large panel of firms to evaluate the economic incidence of the minimum wage increase contrary to theoretical models that attribute the small employment eects of minimum wage changes to monopsonistic wage setting we find no evidence that the rise in the minimum wage led to lower profitability among low wage employers instead we find that the costs of the minimum wage were largely passed through to consumers

input use decisions with greater information on crop conditions implications for insurance moral hazard and the environment emerging precision agriculture technologies allow farms to make input decisions with greater information on crop conditions this greater information occurs by providing improved predictions of crop yields using remote sensing and crop simulation models and by allowing farms to apply inputs within the growing season when some crop conditions are already realized we use a stylized model with uncertainty in yield and price to examine how greater information on crop conditions i e a forecast affects input use for insured and uninsured farms we show that moral hazard decreases farms apply more inputs as the forecast accuracy improves when the forecast indicates good yields and vice versa when the forecast indicates bad yields in the long run moral hazard decreases in response to an improvement in forecast accuracy even though moral hazard decreases in the long run indemnity payments are likely to increase in the long run driven by the increase in moral hazard when the forecast indicates bad crop conditions we use the results of our model to discuss the potential impact of different technologies and types of inputs on the federal crop insurance program and the environment

income inequality and the labour market in britain and the us abstract we study household income inequality in both great britain and the united states and the interplay between labour market earnings and the tax system while both britain and the us have witnessed secular increases in 90 10 male earnings inequality over the last three decades this measure of inequality in net family income has declined in britain while it has risen in the us to better understand these comparisons we examine the interaction between labour market earnings in the family assortative mating the tax and welfare benefit system and household income inequality we find that both countries have witnessed sizeable changes in employment which have primarily occurred on the extensive margin in the us and on the intensive margin in britain increases in the generosity of the welfare system in britain played a key role in equalizing net income growth across the wage distribution whereas the relatively weak safety net available to non workers in the us mean this growing group has seen particularly adverse developments in their net incomes

testing for the monotone likelihood ratio assumption although monotonicity of the likelihood ratio for conditioned densities is a common technical assumption in economic models empirical tests for its plausibility do not appear to have been conducted this article develops such a test based on the theory of order restricted inference that is robust with respect to the correlation structure of the distributions being compared the test is applied to study the technology revealed by agricultural production experiments for the data under scrutiny the results support the monotone likelihood ratio assumption in a second application we find some support for the assumption of affiliation among bids cast in a multiple round vickrey auction for a consumption good

insurance moral hazard and chemical use in agriculture this paper examines how crop insurance affects corn farmers fertilizer and pesticide use in the u s midwest crop insurance might be expected to affect chemical use because of moral hazard insured farmers may undertake riskier production than do uninsured farmers results suggest that insurance exerts considerable influence on corn farmers chemical use decisions those purchasing insurance applied significantly more nitrogen per acre 19 spent more on pesticides 21 and treated more acreage with both herbicides and insecticides 7 and 63 than did those not purchasing insurance these results suggest that both fertilizer and pesticides may be risk increasing inputs

parametric and nonparametric statistical modelling of crop yield implications for pricing crop insurance contracts this article considers alternative methods to calculate the fair premium rate of crop insurance contracts based on county yields the premium rate was calculated using parametric and nonparametric approaches to estimate the conditional agricultural yield density these methods were applied to a data set of county yield provided by the statistical and geography brazilian institute ibge for the period of 1990 through 2002 for soybean corn and wheat in the state of parana in this article we propose methodological alternatives to pricing crop insurance contracts resulting in more accurate premium rates in a situation of limited data

the impacts of multiperil crop insurance on indonesian rice farmers and production this article analyzes the effect of multiperil crop insurance policy for risk averse indonesian rice farmers located in tuban and gresik regencies of the east java province based on the model comparative static analysis of a change in policy variables coverage levels and premium subsidies on input use through the coupling wealth and insurance effects are presented the comparative static results are largely ambiguous and left as empirical questions consequently the model is numerically simulated to quantify the effects of different coverage levels and subsidy rates on input use expected net insurance payments and certainty equivalents the empirical analysis shows that mpci crop insurance results in a decline in expected yield for coverage levels above about 82 5 for both regencies furthermore higher subsidy rates amplify the reduction in input use and yield therefore incomplete coverage with relatively low premium subsidies is the best policy to minimize the impact on input use and yield however from the farmers perspective the optimal policy combination results from the highest coverage level and subsidy which offer the largest expected net insurance payments and certainty equivalent

investment and equity effects of land regularisation the case of nicaragua we use data from nicaragua to examine the impact of award of registered and non registered title on land values and changes in land attached investment registration acquisition through purchase and agrarian reform title all are associated with significant increases in the value of plots receipt of registered title is found to increase land values by 30 and at the same time greatly increase the propensity to invest bringing such investment closer to the optimum in line with descriptive statistics indicating great demand for land right regularisation especially from the poor this suggests that titling can have a positive distributional effect at the same time the legal validity and official recognition of the titles issued appears to be of great importance

moral hazard cycles in individual coverage crop insurance this paper examines the moral hazard implications of individual coverage crop insurance contracts individual coverage contracts are informationally superior to standard contracts because the farmer s coverage is proportional to his average historical yield despite this apparent benefit the steady state solution is shown to be characterized by moral hazard cycles where moral hazard is practiced in alternative periods the amplitude of the cycle and thus the variability in planned production is shown to be larger the lower the degree of production uncertainty the fewer the number of years used in the averaging process the higher the coverage threshold and the lower the level of co insurance

unequal pay or unequal employment a cross country analysis of gender gaps we analyze gender wage gaps correcting for sample selection induced by nonemployment we recover wages for the nonemployed using alternative imputation techniques simply requiring assumptions on the position of imputed wages with respect to the median we obtain higher median wage gaps on imputed rather than actual wage distributions for several oecd countries however this difference is small in the united states the united kingdom and most central and northern eu countries and becomes sizable in southern eu countries where gender employment gaps are high selection correction explains nearly half of the observed negative correlation between wage and employment gaps

tailored to the extremes quantile regression for index based insurance contract design a new approach for weather index based insurance design based on quantile regression qr to condition the yield index dependency is developed and compared to standard regression technique three conceptual different risk measures i e expected utility expected shortfall and a spectral risk measure are used to evaluate the risk reducing properties of these contracts our findings show that qr is much more powerful in establishing the yield index dependency and lead for all risk measures to a higher risk reduction than the standard technique ordinary least squares ols thus qr leads to a more efficient contract design which is beneficial for both the insurer smaller remaining risk and the insured higher demand and willingness to pay our empirical application is based on a 31 years long time series of wheat yield data from northern kazakhstan

crop insurance in a political economy an alternative perspective on agricultural policy lawmakers often subsidize farmers in times of financial distress this article models this political impulse as a constraint on government farm policy describing how ex ante government farm insurance can deter ex post disaster relief and improve production incentives by countering the moral hazard that otherwise prevails absent ex ante government policy ex post relief takes the form of revenue insurance which prompts excessive entry into farm production and under production by operating farmers ex ante government policy can raise economic and political welfare by buying out low productivity farmers and offering profitable farmers a combination of revenue insurance price supports and a program participation fee copyright 2003 oxford university press

property rights and natural resource management incentives do transferability and formality matter this article examines how property rights expectations affect resource management incentives it utilizes expected property rights over different timespans and of different strengths corresponding to a investments of different intensities and b farmers sense of security regarding their often de facto property rights the results suggest that property rights and their alienability in ten year time matter to intensive infrastructural investments although not to lighter investments formality of property rights is shown to be insignificant to investment incentives indicating that there is no functional difference between formal rights and customary rights at present in indigenous communities of the philippines copyright 2008 oxford university press

tenure security investment and productivity in gambian agriculture a generalized probit analysis the determinants of investment input use and productivity are investigated under customary tenure in peri urban areas of the gambia a structural model is specified to investigate the role of tenure security on farm investments and input use and thereby on yield testing of the structural form hypotheses requires simultaneous equation estimation containing both continuous and discrete endogenous variables the model is estimated as a feasible generalized least squares amemiya s generalized probit some of the positive relationships hypothesized between tenure security investment and yields are corroborated in particular tenure security is found to enhance long term investments which in turn enhance yields

copula based models of systemic risk in u s agriculture implications for crop insurance and reinsurance contracts the federal crop insurance program has been a major fixture of u s agricultural policy since the 1930s and continues to grow in size and importance indeed it now represents the most prominent farm policy instrument accounting for more government spending than any other farm commodity program the 2014 farm bill further expanded the crop insurance program and introduced a number of new county level revenue insurance plans in 2013 over 123 billion in crop value was insured under the program crop revenue insurance first introduced in the 1990s now accounts for nearly 70 of the total liability in the program the available plans cover losses that result from a revenue shortfall that can be triggered by multiple dependent sources of risk either low prices low yields or a combination of both the actuarial practices currently applied when rating these plans essentially involve the application of a gaussian copula model to the pricing of dependent risks we evaluate the suitability of this assumption by considering a number of alternative copula models in particular we use combinations of pair wise copulas of conditional distributions to model multiple sources of risk we find that this approach is generally preferred by model fitting criteria in the applications considered here we demonstrate that alternative approaches to modeling dependencies in a portfolio of risks may have significant implications for premium rates in crop insurance

coping with systemic risk in index based crop insurance the implementation of index based crop insurance is often impeded by the existence of systemic risk of insured losses we assess the effectiveness of two strategies for coping with systemic risk regional diversification and securitization with catastrophe cat bonds the analysis is conducted in an equilibrium pricing framework which allows the optimal price of the insurance and the number of traded contracts to be determined we also explore the role of basis risk and risk aversion of market agents the model is applied to a hypothetical area yield insurance for rice producers in northeast china if yields in two regions are positively correlated we find that enlarging the insured area leads to higher insurance premiums unless capital market investors are very risk averse a cat bond written on an area yield index outperforms regional diversification in terms of certainty equivalents of both farmers and insurers

gender wage inequality during sri lanka s post reform growth a distributional analysis abstract this paper investigates gender wage inequality in sri lanka during 1992 2014 a period of robust economic growth following pro market reforms the gap in mean wages between men and women decreased steadily over this period unconditional quantile regression reveals the decline in gender wage inequality was driven by the upper half of the distribution and was due to improvements in women s observable human capital yet the pay structure became more unequal indicating widening gender gaps in the returns to labor market characteristics and in unobservable determinants of wages the gender gap in pay structure widened disproportionately in the lower half of the distribution coinciding with falling absolute and relative returns to women in manufacturing industries and production occupations facing greater international competition the study also demonstrates selection bias underestimates the gender wage gap and overestimates the gains in equality over time factors that hinder gender equality in the labor market are discussed along with policy implications

crop insurance acreage decisions and nonpoint source pollution the redirection of farm policy in the 1996 farm bill has generated much interest in seeking environmentally friendly and economically viable ways to protect farm income agricultural insurance has been suggested as such an instrument this article estimates the effect of crop insurance on crop mix and the resulting change in chemical use in the central nebraska basin providing corn insurance will shift land from hay and pasture to corn which will increase chemical use at the extensive margin this extensive margin effect dominates the effect of crop insurance on the application rate leading to an increase in total chemical use

risk aversion versus expected profit maximization with a progressive income tax this article introduces the terms apparent or pseudo risk aversion to represent those situations where real risk aversion is falsely attributed simply because second and higher moments of random variables are arguments in a decision maker s objective function apparent risk aversion can occur when stochastic variables nonlinearly enter the objective function the progressive income tax structure is highlighted as a neglected but important source of apparent risk aversion such sources of apparent risk aversion should be recognized otherwise an incorrect level of risk aversion might be claimed or risk aversion might be claimed when risk neutrality prevails

risks and farmers investment in productive assets in nigeria the majority of farmers in sub saharan africa ssa lack the means to mitigate the impact of risks associated with rainfall and commodity prices due to capital constraints and the imperfect insurance market in these countries because most ssa farmers are risk averse they may be willing to invest in productive assets that can mitigate the impacts of such risks if their capital constraints are relaxed through external financial assistance we test this hypothesis by using panel data on investment behavior of nigerian farmers who received financial assistance on productive assets the empirical results show that farmers facing higher rainfall risks are more likely to invest in irrigation pumps that can mitigate the impact of rainfall risks while those facing higher risks of white gari price are more likely to invest in milling machines that enable them to process cassava into flour instead of gari which supports our hypothesis

experimental identification of asymmetric information evidence on crop insurance in the philippines abstract i study asymmetric information in crop insurance in the philippines using a two level randomized field experiment and incentivized preference elicitation in this first experimental study of moral hazard in non health insurance preventable damages double on randomly insured plots among farmers with high trust in the insurance provider farmers prefer insurance on plots that are at risk of floods and crop diseases a sign of classic adverse selection and plots that are far away from home a sign of selection on anticipated moral hazard behavior resulting in 72 higher payouts on preferred plots overcoming these challenges requires leveraging new technologies

evaluating a simple method for estimating black white gaps in median wages racial differences in wage rates are important measures of economic inequality among races because for almost all individuals labor income constitutes the most important component of lifetime income as a consequence the prices at which individuals may sell their time provide vital infornation about the distribution of welfare and economic success however we only observe prices when market transactions occur and thus we only observe wage rates for individuals who are employed since the wages of employed workers are not randomly sampled from the distribution of potential wages it is difficult to draw inferences concerning racial gaps in potential wages from data on observed wage rates richard butler and james heckman 1977 raised this issue in the context of assessing the impact of government policies on racial income inequality charles brown 1984 james smith and finis welch 1989 and amitabh chandra 2000 also examine the extent of racial differences in participation rates and the impact of these differences on measures of racial wage and income gaps this topic remains salient in part because employment rates among working age black males remain significantly below corresponding rates for whites neal and johnson 1996 estimated racial gaps in median wages among men by imputing wages of zero for all men in a particular crosssection who report that they have not worked at all during the survey period under a specific assumption concerning the distribution of missing wages this procedure yields consistent estimates of the black white gap in median wages conditional on observed characteristics below we spell out this assumption and use panel data to investigate the extent to which it may be violated in cross section wage analyses our results suggest that imputing wages of zero for unemployed individuals may provide a reasonable way to estimate median wage regressions among men

supply response to agricultural insurance risk reduction and moral hazard effects this paper examines the consequences of agricultural insurance for expected supply the effect of insurance is shown to decompose into a risk reduction effect as well as a moral hazard effect the direction and magnitude of these effects depend on the parameters of the insurance contract producer s risk preferences and the underlying technology two models are considered for this purpose in the first model widely employed in the literature a producer controls only one input the second model uses a dual approach to extend the results to the case where a producer controls multiple inputs

separation and hedging results with state contingent production a state contingent model of production under uncertainty is developed and compared with more traditional models of production under uncertainty producer behaviour with both production and price risk in the presence and in the absence of futures and forward markets is analysed in this state contingent framework conditions for the optimal hedge to be positive or negative are derived we also show that under plausible conditions a risk averse producer facing price uncertainty and the ability to hedge price risk will never willingly adopt a nonstochastic technology new separation results which hold in the presence of both price and production risk are then developed these separation results generalize townsend s spanning results by reducing the number of necessary forward markets by one

producer attitudes toward output price risk experimental evidence from the lab and from the field a number of agricultural and food policy instruments are predicated on the idea that producers dislike output price risk we test experimentally some theoretical predictions about the behavior of producers in the face of output price risk namely sandmo s 1971 prediction that price risk at the extensive margin causes risk averse producers to decrease how much they produce and batra and ullah s 1974 prediction that price risk at the intensive margin causes producers whose preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion to further decrease how much they produce we do so in labs with us college students as well as in the field with peruvian farmers first as regards price risk at the extensive margin we find no support for sandmo s prediction second consistent with batra and ullah s prediction we find that output decreases in response to price risk at the intensive margin when imposing a linear relationship between output and price risk when relaxing the assumption of linearity between output and price risk however we find a nonmonotonic relationship between output and price risk taken together these results are broadly inconsistent with expected utility theory alternative models of behavior in the face of risk such as prospect theory may explain the behavior we observe

the importance of cost of living and education in estimates of the conditional wage gap between black and white women while evidence about discrimination in u s labor markets typically implies preferential treatment for whites recent studies document a substantial wage premium for black women for example fryer 2011 although differential selection of black and white women into the labor market has been a suggested explanation we demonstrate that accounting for selection does not eliminate the estimated premium we then incorporate two additional omitted variables recently documented in the literature 1 local cost of living and 2 years of education attained conditional on afqt score after controlling for these variables we find no evidence of a wage premium for black women

developing experience based premium rate discounts in crop insurance this article addresses the feasibility of implementing an experience based premium rate discount system in crop insurance while adverse selection and moral hazard in crop insurance have been extensively studied in the past discount systems or bonus malus incentives have not to our knowledge been investigated our empirical analysis indicates that a crop insurance discount system could be implemented based on a measure of favorable past insurance experience the estimated average discounts based on the rating methods developed in this study ranged from 5 to 9 depending on the crop being considered

optimal area yield crop insurance reconsidered the implementability of area yield insurance contracts in the presence of symmetric and asymmetric information about the farmer s beta linking his yield to the risk pool s yield is examined in the presence of fixed costs and symmetric information mahul s result that optimality requires setting the slope of the indemnity schedule equal to each farmer s beta is confirmed when there is asymmetric information between the insurer and the farmer however this full insurance contract is vulnerable to adverse selection and therefore may not be implementable for general cost structures the optimal area yield insurance contract under asymmetric information is characterized

a distributional analysis of the gender wage gap in bangladesh this article empirically investigates the gender wage gap in bangladesh during the period 2005 2009 applying unconditional quantile regression models the article demonstrates that women are paid less than men throughout the wage distribution and the gap is higher at the lower end of the distribution discrimination against women is the primary determinant of the wage gap the article also demonstrates that the observed gender wage gap is likely to be underestimated if we ignore selection in full time employment a number of policy implications are discussed

solar power investment in north africa reducing perceived risks abstract climate protection targets for mid century imply a need to scale up european renewable power production to a level that may exceed the available land area within europe s borders one attractive solution from a cost and feasibility perspective is the development of large scale concentrating solar power plants in north africa and the middle east however these developments are seen by many people as risky in terms of both european energy security and in terms of the risks faced by project developers in this paper we focus on the latter of theses issues first we examine the risks that project developers are most concerned about and identify these as being associated not with terrorism and rogue state behavior but rather with corruption and inefficient and unpredictable bureaucracies second we identify a range of policy approaches that can reduce these risks either by mitigating their consequences or by seeking to eliminate their underlying causes third we investigate the financial benefits of taking such steps to reduce or eliminate investment risks we find the potential savings to european electricity consumers to exceed 200 billion

the efficiency of composite weather index insurance in hedging rice yield risk evidence from china as an economic and market transparent program weather index insurance is expected to mitigate asymmetric problem capturing the relationship between yield and weather factor s is the basis of index insurance but remains a challenge for weather index schemes meanwhile composite weather index insurance is needed by farmers when their agricultural activities involve several risks but is rarely studied we aim to design a composite weather index insurance model and evaluate its efficiency in hedging yield risk by using the case of rice production in china we divide the whole growth cycle of rice into six stages on the basis of agronomic knowledge and use the average value of each weather factor in each stage to design a weather index then the efficiency of composite weather index insurance is evaluated by mean semivariance and value at risk methods first we find that subdivision of the growth cycle helps to better capture the subtle relationship between rice yield and weather factors second composite weather index insurance evidently reduces yield risk our findings help further adoption of weather index insurance in agricultural fields

efficient redistribution using quotas and subsidies in the presence of misrepresentation and cheating this paper introduces misrepresentation and cheating into the policy analysis of output quotas and subsidies analytical results show that when cheating occurs output quotas are a less efficient means of income redistribution than is traditionally believed as well cheating increases the transfer efficiency of output subsidies the result is that an all or nothing choice between quotas and subsidies will generally favor the use of subsidies a combination of quotas and subsidies however usually remains the most efficient means of income redistribution through market intervention a key assumption in agricultural policy analysis is that farmers follow the provisions of the policy instruments in the manner desired by the policy maker or alternatively that it is costless to ensure that farmers do so in reality however farmers may be expected to act opportunistically when faced with an agricultural policy when a production quota is in effect farmers may cheat by overproducing and selling the above quota amount through alternative channels under an output subsidy scheme farmers may report and collect on a greater quantity of production than they actually produced the possibility of misrepresentation and cheating arises because it is costly to determine farmers actions because of this cost farmers are in a position to misrepresent their quantity of production and or to cheat very few studies have incorporated misrepresentation or cheating in theoretical agricultural policy analysis one exception is alston and smith who raise the question of cheating and black market activity in an examination of rationing in an industry with an effective minimum price policy in place studies that deal with farmer opportunism can also konstantinos giannakas is an assistant professor in the department of agricultural economics university of nebraska lincoln murray fulton is director centre for the study of co

the design of an optimal insurance policy almost every phase of economic behavior is affected by uncertainty the economic system has adapted to uncertainty by developing methods that facilitate the reallocation of risk among individuals and firms the most apparent and familiar form for shifting risks is the ordinary insurance policy previous insurance decision analyses can be divided into those in which the insurance policy was exogenously specified see john gould jan mossin and vernon smith and those in which it was not see karl borch 1960 and kenneth arrow 1971 1973 in this paper the pioneering work of borch and arrow the derivation of the optimal insurance contract form from the model is synthesized and extended

categorizing risks in the insurance industry this paper analyzes the welfare implications of imperfectly categorizing risks in the insurance industry under conditions of asymmetric information firms initially unable to distinguish the risk type of individuals are provided with imperfect information concerning risk membership the paper then compares various wilson type equilibria to determine the welfare implications of firms imperfectly categorizing risks it is shown that only in the case where the initial equilibrium is of the nash no subsidy type is there a pareto type improvement in welfare

effects of crop insurance premium subsidies on crop acreage crop insurance premium subsidies affect patterns of crop acreage for two reasons first holding insurance coverage constant premium subsidies directly increase expected profit which encourages more acreage of insured crops direct profit effect second premium subsidies encourage farms to increase crop insurance coverage with more insurance coverage farms obtain more subsidies and farm revenue becomes less variable as indemnities offset revenue shortfalls so acreage of insured crops likely increases indirect coverage effect by exploiting exogenous policy changes and using approximately 180 000 county crop year observations we estimate the sum of these two effects of premium subsidies on the pattern of u s acreage across seven major field crops we estimate that a 10 increase in the premium subsidy causes a 0 43 increase in the acreage of a crop in a county holding the premium subsidy of its competing crop constant taking into account the small share of premium subsidies in expected crop revenue this subsidy impact is analogous to an own subsidy acreage elasticity of 1 24 which exceeds own price acreage elasticity estimates in the literature one explanation for the larger acreage response to premium subsidies is that insurance causes an indirect coverage effect in addition to a direct profit effect

optimal insurance against climatic experience an optimal insurance contract against a climatic risk is derived in the presence of an uninsurable and dependent aggregate production risk the optimaldesign depends on the stochastic dependency between both sources of uncertainty and on the producer s attitude towards risk especially on his prudent behavior rationalweather insurance purchasing decisions are al so derived the prudent producer responds to actuarially fair weather insurance by increasing his exposure towards risk the u s multiple peril crop insurance program in which indemnity payments are based on the producer s individualyiel ds has been disappointing in that premiums have not been sufficient to cover indemnity payments and administrative costs this failure has induced the u s government to promote alternative insurance policies since 1993 the risk management agency has offered areayield contracts under its group risk plan in selected counties skees black and barnett another alternative is to base the indemnity on a weather index such as rainfall or temperature this policy was proposed in the past by sanderson but has failed to gain acceptance among policy makers the difficulties of rainfall insurance were a subject of debate in australia e g bardsley abey and davenport quiggin 1986 patrick the recent development of weather based instruments on financialmarkets known as weather derivatives for which the payoff depends on the cause of risk rather than on its effect on yield provide new opportunities for covering exposure to unfavorable weather events the objective of this article is threefold first a stochastic production function affected by a climatic risk and by an aggregate production risk where both sources of risk are stochastically dependent is de

private crop insurers and the reinsurance fund allocation decision this research investigates the strategic behavior of private crop insurance firms reinsured by the usda through the standard reinsurance agreement this arrangement allows the private firm to strategically allocate individual policies into different risk sharing arrangements thus firm earnings are conditioned upon accurately forecasting policy loss experience our analysis begins with models investigating the characteristics explaining the placement of policies into the assigned risk fund then a simulation model of the sra is used to compare the post sra returns of actual firm allocations to two alternative allocation strategies based on a aggregate models and a policy level econometric

investment in soil conservation in northern ethiopia the role of land tenure security and public programs abstract a double hurdle statistical analysis of 250 farms in the tigray region of ethiopia reveals different causal factors for soil conservation adoption versus intensity of use farmers reasons for adopting soil conservation measures vary sharply between stone terraces and soil bunds long term investments in stone terraces were associated with secure land tenure labour availability proximity to the farmstead and learning opportunities via the existence of local food for work ffw projects by contrast short term investments in soil bunds were strongly linked to insecure land tenure and the absence of local food for work projects public conservation campaigns on private plots reduced adoption of both stone terraces and soil bunds whereas capacity factors largely influenced the adoption decision expected returns carried more influence for the intensity of stone terrace adoption measured as metres of terrace per hectare more stone terracing was built where fertile but erodible silty soils in higher rainfall areas offered valuable yield benefits intensity of terracing was also greater in remote villages where limited off farm employment opportunities reduced construction costs these results highlight the importance of the right kind of public interventions direct public involvement in constructing soil conservation structures on private lands appears to undermine incentives for private conservation investments when done on public lands however public conservation activities may encourage private soil conservation by example secure land tenure rights clearly reinforce private incentives to make long term investments in soil conservation

rate making for farm level crop insurance implications for adverse selection this research identifies two problems in the new federal crop insurance that may cause adverse selection a the relationship between rate making and expected yields for individual farmers and b the bias introduced in coverage protection when trends are not used to establish expected yields a theoretical investigation using the normality assumption demonstrates the potential severity of these problems and empirical results from farm level data lend further support as crop insurance changes to individualized methods of protection these issues will be particularly important for developing rates

land tenure security and investment incentives puzzling evidence from burkina faso abstract the commonsense logic associating higher land security and higher incentives to invest has been recently called into question in the case of african agriculture to be meaningful empirical tests have to be carefully designed so as to take account of the possible endogeneity of the land rights variable this is done in this paper by applying suitable econometric methods to the original data collected in burkina faso the results obtained cast doubt on the existence of a systematic influence of land tenure security on investment by reviewing the justifications for scepticism in the recent literature we are able to conclude that the traditional village order where it exists provides the basic land rights required to stimulate small scale investment

estimating the prevalence and cost of yield switching fraud in the federal crop insurance program producers who manipulate and switch their reported crop yields between separately insured units can increase their insurance indemnities substantially a statistical model that identifies potential yield switching is developed the unrestricted statistical model is singular and is identified by imposing a mixture of system estimable and system nonestimable restrictions lower bound estimates of yield switching fraud incidence and costs are obtained by applying the model to 207 067 multiple unit producers who purchased crop insurance in 1998

black white earnings ratios since the civil rights act of 1964 the importance of labor market dropouts published median earnings of wage and salary workers by race and sex are based on distributions that exclude those without earnings and those not employed as wage and salary workers at the time of the survey it has been argued that the changing importance of these exclusions rather than any improvement in the distribution of offered wages for blacks accounts for the apparent increase in black white relative median earnings this paper presents a new method for correcting the published medians for such censoring the apparent improvement in relative earnings is reduced but not eliminated by the correction

a role for capital markets in natural disasters a piece of the food security puzzle abstract natural disaster can create significant shocks in food supplies for small country states these events are very disruptive to the development process market based means for managing natural disaster risk are emerging for example despite the failure of government subsidized crop insurance around the world it is now possible to create index based contracts that would trigger when events that create serious crop failure problems occur this paper investigates the logic for such contracts and some basic designs using measures of rainfall

valuing agricultural insurance this paper proposes a method for estimating a farmer s stochastic discount factor that is independent of his or her risk preferences and shows that that stochastic discount factor is appropriate for calculating a farmer s willingness to pay for a crop insurance product an empirical example illustrates how production and price data might be combined with returns data to permit econometric estimation of the stochastic discount factor and the implications of those illustrative results are briefly discussed

further toward a theory of agricultural insurance the economic theory of contracts is applied to agricultural insurance to show that given full information pareto optimal insurance contracts are actuarially fair provide full coverage and differ for each individual the information problems of moral hazard and adverse selection prevent pareto optimality from being attained several second best solutions to these problems are applied to agricultural insurance it is shown that information collection and the application of contract design principles are second best solutions which may achieve the benefits of insurance at less cost than the current practice of public subsidies in theory agricultural insurance is an efficient risk sharing mechanism in practice however agricultural insurance has been a costly means of transferring risk from farmers to governments and or other insurers to induce farmers to participate in agricultural insurance governments have borne significant subsidy costs hazell pomareda and valdes p 295 in a recent study ahsan ali and kurian aak concluded that public subsidies are necessary to make agricultural insurance viable they also showed that insurance will increase output relative to a case with no insurance thus insurance is beneficial particularly in less developed countries where increasing food supplies is a policy goal for this reason they concluded that public subsidization of insurance also is desirable their conclusions are derived from a simplified model of production with one output and one input in this article we consider a more general production model with multiple inputs and outputs we show that aak s conclusion about the benefits of insurance may not hold depending on the nature of the inputs and outputs as defined by the production function carl h nelson is an assistant professor of agricultural economics

input use under crop insurance the role of actual production history the impact of crop insurance on changes in input use has attracted much attention by economists while there are a number of studies on this topic they frame moral hazard in inputs use in a static model however when agricultural producers are forward looking they would make input allocation decisions realizing that their decisions would affect their future actual production history this in turn affects the probability and size of future indemnity payments thus moral hazard should be framed in a dynamic input use decision model we first show theoretically that under certain feasible conditions a static analysis always results in lower optimal input use when compared to a dynamic one with endogenous actual production history this is because static models fail to recognize the role of actual production history we then run numerical simulations using nitrogen application rates as a case study we find that static models indicate significant reduction in nitrogen use compared to the no insurance scenario whereas the dynamic models with a role for actual production history indicate almost no reduction in applied nitrogen the dynamic analysis not only suggests a near absence of moral hazard but for low coverage rates it results in an optimal nitrogen rate higher than that under the no insurance scenario these findings illustrate the importance of recognizing the role of actual production history in mitigating moral hazard possibilities in crop insurance and the dynamic nature of moral hazard in crop insurance

the pricing of revenue assurance a theoretical model to value gross revenue assurance under one of the popular proposals facing u s policy makers is developed the approach makes use of a fundamental paradigm of asset valuation and stochastic calculus because farm level gross revenue is not a traded asset equilibrium arguments must be made to specify the partial differential equation characterizing the value of the assurance an example solution is presented under the assumption of lognormally distributed gross revenue county level data for a variety of crops are used to examine empirically the pricing ability of the model

toward a theory of agricultural insurance in this paper we develop a theory of crop insurance we start by reaffirming the risk spreading role of competitive crop insurance markets it is argued however that once the problems of imperfect information are recognized a competitive crop insurance market may not exist at all two candidates present themselves first is market insurance with the public sector as a source of costly information gathering and dissemination and second is the direct provision of crop insurance by the public sector we focus on the latter and develop a model of public insurance as a decentralized plan where the farmer determines factor utilization taking the insurance contract as given in turn the insurance agency taking factor utilization as determined by the farmer chooses the optimal contract so as to maximize the value of aggregate output in the economy

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

technological uncertainty and the theory of the firm several recent articles 1 6 have generalized the theory of the firm to incorporate price uncertainty and risk aversion it is now well known that the risk averse entrepreneur will select that level of output at which the expected price equals the marginal cost plus the marginal risk premium leland 5 provides a similar generalization given demand uncertainty however in each case the assumption of a well specified technology is maintained this paper complements and generalizes the earlier work on the theory of the firm by investigating the effect which technological uncertainty has on the firm s optimal production decision like the earlier work on the theory of the firm we show that the firm selects the level of input at which the expected marginal productivity equals the factor price plus the marginal risk premium unlike the earlier work we show that the sign of the marginal risk premium is not always positive and that it depends on the structure of the firm s technology we show that the distinction between price and technological uncertainty is important because each can lead to different implications for firm behavior like its predecessors the model of the firm presented here assumes a single ownerentrepreneur who makes the production decision we modify the baron and sandmo models by assuming that the entrepreneur knows the cost of each production decision but not the output as a result the entrepreneur s decision yields a random variable denoting output and a linear transformation of it denoting profit the entrepreneur chooses the random variable denoting profit to maximize his expected utility there are at least three distinct ways in which our notion of technological uncertainty may be interpreted first the entrepreneur may not know the location of the production surface in this case each production decision yields a random output an increase in the

the changing nature of gender selection into employment europe over the great recession the aim of this paper is to evaluate the role played by selectivity issues induced by nonemployment in explaining gender wage gap patterns in the eu since the onset of the great recession we show that male selection into the labour market traditionally disregarded has increased this is particularly the case in peripheral european countries where dramatic drops in male unskilled jobs have taken place during the crisis as regards female selection traditionally positive we document mixed findings while it has declined in some countries as a result of increasing female lfp due to an added worker effect it has become even more positive in other countries this is due to adverse labour demand shifts in industries which are intensive in temporary work where women are over represented these adverse shifts may have more than offset the rise in unskilled female labour supply

agricultural insurance and soil depletion in a simple dynamic model we study the effects of agricultural insurance on farm production choices soil depletion and the environment when there are two related risks one in short to medium run production revenues and the other in land value the analysis considers pure and truncating insurance programs that stabilize linear combinations of short run revenue risk and land price risk production revenue stabilizing insurance is often found to elicit increased farmer output thus exacerbating environmental externalities and causing further soil depletion land value stabilizing insurance typically elicits lower output thus mitigating environmental externalities and pushing farmers closer to their complete insurance output levels

bayesian estimation of possibly similar yield densities implications for rating crop insurance contracts the agricultural act of 2014 solidified insurance as the cornerstone of u s agricultural policy the congressional budget office 2014 estimates that this act will increase spending on agricultural insurance programs by 5 7 billion to a total of 89 8 billion over the next decade in light of the sizable resources directed toward these programs accurate rating of insurance contracts is of the utmost importance to producers private insurance companies and the federal government unlike most forms of insurance agricultural insurance is plagued by a paucity of spatially correlated data a novel interpretation of bayesian model averaging is used to estimate a set of possibly similar densities that offers greater efficiency if the set of densities are similar while seemingly not losing any if the set of densities are dissimilar simulations indicate that finite sample performance in particular small sample performance is quite promising the proposed approach does not require knowledge of the form or extent of any possible similarities is relatively easy to implement admits correlated data and can be used with either parametric or nonparametric estimators we use the proposed approach to estimate u s crop insurance premium rates for area type programs and develop a test to evaluate its efficacy an out of sample game between private insurance companies and the federal government highlights the policy implications for a variety of crop state combinations consistent with the simulation results the performance of the proposed approach with respect to rating area type insurance in particular small sample performance remains quite promising

insurability and moral hazard in agricultural insurance markets pareto optimal and constrained pareto optimal all risk insurance contracts are studied conditions required for emergence of competitive insurance markets are isolated and discussed full insurance contracts are shown to be dominated by contracts involving coinsurance and deductibles if insurers are pseudo risk averse the effect of moral hazard on all risk agricultural insurance indemnity schedules is examined results for indemnity schedules under moral hazard and constant absolute risk aversion show that providing farmers with the incentives to take appropriate actions may imply lower deductibles in the presence of moral hazard than in the absence of moral hazard

repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard abstract an attempt is made to account for the frequently observed phenomenon of insurance companies offering discounts to clients who possess a favorable record of past claims we argue that such discounts provide a mechanism which enables both insurer and insured to counteract the inefficiency which arises from moral hazard

how might climate change influence farmers demand for index based insurance the low observed uptake of non subsidised index based insurance policies in developing countries has been puzzling researchers for about a decade this paper analyses the role of drought frequency in farmers demand for index based insurance in developing countries while it is typically assumed that an increase in exposure to risk would result in higher demand for index insurance this paper finds the opposite an increase in drought frequency may result in lower demand for index insurance under fairly standard conditions in an expected utility model we show that the demand for insurance is an inverted u function of drought frequency we further show that downside basis risk decreases insurance demand under frequent drought conditions it implies that insurance against similar but more frequent events cannot meet large demand from farmers to check the empirical relevance of these effects we conduct an insurance field experiment in burkina faso with 205 farmers we analyse insurance demand for different drought frequencies different levels of basis risks and different loading factors through incentivised lottery choices this analysis confirms that for higher drought frequencies insurance demand is lower insurance demand also decreases with basis risk and the loading factor

the impact of employment quotas on the economic lives of disadvantaged minorities in india abstract india has the world s biggest and arguably most aggressive employment based affirmative action policy for minorities this paper exploits the institutional features of a federally mandated employment quota policy to examine its causal impact on the economic lives of the two distinct minority groups scheduled castes and scheduled tribes my main finding is that a 1 percentage point increase in the employment quota for scheduled castes increases the likelihood of obtaining a salaried job by 0 6 percentage points for male scheduled caste members residing in the rural sector the employment quota policy has no impact for scheduled tribes contrary to popular notion i do not find evidence of elite capture among the scheduled castes the impact is concentrated among members who have completed less than secondary education consistent with the employment results i find that the policy improved the well being of scheduled castes members in rural areas who have completed less than secondary education finally the impact of the employment quota policy varies by state characteristics

livestock disease indemnity design when moral hazard is followed by adverse selection averting or limiting the outbreak of infectious disease in domestic livestock herds is an economic and potential human health issue that involves the government and individual livestock producers producers have private information about preventive biosecurity measures they adopt on their farms prior to outbreak ex ante moral hazard and following outbreak they possess private information about whether or not their herd is infected ex post adverse selection we investigate how indemnity payments can be designed to provide incentives to producers to invest in biosecurity and report infection to the government in the presence of asymmetric information we compare the relative magnitude of the first and second best levels of biosecurity investment and indemnity payments to demonstrate the tradeoff between risk sharing and efficiency and we discuss the implications for status quo u s policy

relaxing heteroscedasticity assumptions in area yield crop insurance rating this article focuses on the effect of differing heteroscedasticity assumptions on derived premium rates of area yield crop insurance tests of the proportional and absolute heteroscedasticity assumptions are conducted using both in sample and out of sample measures our results suggest that arbitrarily imposing a specific form of heteroscedasticity or homoscedasticity in insurance rate calculations limits actuarial soundness our results have practical implications for the federal crop insurance programs as we reject the traditional rating assumptions for many cotton regions and lower yielding higher risk corn and soybean counties but not in the heart of the cornbelt copyright 2011 oxford university press

systemic risk reinsurance and the failure of crop insurance markets without affordable reinsurance private crop insurance markets are doomed to fail because systemic weather effects induce high correlation among farm level yields defeating insurer efforts to pool risks across farms using an empirical model of the u s crop insurance market we find that u s crop insurer portfolios are twenty to fifty times riskier than they would be otherwise if yields were stochastically independent across farms we also find that area yield reinsurance contracts would enable crop insurers to cover most of their systemic crop loss risk reducing their risk exposure to levels typically experienced by more conventional property liability insurers copyright 1997 oxford university press

eliciting time versus money time scarcity underlies asymmetric wage rates marketing strategies are often tied to how consumers spend time e g waiting in lines searching across stores in return for money e g receiving a discount viewing such time money tradeoffs in terms of a reservation wage rate for consumers we identify a wage rate asymmetry between two elicitation procedures a money elicit mel state the minimum amount of money m that you would accept in return for spending a given number of hours t and b time elicit tel state the maximum number of hours t that you would spend in return for accepting a given amount of money m while these procedures are normatively equivalent we propose that tel vs mel wage rates are higher because time scarcity receives a higher weight in tel judgments in eight studies including both hypothetical and real settings we document the wage rate asymmetry the time scarcity process and a downstream consequence of tel vs mel reducing the likelihood of accepting a time money tradeoff we discuss the implications for practice and for research on wage rates time versus money procedural invariance and scarcity