wall street occupations many finance jobs entail the risk of large losses and hard to monitor effort we analyze the equilibrium consequences of these features in a model with optimal dynamic contracting we show that finance jobs feature high compensation up or out promotion and long work hours and are more attractive than other jobs moral hazard problems are exacerbated in booms even though pay increases employees whose talent would be more valuable elsewhere can be lured into finance jobs while the most talented employees might be unable to land these jobs because they are too hard to manage

outcome based accountability theory and evidence abstract a firm s payoffs can often depend on whether it exceeds a threshold of performance in a principal agent setting we demonstrate that the optimal contract induces efficient effort by basing firing decisions solely on whether the agent was successful even though the absolute level of performance is more informative we test the predictions of our model using thirty seasons of nfl data we find that a coach is 6 percentage points more likely to be fired after a close loss beyond this the margin of victory has no significant impact on firing probabilities despite being more informative about future success also consistent with the predictions of our model coaches maximize team effort by playing their best players when doing so has the largest impact on the probability of winning

collective labor supply a single equation model and some evidence from french data in chiappori s 1988 collective model of labor supply hours of work are supposed flexible in many countries however male labor supply does not vary much in that case the husband s labor supply is no longer informative about the household decision process and individual preferences to identify structural components of the model additional information is needed we thus consider an approach in which the wife s labor supply is expressed as a function of the household demand for one specific good we demonstrate that the main properties of chiappori s initial model are preserved and apply our results on french data

caught in the trap welfare s disincentive and the labor supply of single men abstract youth unemployment is particularly large in many industrialized countries and has dramatic consequences in both the short and long term while there is abundant evidence about the labor supply of married women and single mothers little is known about how young childless singles react to financial incentives the french minimum income revenu minimum d insertion rmi often accused of generating strong disincentives to work offers a natural setting to study this question since childless single individuals primarily males constitute the core group of recipients exploiting the fact that childless adults under age 25 are not eligible for this program we conduct a regression discontinuity analysis using french census data we find that the rmi reduces the participation of uneducated single men by 7 10 at age 25 we conduct an extensive robustness check and discuss the implications of our results for youth unemployment and current policy developments

labour supply estimation and public policy abstract economists devote considerable energies towards refining their econometric techniques to overcome difficulties connected with conducting empirical research despite advances in technique it is not clear whether further refinement in this direction is worthwhile for policy purposes it may be that no further amount of statistical adjustment of inadequate data will increase understanding and that better data is simply necessary to add to our knowledge but rarely is sufficient credit paid to new forms of data in short econometric technique is emphasized to the neglect of data innovation as if new data were merely lying about waiting for an ingenious suggestion for use this paper surveys advances of the last twenty five years in estimating labour supply for policy purposes with a view towards appreciating the relative contribution of both improvements in econometric technique as well as developments of new data after briefly detailing the key parameters which economists have sought to estimate we describe the early first generation research circa 1970 which is plagued by problems of unobservable variables measurement errors truncation and selectivity bias and non linear budget constraints second generation research constitute attempts to resolve one or more of these difficulties and the respective contribution of econometric technique and new data is acknowledged and assessed including the contribution of data generated by large scale social experiments in which participants are randomly assigned to different guaranteed income plans and their labour supply behaviour measured

termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model i construct an equilibrium model of the labor market where workers and firms enter into dynamic contracts that can potentially last forever but are subject to optimal terminations upon a termination the firm hires a new worker and the worker who is terminated receives a termination contract from the firm and is then free to go back to the labor market to seek new employment opportunities and enter into new dynamic contracts the model permits only two types of equilibrium terminations that resemble respectively the two kinds of labor market separations that are typically observed in practice involuntary layos and voluntary retirements the model allows simultaneous determination of its equilibrium turnover unemployment and retirement as well as the expected utility of the new labor market entrants

labor supply deadweight loss and tax reform act of 1986 a nonparametric evaluation using panel data abstract tax reform act of 1986 tra 1986 has provided an invaluable source of variation in tax rates to study the effects of tax reforms on labor supply in the us most existing studies exploiting variation generated by tra 1986 have used cross sectional variation in tax rates or assumed a linear labor supply function or have not couched their analysis in a nonlinear budget set framework this paper uses the drastic variation in the budget set induced by tra 1986 as a source of identification and combines two novel approaches to estimate behavioral effects of tax reforms i first use nonparametric estimation methods with nonlinear budget sets blomquist soren newey w 2002 nonparametric estimation with nonlinear budget sets econometrica 70 6 2455 2480 to estimate a labor supply function using waves of psid just before and after tra 1986 nonparametric method developed in hausman and newey hausman j whitney newey 1995 nonparametric measurement of exact consumer s surplus and deadweight loss econometrica 63 1145 76 is then applied to estimate the deadweight loss from tra 1986 the nonparametric estimate of the compensated wage elasticity is 0 22 i find that tra 1986 had a small but positive effect on labor supply of men of about 2 at the sample mean tra 1986 was associated with robust reduction in deadweight loss from the pre tra 1986 level and this reduction is positively correlated with income and wages

assessing empirical approaches for analyzing taxes and labor supply recent surveys on the labor supply responses of men document a divergence in the estimates of substitution and income effects obtained using various estimation approaches generally studies accounting for nonlinear tax schedules in a static setting via a piecewise linear approach produce estimates that typically imply higher substitution and lower income responses than are suggested by empirical work applying other approaches this paper demonstrates that maximum likelihood estimation of a consumer choice problem with nonlinear budget sets implicitly relies on the satisfaction of inequality constraints that translate into behaviorally meaningful restrictions these constraints arise not as a consequence of economic theory but instead as a requirement to create a properly defined statistical model in the analysis of piecewise linear budget sets the implicit constraints required by maximum likelihood in estimation amount to imposition of slutsky conditions at all wage income combinations associated with kink points in the analysis of differentiable budget sets the tacit constraints invoked by maximum likelihood also involve inequality restrictions on slutsky terms the empirical work presented in this study supports the contention that these implicit constraints play a major role in explaining the discrepancies in estimates found in the literature on men s labor supply

collective female labour supply theory and application this article deals with female labour supply in the collective framework it studies married couples and starting from the empirical observation that the husband s labour supply is generally fixed at full time it shows that in this case structural elements of the decision process such as individual preferences or the rule that determines the intra household distribution of welfare can be identified if household demand for at least one commodity together with the wife s labour supply is observed these theoretical considerations are followed by an application using french data

the econometrics of kinked budget constraints in the last several years a branch of applied econometrics has developed which is devoted to the development of techniques for the estimation of demand and other functions when the budget constraint is piecewise linear or kinky that is when the constraint consists of a number of segments joined together at kink points such constraints most frequently arise from government tax and transfer programs for example the federal income tax imposes a piecewise linear schedule by the use of constant marginal tax rates within brackets a problem analyzed by hausman 1981 the payroll tax in the social security system likewise generates a kinked schedule inasmuch as the marginal tax rate on earnings is zero above a certain earnings maximum federal and state transfer programs for the poor result in piecewise linear constraints because transfer benefits are taxed in the sense of a negative income tax as income rises and because that tax rate falls to zero at the kink point where an individual or family loses eligibility for the benefit altogether many government transfer programs impose additional nonlinearities by altering this tax rate by discrete amounts over the range of positive benefits as well but kinked constraints sometimes arise in nongovernment contexts a well known example being the block pricing schedule commonly set by utilities and volume discounting in general kinked budget constraints create two difficulties that have several interesting facets one difficulty is that changes in tax and transfer schedules can have unexpected effects that can be exactly the opposite in sign to those expected from economic theory examples of this phenomenon are given below the second difficulty that with which this paper is mostly concerned relates to the implications of kinked budget

nonparametric estimation of the impact of taxes on female labor supply this paper proposes a simple extension of nonparametric estimation methods for nonlinear budget set models derived in blomquist and newey 2002 to censored dependent variables the nonparametric method is applied to estimate female labor supply elasticities using data on married women from the 1985 and 1989 waves of the panel study of income dynamics exploiting the substantial variation in budget sets caused by the tax reform act of 1986 as a source of identification the estimated wage elasticities from this new method are 0 56 overall and 0 27 on the intensive margin the income elasticity estimates are close to 0 67 overall and 0 13 on the intensive margin compared with the linear labor supply model the estimated elasticities are usually larger for the nonparametric specifications that account for nonlinear budget sets copyright 2010 john wiley sons ltd

managerial turnover in a changing world we develop a dynamic theory of managerial turnover in a world in which the quality of the match between a firm and its managers changes stochastically over time shocks to managerial productivity are anticipated at the time of contracting but privately observed by the managers our key positive result shows that the firm s optimal retention decisions become more permissive with time our key normative result shows that compared to what is efficient the firm s contract induces either excessive retention at all tenure levels or excessive firing at the early stages of the relationship followed by excessive retention after sufficiently long tenure

sampling variability some observations from a labour supply equation in economics the number of observations available for empirical work is often predetermined researchers assume some large sample distribution and carry through with measurement and testing applied to data sets of varying sizes the consequences of sampling variability are generally ignored it is shown in a re sampling experiment using data sets of different sizes and estimating log linear male labour supply equations that a wide range of what appears to be statistically supported estimates of the wage elasticity of labour supply are generated testing based on bootstrapped estimates shows that 4000 observations are required to reduce sampling variability to statistically acceptable levels

the estimation of a joint wage hours labor supply model in this paper the standard cross sectional static model of labor supply is modified to make the wage endogenous and a joint wage hours model is estimated the econometric technique addresses the non linearity of the budget constraint by approximating the constraint by a series of discrete points the results show that the budget constraint is indeed nonlinear that hours affect the wage quadratically that true wage elasticities are lower as a result and that the model fits the hours distribution much better than the standard tobit model

the effect of income taxation on the labor supply of married men in sweden abstract this paper presents labor supply functions estimated on a sample of prime age swedish males the model used takes account of the nonlinear character of individuals budget sets caused by the progressive income tax it also allows preferences to vary between individuals calculations with the estimated functions using a partial equilibrium framework indicate a sizeable effect of the income tax on hours of work the average expected deadweight loss of the income tax is found to be approximately 20 percent of tax revenue

wealth effects and agency costs abstract we analyze how the agent s initial wealth affects the principal s expected profits in the standard principal agent model with moral hazard we show that if the principal prefers a poorer agent for all specifications of action sets probability distributions and disutility of effort then the agent s utility of income must exhibit a coefficient of absolute prudence less than three times the coefficient of absolute risk aversion for all levels of income thus strengthening the sufficiency result of thiele and wambach 1999 also we prove that there is no condition on the agent s utility of income alone that will make the principal prefer richer agents moreover we show that for an interesting class of problems the principal prefers a relatively poorer agent if agent s wealth is sufficiently large finally we discuss how alternative ways of modeling the agent s outside option affects the principal s preferences for agent s wealth

a life cycle consistent empirical model of family labour supply using cross section data this paper estimates a utility maximising model of the joint determination of male and female labour supplies using a sample of married couples from the u k family expenditure survey the emphasis is on the estimation of within period preferences that are consistent with intertemporal two stage budgeting under uncertainty however the approach we adopt provides an alternative method of estimating certain aspects of life cycle behaviour to the fixed effects constant approach of heckman and macurdy 1980 macurdy 1981 and browning deaton and irish 1985 moreover it relaxes some of the underlying restrictions that are implicit in these constant models under uncertainty

work costs and nonconvex preferences in the estimation of labor supply models abstract works costs have not been adequately handled in labor supply estimation likely due to their complexity we show that if work costs are not accounted for in the budget and time constraints in a structural labor supply model they will be subsumed into the data generating preferences even if underlying preferences over consumption and leisure are convex the presence of unobservable work costs can make these preferences appear nonconvex however we show that under plausible conditions policy relevant calculations such as estimates of the effect of tax changes on labor supply and deadweight loss measures are not affected by the fact that estimated preferences incorporate work costs

labour supply tax evasion and the marginal cost of public funds an empirical investigation abstract in this paper we extend the concept of marginal cost of public funds itmcf to incorporate tax evasion in the labour market mcf values are also computed from various tax reforms applied to the province of quebec canada 1985 for this purpose a utility based labour supply model that allows for both regular and irregular work activities is used at the benchmark situation the mcf associated with an increase in marginal income tax rates ranges between 1 39 and 1 53 depending upon whether we consider rationing or not moreover the presence of the irregular sector accounts for between 0 02 and 0 05 of this mcf although small in magnitude the impact of the irregular sector increases rapidly with the level of marginal tax rates

market based incentives we study optimal incentives in a principal agent problem in which the agent s outside option is determined endogenously in a competitive labor market in equilibrium strong performance increases the agent s market value when this value becomes sufficiently high the threat of the agent s quitting forces the principal to give the agent a raise the prospect of obtaining this raise gives the agent an incentive to exert effort which reduces the need for standard incentives like bonuses in fact whenever the agent s option to quit is close to being in the money the market induced incentive completely eliminates the need for standard incentives

incentives ceo compensation and shareholder wealth in a dynamic agency model abstract m jensen and k murphy 1990 j polit econ 98 225 264 argue that the observed pay performance sensitivity of ceo compensation is too low to be consistent with formal agency theory this paper uses a dynamic agency model to offer a resolution of the jensen and murphy puzzle we show that the dynamic agency model can predict either a positive or a negative pay performance sensitivity depending on the parameter values of the model and the distribution of the ceos initial expected discounted utilities for a large variety of parameter values and for properly chosen distributions of initial ceo expected discounted utilities our model is capable of generating data where the pay performance sensitivity is significantly positive but very small as in jensen and murphy s data the key to our result is a compensation rigidity that is created endogenously by the optimal dynamic contract journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c63 d82 g30

a theory of political cycles abstract we study how the proximity of elections affects policy choices in a model in which policymakers want to improve their reputation to increase their reelection chances policymakers equilibrium decisions depend on both their reputation and the proximity of the next election typically incentives to influence election results are stronger closer to the election for a given reputation level as argued in the political cycles literature and these political cycles are less important when the policymaker s reputation is better our analysis sheds light on other agency relationships in which part of the compensation is decided upon infrequently

optimal security design and dynamic capital structure in a continuous time agency model we derive the optimal dynamic contract in a continuous time principal agent setting and implement it with a capital structure credit line long term debt and equity over which the agent controls the payout policy while the project s volatility and liquidation cost have little impact on the firm s total debt capacity they increase the use of credit versus debt leverage is nonstationary and declines with past profitability the firm may hold a compensating cash balance while borrowing at a higher rate through the credit line surprisingly the usual conflicts between debt and equity asset substitution strategic default need not arise in this paper we consider a dynamic contracting environment in which a riskneutral agent or entrepreneur with limited resources manages an investment activity while the investment is profitable it is also risky and in the short run it can generate arbitrarily large operating losses the agent will need outside financial support to cover such losses and continue the project the difficulty is that while the probability distribution of the cash flows is publicly known the agent may distort these cash flows by taking a hidden action that leads to a private benefit specifically the agent may i conceal and divert cash flows for his own consumption and or ii stop providing costly effort which would reduce the mean of the cash flows therefore from the perspective of the principal or investors that fund the project there is the concern that a low cash flow realization may be a result of the agent s actions rather than the project s fundamentals to provide the agent with appropriate incentives investors control the agent s wage and may also withdraw their financial support for the project and force its early termination we seek to characterize an optimal contract in this framework and relate it to the firm s choice of capital structure we develop a method to solve for the optimal contract given the incentive constraints in a continuous time setting and study the properties of the credit line debt and equity that implement the contract as in the discrete time model of demarzo and fishman 2003 the continuous time setting offers several peter m demarzo is from stanford university and yuliy sannikov is from u c berkeley we

family labor supply with taxes over the period 1960 1983 the proportion of federal tax revenue raised by taxation of labor supply has risen from 57 77 percent in this paper we specify and estimate a model of family labor supply which treats both federal and state taxation husbands and wives labor supply are treated jointly rather than in aseparate manner as in previous research a method to calculate the virtual wage for nonworking spouses is used within a utility maximizing framework to treat correctly the joint family labor supply decision joint family efforts are found to be important the efficiency cost deadweight loss of labor taxation is estimated to be 29 6 of tax revenue raised the effect of the new 10 deduction to ease the marriage tax for working spouses leads to a prediction of 3 8 increase in wives labor supply and a 9 decrease in husbands labor supply overall taxes paid are predicted to decrease by 3 4 this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

interdependent behavior and the effect of taxes abstract the paper studies the effect of taxes on labor supply in a model with interdependent behavior i e individuals preferences depend on other people s behavior it is found that not taking the interdependency into account can lead to a serious bias in the predicted effects of a tax change it is also shown that interdependent behavior can give rise to spikes in the hours distribution such spikes often have been attributed to quantity constraints

optimal self enforcement and termination abstract we study a principal agent problem where the agent receives a stochastic outside opportunity offer each period and he cannot commit to the ongoing contractual relationship termination which is costly allows the principal to go back to an external market to hire a new agent the principal responds strategically to the agent s outside offers choosing optimally between retaining the agent which must be self enforced and terminating him which then ends the current contract the model generates both voluntary and involuntary terminations and dynamics and stationarity outcomes that are of interest especially for understanding employment relationships with on the job search

structural estimation of family labor supply with taxes estimating a continuous hours model using a direct utility specification this paper proposes a new method for estimating family labor supply in the presence of taxes this method accounts for continuous hours choices measurement error unobserved heterogeneity in tastes for work the nonlinear form of the tax code and fixed costs of work in one comprehensive specification estimated on data from the 2001 psid the resulting elasticities for married males are consistent with those found elsewhere in the literature but female wage elasticities are substantially smaller than those found in most of the literature simulations of recent tax acts predict small effects on the labor supply of married couples

labor supply and taxation in france this paper provides sequential labor supply estimates for french married men and women under specifications analogous to those used by hausman to account for the effects of taxation upon the budget constraint results suggest that even though labor force participation follows the expected pattern work hours are quite rigid most of the variation in the latter being attributed to measurement errors the second part of the paper concentrates on the simultaneous estimation of male and female labor supply conditional maximum likelihood techniques are shown to permit the separate estimation of work hours for both spouses with an appropriate set of instruments aimed at correcting for the biases arising from simultaneity selectivity and the nonlinearity of the budget constraint although consistent the resulting estimates apparently contradict the usual rationality restrictions on family labor supply behavior and seem to confirm the lack of flexibility in work hours

equilibrium matching and termination in an equilibrium model of the labor market with moral hazard jobs are dynamic contracts job separations are terminations of optimal dynamic contracts transitions from unemployment to new jobs are modeled as a process of random matching and nash bargaining non employed workers make consumption and saving decisions as in a standard growth model as well as whether or not to participate in the labor market the stationary equilibrium is characterized the model is then calibrated to the u s labor market to study quantitatively the worker flows and distributions the compensation dynamics and the effects of ui system

returns to scale and most productive scale size in dea with negative data abstract non parametric evaluation of returns to scale of production units in standard dea models becomes problematic when their underlying technologies involve negative data the methodology recently offered by allahyar and rostamy malkhalifeh 2015 hence after called arm model is of some help to deal with this issue however there are two shortcomings underlying the arm model first it may not be capable of locating all the production units exhibiting constant returns to scale and second it is also not able to determine most productive scale size in order to deal with these two shortcomings the current paper contributes to the dea literature in two ways first it makes a unifying attempt to propose a general non radial dea model to determine both the most productive scale size and the returns to scale characterizations of production units in the presence of negative data second the proposed model can be adapted in a dynamic dea technology setting to determine growth efficiency and returns to growth behavior of production units facing hyper competition in a new economy

managerial legacies entrenchment and strategic inertia this paper argues that the legacy potential of a firm s strategy is an important deter minant of ceo compensation turnover and strategy change a legacy makes ceo replacement expensive because firm performance can only partially be attributed to a newly employed manager boards may therefore optimally allow an incumbent to be entrenched moreover when a firm changes strategy it is optimal to change the ceo because the incumbent has a vested interest in seeing the new strategy fail even though ceos have no specific skills in our model legacy issues can explain the empirical association between ceo and strategy change this paper proposes a model of ceo replacement and puts forward a novel determinant for turnover decisions the legacy potential of a firm s strategy we mean by this the extent to which a manager s decisions affect future firm cash flows potentially beyond the manager s own tenure the replacement of a ceo is arguably one of the most important decisions a firm takes yet the theoretical and empirical finance literature has relatively little to say about the firm and manager specific characteristics that lead to one manager being fired and replaced by another as brickley 2003 points out the only variable that predicts turnover empirically is poor firm performance but it has little pre dictive power theoretical papers on managerial turnover tend to reduce ceo successions to a sequence of static interactions see below for more details as such they do not distinguish between a ceo who is hired and can start a fresh project or one who is constrained in this choice because he inherits a prede cessor s long term strategy our paper focuses on this latter phenomenon and investigates turnover decisions when strategy choices have a legacy potential the fact that a dynamic link exists between a ceo and his predecessor is probably more recognized in the accounting literature than in finance pourciau both authors are from the toulouse school of economics and the institut d administration des

optimal long term financial contracting we develop an agency model of financial contracting we derive long term debt a line of credit and equity as optimal securities capturing the debt coupon and maturity the interest rate and limits on the credit line inside versus outside equity dividend policy and capital structure dynamics the optimal debt equity ratio is history dependent but debt and credit line terms are independent of the amount financed and in some cases the severity of the agency problem in our model the agent can divert cash flows we also consider settings in which the agent undertakes hidden effort or can control cash flow risk

outside opportunities and termination abstract we study a dynamic principal agent relationship where a stochastic outside opportunity offer arises each period for the risk averse agent termination is costly but it allows the agent to pursue the available outside opportunity and the principal to return to an external market to hire a new agent the principal acts strategically with respect to the agent s outside offers and we show that it is optimal to terminate the current relationship if and only if the agent s outside offer is above a cutoff level the optimal contract generates both voluntary and involuntary terminations severance compensation arises endogenously and we show that it may be paid only in involuntary terminations conditional on termination the size of the optimal severance compensation depends positively on the agent s current compensation but negatively on his outside offer the optimal contract dictates an inverted u relationship between compensation and the probability of termination

a theory of political and economic cycles abstract we develop a theoretical framework in which political and economic cycles are jointly determined these cycles are driven by three political economy frictions policymakers are non benevolent they cannot commit to policies and they have private information about the tightness of the government budget and rents our first main result is that in the most favorable equilibrium to the households distortions to production emerge and never disappear even in the long run this result is driven by the interaction of limited commitment and private information on the side of the policymaker since in the absence of either friction there are no long run distortions to production our second result is that if the variance of private information is sufficiently large there is equilibrium turnover in the long run so that political cycles never disappear finally our model produces a long run distribution of taxes distortions and turnover where these all respond persistently to temporary economic shocks

repeated moral hazard and one sided commitment abstract this paper considers a repeated unobserved endowment economy with a restriction that agents can walk away from insurance contracts at the beginning of any period and contract with another insurer one sided commitment an equilibrium is derived characterized by a unique market determined insurance contract with the property that agents never want to walk away from it the paper shows that trade or insurance still occurs and that a non degenerate long run distribution of consumption exists a numerical example shows that this distribution is nearly log normal journal of economic literature classification numbers d30 d31 d80 d82

managerial incentives and the role of advisors in the continuous time agency model we explore a continuous time agency model with double moral hazard using a venture capitalist vc entrepreneur relationship where the vc both supplies costly effort and chooses the optimal timing of the initial public offering ipo we show that optimal ipo timing is earlier under double moral hazard than under single moral hazard our results also indicate that the manager s compensation tends to be paid earlier under double moral hazard we derive several comparative static results notably that ipo timing is earlier when the need for monitoring by the vc is smaller and when the volatility of cash flows is larger the author 2013 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

when to fire a ceo optimal termination in dynamic contracts abstract existing models of dynamic contracts impose that it is both optimal and feasible for the contracting parties to bind themselves together forever this paper introduces optimal termination in dynamic contracts we modify the standard dynamic agency model to include an external labor market which upon the dissolution of the contract allows the firm to return to the labor market to seek a new match under this simple closure of the model two types of terminations emerge under one scenario the agent is fired after a bad output and he becomes too poor to be punished effectively under the second scenario the agent is forced out after a good output and he becomes too expensive to motivate

a continuous time version of the principal agent problem this paper describes a new continuous time principal agent model in which the output is a diffusion process with drift determined by the agent s unobserved effort the risk averse agent receives consumption continuously the optimal contract based on the agent s continuation value as a state variable is computed by a new method using a differential equation during employment the output path stochastically drives the agent s continuation value until it reaches a point that triggers retirement quitting replacement or promotion the paper explores how the dynamics of the agent s wages and effort as well as the optimal mix of short term and long term incentives depend on the contractual environment the understanding of dynamic incentives is central in economics how do companies motivate their workers through piece rates bonuses and promotions how is income inequality connected with productivity investment and economic growth how do financial contracts and capital structure give incentives to the managers of a corporation the methods and results of this paper provide important insights to many such questions this paper introduces a continuous time principal agent model that focuses on the dynamic properties of optimal incentive provision we identify factors that make the agent s wages increase or decrease over time we examine the degree to which current and future outcomes motivate the agent we provide conditions under which the agent eventually reaches retirement in the optimal contract we also investigate how the costs of creating incentives and the dynamic properties of the optimal contract depend on the contractual environment the agent s outside options the difficulty of replacing the agent and the opportunities for promotion our new dynamic insights are possible due to the technical advantages of continuous time methods over the traditional discrete time ones continuous time leads to a much simpler computational procedure to find the optimal contract by solving an ordinary differential equation this equation highlights the factors that determine optimal consumption and effort the dynamics of the agent s career path are naturally described by the drift and volatility of the agent s pay offs the geometry of solutions to the differential equation allows for easy comparisons to see how the agent s wages effort and incentives depend on the contractual environment finally continuous time highlights many essential features of the optimal contract including the agent s eventual retirement in our benchmark model a risk averse agent is tied to a risk neutral principal forever after employment starts the agent influences output by his continuous unobservable effort input the principal sees only the output a brownian motion with a drift that depends on the agent s effort the agent dislikes effort and enjoys consumption we assume that the agent s utility function has the income effect that is as the agent s income increases it becomes costlier to compensate him for the effort also we assume that the agent s utility of consumption is bounded from below

nonparametric panel estimation of labor supply in this article we estimate structural labor supply with piecewise linear budgets and nonseparable endogenous unobserved heterogeneity we propose a two stage method to address the endogeneity iss

on repeated moral hazard with discounting in this paper we analyze optimal contracts in an infinitely repeated agency model in which both the principal and agent discount the future we show that there is a stationary representation of the optimal contract when the agent s conditional discounted expected utility is used as a state variable this representation reduces the multi period problem to a static variational problem which can be analyzed using standard variational techniques this reduction is used to obtain several properties of the contract

an exogeneity test for a simultaneous equation tobit model with an application to labor supply a test of weak exogeneity in the simultaneous equation tobit model is proposed and illustrated using a female labour supply model estimated using cross section data the test statistic can be simply output from any standard tobit maximum likelihood package and is asymptotically efficient the procedure provides consistent estimators for the simultaneous tobit model whose asymptotic covariance matrix is a simple extension of the usual tobit formula we also provide the lagrange multiplier test of weak exogeneity this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the effect of social benefits on youth employment combining regression discontinuity and a behavioral model natural experiments provide robust identifying assumptions for the estimation of policy effects yet their use for policy design is often limited by the difficulty of extrapolating on the basis of reduced form estimates in this study we exploit an age condition in the eligibility for social assistance in france which lends itself to a regression discontinuity rd design we suggest making the underlying labor supply model explicit that is translating the reduced form discontinuity in terms of discontinuous changes in disposable incomes this exercise shows the potential of combining natural experiments and behavioral models in particular we can test the external validity of the combined approach we find that it predicts the effect of a subsequent reform which extends transfers to the working poor remarkably well the model is then used to simulate the extension of social assistance to young people and finds that a transfer program with an in work component would not create further disincentives to work in this population

evaluating the impact of the french tax credit on the employment rate of women abstract this paper investigates the employment impact of a new tax credit programme that was put in place in france in 2001 according to the theoretical labour supply model tax credits will have a positive effect on individual labour market participation as they increase the rewards from work however tax credits may discourage married women s participation mainly due to income effects we analyse the introduction of the french measure by adopting a non experimental evaluation method various treatment and control groups are defined the first specification adopted relies on the policy eligibility rules for the construction of the control and treatment groups the others hinge respectively on marital status for women in couple households and on the presence of children for single women we find evidence of a negative employment effect for married women with a reduction of about three percentage points in the employment rate after the introduction of the policy in particular it seems to be the conditioning on total household resources that discourages married women s labour market participation on the contrary the employment impact of the measure is positive for cohabiting women and twice as large the policy effect is very small and statistically not significant for single women the net impact of the introduction of the tax credit on the total employment of women is very marginal amounting to the creation of about two thousand new jobs