financial intermediation reserve requirements and inside money a general equilibrium analysis abstract reserve requirements are examined in a general equilibrium context the paper develops a simple general equilibrium model that includes diverse opportunities for investment and a role for financial intermediaries two versions of the model are considered one is a thought experiment in which currency serves purely to satisfy legal reserve requirements the other is more realistic the model is used to analyze the comparative static effects of changes in reserve requirements the effects of changes in other parameters of the economy in the presence of reserve requirements and some qualitative issues raised by reserve requirements

self rewards and personal motivation self administered rewards are ubiquitous they serve as incentives for personal accomplishments and are widely recommended to increase personal motivation we show that in a model with time inconsistent and reference dependent preferences self rewards can be a credible and effective tool to overcome self control problems we also discuss the different types of self rewards the individual can use such as vice goods and virtue goods and analyze which types of goods the individual prefers

security analysis and trading patterns when some investors receive information before others in existing models of information acquisition all informed investors receive their information at the same time this article analyzes trading behavior and equilibrium information acquisition when some investors receive common private information before others the model implies that under some conditions investors will focus only on a subset of securities herding while neglecting other securities with identical exogenous characteristics in addition the model is consistent with empirical correlations that are suggestive of oft cited trading strategies such as profit taking short term position reversal and following the leader mimicking earlier trades in existing models of information acquisition all informed investors receive their information at the same time while these models provide many important insights in reality some investors either fortuitously or owing to superior skill acquire pertinent information before others by being first an investor can exploit this information to great advantage information that is uncovered only slightly later is less valuable even if it has not yet been publicly revealed we show in this article that the sequential nature of information arrival has a significant effect on both the trading decisions and the types of information collected by investors the model we develop describes the investment choices of a set of competitive risk averse investors who investigate the long term prospects of firms lucky or high ability investors uncover the

sensitivity analysis of efficiency and malmquist productivity indices an application to spanish savings banks abstract hypothesis testing and statistical precision in the context of non parametric efficiency and productivity measurement have been investigated since the early 1990s recent contributions focus on this matter through the use of resampling methods i e bootstrapping techniques however empirical evidence is still practically non existent this gap is more noticeable in the case of banking efficiency studies where the literature is immense in this work we explore productivity growth and productive efficiency for spanish savings banks over the initial post deregulation period 1992 1998 using data envelopment analysis dea and bootstrapping techniques results show that productivity growth has occurred mainly due to improvement in production possibilities and that mean efficiency has remained fairly constant over time the bootstrap analysis yields further evidence as for many firms productivity growth or decline is not statistically significant with regard to efficiency measurement the bootstrap reveals that the disparities in the original efficiency scores of some firms are lessened to a great extent

trading on inside information evidence from the share structure reform in china abstract we examine stock trading activities in days before chinese listed firms made public announcement to start share structure reform there is significant evidence that relative to a benchmark period institutional investors bought more event firms shares in the last two trading days prior to announcement randomization tests show significant differences in institutional trading activities between event firms and matched control firms which suggests that some institutions had inside information moreover large trades account for a significant proportion of daily stock price changes in the last 2 days the evidence is consistent with the prediction by holden and subrahmanyam 1992 that when multiple informed investors acquire the same piece of information they will trade aggressively we also find that over the reform period the median share value change of event firms is 6 higher than that of control firms our findings have important implications for enforcement of insider trading regulations in china

insider trading investment and liquidity a welfare analysis we compare equilibrium trading outcomes with and without participation by an informed insider assuming inflexible ex ante aggregate investment choices by agents noise trading arises from aggregate uncertainty regarding other agents intertemporal consumption preferences the welfare levels of outsiders can thus be ascertained the allocations without insider trading are not ex ante pareto efficient because our model differs from standard ones with negative exponential utility functions and normal returns we characterize the circumstances under which the revelation of payoff relevant information via prices arising from insider tradingbenefits outsiders with stochastic liquidity needs by improving risk sharing among them in models of informed trading allen 1984 dennert 1992 grossman and stiglitz 1980 kyle 1985 leland 1992 repullo 1994 it has been customary in order not to have an unrealistic fully revealing rational expectation equilibrium ree and no profits for informed traders to postulate some portion of the market demand for securities as arising from unmodeled noise traders whose endowments and preferences for consumption are left unspecified this makes it difficult to reach a welfare judgment regarding the impact of insider trading even when the implications for the informativeness of asset prices and investment can be ascertained thus an important issue in financial regulatory policy regarding the desirability of allowing trading by asymmetrically informed corporate insiders remains largely unresolved at the conceptual level our major goal in this paper is to rectify this shortcoming by modeling both noise traders and rational a priori uninformed traders together as agents with well specified preferences these agents allocate their endowments across a risky long term and a riskless short term investment ex ante london school of economics and political science and cepr and universita degli studi di torino respectively we are grateful for financial support from the ente einaudi the italian murst and the international centre for economic research icer torino it is a pleasure to acknowledge the excellent research assistance of giacomo elena work on this paper was begun while bhattacharya was a visiting fellow at icer during the summer of 1995 we wish to thank without implicating in errors gabriella chiesa and jose marin for advice and encouragement and participants at seminars at the universities of brescia roma tor vergata tilburg torino the cepr conference on information financial intermediation and the macroeconomy alghero 1997 as well as an anonymous referee and the editor rene stulz for their very helpful comments and suggestions

insider trading outside search and resource allocation why firms and society may disagree on insider trading restrictions we show that entrepreneurs may prefer to allow insider trading even when it is not socially optimal we examine a model in which an insider manager allocates resources on the basis of his private information and outside information conveyed through the secondary market price of the firm s shares if the manager is allowed to trade he will compete with informed outsiders reducing the equilibrium quality of outside information while the benefits to production of outside information are the same for society and entrepreneurs we show that the social and private costs are different thus entrepreneurs and society may disagree on the conditions under which insider trading restrictions should be imposed article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

anomalies in intertemporal choice evidence and an interpretation research on decision making under uncertainly has been strongly influenced by the documentation of numerous expected utility eu anomalies behaviors that violate the expected utility axioms the relative lack of progress on the closely related topic of intertemporal choice is partly due to the absence of an analogous set of discounted utility du anomalies we enumerate a set of du anomalies analogous to the eu anomalies and propose a model that accounts for the anomalies as well as other intertemporal choice phenomena incompatible with du we discuss implications for savings behavior estimation of discount rates and choice framing effects

modelling time inconsistent preferences abstract the paper reviews some recent theoretical contributions on the modelization of time inconsistent preferences as well as implications for individual behavior the focus is on the interpretation of the concepts and the link with concepts in psychology

the sources of productivity change in spanish banking abstract in this paper we examine the pattern of productivity change in spanish banking over the period 1986 1993 two sectors dominate spanish banking commercial banks and the faster growing savings banks we begin by examining productivity change separately within each sector however since the two sectors are gradually becoming more competitive we continue by merging the two sectors and by examining productivity change in the industry the merging procedure follows a methodology originally proposed by charnes cooper and rhodes 1981 in which intra sectoral managerial inefficiency is eliminated prior to merging this procedure allows us to distinguish differences in managerial efficiency within each sector from differences in the institutional efficiency of the two sectors it also enables us to decompose potential productivity change into institutional efficiency change technical change and the impact of scale economies we find the commercial banks to have had a slightly lower rate of productivity growth but a slightly higher rate of potential productivity growth we attribute this phenomenon to differences in both managerial efficiency and institutional efficiency to differences in the rate of technical progress and to the adverse impact of diseconomies of scale in the commercial banking sector

insider trading 2 0 the ethics of information sales the sale of faster access to financial market data has recently generated public controversy ny attorney general eric schneiderman has referred to such fast data feeds as insider trading 2 0 for example thomson reuters sold the university of michigan s consumer sentiment index to computerized trading firms 2 seconds before releasing its data to its other paying clients this paper explores the ethical issues involved in the sale of such information is selling faster access ethically the same as traditional insider trading which generally involves a breach of fiduciary duty or the use of misappropriated information such practices are extremely different from traditional insider trading as there is neither a breach of fiduciary duty nor misappropriation of inside information the ethical issues are similar to other market segmentation and price discrimination issues in which different prices are charged to different customers the ability to price discriminate across segments can actually benefit large segments of the population who may receive lower prices because others such as the high speed traders are paying more the sale of faster access to information especially by exchanges raises additional ethical issues there may be adverse effects on market quality that must be addressed the moral distaste for the practice expressed by some stems from the seeming unfairness of a modern market structure that provides advantages to a small group of computerized traders

insider trading legislation and corporate governance this paper analyzes the impact of insider trading legislation on corporate governance in a context where large dominant shareholders can monitor underperforming companies managers have an incentive to give early warnings about adverse developments to dominant shareholders this information is effectively a bribe to induce dominant shareholders to sell their stock and refrain from intervention if insider trading is unregulated dominant shareholders collude with management at the expense of small shareholders the optimal regime forces the company to disclose all material information to the market private contracting between companies and shareholders leads to optimal insider trading regulation only if initial shareholders can enter a binding commitment otherwise large shareholders and managers recontract at the expense of small share holders enforcement also matters european union legislation requires inside information to be precise such a narrow definition creates a grey zone where information is private but cannot be classified as inside information as a result the effectiveness of corporate governance and firm value are reduced regulation in the us that treats shareholders with a stake exceeding 10 as insiders is potentially harmful

investment and insider trading within a dynamic environment this paper introduces an inside trader to an economy where rational but uninformed traders choose between investment projects with different levels of insider trading when inside information has little value in future investment decisions insider trading distorts investment towards assets with less private information imposing net welfare costs on the economy when an insider s private information is valuable in making future investment decisions the net social benefit of inside trading can be positive the resulting increases in investment efficiency due to more informative prices is enough to compensate for the distortion induced by the inside trader when insiders receive private information more than once insiders may trade to reveal their private information at the beginning of their relationship with the firm this has two effects i more information is revealed in equilibrium and ii there is less chance than an uninformed agent will have to trade with the insider both these effects reduce the investment inefficiencies associated with insider trading as a consequence uninformed liquidity traders prefer to trade in a market with a long term insider this improvement in investment efficiency leads to a pareto improvement both the uninformed traders and the insider are made better off if the insider receives information more than once

information expected utility and portfolio choice we study the consumption investment problem of an agent with a constant relative risk aversion preference function who possesses noisy information about the future prospects of a stock we also solve for the value of information to the agent in closed form we find that information can significantly alter consumption and asset allocation decisions for reasonable parameter ranges information increases consumption in the vicinity of 25 information can shift the portfolio weight on a stock from 0 to around 70 thus de pending on the stock beta the weight on the market portfolio can be considerably reduced with information causing the appearance of underdiversification the model indicates that stock holdings of informed agents are positively related to wealth unrelated to systematic risk and negatively related to idiosyncratic uncertainty we also show that the dollar value of information to the agent depends linearly on his wealth and decreases with both the propensity to intermediate consumption and risk aversion

to be consumed with moderation abstract we study the optimal behavior of a hyperbolic discounting agent who has incomplete information about his own preferences and can only learn them through consumption we show that even if moderate current consumption and moderate future consumption always dominates abstinence the agent may optimally decide not to consume as a commitment device against inefficient learning that would lead to future excesses this provides a rationale for why smokers gamblers or compulsive buyers stick to second best personal rules of behavior such as abstinence without invoking standard habit formation arguments we also study how urges modify the strategy of the individual

ownership structure speculation and shareholder intervention an institution holding shares in a firm can use information about the firm both for trading speculation and for deciding whether to intervene to improve firm performance intervention increases the value of the institution s existing shareholdings but intervention only increases the institution s trading profits if it enhances the precision of the institution s information relative to that of uninformed traders thus the ability to speculate can increase or decrease institutional intervention we examine key factors that affect the intervention decision the usefulness of short swing provisions and restricted shares in encouraging institutional intervention and implications for ownership structure across different firms institutional investors hold an ever greater fraction of corporate america s equity traditionally these institutions were stock pickers who tried to beat the market through trading if a firm whose stock they held seemed headed for trouble these investors headed for the door the wall street rule more recently some of these institutions have been using the ownership rights attached to their shares to pressure firms to act in the shareholders interest some have even argued that there is a synergy between gathering information for use in trading shares speculation and intelligently pressuring firms to improve performance intervention we argue that these motives can also conflict analyzing these motives allows us to predict which firms are most likely to attract institutional intervention which in turn has crosssectional implications for firm ownership structure recent examples suggest that institutional investors with large stakes sometimes intervene and sometimes follow the wall street rule so that there is indeed a choice to be studied in the early 1990s there was a wave of activism by a variety of large institutional investors among them calpers the california public employees pension fund putnam management a mutual fund manager and j p morgan a bank holding company these institu

the efficient market hypothesis and insider trading on the stock market we study the behavior of a large trader with private information about the mean of an asset with a risky return we argue that if the variability of the return is not too great typically the trader will find it desirable to ensure that the market price does not reveal his information that is that a pooling equilibrium arises such an equilibrium has the advantage of avoiding the incentive constraints that arise in separating equilibria where information can be inferred from prices thus the efficient market hypothesis may well fail if there is imperfect competition despite the uniformativeness of prices the other competitive traders are also better off in the pooling equilibrium than in any separating equilibrium again if one assumes limited variability

a theory of rational addiction we develop a theory of rational addiction in which rationality means a consistent plan to maximize utility over time strong addiction to a good requires a big effect of past consumption of the good on current consumption such powerful complementarities cause some steady states to be unstable they are an important part of our analysis because even small deviations from the consumption at an unstable steady state can lead to large cumulative rises over time in addictive consumption or to rapid falls in consumption to abstention our theory also implies that cold turkey is used to end strong addictions that addicts often go on binges that addicts respond more to permanent than to temporary changes in prices of addictive goods and that anxiety and tensions can precipitate an addiction

does insider trading raise market volatility this paper studies the role of insider trading in explaining cross country differences in stock market volatility it introduces a new measure of insider trading the central finding is that countries with more prevalent insider trading have more volatile stock markets even after one controls for liquidity maturity of the market and the volatility of the underlying fundamentals volatility of real output and of monetary and fiscal policies moreover the effect of insider trading is quantitatively significant when compared with the effect of economic fundamentals

regulation and market power in the spanish liquefied petroleum gas industry progress or failure this paper presents a detailed study of the structure market power and competition in the distribution sector for liquefied petroleum gas lpg within spain it is a segment of energy consumption and supply that is not often given serious attention despite the fact that lpg is a crucial source of energy to many households in many countries in europe and in the rest of the world despite formally being an open and liberalized sector the spanish lpg market is characterized by high concentration within the industry repsol butano the dominant operator practically controls the entire value chain these structural characteristics probably justify state intervention in the form of price fixing in order to guarantee accessible prices for final consumers nevertheless applying this tool has had negative effects on the opening and liberalization process on the one hand it fails to encourage entry or an increase in the participation of new operators on the other it has considerably deteriorated the economic and financial performance of the distribution agents that are subjected to two strong forces first the dominant operator looks after its own interests and its income and second the government tries to defend the interests of final consumers by fixing prices that inadequately remunerate the activity this shows the contradictory regulatory actions that try to promote competition and then establish mechanisms to regulate activity by fixing prices that act as price limits these government set prices discourage new competitors from entering

procrastination and obedience in this lecture i shall focus on situations involving repeated decisions with time inconsistent behavior although each choice may be close to maximizing and therefore result in only small losses the cumulative effect of a series of repeated errors may be quite large thus in my examples decision makers are quite close to the intelligent well informed individuals usually assumed in economic analysis but cumulatively they make seriously wrong decisions that do not occur in standard textbook economics this lecture discusses and illustrates several pathological modes of individual and group behavior procrastination in decision making undue obedience to authority membership of seemingly normal individuals in deviant cult groups and escalation of commitment to courses of action that are clearly unwise in each case individuals choose a series of current actions without fully appreciating how those actions will affect future perceptions and behavior the standard assumption of rational forwardlooking utility maximizing is violated the nonindependence of errors in decision making in the series of decisions can be explained with the concept from cognitive psychology of undue salience or vividness for example present benefits and costs may have undue salience relative to future costs

the advantage to hiding one s hand speculation and central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market abstract we analyze an asymmetric information model of sterilized intervention in the foreign exchange market we characterize an equilibrium in which a central bank with inside information about its exchange rate target trades with risk averse speculators who have private information about future spot rates the model identifies circumstances in which perverse responses to intervention will be observed i e the domestic currency depreciates when the central bank purchases it and it provides conditions under which the exchange rate will be highly sensitive to intervention the model also provides an explanation for two forms of policy secrecy i secrecy about the scale of an intervention operation is always desirable ii secrecy about the target is sometimes desirable

regulatory reform in european banking abstract a stylized model of the role of banks in a context of imperfect financial markets where the potential for market failure exists is proposed the specificity of banking is analyzed and the need of regulation explained the study of regulatory responses highlights the importance of their associated side effects particular attention is devoted to the interaction of regulation and competition in a strategic context the effects of deregulation and european integration of financial markets on banking competition are dealt with in the proposed framework

analyzing insider trading from the perspectives of utilitarian ethics and rights theory the common view is that insider trading is always unethical and illegal but such is not the case some forms of insider trading are legal furthermore applying ethical principles to insider trading causes one to conclude that it is also sometimes ethical this paper attempts to get past the hype the press reports and the political grandstanding to get to the truth of the matter the author applies two sets of ethical principles utilitarianism and rights theory in an attempt to determine when and in what circumstances insider trading is ethical the views of henry manne an early proponent of insider trading are critically examined as are the major arguments against insider trading is insider trading good for the company if it is used as a form of executive compensation which makes it possible to pay lower salaries than would otherwise be the case does insider trading cause the stock market to work more efficiently if insider trading does increase efficiency is that sufficient to call for its total legalization or are there other things to be considered several arguments against insider trading have been put forth over the last few decades but there are problems with all of them one of the main arguments is the fairness argument the problem with this argument is that different people have different definitions of unfairness a closely related argument is the level playing field argument which advocates wider dissemination of information so that it is less asymmetric one problem with the level playing field argument is that it is better applied to sporting competitions than to trading in information some economists argue that forcing the disclosure of nonpublic information can actually result in more harm than good and must necessarily involve the violation of property rights other arguments examined in this chapter include the fiduciary duty argument the problem of outside traders the misappropriation doctrine and the restrictions that insider trading laws place on freedom of speech and press the article concludes by setting forth some principles or guidelines to determine when insider trading should be punished and when it should not

goal setting and self control abstract this paper addresses the role of non binding goals to attenuate time inconsistency present biased agents have linear reference dependent preferences and endogenously set a goal that is the reference point they face an infinite horizon optimal stopping problem in continuous time when there is sufficient commitment to expectation based goals goal setting attenuates the present biased agent s tendency to stop too early and may even lead an agent to wait longer than the first best in particular reference dependence is strictly worse for a time consistent agent notably none of the effects of goal setting require loss aversion

some remarks on leland s model of insider trading this paper shows that leland s 1992 results on the positive effects of insider trading on investment are not robust to the introduction of noise in the insider s information the paper then considers two variations of his model in which the insider is risk neutral to ensure robustness and the investment decision is prior to the placing of the stock in the market it is shown that if insider trading takes place in the primary market it has no effect on the level of investment whereas if it takes place in the secondary market it has a negative effect on investment ing debate insider trading moves the resolution of uncertainty forward and this may bring benefits better information for investment decisions as well as costs increased volatility of prices and hence higher risk premia to analyse these effects leland 1992 constructs a model with an endogen ous level of investment and he shows that when insider trading is permitted stock prices will be higher on average expected real investment will rise and markets will be less liquid and more volatile leland s model is however very special first of all he assumes that the risk averse insider learns exactly the future return of the risky asset in this paper i analyse the robustness of leland s results to the introduction of some noise in the insider s information i show that given the assumptions of his model an arbitrarily small amount of noise is sufficient to make negligible all the effects of insider trading the source of this lack of robustness lies in the assumption that because of risk aversion the insider s trade is always negligible except in the limit case where holding the asset entails no risk to ensure robustness to the intro duction of noise in the insider s information i then consider a model with a risk neutral insider however for this model insider trading does not have any effect on the average price of the risky asset and hence no effect on the average level of investment another feature of leland s model is the fact that the only supplier of the risky asset is assumed to be a price taker this seems a fairly implausible assumption so i propose an alternative model with a risk neutral insider in which the investment decision is prior to the placing of the asset in the market and which allows the supplier to have market power the equilibrium of this model can be easily derived from leland s analysis and although we get the same results for the volatility of the price and the liquidity of the market now insider trading has no effect on the level of investment the result however depends crucially on the assumption that the supplier of the asset is risk neu tral under risk aversion the increase in price volatility would imply a negative

deregulation and competition in spanish banking the spanish financial system has undergone a strong liberalization process in the last fifteen years which has accelerated recently starting from a situation of tight regulation and protection from competition the deregulation process has been reinforced by the projected integration of european financial markets and has accompanied major developments in financial markets and banking deregulation has many effects in this short note we concentrate mainly on competition in banking after reviewing the evolution of regulation section 2 and the present state of the financial system section 3 we analyze the effects of liberalization on competition section 4 and conclude with some comments on other effects and open questions

exploring efficiency differences over time in the spanish banking industry abstract over the last 15 years the competitive conditions under which spanish banking firms operate have become much tighter deregulation has affected both banks and savings banks allowing them to expand geographically and to choose less regulation conditioned output mixes this paper analyzes how in these circumstances banking efficiency has been affected considering two specifications of output and analyzing the dynamics of the entire distribution not only mean and standard deviation results differ depending on the output definition but they show that in general efficiency scores exhibit dynamic patterns that only two moments of the distribution hardly capture in particular regardless of the output definition considered efficiency scores were more dispersed in 1985 and more concentrated in 1995 and there were substantial changes in firms efficiency relative positions as measured by transition probability matrices in addition the multi modality of the distributions has almost disappeared at the end of the period

the value of information when preferences are dynamically inconsistent the paper reviews the main findings on individual decision making under time inconsistent preferences incomplete information and different learning environments first when agents choose whether to learn or not avoiding costless information can be their optimal strategy strategic ignorance predicts a systematic bias in the agents perceived payoff second when information flows exogenously as in the literature on investment under uncertainty agents may undertake irreversible investments anticipating expected losses such decisions are taken only as a commitment device against the acquisition of future information undesirable from the current perspective furthermore several equilibria coexist the agent will succeed in avoiding investments with losses or not depending on the degree of trust on his future behavior third under learning through consumption abstention can be part of an equilibrium strategy in activities where moderate consumption if feasible would yield a higher payoff c 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

generic existence of completely revealing equilibria for economies with uncertainty when prices convey information conditions which imply the existence of strict rational expectations equilibria for most static pure exchange economies where prices convey information about the state of the world are analyzed information is aggregated and transmitted by prices because agents have different initial information and maximize the conditional expectation of state dependent utility functions major results state that if with probability one agents characteristics do not vary too much as the state of the world varies then generically there exist equilibrium price functions which reveal all initial information more precisely if the support of the image measure is contained in a compact c1 manifold satisfying some technical conditions which is of sufficiently low dimension relative to the number of commodities then existence of completely revealing equilibria is generic any economy satisfying these assumptions can be approximated by a sequence of economies which also obey these assumptions and have completely revealing equilibrium price functions slight perturbations do not destroy the existence property

insider trading in a rational expectations economy it is often argued that efficiency considerations require society to freely permit insider trading in this article an opposing efficiency argument is formalized the model incorporates an investment stage followed by a trading stage if outsiders expect insiders to take advantage of them in trading outsiders will reduce their investment the insiders loss from this diminished investor confidence may more than offset their trading gains consequently a prohibition on insider trading may effect a pareto improvement insiders are made better off if they can precommit not to trade on their privileged information govemment regulation accomplishes exactly this jel 022 026 313 the traditional rationale articulated for insider trading regulation and other securities law is that such rules promote confidence in markets indeed president franklin d roosevelt justified the first major u s securities legislation by saying it should give impetus to honest dealing in securities and thereby bring back public confidence similar language is still invoked half a century later in connection with enforcement efforts against insider trading and in proposals for tightened stock

the brain as a hierarchical organization based on recent neuroscience evidence we model the brain as a dual system organization subject to three conflicts asymmetric information temporal hori zon and incentive salience under the first and second conflicts we show that the uninformed system imposes a positive link between consumption and labor at every period furthermore decreasing impatience endogenously emerges as a consequence of these two conflicts under the first and third conflicts it becomes optimal to set a consumption cap finally we discuss the behavioral implications of these rules for choice bracketing and expense tracking and for consumption over the life cycle jel dil d74 d82 d87 d91

self regulation through goal setting goals are an important motivator but little is known about why and how people set them we address this issue in a model based on two stylized facts first goals serve as reference points for performance second present biased preferences create self control problems we show the power and limits of self regulation through goals goals increase an individual s motivation but only up to a certain point furthermore they are painful self disciplining devices thus greater self control problems may result in tougher goals but for a severe present bias goals either lack a motivating force or are too painful to be accepted

the effects of deregulation on the performance of financial institutions the case of spanish savings banks this paper examines the impact of regulatory reform on the performance of spanish savings banks the focus is whether increased competition brought on by deregulation affected performance of banks over time output technical efficiency which is defined in terms of the production possibility frontier is also examined empirical results show declining levels of output technical efficiency along with a significantly high rate of technical progress in spite of declining technical efficiency during this period evidence of an increasing trend in productivity growth is found

why regulate insider trading evidence from the first great merger wave 1897 1903 we use event time methodology to study legal insider trading associated with mergers circa 1900 for mergers with prospective disclosures similar to today s we find substantial value gains at announcement implying participation by outside shareholders despite the absence of insider constraints furthermore preannouncement stock price runups relative to total value gain are no more than those observed for modern mergers insider regulation apparently has produced little benefit for outsiders with the inside information pricing function and related gains shifting to external information specialists other results suggest market penalties for nondisclosure i e insider trading is less successful in a restricted information environment

do demand curves for stocks slope down since september 1976 stocks newly included into the standard and poor s 500 index have earned a significant positive abnormal return at the announcement of the inclusion this return does not disappear for at least ten days after the inclusion the returns are positively related to measures of buying by index funds consistent with the hypothesis that demand curves for stocks slope down the returns are not related to s p s bond ratings which is inconsistent with a plausible version of the hypothesis that inclusion is a certification of the quality of the stock

advance disclosure of insider trading using a strategic rational expectations equilibrium framework we show that forcing a well informed insider to disclose her trades in advance tends to increase welfare for both the insider and less informed outsiders advance disclosure generates price risk for the insider and to mitigate this risk the insider trades less aggressively on her private information consequently outsiders face lower adverse selection costs which improves risk sharing and increases welfare the drop in trading aggressiveness also causes market efficiency to decline furthermore pretrade disclosure encourages excessive risk taking but may either encourage or discourage managerial effort

strategic ignorance as a self disciplining device we analyse the decision of an agent with time inconsistent preferences to consume a good that exerts an externality on future welfare the extent of the externality is initially unknown but may be learned via a costless sampling procedure we show that when the agent cannot commit to future consumption and learning decisions incomplete learning may occur on a markov perfect equilibrium path of the resulting intra personal game in such a case each agent s incarnation stops learning for some values of the posterior distribution of beliefs and acts under self restricted information this conduct is interpreted as strategic ignorance all equilibria featuring this property strictly pareto dominate the complete learning equilibrium for any posterior distribution of beliefs

self confidence and personal motivation the maintenance and enhancement of self esteem has always been identified as a fundamental human impulse philosophers writers educators and of course psychologists have all emphasized the crucial role played by self image in motivation affect and social interactions the aim of this chapter is to bring these concerns into the realm of economic analysis and show that this has important implications for how agents process information and make decisions conversely the tools of economic modelling can help shed light on a number of apparently irrational behaviours documented by psychologists

using privileged information to manipulate markets insiders gurus and credibility access to private information is shown to generate both the incentives and the ability to manipulate asset markets through strategically distorted announcements the fact that privileged information is noisy interferes with the public s attempts to learn whether such announcements are honest it allows opportunistic individuals to manipulate prices repeatedly without ever being fully found out this leads us to extend sobel s 1985 model of strategic communication to the case of noisy private signals our results show that when truthfulness is not easily verifiable restrictions on trading by insiders may be needed to preserve the integrity of information embodied in prices

partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium in a competitive economy abstract a class of pure exchange economies is considered in which some agents are informed of private information and others are uninformed existence of a partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium ree is proved without restricting attention to particular functional forms for utility functions and probability distributions without introducing noise into the model and without departing from the standard definition of ree the equilibrium is robust in the sense that if the primitives of the economy are slightly perturbed the economy continues to have a qualitatively similar ree with somewhat stronger assumptions placed on the economy the equilibrium is also the unique measurable ree