the democratic political economy of progressive income taxation why do both left and right political parties typically propose progressive income taxation schemes in political competition analysis of this problem has been hindered by the two dimensionality of the issue space to give parties a choice over a domain that contains both progressive and regressive income tax policies requires an issue space that is at least two dimensional nash equilibrium in pure strategies of the standard two party game whose players have complete preferences over a two dimensional policy space generically fails to exist i introduce a new equilibrium concept for political games based on the fact of factional conflict within parties each party is supposed to consist of reformists militants and opportunists each faction has a complete preference order on policy space but together they can only agree on a partial order nash equilibria of the two party game where the policy space consists of all quadratic income tax functions and each party is represented by its partial order exist and it is shown that in such equilibria both parties propose progressive income taxation

the geographical dimension of the development effects of natural resources we study the contribution of natural resource intensity to long term development along different dimensions per capita income institutional quality and education we allow natural resources to affect these dimensions differently in different regions of the world the evidence suggests that natural resources are generally a positive driver of development but in sub saharan africa ssa their contribution is almost negligible if not even negative we explain these cross regional differences with the fact that in ssa more than anywhere else large resource endowments are combined with a particularly bad disease environment some historical evidence and formal econometric results support this hypothesis

corruption in america abstract we use a data set of federal corruption convictions in the u s to investigate the causes and consequences of corruption more educated states and to a smaller degree richer states have less corruption this relationship holds even when we use historical factors like congregationalism in 1890 as an instrument for the level of schooling today the level of corruption is also correlated with the level of income inequality and racial fractionalization and uncorrelated with the size of government there is a weak negative relationship between corruption and economic development in a state these results echo the cross country findings and support the view that the correlation between development and good political outcomes occurs because education improves political institutions

optimal taxation and strategic budget deficit under political regime switching i develop a dynamic political economy theory of optimal taxation and budget distortions in a model with partisan politics under asymmetric information politics affects the distribution of utilities in the economy political regime switching introduces fluctuations of this distribution these fluctuations justify strategic budget distortions by governments currently holding office and willing to favour their redistributive concerns against future majority under quite general assumptions on preferences these distortions take the form of budget deficits resp surpluses with leftist rightist governments endogenizing the probabilities of getting elected may reverse this result this paper presents a dynamic political economy theory of taxation policy showing how partisan governments create strategic budget distortions under quite general assumptions on preferences for redistribution these distortions take the form of budget surpluses resp deficits when rightist resp leftist governments hold office being uncertain on whether it will remain in office in the future the current government chooses a level of deficit which will favour its redistributive concerns against those of future majorities it does so by constraining the redistributive policy of its successor through the budget constraint that the latter inherits a leftist resp rightist government is more resp less enclined to redistribute income by running some deficit today the leftist government ensures that society gets poorer tomorrow a future rightist government will redistribute more as society gets poorer the implemented tax policy will thus be close to what a leftist government would have chosen itself on the contrary by running a surplus today a rightest government relaxes the burden of taxation imposed by tomorrow s leftist government on high income agents this leftist government will be less eager to redistribute and will adopt the rightist party s behaviour under political regime switching strategic distortions of the state budget constraint become important tools for current governments willing to favour their own redistributive concerns against those of future majorities as a result of this dynamic game between partisan governments playing at different points in time with the state budget constraint future policies blend together the preferences for redistribution of current and past governments the commitment value of budget deficits has already been stressed by persson and

the political economy of publicly provided private goods abstract this paper integrates two different approaches to the analysis of public provision of private goods education health care day care etc while normative public economics has established an efficiency case for such provision the commonly held political economy view has been that it is an economically inefficient phenomenon generated by the political process we establish a political economy framework which in general yields an efficient choice of distributional policy it follows that the central mechanism studied in the normative theory is equally relevant to voting models of decisions on public provision it is shown that under plausible information constraints economically efficient public provision of private goods will be part of politically rational decisions the result is established both within a median voter process and a representative democracy of political parties

the added worker effect the term added worker effect usually refers to a temporary increase in the labor supply of married women whose husbands have become unemployed this paper presents a new approach to the empirical study of the added worker effect which emphasizes the role of employment uncertainty and credit constraints in generating short run participation and employment patterns the estimates are based on employment transition probabilities rather than static measures of labor supply and are used in a dynamic simulation of changes in the employment and participation rates of wives following an exogenous increase in unemployment among their husbands the results show a small but significant added worker effect at least for white families and suggest that the apparent disagreement among previous studies may stem from different approaches to measuring responses to a transitory event such as an unemployment spell

the rising instability of u s earnings the inequality of earnings and of family incomes in the united states has increased since the late 1970s autor katz and kearney 2008 this increase in cross sectional inequality has largely been interpreted as a growing disparity in permanent incomes between those with high incomes and those with low incomes however growing inequality could equally well be a result of growing income instability if workers experience increasingly large fluctuations in earnings from year to year this would also increase the measured inequality of earnings from year to year for example if everyone maintained the same level of permanent income but some experienced a 500 increase in their income in the first year and then a reversal to 500 below their permanent incomes in the following year while an equal number experienced the opposite a drop in income followed by an offsetting rise measured inequality would rise though nothing would have happened to the dispersion of permanent incomes while this example is an extreme one it points to the fact that the large rise in earnings inequality between the 1970s and the 1990s could reflect either a rise in disparity of permanent incomes a rise in earnings instability or some portion of both without longitudinal data it is impossible to distinguish between these two very different explanations for increased cross sectional measures of inequality in this paper we provide longitudinal measures that separate changes in income inequality into changes that permanently change income to new levels and those that only reflect transitory change we refer to the latter as changes in income instability and discuss how the instability of individual earnings and family income in the united states has evolved over the last quarter century

the limits of political compromise debt ceilings and political turnover we study the desirability of limits on the public debt and of political turnover in an economy where incumbents have an incentive to set public expenditures above the socially optimal level due to rent seeking motives parties alternate in office and cannot commit to future policies but they can forge a political compromise where each party curbs excessive spending when in office if it expects future governments to do the same in contrast to the received literature we find that strict limits on government borrowing can exacerbate political economy distortions by making a political compromise unsustainable this tends to happen when political turnover is limited conversely a tight limit on the public debt fosters a compromise that yields the efficient outcome if political turnover is vigorous our analysis thus suggests that to sustain good economic policies a society needs to restrict either the extent of political turnover or the ability of governments to issue debt but not both

a contribution to the theory of optimal utilitarian income taxation abstract the paper provides a new formulation of the mirrlees seade theorem on the positivity of the optimal marginal income tax under weaker assumptions and in a more general model the formulation of the theorem is independent of whether the model involves finitely many types or a continuous type distribution the formal argument makes the underlying logic transparent relating the mathematics to the economics and showing precisely how each assumption enters the analysis

cyclical dynamics in idiosyncratic labor market risk is individual labor income more risky in recessions this is a difficult question to answer because existing panel data sets are so short to address this problem we develop a generalized method of moments estimator that conditions on the macroeconomic history that each member of the panel has experienced variation in the cross sectional variance between households with differing macroeconomic histories allows us to incorporate business cycle information dating back to 1930 even though our data do not begin until 1968 we implement this estimator using household level labor earnings data from the panel study of income dynamics we estimate that idiosyncratic risk is i highly persistent with an annual autocorrelation coefficient of 0 95 and ii strongly countercyclical with a conditional standard deviation that increases by 75 percent from 0 12 to 0 21 as the macroeconomy moves from peak to trough

using elasticities to derive optimal income tax rates this paper derives optimal income tax formulas using compensated and uncompensated elasticities of earnings with respect to tax rates a simple formula for the high income optimal tax rate is obtained as a function of these elasticities and the thickness of the top tail of the income distribution in the general non linear income tax problem this method using elasticities shows precisely how the different economic effects come into play and which are the key relevant parameters in the optimal income tax formulas of mirrlees the optimal non linear tax rate formulas are expressed in terms of elasticities and the shape of the income distribution these formulas are implemented numerically using empirical earning distributions and a range of realistic elasticity parameters

an economic model of representative democracy this paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office the approach has a number of attractive features first it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by as well as of the people second the model is analytically tractable being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally third it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy

micro targeting and polarization abstract this paper connects the rise in polarization to changes in media technology which allow for higher precision in the advertising strategy of candidates candidates place ads in media outlets whose audiences differ in ideology and size we develop the concept of media centrality which takes into account differences in the media network and in ideology media centrality leads to a simple characterization of both the optimal targeting strategy and policy we show that generally a more fragmented media landscape leads to an increase in polarization

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

the nature of precautionary wealth abstract this paper uses the panel study of income dynamics to provide some of the first direct evidence that wealth is systematically higher for consumers with predictably greater income uncertainty however the apparent pattern of precautionary wealth is not consistent with a standard parameterization of the life cucle model in which consumers are patient enough to begin saving for retirement early in life wealth is estimated to be far less sensitive to uncertainty than implied by that model instead our results suggest that over most of their working life time consumers behave in accordance with the buffer stock models of saving described in carroll 1992 1997 or deaton 1991 in which consumers hold wealth principally to insulate consumption against near term fluctuations in income

effectiveness of electoral systems for reducing government corruption a game theoretic analysis abstract a theoretical model is developed for predicting the relative effectiveness of different electoral systems for reducing government corruption we consider voting games in which parties with known corruption levels and known positions on a major policy question compete for legislative seats we find that approval voting and proportional representation are fully effective in the sense that all equilibria exclude corrupt parties from legislative seats plurality voting is partly effective in the sense that there always exist some equilibria that exclude corrupt parties borda voting is ineffective because for some political situations no equilibria can guarantee the exclusion of corrupt parties journal of economic literature classification number d72

voting over income taxation abstract a major problem of the positive theory of income taxation is to explain why statutory income tax schedules in practice are marginal rate progressive while it is commonly believed that this is but a simple consequence of the fact that the number of relatively poor voters exceeds that of richer voters in general putting this contention in a voting equilibrium context is not a trivial task we do this here in the context of nonlinear taxation and attempt to provide a formal argument in support of this heuristic claim we first establish the existence of mixed strategy equilibria and identify certain cases in which marginal rate progressive taxes are chosen almost surely by the political parties unfortunately we also find that if the tax policy space is not artificially constrained the support of at least one equilibrium cannot be contained within the set of marginal rate progressive taxes

valence politics and equilibrium in spatial election models spatial models of two party or two candidatecompetition almost never have pure strategy nashequilibria when the issue space has more than onedimension this paper shows that the introduction ofvalence issues can create conditions where equilibriaexist even in a multidimensional setting we derivesufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria and characterize the spatial locations of twocompeting parties or candidates when such equilibriaexist the party with the advantage on the valencedimension will generally take a moderate position onthe positional issues we consider the implications ofthese results for public perceptions of the parties incumbency advantages and realigning elections

income inequality and colonialism this paper proposes that colonialism is a major explanation behind today s differences in income inequality across countries we argue that income inequality has been higher in the colonies where the percentage of european settlers to total population was higher as long as europeans remained a minority the countries where europeans became the majority of the population did not suffer from high inequality these initial differences continue to hold today the empirical evidence we provide strongly supports our thesis

inequality in landownership the emergence of human capital promoting institutions and the great divergence this paper suggests that inequality in the distribution of landownership adversely affected the emergence of human capital promoting institutions e g public schooling and thus the pace and the nature of the transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy contributing to the emergence of the great divergence in income per capita across countries the prediction of the theory regarding the adverse effect of the concentration of landownership on education expenditure is established empirically based on evidence from the beginning of the 20th century in the u s

income taxation and the diversity of consumer goods a political economy approach after tax income inequality has risen since the mid 1990s as increases in market income inequality have not been offset by greater fiscal redistribution we argue that the substantial increase in the diversity of consumer goods has mitigated mounting political pressures for redistribution within a probabilistic voting framework we demonstrate that if the share of diversified goods in the consumption bundle increases sufficiently with income then an increase in goods diversity can reduce the political equilibrium tax rate focusing on oecd countries we find empirical support for both the model s micro political foundations and the implied relation between goods diversity and fiscal policy outcomes

institutions and agricultural productivity in sub saharan africa agricultural productivity in 41 sub saharan africa ssa countries from 1960 to 1999 is examined by estimating a semi nonparametric fourier production frontier over the four decades the estimated rate of productivity change was 0 83 per year although the average rate from 1985 99 was a strong 1 90 per year former uk colonies exhibited significantly higher productivity gains than others while liberia and countries that had been colonies of portugal or belgium exhibited net reductions in productivity we measure a significant reduction in productivity during political conflicts and wars and a significant increase in productivity among those countries with higher levels of political rights and civil liberties

for better for worse intrahousehold risk sharing over the business cycle abstract marriage allows couples to diversify labor income risks and dynamically coordinate labor supply decisions in response to shocks this paper argues that these risk sharing benefits of marriage are countercyclical husbands and wives income changes are more positively correlated when the economy is growing rapidly as a result while individuals face more idiosyncratic income risk in bad times than in good households do not i exploit variation in the cross sectional covariance of husbands and wives incomes to infer the covariance of past income changes couples with marriages spanning periods of greater economic expansion have more positively correlated incomes in the cross section

the provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives politicians who care about the spoils of office may underprovide a public good because its benefits cannot be targeted to voters as easily as pork barrel spending we compare a winner take all system where all the spoils go to the winner to a proportional system where the spoils of office are split among candidates proportionally to their share of the vote in a winner take all system the public good is provided less often than in a proportional system when the public good is particularly desirable we then consider the electoral college system and show that it is particularly subject to this inefficiency

incentives to cultivate favored minorities under alternative electoral systems a simple model is used to compare under different electoral systems the incentives for candidates to create inequalities among otherwise homogeneous voters by making campaign promises that favor small groups rather than appealing equally to all voters in this game model each candidate generates offers for voters independently out of a distribution that is chosen by the candidate subject only to the constraints that offers must be nonnegative and have mean 1 symmetric equilibria with sincere voting are analyzed for two candidate elections and for multicandidate elections under rank scoring rules approval voting and single transferable vote voting rules that can guarantee representation for minorities in multiseat elections generate in this model the most severely unequal campaign promises

does unemployment insurance crowd out spousal labor supply previous research on unemployment insurance ui has emphasized the program s effect on individual search behavior this state contingent income may also reduce the labor supply of family members during the unemployment spell we investigate this question within the context of wives labor supply responses to their husbands unemployment spells we find strong crowdout of this form of family self insurance our estimates imply that for each dollar of ui receipt wives earn up to 73 cents less the reduction in spousal hours of work is over 40 as large as previous estimates of the effect of ui on search time of husbands

historical legacies a model linking africa s past to its current underdevelopment abstract recent studies have found evidence linking africa s current under development to colonial rule and the slave trade given that these events ended long ago why do they continue to matter today i develop a model exhibiting path dependence which provides one explanation for why these past events may have lasting impacts the model has multiple equilibria one equilibrium with secure property rights and a high level of production and others with insecure property rights and low levels of production i show that external extraction when severe enough causes a society initially in the high production equilibrium to move to a low production equilibrium because of the stability of low production equilibria the society remains trapped in this suboptimal equilibrium even after the period of external extraction ends the model provides one explanation why africa s past events continue to matter today

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

politics institutions and trade lessons of the interwar era recent studies cast doubt on the value added of international trade agreements and institutions using a new data set that consists of about 35 000 observations on the trade of fifty four nations between 1919 and 1938 we examine whether this skepticism also applies to the infamous interwar trade blocs traditional historical accounts attribute to them a large drop in international trade and a rise in the political tensions that would later erupt in world war ii in this study we show that no bloc raised trade among its members as a whole or decreased trade between members and nonmembers however our findings are not wholly consistent with the skepticism recent studies express we argue that conflicts of interest among the great powers encouraged the emergence of the bloc system and also gave rise to intrabloc trade shifts consistent with the political interests of their great power hubs the political military alliances these conflicts created also reduced trade between their signatories and we argue more generally that the causal chain runs from politics to trade as a result measuring only the effect of agreements and institutions on aggregate trade between their members can generate inaccurate estimates of their value added

international migration and the role of institutions we study the determinants of international migration with special attention to the role of institutional factors other than economic and demographic fundamentals we evaluate the impact of political institutions and of those institutions specifically targeted at attracting migrants for a dataset on 19th century migration we find that economic and demographic differentials play a major role but that the quality of institutions also matter we produce evidence that both political and migration institutions represent significant factors of attraction even after controlling for their potential endogeneity through a set of instruments exploiting colonial history and the institutions inherited from the past

did colonization matter for growth an empirical exploration into the historical causes of africa s underdevelopment we investigate the impact of 20th century european colonization on growth we 5nd that colonial heritage as measured by the identity of the metropolitan ruler and by the degree of economic penetration matters for the heterogeneity of growth performances in africa colonial indicators are correlated with economic and sociopolitical variables that are commonly employed to explain growth and there are growth gains from decolonization colonial indicators also add signi5cant explanatory power to worldwide growth regressions and are correlated with the sub saharan africa and the latin america dummies c

a theory of infrastructure led development abstract this paper proposes a theory of long run development based on public infrastructure as the engine of growth the government in addition to investing in infrastructure spends on health services which in turn raise labor productivity and lower the rate of time preference infrastructure affects the production of both commodities and health services as a result of network effects the degree of efficiency of infrastructure is nonlinearly related to the stock of public capital itself provided that governance is adequate enough to ensure a sufficient degree of efficiency of public investment an increase in the share of spending on infrastructure financed by a cut in unproductive expenditure or foreign grants may facilitate the shift from a low growth equilibrium characterized by low productivity and low savings to a high growth steady state

the long term effects of africa s slave trades can part of africa s current underdevelopment be explained by its slave trades to explore this question i use data from shipping records and historical documents reporting slave ethnicities to construct estimates of the number of slaves exported from each country during africa s slave trades i find a robust negative relationship between the number of slaves exported from a country and current economic performance to better understand if the relationship is causal i examine the historical evidence on selection into the slave trades and use instrumental variables together the evidence suggests that the slave trades have had an adverse effect on economic development

colonialism and modern income islands as natural experiments abstract using a new database of islands throughout the atlantic pacific and indian oceans we find a robust positive relationship between the number of years spent as a european colony and current gdp per capita we argue that the nature of discovery and colonization of islands provides random variation in the length and type of colonial experience we instrument for length of colonization using variation in prevailing wind patterns we argue that wind speed and direction had a significant effect on historical colonial rule but do not have a direct effect on gdp today the data also suggest that years as a colony after 1700 are more beneficial than earlier years we also find a discernable pecking order among the colonial powers with years under u s british french and dutch rule having more beneficial effects than spanish or portuguese rule our finding of a strong connection between modern income and years of colonization is conditional on being colonized at all since each of the islands in our da

a reduced form optimal nonlinear income tax problem abstract for a finite population with quasilinear preferences it is shown how mirrlees optimal nonlinear income tax problem can be simplified to a reduced form problem involving only the allocation of the consumption good this result is a finite version of a proposition established in the continuum by s lollivier and j c rochet

a drawback of electoral competition in most major democracies there are very few parties compared to the number of possible policy positions held by voters we provide an efficiency rationale for why it might be appropriate to limit the proliferation of parties in our model the larger the number of parties the greater the inefficiency of the outcome of electoral competition the reason is that when the number of parties increases electoral incentives push each party to focus its electoral promises on a narrower constituency and then special interest policies replace more efficient policies that have diffuse benefits the analysis provides a possible explanation for the existence of institutional features that limit the extent of electoral competition thresholds of exclusion runoff electoral systems and majoritarian two party political systems jel d82 l15

aid poverty reduction and the new conditionality the paper examines the effect of aid on poverty rather than on economic growth we devise a pro poor public expenditure index and present evidence that together with inequality and corruption this is a key determinant of the aid s poverty leverage after presenting empirical evidence which suggests a positive leverage of aid donors on pro poor expenditure we argue for the development of conditionality in a new form which gives greater flexibility to donors in punishing slippage on previous commitments and keys aid disbursements to performance in respect of policy variables which governments can influence in a pro poor direction

how important is intra household risk sharing for savings and labor supply abstract while it is recognized that the family is a risk sharing institution little is known about the quantitative effects of this source of insurance on savings and labor supply in this paper we present a model where workers females and males are subject to idiosyncratic employment risk and where capital markets are incomplete a household is formed by a female and a male who decide on consumption savings and labor supplies in a calibrated version of our model we find that intra household risk sharing has its largest impact among wealth poor households while the wealth rich use mainly savings to smooth consumption across unemployment spells wealth poor households rely on spousal labor supply for instance for low wealth households average hours worked by wives of unemployed husbands are 8 higher than those worked by wives of employed husbands this response in wives hours makes up 9 of lost family income we also study consumption losses upon an unemployment spell precautionary savings and the crowding out effects of the public unemployment insurance program on the extent of risk sharing within the household

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

electoral rules and corruption is corruption systematically related to electoral rules recent theoretical work suggests a positive answer but little is known about the data we try to address this lacuna by relating corruption to different features of the electoral system in a sample of about eighty democracies in the 1990s we exploit the cross country variation in the data as well as the time variation arising from recent episodes of electoral reform the evidence is consistent with the theoretical priors larger voting districts and thus lower barriers to entry are associated with less corruption whereas larger shares of candidates elected from party lists and thus less individual accountability are associated with more corruption individual accountability appears to be most strongly tied to personal ballots in plurality rule elections even though open party lists also seem to have some effect because different aspects roughly offset each other a switch from strictly proportional to strictly majoritarian elections only has a small negative effect on corruption jel e62 h3

a model of political competition with citizen candidates the authors develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates a winner implements her favorite policy the equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of running and positively on the benefits of winning for some parameter values all equilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates whose positions are distinct two candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule than under a runoff system the candidates positions are less differentiated under a runoff system there exist equilibria under both systems in which some candidates have no chance of winning

unemployment marriage and divorce in this paper we examine whether the business cycle plays a role in marriage and divorce we use data on spain since the differences between recession and expansion periods across regions are quite pronounced in that country we find that the unemployment rate is negatively associated with the marriage rate pointing to a pro cyclical evolution of marriage however the response of the divorce rate to the business cycle is mixed results show the existence of different patterns depending on geography divorce rates in coastal regions are pro cyclical while in inland regions divorces react to unemployment in a counter cyclical way

a dynamic theory of public spending taxation and debt this paper presents a dynamic political economy theory of public spending taxation and debt policy choices are made by a legislature consisting of representatives elected by geographically defined districts the legislature can raise revenues via a distortionary income tax and by borrowing these revenues can be used tofinance a national public good and district specific transfers interpreted as pork barrel spending the value of the public good is stochastic reflecting shocks such as wars or natural disasters in equilibrium policy making cycles between two distinct regimes business as usual in which legislators bargain over the allocation of pork and responsible policy making in which policies maximize the collective good transitions between the two regimes are brought about by shocks in the value of the public good in the long run equilibrium tax rates are too high and too volatile public good provision is too low and debt levels are too high in some environments a balanced budget requirement can improve citizen welfare

voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules abstract majority voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules proposed by a continuum of individuals who have quasilinear in consumption preferences is considered roell 2012 has shown that individual preferences over these schedules are single peaked in this article a complete characterization of selfishly optimal schedules is provided each selfishly optimal schedule has a bunching region in a neighborhood of the proposer s skill type coincides with the maxi max schedule below this region and coincides with the maxi min schedule above it using techniques introduced by vincent and mason 1967 the bunching region is identified by solving an unconstrained optimization problem information about the optimal schedules is used to provide a relatively simple proof of single peakedness the condorcet winning tax schedule features marginal tax rates that are negative resp positive on the maxi max resp maxi min part of the schedule except at the endpoints of the skill distribution where they are zero

the politics of progressive income taxation with incentive effects this paper studies majority voting over quadratic taxation and investigates under which conditions marginal progressivity emerges as a voting outcome in our model with endogenous income there is no majority condorcet winning tax schedule we then investigate less demanding political equilibrium concepts in order to see under which conditions the set of equilibria is composed only of progressive tax functions we follow three strategies i reduction of the policy space to the tax functions that are ideal for some voter ii elimination of weakly dominated strategies and the use of mixed strategies in a standard downsian two party competition game iii assumption that political parties interact repeatedly and care about the size of their majority although each approach captures a different aspect of political behavior they point to the same simulation based conclusion that progressivity is more likely to emerge for most distributions of abilities and that it is actually the only possible voting outcome if the distribution is sufficiently concentrated at the middle

income and consumption a micro semistructural analysis with pervasive heterogeneity we develop a model of consumption and income that allows for pervasive heterogeneity in the parameters of both processes introducing codependence between household income parameters and preference

a model of candidate location when one candidate has a valence advantage that under some fairly weak assumptions for all levels of the valence advantage the advantaged candidate chooses a more moderate position than the disadvantaged candidate empirical studies of congressional elections by fiorina 1973 and ansolabehere snyder and stewart 2001 support this result d owns 1957 seminal work presents a puzzle for scholars of u s elections why do candidates not converge to the median voter one of the best explanations is that the candidates themselves have ideological preferences as calvert 1985 and wittman 1977 1983 have shown when candidates have such preferences and they are sufficiently uncertain about the preferences of the median voter then they do not converge although they may moderate their positions from their ideal point the basic version of the calvert wittman model however does not account for another basic fact of u s elections often one of the candidates has an advantage due to a nonpolicy factor such as incumbency greater campaign funds better name recognition superior charisma superior intelligence and so on stokes has dubbed such factors valence factors and he has noted their importance in u s elections stokes 1963 1992 1 in this article i extend the basic calvert wittman model by giving one candidate a valence advantage over the other i show that if the valence characteristics of the candidates are approximately equal then when a candidate s valence advantage increases this causes her to move toward the

worker displacement and the added worker effect this article examines the added worker effect which is the labor supply response of wives to their husbands job losses unlike past studies which focused on the husbands current unemployment status this article analyzes wives responses before and after job losses to examine the life cycle labor supply adjustments using panel study of income dynamics data reveals small predisplacement effects and large persistent postdisplacement effects the timing of the responses differs with type of displacement possibly because of differences in the information acquired before job loss long run labor supply increases compensate for over 25 of the husbands lost income

policy divergence in multicandidate probabilistic spatial voting existing models of multicandidate spatial competition with probabilistic voting typically predict a high degree of policy convergence yet in actual elections candidates advocate quite divergent sets of policies what accounts for this disparity between theory and empirical observation i introduce two variations on the basic probabilistic vote model which may account for candidate policy divergence 1 a model which incorporates candidate specific variables so that candidates may enjoy nonpolicy related electoral advantages or disadvantages 2 a model which allows nonzero correlations between the random terms associated with voters candidate utilities thereby capturing situations where voters view two or more candidates as similar on nonpolicy grounds i report candidate equilibrium analyses for each model which show far greater policy divergence than exists under the standard probabilistic vote model i then analyze the strategic logic which underlies these results

why does capital flow to rich states abstract the magnitude and the direction of net international capital flows do not fit neoclassical models the fifty u s states comprise an integrated capital market with very low barriers to cap

redistributive politics with distortionary taxation abstract this paper proposes a first step towards a positive theory of tax instruments we present a model of redistributive politics that extends those of myerson r myerson incentives to cultivate minorities under alternative electoral systems amer polit sci rev 87 1993 856 869 and lizzeri and persico a lizzeri n persico the provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives amer econ rev 91 2001 225 239 two politicians compete in terms of targeted redistributive promises financed through distortionary taxes we solve for the case of both targetable and non targetable taxes we prove that there is an imperfect efficiency targetability trade off on the tax side politicians prefer targetable taxes over non targetable ones especially when the latter are less efficient yet targetable taxation is always used even when it is very inefficient compared to non targetable taxes

explaining african economic performance africa has had slow growth and a massive exodus of capital in many respects it has been the most capital hostile region we review and interpret the aggregate level and microeconomic literatures to identify the key explanations for this performance there is a reasonable correspondence of the two sets of evidence pointing to four factors as being important these are a lack of openness to international trade a high risk environment a low level of social capital and poor infrastructure these problems are to a substantial extent attributable to government behaviour and the paper includes a review of the political economy literature which addresses that behaviour

sources of inefficiency in a representative democracy a dynamic analysis this paper studies the efficiency of policy choice in representative democracies it extends the citizen candidate model of democratic policy making to a dynamic environment equilibrium policy choices are shown to be efficient in the sense that in each period conditional on future policies being selected through the democratic process there exists no alternative current policy choices which can raise the expected utilities of all citizens however policies that would be declared efficient by standard economic criteria are not necessarily adopted in political equilibrium the paper argues that these divergencies are legitimately viewed as politicalfailures

distributive politics and electoral competition abstract within the framework of pure redistribution dividing one unit of a homo geneous good among identical individuals the paper analyses the redistribution that arises from downsian two party electoral competition it appears that the strategic behavior of vote maximizing parties leads them to propose divisions which are not far from the egalitarian one journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d63 d72

why has africa grown slowly we distinguish between policy and destiny explanations of africa s slow growth during the past three decades policies were poor high export taxation and inefficient public service delivery and destiny was adverse landlocked tropical locations and terms of trade deterioration during the 1990s africa s economic policies improved although with considerable variation both between countries and between policies trade and exchange rate policies improved much more than service delivery thus the differing explanations of past slow growth imply different predictions for growth in the coming decade we argue that poor public economic services are likely to be the binding constraint

state capacity and repression a model of colonial rule abstract state capacity in colonial regimes can have spillover effects on the welfare of citizens if the colonizer is removed this work shows that when spillovers are positive investments in state capacity and repression by the colonizer are strategic complements the colonizer needs a larger repression when state capacity is high because the latter increases the incentives of the colonized to rebel therefore determinants of investment in repression such as geographic factors or idiosyncratic features of the colonizer can affect state capacity this work contributes to explain the heterogeneous levels of state capacity in non settler colonies and has policy implications for present autocratic regimes

colonial legacies and economic growth much of the work on colonialism has been theoretical or anecdotal in this paper i close the gap between the literature on development and new growth theory by testing the effect of colonization on subsequent growth and development in a sample of 63 ex colonial states from 1961 1990 i find that colonies that were held for longer periods of time than other countries tend to perform better on average after independence finally i show that the level of education at the time of independence can help to explain much of the development gap between the former british and french colonies in africa

economic institutions and comparative economic development a post colonial perspective summary existing literature suggests that either colonial settlement conditions or the identity of colonizer were influential in shaping the post colonial institutional environment which in turn has impacted long run economic development these two potential identification strategies have been treated as substitutes we argue that the two factors should instead be treated as complementary and develop an alternative and unified iv approach that simultaneously accounts for both settlement conditions and colonizer identity to estimate the potential causal impact of a broad cluster of economic institutions on log real gdp per capita for a sample of former colonies using population density in 1500 as a proxy for settlement conditions we find that the impact of settlement conditions on institutional development is much stronger among former british colonies than colonies of the other major european colonizers conditioning on several geographic factors and ethno linguistic fractionalization our baseline 2sls estimates suggest that a standard deviation increase in economic institutions is associated with a three fourth standard deviation increase in economic development our results are robust to a number of additional control variables country subsample exclusions and alternative measures of institutions gdp and colonizer classifications we also find evidence that geography exerts both an indirect and direct effect on economic development

changes in the distribution of earnings volatility recent research has documented a rise in the volatility of individual labor earnings in the united states since 1970 existing measures of this trend abstract from within group latent heterogeneity effectively estimating an increase in average volatility for observable groups we decompose this average and find no systematic rise in volatility for the vast majority of individuals increasing average volatility has been driven almost entirely by rising earnings volatility of those with the most volatile earnings identified ex ante by large past earnings changes we characterize dynamics of the volatility distribution with a nonparametric bayesian stochastic volatility model from jensen and shore 2011

political competition and mirrleesian income taxation a first pass we study downsian competition in a mirrleesian model of income taxation the competing politicians may dier in competence if politicians engage in vote share maximization the less competent politician s policy proposals are attractive to the minority of rich agents whereas those of the competent politician are attractive to the majority of poor agents the less competent politician wins with positive probability which gives rise to a political failure in the sense of besley and coate 1998 political failures are avoided if politicians maximize winning probabilities nevertheless the two equilibria cannot be pareto ranked the minority may be better o under vote share maximization

political economy of mechanisms we study the optimal mirrlees taxation problem in a dynamic economy in contrast to the standard approach where the taxation mechanism is operated by a benevolent planner with full commitment power we focus on economies in which policy decisions are made by self interested politicians who cannot commit to policies the society controls politicians using elections we show that the provision of incentives to politicians can be partly separated from redistribution across agents and that political economy constraints can be modeled as introducing additional aggregate distortions in the dynamic mirrlees problem we provide conditions under which the political economy distortions persist or disappear in the long run if the politicians are as patient as the agents the best sustainable mechanism leads to an asymptotic allocation where the aggregate distortions arising from political economy disappear in contrast when politicians are less patient than the citizens positive aggregate labor and capital taxes remain even asymptotically we conclude by providing a brief comparison of centralized

how do electoral systems affect fiscal policy evidence from cantonal parliaments 1890 2000 using a new data set on swiss cantons since 1890 we analyze how the adoption of proportional representation affects fiscal policy in line with economic theory we show that proportional systems shift spending toward broad goods like education and welfare benefits but decrease spending on geographically targetable goods like roads we find little evidence that proportional representation increases the overall size of government an analysis of the underlying theoretical mechanisms reveals that proportional representation increases electoral turnout left wing representation and political fragmentation these changes in political representation explain a substantial share of the rise in education spending but a small share of the rise in welfare spending or the decline in road expenditures jel h4 h11 i38

income variance dynamics and heterogeneity recent theoretical work has shown the importance of measuring microeconomic uncertainty for models of both general and partial equilibrium under imperfect insurance in this paper the assumption of i i d income innovations used in previous empirical studies is removed and the focus of the analysis is placed on models for the conditional variance of income shocks which is related to the measure of risk emphasized by the theory we first discriminate amongst various models of earnings determination that separate income shocks into idiosyncratic transitory and permanent components we allow for education and time specific differences in the stochastic process for earnings and for measurement error the conditional variance of the income shocks is modelled as a parsimonious arch process with both observable and unobserved heterogeneity the empirical analysis is conducted on data drawn from the 1967 1992 panel study of income dynamics we find strong evidence of sizeable arch effects as well as evidence of unobserved heterogeneity in the variances

self selection and pareto efficient taxation abstract this paper analyses the set of pareto efficient tax structures the formulation of the problem as one of self selection not only shows more clearly the similarity between this problem and a number of other problems such as the optimal pricing of a monopolist which have recently been the subject of extensive research but also allows the derivation of a number of new results we establish i under fairly weak conditions randomization of tax structures is desirable ii if different individuals are not perfect substitutes for one another in production then the general equilibrium effects until now largely ignored in the literature of changes in the tax structure may be dominant in determining the optimal tax structure in particular if the relative wage of high ability and low ability individuals depends on the relative supplies of labor the optimal tax structure entails a negative marginal tax rate on the high ability individuals and a positive marginal tax rate on the low ability individuals the marnitude of which depends on the elasticity of substitution iii if individuals differ in their preferences pareto efficient taxation may entail negative marginal tax rates for high incomes while iv if wage income is stochastic the marginal tax rate at the upper end may be 100 our analysis thus makes clear that the main qualitative properties of the optimal tax structure to which earlier studies called attention are not robust to these attempts to make the theory more realistic