approximating wtp and wta for environmental goods from marginal willingness to pay functions abstract willingness to pay wtp and willingness to accept wta for a change in the quantity of an environmental good can be represented by corresponding hicksian welfare measures the paper suggests a simple method of approximating wtp and wta given the information about the marginal willingness to pay mwtp for it it demonstrates that a polynomial based on the mwtp function allows to approximate the hicksian measures which may differ considerably much better than consumer s surplus in quantity space

strategic behavior in contests comment almost by definition contests involve strategy this is especially true in contests between unevenly matched contenders in a recent article avinash dixit 1987 explored strategic commitment in contests between a favorite and an underdog the favorite is defined as the player whose chance of victory exceeds one half at the nash equilibrium an underdog s chance is less than one half dixit concludes that if the favorite has the opportunity to move first then he will overcommit effort compared with the nash equilibrium an important implication of the favorite overcommitting effort is that strategic behavior leads to greater social costs see gordon tullock 1980 the opposite holds if the underdog has the opportunity to move first this paper demonstrates that the favorite will never overcommit effort given endogenous order of moves the favorite finds it advantageous to wait until the underdog moves surprisingly the underdog s best strategy is not to wait but to make the first move throwing the first punch the equilibrium order of play is for the underdog to move before the favorite in this equilibrium one never observes overcommitment of effort consequently extending dixit s model to allow for endogenous order of moves suggests that strategic behavior in contests will lead to undercommitment compared with nash behavior

a review of wta wtp studies abstract willingness to accept wta is usually substantially higher than willingness to pay wtp these constructs have been studied for roughly 30 years and with a wide variety of goods this paper reviews those studies we find that the less the good is like an ordinary market good the higher is the ratio the ratio is highest for non market goods next highest for ordinary private goods and lowest for experiments involving forms of money a generalization of this pattern holds even when we account for differences in survey design ordinary goods have lower ratios than non ordinary ones we also find that ratios in real experiments are not significantly different from hypothetical experiments and that incentive compatible elicitation yields higher ratios

efficient methods of measuring welfare change and compensated income in terms of ordinary demand functions a utility maximizing consumer with a completely known system of ordinary demand functions q h p c is considered let p qo and p q be two arbitrary equilibrium situations the problem is to evaluate in which of the situations the utility is higher without knowing the utility function revealed preference theory tells that the ordinary demand functions which are in principle observable contain enough information to solve the problem remaining difficulties are therefore mainly computational we present how the compensated income c i c p qo and the compensated demand h p cl1 are calculated with arbitrary accuracy using only the ordinary demand system our two efficient algorithms also have interesting interpretations in terms of index numbers and consumer surplus measures

an analysis of technological change factor substitution and economies of scale in manufacturing industries in india the biases of technological change factor substitution and economies of scale in four major manufacturing industries viz cement electricity and gas cotton textiles and iron and steel in india are examined the translog cost functions are estimated using annual time series data covering the period 1960 61 to 1982 83 the study reveals that technical change has been biased towards the use of labour and materials and against the use of capital and energy in electricity and gas industries in cotton textiles the technological change has shown the opposity biases significant economies of sclae exist in the production of electricity and gas enough evidence of substitution possibilities among factors of production in all the four industries was also found

technological capabilities and industrialization abstract this paper reviews the implications for industrial strategy of recent research on technological capabilities at the firm and national levels after exploring the nature and determinants of microlevel technological development a simple framework for explaining the growth of national capabilities is set out based on the interplay of incentives capabilities and institutions each may suffer market failure and so require corrective intervention the experience of some industrializing countries is described to assess the validity of this framework it is concluded that interventions carefully and selectively applied are necessary for industrial success

optimal production with learning by doing abstract this paper characterizes optimal production over time when production cost is a decreasing function of past accumulated output when production exhibits learning by doing monopolistic competitive and socially optimal solutions are considered

the elasticity of substitution in india s manufacturing sector abstract using cross section data and the translog cost function this paper examines the substitution possibilities between capital and materials and labor and materials since raw materials might be used to overcome the bottlenecks caused by shortages of physical capital and skilled labor three significant conclusions are a since materials are substitutable for both capital and labor to a considerable extent capital and skilled labor may not be a binding constraint on growth agricultural materials expansion may substitute for these inputs and lead to expansion in the industrial sector b fixed proportion models are not warranted in india without modification and c separability tests showed that materials must be included in the production function

a positive theory of environmental quality regulation this paper demonstrates that environmental quality regulation may enhance producer wealth while simultaneously reducing an externality problem by restricting access to common property regulation not only corrects a resource misallocation but it creates a scarcity rent as well in the recent history of environmental quality the common access problem has been addressed by federal and state agencies through a standards based approach rather than through the enforcement of tradable property rights as a consequence rents from the right to use these assets have accrued to producers the data are convincing that there is a strong interplay between producers consumers and the victims of pollution each party has some influence on the outcome and one sided analysis neglects many important aspects of regulation environmental quality regulation is complicated but many of the observed perplexities are consistent with a rent seeking self interest theory of government 46 references 1 figure 7 tables

divergence in alternative hicksian welfare measures the case of revealed preference for public amenities this paper investigates the divergence between the two hicksian welfare measures of non traded amenity improvement associated with housing first the hicksian surplus measures for amenity changes are analytically developed based on explicit specification of utility structures a hedonic two stage approach is then applied to empirically show that for quantity changes in contrast to hypothetical markets divergence in real market is small the paper also analytically develops expressions for the income and substitution effects and empirically shows that for a given income effect the greater the substitution effect the smaller the divergence between the two measures copyright 2002 john wiley sons ltd

the structure of production in south korea s manufacturing sector abstract this paper estimates a model of producer behavior for south korean manufacturing that simultaneously identifies substitution elasticities and scale economies a non homothetic translog function is employed which takes on various other functional forms i e cobb douglas homothetic homogeneous as special or limiting cases four significant conclusions are a there is potential scale economies in each subsector of south korean manufacturing b the substitutabilities between factor inputs are relatively low c factor demands are price elastic d the scale economies are correlated with the factor intensity

application of sample selection model to double bounded dichotomous choice contingent valuation studies modeling households behavior with the data from a contingentvaluation cv survey is often complicated by samplenon response which can cause non response bias and sampleselection bias leading to inconsistent parameter estimates and adistorted mean willingness to pay estimate this paper reportsthe results of empirical tests for both biases using householdsurvey data in which the double bounded dichotomous choice cvquestion involved the benefit of a tap water quality improvementpolicy in korea no non response bias but sample selection bias is detected in the sample to correct for sample selection bias a sample selection model is employed the authors also discusshow failure to correct for bias may distort aggregate benefitestimates

dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders the theory of rent seeking with its origins in the observations of gordon tullock 1967 or to use jagdish bhagwati s 1982 proposed term the theory of directly unproductive profit seeking activities is concerned with the potentially adverse effects on resource allocation of incentives to cap ture and defend artificially contrived rents and transfers the scope for so cial loss proposed by the theory derives from the relation between the value of a contestable prize and the value of the resources attracted into the con test to determine the beneficiary of the prize underlying this social loss is a specification of how rational behavior by optimizing agents links the value of the prize sought to the resources expended it has been traditional to assume competitive behavior in describing the activities of lobbying and influence seeking then if some further condi tions are satisfied l the total value of the resources expended precisely equals the value of the prize sought so dissipation is complete 2 conse quently the social cost associated with contestability of a rent can be in ferred from the value of the rent itself and the detailed and hard to come by information on individual outlays made in the course of the contest be comes unnecessary by basing their analyses on competitive dissipation contributors to the rent seeking literature see the review by robert tollison 1982 have been able to presume that the observed value of a contested rent is an exact measure of the associated social cost of monopoly power or regu lation similarly in the trade theoretic literature where the rights contested are to quota premia or revenues from trade taxes krueger 1974 bhagwati

measuring welfare changes in settings with imposed quantities abstract an intuitively attractive money metric utility measure is developed which is applicable in settings where individuals receive fixed quantities of one or more goods one use of this measure is in cost benefit analyses of imposed quantity changes the approximate measures typically used are shown to be subject to relatively large approximation errors however techniques are presented which can always be used to numerically evaluate the exact welfare measure provided that one knows the uncompensated demand function s or marginal willingness to pay function s of individuals

policy reform and labour demand in branches of sri lankan manufacturing industry many policy reforms in developing countries aim to remove factor market distortions whether such reforms reduce unemployment depends partly on the substitution possibilities between labour and other factors of production this paper examines labour demand in seven branches of sri lankan manufacturing industry using data on 4 digit industrial categories over the 1990 to 1997 period the box cox transformation is used to allow for flexible and data dependent elasticities the elasticity of capital labour substitution varies widely across the branches of industry and is usually variable rather than constant the average long run own wage elasticity of labour demand for the manufacturing sector is estimated as 0 80 so factor price policy should have an important effect on labour demand in this setting

evaluation of nonmarket goods recovering unconditional preferences a new approach is proposed for the evaluation of nonmarket goods starting from a complete or incomplete conditional demand system for market goods which is observable and depends on nonmarket goods this information is not sufficient to recover the underlying preference ordering of the representative consumer the central idea is to employ additional marginal willingness to pay functions for the nonmarket goods since they can be estimated either together with the demand system or in a separate step they are less arbitrary than the assumptions or hypotheses usually made if the entire system is weakly integrable the underlying ordering and appropriate welfare measures can be derived in this article i investigate the relationship between conditional and unconditional demand systems present sufficient conditions for weak integrability and demonstrate the practicability of the procedure proposed by means of three examples

revealed preference and household production abstract the paper deals with the possibilities of recovering the underlying preference ordering from observed behavior when nonmarket goods are employed in household production the problem is relevant for the evaluation of environmental goods and for the measurement of welfare in environmental policy it is shown that preferences can be recovered if and only if a corresponding mixed demand system can be integrated this system can be derived from observable behavior and the household production functions imposed the conditions for its integrability are presented and can be checked therefore the approach suggested is operational and allows to decide whether the behavior observed and the household production functions chosen as maintained hypothesis are consistent this result is important since the evaluation of nonmarket goods in this framework crucially depends on the choice of the household production functions

transfer seeking and avoidance on the full social costs of rent seeking we would like to thank gordon tullock and an anonymous referee of this journal for their helpful comments and suggestions this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

public and private returns from joint venture research an example from agriculture public research institutions are turning increasingly to the private sector for additional financial support such a trend in the short run lessens the need for public research expenditures but may in the long run prove to be very costly to the economy as a whole this is because private funding increases the chance that the direction of research will shift so that private benefits are enhanced such a shift is especially costly if public research funds are then not forthcoming that would have the potential of producing the maximum level of benefits to the economy as a whole a case study of canadian barley research is used to illustrate this problem

the economic benefits of surface water quality improvements in developing countries a case study of davao philippines two nonmarket valuation techniques the contingent valuation method and travel cost model are used to estimate the economic value that people in davao philippines place on improving the water quality of the rivers and sea near their community the contingent valuation and travel cost estimates are very close to each other and are quite low both in absolute terms and as a percentage of household income these findings suggest that water pollution control is simply not a high priority for davao s residents and support the argument that households willingness to pay for environmental amenities such as improved water quality is low

what do income tests tell us about the gap between wta and wtp for public goods abstract theory relates the gap between wta willingness to accept compensation and wtp willingness to pay to the income elasticity of wtp it has been suggested that empirical estimates of the income elasticity of wtp can therefore be used to test whether an observed gap between wta and wtp is consistent with rational behavior we examine this issue for the case of non market public goods we identify the theoretically appropriate tests of income sensitivity and examine conditions for valid income sensitivity tests we show that income tests may provide false signals in common settings indicating an inconsistency where none exists

patent competition rent dissipation and the persistence of monopoly the role of research budgets abstract the paper investigates how patent rights can contribute to the persistence of monopoly patent competition is modelled as a dollar auction game between two firms incumbent and entrant any bid expenditure on r d in the game constitutes sunk cost whose total amount is constrained by fixed research budgets the explicit solution subgame perfect equilibrium determines who wins the patent and how the winning expenditures depend on order of play and budgets of firms the entrant can win if he moves first and has the higher budget rent may or may not be dissipated by the competition

welfare measurement in the household production framework the household production approach to consumer behavior developed from the work of gary becker william gorman and kelvin lancaster has considerable descriptive appeal in modelling the decisions of households the approach derives from the observation that households frequently purchase market goods that do not yield utility directly but are combined to produce commodity service flows which the household values thus observed behavior is determined by household production technology as well as by tastes the advantage of this distinction is that we can pose reasonable hypotheses about characteristics of technology though we rarely possess useful a priori information regarding tastes the putative advantages of the household production approach are questioned on empirical and conceptual grounds by robert pollak and michael wachter 1975 they show that jointness in production or nonconstant returns to scale cause implicit commodity prices to depend on both tastes and technology raising serious econometric difficulties in the estimation of commodity demand functions in addition since commodity prices become functions of the commodity bundle consumed the analogy to traditional demand theory breaks down joint production occurs when a good enters several production processes simultaneously or equivalently when a good in one production process also enters directly into the individual s utility function the most common example is time which provides the context for all production processes and is often associated with the production of several commodities simultaneously since joint production in the household is likely to be pervasive the critique by pollak and wachter cannot be ignored in response to the comment by william barnett pollak and wachter 1977 suggest dispensing with the notion of commodity prices and treating the demand for commodities as a function of goods prices this approach confounds tastes and technology but it eliminates the troublesome concept of commodity prices as parameters when in fact they are likely to be endogenous in this paper we show that results from positive analysis such as the critique by pollak and wachter have implications for the use of the household production framework for welfare analysis the household production function approach has had considerable appeal for measuring welfare effects of public actions in the environmental and natural resource areas gardner brown john charbonneau and michael hay elizabeth wilman yet traditional approaches to welfare measurement are frequently inapplicable we argue that welfare measurement in this framework is complicated by the difficulties of unravelling tastes and technology we extend pollak and wachter s results by demonstrating that marshallian demand functions for commodities cannot be uniquely defined thus marshallian functions cannot be used to derive exact compensated functions in the manner of jerry hausman and of george mckenzie and i f pearce nor can compensating and equivalent variation measures be bounded by marshallian consumer s surplus estimates following robert willig in fact duality results that normally allow us to move between marshallian and hicksian functions are not assistant and associate professors respectively department of agricultural and resource economics university of maryland college park md 20742 this paper is scientific article no a3404 contribution no 6476 of the maryland agricultural experiment station we wish to thank darrell hueth james opaluch v kerry smith and elizabeth wilman for comments on an earlier draft

contingent valuation techniques for assessing environmental impacts further evidence abstract this paper provides further evidence on the development and application of the iterative bidding technique used to assess environmental impacts three specific issues the hypothetical nature of the survey technique the questionnaire information structure and the bidding procedure starting point are examined theoretically and empirically to determine their effect on individual bid behavior the empirical results indicate that the importance of these influences may have been overstated in earlier studies

an econometric estimation of hicksian and marshallian elasticities in indian manufacturing the knowledge of substitution possibilities between different factors of production is essential in evaluating the impact of public policies on productivity employment industrial growth and factor intensity since the advent of flexible functional forms in the early 1970s a large number of studies have estimated the ease of factor substitution however to date most of the empirical evidence on factor substitution is based on a cost function a drawback with the cost function

axiomatic foundations of hicksian measures of welfare change abstract the aggregate hicksian measures i ev i and i cv i are characterized by three simple properties one property concerns the ranking of two states the measures are paretian a second property expresses the postulate that welfare changes are to be evaluated in money the third one deals with redistributions of incomes distributional considerations are taken into account by employing variable distributional weights i

on measuring the value of a nonmarket good using market data we use line integral theory to lay out in a more general theoretical framework the conditions under which it is possible to measure with market data the welfare effects of a change in a nonmarket good we present in detail a numerical method of measuring the value of nonmarket goods using market data under either weak neutrality or weak complementarity our numerical method is more flexible than the existing analytical method because it can be used with any well behaved marshallian demand function and can be used even when the willig condition does not hold

conflict and rent seeking success functions ratio vs difference models of relative success the rent seeking competitions studied by economists fall within a much broader category of conflict interactions that also includes military combats election campaigns industrial disputes lawsuits and sibling rivalries in the rent seeking literature each party s success pi which can be interpreted either as the probability of victory or as the proportion of the prize won has usually been taken to be a function of the ratio of the respective resource commitments alternatively however pi may instead be a function of the difference between the parties commitments to the contest the contest success function csf for the difference from is a logistic curve in which as is consistent with military experience increasing returns apply up to an inflection point at equal resource commitments a crucial flaw of the traditional ratio model is that neither onesided submission nor two sided peace between the parties can ever occur as a cournot equilibrium in contrast both of these outcomes are entirely consistent with a model in which success is a function of the difference between the parties resource commitments

on the measurement of welfare for market and nonmarket goods a numerical approach extending vartia s 1983 framework the paper presents a simple numerical approach to the measurement of welfare for market and nonmarket goods on the basis of an incomplete mixed demand system the method allows the determination of exact welfare measures it provides a flexible and well founded alternative to ad hoc methods based on consumer surplus

willingness to pay and willingness to accept how much can they differ comment i agree with the point made by edoh y amiran and daniel a hagen 2003 that there can be a substantial or even infinite divergence between the wta and wtp for a public good even where there is a nonzero elasticity of substitution between market goods and the public good provided that the indifference curves are asymptotically bounded with respect to market goods in the manner they describe this is an important point they are also correct to point out that the elasticity of substitution is a local concept whereas their asymptotic boundedness condition applies also for discrete changes my 1991 paper used a local analysis because it was following the structure of the analysis in robert d willig 1976 and alan randall and john r stoll 1980 i wanted to show that while randall and stoll appeared to extend willig s local result on wta versus wtp from price changes to changes in the quantity of a public good the relevant elasticity was in fact different and involved the substitution elasticity as well as the income elasticity i view these points by amiran and hagen as not two separate results but essentially the same result their asymptotic boundedness condition generalizes my zero elasticity of substitution condition to discrete changes the asymptotic boundedness condition can be expressed as follows assuming a bivariate utility function u x q and given a reference point x q associated with a reference utility level u u x q there exists some q q such that for all q q there exists no x such that u x q u in other words no amount of x can substitute for the reduction in public good from q to q q in the case of a zero elasticity of substitution q q but as amiran and hagen show in their theorem 1 this is unnecessarily restrictive when dealing with a discrete reduction in q furthermore their theorem 2 can be viewed as a special case of their theorem 1 in which q 0 which makes q an essential commodity it is well known in consumer theory that the wta to avoid the loss of an essential market good is infinite their theorem 2 extends this result to the case of an essential nonmarket good but as their theorem 1 shows essentialness is not necessary for an infinite wta the boundedness condition is the key and this implies a fundamental lack of substitutability between money market goods and the public good

what marshall didn t know on the twentieth century s contributions to economics some of this century s many valuable contributions to economics like macroeconomics econometrics and game theory are widely recognized however arguably equally important is the enhanced role of empirical study permitted by more abundant data and improved methods also insufficiently recognized are the increased rigor and use of applied economics in public finance regulation corporation finance etc employing abstract theory and sophisticated data analysis the striking contrast with earlier intuitively based applied economics and empirical study is illustrated comparison with marshall s principles also indicates that except for macroeconomics remarkably little space in today s texts deals with some of the rich contributions of this century what has twentieth century economics accomplished a great deal as will be shown here but the discussion needs an illuminating starting point in 1946 after arriving at the london school of economics as an entering graduate student 1 i soon found that in

consumer s surplus without apology the purpose of this paper is to settle the controversy surrounding consumer s surplus and by so doing to validate its use as a tool of welfare economics i will show that observed consumer s surplus can be rigorously utilized to estimate the unobservable compensating and equivalent variations the correct theoretical measures of the welfare impact of changes in prices and income on an individual i derive precise upper and lower bounds on the percentage errors of approximating the compensating and equivalent variations with consumer s surplus these bounds can be explicitly calculated from observable demand data and it is clear that in most applications the error of approximation will be very small in fact the error will often be overshadowed by the errors involved in estimating the demand curve the results in no way depend upon arguments about the constancy of the marginal utility of income consequently this paper supplies specific empirical criteria which can replace the apologetic caveats frequently employed by those who presently apply consumer s surplus moreover the results imply that consumer s surplus is usually a very good approximation to the appropriate welfare measures to preview below i establish the validity of these rules of thumb for a

to fight or not to fight an analysis of submission struggle and the design of contests this paper considers the players behaviour in an asymmetric two player contest when do they decide to struggle and when to subjugate analysing contest success functions it is found that two crucial prerequisites for struggle or war have to be met thus such an equilibrium is possible but restrictive if a self interested rule setter chooses the contest success function endogenously we show that one player will always subjugate applications to rent seeking and environmental regulation are discussed

approximating compensated income from ordinary demand functions abstract this paper proposes a re versible s econd or der t aylor resort approximation to compensated income from ordinary demand functions resort yields the malmquist vartia m v algorithm as a first order case using the slutsky equation resort obtains the substitution matrix and checks it for symmetry and negative semi definiteness to validate compensated income this validation procedure is an improvement over m v

substitution between production labor and other inputs in unionized and non unionized manufacturing the ease of substitution between labor and other factors of production is an important determinant of the elasticity of demand for labor and thus of the economic effects of unionism all else the same the greater the elasticity of substitution the greater is the elasticity of derived demand and the greater the displacement of labor for a given union induced wage increase in sectors where this elasticity is large unions are likely to be relatively weak and able to win only slight wage gains freeman and medoff 1981 and forthcoming or if they win large gains will have to pay a high price in terms of lost jobs in the sectors where the elasticity is small unions may be able to extract a substantial wage premium at little cost in terms of employment moreover as a simple general equilibrium model indicates the elasticity of substitution between labor and other factors in the unionized sector is a key parameter in determining the impact of the iiunion wage effect on the earnings of nonunion workers and on the efficiency of the economy johnson and mieskowski 1970 despite the importance of the elasticity of labor demand for an analysis of unionism little attention has been given to the absolute and relative magnitude of this elasticity under collective bargaining while there is some discussion of technological change and the substitution of capital and nonproduction workers for organized production workers in the institutional literature e g slichter 1941 slichter healy and livernash 1960 bok and dunlop 1970 modern econometric work provides no estimates of the relevant parameters as a result johnson and mieskowski 1970 rees 1963 lewis 1964 and others have been forced to evaluate union effects with guesstimates of the elasticities of concern in union settings this paper attempts to fill some of the gap in our knowledge by providing estimates for u s manufacturing of the constant output elasticity of demand for unionized and nonunionized production workers and of the elasticity of substitution between these workers and other inputs the analysis concentrates on what we call the relative inelasticity hypothesis which states that the demand for production workers will be more inelastic in the presence of a union for two reasons the likelihood that unions have organized and survived in sectors with low elasticities and the effects of various contract provisions on the ability of management to substitute other factors for production labor the study is divided into four sections section i develops the rationale for the relative inelasticity hypothesis and describes the nature of the empirical analysis conducted to test its validity the second section uses a 1972 state by 2 digit standard industrial classification sic industry data file for manufacturing to estimate the elasticity of substitution between production labor and both nonproduction labor and capital in the union and nonunion sectors of u s manufacturing industries section iii provides estimates based on a 1968 72 sample of manufacturing establishments of the elasticity of substitution between production and nonproduction labor the only two inputs for which information is available the final section briefly summarizes the findings and discusses their implications for understanding the impact of trade unionism on the u s economy to preview the ensuing discussion our main conclusion is substitution between production labor and other inputs is generally lower in union received for publication march 6 1978 revision accepted for publication august 17 1981 both authors are with harvard university and the national bureau of economic research supported by u s department of labor grant no j 9 m 6 0094 national science foundation grant no apt77 16279 and the national bureau of economic research under its program of research on labor economics we are especially grateful to jane mather for her invaluable assistance on this project and to greg bialecki charles brown gary chamberlain kathy coons jon fay martin van denburgh and lori wilson for their significant contributions the study has not been reviewed by the board of directors of the national bureau

despairing over disparities explaining the difference between willingness to pay and willingness to accept this paper examines the three major explanations for the disparity between willingness to pay wtp and willingness to accept wta observed in contingent value surveys and laboratory experiments a belief that the results must be biased in some fashion hanemann s 1991 substitutes hypothesis and the loss aversion model proposed by tversky and kahneman 1991 starting from the assumption that individuals make utility maximizing choices we develop structural equations that yield parametric tests of the hypotheses within a single non experimental framework the approach is flexible enough to incorporate a variety of functional form and distributional assumptions and can be applied to either data from either open ended bids or dichotomous choice questions the usefulness of the approach is demonstrated using data from a survey that asked both wtp and wta questions the results provide weak support for loss aversion

analysing rationing policies drought and its effects on urban users welfare analysing rationing policies during drought the aim of this paper is to study the impact on consumers of rationing policies implemented during water shortages water scarcity gives rise to the need for rationing and various methods including supply cutoffs can be used a model is devised to quantify the welfare losses associated with qualitive and quantitive restrictions based on virtual prices and using the consumer surplus as a welfare measurement welfare variations for different users have been calculated to achieve the aim information relative to seville spain has been used analysing the drought period that took place in the first half of the 1990s it has been possible to observe the main source that led to welfare losses for each kind of user

on the choice of production functions the case of us manufacturing industries a new ces bairam 1989 1991 production function that has the cobb douglas and leontief functions as special cases is considered and estimated for the nondurable goods and durable goods sectors in us manufacturing the translog and ces functions cannot be estimated properly due to multicollinearity whereas the cobb douglas and new ces functions yield coefficients that have the correct sign and are significant at the 1 or 5 level both sectors exhibited increasing returns to scale though the nondurable goods sector is more efficient than the other sector although the cobb douglas function cannot be rejected the new ces functions has the maximized value of the log likelihood function and the advantage that the variable output elasticity with respect to inputs can be tested

a review article the case against the use of the sum of compensating variations in cost benefit analysis this paper presents a case against the use of the sum of compensating varia tions as a cost benefit test we argue that 1 the ethical judginents implied by the test are not defensible 2 positive sums of compensating variations occur without potential pareto improvements resulting in social preference reversals without simultaneous scitovsky re versals 3 when lump sum transfers are feasible a positive sum of compensating variations is necessary but not sufficient for a potential pareto improvement 4 in order to eliminate preference reversals and intransitivities all households must have almost identical quasi homothetic preferences a condition that is not satisfied in real economies