a comparative study of efficiency in european banking this paper investigates whether there has been an improvement in and convergence of productive efficiency across european banking markets since the creation of the single internal market using efficiency measures derived from dea estimation the determinants of european bank efficiency are evaluated using the tobit regression model approach the established literature on modelling the determinants of bank efficiency is then extended by recognizing the problem of the inherent dependency of dea efficiency scores when used in regression analysis to overcome the dependency problem a bootstrapping technique is applied overall the results suggest that since the eu s single market programme there has been a small improvement in bank efficiency levels although there is little evidence to suggest that these have converged the results also suggest that inference on the determinants of bank efficiency drawn from non bootstrapped regression analysis may be biased and misleading

auction design for the efficient allocation of service capacity under congestion we consider the problem of efficiently allocating the capacity of a number of service facilities prone to congestion to a set of users with private information regarding their willingness to pay for different combinations of throughput versus latency auction mechanisms can be used to schedule the service capacity of available facilities however the interdependency of users valuations implies that simple uniform price adjustment processes e g tatonnement either fail to effectively clear or are subject to strategic manipulation in this paper we propose an iterative auction design and show that i it is efficient i e the auction closes with the allocation of service that maximizes the social welfare and ii it is strategy proof that is it is a dominant strategy for users to truthfully reveal their demand for service capacity throughout the auction

multi item vickrey dutch auctions descending price auctions are adopted for goods that must be sold quickly and in private values environments for instance in flower fish and tobacco auctions in this paper we introduce ex post efficient descending auctions for two environments multiple non identical items and buyers with unit demand valuations and multiple identical items and buyers with non increasing marginal values our auctions are designed using the notion of universal competitive equilibrium uce prices and they terminate with uce prices from which the vickrey payments can be determined for the unit demand setting our auction maintains linear and anonymous prices for the homogeneous items setting our auction maintains a single price and adopts ausubel s notion of clinching to compute the final payments dynamically the auctions support truthful bidding in an ex post nash equilibrium and terminate with an ex post efficient allocation in simulation we illustrate the speed and elicitation advantages of these auctions over their ascending price counterparts

determinants of banks nerlovian economic efficiency a dea bootstrap approach this study aims to evaluate the nerlovian economic efficiency of taiwanese commercial banks and its determinants by assuming the presence of an imperfectly competitive market using a two stage esti

on minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts the literature on ascending combinatorial auctions yields conflicting insights regarding the possibility to implement the vickrey payoffs for general valuations we introduce the class of minimal ascending auctions a class which allows one to disconnect the final payments from the final bids but which prohibits the raising of the price vector of a provisionally winning bidder we first establish the impossibility of implementing the vickrey payoffs for general valuations second we propose a minimal ascending auction that yields a bidder optimal competitive equilibrium thanks to payment discounts

a stochastic dea study of hotel efficiency this current study is the first to apply stochastic data envelopment analysis sdea approach to assess the efficiency of hotels the determinants of hotel efficiency were also investigated employing the tobit regression model approach the sdea results show that the sdea efficiency measures are higher than the deterministic ones and the greater the stochastic variability of outputs the closer the envelope moves successively to any given observation and the efficiency score approaches one the optimal solution to sdea involves the presence of some buffer slack of all outputs in applications involving practice production situation such buffer slack can be interpreted as the firms need to hold inventory excess capacity and organizational slack against stochastic uncertainty of market environment our results also indicate that resort hotels achieve better efficiency than those in metropolitan areas and operating as part of a chain is not the main determinant of the efficiency of international touri

revenue and efficiency in multi unit uniform price auctions abstract this paper analyzes efficiency in a uniform price multi unit auction with a positive reservation price i demonstrate that the reservation price is an important policy tool that may increase efficiency or welfare in multi unit uniform price auctions i show that the higher the reservation price is the higher is the seller s revenue and the higher is the efficiency of a final allocation of units that could be attained in a multi unit uniform price auction the reservation price increases the bidder s equilibrium strategy in a specific way that is inherent to the uniform price auction thus the reservation price effect on efficiency is in contrast to other auction formats e g the reservation price decreases efficiency in the vickrey auction and single unit auctions with symmetric bidders therefore the main result can be added to the list of results from mechanism design and auction theory that fail to extend the single unit single dimensional context to the multi unit multi dimensional one

bias and precision in the dea two stage method in data envelopment analysis dea the two stage method is a popular procedure for accounting for exogenous influences on efficiency with the conventional two stage method a dea is first conducted using only traditional endogenous inputs and outputs then the first stage dea scores are regressed on the environmental contextual exogenous inputs of interest the regression outcomes are used to identify exogenous inputs that influence the first stage dea scores to a statistically significant degree and to adjust dea scores to account for these influences herein it is demonstrated empirically that the conventional method exhibits substantial bias and low precision with the degree of bias and precision affected by input variance and correlation a reverse two stage procedure that yields estimates without the bias and precision problems that compromise the validity of the conventional method s estimates is suggested

efficiency and risk in taiwan banking sbm super dea estimation in this study we adopt the two data envelopment analysis dea methods including banker charnes cooper bcc and slacks based measure sbm super efficiency to investigate whether a bank s technical efficiency index s results incorporating account risk and not incorporating account risk differ significantly the information is obtained from 43 taiwanese banks for the period 1998 to 2002 we also employ the nonradial and slacks based malmquist total factor productivity tfp index to measure the impact of productivity change on the panel data our empirical results from the dea approach are summarized as follows 1 loan quality factors have an impact on a bank s efficiency in general the bank with a higher degree of problem loans drops down its efficiency by incorporating account risk however the bank with a lower degree of problem loans increases its efficiency by incorporating account risk 2 super efficiency provides a good framework for ranking efficient units 3 based on the nonradial an

behavior in group contests a review of experimental research group contests are ubiquitous some examples include warfare between countries competition between political parties team incentives within firms group sports and rent seeking in order to succeed members of the same group have incentives to cooperate with each other by expending individual efforts however since effort is costly each member also has an incentive to abstain from expending any effort and instead free ride on the efforts of other members contest theory shows that the intensity of competition between groups and the amount of free riding within groups depend on the group size sharing rule group impact function contest success function and heterogeneity of players we review experimental studies testing these theoretical predictions almost all studies of behavior in group contests find significant over expenditure of effort relative to the theory we discuss potential explanations for such over expenditure including the utility of winning bounded rationality relative payoff maximization parochial altruism and social identity despite over expenditure most studies find support for the comparative statics predictions of the theory with the exception of the group size paradox finally studies show that there are effective mechanisms that can promote within group cooperation and conflict resolution mechanisms that can de escalate and potentially eliminate between group conflict

approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values abstract this paper studies the revenue maximization problem in environments wherein buyers have interdependent values and correlated types we show that 1 when the system of feasible sets is a matroid and buyer valuations satisfy a single crossing condition the generalized vickrey clarke groves mechanisms with lazy reserves vcg l are ex post incentive compatible and ex post individually rational 2 if in addition the valuation distribution satisfies a generalized monotone hazard rate condition the vcg l mechanism with conditional monopoly reserves is approximately optimal then we construct an ascending auction that implements the truth telling equilibrium of a vcg l mechanism in ex post equilibrium finally we discuss the connection between the vcg l mechanisms and greedy algorithms studied in lehmann et al 2002 and deferred acceptance auctions studied in milgrom and segal 2014 and the impact of competition by proving a bulow and klemperer 1996 type result

a study of bank efficiency taking into account risk preferences abstract i use the stochastic cost frontier approach to investigate efficiency of banks operating in the third federal reserve district accounting for the quality and riskiness of bank output in addition to the mean and mode of the conditional distribution of the one sided error term i calculate confidence intervals for the inefficiency measures based on the conditional distribution the results indicate that third district banks are operating at cost efficient output levels and product mixes but are not efficiently using their inputs the second part of the article relates the inefficiency measures to several correlates

an efficient dynamic auction for heterogeneous commodities this paper proposes a new dynamic design for auctioning multiple heterogeneous commodities generalizing earlier work that treated identical objects an auctioneer wishes to allocate one or more units of each of k heterogeneous commodities to n bidders the auctioneer announces a vector of current prices bidders report back quantities demanded at these prices and the auctioneer adjusts the prices units are credited to bidders at the current prices as their opponents demands decline and the process continues until every commodity market clears bidders rather than being required to behave as price takers are permitted to strategically exercise their market power nevertheless with pure private values the proposed auction yields walrasian equilibrium prices an efficient outcome results as from a vickrey clarke groves mechanism but bidders are only required to evaluate their demands along a one dimensional path of prices rather than reporting their utilities over the entire k dimensional consumption set the auction is also more transparent and potentially simpler for bidders to understand and has the advantage of assuring the privacy of the upper portions of bidders demands theoretically the new auction provides a new foundation for convergence to walrasian equilibrium in an exchange economy practically it provides an efficient method for simultaneously auctioning two or more related types of securities for example three month and six month treasury bills it is also potentially useful for auctioning multiple types of communications spectrum for example licenses for paired and unpaired spectrum

selective recognition how to recognize donors to increase charitable giving recognizing donors by revealing their identities is important for increasing charitable giving we conducted a field experiment to examine how different recognition methods impact giving and found that all forms of recognition that we examined had a positive impact on increasing donations whereby recognizing only highest donors positive recognition and recognizing only lowest donors negative recognition had the most pronounced effect we argue that selective recognition both positive and negative creates tournament like incentives recognizing the highest donors activates the desire to seek a positive prize of prestige thus increasing the proportion of donors who contribute large amounts recognizing the lowest donors activates the desire to avoid a negative prize of shame thus decreasing the proportion of donors who do not contribute or contribute very little therefore selective recognition is an effective tool that can be used in the field by charities to increase donations

information or regulation what drives the international activities of commercial banks information costs and regulatory barriers distinguish international financial markets from national ones using panel data on bilateral assets and liabilities of commercial banks i empirically determine the impact of information costs and regulations and i isolate intra eu financial linkages i confirm that information costs and regulations are important factors influencing international asset choices of banks but their relative importance differs among countries

social image concerns and prosocial behavior field evidence from a nonlinear incentive scheme abstract using longitudinal data on the entire population of blood donors in an italian town we examine how donors respond to a nonlinear award scheme that rewards them with symbolic prizes medals when they reach certain donation quotas our results indicate that donors significantly increase the frequency of their donations immediately before reaching the thresholds for which the rewards are given but only if the prizes are publicly announced in the local newspaper and awarded in a public ceremony the results are robust to several specifications sample definitions and controls for observable and unobservable heterogeneity our findings indicate that social image concerns are a primary motivator of prosocial behavior and that symbolic prizes are most effective as motivators when they are awarded publicly we discuss the implications of our findings for policies aimed at incentivizing prosocial behavior

financial distress drivers in brazilian banks a dynamic slacks approach abstract this study applies the dynamic slacks based model dsbm developed by tone and tsutsui 2010 in order to assess the evolution of input saving output increasing potentials in major brazilian banks from 1996 to 2011 we propose that these potentials or slacks can be used as proxies for an eventual financial distress situation in the future the main research objective is to determine whether or not different characteristics of bank type related to ownership size and merger and acquisition processes are significantly related to inefficiency levels and by extension to an eventual financial distress situation since higher inefficiency levels also imply lower input saving output decreasing potentials based on a balanced panel model secondary data from economatica were collected and analyzed results indicate higher inefficiency levels and slacks in small public and national banks policy implications are also addressed

a dynamic stochastic frontier model to evaluate regional financial efficiency evidence from chinese county level panel data abstract studies have widely used stochastic frontier models to assess financial efficiency however traditional static approaches do not take dynamic characteristics of financial systems into account this article develops a dynamic stochastic frontier model to evaluate regional financial efficiency and provides an empirical test of the model by using panel data of 62 chinese counties during the 2001 2010 period the model measures the dynamic impact of the input output variables and environmental variables on financial efficiency and allows for the separation of technical change from the change in technical efficiency the results show that the dynamic model provides a better fit to the data than the static model in addition a gradient difference emerges in the regional financial efficiency among the six major regions of china the results offer practical implications for the development of regional financial services in china as well as other developing countries and emerging economies

do women shy away from competition do men compete too much we examine whether men and women of the same ability differ in their selection into a competitive environment participants in a laboratory experiment solve a real task first under a noncompetitive piece rate and then a competitive tournament incentive scheme although there are no gender differences in performance men select the tournament twice as much as women when choosing their compensation scheme for the next performance while 73 percent of the men select the tournament only 35 percent of the women make this choice this gender gap in tournament entry is not explained by performance and factors such as risk and feedback aversion only playa negligible role instead the tournament entry gap is driven by men being more overconfident and by gender differences in preferences for performing in a competition the result is that women shy away from competition and men embrace it

asymmetric english auctions abstract this paper studies equilibria of the n bidder single object english or open ascending price auction in a setting with interdependent values and asymmetric bidders maskin in h siebert ed privatization institut fur weltwirtschaften der universitat kiel kiel 1992 pp 115 136 showed that if the values satisfy a single crossing condition then the two bidder english auction has an efficient equilibrium in this paper two extensions of the single crossing condition the average crossing condition and the cyclical crossing condition are introduced the main result is that under either of these conditions the n bidder english auction has an efficient equilibrium

competition for scarce resources we model a downstream industry where firms compete to buy capacity in an upstream market which allocates capacity efficiently although downstream firms have symmetric production technologies we show that industry structure is symmetric only if capacity is sufficiently scarce otherwise it is asymmetric with one large fat capacity hoarding firm and a fringe of smaller lean capacity constrained firms as demand varies the industry switches between symmetric and asymmetric phases generating predictions for firm size and costs across the business cycle surprisingly increasing available capacity can cause a reduction in output and consumer surplus by resulting in such a switch

why european banks are less profitable than u s banks a decomposition approach abstract the low profitability of european banks relative to their u s counterparts has recently raised concerns among policy makers and researchers this paper attempts to shed light on this issue by using the o donnell 2012 decomposition approach this approach enables us to decompose the relative profitability of european banks into an output input price index and a total factor productivity index with the former further decomposed into two price indexes and the latter further into four productivity and efficiency measures our results show that european banks profitability was not only weak but also deteriorated over time our further analysis shows that the decline in the output input price index was due to declines in relative lending rate and relative return on securities and an increase in funding costs while the decline in the productivity index was driven by declines in technical efficiency scale efficiency and residual mix efficiency

rational expectations information acquisition and competitive bidding most rational expectations market equilibrium models are not models of price formation and naive mechanisms leading to such equilibria can be severely manipulable in this paper a bidding model is developed which has the market like features that bidders act as price takers and that prices convey information higher equilibrium prices convey more favorable information about the quality of the objects being sold than do lower prices bidders can benefit from trading only if they have a transactions motive or if they have access to inside information apart from exceptional cases prices are not fully revealing a two stage model is developed in which bidders may acquire information at a cost before bidding and for which the equilibrium price is fully revealing resolving a well known paradox

an efficient ascending bid auction for multiple objects when bidders exhibit multi unit demands standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes this article proposes a new ascending bid auction for homogeneous goods such as treasury bills or telecommunications spectrum the auctioneer announces a price and bidders respond with quantities items are awarded at the current price whenever they are clinched and the price is incremented until the market clears with private values this dynamic auction yields the same outcome as the sealed bid vickrey auction but has advantages of simplicity and privacy preservation with interdependent values this auction may retain efficiency whereas the vickrey auction suffers from a generalized winner s curse

ascending price vickrey auctions for general valuations ascending price auctions typically involve a single price path with buyers paying their final bid price using this traditional definition no ascending price auction can achieve the vickrey clarke groves vcg outcome for general private valuations in the combinatorial auction setting we relax this definition by allowing discounts to buyers from the final price of the auction or alternatively calculating the discounts dynamically during the auction while still maintaining a single price path using a notion called universal competitive equilibrium prices shown to be necessary and sufficient to achieve the vcg outcome using ascending price auctions we define a broad class of ascending price combinatorial auctions in which truthful bidding by buyers is an ex post nash equilibrium any auction in this class achieves the vcg outcome and ex post efficiency for general valuations we define two specific auctions in this class by generalizing two known auctions in the literature 11 24

an ascending vickrey auction for selling bases of a matroid consider selling bundles of indivisible goods to buyers with concave utilities that are additively separable in money and goods we propose an ascending auction for the case when the seller is constrained to sell bundles whose elements form a basis of a matroid it extends easily to polymatroids applications include scheduling allocation of homogeneous goods and spatially distributed markets among others our ascending auction induces buyers to bid truthfully and returns the economically efficient basis unlike other ascending auctions for this environment ours runs in pseudopolynomial or polynomial time furthermore we prove the impossibility of an ascending auction for nonmatroidal independence set systems

entry into winner take all and proportional prize contests an experimental study this experiment compares the performance of two contest designs a standard winner take all tournament with a single fixed prize and a novel proportional payment design in which that same prize is divided among contestants by their share of total achievement we find that proportional prizes elicit more entry and more total achievement than the winner take all tournament the proportional prize contest performs better by limiting the degree to which heterogeneity among contestants discourages weaker entrants without altering the performance of stronger entrants these findings could inform the design of contests for technological and other improvements which are widely used by governments and philanthropic donors to elicit more effort on targeted economic and technological development activities

multi unit auctions with budget limits abstract we study multi unit auctions for bidders that have a budget constraint a situation very common in practice that has received relatively little attention in the auction theory literature our main result is an impossibility there is no deterministic auction that 1 is individually rational and dominant strategy incentive compatible 2 makes no positive transfers and 3 always produces a pareto optimal outcome in contrast we show that ausubel s clinching auction satisfies all these properties when the budgets are public knowledge moreover we prove that the clinching auction is the unique auction that satisfies all these properties when there are two players this uniqueness result is the cornerstone of the impossibility result few additional related results are given including some results on the revenue of the clinching auction and on the case where the items are divisible

the impact of liberalization on the productive efficiency of indian commercial banks abstract we examine the productive efficiency of 70 indian commercial banks during the early stages 1986 1991 of the ongoing period of liberalization we use data envelopment analysis to calculate radial technical efficiency scores we then use stochastic frontier analysis to attribute variation in the calculated efficiency scores to three sources a temporal component an ownership component and a random noise component we find publicly owned indian banks to have been the most efficient followed by foreign owned banks and privately owned indian banks we also find a temporal improvement in the performance of foreign owned banks virtually no trend in the performance of privately owned indian banks and a temporal decline in the performance of publicly owned indian banks we attempt to explain these patterns in terms of the government s evolving regulatory policies

a non cooperative bargaining model with strategically timed offers abstract rubinstein s alternating offers bargaining model is enriched by allowing players to choose when and whether or not to make an offer time is continuous and players make offers whenever they wish it is assumed that upon making an offer players must wait a fixed amount of time before making another it is shown that if players can react arbitrarily quickly to their opponent s offers then all subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes are rubinstein like in particular efficient however if it takes time to react then some delay can be supported this potential delay becomes arbitrarily large as reaction times increase journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 c72

assessing productive efficiency of banks using integrated fuzzy dea and bootstrapping a case of mozambican banks performance analysis has become a vital part of the management practices in the banking industry there are numerous applications using dea models to estimate efficiency in banking and most of them assume that inputs and outputs are known with absolute precision here we propose new fuzzy dea level models to assess underlying uncertainty further bootstrap truncated regressions with fixed factors are used to measure the impact of each model on the efficiency scores and to identify the most relevant contextual variables on efficiency the proposed models have been demonstrated using an application in mozambican banks to handle the underlying uncertainty findings reveal that fuzziness is predominant over randomness in interpreting the results in addition fuzziness can be used by decision makers to identify missing variables to help in interpreting the results price of labor price of capital and market share were found to be the significant factors in measuring bank efficiency managerial implications are addressed

impact of financial reforms on efficiency of state owned private and foreign banks in pakistan this article uses a unique bank level data from 1991 to 2000 and evaluates how financial reforms affect banking efficiency of domestic and foreign banks in pakistan the results suggest that banking efficiency falls during initial reform period when banks adjust to enhanced competition but increases in more advanced stages of reform while in general foreign and private banks show superior efficiency and factor productivity than do state owned banks the relative performance of foreign banks worsens after the consolidation stage of the financial reforms is over we show the importance of link between bank size asset quality and bank branches with efficiency indexes and also note that every 10 increase in share of nonperforming to total loans decreases banking efficiency by 6 to 10

intellectual capital and firm performance evidence from indian banking sector in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis the entire indian banking industry was paralysed and their performance was shattered by the unfolding of enormous cases of non performing assets npa

efficiency and credit rating in taiwan banking data envelopment analysis estimation in this article we use the data envelopment analysis to measure the efficiency of banks before and after credit rating is taken into consideration and we also employ the malmquist productivity index to measure the total factor productivity changes from 2001 to 2003 the results are as follows 1 there is a positive relationship between the efficiency scores and credit rating and thus the credit rating can be a representative to evaluate the performance and quality of a bank 2 we use the wilconxon two sample test of nonparametric statistic to test the influences of credit rating the empirical result shows that the credit rating is proven to influence the efficiency of banks 3 the efficiency scores improve in both investment grade above tw bbb and speculation grade under tw bbb when credit rating is taken into consideration the empirical results show that the efficiency scores of banks with a high credit rating improved relatively more when compared to banks with a lower credit rating

evaluating the cost efficiency of the italian banking system what can be learned from the joint application of parametric and non parametric techniques abstract research on bank efficiency has developed in two separate streams econometric studies and data envelopment analysis a linear programming technique these two branches of literature have developed quickly but separately in this paper these two approaches have been tested on a common panel of 270 italian banks and this has suggested the following i econometric and linear programming results do not differ dramatically when based on the same data and conceptual framework ii when differences arise they can be explained by going back to the intrinsic features of the models moreover some findings on italian banks may be of interest also to the international reader i efficiency scores show a high variance ii the banking system is split in two between northern and southern banks iii there is a direct rather than inverse relationship between productive efficiency and asset quality iv the efficiency of italian banks did not increase over the period 1988 1992

implementing efficient multi object auction institutions an experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents abstract we study three alternative implementations of the vickrey multi unit demand auction vickrey s original static sealed bid auction and two dynamic ausubel auctions with and without public dropout information reported during the auction although implemented by a weaker solution concept behavior in the dynamic vickrey auction with the public dropout information comes significantly closer to the theoretical prediction of sincere bidding bidding one s valuations than either the static vickrey auction or the dynamic auction without dropout information this suggests a possible tradeoff between the simplicity and transparency of a mechanism and the strength of its solution concept when agents are still learning and or when players are not fully rational drawing on results from related single unit and multi unit demand auctions and the results of a new single unit demand auction experiment we provide important insights into the behavioral mechanism underlying the superior performance of the ausubel auction with feedback information

wto challenges and efficiency of chinese banks after joining the world trade organisation wto in december 2001 china was given 5 years to completely open up its banking market for international competition chinese banks have been renowned for their mounting nonperforming loans and low efficiency despite gradual reforms the banking system is still dominated by state ownership and encapsulated monopolistic control how to raise efficiency is a key to the survival and success of domestic banks especially the state owned commercial banks two important factors may be responsible for raising efficiency ownership reform and hard budget constraints this article uses a panel data of 22 banks over the period 1995 to 2001 and employs a stochastic frontier production function to investigate the effects of ownership structure and hard budget constraint on efficiency empirical results suggest that nonstate banks were 8 18 more efficient than state banks and that banks facing a harder budget tend to perform better than those heavily capitalized by the

consistency in performance rankings the peru water sector regulators can utilize a number of alternative methodologies for comparing firm efficiency but these approaches need to be robust to be accepted by stakeholders this study evaluates the consistency of water utility performance rankings for peruvian water utilities the results indicate that data envelopment analysis dea and stochastic frontier analysis sfa yield similar rankings in this case in addition the techniques have comparable success for identifying the best and worst performing utilities however these rankings based on sophisticated statistical techniques are not highly correlated with those developed by the peruvian water regulator sunass this result does not invalidate the performance rankings obtained by the regulator since those rankings are based on more dimensions of utility performance however they illustrate the importance of developing sound techniques for identifying weak utilities improvements in sector performance require that benchmarking be given greater attention t

multi item vickrey english dutch auctions abstract assuming that bidders wish to acquire at most one item this paper defines a polynomial time multi item auction that locates the vcg prices in a finite number of iterations for any given starting prices this auction is called the vickrey english dutch auction and it contains the vickrey english auction sankaran j k 1994 on a dynamic auction mechanism for a bilateral assignment problem math soc sci 28 143 150 and the vickrey dutch auction mishra d parkes d 2009 multi item vickrey dutch auctions games econ behav 66 326 347 as special cases by means of numerical experiments it is showed that when the auctioneer knows the bidders value distributions the vickrey english dutch auction is weakly faster than the vickrey english auction and the vickrey dutch auction in 89 percent and 99 percent respectively of the investigated problems a greedy version of the vickrey english dutch auction is demonstrated to perform even better in the simulation studies

an efficient multi unit ascending auction we provide an ascending auction that yields an e cient outcome when there are many identical units for sale and bidders have interdependent values and downward sloping demand our ascending auction both extends and generalizes ausubel s 1997 and yields the same outcome as perry and reny s 2000 generalization of vickrey s 1961 sealed bid auction there are two key components to our auction bidders are permitted both to

estimating the wetland rental fee a case study involving a taiwan wetland wetlands provide many functions that are both economic and recreational and are valuable in terms of their ecological diversity while at the same time being nonmarket value products the purpose of this study is to estimate the optimal wetland rental through estimations of both the demand and supply functions in relation to wetland the wetland supply function is directly estimated based on the data provided by the owners of the wetland while the estimation of the wetland input demand function involves using the bootstrapping and contingent visitation approaches such estimation approaches could also be applied to other nonmarket value products that give rise to environmental externalities the estimation of rental fee could provide a long term leasing contract that gives the landlord with a particular rent to lease their lands to support a wetland eco tourism park to maintain wetland for substantial management several environmental management policy implications are also addressed

bank office outreach structure and performance in regional banking markets burgstaller j bank office outreach structure and performance in regional banking markets regional studies this paper studies bank penetration market structure and banking conduct across austrian districts neither differences in market concentration nor in the activity of out of market banks can explain the regional dispersion of interest rates bank profitability and efficiency a higher bank density is connected to more competition and lower mark ups and indicates more efficient banking markets as well as efficiency is the main determinant of bank profits and competition seems to be mildly indicative of stronger regional growth the preservation of a fair regional bank outreach appears to be an important policy target burgstaller j burgstaller j le rayon d action des guichets ban

on the sources of heterogeneity in banking efficiency literature one learns two main lessons from studying the great quantity of banking efficiency literature these lessons regard the heterogeneity in results and the absence of a comprehensive review aimed at understanding the reasons for this variability surprisingly although this issue is well known it has not been systematically analyzed before in order to fill this gap we perform a meta regression analysis mra by examining 1 661 efficiency scores retrieved from 120 papers published over the period 2000 2014 the meta regression is estimated by using the random effects multilevel model reml because it controls for within study and between study heterogeneity the analysis yields four main results firstly parametric methods yield lower levels of banking efficiency than nonparametric studies this holds true even after controlling for the approach used in selecting the inputs and outputs of the frontier secondly we show that banking efficiency is highest when using the value added approach followed by estimates from studies based on the intermediation method whereas those based on the hybrid approach are the lowest thirdly efficiency scores also depend on the quality of studies and on the number of observations and variables used in the primary papers as far as the effects of sample size dimension and quality of papers are concerned there are significant differences in sign and magnitude between parametric and nonparametric studies finally cost efficiency is found to be higher than profit and production efficiency interestingly mra results are robust to the potential outliers in efficiency and sample size distributions