does the public sector over provide club goods a general result abstract with nondistortionary user charges the first best and second best of a single club exogenous income economy with identical individuals coincide they differ if incomes differ overprovision of a superior club good then occurs in the second best

pigou meets mirrlees on the irrelevance of tax distortions for the second best pigouvian tax this paper extends the mirrlees 1971 model of optimal income redistribution with optimal corrective taxes to internalize consumption externalities using general utility structures and exploring both linear and non linear taxes it is demonstrated that the optimal second best tax on an externality generating good should not be corrected for the marginal cost of public funds since it equals one in the optimal tax system in the optimum distortions of income taxes are equal to marginal redistributional gains if the government does not have access to a non distortionary marginal source of finance the marginal cost of public funds can be either larger or smaller than one depending on subjective preferences for income redistribution the optimal second best corrective tax is then either higher or lower than the pigouvian level the findings in this paper generalize and amend prior results based on representative agent models shedding new light on the weak double dividend hypothesis and on the welfare gains of recycling revenue from environmental taxes

on the welfare effects of a duty free zone abstract the analysis extends and corrects the results of an earlier paper by hamada two problems are analyzed 1 how is location of production affected by opening up of a free zone taking into account different kinds of trade barriers and zones implications for production consumption and welfare in a number of different cases are analyzed 2 what are the effects of capital inflow either into the zone or into the host country our results show that both types of capital inflow diminish welfare and welfare diminishes comparatively more when imported into the zone repatriated income as well as its composition is explicitly incorporated

progressive taxation and the social marginal cost of public funds abstract this paper describes the calculation of the social marginal cost of public funds smcf for a progressive tax system which distorts individuals labour supply decisions a formula for the smcf indicates that the income and substitution effects of the labour supply response are weighted by the changes in individuals average and marginal tax rates respectively other well known formulas for the smcf are shown to be special cases of this formula the difference between this formula and the mayshar 1991 formula is shown to be due to different but equally valid ways of computing the change in the average tax rate the condition under which a marginal tax rate increase may lead to a reduction in revenues is derived

on the choice between capital import and labor export abstract the paper analyses some questions arising in connection with inflow of foreign capital into a host country and its free zone when capital is mobile between sectors capital import into any part of the economy decreases welfare with sector specific capital import of capital into the protected sector export sector decreases increases welfare if capital import into the export sector of the domestic zone is infeasible there may be a case for establishing a free zone and allowing capital import exclusively there with a suitable tax policy capital import into the free zone will always be beneficial

the marginal welfare cost of public funds theory and estimates abstract we derive a general analytic formula for the marginal welfare cost mwc of public funds without imposing restrictive assumptions on preferences or technologies the framework encompasses the various special cases previously considered and reconciles the disparities among the reported estimates of mwc unresolved differences in existing estimates are fully explained by appropriate interpretations of intended thought experiments and alternative assumptions about the elasticity of labor supply with respect to public spending further progress in measuring mwc requires empirical estimation of labor supply functions that include government spending as an explanatory variable

international factor movements repatriation and welfare abstract this paper analyzes two different ways of allowing foreign capital inflow introducing it into the domestic economy and introducing it into a duty free zone it shows how the ranking of the two policies depends on the production patterns in the duty free zone and the rules of factor income repatriation the result can be used to explain the discrepancy between the rankings of these policies in two recent papers the analysis also shows how the way of repatriating factor income could affect the equilibrium of factor movement the welfare of the factor owners and the welfare of the countries concerned

nature of transfers income tax function and empirical estimation of elasticity of taxable income for brazil abstractthis article aims to estimate the elasticity of taxable income eti taking into account the nature of transfers and their use as a redistribution package involving cash and in kind transfers to households in brazil our contributions are twofold first we provide a simple model with balanced budget government that reveals the role played by cash and in kind transfers on the labour supply and income tax revenues thereof next in order to estimate eti in the presence of cash and in kind transfers brazilian population surveys pesquisa nacional por amostra de domicilios pnad are used to explore a limited tax reform that was implemented between 1997 and 1998 this reform only affected the higher income tax bracket our findings suggest that in kind cash transfers are positively negatively associated with reported taxable income and precise estimation of eti requires estimates of both types of transfers last we estimate the eti for brazil in the range from 0 4 to 1 3 not different fro

is an enclave sector a cure for unemployment in ldcs abstract in the framework of a simple general equilibrium model this paper demonstrates that the establishment of an enclave sector through foreign capital inflow does not always reduce employment in a labor surplus developing economy we point out a case where such capital inflows paradoxically accentuate the problem of unemployment in the host economy

the gains from duty free zones abstract duty free zones have been established in many countries and duty free shops can be found in every major international airport this paper investigates their welfare effect in the tradition of the pareto gains from trade literature using the dual approach developed in dixit and norman 1980 we show that the introduction of a duty free zone leads to pareto gains over autarky compared to free trade its welfare impact depends on the redistribution mechanism accompanying free trade we show that with a dixit norman tax scheme free trade is pareto inferior to a duty free zone regime the opposite holds true for lump sum redistribution

tax effects versus budget effects on labor supply this paper analyzes the effects on labor supply of parallel changes in taxes and public spending of various types a number of important recent developments in the labor supply behavior of households are highlighted by such a study of various types of budget effects rather than isolated tax effects this comes out in particular when considering cross substitution effects on labor supply of changes in public spending on goods and services or of the subsidization of goods and services provided by private markets moreover the income effects of tax changes are often mitigated or possibly even removed by the income effects of the accompanying expenditure changes

marginal welfare costs of taxation with human and physical capital i introduction marginal welfare cost of taxation is the amount by which the social cost of an additional tax dollar differs from 1 because of distortionary taxation browning and johnson 1984 stuart 1984 browning 1987 ballard 1988 and allgood and snow 1998 use static models of the u s economy in which labor supplies adjust but the stocks of human and physical capital are fixed to calculate estimates of this welfare cost relevant to cost benefit analysis the studies by lucas 1990 and perroni 1995 incorporate human and physical capital into calculations of excess burden for the purpose of comparing alternative tax systems but do not address the welfare costs of marginal tax and spending reforms ballard et al 1985 and judd 1987 provide estimates of welfare cost using models that allow the stock of physical capital to change in response to marginal reforms but the stock of human capital is exogenous in these studies however judd 2001 argues that there is ample evidence indicating that human capital investment decisions have a significant effect on the cost of altering the tax system which suggests that these decisions could also have an important influence on marginal welfare cost in this article we present estimates of welfare costs for marginal reforms to government tax and spending policies when labor supply saving and education decisions are all endogenous we focus our analysis on marginal reforms because as skinner and slemrod 1985 observe most policy reforms enacted do not involve replacing one tax or spending system with another but instead typically entail marginal adjustments in tax laws and government appropriations using a perfect foresight overlapping generations model with a three period life cycle we derive analytical expressions for the changes in labor supply saving and education and use them to calculate marginal welfare cost as shown by auerbach et al 1983 in overlapping generations models steady state welfare comparisons of alternative tax policies are biased unless households are compensated for intergenerational redistribution along the transition path to arrive at our steady state estimates of welfare costs we adapt the compensation method introduced by gravelle 1991 for analyzing fundamental tax reforms to the context of incremental tax and spending reforms in a static one consumer model triest 1990 has shown that marginal welfare cost mwc is positive solely because of tax leakage the decline in tax revenue caused by reductions in the tax base we extend this insight to an intertemporal context that incorporates tax leakage arising from changes in both human and physical capital investment we evaluate three sets of reforms first a revenue neutral reduction in the tax on capital income funded by a higher tax on labor income second spending on a public good financed by either a higher tax on labor or interest income third a per capita lump sum transfer or demogrant also funded by either a higher tax on labor or interest income we find that marginal welfare costs are uniformly lower in the dynamic model where investment decisions are endogenous than in the static model where investment decisions are fixed and that the majority of the difference between the dynamic and static estimates is attributable to human capital decisions the principal reason is that a reallocation of time between labor hours and human capital investment has opposing and potentially offsetting effects on effective labor supply as a result labor supply responds less elastically in the dynamic model and changes in labor supply are the main source of tax leakage because wage taxation is the main source of tax revenue we also find that shifting marginal financing from capital to labor results in a lower welfare cost the reason being that such a change encourages saving which increases wage rates and stimulates labor supply leading to a reduction in marginal welfare costs

public goods self selection and optimal income taxation using the self selection approach to tax analysis this paper derives a modified samuelson rule for the provision of public goods when the government deploys an optimal nonlinear income tax this approach gives a straightforward interpretation of the central result in this area generalises it and provides a simple characterisation of optimal policy in a wide range of circumstances the analysis also emphasises and clarifies the significance of the choice of numeraire for the optimality of decentralising public spending decisions it is well known that the famous samuelson rule for the provision of public goods may not be applicable when the tax revenues used to finance the public goods come from distorting taxes the principle was recognized as long ago as pigou 1947 long before the samuelson rule was devised pigou saw that in addition to the resource cost involved in transferring funds from the private to the public sector there was a deadweight loss involved from this insight he suggested that the criterion for providing public goods should be more stringent than the samuelson rule would later suggest in particular one might expect that the inclusion of the deadweight loss of taxes as part of the cost of providing a public good would lead to a reduction in its optimal provision relative to a situation in which lump sum taxes were available the problem was investigated more systematically by atkinson and stern 1974 who considered the case in which a public good is financed by a set of optimal commodity taxes all individuals were assumed to be identical so efficiency alone dictated the objective they found that no prima facie case could be made for the pigou position that the use of distortionary taxes called for a reduction in the supply of the public good their analysis clearly showed that there were two influences at work when the financing of a public good was by distorting taxes on the one hand

capital and technology movements and economic welfare economists have long valued capital mobility as an aid to international efficiency robert mundell has shown that under certain conditions the capital movement induced by tariffs on goods will substitute for trade and enable the tariff impeded international economy to reach essentially the same equilibrium as would a completely free international economy it will also except possibly for the case when the optimal tariff is non zero benefit both countries but if perfect unlimited capital mobility is a good thing for the borrowing country it does not follow as this paper demonstrates that any limited amount of capital mobility however small is a good thing if the capital movement is due to discrepancies in returns due solely to a tariff then a small amount of capital inflow will actually diminish welfare in the recipient country thus countries which take a few cautious steps toward liberalization of capital flow may find their welfare diminished this conclusion is related to the intuitive notion that perhaps it might not be a good idea to allow only a few foreign investors to reap high rates of return in capital short countries if foreign investment is allowed enough should be allowed to depress the rate of return so that excessive profits are not taken otut of the country by a few privileged investors on the other hand however this paper shows that if differences in returns are due to a technological advantage in the capital importing country so that the country with initially high return to capital nonetheless exports the capital intensive good and if these differences in returns are accompanied but not caused by tariffs then even short hesitant steps toward liberalization of capital inflow will improve the borrowing country s welfare this paper also shows that the home country s welfare may be improved or diminished by importing the advanced country s technology when the home country levies a tariff and pays royalties for the technology the critical point is that a movement of technology may either increase or diminish economic welfare depending on whether the technological progress is of the capital saving type or of the labor saving type in the fixed production coefficients case in the same case when the technological progress is hicksian neutral technology inflow will reduce or have no effect on the home country s economic welfare depending on whether the foreign country s technological progress occurs in the home country s inmport competing or export industries similarly capital or technology inflow will never increase the borrowing country s welfare when the country specializes completely in a single industry some of these results should be modified when we treat the possibility that changes in factor prices alter factor proportions

redistribution and the marginal cost of public funds abstract discussions of the marginal cost of public funds with distortionary taxation are often cast in the framework of a one consumer economy while the main justification of distortionary taxes is that they are needed for redistribution this paper analyzes the issue in a model with heterogeneous consumers and a linear income tax focusing on the tradeoff between labour market distortions and the redistribution from high wage to low wage workers in an optimal tax system the mcf will be the same for all sources of funds and under certain assumptions less than one without optimality the mcf will in general differ between different sources of finance

property taxation congestion and local public goods abstract the residential property tax has been viewed as a congestion fee even if it distorts housing decisions this paper shows that the rule for a competitive jurisdiction s optimal public good supply may be written in a form in which no such role appears congestion costs enter the cost side of this rule in the same way that they enter when only a land tax is available the new rule is reconciled with an alternative rule in the literature which contains no congestion costs

interjurisdictional capital mobility fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy abstract recent studies emphasize that local property taxation may result in inefficiently small amounts of local public spending this paper shows that the inefficiency can be traced to a fiscal externality when one jurisdiction increases its taxes it causes a flow of capital to other jurisdictions that increases their tax revenues the inefficiency can be corrected with a subsidy that internalizes the externality key empirical parameters determining the magnitude of the externality are identified illustrative calculations indicate that subsidy rates on the order of 40 might be required to achieve efficiency

a marginal cost of funds approach to multi period public project evaluation implications for the social discount rate abstract although the use of marginal cost of funds mcf has been widely appreciated in public finance literature discussions of mcf have been confined to a static setting this paper develops a multi period project evaluation rule that is based on mcf unlike previous approaches the parameters required for implementing the mcf rule are independent of projects under consideration a lesson from this paper is that the government discount rate policies that are largely based on the concepts of social discount rate and shadow price of capital should be rewritten with the use of parameters representing mcf

the measurement of waste in a public goods economy abstract a small open economy model is developed to measure the waste of the whole economy when levels of public goods are determined by the government the allais debreu diewert measure of waste is defined and its second order approximation is calculated this measure utilizes the second order substitution matrices of the restricted profit function and the restricted expenditure function evaluated at an equilibrium finally simple examples and diagrams are utilized to clarify the economic implications of our approach

when do distortionary taxes reduce the optimal supply of public goods abstract it is often argued that the optimal level of public good provision is below the first best level as long as the government s expenditures have to be financed by distortionary taxes i examine this hypothesis and show that it is correct in a representative consumer economy if i the public good is normal and ii private commodities are normal and gross substitutes otherwise counterexamples can be constructed these results hold also with heterogeneous households provided that equity considerations are ignored in general however distributional objectives may lead to a higher level of public expenditures in second best than in first best

contribution of crude oil price to households budget the weight of indirect energy use we propose a new method to evaluate the burden of oil price on any set of goods and services and apply it to french households this method takes into account the contribution of indirect energy consumption which constitutes typically one half of the energy used by a typical french household it yields an average burden of 4 4 in 2006 with a higher relative burden for households with lower income older members and rural dwelling

tax rates and labor supply in fiscal equilibrium tax rates and labor supply in fiscal equilibrium i introduction if the government changes the tax on wage income what happens to aggregate labor supply this question is at the core of debates between proponents of supply side and keynesian approaches to government fiscal policy it is unfortunate therefore that previous attempts to resolve the issue have obscured decisive assumptions regarding the preference relation between leisure and public spending one argument exposited recently by gwartney and stroup 1983 1986 and ehrenberg and smith 1988 179 80 descends from an older literature represented by the works of friedman 1949 1954 goode 1949 scitovsky 1951 and bailey 1954 and emphasizes the importance of a balanced budget framework for addressing the question this approach reveals the presence of an income effect caused by the change in government spending that must accompany the tax change at optimum according to this view this income effect exactly offsets the income effect of the tax change so that only the substitution effect of the tax remains as a consequence a balanced budget increase in the wage tax unambiguously decreases economy wide labor supply provided the increase in public spending is valued the same as the forgone private spending a different approach was initiated by winston 1965 and subsequently elaborated upon by lindbeck 1982 fullerton 1982 hanson and stuart 1983 bohanon and van cott 1986 and gahvari 1986 this approach stresses the importance of the preference relation between public spending and private spending rather than the role of the public spending income effect in determining the change in aggregate labor supply as a special example gahvari 1986 assumes a preference structure which implies that public spending does not have any influence on labor supply so there is only the partial equilibrium effect of the tax however the general conclusion of this line of reasoning is that the theoretical ambiguity of the labor supply response arises from both tax and spending effects in this paper a simple formal model is used to develop a careful accounting of the various income and substitution effects the model is sufficiently general to permit a rigorous comparison of earlier studies and to expose implicit assumptions responsible for their conclusions we show that the two approaches outlined above are associated respectively with the focal cases of compensated independence and ordinary independence between leisure and public spending the pan of the paper is as follows section ii contains a model of labor supply in the presence of wage taxation and public spending in section iii the effect on aggregate labor supply of a balanced budget change in wage taxation is analyzed section iv provides an interpretation of several previous analyses of these issues section v contains a summary of our results ii the model consider an economy with n identical consumers who derive utility from leisure l a pure private good x which serves as numeraire and a publicly provided good z the utility function u l x z is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable and strictly quasi concave everyone is endowed with t units of time which are allocated either to labor market work or leisure nonmarket activities the marginal product of labor in producing the private good is the constant real gross of tax wage rate w because agents are identical we can confine attention to allocations of equal consumption as a consequence the production possibilities frontier assumed to be linear can be expressed in per capita terms as wl x p n z wt 1 where p is the constant marginal cost of z with identical agents and only two goods not publicly provided it may be assumed without loss of generality that public spending is financed by a wage tax with constant marginal and average ad valorem rate t

the persistence and inefficiency of property tax finance of local public expenditures abstract i both characterize and evaluate equilibrium outcomes in multiple jurisdiction economies with property and land taxation but where direct taxation of residents is not possible the model contains perfectly mobile capital and population and competitive entrepreneurial governments that choose local taxes and expenditures to maximize after tax land rent when the cost of public goods is proportional to population the property tax emerges as the sole source of local finance even though the land tax has no deadweight loss it is shown that equilibria are not constrained efficient in general hence decentralized decision making is not consistent with the best use of the available tax instruments

the locational choice for free trade zones rural versus urban options abstract urban and rural areas are compared as appropriate locations for a free trade zone within a developing country suffering from urban unemployment if domestic capital is mobile between the two regions then the rural area is shown to be preferable to the urban area and sufficient conditions for this conclusion are presented this conclusion may be reversed however if capital is sector specific the condition for this reversal is also discussed

foreign capital and protectionism in terms of a simple model it is shown that the growth in the export processing zone through an influx of foreign owned capital reduces welfare for an economy importing capital intensive goods and following a protectionary policy similarly it follows that growth in the export processing zone should benefit economies importing labor intensive goods

unemployment and foreign capital the relative opportunity costs of domestic labour and welfare the consequences of increased foreign capital for an economy with unemployment are analyzed under different assumptions that influence the relative oportunity costs of domestic labor the investigation suggests that the implications of the literature on the welfare effect of increased foreign capital are misleading the paper shows that welfare gains result from increased foreign capital if the opportunity costs of labor are sufficiently low relative to the wages earned by laborers employed by new foreign capital a number of cases where this occurs are presented the findings of the paper suggest that cases where increased foreign capital must be welfare harming represent extreme parameterizations in the set of possibilities copyright 1991 by the london school of economics and political science

unemployment and the formation of duty free zones abstract a number of authors have suggested that the formation of a duty free zone may reduce the welfare of the host country their analyses assumed full employment for a country suffering unwemployment of the harris todaro type we show that the value of national output at world prices increases with the formation of a duty free zone which involves the reduction of tariffs on intermediate imports into the zone

intermediate goods and the formation of duty free zones abstract if a country forms a duty free zone by lowering tariffs on intermediate goods and taxes on foreign capital used in the zone then resources are attracted from the surrounding domestic zone this can worsen the effects of the distortions due to the tariffs remaining in the domestic zone and can lower the host country s national income and welfare this tends to occur if 1 there is less substitutability between the intermediate and labor than between these factors and capital 2 there is currently a small foreign owned sector in which the share of labor in total costs is large relative to the share of the imported intermediate in the foreign sector and relative to the share of labor in total costs in the domestic zone ironically under the latter circumstances the host country is likely to regard a duty free zone as an attractive option

a reconsideration of the welfare economics of a free trade zone abstract this paper presents a model of a free trade zone which incorporates the fact that such zones are often established by government subsidies designed to promote non traditional exports in our model the condition is derived under which the establishment of a free trade zone can increase welfare regardless of the relative factor intensity of a zone based industry however the relative factor intensity of a free trade zone plays a crucial role in determining the change in welfare following economic growth and foreign investment

labor supply taxes and government spending a microeconometric analysis the effect of government spending on labor supply behavior is critical to predicting the balanced budget effect of income taxes and to estimating the marginal social cost of public funds yet its very existence not to mention direction and magnitude has not been empirically investigated this research estimates a labor supply function that incorporates income taxation and government spending using microeconomic data for men and women the empirical results suggest that public sector spending may have a significant effect on labor supply thereby leading to estimates of the marginal social cost of public funds that differ from those typically calculated

taxation base in developing countries abstract informal sectors are larger in developing countries than in rich countries this is a result of higher fixed costs of entry into the formal economy in developing countries we show that raising barriers to entry is consistent with a deliberate government policy for raising tax revenue by generating market power and hence rents for the permitted entrants market entry fees foster the emergence of large taxpayers the rents can be readily confiscated by the government through entry fees and taxes on profits at a low administrative cost the relevance of the theory is assessed with a sample of 64 countries empirical analysis supports the results of the paper

a generalized approach to multigeneration project evaluation 1 introductionit is well known that the choice of discount rate plays a significant role in the ranking of projects with varying time paths of costs and benefits for public projects the choice of the appropriate social discount rate sdr is not clear cut even in the context of short lived projects in which costs and benefits occur within a single generation in particular when capital taxes produce a wedge between gross and net rates of return should one discount at the economy s rate of return the before tax rate or the individual s rate of return the after tax rate in the single generation context the literature falls in two camps 1 one camp argues that the appropriate sdr is a weighted average of the gross and net rates of return with weights typically determined by the fractions of resources drawn from consumption and private investment respectively 2 a second camp argues that future benefits should be discounted at the net rate of return but that the initial investment should be multiplied by a scale factor so that the direct costs of the project can be expressed in terms of consumption units 3both approaches suffer from severe implementation problems for the first approach there is no general formula for the weights needed to calculate the sdr as a weighted average of two market rates of return dreze 1974 indeed the appropriate sdr to use is project specific stiglitz 1982 without a systematic methodology to derive project specific sdrs the weighted average approach is hard to implement for the second approach which equalizes the sdr to the net rate of return the scale factor the opportunity cost of public investment must be quantified the opportunity cost of public investment depends on whether resources come from private investment or consumption and on the calculation of the present value of the future consumption yielded by a unit of capital discounted at the net rate of return that is the shadow price of capital as lind 1997 points out however there is no general agreement on a specific procedure for calculating the shadow price of capital indeed the concept of the opportunity cost of public investment suffers the same project dependence problem as the first view of the sdr diamond 1968 multigeneration projects such as nuclear waste disposal natural resource conservation or even social security reform further complicate discount rate choice specifically intergenerational equity in addition to intertemporal efficiency plays a role in determining the appropriate social discount rate for multigeneration public project evaluation 4 as in the single generation context there are two competing views on the appropriate discount rate when evaluating multigeneration projects the descriptive and the prescriptive approaches 5the descriptive approach to discounting is a market based approach it does not rely on an explicit social welfare function swf or the pure time preference rate embedded in the swf however the descriptive approach works under the assumption that intergenerational compensation through changes in the tax debt policy is available 6 it is argued that under appropriate intergenerational compensation the market rates of return are still relevant for calculating the sdr for multigeneration project evaluation and in general the sdr should be a weighted average of the gross and net rates of return this descriptive view of setting the sdr equal to the market return appears to underlie the office of management and budget s omb adoption of 7 as the appropriate discount rate for federal programs 7the intent of the prescriptive approach is to use the social discount rate as an expression of ethical judgment on how consumption of future generations should be compared to consumption of current generations

the benefit rule for a pure public good in the presence of a social security program public good whereby the sum of the marginal rates of substitution between the public good and some numeraire private good for all agents who benefit frqm the public good must be equal to the corresponding marginal rate of transformation i e xmrs mrt this rule can be implemented in a decentralized fashion if the government has enough financing instruments available e g person specific lump sum taxes and government debt however whether or not the first best benefit rule can be implemented when the government only has control over relative prices is an open issue pigou 1947 diamond and mirrlees 1971 dasgupta and stiglitz 1971 atkinson and stern 1974 pestieau 1974 and more recently wildasin 1979 1984 1985 king 1986 and batina 1987 have considered the effect of decentralizing the government s policy on the optimal first best benefit rule for a public good it is generally true that if the government cannot completely control the economy because of a lack of policy instruments then the first best benefit rule governing the provision of the public good must be modified as a result

decomposition of s concentration curves for any given order of inverse stochastic dominance standard concentration curves are decomposed into three components called contribution curves those compo nents correspond to within group inequalities between group inequalities and transvari ational inequalities we prove for all orders that contribution curve dominance implies systematically welfare improving tax reforms and conversely accordingly as welfare ex pansions may be costly in terms of particular inequalities we propose targeted fiscal reforms jel classification d63 h20

unemployment and the optimal export processing zone abstract in a country with harris todaro unemployment the formation of an urban export processing zone reduces national income unless it raises rural wages in that case increases in zone wages increase national income by less than dollar for dollar if foreign capital is taxed optimally then intermediate imports into the zone should be subsidized while the wage should be at the minimum feasible level for a given tax policy either the wage should be at the minimum or the ad valorem tariff on the intermediate should exceed the inverse of the elasticity of supply of labor from the countryside existing zone policies depart from these prescriptions

why special economic zones using trade policy to discriminate across importers tariffs are generally assumed to depend on the product not the identity of the importer however special economic zones are a common economically important policy used worldwide to lower tariffs on selected goods for selected manufacturers i show this is motivated by policymakers desire to discriminate across buyers when a tax is intended to raise prices for sellers through a mechanism distinct from existing theories of optimal taxation using a new dataset compiled from public records and exogenous changes in imports of intermediate goods i find the form composition and size of us zones are consistent with the theory

reconciling alternative views about the appropriate social discount rate abstract this paper shows that in an economy with an exogenous rate of return and a given capital income tax distortion and with lump sum taxes as the marginal tax instrument the soc and mcf criteria both correctly identify all worthwhile projects if the criteria are properly applied the equivalence between the soc and mcf criteria continues to hold i if distortionary taxes are used to balance the budget and ii if the rate of return to capital is endogenous apparent differences between the soc and mcf criteria arise from different definitions of a project s indirect revenue effect neither criterion has an implementation advantage because the information requirements for each are identical

the welfare effects of intergovernmental grants in an economy with distortionary local taxes a simple general equilibrium analysis this paper examines the welfare impact of intergovernmental transfers when recipient governments use distortionary taxes both lump sum and matching grants are investigated a distortionary factor depending on local demand and supply elasticities and the local tax rate on the taxed commodity determines the real income change to a jurisdiction per dollar transferred matching grants are dominated by lump sum grants when these can be set optimally for each recipient if grant policy must be uniform positive or negative matching rates are desired if equity adjusted distortionary factors are positively negatively correlated with local public service levels

learning dynamics and support for economic reforms why good news can be bad support for economic reforms has often shown puzzling dynamics many reforms that began successfully lost public support this paper shows that learning dynamics can rationalize this paradox because the process of revealing reform outcomes is an example of sampling without replacement this concept challenges the conventional wisdom that one should begin by revealing reform winners it may also lead to situations in which reforms that enjoy both ex ante and ex post majority support will still not come to completion the framework can be used to explain why gradual reforms worked well in china where successes in special economic zones facilitated further reform whereas this was much less the case for latin american and central and eastern european countries

marginal welfare cost calculations differential analysis vs balanced budget analysis abstract in a differential analysis tax revenue collections are held constant in a balanced budget analysis the spending level is changed and the level of distortionary taxation is changed correspondingly here income effects are important and efficiency calculations depend chiefly on uncompensated elasticities unless government exhaustive expenditure is assumed to substitute closely for cash a small scale computational general equilibrium model is constructed and differential and balanced budget experiments are performed results show that marginal welfare costs calculated from balanced budget experiments can be negative when labor supply functions are backward bending interactions among parameter values and efficiency costs are explored

consumption dominance curves testing for the impact of indirect tax reforms on poverty abstract a new tool is presented to test for the robustness of the impact on poverty of marginal tax reforms for pairs of commodities consumption dominance curves exist for every order of stochastic dominance an illustration is provided with bolivian data