efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

robust trading mechanisms we consider the problem of designing a trading institution for a single buyer and seller when their valuation of the good is private information it is shown that posted price mechanisms are essentially the only mechanisms such that each trader has a dominant strategy a posted price mechanism is one where a price is posted in advance and trade occurs if and only if all traders agree to trade

firm size and executive compensation using several data sets the relationship between executive income and firm size is shown to be relatively stable over time and in different countries the elasticity of executive earnings to firm size is about the same today as it was in the 1930s with evidence of a decline in the earnings of top executives controlling for firm size in addition to the effects of size and other firm and industry characteristics there are returns to age and experience there is also substantial variability in the level of compensation among firms of comparable size indicating that there may be impediments to mobility

mechanism design with incomplete information a solution to the implementation problem the main result of this paper is that the multiple equilibrium problem in mechanism design can be avoided in private value models if agents do not use weakly dominated strategies in equilibrium we show that in such settings any incentive compatible allocation can be made the unique equilibrium outcome to a mechanism we derive a general necessary condition for unique implementation which implies that the positive result for private value models applies with considerably less generality to common value settings and to situations in which an agent s information does not index the agent s preferences

implementing just and efficient decision making in an economy with one public good one private good and quasi linear utilities we explore decision making mechanisms to non cooperatively implement an efficient outcome by auctioning the leadership role among agents one implements egalitarianism namely the efficient outcome that distributes equally the surplus available from an a priori given status quo a refinement of this mechanism so called autioning the leadership with differentiated buds allows us to implement an efficient anonymous and neutral outcome it achieves egalitarianism above the vickrey clarke groves decision

job search and mobility in developing countries theory and policy implications abstract a labor market model is developed in which the formal sector is characterized by search frictions whereas the informal sector is competitive we show that there exists a unique steady state equilibrium in this dual economy we then consider different policies financed by a tax on firms profits we find that reducing the unemployment benefit or the firms entry cost in the formal sector induces higher job creation and formal employment reduces the size of the informal sector but has an ambiguous effect on wages we also find that an employment wage subsidy policy and a hiring subsidy policy have different implications in particular the former increases the size of the informal sector while the latter decreases it

an analysis of the use of accounting and market measures of performance in executive compensation contracts prior research has provided useful insights into the structure of compensation plans and their incentive effects however one important limitation of these studies is the virtual absence of any cross sectional analyses of the attributes of compensation contracts 2 this absence is related in part to the problems associated with controlling for other factors that affect compensation that is compensation contracts are

undominated nash implementation in bounded mechanisms we study implementation in undominated nash equilibrium by bounded mechanisms an undominated nash equilibrium is a nash equilibrium in which no agent uses a weakly dominated strategy a mechanism is bounded if every dominated strategy is dominated by some undominated strategy we identify necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for such implementation these conditions are satisfied in virtually all economic environments and are also satisfied by interesting correspondences from the social choice literature for economic settings we provide a particularly simple implementing mechanism for which the undominated equilibrium outcomes coincide with those obtained from the iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies

wages and employment in a segmented labor market this paper analyzes the impact of business cycle fluctuations on a labor market segmented into a unionized primary sector and a competitive secondary sector either permanent or temporary changes in real aggregate demand are shown to widen the intersectoral wage differential in recession and under reasonable specifications of key parameters to cause greater fluctuations of primary sector employment than secondary sector employment this pattern agrees with the stylized facts of the u s economy

alternative models of earnings determination and labor market structures there are three distinct research traditions in the analysis of individual earnings determination human capital or earnings function analyses aggregate wage analyses and labor demand analyses an important and incongruous aspect of each is the treatment of geographical differences in labor markets this paper first investigates the magnitude and character of geographical wage differentials the sizable differences discovered there are then related to the existing and highly simplified models of labor market differences while the two major classes of models compensating differentials and labor demand differ significantly in assumptions and implications it is impossible to distinguish adequately between them there appears to be a clear need for more structural analyses of labor market operations

inflation and unemployment the world economy today is vastly different from the 1930s when seymour harris the chairman of this meeting infected me with his boundless enthusiasm for economics and his steadfast confidence in its capacity for good works economics is very different too both the science and its subject have changed and for the better since world war ii but there are some notable constants unemployment and inflation still preoccupy and perplex economists statesmen journalists housewives and everyone else the connection between them is the principal domestic economic burden of presidents and prime ministers and the major area of controversy and ignorance in macroeconomics i have chosen to review economic thought on this topic on this occasion partly because of its inevitable timeliness partly because of a personal interest reaching back to my first published work in 1941

the determinants of migrating with a pre arranged job and of the initial duration of urban unemployment an analysis based on indian data on rural to urban migrants abstract based on survey data on 1 400 rural migrants in delhi this paper examines within a multivariate context the determinants of migrating with a pre arranged job and of the initial duration of urban unemployment the results show that the probability of moving with a prearranged job increases with education and with age and is higher for those who seek non manual jobs for migrants who arrive in the city without a pre arranged job unemployment duration depends on marital status premigration information on urban employment opportunities and on the reliance on contacts for job search

modelling the informal sector formally abstract the theoretical characterization of formal informal sector dualism by labor market dualism is integrated with its empirical characterization by size dualism by supposing that the minimum formal sector wage is only enforced for firms greater than a certain size a firm s size varies directly with the talent of its enterpreneur manager and the choice between formal and informal sector entrepreneurship is determined endogenously it is then shown that the size gap between the smallest formal sector firm and largest informal sector firm varies directly with the formal informal sector wage differential which in turn is shown as expected to increase the further is the minimum wage above the market clearing wage the comparative statics of changes in the size of the firm above which the minimum wage is enforced are also examined

a nonparametric efficient public good decision mechanism undominated bayesian implementation abstract it is known that with incomplete information there are bayesian mechanisms that undertake public projects achieving ex post efficiency and budget balance however there are two shortcomings in these mechanisms first the mechanism designer is required to know the agents prior beliefs which is quite demanding second the mechanism may possess multiple equilibria including undesirable ones this paper presents a bayesian mechanism that is nonparametric in that the mechanism designer cannot incorporate any information other than that received from the agents moreover at all undominated bayesian equilibria of the mechanism the public project is undertaken efficiently and budget is balanced journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d78 d82

on the job search in a developing country an analysis based on indian data on migrants job search by those who are employed has received increasing attention in recent years in both the theoretical and the empirical literature on labor markets in developed countries much of the interest stems from the observation that job changes often take place without an intervening period of unemployment and that there is a close relationship between searching for a job and quitting the current job also on the job search affects the rate of unemployment during the period between jobs a major preoccupation of the empirical research has been to estimate the returns to on the job search and to test the determinants of job search the bulk of this work uses data for the united states and the united kingdom 2 job search theory has not been empirically tested in the context of a developing country on the job search particularly in the so called informal sector of the urban labor market is an important feature of probabilistic models of migration in developing countries in the vein of michael p todaro and of john r harris and todaro 3 such models hypothesize that individuals migrate to urban centers with the aim of obtaining employment in the formal sector and that informal sector employment is a transitional phase during which migrants are searching for formal sector jobs recent work by gary s fields has formalized the theoretical aspects of this job search process within the framework of a multisector model 4 thus it would be of interest to find out if there are significant differences between developed and developing countries with respect to the determinants of on the job search

subgame perfect implementation of bargaining solutions abstract this paper provides simple four stage game forms that fully implement a large class of two person bargaining solutions in subgame perfect equilibrium the solutions that can be implemented by our game forms are those that maximize a monotonic and quasi concave function of utilities after normalizing each agent s utility function so that the maximum utility is 1 and the utility of the disagreement outcome is 0 this class of solutions includes the nash kalai smorodinsky and relative utilitarian solutions the game forms have a structure of alternating offers and contain no integer device

the compensation of spanish executives a test of a managerial talent allocation model abstract this paper provides empirical evidence in support of the theory on how managerial capabilities are allocated in hierarchical organizations developed by rosen bell journal of economics 1982 autumn 311 323 the evidence is obtained from a sample of spanish firms and covers managers at the top and middle positions in the hierarchy most previous empirical work has related rosen s model to the elasticity of compensation to size obtained estimating a structural model that explains the salary of the managers as a function of the size of the firm but since compensation and size are both endogenous variables the elasticity estimated by this way will be inconsistent using human capital variables as proxies of managerial talent we estimate the reduced form of the model and therefore the inconsistency problem is overcome

subgame perfect implementation this paper examines the use of stage mechanisms in implementation problems and provides a partial characterization of the set of subgam e perfect implementable choice rules it is shown that in many economic environments virtually an y choice rule can be implemented to illustrate the power of this approach the paper discusses a number of models in which it is possible to implement the first best although it wouldn t have been possible to do so without using stage mechanisms the diversity of these models suggests that subgame perfect implementation may find wide application copyright 1988 by the econometric society

the strategic choice of managerial incentives do firms with separate owners and managers maximize profits we address this question for an oligopoly where managers compete in quantities or prices as in the cournot or bertrand models and owners choose their managers incentives we find that there is a strategic aspect in the problem of selecting incentives and that profit maximizing behavior does not result in particular in the oligopoly we study the behavior of firms competing in quantity price more closely resembles perfectly competitive collusive behavior than cournot bertrand behavior

on the job search in a labor market model a comment abstract using a three sector model of the labor market built by fields 1989 this note shows that when the demand for goods produced in the traditional sector increases with modern sector employment modern sector enlargement may reduce the level of urban unemployment

on the job search in a labor market model ex ante choices and ex post outcomes abstract this paper builds a multi sector labor market model including wage dualism open unemployment underemployment on the job search and expected wage equalization the innovative feature of this model is the distinction between the ex ante allocation of the labor force among search strategies and the ex post allocation of the labor force among labor market outcomes among the findings are more efficient on the job search lowers the equilibrium unemployment rate in a rational expectations equilibrium the average rural and urban wages will not be equal modern sector enlargement may leave labor market conditions in one of the sectors unchanged even when wages and employment in that sector are fully flexible

efficient repeated implementation this paper examines repeated implementation of a social choice function scf with innitely lived agents whose preferences are determined randomly in each period an scf is repeated implementable in nash equilibrium if there exists a sequence of possibly history dependent mechanisms such that i its nash equilibrium set is non empty and ii every nash equilibrium outcome corresponds to the desired social choice at every possible history of past play and realizations of uncertainty we show with minor qualications that in the complete information environment an scf is repeated implementable in nash equilibrium if and only if it is ecient we also discuss several extensions of our analysis including constructions employing only nite mechanisms

a welfare economic analysis of labor market policies in the harris todaro model this paper presents a welfare economic analysis of the benefits of various labor market policies in the harris todaro labor market model the policies considered are a policy of modern sector job creation which i call modern sector enlargement msenl a policy of rural development which i call traditional sector enrichment tsenr and a policy of wage limitation in the urban economy which i call modern sector wage restraint mswr first i analyze the inequality effects of these policies i then perform two welfare economic analyses the first based on summary measures of labor market conditions total labor earnings unemployment inequality of labor incomes and poverty rates and the second based on dominance analysis in the labor market in both cases assuming that the costs are borne elsewhere the results of the welfare analyses are compared and it is shown that tsenr unambiguously increases welfare in the labor market using both approaches the other policies yield ambiguous results and no policy is unambiguously welfare decreasing

collusive dominant strategy truthfulness abstract we show that collusion and wrong beliefs may cause a dramatic efficiency loss in the vickrey mechanism for auctioning a single good in limited supply we thus put forward a new mechanism guaranteeing efficiency in a very adversarial collusion model where the players can partition themselves into arbitrarily many coalitions exchange money with each other and perfectly coordinate their actions our mechanism bypasses classic impossibility results such as those of green and laffont and of schummer by providing the players with a richer set of strategies making it dominant for every coalition c to instruct each of its members to report truthfully not only his own valuation but also his belonging to c our mechanism is coalitionally rational which implies being individually rational for independent players

implementation in undominated strategies a look at bounded mechanisms this paper examines the impact of placing natural restrictions on the mechanisms considered for implementation problems it is shown that if all mechanisms are considered and preferences satisfy a basic condition then any social choice correspondence can be implemented in undominated strategies an example points out that the strength of this result derives from the use of mechanisms with questionable features in part of the message space the agent who announces the highest integer is rewarded this sort of tail chasing construction common in the constructive proofs of the literature is used to assure that undesired strategy combinations do not form an equilibrium if such mechanisms are ruled out then the social choice correspondences which can be implemented in undominated strategies satisfy an incentive compatibility type condition called strategy resistence for social choice functions this is equivalent to strategy proofness this contrast suggests that this issue should be examined as it applies to other solution concepts used in implementation theory the last portion of the paper begins to explore the issue as it relates to nash implementation and undominated nash implementation

implementing coordinated team play abstract this note studies a moral hazard model of joint production in which there are strong gains to coordination the mechanism we propose for resolving the tacit collusion problem that arises in our setting makes use of at will contracts which provide the agents with the option to quit at any time journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d82

the relative effects of unemployment insurance parameters on search strategy abstract this paper theoretically examines the relative effect of two unemployment insurance parameters on search behavior the relative influence of each parameter is found to depend upon what an individual could expect to earn if he worked part time while searching

corporate performance and managerial remuneration an empirical analysis abstract economic theories of efficient compensation predict a positive relationship between executive pay and corporate performance and yet efforts to document this relationship have been largely unsuccessful in this paper we argue that previous cross sectional studies have omitted important variables which seriously bias their results using data that focus on individual executives over time we find that executive compensation is strongly positively related to corporate performance as measured by shareholder return and growth in firm sales the results are robust to the stock market performance measure utilized

complexity and repeated implementation this paper examines the problem of repeatedly implementing an ecient social choice function when the agents preferences evolve randomly we show that the freedom to set dierent mechanisms at dierent histories can give the planner an additional leverage to deter undesirable behavior even if the mechanisms are restricted to be simple and nite specically we construct a history dependent sequence of simple mechanisms such that with minor qualications every pure subgame perfect equilibrium delivers the correct social choice at every history while every mixed equilibrium is strictly pareto dominated more importantly when faced with agents with a preference for less complex strategies at the margin the ecient social choice function can be repeatedly implemented in subgame perfect equilibrium in pure or mixed strategies our results demonstrate a positive role for complexity considerations in mechanism design

compensation across executive labor markets what can we learn from cross listed firms there is wide consensus that chief executive officers ceos of us firms earn significantly more than their canadian counterparts using a matched sample we find that the majority of this difference is due to us ceos earning 50 more than ceos of canadian non cross listed firms we find no such us premium for canadian cross listed firms because the use of options allows the cross listed firms to keep pace with their neighbors to the south while firms that list only in canada compete in the labor market defined by their national boundary cross listed firms appear to be competing directly with their us counterparts for executive talent in investigating alternative explanations for the elimination of the compensation differential for canadian cross listed firms we find evidence consistent with both the bonding and the rent extraction hypotheses

asymmetric information bargaining problems with many agents a yes or no decision must be made about some issue all agents must agree the coase theorem asserts that the efficient outcome will always result suppose the value positive or negative that an individual attaches to an affirmative decision is privately known to that individual it is proved under very mild conditions that with independent types as the number of agents increases the probability of an affirmative efficient decision goes to zero an example in which it is common knowledge that an affirmative decision is efficient and yet the probability of such a decision goes to zero is given

dominant strategy implementation of bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules abstract a large literature on incentive mechanisms represents incentive constraints by the requirement that truthful reporting be a bayesian equilibrium this paper identifies mechanism design problems for which there is no loss in replacing bayesian incentive compatibility by the stronger requirement of dominant strategies we identify contexts where it is possible to change the transfer payments of an optimal bayesian mechanism so as to create dominant strategies and yet leave every participant s expected utility unchanged we also address the issue of multiple equilibria and unique implementation contexts where these results apply include auctions bilateral bargaining procurement contracting and intrafirm resource allocation

the conditional auction mechanism for sharing a surplus a first bid auction to allocate the leadership role is used to choose a public decision and a balanced set of transfers the mechanism is shown to implement an equal sharing of the surplus above the average utility level at the equilibrium an agent s message reveals the other agent s utility when only two players are involved and the exact value of the joint surplus a variety of other contexts allow for the construction of similar auction like mechanisms displaying the same mirror image effect

amicable divorce dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms abstract this paper considers mechanisms for allocating the assets of a dissolving partnership that can be specified without information on the distribution of valuations of the asset or the level of risk aversion of the participants for the case of a single asset and risk averse agents three simple mechanisms are considered these mechanisms can be ranked in terms of ex post efficiency and partially ranked in terms of interim expected utility the efficiency of the alternating selection mechanism is considered for environments when there are many items to be allocated agents are risk neutral and transfers are prohibited conditions are given when a myopic strategy of picking the most preferred abailable item forms an equilibrium and these conditions are satisfied under independence under the further assumption of identical distributions of valuations it is shown that the total expected efficiency loss is at most 1 2 of the maximal value of a single item regardless of how many items are to be allocated

heterogeneous firms and the organization of production firms in the same industry exhibit systematic differences in the organization of production and the structure of employment entrepreneurial ability is the specific scarce input that limits the size of a firm this input must be allocated to two activities coordinating production and monitoring workers able entrepreneurs can convert calendar time into larger supplies of coordinating effort that enable them to assemble large firms greater ability implies a higher shadow price of time which increases the implicit costs of monitoring a dispersion of entrepreneurial abilities generates an equilibrium size distribution of firms differences in monitoring costs affect the choice of worker productivities the design of products and the organization of production the monitoring cost hypothesis advanced in this paper goes a long way in explaining the equilibrium of an industry containing heterogeneous firms that differ in size and behavior

nash equilibrium and welfare optimality if is a set of social alternatives a social choice rule scr assigns a subset of a to each potential profile of individuals preferences over a where the subset is interpreted as the set of welfare optima a game form or mechanism implements the social choice rule if for any potential profile of preferences 1 any welfare optimum can arise as a nash equilibrium of the game form implying in particular that a nash equilibrium exists and 2 all nash equilibria are welfare optimal the main result of this paper establishes that any scr that satisfies two properties monotonicity and no veto power can be implemented by a game form if there are three or more individuals the proof is constructive

implementation in minimax regret equilibrium this note studies the problem of implementing social choice correspondences in environments where individuals have doubts about the rationality of their opponents we postulate the concept of minimax regret as our solution concept and show that social choice correspondences that are maskin monotonic and satisfy the no veto power condition are implementable in minimax regret equilibrium for all 0 1

self disclosure at international cartels we study revelation behavior at illegal international cartels our hypotheses suggest that a resource advantage induces executives of large multinational enterprises mnes to be more likely to reveal the cartel and to cooperate with the antitrust agency during the prosecution stage moreover we expect the cultural background to influence the firm s inclination to reveal incriminating evidence empirical tests based on data about cartel breakdowns under the eu leniency program show that large mnes are indeed more likely to reveal the cartel however they largely fail to explain variation in legal actions along cultural dimensions