women ask for less only from men evidence from bargaining in the field abstract data from a tv show provide the opportunity to study gender differences and gender interaction effects in bargaining with sizable stakes a proposer and a responder who is selected by the proposer bargain over a fixed pie proposers are in a stronger bargaining position because they have a positive outside option and information on the size of the pie while responders have neither the matching between male proposers and female responders stands as the most favorable for proposers women as responders demand less only from male proposers which explains the difference in earnings

are contributions to public pension programmes a tax on employment many studies describe the potentially adverse impact on employment of the payroll costs of financing public pension programmes conventionally empirical studies treat contributions to public pension programmes as a pure tax in for example calculations of the tax wedge by oecd but this approach ignores any future rights to benefits that are perceived by contributors in fact public pension programmes contain both an actuarial and a redistributive component the former closer to saving the latter a tax the paper constructs indicators of the tax component of pension programmes both between and within generations across a range of oecd countries and time periods it uses these measures in a cross country panel analysis of the determinants of age and gender specific economic activity rates the results reveal robust evidence that when public pension programme contributions are broken down into a tax component and a savings component the tax component of the payroll contribution reduces economic activity rates among women while a higher retirement saving component has the opposite effect there is little evidence that average tax rates however constructed have any adverse impact on the economic activity rates of men richard disney

race and gender discrimination in bargaining for a new car more than three hundred paired audits at new car dealerships reveal that dealers quoted significantly lower prices to white males than to black or female test buyers using identical scripted bargaining strategies ancillary evidence suggests that the dealerships disparate treatment of women and blacks may be caused by dealers statistical inferences about consumers reservation prices but the data do not strongly support any single theory of discrimination copyright 1995 by american economic association

education choices and returns on the labor and marriage markets evidence from data on subjective expectations in this paper we analyze the role of expected labor and marriage market returns as determinants of the college enrollment decisions of mexican high school graduates moreover we investigate whether the relative weights of these factors differ by gender we use data on individuals expectations regarding future labor market outcomes which we directly elicited from the youths and two different measures of marriage market returns first marriage market returns are proxied by the net supply of potential partners in the youths local marriage markets second we use data which elicits youths beliefs about their future spouse s earnings conditional on their own education level we find that labor market as well as marriage market returns are important determinants of the college enrollment decision however boys and girls preferences differ in terms of the relative role of the two determinants in that the relative weight of labor market versus marriage market returns is larger for boys than for girls

the visible hand race and online market outcomes we examine the effect of race on market outcomes by selling ipods through local online classified advertisements throughout the us each advertisement features a photograph including a dark or light skinned hand or one with a wrist tattoo black sellers receive fewer and lower offers than white sellers and the correspondence with black sellers indicates lower levels of trust black sellers outcomes are particularly poor in thin markets suggesting that discrimination may not survive competition among buyers and those with the most racial isolation and property crime consistent with channels through which statistical discrimination might operate economic outcomes in the us are highly correlated with race but the causal mechanisms underlying these correlations are not well understood in particular it remains unclear how much of the correlation is due to discrimination and how much is due to other characteristics that are correlated with race such as education there is an extensive literature on the effect of race on market outcomes focusing on both labour and goods including housing markets however discrimination is not a monolithic phenomenon and it is important to investigate its extent and causes in a variety of different contexts across which they may differ our study asks the following question when the typical person engages in a consumer transaction usually as a buyer does he or she try to avoid dealing with minority sellers and does she treat minority sellers differently

equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining this paper considers a market where pairs of agents who are interested in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process and upon meeting initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction the basic bargaining problem is treated with the strategic approach the paper derives the steady state equilibrium agreements analyzes their dependence on market conditions such as the relative numbers of agents of different types and discusses their relations with the competitive equilibrium outcome and other results in the search equilibrium literature this paper considers a market that operates in the following way pairs of agents who have mutual interest in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process when two agents meet they initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction if two agents reach an agreement a transaction takes place and they leave the market of course the bargaining positions and hence the agreement reached in any particular meeting will be affected by the conditions prevailing in the market these will include the chances that each of the negotiating parties have of meeting other partners in the event that the agreement in the current negotiations is delayed also the expected length of time required to achieve an alternative transaction and the expected behavior of alternative partners the study of such a market mechanism is of interest for two reasons firstly it captures some realistic aspects of the trade in certain specific markets e g asset markets such as housing and some labor markets secondly it contributes to an understanding of the micro mechanisms of price formation and their role in shaping market outcomes in both cases the features studied are largely neglected in the traditional market equilibrium analyses the related literature includes the articles by diamond 4 5 diamond and maskin 6 mortensen 8 9 and zusman and bell 13 these articles consider markets of the type described above in which transactions are concluded at pairwise meetings of agents the major difference between our work and these articles is in the approach to the basic bargaining problem in the cited articles it is assumed that a meeting is concluded with an instantaneous agreement which divides the associated surplus in an arbitrary predetermined way when the surplus is assumed to be divided equally the division rule is in fact nash s axiomatic bargaining solution in contrast the present paper treats the basic bargaining problem with the strategic approach see rubinstein 19 which constitutes an attempt to look into the bargaining black box this approach explicitly models the time dimension of the bargaining process describes in detail the bargaining procedure and justifies the agreement as a perfect equilibrium in

what s in a picture evidence of discrimination from prosper com abstract we find evidence of significant racial disparities in a new type of credit market known as peer to peer lending loan listings with blacks in the attached picture are 25 to 35 percent less likely to receive funding than those of whites with similar credit profiles despite the higher average interest rates charged to blacks lenders making such loans earn a lower net return compared to loans made to whites with similar credit profiles because blacks have higher relative default rates these results provide insight into whether the discrimination we find is taste based or statistical

prejudice and wages an empirical assessment of becker s the economics of discrimination we test the predictions from becker s 1957 seminal work on employer prejudice and find that relative black wages a vary negatively with the prejudice of the marginal white in a state b vary negatively with the prejudice in the lower tail of the prejudice distribution but are unaffected by the prejudice of the most prejudiced persons in a state and c vary negatively with the fraction of a state that is black our estimates suggest that one quarter of the racial wage gap is due to prejudice with nontrivial consequences for black lifetime earnings

what drives taxi drivers a field experiment on fraud in a market for credence goods credence goods are characterized by informational a symmetries between sellers and consumers that invite fraudulent behavior by seller s this paper presents the results of a natural field experiment on taxi rides in athens g reece set up to measure different types of fraud and to examine the influence of passengers p resumed information and income on the extent of fraud results reveal that taxi drivers c heat passengers in systematic ways passengers with inferior information about optimal routes are taken on longer detours while asymmetric information on the local tariff system l eads to manipulated bills higher income seems to lead to more fraud

do women shy away from competition do men compete too much we examine whether men and women of the same ability differ in their selection into a competitive environment participants in a laboratory experiment solve a real task first under a noncompetitive piece rate and then a competitive tournament incentive scheme although there are no gender differences in performance men select the tournament twice as much as women when choosing their compensation scheme for the next performance while 73 percent of the men select the tournament only 35 percent of the women make this choice this gender gap in tournament entry is not explained by performance and factors such as risk and feedback aversion only playa negligible role instead the tournament entry gap is driven by men being more overconfident and by gender differences in preferences for performing in a competition the result is that women shy away from competition and men embrace it

incomplete information bargaining with outside opportunities we consider two kinds of outside opportunity that a seller of an indivisible good might have selling to a different buyer and consuming the good herself in both models the seller is uncertain about the buyer s valuation and becomes more pessimistic over time when the seller becomes sufficiently pessimistic she prefers the outside opportunity so she will not bargain indefinitely with the current buyer despite the resulting finite horizon nature of negotiations the link between the buyer s willingness to accept an offer and the seller s eagerness to go outside generates multiple equilibria

dealer price discrimination in new car purchases evidence from the consumer expenditure survey this paper documents the variation in dealer discounts for new cars using transactions price data from the consumer expenditure survey consumer specific characteristics fail to explain dealer discounts whereas model market specific and purchase transaction variables e g first time purchase trade in and financing through dealer do explain them the results contradict earlier findings of race and gender discrimination based on a controlled experiment this contradiction is reconciled by examining the higher moments of the empirical discount distribution while mean and median markups do not vary by race and gender minority purchases are characterized by higher dispersion this may rationalize the disparate treatment of minorities by dealers documented in the controlled experiment

gender differences in bargaining outcomes a field experiment on discrimination abstract relying on a commonly used fixed offer bargaining script we examine gender differences in bargaining outcomes in a highly competitive and frequently used market the taxi market in lima peru our bargaining script secures that only the seller can change prices and terminate negotiations thus we are able to examine differences in the seller s entire path of negotiation and in the reservation price at which they are willing to trade we find that male and female passengers who use the same bargaining script are not treated equally men face higher initial prices final prices and rejection rates these differences are consistent with male drivers being more reluctant to give in to demanding negotiations by male passengers and with male passengers being perceived as having high valuations to identify whether taste based or statistical discrimination drives the inferior treatment of men we conduct an experiment where passengers send a signal on valuation before negotiating the signal eliminates gender differences and the response is shown only to be consistent with statistical discrimination thus in the limiting case of a highly competitive market with experienced traders we do not find evidence of taste based discrimination the differential observed is however consistent with statistical discrimination

discrimination nepotism and long run wage differentials the wage discrimination model developed by becker has been criticized for predicting that competitive forces will lead to the disappearance of racial discrimination in the long run we have reformulated the model in terms of nepotism toward white workers rather than discrimination against black workers in this new framework both nepotistic and taste neutral firms are expected to survive the competitive struggle in the long run therefore the new framework is consistent with long run as well as short run racial wage differentials

neoliberal economic policies and infant and child mortality simulation analysis of a chilean paradox abstract the paradox of deteriorating living standards for the poorest coexisting with declining infant and child mortality rates during the 1970s is explained by a simultaneous model where these rates and the birth rate are endogenous partial and general equilibrium results conflict some apparently satisfactory policy tools have counterproductive impacts action on small groups of selected policy variables is more effective than overall economic and social welfare expansion and policy effects differ according to social class the role of midwife visits average real earnings and cheap energy for poor urban households are emphasized perversely high unemployment also contributed to the actual mortality decline during the period

orchestrating impartiality the impact of blind auditions on female musicians a change in the audition procedures of symphony orchestras adoption of blind auditions with a screen to conceal the candidate s identity from the jury provides a test for sex biased hiring using data from actual auditions in an individual fixed effects framework we find that the screen increases the probability a woman will be advanced and hired although some of our estimates have large standard errors and there is one persistent effect in the opposite direction the weight of the evidence suggests that the blind audition procedure fostered impartiality in hiring and increased the proportion women in symphony orchestras

gender differences in experimental wage negotiations i introduction gender wage gaps have been the subject of extensive research in labor economics although this gap has narrowed in the last decades blau and kahn 2003 report that women still receive lower wages than men in many countries traditionally differences in the accumulation of human capital and discrimination are seen as the main factors responsible for this wage gap bertrand 2011 however even after controlling for various measures of human capital the wages of men and women differ significantly and this wage gap persists over time recently alternative explanations have been analyzed more closely such as gender differences in preferences croson and gneezy 2009 risk attitudes eckel and grossman 2008 and responses to competitive situations gneezy leonard and list 2009 in many labor relationships wages are determined by bilateral bargaining hence another source of the persistent gender wage gap could be differences in bargaining behavior between women and men babcock and laschever 2003 find that 57 of male graduate business students bargain over their starting salaries while only 7 of women do so consequently male starting salaries are 7 6 higher than those obtained by women investigating the salary negotiating behaviors and starting salary outcomes of graduating master of business administration mba students gerhart and rynes 1991 find that women obtain lower salary increments when negotiating than men wood et al 1993 report significant male female pay differences of law school graduates both 1 year and 15 years after graduation apart from wages team production hiring and promotion decisions are further domains where significant gender differences emerge sutter et al 2009 at least some of these differences might also be related to differences in the bargaining behavior of men and women this paper studies whether men and women behave differently in wage negotiations 1 the analysis is based on a laboratory experiment with face to face alternating offers wage bargaining allowing experimental subjects to see each other in face to face negotiations and thus to easily identify their bargaining partner s gender allows us to analyze gender differences our results suggest that gender and gender pairing play an important role in bargaining processes in our experimental wage negotiations male employees are able to negotiate higher wages than female employees moreover male employers pay lower wages to female employees than female employers pay to male employees we find that men acting as employees achieve more favorable outcomes than female employees because they already demand a larger share for themselves when making their first offers when acting as employers we do not find behavioral differences between men and women overall these results provide further evidence that part of the gender wage gap can be attributed to behavioral differences in wage negotiations the paper is organized as follows section ii provides a brief review of the literature on gender differences in bargaining experiments in section iii we present our experimental design section iv discusses the effects of gender and gender pairing in the bargaining process section v concludes ii gender differences and bargaining a number of studies have examined differences in the behavior of women and men in bargaining situations in a controlled field study ayres and siegelman 1995 analyze the bargaining outcomes of men and women negotiating the price of a new car they report that car sellers offer male buyers lower prices than female buyers ayres 1991 finds that women obtain worse bargaining outcomes than men negotiating with a female seller save soderbergh 2009 finds that female university graduates propose lower wage bids than male university graduates and also receive lower wage offers than male students conducting field experiments in lima peru castillo et al

male female wage differentials and policy responses without implicating them for any of the contents of the paper i am grateful to the following for helpful discussions or comments andrea beller university of illinois david bloom harvard and columnbia glen cain university of wisconsin ron ehrenberg cornell victor fuchs stanford bob gregory australian national university jonathan leonard university of california berkeley roberta robb brock university and paul weiler harvard financial support of the humanities and social sciences committee of the research board of the universitu of toronto is eratefullu acknowlede ed

wages employment and statistical discrimination evidence from the laboratory i introduction while taste based discrimination becker 1957 is driven by prejudice research on statistical discrimination attempts to explain differential treatment of individuals unrelated to prejudice in essence statistical discrimination results when the actual or assumed statistical properties of a group are applied to anyone belonging to that group differential treatment based on lower average outcomes of one s group e g minorities females was considered a starting point for modeling of statistical discrimination see phelps 1972 however labor market researchers then considered that statistical discrimination could result from measures other than the average outcomes of one s group see aigner and cain 1977 lundberg and startz 1983 theoretical models have explored various reasons why statistical discrimination might arise in varied contexts most notable are the models based on differential screening or communication costs cornell and welch 1996 lang 1986 noisier productivity signals see discussion in aigner and cain 1977 or incomplete information lundberg and startz 1983 1 field studies some of which involve experimental manipulations have uncovered evidence of statistical discrimination in mortgage lending ladd 1998 auto sales ayers and siegelman 1995 goldberg 1996 harless and hoffer 2002 sports card price negotiations list 2004 law enforcement decisions applebaum 1996 exam grading hanna and linden 2012 taxi fare negotiations castillo et al 2013 and vehicle repair estimates gneezy and list 2006 in labor markets some discrimination may be due to factors other than productivity characteristics neumark 1999 but the evidence for statistical discrimination based on race has been elusive see altonji and pierret 2001 identifying statistical discrimination from field data is complicated by the fact that it may arise as first moment or second moment statistical discrimination and they are difficult to disentangle empirically more controlled laboratory studies have also examined statistical discrimination anderson and haupert 1999 castillo and petrie 2010 davis 1987 dickinson and oaxaca 2009 fershtman and gneezy 2001 masclet peterle and larribeau 2012 2 findings from these laboratory studies indicate that statistical discrimination may result from aversion to risk mistaken stereotypes biased probability assessments or incomplete information the benefit of the laboratory approach is our ability to control and cleanly identify the source of the discrimination if it exists whether taste based or statistical discrimination is most always measured along a single dimension such as vehicle pricing labor market wages group choice or job assignments 3 however in many instances multiple avenues for discrimination exist simultaneously and to focus on only one may produce a systematically biased view of the prevalence of statistically based discrimination 4 in this paper we examine statistical discrimination in a controlled experimental environment statistical discrimination in our study can only be based on productivity distribution risk attached to worker groups we not only cleanly separate taste based from statistical discrimination but we also cleanly isolate second moment statistical discrimination in a way not possible from field data building on dickinson and oaxaca 2009 our key contribution is to examine an environment in which discrimination may be exercised simultaneously along the dimensions of both wages and employment rates this more closely approximates the field environments we hope to study where discrimination may exist in terms of labor market wages and or hiring practices auto sales prices and or sales rates mortgage rates and or home sales as in dickinson and oaxaca 2009 subjects negotiate in a simulated labor market where worker subjects are given an induced common knowledge productivity distribution

shopping while female who pays higher prices and why i estimate gender price discrimination in the ugandan antimalarial drug market with an audit study to determine whether results are consistent with statistical or taste based discrimination i contrast gender results with results by ethnicity tribe vendors initially offer women prices that are 0 12 3 percent higher however women are 16 percentage points more likely to successfully bargain for a discount resulting in no differential in price paid results are stronger among majority tribe females i find no differences in drug quality both women and minorities report better service quality offer price differentials suggest statistical discrimination there is no differential for prices paid

disagreement in markets with matching and bargaining this paper develops an explanation of why bargainers often terminate negotiations in disagreement in spite of positive expected gains from continued negotiation the key to the analysis is a model which embeds bargaining activity within a market agents are continually faced with the choice between continuing to bargain with an existing partner or searching for a new partner bargainers may then terminate negotiations without an agreement in spite of positive expected gains from continued bargaining because seeking a new bargaining partner promises a higher return

gender bias and credit access we extract an exogenous measure of gender bias from survey responses by descendants of u s immigrants on questions about the role of women in society we then use data on around 6 000 small business firms from 17 countries and find that in high gender bias countries female entrepreneurs are more likely to opt out of the loan application process and to resort to informal finance even though banks do not appear to actively discriminate against them these results are not driven by credit risk differences between female and male owned firms or by any idiosyncrasies in the set of countries in our sample

performance in competitive environments gender differences even though the provision of equal opportunities for men and women has been a priority in many countries large gender differences prevail in competitive high ranking positions suggested explanations include discrimination and differences in preferences and human capital in this paper we present experimental evidence in support of an additional factor women may be less effective than men in competitive environments even if they are able to perform similarly in non competitive environments in a laboratory experiment we observe as we increase the competitiveness of the environment a significant increase in performance for men but not for women this results in a significant gender gap in performance in tournaments while there is no gap when participants are paid according to piece rate this effect is stronger when women have to compete against men than in single sex competitive environments this suggests that women may be able to perform in competitive environments per se