selecting suitable compensation plans of executive stock options theoretical and empirical works have emphasized that executive stock option plans play an important role in compensation management and corporate governance owing to the incentives to increase firm stock price and volatility levels this study not only proposes models of executive stock options and constructs value matched financial variables for comparing the incentive effects towards these options but also develops an empirical study exploring the characteristics of executive stock options and suitable compensation management for companies this investigation examines the daily value and compares incentive effects of six kinds of executive stock options with the empirical data of tsmc the world s largest dedicated semiconductor foundry which is listed on the tse and nyse empirical results indicate that purchased options would be the best choice for companies that are unsuitable to undertake risky investments while the relative indexed options are appropriate for bear markets and good for companies

ecological economic viability as a criterion of strong sustainability under uncertainty strong sustainability according to the common definition requires that different natural and economic capital stocks be maintained as physical quantities separately yet in a world of uncertainty this cannot be guaranteed to therefore define strong sustainability under uncertainty in an operational manner we propose to use the concept of viability viability means that the different components and functions of a dynamic stochastic system at any time remain in a domain where the future existence of these components and functions is guaranteed with sufficiently high probability we develop a unifying and general ecological economic concept of viability that encompasses the traditional ecological and economic notions of viability as special cases it provides an operational criterion of strong sustainability under a mild form of uncertainty and for medium spatial and temporal scales we illustrate this concept and demonstrate its usefulness by applying it to livestock grazing management in semi arid rangelands publication ecological economic viability as a criterion of strong sustainability under uncertainty available from https www researchgate net publication 46490456 ecological economic viability as a criterion of strong sustainability under uncertainty accessed apr 3 2017

ironing out the kinks in executive compensation linking incentive pay to average stock prices abstract traditional stock option grant is the most common form of incentive pay in executive compensation applying a principal agent analysis we find this common practice suboptimal and firms are better off linking incentive pay to average stock prices among other benefits averaging reduces volatility by about 42 making the incentive pay more attractive to risk averse executives holding the cost of the option grant to the firm constant asian stock options are more cost effective than traditional stock options and provide stronger incentives to increase stock price more importantly the improvement is achieved with little impact on the option grant s risk incentives after adjusting for option cost finally averaging also improves the value and incentive effects of indexed stock options

agricultural price distortions trends and volatility past and prospective thanks are due to the australian research council the rural industries research and development corporation and the world bank for financial assistance

the role of uncertainty and expectations in modeling range land use strategies an application of dynamic optimization modeling with recursion abstract this paper presents a bio economic optimization modeling approach for the simulation of land use decision making by farmers faced with climatic uncertainties the approach is applied to the study of land use strategies on commercial ranches in namibia first we compare two models differing in their structure the first one is an inter temporal optimization model forward looking with perfect foresight while the second is recursive and it explicitly incorporates uncertainty in the decision making process second we point out the structural advantage of the recursive optimization model in its ability to simulate how decision makers perceptions on the occurrence of stochastic events alter land use strategies and their economic and ecological outcomes both models make use of a state and transition conceptual framework to depict the bio economic feedback we found that the incorporation of rainfall uncertainty in decision making is crucial when modeling land use strategies in highly variable ecological economic systems such as ranches in arid rain fed areas where knowledge of rainfall distribution is inaccurate due to lack of experience or climate change both farmers and rangelands would be better off by precautiously expecting low rainfalls finally our results show that minimizing herd size adjustment costs would support the establishment of sustainable land use strategies

managerial incentives risk aversion and debt we investigate the risk choices of risk averse ceos following recent theoretical work we expect ceo risk aversion to be more pronounced in firms with high leverage or high default probability we find that the ceos of these firms reduce firm risk even in the presence of strong risk taking incentives our results are robust to controls for the sensitivity of ceo wealth to stock price changes firm risk determinants the endogenous feedback effects of firm risk on ceo incentives unobserved firm and market effects and debt governance the impact of ceo risk aversion is economically significant

the other side of the trade off the impact of risk on executive compensation the principal agent model of executive compensation is of central importance to the modern theory of the firm and corporate governance yet the exiting empirical evidence supporting it is quite wea

risk taking in contests and the role of carrots and sticks i introduction when individuals compete for promotions bonuses or other rewards tied to their relative performance ranking vis a vis other contestants competition is likely to drive not just work effort but where imperfect monitoring permits other choices at the contestants discretion in this article we ask how rank dependent compensation influences attitudes toward risk or the choice of variance of output when contestants have opportunities to influence this aspect of their output distribution unlike previous literature we assume that it is costly for contestants to alter the variance of output and that identical contestants simultaneously choose both the mean of their output distribution i e work effort and its variance our analysis emphasizes the importance of the number of players and symmetry or lack thereof of payoffs on contestants incentives we find that contestants will engage in risk seeking increasing the variance of their output distribution in contests among three or more players when the payoff structure offers a greater prize for ranking first than the penalty for ranking last as happens in winner take all contests if the tournament organizer or sponsor values the aggregate output of the contestants as is typically assumed in labor market tournaments this risk seeking behavior is inefficient because it is costly but does not increase the expected output however we argue that many contests such as the research and development tournaments first modeled by taylor 1995 may be characterized by an organizer who cares only or primarily about the highest output achieved by a single contestant e g the best submission received in such cases the organizer may benefit from costly risk taking among contestants we show that three payoff levels a prize to the contestant ranked first a penalty to the contestant ranked last and a common intermediate payoff to all others are sufficient to achieve any combination of effort and variance of output that the organizer wishes to induce among contestants so long as the desired output variance does not exceed that which results from a winner take all prize structure therefore the sponsor s problem can be characterized as choosing the optimal mean and variance of the output distribution given the contestants costs of influencing the mean and variance of output in this way our model provides an explanation for the importance of both carrots prizes and sticks penalties in competitive settings only through the combined use of both can a contest organizer determine the effort and the variance of output chosen by contestants and doing so is necessary to achieve optimal performance from contests since the pioneering work of lazear and rosen 1981 nalebuff and stiglitz 1983 o keeffe viscusi and zeckhauser 1984 and others rank order tournaments or contests have been used to model incentives in a variety of economic settings in particular executive compensation has frequently been modeled as a tournament in which low level executives are motivated by the prospect of climbing the corporate ladder and obtaining the large salaries attendant to top ranking executives as in rosen 1986 and bognanno 2001 similarly the behavior of investment fund managers who compete for top fund rankings has been modeled as a tournament by brown harlow and starks 1996 taylor 1995 developed a model of research tournaments in which contestants search for an innovation and the best innovation submitted to the sponsor wins a prize the distinguishing feature of a tournament or contest is that contestants are paid based on the rank of their output relative to others rather than the level of output prize levels are set in advance and competition to win generates the incentive to exert effort to increase output lazear and rosen 1981 showed that rank order tournaments can provide an efficient incentive framework in a labor market setting when workers are risk neutral

does stock return predictability affect eso fair value abstract executive stock options esos are modified american options that cannot be valued using standard methods with a few exceptions the literature has discussed the eso fair value by assuming unpredictable stock returns which are not supported by the available empirical evidence in this paper we obtain the fair value of american esos when stock returns are predictable and specifically driven by the trending ornstein uhlenbeck process of lo and wang 1995 we solve the executive s portfolio allocation problem for a simple buy and hold strategy when his wealth can be distributed between a risk free asset and a market portfolio this problem is jointly solved with the executive s optimal exercise policy we find that executives tend to wait longer the higher the predictability independently of the composition of executive s asset menu we have also analyzed the implications under the fas123r proposals for the eso fair value and found that even for low autocorrelations there is a meaningful mispricing when unpredictable returns are erroneously assumed

optimal exercise prices for executive stock options although exercise prices for executive stock options can be set either below or above the grant date market price in practice virtually all options are granted at the money we offer an economic rationale for this apparent puzzle by showing that pay to performance incentives for risk averse undiversified executives are typically maximized by setting exercise prices at or near the grant date market price we provide an operationally useful alternative to black scholes 1973 for the purpose of both valuing executive stock options and measuring the incentives created by options our framework has implications not only for exercise price policies but also for indexed options option repricings exchanges of cash for stock based compensation and the design of bonus plans

pricing executive stock options under employment shocks abstract we obtain explicit expressions for the subjective objective and market value of perpetual executive stock options esos under exogenous employment shocks driven by an independent poisson process previously we obtain the executive s optimal exercise policy from the subjective valuation that is necessary for the objective one or fair value the perpetual eso is compared with the true finite maturity eso finding that the approximation is reasonably good to illustrate the usefulness of the objective valuation for accounting purposes we analyze the statistical distribution of the fair value when there is uncertainty about the employment shock intensity finally the role of esos in the design of executives incentives is also discussed

aspects of the optimal management of cyclical ecological economic systems abstract we now know that from a functional standpoint jointly determined ecological economic systems ecosystems cycle over time however because this recognition has been recent the ecological economics literature contains very few formal studies of the management of cyclical ecosystems consequently the objective of this paper is to use renewal theory to examine two ways of analyzing the optimal management of cyclical ecosystems

american garch employee stock option valuation abstract we implement a flexible simulation based approach for the fair value of employee stock option eso that accounts for the vesting period departure risk and voluntary suboptimal early exercise we introduce garch effects on the underlying asset and we analyze the price bias with respect to the constant volatility case we also perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to changes in several eso characteristics we compare this valuation with fas 123 method revealing a fas overvaluation finally we value a real eso plan providing the confidence intervals for the estimated eso prices

conservation in the optimal use of rangelands abstract in previous papers we have considered the optimal mix of biodiversity in semi arid rangelands focusing on the steady state this paper addresses the question of conservation in the optimal use of rangelands where conservation is understood to mean maintenance of the system in a natural state we consider a rangeland that may exist in one of two states in the natural state its dynamics are regulated by fire in the managed state its dynamics are regulated by grazing pressure by livestock we show that the optimal use of rangelands may include its maintenance in both states at different points in time depending on initial conditions and the set of relative prices

private information in executive stock option trades evidence of insider trading in the uk uk executives stock option exercises and associated sell decisions are motivated by private inside information executives use their inside information to lock in short term gains and to sell stock acquired prior to negative abnormal stock returns this informed trading is robust to the alternative factors that might motivate the exercise of executive stock options including option moneyness and value of exercise we suggest that the disparity in informed trading between us and uk executives option trades is related to important differences in the proportion of executive remuneration linked to options the regulation of options and the taxation of option gains

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

too much of a good incentive the case of executive stock options abstract using a utility maximization framework i show that the incentive to increase stock price does not always increase as more options are granted keeping the total cost of his compensation fixed granting more options creates greater incentives to increase stock price only if option wealth does not exceed a certain fraction of total wealth beyond this critical level granting more options actually reduces incentive effects and becomes counterproductive in addition stock options also create incentive to reduce increase idiosyncratic systematic risk these incentive effects are sensitive to the choice of exercise price

a short note on updating the grilli and yang commodity price index the grilli and yang commodity price index is one of the most widely used commodity price series in the applied economics literature this note provides some practical advice on updating this data series by listing the base period index values identifying relevant data sources and describing a method for computing subindex weights in 1988 enzo grilli and maw cheng yang published their seminal article on the long run development of an index of 24 primary commodity prices gycpi deflated by an index of manufactured goods unit values the sample of average annual primary commodity prices covers about 54 percent of the primary commodity trade in the index reference period 1977 79 the deflators considered for manufacturing prices were the u s manufacturing price index usmpi and the manufacturing unit value index muv 1widely used and discussed the grilli and yang data set has been extended by a number of researchers the data have been employed in a variety of contexts in later studies thus the gycpi data continue to enjoy wide popularity in their own right and as a benchmark for new approaches to empirical studies

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

does option compensation increase managerial risk appetite this paper solves the dynamic investment problem of a risk averse manager compensated with a call option on the assets he controls under the manager s optimal policy the option ends up either deep in or deep out of the money as the asset value goes to zero volatility goes to infinity however the option compensation does not strictly lead to greater risk seeking sometimes the manager s optimal volatility is less with the option than it would be if he were trading his own account furthermore giving the manager more options causes him to reduce volatility managers with convex compensation schemes play an important role in financial markets this paper solves for the optimal dynamic investment policy for a risk averse manager paid with a call option on the assets he controls the paper focuses on how the option compensation impacts the manager s appetite for risk when he cannot hedge the option position on one hand the convexity of the option makes the manager shun payoffs that are likely to be near the money under the optimal policy the manager either significantly outperforms his benchmark or else incurs severe losses furthermore in examples of optimal trading strategies asset volatility goes to infinity as asset value goes to zero yet option compensation does not strictly lead to greater risk seeking as asset value grows large or if the evaluation date is far away the manager moderates asset risk for example if the manager has constant relative risk aversion crra asset volatility converges to the merton constant as asset value goes to infinity in some situations the manager actually chooses a lower asset volatility than he would if he were investing on his own because the leverage inherent in his option magnifies his exposure to the asset volatility in addition with all constant or decreasing absolute risk averse utility functions from the hyperbolic absolute risk averse hara class giving the manager more options causes him to reduce asset volatility in the crra case for example the manager targets a fixed volatility for his personal

modelling loss of resilience in agroecosystems rangelands in botswana economists have recently begun to consider the questions raised by the ecological concept of resilience a measure of the degree to which a system can be perturbed before it switches from one stability domain to another at a theoretical level it has been argued that the loss of resilience in an ecological economic system involves a change in its long run productive potential but no consideration has yet been given to the empirical investigation of this this paper discusses an econometric approach to the problem using the example of semi arid rangelands the long run productive potential of the system is regarded as an unobserved state variable change in which is irreversible or at least only slowly reversible it is estimated by applying the extended nonlinear kalman filter the paper illustrates the approach using data from botswana for the period 1965 1993 the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters associated with the loss of resilience mechanism are non zero they indicate a small loss of resilience event at the end of the long drought in the 1980s however these parameters are very imprecisely estimated and are therefore statistically insignificant we find that the sensitivity of the system to exogenous shocks varies with fluctuations in both economic and non economic parameters contrary to what is usually thought to be the case the sensitivity of the system to exogenous shocks is only weakly affected by variations in offtake prices but is very strongly affected by variations in the cost of herd maintenance this suggests that offtake prices may be a weak tool for controlling the size of cattle stocks and preventing a loss of resilience on the other hand taxes on cattle stocks or grazing fees may be very effective