the retrenchment hypothesis and the extension of the franchise in england and wales does an extension of the voting franchise always increase public spending or can it be a source of retrenchment we study this question in the context of public spending on health related urban amenities in a panel of municipal boroughs from england and wales in 1868 1871 and 1886 we find evidence of a u shaped relationship between spending on urban amenities and the extension of the local voting franchise our model of taxpayer democracy suggests that the retrenchment effect was related to enfranchisement of the middle class through nation wide reforms and that these reforms might have been pareto inferior in the average borough

women s suffrage political responsiveness and child survival in american history women s choices appear to emphasize child welfare more than those of men this paper presents new evidence on how suffrage rights for american women helped children to benefit from the scientific breakthroughs of the bacteriological revolution consistent with standard models of electoral competition suffrage laws were followed by immediate shifts in legislative behavior and large sudden increases in local public health spending this growth in public health spending fueled large scale door to door hygiene campaigns and child mortality declined by 8 15 or 20 000 annual child deaths nationwide as cause specific reductions occurred exclusively among infectious childhood killers sensitive to hygienic conditions

women as policy makers evidence from a randomized policy experiment in india this paper uses political reservations for women in india to study the impact of women s leadership on policy decisions since the mid 1990 s one third of village council head positions in india have been randomly reserved for a woman in these councils only women could be elected to the position of head village councils are responsible for the provision of many local public goods in rural areas using a dataset we collected on 265 village councils in west bengal and rajasthan we compare the type of public goods provided in reserved and unreserved village councils we show that the reservation of a council seat affects the types of public goods provided specifically leaders invest more in infrastructure that is directly relevant to the needs of their own genders

democracy comes to europe franchise extension and fiscal outcomes 1830 1938 abstract this paper examines the relation between public spending and the spread of democracy in western europe during the period 1830 1938 our data set includes measures of the size of the electorate the election rule and electoral participation as well as measures of the size and composition of central government expenditures for 12 countries we estimate panel regressions and find that 1 the gradual lifting of socio economic restrictions on the voting franchise contributed to growth in government spending mainly by increasing spending on infrastructure and internal security 2 the female suffrage had a weak positive effect through spending on health education and welfare 3 the change from majority to proportional rule which took place in 10 of the countries did not contribute to growth in government spending and held back spending on health education and welfare 4 there exists weak complementarity between economic development and the spread of democracy

partisan competition growth and the franchise we present an argument for changes in the franchise in which an elite split along economic interests uses the suffrage to influence implemented policies through the influence of these policies on the character of industrialization we analyze the effects of franchise changes on economic growth we identify in the social structure of society an explanation for the connection between enfranchisement and growth when 1 there exists an economic conflict among the elite 2 landed classes are not politically strong and 3 there exists a critical mass of industrial workers we observe both growth and democratization the lack of conditions 1 or 2 resolves in stagnant autocracies while the absence of condition 3 drives growth deterring democratic expansions we provide historical support for our argument by analyzing the experience of eleven countries

oligarchy democracy inequality and growth abstract this paper analyses the dynamics of inequality democratization and economic development in a political economy model of growth where education is both the engine of growth and a determinant of political participation in a context with imperfect capital markets we investigate the incentives for an educated oligarchy to subsidize the poor s education and to initiate a democratic transition we characterize the equilibrium patterns of political institutions income distribution and growth as a function of the initial income and inequalities in particular we identify circumstances under which the elite promotes the endogenous emergence of a middle class for purely political economy reasons a simple linear infinite horizon framework is then presented in this setting we discuss the importance of historical dependence for long run social stratification and redistribution

an economic model of representative democracy this paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office the approach has a number of attractive features first it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by as well as of the people second the model is analytically tractable being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally third it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy

inequality democracy and the protection of property rights motivated by the observed relevance of institutional quality such as strong property rights for economic performance this research considers the emergence of property rights protection as a political outcome it argues that the support for such protection is greater the more equal income distribution and the smaller political bias when these conditions initially hold the politically influential rich elite may prefer to relinquish its power through democratisation in order to commit future policy makers to the enforcement of property rights thus ensuring larger investment and faster growth along the transition path in a very unequal economy however such democratisation will not take place

timber price dynamics following a natural catastrophe catastrophic shocks to existing stocks of a renewable resource can cause long run price shifts with timber these long run price shifts may be accompanied by a short run price drop due to salvage hurricane hugo damaged 20 of southern pine timber in the south carolina coastal plain in 1989 to estimate the short and long run effects of the hurricane on the prices of timber stocks we estimated an intervention model of the residuals of cointegration of south carolina sawtimber and pulpwood stumpage prices with prices of similar products from other regions modeling revealed a 30 negative price spike due to salvage and a long run enhancement effect leading to prices that are 10 to 30 higher than they would have been had hugo not occurred

the incidence of regional taxes in a general equilibrium framework abstract a six region general equilibrium model of the united states is presented and used to evaluate the incidence of state local business taxes because this formulation allows for labor and capital mobility the provision of public goods distinctions between household and business level taxes and the interaction of state local and federal tax systems numerical analysis is particularly appropriate simulations show that capital improvements generally bear the average economy wide burden of business taxes levied on them regardless of whether a multilateral or unilateral policy change is considered or whether the alternative tax is imposed on immobile resources or household income however for other factors of production both mobile andimmobile the effects vary across scenarios a demonstration that incidence should not be thought of as a single outcome or value

changing the name of the game rsa indigenous and inward investors and the national assembly for wales the recent rejection of british aerospace s bae application for 25m in regional selective assistance rsa for its broughton facility in north wales and subsequent granting of 19 5m in other aid packages has highlighted an important policy issue now facing development areas across the uk in particular how do governments balance the ability of foreign investors to lever increasingly scarce economic development resources from central coffers on a continuing almost automatic basis against the new policy agenda which is focusing to a much higher degree on the needs of indigenous firms using a new database on rsa to contrast the fortunes of bae with those of several prominent inward investors this article illustrates the complex political economy that now surrounds grant decisions in post devolution uk

why did the elites extend the suffrage democracy and the scope of government with an application to britain s age of reform a new rationale is presented for why an elite may want to expand the franchise even in the absence of threats to the established order expanding the franchise can turn politicians away from particularistic politics based on ad personam redistribution within the elite and foster competition based on programs with diffuse benefits if these programs are valuable a majority of the elite votes in favor of an extension of the franchise despite the absence of a threat from the disenfranchised we argue that the evolution of public spending and of political competition in nineteenth century britain is consistent with our model i introduction at the beginning of the nineteenth century in most countries narrow elites had a disproportionate influence on public affairs even in england where parliament was an influential institution suffrage was mostly the privilege of the wealthy and some members of parliament were elected in boroughs with as few as 100 voters while cities such as manchester did not have any representative a century later most western countries had universal male suffrage with female suffrage to arrive shortly thereafter what brought about this democratic revolution in many cases the elites were forced out of power after violent revolutions however there are important examples such as england where democratization took the form of gradual extensions of the suffrage and these were accompanied by little overt violence it is the peculiar pride of england that the record of social and political reform is to be found on the statute book not in the annals of revolution cheyney 1931 p vii such peaceful democratizations are difficult to rationalize within the benchmark political economic models in those models extending the franchise dilutes the elite s power to influence policy and results

the effect of the expansion of the voting franchise on the size of government this paper examines the claim that expansion of the voting franchise has been an important factor in the growth of government state government spending and state and local spending are explained using a panel of 46 states for 1950 88 elimination of poll taxes and literacy tests led to higher turnout particularly among the poor and a poorer pivotal voter as predicted we find that these changes a fall in the income of voters relative to state income and the ouster of republicans from state government led to a sharp rise in welfare spending but no change in other spending

inequality in landownership the emergence of human capital promoting institutions and the great divergence this paper suggests that inequality in the distribution of landownership adversely affected the emergence of human capital promoting institutions e g public schooling and thus the pace and the nature of the transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy contributing to the emergence of the great divergence in income per capita across countries the prediction of the theory regarding the adverse effect of the concentration of landownership on education expenditure is established empirically based on evidence from the beginning of the 20th century in the u s

policy review section in this policy review section gerry stoker of the institute of local government studies presents a critical review of the role of urban development corporations udcs in comparing the experience of the udcs consideration is given to the varying nature of the land and property market in each udc area to the relationship with local authorities and other local bodies and the regeneration strategies pursued by the udcs this is followed by an assessment of the impact of the udcs in economic social and political terms in the second article john britton of the university of toronto examines the theoretical case for interventionist public policies to assist the innovation process in small and medium sized enterprises these arguments are supported by a review of the experience of various national support programmes introduced in the uk in particular the manufacturing advisory service introduced in 1978 and the design advisory service launched in 1982

environmental and distributional impacts of conservation targeting strategies abstract resource purchasing funds have become a major tool for environmental protection and resource conservation these funds use various strategies to target resources for conservation the choice of which may lead to striking differences in environmental performance this paper develops an analytical framework to analyze the impact of alternative targeting strategies on different interest groups including consumers producers labor and environmentalists we show that ignoring the output price effect of purchasing funds reduces environmental gain and in some cases may make a purchasing fund counterproductive and we argue that the optimal design of targeting criteria must consider the price feedback effect

slavery education and inequality abstract we investigate the effect of slavery on the current level of income inequality across us counties we find that a larger proportion of slaves over population in 1860 persistently increases inequality and in particular inequality across races we also show that a crucial channel of transmission from slavery to racial inequality is human capital accumulation i e current inequality is primarily influenced by slavery through the unequal educational attainment of blacks and whites finally we provide suggestive evidence that the underlying links run through the political exclusion of former slaves and the resulting negative influence on the local provision of education

land and power theory and evidence from chile many employment relationships concede rents to workers depending on the political institutions the presence of such rents allows employers to use the threat of withdrawing them to control their workers political behavior such as their votes in the absence of secret ballot we examine the effects of the introduction of the secret ballot in chile in 1958 on voting behavior before the reforms localities with more pervasive patron client relationships tended to exhibit a much stronger support for the right wing parties traditionally associ ated with the landed oligarchy after the reform however this difference across localities completely disappeared jel d72 n46 o13 o15 o17

can mandated political representation increase policy influence for disadvantaged minorities theory and evidence from india accountable governments often fail to reflect the interests of disadvantaged minorities this paper exploits the institutional features of political reservation as practiced in indian states to examine the role of mandated political representation in providing disadvantaged groups influence over policy making ifind that political reservation has increased transfers to groups which benefit from the mandate this finding also suggests that complete policy commitment may be absent in democracies as is found in this case jel d72 d78 hl 1 h50

persistence of power elites and institutions we construct a model to study the implications of changes in political insti tutions for economic institutions a change in political institutions alters the distribution of de jure political power but creates incentives for investments in de facto political power to partially or even fully offset change in de jure power the model can imply a pattern of captured democracy whereby a democratic regime may survive but choose economic institutions favoring an elite the model provides conditions under which economic or policy outcomes will be invariant to changes in political institutions and economic institutions them selves will persist over time jel d02 d72 the domination of an organized minority over the unor ganized majority is inevitable the power of any minority is irresistible as against each single individual in the majority who stands alone before the totality of the organized minor ity at the same time the minority is organized for the very reason that it is a minority

clientelism in indian villages abstract we study the operation of local governments panchayats in rural maharashtra india using a survey that we designed for this end elections are freely contested fairly tallied highly p

the effect of regional policy on manufacturing investment and capital stock within the u k between 1959 and 1978 rees r d and miall r h c 1981 the effect of regional policy on manufacturing investment and capital stock within the u k between 1959 and 1978 reg studies 15 415 424 the impact of u k regional policy on manufacturing investment and capital stock is examined this paper establishes that the distribution of both investment and capital stock within the u k varies with the changing phases of regional policy and that when the policy was at its strongest a sizeable proportion of u k manufacturing investment may have been diverted by the policy to the three main development area da regions no evidence was found for the hypotheses either that the policy had a greater effect the more capital intensive the industry or that it influenced the capital intensity of existing industries in das

why did the west extend the franchise democracy inequality and growth in historical perspective during the nineteenth century most western societies extended voting rights a decision that led to unprecedented redistributive programs we argue that these political reforms can be viewed as strategic decisions by the political elite to prevent widespread social unrest and revolution political transition rather than redistribution under existing political institutions occurs because current transfers do not ensure future transfers while the extension of the franchise changes future political equilibria and acts as a commitment to redistribution our theory also offers a novel explanation for the kuznets curve in many western economies during this period with the fall in inequality following redistribution due to democratization i introduction the nineteenth century was a period of fundamental political reform and unprecedented changes in taxation and redistribution britain for example was transformed from an oligarchy run by an elite to a democracy the franchise was extended in 1832 and then again in 1867 and 1884 transferring voting rights to portions of the society with no previous political representation the decades after the political reforms witnessed radical social reforms increased taxation and the extension of education to the masses moreover as noted by kuznets inequality which was previously increasing started to decline during this period the gini coefficient for income inequality in england and wales had risen from 0 400 in 1823 to 0 627 in 1871 but fell to 0 443 in 1901 two key factors in the reduction in inequality were the increase in the proportion of skilled workers williamson 1985 and the redistribution of income toward the poorer segments of the society for example taxes rose from 8 12 percent of national product in 1867 to 18 8 percent by 1927 and the progressivity of the tax system increased substantially see lindert 1989

a test of the hotelling rule using old growth timber data the paper tests hotelling s prediction that scarcity rent for a non renewable resource will rise at the rate of discount in a market equilibrium we perform the test using data for old growth timber a resource that is effectively non renewable in contrast to previous studies for this resource a measure of scarcity rent is directly observable in the form of stumpage price bids in timber auctions we construct a model that allows for replanting and captures the institutional framework of the western u s timber market the modified hotelling rule that we derive is not rejected in several of our specifications

policy evaluation as science a critical assessment during theh last few years policy evaluation has become an important area of research urban and regional policies have been subjected to more detailed scrutiny than ever before yet the gowing body of evaluative research remains isolated from many wider debates in the social and economic sciences this can be attributed partly to the predilection for scientific methods caused by the apparent certainty and objectivity they confer this orientatioin is reflected in the tendency to separate evaluation from the policy process the narrow perspective of many evaluative studies the emphasis on quantification the mechanical approach to analysis and the inattention paid to undestanding causal processes

the political class and redistributive policies we study the eect of the composition of the political class on the size of government first we use a citizen candidate model to show that the extension of surage may be inconsequential for government spending when there are pre existing stricter requirements for holding oce we then test this prediction empirically using data from the 13 u s original colonies we nd that the extension of the franchise did not aect government spending or the composition of the political class however the subsequent elimination of economic qualications to hold oce increased government spending and enriched the class heterogeneity

a micro level approach to the analysis of the displacement effects of regional incentive policy the case of finland tervo h 1989 a micro level approach to the analysis of the displacement effects of regional incentive policy the case of finland reg studies 23 511 521 this paper analyses the impact of regional incentive policy from the point of view of efficiency contrary to usual practice a micro level approach is used four possibilities for displacement effects to arise are proposed displacement may be either direct or indirect and simultaneously directed either at existing or potential production the empirical results concerning the situation of finland suggest that regional policy has been more than a zero sum game between the assisted and non assisted areas during the period 1975 81 tervo h 1989 une micro analyse des effets de deplacement de la politique d incitations a finalite regionale cas d etude de la finlande reg studies 23 511 521 cet article analyse les effets de la politique d incitations a finalite regionale du point de vue de l efficience a l encontre de la pratique recue il s ag

self interest agency theory and political voting behavior the ratification of the united states constitution two hundred years ago the united states constitution replaced the articles of confederation as the fundamental law of the land when new hampshire became the ninth state to ratify the constitution on june 21 1788 the document represented the successful culmination of a movement to strengthen the national government scholars long have debated the possible causes for this important change in political institutions see james hutson 1984 a change which was to have major consequences for the development of the nation douglass north 1981 ch 14 despite the intense debate few scholars have either offered any theoretical model of the delegates voting behavior or employed formal statistical analysis to test their hypotheses about voting behavior at the 13 state ratifying conventions these omissions are surprising particularly since charles a beard 1913 long ago stated that the contest over ratification represented the ultimate test of the role of economic interests in the making of the constitution a test he never conducted given the recent interest exhibited by economists in explaining political behavior the absence of a rigorous analysis of voting at the 13 ratifying conventions is even more surprising economists and economic historians have all but ignored the ratification process in a progress report on our study of the making of the constitution we robert mcguire and robert ohsfeldt 1984 recently provided a tentative theoretical model and summarized preliminary indications drawn from incomplete data of delegates voting behavior during the drafting and ratification of the constitution more recently we mcguire and ohsfeldt 1986 mcguire 1988 presented the final results of our econometric studies of the voting behavior during the drafting of the constitution at the federal convention of 1787 in the present paper we offer a principalagent model and econometric tests of voting behavior during the ratification of the constitution at the 13 state conventions an analysis of voting at the ratification stage allows for a stronger test of the factors influencing voting behavior than an analysis of the federal convention of 1787 because of a greater number of delegates over 1200 versus 55 and a more straightforward voting process the paper not only addresses an important and controversial issue in economic history the role of economic interests in the ratification of the constitution it also advances our general understanding of polit

hotelling s theory enhancement and the taking of the redwood national park we estimate a reduced form model of the redwood timber industry that is consistent with hotelling s exhaustible resource theory the consequences for this theory of various assumptions about the elasticity of expectations are derived the estimated equations are used to test the hypotheses about expectations we also use these equations to find the amount that owners of redwood not taken for the redwood national park benefited from the park s establishment

chiefs economic development and elite control of civil society in sierra leone we study the effect of constraints on chiefs power on economic outcomes citizens attitudes and social capital a paramount chief in sierra leone must come from a ruling family originally recognized by british colonial authorities in chiefdoms with fewer ruling families chiefs face less political competition and development outcomes are significantly worse today variation in the security of property rights over land is a potential mechanism paradoxically with fewer ruling families the institutions of chiefs authority are more highly respected and measured social capital is higher we argue that these results reflect the capture of civil society organizations by chiefs

a model of political competition with citizen candidates the authors develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates a winner implements her favorite policy the equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of running and positively on the benefits of winning for some parameter values all equilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates whose positions are distinct two candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule than under a runoff system the candidates positions are less differentiated under a runoff system there exist equilibria under both systems in which some candidates have no chance of winning

the measurement of the impact of regional policies in europe a survey and critique ashcroft b 1982 the measurement of the impact of regional policies in europe a survey and critique reg studies 16 287 305 the paper examines the broad approaches and particular methods used to estimate the impact of regional policies in several european countries the strengths and weaknesses of the major approaches are identified the total effects their components and the effects of individual policy instruments are considered the theory and measurement of the costs and benefits of regional policy is examined some areas for further research are suggested