household saving in ldcs credit markets insurance and welfare some ways in which farmers in ldcs can protect their living standards against fluctuations in income are discussed after considering the theory of consumption under uncertainty when there is no or limited borrowing the case where some borrowing is allowed is also examined empirical evidence from some ldcs is used to look at i household borrowing and lending their importance and timing and their role in smoothing consumption and ii the life cycle behavior of consumption and income the results suggest that hump lifecycle saving is not likely to be a very important generator of wealth in ldcs and provide further evidence on the limited role of credit markets

credit market constraints consumption smoothing and the accumulation of durable production assets in low income countries investments in bullocks in india in this paper we formulate and estimate a finite horizon structural dynamic model of agricultural investment behavior that incorporates the major features of low income agricultural environments income uncertainty constraints on borrowing and rental markets and the use of investment assets to generate income and smooth consumption the model is fit to longitudinal indian household data on farm profits bullock stocks and pump sets the estimated structural parameters are used to assess the effects on the life cycle accumulation of bullocks agricultural profits and welfare associated with complete markets and bullock liquidity and with second best policies that provide assured sources of income to farmers and weather insurance

games of fair division abstract we consider the problem of fairly allocating an indivisible good to one of several agents equally entitled to it when monetary compensations to the others are possible our primary normative concept is no envy first we show that there is no non manipulable selection from the no envy solution then we study the direct revelation games associated with subsolutions of the no envy solution the set of equilibrium allocations of any one of them coincides with the set of envy free allocations for the true preferences journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d63 d7l d82

strategy proof exchange we consider the allocation of goods in exchange economies with a finite number of agents who may have private information about their preferences in such a setting standard allocation rules such as walrasian equilibria or rational expectations equilibria are not compatible with individual incentives we characterize the set of allocation rules which are incentive compatible or in other words the set of strategy proof social choice functions social choice functions which are strategy proof are those which can be obtained from trading according to a finite number of pre specified proportions the number of proportions which can be accommodated is proportional to the number of agents such rules are necessarily inefficient even in the limit as the economy grows

unforeseen contingencies and incomplete contracts we scrutinize the conceptual framework commonly used in the incomplete contract literature this literature usually assumes that contractual incompleteness is due to the transaction costs of describing or of even foreseeing the possible states of nature in advance we argue however that such transaction costs need not interfere with optimal contracting i e transaction costs need not be relevant provided that agents can probabilistically forecast their possible future payoffs even if other aspects of the state of the nature cannot be forecast in other words all that is required for optimality is that agents be able to perform dynamic programming an assumption always invoked by the incomplete contract literature the foregoing optimality result holds very generally provided that parties can commit themselves not to renegotiate moreover we point out that renegotiation may be hard to reconcile with a framework that otherwise presumes perfect rationality however even if renegotiation is allowed the result still remains valid provided that parties are risk averse

nutritional status during an economic crisis evidence from russia between 1996 and 1998 russia experienced a spectacular decline in economic activity which was followed by a dramatic rebound between 1998 and 2000 we use panel data to examine the impact of variation in household resources on six dimensions of nutritional status distinguishing longer run from short term fluctuations in resources nutritional status is very resilient to short term variation in household resources gross energy intake adult weight and child stature change very little as expenditure deviates from its long run average longer run resources have a substantively large positive and significant effect on energy intake diet quality adult weight and child stature the evidence indicates that individuals and households are able to weather short term fluctuations in economic resources at least in terms of maintaining body mass and energy intake increased globalisation has resulted in many less developed countries becoming more integrated into world markets this integration carries both benefits and costs for the populations of those countries an oft cited cost is elevated risk of exposure to economic fluctuations which has been manifest in several spectacular economic crises across the globe in the last few decades there is however little evidence on the extent to which individuals and families are able to mitigate deleterious effects of these economic upheavals on their well being in spite of its importance for understanding the consequences of globalisation this article provides new evidence on this issue specifically we examine the relationship between several dimensions of nutritional well being and variation in household resources during the russian economic crisis in the late 1990s the economies of the former soviet bloc have been especially volatile since the transition to market based economies which began in the early 1990s nowhere has this been more true than in russia where in the last half of 1998 real gdp collapsed by around 30 and then rapid growth brought the economy back to its pre crisis level by 2000 the time path of changes in gdp is closely mimicked by changes in the incomes and expenditures of russian households using extremely rich longitudinal household survey data from the russian longitudinal monitoring survey rlms we examine the impact of these large fluctuations in household resources on nutrient intake and on anthropometric markers of nutritional status at the individual level in so doing we address an important issue in the literature regarding the extent to which households in low income settings are able

poverty traps and index based risk transfer products summary a growing literature suggests that in low income countries households with few assets can be trapped in chronic poverty this article reviews relevant threads of the poverty traps literature to motivate a description of the opportunities presented by innovative index based risk transfer products these products can be used to address some insurance and credit market failures that contribute to the persistence of poverty among households in low income countries applications are considered at the micro meso and macro levels 2008 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

earmarked taxation welfare versus political support abstract compared with the traditional public finance approach of a monolithic fully informed planner earmarking of taxation is less likely to be optimal if a principal agent setting is considered where taxing and spending are performed by two separate agents which are monitored by the parliament we assume that the parliament either maximizes welfare or expected votes vote maximizers are more inclined to choose earmarking but at the price of inefficiently high costs

misrepresentation of utilities in bargaining pure exchange and public good economies in order to analyze bargaining in pure exchange and public good economics when the agents are not informed about their opponents payoffs we embed each bargaining problem into a noncooperative game of misrepresentation in pure exchange public good economies with an arbitrary number of agents whose true utilities satisfy a mild assumption the set of allocations obtained at the linear strategies nash equilibria of this game is equal to the set of constrained walrasian lindahl allocations with respect to the agents true utilities without this assumption the result holds for two agent pure exchange economies and under alternative assumptions for public good economies c 2002 elsevier science usa

are incentives against economic justice abstract we consider the problem of fairly allocating a social endowment of indivisible goods and money when the domain of admissible preferences contains but is not restricted to quasi linear preferences we analyze the manipulability of the generalized money rawlsian fair gmrf solutions i we show that the nash and strong nash equilibrium correspondences of the preference revelation game form associated with each gmrf solution coincide with the no envy solution in equilibrium efficiency is preserved according to agents true preferences ii a corollary is that the gmrf solutions naturally implement the no envy solution in nash and strong nash equilibria

double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint i consider the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents in which each agent pays a price for his object and all prices sum to a given constant the objective is to select an assignment price pair that is envy free with respect to the agents true preferences i propose a simple mechanism whereby agents announce valuations for all objects and an envy free allocation is selected with respect to these announced preferences i prove that the proposed mechanism implements both in nash and strong nash equilibrium the set of true envy free allocations

precautionary behavior migrant networks and household consumption decisions an empirical analysis using household panel data from rural china abstract we develop a test of precautionary behavior in the consumption decisions of rural agricultural households among surveyed households facing a median level of consumption risk 10 of savings can be attributed to a precautionary motive and this increases to 15 for households with consumption per capita below the poverty line we next use distant lags of local rainfall shocks uncorrelated with current consumption growth to identify the size of migrant networks outside the village and then present evidence that both poor and nonpoor households engage in less precautionary saving as the size of the village migrant network increases

credit markets in northern nigeria credit as insurance in a rural economy this article addresses the issues of imcomplete markets and imperfect information in the context of credit markets in rural northern nigeria in much recent theoretical literature the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection are assumed to be decisive for the organization of agrarian institutions in contrast it is found that in the four villages surveyed credit transactions take advantage of the free flow of information within rural communities information asymmetries between borrower and lender are unimportant and their institutional consequences the use of collateral and interlinked contracts are absent credit transactions play a direct role in pooling risk between households through the use of contracts in which the repayment owed by the borrower depends on the realization of random production shocks by both the borrower and the lender

credit as insurance in agrarian economies abstract this paper examines consumption credit as an insurance mechanism in agrarian economies it explains the more rapid adoption of new technology in the green revolution by large farmers who had greater access to consumption credit the paper also demonstrates how the emergence and expansion of consumption credit markets by mitigating the need for hoarding in order to meet consumption contingencies enhances growth by encouraging investment

risk aversion and credit constraints in farmers decision making a reinterpretation in 1976 the agricultural development council sponsored a conference on risk uncertainty and agricultural development which has been summarised in a volume edited by james roumasset jean marc boussard and inderjit singh 1979 the volume provides an excellent review of the state of the art at that time however as discussed in the summary chapters of that volume there were few theoretical empirical or policy issues on which clear conclusions could be reached on the basis of knowledge then available in the intervening years progress has been made on a number of issues as a result of both empirical investigations and theoretical advances this paper concentrates on advances which have relevance to the controversy about the relative roles of risk aversion and credit constraints in limiting farmers investment levels especially for purchased inputs such as seeds or fertilizers in particular we review recent experimental studies on the extent of risk aversion among farmer populations in developing

misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem it has been shown previously that for two sided discrete markets of the kind exemplified by the marriage problem no strategy proof procedure for aggregating preferences into stable outcomes exists here it is shown that nash equilibrium misrepresentation of preferences nevertheless results in a stable outcome in terms of the true preferences when the aggregation procedure yields the optimal stable outcome in terms of the stated preferences for one side of the market journal of economic literature classification numbers 022 025 026 0 1984 academic

informal insurance arrangements with limited commitment theory and evidence from village economies recent work on consumption allocations in village economies finds that idiosyncratic variation in consumption is systematically related to idiosyncratic variation in income thus rejecting the hypothesis of full risk pooling we attempt to explain these observations by adding limited commitment as an impediment to risk pooling we provide a general dynamic model and completely characterise efficient informal insurance arrangements constrained by limited commitment and test the model using data from three indian villages we find that the model can fully explain the dynamic response of consumption to income but that it fails to explain the distribution of consumption across households

general fund financing versus earmarked taxes an alternative model of budgetary choice in a democracy this paper presents an alternative model of budgetary choices in a direct democracy our model is not only more consistent with the underlying assumptions of consumer theory but also is easier to apply to the study of problems such as the impact of lump sum subsidies changes in the costs of production and so forth on the equilibrium levels of collective variables

fair allocation of disputed properties we model problems of allocating disputed properties as generalized exchange economies in which agents have preferences and claims over multiple goods and the social endowment of each good may not be sufficient to satisfy all individual claims in this context we investigate procedural and end state principles of fairness their implications and relations to do so we explore procedural allocation rules represented by a composition of a rights assignment mechanism to assign each profile of claims individual property rights over the endowment and walrasian or other individually rational exchange rule using variants of fairness based on no envy as end state principles we provide axiomatic characterizations of the three focal egalitarian mechanisms known in the literature on rationing problems as constrained equal awards constrained equal losses and proportional mechanisms our results are connected to focal contributions in political philosophy and also provide rationale for market based environ mental policy instruments such as cap and trade schemes and personal carbon trading and moral foundation for the three proposals to allocate ghg emission rights known as the equal per capita sharing the polluter pays principle and the equal burden sharing the victims pay principle

large indivisibles an analysis with respect to price equilibrium and fairness an exchange economy is considered in which there are a finite number of individuals the same number of indivisibles and a fixed amount of a divisible good each individual consumes exactly one of the indivisibles and a certain quantity of the divisible good the existence of prices corresponding to pareto efficient allocations is proved it is also shown that this economy possesses fair allocations income fair allocations coalition fair allocations and pareto efficient egalitarian equivalent allocations in this study the effect of including large indivisibles in an exchange economy will be analyzed the analysis will be carried out with respect to the existence of price equilibrium and with respect to the existence of different forms of fairness the economy consists of a finite number of individuals the same number of indivisibles and a fixed amount of a divisible good it is assumed that each individual consumes exactly one of the indivisibles and some quantity of the divisible good we may interpret the indivisibles as being professions or houses the relationship between price equilibrium and a pareto efficient allocation is well known and proved in a number of cases under different assumptions about preferences and commodities for a standard economy see e g debreu 5 in case of nonconvexities which may also describe a certain type of indivisibility we may have an exact relationship in economies with a continuum of individuals see e g hildenbrand 11 but otherwise an approximate relationship obtains the degree of approximation depends on the degree of nonconvexities in preferences and not on the number of individuals see e g arrow and hahn 1 we will prove the existence of prices characterizing a pareto efficient allocation in a case where the indivisibles play an essential role and where approximate results would be too approximate the indivisibles may be considered large for the individual compared to his total consumption the theory of fairness has developed considerably during the seventies different kinds of concepts of fairness have been introduced and analyzed see daniel 41 foley 81 pazner and schmeidler 121 and schmeidler and vind 141 among others normally these authors have considered models with divisible goods or an infinite number of individuals for exchange economies the existence of fair allocations an envy free and pareto efficient allocation has been proved in

maximal manipulation of envy free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money abstract we consider the problem of the fair allocation of indivisible goods and money with non quasi linear preferences the purpose of the present study is to examine strategic manipulation under envy free solutions we show that under a certain domain richness condition each individual obtains the welfare level of his optimal envy free allocation by maximally manipulating the solutions this maximal manipulation theorem is helpful in analyzing the set of nash equilibrium allocations in the direct revelation games associated with a given envy free solution if an envy free solution satisfies a mild condition the set of nash equilibrium allocations in its associated direct revelation game coincides with that of envy free allocations

do migrants really save more understanding the impact of remittances on savings in rural china abstract this article studies the impact of remittances on the savings behaviour of rural households in china using a primary survey undertaken by the authors in 2006 allowing for endogeneity and left censoring of remittances we find that the marginal propensity to save out of remittances is well below half of that out of other sources of incomes moreover we find no evidence of any direct effect of remittances on either capital input or gross output of farm production these findings are robust with respect to alternative definition of savings and are in line with recent studies which conclude that remittances are largely used for consumption purposes by rural chinese households

permanent household income and consumption in urban south america milton friedman s permanent income hypothesis pih is considerably more complex and difficult to test than it appears at first sight which is why certain of its postulates still cannot be accepted or rejected with certainty one of the chief difficulties is that of separating the effects on consumption of permanent income which is unobservable and of various observable household characteristics which may be highly correlated with permanent income but may also be presumed to affect consumption directly this difficulty can be overcome provided a variable can be found which is associated with permanent income but has no independent direct effect on the propensity to consume if households are grouped by classes of that variable the permanent consumption propensity or elasticity can be estimated from mean income and consumption in the groups this technique requires the assumption of zero mean transitory income in each group but does not depend on the postulate that transitory income is uncorrelated with consumption for these reasons it cannot be applied to individual households this paper presents and estimates a model which separates the direct and indirect effects on consumption of a series of observable characteristics using regression techniques on individual household observations this makes it possible to estimate all the parameters of the model both the consumption propensity or elasticity and the contribution to permanent income of each observable explanatory variable the technique still requires that at least one of the explanatory variables affect consumption only through permanent income but for all other variables both direct and indirect influences can be estimated and the propensity to consume a given income can vary among households with different characteristics another principal problem with the pih is the assumption that transitory income and consumption are uncorrelated efforts to test this postulate can lead to very different results ranging from agreement with the hypothesis to findings of high propensities to consume transitory income see robert ferber pp 1306 09 this inconsistency and continued controversy over the hypothesis is due to the fact that permanent income cannot be estimated exactly but can be known only with an error which is conceptually distinct from transitory income empirical work on the pih has uniformly overlooked this fact treating estimates of permanent income as exact and regarding the whole of the unexplained residual as transitory income the present model explicitly distinguishes the estimation error from the error of transitory income or consumption the two transitory components can then be assumed to be uncorrelated while the part of permanent income which is not explained is consumed exactly like the explained part whether residual income and consumption appear to be correlated or not then depends on the relative sizes of these two components the unexplained permanent part and the true transitory part this technique has the further advantage that estimating the variance of the error of estimation makes it possible to tell how well a set of observable variables explain permanentincome this explanation may be better than the brookings institution robert solow richard eckaus and robert hall supervised the dissertation 1974 on which this article is based i am particularly grateful to ross williams and robert hall for help in specifying and estimating the model and to denisard alves for a crucial suggestion william cline irwin friend ricardo ffrench davis and robert ferber provided helpful comments on earlier versions subsequent discussions with surjit bhalla and robert lawrence have been most useful i am also much indebted to the managing editor and to a referee for improvements in the final version

consumption versus asset smoothing testing the implications of poverty trap theory in burkina faso abstract despite solid theoretical foundations for the notion that poor borrowing constrained households will intertemporally manage assets to smooth consumption the consumption smoothing hypothesis has not always withstood empirical scrutiny this paper reassesses the intertemporal asset management problem with a poverty trap model and shows that we would expect to see asset smoothing not consumption smoothing in the neighborhood of critical asset levels at which optimal accumulation behavior bifurcates we then employ threshold estimation techniques to empirically confirm the co existence of consumption and asset smoothing regimes using a household panel data set from west africa households above the estimated threshold almost completely insulate their consumption from weather shocks whereas those below the threshold do not these results not only indirectly provide evidence of the existence of poverty traps but also speak to the level and incidence of the costs of uninsured risk

asset smoothing consumption smoothing and the reproduction of inequality under risk and subsistence constraints abstract a growing literature asks whether low wealth agents can accumulate assets over time or whether they are trapped in poverty this paper develops a stochastic dynamic programming model with endogenous asset price risk to explore savings and portfolio decisions in a resource poor environment characterized by risk and subsistence constraints optimal portfolio strategies are found to bifurcate despite divisible assets and fully rational agents wealthier agents acquire a higher yielding portfolio and pursue conventional consumption smoothing poorer agents acquire a less remunerative portfolio and pursue asset smoothing rather than consumption smoothing asset based risk coping thus results in positive correlation between initial wealth and portfolio rate of return

a heterogeneous agent model of credit linked index insurance and farm technology adoption abstract protection from downside risk is a determinant of technology uptake among subsistence agricultural households access to credit insurance and savings may stimulate technology adoption where new methods are riskier but higher yielding or require sunk costs in this paper we employ a dynamic stochastic heterogeneous agent model where farm households have access to contingent credit and make savings technology and loan repayment choices our approach is novel as insurance is modeled as a meso level product where the bank is indemnified before any payouts are distributed to borrowers thus it accounts for both supply and demand side concerns showing a flow of effects when index insurance contracts are sold to risk aggregators for whom basis risk is lower results show letting the lender lay first claim on indemnities lowers default which can decrease interest rates and expand credit access insurance and savings may also spur technology uptake

manipulation of preferences and relative utilitarianism abstract given n agents with who wish to divide m commodities consider the n person noncooperative game with strategies consisting of concave increasing utility functions and whose outcomes are the relative utilitarian solution any constrained equal income competitive equilibrium allocation for the true utilities is shown to ba a nash equilibrium outcome for the noncooperative game conditions are presented under which these are the only pure strategy equilibrium outcomes journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c78 d71

wealth weather risk and the composition and profitability of agricultural investments despite the growing evidence that farmers in low income environments are risk averse there has been little empirical evidence on the importance of risk in shaping the actual allocation of production resources among farmers differentiated by wealth the authors use panel data on investments in rural india to examine how the composition of productive and nonproductive asset holdings varies across farmers with different levels of total wealth and across farmers facing different degrees of weather risk income variability is a prominent feature of the experience of rural agents in low income countries the authors report evidence based on measures of rainfall variability that the agricultural investment portfolio behavior of farmers in such settings reflects risk aversion due evidently to limitations on consumption soothing mechanisms such as crop insurance or credit markets the authors results suggest that uninsured weather risk is a significant cause of lower efficiency and lower average incomes a one standard deviation decrease in weather risk measured by the standard deviation of the timing of the rainy season would raise average profits by up to 35 percent among farmers in the lowest wealth quartile moreover rainfall variability induces a more unequal distribution of average incomes for a given distribution of wealth wealthier farmers are willing to absorb significant risk without giving up profits to reduce production risk smaller farmers have to invest their limited wealth in ways that reduce their exposure to risk at the cost of lower profit rates the authors found that at high levels of rainfall variability differences in rates of profit per unit of agricultural assets were similar across classes of wealth but over the sample range of rainfall variability these rates of profit were always higher for the poorer farmers than for the wealthier ones suggesting that the disadvantages of small farmers in risk diffusion are more than offset by their labor cost advantage

insurance credit and technology adoption field experimental evidence from malawi this brief summarizes the insurance credit and technology adoption field experimental evidence from malawi the farmers were offered loans for the november 2006 planting season does production risk suppress the demand for credit the author implemented a randomized field experiment to ask whether provision of insurance against a major source of production risk induces farmers to take out loans to adopt a new crop technology the study sample was composed of roughly 800 maize and groundnut farmers in malawi where by far the dominant source of production risk is the level of rainfall the author randomly selected half of the farmers to be offered credit to purchase high yielding hybrid maize and groundnut seeds for planting in the november 2006 crop season the other half of farmers were offered a similar credit package but were also required to purchase at actuarially fair rates a weather insurance policy that partially or fully forgave the loan in the event of poor rainfall surprisingly take up was lower by 13 percentage points among farmers offered insurance with the loan take up was 33 0 percent for farmers who were offered the uninsured loan there is suggestive evidence that reduced take up of the insured loan was due to farmers already having implicit insurance from the limited liability clause in the loan contract insured loan take up was positively correlated with farmer education income and wealth which may proxy for the individual s default costs by contrast take up of the uninsured loan was uncorrelated with these farmer characteristics

let them cheat abstract we consider the problem of fairly allocating a bundle of infinitely divisible goods among a group of agents with classical preferences we propose to measure an agent s sacrifice at an allocation by the size of the set of feasible bundles that the agent prefers to her consumption as a solution we select the allocations at which sacrifices are equal across agents and this common sacrifice is minimal we then turn to the manipulability of this solution in the tradition of hurwicz 1972 we identify under some mild assumptions on preferences the equilibrium allocations of the manipulation game associated with this solution when all commodities are normal for each preference profile each equal division constrained walrasian allocation is an equilibrium allocation conversely each equilibrium allocation is equal division constrained walrasian furthermore we show that if normality of goods is dropped then equilibrium allocations may not be equal division constrained walrasian

migration risk and liquidity constraints in el salvador abstract this article utilizes panel data from el salvador to investigate the use of transnational migration as an ex post risk management strategy i show that adverse agricultural conditions in el salvador increase both migration to the united states and remittances sent back to el salvador i show that in the absence of any agricultural shocks the probability that a household sent members to the united states would have decreased on average by 24 26 i also show that the 2001 earthquakes reduced net migration to the united states a one standard deviation increase in earthquake damage reduced the average probability of northward migration by 37 11 the evidence suggests that the effects of the earthquakes had more to do with households retaining labor at home to cope with the effects of the disaster than with the earthquakes disrupting migration financing

the macroeconomic consequences of disasters abstract natural disasters have a statistically observable adverse impact on the macro economy in the short run and costlier events lead to more pronounced slowdowns in production yet interestingly developing countries and smaller economies face much larger output declines following a disaster of similar relative magnitude than do developed countries or bigger economies a close study of the determinants of these adverse macroeconomic output costs reveals several interesting patterns countries with a higher literacy rate better institutions higher per capita income higher degree of openness to trade and higher levels of government spending are better able to withstand the initial disaster shock and prevent further spillovers into the macro economy these all suggest an increased ability to mobilize resources for reconstruction financial conditions also seem to be of importance countries with more foreign exchange reserves and higher levels of domestic credit but with less open capital accounts appear more robust and better able to endure natural disasters with less adverse spillover into domestic production

using weather variability to estimate the response of savings to transitory income in thailand this paper measures the extent to which farmers are able to use savings and dissavings to smooth consumption in response to unexpected shocks to income time series information on regional rainfall is used to construct estimates of transitory income due to rainfall shocks the relationship between these measures of transitory income and savings indicates that farm households save a significantly higher fraction of transitory income than nontransitory income jel d91 016 the incomes of farm households in developing countries are notorious for being both low and uncertain policies that increase the incomes of farmers may well be different

productivity credit risk and the demand for weather index insurance in smallholder agriculture in ethiopia the article explores the relationship between fertilizer use and the demand for weather index insurance wii among smallholder farmers in ethiopia we examine whether fertilizer use is profitable under current smallholder production conditions whether risk related factors affect fertilizer use and we estimate the returns to inputs in the agricultural production function in the absence of insurance we then study how these primitives of agricultural production functions relate to insurance demand the study compares a survey based estimate of willingness to pay with actual uptake for the weather insurance finding the stated and actual demand to be almost completely uncorrelated while those with high marginal returns to inputs say they would purchase insurance only those with low marginal returns actually do consistent with the stated purpose of the product as input insurance insurance demand proves to be highly responsive to the existence and amount of randomly allocated insurance vouchers jel classifications c83 g22 q12

savings behaviour in low income countries the empirical literature on savings in low income countries has exploited some remarkable data sets to shed new light on savings behaviour in the poor agricultural households that make up the majority of the population in such countries a number of conclusions have emerged i the degree of consumption smoothing over seasons within the year and across years in response to very large income fluctuations is higher than was supposed ii the lack of complete insurance and credit markets however is manifested in asset stocks and asset compositions among farmers especially small farmers that are inefficient iii the combination of low and volatile incomes is an important cause of inefficiency and income inequality iv the proximity of formal financial institutions increases financial savings and crowds out informal insurance arrangements thus in principle better facilitating financial intermediation and iv simple life cycle models of savings do not appear to explain long term savings in low income settings copyright 2001 oxford university press

implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems abstract this note analyzes the possibility of implementing stable outcomes for marriage markets our first result shows a contradiction between the use of stable mechanisms and the hypothesis of agents behavior considered in the nash equilibrium concept we analyze the possibility of implementing two sets of stable allocations by employing two types of mechanisms the first mechanism is a now or never choice process that permits us to implement in undominated nash equilibria the set of all the stable allocations the second choice process is the classic algorithm in matching theory the gale shapley mechanism a reversal property is observed in such a mechanism when agents act strategically the use of a mechanism which selects the best solution for one side of the market in the absence of strategic behavior yields the best stable solution for the agents on the other side under dominance solvability journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c72 d78 j41

sincere and sophisticated players in an equal income market abstract we study the simultaneous direct revelation mechanism associated with each equal income competitive social choice function in the allocation of objects and money among sincere and strategic agents strategic agents take advantage of sincere agents they non cooperatively coordinate on the equal income competitive allocations for the true preferences that are pareto undominated for them within the set of equal income competitive allocations sincere agents are protected to some extent however their welfare is usually above their maximin payoff

imperfect commitment altruism and the family evidence from transfer behavior in low income rural areas in this paper we examine empirically whether risk pooling is more advantageous among altruistic compared to selfish agents in a framework where individuals cannot make binding commitments in particular we incorporate altuism into a model of risk sharing under imperfect commitment and use simulation methods to establish tests of the roles of both altruism and commitment problems in determining the extent of insurance and the intertemporal movements in interhousehold transfers the tests are carried out using three panel data sets from two countries of rural south asia that provide detailed information on transfers and enable the measurement of income shocks the estimates provide strong support for the notion that imperfect commitment substantially constrains informal transfer arrangements whether kin based or not but also provide evidence that altruism plays an important role in ameliorating commitment constraints and thus in increasing the gains from income pooling

household responses to economic and demographic shocks marginal logit analysis using indonesian data abstract we analyse the responses of indonesian households to demographic and economic shocks and examine how these responses vary in relation to the household s permanent income and the extent to which the shock is common across the community households respond in different ways to demographic and economic shocks economic shocks are more likely to result in a labour supply response from the household and this probability is further increased if the shock is common for rural households use of savings increases with permanent income the article also examines the role of the interviewer in influencing survey responses

are the poor less well insured evidence on vulnerability to income risk in rural china the authors test how well consumption is insured against income risk in a panel of sampled households in rural china they estimate the risk insurance models by generalized method of moments treating income and household size as endogenous insurance exists for all wealth groups although the hypothesis of perfect insurance is universally rejected those in the poorest wealth decile are the least well insured with 40 percent of an income shock being passed on to current consumption by contrast consumption by the richest third of households is protected from almost 90 percent of an income shock the extent of insurance in a given wealth stratum varies little between poor and nonpoor areas

natural disasters and labor markets abstract while it is clear that natural disasters have serious welfare consequences for affected populations less is known about how local labor markets in low income countries adjust to such large shocks combining data from the indonesia family life survey the desinventar database the u s geological survey and district level employment indicators this paper explores how a large earthquake in indonesia affected labor market outcomes in particular the evolution of wages across sectors i find that the earthquake had a positive effect on wage growth for workers who were employed in the agricultural sector at baseline i propose two mechanisms for this result a higher growth rate of the price of rice and a downward shift in the supply of workers in the agricultural sector i show that evidence mainly supports the latter labor shifted out of the agricultural sector into the construction sector raising the marginal product of labor in agriculture

risk and intertemporal substitution livestock portfolios and off take among kenyan pastoralists abstract most decisions involve variability in two dimensions uncertainty across states of nature and fluctuations over time the stakes involved in tradeoffs between these variability dimensions are especially high for the poor who have difficulty managing and recovering from shocks we assume epstein and zin recursive preferences and estimate risk aversion and intertemporal substitution as distinct preferences using data from kenyan herders results suggest that the assumption implicit in additive expected utility models that relative risk aversion rra is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution eis is flawed specifically our rra and eis estimates are consistent with a preference for the early resolution of uncertainty which we believe is driven importantly by the instrumental value of early uncertainty resolution this same preference pattern is consistent with asset smoothing in response to a dynamic asset threshold

earmarked taxation and political competition abstract although tax earmarking constitutes a voluntary constraint for government s policymaking it is widely used in the real world this paper investigates the electoral dimension of earmarking in a model of political competition with ideological parties its main contribution is to derive new insights on the relationship between earmarking and parties probability of winning the elections we find that the electoral pressure may favor the existence of tax earmarking equilibria but that it sometimes creates a tendency against earmarked taxation even when as shown by brett and keen 2000 brett c keen m 2000 political uncertainty and the earmarking of environmental taxes journal of public econonomics 75 315 340 incumbent governments have strong incentives to use earmarking rules to constrain future policymakers

the old age security hypothesis reconsidered abstract that the introduction of a means for transferring present to future consumption other than children in a developing country will reduce the rate of population growth is shown to depend crucially on the assumption that parents do not care about the numbers or the welfare of the children they have when parents do care the conclusion no longer unambiguously follows because the new means for providing for parents old age leads to a positive income effect

the impact of conditional cash transfers on consumption and investment in nicaragua abstract this article examines the impact of a nicaraguan conditional cash transfer programme on measures of expenditures and productive investment despite clear evidence from a randomised evaluation that the programme increased current expenditures there is little evidence that it increased agricultural or non agricultural investment an estimated marginal propensity to consume out of the transfers of nearly one combined with no effect of cumulative past transfers on current consumption corroborate the direct evidence on investment in contrast to gains made in human capital investment the potential for long term increases in consumption as a result of other forms of increased investment may be limited

agricultural decisions after relaxing credit and risk constraints the investment decisions of small scale farmers in developing countries are conditioned by their financial environment binding credit market constraints and incomplete insurance can limit investment in activities with high expected profits we conducted several experiments in northern ghana in which farmers were randomly assigned to receive cash grants grants of or opportunities to purchase rainfall index insurance or a combination of the two demand for index insurance is strong and insurance leads to significantly larger agricultural investment and riskier production choices in agriculture the binding constraint to farmer investment is uninsured risk when provided with insurance against the primary catastrophic risk they face farmers are able to find resources to increase expenditure on their farms demand for insurance in subsequent years is strongly increasing with the farmer s own receipt of insurance payouts with the receipt of payouts by others in the farmer s social network and with recent poor rain in the village both investment patterns and the demand for index insurance are consistent with the presence of important basis risk associated with the index insurance imperfect trust that promised

the manipulability of resource allocation mechanisms the vulnerability to manipulate behaviour of resource allocation mechanisms is evaluated by determining the nash equilibria of associated manipulation games under manipulation all monotonic correspondences are essentially equivalent to the walrasian correspondence for most non monotonic correspondences of interest the initial position appears at equilibrium to be efficient

nash equilibrium and welfare optimality if is a set of social alternatives a social choice rule scr assigns a subset of a to each potential profile of individuals preferences over a where the subset is interpreted as the set of welfare optima a game form or mechanism implements the social choice rule if for any potential profile of preferences 1 any welfare optimum can arise as a nash equilibrium of the game form implying in particular that a nash equilibrium exists and 2 all nash equilibria are welfare optimal the main result of this paper establishes that any scr that satisfies two properties monotonicity and no veto power can be implemented by a game form if there are three or more individuals the proof is constructive

inefficiency of strategy proof rules for pure exchange economies abstract in his pioneering article in decision and organization c b mcguire and r radner eds pp 297 336 north holland amsterdam 1972 hurwicz establishes that there is no strategy proof pareto efficient and individually rational rule for pure exchange economies with two agents and two goods provided that the domain includes a sufficiently wide class of classical preferences in this article we extend his result to pure exchange economies with any finite number of agents and goods we establish that i there is no strategy proof pareto efficient and individually rational rule on the class of classical homothetic and smooth preferences and ii there is no strategy proof pareto efficient and symmetric rule on the same class of preferences journal of economic literature classification numbers d78 d71 c72

effects of transitory shocks to aggregate output on consumption in poor countries this paper provides instrumental variables estimates of the response of aggregate private consumption to transitory output shocks in poor countries to identify exogenous unanticipated idiosyncratic and transitory variations in national output we use year to year variations in rainfall as an instrumental variable in a panel of 39 sub saharan african countries during the period 1980 2009 our estimates yield a marginal propensity to consume out of transitory output of around 0 2 to explain this result we show using instrumental variables techniques that there is a significant negative effect of transitory output shocks on net current transfers and a significant positive and quantitatively large effect on the trade balance an important implication is that frictions to private financial flows do not necessarily imply large effects of transitory shocks to aggregate output on private consumption in poor countries

consumption risk technology adoption and poverty traps evidence from ethiopia much has been written on the determinants of input and technology adoption in agriculture with issues such as input availability knowledge and education risk preferences profitability and credit constraints receiving much attention this paper focuses on a factor that has been less well documented the differential ability of households to take on risky production technologies for fear of the welfare consequences if shocks result in poor harvests building on an explicit model this is explored in panel data for ethiopia historical rainfall distributions are used to identify the counterfactual consumption risk controlling for unobserved household and time varying village characteristics it emerges that not just ex ante credit constraints but also the possibly low consumption outcomes when harvests fail discourage the application of fertilizer the lack of insurance causes inefficiency in production choices