campaign contributions and congressional voting a simultaneous probit tobit model m any citizens and scholars have been troubled by the influence that special interest groups appear to exert over policymaking as a result of their roles in the financing of political campaigns these concerns inspired the enactment of a number of election law reforms in the 1970s and have led to increasing popular support for public financing of electoral campaigns despite the public attention these issues have attracted few social scientists have attempted to analyze the financial relationships between interest groups and policymakers empirically 1 one such study was reported by durden and silberman 1976 who included contributions from the afl cio political action committee as an independent variable in an equation explaining congressional voting on minimum wage legislation their results indicated that campaign contributions significantly affected voting on that issue the work i have done differs substantially from that of durden and silberman in two ways first i have chosen to examine issues which were of considerably narrower concern than the minimum wage issue in the interest of simplicity i examine issues of concern to just one or a few groups i have also used a different econometric technique if campaign contributions are actually endogenous as seems plausible the single equation estimation technique employed by durden and silberman is subject to a possible simultaneous equations bias for each issue studied i have therefore jointly estimated a two equation system explaining both votes on the bill and contributions from an associated interest group the simultaneous probit tobit model which i use takes into account the dichotomous nature of the variable indicating a congressman s vote the non negativity constraint imposed on the contribution variable and the possibility of correlation between the error terms for the equations explaining these two variables 2 full information maximum likelihood fiml estimates for the model are consistent and asymptotically efficient

reducing bureaucratic corruption interdisciplinary perspectives on what works abstract this article offers the first comprehensive review of the interdisciplinary state of knowledge regarding anti corruption policies with a particular focus on reducing corruption among civil servants drawing on the work of economists political scientists sociologists and anthropologists we examine seven policy categories 1 rewards and penalties 2 monitoring 3 restructuring bureaucracies 4 screening and recruiting 5 anti corruption agencies 6 educational campaigns and 7 international agreements notably rigorous empirical evaluation is lacking for the majority of commonly prescribed anti corruption policies nevertheless we find growing evidence of the effectiveness of policies based on monitoring including anti corruption audits and e governance in addition adequate civil service wages seem to be a necessary but insufficient condition for control of corruption an emerging skepticism regarding the effectiveness of anti corruption agencies also is apparent in the literature we conclude with broader lessons drawn from our review such as the recognition that when corruption is a systemic problem it cannot be treated in the long term with individual level solutions

do unemployed workers benefit from enterprise zones the french experience this paper presents an impact evaluation of the french enterprise zone program which was initiated in 1997 to help unemployed workers find employment by granting a significant wage tax exemption about one third of total labor costs to firms hiring at least 20 of their labor force locally drawing from a unique geo referenced dataset of unemployment spells in the paris region over an extensive period of time 1993 2003 we are able to measure the direct effect of the program on unemployment duration distinguishing between short and medium term effects this is done by implementing an original two stage empirical strategy using individual data in the first stage and aggregate data and conditional linear matching techniques in the second stage we show that although the enterprise zone program tended to pick winners it is likely to be cost ineffective it had a small but significant effect on the rate at which unemployed workers find a job which is increased by a modest 3 this effect is localized and significant only in the short run i e at best during the 3 years that follow the start of the policy

corruption in america abstract we use a data set of federal corruption convictions in the u s to investigate the causes and consequences of corruption more educated states and to a smaller degree richer states have less corruption this relationship holds even when we use historical factors like congregationalism in 1890 as an instrument for the level of schooling today the level of corruption is also correlated with the level of income inequality and racial fractionalization and uncorrelated with the size of government there is a weak negative relationship between corruption and economic development in a state these results echo the cross country findings and support the view that the correlation between development and good political outcomes occurs because education improves political institutions

shirking and sorting in a political market with finite lived politicians this paper analyzes principal agent slack in the context of a political market composed of voters challengers and incumbents the introduction of a last period via finite livedness in combination with voters imperfect information about politicians preferences causes time varying shirking behavior on the part of politicians political markets eventually sort out those politicians with significantly deviant policy preferences potentially providing a solution to the last period problem and enabling politicians to make credible commitments in the extreme sorting can insure that it is not worthwhile for potential shirkers to run for office a systematic relationship between political shirking and number of terms in office may exist and depends on how quickly sorting takes place we show that evidence of little if any shirking is quite consistent with politicians having diverse and strongly held policy preferences in addition if sorting is a significant feature of political markets cross sectional studies will tend to oversample little and non shirking politicians compared to longitudinal studies reinterpretations of existing empirical work are also discussed

brand names and barriers to entry in political markets the most obvious implication of this discussion is that barriers to entry in politics will raise the costs of governments transferring wealth more generally it will raise the cost of public provision of goods and services in the case of transfers the inefficiency created by barriers depends on whether one values government transfers the total transfer the transfer to the beneficiaries plus the politician s commission is maximized by the politician who can create support the most efficiently for other governmental services which are viewed as efficiency creating e g national defense these barriers reduce the amount of a valuable output we desire to purchase this result also supplies a possible efficiency explanation for the limitation on the number of terms imposed on the presidency and many governorships brand names are not really the barriers information costs are what cause brand name to be used and are the more fundamental barrier to entry what we are arguing is that private and not public organizations can in certain respects better overcome these information costs

a general equilibrium model of congressional voting in this paper we specify a model in which congressmen constituents and campaign contributors simultaneously decide on behavior constituents and contributors desire to influence the voting behavior of congressmen congressmen on the other hand want to be elected and vote accordingly we empirically test this model using roll call voting on eight bills dealing with economic regulation and find support for the model our results indicate that part of the voting behavior of congressmen may be explained by noneconomic factors we also find that unions and businesses as campaign contributors are sometimes influential unions are more often influential than is business ideological factors are also important in explaining voting

equilibrium asset pricing with epstein zin and loss averse investors abstract we study multi period equilibrium asset pricing in an economy with epstein zin ez agents whose preferences for consumption are represented by recursive utility and with loss averse la agents who derive additional utility of gains and losses and are averse to losses we propose an equilibrium gain loss ratio for stocks and show that the la agents are more less risk averse than the ez agents if their degree of loss aversion is higher lower than this ratio when all the agents have unitary relative risk aversion degree and elasticity of intertemporal substitution we prove the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium and the market dominance of the ez agents in the long run finally we extend our results to the case in which the la agents use probability weighting in their evaluation of gains and losses

capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics the economic theory of regulation long ago put public interest theories of politics to rest these theories have correctly been viewed as normative wishings rather than explanations of real world phenomena they have been replaced by models of political behavior that are consistent with the rest of microeconomics anthony downs 1957 james buchanan and gordon tullock 1965 george stigler 1971 sam peltzman 1976 recently however debate has arisen over whether some version of a public interest theory of regulation will have to be readmitted to our thinking about actions and results in the political arena what is at issue is the empirical importance of the altruistic publicly interested goals of rational actors in determining legislative and regulatory outcomes james kau and paul rubin 1979 kalt 1981 peltzman 1982 this study assesses the nature and significance of publicly interested objectives in a particular instance of economic policymaking u s senate voting on coal strip mining regulations the existence of such objectives is of course no contradiction of the economic view of human behavior kenneth arrow 1972 gary becker 1974 and may well be rooted in genetic biological history becker 1976 jack hirshleifer 1978 generally however individuals altruistic publicly interested goals have been given little attention this reflects the judgment that such goals are so empirically unimportant as to allow the use of occam s razor in positive models or well founded apprehensions that these goals are unusually difficult to identify measure and analyze notwithstanding the latter problem we find that approaches which confine themselves to a view of political actors as narrowly egocentric maximizers explain and predict legislative outcomes poorly the tracking and dissecting of the determinants of voting on coal strip mining policy suggest that the economic theory of politics has been prematurely closed to a broader conception of political behavior

constituent interest vs legislator ideology the role of political opportunity cost this paper applies the economic model of legislative voting to the automobile industry domestic content vote in the u s house of representatives in 1982 we consider constituent interests for and against the ml and compare the predictive powers of alternative indicators of ideological preferences we also examine the role of political opportunity cost and find that lame ducks were significantly less likely to vote for the bill than were returnees to congress given the political advantages of voting for the bill this is consistent with the view that legislators were influenced by the case for freer trade

using state level simulations in a political economy model of us trade policy most analyses of us congressional votes on trade policy identify political and economic factors and general economic conditions as significant factors in this paper we examine whether simulated state level impacts of trade policy changes obtained from an applied general equilibrium model explain recent us senate votes on trade bills we find that simulated gross state product effects are good predictors of recent trade policy votes our model based measures of trade sensitivity perform slightly better in statistical terms than the more traditional economic measures for the senate as a whole import considerations have a larger impact on senate voting than export considerations

taxes torts and the toxics release inventory congressional voting on instruments to control pollution i introduction governments can choose from a wide variety of policy instruments to control pollution including tax and subsidy schemes marketable permits information provision programs liability systems with well defined property rights and command and control selection of emission standards or technologies economists throughout the 1980s devoted significant effort to modeling the relative merits of these instruments the question of why politicians would prefer one manner of controlling pollution over another also attracted attention starting with buchanan and tullock s 1975 positive theory of externality control in which polluters find direct regulatory controls on emissions more profitable than pollution taxes theories of instrument selection have been developed in which politicians choose policies based on the relative costs and benefits to shareholders workers and environmentalists are affected by the constraints imposed by political institutions and are driven to select the most efficient policy instrument to achieve a given level of redistribution 1 to date however there have been few empirical tests of what drives instrument selection in environmental policy there is a large empirical literature devoted to explaining the level of support for environmental programs in congress most articles focus on the degree to which a legislator s stand on a given environmental bill can be explained by narrow district interests generally the material interests of constituents or by ideology either constituents or the member s own policy preferences studies of voting on environmental legislation by ackerman and hassler 1981 crandall 1983 pashigian 1985 and yandle 1989 offer evidence that legislators actions are in part explained by the district or state level impacts of proposed legislation on their constituents kalt and zupan 1984 find that after controlling for constituents material self interest in proposed strip mining legislation the ideology of constituents and the personal ideologies of their representatives influence voting on this aspect of environmental preservation as grier 1993 demonstrates debate over the general role of the legislator s specific ideology in voting continues in studying votes in the house and senate on the proposed size of the superfund during debate over the program s renewal hird 1993 concludes that congressional voting on superfund is found to represent legislator s environmental and liberal ideologies as much as if not more than narrowly defined self interest he links the importance of ideology to voting on superfund in part to the bill s symbolic environmental appeal in environmental legislation the final impact of a bill on industry and the environment often depends on issues resolved through technical amendments downs s theory of rational ignorance and arnold s theory of the degree to which constituents will link congressional actions with real world outcomes predict that members of congress may be less constrained by general constituent interests on amendment votes since these votes are less likely to be covered in the media than are final legislative votes as denzau and munger 1986 and grier and munger 1991 note groups with specific interests such as affected industries may find it less costly to persuade a member of congress to vote their way on a measure if the representative s constituents are supportive of or indifferent to the measure in the case of technical amendments affected parties may be more influential than on highly visible votes because the lack of media coverage translates into a lower probability that the vote will become a major campaign issue in future elections this implies that voting on the instruments to control pollution will be driven in part by the specific district level costs and benefits of these measures while voting on the final passage of a bill will be more driven by general constituent interests

attendance rates political shirking and the effect of post elective office employment attendance rates political shirking and the effect of post elective office employment i introduction political shirking the degree to which a politican s actions deviate from the wishes of his constituents can take many different dimensions economists e g amacher and boyes 1978 davis and porter 1989 dougan and munger 1989 kalt and zupan 1984 lott 1987d nelson and siberberg 1987 and peltzman 1984 have debated whether shirking exists in how a politician votes when he does vote this divergence is measured through some particular special interest voting ratings e g american conservative union americans for democratic action etc however shirking can obviously take as many forms as there are outputs that a politician produces besides how he votes he also produces services for his constituents involving everything from being personally available to listen to the constituents grievances to ensuring effective handling of case work by his staff see for example fiorina 1977 fenno 1978 and cain et al 1987 1 one dimension that has not been sufficiently examined is the extent to which politicians shirk by failing to vote on pending legislation 2 no attention has been given to which mechanisms will make this particular type of shirking relatively more costly most economists agree that opportunitic behavior by politicians is limited by the threat of reelection e g amacher and boyes 1978 barro 1973 kalt and zupan 1984 nelson 1976 and telser 1976 3 by implication the level of shirking should be the greatest when a politician decides to leave office however this opportunistic behavior might be reduced to the extent that political parties or constituencies impose costs for shirking through affecting politicisns post elective office career or the careers of their children thus a politicians last term in elective office may not represent his last period in any meaningful sense the next section outlines the differing views on how politicians act when they no longer face the threat of reelection section iii describes some empirical evidence on what mechanisms may prevent this last period problem the final section discusses the impliactions of these results ii the last period whether economists view politicians as ideologues e g kau and rubin 1979 and kalt and zupan 1984 or as simply attempting to maximize political support e g barro 1973 ferejohn 1986 nelson 1976 and peltzman 1984 the threat of reelection is seen as preventing shirking as kalt and zupan 1984 298 phrase it it appears that the proximity of the next election inhibits ideological shirking even those who do not view the last period as affecting how a politician votes argue that it will affect how often he votes lott 1987a 1987b has argued that if voters can determine and elect politicians that have ideological preferences corresponding exactly to the wishes of constituents politicians voting patterns should continue to reflect those values even when the cost of shirking in terms of forgone future votes is low the penalty to ideologues of not votingfor their constituency in the last period when they no longer face reelection is the forgone utility from not doing what they personally value assuming that politicians also desire leisure politicians should continue to vote for what they believe in but they should vote less frequently since they no longer receive the additional return of larger future support mechanisms to overcome this last period problem have been suggested by becker and stigler 1974 9 10 they argue that opportunistic behavior can be controlled if officeholders face the loss of a pension or equivalently a posted bond in the event of opportunistic behavior in their last term however the actual pension system does not effectively eliminate the last period for politicians since retirement payments are not based on cheating in the last period

corruption via media capture the effect of competition in this article we compare a government s optimal choice of whether to engage in corruption by capturing the media outlets through bribery in two alternative media market structures monopoly versus duopoly while there is an extra bribe claimant in a media duopoly relative to monopoly it may also be harder for each firm to individually expose corruption when the rival co opts with the government we find that when the latter effect is stronger than the former media is captured at lower bribes under duopoly relative to monopoly and in such instances media competition facilitates rather than hindering corruption

shirking representation and congressional behavior voting on the 1983 amendments to the social security act our central goals at the outset of the paper were three 1 to report on the relative significance of a sophisticated measure of constituent economic interest and a commonly used variable ada score that purports to measure the personal ideology of the candidate 2 demonstrate that the constituent economic interest variable should be adjusted to account for the fact thatvoters not citizens are the only effective principals in influencing a legislator s voting activities and 3 call into question on both theoretical and empirical grounds the claim that legislators shirk their responsibilities to voters by voting their own ideological preferences in order to evaluate our efforts consider table 5 for a large majority 15 of the 18 relevant runs the ideological variable is significant our measure of constituent economic interests does not eliminate the explanatory power of the ideological voting variable but this does not indicate shirking as opposed to shirking we may observe ideological voting because 1 it provides brand name capital 2 it represents the ideological preferences of the constituents or 3 it acts as a measure of median voter economic preferences further ada scores do not allow us to differentiate between these competing explanations for 11 of the 18 models one of the economic variables accounts for a significant portion of the variance in the dependent variables the results derived from our measure of constituent economic interests contradict most findings of the lasi school and raise questions about the validity of the empirical characterization of constituent interests in that research a breakdown of the results by chamber indicates that significant differences in the degree of ideological voting between the house and senate may exist this is important in that most research has focused only on the senate where ideological voting is more prevalent for the house table 5 reveals the constituent economic interest variable isalways significant and in fully one half of the relevant regressions it is theonly significant variable knocking ada out of the race as noted earlier the insignificance of ada is some indication of the absence of ideological shirking though its significance may indicate only measurement error voter ideology or reputational capital in the senate the results are more evenly split though it is clear that the adjusted for reelection constituency economic interest variable is an improvement ada is significant in all 12 senate regressions and the respective economic variables are significant in 5 or just under half this side by side comparison is provocative though it remains to be tested in detail but our preliminary conclusions can be stated as follows first as peltzman 1984 suggested a better specification of economic interest and constituency representation reduces though it does not eliminate the role of the ada variable in the senate second we find evidence that ideological shirking if it exists is much smaller in the house in fact from an institutional perspective it can be argued that economic interests are dominant since house districts are smaller and more homogeneous further the shorter terms for house members may make them more directly accountable to voters and smaller groups of voters may force a lesser reliance on pure ideological campaigning and require a more personal presentation of self

discrete time behavioral portfolio selection under cumulative prospect theory we formulate and study three multi period behavioral portfolio selection models under cumulative prospect theory i s shaped utility maximization without probability weighting in a market with one risky asset ii s shaped utility maximization without probability weighting in a market with multiple risky assets which follow a joint elliptical distribution and iii s shaped utility maximization with inverse s shaped probability weighting in a market with one risky asset for the first two time consistent models we identify the well posedness conditions and derive the semi analytical optimal policies for the third time inconsistent model we assume that the investor is aware of the time inconsistency but is unable to commit to his initial plan of action then we reformulate the model into an intrapersonal game model and derive the semi analytical subgame perfect nash equilibrium time consistent policy under well posedness condition all the three policies take a piecewise linear feedback form our analysis of the three models not only partially explains the well documented phenomena of non participation puzzle and horizon effect but also extends the two fund separation theorem into multi period s shaped utility setting and pushes forward the study on time inconsistency issue incurred by probability weighting

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

a reexamination of the principal agent relationship in politics abstract that senators from the same state often have a large difference in their ideological voting records has proven inconvenient for a literature that has largely relied on a median voter model of elections one exception is palfrey review of economic studies 1984 51 139 156 whose analysis implies the hypothesis that the expected difference in such voting records varies directly with the variance of that state s density function of constituent ideological preferences this paper provides empirical testing consistent with this hypothesis the paper then argues that currently accepted methodology for measuring senatorial shirking is systematically biased towards indicating shirking and provides empirical analysis consistent with this argument

supplementing zupan s measurements of the ideological preferences of u s presidents mark a zupan s synthetic americans for democratic actionpresidential ratings published in public choice in 1992 runfrom 1947 1989 the authors extend zupan s ratings through1999

dynamic portfolio choice and asset pricing with narrow framing and probability weighting this paper shows that the framework proposed by barberis and huang 2009 to incorporate narrow framing and loss aversion into dynamic models of portfolio choice and asset pricing can be extended to also account for probability weighting and for a value function that is convex on losses and concave on gains we show that the addition of probability weighting and a convex concave value function reinforces previous applications of narrow framing and cumulative prospect theory to understanding the stock market non participation puzzle and the equity premium puzzle moreover we show that a convex concave value function generates new wealth effects that are consistent with empirical observations on stock market participation

congressional decision making and the separation of powers to what extent does the separation of powers affect congressional roll call voting behavior to answer this question i offer a strategic model of congressional decision making that asserts members of congress pursue public policy goals when casting roll call votes from the equilibrium predictions of a formal model i generate testable hypotheses by computing the expected net amount of sophisticated nonsincere congressional behavior given changes in decision context i test the predictions of the theoretical model with data from all civil rights roll call votes from the 83d to the 102d congress the results demonstrate that both the other legislative chamber and the supreme court profoundly constrain house members and senators when casting roll call votes this is strong evidence of the importance of policy outcomes to members of congress when voting on the floor

legislator voting and shirking a critical review of the literature we set out to critically review the progress in answering two related questions what determines how legislators vote and how can shirking by legislators be measured in the first category the hypothesis that legislators shirk in order to indulge their personal ideological preferences has led researchers astray the theoretical underpinning is shaky on two counts first legislators who indulge their preferences at the expense of their constituents preferences put themselves at a competitive electoral disadvantage second the original two stage procedure used to measure ideological shirking is severely flawed among many other problems the residual measure of shirking implicitly assumes that the median voter is the relevant constituent principal for the legislator agent

congestion in a city with a central bottleneck we consider dynamic congestion in an urban setting where trip origins are spatially distributed all travelers must pass through a downtown bottleneck in order to reach their destination in the cbd each traveler chooses departure time to maximize general concave scheduling utility we find that at equilibrium travelers sort according to their distance to the destination the queue is always unimodal regardless of the spatial distribution of trip origins we construct a welfare maximizing tolling regime which eliminates congestion all travelers located beyond a critical distance from the cbd gain from tolling even when toll revenues are not redistributed while nearby travelers lose we discuss our results in the context of acceptability of tolling policies

ideology and legislator shirking we argue that legislator shirking voting on the basis of personal ideology rather than the interests of one s constituents can exist but its appearance should conform to the law of demand we test and confirm this theory using votes on defense expenditure bills in the u s senate in 1982 we assume the cost of shirking is relatively higher on narrowly focused bills on specific weapons systems with well defined beneficiaries and relatively lower on general defense expenditure bills with uncertain final distribution of funds we find greater influence for senators ideology in general versus specific bills

pacs lobbies and political conflict the case of gun control previous research has shown that pac contributions from the national rifle association as well as letters and lobbying by handgun control inc significantly affected congressional voting on the firearms owners protection act of 1986 holding constant ideology party constituency characteristics and a proxy for prior position on the issue using data from that study this paper shows that contributions have a somewhat different effect than lobbying contributions from nra were primarily targeted at nra supporters and had the net effect of making the progunners even more so contributions from handgun control while they did not significantly reinforce the proclivities of the gun controllers were directed only at that group at least in this case money appears to exacerbate conflict by contrast the police lobby directed its attention at both gun controllers and pro gunners the lobby effectively induced pro gunners to moderate their position

a free press is bad news for corruption abstract this paper tests the proposition that a free press may be a powerful control on corruption we find evidence of a significant relationship between more press freedom and less corruption in a large cross section of countries this result is robust to specification and sample and the relationship is not sensitive to the choice of a particular measure of corruption or of press freedom furthermore we present evidence which suggests that the direction of causation runs from higher press freedom to lower corruption

legislators and interest groups how unorganized interests get represented this paper derives a supply price for public policy using a constrained maximization model in the model three sets of agents each have preferences over outcomes organized interest groups offer campaign contributions to improve their own wealth voters offer votes to obtain outcomes closer to their most preferred outcomes and legislators seek both campaign contributions and votes to obtain reelection a given legislator s supply price for policy is shown to depend on the productivity of his effort as determined by committee assignments priority and ability and by the preferences of his unorganized constituency in the home district two extreme assumptions about the effectiveness of campaign spending in eliciting votes are used to illustrate the comparative statics properties of the model the prediction of the model is that interest groups will in general seek out legislators whose voters are indifferent to the policy the interest group seeks thus voters who do have preferences over policy are in effect represented even though they are not organized

transparency and corruption evidence from india abstracttheories of corruption suggest that higher levels of transparency are necessarily associated with lower levels of corruption yet in highly hierarchical societies in which the gulf between government officials and the most underprivileged members of society is very wide this relationship may not hold in this paper i test the link between transparency and corruption by means of a field experiment i ask how effective recourse to a freedom of information law is in comparison to bribery for both slum dwellers and middle class individuals in india as they apply for basic public services i demonstrate that applicants who make use of the freedom of information law attain almost the same rate of success as those who bribe recourse to a freedom of information law comes close to erasing class differences that is it results in comparable processing times for slum dwellers and middle class individuals

dynamic trading with reference point adaptation and loss aversion we formalize the reference point adaptation process by relating it to a way people perceive prior gains and losses we then develop a dynamic trading model with reference point adaptation and loss aversion and derive its semi analytical solution the derived optimal stock holding has an asymmetric v shaped form with respect to prior outcomes and the related sensitivities are directly determined by the sensitivities of reference point shifts with respect to the outcomes we also find that the effects of reference point adaptation can be used to shed light on some well documented trading patterns e g house money break even and disposition effects

who owns the media the authors examine patterns of media ownership in 97 countries around the world they find that almost universally the largest media firms are controlled by the government or by private families government ownership is more pervasive in broadcasting than in the printed media government ownership is generally associated with less press freedom fewer political and economic rights inferior governance and most conspicuously inferior social outcomes in education and health the adverse effects of government ownership on political and economic freedom are stronger for newspapers than for television the adverse effects of government ownership of the media do not appear to be restricted solely to instances of government monopoly the authors present a range of evidence on the adverse consequences of state ownership of the media state ownership of the media is often argued to be justified on behalf of the social needs of the disadvantaged but if their findings are correct increasing private ownership of the media through privatization or by encouraging the entry of privately owned media can advance a variety of political and economic goals especially those of meeting the social needs of the poor

a model of casino gambling we show that prospect theory offers a rich theory of casino gambling one that captures several features of actual gambling behavior first we demonstrate that for a wide range of preference parameter values a prospect theory agent would be willing to gamble in a casino even if the casino offers only bets with no skewness and with zero or negative expected value second we show that the probability weighting embedded in prospect theory leads to a plausible time inconsistency at the moment he enters a casino the agent plans to follow one particular gambling strategy but after he starts playing he wants to switch to a different strategy the model therefore predicts heterogeneity in gambling behavior how a gambler behaves depends on whether he is aware of the time inconsistency and if he is aware of it on whether he can commit in advance to his initial plan of action this paper was accepted by brad barber teck ho and terrance odean special issue editors

the wrong kind of transparency in a model of career concerns for experts when is a principal hurt from observing more information about her agent this paper introduces a distinction between information on the consequence of the agent s action and information directly on the agent s action when the latter kind of information is available the agent faces an incentive to disregard useful private signals and act according to how an able agent is expected to act a priori this conformist behavior hurts the principal in two ways the decision made by the agent is less likely to be the right one discipline and ex post it is more difficult to evaluate the agent s ability sorting the paper identifies a necessary and sufficient condition on the agent signal structure under which the principal bene ts from committing not to observe the agent s action the paper also shows the existence of strategic complementarities between information on action and information on consequence the results on the distinction between action and consequence are then used to interpret existing disclosure policies in delegated portfolio management in particular they are consistent with hitherto puzzling evidence that mutual funds systematically overperform pension funds

explaining legislators positions on outside income limits voting on honoraria ceilings in the u s senate 1981 1983 this article examines roll call voting by members of the u s senate on three proposals to limit members outside income in the 1980s i find that several factors influenced legislators votes on outside income limits legislation oill first financial self interest was an important constraint on members willingness to support oill members who earned more honoraria were less likely to vote yes but this opposition was neutralized when limits were attached to the compensating mechanism of a pay raise senators from poorer states were generally more likely to support honoraria limits alone but less likely to support limits linked to a pay raise suggesting a responsiveness to constituent interests in both cases finally when oill was linked to a pay raise electoral considerations became prominent in legislators vote decisions with electorally vulnerable members less likely to vote yes

sunshine as disinfectant the effect of state freedom of information act laws on public corruption abstract we assess the effect of freedom of information act foia laws on public corruption in the united states specifically we investigate the impact of switching from a weak to a strong state level foia law on corruption convictions of state and local government officials the evidence suggests that strengthening foia laws has two offsetting effects reducing corruption and increasing the probability that corrupt acts are detected the conflation of these two effects led prior work to find little impact of foia on corruption we find that conviction rates approximately double after the switch which suggests an increase in detection probabilities however conviction rates decline from this new elevated level as the time since the switch from weak to strong foia increases this decline is consistent with officials reducing the rate at which they commit corrupt acts by about 20 these changes are more pronounced in states with more intense media coverage for those that had more substantial changes in their foia laws for foia laws which include strong liabilities for officials who contravene them for local officials and for more serious crimes conviction rates of federal officials who are not subject to the policy show no concomitant change

time series evidence on shirking in the u s house of representatives this paper presents time series evidence on the voting behavior of members of the u s house of representatives from 1975 to 1990 the empirical results indicate that voting behavior of individual congressmen is remarkably stable over time we find no evidence of economically significant last term effects on voting behavior nor are there important effects of legislative tenure on voting patterns the most significant deviations in voting behavior occur for congressmen who failed to win their reelection bid suggesting that sizable deviations from previous policy positions may result in swift retribution by constituents in the district