competing for endorsements endorsements are a simple language for communication between interest group leaders and group members the members who share policy concerns may not perfectly understand where their interests lie on certain issues if their leaders cannot fully explain the issues they can convey some information by endorsing a candidate or party when interest groups endorse legislative contenders the candidates may compete for backing policies may favor special interests at the expense of the general public the authors examine the conditions under which parties compete for endorsements the extent to which policy outcomes are skewed and the normative properties of the political equilibria

public employees as swing voters empirical evidence on opposition to public reform reform offers economic gains for society atlarge but can represent a threat to theinterests of public employees publicsector reform faces opposition from votersemployed in public sector norwegian dataallow for an analysis this interpretation survey data show that public employeesprefer less reform than the rest of thepopulation the voting behavior of publicemployees is more sensitive to reform thanis that of other voters the swing voterhypothesis and hence shares of publicemployees in a local jurisdiction have anegative impact on the probability ofreform

how does globalization affect the implicit tax rates on labor income capital income and consumption in the european union this article analyzes the effects of globalization on implicit tax rates itrs on labor income capital income and consumption in the eu15 and central and eastern european new member states cee nms we find supportive evidence for an increase in the itr on labor income in the eu15 but no effect on the itr on capital income there is evidence of convergence in terms of the itr on consumption as countries with higher than average itr on consumption respond to globalization by decreasing their tax rates there are important differences among the welfare regimes within the eu15 social democratic countries have decreased the tax burden on capital but increased that on labor due to globalization globalization exerts a pressure to increase taxes on labor income in the conservative and liberal regimes as well taxes on consumption decrease in response to globalization in the conservative and social democratic regimes in the cee nms there is no effect of globalization on the itr on labor and capital income but we find a negative impact on the itr on consumption in the cee nms with higher than average itr on consumption jel h23 h24 h25 f19 f21

do low corporate income tax rates attract fdi evidence from central and east european countries fifty six bilateral country relationships combining 7 home countries from the eu and the us and 8 central and east european host countries ceecs of foreign direct investment fdi from 1995 2003 are used in a panel gravity model setting to estimate the role of taxation as a determinant of fdi while gravity variables explain most of the variation of fdi inflows the bilateral effective average tax rate beatr is roughly equally important to other cost related factors the semi elasticity of fdi with respect to taxes is about 4 3 this value is above those of earlier studies in absolute terms and can partly be attributed to using the beatr instead of the statutory tax rate our results indicate that tax lowering strategies of ceec governments seem to have an important impact on foreign firms location decisions

great expectations and the end of the depression what ended the great depression in the united states this paper suggests that the recovery was driven by a shift in expectations this shift was triggered by president franklin delano roosevelt s fdr policy actions on the monetary policy side roosevelt abolished the gold standard and announced an explicit policy objective of inflating the price level to pre depression levels on the fiscal policy side roosevelt expanded real and deficit spending which helped make his policy objective credible the key to the recovery was the successful management of expecta tions about future policy roosevelt s rise to power is modeled as a policy regime change as in thomas sargent 1983 and peter temin and barry wigmore 1990 this paper formalizes temin and wigmore s argu ment in a repeated game setting using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model and argues that the regime change can account for the recovery in the model a regime change means the elimination of certain policy dogmas that constrain the actions of the government the regime change generates an endogenous shift in expectations due to a coordination of mon etary and fiscal policy this coordination ended the great depression by engineering a shift in expectations from contractionary i e the private sector expected future economic contrac tion and deflation to expansionary i e the public expected future economic expansion and inflation the expectation of higher future inflation lowered real interest rates thus stimulating demand while the expectation of higher future income stimulated demand by raising permanent income

the boundaries of multinational enterprises and the theory of international trade this paper begins with a review of empirical evidence on multinational firms conceptual underpinnings of a theory are developed relying in particular on the notion of knowledge capital as a mobile joint input into geographically separated production facilities this idea is embedded in a simple two country general equilibrium model that supports multinational production in equilibrium under conditions consistent with the empirical evidence the final section examines internalization and shows why certain properties of knowledge capital also imply a preference for transferring technologies internally within the firm rather than through arm s length markets

imperfectly informed voters and strategic extremism we analyze a two candidate downsian model considering that voters use shortcuts e g interest group media endorsements to infer candidates policy platforms that is voters do not observe candidates exact platforms but only which candidate offers the more leftist rightist platform relative positions in equilibrium candidates behavior tends to maximum extremism but it may converge or diverge depending on how voters behave when indifferent policywise between the candidates when the tie breaking rule used by the voters is sufficiently fair candidates converge to the extreme preferred by the median voter but when it strongly favors a certain candidate each candidate specializes in a different extreme

elections with limited information a fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources a one dimensional model of two candidate elections under asymmetric information is theoretically developed and experimentally tested candidates do not know voter utility functions and most voters are uninformed about candidate policy positions a fulfilled expectations equilibrium is defined using poll and endorsement data as information sources it is proved that with any positive fraction of informed voters any equilibrium extracts all available information all participants voters and candidates alike act as if they were fully informed for fixed candidate strategies a dynamic is given for convergence to voter equilibrium and this process is shown to imply a bandwagon effect

an information rationale for the power of special interests political decisions are often biased in favor of special interests at the expense of the general public and they are frequently inefficient in the sense that the losses incurred by the majority exceed the gains enjoyed by the minority this article explains the bias in terms of information asymmetries and the free rider problem first incumbents increase their reelection prospects by biasing policy toward groups that are better able to monitor their activities second because smaller groups are better able to overcome the free rider problem of costly monitoring policy will be biased in their favor third the effect of asymmetric monitoring on voter welfare is ambiguous the inefficiencies created by the policy bias are offset by a positively valued selection bias incumbents of above average quality are more likely to survive voter scrutiny than are low quality types

did fin 48 increase companies tax payments trade off between disclosure and tax burdens this article examines the effects of implementing fin 48 on companies tax burdens while the literature examines how fin 48 impacts companies financial reporting its effect on tax payments has not yet been explored we find that fin 48 likely increased larger companies tax burdens prior to the adoption of fin 48 larger companies may have used their asymmetric information advantage over the tax authorities to maintain relatively aggressive tax positions to the extent that such tax saving strategies were possible only for larger companies fin 48 appears to have reduced the appeal of these more aggressive tax minimization strategies

globalization welfare regimes and social protection expenditures in western and eastern european countries this paper analyzes the effects of globalization on social protection expenditures in european countries the particular focus is on a the eastern european countries and b on differences in globalization effects between welfare regimes we find evidence in favor of the compensation hypothesis in western europe which is driven by the conservative welfare regime outweighing the efficiency effect of globalization in the social democratic welfare regime in eastern european countries the efficiency effect is predominant no globalization effect is found for the liberal and the southern welfare regimes

does political knowledge increase turnout evidence from the 1997 british general election a number of recent formal models predict a positive effect of political knowledge on turnout both information acquisition and turnout however are likely to be determined by a similar set of variables rendering hard the identification of a causal link in empirical investigations available empirical regularities should therefore be interpreted as mere correlations i address this problem by using an intrumental variables approach where the instruments are represented by various proxies of information supply on mass media using survey data from the 1997 british general election study i show that political knowledge has a sizeable influence on the probability of voting and that mass media play an important role in influencing political participation

exports and economic growth in central and east european countries during transition this paper quantifies the contribution of exports to economic growth in central and east european countries ceecs during transition two theoretical models are examined the first is based on an aggregate production function which includes exports as an additional input while the second is based on a two sector exports and non exports model where exports provide positive externalities in non export production each model is estimated with both fixed and random effects using panel data results show that the random effects model is preferred and that exports have a significant impact on economic growth

monopoly agenda control and asymmetric information this paper extends the romer rosenthal 1978 1979 model of monopoly agenda control to an environment where only the agenda setter knows with certainty the outcome associated with a failed proposal the presence of this asymmetric information implies that any take it or leave it proposal may provide information crucial to the decision calculus of the voters a fact which an optimal proposal strategy will incorporate the equilibrium behavior of the agenda setter and voters is characterized and contrasted with that in the complete information environment and a number of empirical predictions concerning the nature of elections with monopoly controlled agendas are derived

heterogeneity in perceptions of national economic conditions empirical findings concerning economic voting differ according to the level of analysis employed a widely accepted explanation for the inconsistency between macroand microlevel evidence of economic voting is the high degree of random variation that plagues survey data according to this explanation aggregation purges individual level noise from mass opinions on policy issues and outcomes building on the research of bartels 1996 we debate the validity of this explanation by demonstrating that public evaluations of the national economy vary systematically with information media exposure political attitudes personal experiences and demographic characteristics furthermore we show that these sources of subjective heterogeneity produce systematic biases when national economic evaluations are aggregated these findings challenge a widely accepted notion that because error in individual level measures or expressions of preferences is random the aggregation of these individual measures ensures that they correctly represent the collective preference mpirical findings concerning the influence of the economy on political behavior differ depending on the level of analysis employed using aggregate level data numerous studies have established a statistical relationship between economic conditions and election outcomes or executive popularity e g kramer 1971 mackuen erikson and stimson 1992 on the basis of the macro level evidence alone one would have little reason to doubt that the economy matters in contrast individual level studies using survey data have produced only mixed evidence that voters consider economic conditions when evaluating the incumbent government and its leaders e g fiorina 1978 1981 kinder and kiewiet 1979 1981 moreover the strongest survey evidence of economic voting suggests that voters primarily care about national economic conditions not their personal financial situation this finding contradicts the egocentric theory posited by early macro level research that national economic indicators matter because they are correlated with personal financial circumstances the micro macro dichotomy in economic voting research reflects a similar dichotomy in research on voter sophistication and representation aggregate level studies tend to indicate that voters are reasonably well informed about the economy and make forward looking rather sophisticated voting decisions e g alesina londregan and rosenthal 1993 suzuki and chappell 1996 palmer and whitten 1999 these studies infer that mass political decisions conform to rational expectations or at least limited information rationality e g mackuen erikson and stimson 1992 in contrast to this macro level image of the voter individual level survey research has shown that the public in general has low levels of political sophistication lacking much knowledge of and interest in politics e g

partisan cycles in congressional elections and the macroeconomy in the postwar united states the president s party has always done worse in the midterm congressional elections than in the previous congressional election republican administrations exhibit below average and democratic administrations above average economic growth in the first half of each term whereas in the latter halves the two see equal growth our rational expectations model is consistent with these two regularities in presidential elections voters choose between two polarized candidates they then use midterm elections to counterbalance the president s policies by strengthening the opposition in congress since presidents of different parties are associated with different policies our model predicts a spurious correlation between the state of the economy and elections our predictions contrast with those of retrospective voting models in which voters reward the incumbent if the economy is doing well before the election our model performs empirically at least as well as and often better than alternative models

determinants of biofuel oriented land acquisitions in sub saharan africa abstract the recent surge of investors interest for african land has triggered the debate about the drivers and effects of the so called land grabbing after a review of the relationship between investment in land and biofuel development in sub saharan africa we contribute to the existing literature in four dimensions we use the updated version of land matrix whose potentialities are currently underexploited we concentrate on land deals for cultivating biofuel crops which are emblematic of the food land energy nexus we focus on fdi to the african continent the most targeted region for land grabbing finally we delve deeper into the influence of institutional quality by testing the role of different institutional dimensions we find that abundance of water resources and general business conditions security and regulatory quality facilitate the investment in land for biofuels as for land governance what matters is the strength and security of land tenure rights rather than the type of tenure system

supersized votes ballot length uncertainty and choice in direct legislation elections voters in polities that make heavy use of direct democracy are frequently confronted with ballots that contain a multitude of propositions claims that direct legislation elections overwhelm voters with choices they are not competent to make should particularly apply to such demanding settings yet evidence on the effects of lengthy ballots on voting behavior is scant this study reviews theories of decision making under uncertainty and tests their predictions in a mixed heteroscedastic model of vote choice that is fitted to a unique collection of survey and contextual data on swiss referendums increasing ballot length is demonstrated to interfere with the voters ability to translate their political preferences into consistent policy choices

the determinants of foreign direct investment in transition economies a meta analysis in this paper we conduct a meta analysis of studies that empirically examine the relationship between economic transformation and foreign direct investment fdi performance in central and eastern europe and the former soviet union over the past quarter century more specifically we synthesise the empirical evidence reported in previous studies that deal with the determinants of fdi in transition economies focusing on the impacts of transition factors we also perform meta regression analysis to specify determinant factors of the heterogeneity among the relevant studies and the presence of publication selection bias we find that the existing literature reports a statistically significant non zero effect as a whole and a genuine effect is confirmed for some fdi determinants beyond the publication selection bias

the causality between fdi and sector specific production in turkey evidence from threshold cointegration with regime shifts abstractthis article considers bidirectional nonlinear cointegration relation between fdi and industrial output in turkey the data cover the monthly period 2005 1 2013 10 for the time series of total industrial production 36 sub industrial sectors production and fdi following nonlinear threshold cointegration and vecms the article yields that i total industrial production and nine sub industrial productions have positive long run impact on fdi with significant error corrections ii six sub industrial productions have short term influence on fdi iii fdi has long run positive impulse on total industrial production and nine sub industrial productions with some significant error corrections and iv fdi affects four sub industrial productions in the short run as well as in the long run the results of vecms from i also reveal that the all short term adjustment parameters are found significant and powerful in 10 typical regimes regime 1s and in 5 extreme regimes regime 2s finally the outcom

relying on the information of interested parties we investigate the conventional wisdom that competition among interested parties attempting to influence a decisionmaker by providing verifiable information elicits all relevant information we find that if the decisionmaker is strategically sophisticated and well informed about the relevant variables and about the preferences of the interested party or parties competition may be unnecessary to achieve this result if the decisionmaker is unsophisticated or not well informed competition is not generally sufficient if the interested parties interests are sufficiently opposed however or if the decisionmaker is seeking to advance the parties welfare then competition can reduce or even eliminate the decisionmaker s need for prior knowledge about the relevant variables and for strategic sophistication in other settings only the combination of competition among information providers and a sophisticated skepticism is sufficient to allow effective decisionmaking

busy voters agenda control and the power of information t he correspondence between individual preferences and electoral outcomes is often affected by the existence of information asymmetries among electoral participants and the presence of individuals or groups who exercise some form of agenda control while the effects of agenda control in political decision making are widely recognized the effects of information asymmetries are not as well understood since information asymmetries are fundamental characteristics of most elections a deep understanding of the correspondence between individual preferences and electoral outcomes requires a serious consideration of the effects of information i develop a generalizable agenda control model that takes as given the observation that most voters are not naturally inclined to invest in political information the model allows me to provide a dynamic description of how voters and political elites can adapt to the information problems that characterize political decision making it also allows me to demonstrate the effect of these adaptations on electoral outcomes