rules stability and growth abstract this paper examines two systems of fiscal redistribution in the context of a growing economy subject to unexpected shocks rules and discretion under the former system the tax system is in place and is known to households contemplating investment decisions under the second redistribution is decided upon only after the investment decisions have been made i find that rules always lead to faster capital accumulation and growth but political support for them is only likely to occur in a stable economy income inequality adversely affects the likelihood of adopting rules especially so in an unstable economy

political instability corruption and policy formation the case of environmental policy abstract this paper develops a theory of environmental policy formation taking into consideration the degree of corruptibility and political turbulence the predictions that emerge are that the interaction between the two variables is important political instability has a negative effect on the stringency of environmental regulations if the level of corruption is low but a positive effect when the degree of corruption is high corruption reduces the stringency of environmental regulations but the effect disappears as political instability increases the empirical findings are fully consistent with the predictions of the model

semicollusion in the norwegian cement market abstract a model of semicollusion where firms collude on prices and compete on capacities is tailor made to the characteristics of the norwegian cement market and tested on this particular market for the period 1927 1982 the results indicate that the rapid increase in capacity and thereby in exports in the period 1956 1967 the late phase of the price cartel best can be explained by the market sharing agreement each firm overinvested in capacity to receive a large quota in the domestic market

disadvantageous collusion and government regulation abstract the semi collusion model indicates that when firms collude on outputs and compete on capacities cartel members may be worse off why do rational firms choose such kind of disadvantageous collusion in order to solve the puzzle this article uses taiwan s flour cartel case to investigate firms incentives and finds that government regulation seems to be the primary reason to create such a predicament

where is the plus in credit plus the case of chiapas mexico abstractit has become common to try and increase the effectiveness of microfinance programmes by adding supplementary services to the financial product however the added value accruing from this credit plus approach has been little analysed we hypothesise that the extent of added value from credit plus depends on the ability of the credit supplier to cultivate trust or social capital amongst clients applying difference in difference estimation we exploit a natural experiment of two credit plus programmes in mexico the findings suggest that credit plus is not universally effective but that it is at its most effective especially with low income groups where bonding within group social capital exists

how can market mechanisms for forest environmental services help the poor preliminary lessons from latin america summary market mechanisms for forest environmental services are a new approach for conservation but there is also an increasing interest in the derived developmental benefits of these mechanisms we first propose a conceptual framework for future research on the livelihood impacts of environmental service markets we then review eight latin american case studies on carbon sequestration and watershed protection market initiatives finding positive local income effects in most cases more land tenure security and socioinstitutional strengthening in some cases but some negative effects also we recommend pro poor policy measures such as reducing smallholders transaction costs and removing inappropriate access restrictions

poverty and landownership the author studies how landownership affects labor allocation income distribution and poverty in less developed countries he focuses on three prototypes of ownership classes landlords smallholders and landless people agents are identical except for their ownership of assets on the basis of optimizing behavior they divide into urban workers in the modern sector urban workers in the informal sector agricultural laborers subsistence farmers and landlords the impact of land reform on production and poverty depends on the amount of fertile land per capita a more egalitarian distribution of landownership reduces poverty where land is scarce but not where land is abundant copyright 1992 by american economic association

from correlates and characteristics to causes thinking about poverty from a chronic poverty perspective summary poverty and poverty reduction are currently the central concerns of development discourse and policy despite recent theoretical advances poverty analysis continues to be dominated by an income consumption conception of poverty we argue for understandings of poverty that go beyond measurement led conceptualizations to more adequately expose the causes of poverty chronic poverty is one such concept its focus on poverty duration and dynamics highlights the forms of social relations that produce poverty and which are often embedded within political institutions and economic structures poverty reduction does not simply require good policy it requires creating the capacity of poorer people to influence and hold accountable those who make policies

economic determinants of land invasions this study estimates the effect of economic conditions on redistributive conflict we examine land invasions in brazil using a panel data set with over 50 000 municipality year observations adverse eco nomic shocks instrumented by rainfall cause the rural poor to invade and occupy large landholdings this effect exhibits substantial heterogeneity by land inequality and land tenure systems but not by other observable variables in highly unequal municipalities negative income shocks cause twice as many land invasions as in municipalities with average land inequality cross sectional estimates using fine within region variation also suggest the importance of land inequality in explaining redistributive conflict i introduction c onflict over land is endemic to many rural econo mies in environments marked by a highly skewed distribution of property incomplete land and credit markets poorly or unevenly enforced property rights and weak political institutions agents often resort to extralegal means to improve their economic positions the poor frequently invade private properties and occupy them until either forcibly expelled or granted official titles land conflict which is prevalent in many countries such as brazil south africa uganda and venezuela may distort the allocation of resources in the agricultural sector away from productive uses and thereby contribute to the persistence of rural poverty how do economic conditions affect this redistrib utive conflict this paper explores this question using a rich municipal level data set of 5 299 land invasions from 1988 to 2004 in brazil we follow miguel satyanath and sergenti 2004 by using rainfall as a source of exogenous variation to study the relationship between income and conflict and we find that adverse economic shocks cause the rural poor to invade large landholdings this effect exhibits considerable het erogeneity by land inequality and land tenure systems in highly unequal municipalities negative income shocks cause twice as many land invasions as in municipalities with average land inequality the effect of income shocks is even stronger in highly polarized municipalities as measured by the degree of bimodality in the land distribution cross sectional estimates using fine within region variation also suggest the importance of land inequality in explaining redistributive conflict we also find that income shocks cause significantly more land invasions in municipalities with a greater proportion of land under fixed rent contracts by contrast we find no evidence of heterogeneity on a range of other political and socioeconomic variables including political competition sharecropping police expenditures and social welfare spending recent microeconometric studies have examined two

sunk costs and strategic commitment a proposed three stage equilibrium dixit s i980 paper in this journal the role of investment in entry deterrence has attracted considerable interest from economists concerned with constructing a modern theory of strategic behaviour towards entry in fact the paper has spawned quite an industry of commitment models in which the equilibrium payoffs in some final period game can be influenced by strategic commitments made by the players in an earlier period for similar models with important insights into strategic entry deterrence see eaton and lipsey i980 i98i schmalensee i98i the purpose of this note is to argue that when the instrument of stragetic commitment takes the form of sunk costs which both entrant and incumbent have to bear as it does in dixit s paper and in many other examples a three stage model rather than the two stage model presented by dixit is required although the proposed equilibrium differs from dixit s its qualitative features are the same it may or may not be profitable to deter entry and if it is the first mover may still prefer to play an accommodation strategy and allow entry to take place following dixit we restrict our attention to the asymmetric case in which one firm the incumbent makes the first move the two stage game involves the first mover sinking part of its costs in advance so that in the second stage equilibrium it will have a current cost advantage over the entrant which must incur the full cost of producing any desired output level the second period cost asymmetry ensures the incumbent a lar ger share of the post entry market which may be sufficient to deter entry altogether the problem with the two stage game lies in the nature of sunk costs sunk costs by definition are committed before the production period takes place if they were expended as a flow simultaneously with production they would not be sunk the installation of capacity is the natural example employed by dixit and well illustrates the point if installed capacity is a sunk cost which it must be for the incumbent to acquire any strategic advantage at all then the entrant s installed capacity is equally sunk and must also be committed before the production period takes place given this observation the post entry final period equilibrium should not be modelled as if the entrant were simultaneously incurring both variable and sunk costs but the incumbent only incurs variable costs this implies too great an asymmetry in favour of the incumbent the final period equilibrium should involve both firms incurring only variable

optimal taxation and fiscal constitution abstract assuming a world with excessive taxes the focuses of this paper are political mechanisms that ensure efficiency enhancing restraints on taxes in particular it is shown that supermajority requirements to approve tax increases as currently used in some us states is the means of attaining this objective their relationship to another such mechanism prevalent in earlier centuries that of franchise restrictions is discussed

a theory of political transitions we develop a theory of political transitions inspired by the experiences of western europe and latin america nondemocratic societies are controlled by a rich elite the initially disenfranchised poor can contest power by threatening revolution especially when the opportunity cost is low for example during recessions the threat of revolution may force the elite to democratize democracy may not consolidate because it is redistributive and so gives the elite an incentive to mount a coup highly unequal societies are less likely to consolidate democracy and may end up oscillating between regimes and suffer substantial fiscal volatility

why is there no revolution in north korea the political economy of revolution revisited the paper critically assesses the acemoglu robinson approach to revolutions as it is focused on inequality of wealth or income rather than on collective action problems we show that income inequality is not a sufficient and not even a necessary condition for a revolution to occur rather a necessary condition for a revolution is that any subpopulation can expect net benefits from it for which inequality is not a precondition as a result a certain structure of commitment devices or their absence rather than inequality is crucial for explaining why revolutions sometimes occur and sometimes not

taxation of interest income deregulation and the banking industry removing interest rate ceilings on bank deposits or reducing the tax rate applicable to the interest earned on such deposits are alternative means of increasing the after tax return to depositors these alternatives however have differing impacts on the structure of a competitive banking industry this paper develops a model which focuses on a bank s choice between paying an explicit interest rate on its deposits and paying a return in the form of services the model allows banks to differ in their production technologies and depositors in their marginal tax rates and preferences for services the effects of tax rate changes and a ceiling on the explicit deposit interest rate are analyzed coinciding with the rise in market interest rates to levels significantly above regulation ceiling rates on bank and savings and loan deposits has been a move to reduce the level of taxation on interest income general proposals to reduce the tax on interest income seem to have gained support as a means of increasing after tax rates of return in order to increase aggregate savings while proposals to allow banks and savings and loans to offer tax free savings certificates are supported as a means of reducing the cost of funds for such thrift institutions for example the tax exempt all savers certificates were designed to yield higher after tax rates of return for some individuals while simultaneously lowering the cost of funds to the issuing institutions as a means of providing a higher return to depositors an obvious alternative to reducing the tax on interest income would be to speed the removal of interest rate ceilings which apply to deposits at banks and savings and loans tax changes and deregulation would both affect the banking industry by leading to changes in the after tax interest rate on deposits the composition of deposit return between explicit taxable interest payments and the provision at below cost of nontaxable services might also be affected along with the optimum level of deposits for an individual bank and the size of the banking industry unfortunately none of these implications all of which are relevant for analyzing recent tax and deregulation proposals have been studied within the framework of a model of the banking industry this paper develops a model which focuses on the bank s choice between paying an explicit interest rate on its deposits and paying a return in the form of services previous models have often ignored this choice assuming that only the total return and not its composition mattered to the bank kareken 11 klein

production appropriation and income transfer suk jae noh 1 introduction the idea is not new that redistribution of resources purchases social stability because inequality in income or resource distribution fosters antisocial behaviors such as crime and revolt the time and effort involved in these unproductive activities are simply wasted from the social point of view if in this case resource redistribution reduces these appropriative activities it helps increase the production efficiency of the economy by diverting resources from appropriative to productive activities accordingly whether in the form of land reform grossman 1994 1995 or extension of franchise acemoglu and robinson 1996 resource redistribution emerges in some cases as an equilibrium outcome in various conflictual situations however it is unlikely that prevention of appropriative activities with resource redistribution alone can be sustained in a continuing conflict without some minimum amount of precautionary measures backed by force 1 in the other extreme social stability can also be achieved by suppressing those appropriative activities with force alone for example by expending resources on the military or police grossman 1991 consequently to evaluate properly the role of resource redistribution it is desirable to consider a conflict where these two distinct measures of deterrence the use of force stick and transfer of resources carrot are simultaneously available and to analyze how they are employed in resolving a conflict 2 building on the recent analyses of conflict 3 this article investigates how redistribution of income changes the equilibrium allocation of resources between production and appropriation given that deterrence of appropriative activities can also be achieved by suppression with force to investigate the problem in a simple general equilibrium framework i consider a conflict between the prey and predator and assume that income transfer is possible only from the prey to the predator 4 to fix the idea consider the ancient china confronting a potential predation from a barbarian country or the ruling class in a country that faces a possible appropriation from the ruled class in addition to the option of building up defense if we permit the prey the option of making income transfer it is intuitively clear that nonaggression where the predator becomes a producer rather than a predator would be a more likely outcome in equilibrium than otherwise to achieve his or her objective with two instruments at his or her disposal the prey faces a trade off in choosing between these two measures i ask the following questions first given that both defense and income transfer are similar in their effect when are these two measures simultaneously employed by the prey in the equilibrium second if the option of income transfer is used in the equilibrium how are the amounts of defense and offense affected in comparison with the case where the option of income transfer is not available considering a two period model of conflict 5 i assume that in the first period the prey allocates resource endowment between production and defense the outcome of prey s production is realized in the second period and is vulnerable to the attack of the predator however the prey has the option of transferring part of his or her produced output to the predator in the second period given these assumptions along with the specific forms of production and conflict technologies i first derive the equilibrium outcomes of the conflict when the option of income transfer is not available in one equilibrium i have nonaggression where the prey builds up a sufficiently large amount of defense that completely deters the predation of the predator this equilibrium holds if resource base of the prey relative to that of the predator is not too large in other situations i obtain pure predation where the predator becomes a pure predator

arming as a strategic investment in a cooperative equilibrium to develop a positive economic theory of military spending this analysis focuses on a game theoretic general equilibrium model of international conflict in which consumption peaceful investment and military spending are endogenously determined the analysis illustrates that when there is repeated interaction between nations a game of threats and punishments generally will not support a disarmament outcome and that fluctuations in military spending can be an endogenous result of fluctuations in aggregate economic activity furthermore the analysis shows how the relation between aggregate economic activity and military spending qualitatively depends on whether governments are acting opportunistically or cooperatively copyright 1990 by american economic association

national pro poor spending programmes and their effect on income inequality and poverty evidence from vietnam abstractthis article examines the causal effects of the national pro poor targeted programmes ntps on both poverty incidence and inequality in vietnam over the period 2002 2010 while the links between ntps and poverty alleviation and income inequality have previously been analysed independently this study is the first to offer a comprehensive analysis of ntps expenditure on poverty and inequality simultaneously applying the system generalized method of moments estimator to a panel of vietnamese regional data we are unable to establish that ntps have significantly mitigated poverty incidence however we estimate that ntps have significantly increased inequality we offer possible explanations why the ntps have resulted in these unintended outcomes and discuss potential policies which can reduce both poverty and inequality

programs for the poorest learning from the igvgd program in bangladesh abstract this article examines a program that seeks to reach bangladesh s hardcore poor by combining elements of livelihood protection food aid with livelihood promotion skills training and microfinance bangladesh rural advancement committee s income generation for vulnerable group development program has deepened the outreach of its poverty reduction activity and achieved impressive results detailed local level fieldwork revealed however that program practice differed markedly from program plans this is found to have important implications for both future program design and the understanding of who does not benefit from such innovative programs we conclude that while such programs mixing livelihood protection and promotion should be a major focus for anti poverty strategies there will remain a role for more traditional social welfare schemes

borrowing money exchanging relationships making microfinance fit into local lives in kumaon india summary why don t microfinance clients use programs the way development planners and funders expect why do clients change how microfinance projects function in unanticipated ways previous scholarship on microfinance has overlooked the relevance of already existing borrowing practices and norms to how people engage with and use microfinance over 18 months of ethnographic fieldwork in the kumaon region of eastern uttarakhand state in northern india i found that kumaonis altered the microfinance program of a local ngo to make it fit with their already existing borrowing practices which were intimately tied to their livelihood strategies kumaoni livelihoods were based on exchange relationships with family friends and neighbors through which they could secure the means for physical and financial survival as well as social and emotional survival these relationships were governed by a moral economy that obligated exchange partners to properly assist one another and ensured balance between partners and across multiple social ties rather than abandoning their exchange relationships kumaonis and local fieldworkers who also relied on these ties altered microfinance so that it fit with this moral economy and became another node in the already existing networks of assistance if they had not been able to alter projects kumaonis would likely have stopped participating as other groups in similar circumstances around the globe have done although the microfinance program was a success in the eyes of beneficiaries senior staff members and donors remained unaware of why projects changed on the ground to ensure that development programs can be made relevant to people s lives and cultural values development practitioners must relinquish control over the minutiae of development and allow local level workers to negotiate the details of projects with participants

a model of institutional formation within a rent seeking environment abstract this paper presents a game theoretic model in which some fraction of output is appropriated from entrepreneurs entrepreneurs are able to form a league to prevent this appropriation but this might not be individually rational because of either the free rider problem or coordination failure the model also shows that poorer countries are less able to form this league and so might not be able to develop institutions establishing property rights

contesting resources rent seeking conflict and the natural resource curse a growing empirical literature links natural resource abundance and pointiness to impeded economic growth and civil strife we develop rent seeking and conflict models that capture the most salient features of contests for resource rents and show how both resource abundance and geographical clustering can be associated with intense contests and sub optimal economic performance however we also show that these relationships are not necessarily monotonous pointiness can trigger more intense contests but can also facilitate the coordination on peaceful outcomes finally we show that contesting resources through violent conflict may yield superior outcomes from an economy wide perspective than contests through rent seeking

das human kapital a theory of the demise of the class structure this paper suggests that the demise of the capitalists workers class structure was a socio economic transformation orchestrated by the capitalists in reaction to the increasing importance of human capital in sustaining their profit rates physical capital accumulation in the process of industrialization enhanced the importance of human capital in production and generated incentives for capitalists to support the provision of public education for the masses triggering the demise of the existing class structure the implications of the theory are consistent with the voting patterns on england s education reform of 1902

growing into and out of social conflict we develop a model of growth and distributional conflict which demonstrates that social tensions may peak at an intermediate development stage in fact unless the economy is caught in an underdevelopment trap the relationship between average wealth and the likelihood of radical redistribution tends to be hump shaped while the net benefits of redistribution for the poor are small at low development stages moving towards egalitarianism considerably improves their income prospects once an intermediate level of per capita wealth is reached as the economy grows further the incentive to challenge the existing social order decreases again and eventually vanishes

payments for ecosystem services as commodity fetishism abstract payments for ecosystem services pes economically reward resource managers for the provision of ecosystem services and are thus characterised by i an ecological function subject to trade ii the establishment of a standard unit of exchange iii and supply demand and intermediation flows between those who sell and buy ecosystem services this paper departs from the term commodity fetishism broadly understood as the masking of the social relationships underlying the process of production to illuminate three invisibilities in the commodification of ecosystem services firstly we argue that narrowing down the complexity of ecosystems to a single service has serious technical difficulties and ethical implications on the way we relate to and perceive nature secondly the commodification of ecosystem services denies the multiplicity of values which can be attributed to these services since it requires that a single exchange value is adopted for trading finally we suggest that the process of production exchange and consumption of ecosystem services is characterised by power asymmetries which may contribute to reproducing rather than addressing existing inequalities in the access to natural resources and services

property rights and the political organization of agriculture we propose a general equilibrium model where the economic organization of agriculture and the political equilibrium determining the security of property rights are jointly determined in particular because the form of organization may affect the probability and distribution of benefits from future property challenges it may be shaped in anticipation of this impact property rights security may then be secured at the expense of economic efficiency the model provides a framework for understanding why in some contexts land is redistributed primarily via land sales and tenancy markets but via politics and conflict in others we test some implications of the theory using a five decade panel dataset that traces changes in the extent of tenancy and tenancy reform across 15 indian states

on the workings of a cartel evidence from the norwegian cement industry using the institutional set up of the norwegian cement industry in particular its sharing rule we are able to identify the workings of a cartel in some detail given data on prices production and exports we are able to identify marginal costs as well as the effectiveness of the cartel we compare our marginal cost estimates which are derived from an equilibrium condition to detailed cost accounting data and find that our estimate of marginal cost is very much in line with the data we then show that the cement cartel has been ineffective in the sense that the sharing rule induces overproduction and exporting below marginal costs in this sense it is consumers not firms that benefi tf rom the sharing rule we find that the ineffectiveness of the cartel is becoming so large that domestic welfare of a merger to monopoly would in fact be positive at around 1968 which is exactly when the merger actually took place however we also show that competition would have resulted in even higher welfare gains over the entire sample

changing political regimes and tropical deforestation expansion of agriculture is a main cause of tropical deforestation government policies and weak property rights contribute to this process by encouraging landowners and landless to accelerate land clearing using panel data common to previous studies we add the dimension of new political regimes democratic and non democratic and investigate how the rate of agricultural land expansion in tropical countries depends on the nature and persistence of each regime we find that both new autocratic and democratic regimes have accelerated the expansion of agricultural land thus yielding support to some of the findings in the earlier literature interesting differences emerge between regions with the impact being most pronounced in latin america we interpret these results mainly in the context of increasing tenure and ownership insecurity which in turn is driven by the tendency of new regimes to implement land reforms as a form of social and economic policy or voter payback the argument is developed more formally using a simple competitive land use model that incorporates political regime dependent confiscation risk and agricultural subsidy policy

conflict and distribution abstract we develop a behavioral model that links the level and pattern of social conflict to the societywide distribution of individual characteristics the model can be applied to groups that differ in characteristics such as wealth ethnicity religion and political ideology we settle questions of existence and uniqueness of conflict equilibrium conflict is seen to be closely connected with the bimodality of the underlying distribution of characteristics however in general the conflict distribution relationship is nonlinear and surprisingly complex our results on conflict patterns also throw light on the phenomena of extremism and moderation journal of economic literature classification numbers d63 d72 d74

poverty and environmental degradation a review and analysis of the nexus abstract there is much controversy surrounding the poverty environmental degradation nexus the predominant school of thought argues that poverty is a major cause of environmental degradation and if policy makers want to address environmental issues then they must first address the poverty problem another school of thought argues that a direct link between poverty and environmental degradation is too simplistic and the nexus is governed by a complex web of factors in this paper a formal structure for analyzing the complex web of factors is formulated and used to review the existing literature on the links between poverty and the degradation of four natural resource sectors the analysis highlights the important role institutional and market failure in encouraging agents from various income groups to exhibit unsustainable activities which in turn forces some of the agents to fall into poverty another important factor is the role of conflicts between different agents income groups in the povertyenvironmental degradation nexus the analysis also highlights the presence of feedback loops between environmental degradation and poverty

workers warriors and criminals social conflict in general equilibrium we incorporate appropriation activities social conflict into canonical models of trade and study how economic shocks and policies affect the intensity of conflict we show that not all shocks that could make society richer reduce conflict positive shocks to labor intensive industries diminish conflict while positive shocks to capital intensive industries increase it the key requirement is that conflict activities be more labor intensive than the economy as this determines how shocks affect the returns and costs of conflict our theory is consistent with several observed patterns of conflict and implies that empirical work should take into account the relative factor intensities of the productive and conflict sectors in each country incorporating appropriation into a canonic general equilibrium model affects what policies may be deemed desirable in order to reduce conflict and generate pareto improvements policy must be distortionary while reforms that appear efficiency enhancing under the unrealistic assumption of perfect property rights may backfire this offers one explanation for why reforms based on traditional models without appropriation may be delayed and become unpopular when implemented and why societies may sympathize with seemingly inefficient redistribution

evaluating the long run impact of an innovative anti poverty programme evidence using household panel data using a four round panel data set from the first phase of the challenging the frontiers of poverty reduction targeting the ultra poor cfpr tup programme of brac we investigate whether a one off transfer of livestock assets improves well being of the very poor women in bangladesh programme impact is assessed on a wide range of monetary and nonmonetary measures of well being using difference in difference dd as well as matching methods we find significant positive long term impact on food security household savings assets and participation in microfinance participant women are less likely to be in distress occupation and more into self employment however the long term effect is much smaller for most outcomes when compared to short and medium run impacts we conclude by discussing the significance of the institutional and regional context for the observed time path of estimated programme effect

can payments for environmental services help reduce poverty an exploration of the issues and the evidence to date from latin america summary this paper examines the main ways in which payments for environmental services pes might affect poverty pes may reduce poverty mainly by making payments to poor natural resource managers in upper watersheds the extent of the impact depends on how many pes participants are in fact poor on the poors ability to participate and on the amounts paid although pes programs are not designed for poverty reduction there can be important synergies when program design is well thought out and local conditions are favorable possible adverse effects can occur where property rights are insecure or if pes programs encourage less labor intensive practices 2004 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

decentralized payments for environmental services the cases of pimampiro and profafor in ecuador abstract few payment for environmental services pes schemes in developing countries operate outside of the central state s umbrella and are at the same time old enough to allow for a meaningful evaluation ecuador has two such decentralised consolidated experiences the five year old pimampiro municipal watershed protection scheme and the twelve year old profafor carbon sequestration programme we describe and compare the two cases using a common pes definition and methodology drawing on both primary interview based information and secondary data we find that both schemes have been relatively effective in reaching their environmental objectives in terms of having probably high additionality levels and low leakage effects a strong focus on the targeted environmental service and a strong degree of conditionality seem to be two key factors explaining these achievements although neither scheme has targeted poverty alleviation or other side objectives both are likely to have improved pes recipients welfare mostly through higher incomes we highlight several observations with more generalised relevance and lessons for the design of pes schemes

consumer benefited cartels under strategic capital investment competition abstract the purpose of this paper is to refute the genrally accepted idea that a cartel raises producers surplus at the expense of consumers surplus if firms in an industry expect that a cartel in which the output is allocated on the bases of the capital equipment will be formed then each firm tries to make a larger capital investment than before which may lead to larger consumers surplus through this argument i shall present one of the reasons why heavy industries had excess capacity in postwar japan

towards a unified scheme for environmental and social protection learning from pes and cct experiences in developing countries environmental protection and poverty alleviation in the developing world are usually heralded as joint objectives however these two goals are often associated with different sectoral policy instruments while so called payments for environmental services pes are increasingly being promoted for environmental protection poverty alleviation is increasingly addressed by conditional cash transfers cct program these instruments although aimed to achieve distinct objectives have a number of similarities and challenges in their design and implementation phases this paper elaborates on these similarities and develops a unifying generic framework that is used to discuss the extent to which both approaches could be unified

how much can asset transfers help the poorest evaluating the results of brac s ultra poor programme 2002 2008 abstract the impacts of an innovative programme in rural bangladesh which has assisted extremely poor households literally the poorest of the poor were assessed over a six year period 2002 2008 the provision of a substantial dose of assets has helped produce very positive results by and large vulnerability to downturns on account of negative events such as illnesses and house damage has resulted in asset losses for several assisted households additional measures that reduce vulnerability and risk will help complete the good work commenced by the asset transfer plan

the demand side of social protection lessons from cambodia s labour rights experience summary in fragile states recent efforts to advance the social protection agenda have focused primarily on loosening supply side constraints but the resulting kaleidoscope of donor driven projects has often overlooked the need to create a sense of ownership by beneficiaries in part this is because it is unclear what political and social structures effectively facilitate activism in situations where state society relations are contentious we use cambodia s unusual success creating and sustaining a labor rights regime to illustrate the dynamics behind one type of social regime change that has opened up governance over worker protections in a sustainable and potentially replicable way

education social cohesion and economic growth analysis of the contribution of education to growth through its role in promoting a common culture indicates that when different cultural groups separately determine the social content of their school curricula excessive polarization can result with less than optimal growth the optimal trajectory involves a gradual reciprocal convergence of school curricula towards the middle ground this may be difficult to implement in a political context in which all agents are identified with one group or another when curricula are determined by legislative bargaining centralization of schooling may result in overly rapid homogenization in some cases and perhaps surprisingly excessive polarization in others this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

entry barriers and economic welfare the relationship between economic welfare and the number of firms in a quasi cournot market is examined in the first place we presuppose the existence of a strong first best government that can enforce the marginal cost principle to the firms along with regulating the number of firms it is shown that there exist excessive number of firms at the free entry quasicournot equilibrium vis a vis the first best welfare maximizing number of firms the thrust of this result essentially survives even if we replace a utopian first best government by a secondbest government that leaves the firms to pursue their respective profit maximization freely and engages solely in regulating the number of firms it can be shown that the excess entry prevails again in this second best world recent studies in the theoretical industrial organization literature have uncovered several instances which cast serious doubt on the reasonableness of a widespread belief that increasing competition will increase welfare stiglitz 1981 p 184 it has been shown that there are cases which are not altogether unreasonable where social welfare will be increased by strengthening rather than weakening the protection of incumbent firms from the threat of potential entry this is in sharp contrast with the traditional belief 2 what is not known however is how robust these pathologies in fact are we intend to settle this problem by proving two excess entry theorems in the quasi cournot parametric conjectural variations homogeneous oligopoly model seade 1980a b in the first place we presuppose the existence of a strong first best government that could costlessly enforce the marginal cost pricing principle by firms in an oligopolistic market and regulate entry in pursuit of first best social welfare optimization it is shown that the number of firms at the free entry equilibrium exceeds the first best welfare optimizing number of firms the result has already been noted by von weizsacker 1980a b and others in terms of numerical examples our theorem 1 asserts that this phenomenon always holds true for the family of quasi cournot models at hand an implication of this result is that the existence of entry barriers which protect incumbent firms from potential competitors is not necessarily welfare decreasing in sharp contrast with the traditional belief a problem remains with theorem 1 however in that an omnipotent first best government does not exist in reality and the first best ideal is unrealizable in the actual economy therefore even if the intervention by a first best government with a view to restricting the number of firms within an industry may be welfare improving it does

luther and suleyman this paper emphasizes that the evolution of religious institutions in europe was influenced by the expansionary threat posed by the ottoman empire between the mid 15th century and the early 17th century various historical accounts have suggested that the ottomans rise helped the protestant reform movement as well as its various offshoots such as zwinglianism anabaptism and calvinism survive their infancy and mature utilizing a comprehensive dataset on violent conflicts for the period between 1451 and 1650 i find strong empirical support for the idea that ottoman military engagements in continental europe lowered the number and extent of violent conflicts among and within the european states ottomans influence in europe extended to the feud between the protestant reformers and the catholic establishment during the time between the birth of lutheranism and the end of the thirty years war the likelihood and timing of military engagements between the protestant reformers and the counter reformation forces depended negatively and statistically significantly on ottomans military activities in europe

population increase and the end of colonialism between 1946 and 1976 the european powers granted independence to all of their large colonies in africa and southeast asia this paper attempts to provide an economic explanation for this remarkable ending to the era of colonialism the main theoretical innovation is to consider the effect of population increase on the allocation of time by the indigenous population between productive and subversive activities the analysis suggests that the increase in population during the colonial period increased the potential private return to subversive activity until the colonies became a net burden on the metropolitan governments it also suggests that there was less subversive activity in colonies in which the market for indigenous labour was monopsonized because monopsonistic employers internalized the potential negative effect of subversive activity on net profits

dictators and oligarchs a dynamic theory of contested property rights in an economy with weak economic and political institutions the major institutional choices are made strategically by oligarchs and dictators the conventional wisdom presumes that as rent seeking is harmful for oligarchs themselves institutions such as enforcement of the property rights will emerge eventually we explicitly model a dynamic game between oligarchs and a dictator who can contain rent seeking the oligarchs choose either a weak dictator who can be overthrown by an individual oligarch or a strong dictator who can only be replaced via a consensus of oligarchs in equilibrium no dictator can commit to both i protecting the oligarchs property rights from the other oligarchs and ii not expropriating oligarchs himself we show that a weak dictator does not limit rent seeking a strong dictator does reduce rent seeking but also expropriates individual oligarchs we show that even though eliminating rent seeking is pareto optimal weak dictators do get appointed in equilibrium and rent seeking continues this outcome is especially likely when economic environment is highly volatile

two aggregate games demonstration using a production appropriation model we expand the scope of the two aggregate method by applying it to a situation where many heterogeneous players are free to contribute to both aggregates such situations naturally arise in various resource allocation problems hence our method is useful in many applications a production appropriation model is employed to illustrate how the problem of establishing the nash equilibrium can be reduced from solving n 2 best response functions in n unknowns to solving two consistency conditions in two unknowns we then conduct a comparative static exercise that the conventional approach could not handle easily if at all to demonstrate the power of our method this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

failure vs displacement why an innovative anti poverty program showed no net impact in south india abstract we analyze a randomized trial of an innovative anti poverty program in south india part of a series of pilot programs that provide ultra poor households with inputs to create new sustainable livelihoods often tending livestock in contrast with results from other pilots we find no lasting net impact on income or asset accumulation in south india we explore concerns with program implementation data errors and the existence of compelling employment alternatives the baseline consumption data contain systematic errors and income and consumption contain large outliers steps to address the problems leave the central findings largely intact wages for unskilled labor rose sharply in the area while the study was implemented blunting the net impact of the intervention and highlighting one way that treatment effects depend on factors external to the intervention itself such as broader employment opportunities

why did the west extend the franchise democracy inequality and growth in historical perspective during the nineteenth century most western societies extended voting rights a decision that led to unprecedented redistributive programs we argue that these political reforms can be viewed as strategic decisions by the political elite to prevent widespread social unrest and revolution political transition rather than redistribution under existing political institutions occurs because current transfers do not ensure future transfers while the extension of the franchise changes future political equilibria and acts as a commitment to redistribution our theory also offers a novel explanation for the kuznets curve in many western economies during this period with the fall in inequality following redistribution due to democratization i introduction the nineteenth century was a period of fundamental political reform and unprecedented changes in taxation and redistribution britain for example was transformed from an oligarchy run by an elite to a democracy the franchise was extended in 1832 and then again in 1867 and 1884 transferring voting rights to portions of the society with no previous political representation the decades after the political reforms witnessed radical social reforms increased taxation and the extension of education to the masses moreover as noted by kuznets inequality which was previously increasing started to decline during this period the gini coefficient for income inequality in england and wales had risen from 0 400 in 1823 to 0 627 in 1871 but fell to 0 443 in 1901 two key factors in the reduction in inequality were the increase in the proportion of skilled workers williamson 1985 and the redistribution of income toward the poorer segments of the society for example taxes rose from 8 12 percent of national product in 1867 to 18 8 percent by 1927 and the progressivity of the tax system increased substantially see lindert 1989

rural organization and land reform in brazil the role of nonagricultural benefits of landholding abstract this article examines the effects of nonagricultural land use on agrarian organization and land reform in an economy characterized by limited credit and land rental markets the nonagricultural demand for land under credit constraint generates a potential mismatch between the distribution of land and the distribution of farming skills this disparity reduces the agricultural output if the land rental market is absent a perfect land rental market is shown to determine the highest possible agricultural output policy implications from the model include in addition to market improvements the fact that small farmers rather than landless people should be the target of redistributive land reform programs

estimating the average treatment effect of social safety net programmes in bangladesh since the famine in 1974 the bangladesh government and some national and international agencies have been providing food or cash or both to poor households through the social safety net programmes i seek to estimate how much these programmes affect the well being of poor households most previous studies have estimated impacts of these programmes on calorie consumption simply computing the raw differential however both observed and unobserved characteristics bias this treatment effect using fuzzy regression discontinuity rd design i control for these selection effects

on the origins of the state stationary bandits and taxation in eastern congo a positive demand shock for coltan a mineral whose bulky output cannot be concealed leads armed actors to create illicit customs and provide protection at coltan mines where they settle as stat

how effective is a big push to the small evidence from a quasi experiment summary this paper investigates whether a big push to the extreme poor in terms of a one off large grant enables them to participate in the microfinance program the analysis uses data from a quasi experiment on brac s ultra poor program in bangladesh the results for the baseline and repeat survey data for the treatment and comparison groups show that such a big push does make a significant impact on graduation to the microfinance program the results are robust to correction for self selection bias social capital and awareness also play important role in their decision on ngo membership and borrowing

studying the role of political competition in the evolution of government size over long horizons here we argue for the use of cointegration and error correction analysis to combine economic factors that are nonstationary with political factors that are stationary into an empirical model of the evolution of public policy over long periods the approach is applied to disentangle the contributions of economics and politics to the evolution of public expenditure by the government of canada over 130 years political competition emerges as the primary political factor affecting government size

the role of freedom growth and religion in the taste for revolution a fundamental question about the determinants of civil conflict is the relative importance of political freedoms versus economic development this paper takes a new approach to provide an answer by using micro data based on surveys of revolutionary tastes of 130 000 people living in 61 nations between 1981 and 1997 controlling for personal characteristics country and year fixed effects more freedom and economic growth both reduce revolutionary support losing one level of freedom equivalent to a shift from the us to turkey increases support for revolt by 4 percentage points to reduce support by the same amount requires adding 14 percentage points onto the gdp growth rate being muslim in a free country has no effect on the probability of supporting revolt compared to a non religious person however being muslim in a country that is not free increases it by 13 percentage points being christian in a free country decreases the chance of supporting revolt by 4 percentage points compared to a non religious person and in a not free country by 1 percentage point

consumer benefiting exclusive territories i investigate the effect of exclusive territories which are typical vertical controls imposed by upstream firms using shipping spatial models i consider an industry that consists of many independent local markets an upstream monopolist restricts competition between downstream firms using exclusive territories i find that exclusive territories reduce the prices of final products in all local markets in quantity setting competition in price setting competition they raise prices in half the local markets reduce them in other markets and also reduce the total consumer surplus jel classification l42 r32 a propos de territoires exclusifs qui profitent aux consommateurs l auteur analyse les effets de la regle des territoires exclusifs qui est souvent imposee comme controle vertical par les entreprises en amont a l aide de modeles spatiaux de livraison on considere le cas d une industrie composee de plusieurs marches locaux independants un monopoleur en amont reduit la concurrence entre entreprises en aval en imposant la regle des territoires exclusifs on decouvre que cette regle reduit les prix du produit final dans tous les marches locaux s il y a concurrence par les quantites s il y a concurrence par les prix la regle accroit les prix dans la moitie des marches locaux les reduit dans les autres et reduit aussi le surplus au consommateur

income inequality and the taste for revolution abstract although property rights are the cornerstone of market economies throughout history existing claims have been frequently overturned by revolutions one unsettled question is whether income inequality affects the likelihood of revolt this paper takes an approach different from previous studies by introducing data derived from two surveys of revolutionary preferences across a quarter million randomly sampled individuals more people are found to have a preference for revolt when inequality in their nation is high a 1 standard deviation increase in the gini coefficient explains up to 38 percent of the standard deviation in revolutionary support the results hold after controlling for a set of personal characteristics and country and year fixed effects since higher levels of income are found to have a negative impact on the taste for revolt the results suggest that either going for growth or implementing policies that reduce inequality can buy off those individuals with revolutionary preferences

the humean critique of lump sum taxation or the implausibility of pure lump sum taxes in autocracy this paper revives hume s idea that it is unlikely forsovereign governments to implement pure lump sum taxationbecause lump sum taxes are arbitrary we phrase the problem asone of time inconsistency of tax collection for a tax revenuemaximizing leviathan government we demonstrate that whilelump sum taxation is more efficient than distortionary incometax in terms of the ex ante amount of tax revenueraised honoring a lump sum tax is less likely to be crediblethan honoring a distortionary income tax we also extend theframework to understanding the relationship betweenexpropriation risk and the lack of foreign direct investment

land inequality and conflict intensity this paper investigates the impact of land inequality on conflict intensity a fundamental distinction with the existing literature lies in the nature of inequality under consideration we investigate how land inequality across landlords only influences the intensity of the fight against a rebel group comprised of landless individuals we show that conflict intensity is non monotonic in land inequality in particular the most severe conflicts occur for intermediate land inequality levels moreover a pareto improving and thus voluntary transfer of land from the smaller to the larger landlord may exist

welfare spending and political conflict in latin america 1970 2010 abstract we study an age old question in political economy does government spending on welfare ensure peace this question was at the heart of the european welfare state model of the early 20th century and remains relevant today in face of rising inequalities and political conflict yet there is limited empirical evidence about this question we make use of a panel of 12 latin american countries over the period 1970 2010 to show that welfare spending has led to substantial reductions in conflict across the region this effect is more pronounced when associated with reductions in inequality and increasing social and institutional trust

exploring the links between equity and efficiency in payments for environmental services a conceptual approach this paper addresses the relationship between equity and efficiency in pes schemes from a conceptual point of view emphasis is placed on the role of the institutional setting social perceptions about economic fairness or distributive justice of the payments uncertainty and interactions between agents including power relations we introduce the heuristic concept of the efficiency equity interdependency curve to illustrate potential combinations between equity and efficiency that may be theoretically possible the paper argues that different types of institutional factors determine which equity efficiency combinations may be potentially feasible influence the actual combination that will be achieved on the ground and condition possible changes in that combination due to exogenous factors by stressing the role of institutional aspects in shaping the equity efficiency relationship the paper attempts to go beyond the dominant coasean vision of pes