extended benefits and the duration of ui spells evidence from the new jersey extended benefit program abstract this paper examines the impact on the duration of unemployment insurance receipt of a politically motivated program that offered 13 weeks of extended benefits for 6 months in 1996 using state level data and individual administrative records from before during and after the program we find that it raised the fraction of claimants who exhausted their regular benefits by 1 3 percentage points had the program run long enough to affect claimants from the first day of their spell the fraction exhausting would have risen by 7 percentage points and the average recipient would have collected regular benefits for one extra week

explaining european union citizens trust in the european central bank in normal and crisis times we study the determinants of trust in the european central bank ecb as measured by the european commission s eurobarometer survey in particular during the global financial crisis and the european sovereign debt crisis we find that the fall in trust in the ecb in crisis times can be rather well explained based on the pre crisis determinants we also show that the fall in trust reflected the macroeconomic deterioration a more generalized fall in the trust in european institutions in the wake of the crisis and the severity of the banking sector s problems to which the ecb was associated in the public opinion

a model of military spending and economic growth this paper investigates a model of militaryconflict between two regimes in which eachmay initiate combat in order to confiscateresources from the other conflict or thepotential for same results in wastefulmilitary spending which lowers growth foreach regime equilibrium military spendingis determined in a one shot game analysisof the one shot game is followed by a studyof the prospects for an equilibrium inwhich regimes lower military spending anddo not engage in combat in repeated play in this latter case military spending willbe decreased to a level just sufficient todeter deviations from the no combatequilibrium this minimum level increases and growth decreases with the internalpolitical instability of each regime moreover an exogenous increase in thedefensive capability of each regime mayeither increase or decrease growth depending upon the initial level ofmilitary spending and growth

law and employment lessons from latin america and the caribbean analyzing the effects of regulation and deregulation on latin american labor markets law and employment joins the ongoing debate about the virtues and costs of legislating mandatory benefits for workers of the numerous labor regulations that were altered or created in latin america during the last thirty years many have had unintended and far reaching results nobel prize winning economist james j heckman and carmen pages document the behavior of firms attempting to stay in business and be competitive while facing the high costs of complying with these labor laws they challenge the prevailing view that labor market regulations affect only the distribution of labor incomes and have little or no impact on efficiency or the performance of labor markets this volume shows that mandated benefits reduce employment have a disruptive impact on turnover rates and labor market flexibility promote inequality and discriminate against marginal workers along with in depth studies of colombia peru brazil argentina chile and uruguay law and employment provides comparative analysis from a range of european countries and the united states while also covering important changes in reg

learning to love globalization education and individual attitudes toward international trade recent studies of public attitudes toward trade have converged on one central finding support for trade restrictions is highest among respondents with the lowest levels of education this has been interpreted as strong support for the stolper samuelson theorem the classic economic treatment of the income effects of trade that predicts that trade openness benefits those owning factors of production with which their economy is relatively well endowed those with skills in the advanced economies while hurting others low skilled workers we reexamine the available survey data showing that the impact of education on attitudes toward trade is almost identical among respondents in the active labor force and those who are not even those who are retired we also find that while individuals with college level educations are far more likely to favor trade openness than others other types of education have no significant effects on attitudes and some actually reduce the support for trade even though they clearly contribute to skill acquisition combined these results strongly suggest that the effects of education on individual trade preferences are not primarily a product of distributional concerns linked to job skills we suggest that exposure to economic ideas and information among college educated individuals plays a key role in shaping attitudes toward trade and globalization this is not to say that distributional issues are not important in shaping attitudes toward trade just that they are not clearly manifest in the simple broad association between education levels and support for free trade the authors would like to thank james alt jeffry frieden robert lawrence dani rodrik ron rogowski ken scheve andy baker peter gourevitch and beth simmons for helpful comments on earlier drafts

on the origins of property rights conflict and production in the state of nature i analyse the emergence of property rights in a model of conflict and production in the absence of institutions of enforcement the population of agents evolves dynamically through conflicts for possession of factor goods among pairs of randomly matched agents conflicts are incomplete information wars of attrition with an agent s type consisting of his or her independently drawn valuation of the prize and cost of competing for it i prove equilibrium existence and show that in the steady state of the game the population sorts into two stable groups resource haves and have nots in accordance with a known function of their primitive types

the timing of partisan and nonpartisan appointments to the central bank some new evidence this paper empirically tests two prevalent but competing theories regarding the timing of appointments to the board of governors by presidential administrations both theories were developed simultaneously in the economics literature by havrilesky and gildea 1992 and waller 1992 and are observationally equivalent by suggesting that administrations will select partisans early in their four year terms and nonpartisans sectoral later in their four year terms although each bases this prediction on a different theoretical model several empirical replications with updated data sets presented here work to confirm the solutions put forth consistently by both models however the results of a new statistical test perhaps lends slightly more credence to the theoretical foundations of waller s bargaining model

do people understand monetary policy abstract we combine questions from the michigan survey about future inflation unemployment and interest rates to investigate whether households are aware of the basic features of u s monetary policy our findings provide evidence that some households form their expectations in a way that is consistent with a taylor 1993 type rule we also document a large degree of variation in the pattern of responses over the business cycle in particular the negative relationship between unemployment and interest rates that is apparent in the data only shows up in households answers during periods of labor market weakness

alliances in the shadow of conflict victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war this article presents an experiment on the determinants of whether alliances break up and fight internally after having defeated a joint enemy first if peaceful sharing yields an asymmetric rent distribution this increases the likelihood of fighting in turn anticipation of the higher likelihood of internal fight reduces the alliance s ability to succeed against the outside enemy second the option to make nonbinding nonaggression declarations between alliance members does not make peaceful settlement within the alliance more likely third higher differences in the alliance players contributions to alliance effort lead to more internal conflict and more intense fighting

a dynamic model of conflict and appropriation abstract this paper presents an extension of a static model of economic conflict analyzed by hirshleifer 1991 1995 and skaperdas 1992 to an infinite horizon differential game our aim is to highlight the strategic role of appropriation among a smaller group of agents in an intertemporal context the model yields the conclusion that there exists a unique linear nonlinear markov perfect equilibrium strategy even when strategies are defined over the entire state space we demonstrate that partial cooperation can be seen as a long run response to conflict moreover a decrease in the effectiveness of appropriation the depreciation rate of a common pool stock the rate of time preferences or an increase in the degree of noise improves the degree of partial cooperation and thus welfare in an anarchic society

trust no more the impact of the crisis on citizens trust in central banks abstract citizens trust in economic institutions has generally declined since the onset of the crisis in particular eurobarometer surveys show that trust in the european central bank ecb has fallen significantly during the crisis this paper studies the determinants of public trust in the ecb over the lifetime of the euro net trust in the ecb has decreased significantly in those countries which have experienced increasing sovereign bond yields and financial market turbulence the finding that country specific variables affect citizens trust in the ecb may seem counterintuitive however it is consistent with strong evidence in the political science literature showing that domestic considerations play a significant role when citizens get an opportunity to express their opinion on eu matters

arming as a strategic investment in a cooperative equilibrium to develop a positive economic theory of military spending this analysis focuses on a game theoretic general equilibrium model of international conflict in which consumption peaceful investment and military spending are endogenously determined the analysis illustrates that when there is repeated interaction between nations a game of threats and punishments generally will not support a disarmament outcome and that fluctuations in military spending can be an endogenous result of fluctuations in aggregate economic activity furthermore the analysis shows how the relation between aggregate economic activity and military spending qualitatively depends on whether governments are acting opportunistically or cooperatively copyright 1990 by american economic association

effect of income on trust evidence from the 2009 economic crisis in russia this article draws on a natural experiment to identify the relationship between income and trust we use a unique panel data set on russia where gdp experienced an 8 drop in 2009 the effect of the crisis had been uneven among russian regions because of their differences in industrial structure inherited from the soviet period after instrumenting average regional income by soviet industrial structure we find that 10 decrease in income is associated with a five percentage point decrease in social trust we also find that post crisis economic recovery did not fully restore pre crisis trust level

productivity gains from unemployment insurance this paper argues that unemployment insurance increases labor productivity by encouraging workers to seek higher productivity jobs and by encouraging rms to create those jobs we use a quantitative model to investigate whether this eect is comparable in magnitude to the standard moral hazard eects of unemployment insurance our model economy captures the behavior of the u s labor market for high school graduates quite well with unemployment insurance more generous than the current u s level unemployment would increase by a magnitude similar to the micro estimates but because the composition of jobs also changes total output and welfare would increase as well

the frequency of monetary policy signaling from the administration to the federal reserve note recently this journal published a paper that reported the first hard evidence of direct and systematic administration influence on monetary policy havrilesky 1988a an index was constructed from a simple weekly sum of the number of wall street journal articles that indicated whether the administration desired either easier 1 or tighter 1 monetary policy the index signaling from the administration to the federal reserve or safer was premised on the notion that the financial press efficiently reports the content of the mostly informal exchanges that are occumng between the executive branch and the fed one problem with using this index as a means of continually measuring an administration s influence on monetary policy and whether its signals are heeded regularly or only episodically say as presidential elections approach l is that periodically the level of signaling shifts rather abruptly for example a precipitous drop in signaling occurred after 1984 the yearly average of the absolute value of monthly signals fell by over one half in the 1984 1988 period compared to the 1981 1984 period the break coming in 1985 when the yearly total of the absolute value of monthly signals fell to six as compared to twenty two in 1984 2 unless such shifts can be explained standard reaction function estimation of the causes and consequences of signaling is not feasible across all time periods this paper will attempt to explain these and other changes in signaling over the period from october 1974 to december 1989 using data on the state of the economy and the partisan composition of the federal reserve board of governors except for the welldocumented shift that occurred during the reagan administration it will be as

who wants the euro and why economic explanations of public attitudes towards a single european currency the paper looks at whether public attitudes towards a single european currency held in the european union member states reflect a rational evaluation of the involved benefits and costs it finds that they do the looser monetary and fiscal policy was in the past and the more time a country spent in the ems the more citizens welcome the euro attitudes towards the euro do not seem consistent with attitudes towards a european central bank however upon closer scrutiny opponents of a single currency appear to be less consistent and less rational in their responses than proponents

payments data do consumers want banks to keep them in a safe or turn them into gold abstractfor policymakers seeking to protect financial stability and financial institutions it is key to know consumers attitudes towards payments data usage this article provides detailed insigh

the distribution of income in a despotic society a distribution of income between rulers and subjects can be derived as an equilibrium of violence rather than from considerations of marginal products of owned factors of production society is organized in ranks and the occupants of each rank are provided with incomes just sufficient that obedience is preferable to rebellion to incorporate such considerations into a model it is necessary to recognize phenomena that are normally excluded from economic analysis combat the mortality rate from natural causes and from violence as a component of the utility function and a rudimentary technology of control

the distribution of income in the presence of appropriative activities we examine the distribution of income when agents allocate their initial endowments between production and appropriation arms investments influence or rent seeking activities final output depends on the productive contributions of the agents but is divided between them according to their relative contributions in appropriation various possible improvements in an agent s useful productivity reduce the agent s equilibrium share of income but increases in initial endowments increase an agent s share we contrast our results to those that would obtain in the competitive counterpart to our model and discuss its relevance both for history and for the present the results extend to a class of models where distribution is determined between two groups of agents with agents within each group behaving non cooperatively but without exhibiting the free rider problem

war and peace cyclical phenomena this paper demonstrates how the analysis can differ dramatically between two common static modeling approaches to conflict the first approach uses a one period setup and associates positive arms investments with conflict the second approach has two periods where arming decisions are taken in the first period and the decision on whether to go to war is taken separately in the second building on the latter approach i introduce a repeated game protocol with myopic players under these circumstances countries may end up in cycles of war and peace this result offers a novel explanation for a common pattern in history

the role of shocks and institutions in the rise of european unemployment the aggregate evidence two key facts about european unemployment must be explained the rise in unemployment since the 1960s and the heterogeneity of individual country experiences while adverse shocks can potentially explain much of the rise in unemployment there is insufficient heterogeneity in these shocks to explain cross country differences alternatively while explanations focusing on labour market institutions explain current heterogeneity well many of these institutions pre date the rise in unemployment based on a panel of institutions and shocks for 20 oecd nations since 1960 we find that the interaction between shocks and institutions is crucial to explaining both stylised facts

collective rent dissipation the theory of rent seeking was initiated by tullock 1967 1980 followed by krueger 1974 and posner 1975 and more recently extended in various directions by allard 1988 appelbaum and katz 1986a b c gradstein and nitzan 1989 hillman and katz 1984 1987 hillman and samet 1987 hillman and riley 1989 katz et al 1990 long and vousden 1987 ursprung 1990 and varian 1989 the purpose of this paper is to extend this theory by introducing the possibility of collective group rent seeking with voluntary individual decisions regarding their extent of participation in the collective rent seeking efforts

endogenous strength in conflicts in this paper we study a two period contest where the strength of players in the second period depends on the result of the contest in the first stage we show that in contrast to one shot contests in the same setting heterogeneous players exert different efforts in the first stage and rent dissipation in the first period may be large we study the conditions under which the discouragement effect holds in addition new issues emerge like the evolution of the strengths and the shares of the prize during the game

central bank communication and monetary policy a survey of theory and evidence over the last two decades communication has become an increasingly important aspect of monetary policy these real world developments have spawned a huge new scholarly literature on central bank communication mostly empirical and almost all of it written in this decade we survey this ever growing literature the evidence suggests that communication can be an important and powerful part of the central bank s toolkit since it has the ability to move financial markets to enhance the predictability of monetary policy decisions and potentially to help achieve central banks macroeconomic objectives however the large variation in communication strategies across central banks suggests that a consensus has yet to emerge on what constitutes an optimal communication strategy

unemployment vs mismatch of talents reconsidering unemployment benefits we develop an equilibrium search matching model with risk neutral agents and two sided ex ante heterogeneity unemployment insurance has the standard effect of reducing employment but also helps workers to get a suitable job we show through calibrations how the mere difference on unemployment insurance when countries experience a common skilled biased technological shock may result in differences in unemployment productivity growth and wage inequality these results are consistent with the contrasting performance of the labour market in europe and the united states in the last twenty five years the model is used to address some political economy issues

guns butter and anarchy a state in the international system implicit in realism must allocate its limited resources between satisfying its intrinsically valued ends and the means of military power i formalize this guns versus butter problem in a simple infinite horizon model in which two states must continually decide how to allocate their resources and whether to attack the other state the analysis establishes sufficient conditions to ensure the existence of an equilibrium in which neither state attacks shows that there is a strictly pareto dominant pair of peaceful equilibrium payoffs characterizes the unique peaceful markov perfect equilibrium that yields them and describes the comparative statics of the equilibrium allocations more broadly the analysis also suggests that the notion of anarchy has little if any substantive significance distinctively related to international politics and that the problem of absolute and relative gains is superfluous

deposit insurance banking crises and market discipline evidence from a natural experiment on deposit flows and rates published in journal of money credit and banking volume 45 issue 1 february 2013 pages 179 200 as as deposit insurance banking crises and market discipline evidence from a natural experiment on deposit flows and rates

mortgage risks debt literacy and financial advice a limited understanding of mortgage contracts and the risks involved may have contributed to the outbreak of the 2007 2008 financial crisis we developed a special questionnaire relating mortgage loan decisions to financial knowledge and financial advice our results demonstrate that homeowners appear to be well aware of mortgage risks large loans relative to home value are perceived as riskier as are loans with large mortgage payments relative to income and loans linked to investment vehicles homeowners with riskier mortgages indicated that they could encounter financial problems should house prices or their income decline homeowners with relatively low debt literacy are more likely to take out traditional mortgages with principal repayments over the maturity of the loan riskier mortgages are more prevalent among homeowners with a better understanding of loan contracts financially less sophisticated homeowners consulting mortgage brokers too hold riskier mortgages

the role of social capital in financial development to identify the effect of social capital on financial development we exploit social capital differences within italy in high social capital areas households are more likely to use checks invest less in cash and more in stock have higher access to institutional credit and make less use of informal credit the effect of social capital is stronger where legal enforcement is weaker and among less educated people these results are not driven by omitted environmental variables since we show that the behavior of movers is still affected by the level of social capital of the province where they were born

long term relationships governed by short term contracts this paper studies the effects of contract duration on the incentive to invest in a relationship when its parties are rational and have perfect information and contracts are complete ex cept that short term contracts specify only current period actions t hen short term contracting distorts investment decisions only when t he efficient plan involves mainly sunk cost investment and the relati onship plays a consumption smoothing role there is a general but no t universal tendency to underinvest copyright 1988 by american economic association

why do people save in cash distrust memories of banking crises weak institutions and dollarization abstract the paper analyzes why households hold sizeable shares of their assets in cash at home rather than at banks a phenomenon that is widespread in many economies but for which information is scarce using survey data from ten central eastern and southeastern european countries i document the relevance of this behavior and show that cash preferences cannot be fully explained by whether people are banked or unbanked the analysis reveals that a lack of trust in banks memories of past banking crises and weak tax enforcement are important factors moreover cash preferences are stronger in dollarized economies where a safe foreign currency serves as a store of value

trust in public institutions over the business cycle this paper explores the link between two coincident events the great recession and the current high levels of mistrust the american people have for public institutions we begin by documenting the recent sharp decline in the con fidence the american public has in their govern ment financial and business sectors and to a lesser extent their media and their courts we are motivated by our own casual empiricism which suggests that widespread mistrust has been an important constraint on policymakers attempt ing to pass expansionary macroeconomic poli cies in the wake of the great recession we then assess whether this decline in trust is a standard cyclical response whether it reflects other fac tors or whether it is due to the specific character of the current downturn yet there is little exist ing literature documenting the cyclically of trust and indeed robert z lawrence 1997 p 132 notes that our understanding of the links between economic performance and trust leaves much to be desired our contribution therefore lies in our demonstration of how trust moves with the business cycle using data on the united states and cross country comparisons

conflict and rent seeking success functions ratio vs difference models of relative success the rent seeking competitions studied by economists fall within a much broader category of conflict interactions that also includes military combats election campaigns industrial disputes lawsuits and sibling rivalries in the rent seeking literature each party s success pi which can be interpreted either as the probability of victory or as the proportion of the prize won has usually been taken to be a function of the ratio of the respective resource commitments alternatively however pi may instead be a function of the difference between the parties commitments to the contest the contest success function csf for the difference from is a logistic curve in which as is consistent with military experience increasing returns apply up to an inflection point at equal resource commitments a crucial flaw of the traditional ratio model is that neither onesided submission nor two sided peace between the parties can ever occur as a cournot equilibrium in contrast both of these outcomes are entirely consistent with a model in which success is a function of the difference between the parties resource commitments

bashing and coercion in monetary policy bashing and coercion in monetary policy i introduction we ve got excess plant capacity i don t think that growth is excessive i have not been overly concerned with inflation president bush in a february 14 1989 interview with the wall street journal p a8 with the economy running close to potential the risks seem to be on the side of a further strengthening of price pressure chairman greenspan in testimony before congress on february 21 1989 reprinted from the wall street journal february 22 1989 p a2 many investors appeared to be confused by conflicting statements by bush greenspan and other u s officials wall street journal february 22 1989 p a1 if the fed pushes interest rates significantly higher bush may go public with critism wall street journal march 24 1989 p a1 recent research in macroeconomic policy games by rogoff 1985 alesina 1988 tabellini 1987 and waller 1989a has concentrated on the importance of an independent central bank in a discretionary policymaking environment in the original work on policy games by barro and gordon 1983a 1983b no distinction was made between the monetary authority and the fiscal authority but these researchers argue that because the fiscal authority may have incentives to create excessive inflation giving the powers of money creation to an independent monetary authority whose inflation preferences differ from the current fiscal authority may enable society to reduce the equilibrium inflation rate this results holds even though monetary policy is still chosen in a discretionary fashion therefore backus and driffill 1985a 537 conclude autonomous central banks thus act as a precommitment device which may help to make noninflationary policies more credible and less costly implicit in the term independent is the belief that the central bank is free to choose monetary policy without interference from the fiscal authority administration however this is not generally the case the appointment of central bankers by the legislative or executive branch of the government governmental oversight of policy decisions or political pressure on the central bank by these branches will tend to influence the setting of monetary policy and subsequently the extent to which the central bank is truly independent 1 kane 1984 argues that even if it is not able to directly choose monetary policy the current administration still may be able to achieve its preferred monetary growth path by putting pressure on the monetary authority to do its bidding restricting the powers of the central bank public criticism of central bank performance here after referred to as bashing 2 exclusion from fiscal policy planning which hurts the egos of central bankers or undertaking actions which damage the post central bank income or opportunities of the central bankers are ways he suggests in which the administration can coerce cooperation from the central bank in creating excessive money growth such arguments have given rise to the view that the administration is engaged in a reputation building game with the central bank although the central bank has control of the money supply the administration can threaten to impose a welfare loss by bashing the central bank if it does not generate the monetary policy preferred by the administration the success of this strategy depends on the size of the bashing costs imposed on the central bank and also on the extent to which these threats are credible credibility in turn depends on the benefits and costs incurred by the administration in carrying out its threats as a result the administration may choose to bash the central bank if it does not produce the administration s preferred money inflation outcome by establishing a reputation for bashing the administration may be able to obtain its desired policy outcome in the future

trust in banks abstract trust in banks is considered essential for an effective financial system yet little is known about what determines trust in banks only a handful of single country studies discuss the topic so this paper aims to fill the gap by providing a cross country analysis on the level and determinants of trust in banks using world values survey data covering 52 countries during the period 2010 2014 we observe large cross country differences in trust in banks and confirm the influence of several sociodemographic indicators our main findings include women tend to trust banks more than men trust in banks tends to increase with income but decrease with age and education and access to television enhances trust while internet access erodes trust additionally religious political and economic values affect trust in banks notably religious individuals tend to put greater trust in banks but differences are observed across denominations the holding of pro market economic views is also associated with greater trust in banks

the productivity effects of privatization longitudinal estimates from hungary romania russia and ukraine this paper estimates the effect of privatization on multifactor productivity using comprehensive panel data on initially state owned manufacturing firms in four economies we exploit the data s longitudinal dimension to control for preprivatization selection and estimate long run impacts the estimates are robust to functional form but sensitive to selection controls our preferred random growth estimates imply positive multifactor productivity effects of 15 percent in romania 8 percent in hungary and 2 percent in ukraine but a 3 percent effect in russia the foreign privatization effect is larger 18 35 percent in all countries positive domestic effects appear immediately in hungary romania and ukraine and continue growing thereafter but emerge only five years after privatization in russia

effective property rights conflict and growth abstract this paper shows how the interaction between conflict and growth can give rise to a nonmonotone relationship between property rights and social welfare this interaction is illustrated in a model of endogenous growth in which equilibrium diversion of resources is the cost of securing effective property rights a symmetric equilibrium allocation associated with more secure property rights and faster growth can be pareto dominated by one associated with poorer property rights and slower growth faster growth can exacerbate the problem of diversion whenever property rights are sufficiently poor these results call for caution before a society decides to pursue economic growth independently of the institutional structure of property rights furthermore if this structure is inappropriate piecemeal reform might not be in the interest of society and a substantial reform might be necessary if it is to be welfare improving

inflation targeting a new framework for monetary policy he world s central bankers and their staffs meet regularly in venues from basle to washington to share ideas and discuss common problems perhaps these frequent meetings help explain why changes in the tactics and strategy of monetary policymaking such as the adoption of money growth targets in the 1970s the intensification of efforts to reduce inflation in the 1980s and the recent push for increased institutional independence for central banks tend to occur in many countries more or less simultaneously whatever their source major changes in the theory and practice of central banking are of great importance for both individual countries and the international economy in this article we discuss a new strategy for monetary policy known as inflation targeting which has sparked much interest and debate among central bankers and monetary economists in recent years this approach is characterized as the name suggests by the announcement of official target ranges for the inflation rate at one or more horizons and by explicit acknowledgment that low and stable inflation is the overriding goal of monetary policy other important features of inflation targeting include increased communication with the public about the plans and objectives of the monetary policymakers and in many cases increased accountability of the central bank

on revolt and endogenous economic policy in autocratic regimes numerous empirical studies have investigated the direction of causality between democracy and economic growth as well as the level of income per capita but this empirical work has been paralleled by relatively few theoretical models that endogenize the institutional structure of the regime moreover the different types of autocratic regimes have received relatively little attention this paper develops a game theoretic model of endogenous economic policy in autocratic regimes facing a revolt or an insurgency in this model there are three players the regime the rebels and the masses there are three stages in the game in the first stage the regime determines the level of infrastructure and the tax rate in the second stage the masses allocate their time between production and helping the rebels in the third stage the regime and the rebels simultaneously choose their fighting effort levels in a contest in which the probability of survival of the regime is determined it is found that autocratic regimes facing a revolt endogenously sort themselves into tinpot regimes that maximize their consumption at the cost of their survival and weak and strong totalitarian regimes that maximize their probability of survival at the expense of their consumption empirical implications of the model are derived and the relevance of the model to public policy is discussed

public inflation aversion and the political economy of macroeconomic policymaking do the macroeconomic priorities of citizens differ across countries if so what accounts for this variation and what are its consequences for explanations of the choice of monetary institutions macroeconomic policy and international monetary cooperation this article uses survey data from twenty advanced economies to examine individual preferences about macroeconomic priorities the analysis establishes three key findings first the results suggest that economic context defined by inflation and unemployment performance has a substantial impact on the public s economic objectives in a way that is broadly consistent with the specification of utility loss functions in the theoretical political economy literature second the results suggest that there is significant cross country variation in inflation aversion controlling for economic context third some of this variation is accounted for by national level factors affecting the aggregate costs of inflation and unemployment these results have significant implications for optimal monetary policymaking the explanation of variation in economic outcomes and for accounts of the choice of institutional frameworks for policymaking i thank the bank of england the center for basic research in the social sciences and the institution for social and policy studies for research support and jim alt andrew bailey bill bernhard lawrence broz john freeman jeff frieden jim granato shigeo hirano david lake jeff lax simon price rose razaghian ron rogowski david stasavage gabriel sterne mike tomz jim vreeland the editor and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments all views expressed are those of the author and do not represent those of the bank of england

the regulation of labor author s botero juan djankov simeon la porta rafael lopez de silanes florencio shleifer andrei abstract we investigate the regulation of labor markets through employment collective relations and social security laws in 85 countries we find that the political power of the left is associated with more stringent labor regulations and more generous social security systems and that socialist french and scandinavian legal origin countries have sharply higher levels of labor regulation than do common law countries however the effects of legal origins are larger and explain more of the variation in regulations than those of politics heavier regulation of labor is associated with lower labor force participation and higher unemployment especially of the young these results are most naturally consistent with legal theories according to which countries have pervasive regulaory styles inherited from the transplantation of legal systems

conflict settlement and the shadow of the future abstract we examine a conflictual setting in which adversaries cannot contract on an enforcement variable arms and where the future strategic positions of adversaries are very different when there is open conflict than when there is settlement we show that as the future becomes more important in this setting open conflict becomes more likely than settlement we demonstrate the theoretical robustness of this finding and test it in a laboratory experiment as predicted we find that subjects are more likely to engage in destructive conflict as the future becomes more important

war and conflict in economics theories applications and recent trends we review the main economic models of war and conflict these models vary in details but their implications are qualitatively consistent highlighting key commonalities across a variety of conflict settings recent empirical literature employing both laboratory and field data in many cases confirms the basic implications of conflict theory however this literature also presents important challenges to the way economists traditionally model conflict we finish our review by suggesting ways to address these challenges

was weber wrong a human capital theory of protestant economic history max weber attributed the higher economic prosperity of protestant regions to a protestant work ethic we provide an alternative theory protestant economies prospered because instruction in reading the bible generated the human capital crucial to economic prosperity we test the theory using county level data from late nineteenth century prussia exploiting the initial concentric dispersion of the reformation to use distance to wittenberg as an instrument for protestantism we find that protestantism indeed led to higher economic prosperity but also to better education our results are consistent with protestants higher literacy accounting for most of the gap in economic prosperity

optimal unemployment insurance this paper considers the design of an optimal unemployment insurance system the problem is modeled as a repeated principalagent problem involving a risk averse agent the unemployed worker and a risk neutral principal which cannot monitor the agent s search effort the optimal long term contract subject to the associated incentive constraints is characterized this contract involves a replacement ratio that decreases throughout the unemployment spell and a wage tax after reemployment that under some mild regularity conditions increases with the lenght of the unemployment spell some numerical results are presented that suggest that the gains from switching to this optimal unemployment insurance scheme could be quite large the performance of this optimal contract is also compared to alternative liquidity provision mechanisms

give peace a chance the effect of ownership and asymmetric information on peace abstract we study the possibility of peace when two countries fight a war over the ownership of a resource war is always the outcome of the game played by rational countries under complete or asymmetric information when there is no pre established distribution of the resource among countries when there is such a distribution of the resource under complete information peace is feasible for some initial distributions of the resource whereas under asymmetric information there are two classes of equilibria peaceful equilibria in which peace has a positive probability and aggressive equilibria which assign probability one to war surprisingly a little asymmetric information may yield war

introduction to development theory abstractthisarticle introduces the symposium on economic development theory 2007 elsevier inc all rights reserved jel classi cation o11 o12keywords development economics development economics a subject that studies institutions growth inequality and povertyin the developing world is a large lively and exciting area of research the objective of thissymposium is to put together some contributions in economic theory with a distinct focus ondevelopment questions much of early development economics as typi ed in the work of paul rosenstein rodan arthurlewis ragnarnurkse tiborscitovsky allynyoung gunnarmyrdal harveyleibenstein alberthirschman amartyasenandothers wastheoretical thoughnotnecessarilyinthesenseofformalmodel building theseauthorsallfelttheneedtobringnewconceptsintoeconomictheory ideas that would capture the essential features of underdevelopment and provide explanationsof the development process existing economic theory with its focus on competitive markets depersonalized exchange steady technical progress and balanced growth simply did not seemrightwhenmatchedwiththegroundrealitiesofunderdevelopment fragmented imperfect orjustplain missing markets highly personalized transactions in credit insurance or agrarian tenancy ambiguousornonexistentpropertyrights andwidespreadevidenceofpovertytrapsandhistoricallock ins a fair bit of modern economic theory was born in some of these early development writings young s article 40 on increasing returns was perhaps the rst systematic study of noncon vexities in economic growth rosenstein rodan s celebrated paper 32 on post war interven tion in europe provided a conceptual foundation for modern thinking on coordination failures

do unemployment benefits promote or hinder job reallocation abstract according to recent and largely untested theories unemployment benefits ubs could improve the extent and quality of job reallocation even at the cost of increasing unemployment in this paper we use a new set of yearly panel data from a large number of countries to evaluate empirically the relationship between unemployment benefits and job reallocation unlike previous work assessing the effects of ubs on labor market stocks we focus on flows and rely on policy experiments notably the introduction from scratch of unemployment benefits in many countries we exploit the longitudinal nature of our data to lessen the potentially important selection endogeneity and omitted variable problems we find a positive sizable and significant effect of the introduction of ubs on job reallocation arising mainly from the job destruction margin although this effect fades away over time these findings appear to be robust to changes in the countries in the sample control variables or estimation methods we discuss to what extent our results are consistent with equilibrium matching models with or without endogenous sorting of workers into jobs providing entitlement to ubs and stochastic job matching

differing preferences between anti inflation and anti unemployment policy among the rich and the poor abstract this paper assesses the preferences of the rich and the poor towards anti inflationary and anti unemployment policy using a consistent cross country social survey i find that the poor are less likely than the rich to prioritize combating inflation rather than unemployment

revisiting the coyne affair a singular event that changed the course of canadian monetary history the coyne affair occurred during the 1959 61 period and led to the resignation of the governor eventually major reforms of the bank of canada act were enacted archival and empirical evidence is used to assess the performance of monetary policy throughout the 1950s in doing so a real time data set is constructed for both canada and the us that permits the estimation of a reaction function i find that while the case against james coyne is not proven there was a brief period when monetary policy was excessively tight and this may well have worsened an already weak economic environment l affaire coyne a eu lieu au cours de la periode 1959 61 et a conduit a la demission du gouverneur de la banque du canada eventuellement des reformes majeures a la loi sur la banque du canada ont ete mises en uvre on utilise des documents d archives et des resultats empiriques pour evaluer la performance de la politique monetaire dans les annees 1950 ce faisant on construit une base de donnees en temps reel pour le canada et les etats unis qui permet de faire l estimation d une fonction de reaction on decouvre que meme si l argumentation developpee contre coyne n est pas prouvee il y a eu une courte periode durant laquelle la politique monetaire a ete excessivement restrictive et que cela peut fort bien avoir entraine la deterioration d une economie deja affaiblie

the match quality gains from unemployment insurance this paper assesses the benefits of unemployment insurance ui by measuring its effect in match quality we note that ui generosity should affect the decision to match or not and should therefore have some effect on match quality using nlsy data we analyze the relationship between postunemployment job tenure and measures of the state level ui generosity and the unemployment rate at the time the job is started we show that greater ui generosity leads to longer job tenure furthermore we find some evidence that this effect is more pronounced during busts ui having a limited dampening effect on the cyclical variation in match quality

can the shadow of the future harm cooperation abstract it is generally thought that in long term relationships high valuations of the future are conducive to cooperation in an intertemporal model of conflict however we demonstrate the possibility of the opposite effect a longer shadow of the future may harm cooperation in particular we show that the degree of inefficiency is positively related to i the agents valuation of the future ii potential growth rates in resources iii the size of initial resource endowments and iv the effectiveness of conflict

reputation incomplete information and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria a game with multiple equilibria and incomplete information which allows for reputation building is repeated infinitely many times increasing differences in patience contribute to a greater likelihood of cooperation as one player becomes sufficiently more patient than the other player both players benefit and both players risk limits and the conflict between the players decrease

economic reform and dynamic political constraints in this paper we examine the impact of political constraints on economic reform plans with special reference to the transition from centrally planned to market economies we analyse the problem of an agenda setting reform minded government facing a bureaucracy or industrial sector for which allocative efficiency requires redundancies and an increase in work intensity the government also tries to minimize the rents conceded to its heterogeneous workforce we examine two types of political constraints unanimity rule and majority rule both in a one period and a two period horizon the main results are the following first of all we show how adverse selection and time consistency may generate the widely observed feature of gradualism as an ingredient of an optimal reform second under a majority rule it is shown to be possible for the government to obtain a majority vote for a reform scheme that intertemporally hurts majority interests indeed the government can improve rent extraction through the strategic use of the threat of future proposals the group which expects to be in the minority tomorrow may accept concessions while its votes can be used to extract rents from another group these results suggest that in a dynamic context democratic constraints should not be overestimated as an obstacle against efficiency enhancing economic reforms the results of this paper may throw some light on the political economy of current reforms in eastern europe governments and political decision makers in general always face political constraints when elaborating reform proposals they know that the need to overcome potential opposition from various groups of the population constrains proposals for change political constraints vary depending on the specific institutional structure of society and are clearly different under a military dictatorship than under a parliamentary democracy the role of political constraints seems particularly important in eastern europe today where new democratic governments face the huge task of achieving the transition to a market economy while the introduction of democracy may have removed some important obstacles to economic change namely the veto power of a powerful nomenclatura under communist one party rule fears are expressed that it could potentially jeopardize economic reforms which may during the transition period hurt a majority of the population what can economic theory tell us about optimal economic reform under political constraints this paper starts addressing this ambitious question by looking at structural reform focusing on a restructuring of economic sectors which requires massive redundancies and a significant rise in labour productivity our model illustrates the case of planning

who supports the ecb evidence from eurobarometer survey data this paper contributes empirically to the long debated issue of the legitimacy of the european central bank ecb with regard to european polities using micro level data from the eurobarometer survey we shed light on the socio demographic determinants of public opinion support for the ecb we find that people with higher level of education and income and centre to right wing political orientation tend to support the ecb as well as people with optimistic expectations on the economic situation by contrast the unemployed tend to distrust the ecb the policy relevance of such results is important for ecb s communication strategy with the general public

modern hyper and high inflations since 1947 hyperinflations by cagan s definition in market economies have been rare much more common have been longer inflationary processes with inflation rates above 100 percent per annum based on a sample of 133 countries and using the 100 percent threshold as the basis for a definition of very high inflation episodes this paper examines the main characteristics of such inflations among other things we find that i close to 20 percent of countries have experienced inflation above 100 percent per annum ii higher inflation tends to be more unstable iii in high inflation countries the relationship between the fiscal balance and seigniorage is strong both in the short and long run iv inflation inertia decreases as average inflation rises v high inflation is associated with poor macroeconomic performance and vi stabilizations from high inflation that rely on the exchange rate as the nominal anchor are expansionary

efficient unemployment insurance this paper constructs a tractable general equilibrium model of search with risk aversion an increase in risk aversion reduces wages unemployment and investment unemployment insurance has the opposite effect insured workers seek high wage jobs with high unemployment risk an economy with risk neutral workers achieves maximal output without any unemployment insurance but an economy with risk averse workers requires a positive level of unemployment insurance to maximize output therefore moderate unemployment insurance not only improves risk sharing but also increases output

is it possible that an independent central bank is impossible the case of the australian notes issue board 1920 1924 the history of the australian notes issue board over the period 1920 1924 is presented it is shown that the board was created as a genuinely independent monetary authority but was soon abolished as its policies antagonised interests upon which the government depended the episode illustrates the thesis that the possibility of a genuinely independent monetary authority is problematic

crises and confidence systemic banking crises and depositor behavior abstract we show that individuals who have experienced a systemic banking crisis are 11 percentage points less likely to use banks in the u s than otherwise similar individuals who emigrated from the same country but did not live through a crisis this finding is robust to controlling for exposure to other macroeconomic events and to various methods for addressing potential bias due to migrant self selection consistent with the view that personal experience plays an important role in decision making the effects are larger for individuals who were older and more likely to have had wealth entrusted to the banking system at the time of the crisis and for people who experienced crises in countries without deposit insurance

incentives at the counter an empirical analysis of surcharging card payments and payment behaviour in the netherlands in card payment systems no surcharge rules prohibit merchants from charging consumers extra for card payments however such rules are prohibited in the netherlands dutch retailers are allowed to surcharge consumers for debit card use this setting permits an empirical analysis of the impact of surcharging card payments on merchant acceptance and consumer payment choice based on consumer and retailer survey data our analysis shows that surcharging steers consumers away from using debit cards towards cash half of the observed difference in debit card payment shares across retailers can be explained by this surcharge effect removing debit card surcharges may induce cost savings of more than eur 50 million in the long run

how organizational structure can reduce rent seeking in multi tiered organizations individuals can engage in unproductive rent seeking activities both within and between the divisions of the organization nevertheless a multi tiered organizational structure can induce efficiency gains by decreasing rent seeking we present a model of production and simultaneous internal and external rent seeking assuming a logistic contest success function in equilibrium there is generically either internal or external rent seeking but not both a multi tiered organization leads to less rent seeking and higher welfare even though the production technology gives no reason for any specific organizational structure our findings constitute a new efficiency rationale for multi tiered organizations

who trusts the bank of england and high street banks in britain following the global financial crisis gfc of 2008 there was recognition that client trust in financial institutions had been damaged while institutional trust has become an accepted barometer l