credit constraints equity market liberalizations and international trade abstract this paper provides evidence that credit constraints are an important determinant of international trade flows i exploit shocks to the availability of external finance and examine the impact of equity market liberalizations on the export behavior of 91 countries in the 1980 1997 period i show that liberalizations increase exports disproportionately more in financially vulnerable sectors that require more outside finance or employ fewer collateralizable assets this result is not driven by cross country differences in factor endowments and is independent of simultaneous trade policy reforms moreover it obtains with equal strength in the full panel of countries as well as in both panel and event study analyses of countries which removed capital controls during the sample period finally the effects of liberalizations are more pronounced in economies with initially less active stock markets indicating that foreign equity flows may substitute for an underdeveloped domestic financial system similarly opening equity markets has a greater impact in the presence of higher trade costs caused by restrictive trade policies

tastes skills and local public goods abstract this paper analyzes optimal club configurations in an economy where different types of labor are complementary in the production of private goods extending the work of berglas journal of public economics 6 409 423 1976 the analysis shows that when labor types are nonessential in production a homogeneous club configuration may be optimal despite the presence of labor complementarity the assumption that inputs are essential precluded this outcome in berglas model it is shown that homogeneous clubs are optimal when complementarity is weak or when preferences are substantially different

technology and financial structure are innovative firms different we use data on publicly traded u k firms to investigate whether financing choices differ systematically with r d intensity as well as looking at a balance sheet measure of the debt assets ratio we also consider the probability of raising finance by issuing new equity and the shares of bank debt and secured debt in total debt we find a nonlinear relationship with the debt assets ratio firms that report positive but low r d use more debt finance than firms that report no r d but the use of debt finance falls with r d intensity among those firms that report r d we find a simpler relationship with the probability of issuing new equity firms that report r d are more likely to raise funds by issuing shares than firms that report no r d and this probability increases with r d intensity the shares of bank debt and secured debt in total debt are both lower for firms that report r d compared to those that do not and tend to fall as r d intensity rises we discuss possible explanations for these patterns jel g32 o31 d21

heterogeneity within communities a stochastic model with tenure choice standard explanations for the income heterogeneity within neighborhoods rely on differences of preferences across households and heterogeneity of the housing stock we propose an alternative and complementary explanation we construct a stochastic equilibrium sorting model where 1 income is the sole dimension of household heterogeneity 2 households form state contingent housing location plans that may involve moves over their lifetimes 3 households choose whether to own or rent depending on the housing expenditure risk associated with each tenure mode and 4 there is a probability that newcomer households move in and compete for homes with native households income mixing within neighborhood arises for two reasons first allowing natives to form state contingent housing location plans breaks the indivisibility of housing consumption implicit in the literature where households choose their location once and for all second natives can insure themselves against rent fluctuations by buying their home prior to the realization of the population shock newcomers cannot as a result poorer natives stay in the more desirable communities and only richer newcomers move in these communities evidence from u s metropolitan areas supports the effects predicted by the model

competition between private and public schools vouchers and peer group effects a theoretical and computational model with tax financed tuition free public schools and competitive tuition financed private schools is developed students differ by ability and income achievement depends on own ability and on peers abilities equilibrium has a strict hierarchy of school qualities and two dimensional student sorting with stratification by ability and income in private schools high ability low income students receive tuition discounts while low ability high income students pay tuition premia tuition vouchers increase the relative size of the private sector and the extent of student sorting and benefit high ability students relative to low ability students

financial markets financial dependence and the allocation of capital abstract we explore one specific channel through which finance promotes growth the allocation of capital using international industrial data we find that countries with developed financial markets invest more in growing industries and pull out more funds of declining ones most interestingly this pattern is more eminent for those industries more dependent on external financing various robustness checks show that the results are not driven by reverse causality omitted variables specific countries or industries

why voters may prefer congested public clubs governmental facilities for such services as education health and transportation are often small of poor quality and overcrowded even when the costs are spread among all taxpayers we also find that governments may subsidize private facilities providing the same services or may charge admission fees at public facilities we explain these phenomena with a model which considers two types of people rich and poor a majority consisting of poor people may purposely build small and low quality facilities to discourage use by the rich thereby lowering taxes for the same reason the poor may benefit from an admission fee at public clubs or even from a subsidy to private clubs they do not use

the impact of environmental policy stringency on industrial r d conditional on pollution intensity and relocation costs stringent environmental regulations may encourage industrial innovation as technological advancements lower the cost of pollution abatement popp et al in handbook of the economics of innovation vol ii academic press burlington pp 873 938 2010 the pollution havens hypothesis on the other hand indicates that rather than innovating dirty industries may relocate to countries with less stringent environmental regulations copeland and taylor in j econ lit 42 1 7 71 2004 thus more stringent environmental regulations may increase or decrease innovative activities this paper examines empirically the impact of environmental regulations on r d intensities and r d expenditures in 21 manufacturing industries in 28 oecd countries from 2000 to 2007 i consider pollution intensity and the relative ease of relocation immobility as industry characteristics that determine the optimal industry response to increased environmental policy stringency i find that more pollution intensive industries innovate less as regulatory environments become more restrictive relative to less pollution intensive industries at the same time more immobile industries innovate more than more mobile industries as environmental regulations become more stringent illustrating innovation as an alternative to relocation

on price taking equilibria in club economies with nonanonymous crowding abstract competitive equilibrium in a coalition production economy or a club economy typically does not exist when there is free entry for two reasons first there may be an integer problem as is familiar from club theory with anonymous crowding second optimal groups may have different compositions from the population and then even if there is no integer problem it may be impossible to partition the population into optimal groups i define a notion of approximate equilibrium and show that such an equilibrium always exists in a sufficiently large economy i focus on the optimal size of the economy rather than of clubs

bad investments and missed opportunities postwar capital flows to asia and latin america since 1950 the economies of east asia grew rapidly but received little inter national capital while latin america received considerable international capitaleven as their economies stagnated the literature typically explains the failureof capital to flow to high growth regions as resulting from international capitalmarket imperfections this paper proposes a broader thesis that country specificdistortions such as domestic labor and capital market distortions also impactcapital flows we develop a dsge model of asia latin america and the rest ofthe world that features an open economy business cycle accounting framework tomeasure these domestic and international distortions and to quantify their con tributions to international capital flows we find that domestic distortions havebeen the predominant drivers of international capital flows and that the generalequilibrium effects of these distortions are very large international capital market distortions also matter but less

the seven main stylized facts of the mexican economy since trade liberalization and nafta in mexico a remarkably dynamic expansion of exports has been associated with a surprisingly poor overall growth performance moreover this collapse of the export multiplier took place in a context of both massive inflows of foreign direct investment and unrestricted market access to the us the first two items on all developing countries growth agenda today therefore the study of mexico is an ideal scenario within which to assess the impact of the new development model on growth and catching up copyright 2005 oxford university press

competitive equilibrium and the core in club economies with anonymous crowding in club economies with anonymous crowding competitive equilibrium states of the economy are efficient and coincide with the core when there is only one private good anonymous admission prices permit consumers with different tastes to share facilities consumers might do so when their demands for facility size and crowding coincide in which case sharing is efficient thus similarity of demands is the relevant consideration for efficiently grouping consumers with different tastes

r d and internal finance a panel study of small firms in high tech industries since joseph schumpeter economists have argued that internal finance should be an important determinant of r d expenditures yet almost without exception previous empirical studies have not found evidence of such a relation using newly available data the authors investigate this puzzle with a panel of 179 small firms in high tech industries under each estimation strategy they employ the authors find an economically large and statistically significant relationship between r d investment and internal finance their results are consistent with the view that because of capital market imperfections the flow of internal finance is the principal determinant of the rate at which small high tech firms acquire technology through r d copyright 1994 by mit press

standardised capital stock estimates in latin america a 1950 94 update capital stock estimates are used extensively in many areas of economic research in spite of both theoretical and practical difficulties with respect to their use estimation and meaning the lack of comparable capital stock estimates in latin america has hindered analysis of economic development in the region and comparisons with other developed and developing countries standardised gross and net fixed capital stock estimates for the 1950 94 period are presented for seven latin american countries argentina brazil chile colombia ecuador mexico and venezuela the methodology employed is the perpetual inventory method which estimates capital stocks as a weighted sum of past investment flows several methodological issues are discussed especially depreciation and service life estimation capital stocks have been disaggregated in machinery and equipment non residential and residential structures with services lives of 15 40 and 50 years respectively copyright 2000 by oxford university press

capital account liberalization what do cross country studies tell us capital account liberalization it is fair to say remains one of the most controversial and least understood policies of our day one reason is that different theoretical perspectives have very different implications for the desirability of liberalizing capital flows another is that empirical analysis has failed to yield conclusive results the answer another influential strand of thought contends is that this efficient markets paradigm is fundamentally misleading when applied to capital flows limits on capital movements are a distortion it is an implication of the theory of the second best that removing one distortion need not be welfare enhancing when other distortions are present

educational vouchers and cream skimming educational vouchers and cream skimming epple and romano 1998 show equilibrium provision of education by public and private schools has the latter skim off the wealthiest and most able students and universal vouchers lead to further cream skimming here we study voucher design that injects private school competition and increases technical efficiencies without cream skimming conditioning vouchers on student ability without restriction on participating schools policies fails to affect significantly cream skimming however by adding restrictions like tuition constraints such vouchers can reap the benefits of school competition without increased stratification this is accomplished while allowing voluntary participation in the voucher system and without tax increases

clubs local public goods and transportation models a synthesis abstract clubs local public goods and transportation models are analyzed within a unified model the emphasis is on the derivation of optimal allocation pricing and the size of the sharing group we derive the conditions under which optimal prices will yield surplus or deficit as well as those under which competitive provision will be efficient given heterogeneous tastes we prove that segregation according to tastes is generally efficient although several cases where this result does not hold are also discussed we show that the existing literature is unnecessarily restrictive and that the unified approach suggested here considerably extends the existing analysis of clubs local public goods and the transportation problems

ability tracking school competition and the distribution of educational benefits abstract to study the effects of ability grouping on school competition we develop a theoretical and computational model of tracking in public and private schools we examine tracking s consequences for the allocation of students of differing abilities and income within and between public and private schools private schools tend to attract the most able and wealthiest students and rarely track in equilibrium public sector schools can maximize attendance by tracking students public schools retain a greater proportion of higher ability students by tracking but lose more wealthy lower ability students to the private sector consequently socioeconomic status is a predictor of track assignment in public schools for the entire population public sector tracking has small aggregate effects on achievement and welfare but results in significant redistribution from lower to higher ability students

how national and international financial development affect industrial r d abstract we examine the impacts of both domestic and international financial market development on r d intensities in 22 manufacturing industries in 18 oecd countries for the period 1990 2003 we take account of such industry characteristics as the need for external financing and the amount of tangible assets multiple forms of domestic financial development are important determinants of r d intensity but only foreign direct investment is significant among alternative measures of international financial development we find the strongest effects for private bond market capitalization while fdi private credit by banks and stock market capitalization have similar effects in terms of magnitude

who is afraid of political risk multinational firms and their choice of capital structure this paper investigates how multinational firms choose the capital structure of their foreign affiliates in response to political risk we focus on two choice variables the leverage and the ownership structure of the foreign affiliate and we distinguish different types of political risk such as expropriation unreliable intellectual property rights and confiscatory taxation in our theoretical analysis we find that as political risk increases the ownership share tends to decrease whereas leverage can both increase or decrease depending on the type of political risk using the microdatabase direct investment of the deutsche bundesbank we find supportive evidence for these different effects

sorting by foot travel for local public goods and equilibrium stratification we re examine tiebout s hypothesis of endogenous sorting in a competitive spatial equilibrium framework by considering both income and preference heterogeneity and by allowing agents to decide endogenously the number of visits to a travel for local public good the equilibrium configuration may be completely segregated incompletely segregated or completely integrated depending on relative market rents and income preference local tax parameters a segregated equilibrium may feature endogenous sorting purely by income or by both income and preferences while the rich need not be closer to the local public facility site multiple equilibria may arise when the equilibrium configuration is incompletely segregated jel classification d50 h41 classification par deplacement biens publics locaux accessibles par deplacement et stratification d equilibre les auteurs reexaminent l hypothese de tiebout de classification endogene dans un cadre d equilibre spatial concurrentiel en tenant compte a la fois de l heterogeneite des revenus et des preferences ainsi qu en permettant aux agents de decider de maniere endogene du nombre de visites pour se procurer un bien public local par deplacement il peut s ensuivre des equilibres de segregation complete de segregation incomplete ou d integration complete selon les rentes relatives et les parametres de revenus de preferences ou de fiscalite locale un equilibre de segregation peut entrainer une classification endogene sur la base seulement des revenus ou sur la base des revenus et des preferences alors que les riches n ont pas besoin d etre plus proches du site du bien public local des equilibres multiples peuvent surgir quand la configuration d equilibre en est une de segregation incomplete

two tier pricing of shared facilities in a free entry equilibrium we explore how well the market will provide shared facilities which are subject to congestion it is usually efficient to have multiple facilities because it is more efficient to spend resources on facilities than to endure crowding costs we assume firms can charge a membership price and a visit price we present a symmetric nash equilibrium in these two prices we show that ifthe number offirms is large the membership price will be small thus the membership price is a measure of market power when entry occurs in response to positive profit but such that entry is deterred by the prospect of negative profit in a symmetric nash equilibrium the endogenous number offirms is bounded below by one fewer than the efficient number thefees paid by a client converge to an appropriately defined competitive price as the economy is replicated

volatility and growth credit constraints and the composition of investment abstract how does uncertainty and credit constraints affect the cyclical composition of investment and thereby volatility and growth this paper addresses this question within a model where firms engage in two types of investment a short term one and a long term one which contributes more to productivity growth because it takes longer to complete long term investment has a relatively less cyclical return but it also has a higher liquidity risk the first effect ensures that the share of long term investment to total investment is countercyclical when financial markets are perfect the second implies that this share may turn procyclical when firms face tight credit constraints a novel propagation mechanism thus emerges through its effect on the cyclical composition of investment tighter credit can lead to both higher volatility and lower mean growth evidence from a panel of countries provides support for the model s key predictions

decentralization in replicated club economies with multiple private goods abstract we show that exhaustion of blocking opportunities is a sufficient condition such that every allocation in the core of a replicated club economy can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium and that a related condition efficient scale is necessary and under an assumption on endowments sufficient such that competitive equilibrium exists and the core is nonempty these results do not require the euclidean structure and monotonicity assumed in lindahl equilibrium do not require convexity of preferences or costs and do not require the strong assumption that private goods are essential journal of economic literature classification numbers d46 d50 d61 h40

opposites attract the effect of the federal income tax code on community composition abstract if houses in two homogeneous but dissimilar communities are reorganized as a single heterogeneous community property tax payments are shifted from owners of small houses to owners of large houses we consider three aspects of the federal income tax code which causes this shifting to raise aggregate property values in the heterogeneous community first the property tax is deductible and the tax rate structure is progressive second some families do not itemize third the restriction on saving in tax deferring assets suggests the use of different interest rates to capitalize future property taxes because of these aspects heterogeneous communities are established provided the different family types desire similar levels of public service

clubs and the market large finite economies abstract this paper builds a general equilibrium model of finite economies with exchange and club formation agents trade multiple private goods widely in the market can belong to several clubs and care about the characteristics of other club members because club memberships are indivisible and choices of club memberships must be coordinated across the population the core of such an economy may be empty and equilibrium may not exist however for large finite club economies an approximate core is not empty and states in this approximate core can be approximately decentralized by prices for private goods and for club memberships the arguments use convexification tools familiar from the literature on private goods economies and a new tool of some independent interest that addresses the special problems created by the nature of club memberships journal of economic literature classification numbers d2 d5 h4

efficiency equilibrium and exclusion when the poor chase the rich using a simple adverse selection model we characterize equilibrium when the rich chase the poor if communities are established by competitive entrepreneurs the equilibrium exists is unique and is efficient it involves either complete separation or complete pooling different income groups may rank these qualitative outcomes differently we show how restrictions imposed by a central government may alter the nature of equilibrium such restrictions may be explained as the choice of a low income majority altering the equilibrium to the pooling outcome which they prefer

clubs and the market this paper defines a general equilibrium model with exchange and club formation agents trade multiple private goods widely in the market can belong to several clubs and care about the characteristics of the other members of their clubs the space of agents is a continuum but clubs are finite it is shown that i competitive equilibria exist and ii the core coincides with the set of equilibrium states the central subtlety is in modeling club memberships and expressing the notion that membership choices are consistent across the population

r d tax incentives in eu countries does the impact vary with firm size this paper studies the effect of r d tax incentives on the research activity of manufacturing firms based in france italy spain and the uk over the period 2007 2009 using a matching procedure we show that in all the examined countries but spain r d tax incentives induced a statistically significant increase in the intensity of r d expenses over sales however this effect is driven only by the behaviour of small firms by assessing the benefit cost ratio of r d tax policies we find evidence of substantial additional effects in italy and the uk

tiebout economies with differential genetic types and endogenously chosen crowding characteristics abstract we consider a tiebout economy with differential crowding and public projects in which agents are distinguished by their tastes and genetic endowments agents choose which crowding characteristic for example a skill they wish to express and this affects their value to other members of their jurisdiction club firm etc an agent s choice is influenced both by his genetic endowment which affects his cost of acquiring crowding characteristics and by his preferences over which crowding characteristic he expresses we show that if small groups are strictly effective the core is equivalent to the set of anonymous competitive equilibrium outcomes but that the core generally contains taste homogeneous jurisdictions journal of economic literature classification numbers h41 h72

equivalence of the core and competitive equilibrium in a tiebout economy with crowding types abstract we propose a new model of a local public goods economy with differentiated crowding the new feature is that taste and crowding characteristics of agents are distinguished from one another we prove that if the economy satisfies strict small group effectiveness then the core is equivalent to the set of tiebout equilibrium outcomes equilibrium prices are defined to depend solely on crowding characteristics this implies that only publicly observable information and not private information such as preferences is needed to induce agents to sort themselves into efficient jurisdictions thus our model allows us to satisfy bewley s 6 anonymity requirement on taxes in his well known criticism of the tiebout hypothesis

finance and the sources of growth the authors evaluate whether the level of development in the banking sector exerts a causal impact on economic growth and its sources total factor productivity growth physical capital accumulation and private saving they use 1 a pure cross country instrumental variable estimator to extract the exogenous component of banking development and 2 a new panel technique that controls for country specific effects and endogeneity they find that banks do exert a large causal impact on total factor productivity growth which feeds through to overall gdp gross domestic product growth the long run links between banking development and both capital growth and private savings are more tenuous