tax competition and the creation of redundant products there are products that are assembled from kits but that once assembled are identical to other products an example is the roll your own cigarette because the kit requires time to assemble it is more costly than the assembled product in the absence of tax competition the kit is not bought or is redundant i show that tax competition between regions supports strategies that tax the redundant product at a lower tax rate than its assembled counterpart and it is bought a welfare loss is thereby created jel classification h71 bien des produits peuvent etre assembles a partir de trousses une fois assembles ces produits sont identiques a d autres produits un exemple est le fait de rouler ses propres cigarettes parce que la trousse reclame du temps pour l assemblage le produit coute plus cher que le produit deja assemble en l absence de concurrence fiscale on n achete pas la trousse ou elle est redondante on montre que la concurrence fiscale entre regions supporte des strategies qui taxent le produit redondant a un taux plus bas que sa contrepartie assemblee et que ce produit redondant est achete une perte de bien etre s ensuit

armington models and terms of trade effects some econometric evidence for north america elasticities of substitution among u s imports from mexico canada the rest of the world and competing domestic production are estimated for twenty two mining and manufacturing sectors based on quarterly data for 1980 88 these elasticities will provide a benchmark for computable general equilibrium models of north american trade liberalization the authors also find that estimated armington elasticities are low and therefore researchers may want to reconsider the device of using high values of armington elasticities in multicountry computable general equilibrium models to avoid large terms of trade losses associated with preferential trade liberalization

commodity tax harmonization and the location of industry we study the positive implications of commodity taxation and tax harmonization under the destination and origin principles when firms are monopolistic competitors facing variable demand elasticity and segmented markets our emphasis is on the international location of firms in the presence of market size asymmetries and trade costs under the destination principle an increase in the tax rate of a country always causes some firms to relocate to the other this effect may be reversed under the origin principle when economic integration is deep enough under tax harmonization the choice of a common tax principle is irrelevant for the market outcomes and for the global tax revenues it affects however the distribution of revenues between small and large countries c 2006 elsevier b v all rights reserved

does competition for capital discipline governments decentralization globalization and public policy competition among countries or regions within them to attract mobile capital is often thought to discipline their governments motivating them to invest more in infrastructure reduce waste and corruption and spend less on non productive public goods the result should be convergence on business friendly policies we argue that this requires an assumption units start out very similar that is often unrealistic if units are heterogeneous in natural resources geographical location inherited human capital or infrastructure capital mobility often weakens discipline on the poorlyendowed units this may help explain disappointing results of liberalizing capital flows within russia and sub saharan africa jel f36 h73 h87

adverse selection commitment and renegotiation extension to and evidence from insurance markets with asymmetric information full commitment to long term contracts may permit markets to approach first best allocations however commitment can be undermined by opportunistic behavior notably renegotiation we reexamine commitment in insurance markets we present an alternative model which extends laffont and tirole s procurement model to address uncertainty and competition which involves semipooling in the first period followed by separation this and competing models e g single period models and no commitment models have different predictions concerning temporal patterns of insurer profitability a test using california data suggests that some automobile insurers use commitment to attract selective portfolios comprising disproportionate numbers of low risks

welfare improving asymmetric information in dynamic insurance markets this article presents a two period asymmetric learning model of insurance markets when information about past accidents is not shared by insurers asymmetries of information develop through time equilibrium contracts exist are payoff unique and display a realistic bonus malus pattern eliminating asymmetries through information sharing is welfare decreasing in contrast with past contributions on insurance and adverse selection when second period contract offers cannot be contingent on initial contract choice a strict increase in welfare is obtained through menus of contracts although initial contract choice is in itself worthless information

tax competition and tax co ordination under destination and origin principles a synthesis this paper proposes a general framework for analysing commodity tax competition under destination and origin principles based on three possible tax spillovers the consumer price spillover the producer price terms of trade spillover and rent spillovers a model is presented which can be extended to accommodate all three spillovers using this model many of the results in the existing literature can be derived compared and extended

a theory of interregional tax competition a general equilibrium model is constructed to study tax competition where local governments compete for capital by holding down property tax rates and public expenditure levels an exact definition of tax competition is provided and both the existence and nonexistence of tax competition are shown to be theoretically possible it is argued however that tax competition must occur under empirically reasonable conditions inefficiency in public production is also explicitly modeled the amount of capital used to produce a given level of public service output is shown to be greater than that which is required to minimize costs evaluated at the prices facing private firms

heterogeneous vertical tax externalities and macroeconomic effects of federal tax changes the role of fiscal advantage abstract how do state tax rates respond to federal tax shocks this paper presents a novel mechanism of heterogeneous vertical tax externalities across state levels of fiscal advantage showing that tax increases can be expansionary even without their reinvestment states rich in natural resources have a fiscal advantage in the inter state competition over production factors which allows them to respond better to increases in federal taxes and consequently attract capital from other parts of the nation we add heterogeneity in fiscal advantage levels to an otherwise standard model of vertical tax externalities and horizontal tax competition the model shows that irrespective of federal redistribution the contractionary effect of a federal tax increase can be overturned in fiscally advantaged states through an increase in their tax base using the case of the u s and narrative based measures of federal tax shocks a la romer and romer 2010 we provide empirical evidence for the various aspects of this mechanism specifically our baseline estimates indicate that controlling for federal transfers a 1 increase in the gdp share of capital related federal taxes at the beginning of a year increases the growth rate of the per capita tax base by approximately 0 7 in high fiscal advantage states at the end of it

incentive equivalence with fixed migration costs abstract if migration between communities is costless and if policy makers in each community anticipate the migration response to policy changes then the interests of the two communities are perfectly aligned decentralization is efficient this incentive equivalence is well known however the first order approach used in virtually all the literature may obscure the fact that no convexity assumptions need be made about technology or tastes this fact underscores the relevance of incentive equivalence even when there are scale economies in the public sector here the consequences of positive migration costs for this incentive equivalence are considered in contrast with much of the literature migration costs are assumed the same for everyone this formulation differs from the more common attachment to home assumption of heterogeneous migration costs conditional on the direction of migration interests of different communities are still perfectly aligned but natives of different communities may prefer different directions of migration weakening incentive equivalence if local policy makers have the power to induce large changes in migration flows however incentive equivalence fails only if economies of scale in population are important so that communities may be under populated

international tax competition and the deficit bias i analyze the dynamic effects of tax competition on public budget deficits i find that stronger tax competition leads to a fiscal deficit bias at the early stages of financial liberalization when countries differ in terms of capital mobility further liberalization leads to external imbalances and diverging fiscal deficits while corporate tax rates converge consistent with theory i find that stronger tax competition increases deficits in a sample of oecd countries controlling for tax revenues and other standard determinants of fiscal deficits jel e62 f62

information revelation and market incompleteness this paper introduces a theory of market incompleteness based on the information transmission role of prices and its adverse impact on the provision of insurance in financial markets we analyse a simple security design model in which the number and payoff of securities are endogenous agents have rational expectations and differ in information endowments and attitudes toward risk when markets are incomplete equilibrium prices are typically partially revealing while full relevation is attained with complete markets the optimality of complete or incomplete markets depends on whether the adverse selection effect the unwillingness of agents to trade risks when they are informationally disadvantaged is stronger or weaker than the hirshleifer effect the impossibility of trading risks that have already been resolved as new securities are issued and prices reveal more information when the hirshleifer effect dominates an incomplete set of securities is preferred by all agents and generates a higher volume of trade hirshleifer 1971 was the first to point out that revelation of information can reduce risksharing opportunities in insurance markets resulting in a welfare loss in this paper we build on hirshleifer s insight to develop a theory of endogenous market incompleteness we show that in an economy with asymmetric information in which agents learn from prices an incomplete financial structure may be optimal the reason is that less information is revealed by prices when markets are incomplete than in an otherwise identical economy with complete markets 1 paradoxically a greater degree of incompleteness may result in better risk sharing since the only risks that can be traded are those whose resolution is not common knowledge at the time of trade for the same reason incompleteness of markets may also foster a higher volume of trade the connection between security design asymmetric information trading volume and welfare in financial markets is a subtle one and it is important to isolate its various facets the efficacy of security markets in aggregating and transmitting private information depends on the characteristics of the financial structure and especially on the number of tradeable assets indeed within the rational expectations paradigm informational differences disappear in equilibrium generically when the price vector has

the competitive effects of a new product introduction a case study this paper analyzes the competitive effect of a new product introduction we break the overall competitive effect into two parts the effect on the prices of existing products due to increased competition and the effect of having additional product variety using data from both before and after the introduction we directly estimate the price effects and the additional variety effect then using only the estimated post introduction demand structure along with an assumed model of competition we estimate the price effects indirectly by comparing the indirect and direct estimates we assess the validity of alternative models of competition for the industry

income taxes and the destination of movers to multistate msas abstract we examine how differences in state income tax rates as well as other state and local taxes and public service expenditures influence the choice of state of residence for households federal tax filers moving into multistate metropolitan areas msas using data from the irs on the migration of taxpayers msas that are on borders provide a spatial discontinuity discrete differences in state tax rates within a single labor market these msas allow residents to live in one state and work in another state we find that differences in state income tax rates have a significant impact on the relative rate of migration to the states within an msa however contrary to what would be expected this impact is only significant in msas in which the filing state is based on employment states without reciprocity and not for those states in which the filing state is the state of residence states with reciprocity in msas where states do not have reciprocity agreements a difference of ten percent in tax rates leads to a 4 1 percent difference in the relative rate of incoming taxpayers analogously we find that a ten percent difference in state tax rates in these msas results in a 3 3 percent difference in the rate of tax base inflow agi our results suggest that one reason that differences in state income taxes appear to have more impact in multistate msas without reciprocity is that only relatively large differences in state income tax rates have any impact on migration and these differences are much more pronounced in msas without reciprocity

patient mobility and health care quality when regions and patients differ in income we study the effects of cross border patient mobility on health care quality and welfare when income varies across and within regions we use a salop model with a high middle and low income region in each region a policy maker chooses health care quality to maximise the utility of its residents when health care costs are financed by general income taxation in equilibrium regions with higher income offer better quality which creates an incentive for patient mobility from lower to higher income regions assuming a prospective payment scheme based on drg pricing we find that lower non monetary administrative mobility costs have i no effect on quality or welfare in the high income region ii a negative effect on quality but a positive effect on welfare for the middle income region and iii ambiguous effects on quality and welfare for the low income region lower monetary mobility costs copayments might reduce welfare in both the middle and low income region thus health policies that stimulate cross border patient mobility can be counterproductive when regions differ in income

one pool to insure them all age risk and the price s of medical insurance asymmetric information can lead to adverse selection and market failure in a dynamic setting asymmetric information also limits reclassification risk this certainty offsets the costs of adverse selection using a dynamic model of endogenous insurance choice and price calibrated to the u s medical insurance market i find that asymmetric information is pareto improving when information is fully asymmetric however when insurers can discriminate by age group but not within age groups the young benefit by paying less for insurance the insurance market for the near elderly collapses because it is no longer implicitly subsidized by the participation of the young

a theory of wage dynamics a dynamic equilibrium model of long term implicit labour contracts under incomplete but symmetric information is developed workers are assumed to be risk averse and of unknown ability or productivity risk neutral firms learn as do workers about each worker s productivity by observing the worker s output over time it is shown that equilibrium contracts provide for wages which never decline with age and increase only when the worker s market value increases above his current wage in addition to characterizing the equilibrium wage contract we also derive some of its implications for the behaviour of aggregate wages across various groups of workers these implications explain some findings in the recent empirical literature on ageearnings profiles in particular our model can explain why earnings may be positively related to experience even after controlling for productivity as some empirical studies have indicated

managerial task assignment and promotions a two period model of managerial task assignment is developed where the current employer has the advantage of observing the actual performanc e of the manager while outside employers can observe only the assign ments optimal contracts are rigid but the market value of managers is below actual productivity and they are promoted less than is effic ient the author introduces the idea of managers explo iting their information to separate themselves out in the market plac e as a consequence the model has the appealing property of small ab ility based wage differentials within a task as well as large ones b etween tasks copyright 1988 by the econometric society

separating moral hazard from adverse selection and learning in automobile insurance longitudinal evidence from france the identification of information problems in different markets is a challenging issue in the economic literature this paper performs tests of residual asymmetric information in the french automobile insurance market for the 1995 1997 period this market is characterized by the presence of a regulated experiencerating scheme bonus malus contract choices are strongly associated with the bonus malus of policyholders we have access to longitudinal survey data with dynamic information both on claims and accidents we propose a causality test to distinguish pathways through which a positive correlation arises between contract choice and accidents we find evidence of moral hazard among a sub group of policyholders with significant driving experience 5 15 years we distinguish this moral hazard estimate from adverse selection and learning policyholders with less experience have a combination of learning and moral hazard whereas no residual information problem is found for policyholders with more than 15 years of experience

revenue sharing and information exchange under non discriminatory taxation the international exchange of tax information and its merits compared to withholding taxes is the central topic in current debates in international tax policy the purpose of this paper is to characterize and compare the tax regimes that emerge with and without information exchange under the assumption that countries are unable to differentiate between the taxes they apply to residents and non residents it focuses in particular on the role of asymmetries in country size capturing a key feature of tax havens and on the impact and potential desirability of schemes to share the revenue raised by withholding as under the new eu savings tax arrangements or more innovatively as a consequence of information exchange it is shown that irrespective of country size difference pareto efficiency requires that all revenue collected from nonresidents be transferred to the residence country which would require taking the eu practice even further from the norm but is currently the norm in relation to information exchange a withholding scheme with revenue fully reallocated in this way pareto dominates information sharing whatever the allocation under the latter comparing schemes in which there is no revenue sharing however shows that information exchange pareto dominates simple withholding

in a world without borders the impact of taxes on internet commerce the rapid rise in sales over the internet and the fact that most internet buyers pay no sales tax has ignited a considerable debate over taxes and the internet this paper uses new data on the purchase decisions of approximately 25 000 online users to examine the effect of local sales taxes on internet commerce the results suggest that controlling for observable characteristics people living in high sales taxes locations are significantly more likely to buy online the results are quite robust and cannot be explained by unobserved technological sophistication shopping costs or other alternative explanations the magnitudes in the paper suggest that applying existing sales taxes to internet commerce might reduce the number of online buyers by up to 24 percent

horizontal and vertical indirect tax competition theory and some evidence from the usa this paper provides a simple theoretical framework for analysing simultaneous vertical and horizontal competition in excise taxes and estimates equations informed by the theory on a panel of us state and federal excise taxes on cigarettes and gasoline we also examine the role played by smuggling the results are generally consistent with the theory when the characteristics of the markets for the goods are taken into account for neither good do federal excise taxes affect state taxes taxes in neighbouring states have a significant and large effect in the case of cigarettes and a much weaker effect in the case of gasoline we also find that in the setting of cigarette taxes concerns about cross border shopping play a more important role than concerns about smuggling

repeated insurance contracts and learning this article considers a repeated insurance model with incomplete information in which the insurer and the consumer both learn over time about the unknown risk category of the consumer care choices by young consumers affect the informational value of the accident history under an optimal scheme of long term insurance contracts young consumers will always be subsidized by old consumers and consumers who are reassessed as low risk types are always subsidizers i e reverse experience ratings we compare this optimal scheme with the set of contracts that would emerge in a competitive market if only short term contracting were possible these sequentially competitive contracts can lead to over investment in care by both young and old consumers relative to the optimum in contrast to the underinvestment problem associated with moral hazard in insurance

on pareto improving commodity tax changes under fiscal competition this paper shows that when a noncooperative fiscal equilibrium of the mintz tulkens 1986 model of tax competition is inefficient pareto improving changes are positive for the taxes of both regions under concavity of the regions welfare functions it also identifies a class of such equilibria that are always efficient

local fiscal competition an application to sales taxation with multiple federations abstract local sales tax rates influence the location of retail activity this paper develops a theory and empirical identification strategy for studying sales tax competition with multiple federations as exemplified by multiple counties each containing several cities in addition to strategic interactions with nearby cities and a city s own county city tax rates are influenced by the tax rates of neighboring counties cities react heterogeneously to own county sales tax rates depending on distance to the county border using data on the driving time to county borders and a comprehensive cross section of local sales tax rates i exploit variation in proximity to county borders to identify vertical fiscal competition cities located near county borders react more intensely to their county s tax rate in comparison to towns at the interior an increase in the neighboring county tax rate raises city tax rates in nearby counties

the political economy of regional integration projects at borders where poor and rich meet the role of cross border shopping and community sorting abstract at borders between poor and rich countries huge service price differentials could be exploited to mutual benefit offering better paid job opportunities to the poor as well as better shopping opportunities to the rich however cross border shopping is often limited by the substantial transaction costs of crossing the border moreover countries and regions frequently fail to cut these transaction costs even when they have the opportunity to do so we provide a politico economic analysis of cross border integration projects more specifically we show how the political outcome depends on i intra country mobility ii decision making and housing ownership regimes and iii federal grants and international border regulations our analysis builds on two key characteristics in which individuals differ interregional mobility and intercultural ability

tax evasion fiscal competition and economic integration abstract this paper examines the implications of tax evasion for fiscal competition and tax harmonization policies in an economic union first for symmetric countries it proves that the equilibrium values of the tax and audit rates are less than optimal tax harmonization alone will also lead to a less than optimal audit rate second for asymmetric countries the paper shows that integration may turn an honest country into an evading one it argues that tax harmonization alone may be a bad policy in that it can make both countries worse off it may also cause an otherwise honest country to turn to evasion

differentiating the consumer benefits from labeling of gm food products although recurrent evidence is found that consumers have different willingness to pay for gm and non gm products there is disagreement in the scientific community about the size of consumer benefits from gm labeling in this article we use a theoretical model based on a standard constant elasticity of substitution ces to explain the importance of the quality effect it is shown that failing to consider the quality effect may yield an overestimation of benefits from gm labeling voluntary or mandatory

reforming an asymmetric union on the virtues of dual tier capital taxation the tax competition for mobile capital in particular the reluctance of small countries to agree on measures of tax coordination has ongoing political and economic fallouts within europe we analyse the effects of introducing a two tier structure of capital taxation where the asymmetric member states of a union choose a common federal tax rate in the first stage and then non cooperatively set local tax rates in the second stage we show that this mechanism effectively reduces competition for mobile capital between the members of the union moreover it distributes the gains across the heterogeneous states in a way that yields a strict pareto improvement over a one tier system of purely local tax choices we also discuss the effects of diverging capital endowments within the union and capital flows to third countries

international tax coordination regionalism versus globalism tax competition for mobile capital can undermine the attempts of governments to redistribute income from rich to poor i study whether international tax coordination can alleviate this problem using a general equilibrium model synthesizing recent contributions to the tax competition literature the model highlights the crucial distinction between global tax coordination and regional coordination with high capital mobility between the tax union and the rest of the world the welfare gain from regional capital income tax coordination is only a small fraction of the gain from global coordination even if the tax union is large relative to the world economy

eu regional policy and tax competition the european union eu provides coordination and financing of trans european transport infrastructures i e roads and railways which link the eu member states and reduce the cost of transport and mobility this raises the question of whether eu involvement in this area is justified by inefficiencies of national infrastructure policies moreover an often expressed concern is that policies enhancing mobility may boost tax competition we analyze these questions using a model where countries compete for the location of profitable firms we show that a coordination of investment in transport cost reducing infrastructures within union countries enhances welfare and mitigates tax competition in contrast with regard to union periphery infrastructure the union has an interest in a coordinated reduction of investment expenditures here the effects on tax competition are ambiguous our results provide a rationale for eu level regional policy that supports the development of intra union infrastructure

which border taxes origin and destination regimes with fiscal competition in output and emission taxes abstract this paper posits a two stage game in tax regime and tax rates to study the property of second best emission and output taxes in a two country world with an atmospheric externality it shows that i either the destination destination or the origin origin tax regime may constitute the subgame perfect nash equilibrium of this game ii either regime may pareto dominate the other iii it is possible to have a prisoner s dilemma game where the origin origin regime pareto dominates but the choice of the destination regime is the dominant strategy for each country other results include iv under origin origin regime the output tax is used for fiscal competition the emission tax is set at a rate equal to the national marginal social damage of emissions and public goods are provided suboptimally v under destination destination regime the output tax is ineffective as an instrument for fiscal competition the emission tax is used not only for combating pollution but also for tax competition the tax is set at a rate below the national marginal social damage of emissions emissions are pushed above their closed economy level the provision of public goods are optimal

policy competition for foreign direct investment between asymmetric countries the present paper analyses policy competition for foreign direct investment between countries of different size and different market structure we demonstrate how policy competition affects the location decision of the foreign investor and derive welfare implications the key variables in our analysis are intra regional trade costs differences in market size and minimum wages

the impact of fuel tourism on retailers diesel price in spanish neighbouring regions since 1986 car fuel consumption in spain has been subject to the special hydrocarbons tax and the value added tax in addition since 2002 regional governments have been able to apply a regional excise duty on hydrocarbons this article analyses the impact that such a regional tax has on the retailer s diesel price at the border of the province of lugo in the region of galicia and the province of leon in the region of castile leon only the former region has the regional tax evidence shows that variations in the price of diesel at the border of lugo are of the same sign but of lower intensity than at the border of leon the price price elasticity is 0 8060 these results suggest that service stations located in regions with higher excise duties use their price policy to lessen the negative effects generated for fuel tourism

asymmetric tax competition abstract the paper analyzes nash equilibrium when two jurisdictions set tax rates on a tax base which is mobile between them population differences imply tax differences the smaller jurisdiction levies a lower tax rate in equilibrium and its residents are better off than those in the larger jurisdiction the nash equilibrium is inefficient if the two jurisdictions merged the resulting allocation would be efficient however if differences in population are great enough residents of the small jurisdiction would be made worse off by such a merger

repeated moral hazard the role of memory commitment and the access to credit markets abstract the dynamic dimension introduces new questions in moral hazard models thus the roles of memory and commitment have recently raised a marked interest the goal of this paper is to discuss and clarify the issues at hand and to present some new results we show that two conditions are necessary for the optimal long term contract to be implementable via spot contracts first the long term optimum should be renegotiation proof second spot contracts should provide efficient consumption smoothing we discuss how the availability of credit to the agent affects these two prerequisites we also study the hitherto neglected case in which the repetition of the moral hazard problem generates hidden information at recontracting dates the optimal renegotiation proof contract then implements the minimum effort level unless it involves randomized savings

on the interaction between vertical and horizontal product differentiation an application to banking the author studies the conditions under which banks offer remote access note there exists interaction between location and taste for remote access offering remote access is an instrument to partially segment depositors according to their taste for that technology the interaction between location and taste for remote access enhances this effect different equilibria emerge as the result of two effects first introducing remote access steals depositors from the opponent as the product specification becomes more appealing second deposit rate competition is affected as remote access determines the substitutability of banks copyright 1996 by blackwell publishing ltd

taxing an independent scotland if scotland were to become independent it would gain considerably more control over its tax system than it currently enjoys in this paper we consider the consequences of independence for the optimal design of a new scottish tax system an analysis which would also be of some relevance for considering the consequences for tax design of independence of other smaller nations scotland is different from the rest of the uk in some ways that are important for tax system design incomes are more equally distributed for example that is one reason why the progressive income tax currently raises less per head in scotland than in the rest of the uk it also suggests that there is less to be gained in terms of redistribution from sharply progressive taxation independence would create additional complexity for individuals and firms working or trading across borders it could also put downward pressure on tax rates and our analysis suggests that optimal tax rates in an independent scotland are likely to be lower than optimal rates in the uk as a whole at the same time the context of a substan tial budget deficit will continue to put upward pressure on tax rates

did the single market cause competition in excise taxes evidence from eu countries tax competition theory predicts that the introduction of the eu single market in 1993 should have caused excise tax competition and thus increased strategic interaction in the setting of excise taxes among eu countries we test this prediction using a panel data set of 12 eu countries over the period 1987 2004 we find that for excise duties on still and sparkling wine beer and ethyl alcohol strategic interaction significantly increased after 1993 there is weaker evidence of increased interaction in cigarette taxes possibly because cigarettes are widely smuggled giving rise to tax competition even before the single market

time consistent health insurance currently available health insurance contracts often fail to insure long term illnesses sick people can suffer large increases in premiums or denial of coverage i describe insurance contracts that solve this problem their key feature is a severance payment a person who is diagnosed with a long term illness and whose premiums are increased receives a lump sum equal to the increased present value of premiums this lump sum allows him or her to pay the higher premiums required by any insurer people are not tied to a particular insurer or a group and the improvement is free insurance companies can operate at zero economic profits and consumers can pay exactly the same premium they do with standard contracts

bank secrecy illicit money and offshore financial centers this paper discusses the effects of pressure policies on offshore financial centers as well as their ability to enforce the compliance of those centers with anti money laundering regulations offshore banks can be encouraged to comply with rigorous monitoring of an investor s identity and the origin of his her funds when pressure creates a sufficiently high risk of reputational harm to the investor we show that such pressure policies harm both offshore and onshore investors and can benefit both the bank industry and tax administrations we show that social optimal pressure policies are dichotomous decisions between no pressure at all and a pressure great enough to persuade offshore banks to comply the delegation of pressure policies to onshore tax institutions may be inefficient deeper financial integration fosters compliance by the offshore center

the insurance effect of groups many people belong to groups which partially identify their characteristics this paper argues that when agents are risk averse and where only group characteristics are visible rather than individual characteristics the pareto optimal construction of groups differs in systematic ways from standard notions of how groups should be formed two applications are considered the assignment of workers to jobs where it is shown the optimal contract does not involve maximizing output and accident insurance where the optimal contract does not involve complete insurance many people belong to groups which serve to partially identify otherwise hidden talents or characteristics for example it is possible to find out that certain authors have written an article but their individual contributions are much more difficult to ascertain similarly it may be easy to determine that a worker is a foreman but much more difficult to tell how much better he is than other foremen or that somebody is employed which tells us something about his talents but not whether he is more talented than the average employed person each of these examples illustrates cases where we can see the group to which an agent belongs author foreman employed rather than an individual s characteristics standard notions of efficiency tell us how these groups should be formed academics should write papers together only if their joint product is greater than if they operated separately a worker should be employer as a foreman only if his productivity is higher as a foreman than elsewhere in the organization and so on the principal result of this paper is that when agents are risk averse and where only groups of the type above are visible to some agents rather than individual characteristics these assignment rules may not be pareto optimal instead for example someone who is less competent as a foreman than as an operative may still be employed as a foreman and this yields higher welfare than employing that worker as an operative let me explain the intuition by a simple example assume that workers who join a firm are uncertain of their ability they are risk averse and seek insurance over that uncertainty untalented workers should be fired on standard efficiency grounds as they have higher productivity elsewhere assume that after a period of production information on ability becomes available to the employer and the employee but that other employers must infer this information from whether the

does size asymmetry exacerbate the inefficiency of tax competition many authors demonstrate that the tax gap resulting from tax competition increases with the size asymmetry of the competing countries consequently increasing country size disparities exacerbates the inefficiency of tax competition the aim of this note is to show that this classical view has no general validity if we consider that countries compete not only in taxes but also in the provision of infrastructure the simple model we develop for this purpose demonstrates that the effect of size disparity on efficiency depends crucially on the degree of international capital mobility

commodity tax competition between member states of a federation equilibrium and efficiency we first describe regional market equilibria whereupon consumers of each region allocate their purchases of private goods between domestic and nondomestic ones according to the structure of relative prices taxes and transportation costs next regional optimal tax levels and public good quantities are derived the tax of the other region being held constant fiscal competition arises from the ability of one region in choosing its tax to alter the tax base of the other

tax compliance and fiscal externalities evidence from u s diesel taxation abstract fiscal externalities across jurisdictions can arise from tax evasion and avoidance while the tax competition literature has generally focused on base shifting and the resulting positive fiscal externalities we show theoretically and empirically that negative fiscal externalities can dominate when the tax base is apportioned across jurisdictions this can lead to a negative relationship between jurisdiction size and the desired tax rate interstate truckers in the united states owe state diesel taxes based on diesel consumption which is apportioned based on the miles driven in each state we find that own state diesel sales fall when the diesel tax rates of other states rise suggesting that tax base evasion is the predominant source of externalities we then estimate a tax reaction specification finding that the own state tax rate is negatively correlated with the tax rates set in other states and with state size both consistent with the sign of the estimated fiscal externality

mandatory versus voluntary labelling of genetically modified food evidence from an economic experiment opponents of the voluntary labelling scheme for genetically modified gm food products often argue that consumers have the right to know and therefore advocate mandatory labelling in this article we argue against this line of reasoning using experimental auctions we show that the quality of the signal generated by a mandatory labelling scheme is affected by the number of labels in the market if there are two labels one for gm products and one for non gm products mandatory and voluntary labelling schemes generate a similar degree of uncertainty about the quality of products that do not carry a label

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

paternalism and tax competition when consumers make mistakes the government may wish to use paternalistic taxation as a corrective measure we analyse the extent to which tax competition undermines the feasibility of paternalistic taxation we show that the paternalistic component of a tax on a harmful good is reduced when there is cross border shopping but it does not disappear altogether in a model with tax competition between two countries only one of which has a paternalistic objective we show that a minimum tax rate requirement can be pareto improving despite the divergence in policy objectives tax harmonization however reduces welfare in the non paternalistic country

tax evasion tax competition and the gains from nondiscrimination the case of interest taxation in europe this paper uses a game tlieoredc approach to analyse the taxadon of interest income in europe in the presence of tax evasion the model allows tis to assess the success of various reform proposals we argue tbat the tax treatment of nonresidents interest income plays a crucial role when decisions on discriminatio n and on withholding tax rates are made noncooperadvely the outcome is similar to a prisoners dilemma all countries discriminate but in equilihrium internationally mobile portfolio capital evades taxation successfully in contrast if all governments did not discriminate tax competition leads to less tax evasion the integration of capital markets in europe has hrought various benefits at the same time however governments struggle to contain tax evasion international capital flight as an attempt to evade taxes is particularly relevant in the area of taxation of interest income banking secrecy laws in some eu countries and low tax rates in small countries like luxembourg which hoost its role as financial centre have led to the effective elimination ofthe taxation of interest income for some investors the economist speaks not surprisingly about the disappearing taxpayer may 31 1997 several proposals have been made in order to overcome this situation the european commission supports the introduction of a minimum tax rate and or the status of a community resident under the concept of a community resident a country s tax on interest income is independent of the residence of the investor practically realising the source principle by contrast a proposal of the oecd 1977 argues in favour of a maximum withholding tax rate on interest income none of these proposals has been unanimously accepted since gains and losses from non coordinated policies differ greatly across member states the main beneficiary of the present situation is luxembourg which attracts large amounts of foreign capital in particular from germany the united kingdom opposes any coordination for political reasons and because tax coordination may also threaten london s role as the leading financial centre in europe in contrast germany sticks to its traditional bank secrecy law which enables resident investors to evade german taxation by investing abroad

the simple analytics of tobacco taxation with illegal supply this paper examines the impact of tobacco excise taxes where legal and illegal supplies coexist the government s objective is to minimize cigarettes smoked in the economy or to maximize revenue or to minimize illegal activity it reacts to a competitive illegal supply in an adjoining jurisdiction a model of consumer choice is used to demonstrate how demand response to tax changes can yield counterintuitive results while the model mimics the canadian market similar situations characterize the us and european markets a novel element of the paper is the treatment of externalities on the supply side rather than the demand side resume analytique simple des taxes sur le tabac quand il y a offre illegale ce memoire examine l impact des taxes sur la vente de tabac quand des offres legale et illegale coexistent l objectif du gouvernement est de minimiser les cigarettes fumees dans l economie ou de maximiser le revenu fiscal ou de minimiser l activite illegale il doit prendre en compte l offre concurrentielle illegale dans une juridiction contigue on utilise un modele de choix du consommateur pour montrer comment la reaction de la demande aux changements dans les taxes peut engendrer des resultats contre intuitifs bien que le modele soit concu pour le marche canadien on trouve des situations avec des caracteristiques similaires dans les marches americain et europeens un element novateur du memoire est sa prise en compte des externalites du cote de l offre plutot que du cote de la demande

implementing tax coordination abstract this paper investigates whether tax competition can survive under tax coordination when information is private or nonverifiable we focus on a two jurisdiction model where capital can move across borders and where jurisdictions have different public good requirements but are otherwise identical in this setting coordination may call for a second best allocation supported by differentiated tax rates if however coordination must be achieved via a set of common rules that condition tax rates on jurisdictions choices the second best allocation may not be implementable we show that incentive compatibility requirements will generally affect not only the choice of coordinated rates in states where jurisdictions are different but also the choice of harmonized rates in states where jurisdictions have identical preferences for public consumption

nash equilibrium tariffs for the united states and canada the roles of country size scale economies and capital mobility a theoretical analysis of optimal nash equilibrium tariff rates is presented a numerical general equilibrium model is then used to find nash equilibrium tariff rates for the united states and canada the nash equilibrium tariffs are small relative to partial equilibrium estimates 18 percent for the united states and 6 percent for canada the united states is essentially indifferent between the nash equilibrium and free trade while canada is better off at the latter by 4 billion empirical results support theoretical predictions that the optimal tariff is smaller when the country is smaller there are scale economies and free entry and capital is internationally mobile

who benefits from partial tax coordination in this paper we investigate whether partial tax coordination is beneficial to countries within and outside a tax union in which countries are supposed to compete in taxes and infrastructure our results demonstrate that a subgroup of countries agreeing on a common tax rate can harm both member and nonmember states this is in contrast to the classical findings that partial tax harmonisation is pareto improving when a minimum tax rate is imposed within a tax union we demonstrate that it does not necessarily improve the welfare of the member countries moreover both the high tax and low tax countries can be worse off this conclusion is at odds with the classical result that a high tax country benefits from the imposition of a lower tax bound

the efficiency effects of categorical discrimination in the insurance industry recent public policy debate has focused concern on the equity dimensions of categorical discrimination based on sex age or race in insurance and similar markets we consider the efficiency effects of such discrimination and establish that costless imperfect categorization always enhances efficiency when categorization entails a nonnegligible resource cost however no unambiguous efficiency ranking of informational regimes is possible when categorization is costless we demonstrate that government having no better information than market participants can effect redistribution without assuming dictatorial control of the market implying that a market equilibrium with costless categorization is potentially pareto superior to one without it when categorization is costly however the market may categorize when pareto improvements are not possible

milk by any other name consumer benefits from labeled milk this article uses revealed preferences of consumers to study the consumer benefits from rbst free and organic labeled milk the article specifies and estimates a quadratic aids demand system model for different milk types using u s supermarket scanner data the introduction of rbst free and organic milk is used to estimate consumer benefits that are decomposed into two components competitive and variety effects results show significant consumer benefits from organic milk and to a lesser extent from rbst free milk based on the findings we explore implications for present u s labeling standards th eu s food sector is going through rapid transformations in terms of new product introduction and innovations organic and genetically modified gm food products are leading the way in changing the landscape of available choices to consumers this rapid expansion of product space has taken place concomitantly with an increase in public policy concerns on issues of standardization labeling health risks and associated consumer welfare in this paper we explore these broader issues in the context of a specific product introduction the introduction of recombinant bovine somatotropin rbst free and organic milk in the u s market from a policy perspective understanding the market for organics and the various components of that demand i e what portion is for gm free and what is for other attributes of organics can help determine the value of creating a national standard and the potential welfare losses to consumers of weakening such a standard are consumers willing to pay extra for organic and rbst free milk if so how

endogenous timing in the presence of non monotonicities the aim of this paper is to generalize the endogenous timing game proposed by hamilton and slutsky games and economic behavior 1990 2 pp 29 46 by allowing the payoff or the marginal payoff of a player to become non monotonic with respect to the strategy of the opponent we propose a taxonomy of the subgame perfect nash equilibria based on the characteristics of the payoff functions proposed by eaton canadian journal of economics 2004 37 pp 805 29 we determine under which conditions of the initial payoff functions commitment has a social value and when the simultaneous move nash equilibrium is commitment robust and discuss its pareto efficiency

commodity tax competition under destination and origin principles abstract this paper studies the effect of switching from the destination to the origin principle of taxation on non cooperative commodity tax equilibrium when taxes are constrained to be uniform across commodities the switch has no effect when differentiated taxes are allowed the effects of the switch depend on whether countries are small or large in both cases the switch imposes the requirement that taxes must be uniform across commodities within each country in the second case there are two further effects of the switch i negative spillover effects from tax policy are introduced ii incentives to manipulate the terms of trade are changed the switch does not necessarily lead to a fall in all tax rates

the spatial incidence of local retail taxation this paper examines the effects of local retail taxation in two simple models of spatial competition suppose that a suburb or central city imposes an excise tax or subsidy on a particular commodity such as gasoline liquor restaurant meals or groceries or imposes a general sales tax that affects many commodities simultaneously to what extent does this lead to higher prices within the jurisdiction and in neighboring jurisdictions section ii presents the basic model of spatial competition that forms a component of the fixed locations model of section iii and the entry model of section iv infinitely many stores are located along an infinite line and demand density is completely inelastic and uniform along the line the main endogenous variables of interest are the prices charged by the different stores throughout the paper a nash equilibrium in prices is assumed section iii presents the fixed locations model in which the tax is imposed after stores have already established themselves store locations are fixed due to location specific sunk costs if a suburb containing a single store imposes an excise tax on a commodity the store that is taxed and its first second and third nearest neighbors on each side increase their prices by 57 7 percent 15 5 percent 4 2 percent and 1 1 percent of the tax respectively this result is independent of the spacing of the stores and independent of whether or not they are evenly spaced if a suburb containing several stores imposes an excise tax the changes in price follow directly by adding the effects of taxes on several adjacent stores if a central city taxes all stores on the right half line the results are given by 12 the taxed and untaxed stores closest to the boundary

ethics welfare and markets an economic analysis the present article examines society s welfare when goods with identical physical attributes can be produced using two alternative technologies one of them less ethically desirable but less expensive for at least some producers for the scenario where identification costs must be borne by producers and consumers of the high quality good the outcome under unregulated markets is identical to the optimal solution of a central planner constrained to neither ban the undesirable technology nor segregate the low quality good however under certain circumstances the unregulated market equilibrium may be improved upon by government intervention that shifts the burden of identification costs to the producers of the low quality good or which bans the production of the low quality good the optimal intervention needs to be determined case by case and depends on consumer preferences relative production costs and relative costs of identification and fraud prevention

will destination based taxes be fully exploited when available an application to the u s commodity tax system abstract we develop a tax competition model that allows for the setting of both an origin based and a destination based commodity tax rate in the presence of avoidance and evasion in the presence of evasion jurisdictions will give cross border shoppers tax preferential treatment thus not fully exploiting the potential of destination based taxation moreover the divergence between origin based and destination based taxes is stronger when the incentives for consumers tax arbitrage opportunities increase the united states is one example of many such systems while sales taxes are due at the point of sale use taxes are due on goods purchased out of state we document that when able to set both rates a majority of jurisdictions levy destination based use taxes at a lower rate than origin based sales taxes in response to changes in state level policies that increase tax avoidance opportunities the results of the empirical model broadly confirm our theory

prices taxes and automotive fuel cross border shopping abstract the aim of the present paper is to determine whether differences in automotive fuel prices among neighboring autonomous communities i e spanish political administrative regions affect the decisions taken by individuals regarding the region in which to purchase fuel in particular the intention is to discover if price increases in certain autonomous communities as a result of the application of the regional tranche of the hydrocarbon retail sales tax hrst has affected fuel purchases in neighboring communities in order to achieve the above mentioned objectives the monthly purchases of automotive diesel in aragon between january 2001 and march 2007 is estimated from the fuel price in aragon the relation between prices in each of the bordering communities and aragon weighted by density of traffic the number of vehicles registered in that community and three dummy variables representative of the implementation of the regional tranche of the hrst in madrid catalonia and valencia the paper finds empirical evidence to demonstrate a positive effect of the relative prices in the neighboring communities and vehicle registrations and also a negative effect of prices in aragon upon the acquisition of diesel in this region in the case of catalonia some evidence suggests that the price effect may have been strengthened following the introduction of the regional tranche of the hrst in august 2004

how to make the metropolitan area work neither big government nor laissez faire we study how political boundaries and tax competition among jurisdictions interact with the labor and land markets to determine the economic structure and performance of metropolitan areas contrary to general belief institutional fragmentation and cross border commuting need not be welfare decreasing but the size of the central city matters for welfare under tax competition the central business district is too small tax competition also prevents public policy enhancing global productivity to produce their full impact although our results support the idea of decentralizing the supply of local public services by independent jurisdictions they also highlight the need of coordinating tax policies

economic freedom and taxation is there a trade off in the locational competition between countries this paper investigates the relationshipbetween economic freedomand taxation we argue that an economicallyfree environment improvesthe attractiveness of a location which inturn enables governmentsto levy higher business taxes to test thishypothesis empirically weestimate the impact of economic freedom onthe national tax policy where the latter is measured by thecorporate tax revenue related tognp corporate tax ratio we utilize adata set of 46 developed and lessdeveloped countries between 1980 and 1997and find a clear confirmationof our hypothesis further a simulationanalysis reveals that the observedchange in economic freedom has equalizedthe international distributionof corporate tax ratios

asymmetric commodity tax competition comment on de crombrugghe and tulkens abstract a widely noticed result by de crombrugghe and tulkens journal of public economics 41 1990 335 350 states that asymmetric commodity tax competition always leads to tax rates being too low in both countries even though there are counteracting private and public consumption effects for the high tax region this note argues that the result depends crucially on the assumption that welfare in the high tax region is concave in the tax rate of the low tax country and shows that this assumption cannot generally be met in the underlying mintz and tulkens journal of public economics 29 1986 133 172 model it is also shown that a tax increase in the low tax country will hurt the high tax region when the marginal transaction cost schedule is sufficiently elastic with respect to the level of cross border shopping

the scope for taxation and public expenditure in an open economy in this survey of some central issues of tax and expenditure policy in an open economy we consider the implications for policy of free although not necessarily perfect international mobility of commodities capital and labour we examine the issues both from a positive and a normative point of view trying to identify both the incidence and welfare effects of international mobility one general conclusion is that tax distortions may increase in magnitude in comparison with a closed economy but they may also increase in kind as when otherwise neutral taxes become distortionary because of factor mobility

tax competition tax exporting and higher government choice of tax instruments for local governments abstract this paper presents a theoretical model with tax exporting due to external ownership of a fraction of the land in each local jurisdiction there are n local jurisdictions in a metropolitan area n 1 and many metropolitan areas in a world economy the paper examines the usage of business property taxes and source based wage taxes by local jurisdictions first in the presence of and then in the absence of residence based lump sum taxes and how this depends on and n the paper then examines the choice of a world national or state government as to whether to allow local metropolitan or sub metropolitan governments to use business property taxes wage taxes or both assuming that the local governments choose the actual tax rates

jeux sans frontieres tax competition and tax coordination when countries differ in size closer international integration is putting increasing pressure on existing national tax structures this paper uses a simple two country model to address a range of consequent policy concerns focusing particularly on the role of country size differences in size exacerbate the inefficiency from noncooperative behavior harming both countries the smaller country loses from harmonization to any tax rate between those set in the noncooperative equilibrium but both countries gain from the imposition of a minimum tax anywhere in that range the fully optimal response to freer cross border trade however may be to do nothing jel h20 h77

a note on equilibrium leadership in tax competition models this paper reexamines the work of kempf and rota graziosi j pub econ 94 768 776 2010 which shows that leadership by the small region is the risk dominant equilibrium under the endogenous timing game they obtained this result in a model where the asymmetry among regions translates into different gradients of the demand for capital but identical vertical intercepts in this paper we simply reverse the form of asymmetry by considering different vertical intercepts but identical gradients the reason is that market power is typically related to the intercept and not to the slope of the demand function we then show that leadership by the large region becomes the risk dominant equilibrium and can even become pareto superior

state and local tax competition in a spatial model with sales taxes and residential property taxes abstract this paper presents a theoretical model with a uniformly populated line that is divided into local jurisdictions and or states if one level of government imposes sales and residential property taxes and if the spatial extent of each taxing jurisdiction is positive and finite then in nash equilibrium the sales tax rate is less than residential property tax rate housing consumption is suboptimal and the public good is underprovided in each jurisdiction if a very large state or country is divided into local jurisdictions and if both levels of government choose tax rates endogenously then under some assumptions there is an efficient outcome

aggregation and imperfect competition on the existence of equilibrium we present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products the central result provides general conditions under which there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products this includes products with multi dimen sional attributes in addition to the proof of existence we provide conditions for uniqueness our analysis covers location models the characteristics approach and probabilistic choice together in a unified framework to prove existence we employ aggregation theorems due to prekopa 1971 and borell 1975 our companion paper caplin and nalebuff 1991 introduces these theorems and develops the application to super majority voting rules we present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products the central result is that there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products in addition to the proof of existence we provide conditions for uniqueness our model both unites diverse strands of the earlier literature and opens up uncharted areas for future analysis in particular we expand the traditional one dimensional framework to allow for multi dimen sional product differentiation our approach involves twin restrictions on consumer preferences one on individuals preferences the other on the distribution of preferences across society these are generalizations of the restrictions supporting 64 majority rule presented in caplin and nalebuff 1988 to prove existence we apply a new technique of aggregation this technique is valuable in a variety of other problems in the companion paper we use the aggregation result to generalize our earlier work on 64 majority rule and to characterize the relationship between the distribution of human capital and the distribution of income caplin and nalebuff 1991 there are additional applications in statistics and in search theory we begin with a brief review of the early literature on imperfect competition describing in more detail the existence problem and previous solutions section 3 presents our twin assumptions and shows that they cover many standard cases in section 4 we introduce the aggregation theorem and use it in the analysis of demand functions the proof of existence of equilibrium is in section

diesel price convergence and mineral oil taxation in europe we empirically analyse convergence of european producer and consumer prices for diesel fuel and investigate the role of excise taxation by comparing the speed of convergence of prices and taxes we find a surprisingly fast speed of convergence for consumer prices while this can in part be explained by fuel tourism the main driving force is producer price dynamics tax convergence contributes weakly to price convergence but the overall effect is to slow down consumer relative to producer price convergence

a three input model of the spatial effects of a central city wage tax abstract this paper considers the short run and long run spatial effects on wages employment and business capital as functions of location of a localized increase in wage tax rates the model is most applicable to a central city that has a higher wage tax rate than the surrounding suburbs the inclusion of land as a third input in production significantly reduces the long run effects of a central city wage tax on employment near the central city boundary as compared with a model in which labor and capital are the only two inputs the short run effects are significantly less than the long run effects

consumer lock in with asymmetric information abstract a two period version of the rothschild and stiglitz 1976 model of competitive screening in an insurance market is presented its features include repeat purchase of insurance among consumers no commitment among insurers or consumers asymmetric information among insurers about a consumer s accident history and state contingent contracts an equilibrium may exist in this model with full pooling in period one and consumer lock in in period two in such an equilibrium high risk consumers are experience rated and firms earn negative profits in period one and positive profits in period two

price dynamics in european petroleum markets this paper analyses horizontal and vertical price dynamics in the eu petroleum markets the results indicate that the cross country price differentials have significant impact on the local price adjustments we investigate the cross national price spill overs and find that the extent of the welfare transfer due to asymmetric price transmission when analysed in a cross country setting is less pronounced than claimed in previous contributions in this area we also find empirical evidence although indirect for the politically charged concept of fuel tourism using a pan european cross product time series dataset