interjurisdictional spillovers decentralized policymaking and the elasticity of capital supply a key question in the fiscal federalism literature is whether decentralized policymaking in an economy with spillovers among jurisdictions leads to an efficient outcome see e g oates 1972 a striking example where this question is of particular importance is the current debate on global warming the failure of the copenhagen summit in late 2009 has shown impressively that centralized solutions to the climate change problem are hard to realize one might thus want to know whether a decentralized policy approach where each country chooses its own climate policy without coordinating it with the climate policy of other countries gives hope for an efficient policy outcome further important examples of decentralized decision making in the presence of interjurisdictional spillover effects can be found in the decentralized provision of education and infrastructure at first glance it is hardly imaginable that decentralized policymaking can ever be optimal it is not only the very existence of spillovers that causes doubt the policy instruments themselves also create policy externalities despite this presumption against the efficiency of decentralized policymaking the previous literature provides several studies in which decentralization leads to an undistorted policy choice an important example is the paper of oates and schwab 1988 who argue that the choice of capital taxes in an economy with identical jurisdictions mobile capital and local pollution may indeed be efficient in a remarkable recent paper ogawa and wildasin 2009 extend the analysis to account for transboundary pollution spillovers and asymmetric countries and still get the efficiency result in their model emissions and thus the extent of spillovers generated by a jurisdiction is proportional to capital employed in this jurisdiction the choice of capital taxes is then distorted by the jurisdictions incentives for tax competition and by the jurisdictions disregard of spillover effects but the key argument is that both distortions just neutralize each other and thereby lead to efficient capital tax rates our paper contributes to this literature and points to the important role that the elasticity of aggregate capital supply with respect to the net rate of return to capital plays for the efficiency of decentralized policymaking in accordance with the previous literature we show that under a fixed capital supply zero capital supply elasticity the decentralized policy choice is indeed optimal if the capital supply elasticity is strictly positive however capital tax rates are inefficiently low in the decentralized

foreign direct investment and the dark side of decentralization countries differ in their government architecture some countries are characterized by a high degree of concentration of fiscal administrative judicial executive and lawmaking powers whereas others have decentralized many functions and responsibilities of government to different jurisdictions and various levels of government the cross country differences in the organization of government are also not static but have been subject to substantial change in many countries the co existence of different organizational patterns of government has created an important debate regarding the determinants of particular government structures as well as questions regarding the optimality of different forms of organization

population growth and savings in ldcs a survey article both population growth and savings have traditionally taken a certain place of pride among models of growth and development the purpose of this paper is to examine the literature concerning the hypothesis that the savings rate itself is a function of the population growth rate and this effect exacerbates the negative effect of population on economic growth the evidence is examined from three perspectives i macroeconomic effects of variations in the age structure of the population ii choice theoretic models of family decision making particularly the joint determination of fertility decisions and savings decisions and iii market level interactions of variables which determine individual decisions the paper concludes that both population growth and savings rates are inextricably tied up in the process of economic development there are many ways in which the two variables may interact but no generalizations can be safely made across countries

a note on the causality between export and productivity abstract in this paper we re examine the export led growth hypothesis through testing granger causality from exports to labor productivity using the methodology developed in toda and yamamoto 1995

does tax competition soften regional budget constraint this paper analyses the impact of both horizontal and vertical tax competition on central government transfers towards regions as well as on the softness of the regional budget constraint we show that tax interactions have no impact on the optimal central government grant whereas they harden the regional budget constraint when the regional debt is not too heavy

fiscal federalism and lobbying abstract which government functions should be decentralized resp centralized once lobbying behavior is taken into account we find that the answer largely depends on how the interests of the regional lobbies are positioned with respect to the function to be decentralized resp centralized when regional lobbies have conflicting interests then lobbying is less damaging for social welfare under centralization than under decentralization on the contrary when regional lobbies have aligned interests then lobbying is less damaging for social welfare under decentralization provided that policy spillovers on the non organized groups are not too strong

on production efficiency in federal systems abstract this paper emphasises the role of the allocation of rents between the levels of government within a federal economy in the achievement of production efficiency it is shown that in a federal economy in the absence of vertical transfers production efficiency dictates rents should be allocated to the upper federal level of government

does fiscal cooperation increase local tax rates in urban areas charlot s paty s and piguet v does fiscal cooperation increase local tax rates in urban areas regional studies the main purpose of this paper is to assess the effects of fiscal cooperation on local taxation in a decentralized country using experience in french urban municipalities a tax setting model for local business tax is estimated using spatial and panel econometric techniques for the period 1993 2003 controlling for population size it is found that fiscal cooperation is likely to reduce tax competition and as a consequence to increase local business tax rates

decentralization and international tax competition abstract this paper models tax competition between two countries that are divided into regions in the first stage of the game the strategy variable for each country is the division of a continuum of public goods between central and regional government provision in the second stage the central and regional governments choose their tax rates on capital a country s decentralization level serves as a strategic tool through its influence on the mix of horizontal and vertical externalities that exists under tax competition in contrast to standard tax competition models decentralizing the provision of public goods may improve welfare

an empirical analysis of intergovernmental tax interaction the case of business income taxes in canada both federal and provincial governments in canada levy corporate taxes on busi nesses in their jurisdictions which potentially gives rise to horizontal and vertical tax exter nalities within the federation using a simple model of interdependent tax choices we estimate tax setting functions for the federal government ontario quebec and an aggregate of the remaining eight provinces we find evidence of significant vertical and horizontal tax inter actions provincial tax rates respond negatively to the federal tax rate while at least some provinces increase their tax rates in response to increases in the tax rates of other provinces

a theory of interregional tax competition a general equilibrium model is constructed to study tax competition where local governments compete for capital by holding down property tax rates and public expenditure levels an exact definition of tax competition is provided and both the existence and nonexistence of tax competition are shown to be theoretically possible it is argued however that tax competition must occur under empirically reasonable conditions inefficiency in public production is also explicitly modeled the amount of capital used to produce a given level of public service output is shown to be greater than that which is required to minimize costs evaluated at the prices facing private firms

does tax competition tame the leviathan abstract we study the impact of tax competition on equilibrium taxes and welfare focusing on the jurisdictional fragmentation of federations in a representative agent model of fiscal federalism fragmentation among jurisdictions with benevolent tax setting authorities unambiguously reduces welfare if however tax setting authorities pursue revenue maximization fragmentation by pushing down equilibrium tax rates may under certain conditions increase citizen welfare we exploit the highly decentralized and heterogeneous swiss fiscal system as a laboratory for the estimation of these effects while for purely direct democratic jurisdictions which we associate with relatively benevolent tax setting we find that tax rates increase in fragmentation fragmentation has a moderating effect on the tax rates of jurisdictions with some degree of delegated government our results thereby support the view that tax competition can be second best welfare improving by constraining the scope for public sector revenue maximization

a revisitation of the savings growth nexus in mexico by employing tests for long term causality contrary to sinha and sinha economic letters 1998 in mexico savings is shown to precede growth this paper further explores the complex dynamics of this inter relationship to lend clarity to this nexus

heterogeneous vertical tax externalities and macroeconomic effects of federal tax changes the role of fiscal advantage abstract how do state tax rates respond to federal tax shocks this paper presents a novel mechanism of heterogeneous vertical tax externalities across state levels of fiscal advantage showing that tax increases can be expansionary even without their reinvestment states rich in natural resources have a fiscal advantage in the inter state competition over production factors which allows them to respond better to increases in federal taxes and consequently attract capital from other parts of the nation we add heterogeneity in fiscal advantage levels to an otherwise standard model of vertical tax externalities and horizontal tax competition the model shows that irrespective of federal redistribution the contractionary effect of a federal tax increase can be overturned in fiscally advantaged states through an increase in their tax base using the case of the u s and narrative based measures of federal tax shocks a la romer and romer 2010 we provide empirical evidence for the various aspects of this mechanism specifically our baseline estimates indicate that controlling for federal transfers a 1 increase in the gdp share of capital related federal taxes at the beginning of a year increases the growth rate of the per capita tax base by approximately 0 7 in high fiscal advantage states at the end of it

tax competition in federations revisited we extend keen and kotsogiannis 2002 2004 by considering all purpose public goods that are beneficial to both producers and consumers horizontal externality resp vertical externality exerted by tax competition will not necessarily lead to inefficient outcomes

how responsive is business capital formation to its user cost an exploration with micro data abstract the response of business capital formation to its user cost is critical to evaluating tax reform deficit reduction and monetary policy evidence for a substantial user cost elasticity however is sparse most evidence has been based on aggregate data although several recent studies with firm level data report substantial effects with a particularly rich micro dataset containing over 26 000 observations this paper explores what can be learned about the user cost elasticity while the results depend to some extent on the specification and econometric technique various diagnostics lead us to prefer a precisely estimated but small elasticity of approximately 0 25 this paper is dedicated to the memory of robert eisner who labored early and ably on uncovering the determinants of investment spending and highlighting the importance of the question found in the title of this paper

tax structure in a federation abstract does national taxation of a base influence the degree to which the local government will use the same tax base does the tax rate chosen by one local government influence the choices made by another local government the theoretical answer to these questions is often in the affirmative because of vertical and horizontal externalities that result when several governments are operating at the same time in a fiscal system however little empirical information is available this paper estimates the impact of horizontal and vertical externalities on the choice of tax rates by local governments operating in a federation higher national income tax rates and lower poverty rates are found to lead to lower local income tax rates

networks of innovators a synthesis of research issues abstract this paper will first summarise some key findings of empirical research in the 1960s on the role of external sources of scientific technical and market information in successful innovation by business firms this work demonstrated unambiguously the vital importance of external information networks and of collaboration with users during the development of new products and processes moreover the dilemmas of cooperative research in competitive industries were recognised and studied long ago 35 62 76 what then is new about the present wave of interest in networks of innovators are there new forms of organisation or new technologies or new policies which justify renewed research efforts since they go beyond those developments already analysed in earlier empirical and theoretical work section 2 reviews the evidence of new developments in the 1980s in industrial networks regional networks and government sponsored innovative activities it shows that there has indeed been a major upsurge of formal and semi formal flexible networks in the 1980s including some new types of network it also shows that some older forms of research cooperation have been modified and transformed the papers at montreal largely concentrated on the role of regional supplier networks which are a good example of such new wine in old bottles this paper attempts to locate the regional network discussion within a wider context of new developments in networking section 3 discusses the causes of these new developments and whether they are likely to remain a characteristic of national and international innovation systems for a long time to come or prove to be a temporary upsurge to be overtaken later by a wave of take overs and vertical integration finally section 4 sums up some of the other key issues which require further research and debate and the implications for social science theory

interpenetration of organization and market japan s firm and market in comparison with the u s abstract resource allocation mechanisms used in the market and within the firm are quite often a mixture of the pure market principle and the pure organization principle market principles penetrate into the firm s resource allocation and organization principles creep into the market allocation interpenetration occurs to remedy the failure of pure principles other in the market or in the organization after presenting this new perspective we analyze resource allocation mechanisms in japan and the u s one conclusion is that interpenetration patterns are rather different between the two countries due to institutional economic and societal differences we also analyze the ways in which these differences affect japanese and american corporate behavior in such areas as diversification strategy corporate financing and innovation and venture business activity

a spatial analysis of provincial corporate income tax responses evidence from canada using a model of interdependent tax choices and accounting for equalization entitlements and general transfers this paper estimates making use of a spatial econometric framework corporate income tax setting functions for all canadian provincial governments the results show that there is a statistically significant positive fiscal interaction among a subset of provinces and between all provinces and the federal government provincial corporate income taxes are also found to be negatively related to equalization entitlements general federal transfers and the federal corporate income tax a robustness check on the fiscal relationship between ontario and quebec verifies the existence of significant bi directional fiscal interdependencies the paper also introduces u s state corporate income taxes as covariates and examines their interaction with canadian provinces a l aide d un modele de choix fiscaux interdependants et en tenant compte des paiements de perequation et des transferts generaux ce texte calibre a l aide d un cadre econometrique spatial les fonctions de definition de fiscalite des revenus de societes de tous les gouvernements provinciaux canadiens les resultats montrent qu il y a un effet d interaction positif significatif entre un sous ensemble de provinces et entre les provinces dans leur ensemble et le gouvernement federal les impots sur le revenu des societes des provinces sont co relies negativement avec les paiements de perequation les transferts generaux et l impot federal sur le revenu des societes des tests de robustesse montrent qu il y a relation d interdependance fiscale bidirectionnelle significative entre le quebec et l ontario le memoire introduit les impots sur le revenu des societes aux etats unis comme co variables et examine leur interaction avec ce qui se passe dans les provinces canadiennes

capital taxation and production efficiency in an open economy we attempt to clarify the role of the production efficiency theorem in international capital taxation it is shown that a direct open economy analogue to the production efficiency theorem arises not in the small country case but in the more general setting of tax competition between a finite number of identical jurisdictions

mergers in fiscal federalism this paper analyzes mergers of regions in a two tier setting with both horizontal and vertical tax competition the merger of regions induces three eects on regional and local tax policies which are transmitted both horizontally and vertically i an alleviation of tax competition at the regional level ii a rise in the regional tax base and iii a larger internalization of tax externalities generated by cities it is shown that the merger of regions increases regional tax rates while decreasing local tax rates this nash equilibrium with mergers is then compared with the nash equilibrium with coalitions of regions

decentralized taxation and the size of government evidence from swiss state and local governments according to the leviathan model fiscal federalism is seen as a binding constraint on a revenue maximizing government the competitive pressure of fiscal federalism is supposed to reduce public sector size as compared to unitary states however empirical results concerning the leviathan hypothesis are mixed this study uses a state and local level panel data set of swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998 to empirically analyze the effect of different federalist institutions on the size and structure of government revenue because of the considerable tax autonomy of sub national swiss governments it is possible to investigate different mechanisms by which fiscal federalism may influence government size the results indicate that tax exporting has a revenue expanding effect whereas tax competition favors a smaller size of government fragmentation has essentially no effect on the size of government revenue for swiss cantons the overall effect of revenue decentralization leads to fewer tax revenue but higher user charges thus revenue decentralization favors a smaller size of government revenue and shifts government revenue from taxes to user charges

political decentralization and corruption evidence from around the world abstract how does political decentralization affect the frequency and costliness of bribe extraction by corrupt officials previous empirical studies using subjective indexes of perceived corruption and mostly fiscal indicators of decentralization have suggested conflicting conclusions in search of more precise findings we combine and explore two new data sources an original cross national data set on particular types of decentralization and the results of a firm level survey conducted in 80 countries about firms concrete experiences with bribery in countries with a larger number of government or administrative tiers and given local revenues a larger number of local public employees reported bribery was more frequent when local or central governments received a larger share of gdp in revenue bribery was less frequent overall the results suggest the danger of uncoordinated rent seeking as government structures become more complex

interjurisdictional capital mobility fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy abstract recent studies emphasize that local property taxation may result in inefficiently small amounts of local public spending this paper shows that the inefficiency can be traced to a fiscal externality when one jurisdiction increases its taxes it causes a flow of capital to other jurisdictions that increases their tax revenues the inefficiency can be corrected with a subsidy that internalizes the externality key empirical parameters determining the magnitude of the externality are identified illustrative calculations indicate that subsidy rates on the order of 40 might be required to achieve efficiency

the impressive contribution of canadian economists to fiscal federalism theory and policy the study of fiscal federalism has been central to the research of canadian economists since the rowell sirois report to mark the 50th anniversary of the founding of the canadian economics association it is fitting to take stock of their contributions we focus on the period since 1982 and emphasize the main scholarly publications of an inclusive array of canadian economists and economists in canadian universities our attention is devoted to applications in the context of federal and provincial governments setting aside related issues in municipal government finance we briefly discuss instances where the fiscal federalism literature has informed policy debates including through policy research institutes government commissions and international organizations la contribution impressionnante des economistes canadiens a la theorie et a la politique du federalisme fiscal l etude du federalisme fiscal a ete un element central de la recherche des economistes canadiens depuis la commission rowell sirois au moment de celebrer le 50eme anniversaire de la fondation de l association canadienne d economique le moment est approprie pour prendre la mesure de leurs contributions on se concentre sur la periode apres 1982 et on souligne les principales publications savantes d un ensemble inclusif d economistes canadiens et d economistes dans les universites canadiennes une attention particuliere est portee aux applications dans le contexte federal et provincial mettant de cote les enjeux relies a la finance municipale on discute brievement des instances ou la litterature sur le federalisme fiscal a eclaire les debats de politiques publiques y compris a travers les instituts de recherche sur les politiques publiques les commissions gouvernementales et les organisations internationales

innovation networks and vertical integration abstract a central debate in industrial policy today is that between proponents of large vertically integrated firms on the one hand and those of networks of small specialized producers on the other this paper argues that neither institutional structure is the panacea its supporters claim the menu of institutional alternatives is in fact quite large and both firms and networks of which there are several kinds can be successful growth promoting adaptations to the competitive environment industrial structures vary in their ability to coordinate information flows necessary for innovation and to overcome power relationships adverse to innovation the relative desirability of the various structures then depends on the nature and scope of technological change in the industry and on the effects of various product life cycle patterns the principal policy conclusion of this analysis is that the government s role ought to be facilitating rather than narrow and prescriptive allowing scope for firms to develop organizational forms that are best adapted to their particular environments

does federalism lead to excessively high taxes the relative strengths of vertical and horizontal tax externalities turn on the balance between the interest responsiveness of the supply of savings and demand for capital the extent to which immobile factors are taxed by the states and the strength of preferences between federal and state expenditures the vertical externality will dominate if the aggregate tax base of the federation is responsible to the state tax instrument tax interactions in federations are more complex than has often been supposed

capital tax competition under a common currency abstract we re examine the view that capital taxes are too low when capital is mobile across tax jurisdictions we do so by emphasising a previously neglected implication of decentralised capital tax setting when jurisdictions share a common currency namely capital taxes give rise to a vertical externality by affecting the revenues of the over arching central bank from issuing the common currency this externality may lead ceteris paribus to too high regional capital taxes and may more than offset the usual effects of tax competition in this case and contrary to conventional wisdom decentralised capital taxes will be too high

horizontal and vertical indirect tax competition theory and some evidence from the usa this paper provides a simple theoretical framework for analysing simultaneous vertical and horizontal competition in excise taxes and estimates equations informed by the theory on a panel of us state and federal excise taxes on cigarettes and gasoline we also examine the role played by smuggling the results are generally consistent with the theory when the characteristics of the markets for the goods are taken into account for neither good do federal excise taxes affect state taxes taxes in neighbouring states have a significant and large effect in the case of cigarettes and a much weaker effect in the case of gasoline we also find that in the setting of cigarette taxes concerns about cross border shopping play a more important role than concerns about smuggling

local fiscal competition an application to sales taxation with multiple federations abstract local sales tax rates influence the location of retail activity this paper develops a theory and empirical identification strategy for studying sales tax competition with multiple federations as exemplified by multiple counties each containing several cities in addition to strategic interactions with nearby cities and a city s own county city tax rates are influenced by the tax rates of neighboring counties cities react heterogeneously to own county sales tax rates depending on distance to the county border using data on the driving time to county borders and a comprehensive cross section of local sales tax rates i exploit variation in proximity to county borders to identify vertical fiscal competition cities located near county borders react more intensely to their county s tax rate in comparison to towns at the interior an increase in the neighboring county tax rate raises city tax rates in nearby counties

the economics of split ticket voting in representative democracies in u s elections voters often vote for candidates from different parties for president and congress voters also express dissatisfaction with the performance of congress as a whole and satisfaction with their own representative the authors develop a model of split ticket voting in which government spending is financed by uniform taxes the benefits from this spending are concentrated while the model generates split ticket voting overall spending is too high only if the president s powers are limited overall spending is too high in a parliamentary system the authors model can be used as the basis of an argument for term limits copyright 1997 by american economic association

reforming an asymmetric union on the virtues of dual tier capital taxation the tax competition for mobile capital in particular the reluctance of small countries to agree on measures of tax coordination has ongoing political and economic fallouts within europe we analyse the effects of introducing a two tier structure of capital taxation where the asymmetric member states of a union choose a common federal tax rate in the first stage and then non cooperatively set local tax rates in the second stage we show that this mechanism effectively reduces competition for mobile capital between the members of the union moreover it distributes the gains across the heterogeneous states in a way that yields a strict pareto improvement over a one tier system of purely local tax choices we also discuss the effects of diverging capital endowments within the union and capital flows to third countries

state and local tax competition in a spatial model with sales taxes and residential property taxes abstract this paper presents a theoretical model with a uniformly populated line that is divided into local jurisdictions and or states if one level of government imposes sales and residential property taxes and if the spatial extent of each taxing jurisdiction is positive and finite then in nash equilibrium the sales tax rate is less than residential property tax rate housing consumption is suboptimal and the public good is underprovided in each jurisdiction if a very large state or country is divided into local jurisdictions and if both levels of government choose tax rates endogenously then under some assumptions there is an efficient outcome

the deductibility of provincial business taxes in a federation with vertical fiscal externalities should provincial business taxes be deductible under a federal profit tax we show that the optimal deductible which neutralizes the vertical fiscal externality between the federal and provincial government is the change in the federal tax base per dollar of tax revenue collected by the provincial government the optimal payroll tax deductibility rate depends on the extent to which it is shifted to workers and on the difference between the federal tax rates on profits and on labour income two apparently contradictory positions full deductibility of a payroll tax and non deductibility are special cases of our model la deductibilite des taxes provinciales imposees aux entreprises dans une federation ou il y a des externalites fiscales verticales est ce que les taxes provinciales imposees aux entreprises devraient etre deductibles de l impot federal sur les profits les auteurs montrent que l optimum de deductibilite qui neutralise les externalites fiscales verticales entre le federal et les provinces est le changement dans la base d imposition federale par dollar de revenu fiscal collecte par le gouvernement provincial le taux de deductibilite optimal d un impot sur les salaires depend de la portion du fardeau fiscal qui est deportee vers les travailleurs et de la difference entre les taux d imposition du federal sur les profits et sur le revenu du travail deux positions apparemment contradictoires pleine deductibilite d un impot sur les salaires et deductibilite nulle sont des cas speciaux du modele general

the nature and importance of economic competence this chapter takes on three tasks 1 to survey the study of economic competence as it appears in economic literature 2 to give a meaningful and operational definition of economic competence as one of the factors contributing to macroeconomic growth and 3 to suggest a methodology pursued in greater depth elsewhere to generalize and link economic competence as defined at the micro firm individual level to macroeconomic growth through simulation on the micro based macroeconomic model of the swedish economic system moses by introducing knowledge in the micro setting of firm organizational competence we arrive at a very different interpretation measured at the macro industry level from that of standard neoclassical theory

social accounting and the public sector this article contributes to the theory of social accounting as such it tries to extend earlier literature on the welfare equivalence of the comprehensive net national product in two main directions both of which refer to the public sector one is by considering welfare measurement problems associated with public good provision and redistributive policy respectively when the public revenues are raised by distortionary taxes the other is by addressing the consequences of a federation like decision structure where independent tax and expenditure decisions are made both by the central government and by lower level governments

vertical tax competition in brazil empirical evidence for icms and ipi in the period 1995 2009 abstract the main objective of this study is to quantify the impact caused by changes in federal tax on the tax policy of the brazilian states considering the presence of horizontal tax competition between states using panel data covering 26 brazilian states plus the federal district during the period 1995 2009 two models were estimated representing the average reaction of the states in response to changes in federal tax rates in the first model both levels of government act simultaneously whereas in the second model reaction is sequential with the federal government acting as the leader in defining its effective tax rates the results indicate a positive and significant response of states to increases in the federal tax rate resulting in an over taxation of the common tax base and higher tax rates additional tests show that the first model is the most suitable to represent the problem analysed

commodity tax competition between member states of a federation equilibrium and efficiency we first describe regional market equilibria whereupon consumers of each region allocate their purchases of private goods between domestic and nondomestic ones according to the structure of relative prices taxes and transportation costs next regional optimal tax levels and public good quantities are derived the tax of the other region being held constant fiscal competition arises from the ability of one region in choosing its tax to alter the tax base of the other

decentralization and fuel subsidies abstract this paper explores the role of decentralization in explaining variation in fuel subsidies across countries using panel data over the period 1998 2008 and for 108 countries it emerges that the effect of decentralization taken to be an increase in the number of government levels broadly decreases both diesel and gasoline subsidies with this effect being more pronounced when the level of political accountability is low for developing countries for which political accountability is low decentralization decreases gasoline and diesel subsidies by at least 6 98 and 12 99 respectively for developed countries for which political accountability is high decentralization does not have any impact on both gasoline and diesel what this evidence points to is that in developing economies where voters are poorly informed and accountability is low decentralization appears to be associated with lower fuel subsidies

vertical tax externalities and the composition of public spending in a federation abstract dividing tax power between different levels of government in a federation is shown to lead not only to overtaxation but also distorts the composition of state and federal public spending

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

on the desirability of input taxes abstract if it is not possible to tax all final goods and it is considered desirable to impose positive taxes on currently untaxed goods then it is desirable to tax inputs and intermediate goods at positive rates

how large are the welfare costs of tax competition abstract competition among regional governments may lead to suboptimal levels of capital taxation as governments ignore the external benefits of capital flight to other regions however there have been few attempts to quantify the magnitude of the resulting efficiency losses this paper presents extensive calculations of the efficiency costs over a wide range of parameter scenarios and assumptions about government behavior using various generalizations of wildasin journal of urban economics 25 1989 193 213 the efficiency costs tend to be fairly moderate under most though not all scenarios and particularly when allowance is made for the possibility of leviathan and non competitive government behavior

greenfield vs acquisition the strategy of japanese investors in the united states multinational firms can enter a foreign market by taking over existing local firms acquisitions or by setting up new ventures greenfield investments surprisingly there has been limited empirical work on this topic this paper examines the determinants of this choice by looking at japanese entries into the united states by focusing on firms of one country entering a single market we are able to separate the impact of a firm s strategy from that of the characteristics of the target industry or country this paper tests simultaneously a number of competing hypotheses the results suggest that acquisitions are used by japanese investors with weak competitive advantages while investors with strong advantages find that greenfield investments are a more efficient way to transfer these advantages to the u s acquisitions are also chosen to enter industries with either very high or very low growth rates when entry is at a scale that is large relative to the parent and when entry is into a different industry the japanese investor s previous experience of the u s market its financial situation and its status as a follower in an oligopolistic industry have no statistically significant impact on the entry mode neither do u s stock market conditions

fiscal federalism revisited abstract we analyze how constitutional restrictions on tax bases within a federation affect the nature of pareto improving directions of tax reform and the design of optimal federal taxes we show that constraints on federal taxation entail production inefficiency at the optimum except under very restrictive circumstances in passing we show that using consumer prices as control variables a standard procedure in tax reform analysis rather than the taxes themselves leads to incorrect conclusions when not all taxes or prices can be controlled journal of economic literature classification numbers d61 h21 h70

misaligned incentives and the scale of incarceration in the united states abstract the incarceration rate has increased substantially in the united states between the 1980s and the 2000s in this paper i explore an institutional explanation for this growth the fact that costs of incarceration are not fully internalized typically prison is paid for at the state level but county employees such as judges prosecutors or probation officers determine time spent in custody i exploit a natural experiment that shifted the cost burden of juvenile incarceration from state to counties keeping overall costs and responsibilities unchanged this resulted in a stark drop in incarceration and no increase in arrests suggesting an over use of prison when costs are not internalized the large magnitude of the change suggests that misaligned incentives in criminal justice may be a significant contributor to the current levels of incarceration in the united states

ad valorem taxes and the fiscal gap in federations abstract this paper shows that the federal government can always achieve the second best optimum of public good provision but a precise evaluation of the fiscal gap requires an explicit consideration of the underlying fundamentals of the federal economy

transaction cost economics in real time this paper attempts to place the theq of the boundaries of thejirm within the context of the passage of time more precisely it resurrects and places in a modem frame some of the insights of the chsical and marshallian theories of organization the modem reinterpretation of those theories centers around the capabilities view of the jirm taken together with governance costs the capabilities ofjirm and market determine the boundaries of the jirm in the short run ovw time capabilities change as firms and markets learn which implies a kind of information or knowledge cost the cost of trandewing the firm s capability to the market w vice versa these dynamic governance costs are the costs of persuading negotiating and coordinating with and teaching others they arise in the face of change notably txchnological and organizational innovation in fit they are the costs of not having the capabilities you need when you need them dynamic transaction costs provide an explanation for vertical integration that is arguably more general than those dominant in the literature in the face of uncertainty and divwgent views ofthe future common ownership of multiple stages of production is a supwior institutional arrangement for coordinating systemic change asset specrfity is neither necessary nor suffient for this to be true dynamic governance costs may also affit internal organization it may sometimes be costly in 3 terms of persuasion negotiation and teaching to create within the firm capabilities readily available on the market indeed in cases in which systemic coordination is not 4 the issue the market may turn out to be the superior institution of coordination in e 2 genwal the capabilities view of the jirm suggests that we look atfim2 and market as alternative and sometimes overlapping institutions of learning 1 transaction costs in the long rzln and the short 9 x classical and neoclassical perspectives

an optimal taxation approach to fiscal federalism in a federal system of government each unit of government decides independently how much of each type of public good to provide and what types of taxes and which tax rates to use in funding the public goods in this paper we explore what types of problems can arise from this decentralized form of decision making in particular we describe systematically the types of externalities that one unit of government can create for nonresidents through both its public goods decisions and its taxation decisions the paper also explores briefly what the central government might do to lessen the costs of decentralized decision making

vertical externalities in tax setting evidence from gasoline and cigarettes abstract a common feature of federal systems is that tax bases are joint property consequently state and federal tax setting decisions are interdependent our aim here is to put forward a rudimentary theoretical analysis of this phenomenon and to use the theory as a framework for econometrically estimating the magnitude of the responses we find that when the federal government increases taxes there is a significant positive response of state taxes for example a 10 cent per gallon increase in the federal tax rate on gasoline leads to a 3 2 cent increase in the state tax rate

tax decentralization and local government size this paper investigates the relationship between fiscal federalism and the sizes of local governments while many empirical studies emphasized that grants encourage the growth of local public spending and local taxes constrain it they are more silent regarding the effects of different types of tax autonomy the paper addresses this issue by arguing that tax decentralization as organized on tax bases used only by local governments tax separation rather than on tax base sharing would restrain local public expenditures using an unbalanced panel of oecd countries the key finding is that only property taxes mostly based on a tax separation scheme seem to favor smaller local governments thus while tax decentralization is a necessary condition for limiting the growth of local governments it does not appear sufficient as tax separation schemes among government levels would in fact be required

pareto efficient international taxation this paper analyzes pareto efficient international tax regimes because every country faces its own national budget constraint the diamond mirrlees production efficiency theorem which underlies key tenets of policy advice in international taxation the desirability of destination basis for commodity taxation of the residence principle for capital income taxation and of free trade does not apply the paper establishes conditions relating to the availability of explicit or implicit devices for reallocating tax revenues across countries under which production efficiency is nevertheless desirable and characterizes the precise ways in which pareto efficient international taxation may require violation of established tenets

cart before the horse the saving growth nexus in mexico abstract using recent developments in econometric techniques we show that the conventionally accepted view that higher saving rate causes higher economic growth does not hold for mexico in fact the causality goes in the opposite direction

overlapping soft budget constraints abstract our paper identifies a potential problem with decentralization at a time when its virtues are widely extolled we show that responsibility for equalization at multi levels within a decentralized federation creates an overlapping equalization policy that can worsen fiscal discipline contrary to qian and roland 1998 we also show in our set up that fiscal competition among regional rescuers does not act as a commitment device to harden the local budget constraint

public good provision and the comparative statics of optimal nonlinear income taxation comparative static properties of the solution to an optimal nonlinear income tax problem are provided for a model in which the government both designs an income tax schedule for redistributive purposes and provides a public good optimally there are two types of individuals distinguished by their skill levels who have the same quasilinear preferences for labor supply and the consumption of a private and a public good comparative statics are obtained for the weights in a weighted utilitarian social welfare function the prices of the two goods a taste parameter that measures the onerousness of working and the skill levels