taxation of financial services under a vat in simple economic models it is relatively easy to describe how to impose a value added tax at a uniform rate on all consumption goods and to demonstrate that this tax is equivalent to a proportional labor income tax plus a tax on existing assets the equivalence involves little more than the national income identity relating the sources and uses of income once one attempts to incorporate the costs of financial intermediation however tax analysis becomes more complicated in attempting to determine how a vat should treat financial transactions various authors have attempted to apply results from simpler models unfortunately these results can lead to conflicting ambiguous and misleading prescriptions in this paper we argue that one needs to rely more on the fundamental objectives of a vat to decide how it should treat financial transactions adopting this approach we find that in principle the vat should apply to resources devoted to financial transactions in the same manner that it does in other sectors however as discussed below there are real problems in implementing such a tax on the financial sector which we do not attempt to address in this paper

planning under incomplete information and the ratchet effect abstract central planning of production is usually performed under asymmetric information the firm in general has more information about its productive possibilities than the central planner from now on for short cp this justifies the use of incentives schemes in which the cp does not directly fix activity levels casual observation of such existing schemes suggests that the time dimensions is crucial for their working typically the cp revises the incentive scheme over time to take into account the information provided by the firm s performance managers of centrally planned economies as well as economists have long recognized that this revision induces firms to underproduce in order to avoid demanding schemes in the future this is the ratchet effect it is purpose of the present paper to study the ratchet effect under the non commitment assumption which we believe to be more realistic the inadequacy of conceptual tools made if difficult in the past to consider such an assumption now basic research on dynamic games with incomplete information recently resulted in new ideas which look particularly relevant for a theoretical analysis of the problem

do we now collect any revenue from taxing capital income the wide variation in effective tax rates on income from different types of capital received by different investors creates numerous tax arbitrage opportunities that result in a loss in both government revenue and economic efficiency the objective of this chapter is to estimate the revenue and distributional effects of tax arbitrage using tax data from 1983 by examining the effects of two tax changes that would each substantially reduce the opportunities for tax arbitrage our principal conclusions are as follows 1 taxing real rather than nominal interest income would have raised government revenue in 1983 by 25 5 billion 2 this increase in revenue would occur mainly at the expense of those in the highest tax brackets 3 taxing the cash flow from real capital and exempting from tax any income from financial assets would have raised government revenue by 17 4 billion since this tax change eliminates all distortions to savings and investment decisions our revenue forecast suggests that the tax l

dual income taxation a promising path to tax reform for developing countries summary the dual income tax combines a progressive tax on labor income and a lower flat tax on income from capital unlike flat tax systems a dual income tax provides developing countries greater flexibility in addressing tax competition while retaining progressivity countries could use the move to a dual income tax system not just as an opportunity to rationalize the taxation of income from business operations and investment but also as a vehicle for broader reform of their tax systems

comparative statics of the optimal dynamic incentive contract abstract each period a firm must carry out an indivisible project the cost of which depends on the firm s constant efficiency and its variable level of effort only the cost is observed by the regulator who has to choose the incentive scheme the optimal dynamic mechanism is derived under possible commitment of the regulator over time then under non commitment it is shown that there are four types of continuation equilibria also the profile of effort levels is compared to the commitment case finally some numerical comparative statics is performed and it is shown that all types of equilibria can be optimal

sticky information and sticky prices abstract in the u s and europe prices change at least once a year yet nominal macro shocks seem to have real effects lasting well beyond a year sticky information models as posited by mankiw and reis 2002 sticky information versus sticky prices a proposal to replace the new keynesian phillips curve quarterly journal of economics 117 1295 1328 sims 2003 implications of rational inattention journal of monetary economics 50 3 665 690 and woodford 2003 princeton university press princeton nj can reconcile micro flexibility with macro rigidity we simulate a sticky information model in which price setters update information on macro shocks less frequently than information on micro shocks we then examine price changes in the micro data underlying the u s cpi empirical price changes react to old information just as sticky information models predict

is inflation sticky abstract new keynesian sticky price models predict that monetary policy can affect real variables however they also predict that inflation can be reduced without depressing output or employment in fact bringing down inflation is costly presenting a challenge to the new keynesian model two departures from the new keynesian model predict costly disinflation one assumes sticky inflation rather than sticky prices while the other assumes less than perfectly rational expectations taking into account information from surveys of inflation expectations i find the evidence suggests that inflation is not sticky and that inflation expectations are less than perfectly rational

expectations heterogeneous forecast errors and consumption micro evidence from the michigan consumer sentiment surveys the household data underlying the michigan index of consumer sentiment are used to test the rationality of consumer expectations and their usefulness in forecasting expenditure the results can be interpreted as characterizing the shocks that hit different types of households over time expectations are found to be biased and inefficient at least ex post people underestimated the disinflation of the early 1980s and the severity of recent business cycles people s forecast errors are also systematically correlated with their demographic characteristics in part because of time varying group level shocks further sentiment helps forecast consumption growth some of this rejection of the permanent income hypothesis is due to the systematic demographic components in forecast errors

procurement and renegotiation parties bound by an incomplete contract have an incentive to renegotiate after acquiring new information the issue of the parties investment in the relationship before renegotiation is analyzed in a simple two period procurement model the firm invests in the first period it then learns its production cost and the sponsor learns its value for the project williamson s underinvestment presumption is shown to hold under very general assumptions about bargaining and about the ex post asymmetry of information as long as the firm s investment is not observable by the sponsor the introduction of a cancellation fee may well lead to even less investment contrary to what is sometimes argued the role of ex ante price fixing as an alternative way to reintroduce some form of commitment and the problem of cost overruns are discussed last it is shown that if investment is observable by the sponsor andthus may become a joint decision variable the two parties may choose to under or overinvest

efficiency improving investment and the ratchet effect abstract in a long term relationship between a regulator and a firm the production technology may change due to investment this paper investigates how the introduction of such an investment possibility influences the dynamic regulation problem when long term commitments are infeasible contractible investment is shown to reduce the ratchet effect by increasing separation in the first period due to the separation effect of investment the first period optimal scheme converges toward the optimal scheme with commitment as investment increases finally assuming noncontractible investment the paper analyzes the relationship between separation and the degree of under investment

the dynamics of incentive contracts the paper studies a simple two period principal agent model in which the principal updates the incentive scheme after observing the agent s first period performance the agent has superior information about his ability the principal offers a first period incentive scheme and observes some measure of the agent s first period performance cost or profit which depends on the agent s ability and unobservable first period effort the relationship is entirely run by short term contracts in the second period the principal updates the incentive scheme and the agent is free to accept the new incentive scheme or to quit the strategies are required to be perfect and updating of the principal s beliefs about the agent s ability follows bayes rule the central theme of the paper is that the ratchet effect leads to much pooling in the first period first for any first period incentive scheme there exists no separating equilibrium second when the uncertainty about the agent s ability is small the optimal scheme must involve a large amount of pooling the paper also gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partition equilibria and looks at the effect of cost uncertainty

the importance of asymmetric tax policy and dangers of aggregation existing tax policies have many complex features that make distinctions across goods factors and financial structures that distort economic allocations their importance is ignored when tax policy is summarized by an effective tax rate in fact the losses due to asymmetries are often larger than the losses due to the level of taxation

public information and inflation expectations microeconometric evidence from a natural experiment abstract governments provide public information to reduce information imperfections do households rely on public signals to inform themselves about market conditions to identify the importance of public information in households price expectations we take advantage of a unique natural experiment in ecuador where the published inflation rate had been different from the correct rate over a period of fourteen months due to a software error we find that the public signal about prices plays an important role in households price expectations and the change in price expectations affects their savings choices the effect is stronger for better educated and older people

regulation with wage bargaining in many regulated industries labour unions are strong and there is clear empirical evidence of labour rent sharing in this paper we study optimal regulation in a model in which wages are determined endogenously by wage bargaining at the firm level a seemingly robust conclusion at least when worker bargaining power is considerable is that incentives for cost efficiency should be stronger than in the standard case in which wages do not depend on the regulatory regime

macroeconomic expectations of households and professional forecasters economists have long emphasized the importance of expectations in determining macroeconomic outcomes yet there has been almost no recent effort to model actual empirical expectations data instead m acroeconomists usually simply assume that expectations are rational this paper shows that while empirical household expectations are not rational in the usual sense expectational dynamics are well captured by a model in which households views derive from news reports of the views of professional forecasters which in turn may be rational the model s estimates imply that people only occasionally pay attention to news reports this inattention generates stickyness in aggregate expectations with important macroeconomic consequences

optimal taxation in a growth model with public consumption and home production in a neoclassical growth model with public consumption we show the following pareto optimal tax rules the government should tax leisure and private consumption at the same rate and subsidize net investment at the same rate it taxes net capital income also it should tax capital income more heavily than labor income in an extension for home production the additional rule is to tax investment for home production at the same rate of the tax on private market consumption these tax and subsidy rates should be constant over time except the initial tax rate on capital income

efficient use of information and social value of information this paper analyzes equilibrium and welfare for a tractable class of economies games that have externalities strategic complementarity or substitutability and heterogeneous information first we characterize the equilibrium use of information complementarity heightens the sensitivity of equilibrium actions to public information raising aggregate volatility whereas substitutability heightens the sensitivity to private information raising cross sectional dispersion next we define and characterize an efficiency benchmark designed to address whether the equilibrium use of information is optimal from a social perspective the efficient use of information reflects the social value of aligning choices across agents finally we examine the comparative statics of equilibrium welfare with respect to the information structure the social value of information is best understood by classifying economies according to the inefficiency if any in the equilibrium use of information we conclude with a few applications including production externalities beauty contests business cycles and large cournot and bertrand games

limited attention as a scarce resource in information rich economies this article uses basic facts from the psychology of attention to show how the limited attention of consumers affects economic competition the article determines endogenously whether an economy is information rich or information poor a conventional economic equilibrium results if subjects have spare attention capacity at the positive level the respective impacts of advances in information technology international integration and the media on equilibrium diversity and level of attention seeking activities are shown at the normative level the issues of welfare efficiency and optimal policy interventions are addressed

the political economy of high income taxation capital taxation path dependence and political institutions in denmark denmark s income tax burden as the percentage of gdp is larger than the total tax burden of the united states and it has increased further after 1980 how can this be explained given increasing tax competition and widespread views that strong reliance on regressive taxes was conducive to building and maintaining large tax and welfare states the article highlights three factors first large income taxes are feasible if the capital tax burden is moderated within the income tax second the effective capital income tax burden that had developed up to the early 1980s was extremely low so that subsequent tax reforms could cut marginal tax rates on mobile types of capital income while increasing tax revenue third drastic changes in the legal structure of the income tax and stability in aggregate tax policy outcomes were facilitated by proportional representation and legislative majority rule

are perceptions of inflation rational some evidence for sweden this survey paper argues that walrasian markets and monetary exchan ge are alternative not complementary arrangements for coordinating economic activity that if one realizes this many informational anomalies and price rigidities that appear irrational in a walrasia n context can be understood as the outcome of maximizing behavior in a monetary economy and that the precautionary approach to modelin g the demand for money takes on a particular importance in this way of looking at things empirical evidence on the demand for money is cite d in support of this point of view which tends to reinstate the quantity of money as an important economic variable in contrast to the new classical vision of the economy whi ch downgrades money s importance this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

sticky information and model uncertainty in survey data on inflation expectations abstract this paper compares three reduced form models of heterogeneity in survey inflation expectations on the one hand we specify two models of forecasting inflation based on limited information flows of the type developed in mankiw and reis 2002 sticky information versus sticky prices a proposal to replace the new keynesian phillips curve quarterly journal of economics 117 4 1295 1328 we present maximum likelihood results that suggests a sticky information model with a time varying distribution structure is consistent with the michigan survey of inflation expectations we also compare these sticky information models to the endogenous model uncertainty approach in branch 2004 the theory of rationally heterogeneous expectations evidence from survey data on inflation expectations economic journal 114 497 non parametric evidence suggests that models which allow the degree of heterogeneity to change over time provide a better fit of the data

robustness of the estimates of the hybrid new keynesian phillips curve abstract gali and gertler 1999 inflation dynamics a structural econometric approach journal of monetary eonomics 44 2 195 222 developed a hybrid variant of the new keynesian phillips curve that relates inflation to real marginal cost expected future inflation and lagged inflation gmm estimates of the model suggest that forward looking behavior is dominant the coefficient on expected future inflation substantially exceeds the coefficient on lagged inflation while the latter differs significantly from zero it is quantitatively modest several authors have suggested that our results are the product of specification bias or suspect estimation methods here we show that these claims are incorrect and that our results are robust to a variety of estimation procedures including gmm estimation of the closed form and nonlinear instrumental variables also as we discuss many others have obtained very similar results to ours using a systems approach including fiml techniques hence the conclusions of gg and others regarding the importance of forward looking behavior remain robust

implications of rational inattention abstract a constraint that actions can depend on observations only through a communication channel with finite shannon capacity is shown to be able to play a role very similar to that of a signal extraction problem or an adjustment cost in standard control problems the resulting theory looks enough like familiar dynamic rational expectations theories to suggest that it might be useful and practical while the implications for policy are different enough to be interesting

the strategic use of innovation to influence regulatory standards this paper investigates the welfare consequences of strategic behavior by firms to affect the amount of environmental regulation they face environmental regulation often attempts to force an industry to develop cleaner technology but the regulator may have no means to commit to a specific standard this lack of regulatory commitment induces firms to choose innovation strategically it is well known that firms have incentives to suppress innovation to induce the regulator to ratchet down the standard and this strategic behavior lowers welfare this paper explores a countervailing incentive in oligopoly settings firms have heightened incentives to innovate so as to increase regulation and raise rivals costs in equilibrium the incentive to raise rivals cost can mitigate the welfare loss arising from no regulatory commitment also a regulator who is unable to commit ex ante to the stringency of a regulatory standard can induce more clean technology than a regulator with a commitment mechanism