jurisdiction size political participation and the allocation of resources this paper analyzes the effect of population size on politicalparticipation and allocative efficiency increasing populationis generally found to reduce political participation however since participation is not evenly spread throughout thepopulation this will have consequences for allocation namely we argue that increasing population size shifts powerto the rich we discuss the consequences for the optimal sizeof jurisdictions the size of government and the measurementof publicness

corporate conservatism and relative compensation this paper demonstrates that in a simple setting with managerial concern for reputation and asymmetric information on ability most managers may refrain from undertaking innovations that stochastically dominate an industry standard common components of uncertainty lead to market inferences of managerial ability based on relative performance managers who undertake the industry standard are consequently evaluated with a more accurate benchmark than those innovating discontinuities in compensation when performance is low because of firings lead managers to have differing valuations of an accurate benchmark depending on type in particular very high and very low ability managers are more likely to undertake superior innovations than those of average ability

replicating ricardian equivalence tests with simulated series this paper replicates standard consumption function tests of ricardian equivalence using series generated from a model which nests ricardian equivalence within a non ricardian alternative due to finite horizons and or distortionary taxation the author shows that the estimates of the effects of taxation on consumption are not robust and that standard tests may have weaknesses which can lead to conflicting results whether ricardian equivalence holds or not the simulations also show that no clear conclusions about ricardian equivalence can be drawn from observing a low correlation between the current account and government budget deficits copyright 1997 by american economic association

the spread of the multidivisional form among large firms 1919 1979 the multidivisional form is the favored form of organization for the large firms that dominate the american economy this study takes up the causes of the dissemination of that form among large firms from 1919 to 1979 five theories are initially proposed as possible explanations for the changes observed and these theories are operationalized and tested the model that seems most consistent with the data emphasizes the ability of key actors to alter structure under three circumstances when the firm has a product related or unrelated strategy which is consistent with chandler s 1962 theorizing when the corporate presidents have a background in sales or finance and when other firms in the industry alter their structures the implications of these results for theories of organizational change are discussed with special reference to the importance of conceiving how actors operate with varying rationalities in this process

viewpoint decision making in committees this article reviews recent developments in the theory of committee decision making a committee consists of self interested members who make a public decision by aggregating imperfect information dispersed among them according to a pre specified decision rule we focus on costly information acquisition strategic information aggregation and rules and processes that enhance the quality of the committee decision seeming inefficiencies of the committee decision making process such as over cautiousness voting and delay emerge as partial remedies to these incentive problems cet article passe en revue certains developpements recents dans la theorie de la prise de decision en comite un comite est defini comme un groupe de membres qui ont des interets particuliers et qui prennent une decision publique en agregeant une information imparfaite et dispersee a travers le groupe selon une regle de decision pre etablie les auteurs portent leur attention sur l acquisition couteuse d information l agregation de l information strategique et les regles et procedures qui accroissent la qualite de la decision en comite ce qui apparait comme des inefficacites du processus de prise de decision en comite sur precaution votes delais s avere etre des remedes partiels aux problemes d incitation

presidential coattails versus the median voter senator selection in us elections abstract we show that senators elected in presidential elections are more ideologically extreme than senators elected in midterm elections this finding is in contrast to the literature suggesting that voters in presidential elections are more ideologically moderate than voters in midterm elections to explain this incongruence we propose a theory of spillover effects in which party labels enable voters to update their beliefs about candidates across contemporaneous races for office unexpected support for a candidate in one race carries marginal candidates from the same party in other races our theory implies that presidential coattails may skew representative government away from the median voter ideal

note performance evaluation of state owned enterprises a process perspective state owned enterprises soes have become important instruments of social and economic policy in industrialized mixed economies and in developing countries the use of soes as instruments of public policy and the resulting clashes between these enterprises and private firms on the one hand and government and other controllers on the other are causing concern public committees in different countries as well as international organizations have been searching for positive theory for guidance in handling the multitude of problems related to these enterprises theoretical models have made important contributions to the formalization of certain problems and the classification of the information needed to solve them unfortunately these theoretical models have had little relevance for the solution of important real problems much of the research on soes is concerned with how these enterprises should behave and what should be the product of their operations almost no research has been done on why soes function as they do the paucity of knowledge about the operation of soes stems both from insufficient research effort and from the concern of researchers with formal structures and products of these organizations and not with management behavior or with decision processes the purpose of this paper is to call for research beyond the confines of traditional economics using the tools of management science to obtain insights into the difficult but salient problems of soes

failures in regulator led deinstitutionalization of questionable business practices prior works in institutional theory are characterized by an assumption that the legal basis for authority of regulatory agencies is sufficient to ensure compliance by business organizations from a business ethics standpoint this would imply that regulatory oversight can hinder organizations pursuit of questionable business practices however the evidence for regulatory efficacy is far from clear as questionable business practices tend to persist despite regulatory monitoring drawing on the case of the regulatory failure to trigger a shift away from aggressive banking practices in ireland which had serious social and economic costs we highlight three barriers to deinstitutionalization 1 insufficient advocacy for change coupled with an inability to problematize the risks of extant business practices 2 unwillingness to impose change through the use of threats power or sanctions and 3 contradictions in the institutional environment that can obfuscate the regulators message thus our study proposes that regulator led change might not be as straightforward as previously theorized in doing so it advances prior theory through an explicit focus on the importance of three types of institutional work that are necessary for regulator led deinstitutionalization

sustainable competitive advantage combining institutional and resource based views this article suggests that the context and process of resource selection have an important influence on firm heterogeneity and sustainable competitive advantage it is argued that a firm s sustainable advantage depends on its ability to manage the institutional context of its resource decisions a firm s institutional context includes its internal culture as well as broader influences from the state society and interfirm relations that define socially acceptable economic behavior a process model of firm heterogeneity is proposed that combines the insights of a resource based view with the institutional perspective from organization theory normative rationality institutional isolating mechanisms and institutional sources of firm homogeneity are proposed as determinants of rent potential that complement and extend resource based explanations of firm variation and sustainable competitive advantage the article suggests that both resource capital and institutional capital are indispensable to sustainable competitive advantage 1997 john wiley sons ltd

social capital for hire mobility of technical professionals and firm influence in wireless standards committees the movement of personnel between firms has been shown to have important implications for firms yet there has been little direct investigation of the underlying mechanisms we propose that in addition to their human capital mobile individuals carry social capital affecting the outcomes of the firms they join and leave by altering the patterns of interaction between firms in this study we examine how job mobility affects firm influence in a technical standards setting committee for u s wireless telecommunications we hypothesize and find that hiring individuals who are richer in social capital increases firm influence in technical standards setting committees by increasing the hiring firm s social capital we also find the benefits of hiring social capital are attenuated when an interfirm relationship is maintained by multiple individuals in contrast we find that the loss of personnel does not affect a firm s social capital or influence over standards directly but that it does have an effect on firm social capital and influence contingent on changes in the firm s business strategy in advancing these arguments we address the broader question of individuals as carriers of social capital and the conditions under which interpersonal connections are appropriable by firms

a theory of participatory democracy based on the real case of porto alegre participatory democracy is a process of collective decision making that combines elements from both direct and representative democracy citizens have the power to decide on policy proposals and politicians assume the role of policy implementation the aim of this paper is to understand how participatory democracy operates and to study its implications over the behavior of citizens and politicians and over the final policy outcomes to this end we explore a formal model inspired by the experience of participatory budgeting implemented in the brazilian city of porto alegre that builds on the model of meetings with costly participation by osborne et al 2000 meetings with costly participation american economic review 90 927 943

meetings with costly participation comment in a recent paper osborne rosenthal and turner 2000 investigate a model of meetings with costly participation their main result is that the equilibrium number of participants is small and their positions are extreme in particular when the policy space is one dimensional and the policy outcome is the median of participants positions they conclude that the number of attendees is even the proof is flawed we construct an example with an odd number of attendees oddness of the number of participants has a dramatic consequence on how equilibria look like this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

democracy undone systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets we study the competitive equilibrium of a market for votes where the choice is binary and it is known that a majority of the voters supports one of the two alternatives voters can trade votes for a numeraire before making a decision via majority rule we identify a sufficient condition guaranteeing the existence of an ex ante equilibrium in equilibrium only the most intense voter on each side demands votes and each demands enough votes to alone control a majority the equilibrium strongly resembles an all pay auction for decision power it makes clear that votes are only a medium for the allocation of power the probability of a minority victory is always higher than efficient and converges rapidly to one half as the electorate increases for any minority size the numerical advantage of the majority becomes irrelevant democracy is undone by the market

policy as myth and ceremony the global spread of stock exchanges 1980 2005 we examine the antecedents and consequences in developing countries of creating a national stock exchange a core technology of financial globalization we study local conditions and global institutional pressures in the rapid spread of exchanges since the 1980s and examine how conditions at the point of adoption affected exchanges subsequent vibrancy little prior research connects the process of diffusion with the operational performance of adopted policies we find that international coercion was associated with more ceremonial adoption but that contrary to expectations common in institutional research contagion processes via peer groups and normative emulation of prestigious actors enhanced vibrancy economic globalization provides a generative context in which to consider the policy implications of organizational theory and research globalization creates both opportunities and challenges for countries on the periphery of the world economy the central question for policy makers is what structures and institutions they should adopt to promote economic and social vibrancy notably waves of alternative theories and associated packages of reforms have swept over the globe in recent decades observing this process of global diffusion and often abandonment of policies and practices meyer boli thomas and raminrez 1997 extended analyses of myth and ceremony at the organization level to the nation state in their world society approach a core idea in this work is that coercion and mimicry of peers or competitors typically based in a substrate of network ties often

when costly voting is beneficial abstract we present a costly voting model in which each voter has a private valuation for their preferred outcome of a vote when there is a zero cost to voting all voters vote and hence all values are counted equally regardless of how high they may be by having a cost to voting only those with high enough values would choose to incur this cost we show that by adding this cost welfare may be enhanced even when the cost of voting is wasteful such an effect occurs when there is both a large enough density of voters with low values and the expected value of voters is high enough

participation quorums in costly meetings meetings of shareholders societies and clubs often require a minimal participation quorum in the absence of a quorum no valid decisions can be made thus decisions are postponed to a later meeting this paper examines the effect of such quorum constraints on both individual behavior and collective outcomes in a model of costly meetings we show that when a binding quorum constraint delivers an immediate decision it also induces a welfare loss with respect to the outcome that prevails when no quorum applies potentially including policy distortions when the quorum requirement is high and causes the decision to be postponed the number of participants in the second meeting may decrease with respect to the zero quorum rule

density dependence in the evolution of populations of newspaper organizations a model of density dependence is proposed to explain regularities in the growth and decline of organizational populations density the number of organizations is assumed to be a function of the social processes of legitimation and competition at low density the model predicts that the legitimation process will dominate and will lead to high organizational founding rates and low organizational mortality rates at high levels of density competition will dominate and consequently founding rates will decline and mortality rates will rise the model is tested with hazard function models using data from nine newspaper populations spanning the 19th and 20th centuries and covering over 5200 newspapers analysis offounding rates provides strong empirical support for the model analysis of mortality rates reveals that the model holds for large populations

testing for the lucas critique a quantitative investigation this thesis contains four essays which studies the macroeconomic effects of fiscal and monetary policy quantitatively the first essay investigates whether swedish postwar business cycles have been generated by domestic or foreign shocks and finds that they are about equally important in the second essay the effects of government budget deficits on interest rates in sweden are studied in a small open economy framework the empirical results which have high power due to very large swings in deficits and interest rates provide support that larger deficits produce higher interest rates and thus give support against the ricardian view the third essay seeks to identify optimal social insurance and redistribution levels in sweden and the u s with respect to temporary and permanent idiosyncratic productivity risks the results indicate that sweden should reduce the social security level while the u s should approximately maintain the current level in the last essay the small sample properties of a well known statistical test for the lucas critique the super exogeneity test is studied in a general equilibrium environment the results indicate that the super exogeneity test do not have sufficient power in small samples

signaling sustainability leadership empirical evidence of the value of djsi membership we explore the relationship between corporate sustainability reputation and firm value by asking whether signaling sustainability leadership through membership on a recognized sustainability index is value generating increasingly stakeholders are demanding that firms demonstrate their commitment to sustainability one signal that companies can send to stakeholders to indicate that they are sustainability leaders is membership on a recognized best in class sustainability index this article explores both the short term and the intermediary impact on north american firms of being included or removed from the dow jones sustainability world index djsi our results provide evidence that being added to the djsi results in a sustained increase in a firm s share price suggesting that the benefits of being included on the djsi outweigh the costs associated with applying this article also notes a temporary decrease in the value of firms for the first 10 days after their removal from the djsi however this effect is eliminated within the next ten trading days

public protests and policy making technological advances and the development of social media have made petitions public protests and other form of spontaneous activism increasingly common tools for individuals to influence decision makers to study these phenomena in this article i present a theory of petitions and public protests that explores their limits as mechanisms to aggregate information the key assumption is that valuable information is dispersed among citizens through petitions and protests citizens can signal their private information to the policy maker who can then choose to use it or not i first show that if citizens individual signals are not sufficiently precise information aggregation is impossible no matter how large is the population of informed citizens even if the conflict with the policy maker is small i then characterize the conditions on conflict and the signal structure that guarantee information aggregation when these conditions are satisfied i show that full information aggregation is possible as the population grows to infinity when they are not satisfied i show that information aggregation may still be possible if social media are available

public information and electoral bias abstract we present a theory of voting that predicts that elections are more likely to be close and voter turnout is more likely to be high when citizens possess better public information about the composition of the electorate these findings suggest that providing more information to potential voters about aggregate political preferences e g through pre election polls or expert forecasts may undermine the democratic process our analysis reveals that if the distribution of political preferences is common knowledge then the unique type symmetric equilibrium leads to a stark neutrality result in which each alternative is equally likely to win the election by contrast when citizens are ignorant about the preference distribution the majority is more likely to win the election and expected voter turnout is lower welfare is therefore unambiguously higher when citizens possess less information about the preference distribution

reshaping institutions evidence on aid impacts using a pre analysis plan this brief summarizes the results of a gender impact evaluation study entitled reshaping institutions evidence on aid impacts using a pre analysis plan conducted between 2005 and 2009 in sierra leone the study observed the impact of pre analysis plan pap on local institutions by imposing participation requirements for marginalized groups including women and test for learning by doing effects in sierra leone on the individual and village level requiring women and young adults to take on leadership positions participate in project meetings and sign off on project finances does not have any persistent effect on their participation in local decision making or attitudes regarding leadership ability the project successfully established village organizations and tools to manage the project the distributions of the project s benefits were equitable and leakage was minimal there was a significant positive impact on the stock and quality of local public infrastructure however there are no detectible changes in the ability to raise funds for local public goods decision making process or social norms and attitudes funding for the study derived from the gobifo project the institutional reform and capacity building project ircbp the world bank development impact evaluation dime the horace w goldsmith foundation the international growth center 3ie and the national bureau of economic research nber african successes project

government debt government spending and private sector behavior a current period tax reduction financed by issuing government debt shifts the timing of tax collection from the current period to the future if the future taxes implied by government debt are not fully perceived and discounted by the private sector there will be a net wealth effect that increases private sector consumption thus reducing capital accumulation and growth if on the other hand the implied future taxes are perceived and discounted by the private sector the current period tax reduction will be used to increase private saving to pay for the future taxes and government debt will be absorbed without any real effects on the economy the effects of government spending financed by current period taxation also depend upon private sector perceptions 2 if the benefits of government spending are ignored private sector consumption will decrease in accordance with the reduction in permanent disposable income to the extent that government spending is on consumption type goods that are perceived as substitutes for privately provided consumption goods there will be a relatively greater reduction in private sector consumption to the extent that government spending is on investment type goods yielding future goods and services that are perceived as substitutes for future privately provided consumption goods there will be a relatively smaller reduction in private sector consumption the standard approach to modeling private sector consumption saving behavior involves a rather asymmetric set of assumptions as to how the private sector perceives the various elements of government fiscal policy 3 current period taxes are assumed to be fully perceived but current period government spending is implicitly assumed to be completely ignored by the private sector in considering permanent personal disposable income the private sector is assumed to be forward looking in its assessment of income and taxation the stock of government debt is nevertheless included as part of the stock of private wealth the implicit assumption associate professor of economics graduate school of business university of chicago 1101 east 58th street chicago il 60637 i thank eugene fama levis kochin michael mussa paul evans and an anonymous referee for helpful comments i am particularly grateful to daniel benjamin for contributing many hours of discussion and laura lahaye who was a research assistant and valuable adviser on earlier drafts the theoretical debate on the burden of the debt has been long standing gerald o driscoll 1977 documents ricardo s nineteenth century position robert barro 1974 reopened the debate by introducing the fundamental issue of intergenerational transfers also discussed in merton miller and charles upton 1974 the empirical side of the debate was initiated by levis kochin s 1974 attempt to test for the effects of deficits on consumption and by martin feldstein s 1974 attempt to test for the effects of social security wealth on consumption other empirical contributions include jess yawitz and laurence meyer 1976 myself 1978 and j earnest tanner 1978 1979 with respect to the effects of government deficits and debt and barro 1978 michael darby 1979 and dean leimer and selig lesnoy 1982 with respect to social security wealth see also interesting recent papers by john seater 1982 who generates detailed tests of the effects of deficits and debt on consumption charles plosser 1982 who explores the effects of government spending and debt shocks on interest rates and feldstein 1982 who attempts tests similar to some in this paper see fn 29 2martin bailey s 1962 1971 development of the effects of government spending on private consumption and aggregate economic activity is the seminal contribution paul david and john scadding 1974 extend bailey s ideas and provide some supporting empirical evidence more recently willem buiter 1977 and myself 1978 developed models based on bailey s earlier work barro 1981 has an interesting paper on related issues see also david aschauer 1982 3the standard approach incorporates fiscal policy through the concept of personal disposable income and by including the stock of government debt as part of personal wealth see for example the empirical specification of albert ando and franco modigliani 1963 which has been the basis of most empirical consumption studies since and feldstein 1974 for one of the more influential papers based on the ando modigliani specification

rigging the lobbying process an application of the all pay auction textabstractin a world where a politician can explicitly auction off a prize to the high bidder the standard auction literature can be used to analyse political behavior the justice system however precludes politicians from explicitly selling the prize to the highest bidder thus politicians cannot let it become public knowledge that they are in the business of selling political favors an institution has emerged in political markets to overcome this constraint which are termed as lobbying lobbyists make implicit payments to the politician through campaign contributions if these up front payments were rebated to those failing to receive the prize it would be clear that the politician was selling favors this article has examined an interesting principle arising in all pay auctions this principle states that a politician wishing to maximize political rents may find it in his best interest to exclude certain lobbyists from participating in the lobbying process particularly lobbyists valuing most the political prize

weaving together the normative and regulative roles of government how the norwegian sovereign wealth fund s responsible conduct is shaping firms cross border investments based on institutional theory i extend research on the regulative role of national government in society and suggest that government exerts important influences on firms actions through the diffusion of norms i suggest that the norwegian government by instituting an ethical council that publicly censors and certifies the cross border investments of the norwegian sovereign wealth fund government pension fund global contributes to the professionalization of responsible investment principles and thus plays a normative role in shaping firms investments employing a quasi natural experiment i find that focal norwegian firms are more likely to make responsible cross border investments following the formation of the council on ethics in 2004 and its associated censorship announcements further i find that the normative pressure for responsible investments is mediated by firms imitation or overlap with the norwegian sovereign wealth fund s investments however the mediated effect of normative pressure on responsible investments becomes weaker for government owned firms these findings highlight the importance of normative mechanisms through which government can influence firms behavior especially in contexts where regulatory authority may not hold moreover these findings reveal the interplay among the normative mimetic and regulative pressures and the heterogeneity in the extent to which firms within the same country demonstrate institutional isomorphism

conflicts and common interests in committees committees improve decisions by pooling members independent information but promote manipulation obfuscation and exaggeration of private information when members have conflicting preferences committee decision procedures transform continuous data into ordered ranks through voting this coarsens the transmission of information but controls strategic manipulations and allows some degree of information sharing each member becomes more cautious in casting the crucial vote than when he alone makes the decision based on own information increased quality of one member s information results in his casting the crucial vote more often committees make better decisions for members than does delegation

costly participation and heterogeneous preferences in informational committees informational committees are groups of people who are designated to gather information this article develops a simple model of committee size based on costly participation and preference heterogeneity in a setting in which the information structure and policy preferences are both represented by normal random variables i characterize an equilibrium under the mean decision rule and derive the optimal committee size i show that when effort costs are sufficiently high preference heterogeneity can provide members additional incentives to gather information and thus the optimal committee size and the principal s expected payoff can increase in the heterogeneity of committee members policy preferences

a critical review of sustainable business indices and their impact most studies into the performance of socially responsible investment vehicles have focused on the performance of sustainable or socially responsible mutual funds this research has been complemented recently by a number of studies that have examined the performance of sustainable investment indices in both cases the majority of studies have concluded that the returns of socially responsible investment vehicles have either underperformed or failed to outperform comparable market indices although the impact of sustainable indices to date has been limited the recent launch of sustainable indices by dow jones and ftse suggests that more attention is being paid to the subject by financial markets investors and companies this development raises a number of important issues which are reviewed in this article a the performance of indices compared with their benchmark indices b the methodologies employed in compiling the indices and c the impact of the indices on companies and the investment community the article concludes with a number of suggestions for areas that merit future research

party formation in single issue politics we study the implications of economies of party size in a model of party formation we show that when the policy space is one dimensional candidates form at most two parties this result does not depend on the magnitude of the economies of party size or sensitively on the nature of the individuals preferences it does depend on our assumptions that the policy space is one dimensional and that uncertainty is absent we study how modifications of these assumptions affect our conclusions

human resource management in us subsidiaries in europe and australia centralisation or autonomy we explore determinants of subsidiary autonomy in setting human resource management hrm practices within us parented multinational enterprises mnes in europe and australia we examine both the effect of strategic context and the effect of the institutional location of the subsidiary we find that us mnes show greater centralisation of control over hrm where the subsidiary faces global markets in coordinated market economies vs liberal market economies and where union density is low

candidate entry and political polarization an antimedian voter theorem we study a citizen candidate entry model with private information about ideal points we fully characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of the entry game and show that only relatively extreme citizen types enter the electoral competition as candidates whereas more moderate types never enter it generally leads to substantial political polarization even when the electorate is not polarized and citizens understand that they vote for more extreme candidates we show that polarization increases in the costs of entry and decreases in the benefits from holding office moreover when the number of citizens goes to infinity only the very most extreme citizens with ideal points at the boundary of the policy space become candidates finally our polarization result is robust to changes in the implementation of a default policy if no citizen runs for office and to introducing directional information about candidates types that is revealed via parties

globalization pressures and the state the worldwide spread of central bank independence the authors examine the impact of globalization on state structures in the specific instance of the central bank following the world system world society and neoinstitutional perspectives in sociology they assume that states are in cultural political and economic competition with each other thereby seeking to maintain their position and status frequently by adopting organizational forms or practices that make them isomorphic with their environment the authors predict that countries boost the independence of their central bank from the political power as their exposure to foreign trade investment and multilateral lending increases they also model the cross national dynamic process of diffusion of central bank independence by examining the impact of cohesive and role equivalent trade relationships between countries they find support for their hypotheses with information on 71 countries between 1990 and 2000

is there a better commitment mechanism than cross listings for emerging economy firms evidence from mexico the last decade of work in corporate governance has shown that weak legal institutions at the country level hinder firms in emerging economies from accessing finance and technology affordably to attract outside resources these firms must often use external commitments for repayment research suggests that a common commitment mechanism is to borrow us securities laws which involves listing the emerging economy firm s shares on a us exchange this paper uses a quasi natural experiment from mexico to examine the conditions under which forming a strategic alliance with a foreign multinational firm is actually a superior mechanism for ensuring good corporate governance

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

negotiations in multi issue committees abstract we propose a non cooperative bargaining approach to the problem of collective decision making in committees by modelling this process as a sequential bargaining game the main objective of the paper is to discuss the formation of the agenda in multi issue committees and its relation to the importance of the issues we start by asserting that in the case of a single issue the set of all equilibrium outcomes of our game coincides with the set of coalitional stable outcomes we then consider multi issue committees to discuss the problem of forming agendas we argue that from the point of view of efficiency and stability the most important issues should be put first on the agenda we conclude with a sufficient condition on players preferences which guarantees the efficiency and stability of the bargaining outcomes for every possible agenda

ricardian equivalence and lucas critique an alternative test of ricardian equivalence using super exogeneity tests in simulated series this article considers an alternative methodology nested on super exogeneity tests to verify the occurrence of ricardian quivalence the advantage of this new procedure is based on the intuitive appeal and the statistical procedure more appropriated than the econometric techniques previously adopted in this literature

meetings with costly participation an empirical analysis we analyse a firm s decision to participate in public meetings which determine regulation using data from the mid atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery we find that firms with a preference for extreme policies are much more likely to participate in public meetings than firms with a preference for moderate policies we also find that participation rates are higher for larger closer and more influential firms these results are of interest for several reasons voluntary meetings with costly participation are ubiquitous as an institution for resource allocation examples include faculty meetings parent teacher association meetings and condominium association meetings moreover the requirement that regulators allow and encourage public participation is an almost universal feature of the u s regulatory process 1 yet despite their importance meetings with costly participation are little studied and basic questions about them are unanswered who goes does participation vary with observable characteristics do meeting participants represent the interested population our analysis of the mid atlantic clam fishery answers these questions large nearby extremists participate in meetings with costly participation it is clear that these findings improve our understanding of voluntary participation in costly meetings and hence of most regulatory decisions taken in the u s however they also suggest 1 the administrative procedure act requires that all u s federal regulatory agencies shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data views or arguments with or without the opportunity for oral presentation title 5 u s code section 553 c 1988 edition in corrosion proof fittings v environmental protection agency 1991 the supreme court showed its willingness to require that public opinion be adequately consulted in this case the court vacated proposed regulation because the environmental protection agency prematurely ended public hearings and deprived the public of sufficient opportunity to comment on analyse and influence the regulatory proceedings in this case public participation is mandated by the toxic substances control act rather than the administrative procedure act

the intergovernmental network of world trade igo connectedness governance and embeddedness membership in certain intergovernmental organizations igos such as the world trade organization has long been argued to stimulate trade yet evidence linking igos to trade is mixed the authors argue that identifying the influence of igos requires attention not only to the institutions igos enact but also to the network through which they enact them this approach allows them to demonstrate that trade between two countries increases by an average of 58 with every doubling of the strength of igo connection between the countries they also contribute to debates regarding the mechanisms through which structural relationships influence economic behavior by showing that substantial trade benefits occur not only through economic igos but also through igos that were formed for social and cultural purposes and that connections through igos that are organizationally strong have more impact than those through minimalist igos

meetings with costly participation reply this note corrects an error in an example in meetings with costly participation aer 90 4 927 943 it characterizes the set of equilibria for the example under the assumptions in the paper shows that in all the equilibria an interval of moderate po sitions is devoid of participants and provides assumptions under which the result as originally stated is correct

the swing voter s curse the authors analyze two candidate elections in which some voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters they demonstrate the existence of a swing voter s curse less informed indifferent voters strictly prefer to abstain rather than vote for either candidate even when voting is costless the swing voter s curse leads to the equilibrium result that a substantial fraction of the electorate will abstain even though all abstainers strictly prefer voting for one candidate over voting for another copyright 1996 by american economic association

meetings with costly participation we study a collective decision making process in which people interested in an issue may participate at a cost in a meeting and the resulting decision is a compromise among the participants preferences we show that the equilibrium number of participants is small and their positions are extreme and when the compromise is the median the outcome is likely to be random the model and its equilibria are consistent with evidence on the procedures and outcomes of us regulatory hearings jel d7 h0 l5

a test of steady state government debt neutrality a test of steady state government debt neutrality this paper investigates whether in the steady state the real interest rate is an increasing function of both the government debt and government spending using data from the period between january 1981 and march 1986 the paper finds no evidence of such a relationship these data afford an especially powerful test because the ratio of federal debt to trend output which had fallen from 93 to 33 percent between january 1948 and december 1980 reversed course after the enactment of the economic recovery tax act reaching 47 percent in march 1986 i introduction in conventional macroeconomic analysis government debt is not neutral because households view it as contributing to their net wealth as a result the larger the government debt is the wealthier households feel and the more they consume more consumption in turn spells less investment over time and thus a lower steady state capital stock as a result output is ultimately lower and the real interest rate higher in principle however households need not view government debt as net wealth 1 if households accurately foresee the future taxes that will service the government debt if they face perfect capital markets if taxes do not distort their decisions and if they internalize future generations then they treat the future taxes servicing the government debt as an exact offset consequently government debt is neutral since it does not make households feel wealthier and hence affects nothing 2 nevertheless because most macroeconomists doubt that households accurately foresee future servicing taxes have access to perfect capital markets and internalize future generations they do not model government debt as neutral like perfect competition however government debt neutrality may be a good approximation in many applications even if the assumptions underlying it are unrealistic therefore empirical analysis rather than introspection should determine how one models government debt this paper provides such an empirical analysis the empirical analysis focuses on the steady state relationship between government debt and the real interest rate 3 in the steady state a larger government debt leads to a smaller capital stock and hence a higher marginal product of capital if households view government debt as net wealth consequently the real interest rate is also higher if instead government debt is neutral nothing should happen to the real interest rate u s data from the period between january 1981 and march 1986 have been used here to investigate whether a larger government debt leads to a higher real interest rate in the steady state and hence whether government debt is neutral these data afford an especially powerful test because the ratio of federal debt to trend output which had fallen from 94 to 33 percent between january 1948 and december 1980 reversed course after the enactment of the economic recovery tax act reaching 47 percent by march 1986 moreover this upward trend is likely to continue well beyond 1986 such an enormous increase in federal debt should have raised by steady state real interest rate appreciably if households view government debt as net wealth to any important extent in the absence of evidence that the steady state real interest rate did rise government debt is judged to be neutral in the steady state section ii formulates the model which is estimated in sections iii and iv section v summarizes the paper and then briefly reviews an extensive literature consistent with government debt neutrality ii formulation of the econometric model the appendix demonstrates that if households view government debt as net wealth the real interest rate should be an increasing function of both the government debt and government spending in the steady state see also evans 1988 for this analysis

does voluntary participation undermine the coase theorem abstract the coase theorem states that costless enforcement of voluntary agreements yields efficient outcomes we argue that previous treatments fail to recognize the full meaning of voluntary it requires a two stage game a non cooperative participation decision followed by coaseian bargaining only among those who choose to participate we illustrate this in a simple public goods model and find outcomes ranging from extremely inefficient to fully efficient however the efficient equilibrium is not robust to even very small transaction costs thus we cast doubt on coaseian claims of universal efficiency finally we outline a kind of coercion that restores efficiency