equilibrium price dispersion with heterogeneous searchers abstract firms simultaneously set prices in a homogeneous product market where uninformed consumers search for price information some uninformed consumers are local searchers who visit only one seller whereas others search sequentially with an optimal reservation price equilibrium prices may follow a mixture distribution with clusters of high and low prices separated by a zero density gap when the exogenous reservation price of local searchers depart from that of the optimizing sequential searchers by a relatively small amount the presence of local searchers either has no effect on market outcomes or benefits all consumers a reduction in search cost sometimes leads to higher equilibrium prices

competition under consumer loss aversion we address the effect of expectation based consumer loss aversion on firm strategy in imperfect competition consumers are fully informed about match value and price at the moment of purchase however some consumers are initially uninformed about their tastes and form a reference point consisting of an expected match value and price distribution whereas others are perfectly informed all the time we show that if firms have symmetric costs a larger share of informed consumers leads to a more competitive outcome the reverse holds if cost asymmetry in duopoly is sufficiently large

occupational self selection a human capital approach to sex differences in occupational structure a rich and diverse literature exists concerning the distribution of labor incomes one approach namely that of human capital concentrates on lifetime accumulation paths of earnings capacity units human capital individual variations in human capital imply differences in earnings power thereby yielding strong implications concerning earnings distribution within a population despite its explanatory power the human capital model has been widely criticized one criticism centers on its inability to obtain inferences concerning occupational distribution the purpose of this paper is to alleviate at least some such criticism by applying the hedonic price approach so as to embed occupational choice into the human capital framework the significance is that neoclassical economic theory can be used to obtain implications concerning the determinants of occupational structure excerpt

foreign exchange market reactions to sovereign credit news abstract we analyse the reaction of the foreign exchange spot market to sovereign credit signals by fitch moody s and s p during 1994 2010 we find that positive and negative credit news affects both the own country exchange rate and other countries exchange rates we provide evidence on unequal responses to the three agencies signals fitch signals induce the most timely market responses and the market also reacts strongly to s p negative outlook signals credit outlook and watch actions and multiple notch rating changes have more impact than one notch rating changes considerable differences in the market reactions to sovereign credit events are highlighted in emerging versus developed economies and in various geographical regions

boys will still be boys gender differences in trading activity are not due to differences in over confidence abstract the fact that men trade more than women in financial markets has been attributed to men s overconfidence however evidence supporting this view is only indirect we directly test this conjecture experimentally by measuring confidence using monetary incentives before participants trade in a simulated market we find that men are more confident than women in our trading task men also trade more and they hold larger and less diversified portfolios than women however we do not find that differences in confidence explain any portion of the gender gap in trading activity we explore alternative candidate channels such as risk aversion financial literacy or competitiveness but find that these factors are also unlikely to play a role

on the effectiveness of exchange rate interventions in emerging markets we analyze the effectiveness of exchange rate interventions for a panel of 18 emerging market economies during the period 2003 2011 using an error correction model approach we find that on average intervention is effective in moving the real exchange rate in the desired direction controlling for deviations from the equilibrium and short term changes in fundamentals and global financial variables our results are robust to different samples and estimation methods we find little evidence of asymmetries in the effect of sales and purchases but some evidence of more effective interventions for large deviations from the equilibrium we also explore differences across countries according to the possible transmission channels and nature of some global shocks

real and monetary determinants of real exchange rate behavior theory and evidence from developing countries abstract this paper develops a dynamic model of real exchange rate rer behavior in developing countries a three goods economy exportables importables and non tradables is considered residents of this country hold domestic and foreign assets and there is a dual exchange rate regime there is a government that consumes importables and non tradables a distinction is made between equilibrium and disequilibrium movements of the rer the determinants of real exchange rate misalignment are studied with emphasis placed on the role of devaluations and balance of payments crises the implications of the model are tested using data for 12 developing countries the results obtained are generally favorable for the model the issue of rer stationarity is also analyzed

should central bankers talk to the foreign exchange markets in this paper we study the role of official statements and speeches given by central bank authorities in charge of foreign exchange policy we investigate the impact of statements that comment on and confirm such interventions on the day of the intervention on the two major foreign exchange markets over an extended period 1989 2003 we also study the impact in terms of policy effectiveness of central bank communication before the actual operations our results suggest that appropriate speeches clarifying the current intervention policy can have marginally virtuous effects both in terms of exchange rate level and exchange rate volatility this leads us to conclude that in general actual interventions on the market should still be employed provided that official statements are used to clarify the nature and purpose of these interventions c 2008 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

new evidence on the monetary approach of exchange rate determination in mexico 1994 2007 a cointegrated svar model abstract we provide empirical evidence supporting the validity of both short and long run versions of the monetary approach of exchange rate determination for the mexican peso u s dollar exchange rate from 1994 to 2007 using a cointegrated svar model we estimate not only the long run relationship between the variables of the monetary model for the exchange rate but also the very short run effects which have been often ignored in previous empirical work we show that there are robust short and long run relationships between the mexican monetary aggregates and the exchange rate which ultimately responds to what bilson s variant of maer predicts

prominence complexity and pricing this paper analyzes prominence in a homogeneous product market where two firms simultaneously choose both prices and price complexity levels complexity limits competing offers comparability and results in consumer confusion confused consumers are more likely to buy from the prominent firm in equilibrium there is dispersion in both prices and price complexity the nature of equilibrium depends on prominence compared to its rival the prominent firm makes higher profit associates a smaller price range with lowest complexity puts lower probability on lowest complexity and sets a higher average price however higher prominence may benefit consumers and conditional on choosing lowest complexity the prominent firm s average price is lower which is consistent with confused consumers bias

external debt capital flight and political risk abstract this paper explains the simultaneous occurence of large external debts private capital outflows and low domestic capital formation we consider a general equilibrium model in which two government types with conflicting distributional goals randomly alternate in office uncertainty over the fiscal policies of future governments generates capital flight and small domestic investment and induces the government to overaccumulate external debt the model also predicts that left wing governments are more inclined to restrict capital outflows than right wing governments finally we examine how political uncertainty affects the risk premium and how debt repudiation may occur after a regime change

certification under oligopolistic competition in a symmetric duopolistic market where each firm s choice regarding certain quality attributes such as the environmental friendliness of its product is its own private information the extent of horizontal differentiation between firms plays a crucial role in a certifier s optimal certification policy under a non profit certifier it is always the case that both firms produce the highest quality and opt for certification this is also the case under a for profit certifier but only when the degree of horizontal differentiation is sufficiently high when horizontal differentiation is low the for profit certifier by charging a very high certification fee creates maximum vertical differentiation between firms as a result only one firm produces the highest quality and opts for certification whereas the other firm produces the lowest quality and does not opt for certification this asymmetry under a for profit certifier makes the market inefficient which provides one possible explanation for the existence of mostly non profit certifiers in such markets

fluctuations in the dollar a model of nominal and real exchange rate determination abstract this paper develops a model of exchange rate determination that extends the dornbusch frankel model to allow for large and sustained changes in real exchange rates real exchange rate changes are related to movements in the current account both through changes in expectations about the long run equilibrium real exchange rate and through changes in the risk premium the model is estimated empirically for the dollar s weighted average exchange rate over the flexible rate period of the 1970s the results indicate that innovations to the current account have been a significant determinant of the exchange rate predominantly through changes in expectations

oligopolistic competition in price and quality abstract we consider an oligopolistic market where firms compete in price and quality and where consumers have heterogeneous information some consumers know both the prices and quality of the products offered some know only the prices and some know neither we show that if there are sufficiently many uninformed consumers then there exists a unique equilibrium where price is a perfect indicator of quality this equilibrium is characterized by dispersion and pareto inefficiency of the price quality offers where better price quality combinations are associated with lower prices

choosing and reneging on exchange rate regimes we use data on announced and actual exchange rate arrangements to ask which countries follow de facto regimes different from their de iure ones that is do not do what they say our results suggest that countries with poor institutional quality have difficulty in maintaining pegging and abandon it often in contrast many countries with relatively good institutions display fear of floating that is they manage more than announced perhaps to signal their differences from those countries incapable of maintaining promises of monetary stability jel f3 o1

gender and competition at a young age gender gaps may be observed in a variety of economic and social environments one of the possible determining factors is that men are more competitive than women and so when the competitiveness of the environment increases the performance of men increases relative to that of women we test this hypothesis in a field study conducted with 9 year old children running on a track they first run alone and then in pairs over a short distance with different gender composition of the pairs the results support the hypothesis that performance in competition varies according to gender when children ran alone there was no difference in performance in competition boys but not girls improved their performance this finding relates to the discussion regarding single sex schools the outcomes of examinations in a mixed sex school can show a gender gap in favor of boys even when this gap does not reflect actual abilities girls who are as talented as boys will end up performing worse just because they are not as competitive and will not achieve as high scores in examinations as boys

gender role attitudes and the labour market outcomes of women across oecd countries this paper uses data from the world value surveys 1990 1995 1999 to investigate the impact of gender role attitudes and work values on women s labour market outcomes across 25 oecd countries anti egalitarian views are found to display the strongest negative association with female employment rates and the gender pay gap these views are however softening among recent cohorts on the other hand perceptions of women s role as homemakers which are likely formed in youth and linked to religious ideology are more persistent over time they could be implicated in the recent slowdown of the gender convergence in pay finally the unavoidable clash between family values and egalitarian views that takes the form of an inner conflict for many women the so called mother s guilt is another obstacle in the path towards greater gender equality in the labour market copyright 2005 oxford university press

consumer search with observational learning this article studies observational learning in a consumer search environment consumers observe the purchasing decision of a predecessor with similar preferences consumers rationally emulate by initiating their search at the firm from which their predecessor purchased free riding on search effort and reacting less to price changes prices are nonmonotone in search costs and may be as low as marginal costs we discuss several extensions and show that the effect of emulation on prices is stronger when i the number of firms increases ii consumers first visits are more elastic with respect to market shares and iii prices are adjusted more frequently

the impact of us sanctions on poverty abstract in this paper we analyze the effect of us economic sanctions on the target countries poverty gap during the period 1982 2011 econometrically we employ a matching approach to account for differences in the countries economic and political environment and the likelihood of being exposed to us sanctions our results indicate that us sanctions are adversely affecting those living in poverty as we observe a 3 8 percentage point pp larger poverty gap in sanctioned countries compared to a control group that is as close as possible in terms of observable pretreatment characteristics in addition we show that the impact of sanctions on poverty i increases with the severity of sanctions ii is larger for multilateral sanctions than for unilateral sanctions imposed by only the united states and iii is long lasting as the poverty gap increases over the first 21 years of a sanction regime

asymmetric tournaments equal opportunity laws and affirmative action some experimental results this paper assesses whether affirmative action programs and equal opportunity laws affect the output of economic agents more precisely we find that equal opportunity laws and affirmative action programs always benefit disadvantaged groups equal opportunity laws also increase the effort levels of all subjects and hence the profits of the tournament administrator usually the firm the effects of affirmative action programs depend on the severity of a group s cost disadvantage when the cost disadvantage is severe these programs significantly increase effort levels and hence profits the opposite is true when the disadvantage is slight

do women shy away from competition do men compete too much we examine whether men and women of the same ability differ in their selection into a competitive environment participants in a laboratory experiment solve a real task first under a noncompetitive piece rate and then a competitive tournament incentive scheme although there are no gender differences in performance men select the tournament twice as much as women when choosing their compensation scheme for the next performance while 73 percent of the men select the tournament only 35 percent of the women make this choice this gender gap in tournament entry is not explained by performance and factors such as risk and feedback aversion only playa negligible role instead the tournament entry gap is driven by men being more overconfident and by gender differences in preferences for performing in a competition the result is that women shy away from competition and men embrace it

tournaments without prizes evidence from personnel records we use a quasi experimental research design to study the effect of giving workers feedback on their relative performance the setting is a firm in which workers are paid piece rates and where for exogenous reasons management begins to reveal to workers their relative position in the distribution of pay and productivity we find that merely providing this information leads to a large and long lasting increase in productivity that is costless to the firm our findings are consistent with the interpretation that workers incipient concerns about their relative standing are activated by information about how they are performing relative to others this paper was accepted by olav sorenson organizations

price competition with consumer confusion this paper proposes a model in which identical sellers of a homogenous product compete in both prices and price frames i e ways to present price information we model price framing by assuming that firms frame choices affect the comparability of their price offers consumers may fail to compare prices due to frame differentiation and due to frame complexity in the symmetric equilibrium the firms randomize over both price frames and prices and make positive profits this result is consistent with the observed coexistence of price and price frame dispersion in the market we also show that i the nature of equilibrium depends on which source of consumer confusion dominates and ii an increase in the number of firms can increase industry profits and harm consumers

discrimination social identity and durable inequalities what are the mechanisms by which societal discrimination affects individual achievement and why do the effects of past discrimination endure once legal barriers are removed we report the findings of two experiments in village india that suggest that the mechanisms of discrimination operate in part within the individuals who are members of the groups who have been discriminated against we demonstrate that publicly revealing an individual s membership in such a group alters his behavior in ways that make the effects of past discrimination persist over time a growing literature in social psychology on stereotype threat finds that stereotyped based expectations affect individual performance in the domain of the stereotype a study by jeff stone et al 1999 is illustrative when college students were asked to perform a task described as diagnostic of natural athletic ability blacks stereotyped as better athletes but worse students than whites performed better than whites when the same test was presented as diagnostic of sports intelligence the performance of blacks declined that of whites improved and the racial gap was reversed evidence suggests that a mediating factor in stereotype threat is a change in self confidence mara cadinu et al 2005 in our studies we investigated whether the public revelation of social identity caste affects cognitive task performance and responses to economic opportunities by young boys in village india subjects were sixth and seventh graders drawn from the two ends of the caste hierarchy we asked subjects to learn and then perform a task under incentives and we manipulated whether their peers in the experimental session knew their caste caste is well suited to this manipulation because unlike race gender and ethnicity there are no unambiguous outward markers of caste among young boys six subjects generally from six different villages participated in each experimental session in the control condition the subjects were anonymous within the six person group in the experimental conditions the experimenter publicly revealed subjects names and caste in the task solving mazes in which performance was studied here the low caste subjects in the anonymous condition did not perform significantly differently from high caste subjects but when caste identity was publicly revealed in a mixed caste group a significant caste gap emerged the caste gap was due to a 20 percent decline in the average number of mazes solved by the low caste the study shows that publicly revealing the social identity of an individual can change his behavior even when that information is irrelevant to payoffs our results are a generalization of the literature on stereotype threat like that literature we find that individuals performance is more in accordance with the stereotype of the group when group membership is made salient in some way unlike that literature salience in our experiments depends on the public revelation of social identity and more importantly we do not argue that the domain of the tasks undertaken by discussants rachel croson university of pennsylvania iris bohnet harvard university stefano dellavigna university of california berkeley

a gender agenda a progress report on competitiveness i review the role of a new behavioral trait competitiveness on the gender agenda i first describe how to measure competitiveness in the laboratory and show that gender differences in competitiveness are robust i then establish the external economic relevance of the experimental measure of competitiveness competitiveness correlates with education and labor market outcomes and can help account for gender differences therein finally institutions can differ in the importance they place on competitiveness and hence can affect gender differences in economic outcomes exploring these institutional differences and their effects remains an open area of behavioral market design

seigniorage and political instability the importance of seigniorage relative to other sources of government revenue differs markedly across countries this paper tries to explain this regularity by studying a political model of tax reform the model implies that countries with a more unstable and polarized political system will have more inefficient tax structures and thus will rely more heavily on seigniorage this prediction of the model is tested on cross sectional data for seventy countries the authors find that after controlling for other variables political instability is positively associated with seigniorage copyright 1992 by american economic association

competition for attention we present a model of market competition in which consumers attention is drawn to the products most salient attributes firms compete for consumer attention via their choices of quality and price strategic positioning of a product affects how all other products are perceived with this attention externality depending on the cost of producing quality some markets exhibit commoditized price salient equilibria while others exhibit de commoditized quality salient equilibria when the costs of quality change innovation can lead to radical shifts in markets as in the case of decommoditization of the coffee market by starbucks in the context of financial innovation the model generates the phenomenon of reaching for yield

capital flow management measures what are they good for abstract are capital controls and macroprudential measures related to international exposures successful in achieving their objectives assessing their effectiveness is complicated by selection bias countries which change their capital flow management measures cfms often share specific characteristics and are responding to changes in variables that the cfms are intended to influence this paper addresses these challenges by using a propensity score matching methodology we also create a new database with detailed information on weekly changes in controls on capital inflows capital outflows and macroprudential measures related to international transactions from 2009 to 2011 for 60 countries results show that these macroprudential measures can significantly reduce some measures of financial fragility most cfms do not significantly affect other key targets however such as exchange rates capital flows interest rate differentials inflation equity indices and different volatilities one exception is that removing controls on capital outflows may reduce real exchange rate appreciation therefore certain cfms can be effective in accomplishing specific goals but most popular measures are not good for accomplishing their stated aims

do real exchange rate appreciations matter for growth the impact of exchange rate changes on growth a long standing key issue in international macroeconomics has received renewed attention in recent years owing to weaker growth rates and the debate on currency wars the connection between real exchange rates and growth remains however an unsettled question in the academic literature we fill this gap by providing an empirical assessment based on a broad sample of emerging and advanced economies we assess the impact of appreciations productivity booms and capital inflows surges using a propensity score matching approach to address causality issues appreciations associated with higher productivity have a larger impact on growth than those associated with capital inflows furthermore appreciations per se tend to have a negative impact on growth we provide a simple theoretical model that delivers a contrasted growth appreciation pattern depending on the underlying shock the model also implies adverse effects of shocks to international capital flows so concerns about an appreciation are not inconsistent with concerns about a depreciation while the presence of an externality through firms destruction leads to inefficient allocations addressing the inefficiency does not dampen exchange rate movements

a positive theory of fiscal deficits and government debt this paper considers an economy in which policymakers with different preferences alternate in office as a result of elections government debt is used strategically by each policymaker to influence the choices of his successors if different policymakers disagree about the desired composition of government spending between two public goods the economy exhibits a deficits bias that is debt accumulation is higher than it would be with a social planner the equilibrium level of debt is larger the larger is the degree of polarization between alternating governments and the less likely it is that the current government will be re elected

do gender stereotypes reduce girls or boys human capital outcomes evidence from a natural experiment schools and teachers are often said to be a source of stereotypes that harm girls this paper tests for the existence of gender stereotyping and discrimination by public high school teachers in israel it uses a natural experiment based on blind and non blind scores that students receive on matriculation exams in their senior year using data on test results in several subjects in the humanities and sciences i found contrary to expectations that male students face discrimination in each subject these biases widen the female male achievement difference because girls outperform boys in all subjects except english and at all levels of the curriculum the bias is evident in all segments of the ability and performance distribution and is robust to various individual controls several explanations based on differential behavior between boys and girls are not supported empirically however the size of the difference is very sensitive to teachers characteristics suggesting that the bias against male students is the result of teachers and not students behavior

rent seeking with regretful agents theory and experiment abstract we investigate both theoretically and experimentally the role that information disclosure has on behavior in all pay environments in which all agents must exert costly effort but only the winner is rewarded through the lens of all pay auctions we show that bidders who have regret concerns when they lose an auction may alter their bids whether or not information about the winning bid is disclosed all losing bidders regret not bidding 0 however when feedback on the winning bid is provided those bidders who lost at an affordable price may regret not bidding more we show that the former effect causes bidders to lower their bids while the latter effect causes bidders to raise their bids our experimental results indicate overbidding whether or not the winning bid is disclosed to losing bidders however disclosing the winning bid leads to even more aggressive bidding increases revenues decreases the frequency of dropouts and also leads to more efficient allocations thus our results show that information disclosure is a powerful tool that mechanism designers may wish to exploit to extract more rents in all pay environments

shrouded attributes consumer myopia and information suppression in competitive markets bayesian consumers infer that hidden add on prices e g the cost of ink for a printer are likely to be high prices if consumers are bayesian firms will not shroud information in equilibrium however shrouding may occur in an economy with some myopic or unaware consumers such shrouding creates an inefficiency which firms may have an incentive to eliminate by educating their competitors customers however if add ons have close substitutes a curse of debiasing arises and firms will not be able to profitably debias consumers by unshrouding add ons in equilibrium two kinds of exploitation coexist optimizing firms exploit myopic consumers through marketing schemes that shroud high priced add ons in turn sophisticated consumers exploit these marketing schemes it is not possible to profitably drive away the business of sophisticates it is also not possible to profitably lure either myopes or sophisticates to nonexploitative firms we show that informational shrouding flourishes even in highly competitive markets even in markets with costless advertising and even when the shrouding generates allocational inefficiencies

prices as signals of product quality this paper is concerned with the provision of quality in markets in which consumers have only imperfect information the analysis focuses on a market for a product that can be produced at different quality levels all consumers prefer higher to lower quality but they may differ in their willingness to pay for quality producers can produce any quality they like but higher qualities are more costly to produce the information in this market is imperfect in the sense that the exact quality chosen by a firm is known only to the firm itself some information about the quality of a firm s product will however reach its potential customers even if they do not make any special effort to acquire it within the framework suggested here two conclusions are drawn first prices may serve as signals which exactly differentiate the available quality levels that is there exists a fulfilledexpectations equilibrium at which each price signals a unique quality level second the pricesignals are not arbitrary each price signal exceeds the marginal cost of producing the quality it signals such a mark up depends on the nature of the product specific information received by consumers the poorer the information the higher the mark up

clean evidence on peer effects we study subjects who were asked to fill letters into envelopes with a remuneration independent of output in the pair treatment two subjects worked at the same time in the same room and peer effects were possible in the single treatment subjects worked alone and peer effects were ruled out we find evidence of peer effects in the pair treatment because the standard deviations of output are smaller within pairs than between pairs moreover average output is higher in the pair treatment thus peer effects raise productivity finally low productivity workers are the most sensitive to the behavior of peers

the timing of choice enhancing policies abstract recent studies investigate policies motivating consumers to make an active choice as a way to protect unsophisticated consumers we analyze the optimal timing of such choice enhancing policies when a firm can strategically react to them in the model a firm provides a contract with automatic renewal we show that a policy intending to enhance consumers choices when they choose a contract can be detrimental to welfare by contrast a choice enhancing policy at the time of contract renewal increases welfare more robustly our results highlight that policies should be targeted in timing to the actual choice inefficiency

competing for consumer inattention consumers purchase multiple types of goods but may be able to examine only a limited number of markets for the best price we propose a simple model that captures these features conveying new insights a firm s price can deflect or draw attention to its market and consequently limited attention introduces a new dimension of cross market competition we characterize the equilibrium and show that having partially attentive consumers improves consumer welfare with less attention consumers are more likely to miss the best offers but enhanced cross market competition decreases average price paid as leading firms try to stay under the consumers radar

incentives through consumer learning about tastes we consider a long lived firm that faces an infinite sequence of finitely lived consumers in each period the firm can exert either high or low effort which is the firm s private information when consumers learn about the firm s talent from the outcomes of previous transactions there exists no equilibrium in which the firm always exerts high effort however when consumers learn about their own tastes such an equilibrium can exist consumer learning about tastes therefore is an alternative to reputational concerns that produces stable incentives we discuss the implications of this mechanism for advertising advertising content and consumer education

the impact of consumer attentiveness and search costs on firm quality disclosure a competitive analysis firms can invest to disclose quality information about their products to consumers but consumers are not always perfectly attentive to these disclosures indeed technologies such as digital video recorders have increased the ease with which disclosures can be avoided by consumers although such inattention may result in a consumer missing information from one or more competing firms consumers who have missed disclosures might decide to search for quality information to become fully informed before making a purchase decision in this paper we incorporate consumer attentiveness as well as the related endogenous search decision into a model of quality disclosure our results suggest that firms should disclose less quality information as the share of partially informed consumers informed about one firm but not the other increases or as consumer search costs increase we also provide insights into the potential impact of consumer trends toward lower attentiveness and lower search costs this paper was

inattentive consumers and product quality this paper studies a model in which some consumers shop on the basis of price alone without attention to potential differences in product quality a firm may offer a low quality product to exploit these inattentive consumers in the unique symmetric equilibrium of the model firms choose prices with mixed strategies similarly to varian 1980 in which some consumers purchase from a random seller without attention to market prices in our model though firms also choose quality stochastically and there is both price and quality dispersion two stylized policy interventions are considered competition policy which acts to increase the number of sellers and market transparency reforms which act to increase the fraction of attentive consumers with fewer inattentive consumers firms are less likely to cheat i e cut quality which therefore improves welfare but profit and consumer surplus can either increase or decrease when there is a large number of sellers approximately half the sellers cheat regardless of the fraction of inattentive consumers and introducing more sellers boosts consumers surplus and reduces profit while the impact on welfare is ambiguous

orchestrating impartiality the impact of blind auditions on female musicians a change in the audition procedures of symphony orchestras adoption of blind auditions with a screen to conceal the candidate s identity from the jury provides a test for sex biased hiring using data from actual auditions in an individual fixed effects framework we find that the screen increases the probability a woman will be advanced and hired although some of our estimates have large standard errors and there is one persistent effect in the opposite direction the weight of the evidence suggests that the blind audition procedure fostered impartiality in hiring and increased the proportion women in symphony orchestras

why women don t run experimental evidence on gender differences in political competition aversion abstract women s underrepresentation in leadership positions has been well documented but the reasons behind it are not well understood we carry out a field experiment to test a prominent theory about the source of the gender gap in leadership ambition women s higher aversion to competitive environments using politics as a context for our study we employ two distinct subject pools highly politically active individuals and workers from an online labor market we find that priming individuals to consider the competitive nature of politics has a strong negative effect on women s interest in political office but not on men s interest hence significantly increasing the gender gap in leadership ambition

the political economy of growth a critical survey of the recent literature this article reviews the recent literature on the political economy of growth focusing on the research that has developed at the intersection of the endogenous growth literature and the new political economy it explores the relationship among four key variables economic growth and capital accumulation political instability political freedom and democratic institutions and income inequality

prices product qualities and asymmetric information the competitive case recent developments in the economics of information emphasize the informational content of prices we examine the degree to which prices convey information on product quality to uninformed agents under perfect competition we show that a rational expectations equilibrium may not exist when an equilibrium does exist the information on quality conveyed by prices depends on the shape of the average cost curves and the relative numbers of informed and uniformed agents

how costly is diversity affirmative action in light of gender differences in competitiveness affirmative action is often criticized for causing reverse discrimination and lowering the qualifications of those hired under the policy however the magnitude of such adverse effects depends on whether the best suited candidate is hired absent the policy indeed affirmative action may compensate for the distortion discrimination imposes on the selection of candidates this paper asks whether affirmative action can have a similar corrective impact when qualified individuals fail to apply for a job we evaluate the effect of introducing a gender quota in an environment where high performing women fail to enter competitions they can win we show that guaranteeing women equal representation among winners increases their entry the response exceeds that predicted by the change in probability of winning and is in part driven by women being more willing to compete against other women the consequences are substantial as the boost in supply essentially eliminates the anticipated costs of the policy this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behavioral economics

does competition destroy ethical behavior explanations of unethical behavior often neglect the role of competition as opposed to greed in assuring its spread using the examples of child labor corruption excessive executive pay corporate earnings manipulation and commercial activities by universities this paper clarifies the role of competition in promoting censured conduct when unethical behavior cuts costs competition drives down prices and entrepreneurs incomes and thereby reduces their willingness to pay for ethical conduct nonetheless i suggest that competition might be good for ethical behavior in the long run because it promotes growth and raises incomes higher incomes raise the willingness to pay for ethical behavior but may also change what people believe to be ethical for the better this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

entrepreneurs embrace competition evidence from a lab in the field study referring to isreal m kirzner 1973 and schumpeter 1934 who emphasized the competitive nature of entrepreneurship this study investigates whether potential and revealed entrepreneurs are more likely to seek competition than non entrepreneurs we provide a conceptual framework that links entrepreneurship to three facets of individual competitiveness drawn from economic entrepreneurship and psychological research a desire to win striving for personal development and an enjoyment of competition following economic research linking competitive behavior in experiments to career choices we conduct a lab in the field study and demonstrate that entrepreneurs are more likely to enter competitions than non entrepreneurs accounting for individual desires to win and mastery related achievement motivations our results indicate that entrepreneurs tend to enter competition for the sake of competition itself rather than for the prospect of winning it or personal development our results suggest that enjoyment of competition might be an additional factor driving entrepreneurs market entry decisions beyond well known factors like overconfidence and risk taking

what explains the gender gap in college track dropout experimental and administrative evidence copyright 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 by the american economic association permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of american economic association publications for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not distributed for profit or direct commercial advantage and that copies show this notice on the first page or initial screen of a display along with the full citation including the name of the author copyrights for components of this work owned by others than aea must be honored abstracting with credit is permitted the author has the right to republish post on servers redistribute to lists and use any component of this work in other works for others to do so requires prior specific permission and or a fee permissions may be requested from the american economic association administrative office by going to the contact us form and choosing copyright permissions request from the menu copyright 2016 aea

gender competitiveness and career choices gender differences in competitiveness have been hypothesized as a potential explanation for gender differences in education and labor market outcomes we examine the predictive power of a standard laboratory experimental measure of competitiveness for the later important choice of academic track of secondary school students in the netherlands although boys and girls display similar levels of academic ability boys choose substantially more prestigious academic tracks where more prestigious tracks are more math and science intensive our experimental measure shows that boys are also substantially more competitive than girls we find that competitiveness is strongly positively correlated with choosing more prestigious academic tracks even conditional on academic ability most important we find that the gender difference in competitiveness accounts for a substantial portion about 20 of the gender difference in track choice

the impact of the menstrual cycle and hormonal contraceptives on competitiveness we examine whether competitiveness in women is influenced by biological factors female participants in a laboratory experiment solve a simple arithmetics task first under a piece rate and then under a competitive tournament scheme participants can then choose which compensation scheme to apply in a third round we find that the likelihood of selecting into the competitive environment varies strongly and significantly over the menstrual cycle and with the intake of hormonal contraceptives the observed patterns are consistent with a negative impact of the sex hormone progesterone on competitiveness we show that the effect of the menstrual cycle and hormonal contraceptives on competitiveness is due neither to an impact on performance nor to an impact on risk aversion or overconfidence

men women and competition an experimental test of behavior this study reports a series of experiments that examine outcomes when agents are able to choose between a payment scheme that rewards based on absolute performance i e piece rate and a scheme that rewards based on relative performance i e a tournament we test for the presence and persistence of gender differences in performance and the rate of entry into the tournament option and whether these differences are sensitive to the structure of the tournament rewards in the winner take all wta condition only the best performer in the tournament for each round received a payment 4 50 in the graduated tournament condition the same payment 4 50 was divided among the first second and third finishers in the tournament in the wta condition men showed significantly lower forecast errors than women in addition a clear sorting effect occurs in the wta condition in early rounds of the wta condition male entrants into the tournament show significantly lower forecast errors than female tournament entrants however the difference disappears over time after controlling for forecasting skill gender did not predict entry into the tournament for the wta condition however lower forecasting skill reduced the probability of entry in the graduated tournament the situation was reversed men entered the tournament at significantly higher rates even after controlling for skill forecasting skill had no impact on the decision to enter the tournament while the average male entrant to the tournament had lower forecast errors than the average female entrant the men entered at much higher rates as a consequence men were much more likely than women to enter the tournament too frequently

voting on the budget deficit this paper analyzes a model in which a group of rational individuals votes over the composition and time profile of public spending all voters agree that a balanced budget is ex ante optimal however if there is disagreement between current and future majorities a balanced budget is not a political equilibrium under majority rule under certain conditions a majority of the voters favors a budget deficit and the equilibrium deficit is larger the greater is the polarization among voters copyright 1990 by american economic association

a model of add on pricing this paper examines competitive price discrimination with horizontal and vertical taste differences consumers with higher valuations for quality are assumed to have stronger brand preferences two models are considered a standard competitive price discrimination model in which consumers observe all prices and an add on pricing game in which add on prices are naturally unobserved and firms may advertise a base good at a low price in hopes of selling add ons at high unadvertised prices in the standard game price discrimination is self reinforcing the model sometimes has both equilibria in which the firms practice price discrimination and equilibria in which they do not the analysis of the add on pricing game focuses on the chicago school argument that profits earned on add ons will be competed away via lower prices for advertised goods a conclusion is that add on practices can raise equilibrium profits by creating an adverse selection problem that makes price cutting unappealing although profitable when jointly adopted using add on pricing is not individually rational in a simple extension with endogenous advertising practices and costless advertising several models that could account for add on pricing are discussed

market regulation of voluntary add on contracts abstract this paper analyzes contract choices and the effectiveness of consumer protection policies when firms can offer voluntary add on insurance for their products we develop a model in which a base product can be sold together with a voluntary extended warranty contract that insures consumers against the risk of product breakdown some consumers do not pay attention to extended warranties before making base product choices but overestimate the value of such warranties at the point of sale under retail competition the consumers option to buy multiple base products can endogenously create a base price floor that may prevent firms from redistributing the full warranty profits via loss leadership inducing competition in the warranty market weakly increases consumer welfare and weakly outperforms a minimum warranty standard which can even reduce consumer surplus the results are consistent with the effects of recent changes regarding extended warranty regulation by uk legislators

contests with three or more heterogeneous agents abstract we study monotone equilibrium behavior in contests with observable effort bid where three or more participants have distinct risk attitudes and the monetary value for the prize of each is drawn independently from a distinct distribution these differences can either cause a player to drop out that is always choose zero effort regardless of his valuation or use all or nothing strategies with discontinuous effort choice neither complete drop out nor discontinuous bidding with finitely many gaps is consistent with pure strategy monotone bayesian nash equilibrium in a contest with either ex ante identical players or only two distinct participants

the mirage of exchange rate regimes for emerging market countries this paper argues that much of the debate on choosing an exchange rate regime misses the boat it begins by discussing the standard theory of choice between exchange rate regimes and then explores the weaknesses in this theory especially when it is applied to emerging market economies it then discusses a range of institutional traits that might predispose a country to favor either fixed or floating rates and then turns to the converse question of whether the choice of exchange rate regime may favor the development of certain desirable institutional traits the conclusion from the analysis is that the choice of exchange rate regime is likely to be of second order importance to the development of good fiscal financial and monetary institutions in producing macroeconomic success in emerging market countries this suggests that less attention should be focused on the general question whether a floating or a fixed exchange rate is preferable and more on these deeper institutional arrangements a focus on institutional reforms rather than on the exchange rate regime may encourage emerging market countries to be healthier and less prone to the crises that we have seen in recent years

performance in competitive environments gender differences even though the provision of equal opportunities for men and women has been a priority in many countries large gender differences prevail in competitive high ranking positions suggested explanations include discrimination and differences in preferences and human capital in this paper we present experimental evidence in support of an additional factor women may be less effective than men in competitive environments even if they are able to perform similarly in non competitive environments in a laboratory experiment we observe as we increase the competitiveness of the environment a significant increase in performance for men but not for women this results in a significant gender gap in performance in tournaments while there is no gap when participants are paid according to piece rate this effect is stronger when women have to compete against men than in single sex competitive environments this suggests that women may be able to perform in competitive environments per se

selection into self improvement and competition pay gender stereotypes and earnings volatility abstract we examine whether men and women differ in their willingness to select into a contract that pays upon improving one s past performance experiment participants choose to perform a task under either a regular piece rate or a larger piece rate provided they improve relative to a previous round women are less willing than men to select into self improvement pay and this gender gap is largely explained by higher risk aversion and to a smaller extent lower self confidence high earnings volatility widens the gender gap and makes self improvement pay less attractive than competition pay we find no effect of gender stereotypes in the willingness to sort into self improvement the results provide insight into the feasibility and potential of using self improvement contracts as gender neutral incentive mechanisms