reward structures and the allocation of talent as relative rewards that different professions receive are a key factor in the allocation of talent what determines the reward structure of a society is an important question this paper develops an equilibrium model of the allocation of talent between productive and unproductive activities such as rent seeking the existence of rent seeking creates a negative externality on productive agents and implies that relative rewards are endogenously determined the same externality can also lead to the existence of multiple equilibria each with different reward structures in a dynamic setting allocations of past generations as well as expectations of future allocations influence current rewards and the society may get trapped in a rent seeking steady state equilibrium the paper also discusses how the non pecuniary reward structure can be influenced by equilibrium selection and a historical example that suggests the presence of a causal link from the allocation of talent to non pecuniary rewards

from rent seeking to human capital a model where resource shocks cause transitions from stagnation to growth we present a growth model where agents divide time between rent seeking in the form of resource competition and working in a human capital sector the latter is interpreted as trade or manufacturing rent seeking exerts negative externalities on the productivity of human capital adding shocks in the form of fluctuations in the size of the contested resource the model can replicate a long phase with stagnant incomes and high levels of rent seeking interrupted by small failed growth spurts eventually followed by a permanent transition to a sustained growth path where rent seeking vanishes in the limit the model also generates a rise and fall of the so called natural resource curse before the takeoff an increase in the size of the contested resource has a positive effect on incomes shortly after the takeoff the effect is negative and on the balanced growth path the growth rate of per capita income is independent of resource shocks les auteurs presentent un modele de croissance ou les agents divisent leur temps entre la chasse aux rentes sous la forme de concurrence pour la ressource existante et le travail productif dans le secteur du capital humain cette derniere activite peut se faire dans le commerce ou le secteur manufacturier la chasse aux rentes a des effets externes negatifs sur la productivite du capital humain si l on injecte des chocs prenant la forme de fluctuations dans la taille de la ressource contestee le modele peut generer une longue periode durant laquelle les revenus stagnent et le niveau de chasse aux rentes est eleve periode interrompue par des petits sursauts de croissance qui tournent court et suivie eventuellement par une transition permanente a un sentier de croissance soutenue ou a la limite les activites de chasse aux rentes disparaissent le modele genere aussi l apparition et la disparition de la malediction des ressources naturelles avant que la croissance prenne son envol un accroissement de la taille de la ressource contestee a un effet positif sur les revenus peu apres le decollage l effet est negatif et sur le sentier de croissance equilibree le taux de croissance des revenus per capita est independant des chocs sur la ressource

the rise of europe atlantic trade institutional change and economic growth the rise of western europe after 1500 is due largely to growth in countries with access to the atlantic ocean and with substantial trade with the new world africa and asia via the atlantic this trade and the associatedcolonialism affected europe not only directly but also indirectly by inducing institutional change where initial political institutions those established before 1500 placed significant checks on the monarchy the growth of atlantic trade strengthened merchant groups by constraining the power of the monarchy and helped merchants obtain changes in institutions to protect property rights these changes were central to subsequent economic growth

rent seeking and resource booms abstract this paper develops a model of rent seeking in which the opportunity cost of rent seeking is foregone entrepreneurship it provides conditions under which resource booms tend to lead to an increase in rent seeking activity and those in which they induce entrepreneurship we identify an important difference between the two activities which leads resource booms to bias gains in favour of rent seeking over entrepreneurship but we also show that this bias depends on the nature of the initial equilibrium

occupational choice and the spirit of capitalism the british industrial revolution triggered a socioeconomic transformation whereby the landowning aristocracy was replaced by industrial capitalists rising from the middle classes as the economically dominant group we propose a theory of preference formation under financial market imperfections that can account for this pattern parents shape their children s preferences in response to economic incentives middle class families in occupations requiring effort skill and experience develop patience and a work ethic whereas upper class families relying on rental income cultivate a refined taste for leisure these class specific attitudes which are rooted in the nature of preindustrial professions become key determinants of success once industrialization transforms the economic landscape i introduction the industrial revolution was more than capital accumulation and growth it also set off a social and political transformation that redefined hierarchies in society and reshaped the distribution of income and wealth before the onset of industrialization in eighteenth century britain wealth and political power were associated with the possession of land over the course of the nineteenth century a new class of entrepreneurs and businessmen emerged as the economic elite for the most part the members of this class rose from humble beginnings and had their social origins in the urban middle classes the landed elite was left behind and eventually lost its political and economic predominance many observers of the time linked this reversal in economic fortunes to differences in values attitudes and ultimately preferences across social classes there are countless examples both in scholarly and in fictional writing of portrayals of members of the landowning class as averse to work unwilling to save ill disposed tocommercialactivity andunabletoconsidermoneyassomething

princes and merchants european city growth before the industrial revolution as measured by the pace of city growth in western europe from 1000 to 1800 absolutist monarchs stunted the growth of commerce and industry a region ruled by an absolutist prince saw its total urban population shrink by one hundred thousand people per century relative to a region without absolutist government this might be explained by higher rates of taxation under revenue maximizing absolutist governments than under nonabsolutist governments which care more about general economic prosperity and less about state revenue

ethnic diversity civil war and redistribution in a game theoretic framework we analyse the circumstances under which self enforcing redistribution and power sharing coalitions can be used to peacefully resolve ethnic conflict the existence of a pacific equilibrium depends crucially on ethnic diversity the number of ethnic groups the risk of civil war is comparatively high at intermediate levels of ethnic diversity the risk is low if a society is either very homogeneous or very diverse predictions of the model are consistent with evidence on the incidence of civil war

anarchy and autarky endogenous predation as a barrier to trade this article presents a general equilibrium two country ricardian trade model with endogenous transactions costs that arise from individual utility maximizing allocation of labor to production and piracy in the absence of institutions for risk sharing and coordination of defense autarky obtains over most of the parameter space when both trade and predation are supported in equilibrium terms of trade effects can make security immiserizing in that case paradoxically predation creates trade

the voracity effect abstract we analyze an economy that lacks a strong legal political institutional infrastructure and is populated by multiple powerful groups powerful groups dynamically interact via a fiscal process that effectively allows open access to the aggregate capital stock in equilibrium this leads to slow economic growth and a voracity effect by which a shock such as a terms of trade windfall perversely generates a more than proportionate increase in fiscal redistribution and reduces growth we also show that a dilution in the concentration of power leads to faster growth and a less procyclical response to shocks jel f43 o10 o23 o40

industrial development and the convergence question the paper studies endogenous world balanced growth equilibria in which national learning productivity differentials govern relative per capita products learning productivities depend on the national share of world specialized goods production national and world scale and familiarity with the foreign economy familiarity indexes the extent to which imported specialized goods enhance learning productivity we find that mutual familiarization causes per capita products to converge unfamiliar economies diverge substantially and persistently unilateral familiarization of a less developed country ldc with the leading economy causes the ldc to catch up to and even overtake the leader

human capital and economic development abstract this paper develops a general equilibrium model of fertility and human capital investment with young adult mortality because young adult mortality is negatively related to average young adult human capital human capital accumulation lowers mortality inducing demographic transition and industrial revolution data confirm that young adult mortality is related negatively to schooling and the rate of return to schooling and positively to fertility the data indicate a negative relationship between tfp growth and schooling accumulation the model fits the data on country populations per capita incomes human capital total fertility rates infant mortality life expectancy and conditional life expectancy

natural resources rent seeking and welfare abstract a new and very simple mechanism to explain why natural resource abundance may lower income and welfare is developed in a model with rent seeking a greater amount of natural resources increases the number of entrepreneurs engaged in rent seeking and reduces the number of entrepreneurs running productive firms with a demand externality it is shown that the drop in income as a result of this is higher than the increase in income from the natural resource more natural resources thus lead to lower welfare

conflict and rent seeking success functions ratio vs difference models of relative success the rent seeking competitions studied by economists fall within a much broader category of conflict interactions that also includes military combats election campaigns industrial disputes lawsuits and sibling rivalries in the rent seeking literature each party s success pi which can be interpreted either as the probability of victory or as the proportion of the prize won has usually been taken to be a function of the ratio of the respective resource commitments alternatively however pi may instead be a function of the difference between the parties commitments to the contest the contest success function csf for the difference from is a logistic curve in which as is consistent with military experience increasing returns apply up to an inflection point at equal resource commitments a crucial flaw of the traditional ratio model is that neither onesided submission nor two sided peace between the parties can ever occur as a cournot equilibrium in contrast both of these outcomes are entirely consistent with a model in which success is a function of the difference between the parties resource commitments

institutions and the resource curse countries rich in natural resources constitute both growth losers and growth winners we claim that the main reason for these diverging experiences is differences in the quality of institutions more natural resources push aggregate income down when institutions are grabber friendly while more resources raise income when institutions are producer friendly we test this theory building on sachs and warner s influential works on the resource curse our main hypothesis that institutions are decisive for the resource curse is confirmed our results contrast the claims of sachs and warner that institutions do not play a role

the varieties of resource experience natural resource export structures and the political economy of economic growth many oil mineral and plantation crop based economies experienced a substantial deceleration in growth following the commodity boom and bust of the 1970s and early 1980s this article illustrates how countries dependent on point source natural resources those extracted from a narrow geographic or economic base such as oil and minerals and plantation crops are predisposed to heightened economic and social divisions and weakened institutional capacity this in turn impedes their ability to respond effectively to shocks which previous studies have shown to be essential for sustaining rising levels of prosperity analysis of data on classifications of export structure controlling for a wide array of other potential determinants of governance shows that point source and coffee and cocoa exporting countries do relatively poorly across an array of governance indicators these governance effects are not associated simply with being a natural resource exporter countries with natural resource exports that are diffuse relying primarily on livestock and agricultural produce from small family farms do not show the same strong effects and have had more robust growth recoveries

effective property rights conflict and growth abstract this paper shows how the interaction between conflict and growth can give rise to a nonmonotone relationship between property rights and social welfare this interaction is illustrated in a model of endogenous growth in which equilibrium diversion of resources is the cost of securing effective property rights a symmetric equilibrium allocation associated with more secure property rights and faster growth can be pareto dominated by one associated with poorer property rights and slower growth faster growth can exacerbate the problem of diversion whenever property rights are sufficiently poor these results call for caution before a society decides to pursue economic growth independently of the institutional structure of property rights furthermore if this structure is inappropriate piecemeal reform might not be in the interest of society and a substantial reform might be necessary if it is to be welfare improving

from malthus to modern growth can epidemics explain the three regimes we model demographic and economic long run development in a setting where mortality is endogenous and subject to epidemic shocks the model replicates the full transition from malthusian stagnation to modern growth consistent with the historical facts the economy also passes an intermediate post malthusian phase where growth rates of both population and per capita income increase simultaneously as mortality rates fall and become less volatile the escape from the malthusian trap is the result of a series of mild epidemic shocks making it inevitable at some stage but its timing random calibrations show that it can differ by thousands of generations absent differences in exogenous parameters

mortality and early growth in england france and sweden we set up a stochastic open economy growth model with endogenous fertility and mortality a three country version of the model is calibrated to pre industrial mortality data from england france and sweden by fitting parameters to match observed rates of correlation in mortality rates the model can also account for differences in both the volatility of mortality rates and the timing of the industrial revolution

population technology and growth from malthusian stagnation to the demographic transition and beyond this paper develops a unied growth model that captures the historical evolution of population technology and output it encompasses theendogenous transitionbetween three regimes that have characterized economic development the economy evolves from amalthusianregime wheretechnologicalprogressis slow andpopulationgrowthprevents anysustainedriseinincomepercapita intoapost malthusianregime wheretechnological progress rises and population growth absorbs only part of output growth ultimately a demographic transition reverses the positive relationship between income and population growth andtheeconomyentersamoderngrowthregimewithreducedpopulationgrowth

swords or plowshares a theory of the security of claims to property this paper develops a general equilibrium model of the allocation of resources among appropriative and productive activities the model emphasizes the distinction between offensive weapons which are the instruments of predation and fortifications which provide defense against predation the analysis of this model shows how the equilibrium security of claims to property is determined the analysis focuses on the possibility of a nonaggressive equilibrium in which no resources are allocated to offensive weapons and claims to property are fully secure we also analyze the complex relation between economic welfare and the security of claims to property we find for example that a relatively poor agent could be better off in an equilibrium with less secure claims to property

selling sharing and everything in between the hybrid economies of collaborative networks recent consumer research has examined contexts where market based exchange gift giving sharing and other modes of exchange occur simultaneously and obey several intersecting logics but consumer research has not conceptualized these so called hybrid economic forms nor explained how these hybrids are shaped and sustained using ethnographic and netnographic data from the collaborative network of geocaching this study explains the emergence of hybrid economies performativity theory is mobilized to demonstrate that the hybrid status of these economies is constantly under threat of destabilization by the struggle between competing performativities of market and nonmarket modes of exchange despite latent tension between competing performativities the hybrid economy is sustained through consumer producer engagements in collaborative consumption and production the creation of zones of indeterminacy and the enactment of tournaments of value that dissipate controversies around hybrid transactions implications are drawn for consumer research on the interplay between market and nonmarket economies

the condition of the working class in england 1209 2004 i use building workers wages for 1209 2004 and the skill premium to consider the causes and consequences of the industrial revolution real wages were trendless before 1800 as would be predicted for the malthusian era comparing wages with population however suggests that the break from the technological stagnation of the malthusian era came around 1640 long before the classic industrial revolution and even before the arrival of modern democracy in 1689 building wages also conflict with human capital interpretations of the industrial revolution as modeled by gary becker kevin murphy and robert tamura oded galor and david weil and robert lucas human capital accumulation began when the rewards for skills were unchanged and when fertility was increasing

cross country evidence on the link between volatility and growth this paper presents empirical evidence against the standard dichotomy in macroeconomics that separates growth from the volatility of economic fluctuations in a sample of ninety two countries as well as a sample of oecd countries the authors find that countries with higher volatility have lower growth the addition of standard control variables strengthens the negative relationship the authors also find that government spending induced volatility is negatively associated with growth even after controlling for both time and country fixed effects copyright 1995 by american economic association

malthus to solow a unified growth theory is developed that accounts for the roughly constant living standards displayed by world economies prior to 1800 as well as the growing living standards exhibited by modern industrial economies our theory also explains the industrial revolution which is the transition from an era when per capita incomes are stagnant to one with sustained growth the authors use a standard growth model with several technologies the first denoted the malthus technology requires land labor and reproducible capital as inputs the second denoted the solow technology does not require land the authors show that in the early stages of development only the malthus technology is used and due to population growth living standards are stagnant despite technological progress eventually technological progress causes the solow technology to become profitable and both technologies are employed at this point living standards improve since population growth has less influence on per capita income growth in the limit the economy behaves like a standard solow growth model excerpt