reputation and impermanent types i consider a version of the chain store game where the incumbent firm s type evolves according to a markov process with two states a tough type who always fights entry and a weak type who prefers to accommodate there exists a minimal level of persistence necessary for the incumbent to be able to sustain any reputation for being tough above that level as the number of markets t increases in equilibrium play alternates between intervals of entry by competitors and intervals of deterrence when t is infinite then regardless of the discount factor there exists a sequential equilibrium in which the incumbent s payoff is bounded below her stackelberg payoff both results are in contrast to the outcome when the incumbent s type is fixed one interpretation is that reputation is not permanent but must be renewed occasionally

firm valuation earnings expectations and the exchange rate exposure effect consistent with previous research we fail to find a significant correlation between the abnormal returns of our sample firms with international activities and changes in the dollar we investigate the possibility that this failure is due to mispricing lagged changes in the dollar are a significant variable in explaining current abnormal returns of our sample firms suggesting that mispricing does occur a simple trading strategy based upon these results generates significant abnormal returns corroborating evidence from returns around earnings announcements as well as errors in analysts forecasts of earnings is also provided it is a widely held view that exchange rate movement should affect the value of a firm standard economic analysis implies that the profitability and value of most u s firms with foreign sales or operations abroad should increase decrease with an unexpected depreciation appreciation of the dollar as expected foreign currency cash flows translate into larger smaller u s

wealth taxation and wealth accumulation theory and evidence from denmark using administrative wealth records from denmark we study the effects of wealth taxes on wealth accumulation denmark used to impose one of the world s highest marginal tax rates on wealth but this tax was greatly reduced starting in 1989 and later abolished due to the specific design of the wealth tax the 1989 reform provides a compelling quasi experiment for understanding behavioral responses among the wealthiest segments of the population we find clear reduced form effects of wealth taxes in the short and medium run with larger effects on the very wealthy than on the moderately wealthy we develop a simple life cycle model with utility of residual wealth bequests allowing us to interpret the evidence in terms of structural primitives we calibrate the model to the quasi experimental moments and simulate the model forward to estimate the long run effect of wealth taxes on wealth accumulation our simulations show that the long run elasticity of taxable wealth with respect to the net of tax return is sizable at the top of the distribution

minimum wage and real wage inequality evidence from pass through to retail prices this paper considers the impact of the minimum wage on both labor and product markets using detailed store level scanner data i provide empirical evidence that a 10 increase in the minimum wage r

an empirical test of hypercongestion in highway bottlenecks abstract there is a widely held view that as demand for travel goes up this decreases not only speed but also the capacity of the road system a phenomenon known as hypercongestion we revisit this idea in the context of highway bottlenecks we propose an empirical test using an event study design to measure changes in highway capacity at the onset of queue formation we apply this test to three highway bottlenecks in california for which detailed data on traffic flows and vehicles speeds are available we find no evidence of a reduction in highway capacity at any of the three sites during periods of high demand across sites and specifications we have sufficient statistical power to rule out even small reductions in highway capacity this lack of evidence of hypercongestion stands in sharp contrast to most previous studies and informs core models in urban and transportation economics

default settlement and signalling lending resumption in a reputational model of sovereign debt this paper develops a simple model of sovereign debt in which defaulting nations are excluded from capital markets and regain access by making partial repayments this implication of the model is consistent with the historical evidence that defaulting countries return to international loan markets soon after a settlement but after varying periods of exclusion copyright 1995 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

analyzing the analysts career concerns and biased earnings forecasts this paper examines the career concerns of security analysts we relate long histories of their earnings forecasts to job separations we find that relatively accurate past forecasts lead to favorable career outcomes such as remaining at or moving up to a high status large prestigious brokerage house controlling for accuracy optimistic forecasts relative to the consensus increase the chances of favorable job separations job separations depend much less on accuracy for analysts who cover stocks that are underwritten by their brokerage houses such analysts are also much more likely to be rewarded for optimistic forecasts than other analysts furthermore job separations were much less sensitive to accuracy and somewhat more sensitive to optimism during the stock market mania of the late 1990s these findings suggest that the well documented analyst forecast optimism bias is likely due to incentives to promote stocks

reputation and exogenous private learning abstract short run competitors in the chain store game receive noisy signals of the long run incumbent firm s type the history of signals which in the limit is fully revealing is observable to the competitors but possibly not to the incumbent as long as there is sufficient noise in the signals then in any equilibrium a patient weak incumbent obtains a payoff strictly higher than her minmax payoff

on the incentive effects of job rotation abstract a new employee may work hard to build his reputation this effect is greatest when he starts the longer he is employed at his job the more the firm will already have learned about his ability the incentives for an employee to influence the firm s perceptions of his ability decrease over time if rotating the employee to a different job leads to new uncertainty about his ability this generates a fresh impulse for effort however job rotation also reduces the employee s time horizon thus reducing future rents from reputation this trade off leads to a unique optimum we derive a simple rule of thumb for an optimal rotation time our main results still hold for cases of complete but imperfect information transmission the incentive effects of job rotation also prevail in a setting in which skills are job specific we study several extensions rotations across multiple employees absence of commitment to a rotation time different bargaining positions discounting over time and learning by doing effects

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

impermanent types and permanent reputations we study the impact of unobservable stochastic replacements for the long run player in the classical reputation model with a long run player and a series of short run players we provide explicit lower bounds on the nash equilibrium payoffs of a long run player both ex ante and following any positive probability history under general conditions on the convergence rates of the discount factor to one and of the rate of replacement to zero both bounds converge to the stackelberg payoff if the type space is sufficiently rich these limiting conditions hold in particular if the game is played very frequently

redistributive taxation in a simple perfect foresight model abstract we investigate the redistributive potential of capital taxation in an intertemporal maximizing model of capital formation first even unanticipated redistributive capital taxation is severely limited in its effectiveness since it depresses wages second under any convergent redistributive tax policy which maximizes a paretian social objective the capital income tax will converge to zero independent of the factor supply elasticities these results are independent of workers holdings of capital

managerial incentive problems a dynamic perspective the paper studies how a person s concern for a future career may influence his or her incentives to put in effort or make decisions on the job in the model the person s productive abilities are revealed over time through observations of performance there are no explicit output contingent contracts but since the wage in each period is based on expected output and expected output depends on assessed ability an implicit contract links today s performance to future wages an incentive problem arises from the person s ability and desire to influence the learning process and therefore the wage process by taking unobserved actions that affect today s performance the fundamental incongruity in preferences is between the individual s concern for human capital returns and the firm s concern for financial returns the two need be only weakly related it is shown that career motives can be beneficial as well as detrimental depending on how well the two kinds of capital returns are aligned it is well understood by now that informational externalities may place special demands on the organization of economic exchange simple price mediated markets will frequently fail in the presence of asymmetric information in that case more elaborate contractual arrangements have to be used as substitutes for the price system lately considerable effort has been devoted to the analysis of contracting under incomplete information with the objective to understand the range of economic institutions that emerge in response to the failure of the price system the analysis of moral hazard has played a prominent role in this development moral hazard problems arise when for some reason or another transacting parties cannot contract contingent on the delivery of the good for instance in buying labour services it may be that the amount of labour supplied is not directly observable precluding a simple exchange of wage for labour as a partial remedy to this problem an imperfect mutually observed signal about the supply of labour can be used as a proxy in the contract frequently output is taken as such a proxy the drawback is that output is often influenced by other factors than labour input which induce undesirable risk into the contract one is therefore faced with a tradeoff between allocating risk associated with incomplete observability and providing incentives for a proper supply of labour gaining insight into this tradeoff is important not only for understanding contracting in the small e g managerial incentive schemes but also because it is closely related to the fundamental tension between equity and efficiency in the society as a whole while our understanding of moral hazard has advanced a lot in past years it is clear that much work remains an important question that has received little attention until

incentive effects of inheritances and optimal estate taxation i consider optimal nonlinear taxation of income and bequests with a joy of giving bequest motive and explicitly characterize the optimal estate tax rate the optimal formula trades off correction of externality from giving and discouraging effort of children due to income effect generated by bequests the analysis shows that optimality of a positive tax on bequests rests on the strength of the effect of bequests on behavior of future generations the analysis also suggests that inheritance rather than estate tax is better suited to implement the optimal policy

pre event trends in the panel event study design we consider a linear panel event study design in which unobserved confounds may be related both to the outcome and to the policy variable of interest we provide sufficient conditions to identify the causal effect of the policy by exploiting covariates related to the policy only through the confounds our model implies a set of moment equations that are linear in parameters the effect of the policy can be estimated by 2sls and causal inference is valid even when endogeneity leads to pre event trends pre trends in the outcome alternative approaches perform poorly in our simulations

imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations we study the long run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring it is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types thus a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for noncredible behavior in the presence of imperfect monitoring

the folk theorem with imperfect public information the authors study repeated games in which players observe a public outcome that imperfectly signals the actions played they provide conditions guaranteeing that any feasible individually rational payoff vector of the stage game can arise as a perfect equilibrium of the repeated game with sufficiently little discounting the central condition requires that there exist action profiles with the property that for any two players no two deviations one by either player give rise to the same probability distribution over public outcomes the results apply to principal agent partnership oligopoly and mechanism design models and to one shot games with transferable utilities copyright 1994 by the econometric society

limited records and reputation bubbles abstract this paper offers a tractable and fully rational model to study the economics of reputation in a dynamic market with limited record keeping i e a market in which new entrants observe only the last few periods of play of the long run player instead of the full history of the market we show that trust is gradually granted to the opportunistic long run player despite the fact that his type is perfectly observed by the short run opponents and the perfectly informed short run players ride and drive up reputation bubbles at the expense of their uninformed successors we characterize equilibrium payoffs uniformly over time which is useful for analyzing ongoing repeated relationships where the starting moments have passed

information revelation in relational contracts we explore subjective performance reviews in long term employment relationships we show that firms benefit from separating the task of evaluating the worker from the task of paying him the separation allows the reviewer to better manage the review process and can therefore reward the worker for his good performance with not only a good review contemporaneously but also a promise of better review in the future such reviews spread the reward for the worker s good performance across time and lower the firm s maximal temptation to renege on the reward the manner in which information is managed exhibits patterns consistent with a number of well documented biases in performance reviews

positive long run capital taxation chamley judd revisited according to the chamley judd result capital should not be taxed in the long run in this paper we overturn this conclusion showing that it does not follow from the very models used to derive it for the main model in judd 1985 we prove that the long run tax on capital is positive and significant whenever the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is below one for higher elasticities the tax converges to zero but may do so at a slow rate after centuries of high tax rates the main model in chamley 1986 imposes an upper bound on capital taxes we provide conditions under which these constraints bind forever implying positive long run taxes when this is not the case the long run tax may be zero however if preferences are recursive and discounting is locally nonconstant e g not additively separable over time a zero long run capital tax limit must be accompanied by zero private wealth zero tax base or by zero labor taxes first best finally we explain why the equivalence of a positive capital tax with ever increasing consumption taxes does not provide a firm rationale against capital taxation

restricted feedback in long term relationships abstract this paper studies long term relationships modeled as repeated games with restricted feedback players condition current play on summary statistics of past play rather than the entire history as may be the case in online markets our state strategy equilibrium framework allows for arbitrary restrictions on strategies we derive a recursive characterization for the set of equilibrium payoffs similar to that of abreu pearce and stacchetti 1986 1990 2 3 for perfect public equilibria and show that the set of equilibrium payoffs is the largest fixed point of a monotone operator we use our characterization to derive necessary and sufficient conditions for efficient trade in a repeated product choice game where costumers condition their purchase decisions only on the last performance signal

reputation and survival learning in a dynamic signalling model we consider the impact of reputation on the survival of a monopolist selling single units in discrete time periods whose quality is learned slowly if the seller learns her own quality at the same rate as customers a sufficiently bad run of luck could induce her to stop selling when she knows her quality a good seller never stops selling though at low reputations a bad seller does with some probability furthermore a seller with positive though imperfect information sells for the same number of periods whether her information is private or public we further consider the robustness of the central result when the seller s opportunities for strategic behaviour are limited

disappearance of reputations in two sided incomplete information games abstract this paper examines the sustainability of reputations in a class of games with imperfect public monitoring and two long lived players both of whom have private information about their own type and uncertainty over the types of the other player this class namely reputation games with one sided moral hazard can capture economic interactions that may involve hidden information or hidden action extending the techniques of cripps et al 2004 it is found that neither player can sustain a reputation permanently for playing a noncredible behavior in these games and the reputations disappear uniformly across all nash equilibria

a game theoretic model for the role of reputation feedback systems in peer to peer commerce abstract we propose a dynamic game theoretic model to study how a reputation feedback system affects a peer to peer p2p trading platform continuums of buyers and sellers with bounded rationalities are paired to trade periodically sellers have private knowledge on their own types that encode tendencies to cheat their reputation scores are on the other hand visible to all and periodically updated by their trading partners a buyer can use a seller s score to assess the latter s characters and decide whether to trade using a continuity based fixed point theorem we first establish the existence of equilibria that convey information on traders behaviors as well as the type score composition on the market we then look into a special case which for model tractability includes two types of sellers with two score levels besides the proportion of prone to cheating sellers it indicates that how much sellers value their future payoffs also plays a major role in determining the prevalence of online frauds therefore reputation feedback systems are especially beneficial under high trading volumes which can in turn for instance be facilitated by attracting more buyers to the online marketplace

sustainable reputations with rating systems abstract in a product choice game played between a long lived seller and an infinite sequence of buyers we assume that buyers cannot observe past signals to facilitate the analysis of applications such as online auctions e g ebay online shopping search engines e g bizrate com and consumer reports we assume that a central mechanism observes all past signals and makes public announcements every period the set of announcements and the mapping from observed signals to the set of announcements is called a rating system we show that absent reputation effects information censoring cannot improve attainable payoffs however if there is an initial probability that the seller is a commitment type that plays a particular strategy every period then there exists a finite rating system and an equilibrium of the resulting game such that the expected present discounted payoff of the seller is almost his stackelberg payoff after every history this is in contrast to cripps mailath and samuelson 2004 5 where it is shown that reputation effects do not last forever in such games if buyers can observe all past signals we also construct finite rating systems that increase payoffs of almost all buyers while decreasing the seller s payoff

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

community enforcement of trust with bounded memory we examine how trust is sustained in large societies with random matching when records of past transgressions are retained for a finite length of time to incentivize trustworthiness defaulters should be punished by temporary exclusion however it is profitable to trust defaulters who are on the verge of rehabilitation with perfect bounded information defaulter exclusion unravels and trust cannot be sustained in any purifiable equilibrium a coarse information structure that pools recent defaulters with those nearing rehabilitation endogenously generates adverse selection sustaining punishments equilibria where defaulters are trusted with positive probability improve efficiency by raising the proportion of likely re offenders in the pool of defaulters

reputation and performance among security analysts members of the institutional investor all american research team supply more accurate earnings forecasts than other analysts when forecasts are matched by the corporation followed and by the date of brokerage house issuance this contemporaneous advantage is complemented by a timing advantage all americans supply forecasts more often than other analysts stocks returns immediately following large upward forecast revisions suggest that all americans impact prices more than other analysts however there is virtually no difference in returns following large downward revisions nevertheless the collective results suggest a positive relation between reputation and performance and assuming that all americans are better paid pay and performance

is more information always better a case in credit markets this paper studies the impact of behavioral and non behavioral information contained in consumer credit reports on the credit market a repeated game of incomplete information between a borrower and a sequence of lenders is considered lenders beliefs regarding the borrower s type depend on the borrower s historical loan performance and other informative signals it is established that for low beliefs strategic defaults occur in equilibrium as the borrower defaults on his loans despite having the ability to repay them further as the ancillary signals become increasingly informative of the borrower s type the range of beliefs over which strategic defaults occur expands this increase in strategic defaults highlights an unintended negative effect of allowing informative signals to influence beliefs on the upside the informative signals allow lenders to learn the borrower s type more quickly

progressive estate taxation we present a model with altruistic parents and heterogeneous productivity we derive two key properties for optimal estate taxation first the estate tax should be progressive so that parents leaving a higher bequest face a lower net return on bequests second marginal estate taxes should be negative so that all parents face a marginal subsidy on bequests both properties can be implemented with a simple nonlinear tax on bequests levied separately from the income tax these results apply to other intergenerational transfers such as educational investments and are robust to endogenous fertility choices both estate or inheritance taxes can implement the optimal allocation but we show that the inheritance tax has some advantages finally when we impose an ad hoc constraint requiring marginal estate taxes to be nonnegative the optimum features a zero tax up to an exemption level and a progressive tax thereafter

do industry level analyses improve forecasts of financial performance prior research documents mean reversion in firm profitability and growth under the implicit assumption that profitability and growth of all firms revert to a common benchmark at the same rate however a large body of academic research suggests that there are systematic interindustry differences e g industry barriers to entry that differentially affect firm performance based on industry membership we evaluate the relative forecast accuracy of mean reverting models at the industry and economywide levels and find that industry specific models are generally more accurate in predicting firm growth but not profitability

is more information always better experimental financial markets with cumulative information abstract we study the value of information in financial markets by asking whether having more information always leads to higher returns we address this question in an experiment where information about an asset s intrinsic value is cumulatively distributed among traders we find that only the very best informed traders i e insiders significantly outperform less informed traders however there is a wide range of information levels from zero information to above average information levels where additional information does not yield higher returns the latter result implies that the value of additional information need not be strictly positive

information acquisition and reputation dynamics we study dynamic incentives and behaviour in markets with costly discovery of past transactions in our model a sequence of short lived customers interact over time with a single long lived firm that privately knows its type good or opportunistic customers must pay to observe the firm s past behaviour we characterize the equilibrium structure that features accumulation consumption and restoration of reputation the opportunistic firm deliberately builds its reputation up to a point where the maximum periods of information acquired by customers do not reveal past opportunistic behaviour and exploits the customers who most trust the firm copyright 2011 oxford university press

public trust and government betrayal abstract this study presents a simple model of government reputation in which government type cannot be directly observed by households with the variation that government type rather than being permanent follows an exogenous markov process this formulation captures three characteristics of bad policy outcomes governments which betray public trust do so erratically public trust is regained only gradually after a betrayal and governments with recent betrayals betray with higher probability than other governments

who wants a good reputation we examine a market in which long lived firms face a short term incentive to exert low effort but could earn higher profits if it were possible to commit to high effort there are two types of firms inept firms who can only exert low effort and competent firms who have a choice between high and low effort there is occasional exit and competent and inept potential entrants compete for the right to inherit the departing firm s reputation consumers receive noisy signals of effort choice and so competent firms choose high effort in an attempt to distinguish themselves from inept firms a competent firm is most likely to enter the market by purchasing an average reputation in the hopes of building it into a good reputation than either a very low reputation or a very high reputation inept firms in contrast find it more profitable to either buy high reputations and deplete them or buy low reputations

the information content of earnings revenues and expenses in this paper we model risk adjusted returns at earnings announcements as a function of unexpected revenues and unexpected expenses in order to test for the information content of the components of earnings as well as for their incremental information content over earnings we use value line vl forecasts of earnings and revenues as a proxy for the market s expectation of these numbers and as a basis for the market s expectation of expenses we find both revenues and expenses have information content that is incremental to earnings we also model riskadjusted returns as a function of earnings and revenues to compare our findings with previous research that used a martingale model to derive expected revenues consistent with previous research we find no incremental information content in revenues in this formulation however we find information content in both earnings and revenues when expectations are taken from vl forecasts wilson 1986 found that investors used the earnings and revenues released at the preliminary announcement date to forecast the accruals and funds subsequently disclosed in the annual report or 10 k however he found no evidence of information content for revenues at this date wilson used prior periods revenues cash from operations current and noncurrent accruals and capital expenditures to predict revenues using

rationality and analysts forecast bias this paper proposes and tests a quadratic loos utility function for modeling corporate earnings forecasting where financial analysts trade off bias to improve management access and forecast accuracy optimal forecasts with minimum expected error are optimistically biased and exhibit predictable cross sectional variation related to analyst and company characteristics empirical evidence from individual analyst forecasts is consistent with the model s predictions these results suggest that positive and predictable bias may be a rational property of optimal earnings forecasts prior studies using classical notions of unbiasedness may have prematurely dismissed analysts forecasts as being irrational or inaccurate

reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player a single long run player plays a simultaneous move stage game against a sequence of opponents who play only once but observe all previous play let the stackelberg strategy be the pure strategy to which the long run player would most like to commit himself if there is positive prior probability that the long run player will always play the stackelberg strategy then his payoff in any nash equilibrium exceeds a bound that converges to the stackelberg payoff as his discount factor approaches one when the stage game is not simultaneous move this result must be modified to account for the possibility that distinct strategies of the long run player are observationally equivalent

intertemporal consumption and credit constraints does total expenditure respond to an exogenous shock to credit there is continuing controversy over the importance of credit constraints this paper investigates whether total household expenditure and debt is affected by an exogenous increase in access to credit provided by a credit market reform that enabled danish house owners to use housing equity as collateral for consumption loans we find that the magnitude of the response is correlated with the amount of equity released by the reform and that the effect is strongest for younger households even for this group the response was moderate the aggregate effect of the reform was significant but small

wealth inequality in the united states since 1913 evidence from capitalized income tax data this paper combines income tax returns with flow of funds data to estimate the distribution of household wealth in the united states since 1913 we estimate wealth by capitalizing the incomes reported by individual taxpayers accounting for assets that do not generate taxable income we successfully test our capitalization method in three micro datasets where we can observe both income and wealth the survey of consumer finance linked estate and income tax returns and foundations tax records wealth concentration has followed a u shaped evolution over the last 100 years it was high in the beginning of the twentieth century fell from 1929 to 1978 and has continuously increased since then the rise of wealth inequality is almost entirely due to the rise of the top 0 1 wealth share from 7 in 1979 to 22 in 2012 a level almost as high as in 1929 the bottom 90 wealth share rst increased up to the mid 1980s and then steadily declined the increase in wealth concentration is due to the surge of top incomes combined with an increase in saving rate inequality top wealth holders are younger today than in the 1960s and earn a higher fraction of total labor income in the economy we explain how our ndings can be reconciled with survey of consumer finances and estate tax data

entrants reputation and industry dynamics this article analyzes entry exit decisions in a market where reputation determines the price that firms may charge within a rational expectation model of competition in a nonatomic market under heterogeneous reputations the analysis focuses on the class of name switching reputational equilibria in which a firm discards its name if and only if its reputation falls below the entrants reputation the main technical result is the existence of a unique steady state equilibrium within this class in which the entrants reputation is endogenous the resulting industry dynamics is largely on agreement with the findings in the empirical literature

maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed this paper studies reputation effects in games with a single long run player whose choice of stage game strategy is imperfectly observed by his opponents we obtain lower and upper bounds on the long run player s payoff in any nash equilibrium of the game if the long run player s stage game strategy is statistically identified by the observed outcomes then for generic payoffs the upper and lower bounds both converge as the discount factor tends to 1 to the long run player s stackelberg payoff which is the most he could obtain by publicly committing himself to any strategy

14 week quarters many firms define their fiscal quarters as 13 week periods for these firms each fiscal year contains 52 weeks which leaves out one two day s a year to compensate one extra week is added to every fifth sixth year consequently one quarter therein comprises 14 weeks we find evidence of predictable stock returns and forecast errors in 14 week quarters which suggests that investors and analysts do not on average adjust their expectations for the extra week the ease with which 14 week quarters can be predicted and expectations adjusted suggests a surprising lack of effort on the part of investors and analysts