a normative model of behavior based upon an activity hierarchy this paper integrates the psychological framework of a preference hierarchy with the economic framework used to analyze the allocation of time and commodities residual income available to an activity is found to be the primary determinant of the level of an activity s time and commodity demands and the most important variable affecting marginal consumption of new commodities

efficiency and information aggregation in auctions the tension between allocative efficiency and information aggregation is explored in the context of an auction k identical objects of unknown quality are auctioned off to n bidders whose tastes affect their valuation of an object of given quality bidders receive a signal about the quality of the objects the k highest bidders get an object and pay a price equal to the k first highest bid we find conditions under which in the limit objects are allocated efficiently to those with the highest tastes and price converges in probability to the value of an object to the marginal taste type

grouping durable goods modelling consumer preferences has a long history of interest in the literature several approaches that have been proposed consider consumer behaviour to be hierarchical products are divided into groups and preferences within a group are modelled independently an important question that arises in these efforts concerns the development of appropriate higher level groups this paper replicates and extends an earlier study by pickering et al 1973 in which product groups were developed based on consumer perceptions of product attributes we collect survey data perceived product attributes and similarity ratings for a set of durable products multiple measures are thus used to test the stability and consistency of product groups a matrix of product similarity values is constructed for each of these two survey based measures cluster analysis is then performed to develop a grouping scheme for these durable goods althought differences are observed the product composition of the resulting product groups a

general equilibrium rebound from energy efficiency innovation abstract energy efficiency improvements rebound when economic responses undercut their direct energy savings i show that general equilibrium channels typically amplify rebound by making consumption goods cheaper but typically dampen rebound by increasing demand for non energy inputs to production and by changing the size of the energy supply sector improvements in the efficiency of the energy supply sector generate especially large rebound because they make energy cheaper in all other sectors quantitatively general equilibrium channels reduce rebound in u s consumption good sectors from 39 to 28 but increase rebound in the energy supply sector from 42 to 80

the possibility of informationally efficient markets abstract a rational expectations equilibrium with positive demand for financial information does exist under fully revealing asset price contrary to a wide held conjecture whereas a continuum of investors is inconsistent with fully revealing equilibrium finitely many investors with average portfolios demand information in equilibrium if they can adjust portfolio size in an additive signal return model more information diminishes the expected excess return of a risky asset so that investors who only have a choice of portfolio composition or whose asset endowments strongly differ from the average portfolio are worse off under fully revealing price information market equilibria both with and without information acquisition are pareto efficient

convergence to efficiency in a simple market with incomplete information a model of trade with m buyers and m sellers is considered in which price is set to equate revealed demand and supply in a bayesian nash equilibrium each trader acts not as a price taker but instead misrepresents his true demand supply to influence price in his favor this causes inefficiency we show that in any equilibrium the amount by which a trader misreports is o 1 m and the corresponding inefficiency is o 1 m2 the indeterminacy and the inefficiency that is caused by the traders bargaining behavior in small markets thus rapidly vanishes as the market increases in size

stochastic stability in a double auction abstract in a k double auction a buyer and a seller must simultaneously announce a bid and an ask price respectively exchange of the indivisible good takes place if and only if the bid is at least as high as the ask the trading price being the bid price with probability k and the ask price with probability 1 k we show that the stable equilibria of a complete information k double approximate an asymmetric nash bargaining solution with the seller s bargaining power decreasing in k note that ceteris paribus the payoffs of the seller of the one shot game increase in k nevertheless as the stochastically stable equilibrium price decreases in k choosing the seller s favorite price with a relatively higher probability in individual encounters makes him worse off in the long run

optimal trading mechanisms with ex ante unidentified traders abstract we analyze optimal trading mechanisms in an exchange economy where each trader owns some units of a good to be traded and may be either a seller or a buyer depending on the realization of the privately observed valuations the concept of virtual valuation is extended to ex ante unidentified traders the traders virtual valuations now depend on the choice of the trading mechanism and are generally nonmonotonic we show that the trading mechanisms that maximize a broker s expected profit or expected total gains from trade are generalized double auctions which maximize the gains from trade measured in some modified monotonic virtual valuations for the traders the bunching phenomena will be a general feature in these mechanisms we also show that the optimal mechanisms converge towards simple bid ask price mechanisms as the number of participants in the market increases journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 d82

existence of equilibrium in single and double private value auctions we show existence of equilibria in distributional strategies for a wide class of private value auctions including the first general existence result for double auctions the set of equilibria is invariant to the tie breaking rule the model incorporates multiple unit demands all standard pricing rules reserve prices entry costs and stochastic demand and supply valuations can be correlated and asymmetrically distributed for double auctions we show further that at least one equilibrium involves a positive volume of trade the existence proof establishes new connections among existence techniques for discontinuous bayesian games

optimality versus practicality in market design a comparison of two double auctions we consider a market for indivisible items with m buyers and m sellers traders privately know their values costs which are statistically dependent two mechanisms are considered the buyer s bid double auction collects bids and asks from traders and determines the allocation by selecting a market clearing price it fails to achieve all possible gains from trade because of strategic bidding the designed mechanism is a revelation mechanism in which honest reporting of values costs is incentive compatible and all gains from trade are achieved this optimality however comes at the expense of plausibility i the monetary transfers among the traders are defined in terms of the traders beliefs about each other s value cost ii a trader may suffer a loss ex post iii the mechanism may run a surplus deficit ex post we compare the virtues of the simple yet mildly inefficient buyer s bid double auction to the flawed yet perfectly efficient designed mechanism

market efficiency and the u s market for sulfur dioxide allowances focusing on the u s sulfur dioxide so2 allowance market from its inception in 1994 to 2009 we model allowance prices to determine the influence of market fundamentals on allowance price level and volatility we find evidence that the so2 market operates in ways that are not inconsistent with an efficient market prices that reflect marginal abatement costs after the first few years of the program but before a court decision that introduced significant uncertainty into the market in mid 2008 our empirical analysis finds that the so2 market similar to other emission markets studied in the literature can remain relatively inefficient for several years after launch we also find that market volatility increases in response to all types of communications from the administrator suggesting that the development of a formal communication strategy possibly similar to that used by central banks would reduce price volatility and increase the efficiency of the market

pollution claim settlements reconsidered hidden information and bounded payments abstract a principal s production decision imposes a negative externality on an agent the principal may be a pollution generating firm the agent may be a nearby town the principal offers a contract to the agent who has the right to be free of pollution then the agent privately learns the disutility of pollution finally a production level and a transfer payment are implemented suppose there is an upper bound possibly zero on payments that the agent can make to the principal in the second best solution there is underproduction for low cost types while there is overproduction for high cost types in contrast to standard adverse selection models of pollution claim settlements there may thus be too much pollution compared to the first best solution

revenue and efficiency in multi unit uniform price auctions abstract this paper analyzes efficiency in a uniform price multi unit auction with a positive reservation price i demonstrate that the reservation price is an important policy tool that may increase efficiency or welfare in multi unit uniform price auctions i show that the higher the reservation price is the higher is the seller s revenue and the higher is the efficiency of a final allocation of units that could be attained in a multi unit uniform price auction the reservation price increases the bidder s equilibrium strategy in a specific way that is inherent to the uniform price auction thus the reservation price effect on efficiency is in contrast to other auction formats e g the reservation price decreases efficiency in the vickrey auction and single unit auctions with symmetric bidders therefore the main result can be added to the list of results from mechanism design and auction theory that fail to extend the single unit single dimensional context to the multi unit multi dimensional one

auctions actions and the failure of information aggregation we study a market where k identical and indivisible objects are allocated using a uniform price auction where n k bidders each demand one object before the auction each bidder receives an informative but imperfect signal about the state of the world the good that is auctioned is a common value object for the bidders and a bidder s valuation for the object is determined jointly by the state of the world and an action that he chooses after winning the object but before he observes the state we show that there are equilibria where the auction price is completely uninformative about the state of the world and aggregates no information even in an arbitrarily large auction in the equilibrium that we construct because prices do not aggregate information agents have strict incentives to acquire costly information before they participate in the market also market statistics other than price such as the amount of rationing and bid distributions contain extra information about the state our findings sharply contrast with past work which shows that large auctions aggregate information when there is no ex post action

modelling the relationship between energy intensity and gdp for european countries an historical perspective 1800 2000 abstract in this paper we discuss an original article by gales et al 2007 concerning the relationship between total energy intensity and gdp per capita in their chiefly descriptive analysis of four european countries sweden the netherlands italy and spain over the last two centuries no inverted u curve relationship was found between total energy intensity sum of traditional and modern energy sources and gdp per capita by contrast in addition to considering total energy intensity we also distinguish between modern energy intensity and traditional energy intensity further we integrate qualitative analysis with empirical analysis i e the ardl cointegration procedure in order to make our results more robust the main conclusions of gales et al 2007 are only partially confirmed considering total energy intensity can lead to erroneous conclusions in particular our estimates show a u shaped relationship between total energy intensity and gdp per capita in addition when we decompose total energy intensity two different relationships emerge a hyperbolic pattern traditional energy carriers and a u shaped inverse pattern modern energy carriers we conclude that the decreasing branch of the u shaped relationship between total energy intensity and gdp per capita is driven by traditional energy sources when the latter dominate modern energy sources low levels of gdp per capita in contrast the ascending branch of the u shaped relationship is driven by modern energy sources when prevailing over traditional sources high levels of gdp per capita

information revelation in auctions with common and private values we explore the incentives to reveal verifiable private information when there are both common and private components to agents valuations and when private information is held in both dimensions when agents observe only one signal they have no incentive to reveal the signal because such a revelation would negate their information advantage however when agents observe multiple signals they may be incentivized to reveal certain signals that could lower their opponents bids and thereby result in a higher profit from other signals this paper shows that there exists an equilibrium with revelation of common value signals in standard auctions which is an efficient equilibrium that maximizes the social welfare and could provide the seller with a higher profit than a situation with no information revelation

competitive rational expectations equilibria without apology abstract consider a financial market with n risk averse asymmetrically informed traders when n grows at the same rate as noise trading prices in competitive and in strategic rational expectations equilibrium converge to each other at a rate of 1 n equilibria in the two scenarios are close when noise trading volume per informed trader is large in relation to risk bearing capacity both equilibria converge to the competitive equilibrium of a limit continuum economy as the market becomes large at a slower rate of 1 n the results extend to endogenous information acquisition and the connections with the grossman stiglitz paradox are highlighted

on the possibility of informationally efficient markets this paper presents conditions for a resolution of the grossman stiglitz paradox of informationally efficient markets we display a market with asymmetric information where a privately revealing equilibrium obtains in a competitive framework and where incentives to acquire information are preserved as long as the correlation in traders valuations is not too large the equilibrium is efficient and the problems associated with fully revealing rational expectations equilibria are precluded without resorting necessarily to noise traders the robustness of the results to general information structures is established and the effect of market power is examined in a large market approximation to the competitive economy the model is applied to explain changes in bidding behavior in central bank liquidity auctions in the crisis period jel d82 d84 g14 e59

almost dominant strategy implementation exchange economies abstract we relax strategy proofness a form of dominant strategy implementation by allowing small gains from manipulation in 2 agent exchange economies this relaxation is shown to have a discontinuous effect on the range of efficient rules demonstrating a type of non robustness in previous impossibility results when gains are measured with respect to a single good and preferences are linear we characterize a particular rule as being the most equitable among all efficient rules satisfying the relaxation

five centuries of energy prices concerns about rising energy prices tend to occur in times of economic expansion to disappear in times of recession a recurring fear is that in the long run real energy prices will trend upwards this paper presents evidence from five hundred years of prices of energy sources for the united kingdom over this time period there is little support for any general trend of rising fuel prices and some evidence of significant declines using this information on prices and consumer expenditure to weight the series an average price of energy series has been created reflecting the substitution away from more scarce fuels driving prices down and towards more valuable ones driving prices up over more than five hundred years and albeit with significant long lived fluctuations there seems little evidence of a rising long run trend in the real price of energy

stability in large matching markets with complementarities labor markets can often be viewed as many to one matching markets it is well known that if complementarities are present in such markets a stable matching may not exist we study large random matching markets with couples we introduce a new matching algorithm and show that if the number of couples grows slower than the size of the market a stable matching will be found with high probability if however the number of couples grows at a linear rate with constant probability not depending on the market size no stable matching exists our results explain data from the market for psychology interns

efficiency in auctions with private and common values an experimental study this discussion has resulted in a publication in the american economic review 2002 92 3 625 43 auctions are generally not efficient when the object s expected value depends on private and common value information we report a series of first price auction experiments to measure the degree of inefficiency that occurs with financially motivated bidders while some subjects fall prey to the winner s curse they weigh their private and common value information in roughly the same manner as rational bidders with observed efficiencies close to predicted levels increased competition and reduced uncertainty about the common value positively affect revenues and efficiency the public release of information about the common value also raises efficiency although less than predicted

the relevance of a choice of auction format in a competitive environment we examine the relevance of an auction format in a competitive environment by comparing uniform and discriminatory price auctions with many bidders in a private values setting we show that if the number of objects for sale is small relative to the number of bidders then all equilibria of both auctions are approximately efficient and lead to approximately the same revenue when the number of objects for sale is proportional to the number of bidders then the particulars of the auction format matter all equilibria of the uniform auction are efficient while all of the equilibria of the discriminatory auction are inefficient the relative revenue rankings of the auction formats can go in either direction depending on the specifics of the environment these conclusions regarding the efficiency and revenue ranking are in contrast to the previous literature which focused on the case of independent information across agents

existence of equilibrium in large double auctions abstract we show the existence of a pure strategy symmetric increasing equilibrium in double auction markets with correlated conditionally independent private values and many participants the equilibrium we find is arbitrarily close to fully revealing as the market size grows our results provide strategic foundations for price taking behavior in large markets

harmful competition in insurance markets there is a general presumption that competition is a good thing in this paper we show that competition in the insurance markets can be bad and that adverse selection is in general worse under competition than under monopoly the reason is that monopoly can exploit its market power to relax incentive constraints by cross subsidization between different risk types cream skimming behavior on the contrary prevents competitive firms from using implicit transfers in effect monopoly is shown to provide better coverage to those buying insurance but at the cost of limiting participation to insurance performing simulation for different distributions of risk we find that monopoly in general performs much better than competition in terms of the realization of the gains from trade across all traders in equilibrium

tail expectation and imperfect competition in limit order book markets abstract perfect competition in liquidity provision in limit order markets is characterized by a tail expectation condition glosten 1994 in this paper we model imperfect competition in schedules by infinitely many liquidity suppliers quoting on a limit order book we show that there are zero rent mixed strategy equilibria featuring finite numbers of active liquidity suppliers none of the equilibria satisfies the competitive outcome not even on average considering a sequence of equilibria with the number of active liquidity suppliers becoming large we show that the aggregate stochastic marginal price schedule converges to the deterministic competitive marginal price schedule

matching with couples stability and incentives in large markets accommodating couples has been a longstanding issue in the design of centralized labor market clearinghouses for doctors and psychologists because couples view pairs of jobs as complements a stable matching may not exist when couples are present this paper s main result is that a stable matching exists when there are relatively few couples and preference lists are suciently short relative to market size we also discuss incentives in markets with couples we relate these theoretical results to the job market for psychologists in which stable matchings exist for all years of the data despite the presence of couples

the rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms abstract we study the steady state of a market with incoming cohorts of buyers and sellers who are matched pairwise and bargain under private information a friction parameter is the length of the time period until the next meeting we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the convergence of mechanism outcomes to perfect competition at the linear rate in which is shown to be the fastest possible among all bargaining mechanisms the condition requires that buyers and sellers always retain some bargaining power the bargaining mechanisms that satisfy this condition are called nonvanishing bargaining power nbp mechanisms simple random proposer take it or leave it protocols are nbp while k double auctions k da are not we find that k das have equilibria that converge to perfect competition at a linear rate converge at a slower rate or even do not converge at all

on the value of competition in procurement auctions it is commonly stated that ascending price or second price auctions allocate goods e ciently to those who value them most this implies that the more bidders at the auction stage the more e cient the nal allocation we review this statement when bidders have private information both on a private element and a common element while the nal allocation need not be ex post e cient we show that when bidders are ex ante symmetric more competition at the auction yields higher e ciency on expectation when bidders are ex ante asymmetric in particular with respect to the information on the common element the statement need no longer be true

market power and information revelation in dynamic trading we study a strategic model of dynamic trading where agents are asymmetrically informed over common value sources of uncertainty there is a continuum of buyers and a finite number n of sellers all buyers are uninformed while at least one seller is privately informed about the true state of the world when n 1 full information revelation never occurs in equilibrium and the only information transmission happens in the first period with n 1 the outcome depends both on the structure of the sellers information and even more importantly on the intensity of competition allowed by the existing trading rules when there is intense competition absence of clienteles information is fully and immediately revealed to the buyers in every equilibrium for n large enough regardless of the number of informed sellers on the other hand for trading arrangements characterized by less intense forms of competition presence of clienteles for any n we always have equilibria where information is never fully revealed moreover in that case when only one seller is informed for many parameter configurations there are no equilibria with full information revelation even for large n jel c72 c78 d82 d83

the efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information we consider the efficiency properties of exchange economies where privately informed traders behave strategically specifically a competitive mechanism is any mapping of traders reports about their types to an equilibrium price vector and allocation of the reported economy in our model some traders may have non vanishing impact on prices and allocations regardless of the size of the economy although truthful reporting by all traders cannot be achieved we show that given any desired level of approximation there is n such that any bayesian nash equilibrium of any competitive mechanism of any private information economy with n or more traders leads with high probability to prices and allocations that are close to a competitive equilibrium of the true economy in particular allocations are approximately efficient a key assumption is that there is small probability that traders behave non strategically

overbidding and inefficiencies in multi unit vickrey auctions for normal goods abstract i examine bid behavior in uniform price auctions and multi unit vickrey auctions without the standard quasilinearity restriction on bidder preferences instead of assuming quasilinearity i assume that bidders have weakly positive wealth effects i e the goods are normal goods my setting nests quasilinearity but also allows for budget constraints financial constraints and risk aversion i show that without the quasilinearity restriction truthful reporting is not a dominant strategy in the vickrey auction instead bidders truthfully demand for their first unit and weakly overreport their demand for later units the incentive to overreport demand means that the vickrey auction is generally inefficient this mirrors the well known demand reduction results in uniform price auctions moreover the efficiency ranking of the two auctions is ambiguous in fact there are cases where the uniform price auction is pareto efficient and the vickrey auction is pareto inefficient even if only one bidder has non quasilinear preferences

the loser s curse and information aggregation in common value auctions we consider an auction in which k identical objects of unknown value are auctioned off to n bidders the k highest bidders get an object and pay the k 1st bid bidders receive a signal that provides information about the value of the object we characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of this auction we then consider a sequence of auctions a r with n r bidders and k r objects we show that price converges in probability to the true value of the object if and only if both k r and n r k r i e both the number of objects and the number of bidders who do not receive an object go to infinity

monotonicity and rationalizability in a large first price auction this paper proves that the monotonicity of bidding strategies together with the rationality of bidders implies that the winning bid in a first price auction converges to the competitive equilibrium price as the number of bidders increases wilson 1977 instead of analysing the symmetric nash equilibrium we examine rationalizable strategies bernheim 1984 pearce 1984 among the set of monotonic bidding strategies to prove that any monotonic rationalizable bidding strategy must be within a small neighbourhood of the truthful valuation of the object conditioned on the signal received by the bidder we obtain an information aggregation result similar to that of wilson 1977 while dispensing with almost all symmetric assumptions and using a milder solution concept than the nash equilibrium in particular if every bidder is ex ante identical then any rationalizable bidding strategy must be within a small neighbourhood of the symmetric nash equilibrium in a symmetric first price auction the symmetry of outcomes is implied rather than assumed copyright 2005 wiley blackwell

dynamic matching two sided incomplete information and participation costs existence and convergence to perfect competition consider a decentralized dynamic market with an infinite horizon and participation costs in which both buyers and sellers have private information concerning their values for the indivisible traded good time is discrete each period has length and each unit of time continuums of new buyers and sellers consider entry traders whose expected utility is negative choose not to enter within a period each buyer is matched anonymously with a seller and each seller is matched with zero one or more buyers every seller runs a first price auction with a reservation price and if trade occurs both the seller and the winning buyer exit the market with their realized utility traders who fail to trade continue in the market to be rematched we characterize the steady state equilibria that are perfect bayesian we show that as converges to zero equilibrium prices at which trades occur converge to the walrasian price and the realized allocations converge to the competitive allocation we also show the existence of equilibria for sufficiently small provided the discount rate is small relative to the participation

efficiency of large private value auctions we consider discriminatory and uniform price auctions for multiple identical units of a good players have private values possibly asymmetrically distributed and for multiple units our setting allows for aggregate uncertainty about demand and supply in this setting equlibria generally will be inefficient despite this we show that such auctions become arbitrarily close to efficient if they are large and use this to derive an asymptotic characterization of revenue and bidding behavior

multiunit pay your bid auction with one dimensional multiunit demands an arbitrary number of units of a good is sold to two bidders through a discriminatory auction the bidders are homogeneous ex ante and their demand functions are two step functions that depend on a single parameter we characterize the symmetric bayesian equilibrium and prove its existence and uniqueness we compare this equilibrium with the equilibrium of the multiunit vickrey auction and with the equilibria of the single unit first price and second price auctions we examine the consequences of bundling all units into one package we study the impacts that variations of the relative supply have on the equilibrium on the bidders average payoffs per unit and on the efficiency of the equilibrium allocation

the essentiality of money in environments with centralized trade abstract lagos and wright 2005 introduced an influential model of monetary exchange in which trade alternates between centralized and decentralized markets and money is essential a limitation of their model and of the literature that follows is that they do not provide a microfoundation for the process of exchange in the centralized market in this paper we show that how one models exchange in the centralized market matters for the essentiality of money by describing the centralized market as a strategic market game and studying conditions under which money is essential

numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions abstract we propose numerical algorithms for solving first price auction problems where bidders draw independent valuations from heterogeneous distributions the heterogeneity analyzed in this work is what might naturally emerge when subsets of distributionally homogeneous bidders collude bid functions and expected revenues are calculated for two special cases extensions to more general asymmetric first price auctions are discussed journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 c63 c72 d82

preference trees preference hierarchies and consumer behavior n a recent article coursey 1985 i considered consumer behavior in a model in which preferences are described by an activity hierarchy using this activity hierarchy description consumers were found to sequentially satisfy higher ranked activities in their preference ordering up to the point that their monetary and time resources were exhausted among the more interesting implications of this behavior were that 1 if a consumer s economic resources are subsequently increased then additional consumption will commence at the point where the consumer s resources were initially exhausted 2 a change in the price of a commodity used in an activity will have a pure substitution effect in the production of that activity and a spillover income effect at the point of resource exhaustion and 3 comparative statics effects of any change are unidirectional and will affect behavior only from the point where the effects enter the consumer s sphere forward to the point of exhaustion of economic resources the results were derived under the assumption that each commodity can be used in the production of only one activity in their follow up article brooks and earl 1987 relaxed this assumption and considered the implications of jointness in consumption in the context of the activity hierarchy model in their extension a commodity may be used as a perfect substitute at different places in the activity hierarchy they concluded that my general results become less clear when commodities can be used in this fashion i fully concur with their motive for this extension and welcome their remarks as a further contribution to the field of choice regarding priorities 2 in this brief article i wish to outline fully how their results should be interpreted one interpretation involves the theoretical relationship between the activity hierarchy model and the more traditional to economists utility maximization model the second interpretation involves the use of the activity hierarchy model and its extensions for empirical analysis

toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium a step toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium is taken by considering a double auction with n buyers and m sellers with interdependent values and affiliated private information if there are sufficiently many buyers and sellers and their bids are restricted to a sufficiently fine discrete set of prices then generically there is an equilibrium in nondecreasing bidding functions that is arbitrarily close to the unique fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium of the limit market with unrestricted bids and a continuum of agents in particular the large double auction equilibrium is almost efficient and almost fully aggregates the agents information

price formation in single call markets this paper reports a laboratory experiment designed to examine the price formation process in a simple market institution the single call market the experiment features random values and costs each period so each period generates a new price formation observation other design features are intended to enhance the predictive power of the bayesian nash equilibrium bne theory developed recently for this trading institution we find that the data support several qualitative implications of the bne but that subjects bid and ask behavior is not as responsive to changes in the pricing rule as the bne predictions bids and asks tend to reveal more of the underlying values and costs than predicted particularly when subjects are experienced nevertheless observed trading efficiency falls below the bne prediction the results offer more support for the bne when subjects compete against nash robot opponents a simple learning model accounts for several of the deviations from bne

markups in double auction markets abstract we study the continuous double auction cda market with simulated traders using three simple markup rules relative to analytic results obtained for markups in the simpler call market cm we find that uniform cda markups have a more complex and non monotonic impact on cda market outcomes such as price volume and efficiency the symmetric nash equilibrium markup in the cda is remarkably close to the most efficient markup in thick markets which may partially explain the mysterious efficiency for cda market

the demand for stocks an analysis of ipo auctions we analyze a unique dataset that includes the full demand schedules of 27 israeli ipos that were conducted as nondiscriminatory uniform price auctions to the best of our knowledge this is the first time the whole demand schedule for any asset is described the demand schedules are relatively flat around the auction clearing price the average elasticity is 27 the elasticity is low when the return distribution contains a large unique component we also find a significant average abnormal return of 4 5 on the first trading day and a positive correlation between the abnormal return and the elasticity of demand article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

imperfect competition and efficiency in lemons markets this article studies the impact of competition on the degree of inefficiency in lemons markets more precisely we characterise the second best mechanism i e the optimal mechanism with private information in a stylised lemons market with finite numbers of buyers and sellers we then study the relationship between the degree of efficiency of the second best mechanism and market competitiveness a general message of our results is that increasing competition may not help lemons markets in some circumstances moreover increasing competition beyond a certain degree increases the distance between the first best and second best levels of efficiency

the effectiveness of english auctions abstract we study the performance of the english auction under different assumptions about the seller s degree of bayesian sophistication we define the effectiveness of an auction as the ratio between the expected revenue it generates for the seller and the expected valuation of the object to the bidder with the highest valuation total surplus we identify tight lower bounds on the effectiveness of the english auction for general private values environments and for private values environments where bidders valuations are non negatively correlated for example when the seller faces 12 bidders who the seller believes have non negatively correlated valuations whose expectations are at least as high as 60 of the maximal possible valuation an english auction with no reserve price generates an expected price that is more than 80 of the value of the object to the bidder with the highest valuation

internet auctions with many traders abstract we study a multi unit auction environment similar to ebay sellers each with a single unit of a homogeneous good set reserve prices at their own second price auctions each buyer has private value for the good and wishes to acquire a single unit buyers can bid as often as they like and move between auctions we characterize a perfect bayesian equilibrium for this decentralized dynamic mechanism in which conditional on reserve prices an efficient set of trades occurs at a uniform price in a large but finite market the sellers set reserve prices equal to their true costs under a very mild distributional assumption so ex post efficiency is achieved buyers strategies in this equilibrium are simple and do not depend on their beliefs about other buyers valuations or the number of buyers and sellers

rational expectations information acquisition and competitive bidding most rational expectations market equilibrium models are not models of price formation and naive mechanisms leading to such equilibria can be severely manipulable in this paper a bidding model is developed which has the market like features that bidders act as price takers and that prices convey information higher equilibrium prices convey more favorable information about the quality of the objects being sold than do lower prices bidders can benefit from trading only if they have a transactions motive or if they have access to inside information apart from exceptional cases prices are not fully revealing a two stage model is developed in which bidders may acquire information at a cost before bidding and for which the equilibrium price is fully revealing resolving a well known paradox

the 2007 nobel memorial prize in mechanism design theory this paper provides an overview of mechanism design theory and explains the roles played by leonid hurwicz eric maskin and roger myerson in the development of this field

historical energy price shocks and their changing effects on the economy abstract the purpose of this paper is to identify the changes in the impact of energy shocks on economic activity with an interest in assessing if an economy s vulnerability and resilience to shocks improved with economic development using data on the united kingdom over the last three hundred years the paper identifies supply aggregate demand and residual shocks to energy prices and estimates their changing influence on energy prices and gdp the results suggest that the impacts of supply shocks rose with its increasing dependence on coal and declined with its partial transition to oil however the transition from exporting coal to importing oil increased the negative impacts of demand shocks more generally the results indicate that improvements in vulnerability and resilience to shocks did not progress systematically as the economy developed instead the changes in impacts depended greatly on the circumstances related to the demand for and supply of energy sources if these experiences are transferable to future markets a transition to a diversified mix of renewable energy is likely to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience to energy price shocks

on the implications of jointness in a normative model of behavior based on an activity hierarchy t he widespread belief that it is often useful to kill two birds with one stone makes it clear that most consumers recognize that there exists considerable scope for using an input gainfully in the production of more than one consumption activity however economic theorists often forget this lay belief as they set up their formal models and consequently they come to inappropriate conclusions this recently occurred in coursey s 1985 normative analysis of consumer behavior in this journal where he models priority based choice over activities this article indicates how the implications of his model may be modified if activities use a common input 2 in contrast to coursey we show that priority based choice does not necessarily imply that 1 an increase in an individual s income will lead to a reduction in the percentage of a consumer s budget spent on inframarginal activities or 2 a change in the price of a commodity producing a marginal activity will only lead to changes in an individual s consumption of marginal and extramarginal commodities put simply it appears that coursey s general results are valid only when one adopts his implicit assumption that there is no jointness in production

mechanism choice and strategic bidding in divisible good auctions an empirical analysis of the turkish treasury auction market we propose an estimation method to bound bidders marginal valuations in discriminatory auctions using individual bid level data and apply the method to data from the turkish treasury auction market using estimated bounds on marginal values we compute an upper bound on the inefficiency of realized allocations as well as bounds on how much additional revenue could have been realized in a counterfactual uniform price or vickrey auction we conclude that switching from a discriminatory auction to a uniform price or vickrey auction would not significantly increase revenue moreover such a switch would increase bidder expected surplus by at most 0 02 percent

local discouragement and global collapse a theory of coordination avalanches abstract we study a dynamic game in which all players initially possess the same information and coordinate on a high level of activity eventually players with a long string of bad experiences become inactive this prospect can cause a coordination avalanche in which all activity in the population stops coordination avalanches are part of pareto efficient equilibria they can occur at any point in the game their occurrence does not depend on the true state of nature and allowing players to exchange information may merely hasten their onset we present applications to search markets organizational meltdown and inefficient computer upgrades jel d83

convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate abstract consider a decentralized dynamic market with an infinite horizon and incomplete information in which buyers and sellers values for the traded good are private and independently drawn time is discrete each period has length and each unit of time a large number of new buyers and sellers enter the market within a period each buyer is matched with a seller and each seller is matched with zero one or more buyers every seller runs a first price auction with a reservation price and if trade occurs the seller and winning buyer exit with their realized utility traders who fail to trade either continue in the market to be rematched or exit at an exogenous rate we show that in all steady state perfect bayesian equilibria as approaches zero equilibrium prices converge to the walrasian price and realized allocations converge to the competitive allocation

multiunit auctions in which almost every bid wins 1 introduction recent work suggests that multiunit auctions are much more complicated than their singleunit counterparts back and zender 1993 katzman 1995 noussair 1995 ausubel and cramton 1996 chakraborty 1997 engelbrecht wiggans and kahn 1998a because multiunit auctions are of such importance in economics and finance applications treasury auctions auctions for electromagnetic spectrum electric power privatizations procurement it becomes important for economic theorists to be able to make legitimate predictions about the performance of various commonly used auction forms this is an enormous task to date only certain natural but extreme cases have yielded to analysis for example restriction to auctions in which purchasers only want one or two units engelbrecht wiggans and kahn 1998a b katzman 1995 other results have been demonstrated asymptotically 1 a problematic case since expanding the number of bidders eliminates the very feature that generates a need for organized auctions a limited number of purchasers thus to have a comprehensive understanding of the behavior of multiunit auctions it will likely be necessary to devote attention to a large variety of cases as part of that process this paper examines a different sector of the parameter space one unexamined thus far but one that is readily amenable to solution by simple analytic techniques without resort to asymptotic approximations we consider auctions in which the number of units available is so large that every bid but one wins a unit we examine in the case of independent private values three different auctions the pay your bid auction section 3 and two different forms of uniform price auction sections 4 and 5 we find that when all but one bid wins the three auctions are efficient in section 6 we use a multiunit revenue equivalence result of engelbrecht wiggans 1988 to calculate their expected revenue by comparison to a vickrey auction vickrey 1961 1962 in most previously studied cases specifically those in which each bidder wins at most one object vickrey auctions turn out to be uniform price auctions in the case where all but one bid wins the vickrey auction differs significantly from uniform price auctions for example in the case of two bidders and a reservation price of zero efficiency implies that each bidder in the vickrey auction wins approximately half of the units nonetheless we show that all the revenue from the vickrey auction comes from one bidder the other pays nothing the analysis of the vickrey auction shows the importance of the reserve price in a multiunit setting we also find that the bids from the two forms of uniform price auction are identical providing some justification for the common practice of using one as a proxy for the other in theoretical work section 8 shows that this equivalence continues to hold for some cases beyond the pure private values setting of the rest of the paper of course the case where every bid but one wins is an extreme example nonetheless as we briefly argue in the final section the equivalence of the two uniform price auctions in this case is still significant since the extreme example we consider is in important ways biased against similarity of the two auction forms the final section also provides some conjectures about when the two forms of uniform price auction are likely to yield similar bids 9 summary in this paper we have used the case of auctions in which almost every bid wins as a natural laboratory for comparison of different auction rules we have seen three useful points the first is extremely simple if a player is guaranteed to win a unit the reserve price plays a central role in determining revenue in single unit auctions with more than one bidder reserve prices play no role as long as they are below the support of the bidders valuations in contrast when some bidder is assured of winning at least one unit no matter what that bidder bids we need a lower limit on the bids to keep revenue from drifting to minus infinity

bilateral trading and incomplete information price convergence in a small market abstract we study a model of decentralised bilateral interactions in a small market where one of the sellers has private information about her value in addition to this seller with private information there are two identical buyers and another seller whose valuation is commonly known to be in between the two possible valuations of the seller with private information we consider an infinite horizon game with simultaneous one sided offers and simultaneous responses we construct one particular pbe of the game and show that as the discount factor goes to 1 prices in all transactions converge to the same value we then show that this is the case with any stationary equilibrium of the game that is the asymptotic outcome is unique across all stationary equilibria

informational robustness of competitive equilibria abstract consider an exchange economy with complete information we perturb this economy by assuming that each agent s observation about the true state of the world is noisy the paper investigates the robustness of equilibria of the complete information economy with respect to incomplete information we provide conditions under which complete information equilibria are limits of equilibria of the economies with incomplete information as the noise in the signal converges to zero journal of economic literature classification numbers d51 d82

a low carbon industrial revolution insights and challenges from past technological and economic transformations recent efforts to promote a transition to a low carbon economy have been influenced by suggestions that a low carbon transition offers challenges and might yield economic benefits comparable to those of the previous industrial revolutions this paper examines these arguments and the challenges facing a low carbon transition by drawing on recent thinking on the technological economic and institutional factors that enabled and sustained the first british industrial revolution and the role of general purpose technologies in stimulating and sustaining this and subsequent industrial transformation processes that have contributed to significant macroeconomic gains these revolutions involved profound long drawn out changes in economy technology and society and although their energy transitions led to long run economic benefits they took many decades to develop to reap significant long run economic benefits from a low carbon transition sooner rather than later would require systemic efforts and incentives for low carbon innovation and substitution of high carbon technologies we conclude that while achieving a low carbon transition may require societal changes on a scale comparable with those of previous industrial revolutions this transition does not yet resemble previous industrial revolutions a successful low carbon transition would however amount to a different kind of industrial revolution

asymptotic efficiency for discriminatory private value auctions we consider discriminatory auctions for multiple identical units of a good players have private values possibly for multiple units none of the usual assumptions about symmetry of players distributions over values or symmetry of equilibrium play are made because of this equilibria will typically involve inefficient allocations equilibria also become very difficult to solve for using an approach which does not depend on explicit equilibrium calculations we show that such auctions become arbitrarily close to efficient as the number of players and possibly the number of objects grows large and provide a simple characterization of limit equilibria

modularity and greed in double auctions abstract designing double auctions is a complex problem especially when there are restrictions on the sets of buyers and sellers that may trade with one another the goal of this paper is to develop a modular approach to the design of double auctions by relating it to the exhaustively studied problem of designing one sided mechanisms with a single seller or alternatively a single buyer we consider several desirable properties of a double auction feasibility dominant strategy incentive compatibility the still stronger incentive constraints offered by a deferred acceptance implementation exact and approximate welfare maximization and budget balance for each of these properties we identify sufficient conditions on two one sided algorithms one for ranking the buyers one for ranking the sellers and on a method for their composition into trading pairs which guarantee the desired property of the double auction our framework also offers new insights into classic double auction designs such as the vcg and mcafee auctions with unit demand buyers and unit supply sellers

buybacks with costly participation abstract posted price offers and first price auctions along with the multi unit discriminatory auction extension are two widely used mechanisms for allocating conservation contracts the choice between the two typically hinges on the trade off between the posted price s simplicity and the potential revenue gains of the auction in this paper we introduce a novel mechanism that attempts to bridge the gap between the performance of posted price offers and auctions a two price and lottery schedule combines the simplicity of the former with some of the flexibility of the latter using a model that incorporates agents cognitive and information costs of bidding we analyze how the ranking of allocative efficiency and cost effectiveness between the mechanisms varies as the wedge of participation costs increases when the number of bidders is endogenously determined by participation costs bid shading associated with a lack of competition in the auction compromises its cost effectiveness vis a vis the posted price and the lottery schedule we use data from three recent buybacks for fishing licenses conducted in maryland to calibrate our model and identify conditions under which the two price schedule outperforms the other mechanisms

sunspots in the laboratory we show that extrinsic or nonfundamental uncertainty influences markets in a controlled environment this work provides the first direct evidence of sunspot equilibria these equilibria require a common understanding of the semantics of the sunspot variable and they appear to be sensitive to the flow of information sunspots always occur in a closed book call market but they happen only occasionally in a double auction where inframarginal bids and offers are observable

incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism abstract the probabilistic serial mechanism bogomolnaia and moulin 2001 9 is ordinally efficient but not strategy proof we study incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism for large assignment problems we establish that for a fixed set of object types and an agent with a given expected utility function if there are sufficiently many copies of each object type then reporting ordinal preferences truthfully is a weakly dominant strategy for the agent regardless of the number of other agents and their preferences the non manipulability and the ordinal efficiency of the probabilistic serial mechanism support its implementation instead of random serial dictatorship in large assignment problems

auctions for initial sale of annual catch entitlement we use a laboratory experiment calibrated to a representative new zealand fishery to assess three sealed bid multi unit demand auction mechanisms under consideration for allocating quota for species being introduced into the quota management system these auctions allocate the k units to the k highest bids but prices are determined according to discriminative kth price and k 1st price rules in our experiment the auctions are equally efficient but revenue is highest in the discriminative auction and lowest in the k 1st price auction results are robust to industry subjects and subjects are responsive to the across unit bidding incentives present in multi unit demand auctions

bilateral matching and bargaining with private information we study equilibria of a dynamic matching and bargaining game dmbg with two sided private information bilateral bargaining the model is a private information replica of mortensen and wright 2002 there are two kinds of frictions time

first price auctions in the asymmetric n bidder case i consider the first price auction when the bidders valuations may be differently distributed i show that every bayesian equilibrium is an essentially pure equilibrium formed by bid functions whose inverses are solutions of a system of differential equations with boundary conditions i then prove the existence of an equilibrium i prove its uniqueness when the valuation distributions have a mass point at the lower extremity of the support i give sufficient conditions for uniqueness when every valuation distribution is one of two atomless distributions i establish inequalities between equilibrium strategies when relations of stochastic dominance exist between valuation distributions

on the trade off between deficit and inefficiency and the double auction with a fixed transaction fee in many trading environments any incentive compatible and individually rational market mechanism will be either inefficient or will run a deficit we prove that as the market size m gets large for any fixed surplus or deficit x m times the minimal absolute inefficiency converges to c x where c is essentially a quadratic function of textitx we introduce a new mechanism the double auction with a fixed transaction fee by choosing the size of the fee appropriately any level of deficit or surplus can be implemented and the resulting mechanisms achieve the above bound corollaries include an asymptotic version of the myerson satterthwaite impossibility theorem a description of the minimal subsidy required to implement the efficient trading rule a characterization of the minimal inefficiency obtainable with budget balanced market mechanisms recommendations on the optimal organization of trade and insights on the effects of taxation

revenue equivalence in multi object auctions abstract the theory of auctions suggests that under certain conditions seemingly different methods for auctioning a single object will result in the same expected price this result extends quite easily to the case of more than one object

the modified vickrey double auction abstract we modify w vickrey s 1961 j finance 16 8 37 mechanism for call markets by introducing the participation stage and study the efficiency properties of the modified mechanism we provide sufficient conditions under which the modified vickrey double auction achieves full efficiency in addition we prove that the modified vickrey double auction achieves asymptotic efficiency even when full efficiency cannot be achieved journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d44 d82

a competitive distribution of auctions in this paper a competitive distribution of auctions is described for an economy consisting of an infinite number of buyers and sellers all of whom differ according to their valuation for the single indivisible object being traded a competitive distribution of auctions is such that no seller can improve his profits by deviating to any alternative direct mechanism it is shown that the competitive distribution of auctions will have the property that each buyer and seller s best reply is independent of his beliefs about the tastes of other buyers and sellers on the market the purpose of this paper is to provide an equilibrium for an economy in which sellers compete by offering different direct mechanisms to buyers no attempt is made to give a complete characterization of all possible equilibria rather we focus on one equilibrium in which the contracts that are offered by sellers in equilibrium and buyer s behaviour under these contracts are both independent of traders beliefs about one another the equilibrium illustrates one of the reasons why contracts that are employed in practice may not be as finely tuned to beliefs as the theory of mechanism design says that they should be the answer is simply that contracts are not offered in a vacuum sellers in the model studied in this paper need to compete with one another in order to attract buyers highly tuned mechanisms tend to extract buyer surplus in such an environment sellers are able to attract many buyers by offering to use cruder mechanisms that leave some surplus for buyers in this paper sellers are allowed to have different costs for the commodity that is being traded nonetheless the equilibrium for the limit economy in which there are infinitely many buyers and sellers is such that every seller offers a second price auction and publicizes a reserve price equal to his cost in a standard monopoly auction the optimal reserve price for the seller exceeds his cost by an amount that depends on his beliefs about buyers valuations myerson 1981 a seller who raises his reserve price has his profits affected in two distinct ways by raising his reserve price the seller makes it unprofitable for some buyer types to participate in his auction the seller therefore loses any surplus that he might have earned by trading with these buyers the buyers who still find it profitable to participate in the seller s auction will end up having to pay a higher price when they win because of this increase in the seller s reserve price this means that the seller will be able to extract a bit more surplus from buyers who continue to participate the seller raises the reserve price until the marginal cost associated with raising the reserve price is just equal to the marginal gain associated with the ability to extract more surplus from remaining buyers competition mitigates this argument since there is a limit to the amount of surplus that the seller can extract from remaining buyers before they decide that they should instead choose one of the alternative auctions that are being held on the market with

information and strategic behavior abstract does encouraging trader participation enhance market competitiveness this paper shows that when trader preferences are interdependent trader market power does not necessarily decrease with greater participation and traders need not become price takers in large markets thus larger markets can be less liquid and associated with lower ex ante welfare in the linear normal model the necessary and sufficient condition on the information structure is provided under which price impact is monotone in market size a condition is given when the rational expectations equilibrium which is typically not fully revealing within the considered class of preference interdependencies is obtained in large markets

efficiency of large double auctions we consider large double auctions with private values values need be neither symmetric nor independent multiple units may be owned or desired participation may be stochastic we introduce a very mild notion of a little independence we prove that all nontrivial equilibria of auctions that satisfy this notion are asymptotically efficient for any alpha 0 inefficiency disappears at rate 1 n 2 alpha