asset pricing implications of pareto optimality with private information we compare the empirical performance of a standard incomplete markets asset pricing model with that of a novel model with constrained pareto optimal allocations we represent the models stochastic discount factors in terms of the cross sectional distribution of consumption and use these representations to evaluate the models empirical implications the first model is inconsistent with the equity premium in the united states united kingdom and italy the second model is consistent with the equity premium and the risk free rate in all three countries if the coefficient of relative risk aversion is roughly 5 and the quarterly discount factor is less than 0 5

the distribution of money and prices in search equilibrium this article considers a search theoretic model of monetary exchange agents bargain over both the amount of money and the quantity of goods to be exchanged in bilateral meetings determining endogenously the distributions of money and of prices i show that money is neutral if changes in the money supply are accomplished via proportional transfers however within the class of lump sum transfers an increase of the rate of monetary expansion tends to decrease the dispersion of wealth and prices and to improve welfare when inflation is low but when inflation is high enough the opposite effects occur

an adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance abstract we ask whether offering a menu of unemployment insurance contracts is welfare improving in a heterogeneous population we adopt a repeated moral hazard framework as in shavell and weiss 1979 supplemented by unobserved heterogeneity about agents job opportunities our main theoretical contribution is a quasi recursive formulation of our adverse selection problem including a geometric characterization of the state space our main economic result is that optimal contracts for bad searchers tend to be upward sloping due to an adverse selection effect this is in contrast to the well known optimal decreasing time profile of benefits in pure moral hazard environments that continue to be optimal for good searchers in our model

an axiomatic characterization of yitzhaki s index of individual deprivation abstract this note presents and discusses a number of properties a measure of individual deprivation should satisfy the axioms we propose are necessary and sufficient to characterize yitzhaki s index of deprivation making the structure of the index more transparent

optimal capital income taxation with incomplete markets borrowing constraints and constant discounting for a wide class of infinitely lived agent models chamley has shown that the optimal capital income tax rate is zero in the long run lucas has argued that for the u s economy there is a significant welfare gain from switching to this policy this paper shows that for the bewley class of models with incomplete insurance markets and borrowing constraints the optimal tax rate on capital income is positive even in the long run therefore cutting the capital income tax to zero may well lead to welfare losses

heterogeneity redistribution and the friedman rule we study monetary models with nondegenerate stationary distributions of money holdings we find that the friedman rule does not typically maximize ex post social welfare an increase in the rate of growth of the money supply has two effects the standard distortionary or rate of return effect makes money a less desirable asset for all moneyholders a second redistributive effect creates a transfer from one type of agent to the other an increase in the rate of growth of money away from the friedman rule can produce a rate of return effect that dominates the standard effect

default and aggregate income abstract this paper studies how default varies with aggregate income we analyze a model in which optimal contracts enable risk sharing of privately observed idiosyncratic income by allowing for default default provisions allow agents with low idiosyncratic income realizations to repay less and thus provide insurance default penalties ensure that only these agents default we show that default can occur under the optimal contract and that default provisions vary with aggregate income we provide conditions such that both the amount of default and default penalties vary countercyclically with aggregate income and show that the default rate can be discontinuous

computing multi period information constrained optima this paper presents a detailed theoretical derivation and justification for methods used to compute solutions to a multi period including infinite period continuum agent unobservedeffort economy actual solutions are displayed illustrating cross sectional variability in consumption and labour effort in the population at a point in time and variability for a typical individual over time the optimal tradeoff between insurance and incentives is explored and the issue of excess variability is addressed by consideration of the analogue full information economy and various restricted contracting regimes

banking a new monetarist approach we develop a model where i banks take deposits and make investments ii their liabilities facilitate third party transactions other models have i or ii not both although we argue they are intimately connected we show that they both emerge from limited commitment we describe an environment characterize desirable allocations and interpret the outcomes as banking arrangements banks are essential without them the set of feasible allocations is inferior as a technical contribution we characterize dynamically optimal credit allocations with frictions show they involve backloading and analyse how this interacts with banking we also confront the theory with economic history copyright 2013 oxford university press

incentive feasible deflation abstract for competitive economies in which the real rate of return on money is too low the standard prescription is to engineer a deflation that is to operate monetary policy according to the friedman rule implicit in this recommendation is the availability of a lump sum tax instrument in this paper i view lump sum tax obligations as a form of debt subject to default while individuals may want to honor such obligations ex ante a lack of commitment the sine qua non of modern monetary theory may prevent them from the following through on their promises ex post when this is the case there may exist an incentive induced limit to deflationary policy

slipping into and out of poverty the dynamics of spells this paper examines the dynamics of poverty previous analyses have examined either fluctuations in the male heads earnings or the frequency of poverty periods over a fixed time frame our approach depends on a definition of spells of poverty using this methodology we find that the majority of poor persons at any time are in the midst of a rather long spell of poverty the methodology also allows us to estimate that less than 40 percent of poverty spells begin because of a drop in the heads earnings while 60 percent of the spells end when the heads earnings increase thus researchers must focus on household formation decisions and on the behavior of secondary family members there has been a dramatic resurgence recently of discussion of the underclass the discussion is reminiscent of debates about poverty during the 1960s when the notions of a culture of poverty particularly as popularized by michael harrington s other america 1962 dominated both intellectual and policy thinking the idea of an underclass seems inconsistent however with much of the research on the dynamics of poverty during the 1970s that research using new longitudinal data seemed to show that the bulk of the poor were poor for only a few years the research also showed that the poor were a very heterogeneous group including a small minority of persistently poor the persistence of poverty is of interest both for understanding the phenomenon and for developing policy claims about dependency and separate life styles among the poor rest on assumptions about the long term nature of poverty questions

optimal contracting with dynastic altruism family size and per capita consumption we use a barro becker model of endogenous fertility in which parents are subject to idiosyncratic shocks that are private information either to labor productivity or taste for leisure to study the efficient degree of consumption inequality in the long run the planner uses the trade off between family size and future consumption and leisure to provide incentives for workers to reveal their shocks we show that in this environment the optimal dynamic contract no longer features immiseration in consumption we also discuss the implications of the model on the long run properties of family size in the optimal contract and show that the long run trend in dynasty size can be either positive or negative depending on parameters

the distribution of money balances and the nonneutrality of money recent monetary models with explicit microfoundations are made tractable by assuming that agents have access to centralized markets after one round of decentralized trade given quasi linear preferences this makes the distribution of money degenerate which keeps the models simple but precludes the discussion of distributional effects of monetary policy we generalize these models by assuming two rounds of trade before agents can readjust their money holdings to study a range of new distributional effects analytically we show that unexpected symmetric lump sum money injections may increase short run output and welfare whereas asymmetric injections may increase long run output and welfare

household heterogeneity and real exchange rates we assume that individuals can fully insure themselves against cross country shocks but not against individual specifi cs hocks we consider two particular models of limited risk sharing domestically incomplete markets di and private information pareto optimal pipo risk sharing for each model we derive a restriction relating the cross sectional distributions of consumption and real exchange rates we evaluate these restrictions using household level consumption data from the us and the uk we show that the pipo restriction fits the data well when households have a coefficient of relative risk aversion of around 5 the restrictions implied by the complete risk sharing model and the di model fare poorly this paper was prepared for the economic journal lecture at the 2006 royal economic society meetings kocherlakota thanks winnie choi for many stimulating conversations about real exchange rates kocherlakota acknowledges the support of nsf 0305833 and 0606695 we thank an associate editor of the journal george alessandria and ivan werning for helpful comments jaromir nosal and sonam sherpa for research assistance orazio attanasio and andrew leicester for help with the fes data and joan gieseke and hakki yazici for editorial assistance the views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the federal reserve bank of minneapolis or the federal reserve system

a divisible search model of fiat money this paper extends the kiyotaki wright search model of fiat money to allow for divisible money and goods the extension allows me to examine the standard issues in monetary economics such as the neutrality and superneutrality of money by severing the artificial link in the kiyotaki wright model between the money supply and the number of money holders it is shown that money is neutral but not superneutral money growth generates a trading opportunity effect it changes the fraction of different agents in the economy and hence changes the probability with which agents have a successful match in addition money growth has a negative effect on the real money balance that is familiar in walrasian monetary models the balance of the two effects can imply a positive optimal money growth rate

optimal money creation in pure currency economies a conjecture in a pure currency economy money is the only durable object and people have private histories in such economies taxation is not feasible and in some of them trade is enhanced through the use of money for economies of that kind in which a nondegenerate distribution of money part of the state of the economy affects trades and real outcomes and in which trades affect the state at the next date the conjecture is that there are transfer schemes financed by money creation that improve ex ante representative agent welfare relative to what can be achieved holding the stock of money fixed jel codes e52 e58 copyright 2014 oxford university press

efficient allocations in dynamic private information economies with persistent shocks a first order approach this article studies efficient allocations in a dynamic private information economy with a continuum of idiosyncratic shocks that are persistent i develop a first order approach for this environment and show that the problem has a simple recursive structure that relies on only a small number of state variables making the problem tractable i find sufficient conditions that guarantee that the first order approach is valid to illustrate the first order approach i numerically compute the efficient allocations in a mirrleesean economy with productivity shocks that follow a random walk and verify the validity of the first order approach i show that persistent shocks create a new trade off where the social planner decreases the informational rent of the agent today at the cost of providing higher insurance in the future copyright 2013 oxford university press

unique monetary equilibrium with inflation in a stationary bewley aiyagari model abstract we prove the existence and uniqueness of a stationary monetary equilibrium in a bewley aiyagari model with idiosyncratic shocks this is an exchange economy with an infinite horizon and one consumption good and with each agent facing idiosyncratic endowment shocks at each period the agents may trade their endowments for the only asset fiat money the government increases the money supply at a constant growth rate that induces inflation in a stationary monetary equilibrium we identify the necessary and sufficient condition for a stationary monetary equilibrium where money has a positive value and the aggregate real balance is constant over time to exist and when it exists we show that it is unique the argument for uniqueness is based on a new monotonicity result for the average optimal consumption

markov perfect risk sharing moral hazard and limited commitment abstract we define characterize and compute markov perfect risk sharing contracts in a dynamic stochastic economy with endogenous asset accumulation and simultaneous limited commitment and moral hazard frictions we prove that markov perfect insurance contracts preserve standard properties of optimal insurance with private information and are not more restrictive than a long term contract with one sided commitment markov perfect contracts imply a determinate asset time path and a non degenerate long run stationary wealth distribution quantitatively we show that markov perfect risk sharing contracts provide sizably more consumption smoothing relative to self insurance and that the welfare gains from resolving the commitment friction are larger than the gains from resolving the moral hazard friction at low asset levels while the opposite holds for high asset levels

interest rates in a credit constrained economy when households face credit constraints in an economy with inside as well as outside money stationary equilibrium real interest rates are below the household rate of time preference they also depend significantly upon household risk aversion the demand for inside versus outside money bank costs bank reserves inflation and the marginal productivity of capital and capital depreciation rates in addition changes in financial variables affect per capita capital and output to a greater extent when households are credit constrained copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

asset trading mechanisms and expansionary policy abstract previous authors have argued that the otimal monetary policy is contractionary if buyers value consumption substantially more than sellers there is some randomness and informational constraints make asset trading useful we show that there is an incentive compatible expansionary policy that dominates all incentive compatible contractionary policies

endogenous groups and dynamic selection in mechanism design abstract we create a dynamic theory of endogenous risk sharing groups with good internal information and their coexistence with relative performance individualistic regimes which are informationally more opaque inequality and organizational form are determined simultaneously numerical techniques and succinct reformulations of mechanism design problems with suitable choice of promised utilities allow the computation of a stochastic steady state and its transitions regions of low inequality and moderate to high wealth utility promises produce the relative performance regime while regions of high inequality and low wealth produce the risk sharing group regime if there is a cost to prevent coalitions risk sharing groups emerge at high wealth levels also transitions from the relative performance regime to the group regime tend to occur when rewards to observed outputs exacerbate inequality while transitions from the group regime to the relative performance regime tend to come with a decrease in utility promises some regions of inequality and wealth deliver long term persistence of organization form and inequality while other regions deliver high levels of volatility

repeated insurance relationships in a costly state verification model with an application to deposit insurance abstract we consider the problem of an insurer who enters into a repeated relationship with a set of risk averse agents in the presence of ex post verification costs the insurer wishes to minimize the expected cost of providing these agents a certain expected utility level we characterize the optimal contract between the insurer and the insured agents we then apply the analysis to the provision of deposit insurance our results suggest in a deposit insurance context that it may be optimal to utilize the discount window early on and to make deposit insurance payments only later or not at all

liquidity and trading dynamics in this paper we build a model where the presence of liquidity constraints tends to magnify the economy s response to aggregate shocks we consider a decentralized model of trade where agents may use money or credit to buy goods when agents do not have access to credit and the real value of money balances is low agents are more likely to be liquidity constrained this makes them more concerned about their short term earning prospects when making their consumption decisions and about their short term spending opportunities when making their production decisions this generates a coordination element in spending and production which leads to greater aggregate volatility and greater comovement across producers

an evaluation of does economic inequality breed political conflict studies contradictory findings that economic inequality may have a positive negative or no impact on political conflict are a puzzle for conflict studies three approaches have been used t o explain the inconsistent findings of the ei pc economic inequality political conflict nexus statistical modeling formal modeling and theory building because analysts have tended to possess different research skills these three approaches have been employed in isolation from one another singly however all three approaches have proved deficient and are unlikely to solve the ei pc puzzle the most fruitful approach is to combine the assumptions of the theory builders and the deductive approach of the formal modelers with the various empirical tests of the statistical modelers such an approach to the ei pc puzzle produces a crucial test of the deprived actor and rational actor theories of conflict the approach is also our best hope for solving the other long standing puzzles in conflict studies

capital income taxation wealth distribution and borrowing constraints the theorem of zero taxation of capital income is reexamined and is shown to hinge critically on the assumptions of a long horizon and perfect markets for the inter temporal allocation of resources the theorem does not hold when borrowing constraints prevent individuals from insuring against idiosyncratic shocks and have a precautionary motive for savings structural assumptions are made such that with no taxation aggregate savings are socially excessive in the long run i e the rate of return is smaller than the discount rate sufficient conditions for a pareto efficient taxation or subsidization of capital in the long run depend on the correlation between individuals consumption and savings a subsidy may be efficient when individuals incomes follow a predictable pattern of life cycles with no negative bequest 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

money as a mechanism in a bewley economy we study what features an economic environment might possess such that it would be pareto ecient for the exchange of goods in that environment to be conducted on spot markets where those goods trade for money we prove a conjecture that is essentially due to bewley 1980 1983 the gist is that monetary spot trading is nearly ecient ex ante in an environment where very patient agents can accumulate large enough money stocks to be completely self insured we also study examples where a nonmonetary mechanism is preferred ex ante to any monetary mechanism at least when the comparison is restricted to stationary equilibria and where an inflationary monetary mechanism is preferred ex ante to a laissez faire or deflationary monetary mechanism in an environment with impatient agents j e l classification e31 e42

adverse selection and moral hazard quantitative implications for unemployment insurance abstract a model of optimal unemployment insurance with adverse selection and moral hazard is constructed the model generates both qualitative and quantitative implications for the optimal provision of unemployment insurance qualitatively for some agents incentives in the optimal contract imply consumption increases over the duration of non employment calibrating the model to a stylized version of the u s economy quantitatively illustrates these theoretical predictions the optimal contract achieves a welfare gain of 1 94 relative to the current u s system an additional 0 87 of gains relative to a planner who ignores adverse selection and focuses only on moral hazard

optimal policy in a model of endogenous fluctuations and assets assets are coupled to endogenous aggregate output fluctuations in a model of heterogeneous agents those agents wish to avoid reacting inadvertently to an unobservable noise process but to do so must elicit reactions to that noise from each other an abstract institution is modeled that optimizes this elicitation by strategically transmitting information about aggregates i designate this feedback feedback is used by agents and so influences the characteristics of aggregate fluctuations the optimal feedback policy minimizes asset rates of return maximizes the persistence of aggregate output fluctuations and causes the distribution of wealth to widen continually and without limit

growth and risk sharing with private information abstract we examine the impact of incomplete risk sharing on growth and welfare the source of market incompleteness in our economy is private information a household s idiosyncratic productivity shock is not observable by others risk sharing between households occurs through long term contracts with intermediaries we find that incomplete risk sharing tends to reduce the rate of growth relative to the complete risk sharing benchmark numerical examples indicate that the welfare cost and the growth effect of private information are small

trade agreements with domestic policies as disguised protection abstract wto rules prohibit disguised protection in the form of domestic policies how then do governments cooperate over trade and domestic policies when none can verify whether a nation s domestic tax reduction is a protective measure or a reaction to a production externality in this paper each government privately observes whether a production externality associated with its import competing good is high or low this paper finds that in an optimal agreement disguised protection with domestic policies is never used by governments with a high externality and is never commonly realized moreover in an optimal agreement tariffs may be conditional on domestic policies

the transmission of monetary policy through redistributions and durable purchases this paper studies a redistribution channel for the transmission of monetary policy using a tractable olg setting in which the government is a net debtor we show that standard open market operations omo conducted by central banks have signi cant revaluation eects that alter the level and distribution of wealth in the economy and the real interest rate expansionary omo generate a negative wealth eect the private sector as a whole is a net creditor to the government increasing households incen tives to save for retirement and pushing down the real interest rate this in turn leads to a substitution towards durables generating a temporary boom in the durable good sector with search and matching frictions a form of productive investment is added to the model and the fall in interest rates causes an increase in labour demand raising aggregate employment the mechanism can mimic the empirical responses of key macroeconomic variables to monetary policy interventions the model shows that dierent monetary interventions e g omo versus helicopter drops can have sharply dierent eects on activity

proximity sensitive individual deprivation measures we characterize a generalization of the linear index of individual deprivation our class allows for an income increase of a higher income individual to have a stronger impact the closer they occur to the income of the person under consideration

optimal unemployment insurance with human capital depreciation and duration dependence this paper studies the effect of human capital depreciation and duration dependence on the design of an optimal unemployment insurance ui scheme our results partially confirm those obtained in most previous studies benefits should decrease with unemployment duration the optimal program also generates two main novel features which are not present in stationary models first if human capital depreciates rapidly enough during unemployment ui transfers are bounded below by a minimal assistance level that arises endogenously in the efficient program second we study the optimality of imposing a history contingent wage tax after reemployment our numerical simulations based on the spanish and us economies show that the wage tax should decrease with the length of worker s previous unemployment spell and become a wage subsidy for long term unemployed workers as a by product of our study we develop a systematic approach suitable for studying recursively a wide range of dynamic moral hazard problems and other models with similar characteristics

on ramsey s conjecture efficient allocations in the neoclassical growth model with private information abstract in his seminal paper of 1928 ramsey conjectured that if agents discounted the future differently in the long run all agents except the most patient would live at the subsistence level the validity of this conjecture was investigated in different environments in particular it has been confirmed in the neoclassical growth model with dynamically complete markets this paper studies this conjecture in a version of this model that includes private information and heterogeneous agents a version of bayesian implementation is introduced and a recursive formulation of the original allocation problem is established efficient allocations are renegotiation proof and the expected utility of any agent cannot go to zero with positive probability if the economy does not collapse if the economy collapses all agents will get zero consumption forever thus including any degree of private information in the neoclassical growth model will deny ramsey s conjecture if efficient allocations are considered

payments systems design in deterministic and private information environments abstract the first setup we study is a deterministic model with spatial separation where we consider alternative payments systems institutions and their implications for allocation and welfare a payments system with period by period settlement in outside money improves on decentralized exchange an efficient allocation is supported by a payments system where settlement is not imposed in the second model there is random matching and unobserved productivity shocks and preference shocks we explore how risk should be shared optimally in this economy and interpret the results in terms of how actual payments systems should operate journal of economic literature classification numbers e4 e5

relative deprivation and economic welfare a statistical investigation with gini based welfare indices the average level of relative deprivation is considered as a measure of the economic welfare or standards of living for a society this approach yields welfare indices that are weighted combinations of the mean income and the gini coefficient there has been no systematic international comparison of these gini based welfare indices in this paper they are applied to compare relative deprivation and economic welfare using data from the luxembourg income study the asymptotic distributions of estimators of gini based welfare indices are provided under weighted sampling

should we get married the effect of parents marriage on out of wedlock children i introduction while marriage remains the foundation of family life in the united states the traditional process of family formation specifically marriage before having children has been dwindling the proportion of american children born to unmarried parents has increased dramatically over the past three decades from 12 in 1970 to nearly one third of all births today siglerushton and mclanahan 2002 the decoupling of marriage and fertility behavior is particularly common among the low income less educated urban population mclanahan and sandefur 1994 unmarried parents often have fewer resources and their children tend to display inferior outcomes compared to those raised by two married parents 1 concerned with the rise in out of wedlock parenthood and its implications for the children involved policies in recent years have been geared toward promoting marriage among unmarried parents 2 however little is known about the potential benefits of marriage after childbirth couples who have children out of wedlock are known to be selectively different from those who marry before having children unmarried parents tend to be of lower socioeconomic standing face poorer prospects in the marriage market and have lower incentives for assortative mating brown 2004 garfinkel glei and mclanahan 2002 rosenzweig 1999 hence interpreting the outcome differences found in simple comparisons of children born to married versus unmarried parents as benefits of marriage can be misleading as these differences may largely reflect the more favorable characteristics of married parents this study examines whether marriage between the biological parents after childbearing benefits the children involved using data on a representative sample of children all born to unmarried couples drawn from the fragile families and child wellbeing study ffcws the ffcws is particularly well suited to address this question as it provides child assessment data and detailed marriage fertility and socioeconomic information on both biological parents for a large representative sample of children born outside of marriage we focus on the effect of marriage among parents who are romantically involved at childbirth on child cognitive ability measured at age 3 based on scores from the peabody picture vocabulary test ppvt a widely used interviewer administered measure of receptive hearing and verbal ability in addition effects of marriage on child health and behavioral outcomes are analyzed a significant fraction of children in our sample experience the marriage of their parents we analyze whether marriage after childbearing affects early developmental outcomes using an empirical strategy centering around a potential outcome framework similar to an experiment where the treatment marriage after childbirth is randomly assigned we draw on matching methods e g heckman ichimura and todd 1998 rosenbaum and rubin 1983 to identify the treatment effect exploiting the detailed information on the parents provided in the ffcws this approach addresses the selection into marriage by constructing an appropriate comparison group for children whose parents marry after childbirth we first estimate the probability of marriage among unwed parents with a newborn and then compare the outcomes of children whose parents share similar probabilities of marriage but differ only in whether their parents transitioned into marriage within 3 yr after their birth the present study also sheds light on the role of typically unobserved factors likely to be important determinants of selection into marriage including the father s attributes and the degree to which the parents have similar characteristics positive assortative matching while some studies have examined the determinants of marital union formation among the population of single mothers e g aassve 2003 relatively little is known about the factors influencing the transition into marriage and the role of similarities in traits between unmarried biological parents

dynamic contracting with persistent shocks abstract in this paper we develop continuous time methods for solving dynamic principal agent problems in which the agent s privately observed productivity shocks are persistent over time we characterize the optimal contract as the solution to a system of ordinary differential equations and show that under this contract the agent s utility converges to its lower bound immiserization occurs unlike under risk neutrality the wedge between the marginal rate of transformation and a low productivity agent s marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure will not vanish permanently at her first high productivity report also the wedge increases with the duration of a low productivity report we apply the methods to numerically solve the mirrleesian dynamic taxation model and find that the wedge is significantly larger than that in the independently and identically distributed i i d shock case

moral hazard optimal unemployment insurance and experience rating abstract this paper is concerned with evaluating alternative unemployment insurance ui schemes in a dynamic economy with moral hazard we consider changes in the size and duration of ui benefits and the effects of experience rating and use a dynamic contracting approach to determine a benchmark optimal allocation radical changes in the current ui system increase welfare but not by much a move to full experience rating has distributional effects but the aggregate effects are negligible

optimal monetary policy with heterogeneous money holdings abstract we study the optimal anticipated policy in a pure currency economy with flexible prices and a non degenerate distribution of money holdings the economy features a business cycle and lump sum monetary injections have distributional effects that depend on the state of the cycle we parsimoniously characterize the dynamics of the economy and study the optimal regulation of the money supply as a function of the state under commitment the optimal policy prescribes monetary expansions in recessions when insurance is most needed by the cash poor unproductive agents conversely the optimal policy prescribes monetary contractions during booms so that the inflationary effect of the occasional expansions is undone

the race is to the swift socioeconomic origins adult education and wage attainment the winners in today s winner take all labor markets are differentiated by advanced levels of educational attainment especially higher degrees this article applies a sociological model of cumulative dis advantage to the baby boom cohort to examine whether life course timing differences in educational attainment help explain wage differentials by midlife it finds that advantaged social origins lead to early postsecondary completion of degrees which in turn yield higher wages a pathway of cumulative disadvantage is also evident where those least advantaged exit schooling early in life do not return as adults and earn low wages in a middle path advantaged social origins promote adult school attainment primarily for those without degrees but generally without the wage boosts associated with attainment earlier in life

a theory of financing constraints and firm dynamics there is widespread evidence supporting the conjecture that borrowing constraints have important implications for firm growth and survival in this paper we model a multiperiod borrowing lending relationship with asymmetric information we show that borrowing constraints emerge as a feature of the optimal long term lending contract and that such constraints relax as the value of the borrower s claim to future cash flows increases we also show that the optimal contract has interesting implications for firm dynamics in agreement with the empirical evidence as age and size increase mean and variance of growth decrease and firm survival increases

communication commitment and growth abstract we study the effect on the growth of an economy of alternative financing opportunities in a stochastic growth model with incentive constraints efficient accumulation mechanisms are designed and computed for economies that differ in their incentive structure we show that when borrowing is subject to information constraints there is a computable efficient transfer mechanism that does not affect capital accumulation and investment patterns even though consumption patterns and the distribution of wealth are affected in contrast enforcement constraints can severely reduce the outside financing opportunities and affect investment patters and economic growth we adapt numerical algorithms for obtaining numerical solutions of these models

the equivalence of lending equilibria and signalling based insurance under asymmetric information i present a model in which a continuum of individuals have stochastic idiosyncratic income shocks complete insurance is physically feasible but unattainable due to an information asymmetry income shocks are observable only by the individuals receiving them any insurance institution must therefore rely on self reporting of income innovations two ways of achieving incentive compatible self reporting are presented the first is a debt market with an explicit lending restriction the second is an insurance contract that linearly filters a signal transmitted by individuals the two are then demonstrated to be identical equilibrium consumption fluctuates in a random walk which is inefficient given the physical potential for complete insurance but is efficient given the information constraints the results are complementary to those of green 1987 but permit more general stochastic processes of income to be analyzed serial correlation of income reduces the efficiency of the insurance

money capital and redistributive effects of monetary policies abstract this paper examines the redistributive role of expansionary monetary policies for this purpose a physical environment with heterogeneous agents is described to emphasize two frictions one is a within market friction that agents cannot borrow within each market the other is a cross market friction that agents cannot borrow across markets although a contractionary monetary policy is required to eliminate the within market friction as in many previous monetary models an expansionary monetary policy is required to eliminate the cross market friction when both frictions are operational no monetary policy alone can restore efficiency and the second best monetary policy requires the money growth rate to exceed the friedman rule the first best allocation can be achieved by a combination of fiscal policies and the friedman rule

the welfare cost of inflation under imperfect insurance abstract this paper examines the welfare cost of inflation in an economy where agents hold money in order to smooth consumption in the face of income variability for which there is no insurance the findings indicate that for the type of economies considered here the area under the empirical money demand curve is a poor measure of the welfare cost of inflation this area accounts for only one fourth of the true costs in the case of 5 inflation

heterogeneous consumers segmented asset markets and the real effects of monetary policy this paper proposes a novel mechanism by which changes in the distribution of money holdings have real effects specifically i develop a flexible price model of segmented asset markets that generates real aggregate effects of monetary policy through the dependence of optimal markups on the heterogeneity of money holdings because varieties of consumption bundles are purchased sequentially newly injected money disseminates slowly throughout the economy via second round effects the model predicts a short term inflation output trade off a liquidity effect countercyclical markups and procyclical wages after monetary shocks among other correlations of financial variables it also reproduces the empirical negative relationship between changes in the money supply and markups

progressive estate taxation we present a model with altruistic parents and heterogeneous productivity we derive two key properties for optimal estate taxation first the estate tax should be progressive so that parents leaving a higher bequest face a lower net return on bequests second marginal estate taxes should be negative so that all parents face a marginal subsidy on bequests both properties can be implemented with a simple nonlinear tax on bequests levied separately from the income tax these results apply to other intergenerational transfers such as educational investments and are robust to endogenous fertility choices both estate or inheritance taxes can implement the optimal allocation but we show that the inheritance tax has some advantages finally when we impose an ad hoc constraint requiring marginal estate taxes to be nonnegative the optimum features a zero tax up to an exemption level and a progressive tax thereafter

subjective random discounting and intertemporal choice this chapter provides an axiomatic foundation for a particular type of preference shock model called the random discounting representation where a decision maker believes that her discount factors change randomly over time for this purpose we formulate an infinite horizon extension of dekel lipman and rustichini econometrica 69 891 934 2001 and identify the behavior that reduces all subjective uncertainties to those about future discount factors we also show uniqueness of subjective belief about discount factors moreover a behavioral comparison about preference for flexibility characterizes the condition that one s subjective belief second order stochastically dominates the other finally the resulting model is applied to a consumption savings problem

currency and credit are equivalent mechanisms i study a pure exchange economy with many agents whose marginal utility of consumption is stochastically heterogeneous and independent of wealth with realized marginal utility of wealth private information i show that currency and credit are equivalent to a contract that is efficient when the privacy of information is viewed as a constraint and that the cash in advance constraint is an expression of an incentive constraint

consumption commitment and cycles abstract this paper examines the properties of efficient allocations of risk in an economic environment in which the outside enforcement of risk sharing arrangements is infinitely costly in these allocations unanticipated relative productivity movements have effects on both the current and future distribution of consumption across individuals if preferences over consumption and leisure are nonhomothetic these changes in the allocation of consumption will generate persistent cycles in aggregate output that do not occur in efficient allocations when enforcement is costless

a unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis search theoretic models of monetary exchange are based on explicit descriptions of the frictions that make money essential however tractable versions of these models typically make strong assumptions that render them ill suited for monetary policy analysis we propose a new framework based on explicit micro foundations within which macro policy can be studied the framework is analytically tractable and easily quantifiable we calibrate the model to standard observations and use it to measure the cost of inflation we find that going from 10 percent to 0 percent inflation is worth between 3 and 5 percent of consumption much higher than previous estimates

on efficient distribution with private information this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with many consumers each of whom is subject to private idiosyncratic taste shocks we propose a recursive method for finding feasible allocations that are incentivecompatible and that are pareto optimal within this set the method is applied to several parametric examples we find that in an efficient allocation the degree of inequality continually increases with a diminishing fraction of the population receiving an increasing fraction of the resources we discuss the extent to which these allocations can be decentralized via market arrangements this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with private information the economy we study has a constant endowment flow of a single non storable consumption good which is to be allocated each period among a large number of consumers each period these consumers experience unpredictable idiosyncratic privately observed taste shocks affecting their marginal utility of current consumption efficiency dictates that more resources be allocated to those consumers who in any given period have a high marginal utility of current consumption

effects of family instability income and income instability on the risk of a premarital birth in this study i contrast hypotheses about the effects of family structure on premarital birth risks with three income hypotheses 1 a low income hypothesis that the risk of a premarital birth is higher for women from disadvantaged economic backgrounds because they possess fewer or less attractive economic opportunities 2 a permanent income and transitory income hypothesis that uncertainties generated by unexpected fluctuations in family income increase premarital birth risks net of absolute income levels and 3 an income level and income change hypothesis that downward trends in family income reflect worsening socioeconomic opportunities that increase premarital birth risks net of absolute income levels i use prospective income and retrospective parental histories in the u s national longitudinal survey of youth to determine if the effect of family instability is an artifact of low unstable or declining income in the family of origin excerpt

repeated principal agent relationships with lending and borrowing abstract it is shown optimal long term contracts are strictly better than a series of unrelated short term contracts for two reasons long term contracts allow risk to be spread over time and the agent s intertemporal choices provide information about the unobservable random variable

regional differences and the components of growth and inequality change abstract inequality change can be decomposed simply in terms of per capita income and population changes using the gini index an illustration based on u s data for the two intercensus periods 1960 1970 and 1970 1980 is given this decomposition analysis is also applied to the study of changes in a welfare index originally proposed by sen

intertemporal distortions in the second best we consider a very general class of public nance problems that encompasses ramsey models of optimal taxation as well as economies with limited commitment private information and political economy frictions we identify a su cient condition to rule out permanent intertemporal distortions at the optimum if there exists an admissible allocation that converges to the rst best steady state then all intertemporal distortions are temporary in the second best we analyze a series of applications to illustrate the signi cance of this result

idiosyncratic production risk growth and the business cycle we introduce a neoclassical growth economy with idiosyncratic production risk and incomplete markets each agent is an entrepreneur operating her own technology with her own capital stock the general equilibrium is characterized by a closed form recursion in the cara normal case incomplete markets introduce a risk premium on private equity which reduces the demand for investment as compared to complete markets the steady state can thus have both a lower capital stock due to investment risk and a lower interest rate due to precautionary savings furthermore the anticipation of high real interest rates in the future feeds back into high risk premia and low investment in the present thus slowing down convergence to the steady state our results highlight the importance of private risk premia for capital accumulation and business cycles

sluggish responses of prices and inflation to monetary shocks in an inventory model of money demand we examine the responses of prices and inflation to monetary shocks in an inventory theoretic model of money demand we show that the price level responds sluggishly to an exogenous increase in the money stock because the dynamics of households money inventories leads to a partially offsetting endogenous reduction in velocity we also show that inflation responds sluggishly to an exogenous increase in the nominal interest rate because changes in monetary policy affect the real interest rate in a quantitative example we show that this nominal sluggishness is substantial and persistent if inventories in the model are calibrated to match u s households holdings of m2

optimal monetary policy distribution efficiency versus production efficiency this paper investigates the trade off between distribution effect and production effect of monetary policy when there exist unobservable idiosyncratic liquidity shocks in the absence of risk sharing arrangements such as a credit market monetary policy serves to provide ex post insurance to smooth consumption specifically issuing interest bearing bonds restores credit transactions on money through bond money exchanges such a policy has a positive distribution effect but the resulting inflation hampers production efficiency it is demonstrated that the trade off between distribution efficiency gain and production efficiency loss would result in net welfare enhancement if consumers are relative risk averse enough politique monetaire optimale efficacite dans la distribution versus efficacite dans la production ce memoire examine la relation d equivalence entre l effet sur la distribution et l effet sur la production de la politique monetaire quand existent des chocs de liquidite idiosyncratiques non observables en l absence d arrangement pour le partage des risques tel qu un marche du credit la politique monetaire sert d assurance ex post pour lisser les variations dans les niveaux de consommation specifiquement emettre des obligations qui paient des interets restore les transactions monetaires de credit via les echanges obligations monnaie une telle politique a un effet positif sur la distribution mais l inflation qui en resulte nuit a l efficacite de la production on montre que la relation d equivalence entre les gains d efficacite dans la distribution et la perte d efficacite dans la production resultent en une amelioration du niveau net de bien etre si les consommateurs ont une aversion suffisamment grande au risque relatif

income fluctuation and asymmetric information an example of a repeated principal agent problem we examine a simple repeated principal agent model with discounting there are a risk averse borrower with an unobservable random income and a risk neutral lender the efficient contract is characterized it tends to the first best constant consumption contract as the discount factor tends to one and the time horizon extends to infinity if the time horizon is infinite and the contract is legally enforceable the borrower s utility becomes arbitrarily negative with probability one if the borrower has constant absolute risk aversion consumption is transferred between any two states at a constant interest rate which is less than the rate of time preference

competitive risk sharing contracts with one sided commitment this paper analyzes dynamic equilibrium risk sharing contracts between profit maximizing intermediaries and a large pool of ex ante identical agents that face idiosyncratic income uncertainty that makes them heterogeneous ex post in any given period after having observed her income the agent can walk away from the contract while the intermediary cannot i e there is one sided commitment we consider the extreme scenario that the agents face no costs to walking away and can sign up with any competing intermediary without any reputational losses we demonstrate that not only autarky but also partial and full insurance can obtain depending on the relative patience of agents and financial intermediaries insurance can be provided because in an equilibrium contract an up front payment effectively locks in the agent with an intermediary we then show that our contract economy is equivalent to a consumption savings economy with one period arrow securities and a short sale constraint similar to bulow and rogoff 1989 from this equivalence and our characterization of dynamic contracts it immediately follows that without cost of switching financial intermediaries debt contracts are not sustainable even though a risk allocation superior to autarky can be achieved

on repeated moral hazard with discounting in this paper we analyze optimal contracts in an infinitely repeated agency model in which both the principal and agent discount the future we show that there is a stationary representation of the optimal contract when the agent s conditional discounted expected utility is used as a state variable this representation reduces the multi period problem to a static variational problem which can be analyzed using standard variational techniques this reduction is used to obtain several properties of the contract

investor protection optimal incentives and economic growth does investor protection foster economic growth to assess the widely held affirmative view we introduce investor protection into a standard overlapping generations model of capital accumulation better investor protection implies better risk sharing because of entrepreneurs risk aversion this results in a larger demand for capital this is the demand effect a second effect the supply effect follows from general equilibrium restrictions better protection i e higher demand increases the interest rate and lowers the income of entrepreneurs decreasing current savings and next period s supply of capital the supply effect is stronger the tighter are the restrictions on capital flows our model thus predicts that the positive effect of investor protection on growth is stronger for countries with lower restrictions cross country data provide support for this prediction as does the detailed examination of the growth experiences of south korea and india

essential interest bearing money i examine optimal monetary policy in a lagos and wright a unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis j polit econ 113 2005 463 484 model where trade is centralized and all exchange is voluntary i identify a class of incentivefeasible policies that improve welfare beyond what is achievable with zero intervention any policy in this class necessarily entails a non negative inflation rate and a strictly positive nominal interest rate despite the absence of a lump sum tax instrument there exists an incentive feasible policy that implements the first best allocation

dynamics of income distribution in this paper we have obtained closed form solutions in cass koopmans growth models with heterogeneous agents the relationship between the form of the production function and the dynamics of income distribution is made explicit we then use this relationship to determine what production structure is simultaneously consistent with facts on growth and income inequality our empirical findings give support to models with decreasing returns in the reproducible factor jel classification d3 o1 o4 dans ce memoire les auteurs obtiennent des solutions pour des modeles de croissance a la cass koopmans dans le cas ou les agents sont heterogenes on explicite la relation entre la forme de la fonction de production et la dynamique de la repartition des revenus on utilise alors cette relation pour determiner quelle structure de production est arrimee aux faits connus a la fois quant a la croissance economique et a la repartition des revenus les resultats empiriques supportent les modeles ou les rendements sur les acteurs de production reproductibles sont decroissants

international lending with moral hazard and risk of repudiation in this paper i examine the constrained optimal pattern of capital flows between a lender and a borrower in an environment in which there are two impediments to forming contracts the first impediment to contracting arises from the assumption that lenders cannot observe whether borrowers invest or consume borrowed funds this assumption leads to a moral hazard problem in investment the second impediment arises from the assumption that the borrower as a sovereign nation may choose to repudiate his debts the optimal contract is shown to specify that the borrowing country experience a capital outflow when the worst realizations of national output occur this seemingly perverse capital outflow forms a necessary part of the optimal solution to the moral hazard problem in investment

political economy of mechanisms we study the optimal mirrlees taxation problem in a dynamic economy in contrast to the standard approach where the taxation mechanism is operated by a benevolent planner with full commitment power we focus on economies in which policy decisions are made by self interested politicians who cannot commit to policies the society controls politicians using elections we show that the provision of incentives to politicians can be partly separated from redistribution across agents and that political economy constraints can be modeled as introducing additional aggregate distortions in the dynamic mirrlees problem we provide conditions under which the political economy distortions persist or disappear in the long run if the politicians are as patient as the agents the best sustainable mechanism leads to an asymptotic allocation where the aggregate distortions arising from political economy disappear in contrast when politicians are less patient than the citizens positive aggregate labor and capital taxes remain even asymptotically we conclude by providing a brief comparison of centralized

the political economy of intergenerational income mobility the intergenerational elasticity of income is considered one of the best measures of the degree to which a society gives equal opportunity to its members while much research has been devoted to measuring this reduced form parameter less is known about its underlying structural determinants using a model with exogenous talent endowments endogenous parental investment in children and endogenous redistributive institutions we identify the structural parameters that govern the intergenerational elasticity of income the model clarifies how the interaction between private and collective decisions determines the equilibrium level of social mobility two societies with similar economic and biological fundamentals may have vastly different degrees of intergenerational mobility depending on their political institutions we offer empirical evidence in line with the predictions of the model we conclude that international comparisons of intergenerational elasticity of income are not particularly informative about fairness without taking into account differences in politico economic institutions jel e24 j62 j68 p16