reciprocal relationships and mechanism design we study an incomplete information game in which players can coordinate their actions by contracting among themselves we model this relationship as a reciprocal contracting procedure where each player has the ability to make commitments contingent on the other players commitments we differ from the rest of the literature on reciprocal contracting by assuming that punishments cannot be enforced in the event that cooperation breaks down we fully characterize the outcomes that can be supported as perfect bayesian equilibrium outcomes in such an environment we use our characterization to show that the set of supportable outcomes with reciprocal contracting is larger than the set of outcomes available in a centralized mechanism design environment in which the mechanism designer is constrained by his inability to enforce punishments against non participants the difference stems from the players ability in our contracting game to convey partial information about their types at the time they offer contracts we discuss the implications of our analysis for modelling collusion between multiple agents interacting with the same principal

a joint product analysis of the adoption of modern cereal varieties in developing countries semi dwarf wheat varieties have been slow to diffuse in some regions despite their superior grain yield we analyze varietal differences in yields of the joint products of grain and straw the decision to adopt new varieties and nitrogen demand the low straw yield of semi dwarf varieties under low input conditions is shown to be a plausible explanation for their slow adoption in some regions first generation modern varieties induced a large increase in the derived demand for nitrogen but subsequent varietal development appears to have had little impact on nitrogen demand

optimal auction with resale this paper investigates the design of seller optimal auctions when winning bidders can attempt to resell the good in that case the optimal allocation characterized by myerson 1981 cannot be achieved without resale i find a sufficient and necessary condition for sincere bidding given the possibility of resale in two bidder cases i prove that the myerson allocation can be achieved under standard conditions supplemented with two assumptions with three or more bidders achieving the myerson allocation is more difficult i prove that it can be implemented in special cases in those cases the myerson allocation is generated through a sequence of resale auctions each optimally chosen by a reseller

tradeoffs and complementarities in the adoption of improved seeds fertilizer and natural resource management technologies in kenya there is widespread consensus that agricultural technology has an important role to play for poverty reduction and sustainable development there is no consensus however about the types of technologies that are best suited for smallholder farmers in africa while some consider natural resource management nrm technologies as most appropriate others propagate input intensification with a stronger role of the private sector in the public debate these two strategies are often perceived as incompatible environmental non governmental organizations in particular consider low external input strategies as the only sustainable form of agriculture a view that has considerable influence on policymakers and the international donor community most existing research studies on smallholder innovation focus on the adoption of individual technologies so that comparisons between different types of technologies in the same context are not easily possible we use representative data from maize producing households in kenya and a multivariate probit model to analyze the adoption of different types of technologies simultaneously results indicate that nrm technologies and strategies that build on external inputs are not incompatible interesting complementarities exist which are not yet sufficiently exploited because many organizations promote either one type of technology or the other but rarely a combination of both

managerial bargaining power in the determination of compensation contracts and corporate investment this paper considers the design of managerial compensation contracts and their impact on corporate investment decisions and the managerial effort decision the model relates the compensation scheme to outside share ownership and managerial bargaining position using the methods of mechanism design under asymmetric information a shift in favor of effort is documented in the case where managerial bargaining strength is weak while a shift toward more use of capital investment results from strong managerial bargaining power the model distinguishes managerial equity holdings from contingent compensation contracts our results are related to the empirical literature on pay performance sensitivities

solar energy market developments in india abstract considering india s ambition to ensure energy security renewable energy sources like solar wind biomass and small hydro can play crucial role in the energy mix of the country solar has been identified as one of the key renewable sources to supplement the conventional energy sources and reduce carbon footprint in india authors review solar energy potential market developments capacity additions actual production and component manufacturing industry trade status and economics of solar energy in the country recently the government revised target for solar power capacity installation from 20 gw to100 gw by 2022 however the solar industry faces a significant level of challenges in the areas of grid connectivity and evacuation infrastructure regulatory policy developments capacity utilization initial capital investment lack of innovative financing models consumer awareness and acceptance authors suggest that by taking key strategic steps like creating attracting investment climate making easy access to financing developing transmission and distribution infrastructure skill development and developing domestic component manufacturing industry the challenges can be addressed such progressive steps would enable india to achieve the objective of industrialization through clean energy

information revelation incentives and the value of a real option the real options approach to capital budgeting focuses on valuing benefits of project flexibility this paper presents an incentive consideration in such valuation operating flexibility not only allows a firm to change course in response to new information but also allows interested observers to make inferences based on the change in course or lack thereof such information conveyance through refined operating choices can alter observers incentives as a result an option to delay may prove valuable because it allows a firm to prolong informational advantages

selling an asset to a competitor a seller decides whether to allocate an item among two potential buyers the seller and buyer 1 interact ex post in such a way that each of them suffers a negative externality if the other possesses the item we show that the optimal allocation rule favors buyer 2 who does not interact ex post with the seller and in particular bidder 1 may not obtain the good even if his valuation is highest the auction is therefore subject to resale when resale is possible the seller must distort the original auction we show that the mechanism depends crucially on the way resale is organized ex post the seller may decide to always allocate the good to the agent with the highest valuation when rents are fully extracted by an intermediary on the resale market however she may resort to a stochastic mechanism when the winner of the primary auction has full bargaining power in the resale stage

implicit contracts moral hazard and unemployment this paper considers a firm whose marginal revenue product of labor is a random variable we derive the form of an optimal long term contract between workers and the firm under the assumption that labor s marginal product is observed by the firm but not by the workers we show that the existence of asymmetric information causes unemployment to be greater than in a situation where information about labor s marginal product is public or where employment is determined in spot markets in particular unemployment can occur when the marginal product of labor exceeds the reservation wage

stuck on stubble the non market value of agricultural byproducts for diversified farmers in morocco diversified agricultural households often use byproducts of one activity as inputs for another for crop livestock farmers cereal production provides grain and crop residue where the latter can be used as livestock feed to properly assess the cost of introducing new technologies into such systems one must value the implicit cost of byproducts which is made difficult by missing byproduct markets we estimate the shadow value of non market crop stubble using household data from morocco and find that stubble accounts for around one quarter of the value of cereal production in a normal rainfall year and three quarters in a drought year

strategic delay in bargaining this paper analyses a bargaining model with incomplete information in which the time between offers is an endogenous strategic variable we find equilibria involving a delay to agreement that is due to the use of strategic time delay by bargainers to signal their relative strength under some specifications of the parameters delay is present in the unique sequential equilibrium whose beliefs satisfy one intuitive restriction this delay does not vanish as the minimal time between offers becomes small

ratifiable mechanisms learning from disagreement in a mechanism design problem participation constraints require that all types prefer the proposed mechanism to some status quo if equilibrium play in the status quo mechanism depends on the players beliefs then the inference drawn if someone objects to the proposed mechanism may alter the participation constraints we investigate this issue by modeling the mechanism design problem as a two stage process consisting of a ratification state followed by the actual play of the chosen game we develop and illustrate a new concept ratifiability that takes account of inferences from a veto in a consistent way

nonfarm income diversification and household livelihood strategies in rural africa concepts dynamics and policy implications abstract asset activity and income diversification lie at the heart of livelihood strategies in rural africa this paper introduces a special issue on the topic income diversification and livelihoods in rural africa cause and consequence of change we concentrate on core conceptual issues that bedevil the literature on rural income diversification and the policy implications of the empirical evidence presented in this special issue

estimating labor supply of farm households under nonseparability empirical evidence from nepal abstract this paper examines the labor supply of farm households in nepal using a recently developed methodology that accounts for the simultaneity between production and consumption decisions of the households estimates of marginal products of male and female labor or shadow wages are obtained from an agricultural production function an instrumental variable approach is then used to recover the household s structural labor supply from variations in the shadow wages and income as well as other household characteristics the findings reveal that both male and female total labor supply are sensitive to changes in shadow wages and income human capital embodied in education is found to exert a significant positive effect on output but has no statistically significant impact on total labor supply of individuals the results also rejects the existence of efficient labor markets in rural nepal

collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values abstract the standard approach to collusion in auctions posits an uninformed disinterested third party who prior to the auction designs and implements a collusive mechanism in environments where collusion agreements are likely to be both proposed and executed by the involved parties this approach may neglect information leakages from simply a proposal to collude we consider a model of collusion where one informed bidder proposes to another as in es and schummer 2004 we allow for general interdependent values and affiliated signals in contrast to third party modeling approaches collusion is inefficient from both a social perspective except for the case of pure common values and from the perspective of the ring both bidders are better off than without colluding but the surplus extracted from the seller is distributed asymmetrically between the bidders the potential for information leakage from proposing is bad for low types who reveal that they are weak competitors but is advantageous for high types because they are able to signal their strength we identify a so called briber s curse whereby acceptance of a proposal causes the proposer to downgrade her expected value for the object when there is additional competition in the form of bidders outside of the cartel the briber s curse significantly harms cartel profits and raises seller revenues

the principal agent relationship with an informed principal the case of private values we analyze the principal agent relationship when the principal has private information as a three stage noncooperative game contract proposal acceptance refusal and contract execution we assume that the information does not directly affect the agent s payoff private values equilibrium exists and is generically locally unique moreover it is pareto optimal for the different types of principal the principal generically does strictly better than when the agent knows her information equilibrium allocations are the walrasian equilibria of an economy where the traders are different types of principal and exchange the slack on the agent s individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints

incentives in principal agent relationships this article identifies some of the major issues that have been examined in the literature on incentives the article begins by discussing the frictions that lie at the heart of incentive problems next the principal s optimal response to these frictions is explored taking as given the characteristics of the agents with whom the principal interacts in a nonrepeated setting the design of individualized contracts contests and tournaments is analyzed then the principal s task of selecting the best agent is addressed and repeated agency relationships are considered

screening in a matching market contract design under incomplete information is often analysed in a bilaterally monopolistic setting if the informed party s reservation value does not depend on its private information its type it is a standard result that the uninformed side offers low types distorted contracts to reduce the information rent left to high types we challenge this result by embedding contract design in a matching market environment we consider a market where players meet pairwise and where in each match either side may be chosen to make a take it or leave it offer as frictions become sufficiently low we find that the set of equilibria is independent of whether there is complete or incomplete information in particular all contracts are free of distortions

a non cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information verifiable types abstract we consider a non cooperative sequential bargaining game with incomplete information where two players negotiate for mechanisms with ex post verifiable types at the interim stage we prove the existence of a stationary sequential equilibrium of the bargaining game where the ex post nash bargaining solution with no delay is asymptotically implemented with probability one further the ex post nash bargaining solution is a unique outcome of a stationary equilibrium under the property of independence of irrelevant types iit whereby the response of every type of a player is independent of allocations proposed to his other types and under a self selection property of their belief

mechanism design by an informed principal private values with transferable utility we provide a solution to the informed principal problem in the independent private values setting with monetary transfers the principal s private information creates signaling considerations that may distort the implemented allocation we show that there is no distortion all principal types implement an allocation that is optimal for the principal ex ante before he she learns his her type as an application we consider settings with linear utility for bilateral exchange in which the principal is one of the traders the solution is a combination of a participation fee a buy out option for the principal and a resale stage with posted prices

interim third party selection in bargaining abstract third party intervention can reduce the risk of conflict in situations where the bargaining failure is due to asymmetric information in this paper i consider the selection of a third party in a two person bargaining problem where each disputant has private information about its relative strength or weakness for a class of problems i find that the disputants choose the third party that is best for the strong type but worst for the weak type due to the incentive of each disputant to avoid seeming weak to their adversary the selected third party s intervention entails a higher ex ante chance of conflict than intervention by any other alternative this paper shows how the process of interim third party selection can have important consequences for the outcome of a third party intervention in bargaining

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

a signaling based theory of contractual commitment to relationships abstract in this paper i present signaling as an explanation for how and why parties commit to relationships when they initially contract about the terms of those relationships two forms of contractual commitment to a relationship are considered a promise to trade in the future contracted quantity and a promise not to trade with anyone else contracted exclusivity a party is said to commit more to a relationship if it commits initially to trade a higher quantity and or to a higher level of exclusivity i characterize equilibrium contracts and therefore commitment both the ability to signal information through an exclusivity commitment and whether the informed party commits more to the relationship when the relationship is more likely to succeed depend on the source of the asymmetry of information

peasant household behaviour with missing markets some paradoxes explained a model of peasant household behavior under varying degrees of household specific food and labor market failures is constructed to show that these structural features can explain several well known patterns of peasant response which have often been attributed to peculiar motives presumed specific to peasants the model explains sluggish response to cash crops prices and high instability in perceived food and labor scarcities the key role of manufactured consumer goods prices in stimulating peasants effort in cash crops production the effectiveness of taxation as opposed to incentives in stimulating cash crops production and the key role of technological change in food production to enhance cash crop production results are obtained analytically in the case of one market failure and by numerical simulation with more than one

contractual signaling relationship specific investment and exclusive agreements i analyze a model of hold up with asymmetric information at the contracting stage the asymmetry of information concerns the value of trade with external parties i show that contractual signaling and efficiency of investment can conflict if only quantity is contractible this conflict generates inefficient equilibria in terms of investment contracting on exclusivity in addition to quantity resolves the conflict and consequently eliminates the inefficiency of investment

on risk transactions and economic development in the semiarid tropics recent interest in the institutions and production relations of tropical agriculture seem to hold promise for increased collaboration between economists and anthropologists in efforts to explain existing patterns of production and socioeconomic interaction this focus on customs and on the more formal institutional arrangements is encouraging given the continuing concern for food production in much of the semiarid tropics two recent papers are particularly germane to this growing literature h p binswanger and m r rosenzweig have offered a foundation for addressing the production relations in agriculture with a general focus on conditions in south asia more recently binswanger and j mcintire provide an explanation for the major institutions and customary features of production relations in three agroclimatic subzones of the land abundant tropics that have simple technology and high transport costs 2 they also offer predictions of how these institutions and features might change in response to the opening up of subsistence economies and to population growth our approach here is consistent with this recent work in several respects first it is explanatory in that we offer possible explanations for observed behavior in the land abundant tropics where agriculture is a mixture of cropping and livestock management second it is predictive in that we draw on economic theory to hypothesize likely changes in behavior in the face of institutional change finally it is offered in the interest of stimulating a concern for the institutional preconditions of economic development by such preconditions we have in mind the institutional arrangements that can stimulate the economic development process in particular we focus on the role of transactions in the economy we do not believe that there is anything intrinsically undesirable about transactions that are restricted to a circle of family and acquaintances on the contrary such transactions play an important

total cost procurement auctions impact of suppliers cost adjustments on auction format choice we consider sealed and open bid total cost procurement auctions where two attributes are used for contract award decisions price which is bid by the supplier and a fixed cost adjustment which is included by the buyer to capture nonprice factors such as logistics costs suppliers know only their own true production cost and their own cost adjustment and the buyer does not know the suppliers true production costs but does know all suppliers cost adjustments which she herself sets in order to make an informed total cost decision the buyer who seeks to minimize her total price and cost adjustment procurement cost can choose to run a first price sealed bid auction where suppliers bids are affected by their beliefs about each other s total costs or a descending open bid auction where only the actual realizations of suppliers total costs drive the auction outcome we characterize the buyer s choice between the two formats as a threshold decision over suppliers cost adjustments and analyze the effect of supplier beliefs on her decision we also study the impact of additional suppliers on the buyer s decision the effect of correlation between suppliers production costs and their cost adjustments and additive as well as multiplicative total cost functions the results suggest that procurement managers can use their evaluations of suppliers cost adjustments to make better auction format decisions

using shadow wages to estimate labor supply of agricultural households with few exceptions most studies of the labor demand and supply decisions of agricultural households in developing countries have relied on the empirical advantages of separability given the questionable nature of some of the assumptions sufficient for separability i apply a recent methodology that accounts for the simultaneity between the production and consumption decisions of a farm household using data from rural india direct estimates of the marginal productivities shadow wages of family male and female labor are derived from a cobb douglas agricultural production function the estimated shadow wages and income are then used as regressors in a structural model of labor supply

the value of information and optimal organization the paper addresses the issue of optimal organization of production i compare three organizational forms centralization one agent produces difierent inputs decentralization each of the two agents produces a difierent input and contracts directly with the principal and delegation two agents produce difierent inputs the principal contracts with one of them only the optimal organizational form depends on the degree of complementarity substitutability between the inputs in the flnal use the degree of complementarity substitutability also determines whether delegation is payofi equivalent to the two agent mechanism from the point of view of the principal in the context of delegation i consider which of the two agents should serve as the primary contractor i also address the issue of collusion between the agents in a decentralized organization and characterize the conditions under which a stake of collusion exists jel fields d2 d82 l23

shadow wages and shadow income in farmers labor supply functions this article extends the current literature on estimating the labor supply function in agriculture by providing a different method to derive the shadow wage and shadow income the method is based on the observation that the shadow wage is the marginal product of labor at the optimal point of both farm and household production functions thus under certain assumptions on the functional form of the production functions both the shadow wage and shadow income can be derived without estimating the production function using a sample of vietnamese farmers the results from the new method are shown to be consistent with the theory

vertical contracting with informational opportunism we consider vertical contracting arrangements between a manufacturer and a retailing network when retailers have private information and the organization is run through bilateral contracts we highlight a new form of informational opportunism arising when the manufacturer manipulates information learned separately in each relationship we characterize the set of allocations robust to such opportunism by means of simple ex post incentive compatibility constraints those constraints limit the manufacturer s ability to use yardstick competition among retailers they simplify contracts and restore a rent efficiency trade off even with correlated information we show that sell out contracts are optimal under a wide range of circumstances

addressing the renewable energy financing gap in africa to promote universal energy access integrated renewable energy financing in malawi abstract the sustainable energy for all initiative is a global initiative launched by the united nations secretary general in 2012 with a goal of providing universal access to modern energy services by 2030 to achieve this goal substantial financial and technological investments will be required at a rate far exceeding historical levels sub saharan africa has a 30 5 electrification rate and policy reform issues to improve electrification have been poorly implemented thereby sprinkling doubt as to whether the region would be able to achieve 100 access to electricity for all by the year 2030 sub saharan africa faces a tough challenge in order to achieve universal access to modern energy services since the region fails to attract energy sector investments there is also a general perception that the region contributes very little to global greenhouse gas emissions hence offers few opportunities to reduce these emissions consequently missing out on attracting climate finance projects a guarantee of power purchase has been shown to attract energy sector investments however guarantees of power purchases such as feed in tariffs are experiencing slow market growth in developing countries because of a range of technical regulatory and financial barriers using malawi as a case study of a developing country this review provides a perspective from a sub saharan africa least developed country as to the various electrification renewable energy deployment and climate change management challenges that still require urgent attention this study shows that despite the perceived regulatory and financial challenges malawi can integrate and use a combination of adapted price guarantee schemes cross subsidies and environmental taxes in order to support initiatives aimed at supporting the country s development of renewable energy sources and hence indirectly support the sustainable energy for all initiative

the revelation and delegation principles in common agency games in the context of common agency adverse selection games we illustrate that the revelation principle cannot be applied to study equilibria of the multi principal games we then demonstrate that an extension of the taxation principle what we term the delegation principle can be used to characterize the set of all common agency equilibria this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

overcoming incentive constraints by linking decisions consider a bayesian collective decision problem in which the preferences of agents are private information we provide a general demonstration that the utility costs associated with incentive constraints become negligible when the decision problem is linked with a large number of independent copies of itself this is established by defining a mechanism in which agents must budget their representations of preferences so that the frequency of preferences across problems mirrors the underlying distribution of preferences and then arguing that agents incentives are to satisfy their budget by being as truthful as possible we also show that all equilibria of the linking mechanisms converge to the target utility levels the mechanisms do not require transferable utility or interpersonal comparisons of utility and are immune to manipulations by coalitions

robust predictions for bilateral contracting with externalities the paper studies bilateral contracting between one principal and n agents when each agent s utility depends on the principal s unobservable contracts with other agents we show that allowing deviations to menu contracts from which the principal chooses bounds equilibrium outcomes in a wide class of bilateral contracting games without imposing ad hoc restrictions on the agents beliefs this bound yields for example competitive convergence as n in environments in which an appropriately defined notion of competitive equilibrium exists we also examine the additional restrictions arising in two common bilateral contracting games the offer game in which the principal makes simultaneous offers to the agents and the bidding game in which the agents make simultaneous offers to the principal

entitling the pollutee liability versus standard under private information this paper considers and compares two different legal means full liability and standard to reduce and to regulate pollution at a local level accounting for private information about benefits and costs the familiar polluter pays principle makes the polluter liable for any damage since the courts lack information about the true damage the pollutee can and presumably will overstate this damage nevertheless voluntary arrangements bypassing the courts exist e g for coasean reasons however such out of court arrangements fail to improve in many cases the inefficient allocation of pollution due to agency costs given these unsatisfactory consequences of the polluter pays principle even after allowing for contracts around the law we propose a modification of standards the pollutee is entitled that a certain standard is satisfied yet can trade this right for financial compensations contracts induced by this legal rule are countervailing the optimal mechanism switches between subsidies and payments and first best efficiency holds at both ends and this characteristic allows such a privatized standard to track the first best quite well and often better than the polluter pays principle this relative ranking under private information is the opposite of the one that holds under uncertainty here liability dominates the standard

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

informed seller with taste heterogeneity consider a seller with a single indivisible good facing a buyer whose willingness to pay depends on his privately known taste and on product characteristics privately known by the seller what selling procedure can arise as an equilibrium of the game in which the seller strategically chooses mechanisms conditional on his information we characterize the set of equilibrium outcomes and establish that ex ante revenue maximizing mechanisms are in this set there is generally a continuum of revenue ranked equilibrium outcomes focusing on the revenue maximizing equilibrium we show that the seller in general benefits from private information and does not benefit from committing to a disclosure or a certification technology we also provide conditions under which the privacy of the seller s information does not affect revenue

loan commitments and the debt overhang problem the debt overhang problem is shown to arise in the context of an entrepreneurial project that requires a sequence of investments financed by an outside lender the entrepreneur not internalizing losses accruing to the lender which financed the initial investments may inefficiently cancel the project and instead pursue an outside opportunity it is shown that loan commitments contracts that allow the entrepreneur to borrow a variable amount at a set interest rate in return for a fixed fee are the optimal financial contracts in this setting strictly dominating standard debt the existence of the fixed fee allows loan commitments to set a relatively low interest rate improving the entrepreneur s incentives to continue the project the paper specifies the optimal contract fully derives robust comparative statics properties using an extension of milgrom and roberts 1994 and extends the results to more realistic settings e g allowing the market risk free rate to be stochastic

effects of the internal wage on output supply a structural estimation for japanese rice farmers farmers are offered a higher wage rate by their off farm employers than the rate of remuneration they receive for their labor on their own family farms in japan however it is not possible for them to work for as many hours as they want for their off farm employers at the offered wage rate hence they perceive that they face an imperfectly competitive market for labor with only limited opportunities for wage employment see for example arayama 1986 kang and maruyama 1992 markets for their output and factors of production are observed to be perfectly competitive thus the state of the markets they face proves to be similar to the one producer consumer households face in the circumstances addressed in section 2 2 of the preceding chapter since the market for labor is not a perfectly competitive one because it offers only limited opportunities for wage employment the market wage rate ceases to be relevant in organizing their family farms and in making their choice over their level of consumption they are obliged to form an internal wage rate on their own for these purposes within their households the analytical results in section 2 2 show that the internal wage rate proves to be lower than the market rate and renders their supply of output and their demand for factors of production less elastic than in the instance in which all relevant markets are perfectly competitive in extreme cases it gives rise to a downward sloping supply function of output and upward sloping demand functions for the factors of production

a complete solution to a class of principal agent problems with an application to the control of a self managed firm this paper considers a class of principal agent problems which have the following features 1 there is adverse selection because the principal ignores the value of one parameter of the agent s true characteristics 2 leaving aside the information parameter the principal s welfare as well as the agent s welfare depend on two types of variables observable to both of them the first ones possibly multidimensional are called action variable s and the second one which is one dimensional has in general the meaning of a money transfer 3 the principal is a stackelberg leader of the two person game he can commit himself to decision rules which are admissible on informational grounds he optimizes within the adequate class taking into account besides the agent s reaction one constraint which has generally the meaning of an individual rationality constraint and sometimes of a feasibility constraint the optimization is limited to the class of non stochastic mechanisms 4 the problem can also receive an alternative interpretation the principal faces a continuum of agents of unknown characteristics the distribution being known however stylized principal agent problems of this type have often been considered in the economic literature in particular the reader will later be able to recognize that the standard income tax model a la mirrlees 1971 the quality or quantity choice model of the monopolist a la mussa and rosen 1978 or maskin and riley 1982 and the model of government regulation of the private monopolist of baron and myerson 1982 all belong to

a note on the seller s optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two sided incomplete information it is shown with an example that in bilateral trade problems with two sided incomplete information some seller types may obtain higher expected payos in mechanisms other than the one where they make a take it or leave it oer contrary to popular belief if one looks at the mechanism selection problem of the informed seller then the op timality of a take it or leave it oer for the seller is restored journal of economic literature classi cation numbers c72 c78 d82

governing the transition to renewable energy a review of impacts and policy issues in the small hydropower boom abstract the transition to renewable energy technologies raises new and important governance questions with small hydropower shp expanding as part of renewable energy and climate mitigation strategies this review assesses its impacts and identifies escalating policy issues to provide a comprehensive literature review of small hydropower we evaluated over 3600 articles and policy documents this review identified four major concerns 1 confusion in small hydropower definitions is convoluting scholarship and policy making 2 there is a lack of knowledge and acknowledgement of small hydropower s social environmental and cumulative impacts 3 small hydropower s promotion as a climate mitigation strategy can negatively affect local communities posing contradictions for climate change policy and 4 institutional analysis is needed to facilitate renewable energy integration with existing environmental laws to ensure sustainable energy development for readers interested in small hydropower we clarify areas of confusion in definition and explain the corresponding impacts for distinct system designs for a broader readership we situate small hydropower implementation within international trends of renewable energy development the contradictory impacts of climate change policy emerging dynamics in energy finance and reliance on market mechanisms our paper provides a timely contribution to scholarship on small hydropower and the transition to renewable energy

the governance of clean energy in india the clean development mechanism cdm and domestic energy politics this paper explores the ways in which clean energy is being governed in india it does so in order to improve our understanding of the potential and limitations of carbon finance in supporting lower carbon energy transitions and to strengthen our appreciation of the role of politics in enabling or frustrating such endeavors in particular we emphasize the importance of politics and the nature of india s political economy in understanding the development of energy sources and technologies defined as clean both by the united nations clean development mechanism cdm and leading international actors by considering the broad range of institutions that exert formal and informal political influence over how the benefits and costs of the cdm are distributed the paper highlights shortcomings in the narrow way in which cdm governance has been conceptualized to date this approach goes beyond analysis of technocratic aspects of governance often reduced to a set of institutional design issues in order to appreciate the political nature of the trade offs that characterize debates about india s energy future and the relations of power which will determine how and on whose terms they are resolved

promoting fair competition in public procurement abstract if a government cares for local firms profit but not for foreign firms foreign firms will be discriminated against when competing for government procurement contracts foreign firms will be chosen less often and when chosen earn less profit than local firms we analyze a more central authority s policies against such discrimination given a situation in which a government has private information on product quality and the competing firms have private information on own costs necessary and sufficient conditions for free revelation of quality information are derived finally optimal policy when these conditions are not satisfied is characterized and discussed

shadow wages and peasant family labour supply an econometric application to the peruvian sierra a striking feature of developing economies is the large proportion of the work force that is self employed lack of widespread labor market participation in the agricultural sector can pose a major obstacle to the empirical implementation of economic models of the peasant household whether because wage data are simply not available or because the assumptions required to make use of wage data stretch the bounds of credulity this paper develops a methodology for estimating a structural labor supply model for primarily self employed peasant households which holds under a general agricultural technology and set of labor market conditions the unique feature of the approach is that the opportunity cost of time or shadow wage of household workers is explicitly estimated from an agricultural production function and is subsequently used to identify a set of structural labor supply parameters recent household survey data from rural peru is employed to estimate and perform various diagnostic tests on the model the empirical findings lend support to the hypothesis that peasant households allocate their members time as if to maximize a family utility function and moreover demonstrate the tractability of the shadow wage methodology and its usefulness in estimating more elaborate time allocation models

delegated monitoring versus arm s length contracting abstract this paper analyzes the optimal organization of input suppliers in a procurement context we discuss when a top firm chooses to induce information sharing and active coordination between its suppliers consolidation rather than having them contract at arm s length delegation in designing the organization the firm anticipates that different supplier networks have different costs of inducing information revelation from suppliers when the cost of information sharing varies the optimal organization exhibits various discrete degrees of consolidation there is excessive arm s length contracting compared to the case where the top firm controls this organizational choice itself the paper offers also a methodology to study in a unified framework various organizational forms separately analyzed in the literature

optimal regulation of multinationals under collusion this paper analyses the optimal collusion proof mechanism for the regulation of multinational firms mnfs in foreign direct investment fdi projects there is a host country with a profitable investment opportunity either a multinational firm mnf or a local firm lf can undertake this project nonetheless due to its firm specific advantage and the mnf has the potential to create a larger surplus the host government faces an informational constraint such that it cannot observe the extra surplus the mnf can generate using this set up karabay 2010 shows that employing foreign ownership restrictions to force a joint venture jv can help the host government to partially overcome its information disadvantage in this paper we extend karabay 2010 by studying the host government s optimal regulatory policy when the mnf and the lf can collude it turns out collusion imposes no cost on the host government and the expected welfare attained in the absence of collusion can still be secured under collusion

farmers subjective valuation of subsistence crops the case of traditional maize in mexico shadow prices guide farmers resource allocations but for subsistence farmers growing traditional crops shadow prices may bear little relationship with market prices we econometrically estimate shadow prices of maize using data from a nationally representative survey of rural households in mexico shadow prices are significantly higher than the market price for traditional but not improved maize varieties they are particularly high in the indigenous areas of southern and southeastern mexico indicating large de facto incentives to maintain traditional maize there

examining the regional pattern of renewable energy cdm power projects in india abstract india is one of the leading host countries of clean development mechanism cdm projects but these projects have been concentrated within ten states of the country while the skewed distribution of cdm projects across countries is well recognized little attention has been given to the skewed distribution of cdm projects within a country like india we examine the different factors that account for the regional distribution of renewable energy based cdm power projects in india using state specific and renewable form specific explanatory variables including natural potential economic conditions and government policies we find that state implementation of fiscal incentive measures and cdm benefit sharing were the most significant factors in locating these projects within the states apart from natural renewable potential in the top ten states controlling for the government incentives and subsidies the pre installed renewable power capacity was also a significant factor state financial incentives and cdm benefit clause were also found to be the most significant factor in the generation of certified emission reductions from cdm projects unfortunately states with relatively higher natural potential lost out on the additional product gains through cers and an important aspect of the cdm approach seems to have been missed in india that of promoting development in other regions of the country which had natural potential

resale in second price auctions with costly participation abstract we study sealed bid second price auctions with costly participation and resale each bidder chooses to participate in the auction if her valuation is higher than her optimally chosen participation cutoff if resale is not allowed and the bidder valuations are drawn from a strictly convex distribution function the symmetric equilibrium where all bidders use the same cutoff is less efficient than a class of two cutoff asymmetric equilibria existence of these equilibria without resale is sufficient for existence of similarly constructed two cutoff equilibria with resale moreover the equilibria with resale are more asymmetric and under a sufficient condition more efficient than the corresponding equilibria without resale

carbon market risks and rewards firm perceptions of cdm investment decisions in brazil and india the carbon market experiences of brazil and india represent policy success stories under several criteria a careful evaluation however reveals challenges to market development that should be addressed in order to make the rollout of a post 2012 cdm more effective we conducted firm level interviews covering 82 cdm plants in the sugar and cement sectors in brazil and india focusing on how individual managers understood the potential benefits and risks of undertaking clean development mechanism cdm investments our results indicate that the cdm operates in a far more complex way in practice than that of simply adding a marginal increment to a project s internal rate of return our results indicate the following first although anticipated revenue played a central role in most managers decisions to pursue cdm investments there was no standard practice to account for financial benefits of cdm investments second some managers identified non financial reputational factors as their primary motivation for pursuing cdm projects and third under fluctuating regulatory regimes with real immediate costs and uncertain cdm revenue managers favored projects that often did not require carbon revenue to be viable the post 2012 cdm architecture can benefit from incorporating these insights and in particular reassess goals for strict additionality and mechanisms for achieving it

aid conditionality and military expenditure reduction in developing countries models of asymmetric information this paper analyzes problems of implementing noneconomic conditionality such as military expenditure reduction in the granting of foreign aid given the presence of asymmetric information the authors present two conceptually separate principal agent models to capture the stylized facts of multilateral and bilateral aid negotiations respectively the first model is an application of the problem of adverse selection when there is more than one type of principal donor with varying objectives the second model extends moral hazard to double moral hazard where neither principal nor agent recipient can fully observe or verify each other s strategies copyright 1995 by royal economic society

interim bayesian persuasion first steps some recent information transmission models kamenica and gentzkow 2011 rayo and segal 2010 view the sender as an information structure designer this view emphasizes a connection between design and information transmission it departs from traditional models of information transmission crawford and sobel 1982 grossman 1981 milgrom 1981 spence 1973 since it assumes that the sender commits to an information system before learning her type so that her choice is by itself uninformative by contrast there is a small but active tradition in mechanism design following myerson 1983 that considers the possibility that a choice of mechanism by an informed principal may be used as a signal by the participants in the mechanism through the study of an example this short paper proposes a modest first step toward building a theory of information structure design by an informed principal i work in a simple framework where a sender whose type is either high or low seeks validation from a receiver who wants to validate high types exclusively the sender chooses an infor mation system i e a conditional distribution of signals for each of her types from a feasible set i allow for potential restrictions on the set of feasible information systems which is important to make bayesian persuasion models more flexible i consider perfect bayesian equilibria of the game in which the sender chooses an information system after learning her type and the receiver chooses whether to validate after observing the signal generated by the information system

sequential communication with ex post participation constraints abstract this paper examines an informed principal agent game with ex post participation constraints for the agent it shows that the players do not lose by communicating in turn among themselves rather than simultaneously if and only if the principal communicates first it then considers every bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules that assign non negative payoffs for one player in a bilateral asymmetric information framework it provides necessary and sufficient conditions for sequential communication to be as efficient as simultaneous communication in implementing these allocation rules when the player with unbounded payoffs moves first

entrepreneurs and new ideas we study how early stage new ideas are turned into successful businesses even promising ideas can be unprofitable if they fail on one dimension such as technical feasibility correspondence to market demand legality or patentability to screen good ideas the entrepreneur needs to hire experts who evaluate the idea along their dimensions of expertise sharing the idea however creates the risk that the expert would steal it yet the idea thief cannot contact any other expert lest he should in turn steal the idea thus stealing leads to incomplete screening and is unattractive if the information of the other expert is critical and highly complementary in such cases the entrepreneur can form a partnership with the experts thus granting them the advantage of accessing each other s information yet very valuable ideas cannot be shared because it is too tempting to steal them

on the existence of positive equilibrium profits in competitive screening markets abstract frictionless consumer choices and price competition are often associated with competitive markets and vanishing equilibrium profits we discuss vanishing profits in competitive screening markets like insurance we assume symmetric firms which exhibit constant returns to scale consumer heterogeneity creates the possibility of adverse selection firms can offer multiple contracts in equilibrium and importantly in any deviation nash equilibrium profits vanish if each consumer has a unique optimizing bundle at equilibrium prices or more generally if there exists a linear ordering of contracts that dictates the preferences of firms whenever consumers are indifferent between multiple optimal contracts of particular interest equilibrium profits vanish if for each agent indifference curves are steeper than iso profit curves the results extend to miyazaki wilson spence equilibria we provide examples of economies where there exists an equilibrium with strictly positive profit and show that these examples are robust hold for an open set of economies

optimal promotion policies with the looking glass effect this chapter considers a model where the agent is uncertain about his innate ability and instead makes an inference from others namely the principal s perception as often emphasized in the psychology literature when the principal has superior knowledge about the agent s productivity than the agent himself the principal has an incentive to use promotions strategically to boost the agent s self confidence within this framework the optimal promotion policy depends not only on the agent s current expected ability type but also on the history of his previous job assignments we then use this fact to explain why we rarely observe demotions in organizations

towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm this paper outlines a theory of the multiproduct firm important building blocks include excess capacity and its creation market imperfections and the peculiarities of organizational knowledge including its fungible and taut character a framework is adopted in which profit seeking firms are seen to diversify in order to avoid the high transactions costs associated with using various markets to trade the services of various specialized assets neoclassical explanations of the multiproduct firm are shown to be seriously deficient

sequential bargaining with incomplete information this paper describes a simple two person two period bargaining game and solves it using the concept of perfect bayesian equilibrium in which the actions of each player convey information which is used by his opponent the paper examines the effects of changes in bargaining costs the size of the contract zone and the length of the bargaining process on such aspects of the solution as the probability of impasse and the likelihood of concessions the combination of information transfer and the lack of pre commitment embodied in perfectness yields many surprising results common perceptions about the effects of parameter changes on bargaining processes are suspect and should be checked in the particular game being discussed

bribing in second price auctions an ipv 2 bidder second price auction is preceded by two rounds of bribing prior to the auction each bidder can try to bribe his rival to depart from the auction so that he the briber will become the sole participant bribes are offered sequentially according to an exogenously given order restricting attention to pure strategies and imposing a certain refinement i study the efficient equilibria of this game in any such equilibrium whenever the first mover offers a strictly positive bribe this bribe is given by his surplus his valuation minus the payoff that he would have received in the dominant strategy equilibrium of the auction i derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of such an equilibrium i also extend this equilibrium s construction to a model with general valuations not necessarily ipv

existence of equilibrium in common agency games with adverse selection abstract we establish the existence of subgame perfect equilibria in general menu games known to be sufficient to analyze common agency problems our main result states that every menu game satisfying enough continuity properties has a subgame perfect equilibrium despite the continuity assumptions that we make discontinuities naturally arise due to the absence in general of continuous optimal choices for the agent our approach then is based on and generalizes the existence theorem of simon l zame w 1990 discontinuous games and endogenous sharing rules econometrica 58 4 861 872 designed for discontinuous games

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

equilibrium rejection of a mechanism we study a mechanism design problem in which players can take part in a mechanism to coordinate their actions in a default game by refusing to participate in the mechanism a player can revert to playing the default game non cooperatively we show with an example that some allocation rules are implementable only with mechanisms which will be rejected on the equilibrium path in our construction a refusal to participate conveys information about the types of the players this information causes the default game to be played under different beliefs and more importantly under different higher order beliefs than the interim ones we find a lower bound on all the implementable payoffs we use this bound to establish a condition on the default game under which all the implementable outcomes are truthfully implementable without the need to induce rejection of the mechanism

resource allocation under demand uncertainty and private information we study the effect of multilateral private information on the efficiency of markets where capacity constrained upstream agents supply a resource to downstream entities facing uncertain end demands we analyze two models a pooling system in which a single downstream principal pools a resource from multiple upstream agents and a distribution system in which one upstream principal allocates a resource across multiple downstream agents we show that the presence of multilateral private information does not hinder efficiency in the pooling system in contrast in the distribution system the quantities allocated to downstream agents can exceed as well as fall short of their first best levels these results shed light on the recently improved performance of u s agricultural produce market and the observed episodes of shortages oversupplies in flu vaccine and other seasonal markets this paper was accepted by manel baucells decision analysis