testing informational assumptions in common value bidding models this paper provides an example of a means of linking mathematical theory laboratory experiments and standard empirical work theory by necessity abstracts from the naturally occurring world and experiments designed to test theory must incorporate the same abstractions on the other hand empirical tests are generally performed on naturallyoccurring data which may not reflect those same abstractions given this possible divergence naturally occurring data should be tested for consistency with theoretical assumptions whenever possible on the basis of standard symmetric bidding theory this paper reports on a preliminary version of such a test for off shore oil bidding data

optimal nonparametric estimation of first price auctions this paper proposes a general approach and a computationally convenient estimation procedure for the structural analysis of auctioni data considering first price sealed bid auction models within the independent private value paradigm we show that the underlying distribution of bidders private values is identified from observed bids and the number of actual bidders without any parametric assumptions using the theoiy of minimax we establish the best rate of uniform convergence at which the latent density of private values can be estimated nonparametrically from available data we then propose a two step kernel based estimator that converges at the optimal rate

institutional selection in international relations state anarchy as order by the end of the medieval era three new competing institutions attempted to capture gains from trade and reduce feudal particularism sovereign territorial states cityleagues and city states by the middle of the seventeenth century city leagues and city states had declined markedly territorial states survived as the dominant form because they were able to reduce free riding lower transaction costs and credibly commit their constituents the selection process took place along three dimensions first sovereign territorial states proved competitively superior in the economic realm second states increasingly recognized only other sovereign territorial states as legitimate actors in the international system third other actors defected to or copied the institutional makeup of sovereign territorial organization the emergence of discrete territorial units in which only sovereign authorities represented their citizens as the predominant type of organization in international affairs created a new solution to the problem of markets and hierarchies

updating the reserve price in common value auctions we consider a common value auction model with bidder participation determined jointly by nature and by bidder optimization in this framework an increase in the reserve price as two effects it deters marginal bidders and it deters bidders from becoming informed we then derive a test statistic for establishing when it is optimal to raise the reserve price this statistic is independent of the distribution of valuations we then apply the analysis to u s offshore oil sales and find evidence that the reserve price is dramatically too low this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

domestic responses to capital market internationalization under the gold standard 1870 1914 the internationalization of capital markets that occurred during the era of the classical gold standard 1870 1914 was part of a broader set of trends that threatened to drain local markets from capital and channel that capital to the national financial center and from there toward other national financial centers still internationalization was neither inevitable uniform nor irreversible but was a political choice informed by redistributional considerations between rival domestic interests and decided by politically dominant coalitions the domestic institutional structure in each country determined the composition of the politically dominant coalition decentralized structures allowed potential losers to curb public policies favorable to capital market internationalization whereas centralized structures allowed expected winners to promote such policies as a result economies with centralized states ended up being the most dependent on the international capital market whereas economies with decentralized states took a less active part in the globalization of finance

setting the agenda electoral competition commitment of policy and issue salience by committing policy an incumbent in effect disowns an issue when she maintains policy flexibility the issue remains electorally salient electoral competition shapes political commitment decisions and collapses the multi dimensional issue space into a low dimensional space of electorally salient issues

structural estimation of the affiliated private value auction model we consider the structural estimation of the affiliated private value apv model in first price sealed bid auctions the model allows for bidders individual efficiencies and opportunity costs while permitting dependence among bidders private values through affiliation we establish the nonparametric identification of the apv model characterize its theoretical restrictions and propose a computationally convenient and consistent two step nonparametric estimation procedure for estimating the joint private value distribution from observed bids using simulated bid data we provide a step by step guide on how to implement our procedure and show the good behavior of our estimator in small samples

testing for affiliation in first price auctions using entry behavior in this article we show that affiliation among potential bidders private information either private signals or entry costs leads to affiliation among their entry decisions we propose a test for affiliation among potential bidders private information based on the implication of affiliation on the entry behavior which is general and widely applicable to various scenarios the test is implemented using the simulation based method we then apply our method to timber sales in the oregon department of forestry and find a small but strongly significant level of affiliation among all timber companies

non additive beliefs and strategic equilibria abstract this paper studies n player games where players beliefs about their opponents behaviour are modelled as non additive probabilities the concept of an equilibrium under uncertainty which is introduced in this paper extends the equilibrium notion of dow and werlang 1994 j econom theory 64 305 324 to n player games in strategic form existence of such an equilibrium is demonstrated under usual conditions for low degrees of ambiguity equilibria under uncertainty approximate nash equilibria at the other extreme with a low degree of confidence maximin equilibria appear finally robustness against a lack of confidence may be viewed as a refinement for nash equilibria journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d81

informational rents in oil and gas concession auctions in brazil abstract this article aims to estimate the informational rents earned by winning bidders in oil and gas exploration and production auctions in brazil we estimate the distributions of bids and bidders private valuations using a nonparametric structural model and assuming independence and asymmetry between participants petrobras the brazilian state owned petroleum giant and former oil sector monopolist was considered a competitor that was distinct from other competitors thus we investigate a database based on information from all auctions held between 1999 and 2008 the results suggest that petrobras earned significantly higher information rents than other competitors such rents ranged from 15 to 63 depending on the number and type of competitors

global linkages and domestic politics trade reform and institution building in india in comparative perspective this article examines how the world trade organization wto affects institutional development and policy responses in india india is a country traditionally resistant to external pressures but in

identification in first price and dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable within the ipv paradigm we show nonparametric identication of model primitives forrst price and dutch auctions with a binding reserve price and auction specic unobservable sets of potential bidders

extensive form games with uncertainty averse players abstract nash equilibrium presumes that the beliefs of a player are represented by a probability measure motivated by the ellsberg paradox and relevant experimental findings demonstrating that this representation of beliefs may be unrealistic this paper generalizes nash equilibrium in finite extensive form games to allow for preferences conforming to the multiple priors model developed by gilboa and schmeidler journal of mathematical economics 18 1989 141 153 the implications of this generalization for strategy choices and welfare are studied journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d81

identification and estimation of discriminatory auctions when bidders have private values and singleton demand this note shows how to identify and estimate the distribution of valuations of bidders participating in discriminatory auctions when valuations are private and bidders have singleton demand

empirical testing of auction theory given the state of affairs in auction theory there is at least one model for instance to support any position one would care to take concerning the revenue of sealed bid vs open auctions it should not come as a surprise that a fair amount of empirical work in auctions is underway this paper reports the results of some recently completed research i first discuss papers in which the predictions being tested derive directly from the pure theory of auctions and then papers in which the predictions arise out of an application of auction theory to a related institution

globalization and the changing logic of collective action globalization transforms collective action in domestic and international politics as the scale of markets widens and as economic organization becomes more complex the institutional scale of political structures can become insufficient for the provision of an appropriate range of public goods a process of this sort occurred prior to the emergence of the modern nation state which itself constituted a paradigmatic response to this predicament today however a complex process of globalization of goods and assets is undermining the effectiveness of state based collective action overlapping playing fields are developing made up of increasingly heterogeneous transnational local and intermediate arenas the residual state retains great cultural force and innovative projects for reinventing government are being tried nevertheless the state s effectiveness as a civil association has eroded significantly and this may lead to a crisis of legitimacy

5 information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values a laboratory study in affiliated private value auctions each bidder has perfect information regarding his her own value for the object at auction but higher values of the item for one bidder make higher values for other bidders more likely we report on a series of experiments examining three key implications of these auctions i in a first price auction public information about rivals values increases expected revenue ii an english auction increases expected revenue compared to a first price auction and iii a second price auction is isomorphic to an english auction in examining these issues we compare predictions of some ad hoc bidding models with nash equilibrium predictions in the first price auction experiments nash equilibrium bidding theory organizes the data better than either of two ad hoc bidding models public information about others valuations does increase average revenue but the increase in revenue is smaller and less reliable than predicted under risk neutral nash equilibrium bidding lower average revenue might be attributed to risk aversion while the high variability is attributed to a sizable frequency of individual bidding errors relative to the theory bidding theory precisely organizes english auction outcomes after a brief initial learning period the dominant strategy equilibrium does not organize second price auctions nearly as well as market prices persistently exceed predicted prices the difference between english and second price outcomes is attributed to effects of different information flows inherent in the structure of the two institutions on eliminating bidding errors revenue impacts of these two institutions relative to a first price auction are examined in light of observed bidding patterns

the winner s curse and bidder competition in acquisitions evidence from failed bank auctions this study examines the effect of bidder competition in acquisitions we use predictions from auction theory to test whether acquirers of failed banks overpay the winner s curse when bidding in fdic sealed bid purchase and assumption p a transactions auctions the empirical results indicate that winning bids tend to increase as the number of competitors increases as predicted by theory we also find that bid levels of all bidders increase with increased competition which is consistent with bidders failing to adjust for the winner s curse in a common value auction setting however additional tests using winning bids only are consistent with both a common value and a private values model so this result should be interpreted with caution the winner s curse hypothesis states that the winner of a sealed bid auction in which the value of the object being competed for is uncertain tends to be the one who most overestimates the true value of the auctioned object as a result auction winners who fail to recognize this possibility are likely to be cursed by having paid more for the object than its true worth this hypothesis has been applied to various situations including bidding on oil and gas leases capen et al 3 and corporate takeovers roll 16 varaiya 19 support for the existence of the winner s curse has been reported primarily from laboratory experiments bazerman and samuelson 1 kagel and levin 12 testing of the winner s curse hypothesis with market data is in its early stages gilley karels and leone s 7 study of bidding for oil leases provides mixed suport brannman klein and weiss 2 examine bidding behavior in a variety of auction markets and interpret some of their results as supporting the winner s curse hypothesis our study examines the effects of bidder competition and the winner s curse hypothesis within the context of fdic auctions of failed banks our study may also have relevance for the broader corporate control literature this literature uniformly indicates that shareholders of acquired firms earn large

the affiliation effect in first price auctions we study the monotonicity of the equilibrium bid with respect to the number of bidders n in affiliated private value models of first price sealed bid auctions and prove the existence of a large class of such models in which the equilibrium bid function is not increasing in n we moreover decompose the effect of a change in n on the bid level into a competition effect and an affiliation effect the latter suggests to the winner of the auction that competition is less intense than she had thought before the auction since the affiliation effect can occur in both private and common value models a negative relationship between the bid level and n does not allow one to distinguish between the two models and is also not necessarily only due to bidders taking account of the winner s curse

an empirical study of auction revenue rankings the case of municipal bonds using a novel dataset of 386 rst price municipal bond auctions held in california i perform counterfactual revenue comparisons based on the theoretical result of milgrom and weber 1982 i show that the revenue in the second price auction is non parametrically identi ed and the counterfactual revenue in the english auction can be bounded in an informative way these results form a

violations of belief persistence in dempster shafer equilibrium abstract belief persistence is a standard rationality axiom in formal models of belief change it requires that new information be accommodated with the smallest possible change to existing beliefs this note shows that violations of belief persistence are possible in j eichberger and d kelsey s 1999a signalling games with uncertainty unpublished university of birmingham 1999b in beliefs interactions and preferences in decision making m j machina and b munier eds pp 135 157 dordrecht kluwer academic dempster shafer equilibrium dse a solution concept for signaling games based on choquet expected utility such violations may lead to implausible equilibria so a refinement of dse is proposed journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d81

the recursivity of law global norm making and national lawmaking in the globalization of corporate insolvency regimes for the past 15 years an enormous enterprise of global norm making and related national lawmaking has been underway in many areas of global commerce this article shows that leading global institutions such as the world bank imf and united nations are building an international financial architecture with law including corporate bankruptcy law as its foundation building on research on international institutions and three national cases china indonesia korea the authors propose a new framework for legal change in a global context the recursivity of law they argue that the globalization of bankruptcy law has proceeded through three cycles 1 at the national level through recursive cycles of lawmaking 2 at the global level through iterative cycles of norm making and 3 at the nexus of the two recursive cycles are driven by driven by four mechanisms the indeterminacy of law contradictions diagnostic struggles and actor mismatch thus the recursivity of law both revives and expands the soc

can top down and bottom up be reconciled electoral competition and service delivery in malaysia summary top down versus bottom up is one of development s enduring tensions not least in public service delivery in malaysia public services have traditionally been animated from the top down bottom up forces in civil society have strengthened recently but so too have top down forces and their impact on public services is greater malaysia s experience suggests that where electoral competition gives politicians an incentive to respond to voters service preferences top down initiatives have the greater potential for large scale social change participatory initiatives will be most effective when they play a supplementary role

nonparametric identification of risk aversion in first price auctions under exclusion restrictions this paper studies the nonparametric identification of the first price auction model with risk averse bidders within the private value paradigm first we show that the benchmark model is nonindentified from observed bids we also derive the restrictions imposed by the model on observables and show that these restrictions are weak second we establish the nonparametric identification of the bidders utility function under exclusion restrictions our primary exclusion restriction takes the form of an exogenous bidders participation leading to a latent distribution of private values that is independent of the number of bidders the key idea is to exploit the property that the bid distribution varies with the number of bidders while the private value distribution does not we then extend these results to endogenous bidders participation when the exclusion restriction takes the form of instruments that do not affect the bidders private value distribution though derived for a benchmark model our results extend to more general cases such as a binding reserve price affiliated private values and asymmetric bidders last possible estimation methods are proposed

econometrics of first price auctions in this paper we propose an estimation method for the empirical study of theoretical auction models we focus on first price sealed bid and descending auctions and we adopt the private value paradigm where each bidder is assumed to have a different private value only known to him for the object that is auctioned following mcfadden 1989 and pakes and pollard 1989 our proposed method is based on simulations specifically the method relies on a simulated nonlinear least squares objective function appropriately adjusted so as to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters of interest we illustrate the proposed method by studying a market of agricultural products where descending auctions are used our analysis takes into account heterogeneity of the auctioned objects and the fact that only the winning bid is observed we estimate the parameters that characterize the distribution of the unobserved private values for each auctioned object

mechanism choice and strategic bidding in divisible good auctions an empirical analysis of the turkish treasury auction market we propose an estimation method to bound bidders marginal valuations in discriminatory auctions using individual bid level data and apply the method to data from the turkish treasury auction market using estimated bounds on marginal values we compute an upper bound on the inefficiency of realized allocations as well as bounds on how much additional revenue could have been realized in a counterfactual uniform price or vickrey auction we conclude that switching from a discriminatory auction to a uniform price or vickrey auction would not significantly increase revenue moreover such a switch would increase bidder expected surplus by at most 0 02 percent

some evidence of the winner s curse the mathematical complexity of auction theory has restricted empirical work to qualitative tests of its basic predictions with mixed results this paper exploits the theory of order statistics to derive a nash bid function that is linear in its parameters allowing direct estimati on by linear least squares the bid function is fitted to a cross section of auctions for highway construction contracts from thirty three states and provides support for several hypotheses of the theory of common value auctions copyright 1988 by american economic association

room to move international financial markets and national welfare states a central research question in international political economy concerns the influence of financial markets on government policy outcomes to what extent does international capital mobility limit government policy choices i evaluate the relationship between international financial markets and government policy outcomes with a focus on the government bond market in developed democracies evidence includes interviews with financial market participants and a cross sectional time series analysis of the determinants of interest rates this evaluation suggests that governments of developed democracies face strong but narrowly defined financial market pressures financial market participants are concerned with a few macroeconomic policy indicators including inflation rates and government deficit gdp ratios but not with micropolicy indicators such as the distribution of government spending across functional categories in these areas governments retain policymaking autonomy i conclude by exploring the role of financial market influences within domestic politics and offering suggestions for further research

perspectives on multinational enterprises in emerging economies multinational enterprises mnes play a pivotal role in the development of many emerging economies in consequence they became the focus of scholarly research by economists and policy analysts in contrast international business scholars have been comparatively uninterested in analysing this role of mnes yet they could make important contributions to these debates first studies taking the individual firms as starting point would enhance understanding of the interaction between mnes and the local environment second theories and research methodologies developed in international business research could provide new insights into the dynamics of mnes in emerging economies the objective of this paper is to motivate more international business scholars to engage in research on positive and negative spillovers from foreign direct investment fdi in emerging economy societies to advance this research agenda scholars need to analyse the specific activities and capabilities of the firms involved and the impact of fdi on the broader social and environmental context for management this agenda raises the ethical question to what extent ought businesses to care about their local stakeholders

asymmetry in first price auctions with affiliated private values collusion and heterogeneity across firms may introduce asymmetry in bidding games a major difficulty in asymmetric auctions is that the bayesian nash equilibrium strategies are solutions of an intractable system of differential equations we propose a simple method for estimating asymmetric first price auctions with affiliated private values considering two types of bidders we show that these differential equations can be rewritten using the observed bid distribution we establish the identification of the model characterize its theoretical restrictions and propose a two step non parametric estimation procedure for estimating the private value distributions an empirical analysis of joint bidding in ocs auctions is provided copyright 2003 john wiley sons ltd

identification and inference in ascending auctions with correlated private values we introduce and apply a new nonparametric approach to identification and inference on data from ascending auctions we exploit variation in the number of bidders across auctions to nonparametrically identify useful bounds on seller profit and bidder surplus using a general model of correlated private values that nests the standard independent private values ipv model we also translate our identified bounds into closed form and asymptotically valid confidence intervals for several economic measures of interest applying our methods to much studied u s forest service timber auctions we find evidence of correlation among values after controlling for a rich vector of relevant auction covariates this correlation causes expected profit the profit maximizing reserve price and bidder surplus to be substantially lower than conventional ipv analysis of the data would suggest

semiparametric estimation of first price auctions with risk averse bidders in view of the non identification of the first price auction model with risk averse bidders this paper proposes some parametric identifying restrictions and a semiparametric estimator for the risk aversion parameter s and the latent distribution of private values specifically we exploit heterogeneity across auctioned objects to establish semiparametric identification under a conditional quantile restriction of the bidders private value distribution and a parameterization of the bidders utility function we develop a multistep semiparametric method and we show that our semiparametric estimator of the utility function parameter s converges at the optimal rate which is slower than the parametric one but independent of the dimension of the exogenous variables thereby avoiding the curse of dimensionality we then consider various extensions including a binding reserve price affiliation among private values and asymmetric bidders the method is illustrated on u s forest service timber sales and bidders risk neutrality is rejected

globalization as galton s problem the missing link in the analysis of diffusion patterns in welfare state development most macro cross national studies in political science that analyze the impact of globalization on domestic policies do not sufficiently consider the meth odological consequences of diffusion processes or galton s problem as it is often referred to i argue that globalization is a form of diffusion therefore it requires a shift from an exclusively functional analysis which dominates in almost all estab lished comparative studies in the field to a diffusional analysis i assume that glob alization leads to a shift in focus on the part of political actors from domestic to international issues i test this hypothesis by examining social expenditure rates of sixteen highly developed welfare states the results indicate that globalization has become a highly influential factor since the late 1980s in contrast to the years before in addition to the actual results presented here the methodological approach of ana lyzing globalization as diffusion is relevant to other areas of comparative and inter national politics and may be a tool in future research

asymmetry in procurement auctions evidence from snow removal contracts differences in cost efficiency and productivity across firms may introduce asymmetries in procure ment auctions relying on a structural approach this article investigates potential asymmetry among firms bidding for snow removal contracts in montrthe empirical results show that firms located in close proximity have a cost advantage relative to other firms in the most urbanised part of montrbecause of prohibitive equipment storage costs the extent of inefficiency due to asym metry is empirically assessed various policy experiments are performed a bidding preference policy shows that the city could expect to reduce its costs for allocating snow removal contracts when bidders willingness to pay depends in part on observable variables the princi pal s interest is not best served by creating a level auction playing field this article studies procurement auctions for snow removal contracts in montrit investigates the degree to which companies in disadvantageous locations should win even if they do not submit the lowest bid from the submitted bids a novel empirical methodology estimates the extent of cost variation across firms along with its variation within loca tion although the dispersion is substantial the gain from treating bidders unequally is limited when observed individual characteristics affect the firms costs and their bidding strategies all bidders cannot be treated alike these differences in characteristics or asymmetries among bidders may arise from their size as noted by laffont et al 1995 their capacity constraints as in jofre bonet and pesendorfer 2003 or the possession of better information as in hendricks and porter 1988 and hendricks et al 1994

auctioning and bargaining an econometric study of timber auctions with secret reservation prices this article considers a first price sealed bid auction at which the seller s reservation price is not announced in advance we allow for a second round of bargaining and consider the nash bargaining outcome when the object is unsold after the auctioning round we characterize the bidders and seller s bayesian nash equilibrium strategies the distributions of the buyers and seller s private values are estimated by nonlinear least squares from auction data on standing timber while solving numerically the differential equations characterizing the seller s and buyers equilibrium strategies the performance of the estimated model is then compared to a model in which the players behave myopically

semiparametric estimation of the optimal reserve price in first price auctions the optimal reserve price in the independent private value paradigm is generally expressed as a functional of the latent distribution of private signals which is by nature unobserved this feature has limited the implementation of the optimal reserve price in practice in this article we consider first price auctions within the general affiliated private values paradigm we show that the seller s expected profit can be written as a functional of the observed bid distribution we propose a semiparametric extremum estimator for estimating consistently the optimal reserve price from observed bids as an illustration we consider the outer continental shelf ocs wildcat auctions

identification and estimation of auction models with unobserved heterogeneity in many procurement auctions the bidders unobserved costs depend both on a common shock and on idiosyncratic private information assuming a multiplicative structure i derive sufficient conditions under which the model is identified and propose a non parametric estimation procedure that results in uniformly consistent estimators of the cost components distributions the estimation procedure is applied to data from michigan highway procurement auctions private information is estimated to account for 34 of the variation in bidders costs it is shown that accounting for unobserved auction heterogeneity has important implications for the evaluation of the distribution of rents efficiency and optimal auction design

nonparametric estimation of asymmetric first price auctions a simplified approach abstract we present an approach to nonparametric estimation of pseudo values in asymmetric affiliated private values apv models for first price auctions that eliminates the curse of dimensionality we show that pseudo values can be estimated by using two dimensional functions of bids for apv models regardless of the form of asymmetry

estimation in english auctions with unobserved heterogeneity we propose a framework for identification and estimation of a private values model with unobserved heterogeneity from bid data in english auctions using variation in the number of bidders across auctions and extend the framework to settings where the number of bidders is not cleanly observed in each auction we illustrate our method on data from ebay motors auctions we find that unobserved heterogeneity is important accounting for two thirds of price variation after controlling for observables and that welfare measures would be dramatically misestimated if unobserved heterogeneity were ignored

optimal regulation of multinationals under collusion this paper analyses the optimal collusion proof mechanism for the regulation of multinational firms mnfs in foreign direct investment fdi projects there is a host country with a profitable investment opportunity either a multinational firm mnf or a local firm lf can undertake this project nonetheless due to its firm specific advantage and the mnf has the potential to create a larger surplus the host government faces an informational constraint such that it cannot observe the extra surplus the mnf can generate using this set up karabay 2010 shows that employing foreign ownership restrictions to force a joint venture jv can help the host government to partially overcome its information disadvantage in this paper we extend karabay 2010 by studying the host government s optimal regulatory policy when the mnf and the lf can collude it turns out collusion imposes no cost on the host government and the expected welfare attained in the absence of collusion can still be secured under collusion

collective strategies in fighting corruption some intuitions and counter intuitions this article explores the plausibility of some intuitions and counter intuitions about the anti corruption efforts of mdbs and international organizations leveraging the power of the private sector regulation of a sizable percentage of global private sector actors now falls into a new area of international governance with innovative institutions standards and programs we wrestle with the role and value of private sector partnerships and available informal and formal social controls crafting proportional informal controls e g monitoring evaluations and sanctions and proper incentives to cooperative games across networks are the lynchpins of successful collective action programs ambivalence with informal social controls or effective incentives we argue risks far too much deference to private sector interests

nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty breaking down backward induction abstract we define nash equilibrium for two person normal form games in the presence of knightian uncertainty using the formalization of schmeidler and gilboa we show that nash equilibrium exists for any degree of uncertainty aversion that maxmin behaviour can occur even when it is not rationalizable in the usual sense and that backward induction breaks down in the twice repeated prisoners dilemma we relate these results to the literature on cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma and the literature on epistemological conditions underlying nash equilibrium the knowledge notion implicit in this model of equilibrium does not display logical omniscience journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d81

optimism and pessimism in games this paper considers the impact of ambiguity in strategic situations it extends the earlier literature by allowing for optimistic responses to ambiguity ambiguity is modelled by ceu preferences we propose a new solution concept for players who may express ambiguitypreference then we study comparative statics of changes in ambiguity attitude in games with strategic complements this gives a precise statement of the impact of ambiguity on economic behaviour

estimation of beauty contest auctions beauty contests are auction mechanisms used to buy or sell differentiated products where the auctioneer does not specify a decision rule to pick the winning bidder beauty contests are widely used in procuring welfare to work projects freelance services selling online ads real estate transactions and hiring dating marriage decisions unlike price only auctions beauty contests have no closed form bidding strategies and suffer from nonmultiplicatively separable unobserved auction heterogeneity which makes their estimation challenging to address these challenges we formulate beauty contests as incomplete information games and present a two step estimator a key contribution of our method is its ability to account for common knowledge auction specific unobservables using finite unobserved types we show that unobserved auction types and distributions of bids are nonparametrically identified and recoverable in the first step using a nonparametric expectation maximization em like algorithm and that

political responses to interdependence what s left for the left heightened economic interdependence in recent years is commonly argued to have generated great pressures for convergence in economic policies across the advanced industrial democracies interdependence has clearly had a great impact on the types of economic policies that governments can pursue they have been unable to pursue independent fiscal and monetary policies since the mid 1970s furthermore all governments have been forced to attempt to promote the competitiveness of national goods and services in world markets and to increase the speed and efficiency with which national producers adjust to changes in global markets there are however different policies consistent with these goals statistical analyses of economic policies since the mid 1970s show that governments of the left and the right continue to be able to enact distinctive supply side policies that promote competitiveness and flexible adjustment and simultaneously further their partisan objectives

global networks and domestic policy convergence a network explanation of policy changes national economies are embedded in complex networks such as trade capital flows and intergovernmental organizations igo s these globalization forces impose differential impacts on national economies depending on a country s network positions this article addresses the policy convergence divergence debate by focusing on how networks at the international level affect domestic fiscal monetary and regulatory policies the author presents two hypotheses first similarity in network positions induces convergence in domestic economic policies as a result of peer competitive pressure second proximity in network positions facilitates policy learning and emulation which result in policy convergence the empirical analysis applies a latent space model for relational dyadic data and indicates that position similarity in the network of exports induces convergence in fiscal and regulatory policies position similarity in the network of transnational portfolio investments induces convergence in fiscal policies and position proximity in igo networks is consistently associated with policy convergence in fiscal monetary and regulatory policies

sequential two player games with ambiguity if players beliefs are strictly non additive the dempster shafer updating rule can be used to define beliefs off the equilibrium path we define an equilibrium concept in sequential two person games where players update their beliefs with the dempster shafer updating rule we show that in the limit as uncertainty tends to zero our equilibrium approximates bayesian nash equilibrium by imposing context dependent constraints on beliefs under uncertainty

globalization and the decline of the welfare state in less developed countries why have trends in government welfare spending in developing countries diverged from those in developed countries i address this question by investigating the effects of capital and trade flows on government welfare spending in fifty three developing countries using an original measure of labor power in developing countries i test the links between international markets labor s political strength and the welfare state i argue that labor s collective action problems caused by large populations of low skilled and surplus workers offset labor s potential political gains from globalization i show that when the proportion of low skilled workers in a nation is high globalization will lead to a decline in welfare spending most significantly the results suggest that in nations where labor market institutions are not yet well developed government social welfare spending is constrained by international market forces

bounds on revenue distributions in counterfactual auctions with reserve prices measuring auction revenues under counterfactual reserve prices or formats requires knowledge of distributions of bidders values and private signals this poses a challenge when bids are observed from rst price common value auctions i bound counterfactual revenue distributions without imposing parametric restrictions on the model structure using data from u s municipal bond auctions i nd rst price and second price auctions under optimal reserve prices lead to little improvement in revenues over existing rst price formats the number of bidders has a more signi cant impact on revenues in optimal auctions i also nd invoking an incorrect assumption of private values in counterfactual analyses results in small errors in predicting revenues from optimal sp auctions

code creation in endogenous merger experiments we study the conflict that can occur in a merger due to firms use of specialized language or code and whether participants accurately forecast this difficulty after creating a shared code to describe different pictures accurately subjects bid for extra payments to join a merged group the two lowest bidders are placed in the merged group values inferred from two different bidding procedures indicate fairly accurate general appraisals of the cost of the merger but the values of those subjects who bid the least and choose to join the merged group are too optimistic reflecting an organizational winner s curse

international systems and domestic politics linking complex interactions with empirical models in international relations following older debates in international relations literature concerning the relative importance of domestic versus systemic factors newer debates emphasize interdependence among states and the complex interactions between systemic and domestic factors as globalization and democratization advance theories and empirical models of international politics have become more complicated we present a systematic theoretical categorization of relationships between domestic and systemic variables we use this categorization so that scholars can match their theory to the appropriate empirical model and assess the degree to which systemic factors affect their arguments we also present two advances at the frontier of these empirical models in one we combine hierarchical models of moderating relationships with spatial models of interdependence among units within a system in the other we provide a model for analyzing spatial interdependence that varies over time this enables us to examine how the level of interdependence among units has evolved we illustrate our categorization and new models by revisiting the recent international political economy ipe debate over the relationship between trade policy and regime type in developing countries

irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games abstract based on a model where deviations from equilibrium play are assumed to identify irrational players who are characterized by ambiguous set valued strategies this paper introduces an equilibrium notion for extensive games with ambiguity averse players that yields a precise interpretation for the counterfactual reasoning usually associated with backward induction the resulting equilibria are always nash equilibria but may not satisfy the conditions required for various refinements of nash equilibrium including those for subgame perfection existence of such equilibria is proved for all two player games and for n player games with perfect information