income tax evasion revisited the impact of interest rate yields on tax free municipal bonds 1 introductionincome tax evasion remains a timely issue as evidenced by recently published studies e g see feige 1989 1994 alm jackson and mckee 1992 pestieau possen and slutsky 1994 cebula 1997 2001 alm mcclelland and schulze 1999 atkins 1999 panteghini 2000 ali cecil and knoblett 2001 saltz 2001 in an effort to provide further insight into the determinants of tax evasion this study hypothesizes that the tax evasion decision may include an assessment of the tax free interest rate yield on say high grade municipal bonds relative to the taxable interest rate yield on alternative high quality bond issues such as 10 year treasury notes presumably the higher the interest rate yield on high grade municipals whose interest is legally exempt from federal income taxation relative to the taxable interest rate yield on 10 year treasury notes the more attractive those municipals become ceteris paribus in effect the interest paid on tax free bonds especially for households in higher tax brackets may offer an attractive legal alternative income tax avoidance to illegal income tax evasion 1 thus it is hypothesized that the higher the tax free interest rate yield on high grade municipals relative to the taxable yield on 10 year treasury notes or equivalent taxable issues the less the incentive for and hence the less the degree of income tax evasion this study investigates empirically whether higher yields on tax free municipals relative to the taxable yields on 10 year treasury notes reduce the degree of aggregate federal personal income tax evasion section 2 provides the model which includes a variety of variables already established in the literature to affect tax evasion section 3 describes the data sections 4 and 5 provide the empirical findings and concluding remarks 2 the modelthe economy consists of agents who generate economic value that is reflected in the form of income and choose whether to report none some or all of their income to the internal revenue service irs the probability that the representative economic agent will not report taxable income pnr is treated as an increasing function of the expected gross benefits to the agent of not reporting income eb and a decreasing function of the expected gross costs to the agent of not reporting income ec formula omitted see article image the expected gross benefits from not reporting income to the irs are hypothesized to be an increasing function of income tax rates unlike previous studies this study focuses on both the average effective federal personal income tax rate aept and the maximum marginal federal personal income tax rate max such that formula omitted see article image furthermore as suggested by feige 1994 and cebula 2001 the higher the level of public dissatisfaction dis with the perceived performance of government employees and elected government officials the greater the subjective benefit taxpayers derive from tax evasion accordingly becomes formula omitted see article image finally as explained in section 1 it is hypothesized in this study that the higher the tax free interest rate yield on high grade municipal bonds tf relative to the taxable interest rate yield on 10 year treasury notes ten the greater the incentive to engage in legal tax avoidance and the lower the incentive to engage in tax evasion thus becomes formula omitted see article image the expected gross costs of not reporting income to the irs are hypothesized to be an increasing function of the expected risks thereof in this study to the representative economic agent the expected penalty from not reporting taxable income to the irs if said activity is detected by the irs is measured in part by the total pecuniary penalties including both penalties per se and interest previously assessed by the irs on audited tax returns pen

sovereign ratings and their asymmetric response to fundamentals abstract the evolution of sovereign ratings is strongly asymmetric as downgrades tend to be deeper and faster than upgrades in other words once a country loses its initial status it takes a long time to recover it using s p data we characterize rating cycles in terms of their duration and amplitude then we study whether the reaction of this agency to new domestic economic and financial information is also different during upgrade and downgrade phases our results indicate that favorable fundamentals could be helpful in terms of smoothing and slowing down rating downgrades whereas they do not seem to accelerate rating upgrades

good ipos draw in bad inelastic banking capacity and hot markets we posit that screening ipos requires specialized labor which is in fixed supply a sudden increase in demand for ipo financing increases the compensation of ipo screening labor this results in reduced screening encouraging sub marginal firms to enter the ipo market further fueling the demand for screening labor the model s conclusions are consistent with empirical findings of increased underpricing during hot markets positive correlation between issue volume and underpricing and with tipping points between hot and cold markets finally the model makes sharp predictions relating the ipo market to fundamental values of firms and to investment banking returns

ceo wage dynamics estimates from a learning model abstract the level of chief executive officer ceo pay responds asymmetrically to good and bad news about the ceo s ability the average ceo captures approximately half of the surpluses from good news implying ceos and shareholders have roughly equal bargaining power in contrast the average ceo bears none of the negative surplus from bad news implying ceos have downward rigid pay these estimates are consistent with the optimal contracting benchmark of harris and holmstrom 1982 and do not appear to be driven by weak governance risk averse ceos accept significantly lower compensation in return for the insurance provided by downward rigid pay

economic policy uncertainty and sovereign credit rating decisions panel quantile evidence for the eurozone we employ a panel quantile framework that quantifies the relative importance of quantitative and qualitative factors across the conditional distribution of sovereign credit ratings in the eurozone area we find that regulatory quality and competitiveness have a stronger impact for low rated countries whereas gdp per capita is a major driver of high rated countries a reduction in the current account deficit leads to a rating or outlook upgrade for low rated countries economic policy uncertainty impacts negatively on credit ratings across the conditional distribution however the impact is stronger for the lower rated countries in other words the creditworthiness of low rated countries takes a much bigger hit than that of high rated countries when european policy uncertainty is on the rise

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

a public good approach to credit ratings from concept to reality abstract from the onset of the 2008 2009 financial crisis to the subsequent european sovereign debt crisis credit rating agencies have been assigned considerable blame reforming the credit rating industry has hence become an important policy issue in addition to the regulatory efforts in the context of accepting the for profit business model of ratings there is a growing realization that credit ratings bear the characteristics of a public good financial market participants need reliable transparent and independent assessment of credit risks credit ratings are therefore better viewed as an infrastructure matter however the proposed regulations seem to have missed this point this paper introduces a new approach to credit ratings undertaken by the risk management institute at the national university of singapore that is predicated on the provision of credit ratings as a public good with a public good alternative in place the currently predominant for profit business model may be counterbalanced

last bank standing what do i gain if you fail banks are highly leveraged institutions potentially attracted to speculative lending even without deposit insurance a counterbalancing incentive to lend prudently is the risk of loss of charter value which depends on future rents we show in a dynamic model that current concentration does not reduce speculative lending and may in fact increase it in contrast a policy of temporary increases in market concentration after a bank failure by promoting a takeover of failed banks by a solvent institution is very effective by making speculative lending decisions strategic substitutes it grants bankers an incentive to remain solvent subsequent entry policy fine tunes the trade off between the social costs of reduced competition and the gain in stability

tax evasion and uncertainty in a dynamic context we study optimal dynamic compliance decisions in an uncertain environment contrary to the static literature greater uncertainty affects consumption not the optimal tax evasion rule thus audit and sanctions rather than fiscal uncertainty should be used to control tax evasion

asset portfolio securitizations and cyclicality of regulatory capital this paper analyzes the level and cyclicality of regulatory bank capital for asset portfolio securitizations in relation to the cyclicality of capital requirements for the underlying loan portfolio as under basel ii iii we find that the cyclicality of capital requirements is higher for i asset portfolio securitizations relative to primary loan portfolios ii ratings based approach rba relative to the supervisory formula approach iii given the rba for a point in time rating methodology relative to a rate and forget rating methodology and iv under the passive reinvestment rule relative to alternative rules capital requirements of the individual tranches reveal that the volatility of aggregated capital charges for the securitized portfolio is triggered by the most senior tranches this is due to the fact that senior tranches are more sensitive to the macroeconomy an empirical analysis provides evidence that current credit ratings are time constant and that economic losses for securitizations have exceeded the required capital in the recent financial crisis

analyzing the analysts career concerns and biased earnings forecasts this paper examines the career concerns of security analysts we relate long histories of their earnings forecasts to job separations we find that relatively accurate past forecasts lead to favorable career outcomes such as remaining at or moving up to a high status large prestigious brokerage house controlling for accuracy optimistic forecasts relative to the consensus increase the chances of favorable job separations job separations depend much less on accuracy for analysts who cover stocks that are underwritten by their brokerage houses such analysts are also much more likely to be rewarded for optimistic forecasts than other analysts furthermore job separations were much less sensitive to accuracy and somewhat more sensitive to optimism during the stock market mania of the late 1990s these findings suggest that the well documented analyst forecast optimism bias is likely due to incentives to promote stocks

industry product market competition and managerial incentives abstract while some studies suggest that industry product market competition can substitute for managerial incentives other studies suggest a complementary relation the underlying assumption behind these studies is that competition can be uni dimensionally proxied for by industry concentration however recent studies suggest that competition can reflect several dimensions product substitutability market size and entry costs given the level of industry concentration using these determinants of competition this study contributes to the literature by showing that a firms provide stronger incentives when industry competition is greater b competition is multi dimensional in its relation to incentives and c industry characteristics play a major role in influencing incentives

does the market understand rating shopping predicting mbs losses with initial yields we study rating shopping on the mbs market outside of aaa losses are higher on single rated tranches than on multi rated ones and yields predict future losses for single rated tranches but not for multi rated ones conversely ratings have less explanatory power for single rated tranches these results suggest that single rated tranches have been shopped whereby pessimistic ratings never reach the market for aaa rated mbs by contrast 93 receive two or three such ratings and those ratings agree 97 of the time this ratings convergence suggests that agencies cater to investors who cannot purchase a tranche unless it has multiple aaa ratings

rating the raters are reputation concerns powerful enough to discipline rating agencies abstract credit rating agencies cras are accused of bearing a strong responsibility for contributing to the subprime crisis by having been deliberately too lax in the ratings of some structured products in response to this accusation cras argue that such an attitude would be too dangerous for them since their reputation is at stake the objective of this article is to examine the validity of this argument within a formal model are reputation concerns sufficient to discipline rating agencies we show that the reputation argument only works when a sufficiency large fraction of the cra income comes from other sources than rating complex products by contrast when rating complex products becomes a major source of income for the cra we show that it is always too lax with a positive probability and inflates ratings with probability one when its reputation is good enough we provide some empirical support for this prediction by showing that ceteris paribus the proportion of subprime residential mortgage backed securities rmbs that were rated aaa by the three main cras indeed increased over the last eight years we analyze the policy implications of our findings and advocate for a new business model of cras that we call the platform pays model

the value of delegated quality control this paper studies the case in which a firm delegates quality control to an independent monitor in a repeated game consumers trust provides incentives to acquire information about whether the good is defective and withhold defective goods from sale if third party reports are observable to consumers delegation lessens the first and dispenses with the second moral hazard concern but also creates agency costs internal quality control is optimal only if trades are sufficiently frequent and consumer information is sufficiently precise this result holds in the presence of the possibility of collusion fully non verifiable presale information and economies of scale in external quality control

correlated demand shocks and price wars during booms the supergame theoretic model of price competition rotemberg and saloner 1986 is re examined in the case of serially correlated demand shocks the equilibrium price is shown to exhibit the same counter cyclical movement as in the i i d case if the discount factor and the number of firms satisfy certain relationship

ratings quality over the business cycle credit rating agencies cras have long held that reputational concerns discipline their behavior the value of reputation however depends on economic fundamentals that vary over the business cycle in a model of ratings incorporating endogenous reputation and a market environment that varies we find that ratings quality is countercyclical specifically a cra is more likely to issue less accurate ratings when fee income is high competition in the labor market for analysts is tough and securities default probabilities are low persistence in economic conditions can diminish our results while mean reversion exacerbates them the presence of naive investors reduces overall quality but quality remains countercyclical finally we demonstrate that competition among cras yields similar results

the price elasticity of selective demand a meta analysis of econometric models of sales the author describes a meta analysis of econometric studies that estimated the elasticity of selective sales or market share to price the literature review yielded 367 suitable price elasticities

does sovereign risk in local and foreign currency differ abstract sovereign debt in local currency has been considered safer than in foreign currency the literature offers scant guidance as to why such a gap existed or why it has slowly and steadily diminished over the past two decades we suggest and empirically test five hypotheses we find fx reserves and original sin greater financing in local currency to consistently be robust determinants of the gaps in local and foreign currency ratings as for why the gap has declined we identify as important factors the surge in global reserves and to a lesser extent the decline of original sin

getting the word out enforcement information dissemination and compliance behavior the question for the tax authority is how individuals become aware of enforcement effort to be an effective tool in reducing tax evasion taxpayers must be aware of the current audit and penalty regime we use laboratory experiments to examine the compliance impact of types of information dissemination regarding audit frequency and results the information includes official information disseminated by the tax authority and unofficial or informal communications among taxpayers our results indicate that the effect of the type of post audit information is conditional on whether the taxpayer is well informed of the audit rate prior to filing we find that the tax authority would be served by pre announcing audit rates credibly and by emphasizing the previous period audit frequency in annual reporting of enforcement effort

cdos and the financial crisis credit ratings and fair premia abstract we study risk and return characteristics of cdos using the market standard models we find that fair spreads on cdo tranches are much higher than fair spreads on similarly rated corporate bonds our results imply that credit ratings are not sufficient for pricing which is surprising given their central role in structured finance markets this illustrates limitations of the rating methodologies that are solely based on real world default probabilities or expected losses and do not capture risk premia we also demonstrate that cdo tranches have large exposure to systematic risk and thus their ratings and prices are likely to decline substantially when credit conditions deteriorate

ceo incentives and firm size we develop a model that clarifies how to measure ceo incentive strength and how to reconcile the enormous differences in pay sensitivities between executives in large and small firms the crucial parameter is shown to be the elasticity of ceo productivity with respect to firm size we find that ceo marginal products rise significantly with firm size confirming rosen s conjecture that ceos of large firms have a chain letter effect on firm performance and overall ceo incentives are roughly constant or decline slightly with firm size we employ a multitask model to discuss implications for the design of control systems

ratings competition in the cmbs market we consider the relationship between competition among credit rating agencies and the ratings of commercial mortgage backed securities cmbs using data from 2002 to 2007 we characterize competition using fitch s aggregate share of cmbs ratings and a measure of fitch s deal specific market share constructed as the probability of fitch being hired for a specific transaction controlling for deal characteristics we find that subordination levels were lower when fitch s aggregate and deal specific market shares were higher which suggests that ratings competition yielded less stringent ratings when fitch was a more significant competitor although this effect dissipates when fitch s market shares were high

does africa need a rotten kin theorem experimental evidence from village economies this paper measures the economic impact of social pressure to share income with kin and neighbors in rural kenyan villages the authors conduct a lab experiment in which they randomly vary the observability of investment returns the goal is to test whether subjects reduce their income in order to keep it hidden the analysis finds that women adopt an investment strategy that conceals the size of their initial endowment in the experiment although that strategy reduces their expected earnings this effect is largest among women with relatives attending the experiment parameter estimates suggest that women behave as though they expect to be pressured to share four percent of their observable income with others and substantially more when close kin can observe income directly although this paper provides experimental evidence from a single african country observational studies suggest that similar pressure from kin may be prevalent in many rural areas throughout sub saharan africa

efficient tax reporting the effects of taxpayer liability information services the complexity of the individual income tax system can give rise to both under and overreporting of liability thus creating a wedge between taxpayer perceptions of the price of public services and their actual cost and potentially leading to budget misallocations and associated efficiency losses this study uses theory and experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of taxpayer service programs that endeavor to resolve uncertainty over tax liability to do so we induce uncertainty over tax liability and investigate the effects of both service accuracy and reliability we find participants are less likely to file when tax liability is uncertain but the provision of information offsets this effect furthermore it appears that simply providing a service even one that imperfectly reveals liability increases the propensity to file and the accuracy of the filing when a service that promises to resolve uncertainty completely is requested but not delivered the result is underreporting even more severe than in a setting where no service is available jel h2 h26 c91

employer sanctions on hiring illegal labor an experimental analysis of firm compliance abstract the employer sanctions provision of the 1986 immigration reform and control act penalizes employers who knowingly hire unauthorized workers under irca employers are subject to civil and or criminal penalties however given the widespread availability of counterfeit documentation in some cases it becomes difficult to discern the employment eligibility status of some workers using experimental methods this study provides some evidence that marginal increases in employer compliance rates are significantly higher when employers have perfect information on the employment eligibility status of its potential workers than when they do not the experimental results suggest that increases in government spending for employer sanctions enforcement may be more effective if the informational asymmetry faced by employers is solved first a possible solution to this problem may lie in the adoption of tamper proof documentation such as a national identification card

on the internal revenue service s service and enforcement i introduction the internal revenue service irs services as well as audits taxpayers the irs provides taxpayer service through a variety of channels including its website toll free telephone lines and the taxpayer assistance center for fy 2008 the irs budget request includes 3 6 billion for taxpayer service and 7 2 billion for enforcement everson 2007 in the assessment of the fy 2009 irs budget request the government accountability office gao 2008 1 points out that effective tax administration requires a balance of service and enforcement and enforcement efforts should be combined with taxpayer service because both affect compliance although taxpayer service is an important activity of the irs s operation to our knowledge there is no formal model to address the connection between service and enforcement and more importantly its policy implications in the context of tax compliance this article seeks to take a step to fill this void we consider a simple tax compliance model which is built upon the seminal work of graetz reinganum and wilde 1986 hereafter grw unlike the classical contribution of allingham and sandmo 1972 and yitzhaki 1974 which treats the irs actions as exogenous in their analysis of tax evasion the grw model views the irs as a strategic player that interacts with taxpayers the grw model also differs from the principal agent tax evasion model first introduced by reinganum and wilde 1985 as pointed out by grw the principal agent model suffers from the time inconsistency problem as it requires that the irs announce and commit to an audit policy even though the precommitted audit policy will typically prove suboptimal once taxpayers submit their reported income grw emphasize that their interactive model follows the natural temporal sequence of decisions first taxpayers report their income and only then does the irs decide whether to perform tax audits this sequence is what we typically observe in the real world 1 however like other models on tax compliance grw consider the enforcement part but leave out the service part of the irs activities we extend the grw model to the real world in which the irs services as well as audits taxpayers similar to grw we assume that a taxpayer has either high income or low income to incorporate the role of the irs s service we also assume that taxpayers are uncertain about whether their incomes are eligible for deduction exemption and may seek advice from the taxpayer service provided by the irs to mitigate the uncertainty an important feature of our model is that in equilibrium all net tax revenues collected by the irs are from those taxpayers who voluntarily report high incomes to the irs to maximize the population of the taxpayers in this group the irs will not provide the most accurate service but only maintain an intermediate level of quality the optimal level of accuracy will be increasing as the difficulty in identifying the true income eligibility increases which may be due to more complicated tax laws moreover there exists a conflict between the irs and the society with regard to the optimal taxpayer service in that the society s preferred quality of taxpayer service is likely to be sufficiently high the conflict tends to be intensified as the cost of tax audits becomes lower our result is consistent with the trend in the united states regarding the resources allocated to the taxpayer service in the past few decades we also extend our model in the following two directions the first extension is to address the issue of corruption in tax administration many developing countries suffer from inefficiencies in tax administration and corruption arising from enforcement some authors argue that it is important for developing countries to recognize the service paradigm of tax compliance which emphasizes not only the role of enforcement but also the role of taxpayer service

ceo talent ceo compensation and product market competition abstract we develop a structural industry equilibrium model to show how competitive chief executive officer ceo firm matching and product markets jointly determine firm value and ceo pay we analytically derive testable implications for the effects of product market characteristics on firm size ceo pay and ceo impact on firm value ceo talent matters more in more competitive markets with greater product substitutabilities our ceo impact estimates are much higher than those obtained by previous structural approaches that abstract away from ceo market segmentation the estimates differ across industries primarily due to variation in product market competition rather than variation in the ceo talent distribution

conservation auctions and compliance theory and evidence from laboratory experiments many agri environmental conservation programs are faced with the problem of imperfect monitoring this provides farmers with an incentive for noncompliance because they can receive subsidies without implementing the conservation scheme in this paper bidding behavior and auction performance are compared for discriminatory price and uniform price auctions in an imperfect monitoring environment our theoretical analysis suggests that auction performances are equalized between the discriminatory price and uniform price auctions however laboratory experiments reveal that although the discriminatory price auction has an advantage in terms of reducing policy costs it is more likely to cause adverse selection as a result the uniform price auction tends to have higher efficiency and cost effectiveness when compliance behavior is taken into account

endogenous audits uncertainty and taxpayer assistance services theory and experiments abstract in recent years there has been a sharp rise in the information available to individual income taxpayers such as through tax preparation software provided by third parties and support available by tax agencies but the effects of this information on tax reporting are not well understood within a setting characterized by an endogenous audit process and taxpayer uncertainty this study uses theory and laboratory experiments to investigate the effects of taxpayer assistance services that better inform taxpayers about their tax liability and the audit process the endogenous audit rule we study is simple yet relative to existing work is more likely to characterize the actual incentives facing taxpayers among our findings and in contrast to the case of purely random audits in theory the effect of providing more accurate information on tax liability is ambiguous and we find support empirically for increased tax underreporting even in a setting where theory predicts the opposite this unanticipated result is mitigated when services provide better information on both liability and the audit process suggesting that audit information may be more salient to participants

randomness in tax enforcement abstract when there is tax evasion increased randomness about how much taxable income an auditor would assess generally leads to higher reported income and more revenue when reducing randomness is costly optimality requires some randomness in assessed taxable income even if reducing randomness is costless taxpayers may prefer some randomness when the increased revenue can be rebated so that the government s revenue stays fixed

on the effect of aggregate uncertainty on certification intermediaries incentives to distort ratings abstract we analyze a certification intermediary s incentives to distort ratings in a model with a monopolistic profit maximizing certification intermediary a continuum of heterogeneous sellers and a competitive market of risk neutral buyers the value of a seller s good is known to the seller and observable by the certifier but not by buyers sellers can choose to get a rating the certification intermediary can reveal a signal of arbitrary precision about the quality of the good in contrast to the existing literature we allow aggregate uncertainty as in the existing literature one rating class is optimal however the certification intermediary does not generally choose a socially optimal cutoff the certifier is more likelyto be too lenient if the distribution of aggregate uncertainty has a lower mean a higher variance and is more left skewed it is more likely to be too strict if the opposite holds

free riding and uncertainty this paper examines the effects of uncertainty on pure public good provision and free riding behavior two models are presented in the first nash behavior is assumed and uncertainty is with respect to the contributions of the rest of the community for the second model non nash behavior is assumed and uncertainty concerns the nonzero response that a representative individual s optimizing choice will cause in the community propositions provide sufficient conditions for increased risk to worsen free riding behavior in the two models for nash behavior we also give the sufficient condition for increased risk to ameliorate free riding behavior the effects of group size on free riding are also explored for uncertain responses by the community

on the path dependence of tax compliance abstract this paper presents experimental evidence that tax compliance is path dependent for given values of the audit probability and the fine for tax evasion we compare the income declaration of subjects who faced a change in one of the two parameters to that of subjects who experienced no such parameter change we show that past tax enforcement regimes continue to have an impact on current income declarations this finding may be explained by reference dependent preferences and it has important policy implications for instance legal transplants cannot be expected to reliably yield similar behavior in countries with different legal histories

estimating the costs of issuer paid credit ratings we compare the stability and timeliness of credit ratings produced by a traditional issuer paid rating agency moody s investors service and a subscriber paid rater rapid ratings moody s ratings exhibit less volatility but are slower to identify default risk we control for moody s aversion to ratings volatility and still find its ratings lag rapid ratings more importantly accuracy ratios indicate that rapid ratings provides a better ordinal ranking of credit risk we quantify the loss avoidance associated with rapid ratings signals to estimate costs associated with regulatory and contractual systems based on issuer paid ratings the author 2013 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

tacit collusion under interest rate fluctuations previous literature has shown that demand fluctuations affect the scope for tacit collusion i study whether discount factor fluctuations can have similar effects i find that collusion depends not only on the level of the discount factor but also and more surprisingly on its volatility collusive prices and profits increase with a higher discount factor level but decrease with its volatility these results have important implications for empirical studies of collusive pricing the role that collusive pricing may play in economic cycles and the study of cooperation in repeated games

who profits from taxpayer confusion abstract when taxpayers are uncertain of true taxable income they must decide whether to resolve their uncertainty by seeking tax advice and then decide how much taxable income to report since tax advisors must sign their advisees tax returns the audit policy can depend on whether tax advice was sought in the optimal audit policy some taxpayers will not resolve their uncertainty and the optimal policy yields higher net revenue with uncertainty than without

reputation and competition this paper shows how competition generates reputation building behavior in repeated interactions when the product quality observed by consumers is a noisy signal of firms effort level there are two types of firms and good firms try to distinguish themselves from bad firms although consumers get convinced that firms which are repeatedly successful in providing high quality are good firms competition endogenously generates the outside option inducing disappointed consumers to leave firms this threat of exit induces good firms to choose high effort allowing good reputations to be valuable but its uncompromising execution forces good firms out of the market jel c7 d8

the impact of public transfer expenditures on tax evasion an experimental approach abstract this paper outlines the methodology and results of an experiment undertaken to analyze primarily the impact of public sector transfer payments on tax evasion behaviour apart from the use of transfer payments further explanatory variables used were income expected auditing probability and perceived tax burden the influence of these variables on both the propensity to evade taxes and the extent of taxes evaded are investigated in an attempt to add more realism some innovative changes to the experimental approach were incorporated

building support for taxation in developing countries experimental evidence from mexico abstract drawing on insights from the literature on institutional design how rules shape behavior to achieve desired outcomes this article examines how certain design features of taxes such as allowing for civil society oversight earmark mechanisms that direct tax revenue for a specific purpose and sunset provisions that make the duration of taxes finite affect political support for tax reforms it also evaluates how three important aspects of the fiscal exchange trust in government perceptions of the public good and level of income shape the effect of these design features based on an original survey experiment focusing on the provision of public safety in mexico i find that these design features increase political support for taxation especially among those with low trust in government and low income these findings have important implications not just for mexico but also a number of other countries across latin america that have both low levels of extraction and increased public spending imperatives

imperfect competition and reputational commitment abstract competition can both aid and hinder reputational commitments for quality these are self sustaining depending on future profits after maintaining or deviating from the commitment and on current costs of sustaining it competition can affect these three elements at different rates

income tax compliance and evasion a graphical approach individual income tax compliance has been one of the most significant applications of becker s 6 economic approach to criminal activity and punishment this paper considers an approach to optimal audit policies that relies on the distribution of risk aversion among taxpayers and is consistent with some stylized facts about the u s tax system rather than considering the tax evasion situation as a game between the tax collector and identical taxpayers this model has the tax collector choose an audit probability to maximize expected tax revenues net of audit costs knowing that each taxpayer has a reservation audit probability the smallest audit probability that would evoke truthful reporting depending on how averse to risk she is as the heterogeneity in the population vanishes this problem becomes the same as the tax compliance problem analyzed in graetz reinganum and wilde 9 this paper extends earlier contributions by analyzing income tax evasion and compliance with a population that is heterogeneous with respect to risk aversion how other parameters of the problem influence optimal audit probabilities as well as the equilibrium proportion of tax evaders will be explored the diversity in preferences over lotteries leads to some interesting comparative static results for example the impact of an increase in the penalty for lying is ambiguous in this model the graphical approach taken here allows us to identify the relevant factors and how they interact additionally this analysis makes it clear why the distribution of risk aversion in the population affects the equilibrium audit probability but not the proportion of tax evaders this problem has been approached in several different ways 1 for example clotfelter 7 slemrod 15 aim and beck 2 and witte and woodbury 16 have studied this phenomenon econometrically but the dearth of reliable data has made empirical analysis difficult other economists most noteworthy alm mcclelland and schulze 5 and alm jackson and mckee 4 have taken a different tack employing the methods of experimental economics while these seminal studies have shed substantial light on taxpayer behavior a leap of faith is required to extrapolate from the laboratory to actual tax compliance decisions the theoretical tax compliance literature originally focused on the behavior of the taxpayer as in allingham and sandmo 1 that is individuals were modeled as expected utility maximizers with exogenously given audit probabilities more recent contributions to the theoretical literature reinganum and wilde 12 13 and graetz reinganum and wilde 9 for example have

traders vs relationship managers reputational conflicts in full service investment banks we present a model that explains why investment bankers struggle to manage conflicts of interest banks can build a type reputation for technical competence by performing complex deals that may not serve their clients interest on the other hand banks can sustain a behavioral reputation by refraining from doing so a behavioral reputation is a luxury reserved for banks that have proven their abilities the model sheds light on conflicts between the trading and advisory divisions of investment banks as well as the consequences of technological change for time variation in the relative strength of behavioral and type reputation concerns

cheating ourselves the economics of tax evasion no government can announce a tax system and then rely on taxpayers sense of duty to remit what is owed some dutiful people will undoubtedly pay what they owe but many others will not over time the ranks of the dutiful will shrink as they see how they are being taken advantage of by the others thus paying taxes must be made a legal responsibility of citizens with penalties attendant on noncompliance but even in the face of those penalties substantial tax evasion exists and always has the history of taxation is replete with episodes of evasion often notable for their inventiveness during the third century many wealthy romans buried their jewelry or stocks of gold coin to evade the luxury tax and homeowners in eighteenth century england temporarily bricked up their fireplaces to escape notice of the hearth tax collector webber and wildavsky 1986 p 141 this essay reviews what is known about the magnitude nature and determinants of tax evasion with an emphasis on the u s income tax alm 1999 andreoni erard and feinstein 1998 and slemrod and yitzhaki 2002 offer more comprehensive recent reviews of the literature it then places this information into a conceptual and policy context

experimental evidence on the relationship between tax evasion opportunities and labor supply abstract motivated by the observation that access to evasion opportunities is distributed heterogeneously across the labor market this paper examines the extent to which labor supply elasticities with respect to tax rates depend on such evasion opportunities we first discuss the channels through which access to evasion affects labor supply responses and then set up a laboratory experiment n 205 in which all participants undertake a real effort task over several rounds subjects face a tax rate that varies across rounds and are required to pay taxes on earned income the treatment group is given the opportunity to underreport income while the control group is not we find evidence that participants in the treatment group respond differently to changes in the net of tax rate than participants in the control group the effect is more prevalent when tax rates fall additionally the direction of the treatment effect is dependent on the evolution of tax rates across rounds

ratings shopping and asset complexity a theory of ratings inflation abstract many identify inflated credit ratings as one contributor to the recent financial market turmoil we develop an equilibrium model of the market for ratings and use it to examine possible origins of and cures for ratings inflation in the model asset issuers can shop for ratings observe multiple ratings and disclose only the most favorable before auctioning their assets when assets are simple agencies ratings are similar and the incentive to ratings shop is low when assets are sufficiently complex ratings differ enough that an incentive to shop emerges thus an increase in the complexity of recently issued securities could create a systematic bias in disclosed ratings despite the fact that each ratings agency produces an unbiased estimate of the asset s true quality increasing competition among agencies would only worsen this problem switching to an investor initiated ratings system alleviates the bias but could collapse the market for information

contracting to compete for flows abstract we present a model in which asset managers design their contracts to attract flows of investor capital we find that they make their contracts depend on public information e g credit ratings or benchmark indices as a way to attract flows rather than as a way to mitigate incentive problems as has been emphasized in the literature unfortunately asset managers competition for flows triggers a race to the bottom asset managers use public information in their contracts even though it is socially inefficient this inefficiency arises because contracting on public information prevents risk sharing

gender differences in revealed risk taking evidence from mutual fund investors abstract using data from a national survey of nearly 2000 mutual fund investors we investigate whether investor gender is related to risk taking as revealed in mutual fund investment decisions consonant with the received literature we find that women exhibit less risk taking than men in their most recent largest and riskiest mutual fund investment decisions more importantly we find that the impact of gender on risk taking is significantly weakened when investor knowledge of financial markets and investments is controlled in the regression equation this result suggests that the greater level of risk aversion among women that is frequently documented in the literature can be substantially but not completely explained by knowledge disparities

disclosure policy and industry fluctuations this paper examines voluntary disclosures in a repeated oligopoly and their association with price setting behavior and industry profits along industrial fluctuations the analysis focuses on the collectively optimal equilibrium among oligopoly firms we show that in industries that are highly concentrated or feature low cost of capital nondisclosure is prevalent and results in stable product prices and high profit margins otherwise firms may selectively disclose to soften competition in the product market under partial disclosure firms withhold information during sharp industry expansions or declines consequently the disclosure policy dampens the dissemination of shocks to the industry this paper was accepted by mary barth accounting

choice under uncertainty problems solved and unsolved ffifteen years ago the theory of choice under uncertainty could be considered one of the success stories of economic analysis it rested on solid axiomatic foundations it had seen important breakthroughs in the analytics of risk risk aversion and their applications to economic issues and it stood ready to provide the theoretical underpinnings for the newly emerging information revolution in economics 1 today choice under uncertainty is a field in flux the standard theory is being challenged on several grounds from both within and outside economics the nature of these challenges and of our profession s responses to them is the topic of this paper

the excess burden of tax evasion an experimental detection concealment contest abstract tax evasion may cause social welfare losses due to the incentives of taxpayers to invest in the concealment and of tax authorities to invest in the detection of tax evasion reducing the investment of both parties at the same time would then lead to a pareto improvement given that concealment and detection costs are hardly measurable in reality we show in a controlled laboratory experiment that the welfare losses from a concealment detection contest depend positively on the prevailing tax rate but not on the penalty which is imposed in case of detected tax evasion hence policy makers who are concerned about socially inefficient concealment and enforcement costs should focus on tax rates rather than penalty rates

on the external validity of laboratory tax compliance experiments i introduction laboratory methods are now widely accepted as a methodological approach in economics and increasingly they have been used to examine specific public policy issues there is much to be gained from careful laboratory experiments they offer a low cost means of testing and replicating policy innovations and they generate precise data on individual behavior thereby allowing estimation of behavioral responses importantly they allow many policy innovations to be introduced singly and exogenously in a controlled environment and as a result laboratory experiments are typically seen as having a high degree of internal validity brewer 2000 campbell and stanley 1966 shadish cook and campbell 2002 because the causal relation between variables can be properly demonstrated however as emphasized by plott 1987 using laboratory experiments can allow more general inferences regarding human behavior only when the setting implemented in the laboratory parallels what is observed in the naturally occurring world even beyond this requirement of parallelism is the need for generalizing behavioral observations from the laboratory to the field or external validity internal validity can be demonstrated through the evaluation of the design however external validity can only be verified empirically and only with respect to the specific setting being investigated this paper investigates the external validity of laboratory experiments and does so in the context of experiments on tax compliance behavior tax evasion is central to many important policy questions current estimates report the tax gap or difference between taxes owed and taxes paid in the united states to be 450 billion annually internal revenue service 2012 beyond these massive revenue losses evasion creates major misallocations in resource use when individuals alter their behavior to cheat on their taxes its presence requires that government expend resources to detect noncompliance to measure its magnitude and to penalize tax evasion evasion alters the distribution of income in arbitrary unpredictable and unfair ways and it may contribute to feelings of unjust treatment and disrespect for the law more broadly it is not possible to understand the true impact of taxation without recognizing the existence and the effects of tax evasion laboratory methods have been used to examine a wide range of policies that may affect the compliance decision policies that have not always proven amenable to either theoretical analyses or empirical analyses with field data however laboratory studies of compliance are sometimes viewed with skepticism the most common criticism is that the student subjects typically used in experiments may not be representative of taxpayers undergraduates may have little experience with filing tax returns and their economic and demographic backgrounds may differ from those of taxpayers another criticism is that the context of laboratory compliance experiments does not closely enough resemble the context in which actual compliance decisions are made as a result there is a concern that experimental results on policy innovations that rely upon student subjects in laboratory compliance experiments cannot be generalized to the population it is this issue that we examine here building on previous research we present several types of evidence on the external validity of experiments on individual compliance decisions a first question examines whether behavior of laboratory participants is replicated by behavior of individuals making a similar decision in the naturally occurring world that is do participants in laboratory experiments exhibit different patterns of behavior than individuals in a similar naturally occurring setting to answer this question we utilize a special data set from the u s internal revenue service irs assembled as part of its national research program nrp

conflict of interest and the credibility of underwriter analyst recommendations brokerage analysts frequently comment on and sometimes recommend companies that their firms have recently taken public we show that stocks that underwriter analysts recommend perform more poorly than buy recommendations by unaffiliated brokers prior to at the time of and subsequent to the recommendation date we conclude that the recommendations by underwriter analysts show significant evidence of bias we show also that the market does not recognize the full extent of this bias the results suggest a potential conflict of interest inherent in the different functions that investment bankers perform

credit rating industry a helicopter tour of stylized facts and recent theories the recent subprime crisis and the ongoing euro zone crisis have generated an enormous interest in the credit rating industry not only among economists but also among average citizens as a consequence we have seen an explosion of the economic literature on the industry the objective of this survey is to introduce readers to the key stylized facts of the credit rating industry and to the recent theoretical economic literature on this industry

searching for ghosts who are the nonfilers and how much tax do they owe this paper is about ghosts individuals who fail to comply with their income tax filing requirements as their name suggests the identities and characteristics of these individuals are shrouded in mystery in this paper we attempt to de mystify the issues surrounding ghosts and examine their role in the compliance process we begin by extending a standard model of tax evasion to account for the existence of ghosts we then examine the empirical significance and policy relevance of our extension using a unique data set containing detailed tax and audit information for both filers and nonfilers of u s federal income tax returns 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

tax compliance and psychic costs behavioral experimental evidence using a physiological marker although paying taxes is a key element of a well functioning society there is still limited understanding as to why people actually pay their taxes models emphasizing that taxpayers make strategic financially motivated compliance decisions seemingly assume an overly restrictive view of human nature law abidance may be more accurately explained by social norms a concept that has gained growing importance as research attempts to understand the tax compliance puzzle this study analyzes the influence of psychic stress generated by the possibility of breaking social norms in the tax compliance context we measure psychic stress using heart rate variability hrv which captures the psychobiological or neural equivalents of psychic stress that may arise from the contemplation of real or imagined actions producing immediate physiologic discomfort the results of our laboratory experiments provide empirical evidence of a positive correlation between psychic stress and tax compliance thus underscoring the importance of moral sentiments for tax compliance we also identify three distinct types of individuals who differ in their levels of psychic stress tax morale and tax compliance

an experimental study of compliance and leverage in auditing and regulatory enforcement evidence suggests that a large majority of firms and individuals comply with regulations and tax laws even though the frequency of inspections and audits is often low moreover fines for noncompliance are also typically low when regulatory violations are discovered these observations are not consistent with static compliance models harrington 1988 modified these static models by specifying a dynamic game in which some agents have an incentive to comply even when the cost of compliance each period is greater than the expected penalty this paper reports a laboratory experiment based on the harrington model framework in which subjects move between two inspection groups that differ in the probability of inspection and severity of fine subjects decide to comply or not in the presence of low medium or high compliance costs enforcement leverage arises in the harrington model from movement between the inspection groups based on previous observed compliance and noncompliance our results indicate that consistent with the model violation rates increase when compliance costs become higher and as the probability of switching groups becomes lower behavior does not change as sharply as the model predicts however since violation rates do not jump from 0 to 1 as parameters vary across critical thresholds a simple model of bounded rationality explains these deviations from optimal behavior

collusion over the business cycle we present a theory of collusive pricing for markets in which demand alternates stochastically between fast growth boom and slow growth recession phases we show that 1 the most collusive prices are weakly procyclical countercyclical when demand growth rates are positively negatively correlated through time and 2 the amplitude of the collusive pricing cycle is larger when the expected duration of boom phases decreases and when the expected duration of recession phases increases we also offer a generalization of rotemberg and saloner s 1986 model interpreting their findings in terms of transitory demand shocks that occur within broader business cycle phases

bank ratings what determines their quality this paper examines the quality of credit ratings assigned to banks by the three largest rating agencies we interpret credit ratings as relative assessments of creditworthiness and define a new ordinal metric of rating error based on banks expected default frequencies our results suggest that on average large banks receive more positive bank ratings particularly from the agency to which the bank provides substantial securitization business these competitive distortions are economically significant and contribute to perpetuate the existence of too big to fail banks we also show that overall differential risk weights recommended by the basel accords for investment grade banks bear no significant relationship to empirical default probabilities harald hau sam langfield and david marques ibanez

the impact of cyclical demand movements on collusive behavior recent work by rotemberg and saloner 1986 investigates the effect of the business cycle on optimal collusive pricing by specifying that demand is subject to i i d shocks an implication of the i i d assumption is that firms expectations on future demand are unrelated to the current level of demand we put forth a model that allows for both the level of current demand and firms expectations on future demand to change over time thus it captures two important properties of the business cycle our analysis reveals that while the gain to deviating from a collusive agreement is greatest during booms firms find it most difficult to collude during recessions as the forgone profits from inducing a price war are relatively low an implication of this effect for pricing behavior is that at the same level of demand price is lower when demand is declining than when demand is rising consistent with previous theoretical work we find that firms price countercyclically for a range of values for the discount factor however numerical simulations reveal a greater tendency for firms to price countercyclically during recessions than during booms

does variability in crimes affect other crimes the case of international corruption and shadow economy abstractusing data on more than 125 countries this article attempts to add to the research linking corruption and the shadow economy by examining the effect of variability uncertainty in one whi

honest certification and the threat of capture abstract this paper derives conditions under which reputation enables certifiers to resist capture these conditions alone have strong implications for the industrial organization of certification markets 1 honest certification requires high prices that may even exceed the static monopoly price 2 honest certification exhibits economies of scale and constitutes a natural monopoly 3 price competition tends to a monopolization the results derive from a general principle of reputation models that favors concentration this principle implies benefits from specialization and explains specialized certifiers as efficient market institutions that sell reputation as a service to other firms

why are ceos rarely fired evidence from structural estimation i evaluate the forced ceo turnover rate and quantify effects on shareholder value by estimating a dynamic model the model features learning about ceo ability and costly turnover to fit the observed forced turnover rate the model needs the average board of directors to behave as if replacing the ceo costs shareholders at least 200 million this cost mainly reflects ceo entrenchment rather than a real cost to shareholders the model predicts that shareholder value would rise 3 if we eliminated this perceived turnover cost all else equal the model also helps explain the relation between ceo firings tenure and profitability

tax morale affects tax compliance evidence from surveys and an artefactual field experiment our working hypothesis is that cross cultural differences in tax compliance behavior have foundations in the institutions of tax administration and citizen assessment of the quality of governance tax compliance being a complex behavioral issue its investigation requires use of a variety of methods and data sources results from artefactual field experiments conducted in countries with substantially different political histories and records of governance quality demonstrate that observed differences in tax compliance levels persist over alternative levels of enforcement the experimental results are shown to be robust by replicating them for the same countries using survey response measures of tax compliance

tax reporting game under uncertain tax laws and asymmetric information abstract this study models a game played by a tax enforcement agency and a taxpayer who is only partially informed about her true taxable income due to complexity of tax laws a signalling equilibrium is shown to exist in which the taxpayer s report is monotone increasing in her private information about taxable income investigated also is the effect of changes in uncertainty on reporting decisions and the agency s expected revenue

the effect of risk on the ceo market this article presents a market equilibrium model of ceo assignment pay and incentives under risk aversion and moral hazard each of the three outcomes can be summarized by a single closed form equation in the presence of moral hazard assignment is distorted from positive assortative matching on firm size as firms with higher risk or disutility choose less talented ceos such firms also pay higher salaries in the cross section but economywide increases in risk or the disutility of being a ceo do not affect pay the strength of incentives depends only on the disutility of effort and is independent of risk and risk aversion if the ceo can affect firm risk incentives rise and are increasing in risk and risk aversion we calibrate the losses from various forms of poor corporate governance such as failures in monitoring and inefficiencies in ceo assignment jel g34 j33 this article presents a market equilibrium model of ceo assignment pay and incentives risk averse managers of different talents are hired in a competitive market by heterogeneous firms which vary in their size risk and level of effort required the level of pay drives the assignment of talent to firms the strength of incentives induces the efficient effort level and is determined by an optimal contracting approach our main contribution is to incorporate risk into a ceo market equilibrium in a tractable manner a large empirical literature has shown that risk is a firstorder determinant of compensation contracts demsetz and lehn 1985 garen 1994 core and guay 1999 oyer and schaefer 2004 peters 2009 peters and wagner 2009 but most theories assume risk neutrality this assumption is

employer tax evasion in the unemployment insurance program we use unique data to analyze employer tax compliance with unemployment insurance ui provisions the data indicate that employers may have underreported 728 million of ui taxes nationally in 1987 alone to formally examine this noncompliance a theoretical model of payroll tax evasion is developed showing that increasing payroll tax rates among other things likely increases noncompliance by risk neutral firms this prediction is empirically verified the finding that ui tax evasion is systematically related to various firm characteristics suggests that ui audits may be effectively targeted by statistical profiles derived from our model thereby improving compliance