low inflation the behavior of financial markets and institutions this paper provides a broad overview of the potential impact of low inflation deflation on u s financial markets and institutions it is argued that the contemporary experience of japan and the historical experience of the united states in the 1920s and 1930s offer only limited insights into the potential impact of low inflation deflation on today s u s financial system a number of potential implications are discussed including a decline in secondary market trading and a trend towards reintermediation in addition low inflation deflation is likely to have a material effect on bank duration and convexity exposures

consumer debt stress changes in household debt and the great recession this research examines psychological debt stress and changes in household debt holdings for consumers during the great recession using data from a monthly national u s household survey covering the period 2006 through 2012 debt stress measures in the population rose by over 50 at the bottom of the recession determining relative stress for eight different types of household debt we find that noncollateralized debts are more stressful than collateralized debt and that during the recession the composition of debt shifted away from collateralized debt and toward noncollateralized our empirical results show that women and hispanics experienced higher measured levels of stress jel d12 d18 i introduction in the latter part of the twentieth century household debt began to rise to high levels in the united states accompanying this there was an upsurge in reports concerning psychological debt stress coming from financial and family counselors health care professionals employers and others these reports pointed to a wide range of health family and job problems for americans arising from this increase in debt after 2007 events in the housing market marked the onset of the great recession and financial crisis many households faced declining home prices and foreclosure as well as changes in other asset values and incomes there was a general tightening of credit and changes in some lending practices by banks here we seek to add additional understanding to changes in consumer debt stress 1 during the great recession by relating them to changes in eight different types of debt holdings during this period we use data covering 2006 through 2012 from the consumer finance monthly survey cfm a national random telephone survey of household finances taken on a monthly basis from a cross

comment on cole the view that small rms face greater problems in obtaining credit thanlarge rms has a long history going back at least as far as the loan relationshipmodels of hodgeman 1961 and wood 1975 and the credit rationing work ofja ee and modigliani 1969 nevertheless there are few studies that provideor analyze direct evidence that credit is rationed with nonprice terms to rms at the macro level most empirical studies of business credit availability use in direct proxies ranging from early studies such as ja ee and modigliani 1969 who gauged availability by the share of small sized loans among all bank loans to more modern models that point to a role of cash ow as a determinant ofinvestment at the micro level empirical studies have indirectly tested forthe existence of credit rationing by assessing the behavior of loan pricing e g berger and udell 1992 1995 testing whether liquidity or cash owhas a greater impact on investment by smaller rms relative to larger rms e g fazzari et al 1988 or investigating whether smaller rms more heavilyuse expensive trade credit during periods of tight credit e g ja ee 1971 pe tersen and rajan 1994 cole 1998 lls a void in the literature on credit availability by testing how rm characteristics a ect a small rm s likelihood of experiencing a loan denialusing a unique cross section data set that provides direct evidence of nonpricecredit rationing this paper nds that preexisting nancial service relationshipswith a lender have a positive e ect on the probability of loan approvals con sistent with prior studies arguing that banks gain information about credit riskfrom monitoring borrower deposit activity e g black 1975 fama 1985 nakamura 1993 in addition results indicate that much of the e ect of

how integrated are the money market and the bank loans market within the european union abstract this paper estimates cointegration vectors of the time series of money market interest rates and bank lending rates the study includes six member countries of the european union eu and covers a period of 10 years from 1985 to 1994 during this period significant steps were taken that intensified financial integration in the eu including the free flow of capital a system of stable exchange rate parities and the implementation of a single market for banking services we conclude that the domestic money markets are closely linked but the domestic banking markets are segmented preliminary investigation of international differences in the capital structure of firms on the one hand and of domestic business cycle conditions on the other hand do not seem to explain differences in bank spreads across countries the results point to other directions presumably to local market power and to differences in the role of lender monitoring

bank loan portfolios and the monetary transmission mechanism abstract we study the portfolio behavior of bank loans following a monetary tightening and find that real estate and consumer loans sharply decrease while commercial and industrial c i loans increase these responses are compared with responses following non monetary shocks which also reduce output but keep interest rates roughly unchanged during such a non monetary downturn c i loans sharply decrease while real estate and consumer loans show no substantial response these responses together with the responses of relevant lending rates are hard to reconcile with a decline in the supply of c i bank loans during a monetary downturn as stressed by the bank lending channel several arguments are presented explaining why the supply of c i loans may actually increase after a monetary contraction

market response to banks granting lines of credit abstract prior research has shown and this paper confirms that when the market becomes aware a line of credit is granted the borrower s stock has a positive and significant reaction the borrower s reaction is used to identify the exact date the market becomes aware of the granting of the line of credit this date is used as a one day window to investigate whether the bank s stock also reacts this reaction will be most obvious with large lines of credit all lines of credit larger than us 1 billion granted during the years 1993 1996 are investigated the results show as predicted a positive and significant reaction by the bank s stock

when different market concentration indices agree abstract the herfindahl hirschman entropy and n firm indices may not agree when comparing market concentrations for different oligopoly markets the majorization pre ordering is shown to be both necessary and sufficient for all to agree

value function approximation in the presence of uncertainty and inequality constraints an application to the demand for credit cards abstract we present an algorithm for approximating the solution to discrete time stochastic dynamic programs with inequality constraints the algorithm exploits the state preference approach to choice under uncertainty to reduce the dimensionality of the state space and polynomial approximation to improve computational efficiency it is particularly useful in financial applications involving liquidity and credit constraints and more than one asset the algorithm provides information about the derivatives of the value function and therefore risk aversion along with asset demands

bond underwriting by banks and conflicts of interest evidence from japan during the pre war period abstract article 65 of the securities and exchange law of japan which was carried into effect in 1948 prohibited banks from underwriting corporate securities partially because of the concern that combining the banking and securities businesses might result in a potential conflict of interest this paper studies the pricing and long term default performance of industrial bonds underwritten by commercial banks the industrial bank of japan ibj and trust firms as compared to those underwritten by investment houses during the pre war period in japan when banks were allowed to underwrite industrial bonds the evidence rejects the concern about the conflicts of interest

backward induction algorithm for a class of closed loop stackelberg games abstract in the paper a new deterministic continuum strategy two player discrete time dynamic stackelberg game is proposed with fixed finite time duration and closed loop information structure the considered payoff functions can be widely used in different applications mainly in conflicts of consuming a limited resource where one player called leader is a superior authority choosing strategy first and another player called follower chooses after in case of convex payoff functions and certain parameter values we give a new particular backward induction algorithm which can be easily realized to find a leader follower equilibrium of the game in a certain sequential equilibrium realization from the last step towards the first one with respect to the current strategy choices of the players considerations on uniqueness and game regulation i e setting parameters of the game to achieve a predefined equilibrium are also provided the finite version of the game with finite strategy sets is also given along with its simplification and solution method several practical examples are shown to illustrate the comprehensive application possibilities of the results

unequal treatment of identical agents in cournot equilibrium oligopoly models where prior actions by firms affect subsequent marginal costs have been useful in illuminating policy debates in areas such as antitrust regulation environmental protection and international competition we discuss properties of such models when a cournot equilibrium occurs at the second stage aggregate production costs strictly decline with no change in gross revenue or gross consumer surplus if the prior actions strictly increase the variance of marginal costs without changing the marginal cost sum therefore unless the cost of inducing second stage asymmetry more than offsets this reduction in production costs the private and social optima are asymmetric

trust interlinking transactions and credit in the industrial district an essential feature of the industrial district is trust among individuals and firms within it this paper focuses mainly on trust based on investments in building up a good reputation that is a personal capital that can even substitute for collateral in obtaining credit informal credit often linked to other transactions and especially subcontracting is therefore an important way of financing economic development in the industrial district moreover the importance of trust as personal capital gives rise to a double financial intermediation in the industrial district this double intermediation constitutes a device to reduce information problems that are usually responsible for credit rationing c 1994 academic press inc copyright 1994 by oxford university press

sharing default information as a borrower discipline device abstract creditors often share information about their customers credit records besides helping them to spot bad risks this acts as a disciplinary device if creditors are known to inform one another of defaults borrowers must consider that default on one lender would disrupt their credit rating with all the other lenders this increases their incentive to perform however sharing more detailed information can reduce this disciplinary effect borrowers incentives to perform may be greater when lenders only disclose past defaults than when they share all their information in some instances by fine tuning the type and accuracy of the information shared lenders can raise borrowers incentives to their first best level

consumer rationality and credit cards borrowing on credit cards at high interest rates might appear irrational however even low transactions costs can make credit cards attractive relative to bank loans credit cards also provide liquidity services by allowing consumers to avoid some of the opportunity costs of holding money the effect of alternative interest rates on the demand for card debits can explain why credit card interest rates only partially reflect changes in the cost of funds credit card interest rates that are inflexible relative to the cost of funds are not inconsistent with a competitive equilibrium that yields zero profits for the marginal entrant

stackelberg and marshall this paper advocates a generalized n firm stackelberg model as a plausible testable alternative description of oligopoly a pure strategy equilibrium must exist for this model the main result is that efficiency obtains in the limit as the scale of each firm is shrunk relative to demand this is demonstrated for the case of u shaped average cost and also for that of natural monopoly copyright 1990 by american economic association

modeling credit card borrowing a comparison of type i and type ii tobit approaches this study focuses on credit cards as a borrowing medium using 1998 survey of consumer finance data the type ii tobit approach used here overcomes a shortcoming of the conventional type i tobit model which restricts the coefficients of the binary borrowing decision the first step and balance level decision the second step to have the same sign by separately estimating the first and second steps as reduced form functions in which the overall effects of supply and demand are incorporated the type ii tobit procedure yields more consistent results with other studies and quantifies the marginal effect elasticity of a particular determinant for practical uses more than 11 000 bank and nonbank holding companies issued credit cards in 1997 among these firms the top 50 issuers market share is 90 4 and the 10 largest credit card issuers hold 57 3 of total outstanding balances bank holding company revenue from interest on outstanding balances is 57 5 billion which is 77 8 of the total revenue of 73 9 billion moreover about 80 of 102 million u s households own at least one credit card demand for credit cards consists of two components one being the demand as a transaction medium and the other being the demand as a borrowing medium over 68 of bank type credit card holders use their credit cards only as a transaction medium 1 which means that they pay off their balances in full each month cargill and wendel 1996 however other credit card holders use their cards as a source of short term lowamount borrowing or as an instrument for consumption smoothing this study focuses on credit cards as a borrowing medium total household debts have been investigated in other studies relating household debt levels to credit or liquidity constraints using a two step selection approach duca and rosenthal 1993 examine the extent to which borrowing constraints restrict household access to debt and the manner in which lenders vary debt limits across borrowers crook 2001 investigates the determinants of credit constraints and the factors in the amount of household debt with a multistage model however it is necessary to separate the credit card debt from other household debts in the sense that every credit card user could borrow without incurring a transaction cost brito and hartley 1995 provide a theoretical model in which the equilibrium interest rate can be very high and inflexible under the

bank information monopolies and the mix of private and public debt claims this article examines the determinants of the mix of private and public debt using detailed information on the debt structure of 250 publicly traded corporations from 1980 through 1990 we find that the relationship between bank borrowing and the importance of growth opportunities depends on the number of banks the firm uses and whether the firm has public debt outstanding for firms with a single bank relationship the reliance on bank debt is negatively related to the importance of growth opportunities in contrast among firms borrowing from multiple banks the relationship is positive

costly monitoring financial intermediation and equilibrium credit rationing abstract this paper establishes a link between equilibrium credit rationing and financial intermediation in a model with asymmetrically informed lenders and borrowers costly monitoring and investment project indivisibilities intermediation is shown to dominate borrowing and lending between individuals and these financial intermediaries exhibit several of the important features of intermediaries as we know them equilibrium interest rates and the aggregate quantity of loans respond quite differently to changes in taste and technology parameters depending on whether or not there is rationing in equilibrium

do consumers need more protection from small dollar lenders historical evidence and a roadmap for future research we summarize the current debate surrounding four small dollar credit products pawn loans vehicle title loans payday loans and cash installment loans from finance companies we review the contributions of scholars that inform this debate we underscore that users of these products fit the description of those whom consumer credit models predict benefit from these products many studies find that on average consumer use of small dollar credit products is at worst innocuous there are however findings of heterogeneity in borrowers experiences the disagreements surrounding these credit products and the difficulty in crafting the proper policy response stems from this heterogeneity jel d18 g23

corporate bond covenants and social responsibility investment this paper examines the effect of corporate social responsibility csr on the number of bond covenants we find that a high csr score has a negative association with the number of bond covenants moreover our results are more pronounced for firms with a high bid ask spread and high agency costs our analysis highlights the effect of the good stakeholder relationship on the bond contracts

disproportional control rights and the governance role of debt we examine the governance role of debt in the context of u s based dual class ownership structures we hypothesize that the use of debt alleviates the conflict between shareholder classes by balancing the power of controlling insiders we document that dual class firms have higher leverage and a greater propensity to issue private debt they also more frequently use cash sweeps and performance based covenants dual class firms with greater agency conflicts and a greater need to access the capital market appear to rely more extensively on debt these findings are consistent with controlling insiders bonding against the agency costs associated with dual class ownership the governance role of debt is further corroborated by the valuation effect of debt for dual class companies private debt issuances trigger greater positive market reactions to the inferior dual class stock in relation to both the superior dual class stock and a matched sample of single class firms further leverage attenuates the previou

what s different about banks abstract negotiable certificates of deposit cd s trade in the capital market in competition with other securities like commercial paper and bankers acceptances if cd s must pay lenders competitive monetary interest the reserve tax on cd s is borne by bank borrowers viability of the tax means there must be something special about bank loans that makes some borrowers willing to pay higher interest rates than those on other securities of equivalent risk moreover there must be something special about banks that prevents other intermediaries from competing to assure that it never pays to finance loans with cd s

dynamic programming approach to discrete time dynamic feedback stackelberg games with independent and dependent followers stackelberg games play an extremely important role in such fields as economics management politics and behavioral sciences stackelberg game can be modelled as a bilevel optimization problem there exists extensive literature about static bilevel optimization problems however the studies on dynamic bilevel optimization problems are relatively scarce in spite of the importance in explaining and predicting some phenomena rationally in this paper we consider discrete time dynamic stackelberg games with feedback information dynamic programming algorithms are presented for the solution of discrete time dynamic feedback stackelberg games with multiple players both for independent followers and for dependent followers when the followers act dependently the game in this paper is a combination of stackelberg game and nash game

ranking income distributions a large variety of policy questions involve choices between social states and a consequent ordering of the feasible alternatives when these social states are related to the levels of welfare experienced by individuals or households two central issues stand out in determining the relative desirability of different social outcomes one of these is the essentially positive exercise of achieving comparability between households with different characteristics such as composition or preferences operating in different environments for example facing different price structures the other concerns the normative judgments implicit in the evaluation of alternative allocations of resourcesthe emphasis placed on inequality between households and the extent to which greater inequality can be compensated by higher average living standards this paper focuses on the second of these issues and in doing so we abstract from the problem of household comparability by considering a population of n households identical in all respects except for their incomes the question of ordering social states then becomes one of ranking income distributions over a group of anonymous households or individuals borrowing the usual assumptions imposed on consumer preferences we may suppose that a social ordering of income distributions can be represented by a welfare function 2

market response to bank relationships evidence from korean bank reform abstract this paper examines how the forced closure of failing banks and the transfer of their loans to surviving banks affect the market value of firms that borrow from the closed banks pre existing relationships between firms and the banks that acquire their loans are detrimental to the positive valuation effects of the event banks may have an incentive to favor pre existing relationships to increase the value of previously extended loans therefore loan renewals to firms with prior relationships do not signal borrower quality to the market which is aware of the banks conflicts of interest this study highlights the importance of the specific mechanisms employed to replace failed banks without decreasing the value of their client firms

consumer search behavior in the changing credit card market this article investigates whether search costs inhibit consumers from searching for lower credit card interest rates the results provide evidence that the credit card search environment has changed since the mid 1990s using the 2001 survey of consumer finances we model consumers propensity to search and their probability of being denied credit simultaneously and find that larger credit card balances induce cardholders to search more even though they face a higher probability of rejection this result may be related to the high volume of direct solicitation combined with disclosure requirements which has lowered the cost of search to find lower interest rates

the democratization of credit and the rise in consumer bankruptcies financial innovations are a common explanation for the rise in credit card debt and bankruptcies to evaluate this story we develop a simple model that incorporates two key frictions asymmetric information about borrowers risk of default and a fixed cost of developing each contract lenders offer innovations that ameliorate asymmetric information or reduce this fixed cost have large extensive margin effects via the entry of new lending contracts targeted at riskier borrowers this results in more defaults and borrowing and increased dispersion of interest rates using the survey of consumer finances and federal reserve board interest rate data we find evidence supporting these predictions specifically the dispersion of credit card interest rates nearly tripled while the new cardholders of the late 1980s and 1990s had riskier observable characteristics than existing cardholders our calculation suggest these new cardholders accounted for over 25 of the rise in bank credit card debt and delinquencies between 1989 and 1998

banks and loan sales marketing nonmarketable assets theories of financial intermediation predict that bank loans should not be marketable because of moral hazard problems banks will not conduct credit risk analysis or monitor borrowers if they are not at risk for failing to perform these services throughout most of history bank loans have not in fact been marketable yet by the end of the 1980 s the amount of commercial and industrial loan sales outstanding had grown to over 250 billion from trivial amounts at the beginning of the decade to explain the opening of this loan sales market we present a model of incentive compatible loan sales that allows for implicit contractual features between loan sellers and loan buyers we then test for the presence of these features using a sample of over 800 recent loan sales

micro finance competition motivated micro lenders double dipping and default abstract we develop a tractable model of competition among socially motivated mfis so that the objective functions of the mfis put some weight on their own clients utility we find that the equilibrium involves double dipping i e borrowers taking multiple loans from different mfis whenever the mfis are relatively profit oriented further double dipping necessarily leads to default and inefficiency and moreover borrowers who face relatively higher transactions costs optimally decide to double dip interestingly an increase in mfi competition can increase the extent of double dipping and default further the interest rates may go either way with the interest rate likely to increase with more competition if the mfis are very socially motivated

do banks have a future abstract are banks special intermediaries do they play any unique role in the economy and if so will they retain their specialness in the ever faster changing world of finance the rapid evolution of finance over the last two decades and the breathtaking e age revolution have persuaded many that eventually banks will be indistinguishable from other financial intermediaries since all their functions can at least as efficiently be carried out by nonbanks this study re explores the issue of the specialness of banks in light of the large existing literature on the subject and presents an approach which identifies the banks specialness with their unique capacity to lend out claims on their own debt which the public accepts and uses as money the study discusses various structural and policy implications deriving from the approach and draws on it to point to the continuing relevance of banking in a world where nonbanks are taking business away from banks lending to production has become relatively less important and the use of e money may soon be dominating financial transactions

a stochastic multiple leader stackelberg model analysis computation and application we study an oligopoly consisting of m leaders and n followers that supply a homogeneous product or service noncooperatively leaders choose their supply levels first knowing the demand function only in distribution followers make their decisions after observing the leader supply levels and the realized demand function we term the resulting equilibrium a stochastic multiple leader stackelberg nash cournot sms equilibrium we show the existence and uniqueness of sms equilibrium under mild assumptions we also propose a computational approach to find the equilibrium based on the sample average approximation method and analyze its rate of convergence finally we apply this framework to model competition in the telecommunication industry

a stochastic version of a stackelberg nash cournot equilibrium model we consider a stochastic version of the stackelberg nash cournot model proposed by murphy et al 1983 ln the first stage the leader chooses and announces his production level taking into account the reaction of the followers the decision of the leader is taken when market demand is uncertain in the second stage the followers knowing the leader s output react to this level according to the cournot assumption at this stage demand is known we study the extension of the murphy et al model and give a numerical illustration of this model using the european gas market

the effect of lender identity on a borrowing firm s equity return previous research demonstrates that a firm s common stock price tends to fall when it issues new public securities by contrast commercial bank loans elicit significantly positive borrower returns this article investigates whether the lender s identity influences the market s reaction to a loan announcement although we find no significant difference between the market s response to bank and nonbank loans we do find that lenders with a higher credit rating are associated with larger abnormal borrower returns this evidence complements earlier findings that an auditor s or investment banker s perceived quality signals valuable information about firm value to uninformed market investors previous studies show that certain types of loan announcements generate significantly positive abnormal returns to the average borrower s equity 1 this finding contrasts with the negative equity returns generally associated with a corporation s issuance of public securities smith 1986 this difference in market reactions indicates that private and public securities are not perfect substitutes for the average firm in this sense lender identity defined as public versus private lender significantly impacts the borrower s abnormal equity return the standard theoretical explanation for this difference is that private lenders either obtain private information about the firm s value or they have the incentive and ability to monitor firm behavior more effectively than other outside monitors can although the empirical literature on private lending has evaluated primarily commercial bank loans and lines of credit these theoretical arguments apply equally to any type of private

borrowing during unemployment unsecured debt as a safety net this paper examines whether unsecured credit markets help disadvantaged households supplement temporary shortfalls in earnings by investigating how unsecured debt responds to unemployment induced earnings losses results indicate that very low asset households those in the bottom decile of total assets do not borrow in response to these shortfalls however other low asset households do borrow increasing unsecured debt by more than 11 cents per dollar of earnings lost in contrast wealthy households do not increase unsecured debt during unemployment the evidence suggests that very low asset households do not have sufficient access to unsecured credit to smooth consumption over transitory unemployment spells

bankruptcy priority for bank deposits a contract theoretic explanation over the past decade several countries including the us have introduced or redesigned legislation that confers priority in bankruptcy upon all or some bank deposits we argue that in the presence of contracting costs such rules can increase efficiency we first show in a private information model that a borrower can reduce overall costs of finance by letting informationally heterogeneous lenders choose between junior and senior debt in particular we find that debt priorities reduce socially wasteful information gathering by investors we then argue why particularly in banking legal standardization of debt priorities may be superior to bilateral private arrangements article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital abstract this paper is concerned with the structure and time consistency of optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital in a dynamic context optimal taxation means distributing tax distortions over time in a welfare maximizing way for a barter economy our main finding is that with debt commitments of sufficiently rich maturity structure an optimal policy if one exists is time consistent in a monetary economy the idea of optimal taxation must be broadened to include an inflation tax and we find that time consistency does not carry over an optimal inflation tax requires commitment by rules in a sense that has no counterpart in the dynamic theory of ordinary excise taxes the reason time consistency fails in a monetary economy is that nominal assets should from a welfare maximizing point of view always be taxed away via an immediate inflation in a kind of capital levy this emerges as a new possibility when money is introduced into an economy without capital

an empirical analysis of the determinants of corporate debt ownership structure i examine the relation between corporate debt ownership structure and several firm characteristics suggested by recent theory the results demonstrate the importance of monitoring and information costs the likelihood and costs of inefficient liquidation and borrowers incentives in affecting firms debt source preferences several theoretical predictions receive support while others do not the results also suggest important differences between bank and private non bank debt which contrasts with most theoretical models additionally i find evidence of systematic use of bank debt by firms with access to public debt suggesting the benefits attributed to bank debt in theoretical models remain important after firms gain access to public debt markets although different lenders appear to have different maturity preferences the results also suggest debt maturity and debt ownership decisions may be separable

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

on noncooperative oligopoly equilibrium in the multiple leader follower game abstract in this paper we provide new proofs of existence and uniqueness of a stackelberg market equilibrium for a multiple leader follower noncooperative oligopoly model in which heterogeneous firms compete on quantities to this end we consider a two stage game of complete and perfect information in which many leaders interact strategically with many followers the stackelberg market equilibrium constitutes a pure strategy subgame perfect nash equilibrium of this game existence and uniqueness are more difficult to handle in this framework insofar as the presence of several leaders and followers displays a richer set of strategic interactions then to prove existence we notably provide a new procedure to determine the conditions under which the optimal behavior of the followers may be written as functions of the sole strategy profile of the leaders some examples outline our procedure and discuss our assumptions

bank competition and consumer search over credit card interest rates this article models bank competition facing consumers with different search incentivesandfindsthatconsumerswithhighercreditcardbalanceshavelowerinterestrates giventheirriskclassduetotheirgreatersearcheffort italsofindsthatadefaulthistory leads to higher interest rates the equilibrium interest rate corresponding to risk type and motive borrowing versus convenience transactions is derived theoretically and the determinants of the interest rate are estimated using an original data set endogeneity of default is handled with a two equation system jel d14 d12 d11 this study analyzes market outcomes in the credit card industry when credit card banks ccbs compete with interest rates and cardholders have different motives for using credit cards the study takes account of the role of consumer motivation in a way that has not been captured by previous work in our model consumers react differently to interest rate offers depending on their motive for using credit cards i e borrowing versus conve

the emergence and regulation of contingent commitment banking abstract in but a relatively few years banking has changed considerably now it is very much a business of making contingent promises or commitments and even just a decade ago it was not recognizing change is apparently easier though than accounting for it or than not worrying about it in this paper an attempt is made to account for the change from traditional to contingent commitment banking an attempt which must however be regarded as less than brilliantly successful and responding to the concern that has been expressed by among others federal reserve officials it is argued that even if banking keeps on changing until the last vestige of the traditional has disappeared the federal reserve need not in the end be less effective as the u s monetary authority than it is at present there is also a concern shared by some federal reserve officials that if change persists then unless bank regulatory policy is altered appropriately financial stability will be increasingly threatened that could be but as is argued in the paper it is far from obvious that more capital and or a risk adjusted capital requirement will make bank failures rarer than they otherwise would be

the information content of distressed restructurings involving public and private debt claims abstract this paper examines debt restructurings by financially distressed firms we develop a model which predicts that in public debt exchange offers firms with unfavorable private information will offer equity claims to convince bondholders that the firm s prospects are poor in contrast offering equity to well informed private lenders conveys favorable private information to outsiders consistent with our analysis we find positive average abnormal returns around restructurings that offer equity to private lenders and senior debt to public debtholders and we find significant negative average abnormal returns when private lenders are offered senior debt and public lenders are offered equity

stackelberg equilibria in managerial delegation games abstract managerial compensation packages do not only influence managers behavior but also have an impact on competing firms in a managerial delegation game investigating the latter aspect it is shown that the inherent prisoner s dilemma situation can be resolved without changing the normally studied setup or timing in the first stage owners choose an incentive function for their managers in the second stage they choose the weights assigned to that function besides profits and in the third stage managers play a cournot game solving this continuous optimization problem with the implicit function theorem shows that choosing an incentive from the set of multiplicative incentives i e any generalized affine transformation of the product of both firms quantities which includes e g relative profit ensures that the stackelberg outcome is among the set of equilibrium outcomes furthermore it is the unique outcome if the rival owner opts for one of the well known incentives like sales revenue or market share the general approach used allows demonstrating that with no other linear incentive a stackelberg outcome results and that incentives like profit to cost ratio should be avoided selecting a multiplicative incentive is a dominant strategy of the game

a multiple leader stackelberg model and analysis this paper presents a new multiple leader follower model that is a consistent extension of stackelberg s leader follower duopoly the development contrasts with other existing extensions by demonstrating how the leader firms can utilize the true reaction curve of the follower firms it also provides sufficient conditions for some useful convexity and differentiability properties of this function for the proposed model we conduct a static analysis and discuss the existence uniqueness and computation of an equilibrium solution as well as study certain issues regarding the relative profits of leader and follower firms since the cournot oligopoly and the stackelberg leader follower models are special cases of this model the analysis in this paper hopefully provides some further insights about these types of models

on the status of the nash type of noncooperative equilibrium in economic theory in economic theory the nash type of noncooperative equilibrium is a widely used equilibrium concept nevertheless the concept is frequently misunderstood and misleading explanations and interpretations are often given this paper presents a sample of such frequently appearing misleading explanations and goes on to explain why they are misleading the case for using the nash noncooperative equilibrium concept is stronger than what is implied by the many misleading statements found in the literature a basic issue is whether it can be argued that decisions in accordance with the noncooperative equilibrium theory are individually rational decisions this issue is not covered by the classical rationality postulate in economic theory this problem is tackled by stating certain postulates which may be taken as defining individual rationality in situations of noncooperative interaction it is shown that nash behavior satisfies these postulates

diversification versus optimality is there really a diversification puzzle abstractin this paper we provide a general valuation of the diversification attitude of investors first we empirically examine the diversification of mean variance optimal choices in the us stock market during the 11 year period 2003 2013 we then analyze the diversification problem from the perspective of risk averse investors and risk seeking investors second we prove that investors optimal choices will be similar if their utility functions are not too distant independent of their tolerance or aversion to risk finally we discuss investors attitude towards diversification when the choices available to investors depend on several parameters

an examination of the factors associated with bank switching in the u k small firm sector previous research has consistently shown that a large number of firms are sufficiently dissatisfied with their bank relationship to have considered switching to an alternative bank in practice however the number of firms which actually switch banks is relatively low this paper examines empirical evidence from a postal survey of small firms in order to investigate this paradox binomial and multinomial logistic regression is used to identify the characteristics which discriminate between a group of firms considering switching banks and two other groups namely those which had switched banks in the previous three years and those which had not switched banks and were not considering doing so the paper tests the hypothesis that some small firms may be informationally captured in that they are tied into their current bank relationship due to difficulties in conveying accurate information about their performance the results provide some evidence in support of the hypothesis in that rapidly changing information particularly changing technology was a characteristic associated with firms which were considering switching but had not switched however there was no significant evidence to support the hypothesis that superior performing firms are more likely to be informationally captured growth and perceived business success were both associated with firms which switched banks there was strong evidence that the main drivers of the decision to switch or consider switching banks were difficulties obtaining finance and dissatisfaction with the service provided the results also showed that firms which were considering switching banks tended to use more alternative non banking sources of finance it is concluded that some firms will resolve difficulties obtaining finance by switching banks whereas others will use alternative sources of finance depending on the balance between the benefits of switching such as increased finance and switching costs including information provision

optimal monetary policy with countercyclical credit spreads we study optimal monetary policy in a new keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model with a credit channel and relationship lending in banking we show that borrowers bank specific deep habits give rise to countercyclical credit spreads which in turn make optimal monetary policy depart substantially from price stability under both discretion and commitment our analysis shows that the welfare costs of setting monetary policy under discretion with respect to the optimal ramsey plan and of using simpler suboptimal policy rules are strictly increasing in the magnitude of deep habits in credit markets and market power in banking

comovement information production and the business cycle abstract recent theoretical research suggests that information production is a positive externality of aggregate economic activity veldkamp 2005 both the quantity and quality of information increase during periods of economic expansion and decrease during periods of contraction based on this insight we hypothesize and confirm that time varying information production drives the comovement patterns observed in stock returns we examine stock return comovement in 36 countries from 1980 to 2007 and show that consistent with the theory comovement patterns are countercyclical that is when information production is high low comovement is low high we also find that the relation between comovement and the business cycle is stronger in countries that experience large intertemporal swings in information production finally we show that the relation between business cycle and comovement is stronger in poor countries countries with less developed financial markets and countries with weaker accounting and transparency standards these results suggest that financial development and transparency are conducive to a steady flow of financial information over the business cycle

competition in loan contracts we present a model of an unsecured loan market many lenders simultaneously offer loan contracts a debt level and an interest rate to a borrower the borrower may accept more than one contract her payoff if she defaults increases in the total amount borrowed if this payoff is high enough deterministic zero profit equilibria cannot be sustained lenders earn a positive profit and may even charge the monopoly price the positive profit equilibria are robust to increases in the number of lenders despite the absence of asymmetric information the competitive outcome does not obtain in the limit

debt and communications technology diffusion retrospective evidence this study has evaluated the relationship between debt in the capital structure of firms and the dynamics of broadband and digital technology adoption in the united states based on a large dataset on local exchange carriers in the united states over a contemporary historical fourteen year period from 1988 to 2001 using treatment effects modeling the impact of debt in impacting the levels of firms broadband deployment has been found to be negative and significant the primary source of debt in the sector has been in the form of arm s length corporate bonds and the assumptions of the monitoring hypothesis associated with such debt that lenders in the face of information and collective actions problems might not be able to control managers and hence invest less in highly technology intensive situations are supported by the data additionally the data set has been split into separate sets for two periods one between 1988 and 1995 for the period before the telecommunications act of 1996 came into force and the other set between 1996 and 2001 and the results have stayed consistent a test of the coefficients between the two periods has shown that the negative impact of leverage on broadband deployment has become stronger after the introduction of competition in the sector and this has suggested that the change in the institutional logics between the two periods has been of material impact in influencing lenders perceptions

money and interest in a cash in advance economy the authors analyze an aggregative general equilibrium model in which the use of money is motivated by a cash in advance constraint applied to purchases of a subset of consumption goods the system is subject to both real and monetary shocks which are economy wide and observed by all they develop methods for verifying the existence of characterizing and explicitly calculating equilibria copyright 1987 by the econometric society

credit card debt and consumption evidence from household level data this research investigates the relationship between credit card debt and consumption using household level data this is a departure from the previous studies which have used aggregate measures of consumption and general debt such as the debt service ratio or total revolving credit we use a detailed monthly survey of credit card use to impute credit card debt to respondents from the consumer expenditure survey sample in contrast to some earlier studies using aggregate data we find a negative relationship between debt and consumption growth our work shows that a 1000 increase in credit card debt results in a decrease in quarterly consumption growth of almost 2 investigations are also made into effects of debt within different age categories and into the impact of expected income growth on the debt consumption relationship

loan sales and the cost of bank capital this paper considers a model where banks may improve the returns on loans by monitoring borrowers bank regulation together with competitive deposit and equity financing can give banks an incentive to sell loans but the extent of their loan selling is limited by a moral hazard problem a solution is given for the optimal design of the bank loan buyer contract that alleviates this moral hazard problem an explanation is also given as to why some banks might buy loans and why loan sales volume has recently increased banks practice of making loans and then selling them to other institutions and individuals has grown in popularity an important example in the development of loan selling has been the increase in banks mortgage loans that are insured and pooled under the authority of the government national mortgage association gnma and then sold to secondary market investors recently however there has been a dramatic rise in the volume of other types of loans being sold especially by money center banks portions of commercial loans originated by these larger banks are being sold to smaller banks foreign banks and other financial and nonfinancial institutions in addition banks car loans and credit card receivables have also been pooled and sold to institutions and individuals selling loans that were once considered nonmarketable assets a process that has been termed asset securitization may be signalling the start of a fundamental change in the commercial banking business the leading banks in loan selling operations now view themselves more as originators and distributors of loans rather than as institutions holding loans as assets the potentially large impact of loan sales on the future of commercial banking naturally evokes the question of what incentives exist for banks to sell loans in this paper we show that loan sales allow some banks to finance loans less expensively than by traditional deposit or equity issue because bank funds received via loan sales can avoid costs associated with required reserves and

perfect competition as the limit of a hierarchical market game abstract it is shown that competitive equilibrium can be seen as the limit of some hierarchical game in which the rights or information of the players can be strictly ordered

reason for reserve reserve requirements and credit this paper considers the impact of a regulatory policy action on bank credit and traces its incidence across banks i make use of a reserve requirement increase in lebanon that was considerably greater on foreign currency deposits than on domestic currency deposits all banks cut lending as they scrambled to adjust portfolios but the policy shock disproportionately affected banks with a greater reliance on dollar funding and with low buffers of dollar liquid assets exposed domestic owned banks also adjusted more slowly than similar foreign owned banks that obtained outside funding descriptive firm bank matching evidence reveals a disproportionate impact on small firms

the demand for credit cards evidence from the survey of consumer finances i introduction the credit card market has expanded rapidly over the past 20 years in 1983 65 of households held at least one card by 1998 about 74 did so the size of real balances on these cards more than tripled in this period analysts have proposed a number of explanations for the increase but untangling the main causes is complicated by the unique nature of the credit card financial product an individual who obtains a credit card has obtained the right to borrow a certain amount called the limit with no questions asked under predetermined payback rules thus credit cards involve both assets and liabilities the available limits are best thought of as assets which can be used by a consumer to hedge against future income shortfalls or just to facilitate paying for goods and thereby reducing the need to carry cash the asset and limit components of credit cards makes them similar to financial instruments for example the asset component is essentially an option a subject that has been studied extensively in the corporate finance literature the seminal work is black and scholes 1973 who developed a method for valuing an option washam and davis 1998 extend this method to the problem of valuing the liquidity of credit resources this body of literature suggests that for some people a credit card can be viewed as a source of liquid funds for business purposes moreover once a credit card is used it becomes a debt liability in effect these are loans that the user has taken on to cover an income shortfall or simply to make a purchase for which borrowing makes sense again a corporate equivalent would be line of credit borrowing see myers 1989 or miller et al 1998 for an introduction these similarities raise the question of what sort of sample one should analyze for a study of consumer use of credit cards in all likelihood many average consumers who use credit cards are actually business entrepreneurs who use the cards to finance small business considering that wealth is an important element of any study of credit cards one faces the further problem that small business wealth is hard to measure accurately some research lindh and ohlsson 1998 suggests that access to liquid credit such as credit cards can make the difference between becoming self employed or not dunn and holtz eakin 2000 argue that family financial capital can ease the transition to self employment although they do not discuss credit availability in their study their results are strong evidence that credit cards would also ease that transition other studies that focus on the role of liquid credit and entrepreneurial activity include meyer 1990 blanchflower and oswald 1998 cox and japelli 1990 and evans and jovanovich 1989 our focus here is not on the use of credit cards as a business financing tool however it is apparent from this literature that business finance certainly plays a powerful role in determining the use of credit cards by some owners the research suggests that entrepreneurs would be more likely to be using credit cards for financing business rather than for consumer purposes for this reason it is important to separate the self employed from the non self employed in our sample looking specifically at consumers the unusual nature of the credit card financial product raises interesting questions for empirical researchers who hope as we do to provide some estimates of the responsiveness of the credit card demand to standard price and income effects the object of this article is to raise these questions and then answer some of them estimating regression models using data from the survey of consumer finances scf specifically we make two empirical approaches first we model credit card demand as a two stage process with a consumer obtaining limits in the first stage and then borrowing some fraction of those limits in the second

the liquidity services of money this paper investigates the liquidity services provided by cash interest bearing check balances and securities which pay higher interest than checks securities must be traded before con sumers know their desired level or composition of consumption cash a nd checks are more liquid since they are available on demand cas h is more liquid than checks since it is more widely useable as a medium of exchange cash will often be used to buy goods which could be bought by check and the demand for cash will be less sensitive t han the demand for checks to the interest paid on check balances copyright 1988 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

deposit insurance and subsidized recapitalizations the 2007 2009 financial crisis saw a vast expansion in deposit insurance guarantees around the world and yet our understanding of the design and consequences of deposit insurance schemes is in its infancy we provide a new rationale for the provision of deposit insurance in our model the banking sector exhibits both adverse selection and moral hazard which implies that the social benefits of bank monitoring must for incentive reasons be shared between depositors and banks consequently socially too few deposits are made in equilibrium deposit insurance or equivalently bank recapitalization corrects this market failure we find that deposit insurance should be funded not by banks or depositors but out of general taxation the optimal level of deposit insurance varies inversely with the quality of the banking system hence when the soundness of the financial sector is uncertain governments should consider supporting deposit insurance schemes and undertaking subsidized recapitalizations

a characterization for the negative welfare effects of cost reduction in cournot oligopoly abstract this paper characterizes the welfare effects of cost reductions in a cournot model with linear costs under linear demand a small reduction in a firm s marginal cost reduces welfare if and only if its market share is less than 1 2n 2 or equivalently its marginal cost exceeds a critical level determined by the market a large cost reduction by the firm increases welfare if and only if its magnitude is at least twice the difference between the current marginal cost and its critical value the paper also extends the results to non linear demand but the characterizations become less tractable

is financial inclusion good for bank stability international evidence abstract financial inclusion has become an important public policy priority following the recent global financial crisis yet we know very little of how it impacts soundness of the providers of financial services using an international sample of 2635 banks in 86 countries over the period 2004 12 we find that higher level of financial inclusion contributes to greater bank stability the positive association is particularly pronounced with those banks that have higher customer deposit funding share and lower marginal costs of providing banking services and also with those that operate in countries with stronger institutional quality the results are robust to instrumental variables analysis controlling for bank fixed effects alternative measures of financial inclusion among several other robustness tests our results highlight that the importance of ensuring inclusive financial system is not only a development goal but also an issue that should be prioritised by banks as such a policy drive is good for their stability

stackelberg nash cournot equilibria characterizations and computations the supply side of an oligopolistic market supplying a homogeneous product noncooperatively is modeled in this market there is one leader and n followers the followers operate under the cournot assumption of zero conjectural variation and are accordingly called cournot firms the leader called a stackelberg firm specifically takes into account the reaction of the cournot firms to its output for this situation we study the behavior and implications of the joint cournot reaction curve as generated by plausible economic market assumptions in particular we study the existence and uniqueness of a stackelberg nash cournot equilibrium in addition we prescribe an efficient algorithm to determine a set of equilibrating output quantities for the firms

bank lending and initial public offerings abstract in this paper we test the hypothesis that banking relations are a signal about firm value we argue that bank processing of asymmetric information and external monitoring of corporate activities reduce the ex ante uncertainty of investors about firm value we demonstrate that the existence of bank debt and or lines of credit lowers the expected initial return associated with initial public offerings the empirical results are robust with respect to the inclusion of variables which reflect other mechanisms that can ameliorate ex ante uncertainty our work adds to the body of evidence that supports the hypothesis that intermediaries provide valuable asset services to corporate borrowers

monetary policy and global banking when central banks adjust interest rates the opportunity cost of lending in local currency changes but absent frictions there is no spillover effect to lending in other currencies however when equity capital is limited global banks must benchmark domestic and foreign lending opportunities we show that in equilibrium the marginal return on foreign lending is affected by the interest rate differential with lower domestic rates leading to an increase in local lending at the expense of a reduction in foreign lending we test our prediction in the context of changes in interest rates in six major currency areas

bank firm relationships and allocative efficiency in northeastern and central italy and in the south abstract we make two contributions on the extent and impact of relationship banking based on close and long lasting bank firm customer relationships in the three sub systems in which italy may be subdivided first we show that relationship banking is more extensive in both sub systems where small businesses prevail the fast growing northeast and center nec and the south the marginal area of dependent development second we demonstrate that relationship banking improves the allocation of credit in the nec but worsens it in the south this evidence suggests that relationship banking may be beneficial or detrimental depending on the socio economic structure

competitive interest payments on bank deposits and the long run demand for money reply this paper tests two assumptions made in previous demand for money studies the first assumption concerns the role assigned to the interest rate in the demand for money function common practice identifies the rate of interest with the opportunity cost of holding money in section i this formulation is shown to blur an important distinction between the price of money and the price of money substitutes and to implicitly assume that the relevant price variable is the difference between these two distinct prices a second assumption is that the current ban on interest payments on demand deposits is fully effective in section ii i operationally define these price variables and estimate perfectly competitive interest payments on commercial bank deposits this is done by crudely measuring commercial bank marginal costs and assuming that all excess profit is passed on to depositors in indirect ways section iii presents estimates of a more complete longrun demand for money relationship which explicitly includes an own price and a cross price as separate influences and assumes that the prohibition of the payment of interest on deposits is totally ineffective although no firm conclusion is reached concerning the proper functional specification of the demand function the results significantly improve upon previous demand for money estimates which assumed that the interest payment prohibition is totally effective in section iv the results are summarized and implications of the analysis for monetary theory are presented my competitive demand for money formulation leads to a reinterpretation of the existing evidence on what is generally referred to as the interest elasticity of demand for money this estimate is shown to be significantly biased downward it also implies that the demand for and supply of money are more interdependent than is usually assumed

the certification value of private debt renegotiation and the design of financial contracts empirical evidence from europe abstract by using a sample of bank loan renegotiations by european firms i show that the renegotiation of financial contracts bears a certification value while deeply changing the contractual features of the loan over time to the benefit of shareholders i find that amendments to financial covenants and to loan amounts increase the cumulative abnormal returns of a borrowing firm by 10 15 early and less frequent renegotiations of bilateral loans with short maturities also imply a positive stock market reaction amendments signaling the early accrual of new and positive information allow increasing firm value

mutual fund activism and market regulation during the pre ifrs period the case of earnings informativeness in china from an ethical perspective this paper investigates the emerging effect of mutual fund involvement on the agency problem between majority and minority shareholders during the pre ifrs period in china indicated by earnings informativeness from an ethical perspective we find that the presence of mutual fund hampers earnings informativeness implying that mutual funds in general at their early stage in china are not yet capable of serving as an effective monitor this finding is in sharp contrast to the role of institutional investors in mature markets as documented in the literature however mutual funds affiliated with banks have been found to be effective to improve earnings informativeness of chinese listed companies and the impact is more pronounced among those affiliated with joint equity banks compared to their counterparts affiliated with state owned banks

the benefits of lending relationships evidence from small business data this paper empirically examines how ties between a firm and its creditors affect the availability and cost of funds to the firm we analyze data collected in a survey of small firms by the small business administration the primary benefit of building close ties with an institutional creditor is that the availability of financing increases we find smaller effects on the price of credit attempts to widen the circle of relationships by borrowing from multiple lenders increases the price and reduces the availability of credit in sum relationships are valuable and appear to operate more through quantities rather than prices

capital regulation and insured banks choice of individual loan default risks abstract how bankers choose the riskiness of their individual assets is an important question it is well known that fixed premium deposit insurance leads a bank to prefer a high variance asset portfolio but its effect on individual asset choice has not been carefully evaluated this paper demonstrates how bank examination procedures and capital adequacy standards can make the value of a bank s deposit insurance contract concave in individual asset risks insured bankers may therefore have a rational preference ceteris paribus for relatively safe individual loans even while they prefer risky portfolio returns the model s implications for loan securitization and the federal regulators new risk based capital standards are discussed

interest rates in a credit constrained economy when households face credit constraints in an economy with inside as well as outside money stationary equilibrium real interest rates are below the household rate of time preference they also depend significantly upon household risk aversion the demand for inside versus outside money bank costs bank reserves inflation and the marginal productivity of capital and capital depreciation rates in addition changes in financial variables affect per capita capital and output to a greater extent when households are credit constrained copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

effect of the number of banking relationships on credit availability evidence from panel data of spanish small firms this paper investigates how the choice between single or multiple banking relationships affects credit availability for a complete panel of small and medium sized spanish firms the results seem to indicate the existence of rationing since a substitution relation has been found between trade and bank credit we also analyse the relationship between the level of indebtedness and the interest rate for each group of firms the results show that those smes that work with fewer financial intermediaries obtain fewer funds for the same increase in the interest rate which indicates that these companies have more financial restraints

the determinants of bank interest rate margins an international study abstract this paper studies the determinants of bank net interest margins nims in six selected european countries and the us during the period 1988 1995 for a sample of 614 banks we apply the ho and saunders model ho t saunders a 1981 the determinants of bank interest margins theory and empirical evidence journal of financial and quantitative analyses 16 581 600 to a multicountry setting and decompose bank margins into a regulatory component a market structure component and a risk premium component the regulatory components in the form of interest rate restrictions on deposits reserve requirements and capital to asset ratios have a significant impact on banks nims the empirical results suggest an important policy trade off between assuring bank solvency high capital to asset ratios and lowering the cost of financial services to consumers low nims the more segmented or restricted the banking system both geographically and by activity the larger appears to be the monopoly power of existing banks and the higher their spreads macro interest rate volatility was found to have a significant impact on bank nims this suggests that macro policies consistent with reduced interest rate volatility could have a positive effect in reducing bank margins

on the existence of cournot equilibrium this paper examines the existence of n firm cournot equilibrium in a market for a single homogeneous commodity it proves that if each firm s marginal revenue declines as the aggregate output of other firms increases which is implied by concave inverse demand then a cournot equilibrium exists without assuming that firms have nondecreasing marginal cost or identical technologies also if the marginal revenue condition fails at a potential optimal point there is a set of firms such that no cournot equilibrium exists the paper also contains an example of nonexistence with two nonidentical firms each with constant returns to scale production