hedging interest rate risk with futures portfolios under full rank assumptions a spot portfolio of rate sensitive assets can be hedged by a portfolio of interest sensitive futures contracts the hedge ratios of minimum variance portfolios are unique when the fixed cash flows of underlying instruments are linearly independent and when the covari ance matrix of unexpected changes in spot rates over the term of the cash flows is of full rank hilliard s 1984 full rank model has produced smaller portfolio variances than a duration model in a short term hedging context however the methodology typically re quires extensive econometric analysis this paper develops a structured covariance matrix of full rank that requires only one parameter estimate hedging examples are provided

origins and development of the eu ets the successful creation of the european union emissions trading scheme eu ets was not inevitable countries such as canada and japan which might be thought to have a less complex and more cohesive cultural and institutional context failed to do so europe succeeded for a number of reasons with a single market for the economy the logic of a single market for environment is inexorable the european commission which had failed in its earlier efforts to introduce a carbon energy tax made the case for trading with great skill and persistence on the basis of qualified majority voting which meant no country had a veto the uk and denmark initiated their own national schemes and there was a serious risk of balkanising the market with up to 27 different schemes with the losses of scale and scope this would entail meeting the union s kyoto commitments required a substantive pan european response and eu ets was the most credible and effective way of doing so the european parliament and environmental non governmental organisations played a constructive role pushing for more auctioning of allowances and less of them allocated centrally free allocation managed by member states ms was a necessary condition to achieve the support needed so they failed to achieve these objectives in the initial phase but they characterize the commission s proposals post 2012

good things do not always come in threes on the excess cost of overlapping regulation in eu climate policy since the mid 1990 s the european union eu aims at pushing global climate policy the objective is to promote international cooperation by the adoption of substantial eu wide greenhouse gas emission reduction targets and their least cost implementation our quantitative impact assessment of the eu climate and energy package shows that the myriad of instruments used in the eu to curb greenhouse gas emissions is doomed to generate substantial excess cost we conclude that eu climate and energy policy should better disentangle its choices of objectives targets and policy instruments on rigorous economic grounds in order to improve the coherence and overall cost effectiveness of policy initiatives

cap and trade a sufficient or necessary condition for emission reduction influenced by the success of emission trading in the us for sulphur dioxide so 2 some economists have argued for an upstream economy wide cap and trade scheme as the primary tool for achieving the required reduction in greenhouse gas ghg emissions this paper addresses that argument and concludes that cap and trade will need to be accompanied by complementary regulatory measures while it is a necessary component in a climate mitigation programme it is unlikely to be sufficient by itself to accomplish the desired emission reductions the paper reviews the evidence on how so 2 emissions were reduced and the extent to which actual emission trading was responsible for the reduction as opposed to other innovations it also identifies differences between the past regulation of so 2 and other air pollutants and the challenges presented by the regulation of ghg emissions what actually happened in the us with so 2 emission trading deviated in several significant respects from what would be predicted based on the conventional theoretical analysis while there was a dramatic reduction in so 2 emissions it occurred because of several factors some of which are unlikely to apply for ghg emissions and others of which argue for an activist regulatory policy by the government as a complement to the functioning of an emissions market for ghgs copyright 2010 oxford university press

does weather or energy prices affect carbon prices abstract this study investigates the extent that key energy prices coal gas oil and electricity and weather explain carbon prices a key feature of the european union emissions trading scheme eu ets and whether this relationship changed since full auctioning came into effect in 2013 energy prices were found to impact the carbon price in phase iii of the eu ets however modelling based solely on energy prices explained only 12 of carbon price variation weather variables did not affect the carbon price except for unanticipated temperature changes these results indicate that it is not the level of temperature that impacts the carbon price rather it is unanticipated changes in temperature that matter given that climate change is associated with increased variance in temperature this result is consistent with climate change resulting in greater carbon price volatility and higher hedging costs

population adaptation with newcomers and incumbents the effects of the organizational niche the article integrates three theory fragments of organizational ecology using symbolic logic it takes an earlier model that aligned inertia theory with red queen competition theory as a departure point and extends this model with temporal niche theory effects the conflicting predictions between earlier and new theory phases are reconciled by applying the knowledge updating feature of non monotonic logic the results indicate a rationale for discriminating between qualitative and quantitative aspects of environmental change and also for telling apart ways of organizational adaptation based on effectiveness and efficiency

on the design of optimal grandfathering schemes for emission allowances to meet its commitment under the kyoto protocol the eu plans to implement an emissions trading system whith grandfathering of allowances besides having distributional impacts the choice of the grandfathering scheme may affect efficiency if firms anticipate how future allocations depend on upcoming decisions in this paper we determine central design rules for optimal grandfathering within a simple two period model we find that for small open trading systems where allowance prices are exogenous first best second period grandfathering schemes must not depend on firm specific decisions in the first period second best schemes correspond to a ramsey rule of optimal tax differentiation and are generally based on both previous emissions and output however ofr closed emissions trading systems i e endogeneous allowance prices firstand second best rules coincide and must not depend on previous output levels they consist of an assignment proportional to the emissions in the first period plus a term which does not depend on firm specific decisions in either of the two periods

european emission trading scheme and competitiveness a case study on the iron and steel industry abstract we quantify the impact of the european emission trading scheme ets on the two dimensions of competitiveness production and profitability for the iron and steel industry among those covered by the scheme this sector is one of the most exposed since it is both highly co 2 intensive and relatively open to international trade we also examine the robustness of these results to various assumptions marginal abatement cost curve trade and demand elasticities as well as pass through rates and updating of allocation rules of which the latter two are scarcely debated we conclude that for this sector competitiveness losses are small we prove this conclusion to be robust hence arguments against tightening the environmental stringency of the ets in phase ii are not justified on grounds of competitiveness loss our systematic sensitivity analysis allows us to identify the important assumptions for each output variable it turns out that pass through rates and updating rules are significant despite being often implicit and least debated in existing analyses

marginal abatement costs of greenhouse gas emissions from european agriculture cost effectiveness and the eu non ets burden sharing agreement abstract we propose a quantitative assessment of the marginal abatement costs mac of greenhouse gas emissions from european agriculture and analyze the implications of the non ets burden sharing agreement bsa for this sector this assessment is based on mac reduced forms the generic specification of which enables simple parameterization and numerical computations such mac curves are parameterized for each member state using the outputs of a detailed model of the european agricultural supply they are then used to compute total and marginal abatement costs involved by the bsa targets as well as the cost effective effort sharing the corresponding emission price and abatement costs the main findings are i flexibility mechanisms such as a cap and trade system for agricultural emissions could reduce the total costs of meeting the 10 eu abatement target by a factor two to three relative to the strict implementation of each country s target ii the corresponding equilibrium emission price is found to be 32 42 tco2eq depending on the assumption regarding business as usual emissions and iii a cap and trade system with allowances based on the bsa targets would involve substantial transfers from eu 15 countries to new member states an important share of which being made of hot air

extending the sectoral coverage of an international emission trading scheme in a model inspired by the eu emissions trading scheme non cooperative countries allocate their emissions to internationally trading and non trading sectors each country is better off with trading than without and aggregate welfare is maximized with all sectors in the trading scheme we analyze the effects of extending the sectoral coverage of the trading scheme in a two country model with quadratic abatement costs if only the original trading sector is asymmetric between countries the welfare change is always positive and the same in both countries if the original and additional trading sectors are asymmetric one country might lose but there is an aggregate welfare gain if the original trading sector and the non trading sector are asymmetric both countries always gain

price drivers and structural breaks in european carbon prices 2005 2007 this article aims at characterizing the daily price fundamentals of european union allowances euas traded since 2005 as part of the emissions trading scheme ets the presence of two structural changes on april 2006 following the disclosure of 2005 verified emissions and on october 2006 following the european commission announcement of stricter phase ii allocation allows to isolate distinct fundamentals evolving overtime the results extend previous literature by showing that eua spot prices react not only to energy prices with forecast errors but also to unanticipated temperatures changes during colder events besides the sub period decomposition of the pilot phase gives a better grasp of institutional and market events that drive allowance price changes

alternative duration specifications and the measurement of basis risk empirical tests dramatic increases in interest rate levels and volatility since the early 1970s have renewed interest in fixed income securities and have motivated much study of the appropriate measure of risk for bonds many authors have expanded on macaulay s 1938 concept of duration as a surrogate for risk measurement and have developed a variety of new measures of duration numerous commercial duration based immunization programs are now available purporting to explain returns to provide good measures of risk and to protect fixed income portfolios from volatile interest rates e g leibowitz 1979 leibowitz and weinberger 1981 this paper tests the explanatory power of a number of recently proposed duration measures we show that despite the flood of articles and commercial programs claiming superiority for particular measures of duration the measures studied were virtually indistinguishable empirically in fact none of them did much better than this paper empirically investigates seven duration measures and their role in explaining price volatility caused by interest rate movements that is basis risk the data analysis does not support the important testable implications of the various durations as measures of basis risk all seven durations fail linearity and single risk factor tests from which their advantages are supposed to derive fixed income performance comparisons and immunization strategies based on these durations have not been worthwhile

case study on initial allocation of shanghai carbon emission trading based on shapley value abstract carbon emission trading is an effective measure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions worldwide china has publicized plans to initiate the demonstration of carbon emission trading in seven regions as of 2013 initial allocation is fundamental but it proposes difficulty in the mechanism design of the carbon emission trading system benchmark grandfathering and the shapley value have been employed to simulate a specific case which consists of the initial allocation of carbon emission allowances of three power plants in shanghai china the results of the shapley value are regarded as a theoretical equitable reference the results of benchmark are similar to those of the shapley value however it is apparent that the allocation regarding grandfathering is inequitable considering other factors we proposed the following at the introduction of experimental stage free allocation pertaining to grandfathering can be adopted meanwhile benchmark should be prepared and adopted at the appropriate time furthermore a portion of the initial allowances can be reserved for auction and this portion for auction will escalate to the extent of 100 upon entering the formal stage in addition the tiered price mechanism and the subsidy policy are also suggested

the money and bond markets in france abstract when rates of return on bonds are computed over extremely short holding periods the ex post cross sectional relationship between realized return and risk is linear it is therefore possible at any time to extrapolate the cross sectional relationship to a zero risk level and thus to determine the implied instantaneous riskless rate of interest we apply this technique to french bond price data using a rather unique data set in which prices are sampled daily we are able to compare the overnight rate implied in bond price data to the actual overnight money market rate we conclude that the two rates are significantly different which is evidence of segmentation between the two markets the institutional set up prevailing in france during the sample period explains the segmentation result

market efficiency in the european carbon markets in this paper we study the relationship between futures and spot prices in the european carbon markets from the cost of carry hypothesis the aim is to investigate the extent of efficiency market the three main european markets bluenext eex and ecx are analyzed during phase ii covering the period from march 13 2009 to january 17 2012 futures contracts are found to be cointegrated with spot prices and interest rates for several maturities in the three co2 markets results are similar when structural breaks are taken into account according to individual and joint tests the cost of carry model is rejected for all maturities and co2 markets implying that neither contract is priced according to the cost of carry model the absence of the cost of carry relationship can be interpreted as an indicator of market inefficiency and may bring arbitrage opportunities in the co2 market

decoupling the eu ets from subsidized renewables and other demand side effects lessons from the impact of the eu ets on co2 emissions in the german electricity sector abstract this paper analyzes the impact of the eu ets on co2 reduction in the german electricity sector we find an ets induced emission abatement which is not exceeding 6 of total emissions with a maximum already in 2010 thereafter the ets has not induced additional reductions this outcome corresponds to the recent debate about sub optimal performance of the eu ets caused by excessive allowances following up on this we develop a unilateral flexible cap to eliminate demand side effects which lead to excessive allowances the unilateral flexible cap is based on emission intensities using the works of newell and pizer 2008 sue wing et al 2009 we prove that an intensity based emission cap is advantageous in the german electricity sector when compared to an absolute cap an ex post analysis shows that the amount of excessive allowances resulting from the economic crisis during the second trading period could have been significantly lowered with a unilateral flexible cap this approach also decouples the eu ets from a simultaneous promotion of renewable energy

a literature based multi criteria evaluation of the eu ets abstract this article reviews the existing literature on the european union emission trading scheme eu ets focusing on empirical ex post research since the end of the first period 2007 the literature is presented through a multi criteria evaluation concerning environmental effectiveness despite over allocation during the first period abatement is estimated between 2 5 and 5 trade driven carbon leakage was not observed even if long term economic models predict divergent leakage estimates for certain at risk sectors the abatement target was likely to be below an economically efficient level but was reached in a fairly cost effective way even if free allocation gave rise to several distortional effects equity concerns were manifold and constitute a major drawback to the policy finally institutional feasibility can be considered positive in that the eu ets passed the european legislative process unlike the previously proposed eu wide carbon tax

transaction costs and tradeable permits abstract tradeable permit systems are at the center of current interest and activity in market based reforms of environmental policy because these systems can offer significant advantages over conventional approaches to pollution control unfortunately claims made for their relative cost effectiveness have often been exaggerated transaction costs which may be significant in these markets reduce trading levels and increase abatement costs in some cases equilibrium permit allocations and hence aggregate control costs are sensitive to initial permit distributions providing an efficiency justification for politicians typical focus on initial allocations

efficiency productivity and environmental policy a case study of power generation in the eu this study uses the eu public power generating sector as a case study to investigate the environmental efficiency and productivity enhancing performance of the european union s co2 emissions trading scheme eu ets in its first phase using data envelopment analysis methods we measure the environmental efficiency and the productivity growth registered in public power generation across the eu over the 1996 2007 period in the second stage of our analysis we attempt to explain changes in productivity and efficiency over time using econometric techniques our analysis suggests two conclusions carbon pricing led to an increase in environmental efficiency and to a shift outwards of the technological frontier and the overly generous allocation of emission permits had a negative impact on both measures these results are shown to be robust to changes in controls and specifications

rethinking and reshaping the climate policy literature review and proposed guidelines abstract addressing climate change represents a governing the climate commons on a global scale the tragedy of the commons might better be described as the failure of governing the commons hardin s solutions were centralized government and private property which have long been criticized as oversimplified however governing the unprecedented climate commons there is only a global federalism of climate policy the kyoto protocol the kyoto cannot keep atmospheric co2 level below 450 ppm rising 2 c some key evidences of the kyoto failures are identified the kyoto failures do not indicate that the kyoto is a wrong tool of centralized government instead the kyoto failures are derived from the fact that the only centralized government cannot effectively govern the commons which have been proven by the efforts of governing the commons last four decades here we propose a wide diversity of governance systems for climate common to addressing global warming the multi level and multi scale governing system includes but is not limited to i starting at home ii emphasizing the local approach iii efforts of global level focusing these top emitters iv improved information sharing v privatizing the property of climate to avoid free riders vi combination mitigation with adaptive vii improved ecology services to expand carbon sinks we argue that the kyoto failures indicate again that reliance on a single solution may result in more of a problem than a solution in governing the common therefore continuing to wait for another global federalism of climate policy may lead to missing the chance to make significant mitigations and adaptations in time to battling the climate change post 2012 multi level and multi scale approaches could make a difference in collective action for governing the climate commons to meet climate challenge

the eu 20 20 2020 targets an overview of the emf22 assessment three computable general equilibrium models are used to estimate the economic implications of a stylized version of eu climate policy if implemented at the lowest possible cost the 20 emissions reduction would lead to a welfare loss of 0 5 2 0 by 2020 second best policies increase costs a policy with two carbon prices one for the ets one for the non ets could increase costs by up to 50 a policy with 28 carbon prices one for the ets one each for each member state could increase costs by another 40 the renewables standard could raise the costs of emissions reduction by 90 overall the inefficiencies in policy lead to a cost that is 100 125 too high the models differ greatly in the detail of their results the ets non ets split may have a negligible impact on welfare while the renewables standard may even improve welfare the models agree however that the distortions introduced by total eu package imply a substantial welfare loss over and above the costs needed to meet the climate target the marginal total and excess costs reported here are notably higher than those in the impact assessment of the european commission

free euas and fuel switching abstract this paper focuses on the impact of euas on the optimal policy of a competitive electricity producer the effect of grandfathering is consistently shown to introduce significant distortions to the system it is theoretically shown that there is a threshold value of carbon price so that for prices above this the eua becomes an incentive for reduced production rather than a penalty for inefficient producers these theoretical results are supported by the data of one producer from italy and one from germany furthermore the empirical evidence concludes that the high level of free allowances may generate a shift in production from less to more polluting technologies

effects of unilateral climate policy on terms of trade capital accumulation and welfare in a world economy we present a two good two country overlapping generations model where emissions arise from production and each country has a domestic emission permit system when one country unilaterally reduces her cap on emissions her output available for domestic and foreign consumption diminishes more than in the other country with unchanged consumption expenditure shares for both goods the domestic terms of trade improve while capital stocks decline in the reducing and less strongly in the non reducing country improving terms of trade in the reducing country and falling capital stocks lead in total to welfare losses in both countries however if the country which unilaterally reduces her emission permits is a net creditor to the world economy and the golden rule applies her own welfare loss remains below that of the non reducing country