international bargaining in the presence of global environmental change this model deals with the greenhouse effect that is to say with a problem of international pollution through a description of the bargaining process it aims to determine the different forms that may be taken by cooperation agreements between the countries involved we demonstrate in particular that under some conditions it is always possible for the countries to reach an agreement such agreements are the work of a group of so called leader countries characterized by their commitment in favour of cooperation these leader countries use transfers to induce other countries to join them but they can be insufficiently attractive to convince all the countries to cooperate so as we show in the discussion the cooperation is not necessarily total therefore the key of a common problem can be a partial cooperation and not necessarily a common cooperation

banking deregulation and industry structure evidence from the french banking reforms of 1985 we investigate how the deregulation of the french banking industry in the 1980s affected the real behavior of firms and the structure and dynamics of product markets following deregulation banks are less willing to bail out poorly performing firms and firms in the more bank dependent sectors are more likely to undertake restructuring activities at the industry level we observe an increase in asset and job reallocation an improvement in allocative efficiency across firms and a decline in concentration overall these findings support the view that a more efficient banking sector helps foster a schumpeterian process of creative destruction many economies around the world are characterized by heavily regulated bank

exchange rates and unfair trade an examination of the changing country pattern of dumping and subsidy complaints by u s companies over time suggests that exchange rate fluctuations are a significant factor in determining case filings especially against japanese companies the inverse relationship observed between filings and the real external value of the u s dollar is consistent both with the traditional or technical interpretation of dumping and subsidy cases and with the view that they are promoted by rent seeking activities of lawyers and economists representing petitioners while this result says nothing about the merits of any particular case it cautions that the prevalence of unfair trade is not exogenous with respect to broader macroeconomic considerations copyright 1989 by mit press

the role of uncertainty and learning for the success of international climate agreements abstract transnational externalities e g transboundary pollution trade contagious diseases and terrorism warrant coordination and cooperation between governments but this proves often difficult one reason for the meager success is the public good character of many of these economic problems encouraging free riding another reason one might suspect is uncertainty surrounding most environmental problems and in particular climate change this provides often an excuse for remaining inactive paradoxically some recent papers have concluded just the opposite the veil of uncertainty can be conducive to the success of international environmental cooperation in this paper we explain why and under which conditions this can be true however we argue that those conditions are the exception rather than the rule most important we suggest a mechanism for those conditions where learning has a negative effect on the success of cooperation which removes this effect or even turns it into a positive effect our results apply beyond the specifics of climate change to similar problems where cooperation generates positive externalities

electoral cycles in savings bank lending we provide evidence that german savings banks which are controlled by county level politicians systematically adjust lending policies in response to local electoral cycles the different timings of county elections across states and the existence of a comparable group of cooperative banks that are very similar to savings banks but lack their political connectedness allow for identification of the effects of county elections on savings bank lending these effects are economically meaningful and very robust to various specifications we find that election induced lending negatively impacts savings bank profitability and is associated with an increase in credit defaults roughly three years after an election examining the political economy aspects of our findings we provide evidence that savings bank excess lending and public spending at the county level are substitute levers for county politicians finally we find indications that subpar pre election economic county performance hurts re election prospects and increases the intensity of lending cycles

exchange rates and industry demands for trade protection the recent confrontation between china and the united states over currency policy illustrates a broader phenomenon exchange rate misalignments tend to spill over into trade policy although previous studies have shown that aggregate protectionist activity is positively related to the level of the real effective exchange rate we explore this relationship at the industry level several industry specific characteristics determine the protectionist response to exchange rate changes including the degree of exchange rate pass through the level of import penetration and the share of imported intermediate inputs in total industry inputs we find that the marginal effect of currency appreciation on the number of industry level antidumping petitions is positive and significant only for industries with high pass through therefore exchange rates appear to induce demands for trade barriers only in industries where competitiveness is directly harmed by currency appreciation

some economics of global warming the greenhouse effect itself is simple enough to understand and is not in any real dispute what is in dispute is its magnitude over the coming century its translation into changes in climates around the globe and the impacts of those climate changes on human welfare and the natural environment these are beyond the professional understanding of any single person the sciences involved are too numerous and diverse demography economics biology and the technology sciences are needed to project emissions atmospheric chemistry oceanography biology and meteorology are needed to translate emissions into climates biology agronomy health sciences economics sociology and glaciology are needed to identify and assess impacts on human societies and natural ecosystems and those are not all there are expert judgments on large pieces of the subject but no single person clothed in this panoply of disciplines has shown up or is likely to this article makes an attempt to forecast the economic and social consequences of global warming due to anthropogenic greenhouse gases and attempting to prevent it

international pollution control cooperative versus noncooperative strategies abstract international pollution control involving two neighboring countries is modeled as a simple two player dynamic game each country produces a good that is consumed by domestic households production of each consumption good results in emissions of pollutants households in each country derive utility from the consumption of the domestically produced good but incur costs through the total stock of pollution stock externality in this setting we characterize cooperative as well as noncooperative pollution control strategies of the governments of the two countries that maximize the discounted stream of net benefits of a representative consumer it turns out that when the governments are restricted to use linear strategies noncooperative behavior results in overall losses for both countries if on the contrary governments use nonlinear markov perfect strategies and the discount rate is small enough a pareto efficient steady state pollution stock can be supported as a differentiable subgame perfect equilibrium thus the emergence of first best solutions cooperative outcomes does not require any institutional arrangements threats retaliation etc but can be brought about through the use of nonlinear markov perfect equilibrium strategies

effects of international sharing of pollution abatement burdens on income inequality among countries abstract improvements in environmental quality will boost output production and hence economic growth however although environmental abatement equally benefits all economies in the world it is shown that if the private productive resources are not yet accumulated sufficiently in low income economies income inequality among economies can be widened in the short term not only under equal burden sharing of pollution abatement but even under income proportional burden sharing when the marginal productivity is diminishing the negative effect of the burden is large relative to the positive effect of the improved environment in economies in which resources are not accumulated sufficiently

the trade effects of us anti dumping actions against china post wto entry since china s entry into the wto us anti dumping ad actions against china have increased particularly with respect to multiple petitions distinguishing between us single and multiple petitions we examine the trade effects of us ad actions against china based on an unbalanced panel of quarterly trade data the results show that a us single petition investigation greatly restrains us imports of the filed products from china but also causes more significant import diversion from non named countries in the short run a preliminary ad duty imposed on china via a us multiple petition not only restrains us imports of the filed products from china but also prevents trade diversion from non named countries in the long run a final ad duty on china resulting from a us multiple petition creates a larger destructive effect on china and causes us import diversion from non named countries thus a final ad duty imposed on china following a us multiple petition not only harms china s exports but also fails to help the us achieve import substitution furthermore we have been able to reveal the negative trade effect of a preliminary ad duty even in cases where the ultimate decision is not to impose a final duty

macroeconomic factors and antidumping filings evidence from four countries abstract this paper examines the relationship between antidumping filings and macroeconomic factors real exchange rate fluctuations affect the two criteria for dumping in opposite ways making the overall effect on filings ambiguous in theory examining the filing patterns of the four major users of ad law during the 1980 98 period we find that real exchange rates and domestic real gdp growth both have statistically significant impacts on filings bilateral filing data indicate that a one standard deviation real appreciation of the domestic currency increases filings by 33 we also find one standard deviation fall in domestic real gdp increases filings by 23

non equivalent pass through of anti dumping duties countervailing duties and import tariffs we directly compare the short run pass through of tariffs anti dumping ad duties and countervailing cv duties into us import prices consistent with the theoretical predictions we find clear pattern of non equivalence in import price reaction to the three duty types with the most notable difference detected between ad duties and tariffs according to our estimates a tariff rate would have to be approximately two times higher than an ad duty rate in order to have the same effect on the delivered import price

wasteful public spending and state aid control the conventional academic rationale for supranational intervention to curb state aids to industry appeals to transfrontier spillovers however competition policy practitioners often speak in terms of curbing wasteful spending regardless of whether or not any international spillovers are involved although it is often argued that such wasteful spending calls not for supranational state aid control but rather for better domestic political accountability this paper argues that wasteful spending may be a by product of accountability not a symptom of its absence specifically we describe a model in which politicians fund projects that are wasteful as a way to signal their diligence and voters rationally reward them for this we discuss implications for the role of state aid control mechanisms 2006 by the european economic association

multi issue bargaining with endogenous agenda abstract the first part of this paper shows that in a noncooperative bargaining model with alternating offers and time preferences the timing of issues the agenda matters even if players become arbitrarily patient this result raises the question of which agenda should come up endogenously when agents bargain over a set of unrelated issues it is found that simultaneous bargaining over packages should be a prevailing phenomenon but we also point to the possibility of multiple equilibria involving even considerable delay journal of economic literature classification number c78

perfect equilibria in a model of bargaining with arbitration abstract we consider an alternating offer bargaining model in which the players may agree to call in an arbitrator in case of disagreement the main message of our study is that the mere presence of an arbitrator who can only become active with the consent of both parties in the background of negotiations may entirely drive their outcome we compare our results with those obtained in models with outside options journal of economic literature classification number c78

import protection business cycles and exchange rates evidence from the great recession this research estimates the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations on import protection policies over 1988 q1 2010 q4 for five industrialized economies the united states european union australia canada and south korea there is evidence of a strong countercyclical trade policy response in the pre great recession period of 1988 q1 2008 q3 during which increases in domestic unemployment rates real appreciations in bilateral exchange rates and declines in the gdp growth rates of bilateral trading partners led to substantial increases in new temporary trade barriers it then applies this pre great recession empirical model to realized macroeconomic data from 2008 q4 2010 q4 and find it predicts a surge of new import protection during the great recession e g for the us and eu the model predicts new trade barriers would cover an additional 15 percentage points of nonoil imports well above the baseline level of 2 3 percent of import coverage immediately preceding the crisis finally the research examines why the realized trade policy response differed from model predictions while exchange rate movements played an important role in limiting new import protection during the great recession there is also evidence of one particularly important change in trade policy responsiveness i e in this period governments refrained from imposing new temporary trade barriers against foreign trading partners experiencing their own weak or negative economic growth

has the byrd amendment affected us imports the continued dumping and subsidy offset act cdsoa also known as the byrd amendment allows the u s government to distribute revenues from antidumping duties to domestic firms alleging harm prior to the amendment these revenues were not distributed to firms in this article we formally test the hypothesis that the byrd amendment effectively provides double protection to u s firms to the extent that it further restricts u s imports as argued by the e u and eleven other u s trading partners using a rich panel of 362 u s manufacturing industries for the period 1998 to 2003 we find that whether or not the byrd amendment restricted u s imports depends crucially on the level of competitiveness in the import competing industry specifically we find that the byrd amendment served to restrict imports only in industries where competition is relatively weak while the amendment is associated with an increase in imports in more competitive industries

capital market imperfections international credit markets and nonconvergence abstract we consider a two country growth model with international capital markets these markets fund capital investment in both countries and operate subject to a costly state verification csv problem investors in each country require some external finance but also provide internal finance which mitigates the csv problem when two identical except for their initial capital stocks economies are closed they necessarily convergemonotonicallyto the same steady state output level unrestricted international financial tradeprecludesotherwise identical economies from converging and poor countries are necessarily net lenders to rich countries oscillation in real activity and international capital flows can occur journal of economic literatureclassification numbers e00 f00 f34 g14

towards a better climate treaty the kyoto protocol is an example of how not to construct a treaty negotiators began by focusing on the short term agreeing that the industrialized countries should cut their emissions of greenhouse gases by about 5 relative to 1990 by 2008 2012 then they agreed that these cuts should be achieved cost effectively incorporating flexible mechanisms only later did they worry about whether the treaty created incentives for broad participation and full compliance negotiators should have approached things the other way around they should have begun by thinking of how they could achieve both broad participation and full compliance and of how they could reduce emissions in the long term had they done so a better more effective treaty would have been negotiated in this essay the author explains why kyoto is unlikely to succeed in mitigating climate change he also proposes an alternative treaty design that is likely to work better

moral hazard and information sharing a model of financial information gathering agencies we propose a theory of information gathering agencies in a world of informational asymmetries and moral hazard in a setting in which true firm values are certified by screening agents whose payoffs depend on noisy ex post monitors of information quality the formation of information gathering agencies groups of screening agents is justified on two grounds first it enables screening agents to diversify their risky payoffs second it allows information sharing the first effect itself is insufficient despite the risk aversion of screening agents and the stochastic independence of the monitors used to compensate them this paper develops a model that explains the formation of financial institutions which acquire and process information for the purpose of certifying asset qualities but do not get involved in funding the model makes two basic assumptions the first is that there is an informational asymmetry in the capital market involving insiders possessing more accurate information about the true economic values of their firms than outsiders and the second is that those engaged in the production of information to rectify this asymmetry can gain from sharing their information examples of the information gathering agencies iga s we study are creditrating agencies financial newsletters standard and poor s value line investment counselors credit bureaus etc iga s are distinct from funding financial intermediaries ffi s like banks and credit unions that in addition to acquiring and processing information also issue claims against themselves fund their customers needs and transform asset characteristics from a modeling standpoint a key distinction between iga s and ffi s is that in the case of the latter outsiders depositors for instance do not necessarily have to assess the quality of the intermediary s information since the intermediary can be made accountable for this quality through the positions it takes in the screened assets thus models that explain ffi s focus on how the contracts offered by the intermediary ensure information reliability without reliance on explicit monitoring on the other hand because of the absence of loan and deposit type contracts to dissipate informational problems a model explaining iga s must rely on monitoring related mechanisms

genetic algorithm learning and the cobweb model this paper presents the cobweb model in which competitive firms in a market for a single good use a genetic algorithm to update their decision rules about next period production and sales the results of simulations show that the genetic algorithm converges to the rational expectations equilibrium for a wider range of parameter values than other algorithms frequently studied within the context of the cobweb model price and quantity patterns generated by the genetic algorithm are also compared to the data of experimental cobweb economies it is shown that the algorithm can capture several features of the experimental behavior of human subjects better than three other learning algorithms that are considered

double dividend with involuntary unemployment efficiency and intergenerational equity this paper analyzes the double dividend and distributional issues within an overlapping generations model framework with involuntary unemployment we characterize the necessary conditions needed to obtain a double dividend when the revenue of the environmental tax is recycled by a variation of the labor tax rate we show that an employment dividend may occur without any efficiency dividend and that the young generation is not always harmed by the fiscal reform even without any intergenerational transfers therefore three dividends environmental efficiency and intergenerational equity can occur simultaneously

r d subsidies and productivity in smes this paper examines the effect of r d subsidies on labour productivity we use firm level data on finnish smes from 2000 to 2012 and apply a combined matching and difference in differences method to control for selection bias we find no significant positive effect on labour productivity over the five year period after a subsidy is granted however the results vary over time and indicate a 2 4 negative effect on smes annual productivity growth one to 2 years after the subsidy year nevertheless subsidies generate a positive employment effect and enhance firm survival additional scrutiny reveals that subsidies positively affect the human capital level of low skill firms

the political economy of administered protection trade restrictions are hardly ever voted directly by congress though the threat of direct congressional action is frequently present pressure for protection is usually applied through the major instruments for the administrative regulation of imports the antidumping and countervailing duty procedures and the escape clause mechanism in this paper we will examine these instruments for the administrative regulation of imports the form of the paper is not novel a theory of how these mechanisms work is developed then operational implications of this theory are deduced and tested over the record of countervailing duty antidumping and escape clause cases decided from 1975 through 1979 this is the period over which the trade act of 1974 was in force because the nature of these mechanisms is relatively unfamiliar a relatively large amount of institutional information is provided

how the european union s and the united states anti dumping duties affect taiwan s pv industry a policy simulation abstract to address continuous increases in global energy demand countries around the world are developing coping plans that promote the development of renewable energy industries a major focus of these nations efforts is the photovoltaic pv industry since 2014 the european union eu and the united states have imposed anti dumping duties on pv industries in china and taiwan because the development of the pv industry is affected by relevant government policies taiwan is ranked second in the world in pv production and these duties will undoubtedly affect the future development of taiwan s pv industry thus pv manufacturers and the taiwanese government are extremely concerned about the impact of the anti dumping duties imposed on taiwan s pv industry in fact the development structure of the pv industry is complex and dynamic in this study by assessing industry characteristics the extant literature and responses from interviews with experts system dynamics sd is used to identify three key loops and explore the structure of the development of taiwan s pv industry finally trends in production capacity and financial conditions imposed by anti dumping duties on taiwan s pv industry are simulated to address the impact that different anti dumping duty rates could produce repeated simulations are conducted to determine the critical rate at which this industry may disappear in addition relevant topics are discussed and viable policy recommendations are proposed

a genetic game of trade growth and externalities abstract a genetic algorithm is introduced to search for optimal policies in the presence of knowledge spillovers and local pollution in a dynamic north south trade game non cooperative trade compounds inefficiencies stemming from externalities cooperative trade policies are efficient and yet not credible short of a joint maximization of the global welfare transfer of knowledge remains as a viable route to improve world welfare

economic growth and greenhouse gas emissions abstract recent empirical research has examined the relationship between certain indicators of environmental degradation and income concluding that in some cases an inverted u shaped relationship which has been called an environmental kuznets curve ekc exists between these variables unfortunately this inverted u shaped relationship does not hold for greenhouse gas emissions one explanation of the absence of ekc like behavior in greenhouse gas emissions is that greenhouse gases are special pollutants that create global not local disutility but the international nature of global warming is not the only reason that prevents de linking greenhouse gas emissions from economic growth the intergenerational nature of the negative impact of greenhouse gas emissions may have also been an important factor preventing the implementation of greenhouse gas abatement measures in the past in this paper we explore the effect that the presence of intergenerational spillovers has on the emissions income relationship we use a numerically calibrated overlapping generations model of climate economy interactions we conclude that 1 the intertemporal responsibility of the regulatory agency 2 the institutional capacity to make intergenerational transfers and 3 the presence of intergenerationally lagged impact of emissions constitute important determinants of the relationship between economic growth and greenhouse gas emissions

bargaining and international environmental agreements this article surveys game theoretic papers focused on the negotiation process that leads to an international environmental agreement most of the papers considered apply bargaining theory although other approaches have been considered as well among other issues the papers considered analyze the burden sharing rule that will result from a negotiation over a global public good the role of information asymmetries the impact of unilateral commitments delegation and ratification whether or not countries are going to form groups during the negotiation process and the influence of the expectation of a future bargaining process on investment decisions the basic bargaining model is optimistic as it predicts that countries will reach an efficient agreement immediately however all the developments of this model surveyed afterwards are rather pessimistic and even the basic model has perverse incentives for pre negotiation signals

strategic delegation of environmental policy making a common claim is that nations should cooperate in environmental policy making however there is little empirical support that noncooperative decision making results in too low environmental standards and taxes we develop a theoretical model and show that if the median voter cares sufficiently for the environment she has an incentive to delegate policy making to a politician that cares more for the environment than she does herself by doing so she mitigates the race to the bottom in environmental taxes in contrast if environmental policies are determined cooperatively with other countries the median voter has an incentive to delegate policy making to a politician that cares less for the environment than she does herself so as to free ride on international environmental agreements

cross border externalities and trade liberalization the strategic control of pollution the authors examine international trade in a commodity whose production creates a negative externality for the importing country and they consider the nations strategic policy choices when they can restrict trade and when they are bound by a free trade agreement when pollution abatement technology is available the exporting country induces its adoption despite national indifference to the externality in order to reduce the tariff in a free trade agreement environmental policy is used to exploit monopoly power in trade an alternative policy instrument a process standard is introduced national competition in controlling emissions leads to very restrictive antipollution measures we examine international trade in a commodity whose production creates a negative externality for the importing country and we consider the nations strategic policy choices when they can restrict trade and when they are bound by a free trade agreement when pollution abatement technology is available the exporting country induces its adoption despite national indifference to the externality in order to reduce the tariff in a free trade agreement environmental policy is used to exploit monopoly power in trade an alternative policy instrument a process standard is introduced national competition in controlling emissions leads to very restrictive anti pollution measures

non economic engagement and international exchange the case of environmental treaties we examine the role of non economic partnerships in promoting international economic exchange since far sighted countries are more willing to join costly international partnerships such as environmental treaties environmental engagement tends to encourage international lending countries with such non economic partnerships also find it easier to engage in economic exchanges since they face the possibility that debt default might also spill over to hinder their non economic relationships we present a theoretical model of these ideas and then verify their empirical importance using a bilateral cross section of data on international crossholdings of assets and environmental treaties our results support the notion that international environmental cooperation facilitates economic exchange

do lenders favor politically connected firms rent provision in an emerging financial market corruption by the politically connected is often blamed for economic ills particularly in less developed economies using a loan level data set of more than 90 000 rms that represents the universe of corporate lending in pakistan between 1996 and 2002 we investigate rents to politically connected rms in banking classifying a rm as political if its director participates in an election we examine the extent nature and economic costs of political rent provision we nd that political rms borrow 45 percent more and have 50 percent higher default rates such preferential treatment occurs exclusively in government banks private banks provide no

on line computation of stackelberg equilibria with synchronous parallel genetic algorithms this paper develops a method to compute the stackelberg equilibria in sequential games we construct a normal form game which is interactively played by an arti1cially intelligent leader ga l and a follower ga f the leader is a genetic algorithm breeding a population of potential actions to better anticipate the follower s reaction the follower is also a genetic algorithm training on line a suitable neural network to evolve a population of rules to respond to any move in the leader s action space when gas repeatedly play this game updating each other synchronously populations converge to the stackelberg equilibrium of the sequential game we provide numerical examples attesting to the e7ciency of the algorithm 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

a bargaining model with incomplete information about time preferences etude d un jeu de negociation strategique sequentiel avec information incomplete caracterisation d une classe d equilibres sequentiels appeles equilibres sequentiels de negociation et demonstration de l unicite de cet equilibre

north south climate change negotiations a sequential game with asymmetric information this article determines the conditions under which thesouthern countries should act together or separately whilenegotiating with the north about climate change policy andabout the conditions for future southern engagement the papermodels the international negotiations with complete and withasymmetric information in a dynamic framework results showthat depending on their characteristics the differentplayers can obtain benefits delaying the moment of theagreement

credit and efficiency in centralized and decentralized economies we study a credit model where because of adverse selection unprofitable projects may nevertheless be financed indeed they may continue to be financed even when shown to be low quality if sunk costs have already been incurred we show that credit decentralization offers a way for creditors to commit not to refinance such projects thereby discouraging entrepreneurs from undertaking them initially thus decentralization provides financial discipline nevertheless we argue that it puts too high a premium on short term returns the model seems pertinent to two issues soft budget constraint problems in centralized economies and differences between anglo saxon and german japanese financing practices

global dynamic inefficiency in the absence of international policy coordination a north south case abstract this paper demonstrates that decentralized behavior reflected in non coordinated resource pricing and investment strategies may lead to global dynamic inefficiency it is shown that in a north south world capital accumulation in the north reduces the social cost associated with the presence of labor market imperfections of the lewis type in the south whereas resource pricing in the south affects investment decisions in the north thus international policy coordination is required for attaining global dynamic efficiency

cumulation and itc decision making the sum of the parts is greater than the whole in 1984 congress amended the antidumping and countervailing duty laws man dating that the international trade commission itc cumulate imports across countries when determining injury we estimate that cumulation increases the probability of an affirmative injury determination by 20 to 30 percent and has changed the itc s decision from negative to affirmative for about one third of cumulated cases we also show that the protective effect of cumulation increases as the number of countries involved increases holding import market share constant that is cumulated imports have a super additive effect on itc decision making

regulating global biodiversity what is the problem we distinguish between local problems of biodiversity loss and global ones where international cooperation is required global biodiversity regulation involves choosing the optimal stopping rule regarding global land conversions in order to ensure that some areas of unconverted natural reserves remain to support the production sector that exists on converted lands the basic difficulty with implementing a solution to this global problem lies in the asymmetry in endowments between those states that have previously converted and those that have not we demonstrate that the fundamental problem of global biodiversity regulation is similar to the bargaining problem analysed by nash rubinstein and others there are benefits from global land conversion and there must be agreement on their distribution before the conversion process can be halted since the institutions addressing global biodiversity problems are either highly ineffectual benefit sharing agreements prior informed consent clauses or very extreme incremental cost contracts the biodiversity bargaining problem remains unresolved for this reason we anticipate that suboptimal conversions will continue to occur as a way of protesting the ineffective and unfair approaches employed in addressing this problem to date

technology transfer with transboundary pollution a signalling approach there are increasing complaints from the developing world that developed countries seem reluctant to transfer green technology despite its benefits in helping to solve the climate problem identifying a signalling effect of technology transfer that was neglected by the previous literature this paper offers a rationale for this reluctance in a north south model with transboundary pollution in a benchmark case with complete information the north makes complete technology transfer leading to a pareto improvement however if the north s valuation on climate damage is its private information the north does not completely transfer the technology in almost all of the equilibria resume transfert de technologie quand il y a pollution transfrontiere une approche en termes de signaux il y a de plus en plus de plaintes dans le monde en developpement que les pays developpes sont reticents a transferer la technologie verte malgre les avantages que cela procurerait pour aider a resoudre les problemes lies aux changements climatiques identifiant cet effet de signalisation du transfert de technologie qui a ete neglige dans la litterature specialisee ce texte suggere des raisons pour expliquer cette reticence dans un modele nord sud avec pollution transfrontiere dans un cas de figure avec information complete le nord effectue un transfert complet de technologie menant a une amelioration a la pareto cependant si l evaluation du dommage cause par le climat est son information privee le nord ne transfere pas completement la technologie dans presque tous les equilibres

the consequences of a one sided externality in a dynamic two agent framework abstract we develop a dynamic model where all agents contribute to a global externality but only those in a specific region suffer from it we model this in a dynamic setting via a two agent non cooperative overlapping generations model and analyze the consequences for economic growth and intertemporal choices we find that multiple steady states may result from this asymmetry in particular if the agent who is affected by the externality has to spend a large share of his income to offset it then he may be stuck in an environmental poverty trap we provide conditions for the existence of and local convergence to the equilibria as well as a condition for the global convergence to the poverty trap while in addition to maintenance expenditures externalities tend to be addressed via studying taxes investment in r d or alike we focus on capital market integration specifically agents in the affected region can open up their capital market to enable capital inflows we investigate whether an open capital market improves or worsens their welfare while we do find that capital market integration eliminates the environmental poverty trap we show that capital market integration is not always in both agents interest in particular we provide conditions under which the agents prefer autarkic or integrated capital markets

ratification requirement and bargaining power when a large group of people is affected by a bargaining outcome practical reasons often require that the group be represented by an agent in the bargaining this paper addresses the issue of how the group ensures that the agent reaches an agreement that satisfies the group the authors show that by adopting a super majority ratification rule the group may improve its bargaining position and obtain a larger share of the bargaining surplus however a super majority ratification rule also involves the risk that a beneficial agreement is rejected by a minority of the group copyright 1997 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

international and intergenerational environmental externalities we examine a world in which policymakers actions in a given country at a given time have long lived effects on a common resource the global environment we consider the first best in which long lived planners behave cooperatively then examine the allocation of resources when there is non cooperation across countries across time or both finally we analyze the dynamic behavior of the economy along balanced growth paths it is found that while long lived international institutions are necessary to internalize all externalities cooperation at a point in time may be harmful to future generations

the macroeconomics of dr strangelove the cold war has ended and president george bush has declared the beginning of a 4 new world order this new world order has so far been characterized by the intensification of regional disputes civil strife and civil war its implications for arms proliferation and arms control are still unclear this paper considers both superpower conflict and the transition to international cooperation in the context of a model that emphasizes intergenerational linkages specifically we explore the weapons accumulation decisions of two adversarial countries in the context of a deterrence conflict initiation game embedded in an overlapping generations model the demographic structure of the overlapping generations model allows the analysis of both between and withincountry intergenerational external effects caused by past weapons accumulation decisions while the two country setting permits consideration of international external effects caused by the adversary country s current weapons accumulation decision we analyze the noncooperative equilibrium and then consider the effects of a regime change characterized by international cooperation but where the intergenerational externali

a theory of privatisation public enterprises around the world have proved to be highly inefficient primarily because they pursue strategies such as excess employment that satisfy the political objectives of politicians who control them privatization of public enterprises can raise the cost to politicians of influencing them since subsidies to private firms necessary to force them to remain inefficient are politically harder to sustain than wasted profits of the state firms in this way privatization leads to efficient restructuring of firms moreover privatization is more effective when combined with a tight monetary policy and when the new owners of firms are profit maximizing investors rather than their employees or even managers copyright 1996 by royal economic society

empirical evidence on surrogate country method for non market economy us anti dumping policy towards china whether the non market economy nme treatment on china can be maintained even after the expiry date under section 15 of china s world trade organization wto accession protocol is one of the most controversial issues in the wto in fact the key issue of the nme status in the anti dumping ad proceedings turns out to be how surrogate countries are selected in relation to dumping margin calculation this paper reviews the us practices concerning the application of the surrogate country method despite the general perception of capricious and random selection of surrogate countries the department of commerce has maintained a consistent pattern for applying the criteria this seemingly consistent practice however raised systematic problems but not at a significant scale in dumping margin calculation concerning chinese products this result sheds an interesting light on the current wto disputes concerning the china s nme status at least in terms of the us ad practices the result of the wto dispute settlement process may not have a significant impact on the china s exportation

the politician and his banker how to efficiently grant state aid abstract politicians should spend money as efficiently as possible but what is the best method of granting state aid to firms we use a theoretical model with firms that differ in their success probabilities and compare different types of direct subsidies with indirect subsidies through bank loans we find that for a large range of parameters subsidies through banks entail higher social welfare than direct subsidies avoiding windfall gains to entrepreneurs and economizing on screening costs for selfish politicians subsidizing a bank has the additional advantage that part of the screening costs are born by private banks consequently from a welfare perspective politicians use subsidized banks inefficiently often

harmonization and side payments in political cooperation for two districts or countries that try to internalize externalities i analyze a bargaining game under private information i derive conditions for when it is efficient with uniform policies across regions with and without side payments and when it is efficient to prohibit side payments in the negotiations while policy differentiation and side payments allow the policy to better reflect local conditions they create conflicts between the regions and thus delay the results also describe when political centralization outperforms decentralized cooperation and they provide a theoretical foundation for the controversial uniformity assumption traditionally used by the fiscal federalism literature

the impact of state aid on the survival and financial viability of aided firms we estimate the causal impact of restructuring aid granted by the european commission between 2003 and 2012 on the survival and financial viability of aided firms using a comprehensive dataset we find that restructuring aid increases a firm s average survival time by 8 to 15 years and decreases the hazard rate by 58 to 68 percent depending on the definition of firm survival further analysis finds strong support that in the longer run aid receiving firms have a significantly higher probability to improve their financial viability than the counterfactual group

north south negotiations on emission reductions a bargaining approach this article models north south negotiations on emission reductions where the north provides side payments in exchange for the south s adoption of a more stringent emission standard we find that depending on where firms compete strong asymmetry among regions the two regions different valuations of side payments and climate change damage can produce self enforcing cooperative agreements moreover the south s optimal standard choice can be one of two polar cases i e either the cleanest or the dirtiest irrespective of the continuum of standards available the results above can also hold true when both parties bargain over the south s emission tax

the incentives for north south transfer of climate mitigation technologies with trade in polluting goods the need to transfer climate mitigation technologies towards the developing world has been acknowledged since the beginning of climate negotiations little progress has however been made as shown by article 10 of the paris agreement one reason is that these technologies could become vital assets to compete on global markets this paper presents a partial equilibrium model with two regions the north and the south and imperfect competition in the international polluting goods market to analyze the north s incentives to accept technology transfer results crucially depend on the existence of environmental cooperation when both northern and southern governments set emission quotas non cooperatively inducing fewer global emissions is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the north to accept the transfer in contrast when governments set quotas cooperatively the north has no incentive to share its technology either before or after the agreement technology transfer commitments may be included in the agreement but with no effect on global emissions and global surplus the only impacts are distributional technology transfers and side payments may be substitute instruments

a regional dynamic general equilibrium model of alternative climate change strategies outcomes and noncooperative equilibria this study finds that cooperative policies show much higher levels of emissions reductions than do noncooperative strategies that there are substantial differences in the levels of controls in both the cooperative and the noncooperative policies among different countries and that high income countries may be the major losers from cooperation jel h41 q4 q2 q20

an overlapping generations model of growth and the environment this article analyzes the potential conflict between economic growth and the maintenance of environmental quality in an overlapping generations model short lived individuals make decisions which have long lasting effects on both factor productivity and the environment the model provides a theoretical explanation of observed correlations between environmental quality and income whereby economic growth is associated first with declines then improvements in environmental quality it suggests circumstances in which multiple pareto ranked steady state equilibria may arise and in which sustained growth of both capital and environmental quality may occur overmaintenance of the environment analogous to dynamically inefficient overaccumulation of capital may emerge copyright 1994 by royal economic society

the rise of us anti dumping activity in historical perspective empirical studies of anti dumping activity focus almost exclusively on the period since 1980 this paper puts recent us anti dumping experience in historical context by studying the determinants of annual case filings over the past half century the conventional view that few anti dumping cases existed prior to 1980 is not correct although most did not result in the imposition of duties the increased number of cases in recent decades largely reflects petitions that target multiple source countries the number of imported products involved has actually fallen since the mid 1980s the annual number of anti dumping cases is influenced by the unemployment rate the exchange rate import penetration closely related to the decline in average tariffs and changes in the anti dumping law and its enforcement in the early 1980s

politicians and banks political influences on government owned banks in emerging markets abstract government ownership of banks is very common in countries other than the united states this paper provides cross country bank level empirical evidence about political influences on these banks it shows that government owned banks increase their lending in election years relative to private banks this effect is robust to controlling for country specific macroeconomic and institutional factors as well as bank specific factors the increase in lending is about 11 of a government owned bank s total loan portfolio or about 0 5 of the median country s gdp per election per government owned bank

game theoretic models for climate change negotiations abstract negotiations to reduce greenhouse gas accumulation in the atmosphere are modeled as extensive games of perfect information various solution concepts such as nash equilibrium reaction function equilibrium correlated equilibrium and bargaining solutions are applied analyzed and computed special reduction techniques are used when the size of the game tree becomes excessive a new solution concept the tree correlated equilibrium is also introduced main features of an excel add in designed to compute various solutions are briefly described and a sample policy analysis for a special negotiating scenario is discussed

tariff liberalisation and increased administrative protection is there a quid pro quo theoretical models and intuition suggest that the amount of non traditional protection such as anti dumping duties will increase as more traditional forms such as tariffs are lowered under multilateral trade agreements this paper is the first empirical study of the role of tariff liberalisation in the spread of anti dumping through both correlations and regression approaches we analyse the relationship between tariff concessions made during the uruguay round trade negotiations and the filing of anti dumping petitions with particular interest in whether multilateral trade reductions have spurred the recent growth in new users of anti dumping policies we find that at least for developing economies tariff reductions agreed to under the uruguay round not only increased the likelihood of a country using anti dumping protection but also the total number of anti dumping petitions filed by countries

state aid in the european union the prohibition of subsidies in an integrated market the effect of prohibiting state aid in an integrated market is analysed in a symmetric cournot oligopoly model where one firm is located in each member state subsidies are financed by distortionary taxation so there is a trade off between the deadweight loss from the oligopolistic distortion and that from distortionary taxation it is shown that there exists a range of values for the opportunity cost of government revenue where member states want to give subsidies and where the multilateral prohibition of subsidies would increase aggregate welfare furthermore this range of values is shown to include plausible estimates of opportunity cost

incomplete information and incentives to free ride on international environmental resources abstract this paper studies free riding incentives on common environmental resources in an incomplete information repeated game where abatements are perishable and perfect substitutes two contrasting types of perfect bayesian equilibria emerge for high discount factors or low discount factors but pessimistic prior beliefs the inclusion of incomplete information has no impact on the pattern of abatements otherwise the countries attempt to use their private information strategically and the game becomes a war of attrition this generates an outcome where the pessimistic country unilaterally abates forever and another which involves delay until the first abatement if both countries are optimistic

international aspects of pollution control pollution is a by product of production is only gradually dissolved by the environment and crosses national borders the market outcome ignores the adverse effects of pollution and thus yields higher levels of output and pollution than would prevail under a supranational social planner which does care about pollution in practice governments often do not cooperate and this leads to outcomes of pollution and production in between the market outcomes and the outcomes under supra national social planning absence of precommitment leads to lower emission charges less cleaning up activities and more pollution appropriate levels of emission charges under the various outcomes are a result of this analysis attention is also paid to investment in clean technology the debate between optimists who believe that higher production is compatible with sound environmental policy and pessimists can be analysed in this way