escaping the green prison entrepreneurship and the creation of opportunities for sustainable development abstract while entrepreneurial activity has been an important force for social and ecological sustainability its efficacy is dependent upon the nature of market incentives this limitation is sometimes explained by the metaphor of the prisoner s dilemma which we term the green prison in this prison entrepreneurs are compelled to environmentally degrading behavior due to the divergence between individual rewards and collective goals for sustainable development entrepreneurs however can escape from the green prison by altering or creating the institutions norms property rights and legislation that establish the incentives of competitive games we provide a variety of evidence of such entrepreneurial action and discuss its implications for theory and practice

an econometric analysis of exploration and extraction of oil in the u k continental shelf this paper develops an econometric model for the analysis of exploration and production policies of price taking suppliers and derives theoretically consistent exploration and output equations for oil which explicitly take account of the oil discovery process and the intertemporal nature of exploration and production decision the model is then applied to an empirical analysis of oil exploration and extraction on the united kingdom continental shelf ukcs over the period 1978 1 1986 4 the analysis explicitly takes account of the available engineering information concerning the pressure dynamics of the petroleum reserves and the geological knowledge pertinent to the discovery process and presents formal statistical tests of the significance of these factors for the explanation of output and exploration in the north sea copyright 1990 by royal economic society

testing for non jointness in oil and gas exploration a variable profit function approach although the assumption of non joint production is made in a number of areas of economics its empirical validity is seldom examined in this paper we investigate the hypothesis of non jointness in the context of a multiple output production process which utilizes both fixed and variable inputs specifically we test the hypothesis of almost non jointness in the input quantities and prices as well as the hypothesis that inputs and outputs are separable using data on oil and natural gas exploration in alberta canada to facilitate global tests of these hypotheses we estimate a generalized linear generalized leontief variable profit function both with and without the restrictions implied by nonjointness and by separability on the basis of likelihood ratio tests we reject the hypothesis of separability but are unable to reject the non jointness hypothesis based on the maximum likelihood estimates obtained in the non joint case we examine some empirical issues concerning oil and gas exploration activity

relational goods and participation incorporating sociability into a theory of rational action theoretical explanations of why rational individuals would participate in politics remain unsatisfactory this paper addresses the problem by developing and analyzing models which include among citizens payoffs relational goods objectives which depend upon interactions among persons the models predict more participation than do the standard approaches for example under some circumstances persons will be more likely to act if they believe others will act contrary to free rider logic more importantly conditions are identified under which leaders could increase mass activity thus a model is provided of mobilization in terms of the preferences and decisions of a rational individual

climbing the hierarchical ladders of rules a life cycle theory of institutional evolution this paper proposes an analysis of the emergence and evolution of institutional frameworks it explains the causes process and outcome of institutional evolution we first describe the institutional framework as a multilevel system at the bottom of which several local and flexible institutions apply to subsets of the society while at the top a single generic and rigid institution applies to all dissatisfied with generic order promoters of local orders try to design collective governance solutions that are better suited to their needs if agents are heterogeneous as we assume then coordination needs differ and a competitive process begins among sponsors of alternative orders to benefit from efficiency gains promoters of local orders encourage adherence to their preferred system of rules the resulting competition for adherents explains why local and voluntary institutions might progressively turn into generic and mandatory ones we thus establish a logical continuum between contractual governance mechanisms and institutions we then analyze the strategic interplay among sponsors of alternative institutional orders by considering not only the horizontal competition among institutions emerging in the same time but also the vertical competition between promoters of new rules and sponsors of the established more generic rules

exchange rates inflation and the sterilization problem germany 1975 1981 when the goals of internal and external macroeconomic equilibrium are in conflict sterilized intervention in the foreign exchange market may provide an independent policy instrument through which the central bank can resolve its dilemma in the short run this paper is concerned with the west german bundesbank s use of sterilization during the recent years of exchange rate flexibility the paper asks whether the bundesbank pursued sterilization during the years 1995 1981 and whether sterilized foreign exchange intervention exerts a significant influence on the exchange rate in the german case estimation of a stylized bundesbank reaction function suggests an affirmative answer to the first of these questions to assess the efficacy of sterilized intervention a structural portfolio balance model of german asset markets and prices is estimated dynamic perfect foresight simulations of the empirical model are used to ascertain whether imperfect substitutability between foreign and domestic bonds is sufficient to allow the bundesbank to attain independent internal and external goals over the short run of about a month the model s verdict is that the bundesbank has little if any power to influence the exchange rate over that time span without altering current or expected future money market conditions this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

on the optimal resource rent tax total payments to government by a mineral exploration firm which follows bayesian procedures when deciding on exploration plans are shown to vary with the rate of resource rent tax in a two part tax scheme which also includes a competitive auction of the right to explore and mine if the explorer is risk neutral then a zero tax rate maximises government revenue

an evolutionary approach to norms iorms provide a powerful mechanism for regulating conflict in groups even when there are more than two people and no central authority this paper investigates the emergence and stability of behavioral norms in the context of a game played by people of limited rationality the dynamics of this new norms game are analyzed with a computer simulation based upon the evolutionary principle that strategies shown to be relatively effective will be used more in the future than less effective strategies the results show the conditions under which norms can evolve and prove stable one interesting possibility is the employment of metanorms the willingness to punish someone who did not enforce a norm many historical examples of domestic and international norms are used to illustrate the wide variety of mechanisms that can support norms including metanorms dominance internalization deterrence social proof membership in groups law and reputation

reserve and land prices with exploration under uncertainty abstract arrow and chang j econom environ manag 9 1 10 1982 analyze an exploration extraction model with uncertainty about the distribution of deposits reserve prices do not exhibit any rising trend when the unexplored land area is big but in order to know what happens when the unexplored area is smaller a probabilistic analysis not yet performed ibid p 10 is required their conjecture of a rising trend at less than the discount rate is confirmed however land prices can be expected to grow faster than reserve prices which helps discriminate between arrow and chang s and other rationalizations of the failure of resource prices to rise at the discount rate

capital mobility for developing countries may not be so high abstract international capital flows to developing countries have taken on considerable policy importance in recent years there is disagreement however about whether financial capital mobility has become so high that developing countries have little ability to sterilize capital flows this paper reviews several popular methods of estimating the degree of capital mobility for developing countries and shows that they are subject to potentially important upward biases due to inappropriate assumptions concerning the roles of domestic inflation and sterilization corrections for these factors can cut estimates of capital mobility by one half or more

money and output in latin america some tests of a rational expectations approach abstract this paper deals with the relationship between money and output in sixteen latin american countries making use of the framework of analysis elaborated by robert barro for the united states three closely interrelated hypotheses are tested 1 that the growth of the money supply is predictable in that it differs from a random walk with trend 2 that only the part of money growth which is not predicted will affect real output in the short run and 3 that as lucas has argued the slope of the phillips curve is smaller in size for countries where money and prices are less predictable

the value of information in resource exploration the interaction of strategic plays and institutional rules abstract several characteristics of information used in resource exploration have led to conjectures that the private market will provide a suboptimal amount of such information a public information provision has been proposed as a remedy both for problems of underproduction and overproduction of private information this paper demonstrates that barring exceptional conditions public provision of information cannot be guaranteed to be a generic solution to the private information overprovision problem in fact an example is developed to demonstrate the possibility that public information exacerbates the private overprovision problem

are the roots of the modern lex mercatoria really medieval this article analyzes how trade was conducted between the tenth and thirteenth centuries we claim that as most exchange was simultaneous differences between law codes did not pose a substantial problem and that mercantile guilds developed not to provide institutions comparable to the modem lex mercatoria but rather to supply physical security the development of nonsimultaneous exchange was made possible predominantly by the emergence of urban autonomy and urban law applicable to all merchants trading within town so it appears that the importance of universally accepted commercial institutions in the middle ages has hitherto been vastly overrated

the contribution of l c gray to the economic theory of exhaustible natural resources and its roots in the history of economic thought abstract the paper opens with an assessment of natural resources economics up to 1913 14 when gray published his two pioneering articles in natural resources economics part i an in depth study of gray weighing his contribution to the microeconomic theory of the mine and the macroeconomic theory of conservation against current literature constitutes the main body of the paper part ii gray and hotelling s contributions to the theory of the mine are compared part iii the paper concludes with a comparison drawn between the author s findings and the scant attention previously paid to gray s contributions to natural resources economics so far as i know this is the first attempt to apply economic theory to this particular problem of conservation h c taylor unpublished letter to c r van hise may 23 1913 a reference to gray s economic possibilities of conservation

the supply of non renewable resources there exists no formal treatment of non renewable resource nrr supply systematically deriving quantity as function of price we establish instantaneous restricted fixed reserves and unrestricted nrr supply functions the supply of a nrr at any date and location not only depends on the local contemporary price of the resource but also on prices at all other dates and locations besides the usual law of supply which characterizes the own price effect cross price effects have their own law they can be decomposed into a substitution effect and a stock compensation effect we show that the substitution effect always dominates a price increase at some point in space and time causes nrr supply to decrease at all other points this new but orthodox supply setting extends to nrrs the partial equilibrium analysis of demand and supply policies thereby it provides a generalization of many results about policy induced changes on nrr markets the properties of restricted and unrestricted supply functions are characterized for hotelling homogeneous as well as ricardian non homogeneous reserves for a single deposit as well as for several deposits that endogenously come into production or cease to be active

cooperative networks altruism group solidarity reciprocity and sanctioning in ugandan producer organizations repeated interaction and social networks are commonly considered viable solutions to collective action problems this article identifies and systematically measures four general mechanisms that is generalized altruism group solidarity reciprocity and the threat of sanctioning and tests which of them brings about cooperation in the context of ugandan producer organizations using an innovative methodological framework that combines lab in the field experiments with survey interviews and complete social networks data the article goes beyond the assessment of a relationship between social networks and collective outcomes to study the mechanisms that favor cooperative behavior the article first establishes a positive relationship between position in the network structure and propensity to cooperate in the producer organization and then uses farmers behavior in dictator and public goods games to test different mechanisms that may account for such a relationship results show that cooperation is induced by patterns of reciprocity that emerge through repeated interaction rather than other regarding preferences like altruism or group solidarity

trust and performance in cross border marketing partnerships a behavioral approach existing research on international partnerships focuses primarily on the ex ante structuring of interorganizational relationships this study departs from this research by taking a behavioral approach to understand the ex post maintenance of cross border marketing partnerships a conceptual model is developed by identifying the antecedents of trust and performance in such partnerships the model is empirically tested on a sample of u s firms having distributor and licensing relationships with firms from asia europe and central south america findings support the importance of bilateral relational norms and informal monitoring mechanism in building interorganizational trust and improving market performance of international partnerships

the balance of payments offset to monetary policy monetarist portfolio balance and keynesian estimates for mexico and venezuela three balance of payments equations are specified and estimated for mexico and venezuela while a large offset is found for venezuela there is no evidence of a significant offset for mexico in the 1970s however it is shown that from 1951 to 1970 the offset was close to minus one suggesting there was structural change in the 1970s the estimated offset for venezuela in the keynesian equation is smaller than that in the monetarist equation supporting arguments that the latter is biased toward minus one however the long run offset is minus one in accord ance with both approaches copyright 1986 by ohio state university press

the emergence of generalized exchange the existence of generalized exchange characterized by unilateral resource giving has been a puzzle when we assume rational actors because free riding can occur this article first identifies pure generalized exchange in which each actor gives resources to the recipient s of his choice then it proposes the fairness based selective giving strategy an actor adopting this strategy selects a recipient whose behaviors satisfy her criterion of fairness provided perfect information is given the results of evolutionary simulation show that pure generalized exchange can emerge among egoists without collective norms even in societies in which individuals have information only about their immediate neighbors

environmental policy when consumers value conformity abstract we present a model of consumer behaviour when consumers value conformity and examine the implications for environmental policy the model shares a feature set out in dasgupta et al 2016 of having a structure of preferences for conformity which induces a mass of consumers to adhere exactly to a norm level of consumption clumping however we extend our previous analysis by analysing the conditions for the existence and potential uniqueness of consumption norms in doing so we introduce threshold effects whereby individuals adhere to a norm only if sufficiently many others do so taken together these have striking implications for environmental policy in the case where the norm good generates pollution emissions clumping means many individuals will not change behaviour unless the norm changes while threshold effects plus clumping means that it may be hard to change a norm we show that the use of pigovian taxes to control behaviour may be either ineffective or welfare reducing and that the optimal pigovian tax will work only if it is above some threshold level there are parameter values for which quantity based injunctive policies raise welfare relative to no intervention while optimal pigovian taxes would lower welfare

federal deficits macro stabilization goals and federal reserve behavior the effects of federal deficits on federal reserve behavior as proxied by changes in the growth rate of the monetary base are analyzed in this study multivariate granger causality tests are employed in the analysis the deficit measure that is the focus of the analysis is the change in the real market value of privately held federal debt the tests indicate that the deficit granger causes the monetary base additionally concerns for financial market stability real output and exchange rate movements in the period of floating rates also affect federal reserve behavior

welfare state disincentives with endogenous habits and norms it is assumed in this paper that habits and social norms constrain the influence of economic disincentives on individual behavior but that these constraints themselves may subsequently be influenced by the very same disincentives it is also assumed that an individual is more likely to obey such habits and norms if many individuals in society do so though such constraints on economic behavior usually recede only gradually in response to changes in economic incentives it is argued that major macroeconomic shocks may drastically speed up the process a ketchup effect these features may generate multiple equilibria and vicious dynamics

exploration and scarcity noting that a suggested measure of natural resource scarcity resource rent is unobservable we show that rent is linked to observable marginal exploration cost a two period model of extraction and exploration reveals that rent is equal to this cost when discovery is certain under risky exploration cost data can be used to bound rent the model also indicates how exploration uncertainty affects the competitive firm s extraction and exploration decisions finally the behavior of u s oil and gas exploration costs suggests that these costs were rising in the postwar era which has different implications for scarcity than indicated by other measures of scarcity

the short run relation between growth and inflation in latin america reply sebastian edwards uses a new unexpected money variable based on the addition of the contemporaneous fiscal deficit to my autoregressive money growth equations to argue that 1 in brazil and chile there is no significant relationship between unexpected money growth and output growth 2 unexpected money growth has different estimated effects on output in colombia peru and mexico and these effects substantially exceed those estimated in brazil and chile and 3 thus my 10 percent rule for the effect of unexpected money growth on output growth does not hold in addition edwards incorporates the terms of trade in his output equations and finds they are important in the case of chile and mexico finally edwards takes issue with my use of lagged inflation to explain output edwards and i use somewhat different data not only in terms of sources but also edwards often uses m2 rather than ml in reporting his best results however edwards and my basic results are broadly similar compare his table 1 and my original tables 1 and 4 this is encouraging and in general makes it seem not worth quibbling over the differences in data however there is one difference which affects the results that i will discuss later the inclusion of the fiscal deficit in the money growth equation is a key difference in our work as i pointed out in my earlier article fiscal and monetary policy often are closely related in latin america thus it is not surprising that edwards finds the deficit divided by lagged money is a significant factor in explaining money growth however the point is not to explain money growth but to estimate a relationship which the public could have been using to predict how much money and thus nominal aggregate demand has grown since the last observation on the money stock 2 it strains credulity to assume that in latin america the budget deficit could be used by the public to estimate money growth contemporaneously data on the cash deficit usually are available publicly only with a long lag moreover many alternative versions of a deficit involving creative accounting methods are reported for example for many years in colombia the reported deficit which is available with about a one quarter lag treated both the unspent portion of the budget and the accounting profits from the revaluation of the local currency value of exchange reserves as income procedures which caused great confusion inside as well as outside the government despite such problems the cash deficit still might be useful as a monetary growth predictor for example it may be correlated with some other easily available contemporaneous indicator of money growth however its usefulness can best be judged from a comparison of the results when the deficit is used only as the money growth predictor to determine unexpected money a constrained equation with those obtained when it is used as an additional independent variable an unconstrained equation a test robert barro has suggested in another context world bank the views and interpretations expressed in this article are my own and should not be attributed to the world bank its affiliated organizations or to any individual acting in their behalf edwards also uses the seemingly unrelated regression technique to take into account possible interrelationships in the error terms across countries judging from the reported t statistics this procedure did not improve the fits greatly 2surprisingly the deficit is not significant in explaining domestic credit in mexico this result and the estimated negative relationship between edwards domestic credit series and output suggest a problem in the domestic credit variable

optimal consumption of a nonrenewable resource with stochastic discoveries and a random environment we present a general model for the optimal consumption of a nonrenewable resource under two kinds of uncertainties one source of uncertainty is in the resource discovery process and the other is in the economic environment that affects resource supply and demand conditions such as exhaustion and development of a substitute the problem is formulated as one of optimally controlling a storage process with markov additive discoveries the optimal value of the resource stock is characterized as the solution of a functional equation and the existence of an optimal consumption policy is established it is shown that in a given environment the optimal consumption rate is increasing and the resource price is decreasing in the level of proven reserves a counterexample is provided to show that better environments may in fact mean higher prices and lower consumption rates finally a variety of examples is given to illustrate the scope and applicability of the general model

the optimal depletion and exploration of a nonrenewable resource in spite of its importance the exploration process has not received much attention in the economics of nonrenewable resources among the researchers who investigated this problem we might mention arrow and chang 1982 deshmukh and pliska 1980 pindyck 1978 1980 and gilbert 1979 1981 for earlier work on this subject we might also mention gaffney 1967 and herfindahl 1974 basically an exploration program is a search for potential deposits whose sizes and locations are both uncertain furthermore exploration technology exhibits a high degree of scale economies our paper represents an attempt to deal with these rather neglected aspects of the exploration process in a model of simultaneous extraction and exploration

antitrust exploration and social optimality in nonrenewable resource markets abstract dependence of electrical utilities on uncertain supplies of uranium apparently has led to an unusual conditioning of uranium demand on the uncertainty of supply which in turn depends on the volume of reserves this paper examines the implications of controlling resource production uncertainty through exploration exploration gives a monopolistic resource supplier another tool in addition to restricting output that can be used to exercise market power exploration however is not subject to antitrust regulation results show that traditional antitrust laws may move such an industry away rather than toward social optimality

a model of mineral taxation and exploration a model of optimal mineral exploration effort is used to determine sufficient conditions for a resource rent tax to be neutral with respect to exploration effort analyses the revenue implications of different rates of resource rent tax firms are assumed to use decision making processes which are implicitly bayesian in determining how much exploratory information to acquire prior to deciding whether or not to extract relates the tax rate and expected revenue from a resource rent tax takes account of the impact of the tax on mineral exploration the likelihood of mining and consequent long run mineral supply

an examination of the objectives of monetary policy in four developing economies abstract this paper presents a model of monetary policy in developing economies which is estimated for mexico korea india and zambia the model is designed to identify both the goals and patterns of policy in these economies the results demonstrate that the authorities in these economies respond to foreign reserve flows partially sterilizing their impact in three countries they also respond to domestic variables accomodating seasonal variation and growth or price changes

look at me saving the planet the imitation of visible green behavior and its impact on the climate value action gap abstract examining the regional distribution of 15 different greenhouse gas mitigation practices mps across australia we study the tendency for consumers to imitate visible pro environmental behavior in their local region while there is a great deal of variation in the specific type of mps adopted by consumers located in the same region anova results suggest that they tend to adopt a similar number of mps as their neighbours using discrete choice modelling our results suggest that this is due to the peer adoption of certain visible mps such as using public transport or car pooling encouraging agents to adopt other types of visible mps however the character of this spillover is limited in that visible pro environmental behavior does not appear to influence the adoption of non visible mps we also find that social imitation patterns help individuals overcome the observed gap between their stated concern about climate change and their propensity to act on this concern known as the climate value action gap policy implications for designing effective green nudges are discussed

a theory of kindness reluctance and shame for social preferences abstract recent experimental evidence from dictator games suggests that proposers take money from receivers when taking is an option and that many proposers are reluctant to play the game this paper proposes a behavioral model with two components a choice correspondence that depends on the endowed allocation and the menu of allocations available and a preference ordering over endowment menu pairs the choice correspondence governs behavior when the proposer actually plays a game and the preference ordering governs the proposer s willingness to play a particular game the model is then used to characterize notions of proposer kindness reluctance and shame

institutions and economic growth an historical introduction abstract in this essay the interdependence of political and economic institutions is examined against premises in neoclassical theories of economies which maintain that population and savings are the principal determinants of economic growth that institutions matter in the development of economies is the difference in assumptions i examine i look at the institutional frameworks that preceded adoption of the united states constitution and the northwest ordinance in early america i then trace the precedents of these american institutions to the evolution of common law in england where interests unconcerned with the crown coalesced to form competing political units i then contrast england s institutional development with the comparatively centralized enforcement mechanisms of spain to examine the hypothesis that institutional differences produce economic consequences

locational asymmetry and the potential for cooperation on a canal abstract illegal water diversions and lax rule enforcement are common on irrigation canals we present a mathematical programming model of a watercourse calibrated to a canal in maharashtra on which farmers voted to cooperate to control water theft the model solution computes the crop choices and profits of individually optimizing farmers who differ in their location it reveals the spatial distribution of gains and losses from cooperation it illuminates why voluntary bargaining will rarely achieve an efficient water allocation it also shows that landless laborers might well be against local cooperation if the expropriated water nurtures labor intensive crops

a dynamic approach to forest regimes in developing economies abstract in the developing economies optimal forest regimes should incorporate the socio economic characteristics of the user groups and since socio economic factors will change with time optimal forest regimes will also follow a dynamic path the two most important socio economic factors are the heterogeneity of the user group with respect to forest management and the direct dependence of the user group on forest normally the heterogeneity will increase and dependence will decrease with economic growth of user group an optimal control model is used to integrate the dynamics of natural system such as joint product of forests and its growth function and the dynamics of the two socio economic factors heterogeneity and dependence the model demonstrates that the dynamics of optimal forest regimes will depend upon the change in natural factors socio economic factors and on the interactions between natural and socio economic factors hence optimal forest management strategies would require a continuous refinement in forest management regimes instead of static state regimes as local communities in developing economies pass through different phases of economic growth

grade selection under uncertainty least cost last and other anomalies abstract grade selection rules for heterogeneous resource deposits with increasing marginal extraction costs are derived it is shown that contrary to the conventional wisdom it can be optimal to extract the least cost deposits last there are a number of rules that are compatible with dynamic profit maximization under certainty nevertheless none explains empirical regularities in actual extraction patterns when uncertainty about future price is introduced however the theoretical model conforms closely not only to observed grade selection patterns but also to observed mineral industry price paths

a martingale characterization of the price of a nonrenewable resource with decisions involving uncertainty abstract this paper presents a general model of nonrenewable resource consumption and exploration decisions involving uncertainty about the time of occurrence of an event such as exhaustion stock discovery or a substitute development the resulting price process is characterized in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions under which the price is expected to rise at a rate equal to greater than or less than the discount rate the general model is illustrated and the price process and the optimal decisions are characterized by examining the three types of uncertainty indicated above

exploration and exhaustible resources the microfoundations of aggregate models the appropriate specifications for aggregate extraction and exploration cost functions are derived from a disaggregate model of the search for low cost deposits of an exhaustible resource the common practice of combining the no discovery extraction cost function with exploration is shown to result in a misspecified model for which the total cost of extracting the resource is not well defined the widely accepted prediction that the anticipated discovery of low cost deposits results in a u shaped price path appears to be an artifact of this misspecification for the authors properly specified cost functions the predicted resource price always rises copyright 1989 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

sectoral supply of minerals of varying quality in this sectoral model of mineral production investment in capacity and variation in orebody grade and volume help explain some stylized facts more than one grade of ore may be exploited simultaneously mine exhaustion but not necessarily entry occurs in declining order of grade the price may rise or fall but is likely to fall initially young industry and must eventually rise at less than the interest rate unless demand expands rapidly these trends exhibit fluctuations due to entry and exhaustion of deposits resource price cyclicality is reinforced because mines keep producing at capacity when the price is falling

a parsimonious model of tax avoidance and distortions in petroleum exploration and development abstract we present a simple model of petroleum exploration and development that can be applied to study the performance of alternative tax systems and identify potential distortions although the model is highly simplified it incorporates many factors and some of the key tradeoffs that would influence an investor s investment behavior the model recognizes the role of enhanced oil recovery and treats the impact of taxation on exploration and development in an integrated manner consistent with an investor s joint optimization of investments at both stages of the process the model is simple and user friendly which facilitates application to a broad range of problems

behind the market stage where real societies exist part i the role of public and private order institutions this two part article is an attempt to clarify the social conditions upon which the viability and efficiency of the market system rest it strives to show that the embeddedness thesis that is an explanation based upon the existence of long run personal ties involving the use of reputation mechanisms among transactors cannot fully elucidate the question as to how the problem of trust is solved in market societies as explained in part i there are difficulties of both theoretical and empirical historical kinds and these explain why the market order needs to be sustained by private and public order institutions in part ii the role of generalised morality in backing or supplementing such institutions is discussed in the light of game theory and particular emphasis is put on the ability of moral norms to sustain honest behaviour by generating the right kind of preferences and establishing trust the vexed problem of the dynamics of norm emergence and erosion is then addressed with a view to showing

optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring abstract there exist optimal symmetric equilibria in the green porter model 4 8 having an elementary intertemporal structure such an equilibrium is described entirely by two subsets of price space and two quantities the only production levels used by firms in any contingency the central technique employed in the analysis is the reduction of the repeated game to a family of static games

endogenous games and equilibrium adoption of social norms and ethical constraints abstract we consider a situation in which games are formed endogenously in two senses 1 there is a pregame in which agents choose to learn a subset of all feasible strategies and can then employ only these strategies in subsequent play and 2 agents choose their game partners through a costly search process we show that at any subgame perfect equilibrium agents will constrain their action sets in the pregame in such a way that a single social norm prevails thus all agents in a society will abide by the same ethical standard although what standard this will be cannot be predicted we also show that these are essentially the only spe outcomes we suggest that this provides at least a partial explanation for experimental observations that agents apparently choose strategies that do not maximize their payoffs

estimating potential social losses from market failure oil exploration in alberta this article presents estimates of the potential social losses caused by market failure in oil exploration in the rainbow zama region of alberta we construct models that predict exploratory drilling for noncooperative nash equilibrium with and without taxes and for the social optimum in the absence of appropriate property rights or taxes estimated losses are of the order of 80 of potential rents with taxes estimated losses are of the order of 30 we show that actual drilling resembles that predicted by the noncooperative model with taxes rather than by the optimal model this indicates that the land tenure system in alberta did not effectively ameliorate the market failure not eliminated by taxation

help harm or avoid on the personal advantage of dispositions to cooperate and punish in multilateral pd games with exit abstract simulated round robin tournaments are used 1 to assess the relative performance of non defecting conditionally cooperative programs in a three person pd setting where exit is possible pdes and 2 to assess the importance of sanctions for the success of joint enterprises we find that the possibility of exit allows individuals to escape from dysfunctional teams which increases the potential benefits of cooperation while reducing those associated with free riding we also find that punishment especially targeted punishment is critical to the success of shorter term enterprises similar results held in evolutionary settings where successful behavioral programs can be imitated or propagated by non rational biological or social processes our results suggest that non defecting programs of conditional cooperation can be rational average payoff maximizing strategies for participating in small multilateral settings where individuals can choose to participate in a pd game or not

the antecedents and performance implications of cooperative exchange norms our study investigates the antecedents and performance implications of cooperative exchange norms we argue that in early relationships the level of expected cooperative norms in an exchange is the result of a calculative process facilitated by transaction attributes joint transaction specific investments and observability the greater the level of these two exchange attributes the greater the level of cooperative exchange norms all else being equal we further argue that the realized level of cooperative exchange norms can deviate from the expected level because the development of such norms is the result of social processes that management cannot directly and fully control this gap between realized and expected norms affects exchange performance performance suffers when the realized level of cooperative exchange norms falls below the expected level but overshooting expectations lays a critical groundwork for repeat transactions the analysis of a survey of 182 collaborative r d alliances provides initial support for our theory

are they efficient in the middle using propensity score estimation for modeling middlemen in indian corporate corruption corrupt regulatory environment encourages firms to deploy middlemen for speedy and assured acquisition of different services from regulatory agencies using a world bank dataset of 2210 indian manufacturing firms this article examines how firms with middlemen deal with corrupt governmental agencies for its operational efficiency our results demonstrate that deployment of middlemen by the firms is often accompanied by a substantial increase in operational delay relatively trigger more consumption of senior management s time on regulatory disentanglement enhance the likelihood tendency to pay bribe and likely to face more court cases as a means of restitution of legal rights as firm specific attributes may contaminate our preliminary results we utilized the propensity score framework to examine relationships among variables of interests our study contributes to the inconspicuous part of the corruption literature by attempting to present a comprehensive but indirect assessment of the functions of middlemen that predominantly remained unattended except some scattered descriptive case based anecdotal presentations

international regimes and alliance behavior explaining nato conventional force levels with the end of the cold war the military posture of the north atlantic treaty organization nato has entered a period of profound change prior to the recent dramatic political events in europe however nato conventional force levels in the central region had been remarkably stable for some three decades this article seeks to explain this record of stability in terms of three widely used theories of international relations it argues that balance of power theory and public goods theory cannot alone provide a satisfactory account rather these traditional approaches for understanding alliance behavior must be supplemented by regime theory which emphasizes the constraining effects of enduring institutional factors even in the face of structural change specifically it shows how an international regime has influenced the provision of conventional forces in the central region by alliance members more generally this analysis seeks to contribute to the literature on international regimes in three ways first it demonstrates that regimes do matter by providing an example of their importance for explaining state behavior and international outcomes second it extends regime theory to relations among military allies third it elaborates a comprehensive model for understanding why states actually comply with regime injunctions the model stresses both the ways in which regimes effectively modify the international environment within which states operate altering the costs and benefits associated with different courses of action and the ways in which participating states may internalize regime norms and rules thereby making compliance increasingly automatic

extraction costs and the economics of nonrenewable resources the study questions the fundamental assumption of the standard aggregate exploration extraction model of nonrenewable resources that extraction costs and the level of reserves are inversely related it also raises questions about the model s conclusions regarding exploration incentives and the valuation of reserves an empirically tested disaggregate model is presented that suggests that exploration activity occurs from firms attempting to balance marginal extraction plus user costs at the intensive and extensive margins exploration is carried out until the marginal discovery cost of a deposit equals its present asset value and a u shaped price path is indicated

exploration information and regulation in an exhaustible mineral industry abstract the paper presents a model of exploration and production in an uncertain environment exploration provides a by product of information that helps predict future finds more accurately when this information is not equally valued at the margin by society and industry socially inefficient levels of exploration are chosen by industry in this event government intervention may be warranted a regulator could control future prices to encourage industry to select socially preferred levels of production and exploration alternatively by making public varying amounts of exploration information incentives to industry could be adjusted conditions where such regulation might yield sufficient gains to society to offset regulatory costs are considered

drivers of commitment and its impact on performance in cross cultural buyer seller relationships the importer s perspective much of the recent literature on interorganizational relations provides evidence that relationship commitment can produce significant benefits for firms somewhat surprisingly limited attention has been devoted to the role that commitment plays in international buyer seller associations merging findings from the international business and transaction cost economics literature we propose and test a model that explains how commitment develops and its impact on performance in cross cultural interorganizational relations a sample of 216 overseas distributor manufacturer relationships provides the empirical setting for this research the findings suggest that transaction specific investments by the importer and exporter opportunism affect importer commitment and that environmental volatility and cultural sensitivity are indirectly associated with commitment through opportunism most important the study reveals that an importer s commitment has a positive impact on its performance in the relationship however no relationship is established between environmental volatility and commitment the implications of the study are discussed along with limitations and directions for future research

neutrality and efficiency of petroleum revenue tax a theoretical assessment we use an irreversible investment model of oil development to show how a fiscal regime can be both neutral with respect to development decisions and efficient in recouping economic rents we find that there is a unique rate for calculating the tax deductibility of capital costs which ensures economic neutrality while tax efficiency involves high rates of tax on profits after these deductions using parameters of the uk petroleum revenue tax prt numerical calculations in our simplified model suggest that prt was both neutral and relatively efficient in conclusion the tax efficiency of prt is compared with that of a neutral resource rent tax

asymmetric information information externalities and efficiency the case of oil exploration in this article we examine the efect of private information and information externalities on the ex post eficiency of investment in oil exploration we show that too much drilling tends to occur ifjirms believe that the area is likely to contain a sizeable pool of oil and too little drilling occurs if the opposite is true bargaining with well defined property rights to the information externality can eliminate underinvestment but overinvestment remains a problem because firms have an incentive not to disclose their private information

the economics of exploration for non renewable resources abstract the literature on exploration for non renewable resources is surveyed following a brief synopsis in section 2 section 3 focuses on issues related to the world market for resources section 4 considers more microeconomic supply related issues linked to the exploration of the small region or play section 5 turns to the small but growing literature on exploration as a learning process related to r d the latter sections pay particular attention to empirical and policy aspects

optimal pricing use and exploration of uncertain natural resource stocks abstract units of natural resources to be called mines are assumed distributed over an unexplored territory according to a poisson process in space at any moment total reserves and unexplored land are given society can determine the rate of consumption and the rate of exploration reserves are drawn down by consumption and increased by discoveries made during exploration the amount of unexplored land is decreased by exploration at any moment the payoff of society is a concave function of consumption less a linear function of exploration with future payoffs discounted optimal policies are considered and in particular it is shown for a large amount of unexplored land the shadow prices of reserves and of unexplored land move in random cycles but show only a slight upward tread thereby casting some light on the failure of mineral prices to rise at the market rate of interest

the abolition of slavery and the end of international war slavery and war have both historically been considered inevitable consequences of human nature yet slavery has been abolished and moral progress may have contributed to slavery s disappearance both realists and marxists are skeptical about the impact of ethical constraints on political decisions while idealists as well as at least some regime analysts emphasize the role of those constraints however elements of all of these approaches support the proposition that moral progress may bring an end to international war some historical trends do not support the idea that international war is on the verge of disappearance but there has not been a war between major powers since 1945 in addition norms against colonialism are strong no war has occurred between democratic states nor does a war appear likely among the rather sizable number of industrialized democratic states in the international system today explanations of these pockets of peace based on caution induced by nuclear weapons or on economic interdependence for example are certainly not beyond question therefore it may be that norms inhibiting the initiation of international war have already made obsolete not only wars between the richest and most powerful states in the world but also some forms of depradation by the strong against the relatively weak states

institutional individualism and institutional change the search for a middle way mode of explanation after noting the lack of enthusiasm of several well known scholars concerning the adoption of both methodological holism and methodological individualism in its several versions this paper shows that institutional individualism is a different mode of explanation from both of these and also that it is not the same thing as the so called popperian programme of situational analysis institutional individualism is a mode of explanation that yields non systemic and non reductionist explanations at the same time as it allows for the incorporation into economic theories and models of the many formal and informal institutional aspects surrounding all human interactions whether these interactions take place within stable structures of legal rules and social norms or whether they attempt to change the said rules and norms finally the paper shows that it is possible for old institutionalists to make institutional individualist analyses of institutional changes while retaining the remaining methodological assumptions of the school the same is true for new institutionalists some examples are offered from both camps copyright 2001 by oxford university press

the effects of community characteristics on community social behavior abstract the purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of a community s economic characteristics on its ability to generate adherence to socially efficient norms these norms prescribe a behavior for an individual when his her preferred behavior imposes a negative externality on others this paper explores social norms as a mechanism of how neighborhood characteristics can affect individual behavior understanding the mechanism through which community characteristics affect individual behavior is important in that it enables the development of a testable structural empirical model which is purged of the omitted variable bias arising from the potential endogeneity of the neighborhood choice

the evolution of social norms in common property resource use the problem of extracting commonly owned renewable resources is examined within an evolutionary game theoretic framework it is shown that cooperative behavior guided by norms of restraint and punishment may be stable in a well defined sense against invasion by narrowly self interested behavior the resource stock dynamics are integrated with the evolutionary game dynamics effects of changes in prices technology and social cohesion on extraction behavior and the long run stock are analyzed when threshold values of the parameters are crossed social norms can break down leading generally to the lowering of the long run stock and possibly to its extinction copyright 1996 by american economic association

economic ethics and institutional change our economic system the market economy is a part of a broader system or society we frequently study the operation of the market economy as if it were autonomous even though there are many complex and mutual relationships between society the economic system and the other systems political cultural religious legal etc that form part of society in a market economy we may identify several components a frame or background in which the economic activity takes place a set of ideas and theories the values shared by this society the set of institutions norms and rules that control the economic behavior of people and the incentives or motivations of the economic agents the play of these elements defines the operation of a market economy is ethics an institution or does it belong to the set of values and ideas in this paper i will discuss the role of institutions norms and rules in society with special reference to the economic system in order to gain insight into the relationship between institutions and ethics i study first the concept and features of social institutions and norms second institutional change and third the relationship between ethics and institutions