sequential labor decisions under uncertainty an estimable household model of west african farmers this paper reports estimates of the structural parameters of a stochastic control model that describcs the labor decisions of small farmers in burkina faso west africa the focus of the estimation is on measuring flexibility in production and intertemporal substitutability in consumption full information maximum likelihood estimates of the primitive parameters of the model are computed even though optimal labor decision rules cannot be derived analytically vuong s non nested model specification test shows that this method yields parameter estimates that are superior to those derived by assuming that farmers solve a deterministic control problem the low levels of agricultural labor effort commonly observed in the survey area are shown to be a consequence both of the low productivity of labor in archaic rainfed agriculture and of farmers awareness that in the absence of a labor market overly ambitious production plans lead to seasonal manpower constraints to meet rainfed farmers concerns agricultural research institutes and extension services should factor flexibility into their research agendas

a modified malmquist luenberger productivity index assessing environmental productivity performance in china abstract the malmquist luenberger m l index has been used to assess environmental productivity growth with undesirable outputs through applying directional distance function ddf to standard malmquist productivity measurement however when calculating the cross period ddfs the m l index has the same infeasibility problem as the malmquist index does to address this infeasibility problem this paper discusses when infeasibility may happen and develops a modified m l index that is based on a new ddf we propose that the modified m l index can be applied to assessing environmental performance at both macro and micro levels at a macro level we evaluate china s growth in total factor productivity tfp from 1999 to 2012 accounting for undesirable impacts the results show that technical change is the main driver of most tfp growth the tfp changes support the status quo of a distinct gap in economic development among different regions at a micro level we assess chinese auto manufacturers environmental performance from 2005 to 2012 the results suggest that chinese automakers have enjoyed a noticeable tfp improvement and that technical change is the major contributor as well taking together reducing air emissions and other pollutants is an effective way of improving environmental productivity as demonstrated the proposed modified m l index has proved to be consistently feasible and guarantees non negative reference targets for all metrics as a result we recommend the modified m l index as a robust tool for solving the infeasibility problem that is typical in conventional index and for assessing productivity under environmental impacts

precautionary saving and endogenous labor supply with and without intertemporal expected utility we analyze precautionary saving behavior in a framework with labor and nonlabor income risks an endogenous supply of labor and a representation of preferences that disentangles attitudes towards risk attitudes towards intertemporal substitution and ordinal preferences for consumption and leisure this preference structure allows us to disentangle and to describe in an intuitive way the different forces that determine precautionary saving in the small and in the large

multiple equilibrium overnight rates in a dynamic interbank market game abstract we analyse a two period model of the interbank market i e the market where banks trade liquidity we assume that banks do not take the interbank interest rate as given but instead negotiate on interest rates and transaction volumes with each other the solution concept applied is the shapley value we show that there are a multiplicity of average equilibrium interest rates of the first period so that the average interest rate in this period does not convey any information on the expected liquidity situation on the interbank market as the banks control not only the transaction volumes but also the interest rates they can leave the interest rates constant and adjust the transaction volumes when for example a liquidity deficit becomes more likely

dynamic processes of social and economic interactions on the persistence of inefficiencies an economy with a finite number of agents and a finite number of states is considered an exogenous institutional rule prescribes which moves from one state to another are feasible to each coalition at each time an agent is called to act with some exogenous probability and he chooses a coalition a feasible new state to move the economy to and side payments between the agents in the coalition the setup can be applied to various dynamic processes of social and economic interactions such as legislative bargaining coalition formation or exchange economies whenever agents are unable to write long term contracts but are otherwise unconstrained both in their ability to write arbitrary spot contracts and in their ability to collude there can be long run inefficiencies with cycles or inefficient steady states however when agents are sufficiently patient the initial state from which the process starts plays no role in the long run moreover when there exists an efficient state that is free of negat

modeling the impact of technological change on nutrition and marketed surplus abstract this study develops and demonstrates procedures for modeling the impact of agricultural technology adoption decisions on consumption and nutrition in a subsistence farming context the method is based on expected direct utility maximization edum formulation and incorporates subsistence quantities for broad aggregates of protein calories and other consumption goods the method is applied to a hillside farming system of southern honduras where new sorghum cultivars and erosion control techniques are being introduced the expected direct utility maximization model allows the estimation of the effects of new technology on consumption and marketed surplus in situations where marginal values of products vary by state of nature and are affected by consumption and production choices the introduction of the new technologies in southern honduras results in improved nutrition and substantial increases in marketed surplus these effects are due to simultaneous changes in output and consumption patterns this work extends the subject of household modeling to problems with risk and thus complements prior work in both the integrated analysis of production consumption decisions and stochastic decision analysis

whose deletion does not affect your payoff the difference between the shapley value the egalitarian value the solidarity value and the banzhaf value abstract this study provides a unified axiomatic characterization method of one point solutions for cooperative games with transferable utilities any one point solution that satisfies efficiency the balanced cycle contributions property bcc and the axioms related to invariance under a player deletion is characterized as a corollary of our general result bcc is a weaker requirement than the well known balanced contributions property any one point solution that is both symmetric and linear satisfies bcc the invariance axioms necessitate that the deletion of a specific player from games does not affect the other players payoffs and this deletion is different with respect to solutions as corollaries of the above characterization result we are able to characterize the well known one point solutions the shapley egalitarian and solidarity values in a unified manner we also studied characterizations of an inefficient one point solution the banzhaf value that is a well known alternative to the shapley value

coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game we examine a legislative voting game where decisions are being made over both ideological and distributive dimensions and legislators preferences are separable over the two dimensions in equilibrium legislators prefer to make proposals for the two dimensions together rather than offering sequential proposals on the two dimensions separately the equilibria exhibit interaction between the ideological and distributive dimensions and in any equilibrium there is a positive probability that a proposal is made and approved which excludes the median legislator as defined over the ideological dimension in contrast with a game where no distributive decision is being made moreover in any stationary equilibrium there is more than one ideological decision that has a positive probability of being proposed and approved we show that legislators can gain from forming political parties and consider examples where predictions can be made about the composition of parties we discuss the impact of political parties on the outcome

bargaining foundations of shapley value1 a transferable utility economy in which each agent holds a resource which can be used in combination with the resources of other agents to generate value according to the characteristic function v is studied using a dynamic model of bargaining the main theorem establishes that the payoffs associated with efficient equilibria converge to the agents shapley values as the time between periods of the dynamic game goes to zero in addition it is demonstrated that an efficient equilibrium exists and is unique when an additivity condition is satisfied to demonstrate the sensitivity of the solution to the institutional detail we modify the model to allow for partnerships and show that the shapley value is no longer achieved

bargaining and value we present and analyze a model of noncooperative bargaining among n participants applied to situations describable as games in coalitional form this leads to a unified solution theory for such games that has as special cases the shapley value in the transferable utility tu case the nash bargaining solution in the pure bargaining case and the recently introduced maschler owen consistent value in the general nontransferable utility ntu case moreover we show that any variation in a certain class of our bargaining procedure which generates the shapley value in the tu setup must yield the consistent value in the general ntu setup

efficiency analysis of hydroelectric generating plants a case study for portugal abstract this paper estimates changes in total productivity breaking this down into technically efficient change and technological change by means of data envelopment analysis dea applied to the hydroelectric energy generating plants of edp the portugal electricity company the aim of this procedure is to seek out those best practices that will lead to improved performance in the energy market we rank the plants according to their change in total productivity for the period 2001 2004 concluding that some plants experienced productivity growth while others experienced a decrease in productivity the implications arising from the study are that edp should adopt an internal benchmark management procedure in order to evaluate the relative position of each hydroelectric generating plant and to adopt managerial strategies designed to catch up with the frontier of best practices as the frontier is shifting along the time constant efforts are needed in this respect along the time

on weighted kalai samet solutions for non transferable utility coalitional form games abstract we investigate the implications of the axiom of coalitional concavity for non transferable utility coalitional form games this axiom says that if the feasible set of some coalition is uncertain whereas the feasible sets of other coalitions are known then all players in the coalition with the uncertain feasible set should weakly benefit from reaching a compromise before the uncertainty is resolved by imposing this axiom in addition to other minor axioms we characterize the weighted kalai samet econometrica 53 1985 307 solutions these solutions coincide with the weighted egalitarian solutions on the domain of bargaining problems and with the weighted shapley values on the domain of transferable utility coalitional form games

optimal capital structure and bankruptcy choice dynamic bargaining versus liquidation abstract we model a firm s optimal capital structure decision in a framework in which it may later choose to enter either chapter 11 reorganization or chapter 7 liquidation creditors anticipate equityholders ex post reorganization incentives and price them into the ex ante credit spreads using a realistic dynamic bargaining model of reorganization we show that the off equilibrium threat of costly renegotiation can lead to lower leverage even with liquidation in equilibrium if reorganization is less efficient than liquidation the added option of reorganization can actually make equityholders worse off ex ante even when they liquidate on the equilibrium path

risk and revelation changing the value of information a different approach is introduced to determine the value of an information sharing agreement the measure of risk aversion loving this approach reveals the relationship between information sharing models and the risk literature it also allows uncertainty regarding the slope of a firm s own demand function to be examined which previous work eschews the results suggest that the incentive to reveal information is more prevalent than previously thought firms prefer to commit to reveal private valued information in both quantity and price competition this differs from previous work where the incentive to commit depended on the type of competition

coalition formation and bargaining protocols a review of the literature this paper offers a review of the vast literature regarding bargaining and coalition formation this topic has been generally described as the attempt to provide strategic foundations to cooperative solution concepts it can therefore be seen as the linking ring between the non cooperative and the cooperative game theoretic approach to coalition formation its central role in economic theory and its relatively long history that goes back to the nash program have fostered a large academic production including surveys nonetheless this paper will focus on an aspect that is often neglected in the dedicated surveys the specificities of the bargaining protocols leading to different outcomes although generally downgraded to the rank of details the differences in bargaining protocols even when minor can cause significant changes in fundamental aspects such as the possibility to reach full cooperation the distribution of final pay offs and the time taken to reach an agreement focused on externalities free games therefore on bargaining protocols sustaining solution concepts for cooperative games in characteristic function form the paper aims at providing a brief but exhaustive review of the topic that could result in a very useful tool for any researcher approaching the subject of coalitional bargaining

alternative measures of environmental technology structure in dea an application abstract the nonparametric data envelopment analysis dea literature on environmental efficiency ee considers handling undesirable outputs in two alternative ways either in their original forms with the assumption that these are weakly disposable or in various translated forms with the assumption that these are strongly disposable choosing a particular approach implies adoption of a particular distinct treatment of undesirable outputs and hence yields a distinct set of ee estimates to explore the effects of the interplay between choice of ee measure and specific treatment of undesirable outputs this paper attempts to generate all possible output oriented ee measures based on these two alternative approaches furthermore guided by the argument that slacks are important in identifying properly the efficiency behavior of firms it proposes two new alternative slacks based formulations of ee one based on the range directional model and the other on the generalized proportional distance function model using a confected data set of ten firms and a real life data set of 22 oecd countries our empirical analysis reveals that first ee scores are influenced not only by the choice of disposability assumption for undesirable outputs but also by the way these are treated in various translated forms second the choice of any particular treatment of undesirable outputs plays no role in influencing the rankings of firms and third our two new alternative ee formulations are at the least viable alternatives to existing ee measures in ranking firms according to their eco efficiency behavior

bidding for the surplus a non cooperative approach to the shapley value abstract we propose a simple mechanism to determine how the surplus generated by cooperation is to be shared in zero monotonic environments with transferable utility the mechanism consists of a bidding stage followed by a proposal stage we show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism coincide with the vector of the shapley value payoffs we extend our results to implement the weighted shapley values finally we generalize our mechanism to handle arbitrary transferable utility environments the modified mechanism generates an efficient coalition structure and implements the shapley values of the super additive cover of the environment journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 c72

bargaining in committees as an extension of nash s bargaining theory abstract this paper addresses the following issue if a set of agents bargain on a set of feasible alternatives in the shadow of a voting rule that is any agreement can be enforced if a winning coalition supports it what general agreements are likely to arise in other words what influence can the voting rule used to settle possibly nonunanimous agreements have on the outcome of consensus we model the situation as an extension of the nash bargaining problem in which an arbitrary voting rule replaces unanimity in this setting a natural extension of nash s solution is characterized

equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining this paper considers a market where pairs of agents who are interested in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process and upon meeting initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction the basic bargaining problem is treated with the strategic approach the paper derives the steady state equilibrium agreements analyzes their dependence on market conditions such as the relative numbers of agents of different types and discusses their relations with the competitive equilibrium outcome and other results in the search equilibrium literature this paper considers a market that operates in the following way pairs of agents who have mutual interest in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process when two agents meet they initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction if two agents reach an agreement a transaction takes place and they leave the market of course the bargaining positions and hence the agreement reached in any particular meeting will be affected by the conditions prevailing in the market these will include the chances that each of the negotiating parties have of meeting other partners in the event that the agreement in the current negotiations is delayed also the expected length of time required to achieve an alternative transaction and the expected behavior of alternative partners the study of such a market mechanism is of interest for two reasons firstly it captures some realistic aspects of the trade in certain specific markets e g asset markets such as housing and some labor markets secondly it contributes to an understanding of the micro mechanisms of price formation and their role in shaping market outcomes in both cases the features studied are largely neglected in the traditional market equilibrium analyses the related literature includes the articles by diamond 4 5 diamond and maskin 6 mortensen 8 9 and zusman and bell 13 these articles consider markets of the type described above in which transactions are concluded at pairwise meetings of agents the major difference between our work and these articles is in the approach to the basic bargaining problem in the cited articles it is assumed that a meeting is concluded with an instantaneous agreement which divides the associated surplus in an arbitrary predetermined way when the surplus is assumed to be divided equally the division rule is in fact nash s axiomatic bargaining solution in contrast the present paper treats the basic bargaining problem with the strategic approach see rubinstein 19 which constitutes an attempt to look into the bargaining black box this approach explicitly models the time dimension of the bargaining process describes in detail the bargaining procedure and justifies the agreement as a perfect equilibrium in

environmentally sensitive productivity growth a global analysis using malmquist luenberger index abstract we examine conventional and environmentally sensitive total factor productivity tfp in 41 developed and developing countries over the period of 1971 to 1992 due to the non availability of reliable input and co 2 emissions price data the study uses directional distance function to derive malmquist luenberger ml productivity index the index allows us to decompose the tfp into measures of technical and efficiency changes dea is used to compute the directional distance functions we find that tfp index value is not different when we account for the co 2 emissions relative to the situation when they are freely disposable but for the components of tfp change technical and efficiency changes the null hypothesis of whether the indexes are the same under two different scenarios cannot be accepted issues of catch up and convergence or in some cases possible divergence in productivity are examined within a global framework the paper also studies the impact of openness on conventional and environmentally sensitive measures of productivity

urban squatting and community organization in developing countries abstract it is estimated that up to 30 35 percent of the total urban population of the third world about 185 million people live in squatter settlements this paper presents from an economic perspective of tenure choice under uncertainty a unified and consistent theoretical framework of this phenomenon which has heretofore been studied mainly by other social scientists the model is able to explain why land invasions occur furthermore it provides some insights as to why the number of squatters in an urban area depends on a squatter community s ability to form coalitions to fully protect its members rights it is shown in the paper that if a community is successful in controlling its size government efforts which are meant to reduce the number of squatters may lead to the opposite results in particular the imposition of heavier fines or the increase of government expenditures on eviction activity threat campaigns eviction in other jurisdictions etc will likely lead to an increase in the optimal number of squatters unless the decline in expected utility caused by these efforts is so great that squatting no longer becomes viable at any community size

when do market games have transferable utility a pure exchange economy generates a market game in which the allocations achievable by any coalition are determined by the initial endowments of its members subject to certain regularity conditions it is shown that for a market game it is possible to find utility representations for each consumer so that the game can be treated as a game with transferable utility if and only if indirect utility of all consumers can be represented in the gorman polar form this is the class for which aggregate demand behaves as if it were the demand of a single consumer journal of economic literature classification numbers 021 022 cc 1985 academic press inc

how does the spirit of capitalism affect stock market prices bakshi and chen 1996 suggest that the spirit of capitalism affects stock prices by increasing society s aversion to risk in this article i show that the way in which the spirit of capitalism impinges upon asset prices depends on the interaction of impatience willingness to substitute over time and ordinal preferences between consumption and status in addition to risk aversion i develop a general model that charts the channels through which the spirit of capitalism affects asset prices an increase in the capitalist spirit may increase or decrease risk aversion and may actually decrease the prices of risky assets article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

a theory of dynamic oligopoly ii price competition kinked demand curves and edgeworth cycles we provide game theoretic foundations for the classic kinked demand curve equilibrium and edgeworth cycle we analyze a model in which firms take turns choosing prices the model is intended to capture the idea of reactions based on short run commitment in a markov perfect equilibrium mpe a firm s move in any period depends only on the other firm s current price there are multiple mpe s consisting of both kinked demand curve equilibria and edgeworth cycles in any mpe profit is bounded away from the bertrand equilibrium level we show that a kinked demand curve at the monopoly price is the unique symmetric renegotiation proof equilibrium when there is little discounting we then endogenize the timing by allowing firms to move at any time subject to short run commitments we find that firms end up alternating thus vindicating the ad hoc timing assumption of our simpler model we also discuss how the model can be enriched to provide explanations for excess capacity and market sharing keiiwords tacit collusion markov perfect equilibrium kinked demand curve edgeworth cycle excess capacity market sharing endogenous timing

the coalitional nash bargaining solution the coalitional nash bargaining solution is defined to be the core allocation for which the product of players payoffs is maximal we consider a non cooperative model with discounting in which one team may form and every player is randomly selected to make a proposal in every period the grand team consisting of all players generates the largest surplus but a smaller team may form we show that as players get more patient if an efficient and stationary equilibrium exists it must deliver payoffs that correspond to the coalitional nash bargaining solution we also characterize when an efficient and stationary equilibrium exists which requires conditions that go beyond the nonemptiness of the core

radial and non radial decompositions of luenberger productivity indicator with an illustrative application abstract viewing slacks as one possible source of inefficiency and that inputs have differential importance in the production process this paper develops based on the directional russell measure of inefficiency the non radial luenberger indicator this indicator is then shown as the sum of the individual input specific luenberger indicators the luenberger indicator and its various input specific indicators are also then shown as the composite measure of efficiency change and technical change this decomposition enables the researcher to empirically examine the contributions of each factor input towards the productivity change and its components efficiency change and technical change our proposed decomposition scheme is then empirically illustrated to analyze the eco productivity performance behavior of the 22 oecd countries during the period 1995 2004 our results indicate that first the productivity change estimates yielded from the non radial luenberger indicator are different from those yielded from its radial counterpart when slacks are present second most of these countries are found experiencing productivity growth due to technical progress alone and finally as regards the order of input specific contributions towards productivity growth capital contributes the most followed by savings in emissions and labor respectively

dea radial measurement for environmental assessment and planning desirable procedures to evaluate fossil fuel power plants abstract energy policy depends on a proper use of methodology in guiding a large energy issue such as the global warming and climate change dea is one of such methodologies that are often used for preparing environmental policy which is closely linked to various energy issues unfortunately the use of dea applied to environmental policy is insufficient often misguiding policy makers and other individuals who are involved in energy issues this study provides three guidelines for a use of dea in preparing environmental assessment first it is important to prepare both primal and dual formulations to confirm whether information regarding all production factors i e inputs desirable and undesirable outputs is fully utilized in dea assessment second dea has model variations in radial and non radial measurements it is necessary for us to examine environmental issues by different models in order to avoid a methodological bias existing in those empirical studies finally dea environmental assessment needs to incorporate the concept of natural and managerial disposability the natural disposability indicates that a firm negatively adapts a regulation change on undesirable outputs in contrast the managerial disposability indicates that a firm positively adapts the regulation change because the firm considers the regulation change as a new business opportunity

harsanyi values of large economies nonequivalence to competitive equilibria abstract we consider economies with many agents and compare the competitive equilibria and the value allocations of the resulting coalitional games in particular we provide a smooth and robust example where the value principle does not hold for the harsanyi ntu value there is a unique competitive equilibrium which however does not belong to the nonempty set of harsanyi value allocations journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 d51

constant increasing and decreasing risk aversion with many commodities the arrow 1971 pratt 1964 theory of risk aversion has achieved important successes in the study of economic responses to risk this theory applies to a special class of cases in which the von neumann morgenstern expected utility hypothesis is used to explain these responses under this hypothesis individuals who maximize the expected utility of different utility functions will in general make different choices in the face of uncertainty for the purpose of predicting which of two different utility functions will lead to locally more risk averse economic behaviour the essential feature of these functions is their associated arrow pratt absolute risk aversion measures in fact the local comparisons can be extended to global comparisons if the arrow pratt absolute measures are uniformly comparable the arrow pratt measure of absolute risk aversion and a closely related measure of relative risk aversion also play crucial roles in the investigation of changes induced by wealth increases in the risk taking behaviour of a single expected utility maximizing individual this study has resulted in a satisfactory theory of increasing decreasing and constant absolute and relative risk aversion the special cases to which the arrow pratt theory is directly applicable are those in which the utility functions in question are functions of a single variable e g wealth unfortunately the models required to explain many economic decisions employ a version of the expected utility hypothesis in which the argument of the utility function is a multidimensional vector one example arises in the study of the consumption savings decision another occurs in the analysis of the combined consumption savings portfolio decision a final example is obtained in the investigation of demand for goods of uncertain quality the papers of kihlstrom mirman 1974 and diamond stiglitz 1974 have suggested a partial generalization of the arrow pratt theory of absolute risk aversion this

assessing sustainability performance of global supply chains an input output modeling approach abstract measuring the sustainability performance of supply chains is fundamental to sustainable supply chain management sustainability performance is usually evaluated from multiple aspects within the triple bottom line framework with globalization supply chains have also been characterized by the complex and global natures ignoring the multidimensional and transnational features imposes challenges on the performance assessment of global supply chains gscs to resolve this issue we propose an input output modeling approach based on the multi region input output mrio model and the data envelopment analysis dea technique which is able to account for the multidimensional characteristic of supply chains in a global context two indices are introduced to measure the status and evolvement of environmental sustainability performance of gscs we apply the proposed approach to empirically examine the environmental performance of gscs of the manufacturing sectors in 16 major economies during 2005 2014 the average environmental inefficiency of the economies was considerable and roughly 40 of the pollution could potentially be reduced along gscs overall the environmental performance of gscs averagely rose by 20 6 during the study period with fluctuations and regional sectoral heterogeneities observed

evaluating environmental performance using data envelopment analysis the case of european countries abstract environmental efficiency is considered to be a critical pillar of sustainable development consequently improving environmental performance has aroused attention at both the local and global level this study evaluated the environmental performance of european union eu countries using the data envelopment analysis dea approach and the global malmquist luenberger index although literature using the dea approach to measure environmental performance exists this study s main contribution was considering different types of undesirable outputs and using long term panel data on eu countries in particular the dea window analysis technique was applied to evaluate the environmental performance of 27 eu countries in cross sectional and time varying data during the period 2000 2017 three dea models were examined labor capital and energy were used as common inputs with a combination of different outputs including gross domestic product carbon dioxide and particulate matter emissions and waste the empirical results revealed that the trends in the environmental performance of the entire eu and its individual countries were similar under all examined models environmental performance was indeed negatively affected by the financial crisis of 2007 2008 this impact was mainly observed in eastern eu countries furthermore both economic and environmental variables significantly influenced countries overall efficiency the analysis using the global malmquist luenberger index elucidated that overall eu countries experienced the efficiency improvement during the study period although fluctuations were observed these results enable countries and policymakers to understand their environmental performance identify strengths and weaknesses and set targets for further improvement based on the current best practices of comparable peers

bargaining with asymmetric threat points abstract the 2 person version of hart and mas colell econometrica 64 1996 357 is studied reinterpreted as a bargaining game with asymmetric threat points multiplicity of stationary subgame perfect equilibria is necessary for multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria and depends on risk aversion and the point constructed with the payoff that responders get if breakdown occurs

the decomposition of total factor co2 emission efficiency of 97 contracting countries in paris agreement abstract greenhouse gas reduction requires joint efforts from the global society while improving co2 emission efficiency is a centrally important means to realize emission reduction targets therefore it is of strategic importance to identify main influential factors to co2 emission efficiency of different countries by considering the technology heterogeneity the originality herein lies in that applying the modified decomposition method of metafrontier malmquist luenberger index mml to define the priority of contracting countries in paris agreement to improve emission efficiency in this study 97 contracting countries of paris agreement are divided into 4 groups according to levels of income low income countries lower middle income countries upper middle income countries and high income countries and studied with their input and output data during 1990 2014 as samples the empirical results reveal that the paths for the contracting countries of paris agreement to improve the efficiency are different first lower middle income group can be facilitated through increasing factor input to increase the mml index considering the highest increase in scale efficiency 2 78 second low income group should eliminate the excessive concentration of inputs by enhancing the energy management efficiency third in terms of the significant advancement of high income group s mml index brought by technology advancement and the abnormal drop of brunei darussalam s mml related to technology decay this analysis emphasized that the advancement and innovation of energy technology are the main force for total factor co2 emission efficiency improvement

legislative bargaining under weighted voting organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting we analyze this setting using a non cooperative bargaining game based on the baron ferejohn 1989 model unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory we find that each voter s expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight an exception occurs when many high weight voters exist as low weight voters may expect disproportionately high payoffs due to proposal power the model also predicts that ex post the coalition formateur the party chosen to form a coalition will receive a disproportionately high payoff using data from coalition governments from 1946 to 2001 we find strong evidence ofsuch formateur effects

non cooperative bargaining and union formation we study a union formation decision problem when workers consist of two groups distinguished by different productivities workers may form either a joint union or two separate unions the whole decision process is modelled as an extensive form bargaining game workers form a joint union when the sizes or productivities of the groups are similar in the first case there is a wage differential which is more less than proportional to the productivity difference if the size of the more productive is smaller larger than that of the less productive in the second case there is no wage differential in this paper we study a union formation decision problem when workers consist of two groups distinguished by different productivities they may form either a joint union or two separate unions depending on the relative size and productivity of the two groups the whole decision process is modelled as an extensive form bargaining game in which the two groups of workers bargain with each other as well as with a firm the labour market is sharply distinguished from the goods market by the widespread practice of collective bargaining usually several groups of workers with different characteristics for example skill level or geographical location are represented as a single unit and or several employers form a single bargaining unit against a giant union this multiplicity of bargaining units creates a complicated bargaining structure and makes the outcome hard to analyse the purpose of this paper is to provide a model which captures this complexity and at the same time clarifies the underlying structure of bargaining power although economists have been aware of the multiplicity problem for a long time it has been received little rigorous theoretical treatment until recently davidson 1985 examined the possible gains that can be obtained by trade unions through joint bargaining in an oligopolistic industry there is a positive externality due to the fact that a higher wage rate in one firm generates a larger demand hence a higher wage in competing firms when a joint union is organized these externalities are internalized to the benefit of workers horn and wolinsky 1985 investigated the equilibrium pattern of unionization in an industry where a firm employs two types of workers they found that workers tend to form a single union when the two types are substitutes in the sense that the incremental contribution of one group to the firm s revenue is decreasing with respect to the size of the other group since workers bargaining power comes from the loss that they can

strategic disclosure of feasible options abstract the paper illustrates how people who need to make a joint decision may have an incentive to withhold information regarding the existence of pareto improving options the resulting level of inefficiency varies with the way compromises are reached when the parties have to choose among multiple options various reasonable compromise rules can be ranked unequivocally and a rule resulting in a minimal level of inefficiency is identified qualitative results extend to sequential disclosure enforcing a hard deadline for disclosure may be welfare improving in some circumstances

multivariate decision making abstract consider a set of multivariate risky options a partial ordering of these options is quite difficult and even for the two dimensional case a knowledge of the cross derivatives of the decision maker s utility function is required in this paper we establish first degree multivariate stochastic dominance by applying the concepts of the indirect utility function and the indirect probability distribution thus we reduce the complex multivariate risky option into a univariate risky option where the random variable is the derived indirect income the second degree stochastic dominance rule is also derived under certain restrictions on the utility function

dynamic stability and international trade under uncertainty in the presence of output or price uncertainty the heckscher ohlin samuelson h o s model with incomplete risk markets has been shown to exhibit a wide range of perverse comparative statics responses which contradict the predictions d la stolper samuelson and rybczynski and opens up the possibility of perverse price output responses this paper revisits the question raised by neary 1978 and examines the dynamic stability properties of an h o s model under uncertainty in relation to the conditions under which these perverse responses emerge the findings suggest that once the risk attitudes of the representative entrepreneur is appropriately accounted for in the specification of value factor intensities dynamic stability with respect to a marshallian adjustment process is necessary and sufficient for the normality of all of the standard comparative statics responses except for the rybczynski result the basic analytics are then applied to various existing setups of the h o s model under uncertainty in each case the applicability of the stability condition in precluding comparative static responses that violate standard predictions is examined

secession and value abstract a model with random proposals where secession of coalitions is the only threat yields exploitative allocations if proposals for coalition s involve randomization the responders pay off vector consists of shapley values for coalition sizes ranging from 1 to s 1

multilateral bargaining problems abstract in many situations in economics and political science there are gains from forming coalitions but conflict over which coalition to form and how to distribute the gains this paper presents an approach to such multilateral bargaining problems a solution to a multilateral bargaining problem specifies an agreement for each coalition that is consistent with the bargaining process in every coalition we establish the existence of such solutions show that they are determined by reservation prices and characterize these reservation prices as the payoffs of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of a non cooperative bargaining model journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 c72 c78

monotonicity of social welfare optima abstract this paper considers the problem of maximizing social welfare subject to participation constraints it is shown that for an income allocation method that maximizes a social welfare function there is a monotonic relationship between the incomes allocated to individual agents in a given coalition with at least three members and its participation constraint if and only if the aggregate income to that coalition is always maximized an impossibility result demonstrates that there is no welfare maximizing allocation method in which agents individual incomes monotonically increase in society s income thus for any such allocation method there are situations where some agents have incentives to prevent society in becoming richer

welfarism in economic domains abstract in economies with public goods and agents with quasi linear preferences we give a characterization of the welfare egalitarian correspondence in terms of three axioms pareto optimality symmetry and solidarity this last property requires that an increase in the willingness to pay for the public goods of some of the agents should not decrease the welfare of any of them journal of economic literature classification numbers d63 h41

noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games abstract this paper studies coalition formation payoff division and expected payoffs in a divide the dollar by majority rule game with random proposers a power index is called self confirming if it can be obtained as an equilibrium of the game using the index itself as probability vector unlike the shapley value and other commonly used power indices the nucleolus has this property the proof uses a weak version of kohlberg s siam j appl math 20 1971 62 balancedness result reinterpreting the balancing weights as probabilities in a mixed strategy equilibrium

what do normative indices of multidimensional inequality really measure we argue that normative indices of multidimensional inequality do not only measure a distribution s extent of inequity i e the gaps between the better off and the worse off but also its extent of inefficiency i e the non realized mutually beneficial exchanges of goods we provide a decomposition that allows quantifying these two parts of inequality exact formulas of the inequity and inefficiency components are provided for a generic class of social welfare functions the inequity component turns out to be a two stage measure which applies a unidimensional inequality measure to the vector of well being levels we critically discuss two prominent transfer principles viz uniform majorization and correlation increasing majorization in the light of the decomposition a decomposition of inequality in human development illustrates the analysis

the choquet bargaining solutions abstract we axiomatically investigate the problem of rationalizing bargaining solutions by social welfare functions that are linear in every rank ordered subset of r n such functions the so called choquet integrals have been widely used in the theories of collective and individual choice we refer to bargaining solutions that can be rationalized by choquet integrals as choquet bargaining solutions our main result is a complete characterization of choquet bargaining solutions as a corollary of our main result we also obtain a characterization of the generalized gini bargaining solutions introduced by blackorby et al 1994 econometrica 62 1161 1178 journal of economic literature classification numbers d71 c78

the econometrics of nonlinear budget sets traditional empirical analysis of consumer demand has usually made the assumption of linear budget sets that is the consumer is assumed to purchase any desired quantity at a constant price subject to a budget constraint the major exception to this framework is the analysis of demand when some goods are rationed 2 in the rationed case the price is constant up to a quantity limit in contrast to the rationed case here i consider the situation where the price varies with the amount of the good purchased empirical situations with nonconstant prices come readily to mind and of course they have received much recent attention from theorists since mirrlees 44 paper on optimal nonlinear taxation the following examples are meant to give a partial listing of cases when nonlinear budget sets occur i electricity prices many electric utilities engage in declining block pricing that is the marginal price of successive kwh s of electricity decrease at a given number of points determined by total demand thus the budget set is piecewise linear houthakker 36 was the first to propose an approach to this problem taylor 51 analyzes the problem at length and hausman kinnucin and mcfadden 31 use an instrumental variables estimator to provide consistent estimates of the demand function

examining the drivers of total factor productivity change with an illustrative example of 14 eu countries abstract based on the different models developed by korhonen and luptacik korhonen p luptacik m 2004 eco efficiency analysis of power plants an extension of data envelopment analysis european journal of operational research 154 437 46 this contribution centers on the development of an intertemporal comparison in order to analyze eco efficiency change over time in this setup two model variants by korhonen and luptacik 2004 are used in order to provide deeper insights concerning the driving forces for the change in the eco efficiency which bias in technical change can be observed is it more input saving or pollution reducing for illustration purposes the proposed approach is used to analyze the performance of 14 countries of the european union for the period 1995 2004 an average eco productivity growth of 22 is observed the estimated contribution of improved use of input is 20 and that of reduced relation of greenhouse gas emissions is 23 therefore it is concluded that on average the eco productivity growth is more driven by improved environmental conditions

bargaining and the value of money abstract search models of monetary exchange have typically relied on nash 1950 the bargaining problem econometrica 18 155 162 bargaining or strategic games that yield an equivalent outcome to determine the terms of trade by considering alternative axiomatic bargaining solutions in a search model with divisible money we show that the properties of the bargaining solutions do matter both qualitatively and quantitatively for questions of first degree importance in monetary economics such as i the efficiency of monetary equilibrium ii the optimality of the friedman rule and iii the welfare cost of inflation

an implementation of the owen value abstract we present an implementation of the owen value owen 1977 essays in mathematical economics and game theory pp 76 88 inspired by the bidding mechanism introduced by perez castrillo and wettstein 2001 j econ theory 100 274 294 the idea is the following first players of each coalition play the bidding mechanism trying to obtain the resources of the coalition later players who obtained the resources play the bidding mechanism in order to share the surplus

taxation risk taking and growth a continuous time stochastic general equilibrium analysis with labor leisure choice abstract this paper investigates the equilibrium relationship between taxation portfolio choice risk taking and capital accumulation specifically it examines how taxes affect risk taking and capital accumulation we extend the existing literature by relaxing two crucial assumptions in modelling risk taking behavior i that the investment opportunity set is fixed and ii that there is no distinction between attitudes towards risk and behavior towards intertemporal substitution we extend the investment opportunity set of individuals through optimally determined human capital and distinguish intertemporal substitution from attitudes towards risk via a recursive utility function in the presence of these extensions the paper successfully derives a closed form solution to the stochastic growth model with stochastic wage income

bargaining with uncertain disagreement points much of the uncertainty concerning the likely outcome of a typical management labor conflict pertains to the cost of possible conflict to the two sides in this paper we consider situations of this kind where the cost of conflict is not known with certainty however we will assume the benefits from cooperation to be known we place our analysis in the abstract framework formulated by nash 1950 nash described a bargaining problem as a pair consisting of a feasible set the amount to be divided among management and labor and a disagreement point giving the payoffs to both sides when they fail to reach agreement on a division that is the strike nash investigated the existence of solutions to such problems that would satisfy a certain list of appealing properties in his analysis both feasible set and disagreement point were assumed to be known here we assume only the feasible set to be known several studies have appeared of bargaining situations where the feasible set is unknown but the disagreement point is known while we are of course not denying the relevance of such studies we believe that an analysis of situations where it is the consequences of conflict that are unknown might be equally and perhaps even more relevant to industrial experience indeed consider a management labor conflict over wages and benefits in many industries the future profitability of the enterprise can be predicted with reasonable accuracy on the basis of its performance in the previous years whereas the impact of a strike might depend on a number of factors that are significantly harder to evaluate this is because strikes are infrequent and conjectures about these factors are often not put to the test a strike is a threat that is often not carried out and because they involve a number of parameters that are difficult to quantify such as the psychological readiness of the strikers the support they might receive from the population and the media and the likely response of competing and related industries we impose on solutions a new condition of disagreement point concavity guaranteeing that agents will agree on a compromise before the uncertainty concerning the disagreement point is resolved to illustrate this requirement somewhat more concretely suppose that bargaining takes place today without the precise location of the disagreement point being known this uncertainty being resolved tomorrow the bargainers have two options the first option is simply to wait until tomorrow and solve then whatever problem has come up unfortunately the resulting pair of contingent compromises evaluated today is in general strictly pareto dominated the other possibility is to solve today the problem obtained by replacing the uncertain disagreement point by its expected value this represents the cost of conflict evaluated today and to solve the resulting problem today this second option has the advantage of yielding paretoundominated compromises provided of course that agents would in the case of no uncertainty select such compromises but unfortunately it may make one of the agents worse off than under the first option in order to ensure that all agents agree to reaching a compromise today we require that the second option always pareto dominate the first one we show that disagreement point concavity when used in conjunction with three standard properties that are satisfied by virtually all of the solutions commonly discussed

the comparison of multi dimensioned distributions of economic status the literature on inequality measurement has been largely concerned with single dimensioned indicators this paper explores some of the issues which arise when there are several dimensions to inequality and these are not readily reduced to a single index concentrating particularly on the two dimensioned case we make use of results on multi variate stochastic dominance in portfolio theory extending these and applying them to the measurement of inequality the use of the dominance conditions is illustrated by an application to the international distribution of income and life expectancy

egalitarian solutions and uncertain disagreement points abstract we consider bargaining problems with uncertain disagreement points we search for solutions providing agents the incentive to reach agreements before the uncertainty is resolved we identify the weighted egalitarian solutions as being the only ones in the family of directional solutions characterized in an earlier paper chun and thomson 1987 to satisfy three alternative lists of complementary conditions we also show that on the class of coalitional form games the kalai samet 1985 extension of the egalitarian solutions does not provide this incentive for early agreement

crime and conspicuous consumption we study how property crime distorts consumption decisions using an incomplete information model we argue that consuming conspicuous goods reveals information to criminals seeking bountiful victims and increases the likelihood of being victimized thus property crime reduces the consumption of visible goods even when these cannot be directly stolen but simply carry information about a potential victim s wealth we exploit the large decline in property crime in the u s during the 90s to test this mechanism using data from the u s consumer expenditure survey from 1986 to 2003 we find that households located in states experiencing sharper reductions in property crime increased significantly their consumption of visible goods even when these goods are not generally stolen both in absolute terms and relative to other consumption goods our findings hold when we instrument the decline in property crime during the 90s using a variety of strategies

a noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining the authors explore a sequential offers model of n person coalitional bargaining with transferable utility and with time discounting their focus is on the efficiency properties of stationary equilibria of strictly superadditive games when the discount factor delta is sufficiently large it is shown that delay and the formation of inefficient subcoalitions can occur in equilibrium the latter for some or all orders of proposer however efficient stationary equilibrium payoffs converge to a point in the core as delta approaches one strict convexity is a sufficient condition for there to exist an efficient stationary equilibrium payoff vector for sufficiently high delta

axiomatic bargaining theory on economic environments abstract axiomatic bargaining theory is reexamined by focusing upon the economic exhange environment instead of the traditional utility possibility set it is argued that the axioms of the traditional theory impose stronger restrictions than can be supported by their motivating economic intuitions weaker alternative axioms making explicit use of economic information are used to characterize the standard bargaining solutions a key idea is to impose consistency of the solution with respect to changes in the dimension of the commodity space even these weaker economic axioms however may be unrealistic restrictions to impose on the bargaining solution in the context of many economic bargaining problems

arrow pratt measures of risk aversion the multivariate case arrow pratt measures of risk aversion have been defined for the univariate case for utility functions having the same ordinal preferences the authors extend k j arrow s probability premium index to the multivariate case and obtain a unique solution that can be employed to risk aversion comparison analysis they also extend g t duncan s definition of the risk premium vector and show that it can be employed in comparative risk aversion once they confine themselves to the same preference ordering hence the authors end up with two multivariate risk indexes that are parallel to the arrow and pratt univariate indexes copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

productivity growth and environmental regulations accounting for undesirable outputs analysis of china s thirty provincial regions using the malmquist luenberger index this paper employs the malmquist luenberger ml productivity index to evaluate china s growth in total factor productivity tfp incorporating undesirable outputs during the period from 1989 to 2008 the ml productivity index and its components technical and efficiency changes are derived from the directional distance function which gives credit for an increase in good outputs and for reductions in undesirable outputs the average annual ml productivity growth accounting for undesirable outputs is 2 46 whereas the value of the traditional malmquist productivity index is 4 84 showing that the true tfp growth in china is overestimated if undesirable outputs are ignored we explore the strictness in enforcing environmental regulations and its impact on improvements in ml productivity the results show that the enforcement of environmental regulations in china is in general far below the levels achieved in the best performing regions and that the more stringent enforcement of environmental regulations would help to improve ml productivity growth in china

a noncooperative view of coalition formation and the core a noncooperative implementation of the core is provided for games with transferable utility the implementation obtained here is meant to reflect the standard motivation for the core as closely as possible in the model proposed time is continuous this idealized treatment of time is most amenable for capturing an essential feature of the core there is always time to reject a noncore proposal before it is consumated

monotonic solutions to general cooperative games etude de jeux cooperatifs qui sont des jeux a plusieurs joueurs mis sous la forme de coalition dans lesquels l utilite n est pas supposee etre transferable

a theory of gradual coalition formation we study noncooperative multilateral bargaining games based on underlying tu games in which coalitions can renegotiate their agreements we distinguish between models in which players continue to bargain after implementing agreements reversible actions and models in which players who implement agreements must leave the game irreversible actions we show that renegotiation always results in formation of the grand coalition if actions are reversible but that the process may otherwise end with smaller coalitions on the other hand we show that the grand coalition cannot form in one step if the core of the game is empty irrespective of the reversibility of actions agreements between players form the basis of much that game theory seeks to explain there are obviously many useful ways to categorize such agreements in multilateral negotiations that is with more than two participants it seems natural to distinguish between cases in which the coalition forms in one step and those in which the coalition grows to its eventual size by attracting new members thus recipients of marshall aid collectively agreed to american terms at the ceec in 1947 whereas a strict subset of these countries agreed to the schuman plan in 1950 with the other current members joining the eu over time similarly negotiations on climate change culminated in universal agreement at rio in 1992 whereas india and china only agreed to reduce cfc emissions in london in 1990 after other countries had signed up to the montreal protocol finally un security council resolution 242 urged that a multilateral conference be set up to establish a comprehensive settlement in the middle east whereas the process initiated by the oslo agreements and arguably camp david has consisted of a sequence of agreements between israel and its neighbours we will refer to cases in which the grand coalition forms in one step as involving immediate coalition formation or icf for short and cases in which a coalition grows as involving gradual coalition formation

constrained egalitarian allocations abstract this paper proposes a constrained egalitarian solution concept for tu games which combines commitment for egalitarianism and promotion of individual interests in a consistent manner the paper shows that the set of constrained egalitarian allocations is nonempty for weakly super additive games the solution is almost unique if the desirability relation between players is complete

tenure security and urban squatting while recent studies have shown that up to 35 of the total urban population of the third world live in squatter settlements there is a dearth of economic analysis on the phenomenon of squatting this paper attempts to fill this gap the equilibrium model argues that the difference in unit housing prices between the non squatting formal sector of a city and its squatting informal sector reflects the premium associated with a secure tenure status the empirical portion of this paper uses hedonic price techniques to derive the average premium on tenure security in a medium sized philippine city davao results show that formal sector unit dwelling prices are about 18 renters to 58 owners more than in the informal sector these equilibrium price differentials were found to be greater for lower income groups larger household sizes and households with older heads for renters and younger heads for