equilibrium properties of auctions and alternative procedures for allocating transferable permits abstract this paper examines the equilibrium properties of a range of auctions and related procedures placing emphasis on the types of procedures that are likely to be of special interest in environmental management applications nash equilibrium properties are first derived for a very general class of auctions for multiple homogeneous or heterogeneous objects or permits next it is shown that given appropriate assumptions three broad classes of public allocation procedures that do not generate revenues for the government would yield participants equal expected profits these classes are 1 incentive compatible auctions where bidders receive equal lump sum refunds 2 non incentive compatible procedures where refunds are a function of participants bids and 3 free initial distribution of permits on a lump sum basis followed by trading via a competitive market the applicability of the general results is then demonstrated by examining the particular non incentive compatible fair division procedure originally suggested by knaster finally implications of the theoretical results for applications including the allocation of transferable discharge permits and water rights are discussed

marketable pollution permits in oligopolistic markets with transaction costs in this paper we present a variational inequality framework for the modeling qualitative analysis and computation of equilibrium patterns in multiproduct multipollutant oligopolistic markets with marketable pollution permits in the presence of transaction costs the model deals explicitly with spatial differentiation and also guarantees that the imposed environmental quality standards are met through the initial allocation of licenses an algorithm is proposed with convergence results to compute the profit maximized quantities of the oligopolistic firms products and the quantities of emissions along with the equilibrium allocation of licenses and their prices numerical examples are included to illustrate this approach

market power permit allocation and efficiency in emission permit markets market power in permit markets has been examined in some detail following the seminal work of hahn q j econ 99 4 753 765 1984 but the effect of free allocation on price manipulation with market power in both product and permit market has not been fully addressed i show that in this case the threshold of free allocation above which a dominant firm will set the permit price above its marginal abatement costs is below its optimal emissions in a competitive market and that overall efficiency cannot be achieved by means of permit allocation alone in addition to being of general economic interest this issue is relevant in the context of the eu ets i find that the largest german uk and nordpool power generators received free allowances in excess of the derived threshold conditional on having price setting power in both the electricity and permit markets these firms would have found it profitable to manipulate the permit price upwards despite being net permit buyers

ethical influences on the evolution of the us tradable permit approach to air pollution control abstract in 1975 a novel approach to air pollution control was implemented in the usa from this rather humble beginning this approach has now been expanded rather dramatically in several different directions this paper describes this evolution shows how the design of the system has been adapted to accommodate ethical concerns and describes how the latest versions of this approach have transformed the regulatory process which spawned the approach in the first place

firm behaviour under pollution ratio standards with non compliance this paper compares a firm s short run optimal production and abatement rules under emission level standards and standards expressed in terms of emissions per unit of output ratio standards the models allow for non compliance with standards with expected penalties dependant on either level or relative violations of the standard in question it is shown that ratio arguments make a difference to the optimal decision rules derived for a profit maximising firm for example for a given level of emissions the firm both produces more and abates more under a ratio standard so that ratio and level standards cannot be used interchangeably to achieve the same combination of emissions and output the implications for the efficiency of pollution control are briefly discussed

regulation and evolution of compliance in common pool resources the evolution of compliance with regulation and the evolution of a cpr stock are modeled jointly in a setup where replicator dynamics describing compliance with harvesting rules are combined with resource stock dynamics this evolutionary approach suggests that in long run equilibrium coexistence of both cooperative and non cooperative rules is possible under regulation stock effects on profits and a certain structure of auditing probabilities could imply the emergence of a limit cycle in areas of low stock levels as an equilibrium outcome it might be easier for the regulator to obtain full compliance under precommitment to fixed auditing probabilities

an optional permit system for global pollution control abstract this paper describes an optional permit system to control global environmental pollution the proposed scheme serves as an appropriate incentive to induce each country to adopt globally optimal behavior under asymmetric information where some world agency has no information about the pollution production functions of countries

the exercise of market power in laboratory experiments douglas d davis and charles a holt march 1998 introduction many aspects of antitrust policy are influenced by the possibility that sellers in concentrated markets may have the power to raise prices above competitive levels of course anyone can raise price so the issue is whether a change in structure e g a merger will allow one or more sellers to raise price profitably a price increase by one seller diverts sales to others so a firm is more likely to have market power when its competitors have limited capacity to expand their sales thus a merger that reduces competitors capacity may create market power in laboratory experiments any treatment that reassigns units of capacity from one seller to another may create or destroy market power even if the aggregate supply curve is unchanged for example giving one seller a relatively large endowment of infra marginal low cost units may make it less risky for this seller to raise price and forego the sale of high cost units thus it is not surprising that experiments with apparently similar supply and demand structures may yield different price outcomes as discussed below there are a number of other ways in which structural changes can affect the degree of power that sellers enjoy market power can also be sensitive to the trading institution and this is the context that power issues first arose in experimental economics for example the public posting of uniform prices in a posted offer auction eliminates the incentive to offer discounts on marginal units that arises in a double auction in fact smith 1981 found that even monopolists are sometimes unable to maintain prices above competitive levels in double auctions whereas supra competitive prices are the norm in postedoffer monopolies similarly holt langan and villamil 1986 found that sellers in concentrated double auctions were sometimes able to raise prices but that prices fell to competitive levels in about half of the sessions despite the high concentration of seller capacity davis and williams 1991 replicated the holt langan and villamil results for double auctions and then used the same market

what can we learn from the grand policy experiment lessons from so2 allowance trading stable url http links jstor org sici sici 0895 3309 28199822 2912 3a3 3c69 3awcwlft 3e2 0 co 3b2 tthe journal of economic perspectives is currently published by american economic association your use of the jstor archive indicates your acceptance of jstor s terms and conditions of use available athttp www jstor org about terms html jstor s terms and conditions of use provides in part that unless you have obtainedprior permission you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles and you may use content inthe jstor archive only for your personal non commercial use please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work publisher contact information may be obtained athttp www jstor org journals aea html each copy of any part of a jstor transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission the jstor archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long term preservation and access to leading academicjournals and scholarly literature from around the world the archive is supported by libraries scholarly societies publishers and foundations it is an initiative of jstor a not for profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology for more information regarding jstor please contact support jstor org http www jstor orgtue jun 26 16 25 17 2007

some economics of global warming the greenhouse effect itself is simple enough to understand and is not in any real dispute what is in dispute is its magnitude over the coming century its translation into changes in climates around the globe and the impacts of those climate changes on human welfare and the natural environment these are beyond the professional understanding of any single person the sciences involved are too numerous and diverse demography economics biology and the technology sciences are needed to project emissions atmospheric chemistry oceanography biology and meteorology are needed to translate emissions into climates biology agronomy health sciences economics sociology and glaciology are needed to identify and assess impacts on human societies and natural ecosystems and those are not all there are expert judgments on large pieces of the subject but no single person clothed in this panoply of disciplines has shown up or is likely to this article makes an attempt to forecast the economic and social consequences of global warming due to anthropogenic greenhouse gases and attempting to prevent it

auctions or grandfathering the political economy of tradable emission permits despite the prevalence of grandfathered permits we still observe that a hybrid policy in which a fraction of initial emission permits is distributed through auctions is adopted in some cases we also observe that some polluting industries support auctioned permits and that most environmental groups support grandfathered permits this paper attempts to explain these phenomena from the perspective of political economy and investigates the conditions under which grandfathering auctions or a hybrid instrument will be the equilibrium policy by constructing a two stage lobbying game in which the type of policy instrument auction grandfathering or a hybrid instrument is determined in the first stage and then the number of permits is decided in the second stage we highlight the strategic interaction of the lobbying activities between the two stages in explaining the behavior of the lobbying groups

the regulatory choice of noncompliance in emissions trading programs this paper addresses the following question to achieve a fixed aggregate emissions target cost effectively should emissions trading programs be designed and implemented to achieve full compliance or does allowing a certain amount of noncompliance reduce the costs of reaching the emissions target the total costs of achieving the target consist of aggregate abatement costs monitoring costs and the expected costs of collecting penalties from noncompliant firms under common assumptions i show that allowing noncompliance is cost effective only if violations are enforced with an increasing marginal penalty however one can design a policy that induces full compliance with a constant marginal penalty that meets the aggregate emissions target with lower expected costs this last result does not depend on setting an arbitrarily high constant marginal penalty in fact the marginal penalty need not be higher than the equilibrium marginal penalty under the policy with the increasing marginal penalty and can actually be lower finally tying the marginal penalty directly to the permit price allows the policy objective to be achieved without any knowledge of firms abatement costs

comparing specific and ad valorem pigouvian taxes and output quotas when the production or use of a good creates an external cost an unregulated market produces a socially inefficient quantity of output one remedy for this inefficiency is to impose a pigouvian tax equal to the marginal external damage associated with the good in many circumstances privately optimizing agents facing a pigouvian tax make decisions that are consistent with the maximization of social welfare

strategic state level environmental policy with asymmetric pollution spillovers this paper examines the strategic behavior of state level utility regulators in the context of the federal tradable emissions permits market when state to state pollution spillovers are asymmetric strategic behavior is possible because a state s environmental policy indirectly affects the price of permits and therefore abatement in other states we show that the optimal pollution penalty is comprised of two parts i a pigouvian tax adjusted for state to state spillovers and ii an optimal tariff designed to improve the terms of trade in permits generally abatement costs are not minimized and the outcome is pareto inefficient regardless of the size of the market 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

stock prices and economic news this paper examines the daily response of stock prices to announcements about the money supply inflation real economic activity and the discountrate except for the discount rate survey data on market participants expectations of these announcements are used to identify the unexpected component of the announcements in order to test the efficient markets hypothesis that only the unexpected part of any announcement the surprise moves stock prices the empirical results support this hypothesis and indicate further that surprises related to monetary policy significantly affect stock prices there is only limited evidence of an impact from inflation surprises and no evidence of an impact from real activity surprises on the announcement days there is also only weak evidence of stock price responses to surprises beyond the announcement day this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the reaction of stock prices to unanticipated changes in money a note much of the past work on the money stock market relationship centered on the question of whether money is a leading indicator of stock prices studies by sprinkel 22 homa and jaffee 10 and hamburger and kochin 8 supported the view that past increases in money lead to increases in equity prices the implication of this work was that investors could earn above normal proflts by using a trading strategy based on the observed behavior of the money stock this contradicts the efficient markets hypothesis which asserts that current asset prices reflect all available information so that no such trading strategy can exist subsequent research by cooper 3 pesando 17 rozeff 21 and rogalski and vinso 19 has shown that past money changes do not contain predictive information on stock prices upholding the efficient markets view this paper investigates whether the response of common stock prices to weekly money announcements is consistent with the efflcient markets hypothesis unlike the above research therefore the focus is on the very short run response of stock prices to both anticipated and unanticipated announced changes in money recent work by berkman 1 grossman 7 urich and wachtel 25 and roley 20 indicates that short term interest rates respond only to the unexpected component of the announcement with short term rates rising when the announced change in money exceeds the expected change berkman also examined the reaction of stock prices finding that an unanticipated increase in the money supply depressed share prices lynge 13 found that positive money announcements lowered stock prices but since he did not distinguish expected from unexpected money growth his results do not bear directly on the efficient markets issue in investigating the response of stock prices to weekly money announcements survey data on market participants forecasts of the announced weekly change

environmental and resource economics a canadian retrospective the paper reviews research contributions to environmental and resource economics by scholars in canada we focus mainly on work from the past 25 years but also highlight earlier pathbreaking work we begin by looking at broad trends in research both internationally and within canada we then review canadian contributions to various topics in the field canadians have played a leading role in the development of the field especially in resource economics international environmental economics and the valuation of environmental amenities

stochastic pollution costly sanctions and optimality of emission permit banking abstract this paper identifies a new economic motive for pollution regulations that allow polluting firms to bank and borrow emission permits over time when aggregate pollution is stochastic an intertemporal permit trading regime can provide firms with efficient incentives for pollution abatement without the need for costly government enforcement actions that would otherwise be required

assessing the relative merits of development charges and transferable development rights in an uncertain world traditionally regulatory instruments have been used to achieve planning objectives however emerging market based policy instruments such as transferable development rights a quantity based app

the ramsey rule revisited in pursuit of an optimum tax scheme in terms of minimizing welfare loss economists have been searching for a better solution since the seminal contribution of ramsey 17 the literature is voluminous they include the works by hotelling 9 hicks 8 harberger 7 dimond and mirrlees 2 dixit 3 4 and sandmo 19 the ramsey optimum tax rule that is the percentage reduction in quantity demanded of each commodity be the same was interpreted by kahn 11 as the inverse elasticity rule the inverse elasticity rule states that the optimum tax rates and price elasticities of demand should be inversely related the merit of the inverse elasticity rule is that the optimum tax rate does not require the explicit knowledge on prices and quantities of the taxed commodities to evaluate policy implications one needs only to examine the published price elasticities of demand to arrive at optimum tax rates however the inverse elasticity rule normally applies only to a constant cost case in which average cost hence marginal cost is horizontal 10 18 in a competitive market while the constant cost case is plausible it assumes away the producer s surplus in this paper we prove that the inverse elasticity rule with the ad valorem tax on the gross demand price is equivalent to that with the supply ad valorem tax developed by ramsey however the inverse elasticity formula with the unit tax as shown in this paper is different furthermore we propose a sufficient condition for optimum tax ratio with a positively sloped supply schedule in addition we explore a sufficient condition for an optimum equiproportional tax across all commodities last we employ some empirical estimates of price elasticities of both demand and supply to calculate the optimum tax ratios

monetary announcements and stock prices in israel abstract responses of stock prices to monetary announcements in israel are examined only the unexpected part of monetary injection announcements are found to have a significant impact on stock prices unlike findings for the u s this impact is positive

the emissions trading paradox abstract this article considers the price history of co2 allowances in the eu emission trading scheme since european emissions trading started in 2005 the prices of allowances have varied between less than one and thirty euro per ton of co2 this previously unpredicted volatility and more notably a significant price crash in may 2005 led to the hypothesis that electricity producers might use their market power to influence the prices of allowances besides market power the combination of information asymmetry and price interdependencies between prices of primary goods especially electricity and allowances plays an important role in explaining the emissions trading paradox the model presented will show that banking can lead to such a price crash if market participators act rationally furthermore in such a scenario banking can be profitable for sellers at the cost of buyers

a trading ratio system for trading water pollution discharge permits abstract the fact that water flows to the lowest level uni directionally is a very specific and useful property of water by utilizing this property we design a trading ratio system trs of tradable discharge permits for water pollution control such a trading ratio system has three main characteristics 1 the zonal effluent cap is set by taking into account the water pollutant loads transferred from the upstream zones 2 the trading ratios are set equal to the exogenous transfer coefficients among zones and 3 permits are freely tradable among dischargers according to the trading ratios this paper shows that the trs can take care of the location effect of a discharge and can achieve the predetermined standards of environmental quality at minimum aggregate abatement costs problems with hot spots and free riding can be avoided and the burdens on both dischargers and the environmental authority should be relatively light

further results on permit markets with market power and cheating abstract this paper examines a market for pollution permits in which one firm has market power and one or more firms is noncompliant i show that the firm with market power may choose to hold more permits than it needs effectively retiring permits from the market i also show that some noncompliance may be socially desirable because it can mitigate the distortion caused by market power similarly some degree of market power may be socially desirable because it can in turn mitigate the distortion caused by noncompliance

auction design for the allocation of emission permits in the presence of market power to the extent that emission permits have been allocated using market mechanisms this has been done using a sealed bid auction design typically with discriminatory prices however several authors have recommended the ascending auction format basically two competing ascending auction designs have been suggested the standard ascending auction with clock or demand schedules or an alternative ascending clock implementation of vickrey pricing the latter design was introduced as a response to problems of bid shading under the sealed bid and the standard ascending auction format the purpose of this paper is to investigate the allocation of permits under these two alternative mechanisms the auction process and the resulting market outcome in the presence of oligopolistic competition are simulated in this setting it is not obvious that bid shading is the optimal strategy under the standard design nor is it obvious that sincere bidding is the optimal strategy under the alternative ascending auction design the alternative auction format makes it less costly to pursue a strategy to increase market shares through the acquisition of emission permits thus increasing the competitor s costs leading to overbidding as the optimal strategy

the tradable permits approach to protecting the commons lessons for climate change tradable permit approaches for rationing access to the commons have been applied to many different types of resources in many different countries this essay reviews the experience with three main applications of tradable permit systems air pollution control water supply and fisheries management as well as some unique related programmes the purpose of the review is to draw together what we have learned about tradable permits in practice that might offer some useful insights for the implementation of the three tradable permit mechanisms that are part of the kyoto protocol copyright 2003 oxford university press

enforcement and price controls in emissions trading this paper examines how enforcement affects the structure and performance of emissions trading programs with price controls under uncertainty about firms abatement costs the analysis highlights how an enforcement strategy can cause abatement cost risk to be transmitted to enforcement costs via the price of permits when this occurs accommodating the effect of abatement cost risk with an optimal policy results in higher expected emissions and lower expected permit price than their second best optimal values however it is possible to design an enforcement strategy that shields enforcement costs from abatement cost risk by tying sanctions directly to permit prices this enforcement strategy stabilizes enforcement effort the optimal permit supply and price controls are independent of enforcement costs and the policy produces the second best optimal outcome

when and for whom would e waste be a treasure trove insights from a network equilibrium model of e waste flows electrical and electronic equipment waste e waste is growing fast due to its potential economic value as well as its possible negative impacts on the environment tracing e waste flow is a major concern for stakeholders of e waste management especially whether or not adequate amounts of electrical and electronic equipment waste weee flow into the designed recycling systems is a fundamental issue for sustainable operations in this paper we analyze how technical market and legislative factors influence the total amount of e waste that is collected recycled exported and legally and illegally disposed off we formulate the e waste network flow model as a variational inequality problem the results of the numerical examples highlight the importance of considering the interaction between the supply and the demand side for precious materials in policy decisions low collection rates of e waste lead to low profits for stakeholders and make it difficult to establish sustainable recycling operations increasing weee collection rates increases recyclers profits however it only increases smelters profits up to a certain limit after which smelters cannot benefit further due to limited demand for precious materials furthermore the results emphasize the importance of establishing international control regimes for weee flows and reveal possible negative consequences of the recent trend of dematerialization more precisely product dematerialization tends to decrease recyles and smelters profits as well as to increase the outflow of e waste from the designated recycling system authors abstract

the design of a dynamic tradeable quota system under market imperfections abstract market power within a dynamic system of tradeable quotas with banking and borrowing of quotas leads to a nonoptimal distribution of abatement across agents in this paper we introduce a quota system that may reduce the efficiency loss from market power and thereby result in a distribution of abatement across agents that is closer to a cost effective outcome however this system will in general lead to a nonoptimal distribution of abatement across periods hence we may face a trade off between a cost effective distribution of abatement across periods and reduced adverse effects of market power

abatement and permits when pollution is uncertain and violations are fined this paper considers a firm s choice of abatement and of the number of permits if actual pollution is stochastic such that full compliance cannot be ensured this straightforward extension induces non trivial and unexpected comparative static properties such as permits and abatement can be either substitutes or complements higher fines can lower the number of acquired permits or abatement and higher permit prices can reduce abatement yet integrating these reactions into a competitive permit market eliminates puzzling features this is an additional justification of tradable permits over standards where regulators must cope with potentially counterproductive firm reactions

environmental regulation a value theoretic and class based analysis following a value theoretic and class based approach it is argued in this paper that ecological problems are inseparably linked to the process of extracting surplus value in capitalism and owing to their adverse impacts instigate struggles over the appropriation of nature these struggles fought within and outside the state by competing agents shape environmental regulation in particular taxes permits command and control measures and subsidies affect prices profits and rents and have class and other social implications evidence of current environmental regulation shows that it takes places under the great influence of capitalist concerns

multi sector model of tradable emission permits this paper presents a multi sector model of tradable emission permits which includes oligopolistic and perfectly competitive industries the firms in oligopolistic industries are assumed to exercise market power in the tradable permit market as well as in the product market specifically we examine the effects of the initial permit allocation on the equilibrium outcomes focusing on the interaction among these product and permit markets it is shown that raising the number of initial permits allocated to one firm in an oligopolistic industry increases the output produced by that firm under certain conditions raising a clean less polluting firm s share of the initial permits can lead to reductions in both the product and permit prices we discuss criteria for the socially optimal allocation of initial permits considering the trade off between production inefficiency and consumer benefit

tradable quota taxation and market power abstract we investigate how corrective taxation can improve the efficiency properties of tradable quota systems affected by market power indeed we show that when there is a dominant firm in the tradable quota market the regulator can set an ad hoc taxation on firms traded quotas that restores cost effectiveness without driving the dominant firm s net demand to zero achieving cost effectiveness with market power and quota taxation implies some costs in terms of tax revenue that however can be justified by the corresponding reduction of compliance costs moreover we see that there may be cases where all firms result to be better off after the implementation of corrective taxation

fishing quota markets abstract in 1986 new zealand responded to the open access problem by establishing the world s largest individual transferable quota itq system using a 15 year panel dataset from new zealand that covers 33 species and more than 150 markets for fishing quotas we assess trends in market activity price dispersion and the fundamentals determining quota prices we find that market activity is sufficiently high in the economically important markets and that price dispersion has decreased we also find evidence of economically rational behavior through the relationship between quota lease and sale prices and fishing output and input prices ecological variability and market interest rates controlling for these factors our results show a greater increase in quota prices for fish stocks that faced significant reductions consistent with increased profitability due to rationalization overall this suggests that these markets are operating reasonably well implying that itqs can be effective instruments for efficient fisheries management

marketable permits market power and cheating abstract in this paper we present a model of a noncompliant firm operating in a marketable pollution permit market in the main result of the paper we show how compliance is related to the initial distribution of permits a firm with market power will cheat less the larger its endowment of permits is from a fixed stock of permits the competitive fringe however will cheat more as its endowment of permits is reduced generating an ambiguous global impact on cheating

market power and transferable property rights the appeal of using markets as a means of allocating scarce resources stems in large part from the assumption that a market will approximate the competitive ideal when competition is not a foregone conclusion the question naturally arises as to how a firm might manipulate the market to its own advantage this paper analyzes the issue of market power in the context of markets for transferable property rights first a model is developed that explains how a single firm with market power might exercise its influence this is followed by an examination of the model in the context of a particular policy problem the control of particulate sulfates in the los angeles region

the kyoto protocol market power and enforcement the kyoto protocol aims to limit aggregate carbon emissions by participating countries to 1990 emissions levels in aggregate it also allows for the creation of a permit market in which countries will be able to buy and sell the right to emit carbon dioxide this paper investigates how market power held by the countries of the former soviet union and enforcement of the carbon emission limits might affect the abatement and the cost of compliance with the kyoto protocol to do so it uses a modified version of the van egteren weber 1996 model to investigate a permit market in the presence of both market power and enforcement difficulties it then simulates the model finding that if meeting abatement targets is the goal regulating the supply side of the market and convex fine schedules are the most effective tools

market power in tradable emission markets a laboratory testbed for emission trading in port phillip bay victoria abstract in theory competitive emission permit markets minimize total abatement costs permit markets are often imperfectly competitive however and may be thin and dominated by large firms the dominant firm s could exercise market power and increase other firms costs of pollution control while reducing their own emission control costs this paper reports a testbed laboratory experiment to examine whether a dominant firm can exercise market power in a permit market organized using the double auction trading institution our parameters approximate the abatement costs of sources in a proposed tradable emissions market for the reduction of nitrogen in the port phillip watershed in victoria australia we vary across treatments the initial allocation of permits to sources so that in one treatment the seller of permits is a monopolist and in another treatment the market is duopolistic we also vary the information that subjects have about the number and abatement costs of their competitors we find that prices and seller profits are higher and efficiency is lower on average in the monopoly sessions compared with the duopoly sessions but the differences are not substantial and are not statistically significant due to pronounced variation across sessions moreover prices profits and transaction volumes are usually much closer to the competitive equilibrium ce than the monopoly equilibrium

intergovernmental versus intersource emissions trading when firms are noncompliant abstract this paper analyzes the relative cost effectiveness of intergovernmental versus intersource cross border emissions trading when polluting firms are noncompliant a special focus is placed on the presence of enforcement costs and the associated credibility problem of governmental monitoring it is shown that without inspection commitment the intergovernmental system is more cost effective because the endorsed flexibility in domestic emission taxation serves as a commitment device for building credibility of monitoring

markets and regulatory hold up problems abstract many regulatory programs such as environmental regulation are effective only if firms make irreversible investments that reduce the cost of compliance a firm potentially subject to regulation may therefore behave strategically by not investing thereby forcing the regulator to void the proposed regulation we show that such incentives which resemble a hold up problem may not be overcome when government s only tool is the imposition of an emissions tax the hold up problem can be overcome by the issuance of tradeable permits a time consistent equilibrium exists with all firms investing and the government imposing regulations even if no permits are traded and their market price is low indeed an observation of no trade may indicate that pollution abatement is great

new economic theories this paper analyses some of the most important spillovers of recent developments of economic theory into environmental economics attention is given to the anlaysis of sustainable economic development paths where endogenous growth models are used the implications of environmental dumping and more generally of policies concerning global environmental issues where new trade theories are very useful and the effectiveness of environmental policy instruments when markets are imperfectly competitive where industrial organisation theory is employed the paper does not only note recent developments in environmental economics but also relates these to the previous environmental economics literature thus it can be assessed whether new results actually improve our knowledge of crucial economic and environmental issues

a tradable permit system in an intertemporal economy it is known that in an intertemporal competitive economy a tradable permit system may not achieve efficiency without setting appropriate permit interest rates i e rewards for holding permits to find the rates however we need to know in advance the path of efficient permit prices which is difficult to obtain this study intends to solve this problem in two ways first we analyze a special case in which the permit interest rates are given by a simple rule for example if the marginal abatement cost of pollution emission is constant then the appropriate rate is to equal the monetary interest rate as is the case for global warming if the damage is caused in the future far beyond the planning period of the environmental program the appropriate rate coincides with the marginal self recovery of environmental stock under certain conditions as a second approach we propose a tradable permit system with a permit bank as a mechanism by which the permit interest rates are generated endogenously without governmental intervention other than the issuance of permits however we also show that this approach raises the problem of indeterminacy of the equilibrium

non compliance and the quota price in an itq fishery this paper examines the effects of non compliance on quota demands and the equilibrium quota price in an itq fishery i show that whereas lower quota prices are implied unambiguously by expected penalties which are a function of the absolute violation size the expectation of penalties based upon relative violations of quota demands can under certain conditions produce higher quota prices than in a compliant quota market if there are both compliant and non compliant firms in the fishery the result would then be a shift in quota demand from compliant to non compliant firms rather than the reverse the findings are generally applicable to quota markets in other industries including pollution permit markets

corruption and air pollution in europe this paper examines how the effectiveness of regulatory framework influences levels of sulphur emissions in a scenario where to reduce its emission tax payments a polluting firm may under report emissions level at the risk of being audited and fined first a model to explain how changes in regulatory framework e g audit effectiveness and transboundary spillovers affect both actual and reported emissions is developed then the theoretical predictions using data for 39 european countries from 1999 to 2003 are tested and inferences about true emission levels are made the empirical analysis supports the theoretical predictions with significant implications for the interpretation of pollution data reported to international monitoring agencies countries with effective regulation are likely to have relatively high reported emissions of sulphur but this should not automatically be interpreted as weak environmental performance because their actual pollution levels are likely to be lower than in nations with less effective regulation

enforcing transferable permit systems in the presence of market power we derive an enforcement strategy for a transferable permit system in the presence of market power that achieves complete compliance in a cost effective manner we show that the presence of a firm with market influence makes designing an enforcement strategy more difficult than enforcing a perfectly competitive system we also re consider hahn s 1984 suggestion that a firm with market influence should be allocated permits so that it chooses to not participate in the permit market when enforcement and its costs are taken into account hahn s suggestion does not hold except in a very special case the presence of market power will limit the extent to which transferable emissions permit systems can fulfill their theoretical promises hahn 1984 was the first to show that permit trading in the presence of market power cannot be expected to result in a distribution of emissions that minimizes aggregate abatement costs furthermore the distribution of emissions will never be completely independent of the initial allocation of permits modeling a transferable permit system in which one firm has market power while the rest are perfect competitors a dominant firm competitive fringe model hahn demonstrated that aggregate abatement costs are minimized only when the dominant firm is allocated exactly the number of permits it will choose to hold in equilibrium simply aggregate abatement costs are minimized only when a firm that can manipulate the permit price does not because it chooses to not trade permits like most of the theoretical literature on transferable permit systems hahn ignored the fact that compliance in a permit system must be enforced recognizing this important omission van egteren and weber 1996 extended hahn s work to

using history dependence to design a dynamic tradeable quota system under market imperfections a transferable quota system is analysed in a two period model with market power so far the management mechanisms presented in the literature to remedy market power have either not succeeded in securing efficiency in the distribution of quota within and across time periods or have resulted in only one of the two inefficiencies being eliminated in this paper a new mechanism is introduced where allocation of quota is made dependent upon historic quota acquisitions this opens for a trade off between distributional and time efficiency or under specific circumstances securing overall efficiency

free trade and global warming a trade theory view of the kyoto protocol this paper demonstrates how three important results in environmental economics true under mild conditions in closed economies are false or need serious amendment in a world with international trade in goods since the three results we highlight have framed much of the ongoing discussion and research on the kyoto protocol our viewpoint from trade theory suggests a re examination may be in order specifically we demonstrate that in an open trading world but not in a closed economy setting 1 unilateral emission reductions by the rich north can create self interested emission reductions by the unconstrained poor south 2 simple rules for allocating emission reductions across countries such as uniform reductions may well be efficient even if international trade in emission permits is not allowed and 3 when international emission permit trade does occur it may make both participants in the trade worse off and increase global emissions

a panel data heterogeneous bayesian estimation of environmental kuznets curves for co2 emissions this article investigates the environmental kuznets curves ekc for co2 emissions in a panel of 109 countries during the period 1959 to 2001 the length of the series makes the application of a heterogeneous estimator suitable from an econometric point of view the results based on the hierarchical bayes estimator show that different ekc dynamics are associated with the different sub samples of countries considered on average more industrialized countries show evidence of ekc in quadratic specifications which nevertheless are probably evolving into an n shape based on their cubic specification nevertheless it is worth noting that the eu and not the umbrella group led by us has been driving currently observed ekc like shapes the latter is associated to monotonic income co2 dynamics the eu shows a clear ekc shape evidence for less developed countries consistently shows that co2 emissions rise positively with income though there are some signs of an ekc analyses of future performance neverthe

on the third law of demand i introduction the alchian and allen 1967 63 64 theorem sometimes elevated to the status of a third law of demand as in bertonazzi et al 1993 is a clever application of the fundamental principle of economizing behavior as usually stated the theorem suggests that by reducing the price of higher quality relative to lower quality versions of the same good a fixed transportation charge will trigger a predictable shift in the mix of quality grades purchased by consumers in distant markets as compared to the mix purchased locally producers will respond rationally to this difference in behavior relatively more high quality goods will be included in outbound shipments leaving more low quality goods to be sold nearer the point of origin hence other things being the same the theorem predicts that it will be harder to find good apples in the state of washington a prime apple growing region than in say new york city where bad apples are comparatively more expensive the first law of demand still holds of co urse in that fewer apples of both types will be consumed in new york than in seattle ceteris paribus similarly given that the cost of a babysitter will be the same no matter where the parents of young children decide to spend the evening out they are more likely than an otherwise identical childless couple to choose an upscale restaurant over an inexpensive eatery and to go to the theater rather than to the movies moreover if both couples plan to see a play or a concert the couple with children will opt for better seats the foregoing examples indicate that the alchian and allen theorem is rich in empirical implications in what follows however we show that placed in the context of a market model its range of applications is narrower than has been acknowledged in the literature heretofore more specifically our analysis demonstrates that a fixed charge unambiguously reduces the price of a higher quality good relative to a lower quality version of the same good only when that good is sold by a perfectly competitive constant cost industry under increasing cost conditions or imperfectly competitive industry structures by contrast it is possible for relative prices either to be unaffected by the addition of a fixed charge or indeed for the lower quality good to become relatively cheaper in distant markets depending on the elasticity characteristics of relevant market demand and supply functions our analysis is in no way intended as an attack on alchian and allen or their fine textbook which has taught more than one generation of economists to be better price theorists we do not quarrel in the least with the pedagogical value of their theorem which has been immense our purpose is to identify some plausible scenarios under which the third law of demand may fail to hold the present article is thus in the spirit of yang and stitt 1995 who show that the ramsey 1927 rule for optimal commodity taxation is changed in important ways when the assumption of constant production costs is relaxed it is organized as follows in the next section the fundamentals of the alchian and allen theorem are described in more detail and its predictions are situated within the existing literature section iii explores the theorem s operations under alternative cost conditions and industry structures factors complicating the analysis of the effects of a fixed charge on the relative prices of high and low quality goods are also addressed in this section finally section iv contains some concluding remarks ii shipping the good apples out to borrow an example from a classic statement of the alchian and allen theorem 1 suppose that good washington apples sell for 10 cents each in seattle and bad apples each cost a nickel there because the price of a good apple is twice that of a bad apple seattle s consumers must sacrifice the opportunity of buying two bad apples to obtain a good one