the impact of rural electric access on deforestation rates summary overpopulation and economic industrialization are two common explanations for deforestation political ecology however highlights that good governance and effective land management at the local level can offset the impact of population growth and development on environmental degradation in this paper we provide an innovative argument derived from political ecology to explain deforestation but rather than pursing a bottom up approach to governance we take a top down approach we argue that the state can ease deforestation rates by weaning rural populations off of the consumption of biomass for their energy needs by expanding rural electrification access using a panel analysis of 158 countries for the years 1990 2000 and 2010 we find that not only does rural electrification cause deforestation rates to decrease but also that it is more robust in explaining deforestation than population growth or development our study provides two innovations to political ecology it highlights that the state can help rather than hinder local populations with managing their local environments in a more sustainable way by providing them with public goods based energy alternatives and it supplements political ecology s qualitative focus on environmental degradation with a generalized quantitative analysis of state based initiatives on deforestation our results suggest that current global initiatives addressing deforestation specifically the reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation redd agenda of the united nations framework convention on climate change should not only assist local land managers but also work with the state to ensure universal access to electricity

optimal investments in power generation under centralized and decentralized decision making this work presents a novel model for optimization of investments in new power generation under uncertainty the model can calculate optimal investment strategies under both centralized social welfare and decentralized profit objectives the power market is represented with linear supply and demand curves a stochastic dynamic programming algorithm is used to solve the investment problem where uncertainty in demand is represented as a discrete markov chain the stochastic dynamic model allows us to evaluate investment projects in new base and peak load power generation as real options and determine optimal timing of the investments in a case study we use the model to compare optimal investment strategies under centralized and decentralized decision making a number of interesting results follow by varying the assumptions about market structure and price response on the demand side

generation capacity expansion analysis open loop approximation of closed loop equilibria in this paper we propose a methodology to approximate closed loop capacity equilibria using only open loop capacity equilibrium models in the closed loop model generation companies choose capacities that maximize their individual profit in the first stage while the second stage represents the conjectured price response market equilibrium in the open loop model firms simultaneously choose capacities and quantities to maximize their individual profit while each firm conjectures a price response to its output decisions the closed loop equilibrium model is an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints which belongs to a class of problems that is very hard to solve the open loop equilibrium model is much easier to solve however it is also less realistic with the approximation scheme proposed in this paper we are able to solve the closed loop model reasonably well when market behavior is closer to oligopoly than to perfect competition by smartly employing open loop models which reduces the computational time by two orders of magnitude we achieve this by transforming the open loop equilibrium problem into an equivalent convex quadratic optimization problem which can be solved efficiently finally a case study is presented in order to validate the proposed approximation scheme

equilibrium of interdependent gas and electricity markets with marginal price based bilateral energy trading the increasing interdependencies between natural gas systems and power systems create new business opportunities in coupled energy distribution markets this paper studies the marginal price based bilateral energy trading on the equilibrium of coupled natural gas and electricity distribution markets convex relaxation is employed to solve a multiperiod optimal power flow problem which is used to clear the electricity market a successive second order cone programming approach is utilized to solve a multiperiod optimal gas flow problem which is used to clear the gas market in addition the line pack effect in the gas network is considered which can offer storage capacity and provide extra operation flexibility for both networks in both problems locational marginal energy prices are recovered from the lagrangian multipliers associated with nodal balancing equations furthermore a best response decomposition algorithm is developed to identify the equilibrium of the coupled energy markets with bilateral gas and electricity trading which leverages the computational superiority of socps cases studies on two test systems validate the proposed methodology

strategic offering for a wind power producer as a result of subsidies and technological maturity renewable electricity producers have grown in some jurisdictions to clearly dominant positions in the market under this context we propose an offering strategy for a wind power producer with market power that participates in the day ahead market as a price maker and in the balancing market as a deviator uncertainty pertaining to wind power production and balancing market price is represented through a set of correlated scenarios the proposed model is a stochastic mathematical program with equilibrium constraints mpec that can be recast as a tractable mixed integer linear programming milp problem which is solvable using available optimization software results from an illustrative example and two case studies show the effectiveness of the proposed model

risk neutral and risk averse approaches to multistage renewable investment planning under uncertainty abstract strategies for investing in renewable energy projects present high risks associated with generation and price volatility and dynamics existing approaches for determining optimal strategies are based on real options theory that often simplify the uncertainty process or on stochastic programming approaches that simplify the dynamic aspects in this paper we bridge the gap between these approaches by developing a multistage stochastic programming approach that includes real options such as postponing hedging with fixed forward contracts and combination with other sources the proposed model is solved by a procedure based on the stochastic dual dynamic programming sddp method the framework is extended to the risk averse setting a specific case study in investment in hydro and wind projects in the brazilian market is used to illustrate that the investment strategies generated by the proposed approach are efficient

on the dynamics of renewable resource harvesting and pollution control the paper presents a dynamic partial equilibrium model which combines optimal renewable resource harvesting and optimal pollution control pollution accumulates as a slowly decaying stock and is assumed to affect the growth and the quality of the renewable resource stock the aim is to maximize a social welfare functional which gives the present value of the difference between natural resource benefits and pollution control costs the existence uniqueness and the dynamic properties of the steady states are investigated the analysis also gives a general result concerning the steady state of any two state variable optimal control problems

current status of renewable energy in nepal opportunities and challenges abstract energy is indispensible in modern society and is one of the most important components of socio economic development nepal is one of the least developed countries with more than 80 of its population residing in rural communities per capita energy usage often viewed as a key index of the development in the country is far less than the global average per capita energy usage the energy sector is dominated by the traditional energy sources such as fuel woods crop residues and animal dung mainly for domestic usage contributing to about 86 of the national energy consumption currently 40 of the population has access to electricity and the rural electrification accounts for only 29 the majority of rural populations are meeting their energy needs by burning biomass in traditional stoves which has several environmental and public health issues nearly all fossil derived fuels consumed in the country are imported in a refined form and the perpetual increase in petroleum imports has adversely impacted the existing fragile economy of the country despite a huge potential in harnessing various renewable energy resources such as hydropower solar power wind energy and biofuels bioenergy these resources have not been sustainably captured due to geographical technical political and economical reasons this paper presents a brief account of nepal s renewable energy resources and the current status of various renewable energy technologies rets such as micro hydro solar power wind energy biofuel bioenergy improved cook stoves and improved water mill it also highlights the opportunities and barriers for the development of rets finally this paper presents some recommendations for the promotion development and implementation of rets in the country

a three level static milp model for generation and transmission expansion planning we present a three level equilibrium model for the expansion of an electric network the lower level model represents the equilibrium of a pool based market the intermediate level represents the nash equilibrium in generation capacity expansion taking into account the outcomes on the spot market and the upper level model represents the anticipation of transmission expansion planning to the investment in generation capacity and the pool based market equilibrium the demand has been considered as exogenous and locational marginal prices are obtained as endogenous variables of the model the three level model is formulated as a mixed integer linear programming milp problem the model is applied to a realistic power system in chile to illustrate the methodology and proper conclusions are reached

numerical solutions to nash cournot equilibria in coupled constraint electricity markets a numerical method based on a relaxation algorithm and the nikaido isoda function is presented for the calculation of nash cournot equilibria in electricity markets nash equilibrium is attained through a relaxation procedure applied to an objective function the nikaido isoda function which is derived from the existing profit maximization functions calculated by the generating companies we also show how to use the relaxation algorithm to compute and enforce a coupled constraint equilibrium which occurs if regulatory generation and distribution and more restrictions are placed on the companies and entire markets moreover we use the relaxation algorithm to compute players payoffs under several player configurations this is needed for the solution of our game under cooperative game theory concepts such as the bilateral shapley value and the kernel we show that the existence of both depends critically on demand price elasticity the numerical method converges to a unique solution under rather specific but plausible concavity conditions a case study from the ieee 30 bus system and a three bus bilateral market example with a dc model of the transmission line constraints are presented and discussed

bi level game approaches for coordination of generation and transmission expansion planning within a market environment the main purpose of this paper is to develop methodologies for simultaneous generation and transmission expansion planning problem of power networks while investigating interactions between these two important sections in the proposed methodologies a transmission operator to operating under different incentives decides about investment in transmission network while anticipating the outcome of a purely competitive electricity market where several rival generation firms complete with each other to determine operating level of their generators amount of their sales and amount of their investment in generation capacity the proposed methodologies rely on bi level programming models whose upper level model represent the problem of investment in transmission by to and the lower level problems represent market outcomes obtained from clearing the market these bi level models are reduced to mixed integer linear and nonlinear programming using the duality theory and karush kuhn tucker kkt optimality conditions the results of the proposed models are analyzed and compared using two illustrative examples

optimal bidding strategy of a plug in electric vehicle aggregator in day ahead electricity markets under uncertainty with a large scale introduction of plug in electric vehicles pevs a new entity the pev fleet aggregator is expected to be responsible for managing the charging of and for purchasing electricity for the vehicles we approach the problem of an aggregator bidding into the day ahead electricity market with the objective of minimizing charging costs while satisfying the pevs flexible demand the aggregator places demand bids only no vehicle to grid is considered the aggregator is assumed to potentially influence market prices in contrast to what is commonly found in the literature specifically the bidding strategy of the aggregator is formulated as a bilevel problem which is implemented as a mixed integer linear program the upper level problem represents the charging cost minimization of the aggregator whereas the lower level problem represents the market clearing since the bids of other market participants are not known to the aggregator ex ante a simple strategy is used to estimate them based on historical data an aggregated representation of the pev end use requirements as a virtual battery with time varying power and energy constraints is proposed derived from individual driving patterns since driving patterns cannot be perfectly forecasted we introduce a probabilistic virtual battery model we compare the results of the proposed bidding strategy with those of a bidding strategy assuming exogenous prices uncontrolled charging and a central dispatch of the fleet we also explore the impacts of different sources of uncertainty results show that with the proposed bidding strategy costs are significantly lower than under inflexible charging and are lower than assuming exogenous prices moreover the approach also performs well under uncertainty results also suggest that the aggregator only has limited market power potential at moderate pev penetrations

international pollution control cooperative versus noncooperative strategies abstract international pollution control involving two neighboring countries is modeled as a simple two player dynamic game each country produces a good that is consumed by domestic households production of each consumption good results in emissions of pollutants households in each country derive utility from the consumption of the domestically produced good but incur costs through the total stock of pollution stock externality in this setting we characterize cooperative as well as noncooperative pollution control strategies of the governments of the two countries that maximize the discounted stream of net benefits of a representative consumer it turns out that when the governments are restricted to use linear strategies noncooperative behavior results in overall losses for both countries if on the contrary governments use nonlinear markov perfect strategies and the discount rate is small enough a pareto efficient steady state pollution stock can be supported as a differentiable subgame perfect equilibrium thus the emergence of first best solutions cooperative outcomes does not require any institutional arrangements threats retaliation etc but can be brought about through the use of nonlinear markov perfect equilibrium strategies

the prospects of renewable energy technologies for rural electrification a review from nepal abstract utilization of renewable energy technologies remains one of the major energy policies throughout the world these technologies are proven to be successful for electrifying rural communities especially in developing countries realizing the benefits of renewable energy sources the government of nepal has initiated the production and distribution of renewable energy technologies in recent years mainly to electrify rural communities although these technologies are suitable for providing electricity in isolated and remote rural areas their implementation programs have not been successful as expected this review provides broad spectrum view about the energy situation in nepal and highlights the current policies and subsidies for the optimal utilization of renewable energy resources in isolated and poor rural communities in addition major promotional barriers for their implementation in nepal have been discussed

market impacts of energy storage in a transmission constrained power system environmental concerns have motivated governments in the european union and elsewhere to set ambitious targets for generation from renewable energy re technologies and to offer subsidies for their adoption along with priority grid access however because re technologies like solar and wind power are intermittent their penetration places greater strain on existing conventional power plants that need to ramp up more often in turn energy storage technologies e g pumped hydro storage or compressed air storage are proposed to offset the intermittency of re technologies and to facilitate their integration into the grid we assess the economic and environmental consequences of storage via a complementarity model of a stylized western european power system with market power representation of the transmission grid and uncertainty in re output although storage helps to reduce congestion and ramping costs it may actually increase greenhouse gas emissions from conventional power plants in a perfectly competitive setting conversely strategic use of storage by producers renders it less effective at curbing both congestion and ramping costs while having no net overall impact on emissions

impacts of network constraints on electricity market equilibrium nash equilibrium is usually used as the solution of generator s strategic bidding in electricity markets the available literature has shown by simulation that multiple market equilibria or no pure equilibrium may be induced after the inclusion of network constraints transmission constraints this paper presents a systematical analysis for the impacts of network constraints on the market equilibrium in oligopolistic electricity markets in our modeling the independent system operator iso dispatches generation and determines nodal prices via solving an optimal power flow opf and the individual generator optimizes its submitted supply function with nash supply function equilibrium sfe strategy after taking into account iso s decision making process on dispatched generations and nodal prices the conditions for the existence of equilibrium are given and it is shown that there may be multiple equilibria or no pure nash equilibrium the equilibrium if it exists will be at a point where generators pay no congestion charge

economic growth pollution and renewable resources abstract this paper first analyzes a model of economic growth with stock pollution allowing smooth substitution between emissions and reproducible capital when emissions are optimally controlled the steady state consumption is lower than without pollution control but the optimal steady state equilibrium may not exist if the marginal productivity of capital is bounded the steady state is shown to be a local saddle point independent of the rate of discount if pollution is not controlled a competitive economy moves along a stable growth path toward a too heavily polluted steady state next a growth model in which pollution affects the growth of renewable resources is presented the conditions for the existence and saddle point property of the steady state are given and the consequences of nonoptimal externality taxes are discussed when renewable resources are included higher than optimal pollution may decrease steady state consumption contrary to the case where renewable resources are ignored

evaluating the strategic behavior of cement producers an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints abstract this paper investigates the equilibria reached by a number of strategic producers in the cement sector through a technological representation of the market we present a bilevel model for each producer that characterizes its profit maximizing behavior in the bilevel model the upper level problem of each producer is constrained by a lower level market clearing problem representing cement trading and whose objective function corresponds to social welfare replacing the lower level problem by its optimality condition yields a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints mpec then all strategic producers are jointly considered representing their interaction requires solving jointly the interrelated mpecs of all producers which results in an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints epec a parametric analysis concerning cost capacity and demand fluctuations has been conducted our analysis shows that the european cement sector is mature and has lost its competitiveness african cement market can assume a prominent role in international markets in the coming future if investments in new and efficient capacity are carried out finally the far east will remain the reference exporter of cement at worldwide level

nash equilibrium in strategic bidding a binary expansion approach this paper presents a mixed integer linear programming solution approach for the equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints epec problem of finding the nash equilibrium ne in strategic bidding in short term electricity markets a binary expansion be scheme is used to transform the nonlinear nonconvex ne problem into a mixed integer linear problem milp which can be solved by commercially available computational systems the be scheme can be applicable to cournot bertrand or joint price quantity bidding models the approach is illustrated in case studies with configurations derived from the 95 gw brazilian system including unit commitment decisions to the price maker agents

a bilevel approach to transmission expansion planning within a market environment we present a bilevel model for transmission expansion planning within a market environment where producers and consumers trade freely electric energy through a pool the target of the transmission planner modeled through the upper level problem is to minimize network investment cost while facilitating energy trading this upper level problem is constrained by a collection of lower level market clearing problems representing pool trading and whose individual objective functions correspond to social welfare using the duality theory the proposed bilevel model is recast as a mixed integer linear programming problem which is solvable using branch and cut solvers detailed results from an illustrative example and a case study are presented and discussed finally some relevant conclusions are drawn

generation investment equilibria with strategic producers part i formulation the first of this two paper series proposes a methodology to characterize generation investment equilibria in a pool based network constrained electricity market where the producers behave strategically to this end the investment problem of each strategic producer is represented using a bilevel model whose upper level problem determines the optimal investment and the supply offering curves to maximize its profit and whose several lower level problems represent different market clearing scenarios this model is transformed into a mathematical program with equilibrium constraint mpec through replacing the lower level problems by their optimality conditions the joint consideration of all producer mpecs one per producer constitutes an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints epec to identify the solutions of this epec each mpec problem is replaced by its karush kuhn tucker kkt conditions which are in turn linearized the resulting mixed integer linear system of equalities and inequalities allows determining the epec equilibria through an auxiliary milp problem

capacity expansion equilibria in liberalized electricity markets an epec approach this paper presents a novel way to model the generation capacity expansion problem in a liberalized framework via a multi year bilevel equilibrium model in the upper level the competing generation companies maximize their individual profits while the lower level represents the market using a conjectured price response approach which allows us to vary the strategic spot market behavior to see how much the reigning competitive behavior impacts investment decisions the bilevel equilibrium model is formulated as an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints transformed into a mixed integer linear program and solved as such using diagonalization in order to verify equilibria we present a case study to apply this new modeling approach and to demonstrate that the proposed equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints can have multiple solutions whose respective investments can vary

generation investment equilibria with strategic producers part ii case studies this paper analyzes numerically the approach reported in the companion paper for identifying generation investment equilibria in an electricity market where the producers behave strategically to this end a two node illustrative example and a large scale case study based on the ieee reliability test system rts are examined and the results obtained are reported and discussed

a stochastic multiple leader stackelberg model analysis computation and application we study an oligopoly consisting of m leaders and n followers that supply a homogeneous product or service noncooperatively leaders choose their supply levels first knowing the demand function only in distribution followers make their decisions after observing the leader supply levels and the realized demand function we term the resulting equilibrium a stochastic multiple leader stackelberg nash cournot sms equilibrium we show the existence and uniqueness of sms equilibrium under mild assumptions we also propose a computational approach to find the equilibrium based on the sample average approximation method and analyze its rate of convergence finally we apply this framework to model competition in the telecommunication industry

developing competitive strategies for buyer supplier negotiations using differential game theory a model is developed to analyze the dynamics accompanying buyer supplier negotiations two cases are examined the first supposes that the players bargain cooperatively and try to reach pareto optimal solutions the second assumes a noncooperative atmosphere and seeks out nash equilibria although the latter are not necessarily efficient they do provide a measure of stability and hence may be considered a conservative strategy in either case the buyer and supplier are bargaining over n issues with a view toward minimizing their individual costs these costs are represented by a linear combination of the terminal offer or bid and the cumulative losses incurred during the negotiating process in the analysis closed form solutions are obtained for a variety of structural and behavioral assumptions for certain nash equilibria it is shown that agreement is reached on all issues simultaneously the results can be used to evaluate the performance of different strategies as well as check for suboptimality

generation flexibility in ramp rates strategic behavior and lessons for electricity market design abstract a ramp rate usually defines the speed at which an electric power producer can decrease or increase its production in limited time the availability of fast ramping generators significantly affects the economic dispatch especially in the systems with high penetration of intermittent energy sources e g wind power since the fluctuations in supply are common and sometimes unpredictable one of the regulatory practices of how to impel generators to provide their true ramp rates is to separate the stages of submitting the bids on ramp rate and production in this paper we distinguish two types of market structures one stage when electric power producers are deciding their production and ramp rate at the same time or two stage when generators decide their ramp rate first and choose their production levels at the second stage we employ one stage and two stage equilibrium models respectively to represent these market setups and use a conjectured price response parameter ranging from perfect competition to the cournot oligopoly to investigate the effect of the market competition structure on the strategic decisions of the generators we compare these two market setups in a symmetric duopoly case with two time periods and prove that in the two stage market setup the level of ramp rate is independent of the strategic behavior in the spot market and generally lower than the one offered in the one stage setup we also show that the ramp rate levels in one and two stage models coincide at the cournot oligopoly we extend the model to asymmetry several load periods portfolio bidding and uncertainty and show that withholding the ramp rate still occurs in both models our findings prove that market regulators cannot rely on only separating the decision stages as an effective measure to mitigate market power and in certain cases it may lead to an adverse effect

dynamic pricing design for demand response integration in power distribution networks this paper presents optimal pricing design for demand response dr integration in the distribution network in particular we study the energy scheduling problem for a load serving entity lse that serves two types of loads namely inflexible and flexible loads inflexible loads are charged under a regular pricing tariff while flexible loads enjoy a dynamic pricing tariff that ensures cost saving for them moreover flexible loads are assumed to be aggregated by several dr aggregators the interaction between the lse and its customers is formulated as a bilevel optimization problem where the lse is the leader and dr aggregators are the followers the optimal solution of this problem corresponds to the optimal pricing tariff for flexible loads the key advantage of the proposed model is that it can be readily implemented thanks to its compatibility with existing pricing structures in the retail market extensive numerical results show that the proposed approach provides a win win solution for both the lse and its customers

transmission and wind power investment this paper jointly considers wind power investment and transmission reinforcement the proposed model is a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints mpec that seeks to identify the optimal wind projects to be developed and the required network reinforcements under the transmission system operator perspective this mpec seeks to minimize consumer payments and is constrained by investment conditions and the equilibria of the market under different operating conditions an array of subsidies is considered to promote independent wind power investment an example and two case studies illustrate the characteristics of the proposed model

on noncooperative oligopoly equilibrium in the multiple leader follower game abstract in this paper we provide new proofs of existence and uniqueness of a stackelberg market equilibrium for a multiple leader follower noncooperative oligopoly model in which heterogeneous firms compete on quantities to this end we consider a two stage game of complete and perfect information in which many leaders interact strategically with many followers the stackelberg market equilibrium constitutes a pure strategy subgame perfect nash equilibrium of this game existence and uniqueness are more difficult to handle in this framework insofar as the presence of several leaders and followers displays a richer set of strategic interactions then to prove existence we notably provide a new procedure to determine the conditions under which the optimal behavior of the followers may be written as functions of the sole strategy profile of the leaders some examples outline our procedure and discuss our assumptions

market based coordination of transmission and generation capacity planning we propose an iso model for coordinating transmission expansion planning with competitive generation capacity planning in electricity markets the purpose of the model is a holistic simulation of generation and transmission capacity expansion in the market environment the solution represents an iterative process for simulating the interactions among gencos transcos and the iso which might be terminated by the iso based on a pre specified stopping criterion the proposed model adopts a joint energy and transmission auction market and a capacity mechanism the joint auction market enables competition to occur among generation and transmission resources the capacity mechanism offers incentives for market participant investments that reflect the locational values of additional capacity transmission capacity expansion decisions are made by merchant transmission lines that recover their capacity investments through transmission marginal pricing and capacity payments transmission network security is reflected in the proposed competitive resource planning model the examples illustrate a coordinated planning of generation and transmission in restructured power systems

information value under demand uncertainty and endogenous market leadership in an oligopoly model with firms choosing to produce in one of two periods we identify the circumstance under which a firm s having early information regarding stochastic demand results in market leadership high demand volatility leads to stackelberg competition with the information advantaged firm leading in the n firm case an equilibrium with multiple leaders and multiple followers emerges endogenously in a duopoly information acquisition game we identify conditions that determine whether neither one or both firms will pay to acquire early information and note that one firm s obtaining early information may generate a positive externality benefitting its competitor both symmetric and asymmetric outcomes are possible and stackelberg market leadership may occur in equilibrium but only when firms have different costs of information our finding that an information advantage may convey leadership which then affects the value of information to the players applies to other settings exhibiting first mover advantage such as certain public good provision games jel c72 d82 l13

a multiple leader stackelberg model and analysis this paper presents a new multiple leader follower model that is a consistent extension of stackelberg s leader follower duopoly the development contrasts with other existing extensions by demonstrating how the leader firms can utilize the true reaction curve of the follower firms it also provides sufficient conditions for some useful convexity and differentiability properties of this function for the proposed model we conduct a static analysis and discuss the existence uniqueness and computation of an equilibrium solution as well as study certain issues regarding the relative profits of leader and follower firms since the cournot oligopoly and the stackelberg leader follower models are special cases of this model the analysis in this paper hopefully provides some further insights about these types of models

impact of network payment schemes on transmission expansion planning with variable renewable generation abstract a large number of studies have dealt with the transmission expansion planning tep problem however few investigations have focused on analyzing the impacts of network payment schemes on network configuration and the benefits losses distribution among the participants in electricity markets in this paper we propose a multi annual transmission expansion planning model considering four different network payment schemes to finance the construction of new transmission lines seeking to reduce the total system costs wind and solar power generation are included in the model taking into account their variability the proposed models are reformulated as mixed integer linear programming milp problems we use seven performance metrics related with congestion nodal prices and generator benefits among others to evaluate the effect of each payment scheme a realistic case study based on the main power system in chile is analyzed to illustrate the proposed models it is shown that integrating line cost recovering equations into the tep model may result into a more realistic and less congested power network also total system cost is highly related with transmission tariff discrimination in that way tariffs with high location dependence perform better in the case studied the chilean power system

roles and potentials of renewable energy in less developed economies the case of nepal increasing the share of renewable energy in the national energy mix remains one of the major energy policy goals across many economies this paper assesses the roles and potentials of renewable energy sources in less developed economies while citing nepal as an example renewable energy has a significant role to play in the electrification of rural areas in developing economies and contribute towards sustainable development realizing full potentials of renewable however requires addressing both the associated demand side and supply side constraints innovative subsidies and tax incentives adequate entrepreneurial support strengthening institutional arrangement and promoting local community based organizations such as the cooperatives are the necessary factors in promoting the green technologies in countries like nepal international factors such as large scale investment and adequate technology transfer are equally crucial to create a rapid spread and increase affordability of decentralized renewable energy technologies in less developed economies

investigating the ability of demand shifting to mitigate electricity producers market power previous work on the role of the demand side in imperfect electricity markets has demonstrated that its self price elasticity reduces electricity producers ability to exercise market power however the concept of self price elasticity cannot accurately capture consumers flexibility as the latter mainly involves shifting of loads operation in time this paper provides for the first time theoretical and quantitative analysis of the beneficial impact of demand shifting ds in mitigating market power by the generation side quantitative analysis is supported by a multiperiod equilibrium programming model of the imperfect electricity market accounting for the time coupling operational constraints of ds as well as network constraints the decision making process of each strategic producer is modeled through a bi level optimization problem which is solved after converting it to a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints mpec and linearizing the latter through suitable techniques the oligopolistic market equilibria resulting from the interaction of multiple independent producers are determined by employing an iterative diagonalization method case studies on a test market reflecting the general generation and demand characteristics of the gb system quantitatively demonstrate the benefits of ds in mitigating producers market power by employing relevant indexes from the literature

an individual welfare maximization algorithm for electricity markets an algorithm that allows a market participant to maximize its individual welfare in electricity spot markets is presented the use of the algorithm in determining market equilibrium points called nash equilibria is demonstrated the start of the algorithm is a spot market model that uses the optimal power flow opf with a full representation of the transmission system and inclusion of consumer bidding the algorithm utilizes price and dispatch sensitivities available from the hessian matrix and gradient of the opf to help determine an optimal change in an individual s bid the algorithm is shown to be successful in determining local welfare maxima and the prospects for scaling the algorithm up to realistically sized systems are very good nash equilibria are investigated assuming all participants attempt to maximize their individual welfare this is done by iteratively solving the individual welfare maximization algorithm until all individuals stop modifying their bids

prospects progress policies and effects of rural electrification in bangladesh abstract energy is instrumental for the development and economic growth of a country although bangladesh is known as a developing country in south asia it has been recognized as a model country by the united nations for its remarkable achievements in attaining the united nations millennium development goals successive governments of the country have taken several developmental initiatives that aim to improve the standard of living and to provide basic rights to the citizens an increase in the demand for energy particularly electricity is a normal consequence of many of these initiatives thus the provision of sufficient electricity has become a genuine challenge for the government studies have indicated that even if the national demand for electricity remains static another 35 years is required by the government to provide electricity to all given the current production pace providing electricity to all may nearly be an impossible task because of the ever increasing demand for electricity the situation in rural areas where many people are deprived of electricity supply is even severe fortunately this coastal and agro based country is geographically located in an area that has a potential in exploiting different renewable forms of energy therefore renewable energy sources can be considered potential solutions to satisfy the future energy demand of the country and to provide electricity particularly in rural areas bangladesh is one of the countries that is seriously vulnerable to the effects of climate change hence the use of renewable energy can contribute to mitigate the effects of both climate change and environmental degradation in the country

quantity setting oligopoly with endogenous sequencing abstract this paper investigates endogenous sequencing in a quantity setting oligopoly i formulate an n firm m period model where each firm chooses both how much to produce and when to produce it i find that at least n 1 firms simultaneously produce in the first period in every pure strategy equilibrium this result shows that the generalized stackelberg type outcome never appears in equilibrium except in a duopoly

a dynamic game of a transboundary pollutant with asymmetric players abstract modeling transboundary pollutants in a dynamic game framework provides a foundation for analyzing the impact of various policy options the focus of this analysis is on the results of a tax subsidy scheme used to address the transboundary problem of global climate change a nonzero sum dynamic game with asymmetric players is used to evaluate the policy impact of the tax subsidy scheme on the respective player s value functions and strategies as determined by a nash equilibrium feedback solution the asymmetry of the players is reflected in their respective attitudes toward global climate change with one player benefiting from the change and the other losing

equilibria in an oligopolistic electricity pool with stepwise offer curves we study the equilibria reached by strategic producers in a pool based network constrained electricity market the behavior of each producer is modeled by a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints mpec whose objective is maximizing profit and whose complementarity constraints describe market clearing the joint solution of all these mpecs constitutes an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints epec the equilibria associated with the epec are analyzed by solving the strong stationarity conditions of all mpecs which can be linearized without approximation by mixed integer linear programming milp techniques the resulting mixed integer linear conditions can be reformulated as an optimization problem that allows establishing diverse objectives to differentiate among alternative equilibria

strategic offering and equilibrium in coupled gas and electricity markets the wide integration of gas fired units and implementation of power to gas technologies bring increasing interdependence among the natural gas and electricity infrastructures this paper studies the equilibrium of the coupled gas and electricity markets which is driven by the strategic offering behaviors each producer endeavours to maximize its own profit by taking the market clearing process into consideration the market equilibrium can be obtained from an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints a special diagonalization algorithm is devised in which the unilateral equilibrium of the gas or electricity market is found in the inner loop given the rivals strategies the interactions of the two markets are tackled in the outer loop case studies on two test systems validate the proposed methodology

exercise of market power on ramp rate in wind integrated power systems with an increasing penetration of wind power there is likely to be an increasing need for fast ramping generating units these generators ensure that no load is lost if supply drops due to the uncertainties in wind power generation however it is observed in practice that in a presence of network constraints fast ramping generating units are prone to act strategically and exercise market power by withholding their ramp rates in this paper we model this gaming behavior on ramp rates we assume a market operator who collects bids in form of marginal costs quantities and ramp rates he runs a ramp constrained economic dispatch given the generators bids forecasted demand and contingencies following the game theoretic concepts we set up a multi level optimization problem the lower level problem is the ramp constrained economic dispatch and the higher level represents the profit maximization problems solved by strategic generators the whole problem is formulated as an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints epec the outcome of the epec problem is a set of nash equilibria to tackle the multiple nash equilibria problem the concept of the extremal nash equilibria is defined and formulated we model the concept of extremal nash equilibria as a single stage mixed integer linear programming problem milp and demonstrate the application of this mathematical framework on an illustrative case and on a more realistic case study with tractable results

stackelberg nash cournot equilibria characterizations and computations the supply side of an oligopolistic market supplying a homogeneous product noncooperatively is modeled in this market there is one leader and n followers the followers operate under the cournot assumption of zero conjectural variation and are accordingly called cournot firms the leader called a stackelberg firm specifically takes into account the reaction of the cournot firms to its output for this situation we study the behavior and implications of the joint cournot reaction curve as generated by plausible economic market assumptions in particular we study the existence and uniqueness of a stackelberg nash cournot equilibrium in addition we prescribe an efficient algorithm to determine a set of equilibrating output quantities for the firms

a mathematical programming approach to a nash cournot equilibrium analysis for atwo stage network of oligopolies this paper deals with the existence characterization and computation of equilibrium solutions arising from related mathematical programming problems associated with a particular market structure the generic structure analyzed herein represents a two stage production process in which a set of some firms produces a semifinished product that serves as an input to another set of firms which converts this to a final good in addition there exists a third set of vertically integrated firms these firms perform the operations jointly performed by the other two sets of firms in producing the final product on the demand side an econometrically derived demand curve is specified for the final product the aim of this paper is to characterize the nature of the equilibrium solutions for such problems under various market behavioral structures derive sufficient conditions under which one can claim the existence of these equilibrium solutions and prescribe methods for computing equilibrium solutions the analysis provides a machinery for considering the effects of mergers and integrations on a firms profits and on industry outputs and prices thereby suggesting incentives or otherwise to merge or integrate

finding equilibria in the pool based electricity market with strategic wind power producers and network constraints this paper proposes a model to find the equilibria in the short term electricity market with large scale wind power penetration the behavior of each strategic player is modeled through a two stage mathematical problem with equilibrium constraints mpec where the upper level problem maximizes the profit of the strategic player and the lower level problem describes the clearing processes of the day ahead and real time markets while considering the network constraints the joint solution of all the mpecs constitutes an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints epec the uncertain wind power production and demand are represented by a set of plausible scenarios by using the duality theory and karush kuhn tucker condition each mpec is transferred into a mixed integer linear programing problem the nash equilibria of the electricity market are obtained by solving the epec using game theory and the diagonalization algorithm case studies are performed to show the effectiveness of the proposed model

national strategic investment in european power transmission capacity abstract the transformation of the european electricity system requires substantial investment in transmission capacity to facilitate cross border trade and to efficiently integrate renewable energy sources however network planning in the eu is still mainly a national prerogative in contrast to other studies aiming to identify the pan european continental welfare optimal transmission expansion we investigate the impact of zonal planners deciding on network investment strategically with the aim of maximizing the sum of consumer surplus generator profits and congestion rents in their jurisdiction this reflects the inadequacy of current mechanisms to compensate for welfare re allocations across national boundaries arising from network upgrades we propose a three stage equilibrium model to describe the nash game between zonal planners i e national governments regulators or system operators each taking into account the impact of network expansion on the electricity spot market and the resulting welfare effects on the constituents within its jurisdiction we propose a novel way to solve the resulting gne epec type problem using a variation of a disjunctive constraints reformulation this allows to solve this problem without a priori assumptions on the relative valuation of shared constraints by each player using a four node sample network we identify several nash equilibria of the game between the zonal planners this example illustrates the failure to reach the first best welfare expansion in the absence of an effective framework for cross border cost benefit allocation

transmission expansion in an oligopoly considering generation investment equilibrium abstract transmission expansion planning tep is a sophisticated decision making problem especially in an oligopolistic electricity market in which a number of strategic price maker producers compete together a transmission system planner who is in charge of making tep decisions requires considering the future generation investment actions however in such an oligopolistic market each producer makes its own strategic generation investment decisions this motivates the transmission system planner to consider the generation investment decision making problem of all producers within its tep model the strategic generation investment problem of each producer can be represented by a complementarity bi level model the joint consideration of all bi level models one per producer characterizes the generation investment equilibrium that identifies the future evolution of generation investment in the market this paper proposes a tri level tep decision making model to be solved by the transmission system planner whose objective is to maximize the social welfare of the market minus the expansion costs and whose constraints are the transmission expansion limits as well as the generation investment equilibrium problem this model is then recast as a mixed integer linear programming problem and solved numerical results from an illustrative example and a case study based on the ieee 14 bus test system demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed approach

strategic generation investment using a complementarity approach this paper provides a methodology to assist a strategic producer in making informed decisions on generation investment a single target year is considered with demand variations modeled through blocks the strategic behavior of the producer is represented through a bilevel model the upper level considers both investment decisions and strategic production actions and the lower level corresponds to market clearing prices are obtained as dual variables of power balance equations rival uncertainties on offering and investment are characterized through scenarios the resulting model is a large scale mixed integer lp problem solvable using currently available branch and cut techniques results pertaining to an illustrative example and a case study are reported and discussed

risk constrained multi stage wind power investment when deciding on wind power investments three major issues arise the production variability and uncertainty of wind facilities the eventual future decline in wind power investment costs and the significant financial risk involved in such investment decisions recognizing the above important issues this paper proposes a risk constrained multi stage stochastic programming model to make optimal investment decisions on wind power facilities along a multi stage horizon the proposed model is illustrated using a clarifying example and a case study

international pollution problems unilateral initiatives by environmental groups in one country abstract international pollution involving two groups of countries is modelled as a two player game each country is characterized by specific preferences for consumption goods and the environment both countries produce a single consumption good with a given technology that determines pollution per unit output each country is economically isolated except for the presence of a global pollutant within a static framework m hoel j environ econom management 20 55 70 1991 shows that unilateral actions to reduce harmful emissions advocated by environmental groups in one country may result in higher total emissions i characterize cooperative and noncooperative emission strategies for the two countries using welfare functions that within a static framework yield total emissions without cooperation always higher than those with cooperation when both governments choose linear closed loop strategies and one country is not sensitive to the environmental condition the unique equilibrium exhibits less pollution than the cooperative equilibrium only if the other country cares a great deal about the well being of future generations and has relatively low bargaining power in the negotiations equilibria that result from nonlinear closed loop strategies are also characterized

generation capacity expansion in liberalized electricity markets a stochastic mpec approach this paper proposes a bilevel model to assist a generation company in making its long term generation capacity investment decisions considering uncertainty regarding the investments of the other generation companies the bilevel formulation allows for the uncoupling of investment and generation decisions as investment decisions of the single investing generation company are taken in the upper level with the objective to maximize expected profits and generation decisions by all companies are considered in the lower level the lower level represents the oligopolistic market equilibrium via a conjectured price response formulation which can capture various degrees of strategic market behavior like perfect competition the cournot oligopoly and intermediate cases

ownership access and sequential investment we extend the property rights framework to allow for a separation of the ownership rights of access and veto and sequential investment parties investing first ex ante do so before contracting is possible parties that invest second ex post can contract on at least some of their investment costs along with this cost sharing effect the incentive to invest is affected by a strategic effect generated by sequential investment together these effects can overturn some of the predictions of the property rights literature for example the most inclusive ownership structure might not be optimal even if all investments are complementary

co planning of investments in transmission and merchant energy storage suitably located energy storage systems are able to collect significant revenue through spatiotemporal arbitrage in congested transmission networks however transmission capacity expansion can significantly reduce or eliminate this source of revenue investment decisions by merchant storage operators must therefore account for the consequences of potential investments in transmission capacity by central planners this paper presents a tri level model to co optimize merchant electrochemical storage siting and sizing with centralized transmission expansion planning the upper level takes the merchant storage owner s perspective and aims to maximize the lifetime profits of the storage while ensuring a given rate of return on investments the middle level optimizes centralized decisions about transmission expansion the lower level simulates market clearing the proposed model is recast as a bi level equivalent which is solved using the column and constraint generation technique a case study based on a 240 bus 448 line testbed of the western electricity coordinating council interconnection demonstrates the usefulness of the proposed tri level model

depletion of the environmental basis for renewable resources the economics of interdependent renewable and nonrenewable resources abstract this paper synthesizes familiar theories of nonrenewable and renewable resource economics in a two sector partial equilibrium analysis of efficient trade offs between renewable resource production and environmental development the irreversible impacts of coastal zone development provide a motivating example while development proceeds the efficient harvest of renewable resources may exceed the sustainable rate while development may involve several periods of growth and decline once development begins it proceeds without significant interruptions if a profitable renewable sector survives development ceases before exhausting all profitable opportunities interdependent stocks reduce distinctions between resource types because each sector exhibits features of the other

managing the international commons resource use and pollution control the simultaneous management in an international context of free access renewable resources and transboundary pollution is examined in a dynamic game framework first best outcomes under international cooperation are determined and compared to noncooperative outcomes when countries follow linear markov strategies an international policy consisting of taxes on emissions and harvesting with international redistribution of tax receipts is used to achieve the cooperative solution in addition side payments may be required to prevent free riding and thus make the international policy implementable

strategic bidding under uncertainty a binary expansion approach this work presents a binary expansion be solution approach to the problem of strategic bidding under uncertainty in short term electricity markets the be scheme is used to transform the products of variables in the nonlinear bidding problem into a mixed integer linear programming formulation which can be solved by commercially available computational systems the be scheme is applicable to pure price pure quantity or joint price quantity bidding models it is also possible to represent transmission networks uncertainties scenarios for price quantity plant availability and load financial instruments capacity reinforcement decisions and unit commitment the application of the methodology is illustrated in case studies with configurations derived from the 80 gw brazilian system

a tri level model of centralized transmission and decentralized generation expansion planning for an electricity market part ii we study a tri level integrated transmission and generation expansion planning problem in a deregulated power market environment the collection of bi level sub problems in the lower two levels is an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints epec that can be approached by either the diagonalization method dm or a complementarity problem cp reformulation this paper is a continuation of its part i in which a hybrid iterative algorithm is proposed to solve the tri level problem by iteratively applying the cp reformulation of the tri level problem to propose solutions and evaluating them in the epec sub problem by dm it focuses on the numerical results obtained by the hybrid algorithm for a 6 bus system a modified ieee 30 bus system and an ieee 118 bus system in the numerical instances the approximate nash equilibrium point for the sub problem can be verified by examining local concavity

roles of renewable energy technologies in improving the rural energy situation in nepal gaps and opportunities abstract nepal is one of the least developed countries with the lowest per capita energy consumption in the world traditional solid biomass plays a significant role in meeting the primary energy demand in the country which represents about 87 of the total primary energy mix till date only 50 of the population has access to electricity and disparity between the urban and rural areas in terms of access to energy is prevalent in order to improve the energy situation in rural areas the government of nepal initiated the promotion and development of renewable energy technologies rets through subsidies nepal has the potential to generate energy through renewable sources like mini microhydro schemes solar power biogas and wind it is estimated that more than 50 mw of electricity can be generated from the micro hydro schemes 2100 mw from solar and 3000 mw from wind moreover the country has the capacity to develop about 1 1 million domestic biogas plants rets may provide ample opportunity to improve the vulnerable rural energy system in nepal if the available renewable resources are optimally utilized

economic criteria for planning transmission investment in restructured electricity markets from an economic perspective a common criterion for assessing the merits of a transmission investment is its impacts on social welfare the underlying assumption in using this criterion is that side payments may be used to distribute the social gains among all market players in reality however since the impacts of an electricity transmission project on different players may vary such side payments are rather difficult to implement this paper focuses on different economic criteria that should be considered when planning electricity transmission investments we propose an electricity transmission investment assessment methodology that is capable of evaluating the economic impacts on the various effected stakeholders and account for strategic responses that could enhance or impede the investment s objectives we formulate transmission planning as an optimization problem under alternative conflicting objectives and investigate the policy implications of divergent expansion plans resulting from the planner s level of anticipation of strategic responses we find that optimal transmission expansion plans may be very sensitive to supply and demand parameters we also show that the transmission investments have significant distributional impact creating acute conflicts of interests among market participants we use a 32 bus representation of the main chilean grid to illustrate our results

linear complementarity models of nash cournot competition in bilateral and poolco power markets two cournot models of imperfect competition among electricity producers are formulated as mixed linear complementarity problems lcps and a simple example is presented to illustrate their application the two models simulate bilateral markets the models include a congestion pricing scheme for transmission but other transmission pricing approaches can also be represented in this framework the two models differ from each other in that one has no arbitrage between nodes of the network while in the other model arbitragers erase any noncost based differences in price the latter bilateral model turns out to be equivalent to a cournot model of a poolco the models differ from other cournot market models in that they include both of kirchhoff s laws via a dc approximation can include arbitragers possess unique solutions and are readily solved by efficient lcp algorithms the key assumption that permits their formulation as lcps is that each producer naively assumes that its output will not affect transmission prices

a robust linear approach for offering strategy of a hybrid electric energy company this paper presents a new approach for determining the day ahead bidding strategies of a large scale hybrid electric energy company the company has both energy generation and energy retailing businesses in a competitive electricity market demand response programs are also considered in the retail side of the company in order to hedge the risk of participation in wholesale market this paper introduces a max min bilevel mathematical programming with equilibrium constraint model for offering a strategy that manages the risk of uncertain forecasted rivals bids by robust optimization the max min bilevel model is converted to its equivalent single level optimization using karush kuhn tucker optimality conditions the duality theory is utilized to find the equivalent ordinary maximization model of the max min problem strong duality theory and big m method are also used to linearize the final model of offering strategy applicability of the proposed approach is shown by implementing it on the ieee 118 bus test system

strategic enhancement and destruction of fisheries and the environment in the presence of international externalities abstract this paper considers enhancement of fisheries and the environment in the presence of international externalities by enhancement we refer to investments which affect the costs and benefits of controlling fish harvest rates or pollution emission levels in a two country two period model it is shown that enhancement may be used strategically to influence the behavior of rival governments and that the strategic effect may either offset or reinforce the standard free rider problem associated with such investment in some cases countries may have an incentive to invest in environmental destruction i e negative enhancement if policies are not coordinated internationally

how many firms should be leaders beneficial concentration revisited we investigate how the number of stackelberg leaders and followers aects economic welfare first we discuss the model with m leaders and n m followers compete in a homogeneous good market daughety 1990 nds that under constant marginal costs the stackelberg model m2 0 n yield a higher welfare than the cournot model m 0 or

a transmission planning framework considering future generation expansions in electricity markets this paper proposes a transmission planning framework in a market environment in which only the generation sector is deregulated the proposed framework is based on modeling generation companies gencos strategic behavior and anticipating their expansion patterns from the viewpoint of a transmission system planner the transmission expansion planning problem in this paper is modeled as a four level optimization problem a solution method based on agent based systems and search based optimization techniques is proposed to determine the optimal transmission expansion plan

renewable generation expansion under different support schemes a stochastic equilibrium approach abstract following the deregulation of electricity markets a current challenge of policy makers is to facilitate the transition to a sustainable power system at the highest welfare for society in this paper we investigate the efficiency of different support schemes such as a feed in tariff a feed in premium and tradable green certificates with respect to incentivizing the required investments in renewable generation we consider a number of generation expansion problems and formulate stochastic equilibrium models that account for uncertainty in demand and renewable supply the risk aversion of investors and the competitiveness of the market the problem of the policy maker is formulated as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints mpec and as a non linear complementarity problem ncp for the feed in schemes and the certificate market respectively our models are solved for a small illustrative example and a larger case study based on the danish power system the results confirm that the main driver for the optimal choice of renewable support scheme is the aversion of power producers towards price and volume risk while the competitiveness of the market rarely affects such choice

finding multiple nash equilibria in pool based markets a stochastic epec approach we present a compact formulation to find all pure nash equilibria in a pool based electricity market with stochastic demands the equilibrium model is formulated as a stochastic equilibrium problem subject to equilibrium constraints epec the problem is based on a stackelberg game where the generating companies gencos optimize their strategic bids anticipating the solution of the independent system operator iso market clearing a finite strategy approach both in prices and quantities is applied to transform the nonlinear and nonconvex set of nash inequalities into a mixed integer linear problem milp a procedure to find all nash equilibria is developed by generating holes that are added as linear constraints to the feasibility region the result of the problem is the set of all pure nash equilibria and the market clearing prices and assigned energies by the iso a case study illustrates the methodology and proper conclusions are reached

international aspects of pollution control pollution is a by product of production is only gradually dissolved by the environment and crosses national borders the market outcome ignores the adverse effects of pollution and thus yields higher levels of output and pollution than would prevail under a supranational social planner which does care about pollution in practice governments often do not cooperate and this leads to outcomes of pollution and production in between the market outcomes and the outcomes under supra national social planning absence of precommitment leads to lower emission charges less cleaning up activities and more pollution appropriate levels of emission charges under the various outcomes are a result of this analysis attention is also paid to investment in clean technology the debate between optimists who believe that higher production is compatible with sound environmental policy and pessimists can be analysed in this way