industry characteristics and interest group formation an empirical study the role of interest groups in the political process has been the subject of much analysis in both political science and economics however few studies have examined directly the factors which influence the variation in interest group formation across industrial sectors and between countries using data on 75 industrial sectors in 10 countries we examine the way in which variations in interest group formation are explained by variations in industrial and political characteristics in cross sectional empirical relationships we test for the significance of a variety of industry and political variables our results indicate that industry characteristics such as the proportion of total demand purchased by households and the concentration ratio are related to variations in interest group formation we discuss the implications that our results have for recent theoretical work on the effect of interest groups on economic policy

collective bargaining arrangements closed shops and relative pay this paper uses establishment level data to examine the impact on union nonunion pay differentials of the industrial relations setting in which bargaining takes place the pre entry closed shop is found to be of prime importance for the pay of both skilled and semiskilled manual workers for skilled workers and for semiskilled workers in larger establishments the differentials are found to be insignificantly different from zero in the absence of a pre entry closed shop copyright 1987 by royal economic society

relative earnings and individual union membership in the united kingdom considerable attention has been focused in recent years on the empirical analysis of the effect of trade unions on the structure of earnings such empirical investigation usually entails measurement of the union non union differential in wages or earnings at the level of the individual this involves comparison of the earnings of union members with estimates of what their earnings would be were they not union members or equivalently examination of differences in earnings between individuals comparable with regard to all other relevant characteristics who differ in their union membership alone in the united kingdom all previous attempts at estimation of this differential have used aggregate data at either the industry or occupation level 1 the conventional methodology involves regression of the logarithm of the average wage on either the proportion of workers who are union members or the proportion covered by a collective agreement together with a vector of industry characteristics that are deemed to determine the non union wage however several problems are immediately apparent with this methodology first the model ignores the possibility of variation in the differential across industries which has potentially serious consequences second the vector of other characteristics customarily used is somewhat limited and raises doubts concerning the adequacy of the standardization for what might loosely be termed labour quality third only a sub sample of industries is ever used owing to lack of data those industries excluded are generally smaller in terms of employment that those included if the differential varies with the size of the industry a further bias will be induced all of these problems are either removed or lessened by the use of individual level data for an analysis of their impact at the industry level see geroski and stewart 1981 2 as a result it is now widely accepted that the appropriate way to measure such differentials is to use micro data sets at the level of the individual worker until recently suitable data have not been available for the united kingdom and hence such analysis was not possible this paper presents the first estimates for the united kingdom based on individual level data if the value of the union non union differential were the same for all workers in the unionized sector analysis at the industry level and the individual level would produce similar results however the marshallian laws of derived demand suggest that this will not be the case despite this clear prediction of variation in the differential there has been little systematic investigation of the variation this paper also presents such an analysis since variation in the differential across industries results in aggregation bias in industry level studies such an analysis is of considerable relevance to the evaluation of the evidence from such studies as well as being of interest in its own right the paper is laid out as follows section i presents a method of estimating the union non union differential at the individual level while section ii

distributive leakages of agricultural support some empirical evidence abstract the paper evaluates the transfer efficiency of the austrian bread grain policy taking into account distributive leakages i e how much of the transfers officially intended to support farm income are finally realised in the upstream and downstream industries gardner s am j agric econ 65 1983 225 well known measure of average transfer efficiency ate is augmented for the case of more than two social groups and computer intensive simulation procedures are utilised to deal with parameter uncertainty

public policies pressure groups and dead weight costs abstract this paper presents a model of competition among special interest groups for political influence each active group exerts pressure to affect its taxes and subsidies where activities of different groups are related by the equality between total tax collections and total tax subsidies the dead weight costs and benefits of taxes and subsidies play a major role in our model an increase in the dead weight cost of taxation encourages pressure by taxpayers while an increase in the dead weight costs of subsidies discourages pressure by recipients various applications of the analysis are discussed

union retreat and regional economic performance the uk experience monastiriotis v 2007 union retreat and regional economic performance the uk experience regional studies 41 1 14 a panel of regional data is used to investigate the impact the well documented decline in trade unionism in the uk had on the economic performance of its regions the analysis departs from the traditional firm level and cross sectional analyses and looks at the economy wide effects of unionism the findings provide evidence in line with theory that predicts that unions will increase wages and unemployment but they also indicate that unionism is positively related to productivity and incomes although in all cases the effects are non linear it is concluded that unionism is not necessarily a burden for the economy so long that the beneficial wage productivity effects outweigh the negative effects on employment monastiriotis v 2007 le declin syndical et la performance economique regionale etude de cas du r u regional studies 41 1 14 on emploie des donnees regionales provenant d un

promotion of the agricultural sector and political power in austria in most industrialized countries farmers as a small and well orgnized group are ableto influence government decisions to get rent creating proposals enacted two different viewsare presented to explain why the chicagoan view efficient redistribution hypothesis and the virginian view inefficient outcome of political bargaining a vertically structuredempirical model of the austrian farm sector is employed to test both hypotheses quantitativeresults of the welfare transfers from consumers taxpayers to farmers and agribusiness firmsare derived and the political weights of these groups are presented

predatory versus productive government the case of u s agricultural policies this essay will argue that agricultural policy in the united states has led to both the enhancement of efficiency through productive policies and the transfer of wealth and income to special interests through redistributive or predatory policies these two activities can be labeled as pests and perts pest policies or political economic seeking transfers are meant to redistribute wealth from one social group to another and are not explicitly concerned with efficiency in contrast perts or political economic resource transactions are intended to correct market failures or to provide public goods these policies have neutral distributional effects at least in design a review of the history of public policy in agriculture reveals not only tension between the pert and pest roles of the public sector but also some coordination between these two types of activities as different interest groups pressure the political process the government trades off pests and perts in its attempts to acquire balance and secure political power at times this has led to combinations of programs that appear incoherent in such a world the challenge for economists is to design and advocate policies that are both economically productive and politically sustainable

downward nominal and real wage rigidity survey evidence from european firms downward nominal and real wage rigidity it has been well established that the wages of individual workers react little especially downwards to shocks that hit their employer this paper presents new evidence from a unique survey of firms across europe on the prevalence of downward wage rigidity in both real and nominal terms we analyse which firm level and institutional factors are associated with wage rigidity our results indicate that it is related to workforce composition at the establishment level in a manner that is consistent with related theoretical models e g efficiency wage theory insider outsider theory we also find that wage rigidity depends on the labour market institutional environment collective bargaining coverage is positively related with downward real wage rigidity measured on the basis of wage indexation downward nominal wage rigidity is positively associated with the extent of permanent contracts and this effect is stronger in countries with stricter employment protection regulations

the political economy of regulations and trade wine trade 1860 1970 dramatic changes in the 1860 1970 wine trade provide insights on the political economy of regulations and policy instrument choice and trade an invasion of phylloxera in the 1870s turned france from the world s leading exporter to a massive importer of wine and grapes when french production recovered a combination of tariffs safety regulations and quality standards were introduced to protect its french producers causing dramatic changes in global wine and grape production and trade including in spain italy turkey greece algeria tunisia and morocco changes in wine regulations were caused by relative income and loss aversion factors in political economy tariffs were the preferred policy instruments as they directly restrict imports bring in revenues have low transaction costs and are preferred political instruments when there are information imperfections safety regulations and quality standards including labelling and input prohibitions reduce asymmetric information for consumers or undesirable externalities and simultaneously protected domestic producers regulations were often targeted at imported products wine and raisins when tariffs were ineffective or constrained by institutions such as on colonial wine hence tariffs and quality regulations were jointly used in wine policy both as complements and as substitutes in policy design

political economy of public policies insights from distortions to agricultural and food markets the agricultural and food sector is an ideal case for investigating the political economy of public policies many of the policy developments in this sector since the 1950s have been sudden and transformational while others have been gradual but persistent this paper reviews and synthesizes the literature on trends and fluctuations in market distortions and the political economy explanations that have been advanced based on a rich global data set covering a half century of evidence on commodities countries and policy instruments the paper identifies hypotheses that have been explored in the literature on the extent of market distortions and the conditions under which reform may be feasible

an analysis of bargaining power for milk cooperatives and milk processors in florida the florida dairy market has a few fluid milk processors and many dairy farmers the dairy farmers are represented in negotiation with the processors by a cooperative this research builds a theoretical model of bargaining between the processors and a cooperative the model is applied to the florida dairy market to examine price negotiations between florida milk processors and a dairy cooperative an expectation maximization em algorithm along with maximum likelihood estimation is used to estimate the econometric disequilibrium model with time series data for the period of october 1998 to may 2009 the results show that the class i price set by the federal milk marketing order is the major factor influencing the cooperative s supply reservation price negotiated quantity and production seasonality affect the processors demand reservation price the processors appear to be more patient and have higher average bargaining power 0 8804 than the cooperative 0 1196 the highest lowest bargaining power

agricultural support policies in imperfectly competitive markets why market power matters in policy design most agricultural policy analysis assumes that markets are perfectly competitive despite increasing evidence to the contrary we demonstrate that the interaction of market power and government intervention may lead to outcomes that are counter to key results of policy analysis for perfectly competitive markets we show that market power may reduce or eliminate entirely the net welfare benefits from removing two traditional support mechanisms price floors and deficiency payments and may increase considerably the government s cost of implementing either of them accordingly optimally designed price support measures may improve welfare in the presence of downstream oligopoly and or oligopsony power copyright 2011 oxford university press

profit sharing and productivity an analysis of uk engineering firms this paper reports productivity differentials of 3 8 percent in favor of profit sharing firms in the u k engineering industry the estimates come from equations in which profit sharing interacts with factor input levels and the firms technological organizational and labor force characteristics and imply more than a simple incentive effect on work effort or more cooperative behavior in given circumstances a technological labor relations interpretation of the origin of the gains is suggested which are found to be asymmetrically distributed the results question policy measures to encourage profit sharing that do not take account of its significance in the process of organizational design copyright 1989 by royal economic society

economic development institutional change and the political economy of agricultural protection an econometric study of belgium since the 19th century this empirical study uses 100 years of annual data on 11 agricultural commodities from belgium to measure the impact of structural changes coinciding with economic development and changes in political institutions on agricultural protection the analysis shows that changes in agricultural protection are caused by a combination of factors governments have increased protection and support to farmers when world market prices for their commodities fell and vice versa offsetting market effects on producer incomes other economic determinants were the share of the commodities in total consumer expenditures negative effect and in total output of the economy positive effect with belgium a small economy there was no impact of the trade position changes in political institutions have affected agricultural protection democratic reforms which induced a significant shift in the political balance towards agricultural interests such as the introduction of the one man one vote system led to an increase in agricultural protection the integration of belgian agricultural policies in the common agricultural policy in 1968 coincided with an increase in protection ceteris paribus both institutional factors related to changes in access to and information about the decision making at the eu level and structural changes in the agricultural and food economy may explain this effect

supply management and import concessions countries such as canada which manage domestic supply by regulating both production and imports have come under pressure in recent years to liberalize their trade policy this paper examines the effect of import concessions on the distribution of rents in supply managed industries although import concessions decrease producer welfare it is shown that rather sizeable concessions may occur before producers are worse off under supply management than free trade this is especially true in industries characterized by a low free trade import share and inelastic demand with regard to net social welfare policies that are designed to transfer market rents to producers through supply management incur larger deadweight losses when they also incorporate import concessions gestion de l offre et concessions faites aux importateurs les pays qui comme le canada gerent l offre domestique en reglementant a la fois la production et les importations ont ete soumis au cours des demi eres annees a des pressions pour qu ils liberalisent leurs politiques commerciales ce memoire examine les effets de concessions faites aux importateurs sur la repartition des rentes dans les industries oiu l offre est geree meme si ces concessions reduisent le bien etre des producteurs on montre qu il faut que les concessions soient re lativement importantes pour que les producteurs soient plus mal en point sous un regime d offre geree que sous un regime de libre echange ceci est particulierement vrai dans le cas des industries caracterisees par une demande inelastique et une faible portion du marche allant aux importations en regime de libre echange pour ce qui est du niveau de bien etre social net les politiques dessinees dans le but de transf6rer les rentes aux producteurs via la gestion de l offre engendrent des pertes plus importantes quand on y ajoute aussi des concessions aux importateurs

least cost subsidization alternatives this paper addresses the problem of designing least cost subsidy schemes for agriculture thus it departs somewhat from the mainstream of the literature on agricultural policy analysis which following wallace s pioneering work focuses on evaluating alternative policies in a welfare theoretic context the approach taken here is more closely related to that taken in the optimal taxation literature e g mirrlees it involves the specification of a goal of farm policy and an examination of appropriate policy instruments to achieve that goal the only policy instruments considered are linear subsidies i e subsidies all individuals receive while the criterion for choosing among alternative subsidy schemes is the minimization of government expenditure hence we are interested in isolating the cheapest way of attaining a stated policy objective and we do not consider the welfare consequences of such policy action no use is made of traditional welfare measures like deadweight loss and consumer surplus the approach is purely positive and therefore ignores issues like those raised in gardner s recent paper on efficient redistribution of eco

measuring the social costs of suboptimal combinations of policy instruments a general framework and an example abstract since most agricultural programs employ two or more policy instruments simultaneously it is notable that little research has attempted to find optimal instrument combinations and no research exists which evaluates the social costs unrealized benefits of combining instruments suboptimally in our paper we report a simple and feasible method to find optimal policy instrument combinations and we provide the first general formal approach to measuring the social costs of suboptimal policy instrument combinations our approach is illustrated in an analysis for five major u s crops corn feed grains wheat rice cotton the simple model we employ for the illustration suggests that except for the feed grains program the observed programs combined policy instruments quite suboptimally we conclude that agricultural economics research now can and should begin placing increased emphasis on studying optimal policy instrument combinations

the economics of coupled farm subsidies under costly and imperfect enforcement this study relaxes the assumption of perfect and costless policy enforcement found in traditional agricultural policy analysis and introduces enforcement costs and cheating into the economic analysis of output subsidies policy design and implementation is modeled in this paper as a sequential game between the regulator who decides on the level of intervention an enforcement agency that determines the level of policy enforcement and the farmer who makes the production and cheating decisions analytical results show that farmer compliance is not the natural outcome of self interest and complete deterrence of cheating is not economically efficient the analysis also shows that enforcement costs and cheating change the welfare effects of output subsidies the efficiency of the policy instrument in redistributing income the level of government intervention that transfers a given surplus to agricultural producers the socially optimal income redistribution and the social welfare from intervention

the political economy of u s wheat legislation bruce a babcock colin a carter and andrew schmitz both taxpayer subsidies to u s wheat producers and domestic deadweight losses increased as a result of the u s wheat program adopted in 1985 a calculation of the costs and benefits of alternative wheat policies shows that mandatory production controls with no taxpayer expense could have made wheat producers as well off as the adopted policy becker s theory of competition among interest groups and peltzman s theory of the equilibrium amount of regulation are shown to be consistent with the observed policy choice if the list of affected interest groups includes agricultural input suppliers and grain marketing firms i introduction every five years congress drafts new farm legislation dictating the provisions of commodity programs for cotton and the major food and feed grains for the subsequent five years from 1973 through 1985 the primary features of the commodity programs were guaranteed farm prices and government stockholding activities deadweight losses from the programs during this time were minimal market prices were generally higher than the government defended price floors because of a booming export market legislated increases in commodity support prices combined with a severe drop off in the demand for agricultural exports beginning in 1982 increased the economic costs of the commodity programs the u s price floor became the world price for wheat cotton and corn grain stocks accumulated while government payments to u s farmers grew to unprecedented levels most agricultural interest groups in 1984 agreed that an overhaul of agricultural policy was necessary supporters of large levels of production and exports wanted to stimulate the demand for exports by eliminating price floors others felt that the united states should reduce budgetary costs by using direct supply controls to raise farm prices the clear winners in the new 1985 farm bill were the proponents of maintained production levels and expanded exports the new policy froze the relatively high supply prices received by farmers while simultaneously lowering price floors becker 1983 argues that two forces mainly determine the outcome of policy debates the first following stigler 1971 and peltzman 1976 is the relative efficiency with which interest groups exert political pressure interest groups that are efficient in exerting political pressure can increase the subsidization or decrease the tax burden of their constituents the second force is the extent of deadweight losses associated with proposed policies those policies with lower deadweight losses are ceteris paribus more likely to be adopted for the simple reason that less tax needs to be collected from losing interest groups for given transfers to winning groups gardner 1987 finds empirical evidence that both the ability to redistribute efficiently and the effectiveness of political organizations help explain which farm commodities have received the most government support since 1930 his study provides little insight however into which force is more important in determining the type of redistribution policies that are ultimately adopted for a given commodity an examination of the wheat program adopted in the 1985 farm bill and alternative policies that were rejected provides an opportunity to determine whether the efficiency of programs or the political prowess of interest groups is more important in determining policy outcomes this task requires a calculation of the magnitudes and the distribution of costs and benefits of the chosen policy and alternative policies costs and benefits are calculated for 1 a continuation of the 1981 farm bill policies through 1986 1990 2 the adopted 1985 farm bill policies and 3 mandatory production controls all three alternatives are examined relative to a laissez faire policy whereby the u s government has no direct involvement in agriculture

unemployment insurance and labor contracts under asymmetric information theory and facts the paper provides evidence to show that many u s labor contracts havelittle or no private unemployment insurance provision a model of an optional contract under asymmetric information with no private unemployment insurance is presented underemployment and involuntaryunemployment may coexist copyright 1986 by american economic association

firm level contracting and the structure of wages in spain in many european countries sectoral bargaining agreements are automatically extended to cover all firms in an industry employers and employees can also negotiate firm specific contracts the authors of this paper use a large matched employer employee data set from a 1995 survey in spain to study the effects of firm level contracting on the structure of wages they estimate a series of wage determination models including specifications that control for individual characteristics coworker characteristics the bargaining status of the workplace and the probability that the workplace was covered by a firm level contract they find that firm level contracting was associated with a 5 10 wage premium with larger premiums for more highly paid workers although they cannot decisively test between alternative explanations for the firm level contracting premium they find that workers with firm specific contracts had substantially longer job tenure than other workers suggesting that the premium was at least

unions wages and productivity some evidence from uk engineering firms estimates of union wage and productivity effects are derived using primary micro level panel data for a sample of firms in the uk engineering industry union wage differentials of the order of 10 are suggested from the results whereas union productivity impacts appear to be non linear with respect to union density

the perverse effects of partial labour market reform fixed term contracts in france we argue that the effects of a partial reform of employment protection by allowing firms to hire workers on fixed term contracts may be perverse the main effect may be high turnover in entry level jobs leading to higher not lower unemployment even if unemployment falls workers may be worse off going through many spells of unemployment and entry level jobs before obtaining a regular job considering french data for young workers since the early 1980s we conclude that the reforms have substantially increased turnover without a substantial reduction in unemployment duration if anything the effect on their welfare appears to have been negative

consequences of discretion in the formation of commodities policy abstract in a simple model of endogenous primary commodity price support policy i policy is affected by private inventories and ii private inventories are affected by speculative attempts to forecast policy the interaction between these two forces is rich yielding bubbles and extrinsic volatility thus helping to explain some odd episodes observed in commodity markets in addition under some conditions a government that wishes to support the price but is unable to commit to future action may be impotent and a government that does not want to support the price may be trapped into doing so by speculative activity

policies and institutions in transition economies a political economy perspective on the agri food sector abstract this paper argues that since democratic governments are vulnerable to political pressure they should intervene with policies and institutions only when the net economic benefits exceed the costs incurred through increased political access if governments in transition economies are to exercise control it is important that public institutions within and supporting the agri food sector are designed in such a way as to restrain political incentives in practice this means that they should be built so as to take advantage of inherent scale economies

crop insurance in a political economy an alternative perspective on agricultural policy lawmakers often subsidize farmers in times of financial distress this article models this political impulse as a constraint on government farm policy describing how ex ante government farm insurance can deter ex post disaster relief and improve production incentives by countering the moral hazard that otherwise prevails absent ex ante government policy ex post relief takes the form of revenue insurance which prompts excessive entry into farm production and under production by operating farmers ex ante government policy can raise economic and political welfare by buying out low productivity farmers and offering profitable farmers a combination of revenue insurance price supports and a program participation fee copyright 2003 oxford university press

on the deadweight cost of production requirements for geographically differentiated agricultural products this article investigates the welfare effects of alternate producer collusion schemes in a context where collusion is authorized in order to cover fixed costs using a linear equilibrium displacement model we find evidence that when the producer group is allowed to control quota levels an input quota policy entails a smaller absolute deadweight loss than an output quota policy this finding suggests that if producer groups are allowed to resort to production distorting instruments to limit output they will make production choices that are less costly for society than if they had been allowed to directly control output levels copyright 2008 oxford university press

how unions affect productivity in manufacturing plants this study investigates several hypotheses as to how unions may affect productivity analysis of data from 46 manufacturing plants for 1982 indicates a negative union impact on productivity the author finds evidence suggesting that unions reduce the effectiveness of some managerial practices undertaken to increase productivity and that a poor labor management relations climate also reduces productivity these two factors account for almost 50 percent of the negative union impact

the political ideology of food abstract using data from a survey of over 700 americans we sought to measure and investigate the nature of citizen s political ideologies in relation to food results reveal that a majority of respondents can be classified as food statists desiring more government action in the realm food and agricultural relative to the status quo people s ideologies with regard to food were multidimensional falling along lines related to food health and quality food safety and farm subsidies respondents were most in favor of additional government action related to food safety food ideology was related to conventional measures of political ideology with for example more liberal respondents desiring more government involvement in food than more conservative respondents but the relationship was far from determinative suggesting food ideology represents a unique construct in its own right

causes of u s farm commodity programs this paper i s an attempt to explain variations by commodity in producer protection afforded by farm price support programs since the1930s particularly emphasized are theideas that these programs are essentially income redistributional measures and that given political forces the programs are attempts to redistribute efficiently variables associated with the cost to producers of generating political pressure and the social cost deadweight losses of redistribution are both found to be empirically important copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

food costs and the 1988 us drought abstract alternative government stock policies are evaluated in terms of their effects on the us livestock sector and consumer food prices before and after the 1988 drought using a comprehensive model of the us agricultural sector stock levels associated with the food security act of 1985 fsa85 are compared with those of a reduced stock policy this option reduced government corn stocks to zero and lowered overall stocks by almost 2 million bushels prior to the drought saving taxpayers about 15 billion compared to the observed level of spending associated with fsa85 however consumers were projected to spend almost 40 billion more following the drought in higher food particularly meat costs because of the dramatic shock lower corn stocks would have on corn prices and the livestock sector

a roll call analysis of the endangered species act amendments public choice economics view legislative process as a transaction in the political market interest groups demand regulation in their favor and lobby lawmakers the lawmakers analyze an assortment of factors and supply legislation to the winning group thereby maximizing their rent from the political market this article examines endangered species act esa amendments from a public choice perspective congressional voting on the esa amendments are assessed using a model based on political incentive and ideology the results show that the lawmakers voting behavior is correlated with their party affiliation ideology and several characteristics of their home state such as number of endangered species proportion of urban population contribution of the natural resources and construction sectors in gross state product and geographical location copyright 2001 oxford university press

deadweight costs and the size of government abstract we provide a model for analyzing effects of the tax system and spending programs on the determination of government spending and taxpayer welfare an improvement in the efficiency of either taxes or spending would reduce political pressure for suppressing the growth of government and thereby increase total tax revenue and spending we demonstrate the similarity of the political responses to revenue shocks spending shocks changes in tax efficiency and changes in spending program efficiency empirical analysis of oil shocks intergovernmental grants and other autonomous changes in taxes or spending indicates that cause and effect is not only from spending to tax structures

intervention bias in agricultural policy abstract this paper re examines the motivation for government intervention in agriculture to support farm prices and incomes a model is outlined in which the government has a preference for higher farm incomes but fails to provide farmers with the socially optimal level of price support even when one accepts the government s income redistribution goals as a valid reflection of social preference it is shown that agricultural policy has an intervention bias government price supports generally are higher than would be socially optimal the source of the intervention bias is a time inconsistency in optimal agricultural policy formation caused by the government s inability to precommit to a rule for setting future price support levels simulation results indicate that in some circumstances the intervention bias in agricultural policy can be substantial

enforcement of implicit employment contracts through unionization in a world in which employment contracts are incomplete it is costly for a firm to establish credibility for honoring implicit terms of employment agreements by monitoring the employment relationships between the firm and its workers the labor union may provide the workforce with valuable information regarding the firm s adherence to these implicit agreements thus the union provides a signaling mechanism that allows workers to coordinate their actions in order to discipline the firm for a breach of the implicit contract this mechanism enhances the firm s credibility when forming employment contracts and facilitates increased employment levels

least cost cheap food policies some implications of international food aid abstract many low income countries pursue cheap food policies in which consumers pay subsidized prices for bread rice and other staples this paper addresses the issue of why different governments select different food subsidy policies using multiple instruments rather than a simple across the board subsidy to provide consumers with access to cheap food it examines the optimal structure of cheap food policies in the context of a partial equilibrium model in which the country may be large in trade and is able to combine import subsidies or tariffs and output taxes or subsidies to transfer income to consumers through the market the model allows for a marginal opportunity cost of government revenues greater than one dollar in addition in the model food aid from overseas may be either given away to the consumer or given to the government for subsequent sale in the domestic market the results indicate that only by happenstance will a country choose to use a pure consumption subsidy or a pure import subsidy to transfer income to consumers in addition an increase in international food aid does not necessarily lead the government to reduce producer and consumer prices for a commodity

appropriation violent enforcement and transaction costs a critical survey this paper focuses on the extension of transaction costs to appropriative activity and coercive power in the property rights approach it has been argued that including the costs of appropriation and violent enforcement in transaction costs is based on the assumption that coaseian bargaining can be extended to any institutional scenario i e voluntary as well as coercive exchange however voluntary transactions cannot capture the logic of coercive power this means that the assumption of an efficient political market is not valid and that the political coase theorem lacks the logical consistency to provide a cornerstone for political theory

why not cut pay abstract i interviewed over 300 business people labor leaders business consultants and counselors of unemployed people all in the northeast of the united states during the recession of the early 1990 s in order to learn why wages and salaries declined in only a few firms employers were reluctant to cut pay because they believed doing so would hurt employee morale leading to lower productivity and current or future difficulties with hiring and retention it was thought that these effects would in the end cost more than the savings from lower pay there were few indications that unemployed people had excessive wage expectations on the contrary many unemployed were too flexible and found themselves rejected by firms as overqualified in most companies pay cuts were not a useful alternative to layoffs because pay cuts would not make it worthwhile to retain many employees and because layoffs harmed morale less than would pay cuts the findings support none of the theories of wage rigidity except those of solow and akerlof that emphasize morale

efficient redistribution using quotas and subsidies in the presence of misrepresentation and cheating this paper introduces misrepresentation and cheating into the policy analysis of output quotas and subsidies analytical results show that when cheating occurs output quotas are a less efficient means of income redistribution than is traditionally believed as well cheating increases the transfer efficiency of output subsidies the result is that an all or nothing choice between quotas and subsidies will generally favor the use of subsidies a combination of quotas and subsidies however usually remains the most efficient means of income redistribution through market intervention a key assumption in agricultural policy analysis is that farmers follow the provisions of the policy instruments in the manner desired by the policy maker or alternatively that it is costless to ensure that farmers do so in reality however farmers may be expected to act opportunistically when faced with an agricultural policy when a production quota is in effect farmers may cheat by overproducing and selling the above quota amount through alternative channels under an output subsidy scheme farmers may report and collect on a greater quantity of production than they actually produced the possibility of misrepresentation and cheating arises because it is costly to determine farmers actions because of this cost farmers are in a position to misrepresent their quantity of production and or to cheat very few studies have incorporated misrepresentation or cheating in theoretical agricultural policy analysis one exception is alston and smith who raise the question of cheating and black market activity in an examination of rationing in an industry with an effective minimum price policy in place studies that deal with farmer opportunism can also konstantinos giannakas is an assistant professor in the department of agricultural economics university of nebraska lincoln murray fulton is director centre for the study of co

are government transfers efficient an alternative test of the efficient redistribution hypothesis the efficient redistribution hypothesis says that no available government policies are pareto superior to observed government policies efficient redistribution from government policy is a central tenet of much recent theoretical and applied political economy literature in this paper limitations of previous attempts to test the efficient redistribution hypothesis are discussed and an alternative test of the efficient redistribution hypothesis that uses vector optimization theory and bootstrap methodology is presented

the economic effects of supply controls the simple analytics of the u s peanut program a gricultural commodity programs employ a wide variety of policy tools to regulate u s agriculture price supports are the most common form of intervention but rights to sell at the supported price are allocated very differently under different commodity programs under recent feed grain programs for example the right to sell at the supported price is linked to acreage set asides agreements not to produce on certain acres in other programs sales by individual farmers are controlled under marketing orders sponsored by the u s department of agriculture usda 2 a third method is through permanent maketing quotas that directly limit output only two major commodity programs those for tobacco and peanuts currently allocate the right to sell in this way the peanut program is the subject of this article 3

the goals of u s agricultural policy a mechanism design approach this article examines motivations underlying the government s choice of alternative policy mechanisms for subsidizing agriculture optimal policies are analyzed for three government objectives one where the government wishes to ensure a minimum level of net income for all farmers a second where the government s only concern is to transfer income from consumers and taxpayers to the farm sector and a final augmented income transfer objective the analysis offers an explanation for agricultural policy mechanisms that involve overproduction by high cost producers relative to a free market equilibrium such a distortion might arise from the existence of nonmarket values for the production of relatively high cost farmers in the government s objective

specification induced uncertainty in the estimation of trade union wage differentials from industry level data at a more specific level the paper is concerned with the estimation of union non union wage differentials from industry level data for the uk manufacturing sector metcalf 1977 reviewing the evidence from such industry level studies concludes that they suggest that a figure of 20 per cent may not be dreadfully in error for the average earnings differential received by manual workers who are covered by a collective agreement a more recent study at the individual level for union membership stewart 1983 suggests that a figure of below 10 per cent may be more appropriate however metcalf s summary figure remains representative of the industrylevel evidence this paper concentrates on two particular problems inherent in these industry level studies and in studies in other areas using such cross section data the first of these concerns the potential industry specificity of parameter values in the case of union wage differentials the marshallian laws of derived demand provide theoretical grounds for expecting the differential to vary across industries failure to take proper account of this will in general result in biased estimation even of the average differential in addition interpreting the estimated average differential as if it were that to be found in a typical industry may be a highly misleading representation of the impact of collective bargaining on the wage structure section i of this paper is concerned with this inter industry variation in the differetial and in particular with modelling how the differential varies with the extent of coverage in the industry our finding is that there is a large inter industry variation in the differential with the average being made up of a large differential in a small group of industries and a much smaller and insignificant differential in the majority of industries in such circumstances the estimated average differential is not representative of that prevailing in either group

judging agricultural policies a survey this survey provides a structured picture of 40 years of literature which uses welfare economic tools to judge agricultural policy challenges and developments of normative agricultural policy analysis are discussed in an easily accessible graphical framework it is shown how the literature has gone from examining a very small discrete set of simple policies to a much broader often continuous set of policies that combine policy instruments simultaneously the importance of the pareto criterion used to explore the limits of how government can affect welfare is revealed moreover given the importance of the objective of income redistribution in agricultural policy agricultural economists have often departed from the purely efficiency oriented tradition in economics it is shown that they have tried to incorporate equity considerations by either adding these criteria as constraints to the social welfare function or directly incorporating these criteria in the functional form of the social welfare function

efficient redistribution through commodity markets efficiency in redistribution is measured in terms of deadweight loss generated per dollar of economic surplus transferred between consumers and producers of a commodity by means of market intervention the implications of supply and demand elasticities for efficiency in redistribution are examined with special attention to the comparison of production control and deficiency payment programs the results may be used to aid in the evaluation of commodity programs and as a basis for consideration of the hypothesis that observed policies are efficient given the political power of interest groups

goals and consequences of rice policy in japan 1965 80 the change in welfare of producers and consumers government cost and the deadweight loss arising from the various forms of government interventions into the rice market in order to protect domestic producers in japan are estimated in a partial equilibrium framework results of the quantitative analysis indicate that the motivation of the government was to minimize budget costs in achieving the target level of producer price support while consumer welfare had an insignificant weight in the government s objective function it is aiso found that acreage control is a second best policy to reduce social inefficiency produced from other forms of market distortions

wage bargaining and nominal rigidities abstract delays in wage negotiations do not necessarily mean work stoppage production can continue under the terms of the old contract while the parties are bargaining holdout this holdout option is included in a strategic bargaining game in addition to strike and lock out threats integrating the bargaining model in a standard macroeconomic framework it turns out that holdout threats will prevail under certain circumstances in this case wages will be rigid in nominal terms so that an increase in aggregate nominal demand increases aggregate output

why firms avoid cutting wages survey evidence from european firms firms very rarely cut nominal wages even in the face of considerable negative economic shocks this paper uses a unique survey of fourteen european countries to ask firms directly about the incidence of wage cuts and to assess the relevance of a range of potential reasons for why the firms avoid cutting wages the paper examines how firm characteristics and collective bargaining institutions affect the relevance of each of the common explanations put forward for the infrequency of wage cuts concerns about the retention of productive staff and a lowering of morale and effort were reported as key reasons for downward wage rigidity across all countries and firm types restrictions created by collective bargaining were found to be an important consideration for firms in western european eu 15 countries but were one of the lowest ranked obstacles in the new eu member states in central and eastern europe

policy dependency and reform economic gains versus political pains economic analysis condemns market intervention in favour of farmers as inefficient and ineffective and therefore worthy of radical reform practical experience however indicates that such lessons are hard to learn and implement economic analysis tends to ignore the path dependencies generated by the policy evolution process without reform strategies that take full account of these dependencies policy reform will continue to be reluctant slow and frequently counterproductive this paper reconsiders the evolution of farm policies and the economic assessment of their costs and benefits in so doing it re phrases conventional economic arguments in terms which seem to accord better with sensible intuition which may prove more accessible and credible to policymakers and advisors the difficulties of reconciling economic efficiency with political acceptability are identified the paper concludes with a substantial challenge to the agricultural economics profession

how strong is the macroeconomic case for downward real wage rigidity we explore the existence of downward real wage rigidity drwr at the industry level based on data from 19 oecd countries for the period 1973 1999 the results show that drwr compresses the distributions of industry wage changes overall as well as for specific geographical regions and time periods but there are not many real wage cuts that are prevented more important however drwr attenuates larger real wage cuts thus leading to higher real wages there is stronger evidence for downward nominal wage rigidity than for drwr real wage cuts are less prevalent in countries with strict employment protection legislation and high union density

a deep recession came with deep wage cuts abstract while economists historically have considered wages rigid downwards recent studies have shown that cuts in nominal wages are more common than previously thought the deep recession experienced in iceland in 2008 coupled with iceland s flexible labor market provided an extreme example of a labor market that experienced widespread and deep cuts in nominal wages data covering two fifths of the labor market showed that 80 of employees experienced a nominal cut in regular hourly wages between 2008 and 2010 the data was collected directly from organizations and excluded the effects of a change in hours worked nominal hourly wages for full time work were cut by 9 3 on average at the same time inflation measured 18

from senators to the president solve the lumber problem or else we use key events associated in the two decade long u s canada softwood lumber trade dispute to present the dynamic relationship between u s congress and the administration in the formation of international trade policy we find that the executive branch of the u s government responded quickly to several letters from a group of u s senators demanding a solution to the lumber problem a roll call analysis is used to identify factors influencing senators willingness to sign these letters and pressure the president on behalf of the u s lumber industry the results show that the economic importance of the lumber industry in a senator s home state is positively correlated with signatory on these letters and that the presence of a large housing industry in a state makes a senator less likely to sign these letters

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

agricultural policies in the presence of distorting taxes this article analyzes how distortionary factor taxes affect the welfare impacts of production subsidies production quotas acreage controls subsidies for acreage reductions and cash transfers to farmers pre existing taxes substantially raise the costs of all these policies these additional costs reflect the welfare losses from financing certain policies by distortionary taxes they also reflect interactions with factor markets caused by changes in the costs of producing agricultural output previous studies ignore the latter types of effect consequently they significantly overstate the costs of production subsidies and understate the costs of production quotas acreage controls and subsidies for acreage reductions

the incidence of agricultural policies abstract a general equilibrium model is used to analyze agricultural policy incidence in the presence of distortionary income taxation the incidence of lump sum transfers to farmers supply control through input retirement and production subsidies are considered partial equilibrium incidence calculations are shown to systematically overstate the benefits farmers receive from farm programs kaldor s compensation test is used to judge the relative efficiency inefficiency of alternative farm programs at the margin supply control through input retirement may dominate decoupled lump sum transfers if the tax system is very inefficient and subsidy payments are high

downward nominal and real wage rigidity survey evidence from european firms it has been well established that the wages of individual workers react little especially downwards to shocks that hit their employer this paper presents new evidence from a unique survey of firms across europe on the prevalence of downward wage rigidity in both real and nominal terms the authors analyse which firm level and institutional factors are associated with wage rigidity the results indicate that it is related to workforce composition at the establishment level in a manner that is consistent with related theoretical models e g efficiency wage theory insider outsider theory the analysis also finds that wage rigidity depends on the labour market institutional environment collective bargaining coverage is positively related with downward real wage rigidity measured on the basis of wage indexation downward nominal wage rigidity is positively associated with the extent of permanent contracts and this effect is stronger in countries with stricter employment protection regulations

cooperative game theory and the measurement of political power many studies using the political preference function ppf approach to measure the political powers of agricultural interest groups have been criticized for offering little theoretical justification for their methodology zusman p 447 beghin and karp p 51 bullock 1994 it has been claimed that cooperative game theory developed by nash 1950 1953 and harsanyi 1963 1977 provides a formal theoretical basis for ppf methodology zusman rausser and zusman 1992 forthcoming zusman and amiad beghin beghin and karp in this paper i present a brief discussion of the geometry of cooperative game theory and discuss and critique studies that have attempted to apply it to empirical studies of the political economy of agriculture

impacts of minimum quality standards imposed through marketing orders or related producer organizations we analyze the impacts of minimum quality standards mqs imposed by producers acting collectively through a producer organization such as a marketing order mqs imposed in a competitive market can never enhance social welfare because in general an mqs creates two deadweight losses one due to inefficient enhancement of product quality and a second due to wastage of the low quality product any mqs that a competitive industry implements based upon a profit criterion causes all consumers in the market to be harmed however an mqs may be preferred relative to supply control as a second best instrument for transferring income to producers