coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game we examine a legislative voting game where decisions are being made over both ideological and distributive dimensions and legislators preferences are separable over the two dimensions in equilibrium legislators prefer to make proposals for the two dimensions together rather than offering sequential proposals on the two dimensions separately the equilibria exhibit interaction between the ideological and distributive dimensions and in any equilibrium there is a positive probability that a proposal is made and approved which excludes the median legislator as defined over the ideological dimension in contrast with a game where no distributive decision is being made moreover in any stationary equilibrium there is more than one ideological decision that has a positive probability of being proposed and approved we show that legislators can gain from forming political parties and consider examples where predictions can be made about the composition of parties we discuss the impact of political parties on the outcome

bargaining foundations of shapley value1 a transferable utility economy in which each agent holds a resource which can be used in combination with the resources of other agents to generate value according to the characteristic function v is studied using a dynamic model of bargaining the main theorem establishes that the payoffs associated with efficient equilibria converge to the agents shapley values as the time between periods of the dynamic game goes to zero in addition it is demonstrated that an efficient equilibrium exists and is unique when an additivity condition is satisfied to demonstrate the sensitivity of the solution to the institutional detail we modify the model to allow for partnerships and show that the shapley value is no longer achieved

bargaining and value we present and analyze a model of noncooperative bargaining among n participants applied to situations describable as games in coalitional form this leads to a unified solution theory for such games that has as special cases the shapley value in the transferable utility tu case the nash bargaining solution in the pure bargaining case and the recently introduced maschler owen consistent value in the general nontransferable utility ntu case moreover we show that any variation in a certain class of our bargaining procedure which generates the shapley value in the tu setup must yield the consistent value in the general ntu setup

normal costs and demand effects in price setting a study of retailing the study aims at contributing to the debate whether there are demand effects in models that seek to explain prices as mark ups on costs for costs it considers actual costs normal costs and an intermediate model with a partial adjustment to the deviation of actual from normal costs for demand effects it considers an effect on the price level of a change of demand with an allowance for asymmetry between demand growth and demand decline tests and estimates are conducted on the basis of data from retailing

optimal capital structure and bankruptcy choice dynamic bargaining versus liquidation abstract we model a firm s optimal capital structure decision in a framework in which it may later choose to enter either chapter 11 reorganization or chapter 7 liquidation creditors anticipate equityholders ex post reorganization incentives and price them into the ex ante credit spreads using a realistic dynamic bargaining model of reorganization we show that the off equilibrium threat of costly renegotiation can lead to lower leverage even with liquidation in equilibrium if reorganization is less efficient than liquidation the added option of reorganization can actually make equityholders worse off ex ante even when they liquidate on the equilibrium path

retail margins during recession and growth the influence of consumer spending on retail price setting behaviour is investigated in the context of a theory developed in previous research the results indicate that the effect is not the same for growth and decline of spending

coalition formation and bargaining protocols a review of the literature this paper offers a review of the vast literature regarding bargaining and coalition formation this topic has been generally described as the attempt to provide strategic foundations to cooperative solution concepts it can therefore be seen as the linking ring between the non cooperative and the cooperative game theoretic approach to coalition formation its central role in economic theory and its relatively long history that goes back to the nash program have fostered a large academic production including surveys nonetheless this paper will focus on an aspect that is often neglected in the dedicated surveys the specificities of the bargaining protocols leading to different outcomes although generally downgraded to the rank of details the differences in bargaining protocols even when minor can cause significant changes in fundamental aspects such as the possibility to reach full cooperation the distribution of final pay offs and the time taken to reach an agreement focused on externalities free games therefore on bargaining protocols sustaining solution concepts for cooperative games in characteristic function form the paper aims at providing a brief but exhaustive review of the topic that could result in a very useful tool for any researcher approaching the subject of coalitional bargaining

the impact of demand and price expectations on the behavior of prices the effects of demand and price expectations on price behavior are analyzed using data from the manufacturing sector and a model formulated to pinpoint the demand oriented factors affecting prices and to incorporate price expectations as a direct influence on price behavior the expected normal demand is seen to have a strong and systemic influence on price behavior the expected normal level of new orders is found to be an adequate measure with sector data in general although some industries require more specification the effects of inventories and unfilled orders on prices are sporadic and across sectors and industries demand oriented forces are concluded to perform as well statistically as cost push determinants expectations concerning the current normal industry price level have a significant and consistent impact on price behavior this supports the idea that firms setting prices take into account their estimates of competitor s prices future price expectations appear to have little effect on current price information 15 references

an evaluation of excess demand actual cost and normal cost pricing hypotheses using non nested tests this paper has emperically analyzed three versions zero lag geometric lag and almon lag of three price change hypotheses namely the excess demand actual cost and the normal cost hypothesis the goal being to select the hypothesis that describes the underlying price dynamics for manufactured goods the rival models are specified as non nested alternatives and each version is estimated by using an efficient estimator the traditional discrimination criteria which clearly reject the zero lag version are found to be impotent in discriminating between the dynamic versions of the models a sequential cross evaluation of the two dynamic versions using both pairwise and multiple non nested hypothesis tests proposed by davidson and mackinnon reveals a systematic domination by the almon version of normal cost pricing over both the excess demand and the actual cost pricing mechanisms in the canadian manufacturing sector during the period 1961 1 87 4 this result is robust under alternative specifications of th

some effects of business environment on retail firms abstractthis paper empirically tests how formal retail entrepreneurs perception about the business environment in cameroon affects the performance of the retail sector i use business owners responses from the 2009 enterprise survey to estimate an econometric model that corrects for heteroscedasticity the results show that regulation costs corruption credit constraints and lack of infrastructure negatively affect the gross margins of firms in contrast the competition of the informal sector perceived by many formal entrepreneurs as a major constraint is positively associated with the gross margins of formal firms policy implications are discussed

the outputs of retail activities concepts measurement and evidence from u s census data the authors develop a new economic framework for the empirical analysis of retail margins this framework formalizes the role of distribution services as outputs of retail activities their main results are the following the measures of outputs of retail activities identified in the data perform as important and robust determinants of retail margins variables that purport to capture oligopolistic features of market structure play a limited or no role in determining retail margins quantity setting and price setting under the assumptions of profit maximization and monopolistic competition are categorically rejected by the data the data base is information on 49 retail sectors from the 1982 u s census of retail trades copyright 1993 by mit press

equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining this paper considers a market where pairs of agents who are interested in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process and upon meeting initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction the basic bargaining problem is treated with the strategic approach the paper derives the steady state equilibrium agreements analyzes their dependence on market conditions such as the relative numbers of agents of different types and discusses their relations with the competitive equilibrium outcome and other results in the search equilibrium literature this paper considers a market that operates in the following way pairs of agents who have mutual interest in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process when two agents meet they initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction if two agents reach an agreement a transaction takes place and they leave the market of course the bargaining positions and hence the agreement reached in any particular meeting will be affected by the conditions prevailing in the market these will include the chances that each of the negotiating parties have of meeting other partners in the event that the agreement in the current negotiations is delayed also the expected length of time required to achieve an alternative transaction and the expected behavior of alternative partners the study of such a market mechanism is of interest for two reasons firstly it captures some realistic aspects of the trade in certain specific markets e g asset markets such as housing and some labor markets secondly it contributes to an understanding of the micro mechanisms of price formation and their role in shaping market outcomes in both cases the features studied are largely neglected in the traditional market equilibrium analyses the related literature includes the articles by diamond 4 5 diamond and maskin 6 mortensen 8 9 and zusman and bell 13 these articles consider markets of the type described above in which transactions are concluded at pairwise meetings of agents the major difference between our work and these articles is in the approach to the basic bargaining problem in the cited articles it is assumed that a meeting is concluded with an instantaneous agreement which divides the associated surplus in an arbitrary predetermined way when the surplus is assumed to be divided equally the division rule is in fact nash s axiomatic bargaining solution in contrast the present paper treats the basic bargaining problem with the strategic approach see rubinstein 19 which constitutes an attempt to look into the bargaining black box this approach explicitly models the time dimension of the bargaining process describes in detail the bargaining procedure and justifies the agreement as a perfect equilibrium in

manufacturing margins differences between small and large firms the influence of labour costs concentration capacity utilization exports and firm size on manufacturing profit margin is studied with a discrimination between small and large firms

a model of pricing behavior an econometric case study empirical pricing studies are scarce in the modern literature in spite of their obvious importance for understanding competition the present study employs a structural model to identify deviations of individual pricing routines from the commonly assumed single period profit maximization it is applied to individual wholesale firms because wholesale pricing has a decisive influence on the price formation in the entire economic system and because hardly any research exists in this area the results show that wholesale firms operate in imperfectly competitive world markets providing a highly differentiated service package traders apply pricing rules consistent with cost mark up pricing the mark up varies among traders with the extent to which a firm s pricing strategy deviates from full profit maximization this divergent behavior is associated with firm size the type of buyers served and other aspects of the wholesale service package

a theory of dynamic oligopoly ii price competition kinked demand curves and edgeworth cycles we provide game theoretic foundations for the classic kinked demand curve equilibrium and edgeworth cycle we analyze a model in which firms take turns choosing prices the model is intended to capture the idea of reactions based on short run commitment in a markov perfect equilibrium mpe a firm s move in any period depends only on the other firm s current price there are multiple mpe s consisting of both kinked demand curve equilibria and edgeworth cycles in any mpe profit is bounded away from the bertrand equilibrium level we show that a kinked demand curve at the monopoly price is the unique symmetric renegotiation proof equilibrium when there is little discounting we then endogenize the timing by allowing firms to move at any time subject to short run commitments we find that firms end up alternating thus vindicating the ad hoc timing assumption of our simpler model we also discuss how the model can be enriched to provide explanations for excess capacity and market sharing keiiwords tacit collusion markov perfect equilibrium kinked demand curve edgeworth cycle excess capacity market sharing endogenous timing

bargaining with asymmetric threat points abstract the 2 person version of hart and mas colell econometrica 64 1996 357 is studied reinterpreted as a bargaining game with asymmetric threat points multiplicity of stationary subgame perfect equilibria is necessary for multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria and depends on risk aversion and the point constructed with the payoff that responders get if breakdown occurs

harsanyi values of large economies nonequivalence to competitive equilibria abstract we consider economies with many agents and compare the competitive equilibria and the value allocations of the resulting coalitional games in particular we provide a smooth and robust example where the value principle does not hold for the harsanyi ntu value there is a unique competitive equilibrium which however does not belong to the nonempty set of harsanyi value allocations journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 d51

market disequilibria and their influence on small retail store pricing in this paper a quantitative model is developed to explain differences in average store price levels we assume that stores may operate under different economic regimes that is under excess capacity or excess demand prices are expected to the higher than average in case of an excess demand regime and lower in an excess capacity situation actual information regarding the regime that applies to each individual store is not available therefore we propose to use a so called switching model with endogenous regime choice to analyse the store price differences the model developed in the paper is estimated using four largely differing types of stores from the dutch retail trade these samples consist mainly of small stores

legislative bargaining under weighted voting organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting we analyze this setting using a non cooperative bargaining game based on the baron ferejohn 1989 model unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory we find that each voter s expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight an exception occurs when many high weight voters exist as low weight voters may expect disproportionately high payoffs due to proposal power the model also predicts that ex post the coalition formateur the party chosen to form a coalition will receive a disproportionately high payoff using data from coalition governments from 1946 to 2001 we find strong evidence ofsuch formateur effects

non cooperative bargaining and union formation we study a union formation decision problem when workers consist of two groups distinguished by different productivities workers may form either a joint union or two separate unions the whole decision process is modelled as an extensive form bargaining game workers form a joint union when the sizes or productivities of the groups are similar in the first case there is a wage differential which is more less than proportional to the productivity difference if the size of the more productive is smaller larger than that of the less productive in the second case there is no wage differential in this paper we study a union formation decision problem when workers consist of two groups distinguished by different productivities they may form either a joint union or two separate unions depending on the relative size and productivity of the two groups the whole decision process is modelled as an extensive form bargaining game in which the two groups of workers bargain with each other as well as with a firm the labour market is sharply distinguished from the goods market by the widespread practice of collective bargaining usually several groups of workers with different characteristics for example skill level or geographical location are represented as a single unit and or several employers form a single bargaining unit against a giant union this multiplicity of bargaining units creates a complicated bargaining structure and makes the outcome hard to analyse the purpose of this paper is to provide a model which captures this complexity and at the same time clarifies the underlying structure of bargaining power although economists have been aware of the multiplicity problem for a long time it has been received little rigorous theoretical treatment until recently davidson 1985 examined the possible gains that can be obtained by trade unions through joint bargaining in an oligopolistic industry there is a positive externality due to the fact that a higher wage rate in one firm generates a larger demand hence a higher wage in competing firms when a joint union is organized these externalities are internalized to the benefit of workers horn and wolinsky 1985 investigated the equilibrium pattern of unionization in an industry where a firm employs two types of workers they found that workers tend to form a single union when the two types are substitutes in the sense that the incremental contribution of one group to the firm s revenue is decreasing with respect to the size of the other group since workers bargaining power comes from the loss that they can

secession and value abstract a model with random proposals where secession of coalitions is the only threat yields exploitative allocations if proposals for coalition s involve randomization the responders pay off vector consists of shapley values for coalition sizes ranging from 1 to s 1

learning and communication in sender receiver games an econometric investigation this paper compares the performance of stimulus response sr and belief based learning bbl using data from game theory experiments the environment extensive form games played in a population setting is novel in the empirical literature on learning in games both the sr and bbl models fit the data reasonably well in common interest games with history while the test results accept sr and reject bbl in games with no history and in all but one of the divergent interest games estimation is challenging since the likelihood function is not globally concave and the results may be subject to convergence bias

productivity growth in the grocery trade this paper presents a model of the growth of the average efficiency of labour per type of shop as a function of the wage rate use of part time labour labour supply and demand and economies of scale shop size the model is estimated on the basis of data for the grocery trade prior to 1975 this yields a forecast beyond 1975 which is compared with more recent observations are estimate of the model on the basis of data for the grocery trade in the period 1975 78 is found to be in agreement with the original estimate some implications of the model are indicated

the outputs of retail activities french evidence a new economic framework is applied to the empirical analysis of retail margins this framework is founded on the definition of profits and incorporates recent theoretical developments formalizing the role of distribution services as outputs of retail activities the main results are the measures of outputs of retail activities identified in the data perform as important and robust determinants of retail margins variables that purport to capture the oligopolistic features of market structure have little association with the variation in retail margins hypotheses of price setting and quantity setting under the assumptions of profit maximization and monopolistic competition are categorically rejected by the data the data base is information on 50 retail sectors from the 1982 survey of firms in commerce and the 1983 survey of firms in services reported by insee

an implementation of the owen value abstract we present an implementation of the owen value owen 1977 essays in mathematical economics and game theory pp 76 88 inspired by the bidding mechanism introduced by perez castrillo and wettstein 2001 j econ theory 100 274 294 the idea is the following first players of each coalition play the bidding mechanism trying to obtain the resources of the coalition later players who obtained the resources play the bidding mechanism in order to share the surplus

a new theory of retailing costs in cross section studies of shops of the same type we find that costs in general and labour in particular depend on the sales size per shop according to a linear function with a positive intercept this paper provides some empirical evidence and a theoretical explanation based on queuing theory

a noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining the authors explore a sequential offers model of n person coalitional bargaining with transferable utility and with time discounting their focus is on the efficiency properties of stationary equilibria of strictly superadditive games when the discount factor delta is sufficiently large it is shown that delay and the formation of inefficient subcoalitions can occur in equilibrium the latter for some or all orders of proposer however efficient stationary equilibrium payoffs converge to a point in the core as delta approaches one strict convexity is a sufficient condition for there to exist an efficient stationary equilibrium payoff vector for sufficiently high delta

a noncooperative view of coalition formation and the core a noncooperative implementation of the core is provided for games with transferable utility the implementation obtained here is meant to reflect the standard motivation for the core as closely as possible in the model proposed time is continuous this idealized treatment of time is most amenable for capturing an essential feature of the core there is always time to reject a noncore proposal before it is consumated

monotonic solutions to general cooperative games etude de jeux cooperatifs qui sont des jeux a plusieurs joueurs mis sous la forme de coalition dans lesquels l utilite n est pas supposee etre transferable