interpreting an error correction model partial adjustment forward looking behaviour and dynamic international money demand an error correction model is derived from a stochastic dynamic programming problem incorporating rational expectations a parametric restriction is derived that allows a test for the theoretical proposition that the optimal strategy behind the error correction from entails the failure to asymptotically close the gap between the choice variable and the growing target this is accomplished by nesting a partial adjustment model with forward looking expectations within the error correction paradigm the counterintuitive behaviour embodied in the error correction model is not supported by the data in the context of a cross country comparison of cash balances relationships

institutional prerequisites for economic growth europe after world war ii abstract european economic growth in the quarter of a century that ended in 1973 outstripped growth in any period of comparable length before or since the elements of europe s growth miracle wage moderation high investment and rapid export growth were delivered by a taylor made set of domestic and international arrangements on the domestic side the social market economy on the external side international agreements and institutions including the european payments union and the european coal and steel community that solved problems of commitment and cooperation that would have otherwise hindered the resumption of growth

investment strategies reversibility and asymmetric information abstract in this paper we examine the reversibility effects on a firm s investment trigger timing and quantity strategies in the presence of asymmetric information between the firm owner and the manager we obtain five main results under conditions of asymmetric information first information asymmetry increases delays investment trigger timing second under information asymmetry investment quantity increases in degree of reversibility while under information symmetry it is constant third social loss arising from information asymmetry increases in degree of manager s informational rent and degree of reversibility but decreases in volatility fourth an increase in volatility increases the owner s value while it decreases the manager s value fifth an increase in volatility increases the ex post manager s value while it decreases the ex ante manager s value an increase in degree of reversibility decreases the ex post manager s value while it increases the ex ante manager s value

real options agency conflicts and optimal capital structure abstract we examine the impact of a stockholder bondholder conflict over the timing of the exercise of an investment option on firm value and corporate financial policy we find that an equity maximizing firm exercises the option too early relative to a value maximizing strategy and we show how this problem can be characterized as one of overinvestment in risky investment projects equityholders incentive to overinvest significantly decreases firm value and optimal leverage and significantly increases the credit spread of risky debt numerical solutions illustrate how the agency cost of overinvestment and its effect on corporate financial policy vary with firm and project characteristics

incomplete contracts and privatization the paper offers a selective survey on the incomplete contracts approach to privatization furthermore a simple model of privatization to an owner manager is developed in which different allocations of ownership rights lead to different allocations of inside information about the firm which in turn affect allocative and productive efficiency in this model privatization is a commitment device of the government to credibly reward the manager for a successful cost reduction and to harden his budget constraint

ambiguity aversion in buyer seller relationships a contingent claims and social network explanation negotiations between buyers and sellers or suppliers of goods and services have become increasingly important due to the growing trend towards international purchasing outsourcing and global supply networks together with the high uncertainty associated with them this paper examines the effect of ambiguity aversion on price negotiations using multiple priors based real options with non extreme outcomes we study price negotiation between a buyer and seller in a dual contingent claims setting call option holding buyer vs put option holding seller to derive optimal agreement conditions under ambiguity with and without social network effects we find that while higher ambiguity aversion raises the threshold for commitment for the seller it has equivocal effects on the buyer s negotiation prospects in the absence of network control conversely when network position and relative bargaining power are accounted for we find the buyer s implicit price or negotiation threshold decreases or increases unequivocally with increasing aversion to ambiguity extending extant real options research on price negotiation to the case of ambiguity this set of results provides new insights into the role of ambiguity aversion and network structures in buyer seller relationships including how they influence the range of negotiation agreement between buyers and sellers the results also help assist managers in formulating robust buying selling strategies for bargaining under uncertainty by knowing their network positions and gathering background information or inferring the other party s ambiguity tolerance beforehand buyers and sellers can anticipate where the negotiation is heading in terms of price negotiation range and mutual agreement possibilities

real investment decisions under adjustment costs and asymmetric information abstract we study the cost of adjustment model of investment when there is asymmetry of information between owners the principal and managers the agent information asymmetry distorts the relationship between investment and the cost of capital for all agent types and a regime of inaction appears over a certain cost range in an observationally different way than when fixed adjustment costs or irreversibilities cause a similar phenomenon uncertainty in the form of an increase in the spread of agents types tends to reduce investment despite symmetric adjustment cost and perfect competition the model gives a new interpretation of tobin s q under asymmetric information explaining some results of the mergers and acquisition literature

the demand for money in eec countries abstract this paper examines the demand for money in the eec countries and is focussed on five issues first it starts form a common economic framework which allows for shifts from m 2 to non money assets and vice versa second special attention is given to the dynamic structure of the statistical model in order to obtain meaningful conclusions on e g the speed of adjustment of actual to optimal money holdings third the study is entirely based on a uniform set of quarterly data for the eight countries concerned fourth the paper presents a careful examination of the residuals and finally analyses the predictive behaviour of the estimated models for all countries we found long run income elasticities greater than unity and interest rate elasticities clustered around 0 20 the impact of inflation and the business cycle variable appeared to be significant in the majority of countries considered

venture capital staged financing and optimal funding policies under uncertainty abstract our paper presents a dynamic model of entrepreneurial venture financing under uncertainty based on option exercise games between an entrepreneur and a venture capitalist vc in particular we analyze the impact of multi staged financing and both economic and technological uncertainty on optimal contracting in the context of vc financing our novel approach combines compound option pricing with sequential non cooperative contracting allowing us to determine whether renegotiation will improve the probability of coming to an agreement and proceed with the venture it is shown that both sources of uncertainty positively impact the vc investor s optimal equity share specifically higher uncertainty leads to a larger stake in the venture and renegotiation may result in a dramatic shift of control rights in the venture preventing the venture from failure moreover given ventures with low volatility situations might occur where the vc investor loses his first mover advantage based on a comparative static analysis new testable hypotheses for further empirical studies are derived from the model

rate base selection and the structure of regulation this article investigates the role played by rate base valuation rules in the context of rate of return regulation it shows 1 that there is nothing inherently fair about any particular valuation rule 2 that properly interpreted rate bases represent promises of future returns 3 that valuation rules can be fairly selected from a very broad class and 4 that once this is recognized rate of return regulation represents a highly effective and flexible means of avoiding the dynamic consistency problems associated with repeated regulatory reviews in addition the article investigates the nature of optimal rate base valuation rules

strategic investment under uncertainty a synthesis abstract investment is a central theme in economics finance and operational research traditionally the focus of analysis has been either on assessing the value of flexibility investment under uncertainty or on describing commitment effects in competitive settings industrial organization research contributions addressing the intersection of investment under uncertainty and industrial organization have become numerous in recent years in this paper we provide an overview aimed at categorizing and relating these research streams we highlight managerial insights concerning the nature of competitive advantage first versus second mover advantage the manner in which information is revealed firm heterogeneity capital increment size and the number of competing firms

a pseudo bayesian model in financial decision making with implications to market volatility under and overreaction abstract this paper develops a model of weight assignments using a pseudo bayesian approach that reflects investors behavioral biases in this parsimonious model of investor sentiment weights induced by investors conservative and representative heuristics are assigned to observations of the earning shocks of stock prices such weight assignments enable us to provide a quantitative link between some market anomalies and investors behavioral biases the seriousness of an anomaly can be quantitatively assessed by investigating into its dependency on weights new results other than the short run underreaction and long run overreaction can be derived and new hypotheses can be formed

error correction mechanisms the interface between economic theory and applied econometrics is often one of uneasy compromise with the pragmatic justification for many accepted procedures resting on a theoretical base this paper examines the surprisingly strong arguments that exist in terms of economic theory for the use of error correction mechanisms in the specification of short run dynamic adjustment a common heresy exists that while economic theory provides a detailed analysis of comparative static equilibria it can offer no guidance as to the appropriate specification of dynamic adjustment towards an equilibrium perhaps in consequence it is not uncommon to find examples where the necessary dynamic specification is achieved by tacking onto an existing equilibrium specification some relatively ad hoc short run adjustment scheme the intercession of stochastic arguments in this process is confused and critical implications are frequently ignored in practice but perhaps more importantly there will typically be no guarantee that the dynamic specification is consistent with the prescribed equilibrium consistency in this sense requires that the short run dynamic adjustment be directed by the perceived disequilibrium and that eventual convergence to the equilibrium position be ensured that two separate theoretical arguments co exist within the final specification is the root cause of many difficulties both theoretical and empirical this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

measuring the agency cost of debt we adapt a contingent claims model of the firm to reflect the incentive effects of the capital structure and thereby to measure the agency costs of debt an underlying model of the firm and the stochastic features of its product market are analyzed and an optimal operating policy is chosen we identify the change in operating policy created by leverage and value this change the model determines the value of the firm and its associated liabilities incorporating the agency consequences of debt the optimal capital structure for a firm is now widely regarded to be determined by a broad range of factors including a mix of tax effects the various agency problems associated with different securities and the various costs of issuing securities including the costs created by adverse selection while the existence of a theoretical optimum has been demonstrated in a variety of papers a less explored area has been the construction of detailed models that enable us to measure each of the relevant factors for a particular company and thereby to determine the actual optimal mix for that firm this gap in our understanding is particularly glaring in the case of agency costs in order to allow a careful modelling of strategic relations the parameters of most agency models are either so simplified that it is impossible to associate them with measurable parameters of a real world case or else the models simply abstract from certain critical factors such as a robust measure of price risk that must be incorporated into any real application for example although we now understand that sinking funds dividend restrictions and other bond covenants help to resolve the conflict of interest between bondholders and equity we do not yet have much in the way of models with which to determine the optimal parameters of these very covenants contingent claims models can provide a consistent framework for multiperiod valuation that properly accounts for risk but they usually abstract from the agency factors entering capital structure decisions when using a contingent claims model to value a firm s securities it is common to take the value of the firm itself as governed by an exogenously defined stochastic process the value of the firm s securities are then derived from this underlying value and as merton 1974 points out in his paper on the pricing of risky debt the modigliani miller theorem obtains so that the value of the firm is independent of the value and the type of debt in order to apply the contingent claims techniques to a setting in which agency problems are central some adaptation is necessary in this paper we

the financial and operating performance of newly privatized firms an international empirical analysis this study compares the pre and postprivatization financial and operating performance of 61 companies from 18 countries and 32 industries that experience full or partial privatization through public share offerings during the period 1961 to 1990 our results document strong performance improvements achieved surprisingly without sacrificing employment security specifically after being privatized firms increase real sales become more profitable increase their capital investment spending improve their operating efficiency and increase their work forces furthermore these companies significantly lower their debt levels and increase dividend payout finally we document significant changes in the size and composition of corporate boards of directors after privatization the last fifteen years have witnessed a significant global shift away from state socialism towards entrepreneurial capitalism one of the most important and visible aspects of this trend has been the enthusiasm with which governments of all political persuasions have sold their state owned enterprises soes to private investors in hopes that the generally unsatisfactory economic performance of these firms can be improved by the discipline of private ownership this denationalization process given its current title of privatization by the conservative government of margaret thatcher in

interactions between investment timing and management effort under asymmetric information costs and benefits of privatized firms abstract in this paper we examine the interactions between investment timing and management effort in the presence of asymmetric information between the owner and the manager where the manager has an informational advantage we find that investment timing is later under asymmetric information than under full information implying a decrease in the value of equity option however in order to minimize any distortion under underinvestment management effort is greater under asymmetric information than under full information we show that there are trade offs in the efficiencies of investment timing and management effort under asymmetric information these results fit well with the findings of past empirical studies concerning the costs and benefits of privatized firms

productive efficiency in public and private firms abstract this paper compares the degree of x inefficiency which emerges as a consequence of the imposition of the optimal incentive contracts in public and private firms using a straightforward principal agent model with two possible states of the world it establishes the rather surprising result that in the good state of the world public ownership always results in a higher degree of productive efficiency

trade unions investment and employment the implications of long term wage contracts and investment in capital on non cooperative wage bargaining between a firm and a union are analysed the union maximises a utilitarian utility function and the firm faces a neoclassical investment problem with internal adjustment costs the monopoly union outcomes with binding contracts is time inconsistent because the union has an incentive to renege on announced low wage strategies once the capital stock has been accumulated the monopoly union outcome without binding contracts leads to credible strategies which correspond to higher wages and lower levels of employment investment and the capital stock efficient contracts give rise to higher employment than monopoly union outcomes whether with or without long term wage contracts the results are illustrated with a numerical example finally when the game between the union and firm is repeated reputational equilibira provide a solution to the problem of time inconsistency

working in public and private firms abstract we develop a theoretical framework for comparing incentives labor productivity and the allocation of effort in public versus private enterprises we incorporate socializing an activity which yields utility for workers and affects a firm s output into a multitask model of work organization we establish the two following results first the optimal workers compensation policy displays a larger incentive intensity in the private firm than in the public firm second labor productivity in the private firm may be higher or lower than in the public firm both results fit well with the findings of empirical work

the impact of voluntary disclosure on a firm s investment policy in this paper we provide a model which describes how voluntary disclosure impacts on the timing of a firm s investment decisions a manager chooses a time to invest in a project and a time to disclose the investment return in order to maximise his monetary payoff we assume that this payoff is linked to the level of the firm s stock price prior to investing the profitability of the project and the market reaction to the disclosure of the investment return are uncertain but the manager receives signals at random points in time which assist in resolving some of this uncertainty we find that a manager whose objective can only be achieved through voluntarily disclosing the return is motivated to invest at a time that would be sub optimal for an identical manager with a profit maximising objective

the effect of uncertainty on investment timing in a real options model abstract this paper examines the effect of uncertainty on investment timing in a canonical real options model we show that the critical value of a project that triggers the exercise of the investment option exhibits a u shaped pattern against the volatility of the project this is due to the two countervailing risk and return factors in effect we further show that such a u shaped pattern is inherited by the expected time to exercise the investment option thus for relatively safe projects greater uncertainty shortens the expected exercise time and thus enhances investment this is in sharp contrast to the negative investment uncertainty relationship commonly found in the extant literature finally we show that the positive investment uncertainty relationship is more likely for high growth projects than for low growth projects

an alternative approach to the american demand for money with a decade of evidence behind it the profession seems to have agreed on the fact that a structural break shifted the american demand for money shortly after 1973 it is difficult to pinpoint the source of the trouble precisely let alone to explain the event with an econometric model in their survey judd and scadding 1982 tentatively concluded that financial innovation is the source of the problem while this conclusion has not been universally accepted the instability of the money demand function is largely taken as a given stylized fact the primary goal of this article is to provide an alternative solution to the case of the missing money using the methods of hendry 1979 it should be stressed at the outset that as this paper deals with a problem in the applied literature it is unabashedly empirical in nature the paper attempts to explain an empirical difficulty without presenting a new theoretical model of money demand rather in the context of the standard transactions demand theory for narrow money a number of questions are analyzed with an atypical econometric model was there actually a shift or a series of shifts in the demand for money if not why have other investigators concluded that there was in fact a shift most importantly what function seems to be the most reasonable approximation to the data generation process during the period in question

on the investment uncertainty relationship in a real options model abstract it appears to be widely accepted in the real options literature that an increase in uncertainty should have an inhibiting effect on investment our article demonstrates that the notion of a negative uncertainty investment relationship is not always correct we show that in certain situations an increase in uncertainty can actually increase the probability of investing and thereby have a positive impact on investment

the search for a stable money demand function a survey of the post 1973 literature phe question of whether the demnand function for money is stable is one of the most important recurring issues in the theory and application of macroeconomic policy what is being sought in a stable demand function is a set of necessary conditions for money to exert a predictable influence on the economy so that the central bank s control of the money supply can be a useful instrument of economic policy as such the notion of a stable demand function appears to involve three key elements e g john t boorman 1976 p 317 and david e w laidler 1977 pp 34 35 first the demand for money relation should be highly predictable in a statistical sense as measured by the usual goodness of fit statistics precision of estimated coefficients and presumably its ability to forecast accurately out of sample second a stable demand function for money has relatively few arguments a relationship that requires knowledge about a large number of variables in order to pin it down is in effect not predictable finally the variables that appear as arguments in the function should represent significant links to spending and economic activity in the real sector in sum a stable demand function for money means that the quantity of money is predictably related to a small set of key variables linking money to the real sector of the economy the importance of a stable money demand function for monetary policy can be illustrated with the standard is lm model in which interest rates and gnp are the endogenous variables in this context a stable demand function for money translates into a well defined relationship between money interest rates and gnp

the effect of mean reversion on investment under uncertainty abstract mean reverting processes are appropriate for most real option investment models yet geometric brownian motion gbm processes are generally used for tractability hassett and metcalf j econom dyn control 19 1995 1471 1488 argue that using a gbm process is justified because mean reversion has two opposing effects it brings the investment trigger closer and also reduces the conditional volatility thereby lowering the likelihood of reaching the trigger and the overall effect on investment should be negligible for most reasonable parameter values this paper extends the hassett and metcalf model by incorporating a third factor the effect of mean reversion on systematic risk the main result is that mean reversion in general does have a significant impact on investment moreover this effect could be either positive or negative depending on various factors such as project duration cost of investing interest rate etc thus it is generally inappropriate to use the gbm process to approximate a mean reverting process

on error correction models specification interpretation estimation abstract error correction models ecms have proved a popular organising principle in applied econometrics despite the lack of consensus as to exactly what constitutes their defining characteristic and the rather limited role that has been given to economic theory by their proponents this paper uses a historical survey of the evolution of ecms to explain the alternative specifications and interpretations and proceeds to examine their implications for estimation the various approaches are illustrated for wage equations by application to uk labour market data 1855 1987 we demonstrate that error correction models impose strong and testable non linear restrictions on dynamic econometric equations and that they do not obviate the need for modelling the process of expectations formation with the exception of a few special cases both the non linear restrictions and the modelling of expectations have been ignored by those who have treated ecms as merely reparameterisations of dynamic linear regression models or vector autoregressions

the british electricity experiment the privatization of the electricity supply industry esi in britain which began 1990 is in itself an unremarkable event much of the esi is privately owned in several european countries and in the united states and the u k privatization program has embraced utilities since 1984 when british telecom was privatized the thing that is remarkable about recent policy toward the industry is the radical nature of the regulatory reform accompanying privatization a vertically integrated administered generation and transmission structure was replaced overnight on march 31 1990 by one that is deintegrated and market based generation and transmission have been separated and there has been an attempt to establish competition in generation a number of countries have been moving gradually in the direction of encouraging competition but nowhere else have such dramatic changes been implemented so quickly

specification tests of the money demand function in an open economy this paper addresses empirically the issues of selecting the appropriate opportunity cost and scale variables of the money demand function in the presence of alternative nonnested hypotheses as part of the process of model specification the role of currency substitution in the demand for money function in an open economy is examined the tests are carried out with quarterly data from the open economy of greece over the floating exchange rate period 1975 82

testing dynamic specification for import demand models the case of cotton error correction models impose few prior restrictions on dynamic model specification and allow the data to determine model structure despite this obvious advantage few applications have adopted the error correction model to explain trade flows an error correction model of cotton import demand is estimated for france japan and hongkong a variety of tests are applied to determine the dynamic structure of the model it is found that the most general models are those that best fit the data for cotton import demand long run elasticities from these general models are significantly different than elasticities derived from a comparable static model

behavior of the firm under regulatory constraint a recent article by akira takayama discusses an earlier paper by harvey averch and leland l johnson on fair rate of return regulation of public utilities although takayama p 255 agrees with averch and johnson s general conclusions that a firm will tend to increase its investment with the introduction of an active constraint on its rate of return he criticizes the a j argument as being confusing ambiguous and in error takayama then attempts a clarification and presents a new formulation which leads to the a j result quoted above this comment will discuss several of takayama s criticisms in addition to showing that the so called a j effect cannot be derived from the basic assumptions made by both averch and johnson and takayama 1 we will show that the very assumptions used to prove the a j effect by defining the region of x require an assumption that the a j effect exists in the first place

evaluation of firm s loss due to incomplete information in real investment decision abstract we investigate the effect of incomplete information in a model where a start up with a unique idea and technology pioneers a new market but will eventually be expelled from the market by a large firm s subsequent entry we evaluate the start up s loss due to incomplete information about the large firm s behavior we clarify conditions under which the start up needs more information about the large firm the proposed method of evaluating the loss due to incomplete information could also be applied to other real options models involving incomplete information

finite project life and uncertainty effects on investment abstract this paper revisits the important result of the real options approach to investment under uncertainty which states that increased uncertainty raises the value of waiting and thus decelerates investment typically in this literature projects are assumed to be perpetual however in today s economy firms face a fast changing technology environment implying that investment projects are usually considered to have a finite life the present paper studies investment projects with finite project life and we find that in contrast with the existing theory investments may be accelerated by increased uncertainty it is shown that this particularly happens at low levels of uncertainty and when project life is short

interactions of corporate financing and investment decisions a dynamic framework this article analyzes the interaction between a firm s dynamic investment operating and financing decisions in a model with operating adjustment and recapitalization costs using numerical analysis we solve the model for cases that highlight interaction effects we find that higher production flexibility due to lower costs of shutting down and reopening a production facility enhances the firm s debt capacity thereby increasing the net tax shield value of debt financing while higher financial flexibility resulting from lower recapitalization costs has a similar effect production flexibility and financial flexibility are to some extent substitutes we find that the impact of debt financing on the firm s investment and operating decisions is economically insignificant

optimal exercise of jointly held real options a nash bargaining approach with value diversion this paper provides a two stage decision framework in which two or more parties exercise a jointly held real option we show that a single party s timing decision is always socially efficient if it precedes bargaining on the terms of sharing however if the sharing rule is agreed before the exercise timing decision is made then socially optimal timing is attained only if there is a cash payment element in the division of surplus if the party that chooses the exercise timing can divert value from the project then the first best outcome may not be possible at all and the second best outcome may be implemented using a contract that is generally not optimal in the former cases our framework contributes to the understanding of a range of empirical regularities in corporate and entrepreneurial finance

recent instability of the demand for money an international perspective aggregate money demand functions once an apparent bulwark for macroeconomic research have had to be re examined in the light of the events and discoveries of the 1970s following goldfeld s extensive analysis it now is widely recognized that the demand for mi balances in the united states cannot be explained satisfactorily by standard functions apparently because of shifts occurring in the early 1970s similar reservations see below have been expressed with respect to m3 balances in the united kingdom where the demand relationships appear to have been upset by the introduction of regulatory reforms in 1971 in both cases part of the problem can be traced to specific events but the possibility remains that a more general instability may be present the rapid inflation experienced by all major industrial countries after 1973 the concurrent collapse of the bretton woods system of fixed exchange rates and the attempts by most major central banks to control growth in domestic money stocks may all have altered the responses of the demand for money to the standard functional arguments this paper presents a range of stability tests for a set of demand functions estimated for two monetary aggregates in each of six countries in order to determine whether money demand functions more generally have been stable over the recent period and to attempt to identify the nature and causes of any observed instabilities the major conclusions are that none of the other functions examined displays instabilities as severe as those of the mi function for the united states and that the latter may be unstable in a more persistent and fundamental way than has heretofore been recognized the equations estimated for this study are based on a variant of goldfeld s log linear real balances function the deflated value of money balances is related to real income interest rates and inflation with lagged adjustments introduced via a simple koyck transformation this function obviously is in a simplified form especially with respect to the lag struc

strategic entry in a triopoly market of firms with asymmetric cost structures abstract this paper examines the strategic investment timing decision in a triopoly market comprising firms with asymmetric cost structures we present three novel results first in the case where there are relatively small cost asymmetries between firms and a relatively small first mover advantage the firm with the lowest cost structure is not always the first investor in other cases the firm with the lowest cost structure is the first investor second an increase in volatility increases the possibility that a firm without the lowest cost structure is the first investor finally even in the three asymmetric firm model we show that the first investor threshold is larger in a triopoly than in a duopoly although it is smaller in a duopoly than in a monopoly

the linear quadratic adjustment cost model and the demand for labour in this paper we demonstrate a new way of testing the linear quadratic adjustment cost lqac model under rational expectations we illustrate how the parameter restrictions arising from this model can be formally specified and we use these restrictions to extent the technique of campbell and shiller 1987 to a wider class of models based on present value relations potentially the demand for labour is an area in which the lqac model can find applicability in practice and subsequently we analyse sectoral labour demand in danish manufacturing we find however that for our data set the quadratic adjustment cost model under rational expectations can be rejected

regression direction and weak exogeneity abstract the absence of testing for weak exogeneity in money demand has often led to stark conditioning claims regarding the validity of price equations this paper uses the johansen procedure to explore the conditioning properties of money demand systems for nonborrowed reserves m1 and m2 our results show that irrespective of the specification of the cointegrating relation a feedback mechanism enters the equation for money the opposite however is not true for the price equations the results also cast a warning for single equation models of money demand in that weak exogeneity is sensitive to how the system is defined

option exercise games an application to the equilibrium investment strategies of firms under the standard real options approach to investment under uncertainty agents formulate optimal exercise strategies in isolation and ignore competitive interactions however in many real world asset markets exercise strategies cannot be determined separately but must be formed as part of a strategic equilibrium this article provides a tractable approach for deriving equilibrium investment strategies in a continuous time cournot nash framework the impact of competition on exercise strategies is dramatic for example while standard real options models emphasize that a valuable option to wait leads firms to invest only at large positive net present values the impact of competition drastically erodes the value of the option to wait and leads to investment at very near the zero net present value threshold copyright 2002 oxford university press

real options and preemption under incomplete information abstract this paper introduces incomplete information and preemption into an equilibrium model of firms facing real investment decisions the optimal investment strategy may lie anywhere between the zero npv trigger level and the optimal strategy of a monopolist depending on the distribution of competitors costs and the implied fear of preemption our model implies that the equity returns of firms which hold real options and are subject to preemption will contain jumps and positive skewness

an error correction approach to money demand the case of sudan abstract an empirical analysis of money demand behavior in sudan is presented based on the dynamic error correction model a theoretical basis for the model is offered which allows an explicit parameterized division of effects into long run influences short term adjustments and proportional equilibrium conditions we refute previous claims that income and price effects may be abnormally high in sudan in part by accounting for both foreign exchange and inflationary influences

regulation asymmetric information and auditing this article analyzes a model of a regulated firm that is better informed about its cost function than is the regulator by auditing at a cost however the regulator is assumed to be able to observe the realized cost of the firm if the regulator finds that the firm had misrepresented its costs at the time at which prices were set he can order a refund to consumers in the optimal policy the regulator audits when the firm reports for pricing purposes that its costs will be high and orders a refund when the auditfinds that realized costs are lower than anticipated given the original report a separation result that obtains for an important case indicates that the initial pricing decision is independent of the auditing decision the auditing decision however depends on the price that was initially set the optimal auditing strategy is characterized and the nature of the welfare gains are identified the methodology used in the analysis involves the characterization of an equilibrium of a revelation game with an ex post observable

devaluating projects and the investment uncertainty relationship abstract sarkar 2000 on the investment uncertainty relationship in a real options model journal of economic dynamics and control 24 219 225 analyzes the investment uncertainty relationship in a real options model demonstrating that the widely accepted conclusion that uncertainty harms investment can be reversed wong 2006 the effect of uncertainty on investment timing in a real options model journal of economic dynamics and control forthcoming confirms this point showing that more uncertainty can reduce the expected time to exercise the investment option this paper deals with such an issue and attempts to integrate both sarkar s and wong s analysis for risk neutral investors we show that uncertainty can favor investment only if projects devaluate over time this conclusion does not hold in a capm framework where we demonstrate that the relationship uncertainty investment can be positive a even when the investment threshold increases with uncertainty and b in the case of projects negatively correlated with the market portfolio

the role of money supply shocks in the short run demand for money abstract previous money demand models are either inconsistent with contemporaneous adjustment of the price level to expected changes in the nominal money supply or imply implausible interest rate fluctuations in response to innovations in nominal money we propose a shock absorber money demand model in which money supply shocks affect the synchronization of asset transactions and so engender a temporary increase or decrease in desired money holdings expected changes do not engender such fluctuations in real money inventories in simultaneous estimates for eight industrial countries the shock absorber model proved empirically superior

economic perspectives on privatization despite being one of the most fundamental issues in political economy the question of the appropriate boundary between public and private enterprise received relatively little attention in mainstream economic analysis until quite recently in the 1980s however programs of ownership reform were started in many developed and developing countries dramatic though some of these policies have been they are likely to be overshadowed in the 1990s by even greater privatization in the reforming socialist economies the opening sections of this paper are organized around three broad and interrelated questions how does ownership matter for the efficiency of enterprise performance what is the role for privatization in financing public debts and deficits what are the distributional and political implications of privatization finally we examine privatization in practice in three countries britain chile and poland

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

the impacts of uncertainties in a real options model under incomplete information abstract this paper examines the impact with respect to the uncertainty of the underlying state variable profit uncertainty on the real options model in a situation of incomplete information profit uncertainty has not incorporated into the real options model under incomplete information in that the underlying state variable is not formulated as the stochastic process see e g bernardo a e chowdhry e b 2002 resources real options and corporate strategy journal of financial economics 63 211 234 we extend the model developed by bernardo and chowdhry to formulate the underlying state variable as the stochastic process we conclude that profit uncertainty has the same type of impact on the real options value and its triggers both under complete and incomplete information

dynamic investment and capital structure under manager shareholder conflict abstract this paper investigates the interactions between the investment and financing decisions of a firm under manager shareholder conflicts arising from asymmetric information in particular we extend the manager shareholder conflict problem in a real options model by incorporating debt financing we show that manager shareholder conflicts over investment policy increase not only the investment and default triggers but also coupon payments which lead to a decrease in the equity value moreover given the presence of manager shareholder conflicts debt financing increases investment and decreases total social welfare as a result there is a trade off between the efficiency of investment and total social welfare with debt financing these results fit well with the findings of previous empirical work in this area

a re examination of the demand for money in small developing economies this paper re examines the money demand function in three small open economies of asia korea pakistan and singapore in addition to using the relatively new procedure of error correction modelling the roles of variables such as a the expected change in the exchange rate b foregin interest rates and c foreign exchange risks on money demand are examined in testing the importance of these variables in the money demand function special attention is paid to testing the assumptions of the classical linear regression model the sample period for each country spans from 1973 1 through 1990 1 the empirical results suggest that the error correction specification performs very well in addition to the traditional variables the results suggest that at least some measure of foreign monetary developments appear to have some significant effect on money demand behaviour in these small developing economies

strategic investment timing under asymmetric access charge regulation in telecommunications in a liberalized telecommunications market an incumbent has several advantages over any entrant an asymmetric access charge regulation for two such asymmetric firms stimulates competitive investment we show that an entrant with a cost disadvantage has an incentive to invest as a leader under an asymmetric access charge regulation these results fit well with the findings of previous empirical work moreover we also investigate the effects of an asymmetric access charge regulation on competitive investment strategies

preemption and rent equalization in the adoption of new technology we study the adoption of a new technology to illustrate the effects of preemption in games of timing we show that the threat of preemption equalizes rents in a duopoly but that this result does not extend to the general oligopoly game if the gain to preemption is sufficiently small then the optimal symmetric outcome which involves late adoption is an equilibrium this contrasts with reinganum s result that in precommitment equilibria there must be diffusion we develop a new and richer formalism for modeling games of timing which permits a continuoustime representation of the limit of discrete time mixed strategy equilibria

investment timing asymmetric information and audit structure a real options framework abstract this paper examines investment timing by the manager in a decentralized firm in the presence of asymmetric information in particular we incorporate an audit technology in the agency model developed by grenadier and wang 2005 investment timing agency and information journal of financial economics 75 493 533 the implied investment trigger in the agency problem with auditing is larger than in the full information problem and smaller than in the agency problem without auditing nevertheless the audit technology does not necessarily reduce inefficiency in the total social welfare

privatization and efficiency differentiating ownership effects from political organizational and dynamic effects this paper argues that the private public ownership factor should be differentiated from other factors that also influence the effect of privatization on efficiency this is empirically confirmed in a longitudinal study of 24 spanish firms for which several political and organizational factors are found to influence the estimated effects of privatization on efficiency the analysis of the timing of the effects reveals a strong significance for post privatization years 5 6 negative and 7 8 positive this suggests that the negative effect of these factors is transitional being eventually offset by the positive effects of the change to private ownership 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved jel classification l33

default and liquidation timing under asymmetric information abstract we consider a dynamic model in which shareholders delegate the running of a firm to a manager who observes private information about the firm s running and liquidation costs we analytically derive the optimal compensation scheme contingent on the firm s cost structure information asymmetries can change the high cost firm s bankruptcy choice and timing most notably even if the liquidation value is higher than the face value of debt the high cost firm can choose default rather than liquidation to reduce the manager s information rent this can lead to the counterintuitive result that the debt value increases beyond the face value as the firm approaches default and that it jumps upward at the default time information asymmetries accelerate negative liquidation and delay positive liquidation whereas they accelerate default the optimal leverage ratio of the asymmetric information case becomes higher than that of the symmetric information case because more debt mitigates the loss due to information asymmetries our results can potentially account for many empirical findings

the buffer stock notion in monetary economics not the least of harry johnson s contributions to our discipline was the series of survey papers on aspects of monetary economics which he produced during the 1960s and 1970s it is no exaggeration to say that the way in which the literature of monetary economics is organised even now follows the design which johnson first set out in 1962 and built on in the subsequent decade nevertheless the subject has not stood still and one of the more interesting developments of the last few years has involved the introduction of what has been variously described as the disequilibrium money shock absorber or as i prefer to call it the buffer stock notion into monetary economics the development of this line of thought was getting underway before johnson s untimely death much of it indeed under the auspices of his own research programme at the lse even so this did not happen early enough for the relevant ideas to be put in their proper niche by johnson himself and the buffer stock approach is not yet fully integrated into the mainstream of monetary economics much of the relevant literature is empirical concerned with modelling particular aspects of the monetary experience of specific countries hence it is fragmented and contains few papers which attempt a coherent account of just what this approach is and how it relates to other approaches to monetary analysis although essays by goodhart 1982a b and judd and scadding 1982a contain important discussions of these issues to the best of my knowledge only jonson 1976a and knoester 1979a have devoted entire papers solely to this central issue and these are relatively inaccessible and hence less widely known than they deserve to be in this lecture i shall attempt to give a brief account of the essentials of this approach first i shall sketch out its microeconomic background and then i shall discuss those theoretical characteristics which differentiate it from the neo austrian analysis of robert e lucas jr and his associates as well as from the conventional keynesian approach to monetary economics last but by no means least i shall argue that it yields simple theoretical insights into important empirical and policy related issues which are troublesome for alternative approaches in short my tribute to harry

the demand for the components of broad money error correction and generalized asset adjustment sytems the distinction between bank and non bank deposits have been blurred over the last decade and this has led to changes in the demand for various types of monetary aggregates thus money demand studies which focus only on one monetary aggregate like m3 currency plus bank deposits without allowing for the altered nature of asset substitutions may lead to wrong inferences about the cause of the growth of the money this paper is concerned with the interactions between the components of broad money currency bank and non bank deposits in the long and short run the long run asset demand equations are specified to encompass the transaction and portfolio motives for demanding money while the short run asset adjustment equations are derived from an underlying dynamic cost minimizing model the short run asset adjustment model is of the error correction form and under certain assumptions is shown to nest the generalized adjustment form the model is applied to the case of australia using both quarterly and

strategic investment in technological innovations abstract the aim of this paper is to determine the optimal timing of technology investment of a single firm in a duopoly framework as time passes different technologies are invented which after sometime become available for the firm to adopt the question here is not only when a firm should invest but also which technology should be adopted for different scenarios the optimal technology investment decision is determined outcomes range from pre emption equilibria to equilibria with second mover advantages

real options in strategic investment games between two asymmetric firms abstract this paper examines strategic investment games between two firms that compete for optimal entry in a project that generates uncertain revenue flows under asymmetry on both the sunk cost of investment and revenue flows of the two competing firms we investigate the value of real investment options and strategic interaction of investment decisions compared to earlier models that only allow for asymmetry on sunk cost our model demonstrates a richer set of strategic interactions of entry decisions we provide a complete characterization of pre emptive dominant and simultaneous equilibriums by analyzing the relative value of leader s and follower s optimal investment thresholds in a duopoly market with negative externalities a firm may reduce loss of real options value by selecting appropriate pre emptive entry when one firm has a dominant advantage over its competitor both the dominant firm and dominated firm enter at their respective leader s and follower s optimal thresholds when the pre emptive thresholds of both firms happen to coincide the two firms enter simultaneously under positive externalities firms do not compete to lead

international evidence on misspecification of the standard money demand equation abstract this paper tests the proposition that the interest rate in the standard money demand equation acts as a proxy for the expected change in interest rates if this is true the interest elasticity in the standard equation will depend on the expectations process for interest rates using cross country data we find that there does exist a relationship between the observed interest elasticity in the standard equation and the predictability of future interest rates from current interest rates

tax evasion and the demand for currency in norway and sweden is there a hidden relationship variables associated with the level of hidden economic activity are examined in terms of their effects on the demand for currency in norway and sweden aggregate time series of marginal tax rates are compiled for this purpose no such effects are evident for norway while in the case of sweden the demand for currency was found to be significantly related to marginal tax rates these estimates are then used as a basis for deriving an estimate of the size of the hidden economy in sweden an analysis of the assumptions underlying this procedure shows that the uncertainty involved in applying the currency approach to measuring the size of the hidden economy is so great as to make it hazardous to rely on such estimates