in search of smoking guns what makes income inequality vary over time in different countries we investigate the forces affecting the distribution of income by analyzing an unbalanced panel of information for 16 industrialized countries for the years 1966 through 1994 income inequality is measured with the gini coefficient of equivalent disposable income individuals are the unit of analysis the statistical analysis uses panel methods the results suggest that many factors affect the development of income inequality some factors are strictly economic a decreased industrial sector generally fosters inequality and some support is found for the view that increased trade of manufactured goods from developing countries is also a factor other forces are outside a strictly defined market sphere low inequality is found when a large proportion of the labor force belongs to a trade union and also when there is a large public sector in addition demographic circumstances are important since the proportion of the population under age 15 has a positive effect on inequality we find however no association between the unemployment rate and inequality

a model of product line design and introduction sequence with reservation utility abstract cannibalization is a major concern for a firm when designing a product line in addition external options from outside the firm s product line may also play a significant role in this paper we investigate the impact of external options represented by reservation utility on product line design and introduction sequence we find that a heterogeneous reservation utility defines the relative attractiveness of segments and corresponding product line b reservation utility makes it more favorable to introduce products sequentially rather than simultaneously c aggregating segments is an effective way to mitigate cannibalization when it becomes too difficult to manage with different values of reservation utility across multiple segments and d introducing products in a non monotone order of quality can improve profit from simultaneous introduction when the value of reservation utility of a middle segment is particularly high

plausibility of signals by a heterogeneous committee krishna and morgan propose amendments to two of gilligan and krehbiel s theoretical studies of legislative signaling the new results for homogeneous committees do not significantly change the empirical expectations ofprior works but the results for heterogeneous committees contradict earlier claims this note gives primary attention to heterogeneous committees and compares and contrasts the new and old equilibria and their empirical implications the notion of signaling is somewhat nebulous in all such games but seems distinctly less plausible in the key krishna morgan proposition than in previous legislative signaling games furthermore the empirical literature on choice of rules specifically the finding of a positive relationship between committee heterogeneity and restrictive rules is inconsistent with the krishna morgan analysis but consistent with gilligan krehbiel analyses even though the former is informationally efficient and the latter are not

understanding corporate coherence theory and evidence abstract multiproduct firms are perceived to be coherent in their scope yet there is no strong theoretical foundations to explain coherence in modern industrial organization theory this paper shows that as u s manufacturing firms grow more diverse they maintain a constant level of coherence between neighboring activities this finding runs counter to the idea that firms with many activities are generally more incoherent a framework is then presented which appeals to the nature of enterprise learning path dependencies and the nature of the selection environment to explain the ubiquity of coherent diversifiers

the sophistication of exports a new trade measure summary trade data are often classified by product characteristics we propose a new classification sophistication as a means of distinguishing between products we construct a sophistication index based on the income levels of exporting economies sophistication captures a range of factors including technology ease of product fragmentation natural resource availability and marketing we calculate sophistication scores at the 3 and 4 digit levels and test how far the index relates to existing technological classifications of products we use the index to examine trade patterns and illustrate how it can be applied in the analysis of export performance of individual economies

linking economic complexity institutions and income inequality summary a country s mix of products predicts its subsequent pattern of diversification and economic growth but does this product mix also predict income inequality here we combine methods from econometrics network science and economic complexity to show that countries exporting complex products as measured by the economic complexity index have lower levels of income inequality than countries exporting simpler products using multivariate regression analysis we show that economic complexity is a significant and negative predictor of income inequality and that this relationship is robust to controlling for aggregate measures of income institutions export concentration and human capital moreover we introduce a measure that associates a product to a level of income inequality equal to the average gini of the countries exporting that product weighted by the share the product represents in that country s export basket we use this measure together with the network of related products or product space to illustrate how the development of new products is associated with changes in income inequality these findings show that economic complexity captures information about an economy s level of development that is relevant to the ways an economy generates and distributes its income moreover these findings suggest that a country s productive structure may limit its range of income inequality finally we make our results available through an online resource that allows for its users to visualize the structural transformation of over 150 countries and their associated changes in income inequality during 1963 2008

on the importance of the supply side in demand side management we discuss how the structure of market supply affects the evaluation of policies to promote energy efficiency in household appliances if competitive markets offer the levels that consumers demand product standards inefficiently restrict choice if suppliers price discriminate minimum standards can restrict the inefficient use of energy intensity to segment consumers we also compare the effects of average intensity standards energy prices and innovation and consider what the different behavioral predictions imply for empirical studies of energy efficiency good policymaking requires knowing not only how consumers value energy efficiency in their decision making but also how producers respond to those values

screening in a matching market contract design under incomplete information is often analysed in a bilaterally monopolistic setting if the informed party s reservation value does not depend on its private information its type it is a standard result that the uninformed side offers low types distorted contracts to reduce the information rent left to high types we challenge this result by embedding contract design in a matching market environment we consider a market where players meet pairwise and where in each match either side may be chosen to make a take it or leave it offer as frictions become sufficiently low we find that the set of equilibria is independent of whether there is complete or incomplete information in particular all contracts are free of distortions

asymmetric information and legislative rules some amendments we reexamine the major tenets of the informational theory of legislative rules focusing on the informational efficiency of rules with varying degrees of restrictiveness when committees are heterogeneous full efficiency is attainable under the unrestrictive open rule as well as the somewhat restrictive modified rule in contrast the restrictive closed rule always leads to inefficiencies when committees are homogeneous the situation is different all equilibria are inefficient regardless of legislative rules but the closed rule leads to greater informational efficiency than does the open rule furthermore the efficiency gains under the closed rule more than offset distributional losses regardless of the degree of preference divergence we also examine the incentives provided by the different rules for information acquisition and committee specialization

multiproduct nonlinear pricing with multiple taste characteristics we analyze optimal multiproduct nonlinear prices in the case where consumer tastes are characterized by more than one taste parameter we present conditions under which the optimal nonlinear price schedule can be computed by finding optimal price schedules separately for each market if so they are unbundled if not they are bundled bundling is weakly superior to unbundling and is strictly superior when a condition that we term uniform ordering of demand curves is weakly violated with uniform ordering of demand curves multiproduct nonlinear prices have the same features as single product ones without this condition it is easy to construct examples that contradict some well known results from the standard literature in mechanism design

new ways of looking at old issues inequality and growth abstract the paper uses new cross country data on income and asset land distribution to show that i there is a strong negative relationship between initial inequality in the asset distribution and long term growth ii inequality reduces income growth for the poor but not for the rich and iii available longitudinal data provide little support for the kuznets hypothesis policies that increase aggregate investment and facilitate acquisition of assets by the poor might thus be doubly beneficial for growth and poverty reduction

do physicians financial incentives affect medical treatment and patient health we investigate whether physicians financial incentives influence health care supply technology diffusion and resulting patient outcomes in 1997 medicare consolidated the geographic regions across which it adjusts physician payments generating area specific price shocks areas with higher payment shocks experience significant increases in health care supply on average a 2 percent increase in payment rates leads to a 3 percent increase in care provision elective procedures such as cataract surgery respond much more strongly than less discretionary services non radiologists expand their provision of mris suggesting effects on technology adoption we estimate economically small health impacts albeit with limited precision

equilibrium informativeness in veto games abstract in a veto game a biased expert recommends an action that an uninformed decision maker can accept or reject for an outside option the arrangement is ubiquitous in political institutions corporations and consumer markets but has seen limited use in applications due to a poor understanding of the equilibrium set and an ensuing debate over selection we develop a simple method to construct every veto equilibrium and identify the most informative equilibrium in a setting that spans prior work we show that krishna and morgan s 2001 equilibrium is maximally informative and strengthen dessein s 2002 comparison of full delegation and veto in an application we study the relationship between a patient and a doctor with a financial incentive to overtreat and show that the doctor s bias harms the patient both through excessive treatment and information loss that the latter can be substantial and that insurance benefits both parties by improving communication

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

honesty in a model of strategic information transmission we consider the following simple model of consumer fraud consumers need one of two possible repairs an expensive repair denoted e or an inexpensive repair denoted i the exogenous probability that a consumer needs the more costly remedy is r each consumer is assumed to know r an expert can observe with certainty which of the two repairs is needed and can offer to sell either to the consumer in a simple extension we allow for uncertainty with respect to the expert s observation we assume that selling the expensive remedy to a consumer who needs only the inexpensive one is more profitable than selling the inexpensive one thus h eii h1 iji where h denotes profit and i denotes conditional on needing the profit functions are increasing in the price of the respective repairs for convenience we suppress the dependence of h on prices in our notation we also assume that a consumer prefers to obtain the appropriate repair to the inappropriate one thus u eie u ije and u iii u eii where u is the consumer s payoff lastly we assume that the functions u eje and u e i are decreasing in the price of the expensive repair and that u iie and u iii are decreasing in the price of the inexpensive repair we also assume that u iie is decreasing in the price of the expensive repair since the consumer ultimately buys the expensive repair in this case see below for further assumptions regarding the repairs we are interested in the equilibrium levels of honesty in this model how honest is the expert at the equilibrium do consumers always follow the expert s advice does the level of honesty increase as the interests of the agents become more similar in a sense to be defined below our assumptions are similar to those in the abstract strategic information transmission models of vincent crawford and joel sobel 1982 and jerry green and nancy stokey 1980 we follow the former paper which asks whether the signals sent become less noisy as the agents preferences become more similar despite the similarity of our model to crawford sobel s we arrive at some different conclusions with respect to the expert s honesty vis a vis the agents closeness of interests we explain this in detail in section iii in addition we allow that the expert may be uncertain about the true state of the world we also explicitly model the level of expert honesty which extends crawford sobel the outline of the paper is as follows in section i we provide the details of the model and show that a unique equilibrium exists comparative static results and a simple extension incorporating the assumption of the incompetent expert are given in section ii we draw comparisons with crawfordsobel in section iii in section iv we conclude with a brief summary

health insurance and the demand for medical care evidence from a randomized experiment we estimate how cost sharing the portion of the bill the patient pays affects the demand for medical services the data come from a randomized experiment a catastrophic insurance plan reduces expenditures 31 percent relative to zero out of pocket price the price elasticity is approximately 0 2 we reject the hypothesis that less favorable coverage of outpatient services increases total expenditure for example by deterring preventive care or inducing hospitalization

budget selection when agents compete abstract a principal selects a budget k of how many projects to fund within an organization and then consults n agents each of whom has private information about his own project s value after receiving cheap talk reports from the agents the principal decides which projects to implement subject to the budget and agents report on new i i d projects every period until the budget is exhausted when the budget is small relative to the number of agents each of whom are biased towards their own projects competition between agents degrades the quality of information conveyed in equilibrium and lowers the principal s payoff a larger budget induces less competition and therefore may be selected in order to extract more information from the agents even though this leads to some unprofitable projects being adopted in an extension i find that a policy of never allowing a funded agent to seek funding again increases payoffs compared to when the agent can always re seek funding

veto based delegation in a principal agent model with hidden information and no monetary transfers i establish the veto power principle any incentive compatible outcome can be implemented through veto based delegation with an endogenously chosen default decision this result demonstrates the exact nature of commitment powers required by the principal 1 to design the default outcome and 2 to ensure that she has almost no formal control over the agent s decisions

contractual distortions in a market with frictions abstract this paper analyses contract design in a decentralized market environment with frictions while principals e g firms have all contractual power their market power is constrained as agents e g workers can choose to wait and search for better offers we find that results depend crucially on how market frictions affect agents utilities with type independent costs of search and waiting equilibrium contracts are always first best if agents are impatient and discount future payoffs however distortions vanish only gradually in the latter case we also characterize equilibrium offers and show that the market exhibits two types of externalities both of which are absent in the case of type independent costs of search

market segmentation by price quality schedules some evidence from automobiles discrimination among heterogeneous buyers of a product is possible through the use of multiple quality variants this article quantifies various implications of the standard mussa rosen model of price quality discrimination as applied to the u s automobile industry it demonstrates that the price quality variants of a major manufacturer indeed segment the market as predicted by the model distortions in the range and nature of products offered in their prices and in the resulting consumer surplus in the automobile market are measured and shown to be significant copyright 1992 by university of chicago press

economic development as self discovery in the presence of uncertainty about what a country can be good at producing there can be great social value to discovering costs of domestic activities because such discoveries can be easily imitated we develop a general equilibrium framework for a small open economy to clarify the analytical and normative issues we highlight two failures of the laissez faire outcome there is too little investment and entrepreneurship ex ante and too much production diversification ex post optimal policy consists of counteracting these distortions to encourage investments in the modern sector ex ante but to rationalize production ex post we provide some informal evidence on the building blocks of our model

when is price discrimination profitable we consider a general model of monopoly price discrimination and characterize the conditions under which price discrimination is and is not profitable we show that an important condition for profitable price discrimination is that the percentage change in surplus i e consumers total willingness to pay less the firm s costs associated with a product upgrade is increasing in consumers willingness to pay we refer to this as an increasing percentage differences condition and relate it to many known results in the marketing economics and operations management literatures

on allocative distortions in problems of self selection this article considers the general structure of self selection models by imposing conditions which permit the ordering of agents by their preferences we provide a characterization of the distortions inherent in the sorting process

market power information and efficiency the link between solutions and equilibrium distortions the extent of competition generally determines both the location and the extent of distortions due to information asymmetries when agents have private information increased competition raises agent welfare at the expense of uninformed principals nevertheless increased competition among principals may lower total surplus the losses sustained by principals as a group exceed the benefits realized by agents as a group when there is a sufficiently large proportion of agents with high cost of agent effort these results are independent of the correlation between the agent s marginal cost and the principal s marginal benefit of agent effort copyright 1993 by blackwell publishing ltd

networks and compatibility implications for antitrust in this paper we draw crucial parallels between the concepts of compatibility and networks and the more traditional concepts of complementarity and vertical relationships we also develop the important distinctions between two way networks and one way networks we then apply our framework to a number of current antitrust issues

increasing quality sequence when is it an optimal product introduction strategy in this paper we analyze the optimal introduction timing of a seller s products targeted at segments that differ in their willingness to pay for quality past studies suggest that an introduction sequence of a high quality product followed by a lower quality version of the product may mitigate the cannibalization effects of the low quality product on profits from the high quality product we show that if customers who value quality more possess an outside option such as a substitute product as may be the case with replacement buyers a seller may find it optimal to follow a low quality product with a higher quality one the latter being targeted at replacement buyers furthermore the ability of the seller to commit to future qualities accentuates the sequential increase in quality in the presence of such buyers thus we show that conditions other than uncertainty or technological improvements occurring over time may justify a seller adopting a strategy of sequentially increasing quality this paper was accepted by j miguel villas boas marketing

physician response to fee changes with multiple payers this paper develops a general model of physician behavior with demand inducement encompassing the two benchmark cases of profit maximization and target income behavior it is shown that when income effects are absent physicians maximize profits and when income effects are very strong physicians seek a target income the model is used to derive own and cross price expressions for the response of physicians to fee changes in the realistic context of more than one payer under the alternative behavior assumptions of profit maximization and target income behavior the implications for public and private fee policy and empirical research on physician response to fees are discussed

monopoly and quality distortion effects and remedies a monopolist that sells in a market in which consumers differ in their willingness to pay for quality will distort and enlarge the range of products offered for sale we examine the positive and normative impacts of remedies used to counteract such distortions for the case of a price ceiling the monopolist improves quality at the low quality end of the market offsetting the distortion induced by the unregulated exercise of monopoly power social welfare can be shown to increase for a sufficiently slight degree of price regulation for minimum quality standards the social welfare implications are ambiguous because the standards may exclude some consumers from the market

quality distortion by a discriminating monopolist the standard model of monopolistic imperfect quality discrimination involving consumer self selection has shown that no distortion occurs at the highest quality level while all lower quality levels are degraded in order to maintain profitable market segmentation this result flows from the assumption that consumers with a higher total utility of quality also have a higher marginal utility of quality the paper develops a reasonable model in which the standard assumption is not satisfied and this alternative model yields vastly different conclusions regarding the form of quality distortion in particular quality may be enhanced not degraded to maintain profitable market segmentation copyright 1989 by american economic association

contract design and bargaining power abstract it is a common assumption in contract theory that the uninformed side makes a take it or leave it proposal in contrast this paper explores a model which allows a shift in bargaining power continuously between the two parties endowing the informed side with more bargaining power gradually reduces distortions

on the international harmonization of bank regulation this paper offers a three way typology of bank regulation and examines the question of international harmonization for each category for economic regulation the danger is that harmonization could support and preserve domestic protectionist regulatory regimes but it could instead be a beneficial guise for lowering protectionist barriers the latter efforts should be encouraged for prudential regulation national regulation should be adequate to handle the extra stresses of international banking harmonization efforts e g the basle accord may offer only modest help but the accord may offer indirect help by limiting national governments competitive efforts implicitly to subsidize their banks risk taking activities finally for information regulation national regulation appears to be adequate and international harmonization does not appear to be necessary copyright 1994 by oxford university press

automobile quality choice under pollution control regulation in this paper we develop a modified quality choice model to study the effects of various mobile source air pollution control regulations we have a single producer that supplies a fixed number of car types two but faces a spectrum of consumers differing in their valuation of car quality the car manufacturer chooses the quality levels of the two car types as well as the sales mix between the two types and the size of the market it wishes to supply by endogenizing both the sales mix and the market size while still allowing quality to be a choice variable we are able to more completely analyze the impact of any car pollution control regulation existing studies of this impact either focus on the model line adjustment response shifts in the quality array or on the price adjustment response changes in the sales mix and market size in allowing for both the model line and the price adjustment options we find that the corporate average fuel efficiency cafe standard is unambiguously welfare superior to the low emission vehicle quantity constraint lev and zero emission vehicle zev programs we also show that the effects of the cafe standard are not equivalent to those of a fuel tax as previously found and that for a given car pollution target the former is preferred to the latter

the monopolist is not the best environmentalist s best friend an example this letter addresses the second degree price discrimination issue when a monopolized product is tied with environmental quality the monopolist may degrade environmental quality too much when marginal valuations of environmental quality and the good itself are positively related across consumers