foreign direct investment and the dark side of decentralization countries differ in their government architecture some countries are characterized by a high degree of concentration of fiscal administrative judicial executive and lawmaking powers whereas others have decentralized many functions and responsibilities of government to different jurisdictions and various levels of government the cross country differences in the organization of government are also not static but have been subject to substantial change in many countries the co existence of different organizational patterns of government has created an important debate regarding the determinants of particular government structures as well as questions regarding the optimality of different forms of organization

is the european community an optimal currency area optimal taxation versus the cost of multiple currencies the authors propose a view of optimal currency areas that is based on the principles of public finance inflation taxes are distortionary and an optimal spreading of tax distortions may require high inflation in one region and low inflation in another each region would need its own currency to do this on the other hand multiple currencies imply valuation and currency conversion costs which impede trade between regions this tradeoff is explored in the context of the european community s debate over a common currency using a two country variant of robert lucas and nancy stokey s cash in advance model copyright 1990 by american economic association

factor mobility and income redistribution in a federation abstract jurisdictions in a federation redistribute income by taxing capital and providing transfers to labor capital and labor move to earn higher returns net of taxes or gross of transfer benefits between jurisdictions in determining its redistributive policy the government for each jurisdiction thus takes into account the effects of its policy on the movement of factors from and to the jurisdiction hence the extent of redistribution depends on the mobility of factors the mobility of capital or labor leads to less redistribution than under autarky however mobility of both capital and labor may lead to more redistribution than if only capital moves as a consequence increased mobility of factors is not necessarily harmful to redistribution

reassessment of the tiebout model abstract the tiebout model has been the reference point for the classical approach to fiscal federalism its emphasis on mobility benefit taxation and the advantages of fiscal competition have informed fiscal federalism since the seminal contributions of musgrave and oates this paper reviews the influence that the tiebout model has had on fiscal federalism and argues that while its insights remain relevant for local government it is far from compelling as a positive description of or a normative prescription for fiscal federalism at the state level some aspects of alternative approaches are presented which lead to different perspectives than tiebout inspired ones

raising children to work hard altruism work norms and social insurance children who can count on support from altruistic parents may not try hard to succeed in the labor market moreover parental altruism makes withdrawal of such support non credible to promote work

foreign direct investment intra firm trade and ownership structure abstract asymmetric information about true opportunity cost in trade between a multinational and its foreign affiliate can alleviate the hold up problem in foreign direct investment selling shares in the affiliate to locals is also beneficial because it increases the parent multinational s information rent that is protected from a host government s confiscatory taxation

incentive effects of the u s welfare system a review the author would like to acknowledge support for prior work on this topic from the u s department of health and human services and helpful comments from three anonymous referees rebecca blank howard chernick john fitzgerald irwin garfinkel peter gottschalk edward gramlich david greenberg judith gueron james heckman v joseph hotz robert hutchens michael keane frank levy larry mead michael murray robert plotnick anuradha rangarajan philip robins howard rolston jeffrey smith and daniel weinberg all opinions and errors are those of the author alone

money is an experience good competition and trust in the private provision of money the interplay between competition and trust as efficiency enhancing mechanisms in the private provision of money is studied with commitment trust is automatically achieved and competition ensures efficiency without commitment competition plays no role trust does play a role but requires a bound on efficiency stationary inflation must be non negative and therefore the friedman rule cannot be achieved the quality of money can be observed only after its purchasing capacity is realized in this sense money is an experience good

international tax competition and the deficit bias i analyze the dynamic effects of tax competition on public budget deficits i find that stronger tax competition leads to a fiscal deficit bias at the early stages of financial liberalization when countries differ in terms of capital mobility further liberalization leads to external imbalances and diverging fiscal deficits while corporate tax rates converge consistent with theory i find that stronger tax competition increases deficits in a sample of oecd countries controlling for tax revenues and other standard determinants of fiscal deficits jel e62 f62

a political economy theory of partial decentralization we revisit the classic problem of tax competition in the context of federal nations and derive a positive theory of partial decentralization a capital poor median voter chooses to use redistributive capital taxes to provide public goods the expectation of high capital taxes however results in a small capital stock which lowers returns to redistribution the median voter therefore wants to commit to a lower level of capital taxes she does so by setting a partial degree of decentralization in the constitution the equilibrium degree of decentralization balances the positive effect of tax competition on capital taxes with the loss in redistribution that results we show that the degree of decentralization is nonmonotonic in inequality increasing in the redistributive efficiency of public good provision and decreasing in capital productivity when public goods are heterogeneous in their capacity to transfer funds all voters agree that goods with high redistributive capacity should be decentralized

privacy and time consistent optimal labor income taxation abstract incomplete information is a commitment device for time consistency problems in the context of time consistent optimal labor income taxation privacy can lead to a pareto superior outcome and increases the effectiveness of public education as a second best policy

the terms of trade and the international coordination of fiscal policy this paper develops an example of a noncooperative game between fiscal authorities in two countries the key strategic link between countries is the terms of trade an equilibrium without cooperation is characterized by excessive tax rates and public spending levels in each country the outcome is analogous to the nash equilibrium of the static optimal tarif game in trade theory but in this model there is also a dynamic distortion caused by noncooperative behaviour this dynamic distortion depresses capital accumulation and reduces the equilibrium capital stock in each country numerical examples suggest a significant welfare benefit of cooperation

cross border externalities and cooperation among representative democracies abstract this paper analyzes the provision of public goods with cross border externalities by representative democracies the level of provision of each country is decided by a policy maker elected by majority rule at the country level we compare the case in which policy makers set their policies noncooperatively with the case in which they set their policies through coasian cooperation cooperation induces policy makers to internalize cross border externalities but it also induces strategic voters to elect a policy maker who cares less about the public good to reduce their public good contribution the former effect increases public good provision while the latter reduces it we show that once voters incentives are taken into account whether cooperation is beneficial depends neither on voters preferences nor on the magnitude of spillovers nor on the size bargaining power or efficiency of each country instead it depends only on the curvature of the demand for the public good cooperation increases decreases public good provision when the demand function is more less convex than the unit elastic demand function hence the desirability of international cooperation depends mostly on the type of public good considered

capital tax competition under a common currency abstract we re examine the view that capital taxes are too low when capital is mobile across tax jurisdictions we do so by emphasising a previously neglected implication of decentralised capital tax setting when jurisdictions share a common currency namely capital taxes give rise to a vertical externality by affecting the revenues of the over arching central bank from issuing the common currency this externality may lead ceteris paribus to too high regional capital taxes and may more than offset the usual effects of tax competition in this case and contrary to conventional wisdom decentralised capital taxes will be too high

conditional versus unconditional trade concessions for developing countries we consider a small open economy that faces a commitment problem in trade liberalization we examine how the relationship with a large trading partner affects the ability of the small countrys government to sustain free trade through a reputational mechanism if the small country s government is patient enough it can overcome its domestic commitment without the help of the large country unconditional liberalization by the large trading partner has an ambiguous effect on the small country s dynamic incentives liberalization through a reciprocal trade agreement in which the large country lowers its tariffs conditionally on the small country doing the same unambiguously dominates unconditional liberalization by the large country as a way of boosting trade reforms and reinforcing policy credibility in the small country however if capacity in the import competing sector can only be reduced gradually a conditional reciprocal agreement may require an asynchronous exchange of concessions with the large country liberalizing before the small country

critical factors for transforming creativity into sustainability abstract although creativity and sustainability have received considerable attention in the literature there is limited research considering both particularly in relation to co existing organizational factors which facilitate the transformation of creativity into sustainable products this paper explores this gap through an analysis of six case studies of commercial organizations presenting both successful and unsuccessful implementation of sustainable products services across types of firms and industries the research framework focuses on three general facets 1 leadership 2 boundaries where different aspects of internal and external firm s activities enable a diversity of opinions and stakeholder engagement and 3 economic alignment instrumentality in which the goal of wealth creation is present and supported by a firm s capabilities the main finding of the paper is that appropriate leadership along with effective boundary spanning and clear profit orientation are simultaneously necessary conditions for successful transformation of creative business ideas into successful sustainable products services by business organizations this implies a steep discounting of success prospects if any of the above factors is lacking the work contributes to the development of general theoretical frameworks and approaches for achieving organizational success based on co creating social and economic value at the same time

bargaining and international policy cooperation the past decade has witnessed the growth of a large literature on international cooperation in trade and macroeconomic stabilization policy virtually all the models developed to date however are based on one of two extreme assumptions concerning governments ability to commit to international agreements either they assume that governments can make constitutionally binding long term agreements or else they assume that governments have no ability to make legal commitments whatsoever in the latter case international policy cooperation is possible only to the extent that reputational factors will allow in this paper i consider a world in which there is no legal mechanism for enforcing long term international agreements but where governments must still incur some small direct costs if they renege these small costs might arise due to legislative or administrative frictions i also allow for the possibility that international economic policy agreements can include small sidepayments for example in negotiating a bilateral reduction in tariffs two allies could simultaneously agree to redistribute the burdens of defense expenditures

overcoming barriers to innovation and diffusion of cleaner technologies some features of a sustainable innovation policy regime despite a deepening understanding of systems and processes by which the innovation and diffusion of cleaner technologies occurs relatively little attention has been given to the development of policy processes that reflect this deeper understanding a set of guiding principles for improving sustainable innovation policy processes has been formulated and disseminated by the authors and colleagues in research drawing on theoretical and empirical analysis including a case study of low carbon energy innovation in the uk and interactions with policy makers and other stakeholders through a series of workshops this paper elaborates on two of the guiding principles 1 stimulating the development of a sustainable innovation policy regime bringing together innovation and environmental policy regimes 2 applying systems thinking engaging with the complexity and systemic interactions of innovation systems and policy making processes to promote a transition to sustainability

the politics of 1992 fiscal policy and european integration the internal market in europe will greatly increase the international mobility of resources how will this affect fiscal policy in different countries we consider taxation of capital in a two country model where a democratically chosen government in each country chooses tax policy higher capital mobility changes the politico economic equilibrium in two ways on the one hand it leads to more tax competition between the countries this economic effect tends to lower tax rates in both countries on the other hand it alters voters preferences and makes them elect a different government this political effect offsets the increased tax competition although not completely

policy cooperation among benevolent governments may be undesirable this paper presents a simple counterexample to the belief that policy cooperation among benevolent governments is desirable it also explains circumstances under which such counterexamples are possible and relates them to the literature on time inconsistency since the work of hamada 1976 investigating the effects of increasing policy cooperation among countries has been a major topic in international economics a standard conclusion of this work is that increasing policy cooperation among countries is desirable in a seminal paper rogoff 1985 has challenged this view using a simple monetary model rogoff shows that cooperation among policy makers can lead to a lower level of welfare than noncooperation does rogoff s result has caused much consternation among those who advocate policy cooperation and his work has been criticized along several dimensions for example some authors including canzoneri and henderson 1988 have noted that a key assumption in rogoff s model is that the objective function of each country s policy maker does not coincide with the objective function of its residents indeed if in his model policy makers maximize the welfare of their country s residents the counterexample is overturned and cooperation strictly dominates noncooperation this feature leads some to interpret rogoff s result as simply saying that if policy makers form a coalition against the private sector they may be worse off than if they do not others such as neck and dockner 1988 have claimed that rogoff s result depends on private agents acting strategically under this interpretation rogoff s result is relevant to say economies with a large trade union but not to economies with a large number of competitive private agents in a somewhat different vein persson 1988 and especially devereux 1986a b have questioned the significance of welfare comparisons across different institutional regimes in a model without a solid foundation for the behavioural relationships this paper presents a simple model in which governments are benevolent but cooperation is still undesirable the model is a two country version of fischer s 1980 optimal tax model in it private agents are competitive in that each agent takes both prices and government policies as uninfluenced by his actions and each government maximizes the welfare of its country s residents in the paper the two different regimes cooperative and noncooperative

the political economy of tax coordination as a bargaining game between bureaucrats and politicians in the public finance literature the view prevails that taxcompetition among countries gives rise to an underprovision ofpublic goods and that coordinated tax increases are thereforedesirable public choice arguments in contrast suggest thattax coordination may not be in the interest of thetaxpayers citizens because imperfections of the politicalprocess political distortions may lead to a waste of taxmoney according to this view tax competition is a desirablecheck on the power to tax whereas tax coordination would onlyrelax the budget constraint of an inefficient public sector the present paper integrates the underprovision argument andthe public choice view into a common theoretical framework the government is assumed to consist of politicians andbureaucrats with diverging interests fiscal policy ismodelled as the outcome of a bargaining game between thebureaucrats and the politicians it turns out that coordinatedtax increases always raise the provision of public goods butalso increase the cost of political distortions the effect onthe welfare of the representative citizen may be positive ofnegative depending in particular on the distribution ofbargaining power between bureaucrats and politicians

welfare dependence concepts measures and trends in the past ten years discussions of the welfare system and welfare reform have increasingly been concerned with the extent of welfare dependence however while the idea that some individuals may be dependent upon the welfare system for support is intuitively clear the concept of welfare dependence is rather ill defined our aims in this paper are to clarify what is meant by welfare dependence to discuss the implications for data handling measurement and statistical modeling and to present new results on the level and trend in welfare dependence in the united states

interactions of commitment and discretion in monetary and fiscal policies we consider monetary scal interactions when the monetary authority is more conservative than the scal with both policies discretionary 1 nash equilibrium yields lower output and higher price than the ideal points of both authorities 2 of the two leadership possibilities scal leadership is generally better with scal discretion monetary commitment yields the same outcome as discretionary monetary leadership for all realizations of shocks but scal commitment is not similarly negated by monetary discretion second best outcomes require either joint commitment or identical targets for both authorities output socially optimal and price level appropriately conservative or complete separation of tasks jel e61 e63

divided we stand united we fall the hume north jones mechanism for the rise of europe the great divergence in incomes between europe and the rest of the world occurred relatively recently why was it that western europe once a backward outpost on the fringes of the eurasian continent able to dominate in terms of income and technology the previously successful eastern economies several mechanisms have been identi ed to account for the rise of europe this paper formalizes one important mechanism the intellectual origins of which can be traced back to hume and weber and which was fully though informally articulated by e l jones this mechanism emphasizes the contrast between the european states system and the eastern empires political competition for a mobile tax base in a states system forces rulers to expropriate less from their subjects and to supply relatively more public services by effectively limiting the exit options of the ruled an empire rewards its ruler with a captive tax base that can be subjected to relatively higher levels of expropriation without a similar rise in public services provided the states system thus encourages higher levels of capital accumulation while the empire stises it the successes of the eastern empires in their consolidation phase are due to the competition they initially faced from neighboring states since europe escaped such consolidation the process of accumulation there never faced the impediments its eastern counterparts did the paper thus also provides a structural explanation for the emergence of institutions in europe that led to relatively secure property rights

asymmetric tax competition abstract the paper analyzes nash equilibrium when two jurisdictions set tax rates on a tax base which is mobile between them population differences imply tax differences the smaller jurisdiction levies a lower tax rate in equilibrium and its residents are better off than those in the larger jurisdiction the nash equilibrium is inefficient if the two jurisdictions merged the resulting allocation would be efficient however if differences in population are great enough residents of the small jurisdiction would be made worse off by such a merger

welfare dependence and self control an empirical analysis this paper investigates the behavioral and policy mechanisms that generate dependence on welfare programs a dynamic model with labor supply disincentives and state dependence in preferences is expanded to incorporate time inconsistency which induces addictive behavior due to problems of self commitment estimation is based on data from a welfare reform experiment which contains a unique policy feature that helps identify the time preference parameters various results indicate that the commitment problem is an important consideration in the design of policy around one fourth of the individuals are time inconsistent and neglecting time inconsistency will cause state dependence in preferences to be overestimated these individuals are more responsive to policy changes due to the presence of commitment related incentives time inconsistency reduces income and net tax contribution by at least 15 and 50 percent respectively an increase in welfare benets aggravates the commitment problem and reduces utility from a time consistent perspective certain dynamic policy interventions are more eective than static interventions in alleviating the commitment problem for instance a dynamic nonwork tax generates strong commitmentrelated work incentives and over half of time inconsistent individuals will voluntarily adopt it as a commitment device the implications of time inconsistency for other policy interventions such as earned income tax credit eitc and a prowork time limit are examined

market size and tax competition abstract with international externalities different country sizes imperfect competition and trade costs tax competition for mobile firms is efficiency enhancing with respect to the free market outcome under both scenarios the resulting inefficiencies in international specialization and trade flows vanish when trade costs are low enough otherwise only international tax coordination can implement the efficient spatial distribution of firms

sustainable innovations in the corporate sector the empirical evidence from ibex 35 firms abstract sustainable innovation practices those which simultaneously contribute to environmental social and economic value creation have drawn increased attention from academics industry leaders and policy makers around the globe there is a general agreement that innovation is a very important part of the puzzle in achieving long term sustainability thus a critical question to be answered is what factors actually differentiate and appear to contribute to sustainable innovations si at the firm level this paper addresses the question by examining empirical evidence from the ibex 35 companies from the years 2010 2015 our results obtained from multivariate regression model indicate that the intensity of a firm s si activity is strongly and statistically significantly associated with the sector in which a given firm operates with a rising level of environmental footprint acting as a stimulant for innovation additionally firms characterized by higher net profit margins and returns on equity were also much more likely to introduce sis the findings also suggest that factors like size and age of a given company as well as level of competition in a sector in which it operates are not significant predictors for the implementation of sustainable innovations overall this study contributes to our understanding of the main characteristics of companies active in the area of si

coordination of fiscal policies in a world economy abstract this paper provides a simple counterexample to the standard belief that in a world economy in which all countries are small strategic interactions between policymarkers are trivial and thus cooperative and non cooperative government policies coincide it is well known that this holds for tariff policies however this paper demonstrates the result does not apply to fiscal policy in addition the paper analyzes how optimally coordinated fiscal policies differ from non cooperative policies it finds that relative to optimally coordinated levels non cooperative government spending can be too high or too low depending on the sign of a transmission effect which captures the overall effect countries actions have on each other

fiscal centralization versus decentralization growth and welfare effects of spillovers leviathan taxation and capital mobility abstract this paper develops an endogenous growth model with spillovers of public goods leviathan taxation and mobile capital to examine the relative merits of centralized and decentralized fiscal systems for economic growth and social welfare we show that a decentralized system dominates a centralized system in terms of economic growth however the difference in social welfare between a decentralized and a centralized system is non monotonic and displays a hump shaped relationship with respect to capital mobility since higher capital mobility induces stronger tax competition this finding implies that there is an optimal degree of tax competition some tax competition is desirable but fierce tax competition may be harmful we also show that there is a critical level of spillovers of public goods above which centralization dominates decentralization in terms of social welfare as in previous studies however if spillovers are below this critical level capital mobility also matters in the welfare comparison between centralized and decentralized systems

the welfare effects of imperfect harmonisation of trade and industrial policy in recent years several countries have made major efforts to coordinate trade and industrial policies examples include the united states canada free trade agreement and the european attempt to complete the e c internal market by the year i992 the design of welfare improving policy reform is complicated by the presence of a large number of policy induced distortions and by the imperfectly competitive nature of many industries it is well known that the nominal reduction of a set of distortions holding other distortions fixed does not necessarily improve welfare this conclusion which arises because the reform occurs in a second best environment certainly survives the introduction of imperfect competition we examine additional complications that arise when reform is carried out under conditions of imperfect competition this subject which is of general theoretical interest is also of immediate practical interest due to the current attempts to harmonise european trade and industrial policies the principal conclusion is that limited cooperation as occurs in customs unions may be worse for members of the union than no cooperation this possibility arises because comparison of welfare under the two situations no cooperation and partial cooperation amounts to a comparison of two second best equilibria such a comparison is in general ambiguous an alternative explanation of the result is that different degrees of cooperation induce different games a comparison of the equilibria of these different games is in general ambiguous in view of this the possibility of disadvantageous cooperation is not surprising this paper identifies circumstances under which the possibility is likely we study the case where countries that form the union i e cooperate coordinate trade policy in an attempt to alter the incentives faced by imperfectly competitive domestic industries for simplicity we assume that these industries each of which is treated as a single firm produce for export only we analyse three variations of a partial equilibrium trading model which illustrate different reasons why limited cooperation may be worse than no cooperation for members of a union we study complete information subgame perfect equilibria section i considers the case where n firms each identified with a different

optimal monetary policies and policy interdependence in the world economy the literature on strategic policy interactions has focused on the implications of alternative strategic policy interactions cooperative versus noncooperative for equilibrium macroeconomic policies given the state of the world economy this paper asks how changes in world economic conditions alter equilibrium policies given the nature of policy interdependence among nations the paper considers a world economy comprised of two countries operating under a system of flexible exchange rates both governments act noncooperatively and choose the rate of growth of their money supply so as to maximize the utility of their country s residents given the rate of growth of the other country s money supply the resulting nash equilibrium rates of growth of the home and foreign money supplies are determined and the dependence of international differences in money growth and inflation rates on international differences in technology jel e52 e60 f41 f42 the international transmission of monetary and fiscal policies has been studied a great deal by economists however policy interdependence how one country s policies depend on the policies enacted by other countries has only recently begun to be explored hamada s 1976 paper was one of the first major contributions in this regard hamada considered a world economy comprised of n countries operating under a fixed exchange rate system in which policymakers set domestic credit growth so as to maximize an objective function depending on inflation and the rate of accumulation of international reserves using this framework hamada demonstrated that in equilibrium optimal domestic credit policies are generally not pareto efficient when they are chosen noncooperatively but are pareto efficient when they are set cooperatively in subsequent work hamada 1979 1985 has elaborated on this and various other aspects of cooperative and noncooperative monetary policies under both fixed and flexible exchange rates many others have followed hamada s lead by comparing the properties of cooperative and noncooperative monetary policies eichengreen 1985 for instance considers discount rates as the instrument of monetary policy and examines issues of leadership and cooperation during the interwar years under the gold standard oudiz and sachs 1985 have used simulation methods to

do credible domestic institutions promote credible international agreements we examine the relationship between international policy coordination and domestic policy reputation when both are self sustaining we show that domestic policy commitment does not necessarily facilitate international cooperation rather efficient policies may be most easily sustained when governments are unable to pre commit to policy domestically moreover the lack of domestic commitment is more likely to facilitate international cooperation the larger the international spillovers of domestic policies are

competitive markets without commitment in the presence of a time inconsistency problem with agency contracts we show that competitive markets can implement allocations that pareto dominate those achieved by a benevolent government and they induce more effort we analyze a model with moral hazard and a two sided lack of commitment after agents have chosen their work firms can modify contracts and agents can switch firms if the ex post market outcome satisfies a weak notion of competitiveness and sufficiently separates individuals it is pareto superior to a government s allocation with a complete breakdown of incentives moreover competitive markets without commitment implement more effort in equilibrium under general conditions

human capital investment and globalization in extortionary states abstract this paper considers education investment and public education policy in closed and open economies with an extortionary government the extortionary government in a closed economy chooses an education policy in order to overcome a hold up problem of time consistent taxation similar to benevolent governments the two types of government differ in their education policies if highly productive labor is mobile extortionary governments incentives for a policy that stimulates higher private education efforts vanish instead they have incentives to prevent individuals from mobility increasing education investment tax competition therefore reduces hold up problems of time consistent extortionary taxation but introduces other distortions that reduce workers utility

inflation taxes and the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy by use of a game of chicken in this study some of the consequences of an uncertain policy struggle game of chicken between independent taxing agencies a monetary and a fiscal authority are exam ined we show that policy uncertainty may improve upon regimes where there is no uncer tainty and one agency succeeds in implementing a low tax policy at the expense of the other agency an uncertain tax policy never dominates a fully coordinated tax policy but it can move average tax rates in the right direction in this sense the game of chicken between agencies can be beneficial and can compensate for the lack of a specific coordinating admin