regions of europe a feasible status to be discussed regions of europe jacques dreze a new concept is proposed that of regions of europe which do not have full statehood and belong not to any state but to the community directly without endorsing this possibility and limiting itself to its economic aspects this article discusses the various dimensions of its economic desirability it appears that in general autonomous regions will not find it advantageous to insure each other investigating how assets and liabilities should be apportioned at the time of secession it argues in favour of distributive neutrality net incomes are unchanged by the secession itself in both the seceding region and the rest of the nation how distributive neutrality could be implemented is explored through a number of suggestive examples in general a region receives a share of the public debt related to its share of the public primary deficit with corrections to account for growth unsustainability of the public debt and so on

intergovernmental transfers and fiscal behavior insurance versus aggregate discipline abstract this paper evaluates the trade off between the advantages of risk sharing and the perils of common pool problems in federal fiscal arrangements under the assumption of asymmetric information we evaluate two alternative regimes of intergovernmental transfers in one regime the central government pre commits to a certain level of transfers that compensate vertical fiscal imbalances and provide some limited ex ante insurance in the other regime it accommodates ex post the fiscal needs of the different provinces in this second case full insurance results but the economy is subject to a tragedy of the fiscal commons with excessive subnational spending insufficient local taxation and reduced production of federal public goods we find the range of parameters for which one or the other institutional regime will be preferable the result is a fiscal federalism version of the usual trade off between rules and discretion

factor mobility and income redistribution in a federation abstract jurisdictions in a federation redistribute income by taxing capital and providing transfers to labor capital and labor move to earn higher returns net of taxes or gross of transfer benefits between jurisdictions in determining its redistributive policy the government for each jurisdiction thus takes into account the effects of its policy on the movement of factors from and to the jurisdiction hence the extent of redistribution depends on the mobility of factors the mobility of capital or labor leads to less redistribution than under autarky however mobility of both capital and labor may lead to more redistribution than if only capital moves as a consequence increased mobility of factors is not necessarily harmful to redistribution

the government expenditure economic growth relation in japan an analysis by using the adl test for threshold cointegration based on annual data from japan for the period 1960 to 2010 we investigate the government expenditure economic growth relation in japan by using the autoregressive distributed lag test for threshold cointegration developed by li and lee 2010 in particular we evaluate the validity of wagner s view and the keynesian view in the case of japan the empirical results presented herein indicate that of these two classical economics perspectives only wagner s view holds for japan the findings also demonstrate that the adjustment process towards its long run equilibrium is asymmetric

depressing dependence transfers and economic growth in the german states 1975 2005 abstractdepressing dependence transfers and economic growth in the german states 1975 2005 regional studies most countries pay substantial intergovernmental transfers to poor regions with the aim of achieving regional convergence consequently transfers should have a positive effect on economic growth however it is equally possible that transfers perpetuate underdevelopment this paper studies empirically the effect of intergovernmental transfers on economic growth with a panel of west german states over the period 1975 2005 the findings suggest that transfers do not foster economic growth presumably because the recipients use them to subsidize declining industries

constitutional rules of exclusion in jurisdiction formation the rules under which jurisdictions nations provinces can deny immigration or expel residents are generally governed by a constitution but there do not exist either positive or normative analyses to suggest what types of exclusion rules are best we stylize this problem by suggesting four constitutional rules of admission free mobility admission by majority vote admission by unanimous consent admission by a demand threshold for public goods in a simple model we characterize the equilibria that result from these rules and provide a positive theory for which constitutional rules will be chosen

inequality and the territorial fragmentation of solidarity a long tradition of research has shown decentralized political struc tures as an important cause behind lower levels of redistribution and higher levels of inequality this article offers an alternative interpretation of the association between fragmented fiscal structures and higher levels of inequality i argue that the distribu tive effects of decentralization depend on the preexisting territorial patterns of inequal ity therefore the political choice between alternative fiscal structures is largely driven by their expected distributive consequences as a result the territorial structure of inequality becomes an important factor to explain why some fiscal structures are more integrated than others two mechanisms link regional income distributions and preferences about the decentralization of redistributive policy differences in the demand for redistribution associated with interregional income differences and dif ferences in the demand for social insurance associated with the incidence of labor market risks i test the argument using a data set of fourteen countries in the orga nization for economic cooperation and development oecd over the period 1980 2000 in addition i illustrate the potential of the approach by analyzing why social solidarity remains territorially fragmented in the european union despite the fact that it has a common currency and a common market

local public goods risk sharing and private information in federal systems abstract we examine the implications of information asymmetries for the optimal design of interregional insurance schemes and the allocation of local public goods we have good and bad news the good news is that the presence of informational asymmetries is not in itself sufficient to deny federations the attainment of either efficiency or egalitarian goals the bad news is that not only the first best may not be incentive compatible but also the incentive compatible optimum may violate participation constraints federations may have to content themselves with fourth best allocations as a result of strategic manipulation of information by privately informed jurisdictions

decomposition of the effect of government size on growth empirical results through a fixed effects regression model show that government size has a negative effect on growth mainly through hampering capital accumulation when a sample is divided into oecd and non oecd countries the negative effect of government size on capital accumulation persists for non oecd countries but not for oecd countries

a theory of mandatory convertibles abstract the objective of this paper is to develop a theoretical analysis of mandatory convertibles which are securities that automatically mandatorily convert to common stock on a pre specified date we consider a firm facing a financial market characterized by asymmetric information and significant costs in the event of financial distress the firm can raise capital either by issuing mandatory convertibles or by issuing more conventional securities like straight debt ordinary convertibles or equity we show that in equilibrium the firm issues straight debt or ordinary convertibles if the extent of asymmetric information facing it is large but the probability of being in financial distress is relatively small it issues mandatory convertibles if it faces a smaller extent of asymmetric information but a greater probability of financial distress our model provides a rationale for the three commonly observed features of mandatory convertibles mandatory conversion capped or limited capital appreciation and a higher dividend yield compared to common stock we also characterize the equilibrium design of mandatory convertibles

tax competition and income redistribution an empirical analysis for switzerland tax competition is supposed to lead to thecollapse of the welfare state because first it willbecome difficult for a single jurisdiction to levy aredistribution tax upon the rich and mobile andsecond such a policy if undertaken in onejurisdiction will attract poor individuals from otherjurisdictions and erode internal redistributionpolicies in this paper the impact of personal incometaxes and transfers on residence decisions oftaxpayers is analyzed with swiss subfederal data therelationship of tax competition and the erosion of theswiss welfare state is tested with aggregate data onincome redistribution

accommodating public expenditure policies the case of fast growing asian economies abstract it is widely believed that the exceptional economic performances of the east asian economies are attributable as much to the visible hand of the state as to the invisible hand of the market this paper analyzes the experiences of japan south korea singapore and taiwan in implementing a key instrument of state intervention namely public expenditure policy the analysis shows that these economies could achieve high standards of physical and social infrastructure even with relatively low spending the key features of complementary spending policy include emphasis on macroeconomic stability cost effective spending involvement of private sector in providing quasi public goods minimum distortions in the labor markets and human resource development to achieve a broad based development

optimal security design how should new securities be designed traditional theories have little to say on this the literature on capital structure and general equilibrium theories with incomplete markets take the securities firms issue as exogenous this paper explicitly incorporates the transaction costs of issuing securities and develops a model where the instruments that are traded are chosen optimally and the economy s market structure is endogenous among other things it is shown that the firm s income stream should be split so that in every state all payoffs are allocated to the security held by the group that values them most this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

government and growth cross sectional evidence economic theory suggests that government contributes to total economic growth in two ways positively through the provision of pigovian public goods and services and negatively through the inefficient provision of such goods and services and the distortionary effects attendant with their provision this paper develops a model that differentiates the two effects and empirically tests the model for a sample of forty eight countries evidence suggests that the net effect of government on growth is positive but that the negative effects are not insignificant though growth in government output contributes to total economic growth at the margin this is approximately offset by distortionary effects attendant with increases in the relative size of government

channels of interstate risk sharing united states 1963 1990 we develop a framework for quantifying the amount of risk sharing among states in the united states and construct data that allow us to decompose the cross sectional variance in gross state product into several components which we refer to as levels of smoothing we find that 39 percent of shocks to gross state product are smoothed by capital markets 13 percent are smoothed by the federal government and 23 percent are smoothed by credit markets the remaining 25 percent are not smoothed we also decompose the federal government smoothing into subcategories taxes transfers and grants to states

international integration risk and the welfare state how does international integration affect the welfare state does it call for a leaner or an expanded welfare state international integration may affect the distortions caused by welfare state activities but also the risks motivating social insurance mechanisms this paper addresses these potentially counteracting effects in a fully specified intertemporal two country stochastic endowment model focusing on the implications when product market integration reduces trade frictions across national product markets it is shown that lower trade frictions may increase the marginal costs of public funds which gives an argument for reducing steady state public consumption however tighter integration of product markets unambiguously leads to more variability in private consumption and this gives a case for expanding the social insurance provided via state contingent public sector activities automatic stabilizers jel classification e30 f10 h11

optimality free mobility and the regional authority in a federation abstract this paper examines the efficiency properties of a federation characterized by strategically competing regions and freely mobile homogeneous individuals analyses of this economy have concluded that achieving a pareto optimal will require intervention by a national authority this paper makes one basic point the nash equilibrium of regional authority behavior is pareto optimal the implication is that there is no role for a national authority in either providing interregional transfers or correcting for decentralized provision of public goods the nash equilibrium involves samuelson public goods provision and regions purchasing preferred population distributions with optimal interregional transfers

the impressive contribution of canadian economists to fiscal federalism theory and policy the study of fiscal federalism has been central to the research of canadian economists since the rowell sirois report to mark the 50th anniversary of the founding of the canadian economics association it is fitting to take stock of their contributions we focus on the period since 1982 and emphasize the main scholarly publications of an inclusive array of canadian economists and economists in canadian universities our attention is devoted to applications in the context of federal and provincial governments setting aside related issues in municipal government finance we briefly discuss instances where the fiscal federalism literature has informed policy debates including through policy research institutes government commissions and international organizations la contribution impressionnante des economistes canadiens a la theorie et a la politique du federalisme fiscal l etude du federalisme fiscal a ete un element central de la recherche des economistes canadiens depuis la commission rowell sirois au moment de celebrer le 50eme anniversaire de la fondation de l association canadienne d economique le moment est approprie pour prendre la mesure de leurs contributions on se concentre sur la periode apres 1982 et on souligne les principales publications savantes d un ensemble inclusif d economistes canadiens et d economistes dans les universites canadiennes une attention particuliere est portee aux applications dans le contexte federal et provincial mettant de cote les enjeux relies a la finance municipale on discute brievement des instances ou la litterature sur le federalisme fiscal a eclaire les debats de politiques publiques y compris a travers les instituts de recherche sur les politiques publiques les commissions gouvernementales et les organisations internationales

the growth tax in the united states by providing public goods including law and order national defense and income redistribution that expands the gains from exchange the scope and membership of the constitutional agreement government expenditures act as a positive externality on the growth rate beyond that level taxes act as a negative externality in this paper a simple model is formulated and the optimal growth maximizing tax rate found empirical estimation finds it to be in the range of 21 5 22 9 percent the effect of taxation beyond this level is a cumulative loss of about 30 trillion 1972 dollars in gnp over the period 1949 89

capital structure and signaling game equilibria in this article we model the financing decisions of a firm as a sequential signaling game we prove that when insiders have perfect information regarding the firm s future case flows the application of refinements to the set of admissible equilibria leads to the dominance of debt over equity financing however we show that when insiders observe the firm s cash flows imperfectly there may exist sequential equilibria in which this pecking order breaks down and some firms strictly prefer equity to debt financing we also prove that despite the breakdown of the pecking order the announcement effect of equity financing will be negative relative to debt financing

implications of the mobility of skilled labor for local public funding of higher education inter jurisdictional labor mobility reduces the incentive for local public funding of education this can be rectified by dividing the financial burden between the federal and local level subsidizing local expenditures by inter jurisdictional payments based on net migration flows c 1997 elsevier science s a

federalism equalization and risk aversion abstract what causes a group of countries to agree to form a federation other alternative arrangements which often are chosen instead are to form a unitary state or to remain autonomous federations usually allow for considerable freedom of movement among constituent regions they also provide a fairly limited redistribution of any rents earned in these regions these two features together imply that residents of poor regions can share in the rents in rich regions by migration this fiscal migration may waste resources why not simply share the rents equally among residents of all regions such a unitary arrangement although efficient would not appeal to residents of a country which is likely to be the best off region in a federation complete autonomy may expose residents of the separate countries to considerable idiosyncratic risk here i demonstrate that federation may be chosen by a group of countries even though it is a more wasteful arrangement than either other alternative if asymmetries among countries and the degree of risk aversion are large federal states also often implement transfers among the regions these transfers can be viewed as substitutes for fiscal migration i also show that the possibility of transfers even without any commitment to specifics makes federalism a more attractive option a federal constitution which requires transfers in excess of what would be made voluntarily may make federalism more attractive still

government size productivity and economic growth the post war experience a substantial portion of the slowdown in productivity and economic growth in the seventies and eighties cannot be ascribed to traditional factors we have found one potential additional source the dramatic growth in the scale of government employing a theoretical model of output growth we derive an equation which controls for cyclical influences and which permits distinguishing the effects of government growth on the economic base from the effects on the economic growth rate we find that increases in the scale of government lead to statistically significant reductions in both the economic base and the economic growth rate in addition we find that most of this government induced retardation of economic activity arises from reductions in productivity rather that reductions in the employment of factors

the cartelization of local governments intergovernmental competition can enhance efficiency centralization of government expenditures inhibits intergovernmental competition because it makes governments more homogeneous and so cartelizes local governments cartelization reduces tiebout competition and limits benchmark competition in which one government s performance can be compared with neighboring governments measuring fiscal centralization as the ratio of local to state and local government expenditures within the state the evidence shows that more fiscal decentralization is associated with higher levels of state per capita income cartelization of local governments negatively impacts income

evidence of public spending crowding out from a panel of oecd countries the empirical relationship between government spending and private investment is examined using a panel of 14 oecd countries the evidence suggests the existence of a significant crowding in effect of private investment by public investment through the positive impact of infrastructure on private investment productivity moreover government consumption appears to crowd out private investment the implications of these results are of foremost importance when it comes to fiscal consolidation deficit reductions engineered through cuts in public investment could severely impinge on private capital accumulation and growth prospects

risk sharing in a federation with population mobility and long horizons in this paper risk sharing among individuals within and across regions in a federation with population mobility and infinite horizons is considered it is shown that the regional authorities will not fully exploit gains from interregional risk sharing when population mobility is imperfect in the nash equilibrium there is complete risk sharing among the individuals within each region however which corresponds to the policies of the central authority regional authorities who care about their reputation may be able to commit to an efficient allocation it is possible that improvements in the degree of mobility will make such commitments less likely jel classification h77 e61 and f36 le partage du risque dans une federation ou la population est mobile et l horizon temporel long ce memoire examine le partage du risque entre personnes a l interieur des regions et entre regions dans une federation ou il y a mobilite de la population et horizon temporel infini on montre que les autorites regionales n exploiteront pas pleinement les gains en provenance d un partage inter regional du risque quand la mobilite de la population est imparfaite cependant dans un equilibre a la nash il y a partage complet du risque entre les individus de chaque region ce qui correspond aux politiques des autorites centrales les autorites regionales qui tiennent a leur reputation peuvent etre capables de s engager a une allocation efficace il est possible que les ameliorations dans le degre de mobilite rendent ces engagements moins probables

federal fiscal constitutions risk sharing and redistribution the paper studies the political and economic determinants of regional public transfers specifically it focuses on how such transfers are shaped by alternative fiscal constitutions where a constitution is an allocation of fiscal instruments across different levels of governments plus a procedure for the collective choice of these instruments realistic restrictions on fiscal instruments introduce a tradeoff between risk sharing and redistribution different constitutions produce very different results in particular a federal social insurance scheme chosen by voting provides overinsurance whereas an intergovernmental transfer scheme chosen by bargaining provides underinsurance

fiscal federalism and monetary unions a quantitative assessment abstract in this paper i provide a quantitative analysis of three different forms of fiscal federalism in monetary unions fully decentralized regional fiscal authorities as the benchmark fiscal equalization with nominal tax revenue sharing and a common central fiscal authority i assess the capability of the different arrangements to stabilize regional consumption output and employment over the business cycle i also study the implications for interregional income consumption risk sharing and welfare from this analysis the following results emerge first a central fiscal authority stabilizes consumption fluctuations and increases the scope of interregional income and consumption risk sharing second fiscal equalization destabilizes consumption fluctuations and also reduces the scope of interregional income and consumption risk smoothing third a central fiscal authority leads to welfare gains whereas fiscal equalization leads to welfare losses

productivity in the united states and its relationship to government activity an analysis of 57 years 1929 1986 under the classical supply side paradigm of productivity grouth raising government economic above rudimentary levels integrates markets and provides useful public goods which enhance growth beyond some point however increasing government activity discourages growth through tax disincentives and by rewarding dependence on government expenditures defining government economic activity to be government expenditures as a percentage of gnp this study looks first at data for the period 1889 1986 and shows that the u s economy has experienced what is predicted by the supply side paradigm in addition the study presents an econometric analysis of government s effects on productivity for the period 1929 1986 using a standard neoclassical growth model this analysis validates the classical supply side paradigm and shows that maximum productivity growth occurs when government expenditures represent about 20 of gnp far less than the 35 which existed in 1986

financial innovation the last twenty years and the next the word revolution is entirely appropriate for describing the changes in financial institu tions and instruments that have occurred in the past twenty years the major impulses to successful financial innovations have come from regulations and taxes the outlook for the future is for a slowing down of the rate of financial innovation but much growth and improvement are still in prospect

labor market integration investment in risky human capital and fiscal competition this paper presents a general equilibrium model where human capital investment increases specialization and exposes skilled workers to region specific earnings risk interjurisdictional mobility of skilled labor mitigates these risks state contingent migration of skilled labor also improves efficiency with perfect capital markets labor market integration raises welfare and reduces ex post earnings inequality if instead human capital investment can only be financed through local taxes labor market integration leads to interjurisdictional fiscal competition shifting the burden of taxation to low skilled immobile workers decentralized public provision of human capital investment creates earnings inequalities and is inefficient

government and economic growth a non linear relationship recently various authors have examined the relationship between growth in government size and total economic growth in each case the authors permitted only a monotonic relationship this paper examines the issue of a non linear relationship between growth in government and overall growth in the economy

outsourcing labor market pooling and labor contracts this paper considers the interaction between input sharing and labor market pooling in urban areas in particular it examines the impact of the size of a city and business risks on the organizational structures of firms located in urban agglomerations and it also discusses the impact of organizational structure on incentives to insure workers against income risks it is shown that manufacturing firms suffer from a coordination game in their decision to outsource production the existence of idiosyncratic risks causes manufacturers to refrain from outsourcing the incentives to offer wage and employment protection to workers are more pronounced when manufacturers outsource the production of their inputs to a local market which mitigates the impact of labor market pooling

economic and social security in the twenty first century with attention to europe a partly heuristic attempt at exploring long run policies aimed at a second best compromise between ex ante risk sharing efficiency and ex post productive efficiency wage subsidies for low skilled workers financed by taxes on high wages are advocated together with improved risk sharing between capital and labour between generations and between the countries belonging to emu the scope of the advocated policies is limited by considerations of moral hazard time consistency and fiscal competition also estimates of some key economic parameters remain very imprecise several avenues of further research are identified

efficient tax exporting in a multijurisdiction economy with free mobility of households between communities some portion of any community s tax is incident upon nonresident landowners it is shown that when the objective of a community is taken to be the level of satisfaction of its residents a fully efficient allocation is a nash equilibrium of the decentralized game in general no local tax structure that restricts a community s tax base to residents can attain the optimum thus tax exporting is necessary for independent local government behavior to be consistent with efficiency

government size and economic growth a new framework and some evidence from cross section and time series data a study of the impact of government size on economic performance and growth is important theoretically one point of view suggests that a larger government size is likely to be detrimental to efficiency and economic growth because for example i government operations are often conducted inefficiently ii the regulatory process imposes excessive burdens and costs on the economic system and iii many of government s fiscal and monetary policies tend to distort economic incentives and lower the productivity of the system at the other extreme one can identify some points of view that assign to the government a critical role in the process of economic development and could argue that a larger government size is likely to be a more powerful engine of economic development there are several arguments on which the latter point of view is based these include besides others i role of the government in harmonizing conflicts between private and social interests ii prevention of exploitation of the country by foreigners and iii securing an increase in productive investment and providing a socially optimal direction for growth and development

factor mobility risk and redistribution in the welfare state economic integration reduces the costs of factor mobility producing efficiency gains and contributing to equalization of net factor returns this raises the cost of income redistribution policy thus threatening a basic function of the welfare state a simple model of costly factor mobility under uncertainty shows that greater factor mobility enables factor owners to pool industry specific region specific or occupation specific risks due to uncertain technology or terms of trade economic integration may thus reduce some of the potential social insurance benefits of redistributive policy

migration with fiscal externalities abstract this paper analyses the distribution of a country s population among regions when migration involves fiscal externalities the main question addressed is whether a decentralized decision making of regional governments can produce an optimal population distribution as recently asserted or a centralized intervention is indispensable as argued before in the literature in analysing this issue it is assumed that migration is costly and accordingly the problem is modelled in a dynamic setup it turns out that while with costless mobility the fiscal externality is fully internalized by voluntary interregional transfers with costly mobility centrally coordinated transfers still remain indispensable for achieving the socially optimal allocation

price and advertising signals of product quality we present a signaling model based on ideas of phillip nelson in which both the introductory price and the level of directly uninformative advertising or other dissipative marketing expenditures are choice variables and may be used as signals for the initially unobservable quality of a newly introduced experience good repeat purchases play a crucial role in our model a second focus of the paper is on illustrating an approach to refining the set of equilibria in signalling games with multiple potential signals

agreeing on efficient emissions reduction we propose a simple contest based mechanism providing incentives to reduce harmful emissions to their efficient level without infringing upon productive efficiency participation in the most stylized form of the scheme is voluntary and individually rational all rules are mutually agreeable and are unanimously adopted if proposed the scheme balances its budget and requires no principal in a perhaps more realistic stochastic output version which could potentially inform policy decisions we show that the transfers required by the efficient mechanism create a mutual insurance motive that can serve as an effective rationale for the gradual formation of international environmental agreements

attachment to home and efficient purchases of population in a fiscal externality economy abstract this paper examines the efficiency properties of an economy characterized by strategically competing regions and individuals with varying degrees of attachment to home in an otherwise standard fiscal externality setting regional authorities may make interregional transfers in purchasing preferred populations however there is a range of distributions of resources over which neither region makes transfers nevertheless all equilibrium allocations resulting from the nash behavior of regional authorities including those that involve no transfers are efficient therefore in contrast to the standard conclusions of the fiscal externality literature there is no efficiency role for a central authority

does a federal country need federal transfers when it has labour mobility sequeira t n and lopes a f does a federal country need federal transfers when it has labour mobility regional studies this work empirically tests optimum currency area theory for members of a given monetary union the united states the united states is recognized as a country where labour mobility between states is high this paper jointly assesses the consequences of having federal transfers and labour mobility in terms of the states cyclical output it is concluded that federal transfers undoubtedly contribute to increase cyclical output however out migration may increase or decrease cyclical output depending on certain conditions as federal transfers proved to be much more important than migration the answer to the question in the paper s title is yes sequeira t n et lopes a f un pays federal a t il besoin des transferts federaux quand il est deja dote de la mobilite du travail regional studies cet article cherche a tester empiriquement la theorie des zones monetaires optimale

investment incentives debt and warrants abstract this paper models and characterizes investment incentive problems associated with debt financing the decision problem of residual claimants is explicity formulated and their investment policies are characterized the paper also analyzes the use of conversion features and warrants to control distortionary incentives these claims reverse the convex shape of levered equity over the upper range of the firm s earnings and this mitigates the incentive to take risk it is shown that under certain conditions such claims can be constructed to restore net present value maximizing incentives and simultaneously meet the financing requirements of the firm

exports as a factor of production a consistency test abstract for more than a decade economists have routinely introduced an export growth variable into a crosscountry production function framework as a way of examining various aspects of the growth process in developing countries the export promotion hypothesis in particular while the authors of these studies have rejected the argument that their results are biased by the accounting relationship between exports and gdp some recent studies offer evidence supporting this contention here a simple procedure is proposed to test for this bias the procedure consists of testing directly for the implied lower productivity in the nonexport sector of the economy

ageing migration and endogenous public pensions abstract this paper analyses migration behaviour of mobile workers in reaction to population ageing we show that the conventional wisdom that a decrease in fertility will lead to a rise in wages and thus to an inflow of immigrants that mitigates the adverse effects of ageing on public pensions may not hold if labour is heterogeneous moreover we demonstrate that if public pensions are endogenous i e if ageing leads the elderly to successfully lobby for higher taxes it may take several generations before a steady state is reached and the initial migration flow may be opposite to the steady state migration

government expenditure and economic growth a cross country study this paper examines the relationship between the share of government consumption expenditure in gdp and the rate of growth of real per capita gdp the work of the u n international comparison project has recently made available new estimates for over 100 countries of both per capita gdp and the share of government consumption these new estimates are based on direct price comparisons rather than exchange rate conversions as a result the statistics for different countries are more comparable and cross country studies will be more reliable

debt bailouts and constitutions a demand based theory of sub national debt bailouts is presented it is shown that revenue sharing rs arrangements alter the demand for bailouts among politicians with regional constituencies as a bailout usually implies a shift of taxation to the federal tier automatic rs may lead to the formation of pro bailout coalitions formed by indebted states and states that are net recipients of the rs arrangement also rs can act as a commitment device for compensating payments among state representatives making a bailout politically rational the model shows that the state debt bailouts approved by the brazilian senate prior to the enactment of the fiscal responsibility act were fully consistent with politicians that maximize the proceeds accruing to their constituencies

federal fiscal transfer rules in monetary unions abstract this paper considers simple rules for federal fiscal transfers that automatically redistribute funds among member states of a monetary union to counteract adverse idiosyncratic shocks the transfer rules target regional differences in nominal gdp consumption spending labor income and fiscal deficits targeting regional fiscal deficits is the only rule that reduces consumption fluctuations and that promotes interregional consumption risk sharing but the overall welfare effect is negative in contrast targeting regional differences in labor income yields the largest welfare gains but it also yields the largest fluctuations in consumption and real gdp it is demonstrated that the welfare gains primarily stem from reducing the allocative inefficiency of input factors caused by nominal rigidities the optimal transfer rule essentially implies a combination of consumption spending and labor income targeting and it primarily targets the allocative inefficiency of factor inputs at the cost of lower interregional consumption risk sharing

regional insurance and migration a dynamic model of migration is developed to study whether labor mobility can hedge people against region specific shocks making private or public insurance redundant the model adopts a novel timing for migration which is argued to be the time frame suitable for analyzing risk sharing issues it also innovates on the existing literature by solving individual migration through convexification of the set of actions the results show that the role of migration as an insurance mechanism is small labor mobility cannot fully remove income differentials between regions it is also shown that a fiscal stabilization scheme is in general optimal moreover any pure risk sharing mechanism has no influence on migration flows

liberty and development a further empirical perspective this paper uses the wright ratings of economic freedom to investigate the relationship between economic freedom and economic development for most countries in the world this rela tionship is apparently strong and direct for such economic freedoms as freedom of property and freedom of movement but inverse for freedom of association these findings appear to be indepen dent of the type of economic system or civil liberties as measured by the gastil ratings which have their own important effects on economic development

optimal design of securities under asymmetric information a firm must decide what security to sell to raise external capital to finance a profitable investment opportunity there is ex ante asymmetry of information regarding the probability distribution of cash flow generated by the investment in this setting we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a security to be optimal uniquely optimal that is for pooling at this security to be an the unique equilibrium outcome using these conditions we show that the debt contract is uniquely optimal if and only if cash flows are ordered by strict conditional stochastic dominance finally we derive an equivalence relationship between optimal security designs and designs that minimize mispricing