does exchange rate variability depress trade flows evidence from error correction models this paper examines the impact of exchange rate volatility on the trade flows of the g 7 countries in the context of a multivariate error correction model the error correction models do not show any sign of parameter instability the results indicate that the exchange rate volatility has a significant negative impact on the volume of exports in each of the g 7 countries assuming market participants are risk averse these results imply that exchange rate uncertainty causes them to reduce their activities change prices or shift sources of demand and supply in order to minimize their exposure to the effects of exchange rate volatility this in turn can change the distribution of output across many sectors in these countries it is quite possible that the surprisingly weak relationship between trade flows and exchange rate volatility reported in several previous studies are due to insufficient attention to the stochastic properties of the relevant time series copyright 1993 by mit press

irreversible investment with regime shifts under the real options approach to investment under uncertainty agents formulate optimal policies under the assumption that firms growth prospects do not vary over time this paper proposes and solves a model of investment decisions in which the growth rate and volatility of the decision variable shift between different states at random times a value maximizing investment policy is derived such that in each regime the firm s investment policy is optimal and recognizes the possibility of a regime shift under this policy investment is intermittent and increases with marginal q moreover investment typically is very small but in some states the capital stock jumps implications for marginal q and the user cost of capital are also examined

access pricing and investment with stochastically growing demand abstract this paper examines the effect of access charges on firms incentives to invest in a network facility with a stochastically growing demand an access to bypass equilibrium is characterized in terms of an access charge and a level of network investment cost in the equilibrium a leader first enters a market by building a new network then a follower makes a sequential investment for the construction of an additional network after accessing the incumbent s network in an open access environment we confirm that the incentive for preemption can be enhanced by an increase in the access charge

who ll stop lying under oath empirical evidence from tax evasion games using two earned income tax declaration experimental designs we show that only partial liars are affected by a truth telling oath a non price commitment device under oath we see no change in the number of chronic liars and fewer partial liars rather than smoothly increasing their compliance we also observe that partial liars who respond to the oath respond by becoming fully honest under oath based on both response times data and the consistency of subjects when several compliance decisions are made in a row we show that partial lying arises as the result of weak preferences towards profitable honesty the oath only transforms people with weak preferences for lying into being committed to the truth

product differentiation and entry timing in a continuous time spatial competition model abstract we extend the well known spatial competition model d aspremont gabszewicz thisse 1979 to a continuous time model in which two firms compete in each instance our focus is on the entry timing decisions of firms and their optimal locations we demonstrate that the leader has an incentive to locate closer to the center to delay the follower s entry leading to a non maximum differentiation outcome we also investigate how exogenous parameters affect the leader s location and firms values and in particular numerically show that the profit of the leader changes non monotonically with an increase in the transport cost parameter

uncertain regulatory timing and market dynamics abstract using a dynamic model of capacity accumulation i examine the relationship between uncertainty about the timing of a new pigouvian tax and oligopolistic competition i find that for some market structures uncertainty about the timing of the regulatory change leads firms to increase investment these results stem from the nature of the uncertainty and its interaction with firms strategic incentive to engage in capacity races they dramatize the importance of accounting for initial conditions when forecasting firms reactions to anticipated regulatory changes in addition i find that more protracted uncertainty leads to greater welfare costs

shipwrecks and treasure hunters we examine dynamic search as a game in which two rivals explore an island for a hidden prize of known value in every period until its discovery the players decide how much of the unsearched area to comb if a player finds the prize alone he wins it and the game ends players have a per period discount factor and costs proportional to the area they search first as a benchmark for efficiency we solve the one player search problem second in the two player setting we show that typically there is inefficient over search a result akin to the tragedy of the commons however for players with intermediate levels of patience there is the possibility of inefficient under search as players incorporate the expected future payoffs in their current search decisions finally with patient players several counterintuitive results can arise for example players might be better off searching a larger island or looking for a less valuable prize

do ethics matter tax compliance and morality in this article we argue that puzzle of tax compliance can be explained at least in part by recognizing the typically neglected role of ethics in individual behavior that is individuals do not always behave as the selfish rational self interested individuals portrayed in the standard neoclassical paradigm but rather are often motivated by many other factors that have as their main foundation some aspects of ethics we argue that it is not possible to understand fully an individual s compliance decisions without considering in some form these ethical dimensions specifically we argue here that there is much direct and indirect evidence that ethics differ across individuals and that these differences matter in significant ways for their compliance decisions we then put this in the larger context of the inability of the standard neoclassical paradigm to explain compliance of at least some individuals and we suggest several possible avenues by which theory can be expanded to incorporate ethics we conclude by arguing that a full house of compliance strategies is needed to combat tax evasion strategies that include the traditional enforcement paradigm suggested by and consistent with neoclassical theory a less traditional service paradigm that recognizes the important role of a kinder and gentler tax administration in encouraging compliance and importantly a new trust paradigm that is built on the foundation of ethics in which the tax administration must recognize that it can erode the ethics of taxpayers by its own decisions

an experimental and theoretical analysis of price matching refund policies abstract price matching refund policies or offers by firms to match competitor s prices are common in both consumer and industrial marketing much of the previous theoretical work in economics suggests that price matching refunds are associated with higher prices in contrast the trade press postulates that price matching policies are associated with lower prices given these inconsistent views regarding price matching policies the authors experimentally examine how consumers view and interpret such policies and then develop a model that incorporates these consumer interpretations as well as asymmetries across stores in the model the asymmetry across stores is the key to deriving the conditions under which a signaling equilibrium exists in the presence of price matching policies the critical point is that the competition reducing and price discrimination effects which seem to form the basis of most of the previous theoretical literature can be counteracted by the presence of differentiated firms

option pricing and foreign investment under political risk abstract the paper analyses asset prices in a context of uncertainty over future government policy as current policy is maintained perceived risk abates thus leading to a gradual appreciation of asset prices and a gradual decrease in their conditional variance option values computed under this process have time series and the term structure of conditional volatility which in general are downward sloping in price series without a policy reversal implied volatility from option prices will exceed actual volatility with this wedge progressively disappearing this may be viewed as the volatility analogue of the peso premium for assets subject to large infrequent price drops

leaders followers and equity risk premiums in booms and busts abstract we study an investment problem in which two asymmetric firms face competition and the regime characterizing the economic condition follows a markov switching process we derive the value functions and investment thresholds of the leader and follower the option value of regime uncertainty is found to be quite important for the investment decision of firms we also show the relationship between the equity risk premium and the economic cycle that has not been done in previous studies which proxy economic conditions by the level of demand or other state variables

regulatory risk vertical integration and upstream investment abstract we investigate the impact of regulatory risk on vertical integration and upstream investment by a regulated firm that provides an essential input to downstream competitors regulatory risk reflects uncertainty about the regulator s commitment to a regulatory policy that promotes the regulated firm s noncontractible investment we show that when the regulator sets the regulatory policy after the vertical industry structure has been established some degree of regulatory risk is ex ante socially beneficial regulatory risk makes vertical integration profitable and stimulates high upstream investment at a lower social cost this occurs for moderate costs of high investment and firms small risk aversion our analysis sheds new light on some relevant empirical patterns in vertically related markets

strategic investment under uncertainty a synthesis abstract investment is a central theme in economics finance and operational research traditionally the focus of analysis has been either on assessing the value of flexibility investment under uncertainty or on describing commitment effects in competitive settings industrial organization research contributions addressing the intersection of investment under uncertainty and industrial organization have become numerous in recent years in this paper we provide an overview aimed at categorizing and relating these research streams we highlight managerial insights concerning the nature of competitive advantage first versus second mover advantage the manner in which information is revealed firm heterogeneity capital increment size and the number of competing firms

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

complementarities in organizational design and the diffusion of information technologies an empirical analysis we use a specially designed survey on french firms located in haute savoie to provide empirical evidence suggesting that information and communication technologies adoption is not only influenced by the traditional factors of technology diffusion but also by complementarity effects between strategies organization and information technologies the data collected permitted several advances firstly we could study authentic ict while the recent literature has mainly focused on computer capital stocks or automation tools secondly we constructed measures of the determinants put forward by the models of technology diffusion thirdly we studied three kinds of practices organizational and strategic practices technological choices

tax competition and income redistribution an empirical analysis for switzerland tax competition is supposed to lead to thecollapse of the welfare state because first it willbecome difficult for a single jurisdiction to levy aredistribution tax upon the rich and mobile andsecond such a policy if undertaken in onejurisdiction will attract poor individuals from otherjurisdictions and erode internal redistributionpolicies in this paper the impact of personal incometaxes and transfers on residence decisions oftaxpayers is analyzed with swiss subfederal data therelationship of tax competition and the erosion of theswiss welfare state is tested with aggregate data onincome redistribution

competition and irreversible investments abstract incumbent monopolists frequently claim that the introduction of competition will reduce future profits and therefore delay future investments in this paper we show that not only is this not generally true but in the oligopolistic industry model of dixit and pindyck investment under uncertainty 1994 this is never the case we extend this result to situations in which investments have positive externalities and situations in which the monopolist has multiple investment opportunities

information revelation through option exercise in many real world situations agents must formulate option exercise strategies with imperfect information in such a setting agents may infer the private signals of other agents through their observed exercise strategies the building of an office building the drilling of an exploratory oil well and the commitment of a pharmaceutical company toward the research of a new drug all convey private information to other market participants this article develops an equilibrium framework for option exercise games with asymmetric private information many interesting aspects of the patterns of equilibrium exercise are analyzed in particular informational cascades where agents ignore their private information and jump on the exercise bandwagon may arise endogenously article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

investment in technological innovations an option pricing approach abstract this paper develops a model of the optimal investment strategy for a firm confronted with a sequence of technological innovations we incorporate many of the most important characteristics of real world technology markets for example we permit innovations to be stochastic in their arrival times and their profitability we also incorporate learning so that firms adopting current innovations become better able to benefit from future innovations the model yields four distinct investment strategies the model is then used to predict actual firm policy these implications are discussed and compared with observed firm behavior

entry in monopoly market this paper develops new empirical models of market concentration from game theoretic models of entry we construct our models from inequality conditions that describe entrants equilibrium strategies in simultaneous move and sequential move games and use them to study the effects of entry in isolated monopoly markets for new automobiles from estimates of the market size necessary to support one and two dealers we conclude that monopoly dealers do not block the entry of a second dealer we also find that entry does not cause price cost margins to fall by much

free trade agreements for better or worse this paper cites reasons why regional free trade agreements fta s may be better than previously recognized when they are formed or expand as in nafta and why they may be worse when they multiply as is now common just about everywhere else if this argument stands it implies a fundamental reevaluation of fta s and their design

green electricity investments environmental target and the optimal subsidy abstract we investigate the optimal investment decision in renewables under market demand uncertainty in the context of the italian strategy for renewable deployment under the eu policy the firm has to decide about the time and size of the investment we find that a higher subsidy level induces the firm to invest earlier with a smaller investment capacity this implies that a given environmental target cannot be reached by a too high too low subsidy level since this will cause the investment level to be too low too late we show that there exists an optimal intermediate subsidy level due to uncertain demand in some cases ensuring to reach the environmental target in time requires an additional conditional subsidy we propose a heuristic for policy makers stating when and how much subsidy to provide furthermore we find that in a more uncertain economic environment the subsidy adjustment to maintain the target level of investment results in the firm investing earlier which is opposite to the standard real options result

foreign ownership and technology adoption evidence from indian firms abstract firms in developing countries rely on foreign technology purchases to improve their technology we use a theoretical framework developed by katz and shapiro to examine the ongoing technology adoption behavior of foreign owned and domestic firms using firm level data on indian firms from 1989 to 1993 we test this theoretical model we find that foreign ownership firm size and market structure are among the variables that impact a firm s probability of adopting new technology we also find that the 1991 liberalization of technology transfer policies in india appears to have had a larger impact on foreign owned firms than domestic firms

regime uncertainty and optimal investment timing abstract we construct a real options model in which a regime change is expected at a pre determined future time and study the effects of regime uncertainty on a firm s strategic investment decision taking into consideration the remaining time to the regime change and the probability of each regime state we show that just before the time of a regime change firms should act as if the worst case scenario was about to happen even if a good state is highly possible

is zoning a negative sum game zoning is well known as a key instrument of planning regulation which is environmental regulation in its broadest sense zoning in terms of economic theorisation is normally justified by the pigovian welfare economics theses of market failure notably

investment with uncertain tax policy does random tax policy discourage investment we consider the impact of tax policy uncertainty on firm level and aggregate investment comparing investment behaviour when uncertainty is due to a shock following geometric brownian motion gbm versus when random discrete jumps in tax policy occur expectations of the likelihood of a tax policy switch have an important negative impact on the gain to delaying investment in the latter model and time to investment can fall with increasing tax policy uncertainty aggregate investment simulations indicate that capital formation is adversely affected by increases in uncertainty in the traditional gbm model but can be enhanced in the jump process model

strategic real options under asymmetric information abstract this paper studies the effect of private information on the capital allocation decisions of firms who operate under imperfect competition i analyze two interactive firms one with private information and the other without who must decide when to undertake an irreversible and uncertain investment decision traditional non strategic models of irreversible investment under uncertainty involve a single decision maker and result in an optimal period of delay before the investment is undertaken in a strategic setting firms must balance their desire to delay against competitive advantages from early investment i find that an equilibrium may not exist within the standard continuous framework when the private information is over revenues moreover when an equilibrium does exist the competitive pressures from the uninformed firm are weak this is in contrast to existing models with asymmetric information over costs where an equilibrium always exists and the competitive pressures remain strong hsu and lambrecht 2007 this work shows that the investment timing decision and thus the value of the private information is highly sensitive to the nature of incomplete information

taxpayer response to an increased probability of audit evidence from a controlled experiment in minnesota abstract in 1995 a group of 1724 randomly selected minnesota taxpayers was informed by letter that the returns they were about to file would be closely examined compared to a control group that did not receive this letter low and middle income taxpayers in the treatment group on average increased tax payments compared to the previous year which we interpret as indicating the presence of noncompliance the effect was much stronger for those with more opportunity to evade in fact the difference in differences is not statistically significant for those who do not have self employment or farm income and do not pay estimated tax surprisingly however the reported tax liability of the high income treatment group fell sharply relative to the control group

investment under uncertainty and policy change in this paper the impact of a policy change on the investment behavior of the firm is studied in an incomplete information setting the policy change occurs when a stochastic process describing the state of the economic environment reaches a certain trigger the firm has incomplete information about the trigger and knows only its probability distribution consequently both the firm s conjecture concerning the trigger value as well as the precision of this conjecture serve as input parameters we derive the optimal investment rule maximizing the value of the firm and show that the impact of the trigger value uncertainty on the optimal investment threshold is non monotonic the threshold decreases with uncertainty for its low levels while the reverse is true if uncertainty is high furthermore we provide results concerning the valuation of the firm s investment opportunity and present some policy implications

project selection commitment and competition we examine project selection decisions of firms constrained in the number of projects they can handle at once a new project opportunity arises every period taking on a project requires a commitment of uncertain duration preventing the firm from selecting another project in subsequent periods until the commitment ends in our dynamic game when two firms are free of commitment they move sequentially in random order symmetric pure strategy markov perfect equilibria always exist in equilibrium the first mover strategically rejects some projects that are then selected by the second mover even when the value of the project is the same for both firms a monopolist rejects more projects and adopts ones of higher average quality compared to the duopolist duopolists select too few projects compared to their jointly optimal behavior we extend the model to allow for externalities asymmetry and n 2n 2 firms

singapore and the new regionalism bilateral trade linkages with japan and the us free trade areas ftas have recently become an integral part of singapore trade policy this paper discusses the reasons behind singapore s recent embracement of new regionalism with particular reference to the proposals to form ftas with japan and the us the paper goes on to examine various aspects of singapore s trade linkages with the two economic superpowers in some detail popular discussion of ftas gives one the appearance that such a trade policy is entirely benign the paper sounds a cautionary note highlighting some reasons to be concerned with singapore s recent embracement of the new regionalism

capital as a commitment strategic investment to deter mobility abstract this paper analyzes how an early entrant in a market can exploit its head start by strategic investment the analysis is based on spence s paper investment strategy and growth in a new market bell j econ 10 1979 1 19 we frist study the investment game in the no discounting case which embodies the key features of mobility deterrence we establish the existence of a set of perfect equilibria and suggest that one particular equilibrium is most reasonable this equilibrium also valid with discounting involves the follower firm being forever deterred from investing to its steady state reaction curve in contrast to spence s proposed solution

irreversible investment and r d spillovers in a dynamic duopoly investments in new production processes usually involve a significant amount of rd an increase in uncertainty delaying the equilibrium calls for higher subsidization rates third numerical simulations show that the spillover reduces the difference between the leader s and the follower s maximum value functions accordingly our model can help generate realistic market betas

small hubs large spokes and overlapping free trade agreements the proliferation of overlapping free trade agreements fta in recent years has led to pair wise hub and spokes has throughout the world being avid subscribers to ftas many countries in the asia pacific region including the united states japan singapore south korea thailand and australia have become trade hubs to their partners who are in turn relegated to spoke status in this paper we question whether being a hub is welfare optimal for a small and open economy such as singapore compared to membership in a single bilateral fta or a multi member free trade zone within this context we use a computable general equilibrium model to examine the welfare implications of the triangular trade relationship of the united states singapore and japan this is facilitated by the japan singapore economic partnership agreement the usa singapore free trade agreement and a hypothetical usa japan economic partnership agreement the analysis is extended to incorporate super hub effects that is the spoke countries could be trade hubs in other has systems our experiment reveals that hub status generates positive welfare gain and is the highest singapore can get from the trade configurations considered meanwhile japan loses more than the usa when both are relegated to spoke status these findings prove to be robust under different market structures and production technologies deeper economic integration super hub effects as well as uncertainty in the key model parameters and the extent of trade liberalisation shocks

on vertical relations and the timing of technology adoption we study the timing of new technology adoption in markets with input outsourcing and thus with vertical relations we find that technology adoption can take place earlier when firms engage in input outsourcing than when they produce the input in house hence the presence of vertical relations can accelerate the adoption of a new technology we also find that particular features of a vertically related market such as the distribution of bargaining power and the contract type through which trading is conducted can crucially affect the speed of technology adoption

finite project life and uncertainty effects on investment abstract this paper revisits the important result of the real options approach to investment under uncertainty which states that increased uncertainty raises the value of waiting and thus decelerates investment typically in this literature projects are assumed to be perpetual however in today s economy firms face a fast changing technology environment implying that investment projects are usually considered to have a finite life the present paper studies investment projects with finite project life and we find that in contrast with the existing theory investments may be accelerated by increased uncertainty it is shown that this particularly happens at low levels of uncertainty and when project life is short

commitment to pay taxes results from field and laboratory experiments abstract a tax authority s ability to successfully collect taxes depends on its relationship with the taxpayers as well as their commitment to contribute to the common good in this paper we examine the effect of promises on tax compliance aimed at fostering taxpayer commitment first in a field experiment we investigate whether tax compliance changes when taxpayers make a formal promise to pay their taxes on time with compliance rewarded by entry into a lottery for either a financial or nonfinancial in kind reward we then complement this analysis with a laboratory experiment in which we measure the effect of promises in the different compliance domain of tax honesty and contrast the effect of a pure promise to pay with schemes that pair the promise with a reward offer we find that taxpayers with a history of compliance or high scores on tax morale are more likely to make the promise but solely offering the possibility to make a promise does not lead to a change in compliance behavior whether or not compliance improves depends on the type of reward to which the promise is linked in our experimental analyses for example compliance only increases if the reward for promise fulfillment is nonfinancial

why do people keep their promises an experimental test of two explanations numerous psychological and economic experiments have shown that the exchange of promises greatly enhances cooperative behavior in experimental games this paper seeks to test two theories to explain this effect the first posits that individuals have a preference for keeping their word the second assumes that people dislike letting down others payoff expectations according to the latter account promises affect behavior only indirectly because they lead to changes in the payoff expectations attributed to others i conduct an experiment designed to distinguish between and test these alternative explanations the results demonstrate that the effects of promises cannot be accounted for by changes in payoff expectations this suggests that people have a preference for promise keeping per se

real options and preemption under incomplete information abstract this paper introduces incomplete information and preemption into an equilibrium model of firms facing real investment decisions the optimal investment strategy may lie anywhere between the zero npv trigger level and the optimal strategy of a monopolist depending on the distribution of competitors costs and the implied fear of preemption our model implies that the equity returns of firms which hold real options and are subject to preemption will contain jumps and positive skewness

measuring and analysing the effects of short term volatility in real exchange rates this paper examines short term volatility in the real effective exchange rates of industrial countries and its impact on their imports it yields three conclusions first volatility has not diminished as markets have gained experience with floating exchange rates the trend appears to be in the opposite direction for some countries second exposure to short term volatility has differed among countries japan and sweden have experienced much more than most other industrial countries third volatility appears to depress the volume of international trade this third finding is consistent with results reported by cushman and by akhtar and hilton and challenges earlier findings by hooper and kohlhagen

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

real exchange rate volatility and the us bilateral trade a var approach this paper uses var models to investigate the impact of real exchange rate volatility on u s bilateral imports from the united kingdom france germany japan and canada the var systems include u s and foreign macro variables and are estimated separately for each country the major results suggest that the effect of volatility on imports is weak although permanent shocks to volatility do have a negative impact on this measure of trade and those effects are relatively more important over the flexible rate period copyright 1989 by mit press

on the effect of high energy prices on investment empirical analyses of firm behaviour typically assume that there is a stable relationship between investment on the one hand and changes in the relative prices of inputs output demand and other determinants on the other hand however because of the lumpy nature and irreversibility of investments and the presence of uncertainty about future economic developments a specific percentage change in relative prices and output demand may not always lead to the same percentage change in capital stocks that means that different regimes may exist in investment behaviour we test whether such regimes exist using high quality data on eight manufacturing industries in the netherlands three different regimes can be identified that are characterized by differences in the relative input price levels and we find that if relative prices take on extreme values the propensity to adjust the scale of production to changes in demand is very low

would international currency taxation and currency stabilisation in developing countries completely flexible exchange rates may be excessively volatile with the implied currency misalignments leading to real inefficiencies in resource allocation and detrimental effects on economic growth this paper analyses whether international currency taxation would be effective in calming exchange rate volatility and avoiding currency crises within the context of a simple model of exchange rate determination it is found that the effects of a tax on foreign exchange volatility depend on the nature of speculation and whether the focus is on capital inflows or outflows

caveat preemptor coordination failure and success in a duopoly investment game abstract we build on mason and weeds 2010 model of duopoly investment under uncertainty by allowing high initial values of the profit shock as in huisman and kort 1999 persistent first mover advantage increases the likelihood of immediate simultaneous investment in contrast with previous models where these have been interpreted as mistakes such simultaneous investment outcomes can be optimal for the industry clustering of investments is thus both more likely and more likely to be a desirable outcome

exchange rates and traded goods prices abstract this paper presents a partial equilibrium model of the determination of domestic and export prices by a monopolistic competitive firm the model stresses the role of exchange rate uncertainty and expectations the most important result of the analysis is that the stochastic properties of deviations from the law of one price are crucially affected by the currency of denomination of export prices using data on domestic and dollar export prices of japanese goods i find that deviations from the law of one price are due to exchange rate surprises but also to price staggering and ex ante price discrimination

continuous time games of timing abstract we address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games with complete information under weak assumptions any two player timing game has a markov subgame perfect e equilibrium for each e 0 this result is tight for some classes of games symmetric games games with cumulative payoffs stronger existence results are established

multinational plant location as a game of timing we study the problem of when firms should switch from exporting to producing at an onshore plant which will cater to a local market the model incorporates factors such as rivalry differences between costs of domestic and offshore production differences in consumer preferences for offshore and domestically produced goods and the capital costs associated with switching to domestic production we find equilibrium timing patterns where there is a leader and a follower diffusion equilibria to be most typical furthermore we find that a firm with lower switching costs has a competitive advantage in the determination of which firm will lead it is found in the duopoly model that market growth and production and transportation unit costs have a relatively greater impact on the timing of the switch than do changes in demand elasticities or changes in the fixed costs of switching with more firms and increased competition however the effect of changes in fixed costs become relatively greater

green investment under time dependent subsidy retraction risk abstract driven by ambitious targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions many countries have introduced support schemes to accelerate investments in renewable energy however in recent years experience showed that over time retraction of support schemes becomes more likely this has a severe effect on investment behaviour in this paper we study the effect of a potential subsidy retraction of a feed in tariff fit on investment in renewable energy capacity where we explicitly account for the fact that the likelihood of policy retraction may change over time we show that the range of fits for which it is optimal to invest immediately decreases the longer a subsidy has been in place if the fit offered is too small and or the subsidy has been installed too long ago it is optimal for the firm to wait with investment until the subsidy is eventually retracted and free market conditions prove to be profitable enough furthermore we show that whether a policy maker aiming at accelerating investment prefers investors to consider retraction risk to be time dependent or not depends on how much time has passed since the subsidy has been introduced at the moment the investor considers investment for the first time

investment in oligopoly under uncertainty the accordion effect this paper studies investments in new markets where more than two anticipated identical competitors are present in case of three firms an accordion effect is detected an exogenous demand shock results in a change of the wedge between investment thresholds of the first and second investor that is qualitatively different from the change of the wedge between the second and third investment threshold furthermore it turns out that in the three firm case the investment timing of the first investor lies in between the one and the two firm case these results are numerically extended to the n firm case

on the external validity of laboratory tax compliance experiments i introduction laboratory methods are now widely accepted as a methodological approach in economics and increasingly they have been used to examine specific public policy issues there is much to be gained from careful laboratory experiments they offer a low cost means of testing and replicating policy innovations and they generate precise data on individual behavior thereby allowing estimation of behavioral responses importantly they allow many policy innovations to be introduced singly and exogenously in a controlled environment and as a result laboratory experiments are typically seen as having a high degree of internal validity brewer 2000 campbell and stanley 1966 shadish cook and campbell 2002 because the causal relation between variables can be properly demonstrated however as emphasized by plott 1987 using laboratory experiments can allow more general inferences regarding human behavior only when the setting implemented in the laboratory parallels what is observed in the naturally occurring world even beyond this requirement of parallelism is the need for generalizing behavioral observations from the laboratory to the field or external validity internal validity can be demonstrated through the evaluation of the design however external validity can only be verified empirically and only with respect to the specific setting being investigated this paper investigates the external validity of laboratory experiments and does so in the context of experiments on tax compliance behavior tax evasion is central to many important policy questions current estimates report the tax gap or difference between taxes owed and taxes paid in the united states to be 450 billion annually internal revenue service 2012 beyond these massive revenue losses evasion creates major misallocations in resource use when individuals alter their behavior to cheat on their taxes its presence requires that government expend resources to detect noncompliance to measure its magnitude and to penalize tax evasion evasion alters the distribution of income in arbitrary unpredictable and unfair ways and it may contribute to feelings of unjust treatment and disrespect for the law more broadly it is not possible to understand the true impact of taxation without recognizing the existence and the effects of tax evasion laboratory methods have been used to examine a wide range of policies that may affect the compliance decision policies that have not always proven amenable to either theoretical analyses or empirical analyses with field data however laboratory studies of compliance are sometimes viewed with skepticism the most common criticism is that the student subjects typically used in experiments may not be representative of taxpayers undergraduates may have little experience with filing tax returns and their economic and demographic backgrounds may differ from those of taxpayers another criticism is that the context of laboratory compliance experiments does not closely enough resemble the context in which actual compliance decisions are made as a result there is a concern that experimental results on policy innovations that rely upon student subjects in laboratory compliance experiments cannot be generalized to the population it is this issue that we examine here building on previous research we present several types of evidence on the external validity of experiments on individual compliance decisions a first question examines whether behavior of laboratory participants is replicated by behavior of individuals making a similar decision in the naturally occurring world that is do participants in laboratory experiments exhibit different patterns of behavior than individuals in a similar naturally occurring setting to answer this question we utilize a special data set from the u s internal revenue service irs assembled as part of its national research program nrp

investment under regime uncertainty impact of competition and preemption abstract in this study we analyze the investment timing problem and introduce a model of two firms competing for investment preemption each of which knows in advance the time at which the economic condition that will have an impact on the investment changes we qualitatively show how two firms strategically optimize their investment timing taking into account competition and preemption

optimal timing of technology adoption abstract in a dynamic programming framework this paper investigates the optimal timing of technology adoption by a competitive firm when technology choice is irreversible and the firm faces a stochastic innovation process with uncertainties about both the speed of the arrival and the degree of improvement of new technologies a numerical example illustrates how the optimal timing decision is affected by changes in parameter values reflecting market conditions the firm s initial technological attributes and the characteristics of the stochastic innovation process some of these effects turn out to be in sharp contrast to common intuition contrasting the optimal decision rule derived here with the rule obtained under the net present value shows that the former implies a slower pace of adoption than implied by the latter the optimal decision rule is generalized for the case of multiple technology switches and it is shown that for all the switching decisions except the last one the optimal rule satisfies the net present value criterion

second mover advantages in the strategic adoption of new technology under uncertainty abstract this paper introduces technological uncertainty into a timing game of new technology adoption it is shown that the timing neither necessarily involves first mover advantages in precommitment equilibria reinganum review of economic studies xlviii 1981 395 405 nor rent equalization due to the threat of preemption fudenberg and tirole review of economic studies lii 1985 383 401 rather there may be second mover advantages because of informational spillovers furthermore the model predicts that the equilibrium payoffs will typically be discontinuous and non monotonic in the probability that the new technology is profitable a welfare analysis reveals several market failures and suggests that policy intervention should adequately depend on the nature of uncertainty and the rate of technological progress

investment under uncertainty the case of replacement investment decisions we analyze the determinants of replacement investment decisions in a contingent claims model with maintenance and operation cost uncertainty we find that the optimal time between replacements is increasing in the volatility of cost the purchase price of a new asset and the corporate tax rate and is decreasing in the systematic risk of cost the salvage value of the asset and the investment tax credit the optimal time between replacements can either increase or decrease with an increase in the depreciation rate extensions of the model to examine the effects of technological and tax policy uncertainty on replacement investment decisions give intuitive but striking results uncertainty about the arrival of a technological innovation that would decrease maintenance and operation cost results in a significant decrease in replacement investment uncertainty in a tax law change that would encourage investment decreases current investment and uncertainty in a tax law change that would discourage investment increases current investment

developing real option game models by mixing concepts from both game theoretic analysis and real options theory an investment decision in a competitive market can be seen as a game between firms as firms implicitly take into account other firms reactions to their own investment actions we review two decades of real option game models suggesting which critical problems have been solved by considering game theory and which significant problems have not been yet adequately addressed we provide some insights on the plausible empirical applications or shortfalls in applications to date and suggest some promising avenues for future research

the impact of corporate and personal income taxes on the location of firms and on employment some panel evidence for the swiss cantons abstract the impact of corporate income taxes on location decisions of firms is widely debated in the tax competition literature tax rate differences across jurisdictions may lead to distortions of firms investment decisions empirical evidence on tax induced relocation and subsequent economic development in the us and europe is still inconclusive much the same applies to switzerland while there is some evidence on personal income tax competition between swiss cantons evidence on the impact of intercantonal corporate income tax differences on the location of business within switzerland is missing in this paper we present econometric evidence on the influence of corporate and personal income taxes on the regional distribution of firms in 1981 and 1991 and on cantonal employment using a panel data set of the 26 swiss cantons from 1985 to 1997 the results show that corporate and personal income taxes deter firms to locate in a canton and subsequently reduce cantonal employment

on the diffusion of new technology a game theoretic approach this paper is an attempt at a rigorous albeit not exceedingly general analysis of the diffusion of new technology in particular consider an industry composed of two firms each using the current best practice technology the firms are assumed to be operating at nash equilibrium output levels generating a market price given demand and profit allocations when a cost reducing innovation is announced each firm must determine when if ever to adopt it based in part upon the discounted cost of implementing the new technology and in part upon the behavior of the rival firm if either firm adopts before the other it can expect to make substantial profits at the expense of the other firm on the other hand the discounted sum of purchase price and adjustment costs may decline with the lengthening of the adjustment period as various quasi fixed factors become more easily variable therefore although waiting costs the firm more in terms of foregone profits it may save money on the cost of purchasing the new technology thus the firm must weigh the costs and benefits of delaying adoption as well as take account of its rival s strategic behavior

tax compliance and psychic costs behavioral experimental evidence using a physiological marker although paying taxes is a key element of a well functioning society there is still limited understanding as to why people actually pay their taxes models emphasizing that taxpayers make strategic financially motivated compliance decisions seemingly assume an overly restrictive view of human nature law abidance may be more accurately explained by social norms a concept that has gained growing importance as research attempts to understand the tax compliance puzzle this study analyzes the influence of psychic stress generated by the possibility of breaking social norms in the tax compliance context we measure psychic stress using heart rate variability hrv which captures the psychobiological or neural equivalents of psychic stress that may arise from the contemplation of real or imagined actions producing immediate physiologic discomfort the results of our laboratory experiments provide empirical evidence of a positive correlation between psychic stress and tax compliance thus underscoring the importance of moral sentiments for tax compliance we also identify three distinct types of individuals who differ in their levels of psychic stress tax morale and tax compliance

impact of bayesian learning and externalities on strategic investment we investigate the interplay between learning effects and externalities in the problem of competitive investments with uncertain returns we examine a game theoretic duopoly investment model in which i a firm can learn about the profitability of the investment by observing the performance of the first mover and ii externalities exist between the investments of two firms we find a region of a war of attrition between the two firms in which the interplay between externalities and learning gives rise to counterintuitive effects on investment strategies and payoffs in particular we find that contrary to the conventional war of attrition where an increase in benefits for the follower generally delays the first move an increase in the rate of learning which tends to benefit the follower can hasten the first investment this paper was accepted by james smith decision analysis

preemption and rent equalization in the adoption of new technology we study the adoption of a new technology to illustrate the effects of preemption in games of timing we show that the threat of preemption equalizes rents in a duopoly but that this result does not extend to the general oligopoly game if the gain to preemption is sufficiently small then the optimal symmetric outcome which involves late adoption is an equilibrium this contrasts with reinganum s result that in precommitment equilibria there must be diffusion we develop a new and richer formalism for modeling games of timing which permits a continuoustime representation of the limit of discrete time mixed strategy equilibria

from turmoil to crisis dislocations in the fx swap market before and after the failure of lehman brothers abstract this paper investigates dislocations in the foreign exchange fx swap market between the us dollar and three major european currencies after the failure of lehman brothers in september 2008 deviations from covered interest parity cip were negatively associated with the creditworthiness of us financial institutions as well as that of european institutions consistent with the deepening of a dollar liquidity problem into a global phenomenon us dollar term funding auctions by the ecb snb and boe as well as the us federal reserve commitment to provide unlimited dollar swap lines are found to have ameliorated the fx swap market dislocations

entry into the electricity market uncertainty competition and mothballing options the present paper analyzes the entry strategies into the electricity market of two firms that have power plants under price uncertainty and competition we consider the symmetric and asymmetric two firms which have either a thermal power plant or a nuclear power plant the differences between the thermal power plant and the nuclear power plant such as the cost structure and operational flexibility are modeled the threshold values of market entry are calculated for each firm with either the thermal power plant or the nuclear power plant as the leader or the follower we show the dependence of cost structures on entry thresholds of the leader and the follower into the electricity market for various market and cost conditions the diagrams of the leader are also shown

do students behave like real taxpayers in the lab evidence from a real effort tax compliance experiment we report on data from a real effort tax compliance experiment using three subject pools students who do not pay income tax company employees whose income is reported by their employer and self employed taxpayers who are responsible for filing and payment while compliance behavior is unaffected by changes in the level of or information about the audit probability higher fines increase compliance we find subject pool differences self assessed taxpayers are the most compliant while students are the least compliant through a simple framing manipulation we show that such differences are driven by norms of compliance from outside the lab

timing of technology adoption and product market competition abstract this paper examines how product market competition affects firms timing of adopting a new technology as well as whether the market provides sufficient adoption incentives it demonstrates that adoption dates differ not only among symmetric firms but also among markets with different market features more specifically technology adoption can occur earlier in a market with cournot competition than in a market with bertrand competition it can also occur earlier in a market in which goods are not too close substitutes therefore this paper shows that competition toughness does not always reinforce adoption incentives when goods are sufficiently differentiated adoption occurs later than is socially optimal

dynamic competition and intellectual property rights in a model of product development we study innovation timing and socially optimal intellectual property rights iprs when firms facing market uncertainty invest strategically in product development if demand growth and volatility are high attrition occurs and iprs should ensure the cost of imitation attains a lower bound we identify if demand growth and volatility are low then provided that the private imitation incentive is socially excessive iprs should set the cost of imitation high enough to induce preemption and possibly winner take all preemption moreover the welfare achieved with optimal iprs is then greater with endogenous innovation than if firm roles are predetermined illustrating the importance of fostering dynamic competition in extensions we show how firms benefit from open standards takeovers have ambiguous welfare effects and simple licensing schemes are welfare improving

e business usage across and within firms in the uk profitability externalities and policy using data from the third uk community innovation survey we model the usage of e business across and within firms in the uk in the year 2000 as a single observation upon an integrated process of inter and intra firm diffusion the intra firm dimension is a significant extension to standard analysis the model estimates indicate that the pattern of e business usage reflects the heterogeneity of firms in terms of size other innovative activity and labour force skills generating differences in the payoffs to use as well as market and non market intermediated externalities the policy implications of the findings are discussed c 2008 elsevier b v all rights reserved

firm scale and the endogenous timing of entry a choice between commitment and flexibility abstract this paper presents a model of stochastic oligopoly with demand uncertainty where firms endogenously choose entry timing we examine two extreme types of market structure and show that the equilibrium correspondence that connects them is continous with two identically sized firms there are symmetric cournot type equilibria where the probability of early entry declines with greater uncertainty and for low uncertainty two asymmetric equilibria with one large firm with a continuum of nonatomic firms there is a unique stackelberg equilibrium we conclude that the behavior of a dominant firm with a finite fringe can be approximated by stackelberg equilibrium journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d21 l11

reference points and effort provision a key open question for theories of reference dependent preferences is what determines the reference point one candidate is expectations what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs in a real effort experiment we manipulate the rational expectations of subjects and check whether this manipulation influences their effort provision we find that effort provision is significantly different between treatments in the way predicted by models of expectation based reference dependent preferences if expectations are high subjects work longer and earn more money than if expectations are low

real options in strategic investment games between two asymmetric firms abstract this paper examines strategic investment games between two firms that compete for optimal entry in a project that generates uncertain revenue flows under asymmetry on both the sunk cost of investment and revenue flows of the two competing firms we investigate the value of real investment options and strategic interaction of investment decisions compared to earlier models that only allow for asymmetry on sunk cost our model demonstrates a richer set of strategic interactions of entry decisions we provide a complete characterization of pre emptive dominant and simultaneous equilibriums by analyzing the relative value of leader s and follower s optimal investment thresholds in a duopoly market with negative externalities a firm may reduce loss of real options value by selecting appropriate pre emptive entry when one firm has a dominant advantage over its competitor both the dominant firm and dominated firm enter at their respective leader s and follower s optimal thresholds when the pre emptive thresholds of both firms happen to coincide the two firms enter simultaneously under positive externalities firms do not compete to lead

the use of field experiments to increase tax compliance governments have become increasingly interested in the explosion of research into taxpayer behaviour this article briefly reviews two main theories of tax compliance deterrence and non deterrence before discussing the recent rapid rise of natural field experiments nfes in this area these nfes represent a win win for policy makers and academics since they can test theories while also evaluating the impact of a specific intervention in the real world the evidence from nfes shows that deterrence approaches improve compliance while the case for non deterrence approaches is less conclusive at the moment nfes could be improved by paying more attention to findings from behavioural science that apparently incidental factors such as timing framing and complexity substantially affect whether compliance occurs or not new directions for future studies include network effects tax payments in addition to declarations the behaviour of firms the provision of public goods and the relationship between attitudes and behaviour

the value of green energy under regulation uncertainty abstract we examine investments in power generation projects under policy uncertainty when the investor has the choice between two alternative technologies a gas fired plant and a wind plant increased likelihood of subsidy withdrawal reduces the payoff from and postpones investments in the wind technology simultaneously it accelerates investments in gas thereby eliminating or further postponing investments in wind capacity we show that this substitution phenomenon can be of first order importance it can have a significant impact on the timing of investment the wind premium and the probability of investing in the wind technology our results provide new insights about the scope and impact of green energy regulation