transnational joint ventures between uk and eu manufacturing companies and the structure of competition this paper analyses both the incidence and motivation for transnational joint ventures between uk and eu companies in relation to the structure of competition it is based on a survey of 812 uk manufacturing plcs and case studies in forty six companies with a total of sixty nine joint ventures the results highlight the importance of transnational jvs in the eu and suggest that they are unlikely to have significantly reduced the level of competition in the union the motivations which underlie these ventures can be broken into two groups large firms undertake jvs in response to competitive pressures within an increasingly unified single market small and medium sized firms undertake jvs in order to penetrate discrete national markets

cost reduction competition and industry performance in many markets firms compete over time by expending resources with the purpose of reducing their costs sometimes the cost reducing investments operate directly on costs in many instances they take the form of developing new products that deliver what customers need more cheaply therefore product development can have the same ultimate effect as direct cost reduction in fact if one thinks of the product as the services it delivers to the customer in the way that lancaster pioneered then product development often is just cost reduction

cooperative and noncooperative r d in duopoly with spillovers contrary to the usual assumption made in most oligopoly models relations among firms are seldom of a wholly cooperative or noncooperative type in many situations they compete in some fields while they cooperate in others an important example is the case of cooperative research efforts bringing fierce competitors together two types of agreement are observed first r d cooperation can take place at the so called precompetitive stage companies share basic information and efforts in the r d stage but remain rivals in the market place 1 a second type of agreement involves an extended collusion between partners creating common policies at the product level the usual justifications of this extension are the difficulties of protecting intellectual property the idea is then to allow partners who have achieved inventions together to also control together the processes and products which embody the results of their collaboration in order to recuperate jointly their r d investments 2 what could be expected from these types of agreement is a reduction in r d expenditures because of less wasteful duplication and a reduction of total production because of more reprinted from the american economic review 78 5 1133 1137 1988 center for operations research econometrics 1348 louvain la neuve belgium we are grateful to jean

learning from failure towards an evolutionary model of collaborative ventures this paper reports on a longitudinal case study of the interaction between two partners to a failed international joint venture we develop a model of the collaboration process in partnership and alliances based on earlier work by ring and van de ven 1994 and by doz 1996 we employ a series of events that occurred in the course of the relationship as the unit of analysis in order to trace the interactions between the partners and to explicate the impact that external shocks have on their perceptions of efficiency and equity the impact of these events as well as the responses they elicit on the quality of the relationship and vice versa are also considered we find that the partners assessments cause them to either engage in renegotiation of the terms of the contract or to modify their behavior unilaterally in an attempt to restore balance to the relationship the process feeds back until a new mutual understanding of equity is restored or else the relationship deteriorates gradually until a point when the venture is dissolved we conclude that positive feedback loops are critical in the evolutionary process that relationship quality is both an outcome and a mediating variable and that procedural issues are critical from the start in fostering a climate for positive reinforcement and the building of mutual trust and confidence in the relationship

secular cost changes and the size of government towards a generalized theory abstract baumol s cost disease account of government growth is contrasted with that of kau and rubin who focus on decreasing costs of tax collection over time the apparent paradox wherein the first theory explains government growth by cost increases and the second by way of cost decreases is technically resolved why both theories seem to be able to stand up to empirical tests even though they use similar data is then explained finally public choice analysis is employed to reveal further potential for the ultimate construction of one all embracing secular cost change theory of government growth

national and organizational culture differences and international joint venture performance this study examines the effect of dimensions of national and organizational culture differences on international joint venture ijv performance based on data from a survey of executives from joint ventures between indian partners and partners from other countries we found that the presumed negative effect from culture distance on ijv performance originates more from differences in organizational culture than from differences in national culture

imperfect rent dissipation with unionized labor traditional rent seeking theory focused only on socially wasteful expenditures by firms competing for restrictive regulations more recently rent defending expenditures by consumers have also been taken into account this paper extends the analysis by adding rent sharing expenditures by organized labor the paper merges the tullock lottery model and the monopoly union model and considers both a costless and a costly wage bargaining mechanism the participation of consumers and workers in the distributional contest is shown to reduce rather than increase the social cost of restrictive regulations the participation of consumers and workers also raises the probability of deregulation

control and performance of international joint ventures control is a critical concept for successful management and performance of international joint ventures ijvs this paper reviews and synthesizes prior studies addressing the conceptualization and operationalization of control within ijvs as well as the ijv control performance relationship the paper also presents a new conceptualization of ijv control as well as a conceptual frame work for studying control of ijvs

household energy and climate mitigation policies investigating energy practices in the housing sector abstract one central aim of climate change mitigation in the european union is to reduce energy consumption in the housing sector in order to ensure effectiveness of policies targeting household energy conservation it is important to investigate existing energy practices of different social groups this article describes and explains energy practices in three leading states in environmental politics technological innovation and support for renewable energy production denmark austria and the united kingdom based on a longitudinal analysis of housing utility costs from the european community statistics on income and living conditions we show that income plays a central role in households energy practices while high income households have higher overall energy consumption low income groups spend a larger share of their income on utility costs the variation of energy consumption across income groups is related to household characteristics characteristics of the dwellings and cross national differences in the housing sector

the impact of joint venture status on the longevity of japanese stakes in u s manufacturing affiliates a number of well known studies report that between one third and two thirds of international joint ventures eventually break up while many generalizations explanations and prescriptions have been based on these statistics their meaning is unclear first all foreign affiliates are subject to normal business risk and to the risk that they will be divested by parents for strategic or financial reasons are these risks higher for joint ventures than for wholly owned subsidiaries second joint ventures may be shorter lived not because of their joint venture status but because affiliates which are joint ventured have other characteristics that make them more likely to exit to know whether joint ventures are shorter lived one must control for the other factors that affect the longevity of affiliates whether wholly owned or joint ventured third many joint ventures contracts contain clauses that allow partners to sell their stakes to one another at specific intervals because they make exit easier joint ventures should have shorter lives but these shorter lives should only be due to sell offs not to liquidations it is therefore important to see whether the supposedly higher termination rate of joint ventures stakes is due to a higher rate of selloffs or to a higher rate of liquidations in this paper we 1 compare the longevity of stakes in joint ventures versus those in wholly owned subsidiaries 2 while controlling for other factors that affect the longevity of such stakes and 3 while distinguishing between two types of exit those through sale and those through liquidation while past authors have addressed these three issues in piecemeal fashion we believe we are the first to address them simultaneously we analyze the factors that affect the longevity of 355 japanese stakes in u s manufacturing affiliates controlling for all the factors that affect exit rates we find that japanese parents are more likely to terminate their stakes in u s joint ventures than in wholly owned subsidiaries this higher termination rate of joint venture stakes is explained by a higher probability of selling them but not of liquidating them most of the other factors that have been found significant in explaining gross divestment of foreign affiliates do in fact only affect exits through sales but not exits through liquidations hence it is true that joint ventures have shorter lives but dangerous to interpret this finding as necessarily meaning that they are more likely to fail

efficient rents 2 free entry and efficient rent seeking in the competition for a monopoly right in which the number of bidders is fixed tullock and others have found the value of the resources spent in the aggregate to capture the transfer to be sometimes less than and sometimes greater than the value of the monopoly we think this approach to be incomplete since it leaves unanswered the question of what determines the number of individuals who will vie for the right to be the monopolist it is unsatisfactory to imagine for example that the franchisor sets the number of contestants one could then foresee that rent seeking would arise to influence the permissible number of bidders and this merely moves the rent seeking dissipation question one step back

the social costs of monopoly and regulation posner reconsidered focuses on social costs of monopoly and trade regulation in the united states benefit of marginal changes on antitrust activities equality of cost in obtaining monopoly and expected profit of monopolist elasticity of inputs in obtaining monopoly ebsco

the locational determinants of direct investments among industrialized countries abstract market size and growth rate as well as tariff barriers have already been shown to influence u s direct investments in the eec the present paper enlarges the field of observation to all bilateral flows of direct investments among six industrialized countries the united states germany france the united kingdom the netherlands and belgium over the years 1969 1982 it also tests the impact of two other would be locational determinants of foreign direct investments namely unit labour costs and export flows moreover a new and alternative specification is put forward and tested which assumes that in the investment decision process foreign locations are in competition not only with each other but also with the home country of the investor

antitrust for high technology industries assessing research joint ventures and mergers the purpose of this paper is to analyze if and how the standard methodology of antitrust analysis should be modified to reflect the importance of r and d and innovation as competitive forces and engines of economic progress focus is on such r and d intensive business combinations as research joint ventures rjvs and horizontal mergers in high technology industries the authors do not propose a complete set of guidelines for the assessment of such combinations they present an economic model of rjvs and high technology mergers that might serve as an analytical underpinning for such guidelines one conclusion of the analysis is that rjvs ought to be accorded special treatment under the antitrust laws this special treatment should entail an explicit recognition that rjvs will be scrutinized under the rule of reason according to guidelines specific to this purpose

a consumer as an entrant in the norwegian cement market this paper sheds light on the strategy of two entrants in the norwegian cement market where both started importing cement one entrant was an initial consumer of the incumbent s product and thus imported for own consumption the author demonstrates that this type of entrant will undertake a sunk investment to have access to a second supplier in cases where other types of entrants are deterred both types of entrants must accept a high import price if the incumbent can purchase the exclusive right to import from foreign suppliers the author finds that the two observed entry attempts are consistent with the model s predictions copyright 1993 by blackwell publishing ltd

sources procedures and microeconomic effects of innovation fabio arcangeli paul david frank engelman christopher freeman massimo moggi richard nelson luigi orsenigo nathan rosenberg michele salvati g n von tunzelman two anonymous referees and the participants at the meeting of the committee on distribution growth and technical progress of the italian national research council cnr rome november 16 1985 have helped with various redraftings a particularly grateful acknowledgment is for the insightful and patient help of moses abramovitz this work has been undertaken at the science policy research unit spru university of sussex as part of the research program of the designated research centre sponsored by the economic and social research council esrc earlier support to the research that led to this paper by the italian national research council cnr is also gratefully acknowledged the statistical research has been undertaken with the assistance of stephano brioschi ilaria fornari and giovannu prennushi

competitive consequences of interfirm collaboration how joint ventures shape industry profitability recent international business research on international joint ventures focuses on how firms can use such ventures for knowledge access and learning to enhance their competitiveness thereby increasing competition in the industry by contrast research in industrial organization economics has observed that firms can also use joint ventures in various ways to attenuate competition in this paper we join these two streams of research to investigate the conditions under which joint ventures reduce or enhance competition by empirically testing the effects of different types of joint ventures on industry profitability our results suggest that joint ventures can be pro competitive or anti competitive depending on whether or not they are formed between competing firms represent foreign market entry and operate in relatively concentrated industries our paper shows the importance of adopting a contingent approach to evaluating the competitive implications of joint ventures and it also points to the value of reinvigorating international business research on the competitive context and consequences of interfirm collaboration

termination outcomes of research alliances abstract we draw upon evolutionary economics and transaction cost economics to examine how alliance experience accumulation at the parent firm level and alliance features at the transaction level jointly and interactively shape the favorability of research alliances termination outcomes fifteen percent of the terminated alliances we examined were successful 34 were failures and 51 experienced an intermediate outcome in the form of contract expiration or unilateral withdrawal by a partner we find that the effect of partner specific experience on the favorability of termination outcomes is greater for non equity alliances than for equity structures affording stronger formal governance mechanisms other forms of experience such as general alliance experience or prior alliances in the same technological area as the focal agreement have no such favorable consequences for alliance termination the findings also indicate that alliance complexity adversely influences firms termination outcomes in alliances we therefore find evidence in partial support of both evolutionary and transaction cost based arguments for the explanation of termination outcomes in research alliances

measures of strategic alliance performance an analysis of construct validity this study evaluates the construct validity of measures of the performance of strategic alliances in 34 equity strategic alliances sas and 45 contractual sas we discuss the content validity of existing measures in the light of current concepts of sa performance empirical results show that the fulfilment of strategic goals and other organizational effectiveness measures of sa performance such as overall performance satisfaction and net spillover effects capture different underlying factors the latter two measures display convergent validity the results also support the discriminant validity of these two measures with respect to contractual changes and survival but not with respect to longevity building on our findings we propose an expanded definition of sa performance that considers both outcome and process performance

regulation and rent seeking prices profits and third party transfers previous research formulated the regulatory process as a contest between consumer and producer groups to determine the regulated price empirical verification of this result has been provided by numerous studies modeling the regulatory process in this fashion results in a rent seeking game in which property rights granted in the original legislation are not exclusively assigned to one group and as a result rent seeking ensues on the relevant margin this study has addressed the issue of third party interest groups extracting transfer payments from the regulatory process by introducing third party interests as an argument in the regulator s majority function it was mathematically demonstrated and empirically verified that a higher regulated price can be expected this finding suggests that other opportunities exist for an enriched theory of regulatory behavior where the political context in which the regulator functions is more precisely defined and extended

life after takeover economic consequences of takeovers are investigated by analyzing profitability of enterprises acquired a s a direct or indirect white knight consequence of tender offer s target companies pre tender profitability averaged 0 97 percentag e points below peer industry norms nine years after takeover acquir ed lines of business had operating income assets percentages 3 10 poi nts below those of non tender lines with similar industry bases mark et shares and merger accounting methods most of the targets postta keover profit decline stemmed from asset value writeups there is no indication that on average the acquirers raised their targets operat ing profitability net of merger related accounting adjustments copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

fishing upstream firm innovation strategy and university research alliances this paper examines how innovation strategy influences firms level of involvement with university based research our results suggest that firms with internal r d strategies more heavily weighted toward exploratory activities allocate a greater share of their r d resources to exploratory university research and develop deeper multifaceted relationships with their university research partners in addition firms with more centralized internal r d organizations spend a greater share of their r d dollars on exploratory research conducted at universities in contrast to other external partners we find evidence suggesting that universities are preferred when the firm perceives potential conflicts over intellectual property 2007 elsevier b v all rights reserved

choice of foreign market entry mode impact of ownership location and internalization factors firms interested in servicing foreign markets face a difficult decision with regards to the choice of an entry mode the options available to a firm include exporting licensing joint venture and sole venture several factors that determine the choice of a specific foreign market entry mode have been identified in previous literature these factors can be classified into three categories ownership advantages of a firm location advantages of a market and internalization advantages of integrating transactions this study examines the independent and joint influences of these factors on the choice of an entry mode multinomial logistic regression model is employed to test the hypothesized effects

cooperative r d and strategic trade policy in this paper three different cooperative r d arrangements in a strategic trade policy model are examined a policy game between two governments is analysed where each government chooses a particular cooperative r d policy in order to maximize national welfare allowing cooperation in r d is also compared with the use of r d subsidies it is jointly optimal for both governments to allow their firms to participate in the same type of cooperative r d and allowing cooperation in r d can

the stability of joint ventures reciprocity and competitive rivalry the focus of the following empirical analysis is the influence of reciprocity and long term relationships on the stability of joint ventures these cooperative incentives are offset by industry structural conditions which may promote competitive rivalry among the partners to separate these effects on joint venture survival the hypothesized relationships are proxied by variables drawn from industry and questionnaire data and estimated under a hazard model specification a theoretical implication of the findings is to suggest a shift of attention from the transaction to the economic relationship as the unit of analysis copyright 1989 by blackwell publishing ltd

efficient capacity investment and joint production agreements in an oligopolistic electricity market the hidroaysen joint venture project abstract we develop a model for a power market with the characteristics of the chilean power supply industry which is an integrated system with a system operator so with a vast authority to define the dispatch of the system we evaluate whether a large joint power generator project made up by the two largest power generators is an anti competitive project considering four investment technologies for power generation namely hydro coal diesel and an advantageous hydro technology which can only be built in a large scale hidroaysen for the joint venture case we use an oligopolistic cournot model and a benevolent social planner both calibrated to the chilean power industry in order to assess the efficiency of alternative investment strategies and conditions whether the hidroaysen joint venture project can be barred to be judged as anti competitive results suggest that the joint venture is an efficient investment and there is a pro competitive behaviour on the part of the two power generators and that there are benefit to consumers who should expect non increasing energy prices as a result of the advantageous hydrotechnology

how do federal regulations affect consumer prices an analysis of the regressive effects of regulation this study is the first to measure the impact of federal regulations on consumer prices by combining consumer expenditure and pricing data from the bureau of labor statistics industry supply chain data from the bureau of economic analysis and industry specific regulation information from the mercatus center s regdata database we determine that regulations promote higher consumer prices and that these price increases have a disproportionately negative effect on low income households specifically we find that the poorest households spend larger proportions of their incomes on heavily regulated goods and services prone to sharp price increases while the literature explores other specific costs of regulation noting that higher consumer prices are a probable consequence of heavy regulation this study is the first to provide a thorough empirical analysis of that relationship across industries irrespective of the reasons for imposing new regulations these results demonstrate that in the aggregate the negative consequences are significant especially for the most vulnerable households

endogenous formation of research coalitions with spillovers abstract we examine the endogenous formation of research coalitions with high spillovers among symmetric firms members of a research coalition set their r and d investments in order to maximize the aggregate profits of members of their coalition the exclusive membership rule supports a more concentrated coalition structure and thus leads to higher industry r and d investments for high spillovers than the open membership rule does however due to free riding problems the grand research coalition which is the socially efficient outcome is rarely an equilibrium outcome under either rule our results suggest that government subsidies to research consortia for basic research with high spillovers can improve social welfare by encouraging wider participation to a research consortium that is by alleviating free rider problems in coalition formation from a more theoretical viewpoint our results on stable coalition structures are applicable to a wide variety of economic coalitions with positive externalities

the trap of continual ownership change in international equity joint ventures this article examines how multiple ownership changes unfold in international equity joint venture iejv evolution and how such repeated changes impact short term performance and long term survival by theorizing a new concept the trap of continual change in the iejv context we challenge the adaptive viewpoint assumed in alliance dynamics research we propose that partners sometimes respond to an initial dissatisfaction with the venture result with a dysfunctional repetition of rearranging the ownership control structure this continual change locks the organization into bad choices and sends it into a downward spiral acknowledging the mixed motive nature of inter partner relationships we incorporate cooperative versus competitive dynamics manifested in shared control arrangements we propose that shared ownership control lends stability to the iejv until the initial iejv agreement is renegotiated this stability is a result of the cooperative forces of mutual interdependence and mutual forbearance between the partners however when the power balance breaks down the potential for inter partner conflict increases when the ownership control structure of the iejv is restructured especially multiple times shared control arrangements become increasingly unstable as behavioral cultural and managerial differences are amplified

the effects of corporate restructuring on aggregate industry specialization it has been widely argued that the purpose of corporate restructuring during the 1980s was to produce a population of more industry specialized competitive firms in response to intensifying global competition a number of studies show that corporate restructuring resulted in increased corporate focus during the 1980s however no study has yet examined whether corporate restructuring resulted in increased specialization at the industry level during the 1980s this study examines this issue first we examine whether or not aggregate industry specialization increased during the 1980s that is we ask did the average firm in any given u s industry become more or less specialized to that industry during the 1980s second we examine whether corporate restructuring was a significant determinant of change in aggregate industry specialization during the 1980s using a sample of 686 four digit sic industries and 64 two digit industry groups this study finds that aggregate industry specialization declined very slightly at both the four digit and two digit level between 1981 and 1989 this study also finds that sell offs of establishments through corporate control transactions or interfirm asset sales had no significant effect on aggregate industry specialization

an analysis of cooperative research and development i analyze the effects of cooperative research whereby member firms agree to share the costs andfruits of a research project before they undertake it in this model industrywide agreements tend to have socially beneficial effects when the degree ofproduct market competition is low when there are r d spillovers in the absence of cooperation when a high degree of sharing is technologically feasible and when the agreement concerns basic research rather than development activities i show that a royalty free cross licensing agreement among any number offirms lowers the equilibrium level of innovation even though it increases the efficiency of r d through sharing

research joint ventures and optimal r d policy with asymmetric information abstract when to allow research joint ventures rjvs or not is an important instrument in the development of an optimal r d policy the regulator however is unlikely to know all the relevant information to regulate r d optimally the extent to which there exist appropriability problems between the firms is one such variable that is private information to the firms in the industry in a duopoly setting we analyze the characteristics of a second best r d policy where the government can either allow rjvs or not and give lump sum subsidies to the parties involved the second best r d policy without subsidies will either block some welfare improving rjvs or allow some welfare reducing ones with lump sum subsidies the second best policy trades off the expected subsidy cost with allowing welfare decreasing rjvs or blocking welfare increasing ones

competing globally allying locally alliances between global rivals and host country factors an emerging literature highlights the relationship between competitive intensity and the likelihood that two rival firms will form an alliance placing this argument in an international context we first suggest that the global competitive intensity between two rival multinationals positively affects the likelihood that they will ally in any host country additionally we highlight how a number of host country contextual factors moderate the relationship between global competitive intensity and alliance formation in a given host country we test our hypotheses with a sample of 13 global automobile companies operating in 27 countries and the results largely support our predictions

the disinterest in deregulation in the analysis of the costs of monopoly power the usual experiment is to convert a competitive industry into a monopoly and observe the consequent change in consumer s surplus modern contributions have emphasized the deadweight cost of monopoly arnold harberger 1954 and the possibility of an associated rent seeking cost of monopoly gordon tullock 1967 the harberger cost of course refers to the lost consumer s surplus triangle the tullock cost concerns the role of competition for monopoly returns taken together and assuming that the competition for monopoly rents is perfect the total cost of monopoly power is a trapezoid the rectangle of monopoly profits plus the triangle of lost consumer s surplus richard posner 1975 in this paper we approach the monopoly problem in a different spirit we compare three states of the world competition regulation and deregulation in this setting we ask what happens if a monopoly is eliminated through deregulation our analysis suggests that because under most conditions tullock costs cannot be recouped the returns to deregulation are lower than previously thought rent seeking expenditures in the past leave the economy permanently poorer even if competition is restored to the industry in contrast the returns to preventing monopoly in the first place are relatively high in our model an insight afforded by the analysis is an explanation of the persistence of laws and regulations which appear to serve no interest in this regard the example of railroad regulation in the united states comes to mind the standard explanation for such regulation is either that voters and government decision makers are ignorant of basic economics or that a small interest group like railroad firms wins rents at the expense of uninformed or economically rational consumers of rail services who do not find it cost effective to seek deregulation we offer another and perhaps more plausible explanation for the persistence of regulation and the apathy of consumers about the costs of regulation namely the costs of such regulations are for the most part the original rent seeking expenditures that lead to the regulation in the first place and these costs are sunk abolishing so called uneconomic laws does nothing to recover these losses hence there is little political support from any quarter to return to the status quo ante in fact as we shall show such a deregulatory program can easily impose more costs than it is worth there are numerous examples of this point including tariffs and quotas of all sorts subsidies to farmers the postal monopoly organized labor s antitrust exemption the licensing of doctors and so forth the traditional explanations of these monopoly rights namely ignorance of economic common sense and special interest groups are neither sufficient nor necessary since the primary costs of these laws are rent seeking expenditures which are made prior to their passage there is simply little to be gained by changing them now gains would accrue in the form of reduced harberger costs costs would be borne in passing and implementing the deregulatory program it is not that the potential gainers from deregulation are large in number diffuse heterogeneous and face high organizational costs rather they do not exist to any degree interpreted in this light efforts by political action groups such as the right to work foundation stand to be a drain on society s resources they cannot produce anything unless they prevent further monopolization through regulation we do not of course mccormick and shughart clemson university clemson sc 29631 tollison center for the study of public choice george mason university fairfax va 22030 thanks go to james buchanan rex cottle and gordon tullock for helpful comments the usual caveat applies

effects of knowledge spillover on inter organizational resource sharing decision in collaborative knowledge creation collaborative knowledge creation is important for firms to gain new competitive advantages but knowledge outgoing spillover harms their existing competitive advantages which puts them into a dilemma when investing rd 2 because the leader invests resources first and faces moral hazards it has the incentives to participate in collaborative knowledge creation only when its benefits from collaborative knowledge creation fruits and knowledge incoming spillover are bigger than those of the follower and the more moral hazards it confronts the more it demands 3 the leader and the follower invest resources at ratios consistent with the benefits and costs the resources bring to them if they can determine the amount or the collaboration is unstable

the dynamics of learning alliances competition cooperation and relative scope we show how the tension between cooperation and competition affects the dynamics of learning alliances private benefits and common benefits differ in the incentives that they create for investment in learning the competitive aspects of alliances are most severe when a firm s ratio of private to common benefits is high we introduce a measure relative scope of a firm in an alliance to show that the opportunity set of each firm outside an alliance crucially impacts its behavior within the alliance finally we suggest why firms might deviate from the theoretically optimal behavior patterns 1998 john wiley sons ltd

determinants of success in international strategic alliances evidence from the global aerospace industry this paper presents the results of a study linking the performance of international joint ventures and alliances set up in the global aerospace industry to their strategic and organizational features in a first stage an empirically based taxonomy of the observed alliances is generated then the economic performance of various types of alliances is evaluated on the basis of industry expert opinions and the difference in performance of different alliance types is tested

the relationship between r d collaboration subsidies and r d performance empirical evidence from finland and germany this study focuses on the impact of innovation policies and r d collaboration in germany and finland we consider collaboration and subsidies as heterogeneous treatments and perform an econometric matching to analyze r d and patent activity at the firm level in general we find that collaboration has positive effects in germany subsidies for individual research do neither exhibit a significant impact on r d nor on patenting but the innovative performance could be improved by additional incentives for collaboration for finnish companies public funding is an important source of finance for r d without subsidies recipients would show less r d and patenting activity whilst those firms not receiving subsidies would perform significantly better if they were publicly funded copyright 2007 john wiley sons ltd

what drives the formation of valuable university industry linkages insights from the wine industry abstract most of the literature on university industry u i linkages assumes that these linkages are beneficial per se we question this assumption suggesting that not all such linkages are equally helpful in this paper we explore the factors driving the formation of valuable u i linkages conceived as those linkages between universities and firms that have a higher potential to diffuse knowledge to other firms in their regional economy our empirical strategy combines case study methodology with econometric techniques using data from two wine clusters in chile and in italy the firm s knowledge base is found to be a key driver of valuable u i linkages we conclude that selectivity should be encouraged among policy makers endeavouring to promote u i linkages

innovation and cooperation implications for competition and antitrust n k robel laureate robert solow and his colleagues on mit s industrial productivity commission recently noted dertouzos lester and solow 1989 p 7 undeveloped cooperative relationships between individuals and between organizations stand out in our industry studies as obstacles to technological innovation and the improvement of industrial performance and later p 105 that interfirm cooperation in the u s has often though not always been inhibited by government antitrust regulation these striking conclusions warrant further exploration unfortunately industrial organization textbooks still discuss horizontal cooperation and competition almost exclusively in terms of standard cartel theory on the other hand vertical cooperation contracting is viewed differently and some textbooks provide treatments of supplier buyer relationships in which cooperation is viewed as enhancing efficiency both in the textbooks and in policy discussion among economists cooperation among competitors is highly suspect being perhaps the last bastion of what was once referred to as the inhospitality tradition in antitrust as a result very little literature addresses how cooperation among competitors can promote competition notwithstanding that cooperation among competitors may sometimes be essential if innovating firms are to compete in today s increasingly global markets imai and baba 1989 such cooperation is already important in japan and in europe 1

illegal markets and the social costs of rent seeking this paper argues that making goods or services illegal results in an increase in the social costs associated with rent seeking the increased social cost is in the form of negative externalities that result from market participants use of coercion and violence in attempts to control trade in the illegal good consequently the social costs of rent seeking will exceed the value of resources dissipated in rent seeking competition and where the external costs exceed the undissipated portion of the tullock cost the social cost of rent seeking is greater than the sum of tullock and harberger costs

interfirm diversity organizational learning and longevity in global strategic alliances organizational theorists have correctly argued that the emergence and maintenance of robust cooperation between global strategic alliance partners is related to the diversity in the partners characteristics yet previous research has failed to systematically delineate the important dimensions of interfirm diversity and integrate the dimensions into a unified framework of analysis this paper develops a multilevel typology of interfirm diversity and focuses on organizational learning and adaptation as critical processes that dynamically moderate diversity s impact on alliance longevity and effectiveness

when competition eclipses cooperation an event history analysis of joint venture failure why do so many joint ventures fail despite the fact that their success is the exception rather than the rule the literature on why joint venture performance has been so poor remains fragmentary we address this issue adopting a transaction cost economics perspective and modeling joint ventures as governance structures that blend the advantages and drawbacks of both markets and hierarchies using a data base on electronics industry ventures and event history analysis we identify several predictors of joint venture failure and test for their influences a key finding is that the presence of competition between joint venture partners outside of the agreement significantly impairs chances for the operation s chance of survival we also find clear evidence that the failure rate of joint ventures is nonmonotonic rising to a peak in the middle term and then declining finally we compare and contrast predictors of terminations due to failure to those due to acquisition of the joint venture by one of its partners our overall conclusions highlight implications for strategic choice theory building and the management of joint ventures

cross function and same function alliances how does alliance structure affect the behavior of partnering firms firms collaborate to develop and deliver new products these collaborations vary in terms of the similarity of the competencies that partnering firms bring to the alliance in same function alliances partnering firms have similar competencies whereas in cross function alliances partners have very different competencies on examining managers view of these alliances we find that on average same function alliances are expected to perform better than cross function alliances holding fixed the level of inputs a game theoretic analysis shows that this apprehension about cross function alliances is consistent with a pareto inferior equilibrium a pareto superior equilibrium however suggests that partners in cross function alliances may invest more in their alliances than those in same function alliances it is also often believed that increasing the number of partnering firms is not conducive for collaborative effort our analysis shows that this belief is correct for same function alliances but not for cross function alliances we test these equilibrium predictions in an experiment where we exogenously vary the type of alliance and the number of partnering firms the experimental results lend support for the pareto superior equilibrium partners in cross function alliances invested more than their counterparts in same function alliances and this difference in investment levels increased with the number of partnering firms we extend our model to consider alliances where firms have an opportunity to learn from their partners and later leverage this knowledge outside the scope of their alliance though such learning increases the resources committed by alliance partners in the learning phase it decreases investment in the subsequent competition and also dampens the overall investment across the two stages in addition an increase in interalliance competition decreases investments in the focal alliance but increases investment in the competition outside the scope of the alliance

arms race or detente how interfirm alliance announcements change the stock market valuation of rivals most prior event studies find that the announcement of a new alliance is accompanied by a positive stock market response for the partners this result has usually been interpreted as evidence for the prevailing view that alliances are effective vehicles for partners to acquire or access new skills and thus become stronger competitors however partners should also earn positive abnormal returns if alliances are used to shape competitive interactions attenuating competitive intensity industry wide in this study we disentangle these different mechanisms by examining how alliance announcements affect the stock market s evaluation of allying firms rivals if an alliance is expected to make partner firms more competitive this should lead to negative abnormal returns for partners rivals if an alliance is expected to facilitate a reduction in competitive intensity this should lead to positive abnormal returns for rivals results from an event study analysis of research and development alliances in the telecommunications and electronics industries during 1996 2004 provide evidence consistent with competition attenuation in some alliances our research thus challenges the increasingly narrow focus on learning and resource accumulation through alliances and calls for broader consideration of the roles and effects of collaboration both for individual firms and for industry structure

on perfect rent dissipation if economists are united on anything it is the proposition that monopoly prices reduce economic welfare by preventing the realization of the maximum gains from trade in any market the extent of such distortions to efficiency are often called harberger costs after arnold harberger s 1954 provocative attempt to measure the extent of these losses in the u s economy more recent analysis has revealed that when monopoly power is achieved via regulation at least part of the monopoly rents so gained will not be simple transfers from consumers to producers but will be dissipated by producers rent seeking activity since such activity employs real resources there are additional costs to monopolization beyond the harberger costs as emphasized by gordon tullock 1967 and richard posner 1975 indeed posner and others have argued that if competition for the monopoly rents is perfect all of the expected rents from regulation will be converted to welfare losses while franklin fisher s 1985 comment has qualified this conclusion somewhat the upshot of the debate is that the rent seeking or tullock costs may greatly exceed the harberger costs 1 another recent strand of the analysis concerns the time pattern over which monopoly returns are dissipated by competition to gain and hold the monopoly right robert mccormick et al 1984 emphasize that to the extent such expenditures are sunk they are forever lost and not recoverable by deregulation while conceding the point martin cherkes et al 1986 argue that most rentseeking expenditures are recurring not sunk and therefore large gains from deregulation remain the purpose of this essay is to point out that recurring or sunk even the largest specification of the harberger and tullock costs of regulatory monopolization may fall far short of the actual welfare costs this is because the analysis concentrates on the rent seeking tullock costs and largely ignores the parallel rent defending2 tullock costs a proper assessment of such rent defending tullock costs might more than double the maximum welfare costs of regulation suggested by posner

built to last or meant to end intertemporal choice in strategic alliance portfolios a salient but rarely explicitly studied characteristic of interfirm relationships is that they can intentionally be formed for finite periods of time what determines firms intertemporal choices between different alliance time horizons shadow of the future theorists suggest that when an alliance has an explicitly set short term time frame there is an increased risk that partners may behave opportunistically this does not readily explain the high incidence of time bound alliances being formed reconciling insights from the shadow of the future perspective with nascent research on the flexibility of temporary organizations and shifting the focus from the level of individual transactions to that of strategic alliance portfolios we argue that firms may be willing to accept a higher risk of opportunism when there are offsetting gains in strategic flexibility in managing their strategic alliance portfolio consequently we hypothesize that environmental factors that increase the need for strategic flexibility namely dynamism and complexity in the environment are likely to increase the relative share of time bound alliances in strategic alliance portfolios our analysis of longitudinal data on the intertemporal alliance choices of a large sample of small and medium sized enterprises provides support for this argument our findings fill an important gap in theory about time horizons in interfirm relationships and temporary organizations and show the importance of separating planned terminations from duration based performance measures

environmental research joint ventures under emission taxes the effect of environmentalpolicy depends crucially on the strategicbehavior of firms firms can undertakepollution abatement innovation cooperativelythrough environmental r d joint ventures rjvs environmental rjvs have not onlyenvironmental but also economic impacts threetypes of environmental rjv are discussed inthis paper r d cartelization in which firmschoose r d efforts to maximize the jointprofit rjv competition in which firms sharethe r d fruits to maximize their own profits and rjv cartelization in which firms share r dfruits and maximize the joint profit an r dcartelization minimizes output quantities maximizes the total emission and minimizes thesocial surplus an rjv cartelization with asufficiently high spillover coefficientmaximizes r d efforts minimizes the totalemission and maximizes the social surplus

equity joint ventures and the theory of the multinational enterprise this paper extends the internalization approach to the theory of the multinational enterprise mne to include an expanded role for equity joint ventures using the transaction cost paradigm of williamson this paper explains why joint ventures may sometimes be preferred over wholly owned subsidiaries also presented is empirical work on joint venture performance in developing countries which demonstrates that under certain conditions joint ventures can be the optimal mode of foreign direct investment

cross cultural differences and joint venture longevity in this paper we test whether national cross cultural differences between joint venture jv parents affect jv longevity by comparing that of two categories of jvs placed in the same environment those between two or more japanese parents on one hand and those between japanese and american parents on the other carefully controlling for other factors that may affect jv longevity we find that the longevity of japanese american jvs is lower than that of japanese japanese jvs such effects however appear only for dissolutions that result from the sale of the venture to one of the partners not for those due to liquidation or sale to a third party

learning from competing partners outcomes and durations of scale and link alliances in europe north america and asia this paper investigates the outcomes and durations of strategic alliances among competing firms using alliance outcomes as indicators of learning by partner firms we show that alliance outcomes vary systematically across link and scale alliances link alliances are interfirm partnerships to which partners contribute different capabilities while scale alliances are partnerships to which partners contribute similar capabilities we find that partners are more likely to reorganize or take over link alliances than scale alliances by contrast scale alliances are more likely to continue without material changes the two types of alliances are equally likely to shut down at similar ages these results support the view that link alliances lead to greater levels of learning and capability acquisition between the partners than do scale alliances copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

innovation and cooperation under vertical product differentiation abstract this paper analyzes the strategic decisions of two identical duopolists who determine both the timing and the quality of their innovation through their research and development activities the product market is vertically differentiated and the firms choose the prices of their innovations in bertrand competition the firms interact in a two stage non cooperative game where they first decide on the quality and innovation date and then choose the prices in the second stage appropriately the existence of equilibria in pure and mixed strategies is analyzed it is shown that the firms have an incentive to form a research joint venture and to share their research know how even when research results are certain and there are no spillover effects and that cooperation is not socially desirable

preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly this article takes a different tack and inquires whether institutions such as the patent system create opportunities for firms with monopoly power to maintain their monopoly power the results apply to other situations such as brand identification spatial location and capacity expansion which share the characteristic that early or preemptive actions may lower the returns to potential competitors

firm ownership preferences and host government restrictions an integrated approach two approaches may explain how multinational enterprises mnes select ownership structures for subsidiaries the first argues that mnes prefer structures that minimize that transaction costs of doing business abroad the second argues that ownership structures are determined by negotiations with host governments whose outcomes depend on the bargaining power of the firm this paper presents a framework integrating these two approaches and uses statistical methods to separate their effects empirically

when are stable rights to rents bad stable enforceable property rights over resources normally furthers economic efficiency i argue that stable rights to government created rents and wealth transfers by contrast generate inefficiency secure rights to receive transfers increases rent seekers incentive to make political investments creating new transfers i demonstrate the point using a two period rent seeking game contestable transfers reduce the probability of establishing a transfer program and aggregate rent seeking expenditures strengthening transfer recipients rights increases the difficulty of eliminating a transfer program

environmental policy convergence the impact of international harmonization transnational communication and regulatory competition in recent years there is growing interest in the study of cross national policy convergence yet we still have a limited understanding of the phenomenon do we observe convergence of policies at all under which conditions can we expect that domestic policies converge or rather develop further apart in this article we address this research deficit from a theoretical perspective we concentrate on the explanatory power of three factors namely international harmonization transnational communication and regulatory competition in empirical terms we analyze if and to what extent we can observe convergence of environmental policies across twenty four industrialized countries between 1970 and 2000 we find an impressive degree of environmental policy convergence between the countries under investigation this development is mainly caused by international harmonization and to a considerable degree also by transnational communication whereas regulatory competition does not seem to play a role

r d cooperation and product market competition abstract i derive equilibria that is self enforcing agreements for firms that cooperate in improving their product and compete in marketing it i am particularly interested in the interaction between rd ii product improvement is a function of the effort by each firm iii firms cannot observe each other s effort iv firms market the product by simultaneously setting prices the analysis reveals some surprising results i find that in some cases although monopoly prices can be sustained in equilibrium optimal equilibria call for firms to set lower than monopoly prices in the short run thus providing the right incentives for investment in r d under a different set of assumptions i find that it is optimal to reduce r d effort below the efficient level as a means to sustain short run collusion in prices even though efficient r d effort could be achieved in equilibrium

non tariff barriers and u k investment in the european community this article contains an investigation of the relationship between united kingdom u k foreign direct investment in the european community ec and the incidence of institutional and legal non tariff barriers ntbs within the ec different types of ntb are identified and the implications of each of these barriers for foreign direct investment is discussed the analysis is based on a survey of u k manufacturing plcs and case studies in sixty companies with cross frontier manufacturing jvs and or subsidiaries in the ec the results highlight the impact of intra ec ntbs on foreign direct investment in the ec particular emphasis is placed on the role of discriminatory public procurement policies

technology policy and the organization of r d abstract in this study we examine how technology policy in the form of r d subsidies and encouragement of research joint ventures rjvs affects the investment incentives of firms in various types of imperfectly competitive markets we find that joint ventures yield lower research intensities in the absence of subsidies in the presence of optimal subsidy policy higher expected welfare is obtained with rjvs but the optimal policy may also involve a more costly subsidy program the analysis also identifies possible difficulties in implementing socially optimal policies arising from private incentives conflicting with the public interest

learning dynamics in research alliances a panel data analysis the aim of this paper is to empirically test the determinants of research joint ventures rjvs group dynamics we develop a model based on learning and transaction cost theories which represent the benefits and costs of rjv participation respectively according to our framework firms at each period in time weigh the benefits against the costs of being an rjv member rjv dynamics can then be interpreted as a consequence of this evolving trade off over time we look at entry turbulence and exit in rjvs that have been set up under the us national cooperative research act which allows for certain antitrust exemptions in order to stimulate firms to co operate in r d accounting for unobserved project characteristics and controlling for inter rjv interactions and industry effects the tobit panel regressions show the importance of group and time features for an rjvs evolution we further identify an average rjvs long term equilibrium size and assess its determining factors ours is a first attempt to produce robust stylized facts about co operational short and long term dynamics a neglected dimension in research co operations but an important element in understanding how collaborative learning works

alliance experience and governance flexibility prior work has mapped the transaction at the heart of an alliance to the risks of opportunism inherent in that alliance and ultimately to how the alliance is structured and governed we extend this approach by noting that the parties in an alliance do not necessarily perceive the same hazards as predominant and thus may have different preferences for how the alliance is structured nevertheless it is in each party s best interest to find a structure that protects its interests while also allowing its partner to protect its interests sufficiently drawing from the alliance management capabilities literature we argue that firms with more alliance experience are better able to protect their interests under any given alliance structure making the choice of structure less consequential to them the resulting governance versatility provides a competitive advantage by enabling firms to form advantageous alliances that are less available to inexperienced competitors our study of innovative alliances in biopharmaceutical industry lends support to the hypotheses allowing us to advance the literature on governance choice in alliances the literature on alliance management and their intersection

analysis of factors affecting a shift in a local energy system towards 100 renewable energy community abstract we explore what factors play a critical role in a shift of a local energy system towards 100 renewable energy community by examining the case using a framework that highlights the role of key state and non state actors investors local officials citizens and policy entrepreneurs and the role of governance mode horizontal self steering partnership participation inclusiveness of energy decision making co ownership of the process for the actual outcome the framework is based on recent transition literature that has focused on the dynamics of change the case study provides the evidence of the important role of participation of local community in the open decision making process from the onset their partnership in the local energy system solutions sense of ownership as well as the role of mayor as a policy entrepreneur

survival of businesses using collaborative relationships to commercialize complex goods authors with many theoretical and managerial perspectives argue that businesses commercializing technologically complex goods benefit when they collaborate closely with other businesses collaboration is viewed as a means for businesses to overcome competency limitations and to achieve the close configuration of components required for complex goods we predict that collaborative relationships often assist businesses to produce complex goods but that the relationships might also cause problems for the collaborating businesses we find that firms using development oriented and marketing oriented collaborative relationships in the hospital software systems industry are less likely to shut down than businesses that follow independent approaches when the environment changes gradually but businesses using collaborative relationships are sometimes susceptible to being acquired by other firms following a sudden environmental shock businesses with collaborative relationships for activities central to the shock became more likely to shut down while businesses with collaborative relationships for activities outside the focus of the shock became more likely to survive the study critically evaluates and tests the widely stated but little tested argument that interfirm collaboration is usually beneficial the results address the issue of whether organizational choices affect comparative business performance

death of the lethargic effects of expansion into new technical subfields on performance in a firm s base business this paper finds that industry incumbents that do not expand into new technical subfields tend to fare poorly in their established businesses even if the market for the established products continues to exist firms that expand from their established businesses survive longer and achieve greater subsequent market share than competitors that do not expand by some measures however a failed attempt to expand into a new subfield may be even more harmful to a base business than nonexpansion the study employs conventional and accelerated event time regression models to analyze market share and survival the sample which includes 371 incumbents in four base subfields of the medical diagnostic imaging industry between 1953 and 1989 examines performance following the emergence of five new technical subfields of the industry

coherence causality and effectiveness of the eu environmental policy system results of complementary statistical and econometric analyses this paper presents the first empirical test of coherence i e consistency of policies within a framework causality i e logical priority of objectives over policies and effectiveness i e ability of policies to tackle challenges as defined by objectives of the overall eu environmental policy system to do so i applied complementary statistical cross sectional and time series and econometric dynamic tri probit analyses to an original panel dataset based on addressed issues i e pollution vs resource trans boundary vs domestic flow vs stock rather than on implemented policies i e eu legislation aiming at optimal pollution production optimal resource use and market competition it would be impossible to perform similar analyses by referring to realized policies rather than tackled issues due to the unbalanced sample characterizing the former with respect to the latter as well as due to overlapping objectives interrelated policies and non univocal relationships between objectives and policies in contrast with previous studies of single eu environmental policies characteristics of the eu environmental policy or eu environmental objectives i found that the overall eu environmental policy system is internally coherent dynamically causal and ex ante effective moreover the evidence suggests that many issues are correlated trans boundary issues became more relevant in 2012 pollution production was more significant than resource use and flow issues were more important than stock issues from 1995 to 2010 finally i show that few objectives overlapped a safe environment objective 1987 1997 was preferred to a greenhouse gas ghg reduction objective 2003 2012 but pursued with a 2 year lag although the latter has recently become preferred to the former in addition a ghg reduction objective was preferred to a sustainable development objective 1998 2002

really a front runner really a straggler of environmental leaders and laggards in the european union and beyond a quantitative policy perspective abstract as it has long been debated who is a front runner and who is a laggard state in terms of environmental protection it is rather surprising that the topic has received rather scant attention as far as quantitative large n research endeavours are concerned of course there is a broad literature on the topic however existing studies have shortcomings the criteria on which the assessments rely are often neither equivalent cross nationally nor are they communicated clearly enough i e not transparent although ambitious efforts have been invested to rank countries in terms of their environmental performance little systematic research exists that clearly determines leaders and laggards in terms of their policies policy performance and states ranking accordingly to the best of our knowledge no empirical study has so far conducted a comprehensive and quantitative leader laggard assessment policy analysis against this backdrop we aim to provide such a paper we especially strive to test the validity of common knowledge classifications or rankings derived from assessments in the literature we demonstrate that while some known frontrunner states are indeed leaders if assessed from a broader policy data perspective other countries commonly assigned a leader role find themselves in a lower position instead in addition some nations commonly excluded from the frontrunners are located unexpectedly high in the rankings even leader laggard reversals occur if our results would be compared to existing classifications most importantly the analyses show a considerable temporal dynamic while often claimed or assumed this has not been proven as clearly until now

the selection of public utility commissioners a re examination of the importance of institutional setting the result of a great many studies is that it makes no difference to the rate level whether the public utility commission is appointed or elected nevertheless the typical response to an inquiry regarding the effect of appointment versus election is that a difference in resulting rate structure should exist in this paper we have reconciled these views and more carefully examined the issue of whether institutional setting does matter in the setting of regulated electricity prices we suggest that one should not necessarily expect elected pucs to behave differently than appointed ones instead different behavior should be expected from pucs that are closer to their constituents than those more isolated irrespective of whether the puc is elected or appointed the results of an empirical examination based on a large sample of utilities operating during the period of 1981 83 support this view the more narrowly defined is the consumer voter group everything else the same the lower is the rate set by the puc

licensing and nontransferable rents traditionally restrictive licensing is assumed to create monopoly profits by restricting output and therefore to produce two kinds of social costs the deadweight loss due to reduced output and the resources devoted to rent seeking however the fact that nonsalvagable resources spent on rent seeking create their own barriers to entry has not been recognized by increasing nontransferable rents licensing prevents the least costly producers from entering and thus produces a third kind of social cost while harold demsetz 1982 dismissal of the traditional notion of entry barriers is correct when assets are transferable the idea of entry barriers is still useful when assets are nontransferable as this note shows in the case of professional licensing