choice modeling at the market stall individual versus collective interest in environmental valuation the market stall or valuation workshop has recently been proposed as a way of addressing some of the limitations of conventional stated preference analysis in this paper we attempt to combine a participatory technique similar to the citizens jury with choice modelling a stated preference technique increasingly being applied in environmental economics our focus is on how changes in the context of decision making between choices made in isolation and those made in a group setting and between choices made on individual well being versus collective criteria produce differences in estimated welfare measures the empirical context used is that of water quality improvements under the water framework directive the most significant reform in water legislation in the european union for many years we find that the choice experiment format can be successfully implemented in a valuation workshop and that moving from individual to collective choice produces in this instance a rather interesting change in both values and preferences which depends on the respondent s interests

learning to trust in indefinitely repeated games abstract although it is well known that trust and trustworthiness i e the fulfillment of trust are important behaviors for the fulfillment of incomplete contracts less is known about how the economic environment influences them in this paper we design an experiment to examine how exogenously determined stochastic past relationship lengths affect trust and trustworthiness in new relationships we find that shorter lasting relationships have an immediate negative impact on both behaviors in the relationships that immediately follow while longer lasting relationships have the opposite effect the effect of stochastic end points declines for trustworthiness but not for trust as subjects gain experience indicating that trust is able to rebound when longer lasting relationships follow shorter lasting ones

the economic impact of social ties evidence from german reunification we use the fall of the berlin wall in 1989 to show that personal relationships which individuals maintain for noneconomic reasons can be an important determinant of regional economic growth we show that west german households who had social ties to east germany in 1989 experienced a persistent rise in their personal incomes after the fall of the berlin wall moreover the presence of these households significantly affects economic performance at the regional level it increases the returns to entrepreneurial activity the share of households who become entrepreneurs and the likelihood that firms based within a given west german region invest in east germany as a result west german regions that for idiosyncratic reasons have a high concentration of households with social ties to the east exhibit substantially higher growth in income per capita in the early 1990s a one standard deviation rise in the share of households with social ties to east germany in 1989 is associated with a 4 7 percentage point rise in income per capita over six years we interpret our findings as evidence of a causal link between social ties and regional economic

deriving distributional weights for qalys through discrete choice experiments this paper presents the first attempt to use a discrete choice experiment to derive distributional weights for quality adjusted life years qalys based on characteristics age and severity of the beneficiaries a novel approach using the hicksian compensating variation is applied advantages include derivation of weights for qalys not just for life or life years saved and investigation of the impact of the size of the health gain by allowing the gain to be traded against other characteristics results suggest one would generally not weight qalys except in a small number of specific cases and in those cases the weights are relatively small methodological challenges are highlighted as is a future research agenda

labour migration and social networks participation in southern mozambique this paper investigates how social networks in poor developing settings are affected by migration using a unique household survey from southern mozambique we test the role of labour mobility in shaping participation in groups and interhousehold cooperation by migrant sending households in village economies at origin we find that migration cum remittances boosts household engagement in community based social networks our findings are robust to alternative definitions of social interaction and to endogeneity concerns suggesting that stable migration ties and higher income stability through remittances may decrease participation constraints and increase household commitment in cooperative arrangements in migrant sending communities

perfect and imperfect strangers in social dilemmas abstract this paper focuses on social dilemma games in which players may or may not meet the same partner again in the future a novel prisoner s dilemma experiment a meta analysis of public goods experiments and a meta analysis of previous prisoner s dilemma experiments document high cooperation rates if the likelihood to meet the same partner again in the future is high

urban poverty and juvenile crime evidence from a randomized housing mobility experiment this paper uses data from a randomized housing mobility experiment to study the effects of relocating families from high to low poverty neighborhoods on juvenile crime outcome measures come from juvenile arrest records taken from government administrative data our e ndings seem to suggest that providing families with the opportunity to move to lower poverty neighborhoods reduces violent criminal behavior by teens

the intrinsic value of decision rights philosophers psychologists and economists have long argued that certain decision rights carry not only instrumental value but may also be valuable for their own sake the ideas of autonomy freedom and liberty derive their intuitive appeal at least partly from an assumed positive intrinsic value of decision rights providing clean evidence for the existence of this intrinsic value and measuring its size however is intricate here we develop a method capable of achieving these goals the data reveal that the large majority of our subjects intrinsically value decision rights beyond their instrumental benefit the intrinsic valuation of decision rights has potentially important consequences for corporate governance human resource management and optimal job design it may explain why managers value power why employees appreciate jobs with task discretion why individuals sort into self employment and why the reallocation of decision rights is often very difficult and cumbersome our method and results may also prove useful in developing an empirical revealed preference foundation for concepts such as freedom of choice and individual autonomy

zero as a special price the true value of free products when faced with a choice of selecting one of several available products or possibly buying nothing according to standard theoretical perspectives people will choose the option with the highest cost benefit difference however we propose that decisions about free zero price products differ in that people do not simply subtract costs from benefits but instead they perceive the benefits associated with free products as higher we test this proposal by contrasting demand for two products across conditions that maintain the price difference between the goods but vary the prices such that the cheaper good in the set is priced at either a low positive or zero price in contrast with a standard cost benefit perspective in the zero price condition dramatically more participants choose the cheaper option whereas dramatically fewer participants choose the more expensive option thus people appear to act as if zero pricing of a good not only decreases its cost but also adds to its benefits after documenting this basic effect we propose and test several psychological antecedents of the effect including social norms mapping difficulty and affect affect emerges as the most likely account for the effect

productivity gains from geographic concentration of human capital evidence from the cities abstract based on recent theoretical developments the argument is made that the average level of human capital is a local public good cities with higher average levels of human capital should therefore have higher wages and higher land rents after conditioning on the characteristics of individual workers and dwellings this prediction is supported by data for standard metropolitan statistical areas smsas in the united states where the smsa average levels of formal education and work experience are used as proxies for the average level of human capital the alternative explanations of omitted smsa variables and self selection are evaluated an estimate of the effect of an additional year of average education on total factor productivity is computed

cooperation among strangers with limited information about reputation abstract the amount of institutional intervention necessary to secure efficiency enhancing cooperation in markets and organizations in circumstances where interactions take place among essentially strangers depends critically on the amount of information informal reputation mechanisms need transmit models based on subgame perfection find that the information necessary to support cooperation is recursive in nature and thus information generating and processing requirements are quite demanding models that do not rely on subgame perfection on the other hand suggest that the information demands may be quite modest the experiment we present indicates that even without any reputation information there is a non negligible amount of cooperation that is however quite sensitive to the cooperation costs for high costs providing information about a partner s immediate past action increases cooperation recursive information about the partners previous partners reputation further promotes cooperation regardless of the cooperation costs

imitation contagion or exertion using a tax reform to reveal how colleagues sick leaves influence worker behaviour we analyse the social interaction effects in sick leave behaviour in the workplace using high quality norwegian matched employer employee data with detailed individual information on sick leaves during the 2004 2006 period we find that social interaction effects in sick leave behaviour in the workplace do exist and that the effects are noticeable in size the strong relationship between the sick leave rates among colleagues is not solely the result of contagious diseases nor is it caused by improved informational quality or by the increased workload for the non absent workers evidence supports the existence of reciprocal worker behaviour that is unrelated to joint leisure seeking activities

moving to opportunity in boston early results of a randomized mobility experiment this paper examines the short run impacts of a change in residential neighborhood on the well being of low income families using evidence from a program in which eligibility for a housing voucher was determined by random lottery we examine the experiences of households at the boston site of moving to opportunity mto a demonstration program in five cities families in high poverty public housing projects applied to mto and were assigned by lottery to one of three groups experimental offered mobility counseling and a section 8 subsidy valid only in a census tract with a poverty rate of less than 10 percent section 8 comparison offered a geographically unrestricted section 8 subsidy or control offered no new assistance but continued to be eligible for public housing our quantitative analyses of program impacts uses data on 540 families from a baseline survey at program enrollment a follow up survey administered l to 3 5 years after random assignment and state administrative data on earnings and welfare receipt 48 percent of the experimental group and 62 percent of the section 8 comparison group moved through the mto program one to three years after program entry families in both treatment groups were more likely to be residing in neighborhoods with low poverty rates and high education levels than were families in the control group however while members of the experimental group were much more likely to be residing in suburban communities than were those in the section 8 group the lower program take up rate among the experimental group resulted in more families remaining in the most distressed communities households in both treatment groups experienced improvements in multiple measures of well being relative to the control group including increased safety improved health among household heads and fewer behavior problems among boys experimental group children were also less likely to be a victim of a personal crime to be injured or to experience an asthma attack there are no significant impacts of either mto treatment on the employment earnings or welfare receipt of household heads in the first three years after random assignment

an experimental test of the efficacy of a simple reputation mechanism to solve social dilemmas abstract the evolution of cooperation has been the focus of intense research in the social sciences natural sciences especially biology and even computer science it has long been recognized that the possibility of future consequences is crucial to the emergence of rational cooperation it was thought that random matching was isomorphic to one shot play but kandori 1992 showed that a reputation labeling mechanism can be used to support cooperation in the random matching prisoner dilemma we designed an experiment to test this result we found that while the level of cooperation steadily declined without a reputation mechanism with our color coded reputation mechanism the level of cooperation steadily increased with experience an econometric mixture model consisting of four reputation conditioned strategies as well as a level 0 type was fitted to the data we cannot reject the hypothesis that the majority of subjects used one of these strategies and learned with experience

habit prisoner s dilemma and americans welfare cost of working much more than europeans europeans work much less than americans some studies claim this is due to high taxes in europe which would benefit by adopting us tax rates and work time others find that taxes have little or no impact on work time i examine the hypothesis that americans would benefit by reducing work time to europe s level empirical and experimental studies show utility falls as other people s income rises due to its historical experience europe is able to internalize this and other negative externalities by restricting work time through minimum vacation time and maximum weekly work hours while the us is not resulting in a prisoner s dilemma overworking trap equilibrium a simple model and work time data are used to derive the us welfare gain from reducing work time to europe s level findings are i parameter values are consistent with experimental results on the relative impact of own and other people s income ii the welfare gain s present value is about 120 percent of annual welfare and iii even if europe s policy reduces work time excessively it does remain beneficial as long as the reduction is less than twice the optimal one

peers at work we study peer effects in the workplace specifically we investigate whether how and why the productivity of a worker depends on the productivity of coworkers in the same team using high frequency data on worker productivity from a large supermarket chain we find strong evidence of positive productiv ity spillovers from the introduction of highly productive personnel into a shift worker effort is positively related to the productivity of workers who see him but not workers who do not see him additionally workers respond more to the presence of coworkers with whom they frequently interact we conclude that social pressure can partially internalize free riding externalities that are built into many workplaces jel j24 l81 m54

consumer search with observational learning this article studies observational learning in a consumer search environment consumers observe the purchasing decision of a predecessor with similar preferences consumers rationally emulate by initiating their search at the firm from which their predecessor purchased free riding on search effort and reacting less to price changes prices are nonmonotone in search costs and may be as low as marginal costs we discuss several extensions and show that the effect of emulation on prices is stronger when i the number of firms increases ii consumers first visits are more elastic with respect to market shares and iii prices are adjusted more frequently

prices and social behaviour evidence from adult smoking in canadian aboriginal communities this paper provides estimates of tobacco price elasticity explicitly distinguishing between two price effects the direct effect reflecting individual reaction to a price change and the indirect effect whereby price influences the individual by changing community smoking behaviour canada s aboriginal communities are small and secluded allowing for plausible identification of reference groups on a relatively large scale estimates suggest a 10 increase in price decreases daily smoking by 0 91 percentage points 2 11 occasional smoking by 1 24 percentage points 8 27 and average smoking intensity by 0 15 cigarettes per day 2 9 it is found that the indirect effect almost doubles the response to a change in tobacco prices over the direct effect alone

crime and social interactions the high variance of crime rates across time and space is one of the oldest puzzles in the social sciences this variance appears too high to be explained by changes in the exogenous costs and benefits of crime we present a model where social interactions create enough covariance across individuals to explain the high cross city variance of crime rates this model provides an index of social interactions which suggests that the amount of social interactions is highest in petty crimes moderate in more serious crimes and almost negligible in murder and rape

payoff complementarities and financial fragility evidence from mutual fund outflows the paper provides empirical evidence that strategic complementarities among investors generate fragility in financial markets analyzing mutual fund data we find that consistent with a theoretical model funds with illiquid assets where complementarities are stronger exhibit stronger sensitivity of outflows to bad past performance than funds with liquid assets we also find that this pattern disappears in funds where the shareholder base is composed mostly of large investors we present further evidence that these results are not attributable to alternative explanations based on the informativeness of past performance or on clientele effects we analyze the implications for funds performance and policies

cooperation among strangers under the shadow of the future we study the emergence of norms of cooperation in experimental economies populated by strangers interacting indefinitely can these economies achieve full efficiency even without formal enforcement institutions which institutions for monitoring and enforcement facilitate cooperation finally what classes of strategies do subjects employ we find that first cooperation can be sustained even in anonymous settings second some type of monitoring and punishment institutions significantly promote cooperation and third subjects mostly employ strategies that are selective in punishment

the effects of lottery prizes on winners and their neighbors evidence from the dutch postcode lottery each week the dutch postcode lottery pcl randomly selects a postal code and distributes cash and a new bmw to lottery participants in that code we study the effects of these shocks on lottery winners and their neighbors consistent with the life cycle hypothesis the effects on winners consumption are largely confined to cars and other durables consistent with the theory of in kind transfers the vast majority of bmw winners liquidate their bmws we do however detect substantial social effects of lottery winnings pcl nonparticipants who live next door to winners have significantly higher levels of car consumption than other nonparticipants

school attendance and child labor a model of collective behavior this paper theoretically investigates how community approval or disap proval aects school attendance and child labor and how aggregate behavior of the community feeds back towards the formation and persistence of an anti or pro schooling norm the proposed community model continues to take aggregate and idiosyncratic poverty into account as an important driver of low school attendance and child labor but it provides also an explanation for why equally poor villages or regions can display dierent attitudes towards schooling distinguishing between three dierent modes of child time allocation school attendance work and leisure the paper shows how the time costs of schooling and child labor productivity con tribute to the existence of a locally stable anti schooling norm it proposes policies that eectively exploit the social dynamics and initiate a permanent escape from the anti schooling equilibrium an extension of the model explores how an education contingent subsidy paid to the poorest families of a community manages to initiate a bandwagon eect towards education for all the optimal mechanism design of

sickness absence and local benefit cultures in many countries sickness absence financed by generous insurance benefits is an important concern in the policy debate there are strong variations in absence behavior among local geographical areas such variations are difficult to explain in terms of observable socioeconomic factors in this paper we investigate whether such variations are related to group effects in the form of social interaction among individuals within neighborhoods well known methodological problems arise when trying to answer this question a special feature of our efforts to deal with these problems is that we adopt several alternative approaches to identify group effects our study is based on a rich set of swedish panel data and we find indications of group effects in each of our approaches

endogenous reputation formation under the shadow of the future recent research has shown that making people s decisions known to others may enhance cooperation in infinitely repeated prisoner s dilemma games with random matching this paper experimentally studies whether people can cooperate with each other by endogenously showing their identities and building cooperative reputations when there is an option to hide the identities our experiment shows that a non negligible fraction of subjects choose to conceal their identities and accordingly subjects fail to cooperate with each other in communities if hiding is cost free however almost all subjects disclose their identities and successfully achieve cooperation if a cost is charged for the act of hiding this finding has a broad methodological implication for the study of reputation mechanisms when infinitely repeated games are used in an experiment as people s behavior may be determined by their ability to hide identities

discrete choice with social interactions this paper provides an analysis of aggregate behavioural outcomes when individual utility exhibits social interaction effects we study generalized logistic models of individual choice which incorporate terms reflecting the desire of individuals to conform to the behaviour of others in an environment of noncooperative decisionmaking laws of large numbers are generated in such environments multiplicity of equilibria in these models which are equivalent to the existence of multiple self consistent means for average choice behaviour will exist when the social interactions exceed a particular threshold local stability of these multiple equilibria is also studied the properties of the noncooperative economy are contrasted with the properties of an economy in which a social planner determines the set of individual choices finally a likelihood function based on the theoretical model is given and conditions for the econometric identifiability of the model are established

play it again partner choice reputation building and learning from finitely repeated dilemma games often the fuller the reputational record people s actions generate the greater their incentive to earn a reputation for cooperation however inability to wipe clean one s past record might trap some agents who initially underappreciate reputation s value in a cycle of bad behaviour whereas a clean slate could have been followed by their reforming themselves in a laboratory experiment we investigate what subjects learn from playing a finitely repeated dilemma game with endogenous symmetric partner choice we find that with a high cooperation premium and good information investment in cooperative reputation grows following exogenous restarts although earlier end game behaviours are observed

collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy experimental evidence this paper uses laboratory experiments to test the implications of the theory of repeated games on equilibrium payoffs and estimate strategies in an infinitely repeated prisoners dilemma game with imperfect public monitoring we find that subjects payoffs i decrease as noise increases and ii are lower than the theoretical maximum for low noise but exceed it for high noise under the assumption that the subjects strategy uses thresholds on the public signal for transition between cooperation and punishment states we find that the best fitting strategy simply compares the most recent public signal against a single threshold

the political trend in local government tax setting previous fiscal studies have paid little attention to the effects of social interaction on local tax setting this paper seeks to fill this gap by developing a theoretical model in which politicians belonging to the same party interact with each other in order to draw inferences about ideology this phenomenon produces a mimic effect which is called the political trend the results of the analysis show that the political trend gives rise to higher income tax rates and to tax mimicking at the local government level the framework developed also makes it possible to discriminate between leviathan type and welfarist type politicians the results show that the former are more sensitive than the latter to changes in the average income tax rate of their peers moreover leviathan type politicians are less sensitive than benevolent ones to changes in the central government s income tax rate

the role of information and social interactions in retirement plan decisions evidence from a randomized experiment this paper analyzes a randomized experiment to shed light on the role of information and social interactions in employees decisions to enroll in a tax deferred account tda retirement plan within a large university the experiment encouraged a random sample of employees in a subset of departments to attend a benee ts information fair organized by the university by promising a monetary reward for attendance the experiment multiplied by more than e ve the attendance rate of these treated individuals relative to controls and tripled that of untreated individuals within departments where some individuals were treated tda enrollment e ve and eleven months after the fair was signie cantly higher in departments where some individuals were treated than in departments where nobody was treated however the effect on tda enrollment is almost as large for individuals in treated departments who did not receive the encouragement as for those who did we provide three interpretations differential treatment effects social network effects and motivational reward effects to account for these results

qalys and the equity efficiency trade off as the volume of research on quality adjusted life years qalys has increased concern has begun to be expressed about the equity aspects of resource allocation decisions based on the results of this research this paper suggests that a common theme running through the criticisms of the qaly approach is a concern about inequality it also suggests that the method for incorporating distributional concerns which is currently being pursued by advocates of the qaly approach will only ever capture concerns other than a concern about inequality the paper suggests a method for incorporating both sets of concerns into resource allocation decisions

peer effects and the rise of beer in russia abstract between 1996 and 2007 per capita beer consumption in russia more than quintupled making beer the most important alcoholic drink in russia today and transforming russia into the world s third largest beer market we study the role of peer effects in this rapid adoption of beer in particular we argue that the initial shocks of improvements in quality and increased advertising were magnified through peer effects using detailed data from the russian longitudinal monitoring survey we analyze the individual choice to drink beer controlling for a wide range of potential factors our results indicate that peer effects played an important role as a transmission mechanism in persuading consumers to start drinking beer in contrast changes in prices and incomes seem to have played only a minor role

social insurance networks based on administrative panel data from norway we examine how social insurance dependency spreads within neighborhoods families ethnic minorities and among former schoolmates we use a fixed effects methodology that accounts for endogenous group formation contextual interactions and time constant as well as time varying confounders we report evidence that social insurance dependency is contagious the estimated network effects are both quantitatively and statistically significant and they rise rapidly with relational closeness in a way that establishes endogenous social interaction as a central causal mechanism social interactions do not cross ethnic borders

institutions and behavior experimental evidence on the effects of democracy a novel experiment is used to show that the effect of a policy on the level of cooperation is greater when it is chosen democratically by the subjects than when it is exogenously imposed in contrast to the previous literature our experimental design allows us to control for selection effects e g those who choose the policy may be affected differently by it our finding implies that democratic institutions may affect behavior directly in addition to having effects through the choice of policies our findings have implications for the generalizability of the results of randomized policy interventions

investigating the social value of health changes this survey has demonstrated that the danish public is concerned with distributional aspects of health gains they have a strong inclination to give priority to those in a more severe health state provided their expected benefits are large enough to bring them to the health level where their rival patients are without treatment results also indicated that the equity argument may not apply with equal force on all health dimensions respondents did to some extent trade off equity for greater health gains a nouvelle finding is that the valuations of health increments per se seem to be affected by whether questions are framed as individual or social choices if social decision making is the issue health gains which involve relieving patients of extreme problems are valued more highly than relief of minor ailments these discrepancies between individual and social valuations suggest that the use of qaly values elicited from an individual s perspective may not be valid in social decision making

the social multiplier aggregate data is often used to make inferences about individual level behavior if there are social interactions in which one person s actions influence his neighbor s incentives or information then these inferences are inappropriate the presence of positive social interactions or strategic complementarities implies the existence of a social multiplier where aggregate relationships will overstate individual elasticities we present a brief model and then estimate the size of the social multiplier in three areas the impact of education on wages the impact of demographics on crime and group membership among dartmouth roommates in these contexts there is a significant social multiplier jel ho jo co

identification of endogenous social effects the reflection problem this paper examines the reflection problem that arises when a researcher observing the distribution of behaviour in a population tries to infer whether the average behaviour in some group influences the behaviour of the individuals that comprise the group it is found that inference is not possible unless the researcher has prior information specifying the compisition of reference groups if this information is available the prospects for inference depend critically on the population relationship between the variables defining reference groups and those directly affecting outcomes inference is difficult to implossible if these variables are functionally dependent or are statistically independent the prospects are better if the variables defining reference groups and those directly affecting outcomes are moderately related in the population

the measurement of individual utility and social welfare it has been suggested by a number of economists that decisions about how to allocate scarce health care resources should be informed by the cost per quality adjusted life years qalys of the different alternatives one of the criticisms of the qaly approach is that it is based on the measurement of individual utility yet the values elicited are used to inform social choice in this respect it is argued that the qaly approach fails to take account of distributional issues that are known to be important in the context of health care this paper addresses this issue and presents an approach grounded in microeconomic theory that is flexible enough to deal with a wide range of efficiency equity trade offs while making the nature of the trade off transparent in addition it is an approach that is relatively simple to investigate empirically and the results of a preliminary study are presented as illustration of this

the evolution of cooperation in infinitely repeated games experimental evidence 1 for example in infinitely repeated prisoner s dilemma games with patient agents both cooperate and defect may be played in equilibrium even though the theory of infinitely repeated games has been used to explain cooperation in a variety of environments no definitive solution has been provided to the problem of equilibrium selection when both cooperation and defection are possible equilibrium outcomes which one should we expect to prevail previous experimental evidence has shown that subjects often fail to coordinate on a specific equilibrium when they play a small number of infinitely repeated games some subjects attempt to establish cooperative agreements while others defect but how would behavior evolve as subjects learn from previous repeated games would cooperation prevail when it can be supported in equilibrium or will subjects learn

the hidden advantage of delegation pareto improvements in a gift exchange game this paper analyzes the effect on performance and earnings of delegating the wage choice to employees our results how that such delegation significantly increases effort levels moreover we observe a pareto improvement as the earnings of both employers and employees increase when employers delegate than when they do not interestingly we also find that the employees performance under delegation is higher than under non delegation even for similar wages while there is strong evidence that behavior reflects strategic considerations this result also holds for one shot interactions a possible non strategic motivation explaining the positive reaction to delegation is a sense of enhanced responsibility