the asset pricing effects of fixed holding costs an upper bound the capital asset pricing model predicts that investors will hold diversified portfolios but many households actually hold very few assets the paper examines the asset pricing implications of one possible explanation for this phenomenon fixed costs of holding assets while earlier authors found the exact asset pricing effects of such costs in single period models under restrictive assumptions i derive a general upper bound on these effects that is also valid in continuous time illustrative calculations reveal that large holding costs must be postulated to generate significant asset pricing effects

an approach to asset pricing under incomplete and diverse perceptions we model a dynamic competitive market where in every period risk neutral traders trade a one period bond against an infinitely lived asset with limited short selling of the long term asset traders lack structural knowledge and use different incomplete theories all of which give statistically correct beliefs about next period s market price of the long term asset the more theories there are in the market the higher is the equilibrium price of the long term asset investors with more complete theories do not necessarily earn higher returns than those with less complete ones who can earn above the risk free rate we provide two necessary conditions for a trader to earn above the risk free rate

the market for quacks a group of n quacks plays a price competition game facing a continuum of patients who recover with probability whether or not they acquire a quack s treatment if patients chose rationally the market would be inactive i assume however that patients choose according to a boundedly rational procedure which re ects anecdotal reasoning this element of bounded rationality has signi cant

taxes and transaction costs in asset market equilibrium abstract this paper examines the effects of capital taxation in an imperfect capital market in which acquiring risky assets incurs costs individual portfolio choice has two distinct aspects the extensive choice of which assets to hold in the portfolio and the intensive choice of what fraction of wealth to invest in each asset held the traditional assumption of zero transaction costs obscures the extensive choice this paper shows that if trading in assets is costly capital taxes have extensive effects as well as the intensive effects previously studied

wealth and portfolio composition theory and evidence we examine a survey of 6010 u s households and estimate a model for household portfolio allocation we extend the conventional portfolio choice model in order to capture the observed incompleteness of household portfolios we show that the empirical specification of the joint discrete and continuous choice that characterizes household portfolio behavior is a switching regressions model with endogenous switching we go on to examine the impact of taxes on portfolio composition using detailed survey data to calculate precisely the marginal tax rate facing each household finally we estimate wealth elasticities of demand for a range of assets and liabilities

bayesian networks and boundedly rational expectations i present a framework for analyzing decision makers with an imperfect understanding of their environment s correlation structure the decision maker faces an objective multivariate probability distribution his own action is one of the random variables he is characterized by a directed acyclic graph over the set of variables his subjective belief filters the objective distribution through his graph via the factorization formula for bayesian networks this belief distortion implies that the decision maker s long run behavior may affect his perception of the consequences of his actions accordingly i define a personal equilibrium notion of optimal choices i show how recent models of boundedly rational expectations as well as new ones e g reverse causality can be subsumed into this framework as special cases some general properties of the bayesian network representation of subjective beliefs are presented as well as a missing data foundation

farm real estate pricing under risk an empirical investigation the rapid increase in farm real estate prices during the last three decades has heightened interest among agricultural economists in explaining this phenomenon even prior to the 1950s several researchers expressed concern that farm real estate prices were increasing at a faster rate than could be justified by farm income 29 technological change and government programs were evaluated for structural changes in price determination 6 13 other important explanatory variables were farm enlargement and urbanization influences 34 more recently harris and nehring 11 lee and rask 18 harris 10 and boehlje and griffin 3 explored the effects of such factors as farm size inflation and government price supports on farm real estate prices while previous research contributed to understanding farm real estate price determination several important questions remain unanswered how is the farm real estate market linked to other capital markets heady and tweeten 12 and later reynolds and timmons 30 used rate of return on common stock as an explanatory variable in their farm real estate price models however their approaches are based more on intuitive reasoning than on rigorous theoretical development how does risk affect farm real estate prices the fact that real estate is a risky investment generally was ignored in previous research 2 441 4 recently harris 10 and boehlje and griffin 3 included risk information in their analyses of factors affecting bid prices for land these studies use strong microfoundations that are not intended to directly reflect risk related linkages with other markets or sectors these issues can be addressed conceptually through capital market theory the purpose of this paper is to explore farm real estate price determination in the context of capital market theory to determine the relationship between the farm real estate

estimating the revenue costs of tax treaties in developing countries 12764 petr jansk marek sediv tax treaties between countries influence how much tax revenues governments receive from multinational enterprises these treaties often reduce the withholding tax rates on outgoing dividend and interest payments we provide illustrative estimates of costs for these two taxes for 14 developing countries in sub saharan africa and asia in a first multi country comparison of this kind these might be overestimates because we assume that foreign direct investments are not influenced by the tax treaties we estimate that the highest potential tax revenue losses are within hundreds of millions us and around 0 1 of gdp with philippines incurring the highest losses both in us and relative to gdp we also find that around 95 of the losses is due to dividends and that only four investor countries japan netherlands switzerland and singapore are together responsible for more than half of the losses we discuss the limitations of these estimates and how future research could improve their quality as well as coverage

price competition under limited comparability this paper studies market competition when firms can influence consumers ability to compare market alternatives through their choice of price formats we introduce random graphs as a tool for modelling limited comparability of formats our main results concern the interaction between firms equilibrium price and format decisions and its implications for industry profits and consumer switching rates we show that narrow regulatory interventions that aim to facilitate comparisons may have adverse consequences for consumer welfare finally we argue that our limited comparability approach provides a new perspective into the phenomenon of product differentiation

correlation misperception in choice we present a decision theoretic analysis of an agent s understanding of the interdependencies in her choices we provide the foundations for a simple and flexible model that allows the misperception of correlated risks we introduce a framework in which the decision maker chooses a portfolio of assets among which she may misperceive the joint returns and present simple axioms equivalent to a representation in which she attaches a probability to each possible joint distribution over returns and then maximizes subjective expected utility using her possibly misspecified beliefs

modeling the economic interaction of agents with diverse abilities to recognize equilibrium patterns we model differences among agents in their ability to recognize temporal patterns of prices using the concept of debruijn sequences in two dynamic models of markets we demonstrate the existence of equilibria in which prices fluctuate in a pattern that is independent of the fundamentals and that can be recognized only by the more competent agents jel c7 d4 s477

an intertemporal general equilibrium model of asset prices this paper develops a continuous time general equilibrium model of a simple but complete economy and uses it to examine the behavior of asset prices in this model asset prices and their stochastic properties are determined endogenously one principal result is a partial differential equation which asset prices must satisfy the solution of this equation gives the equilibrium price of any asset in terms of the underlying real variables in the economy in this paper we develop a general equilibrium asset pricing model for use in applied research an important feature of the model is its integration of real and financial markets among other things the model endogenously determines the stochastic process followed by the equilibrium price of any financial asset and shows how this process depends on the underlying real variables the model is fully consistent with rational expectations and maximizing behavior on the part of all agents our framework is general enough to include many of the fundamental forces affecting asset markets yet it is tractable enough to be specialized easily to produce specific testable results furthermore the model can be extended in a number of straightforward ways consequently it is well suited to a wide variety of applications for example in a companion paper cox ingersoll and ross 7 we use the model to develop a theory of the term structure of interest rates many studies have been concerned with various aspects of asset pricing under uncertainty the most relevant to our work are the important papers on intertemporal asset pricing by merton 19 and lucas 16 working in a continuous time framework merton derives a relationship among the equilibrium expected rates of return on assets he shows that when investment opportunities are changing randomly over time this relationship will include effects which have no analogue in a static one period model lucas considers an economy with homogeneous individuals and a single consumption good which is produced by a number of processes the random output of these processes is exogenously determined and perishable assets are defined as claims to all or a part of the output of a process and the equilibrium determines the asset prices our theory draws on some elements of both of these papers like merton we formulate our model in continuous time and make full use of the analytical tractability that this affords the economic structure of our model is somewhat similar to that of lucas however we include both endogenous production and

can agents with causal misperceptions be systematically fooled using data on house sales and inventories this paper shows that housing market dynamics are driven mainly by listings and less so by transaction speed thus the decision to move house is key to understanding the housing market the paper builds a model where moving house is essentially an investment in match quality implying that moving depends on macroeconomic developments and housing market conditions the endogeneity of moving means there is a cleansing effect those at the bottom of the match quality distribution move first which generates overshooting in aggregate variables the model is applied to the 1995 2004 housingmarket boom

the politics of taxation introduction to the special section abstractdomestic revenue mobilisation has received growing attention in recent years international players such as the organisation for economic co operation and development oecd the world bank and the g20 are calling for more determined action to combat tax evasion and avoidance developing countries are urged to increase their own tax collection however implementing and sustaining tax reforms has proven to be a challenging task for many governments this special section provides new evidence on the political factors determining taxation in developing countries the articles gathered here address two distinct yet related questions first which factors shape long term taxation patterns and why are these patterns so difficult to change even when they prove to be dysfunctional in many ways second which factors determine the fate of specific tax reforms evidence from case studies covering six countries is complemented by a statistical analysis of factors influencing revenue vulnerability in the fac

risk in banking and capital regulation this paper investigates the role of bank capital regulation in risk control it is known that banks choose portfolios of higher risk because of inefficiently priced deposit insurance bank capital regulation is a way to redress this bias toward risk utilizing the mean variance model the following results are shown a the use of simple capital ratios in regulation is an ineffective means to bound the insolvency risk of banks b as a solution to problems of the capital ratio regulation the theoretically correct risk weights under the risk based capital plan are explicitly derived and c the theoretically correct risk weights are restrictions on asset composition which alters the optimal portfolio choice of banking firms the recent increase in bank failures especially after the 1980 and 1982 deregulatory acts has again ignited a controversy over the risk portfolio of the banking industry given the importance of this sector there has been increased scrutiny of the industry s motives for risk taking and possible regulatory changes to improve its stability these investigations have centered around two rather complementary areas the first of these is the role of deposit insurance and how its current pricing procedure encourages risk taking and justifies current bank regulations the works of buser chen and kane 4 kane 9 and benston et al 2 have made substantive contributions the authors demonstrates the way in which our current fixed rate insurance system rewards risk taking by the firm and insulates it through deposit insurance from the market discipline that needs to exist to ensure proper risk evaluation this realization has led these authors to propose a series of regulatory changes to encourage proper portfolio choice within the industry these include a shift to market value accounting risk based deposit insurance premiums and additional capital regulation the last of these serves as a method of coinsurance whereby higher capital levels require the bank to absorb greater losses in the event of failure and encourage additional prudence in management in essense it is one method of risk reduction that may offset the risk preference imposed on the industry due to the inappropriate insurance pricing because the amount of capital influences the probability of bank insolvency and thus the soundness of the entire banking system the regulators ceteris paribus prefer more capital to

arbitrage with fixed costs and interest rate models in this paper we study securities market models with fixed costs we characterize the absence of arbitrage opportunities and we provide fair pricing rules we then apply these results to extend some popular interest rate and option pricing models which present arbitrage opportunities in the absence of fixed costs in particular we prove that the quite striking result obtained by dybvig ingersoll and ross 1996 which asserts that under the assumption of absence of arbitrage long zero coupon rates can never fall is no longer true in models with fixed costs even arbitrarily small ones for instance models where the long term rate follows a diffusion process are arbitrage free in the presence of fixed costs including arbitrarily small ones we also rationalize models with partially absorbing or reflecting barriers on the price processes in particular we propose a version of the cox ingersoll and ross 1985 model which as in longstaff 1992 produces yield curves with realistic humps but does not assume an absorbing barrier for the short term rate this is made possible by the presence of even arbitrarily small fixed costs

the capital asset pricing model theory and empiricism in a recent breakthrough article richard roll i977 has shown that the value of the huge amount of empirical research which has attempted to verify the sharpe lintner capital asset pricing model capm is open to question briefly roll claims that if all the empirical investigators were to take a meanvariance efficient portfolio as the market portfolio they would get in the sample a perfect linear relationship between average security returns and betas in what is commonly known as the second pass cross section regression this perfect linear relationship is tautological it neither proves nor disproves the capm theory it is a technical result obtainable by straightforward algebra without making any assumption regarding the investors preference it is interesting to mention that in another paper published in 1977 stephen ross makes the same argument with regards to the capm and the efficiency of the market portfolio in his words the efficiency of the market portfolio and the capm are equivalent see ross i 977 p 178 the purpose of this paper is to show that empirical evidence and the investigation of investor behaviour lends support to a rejection of the capm theory in its presentform a revised formulation of the capm developed by levy i 978 provides a more suitable theoretical model in the reformulated capm the systematic risk beta plays in most cases only a negligible role in measuring the security s risk in section i we sketch a different prooof of what we consider to be roll s basic claim this proof contributes no additional theoretical results beyond what is given by roll i977 appendix corollary 6 but it is simple very short and uses no matrix algebra in section ii we derive a number of sample efficient sets and demonstrate that all efficient portfolios include short positions such results can be interpreted in one of the following alternative ways a sample variations cause this result but the capm holds and no such results would be obtained if we employed ex ante rather than ex post parameters b the empirical results are not entirely attributed to sample variations and they indeed contradict the capm in its present form since the motives for taking a short position can be explained by strong positive correlations between rates of return of various stocks e g general motors and ford we believe that this co movement of prices prevails ex post as well as

risk return and equilibrium an extension this study extends a recent empirical reexamination of the risk ret urn relationship by examining the possibility that an omitted size re lationship may account for the anomalous results h levy s generaliz ed capital asset pricing model provides the theoretical basis for incorporating the impact of firm size on expected return by examining the relative importance of unsystematic risk in pricing closely held securities compared to pricing widely held securities in so doing the empirical analysis also provides a test of an implication of the generalized capital asset pricing model two methodologies are used t o test the hypotheses empirically the results indicate that even thou gh size has a significant impact on the risk return relationship it apparently does not account for the anomalous results this implicati on is consistent under both methodologies copyright 1988 by the university of chicago

specialization versus diversification as a venture capital investment strategy abstract much important work has informed us of rates of return earned by venture capitalists the importance of venture capitalists to the going public process and the criteria venture capitalists use to evaluate deals this paper seeks to add to the literature by testing hypotheses based upon both the finance and strategic management literature regarding certain venture capitalist investment practices venture capitalists seek to control or manage risk driscoll 1974 macmillan siegel and subbanarasimha 1985 financing structure and investment strategy provide several means for venture capitalists to do this tools available to the venture capitalist include portfolio diversification to spread risk across different industries firms or hot cold ipo markets to minimize unsystematic or investment specific risk information sharing networking and specialization can also be used to control unsystematic risk several hypotheses are developed from these conflicting perspectives data used to test the hypotheses are derived from responses to a survey of venture capitalists three hundred surveys were mailed to venture capitalists 98 or 32 7 returned usable responses portfolio diversification is a well known means to control risk exposure by reducing unsystematic or specific risks however bygrave 1987 1988 as well as financial intermediation theorists argues that maintaining a high degree of specialization is useful for controlling risk as well as for gaining access to networks information and deal flow from other venture investors the analyses of this paper build upon bygrave s work we construct more rigorous tests to resolve the conflict between the diversification and information sharing hypotheses our hypothesis tests were usually resolved in favor of the information sharing view for example venture capitalists in the sample that were heavily involved in seed round financing were diversified across fewer numbers of firms and industries further evidence in favor of information sharing is seen in investment patterns across different financing stages diversification would imply maintaining a portfolio of investments across the different investment stages the information sharing specialization view would argue that it is best to stay focused on a single stage or several connected stages the empirical evidence from the sample once again favors the specialization perspective this research provides information of use to venture capitalists as they seek information on how best to control risk to entrepreneurs as they learn of the factors venture capitalists consider in determining their investment strategy and to academicians as such studies provide insight to general industry practice and thus help to form the basis of classroom discussion and future research endeavors

transaction costs and the pricing of assets the existence of transaction costs explains why investors do not fully diversify their portfolios this paper examines the implications of such limited diversification oi equilibrium asset prices in the framework of the capital asset pricing model in the pricing equation obtained here an asset s risk premium depends on a weighted average of its covariance with the market and its own variance the absence of transaction costs in the sharpe lintner capital asset pricing model capm is often claimed to be only a minor idealization which hardly affects the substantive implications of the model this paper aims to demonstrate that this is not the case incorporating transaction costs into the capm leads to a major reformulation of its basic asset pricing equation in contrast with the capm formula

consideration sets and competitive marketing we present a model of competitive marketing based on the notion that consumers are boundedly rational and that firms use marketing tactics in an attempt to influence consumers decision process the standard model of consumer behaviour assumes that the consumer applies well defined preferences to a perfectly perceived set of available alternatives we retain the assumption that consumers have stable preferences but relax the assumption that they have a perfect perception of what is relevant for their consumption problem thus allowing firms to manipulate that perception our aim is to explore the market implications of this departure from the standard model especially for the way firms deploy marketing strategies in competitive environments the cornerstone of our model is the observation that in the modern marketplace consumers face an overwhelmingly large variety of products and therefore often use screening criteria deliberate as well as unconscious in order to reduce the number of relevant alternatives as a result consumers apply their preferences not to the set of objectively feasible alternatives but to a potentially smaller set which they construct at an earlier stage of the decision process borrowing a term from the marketing literature we refer to this set as the consideration set the basic idea underlying this term is that consumers may be unaware of some of the feasible products and even when they become aware of a new product they still need to be persuaded to consider it as a potential substitute to their currently consumed product

sell probabilistic goods a behavioral explanation for opaque selling probabilistic or opaque selling whereby a seller hides the exact identity of a product until after the buyer makes a payment has been used in practice and received considerable attention in the literature under what conditions and why is probabilistic selling attractive to firms the extant literature has offered the following explanations to price discriminate heterogeneous consumers to reduce supply demand mismatches and to soften price competition in this paper we provide a new explanation to exploit consumer bounded rationality in the sense of anecdotal reasoning we build a simple model where the firm is a monopoly consumers are homogeneous and there is no demand uncertainty or capacity constraint this model allows us to isolate the impact of consumer bounded rationality on the adoption of opaque selling we find that although it is never optimal to use opaque selling when consumers have rational expectations it can be optimal when consumers are boundedly rational we show that opaque selling may soften price competition and increase the industry profits as a result of consumer bounded rationality our findings underscore the importance of consumer bounded rationality and show that opaque selling might be even more attractive than previously thought

the economic determinants of the market reaction to proposed mandatory accounting changes in the oil and gas industry a cross sectional analysis abstract this paper examines the economic reasons for the observed negative abnormal common stock performance of firms whose reported earnings and stockholders equity were negatively affected by the proposed elimination of full cost accounting in the oil and gas industry four explanations of the market effects of this mandatory accounting change are examined 1 naive investor theory 2 modified naive investor theory 3 contracting cost theory and 4 estimation risk theory these hypotheses are developed in detail and used to generate variables for a cross sectional model which explains observed return behavior the effect of the accounting change on total stockholder s equity the existence of financial contracts denominated in terms of accounting numbers and to a lesser extent firm size are shown to be important explanatory variables the importance of these variables is consistent with both the contracting cost and estimation risk theories

the challenges for developing countries in international tax justice developing countries face three main challenges in international tax cooperation the most widely known are the twin problems of tax avoidance by foreign investors and tax evasion by domestic actor

more possessions more worry abstract a common wisdom asserts that the wider the universe of assets to choose from the greater the investor s welfare we show that this is not the case in practice where parameters have to be estimated even when the estimates are unbiased surprisingly risk aversion plays a crucial role corresponding to the desirability of asset expansion by dividing investors in three groups investors with very low risk tolerance and investors with very high risk tolerance are better off with asset expansion and investors with moderate risk tolerance are worse off despite the option to refrain from investing in the additional asset

contracting with diversely naive agents in standard contract theoretic models the underlying assumption is that agent types differ in their preference or cost parameters and the principal s objective is to design contracts in order to screen this type we study a contract theoretic model in which the heterogeneity among agent types is of a cognitive nature in our model the agent has dynamically inconsistent preferences agent types differ only in their degree of sophistication that is their ability to forecast the change in their future tastes we fully characterize the menu of contracts which the principal offers in order to screen the agent s sophistication the menu does not exclude any type it provides a perfect commitment device for relatively sophisticated types and exploitative contracts which involve speculation with relatively naive types more naive types are more heavily exploited and generate a greater profit for the principal our results allow us to interpret real life contractual arrangements in a variety of industries

on price recognition and computational complexity in a monopolistic model a single seller of an indivisible good operates in a market with many consumers who differ in their ability to process information the consumers constraints are modeled in two submodels the first in terms of the limits on the number of sets in the partition of the price space and the second in terms of the limits on the complexity of the operation he can use to process a price offer for the construction of the second submodel the tool of a perceptron is borrowed from the parallel computation literature assuming a negative correlation between the seller s cost of supply of the good and the consumer s ability to process information i demonstrate that the heterogeneity of consumer s abilities can be used by the seller to profitably discriminate among them