financing and funding health care optimal policy and political implementability health care financing and funding are usually analyzed in isolation this paper combines the corresponding strands of the literature and thereby advances our understanding of the important interaction between them we investigate the impact of three modes of health care financing namely optimal income taxation proportional income taxation and insurance premiums on optimal provider payment and on the political implementability of optimal policies under majority voting considering a standard multi task agency framework we show that optimal health care policies will generally differ across financing regimes when the health authority has redistributive concerns we show that health care financing also has a bearing on the political implementability of optimal health care policies our results demonstrate that an isolated analysis of optimal provider payment rests on very strong assumptions regarding both the financing of health care and the redistributive preferences of the health authority

foreign ownership and corporate income taxation an empirical evaluation abstract foreign ownership allows countries to effectively export part of their corporate tax burden hence countries with high foreign ownership are expected to impose relatively high corporate taxes the findings of this paper suggest that there indeed is an economically significant positive relationship between foreign ownership and tax burdens in europe already significant foreign ownership levels in europe offer an explanation for the absence of a race to the bottom in corporate tax levels

profit shifting and investment effects the implications of zero taxable profits abstract recent empirical research documents a tendency of multinational enterprise affiliates to bunch around zero reported profit we set up a theoretical model of multinational firm behavior in which we allow for corner solutions in the choice of the optimal transfer price due to insufficient profits or losses of affiliates such constraints in the choice of the transfer price induce bunching and generate investment effects in the low tax as well as the high tax country in equilibrium affiliates might overinvest and the investment effects generate a tendency for too high profit taxes the analysis provides a micro foundation for the investment effects that result from transfer pricing the finding stands in contrast to the existing literature where transfer pricing choices are unconstrained

progressive taxation and the social marginal cost of public funds abstract this paper describes the calculation of the social marginal cost of public funds smcf for a progressive tax system which distorts individuals labour supply decisions a formula for the smcf indicates that the income and substitution effects of the labour supply response are weighted by the changes in individuals average and marginal tax rates respectively other well known formulas for the smcf are shown to be special cases of this formula the difference between this formula and the mayshar 1991 formula is shown to be due to different but equally valid ways of computing the change in the average tax rate the condition under which a marginal tax rate increase may lead to a reduction in revenues is derived

tax asymmetries the cost of capital and investment some evidence from united kingdom panel data a measure of the cost of capital is developed that incorporates the dynamic effects of tax changes and tax asymmetries estimates of the cost of capital are made using an unbalanced panel of 1987 u k quoted companies over the period 1971 to 1984 there is wide cross sectional variation in the cost of capital the measure is used in estimating an equation where this cross sectional variation is found to be a significant determinant of the level of company investment copyright 1989 by royal economic society

on the sign of the optimum marginal income tax this paper studies a central aspect of optimal income taxation as modelled in mirrlees original paper on the topic identical leisure consumption preferences qualitatively homogeneous skills in production namely whether given concave utilitarianism alone the optimal marginal income tax will be non negative a well known positive answer to this question in weak inequality form was given in the said paper which however we show requires additive separability of individual utility in the ordinal and cardinal senses our main result here is to derive the required strict positivity of the marginal tax under weak conditions slightly wider than noninferiority of consumption and leisure with preferences otherwise arbitrary

the significance of tax law asymmetries an empirical investigation this study uses tax return data for u s nonfinancial corporations for the period 1971 1982 to estimate the importance of restrictions on the ability of firms to use tax credits and to obtain refunds for tax losses our results suggest that the incidence of such unused tax benefits increased substantially during the early 1980s though we do not find these increases attributable to increased investment incentives during that period we present estimates of the marginal tax rate on interest payments which take into account unused tax benefits and emphasize the importance of distinguishing current tax payments from marginal tax rates in estimating the incentive to invest

taxation insurance and precautionary labor we examine optimal taxation and social insurance with adverse selection in competitive insurance markets in a previous literature it has been shown that with perfect insurance markets social insurance improves welfare since it is able to redistribute without creating distortions this result has been taken as robust to the introduction of adverse selection as this would only provide additional justifications for social insurance we show however that adverse selection can weaken the case for social insurance compared to a situation with perfect markets whenever social insurance mitigates private underinsurance it also causes welfare reducing effects by decreasing precautionary labor supply and hence tax revenue in addition adverse selection may reduce the redistributive potential of social insurance we illustrate our general results using different equilibrium concepts for the insurance market notably we derive conditions under which a complete renunciation of social insurance is optimal and the government only relies on income taxation to achieve its redistributive objectives

optimal dynamic taxation with distinctive forms of social status attainment we examine the role of both consumption and wealth induced social comparisons in setting dynamic optimal income taxation under complete information state invariant labor income taxes are used to remedy the externality caused by consumption induced social comparisons while state contingent capital income taxes are used to remedy the externalities caused by both consumption and wealth induced ones under incomplete information distinct types of agents are subject to an identical marginal capital income tax which removes social comparisons to solve the information problem low productivity agents could be subject to a lower marginal labor tax than high productivity agents which contradicts the traditional result in the mirrlees stiglitz models this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

risky local tax bases risk pooling vs rent capture abstract when a jurisdiction s land or other fixed resources are owned by non residents its residents have an incentive to capture the non residents rents by imposing confiscatory taxes when different jurisdictions are subject to less than perfectly correlated risks such taxes destroy the benefits of risk pooling that cross ownership of property otherwise permits if jurisdictions must use property taxes i e taxes on both immobile land and mobile capital instead of taxes on land alone they will compete for mobile capital by keeping tax rates low if capital is sufficiently substitutable for immobile factors tax rates will be low enough to achieve greater effective diversification of risks and higher welfare

optimal linear and two bracket income taxes with idiosyncratic earnings risk abstract this paper quantitatively characterizes optimal linear and two bracket income taxes we consider a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which tax design involves redistributing income for both equity and social insurance substantive findings include i a significant fraction of agents supply zero labor or hold zero assets at the optimum ii neglecting tax distortion imposed on either of labor leisure and consumption saving decisions will lead to the prescription of tax codes that deviate substantially from the optimum and iii the optimal two bracket tax schedule will turn from regressivity to progressivity in the marginal tax rate once the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks becomes sufficiently large the last finding is consistent with the results in apps et al forthcoming and it also reconciles the contradictory results regarding the optimal two bracket tax schedule between slemrod et al 1994 and strawczynski 1998

rationality testing under asymmetric loss abstract this paper shows that if agents have an asymmetric loss function standard empirical tests for the rationality of their expectations are in general invalid we further show that under a popular class of asymmetric loss functions the linex family a valid test can be carried out by estimating an appropriate arch in mean model the contrast between the standard test and our arch m test is illustrated using the goldsmith nagan forecasts of us treasury bill yields

public goods self selection and optimal income taxation using the self selection approach to tax analysis this paper derives a modified samuelson rule for the provision of public goods when the government deploys an optimal nonlinear income tax this approach gives a straightforward interpretation of the central result in this area generalises it and provides a simple characterisation of optimal policy in a wide range of circumstances the analysis also emphasises and clarifies the significance of the choice of numeraire for the optimality of decentralising public spending decisions it is well known that the famous samuelson rule for the provision of public goods may not be applicable when the tax revenues used to finance the public goods come from distorting taxes the principle was recognized as long ago as pigou 1947 long before the samuelson rule was devised pigou saw that in addition to the resource cost involved in transferring funds from the private to the public sector there was a deadweight loss involved from this insight he suggested that the criterion for providing public goods should be more stringent than the samuelson rule would later suggest in particular one might expect that the inclusion of the deadweight loss of taxes as part of the cost of providing a public good would lead to a reduction in its optimal provision relative to a situation in which lump sum taxes were available the problem was investigated more systematically by atkinson and stern 1974 who considered the case in which a public good is financed by a set of optimal commodity taxes all individuals were assumed to be identical so efficiency alone dictated the objective they found that no prima facie case could be made for the pigou position that the use of distortionary taxes called for a reduction in the supply of the public good their analysis clearly showed that there were two influences at work when the financing of a public good was by distorting taxes on the one hand

tax competition when firms choose their organizational form should tax loopholes for multinationals be closed we analyze a sequential game between two symmetric countries when firms can invest in a multinational structure that confers tax savings governments are able to commit to long run tax discrimination policies before firms decisions are made and before statutory capital tax rates are chosen non cooperatively whether a coordinated reduction in the tax preferences granted to mobile firms is beneficial or harmful for the competing countries depends critically on the elasticity with which the firms organizational structure responds to tax discrimination incentives a model extension with countries of different size shows that small countries are likely to grant more tax preferences than larger ones along with having lower effective tax rates

social insurance and redistribution with moral hazard and adverse selection rochet 1991 showed that with distortionary income taxes social insurance is a desirable redistributive device when risk and ability are negatively correlated this finding is re examined when ex post moral hazard and adverse selection are included and under different informational assumptions individuals can take actions influencing the size of the loss in the event of accident or ill health social insurance can be supplemented by private insurance but private insurance markets are affected by both adverse selection and moral hazard we study how equity and efficiency considerations should be traded off in choosing the optimal coverage of social insurance when those features are introduced the case for social insurance is strongest when the government is well informed about household productivity

capital income and profit taxation with foreign ownership of firms abstract this paper establishes optimal rules for capital income and profits taxation in the open economy with or without foreign ownership of domestic firms we show that if there are constraints on the feasibility of profits taxation both saving and investment taxes generally enter the optimal tax package if instead profits can be fully taxed then source based investment taxes vanish if domestic firms are in part owned by foreigners then source based investment taxes can be used to shift income away from these to domestic citizens and they may even be used to finance lump sum transfers to domestic residents

search and taxation in a model of underground economic activities i introduction it is widely recognized that one major effect of taxation is to stimulate activities in the so called underground or shadow economy indeed the extent of underground activities even in the western countries is by no means negligible schneider and enste 2000 report that the size of the shadow economy as percent of gross domestic product gdp in the organisation for economic co operation and development oecd countries in 1996 ranged from 7 5 in switzerland to 28 5 in greece this existence of underground activity is a significant source for concern the possibility of evading taxes makes taxation less efficient by undermining the tax base this possibility may jeopardize long run scope for financing adequate public services furthermore it implies that official measures of for example income and unemployment which form the basis for policy will necessarily be biased the purpose of this article is to suggest a simple micro founded framework for studying the relationship between tax policy and underground economic activities a defining characteristic of the latter is that they are illegal 1 the traditional approach starting with the seminal contribution of allingham and sandmo 1972 characterizes tax evasion as an activity for which there is a risk of detection 2 this approach however does not particularly highlight that underground economic activity involves trade we argue that although underground economic activities and regular activities are similar and can coexist one effect of the illegal status of the former is to differentiate the amount of information that is available in the two market segments whereas information about trading opportunities in regular markets can be assumed to be perfect because underground activity is by definition furtive information about trading opportunities in this segment will be less than perfect traditionally search theory has been used to capture the notion of imperfect information in markets this has a natural interpretation in the current context though trading in the regular market can be regarded as frictionless an agent wishing to trade in the underground sector must devote some time and effort to locating trustworthy trading partners with whom he or she can trade illegally at no risk hence we model underground trade as the outcome of a standard bilateral search process where buyers and sellers devote some time to locating each other and implicitly verifying each others trustworthiness 3 this process individually rational when facing taxes is a socially wasteful activity because it subtracts effort from physical production the model identifies a natural link between participation in the underground economy and individual characteristics this is important for analysis of micro level data our model suggests that individuals with lower earnings capacity are more active in underground economic activities hence the model predicts a negative correlation between individual participation in the underground economy and for example hourly wage and education from the evidence that is available this seems consistent with the data 4 the current model can be used as a framework for future empirical work using micro data because it can fairly easily be extended to include other features such as unemployment and variation across industries in the technology available for underground production to make further predictions about individual involvement in underground activities the systematic relation between earnings capacity and participation in the underground economy is also relevant for policy design consider the implementation of a redistributive tax although the tax aims at improving the welfare of the individuals with low earnings capacity the same individuals can benefit from trading in a relatively large underground economy if the tax is only mildly enforced

in praise of tax havens international tax planning and foreign direct investment abstract the multinationalization of corporate investment in recent years has given rise to a number of international tax avoidance schemes that may be eroding tax revenues in industrialized countries but which may also reduce tax burdens on mobile capital and so facilitate investment both the welfare effects of and the optimal response to international tax planning are therefore ambiguous evaluating these factors in a simple general equilibrium model we find that citizens of high tax countries benefit from some tax planning paradoxically if tax rates are not too high an increase in tax planning activity causes a rise in optimal corporate tax rates and a decline in multinational investment thus fears of a race to the bottom in corporate tax rates may be misplaced

providing support for decisions based on time series information under conditions of asymmetric loss abstract in an experiment decision makers used time series information on the past demand for products to decide on production levels to meet the next period s demand either shortages cost more per unit than surpluses or the asymmetry of losses was in the opposite direction the decision makers were either i unsupported ii provided with statistical point forecasts of the next period s demand or iii asked to estimate probability distributions of next period s demand using the fractile method the decisions were inferred from these distributions decomposition providing statistical forecasts led to decisions incurring significantly lower expected costs than those achieved by the unsupported decision makers however the decomposition procedure did not significantly reduce expected costs because contrary to earlier evidence the fractile method generally led to distributions that were too wide and flat decision makers in both treatments i and ii also performed significantly better when shortages were more costly than surpluses

income related inequality in life years and quality adjusted life years abstract we estimate the income related inequality in sweden with respect to life years and quality adjusted life years qalys we use a large data set from sweden with over 40 000 individuals followed up for 10 16 years to estimate the survival and quality adjusted survival in different income groups for both life years and qalys we discover inequalities in health favouring the higher income groups for men women in the youngest age group 20 29 years the number of qalys is 43 7 45 7 in the lowest income decile and 47 2 49 0 in the highest income decile

taxation of mobile factors as insurance under uncertainty this paper considers the effects of the taxation of mobile factors i e capital under uncertainty the wages earned by residents of a jurisdiction are uncertain due to random shocks since the uncertain wages in a jurisdiction depend on the amount of mobile capital employed in the jurisdiction and since taxation alters the quantity of capital employed taxation affects the riskiness of uncertain wages in particular the taxation of capital moderates the fluctuation of uncertain wages thereby providing insurance for this reason jurisdictions use distortionary capital taxation even if lump sum taxation is available in addition this insurance effect counteracts the tendency toward too low tax rates on capital arising from tax competition and possibly improves the efficiency of tax competition

the political economy of targeting one of the most widely used method of targeting is to reduce welfare benefits as income rises although the need for such targeting is clear enough it also entails two important difficulties firstly the prospect for the recipients of losing part of their benefits if they were to earn more can be a deterrent to work harder secondly by reducing the number of recipients targeting reduces the political support for taxation and redistribution the purpose of this paper is to study the voting equilibrium of the degree of targeting and the level of taxation in an economy where labour supply is variable the analysis reveals that targeting may be fatal for redistribution even though it rejects strictly less than the richest half of the population and that it is not possible for a coalition of the extremes to form and reject the middle income group from the welfare system moreover because targeting affects labour supply we find that pareto improvements are possible when targeting is either too low or too high we also find that voting simultaneously over taxation and targeting is favourable to the poor in the sense that they can converge to their most preferred policy by successively forming a majority coalition with the rich to increase targeting and with the middle to increase taxation

social insurance and the optimum piecewise linear income tax abstract this paper calculates optimal linear income taxes when differences in income are caused by random factors luck rather than by unobserved individual skills as assumed in the classical theory of income taxation as first shown by varian 1980 varian h r 1980 redistributive taxation as social insurance journal of public economics 14 49 68 in the former case income taxation acts as social insurance by introducing life uncertainty and precautionary behavior we find higher optimal marginal tax rates than those found by varian we also find that in the context of a piecewise two bracket linear tax schedule the second marginal tax is higher than the first a finding that contrasts with results recently obtained in the framework of classical income taxation theory which show a lower second marginal tax

note on the shape of the optimum income tax schedule abstract we consider the class of two bracket piecewise linear tax schedules sheshinski 1971 1972 and provide sufficient conditions for the optimum income tax schedule to have positive marginal rates and to be strictly convex calculations yield optimum tax rates between 20 and 35 percent and moderate rate progression the max min optimum has higher tax rates but not necessarily more rate progression than the utilitarian optimum the conditions are quite general postulating nondecreasing income effects as the level of income increases

a characteristics approach to optimal taxation line drawing and tax driven product innovation real world tax legislation assigns goods to different categories of tax rates on the basis of observable characteristics allowing the tax system to handle a constantly evolving set of available goods we recast the theory of optimal taxation in the language of characteristics and we show how to optimally draw lines that delineate tax rate regimes such lines are associated with notches in tax liability as a function of characteristics creating incentives to introduce goods with new combinations of characteristics in order to reduce tax liability with a restricted set of tax instruments such notches are in general part of the second best optimal tax system

the optimal two bracket linear income tax abstract we investigate two bracket piecewise linear income tax structures in a two class economy pareto efficient tax schedules of this type feature at least one marginal tax rate equal to zero and that the marginal tax rate may be increasing and declining we then investigate the optimal structure of taxation when the social welfare function utility function and distribution of abilities are characterized as in the standard optimal linear income tax problem in all cases the second marginal tax rate is less than the first rate but progressivity in the sense of a uniformly rising average tax rate generally obtains

optimal non linear income taxation for the alleviation of income poverty there has been much discussion recently of structuring tax and transfer programs to ensure that resources go to the poor with minimal leaks to the nonpoor the poor have no incentive to earn income with 100 percent marginal tax rates but how high or low the marginal rate of taxation should be and how they should vary with income is a complex issue and opinions vary social security schemes that withdraw benefits represent an extremely high effective marginal tax rate other schemes call for relatively low marginal tax rates at the bottom of the income distribution which tax transfer schedule does most to reduce poverty the issue is one of optimal nonlinear income taxation the authors show that one of the key theoretical results of the welfarist literature is overturned if it is desirable for everybody to work the optimal marginal tax rate on the very poorest individuals is strictly negative they argue that the nonwelfarist perspective points toward lower marginal tax rates in the lower part of the income distribution than does the welfarist perspective but numerical simulations suggest that the effect is of limited quantitative significance using conventional functional forms and parameter values optimal marginal tax rates on the poor are in the 60 70 percent range

optimal income taxation an example with a u shaped pattern of optimal marginal tax rates comment using the mirrlees optimal income tax model with quasi linear preferences the paper examines conditions for marginal tax rates to be rising at high income levels and declining in an interval containing the modal skill it examines conditions for the marginal tax rate to be higher at a low skill level than at the high skill level with the same density an argument only holding for skill levels above a cutoff where resources of a worker are marginally of the same value as resources of the government data on earnings rates are presented copyright 1998 by american economic association

optimal linear income tax with random revenue abstract this paper introduces the concept of risk attitudes a government may take toward random revenue in the design of a linear income tax it shows that the familiar trade off formula between equity and efficiency can be derived either by assuming a risk neutral government attitude toward random revenue or by assuming no randomness of revenue we provide numerical analysis to demonstrate that optimum tax schedules for a non risk neutral government can significantly deviate from those for a risk neutral government

cross border loss offset can fuel tax competition following recent court rulings cross border loss compensation for multinational firms has become a major policy issue in europe this paper analyzes the effects of introducing a coordinated cross border tax relief in a setting where multinational firms choose the size of a risky investment and host countries non cooperatively choose tax rates we show that coordinated cross border loss compensation may intensify tax competition when following current international practice the parent firm s home country bases the tax rebate for a loss making subsidiary on its own tax rate in equilibrium tax revenue losses may thus be even higher than is implied by the direct effect of the reform in contrast tax competition is mitigated when the home country bases its loss relief on the tax rate in the subsidiary s host country

investment incentives and corporate tax asymmetries abstract recent facts on the importance of corporate losses motivate more careful study of the impact of tax incentives for investment on firms that lose money i model firm investment decisions in a setting featuring financing constraints and carrybacks and carryforwards of operating losses i estimate investment responses to tax incentives allowing effects to vary with cash flows and taxable status results suggest that asymmetries in the corporate tax code could have made recent bonus depreciation tax incentives at most 4 less effective than they would have been if all firms were fully taxable cash flows have more important effects on the impact of tax incentives recent declines in cash flows would predict a 24 decrease in the effectiveness of bonus depreciation results thus suggest that tax incentives have the smallest impact on investment exactly when they are most likely to be put in place during downturns in economic activity when cash flows are low

the dynamic effects of tax law asymmetries under the laws of most countries a distinction is made between gains and losses by businesses losses that must be carried forward are subjept to two penalties a loss of interest and expiration previous examinations have focused on the higher expected tax payments such a tax system without full loss offset imposes on risky projects this paper presents a dynamic analysis of the impact of taxation on investment when gains and losses are treated asymmetrically the results demonstrate how firm characteristics and the timing of taxes can influence behaviour under current u s tax law a distinction is made between gains and losses by businesses for corporations gains are taxed at what is essentially a flat rate of 46 while losses do not necessarily qualify for a refund at the same rate to obtain an immediate refund the taxpayer must have had taxable income during the three previous years in excess of the current loss any losses that cannot be carried back in this fashion must be carried forward subject to two implicit penalties such loss carryforwards earn no interest and they expire after fifteen years similar provisions apply in other countries hence businesses investing in risky projects for which the probability of having to carry losses forward is positive can expect to pay higher taxes than they would under a system with full loss offset i e the immediate refund of taxes for losses incurred many corporations

tax revenue losses through cross border loss offset an insurmountable hurdle for formula apportionment abstract this paper analyzes the relevance of firm losses for tax revenues and welfare when switching from separate accounting to a system of tax base consolidation with formula apportionment we find that a system change unambiguously decreases tax revenues in the short run in which neither firms nor governments can adjust their behavior due to the cross border loss offset inherent in formula apportionment in the medium run in which only firms can adjust their strategies tax revenues are still lower under formula apportionment if the probability of incurring losses or the costs of profit shifting are sufficiently small however in the long run where firms and governments can adjust their behavior a switch from separate accounting to formula apportionment is beneficial under the aforementioned conditions furthermore we show that a higher weight on input shares in the apportionment formula may mitigate tax competition and thus increase tax revenues because contrary to output factors input factors provide a backstop against a shortfall of tax revenues due to loss making subsidiaries

do countries compete over corporate tax rates this paper tests whether oecd countries compete with each other over corporate taxes in order to attract investment we develop two models with firm mobility countries compete only over the statutory tax rate or the effective average tax rate while with capital mobility countries compete only over the effective marginal tax rate we estimate the parameters of reaction functions using data from 21 countries between 1983 99 we find evidence that countries compete over all three measures but particularly over the statutory tax rate and the effective average tax rate this is consistent with a belief amongst governments that location choices by multinational firms are discrete we also find evidence of concave reaction functions consistent with the model outlined in the paper

time is money costing the impact of duration misperception in market prices abstract we explore whether and to what extent traders in a real world financial market where participants judgements are reportedly well calibrated are subject to duration misperception to achieve this we examine duration misperception in the horserace betting market we develop a two stage algorithm to predict horses winning probabilities that account for a duration related factor that is known to affect horses winning prospects the algorithm adapts survival analysis and combines it with the conditional logit model using a dataset of 4736 horseraces and the lifetime career statistics of the 53 295 horses running in these races we demonstrate that prices fail to discount fully information related to duration since a horse s last win we show that this failure is extremely costly since a betting strategy based on the predictions arising from the model shows substantial profits 932 5 percent and 16 27 percent with and without reinvestment of winnings respectively we discuss the important implications of duration neglect in the wider economy

premium subsidies and social health insurance substitutes or complements premium subsidies have been advocated as an alternative to social health insurance these subsidies are paid if expenditure on health insurance exceeds a given share of income in this paper we examine whether this approach is superior to social health insurance from a welfare perspective we show that the results crucially depend on the correlation of health and productivity for a positive correlation we find that combining premium subsidies with social health insurance is the optimal policy

a tax programming model abstract this paper presents a new technique for analysing tax reform proposals the technique is general in the sense that it allows the user to choose the targets he thinks are the most important using this technique the israeli income tax reform of 1975 is evaluated

progressive estate taxation we present a model with altruistic parents and heterogeneous productivity we derive two key properties for optimal estate taxation first the estate tax should be progressive so that parents leaving a higher bequest face a lower net return on bequests second marginal estate taxes should be negative so that all parents face a marginal subsidy on bequests both properties can be implemented with a simple nonlinear tax on bequests levied separately from the income tax these results apply to other intergenerational transfers such as educational investments and are robust to endogenous fertility choices both estate or inheritance taxes can implement the optimal allocation but we show that the inheritance tax has some advantages finally when we impose an ad hoc constraint requiring marginal estate taxes to be nonnegative the optimum features a zero tax up to an exemption level and a progressive tax thereafter

taxation and the allocation of talent taxation affects the allocation of talented individuals across professions by blunting material incentives and thus magnifying nonpecuniary incentives of pursuing a calling estimates from the literature suggest that high paying professions have negative externalities whereas low paying professions have positive externalities a calibrated model therefore prescribes negative marginal tax rates on middle class incomes and positive rates on the rich the welfare gains from implementing such a policy are small and are dwarfed by the gains from profession specific taxes and subsidies these results depend crucially on externality estimates and labor substitution patterns across professions both of which are very uncertain given existing empirical evidence

corporation tax finance and the cost of capital this paper examines the influence of corporate tax exhaustion on the firm s financial and investment decisions a dynamic programming model is used to establish effective marginal tax rates in the presence of a tax system that permits the carry forward of losses to future periods the paper demonstrates that internal optimal financial structures may result which do not require the imposition of external constraints the cost of capital is highly sensitive to the current taxable earnings of the firm and the implications of this for such tax transfer activities as leasing are discussed

tax competition with imperfectly mobile capital abstract this paper considers interjurisdictional tax competition in a two period model with imperfectly mobile capital in the first period capital is perfectly mobile in the second period however capital cannot move perfectly because of transactions costs once employed in a jurisdiction in the first period this imperfect mobility of capital may lead to the overprovision rather than the underprovision of public goods in the second period and may make jurisdictions compete more aggressively for capital in the first period

public health insurance and optimal income taxation abstract if individuals differ not only in their inherent capacity to earn income but also in the probability that they will fall ill can subsidized public health insurance be justified on the grounds that it serves as an efficient tool to redistribute welfare this question is analyzed in a model where the social welfare function is a weighted average of individual expected utilities and where taxation is by a linear income tax the answer is yes except in certain special cases

risk aversion performance pay and the principal agent problem this paper calculates numerical solutions to the principal agent problem and compares the results to the stylized facts of ceo compensation the numerical predictions come from parameterizing the models of grossman and hart and of holmstrom and milgrom while the correct incentives for a ceo can greatly enhance a firm s performance providing such incentives need not be expensive for many parameter values ceo compensation need increase only by about 10 for every 1 000 of additional shareholder value for some values the amount is 0 003 cents

the provision of local public goods and factors in the presence of firm and household mobility abstract this paper studies the efficiency properties of allocations when firms and households are mobile and when local governments provide local public goods and local public factors the analysis differentiates between immobile land owners and perfectly mobile workers and concludes that an efficient allocation is obtained if there is no outflow of land rents to absentee owners if rents flow out only local public goods are supplied in accordance with the samuelson rule the provision of local public factors is inefficiently low however and jurisdictions tax mobile firms and mobile households inefficiently high in order to restrict the outflow of rents an optimal intervention scheme is derived in this case we also analyze the distortions that result when the non availability of local head taxes makes it impossible to internalize crowding costs

piecewise linear incentive schemes general outlook and stabilization theories and policies of piecewis e linear incentive schemes are studied in a setting of moral hazard and adverse selection the form of the best such function is analyzed particular attention is given to the loss from using piecewise linear schemes relative to optimal schemes as well as the gain from usin g simpler functional forms such as the linear functions the incentive problem is studied under various informational assumptions which allow some calculations of the value of information copyright 1988 by the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

on the implications of introducing cross border loss offset in the european union abstract this article investigates a tax competition model where countries compete for capital and profits of multinational enterprises mnes through statutory tax rates and cross border loss offset provisions which allow a transfer of foreign subsidiaries losses to the parent company a joint implementation of full cross border loss relief is welfare maximizing because it ensures production efficiency and no profit shifting in equilibrium local governments choose zero level of the loss relief in a noncooperative equilibrium if only capital is mobile and relax the loss offset when mnes engage in profit shifting therefore allowing multinationals to undertake international tax planning activities may be welfare improving in our model

self selection and pareto efficient taxation abstract this paper analyses the set of pareto efficient tax structures the formulation of the problem as one of self selection not only shows more clearly the similarity between this problem and a number of other problems such as the optimal pricing of a monopolist which have recently been the subject of extensive research but also allows the derivation of a number of new results we establish i under fairly weak conditions randomization of tax structures is desirable ii if different individuals are not perfect substitutes for one another in production then the general equilibrium effects until now largely ignored in the literature of changes in the tax structure may be dominant in determining the optimal tax structure in particular if the relative wage of high ability and low ability individuals depends on the relative supplies of labor the optimal tax structure entails a negative marginal tax rate on the high ability individuals and a positive marginal tax rate on the low ability individuals the marnitude of which depends on the elasticity of substitution iii if individuals differ in their preferences pareto efficient taxation may entail negative marginal tax rates for high incomes while iv if wage income is stochastic the marginal tax rate at the upper end may be 100 our analysis thus makes clear that the main qualitative properties of the optimal tax structure to which earlier studies called attention are not robust to these attempts to make the theory more realistic