behavioral contract theory abstract this review provides a critical survey of psychology and economics behavioral economics research in contract theory first i introduce the theories of individual decision making most

competition under consumer loss aversion we address the effect of expectation based consumer loss aversion on firm strategy in imperfect competition consumers are fully informed about match value and price at the moment of purchase however some consumers are initially uninformed about their tastes and form a reference point consisting of an expected match value and price distribution whereas others are perfectly informed all the time we show that if firms have symmetric costs a larger share of informed consumers leads to a more competitive outcome the reverse holds if cost asymmetry in duopoly is sufficiently large

overconfident consumers in the marketplace when consumers sign contracts expectations about future usage of the product or service matter for instance the value provided by car insurance depends on how likely a consumer believes she is to file a claim the value provided by a gym membership depends on how often a consumer anticipates going to the gym and the value provided by a cellular phone contract depends on how many gigabytes of data a consumer anticipates using the standard modeling paradigm makes the expedient assumption that consumers have rational expectations imposing rational expectations drastically simplifies models and eliminates the need to directly measure beliefs as they coincide with the distribution of observed outcomes yet a large literature shows that consumer beliefs often deviate substantially from rational expectations in systematic ways this has important consequences for contract design firm profits consumer welfare and public policy the term overconfidence is used broadly in the psychology literature referring to both overoptimism and overprecision overoptimistic individuals overestimate their own abilities or prospects either in absolute terms or in comparison to others in contrast overprecise individuals place overly narrow confidence intervals around forecasts thereby underestimating uncertainty these biases can lead consumers to misforecast their future product usage or to overestimate their abilities to navigate contract terms in consequence consumer overconfidence causes consumers

selling to overconfident consumers consumers may overestimate the precision of their demand forecasts this overconfidence creates an incentive for both monopolists and competitive firms to offer tariffs with included quantities at zero marginal cost followed by steep marginal charges this matches observed cellphone service pricing plans in the us and elsewhere an alternative explanation with common priors can be ruled out in favor of overconfidence based on observed customer usage patterns for a major us cellular phone service provider the model can be reinterpreted to explain the use of flat rates and late fees in rental markets and teaser rates on loans nevertheless firms may benefit from consumers losing their overconfidence

unawareness and selective disclosure the effect of school quality information on property prices the australian government launched the my school website in 2010 to provide standardised information about the quality of schools to the australian public this paper combines data from this website with home sales data for the state of victoria to estimate the effect of the publication of school quality information on property prices we use a difference in difference approach to estimate the causal effect of the release of information about high quality and low quality schools relative to medium quality schools in the neighborhood and find that the release of information about high quality schools increases property prices by 3 6 percent whereas the release of information about low quality schools has no significant effect the findings indicate that many buyers are unaware of the relevance of school quality information and that real estate agents pursue a strategy of disclosing information about high quality schools to increase the sales price results from a survey of victorian real estate agents provide evidence in favor of this strategy

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

pollution claim settlements under private information abstract the classical problem of resolving a nuisance dispute between a pollution generating firm and nearby residents is modelled here as a mechanism design problem we assume that the designer of the mechanism is the firm that it is uncertain about the actual losses suffered by residents and that the initial assignment of property rights is one where each resident is entitled to prevail we derive a profitmaximizing scheme under the individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints and examine its properties it is shown that the outcomes it yields are sometimes inefficient moreover when many residents are affected by pollution and the degree of uncertainty with respect to the losses they suffer is large these inefficiencies become rampant

trade policy options for chile this article uses a multisector multicountry computable general equilibrium model to examine chile s strategy of additive regionalism negotiating bilateral free trade agreements with all of its significant trading partners taking chile s regional arrangements bilaterally only its agreements with northern partners provide sufficient market access to overcome trade diversion costs due to preferential market access however additive regionalism is likely to provide chile with gains that are many multiples of the static welfare gains from unilateral free trade at least one partner country loses from each of the regional agreements considered and excluded countries as a group always lose gains to the world from global free trade are estimated to be vastly larger than gains from any of the regional arrangements

commitment flexibility and optimal screening of time inconsistency this paper develops a theory of optimal provision of commitment devices to people who value both commitment and flexibility and whose preferences differ in the degree of time inconsistency if time inconsistency is observable both a planner and a monopolist provide devices that help each person commit to the efficient level of flexibility however the combination of unobservable time inconsistency and preference for flexibility causes an adverse selection problem to solve this problem the monopolist and possibly the planner curtail flexibility in the device for a more inconsistent person at both ends of the efficient choice range moreover they may have to add unused options to the device for a less inconsistent person and also distort his actual choices this theory has normative and positive implications for private and public provision of commitment devices

paying not to go to the gym how do consumers choose from a menu of contracts we analyze a novel dataset from three u s health clubs with information on both the contractual choice and the day to day attendance decisions of 7 752 members over three years the observed consumer behavior is difficult to reconcile with standard preferences and beliefs first members who choose a contract with a flat monthly fee of over 70 attend on average 4 3 times per month they pay a price per expected visit of more than 17 even though they could pay 10 per visit using a 10 visit pass on average these users forgo savings of 600 during their membership second consumers who choose a monthly contract are 17 percent more likely to stay enrolled beyond one year than users committing for a year this is surprising because monthly members pay higher fees for the option to cancel each month we also document cancellation delays and attendance expectations among other findings leading explanations for our findings are overconfidence about future self control or about future efficiency overconfident agents overestimate attendance as well as the cancellation probability of automatically renewed contracts our results suggest that making inferences from observed contract choice under the rational expectation hypothesis can lead to biases in the estimation of consumer preferences

incentives for unaware agents the paper introduces the problem of unawareness into principalagent theory and discusses optimal incentive contracts when the agent may be unaware of her action space depending on the agent s default behavior it can be optimal for the principal to propose an incomplete contract that keeps the agent unaware or a complete contract the key tradeoff is that of enlarging the agent s choice set versus adding costly incentive constraints if agents differ in their unawareness optimal contracts show a self reinforcing pattern if there are few unaware agents in the economy optimal contracts promote awareness if unawareness is wide spread optimal contracts shroud the contracting environment thus keeping the agent unaware

packaging of sin goods commitment or exploitation abstract we consider the shopping and consumption decision of an individual with a self control problem the consumer believes that restricting the consumption of a sinful product such as chips is in his long run interest but when facing the actual decision he is tempted to overeat we ask how firms react to such self control problems and possibly exploit them by offering different package sizes in a competitive market either one or three package sizes are offered in contrast to common intuition the large and not the small package might be a commitment device the latter may serve to exploit the naive consumer

modeling the economic interaction of agents with diverse abilities to recognize equilibrium patterns we model differences among agents in their ability to recognize temporal patterns of prices using the concept of debruijn sequences in two dynamic models of markets we demonstrate the existence of equilibria in which prices fluctuate in a pattern that is independent of the fundamentals and that can be recognized only by the more competent agents jel c7 d4 s477

eliciting temptation and self control through menu choices a lab experiment unlike present biased individuals agents who suffer self control costs as in gul and pesendorfer 2001 may choose to restrict their choice set even when they expect to resist temptation to identify these self control types i design an experiment in which the temptation was to read a story during a tedious task the identification strategy relies on a two step procedure first i measure commitment demand by eliciting subjects preferences over menus that did or did not allow access to the story i then implement preferences using a random mechanism allowing to observe subjects who faced the choice yet preferred commitment a quarter to a third of subjects can be classified as self control types according to their menu preferences when confronted with the choice virtually all of them behaved as they anticipated and resisted temptation these findings suggest that policies restricting the availability of tempting options could have larger welfare benefits than predicted by standard models of present bias

markets for ownership the prevailing economic theory of the firm based on a property rights perspective has demonstrated that ownership by dispensable outside parties is an inefficient outcome relative to ownership by productive agents in order to better understand observed patterns of ownership this paper considers the outcome of ma rkets for ownership that operate prior to production taking place the main result is that outside parties will often become the equilibrium asset owners this is precisely because but for ownership such parties would not earn rents in contrast productive agents earn rents even when they do not own assets given that their contribution is complementary with other productive agents their willingness to pay for ownership is less than that of an outside party this result is robust to the introduction of moderate levels of inefficiency arising from outside ownership and to a consideration of opportunities for re sale before production begins the main conclusion drawn is that the nature of the operation of markets for ownership stands alongside incentive effects as important predictors of firm boundaries journal of economic literature classification numbers d23 l22

unplanned purchases and retail competition i propose a framework in which consumers have biased beliefs about their future purchase probabilities leading them to make unplanned purchases us ing this framework i examine the phenomenon of below cost pricing and the welfare eects of banning it when the market is covered a ban on below cost pricing raises social surplus although consumers need not gain they are only guaranteed to ben et if the market is perfectly competitive when the market is not covered a ban always hurts at least some consumers also there is a pro competitive justica tion for the observation that larger rms sometimes charge below cost on the core product lines of smaller rms consumer bias is crucial for this justication multi product retailers sometimes sell certain products beneath cost with the hope of at tracting additional customers who will also buy other higher margin items this practice often referred to as loss leading is controversial with below cost pricing having been banned in a number of countries including belgium germany france and ireland and in approximately half of all us states 1 many us cities also have such prohibitions in this article i examine the welfare consequences of prohibitions on below cost pricing in a market where multi product retailers compete for boundedly rational consumers who practice one stop shopping that is visit at most one store when rivals are symmetric and the market is covered so that all consumers shop a ban on loss leading raises social surplus but when the market is not covered a ban presents a social welfare tradeo fewer consumers choose to shop although those who do generate higher levels of social surplus perhaps surprisingly for those consumers who shop both before and after a ban a ban is guaranteed to make them better o if the market is perfectly competitive but otherwise may harm them taken together these results indicate that it is simplistic to argue that by limiting the scope of competition below cost pricing bans must hurt consumers and society but i also assess below cost pricing laws in the presence of asymmetric competition as when a large rm with a full product line competes against a small rm with a limited product

behavioural characterizations of naivete for time inconsistent preferences we propose non parametric definitions of absolute and comparative naivete these definitions leverage ex ante choice of menu to identify predictions of future behaviour and ex post random choices from menus to identify actual behaviour the main advantage of our definitions is their independence from any assumed functional form for the utility function representing behaviour an individual is sophisticated if she is indifferent ex ante between retaining the option to choose from a menu ex post or committing to her actual distribution of choices from that menu she is naive if she prefers the flexibility in the menu reflecting a mistaken belief that she will act more virtuously than she actually will we propose two definitions of comparative naivete and explore the restrictions implied by our definitions for several prominent models of time inconsistency

managerial beliefs and incentive policies abstract this article examines incentive contracts under moral hazard when a principal and agents disagree about the likelihood that a task will succeed the direction of disagreement alters the effectiveness of monetary incentives the principal s optimal contract is a relative performance evaluation when she is more optimistic than the agents and a joint performance evaluation when she is less optimistic we further show why disagreement may prevail in organizations by considering a simple job assignment problem

how to price discriminate when tariff size matters firms that serve a large market with many diverse consumer types use discriminatory or nonlinear pricing to extract higher revenue inducing consumers to separate by self selecting from a large number of tariff options but the extent of price discrimination must often be tempered by the high costs of devising and managing discriminatory tariffs including costs of supporting consumers in understanding and making selection from a complex menu of choices these tariff design trade offs occur in many industries where firms face many consumer types and each consumer picks the number of units to consume over time examples include wireless communication services other telecom and information technology products legal plans fitness clubs automobile clubs parking healthcare plans and many services and utilities this paper evaluates alternative ways to price discriminate while accounting for both revenues and tariff management costs the revenue maximizing menu of quantity price bundles can be very or infinitely large and hence not practical instead two part tariffs 2pts which charge a fixed entry fee and a per unit fee can extract a large fraction of the optimal revenue with a small menu of choices and they become more attractive once the costs of tariff management are factored in we show that three part tariffs 3pts which use an additional instrument the free allowance are an even more efficient way to price discriminate a relatively small menu of 3pts can be more profitable than a menu of 2pts of any size this 3pt menu can be designed with less information about consumer preferences relative to the menu of two part tariffs which in order to segment customers optimally needs fine grained information about preferences our analysis reveals a counterintuitive insight that more complex tariffs need not always be more profitable it matters whether the complexity is from many choices or more pricing instruments

trading between agents for a better match this paper studies externalities that arise when agents can trade outcomes ex post i show that when agents can trade outcomes ex post principals are incentivized to contract with agents ex ante to reduce ex post transfers to outside agents with whom the principals do not directly contract this causes principals to offer agents piece rates that are inefficiently low and lower than the piece rates they would offer if trading was not allowed although trading reduces an agent s effort and could increase the agent s outside option of rejecting a principal s ex ante contract principals ultimately gain from allowing ex post trading because such trading results in outcomes that better match their tastes

protecting buyers from fine print buyers typically do not read the fine print in contracts providing an incentive for a monopolist to draft terms which are unfavorable to buyers we model this problem proving that trade must then be inefficient we show that regulation which mandates efficient terms raises welfare more interestingly regulations which prohibit the least efficient terms may reduce welfare by inducing the monopolist not to offer favorable terms we extend these results to markets in which some buyers are naive showing that prohibiting the least efficient terms may also harm the naive buyers

present biased preferences self awareness and shirking abstract we model a mechanism design problem in which the principal owns a project that requires work effort by an agent but agents may have time inconsistent present biased preferences and lack complete self awareness of these preferences the self control problem and naivete of an agent may lead him to agree to a contract but later shirk or slack off even though doing so is observable when the principal cannot severely punish shirking and agents are completely naive the second best solution entails allowing a present biased agent to slack off in order to avoid a greater loss due to shirking with greater self awareness among present biased agents the principal may do better by screening some from accepting the contract furthermore when shirking can be severely punished this does not lead to contracts that eliminate effects of the self control problem instead the principal may exploit present biased agents by offering a contract that allows them to slack off which agents fail to foresee they will choose to do but at the expense of foregoing much compensation

the limits of monopolization through acquisition we address the question of whether competitive acquisition of firms by their rivals can result in complete or partial monopolization of a homogeneous product industry this question is modeled in terms of two distinct three stage noncoopera tive games analysis of subgame perfect pure strategy nash equilibria of these games discloses that under simplifying assumptions monopolization of an industry through acquisition is limited to industries with relatively few firms partial monopolization is either limited in scope or can be completely eliminated by prohibiting any owner from acquiring over 50 percent of the firms in the industry

opinions as incentives we study costs and benefits of differences of opinion between an adviser and a decision maker even when they share the same underlying preferences over decisions a difference of opinion about payoff relevant information leads to strategic information acquisition and transmission a decision maker faces a fundamental trade off a greater difference of opinion increases an adviser s incentives to acquire information but exacerbates the strategic disclosure of any information that is acquired nevertheless when choosing from a rich pool of opinion types it is optimal for a decision maker to select an adviser with some difference of opinion centralization of authority is essential to harness these incentive gains since delegation to the adviser can discourage effort

sin licenses revisited abstract we analyze personalized regulation in the form of sin licenses to correct the distortion in the consumption of a harmful good when consumers suffer from varying degrees of self control problems we take into account preference uncertainty which generates a trade off between flexibility and commitment provided by sin licenses we also account for the possibility that consumers may trade the sin good in a secondary market which partially erodes the commitment power of sin licenses we show that if sophisticated consumers are allowed to choose any general individualized pricing scheme for sin goods they will choose a system of sin licenses nevertheless sin licenses do not implement the social optimum in our general setting we derive a simple criterion for assessing whether switching to a system of sin licenses improves welfare over linear sin taxes

vertical foreclosure versus downstream competition with capital precommitment abstract the recent literature on vertical foreclosure suggests that vertical integration can have the anticompetitive effect of enabling an upstream firm to commit to restricting output to downstream firms at the monopoly level we allow the upstream firm to make an ex ante capital precommitment we show that if integration is outlawed the upstream firm will distort capital downward as an alternative device to restrict output we show that this alternative may be socially less efficient than vertical integration

bargaining without a common prior an immediate agreement theorem in sequential bargaining models without outside options each player s bargaining power is ultimately determined by which player will make an offer and when this paper analyzes a sequential bargaining model in which players may hold different beliefs about which player will make an offer and when excessive optimism about making offers in the future can cause delays in agreement the main result states that despite this if players will remain sufficiently optimistic for a sufficiently long future then in equilibrium they will agree immediately this result is also extended to other canonical models of optimism

contract design and self control with asymmetric information i introduction growing evidence from both experimental and field studies supports the view that people s behavior is often time inconsistent that is people are more impatient in the short run than in the long run laibson 1997 phelps and poliak 1968 such time preference is characterized by hyperbolic discounting where the discount rate declines with time into the future see loewenstein and prelec 1992 for a summary of the empirical evidence of such discounting some scholars argue that hyperbolic discounting even has a biological basis bateson and kacelnik 1996 robson 2001 others try to provide a rationale for hyperbolic discounting azfar 1999 halevy 2008 economists have noticed that such a time inconsistent preference has a profound impact on an individual s economic behavior and consequently on the way contracts will in equilibrium be designed a seminal paper by dellavigna and malmendier 2004 henceforth dm provides a framework to study a situation where a time consistent firm contracts with a time inconsistent consumer strikingly they find that for investment goods 1 by charging a per usage price below marginal cost but a higher entrance fee 2 the firm obtains the same profit as in the case where a consumer has no short run impatience as long as the consumer is sophisticated that is he is fully aware of his time inconsistency problem these findings are based on the assumption that the firm has complete information on the consumer s benefits in practice however a consumer may also hold private information on his own willingness to pay consumption benefit by introducing asymmetric information in the dimension of willingness to pay we find significant changes in the properties of the optimal contract the below marginal cost pricing rule may fail for consumers with low willingness to pay due to an upward distortion on the per usage price because of the trade off between efficiency and information rent extraction for investment goods evidence from field studies supports the co existence of both below and above marginal cost pricing see dellavigna 2009 dellavigna and malmendier 2006 use data from three u s health clubs which offer a choice between two contracts a monthly one with a lump sum fee l around 80 and no payment obviously below marginal cost per visit and a pay per visit contract with a price p of 10 probably above marginal cost their finding of consumer behavior is not consistent with the standard intuition of rationality the subscribers with the monthly contract go to the clubs rarely on average they pay 17 per visit although they could pay 10 per visit with the pay per visit contract the authors explanation is that these consumers are naive that is they are over confident toward future self control however in our article even when facing a population of sophisticated consumers as long as there exists asymmetric information on consumption benefit the firm may offer both below and above marginal cost pricing contracts since the per usage price can serve as a screening device which elicits consumers private information a sophisticated consumer may also buy the annual monthly contract with few attendances especially when he has a high consumption benefit in other words the long run self purchases an expensive commitment device to reduce the marginal cost of a visit from 10 to 0 and induce the impatient short run self to exercise more often more importantly unlike the complete information scenario with sophisticated consumers the firm s profit is no longer unaffected by the consumer s short run impatience interestingly the firm s profit is not monotonic in the consumer s short run impatience when the consumer s self control problem is not very severe that is the consumer is sufficiently patient in the short run the upward distortion on the per usage price prevents the first best discount on it so the short run impatience negatively impacts the firm s profit

contracts biases and consumption of access services we study theoretically and empirically the consumption of access services we demonstrate that consumption is affected by contract structure pay per use versus three part tariffs even if the optimal consumption plans are identical we find that although there is extensive individual heterogeneity on average consumers choices follow a structure that is similar to a nearly optimal heuristic and correctly react to imbalances between the number of free calls and call opportunities remaining however consumers use the free units too quickly leading to overconsumption and lost surplus these errors are partially driven by mistaken beliefs about the value distribution we also measure subjects willingness to pay for a contract with free access units and we find that nearly half of subjects are willing to pay at least the full per unit price with a substantial fraction willing to overpay in response the optimal firm strategy offers a three part tariff at a very small discount which increases revenue by 8 14 compared to only offering a pay per use contract data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2013 1889 this paper was accepted by teck hua ho behavioral economics

repeated moral hazard with a time inconsistent agent abstract i consider a repeated principal agent model with moral hazard in which the agent has preferences which are widely used to capture time inconsistency i analyze the case where the agent is sophisticated in the sense that he is fully aware of his inconsistent discounting i characterize the optimal wage scheme for such an agent and compare it to time consistent benchmarks the marginal cost of rewarding the agent for high output today exceeds the marginal benefit of delaying these rewards until tomorrow in this sense the principal does not smooth the agent s rewards over time when facing a sophisticated agent it is optimal for the principal to reward the good performance more and punish the bad performance more in the early period relative to the optimal wage scheme for a time consistent agent

optimal life cycle capital taxation under self control problems we study optimal taxation of savings in an economy where agents face self control problems and we allow the severity of self control to change over the life cycle we focus on quasi hyperbolic discounting with constant elasticity of inter temporal substitution utility functions and linear markov equilibria we derive explicit formulas for optimal taxes that implement the efficient commitment allocation we show analytically that if agents ability to self control increases concavely with age then savings should be subsidised and the subsidy should decrease with age we also study the quantitative effects of age dependent self control problems and find that the optimal subsidies in our environment are much larger than those implied by models with constant self control finally we compare our optimal subsidies with those implied by the 401 k plan although the subsidy levels in the two cases are of comparable magnitudes the 401 k plan implies an increasing pattern of subsidies while the optimal subsidies decrease over the life cycle

managing the evolution of multilateralism author s downs george w rocke david barsoom peter n abstract in the past five years a relatively extensive literature has emerged that explores the demand for multilateral cooperation that is those factors that motivate states to develop or resist developing formal institutions that operate to increase interstate economic military or environmental cooperation 1 these factors include the transaction costs associated with ad hoc and multiple bilateral arrangements increased interstate trade the diffusion of liberal trade theory information about the costs of environmental degradation and trends in elite ideology to date however our understanding of the supply side of multilateralism the standards that are set for admission the order and speed with which candidate states are admitted and the impact of expansion on cooperation and future evolution has been relatively undeveloped 2 partly as a result theorists have had little to say about how multilateral institutions are likely to evolve or what the policy consequences of their expansion will be 3 supply side issues are important because multilateral organizations usually do not spring forth full blown they grow instead of forming an inclusive agreement that is one that covers nearly all of the states that its designers eventually hope to include many multilateral organizations start out with substantially smaller memberships and generally expand over time we argue that among the many possible explanations for the choice of this design strategy there is a rational choice argument

contracting with externalities the paper studies inefficiencies arising in contracting between one principal and n agents when the utility of each agent depends on all agents trades with the principal when the principal commits to a set of publicly observable bilateral contract offers the arising inefficiency is due entirely to the externalities imposed on non signers in contrast when the principal s offers are privately observed the distortion is due to the externalities given agents equilibrium trades comparison of the two externalities determines the relative efficiency of the two contracting regimes in both cases we show that when n is large each agent can be treated as non pivotal provided that appropriate continuity assumptions are satisfied we also study the case in which the principal can condition each agent s trade on other agents messages we characterize the set of such mechanisms in which each agent s participation is voluntary when the principal can commit to any such mechanism she implements the first best outcome while threatening each deviator with the harshest possible punishment however in the presence of noise that goes to zero slower than n goes to infinity in the limit we obtain a generally inefficient outcome in which each agent feels non pivotal

why higher takeover premia protect minority shareholders posttakeover moral hazard by the acquirer and free riding by the target shareholders lead the former to acquire as few sharcs as necessary to gain control as moral hazard is most severe under such low ownership concentration inefficiencies arise in successful takeovers moreover share supply is shown to be upward sloping rules promoting ownership concentration limit both agency costs and the occurrence of takeovers furthermore higher takeover premia induced by competition translate into higher ownership concen tration and are thus beneficial finally one share one vote and simple majority are generally not optimal and socially optimal rules need not emerge through private contracting

technology adoption in the presence of network externalities we analyze technology adoption in industries where network externalities are significant the pattern of adoption depends on whether technologies are sponsored a sponsor is an entity that has property rights to the technology and hence is willing to make investments to promote it key findings include the following 1 compatibility tends to be undersupplied by the market but excessive standardization can occur 2 in the absence of sponsors the technology superior today has a strategic advantage and is likely to dominate the market 3 when one of two rival technologies is sponsored that technology has a strategic advantage and may be adopted even if it is inferior 4 when two competing technologies both are sponsored the technology that will be superior tomorrow has a strategic advantage

downstream mergers and producer s capacity choice why bake a larger pie when getting a smaller slice in this article the effect of downstream horizontal mergers on the upstream producer s capacity choice was studied contrary to conventional wisdom i find a nonmonotonic relationship horizontal mergers induce a higher upstream capacity if the cost of capacity is low and a lower upstream capacity if this cost is high this result is explained by decomposing the total effect into two competing effects a change in holdup and a change in bargaining erosion

life insurance and life settlement markets with overconfident policyholders abstract we analyze how the life settlement market the secondary market for life insurance may affect consumer welfare in a dynamic equilibrium model of life insurance with one sided commitment and overconfident policyholders in our model policyholders may lapse their life insurance policies when they lose their bequest motives however they are overconfident in the sense that they may underestimate the probability of losing their bequest motives we show that in the competitive equilibrium without life settlement overconfident consumers will buy life insurance contracts with too much reclassification risk insurance for later periods the life settlement market can impose a limit on the extent to which primary insurers can exploit overconfident consumers we show that the life settlement market may increase the equilibrium consumer welfare of overconfident consumers when they are sufficiently vulnerable in the sense that they have a sufficiently large intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption our result is robust to alternative specifications where i insurers cannot observe the subjective or objective probability that policyholders will lose their bequest motives ii insurers can include health contingent cash surrender values csvs in the life insurance contract and iii policyholders underestimate their future mortality risk

joining an existing regional trade agreement from the perspective of a small open economy chile s accession to nafta and mercosur during the mid 1970s chile began a bold program of unilateral trade liberalization following decades of protectionism effectively putting an end to four decades of import substitution policies like other countries in latin america chile had relied on quantitative restrictions qrs and in some cases high tariffs to protect the production of importables agricultural exports were subject to qrs moreover agriculture suffered a high indirect taxation from industrial protection hurtado valdrs and muchnik the current trade regime is simple to describe a uniform tariff of 11 applies to all importables except wheat sugar and edible oils which have a price band scheme which provides additional protection beyond the uniform tariff there are no qrs on imports and no export taxes licensing or quotas a uniform vat applies to all imports and domestic production and under the uruguay round agreement ura of april 1994 chile bound tariffs at 25 for all products except wheat and sugar at 31 5 thus chile s program of tariffs like several countries in latin america had already occurred at the time of the ura in april of 1994 chile therefore came out of the gatt negotiations with virtually no mandated changes to its trade policies today chile s agricultural trade policy is facing new challenges one is to maintain an open trade regime in the face of continuous pressure for protection of importables because of a stress on profitability since about 1990 a second challenge is to improve trade related institutions such as rules for dealing with contingency protection measures safeguards antidumping etc that remain out of step with liberalized trade a third challenge is related to preferential trade agreements ptas which have taken on astonishing prominence more recently in the trade policy debate of the posturuguay round in latin america regional agreements are in and trade agreements proliferate mercosur in the southern cone nafta in north america the free trade agreement at the summit for the americas in miami and older treaties such as the andean trade preference act add to these the trade

comment on commitment vs flexibility this comment corrects two results in the 2006 econometrica paper by amador werning and angeletos awa that features a model in which individuals face a trade off between flexibility and commitment first in contrast to proposition 1 in awa we show that money burning can be part of the ex ante optimal contract when there are two states second in contrast to proposition 2 in awa we show that money burning can be imposed at the top in the highest liquidity shock state even when there is a continuum of states we provide corrected versions of the above results publication abstract

insurance self control and contract flexibility we study a competitive insurance market in which some consumers have too optimistic expectations regarding their future use of preventive measures when contracts are long term and inflexible such naive consumers would increase the costs of insurance for low risk consumers the competitive insurance market therefore offers flexible contracts that allow for switching between different tariffs sophisticated consumers choose a partial insurance tariff and remain low risks naive consumers choose the same tariff but later switch to full insurance and become high risks if there are sufficiently many naive consumers they pay a transfer to sophisticated consumers so that high risks subsidize low risks in contrast there are no such transfers when contracts are short term the model generates novel implications for the time frame of insurance contracts and insurance requirements

inferior products and profitable deception we analyse conditions facilitating profitable deception in a simple model of a competitive retail market firms selling homogenous products set anticipated prices that consumers understand and additional prices that naive consumers ignore unless revealed to them by a firm where we assume that there is a binding floor on the anticipated prices our main results establish that bad products those with lower social surplus than an alternative tend to be more reliably profitable than good products specifically 1 in a market with a single socially valuable product and sufficiently many firms a deceptive equilibrium in which firms hide additional prices does not exist and firms make zero profits but perversely 2 if the product is socially wasteful then a profitable deceptive equilibrium always exists furthermore 3 in a market with multiple products since a superior product both diverts sophisticated consumers and renders an inferior product socially wasteful in comparison it guarantees that firms can profitably sell the inferior product by deceiving consumers we apply our framework to the mutual fund and credit card markets arguing that it explains a number of empirical findings regarding these industries

a theory of intermediated investment with hyperbolic discounting investors abstract financial intermediaries may reduce welfare losses caused by hyperbolic discounting investors who may liquidate their investment prematurely when the liquidation cost is low in a competitive equilibrium sophisticated investors are offered contracts with perfect commitment and first best results are achieved naive investors are attracted by contracts that offer seemingly attractive returns in the long run but introduce discontinuous penalties for early withdrawal if the investor types are private information naive investors withdraw early and cross subsidize sophisticated investors when a secondary market for long term contracts opens for trading financial intermediaries are compelled to offer contracts that have more flexible withdrawal options with linear schemes and the welfare of naive investors is improved arbitrage free linear contracts allow for a unique term structure for interest rates that includes a premium for naivete solvency requirements may limit competition for contracts and result in positive profits banks that have capital are able to compete more aggressively which improves investor welfare

choice and procrastination author s o donoghue ted rabin matthew abstract recent models of procrastination due to self control problems assume that a procrastinator considers just one option and is unaware of her self control problems we develop a model where a person chooses from a menu of options and is partially aware of her self control problems this menu model replicates earlier results and generates new ones a person might forego completing an attractive option because she plans to complete a more attractive but never to be completed option hence providing a non procrastinator additional options can induce procrastination and a person may procrastinate worse pursuing important goals than unimportant ones

equilibrium vertical foreclosure the authors formulate a complete but analytically simple equilibrium model of vertical mergers to evaluate the logic of standard vertical foreclosure claims and the criticisms made of those claims the model includes incentives of the integrated firm and unintegrated input suppliers to exclude rivals and the potential holdout problem in this fully specified model vertical foreclosure can emerge in equilibrium copyright 1990 by american economic association

futile attempts at self control we investigate costly yet futile attempts at self control when consumption of a harmful product has a binary breakdown no breakdown nature and individuals tend to underestimate their need for self control considering time inconsistent preferences as well as temptation disutility we show that becoming more sophisticated can decrease welfare and investigate what kind of mistaken beliefs lead to low welfare with time inconsistent preferences being close to perfectly understanding one s preferences but assigning zero probability to true preferences induces the worst outcome jel d03 d11 d91

consumer inattention and bill shock regulation for many goods and services such as electricity health care cellular phone service debit card transactions or those sold with loyalty discounts the price of the next unit of service depends on past usage as a result consumers who are inattentive to their past usage but are aware of contract terms may remain uncertain about the price of the next unit i develop a model of inattentive consumption derive equilibrium pricing when consumers are inattentive and evaluate bill shock regulation requiring firms to disclose information that substitutes for attention when inattentive consumers are sophisticated but heterogeneous in their expected demand bill shock regulation reduces social welfare in fairly competitive markets which may be the effect of the federal communication commission s recent bill shock agreement if some consumers are attentive while others naively fail to anticipate their own inattention however then bill shock regulation increases social welfare and can benefit consumers hence requiring zero balance alerts in addition to the federal reserve s new opt in rule for debit card overdraft protection may benefit consumers

cellular service demand biased beliefs learning and bill shock by april 2013 the fcc s recent bill shock agreement with cellular carriers requires consumers be notied when exceeding usage allowances will the agreement help or hurt consumers to answer this question we estimate a model of consumer plan choice usage and learning using a panel of cellular bills our model predicts that the agreement will lower average consumer welfare by 2 per year because rms will respond by raising monthly fees our approach is based on novel evidence that consumers are inattentive to past usage meaning that bill shock alerts are informative and advances structural modeling of demand in situations where multipart taris induce marginal price uncertainty additionally our model estimates show that an

uncertain demand consumer loss aversion and flat rate tariffs we consider a model of firm pricing and consumer choice where consumers are loss averse and uncertain about their future demand possibly consumers in our model prefer a flat rate to a measured tariff even though this choice does not minimize their expected billing amount a behavior in line with ample empirical evidence we solve for the profit maximizing two part tariff which is a flat rate if a marginal costs are not too high b loss aversion is intense and c there are strong variations in demand moreover we analyze the optimal nonlinear tariff this tariff has a large flat part when a flat rate is optimal among the class of two part tariffs

vertical mergers and market foreclosure ythe model in this paper illustrates three effects of vertical mergers when both stages are oligopolistic and vertically integrated and unintegrated producers coexist first the merging firm increases its final good output second the resulting backward shift in the residual demand curve facing unintegrated final good producers ylowers their demand for the intermediate good third the merged firm withdraws from the intermediate good market the increased concentration pushes the intermediate good price upward which effect dominates depends on market structure under some conditions a vertical merger causes the price of the final good to increase

nudging farmers to use fertilizer theory and experimental evidence from kenya we model farmers as facing small fixed costs of purchasing fertil izer and assume some are stochastically present biased and not fully sophisticated about this bias such farmers may procrastinate post poning fertilizer purchases until later periods when they may be too impatient to purchase fertilizer consistent with the model many farmers in western kenya fail to take advantage of apparently profit able fertilizer investments but they do invest in response to small time limited discounts on the cost of acquiring fertilizer free deliv ery just after harvest calibration suggests that this policy can yield higher welfare than either laissez faire policies or heavy subsidies

opportunism in multilateral vertical contracting nondiscrimination exclusivity and uniformity comment an input supplier selling to competing downstream firms would benefit from publicly committing at the outset to all contracts efficient commitment however would require complete contracts the authors study instead bilateral contracting without commitment regarding others terms each firm then fears that the supplier might opportunistically renegotiate another s contract to increase bilateral profit at the firm s expense the authors show that nondiscrimination clauses generally cannot curb such third party opportunism even with symmetric firms to reassure firms crude forms of commitment may be adopted this could explain the pervasiveness of exclusivity arrangements and the striking uniformity and intertemporal rigidity of franchise contracts copyright 1994 by american economic association

naivete based discrimination we initiate the study of naivete based discrimination the practice of conditioning offers on external information about consumers naivete knowing that a consumer is naive increases a monopolistic or competitive firm s willingness to generate inefficiency to exploit the consumer s mistakes so naivete based discrimination is not pareto improving can be pareto damaging and often lowers total welfare when classical preference based discrimination does not moreover the effect on total welfare depends on a hitherto unemphasized market feature the extent to which the exploitation of naive consumers distorts trade with different types of consumers if the distortion is homogeneous across naive and sophisticated consumers then under an arguably weak and empirically testable condition naivete based discrimination lowers total welfare in contrast if the distortion arises only for trades with sophisticated consumers then perfect naivete based discrimination maximizes social welfare although imperfect discrimination often lowers welfare if the distortion arises only for trades with naive consumers then naivete based discrimination has no effect on welfare we identify applications for each of these cases in our primary example a credit market with present biased borrowers firms lend more than is socially optimal to increase the amount of interest naive borrowers unexpectedly pay creating a homogeneous distortion the condition for naivete based discrimination to lower welfare is then weaker than prudence

consideration sets and competitive marketing we present a model of competitive marketing based on the notion that consumers are boundedly rational and that firms use marketing tactics in an attempt to influence consumers decision process the standard model of consumer behaviour assumes that the consumer applies well defined preferences to a perfectly perceived set of available alternatives we retain the assumption that consumers have stable preferences but relax the assumption that they have a perfect perception of what is relevant for their consumption problem thus allowing firms to manipulate that perception our aim is to explore the market implications of this departure from the standard model especially for the way firms deploy marketing strategies in competitive environments the cornerstone of our model is the observation that in the modern marketplace consumers face an overwhelmingly large variety of products and therefore often use screening criteria deliberate as well as unconscious in order to reduce the number of relevant alternatives as a result consumers apply their preferences not to the set of objectively feasible alternatives but to a potentially smaller set which they construct at an earlier stage of the decision process borrowing a term from the marketing literature we refer to this set as the consideration set the basic idea underlying this term is that consumers may be unaware of some of the feasible products and even when they become aware of a new product they still need to be persuaded to consider it as a potential substitute to their currently consumed product

sell probabilistic goods a behavioral explanation for opaque selling probabilistic or opaque selling whereby a seller hides the exact identity of a product until after the buyer makes a payment has been used in practice and received considerable attention in the literature under what conditions and why is probabilistic selling attractive to firms the extant literature has offered the following explanations to price discriminate heterogeneous consumers to reduce supply demand mismatches and to soften price competition in this paper we provide a new explanation to exploit consumer bounded rationality in the sense of anecdotal reasoning we build a simple model where the firm is a monopoly consumers are homogeneous and there is no demand uncertainty or capacity constraint this model allows us to isolate the impact of consumer bounded rationality on the adoption of opaque selling we find that although it is never optimal to use opaque selling when consumers have rational expectations it can be optimal when consumers are boundedly rational we show that opaque selling may soften price competition and increase the industry profits as a result of consumer bounded rationality our findings underscore the importance of consumer bounded rationality and show that opaque selling might be even more attractive than previously thought

commitment savings in informal banking markets abstract i study the provision of commitment savings by informal banks to sophisticated hyperbolic discounters since a consumer is subject to temptation in the period that he signs a contract banks might exploit his desire for instant gratification even as they help him to commit for the future without banking savings decisions and welfare are not monotonic in the degree of time inconsistency consequently commitment savings will lower welfare for moderately time inconsistent agents if loan contracts are enforceable pure commitment savings will disappear this will further lower welfare if the lender is a profit maximizing bank but raise welfare if the lender is a welfare maximizing ngo finally i consider the coexistence of a bank and ngo there will be zero takeup of ngo provided commitment savings if there is competition from a moneylender but the ngo s offer will raise the agent s reservation utility thus reducing the surplus that can be extracted by the moneylender

de targeting advertising an assortment of products to loss averse consumers we consider product markets in which consumers are interested only in a specific product category and initially do not know which product category matches their tastes using sophisticated tracking technologies an intermediary can make inferences about a consumer s preferred product category and offer advertising firms the possibility to target their ads to match the consumer s taste such targeting reduces overall advertising costs and as a direct effect increases industry profits however as we show in this paper when consumers form reference prices and are loss averse more precise targeting may intensify competition between firms as a result firms may earn higher profits from de targeted advertising i e when the intermediary deliberately informs about some products and their price quotes from outside a consumer s preferred product category

behaviorally optimal auction design examples and observations this paper begins to explore behavioral mechanism design replacing equilibrium by a model based on level k thinking which has strong support in experiments in representative examples we consider optimal sealed bid auctions with two symmetric bidders who have independent private values assuming that the designer knows the distribution of level k bidders we show that in a first price auction level k bidding changes the optimal reserve price and often yields expected revenue that exceeds myerson s 1981 bound and that an exotic auction that exploits bidders non equilibrium beliefs can far exceed the revenue bound we close with some general observations about level k auction design jel c72 c92

how to license intangible property we examine the optimal licensing strategy of a research lab selling to firms who are product market competitors we consider an independent lab as well as a research joint venture we show that 1 demands are interdependent and hence the standard price mechanism is not the profit maximizing licensing strategy 2 the seller s incentives to develop the innovation may be excessive 3 the seller s incentives to disseminate the innovation typically are too low 4 larger ventures are less likely to develop the innovation and more likely to restrict its dissemination in those cases where development occurs and 5 a downstream firm that is not a member of the research venture is worse off as a result of the innovation

the failure of competition in the credit card market the bank credit card market containing 4 000 firms and lacking regulatory barriers casually appears to be a hospitable environment for the model of perfect competition nevertheless this article reports that credit card interest rates have been exceptionally sticky relative to the cost of funds moreover major credit card issuers have persistently earned from three to five times the ordinary rate of return in banking during the periods 1983 88 the failure of the competitive model appears to be partly attributable to consumers making credit card choices without taking account of the very high probability that they will pay interest on their outstanding balances copyright 1991 by american economic association

equilibrium structures in vertical oligopoly abstract the central purpose of this paper is to examine vertical integration as an equilibrium phenomenon we model it as integration between cournot oligopolists in both the upstream and the downstream stages we consider the issue of private profitability versus collective profitability and show that under several situations the equilibrium outcomes may result in a prisoner s dilemma the analysis is extended to consider equilibrium outcomes in a dynamic setting where we find no integration to be a relatively common outcome

incentives for procrastinators we examine how principals should design incentives to induce time inconsistent procrastinating agents to complete tasks efficiently delay is costly to the principal but the agent faces stochastic costs of completing the task and efficiency requires waiting when costs are high if the principal knows the task cost distribution she can always achieve first best efficiency if the agent has private information the principal can induce first best efficiency for time consistent agents but often cannot for procrastinators we show that second best optimal incentives for procrastinators typically involve an increasing punishment for delay as time passes

unforeseen contingency and renegotiation with asymmetric information this article considers a buyer seller contracting model in which the seller possesses private information about all relevant aspects of the state of nature including how much each action is worth to the buyer i argue that given asymmetric information the buyer may not entirely dismiss an unforeseen contingency claim by the seller then if the buyer lacks the foresight awareness to expect the unexpected the model admits an equilibrium in which a seemingly complete contract is written and then renegotiated along its outcome path to generate inefficiency ex post

asymmetric information bargaining problems with many agents a yes or no decision must be made about some issue all agents must agree the coase theorem asserts that the efficient outcome will always result suppose the value positive or negative that an individual attaches to an affirmative decision is privately known to that individual it is proved under very mild conditions that with independent types as the number of agents increases the probability of an affirmative efficient decision goes to zero an example in which it is common knowledge that an affirmative decision is efficient and yet the probability of such a decision goes to zero is given

spurious complexity and common standards in markets for consumer goods behavioural and industrial economists have argued that because of cognitive limitations consumers are liable to make sub optimal choices in complex decision problems firms can exploit these limitations by introducing spurious complexity into tariff structures weakening price competition this paper models a countervailing force consumers choice problems are simplified if competing firms follow common conventions about tariff structures because such a common standard promotes price competition a firm s use of it signals that its products offer value for money if consumers recognize this effect there can be a stable equilibrium in which firms use common standards and set competitive prices

dynamic nonlinear pricing biased expectations inattention and bill shock abstract recent research highlights the importance of biased expectations and inattention for nonlinear pricing in dynamic environments findings are 1 three part tariffs such as cellular service contracts exploit consumer overconfidence 2 surprise penalty fees may be used to further exploit biased beliefs or alternatively to price discriminate more efficiently whenever consumers are inattentive 3 implementing the recent bill shock agreement between cellular carriers and the fcc is predicted to harm rather than help consumers when endogenous price changes are taken into account

exploiting naivete about self control in the credit market we develop a model of the credit market where competitive lenders oer long term contracts specifying a non linear schedule of possible repayment schedules to borrowers who may dier both in their taste for immediate gratication and their prior beliefs about that taste the equilibrium contract to a borrower with given beliefs is discontinuous it features an advantageous option involving fast repayment and a penalty for deviating and repaying later these predictions seem to resemble some salient features of many credit card and mortgage contracts for fully sophisticated borrowers the discontinuity acts as a commitment device and yields fast repayment but all other borrowers even those with an arbitrarily small amount of naivete end up delaying repayment despite the penalty and receive little benet from commitment furthermore because they believe they will repay early they underestimate the cost of credit and hence borrow too much non sophisticated borrowers cross subsidize sophisticated borrowers while sophisticated borrowers discipline rms by preventing very exploitative contracts we identify natural conditions under which the above results obtain even if

self confidence and personal motivation the maintenance and enhancement of self esteem has always been identified as a fundamental human impulse philosophers writers educators and of course psychologists have all emphasized the crucial role played by self image in motivation affect and social interactions the aim of this chapter is to bring these concerns into the realm of economic analysis and show that this has important implications for how agents process information and make decisions conversely the tools of economic modelling can help shed light on a number of apparently irrational behaviours documented by psychologists

contracting with diversely naive agents in standard contract theoretic models the underlying assumption is that agent types differ in their preference or cost parameters and the principal s objective is to design contracts in order to screen this type we study a contract theoretic model in which the heterogeneity among agent types is of a cognitive nature in our model the agent has dynamically inconsistent preferences agent types differ only in their degree of sophistication that is their ability to forecast the change in their future tastes we fully characterize the menu of contracts which the principal offers in order to screen the agent s sophistication the menu does not exclude any type it provides a perfect commitment device for relatively sophisticated types and exploitative contracts which involve speculation with relatively naive types more naive types are more heavily exploited and generate a greater profit for the principal our results allow us to interpret real life contractual arrangements in a variety of industries

on price recognition and computational complexity in a monopolistic model a single seller of an indivisible good operates in a market with many consumers who differ in their ability to process information the consumers constraints are modeled in two submodels the first in terms of the limits on the number of sets in the partition of the price space and the second in terms of the limits on the complexity of the operation he can use to process a price offer for the construction of the second submodel the tool of a perceptron is borrowed from the parallel computation literature assuming a negative correlation between the seller s cost of supply of the good and the consumer s ability to process information i demonstrate that the heterogeneity of consumer s abilities can be used by the seller to profitably discriminate among them