the cost of environmental protection reported expenditures for environmental protection are often cited as an assessment of the burden of current regulatory efforts however the potential for both incidental savings and uncounted costs means that the actual burden could be either higher or lower than these reported values using a production cost model that considers the possible interaction between environmental and non environmental expenditures we directly estimate the dollar for dollar incidental savings uncounted costs arising from a one dollar increase in reported environmental expenditures although recent literature supports the idea that reported expenditures probably understate the actual burden we find no such evidence in the manufacturing sector based on a large panel of plant level data in one industry we find statistically significant overstatement in three others we find no significant deviation in either direction we conclude that although cost estimates are not overstated on average variation and uncertainty exist

an economic model of representative democracy this paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office the approach has a number of attractive features first it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by as well as of the people second the model is analytically tractable being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally third it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy

mandate and paternalism a theory of large elections we propose a game theoretic costly voting model of large elections that incorporates the assumption that mandate matters this innovation is motivated by empirical evidence that us representatives with larger victory margins on average vote in a more partisan manner if voters are paternalistic this new model predicts strictly positive limiting turnout rates as the population grows arbitrarily large the model also preserves stylized comparative statics results of costly voting models including the underdog effect and the competition effect finally we develop an innovative computational strategy to solve the model for large finite electorates and show that our results are not only qualitatively but also quantitatively relevant

signaling and election motivations in a voting model with common values and responsive candidates in this paper we focus on strategic voting behavior when both an election and a signaling motivation affect voters behavior we analyze a model of elections with two candidates competing on a one dimensional policy space voters are privately and imperfectly informed about a common shock affecting the electorate s preferences candidates are assumed to choose policy in response to information gleaned from election results and according to exogenous factors that may lead to polarization in candidates policy choices we analyze a subset of symmetric equilibria in which strategies are symmetric to candidates names and private signals css equilibria we show that signaling and election motivations pull voters to vote in different directions we provide conditions that show the relation between the amount of information aggregated in the election and the motivation that influences voting behavior the most finally we show that when candidates are responsive and polarized all css equilibria are inefficient in the limit

information aggregation through costly political action information about various policy alternatives is dispersed among the individual members of a society prior to a vote over the alternatives some people take costly political action to signal their private information to voters by informing voting decisions political action has potential to decrease the likelihood that voters cast mistaken votes perhaps surprisingly preelection communication may be counterproductive the dispersed information is partially aggregated by the vote and political action may contribute noise to the voting process in some cases the voting mechanism is more likely to implement the full information voting outcome in the absence of preelection political action copyright 1994 by american economic association

why vote for losers voting theory generally concludes that in first past the post elections all votes should go to effective candidates duverger s law and parties should adopt a similar platform median voter theorem however such predictions are not always met in practice we show why divergence and vote dispersion is a natural outcome when a parties are opportunistic b there is uncertainty on the position of the median voter and c elections are repeated voting for losers increases the informational content of elections and may induce mainstream parties to relocate towards extremists as a result to maximize their probability of being elected they do not adopt median

do political protests matter evidence from the tea party movement can protests cause political change or are they merely symptoms of underlying shifts in policy preferences this paper studies the effect of the tea party movement in the united states which rose to prominence through a series of rallies across the country on april 15 tax day 2009 to identify the causal effect of protests we use an instrumental variables approach that exploits variation in rainfall on the day of the coordinated rallies weather on tax day robustly predicts rally attendance and the subsequent local strength of the movement as measured by donations media coverage social networking activity and later events we show that larger rallies cause an increase in turnout in favor of the republicans in the 2010 congressional elections and increase the likelihood that incumbent democratic representatives retire incumbent policymaking is affected as well representatives respond to large protests in their district by voting more conservatively in congress finally the estimates imply significant multiplier effects for every protester republican votes increase by seven to fourteen votes together our results show that protests can build political movements that ultimately affect policy and they suggest that it is unlikely that these effects arise solely through the standard channel of private information revelation

credibility and policy convergence in a two party system with rational voters the traditional approach to modeling political parties behavior based upon the contribution of anthony downs 1957 assumes that the parties unique objective is to win elections thus they maximize their popularity the crucial implication of this assumption for a two party system is that if the two parties have the same information about voters preferences full convergence of policies results from electoral competition this is the crucial implication of the median voter theorem more generally it may be argued that different parties are motivated differently because they represent different constituencies parties may not care only about winning elections per se but also about the quality of the policies resulting from an election in this case the candidates of the two parties view winning an election not only as a goal per se but also as a means of implementing a better policy for their respective constituencies this paper shows that electoral competitions imply dynamic inconsistency if the voters are modeled as rational and forwardlooking agents and parties do not care exclusively about being elected but also about which policy to implement once elected the dynamic inconsistency arises as follows the parties have an incentive to announce convergent platforms to increase their chances of election however if the elected party is not committed to its electoral platform it has an incentive to follow its most preferred policy rather than the policy announced in its platform if voters are rational they account for this incentive thus in general in a one shot electoral game the only timeconsistent equilibrium is one in which no convergence is possible the two parties follow their most preferred policies and the voters rationally expect this outcome full convergence of parties platforms results only as a limiting case when the parties are completely indifferent with respect to the quality of the policies resulting from the election thus these results differ from the existing literature on ideologically motivated politicians for instance donald wittman 1977 1983 randall calvert 1985 which implicitly assumes the possibility of binding commitments to electoral platforms complete or partial policy convergence can be the outcome of political competition if the interaction between the parties and the voters is modeled as an infinitely repeated game in fact if the candidates have concave objective functions the welfare maximizing policy rule implies a complete convergence of parties policies however this cooperative and agreed upon policy may or may not be sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium depending on parameter values in particular it depends on the discount rates of the two parties the degree of polarization of their preferences and the relative popu graduate school of industrial administration carnegie mellon university pittsburgh pa 15213 and national bureau of economic research cambridge ma 02138 this paper is based upon a chapter of my unpublished doctoral dissertation at harvard university i am greatly indebted to jeffrey sachs for directing my attention toward these issues and for many conversations i also wish to thank andrew abel dilip abreu olivier blanchard ramon caminal andrew caplin alex cukierman morris fiorina benjamin friedman herschel grossman howard rosenthal and the referees for very useful comments the responsibilitv af anv n mtnkieis af calrirp nfnlv mine the result of policy convergence in a two party system is more general than the median voter theorem for discussions of convergence results not at the median see john ledyard 1984 peter coughlin 1984 coughlin and shmuel nitzan 1981 melvin hinich 1977 for earlier work on spatial competition see richard mckelvey 1975 hinich ledyard and peter ordeshook 1972 1973 and the references quoted therein the present paper focuses on the result of convergence rather than on the median voter theorem per se

the paradox of information and voter turnout the most prominent explanation for the paradox of voter turnout is that citizens are willing to bear the cost of voting because they perceive a benefit e g fulfilling a civic duty or expressing themselves that is independent of the election outcome however a separate literature highlights the empirical importance of information for voter participation and existing explanations for this are that uninformed citizens either expect smaller benefits from voting or defer strategically to peers who know more this paper simply points out that while either of these theories offers a plausible explanation for the importance of information neither is robust if the motivation for voting is unrelated to the election outcome this is because citizens with positive net voting costs should abstain no matter how well informed while those with negative net voting costs should vote no matter how poorly informed thus the purported resolution to the turnout paradox raises a new paradox of information and voter turnout intuitively the quality of a vote should matter only if the vote is somehow instrumental suggesting that future work should continue to explore instrumental rationales for voting

the condorcet jury theorem free speech and correlated votes one of the more optimistic if obscure propositions about democracy is condorcet s jury theorem cjt the theorem establishes that under certain conditions a majority of a group with limited information about a pair of alternatives is more likely to choose the better alternative than any one member of the group the theorem thus provides a mathematical basis for majority rule voting and potentially gives an important clue to our understanding of the strength of democratic government yet cjt makes two overly restrictive assumptions it assumes that individuals vote independently and that they share a common goal clearly the assumptions preclude any application of the theorem to democratic politics not surprisingly black 1963 163 ruled that the theorem offers truly an unpromising start recently interest in the theorem was revived by miller 1986 who permits voters to have conflicting goals and by grofman and feld 1988 who link it with rousseau s general will miller 1986 and grofman and feld 1988 however retain the assumption of independence in this paper i generalize cjt for correlated votes and offer an analytical basis for free speech moreover i apply the generalized theorem to organization theory who should a chief executive choose as advisers the main results of the paper are summarized for large groups condorcet s result would hold under fairly general conditions for small groups the conditions are severe finally under reasonable assumptions p the probability that a majority selects the

are overhead costs strictly proportional to activity evidence from hospital departments abstract using cross sectional data from hospitals in washington state we test whether overhead costs are proportional to overhead activities this assumption is at the heart of nearly all cost accounting systems which implicitly assume that marginal cost is equal to average cost empirically the proportionality hypothesis can be rejected for most of the overhead accounts on average across the accounts the average cost per unit of activity overstates marginal costs by about 40 and in some departments by over 100 thus the average cost per activity should be used with a great deal of caution in decisions

public protests and policy making technological advances and the development of social media have made petitions public protests and other form of spontaneous activism increasingly common tools for individuals to influence decision makers to study these phenomena in this article i present a theory of petitions and public protests that explores their limits as mechanisms to aggregate information the key assumption is that valuable information is dispersed among citizens through petitions and protests citizens can signal their private information to the policy maker who can then choose to use it or not i first show that if citizens individual signals are not sufficiently precise information aggregation is impossible no matter how large is the population of informed citizens even if the conflict with the policy maker is small i then characterize the conditions on conflict and the signal structure that guarantee information aggregation when these conditions are satisfied i show that full information aggregation is possible as the population grows to infinity when they are not satisfied i show that information aggregation may still be possible if social media are available

collective action cascades an informational rationale for the power in numbers self interested individuals pursue their goals rationally taking into account the constraints imposed by their environment and best responding to the strategic behavior of other individuals when applied to collective action economic theory predicts undersupply meanwhile the behavior of masses of people is described as excitable emotional irrational suggestible hypnotic disorderly and unpredictable in practice it seems collective action is oversupplied and erratically so the contagious and volatile dynamics of collective action appear to defy rationalization i conceptualize a social movement as a dynamic informational cascade turbulencies emerge endogenously from rational individual behavior disorderly mass behavior is a by product of a powerful decentralized mechanism of information aggregation

a nonlinear expenditure system using a linear logit specification recent literature on the estimation of models of consumer expenditure patterns indicates that engel curves are nonlinear and demographic variables are important determinants of demand a linear logit household expenditures model is presented which automatically displays adding up properties derived from the budget constraint while permitting great flexibility in the engel curves in addition homogeneity and symmetry can be imposed and tested and by a simple transformation the coefficients can be estimated by linear regression another advantage of the model is that demographic variables such as household size and composition can be introduced without sacrificing the adding up properties

abstention in elections with asymmetric information and diverse preferences we analyze a model of a two candidate election with costless voting in which voters have asymmetric information and diverse preferences we demonstrate that a strictly positive fraction of the electorate will abstain and that nevertheless elections effectively aggregate voters private information using examples we show that more informed voters are more likely to vote than their less informed counterparts increasing the fraction of the electorate that is informed however may lead to higher levels of abstention we conclude by showing that a biased distribution of information can lead to a biased voting population but does not lead to biased outcomes

voting as communicating mandates multiple candidates and the signaling voter s curse abstract in this spatial model of common value elections votes convey citizens private opinions regarding which policies are socially optimal and the winning candidate utilizes this information in choosing policy in equilibrium large margins of victory convey mandates for candidates to make bold policy changes to communicate extreme policy views citizens support extreme parties that may be unlikely to win office to convey moderate views citizens deliberately abstain from voting thereby avoiding the signaling voter s curse of encouraging overextremism in large elections mandates can identify the optimal policy from an entire continuum thereby greatly strengthening condorcet s 1785 classic jury theorem behavioral patterns are consistent with otherwise puzzling empirical features of elections and can also apply to other political activities such as public protests or writing letters to elected officials

the cost of regulation osha epa and the productivity slowdown the slowdown in productivity growth in the u s economy during the 1970 s has been a matter of great concern to policymakers associated as it is with inflation unemployment and declining real wage growth this paper examines the impact on productivity growth of government regulation specifically worker health and safety regulation by the occupational safety and health administration osha and environmental regulation by the environmental protection agency epa looking at data for 450 manufacturing industries between 1958 and 1978 the study finds a large negative relationship between such regulation and productivity growth using these results about 30 percent of the decline in productivity growth in manufacturing during the 1970 s may be attributed to such regulation several previous studies have looked at the contribution of regulation to the productivity slowdown many of these have inferred that the contribution must be small on the basis of the relatively small amount spent on complying with such regulations edward denison 1979 estimates that only about 16 percent of the productivity slowdown in the 1972 75 period was due to regulation 35 percentage points out of a slowdown of 2 17 percentage points paul portney 1981 notes that little of gnp is spent on pollution control under 2 percent concluding that therefore pollution regulations could have little effect on productivity growth norsworthy et al 1979 also find a small impact of pollution abatement capital expenditures on productivity growth studies based on econometric estimation of the regulation productivity relationship have found a wide range of results gregory christainsen and robert haveman 1981 find regulation reduced labor productivity growth by 27 percentage points using time series data and measures of total federal regulation robert crandall 1981 finds a strong relationship between pollution abatement capital and productivity growth but this relationship disappears when a measure of energy intensity is included robin siegel 1979 observes a significant contribution 5 percentage points from pollution control expenditures to the productivity slowdown for 1965 73 but not for later years finally frank gollop and mark roberts 1983 examine data for a set of electric utilities and find that regulation of emissions had a large impact on total factor productivity growth lowering it for regulated firms by 59 percentage points many other factors might help to explain the productivity slowdown including the rise in energy prices the long and severe recession and declines in research and development expenditures there have been a variety of studies examining the contributions of each factor to the slowdown they generally conclude that many factors contributed to the slowdown but that a sizable fraction of the slowdown remains unexplained by the estimated contributions of all the factors considered

voting as communicating this paper develops a model where voters trade off two different motives when deciding how to vote they care about current decision making they are strategic but they also care about communicating their views about their most preferred candidate so as to influence future elections by influencing other voters opinion and or party positioning in effect voters in this model are intermediate between strategic and sincere voters of conventional models in elections with more than 2 candidates this allows us to better investigate the relative efficiency of various electoral systems our main conclusion is that since voting is used as a communication device electoral systems should be designed to facilitate efficient communication e g by opting for 2 round systems rather than 1 round systems

overconfidence in political behavior this paper studies theoretically and empirically the role of overconfidence in political behavior our model of overconfidence in beliefs predicts that overconfidence leads to ideological extremeness increased voter turnout and stronger partisan identification the model also makes nuanced predictions about the patterns of ideology in society these predictions are tested using unique data that measure the overconfidence and standard political characteristics of a nationwide sample of over 3 000 adults our numerous predictions find strong support in these data in particular we document that overconfidence is a substantively and statistically important predictor of ideological extremeness voter turnout and partisan identification jel c83 d03 d72 d83

differential environmental regulation effects on electric utility capital turnover and emissions this paper tests the hypothesis that differential regulations reduced the rate of capital turnover in the electric utility industry resulting in increased emissions of sulfur dioxide based on a sample of forty four privately owned electric utilities operating over the period 1969 83 the authors results indicate that 1 regulation increased the age of capital by an average of 3 29 years 24 6 percent 2 increases in the age of capital have no statistically significant impact on emissions and 3 in the absence of regulation emissions would have increased by 3 79 tons per million kwhs 34 6 percent copyright 1993 by mit press

the marginal voter s curse an intuitive explanation for voter abstention is that a voter is uncertain which policy or candidate to vote for and so defers to the rest of the electorate to make the decision in majoritarian elections this has been formally modelled as a strategic response to the swing voter s curse which arises because the rare event of a pivotal vote conveys substantial information in electoral systems other than majority rule however the standard pivotal voting calculus may not apply this paper analyzes one such system namely proportional representation where additional votes continue to push the policy outcome in one direction or the other a new strategic incentive for abstention arises in that case to avoid the marginal voter s curse of pushing the policy outcome in the wrong direction intuitively conditioning on the rare event of a pivotal vote might seem to have a greater impact on behavior but the marginal voter s curse actually presents a larger disincentive for voting than the swing voter s curse this and other predictions of the model are con rmed empirically by a series of laboratory experiments

information aggregation in polls we study information transmission via polling a policymaker polls constitu ents who differ in their information and ideology to determine policy full rev elation is an equilibrium in a poll with a small sample but not with a large one in large polls full information aggregation can arise in an equilibrium where constituents endogenously sort themselves into centrists who respond truth fully and extremists who do not we find polling statistics that ignore strate gic behavior yield biased estimators and mischaracterize the polvs margin of error we construct estimators that account for strategic behavior finally we compare polls and elections jel c42 d83

choosing not to choose on the link between information and abstention abstract we use a dataset that allows us to circumvent a number of estimation difficulties that have plagued previous studies of the relationship between information and abstention our results show that information is a major determinant of abstention

the swing voter s curse the authors analyze two candidate elections in which some voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters they demonstrate the existence of a swing voter s curse less informed indifferent voters strictly prefer to abstain rather than vote for either candidate even when voting is costless the swing voter s curse leads to the equilibrium result that a substantial fraction of the electorate will abstain even though all abstainers strictly prefer voting for one candidate over voting for another copyright 1996 by american economic association

polling games and information revelation in the downsian framework abstract we investigate the incentives faced by poll respondents when candidates use polling data to inform their selection of policy platforms focusing on models with a unidimensional policy space single peaked preferences and two office seeking candidates observing a summary statistic from polls that ask respondents their preferences we find that for most environments honest poll response cannot occur in a perfect bayesian equilibrium however simple partially revealing equilibria exist when the poll only asks respondents which party or candidate they prefer when the candidates learn the sample average or see all the data there are partially revealing equilibria that mimic those of the binary message game interpretation of polling data requires knowledge of the equilibrium played as the meanings of poll responses are endogenously determined the analysis suggests that naive use of polling data may be misleading

a model of political competition with citizen candidates the authors develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates a winner implements her favorite policy the equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of running and positively on the benefits of winning for some parameter values all equilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates whose positions are distinct two candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule than under a runoff system the candidates positions are less differentiated under a runoff system there exist equilibria under both systems in which some candidates have no chance of winning

differentiated regulation the case of auto emissions standards this paper presents an analysis of automotive emissions regulation that explicitly considers the link between regulation and the composition of the vehicle stock the adoption of more stringent emissions standards for new vehicles is shown to prolong the retention of old high emission rate vehicles in the fleet for this reason tighter new source standards actually increase aggregate emissions in the short run this result is of general as well as specific interest given the widespread use of differentiated regulatory tools incorporating a bias against new sources in many regulatory programs 3 references 1 table

aggregating information by voting the wisdom of the experts versus the wisdom of the masses this article analyzes participation and information aggregation in a common value election with continuous private signals in equilibrium some citizens ignore their private information and abstain from voting in deference to those with higher quality signals even as the number of highly informed peers grows large however citizens with only moderate expertise continue voting so that voter participation remains at realistic levels e g 50 to 60 percent for simple examples the precise level of voter turnout along with the margin of victory are determined by the distribution of expertise improving a voter s information makes her more willing to vote consistent with a growing body of empirical evidence but makes her peers more willing to abstain providing a new explanation for various empirical patterns of voting equilibrium participation is optimal even though the marginal voter may have very little e g below average expertise and even though nonvoters information is not utilized copyright oxford university press

why do people rate theory and evidence on online ratings abstract the rapid growth of online retail in the last decade has led to widespread use of consumer generated ratings this paper theoretically and experimentally identifies influences that drive consumers to rate products and examines how those factors can create distortions in product ratings by manipulating payoffs and effectively deactivating either the buyer or seller side of an artificial laboratory market raters behavior is decomposed into buyer centric and seller centric components the cost of providing a rating also plays a major role in influencing rating behavior with high and low quality sellers being rated more often than those of moderate quality