repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory the case of risk neutrality we consider a repeated moral hazard problem where both the principal and the wealth constrained agent are risk neutral in each of two periods the agent can exert unobservable effort leading to success or failure incentives provided in the second period act as carrot and stick for the first period so that the effort level induced in the second period is higher after a first period success than after a failure if renegotiation cannot be prevented the principal may prefer a project with lower returns i e a project may be too good to be financed or similarly an agent can be overqualified this article offers a new perspective on dynamic moral hazard problems consider a riskneutral principal who can hire a risk neutral but wealth constrained agent the agent can exert unobservable effort which increases the likelihood of success in the one shot problem there is a well known trade off between effort incentives and rent extraction which leads to a downward distorted effort level compared to the first best solution we extend the standard model by assuming that there is a second period in which the principal can make an investment to continue the project and the agent can again exert unobservable effort it turns out that there are several interesting insights that so far have escaped the literature on repeated moral hazard which was focused on the case of risk averse agents in particular if the principal can commit not to renegotiate the second period incentives can be used to partially circumvent the limited liability constraint in the second period the principal induces the agent to choose a particularly high effort level following a first period success and a particularly low effort level following a first period failure the prospect of a higher second period rent following a first period success motivates the agent to exert more effort in the first period i e rents in the second period act as reward and punishment for the first period it should be emphasized that we assume no technological impact of a first period success or failure on the second period technology nevertheless an optimal dynamic contract exhibits memory hence if an outsider observed today a principal agent pair that was successful and another identical pair that was not successful he would be right to predict that the first pair also is more likely to succeed tomorrow in other words a serial correlation across periods which we sometimes refer to as a hot hand effect is generated endogenously merely based on incentive considerations 2

economics of leadership and hierarchy this paper explores leadership within hierarchical organizations for each hierarchy i consider a dynamic signaling game in which each player observes only the actions of his direct superiors before choosing his action at the top of the hierarchy are the leaders who learn the state from nature the hierarchy controls the flow of information and the timing of the game and determines the equilibrium output and welfare i show that the welfare optimal hierarchy is the chain because it maximizes the incentive of players to lead by example for their subordinates the chain remains optimal even in the presence of verifiable or unverifiable costly information acquisition by the leaders

land development and preservation over time and under uncertainty a review and a research agenda abstract the combination of a rising interest in sustainable natural resource use and the increasingly fractious nature of the interactions between developers and preservationists has led to renewed interest in the question of appropriate natural resource management in this paper i consider the question of land development and preservation over time and under uncertainty i first review the extant literature and then i discuss its shortcomings next i propose a research agenda which will enable us to shed light on some important management questions faced by land developers

journal pricing and mergers a portfolio approach despite their influence on the careers of economists the production and pricing of scholarly journals have received scant attention from the profession by contrast the issue of journal quality and scholarly research productivity have been studied in far greater detail a search in the econlit database using the term journal generates several dozen papers on this topic although there may be a number of reasons for this imbalance it is likely that the tenure process combined with the low if not zero effective cost of journals on campuses have influenced our research agenda in other words while professors worry about their job security publish well or perish others their librarians are charged with maintaining free access to all relevant journals of course this pattern is observed not just in economics but across academic disciplines in recent years however easy access to journals has been threatened beset by persistent journal price inflation especially in the socalled stm fields or science technology and medicine and stagnant budgets many university libraries have been forced to reallocate dollars from monographs to journals to postpone the purchase of new journal titles and in some cases to cancel titles as a consequence libraries often relied on interlibrary loans to satisfy faculty demands this situation and its possible causes has been studied at great length in the library science literature with few exceptions a consensus has evolved there which focuses on the growing importance of commercial publishers in the market for scholarly journals over the past decade or more commercial firms have aggressively raised prices at a rate disproportionate to any increase in costs or quality this appears to be especially true for the largest commercial firms although the analysis underlying these conclusions is generally not of the multivariate sort it is suggestive enough to warrant further investigation school of economics georgia institute of technology 781 marietta street nw atlanta ga 30318 e mail mark mccabe econ gatech edu i would like to thank many of my former colleagues at the department of justice including craig conrath renata hesse aaron hoag russ pittman david reitman dan rubinfeld and greg werden as well as jonathan baker cory capps george deltas luke froeb jeffrey mackie mason roger noll dan o brien richard quandt lars hendrik roller steve salop and margaret slade seminar participants at the federal trade commission georgia tech north carolina state university suny stony brook and wissenschaft zentrum berlin and participants at the meetings of the american economic association the european association of research in industrial economics the southern economics association and western economics association the association of research libraries and its members the national library of medicine the georgia tech library and the georgia tech foundation have provided invaluable assistance expert data support was provided by a large group of individuals including deena bernstein claude briggs pat finn doug heslep and steve stiglitz finally i would like to thank the dozens of librarians and publishers who have provided me with important insights 1 the exceptions are janusz a ordover and robert d willig 1978 lisa lieberman et al 1992 george a chressanthis and june d chressanthis 1994 mccabe 2000 and theodore c bergstrom 2001 ordover and willig model the pricing of a single title to institutional and individual subscribers bergstrom s paper discusses the differences between commercial and nonprofit economics journals the other three papers are discussed below 2 increasingly journals are available in both print and digital versions and for some new titles only a digital format is available see carol tenopir and donald king 2000 ch 15 starting in 1998 commercial publishers began placing their content online although major research libraries have generally responded by adding digital access this shift is still in its early stages especially in cases where library collections are more specialized e g the typical biomedical library for this reason as well as the fact that more than two thirds of the sample period occurred in a print only environment the emphasis of this paper is on the behavior of publishers and libraries in a print environment the economic implications of digital access are considered briefly at the conclusion of the paper and are a subject of ongoing research 3 see martha kyrillidou 1999 4 see tenopir and king 2000 ch 13 for a review of this literature an alternative explanation for journal price inflation has been offered by lieberman et al 1992 they argue that entry by new titles over time has lowered circulation for existing journals forcing the latter to raise prices to cover fixed costs

understanding hurricane evacuation decisions under contingent scenarios a stated preference approach we conduct a stated preference analysis to understand the factors that individual households take into consideration to evacuate during hurricanes in designing the contingent scenarios for evacuation we randomly assign varying levels of hurricane characteristics wind speed lead time for landfall and the height of storm surge combined with different types of emergency management options voluntary versus mandatory evacuation order and a voucher with varying amounts to cover evacuation expenses findings indicate that individual households respond in a non linear fashion to the intensity of hurricanes when making evacuation decisions respondents are also more likely to evacuate when the storm surge reaches a certain threshold in terms of policy interventions mandatory evacuation orders are more effective to increase the likelihood of evacuation the potential intervention in the form of providing evacuation vouchers to assist households to cover their expenses e g for food water transportation and lodging also seems effective we discuss policy implications of our findings

ex ante consumer welfare evaluation in cost benefit analysis abstract public projects and policies are normally evaluated ex ante i e while consumers may still be uncertain about future prices income levels interest rates and preferences this paper extends the theory of ex ante consumer welfare evaluation by developing a 2 period model with multiple sources of uncertainty it provides insights into the influence of temporal uncertainty on the empirical measurement of ex ante willingness to pay

valuing non market goods using contingent valuation abstract contingent valuation is a technique being developed by economists for the valuation of environmental commodities not traded in markets this paper discusses the major problem areas associated with this method of value estimation these comprise bias strategic hypothetical and design biases the discrepancy between willingness to pay and compensation demanded the aggregation procedure the choice of question format and non use values some evidence from comparative studies is reported and comments made on the accuracy of contingent valuation answers finally the conditions under which contingent valuation seems to operate best are set out

on the valuation of uncertainty in welfare analysis thisarticle developsa general model of private and public choice under temporal uncertainty the model incorporatesthe effectsof ris k preferencesand the pros pect of future learning into both the individual and aggregate valuationsof public projects the analys isprovidesnew ins ightson individual valuation itsimplicationsfor benefit cos t analys isand the characterization of paretoefficiency under uncertainty it also resolves some of the confusion in the option value and quasioption value literature private and public decisions typically involve many sources of uncertainty including uncertainty about prices income technology environmental quality health etc temporal uncertainty is also common where some of the risk 1 getsresolved over time due to learning additionally private and public decisions often exhibit some form of irreversibility implying that current choicescan affect the ability of decision makers to be flexible and to adjust their future choices in response to forthcoming information when uncertainty and irreversibility are both present welfare analys isgainscomplexity and importance although considerable progress has been made since weisbrod s seminal article a better understanding of the roles of uncertainty and irreversibility in welfare analys improve our ability aseconomis ts to communicate the importance of risk in project evaluation to public decision makers

estimating the effects of global patent protection in pharmaceuticals a case study of quinolones in india under the trips agreement wto members are required to enforce product patents for pharmaceuticals the debate about the merits of this requirement has been extremely contentious many low income economies claim that patent protection for pharmaceuticals will result in substantially higher prices for medicines with adverse consequences for the health and well being of their citizens on the other hand research based global pharmaceutical companies argue that prices are unlikely to rise significantly because most patented products have therapeutic substitutes in this paper we empirically investigate the basis of these claims central to the ongoing debate is the structure of demand for pharmaceuticals in poor economies where because health insurance coverage is so rare almost all medical expense are met out of pocket using a detailed product level data set from india we estimate key price and expenditure elasticities and supply side parameters for the fluoroquinolones sub segment of the systemic anti bacterials i e antibiotics segment of the indian pharmaceuticals market we then use these estimates to carry out counterfactual simulations of what prices profits and consumer welfare would have been had the fluoroquinolone molecules we study been under patent in india as they were in the u s at the time our results suggest that concerns about the potential adverse welfare effects of trips may have some basis we estimate that in the absence of any price regulation or compulsory licensing the total annual welfare losses to the indian economy from the withdrawal of the four domestic product groups in the fluoroquinolone sub segment would be on the order of u s 450 million or about 73 of the sales of the entire systemic anti bacterials segment in 2000 of this amount foregone profits of domestic producers constitute roughly 50 million or 11 the overwhelming portion of the total welfare loss therefore derives from the loss of consumer welfare in contrast the profit gains to foreign producers in the absence of any price regulation are estimated to be only around 53 million per year

the sign and size of option value we adapt the theoretical state preference model to value nonmarket public goods under individual uncertainty about use illustrating with an assessment of willingness to pay to prevent acid rain lake damage in the northeast united states individual

errors in the numerical assessment of the benefits of price stabilization this paper presents a simple computational procedure for determining a consumer s willingness to pay to have a price stabilization policy implemented numerical simulations are then provided which demonstrate that the commonly used expected surplus measures whether hicksian or marshallian can in fact seriously misstate the true benefits of price stabilization these simulations also illustrate the extent to which the results may be dependent upon the assumptions made implicitly or explicitly regarding the consumer s attitudes toward risk thereby underscoring the need to conduct sensitivity analyses to determine the robustness of cost benefit assessments with respect to these assumptions

collusion exclusion and inclusion in random order bargaining this paper examines the profitability of three types of integration in a cooperative game solved by a random order value e g the shapley value collusion between players i and j is a contract merging their resources in the hands of one of them say i this contract can be represented as a combination of exclusion which lets i exclude j s resource but not use it himself and inclusion which lets i use j s resource but not exclude j from it this representation yields a third difference condition on the characteristic function that determines the profitability of collusion generalizing existing results for specific games namely collusion is profitable unprofitable when the complementarity of the colluding players is reduced increased by other players

the competitive effects of a new product introduction a case study this paper analyzes the competitive effect of a new product introduction we break the overall competitive effect into two parts the effect on the prices of existing products due to increased competition and the effect of having additional product variety using data from both before and after the introduction we directly estimate the price effects and the additional variety effect then using only the estimated post introduction demand structure along with an assumed model of competition we estimate the price effects indirectly by comparing the indirect and direct estimates we assess the validity of alternative models of competition for the industry

spatial differentiation and vertical mergers in retail markets for gasoline this paper studies an empirical model of spatial competition applied to gasoline markets the main feature is to specify commuting paths as the locations of consumers in a hotelling style model as a result spatial differentiation depends in an intuitive way on the structure of the road network and the direction of traffic flows the model is estimated using panel data on the quebec city gasoline market and used to evaluate the consequences of a recent vertical merger difference in difference and counterfactual simulation methods are compared and the results to a large extent validate the assumptions of the demand model jel g34 l13 l42 l81 q41 r41

optimal incentives for sequential production processes i study optimal incentive schemes in organizations where agents perform their tasks sequentially i consider a model in which agents effort decisions are mapped into the probability of the project s success an optimal investment inducing mechanism allocates rewards to agents so as to induce all of them to exert effort in equilibrium at minimal cost to the principal i characterize the unique optimal mechanism in several versions of my benchmark model i also address the problem of allocating individuals with diverse qualifications to different slots of the production process as well as allocating tasks of different importance across different agents copyright 2006 rand

more evidence on the performance of merger simulations government antitrust agencies must predict the price effects of proposed mergers and chal lenge those predicted to reduce consumer wel fare merger simulation a model of oligopoly combined with demand estimates is routinely used to simulate the effects of potential merg ers gregory j werden and luke m froeb 2006 provide a survey merger simulation addresses the key question regulators must answer would a potential merger reduce consumer welfare however it requires strong assumptions on the nature of competition both before and after the merger occurs the shape of demand and mar ginal cost functions as well as the statistical assumptions necessary to consistently estimate demand given these strong assumptions and the substantial resources devoted to antitrust review it is important to evaluate the accuracy of simulation methodology this paper adds to a small literature that evaluates merger simu lation by comparing predicted price effects to retrospective estimates of the price effects of a

welfare measures when agents can learn a unifying theory we extend graham s 1981 welfare analysis under uncertainty to a dynamic environment where the agent can delay and obtain information the dynamic willingness to pay locus unifies the concepts of option price dynamic wtp commitment costs and quasi option value option price dynamic wtp corresponds to the ex ante wtp when the agent ignores recognises the learning opportunity the commitment cost or the difference between option price and dynamic wtp equals the annualised and monetised quasi option value state contingent contracts have added value by allowing trading among agents with heterogeneous access to future information and delay opportunities

incentives and discrimination optimal incentive mechanisms may require that agents are rewarded differentially even when they are completely identical and are induced to act the same we demonstrate this point by means of a simple incentive model where agents decisions about effort exertion is mapped into a probability that the project will succeed we give necessary and sufficient conditions for optimal incentive mechanisms to be discriminatory we also show that full discrimination across all agents is required if and only if the technology has increasing return to scale in the non symmetric framework we show that negligible differences in agents attributes may result in major differences in rewards in the unique optimal mechanism this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

willingness to pay for gains and losses in visibility and health two different willingness to pay responses are compared willingness to pay to avoid loss of air quality and willingness to pay to obtain gains in air quality contingent valuation data were used to estimate bid functions for these two types of responses for visibility and health comparison of the estimated models indicates that in addition to magnitude differences gains and losses for visibility and health are affected differently by health status risk perceptions and other risk related variables results for the loss measure are more reliable in terms of variability of response and econometric modeling

mergers coordinated effects and efficiency in the portuguese non life insurance industry we evaluate the impact on market power and efficiency of a series of mergers on three portuguese non life insurance markets we specify and estimate with a panel of firm level data a structural model which includes preferences technology and a market equilibrium condition firms demand curves are not very elastic firms technologies exhibit scale and scope economies and high cost efficiency scores we find that for the period following the mergers there is no evidence of i an increase in market power through coordinated behavior or ii changes in cost efficiency levels in addition social welfare increased

testing static oligopoly models conduct and cost in the sugar industry 1890 1914 we explore the widespread methodology of using demand information to infer market conduct and unobserved cost components under the hypothesis of static oligopoly behavior direct measures of marginal cost and conduct indicating small market power serve as benchmarks the more competitive models yield better cost estimates the best cost estimates occur when conduct is estimated as a free parameter which in turn only slightly underestimates our direct measure it also tracks the decline in market power accompanying the industry s structural changes the methodology is largely validated although partial cost information can improve its predictive power conclusions are robust to demand function

mergers with differentiated products the case of the ready to eat cereal industry traditional merger analysis is difficult to implement when evaluating mergers in industries with differentiated products i discuss an alternative which consists of demand estimation and the use of a model of postmerger conduct to simulate the competitive effects of a merger i estimate a brand level demand system for ready to eat cereal using supermarket scanner data and use the estimates to 1 recover marginal costs 2 simulate postmerger price equilibria and 3 compute welfare effects under a variety of assumptions the methodology is applied to five mergers two of which occurred and for which i compare predicted to actual outcomes

evaluating the performance of merger simulation evidence from the u s airline industry abstract this paper uses merger simulations to predict postmerger prices for five airline mergers from the 1980s and compares these predictions with observed postmerger prices i find that standard simulation methods which measure the effect of the change in ownership on unilateral pricing incentives do not generally provide an accurate forecast by incorporating postmerger information into the model i measure the relative importance of other factors that also contributed to the observed price changes the results indicate that the unexplained component of the price change is largely accounted for by supply side effects i conclude that deviations from the assumed model of firm conduct play an important role in accounting for the differences between the predicted and observed price changes this conclusion suggests that the predictive performance of merger simulation would benefit if more flexible models of firm conduct were incorporated into the methodology

differentiating use and nonuse values for coastal pond water quality improvements this paper measures the benefits of water quality improvements in three coastal ponds on the island of martha s vineyard massachusetts u s a use option and existence values were elicited from martha s vineyard property owners by the contingent valuation method on average more than half of the total benefits are attributed to existence value results from the heckman selection model show that the exclusion of protest as well as missing bids does not cause significant bias in estimating respondents willingness to pay socioeconomic characteristics are found to have distinctively different influences on use option and existence values different model parameters are likely to be estimated depending on which value categories are measured by a selected valuation technique these findings emphasize the importance of nonuse values from water quality improvements and of socioeconomic characteristics for measuring different categories of values

work environment and individual background explaining regional shirking differentials in a large italian firm the prevalence of shirking within a large italian bank appears to be characterized by significant regional differentials in particular absenteeism and misconduct episodes are substantially more prevalent in the south we consider a number of potential explanations for this fact different individual backgrounds group interaction effects sorting of workers across regions differences in local attributes different hiring policies and discrimination against southern workers our analysis suggests that individual backgrounds group interaction effects and sorting effects contribute to explaining the north south shirking differential none of the other explanations appears to be of first order importance i introduction whether individual behavior is determined by group interactions or by individual background is undoubtedly a fundamental question for the social sciences this question presented itself forcefully when we stumbled onto the following piece of evidence there appear to be significant regional differentials in the prevalence of shirking among the employees of a large italian bank in particular absenteeism and misconduct episodes are considerably more frequent in the southern branches of the bank in this paper we examine several potential explanations for this fact first individual preferences for shirking versus working may differ according to one s region of hirth we will refer to this hj othesis as one of different individual hackgrounds the second possibility is one of locational sorting low shirking types may tend to migrate to the north high shirking types may tend to migrate to the south or hoth third the northern and southern

non cooperative bargaining in natural monopolies abstract the joint production of a single output from a single input by a group of potential users of a technology is usually analyzed in the literature using a cooperative approach we provide an analysis for such economies by means of non cooperative bargaining two bargaining models are analyzed one based on demands the other on proposals we show that the convexity of the production function implies that subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of these bargaining games are coalition stable i e core outcomes in the case of the proposal model the equilibrium outcomes yield even a full characterization of the core journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d21 d42

price competition in u s brewing this study utilizes a brand level dataset that captures a unique natural experiment a 100 increase in the excise tax to evaluate different pricing models in the u s beer industry to assess the plausibility of different models the increase in marginal cost resulting from the tax increase is exploited observed prices in the post increase period are compared to the prices that should be observed under various pricing models three types of models are analyzed bertrand nash leadership and collusion results indicate that extreme cases of collusion can be confidently ruled out while several models may explain the observed prices equally well

further tests of static oligopoly models whiskey 1882 1898 using data from the turn of the century whiskey industry we conduct tests of the neio methodology similar to those conducted by genesove and mullin 1998 like genesove and mullin we find that the neio methodology appears to perform reasonably well for low levels of market power conduct is somewhat overestimated with estimates ranging from 0 17 to 0 35 as compared to direct estimates of 0 09 cost parameters are generally underestimated estimates of conduct and remaining cost parameters improve significantly however with additional information on cost estimates improve further if conduct is allowed to have two regimes which are identified based on historical evidence

divestiture requirements as a tool for competition policy a case from the swedish beer market we investigate the effect of divestitures on prices and welfare following the carlsberg pripps merger in the swedish beer market both difference in difference estimation and simulations using a random coefficients logit model suggest that divestitures are important for dampening price increases prices of divested brands fall by around 3 and the predicted price increase for carlsberg falls from 3 to 1 6 as a result of the divestitures to guide practice on divestitures we investigate the role of the recipient and the number and characteristics of the divested products by simulating post merger outcomes for all relevant cases we find that in this setting with large multiproduct firms the competition authority s most effective means to dampen adverse post merger outcomes are to aim for a small recipient firm and attain a large number of divested products enforcing larger divestitures in terms of market share and raising the average cross price elasticity between the merging parties divested and retained products strengthen the dampening effect further

an assessment of the empirical magnitude of option values for environment goods this paper provides an empirical assessment of the magnitude of option values relative to expected surplus using a model presented by larson and flacco 1992 option values and option prices are computed for both simulated data sets and actual estimates of recreation demands results indicate that option values engendered by price and income uncertainty are generally quite a small percent of expected surplus

the gains from merger or collusion in product differentiated industries a merger in an industry with differentiated products increases the market power of the merging firms to the extent that their products are close substitutes and that other firms produce only more distant substitutes such a merger makes the residual demand curve of each partner steeper by shifting each in the direction of the industry demand curve 2 the extent of this increase in market power depends upon the own elasticity of demand for each merging firm s product as well as the cross elasticity of demand for each with all other firms products as a result evaluating the effect of a merger between two firms with n 2 other competitors would seem to require the estimation of at least n2 parameters all of the price elasticities of demand a formidable task that extremely difficult estimation task is unnecessary however the necessary information is contained in the slopes of the two single firm residual demand curves before the merger and the extent to which the merged firm will face a steeper demand curve for example suppose a merger between two u s brewing firms say pabst and anheuser busch were proposed it is not particularly important to determine whether it is competition from miller or competition from stroh or from heileman or which puts the most effective brake on anheuser busch s pricing only the total effect of these other firms and the particular effect of competition from pabst are of interest this paper proposes econometric procedures for estimating the demand system that merger partners will face based only on pre merger data the key to the procedures is that the effects of all other firms in the industry are summed together formally we start with a model of an n firm product differentiated industry manipulation of the model removes the prices and quantities of all but two firms this reduces the dimensionality of the problem to manageable size rather than an n firm demand system we estimate a two firm residual demand system in this way the technique extends our econometric method for

nonuse values in benefit cost analysis benefit cost analysis bca is a pragmatic realization of the theory of welfare economics much of the research associated with bca has sought to expand the types of benefits that can be measured in dollar terms with this research there has been a progressive movement of goods and services from the set without measures usually designated as intangibles in bca terminology to the set with for example the recreational services provided by projects associated with dams for hydroelectric power or flood control were regarded as intangible until the development of the travel cost model for estimating the demand for outdoor recreation sites one of the current frontiers in bca research is associated with modeling and measuring nonuse benefits in contrast to the past efforts with intangibles research on this topic has remained controversial with few direct effects on the practice of applied welfare economics there are two principal reasons for this outcome first there has not been an accepted set of definitions for nonuse benefits and second applied studies with empirical estimates of nonuse benefits have until recently been non existent clearly these problems are related a consistent set of definitions is a necessary prerequisite for empirical implementation i will argue that consistent definitions for nonuse benefits have been elusive because the conceptual frameworks used in the literature to describe its primary components option value and existence values are not mutually consistent in the process of demonstrating this result i will describe the elements of a consistent framework for treating both use and nonuse benefits and apply it in explaining some of the problems with the available empirical estimates of nonuse benefits

evidence on the accuracy of merger simulations this paper evaluates the efficacy of a structural model of oligopoly used for merger review using premerger data we estimate several demand systems and use a static bertrand model to simulate the price effects of two mergers using pre and postmerger data we directly estimate the price effects the direct estimates imply that one merger resulted in moderate price increases while the second left prices essentially unchanged while some simulations are similar to the directly estimated price effects overall simulations overstate the price effects in one case and understate them in the other explanations for the discrepancies are explored

a note on option value and the expected value of consumer s surplus abstract in roughly contemporaneous papers cicchetti and freeman quart j econ 1971 and schmalensee amer econ rev 1972 reached apparently conflicting conclusions about the sign taken by option value cicchetti and freeman conclude that option value is always non negative schmalensee concludes that option value may be either positive or negative depending upon the circumstances this paper reconciles these seemingly contradictory conclusions it is demonstrated that cicchetti and freeman s unambiguous conclusions concerning the sign of option value are the result of two special strong assumptions not imposed by schmalensee

biosecurity incentives network effects and entry of a rapidly spreading pest abstract protection against pest invasion is a public good yet the nature of private incentives to avoid entry is poorly understood this work shows that due to increasing returns or network effects private actions to avoid entry are strategic complements this means that compulsory action at least by a subset of parties can be an effective policy both heterogeneity in biosecurity costs and the effect of private actions on the extent of the invasion threat are shown to have ambiguous effects on the magnitude of welfare loss due to strategic behavior communicated leadership by some party is preferred to simultaneous moves and it may be best if the party with highest biosecurity costs assumes a leadership role

a note on supply side option value there has recently been a resurgence of interest in the concept of option value anderson 1981 freeman 1984 1985 graham 1981 and smith 1983 1985 two articles in this journal brookshire eubanks and randall 1983 and bishop 1982 have suggested that option value is a more meaningful concept when demands are certain but future availability of the resource is uncertain a change which involves exchanging supply uncertainty for supply certainty will for the risk averse consumer be worth more than the change in expected consumer s surplus the amount more will be the worth of the risk reduction or the option value it will be unambiguously positive freeman 1985 has pointed out that exchanging supply uncertainty for supply certainty is just one of the possibilities and that at least in some cases what is assumed with respect to the price flexibility of income for the good can make a difference the objective of this note is to show that even when the price flexibility of income for the good is zero the sign of option value will be ambiguous in the case where the change involves an increase in the probability of supply fromp ito p2 with 0 p p2 1 this is freeman s 1985 case d and also the case which is the basis for brookshire eubanks and randall s empirical analysis however what is shown here is that neither freeman s 1985 assertion of a negative option value nor brookshire eubanks and randall s assertion of a positive option value can in general be justified for this case a model with supply uncertainty

how do incumbents respond to the threat of entry evidence from the major airlines this paper examines how incumbents respond to the threat of entry of competitors as distinguished from their response to competitors actual entry it uses a case study from the passenger airline industry specifically the evolution of southwest airlines route network to identify particular routes where the probability of future entry rises abruptly when southwest begins operating in airports on both sides of a route but not the route itself this dramatically raises the chance they will start flying that route in the near future we examine the pricing of the incumbents on threatened routes in the period surrounding such events we find that incumbents cut fares significantly when threatened by southwest s entry into their routes this is true even after controlling in several ways for airport specific operating costs the response of incumbents seems to be limited only to the threatened route itself and not to routes out of nearby competitor airports where southwest does not operate e g fares drop on routes from chicago midway but not chicago o hare the largest responses appear to be restricted to routes that were concentrated beforehand incumbents do experience short run increases in their passenger loads concurrent with these fare cuts this is consistent with theories implying incumbents will try to generate some longer term loyalty among current customers before the entry of a new competitor we examine evidence relating this demand building motive to frequent flyer programs and find suggestive evidence in favor of this notion there is only weak evidence that incumbents increase capacity on the routes

executive compensation a modern primer this article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation bringing them together under a simple unifying framework accessible to the general interest reader we analyze assignment models of the level of pay and static and dynamic moral hazard models of incentives and compare their predictions to empirical findings we make two broad points first traditional theories find it difficult to explain the data suggesting that compensation results from rent extraction by ceos however more modern shareholder value theories that arguably better capture the ceo setting do deliver predictions consistent with observed practices suggesting that these practices need not be inefficient second seemingly innocuous features of the modeling setup often made for tractability or convenience can lead to significant differences in the model s implications and conclusions on the efficiency of observed practices we close by highlighting apparent inefficiencies in executive compensation and additional directions for future research

coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities divide and conquer abstract the paper studies bilateral contracting between n agents and one principal whose trade with each agent generates externalities on other agents it examines the effects of prohibiting the principal from i coordinating agents on her preferred equilibrium and ii making different contracts available to different agents these effects depend on whether an agent is more or less eager to trade when others trade more the prohibitions reduce the aggregate trade in the former case and have little or no effect in the latter case the inefficiencies under different contracting regimes are linked to the sign of the relevant externalities and are shown to be typically reduced by both prohibitions

efficiency in sequential partnerships abstract we consider sequential partnerships in which agents obtain non verifiable information about the actions taken by previous agents for such partnerships a budget balanced sharing rule exists that induces efficient production the sharing rule has many desirable features 1 it uniquely implements efficient production 2 it does not rely on message games 3 it does not rely on unlimited liability and 4 it is robust to renegotiation the rule is furthermore simple intuitive and robust to sabotage coalition formation and noise it also induces efficient production when agents obtain incomplete information about previous actions journal of economic literature classificationnumbers d82 l23

specification and estimation of nonseparable two stage technologies the leontief ces and the cobb douglas ces a two stage technology is a sequential production process that first uses pri mary inputs to produce intermediate inputs and then uses theintermediate inputs to produce final output in this paper the authors show that two stage technologies provide a general procedure for combining production functions or cost functions to obtain new specifications suitable for empirical production analysis they investigate two new cost functions for which the input demand systemssatisfy global regularity conditions in a wide range of nondegenerate cases using six data sets the authors estimate thesetwo input demand systems both with and without imposing global regularity conditions and find that one of them performs well copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

option value a conceptual overview the importance of nonuser benefits to the process of efficiently allocating natural environments was first emphasized by krutilla 15 a decade and a half ago one of the components of these nonuser benefits is option value originally introduced by weisbrod 23 as relevant for assets that might be difficult to reproduce option value has been the subject of considerable debate perhaps the simplest approach to explaining the meaning of option value is to use an example consider an individual who is uncertain whether he or she will consume the services of a particular asset in the future furthermore assume this individual is also uncertain whether the asset will be available in the future should he

what happens when demand is estimated with a misspecified model we conduct monte carlo experiments to investigate the biases of assuming a misspecified demand model we study continuous models linear log linear and aids and discrete choice models logit in the context of differentiated products and aggregate data estimating demand with the wrong model yields varying degrees of bias in estimated elasticities but the logit model can yield unbiased estimates for a certain size of the assumed market potential merger simulations confirm the key importance of market potential in logit estimation suggesting that a discrete choice model may be preferable even when the discreteness of the purchase decision is questionable

assessing the impact of a school subsidy program in mexico using a social experiment to validate a dynamic behavioral model of child schooling and fertility this paper uses data from a randomized social experiment in mexico to estimate and validate a dynamic behavioral model of parental decisions about fertility and child schooling to evaluate the effects of the progresa school subsidy program and to perform a variety of counterfactual experiments of policy alternatives our method of validation estimates the model without using post program data and then compares the model s predictions about program impacts to the experimental impact estimates the results show that the model s predicted program impacts track the experimental results our analysis of counterfactual policies reveals an alternative subsidy schedule that would induce a greater impact on average school attainment at similar cost to the existing program

information and the dynamics of environmental protection the concept of the critical period earlier work on environmental decisions under uncertainty is extended from two periods to many permitting treatment of a richer variety of problems implications for pollution control policy of several different kinds of ecosystem recovery dynamics are considered in the context of improving information about ecosystem behavior and preferences for environmental goods multiperiod analogs of the two period concept of quasi option value are developed

demand estimation and merger simulations for drugs logits v aids abstract we use adhd drugs sales data from 2000 2003 and compare estimates of elasticities and merger simulations from three different demand models models include logit random coefficients logit and conditional aids demand model with multistage budgeting the magnitude of cross price elasticities is larger in the third model in comparison to the first two and some of the cross price elasticities are estimated to be negative hypothetical merger simulations show larger price effects for the multistage aids model in comparison to the discrete choice models

option price estimates for water quality improvements a contingent valuation study for the monongahela river abstract we present the findings from a contingent valuation survey designed to estimate the option price bids for the improved recreation resulting from enhanced water quality in the pennsylvania portion of the monongahela river the findings are based on a survey design that used professional interviewers to conduct personal interviews determined from a representative sample of 393 households in addition the research suggests that protest bids and outliers be viewed similarly accordingly a new technique for identifying outlying responses is proposed the findings suggest that the question format affects the option price estimates and that criteria for determining the final sample of responses can have an important influence on contingent valuation results

double edged transparency in teams abstract in a team project with significant complementarities between various players individual tasks news of early success by some encourages others to push ahead with their own tasks while lack of success has the opposite effect this ex post disparity in incentives created gives rise to two differing implications ex ante for an ideal team transparency sometimes it is better to commit to complete secrecy within the team of the various participants interim progress as it mitigates the negative effect of failures in some other situations commitment to full disclosure is better as players are then encouraged to be proactive by exerting efforts in the early rounds and motivate other team members into continued activities by way of interim progress transparency of outcomes has thus double edges it can boost incentives or dampen incentives

option value under income and price uncertainty abstract we present a rigorous examination of the sign of option value under income and price uncertainty we state and prove three theorems on the sign of option value when preferences are state independent if income is uncertain the sign of option value is opposite the sign of the income elasticity of the good in question the analysis of price uncertainty is in two parts one covers the case of own price uncertainty and the other the case where the price of some other good is uncertain in both cases the sign of option value is generally ambiguous

option value an exposition and extension this article examines the role of the discount rate in making decisions that will have significant implications for the environment the authors begin by providing a rationale for discounting in general and by describing the main factors that determine

requiem for option value as freeman 1984 accurately notes a lot of ink has been spilled over the concept of option value during the last two decades graham in his seminal 1981 article outlined the specific conditions under which option price is and more significantly is not an appropriate and relevant measure of value under demand uncertainty while graham s article demonstrates that option value is relevant only under restrictive assumptions regarding preferences and the nature of the uncertainty both the tone and contents of recent articles on the

technology team production and incentives incentive reversal ir is when higher rewards induce some agents to reduce their effort winter 2009 we show that ir can hold for all agents when there is an improvement in production technology and rewards are based on team output whilst ir requires at least one worker s marginal return to be decreasing in team productivity when agents invest simultaneously this is not necessary with sequential investments rather ir can occur with sequential investment when the marginal return of effort for all agents is increasing with improvements in technology

the choice of a welfare measure under uncertainty use of option price as a welfare measure when conducting a benefit cost analysis under uncertainty is appropriate only if the project under consideration will have no impact on the allocation of risk among individuals use of the willingness to pay locus as a benefit measure is appropriate only if the project will result in an efficient allocation of risk a more general welfare measure is proposed maximum agreeable payment that correctly measures the benefits and costs of any project

optimal incentives for teams much of the existing theory of incentives describes a static relationship that lasts for just one transaction this static assumption is not only unrealistic but the resulting predictions appear to be at odds with many work organizations the current paper introduces possible long term interaction among agents and studies how the design of explicit incentives and work organizations can exploit and interact with the implicit incentives generated by the repeated interaction of the agents the optimal incentive scheme is shown to display observed features of the increasingly popular teams such as the use of low powered group incentives