the choice between market failures and corruption because government intervention transfers resources from one party to another it creates room for corruption as corruption often undermines the purpose of the intervention governments will try to prevent it they may create rents for bureaucrats induce a misallocation of resources and increase the size of the bureaucracy since preventing all corruption is excessively costly second best intervention may involve a certain fraction of bureaucrats accepting bribes when corruption is harder to prevent there may be both more bureaucrats and higher public sector wages also the optimal degree of government intervention may be nonmonotonic in the level of income

a demand scenario based fuelwood supply chain a conceptual model abstract fuelwood is one of the main fuels for heating in many countries as the price of fuelwood is relative low comparing to oil or gas demand for fuelwood rises over the years a supply chain is considered by different nodes that are essential for some operations concerning transportation and production due to the sensitive nature of the forest which is the production plant in the examined supply chain certain restrictions concerning the production and distribution of fuelwood should be taken into account a more environment oriented production model should be developed taking into consideration the sustainable management of the forests for this purpose a mixed integer linear programming milp model is considered in modeling uncertainty for fuelwood demand moreover the minimization of the overall operations cost is examined under different fuelwood demand representations using lagrangean relaxation algorithm

reward structures and the allocation of talent as relative rewards that different professions receive are a key factor in the allocation of talent what determines the reward structure of a society is an important question this paper develops an equilibrium model of the allocation of talent between productive and unproductive activities such as rent seeking the existence of rent seeking creates a negative externality on productive agents and implies that relative rewards are endogenously determined the same externality can also lead to the existence of multiple equilibria each with different reward structures in a dynamic setting allocations of past generations as well as expectations of future allocations influence current rewards and the society may get trapped in a rent seeking steady state equilibrium the paper also discusses how the non pecuniary reward structure can be influenced by equilibrium selection and a historical example that suggests the presence of a causal link from the allocation of talent to non pecuniary rewards

the causal relationship between energy consumption and economic growth in the asean 5 countries abstract the objective of this study is to examine the causal relationship between energy consumption and economic growth for asean 5 countries which includes indonesia malaysia thailand singapore and the philippines for empirical examination annual time series data in the period of 1980 2012 are used the results of johansen co integration test reveal that there exists one co integrating relationship among the variables in case of indonesia malaysia the philippines and singapore the results uncover the existence of two co integrating associations among the variables for thailand the granger causality test suggests that there is no unilateral causality for indonesia as in all the three cases in case of malaysia the economic growth caused energy consumption however no evidence is found for causality either from exports or from gross fixed capital formation to energy consumption while in the cases of thailand and the philippines the direction of causality runs from gross fixed capital formation to energy consumption for singapore energy consumption runs from two sides i e one from exports side and the other from gross fixed capital formation side the findings exhibit that energy consumption has significant and long run relationship to economic growth for almost all asean 5 countries the findings suggest that policy makers need to formulate policies conducive to the energy development which will consequently accelerate sustainable economic growth in asean countries energy development should be based on the existing condition of each country a comprehensive investment framework for renewable energy should also be developed besides maintaining adequate energy inventory the asean countries should strengthen their institutions and capacity as well as cooperation in energy management and development

a theory of collective reputations with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality the paper is a first attempt at modelling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations a member s current incentives are affected by his past behaviour and because his track record is observed only with noise by the group s past behaviour as well the paper thus studies the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations and derives the existence of stereotypes from history dependence rather than from a multiplicity of equilibria or from the existence of a common trait as is usually done in the literature it shows that new members of an organization may suffer from an original sin of their elders long after the latter are gone and it derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which group reputations can be rebuilt last the paper applies the theory to analyse when a large firm can maintain a reputation for quality 1 collective reputations collective reputations play an important role in economics and the social sciences countries ethnic racial or religious groups are known to be hard working honest corrupt hospitable or belligerent some firms enjoy substantial rents from their reputations for producing high quality products some departments are reported to treat their faculty or students fairly the paper is a first attempt at modelling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations a member s current incentives are affected by her past behaviour and because her track record is observed only with noise by the group s past behaviour as well the paper studies the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations in a model in which current generations are progressively replaced by new ones and derives the existence of stereotypes from history dependence rather than from a multiplicity of equilibria or from the existence of a common trait as is usually done in the literature see section 2 for a detailed comparison with the literature it shows that new members of an organization may suffer from an original sin of their elders long after the latter are gone and it derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which group reputations can be rebuilt last the paper applies the theory to analyse when a large firm can maintain a reputation for quality let us spell out the building blocks of our theory in more detail a a group s reputation is only as good as that of its members each member is characterized by individual traits such as talent diligence or honesty past individual behaviour conveys information about these traits and generates individual reputations

the fuelwood market in greece an empirical approach abstract wood has been since ancient times the basic household heating medium nowadays wood remains the primary energy source in rural areas of developing countries mainly in africa in greece the domestic demand of fuelwood is relied mainly on the fuelwood domestic supply especially during the post war period the domestic supply satisfies adequately the domestic demand eliminating the role of imports the present study surveys the long run relationship between the fuelwood prices of different forest species in order to determine the role of the special market conditions in their price formation in addition the error correction model is estimated in order to survey the direction of the granger causality among the prices of the fuelwood forest species the implementation of the impulse response analysis and the variance decomposition confirmed that coniferous and beech fuelwood producer price may account for the volatility of the oak fuelwood producer price this result may contribute greatly to the conservation of oak forest an important carbon storage forest ecosystem

economic growth with endogenous corruption an empirical study the effect of corruption on the rate of economic growth for a panel of countries during 1984 2007 is investigated using recent improvements in dynamic panel data techniques to control for the endogeneity of corruption and investment corruption has a significant effect on the growth rate of real per capita income this effect is non linear

the incidence and persistence of corruption in economic development abstract economic development and bureaucratic corruption are determined jointly in a dynamic general equilibrium model of growth bribery and tax evasion corruption arises from the incentives of public and private agents to conspire in the concealment of information from the government these incentives depend on aggregate economic activity which in turn depends on the incidence of corruption the model produces multiple development regimes transition between which may or may not occur in accordance with recent empirical evidence the relationship between corruption and development is predicted to be negative

dissemination of cooking energy alternatives in india a review abstract energy requirements for cooking account for 36 of total primary energy consumption in india the rural and urban populaces depend mainly on non commercial fuels to meet their energy needs diverse urban growth patterns have led to structural changes in economy and have important ramifications on energy consumption in household sector it is observed that india follows income based ladder starting with fuelwood and ending with sophisticated fuels like liquefied petroleum gas lpg and electricity this paper discusses cooking energy dissemination in the country with an objective of understanding the underlying socioeconomic factors governing the utilization of various fuels energy carriers in cooking the diffusion of renewable energy devices is observed to be far below their estimated potential policy interventions required for better dissemination of renewable energy based devices are also discussed

a macroeconomic model on the quality of government and economic performance i introduction the empirical analysis of hall and jones 1999 suggests that the fundamental determinant of a country s economic performance is its social infrastructure the institutions and government policies that provide incentives for individuals those incentives can encourage productive activity or predatory behavior like rent seeking and corruption although suppression of rent seeking appears to be most efficient if it is carried out by the government the power to make and enforce rules makes the government itself particularly prone to expropriation for instance while bureaucrats protect property by suppressing private rent seeking that interferes with productive activity they may also seek rents themselves by soliciting bribes from citizens 1 how do the efficiency of bureaucrats in protecting property rights and the degree of their corruption affect the relative rewards received by producers private rent seekers and bureaucrats and how does the reward structure interact with the allocation of talent between productive and unproductive activity and hence influence a country s economic performance 2 to address the above issues we work with an essentially standard macroeconomic model of production and trade externality based on the work of diamond 1982 in which productive activity is subject to private and public expropriation private rent seekers and bureaucrats do not produce they are completely dependent on producers efforts one important feature is the presence of a negative externality the unproductive activity exerts on the relative rewards that determine the allocation of agent across activity see murphy shleifer and vishny 1993 we first consider as a benchmark a model where the size of bureaucracy is exogenously given and then endogenize it as an individual s choice under an exogenous bureaucracy an agent chooses to be a producer or a private rent seeker producers conduct transactions in the decentralized markets more productive activity yields higher returns to both producers and private rent seekers and this strategic complementarity results in multiple pareto rankable equilibria the equilibrium with a larger population of producers and less rent seeking features higher welfare by choosing a small size of bureaucracy the government can establish the superior equilibrium as the unique outcome that also achieves the constrained optimum social welfare however is decreasing in the size of bureaucracy in this equilibrium the implication is that the smaller the size of bureaucracy the higher the welfare the optimal size of bureaucracy depends on two opposite influences on producers incentives one is the positive effect through better property rights protection the other includes various negative effects as a result of corruption tax burdens and the fact that resources taken up in the public sector could otherwise be devoted to production if the population of bureaucrats is endogenously determined equilibria exist as long as bureaucrats efficiency is high and corruption is low the equilibrium with a larger bureaucracy is associated with higher production and welfare the reason is that with sufficient efficiency in deterring private rent seeking and low corruption a larger bureaucracy makes private production more profitable by reducing resources allocated to private rent seeking and the resulting externality further improves the relative rewards to productive activity in general the equilibrium size of the bureaucracy is not optimal one resulting implication is that for the equilibrium with a smaller bureaucracy society would benefit by increasing the size of bureaucracy despite the fact that bureaucrats are corrupt many believe that the size of government is an important factor for determining economic performance however hall and jones 1999 p 111 argue that the characteristics of an economy such as the size of government should better be thought as outcomes rather than determinants

protection of property rights and growth as political equilibria abstract this paper presents a survey of the literature on property rights and economic growth different theoretical mechanisms that relate property rights to economic development are discussed lack of protection of property rights can result in slow economic growth through different channels expropriation of private wealth corruption of civil servants excessive taxation and barriers to adoption of new technologies the origins of property rights are also considered different theories are illustrated but more attention is paid to the social conflict view and its success and limitations the second part of the paper illustrates relevant empirical works on property rights and growth

the fuelwood consumption in a rural area of greece abstract renewable energy sources are called to play an important role as regards the increasing energy demand worldwide in particular the need to address the problems created by the oil crises has distinguished the importance of renewable energy in economic development biomass is recognized as one of the most important renewable energy sources that can contribute decisively to the energy needs of modern society and the environment protection in both industrialized and developing countries a very important source of biomass is wood and especially fuelwood in greece because of the economic crisis there is an increased consumption of fuelwood especially in rural areas in this paper using a questionnaire and descriptive statistics and logistic regression analysis we explore the determinants of fuelwood consumption in a rural area in order to propose appropriate policies for the efficient supply of the market

rent seeking under a weak institutional environment this paper investigates the role of the institutional environment on economic performance when the state intervenes to correct market failure results demonstrate that in the presence of weak institutions rent seeking plays a crucial role for achieving second best resources allocation

legal environment finance channels and investment the east african example abstract how do legal environments and finance affect investments by firms in the east african community property rights external and internal finance channels key conduits of the transmission mechanism from legal environment to investment individually and interactively affect firms decision to invest firms that perceive secure property rights are more likely to invest in fixed capital the interactions suggest governments in this community would do well to pursue investment growth policies that slant heavily towards financial markets deepening while not ignoring enhancement of legal infrastructures overall property rights external finance internal finance firm size and an export orientation are important determinants of the investment decision

frontrunners and laggards the strategy of environmental regulation under uncertainty the extant literature on the political economy of environmental regulation does not provide a unified theoretical explanation for three salient stylized facts first companies voluntarily invest to reduce the environmental burden that they cause under threat of regulation second ex ante estimates of the compliance cost tend to be systematically higher than ex post estimates finally regulators use limited information provided by the industry i construct a game theoretic model of environmental regulation under uncertainty with a benevolent regulator in equilibrium companies undertake voluntary action to induce regulation that raises barriers to entry this profit driven behavior is not always socially detrimental however as the regulator obtains a credible commitment to production and a more accurate estimate of the compliance cost additionally the results provide a selection explanation for the mismatch between ex ante and ex post cost estimates if companies condition compliance on the installation cost only low cost companies install in equilibrium the analysis combines regulatory capture with social welfare maximization to explain the curious combination of voluntary action and low ex post compliance cost without serious information collection by the regulator

microequity and microfinance abstract this paper examines the work of the village enterprise fund an us nongovernmental organization in east africa as a case study in equity based microfinance in low income countries many small businesses established in high income countries rely on some form of equity capital to fund the startup phase and much of the growth of the business the success of startup grants and equity financing in high income countries suggests that this method might also be applicable in low income countries using the work of the village enterprise fund as an example the paper argues that startup grants and equity finance are useful and appropriate in addition to the more common loan based approaches

optimal taxation with rent seeking we develop a framework for optimal taxation when agents can earn their income both in traditional activities where private and social products coincide and in rent seeking activities where private returns exceed social returns either because they involve the capture of pre existing rents or because they reduce the returns to traditional work we characterize pareto optimal income taxes that do not condition on how much of an individual s income is earned in each of the two activities these optimal taxes feature an externality corrective term the magnitude of which depends both on the pigouvian correction that would obtain if rent seeking incomes could be perfectly targeted and on the relative impact of rent seeking externalities on the private returns to traditional and to rent seeking activities if rent seeking externalities primarily affect other rent seekers for example the optimal correction lies strictly below the pigouvian correction a calibrated model indicates that the gap between the pigouvian and optimal correction can be quantitatively important our results thus point to a hefty informational requirement for correcting rent seeking externalities through the income tax code

distribution and development in a model of misgovernance abstract this paper presents an analysis of bureaucratic corruption income inequality and economic development the analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which bureaucrats are appointed by the government to implement a redistributive programme of taxes and subsidies designed to benefit the poor corruption is reflected in bribery and tax evasion as bureaucrats conspire with the rich in providing false information to the government in accordance with empirical evidence the model predicts a positive relationship between corruption and inequality and a negative relationship between corruption and development

property rights corruption and the allocation of talent a general equilibrium approach we consider an economy where contracts are necessary to encourage investments contract enforcement requires that a fraction of the agents work in the public sector and do not accept bribes we find that 1 it may be optimal to allow some corruption and not enforce property rights fully 2 less developed economies may choose lower levels of property right enforcement and more corruption 3 there may exist a free lunch such that over a certain range it is possible simultaneously to reduce corruption increase investment and achieve a better allocation of talent bureaucratic corruption is widespread in many societies casual empiricism and case studies suggest that corruption distorts the allocation of resources and discourages investment and the creation of new firms e g mydral 1968 desoto 1989 cross country studies also find that countries with high corruption or long bureaucratic delays suffer lower growth e g mauro 1996 sartre 1997 it is therefore tempting to conclude that government policies and bureaucratic corruption are at least partly responsible for the lack of development or slow growth of many economies e g shleifer and vishny 1993 nevertheless governments and bureaucracies do not exist only to seek rents they perform a number of useful functions including provision of public goods correction of market failures and redistribution without understanding why the state exists it is difficult to assess why corruption arises what its consequences are and whether and how it should be prevented in this paper we analyse how the employees of the state bureaucrats can misuse their power to enforce property rights the protection of property rights is commonly viewed as one of the most important roles of the state by political philosophers as diverse as david hume karl marx and robert nozick while a number of social scientists including north and thomas 1973 and rosenberg and bridzell 1989 emphasise the importance of secure property rights in the development of western societies for the state to have a role in enforcing property rights some contractual problems must exist between private parties in our economy these contractual problems are between entrepreneurs in particular production requires two agents and one of the entrepreneurs needs to undertake an investment but the returns accrue to the other one this can be thought as a partnership with the first agent as an upstream supplier providing an input of variable

the economics of forest based biomass supply this paper undertakes a preliminary exploration into the economics of generating energy from forest based biomass the study assesses the feasibility of greatly expanding the share of total energy consumption in developed countries that could be economically satisfied by biomass without fiscal subsidy support given current technologies and with plausible potential technologies ten years into the future the study briefly considers the environmental effects of biomass usage compared with fossil fuels since wood has uses both as fuelwood for energy and as industrial wood for wood products the comparative economics of these alternative uses are examined

informality and rent seeking bureaucracies in a model of long run growth abstract this paper explores the links among growth the informal economy and rent seeking bureaucracies the presence of congestion associated with the enforcement of property rights implies that informality can be useful whether bureaucratic rent seeking is detrimental to growth then depends on how good a substitute informality is to production in the formal sector in order to create profits which can be appropriated rent seeking bureaucrats limit entry into the formal economy as a result firms operate in the informal sector even when the cost of informality is high in which case lower growth emerges however when the cost of informality is low a large number of firms choose to operate informally irrespective of entry conditions in the latter case growth is unaffected by a rent seeking bureaucracy as entry restrictions in the formal economy do not bind

the growth effects of property rights the role of finance summary using a variety of statistical approaches we show that the relationship between property rights and growth is nonlinear stronger enforcement of property rights raises growth up to a point before growth begins to decline we provide a simple theoretical rationale for this conclusion using a model with informational asymmetries in the financial sector stronger property rights have two opposing effects on the one hand it increases capital formation and growth on the other hand it encourages bad borrowing practices thus there exists an optimal level of property rights which maximizes growth however as financial markets mature the negative effects associated with stronger property rights become weaker

socio economic determinants of energy consumption an empirical survey for greece abstract the present study identifies and evaluates the macroeconomic factors that determine energy consumption in greece this study is based on annual time series data covering the period ranging from 1975 2013 the augmented dickey fuller adf test and kpss test are employed in order to test stationarity of the data confirming that all the variables are i 1 within the next step of the methodology we employed a vecm model in order to detect causality among the variables through the granger causality test similarly the impulse response analysis provides that urbanization infrastructure trade income population growth and foreign direct investment are the main determinants of energy consumption in greece during the period surveyed the findings suggest that in order to fulfill the energy demand in the country the decision makers need to formulate energy policy in favor of enlarging the supply of energy and especially renewable energy to foster the process of economic growth and development especially in the times of crisis the particular determinants are a necessity to initiate economic growth

taxation and corruption theory and firm level evidence from uganda this article develops a simple framework to analyse the negotiation over bribe and tax payments during the tax collection process we show that the larger the bribe a firm offers to a tax collector the larger the tax rebate it gets more particularly we show that the negotiation over bribe and tax payments hinges on four other factors firms official liabilities detection firms negotiation power and red tape costs imposed on firms some of the predictions from the theoretical model are tested using firm level data from uganda we find that bribe and tax payments are inversely related thereby supporting the hypothesis of a negotiation taking place between firms and tax collectors in particular a 1 point increase in average bribe payments per employee is associated with a 7 point reduction in average amount of tax payments per employee results are robust to various instruments dealing with the endogenous relationship between bribes and taxes

investment climate and firm productivity an application to vietnamese manufacturing firms abstractthe fundamental aspect of a national competitive advantage is a good investment climate understanding the role of the investment climate in generating firm productivity has received extensive attention by policymakers and economists in many countries the article studies the effect of different dimensions of the investment climate on firm productivity using a large dataset of vietnamese manufacturing firms the article finds that deficiencies in the investment climate are prejudicial to firm productivity and competition furthermore in examining the effect of corruption in association with the quality of the business environment the study also investigates the possibility that corruption may compensate firms for a bad investment climate or at least may neutralize the negative impact of inefficient government regulations in other words corruption acts as speed money to improve the efficacy of the provision of public services or provides leeway for entrepreneurs to bypass the inefficient reg

predicting fuelwood prices in greece with the use of arima models artificial neural networks and a hybrid arima ann model abstract throughout history energy resources have acquired a strategic significance for the economic growth and social welfare of any country the large scale oil crisis of 1973 coupled with various environmental protection issues have led many countries to look for new alternative energy sources biomass and fuelwood in particular constitutes a major renewable energy source res that can make a significant contribution as a substitute for oil this paper initially provides a description of the contribution of renewable energy sources to the production of electricity and also examines the role of forests in the production of fuelwood in greece following this autoregressive integrated moving average arima models artificial neural networks ann and a hybrid model are used to predict the future selling prices of the fuelwood from broadleaved and coniferous species produced by greek state forest farms the use of the arima ann hybrid model provided the optimum prediction results thus enabling decision makers to proceed with a more rational planning for the production and fuelwood market

taxes and bribery the role of wage incentives this paper presents a simple model to evaluate alternative payment schemes for tax inspectors in the presence of corruption we consider problems of both moral hazard which arises because taking bribes cannot be observed without costly monitoring and adverse selection since not all potential tax inspectors can be identified as being honest or dishonest we identify three wage regimes first one could pay the same wage that a tax inspector could earn elsewhere his reservation wage second one could pay a wage which solves the moral hazard problem i e deters bribery this we call an efficiency wage by analogy with recent models examined i n macro economics third the government could pay a wage below the reservation wage at which only the dishonest become tax inspectors the capitulation wage we make precise the conditions under which each yields the greatest amount o f tax revenues net o f administrative costs many countries in the developing world are undergoing structural adjustment programmes which require fundamental fiscal changes outside agencies advise restoration of budget balance a task which involves expenditure cuts and tax increases the treatment of public employee pay scales often poses a particular dilemma i n this process wages and salaries are a significant component of government expenditures and one important question concerns the extent to which wages rather than employment cuts should be used to save money there is sometimes a reluctance to advocate wage cuts stemming in part from a feeling that this might impair the performance of the public sector hence tanzi 1990 argues that a policy of wage cutting is likely to increase the inefficiency of public sector employees especially at a time when the public sector is expected to play a larger role in restructuring the economy p 16 in the context of tax collection the issue is particularly pressing given the need to raise more tax revenues a reduction in efficiency in this branch of the government i s likely t o mean that fewer returns are processed and when individuals living standards are squeezed their incentive to accept bribes in lieu o f collecting taxes i s increased o n this count i t i s even sometimes suggested that wages of tax inspectors should be increased to aid the effort to the comments of henry bienen john hey and two anonymous referees have been helpful in revising this paper the authors are also grateful t o the john m olin program for the study o f economic organization and public policy at princeton university and the pew charitable trusts for financial support mclaren also acknowledges support from the international finance section of princeton university none of the above should be implicated in any way see for example goode 1984 chapter 1 3 and gould and amaro reyes 1983

emergence and persistence of inefficient states we present a theory of the emergence and persistence of inefficient states based on patronage politics the society consists of rich and poor the rich are initially in power but expect to transition to democracy which will choose redistributive policies taxation requires the employment of bureaucrats by choosing an inefficient state structure the rich may be able to use patronage and capture democratic politics so reducing the amount of redistribution in democracy moreover the inefficient state creates its own constituency and tends to persist over time intuitively an inefficient state structure creates more rents for bureaucrats than would an efficient one when the poor come to power in democracy they will reform the structure of the state to make it more efficient so that higher taxes can be collected at lower cost and with lower rents for bureaucrats anticipating this when the society starts out with an inefficient organization of the state bureaucrats support the rich who set lower taxes but also provide rents to bureaucrats we obtain that the rich bureaucrats coalition may also expand the size of bureaucracy excessively so as to generate enough political support the model shows that an equilibrium with an inefficient state is more likely to arise when there is greater income inequality when bureaucratic rents take intermediate values and when individuals are sufficiently forward looking jel p16 h11 h26 h41

factors determining energy consumption evidence from indonesia malaysia and thailand abstract the aim of this study is to verify empirically the impact of various factors on energy consumption in three asean countries namely indonesia malaysia and thailand over the period 1980 to 2012 after using sundry appropriate diagnostic tests for checking time series data the method of least square as an analytical technique is used for parameters estimation the findings validate that fdi inflows economic growth trade openness and human development index have positive and statistically significant impacts on energy consumption the other variable urbanization has positive and statistically significant impacts on energy consumption for thailand and indonesia only while the empirical results reveals that population growth rate has a positive and statistically significant relationship with energy consumption only in the case of malaysia so in the light of determinations of the study the policy implication is that energy policy needs to be orientated in favor of expanding the supply of energy to reach an enhanced degree of sustainable economic growth and development

the effect of growth and corruption on soil sealing in italy a regional environmental kuznets curve analysis this paper analyses and looks more closely at the empirical debate regarding the income elasticity hypothesis postulated in relation to the environmental kuznets curve and the impact of corruption on the relationship between growth and environmental impact measured in terms of soil sealing as proxied by the number of building permits issued by public authorities it postulates that when current private rent is high compared to perceived social costs and a large enough minority benefits from the rules the ekc does not emerge and public intervention fails to perceive social optimality to validate this hypothesis we run a panel data regression model based on data from all italian regions results confirmed the hypothesis evidencing a u shaped relationship i e a detrimental relationship between income and environmental impact quality it also demonstrated that this is contingent on the level of corruption the latter affects the position and the shape of the inverted ekc speeding up the exploitation process it shows that the higher the income the higher the effect of corruption on the environment therefore it advocates caution against any simplistic inference from ekc