asymmetry and revenue in first price auctions abstract we show by an example that in first price ipv auctions asymmetry in bidders valuations need not reduce the revenue compared to a benchmark symmetric model with the same amount of social surplus asymmetry need not reduce competition in first price auctions

deciding between competition and collusion we develop an approach to identify and test for bid rigging in procurement auctions first we introduce a general auction model with asymmetric bidders second we study the problem of identie cation in our model we state a set of conditions that are both necessary and sufe cient for a distribution of bids to be generated by a model with competitive bidding third we discuss how to elicit a prior distribution over a e rm s structural cost parameters from industry experts given this prior distri bution we use bayes s theorem to compare competitive and collusive models of industry equilibrium finally we apply our methodology to a data set of bidding by construction e rms in the midwest the techniques we propose are not computationally demanding use e exible functional forms and can be programmed using most standard statistical packages

on the effects of joint bidding in independent private value auctions an experimental study abstract this article explores the effect of a subset of symmetric bidders joining to bid together possible applications include mergers collusion and joint bidding arrangements the change produces a strong party with a more advantageous value distribution than the remaining weak bidder s the predicted effects include inefficiency a decrease in the seller s revenue and higher bidders payoffs under risk neutrality the members of the strong party benefit less than the weak bidders the prediction is reversed when the bidders are sufficiently risk averse these hypotheses are tested experimentally contrary to the theory joint bidding increases efficiency and the seller s revenue decreases by less than expected strong bidders benefit more than weak bidders indicating that incentives to bid jointly may be greater than hypothesized additionally the experiment assesses the effect of group decision making a nash equilibrium prediction for individual group differences based on differences in risk attitudes is not supported by the data

the optimal sorting of players in contests between groups abstract we study how aggregate effort exerted in contests between groups of heterogeneous players depends on the sorting of players into groups we show that the optimal sorting depends on the curvature of the effort cost function from the perspective of a contest organizer whose objective is to maximize aggregate effort it is optimal to sort players in a way that minimizes the variation in ability across groups if the effort cost function is moderately steep however for a sufficiently steep effort cost function the optimal sorting of players may be the one that maximizes the variation in ability across groups

mergers in symmetric and asymmetric noncooperative auction markets the effects on prices and efficiency abstract united states antitrust merger analysis has recently focused on simulating the unilateral effects of mergers we develop a model to simulate the unilateral price increase from a merger in an auction market we illustrate our results in the context of hospital mergers in the u s and calibrate our simulations to known market parameters we compare the price increases in our model to those suggested by analytically simpler models the simulation results suggest that the unilateral price increases predicted by our model are modest in general we also simulate the merger cost savings that are needed to offset the price effects

asymmetric private values auctions with application to joint bidding and mergers abstract much of the theoretical auction literature assumes that there are no observable differences between the bidders of an auction in this paper i present an asymmetric auction model where the distribution of a bidder s value depends on some commonly observed characteristics the model is applied to joint bidding and mergers in auction markets the results provide additional evidence that first price auctions are less susceptible to the acquisition and exercise of market power than open auctions

a mechanism design approach to ranking asymmetric auctions i propose a new mechanism design approach to the problem of ranking standard auctions with two heterogeneous bidders a key feature of the approach is that it may be possible to rank two auctions even if neither dominates the other for all combinations of types the approach simplifies the analysis and unifies results in the existing literature roughly speaking the first price auction is more profitable than the second price auction when the strong bidder s distribution is flatter and more disperse than the weak bidder s distribution applications include auctions with one sided externalities moreover contrary to previous work reserve prices are easily handled finally the method can be extended to some environments with many bidders

firm size and the nature of innovation within industries the case of process and product r d the effect of firm size on the allocation of r d effort between process and product innovation is examined it is hypothesized that relative to product innovations process innovations are less saleable in disembodied form and spawn less growth this implies that the returns to process r d will depend more on the firm s output at the time it conducts its r d than the returns to product r d incorporating this distinction in a simple model the authors derive and test predictions about how the fraction of r d devoted to process innovation varies with firm size within industries

on the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions we provide a new set of tools for studying asymmetric rst price auctions connecting their equilibria to the concavity of the underlying type distributions and showing how one can use surplus expressions related to symmetric auctions to bound equilibrium behavior in asymmetric auctions we apply these tools to studying procurement auctions in which as is common in practice one seller is given an advantage re ecting for example better reliability or quality we show conditions under which for any given rst price handicap auction there is a second price auction with bonuses that outperforms it with most of our results involving ex post dominance

a point decision for partially identified auction models this article proposes a decision theoretic method to choose a single reserve price for partially identified auction models such as haile and tamer 2003 using data on transaction prices from english auctions the article employs gilboa and schmeidler 1989 for inference that is robust with respect to the prior over unidentified parameters it is optimal to interpret the transaction price as the highest value and maximize the posterior mean of the seller s revenue the monte carlo study shows substantial gains relative to the revenues corresponding to a random point and the midpoint in the haile and tamer interval

low and high types in asymmetric first price auctions abstract we study first price auctions with n bidders where bidders types valuations for the object are drawn independently according to heterogeneous distribution functions we show a relation between the distributions of high types and their equilibrium bids on the other hand we show that there is no relation between the distributions of types and equilibrium bids of low types i e the equilibrium bids of low types are invariable

the financing of research and development evidence on the funding gap for rd 2 evidence for high costs of rd 3 there are limits to venture capital as a solution to the funding gap especially in countries where public equity markets are not highly developed and 4 further study of governmental seed capital and subsidy programs using quasi experimental methods is warranted

optimal sequential auctions sequential sealed first price and open descending price procurement auctions are studied we examine which procurement auction rule achieves the low procurement cost we show that the answer to this policy question depends on whether the items are complements or substitutes with substitutes the first price procurement auction is preferred while with complements the open descending price procurement auction is preferred we also illustrate the procurement cost minimizing auction and the auction rule preferred by the bidders with substitutes bidders prefer the open descending price procurement auction while with complements bidders prefer the first price procurement auction

mechanism design by an informed principal private values with transferable utility we provide a solution to the informed principal problem in the independent private values setting with monetary transfers the principal s private information creates signaling considerations that may distort the implemented allocation we show that there is no distortion all principal types implement an allocation that is optimal for the principal ex ante before he she learns his her type as an application we consider settings with linear utility for bilateral exchange in which the principal is one of the traders the solution is a combination of a participation fee a buy out option for the principal and a resale stage with posted prices

optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective abstract the game theoretic perspective in auction bidding has provided a powerful normative framework for the analysis of auctions and it has generated an impressive volume of research contributions tracing this research we review key recent advances which have greatly expanded our understanding of the operation of auctions and produced a more accurate analysis of mechanism design and optimal bidding we follow various experimental studies which have shown that the predictive power of auction theory remains in many cases limited for this reason we concentrate on research themes which enhance the applicability of auction theory leading to more realistic descriptions of bidding behaviors we identify important innovations which expand the environment of auction bidding and carry us beyond rational decision making we conclude providing directions of future research and discussing their implications

all equilibria of the vickrey auction abstract this paper characterizes the set of nash equilibria in the second price sealed bid auction with independent private values and three or more bidders in addition we show that any effective reserve price implies uniqueness

asymmetric price benefits auctions abstract this paper studies the performance of two auction procedures for allocating the assets of a dissolving partnership when partners valuations for the assets are independent and asymmetrically distributed with one partner reputed to be more interested in the assets to be divided we provide results on existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium induced by these auctions comparative statics are developed especially the differences between relative efficiency and revenue from the two auctions journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d39 d44 d52 d74 d82

differential payments within a bidder coalition and the shapley value bidder coalitions at english auctions frequently distribute collusive gains among members via a secondary auction or knockout when coalition members are sufficiently heterogeneous nested coalition structures are observed in which a knockout is conducted at each level of nesting the nested knockout s characteristics are investigated within many settings we find that the expected payments to coalition members via the nested knockout equal the shapley value incentive compatibility problems of the nested knockout are also analyzed

using game theory to analyze electric transmission pricing policies in the united states abstract us public policy towards the private electric power industry is moving away from restrictive regulation and towards promotion of competition alternative policies concerning access to and pricing of transmission are now being discussed similar issues may arise in europe as trade barriers fall our purpose is to show how game theory can help illuminate that debate and identify desirable policies game theory models are used to estimate the possible effects of various policies upon productive efficiency and the distribution of gains among sellers transmitters and buyers of power static cooperative models are used to calculate the possible outcomes of short run transmission games long run games in which the amount of transmission capacity is a decisition variable are modeled as dynamic noncooperative stackelberg games one conclusion is that under some conditions price regulation and mandatory access could hurt power buyers by removing incentives for building transmission capacity another conclusion is that under a system of voluntary access and price regulation it may be better to allow wheeling prices to exceed the marginal cost of transport rather than to risk losing the benefits of cooperation

game theory econometric models application to procurements in the space industry abstract this paper presents a structural econometric analysis of procurements in the space industry we analyse bidimensional tenders in price and quality the econometric specification assumes that bidders use nash equilibrium strategies these strategies are derived analytically or computed by monte carlo procedures

assessing social costs of inefficient procurement design this paper considers the social costs implied by inefficient allocation of contracts in a first price sealed bid procurement auction with asymmetric bidders we adopt a constrained piecewise linear strategye quilibriumc oncept and estimatet he structural parameterso f the bidders d is tribution of costs we estimate social costs defined as the predicted cost difference between the winning firm and the most efficient bidding firm we also compare the expected procurement costs under two different auction formats the data is collected from procurement auctions of road painting in sweden during 1993 1999 the results indicate that the social costs of inefficient contract allocation is about 2 of total potential production cost and that an effi cient second pricea uction would lower the expected procurementc ost by 2 5 jel d 44 h57 c15

the effect of bidders asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions abstract bidders asymmetries are widespread in auction markets yet their impact on behavior and ultimately revenue and profits is still not well understood this paper defines a natural benchmark auction environment to which to compare any private values auction with asymmetrically distributed valuations the main result is that the expected revenue from the benchmark auction dominates that from the asymmetric auction both in the first price auction and the second price auction moreover for classes of distributions that lend themselves to a quasi ordering of more or less asymmetric configurations we prove that the expected revenue is lower the more asymmetric bidders are these results formalize the idea that competition is reduced by bidders asymmetries applications to merger analysis joint bidding and investment are discussed

international corporate investment and the relationships between financial constraint measures abstract this paper uses international panel data to examine the interrelationships among some commonly used measures of financial constraint the analysis reveals the following insights 1 firms with stronger financial positions are more investment cash flow sensitive than firms with weaker financial positions even after controlling for size and dividend payout and 2 higher payout firms are more investment cash flow sensitive than lower payout firms even after controlling for size and financial strength evidence regarding the impact of firm size that is documented originally becomes much weaker once financial health and dividend payout behavior are controlled for finally additional analysis reveals that many of these results may be driven by the fact that firms possessing high cash flow volatility display lower investment cash flow sensitivities

efficiency of large private value auctions we consider discriminatory and uniform price auctions for multiple identical units of a good players have private values possibly asymmetrically distributed and for multiple units our setting allows for aggregate uncertainty about demand and supply in this setting equlibria generally will be inefficient despite this we show that such auctions become arbitrarily close to efficient if they are large and use this to derive an asymptotic characterization of revenue and bidding behavior

uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions abstract for the case of two buyers we show that equilibrium in the sealed high bid auction is unique when i buyers reservations prices are drawn independently from distributions with finite support and positive mass at the lower endpoint ii buyers have private values and iii buyers preferences are log supermodular for more than two buyers we obtain the same result under the additional assumptions that iv buyers with the same reservation price have the same preferences v buyers are risk neutral or risk averse with non increasing absolute risk aversion and vi the supports of the different buyers distributions of reservation prices have the same upper endpoint

multiunit pay your bid auction with one dimensional multiunit demands an arbitrary number of units of a good is sold to two bidders through a discriminatory auction the bidders are homogeneous ex ante and their demand functions are two step functions that depend on a single parameter we characterize the symmetric bayesian equilibrium and prove its existence and uniqueness we compare this equilibrium with the equilibrium of the multiunit vickrey auction and with the equilibria of the single unit first price and second price auctions we examine the consequences of bundling all units into one package we study the impacts that variations of the relative supply have on the equilibrium on the bidders average payoffs per unit and on the efficiency of the equilibrium allocation

asymmetric first price auctions abstract a new approach to asymmetric first price auctions is proposed which circumvents the need to examine bidding strategies directly specifically the ratio of bidders endogenous payoffs is analyzed and compared to the ratio of the exogenous distribution functions that describe beliefs most of the results are inferred from this comparison in the existing theoretical literature assumptions of first order stochastic dominance or stronger imply that the latter ratio has very specific properties but no such assumptions are imposed here it is proven that first order stochastic dominance is necessary for bidding strategies not to cross when this assumption is relaxed in the numerical literature it is done in a manner that leads to exactly one crossing however it is straightforward to construct examples with several crossings finally bid distributions will cross in auctions with two bidders whenever second order but not first order stochastic dominance applies

numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions abstract we propose numerical algorithms for solving first price auction problems where bidders draw independent valuations from heterogeneous distributions the heterogeneity analyzed in this work is what might naturally emerge when subsets of distributionally homogeneous bidders collude bid functions and expected revenues are calculated for two special cases extensions to more general asymmetric first price auctions are discussed journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 c63 c72 d82

econometrics of first price auctions a survey of the theoretical and applied literature the analysis of auctions is an active area of research for both theoretical and empirical economists this paper provides an overview of the literature relevant to the econometrics of auctions from a structural approach perspective the structural approach is a framework to analyze auction data in which theory and econometrics are closely related there are three fundamental issues at the heart of the structural analysis i are there any testable restrictions imposed by the theoretic model on the data ii is it possible to identify the structural elements that characterize an auction without a priori parametric information iii what can be said about feasible estimation procedures which do not rely on parametric assumptions this survey shows how the structural approach literature has answered each question

comparative statics in first price auctions abstract two bidders take part in a first price auction we show that if a bidder s valuation distribution increases stochastically so will his bid distribution for every possible valuation his opponent will bid higher and the change is beneficial to the auctioneer we generalize our results to the asymmetric setting with n bidders and no more than two different valuation distributions journal of economic literature classification number d44

uniqueness of the equilibrium in first price auctions abstract if the value cumulative distribution functions are strictly log concave at the highest lower extremity of their supports a simple geometric argument establishes the uniqueness of the equilibrium of the first price auction in the asymmetric independent private values model

designed to fail the medicare auction for durable medical equipment we examine the theoretical properties of the auction for medicare durable medical equipment two unique features of the medicare auction are 1 winners are paid the median winning bid and 2 bids are nonbinding we show that median pricing results in allocation inefficiencies as some high cost firms potentially displace low cost firms as winners further the auction may leave demand unfulfilled as some winners refuse to supply because the price is set below their cost we also introduce a model of nonbinding bids that establishes the rationality of a lowball bid strategy employed by many bidders in the actual medicare auctions and recently replicated in caltech experiments we contrast the median price auction with the standard clearing price auction where each firm bids true costs as a dominant strategy resulting in competitive equilibrium prices and full efficiency jel d44 i11 h57

equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions there is a voluminous theoretical literature on sealed high bid auctions auctions in which bids are sealed and the high bidder pays his bid see for example vickrey 1961 myerson 1981 riley and samuelson 1981 milgrom and weber 1982 matthews 1983 maskin and riley 1984 holt 1980 cox smith and walker 1988 a critical property on which this literature relies is the existence of equilibrium in which buyers bidding strategies are monotonic in their types this enables the analyst to perform comparative statics as the distribution of types changes and to compare the welfare properties of the high bid auction with those of other auction institutions one case in which the existence of monotonic equilibrium is readily established is that in which buyers types are distributed smoothly independently and symmetrically in this case there exists a symmetric equilibrium one in which all bidders share the same bidding behaviour as a function of their valuations and this bid function is the solution to a first order differential equation

the effects of double counting and expensing on the measured returns to r d this article focuses on the effects of double counting and expensing on the measured returns to r d the contribution of research and development r d to economic growth has been measured in two general ways the first is to compute total factor productivity in a growth accounting framework and to attribute this residual growth to r d the prevailing view is that in the presence of double counting the measured contribution of r d represents the return above and beyond the normal remuneration to traditional capital author demonstrate that this excess returns interpretation eri is essentially correct in the growth accounting framework and that the resulting bias in the measured contribution of r d to growth is large in postwar u s manufacturing the measured residual is biased downward by as much as 30 the expensing bias is downward and reinforces the excess returns bias in this case and the total bias is large in both the growth accounting and econometric contexts the magnitude of the biases may vary across samples and over time there is simply no substitute for properly measured variables

the relationship between r d and physical investment of firms in science based industries this study is motivated by the one way inducement hypothesis that r d induces granger causes physical investment but physical investment does not induce r d raised by lach and schankerman 1989 and lach and rob 1996 it is demonstrated that their results do not hold after extending the sample that matches their criteria by including more time periods and or more firms namely it is found that the granger causality between r d and physical investment occurs both ways it is also shown that their contemporary relationship derived by dynamic simultaneous expressions is positive in both ways from current r d to current physical investment and from current physical investment to current r d moreover previous r d affects current physical investment and previous physical investment also affects current r d

bid preference programs and participation in highway procurement auctions we use data from highway procurement auctions subject to california s small business preference program to study the effect of bid preferences on auction outcomes our analysis is based on an estimated model of firms bidding and participation decisions which allows us to evaluate the effects of current and alternative policy designs we show that incorporating participation responses significantly alters the assessment of preferential treatment policies

the future of market regulation market regulation is accomplished both by competition and by external government agencies and the trend is toward greater reliance on competition economists have fostered this trend and have even invented markets to help overcome some externality problems they have contributed to a steady improvement in antitrust policy which currently reflects economic knowledge well they diagnosed and demonstrated problems with external regulation of the airline industry and gave assurance that regulation by competition could work in its place success there led not only to deregulation of airlines but also deregulation of railroads trucks buses and in some ways natural gas pipelines two other industries telecommunications and electricity are now following very ambitious paths toward less external regulation and greater dependence on competition the internet raises new issues but there also competition will play an important regulatory role

impact of valuation ranking information on bidding in first price auctions a laboratory study abstract landsberger et al landsberger m rubinstein j wolfstetter e zamir s 2001 first price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge review of economic design 6 461 480 identified optimal bidder behavior in first price private value auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge and they derived comparative statics predictions regarding the auctioneer s expected revenue and the efficiency of the allocation the experiment reported here tests the behavioral components of these comparative statics predictions the results support the prediction that buyers are inclined to bid more aggressively when they learn they have the low value contrary to the theory buyers are inclined to bid less when they learn they have the high value consistent with theory the overall proportion of efficient allocations is lower than in the first price auction before information is revealed but as a result of high value bidders decreasing their bids the expected revenue does not increase on a regular basis contrary to the theory s predictions

technology selection and capacity investment under uncertainty abstract we analyze the problem of technology selection and capacity investment for electricity generation in a competitive environment under uncertainty adopting a nash cournot competition model we consider the marginal cost as the uncertain parameter although the results can be easily generalized to other sources of uncertainty such as a load curve in the model firms make three different decisions i the portfolio of technologies ii each technology s capacity and iii the technology s production level for every scenario the decisions related to the portfolio and capacity are ex ante and the production level is ex post to the realization of uncertainty we discuss open and closed loop models with the aim to understand the relationship between different technologies cost structures and the portfolio of generation technologies adopted by firms in equilibrium for a competitive setting to the best of our knowledge this paper is the first not only to explicitly discuss the relation between costs and generation portfolio but also to allow firms to choose a portfolio of technologies we show that portfolio diversification arises even with risk neutral firms and technologies with different cost expectations we also investigate conditions on the probability and cost under which different equilibria of the game arise

dynamics of r d and investment uk evidence abstract the dynamic relationship between r d investment and stock market value for 185 uk firms over 1984 1992 is analyzed investment granger causes r d but not vice versa r d has an idiosyncratic shock and past r d and investment explain only 1 of excess returns

optimal collusion proof auctions abstract we study an optimal collusion proof auction in an environment where subsets of bidders may collude not just on their bids but also on their participation despite their ability to collude on participation informational asymmetry facing the potential colluders can be exploited significantly to weaken their collusive power the second best auction i e the optimal auction in a collusion free environment can be made collusion proof if at least one bidder is not collusive or there are multiple bidding cartels or the second best outcome involves a non trivial probability of the object not being sold regardless optimal collusion proof auction prescribes non trivial exclusion of collusive bidders i e a refusal to sell to any collusive bidder with positive probability

does r d spending boost tangible investment an analysis on european firms this article investigates the relationship between firm s r d intensity expressed as r d expenditure over sales and investment intensity in tangible assets it is commonly acknowledged that r d r

asymmetry in procurement auctions evidence from snow removal contracts differences in cost efficiency and productivity across firms may introduce asymmetries in procure ment auctions relying on a structural approach this article investigates potential asymmetry among firms bidding for snow removal contracts in montrthe empirical results show that firms located in close proximity have a cost advantage relative to other firms in the most urbanised part of montrbecause of prohibitive equipment storage costs the extent of inefficiency due to asym metry is empirically assessed various policy experiments are performed a bidding preference policy shows that the city could expect to reduce its costs for allocating snow removal contracts when bidders willingness to pay depends in part on observable variables the princi pal s interest is not best served by creating a level auction playing field this article studies procurement auctions for snow removal contracts in montrit investigates the degree to which companies in disadvantageous locations should win even if they do not submit the lowest bid from the submitted bids a novel empirical methodology estimates the extent of cost variation across firms along with its variation within loca tion although the dispersion is substantial the gain from treating bidders unequally is limited when observed individual characteristics affect the firms costs and their bidding strategies all bidders cannot be treated alike these differences in characteristics or asymmetries among bidders may arise from their size as noted by laffont et al 1995 their capacity constraints as in jofre bonet and pesendorfer 2003 or the possession of better information as in hendricks and porter 1988 and hendricks et al 1994

asymptotic efficiency for discriminatory private value auctions we consider discriminatory auctions for multiple identical units of a good players have private values possibly for multiple units none of the usual assumptions about symmetry of players distributions over values or symmetry of equilibrium play are made because of this equilibria will typically involve inefficient allocations equilibria also become very difficult to solve for using an approach which does not depend on explicit equilibrium calculations we show that such auctions become arbitrarily close to efficient as the number of players and possibly the number of objects grows large and provide a simple characterization of limit equilibria

competitive bidding in asymmetric multidimensional public procurement abstract in a multidimensional procurement auction such as a most economically advantageous tender asymmetric opponents with different cost structure and predetermined quality compete for the highest score which combines price and quality production inefficiency characterizes each tenderer we derive the equilibrium equations and boundary conditions for which closed form solutions are not available we compare the bidding behavior of any pair of rival tenderers and demonstrate that equilibrium prices critically depend on the comparison of the cost difference c with respect to the increment of score attribute s for the same production inefficiency a tenderer with a relatively higher c compared to s stands in weak competitive position and is forced to bid more aggressively we show how the opposing advantage of each bidder with respect to cost or score attribute induces the extent of competition under a different perspective we analyze bidding by a pair of tenderers for a given maximum score achieved when pricing is at cost our analysis reveals that the player with consistently higher percentage change of the probability of being more efficient than the rival is in a disadvantageous position and receives lower score in the awarding process our results are useful for tenderers in assessing their competitive position the findings enable contracting authorities to evaluate competition at the preliminary stage of design and to examine the effects of the awarding criterion on pricing

complements and substitutes in sequential auctions the case of water auctions we use data on sequential water auctions to estimate demand when units are com plements or substitutes a sequential english auction model determines the estimating structural equations when units are complements one bidder wins all units by paying a high price for the first unit thus deterring others from bidding on subsequent units when units are substitutes different bidders win the units with positive probability paying prices similar in magnitude even when the same bidder wins all units we re cover individual demand consistent with this stark pattern of outcomes and confirm it is not collusive but consistent with non cooperative behavior demand estimates are biased if one ignores these features

international transport of captured hbox co _2 who can gain and how much if carbon capture and storage ccs is to become a viable option for low carbon power generation its deployment will require the construction of dedicated co2 transport infrastructure in a scenario of large scale deployment of ccs in europe by 2050 the optimal cost minimising co2 transport network would consist of large international bulk pipelines from the main co2 source regions to the co2 sinks in hydrocarbon fields and saline aquifers which are mostly located in the north sea in this paper we use a shapley value approach to analyse the multilateral negotiation process that would be required to develop such jointly optimised co2 infrastructure first we find that countries with excess storage capacity capture 38 45 of the benefits of multilateral coordination implying that the resource rent of a depleted hydrocarbon field when used for co2 storage is roughly 1 per barrel of original recoverable oil reserves or 2 per boe barrel of oil equivalent of original recoverable gas reserves this adds 25 600 to current estimates of co2 storage cost second countries with a strategic transit location capture 19 of the rent in the case of national pipeline monopolies liberalisation of co2 pipeline construction at eu level could eliminate the transit rent and is shown to reduce by two thirds the differences between countries in terms of cost per tonne of co2 exported reaching agreement on such liberalisation may be politically challenging since the payoffs are shown to be strongly divergent across countries

revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions abstract the revenue equivalence theorem is generalized to the case of asymmetric auctions in which each player s valuation is drawn independently from a common support according to his her distribution function

auctions with almost homogeneous bidders abstract we prove that around the symmetric case where the values are identically distributed the equilibrium of the first price auction is jointly differentiable with respect to general bidder specific parameters of the value distributions we show that the revenue equivalence between the first price and the second price auctions to the first order in the size of the parameters is an immediate consequence of this differentiability and the revenue equivalence theorem thereby formally establishing the first order equivalence fibich et al g fibich a gavious a sela revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions j econ theory 115 2004 309 321 noticed for their particular perturbation

numerical simulations of asymmetric first price auctions abstract the standard method for computing the equilibrium strategies of asymmetric first price auctions is the backward shooting method in this study we show that the backward shooting method is inherently unstable and that this instability cannot be eliminated by changing the numerical methodology of the backward solver moreover this instability becomes more severe as the number of players increases we then present a novel boundary value method for computing the equilibrium strategies of asymmetric first price auctions we demonstrate the robustness and stability of this method for auctions with any number of players and for players with mixed types of distributions including distributions with more than one crossing finally we use the boundary value method to study large auctions with hundreds of players to compute the asymptotic rate at which large first price and second price auctions become revenue equivalent and to study auctions in which the distributions cannot be ordered according to first order stochastic dominance

strategic gaming in electric power markets abstract this paper presents an overview of strategic gaming used for understanding the effective company and regulatory strategies for various market participants under alternative scenarios on pricing and institutional structures for electric power utilizing the england and wales e w power pool as a testbed we develop an aggregate model of payoffs for various stakeholders under specified demand and supply scenarios with strategic moves by these stakeholders as the key input to be evaluated the use of this type of model in a strategic gaming setting is then examined together with a discussion of experience in using this approach in evaluating a particular decision problem regarding network investment strategies in the e w power market

first price auctions in the asymmetric n bidder case i consider the first price auction when the bidders valuations may be differently distributed i show that every bayesian equilibrium is an essentially pure equilibrium formed by bid functions whose inverses are solutions of a system of differential equations with boundary conditions i then prove the existence of an equilibrium i prove its uniqueness when the valuation distributions have a mass point at the lower extremity of the support i give sufficient conditions for uniqueness when every valuation distribution is one of two atomless distributions i establish inequalities between equilibrium strategies when relations of stochastic dominance exist between valuation distributions

standard auctions with identity dependent externalities i analyze equilibrium bidding behavior in the open ascending bid auction with identity dependent externalities with reciprocal externalities the allocation is determined by bidders consumption values alone with large nonreciprocal externalities the open auction generates higher expected revenue compared to standard sealed bid auctions the progress of the open auction reveals more information about the identity of the potential winner allowing active bidders greater opportunity to avoid incurring payoff reducing externalities the associated option value to staying active up until a relatively high price translates into higher expected revenue multiple bidders may sequentially quit at the same price and relative to sealed bid auctions bidders experience less ex post regret

modeling competitive bidding a critical essay in analyzing bidding modeling matters this paper is a critical analysis of the models available to aid competitive bidding decision making bidding strategy and auction design in real transactions after an introductory overview this paper describes the contexts in which auctions arise reviews the mainstream theory of single isolated auctions and discusses the important work involved in enrichment of this theory in doing so it indicates results that have been obtained and the sort of changes in analytical approach that are needed to tackle other critical enrichments the paper summarizes briefly what is known about the direct use of models by bidders and auction designers a general theme of this paper is that enriched models are needed to bring bidding theory closer to direct applicability in decision making

asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values we prove an asymptotic revenue equivalence among weakly asymmetric auctions with interdependent values in which bidders have either asymmetric utility functions or asymmetric distributions of signals