occupational choice and the process of development this paper models economic development as a process of institutional transformation by focusing on the interplay between agents occupational decisions and the distribution of wealth because of capital market imperfections poor agents choose working for a wage over self employment and wealthy agents become entrepreneurs who monitor workers only with sufficient inequality however will there be employment contracts otherwise there is either subsistence or self employment thus in static equilibrium the occupational structure depends on distribution since the latter is itself endogenous we demonstrate the robustness of this result by extending the model dynamically and studying examples in which initial wealth distributions have long run effects in one case the economy develops either widespread cottage industry self employment or factory production employment contracts depending on the initial distribution in the other example it develops into prosperity or stagnation

the ir relevance of real wage rigidity in the new keynesian model with search frictions we explore the role of real wage dynamics in a new keynesian business cycle model with search and matching frictions in the labor market both job creation and destruction are endogenous we show that the model generates counterfactual inflation and labor market dynamics in particular it fails to generate a beveridge curve vacancies and unemployment are positively correlated introducing real wage rigidity leads to a negative correlation and increases the magnitude of labor market flows to more realistic values however inflation dynamics are only weakly affected by real wage rigidity this is because of the presence of labor market frictions which generate long run employment relationships the measure of real marginal cost that is relevant for inflation dynamics via the phillips curve contains a dynamic component that does not necessarily move with real wages

common agency and coordination general theory and application to government policy making we develop a model of common agency with complete information and general preferences with nontransferable utility and we prove that the principals nash equilibrium in truthful strategies implements an efficient action we apply this theory to the construction of a positive model of public finance where organized special interests can lobby the government for consumer and producer taxes or subsidies and targeted lump sum taxes or transfers the lobbies use only the nondistorting transfers in their noncooperative equilibrium but their intergroup competition for transfers turns into a prisoners dilemma in which the government captures all the gain that is potentially available to the parties

vacancies unemployment and the phillips curve abstract the canonical new keynesian phillips curve has become a standard component of models designed for monetary policy analysis however in the basic new keynesian model there is no unemployment all variation in labor input occurs along the intensive hours margin and the driving variable for inflation depends on workers marginal rates of substitution between leisure and consumption in this paper we incorporate a theory of unemployment into the new keynesian theory of inflation and empirically test its implications for inflation dynamics we show how a traditional phillips curve linking inflation and unemployment can be derived and how the elasticity of inflation with respect to unemployment depends on structural characteristics of the labor market such as the matching technology that pairs vacancies with unemployed workers we estimate on us data the phillips curve generated by the model while we can reject the baseline new keynesian phillips curve in favor of the search frictions specification we show it is still too stylized to fully describe the dynamics of firms marginal costs

political economy of income distribution dynamics abstract income distribution varies considerably across countries it tends to become more equal with development in some countries but just the opposite occurs in other countries this paper provides a theoretical investigation of the persistent differences in income distribution across countries over time motivated by the relationship between income distribution and public spending at different school levels for a broad range of countries over the past 30 years the analysis centers on the role of public education where specific investments interact with political involvement by different socio economic groups socio economic groups may form lobbies to influence education policy making the formation of lobbies is endogenous persistent inequality is caused by persistent lobbying efforts of the wealthy that lead to an allocation of public education spending more biased toward them

is there a winner s curse in the labor market abstract when a firm can make counteroffers to workers who have received outside wage offers a winner s curse effect may exist raided firms do not make counteroffers to those whose value is less than the raider s wage offer so the raider always earns negative profit when a raid is successful in this paper i demonstrate that when a raided firm makes reassignment decisions in anticipation of outside wage offers and there is at least an infinitesimal probability of exogenous turnover a winner s curse will not occur when there are counteroffers except possibly for workers at the lowest task assignment

standard promotion practices versus up or out contracts this article develops a theory concerning the choice between standard promotion practices and up or out contracts our theory is based on asymmetric learning and promotion incentives we find that firms employ up or out contracts when firm specific human capital is low and standard promotion practices when it is high we also find that if commitment to a wage floor is feasible and effort provision is important up or out is employed when low and high level jobs are similar these results are consistent with many of the settings in which up or out is typically observed such as law firms and academia

oligarchy democracy inequality and growth abstract this paper analyses the dynamics of inequality democratization and economic development in a political economy model of growth where education is both the engine of growth and a determinant of political participation in a context with imperfect capital markets we investigate the incentives for an educated oligarchy to subsidize the poor s education and to initiate a democratic transition we characterize the equilibrium patterns of political institutions income distribution and growth as a function of the initial income and inequalities in particular we identify circumstances under which the elite promotes the endogenous emergence of a middle class for purely political economy reasons a simple linear infinite horizon framework is then presented in this setting we discuss the importance of historical dependence for long run social stratification and redistribution

counteroffers and efficiency in labor markets with asymmetric information this article considers the effect of offer matching on labor market outcomes when the current employer has better information about his worker s productivity than potential employers previous research found that when current employers have better information than potential employers the latter use job assignment to infer an employed worker s qualifications as a result assignment of workers to jobs is inefficient i find that when current employers can match outside offers the equilibrium outcome may be efficient i analyze the effect of the asymmetric information on investment in human capital made by employers and workers and find these investment levels to be first best

an empirical model of labor supply in a life cycle setting this paper formulates and estimates a structural intertemporal model of labor supply using theoretical characterizations derived from an economic model of lifetime behavior a two step empirical analysis yields estimates of intertemporal and uncompensated substitution effects which provide the information needed to predict the response of hours of work to life cycle wage growth and shifts in the lifetime wage path

on the job search sticky prices and persistence abstract models of the monetary transmission mechanism often generate empirically implausible business fluctuations this paper analyzes the role of on the job search in the propagation of monetary shocks in a sticky price model with labor market search frictions such frictions induce long term employment relationships such that the real marginal cost is determined by real wages and the cost of an employment relationship on the job search opens up an extra channel of employment growth that dampens the response of these two components because real marginal cost rigidity induces small price adjustments on the job search gives rise to a strong propagation of monetary shocks that increases output persistence

implications of state dependent pricing for dynamic macroeconomic models abstract state dependent pricing sdp models treat the timing of price changes as a profit maximizing choice symmetrically with other decisions of firms using quantitative general equilibrium models which incorporate a generalized s s approach we investigate the implications of sdp for topics in two major areas of macroeconomic research the early 1990s sdp literature and more recent work on persistence mechanisms first we show that state dependent pricing leads to unusual macroeconomic dynamics which occur because of the timing of price adjustments chosen by firms as in the earlier literature in particular we display an example in which output responses peak at about a year while inflation responses peak at about 2 years after the shock second we examine whether the persistence enhancing effects of two new keynesian model features namely specific factor markets and variable elasticity demand curves depend importantly on whether pricing is state dependent in an sdp setting we provide examples in which specific factor markets perversely work to lower persistence while variable elasticity demand raises it

unequal societies income distribution and the social contract this paper develops a theory of inequality and the social contract aiming to explain how countries with similar economic and political fundamentals can sustain such different systems of social insurance fiscal redistribution and education finance as those of the united states and western europe with imperfect credit and insurance markets some redistributive policies can improve ex ante welfare and this implies that their political support tends to decrease with inequality conversely with credit constraints lower redistribution translates into more persistent inequality hence the potential for multiple steady states with mutually reinforcing high inequality and low redistribution or vice versa

promotion turnover and discretionary human capital acquisition this article explores human capital acquisition decisions when job placement helps determine competition for a worker with asymmetric information workers may invest in firm specific capital without long term contracts specific investment increases promotion chances and hence wage competition shifting competition back to a time when firms are symmetrically uninformed if general human capital is the efficient output maximizing investment then an equivalent firm specific investment maximizes expected career wages this is a general result for sellers in second price auctions sellers of labor invest to maximize the expected second highest bidder valuation wage not the winner s expected valuation

menu costs and phillips curves this paper develops a model of a monetary economy in which individual firms are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks as well as general inflation sellers can change price only by incurring a real menu cost we calibrate this cost and the variance and autocorrelation of the idiosyncratic shock using a new u s data set of individual prices due to klenow and kryvtsov the prediction of the calibrated model for the effects of high inflation on the frequency of price changes accords well with international evidence from various studies the model is also used to conduct numerical experiments on the economy s response to various shocks in none of the simulations we conducted did monetary shocks induce large or persistent real responses

equilibrium unemployment job flows and inflation dynamics this paper develops a general equilibrium model to explain a set of facts regarding job flows unemployment and inflation dynamics it integrates a theory of equilibrium unemployment into a monetary model with nominal price rigidities the labor market displays matching frictions and endogenous job destruction the model can explain the cyclical behavior of unemployment job creation job destruction and the joint fluctuations of the labor input along both the extensive and the intensive margin conditional on a shock to monetary policy allowing for variation of the labor input at the extensive margin leads to a significantly lower elasticity of marginal costs with respect to output this helps to explain the sluggishness of inflation and the persistence of output after a monetary policy shock

income distribution and macroeconomics this paper analyzes the role of wealth distribution in macroeconomics through investment in human capital it is shown that in the presence of credit markets imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital the initial distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and investment both in the short and in the long run as there are multiple steady states this paper therefore provides an additional explanation for the persistent differences in per capita output across countries furthermore the paper shows that cross country differences in macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate shocks can be attributed among other factors to differences in wealth and income distribution across countries

inefficient lobbying populism and oligarchy this paper analyses the efficiency consequences of lobbying in a production economy with imperfect commitment we first show that the pareto efficiency result found for truthful equilibria of common agency games in static exchange economies no longer holds under these more general conditions we construct a model of pressure groups where the set of efficient truthful common agency equilibria has measure zero second we show that under fairly general assumptions the equilibrium will be biased against the group with the highest productivity of private capital reflecting the fact that on the margin less productive groups find lobbying relatively more rewarding finally as an application if lobbies representing the poor and the rich have identical organizational capacities we show that the equilibrium is biased towards the poor who have a comparative advantage in politics rather than in production if the pressure groups differ in their organizational capacity both pro rich oligarchic and pro poor populist equilibria may arise all of which are inefficient with respect to the constrained optimum

promotions and wage growth this article presents evidence that internal mobility defined as a promotion or other position change is an important source of wage growth it accounts for approximately 15 of wage growth over the life cycle for white and black men but less for women the incidence of promotions and other position changes appears tied to the wage level better paid workers are more likely to be promoted the life cycle incidence of internal mobility looks similar to that for conventionally defined job mobility most moves are made early in the career mobility declines both with time in position and with experience

a theory of wage and promotion dynamics inside firms we show that a framework that integrates job assignment human capital acquisition and learning captures several empirical findings concerning wage and promotion dynamics inside firms including the following first real wage decreases are not rare but demotions are second wage increases are serially correlated third promotions are associated with large wage increases fourth wage increases at promotion are small relative to the difference between average wages across levels of the job ladder fifth workers who receive large wage increases early in their stay at one level of the job ladder are promoted quickly to the next

how many winners are good to have on tournaments with sabotage abstract from an employer s perspective a tournament should induce agents to exert productive activities but refrain from destructive ones we experimentally test the predictive power of a tournament model which suggests that within a reasonable framework productive and destructive activities are influenced neither by the number of agents taking part in the tournament nor by the fraction of the winner prizes our results clearly confirm that sabotage in tournaments indeed occurs while tournament size has virtually no effect on behavior a balanced fraction of winner and loser prizes appears to enhance productive activities

lobbying and welfare in a representative democracy this paper studies the impact of lobbying on political competition and policy outcomes in a framework which integrates the citizen candidate model of representative democracy with the menu auction model of lobbying positive and normative issues are analysed on the positive side lobbying need have little or no effect on policy outcomes because voters can restrict the influence of lobbyists by supporting candidates with offsetting policy preferences on the normative side coordination failure among lobbyists can result in pareto inefficient policy choices in addition by creating rents to holding office lobbying can lead to excessive entry into electoral competition

worker allocation hierarchies and the wage distribution economists have traditionally viewed the allocation of workers among jobs through the concept of comparative advantage this paper investigates hierarchical production models which display an absence of comparative advantage in order to demonstrate that for hierarchical production there is a second allocating factor which plays an important role two results are found first the allocation of workers among jobs tends to match high ability workers with positions which value ability highly second despite the fact that the models display an absence of comparative advantage i e the standard theoretical explanation for why wage distributions might be skewed the models wage distributions are skewed to the right relative to the underlying ability distributions

learning about monetary policy rules when labor market search and matching frictions matter abstract this paper examines the implications of labor market search and matching frictions for determinacy and e stability of rational expectations equilibrium ree in a sticky price model with interest rate policy when labor adjustment takes place solely at the extensive margin forecast based policy that meets the taylor principle is likely to induce indeterminacy and e instability regardless of whether it is strictly or flexibly inflation targeting when labor adjustment takes place at both the extensive and intensive margins the strictly inflation forecast targeting policy remains likely to induce indeterminacy but it generates a unique e stable fundamental ree as long as the taylor principle is satisfied therefore the presence of search and matching frictions changes the determinacy properties of a strictly inflation forecast targeting policy and alters its e stability properties when only an extensive margin is present but not when labor adjustment takes place at both margins

imperfections in labor markets and the scope of the firm abstract results are derived showing how the interaction of adverse selection and worker uncertainty about job preferences creates incentives for firms to offer a wider array of jobs or integrate the equilibrium wage structure is characterized non integrated firms make retention wage offers increasing in ability while integrated firms do not a generalization in which costs to integration are relevant is then suggested results indicate that it is the interaction between adverse selection and uncertain preferences that leads to a second period allocation of workers across jobs that is not first best but is second best they also show why the presence of adverse selection and uncertain preferences create a tendency toward a scope of integration broader than the first best outcome

dynamic common agency a general model of dynamic common agency with symmetric information is considered the set of truthful markov perfect equilibrium payoffs is characterized and the efficiency properties of the equilibria are established a condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs is derived for the static and the dynamic game the payoff is unique if and only if the payoff of each principal coincides with his marginal contribution to the social value of the game the dynamic model is applied to a game of agenda setting

job assignments signalling and efficiency this article analyzes a model in which information about a worker s ability is only directly revealed to the firm employing the worker other firms however use the worker s job assignment as a signal of ability three results recur throughout the analysis first wage rates tend to be more closely associated with jobs than with ability levels second there is frequently an inefficient assignment of workers to jobs i e even when a firm has complete information about a worker s output third the severity of this inefficiency tends to be negatively correlated with the level of firm specific human capital in the economy

wealth constraints lobbying and the efficiency of public allocation abstract in esteban and ray 1999 inequality public allocation and development mimeo we formalize a model in which individuals lobby before the government in order to benefit from some productivity enhancing government action infrastructures direct subsidies permissions in short the government honestly tries to allocate these permissions to the agents that will make the best use of them as revealed by the intensity of their lobbying if the marginal cost of resources varies with wealth the amount of information transmitted through lobbying will depend on the degree of inequality in this paper we summarize the main approach and examine the special case of equal wealth we show that the nature of signaling equilibria is critically affected by per capita wealth

trade wars and trade talks when governments meet in the international arena their actions reflect the political situations at home previous studies of trade relations have focused on governments that are immune from political pressures and that act as benevolent servants of the public interest here we introduce domestic politics into the analysis of international economic relations we study the interactions between national leaders who are concerned both with providing a high standard of living to the general electorate and collecting campaign contributions from special interest groups our analysis sheds light on the determinants of the structure of protection in non cooperative and cooperative policy equilibria

classic promotion tournaments versus market based tournaments as initially formulated in the seminal analysis of lazear and rosen 1981 an important perspective for understanding the role of promotions in firms is the tournament perspective that is a promotion and in particular the wage increase associated with a promotion is a prize that serves as an incentive for workers to exert effort and take other actions beneficial to the firm such as the accumulation of human capital in this paper i consider whether the best way to model promotion tournaments is by having firms commit to prizes ex ante as in lazear and rosen s initial formulation or whether promotion prizes should be modeled as arising from the signaling role of promotions and the competition between firms for promoted workers

inequality lobbying and resource allocation this paper describes how wealth inequality may distort public resource allocation a government seeks to allocate limited resources to productive sectors but sectoral productivity is privately known by agents with vested interests in those sectors they lobby the government for preferential treatment the government even if it honestly seeks to maximize economic efficiency may be confounded by the possibility that both high wealth and true economic desirability create loud lobbies broadly speaking both poorer economies and unequal economies display greater public misallocation the paper warns against the conventional wisdom that this is so because such governments are more corrupt jel d72 d78 d82 016 in this paper we propose a particular channel through which wealth inequality distorts the resource allocation process our analysis rests on four premises

five facts about prices a reevaluation of menu cost models are price decreases 3 the frequency of price increases covaries strongly with inflation whereas the frequency of price decreases and the size of price increases and price decreases do not 4 the frequency of price change is highly seasonal it is highest in the first quarter and then declines 5 we find no evidence of upwardsloping hazard functions of price changes for individual products we show that the first second and third facts are consistent with a benchmark menu cost model whereas the fourth and fifth facts are not

straight time and overtime in equilibrium abstract we formulate an equilibrium model of straight time and overtime wages by imposing restrictions on agents consumption sets and using a commodity space that includes employment lotteries we extract some time series implications from a linear quadratic approximation to our model evaluated at particular parameter values we use our model informally to interpret some features of observed time series for wages and employment

the internal economics of the firm evidence from personnel data we analyze twenty years of personnel data from one firm the hierarchical structure is quite simple and stable career movements suggest that the employee s rate of learning and the firm s learning about ability are important there are promotion fast tracks exit rates vary little with tenure or salary the firm has personnel policies like those described in the internal labor markets literature although several theoretical preconditions for ilms such as ports of entry and exit are lacking job levels are important to compensation but there is also substantial individual variation in pay within levels our companion paper in this issue explores the wage policy of this firm

resuscitating the wage channel in models with unemployment fluctuations higher wages all else equal translate into higher inflation more rigid wages imply a weaker response of inflation to shocks this view of the wage channel is deeply entrenched in central banks views and models of their economy in this paper we present a model with equilibrium unemployment which features three distinctive properties first using a search and matching model with right to manage wage bargaining a proper wage channel obtains second accounting for fixed costs associated with maintaining an existing job greatly magnifies profit fluctuations for any given degree of wage fluctuations which allows the model to reproduce the fluctuations of unemployment over the business cycle and third the model implies a reasonably low elasticity of steady state unemployment with respect to changes in benefits the calibration of the model implies low profits but does not require a small gap between the value of working and the value of unemployment for the worker

job discrimination market forces and the invisibility hypothesis the invisibility hypothesis holds that the job skills of disadvantaged workers are not easily discovered by potential new employers but that promotion enhances visibility and alleviates this problem then at a competitive labor market equilibrium firms profit by hiding talented disadvantaged workers in low level jobs consequently those workers are paid less on average and promoted less often than others with the same education and ability as a result of the inefficient and discriminatory wage and promotion policies disadvantaged workers experience lower returns to investments in human capital than other workers

labor market search the taylor principle and indeterminacy abstract in a sticky price model with labor market search and matching frictions forecast based interest rate policy almost always induces indeterminacy when it is strictly inflation targeting and satisfies the taylor principle indeterminacy is due to a vacancy channel of monetary policy that makes inflation expectations self fulfilling the effect of this channel strengthens as the sluggishness of the adjustment of employment relative to that of consumption increases when this relative sluggishness is high the taylor principle fails to ensure determinacy regardless of whether the policy is forecast based or outcome based whether it is strictly or flexibly inflation targeting or contains policy rate smoothing

the cyclical behavior of marginal cost and price the author examines the cyclical behavior of price marginal cost margins for u s manufac turing after 1956 short run marginal cost is markedly procyclical this is primarily due to procyclical overtime payments incurred beca use employment is not perfectly flexible in most industries output price fails to respond to the cyclical movement in marginal cost so price marginal cost margins are markedly countercyclical the res ults contradict business cycle theories that explain low production i n a recession by a high real cost of producing they support theories that explain low production in a recession by the inability of firms to sell their output copyright 1987 by american economic association

on firm level industry level and aggregate employment fluctuations employment fluctuations are examined at different levels of aggregation in a model with firm specific hiring decisions due to search frictions and sticky pricing the results indicate that firm level employment dispersion rises with higher price stickiness and higher demand elasticity whereas it falls with more convexity of search costs and with a higher labor supply elasticity industry level employment is more volatile and less procyclical than aggregate employment and a larger industry size reduces volatility and raises co movement with output the calibrated model is able to match the volatility autocorrelation and cyclical correlation of us industry level employment when incorporating firm specific technology shocks

promotion turnover earnings and firm sponsored training i develop a model in which different technological conditions lead to distinct equilibria with different patterns in labor mobility promotion earning distribution and provision of firm sponsored training key is the asymmetric learning of workers characteristics because of the information that is conveyed to the market by promotion firms have incentives to adopt strategic promotion policies which result in different patterns in the use of internal labor market the theory explains well the differences between the japanese and the united states labor markets

business cycles unemployment insurance and the calibration of matching models this paper theoretically and empirically documents a puzzle that arises when an rbc economy with a job matching function is used to model unemployment the standard model can generate sufficiently large cyclical fluctuations in unemployment or a sufficiently small response of unemployment to labor market policies but it cannot do both variable search and separation finite ui benefit duration efficiency wages and capital all fail to resolve this puzzle however either sticky wages or match specific productivity shocks can improve the model s performance by making the firm s flow of surplus more procyclical which makes hiring more procyclical too

monetary policy trend inflation and unemployment volatility the literature has long agreed that the dmp model after diamond 1982 mortensen 1982 pissarides 1985 with search and matching frictions in the labor market can deliver large volatilities in labor market quantities consistent with empirical data only if there is at least some wage stickiness i show however that the model can deliver nontrivial volatilities without wage stickiness as long as it has price dispersion and nonzero long run inflation rates i find that by keeping inflation at a positive rate monetary policy may be accountable for the large standard deviations observed on labor market variables in addition the shimer 2005 puzzle disappears under monetary policy shocks

asymmetric employer information promotions and the wage policy of firms abstract this paper provides evidence that inefficient promotion strategies and large wage increases upon promotion may both arise as a consequence of asymmetric employer information building on the seminal work by waldman 1984a and milgrom and oster 1987 we first present a model that illustrates how both phenomena may jointly arise due to the information revealing character of promotions using experimental labor markets we find evidence consistent with asymmetric employer information being a causal factor for both inefficient promotions and large wage increases upon promotion furthermore we analyze the effect of asymmetric employer information on profits and turnover

the phillips and beveridge curves revisited abstract this paper extends the labor market search model to account for monopolist intermediate good firms who face price adjustment costs we show quantitatively that embedding monetary shocks in this framework allows to mimic the phillips and beveridge curves

why did the west extend the franchise democracy inequality and growth in historical perspective during the nineteenth century most western societies extended voting rights a decision that led to unprecedented redistributive programs we argue that these political reforms can be viewed as strategic decisions by the political elite to prevent widespread social unrest and revolution political transition rather than redistribution under existing political institutions occurs because current transfers do not ensure future transfers while the extension of the franchise changes future political equilibria and acts as a commitment to redistribution our theory also offers a novel explanation for the kuznets curve in many western economies during this period with the fall in inequality following redistribution due to democratization i introduction the nineteenth century was a period of fundamental political reform and unprecedented changes in taxation and redistribution britain for example was transformed from an oligarchy run by an elite to a democracy the franchise was extended in 1832 and then again in 1867 and 1884 transferring voting rights to portions of the society with no previous political representation the decades after the political reforms witnessed radical social reforms increased taxation and the extension of education to the masses moreover as noted by kuznets inequality which was previously increasing started to decline during this period the gini coefficient for income inequality in england and wales had risen from 0 400 in 1823 to 0 627 in 1871 but fell to 0 443 in 1901 two key factors in the reduction in inequality were the increase in the proportion of skilled workers williamson 1985 and the redistribution of income toward the poorer segments of the society for example taxes rose from 8 12 percent of national product in 1867 to 18 8 percent by 1927 and the progressivity of the tax system increased substantially see lindert 1989

business cycles and labor market search the quantitative implications of labor market search for economic fluctuations are evaluated in the context of a real business cycle model incorporating labor market search into the model is found to improve its empirical performance along several dimensions in particular hours now fluctuate substantially more than wages and the contemporaneous correlation between hours and productivity falls in addition the model replicates the observation that output growth displays positive autocorrelation at short horizons overall the empirical results suggest that the labor market search environment embodies a quantitatively important propagation mechanism copyright 1996 by american economic association

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

inflation and labor market dynamics revisited abstract we demonstrate that the presence of an empirically plausible labor adjustment decision at the firm level rationalizes strategic complementarities in price setting which help explain inflation dynamics those strategic complementarities are typically assumed away in the related existing literature this motivates our revisiting of inflation and labor market dynamics

information transmission and inefficient lobbying abstract in a seminal paper grossman and helpman 1994 introduced a framework to understand how lobbying influences the choice of import export tariffs in this paper we extend their analysis and assume that lobbies have private information to analyze the effects of information transmission in a grossman and helpman lobby game information transmission leads to two agency costs one refers to the cost of signaling and the other to the cost of screening the lobby s competitiveness the signaling cost reduces distortions resulting from the screening cost on the other hand distortions from the screening cost enhance the signaling cost the two combined effects generate more distortions in the political game than each effect separately tariff protection and lobbies rents are lower than those found in grossman and helpman s truthful equilibrium therefore information transmission may improve welfare through the reduction of rent seeking activities

factor shares and savings in endogenous growth in models of steady investment driven growth an individual s propensity to save depends on how much of his income is drawn from accumulated factors of production capital rather than from nonaccumulated factors when agents are heterogeneous in this respect growth oriented policies have distributional consequences and in the absence of lump sum redistribution their implementation faces political constraints if the median voter is capital poor relative to the economy s representative agent political interactions tend to slow down growth when policy acts on capital s income share and tend to accelerate it when investment subsidies are the policy instrument of choice copyright 1993 by american economic association

a theory of trickle down growth and development this paper develops a model of growth and income inequalities in the presence of imperfect capital markets and it analyses the trickle down effect of capital accumulation moral hazard with limited wealth constraints on the part of the borrowers is the source of both capital market imperfections and the emergence of persistent income inequalities three main conclusions are obtained from this model first when the rate of capital accumulation is sufficiently high the economy converges to a unique invariant wealth distribution second even though the trickle down mechanism can lead to a unique steady state distribution under laissez faire there is room for government intervention in particular redistribution of wealth from rich lenders to poor and middle class borrowers improves the production efficiency of the economy both because it brings about greater equality of opportunity and also because it accelerates the trickle down process third the process of capital accumulation initially has the effect of widening inequalities but in later stages it reduces them in other words this model can generate a kuznets curve

distributive politics and economic growth a crude distinction between economics and politics would be that economics is concerned with expanding the pie while politics is about distributing it in this paper we analyze the relationship between the two we focus on how an economy s initial configuration of resources shapes the political struggle for income and wealth distribution and how that in turn affects long run growth our main conclusion is that inequality is conducive to the adoption of growth retarding policies we derive this result from a simple political economy model of growth and present cross country evidence consistent with it the key feature of our model is that individuals differ in their relative factor endowments we distinguish between two types of factors an accumulated factor called capital and a nonaccumulated factor called labor growth is driven by the expansion of the capital stock which is in turn determined by individual saving decisions long run growth is endogenous as the aggregate production function is taken to be linearly homogeneous in capital and productive government services taken together the provision of government services is financed by a tax on capital because government services are productive a small tax on

bringing income distribution in from the cold the title of this presidential address is chosen to highlight the way in which the subject of income distribution has in the past been marginalised for much of this century it has been very much out in the cold there are signs that in the 1990s it is being welcomed back and i shall be referring to recent research but i would like to use this occasion to give further impetus to the re incorporation of income distribution into the main body of economic analysis this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

search frictions real rigidities and inflation dynamics the standard new keynesian model suffers from the so called macro micro pricing conflict in order to match the dynamics of inflation implied by macroeconomic data the model needs to assume an average duration of price contracts which is much longer than what is observed in micro data here i show how departing from the standard model s assumption of a perfectly competitive labor market can help resolve the pricing conflict i do so by assuming search frictions in the labor market in this framework labor becomes firm specific and marginal cost curves become upward sloping this mechanism reduces the slope of the new keynesian phillips curve given a frequency of price adjustment conversely given an estimate of this slope my model implies shorter price durations than the standard model for a plausible calibration and for different slope values my model consistently delivers price durations that are roughly half of those implied by the standard model

strategic promotion and compensation within a hierarchical firm structure this paper details how the composition of a worker s skills and the non observability of a worker s ability affect wage and promotion paths promotionbased compensation schemes derive naturally from the worker s asymmetrically observed ability promotion takes place over time and is inefficient since employers strategically exploit their knowledge of an able worker s ability conversely employers may be unable to efficiently demote and retain bad managers without paying bonuses employers are led to promote educated employees before their equally or more able but uneducated counterparts explanations for fast track promotions plans and other empirical regularities are provided

mismatch shocks and unemployment during the great recession summary we investigate the macroeconomic consequences of fluctuations in the effectiveness of the labor market matching process with a focus on the great recession we conduct our analysis in the context of an estimated medium scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with sticky prices and equilibrium search unemployment that features a shock to the matching efficiency or mismatch shock we find that this shock is not important for unemployment fluctuations in normal times however it plays a somewhat larger role during the great recession when it contributes to raise the actual unemployment rate by around 1 3 percentage points and the natural rate by around 2 percentage points the mismatch shock is the dominant driver of the natural rate of unemployment and explains part of the recent shift of the beveridge curve copyright 2016 john wiley sons ltd