union coverage and profitability among u s firms this paper utilizes unique survey data on labor union coverage at the firm level to examine union effects on the profitability of 705 u s companies during the 1970s market value and earnings are estimated to be about 10 15 percent lower in an average unionized company than in a nonunion company following extensive control for firm and industry characteristics deleterious union effects on firm profitability are sizable throughout the 1972 80 period but vary considerably across industries the relatively poor profit performance of unionized companies may help explain the recent decline in u s union membership the author thanks the w e upjohn institute for employment research for financial support elizabeth gregory for assistance with the union coverage survey zvi griliches for providing access to the rd donald deere terry seaks and anonymous referees for helpful suggestions and seminar participants at connecticut florida state harvard texas a m and william and mary for comments on earlier versions of this research

wages and productivity growth in a dynamic monopoly abstract this paper studies the intertemporal problem of a monopolistic firm that engages in productivity enhancing innovations to reduce labor costs the optimal innovation policy is not monotone and the rate of productivity growth is the highest when the firm s size is in some intermediate range as long as its initial productivity is not too low the firm eventually reaches a steady state where the rate of productivity growth is identical to the rate of wage growth productivity dependent wage differentials do not affect productivity growth in the steady state they increase however the firm s long run equilibrium cost level

strategic behavior in contests comment almost by definition contests involve strategy this is especially true in contests between unevenly matched contenders in a recent article avinash dixit 1987 explored strategic commitment in contests between a favorite and an underdog the favorite is defined as the player whose chance of victory exceeds one half at the nash equilibrium an underdog s chance is less than one half dixit concludes that if the favorite has the opportunity to move first then he will overcommit effort compared with the nash equilibrium an important implication of the favorite overcommitting effort is that strategic behavior leads to greater social costs see gordon tullock 1980 the opposite holds if the underdog has the opportunity to move first this paper demonstrates that the favorite will never overcommit effort given endogenous order of moves the favorite finds it advantageous to wait until the underdog moves surprisingly the underdog s best strategy is not to wait but to make the first move throwing the first punch the equilibrium order of play is for the underdog to move before the favorite in this equilibrium one never observes overcommitment of effort consequently extending dixit s model to allow for endogenous order of moves suggests that strategic behavior in contests will lead to undercommitment compared with nash behavior

war and natural resource exploitation abstract we build a theoretical framework that allows for endogenous conflict behaviour i e fighting efforts and for endogenous natural resource exploitation i e speed ownership and investments while depletion is spread in a balanced hotelling fashion during peace the presence of conflict creates incentives for rapacious extraction as this lowers the stakes of future contest this voracious extraction depresses total oil revenue especially if world oil demand is relatively elastic and the government s weapon advantage is weak some of these political distortions can be overcome by bribing rebels or by government investment in weapons the shadow of conflict can also make less efficient nationalized oil extraction more attractive than private extraction as insecure property rights create a holdup problem for the private firm and lead to a lower license fee furthermore the government fights less intensely than the rebels under private exploitation which leads to more government turnover without credible commitment to future fighting efforts private oil depletion is only lucrative if the government s non oil office rents are large and weaponry powerful which guarantees the government a stronger grip on office and makes the holdup problem less severe

the effects of unions and strikes on the rate of growth of total factor productivity in canada there is a substantial amount of literature regarding the effects or potential effects of trade unions on various measures of productivity brown and medoff 1978 clark 1980 but less information is available on the effects on the rate of growth of productivity measures mansfield 1980 and kendrick 1973 except for tangential references no sources were noted which discussed the effects of strike activity on productivity growth this paper is concerned with the latter two issues there are four main sections i a discussion of the theoretical issues involved ii a discussion of measurement options and problems iii presentation of empirical results and discussion of estimation problems and iv intepretation of the empirical results

the role of unions in hospital cost inflation this study examines the impact of unions on worker compensation and total costs in hospitals both in specific departments and in the hospital as a whole an analysis of data for 367 hospitals for the years 1974 and 1977 shows that unions raised the mean compensation of hospital workers by 8 8 percent without producing offsetting increases in worker productivity thus unions do increase hospital costs although far less than health insurance and other factors do

labor unions and the adoption of new technology the paper examines whether unionization by workers discourages the adoption of labor saving techniques this is done in the context of an oligopolistic industry with a small number of firms some of which are unionized we find that unionization can actually encourage the adoption of labor saving technology provided that the technological improvement is mild and that demand is sufficiently high or demand elasticity sufficiently low if there is an effective threat of entry that causes the union to moderate its wage demands then unionization may encourage the adoption of new technology even at low levels of demand

comparative equilibrium versus comparative statics two approaches are often used to analyse the effects of uncertainty upon individual decision making the comparative equilibrium approach compares an uncertain model with a certainty model usually with the random variable replaced by its mean the comparative statics approach introduces more uncertainty into an already uncertain model and considers the effects upon optimal decisions this paper demonstrates that these two approaches are qualitatively equivalent for the class of models where uncertainty is completely exogenous to the decision maker when individual decisions affect this uncertainty the two analyses are generally qualitatively different an example of each type of model is presented followed by a general analysis

labor unions bargaining power and corporate bond yield spreads structural credit model perspectives abstract this study investigates labor union effects on bond yield spreads from perspectives of structural credit models by employing american bond observations from 2001 to 2007 this research finds that union strength significantly and positively relates to bond yield spreads this effect is roughly equal to that of issuer rating for one standard deviation change when controlling for well known variables the empirical results also show that the positive effects become weaker when management has higher bargaining power additionally union strength volatility significantly and negatively relates to bond yield spreads and capital structure leverage the above results are robust when controlling for credit ratings collinearity concerns industry effect and tax effect

effort levels in contests with two asymmetric players a contest is a situation in which players compete with one another by expending effort to win a prize examples abound firms compete by spending rd 26 krueger 14 posner 20 rogerson 23 appelbaum and katz 1 hillman and riley 12 hirshleifer 13 ellingsen 8 nitzan 18 and baik 2 3 have studied rent seeking contests lazear and rosen 15 o keeffe viscusi and zeckhauser 19 and rosen 24 have examined performance incentives associated with reward schemes riley 22 has analyzed the war of attrition and auctions dixit 7 has considered strategic commitments in contests with different applications these are only a part of the literature on the theory of contests despite the vast literature however the effects of asymmetries between players have not been clarified except by harris and vickers 11 who analyze in a patent race model the strategic consequences of asymmetries the purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of asymmetries between two players on individual and total effort levels in a model with a logit form probability of winning function effort levels expended by the players deserve attention effort in a rent seeking contest is interpreted as social costs and thus total effort level is a measure of economic efficiency effort in an r d contest is interpreted as r d expenditures and thus effort levels determine the expected date of invention we focus on asymmetries between the players resulting from their different valuations of the prize their different abilities to convert effort into probability of winning or both such asymmetries are common in contests for example people in different locations may receive different

long term attachments and long run firm rates of return long term attachments between workers and firms are common numerous studies have examined worker returns to tenure but little is known of firm returns to firm worker matches yet these attachments represent a human capital asset quasi held by the firm which is not captured by traditional accounting measures of firm assets firms with large quasi holdings of human capital will have higher measured return on assets other things equal analysis of data on 250 large manufacturing firms supports the view that firms profit from long term attachments with their workers consequently unmeasured human capital assets contribute to the explanation of persistence in measured long run excess profits across firms

unionisation structures and innovation incentives this paper examines how dierent unionisation structures aect rms innovation incen tives and industry employment we distinguish three modes of unionisation with increasing degree of centralisation 1 decentralisation where wages are determined independently at the rm level 2 coordination where one industry union sets individual wages for all rms and 3 centralisation where an industry union sets a uniform wage rate for all rms while rms investment incentives are largest under centralisation investment in centives are non monotone in the degree of centralisation decentralisation carries higher investment incentives than coordination labour market policy can spur innovation by decentralising unionisation structures or through non discrimination rules

a general model of rent seeking for public goods this paper generalizes the model of collective rent seeking over a public good expanding the rent seeker s consumption bundle to include preferences over the public good and a private good our results suggest collective rent seeking is positively related to group size although free riding exists within a group there is not a one for one tradeoff in addition rent seeking increases with wealth finally total effort expended by both groups increases if either group increases in membership size except in the case of an extremely lopsided contest the key condition underlying these results is that the marginal utility of the public good is not inversely related to the private good

basic research and productivity increase in manufacturing additional evi dence in a recent paper in this review edwin mansfield illustrated empirically using a sample of ten petroleum and six chemical firms that firm rates of productivity change are related to the amount of companyfinanced basic research performed certeris paribus in this note additional evidence is presented which is supportive of mansfield s findings this analysis is based on a sample of fifty one major manufacturing firms active in r d it is unique in that the impacts of company financeda nd governmentfinancedb asic researche xpendituresa re consideredd eterminantso f productivityg rowth the following model was estimated

industrial relations performance economic performance and qwl programs an interplant analysis this study analyzes the relationship among plant level measures of industrial relations performance economic performance and quality of working life programs the analysis employs pooled time series and cross section data from 18 plants within a division of general motors for the years 1970 79 the empirical results show strong associations between industrial relations and economic performance measures and limited support for the hypothesis that quality of working life efforts improve both kinds of performance

measuring the effects of regulation with stock price data this article examines the usefulness of stock returns in measuring the effects of regulation when the dates on which market expectations change are not known and standard sources e g the wall street journal are used to choose announcement dates twenty major changes in regulatory constraint since 1887 are considered tests using either monthly or daily data are found to have surprisingly little ability to detect the effects of regulation the evidence shows that formal regulatory announcements are generally anticipated in cases where it is unclear when expectations change

unions and monopoly profits using cross sectional data for u s manufacturing the author identifies a negative effect of unions on the profits of highly concentrated industries and virtually no effect on the profits of unconcentrated industries the results for concentrated industries are explained in terms of the monopoly model which predicts a negative effect of unions on profits equivalent to the change in employer s surplus the monopoly model also suggests that previous profit studies which omitted the union variable were likely to significantly underestimate the relationship between concentration and profits this prediction is also supported by empirical evidence m sany studies have demonstrated the ability of unions to raise wages above the level of nonunion workers higher union wages in turn may affect the level of prices employment capital intensity productivity and profits recent studies by clark 1982 and freeman 1983 have found significant negative effects of unions on profit rates in the united states using line of business data from 1970 to 1980 for 900 firms clark found a negative effect of unions on the rate of return to capital more specifically the union effects were found to be significantly negative when market shares were low and insignificant when market shares were high according to clark the absence of a union effect in the latter case can be explained by the ability of firms with market power to pass on higher union wages into higher prices 1982 p 47 on the other hand freeman 1983 using data from the survey of manufactures from 1958 to 1976 and the internal revenue service from 1965 to 1976 also found a negative effect of unions on profits contrary to clark s results however the union profit effect was negative only in concentrated industries the point of contention appears to be the role of concentration in determining the union profit effect rather than the overall negative impact of unions the results of clark and freeman are important because previous industrial organization research on profit rates generally ignored unions for instance of the forty six profit studies surveyed by weiss 1974 none included a union variable more recently a profit study in this review by ravenscraft 1983 using high quality line of business data from the federal trade commission also ignored unionization as will be demonstrated the omission of the union variable leads to an understatement of the effect of industrial concentration on profits this means that concentrated industries generate much greater profits than indicated by previous research in order to measure the size of the understatement a new concept employer s surplus is developed which illustrates the theoretical impact of a union wage increase on monopoly profits the empirical estimates of employer s surplus in this paper indicate how monopoly profits are divided between firms and unions most of the data used in this study were obtained from james medoff and charles brown 2 unlike the previous two studies each observation corresponds to a state by two digit sic industry for manufacturing in 1972 because of the large variations in unionization across states this data set offers a useful test of the union profit effect i employer s surplus according to accepted theory the profit maximizing monopolist will employ labor up to the point where the market wage equals the marginal revenue product mrp 3 if for simplicity we assume that all other factors are variable then the mrp curve represents the monopolist s long run demand for labor in the absence of unions employment is determined by the intersection of the mrp curve and nonunion wage wn as pictured in figure 1 if unions raise wages to wa employment will decrease from ln to l with the reducreceived for publication november 28 1983 revision accepted for publication july 6 1984 eastern washington university i am very grateful to dave bunting lisa brown bill dickens claire brown and george strauss for their valuable suggestions on this research this paper is a revised version of chapter 3 from the author s ph d thesis the union impact on profits productivity and prices university of california berkeley 1 see parseley 1980 for a recent review of this literature 2 i would like to thank brown and medoff for making these data available to me 3 marginal revenue product is equal to marginal revenue multiplied by marginal physical product see rees 1979

union structure and firms incentives for cooperative r d investments we examine how different unionisation structures and the spillovers of r d activities affect r d investments and fi rms incentives to form ar esearch joint venture we find that whenever firms invest non cooperatively an industry union increases r d investments if industry specific spillovers are low in case of a research joint venture investments are always higher under firm level unions we also find that firms incentives to form a research joint venture are stronger when they face an industry union if spillovers are low rigidities in the labour market such as high unemployment benefits or and a central union have negative effects on employment output and profits and hinder the diffusion of the efficiency created by a rjv to consumers and employees integrated labour market and r d policies are also discussed

endogenous timing in contests with delegation i introduction contests with delegation where each player hires a delegate to expend effort or resources on the player s behalf to win a prize are common 1 an example is litigation between a plaintiff and a defendant in which each litigant hires an attorney who expends his effort to win the lawsuit on behalf of his client another example is a rent seeking contest in which each firm hires a lobbyist who expends his effort to acquire a monopoly or a procurement contract from the government on behalf of his client yet another example is a patent contest in which each firm hires a group of independent researchers or university professors who conduct research to obtain a patent on behalf of their employer delegation is attractive to players because they each can use superior ability by hiring a delegate with more ability than herself and achieve strategic commitments through delegation in such contests with delegation we believe delegates decide endogenously when to expend their effort after signing delegation contracts indeed pursuing their self interest the delegates may well endogenize the order of their moves and communicate it with each other before they expend their effort we believe also that players take it into account when designing their contracts for the delegates that the delegates will endogenize the order of their moves it is these ideas that motivate this paper accordingly the purpose of this paper is to systematically study contests with delegation in which delegates decide endogenously when to expend their effort after signing delegation contracts and before they expend their effort we study two player contests with delegation focusing on not only the equilibrium delegation contracts between players and their delegates but also the equilibrium orders of the delegates moves specifically we set up and analyze the following three stage game in the first stage two players each hire a delegate and they simultaneously announce their contracts written with their delegates each player s contract specifies how much her delegate will be paid if he wins the contest and how much if he loses it in the second stage each delegate decides when to expend his effort and the delegates announce their decisions simultaneously in the third stage the delegates expend their effort according to their decisions in the second stage to win the prize on behalf of their employers we show that in equilibrium the delegate hired by the higher valuation player chooses his effort level after observing his counterpart s and his expected payoff is greater than that of his counterpart this advantage of the delegate of the higher valuation player can be explained by the fact that his employer the higher valuation player offers better contingent compensation as it will be defined in section ii to him than the lower valuation player does to her delegate we compare the outcomes of the endogenous timing framework the three stage game presented above with those of the simultaneous move framework the game which is the same as the three stage game with the exception that the delegates choose their effort levels simultaneously and this order of their moves is given exogenously an interesting result is that each player offers her delegate a better contract in the endogenous timing framework than in the simultaneous move framework another interesting result is that unless the valuation for the prize of the higher valuation player is significantly greater than that of the lower valuation player then each delegate s expected payoff is greater in the endogenous timing framework than in the simultaneous move framework whereas each player s expected payoff is less in the endogenous timing framework than in the simultaneous move framework in summary pursuing their self interest the delegates decide endogenously when to expend their effort given contracts between the players and the delegates

the intertemporal stability of the concentration margins relationship using a longitudinal data base we find that there has been a substantial narrowing of the spread between the price cost margins of concentrated and unconcentrated industries including measures of macroeconomic fluctuations into standard price cost margin regressions we find significant differences in cyclical behavior across market structure we also explore a possible explanation unionization for differences in cyclical behavior finally we investigate the degree to which our results are affected by the potential simultaneity of concentration advertising and the price cost margin

the relationship between factor endowments and commodity trade abstract the paper establishes general propositions concerning the relationship between a nation s factor endowments and its pattern of commodity trade in a multi factor multi product context inequality relationships between endowments and autarky prices autarky and free trade prices and between autarky prices and free trade net exports are established using a general model of trade attention is then restricted to a multi product multi factor version of the heckscher ohlin samuelson model of trade from an initial autarky equilibrium a comparative statics analysis yields the effect on net exports of a change in one nation s endowment a bilinear inequality between the changes in endowments and net exports is established it is also shown that if a good were to be exported imported when endowments changed and world prices were held fixed then it will continue to be exported imported when world prices have adjusted to re establish free trade equilibrium

the effects of unions on organisational change and employment this paper investigates the association between unionism organizational change and employment using british data over 1980 84 union plants were more likely to have experienced organizational change this is likely to be due to both the once for all removal of restrictive practices and union voice effects the oft cited negative relationship between unionism and employment growth may well arise from the differential extent to which restrictive practices were removed in union plants during 1980 84 more importantly the authors present evidence suggesting that unions were associated with faster employment growth during the late 1970s copyright 1991 by royal economic society

technical efficiency unions and decentralized labor contracts abstract this paper explores the link between the presence of unions in the workplace the adoption of decentralized labor agreements and technical efficiency using a large sample of italian manufacturing firms we apply the data envelopment analysis and its robust version based on bootstrap theory to get reliable estimates of technical efficiency at the firm level in a standard first stage we devote particular attention to the specific technology adopted by distinguishing 20 different sector frontiers as well as to the presence of outliers the obtained efficiency scores are analyzed in a second stage applying a truncated regression model estimated via maximum likelihood following the simar and wilson 2007 2011 methodology our results highlight that the presence of workplace unionization decreases the level of technical efficiency while aspects limiting the unions power such as a strong exposure to international markets high debt levels or the prevalence of flexible assets partially reduce the negative effect however when firms adopt decentralized labor contracts agreements the effect on efficiency is positive and partially compensates the negative unions effect

environmental regulation by private contest abstract it is widely expected that the recent trend in the us eu and elsewhere towards an increased role for private agents and agencies in the formulation and enforcement of environmental regulation will continue if environmental regulation is to be privatised in this way it is natural to ask how far the activities of environmental groups on whose shoulders much of the responsibility for defending the environment is likely to fall should be subsidised or taxed in this paper we identify the trade offs involved and characterise the optimal subsidy tax the analysis is argued to have significant implications for how governments should think about the way in which fiscal law treats environmental ngo s

wage dispersion and productive efficiency evidence for sweden the swedish record of enormous compression of relative wages under centralized solidarity bargaining followed by substantial decompression of wages after central bargaining broke down supplies observations well suited to empirical evaluation of arguments about the response of productive efficiency to shifts in wage distribution we obtain no results supporting fairness morale and cohesiveness theories implying that wage leveling within workplaces and industries may enhance productivity reduction of interindustry wage differentials evidently did however contribute positively to aggregate output and productivity growth most likely for the structural reasons first emphasized by swedish trade union economists almost a half century ago

the impact of labor unions on investment cash flow sensitivity abstract this paper empirically examines how labor unions affect investment cash flow sensitivity using samples from the us covering the period of 1984 2009 we find a significant positive union effect using a q model of investment the capital expenditures of firms are 1 71 times more sensitive to internal cash flows when unionization rates increase one standard deviation from the mean this effect holds when we control for other proxies of financial constraints in addition unionized firms are associated with lower cash cash flow sensitivity which suggests that the higher investment cash flow sensitivity in unionized firms is primarily driven by the incentive of these firms to reduce liquidity and enhance bargaining power against the union we also show that the above union effects become more pronounced during labor contract negotiation years

enterprise unionism the japanese system at work trade unions japanese unions at work the japanese labour market has worked quite well over recent decades whereas the european economies have produced more and more unemployment a popular hypothesis is that this difference can be attributed to unions while in europe unions are strong and centralized and do not care about the individual firm the japanese unions are enterprise unions which deal directly with and understand the heal management employers in japan in turn consult unions and employees on all relevant management decisions this corporatism finally ensures that workers are more motivated and have a higher productivity it is the central conjecture of this paper that the presence of unions increases the voice of the employees significantly by using innovative new firm data it is shown that this is actually the case hence japanese enterprise unions are not harmful but foster information sharing and contribute to the performance of the enterprise toshiaki tachibanaki and tomohiko noda

self enforcing union contracts efficient investment and employment unions an application of the theory of self lead to underinvestenforcing contracts 1983 provides a rich ment we show that set of strategies firm might employ to counter the punishments baldunion opportunism in the context of long lived win considers credible relation specifi capital this work both antici exclude tougher threats that only have the appated and in an important dynamic sense out pearance of being selfflanke the collective voice view of unionism destructive if the e g freeman and medoff 1984 and the en firm discount factor suing slew of union productivity effects studies is sufficientl close to e g addison and hirsch 1989 our purpose one union opportunism can indeed be dehere is to update baldwin s influentia work re terred moreover we newing it to incorporate advances in game theory show that given the that have taken hold since 1983 firm discount factor baldwin s work has had staying power be a shorter lifetime of cause it is a leading edge application of the idea capital does not necessarily promote effi that long term interests can form the foundation ciency although as for credible self enforcement of contracts her baldwin emphasizes it core conclusion is that the union s temptation for does enhance the opportunistic conduct is strongest if the life of firm ability to punish sunk capital is long in relation to the union s hori union opportunism it also creates adverse inzon because unions represent current member centives for the fir to ship and property rights in the unionare not trans engage in opportunistic ferable these tendencies are likely to prevail employment cuts

efficient contracts with costly adjustment short run employment determination for airline mechanics this paper presents an empirical analysis of firm specific employment and wage outcomes for mechanics in the domestic airlines industry a dynamic contracting model is presented that incorporates both costly employment adjustment and potential gaps between contract wage rates and the opportunity value of workers time the model gives a useful description of the employment output linkage in the data but is less successful in capturing the dynamic relation between employment contract wage rates and wage rates outside the airline industry copyright 1986 by american economic association

union effects on productivity evidence from western u s sawmills the authors conjecture that previous studies have tended to overestimate the productivity of union firms relative to nonunion firms due to inadequate controls for output quality and input usage important omissions if the higher cost of unionized labor leads to less labor intensive products and techniques to avoid those problems this study examines a fairly standardized commodity lumber and controls for detailed product attributes and inputs an analysis of data from a survey administered by the authors shows that unionized sawmills were between 12 and 21 less productive than nonunionized mills in fiscal year 1986 as predicted when product quality and raw material usage are not included in the analysis the estimate of union productivity is biased upward

the union impact on profits evidence from industry price cost margin data this paper uses industry price cost margin data to estimate the extent to which unions reduce profits estimates allowing for the endogeneity of union status are contrasted with estimates that assume union status is exogenous and not determined in part by either profitability or industry structure endogeneity is found to be an important consideration in estimating the union impact on profits two stage estimates are considerably larger than ols estimates the final section explores the total estimated redistribution from capital to labor in the manufacturing sector an important conclusion is that unions raise prices less than was previously believed

transfer seeking and avoidance on the full social costs of rent seeking we would like to thank gordon tullock and an anonymous referee of this journal for their helpful comments and suggestions this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the effects of the nlra on stockholder wealth in the 1930s whereas most recent research examining the effects of the nlra on labor management relations has focused on the impact of specific provisions of the law this study provides an estimate of the impact of the passage of the nlra on 75 firms that were at great risk of being unionized in the 1930s taking changes in shareholder wealth as a measure of the shift in the balance of power caused by the nlra the authors find that the passage of the nlra caused a statistically and economically significant decline in shareholder wealth for the sampled firms specifically by april 1937 stockholder wealth in the firms was 15 9 lower than would have been expected had the nlra not been enacted t he impact of public policy on the balance of power between labor and management has always been a fundamental topic in industrial relations recent changes in many labor management relationships have renewed interest in the influence of public policy on labor relations and raised questions of how modifications in these policies might alter the behavior of the parties according to delaney lewin and sockell 1985 the empirical research on this topic has largely concentrated on specific provisions of the wagner act such as election procedures and regulation of employer unfair labor practices for example getman gold

employee participation programs group based incentives and company performance a union nonunion comparison this analysis examines whether union representation positively or negatively influences the effectiveness of employee participation programs and group based incentives in improving firm performance examined at the firm level a model of the independent and interaction effects of participation profit and gain sharing and union representation is estimated against data on 841 manufacturing firms in michigan in 1989 the evidence indicates that employee participation programs contributed substantially more to performance in unionized firms than in nonunion firms whereas profit and gain sharing programs contributed substantially more to performance in nonunion firms than in unionized firms

rent sharing holdup and wages evidence from matched panel data rent sharing by workers can reduce the incentives for investment if some of the returns to sunk capital are captured in higher wages we propose a simple measure of this holdup effect based on the size of the wage offset for firm specific capital accumulation using social security earnings records for workers in the veneto region of italy linked to detailed financial data for their employers we find strong evidence of rent sharing with an elasticity of wages with respect to potential rents per worker of around 4 arising mainly at larger firms with higher price cost margins on the other hand we find little evidence that bargaining lowers the return on investment instead firm level bargaining appears to split the rents after deducting the full cost of capital

the effect of unionization on productivity evidence from a long panel of coal mines the author measures the effect of unionization on productivity based on a panel of west virginia coal mines from 1897 to 1928 output and inputs are measured in physical terms and most of the mine

how unions affect productivity in manufacturing plants this study investigates several hypotheses as to how unions may affect productivity analysis of data from 46 manufacturing plants for 1982 indicates a negative union impact on productivity the author finds evidence suggesting that unions reduce the effectiveness of some managerial practices undertaken to increase productivity and that a poor labor management relations climate also reduces productivity these two factors account for almost 50 percent of the negative union impact

the effects of unions on employment and productivity an unresolved contradiction the evidence that unions substantially increase productivity is contradicted by the evidence that the effect of unions on employment is small it is shown in this paper that if the union is constrained by the firm s demand function and it is the efficiency units of labor that are in the demand function then essentially the only way to resolve this contradiction is for unions to raise the productivity of capital and not of labor under conditions where the substitutability between labor and capital is very limited but estimates of the substitutability parameter are near unity so that one of these effects must be wrong either unions do not substantially increase productivity or they substantially reduce employment

collective rent dissipation the theory of rent seeking was initiated by tullock 1967 1980 followed by krueger 1974 and posner 1975 and more recently extended in various directions by allard 1988 appelbaum and katz 1986a b c gradstein and nitzan 1989 hillman and katz 1984 1987 hillman and samet 1987 hillman and riley 1989 katz et al 1990 long and vousden 1987 ursprung 1990 and varian 1989 the purpose of this paper is to extend this theory by introducing the possibility of collective group rent seeking with voluntary individual decisions regarding their extent of participation in the collective rent seeking efforts

environmental conflicts and the slapp abstract a citizen has the right to challenge a firm s actions regarding development plans or violations of environmental laws firms have responded with the slapp strategic lawsuit against public participation fearing the loss of the constitutional right to petition several u s states have or are considering explicitly restricting the slapp for a class of environmental conflict models with one sided asymmetric information our results suggest that restricting the slapp does not increase the efficiency of the dispute

union rent seeking intangible capital and market value of the firm abstract this study considers the effect of unions on intangi ble capital investment and profitability within the context of a market value rather than a more traditional accounting based approach theory is provided suggesting unions are able to affect profitability by sharing in the economic returns to firm specific intangible capital in support of this hypothesis we find unionization reduces the returns to r d and produces a corresponding limiting influence on r d investment at the firm level i introduction a n extensive literature in economics has ex amined the determinants of profitability with much of the focus centering on the role of market structure only recently however have the effects of labor unions on profitability been analyzed ths is surprising since labor economists long have emphasized union influences on wages and productivity that in turn may affect profitabil ity in recent studies freeman 1983 and karier 1985 report a significant limiting influence of unions on price cost margins in high concentra tion manufacturing industries using firm level data and the market based tobin s

conflict and rent seeking success functions ratio vs difference models of relative success the rent seeking competitions studied by economists fall within a much broader category of conflict interactions that also includes military combats election campaigns industrial disputes lawsuits and sibling rivalries in the rent seeking literature each party s success pi which can be interpreted either as the probability of victory or as the proportion of the prize won has usually been taken to be a function of the ratio of the respective resource commitments alternatively however pi may instead be a function of the difference between the parties commitments to the contest the contest success function csf for the difference from is a logistic curve in which as is consistent with military experience increasing returns apply up to an inflection point at equal resource commitments a crucial flaw of the traditional ratio model is that neither onesided submission nor two sided peace between the parties can ever occur as a cournot equilibrium in contrast both of these outcomes are entirely consistent with a model in which success is a function of the difference between the parties resource commitments

unionization and profitability evidence from the capital market this paper examines the effect of unionization on the profitability of firms abnormal monthly common stock returns for a sample of 253 nyse listed firms are estimated for the month in which the union petitions for an election and for the month in which the national labor relations board certifies the election outcome the results suggest that unionization on average is associated with a reduction in equity value when unions win an election the average loss associated with the unionization drive is 3 8 percent of equity value when unions lose an election there is an average net reduction of 1 3 percent in the equity value of the firm

stackelberg rent seeking in this paper i present a formal analysis of rent seeking games in which the players do not move simultaneously i consider rent seeking situations where the players are risk neutral and may value the prize differently the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in this stackelberg game provides several surprising and interesting results i extend the problem to deal with cases of in complete information concerning the value a player has for the politically contestable rent

sluggish institutions in a dynamic world can unions and industrial competition coexist during the 1930s and 1940s collective bargaining emerged as the workplace governance norm in much of the u s industrial sector following its peak in the 1950s union density in the u s private sector fell steadily to only 7 4 percent in 2006 governance shifted from a formalized union norm to one of constrained managerial discretion in competitive and dynamic economic environments a union tax on company earnings and slow response to economic shocks combine to produce poor performance by union companies two industries automotives and airlines are used to illustrate these points if worker based institutions are to flourish they must add value and permit companies to perform at levels similar to those obtained under evolving nonunion governance norms

investment and union certification using data on union certification elections we estimate the impact of unionization on firms investment behavior employing both a standard q model and an investment surprises technique we find that union certification significantly reduces investment in the year following the election we find that a winning certification election has on average about the same effect on investment in the year following the event as would given the elasticity measures taken from the public finance literature a 33 percentage point increase in the corporate tax the magnitude of the response in years further away from the election is less certain

the effects of grievance activity on productivity this study develops and tests a production function that includes a plant s grievance filing rate as a determinant of productivity application of that function to data on nine unionized paper mill

the determination of r d empirical evidence on the role of unions abstract this paper examines the empirical evidence of the role of union bargaining on innovation we review the existing empirical evidence and emphasis some of the problems with the theoretical assumptions we outline a simple model of strategic rd b the union bargains only over wages

why capital hires labor a bargaining perspective organizational forms often serve as vehicles for the appropriation of quasi rent capitalist firms typically emerge when production requires noncontractible investments in specific physical assets because worker control would divert quasi rents away from ass et owners ex post conversely labor managed firms tend to emerge in niches requiring specialized human capital but general purpose physi cal assets a key result is that capitalist firms can persist in competitive markets even when labor managed firms would yield a larg er total surplus copyright 1993 by american economic association

labour markets and innovation ex post bargaining abstract there is considerable interest in how labour market conditions affect innovation lying behind much of the existing work on this question is a simple model of a single union bargaining with a single firm in which in the absence of binding contracts the union reduces the returns to innovation without bearing any of the costs this misses an important feature of some rd with efficient contracts there are cases where being faced with a stronger union will help a firm to win a patent race it would otherwise have lost

on the contract curve a test of alternative models of collective bargaining the traditional model of collective bargaining confines unions to settlements constrained by the employer s labor demand curve but an alternative model places wage employment outcomes on a contract curve that extends beyond the labor demand curve this paper derives a multidimensional hedonic contract curve model in which employment security provisions are used to maintain efficient bargains outside the employer s demand curve and distinguishes empirically between the contract curve and demand constraint models using data for public school teachers in new york state estimates clearly support the contract curve model over the demand constraint model by linking the gap between compensation and the value of the marginal product to the strength of employment security provisions

a new view of the market structure performance debate ion typically considered in market structure performance studies data on cross sections of firms or industries are unlikely to be sufficiently 2 the question of data selection has been discussed fairly thoroughly by weiss 44 and demsetz i 5 among others although there appears to be little agreement on the direction of bias in the most commonly used samples the question of exogeneity has been less thoroughly discussed although in specific instances e g schmalensee 37 martin 27 it has been dealt with explicitly this content downloaded from 157 55 39 35 on sat 03 sep 2016 05 57 53 utc all use subject to http about jstor org terms 400 james l bothwell thomas f cooley and thomas e hall informative to make such empirical analysis useful it may therefore be more productive to return to industry specific analysis there will undoubtedly be some who are unconvinced by this argument and for them we offer the observation that further empirical studies based on weak deductive foundations are likely to be convincing only to the extent that they account explicitly for the role of prior beliefs and specification uncertainty ii determinants of profitability the conventional market structure conduct performance paradigm has guided vast amounts of empirical research in the field of industrial organization for the past three decades like empirical research in other areas of economics the maintained hypotheses that are considered reflect to a large extent the prior beliefs of the researchers the result is that there is always a suspicion that what is being engaged in is more advocacy than objective empirical analysis in the market structure performance literature the most important alternative prior beliefs maintained hypotheses appear to fall into six categories which we characterize as follows i seller concentration explains profits high rates of return are thought to be caused by monopoly power conferred by high degrees of seller concentration this is the basic collusion specification of bain i 2 seller concentration and entry barriers explain profits high rates of return are thought to reflect monopoly power resulting from both high seller concentration and high barriers to entry this prior comes from the traditional market structure performance paradigm of industrial organization and accounts for the peristence of collusive gains it is prevalent in the work of mann 26 weiss 45 46 comanor and wilson i i qualls 34 1j35 and many other researchers 3 absolute or relative firm size explain profits this prior reflects the demsetz i4 i5 and peltzman 133 notion that high rates of return result from superior firm efficiency or innovativeness and not from oligopolistic collusion and joint profit maximization this prior has also been adopted by others e g shepherd 39 gale i7 who assume that high market shares indicate high barriers to entry 4 risk differentials explain profitability differences this reflects the notion that high rates of return reflect neither monopoly power nor superior efficiency but the payment of positive risk premiums to risk averse investors it underlies much of the work of stigler 4i fisher and hall i6 cootner and holland i3 and many others there are however considerable differences in beliefs about which measure of risk variability of return over time financial leverage or nondiversifiable risk is relevant this content downloaded from 157 55 39 35 on sat 03 sep 2016 05 57 53 utc all use subject to http about jstor org terms the market structure performance debate 40i 5 advertising intensity explains profits this reflects the notion of bloch 4 and others that differences in reported accounting profit rates result from differences in the amounts of omitted intangible capital resulting from advertising expenditures because advertising is assumed by some to be a source of product differentiation this prior also may reflect the belief that the extent of product differentiation is a major determinant of profitability comanor i o schmalensee 13 7 6 growth explains profits this reflects brozen s 6 7 disequilibrium hypothesis that profitability differences result not from monopoly power but from adjustments in capacity lagging behind changes in demand given a particular maintained hypothesis about the most important determinant of profitability there remains uncertainty about the rest of the specification of the model if the results are not robust with respect to uncertainty about the conditioning set of variables then it cannot be concluded that the data are very informative about the hypothesis in question the next section discusses the methodology used to determine whether the results are robust to such specification uncertainty iii specification uncertainty the hypotheses discussed in the previous section all specify the primary determinants of profitability in each case however the investigator must have in mind a set of possible conditioning variables that may or may not belong in the regression although uncertainty about the inclusion or exclusion of such variables is not often explicitly acknowledged it is an inevitable and important aspect of virtually all empirical investigations the primary concern for the problem at hand is the extent to which this specification uncertainty leads to uncertainty in the estimated parameters of primary interest consider the regression model

internal labour markets causes and consequences the paper analyzes the causes and consequences of internal labor market rules that yield long tenure promotion from within seniority pensions and due process in dismissals about half the workforce are estimated to be in such markets competitive reasons for internal labor markets as a response to specific training and arms length relationships between workers and firms are surveyed these reasons are found to be consistent with the pattern of internal labor markets among non union firms however some internal labor markets e g among small unionized firms are probably a response to union pressure and government regulations in these circumstances low labor mobility could pose problems for policy copyright 1991 by oxford university press

do unions capture monopoly profits this paper challenges the conclusion reached in recent studies that unions reduce profits exclusively in highly concentrated industries from their review of previous studies and their analysis of 1977 data on 367 fortune 500 firms the authors conclude that there is no convincing evidence that concentration produces monopoly profits for unions to capture moreover they find that the union wage effect is not greater in concentrated industries as suggested by the hypothesis that unions capture concentration related profits evidence is found suggesting that a firm s market share its expenditures on research and development and its protection from foreign competition provide more likely sources for union rents than does industry concentration several recent studies have found that unions reduce profits significantly and some have concluded that this profit reduction is restricted to highly concentrated industries both conclusions are important the finding that unions reduce profitability indicates that in general the cost increasing effects of unions outweigh any positive productivity effects they may bring to the workplace such a

union effects on productivity profits and growth has the long run arrived this article interprets literature examining union effects on economic performance production function studies indicate small overall union impacts on productivity positive effects where they exist appear to result from management response to decreased profit expectations and from a natural selection process lower profitability among unionized firms is well established more interesting is the possibility that unions appropriate quasi rents deriving from long lived tangible and intangible capital the connection between unions investment behavior and productivity growth emerges as a particularly fruitful line of empirical inquiry although it does not encourage a sanguine view of unionism s long run impact

an ampirical assessment of the contribution of small business employment to u s state economic performance small business proponents regularly couple their arguments for favorable government policies and reduced tax and regulatory burdens to the presumed benefits of increased proportions of small versus large sector employment though regularly espoused at both the state and national level these presumptions regarding the benefits of small business employment remain an empirical issue are the presumed benefits a reality a panel analysis of 48 u s states for a ten year period was used to evaluate the contribution of small businesses to growth in productivity growth in gross state product gsp unemployment and wage inflation at the state level the system of simultaneous equations revealed that states with higher proportions of very small business employment do indeed experience higher levels of productivity growth and gross state product growth while having less wage inflation and lower unemployment rates

effort levels in a cournot nash contest with asymmetric information abstract many contests exist where one player does not know his opponent s value of a fixed prize e g unobservable non market preferences for preservation this paper explores how changes in the nature of a one sided information asymmetry affect effort levels in a cournot nash contest the results indicate that the uninformed player s effort is an uncertain input such that his effort is inversely related to risk this reduces his average odds of success comparative static results are driven by the perceived odds of success and risk for the uninformed player and the actual odds of success for the informed player

the impact of unionization on motor carrier costs i introduction the increasingly competitive markets fostered by the motor carrier act of 1980 have forced motor carriers to focus on cost saving strategies intended to reduce operating miles fuel consumption and capital and labor expenses there are two reasons unions firms may be at a competitive disadvantage in these efforts first although the union nonunion wage differential has decreased following regulatory reform rose 1987 and hirsch 1988 find that union firms still pay higher wages second managers of unionized firms may have less flexibility in the use of inputs since union work rules restrict the activities and substitutability of drivers terminal workers and terminal facilities indeed harrington 1987 reports that post 1980 trucking expenses are still 40 higher for unionized motor carriers than for nonunion firms unionization may affect carrier cost both by increasing the price of labor and by potentially affecting cost function parameters if union rules make labor less productive the entire cost function will shift upwards for a given set of factor input prices further freeman and medoff 1982 argue that work rules may be expected to result in reduced elasticities of substitution between labor and other inputs in the unionized setting indeed they find that substitution between production labor and other labor in manufacturing is generally lower in unionized settings the impact of unionization on production has been investigated in industries such as construction coal mining hospitals and the cement industry by allen 1984 1986a 1986b byrnes et al 1988 and clark 1980a 1980b the results have been inconclusive with unionized firms being more productive than nonunion firms in some instances and less productive in others studies such as allen 1986c and addison and hirsch 1989 have utilized production function methodologies that use restrictive functional forms which impose homogeneity and identical elasticities of substitution between pairs of inputs allen 1986c examines the relative efficiency of union and nonunion firms with a translog cost function allowing for union effects using intercept and slope parameters that vary by union status in his study of different types of construction projects he finds significant differences between the cost functions for union and nonunion firms but no evidence of the inelasticity of factor substitutions as hypothesized by medoff and freeman in fact his estimates of factor demand elasticities show no discernible pattern for union versus nonunion firms leading him to conclude that work rules do not have the anticipated impact on elasticity the purpose of this study is to test whether unionization impacts motor carrier costs and if so to determine the direction of the impact of particular interest is whether the work rules imposed by the teamster s union have had a significant impact on factor substitutability in unionized firms as argued by freeman and medoff 1982 friedlaender and spady 1981 daughety et al 1985 mcmullen and stanley 1988 grimm et al 1989 and ying s 1990 studies of motor carrier industry costs have used translog cost functions which implicitly assume that union and nonunion cost functions arise from the same production technology this is equivalent to accepting the hypothesis that unionization does not affect the production structure of motor carrier firms if unionization does affect a firm s production process the results from these studies could be biased accordingly this study uses a translog cost function to test for differences in the cost structure of union and nonunion carriers not only is the translog cost function standard in the motor carrier literature permitting comparison of these results with those of previous work it also allows the flexibility necessary to examine the differential impact of unions on cost function parameters and elasticities of substitution between factors

new evidence on unions and plant closings britain in the 1990s in this paper we exploit the longitudinal element of the 1990 and 1998 workplace employee relations surveys for britain to investigate the effect of unionism on establishment closings contrary to both recent u s research and long standing british work we find a strong positive association between two measures of unionism union recognition for collective bargaining purposes and union coverage and plant closings this association is robust to the inclusion of highly detailed industry controls but is driven by plants that are parts of multiestablishment entities no such relationship obtains in the case of single plant enterprises in explaining our findings we address their consistency with the widely perceived reduction in the disadvantages of british unionism in recent years

labour markets bargaining and innovation much of the recent empirical work on the impact of unions on rd ii under some circumstances an increase in union strength can make both firms and unions worse off we survey a more recent theoretical literature which takes account of the fact that r d is often undertaken for strategic reasons by firms that are in competition with one another we show that in this framework the prevailing theoretical paradigm may be overturned thus when firms and unions can enter into long term bargains then an increase in union strength will increase decrease r d spending if successful innovation causes employment to rise respectively fall however when r d falls then this increase in union strength can cause both firms and unions to be better off when firms and unions engage in short term bargaining then an increase in union bargaining strength will cause r d to fall when bargaining is over wages alone however when bargaining takes place over wages and employment then if unions care a lot about employment the relationship between union strength and r d is inverse u shaped

strategic groups and rent dissipation we consider a rent seeking contest in which players can form strategic groups before expending their outlays we examine the profitability of endogenous group formation and the effect of such group formation on rent dissipation we show the following when just one strategic group is formed in equilibrium group formation is beneficial both to the group members and to the nonmembers and rent dissipation is smaller than with usual individual rent seeking however when more than two strategic groups are formed in equilibrium group formation is never profitable to any players and rent dissipation is greater than with individual rent seeking jel

ambiguous political power and contest efforts when there is incomplete information on the source of power in a contest the contestants may divide their lobbying efforts between the potential centers of power only one of which determines the contests winning probabilities our analysis focuses on the effect of ambiguity regarding the source of power on the contestants aggregate effort in a symmetric simple lottery contest with two potential centers of power specifically we examine the effects of varying the informativeness of the contestants private signals i e the probability that a signal is correct and the degree of correlation between them our benchmark case is the standard tullock s model in which the source of power is known i e the contestants signals are perfectly informative we show that the level of aggregate effort in this case is reached also when the signals are perfectly uninformative however in any intermediate case the contestants aggregate effort is lower provided that the signals are not perfectly correlated in other words there is a u shape relationship between the informativeness of the signals and the aggregate effort in the contest the lowest level of effort is spent when the signals are independent and the probability that a signal is true is about 0 85 in this case efforts are reduced by about one fifth in comparison with the benchmark case from a rent dissipation of 50 to slightly over 40