executive compensation strategic competition and relative performance evaluation theory and evidence we examine compensation contracts for managers in imperfectly competitive product markets we show that strategic interactions among firms can explain the lack of relative performance based incentives in which compensation decreases with rival firm performance the need to soften product market competition generates an optimal compensation contract that places a positive weight on both own and rival performance firms in more competitive industries place greater weight on rival firm performance relative to own firm performance we find empirical evidence of a positive sensitivity of compensation to rival firm performance that is increasing in the degree of competition in the industry

the dating game do managers designate option grant dates to increase their compensation we provide evidence of two variants of a dating game that entails picking a grant date ex post that is after the board s compensation decision is made back dating picking a date before the board decision date and forward dating waiting after the board decision date to observe the stock price behavior consistent with back dating we find stock return behavior around the grant date to be positively related to reporting lag in the promptly reported sample we find stock return behavior and the pattern of reporting lags consistent with forward dating our calculations show that managers can obtain economically significant benefits by playing the dating game

competition and corporate performance are people right to think that competition improves corporate performance my investigations indicate first that there are some theoretical reasons for believing this hypothesis to be correct but they are not overwhelming furthermore the existing empirical evidence on this question is weak however the results reported here based on an analysis of around 670 u k companies do provide some support for this view most important i present evidence that competition as measured by increased numbers of competitors or by lower levels of rents is associated with a significantly higher rate of total factor productivity growth

information competition and markets one of the dominant characteristics of modern capitalist economies is the important role played by competition not the peculiar static form of pure price competition embodied in the arrow debreu model but rather a dynamic competition more akin to the kind of competition represented by sports contests and other races including patent races in recent years there have been several attempts to explain why firms often base the pay of their workers and managers on relative performance see for example edward lazear and sherwin rosen 1981 such compensation schemes become desirable when three conditions are satisfied a the input effort of workers managers must not be directly observable at least without cost thus firms must either expend resources to monitor inputs or devise reward structures in which compensation is a function of variables such as output or profits which are themselves functions of inputs but are less costly to observe b the relationship between input and output must be stochastic so that by observing output one cannot perfectly infer what the input was c finally the stochastic disturbances which affect the relationship between input and output of different firms must be correlated by looking at the performance of one worker relative to that of others one can make better inferences about his effort than one can make without using this information not only can competition provide a basis of comparison which enables the design of reward structures that can simultaneously provide a high level of incentives with relatively low level risk but compensation schemes based on relative performance have the further advantage of automatically adjusting incentives to changes in the economic environment we refer to this as built in flexibility in a first best world with perfect information concerning the nature of the technology but where it is still costly to monitor individuals activities the compensation scheme would vary from time to time as the environment changed such changes in the compensation scheme are costly to implement and the information required to do so is seldom available when a task is easier the individual s rewards for performing the task should be reduced if pay is based on relative performance although all individuals perform better when they exert the same level of effort their compensation is automatically adjusted thus teachers frequently grade on the curve and a significant fraction of the pay of successful salesmen often consists of bonuses based on relative performance

product market competition and managerial slack this article analyzes the effect of product market competition on managerial incentives in contrast to hart 1983a i show that competition may actually exacerbate the incentive problem the difference in results derives from our different assumptions about managerial preferences the importance of assumptions about preferences suggests that we do not yet understand the precise mechanism through which competition affects incentives

environmental investment and policy with distortionary taxes and endogenous growth abstract recent studies consider public r d spending that affects abatement knowledge and endogenous growth distortionary taxes that affect capital formation pollution taxes that affect environmental degradation and regeneration that restores natural capital our model combines all those elements the combination affects prior results focusing on two parameters the need for distorting taxes and productivity of abatement knowledge relative to pollution first these two extensions can reverse prior findings that pollution tax revenue is always enough to pay for public r d second tax distortions and externalities alter prior findings that the ratio of public to private capital depends only on output elasticities third dynamics affect prior static findings about other public spending crowding out environmental public goods fourth a greater need for public spending can lead to greater increases in distorting taxes or pollution taxes fifth greater environmental regulation can mean growth is higher or lower even if welfare is higher

competition risk and managerial incentives this paper examines how the degree of competition among firms in an industry affects the optimal incentives that firms provide to their managers a central assumption is that there is free entry and exit in the industry which implies that changes in the nature of competition lead to changes in the equilibrium market structure the main result is that as the intensity of product market competition increases as a result of greater product substitutability or greater market size principals unambiguously provide stronger incentives to their agents to reduce costs at the same time more intense competition also leads to more volatile firm level profits consequently managers incentives are positively correlated with firm level risk consistent with empirical evidence a decrease in the cost of entering the market has the opposite effect on incentives but still induces a positive correlation between risk and incentives

the effect of remittances prior to an election the objective of the article is to assess whether remittances have an influence on political manipulation which may occur prior to an election through an increase in the government consumption to gdp ratio we combine data from the national elections across democracy and autocracy data set compiled and discussed in hyde and marinov 2012 and the world development indicators data set we focus on 70 developing countries over the period 1990 2010 it appears that the political budget cycle is reduced up to the point where it is fully cancelled out at a remittance threshold of 10 7 of gdp those findings are robust to different robustness checks

remittances and household consumption instability in developing countries this paper analyzes the impact of remittances on household consumption instability in a large panel of developing countries there are four main results first remittances significantly reduce household consumption instability second remittances play an insurance role by dampening the effects of various sources of consumption instability in developing countries natural disasters agricultural shocks discretionary fiscal policy systemic financial and banking crises and exchange rate instability third the stabilizing role played by remittances is stronger in less financially developed countries fourth the overall stabilizing effect of remittances is mitigated when remittances exceed 6 of gdp

consumer demand for green power and energy efficiency abstract this article examines reported willingness to pay for electric utility investments in renewable energy and energy efficiency resources using the results of deliberative polls conducted by electric utilities in texas 1 age education and salary tend to affect reported willingness to pay for utility investments in these resources intensive exposure to information about energy resource issues led to an increase in the number of respondents interested in paying a modest premium to support investments in both renewable energy resources and energy efficiency however average reported premiums actually declined following the polls as very high outlier responses moved to more reasonable values following the polls these results support the contention that informed dialogue about energy alternatives will result in broader interest in providing a modest level of support for these resources

estimating product market competition methodology and application abstract in oligopolies firms behave strategically and commit to actions that elicit favorable responses from rivals firm actions consequently are a function of the nature of these strategic interactions in this paper we develop a methodology for the empirical estimation of strategic interactions in product markets we then apply our measure of strategic interactions to ceo compensation we use quarterly data on profits and sales from compustat to estimate the slope of firm s reaction function when the slope is negative and marginal profits decrease with an increase in the rival s actions the firm is classified as a strategic substitute when the slope is positive and marginal profits increase with an increase in the rival s actions the firm is classified as a strategic complement as predicted by theory we find significant evidence that strategic substitutes decrease the pay for performance incentives of their ceos on the other hand strategic complements significantly increase ceo pay for performance incentives the empirical measure developed can be used to test a wide variety of strategic models

remittances financial development and growth abstract despite the increasing importance of remittances in total international capital flows the relationship between remittances and growth has not been adequately studied this paper studies one of the links between remittances and growth in particular how local financial sector development influences a country s capacity to take advantage of remittances using a newly constructed dataset for remittances covering about 100 developing countries we find that remittances boost growth in countries with less developed financial systems by providing an alternative way to finance investment and helping overcome liquidity constraints this finding controls for the endogeneity of remittances and financial development does not depend on the particular measure of financial sector development used and is robust to a number of robustness tests including threshold estimation we also provide evidence that there could be an investment channel trough which remittances can promote growth especially when the financial sector does not meet the credit needs of the population

environmental policy public finance and the labour market in a second best world abstract environmental and tax policies and the optimal provision of clean and dirty public goods are analysed within the context of a second best framework of optimal taxation households consume both clean and dirty commodities degradation of the natural environment occurs due to the consumption of dirty private and public goods but can be offset when the government engages in abatement activities increased environmental concern implies a higher dirt tax a lower tax on labour less employment more public abatement and a cleaner environment if the elasticity of substitution between private consumption commodities and leisure is large and that between clean and dirty goods is small public consumption may expand while private consumption contracts otherwise public consumption falls

political violence and social networks experimental evidence from a nigerian election abstract voter education campaigns often aim to increase political participation and accountability we followed a randomized campaign against electoral violence sponsored by an international ngo during the 2007 nigerian elections this paper investigates whether the effects of the campaign were transmitted indirectly through kinship chatting and geographical proximity for individuals personally targeted by campaigners we estimate the reinforcement effect of proximity to other targeted individuals for individuals who self report to be untargeted by campaigners we estimate the diffusion of the campaign depending on proximity to targeted individuals we find evidence for both effects particularly on perceptions of violence effects are large in magnitude often similar to the average effect of the campaign kinship is the strongest channel of reinforcement and diffusion we also find that geographical proximity transmits simple effects on perceptions and that chatting conveys more complex effects on behavior

do migrants improve governance at home evidence from a voting experiment can international migration promote better institutions at home by raising the demand for political accountability a behavioral measure of the population s desire for better governance was designed to examine this question a postcard was distributed to households promising that if enough postcards were mailed back results from a survey module on perceived corruption would be published in the national media data from a tailored household survey were used to examine the determinants of this behavioral measure of demand for political accountability undertaking the costly action of mailing the postcard and to isolate the positive effect of international emigration using locality level variation the estimated effects are robust to the use of instrumental variables including past migration and macro shocks in the destination countries the estimated effects can be attributed mainly to migrants who immigrated to countries with better governance especially migrants who return home

remittances and institutions are remittances a curse summary this paper addresses the complex and overlooked relationship between the receipt of workers remittances and institutional quality in the recipient country using a simple model we show how an increase in remittance inflows can lead to deterioration of institutional quality specifically to an increase in the share of funds diverted by the government for its own purposes in a cross section of 111 countries we empirically verify this proposition and find that a higher ratio of remittances to gdp leads to lower indices of control of corruption government effectiveness and rule of law even after controlling for potential reverse causality

industry product market competition and managerial incentives abstract while some studies suggest that industry product market competition can substitute for managerial incentives other studies suggest a complementary relation the underlying assumption behind these studies is that competition can be uni dimensionally proxied for by industry concentration however recent studies suggest that competition can reflect several dimensions product substitutability market size and entry costs given the level of industry concentration using these determinants of competition this study contributes to the literature by showing that a firms provide stronger incentives when industry competition is greater b competition is multi dimensional in its relation to incentives and c industry characteristics play a major role in influencing incentives

fiscal policy cycles and public expenditure in developing countries the paper studies empirically the fiscal policy instruments by which governments try to influence election outcomes in 24 developing countries for the 1973 1992 period the study finds that the main vehicle for expansionary fiscal policies around elections is increasing public expenditure rather than lowering taxes and public investment cycles seem particularly prominent institutional mechanisms which constrain discretionary expenditure policies and which strengthen fiscal control are therefore worthwhile considering to prevent opportunistic policy making around elections

are international remittances altruism or insurance evidence from guyana using multiple migrant households abstract while international remittances provide significant disposable income for many households in less developed countries there is no consensus on migrants remittance motivation two principal competing explanations for remittances are altruism and risk sharing this paper employs previously unanalyzed data to bring new evidence to the debate we develop a simple theoretical model that yields distinct testable predictions for each motivation among the model s testable predictions is differential remittance behavior by migrants from households with multiple versus single migrants under altruism and risk sharing our estimation finds significant differences in remittance behavior of multiple and single migrants and these differences support the altruistic incentive to remit

migration and institutions exit and voice from abroad a rapidly growing body of research examines the relationship between migration and institutions three strands of studies can be distinguished some studies focused on the role of domestic and foreign institutions in the decision to migrate others were interested by the impact of migration on institutional reforms in migrants countries of origin while the effect of migration on destination countries is largely documented recent studies focus on how migrants affect social and informal institutions in the destination countries this survey puts together these three strands of literature with three purposes first we offer a short definition and synthetic typology of institutions which provide a guide to understand several studies summarized and their results second our analysis is presented following the analytic framework exit voice and loyalty of hirschman in order to highlight the brain grain phenomenon for developing countries from an institutional point of view third we review the limited existing work on the very timely topic whether migrants are harmful or not to institutions in the host countries

empirical tests of budget ratcheting and its effect on managers discretionary accrual choices abstract in this paper we investigate whether budgets ratchet using business unit data from a large multinational corporation we find evidence consistent with ratcheting where favorable budget variances result in performance budget increases that are larger than decreases associated with unfavorable variances of the same magnitude we argue that under ratcheting the cost of reporting positive transitory earnings surprises outweigh the short term benefits of the current period bonus consequently we hypothesize that managers make income decreasing discretionary accruals to offset transitory earnings surprises beyond the level expected under fixed budgets using a proxy for transitory earnings surprise we find evidence consistent with this hypothesis

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

the welfare effects of environmental taxation recent literature has investigated whether the welfare gains from environmental taxation are larger or smaller in a second best setting than in a first best setting this question has mainly been addressed indirectly by asking whether the second best optimal environmental tax is higher or lower than the first best pigouvian rate even this indirect question has itself been approached indirectly comparing the second best optimal environmental tax to a proxy for its first best value marginal social damage msd on closer examination however msd becomes ambiguously defined and variable in a second best setting making it an unreliable proxy for the pigouvian rate given these observations the current analysis reevaluates these welfare questions and finds that when compared directly to its first best value the second best optimal environmental tax generally rises with increased revenue requirements even in cases where the second best environmental tax is lower than its first best value the welfare gains may be greater than in a first best setting these results suggest that the marginal fiscal benefit revenue recycling effect exceeds the marginal fiscal cost tax base effect over a range of environmental tax rates that for benchmark models extends above the first best pigouvian rate these findings reinforce the intuition that environmental policy complements rather than competes with the provision of other public goods

running to keep in the same place consumer choice as a game of status if individuals care about their status defined as their rank in the distribution of consumption of one positional good then the consumer s problem is strategic as her utility depends on the consumption choices of others in the symmetric nash equilibrium each individual spends an inefficiently high amount on the status good using techniques from auction theory we analyze the effects of exogenous changes in the distribution of income in a richer society almost all individuals spend more on conspicuous consumption and individual utility is lower at each income level in a more equal society the poor are worse off

strategic managerial incentive compensation in japan relative performance evaluation and product market collusion in an oligopolistic product market shareholders strategically use information on rival firms performances when designing management incentive contracts when shareholders use industry performance information through relative performances evaluation rpe they evaluate their manager s effort more easily but hinder collusive behavior in the product market however when compensation is positively linked to the industry performance through strategic group performance evaluation sgpe the credibility of a manager s commitment to product market collusion increases and the sustainability of a collusive outcome increases i test how industry performance affects management incentive compensation using the data from 796 japanese firms during the period 1968 to 1992 the results show that management compensation is positively linked to industry profit suggesting the use of sgpe in management incentive compensation cross sectional analysis shows that the positive effect of industry profit on management compe

democracy and foreign education despite the large amount of private and public resources spent on foreign edu cation there is no systematic evidence that foreign educated individuals foster democracy in their home countries using a unique panel dataset on foreign stu dents starting in the 1950s i show that foreign educated individuals promote democracy in their home country but only if the foreign education is acquired in democratic countries the results are robust to several estimation techniques to different definitions of democracy and to the inclusion of a variety of control variables including democracy in trading partners neighboring countries level of income and level and stock of education jel d72 121 015 do foreign educated individuals play a role in fostering democracy in their home countries despite the large amount of resources spent on financing foreign education there is no systematic study on the effects of foreign education on democracy this paper fills this gap using a dataset on foreign students that includes almost all host and sending countries and spans over 50 years numerous policy initiatives and large investment in the united states are based on the notion that foreign educated students promote democracy in their countries of origin through the fulbright program the us government has financed more than 158 000 foreigners studying in the united states 1 the us government not only finances the education of foreign students but also annually issues more than 250 000 nonimmigrant visas for foreign students more than five million individuals have received visas to study in the united states since 1971 2 us efforts to educate foreign students have produced impressive results 46 current and 165 former heads of governments are products of us higher education foreign leaders educated in the united

environmental levies and distortionary taxation pigou taxation and pollution i note an important distinction between the optimal price of environmental quality in a second best world and the optimal level of environmental quality using an analytical general equilibrium model i show that for reasonable parameter values an increase in tax distortions arising from an increase in required tax revenues leads to a fall in the optimal pigouvian tax rate even while environmental quality improves in general knowledge of the direction of changes in optimal environmental tax rates due to changes in the economy is not sufficient for understanding the impact on environmental quality 2003 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

bringing it all back home return migration and fertility choices summary return migration exerts a wide ranging influence upon the countries of origin of the migrants we analyze whether returnees adjust their fertility choices to the norms that prevail in their previous countries of destination using egyptian household level data egyptian men migrate predominantly toward other arab countries characterized by a higher number of children per woman relying on a two step instrumental variable approach to control for the endogeneity of the migration decisions we show that return migration has a positive and significant influence on marital childbearing

annual bonus schemes and the manipulation of earnings abstract using confidential data of executive specific short term bonus plans we investigate the extent to which executives manipulate earnings to maximize the present value of bonus plan payments as such this paper extends the work of healy 1985 like healy we find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that managers manipulate earnings downwards when their bonuses are at their maximum unlike healy we find no evidence that managers manipulate earnings downwards when earnings are below the minimum necessary to receive any bonus we demonstrate that healy s results at the lower bound are likely to be induced by his methodology

managerial incentives and product market competition are imperfectly competitive leibenstein 1966 claims that there may be a substantial amount of x inefficiency where x inefficiency measures the degree to which actual profits depart from the maximum of profits that could be obtained if all operations in the firm were carried out at minimal costs he offers empirical evidence from case studies showing that the welfare loss due to organizational slack is of an order of magnitude bigger than the welfare loss due to monopolistic price distortions on imperfectly competitive markets these results support the common presumption that increasing competition reduces organizational and in particular managerial slack however this early literature does not offer a theoretical explanation for the link between competition and managerial incentives in particular it ignores the fact that managerial incentives can be affected by the design of an incentive scheme in this paper i derive the optimal incentive scheme for a manager as a function of the competitiveness of the environment in which his firm operates the basic impact of increased competition is that it reduces the profits of a firm this has two effects in the model first if a firm has high costs then the reduction of profits may be sufficient to render the firm unprofitable so the probability that it has to be liquidated goes up this unambiguously induces the manager of the firm to work harder for a cost reduction in order to avoid liquidation and to keep his job second the reduction in profits may affect

ceo pay and firm size an update after the crisis in the size of stakes view quantitatively formalised in gabaix and landier 2008 ceo compensation reflects the size of rms aected by talent in a competitive market the years 2004 2011 were not part of the initial study and oer a laboratory to examine the theory with new positive and negative shocks executive compensation measured ex ante did closely track the evolution of average firm value supporting the size of stakes view out of sample during 2007 2009 rm value decreased by 17 and ceo pay by 28 during 2009 2011 firm value increased by 19 and ceo pay by 22

optimal dynamic carbon taxes in a climate economy model with distortionary fiscal policy how should carbon be taxed as a part of fiscal policy the literature on optimal carbon pricing often abstracts from other taxes however when governments raise revenues with distortionary taxes carbon levies have fiscal impacts while they raise revenues directly they may shrink the bases of other taxes e g by decreasing employment this article theoretically characterizes and then quantifies optimal carbon taxes in a dynamic general equilibrium climate economy model with distortionary fiscal policy first this article establishes a novel theoretical relationship between the optimal taxation of carbon and of capital income this link arises because carbon emissions destroy natural capital they accumulate in the atmosphere and decrease future output consequently this article shows how the standard logic against capital income taxes extends to distortions on environmental capital investments second this article characterizes optimal climate policy in sub optimal fiscal settings where income taxes are constrained to remain at their observed levels third this article presents a detailed calibration that builds on the seminal dice approach but adds features essential for a setting with distortionary taxes such as a differentiation between climate change production impacts e g on agriculture and direct utility impacts e g on biodiversity existence value the central quantitative finding is that optimal carbon tax schedules are 8 24 lower when there are distortionary taxes compared to the setting with lump sum taxes considered in the literature

how do remittances affect human capital formation of school age boys and girls we revisit the impact of remittances on educational attainment of school age children in nepal paying particular attention to differences between girls and boys a heightened interest in understanding the impact of remitting practices on a variety of economic variables has emerged as remittances to developing countries continue to rise in nepal the world bank reports that remittances amounted to 1 2 billion us dollars in 2005 while gdp was 8 2 billion and official development assistance totaled 425 million world bank 2007 we use the 1995 1996 nepal living standards survey nlss to examine the impact of remittances on human capital investments for female and male children if remittances do affect human capital positively then not only will remittances affect long run growth in nepal but the opportunities for women in nepal should improve as the female population becomes more educated the effect of remittances on human capital investment is unclear a priori increasing income through remittances may increase investment in children s schooling by relaxing household budget and capital constraints conversely household absenteeism pressures children to work in the home reducing time for education our data provide an opportunity to separate the effect of household disruption from the income effect of remittances on the decision to invest in schooling we are able to measure the number of adults living outside the household so that we may control for absenteeism in estimating the impact of remittances on household schooling choices we ask if the impact varies by gender and age group young child versus older child our results indicate that young children benefit more from remittances but the benefits controlling how do remittances affect human capital formation of school age boys and girls

non linear growth effects of financial development does financial integration matter using both macro and industry level data this paper analyses the non linear effects of financial development and international financial integration on economic growth in europe special attention is devoted to modeling threshold effects with respect to the depth of financial markets as a measure of economies absorption capacity results reveal evidence of significant non linear effects with less developed european countries gaining more from financial development in contrast benefits of international financial integration become significant at higher levels of financial development the data show that monetary integration in europe significantly contributed to a higher degree of financial integration entry of new eu members to the european monetary union may thus be the mechanism ensuring a virtuous development circle as the adoption of the euro may allow the development of domestic financial markets and financial integration to go hand in hand

remittances and labor force participation in mexico an analysis using propensity score matching summary about 2 5 million mexicans migrated to the united states during 1997 2002 and 1 6 million of them sent remittances to their families did recipients change their labor force status in response to these remittances this question has been examined before unlike the previous studies we separate persistent from sporadic remittances and we use propensity score matching to measure differences in behavior we find limited evidence of labor force participation effects of persistent remittances which is broadly consistent with remittances being an integral part of household s income generation strategy

the impact of market competition on ceo salary in the us energy sector1 abstract in this work we examine the impact of market competition on ceos salaries by analyzing a sample of alls p american firms in the energy sector in the 1992 2015 time span and measuring market competition by means of the so called herfindhal hirschman index we divide industries into three sub groups based on small medium and high market concentration and try to expand our research by exploring the impact of the recent financial crisis the paper investigates how ceos salaries are affected by firm level determinants e g firm size returns on assets returns on equity capital expenditure market concentration tobin s q etc as well as by the individual characteristics of each ceo e g ceos age gender based on our findings the market concentration index in the us energy sector has a negative and statistically significant impact on ceo salary for all firms that operate in either a highly monopolistic or a purely competitive environment the results of this empirical work are robust after examining for different alternative high order fixed effects specifications

substituting pollution taxation for general taxation some implications for efficiency in pollutions taxation abstract earlier papers have recognized that nonenvironmental benefits will be realized if pollution taxes are substituted for other taxes which impose efficiency losses on society the purpose of this paper is to investigate the importance of these nonenvironmental benefits for the design of an efficient pollution tax it is found that the efficient tax may be higher or lower than that conventionally defined as optimal and that the net benefit from unrestrained pollution can have important implications for the size of the tax

ceo pay firm size and corporate performance evidence from canada executive compensation of 755 canadian firms is examined over the period 1991 95 and evidence is obtained consistent with previous studies ceo pay rises with firm size and compensation is tied to company performance in addition executives in utilities earn lower pay and their compensation is less responsive to performance than is true for their counterparts in other industries some novel findings are also documented first the sales elasticity of ceo compensation is greater in larger firms second while ceo turnover probability is generally negatively related to the firm s stock performance the threat of dismissal appear to be less pronounced in small firms jel classification g35 j33 salaire des pdg taille de l entreprise et performance des societes resultats pour le canada en etudiant le salaire des pdg de 755 entreprises canadiennes au cours de la periode 1991 95 l auteur confirme certains resultats d etudes anterieures le salaire du pdg croit avec la taille de l entreprise et il est liea la performance de l entreprise il appert aussi que les cadres dans les entreprises de service public gagnent moins relativement parlant et que leur salaire est moins sensible aux ecarts de performance que dans les autres secteurs on met aussi a jour certains resultats inedits d abord il semble que l elasticite du salaire du pdg par rapport au niveau des ventes est plus forte dans les plus grandes entreprises ensuite alors que la probabilite de roulement est en general co reliee negativement a la performance des actions en bourse de l entreprise la menace de renvoi semble moins prononcee dans les petites entreprises

political cycles in a developing economy effect of elections in indian states the author studies the effect of state legislative assembly elections on the policies of state governments in 14 major states of india from 1960 to 1996 she identifies the effect of the timing of elections using an instrument for the electoral cycle that distinguishes between constitutionally scheduled elections and midterm polls she contrasts two levers of policy manipulation fiscal policy and public service delivery to distinguish between alternative models of political cycles the predictions of three models are tested 1 populist cycles to woo uninformed and myopic voters 2 signaling models with asymmetric information 3 a moral hazard model with high discounting by political agents the empirical results for fiscal policy show that election years have a negative effect on some commodity taxes a positive effect on investment spending but no effect on deficits primarily because consumption spending is reduced with regard to public service delivery elections have a positive and large effect on road construction by state public works departments strikingly the fiscal effects are much smaller than the effect on roads the author argues that the pattern of evidence is inconsistent with the predictions of models of voter myopia and asymmetric information she explores an alternative moral hazard model in which the cycle is generated by high political discounting and career concerns persuade politicians to exert greater effort in election years on the management of public works

are bilateral remittances countercyclical by putting together a relatively large data set on bilateral remittances of emigrants this paper is able to shed light on the important hypothesis of smoothing the smoothing hypothesis is that remittances are countercyclical with respect to income in the worker s country of origin the recipient of the remittance while procyclical with respect to income in the migrant s host country the sender of the remittance the econometric results confirm the hypothesis this affirmation of smoothing is important for two reasons first it suggests that remittances should be placed on the list of criteria for an optimum currency area second it brings into doubt plans by governments in some developing countries to harness remittances for their own use in that government spending in these countries generally fails the test of countercyclicality which remittances pass

the switching effect of environmental taxation within bertrand differentiated duopoly we investigate second best optimal taxation of the polluting variety of a product in a bertrand duopoly with differentiated varieties the analysis provides novel insight on a useful social function of environmental regulation besides internalizing the environmental externality the taxation of the polluting variety improves the matching of consumers and product varieties and so creates a socially desirable business switching between the differentiated varieties

the effects of competition on executive behavior economists presume that competition spurs a firm to be more efficient by forcing it to reduce its agency problems this article investigates this presumption it finds that the effects of competition on executive behavior can be decomposed into four effects each of which is of potentially ambiguous sign theory thus offers no definitive defense of this presumption this article also derives sets of conditions under which increased competition has the presumed effect of reducing agency problems in some sets important conditions are that increased competition reduce the executive s expected income and that agency goods e g shirking be normal goods for the executive the article shows that an increase in the shareholder bargaining strength can both reduce the agency problem and make it more sensitive to competition

remittances and working poverty abstractthis article shows that the level and the predictability of remittances reduce working poverty in receiving economies through their effects on labour market dynamics it takes advantage of the new cross country dataset ilo kilm 7th edition containing information on the share of individuals working for less than us 2 per day to identify the main impacts the article proposes a novel approach to deal with the endogeneity of remittances and migration in addition the results are robust to the possible error in measuring working poverty to the potential attrition bias and to the presence of various control variables