bank acquisitions and ownership structure theory and evidence abstract in this paper we both theoretically and empirically consider the joint nature of two ownermanager conflict resolution mechanisms insider shareholdings and shareholder concentration we find evidence of a significant entrenchment effect for high low firms moreover bidder returns are found to be positive for high high firms only we utilize a switching of regression regimes model to solve for critical values of and that subdivide the universe of acquiring firms into separate and distinct ownership structure regimes i e that define high vs low levels of or

estimating treatment effects from spatial policy experiments an application to ugandan microfinance abstract this paper demonstrates a method for estimating treatment effects in spatial tests utilizing a second control group to measure unexplained spatial phenomena the technique is implemented on two innovations in ugandan microfinance and we measure the ways in which concurrent shocks such as an ebola outbreak and a contentious presidential election altered outcomes differentially across regions by correcting for this spatial heterogeneity we measure the impact of the policies a program that increased borrowers control over the terms of their loans improved outcomes while the results of a program that bundled health insurance into the lending contract were more mixed

are overconfident ceos born or made evidence of self attribution bias from frequent acquirers we explore the history of mergers and acquisitions made by individual ceos our study has three main findings 1 ceos first deals exhibit zero announcement effects while their subsequent deals exhibit negative announcement effects 2 while acquisition likelihood increases in the performance associated with previous acquisitions previous positive performance does not curb the negative wealth effects associated with subsequent deals and 3 ceos net purchase of stock is greater preceding subsequent deals than it is for first deals we interpret these results as consistent with self attribution bias leading to overconfidence we also find evidence that the market anticipates future deals based on the ceo s acquisition history and impounds such anticipation into stock prices

ipo pricing in hot market conditions who leaves money on the table this paper explores the impact of investor sentiment on ipo pricing using a model in which the aftermarket price of ipo shares depends on the information about the intrinsic value of the company and investor sentiment i show that ipos can be overpriced and still exhibit positive initial return a sample of recent french offerings with a fraction of the shares reserved for individual investors supports the predictions of the model individual investors demand is positively related to market conditions moreover large individual investors demand leads to high ipo prices large initial returns and poor long run performance the end of the nineties was one of the hottest ipo markets ever in this period both the number of initial public offerings and the level of initial returns have reached unprecedented peaks ritter documents that in 1999 and 2000 only 803 companies went public in the united states raising about 123 billion and leaving about 62 billion on the table in the form of initial returns periodically such periods of ipo euphoria occur these so called hot issue markets are characterized by high ipo volumes and high levels of initial return see ibbotson and jaffe 1975 and ritter 1984 as well as positive serial correlation of ipo initial returns and correlation between recent levels of initial return and current ipo volume surprisingly however pre ipo shareholders do not seem to be upset about leaving so much money on the table loughran and ritter 2002 explain this phenomenon by the fact that insiders of ipo companies consider not only the shares they sell in the ipo but also those they retain which benefit from the large initial price run up ljungqvist and wilhelm 2003 show that during the 1999 to 2000 period ipo companies were significantly different from usual

obtaining welfare bounds in discrete response valuation studies comment in a recent article published in land economics boman bostedt and kristrim 1999 hereafter bbk show how nonparametric lower bound intermediate and upper bound measures of average welfare change can be extracted from discrete response contingent valuation survey data building on the work of kristrim 1990 and haab and mcconnell 1997 the article appears to offer a promising route to getting estimates of mean willingness to pay wtp along with their respective variances without having to estimate parametric choice models thereby providing a computationally simple way to capture both the methodological uncertainty about the choice of a central tendency measure and the statistical uncertainty associated with any particular measure having an accurate estimate of the variance of mean wtp allows one to make confidence interval statements about mean wtp when measures of mean wtp and its variance are extracted

contingent values as implicit contracts estimating minimum legal willingness to pay for conservation of large carnivores in sweden mean willingness to pay wtp based on multiple bounded discrete choice responses from contingent valuation surveys are normally obtained using some kind of parametric estimator this paper instead exploits the possibility to interpret the response to the discrete choice question as an implicit contract between the researcher and the respondent resulting in a minimum legal wtp mlw estimator never previously used in valuation literature it is used in this paper to estimate the wtp for the preservation of large carnivores in sweden based on a large scale national survey results show that mlw estimates only were 12 19 of the comparable parametric estimates in keeping with other results in contingent valuation literature we find that the mlw estimates are positively related to the educational level income and the fraction of urban population while negatively related to age among the advantages of the mlw estimator is its transparency as well as the fact that it rests on a contractual notion of wtp

discounting and underpricing in seasoned equity offers abstract expected discounting in seasoned equity offers is a cost of uncertainty about firm value marketing new shares and acquiring information that raises the offer price stockholders incorporate predictable discounting in stock prices when equity offers are first announced the surprise component of discounting reflecting the lead bank s final adjustment to the offer price releases information that often causes economically large price swings on the offer day disparities between the issuer s closing price and the price suggested in the lead bank s final order book are a primary source of information the discount surprise appears to be used by lead banks to update capital suppliers with that eleventh hour information before they commit their funds

the use of excess cash and debt capacity as a motive for merger this study explores the hypothesis that capital structure change provides bidders and tar gets a motive for merger after a brief review of theories that would support the hypothe sis the paper reports results of tests on 1 leverage in bidder and target firms and 2 change in shareholder wealth associated with change in leverage the findings support the theory of myers and majluf that slack rich bidders pair with slack poor targets to create value these results are contrary to other studies which find highly levered bid ders

getting to the top of mind how reminders increase saving we provide evidence from field experiments with three different banks that reminder messages increase commitment attainment for clients who recently opened commitment savings accounts messages that mention both savings goals and financial incentives are particularly effective whereas other content variations such as gain versus loss framing do not have significantly different effects nor do we find evidence that receiving additional late reminders has an additive effect these empirical results do not map neatly into existing models so we provide a simple model where limited attention to exceptional expenses can generate undersaving that is in turn mitigated by reminders data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2015 2296 this paper was accepted by teck hua ho behavioral economics

what a difference a month makes stock analyst valuations following initial public offerings we examine how analysts establish target prices for ipo firms and whether comparable firms used to support target prices are helpful in explaining ipo offer prices during the bubble period of 1999 to 2000 the average offer price was set at a discount relative to comparable firm valuations in contrast the average offer price was set at a small premium relative to comparables in the pre bubble period this shift appears to hold even after controlling for the differences in the types of firms going public during the bubble period moreover target prices of ipo firms were set at a higher premium relative to comparables during the bubble period while our results suggest that underwriters systematically dis counted offer prices during the bubble period an alternative explanation is that the shift arose because underwriters and analysts faced different incentives and legal exposures dur ing the bubble period

giving stated preference respondents time to think results from four countries previous studies have found that contingent valuation cv respondents who are given overnight to reflect on a cv scenario have 30 40 lower average willingness to pay wtp than respondents who are interviewed in a single session this time to think ttt effect could explain much of the gap between real and hypothetical wtp observed in experimental studies yet giving time to think is still rare in binary or multinomial discrete choice studies we review the literature on increasing survey respondents opportunities to reflect on their answers and synthesize results from parallel ttt studies on private vaccine demand in four countries across all four countries we find robust and consistent evidence from both raw data and multivariate models for a ttt effect giving respondents overnight to think reduced the probability that a respondent said he or she would buy the hypothetical vaccines average wtp fell approximately 40 respondents with time to think were also more certain of their answers and a majority said they used the opportunity to consult with their spouse or family we conclude with a discussion of why researchers might be hesitant to adopt the ttt methodology

does acquisition of a cooperative generate profits for the buyer the dairyworld case this article examines the takeover of a cooperative dairyworld by an investor owned firm saputo that was not previously present in the industry determines if this takeover generates greater returns for the investor owned firms iof and on the basis of this evidence makes some inferences about the behavior and performance of cooperatives and iofs the empirical evidence strongly supports the conclusion that saputo s stock price rose with its takeover announcement this outcome is consistent with a number of explanations including that saputo was unaffected by hubris a factor often suggested as the reason that many firms overbid when they undertake acquisitions dairyworld s poor liquidity and capital shortage problems as well as a limited number of suitors may have weakened its bargaining position in its dealings with saputo the observed increase in saputo s stock price is also consistent with the possibility that by taking over a cooperative saputo was able to decrease competition and thus increase its profits a fruitful area for future research would be a rigorous theoretical and empirical determination of the impact that these various factors have on acquisition profitability such analysis is required before inferences about the behavior and performance of cooperatives and iofs can be fully answered

do auctions induce a winner s curse new evidence from the corporate takeover market abstract we contrast the winner s curse hypothesis and the competitive market hypothesis as potential explanations for the observed returns to bidders in corporate takeovers the winner s curse hypothesis posits suboptimal behavior in which winning bidders fail to adapt their strategies to the level of competition and the amount of uncertainty in the takeover environment and predicts that bidder returns are inversely related to the level of competition in a given deal and to the uncertainty in the value of the target our measure of takeover competition comes from a unique data set on the auction process that occurs prior to the announcement of a takeover in our empirical estimation we control for the endogeneity between bidder returns and the level of competition in takeover deals controlling for endogeneity we find that the returns to bidders are not significantly related to takeover competition we also find that uncertainty in the value of the target does not reduce bidder returns related analysis indicates that prestigious investment banks do not promote overbidding analysis of post takeover operating performance also fails to find any negative effects of takeover competition as a whole the results indicate that the breakeven returns to bidders in corporate takeovers stem not from the winner s curse but from the competitive market for targets that occurs predominantly prior to the public announcement of bids

consistent estimation of cross sectional models in event studies event studies often include cross sectional regressions of announcement effects on exogenous variables if the event is voluntary and investors are rational then standard ols and gls estimators are inconsistent consistent ml estimators are constructed for a cross sectional model of horizontal mergers relating announcement effects to exgeneous characteristics of firms and industries the ols and ml estimates differ dramatically for bidders but not for targets the evidence suggests that managers of bidders but not targets have valuable private information about the potential synergies from proposed mergers article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

issuer surplus and the partial adjustment of ipo prices to public information abstract this study develops a model in which rational issuers maximize the expected surplus from going public by choosing an offer price that weighs the benefit of higher proceeds if the offer is completed against the cost of foregone surplus if the offer fails increases in the market valuation of comparable firms during the waiting period imply higher surplus associated with going public issuers respond with a partial revision in the offer price to elevate the probability of completion the model offers insights into many facts associated with initial public offering pricing including partial adjustment to market returns the inverse relation between withdrawal and market returns the asymmetric price adjustment to up versus down market returns hot issue markets and unconditional underpricing

ipo first day returns offer price revisions volatility and form s 1 language abstract form s 1 is the first sec filing in the initial public offering ipo process the tone of the s 1 in terms of its definitiveness in characterizing the firm s business strategy and operations should affect investors ability to value the ipo we find that ipos with high levels of uncertain text have higher first day returns absolute offer price revisions and subsequent volatility our findings provide empirical evidence for the theoretical models of uncertainty bookbuilding and prospect theory

corporate combinations and common stock returns the case of joint ventures the gain to stockholders from mergers is well documented however there is little evidence as to whether the source of the gain is due to synergy or management displacement merger is just one of an almost limitless variety of ways in which firms combine resources to accomplish some objective a joint venture is another in addition to being of interest as an independent phenomenon because the original managements of the parent firms remain intact under a joint venture investigation of wealth gains from joint ventures provides an opportunity to isolate the management displacement hypothesis from the synergy hypothesis as the source of gains in corporate combinations our results are 1 there are significant wealth gains from joint ventures 2 the smaller partner earns a larger excess rate of return while the dollar gains are more equally divided and 3 the gains scaled by resources committed yield premiums similar to those in mergers we are inclined to interpret our results as supportive of the synergy hypothesis as the source of gain from corporate combinations this paper is an empirical investigation of the common stock returns of u s companies that enter into joint ventures with other u s companies we consider joint ventures in the context of what is by now a burgeoning literature examining the security returns of companies involved in intercorporate mergers and tender offers 1 in this context our objective is to provide evidence as to the source of the well documented gains to stockholders of firms involved in mergers and tender offers in addition joint ventures are an interesting economic phenomenon in their own right they are undertaken by many of the largest u s companies involve billions of dollars in capital expenditures annually and are subject to considerable scrutiny in the popular press in this regard our analysis provides data on what is as yet a relatively unexplored area of economic activity 2 a corporate merger represents the joining together of all the resources of two companies under a single management to accomplish some set of objectives empirical studies have found that mergers generally result in significant increases in the total market values of the merging firms with the stockholders of the

reply to a comment on three reasons to use annual payments in contingent valuation abstract whitehead 2017 suggests the contingent valuation cv data from 3 egan et al 2015b lacks theoretical validity and has a fat tails problem while also questioning our conclusion that cv surveys using annual payments produce willingness to pay wtp estimates that better match consumer surplus estimates from a travel cost model in this reply we use likelihood ratio tests to show that our cv data is theoretically valid we use the turnbull and kristrom distribution free estimators to show that our cv data generate economically significant wtp estimates with small standard errors finally we apply the sensitivity analyses from our original paper to whitehead s results these sensitivity analyses overwhelmingly support our original conclusion in favor of using annual payments in cv surveys

deposit collecting unbundling the role of frequency salience and habit formation in generating savings abstract we report on a field experiment using several methods for collecting deposits made in formal bank accounts in rural areas in sri lanka we find that only frequent face to face collection

generalized additive models for nonmarket valuation via revealed or stated preference methods single site recreation demand and dichotomous choice contingent valuation analyses are typically conducted by implementing models containing strong parametric assumptions which are rarely underpinned by theoretical arguments this work illustrates how these assumptions can be relaxed and the estimation conducted semiparametrically by using generalized additive models gams this approach directly estimates the degree of the variables nonlinearities from the data thereby avoiding subjective choices on the smoothing parameters and offering many advantages when compared to the conventional modeling techniques that dominate the environmental economics literature additionally this paper illustrates how gams can be specified to construct theoretically consistent willingness to pay measures jel c14 q51

on diversification given asymmetry in returns complete diversification is the rational investment strategy for a risk averse individual in a homogeneous securities market who considers only the first two moments of return observed behavior of market participants however demonstrates that the majority of individual investors hold imperfectly diversified portfolios the purpose of the present study is to examine one potential cause for this behavior which does not rely on imperfection in the capital market specifically we show that given the existence of and investor preference for positive skewness a rational investor may hold an optimal limited number of homogeneous risk assets the relationship between the number of risk assets in a portfolio and the total risk of the portfolio has been examined extensively both theoretically and empirically 7 8 16 the general conclusion from these analyses which are set in a mean variance framework is that adding randomly selected and equally weighted risk assets to a portfolio will reduce total risk without affecting return the implication for risk averse investors in a perfect market is that complete diversification is optimal observed behavior of market participants however demonstrates that the majority of individual investors hold imperfectly diversified portfolios in the wharton survey of 1975 in 4 the median number of stocks held was found to be fewer than 4 with 34 percent of the investors holding no more than 2 stocks the two primary studies providing evidence of the undiversified portfolios of individual investors are blume and friend 3 and blume friend and crockett 5 the former analysis was based on a sample of individual income tax returns from 1971 and indicated that considering only dividend paying stocks 34 15 percent of investors sampled held only one stock 50 51 percent held no more than 2 stocks and only 10 72 percent held 10 or more stocks the latter study which included nondividend paying stocks was based on the federal reserve board s 1962 survey of the financial characteristics of consumers the median number of holdings per household was 2 while the average was 3 41 in both 3 and 5 numerous other measures of diversification were employed with the results confirming the conclusion that individual investors are on average highly undiversified the principal theoretical reasons advanced by the authors of these studies relate to the relaxation of assumptions of the standard capital asset

discussion of why don t issuers get upset about leaving money on the table in ipos in this article loughran and ritter 2001 hereafter lr provide an interesting new theory and empirical analysis in this discussion i would like to elaborate on their analysis in several ways first in section 1 1 review microsoft s ipo process as documented in a 1986 fortune article and related this to the lr model and evidence in section 2 i briefly discuss the lr model and its implications and the empirical findings presented in lr that support the model in section 3 i present some additional empirical evidence suggesting that the lr prospect theory model can t fully explain the ipo puzzles section 4 proposes an alternative explanation for these data namely that the data are consistent with a bargaining game in which the issuers underwriters and investors bargaining power changes with business and industry cycles section 5 concludes

abnormal returns and the regulation of nonprofit hospital sales and conversions during the 1990s concerns that nonprofit np hospitals were being sold at below market prices to investor owned io chains helped to prompt the widespread adoption of state laws regulating the sale and conversion of nonprofits in this paper we provide a simple test of under pricing using the io acquirer s abnormal stock market returns at the time of the acquisition prior to regulation we find that io chains did not earn abnormal returns from their acquisitions of nps and earned greater returns from purchasing other io and privately owned hospitals in states that subsequently adopted regulations acquisition activity slowed significantly and acquirer returns became negative efficient markets theory suggests that absent regulation expected merger synergies were already being transferred to the np target and that regulation may have reduced expected synergies or increased the costs of acquiring np hospitals

organizational debut on the public stage marketing myopia and initial public offerings successful initial public offerings ipos provide firms with access to valuable resources but also put pressure on firms to impress potential investors with evidence of their current well being and prospects for future growth to impress investors ipo firms might curtail their marketing budgets which appears to inflate current earnings and provide evidence of current well being however curtailing marketing budgets unexpectedly during an ipo may be a myopic practice in that the immediate benefits of these budget cuts are offset by their longer term adverse consequences on financial well being the extent of these adverse consequences in turn may be moderated by external firm factors including strategic alliances and key customer relationships and internal firm factors such as the strategic emphasis on value creation versus value appropriation a sample of 1 095 ipos during 2000 2011 reveals evidence of myopic marketing practices in more than 37 of the sample investors seem misled during ipos bu

collars and renegotiation in mergers and acquisitions i examine the motivation for and effect of including a collar in a merger agreement the most important cross sectional determinants of the bid structure cash vs stock and whether to include a collar are the market related stock return standard deviations for the bidder and target this evidence supports the hypothesis that the method of payment is dependent on the sensitivities of the bidder and target to market related risk because either has the incentive to demand renegotiation of the merger terms if the value of the bidder s offer changes materially relative to the value of the target during the bid period an important decision made during merger or takeover negotiations is the method of payment to be offered to target shareholders takeover bids can be made in cash and or some combination of securities issued by the bidding firm a considerable number of papers in the finance literature provide empirical evidence on the determinants of the choice between stock and cash as the method of payment including carleton et al 1983 niden 1986 crawford 1987 auerbach and reishus 1988 amihud lev and travlos 1990 chaney lovata and philipich 1991 and martin 1996 however this literature typically ignores the increasing fraction 20 in recent years of stock merger bids that contain a collar while an ordinary stock merger bid specifies the number of bidder shares offered as consideration for each target share the exchange ratio a collar bid provides for certain changes in the exchange ratio conditional on the level of the bidder s stock price around the effective date of the merger often insulating target stockholders from volatility in the bidder s stock price and promising a cash like payoff at the end of the bid period collar bids come in two basic forms the first which i call fixed exchange fex specifies a constant exchange ratio over a range of bidder stock prices with adjustment to the ratio outside those bounds an example of this type of transaction is the merger agreement announced on january 17 1994 between

why do poor people co hold debt and liquid savings i examine the use of flexible savings and loan accounts offered by safesave a microfinance institution serving poor slum dwellers in dhaka bangladesh i find that 59 per cent of the clients co ho

determinants of earnout as acquisition payment currency and bidder s value gains we examine the wealth effects of a comprehensive sample of uk bidders offering contingent payment or earnout as consideration for their acquisitions we show that bidders using earnout generate significantly higher announcement and post acquisition value gains than bidders using non earnout currencies such as cash stock exchange or mixed payments we construct a logistic model to predict when it is optimal for a bidder to offer earnout we show that bidders offering earnout optimally enjoy significantly higher announcement and post acquisition gains than bidders offering non earnout currencies consistent with our model of the choice of the optimal method of payment overall we provide robust evidence that earnout is an effective payment mechanism to mitigate valuation risk to acquirers and also enhances acquirer value during the announcement and post acquisition periods our paper contributes to the broader literature on how corporate acquirers use payment currency to manage information asymmetry and the attendant valuation risk

what are the headwaters of formal savings experimental evidence from sri lanka the world s poor are seeing a rapid expansion in access to formal savings accounts what is the source of savings when households are connected to a formal account we combine a high frequency panel survey spanning two and a half years with an experiment in which a sri lankan bank used mobile point of service pos terminals to collect deposits directly from households each week we find that the headwaters of formal savings lie in sacrificed leisure time households work more and improved savings options generate an increase in labour effort in both self employment and in the wage market the results suggest that the labour allocation channel is an important mechanism linking savings opportunities to income

do unlisted targets sell at discounts academic literature practitioners courts and regulators routinely assert that both private and subsidiary targets sell at discounts relative to public targets however the empirical evidence to support this conclusion is thin our work alters the methodology from prior research to avoid biases due to both one sided sample truncation and jensen s inequality following these changes we find no evidence that unlisted targets sell at discounts our results hold under a number of different approaches and after controlling for known determinants of acquisition pricing

is the ipo pricing process efficient this paper investigates underwriters treatment of public information throughout the ipo pricing process two key findings emerge first public information is not fully incorporated into the initial price range while the economic magnitude of the bias is small it is puzzling because it is not clear who benefits from it further it indicates that the filing range midpoint is not an unbiased predictor of the offer price as prior literature has assumed second while public information is similarly not fully incorporated into the final offer price the small economic significance of this relation indicates that the ipo pricing process is almost efficient

fat tails and truncated bids in contingent valuation an application to an endangered shorebird species a yes response function in a contingent valuation study is said to have fat tails if it has a high and slowly declining yes response rate at high bid levels truncated bids refer to the practice of dropping high bid offers before a yes response rate of near zero is reached this is a common practice in contingent valuation we explore the extent and implications of fat tails and truncated bids in a study of an endangered shorebird species we find among other things that mean willingness to pay is quite sensitive to the highest bid offered so much so that the choice of highest bid nearly dictates outcomes

the dynamics of portfolio management contracts we consider the multiperiod relationship between a client and a portfolio manager and the resulting problem of motivating a manager of unknown ability to acquire valuable information we explore the contractual forms and the optimal retention policy of the client and find that the optimal initial set of contracts features a smaller performance based fee component paid to the manager than in a first best contract and the contract choice elicits only partial information about the manager as a result ex post performance measurement is critical to future recontracting in general managers are retained only if the returns on their portfolio exceed the benchmark by an appropriate amount article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

do reits use cash reserves efficiently evidence from corporate acquisitions abstract we examine the combined impact of corporate governance and excess cash holdings on the propensity of firms to become bidders and engage in value destroying acquisitions we focus on the reit market due to its unique characteristics caused by regulation and the nature of the industry the lack of active real estate takeover market should lead to entrenchment and exacerbate agency costs however given the mandatory high cash payout for reits the absence of takeover market should not cause concerns to shareholders our analyses reveal that unlike conventional firms cash rich reits are not more likely to become acquirers and acquisitions by cash rich reits are not value decreasing however similarly to industrial firms reits with higher excess cash and lower insider ownership are more likely to become bidders we interpret our results to be consistent with the hypothesis that agency problems are less severe in real estate and investors are not averse to use of excess cash by reit managers on intra industry acquisitions

the success of mergers in the 1920s a stock market appraisal of the second merger wave abstract this paper examines the impact on acquiring firm shareholder wealth of mergers during the oligopoly merger wave of the 1920s these acquisitions were relatively unregulated the securities and exchange commission did not exist and antitrust laws were only loosely enforced although the lack of financial market controls and the possibility of monopoly gains should have permitted acquiring companies to capture large take over profits stock price data on 134 firms indicate only modest success the average profitability of an acquisition in the 1920s does not differ from the profitability resulting from mergers in the 1960s and 1970s despite vast differences in the economic environments

bookbuilding how informative is the order book we examine the institutional bids submitted under the bookbuilding procedure for a sample of international equity issues we find that information in bids which include a limit price especially those of large and frequent bidders affects the issue price oversubscription has a smaller but significant effect for ipos public information affects the issue price to the extent that it is reflected in the bids oversubscription and demand elasticity are positively correlated with the first day aftermarket return and demand elasticity is negatively correlated with aftermarket volatility our results support the view that bookbuilding is designed to extract information from investors

corporate takeover bids methods of payment and bidding firms stock returns this study explores the role of the method of payment in explaining common stock returns of bidding firms at the announcement of takeover bids the results reveal significant differences in the abnormal returns between common stock exchanges and cash offers the results are independent of the type of takeover bid i e merger or tender offer and of bid outcomes these findings supported by analysis of nonconvertible bonds are attributed mainly to signalling effects and imply that the inconclusive evidence of earlier studies on takeovers may be due to their failure to control for the method of payment recent studies on corporate takeovers provide inconclusive results on the valuation effects of acquisitions on the common stock of bidding firms 1 substantial differences are reported between the studies that analyze acquisitions initiated as tender offers and those that confine their samples to merger proposals the existence of mixed empirical findings for the bidding firms makes it difficult to interpret existing evidence and to draw conclusions about the managers acquisition motivations nevertheless the reason for the substantial difference between empirical findings on mergers and tender offers still remains an unresolved issue it is observed however that mergers are usually common stock exchange offers whereas tender offers are usually cash offers given that different methods of financing a project have different signalling implications myers and majluf 39 the differential stock returns of bidders in mergers and tender offers may be due to the method of acquisition financing

an analysis of the implications of uncertainty and agency problems on the wealth effects to acquirers of private firms abstract extensive empirical work shows that bidders do not gain from the acquisition of publicly traded targets but experience positive excess returns in the acquisition of privately held firms this study investigates how two important differences between private and public firms namely informational uncertainty and ownership characteristics impact the returns to acquirers a sample of targets that were acquired shortly after filing for an ipo was collected to circumvent the lack of information on private firms in spite of the special characteristics of these targets the listing effect is still prevalent in this sample the results of the analysis are consistent with the hypothesis that acquirers gain in the acquisition of private firms because these targets have a relatively weaker bargaining position due to informational and agency problems and costly access to external capital markets to finance growth opportunities

the outsourcing of r d through acquisitions in the pharmaceutical industry abstract we examine the performance of 160 pharmaceutical acquisitions from 1994 to 2001 and find evidence that on average acquirers realize significant positive returns these returns are positively correlated with prior acquirer access to information about the research and development activities at target firms and a superior negotiating position a unique desperation index is employed to determine the current status of a firm s internal productivity we find that firms experiencing declines in internal productivity or which are more desperate are more likely to engage in an outsourcing type acquisition in an effort to replenish their research pipelines

repayment frequency and default in microfinance evidence from india in stark contrast to bank debt contracts most micro finance contracts require that repayments start nearly immediately after loan disbursement and occur weekly thereafter even though economic theory suggests that a more flexible repayment schedule would benefit clients and potentially improve their repayment capacity micro finance practitioners argue that the fiscal discipline imposed by frequent repayment is critical to preventing loan default in this paper we use data from a field experiment which randomized client assignment to a weekly or monthly repayment schedule and find no significant effect of type of repayment schedule on client delinquency or default our findings suggest that among micro finance clients who are willing to borrow at either weekly or monthly repayment schedules a more flexible schedule can significantly lower transaction costs without increasing client default jel 012 016 022

the willingness to pay by households for improved reliability of electricity service in north cyprus abstract this research examines households willingness to pay wtp for an improved electricity service households wtp is estimated using the payment ladder contingent valuation cv data from 350 in person interviews in north cyprus in order to avoid the cost of outages households are willing to incur a 13 8 increase in their monthly electricity bill a cost benefit analysis cba indicates that the annualized economic benefits of improved reliability of the electricity service would be approximately usd 35 6 million for the residential sector this figure is more than enough to finance the investments needed to completely eradicate any electricity outages in addition the fuel savings from substituting the generation of the new plants for the old plants would yield about usd 32 9 million per year in fuel savings hence a change from the current low reliability policy to one of providing a high quality service would yield an economic net present value to the residents of north cyprus of twice the investment costs or usd 173 3 million within five years

do tender offers create value new methods and evidence abstract conventional techniques of estimating takeover value improvements measure only a fraction of the total gain and include revelation about bidder stand alone value to address these biases we develop the probability scaling method which rescales announcement date returns and the intervention method which uses returns at intervening events perceived value improvements are larger than traditional methods indicate we cannot reject the hypothesis that bidders on average pay fair prices combined bidder target stock returns are higher for hostile offers lower for equity offers and lower for diversifying offers these effects reflect revelation about bidder stand alone value not differences in gains from combination

empirical estimates of beta when investors face estimation risk we examine empirical implications of models of differential information that formalize the following intuition securities for which there is relatively little information are perceived as relatively more risky because of the greater uncertainty surrounding the exact parameters of their return distributions the implication that beta risk for low information firms should decline as information increases is confirmed with several data sets we find such a decline over the first geveral periods subsequent to initial public offerings and initial listings there is also an abrupt risk decline at the first annual earnings announcement this paper examines several empirical implications of security return models involving differential information these models formalize the following intuition securities for which there is relatively little information are perceived as relatively more risky because of the greater uncertainty surrounding the exact parameters of their return distributions the research relates to two streams of literature the first revolves around the new issues and new listings market it begins with ibbotson 1975 and includes for example ritter 1984 beatty and ritter 1986 mcconnell and sanger 1987 and muscarella and vetsuypens 1989 the second is the literature dealing with the effects of differential information on the risk assessment of low information firms this second literature is exemplified by the work of klein and bawa 1976 1977 and barry and brown 1984 1985 in our examination we focus on how increased risk associated with low information firms henceforth called estimation risk manifests itself in observed return data we explore how observed security returns to low information firms appear to researchers in relation to how they appear ex ante to investors who base their predictive distribution of security returns on incomplete information about the parameters of the return generating process we also examine data on new listings and new issues to exemplify some of the relationships the data support the most obvious and direct implication of the differential information model that the expected systematic risk of low information firms decreases as time passes and information increases our evidence as in ibbotson that risk declines with seasoning rejects a restrictive null hypothesis that information risk is diversifiable and the under

a model of venture capitalist investment activity the paper describes the activities of venture capitalists as an orderly process involving five sequential steps these are 1 deal origination the processes by which deals enter into consideration as investment prospects 2 deal screening a delineation of key policy variables which delimit investment prospects to a manageable few for in depth evaluation 3 deal evaluation the assessment of perceived risk and expected return on the basis of a weighting of several characteristics of the prospective venture and the decision whether or not to invest as determined by the relative levels of perceived risk and expected return 4 deal structuring the negotiation of the price of the deal namely the equity relinquished to the investor and the covenants which limit the risk of the investor 5 post investment activities the assistance to the venture in the areas of recruiting key executives strategic planning locating expansion financing and orchestrating a merger acquisition or public offering 41 venture capitalists provided data on a total of 90 deals which had received serious consideration in their firms the questionnaire measured the mechanism of initial contact between venture capitalist and entrepreneur the venture s industry the stage of financing and product development ratings of the venture on 23 characteristics an assessment of the potential return and perceived risk and the decision vis i vis whether to invest the modal venture represented in the database was a start up in the electronics industry with a production capability in place and seeking 1 million median in outside financing there is a high degree of cross referrals between venture capitalists particularly for the purposes of locating co investors factor analysis reduced the 23 characteristics of the deal to five underlying dimensions namely 1 market attractiveness size growth and access to customers 2 product differentiation uniqueness patents technical edge profit margin 3 managerial capabilities skills in marketing management finance and the references of the entrepreneur 4 environmental threat resistance technology life cycle barriers to competitive entry insensitivity to business cycles and down side risk protection 5 cash out potential future opportunities to realize capital gains by merger acquisition or public offering the results of regression analyses showed expected return to be determined by market attractiveness and product differentiation r2 0 22 perceived risk is determined by managerial capabilities and environmental threat resistance r2 0 33 finally a discriminant analysis correctly predicted in 89 4 of the cases whether or not a venture capitalist was willing to commit funds to the deal on the basis of the expected return and perceived risk the reactions of seven venture capitalists who reviewed the model s specification were used to test its validity

public information ipo price formation and long run returns japanese evidence the price formation process of jasdaq ipos is more transparent than in the united states the transparency facilitates analysis of important issues in the ipo literature why offer prices only partially adjust to public information and adjust more fully to negative information and why adjustments are related to initial returns the evidence indicates that early price information conveys the underwriter s commitment to compensate investors for acquiring and or disclosing information offer prices reflect pre ipo market values of public companies and implicit agreements between underwriters and issuers that originate well before the offering underadjustment of offer prices is substantially reversed in the aftermarket copyright c 2009 the american finance association

why don t issuers get upset about leaving money on the table in ipos one of the puzzles regarding initial public offerings ipos is that issuers rarely get upset about leaving substantial amounts of money on the table defined as the number of shares sold times the difference between the first day closing market price and the offer price the average ipo leaves 9 1 million on the table this number is approximately twice as large as the fees paid to investment bankers and represents a substantial indirect cost to the issuing firm we present a prospect theory model that focuses on the covariance of the money left on the table and wealth changes our reasoning also provides an explanation for a second puzzling pattern much more money is left on the table following recent market rises than after market falls this results in an explanation of hot issue markets we also offer a new explanation for why ipos are underpriced copyright 2002 oxford university press

are acquisitions by utility firms beneficial utility firms are subject to peculiar regulatory characteristics that may allow for unique wealth effects resulting from acquisitions the wealth effects derived from acquisitions of utility firms is measured and the analysis reveals negative wealth effects for acquirers and positive wealth effects for targets however the wealth effects are generally less favorable for utility firm acquirers than other acquirer firms because of the regulatory barriers that prevent them from pursuing attractive targets

the gains to bidding firms from merger abstract this study examines the effect of mergers on the wealth of bidding firms shareholders bidding firms gain significantly during the twenty one days leading to the announcement of each of their first four merger bids these results fail to support the capitalization hypothesis that bidders gains are captured at the beginning of merger programs bidders abnormal returns are positively related to the relative size of the merger partners and the gains during the announcement period are larger for mergers which are successful though the gains are larger prior to 1969 merger bids after 1969 also significantly increase the wealth of bidding firms shareholders the results suggest that the inconclusive findings of the earlier studies may be due to methodological deficiencies the findings of this study are consistent with value maximizing behavior by the management of bidding firms

political connections and the process of going public evidence from china abstract we examine how political connections impact the process of going public specifically we test how political connections impact the pricing of the newly offered shares the magnitude of underpricing and the fixed cost of going public based on the experience of the newly public firms from chinese security markets and using multiple measures of political connections we find robust evidence that the issuing firms with political connections reap significant preferential benefits in the process of going public to be specific we find that firms irrespective of their ownership status with greater political connections have relatively higher offering price lower underpricing and lower fixed costs during the going public process

the effect of discretionary price control decisions on equity values abstract the macro literature presents conflicting evidence on the effects of price controls in this study the fact that the macro economic effect of wage and price controls is the aggregation of the micro economic effects is used to implement a different approach to measure the effects of price controls the effect of price controls is inferred from examining the impact of discretionary regulatory decisions on the equity values of individual firms during phase ii of nixon s economic stabilization program the empirical results indicate that violators of the regulations incurred significant abnormal losses that were unrelated to the explicit penalties this suggests that implicit penalties were imposed on offending firms the analysis of price increase decisions provides weak evidence that these price commission decisions had an impact on equity values

anticipation acquisitions and bidder returns industry shocks and the transfer of information across rivals we document market anticipation of merger bids and show that less anticipated bids earn significantly higher announcement returns subsequent bidders in the industry experience significant and positive abnormal returns around the time of initial industry bid announcements these results suggest that announcement period returns underestimate the wealth effects of bidding after accounting for anticipation bidding activity is on average a significant wealth creating event moreover bidders pursuing public targets increase shareholder wealth and bidders in stock swaps do not lose these results contradict conventional wisdom our results shed light on the correct magnitude of acquisition returns and on the transfer of information throughout an industry around the time of an economic shock the author 2011 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

the underpricing of private targets abstract we examine acquisitions of private firms with valuation histories and find a positive relation between acquirer announcement returns and target valuation revisions similar to other studies acquirer announcement returns are positive on average however positive acquirer announcement returns are mainly driven by targets that are acquired for more than their prior valuation this relation is consistent with pricing effects associated with target valuation uncertainty and behavioral biases in negotiation outcomes

escape from the usa government debt to gdp ratio country tax competitiveness and us oecd cross border m as statutory tax rates of a country do not reflect a country s true tax competitiveness we propose and show that government debt to gdp ratio govdebt of a country is a better proxy for its tax competitiveness using a comprehensive sample of 1 884 completed cross border acquisition transactions from the u s to other oecd countries we document that the u s target country govdebt difference is significantly and positively related to both deal announcement return and post deal tax saving of the acquirer the govdebt difference is also significantly and positively related to u s target country deal flow the findings remain robust when we control for the potential endogeneity of govdebt difference our findings strongly suggest that tax avoidance is an important driver of u s oecd cross border deal flow and it increases shareholder wealth for u s acquirers

the daylight saving time anomaly in relation to firms targeted for mergers abstract this paper finds evidence that daylight saving time changes influence the decision making of investors when trading in firms targeted for mergers we find that investors who face imbalances in their circadian cycle generate more positive abnormal stock returns upon the announcement of target firms this result holds within a large number of robustness tests target firms also experience more pronounced stock return volatility in response to their merger announcements the first trading day after clock changes overall these results seem to indicate that investors may overreact to available information when experiencing imbalances in their circadian cycle

venture capitalist certification in initial public offerings this paper provides support for the certification role of venture capitalists in initial public offerings consistent with the certification hypothesis a comparison of venture capital backed ipos with a control sample of nonventure capital backed ipos from 1983 through 1987 matched as closely as possible by industry and offering size indicates that venture capital backing results in significantly lower initial returns and gross spreads in effect the presence of venture capitalists in the issuing firms serves to lower the total costs of going public and to maximize the net proceeds to the offering firm in addition we document that venture capitalists retain a significant portion of their holdings in the firm after the ipo the ability of third party specialists to certify the value of securities issued by relatively unknown firms in capital markets that are characterized by asymmetric information between corporate insiders and public investors has attracted much academic interest in recent years several authors including james 1990 blackwell marr and spivey 1990 and barry muscarella peavy and vetsuypens 1991 have developed and tested models based at least in part on the formal certification hypothesis presented in booth and smith 1986 a related body of work represented by deangelo 1981 beatty and ritter 1986 titman and trueman 1986 johnson and miller 1988 carter 1990 simon 1990 and carter and manaster 1990 has examined how investment bankers and auditors help resolve the asymmetric information inherent in the initial public offering ipo process in this paper we examine whether the presence of venture capitalists as investors in a firm going public can certify that the offering price of the issue reflects all available and relevant inside information we hypothesize that venture capitalists can perform this function that it will be an economically

target firm abnormal returns and trading volume around the initiation of change in control transactions this study examines the average abnormal returns average abnormal trading volume and reported insider trading of corporate control target firms during a period of possibly informed trading this period begins on the unpublicized initiation date as reported in a postannouncement date proxy statement or 14 d1 and ends on the publication date of the first wall street journal story signalling an impending change in corporate control we find that the preannouncement date average abnormal return noted by other researchers begins after the unpublicized initiation date of the transaction we find no evidence of the preannouncement date average abnormal trading volume noted by previous researchers instead we find average abnormal volume beginning with the first public information regarding the transaction

an analysis of compensation in the u s venture capital partnership abstract venture capital limited partnerships are an attractive arena to study cross sectional and time series variations in compensation schemes we empirically examine 419 partnerships the compensation of new and smaller funds displays considerably less sensitivity to performance and less variation than that of other funds the fixed base component of compensation is higher for younger and smaller firms we observe no relation between incentive compensation and performance our evidence is consistent with a learning model in which the pay of new venture capitalists is less sensitive to performance because reputational concerns induce them to work hard

the impact of takeovers on shareholder wealth during the 1920s merger wave we examine the impact of merger announcements on portfolios of acquiring firm and target firm common stock from 1919 to 1930 despite vast changes in the economic and regulatory environment overall acquisition profitability has remained remarkably constant over the last 70 to 80 years target firm shareholders in the 1920s clearly gained from takeovers averaging abnormal returns in excess of 15 while acquiring firm shareholders essentially broke even synergistic or monopolistic gains from consolidation were minimal unlike the more recent experience target firm and acquiring firm abnormal returns were largely unaffected by the mode of acquisition the means of financing or the degree of industrial relatedness

the effect of voluntary sell off announcements on shareholder wealth sell off activities arise when a firm sells part of its assets e g a segment a division etc but continues to exist in essentially the same form this study investigates the effect of voluntary sell offs on stock returns from a sample of over 1000 sell off events first public announcements the evidence shows that both sellers and buyers earn significant positive excess returns from these transactions the excess returns earned by buyers are smaller than those earned by sellers there is also evidence that sell off announcements are preceded by a period of significant negative returns for the sellers which suggests that the sellers on average performed poorly prior to their sell off activities substantial research has been undertaken in recent years on mergers acquisitions tender offers capital structure changes and other financial planning topics this research has considerably expanded our knowledge about the association of these decisions with the welfare of the stockholders involved in these transactions selling a portion of the firm s assets is another important financial planning decision 2 this paper investigates the effect of voluntary sell off announcements on shareholder wealth a sell off is defined as selling part of a firm s assets e g a segment a division etc while the firm continues to exist in essentially the same form as that prior to the sell off this study does not examine the effects of involuntary ordered by the government sell offs and other similar activities such as spin offs leveraged buy outs liquidations reorganizations etc 3