repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory the case of risk neutrality we consider a repeated moral hazard problem where both the principal and the wealth constrained agent are risk neutral in each of two periods the agent can exert unobservable effort leading to success or failure incentives provided in the second period act as carrot and stick for the first period so that the effort level induced in the second period is higher after a first period success than after a failure if renegotiation cannot be prevented the principal may prefer a project with lower returns i e a project may be too good to be financed or similarly an agent can be overqualified this article offers a new perspective on dynamic moral hazard problems consider a riskneutral principal who can hire a risk neutral but wealth constrained agent the agent can exert unobservable effort which increases the likelihood of success in the one shot problem there is a well known trade off between effort incentives and rent extraction which leads to a downward distorted effort level compared to the first best solution we extend the standard model by assuming that there is a second period in which the principal can make an investment to continue the project and the agent can again exert unobservable effort it turns out that there are several interesting insights that so far have escaped the literature on repeated moral hazard which was focused on the case of risk averse agents in particular if the principal can commit not to renegotiate the second period incentives can be used to partially circumvent the limited liability constraint in the second period the principal induces the agent to choose a particularly high effort level following a first period success and a particularly low effort level following a first period failure the prospect of a higher second period rent following a first period success motivates the agent to exert more effort in the first period i e rents in the second period act as reward and punishment for the first period it should be emphasized that we assume no technological impact of a first period success or failure on the second period technology nevertheless an optimal dynamic contract exhibits memory hence if an outsider observed today a principal agent pair that was successful and another identical pair that was not successful he would be right to predict that the first pair also is more likely to succeed tomorrow in other words a serial correlation across periods which we sometimes refer to as a hot hand effect is generated endogenously merely based on incentive considerations 2

the phillips curve macroeconomic policy and the welfare of canadians a review of the two competing paradigms explaining inflation and unemployment fluctuations singles out the keynesian phillips curve as the clear empirical winner over its classic competitors reestimation of the canadian phillips curve for 1957 90 identifies a sharp structural shift toward a high degree of unemployment hysteresis after 1972 the recent attempt of macropolicy to flatten the aggregate demand curve and limit supply side shock accommodation which aims at lower and more stable inflation is then shown to make unemployment higher and more unstable on average to an extent that is an increasing function of the degree of hysteresis understanding and reducing hysteresis and developing a consensus based incomes policy that has a chance of alleviating the dismal trade off should therefore to top research and policy priorities

the labour augmented k s model a laboratory for the analysis of institutional and policy regimes abstract in this work we discuss the research findings from the labour augmented schumpeter meeting keynes k s agent based model it comprises comparative dynamics experiments on an artificial economy populated by heterogeneous interacting agents as workers firms banks and the government the exercises are characterized by different degrees of labour flexibility or by institutional shocks entailing labour market structural reforms wherein the phenomenon of hysteresis is endogenous and pervasive the k s model constitutes a laboratory to evaluate the effects of new institutional arrangements as active passive labour market policies and fiscal austerity in this perspective the model allows mimicking many of the customary policy responses which the european union and many latin american countries have embraced in reaction to the recent economic crises the obtained results seem to indicate however that most of the proposed policies are likely inadequate to tackle the short term crises consequences and even risk demoting the long run economic prospects more objectively the conclusions offer a possible explanation to the negative path traversed by economies like brazil where many of the mentioned policies were applied in a short period and hint about some risks ahead

real sectoral spillovers a dynamic factor analysis of the great recession abstract dynamic factor methods are used to identify the impact of common and idiosyncratic shocks on sixteen u s nonfarm business sectors this paper then studies changes in the transmission of these shocks across sectors during the great recession and evaluates the cross sectoral spillovers the great recession is found to be largely a time of heightened impact of common shocks which accounts for 3 4 of aggregate volatility and large spillovers of negative finance related shocks in addition prior to the recession aggregate fluctuations are mainly driven by sector specific shocks in contrast with findings from previous studies

employment and output effects of observed and unobserved monetary growth the purpose of this paper is to present new evidence on the business cycle effects of contemporaneously observed and unobserved money growth the analysis builds on previous work in two ways first and most important in this paper the output and employment effects of unobserved money growth are estimated without maintained hypotheses about other sources of monetary nonneutrality this approach seems appropriate because the relation between money and business cycles is acknowledged to be not well understood for example see the discussion in grossman 1983 and barro 1984 earlier findings of neutral unobserved money growth involved test procedures that maintained either the neutrality of anticipated money growth barro and hercowitz 1980 or the neutrality of observed money growth boschen and grossman 1982 however the empirical measurement and neutrality of anticipated money growth are unsettled issues see mishkin 1982 while the empirical tests by boschen and grossman 1982 reject the neutrality of observed money growth since incomplete monetary information is a central aspect of many business cycle theories it is of considerable interest to estimate the economic impact of contemporaneously unobserved money growth without placing undue restnctions on the moneylbusiness cycle relation this approach also makes clear that tests of monetary nonneutrality due to incomplete information involve a comparison of coefficients on observed and unobserved monetary growth rather than simply a finding of positive significant coefficients on unobserved money growth

asymmetric shocks and monetary policy in a currency union we analyze the conduct of monetary policy in a currency union in the face of asymmetric shocks in particular we compare the stabilization properties of a currency union versus alternative exchange rate arrangements the relative performance of a currency union is shown to depend on the extent of economic integration in patterns of consumption and production and on the relative weights placed on price stability versus employment stability in the monetary authority s objective function jel classification f33 f40

eductive stability in real business cycle models we reexamine issues of coordination in the standard rbc model is the unique rational expectations equilibrium attainable by rational agents who contemplate the possibility of small deviations from equilibrium surprisingly we nd that coordination cannot be expected even with strong common knowledge assumptions rational agents anticipating small but persistent deviations are led to take actions that eventually contradict the common knowledge assumption this impossibility theorem for eductive learning is not fully overcome when adaptive learning is incorporated into the framework

risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public private partnerships we study the agency costs of delegated public service provision focusing on the link between organizational forms and uncertainty at project implementation we consider a dynamic multitask moral hazard environment where the mapping between efiort and performance is ex ante uncertain but new information may come along during operations our analysis points out at the e ciency gains that bundling planning and implementation as under public private partnerships can bring in terms of better project design and lower operational costs bundling also results in increasingly better performance as uncertainty is reduced by growing experience in the sector bundling should instead be viewed with caution when the private sector seeks to radically innovate on public service provision or to introduce new services but lacks the knowledge and expertise to anticipate the impact of the innovative design procedure technology on the cost of operations the compounding of asymmetric information ex post plus moral hazard and renegotiation may generate diseconomies of scope in agency costs which for high operational risk can make unbundling optimal in this context the use of private flnance can help re establishing the beneflt of bundling only if lenders have su cient expertise to help assessing project risks

limited liability and incentive contracting with ex ante action choices abstract this article examines a principal agent model of financial contracting in which a risk neutral entrepreneur agent makes an unobservable ex ante effort choice while employing the investment funds of a risk neutral investor principal the key innovation is that the investment contract is subject to statutory liability limits given these liability limits two settings are considered one in which the investor payoff function is also constrained to be monotonically nondecreasing in firm profit and another in which no such monotonic contract constraint is imposed in the former case a standard debt contract is shown to emerge and a first best effort choice is not achieved in the latter setting the optimum is characterized by a live or die payoff function and a first best effort level may or may not be realized

the proper scope of government theory and an application to prisons when should a government provide a service in house and when should it contract out provision we develop a model in which the provider can invest in improving the quality of service or reducing cost if contracts are incomplete the private provider has a stronger incentive to engage in both quality improvement and cost reduction than a government employee has however the private contractor s incentive to engage in cost reduction is typically too strong because he ignores the adverse effect on noncontractible quality the model is applied to understanding the costs and benefits of prison privatization

the economic consequences of productivity changes a computable general equilibrium cge analysis cutler h and davies s the economic consequences of productivity changes a computable general equilibrium cge analysis regional studies this paper uses a data intensive cge model to examine sector specific impacts of increases in total factor productivity and labour and capital productivity it focuses on the importance of a sector s output in household consumption and firms intermediate input demand the importance of labour and capital in value added and the impact on the city s consumer price index cpi as factors influencing the transmission mechanism the general equilibrium effects result in unambiguous increases in household migration for total factor productivity and capital productivity but not for the labour case this analysis emphasizes the impact on household income and tax revenue per new household cutler h et davies s les consequences economiques des changements de productivite une analyse egc regional studies cet article utilise un modele d equilibre general calculable egc

the stability pact more than a minor nuisance stability pact more than a minor nuisance the stability and growth pact will lead member countries to aim for cyclically balanced budgets until this steady state is reached europe will continue its efforts at de cit cutting while so doing politicians are less likely to undertake the dif cult labour market reforms that are really needed is further scal retrenchment wise the paper reviews the reasons that have been advanced in favour of a stability pact and nds them wanting the most serious justi cations such as the systemic risk of bank crisis following a government s failure to service its debt can be better dealt with in other ways for example by prudential limits on banks exposure to public debts moreover our analysis reveals that the macroeconomic costs of the stability pact while sizeable are not as dangerous as often believed the costs will be barely visible once the steady state is reached the true macroeconomic costs are front loaded they concern the next few years after a decade already dominated by convergence efforts barry eichengreen and charles wyplosz

conflicting tasks and moral hazard theory and experimental evidence abstract we study a multi task principal agent problem in which tasks can be in direct conflict with each other in theory it is difficult to induce a single agent to exert efforts in two conflicting tasks because effort in one task decreases the success probability of the other task we have conducted an experiment in which we find strong support for the relevance of this incentive problem in the presence of conflict subjects choose two efforts significantly less often when both tasks are assigned to a single agent than when there are two agents each in charge of one task

evaluating unemployment policies what do the underlying theories tell us the paper surveys unemployment policies for advanced market economies and evaluates them by examining the predictions of the underlying macroeconomic theories the basic idea is that for the most part different unemployment policy prescriptions rest on different macroeconomic theories and our confidence in the prescriptions should depend at least in part on theories ability to predict some salient stylized facts about unemployment behavior the paper considers four types of policies laissez faire demand management policies supply side policies and structural policies copyright 1995 by oxford university press

ten commandments for a fiscal rule in the e m u abstract fiscal rules in a monetary union should 1 be simple 2 ensure the solvency of the state 3 relate to the consolidated general government and central bank 4 be neutral as regards the size of the public sector 5 avoid pro cyclical behaviour of the fiscal policy instruments 6 make sense also in the long run 7 allow for important differences in economic structure and initial conditions 8 aggregate into behaviour that makes sense at the level of the union as a whole 9 be credible and 10 be enforced impartially and consistently the paper reviews the rules of the stability and growth pact the uk s golden rule and sustainable investment rule and buiter and grafe s permanent balance rule and enhanced permanent balance rule from the perspective of how well they meet these 10 criteria key words fiscal rules stability and growth pact golden rule financial sustainability journal of economic literature classification system e61 e62 e63 f33 f42 h62 h87 e32 e42 willem h buiter european bank for reconstruction and development one exchange square london ec2a 2jn united kingdom tel 44 0 20 7336 6805 fax 44 0 20 7338 6110 1 e mail buiterw ebrd com office e mail willembuiter whsmithnet co uk home www http www nber org wbuiter

authority and incentives in organizations the paper analyzes the choice of organizational structure as solution to the trade off between controlling behavior based on authority rights and minimizing costs for implementing high efforts the analysis includes the owner of a firm a top manager and two division heads if it is more expensive to incentivize the division heads the owner will prefer full delegation of authority to them to replace their high incentive pay by incentives based on private benefits of control in that situation decentralization is optimal given that selfish behavior is more important than cooperation for maximizing returns but concentrated delegation of full authority to a single division head is optimal for cooperation being crucial if however incentivizing the division heads is clearly less expensive than creating incentives for the top manager the owner will choose centralization given that cooperation is the dominating issue but partial delegation if selfish behavior is crucial

monetary information and monetary neutrality abstract the monetary theory of business fluctuations in market clearing models constructed under the rational expectations assumption as advanced by lucas and others involves the idea that suppliers and demanders will typically misinterpret movements in the general level of prices as representing more or less favorable relative opportunities for real activities the present paper examines the consequences of agents possessing contemporaneous monetary information of a potentially noisy variety for the non neutrality of unanticipated monetary events within such an equilibrium business cycle model this modification of the information structure has the strong testable implication that real activity will be uncorrelated with contemporaneous monetary data

multitask agency problems focus and task clustering abstract this short paper discusses recent insights of multitask agency theory it considers in turn the issues of effort substitution conflicts between tasks and implicit incentives and mission it concludes by addressing the problem of optimal task clustering

building and managing facilities for public services abstract we model alternative institutional arrangements for building and managing facilities for provision of public services including the use of the private finance initiative pfi by exploring the effects on innovative investment activity by providers the desirability of bundling the building and management operations is analyzed and it is considered whether it is optimal to allocate ownership to the public or the private sector we also examine how the case for pfi is affected by the voluntary or automatic transfer of ownership from the private to the public sector when the contract expires asset specificity and service demand risk play critical roles

tax disturbances and real economic activity in the postwar united states abstract this paper investigates the macroeconomic effects of cyclical fluctuations in marginal tax rates it finds that systematically including tax variables in a standard real business cycle model substantially improves the model s ability to reproduce basic facts about postwar u s business cycle fluctuations in particular modeling fluctuations in personal and corporate income tax rates increases the model s predicted relative variability of hours and decreases its predicted correlation between hours and average productivity fluctuations in tax rates produce large substitution effects that alter the leisure labor supply decision

international debt and world business fluctuations abstract the international transmission of real productivity disturbances is examined in an optimizing model with two countries each inhabited by an infinitely lived representative consumer producer we analyze the dynamics of output consumption investment interest rates and net external debt foreign productivity shocks can have positive or negative impacts on domestic output and international debt depending on the intertemporal distribution of the shocks transient foreign shocks are shown to be positively transmitted and lead to increased domestic indebtedness while permanent foreign shocks are negatively transmitted and lead to a decline in domestic indebtedness

globalization and its challenges rudi was born and grew up in krefeld germany he was an undergraduate at the university of geneva and completed his ph d at the university of chicago in 1971 which is where we met he was a student of robert mundell and both the subject matter the development of the mundell fleming model and the elegance and insights of his early work reflected mundell s influence he taught at the university of rochester and at the university of chicago before accepting an offer from mit in 1975

european economic governance the berlin washington consensus this paper argues that the european union has gone farther than any other country or institution in internalizing the prescriptions of the washington consensus embedding neo liberal principles in the treaties defining its governance the eu has enshrined a peculiar doctrine within its constitution we further argue that this berlin washinghton consensus has serious empirical and theoretical flaws as its reliance on pareto optimality leads to neglect the crucial links between current and potential growth we show by means of a simple model that the call for structural reforms as an engine for growth may be controversial once current and potential output are related we claim that adherence to the consensus may go a long way in explaining the poor growth performance of the european economy in the past two decades because of the constraints that it imposed on fiscal and monetary policies the same constraints have deepened the eurozone crisis that started in 2007 putting unwarranted emphasis on austerity and reform challenging the consensus becomes a precondition for avoiding the implosion of the euro and recovering growth

what if supply side policies are not enough the perverse interaction of flexibility and austerity abstract in this work we develop a set of labour market and fiscal policy experiments upon the labour and credit augmented schumpeter meeting keynes agent based model the labour market is declined under two institutional variants the fordist and the competitive set ups meant to capture the historical transition from the post wwii toward the post thatcher reagan period inside these two regimes we study the different effects of supply side active labour market policies almps vs demand management passive labour market ones plmps in particular we analyse the effects of almps aimed at promoting job search and at providing training to unemployed people next we compare the effects of these policies with unemployment benefits meant to sustain income and therefore aggregate demand considering the burden of unemployment benefits in terms of the public budget we link such provision with the objectives of the european stability and growth pact our results show that i an appropriate level of skills is not enough to sustain growth when workers face adverse labour demand ii supply side policies are not able to reverse the negative interaction between flexibility and austerity iii plmps outperform almps in reducing unemployment and workers skill deterioration and iv demand management policies are better suited to mitigate inequality and to sustain long run growth

asymmetric phase shifts in u s industrial production cycles abstract we identify cyclical turning points for 74 u s manufacturing industries and uncover new empirical regularities a industries tend to comove between expansion and contraction phases over the business cycle b clusters of industry turning points are highly asymmetric between peaks and troughs troughs are much more concentrated and sharper than peaks c the temporal pattern of phase shifts across industries supports the spillovers through input output linkages and d macroeconomic shocks such as unanticipated changes in monetary policy government spending oil prices and financial conditions are significant drivers of industrial phase shifts

does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices evidence from gubernatorial term limits this paper analyzes the behavior of u s governors from 1950 to 1986 to investigate a reputation building model of political behavior we argue that differences in the behavior of governors who face a binding term limit and those who are able to run again provides a source of variation in discount rates that can be used to test a political agency model we find evidence that taxes spending and other policy instruments respond to a binding term limit if a democrat is in office the result is a fiscal cycle in term limit states which lowers state income when the term limit binds

threshold behavior and aggregate fluctuation this paper concerns a propagation mechanism in an economy where many individuals follow a threshold rule and interact with a positive feedback we derive an asymptotic distribution of the propagation size when the number of the agents tends to infinity the propagation distribution exhibits a slower convergence to a deterministic value than it would if the agents followed a smooth adjustment policy this gives rise to significant aggregate fluctuations in a finite lumpy adjusting economy even when the agents are hit by small independent shocks

policy impacts under rational expectations abstract this paper re examines for the u s the validity of the macro rational expectations mre hypothesis in contrast to most previous studies in this area the paper a considers the potential real effects of both monetary and fiscal policies b allows for possible endogeneity of these policies and c uses a joint non linear estimation methodology to distangle the hypothesis of rationality from that of neutrality the empirical results reject the joint mre hypothesis for both policies the results also indicate that policy non neutrality is the culprit behind such rejection this evidence offers further empirical support for macro rational expectations models where monetary and fiscal policies can due to some rigidities play a key role in stabilizing the real economy

job design delegation and cooperation a principal agent analysis abstract this paper analyzes how tasks are assigned in organizations tasks can be allocated vertically between a principal and an agent or laterally among agents the resulting organizational job design determines how many tasks are delegated to agents and how the agents tasks are divided among them in the framework of the standard principal agent relationship with moral hazard it is shown that i an incentive consideration causes the principal to group a broad range of tasks into an agent s job rather than hire multiple agents and make each of them specialize in just one task and ii the principal may choose to delegate all the tasks in order to mitigate a conflicting incentive problem with agents

an estimate of a sectoral model of labor mobility this paper develops a model of sectoral labor mobility and tests its main implications the model nests two distinct hypotheses on the origin of mobility a sectoral shocks and b worker employer mismatch we estimate the relative importance of each hypothesis and find that the bulk of labor mobility is caused by mismatch rather than by sectoral shift we then try to put a value on society s match specific information that is we ask to what extent the availability of the option to change jobs raises gnp we find that the mobility option raises expected earnings by roughly between 8 5 percent and 13 percent of labor earnings which translates to an increase in gnp of between 6 percent and 9 percent

to build or not to build normative and positive theories of public private partnerships abstract this paper analyzes whether the two tasks of building infrastructures which are socially useful in providing public services and managing these assets should be bundled or not when performance contracts can be written both tasks should be performed altogether by the same firm if a better design of the infrastructure helps also to save on operating costs otherwise tasks should be kept apart and undertaken by different units in incomplete contracting environments we isolate conditions under which either the traditional form of public provision of services or the more fashionable public private partnership emerges optimally the latter dominates when there is a positive externality and the private benefits from owning assets are small enough finally we take a political economy perspective and study how incentive schemes are modified under the threat of capture of the decision makers much of the gains from bundling may be lost in this case

internal labor markets and worker rents abstract we show that establishing an internal labor market by offering combined contracts across hierarchy levels strictly dominates external recruitment when workers are homogeneous the reason is that only an internal labor market can exploit higher tier rents for incentive provision on lower tiers given unobservable heterogeneity of workers relying on an internal labor market has the further advantage of improving the selection of high ability workers for higher ranks which is complemented by rent based incentive schemes however observable worker heterogeneity gives rise to a trade off between incentive and selection issues and may lead to ports of entry on higher tiers of the hierarchy

convergence endogenous growth and productivity disturbances abstract kelly 1992 has recently shown that evidence on convergence cannot be taken as evidence against endogenous growth in general this study uses a well known class of stochastic growth models to show other difficulties with traditional empirical studies of convergence key parameters typically cannot be estimated consistently in cross section regressions when the parameters are assumed known implications for convergence are unavailable except under restrictive and economically unmotivated assumptions those same assumptions that relate key parameters to cross country convergence render cross section regressions impossible to estimate consistently

moral hazard and limited liability the real effects of contract bargaining abstract i examine the standard assumption in the moral hazard agency literature that the principal has all the bargaining power at the contract offer stage when the agent has limited liability as is often the case in practice the contract changes according to the distribution of bargaining power and consequently so does the agents effort implications of this result are examined

information management in incentive problems we extend the standard procurement model to examine how an agent is optimally induced to acquire valuable planning information before he choose an unobservable level of cost reducing effort concer

prospects for the eurozone for wim duisenberg the euro s perceived independence from the nation state was a path breaking achievement to be proud of and to cherish little more than a decade later and three years into the deepest economic crisis europe has known since the great depression duisenberg s elation rings strangely anachronistic since what the nationless euro seems to have achieved above all is to undermine whatever mutual confidence at the heart of our community there may have been at the start this special issue takes stock of the euro crisis so far it is concerned with the in depth analysis of its main causes policy proposals for a recovery from the crisis and reform strategies for the reconstruction of a more viable and egalitarian eurozone in the future this introduction provides an overview of both core features of the euro crisis and related debates as well as individual contributions to this special issue section 1 examines the origins of the euro crisis section 2 reviews key policy developments in the evolution of the crisis from its onset in may 2010 to the adoption of outright monetary transactions omts by the european central bank ecb in september 2012 and section 3 provides an overview of the contributions to the special issue

the limits of independence and the policy of the ecb it is argued that the european central bank s independence is not as secure as it seems and that as a result it has appreciable institutional incentives to protect and enhance its position it follows that its behaviour should not be understood as being solely determined by the pursuit of price stability one consequence is that certain points on which it has been criticised on the basis that its approach makes for ineffective monetary policy might be better understood as often effective attempts to protect its position another is that making a central bank or any other institution completely independent may be much harder than it seems and failed attempts which come close are not necessarily to be preferred even by the advocates of independence to less ambitious designs

the organization and scope of agents regulating multiproduct industries abstract a mechanism design problem with two dimensional uncertainty is solved to derive the optimal policy for regulating a monopolist with private information about the marginal cost of producing two different goods the paper establishes that informational economies of scope or incentive complementarities arise when one firm produces both goods the regulator should weigh these economies against the benefits of relative performance incentives when choosing between integrated and decentralized organizations unless the marginal costs of the two products are sufficiently positively correlated the optimal ex ante policy gives control of both markets to a single firm journal of economic literature classification number s d82 l22 l51

optimal sales force compensation in dynamic settings commissions vs bonuses this paper studies optimal sales force compensation plans in a multiperiod moral hazard model when the firm wants to implement high effort in every period but only obtains aggregate information on sales the sales agent chooses effort each period after observing previous sales and his incentive responsiveness might change over time the paper derives conditions under which a linear incentive scheme a pure commission dominates a bonus plan and vice versa a commission is optimal if the agent is most difficult to motivate in the last period otherwise combining the commission with a bonus plan can lower the firm s cost of providing incentives in earlier periods the results are robust to different types of cost externalities and demand externalities across periods however if the firm obtains intermediate sales information bonus plans dominate commissions this paper was accepted by j miguel villas boas marketing

revisiting emu s stability pact a pragmatic way forward the stability and growth pact is under fire some countries are meeting major problems in sticking to the rules proposals to reform the pact or ditch it altogether abound the alleged weaknesses of the pact tend to reflect trade offs typical of supra national arrangements this aspect has to be factored in when considering reforms of the current fiscal rules there is no miracle solution emu without rules would be an interesting experiment but a risky policy option given the existing degree of political integration in emu internal adjustment rather than attempting to redesign the rules from scratch appears a more suitable way forward redefining the medium term budgetary target improving transparency tackling the pro cyclical fiscal bias in good times moving towards non partisan application of the rules and improving transparency in the data can achieve both stronger discipline and higher flexibility copyright 2003 oxford university press

the aggregate effects of sectoral reallocations abstract can a one time permanent change in the fundamentals behind the sectoral composition of the economy prompt an aggregate downturn can this downturn be non negligible even if one uses us data to determine the relative size of gross vs net job flows and the importance of job creation costs can one consider the military build down of the 1990s as a plausible cause for the 1990 1991 recession do sectoral reallocations generate responses that are qualitatively similar to productivity shocks we use a variant of the mortensen pissarides 1994 review of economic studies 61 397 415 job creation destruction model calibrate it to us labor market data and run experiments that suggest one can answer yes to all these questions

forecasting errors by the troika in the economic adjustment programme for portugal this article presents an evaluation of the economic adjustment programme negotiated between the portuguese government and the troika european commission ecb and imf in may 2011 using an assessment that is different from the usual studies instead of a comparison between the actual results and the proposed targets an evaluation of the quality of the programme forecast is made showing that errors could have been avoided if the productive input output structure of the economy and also the unemployment rate external deficit trade off had been taken into account the main conclusion of this assessment is that a large underestimation of the unemployment rate was made amounting to about four percentage points which illustrates the technical flaw of this adjustment programme and the huge economic and social costs it unnecessarily caused the methodology used can easily be replicated for assessing other similar programmes such those applied in greece ireland and cyprus

externalities in economies with imperfect information and incomplete markets this paper presents a simple general framework for analyzing externalities in economies with incomplete markets and imperfect infonnation by identifying the pecuniary effects of these externalities that net out the paper simplifies the problem of determining when tax interventions are pareto improving the approach indicates that such tax interventions almost always exist and that equilibria in situations of imperfect information are rarely constrained pareto optima it can also lead to simple tests based on readily observable indicators of the efficacy of particular tax policies in situations involving adverse selection signaling moral hazard incomplete contingent claims markets and queue rationing equilibria traditional discussions of externalities have emphasized the distinction between technological externalities in which the action of one individual or firm directly affects the utility or profit ofanother and pecuniary externalities in which one individual s or firm s actions affect another only through effects on prices while the presence of technological externalities imply in general that a competitive equilibrium may not be pareto efficient pecuniary externalities hy themselves are not a source of inefficiency the fact that prices change has of course important consequences there are both distributional and allocational effects but the distribution effects net out gains for example hy firms whose prices increase are precisely offset by losses e g to individuals who must pay higher prices and there are no welfare losses from the allocation effects as long as the price changes involved are small if firms are maximizing profits and individuals are maximizing utility both facing prices that correctly refiect opportunity costs then standard envelope theorem arguments imply that changes in profits or utility induced by changes in allocations resulting from any small change in prices are negligible

strategic interactions of fiscal policies in europe a global var perspective abstract the paper analyses the strategic interactions of fiscal policies in the european union context by modelling the interdependencies arising between public and private sectors saving investment balances in a global vector autoregressive framework we use two empirical specifications to reflect some important differences in the sequencing of the policy decision making process in this setting we draw policy implications with respect to fiscal policy coordination and fiscal policy discretion we highlight the importance of several factors such as global capital flows uncertainty with respect to policy actions and nature of the shocks as key elements defining the dimension of the prevailing policy tradeoffs

job design with sequential tasks and outcome externalities revisited we revisit job design with sequential tasks and outcome externalities from a different perspective extending schmitz 2013a when two sequential tasks need to be performed by wealth constrained agents the principal can hire only one agent or two different agents when there exists an outcome externality in terms of the fixed cost and such an externality is not too large if the two tasks are conflicting resp synergistic then it is optimal for the principal to hire two different agents resp only one agent when there exists an outcome externality regarding the marginal cost the opposite result holds

sticker shocks using vat changes to estimate upper level elasticities of substitution we estimate the upper level elasticity of substitution between goods and services of a nested aggregate ces preference specification we show how this elasticity can be derived from the long run response of the relative price of a good to a change in its vat rate we estimate this elasticity using new data on changes in vat rates across 74 goods and services for 25 european union countries from 1996 through 2015 depending on the level of aggregation we find a vat pass through rate between 0 4 and 0 7 this implies an upper level elasticity of 3 at the lowest level of aggregation with 74 categories and 1 cobb douglas preferences at a high level of aggregation that distinguishes 10 categories of goods and services

can world real interest rates explain business cycles in a small open economy abstract while the world real interest rate is potentially an important mechanism for transmitting international shocks to small open economies much of the recent quantitative research that studies this mechanism concludes that it has little effect on output investment and net exports we re examine the importance of world real interest rate shocks using an approach that reverses the standard real business cycle methodology we begin with a small open economy business cycle model but rather than specifying the stochastic processes for the shocks and then solving and simulating the model to evaluate how well these shocks explain business cycles we use the model to back out the shocks that are consistent with the model s observable endogenous variables then we use variance decompositions to examine the importance of each shock we apply this methodology to canada and find that world real interest rate shocks can play an important role in explaining the cyclical variation in a small open economy in particular they can explain up to one third of the fluctuations in output and more than half of the fluctuations in net exports and net foreign assets

public versus private ownership quantity contracts and the allocation of investment tasks abstract the government wants a certain good or service to be provided should the required assets be publicly or privately owned or should a partnership be formed building on the incomplete contracting approach we argue that the initially specified quantity of an ex ante describable basic good can have important effects on investment incentives which has been neglected in the literature so far we also study how the tasks of investing in quality improvements and cost reductions should be assigned we show how the optimal contracts and governance structures depend on the exogenous parameters of the model such as the nature of the investments and the parties bargaining powers

spillovers from foreign direct investment within or between industries this paper contributes an estimation framework to measure both technological and linkage externalities from foreign direct investment fdi empirical research dealt mainly with intra industry spillovers from fdi with restrictive treatment of inter industry effects until recently however as optimal organization of the multinational corporation mnc involves minimization of profit losses due to leakage of technical information to competitors host country firms within the mnc s sector experience limited productivity gains ensuing fdi host country producers in other sectors may benefit for example mncs transfer knowledge to local downstream clients or outsource to local upstream suppliers hence fdi substitutes within sector domestic investment but complements it across sectors the net impact on aggregate capital formation by host country producers hinges on the interaction between linkages and spillovers estimations based on the colombian manufacturing census yield the sectoral pattern of fdi spillovers displaying knowledge propagation between but not within industries the findings reveal outsourcing relationships of mncs with local upstream suppliers as the channel of diffusion

information incentives and organizational mode we examine the choice of organizational mode for a two stage production process wherein cost realizations at each stage are observed only by the producing party when these costs are positively correlated the principal prefers to undertake second stage production herself when the correlation is negative and sufficiently small she will prefer that the agent who performs the first stage also perform the second for large negative correlation either mode might be preferred when costs are uncorrelated the principal is indifferent between modes

business cycles and labor market search the quantitative implications of labor market search for economic fluctuations are evaluated in the context of a real business cycle model incorporating labor market search into the model is found to improve its empirical performance along several dimensions in particular hours now fluctuate substantially more than wages and the contemporaneous correlation between hours and productivity falls in addition the model replicates the observation that output growth displays positive autocorrelation at short horizons overall the empirical results suggest that the labor market search environment embodies a quantitatively important propagation mechanism copyright 1996 by american economic association

regulating complementary products a comparative institutional analysis optimal regulation subject to informational constraints is analyzed for industries for which production requires complementary inputs an issue for regulatory policy is whether supply in these industries should be bundled or unbundled bundled supply calls for regulation of an integrated industry unbundled supply has each component regulated separately a main result is that unbundling introduces into regulation an additional component of information cost that is similar to double marginalization in the monopoly pricing of complementary products unbundling may be advantageous if it allows sufficient competition in nonmonopoly services but the information cost can exceed the benefits of competition

tests of equilibrium macroeconomics using contemporaneous monetary data abstract this paper uses contemporaneous monetary data to carry out econometric tests of the equilibrium approach to modelling the relation between monetary disturbances and macroeconomic fluctuations the theoretical analysis introduces into an equilibrium macroeconomic model the availability of preliminary data on current monetary aggregates and the process of accumulation of revised monetary data the econometric analysis tests two hypothesis derived from this extended model one hypothesis concerns the neutrality of perceived monetary policy the econometric results imply rejection of this hypothesis the other hypothesis concerns the non neutrality of errors in preliminary monetary data the econometric results fail to reject the contrary of this hypothesis these tests provide strong evidence against the reality of the equilibrium approach

minimum wages and excessive effort supply abstract it is well known that in static models minimum wages generate positive worker rents and consequently inefficiently low effort we show that this result does not necessarily extend to a dynamic context the reason is that in repeated employment relationships firms may exploit workers future rents to induce excessively high effort

productivity shocks and business cycles this note uses two measures of productivity growth the solow residual and the dual residual from the cost function to test competing theories of the cycle in a number of oecd countries the empirical results indicate that both demand and supply shocks play a role in driving economic cycles and therefore refute the stronger real business cycle hypothesis

the information content of weekly money supply announcements this paper analyzes the information content of weekly money supply announcements and the use of this information in the market determination of interest rates a short term rational expectations model of the financial market is constructed which incorporates the reaction of the federal reserve to deviations from target money supply and provides a context for analyzing the impact of announcements in the model the federal reserve attempts to maintain target growth rates in the money supply by compensating for past deviations from target announcements which contain an unanticipated movement in the money supply lead the public to expect that the federal reserve will change the rate of growth in the short run to compensate the revision of expectations about future short term money supply leads the public to revise their expectations about short term interest rates the implications of the model are empirically tested using data from a survey of expected changes in the money supply and u s treasury bill data the results support the implications of the model that is weekly money supply announcements do contain new information for the market determination of interest rates and it is only the unanticipated component of the announcement which is important

optimal sales force compensation we analyze a dynamic moral hazard model to derive optimal sales force compensation plans without imposing any ad hoc restrictions on the class of feasible incentive contracts we explain when the compensation plans that are most common in practice fixed salaries quota based bonuses commissions or a combination thereof are optimal fixed salaries are optimal for small revenue cost ratios quota based bonuses commissions should be used if the revenue cost ratio takes intermediate large values if firms face demand uncertainty markets are rather thin and the revenue cost ratio large firms should combine a commission with a quota based bonus if word of mouth advertising affects sales a dynamic commission that increases over time can be optimal when entering a new market or launching a new product firms should install long term bonus plans

financial innovation price smoothing and monetary policy financial innovation price smoothing and monetary policy i introduction in a monetary economy the volume of nominal transactions fluctuates with the level of economic activity empirical evidence suggests that the supply of nominal transaction assets such as currency and bank deposits also fluctuates with the level of economic activity some researchers have attributed these observations to the phenomenon of money endogeneity 1 one explanation for this endogenous supply response is a systematic monetary policy as described by black 1972 under which the central bank passively adjusts the money supply to accommodate the changes in money demand alternatively king and plosser 1984 and saving 1979 stress the role of the private banking system in producing this endogenous response they argue that exogenous changes in real activity elicit sympathetic changes in the demand for transaction services that may be partially or fully accommodated by the banking system through its supply of inside money in either case this endogenous supply response tends to mitigate the price adjustment that accompanies a real supply shock 2 in the long run however the price level is ultimately determined by the central bank in the market for the nominal quantity that it controls e g currency bank reserves when deposit accounts are subject to reserve requirements or the monetary base 3 this suggests that if the private banking system does not fully accommodate the real shock and if the shock exhibits a well defined persistence then endogenous price adjustments that are fully anticipated may be further damped by a passive supply response by the central bank in addition if price expectations affect real interest rates then current period price level smoothing via a passive monetary policy may also be possible 4 in addition to employing transaction assets currency and checkable bank deposit accounts to meet their transaction requirements agents may purchase non deposit transaction services directly for firms these services include the tools available to the modern corporate cash manager such as lockbox collection systems repurchase agreements and zero balance accounts in the household sector they take the form of atms debit and credit cards and overdraft privilages on checkable accounts among others these non deposit transaction services represent an increasingly important medium of exchange their supply by the banking system is not directly controlled by the central bank and also offers another avenue by which the economy may respond endogenously to fluctuating transaction requirements associated with real shocks thereby further mitigating the price adjustment 5 the production of non deposit transaction services is subject to technology shocks in the form of financial innovations these innovations alter the economy wide demand for currency and checkable bank deposit accounts and prices adjust as with the introduction of new technology into the production of goods financial innovations are not fully adopted immediately due to the fixed costs of adjusting individual cash management practices but are instead assimilated over time this implies that their effects on transaction asset demands persist if the rate of adoption has a forecastable component the central bank can smooth expected prices by passively accommodating these innovations as with aggregate productivity shocks this persistence may also enable the central bank to damp the disturbances to the current period price level that these innovations create through the impact of price expectations on real interest rates this paper examines a non deposit transaction services market in a model economy that is developed in section ii it has the following features transactors can meet their transaction requirements by allocating wealth to currency or to bank deposit accounts that pay a market determined interest rate or by purchasing non deposit transaction services directly at a market determined price

aggregate fluctuations and the industry structure of the us economy abstract in a two sector economy changes in intermediate input trade as reflected in cost share fluctuations are key to determining the amplification properties of investment specific and neutral shocks i document that the cost shares of intermediate inputs produced by the investment sector correlate positively with gdp whereas those of inputs produced by the consumption sector correlate negatively with gdp the two sector model of greenwood et al 1988 is extended to allow for trade of intermediate goods and to show that the documented correlations discipline heterogeneous elasticities of substitution in intermediate inputs across sectors shock amplification that is the effect of a sectorial shock on aggregate value added depends on the degree of heterogeneity in these elasticities of substitution for a calibrated economy to that of the united states i find that shock amplification is stronger than in a unitary elasticity economy it is also stronger than in an economy with a common non unitary elasticity that is either inferred from data via reduced form estimates or calibrated to match the same targets as our benchmark economy

how to design infrastructure contracts in a warming world a critical appraisal of public private partnerships we analyze how long term uncertainty for example regarding future climate conditions affects the design of concession contracts and organizational forms in a principal agent context with dynamic moral hazard limited liability and irreversibility constraints the prospect of future uncertain productivity shocks on the returns on the firm s effort creates an option value of delaying efforts a course that exacerbates agency costs contracts and organizational forms are drafted to control this cost of delegated flexibility the possibility for the agent to delay investment in response to uncertainty and irreversibility also elicits preference for unbundling different stages of the project through short term contracts our analysis is relevant to infrastructure sectors that are sensitive to changing weather conditions and sheds a pessimistic light on the relevance of public private partnerships in this context

disaggregate stochastic trends in industrial production abstract several industries appear cointegrated at a highly disaggregated level but the cointegration is not sufficient to reduce the system to a single common trend instead the results indicate that ten common trends are present in the industrial production aggregate

job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered a principal wants two sequential tasks to be performed by wealth constrained agents suppose that there is an outcome externality i e a first stage success can make second stage effort more or less effective if the tasks are conflicting the principal s profit maximizing way to induce high efforts is to hire one agent to perform both tasks so that the prospect to get a larger second stage rent after a first stage success motivates the agent to work hard in the first stage in contrast when there is an effort externality i e first stage effort reduces or increases the probability of a second stage success then the principal prefers to hire two agents whenever the tasks are conflicting

technical progress and aggregate fluctuations abstract we compare the cyclical fluctuations exhibited by a stochastic growth model under various stochastic processes governing technical change all of which are highly autocorrelated the results obtained are quite sensitive to the precise form of this stochastic process in particular the results depend on whether growth is deterministic or stochastic and in each case are quite sensitive to the persistence of an innovation the model does a relatively poor job of accounting for features of observed business cycles when technical change is difference stationary and does a better job when technical change is trend stationary but highly autocorrelated

real business cycles in this paper we demonstrate how certain very ordinary economic principles lead maximizing individuals to choose consumption production plans that display many of the characteristics commonly associated with business cycles our explanation is entirely consistent with i rational expectations ii complete current information iii stable preferences iv no technological change v no long lived commodities vi no frictions or adjustment costs vii no government viii no money and ix no serial dependence in the stochastic elements of the environment we also provide a completely worked out example of the type of artificial economy we have in mind the time series properties of the example exhibit some major features of observed business cycles although this type of model may not be capable of explaining all of the regularities in actual business cycles we believe that it provides a useful well defined benchmark for assessing the relative importance of factors e g monetary disturbances

ex post unbalanced tournaments tournaments create strong incentives under the assumption that the competition between the agents is balanced if at the outset one agent is stronger than the other the tournament is ex ante unbalanced and incentives break down handicaps can in this case restore incentives in practice competing agents are often overall equally strong but have different sorts of strengths then competition will typically be unbalanced ex post and incentives break down but handicaps cannot be used we show how a simple means introducing the possibility of a tie can often resolve the problem we examine under what conditions incentives are maximized by ties