the rotten kid theorem meets the samaritan s dilemma a familiar result in the economic theory of the family is becker s rotten kid theorem this theorem states that altruism by a family member will lead other selfish members to act efficiently from the family viewpoint we extend becker s one period model to two periods and show that parental altruism can result in an inefficiency known in other contexts as the samaritan s dilemma implications of this for transfer arrangements within the family and for the ricardian equivalence theorem are drawn

war and natural resource exploitation abstract we build a theoretical framework that allows for endogenous conflict behaviour i e fighting efforts and for endogenous natural resource exploitation i e speed ownership and investments while depletion is spread in a balanced hotelling fashion during peace the presence of conflict creates incentives for rapacious extraction as this lowers the stakes of future contest this voracious extraction depresses total oil revenue especially if world oil demand is relatively elastic and the government s weapon advantage is weak some of these political distortions can be overcome by bribing rebels or by government investment in weapons the shadow of conflict can also make less efficient nationalized oil extraction more attractive than private extraction as insecure property rights create a holdup problem for the private firm and lead to a lower license fee furthermore the government fights less intensely than the rebels under private exploitation which leads to more government turnover without credible commitment to future fighting efforts private oil depletion is only lucrative if the government s non oil office rents are large and weaponry powerful which guarantees the government a stronger grip on office and makes the holdup problem less severe

strategic behavior in contests comment almost by definition contests involve strategy this is especially true in contests between unevenly matched contenders in a recent article avinash dixit 1987 explored strategic commitment in contests between a favorite and an underdog the favorite is defined as the player whose chance of victory exceeds one half at the nash equilibrium an underdog s chance is less than one half dixit concludes that if the favorite has the opportunity to move first then he will overcommit effort compared with the nash equilibrium an important implication of the favorite overcommitting effort is that strategic behavior leads to greater social costs see gordon tullock 1980 the opposite holds if the underdog has the opportunity to move first this paper demonstrates that the favorite will never overcommit effort given endogenous order of moves the favorite finds it advantageous to wait until the underdog moves surprisingly the underdog s best strategy is not to wait but to make the first move throwing the first punch the equilibrium order of play is for the underdog to move before the favorite in this equilibrium one never observes overcommitment of effort consequently extending dixit s model to allow for endogenous order of moves suggests that strategic behavior in contests will lead to undercommitment compared with nash behavior

inequality and the dynamics of public opinion the self reinforcing link between economic inequality and mass preferences this article assesses the influence of income inequality on the public s policy mood recent work has produced divergent perspectives on the relationship between inequality public opinion and government redistribution one group of scholars suggests that unequal representation of different income groups reproduces inequality as politicians respond to the preferences of the rich another group of scholars pays relatively little attention to distributional outcomes but shows that government is generally just as responsive to the poor as to the rich utilizing theoretical insights from comparative political economy and time series data from 1952 to 2006 supplemented with cross sectional analysis where appropriate we show that economic inequality is in fact self reinforcing but that this is fully consistent with the idea that government tends to respond equally to rich and poor in its policy enactments

resource abundance and internal armed conflict types of natural resources and the incidence of new wars abstract recent armed domestic conflicts have been described as being related to natural resource abundance and as being characterized by new features not present in earlier internal conflicts multiplicity of actors devastation of production structures the paper develops and tests a framework that captures both the role of natural resource abundance and the stylized facts from the descriptive literature in a simple two sector model in which violent appropriation of natural resources imposes a negative externality on the production sector the model predicts that the probability of armed conflict varies directly with the size and value of lootable resource endowments and inversely with variables that increase labor productivity in contrast to mineral resources abundance of agricultural resources reduces conflict probability by raising labor productivity these predictions are supported by cross country ordered probit estimations in quantitative terms the negative effect of agricultural resources on conflict probability is almost twice as large as the positive effect of mineral resources

strategic behavior in contests reply in my 1987 paper i modeled contests where the probability of each player winning a prize depends on all players efforts and examined the first order benefits to one player of making a commitment to a strategy slightly different from his nash equilibrium strategy in the special case of a two player symmetric contest i found that this first order effect was zero michael r baye and onsong shin 1999 have taken the useful further step of finding the second order conditions which ensure that the local stationary point is a local maximum they also find an example where such a commitment has a third order benefit whether this is of any substantive economic interest remains to be seen i used the phrase no local effect to mean zero first order effect which was clearly a sloppy use of language but some such restriction on the use of local is essential if the phrase x has no local effect on f x at x 5 a were to mean that all derivatives f a are zero then a taylor series expansion would show that f x 5 f a for all x and no local effect would be the same as no global effect most importantly symmetric contests were only a very special case of my model the focus was on the much more interesting and more general situation of asymmetry among the players where one player s commitment to a strategy different from his nash equilibrium strategy does bring him a first order benefit the favorite benefits by committing to excessive effort and the underdog from committing to too little others for example kyung h baik and jason f shogren 1992 have extended the analysis to endogenize the order of moves and found that it can be in the interests of both contestants to let the underdog make the commitment in my view these are the more interesting economic issues to do with contests than are third order effects in the symmetric case

endogenous timing in games of commercial policy this paper analyzes various equilibria associated with intervention in trade in the context of noncooperative policy games with endogenous timing it is shown that while the subgame perfect equilibria in quota games always involve sequential play that is not necessarily the case in tariff games one implication of the analysis is that in contrast to existing theory trade is not eliminated in quota games another implication is that quotas are not necessarily inferior to tariffs the paper also examines the ways policy leaders and followers differ in their preferences over instruments and allows the choice over instruments to be determined endogenously this paper analyses various equilibria associated with intervention in trade in the context on non cooperative policy games with endogenous timing it is shown that while the subgame perfect equilibria in quota games always involve sequential play that is not necessarily the case in tariff games one implication of the analysis is that in contrast to existing theory trade is not eliminated in quota games another implication is that quotas are not necessarily inferior to tariffs the paper also examines the ways policy leaders and followers differ in their preferences over instruments and allows the choice over instruments to be determined endogenously

shipwrecks and treasure hunters we examine dynamic search as a game in which two rivals explore an island for a hidden prize of known value in every period until its discovery the players decide how much of the unsearched area to comb if a player finds the prize alone he wins it and the game ends players have a per period discount factor and costs proportional to the area they search first as a benchmark for efficiency we solve the one player search problem second in the two player setting we show that typically there is inefficient over search a result akin to the tragedy of the commons however for players with intermediate levels of patience there is the possibility of inefficient under search as players incorporate the expected future payoffs in their current search decisions finally with patient players several counterintuitive results can arise for example players might be better off searching a larger island or looking for a less valuable prize

growth deforestation and the efficiency of the redd mechanism this paper assesses the long term impacts of an international transfer called the reduced emissions from deforestation and degradation redd mechanism which aims at preserving tropical forests of the recipient economy this two sector economy faces a dilemma between economic growth and deforestation the rural sector can substitute reproducible capital for agricultural land whereas the manufacturing sector only requires capital the model shows that the redd mechanism has a non monotonic effect on steady state welfares for low transfer schemes the agricultural output increases with the transfer even though less land is under cultivation for high transfer schemes the increase in the transfer may not offset the decrease in the agricultural output the open loop symmetric nash equilibrium in a dynamic deforestation game predicts that redistributing the transfer among a finite number of producers is less efficient in reducing deforestation than in the social optimum

contests with multiple rounds this paper studies contests where players have the flexibility to add to their previous efforts after observing their rivals most recent effort in an intermediate stage it is found that 1 contrary to previous findings the stackelberg outcome where the underdog leads and the favorite follows cannot be an equilibrium 2 there are multiple subgame perfect equilibria all occurring on the underdog s usual one shot reaction function in between and including the one shot cournot nash and stackelberg outcome with the favorite leading 3 the total equilibrium effort is typically greater than or equal to what a one shot cournot nash play would predict and 4 in settings where players can choose whether or not to disclose their early actions to the rival both the favorite and the underdog disclose in equilibrium applications in sports lobbying and r d races are discussed

leaving home as a self selection device we develop a model of intergeneratioal coresidence and transfers within the family in a setting of asymmetric information following an exchange motive altruistic parents receive services from their children who may make them financial gifts in return however parents do not know the privacyc ost to children of home sharing hence they make additional transfers in order to discipline their children and give them incentives to reveal their true privacy cost we show that only children who stay at the parental home receive an informational rent and that this rent is greaterf or recipients with a low privacy cost

the strategic equivalence of rent seeking innovation and patent race games abstract we establish the strategic equivalence of a variety of rent seeking contests innovation tournaments and patent race games the results allow us to disentangle negative and positive externalities and to apply theorems and results intended for rent seeking games to other games and vice versa we conclude with several examples that highlight the practical utility of our results

a general model of rent seeking for public goods this paper generalizes the model of collective rent seeking over a public good expanding the rent seeker s consumption bundle to include preferences over the public good and a private good our results suggest collective rent seeking is positively related to group size although free riding exists within a group there is not a one for one tradeoff in addition rent seeking increases with wealth finally total effort expended by both groups increases if either group increases in membership size except in the case of an extremely lopsided contest the key condition underlying these results is that the marginal utility of the public good is not inversely related to the private good

on the endogeneity of cournot nash and stackelberg equilibria games of accumulation abstract we characterize equilibria of games with two properties i agents have the opportunity to adjust their strategic variable after their initial choices and before payoffs occur but ii they can only add to their initial amounts the equilibrium set consists of just the cournot nash outcome one or both stackelberg outcomes or a continuum of points including the cournot nash outcome and one or both stackelberg outcomes a simple theorem that uses agents standard one period reaction functions and the one period cournot nash and stackelberg equilibria delineates the equilibrium set applications include contribution oligopoly and rent seeking games

on the origins of property rights conflict and production in the state of nature i analyse the emergence of property rights in a model of conflict and production in the absence of institutions of enforcement the population of agents evolves dynamically through conflicts for possession of factor goods among pairs of randomly matched agents conflicts are incomplete information wars of attrition with an agent s type consisting of his or her independently drawn valuation of the prize and cost of competing for it i prove equilibrium existence and show that in the steady state of the game the population sorts into two stable groups resource haves and have nots in accordance with a known function of their primitive types

distributional preferences in probabilistic and share contests we analyze nash equilibria of probabilistic and share contests where players have distributional preferences if players are sufficiently similar distributional preferences create multiple equilibria for the case of only mildly heterogeneous players equilibrium effort can be lower as well as higher than effort exerted by players with selfish preferences these findings can explain the following three anomalies observed in empirical tests of probabilistic and share contests the large variance of effort levels overspreading individual spending that exceeds the nash equilibrium prediction overspending and aggregate spending that exceeds the value of the prize overdissipation if players are sufficiently heterogeneous the game has a unique equilibrium that is more egalitarian than the selfish nash equilibrium it turns out that the less talented competitor may win the larger share of the prize if his inequality aversion is sufficiently strong we analyze how the equilibria evolve if the number of players becomes larger and how sequential moves influence behavior two new insights follow from the analysis of the sequential move game first sequential moves act as a coordination device in case of multiple simultaneous equilibria and second inequality aversion of the more egalitarian player can be used as a commitment device for low effort this effect can reverse the conventional wisdom that the underdog should lead

endogenous timing in contests with delegation i introduction contests with delegation where each player hires a delegate to expend effort or resources on the player s behalf to win a prize are common 1 an example is litigation between a plaintiff and a defendant in which each litigant hires an attorney who expends his effort to win the lawsuit on behalf of his client another example is a rent seeking contest in which each firm hires a lobbyist who expends his effort to acquire a monopoly or a procurement contract from the government on behalf of his client yet another example is a patent contest in which each firm hires a group of independent researchers or university professors who conduct research to obtain a patent on behalf of their employer delegation is attractive to players because they each can use superior ability by hiring a delegate with more ability than herself and achieve strategic commitments through delegation in such contests with delegation we believe delegates decide endogenously when to expend their effort after signing delegation contracts indeed pursuing their self interest the delegates may well endogenize the order of their moves and communicate it with each other before they expend their effort we believe also that players take it into account when designing their contracts for the delegates that the delegates will endogenize the order of their moves it is these ideas that motivate this paper accordingly the purpose of this paper is to systematically study contests with delegation in which delegates decide endogenously when to expend their effort after signing delegation contracts and before they expend their effort we study two player contests with delegation focusing on not only the equilibrium delegation contracts between players and their delegates but also the equilibrium orders of the delegates moves specifically we set up and analyze the following three stage game in the first stage two players each hire a delegate and they simultaneously announce their contracts written with their delegates each player s contract specifies how much her delegate will be paid if he wins the contest and how much if he loses it in the second stage each delegate decides when to expend his effort and the delegates announce their decisions simultaneously in the third stage the delegates expend their effort according to their decisions in the second stage to win the prize on behalf of their employers we show that in equilibrium the delegate hired by the higher valuation player chooses his effort level after observing his counterpart s and his expected payoff is greater than that of his counterpart this advantage of the delegate of the higher valuation player can be explained by the fact that his employer the higher valuation player offers better contingent compensation as it will be defined in section ii to him than the lower valuation player does to her delegate we compare the outcomes of the endogenous timing framework the three stage game presented above with those of the simultaneous move framework the game which is the same as the three stage game with the exception that the delegates choose their effort levels simultaneously and this order of their moves is given exogenously an interesting result is that each player offers her delegate a better contract in the endogenous timing framework than in the simultaneous move framework another interesting result is that unless the valuation for the prize of the higher valuation player is significantly greater than that of the lower valuation player then each delegate s expected payoff is greater in the endogenous timing framework than in the simultaneous move framework whereas each player s expected payoff is less in the endogenous timing framework than in the simultaneous move framework in summary pursuing their self interest the delegates decide endogenously when to expend their effort given contracts between the players and the delegates

war labor tournaments and contest payoffs abstract when prizes change with effort contestants adjust effort to mitigate that change net payoffs remain unchanged respectively can be larger if prizes are linear concave in effort contest designers can facilitate desired outcomes by making the prize concave in effort

insecure property and technological backwardness we consider the incentive to adopt superior technologies when private property is insecure the welfare costs of insecure property can be substantially greater than those commonly associated with diversion and with the disincentive effect induced by imperfect appropriation of returns when private property is sufficiently insecure anticipation of conflict over economic distribution gives rise to technological backwardness even though 1 superior technologies are readily available at zero cost and 2 the ex post diversion of resources might be small

delaying inter vivos transmissions under asymmetric information this paper develops a model of bequeathing based on a moral hazard type of argument this model explains why altruistic patents prefer late bequests to early inter vivos gifts it also analyzes whether or not they ought to leave rather equal bequests to their children even when the children end up with quite different incomes

risk attitudes and heterogeneity in simultaneous and sequential contests we prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in rent seeking contests in which players are heterogeneous in both risk preferences and production technology given identical linear production technology if the number of risk loving players is large enough the aggregate investment in equilibrium will exceed the rent and all risk neutral and risk averse players will exit the contest in simultaneous and sequential contests with two players we can identify the favorite and underdog based on both players preference parameters our theoretical results suggest that subjects in some recent contest experiments behaved as if they were risk loving

government transfers and the samaritan s dilemma in the family this paper examines the effectiveness of government transfersin overcoming the samaritan s dilemma in a family in which thechild saves an insufficient amount in order to induce largerbequests from the parent the results are as follows first exogenous government transfers do not affect intergenerationalconsumption allocation if bequests are operative second assuming that government transfers are chosen strategically the government precommits to such a level of transfers fromthe parent to the child that bequests become inoperative andthus rids the child of the incentive for undersaving thisengenders an efficient intertemporal allocation ofconsumption

a two stage model of research and development with endogenous second mover advantages this paper describes a simple two stage model of research and development in which the winner of the research stage has the option of moving first in the development stage some unexpected results emerge in equilibrium the leader in the development stage invests less than each follower and is consequently least likely to collect the patent moreover the leader receives a lower expected payoff than each of the followers thus there are endogenous second mover advantages using a game of timing in which the identity of the stackelberg leader is determined to link the two stages i find that firms face quite different incentives in the research stage although the leader invests less than each follower in the research stage as well the leader enjoys higher expected revenue from the complete two stage game than does each follower the equilibrium is inefficient because there is a lag between the time at which research is completed and the time at which development is begun and because aggregate investment is inefficiently asymmetrically distributed across firms

contests with multi tasking the standard contest model in which participants compete in a single dimension is well understood and documented multi dimension extensions are possible but are liable to increase the complexity of the contest structure mitigating one of its main advantages simplicity in this paper we propose an extension in which competition ensues in several dimensions and a competitor that wins a certain number of these is awarded a prize the amount of information needed to run the contest is hence limited to the number of dimensions won by each player we look at the design of this contest from the point of view of maximising effort in the contest per dimension and totally and show that there will be a tendency to run small contests with few dimensions the standard tullock model and its results are encompassed by our framework

do private income transfers increase labor market risk abstract in a two stage model of private income transfers with a labor market we find that the aggregate effect of such transfers induces labor market responses to the increase in moral hazard thereby increasing the volatility of wages and lowering welfare the equilibrium level of transfers exceeds the socially optimum level

income inequality in the united states 1913 1998 this paper presents new homogeneous series on top shares of income and wages from 1913 to 1998 in the united states using individual tax returns data top income and wages shares display a u shaped pattern over the century our series suggest that the large shocks that capital owners experienced during the great depression and world war ii have had a permanent effect on top capital incomes we argue that steep progressive income and estate taxation may have prevented large fortunes from fully recovering from these shocks top wage shares were flat before world war ii dropped precipitously during the war and did not start to recover before the late 1960s but are now higher than before world war ii as a result the working rich have replaced the rentiers at the top of the income distribution

anarchy and its breakdown anarchy defined as a system in which participants can seize and defend resources without regulation from above is not chaos but rather a spontaneous order however anarchy is fragile and may dissolve either into formless amorphy or into a more organized system such as hierarchy under anarchy each contestant balances between productive exploitation of the current resource base and fighting to acquire or defend resources anarchy is sustainable only when there are strongly diminishing returns to fighting effort the decisiveness parameter is sufficiently low and incomes exceed the viability minimum these considerations explain many features of animal and human conflict

private income transfers and market incentives the paper introduces labour supply considerations and labour earnings uncertainty into a parent child framework in the presence of merit goods i investigate the implications of various parental bequest rules on the effort decisions of the offspring where the parent cannot perfectly observe her child s market activities the asymmetry in information and preferences gives rise to a moral hazard problem and as a result the parent may not fully insure her child because the source of risk is not entirely exogenous in this case optimal parental transfers are shown to be state contingent moreover the child s effort is higher in the case with a merit good and parental transfers than in the case without a merit good goods are not only economic commodities but vehicles and instruments for realities of another order influence power sympathy status emotion and the skillful game of exchange consists of a complex totality of maneuvers conscious or unconscious in order to gain security and to fortify one s self against risks incurred through alliances and rivalry levi strauss the principle of reciprocity

land tenure and property rights theory and implications for development policy this article explores the nature of property rights systems their evolution and their effect on resource allocation it is argued that certain institutional arrangements for land rights have evolved in order to reduce uncertainty and increase efficiency in credit as well as in land markets of particular relevance to developing countries the article emphasizes the contribution of public sector infrastructure to effective land rights systems an appendix to the article presents a formal model analyzing the effects of security of land rights on land prices the intensity of cultivation and the use of credit empirical evidence from thailand supports several of the propositions derived from the model

samaritan versus rotten kid another look abstract we set up a two stage game with sequential moves by one altruist and n selfish agents the samaritan s dilemma rotten kid theorem states that the altruist can only reach her first best when the selfish agents move after before the altruist we find that in general the altruist can reach her first best when she moves first if and only if a selfish agent s action marginally affects only his own payoff the altruist can reach her first best when she moves last if and only if a selfish agent cannot manipulate the price of his own payoff

taking time seriously dramatic world change has stimulated interest in research questions about the dynamics of politics we have seen increases in the number of time series data sets and the length of typical time series but three shortcomings are prevalent in published time series analysis first analysts often estimate models without testing restrictions implied by their specification second researchers link the theoretical concept of equilibrium with cointegration and error correction models third analysts often do a poor job of interpreting results the consequences include weak connections between theory and tests biased estimates and incorrect inferences we outline techniques for estimating linear dynamic regressions with stationary data and weakly exogenous regressors we recommend analysts 1 start with general dynamic models and test restrictions before adopting a particular specification and 2 use the wide array of information available from dynamic specifications we illustrate this strategy with data on congressional approval and tax rates across oecd countries

strategic investment with asymmetric spillovers this paper investigates the implications of asymmetric spillovers on noncooperative strategic investments in a duopoly with quadratic pay offs a unique equilibrium in the announcement of the leader follower role exists in the case where one firm absorbs large spillovers while the other at most is able to receive only small spillovers the leader in this equilibrium is the firm that absorbs the large spillovers other asymmetries in initial costs or efficiency in research and development do not affect this outcome

orchestrating rent seeking contests contests have different sometimes quite complex organisational structures in particular while most of the existing literature focusses on simultaneous contests multistage contests are also quite frequently encountered this paper seeks to provide a rationale for the latter by endogenising the choice of a contest structure which is made by an organiser of a contest interested in maximising the efforts expended by the contenders

conflicts over property rights and natural resource exploitation at the frontier abstract competition for land at the frontier is analyzed by considering a game between a first settler and a contestant although the first settler is the legitimate owner of a plot of land his remoteness from the government s administrative center makes it difficult to prove it this creates incentives for a contestant to dispute his claims both contenders will expend resources in order to secure ownership due to transport costs the more remote a plot of land is the lower its output value this tends to discourage appropriative activities land degradation is sometimes used as a substitute to appropriative activities a lower discount rate may encourage land degradation

asymmetry and corrective public policy in contests the proposal of an inefficient policyusually stimulates a political strugglebetween the affected interest groups theresulting wasteful lobbying activities mayreduce welfare even if the proposed policyis not approved in this paper weshow that sufficient asymmetry in payoffsnot only tends to reduce lobbying effortsin standard rent seeking contests as iswell known but it is in fact a necessarycondition for the implementation of asuccessful effective correctivetax transfer policy that complements theproposal of the inefficient policy such apolicy induces an efficient equilibriumoutcome which is in addition optimal fromthe viewpoint of the players that take partin the public policy game

social capital and the dynamics of trust in government it is well understood that trust in government responds to the performance of the president congress and the economy despite improved government performance however trust has never returned to the levels witnessed in the 1950s and 1960s social capital may be the force that has kept trust low if so we need to assess the relative contributions of both government performance and social capital at the macro level using macrolevel data the analysis here is designed to capture the variation over time in both social capital and government performance and let them compete to explain the macro variation in trust the empirical results demonstrate that both government performance and social capital matter but that social capital appears to be the force which accounts for the decline in trust over the last 40 years

economies of scope and scale in green advocacy environmental advocacy is a large and growing activity whilst a number of economists have analysed the advocacy process no systematic attempt has been made to understand the factors influencing the organisation of the sector we explore the relationship between economies of scale and scope in advocacy under the most popular specification of a tullock type contest economies of scope arise when and only when the scale of that activity is sufficiently large the incentives for merger are socially efficient implying no need for policy intervention

to fight or not to fight an analysis of submission struggle and the design of contests this paper considers the players behaviour in an asymmetric two player contest when do they decide to struggle and when to subjugate analysing contest success functions it is found that two crucial prerequisites for struggle or war have to be met thus such an equilibrium is possible but restrictive if a self interested rule setter chooses the contest success function endogenously we show that one player will always subjugate applications to rent seeking and environmental regulation are discussed

contests a comparison of timing and information structures we study a model of imperfectly discriminating contests with two ex ante symmetric agents we consider four institutional settings contestants move either sequentially or simultaneously and in addition their types are either public or private information we find that an effort maximizing designer of the contest prefers the sequential to the simultaneous setting from an ex ante perspective moreover the sequential contest pareto dominates the simultaneous one when the contestants types are sufficiently negatively correlated regarding the information structure the designer ex ante prefers private information while the contestants prefer public information

endogenous timing in the presence of non monotonicities the aim of this paper is to generalize the endogenous timing game proposed by hamilton and slutsky games and economic behavior 1990 2 pp 29 46 by allowing the payoff or the marginal payoff of a player to become non monotonic with respect to the strategy of the opponent we propose a taxonomy of the subgame perfect nash equilibria based on the characteristics of the payoff functions proposed by eaton canadian journal of economics 2004 37 pp 805 29 we determine under which conditions of the initial payoff functions commitment has a social value and when the simultaneous move nash equilibrium is commitment robust and discuss its pareto efficiency

contest efforts in light of behavioural considerations this study shows that distortion of probabilities is a possible reason for rent under dissipation incontests with relatively small number of participants such distortion may also result however inover dissipation of the contested rent focusing on contests with homogeneous contestants and thecommonly studied contest success function our main results clarify under what circumstances i rents are more under dissipated relative to the standard situation where probabilities are notdistorted ii rents are under dissipated yet less intensely relative to the standard situation whereprobabilities are not distorted iii rents are over dissipated and iv the contest does not possess asymmetric interior equilibrium in pure strategies

swords or plowshares a theory of the security of claims to property this paper develops a general equilibrium model of the allocation of resources among appropriative and productive activities the model emphasizes the distinction between offensive weapons which are the instruments of predation and fortifications which provide defense against predation the analysis of this model shows how the equilibrium security of claims to property is determined the analysis focuses on the possibility of a nonaggressive equilibrium in which no resources are allocated to offensive weapons and claims to property are fully secure we also analyze the complex relation between economic welfare and the security of claims to property we find for example that a relatively poor agent could be better off in an equilibrium with less secure claims to property

do rent seeking groups announce their sharing rules i introduction rent seeking can be seen all around us firms or coalitions of firms expend resources to influence government officials who have authority to award monopoly rights self interested pressure groups lobby for government subsidies foreign producers exert effort to avoid imposing tariffs or quotas on their products interest groups or lobbyists contribute to the election of politicians who promise to advance favorable legislation research and development rd then the groups announce their decisions simultaneously before choosing their sharing rules we examine the groups decisions on releasing sharing rule information their sharing rules and the effort levels and payoffs of the individual players in equilibrium we formally consider the following three stage game in the first stage each group decides and announces whether it will release to the rival group the information about its sharing rule which will be determined in the second stage in the second stage the players in each group jointly choose their sharing rule and then each group releases the information about its sharing rule if it decided to do so in the first stage in the third stage all the players in both groups choose their effort levels simultaneously and independently at the end of this third stage the winning player is chosen and the winner shares the prize with the other players in his group according to the sharing rule on which they agreed in the second stage solving the game we find the following first the case where both groups release their sharing rule information never occurs in equilibrium second the case where neither group releases its sharing rule information occurs only if the players are evenly matched third when the players are unevenly matched one group releases its sharing rule information and the other does not

king lear s dilemma precommitment versus the last word abstract we relax the prevalent assumption in the literature on intergenerational transfers that an altruistic parent can perfectly observe her child s activities and market opportunities we find that when private information and market risks are present precommitment by the parent to a transfer dominates having the last word

the economics of tropical deforestation this paper provides a survey of first wave economic studies of tropical deforestation and land use these studies of tropical forest land conversion are generally at the cross country level we also conduct a synthesis cross country analysis of tropical agricultural land expansion the results show that agricultural development is the main factor determining land expansion but institutional factors have an important influence income effects tend to vary from region to region and do not always display an environmental kuznets curve relationship copyright 2001 by blackwell publishers ltd

inefficiency as a strategic device in group contests against dominant opponents i introduction many strategic situations in economics and politics can be understood as contests rd nitzan and ueda 2009 a private good nitzan 1991a 1991b nitzan and ueda 2009 or a mixed good esteban and ray 2001 nitzan and ueda 2011 to a large extent the intensity of free riding or conversely the motivation for individuals to exert effort in a contest is shaped by the intra group incentive scheme or governance structure in standard contests incentives are inseparably linked to the sharing rule i e to the usually exogenous procedure by which the rents acquired in the contest are distributed within the group 1 in a number of economic applications however incentives to exert effort appear to be separate or are even willfully separated from the sharing rule phenomena such as team spirit akerlof and kranton 2005 identification with the group sherif 1966 bornstein and ben yossef 1994 peer pressure kandel and lazear 1992 or social norms to contribute to the social good elster 1989 are examples for this separation alternatively groups could apply selective incentive schemes based on relative performance lazear and rosen 1981 or marginally align individual and group incentives nitzan and ueda 2009 in all these scenarios individuals behave cooperatively i e in the interest of the entire group even if the final distribution of rents follows a standard sharing rule mechanisms to induce cooperation often are costly sanchez pages and straub 2010 may only work under restrictive conditions che and gale 2003 require strategic coordination among individuals hardin 1995 or cannot be ensured to be obeyed unanimously oliver 1980 this might explain why they do not emerge universally or automatically the point we make in this article is even stronger even if there existed perfect and costless solutions to within group free riding problems which will henceforth be called intra group efficient incentive schemes igeis they might not always be adopted why would a group for which an igeis is freely available not wish to utilize it but rather adopt an apparently inefficient governance structure by definition an igeis internalizes all within group externalities and seems to be a safe way to increase one s payoffs however this reasoning ignores repercussions that arise in strategic environments like contests suppose for example that the competing groups have sufficiently unequal strengths say due to unequal sizes or different comparative advantages then the weaker group may refrain from implementing a costless igeis to avoid the contest from heating up adoption of an igeis makes a group more efficient and consequently more aggressive in the contest on one hand higher efforts constitute a cost on the other they affect the share of the rent that this group can hope to acquire or the likelihood of succeeding in the contest 2 an igeis clearly enhances a group s prospects if the other group did not change its behavior however if members of the opponent group reply with a sufficiently strong increase in their contest efforts this diminishes and may potentially more than offset the gains from one s own increased efforts whether this happens depends on the direction of the strategic interaction between groups the detrimental firing back effect can only become relevant if the other group s efforts are sufficiently strong strategic complements to one s own efforts

to deter or to moderate alliance formation in contests with incomplete information we consider two players choice about the formation of an alliance ahead of conflict in a framework with incomplete information about the strength of the potential ally when deciding on alliance formation players anticipate the self selection of other players and the informational value of own and other players choices in the absence of these signaling effects strong players have an incentive to stand alone which leads to a separating equilibrium this separating equilibrium can be destabilized by deception incentives if beliefs are updated on the basis of endogenous alliance formation choices weak players may find it attractive to appear strong in order to deter competitors from positive effort choices strong players may find it attractive to appear weak in order to give their competitors a false sense of security and then beat them with little effort moreover appearing weak allows players to free ride when alliances are formed jel d72 d74

endogenous timing in general rent seeking and conflict models we examine simultaneous versus sequential choice of effort in a two player contest the timing of moves determined in a preplay stage prior to the contest subgame as well as the value of the prize is allowed to be endogenous contrary to endogenous timing models with an exogenously fixed prize the present paper finds the following 1 players may decide to choose their effort simultaneously in the subgame perfect equilibrium spe of the extended game 2 the spe does not need to be unique in particular there is no unique spe with sequential moves if the direct costs of effort are zero 3 symmetry among players does not rule out incentives for precommitment to effort locally away from the cournot nash level 4 finally there may be no correlation between win probability and strategic incentives in our framework a finding most central in the analysis of fixed prize contests

strategic behavior in contests comment in an influential paper avinash dixit 1987 considers a class of symmetric two player contests in which each player s effort xi influences the probability of winning a prize valued at k 0 letting p x1 x2 denote the probability 1 that player 1 wins the expected payoffs of the two players are p1 5 p x1 x2 k 2 x1 and p2 5 1 2 p x1 x2 k 2 x2 dixit s main result is that if there is perfect symmetry between the players and each player s effort has a positive but diminishing marginal effect on his or her probability of winning i e