intertemporal borrowing to sustain exogenous consumption standards under uncertainty abstract consider an agent who is attempting to maintain a given consumption level over time in the face of a stochastic technology he is permitted to borrow and lend at given rates of interest the main results are i if the borrowing rate of interest exceeds the lending rate the expected net indebtedness of the agent must grow unboundedly large unless the consumption target is attainable with at most one loan and ii the probabilities of the two events becoming increasingly indebted and accumulating unbounded wealth sum to unity

information transmission cournot and bertrand equilibria we examine how incentives for two duopolists to honestly share information change depending upon the nature of competition cournot or bertrand and the nature of the information structure while in earlier papers uncertainty is about an unknown common demand intercept in the present paper uncertainty is about unknown private costs the different information structure reverses the incentives to share information while with unknown common demand sharing is a dominant strategy with bertrand competition and concealing is a dominant strategy with cournot competition with unknown private costs sharing is a dominant strategy with cournot competition and concealing is a dominant strategy with bertrand competition

cournot oligopoly with information sharing this paper studies the incentives for information sharing among firms in a cournot oligopoly facing a linear uncertain demand and an affine conditional expectation information structure no information sharing is found to be the unique equilibrium in two cases in which the signals with equal precision are assumed indivisible and infinitely divisible however the nonpooling equilibrium converges to the situation where the pooling strategies are adopted as the amount of information increases hence the efficiency is achieved in the competitive equilibrium as the number of the firm become large

persistent government spending and fiscal multipliers the investment channel this paper inspects the mechanism shaping government spending multipliers in various smallscale dsge setups with endogenous labor supply and capital accumulation we analytically characterize the short run investment multiplier which in equilibrium can be either positive or negative the investment multiplier increases with the persistence of the exogenous government spending process the response of investment to government spending shocks strongly affects short run multipliers on output and consumption

localized competition multimarket operation and collusive behavior this paper studies collusive behavior in a repeated oligopoly model with localized competition also reinterpreted as a model of multimarket operation private information about the rivals past actions naturally arises from these product market structures the resulting communication problems imply that firms should not adopt strategies with too severe punishments infinite grim punishments may be too severe for large discount factors the standard stick and carrot punishments from the perfect public information model are always too severe for all discount factors modified stick and carrot punishments can still be used though for a smaller range of discount factors than the standard stick and carrot punishments

the ir relevance of real wage rigidity in the new keynesian model with search frictions we explore the role of real wage dynamics in a new keynesian business cycle model with search and matching frictions in the labor market both job creation and destruction are endogenous we show that the model generates counterfactual inflation and labor market dynamics in particular it fails to generate a beveridge curve vacancies and unemployment are positively correlated introducing real wage rigidity leads to a negative correlation and increases the magnitude of labor market flows to more realistic values however inflation dynamics are only weakly affected by real wage rigidity this is because of the presence of labor market frictions which generate long run employment relationships the measure of real marginal cost that is relevant for inflation dynamics via the phillips curve contains a dynamic component that does not necessarily move with real wages

monopolistic competition in the spirit of chamberlin a general model this paper develops a model of large group chamberlinian monopolistic competition in which 1 there are many firms producing differentiated commodities 2 each firm is negligible in that it can ignore its impact on and hence reactions from other firms 3 free entry leads to zero profit of operating firms but 4 each firm faces a downward sloping demand curve the existence of a monopolistically competitive equilibrium is established in a companion paper more particular questions such as whether the market provides too many or too few products are addressed for a special case of the model

information and volatility in an economy of interacting agents with both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks we examine how the structure of private information in uences aggregate volatility the maximal aggregate volatility is attained in a noise free information structure in which the agents confound idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks and display excess response to the aggregate shocks as in lucas 14 for any given variance of aggregate shocks the upper bound on aggregate volatility is linearly increasing in the variance of the idiosyncratic shocks our results hold in a setting of symmetric agents with linear best responses and normal uncertainty we establish our results by providing a characterization of the set of all joint distributions over actions and states that can arise in equilibrium under any information structure this tractable characterization extending results in bergemann and morris 8 can be used to address a wide variety of questions linking information with the statistical moments of the economy

aggregation of information in large cournot markets consider a homogeneous product market where firms have private information about an uncertain demand parameter and compete in quantities we examine the convergence properties of bayesian cournot equilibria as the economy is replicated and conclude that large cournot or almost competitive markets do not aggregate information efficiently except possibly when the production technology exhibits constant returns to scale even in a competitive market there is a welfare loss with respect to the first best outcome due to incomplete information in general nevertheless a competitive market is efficient taking as given the decentralized private information structure of the economy endogenous and costly information acquisition is examined and seen to imply that the market outcome always falls short of the first best level with decreasing returns to scale the results are also shown to be robust to the addition of extra rounds of competition which allows firms to use the information revealed by past prices explicit closed form solutions yielding comparative static results are obtained for models characterized by quadratic payoffs and affine information structures

targeted transfers and the fiscal response to the great recession abstract between 2007 and 2009 government expenditures increased rapidly across the oecd countries while economic research on the impact of government purchases has flourished in the data most of the increase in expenditures was in government transfers after documenting this fact we argue that future research should focus on the positive impact of transfers towards this we present a model in which there is no representative agent and ricardian equivalence does not hold because of uncertainty imperfect credit markets and nominal rigidities targeted lump sum transfers are expansionary both because of a neoclassical wealth effect and because of a keynesian aggregate demand effect

information revelation in auctions with common and private values we explore the incentives to reveal verifiable private information when there are both common and private components to agents valuations and when private information is held in both dimensions when agents observe only one signal they have no incentive to reveal the signal because such a revelation would negate their information advantage however when agents observe multiple signals they may be incentivized to reveal certain signals that could lower their opponents bids and thereby result in a higher profit from other signals this paper shows that there exists an equilibrium with revelation of common value signals in standard auctions which is an efficient equilibrium that maximizes the social welfare and could provide the seller with a higher profit than a situation with no information revelation

regime dependence of the fiscal multiplier abstract after the financial market meltdown of the years 2007 2008 the obama administration responded with large fiscal stimulus package yet the reaction to this stimulus has been diverse some predicted a multiplier effect in the order of 1 5 others argued that the multiplier will be less than 0 5 such multiplier estimates typically stem from estimated linear vector autoregressions vars or linearized versions of dsge models in this paper we argue that neither conventional var analysis nor linearized dgse models may be appropriate to evaluate demand effects arising from such a stimulus package the reason is as recent research suggests that the timing of demand shocks matters to assess the multiplier s variability we adopt a regime dependent var approach as is shown in detail our model specification is grounded on theoretical considerations the empirical analysis presented here suggests that a regime dependent var specification is favored for u s output and employment data and that the standard one regime var methodology is inappropriate for analyzing multi regime processes although we employ a nonlinear var framework the chosen setup allows the use of largely familiar macroeconometric modeling tools estimating a two regime var we show that the fiscal multiplier varies with the state of the business cycle and the particular specifics of the measure taken for the u s we find for example the fiscal expansion multiplier is much higher in a regime of a low economic activity than in a regime of high activity as we also show it is size dependent

information use and acquisition in price setting oligopolies asymmetric price setting multi product suppliers have access to multiple sources of information about demand conditions where the publicity of each source corresponds to the cross industry correlation of signals received from it a signal s influence on suppliers prices is increasing in its publicity as well as in its precision the emphasis on relatively public information is stronger for smaller suppliers who control narrower product portfolios when information is endogenously acquired suppliers listen to only a subset of information sources this subset is smaller when products are less differentiated and when the industry is less concentrated smaller suppliers focus attention on fewer information sources the inefficiencies arising from information acquisition and use are identified the associated externalities depend upon the extent of product differentiation the concentration of the industry and the degree of decreasing returns to scale

household debt and fiscal multipliers we study the size of government spending multipliers in a general equilibrium model with search and matching frictions in which we allow for different levels of household indebtedness the main results are a the presence of impatient households and private debt helps to generate government spending multipliers greater than 1 b as financial conditions worsen the size of the government spending multiplier falls c conversely employment vacancies and unemployment multipliers are larger in a credit crunch d the model explains the observed pattern of responses of labour market variables housing prices and private debt to a fiscal shock reasonably well

insisting on a non negative price oligopoly uncertainty welfare and multiple equilibria i study cournot competition under incomplete but symmetric information about the intercept of the linear demand function while assuming that market price must be non negative for all demand realizations although the non negativity assumption is very natural it has only rarely been made in the earlier literature yet it has important economic consequences 1 expected demand effectively becomes convex which means that multiple symmetric pure strategy equilibria can exist and 2 expected total surplus can be larger when the firms do not know demand than when they do the arguments of the paper are relevant also for price competition and for uncertainty about e g cost or the number of firms and these issues are discussed

keynesian government spending multipliers and spillovers in the euro area the global financial crisis has led to a renewed interest in discretionary fiscal stimulus advocates of discretionary measures emphasize that government spending can stimulate additional private spending the keynesian multiplier effect thus we investigate whether the spending package announced by euro area governments for 2009 and 2010 is likely to boost gdp by more than one for one because of modelling uncertainty it is essential that such policy evaluations be robust to alternative modelling assumptions and parameterizations we use five different empirical macroeconomic models with keynesian features such as price and wage rigidities to evaluate the impact of the fiscal stimulus four of them suggest that the planned increase in government spending will reduce private consumption and investment significantly only a model that largely ignores the forward looking behavioural response of consumers and firms implies crowding in of private spending we review a range of issues that may play a role in the recession of 2008 2009 implementation lags are found to reinforce crowding out and may even cause an initial contraction zero bound effects may lead the central bank to abstain from interest rate hikes and increase the gdp impact of government spending crowding in however requires an immediate anticipation of at least two years at the zero bound using a multi country model we find that spillovers between euro area countries are negligible or even negative because direct demand effects are offset by the indirect effect of a euro appreciation new keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge models provide a strong case for government savings packages announced with sufficient lead time spending cuts induce a significant short run stimulus and crowding in of private spending tobias cwik and volker wieland

public infrastructure investment output dynamics and balanced budget fiscal rules abstract we study the dynamic macroeconomic effects of public infrastructure investment under a balanced budget fiscal rule using an overlapping generations model of a small open economy the government finances public investment by employing distortionary labor taxes the balanced budget rule implies a negative short run output multiplier that exceeds in absolute terms the positive long run output multiplier larger public capital spillovers sharpen the intertemporal output tradeoff in contrast to conventional results regarding public investment shocks we obtain dampened cyclical responses for plausible parameter values the cyclical dynamics arise from the interaction between the labor tax rate the tax base and the intergenerational spillover effects we show that financing scenarios involving public debt creation can substantially reduce the short run output contraction and the transitional macroeconomic fluctuations induced by public investment

exchange of cost information in oligopoly when do oligopolists gain by sharing their private information about their costs with one another what are the social welfare effects of such information exchange i study these questions by comparing the oligopolists expected profits under a cost sharing agreement with their expected profits in the bayesian equilibrium that would arise without cost sharing i also analyse the firms decisions to form a trade association to share their cost data under conditions of linear demand and cournot behaviour industrywide information exchange is the unique point in the core of the trade association membership game the exchange of cost data increases expected profits and welfare but reduces expected consumer surplus cost sharing increases efficiency by raising the market shares of lower cost firms and reducing the variability of aggregate output consumer surplus is diminished however because the variance of output is reduced and consumer surplus is a convex function of output

strategic information manipulation in duopolies abstract this paper studies a duopoly market in which firms can draw inferences concerning uncertain market demand from observations of their outputs and market price firms may adjust their outputs away from myopically optimal levels to affect the informativeness of the market price because firms quantities are observed firms can manipulate the extent to which belief revision occurs rather than the direction in which beliefs are revised as in signal jamming models we develop conditions and present examples under which the value of information is positive and negative and under which firms will increase or decrease quantity to manipulate information journal of economic literature classification numbers d80 l13

industry equilibrium with outside financing and moral hazard implications for market integration abstract in this paper we study industry equilibrium under the assumptions that 1 firms need outside financing and 2 they have a moral hazard problem in taking potentially excessive risks we characterize an industry equilibrium with credit rationing where firms choose not to take risks and compare this to the industry equilibrium in the absence of credit rationing in both cases we show that competition increases and prices decline as markets integrate however in markets with credit rationing there is typically more exit a smaller decline in prices and most strikingly the market value of the industry increases rather than decreases

trade association disclosure rules incentives to share information and welfare in this article i propose a monopolistic competition framework to analyze the effects of different disclosure rules used by trade associations on the incentives to share information and on the welfare of consumers firms and society this framework is appropriate whenever a single firm cannot influence aggregate market magnitudes and serves as a benchmark for the analysis of information pooling agreements abstracting from strategic considerations i report two main results first a policy of nonexclusionary disclosure destroys the incentives to share information while exclusionary disclosure preserves them second information sharing increases expected total surplus with cournot competition but decreases it with bertrand competition in the context of a quadratic normal model with demand uncertainty

on the size of fiscal multipliers a counterfactual analysis we point out that fiscal multipliers derived from svar models include the predicted future path of policy instruments after the initial shock net taxes and government expenditures react to each other and are autocorrelated in a counterfactual simulation we report fiscal multipliers that abstract from these dynamic responses

the value to a firm of its rival learning abstract in price competition a firm f reduces its rival s r learning about r s cost in quantity price competition f wants r not to learn about f s cost i show that in quantity competition f wants r not to learn about r s cost

jamming a rival s learning abstract can a firm f cause a rival r to learn less about r does f care i explore f s ability and incentive to affect or jam r s private learning about r the model developed does not have unobserved actions or ex ante asymmetric information which previous jamming models require i find the f wants r not to learn and the more uncertain f believes r is the more f wants to jam r s learning entry deterrence increases with an entrant s uncertainty causing r to want f to believe that r is more certain about r s beliefs than r really is journal of economic literature d82 d83 l13

the state dependent effects of tax shocks abstract this paper studies the state dependent effects of shocks to tax rates we begin with a stylized model in which clean analytical expressions are available the model predicts that a tax rate cut is most stimulative for output in periods in which output is relatively high the model is also used to discuss some conceptual issues related to the construction of tax multipliers we then consider a medium scale dsge model with tax rates on labor and capital income and on consumption the model is solved via a third order perturbation consonant with the intuition from the analytical model tax multipliers for all three types of tax rates vary significantly across states and are most stimulative for output in states in which output is high to evaluate the normative desirability of tax cuts as a tool to combat recessions we also study the properties of the tax cut welfare multiplier which measures the change in aggregate welfare conditional on a tax rate change in contrast to output multipliers welfare multipliers are found to be countercyclical a number of extensions and modifications are considered and our conclusions are generally robust

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games ii applications in part i of this study we established two existence theorems for mixed strategy equilibrium in games with discontinuous payoff functions see theorems 4 4 and 5 5 in dasgupta and maskin 1986 hereafter d m 1986 in this second part we use the second of these two theorems to prove the existence of mixed strategy equilibrium in some wellknown discontinuous economic games that fail to have pure strategy equilibria the models we analyse are the bertrand edgeworth example of price setting duopolists with capacity constraints see section 2 2 price competition among firms producing differentiated products hotelling 1929 and d aspremont gabszewicz and thisse 1979 see section 2 3 spatial competition eaton and lipsey 1975 and shaked 1975 see section 3 and models of market dependent information rothschild and stiglitz 1976 and wilson 1977 section 4 the paper concludes section 5 with a classification of these models

clearing up the fiscal multiplier morass bayesian prior predictive analysis of five nested dsge models suggests that model specifications and prior distributions tightly circumscribe the range of possible government spending multipliers multipliers are decomposed into wealth and substitution effects yielding uniform comparisons across models by constraining the multiplier to tight ranges model and prior selections bias results revealing less about fiscal effects in data than about the lenses through which researchers choose to interpret data when monetary policy actively targets inflation output multipliers can exceed one but investment multipliers are likely to be negative passive monetary policy produces consistently strong multipliers for output consumption and investment

strategic information revelation we analyze the problem in which agents have non public information and are to play an asymmetric information game the agents may reveal some or all of their information to other agents prior to playing this game revelation is via exogenously specified certifiable statements the equilibria resulting from various revelation strategies are used to determine equilibrium revelation of information sufficient conditions are provided for complete revelation of all private information a number of examples are provided illustrating when revelation will or will not occur in commonly analyzed games many economic problems are characterized by the presence of both strategic behaviour on the part of individuals and by asymmetric information models encompassing both of these characteristics have been used successfully to examine questions in many fields usually using the concept of bayesian nash equilibrium as the solution concept typically the agents information is given exogenously and is fixed throughout the analysis modelling the information structure as static is appropriate for some problems but not for all in particular situations that are inherently dynamic most economic encounters allow for some interchange between the agents before the outcome is settled irrevocably in such circumstances it is possible that at least one or more of the agents possessing non public information may be able to reveal part or all of his information to one or all of the other agents in the economy during the course of their contact to the extent that such a communication is believed by the other agents the priors of the other agents will change and we will have what is in essence a new asymmetric information game new in

optimal disclosure policy in oligopoly markets this paper examines the private and social optimality of full disclosure of private information in a two period oligopoly model an incumbent firm is privately informed about the market demand and its production cost after operating as a monopolist in the first period and then competes against an entrant in the second period two main results are derived first it is shown that the incumbent is best off by pre committing to disclose both the demand and cost information by disclosing full information the incumbent nullifies its self defeating intertemporal incentives which arise whenever it has private information about the market demand its cost efficiency or both in addition the equilibrium output variance is the largest under full disclosure which benefits the incumbent ex ante second the paper shows that the incumbent s full disclosure of the demand and cost information may or may not be desirable from a social efficiency standpoint in particular the correlation between the firms production costs is crucial to the rank of disclosure policies in terms of their impact on social efficiency

information sharing and oligopoly in agricultural markets the role of the cooperative bargaining association we study incentives for information sharing among agricultural intermediaries in imperfectly competitive markets for farm output information sharing always increases expected grower and total surplus but may reduce expected intermediary profits even when expected profits increase with information sharing intermediary firms face a prisoner s dilemma where it is privately rational to withhold information given that other firms report truthfully this equilibrium can be avoided if firms information reports are verifiable and if firms commit to an ex ante contract that enforces participation in information sharing we show how agricultural bargaining legislation can implement such a contract with the bargained farm price representing a sufficient statistic of all information held by intermediary firms

government size and business cycle volatility how important are credit constraints in this paper we analyse how the availability of credit influences the relationship between government size as a proxy for fiscal stabilization policy and the amplitude of business cycle fluctuations in a sample of advanced oecd countries interpreting relatively low loan to value ratios as an indication of tight credit constraints we find that government size exerts a stabilizing effect on output and consumption growth fluctuations only when credit constraints are relatively tight our results provide support for the hypothesis that credit market frictions play a crucial role in the transmission of fiscal policy

the government spending multiplier in a mis managed liquidity trap i study the impact of a government spending shock in a new keynesian model when monetary policy is set optimally in this framework the economy is at the zero lower bound but expectations are well managed by the central bank as such the multiplier effect of government spending increases on expected inflation is small while the one on output can be larger than one this is consistent with recent empirical evidence on the effects of the 2009 arra

majoritarian preference utilitarian welfare and public information in cournot oligopoly abstract can individual preferences for public information among heterogeneous consumers be aggregated into a meaningful social preference that does not suffer from condorcet cycles in a cournot model where homogeneous producers observe a public signal about an uncertain cost of production prior to taking quantity decisions we show that the majoritarian preference of consumers for the precision of public information is fairly well behaved so that a condorcet winner always exists under a monotonicity condition on the demand function we characterize the condorcet winning precision in terms of the demand function and the number of firms under which the condorcet winning precision i hurts consumers surplus and profits or ii remains conflict free these results have interesting implications on collective bayesian persuasion by agencies representing consumers showing that when full transparency maximizes expected consumers surplus collective bayesian persuasion can lead to full opacity and vice versa

some fiscal calculus what is the impact of fiscal policy on the econ omy how large are the multipliers of govern ment spending and tax cuts this old question has recently received considerable attention in par ticular in the context of the american recovery and reinvestment act arra of 2009 i contribute to answering that question by calculating fiscal multipliers in a baseline neo classical growth model with endogenous labor supply and fiscal policy allowing for govern ment spending transfers government debt and distortionary taxes on labor and capital income the policy experiments are conducted holding transfers consumption taxes and capital income taxes fixed i e changes in taxation require changes in the distortionary labor tax the model is simple and fairly standard as an additional contribution i provide the model in an elegant and tractable form starting from a fairly general formulation and pointing out the key functional form properties for characterizing the dynamics the formulation of the model here or versions

information sharing in union firm relationships large firms often negotiate wage rates with labor unions when they do an ex ante agreement to share information should make it more likely that they will reach an agreement and capture the gains from trade however if the firm refuses to share information the union may shade down its wage demand to increase the probability of acceptance this reduction in the wage can increase the joint surplus of the agents and increase social welfare as a result there are some circumstances in which bargaining with incomplete information can be better for the agents and society than bargaining with complete information many firms and their input suppliers form long term relationships in which they periodically negotiate their terms of trade as has long been recognized the presence of private information can cause negotiations to break down on occasion resulting in an inefficient disruption of production for example the united auto workers with superior knowledge of its strike fund and or its member s outside options may call for a strike against general motors if the firm is unwilling to meet its wage demands and the firm s unwillingness to concede may be due to its superior knowledge of demand productivity and or its stock of inventories theoretically such disruptions could be avoided if the agents would simply agree to reveal their private information before the negotiations begin 2 whether or not this will occur is unclear however since some agents may be unwilling to enter into such an agreement if it sufficiently weakened their bargaining position the literatures on noncooperative bargaining and mechanism design have already dealt with many of the issues that arise in this environment in the bargaining literature it is generally assumed that the agents already possess the private information and then the implications of different bargaining processes are examined see ausubel et al 2002 for a survey in the mechanism design literature one of the questions addressed is whether the agents can find a way to commit to ex

too much information sharing welfare effects of sharing acquired cost information in oligopoly by using general information structures and precision criteria based on the dispersion of conditional expectations we study how oligopolists information acquisition decisions may change the effects of information sharing on the consumer surplus sharing information about individual cost parameters gives the following trade off in cournot oligopoly on the one hand it decreases the expected consumer surplus for a given information precision as the literature shows on the other hand information sharing increases the firms incentives to acquire information and the consumer surplus increases in the precision of the firms information interestingly the latter effect may dominate the former effect

customer information sharing among rival firms abstract the recent rapid growth of the internet as a medium of communication and commerce combined with the development of sophisticated software tools are to a large extent responsible for producing a new kind of information databases with detailed records about consumers preferences these databases have become part of a firm s assets and as such they can be sold to third parties this possibility has raised numerous concerns from consumer privacy advocates and regulators who have entered into a heated debate with business groups and industry associations about whether the practice of customer information sharing should be banned regulated or left unchecked this paper investigates the incentives of rival firms to share their customer specific information and evaluates the welfare implications if such exchanges are banned in the context of a perfect price discrimination model

the impact of connectivity on market interlinkages evidence from rural punjab up to the 1980s it was generally accepted that many key issues in agrarian development could not be studied without an understanding of market interlinkages recently however this theory has lost its importance in development literature based on a household level survey from rural pakistan this paper seeks to re introduce the importance of interlinkages by illustrating their exploitative potential particularly in unequal isolated villages where landlords are essentially monopolist monopsonist the solution proposed is to break isolation making use of an exogenous shock found in the construction of a motorway the study finds that while connectivity does not break interlinkages completely it does significantly reduce their exploitative nature

fiscal foresight and information flows news or foresight about future economic fundamentals can create rational expectations equilibria with non fundamental representations that pose substantial challenges to econometric efforts to recover the structural shocks to which economic agents react using tax policies as a leading example of foresight simple theory makes transparent the economic behavior and information structures that generate non fundamental equilibria econometric analyses that fail to model foresight will obtain biased estimates of output multipliers for taxes biases are quantitatively important when two canonical theoretical models are taken as data generating processes both the nature of equilibria and the inferences about the effects of anticipated tax changes hinge critically on hypothesized information flows different methods for extracting or hypothesizing the information flows are discussed and shown to be alternative techniques for resolving a non uniqueness problem endemic to moving average representations

optimal research for cournot oligopolists we extend the classical cournot model to take account of uncertainty in either the cost function or the demand function by undertaking research firms can acquire private asymmetric information to help resolve their uncertainty and make a more informed production decision the model is a two stage game in the first stage research levels are chosen and in the second stage conditional on private research outcomes production decisions are made we find that for a linear continuous information structure there is a unique nash equilibrium to the game in the equilibrium there may be an inefficient amount of aggregate research and there may be incomplete pooling as well the model specializes to the classical case when the cost of research is zero and each firm gains essentially the same information by doing an infinite amount of research or when the cost of research is so high no firm undertakes research

government investment and fiscal stimulus effects of government investment are studied in an estimated neoclassical growth model the analysis focuses on two dimensions that are critical for understanding government investment as a fiscal stimulus implementation delays for building public capital and expected fiscal adjustments to deficit financed spending implementation delays can produce small or even negative labor and output responses to increases in government investment in the short run anticipated fiscal adjustments matter both quantitatively and qualitatively for long run growth effects when public capital is insufficiently productive distorting financing can make government investment contractionary at longer horizons

distributional assumptions in the theory of oligopoly information exchange abstract we analyze the profitability of information sharing among cournot oligopolists receiving private information about random demand in this setting previous authors showed information exchange to be unprofitable when firms marginal costs are constant and outputs are perfect substitutes we introduce a measure of the increase in the accuracy of firms demand forecasts when information is shared we provide two examples showing when this measure is large information exchange is profitable even though firms marginal costs are constant and outputs are perfect substitutes moreover we show that in the linear conditional expectations framework which has been standard in the literature this measure reveals these accuracy gains to be severely limited

information and disclosure in strategic trade policy we relax the standard assumption in the strategic trade policy literature that governments possess complete information about the economy assuming instead that governments must obtain information from firms we examine firms incentive to disclose information to the governments in the brander spencer setting with quantity competition we find firms disclosing both demand and cost information thereby justifying the literature s omniscient government assumption with price competition however firms have no incentives to disclose demand or cost information so governments remain uninformed further with quantity competition and unknown demand governments are caught in an informational prisoner s dilemma

when is the government transfer multiplier large transfers to individuals were a larger part of the 2009 u s stimulus package than government purchases using a two agent new keynesian model this paper shows analytically that the multiplier on targeted transfers to financially constrained households is i larger than the purchase multiplier if the zero lower bound zlb binds and ii is more sensitive to the degree of monetary accommodation of inflation targeted transfers provide the same boost to demand as purchases but lower aggregate supply relative to purchases as those receiving transfers want to work less when the aggregate demand curve inverts such as when the zero lower bound binds the extra inflation from lower supply boosts the multiplier this result also holds quantitatively in a medium scale version of the model

learning about fiscal policy and the effects of policy uncertainty abstract in this paper we ask how uncertainty about fiscal policy affects the impact of fiscal policy changes on the economy when the government tries to counteract a deep recession the agents in our model are uncertain about the conduct of fiscal policy and act as econometricians by estimating fiscal policy rules that might change over time we find that assuming that agents are not instantaneously aware of the new fiscal policy regime in place leads to substantially more volatility in the short run and persistent differences in average outcomes we highlight issues that can arise when a policymaker wants to announce a policy change from a methodological perspective we introduce a novel way to model learning in the face of discrete policy changes

duopoly information equilibrium cournot and bertrand abstract in a duopoly model where firms have private information about an uncertain linear demand it is shown that if the goods are substitutes not to share information is a dominant strategy for each firm in bertrand cournot competition if the goods are complements the result is reversed furthermore the following welfare results are obtained 1 i with substitutes in cournot competition the market outcome is never optimal with respect to information sharing but it may be optimal in bertrand competition if the products are good substitutes with complements the market outcome is always optimal 2 ii bertrand competition is more efficient than cournot competition 3 iii the private value of information to the firms is always positive but the social value of information is positive in cournot and negative in bertrand competition

duopoly information exchange the case of unknown slope abstract we model information exchange between duopolists facing a common random demand the slope of the common demand curve facing the firms is assumed unknown and firms observe private signals about this slope we show that for sufficiently large variation in the demand slope firms earn strictly higher profit when they share their information rather than keeping it private even with constant marginal costs and homogeneous goods in this case it is a nash equilibrium for the duopolists to share their information in a quid pro quo information exchange consistent with earlier models information exchange raises welfare

on fiscal multipliers estimates from a medium scale dsge model this paper contributes to the debate on fiscal multipliers in the context of a structural model i estimate a micro founded dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that features a rich fiscal policy block and a transmission mechanism for government spending shocks using bayesian techniques for us data

housework and fiscal expansions in an otherwise standard business cycle model with housework calibrated consistently with data on time use we discipline complementarity between consumption and hours worked and relate its strength to the size of fiscal multipliers evidence on the substitutability between home and market goods confirms that complementarity is an empirically relevant driver of fiscal multipliers however in a housework model substantial complementarity can be generated without imposing a low wealth effect which contradicts the microeconomic evidence also explicitly modeling housework matters for assessing the welfare effects of government spending which are understated by theories that neglect substitutability between home produced and market goods

incentives for information production and disclosure in a duopolistic environment this paper examines the nature of the equilibrium solution to the duopoly problem under various incomplete information structures and the incentives to produce and disclose information attention is focused on the duopolists cost functions the results indicate that disclosure of such information is generally beneficial to the duopolists

uncertainty resolution private information aggregation and the cournot competitive limit a cournot model of oligopoly in which otherwise identical firms have private differential information about the common cost of production and a shared but unknown demand curve is examined a bayesian equilibrium of the corresponding game of incomplete information is solved for explicitly and analysed in the symmetric equilibrium different firms produce at different output levels because they have different information because the information individual firms have is random total output and hence market price is also random for any finite number of firms the main result of the paper relates to the asymptotic properties of the equilibrium when the number of firms becomes large under fairly general conditions on the joint distribution of demand and individual firms information about demand the random equilibrium price converges almost surely to a constant in the limit more importantly this price equals the perfectly competitive price in other words in large markets even if no firm knows the true market demand curve and firms are not price takers and do not use price as a signal to improve their information the competitive price will prevail with certainty in the limit aggregate outcomes are as if all firms shared their private information with each other

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games i theory the article presents information about the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games in this paper and its sequel presents study the existence of nash equilibrium in games where agents payoff functions are discontinuous the enquiry is motivated by a number of recent studies that have uncovered serious existence problems in seemingly innocuous economic games in the sequel to this paper authors have explained the utility function in the economic games referred to earlier are neither continuous nor quasi concave however they demonstrate that the payoff functions in mildly modified versions of these constructs exhibit two weaker forms of continuity which together with the requirement of quasi concavity suffice for the existence of an equilibrium from this one may conclude that at least in the modified versions of these models discontinuities in the payoff functions are not the real source of the problem rather it is the failure of the payoff functions to the quasi concave which is responsible for the non existence of equilibrium these observations bear on the existence of nash equilibrium in pure strategies

monopolistic competition aggregation of competitive information and the amount of product differentiation consider an industry with a large number of homogeneous firms each firm s profits are a function of its own strategy and the strategies the other firms select suppose other firms strategies enter into each firm s profit function only through one or more statistics for example average price in the market may parameterize every firm s profit function we prove that as a general rule the industry s firms will in equilibrium follow at most m 1 distinct strategies where m is the number of statistics by which competitors strategies affect each firm s profits

individual marketing with imperfect targetability our research investigates the competitive ramifications of individual marketing and information management in today s information intensive marketing environments the specific managerial issues we address are as follows first what kinds of incentive environments do competing firms face when they can only target individual customers imperfectly second does the improvement in an industry s targetability intensify price competition in the industry such that all competing firms become worse off third should a firm share its customer knowledge so as to improve its rival s targetability fourth how should an information vendor sell its information that can improve a firm s targetability finally do competing firms have the same incentives to invest in their own targetability to answer those questions we develop a simple model a la narasimhan 1988 in which each of the two competing firms have their own loyal customers and compete for common switchers we assume that each firm can classify its own loyal customers and switchers correctly only with a less than perfect probability this means that each firm s perceived customer segmentation differs from the actual customer segmentation based on their perceived reality these two competing firms engage in price competition as an extension we also allow the competing firms to make their investment decisions to acquire targetability we show that when individual marketing is feasible but imperfect improvements in targetability by either or both competing firms can lead to win win competition for both even if both players behave noncooperatively and the market does not expand win win competition results from the fact that as a firm becomes better at distinguishing its price insensitive loyal customers from the switchers it is motivated to charge a higher price to the former however due to imperfect targetability each firm mistakenly perceives some price sensitive switchers as price insensitive loyal customers and charges them all a higher price these misperceptions thus allow its competitors to acquire those mistargeted customers without lowering their prices and hence reduce the rival firm s incentive to cut prices this effect softens price competition in the market and qualitatively changes the incentive environment for competing firms engaged in individual marketing a prisoner s dilemma occurs only when targetability in a market reaches a sufficiently high level this win win perspective on individual marketing has many managerial implications first we show that superior knowledge of individual customers can be a competitive advantage however this does not mean that a firm should always protect its customer information from its competitors to the contrary we find that competing firms can all benefit from exchanging individual customer information with each other at the nascent stage of individual marketing when firms targetability is low indeed under certain circumstances a firm may even find it profitable to give away this information unilaterally however as individual marketing matures as firms targetability becomes sufficiently high further improvements in targetability will intensify price competition and lead to prisoner s dilemma therefore it is not only prudent politics but also a business imperative for an industry to seize the initiative on the issue of protecting customer privacy so as to ensure win win competition in the industry second we show that the firm with a larger number of loyal customers tends to invest more in targetability when the cost of acquiring targetability is high however the firm with a smaller loyal base can through information investment acquire a higher level of targetability than the firm with a larger loyal base as long as the cost of acquiring targetability is not too high as the cost further decreases competing firms will all have more incentives to increase their investments in targetability until they achieve the highest feasible level third an information vendor should make its information available nonexclusively exclusively when its information is associated with a low high level of targetability when the vendor does sell its information exclusively it should target a firm with a small loyal following if it can impart a high level of targetability to that firm finally our analysis shows that an information intensive environment does not doom small firms in fact individual marketing may provide a good opportunity for a small firm to leapfrog a large firm the key to leapfrogging is a high level of targetability or customer knowledge

cournot competition and the social value of information in a differentiated product cournot model each supplier receives informative signals about demand the cross industry correlations of the signals differ more public signals have higher correlation coefficients in equilibrium information is used inefficiently from the industry s perspective information is over used and too much emphasis is placed on relatively public signals from the consumer s perspective information is under used and too much emphasis is placed on relatively private signals welfare is enhanced by increasing the use of information as desired by consumers but re balancing that use away from public signals as desired by the industry if information is costly and endogenously acquired then suppliers acquire too much new information but they use it too little

the laffer curve revisited abstract laffer curves for the us the eu 14 and individual european countries are compared using a neoclassical growth model featuring constant frisch elasticity cfe preferences new tax rate data is provided the us can maximally increase tax revenues by 30 with labor taxes and 6 with capital taxes we obtain 8 and 1 for the eu 14 there 54 of a labor tax cut and 79 of a capital tax cut are self financing the consumption tax laffer curve does not peak endogenous growth and human capital accumulation affect the results quantitatively household heterogeneity may not be important while transition matters greatly

on the use of heuristics to approximate competitors private information abstract firms often lack knowledge of the nature of the uncertainty they or their opponents face and use heuristics or approximations to determine their strategy we define and analyze one type of heuristic strategy in which firms choose strategies based on the expectation of their opponents private information rather than the full information about the distribution of that private information we find that in equilibrium the degree to which the heuristic strategy differs from the bayesian strategy depends on 1 the convexity of a firm s marginal profits with respect to their opponents private information and 2 whether firm strategies are complementary or substitutable under certain conditions firms equilibrium profits are greater when all firms use heuristics than when all firms use the full information our results provide insight into incentives firms may have to either facilitate or impede access to industry information

prosperity and depression prosperity and depression are relative concepts today both france and japan are depressed relative to the united states equivalently the united states is prosperous relative to these countries i say these countries are depressed relative to the united states because their output per working age person is 30 percent less than the u s level an interesting and important policy question is why are these countries depressed the answers for these two countries turn out to be very different the united states is prosperous relative to france because the u s intratemporal tax wedge that distorts the trade off between consumption and leisure is much smaller than the french wedge i will show that if france modified its intratemporal tax wedge so that its value was the same as the u s value french welfare in consumption equivalents would increase by 19 percent consumption would have to increase by 19 percent now and in all future periods to achieve as large a welfare gain as that resulting from this tax reform the united states is prosperous relative to japan because production efficiency is higher in the united states in the united states total factor productivity is approximately 20 percent higher than in japan if japan suddenly became as efficient in production as the united states its welfare gain in consumption equivalents would be 39 percent equally interesting and important are big changes over time in relative output per working age person across countries why are new zealand s and switzerland s economies depressed by over 30 percent relative to their 1970 trend corrected levels both of these countries have small populations but depressions are not restricted to small countries japan with its 125 million people is now depressed by 20 percent relative to its 1991 trend corrected level on the prosperity side why are ireland and south korea so prosperous now relative to their 1970 trend corrected levels this lecture is concerned primarily with big international differences among relatively rich industrial countries and changes in these differences over time the countries that receive primary attention all have market economies and healthy well educated populations in the countries considered the variations in aggregate output per working age person are large and reasonably good measures of the factor inputs are available this permits in many cases the identification of the change in policy or the difference in policy that gave rise to prosperity or depression this is in contrast to business cycle theory which provides little guidance to policy except for the important policy implication that a stabilization effort will have either no effect or a perverse effect the output variations studied and analyzed in this lecture are big an order of magnitude larger than the much studied business cycle fluctuations the variations studied however are an order of magnitude smaller than the muchstudied differences between the richest and poorest countries surprisingly only recently have depressions been systematically studied from the perspective of growth theory which is the theory used university of minnesota and federal reserve bank of minneapolis i thank my colleagues at the university of minnesota and the federal reserve bank of minneapolis for helpful discussions and comments in particular i thank tim kehoe ellen mcgrattan and nancy stokey for their help i also thank martin weale and franck portier for providing some british and french tax information used in this lecture thanks also go to sami alpanda and james macgee for research assistance and helpful discussions this lecture draws heavily on collaborative research with fumio hayashi i thank the economic and social research institute cabinet office government of japan and the u s national science foundation for financial support the views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the federal reserve bank of minneapolis or the federal reserve system

debt dependent effects of fiscal expansions abstract economists often postulate that fiscal expansions are less stimulative when government debt is high than when it is low empirical evidence however is ambiguous using a nonlinear neoclassical growth model we show that the difference in government spending effects between high and low debt environments depends on the wealth effect on labor supply and on whether the government uses taxes or spending to retire debt because of interrelated state variables structural var estimations conditioning on debt alone can fail to isolate debt dependent effects also uncertainty on when the government will conduct fiscal consolidations generates wide confidence bands for spending multipliers further complicating efforts to estimate debt dependent government spending effects

information sharing in credit markets we present a model with adverse selection where information sharing between lenders arises endogenously lenders incentives to share information about borrowers are positively related to the mobility and heterogeneity of borrowers to the size of the credit market and to advances in information technology such incentives are instead reduced by the fear of competition from potential entrants in addition information sharing increases the volume of lending when adverse selection is so severe that safe borrowers drop out of the market these predictions are supported by international and historical evidence in the context of the consumer credit market a large body of literature on credit markets has shown that asymmetric information may prevent the efficient allocation of lending leading to credit rationing e g jaffee and russell 1976 stiglitz and weiss 1981 or to a wedge between lending and borrowing rates e g king 1986 in this literature informational asymmetries are taken to be exogenous lenders fail to observe some relevant characteristic or action of potential borrowers and have no way of learning about it in some countries however lenders can improve their knowledge about new customers by exchanging information with other lenders through information brokers generally known as credit bureaus the latter collect file and distribute the information voluntarily supplied by their members and operate on the principle of reciprocity lenders who do not provide data are denied access to the bureau s files in other countries instead these institutions do not exist the literature offers no guide to identify the factors that lead to endogenous communication between lenders this paper is an attempt to fill the gap information sharing is important for a number of reasons it may increase the degree of competitiveness within credit markets vives 1990 improve

monopoly competition and information acquisition abstract an incumbent monopolist is uncertain about its linear demand but can acquire public information at a cost we determine how an entry threat affects the firm s information acquisition if returns to scale are constant and the state contingent demands become more dispersed as output increases then entry reduces information acquisition if however either the incumbent or entrant has increasing returns or if the state contingent demands are nonlinear or fail increasing dispersion then entry can increase information finally entry can hurt consumers although entry always increases output it can decrease information consumers sometimes prefer a better informed monopoly to a duopoly

news and financial intermediation in aggregate fluctuations an important disconnect in the news view of fluctuations is the lack of consistent evidence suggestive of significant macroeconomic effects of news shocks findings from estimated dsge models that in theory allow news shocks to matter quantitatively suggest that they do not this disconnect can be resolved once we augment a dsge model with a financial channel that provides amplification to news shocks our results suggest that news shocks to the future growth prospects of the economy are significant drivers of u s fluctuations explaining as much as 50 and 37 of the variance in hours worked and output respectively in cyclical frequencies

is there a fiscal free lunch in a liquidity trap this paper uses a dsge model to examine the eects of an expansion in government spending in a liquidity trap the spending multiplier can be much larger than in the normal situation if the liquidity trap is very persistent and scal stimulus can be rapidly implemented moreover the budgetary costs may be minimal as the large response of output boosts tax revenues allowing for something close to a scal free lunch however we caution that the multiplier may be much smaller under plausible implementation lags for many types of public spending and or if the liquidity trap lasts less than two years in addition because the marginal impact of scal expansion decreases in the scale of the outlay it is crucial to distinguish between average and marginal multipliers

the effects of public spending externalities abstract we conduct a positive analysis on the effects of externalities produced by government spending to this effect we estimate using u s data an rbc model with two salient features first we allow government consumption to directly affect the marginal utility of consumption second we allow public capital to shift the productivity of private factors we provide an identification analysis that supports the strategy adopted for estimating the parameters governing these two channels on one hand private and government consumption are robustly estimated to be substitute goods because of substitutability labor supply reacts little to a government consumption shock so the estimated output multiplier is much lower than in models with separabilities on the other hand our results point towards public investment being unproductive

what do british historical data tell us about government spending multipliers british data from the early 1700s through world war i reflect the results of numerous high quality natural experiments of government spending britain frequently participated in wars increasing military spending massively wartime distortions were relatively limited because the government generally adopted tax smoothing policy and rarely implemented interventions government spending multiplier estimates are low or negative and significantly below unity this paper finds no evidence that the multiplier was higher in the slack state than in the normal state jel e32 e62

fiscal policy and the great recession in the euro area how much did fiscal policy contribute to euro area real gdp growth during the great recession we estimate that discretionary fiscal measures have increased annualized quarterly real gdp growth during the crisis by up to 1 6 percentage points we obtain our result by using an extended version of the european central bank s new area wide model with a rich specification of the fiscal sector a detailed modeling of the fiscal sector and the incorporation of as many as eight fiscal time series appear pivotal for our result

information sharing and tax competition among governments abstract the residence based principle has been proposed as a second best measure to the full international coordination of capital tax policies this system requires that tax authorities have full information about the foreign investments of their residents however the degree of information transmission among governments can be considered as a strategic variable we show that under some features of the tax system there will not be any information sharing while there are institutional arrangements under which governments may transmit partial information for strategic purposes we also show that full information sharing is not necessarily a pareto optimum

a normalized value for information purchases consider agents who are heterogeneous in their preferences and wealth levels these agents may acquire information prior to choosing an investment that has a property of no arbitrage and each piece of information bears a corresponding cost we associate a numeric index to each information purchase information cost pair this index describes the normalized value of the information purchase it is the risk aversion level of the unique cara agent who is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the purchase and it is characterized by a duality principle that states that agents with a stronger preference for information should engage more often in information purchases no agent more risk averse than the index finds it profitable to acquire the information whereas all agents less risk averse than the index do given an empirically measured range of degrees of risk aversion in a competitive economy with no arbitrage investments our model therefore comes close to describing an inverse demand for information by predicting what pieces of information are acquired by agents and which ones are not among several desirable properties the normalized value formula induces a complete ranking of information structures that extends blackwell s classic ordering

the value of information in a simple duopoly model abstract this paper is concerned with the evaluation of information in a duopoly model in which the cost functions are subject to uncertainty it explores how changes in information about the costs available to either firm affects the welfare of both firms along with the welfare of consumers by comparing the ten possible types of information structures it is shown that information may be detrimental that improved information for one firm may or may not benefit the other firm and or the consumer and that it may be more desirable for a firm to gather information about the rival s cost rather than its own all of these irregular results depend on the values of the variances of the costs and their correlation coefficient

coordination in oligopoly the private and social efficiency of two behavioral coordination mechanisms is examined in this paper in cournot oligopoly firms prefer immediate coordination on the nash equilibrium interpreted as a preplay communication over the best reply dynamics and fictitous play which converge to the equilibrium but with delay interpreted as a decentralized learning process in bertrand oligopoly firms prefer the learning process these results indicate that firms have incentives to create institutions such as trade associations or informal meetings to facilitate coordination of production capacities but not prices moreover quantity agreements may even increase social welfare

hysteresis and fiscal policy abstract empirical studies support the hysteresis hypothesis that recessions have a permanent effect on the level of output we analyze the implications of hysteresis for fiscal policy in a dsge model we assume a simple learning by doing mechanism where demand driven changes in employment can affect the level of productivity permanently leading to hysteresis in output we show that the fiscal output multiplier is much larger in the presence of hysteresis and that the welfare multiplier of fiscal policy the consumption equivalent change in welfare for one dollar change in public spending is positive negative in the presence absence of hysteresis the main benefit of accommodative fiscal policy in the presence of hysteresis is to diminish the damage of a recession to the long term level of productivity and thus output

chronicle of a war foretold the macroeconomic effects of anticipated defence spending shocks we identify us defense news shocks as shocks that best explain future movements in defense spending over a ve year horizon and are orthogonal to current defense spending our identied shocks are strongly correlated with the ramey 2011 news shocks but explain a larger share of macroeconomic uctuations and have signicant demand eects fiscal news induces signicant and persistent increases in output consumption investment hours and the interest rate standard dsge models fail to produce such a pattern we propose a sticky price model with distortionary taxation variable capital utilization capital adjustment costs and rule of thumb consumers that replicates the empirical ndings

the effects of discretionary fiscal policy on macroeconomic aggregates a reappraisal fiscal stimuli to recover a cascade of academic and layman articles debate the effectiveness of fiscal policy in stimulating the economy backed up by different economic models and empirical support this essay surveys the theoretical predictions and recent empirical vector autoregression var evidence on the short run effects of discretionary fiscal policy on macroeconomic aggregates

relying on the information of interested parties we investigate the conventional wisdom that competition among interested parties attempting to influence a decisionmaker by providing verifiable information elicits all relevant information we find that if the decisionmaker is strategically sophisticated and well informed about the relevant variables and about the preferences of the interested party or parties competition may be unnecessary to achieve this result if the decisionmaker is unsophisticated or not well informed competition is not generally sufficient if the interested parties interests are sufficiently opposed however or if the decisionmaker is seeking to advance the parties welfare then competition can reduce or even eliminate the decisionmaker s need for prior knowledge about the relevant variables and for strategic sophistication in other settings only the combination of competition among information providers and a sophisticated skepticism is sufficient to allow effective decisionmaking

new keynesian versus old keynesian government spending multipliers renewed interest in fiscal policy has increased the use of quantitative models to evaluate policy because of modelling uncertainty it is essential that policy evaluations be robust to alternative assumptions we find that models currently being used in practice to evaluate fiscal policy stimulus proposals are not robust government spending multipliers in an alternative empirically estimated and widely cited new keynesian model are much smaller than in these old keynesian models the estimated stimulus is extremely small with gdp and employment effects only one sixth as large and with private sector employment impacts likely to be even smaller we investigate the sensitivity of our findings with regard to the response of monetary policy the zero bound on nominal interest rates and the inclusion of an empirically relevant degree of rule of thumb behaviour in the new keynesian model in addition we relate our findings using estimated structural macroeconomic models to the recent literature using reduced form regression techniques

fiscal policy pricing frictions and monetary accommodation this paper empirically investigates whether the theoretical conditions for government expenditure expansions to be effective hold for the data we ask whether the necessary conditions for fiscal effectiveness are relevant on average and in special circumstances that capture features of the recent crisis fiscal policy can be an effective countercyclical tool if monetary policy accommodates the fiscal expansion if expectations about future output growth and inflation are constant and if structural relationships are invariant to the policy change recent expansions are unlikely to produce large output multipliers or have important debt or inflation effects credible deficit and debt reduction schemes can produce sizeable output multipliers fabio canova and evi pappa