women and budget deficits if women have different economic preferences than men then female economic and political empowerment is likely to change economic policy and in turn perhaps macroeconomic outcomes in this paper we narrow the focus to fiscal policy and we investigate whether female enfranchisement affects government budget deficits in a difference in differences regression for swiss cantonal panel data we find that the inclusion of women in the electorate has reduced deficits by a statistically significant amount

the retrenchment hypothesis and the extension of the franchise in england and wales does an extension of the voting franchise always increase public spending or can it be a source of retrenchment we study this question in the context of public spending on health related urban amenities in a panel of municipal boroughs from england and wales in 1868 1871 and 1886 we find evidence of a u shaped relationship between spending on urban amenities and the extension of the local voting franchise our model of taxpayer democracy suggests that the retrenchment effect was related to enfranchisement of the middle class through nation wide reforms and that these reforms might have been pareto inferior in the average borough

explaining business cycles in small open economies abstract this paper analyzes the role of world price shocks fluctuations in the prices of capital intermediate and primary goods and in the world real interest rate in the generation and propagation of business cycles in small open developing countries i construct a stochastic dynamic multi sector small open economy model the model is a variant of the specific factors model and reflects the major structural characteristics of developing economies i utilize variance decomposition methods to quantitatively evaluate the impact of world price shocks the results indicate that world price shocks account for a significant fraction of business cycle variability in developing countries

debt dynamics in europe a network general equilibrium gvar approach in this work we investigate the dynamic interdependencies among the eu12 economies using a competitive general equilibrium network system representation additionally using bayesian techniques we estimate the autoregressive scheme that characterizes the equilibrium price system of the network while characterizing each economy node in the universe of our network in terms of its degree of pervasiveness in this context we unveil the dominant s unit s in our model and estimate the dynamic linkages between the economies nodes lastly in terms of robustness analysis we compare the findings of the degree pervasiveness of each economy against other popular quantitative methods in the literature according to our findings the economy of germany acts as weakly dominant entity in the eu12 economy meanwhile all shocks die out in the short run without any long lasting effect

the real effects of financial integration abstract this paper shows how correlations in gdp fluctuations rise with financial integration finance serves to increase international correlations in both consumption and gdp fluctuations which explains the persistent gap between the two in the data a quantity puzzle the positive association between financial integration and gdp correlation constitutes a puzzle as theory suggests a negative relation if anything nevertheless it prevails in the data even after the effects of finance on trade and specialization are accounted for

democracy comes to europe franchise extension and fiscal outcomes 1830 1938 abstract this paper examines the relation between public spending and the spread of democracy in western europe during the period 1830 1938 our data set includes measures of the size of the electorate the election rule and electoral participation as well as measures of the size and composition of central government expenditures for 12 countries we estimate panel regressions and find that 1 the gradual lifting of socio economic restrictions on the voting franchise contributed to growth in government spending mainly by increasing spending on infrastructure and internal security 2 the female suffrage had a weak positive effect through spending on health education and welfare 3 the change from majority to proportional rule which took place in 10 of the countries did not contribute to growth in government spending and held back spending on health education and welfare 4 there exists weak complementarity between economic development and the spread of democracy

democratisation and tax structure in the presence of home production evidence from the kingdom of greece abstract this paper examines the impact of democratisation on tax structure in an agrarian economy where goods can be produced at home for self consumption we first develop a model of optimal taxation with heterogeneous agents where the good produced in the market is subject to a consumption tax whereas the homogeneous good produced at home is burdened by a direct tax such as land tithes contrary to conventional theory our model suggests that extension of the voting franchise to poorer segments of the population exerts a negative impact on the share of direct to indirect taxes using unique national and regional tax data for the kingdom of greece a typical agrarian economy where universal male suffrage was established in 1864 we provide consistent empirical evidence greek governments adjusted tax policy in order to meet the preferences of the newly enfranchised electorate that constituted mostly peasants and farmers this group was harmed substantially by direct taxes on land but was able to avoid indirect taxes through self consumption we also analyse a sample of 12 european countries over the same period and provide evidence for a similar change in the tax structure when the agricultural sector dominates the economy

a multivariate cointegrated modelling approach in testing temporal causality between energy consumption real income and prices with an application to two asian ldcs unlike previous studies on the casual relationship between energy consumption and economic growth this paper illustrates how the finding of cointegration i e long term equilibrium relationship between these variables may be used in testing granger causality based on the most recent johansen s multiple cointegration tests preceded by various unit root or nonstationarity tests we test for cointegration between total energy consumption real income and price level of two asian ldcs thailand and sri lanka nonrejection of cointegration between variables rules out granger noncausality and implies at least one way of granger causality either unidirectional or bidirectional secondly by using a dynamic vector error correction model we then analyse the direction of granger causation and hence the within sample grangerexogeneity or endogeneity of each of the variables thirdly the relative strength of the causality is gauged through the dynamic variance decomposition technique by decomposing the total

the political economy of financial systems evidence from suffrage reforms in the last two centuries initially voting rights were limited to wealthy elites providing political support for stock markets the franchise expansion induces the median voter to provide political support for banking development as this new electorate has lower financial holdings and benefits less from the uncertainty and financial returns from stock markets our panel data evidence covering 1830 1999 shows that tighter restrictions on the voting franchise induce a greater stock market development whereas a broader voting franchise is more conducive towards the banking sector consistent with perotti and von thadden 2006 our results are robust to controlling for other political determinants and endogeneity

immigration redistribution and universal suffrage the effect of immigration on redistribution has been widely debated this paper contributes to this debate by testing two explanations which are that i immigration tends to reduce redistribution due to people s higher levels of xenophobia and that ii immigration affects redistribution because immigrants do not have the right to vote since the demand for redistribution depends on the expected gap between median voter income and mean income immigrants affect the demand for redistribution because as non citizens they do not change the median voter s income but as economic stakeholders they do affect the mean income four empirical consequences of i and ii are tested at the individual level evidence from the european values survey in 45 countries confirms ii showing that immigrants expected competitiveness on the labor market affects preferences for redistribution and that it is amplified when the perceived number of immigrants is high in contrast i is globally rejected since the impact of the citizens declared level of solidarity with immigrants tends to be weak and depends on the type of measurement or specification used

trade finance specialization and synchronization i investigate the determinants of business cycle synchronization across regions the linkages between trade in goods financial openness specialization and business cycle synchronization are evaluated in the context of a system of simultaneous equations the main results are as follows i specialization patterns have a sizable effect on business cycles most of this effect is independent of trade or financial policy but directly reflects differences in gdp per capita ii a variety of measures of financial integration suggest that economic regions with strong financial links are significantly more synchronized even though they also tend to be more specialized iii the estimated role of trade is closer to that implied by existing models once intra industry trade is held constant the results obtain in a variety of data sets measurement strategies and specifications they relate to a recent strand of international business cycle models with incomplete markets and transport costs and on the empir

the competitive implications of top of the market and related contract pricing clauses this article examines the competitive implications of contract pricing arrangements which link the contract price to the subsequent cash price we focus on so called top of the market pricing tomp in cattle procurement the tomp clause is shown to have anticompetitive consequences when the same buyers who purchase contract cattle with the tomp clause also compete to procure cattle in the subsequent spot market the tomp clause reduces packers incentives to compete aggressively in the spot market although tomp pricing is not in producers collective interest rational sellers may nonetheless sign these contracts with little or no financial inducement

social mobility and the demand for public consumption expenditures the collective choice of public consumption expenditure is reconsidered when voters are socially mobile in accordance with previous work on social mobility and political economics the analysis concerns a class of mobility processes that induce mappings from initial income to expected future income that are monotonically increasing and concave the paper abstracts from the explicitly redistributive role of government and concentrates on public consumption which is modeled as a classical public good in equilibrium provision is sensitive to the degree of social mobility theoretically linking social mobility to public consumption further empirical puzzles about the impact of voting franchise extensions on the growth of government spending are addressed within the context of social mobility

the non democratic origins of income taxation this article examines the adoption of income taxes in western economies since the 19th century we identify two empirical regularities that challenge predictions of existing models of taxation and

why did the elites extend the suffrage democracy and the scope of government with an application to britain s age of reform a new rationale is presented for why an elite may want to expand the franchise even in the absence of threats to the established order expanding the franchise can turn politicians away from particularistic politics based on ad personam redistribution within the elite and foster competition based on programs with diffuse benefits if these programs are valuable a majority of the elite votes in favor of an extension of the franchise despite the absence of a threat from the disenfranchised we argue that the evolution of public spending and of political competition in nineteenth century britain is consistent with our model i introduction at the beginning of the nineteenth century in most countries narrow elites had a disproportionate influence on public affairs even in england where parliament was an influential institution suffrage was mostly the privilege of the wealthy and some members of parliament were elected in boroughs with as few as 100 voters while cities such as manchester did not have any representative a century later most western countries had universal male suffrage with female suffrage to arrive shortly thereafter what brought about this democratic revolution in many cases the elites were forced out of power after violent revolutions however there are important examples such as england where democratization took the form of gradual extensions of the suffrage and these were accompanied by little overt violence it is the peculiar pride of england that the record of social and political reform is to be found on the statute book not in the annals of revolution cheyney 1931 p vii such peaceful democratizations are difficult to rationalize within the benchmark political economic models in those models extending the franchise dilutes the elite s power to influence policy and results

did women s suffrage change the size and scope of government this paper examines the growth of government during this century as a result of giving women the right to vote using cross sectional time series data for 1870 1940 we examine state government expenditures and revenue as well as voting by u s house and senate state delegations and the passage of a wide range of different state laws suffrage coincided with immediate increases in state government expenditures and revenue and more liberal voting patterns for federal representatives and these effects continued growing over time as more women took advantage of the franchise contrary to many recent suggestions the gender gap is not something that has arisen since the 1970s and it helps explain why american government started growing when it did

endogenous enfranchisement when groups preferences conflict in their seminal paper aumann kurz and neyman found the surprising result that the choice of levels of public goods in a democracy is not affected by the distribution of voting rights this implies that groups of individuals may not value the franchise this conclusion however does not correspond to what we commonly observe we propose a new model to address the question of enfranchisement the main feature of our model is that it takes into account natural affinities such as religion or class that may exist between voters this allows us to show that while individuals may not value the vote they nonetheless value the franchise we also show that in the presence of nonconvexities it is more likely that the group in power will grant the franchise when preferences are severely opposed

transmission of business cycle shocks between the us and the euro area we analyse the transmission of structural shocks between the us and the euro area within a two country vector autoregressive var framework for that purpose we simultaneously identify cost push demand and monetary policy shocks for both countries using sign restrictions our results show that domestic shocks explain the largest share of the forecast error variances for gross domestic product gdp consumer prices and interest rate in both countries in the short run whilst spillovers from the other country and global factors gain importance in the medium run the strength of the shock transmission between the two countries is quite symmetric our approach to the identification of structural shocks allows us to construct confidence bands that account both for estimation and identification uncertainty we find impulse responses to domestic shocks to be significant while spillovers across countries are insignificant

the effect of the expansion of the voting franchise on the size of government this paper examines the claim that expansion of the voting franchise has been an important factor in the growth of government state government spending and state and local spending are explained using a panel of 46 states for 1950 88 elimination of poll taxes and literacy tests led to higher turnout particularly among the poor and a poorer pivotal voter as predicted we find that these changes a fall in the income of voters relative to state income and the ouster of republicans from state government led to a sharp rise in welfare spending but no change in other spending

public sector debt dynamics the persistence and sources of shocks to debt in 10 eu countries this paper characterises the time series properties of debt gdp ratios in ten eu countries over the period 1982 2009 it establishes that shocks to debt ratios persist and measures the size and source of the permanent effects of shocks as they evolve over time the analysis shows that debt dynamics in the eu10 are complicated involving important inter country interactions and protracted adjustment periods of the order of ten years we find evidence of asymmetries in the effects of different forms of fiscal consolidation with unanticipated reductions in government spending having a more permanent effect than unanticipated increases in government revenue unanticipated business cycle fluctuations also have important long term effects on the ratio

the provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives politicians who care about the spoils of office may underprovide a public good because its benefits cannot be targeted to voters as easily as pork barrel spending we compare a winner take all system where all the spoils go to the winner to a proportional system where the spoils of office are split among candidates proportionally to their share of the vote in a winner take all system the public good is provided less often than in a proportional system when the public good is particularly desirable we then consider the electoral college system and show that it is particularly subject to this inefficiency

redistributing income under proportional representation although majoritarian decision rules are the norm in legislatures relatively few democracies use simple majority rule at the electoral stage adopting instead some form of multiparty proportional representation moreover aggregate data suggest that average income tax rates are higher and distributions of posttax income flatter in countries with proportional representation than in those with majority rule while there are other differences between these countries this paper explores how variations in the political system per se influence equilibrium redistributive tax rates and income distributions a three party proportional representation model is developed in which taxes are determined through legislative bargaining among successful electoral parties and the economic decision for individuals is occupational choice political economic equilibria for this model and for a two party winner take all majoritarian system are derived and compared

gender quotas and the quality of politicians we analyze the effects of the introduction of gender quotas in candidate lists on the quality of elected politicians as measured by the average number of years of education we consider an italian law which introduced gender quotas in local elections in 1993 and was abolished in 1995 as not all municipalities went through elections during this period we identify two groups of municipalities and use a difference in differences estimation we find that gender quotas are associated with an increase in the quality of elected politicians with the effect ranging from 0 12 to 0 24 years of education this effect is due not only to the higher number of elected women who are on average more educated than men but also to the lower number of low educated elected men the positive effect on quality is confirmed when we measure the latter with alternative indicators it persists in the long run and it is robust to controlling for political ideology and political competition

democracy collective action and intra elite conflict we analyze a model where there is uncertainty about the future power of two ex ante symmetric elites to appropriate surplus and ex ante surplus sharing agreements are not binding we show that in an oligarchy the stronger elite appropriates the entire available surplus whereas a democracy results in a more balanced surplus allocation between the two elites in a democracy the newly enfranchised non elite organize to act collectively so that the weaker elite can credibly threaten to form a coalition with the organized non elite against the stronger elite such a threat ensures that the more balanced surplus sharing proposal chosen by majority voting is renegotiation proof therefore sufficiently risk averse elites unanimously choose democracy as a form of insurance against future imbalances in relative power we emphasize that franchise extension to and low cost of organizing collective political activity for the non elite are both necessary features of a democracy our formal analysis can account for the stylized facts that emerge from a comparative analysis of indian and western european democracies

elite competition and state capacity development theory and evidence from post revolutionary mexico international wars and interstate rivalry have been at the center of our understanding of the origin and expansion of state capacity this article describes an alternative path to the development of state capacity rooted in domestic political conflict under conditions of intra elite conflict political rulers seize upon the temporary weakness of their rivals expropriate their assets and consolidate authority because this political consolidation increases rulers chances of surviving an economic elite s challenge it enhances their incentives to develop state capacity these ideas are evaluated in post revolutionary mexico where commodity price shocks induced by the great depression affected the local economic elite differentially negative shocks lead to increased asset expropriation and substantially higher investments in state capacity which persist to the present

electoral systems and public spending we study the effects of electoral institutions on the size and composition of public expenditure in oecd and latin american countries we emphasize the distinction between purchases of goods and services which are easier to target geographically and transfers which are easier to target across social groups we present a theoretical model in which voters anticipating government policymaking under different electoral systems have an incentive to elect representatives more prone to transfer public good spending in proportional majoritarian systems the model also predicts higher total primary spending in proportional majoritarian systems when the share of transfer spending is high low after dee ning rigorous measures of proportionality to be used in the empirical investigation we e nd considerable support for our predictions

dynamic and contemporaneous causality in a supply chain an application of the us beef industry causal relationships are used to investigate information flows and directions of control in a decentralized multi echelon supply chain where no central authority has system level control over optimizing decisions we use secondary time series data representing the us beef industry to investigate dynamic and contemporaneous causality based on out of sample granger causality and direct acyclic graphs dags results indicate i the us beef supply chain experienced a significant structural change in late 1996 and early 1997 that may be attributed to a weather induced production shock and an apparent turnaround of the cattle cycle ii contemporaneous causalities appear to be stronger and dynamic causalities appear to be weaker after the structural change suggesting faster and more effective information transmission along the supply chain after the structural change iii contemporaneous information appears to flow from upstream to downstream tiers in the supply chain before the structural break which r

let s get real a factor analytical approach to disaggregated business cycle dynamics this paper develops a method for analysing the dynamics of large cross sections based on a factor analytic model we use law of large numbers arguments to show that the number of common factors can be determined by a principal components method the economy wide shocks can be identified by means of simple structural var techniques and that the parameters of the unobserved factor model can be estimated consistently by applying ols equation by equation we distinguish between a technological and a non technological shock identification is obtained by minimizing the negative realizations of the technology shock empirical results on 4 digit industrial output and productivity for the u s economy from 1958 to 1986 show that 1 at least two economy wide shocks both having a long run effect on sectoral output are needed to explain the common dynamics 2 although the technological shock accounts for at least 50 of the aggregate dynamics of output it cannot by itself explain dynamics at business cycle frequencies 3 sector specific shocks explain the main bulk of total variance but generate mainly high frequency dynamics 4 both the technological and the non technological component of output show a peak for positive sectoral comovements of output at business cycle frequencies 5 technological shocks are strongly correlated with the growth rates of the investment in machinery and equipment sectors and their inputs many interesting questions about cyclical fluctuations and economic growth can be answered only by studying the dynamic behaviour of sectoral variables when data contain information on time for a large cross section of sectors traditional econometric techniques used in the macroeconomic literature such as vector autoregressive var and vector autoregressive moving average varma models are not appropriate since they require the estimation of too many parameters this is why new methods which allow for the reduction of the parameter space need to be developed the objective of this paper is both methodological and descriptive at the methodological level we develop a simple framework for the dynamic analysis of large cross sections the basic model is a dynamic factor analytic model as in sargent and sims 1977 the sectoral variables are decomposed into two unobservable components a common component driven by macroeconomic shocks and a purely sectoral component when

sources of international business fluctuations country specific shocks or worldwide shocks abstract this paper identifies sources of business fluctuations in a two country open economy model with the structural var method focusing on the relative importance of worldwide shocks and country specific shocks unlike previous studies which define country specific shocks as labor supply shocks this study explicitly identifies three kinds of permanent shocks worldwide shocks domestic country specific shocks and foreign country specific shocks with identifying restrictions derived from a theoretical model the main finding is that u s country specific shocks are the most important in explaining u s and foreign output fluctuations except in the short run

business cycles for g7 and european countries this article proposes classical business cycle turning points for the g7 and a number of european countries based on industrial production this enables the authors to examine the international nature of cyclical movements free from arbitrary assumptions about the trend in particular they show that cyclical assymetry is common with slopes during declines being generally larger in magnitude than during expansions a binary measure of association for expansion and contradiction regimes indicates a core group of european countries related to each other and apparently linked to the united states and japan through germany copyright 1997 by university of chicago press

voting suffrage and the political budget cycle evidence from the london metropolitan boroughs 1902 1937 we study the opportunistic political budget cycle in the london metropolitan boroughs between 1902 and 1937 under two different suffrage regimes taxpayer suffrage 1902 1914 and universal suffrage 1921 1937 we argue and find supporting evidence that the political budget cycle operates differently under the two types of suffrage taxpayer suffrage where the right to vote and the obligation to pay local taxes are linked encourages demands for retrenchment and the political budget cycle manifests itself in election year tax cuts and savings on administration costs universal suffrage where all adult residents can vote irrespective of their taxpayer status creates demands for productive public services and the political budget cycle manifests itself in election year hikes in capital spending and a reduction in current spending

persistence of power elites and institutions we construct a model to study the implications of changes in political insti tutions for economic institutions a change in political institutions alters the distribution of de jure political power but creates incentives for investments in de facto political power to partially or even fully offset change in de jure power the model can imply a pattern of captured democracy whereby a democratic regime may survive but choose economic institutions favoring an elite the model provides conditions under which economic or policy outcomes will be invariant to changes in political institutions and economic institutions them selves will persist over time jel d02 d72 the domination of an organized minority over the unor ganized majority is inevitable the power of any minority is irresistible as against each single individual in the majority who stands alone before the totality of the organized minor ity at the same time the minority is organized for the very reason that it is a minority

the structure of interdependence in international stock markets abstract this study investigates the dynamic structure of nine major stock markets using an error correction model and directed acyclic graphs dag the dag representation provides a structure of causality among these markets in contemporaneous time building on this contemporaneous structure and the estimated error correction model innovation accounting techniques are applied the results show that the japanese market is among the most highly exogenous and the canadian and french markets among the least exogenous in our nine market study the us market is highly influenced by its own historical innovations but it is also influenced by market innovations from the uk switzerland hong kong france and germany the us market is the only market that has a consistently strong impact on price movements in other major stock markets in the longer run

property rights and competing for the affections of demos the impact of the 1867 reform act on stock prices the 1867 reform act in britain extended the electoral franchise to the skilled but propertyless urban working classes using stock market data and exploiting the fact that foreign and domestic equities traded simultaneously on the london market this paper finds that investors in british firms reacted negatively to the passage of this act we suggest that this finding is consistent with investors foreseeing future alterations of property rights arising from the pressure that the large newly enfranchised group would bring to bear on government policy we also suggest that our findings appear to be more consistent with the tory political competition explanation for the act rather than the whig threat of revolution explanation

on the power of dickey fuller tests against fractional alternatives abstract we examine the properties of dickey fuller unit root tests under fractionally integrated alternatives and find that these tests have quite low power

how do electoral systems affect fiscal policy evidence from cantonal parliaments 1890 2000 using a new data set on swiss cantons since 1890 we analyze how the adoption of proportional representation affects fiscal policy in line with economic theory we show that proportional systems shift spending toward broad goods like education and welfare benefits but decrease spending on geographically targetable goods like roads we find little evidence that proportional representation increases the overall size of government an analysis of the underlying theoretical mechanisms reveals that proportional representation increases electoral turnout left wing representation and political fragmentation these changes in political representation explain a substantial share of the rise in education spending but a small share of the rise in welfare spending or the decline in road expenditures jel h4 h11 i38

the effect of government expenditure on the environment an empirical investigation abstract this paper examines the impact of government spending on the environment using a panel of 77 countries for the time period 1980 2000 we estimate both the direct and indirect effects of government spending on pollution the indirect effect in particular operates through the impact of government spending on income and the subsequent effect of the income level on pollution to take into account the dynamic nature and the potential endogeneity in the relationships examined appropriate econometric methods are used for so2 government spending is estimated to have a negative direct impact on per capita emissions while the direct effect is insignificant on co2 pollution the indirect effect on so2 is negative for low income levels and becomes positive as income increases while it remains negative for co2 for the most part of the sample range the resultant total effects follow the patterns of the indirect effects which dominate their respective direct ones for each pollutant policy implications from the results vary depending on the income level of the considered countries

does high public debt consistently stifle economic growth a critique of reinhart and rogoff we replicate reinhart and rogoff 2010a and 2010b and find that selective exclusion of available data coding errors and inappropriate weighting of summary statistics lead to serious miscalculations that inaccurately represent the relationship between public debt and gdp growth among 20 advanced economies over 1946 2009 countries with public debt gdp ratios above 90 averaged 2 2 real annual gdp growth not 0 1 as published the published results for i median gdp growth rates for the 1946 2009 period and ii mean and median gdp growth figures over 1790 2009 are all distorted by similar methodological errors although the magnitudes of the distortions are somewhat smaller than with the mean figures for 1946 2009 contrary to reinhart and rogoff s broader contentions both mean and median gdp growth when public debt levels exceed 90 of gdp are not dramatically different from when the public debt gdp ratios are lower the relationship between public debt and gdp growth varies significantly by period and country our overall evidence refutes rr s claim that public debt gdp ratios above 90 consistently reduce a country s gdp growth

the enfranchisement of women and the welfare state abstract we offer a rationale for the decision to extend the franchise to women within a politico economic model where men are richer than women women display a higher preference for public goods and women s disenfranchisement carries a societal cost men and women are matched within households which are the center of the decision process we derive the optimal tax rate under two alternative regimes a males only enfranchisement regime and a universal enfranchisement regime the latter is associated with a higher tax rate but as industrialization raises the reward to intellectual labor relative to physical labor women s relative wage increases thus decreasing the difference between the tax rates when the cost of disenfranchisement becomes higher than the cost of the higher tax rate which applies under universal enfranchisement the male median voter is better off extending the franchise to women a consequent expansion of the size of government is only to be expected in societies with a relatively high cost of disenfranchisement we empirically test the implications of the model over the 1870 1930 period we proxy the gender wage gap with the level of per capita income and the cost of disenfranchisement with the presence of catholicism which is associated with a more traditional view of women s role and thus a lower cost the gender gap in the preferences for public goods is proxied by the availability of divorce which implies marital instability and a more vulnerable economic position for women consistently with the model s predictions women s suffrage is correlated positively with per capita income and negatively with the presence of catholicism and the availability of divorce while women s suffrage increases the size of government only in non catholic countries

forecasting with medium and large bayesian vars this paper is motivated by the recent interest in the use of bayesian vars for forecasting even in cases where the number of dependent variables is large in such cases factor methods have been traditionally used but recent work using a particular prior suggests that bayesian var methods can forecast better in this paper we consider a range of alternative priors which have been used with small vars discuss the issues which arise when they are used with medium and large vars and examine their forecast performance using a us macroeconomic dataset containing 168 variables we find that bayesian vars do tend to forecast better than factor methods and provide an extensive comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of various approaches typically we find that the simple minnesota prior forecasts well in medium and large vars which makes this prior attractive relative to computationally more demanding alternatives our empirical results show the importance of using forecast metrics based on the entire predictive density instead of relying solely on those based on point forecasts

the role of international factors in the business cycle a multi country study abstract empirical research has been conducted on the various theories of the business cycle over many countries however very little research has attempted to undertake a multi country disaggregate investigation into the sources of output change this paper decomposes fluctuations in industry output in a particular country into 1 a nation specific shock 2 an industry specific shock 3 a common shock and 4 an idiosyncratic factor using a dynamic factor analysis state space approach the paper finds that the industry specific impulse explains a significant but small part of the variance of the forecast error this provides limited support for the disaggregated real business cycle paradigm

forward exchange market unbiasedness the case of the australian dollar since 1984 abstract this paper implements a robust statistical approach to regression with non stationary time series the methods were recently developed in other work and are briefly exposited here they allow us to perform regressions in levels with non stationary time series data they accommodate data distributions with heavy tails and they permit serial dependence and temporal heterogeneity of unknown form in the equation errors with these features the methods are well suited to applications with frequently sampled exchange rate data which generally display all of these empirical characteristics our application here is to daily data on spot and forward exchange rates between the australian and us dollars over the period 1984 1991 following the deregulation of the australian foreign exchange market we find big differences between the robust and the non robust regression outcomes and in the associated statistical tests of the hypothesis that the forward rate is an unbiased predictor of the future spot rate the robust tests reject the unbiasedness hypothesis but still give the forward rate an important role as a predictor of the future spot rate

the real time predictive content of money for output abstract data on monetary aggregates are subject to periodic redefinitions presumably in part to improve their link to measures of output money data are also revised on a regular basis taking these data imperfections into account we reassess the evidence on the marginal predictive content of m1 and m2 for real and nominal output in particular first by using the latest version of the data that is available and then using sequences of historical time series that would have been available to forecasters in real time we are able to provide a comprehensive assessment of whether money is useful for predicting output we conclude that the generally significant marginal predictive content of m1 or m2 for output that is found using a recently revised data set is not duplicated in a real time setting although m2 is shown to remain useful when 1 year ahead forecasts are constructed using fitted vector autoregressive models

why did the west extend the franchise democracy inequality and growth in historical perspective during the nineteenth century most western societies extended voting rights a decision that led to unprecedented redistributive programs we argue that these political reforms can be viewed as strategic decisions by the political elite to prevent widespread social unrest and revolution political transition rather than redistribution under existing political institutions occurs because current transfers do not ensure future transfers while the extension of the franchise changes future political equilibria and acts as a commitment to redistribution our theory also offers a novel explanation for the kuznets curve in many western economies during this period with the fall in inequality following redistribution due to democratization i introduction the nineteenth century was a period of fundamental political reform and unprecedented changes in taxation and redistribution britain for example was transformed from an oligarchy run by an elite to a democracy the franchise was extended in 1832 and then again in 1867 and 1884 transferring voting rights to portions of the society with no previous political representation the decades after the political reforms witnessed radical social reforms increased taxation and the extension of education to the masses moreover as noted by kuznets inequality which was previously increasing started to decline during this period the gini coefficient for income inequality in england and wales had risen from 0 400 in 1823 to 0 627 in 1871 but fell to 0 443 in 1901 two key factors in the reduction in inequality were the increase in the proportion of skilled workers williamson 1985 and the redistribution of income toward the poorer segments of the society for example taxes rose from 8 12 percent of national product in 1867 to 18 8 percent by 1927 and the progressivity of the tax system increased substantially see lindert 1989

how to get the snowball rolling and extend the franchise voting on the great reform act of 1832 this paper suggests a new approach to analyzing the causes of franchise extension based on a new dataset it provides a detailed econometric study of the great reform act of 1832 in the united kingdom the analysis yields four main results first modernization theory receives limited support second the reform enjoyed some measure of popular support third the threat of revolution had an asymmetric impact on the voting behavior of the pro reform whigs and the anti reform tories while the threat might have convinced reluctant reformers among the whig politicians and among their patrons to support the bill it seems to have hardened the resistance to reform among the tories fourth ideology played a critical role nevertheless it also appears that self interest and political expedience explained the votes of many members of parliament

political and economic inequities and the shaping of institutions and redistribution this article studies the joint effect of political and economic inequalities on redistributive taxation and institutional quality the theoretical model suggests that income inequality coupled with political bias in favor of the rich decreases redistribution and lowers institutional quality the effect of the former is to increase productive investment and the effect of the latter is to decrease it with resulting ambiguous implications for economic growth testing these predictions empirically in a panel of countries we find that inequality has a negative effect on both institutional quality and redistribution

racism and redistribution in the united states a solution to the problem of american exceptionalism abstract the two main political parties in the united states in the period 1976 1992 put forth policies on redistribution and on issues pertaining directly to race we argue that redistributive politics in the us can be fully understood only by taking account of the interconnection between these issues in political competition we identify two mechanisms through which racism among american voters decreases the degree of redistribution that would otherwise obtain in common with others we suggest that voter racism decreases the degree of redistribution due to an anti solidarity effect that some voters oppose government transfer payments to minorities whom they view as undeserving we suggest a second effect as well that some voters who desire redistribution nevertheless vote for the anti redistributive republican party because its position on the race issue is more consonant with their own and this too decreases the degree of redistribution in political equilibrium this we name the policy bundle effect we propose a formal model of multi dimensional political competition that enables us to estimate the magnitude of these two effects and estimate the model for the period in question we compute that voter racism reduced the income tax rate by 11 18 points the total effect decomposes about equally into the two sub effects we also find that the democratic vote share is 5 38 points lower than it would have been absent racism the magnitude of this effect would seem to explain the difference between the sizes of the public sector in the us and northern european countries

a theory of top income taxation and social insurance the development of the welfare state in the western economies between 1930 and 1990 coincided with a puzzling pattern in the taxation of top incomes eective tax rates at the top increased sharply but then gradually decreased even as social transfers continued rising we propose a new theory of the development of the welfare state to explain these facts our main insight is that social insurance and top income taxation are substitutes for averting social con ict we emphasize the role of the great depres sion as a source of aggregate risk and argue that the rise of the welfare state can be understood as a process of exploiting e ciency gains in response to gradual technolog ical improvements in the provision of social insurance our detailed arguments build on the policy histories of the united states great britain and sweden

the political class and redistributive policies we study the eect of the composition of the political class on the size of government first we use a citizen candidate model to show that the extension of surage may be inconsequential for government spending when there are pre existing stricter requirements for holding oce we then test this prediction empirically using data from the 13 u s original colonies we nd that the extension of the franchise did not aect government spending or the composition of the political class however the subsequent elimination of economic qualications to hold oce increased government spending and enriched the class heterogeneity

international comparisons of cattle cycles the time series properties of cattle production in three countries with different technologies argentina the united states and uruguay are studied in order to shed light on the role of technology in the dynamics of the cattle sector four series are analyzed for each country slaughter price stock of cows and total herd spectral decomposition of the time series shows the existence of cycles having surprising regularity for all the four time series the three countries exhibit very similar cyclicities in spite of their different technologies and economic environment

the conscription of wealth mass warfare and the demand for progressive taxation the dominant narrative of the politics of redistribution in political sci ence and economics highlights the signature role of the rise of electoral democracy and the development of political parties that mobilize working class groups we argue in this article that this narrative ignores the critical role played by mass warfare in the development of redistributive public policies focusing attention on the determi nants of progressive taxation we argue that mobilization for mass warfare led to demands for increased taxation of the wealthy to more fairly distribute the burden for the war effort we then show empirically that during the past century mass mobi lization for war has been associated with a notable increase in tax progressivity in the absence of war neither the establishment of universal suffrage nor the arrival of political control by parties of the left is systematically associated with large increases in tax progressivity in making these arguments we devote particular attention to a difference in differences comparison of participants and nonparticipants in world war i those who have made fortunes out of the war must pay for the war and labour will insist upon heavily graduated direct taxation with a raising of the exemption limit that is what labour means by the conscription of wealth

gender gaps in policy making evidence from direct democracy in switzerland this paper uses a unique data set on individual voting decisions to shed new light on gender gaps in policy making our analysis focuses on switzerland the world leader in direct democracy where all citizens directly decide on a broad range of policies at the ballot box analysing all federal votes held between 1981 and 2003 we show that there are large gender gaps in the areas of health environmental protection defence spending and welfare policy the gender gaps typically persist even conditional on socio economic characteristics we also find that female policy makers have a substantial effect on the composition of public spending but a small effect on the overall size of government

probabilistic forecasting of output growth inflation and the balance of trade in a gvar framework summary we apply a global vector autoregressive gvar model to the analysis of inflation output growth and global imbalances among a group of 33 countries 26 regions we account for structural instability by use of country specific intercept shifts the timings of which are identified taking into account both statistical evidence and our knowledge of historic economic conditions and events using this model we compute both central forecasts and scenario based probabilistic forecasts for a range of events of interest including the sign and trajectory of the balance of trade the achievement of a short term inflation target and the incidence of recession and slow growth the forecasting performance of the gvar model in relation to the ongoing financial crisis is quite remarkable it correctly identifies a pronounced and widespread economic contraction accompanied by a marked shift in the net trade balance of the eurozone and japan moreover this promising out of sample forecasting performance is substantiated by a raft of statistical tests which indicate that the predictive accuracy of the gvar model is broadly comparable to that of standard benchmark models over short horizons and superior over longer horizons hence we conclude that gvar models may be a useful forecasting tool for institutions operating at both the national and supra national levels copyright 2010 john wiley sons ltd

unstable politics fiscal space and electoral volatility in the indian states what explains variations in electoral volatility the authors argue that fiscal space availability of financial resources to enact policy initiatives and provide public programs possessed by govern

emergence and persistence of inefficient states we present a theory of the emergence and persistence of inefficient states based on patronage politics the society consists of rich and poor the rich are initially in power but expect to transition to democracy which will choose redistributive policies taxation requires the employment of bureaucrats by choosing an inefficient state structure the rich may be able to use patronage and capture democratic politics so reducing the amount of redistribution in democracy moreover the inefficient state creates its own constituency and tends to persist over time intuitively an inefficient state structure creates more rents for bureaucrats than would an efficient one when the poor come to power in democracy they will reform the structure of the state to make it more efficient so that higher taxes can be collected at lower cost and with lower rents for bureaucrats anticipating this when the society starts out with an inefficient organization of the state bureaucrats support the rich who set lower taxes but also provide rents to bureaucrats we obtain that the rich bureaucrats coalition may also expand the size of bureaucracy excessively so as to generate enough political support the model shows that an equilibrium with an inefficient state is more likely to arise when there is greater income inequality when bureaucratic rents take intermediate values and when individuals are sufficiently forward looking jel p16 h11 h26 h41

do constitutions cause large governments quasi experimental evidence abstract how do constitutional rules for elections and legislation affect the size of government we ask this question in a new sample of about 80 countries in the 1990s in addition to conventional regression methods we use quasi experimental matching methods which more convincingly address legitimate criticisms of causal inference from cross country data both sets of estimates suggest that presidential regimes and majoritarian elections produce smaller governments

sources and propagation of international output cycles common shocks or transmission abstract this paper studies the generation and transmission of international cycles in a multi country model with production and consumption interdependencies two sources of disturbance are considered and three channels of propagation are compared technology disturbances which are mildly correlated across countries are more successful than government expenditure disturbances in reproducing actual data the presence of a common component to the shocks and of production interdependencies appear to be crucial in quantitatively matching the properties of the data

female voting power the contribution of women s suffrage to the growth of social spending in western europe 1869 1960 women s suffrage was a major event in the history of democratization in western europe and elsewhere public choice theory predicts that the demand for publicly funded social spending is systematically higher where women have and use the right to vote using historical data from six western european countries for the period 1869 1960 we provide evidence that social spending out of gdp increased by 0 6 1 2 in the short run as a consequence of women s suffrage while the long run effect is three to eight times larger we also explore a number of other public finance implications of the gender gap

real business cycles in this paper we demonstrate how certain very ordinary economic principles lead maximizing individuals to choose consumption production plans that display many of the characteristics commonly associated with business cycles our explanation is entirely consistent with i rational expectations ii complete current information iii stable preferences iv no technological change v no long lived commodities vi no frictions or adjustment costs vii no government viii no money and ix no serial dependence in the stochastic elements of the environment we also provide a completely worked out example of the type of artificial economy we have in mind the time series properties of the example exhibit some major features of observed business cycles although this type of model may not be capable of explaining all of the regularities in actual business cycles we believe that it provides a useful well defined benchmark for assessing the relative importance of factors e g monetary disturbances

international migration self selection and the distribution of wages evidence from mexico and the united states we use the 1990 and 2000 mexican and u s population censuses to test borjas s negative selection hypothesis that the less skilled are those most likely to migrate from countries with high skill premia earnings inequality to countries with low skill premia earnings inequality we find that mexican immigrants in the united states are more educated than nonmigrants in mexico and were mexican immigrants to be paid according to current skill prices in mexico they would be concentrated in the middle of mexico s wage distribution these results are inconsistent with the negative selection hypothesis and instead suggest that there is intermediate selection of immigrants from mexico

electoral institutions and the politics of coalitions why some democracies redistribute more than others standard political economy models of redistribution notably that of meltzer and richard 1981 fail to account for the remarkable variance in government redistribution across democracies we develop a general model of redistribution that explains why some democratic governments are more prone to redistribute than others we show that the electoral system plays a key role because it shapes the nature of political parties and the composition of governing coalitions hence redistribution our argument implies 1 that center left governments dominate under pr systems whereas center right governments dominate under majoritarian systems and 2 that pr systems redistribute more than majoritarian systems we test our argument on panel data for redistribution government partisanship and electoral system in advanced democracies w hy do some countries redistribute more than others most work on the politics of redistribution starts from the premise that democratic institutions empower those who stand to benefit from redistribution the basic logic is succinctly captured in the meltzer richard 1981 model where the voter with the median income is also the decisive voter with a typical right skewed distribution of income the median voter will push for redistributive spending up to the point where the benefit of such spending to the median voter is outweighed by the efficiency costs of distortionary taxation this argument implies that redistibution is much greater in democracies than in nondemocracies at least of the right authoritarian variety and that among the latter inegalitarian societies redistribute more than egalitarian ones there is some evidence to supportthefirstimplication althoughitisdisputed see ross 2005 but most of the variance in redistribution is probably within the same regime type according to datafromtheluxembourgincomestudy forexample the reduction in the poverty rate in united states as a result of taxation and transfers was 13 in 1994 whereas the comparable figure for sweden was 82 thepovertyrateisthepercentageofhouseholdsbelow 50 of the median income to explain this variance we have to look at political and economic differences

spending biased legislators discipline through disagreement this paper studies politicians who have a present bias for spending they want to increase current spending and procrastinate spending cuts we argue that legislators bias is more severe in economies with low institutional quality we show that disagreement in legislatures leads to policy persistence and that this attenuates the temptation to overspend depending on the environment legislators decisions to be fiscally responsible may either complement or substitute other legislator s decisions in economies with weak institutions politicians actions are strategic complements thus institutional changes that induce fiscal responsibility are desirable they generate a positive responsibility multiplier and reduce inefficient spending however in economies with better institutions the same institutional change would induce some legislators to free ride on others responsibility and may lead to more inefficient spending