assessing the equalizing force of mobility using short panels france 1990 2000 in this paper we document whether and how much the equalizing force of earnings mobility has changed in france in the 1990 s for this purpose we use a representative three year panel the french labour force survey we develop a model of earnings dynamics that combines a flexible specification of marginal earnings distributions to fit the large cross sectional dimension of the data with a tight parametric representation of the dynamics adapted to the short time series dimension log earnings are modelled as the sum of a deterministic component an individual fixed effect and a transitory component which is assumed first order markov the transition probability of the transitory component is modelled as a one parameter plackett copula we estimate this model using a sequential expectation maximization algorithm we exploit the estimated model to study employment earnings inequality in france over the 1990 2002 period we show that in phase with business cycle fluctuations a recession in 1993 and two peaks in 1990 and 2000 earnings mobility decreases when cross section inequality and unemployment risk increase we simulate individual earnings trajectories and compute present values of lifetime earnings for various horizons inequality presents a hump shaped evolution over the period with a 9 increase between 1990 and 1995 and a decrease afterwards accounting for unemployment yields an increase of 11 moreover this increase is persistent as it translates into a 12 increase in the variance of log present values the ratio of inequality in present values to inequality in one year earnings a natural measure of immobility or of the persistence of inequality remains remarkably constant over the business cycle

taxing capital not a bad idea after all we quantitatively characterize the optimal capital and labor income tax in an overlapping generations model with idiosyncratic uninsurable income shocks and permanent productivity difierences of households the optimal capital income tax rate is signiflcantly positive at 36 percent the optimal progressive labor income tax is roughly a at tax of 23 percent with a deduction of 7 200 relative to average household income of 42 000 the high optimal capital income tax is mainly driven by the life cycle structure of the model whereas the optimal progressivity of the labor income tax is attributable to the insurance and redistribution role of the tax system jel e62 h21 h24

dynamic procurement under uncertainty optimal design and implications for incomplete contracts we characterize the optimal dynamic contract for a long term basic service when an uncertain add on is required later on introducing firm risk aversion has two impacts profits for the basic service can be backloaded to induce cheaper information revelation for this service an income effect which reduces output distortions the firm must also bear some risk to induce information revelation for the add on this risk effect reduces the level of the add on but hardens information revelation for the basic service the interaction between these effects has important implications for the dynamics of distortions contract renegotiation and the value of incomplete contracts

optimal taxation merging micro and macro approaches efficient provision of social insurance and efficient redistributionofresourcesamongindividualsaresomeofthemostimportantandchallenging questions in macroeconomics and public finance a seminal contribution of mirrlees 1971 is the starting point for the modern approach to answering these questions a trade off between efficiency and insurance or equity is inherent to this approach and is a key determinant of the optimal policy in this paper we argue that the large body of research that follows mirrlees approach has been developing in two quite separate directions referred to in this paper as the micro and macro approaches we argue that merging the two directions

optimal social security with imperfect tagging workers are exposed to the risk of permanent disability we rely on a dynamic mechanism design approach to determine how imperfect information on health should optimally be used to improve the trade off between inducing the able to work and providing insurance against disability after deriving the fi rst order conditions to this problem we calibrate the model to the u s economy and run a numerical simulation the government should offer back loaded incentives and make strategic use of the difference between the age at which disability occurs and the age of eligibility to disability bene ts also the able who are mistakenly tagged as disabled should be encouraged to work until some early retirement age this makes a decrease in the strictness of the disability test desirable which would reduce the number of disabled who are not awarded the tag and hence improve insurance finally we show how the first best allocation of resources can asymptotically be implemented by making strategic use of the disability test

compensation policy and worker performance identifying incentive effects from field experiments the role of field experiments in evaluating the effect of compensation policies on worker productivity is considered particular attention is paid to the ability of a field experiment to identify the effect of a permanent change in firm policy while field experiments solve endogeneity problems through randomization they do so within a specific and at times artificial environment that may not be replicated by a permanent policy change as such rather than providing a basis for the unrestricted identification of incentive effects experiments are better thought of as providing exogenous variation with which to identify structural parameters these parameters can in turn be used to predict the effects of policy changes jel j3 l2 c9

does the welfare state induce risk taking abstract in cross national data on individual and country level characteristics the variance of log annual income is shown to correlate positively with indicators of redistribution the database comes from the panel comparability paco project which provides uniquely comparable cross national panel data including both eastern and western europe and the us a random effects permanent income regression is used to estimate income variance the variance estimates are then regressed on individual and country characteristics the results indicate robustly that various measures of risk are higher in countries with a higher share of social spending in gdp the evidence can be interpreted as support for the argument that the welfare state encourages risk taking and thereby economic growth

using elasticities to derive optimal income tax rates this paper derives optimal income tax formulas using compensated and uncompensated elasticities of earnings with respect to tax rates a simple formula for the high income optimal tax rate is obtained as a function of these elasticities and the thickness of the top tail of the income distribution in the general non linear income tax problem this method using elasticities shows precisely how the different economic effects come into play and which are the key relevant parameters in the optimal income tax formulas of mirrlees the optimal non linear tax rate formulas are expressed in terms of elasticities and the shape of the income distribution these formulas are implemented numerically using empirical earning distributions and a range of realistic elasticity parameters

the response of worker effort to piece rates we measure the elasticity of worker effort with respect to changes in the piece rate using panel data collected from the payroll records of a british columbia tree planting firm our data contain information on daily worker productivity and the piece rate received over a five month period using a structural model to control for the endogeneity of the piece rate we estimate this elasticity to be approximately 2 14 we also calculate a nonstructural lower bound to this elasticity equal to 0 77 structural estimation also allows us to perform policy experiments and to compare firm profits under alternative compensation systems our results suggest that profits would increase by at least 17 percent were the firm to implement the optimal static contract as predicted by principal agent theory this increase in profits would be due to capturing worker rents after the revelation of private information over ability yet only a negligible proportion of these rents could be captured while inducing workers to reveal ability truthfully suggesting that dynamic considerations were important in determining the firm s actual choice of contract

differential mortality and the progressivity of social security abstract there is a well established negative correlation between earnings and mortality risk using a calibrated general equilibrium macroeconomic model this paper examines how this correlation interacts with the welfare implications of social security s benefit earnings rule my primary findings suggest that the welfare ranking of alternative benefit earnings rules is somewhat sensitive to differential mortality due to their relatively high mortality risk households with unfavorable earnings histories heavily discount the expected utility from old age consumption and therefore do not put much weight on better work retirement consumption smoothing because of this reason social security s benefit earnings rule warrants less redistribution in the presence of differential mortality compared to when mortality risk is uncorrelated to earnings i find that this result continues to hold when household level labor supply distortions are ignored and also when an alternative maximin welfare criterion is considered but not when accidental bequests from the deceased are redistributed to the survivors

a recursive formulation for repeated agency with history dependence abstract we present general recursive methods to handle environments where privately observed variables are linked over time we show that incentive compatible contracts are implemented recursively with a threat keeping constraint in addition to the usual temporary incentive compatibility and promise keeping conditions journal of economic literature classification numbers d30 d31 d80 d82

a solvable continuous time dynamic principal agent model abstract i study the provision of incentives in a continuous time dynamic moral hazard model with hidden actions and hidden states i consider a principal agent model with linear production and exponential utility whose explicit solution allows me to show how allocations are distorted for incentive reasons and how access to hidden savings further alters allocations i solve the model by applying a stochastic maximum principle where the co state variables from the agent s optimization problem become state variables for the principal s problem of choosing an optimal contract i show that the main effect of moral hazard is a distortion on the effort margin with a smaller effect on the intertemporal consumption allocation access to hidden savings shuts down the intertemporal distortions and increases the effort distortion i also show how the optimal contracts can be implemented via a constant equity share a constant flow payment and a constant tax on savings

designing optimal disability insurance a case for asset testing we analyze an implementation of an optimal disability insurance system as a competitive equilibrium with taxes an optimum is implemented by an asset tested disability system in which a disability transfer is paid only if an agent has assets below a specified maximum the logic behind this result is that an agent who plans to falsely claim disability a finds doing so unattractive if he does not adjust his savings and b cannot collect disability insurance if he does adjust his savings in the desired direction upward for a calibrated economy we find that welfare gains from asset testing are significant

comparing income mobility in germany and the united states using generalized entropy mobility measures based on a derivation of the asymptotic sampling distribution of the generalized entropy mobility measures this paper provides a statistically rigorous analysis of income mobility in germany and the united states using the panel data set psid soep equivalent data file several alternative measures of income aggregation inequality measures and groupings are considered to establish robustness we find that to a high degree of statistical confidence post government income mobility is much higher in germany possible reasons for these findings are revealed through disaggregation of the samples by population subgroups

redistribution and social insurance we study optimal redistribution and insurance in a life cycle economy with private idiosyncratic shocks we characterize pareto optima show the forces determining optimal labor distortions and derive closed form expressions for their limiting behavior the labor distortions for high productivity shocks are determined by the labor elasticity and the higher moments of the shock process the labor distortions for low productivity shocks are determined by the autocorrelation of the shock process redistributive objectives and past distortions in a model calibrated using newly available estimates of idiosyncratic shocks the labor distortions are u shaped and the savings distortions generally increase in current earnings jel d82 d91 h21 h23 i38 j22 j24

the surprising power of age dependent taxes this paper provides a new empirically driven application of the dynamic mirrleesian framework by studying a feasible and potentially powerful tax reform age dependent labour income taxation i show analytically how age dependence improves policy on both the intratemporal and intertemporal margins i use detailed numerical simulations calibrated with data from the u s panel study of income dynamics to generate robust policy implications age dependence 1 lowers marginal taxes on average and especially on high income young workers and 2 lowers average taxes on all young workers relative to older workers when private saving and borrowing are restricted finally i calculate and characterize the welfare gains from age dependence despite its simplicity age dependence generates a welfare gain equal to between 0 6 and 1 5 of aggregate annual consumption and it captures more than 60 of the gain from reform to the dynamic optimal policy the gains are due to substantial increases in both efficiency and equity when age dependence is restricted to be pareto improving the welfare gain is nearly as large

pareto efficient income taxation with stochastic abilities abstract this paper studies pareto efficient income taxation in an economy with finitely lived individuals whose income generating abilities evolve according to a two state markov process the study yields three main results first when individuals are risk neutral in any period the only individuals whose earnings are distorted are those who currently are and have always been low ability in addition the degree to which these perpetual low ability types have their earnings distorted decreases over time converging to zero if the time horizon is long enough second the earnings distortions are continuous with respect to the degree of risk aversion at the risk neutral solution third pareto efficient income tax systems can be time consistent even when the degree of correlation in ability types is large the condition for time consistency suggests a novel theoretical reason why the classic equity efficiency trade off may be steeper in a dynamic environment than previously thought

how should capital be taxed this survey discusses how capital should be taxed in advanced economies we review the theoretical optimal tax literature survey empirical studies on the distribution of capital and the distortion

determinants of income mobility and household poverty dynamics in south africa this article analyses household income mobility among africans in south africa s most populous province kwazulu natal between 1993 and 1998 compared to industrialised and most developing countries mobility has been quite high as might have been expected after the transition in south africa this finding is robust when measurement error is controlled for when disaggregating the sources of mobility it is found that demographic changes and employment changes account for most of the mobility observed which is related to rapidly shifting household boundaries and a very volatile labour market in an environment of high unemployment using a multivariate analysis it can be seen that transitory incomes play a large role four types of poverty traps are found associated with large initial household size poor initial education poor initial asset endowment and poor initial employment access that dominate the otherwise observed regression towards the mean

optimal taxation in life cycle economies abstract we use a very standard life cycle growth model in which individuals have a labor leisure choice in each period of their lives to prove that an optimizing government will almost always find it optimal to tax or subsidize interest income the intuition for our result is straightforward in a life cycle model the individual s optimal consumption work plan is almost never constant and an optimizing government almost always taxes consumption goods and labor earnings at different rates over an individual s lifetime one way to achieve this goal is to use capital and labor income taxes that vary with age if tax rates cannot be conditioned on age a nonzero tax on capital income is also optimal as it can imperfectly mimic age conditioned consumption and labor income tax rates journal of economic literature classification numbers e62 h21

insurance and taxation over the life cycle we consider a dynamic mirrlees economy in a life cycle context and study the optimal insurance arrangement individual productivity evolves as a markov process and is private information we use a first order approach in discrete and continuous time and obtain novel theoretical and numerical results our main contribution is a formula describing the dynamics for the labour income tax rate when productivity is an ar 1 our formula resembles an ar 1 with a trend where i the auto regressive coefficient equals that of productivity ii the trend term equals the covariance productivity with consumption growth divided by the frisch elasticity of labour and iii the innovations in the tax rate are the negative of consumption growth the last property implies a form of short run regressivity our simulations illustrate these results and deliver some novel insights the average labour tax rises from 0 to 37 over 40 years whereas the average tax on savings falls from 12 to 0 at retirement we compare the second best solution to simple history independent tax systems calibrated to mimic these average tax rates we find that age dependent taxes capture a sizable fraction of the welfare gains in this way our theoretical results provide insights into simple tax systems copyright 2013 oxford university press

efficient allocations in dynamic private information economies with persistent shocks a first order approach this article studies efficient allocations in a dynamic private information economy with a continuum of idiosyncratic shocks that are persistent i develop a first order approach for this environment and show that the problem has a simple recursive structure that relies on only a small number of state variables making the problem tractable i find sufficient conditions that guarantee that the first order approach is valid to illustrate the first order approach i numerically compute the efficient allocations in a mirrleesean economy with productivity shocks that follow a random walk and verify the validity of the first order approach i show that persistent shocks create a new trade off where the social planner decreases the informational rent of the agent today at the cost of providing higher insurance in the future copyright 2013 oxford university press

two views of inequality over the life cycle data on the life cycle profiles of inequality in wages earnings hours worked and consumption contain precious information for answering questions about the ability of households to insure labor market risk and about the sources of this risk this paper demonstrates that the choice of whether to control for cohort effects or for time effects has a drastic impact on the estimated age profiles for inequality and thus on the answers to those questions it also shows that time effects are required to account of the observed trends in inequality in 30 years of u s data whereas there is no evidence that cohort effects have been important jel c13 d31 d91 j22 j31

how much income mobility is there in britain using the first four waves of the british household panel survey 1991 4 and a variety of methods we show that there is much mobility in household net income from one year to the next in britain however most income changes from one year to the next are not very large and when incomes are longitudinally averaged so that transitory variations are smoothed out substantial permanent income differences are revealed there is some evidence of greater mobility for those in the tails of the income distribution relative to the middle and for elderly persons compared to non elderly persons

education and optimal dynamic taxation the role of income contingent student loans we study the optimal design of integrated education finance and tax systems the distribution of wages is endogenously determined by the costly education decisions of heterogeneous individuals before labor market entry consistent with empirical evidence this human capital investment decision is risky we find that an integrated education and tax system in which the government provides education loans to young individuals coupled with income contingent repayment can always be designed in a pareto optimal way we present a simple empirically driven application of the framework to us data in which individuals make a college entry decision we find the optimal repayment schemes for college loans can be well approximated by a schedule that is linearly increasing in income up to a threshold and constant afterwards so although the full optimum could lead to complicated non linear schedules in theory very simple instruments can replicate it fairly well the welfare gains from income contingent repayment are significant

optimal taxation without state contingent debt in an economy studied by lucas and stokey tax rates inherit the serial correlation structure of government expenditures belying barro s earlier result that taxes should be a random walk for any stochastic process of government expenditures to recover a version of barro s random walk tax smoothing outcome we modify lucas and stokey s economy to permit only risk free debt having only risk free debt confronts the ramsey planner with additional constraints on equilibrium allocations beyond one imposed by lucas and stokey s assumption of complete markets the ramsey outcome blends features of barro s model with lucas and stokey s in our model the contemporaneous effects of exogenous government expenditures on the government deficit and taxes resemble those in lucas and stokey s model but incomplete markets put a near unit root component into government debt and taxes an outcome like barro s however we show that without ad hoc limits on the government s asset holdings outcomes can diverge in importa

capital taxation quantitative explorations of the inverse euler equation economies with private information provide a rationale for capital taxation in this paper we ask what the welfare gains from following this prescription are we develop a method to answer this question in standard general equilibrium models with idiosyncratic uncertainty and incomplete markets we find that general equilibrium forces are important and greatly reduce the welfare gains once these effects are taken into account the gains are relatively small in our benchmark calibration these results do not imply that dynamic aspects of social insurance design are unimportant but they do suggest that capital taxation may play a modest role

a cross national comparison of permanent inequality in the united states and germany traditional cross sectional measures find greater inequality in the united states than in industrialized western european countries but are unable to distinguish transitory from permanent inequality with longitudinal data we measure cross sectional inequality during the 1980s using the shorrocks measure of income stability to find the degree to which single period measures exaggerate permanent inequality surprisingly given the smaller social welfare system and the less restrictive labor markets in the united states we find that both single period inequality and the share of that inequality that persists over time are greater in the united states than in germany

optimal life cycle capital taxation under self control problems we study optimal taxation of savings in an economy where agents face self control problems and we allow the severity of self control to change over the life cycle we focus on quasi hyperbolic discounting with constant elasticity of inter temporal substitution utility functions and linear markov equilibria we derive explicit formulas for optimal taxes that implement the efficient commitment allocation we show analytically that if agents ability to self control increases concavely with age then savings should be subsidised and the subsidy should decrease with age we also study the quantitative effects of age dependent self control problems and find that the optimal subsidies in our environment are much larger than those implied by models with constant self control finally we compare our optimal subsidies with those implied by the 401 k plan although the subsidy levels in the two cases are of comparable magnitudes the 401 k plan implies an increasing pattern of subsidies while the optimal subsidies decrease over the life cycle

testing the significance of income distribution changes over the 1980s business cycle a cross national comparison using kernel density estimation we describe the distribution of household size adjusted real income and how it changed over the business cycle of the 1980s in the united states and the united kingdom we confirm previous studies that show income inequality increased in the two countries and the middle of the distribution was squashed down using a series of statistical tests however we find that while the mass in both tails of the distribution increased significantly in both countries over the period by far the greatest gains were in the upper tail copyright 1999 john wiley sons ltd

on the taxation of durable goods this paper proposes a mirrleesian theory of commodity taxation in the presence of durable goods nondurable goods should be taxed uniformly provided that the preferences over nondurable consumption are weakly separable from labor effort a uniform taxation across all goods is optimal if the utility from durable consumption is linear and the preferences are additively separable between durable goods nondurable goods and labor effort if those conditions are not met wealth effects and substitution effects justify the use of differential commodity taxes to characterize the sign of the tax differential the paper exploits a substitution euler equation that links the marginal rate of substitution between durable and nondurable consumption across time finally an application of this theory suggests that housing investment should face higher tax rates than nondurable consumption

evidence on performance pay and risk aversion abstract making use of a unique representative data set we find clear evidence that risk aversion has a highly significant and substantial negative impact on the probability that an employee s pay is performance contingent which confirms the well known risk incentive trade off

optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital abstract this paper is concerned with the structure and time consistency of optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital in a dynamic context optimal taxation means distributing tax distortions over time in a welfare maximizing way for a barter economy our main finding is that with debt commitments of sufficiently rich maturity structure an optimal policy if one exists is time consistent in a monetary economy the idea of optimal taxation must be broadened to include an inflation tax and we find that time consistency does not carry over an optimal inflation tax requires commitment by rules in a sense that has no counterpart in the dynamic theory of ordinary excise taxes the reason time consistency fails in a monetary economy is that nominal assets should from a welfare maximizing point of view always be taxed away via an immediate inflation in a kind of capital levy this emerges as a new possibility when money is introduced into an economy without capital

optimal savings distortions with recursive preferences abstract this paper derives an intertemporal optimality condition for economies with private information focusing on a class of recursive preferences by comparing it to the situation where agents can freely save in a risk free asset market we derive the optimal savings distortions necessary for constrained optimality our recursive preferences are homogeneous and satisfy a balanced growth condition while allowing us to separate the role of risk aversion and intertemporal elasticity of substitution we perform some quantitative exercises that disentangle the respective roles played by these two parameters in optimal distortions and the implied welfare gains

optimal taxation with behavioral agents this paper develops a theory of optimal taxation with behavioral agents we use a general framework that encompasses a wide range of biases such as misperceptions and internalities we revisit the three pillars of optimal taxation ramsey linear commodity taxation to raise revenues and redistribute pigou linear commodity taxation to correct externalities and mirrlees nonlinear income taxation we show how the canonical optimal tax formulas are modified and lead to novel economic insights we also show how to incorporate nudges in the optimal taxation framework and jointly characterize optimal taxes and nudges

optimal redistribution a life cycle perspective abstract in this paper i characterize the optimal redistribution policy in a simple life cycle framework with both an intensive and an extensive margin of labor supply the extensive margin corresponds to the choice of a retirement age the optimal allocation cannot be implemented in a decentralized economy by a standard non linear income tax alone it can however be implemented by a history dependent social security system which redistributes resources across agents a calibration of the model to the u s economy reveals that the retirement age should optimally be sharply increasing in productivity and that implementing the optimal life cycle redistribution policy can generate large social welfare gains

the desirability of commodity taxation under non linear income taxation and heterogeneous tastes abstract this paper revisits the atkinson stiglitz result on uselessness of commodity taxation in the presence of optimal non linear income taxation in a more general setup namely when tastes are heterogeneous this general analysis displays the key economic assumptions under which the atkinson stiglitz result is robust a small tax on a given commodity is desirable if high income earners have a relatively higher taste for this commodity or if consumption of this commodity increases with leisure an application to the case of savings suggests that even in the presence of optimal non linear earnings taxation there is a role for a supplemental capital income tax in the standard overlapping generation model

machines buildings and optimal dynamic taxes abstract the effective taxes on capital returns differ depending on capital type in the u s tax code this paper uncovers a novel reason for the optimality of differential capital taxation we set up a model with two types of capital equipments and structures and equipment skill complementarity under a plausible assumption we show that it is optimal to tax equipments at a higher rate than structures in a calibrated model the optimal tax differential rises from 27 to 40 percentage points over the transition to the new steady state the welfare gains of optimal differential capital taxation can be as high as 0 4 of lifetime consumption

on the efficiency of equal sacrifice income tax schedules abstract in an economy which primitives are exactly those in mirrlees 1971 we investigate the efficiency of tax schedules derived under the equal sacrifice principle for a given exogenous government consumption level we assess whether there is an alternative tax schedule that raises more revenue while delivering less utility to no one for our preferred parametrizations we find that inefficiency only arises at the top of the income distribution for marginal tax rates well above the ones we currently observe in most countries we also recover the implicit marginal social weights associated with the equal sacrifice schedule and find them not to be monotonic in types for the environments we study

dynamic managerial compensation a variational approach abstract we study the optimal dynamics of incentives for a manager whose ability to generate cash flows changes stochastically with time and is his private information we show that distortions aka wedges under optimal contracts may either increase or decrease over time in particular when the manager s risk aversion and ability persistence are small distortions decrease on average over time for sufficiently high degrees of risk aversion and ability persistence instead distortions increase on average with tenure our results follow from a novel variational approach that permits us to tackle directly the full program thus bypassing some of the difficulties of the first order approach encountered in the dynamic mechanism design literature

persistent private information this paper studies the design of optimal contracts in dynamic environments where agents have private information that is persistent in particular i focus on a continuous time version of a benchmark insurance problem where a risk averse agent would like to borrow from a risk neutral lender to stabilize his utility the agent privately observes a persistent state variable typically either income or a taste shock and he makes reports to the principal i give verifiable sufficient conditions showing that incentive compatible contracts can be written recursively conditioning on the report and two additional state variables the agent s promised utility and promised marginal utility of the private state i then study two examples where the optimal contracts can be solved in closed form showing how persistence alters the nature of the contract unlike the previous discrete time models with independent and identically distributed i i d private information the agent s consumption under the contract may grow over time furthermore in my setting the efficiency losses due to private information increase with the persistence of the private information and the distortions vanish as i approximate an i i d environment

age dependent taxes with endogenous human capital formation we assess the gains attained by the introduction of age dependent labor income taxes in an overlapping generations economy where individuals live a meaningful life cycle and endogenously accumulate human capital the model is sufficiently rich to isolate the role of general equilibrium effects credit market imperfections and different forms of human capital accumulation the large welfare gains we obtain cannot be attained without age dependence nor can they be attained with age dependent taxes if progressivity of labor income taxes and capital income tax rates are not suitably adjusted to profit from the complementarity of these instruments

incentives allocation and labour market reforms during transition the case of urban china 1986 1990 has the reform process in china resulted in the introduction of incentives directed at a more efficient allocation of resources using data on individual earnings in urban liaoning province for the period 1986 1990 and a wage equation approach we address this issue in the context of labour market reforms focusing specifically on returns to education our results indicate that failure to address the issue of endogenous selection of more able individuals into state owned enterprises soes can severely bias returns downwards unlike in soes returns in collective owned enterprises coes increased the latter having been allowed to grow out of the plan more quickly and subject to more competition in factor and product markets we conclude that decentralization without competition is unlikely to result in the introduction of an efficient incentive mechanism the more administratively determined regular wages are one avenue for increased returns we find evidence of differentiated bonuses in coes but

analyst following and pay performance sensitivity evidence from china we examine whether analyst following is associated with pay performance sensitivity in china based on our analyses of 17 020 chinese firm years from 2007 to 2015 we find that pay performance sens

optimal indirect and capital taxation we consider an environment in which agents skills are private information and follow arbitrary stochastic processes we prove that it is typically pareto optimal for an individual s marginal benefit of investing in capital to exceed his marginal cost of doing so this wedge is consistent with a positive tax on capital income we also prove that it is pareto optimal for the marginal rate of substitution between any two consumption goods to equal the marginal rate of transformation this lack of a wedge is consistent with uniform taxation of consumption goods within a period

dynamic optimal taxation with private information we study dynamic optimal taxation in a class of economies with private information optimal allocations in these environments are complicated and history dependent yet we show that they can be implemented as competitive equilibria in market economies supplemented with simple tax systems the market structure in these economies is similar to that in bewley 1986 agents supply labour and trade risk free claims to future consumption subject to a budget constraint and a debt limit optimal taxes are conditioned only on two observable characteristics an agent s accumulated stock of claims or wealth and her current labour income we show that optimal taxes are generally non linear and non separable in these variables and relate the structure of marginal wealth and income taxation to the properties of agent preferences this paper studies optimal taxation in a class of dynamic economies with private information we consider an environment in which agents preferences are defined over consumption and labour and each agent receives a privately observed sequence of i i d preference shocks incentivecompatibility constraints stemming from private information imply that socially optimal or constrained efficient allocations in this environment are complicated and history dependent yet we show that they can be implemented as competitive equilibria in market economies supplemented with simple tax systems the market structure in these economies is identical to that in bewley 1986 huggett 1993 or aiyagari 1994 agents can trade current consumption for claims to future consumption subject to a budget constraint and a borrowing limit these claims have a non contingent pre tax return crucially taxes are conditioned upon only two observable characteristics of an agent current wealth given by the agent s accumulated stock of claims and current labour income they do not depend on any other aspect of an agent s past history most models of dynamic optimal taxation follow the ramsey approach in which the set of fiscal instruments available to the government is exogenously specified 1 linear labour and capital income taxes are typically included in this set while lump sum taxes are ruled out the exclusion of the latter is justified by appealing to incentive or administrative constraints but these are not explicitly modelled these exogenous restrictions on fiscal instruments represent frictions that the government seeks to ameliorate through its optimal choice of tax rates the approach we adopt in this paper builds on the optimal taxation literature initiated by mirrlees 1971 mirrlees assumes that agents receive privately observed shocks to their

making mobility visible a graphical device abstract this paper suggests a method of depicting mobility processes of income or earnings it makes use of nonparametric quantile regression based on bivariate kernel density estimation the method is illustrated with a comparison of german and us income mobility

welfare based income insecurity in the us and germany evidence from harmonized panel data this paper develops normative approaches for measuring individual level income insecurity using concepts derived from expected utility theory and prospect theory we build a suite of measures designed to capture various facets of psychologically distressing income risk we present an application for the us and germany from 1993 2013 employing conditionally heteroskedastic fixed effects models to generate predictive densities for future incomes our results reveal much higher levels of income risk in the us relative to germany which can be mostly attributed to a higher level of autonomous time invariant volatility state by state variations in liberal conservative political administrations partially explain our results and we find some evidence that trade exposure is a contributing factor in the us

long term contracting with markovian consumers to study how a firm can capitalize on a long term customer relationship we characterize the optimal contract between a monopolist and a consumer whose preferences follow a markov process the optimal contract is nonstationary and has infinite memory but is described by a simple state variable under general conditions supply converges to the efficient level for any degree of persistence of the types and along any history though convergence is history dependent in contrast as with constant types the optimal contract can be renegotiation proof even with highly persistent types these properties provide insights into the optimal ownership structure of the production technology

older or wealthier the impact of age adjustment on wealth inequality differences in individual wealth holdings are widely viewed as a driving force of economic inequality however as this finding relies on cross sectional data a concern is that older is confused with wealthier we propose a new method to adjust for age effects in cross sections which eliminates wealth inequality due to age yet preserves inequality arising from other factors using a new cross country comparable database we examine the impact of age adjustments on wealth inequality across countries and over time we find that the most widely used method yields a substantially different picture of age adjusted wealth inequality than our method 2011 the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

liquidity and insurance for the unemployed we study the optimal design of unemployment insurance for workers sampling job opportunities over time we focus on the optimal timing of benefits and the desirability of allowing workers to freely access a riskless asset when workers have constant absolute risk aversion preferences it is optimal to use a very simple policy a constant benefit during unemployment a constant tax during employment that does not depend on the duration of the spell and free access to savings using a riskless asset away from this benchmark for constant relative risk aversion preferences the welfare gains of more elaborate policies are minuscule our results highlight two largely distinct roles for policy toward the unemployed a ensuring workers have sufficient liquidity to smooth their consumption and b providing unemployment benefits that serve as insurance against the uncertain duration of unemployment spells

fiscal rules and discretion under persistent shocks this paper studies the optimal level of discretion in policymaking we consider a fiscal policy model where the government has time inconsistent preferences with a present bias toward public spending the government chooses a fiscal rule to trade off its desire to commit to not overspend against its desire to have flexibility to react to privately observed shocks to the value of spending we analyze the optimal fiscal rule when the shocks are persistent unlike under independent and identically distributed shocks we show that the ex ante optimal rule is not sequentially optimal as it provides dynamic incentives the ex ante optimal rule exhibits history dependence with high shocks leading to an erosion of future fiscal discipline compared to low shocks which lead to the reinstatement of discipline the implied policy distortions oscillate over time given a sequence of high shocks and can force the government to accumulate maximal debt and become immiserated in the long run

on efficient distribution with private information this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with many consumers each of whom is subject to private idiosyncratic taste shocks we propose a recursive method for finding feasible allocations that are incentivecompatible and that are pareto optimal within this set the method is applied to several parametric examples we find that in an efficient allocation the degree of inequality continually increases with a diminishing fraction of the population receiving an increasing fraction of the resources we discuss the extent to which these allocations can be decentralized via market arrangements this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with private information the economy we study has a constant endowment flow of a single non storable consumption good which is to be allocated each period among a large number of consumers each period these consumers experience unpredictable idiosyncratic privately observed taste shocks affecting their marginal utility of current consumption efficiency dictates that more resources be allocated to those consumers who in any given period have a high marginal utility of current consumption

consolidating the evidence on income mobility in the western states of germany and the united states from 1984 to 2006 the cross national intragenerational literature has often analyzed income mobility within short time periods over which mobility might reasonably be thought of as invariant here we argue that a great social transformation german reunification abruptly and permanently altered mobility using standard measures with panel data for the western states of germany and the united states over the period 1984 2006 we find the conventional result that income mobility is greater in germany but when we cut the data into 5 year windows we find that income mobility declines significantly over the years immediately following reunification in germany but not in the united states using both measures jel j1 j6

optimal income taxation when asset taxation is limited several frictions restrict the government s ability to tax assets first it is very costly to monitor trades on international asset markets second agents can resort to nonobservable low return assets such as cash gold or foreign currencies if taxes on observable assets become too high this paper shows that limitations in asset taxation have important consequences for the taxation of labor income we study a simple dynamic moral hazard model of social insurance with observable and nonobservable saving decisions we find that optimal labor income taxes become less progressive when the ability to tax savings is limited

a test of the household income process using consumption and wealth data the evolution of household income can be explained almost equally well by rival models however rival models have very different implications for other household behaviours such as consumption i therefore test between two prominent models in the uk using panel data on consumption and wealth as well as income over 1991 2006 to operate the test i show that long lived income shocks transmit far less than one for one through to consumption and particularly so for younger households i then compare these estimates of transmission with estimates of households ability to smooth shocks captured by the data on wealth conditional on the suitability of the consumption model my estimates provide evidence against the restricted income process rip and in favour of an alternative heterogeneous income process hip this finding also explains why cross sectional consumption inequality grew slowly over the period even though the variance of long lived shocks was high finally i conclude that it is important to consider mean reversion of shocks when constructing life cycle consumption models

a nonparametric analysis of insufficient wage incentives in the chinese health industry abstractthis study provides empirical results on the insufficient wage incentives in the chinese health industry which may result in the poor productivity of high ability medical personnel we fir

optimal government policies in models with heterogeneous agents abstract in this paper we develop a new approach for finding optimal government policies in economies with heterogeneous agents using the calculus of variations we present three classes of equilibrium conditions from government s and individual agent s optimization problems 1 the first order conditions the government s lagrange euler equation and the individual agent s euler equation 2 the stationarity condition on the distribution function and 3 the aggregate market clearing conditions these conditions form a system of functional equations which we solve numerically the solution takes into account simultaneously the effect of the government policy on individual allocations the resulting optimal distribution of agents in the steady state and therefore equilibrium prices we illustrate the methodology on a ramsey problem with heterogeneous agents finding the optimal limiting tax on total income

inequality adjusted income growth we introduce and characterize a new measure of aggregate income growth that allows us to give more weight to individuals with lower individual income growth our measure includes several important measures of directional mobility encountered in the literature the empirical application compares the measure of income growth between the usa and germany and finds that giving more weight to individuals with lower income growth reverses the ranking

an international comparison of lifetime inequality how continental europe resembles north america we compare earnings inequality and mobility across the united states canada france germany and the united kingdom during the late 1990s a flexible model of earnings dynamics that isolates positional mobility within a stable earnings distribution is estimated earnings trajectories are then simulated and lifetime annuity value distributions are constructed earnings mobility and employment risk are found to be positively correlated with base year inequality taken together they produce more equalization in countries with high cross section inequality such that the countries in our sample have more similar lifetime inequality levels than cross section measures suggest

consumption and risk sharing over the life cycle a striking feature of u s data on income and consumption is that inequality increases with age this paper asks if individual specific earnings risk can provide a coherent explanation we find that it can we construct an overlapping generations general equilibrium model in which households face uninsurable earnings shocks over the course of their lifetimes earnings inequality is exogenous and is calibrated to match data from the u s panel study on income dynamics consumption inequality is endogenous and matches well data from the u s consumer expenditure survey the total risk households face is decomposed into that realized before entering the labor market and that realized throughout the working years in welfare terms the latter is found to be more important than the former

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

local versus global assessment of mobility mobility indices are popular tools designed to quantify the extent of income changes by aggregating local distributional change into a global scalar according to some rule for some mobility measures this aggregation rule is only implicit in their standard definition we derive an insightful approximation to the statistical aggregation rule for the important class of mobility indices introduced by shorrocks journal of economic theory 19 1978 376 93 and further generalized by maasoumi and zandvakili economic letters 22 1986 97 102 which enables us to characterize their normative properties we also develop methods for estimation and inference a substantive empirical contribution emerges from the comparison of mobility between the united states and germany our methods reveal why income mobility is higher in germany than in the united states higher german mobility in the bottom of the distribution is combined with an implicitly higher weighting by the mobility index at the bottom

optimal life cycle unemployment insurance we argue that us welfare would rise if unemployment insurance were to be increased for young workers and decreased for old this is because young workers have little means to smooth consumption during unemployment and want jobs to accumulate high return human capital so unemployment insurance is highly valuable to them while the induced moral hazard problem is mild we consider a life cycle model with unemployment risk and endogenous search eort that we calibrate to match us labor market institutions we nd that allowing unemployment replacement rates and other government transfers to decline with age yields sizeable welfare gains which amount to around two thirds of the gains attained under the constrained optimal scheme for unemployment insurance over the life cycle

life course risks mobility regimes and mobility consequences a comparison of sweden germany and the united states1 the analysis of intergenerational mobility has primarily used measures of social position that are functions of an individual s occupation occupation based models of social mobility however have limitations that arguably have grown in recent decades meta analysis of available evidence for sweden western germany and the united states concerning occupational mobility household income mobility job displacement union dissolution and poverty dynamics shows the limitations of the individual level occupation based career trajectory approach to life course mobility this article develops an alternative formulation at the household level which focuses on cross national variation in the extent to which societal institutions influence the rate of events with the potential to change a household s life conditions via the manipulation of incentives for mobility generating events and the extent to which they mitigate the consequences of these events through social insurance the combination of these institut

optimal taxation in a habit formation economy abstract this paper studies habit formation in consumption preferences in a dynamic mirrlees economy we derive optimal labor and savings wedges based on a recursive approach we show that habit formation creates a motive for subsidizing labor supply and savings in particular habit formation invalidates the well known no distortion at the top result we demonstrate that the theoretical findings are quantitatively important in a parametrized life cycle model average labor and savings wedges fall by more than one third compared with the case of time separable preferences

lifetime earnings inequality in germany we employ german social security records to investigate intragenerational lifetime earnings inequality and mobility of yearly earnings for 35 cohorts starting with the birth year 1935 our main result is a striking secular rise of intragenerational inequality in lifetime earnings west german men born in the early 1960s are likely to experience about 85 more lifetime inequality than their fathers in contrast both short term and long term intragenerational mobility are stable longer unemployment spells of workers at the bottom of the distribution of younger cohorts contribute to explaining 20 40 of the overall increase in lifetime earnings inequality

optimal fiscal policy with redistribution i study the optimal taxation oflabor and capital in a dynamic economy subject to government expenditure and technology shocks unlike representative agent ramsey models workers are heterogenous and lump sum taxation is not ruled out i consider two tax scenarios a linear taxation with a lump sum intercept and b nonlinear mirrleesian taxation when taxes are linear i derive a partial equivalence result with ramsey settings that provides a reinterpretation of such analyses i find conditions for perfect tax smoothing oflabor income taxes and zero capital taxation implications that contrast with ramsey are derived for public debt management for the nature of the time inconsistency problem and for the viability of replicating complete markets without state contingent bonds shifts in the distribution of skills provide a novel source for variations in tax rates for the nonlinear tax scenario i show that taxation based on income averages is optimal

on repeated moral hazard with discounting in this paper we analyze optimal contracts in an infinitely repeated agency model in which both the principal and agent discount the future we show that there is a stationary representation of the optimal contract when the agent s conditional discounted expected utility is used as a state variable this representation reduces the multi period problem to a static variational problem which can be analyzed using standard variational techniques this reduction is used to obtain several properties of the contract

sorting and incentive effects of pay for performance an experimental investigation agency theory highlights losses in productivity that may occur when the interests of owners and employees are imperfectly aligned pay for performance has been proposed as a solution to this proble

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

education and labor market discrimination using a model of statistical discrimination and educational sorting we explain why blacks get more education than whites of similar cognitive ability and we explore how the armed forces qualification test afqt wages and education are related the model suggests that one should control for both afqt and education when compar ing the earnings of blacks and whites in which case a substantial black white wage differential emerges we reject the hypothesis that differences in school quality between blacks and whites explain the wage and education differentials our findings support the view that some of the black white wage differential reflects the operation of the

equilibrium subprime lending this paper develops an equilibrium model of a subprime mortgage market our goal is to offer a benchmark with which the recent subprime boom and bust can be compared the model is tractable and delivers plausible orders of magnitude for borrowing capacities as well as default and trading intensities we offer simple explanations for several phenomena in the subprime market such as the prevalence of teaser rates and the clustering of defaults in our model both nondiversifiable and diversifiable income risks reduce debt capacities thus debt capacities need not be higher when a larger fraction of income risk is diversifiable