the cost of road infrastructure in low and middle income countries the connections between transport infrastructure and economic development have been extensively analyzed in previous research but little is known about the cost of infrastructure investments in poor countries this paper examines drivers of unit costs of construction and maintenance of transport infrastructure in low and middle income countries and documents that i there is a large dispersion in unit costs for comparable road work activities ii after accounting for environmental drivers of costs residual unit costs are significantly higher in conflict countries iii there is evidence that costs are higher in countries with higher levels of corruption iv these effects are robust to controlling for a country s public investment capacity and business environment our findings have implications for governments aiming to increase connectivity in poor countries

budget processes and commitment to fiscal discipline abstract we present a framework of investigation into the political economy of the budget process our model suggests that institutional rules governing the budget process can be found to limit the importance of fiscal illusion empirical evidence supports that proposition the choice of rules depends on the political environment as well as the dominant source of uncertainty in the budget process

bilateral trading with naive traders we introduce naive traders in bilateral trading these traders report their true types in direct mechanisms and bid ask their values costs in auctions we show that by expropriating naive traders in direct mechanisms the mechanism designer can subsidize additional trades by strategic traders and improve efficiency in fact complete expropriation of naive traders is a necessary condition for constrained efficiency a significant implication is that in the presence of naive traders ex post individually rational mechanisms are not constrained efficient in contrast if the traders must use a given mechanism then the introduction of naive traders has an ambiguous effect on efficiency

moral rules the moral sentiments and behavior toward a theory of an optimal moral system how should moral sanctions and moral rewards the moral sentiments involving feelings of guilt and of virtue be employed to govern individuals behavior if the objective is to maximize social welfare in the model that we examine guilt is a disincentive to act and virtue is an incentive because we assume that they are negative and positive sources of utility we also suppose that guilt and virtue are costly to inculcate and are subject to certain constraints on their use we show that the moral sentiments should be used chiefly to control externalities and further that guilt is best to employ when most harmful acts can successfully be deterred whereas virtue is best when only a few individuals can be induced to behave well we also contrast the optimal use of guilt and virtue to optimal pigouvian taxation and discuss extensions of our analysis

macroeconomic policies and performance in latin america abstract this paper provides new evidence on macroeconomic policies and results in latin america and the caribbean results are i credibility allows adoption of counter cyclical macroeconomic policies ii accuracy in meeting inflation targets depends on central bank independence and country risk iii intermediate exchange rate er regimes have become less persistent iv er regimes matter for inflation and growth v real er trends are not explained by productivity growth and supply reforms do not resolve real er misalignments vi financial integration has increased significantly vii foreign shocks are a major growth determinant and viii composition of foreign capital inflows matters for growth

institutional quality and capital inflows theory and evidence abstract this paper analyzes both theoretically and empirically the link between capital inflows and the quality of economic institutions to this purpose we construct a small open economy model of the soft budget constraint syndrome wherein persistently cheap funding from abroad i raises the prevalence of extractive projects and ii expands their support by the benevolent government ex post while the government may in principle limit the prevalence of extractive projects ex ante the incentives to do so is limited when foreign borrowing is cheap using a large sample of countries and controlling for reverse causality and omitted variable bias we confirm empirically that capital inflows are followed by a decline in the quality of domestic economic institutions our model and empirical analysis help explain the divergence between southern european countries spain portugal italy and greece and the rest of oecd countries since the mid 1990s

biased signaling and yardstick comparisons in a sovereign debt market abstract this paper develops a sovereign debt model in which governments are privately informed about their likelihood of default but can themselves have a biased perception of this likelihood i show that in this setup government borrowing acts as a signal that is only partially informative about fundamental default probabilities and bond prices do not necessarily reflect true credit risk i also show that in a two country version of the model correlations between the two countries induces yardstick comparisons and the borrowing decision of one government affects the bond price received by the other whether the information spillover increases or decreases the distortion created by the bias depends on the extent to which borrowing signals reinforce each other

fiscal institutions fiscal policy and sovereign risk premia in emu we investigate the effect of fiscal institutions such as the strength of the finance minister in the budget process and deficits on interest rate spreads of eurozone countries deficits significantly increase risk premia measured by relative swap spreads the effect of deficits is significantly lower under emu this effect partly results from neglecting the role of fiscal institutions after controlling for institutional changes fiscal policy remains a significant determinant of risk premia in emu better institutions are connected with lower risk premia furthermore deficits matter less for risk premia in countries with better institutions markets acknowledge that better institutions reduce fiscal difficulties rendering the monitoring of annual developments less important

tax base variability and procyclical fiscal policy in developing countries abstract based on a sample of 56 countries we show that fiscal policy in the g7 countries appears to be acyclical while fiscal policy in developing countries is procyclical i e fiscal policy is expansionary in good times and contractionary in bad times to explain this puzzle we develop an optimal fiscal policy model in which running budget surpluses is costly because they create pressures to increase public spending given this distortion a government that faces large fluctuations in the tax base as is the case for developing countries will find it optimal to run a procyclical fiscal policy

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

screening when some agents are nonstrategic does a monopoly need to exclude we characterize the optimal screening mechanism for a monopolist facing consumers with privately known demands some of whom have limited abilities to misrepresent their preferences we show that consumers with better abilities to misrepresent information benefit from the presence of consumers who lack such abilities whenever the fraction of the latter group is positive there is no exclusion the firm supplies a positive quantity of the good to all consumers whose valuations exceed marginal cost of production our analysis is motivated by the evidence indicating that some individuals have limited ability to misrepresent themselves and imitate others

remittances and institutions are remittances a curse summary this paper addresses the complex and overlooked relationship between the receipt of workers remittances and institutional quality in the recipient country using a simple model we show how an increase in remittance inflows can lead to deterioration of institutional quality specifically to an increase in the share of funds diverted by the government for its own purposes in a cross section of 111 countries we empirically verify this proposition and find that a higher ratio of remittances to gdp leads to lower indices of control of corruption government effectiveness and rule of law even after controlling for potential reverse causality

migration and institutions exit and voice from abroad a rapidly growing body of research examines the relationship between migration and institutions three strands of studies can be distinguished some studies focused on the role of domestic and foreign institutions in the decision to migrate others were interested by the impact of migration on institutional reforms in migrants countries of origin while the effect of migration on destination countries is largely documented recent studies focus on how migrants affect social and informal institutions in the destination countries this survey puts together these three strands of literature with three purposes first we offer a short definition and synthetic typology of institutions which provide a guide to understand several studies summarized and their results second our analysis is presented following the analytic framework exit voice and loyalty of hirschman in order to highlight the brain grain phenomenon for developing countries from an institutional point of view third we review the limited existing work on the very timely topic whether migrants are harmful or not to institutions in the host countries

constitutional rules and fiscal policy outcomes we investigate the effect of electoral rules and forms of government on fiscal policy outcomes in a large sample of democracies we rely on different estimation methods to address prospective problems of statistical inference due to non random selection of these constitutional rules the findings are consistent with our theoretical priors presidential regimes induce smaller governments than parliamentary democracies while majoritarian elections lead to smaller governments and smaller welfare programs than proportional elections

fiscal policy and monetary integration in europe fiscal policy economists policy makers and the media often argue that the maastricht treaty and the stability and growth pact make it difficult for governments of emu countries to stabilize their economies with appropriate fiscal policy and to provide adequate public investment our empirical analysis offers little support to this view discretionary budget deficits have actually become more counter cyclical in emu countries after the maastricht treaty as well as in the other eu and non eu industrialized countries we study and while public investment has declined recently in emu countries a similar tendency is apparent in other countries and started well before the maastricht treaty was signed jordi gali and roberto perotti

planning to cheat eu fiscal policy in real time using real time data from europe s stability and convergence programs we explore how fiscal plans and their implementation in the eu are determined we find that 1 implemented budgetary adjustment falls systematically short of planned adjustment and this shortfall increases with the projection horizon 2 variability in the eventual fiscal outcomes is dominated by the implementation errors 3 there is a limited role for traditional political variables 4 stock flow adjustments are more important when plans are more ambitious and 5 most importantly both the ambition in fiscal plans and their implementation benefit from stronger national fiscal institutions we emphasize also the importance of credible plans for the eventual fiscal outcomes roel beetsma massimo giuliodori and peter wierts

distributional implications of joint tax evasion both buyers and sellers of goods and services may benefit from letting their economic transactions go unrecorded for tax purposes the supplier reduces his tax burden by underreporting income and sales whereas the consumer may gain from buying a non taxed lower priced product the distributional implications of such joint tax evasion depend on the amounts evaded on where the evaders on both sides of the market are found in the income distribution and on how the financial gain is split our empirical investigations show that the tax evasion controlled estimate of income inequality in norway exhibits more income dispersion than official estimates

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

morality in the market abstract being honest can be a competitive disadvantage in markets with the opportunity to violate laws and regulations producers who are willing to cheat may crowd out more efficient producers who are honest and buyers who are willing to cheat may crowd out honest buyers with higher willingness to pay this mechanism makes morality honesty a bad substitute for sanctions in markets honesty reduces cheating but the output may be less efficiently produced and less efficiently allocated among buyers i also show that the effect of honesty depends crucially on the fraction of honest traders among both buyers and sellers while it does not matter whether a buyer or a seller pays the sanction it does matter who is honest

the voracity effect abstract we analyze an economy that lacks a strong legal political institutional infrastructure and is populated by multiple powerful groups powerful groups dynamically interact via a fiscal process that effectively allows open access to the aggregate capital stock in equilibrium this leads to slow economic growth and a voracity effect by which a shock such as a terms of trade windfall perversely generates a more than proportionate increase in fiscal redistribution and reduces growth we also show that a dilution in the concentration of power leads to faster growth and a less procyclical response to shocks jel f43 o10 o23 o40

over optimism in forecasts by official budget agencies and its implications the paper studies forecasts of real growth rates and budget balances made by official government agencies among 33 countries in general the forecasts are found i to have a positive average bias ii to be more biased in booms and iii to be even more biased at the 3 year horizon than at shorter horizons this over optimism in official forecasts can help explain excessive budget deficits especially the failure to run surpluses during periods of high output if a boom is forecasted to last indefinitely retrenchment is treated as unnecessary many believe that better fiscal policy can be obtained by means of rules such as ceilings for the deficit or better yet the structural deficit but we also find iv countries subject to a budget rule in the form of euroland s stability and growth pact sgp make official forecasts of growth and budget deficits that are even more biased and more correlated with booms than do other countries this effect may help explain frequent violations of the sgp the question becomes how to overcome governments tendency to satisfy fiscal targets by wishful thinking rather than by action chile in 2000 created structural budget institutions that may have solved the problem independent expert panels insulated from political pressures are responsible for estimating the long run trends that determine whether a given deficit is deemed structural or cyclical the result is that chile s official forecasts of growth and the budget have not been overly optimistic even in booms unlike many countries in the north chile took advantage of the 2002 7 expansion to run budget surpluses and so was able to ease in the 2008 9 recession

why is fiscal policy often procyclical many countries especially developing ones follow procyclical fiscal policies namely spending goes up taxes go down in booms and spending goes down taxes go up in recessions we provide an explanation for this suboptimal fiscal policy based upon political distortions and incentives for less than benevolent government to appropriate rents voters have incentives similar to the starving the leviathan classic argument and demand more public goods or fewer taxes to prevent governments from appropriating rents when the economy is doing well we test this argument against more traditional explanations based purely on borrowing constraints with a reasonable amount of success

a positive theory of fiscal deficits and government debt this paper considers an economy in which policymakers with different preferences alternate in office as a result of elections government debt is used strategically by each policymaker to influence the choices of his successors if different policymakers disagree about the desired composition of government spending between two public goods the economy exhibits a deficits bias that is debt accumulation is higher than it would be with a social planner the equilibrium level of debt is larger the larger is the degree of polarization between alternating governments and the less likely it is that the current government will be re elected

fiscal forecasts and political systems a legislative budgeting perspective which are the institutional and constitutional settings that best reduce the tendency to manipulate fiscal forecasts this paper addresses the question by examining the quality of fiscal forecasts at different stages of the budget process in 13 european union countries by using annual forecast vintages 1999 2013 from stability and convergence programmes both the role of political structures and the balance of power between the executive and the legislature are assessed as determinants of systematic forecasting errors the findings suggest that the forecasting bias is more effectively countered in presidential and semi presidential systems in parliamentary systems with strong bicameralism and when executive legislature relations are constrained by checks and balances confirmation of these results is also provided by linking our approach to the fiscal institutionalist approach based on the form of fiscal governance and the stringency of fiscal rules in terms of institutional capacity if fiscal rules and legislative organizational and research capacity counter the executive s monopoly of fiscal forecasting strengthening the legislature s formal powers negatively influences the fiscal forecast accuracy indeed strategic considerations may induce the executive to anticipate the legislature s amendment or rejection of the tabled budget by means of more favourable economic and fiscal assumptions the crisis and its urgencies crisis seem to have weakened the effect of institutional executive legislature relations on fiscal forecast accuracy

corruption and development a review of issues in this paper we start with a discussion of some of the different denotations of the problem of corruption we then consider the ways in which the damaging consequences of corruption operate in a developing economy while not ignoring its possible redeeming features in some cases we pursue the question of why corruption is perceptibly so different in different societies and also persistent finally we examine the feasible policy issues that arise in this context

governance quality remittances and their implications for food and nutrition security in sub saharan africa abstract despite impressive progress in the fight against malnutrition and hunger in recent years food and nutrition insecurity remains a major concern in sub saharan africa ssa countries in this study we employ a panel data covering 15 ssa countries from 1996 to 2015 to investigate the growth effects of remittances and quality of governance on food and nutrition security proxied by the average value of food production and the average dietary energy supply adequacy respectively we use a dynamic empirical model based on system gmm to control for unobserved heterogeneity and potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables the empirical results emanating from our analysis show that the interaction of remittances and the composite index of governance quality exerts positive and significant effects on the average value of food production and also contributes to the improvement of average dietary energy supply adequacy in ssa in addition the control of corruption government effectiveness political stability and rule of law scores increase both measures of food and nutrition security albeit the contribution of control over corruption score is relatively the largest as compared to other indicators of governance

the budget process and the size of the budget the new congressional budget process provides members of congress with a new set of institutional mechanisms for making budget decisions this article addresses the question of whether or under what conditions rigid application of the new budget process modeled as first selection of the size of the budget and second its division produces smaller budgets than a piecemeal appropriations process in which the size of the budget is determined residually the theoretical result is that the new process sometimes results in relatively large budgets a testable implication of the theory is that given a choice of how stringently the budget process is to be employed members of congress jointly consider preferences and the expected outcomes under available institutional arrangements and select the arrangement usually a rule that yields the most favorable outcome empirical results from the budget process in the house from 1980 to 1983 are generally supportive of the theoretically derived hypothesis of rational choice of institutional arrangements

optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital abstract this paper is concerned with the structure and time consistency of optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital in a dynamic context optimal taxation means distributing tax distortions over time in a welfare maximizing way for a barter economy our main finding is that with debt commitments of sufficiently rich maturity structure an optimal policy if one exists is time consistent in a monetary economy the idea of optimal taxation must be broadened to include an inflation tax and we find that time consistency does not carry over an optimal inflation tax requires commitment by rules in a sense that has no counterpart in the dynamic theory of ordinary excise taxes the reason time consistency fails in a monetary economy is that nominal assets should from a welfare maximizing point of view always be taxed away via an immediate inflation in a kind of capital levy this emerges as a new possibility when money is introduced into an economy without capital

remittances deteriorate governance abstract i use a natural experiment of oil price driven remittance flows to poor non oil producing muslim countries to demonstrate that remittances deteriorate the quality of governance especially in countries with weak democratic institutions the results indicate that a 1 standard deviation increase in remittances raises corruption by 1 5 index points on a 6 point scale which is equivalent to a dollar 600 decrease in per capita gdp concomitantly remittances may enable governments to reduce their delivery of public services for example health care school enrollment the results suggest that political institutions may mediate the potentially beneficial socioeconomic effects of remittance inflows

measuring lying aversion abstract we introduce a new method for measuring the decision to lie in experiments in the game the decision to lie increases own payment independent of the counterpart s decision but potentially at a cost for the counterpart we identify at the individual level the decision to lie and measure how individuals react to different incentives to lie furthermore we investigate how lying behavior changes over time our method allows us to classify people into types including those who never lie those who always lie and those who react to incentives to lie we suggest this method as a useful instrument for examining factors that influence the decision to lie

remittances and the wage impact of immigration this paper examines how the outflow of remittances affect the wages of native workers the model shows that the wage impact of immigration depends on the competing effects of an increase in labor market competition and an increase in the consumer base immigrant remittances provide a unique way of isolating this latter effect because they reduce the consumer base but not the workforce the predictions of the model are tested using an unusually rich german data set that has detailed information on remittances and wages as expected the results indicate that a 1 percent increase in remittances depress the wages of native workers by 0 06 percent furthermore remittances predominantly affect workers in nontraded industries that are more reliant on domestic consumption

unwilling or unable to cheat evidence from a tax audit experiment in denmark this paper analyzes a tax enforcement field experiment in denmark in the base year a stratified and representative sample of over 40 000 individual income tax filers was selected for the experiment half of the tax filers were randomly selected to be thoroughly audited while the rest were deliberately not audited the following year threat of audit letters were randomly assigned and sent to tax filers in both groups we present three main empirical findings first using baseline audit data we find that the tax evasion rate is close to zero for income subject to third party reporting but substantial for self reported income since most income is subject to third party reporting the overall evasion rate is modest second using quasi experimental variation created by large kinks in the income tax schedule we find that marginal tax rates have a positive impact on tax evasion for self reported income but that this effect is small in comparison to legal avoidance and behavioral responses third using the randomization of enforcement we find that prior audits and threat of audit letters have significant effects on self reported income but no effect on third party reported income all these empirical results can be explained by extending the standard model of rational tax evasion to allow for the key distinction between self reported and third party reported income

the perils of unearned foreign income aid remittances and government survival given their political incentives governments in more autocratic polities can strategically channel unearned government and household income in the form of foreign aid and remittances to finance patronage which extends their tenure in political office i substantiate this claim with duration models of government turnover for a sample of 97 countries between 1975 and 2004 unearned foreign income received in more autocratic countries reduces the likelihood of government turnover regime collapse and outbreaks of major political discontent to allay potential concerns with endogeneity i harness a natural experiment of oil price driven aid and remittance flows to poor non oil producing muslim autocracies the instrumental variables results confirm the baseline finding that authoritarian governments can harness unearned foreign income to prolong their rule finally i provide evidence of the underlying causal mechanisms that governments in autocracies use aid and remittances inflows to reduce their expenditures on welfare goods to fund patronage

fiscal forecasts at the fomc evidence from the greenbooks abstract this paper examines fiscal policy forecasts prepared for the federal open market committee and its influence on u s monetary policy the forecasts contain useful information beyond that i

the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy evidence from the oecd this paper addresses the topic of cyclicality in scal policy in particular we show that the level of cyclicality varies across spending categories and across oecd countries in line with leading theories of scal cyclicality we show that countries with volatile output and dispersed political power are the most likely to run procyclical scal policies wage government consumption is highlighted as the most important channel by which these variables affect scal cyclicality

remittances and public finances evidence from oil price shocks we study the effect of inflowing remittances a major source of capital for many countries on tax revenues and tax policy instrumenting remittances with changes in the oil price interacted with a country s distance to oil producing countries we find that remittances have a large positive effect on vat revenues but no effect on income tax revenues this suggests that remittances often escape the income tax but can be taxed via consumption we further show that tax policy is responsive to shocks in incoming remittances remittances make the adoption of vat systems more likely and they lead to lower vat rates and higher income tax rates

decentralization and corruption evidence across countries the relationship between decentralization of government activities and the extent of rent extraction by private parties is an important element in the recent debate on institutional design the theoretical literature makes ambiguous predictions about this relationship and it has remained virtually unexamined by empiricists the authors make a first attempt at examining the issue empirically by looking at the cross country relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption as measured by a number of different indices their estimates suggest that fiscal decentralization in government spending is significantly associated with lower corruption moreover they find that the origin of a country s legal system for example civil versus common legal code performs extremely well as an instrument for decentralization the estimated relationship between decentralization when so instrumented and corruption is even stronger the evidence suggests a number of interesting areas for future work including investigating whether there are specific services for which decentralized provision has a particularly strong impact on political rent extraction and understanding the channels through which decentralization succeeds in keeping corruption in check

improving fiscal policy in the eu the case for independent forecasts are official output forecasts biased we point out that official forecasts of output dynamics are crucial to the assessment of cyclically adjusted budget balances and provide evidence that in some euro area countries biased forecasts have played a thus far neglected role in generating excessive deficits we suggest that the forecast bias may be politically motivated and that forecasts produced by an independent authority would be better than in house ministry of finance forecasts for the purpose of monitoring budget formation and budget outcomes lars jonung and martin larch

fiscal discipline and the budget process the critical economic policy issue for many oecd countries developing countries and transition economies currently is fiscal consolidation and the maintenance of long run fiscal balance two related components underlie this general goal first several countries face the issue of deficit reduction particularly those countries with high debt gdp ratios second it is becoming increasingly apparent that major reforms of the welfare system and specifically of social security systems are critical ingredients of a long lasting fiscal consolidation see alesina and perotti 1995a in the case of monetary policy a constructive discussion has generated a widespread consensus about the benefits of different monetary institutions relatively few economists dispute the benefits of a certain amount of central bank independence even though different commentators and policymakers may disagree on the optimal degree of independence also a contracting approach has highlighted the benefit of inflation targeting and of certain institutional relationships contracts between the executive and the central bank a similar theoretical and empirical discussion on the role of budget procedures and budget institutions is just beginning in this paper we ask the following two questions i do budget procedures matter for the determination of the budget balance and its composition ii are there certain institutional reforms that one should feel comfortable in recommending based on the relatively scarce empirical evidence available we tentatively answer yes to the first question budget procedures matter on the second question we suggest that the two critical areas of reform are first more transparency second a strengthening of the roles of the executive branch vis a vis the legislature and of the treasury minister vis a vis the rest of the executive branch in order to achieve a centralized and top bottom approach to the budget process

international remittances migration and primary commodities this paper documents the global crude oil market as a key driver of international migration and remittances structural estimation documents that crude oil supply and demand shocks induce sizeable remittances flows the sign and magnitude of remitter outflows differ across countries and structural shocks a multilateral global general equilibrium model is used to show how oil exporting remitters generate international remittance and migration spillovers from crude oil price movements remittees economic outcomes from remittances and migration channels are found to be dominated by terms of trade channels for shocks to the global market for crude oil due to this studies of remittance flows need to account for the source of the commodity price movement if using the correlation between remittee real gdp and remittance inflows

the hidden economy a new view of remittances in the arab world abstract the hidden economy is set in place by the large scale migration of labor in search of employment outside national boundaries remitted earnings channeled largely through informal mechanisms have generated a network of financial and economic relations that define the boundaries and characteristic features of the hidden economy the hidden economy shapes many of the critical parameters of economic activity of the middle east such as exchange rates and the availability of foreign exchange it is difficult to observe or measure working of this important phenomenon since to a large extent it operates through unofficial informal or illegal transactions special emphasis is given to the cases of sudan and egypt to illustrate the operations of the hidden economy and to identify its agents and characteristic features

economic targets and loss aversion in international environmental cooperation in the standard emission problem each countryi s ruling party decides on an optimal level of emissions by analyzing the cost and benefit to the country however such policy decisions are often influenced by political partiesi incentives to be elected voters tend to give higher priority to economic issues than they do to environmental ones as a result political parties have additional incentives to reach a critical economic benefit level at a cost of higher emission level in order to satisfy votersi expectations in economic issues therefore this study explores the implications of political parties being averse to insufficient economic performance relative to a critical economic target level on sustaining an international environmental agreement on emission levels in doing so we allow countries to have asymmetric concerns about economic targets as well as asymmetric technology levels we find that stronger concerns about economic targets deter the most cooperative emission levels countries could jointly sustain furthermore technological asymmetry could either deepen or offset this impact these results suggest that efforts on achieving substantial international environmental agreements should be supported at the citizen level to eliminate the adverse effects

economic targets and loss aversion in international environmental cooperation economic targets in environmental coopeartion in the standard emission problem each country s ruling party decides on an optimal level of emissions by analyzing the cost and benefit to the country however such policy decisions are often influenced by political parties incentives to be elected voters tend to give higher priority to economic issues than they do to environmental ones as a result political parties have additional incentives to reach a critical economic benefit level at a cost of higher emission level in order to satisfy voters expectations in economic issues therefore this study explores the implications of political parties being averse to insufficient economic performance relative to a critical economic target level on sustaining an international environmental agreement on emission levels in doing so we allow countries to have asymmetric concerns about economic targets as well as asymmetric technology levels we find that stronger concerns about economic targets deter the most cooperative emission levels countries could jointly sustain furthermore technological asymmetry could either deepen or offset this impact these results suggest that efforts on achieving substantial international environmental agreements should be supported at the citizen level to eliminate the adverse effects

voting on the budget deficit this paper analyzes a model in which a group of rational individuals votes over the composition and time profile of public spending all voters agree that a balanced budget is ex ante optimal however if there is disagreement between current and future majorities a balanced budget is not a political equilibrium under majority rule under certain conditions a majority of the voters favors a budget deficit and the equilibrium deficit is larger the greater is the polarization among voters copyright 1990 by american economic association

political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries institutions and policies vittorio grilli donato masciandaro and guido tabellini why do countries as similar as the industrialized oecd countries go through such different experience in terms of public deficits and debts or in terms of inflation the answer cannot come from macroeconomic policy responses to different disturbances nor from the principles of optimal taxation but rather from politics this article focuses on the role that particular institutions exert in providing constraints and incentives which shape the actions of policymakers the electoral process and political traditions affect the ability of governments to deal with deficits and mounting debts what seems to matter most it is found is the effect of the durability of governments governments with short horizons act myopically and never quite tackle the hard choices such governments typically exist in countries with an electoral system favouring many small political parties central bank independence promotes low inflation with no apparent costs in terms of real economic performance irrespective of the political institutions in fact there is no link between monetary and fiscal discipline these findings carry powerful implications for countries facing high indebtedness or stubborn inflation but also for the construction of the european economic and monetary union

a noncooperative theory of legislative coalitions this noncooperative theory is based on a model that incorporates an institutional structure that reflects the sequential process of agenda formation and voting in a legislature that has the task of allocating particularistic benefits among legislative districts the theory is intended to identify the incentives for the formation of proposal coordinating coalitions as a function of characteristics of the political system and the rules that govern agenda formation coalition proposals allocate all the benefits to their districts and whenever the coalition has discipline or controls the chair it will be of minimal winning size when proposals are governed by a closed rule when coalition discipline is absent and the chair is neutral the coalition will be comprised of approximately 70 of the legislature a legislative rule that allows amendments may result in larger coalitions coalition composition is also considered

the rationality of usda forecasts under multivariate asymmetric loss a large number of previous studies suggest that many usda forecasts are biased and or inefficient these findings however may be the result of the assumed loss function of usda forecasters we test the rationality of the usda net cash income forecasts and the wasde production and price forecasts between 1988 and 2018 using a flexible multivariate loss function that allows for asymmetric loss and non separable forecast errors our results provide robust evidence that usda forecasters are rational expected loss minimizers yet demonstrate a tendency to place a greater weight on under or overprediction as a result this study provides an alternate interpretation of previous findings of forecast irrationality

political biases despite external expert participation an empirical analysis of tax revenue forecasts in germany this paper explores whether and how political biases arise in an institutional setting where revenue forecasting is delegated to a body that includes experts from institutions neither part of nor controlled by the government the empirical analysis focuses on the performance of german federal tax revenue forecasts in the preparation of which the advice of external experts has a long tradition as an institutional safeguard while on average revenue forecasts turn out to be unbiased the results show that the government exerts an influence in particular optimism pessimism in the government s gdp forecast helps to explain why the revenue forecast turns out too optimistic pessimistic in addition governmental estimates of the revenue effects of tax law changes are found to contribute to forecast errors

do corrupt governments receive less foreign aid critics of foreign aid programs argue that these funds often support corrupt governments and inefficient bureaucracies supporters argue that foreign aid can be used to reward good governments this paper documents that there is no evidence that less corrupt governments receive more foreign aid on the contrary according to some measures of corruption more corrupt governments receive more aid also we could not find any evidence that an increase in foreign aid reduces corruption in summary the answer to the question posed in the title is no

remittances and working poverty abstractthis article shows that the level and the predictability of remittances reduce working poverty in receiving economies through their effects on labour market dynamics it takes advantage of the new cross country dataset ilo kilm 7th edition containing information on the share of individuals working for less than us 2 per day to identify the main impacts the article proposes a novel approach to deal with the endogeneity of remittances and migration in addition the results are robust to the possible error in measuring working poverty to the potential attrition bias and to the presence of various control variables