learning to believe in sunspots a number of authors have shown that competitive economies may possess sunspot equilibria that is rational expectations equilibria in which purely extrinsic uncertainty affects equilibrium prices and allocations 2 such results demonstrate that it does not require a lack of faith in the rationality of market participants to believe that competitive markets may be subject to purely speculative fluctuations driven solely by expectations 3 the mere existence of sunspot equilibria as solutions to a system of marketclearing conditions however might not be judged sufficient to indicate that competitive markets with rational participants could ever be subject to speculative instability the sunspot equilibria represent states of affairs in which agents act differently in the case of different realizations of the sunspot variable and it is rational for each agent to do so but it might be thought unlikely that the beliefs of all the participants in the market could ever come to be coordinated so as to bring about an equilibrium of that kind it is rational to believe that sunspots convey information about future states of affairs once the economy is in a sunspot equilibrium but why would rational agents ever begin to believe in such a thing so as to create the conditions under which the belief is rational in order to address such a question one must go beyond the mere statement of the conditions for equilibrium and discussion of what states of affairs satisfy them one must specify an explicit dynamic process according to which the beliefs of agents adjust when out of equilibrium any exercise of this kind is necessarily unsatisfactory as there is no univocal meaning for the postulate of rational behavior outside of an equilibrium it may well be the case that

information spillovers gains from trade and interventions in frozen markets we study government interventions in markets suffering from adverse selection importantly asymmetric information prevents both the realization of gains from trade and the production of information that is valuable to other market participants we find a fundamental tension in maximizing welfare while some intervention is required to restore trading too much intervention depletes trade of its informational content we characterize the optimal policy that balances these two considerations and explore how it depends on features of the environment our model can be used to study a program introduced in 2009 to restore information production in the market for legacy assets

empirical tests of information aggregation abstract this paper proposes tests to empirically examine whether auction prices aggregate information away from the limit these tests are applied to a unique data set containing winning bids and measures of the value and dispersion of information signals in ebay auctions for computers results suggest that prices partially aggregate information but do not converge to the common value even away from the limit more bidders and stronger information have a significant effect on the convergence of prices and information aggregation even partial information aggregation may represent a potential efficiency gain over one to one trade of used goods with uncertain common values

information aggregation in common value auctions a key question in information economics and finance is whether prices aggregate information in a competitive environment that is when agents are endowed with private information does competition lead in the limit to prices which would occur if all information were public this paper examines the asymptotic properties of prices in common value auctions when the number of bidders becomes large the main idea in this paper is to separate the issue of information aggregation from the issue of revenue efficiency we also distinguish between the amount of information prices contain and the degree to which prices approximate the asset s value using this approach we get a simple characterization of the limiting distribution of prices we are not only able to answer whether prices converge to the asset s value but also get an explicit form for the limiting distribution prices converge to the expected value of the asset conditional on the information possessed by what we call the pivotal bidder this provides insights on how the auction format and the information structure influence the limiting behavior of prices it shows that the limiting distribution of prices can be derived from the statistical properties of certain order statistics this lets us abstract from the specific equilibrium bidding strategies for example we show that while the first and second price auction have different equilibrium strategies they share a similar limiting distribution of prices these auctions yield different limiting distributions from auctions such as the english auction or kn auction our

multiple solution indeterminacies in monetary policy analysis abstract a sizeable fraction of recent research on monetary policy has been concerned with issues relating to analytical indeterminacies i e multiple solutions in rational expectations re models most of the literature features sophisticated re analysis conducted within dynamic models that reflect optimizing behavior by individual agents and incorporate taylor style policy rules a few papers have suggested that some of the particular indeterminacy arguments are misleading or irrelevant for the most part however there has been little dissent from the position that these indeterminacies present a genuine problem for monetary policy makers the purpose of the present paper by contrast is to argue that conclusions based on multiple solution indeterminacy findings are of dubious merit rather generally

monetary and fiscal policy design at the zero lower bound evidence from the lab the global economic crisis of 2007 8 pushed many advanced economies into a liquidity trap a macroeconomic scenario characterised by nomial rates at the zero lower bound zlb low inflation and output below trend we design an experiment to generate empirical evidence on the effectiveness of policies aimed at managing expectations against liquidity traps in a controlled laboratory environment where expectations are elicied directly from human subjects our results suggest that monetary policy alone is not sufficient to insulate the economy form the risk of falling into a liquidity trap even if it preventively cuts the policy augmented with a fiscal switching rule succeeds in avoiding and escapiing liquidity trap episodes we also measure larger than unity fiscal mulipliers when monetary policy is constrained by the zlb experimental results in different treatments are well explained by adaptive learning

theoretical analysis regarding a zero lower bound on nominal interest rates this paper explores several issues concerning a possible zero lower bound zlb including its theoretical rationale the magnitude of effects of low sustained inflation on real interest rates the validity of analyzing monetary policy in models with no monetary variables and the dynamic stabilizing properties of taylor rules in a zlb context the most important argument however is that if the short nominal rate is immobilized at zero there nevertheless exists a route for monetary stabilization policy to be effective via the foreign exchange market its quantitative importance is examined in a calibrated optimizing open economy model

stabilizing expectations at the zero lower bound experimental evidence abstract our study demonstrates how agents expectations can interact dynamically with monetary and fiscal policy at the zero lower bound we study expectation formation near the zero lower bound using a learning to forecast laboratory experiment under alternative policy regimes in our experimental economy monetary policy targets inflation around a constant or state dependent target we find that subjects expectations significantly over react to stochastic aggregate demand shocks and historical information leading many economies to experience severe deflationary traps neither quantitatively nor qualitatively communicating the state dependent inflation targets reduce the duration or severity of economic crises introducing anticipated and persistent fiscal stimulus at the zero lower bound reduces the severity of the recessions when the recovery of fundamentals is sufficiently slow participants expectations become highly pessimistic and neither monetary nor fiscal policy are effective at stabilizing the economy

escape dynamics in learning models this article illustrates and characterizes how adaptive learning can lead to recurrent large fluctuations learning models have typically focused on the convergence of beliefs towards an equilibrium however in stochastic environments there may be rare but recurrent episodes where shocks cause beliefs to escape from the equilibrium generating large movements in observed outcomes i characterize the escape dynamics by drawing on the theory of large deviations developing new results which make this theory directly applicable in a class of learning models the likelihood frequency and most likely direction of escapes are all characterized by a deterministic control problem i illustrate my results with two simple examples

auctions actions and the failure of information aggregation we study a market where k identical and indivisible objects are allocated using a uniform price auction where n k bidders each demand one object before the auction each bidder receives an informative but imperfect signal about the state of the world the good that is auctioned is a common value object for the bidders and a bidder s valuation for the object is determined jointly by the state of the world and an action that he chooses after winning the object but before he observes the state we show that there are equilibria where the auction price is completely uninformative about the state of the world and aggregates no information even in an arbitrarily large auction in the equilibrium that we construct because prices do not aggregate information agents have strict incentives to acquire costly information before they participate in the market also market statistics other than price such as the amount of rationing and bid distributions contain extra information about the state our findings sharply contrast with past work which shows that large auctions aggregate information when there is no ex post action

lack of confidence the zero lower bound and the virtue of fiscal rules abstract in the presence of the zero lower bound standard business cycle models with a taylor type monetary policy rule are prone to equilibrium multiplicity a drop in private sector confidence can drive the economy into a liquidity trap without any change in fundamentals i show in the context of a standard new keynesian model that it is possible to design ricardian fiscal spending rules that insulate the economy from such expectations driven liquidity traps in the case of price adjustment costs desirable fiscal rules ensure that a drop in confidence does not lead to a decline in real marginal costs in the case of nominal wage adjustment costs desirable fiscal spending rules ensure that a drop in confidence does not lead to a decline in the ratio of the marginal rate of substitution between private consumption and hours worked relative to the real wage rate

inflation forecast errors and time variation in term premia the expectations theory of the term strueture is well known to give wrong signals as to the future course of long term interest rates one explanation involves rational time varying term premia however the anomaly may also be due to inflation forecast errors we study survey forecasts of inflation it seems that the respondents forecasts are insufficiently adaptive interest rates reflect expectations similar to the inflation forecasts as a result past survey forecast errors reliably predict premia on u s government bonds

price inference in small markets this paper investigates the effects of market size on the ability of price to aggregate traders private information to account for heterogeneity in correlation of trader values a gaussian model of double auction is introduced that departs from the standard information structure based on a common fundamental shock the paper shows that markets are informationally efficient only if correlations of values coincide across all bidder pairs as a result with heterogeneously interdependent values price informativeness may not increase monotonically with market size as a necessary and sufficient condition for the monotonicity price informativeness increases with the number of traders if the implied reduction in the absolute value of an average correlation statistic of an information structure is sufficiently small

the relevance of a choice of auction format in a competitive environment we examine the relevance of an auction format in a competitive environment by comparing uniform and discriminatory price auctions with many bidders in a private values setting we show that if the number of objects for sale is small relative to the number of bidders then all equilibria of both auctions are approximately efficient and lead to approximately the same revenue when the number of objects for sale is proportional to the number of bidders then the particulars of the auction format matter all equilibria of the uniform auction are efficient while all of the equilibria of the discriminatory auction are inefficient the relative revenue rankings of the auction formats can go in either direction depending on the specifics of the environment these conclusions regarding the efficiency and revenue ranking are in contrast to the previous literature which focused on the case of independent information across agents

managing unanchored heterogeneous expectations and liquidity traps abstract we study the possibility of almost self fulfilling waves of optimism and pessimism and self fulfilling liquidity traps in a new keynesian model with a continuum of heterogeneous expectations in particular all agents choose based on past forecasting performance expectation values out of a distribution around the targets of the central bank this framework allows us to explicitly model the anchoring of expectations as the variance of this distribution of possible expectation values we find that when the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate is not binding adequate monetary policy can prevent waves of optimism and pessimism and exclude near unit root dynamics even when expectations are unanchored however as shocks bring the economy to a situation with a binding zero lower bound there is a danger of a long lasting self fulfilling liquidity trap that can take the form of a deflationary spiral this can be prevented if expectations are strongly enough anchored to the targets or if the inflation target is high enough

discretionary monetary policy and the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates abstract ignoring the existence of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates one considerably understates the value of monetary commitment in new keynesian models a stochastic forward looking model with an occasionally binding lower bound calibrated to the u s economy suggests that low values for the natural rate of interest lead to sizeable output losses and deflation under discretionary monetary policy the fall in output and deflation are much larger than in the case with policy commitment and do not show up at all if the model abstracts from the existence of the lower bound the welfare losses of discretionary policy increase even further when inflation is partly determined by lagged inflation in the phillips curve these results emerge because private sector expectations and the discretionary policy response to these expectations reinforce each other and cause the lower bound to be reached much earlier than under commitment

panel discussion price stability how should long term monetary policy be determined these comments address the question of monetary strategy as distinct from monetary tactics they are not directed at the question of what monetary policy is appropriate at the present time or of how monetary policy should be determined at any specific point as a function of prevailing conditions instead the issue i take is one that has been of increasing interest to economists in recent years what should be the long terrn objectives of the monetary authority increased interest in this issue as opposed to the issue of fine tuning the economy reflects the general intellectual consensus that has emerged on two points first what the monetary authority surely can control in the long run is the growth rate of nominal income second issues of dynamic consistency and commitment are crucial to the design of appropriate monetary policies beyond its recognition of these points my view is that most of what the academic economics community has had to say on the issue of long run monetary strategy has been tangential at best and i fear that many of the papers at this conference have not done much to improve the situation i wish to advance four propositions about monetary policy and to discuss their implications first an optimal tax theory has little or nothing to do with sensible inflation policy second positive rates of inflation are almost certainly desirable third to an important extent institutions do the work of rules and monetary rules should be avoided instead institutions should be drafted to solve time inconsistency problems fourth h j res 409 the proposed zero inflation amendment is a good idea if it is not taken too seriously or too literally but is instead viewed as a device for strengthening the independence of the federal reserve system my first proposition is that the connection between optimal tax theory and infla

some unpleasant properties of loglinearized solutions when the nominal rate is zero does fiscal policy have large and qualitatively different effects on the economy when the nominal interest rate is zero an emerging consensus in the new keynesian nk literature is that the answer to this question is yes evidence presented here suggests that the nk model s implications for fiscal policy at the zero bound may not be all that different from its implications for policy away from it for a range of empirically relevant parameterizations employment increases when the labor tax rate is cut and the government purchase multiplier is less than 1 05

information spillovers in asset markets with correlated values we study information spillovers in a dynamic setting with privately informed traders and correlated asset values a trade of one asset or lack thereof can provide information about the value of other assets the information content of trading behavior is endogenously determined in equilibrium we show that this endogeneity leads to multiple equilibria when the correlation between asset values is suciently high the

tail expectation and imperfect competition in limit order book markets abstract perfect competition in liquidity provision in limit order markets is characterized by a tail expectation condition glosten 1994 in this paper we model imperfect competition in schedules by infinitely many liquidity suppliers quoting on a limit order book we show that there are zero rent mixed strategy equilibria featuring finite numbers of active liquidity suppliers none of the equilibria satisfies the competitive outcome not even on average considering a sequence of equilibria with the number of active liquidity suppliers becoming large we show that the aggregate stochastic marginal price schedule converges to the deterministic competitive marginal price schedule

unstable inflation targets this paper studies long run inflation targets and stability in an imperfect information environment when central banks set an inflation target that is not fully communicated agents draw inferences about inflation from recent data and remain alert to structural change by forming expectations from a forecasting model that is estimated via discounted least squares inflation targets can lead agents beliefs to depart from rational expectations through two channels first implementing a higher inflation target can lead to overshooting second there can be nearly self fulfilling inflation disinflation or deflation that arises as an endogenous response to shocks policy implications for implementing a higher target without deanchoring expectations are discussed

what price accountability the lucas island model and the politics of monetary policy this paper develops a model of an electoral cycle in inflation and output based on rational inflation expectations and rational retrospective voting voters are heterogeneous and partially informed about aggregate macroeconomic variables they observe precisely how monetary policy stimulates their local economies but their observations of economic activity in other sectors are imprecise voters extract information about the incumbent policymaker s economic competence from cross sectoral spillover effects the incumbent has incentives to generate preelection monetary surprises that stimulate the local economies and generate cross sectoral spillover effects he thereby creates an impression of economic competence and furthers his reelection prospects his policy manipulations are the price of political accountability on a positive note the incumbent is more likely to survive voter scrutiny if he is more competent than the average political candidate

animal spirits heterogeneous expectations and the amplification and duration of crises we introduce a simple equilibrium model of a market for loans households lend to firms and form expectations about their loan default probability under heterogeneous expectations with switching between forecasting strategies driven by reinforcement learning even a small fraction of pessimistic traders has a large aggregate effect causing a heterogeneous expectations risk premium i e significantly higher contract rates for loans and significantly lower output our stylized model illustrates how animal spirits and heterogeneous expectations may lead to aconfidence loss and to financial instability amplifying the magnitude of economic crises and slowing down recovery

forward guidance and the role of central bank credibility under heterogeneous beliefs abstract this paper studies the macroeconomic effects of central bank forward guidance when central bank credibility is endogenous we take a stylized new keynesian model with an occasionally binding effective lower bound constraint on nominal interest rates and heterogeneous and boundedly rational households central bank forecasts follow a bivariate var not taking into account the time variation in the distribution of aggregate expectations in this framework we extend the central bank s toolkit to allow for the publication of its own forecasts delphic guidance and the commitment to a future path of the nominal interest rate odyssean guidance we find that both delphic and odyssean forward guidance increase the likelihood of recovery from a liquidity trap even though odyssean guidance alone appears more powerful in inducing recovery we find it to increase ex post macroeconomic volatility and thus reduce welfare

bidder solicitation adverse selection and the failure of competition we study a common value first price auction in which the number of bidders is endogenous the seller auctioneer knows the value and solicits bidders at a cost the number of bidders which is unobservable may thus depend on the true value therefore being solicited conveys information this solicitation effect may soften competition and impede information aggregation under certain conditions there is an equilibrium in which the seller solicits many bidders yet the resulting price is not competitive and fails to aggregate any information more broadly these ideas are relevant for markets with adverse selection in which informed traders initiate contacts

e stability vis a vis determinacy in regime switching models abstract this paper examines e stability determinacy and indeterminacy in a general class of regime switching models with lagged endogenous variables using determinacy conditions from cho 2016 2020 our first result extends mccallum 2007 to models with time varying parameters the unique mean square stable equilibrium is e stable if agents have current information and one period ahead decision rules further we address the existence of e stable non fundamental equilibria and find that iteratively e stable equilibria of indeterminate switching models can exist finally we show that indeterminate new keynesian models with persistent recurring interest rate peg regimes admit iteratively e stable equilibria in special cases the iterative e stability condition coincides with the long run taylor principle

escapist policy rules abstract we study a simple microfounded macroeconomic system in which the monetary authority employs a taylor type policy rule we analyze situations in which the self confirming equilibrium is unique and learnable and explore the prospects for the use of large deviation theory we show that the system can sometimes depart from the self confirming equilibrium towards a non equilibrium outcome characterized by persistently low nominal interest rates and persistently low inflation these events that have some of the properties of liquidity traps observed in the data even though the policymaker remains committed to a taylor type policy rule which otherwise has desirable stabilization properties

learning about monetary policy rules abstract we study macroeconomic systems with forward looking private sector agents and a monetary authority that is trying to control the economy through the use of a linear policy feedback rule we use stability under recursive learning a la evans and honkapohja learning and expectations in macroeconomics princeton university press princeton new jersey 2001 as a criterion for evaluating monetary policy rules in this context we find that considering learning can alter the evaluation of alternative policy rules

liquidity traps and expectation dynamics fiscal stimulus or fiscal austerity we examine global dynamics under infinite horizon learning in new keynesian models where the interest rate rule is subject to the zero lower bound as in evans guse and honkapohja 2008 the intended steady state is locally but not globally stable unstable deflationary paths emerge after large pessimistic shocks to expectations for large expectation shocks that push interest rates to the zero bound a temporary fiscal stimulus or a policy of fiscal austerity appropriately tailored in magnitude and duration will insulate the economy from deflation traps however fiscal switching rules that automatically kick in without discretionary fine tuning can be equally effective

inflation targeting and liquidity traps under endogenous credibility abstract policy implications are derived for an inflation targeting central bank whose credibility is endogenous and depends on its past ability to achieve its targets this is done in a new keynesian framework with heterogeneous and boundedly rational expectations we find that the region of allowed policy parameters is strictly larger than under rational expectations however when the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate is accounted for self fulfilling deflationary spirals can occur depending on the credibility of the central bank deflationary spirals can be prevented with a high inflation target and aggressive monetary easing

learning to believe in secular stagnation this paper shows that a secular stagnation equilibrium as proposed by eggertsson and mehrotra 2014 is e stable this is in contrast to the often studied liquidity trap equilibrium that exist in representative agent new keynesian models at the zero lower bound when there is active monetary policy following a taylor rule this result reconciles the observed stable low growth and low inflation outcomes since the end of the global financial crisis with the instability predicted by the new keynesian model using a standard modeling framework

learnability and monetary policy a global perspective abstract the recent literature on monetary policy design has emphasized the importance of equilibrium determinacy and learnability in the choice of policy rules this paper contains an analysis of the learnability of the equilibrium in a class of simple micro founded models in which the policy authority uses a taylor type monetary policy rule unlike previous analyses the model economy is not linearized about a steady state instead a global perspective is adopted globally the nonlinear model economy can possess rational expectations equilibria other than the steady state consistent with the inflation target of the monetary authorities these include a second low inflation liquidity trap steady state periodic equilibria and sunspot equilibria the main results in the paper characterize the conditions under which these alternative equilibria maybe stable under adaptive learning even when the policy rule obeys the taylor principle the stability of multiple equilibria is associated with policy rules which are forecast based an important finding is that backward looking taylor type policy rules can guarantee that the unique learnable equilibrium is the steady state associated with the inflation target of the monetary authority

where modern macroeconomics went wrong this paper provides a critique of the dsge models that have come to dominate macroeconomics during the past quarter century it argues that at the heart of the failure were the wrong microfoundations which failed to incorporate key aspects of economic behaviour e g incorporating insights from information economics and behavioural economics inadequate modelling of the financial sector meant they were ill suited for predicting or responding to a financial crisis and a reliance on representative agent models meant they were ill suited for analysing either the role of distribution in fluctuations and crises or the consequences of fluctuations on inequality the paper proposes alternative benchmark models that may be more useful both in understanding deep downturns and responding to them

equilibria existence and characterization in auctions achievements and open questions establishing existence and characterizing equilibria is a fundamental step in the study of auctions theoretical characterizations and empirical predictions are well accepted only to the extent that they are based on equilibria however despite the fact that auctions have been extensively studied there are still many problems regarding equilibrium existence and characterization waiting for resolution in this survey we review the landmark results and highlight open questions in addition we review the standard assumptions underlying these results and discuss the suitability of the nash equilibrium solution concept we focus our review on single object auctions but also review results in multi unit divisible combinatorial and double auctions

liquidity traps learning and stagnation we examine global economic dynamics under learning in a new keynesian model in which the interest rate rule is subject to the zero lower bound under normal monetary and fiscal policy the intended steady state is locally but not globally stable large pessimistic shocks to expectations can lead to deflationary spirals with falling prices and falling output to avoid this outcome we recommend augmenting normal policies with aggressive monetary and fiscal policy that guarantee a lower bound on inflation in contrast policies geared toward ensuring an output lower bound are insufficient for avoiding deflationary spirals

rational expectations information acquisition and competitive bidding most rational expectations market equilibrium models are not models of price formation and naive mechanisms leading to such equilibria can be severely manipulable in this paper a bidding model is developed which has the market like features that bidders act as price takers and that prices convey information higher equilibrium prices convey more favorable information about the quality of the objects being sold than do lower prices bidders can benefit from trading only if they have a transactions motive or if they have access to inside information apart from exceptional cases prices are not fully revealing a two stage model is developed in which bidders may acquire information at a cost before bidding and for which the equilibrium price is fully revealing resolving a well known paradox

on the asymptotic distribution of the transaction price in a clock model of a multi unit oral ascending price auction within the common value paradigm using a clock model of a multi unit oral ascending price auction within the common value paradigm we analyze the behavior of the transaction price as the numbers of bidders and units gets large in a particular way we find that even though the transaction price is determined by a fraction of losing drop out bids that price converges in probability to the true but ex ante unknown value subsequently we demonstrate that the asymptotic distribution of the transaction price is gaussian finally we apply our methods to data from an auction of taxi license plates held in shenzhen china

what can survey forecasts tell us about information rigidities a lot we derive common and conflicting predictions from models in which agents face information constraints and then assess their validity using surveys of consumers firms central bankers and professional forecasters we document that mean forecasts fail to completely adjust on impact to shocks leading to statistically and economically significant deviations from the null of full information the dynamics of forecast errors after shocks are consistent with the predictions of models with information rigidities the conditional responses of forecast errors and disagreement among agents can also be used to differentiate between some of the most prominent models of information rigidities

public choice more of a branch or more of a sect economics is a tree with many branches and so is political science public choice attempts to be something as rare as a joint branch of both trees branches are normally defined by the subjects treated labor economics deals with the labor market public economics with the public sector etc however there are also some sects think of marxism and more recently of the post keynesian movement it was quite large in economics only fifteen years ago then it became more and more sectarian till it went out of fashion now it seems to have disappeared or think of mathematical economics that has gradually got more and more isolated from the rest of economics it now mainly produces results that only other mathematical economists understand and care about see paldam 1992 the difference between a branch and a sect is hard to define but the key point probably is

public information and inflation expectations microeconometric evidence from a natural experiment abstract governments provide public information to reduce information imperfections do households rely on public signals to inform themselves about market conditions to identify the importance of public information in households price expectations we take advantage of a unique natural experiment in ecuador where the published inflation rate had been different from the correct rate over a period of fourteen months due to a software error we find that the public signal about prices plays an important role in households price expectations and the change in price expectations affects their savings choices the effect is stronger for better educated and older people

perceived inflation under loss aversion building on prospect theory we apply the concept of loss aversion to the formation of inflation perceptions and test empirically for nonlinearities in the inflation perceptions relation for a panel of 10 euro area countries specifically under the assumption of loss aversion inflation changes above a certain reference rate will be perceived more strongly rejecting rationality of inflation perceptions in general under symmetric loss and in a majority of cases under flexible loss functions panel smooth transition models give evidence of nonlinearities in the inflation perceptions relation regarding both actual inflation and time this result is confirmed by dynamic fixed effects estimates where the slope of the estimated value function is significantly steeper in the loss region and the implied average reference inflation rate is found close to 2

fiscal policy in an expectations driven liquidity trap we study the effects of fiscal policy interventions in a liquidity trap in a model with nominal rigidities and an interest rate rule in a liquidity trap caused by a self fulfilling state of low confidence higher government spending has deflationary effects that reduce the spending multiplier when the zero lower bound is binding instead cuts in marginal labor tax rates are inflationary and become more expansionary when the zero lower bound is binding these findings contradict popular views about the effects of fiscal policy in a liquidity trap

overcoming the zero bound on interest rate policy the paper proposes three options for overcoming the zero bound on interest rate policy a carry tax on money open market operations in long bonds and monetary transfers a variable carry tax on electronic bank reserves could enable a central bank to target negative nominal interest rates a carry tax could be imposed on currency to create more leeway to make interest rates negative quantitative policy monetary transfers and open market purchases of long bonds could stimulate the economy by creating liquidity broadly defined a central bank needs more fiscal support than usual from the treasury to pursue quantitative policy at the interest rate floor

fiscal stimulus in expectations driven liquidity traps abstract i study liquidity traps in a model where agents have heterogeneous expectations and finite planning horizons backward looking agents base their expectations on past observations while forward looking agents have fully rational expectations liquidity traps that are fully or partly driven by expectations can arise due to pessimism of backward looking agents only when planning horizons are finite these liquidity traps can be of longer duration without ending up in a deflationary spiral i further find that fiscal stimulus in the form of an increase in government spending or a cut in consumption taxes can be very effective in mitigating the liquidity trap a feedback mechanism of heterogeneous expectations causes fiscal multipliers to be the largest when the majority of agents are backward looking but there also is a considerable fraction of agents that are forward looking labor tax cuts are always deflationary and are not an effective tool in a liquidity trap

informed speculation with imperfect competition competitive rational expectations models have the unsatisfactory property dubbed the schizophrenia problem by hellwig that each trader takes the equilibrium price as given despite the fact that he influences that price an examination of information aggregation in a non competitive rational expectations model using a nash equilibrium in demand functions shows that the schizophrenia problem is avoided by having each trader take into account the effect his demand has on the equilibrium price given a distribution of private information across traders prices reveal less information than in the competition equilibrium and prices no longer become fully informative in the limit as noise trading vanishes or as traders become risk neutral with small traders the model may become one of monopolistic competition not perfect competition in contrast to the competitive model a reasonable model of endogenous acquisition of costly private information is obtained even when traders are risk neutral

a comparative study of alternative methods of quantifying qualitative survey responses using napm data this article examines the effectiveness of a subjective probability approach to quantify three category qualitative responses from expectations surveys since one cannot make a judgment on the validity of estimated expectations by comparing them with ex post outcomes we use the national association of purchasing managers survey data on materials buying prices and compare them with the producer price index for intermediate materials and components for manufacturing we experimented with normal logistic and scaled f distributions and found that the approach could explain approximately 60 of the variation in the monthly series marginal improvement in the explanatory power of the procedure was noted when the imperceptible parameter was allowed to be asymmetric and variable over time

frequency bias in consumers perceptions of inflation an experimental study we investigate whether the perception of economy wide inflation is affected by the frequency with which various goods prices are observed we provide novel experimental evidence that consumers perceptions of aggregate inflation are systematically biased toward the perceived inflation rates of the frequently purchased items this frequency bias may affect consumers consumption and investment decisions and thus have important macroeconomic consequences it may also explain why consumers typically over estimate inflation in surveys during periods where frequently purchased non durable goods are inflating faster than durables

large common value auctions with risk averse bidders abstract we analyze large symmetric auctions with conditionally i i d common values and risk averse bidders our main result characterizes the asymptotic equilibrium price distribution for the first and second price auctions as an implication we show that with constant absolute risk aversion cara the second price auction raises significantly more revenue than the first price auction while this ranking seems robust in numerical analysis also outside the cara specification we show by counterexamples that the result does not generalize to all risk averse utility functions

the taylor rule and optimal monetary policy where it denotes the fed s operating target for the federal funds rate pt is the inflation rate measured by the gdp deflator yt is the log of real gdp and y t is the log of potential output identified empirically with a linear trend the rule has since been subject to considerable attention both as an account of actual policy in the united states and elsewhere and as a prescription for desirable policy taylor argues for the rule s normative significance both on the basis of simulations and on the ground that it describes u s policy in a period in which monetary policy is widely judged to have been unusually successful taylor 1999 suggesting that the rule is worth adopting as a principle of behavior here i wish to consider to what extent this prescription resembles the sort of policy that economic theory would recommend i consider the question in the context of a simple but widely used optimizing model of the monetary transmission mechanism which allows one to reach clear conclusions about economic welfare the model is highly stylized but incorporates important features of more realistic models and allows me to make several points that are of more general validity out of concern for the robustness of the conclusions reached the analysis here addresses only broad qualitative features of the taylor rule and attempts to identify features of a desirable policy rule that are likely to hold under a variety of model specifications

the perils of taylor rules abstract since john taylor s 1993 carnegie rochester conf ser publ policy39 195 214 seminal paper a large literature has argued that active interest rate feedback rules that is rules that respond to increases in inflation with a more than one for one increase in the nominal interest rate are stabilizing in this paper we argue that once the zero bound on nominal interest rates is taken into account active interest rate feedback rules can easily lead to unexpected consequences specifically we show that even if the steady state at which monetary policy is active is locally the unique equilibrium typically there exist an infinite number of equilibrium trajectories originating arbitrarily close to that steady state that converge to a liquidity trap that is a steady state in which the nominal interest rate is near zero and inflation is possibly negative journal of economic literature classification numbers e52 e31 e63

microfoundations and the demand for money the reader should note that i write this piece in a style that aims to be accessible to that much neglected representative agent the woman on the eurostar train hence unlike the man on the clapham omnibus i assume my intrepid traveller has reasonable knowledge of monetary economics and econometrics but not of the details of the demand for money space constraints force me to indulge in a certain amount of poetic licence but i hope this results in poetic justice there have been many wars fought on this particular battlefield some with almost religious zeal on the theoretical side of the debate we sometimes have the equivalent of religious fundamentalists be they muslims jews christians etc who would dismiss almost any evidence unless it were associated with a strong microtheoretic basis as laid down in the koran talmud or bible the empirical side encompasses agnostics atheists as well as born again econometricians pure theorists inhabit the sunlit uplands while applied economists and policymakers flounder in the muddy plain below occasionally gaining solace from their copy of zen and the art of motorcycle maintenance in general in economics we do not have the luxury of controlled experiments as is the case in the natural sciences what distinguishes good microfoundations from bad and how to weight priors and statistical evidence is subject to much dispute leamer i983 hendry et al i990 as in religion sometimes there is the occasional miracle proclaimed after a suitable interval a new saint may be declared and disciples flock to the new shrine later doubts may arise as to whether a miracle really did occur human behaviour is difficult to explain let alone predict so the search for the equivalent of the holy grail ark of the covenant etc is bound to be arduous in scholarly journals we generally read of the success of the demand for money like diplomats who are sent abroad to lie for the good of their country publication may require applied economists to be somewhat economical with the actualite lovell i983 leamer i983 in this article i want to be as honest as possible about our success and failures in this area the prior information an armchair economist would consider when thinking about the demand for money over the past 40 years in western industrialised countries which have experienced moderate inflation might

the effects of professional forecast dissemination on macroeconomic volatility abstract this paper explores the role that professional forecast announcements can have on macroeconomic volatility bounded rational agents are used inside a medium scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model with financial frictions modeled agents must form expectations about endogenous variables by selecting between three simple linear forecasting specifications some of which contain the inclusion of a professionally announced forecast of the economic variable historically calibrated simulations of the model show that the usage of the announced professional forecast by the agents in their adaptive learning forecast specifications can reduce the volatility in consumption inflation and wages by as much as 26 23 and 22 respectively however if the professional forecast is not disseminated well to the agents or biased in its dissemination agents will learn to ignore the announcement and macroeconomic volatility will increase further the inclusion of very noisy professional forecast signals can result in coordinated volatility cascades where agents could reduce macroeconomic volatility by ignoring the professional forecast but choose not to because of its previous forecast performance

asymmetric information adverse selection and online disclosure the case of ebay motors since the pioneering work of akerlof 1970 economists have been aware of the adverse selection problem that information asymmetries can create in used goods markets the remarkable growth in online auctions of used goods where buyers generally purchase sight unseen therefore poses a puzzle i argue that given a means for credible information disclosure sellers will voluntarily disclose their private information to buyers through online media this limits information asymmetries and adverse selection to test this theory i examine the role of information in a large online used car market ebay motors i nd that sellers selectively disclose information that information asymmetries are reduced by these disclosures and that online media such as photos text and graphics provide a rich environment for information disclosure

central bank communication and the liquidity trap central bank communication plays an important role in shaping market participants expectations this paper studies a simple nonlinear model of monetary policy where agents have incomplete information about the economic environment it shows that agents learning and the dynamics of the economy are heavily affected by central bank s transparency about its policy rule a monetary authority that does not communicate its rule can induce learning equilibria where the economy experiences prolonged periods of deflation and slow growth more generally small expectational errors can result in complex economic dynamics inducing welfare reducing fluctuations on the contrary central bank communication helps stabilizing expectations around the inflation target equilibrium

escaping from a liquidity trap and deflation the foolproof way and others existing proposals to escape from a liquidity trap and deflation including my foolproof way are discussed in the light of the optimal way to escape the optimal way involves three elements 1 an explicit central bank commitment to a higher future price level 2 a concrete action that demonstrates the central bank s commitment induces expectations of a higher future price level and jump starts the economy and 3 an exit strategy that specifies when and how to get back to normal a currency depreciation is a direct consequence of expectations of a higher future price level and hence an excellent indicator of those expectations furthermore an intentional currency depreciation and a crawling peg as in the foolproof way can implement the optimal way and in particular induce the desired expectations of a higher future price level i conclude that the foolproof way is likely to work well for japan which is in a liquidity trap now as well as for the euro area and the united states in case either would fall into a liquidity trap in the future

recurrent hyperinflations and learning we use a model of boundedly rational learning to account for the observations of recurrent hyperinflations in the 1980 s in a standard monetary model we replace the assumption of full rational expectations by a formal definition of quasi rational learning the model under learning matches some crucial stylized facts observed during the recurrent hyperinflations experienced by several countries in the 1980 s remarkably well we argue that despite being a small departure from rational expectations quasi rational learning does not preclude falsifiability of the model it does not violate reasonable rationality requirements and it can be used for policy evaluation

the perils of nominal targets a monetary authority can be committed to pursuing an inflation price level or nominal gdp target yet systematically fail to achieve the prescribed goal constrained by the zero lower bound on the policy rate the monetary authority is unable to implement its objectives when private sector expectations stray far enough from the target low inflation expectations become self fulfilling resulting in an additional markov equilibrium in which the monetary authority falls short of the nominal target average output is below its efficient level and the policy rate is typically low introducing a stabilization goal for long term nominal rates can implement a unique markov equilibrium without fully compromising stabilization policy

comment on m bruno theoretical developments in the light of macroeconomic policy and empirical research the paper by michael bruno is a very interesting and thought provoking survey of the key new likely desirable developments in macroeconomics as seen by a distinguished economist and policymaker i like and agree with most of bruno s arguments and assessments so all i will do is add three further reflections on points in his paper this is a comment in a volume dealing with no less than the development of macroeconomics therefore i have chosen to discuss grand subjects where all i can do is outline the problems and leave the answers to the reader let me begin with bruno s comments on the re emergence of the pricewage spiral in economic theory the importance of the cola the importance of external price rises etc broadly speaking these remarks deal with the importance of institutions for the dynamics of prices and wages i think these remarks are part of a complex something we all should have faced long ago maybe we academic economists have been led astray by analytical convenience into almost universal acceptance of a belief that we should never have accepted without solid empirical support even if it

learning to live in a liquidity trap abstract the taylor rule in combination with the zero lower bound on nominal rates has been shown to create an unintended liquidity trap equilibrium the relevance of this equilibrium has been challenged on the basis that it is not stable under least square learning in this paper we show that the liquidity trap equilibrium is stable under social learning the learning mechanism we employ includes three realistic elements mutation crossover and tournaments we show that agents can learn to have pessimistic sentiments about the central bank s ability to generate price growth giving rise to a stochastically stable environment characterized by deflation and stagnation this article is part of a special issue entitled fiscal and monetary policies

are perceptions of inflation rational some evidence for sweden this survey paper argues that walrasian markets and monetary exchan ge are alternative not complementary arrangements for coordinating economic activity that if one realizes this many informational anomalies and price rigidities that appear irrational in a walrasia n context can be understood as the outcome of maximizing behavior in a monetary economy and that the precautionary approach to modelin g the demand for money takes on a particular importance in this way of looking at things empirical evidence on the demand for money is cite d in support of this point of view which tends to reinstate the quantity of money as an important economic variable in contrast to the new classical vision of the economy whi ch downgrades money s importance this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

heterogeneity learning and information stickiness in inflation expectations in this paper we propose novel techniques for the empirical analysis of adaptive learning and sticky information in inflation expectations these methodologies are applied to the distribution of households inflation expectations collected by the university of michigan survey research center to account for the evolution of the cross section of inflation forecasts over time and measure the degree of heterogeneity in private agents forecasts we explore time series of percentiles from the empirical distribution our results show that heterogeneity is pervasive in the process of inflation expectation formation we identify three regions of the distribution that correspond to different underlying mechanisms of expectation formation a static or highly autoregressive region on the left hand side of the median a nearly rational region around the median and a fraction of forecasts on the right hand side of the median formed in accordance with adaptive learning and sticky information

delay and information aggregation in stopping games with private information abstract we consider equilibrium timing decisions in a model with a large number of players and informational externalities the players have private information about a common payoff parameter that determines the optimal time to invest they learn from each other in real time by observing past investment decisions we develop new methods of analysis for such large games and we give a full characterization of symmetric equilibria we show that the equilibrium statistical inferences are based on an exponential learning model although the beliefs converge to truth learning takes place too late ex ante welfare is strictly between that without observational learning and that with full information

rates of information aggregation in common value auctions we study the rates at which transaction prices aggregate information in common value auctions under the different information structures in wilson rev econ stud 44 1977 511 and pesendorfer and swinkels econometrica 65 1997 1247 we consider uniform price auctions in which k identical objects of unknown value are auctioned to n bidders where both n and k are allowed to diverge to infinity and k n converges to a number in 0 1 the wilson assumptions lead to information aggregation at a rate proportional to n k but the price aggregates information at a rate proportional to n k in the ps setting we also consider english auctions and investigate whether the extra information revealed in equilibrium improves convergence rates in these auctions

monetary policy expectations and commitment commitment in monetary policy leads to equilibria that are superior to those from optimal discretionary policies a number of interest rate reaction functions and instrument rules have been proposed to implement or approximate commitment policy we assess these rules in terms of whether they lead to a rational expectations equilibrium that is both locally determinate and stable under adaptive learning by private agents a reaction function that appropriately depends explicitly on private sector expectations performs particularly well on both counts

have we underestimated the likelihood and severity of zero lower bound events prior to the financial crisis most economists probably did not view the zero lower bound zlb as a major problem for central banks using a range of structural and statistical models we find that previous research understated the zlb threat by ignoring uncertainty about model parameters and latent variables focusing too much on the great moderation experience and relying on structural models whose dynamics cannot generate sustained zlb episodes our analysis also suggests that the federal reserve s asset purchases while materially improving macroeconomic conditions did not prevent the zlb constraint from having first order adverse effects on real activity and inflation