the cost of contract renegotiation evidence from the local public sector the renegotiation of regulatory contracts is known to prevent regulators from achieving the full commitment efficient outcome in dynamic contexts however assessing the cost of such renegotiation remains an open issue from an empirical viewpoint to address this question we fit a structural principal agent model with renegotiation on a set of urban transport service contracts the model captures two important features of the industry first only two types of contracts are used in practice fixed price and cost plus second subsidies increase over time we compare a scenario with renegotiation and a hypothetical situation with full commitment we conclude that the welfare gains from improving commitment would be significant but would accrue mostly to operators

multinational public goods provision under multilateral income transfers and productivity differences abstractthis article examines multinational public goods provision under multilateral income transfers and productivity differences across countries under a planner who uses linear approximation for utility maximization we show that 1 a country is an income receiver if it has a higher productivity than the average in producing public goods enabling it to provide more public goods 2 the amount of transfers can be pinned down for all countries with an adjustment cost 3 each country obtains an identical utility increment and 4 the country with the lowest adjustment cost is the best candidate for the planner country all results are derived based on well known information regarding the cost of producing the public goods and income levels

on the duration of agreements a model of optimal contracts between two infinitely lived parties a borrower and lender is presented and analyzed the objective is to explain the phenomenon of finite length multi period contracts it is shown how costly information acquisition can account for multi period contracts which are of bounded length comparative statics results on how contract length responds to exogenous parameters such as the cost of information acquisition are also derived copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

planning under incomplete information and the ratchet effect abstract central planning of production is usually performed under asymmetric information the firm in general has more information about its productive possibilities than the central planner from now on for short cp this justifies the use of incentives schemes in which the cp does not directly fix activity levels casual observation of such existing schemes suggests that the time dimensions is crucial for their working typically the cp revises the incentive scheme over time to take into account the information provided by the firm s performance managers of centrally planned economies as well as economists have long recognized that this revision induces firms to underproduce in order to avoid demanding schemes in the future this is the ratchet effect it is purpose of the present paper to study the ratchet effect under the non commitment assumption which we believe to be more realistic the inadequacy of conceptual tools made if difficult in the past to consider such an assumption now basic research on dynamic games with incomplete information recently resulted in new ideas which look particularly relevant for a theoretical analysis of the problem

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

a theory of contracts with limited enforcement we present a theory of contracts under costly enforcement in the context of a dynamic relationship between an uninformed buyer and a seller who is privately informed on his persistent cost at the outset public enforcement relies on remedies for breach private enforcement comes from severing relationships we first characterize aggregate enforcement constraints ensuring that trading partners do not breach contracts unduly whether a long term contract is enforceable does not depend on the distribution of penalties for breach between the buyer and the seller while under complete information the optimal contract would remain stationary non stationarity might arise under asymmetric information enforcement constraints are time dependent and easier to satisfy as time passes indeed a high cost seller may be tempted to trade high volumes at high prices at the beginning of the relationship before breaching the contract later on yet such take the money and run strategy becomes less attractive as time passes and can be prevented with backloaded payments the optimal contract thus goes through two different phases first quantities and prices increase at the inception of the relationship later on the contract looks more stationary the public and private sides of enforcement plays different roles in determining the length of the earlier phase of contracting long run screening distortions encapsulate the quality of enforcement offering de facto a link between the quality of the legal system and contractual performances

dynamic contracting under adverse selection and renegotiation abstract we study the effects of renegotiation in an infinitely repeated screening model with long term contracts we propose a simple and tractable recursive formulation to study equilibria in which the monopolist s profit is maximized after every history we show that the monopolist sequentially screens high type consumers and characterize second degree price discrimination policies the monopolist s ability to extract rent from high type consumers by distorting the allocation of low type consumers vanishes as all parties become more patient as a result all distortions disappear and the allocation becomes efficient

optimal contracts under adverse selection and moral hazard a continuous time approach this article presents a continuous time agency model in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard with a risk averse agent and a risk neutral principal under the model setup we show that the optimal controls are constant over time and thus the optimal menu consists of contracts that are linear in the final outcome we also show that when a moral hazard problem adds to an adverse selection problem the monotonicity condition well known in the pure adverse selection literature needs to be modified to ensure the incentive compatibility for information revelation the model is applied to a few managerial compensation problems involving managerial project selection and capital budgeting decisions we argue that in the third best world the relationship between the volatility of the outcome and the sensitivity of the contract depends on interactions between the managerial cost and the firm s production functions contrary to conventional wisdom sometimes the higher the volatility the higher the sensitivity of the contract the firm receiving good news sometimes chooses safer projects or invests less than it does with bad news we also examine the effects of the observability of the volatility on corporate investment decisions copyright 2005 oxford university press

political regimes and international trade the democratic difference revisited how do domestic political institutions affect the outcomes of international trade negotiations specifically are the aggregate trade barriers agreed upon by a democratic pair lower than those by a pair composed of a democracy and an autocracy i revisit these important questions by highlighting some problematic aspect of the analysis by mansfield milner and rosendorff 2000 contrary to their central conclusion i find that whether the aggregate trade barriers are lower for a democratic pair than those for a mixed pair depends on the preferences of the decision makers involved thus although domestic political institutions are important they alone are insufficient to predict a higher level of cooperation among democracies

dynamic yardstick mechanisms abstract this paper shows that the inability of principals to commit to long term contracts is irrelevant when dealing with several agents whose private information is correlated this sharply contrasts with the dynamics of contracting without such correlation the paper also explores what limitations on yardstick mechanisms can justify the use of long term contracts we found that the inability of a principal to commit not to renegotiate long term contracts is without consequence even if there is a bound on transfers that an agent can be asked to pay in contrast short term contracting fails to implement the commitment solution with constraints on transfers second absent current yardstick the possibility of using correlated mechanisms in the future allows the principal to implement the first best with a renegotiation proof long term contract whereas this cannot be achieved with short term contracting

incentive mechanisms for international public goods under uncertainty of production costs abstract we investigate incentive mechanisms for the optimal supply of and demand for international public goods under cost uncertainty we find the incentive mechanism exists iff the nation wise income as well as the global income would be greater than the critical values determined by cost uncertainty

contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication abstract this paper provides new analytical tools for studying principal agent problems with adverse selection and limited commitment by allowing the principal to use general communication devices we overcome the literature s common but overly restrictive focus on one shot direct communication in addition general communication devices solve two fundamental problems of contracting with imperfect commitment first they allow us to identify the local downward incentive constraints as the relevant ones if the agent s preferences satisfy a single crossing property second we show how one may restrict the cardinality of the message spaces of the communication device an example illustrates our arguments and the suboptimality of one shot direct communication

the design of transnational public good mechanisms for developing countries we analyze the design of incentive mechanisms for the provision of transnational public goods under asymmetric information transnational public goods are infrastructures that no single country can afford to build for itself we show that the external constraints imposed by this mechanism may affect consumption pricing and the true redistributive concerns of local governments we characterize the corresponding distortions we also discuss the impact of the preferences for redistribution of the international agency in charge of designing the mechanism and the role of its ability to enforce that mechanism

optimal multiperiod contracts and the gain from enduring relationships under private information informational asymmetries can play a key role in explaining the existence and nature of multiperiod contracts in an illustrative risk sharing model even relatively short two period contracts can be mutually beneficial if there is private information though one period contracts suffice otherwise further contracts which are pareto optimal relative to the environment and the information structure are defined and partially characterized an example illustrates how otherwise inefficient intertemporal tie ins can be used optimally to mitigate incentive problems the obvious borrowing lending schemes are not private information pareto optimal in these period by period actions are not sufficiently constrained discounting affects the form of the optimal contract but none of these qualitative conclusions

the meaning of failed replications a review and proposal the welcome rise of replication tests in economics has not been accompanied by a consensus standard for determining what constitutes a replication a discrepant replication in current usage of the term can signal anything from an unremarkable disagreement over methods to scientific incompetence or misconduct this paper proposes a standard for classifying one study as a replication of some other study it is a standard that places the burden of proof on a study to demonstrate that it should have obtained identical results to the original a conservative standard that is already used implicitly by many researchers it contrasts this standard with decades of unsuccessful attempts to harmonize terminology and argues that many prominent results described as replication tests should not be described as such adopting a conservative standard like this one can improve incentives for researchers encouraging more and better replication tests

adverse selection and renegotiation in procurement as was shown by dewatripont optimal long term contracts are generally not sequentially optimal the parties ex post renegotiate them to their mutual advantage this paper fully characterizes the equilibrium of a simple two period procurement situation and studies the extent to which renegotiation reduces ex ante welfare i a central result is that like in the non commitment case the second period allocation is optimal for the principal conditionally on his posterior beliefs about the agent ii the first period allocation exhibits an increasing amount of pooling when the discount factor grows iii with a continuum of types it is never optimal to induce full separation the paper also analyzes whether renegotiated long term contracts yield outcomes resembling those under either unnegotiated long term contracts or a sequence of short term contracts and it links the analysis with the multiple unit durable good monopoly problem

static and intertemporal household decisions we discuss the most popular static and dynamic models of household behavior our main objective is to explain which aspects of household decisions different models can account for using this insight we describe testable implications identification results and estimation findings obtained in the literature particular attention is given to the ability of different models to answer various types of policy questions

short term contracts and long term agency relationships abstract long term contracts are valuable only if optimal contracting requires commitment to a plan today that would not otherwise be adopted tomorrow we show that commitments are unnecessary and hence short term contracts are sufficient if 1 all public information can be used in contracting 2 the agent can acess a bank on equal terms with the principal 3 recontracting takes place with common knowledge about technology and preferences and 4 the frontier of expected utility payoffs generated by the set of incentive compatible contracts is downward sloping at all times

replication realism and robustness analyzing political regimes and international trade makers who formulate trade policy we show that dai fails to accurately replicate our model and hence erroneously claims that the new equilibria she deduces are consistent with it in addition we demonstrate that in altering one of our assumptions dai offers a model that is less realistic as well as inconsistent with the substantive literature on international bargaining finally we question the robustness of her approach due to these problems of replication realism and robustness we conclude that dai s model is of limited utility ur article established that pairs of democracies trade more freely than mixed country pairs composed of a democracy and an autocracy mansfield milner and rosendorff 2000 hereafter mmr xinyuan dai 2002 asserts that our conclusion depends on the preferences of the decision makers who formulate trade policy dai is incorrect her results differ from ours solely because she has changed a key assumption of the model given the stated assumptions of our model each player s behavior in equilibrium is optimal and is a best reply it is often useful to debate the merits of a model s assumptions and it is not surprising that altering the assumptions can affect a model s results dai however ignores one of our explicitly stated assumptions and fails to acknowledge that her results differ from ours as a consequence moreover she never touches upon the relative merits of her assumption but when choosing a modeling strategy it is important to be attentive to the assumptions one uses preferring those that are more realistic and result in more general conclusions dai s model suffers from serious problems in this regard particularly because of its unrealistic assumptions about international economic negotiations furthermore dai offers no evidence about the robustness of her claims in contrast to our model finally the empirical record lends greater support to our argument than dai s since we found strong evidence that democratic pairs have had more open trade relations than mixed pairs irrespective of policy makers preferences in the following sections we elaborate on these problems of replication realism and robustness first we show that dai fails to replicate our model faithfully and hence erroneously claims that the new equilibria she deduces are consistent with it second we show that altering our assumption as dai does yields a model that is less realistic and less consistent with the substantive literature on international bargaining third we question the robustness of her approach we conclude that her model is of limited utility not only does our model capture an important element of international economic negotiations missing in dai s approach but also it yields results that are robust and have empirical support

limited contract enforcement and strategic renegotiation this paper presents a strategic theory of contract renegotiation in this theory suboptimal contracts are put in place initially to protect one party against undesirable a ctions by another party and are renegotiated once the danger is past the authors develop a model to establish the cases in which simple contracts cannot achieve desirable outcomes so that only a complicated contract or renegotiation will serve unlike most previous accounts of contract renegotiation this theory does not rely on exogenous uncertainty to motivate renegotiation copyright 1988 by american economic association

domestic institutions and international bargaining the role of agent veto in two level games putnam s 1988 conjecture that negotiators can benefit from their domestic constraints implies that they may want to impose domestic constraints on themselves by granting veto power to an agent i show that a negotiator s decision to employ an agent as veto player depends on the kinds of information available to the foreign country and the alignment of preferences between the negotiator and the agent when the foreign country has incomplete information about the negotiator s preferences and the negotiator has preferences too divergent from those of the agent the negotiator will not give veto power to the agent however this applies only to an agent with extreme preferences and a surprisingly large number of agent types will receive veto power the attractiveness of the agent veto to the negotiator is in part due to its informational effect by granting veto power to an agent the negotiator can transmit more information to the foreign country and capture informational gains that would be lost in the absence of the agent veto

long term contracting with markovian consumers to study how a firm can capitalize on a long term customer relationship we characterize the optimal contract between a monopolist and a consumer whose preferences follow a markov process the optimal contract is nonstationary and has infinite memory but is described by a simple state variable under general conditions supply converges to the efficient level for any degree of persistence of the types and along any history though convergence is history dependent in contrast as with constant types the optimal contract can be renegotiation proof even with highly persistent types these properties provide insights into the optimal ownership structure of the production technology

should we pay for ecosystem service outputs inputs or both payments for ecosystem service outputs have recently become a popular policy prescription for a range of agri environmental schemes the focus of this paper is on the choice of contract instruments to incentivise the provision of ecosystem service outputs from farms the farmer is better informed than the regulator in terms of hidden information about costs and hidden actions relating to effort the results show that with perfect information the regulator can contract equivalently on inputs or outputs with hidden information input based contracts are more cost effective at reducing the informational rent related to adverse selection than output based contracts mixed contracts are also cost effective especially where one input is not observable such contracts allow the regulator to target variables that are costly to fake as opposed to those prone to moral hazard such as effort further results are given for fixed price contracts and input based contracts with moral hazard the model is extended to include a discussion of repeated contracting and the scope that exists for the regulator to benefit from information revealed by the initial choice of contract the models are applied to a case study of contracting with farmers to protect high biodiversity native vegetation that also provides socially valuable ecosystem services

on the value of commitment with asymmetric information several recent papers have emphasized that long term relationships can be efficiently governed by short term contracts provided that there is no asymmetric information at the contracting dates this excludes not only adverse selection problems but also moral hazards problems in which hidden actions generate private information over the future in this paper we show in the context of a multiperiod principal agent relationship with adverse selection that renegotiable short term contracts can be as efficient as long term renegotiation proof contracts on the other hand spot contracting may fail to achieve long run efficiency not only because of intertemporal smoothing as with symmetric information but also because of ratchet effects and time inconsistency in the optimal structure of informational rents thus some limited commitment seems to be a necessary and sufficient condition to achieve long run efficiency

moral hazard land fertility and sharecropping in a rural area of the philippines abstract introducing concerns about land fertility for landlords in a principal agent model of sharecropping with moral hazard we show that the optimal contract under limited commitment reflects a trade off between production and land quality maintenance using data from the philippines a model where the leasing out and contract choices are simultaneous is estimated and avoids the selectivity bias of observed contracts landlords prefer to use more incentive contracts for more fertile plots and less incentive ones when crop choices induce land overuse empirical tests reject the model of pure risk sharing in production and show the interest of taking land quality maintenance into account

optimal resource royalties with unknown and temporally independent extraction cost structures the authors study optimal nonrenewable resource royalty contracts when the extracting agent has private information on costs this is a dynamic incentive problem in which the repeated relationship between the principal and the agent is constrained by initial reserves commitment is limited to one period and costs are intertemporally independent compared with full information extraction information asymmetry shifts production to the future when the optimal contract requires exhaustion in two periods when exhaustion by all types in two periods is not warranted the effect on the terminal period is ambiguous and the output of even the lowest cost firm is always distorted copyright 1995 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

long term short term and renegotiation on the value of commitment in contracting spot contracting generally involves efficiency losses relative to long term contracting it is proved here that short term contracting and renegotiation allow to achieve long run efficiency when transfers are not limited objectives are conflicting and no relevant asymmetric information appears at recontracting dates this last assumption excludes adverse selection but not moral hazard when technologies and preferences are time separable copyright 1990 by the econometric society

cognition and incomplete contracts thinking about contingencies designing covenants and seeing through their implications is costly parties to a contract accordingly use heuristics and leave it incomplete the paper develops a model of limited cognition and examines its consequences for contractual design

sequentially optimal mechanisms this paper establishes that posting a price in each period is a revenue maximizing allocation mechanism in a finite period model without commitment a risk neutral seller has one object to sell and faces a risk neutral buyer whose valuation is private information and drawn from an arbitrary bounded subset of the real line the seller has all the bargaining power she designs a mechanism to sell the object at t but if trade does not occur at t she can propose another mechanism at t 1 we show that posting a price in each period is an optimal mechanism a methodological contribution of the paper is to develop a procedure to characterize optimal dynamic incentive schemes under non commitment that is valid irrespective of the structure of the agent s type 2006 the review of economic studies limited

competitive risk sharing contracts with one sided commitment this paper analyzes dynamic equilibrium risk sharing contracts between profit maximizing intermediaries and a large pool of ex ante identical agents that face idiosyncratic income uncertainty that makes them heterogeneous ex post in any given period after having observed her income the agent can walk away from the contract while the intermediary cannot i e there is one sided commitment we consider the extreme scenario that the agents face no costs to walking away and can sign up with any competing intermediary without any reputational losses we demonstrate that not only autarky but also partial and full insurance can obtain depending on the relative patience of agents and financial intermediaries insurance can be provided because in an equilibrium contract an up front payment effectively locks in the agent with an intermediary we then show that our contract economy is equivalent to a consumption savings economy with one period arrow securities and a short sale constraint similar to bulow and rogoff 1989 from this equivalence and our characterization of dynamic contracts it immediately follows that without cost of switching financial intermediaries debt contracts are not sustainable even though a risk allocation superior to autarky can be achieved

should good patents come in small packages a welfare analysis of intellectual property bundling abstract intellectual property owners often hold the rights to several patents each of which is essential to make or use a product we compare the welfare properties of package licenses under which a licensee pays the same fee regardless of the number of technologies licensed with component licenses under which each technology is licensed separately and there is no quantity discount a central finding is that a long term package license can induce incentives to invent around patents and invest in complementary assets that are closer to their socially optimal levels than are those induced by a long term component license we also identify settings in which a short term license is a partial substitute for a package license and a prohibition on package licensing induces parties to adopt contracts that result in less efficient complementary investment because of hold up

international public goods and contribution productivity differentials abstract this paper investigates the impacts of productivity differentials in contributing to the public good on national welfare in the context of non cooperative voluntary provision of a pure public good a country with high productivity does not necessarily enjoy high welfare subsidizing the other country in a contribution game may lead to a strong paradoxical result while a lump sum transfer will lead to a weak paradoxical result we also explore the relationship between the price of the public good and the size of an open club in a multi club model

free to trade democracies autocracies and international trade trade relations we address this issue by analyzing the relationship between regime type and trade policy in a formal model of commercial policy we establish that the ratification responsibility of the legislature in democratic states leads pairs of democracies to set trade barriers at a lower level than mixed country pairs composed of an autocracy and a democracy we test this hypothesis by analyzing the effects of regime type on trade during the period from 1960 to 1990 the results of this analysis accord with our argument democratic pairs have had much more open trade relations than mixed pairs t he effects of domestic political institutions on trade policy have long been a source of controversy among social scientists despite the widespread interest that this debate has prompted however remarkably few studies have addressed the links between political regime type and commercial policy 1 most work on the political economy of trade policy that examines institutional factors focuses only on variations in policy among democracies and avoids comparing democracies with other types of regimes moreover many analyses of trade barriers especially those by economists ignore the effects of domestic political