deciding between competition and collusion we develop an approach to identify and test for bid rigging in procurement auctions first we introduce a general auction model with asymmetric bidders second we study the problem of identie cation in our model we state a set of conditions that are both necessary and sufe cient for a distribution of bids to be generated by a model with competitive bidding third we discuss how to elicit a prior distribution over a e rm s structural cost parameters from industry experts given this prior distri bution we use bayes s theorem to compare competitive and collusive models of industry equilibrium finally we apply our methodology to a data set of bidding by construction e rms in the midwest the techniques we propose are not computationally demanding use e exible functional forms and can be programmed using most standard statistical packages

the demand for energy cross country evidence using the florida model abstract income and own price elasticities of demand for energy for 51 countries in 1980 are presented based on pooled estimates from an 11 good demand system estimated with the florida model results indicate income elasticities of demand for energy are significantly larger than unitary for all countries and own price elasticities of demand for energy range between 0 8 and 1 0

the demand for energy evidence from a cross country demand system abstract some new evidence on the income own price elasticities of demand for energy consumption by consumers is presented estimates are derived from a complete system of cross country demand equations with energy being one of the commodities considered

an asymmetric common value auction model this article develops a model allowing asymmetric information between two bidders in an auction for a common value object it supposes that there is a common prior distribution on the object s value and that each bidder receives a private signal conditional on the object s unknown true value asymmetry comes about through a difference in the precision of the bidder s signals placing a restriction on the nature of this difference i determine the equilibrium bidding strategies for the first price and second price auctions the strategies are symmetric and the second price auction generates a higher seller s expected revenue a result that extends the well known revenue ordering result of symmetric information auctions i do however provide an example to show that this ordering is not necessarily maintained in a less restricted asymmetric setting finally another example illustrates that the seller may prefer that bidders be asymmetrically informed to releasing information that would reduce the asymmetry

buyer collusion and efficiency of government intervention in wheat markets in northern india an asymmetric structural auctions analysis this paper uses auction theory to analyze wholesale markets for wheat in northern india this approach enables us not only to characterize the market in terms of buyer asymmetries but also to detect the existence of collusion and to quantify its impact on market prices we show that buyer asymmetries exacerbate the downward impact of collusion on prices the paper also demonstrates the use of auction theory to analyze questions of government efficiency it considers whether the government paid too much for the wheat it procured at the minimum support price and shows that for our sample it did not the paper is based on a primary survey of two wholesale markets in north india

workforce gender effects on firm performance and workers pay evidence for the uk using linked workplace worker data for the uk a number of hypotheses are tested related to individual gender and the gender composition of the workforce the proportion of female workers per establishment is strongly negatively associated with median workplace pay there is some evidence that workplace performance but not employment size or growth is positively associated with the female male workforce ratio for workers the female wage penalty which is substantial is strongly influenced by the female male workforce ratio in addition commensurate with gender discrimination those who manage female workers receive lower wages but professional workers in the same establishments do not

the price effects of increased competition in auction markets bidding theory predicts low er selling winning bids higher buying winning bids as numbers of bidders incre ase alternative versions predict that winning bids fall rise with the second order statistic the maximum order statistic or 1 n the authors test these pre dictions using data on underwriters spreads on tax exempt bonds offshore oil t racts and national forest timber they estimate winning bids using general vari ables for the product and dummies for 1 2 11 bidders in all cases mor e bidders meansignificantly lower selling winning bids the expected maximum order statistic fits better than either the second order statistic or1 n in te n out of twelve cases copyright 1987 by mit press

in search of predatory pricing can predatory pricing be reproduced in a laboratory environment we report research motivated by this objective we began with conditions that based on the literature appeared to combine the features this literature has suggested are favorable to the emergence of predation next we operationalized what was meant by predatory pricing in our design in order to compare prices with predictions from alternative theories of 10 experiments none evidenced predatory behavior most supported the dominant firm theory the second series of experiments addresses remedies for predation and finds that the effect is to increase prices and reduce efficiency

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

expected revenue from open and sealed bid auctions in his preceding piece paul milgrom has neatly laid out many of the core results of the recent literature on the theory of competitive bidding my immediate goal here is to provide the simplest possible derivation of three basic revenue ranking theorems each of these compares the expected revenue obtained from open bidding as in the typical art auction with the expected revenue obtained when bids are sealed and the winner pays his bid the first of the ranking theorems is the revenue equivalence theorem which establishes conditions under which these two seemingly very different auctions generate the same expected revenue for the seller the other two theorems establish the effect of relaxing one of the key assumptions when buyers are risk averse the seller gains if buyers submit sealed bids and the winner pays his bid on the other hand if valuations of different buyers are positively correlated rather than unrelated the seller extracts more revenue in an open ascending bid auction in reducing these theorems to their basic elements my deeper goal is to provide the reader with a better intuitive understanding of the results

the cost effectiveness of the u s export enhancement program bonus allocation mechanism the u s export enhancement program is evaluated from the perspective of the cost effectiveness of its bonus allocation mechanism the current mechanism resembles a discriminatory price common value auction however auction theory suggests that a discriminatory auction may not be optimal in this setting for several reasons this article evaluates the current format relative to an alternative uniform price auction estimation results reveal evidence of strategic bidder behavior under the current format and simulations suggest that adopting a uniform price auction format for bonus allocation may yield considerable savings to the treasury by eliminating incentives to pad bids and increasing participation in the auction

influence of firm performance and gender on ceo compensation in this article we continue the examination of top executive pay by comparing performance total pay and the influence of ceo gender we analyse compensation differences between male and female ceos using nonparametric analysis we calculate the potential compensation for each executive using two benchmarks first each executive s performance and compensation are evaluated relative to members of the same gender to produce a same gender measure of under compensation each executive s compensation is also benchmarked against the other gender s potential compensation producing an other gender measure of under compensation together both measures allow an analysis of the gender specific potential salaries of each executive while controlling for performance the approach is applied to a sample of male and female executives the results indicate that women are under compensated

on the existence of predatory pricing an experimental study of reputation and entry deterrence in the chain store game a single monopolist plays a sequence of eight periods against a series of different entrants there are two types of monopolists weak monopolists whose single period best response is to acquiesce after entry and strong monopolists whose dominant strategy is to fight entry data show high levels of predatory pricing defined as weak monopolists fighting all entrants in early periods both with and without experimenter induced strong monopolists we reject a number of predictions of the asymmetric information sequential equilibrium model of kreps and wilson 1982 and find important deviations from more general sequential equilibrium models as well

an empirical study of an auction with asymmetric information this paper examines federal auctions for drain age leases on the outer continental shelf from 1959 to 1969 these are leases that are adjacent to tracts on which a deposit has been discovered the authors find that the data strongly support the hypotheses that neighbor firms are better informed about the value of a lease than nonneighbor firms that neighbor firms coordinate their bidding decisions and that both types of firms bid strategically in accordance with the bayesian nash equilibrium model for first price sealed bid auctions with asymmetric information

the sensitivity of consumption of oil products to price changes an econometric investigation abstract this paper presents a small econometric model of the supply and demand of motor spirit diesel fuel oil and other gas diesel oil by modelling at this level of disaggregation it is possible to identify the dynamic structure of each market and estimate own price and cross price elasticities

a dynamic putty semi putty model of aggregate energy demand energy conservation dominated the adjustments of the energy decade the present study develops further the aggregate analysis to revisit the question of energy flexibility within the context of a multi factor dynamic model the resulting model preserves various adding up constraints cross equation parameter restrictions and consistent indexes within an ad hoc stock adjustment dynamic process applications to data for the usa and japan confirm the estimates of large long run elasticities under the assumption of a slow adjustment process

testing market integration new approaches with case material from the west bengal food economy given the inferential dangers of received methods a new methodology is introduced to provide a sequence of tests using weekly spot prices to examine the dynamic relationship of market commodity prices in three locations in west bengal tests suggest that the markets are integrated but a lower degree of integration of paddy and rice prices is identified the hypothesis of full market integration is rejected structural and institutional factors which affect the specifics of performance are identified physical isolation the institutional complexity of marketing systems and contractual forms the polarisation of assets assets specificity the institutional control of information and price formation the underdevelopment of linked markets and the idiosyncratic implementation of state regulatory policy and auto regulatory responses enter the explanation

new evidence on sex segregation and sex differences in wages from matched employee employer data we use new matched employer employee data to estimate the contributions of sex segregation and wage differences by sex within occupation industry establishment and occupation establishment cells to the overall sex gap in wages in contrast to earlier data used to study this question our data cover all industries and occupations across all regions of the united states we find that segregation of women into lower paying occupations industries establishments and occupations within establishments accounts for a sizable fraction of the sex gap in wages nonetheless approximately one half of the sex gap in wages remains attributable to the individual s sex

hedonic prices for fish tuna prices in hawaii over the past two decades the marketing of fish has recognized the importance of quality yet empirical analysis of market transactions could give us little insight into the value of different qualities of fish because market data are typically aggregated we exploit a dataset on the auction price of tuna sold in hawaii to estimate a hedonic model the model provides empirical estimates of price increments due to species quality of the fish such as size or fat content method of handling and market conditions the empirical results are also used to estimate price flexibilities for landings in hawaii

household demand for energy in the uk abstract many demand systems have recently been estimated which treat consumer expenditure on energy as one of a small number of similar expenditure groups this study formulates a simple demand system in which expenditures on individual fuels are also examined and into which the role of the stock of energy using appliances is integrated it goes on to adopt a particular functional form for consumer preferences and then fits the resultant econometric system to quarterly british data

reputation in repeated second price auctions abstract a model in which two bidders take part in a series of second price comon value auctions is examined the question of an optimal auction from an auctioneer s standpoint in a repeated auction setting is partially addressed it is shown that the results from single auction models do not carry over to repeated auctions when one of the bidders is endowed with a reputation for bidding aggressively second price auctions with two bidders are highly susceptible to manipulative behaviour by an aggressive bidder and yield much lower revenues to the auctioneer

econometrics of first price auctions in this paper we propose an estimation method for the empirical study of theoretical auction models we focus on first price sealed bid and descending auctions and we adopt the private value paradigm where each bidder is assumed to have a different private value only known to him for the object that is auctioned following mcfadden 1989 and pakes and pollard 1989 our proposed method is based on simulations specifically the method relies on a simulated nonlinear least squares objective function appropriately adjusted so as to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters of interest we illustrate the proposed method by studying a market of agricultural products where descending auctions are used our analysis takes into account heterogeneity of the auctioned objects and the fact that only the winning bid is observed we estimate the parameters that characterize the distribution of the unobserved private values for each auctioned object

the impact of vat introduction on uk residential energy demand an investigation using the cointegration approach abstract over a two year period which started in april 1994 the real price of energy to uk households was expected to rise by 17 5 as a result of value added tax vat introduction the regressive nature of the tax forced the government to limit vat on residential fuel to 8 using a cointegration approach to take account of the non stationarity fuel consumption time series this paper estimates real energy and fuel specific price and income elasticities for the period 1974 1 1994 1 they suggest that natural gas has a positive real energy price elasticity indicating that as real price of energy rises households scrap inefficient heaters and invest in more efficient ones principally natural gas these estimates enable projections to be made of the impact of the introduction of vat and imply a rise in natural gas consumption as a result of the additional vat although at the expense of other less efficient fuels overall residential energy consumption however is unlikely to fall significantly from the tax suggesting that it is an inappropriate way of achieving environmental objectives

auction cartels and the absence of efficient communication abstract this paper examines the feasibility of collusive mechanisms in single unit auctions a model is constructed with private and common value information asymmetry and continuous type space we show that an incentive compatible bid coordination mechanism bcm does not exist if common value uncertainty is present this result contradicts actual antitrust cases where common effects or resale opportunities created uncertainty about valuations but a price fixing cartel was formed we solve the puzzle by relaxing the assumption that all bidder types truthfully reveal their private information the introduced bayesian bid coordination mechanism bbcm exists if the main source of information asymmetry is private value in that case a designated ring member can signal high valuation and suppress competition our results demonstrate the rationale behind cartel mechanisms with pre auction knockouts

does oligopsony power matter in price support policy design empirical evidence from the thai jasmine rice market in the oligopsony market farmers may receive low prices and policy analysis assuming perfect competition can yield serious bias results in this paper we estimate oligopsony power between processors and farmers and evaluate the welfare impact of the paddy pledging program ppp a generous price support program in the thai jasmine rice market with an imperfect competition model we develop a model that consists of rice supply equation and derived demand equation we then simultaneously estimate these equations using system estimation methods to recover oligopsony power parameters finally we use these parameters to assess the welfare impact of the price support program using annual panel data running from crop marketing year 2001 2002 2015 2016 and exploiting the institutional feature of the ppp we find strong evidence of some oligopsony power a moderate level of oligopsony price distortion and a negative relationship between price support and oligopsony power we also find that the ppp is inefficient but effective in income redistribution moreover the program benefits both farmers and consumers with better policymaking decisions the ppp can be efficient by setting a suitable support price therefore our results show that in the case of the thai jasmine rice market the generally accepted wisdom about agricultural price support policy does not necessarily hold and price support can be designed to improve the efficiency of the market

bidder collusion at forest service timber sales allegations of bidder collusion at forest service timber sales in the pacific northwest were common in the 1970s of course prices may be low for reasons other than collusion we formulate an empirical model that allows for both bidder collusion and supply effects and in which we control for demand conditions noncooperative behavior in which a single unit is sold the standard auction model is a special case it is found to be definitively outperformed by a model of collusion we also find that supply effects are dominated by collusion in determining the winning bids in the market

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

impact of sms based agricultural information on indian farmers this study estimates the benefits that indian farmers derive from market and weather information delivered to their mobile phones by a commercial service called reuters market light rml we conduct a controlled randomized experiment in 100 villages of maharashtra treated farmers associate rml information with a number of decisions they have made and we find some evidence that treatment affected spatial arbitrage and crop grading but the magnitude of these effects is small we find no statistically significant average effect of treatment on the price received by farmers crop value added crop losses resulting from rainstorms or the likelihood of changing crop varieties and cultivation practices although disappointing these results are in line with the market take up rate of the rml service in the study districts which shows small numbers of clients in aggregate and a relative stagnation in take up over the study period jel codes o13 q11 q13 the purpose of this study is to ascertain whether agricultural information distributed through mobile phones generates economic benefits to farmers we implement a randomized controlled trial of a commercial service entitled reuters market light rml offered by the largest and best established private provider of agricultural price information in india at the time of the experiment operating in maharashtra and other indian states rml distributes price weather and crop advisory information through sms messages we offered a one year free subscription to rml to a random sample of farmers to test whether they obtain higher prices for their agricultural output

asymmetry in first price auctions with affiliated private values collusion and heterogeneity across firms may introduce asymmetry in bidding games a major difficulty in asymmetric auctions is that the bayesian nash equilibrium strategies are solutions of an intractable system of differential equations we propose a simple method for estimating asymmetric first price auctions with affiliated private values considering two types of bidders we show that these differential equations can be rewritten using the observed bid distribution we establish the identification of the model characterize its theoretical restrictions and propose a two step non parametric estimation procedure for estimating the private value distributions an empirical analysis of joint bidding in ocs auctions is provided copyright 2003 john wiley sons ltd

the unsupportable support price an analysis of collusion and government intervention in paddy auction markets in north india abstract this paper uses auction theory incorporating buyer asymmetry to analyse the structure of a small market for parmal paddy in north india and to assess the implications of alternative government policies our results suggest that two buyers collude in this market we are able to quantify the extent to which prices are depressed as a consequence such collusion probably characterizes many small grain markets in india government intervention in grain markets in india is pervasive and has in recent years led to its acquiring excessive food stocks and an unwillingness to enforce the support price using simulations we demonstrate that while reducing the support price for paddy may not have the desired effect of reducing government purchases a decrease in the percentage that millers are required to sell as levy to the government will

rice marketing systems in the philippines and thailand do large numbers of competitive traders ensure good performance abstract rice marketing margins are substantially greater in the philippines than in thailand despite many similarities between the two systems and despite the fact that philippine rice marketing has a competitive structure we found that rice marketing costs in the philippines are higher than in thailand mainly due to higher interest rates in the financial system other fundamental factors that also result in higher costs include endowments of water and land rice price and trade policy road quality and lack of non farm job growth however the greater costs can only account for about a fourth of the difference in gross margins implying much higher returns to management in the philippines despite similar levels of risk and no evidence of collusion the excess profits in the philippine marketing system suggest there is much to learn about how developing country commodity markets with competitive structures function in actual practice

does more mean less the male female wage gap and the proportion of females at the establishment level we examine the theoretical empirical and public policy implications of the pro portion of females in the establishment arrow s model of heterogeneous employer discrim ination provides predictions that are tested empirical results indicate support for the theory using establishment data but a contradiction is obtained with the individual data it is es timated that the proportion of females in the establishment accounts for 26 per cent of the gender log wage gap implications for employment equity are considered in the context of a new method of decomposing the log wage gap and indicate that such public policy can reduce this gap by 20 per cent jel classification j71 and j78

traders bidding strategies on european grain export refunds an analysis with affiliated signals gr ce a une specification d une distribution multivariee de l information detenue par les operateurs et dans le cas ou cette distribution presente de faibles correlations sont specifiees les strategies d offre des operateurs lors des adjudications de stocks d intervention de ble tendre europeen il peut etre mis en evidence que les correlations ont des effets opposes sur les strategies d offre suivant les hypotheses retenues pour la valorisation du bien par les acheteurs cette approche structurelle permet d estimer les strategies d offre selon deux methodes econometriques en particulier est estime le modele avec correlation sous l hypothese de valeur commune

the economics of missing markets information and games part 1 out of equilibrium beliefs and out of equilibrium behaviour david m kreps the role of common knowledge assumptions in game theory adam brandenburger and eddie dekel repeated games a survey h sabourian information dynamics and equilibrium frank hahn part 2 the economics of parallel research partha dasgupta strategy variables and theories of industrial organization christopher doyle bargaining theory david canning imperfect competition and international trade k gatsios part 3 missing markets consequences and remedies david m newberry rational expectations information and asset markets margaret bray decision making in the presence of risk mark j machina part 4 theoretical modelling of banks and bank runs luca anderlini optimal multi unit auctions eric maskin and john riley labour contract theory tim worrall part 5 intertemporal general equilibrium models timothy j kehoe sunspots stephen burnell an introduction to nonlinear dynamics and its application to economics david kelsey part 6 some micro and macro implications of inventories j p thomas keynes s liquidity preference theory a suggested reinterpretation louis makowski

auctions with resale markets an application to u s forest service timber sales when bidders anticipate an opportunity for resale trade the value of winning an auction is determined in part by the option values of buying and selling in the secondary market one implication is that a bidder s willingness to pay at an auction increases with the expected level of competition between resale buyers empirical evidence from auctions of timber contracts supports this prediction and rejects standard models that ignore resale the estimated effect is smaller after policy changes expected to diminish the prevalence of resale additional evidence supports the predicted presence of a common value element introduced by the resale opportunity

rational habit formation abstract this paper discusses consumer demand under rational habit formation if consumer tastes change endogenously through habit stocks depending on past consumption the rational consumer will make allowance of the future habit forming effects of current consumption a model with rational habit formation is made formally equivalent to an intertemporal consumer model without habit formation by redefining the cost of consumption and wealth the cost of consumption is obtained by adding the cost of future induced consumption to the rental price of the commodity the extended wealth concept is obtained by subtracting the cost of the initial stocks of habits and the cost of future physically necessary consumption from wealth the paper also investigates the implication of rational habit formation for constructing one period cost of living indices

simultaneous allocation of bundled goods through auctions assessing the case for joint bidding we study the costs and benefits of allowing joint bidding in multiple simultaneous first price sealed bid auctions for bundled goods with private values joint bidding raises the prospect of higher allocative efficiency but also reduces the number of bidders resulting in an ambiguous net impact on seller revenue the research was carried out using laboratory experiments in which groups of up to six buyers competed for eight bundles of two separable goods each the main results show that in our experimental environment allowing joint bidding increases efficiency by 11 3 and revenue by 9 4 the research has immediate applications to the sale of public forest stands that arbor a mixture of species for this reason we explore how the results are affected by excess supply the presence of dominant firms and the removal of an allocation rule requiring multiple bidders under certain circumstances

identification of standard auction models this paper presents new identification results for models of first price second price ascending english and descending dutch auctions we consider a general specification of the latent demand and information structure nesting both private values and common values models and allowing correlated types as well as ex ante asymmetry we address identification of a series of nested models and derive testable restrictions enabling discrimination between models on the basis of observed data the simplest model symmetric independent private values is nonparametrically identified even if only the transaction price from each auction is observed for richer models identification and testable restrictions may be obtained when additional information of one or more of the following types is available i the identity of the winning bidder or other bidders ii one or more bids in addition to the transaction price iii exogenous variation in the number of bidders iv bidder specific covariates while many private values pv models are nonparametrically identified and testable with commonly available data identification of common values cv models requires stringent assumptions nonetheless the pv model can be tested against the cv alternative even when neither model is identified

sealed bid versus open auctions the evidence data from u s forest service timber auctions are used to test vickrey s original proposition that sealed bid and open auctions yield equal revenue models for the high bid in an auction are specified and estimated using three different procedures ordinary least squares two stage least squares and maximum likelihood the second two procedures include a second equation which accounts for the forest service s auction choice and therefore control for selection bias these two procedures which unlike ordinary least squares yield consistent estimators imply a statistically and economically insignificant difference in high bids between sealed bid and open auctions

asymmetric information and collusive behavior in auction markets we present a theoretical and empirical analysis of the behavior of a bidder s cartel in a multiperiod auction market in which the purchaser is relatively uninformed our work establishes a tentative connection between the economics of information and collusion by concentrating on the cartel s informational monopoly and its ability to both increase profits and mask its presence by passing misinformation to the purchaser in the models we develop costs are assumed to be stochastic and projects awarded in adjacent periods to be substitutes for one another as a result the purchaser will have incentive to intertemporally reallocate his demand buying more or less of the current period s project depending upon whether the current market price is lower or higher than the price which he expects to prevail in the future a purchaser who needs to form such price expectations yet is ignorant about production costs and market structure will be particularly attracted to the auction mechanism because the data contained in past auctions bids can apparently be incorporated into an explicit structural model of expected future price in fact such a purchaser may hold auctions frequently merely to acquire information such pleasant appearances are deceiving once the auction s bidders become aware of the informational use to which their bids are being put they will have incentive to form a cartel thereby extracting a premium for their knowledge by misinforming the purchaser and skewing his intertemporal decision making to their advantage in some respects the mechanics of our model resemble the case of a multiproduct monopolist selling goods that are substitutes for one another what is unique to our analysis is the dependence of one of the goods future demand on price expectations which are an information resource we are suggesting that information that is distributed asymmetrically among market participants is susceptible to the inefficiencies of collusion in some ways the implications of our work are considerably stronger than this because our cartel never reveals its true knowledge and thus our market may be more inefficient than more standard monopolies in which the good is always traded albeit at noncompetitive prices furthermore by explicitly modeling the purchaser s rational structural approach to price forecasting we point out that complete rational expectations models may be more susceptible to exploitation by informational cartels than simpler forecasting techniques we have tested the implications of our model in a case study of north carolina highway construction cartels the highway construction industry is an auction market characterized by government procurement agencies who are uninformed relative to suppliers and comes complete with a substantial record of known collusion in recent years thus it seems an ideal hunting ground for verification of our theoretical findings our paper proceeds as follows in section i we model a multiperiod competitive auction market and describe a bayesian mechanism through which the purchaser uses past data to improve the accuracy of his price expectations section ii establishes theoretical results for the bidders cartel which has incentive to form in this market we describe massachusetts institute of technology cambridge ma 02109 and university of arizona tucson az 85721 respectively nold was formerly of rhodes associates and is now deceased we thank richard schmalensee and the participants of the economic and legal organization workshop at the university of chicago for valuable suggestions part of this research was supported under research grant 81 ij cr0062 from the national institute of justice

market structure and incomplete information price formation in a real world repeated english auction abstract this paper examines the effect of buyer size on price formation in an english auction of used state police cars while open auctions generally favor competitive pricing bikhchandani 1988 develops a model of a second price common value auction in which bidders can use strategic behavior based on repeated sales to develop an aggressive reputation and as a result pay lower prices in equilibrium the paper tests this hypothesis by examining sales of 340 used automobiles sold at 13 public auctions conditional on the volume of purchases made by the three largest buyers at the auctions the empirical results show that the number of buyers plays a stronger role in price formation than does buyer size

theory and misbehavior of first price auctions recent experimental evidence appears to reject simple nash equilibrium models of bidding behavior in first price auctions the author presents a methodological critique of this evidence existing tests have concentrated on deviations of subjects from predictions in the message space of the action bid deviations the author suggests that it is more natural to evaluate subject behavior in expected payoff space he concludes that the evidence against the simple models is not significant enough to warrant their rejection copyright 1989 by american economic association

collusive practices in repeated english auctions experimental evidence on bidding rings the repeated meeting of buyers at english auctions where multiple units are sold is a common occurrence the art auctions at sotheby s christie s and other prestigious auction houses are attended by a regular group of institutional buyers more mundanely the same taxicab buyers meet at vehicle auctions for used police cars jon p nelson 1995 commission order buyers attend the same livestock and agricultural commodity auctions these buyers may be agents for multiple meat processors u s department of agriculture grain inspection packers and stockyards administration 2001 the 1946 american tobacco antitrust case american tobacco co et al v united states 328 u s 781 1946 is a well known account of how buyers of tobacco operated to hold down the price of auctioned leaf tobacco at various sites buyers for the big three cigarette manufacturers had developed facilitating practices that helped them purchase raw tobacco at relatively low prices these buyers voluntarily restricted themselves to attend the same auctions buyers were aware of the amount of leaf and the tobacco grades available at auction sites they had instructions from the cigarette makers on the highest bid prices they could pay and communication among these buyers seemed evident from a coordinated practice of buying low grade tobacco that was not used by the makers in the sale of livestock cattle producers have claimed that packer buyers act to hold down cattle prices at the auction site there are a few large processors who give their agents buy orders these orders along with further communication between the processor and agent instruct the agent on the number of cattle to purchase during a given week and provide a schedule of prices they can pay for varying types of cattle some agents represent more than one processor or packer and therefore have multiple buy orders agents repeatedly meet each other at regional cattle auctions they may not be the only buyers but they are the largest purchasers of slaughter cattle brought to market and at most auction sites have substantial monopsony power this paper documents the impacts of several practices that may facilitate low sale prices when multiple units are sold at repeated english auctions laboratory english auction markets are created the number of symmetric buyers attending the auction is either six or two with total demand in these two environments held constant the six buyer market is intended to represent a relatively competitive environment while auctions with two buyers represent rivalry with substantial monopsony power held by each agent we use these two market environments to study how selected treatments or facilitating influences affect the behavior of buying agents the six buyer market generally is viewed as a control for comparison to the dominant twobuyer environment but very collusive behavior may be observed in the six buyer auctions depending upon market practices phillips department of economics and finance university of wyoming p o box 3985 laramie wy 82071 e mail owenphil uwyo edu menkhaus department of agricultural and applied economics university of wyoming p o box 3354 laramie wy 82071 e mail menkhaus uwyo edu coatney u s department of agriculture grain inspection packers and stockyards administration competition branch aurora co 80011 e mail kalyn t coatney usda gov this work has been supported by the u s department of agriculture under grant numbers usdagipsnc5418 and usdag00354009126 the findings and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the funding agency 1 these are regional auctions houses where slaughter cattle primarily cull cows and fed steers and heifers and feeder cattle are sold cull cows are animals taken out of a herd and slaughtered because of age inability to produce calves or reduced milk production concerns regarding slaughter cow possessors sharing common purchasing agents have been raised in assessment of the cattle and hog industries calendar year 2000 u s department of agriculture grain inspection packers and stockyards administration june 2001

information returns and bidding behavior in ocs auctions 1954 1969 this paper examines federal auctions for leases on the outer continental shelf in the light of the predictions of the first price sealed bid common values model of auctions the authors find that the data strongly support the model for auctions in which one bidder is better informed than the other bidders the evidence for auctions in which bidders have noisy but qualitatively similar information is less conclusive but is consistent with a model in which each bidder does not know either the actual or potential number of bidders on a lease copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

child auctions in nineteenth century sweden an analysis of price differences during the nineteenth century destitute and or orphan swedish children were boarded out as a part of that time s public assistance the families to which they were allocated were determined by means of english auctions this paper studies the price differences among such children using empirical data from 601 auctions price is regressed on variables related both to the buyer and to the child the results suggest that variables related to the children s characteristics were important and that the willingness to take a poor or orphan child was dependent on the foster parents uses for a child in the household children who were old enough to be used as shepherd boys or girls were easily placed it was worse with those who were feeble incapacitated blind sick mentally deranged or confined to their beds they were useless to farmers and others as a rule the most miserable were boarded out to the poorest of the non property owners julius ejdestam 1969 the poor s sweden my translation