is free trade in the interest of exporting countries when there is ecological dumping abstract given conditions of oligopolistic competition the coordinated ban of direct export promoting policies e g in the eu or by gatt increases the income of exporting countries however in the presence of environmental distortions free trade can lead to ecological dumping in exporting countries the question arises if free trade is still in the interest of exporting countries we show that welfare maximizing governments of exporting countries prefer free trade even if countries subsidize their local industries indirectly via ecological dumping the existence of further national policy instruments does not make free trade agreements obsolete

multiregional oligopoly with capacity constraints we develop a model of cournot competition between capacity constrained firms that sell a single good to multiple regions we provide a novel characterization for the unique equilibrium allocation o

on the effects of downstream entry we study the effects of entry in a downstream market where firms e g compaq and ibm cvs and safeway buy an input e g microprocessor grocery items from an upstream supplier e g intel procter gamble and sell their output to consumers we show demand conditions where contrary to conventional wisdom entry of a new downstream firm lowers the downstream market output and increases the consumer price thus consumers may be better off with fewer sellers in such markets we also show that this entry may cause the profit of each incumbent downstream firm to i remain unchanged ii decrease or iii even increase also for a class of widely used demand conditions the supplier s optimal price is shown invariant to the entry exit of its downstream buyer firms we classify all possible effects of downstream entry in terms of fundamental market demand conditions

strategic labour contracts labor contracts affect a firm s cost function and for this reason they can be used as a recommitment device to gain a strategic advantage against other firms in a model that is otherwise neutral it is found that if firms compete in prices then strategic considerations alone yield results similar to those obtained by c azariadis 1983 workers are underemployed and worse off in more adverse states of nature on the other hand if firms compete in quantities then the equilibrium contracts resemble those of j green and c kahn 1983 workers are overemployed and better off in more adverse states

protection lobbying and market structure abstract we look at a model of lobbying by oligopolistic industry where firms allocate resources between lobbying and internal cost reducing activities we ask the following questions i if firms differ with respect to comparative advantage in lobbying what is the equilibrium allocation of resources between lobbying and cost reducing activities ii can lobbying opportunities reverse the profitability ranking among firms iii under what condition is the conventional wisdom that highly concentrated industries tend to obtain more protection valid the answers depend on various measures of comparative advantage in lobbying and on the demand curve

fiscal policy in the new open economy macroeconomics and prospects for fiscal policy coordination ceps working documents are published to give an indication of the work within ceps various research programmes and to stimulate reactions from other experts in the field unless otherwise indicated the views expressed are attributable only to the author in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which she is associated

an analysis of preemptive behavior in the titanium dioxide industry abstract much of the recent theoretical work on oligopoly theory focuses on preemptive capital expansion this paper continues this work by testing whether dupont s behavior in the titanium dioxide industry was consistent with the capital commitment model between 1972 and 1977 this is different from previous empirical papers analyzing preemptive capital expansion because it focuses on strategic behavior in a specific industry and because the hypothesis tests in this paper are based on a formal model of firms optimizing behavior the results lend support to the conclusion that dupont committed capital to preempt the smallest five firms in the industry between 1972 and 1977

exchange rate economics 1986 in the past fifteen years key exchange rates have moved in larger and more persistent ways than advocates of flexible rates in the late 1960s would have left anyone free to imagine certainly there was no expectation of constancy for nominal exchange rates but real exchange rate movements of 30 or forty percent were definitely not suggested as a realistic possibility moreover where these large movements did occur they did not obviously appear to be connected with fundamentals and hence seemed difficult to explain in terms of the exchange rate theories at hand the persistence of rate movements was as surprising as the rapid unwinding of apparent misalignments when they did ultimately occur the past fifteen years provide a natural dividing line between the keynesian and monetary approaches of the 1960s and the more recent analysis that takes into account exchange rate expectations and portfolio issues which took off in the early 1970s as well as the brand new approaches that concentrate on partial equilibrium microeconomics to review these ideas the paper starts with a brief look at the u s experience with flexible exchange rates from there it proceeds to the mundell fleming model as a comprehensive framework of analysis the following sections deal with persistent effects of policy disturbances links between exchange rates and prices the political economy of exchange rate movements and the question of policies toward excess capital mobility this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

environmental standards and cournot duopoly a stability analysis in this paper the dynamic effects of public environmental policies are investigated in a cournot duopoly with both heterogeneous and homogeneous expectations in a context of limited rationality it is shown that the increase in upper limits to emissions always tends to destabilise markets and generate a chaotic market dynamics in both cases the policy implication of this result is that the use of environmental policies may favour market stability it is also shown that higher costs of abatement technology entail a higher likelihood of stability loss although in the heterogeneous expectations case also a decrease in costs may destabilise

the tax they pay may be your own promotion taxes and labour supply a model of labour supply is formulated in which increased effort results in an increase in the probability of promotion a simple benchmark model is extended in two directions the first emphasizes the link between labour supply and saving decisions the other takes account of the interaction between workers via contests for promotion a general insight that emerges from the analysis is that when studying the effects of wages and taxes on incentives to work it is sometimes the after tax incomes of other workers in particular senior workers who have already been promoted which are of crucial importance

equilibrium pollution taxes in a two industry open economy abstract this paper involves strategic implications of environmental policy in case of two international oligopolies when countries take part in an international environmental agreement and have agreed on national target levels for a global pollutant this set up permits an analysis of the design of optimal emission taxes across domestic producers by differentiating taxes between industries with different abatement cost demand and number of domestic firms governments are in a position to raise national net foreign rents it is argued that a single national emission trading programme encompassing all domestic producers cannot provide the equivalent strategic policy design

customer markets credit market imperfections and real price rigidity according to standard theory an increase in demand should raise prices of goods given factor prices empirically however prices appear to be unaffected by short run variations in demand this paper suggests an explanation of this observation if customers react slowly to price changes and credit markets are imperfect prices may be unchanged or even fall when demand increases the reason is that when demand is high profits are high and firms can compete more intensely for customers without increasing their borrowing copyright 1991 by the london school of economics and political science

market structure and organizational form this paper studies the determinants of a firm s organizational form in the context of an imperfectly competitive industry there are two kinds of organizational forms the multi divisional form m form and the unitary form u form an m form firm suffers from ignorance of demand externalities among different products and double marginalization is eliminated in contrast in a u form firm demand externalities are taken into consideration and double marginalization exists a firm s optimal choice of organizational form depends on the market structure

the new open economy macroeconomics of government debt in this paper we introduce an overlapping generations structure of the blanchard type in a new open economy macroeconomics model this allows us to study a wider range ofscal shocks compared to the traditional mundell fleming and to the baseline redux models one important policy implication of our model is that the tax cut imple mented in the us in 2001 might have contributed to the appreciation of the dollar vis a vis the euro in contrast the imposition ofscal constraint such as the golden rule proposed by the uk government can have opposite exchange rate e ects

the welfare state and competitiveness in all industrial countries fiscal policy is increasingly about redistribution in this paper the authors study redistribution across different types of agents in a world characterized by the presence of labor unions and distortionary taxation they show that an increase in transfers financed by distortionary taxation has nonlinear effects on unit labor costs relative to the other countries depending on the degree of centralization of the wage setting process in the labor market the authors find considerable empirical support for the model in a sample of fourteen oecd countries copyright 1997 by american economic association

extending the bargaining power model explaining bargaining outcomes among nations mnes and ngos participants in international bargaining include different types nation states mnes ngos and multilateral organizations and different numbers of these actors our theoretical contribution is to extend the bargaining power paradigm with a framework that models bargaining in this complex environment as a network the configuration of supports and constraints among all participating actors in the bargaining environment is captured in the structure of the network antecedents of an actor s bargaining influence in the network include the actor s basis of power network position bargaining outcome preferences and motivation to influence bargaining the network bargaining power nbp model uses network theory to build upon and integrate insights from previous literature in a way that allows us to simultaneously apply these different insights to explain bargaining outcomes these insights include effects of coalitions strategies of less powerful actors leveraging more powerful allies integration of international and domestic politics and applicability to mne related issues beyond fdi finally we illustrate nbp in a scenario of privatized utilities in the dominican republic in which the bargaining power outcome predicted by nbp differs from that of the canonical bargaining power perspective

money demand and the effects of fiscal policies this paper reexamines the choice of the scale variable in the money demand function a variety of evidence suggests that consumer spending is a better scale variable than gnp changing the money demand specification along these lines can profoundly affect the standard keynesian analysis of a tax cut copyright 1986 by ohio state university press

an empirical model of mark ups in a quality differentiated export market abstract this paper develops an empirical model to allow for imperfect competition in the market for traded goods a simultaneous equation model incorporating the demand for and supply of taiwanese footwear exports to the united states is specified and estimated the model allows the identification of two separate sources of mark ups in export prices the first comes from the u s imposed quantitative restriction on these exports the second comes from imperfect competition in the international market for these exports the results suggest competitive behavior by taiwanese footwear exporters the quantitative restriction resulted in a 16 9 percent mark up of prices over marginal cost

useful government spending direct crowding out and fiscal policy interdependence this paper introduces perfect substitutability between private and public consumption in a dynamic open economy with imperfect competition and nominal rigidities this implies a direct crowding out effect that generalising to the two country case some well known properties of a closed economy tends to reduce consumption following both domestic and foreign expansions a less expected result is that sub stitutability has a positive effect on the short run output spillover we also show that if we modify the model to allow for home bias in government spending temporary fiscal expansions display a quasi neutrality property

tax incidence under imperfect competition comment abstract delipalla and o donnell 2001 contains a formula for the incidence of specific and ad valorem taxes in a conjectural variation oligopoly model with potentially asymmetric firms the formula is incorrect we derive the correct formula and provide a discussion of the error and its implications for empirical studies of pass through

export orientation and domestic merger policy theory and some empirical evidence abstract recent open economy industrial organization literature finds export orientation enhances the weight of post merger international competitive gains favouring lenient domestic merger policy however mergers seldom generate the significant synergies supportive of international competitive gains since a joint economies of production effect suggests domestic mergers tend to generate international competitive losses not gains export orientation favours strict not lenient domestic merger policy we show how non synergistic domestic mergers in the presence of international sales might reduce national welfare and incur stringent merger reviews a panel data set of u s merger policy by manufacturing sector 1990 2001 empirically supports export orientation leading to strict merger policy jel classification l40 f10

the macroeconomic effects of monetary and fiscal policy in a small open economy does the exchange rate regime matter abstract this paper develops a small open economy model in the spirit of obstfeld and rogoff 1995 the introduction of endogenous traded sector output unlocks current account and real exchange rate effects within this framework where specific consideration is given to the case with fixed but adjustable parities exchange rate devaluation generates similar qualitative effects as a money supply expansion under floating rates output and external effects of government spending shocks are broadly consistent with the adjusted basic non micro founded mundell and fleming mf framework but differ in significant ways from the baseline mf model contrary to the textbook mf model a government expenditure shock depreciates the nominal exchange rate and generates real effects under the fixed rate system

fiscal consolidation under fixed exchange rates abstract we present the fixed exchange rate version of the obstfeld and rogoff model and analyze the international transmission of fiscal policy shocks the welfare effects of an unanticipated contraction in government expenditure in the home country are shown to depend crucially on the way in which world money stock is set if home authorities alone are responsible for pegging the exchange rate a fiscal adjustment leads to a decrease in the real interest rate stimulates private consumption and limits the contraction in world output compared with a situation in which a cooperative scheme is implemented the model is then used to propose a new interpretation of recent events in the eu countries that have enacted restrictive fiscal policies while pegging their currencies to the dm

welfare and macroeconomic interdependence we develop a baseline model of monetary and fiscal transmission in interdependent economies the welfare effects of expansionary policies are related to monopolistic supply in production and monopoly power of a country in trade an unanticipated exchange rate depreciation can be beggar thyself rather than beggar thy neighbor as gains in domestic output are offset by deteriorating terms of trade smaller and more open economies are more prone to suffer from inflationary shocks larger economies benefit from moderate demand led expansions but may be worse off if policy makers attempt to close the output gap fiscal shocks are generally beggar thy neighbor in the long run in the short run they raise domestic demand at given terms of trade thus reducing the welfare benefits from monetary expansions analytical tractability makes our model uniquely suitable as a starting point to approach the recent new open economy macroeconomic literature

airline network rivalry in this paper the effects of the strategic interaction between deregulated airlines on their network choice are analyzed the authors examine whether switching from a linear to a hub spoke network confers a strategic advantage because it saves costs and improves service quality they find that if hubbing lowers total cost which includes both airline and passenger inconvenience costs the pursuit of strategic advantages usually intensifies the extent of hubbing even if hubbing raises total cost it might be pursued by the airline either because hubbing is a dominant strategy in an oligopolistic setting or because hubbing will be useful in deterring entry

tax incidence under oligopoly a comparison of policy approaches abstract this paper presents a methodological approach for the analysis of tax incidence that encompasses familiar forms of taxation in a general and analytically convenient model in oligopolistic industries the performance of a tax depends on the sensitivity of the unit tax rate to changes in industry output output elastic tax schedules are less likely to be over shifted and have superior welfare properties relative to regulatory instruments that are less responsive to the equilibrium market quantity for revenue neutral tax reforms the finding of delipalla and keen 1992 that ad valorem taxes welfare dominate specific taxes under oligopoly is derived as a special case of this general result

financial constraints competition and hedging in industry equilibrium we analyze the hedging decisions of firms within an equilibrium setting that allows us to examine how a firm s hedging choice depends on the hedging choices of its competitors within this equilibrium some firms hedge while others do not even though all firms are ex ante identical the fraction of firms that hedge depends on industry characteristics such as the number of firms in the industry the elasticity of demand and the convexity of production costs consistent with prior empirical findings the model predicts that there is more heterogeneity in the decision to hedge in the most competitive industries

a structural model of the analysis of retail market power the case of fluid milk we derive a structural model of firm behavior that is composed of the generalized quadratic almost ideal demand system to represent both consumers milk preferences and firm profit maximization conditions that allow for a range of competitive scenarios the importance of this specification is found in its fuller representation of consumer preferences as opposed to the linear approximate almost ideal demand system used in previous analyses we apply this structural framework to investigate retailer conduct in the sale of beverage milk in a u s market using product level data our lerner index estimates show that retailers are not perfectly competitive however this deviation is small copyright 2012 oxford university press

comparative economic performance of conventional and profit sharing firms abstract this paper compares the various economic properties of conventional firms and profit sharing firms the properties contrasted include wage level employment output price total economic rents and industry efficiency the firms operate in an oligopolistic industry with a labor union in general profit sharing firms outperform non sharing firms however there exist counterexamples in which non sharing firms can outperform sharing firms to test the robustness of the results the analysis is conducted for a variety of oligopolistic industries quantity setting pricesetting and joint collusion

fiscal crises and aggregate demand can high public debt reverse the effects of fiscal policy abstract this paper shows how the power of fiscal policy to affect consumption can vary depending on the level of public debt at moderate levels of debt fiscal policy has the traditional keynesian effects current generations of consumers discount future taxes because they may not be alive when taxes are raised or there will be a larger population available to pay the taxes but when debt reaches extreme values current generations of consumers know there is a high probability that they will have to pay extra taxes a fiscal deficit can have a contractionary effect in these situations

paternalism and tax competition when consumers make mistakes the government may wish to use paternalistic taxation as a corrective measure we analyse the extent to which tax competition undermines the feasibility of paternalistic taxation we show that the paternalistic component of a tax on a harmful good is reduced when there is cross border shopping but it does not disappear altogether in a model with tax competition between two countries only one of which has a paternalistic objective we show that a minimum tax rate requirement can be pareto improving despite the divergence in policy objectives tax harmonization however reduces welfare in the non paternalistic country

cost reducing r d in oligopoly abstract this paper provides a conjectural variations model to explore competition in cost reducing r d and the nature of the inter firm externalities it is shown that 1 r d investment in a market with price competition becomes optimal if firms expect that changes in their own r d investment are followed by the rival firms 2 the optimal r d subsidies are positive in collusive oligopolies but negative in competitive oligopolies 3 joint r d ventures in oligopoly could reduce total surplus by causing underinvestment and 4 promoting price competition reduces welfare if firms are not collusive in their r d decisions

symmetric research joint ventures cooperative substitutes and complements we introduce the concepts of cooperative substitutes and complements and use them to explain when all firms in a research joint venture will choose equal levels of r d we show that the second order conditions for a symmetric optimum take a particularly simple form ruling out both excessive cooperative substitutability and excessive cooperative complementarity and nesting conditions already derived in the literature finally we apply our results to the comparison between cooperative and non cooperative r d and show in an important special case that asymmetric outcomes are only optimal for a very limited range of parameter values

a free lunch in the commons we derive conditions under which raising costs through a regulatory constraint or a fully expropriated tax can increase the profits arising from a common pool resource the basic model assumes a fixed number of identical agents with linear costs selling in a single period at an exogenous price a necessary and sufficient condition for a cost increase to be profitable is that aggregate output from the resource be locally convex in aggregate effort we also show that cost increases can be profitable even if price is endogenous agents are heterogeneous entry is costless or agents are playing a markov perfect equilibrium of a dynamic game we also discuss more general welfare implications of the result along with its relation to existing results for a cournot oligopoly

the new open economy macroeconomics a survey since the 1995 publication of obsteld and rogoff s redux model there has been an outpouring of research on open economy dynamic general equilibrium models that incorporate imperfect competition and nominal rigidities this paper offers an interim survey of this recent literature 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

lechatelier samuelson principle in games and pass through of shocks abstract the lechatelier samuelson principle states that as a reaction to a shock an agent s short run adjustment of an affected action is smaller than its long run adjustment when the agent can also adjust other related actions we extend the principle to strategic environments where the long run adjustment also accounts for other players adjusting their strategies we show that the principle holds for supermodular games strategic complements satisfying monotone comparative statics and provide sufficient conditions for the principle to hold in games of strategic substitutes heterogeneity we discuss the principle s implications for cost pass through of multiproduct firms

the effect of emission taxes and abatement subsidies on market structure abstract emission taxes and abatement subsidies are considered to be efficient measures for environment protection the purpose of this paper is to quantify their effects on industry output firm output and on the number of firms in the industry three types of market structure are under discussion perfect competition oligopoly and a dominant firm with a competitive fringe it turns out that emission taxes and abatement subsidies affect the structure of the polluting industry in opposite ways while the effects on industry s emissions are similar in direction but different

strategic foreign exchange management this paper argues that it is possible to advise firms on how to hedge against foreign exchange risks only if one has detailed knowledge of the competitive environment they work in to illustrate this we compare firms hedging requirements in a number of different standard industrial organizations models in particular the cournot model a model with conjectural variations price taking firms and monopolistic competition consider the situation of a firm producing in germany and selling an important part of its total output in the us obviously its profitability may be seriously compromised by an unexpected appreciation of the dm relatively to the the company can react to this uncertainty in two ways either it can assume that the conditions of the modigliani miller theorem are approximately fulfilled and that it best serves the interests of its shareholders by behaving in a risk neutral fashion alternatively the firm may for a variety of reasons behave as a risk averter itself and try to obtain some coverage against exchange rate risk when looking at the amount of insurance taken up by companies on conventional insurance markets one gets the impression that the latter alternative risk averse firms is for many practical cases a realistic assumption the activities of many companies are more easily understood if one admits that they exhibit a certain degree of risk aversion if one accepts this one may go on to ask just how companies should go about insuring themselves against unexpected exchange rate fluctuations more specifically one has to study how much exchange risk the firms should insure against and which exchange rates are of relevance in the example above of a german company selling in the us the answer might at first sight seem obvious the company should obtain coverage against dm fluctuations for an amount approximately equal to its anticipated revenues on brief reflection it immediately appears that this is surely an excessively simplistic answer first the amount of coverage required must be affected by the question of how the price of the product varies when the dm exchange rate shifts second it may be the case that the german company s main competitors are located in say france in this case fluctuations of the