is a uniform social policy better fiscal federalism and factor mobility this paper develops a two country model to study two questions how do the degrees of centralization of redistribution and of factor mobility affect the productive efficiency of the economies what degrees of centralization of redistribution and of factor mobility are likely to be chosen by majority rule the model shows that a system of centralized redistribution can lead to less efficient outcomes if labor or capital are not mobile and an inefficient outcome with incomplete or no factor mobility receives a majority of votes in both countries whenever the structure of labor markets is very different in the two countries

reassessment of the tiebout model abstract the tiebout model has been the reference point for the classical approach to fiscal federalism its emphasis on mobility benefit taxation and the advantages of fiscal competition have informed fiscal federalism since the seminal contributions of musgrave and oates this paper reviews the influence that the tiebout model has had on fiscal federalism and argues that while its insights remain relevant for local government it is far from compelling as a positive description of or a normative prescription for fiscal federalism at the state level some aspects of alternative approaches are presented which lead to different perspectives than tiebout inspired ones

intergovernmental transfers and fiscal behavior insurance versus aggregate discipline abstract this paper evaluates the trade off between the advantages of risk sharing and the perils of common pool problems in federal fiscal arrangements under the assumption of asymmetric information we evaluate two alternative regimes of intergovernmental transfers in one regime the central government pre commits to a certain level of transfers that compensate vertical fiscal imbalances and provide some limited ex ante insurance in the other regime it accommodates ex post the fiscal needs of the different provinces in this second case full insurance results but the economy is subject to a tragedy of the fiscal commons with excessive subnational spending insufficient local taxation and reduced production of federal public goods we find the range of parameters for which one or the other institutional regime will be preferable the result is a fiscal federalism version of the usual trade off between rules and discretion

fiscal federalism and redistributive politics abstract we consider the interaction between redistributive politics at central and local levels in a federal system and characterize the factors influencing success in redistributive politics in both federal and unitary systems we examine how the political characteristics of different states and groups give them better or worse outcomes in a federal system as opposed to a unitary system we examine possibilities of multiple equilibria with divided government between the two layers we analyze the choice between block grants and matching grants we also examine the impact of federalism on the incentives for geographic mobility

dynamic tax externalities and the u s fiscal transformation abstract we propose a theory of tax centralization in politico economic equilibrium taxation has dynamic general equilibrium implications which are internalized at the federal but not at the regional level the political support for taxation therefore differs across levels of government complementarities on the spending side decouple the equilibrium composition of spending and taxation and create a role for inter governmental grants the model provides an explanation for the centralization of revenue introduction of grants and expansion of federal income taxation in the u s around the time of the new deal quantitatively it accounts for approximately 30 of the federal revenue share s doubling in the 1930s and for the long term increase in federal grants

why countries are fiscally decentralizing this paper models and empirically investigates underlying forces that promote governmental decentralization or effective federalism in the world over the last 25 years a move to a federal system is based on the demand by hinterland regions for local autonomy which increases with national income growth greater relative hinterland population and increasing national population it is influenced as well by the degree of democratization nationally and locally decentralization is measured by both institutional indices indicating greater devolution of power to local governments and the share of local governments in national government consumption empirically the paper finds that decentralization changes in ways predicted in particular it increases with economic growth country size and population institutional structures based on colonial experience and initial constitutional provisions also matter

inequality and the territorial fragmentation of solidarity a long tradition of research has shown decentralized political struc tures as an important cause behind lower levels of redistribution and higher levels of inequality this article offers an alternative interpretation of the association between fragmented fiscal structures and higher levels of inequality i argue that the distribu tive effects of decentralization depend on the preexisting territorial patterns of inequal ity therefore the political choice between alternative fiscal structures is largely driven by their expected distributive consequences as a result the territorial structure of inequality becomes an important factor to explain why some fiscal structures are more integrated than others two mechanisms link regional income distributions and preferences about the decentralization of redistributive policy differences in the demand for redistribution associated with interregional income differences and dif ferences in the demand for social insurance associated with the incidence of labor market risks i test the argument using a data set of fourteen countries in the orga nization for economic cooperation and development oecd over the period 1980 2000 in addition i illustrate the potential of the approach by analyzing why social solidarity remains territorially fragmented in the european union despite the fact that it has a common currency and a common market

optimal taxation and intergovernmental transfer in a dynamic model with multiple levels of government abstract in this paper we study the optimal choices of the federal income tax federal transfers and local taxes in a dynamic model of capital accumulation and with explicit game structures among multiple private agents multiple local governments and the federal government in general the optimal local property tax is zero if the local property tax is constrained to be nonnegative whereas the optimal local consumption tax is always positive when the local consumption tax is chosen optimally the federal income tax can be either positive or negative for most reasonable parameter values our numerical calculations have shown that with a positive local consumption tax there exists a reverse transfer from local governments to the federal government

a political economy theory of partial decentralization we revisit the classic problem of tax competition in the context of federal nations and derive a positive theory of partial decentralization a capital poor median voter chooses to use redistributive capital taxes to provide public goods the expectation of high capital taxes however results in a small capital stock which lowers returns to redistribution the median voter therefore wants to commit to a lower level of capital taxes she does so by setting a partial degree of decentralization in the constitution the equilibrium degree of decentralization balances the positive effect of tax competition on capital taxes with the loss in redistribution that results we show that the degree of decentralization is nonmonotonic in inequality increasing in the redistributive efficiency of public good provision and decreasing in capital productivity when public goods are heterogeneous in their capacity to transfer funds all voters agree that goods with high redistributive capacity should be decentralized

optimal regional redistribution under asymmetric information this paper studies optimal redistribution among two different regions in a federal state regional governments supply local public goods financed with distorting local taxes they have better information on their tax bases than the federal government we model this both as an adverse selection problem on the size of local tax bases and or as moral hazard problem on local tax enforcement moral hazard alone does not affect the first best redistribution rule which is a lump sum transfer from the rich to the poor region in all other cases the optimal transfer rule involves a lump sum tax on the rich regions and a premium for fiscal effort by the poor regions with the transfer falling short of the first best level in the equilibrium with moral hazard and adverse selection tax evasion occurs only in the poor region even though the possibility of lax tax enforcement benefits the rich and harms the poor region because it reduces equilibrium redistribution this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

fiscal federalism in europe lessons from the united states experience the existing political and legal institutions of fiscal policy making are under challenge as the united states and the eastern european and soviet states experiment with policy decentralization the states of western europe are looking to a more centralized policy structure via the e e c this paper seeks to raise issues of importance to all such reform efforts notably the need to consider and balance the inefficiencies of fiscal policy decentralization spillovers and wasteful fiscal competition against the inefficiencies of fiscal policy centralization policy cycles and localized pork barrel spending and taxes the need to develop new fiscal policy institutions emphasizing voluntary agreements and responsive agenda setters is stressed robert p inman daniel l rubinfeld department of finance and economics school of law and the wharton school of management department of economics university of pennsylvania university of california philadelphia pa 19104 berkeley ca 94720 and neer fiscal federalism in europe lessons from the united states e perienc by robert p inman and daniel l rubinfeld2 in democratic and totalitarian regimes alike the existing political and legal institutions of economic policy making are under challenge the wisdom of centralized fiscal regimes is now being questioned quietly under the banner of the new federalism in the united states and vocally if not violently through the secessionist movements of eastern europe and the soviet states as these nations experiment with decentralized fiscal institutions the countries of western europe are now looking to the potential of a more centralized economic order within the new european economic community this paper seeks to raise issues of importance to all such reform efforts and within that context to offer some cautionary advise for the design of e e c fiscal institutions based upon the recent american experience with centralized fiscal policy making ii the role for central government fiscal policies in economic unions the european community s progress towards an economic and monetary union the authors wish to thank allesandra casella and barry eichengreen for helpful comments and discussions 2 the authors are professor of finance and economics university of pennsylvania and research associate of the nber and professor of law and economics university of california at berkeley respectively professor rubinfeld gratefully acknowledges the support of the center for real estate and urban economics at the university of california berkeley based upon a common currency will create new demands for the design of fiscal policy 3 perhaps most importantly with a common currency and thus a common monetary policy member states will no longer be able to influence their local economies through exchange rate or monetary policies when state specific economic shocks occur 4 state specific fiscal policies stand as an alternative three questions arise 1 can member state fiscal policies be effective in offsetting local economic shocks in an integrated economic union 2 if effective are such policies likely to be optimally managed at the state level and 3 if ineffective or non optimal what central government policies might be then preferred the recent united states experience is instructive on each point can member state fiscal policies be effective in open integrated economies deficit financed demand creation may be of only limited usefulness to small member states first the demand stimulus of deficit financing is dissipated through import demands from other union states gramlich 1987 has shown that the effectiveness of deficit policies in the smallest u s states is significantly import constrained though larger states may be able to use own deficits to affect state employment prospects second in member states the use of such deficits to combat local shocks may be significantly limited by what the capital markets will allow while deficits may be see eichengreen 1990 there is growing evidence of the economic importance of state specific economic shocks to the short run and long run prospects of states and regions in integrated economic unions see bernard and durlauf 1991 for a study of oecd countries many of which are in the eec and brown coulson and engle 1990 for a study of u s states member states which manage these shocks well are likely to enjoy higher long run growth beneficial to the local economy during downturns and while member states may promise to repay those deficits with surpluses during the upswing such promises are difficult to enforce the u s capital market has appeared reluctant to accept a state s promise of a balanced budget over a business cycle such promises lack credibility when temporary economic downturns are not easily distinguished from long run structural declines when good deficits cannot be distinguished from bad the only credible local government promise may be a balanced budget in each fiscal year the stringent u s state budgets for the recessionary 1992 fiscal year balanced through major tax increases and deep spending cuts offer evidence on the point 5 even if member state deficit policies are economically feasible their management may be non optimal in interdependent economic unions the benefits from local demand creation through deficit financing may spillover to other member states via import expansion while the interest costs of deficits remain with the borrowing state the result will be an under provision of expansionary fiscal policies by member states using the arguments of hart 1982 central government fiscal policies stand as the policy

regional income redistribution and risk sharing how does italy compare in europe abstract this paper investigates income redistribution and risk sharing and the underlying public policy in italy a country marked by stark regional economic contrasts unlike previous works this study also assesses the roles of public consumption investment and welfare assistance in kind the findings suggest that italy s fiscal system provides redistribution at 25 35 and risk sharing at 10 15 of gdp with public consumption playing a large role compared with results in the literature for other countries there appears to be less redistribution and risk sharing through italy s welfare and tax systems because of their different structures

natural resources decentralization and risk sharing can resource booms unify nations previous studies imply that a positive regional fiscal shock such as a resource boom strengthens the desire for separation in this paper we present a new and opposite perspective we construct a model of endogenous fiscal decentralization that builds on two key notions a trade off between risk sharing and heterogeneity and a positive association between resource booms and risk the model shows that a resource windfall causes the nation to centralize as a mechanism to either share risk and or prevent local capture depending on the relative bargaining power of the central and regional governments we provide cross country empirical evidence for the main hypotheses finding that resource booms i decrease the level of fiscal decentralization with no u shaped patterns ii cause the former due to risk sharing incentives primarily when regional governments are relatively strong and iii have no effect on political decentralization

taxation of mobile factors as insurance under uncertainty this paper considers the effects of the taxation of mobile factors i e capital under uncertainty the wages earned by residents of a jurisdiction are uncertain due to random shocks since the uncertain wages in a jurisdiction depend on the amount of mobile capital employed in the jurisdiction and since taxation alters the quantity of capital employed taxation affects the riskiness of uncertain wages in particular the taxation of capital moderates the fluctuation of uncertain wages thereby providing insurance for this reason jurisdictions use distortionary capital taxation even if lump sum taxation is available in addition this insurance effect counteracts the tendency toward too low tax rates on capital arising from tax competition and possibly improves the efficiency of tax competition

a volatility based theory of fiscal union desirability abstract heterogeneous countries may rationally choose to form a currency union first and a fiscal union later we find and illustrate empirically for the emu countries reasonable volatility conditions under which this sequencing in the deepening process is indeed rationalizable changes in the distribution of expected income shocks require a reassignment of political weights to restore unanimous support for an added fiscal dimension the bargaining space depends on countries relative income size and cross correlation of shocks

optimal secession rules abstract should the constitution of a federation allow for peaceful secession constitutionally defined secession rules are optimal ex post if the federation breaks down however they may be suboptimal ex ante if the member countries receive a benefit from the perceived long term stability of the federation and constitutionally defined secession rules increase the probability of a break up the optimal social contract trades off ex ante benefits and ex post losses and it may avoid explicit secession rules if transfers are costly the trade off is present even if ex post renegotiation is allowed finally we show that under asymmetric information it is more difficult to keep the federation together and that a secession war may occur

central governance or subsidiarity a property rights approach to federalism abstract we consider a model where one region in a federation can realize a public project after undertaking value increasing investments while negotiations on the federal level ensure that an efficient project size is implemented in equilibrium non contractibility of investments causes the overall outcome to differ across regimes if the region bears the entire implementation costs of its policies underinvestment prevails and subsidiarity centralized governance is superior when spillovers are weak strong conversely if linear cost sharing arrangements are feasible decentralized authority often admits a socially optimal outcome while centralized authority with majority or unanimity rule does not

fiscal flows and financial markets to what extent do they provide risk sharing within sweden andersson l fiscal flows and financial markets to what extent do they provide risk sharing within sweden regional studies the objective of this paper is to analyse the amount of risk sharing that takes place between regions in sweden it is found that the capital market is the largest source of risk sharing of an exogenous change in gross regional product in sweden still roughly 20 of a change in regional output is smoothed among the regions through the fiscal system there is also some evidence that there are regional differences in the sense that regions located in the south rely more on the capital market as a source of insurance against shocks in output while the tax and transfer systems provide a larger extent of risk sharing for regions located in the north andersson l flux fiscaux et marches financiers dans quelle mesure assurent ils le partage de risques en suede regional studies l objet de cette communication est d analyser l importance du partage de risques entre regions suedoises

are local agreements on equalization grants possible a bargaining model with quasi linear local preferences on local public goods abstract the art 13 of the italian law n 42 2009 theoretically allows for local negotiations between municipalities on the allocation of equalization funds however in the subsequent practice and legislation such form of local negotiation has never been adopted a question arises from the italian experience in the presence of a predetermined equalization scheme decided by the central government are local agreements on equalization transfers possible in this paper we show that in the presence of quasi linear local preferences on public goods there is no space for alternative local agreements on the allocation of equalizing transfers in the presence of predetermined schemes decided by the central government our results suggest that similar practices when allowed are destined to have scarce success we also show that if the central government does not provide a predetermined scheme local agreement on equalization funds are viable

optimal policies in cities with congestion and agglomeration externalities congestion tolls labor subsidies and place based strategies abstract this paper develops a spatial general equilibrium model that accommodates both congestion and agglomeration externalities while firms and households land use decisions are endogenous across continuous space focusing on the interaction between externalities and land use patterns we examine the efficiencies of first best policies and second best pricing and place based strategies using numerical simulations a first best policy must combine both pigouvian congestion tolling pct and pigouvian labor subsidies pls instruments or design an optimal toll or subsidy internalizing agglomeration externalities or congestion externalities we also examine second best pricing policies if only one instrument is adopted congestion pricing policies alone e g a partial pct or a flat rate toll can improve social welfare only in heavy congestion cities and their welfare gains may be insignificant e g below 10 of the welfare improvement achieved by first best policies in contrast second best labor subsidy policies alone are a more effective alternative to first best policies as to place based policies the firm cluster zoning fcz regulation is more efficient than the urban growth boundary ugb policy ugbs only have small effects on the agglomeration economy but could worsen land market distortions via residential rent escalation effects these findings suggest that it is important to internalize business land use decisions and relax monocentricity assumptions in order to appreciate the interplay of both urban externalities since spatial adaptations to policy interventions can distort system efficiencies

uncertain income and redistribution in a federal system abstract this paper considers income redistribution in a federal system where regions experience random shocks federal redistribution serves as insurance against jurisdiction specific shocks but provides a uniform assistance to the poor and cannot suit individual jurisdictions demands for redistribution consequently whether the federal government should redistribute depends on the advantage of pooling the risk and the disadvantage of compromising different preferences for redistribution with mobile individuals federal redistribution loses its advantage because migration ensures the equalization of factor incomes between regions and because even local redistribution serves as insurance however local redistribution creates fiscal externalities and distorts the allocation of labor

who wants political integration evidence from the swedish eu membership referendum abstract the regional voting pattern of the swedish european union eu membership referendum is analyzed to determine voters preferences over two fiscal regimes an autonomous sweden or sweden as part of the eu a major difference between these regimes is that autonomy gives greater national discretion to handle risk sharing and redistribution between regions i find that inhabitants of rich and stable regions with high levels of schooling small receipts of central government transfers and trade relations displaying comparative advantages towards the eu were relatively positive to membership a plausible interpretation is thus that voters in safe and rich regions voted in favor of dismantling the swedish transfer system

federalism equalization and risk aversion abstract what causes a group of countries to agree to form a federation other alternative arrangements which often are chosen instead are to form a unitary state or to remain autonomous federations usually allow for considerable freedom of movement among constituent regions they also provide a fairly limited redistribution of any rents earned in these regions these two features together imply that residents of poor regions can share in the rents in rich regions by migration this fiscal migration may waste resources why not simply share the rents equally among residents of all regions such a unitary arrangement although efficient would not appeal to residents of a country which is likely to be the best off region in a federation complete autonomy may expose residents of the separate countries to considerable idiosyncratic risk here i demonstrate that federation may be chosen by a group of countries even though it is a more wasteful arrangement than either other alternative if asymmetries among countries and the degree of risk aversion are large federal states also often implement transfers among the regions these transfers can be viewed as substitutes for fiscal migration i also show that the possibility of transfers even without any commitment to specifics makes federalism a more attractive option a federal constitution which requires transfers in excess of what would be made voluntarily may make federalism more attractive still

inter regional redistribution through infrastructure investment tactical or programmatic in this paper we study the political economy of the inter regional allocation of investment in infrastructure in an effort to disentangle tactical and programmatic motives where tactical politics refers to the discretionary allocation of investment to districts with more political clout and programmatic politics refers to the allocation of investment according to certain objective criteria e g income level we use a panel of data from the spanish electoral districts for the period 1964 2004 to estimate an equation in which investment depends both on economic and political variables the results show that tactical politics do matter since the districts receiving the most funds are those in which i the incumbent s vote margin is low ii few votes are needed to win an additional seat in the legislature iii the central and regional governments are controlled by the same party and iv regional parties play a pivotal role in the legislature however the results also show that programmatic politics matter since inter regional redistribution is shown to increase i with the arrival of democracy and european union funds ii under leftist governments and iii the weaker the correlation is between political clout and regional income

federal fiscal constitutions risk sharing and redistribution the paper studies the political and economic determinants of regional public transfers specifically it focuses on how such transfers are shaped by alternative fiscal constitutions where a constitution is an allocation of fiscal instruments across different levels of governments plus a procedure for the collective choice of these instruments realistic restrictions on fiscal instruments introduce a tradeoff between risk sharing and redistribution different constitutions produce very different results in particular a federal social insurance scheme chosen by voting provides overinsurance whereas an intergovernmental transfer scheme chosen by bargaining provides underinsurance

a positive model of overlapping income taxation in a federation of states abstract this paper develops a positive theory of overlapping income taxation in a federation of states the analysis provides a complete characterization of the equilibrium federal and states tax rates as functions of the level of total productivity dispersion between the states the federal rate is increasing in the level of total productivity dispersion between the states even if the income of the decisive voter at the federal level is above the mean income given that the individuals income is endogenously determined there exists a negative trade off between the implemented federal tax rate and the resulting states tax rates regardless of the pre tax income of the decisive voter at the state level thus high levels of productivity dispersion between the states cause a higher than optimal federal tax rate together with low states tax rates it is also shown that a system of overlapping income taxation is not efficient the resulting inefficiency might be exacerbated by the implementation of a federal matching grants program contradicting previous results in the related normative literature

redistribution and risk sharing in italy learning from the past abstractredistribution and risk sharing in italy learning from the past regional studies this paper investigates the role of public policies in italy by assessing both the redistribution and the risk sharing functions of interregional net fiscal flows in the long run its comparative approach allows one to contrast results obtained for two periods characterized by diverse regional policy and dynamics of regional convergence although based on a specific example the evidence supports more general conclusions when assessing the regional redistributive and risk sharing power of national fiscal policies many different factors related to the existing policy regime should be accounted for particularly the distribution of government spending between current expenditure and public investment

regional non adjustment and fiscal policy asymmetric shocks regional non adjustment and fiscal policy how will countries handle idiosyncratic macroeconomic shocks under the single currency since the regional adjustment patterns currently prevailing within european currency unions are likely to prevail at the national level under the single currency looking at the ways in which european countries react to internally asymmetric shocks today provides a good preview for the answer to that question in this paper we compare the usa with germany italy and the uk and with canada which is closer to europe than the usa in its labour market and fiscal institutions europe s and to some extent canada s model of regional response differs from that of the usa changes in regional real exchange rates are small in all countries outside of the usa however there is more reliance on interregional transfer payments less on labour migration and the pace of regional adjustment appears to be slower if emu aims at the same degree of economic and social cohesion that its constituent nations enjoy today this suggests that its members may find it hard to resist the eventual extension of existing eu mechanisms of income redistribution a transfer union we propose an alternative strategy based on a relaxed stability pact further strictures against central eu borrowing labour market and fiscal reform and the issuance by individual member states of debt indexed to nominal gdp maurice obstfeld and giovanni peri

simple cost sharing contracts we extend rogerson s 2003 intriguing analysis of the performance of simple procurement contracts to consider settings where the supplier s innate production cost is not necessarily distributed uniformly although the simple contract that rogerson analyzes performs remarkably well when the smaller cost realizations are relatively likely it can perform poorly when the larger cost realizations are relatively likely we show that in all settings under consideration though a fairly simple pair of contracts one that involves linear cost sharing and one that involves full cost reimbursement can always secure more than 73 of the gain achieved with a fully optimal contract

economic and social security in the twenty first century with attention to europe a partly heuristic attempt at exploring long run policies aimed at a second best compromise between ex ante risk sharing efficiency and ex post productive efficiency wage subsidies for low skilled workers financed by taxes on high wages are advocated together with improved risk sharing between capital and labour between generations and between the countries belonging to emu the scope of the advocated policies is limited by considerations of moral hazard time consistency and fiscal competition also estimates of some key economic parameters remain very imprecise several avenues of further research are identified

federations coalitions and risk diversification we investigate the optimal size of a nation in the context of a portfolio choice model under uncertainty with an equal sharing rule we characterize the equilibrium coali tion structure which is shown to depend on income risks and market correlations specifi cally coalitions are likely to form among regions with similar variance in income and among regions with negative market correlations the conditions that yield a grand coalition two sub coalitions of different sizes and singletons are derived moreover the equilibrium coali tion structures are also examined when geographical contiguity is required

liability creating versus non liability creating fiscal stabilisation policies ricardian equivalence fiscal stabilisation and emu this paper looks at theoretical and empirical issues associated with the operation of fiscal stabilisers within an economy it argues that such stabilisers operate most effectively at a national rather than local level as differing cycles across regions tend to offset each other for the country as a whole national fiscal stabilisers are not associated with the same increase in future tax liabilities for the region as local ones accordingly the negative impact from the ricardian effects associated with these tax liabilities is smaller empirical work on data across canadian provinces indicates that local stabilisers are only one third to one half as effective as national stabilisers which create no future tax liability

the redistributive roles of unemployment insurance and the dynamics of voting abstract public unemployment insurance is analyzed as the majority voting equilibrium policy of a dynamic stochastic economy abstracting from incentive effects we focus on redistribution some results are because of the distribution of heterogeneous employment opportunities public insurance may be democratically chosen even if complete private markets exist and because of the dynamics even when agents are intrinsically homogeneous the equilibrium benefit level or duration benefit schedule deviates from what has been described as optimal in the literature the effects of differences in the average frequency or duration of unemployment on equilibrium taxes and benefits are investigated with some unanticipated results

trade capital mobility and tax competition this paper examines a system of governments national state or local that finance public expenditures with taxes on mobile capital e g a property tax unlike previous research on tax competition explicit consideration is given to the general equilibrium determination of the prices at which goods are traded between regions the analysis identifies inefficiencies in government behavior that are not apparent in models in which the terms of trade are exogenously given capital taxation is shown to create an inefficient distribution of public good outputs across regions accompanied by an inefficient pattern of trade a model is presented in which the chosen levels of public good outputs differ across regions containing identical residents and production possibilities there is a wasteful diversity of public good supplies

drowned by numbers stabilization properties of an eu wide unemployment insurance system the recent crisis has given rise to proposals for the creation of a european unemployment insurance system we simulate an eu wide mechanism under various scenarios varying methods of financing common or country specific contribution rates and triggers for pay outs all time or contingent clauses we analyse the impact of the system using different measures of stabilization under different fiscal multipliers a system operating during bad times periods where the increase in unemployment is large would reduce gdp growth variability but also growth correlation among member countries hence there is a trade off between stabilization and synchronization of national business cycles

fiscal devolution and dependency public spending devolution in practice is widely seen as more appropriate for addressing varied political aspirations within state boundaries than is tax devolution a drawback is that devolved public spending may be subject to irresistible upward pressure as illustrated by formula drift of the united kingdom devolved administrations by crowding out the private sector such public spending can exacerbate the problem it was originally intended to alleviate when taxpayers do not value increases in government output at least as highly as the private goods and services they must forgo to finance them then the public sector is too large this article estimates a three sector hecksher ohlin model of the economy with the greatest relative rise of the public spending ratio in the united kingdom wales simulation of the model shows a net gain in employment from a 1 cut in income tax matched by a corresponding reduction in government spending this result is consistent with the current level of intergovernme

does decentralization increase government responsiveness to local needs evidence from bolivia this paper examines whether decentralization increases the responsiveness of public investment to local needs using a unique database from bolivia empirical tests show that investment patterns in human capital and social services changed significantly after decentralization these changes are strongly and positively related to objective indicators of need nationally these changes were driven by the smallest poorest municipalities investing devolved funds in their highest priority projects the findings contradict common claims that local government is too corrupt institutionally weak or prone to interest group capture to improve upon central government s allocation of public resources d 2002 published by elsevier b v

federal tax policies congressional voting and natural resources can abundance of natural resources affect legislators voting behavior over federal tax policies we construct a political economy model of a federalized economy with district heterogeneity in natural resource abundance the model shows that representatives of natural resource rich districts are more less willing to vote in favor of federal tax increases decreases this occurs because resource rich districts are less responsive to federal tax changes due to the immobile nature of their natural resources we test the model s predictions using data on roll call votes in the u s house of representatives over the major federal tax bills initiated during the period of 1945 2003 in conjunction with the presence of active giant oil fields in u s congressional districts our identification strategy rests on plausibly exogenous giant oil field discoveries and exploitation and narrative based aggregate federal tax shocks that are exogenous to individual congressional districts and legislators we find that i resource rich congressional districts are less responsive to changes in federal taxes ii representatives of resource rich congressional districts are more less supportive of federal tax increases decreases controlling for legislator congressional district and state indicators our results indicate that resource richness is approximately half as dominant as the main determinant namely party afiliation in driving legislators voting behavior over federal tax policies

debt bailouts and constitutions a demand based theory of sub national debt bailouts is presented it is shown that revenue sharing rs arrangements alter the demand for bailouts among politicians with regional constituencies as a bailout usually implies a shift of taxation to the federal tier automatic rs may lead to the formation of pro bailout coalitions formed by indebted states and states that are net recipients of the rs arrangement also rs can act as a commitment device for compensating payments among state representatives making a bailout politically rational the model shows that the state debt bailouts approved by the brazilian senate prior to the enactment of the fiscal responsibility act were fully consistent with politicians that maximize the proceeds accruing to their constituencies

interregional redistribution and mobility in federations a positive approach the paper studies the effects and the determinants of interregional redistribution in a model of residential and political choice we find that paradoxical consequences of inter jurisdictional transfers arise if people are mobile while self sufficient regions are nec essarily identical with respect to policies and average incomes in our model interregional redistribution always leads to the divergence of regional policies and per capita incomes thus interregional redistribution prevents interregional equality at the same time however transfers may allow for more interpersonal equality among the inhabitants of each region the voting population may therefore in a decision over the fiscal constitution deliberately implement such a transfer scheme to foster regional divergence empirical evidence from panel data from oecd countries and candian provinces is consistent with the theory

fiscal federalism and monetary unions a quantitative assessment abstract in this paper i provide a quantitative analysis of three different forms of fiscal federalism in monetary unions fully decentralized regional fiscal authorities as the benchmark fiscal equalization with nominal tax revenue sharing and a common central fiscal authority i assess the capability of the different arrangements to stabilize regional consumption output and employment over the business cycle i also study the implications for interregional income consumption risk sharing and welfare from this analysis the following results emerge first a central fiscal authority stabilizes consumption fluctuations and increases the scope of interregional income and consumption risk sharing second fiscal equalization destabilizes consumption fluctuations and also reduces the scope of interregional income and consumption risk smoothing third a central fiscal authority leads to welfare gains whereas fiscal equalization leads to welfare losses