analyst reputation communication and information acquisition earlier studies have shown that reputational concerns tend to reduce agents opportunistic behavior however a recent study by morris argued that analysts experts reputational concerns may discourage truthful communication when they try to avoid being perceived as being misaligned with investors in this paper i examine the effect of reputational concerns on communication in a setting where analysts can choose their precision endogenously because both misaligned and aligned analysts want investors to trust their reports in the future both will aim to build a reputation for being aligned in equilibrium aligned analysts will acquire more information than misaligned analysts as a result investors may favorably update their beliefs about the analysts type when the report is proven to be accurate therefore both types of analysts will have reputational incentives to communicate truthfully the paper also derives conditions under which the analysts reputational concerns have a nonmonotonic impact on aligned analysts equilibrium precision choices and investors welfare

competitive cheap talk we study a competitive cheap talk model with two senders each sender is responsible for a single project and observes its return exactly one project will be implemented both senders share some common interests with the principal but have own project biases under simultaneous communication all equilibria are shown to be partition equilibria but all the equilibria can no longer be ranked ex ante in terms of pareto efficiency the payoff of the principal depends on both the total conflict between the agents and the asymmetry in the own project biases in the equilibrium preferred by the principal the agent with a smaller bias always has veto power to determine which alternative is implemented and weakly more messages in any given equilibrium decreasing the own project bias of one agent improves the precision of communication by both agents finally sequential communication and simple delegation are shown to be essentially outcome equivalent to simultaneous communication

an experimental study of truth telling in a sender receiver game a recent experimental study of cai and wang 2005 on strategic information transmission reveals that subjects tend to transmit more information than predicted by the standard equilibrium analysis to evidence that this overcommunication phenomenon can be explained in terms of a tension between normative social behavior and incentives for lying we show in a simple sender receiver game that subjects incurring in costs to punish liars tell the truth more often than predicted by the logit agent quantal response equilibria whereas subjects that do not punish liars after receiving a deceptive message play on the aggregate equilibrium strategies thus we can partition the subject pool into two groups one group of subjects with preferences for truth telling and one taking into account only material incentives

meaning and credibility in cheap talk games i define neologism proofness a refinement of perfect bayesian equilibrium in cheap talk games it applies when players have a preexisting common language so that an unexpected message s literal meaning is clear and only credibility restricts communication i show that certain implausible equilibria are not neologism proof in some games no equilibrium is journal of economic literature classification numbers d83 d82 c73

wall street and the housing bubble we analyze whether mid level managers in securitized finance were aware of the housing bubble and a looming crisis in 2004 2006 using their personal home transaction data we find little evidence of them timing the bubble or exercising cautious behavior in purchasing homes relative to two uninformed control groups one composed of non housing equity analysts and the other of non real estate lawyers to the extent that the practice of securitization may have led to lax screening of subprime borrowers the average person in our sample did not expect it to lead to problems in the wider housing market our findings suggest the need to expand the incentives based view of the crisis to incorporate a role for distorted beliefs

price manipulation in an experimental asset market we analyze in the laboratory whether an uninformed trader is able to manipulate the price of a financial asset by comparing the results of two experimental treatments in the benchmark treatment 12 subjects trade a common value asset that takes either a high or a low value only three subjects know the actual value of the asset while the market is open for trading the manipulation treatment is identical to the benchmark treatment apart from the fact that we introduce a computer program as an additional uninformed trader this robot buys a fixed number of shares in the beginning of a trading period and sells them again afterwards our main result shows that the last contract price is significantly higher in the manipulation treatment if the asset takes a low value and that private information is very well disseminated by both markets if the value of the asset is high finally even though this simple manipulation program loses money on average it is profitable in some instances

the long run relationship between inflation and output in postwar economies abstract we investigate the relationship between inflation and real output in a large sample of postwar economies our methodology is to use a structural vector autoregression to estimate the response of the level of real output to permanent inflation shocks separately for each country we find that a permanent shock to inflation is not associated with a permanent movement in the level of real output for most countries in our sample the main exceptions are certain low inflation countries in which permanent inflation shocks permanently increase the level of output we also find that permanent inflation shocks do not permanently influence real output growth rates in our sample

traders vs relationship managers reputational conflicts in full service investment banks we present a model that explains why investment bankers struggle to manage conflicts of interest banks can build a type reputation for technical competence by performing complex deals that may not serve their clients interest on the other hand banks can sustain a behavioral reputation by refraining from doing so a behavioral reputation is a luxury reserved for banks that have proven their abilities the model sheds light on conflicts between the trading and advisory divisions of investment banks as well as the consequences of technological change for time variation in the relative strength of behavioral and type reputation concerns

on the incentive effects of job rotation abstract a new employee may work hard to build his reputation this effect is greatest when he starts the longer he is employed at his job the more the firm will already have learned about his ability the incentives for an employee to influence the firm s perceptions of his ability decrease over time if rotating the employee to a different job leads to new uncertainty about his ability this generates a fresh impulse for effort however job rotation also reduces the employee s time horizon thus reducing future rents from reputation this trade off leads to a unique optimum we derive a simple rule of thumb for an optimal rotation time our main results still hold for cases of complete but imperfect information transmission the incentive effects of job rotation also prevail in a setting in which skills are job specific we study several extensions rotations across multiple employees absence of commitment to a rotation time different bargaining positions discounting over time and learning by doing effects

a theory of credibility this paper presents models in which one agent must decide whether to trust another whose motives are uncertain reliability can only be communicated through actions in this context it pays for people to build a reputation based on reliable behaviour someone becomes credible by consistently providing accurate and valuable information or by performing useful services the theory provides a justification for long term arrangements without binding contracts it also describes those situations where it pays an agent to cash in on his reputation many decisions depend on trusting someone consumers must decide whether to believe advertisements banks need to judge the reliability of loan applicants and employers must decide how much responsibility to delegate to their employees this paper attempts to model situations that arise when someone is uncertain about whether to trust the people he deals with in this context reputations for reliability are valuable an agent becomes credible by consistently providing accurate valuable information or by always acting responsibly i analyse a series of simple abstract models of information transmission in the basic model there are two agents the sender s and the receiver r who are to play the game a known finite number of times at each stage both players learn the value of a parameter measuring the importance of that period s play of the game that is the value of making a correct decision and s obtains payoff relevant information s then sends a signal to r who makes a decision that affects the welfare of both players after both players learn the consequences of r s decision the process repeats at each stage r must decide what action to take in order to do that he must assess the credibility of s the difficulty arises because r is uncertain about s s preferences when play begins i model this by assuming that with positive probability s has identical preferences to r s is a friend and with positive probability s has completely opposed preferences to r s is an enemy this uncertainty creates a trade off for enemy senders at each stage providing honest information enhances s s reputation but only at the expense of foregoing an opportunity for immediate gain by duping r the possibility that s is a friend lends credibility to what he says but this credibility may also be exploited by an enemy s the principal equilibrium has the following form in the basic model where s has no control over the importance of a given play s typically conveys accurate information for the first several periods r raises the probability he places on s being friendly after receiving accurate information if he believes that an enemy would have lied to him with positive probability the more important the information the more likely an enemy will attempt to deceive r an enemy will eventually take advantage of r by misleading him when this happens the sender loses all opportunities for deception in the future i

efficiency wages and industry wage differentials a comparison across methods of pay efficiency wage considerations should be less important for piece rate pay than for time wages therefore if industry wage differentials reflect efficiency wage factors then these pay differences should be less sizable and have less explanatory power for piecework than for timework we test this proposition using wage data for male production workers employed in the swedish metalworking industries in 1985 the data are partitioned into two groups of workers in our preferred sub sample of workers who received pay under both piece rates and time wages our results are uniformly consistent with efficiency wage implications for industry wage differentials for the subsample of workers who received pay under either piece rates or time wages industry wage differentials are of equal importance under either pay scheme these latter results however may also be influenced by unaccounted for sorting of workers and employers across methods of pay overall our examination of industry wage differentials across m

low inflation targeting and long run unemployment the model of akerlof dickens and perry 2000 adp predicts that low inflation may cause unemployment to persist at high levels when applied to u s data their results strongly rejected the conventional nairu model we apply the adp model to swedish data the fact that our swedish data also reject the nairu model has a number of interesting implications for the swedish economy and potentially for other european countries as well the results indicate that raising the swedish inflation target from 2 to 4 percent would bring longrun unemployment down by several percentage points the possibility of adp type long run phillips curves also across the euro countries may raise some concern about the emu project while detailed studies on other countries are needed there is nothing to suggest that these non vertical phillips curves would not differ considerably across the euro countries any single inflation level targeted by the ecb would then generate excess unemployment in individual member states

neglected risks financial innovation and financial fragility abstract we present a standard model of financial innovation in which intermediaries engineer securities with cash flows that investors seek but modify two assumptions first investors and possibly intermediaries neglect certain unlikely risks second investors demand securities with safe cash flows financial intermediaries cater to these preferences and beliefs by engineering securities perceived to be safe but exposed to neglected risks because the risks are neglected security issuance is excessive as investors eventually recognize these risks they fly back to the safety of traditional securities and markets become fragile even without leverage precisely because the volume of new claims is excessive

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

who neglects risk investor experience and the credit boom abstract many have argued that overoptimistic thinking on the part of lenders helps fuel credit booms we use new micro data on mutual funds holdings of securitizations to examine which investors are susceptible to such boom time thinking we show that firsthand experience plays a key role in shaping investors beliefs during the 2003 2007 mortgage boom inexperienced fund managers loaded up on securitizations linked to nonprime mortgages accumulating twice the holdings of more seasoned managers moreover inexperienced managers who personally experienced severe or recent adverse investment outcomes behaved more like seasoned managers training and institutional memory can serve as partial substitutes for personal experience

a theory of ambiguity credibility and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information this paper develops a positive theory of credibility ambiguity and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information the monetary policymaker maximizes his own politically motivated objective function that is positively related to economic stimulation through monetary surprises and negatively related to monetary growth the relative importance he assigns to each target shifts stochastically through time his current preference trade off is known to him but not to the public when choosing the state contingent path of money growth for the present and the future the policymaker compares the benefits from current stimulation with the costs associated with higher future inflation expectations current monetary growth conveys information to the public about future money growth because there is persistence in the policymaker s objectives although expectations are rational information is imperfect because monetary control procedures are imprecise as a result the public cannot correctly distinguish persistent changes of emphasis on different policy objectives from transitory monetary control errors the public becomes aware of changes gradually by observing past monetary growth credibility is defined in terms of the speed with which the public recognizes changes in the objectives of the policymaker credibility is lower the noisier monetary control and the more stable the objectives of the policymaker looser monetary control and a higher degree of time preference on the part of the policymaker induce him to produce higher and more variable monetary growth when the policymaker is free to determine the accuracy of monetary control he does not always choose the most effective control available in spite of the fact that monetary surprises always have an expected value of zero the reason is that ambiguous control procedures enable the policymaker to generate positive surprises when he cares more than on average about economic stimulation he leaves the inevitable negative surprises for periods in which he cares more about inflation prevention this result provides an explanation for the fed s preference for ambiguity recently documented by goodfriend 1986 the policymaker is more likely to pick more ambiguous control procedures the more uncertain his objectives and the higher his time preference the paper also provides a theoretical underpinning for the well documented crosscountry positive correlation between the level and the variability of inflation

market manipulation price bubbles and a model of the u s treasury securities auction market this paper models the u s treasury securities auction market and demonstrates that mar ket manipulation can occur in a rational equilibrium it is a dynamic model with traders participating in a when issued market a treasury auction and a resale market manipu lations occur when dealers in the when issued market use their knowledge of the net order flow in order to corner the auction and squeeze the shorts from the when issued market this manipulation equilibrium generates bubbles in treasury security prices and specials in repo rates we also compare discriminatory and uniform price auction rules with respect to manipulation our analysis shows that manipulations can occur in long run equilibrium under discriminatory price auctions but not under uniform price auctions

risk aversion liquidity and endogenous short horizons we analyze a competitive model in which different information signals get reflected in value at different points in time if investors are sufficiently risk averse we obtain an equilibrium in which all investors focus exclusively on the short term in addition we show that increasing the variance of informationless trading increases market depth but causes a greater proportion of investors to focus on the short term signal which decreases the informativeness of prices about the long run finally we also explore parameter spaces under which long term informed agents wish to voluntarily disclose their information article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

do countries falsify economic data strategically some evidence that they might we find evidence supporting the hypothesis that countries at times misreport their economic data in a strategic manner among those suspected are countries with fixed exchange rate regimes high negative net foreign asset positions or negative current account balances which corroborates the intuition developed with a simple economic model we also find that countries with bad institutional quality rankings and those in africa middle east eastern europe and latin america release economic data of questionable veracity our evidence calls for models with public signals to consider strategic misinformation and for establishing independent statistical agencies to assure the delivery of high quality economic data

forward guidance communication commitment or both abstract forward guidance has been suggested as a form of commitment odyssean by the policymaker or as a way of conveying information delphic i analyze the interaction between households and the central bank as a game in which the central bank sends messages without private information the set of equilibrium payoffs is independent of any announcements pure odyssean forward guidance is redundant with private information communication can have social value forward guidance is well suited to leverage preexisting credibility to communicate a central bank s private information about its own preferences or beliefs

rating the raters are reputation concerns powerful enough to discipline rating agencies abstract credit rating agencies cras are accused of bearing a strong responsibility for contributing to the subprime crisis by having been deliberately too lax in the ratings of some structured products in response to this accusation cras argue that such an attitude would be too dangerous for them since their reputation is at stake the objective of this article is to examine the validity of this argument within a formal model are reputation concerns sufficient to discipline rating agencies we show that the reputation argument only works when a sufficiency large fraction of the cra income comes from other sources than rating complex products by contrast when rating complex products becomes a major source of income for the cra we show that it is always too lax with a positive probability and inflates ratings with probability one when its reputation is good enough we provide some empirical support for this prediction by showing that ceteris paribus the proportion of subprime residential mortgage backed securities rmbs that were rated aaa by the three main cras indeed increased over the last eight years we analyze the policy implications of our findings and advocate for a new business model of cras that we call the platform pays model

persuasive communication when the sender s incentives are uncertain abstract we study persuasion in a modified crawford sobel sender receiver game in which the receiver makes a binary decision to accept or reject a good recommended by the sender the good s quality and the sender s type neutral or biased are not observable to the receiver these alterations yield a simple model and a unique truth telling equilibrium in which neutral senders who observe different qualities fully separate but can only communicate low quality levels accurately biased senders adopt a mixed strategy that can successfully persuade the receiver to accept the good most of the time when the sender s degree of bias is continuously distributed a truth telling equilibrium does not exist nonetheless a partition equilibrium exists for any given number of partitions on the message space

persuasion by cheap talk we consider the credibility persuasiveness and informativ eness of multidimensional cheap talk by an expert to a decision maker we find that an expert with state independent preferences can always make credible comparative statements that trade off the expert s incentive to exaggerate on each dimension such communication benefits the expert cheap talk is persuasive if her preferences are quasiconvex communication benefits a decision maker by allowing for a more informed decision but strategic interactions between multiple decision makers can reverse this gain we apply these results to topics including product recommendations voting auction disclosure and advertising jel d44 d72 d82 d83 m37

incentive compatibility in signaling games with a continuum of types on donne deux resultats utiles pour demontrer l existence et pour caracteriser des equilibres de separation dans des jeux de signalement

repeated games with long run and short run players this paper studies the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with long and short run players and little discounting because the short run players are unconcerned about the future each equilibrium outcome is constrained to lie on their static reaction best response curves the natural extension of the folk theorem to games of this sort would simply include this constraint in the definitions of the feasible payoffs and minmax values in fact this extension does obtain under the assumption that each player s choice of a mixed strategy for the stage game is publicly observable but in contrast to standard repeated games the set of equilibrium payoffs is different if players can observe only their opponents realized actions

imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations we study the long run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring it is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types thus a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for noncredible behavior in the presence of imperfect monitoring

inflation and unemployment the world economy today is vastly different from the 1930s when seymour harris the chairman of this meeting infected me with his boundless enthusiasm for economics and his steadfast confidence in its capacity for good works economics is very different too both the science and its subject have changed and for the better since world war ii but there are some notable constants unemployment and inflation still preoccupy and perplex economists statesmen journalists housewives and everyone else the connection between them is the principal domestic economic burden of presidents and prime ministers and the major area of controversy and ignorance in macroeconomics i have chosen to review economic thought on this topic on this occasion partly because of its inevitable timeliness partly because of a personal interest reaching back to my first published work in 1941

careerist experts and political incorrectness abstract while political correctness is a dominant norm in many public situations we also observe behaviors that are apparently politically incorrect often from professionals and experts this paper examines the flip side of political correctness as analyzed in morris 2001 to shed some light on the elusive notion of political incorrectness and elucidate its equilibrium and welfare properties we show that there are circumstances in which unbiased experts deliberately take a politically incorrect stance out of reputational concerns and identify key elements which give rise to this perverse reputational incentive the results suggest that political incorrectness cannot necessarily be viewed as a sign of blunt honesty when informed experts have long term reputational concerns we also examine the welfare consequences of political incorrectness and argue that this form of information manipulation can be beneficial under some conditions

does insider trading raise market volatility this paper studies the role of insider trading in explaining cross country differences in stock market volatility it introduces a new measure of insider trading the central finding is that countries with more prevalent insider trading have more volatile stock markets even after one controls for liquidity maturity of the market and the volatility of the underlying fundamentals volatility of real output and of monetary and fiscal policies moreover the effect of insider trading is quantitatively significant when compared with the effect of economic fundamentals

a monopolistic market for information abstract we analyze a model where traders buy information from a monopolistic seller which is subsequently used in a speculative market in order to overcome the dilution in the value of information due to its leakage through informative prices the seller of information may prefer to sell noisier versions of the information he actually has moreover to obtain higher profits it is desirable for the seller to sell different signals to different traders so that the added noise realizations do not affect equilibrium prices one way of doing so which does not require discrimination is to sell identically distributed personalized signals to each of a large number of traders

peddling influence through intermediaries a sender may communicate with a decision maker through intermediaries in this model an objective sender and intermediary pass on information truthfully while biased ones favor a particular agenda but also have reputational concerns i show that the biased sender and the biased intermediary s reporting truthfulness are strategic complements the biased sender is less likely to use an intermediary than an objective sender if his reputational concerns are low but more likely to do so if his reputational concerns are moderate moreover the biased sender may be more likely to use an intermediary perceived to be more biased

neglected risks the psychology of financial crises sometimes referred to as mit shocks e g caballero and simsek 2013 are consistent with rational expectations in that investors recognize that there is a small chance that the shock might occur but they are harder to reconcile with the reinhart rogoff 2009 observation that crises are not that unusual the 2008 financial crisis in the united states has deepened the challenge by bringing up direct evidence that investors underestimated the risk of a crisis coval jurek and stafford 2009 show that investors underestimated the probability of mortgage defaults in pricing mortgage backed securities foote gerardi and willen 2012 find that investors did not even contemplate the magnitude of home price declines that actually materialized rather than being considered unlikely the risks appear to have been entirely neglected we need a theory of beliefs consistent with sharp underestimates of the odds of a crisis in this paper we present a psychological theory of the neglect of risk and financial crises the theory seeks to explain precisely why the probability estimates of a crisis in a boom are too low offering a foundation of unanticipated shocks and of zero probabilities attached to some states of the world by investors gennaioli shleifer and vishny 2012 our theory yields boom bust financial crises based entirely on beliefs we do not incorporate into the model any economic mechanisms that amplify the shocks such as fire

cheap talk and burned money we augment the standard crawford sobel 1982 econometrica 50 1431 1451 model of cheap talk communication by allowing the informed party to use both costless and costly messages the issues on which we focus are the consequences for cheap talk signaling of the option to burn money and the circumstances under which both cheap talk and burned money are used to signal information

timing decisions in organizations communication and authority in a dynamic environment this paper develops a theory of how organizations make timing decisions we consider a problem where an uninformed principal decides when to exercise an option and interacts with an informed but biased agent this problem is common examples include headquarters deciding when to close a plant drill an oil well or launch a product because time is irreversible the direction of the agent s bias is crucial for communication and allocation of authority when the agent favors late exercise centralized decision making where the principal retains authority and communicates with the agent often features full information revelation but ine cient delay delegation is never optimal in this case in contrast when the agent favors early exercise communication under centralized decision making is partial while option exercise is unbiased or delayed delegation is optimal if the bias is small or delegation can be timed thus delegating decisions such as plant closures is never optimal while delegating decisions such as product launches may be optimal

competence implies credibility the credibility of monetary policy under discretion has been traditionally linked to the central bank s conservatism we show that another trait of the central bank cb her competence at doing her job or reputation thereof can be just as important to make her policy credible and transparent we analyze a static barro and gordon 1983 s game where the effects of monetary policy depend on an unknown state of the economy the cb forms her own private and imprecise view of this state that she may announce to p in a cheap talk game to explain and motivate her policy intentions the precision of the noise in the cb s view measures her competence the more accurate her assessment the clearer an idea she has about what to do the fineness of the equilibrium message space measures monetary policy s transparency in any equilibrium of the cheap talk game the cb credibly announces one of finite inflation targets that differ by at least a multiple of the inflation bias competence ratio if this ratio is too large the cb can credibly communicate only the direction of monetary policy as the cb s competence rises and this ratio falls p knows that the cb puts increasing weight on pursuing her objective targets relative to surprising expectations to stimulate output therefore the equilibrium message space becomes finer a more competent cb is also less likely to erroneously observe extreme realizations of the shocks so she is more able tofine tune expectations at times of business as usual

the role of social capital in financial development to identify the effect of social capital on financial development we exploit social capital differences within italy in high social capital areas households are more likely to use checks invest less in cash and more in stock have higher access to institutional credit and make less use of informal credit the effect of social capital is stronger where legal enforcement is weaker and among less educated people these results are not driven by omitted environmental variables since we show that the behavior of movers is still affected by the level of social capital of the province where they were born

a model of reputation in cheap talk building on sobel 1985 we study a dynamic game of advice where the sender s preferences are unknown to the receiver the novel feature of the model is that there is more than one type of biased sender our main result is that the more equal are the proportions of different biases in the sender population the more information can credibly be transmitted somewhat surprisingly however we also find that the receiver does not benefit from this equality we discuss our results in the context of political lobbying and show that institutions that increase transparency lower lobbyists incentives for truthtelling but unambiguously promote the policymaker s welfare

gambling reputation repeated bargaining with outside options we study the role of incomplete information and outside options in determining bargaining postures and surplus division in repeated bargaining between a long run player and a sequence of short run players the outside option is not only a disagreement point but reveals information privately held by the long run player in equilibrium the uninformed short run players offers do not always respond to changes in reputation and the informed long run player s payoffs are discontinuous the long run player invokes inefficient random outside options repeatedly to build reputation to a level where the subsequent short run players succumb to his extraction of a larger payoff but he also runs the risk of losing reputation and relinquishing bargaining power we investigate equilibrium properties when the discount factor goes to 1 and when the informativeness of outside options diffuses in both cases bargaining outcomes become more inefficient and the limit reputation building probabilities are interior publication abstract

internal control system earnings quality and the dynamics of financial reporting using an earnings management model in which managers manipulate information when the firm s control system fails i introduce a measure of earnings quality based on the notion of integral precision that has solid theoretical foundations a trade off between the frequency and the magnitude of overstatements is shown overstatements are larger when misreporting is less likely overall the model generates a distribution of earnings announcements similar to its empirical analogue and provides a structural method to identify the likelihood and magnitude of misreporting by exploiting information from the moments of the distribution of reported earnings

markets for information of inefficient firewalls and efficient monopolies in this paper we study market environments where information is costly to acquire and is also useful to potential competitors agents may sell or buy reports over the information acquired and choose their trades in the market on the basis of what they learnt reports are unverifiable cheap talk messages hence the quality of the information transmitted depends on the conflicts of interest faced by the senders we find that when information has a prevalent horizontal differentiation component in equilibrium information is acquired when its costs are not too high and in that case it is also sold though reports are typically noisy the market for information is in most cases a monopoly and there is underinvestment in information acquisition we also show that regulatory interventions in the form of firewalls only make the inefficiency worse efficiency can be attained with a monopolist selling differentiated information provided entry is blocked

testing the nairu model for the united states this paper tests using u s data the dynamics implied by the nairu view of the relationship between inflation and the unemployment rate the results are somewhat sensitive to the measure of inflation used but they generally reject the dynamics an alternative way of thinking about the relationship between inflation and the unemployment rate is suggested

asset markets with insider trading disclosure rule and reselling constraint an experimental analysis abstract we investigate the impact of compulsory insider trading disclosure and its combination with a mandatory holding rule on price predictability and asset mispricing we modify the dynamic price adjustment model to account for insiders private information our results show that insiders produce weakly characterized price signals that induce a less than proportional price adjustment to the changes in the dividend value in both markets with disclosure rule and holding requirement in comparison with unregulated markets a shift in insiders strategies from information motivated to liquidity motivated trading appears to fuel the impairment of price predictability in regulated markets the exacerbation of asset mispricing in markets with holding restriction is characterized by a growth in the speculative transactions and loss making trading proposals

disappearance of reputations in two sided incomplete information games abstract this paper examines the sustainability of reputations in a class of games with imperfect public monitoring and two long lived players both of whom have private information about their own type and uncertainty over the types of the other player this class namely reputation games with one sided moral hazard can capture economic interactions that may involve hidden information or hidden action extending the techniques of cripps et al 2004 it is found that neither player can sustain a reputation permanently for playing a noncredible behavior in these games and the reputations disappear uniformly across all nash equilibria

bequests as signals an explanation for the equal division puzzle in the united states more than two thirds of decedents with multichild families divide their estates exactly equally among their children in contrast gifts given before death are usually unequal these findings challenge the validity of existing theories regarding the determination of intergenerational transfers in this paper we develop a theory that accounts for this puzzle based on the notion that the division of bequests provides a signal about a parent s altruistic preferences the theory can also explain the norm of unigeniture which prevails in other societies

language meaning and games a model of communication coordination and evolution language is a powerful coordination device we generalize the cheap talk approach to pre play communication by way of introducing a meaning cor respondence between messages and actions and by postulating two axioms met by natural languages players have a lexicographic preference second to material payoffs against deviating from the meaning correspondence under two sided communication in generic and symmetric n 3 n coordination games a nash equilibrium component in such a lexicographic communication game is evolutionarily stable if and only if it results in the unique pareto efficient out come of the underlying game we extend the analysis to one sided communica tion in arbitrary finite two player games jel c72 c73 z 3

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

an introduction to applicable game theory this paper offers an introduction to game theory for applied economists i try to give simple definitions and intuitive examples of the basic kinds of games and their solution concepts there are four kinds of games static or dynamic and complete or incomplete information complete information means there is no private information the corresponding solution concepts are nash equilibrium in static games of complete information backwards induction or subgame perfect nash equilibrium in dynamic games of complete information bayesian nash equilibrium in static games with incomplete information and perfect bayesian or sequential equilibrium in dynamic games with incomplete information the main theme of the paper is that these solution concepts are closely linked as we consider progressively richer games we progressively strengthen the solution concept to rule out implausible equilibria in the richer games that would survive if we applied solution concepts available for simpler games in each case the stronger solution concept differs from the weaker concept only for the richer games not for the simpler games

the costs of price stability downward nominal wage rigidity in europe in most european countries the prevailing terms of employment including the nominal wage can be changed only by mutual consent this legal feature gives workers a strategic advantage in wage negotiations when employers push for a nominal wage cut the upshot is a long run trade off between inflation and unemployment for low levels of inflation in spite of all agents being rational and with no expectational errors specifically downward nominal wage rigidity and excess unemployment at zero inflation are related to three factors the coverage of collective agreements the legal framework at contract renewal and the strictness of the employment protection legislation for non union workers

incentives through consumer learning about tastes we consider a long lived firm that faces an infinite sequence of finitely lived consumers in each period the firm can exert either high or low effort which is the firm s private information when consumers learn about the firm s talent from the outcomes of previous transactions there exists no equilibrium in which the firm always exerts high effort however when consumers learn about their own tastes such an equilibrium can exist consumer learning about tastes therefore is an alternative to reputational concerns that produces stable incentives we discuss the implications of this mechanism for advertising advertising content and consumer education

information transmission when the sender s preferences are uncertain abstract in deciding on the magnitude of a certain action say investment a decision maker relies on the report of an informed and interested expert who can suppress favorable information the main departure from the related literature is that the decision maker is uncertain as to whether the expert is of a type that wants to minimize the magnitude of the action or to maximize it the unique equilibrium outcome is fully characterized by a threshold level of favorable information if the information is more favorable than that threshold level and if the expert is of the type that wants to maximize the magnitude of the action the information is fully revealed in all other cases the expert report less favorable information and the equilibrium inference is that in expectation the actual information is just as favorable as the threshold level

insider trading in a rational expectations economy it is often argued that efficiency considerations require society to freely permit insider trading in this article an opposing efficiency argument is formalized the model incorporates an investment stage followed by a trading stage if outsiders expect insiders to take advantage of them in trading outsiders will reduce their investment the insiders loss from this diminished investor confidence may more than offset their trading gains consequently a prohibition on insider trading may effect a pareto improvement insiders are made better off if they can precommit not to trade on their privileged information govemment regulation accomplishes exactly this jel 022 026 313 the traditional rationale articulated for insider trading regulation and other securities law is that such rules promote confidence in markets indeed president franklin d roosevelt justified the first major u s securities legislation by saying it should give impetus to honest dealing in securities and thereby bring back public confidence similar language is still invoked half a century later in connection with enforcement efforts against insider trading and in proposals for tightened stock

bubbles and persuasion with uncertainty over market sentiment abstract recent empirical studies suggest that during times of unexpected innovation agents heterogeneously update their beliefs about an asset fundamental value and are uncertain of other agents beliefs about it in this paper i show that when there is uncertainty over the market sentiment defined as other investors beliefs about an asset fundamental value market manipulation can act through a previously unconsidered channel by misleading agents learning on the market sentiment this novel type of market manipulation could strengthen existing financial bubbles or even give rise to new ones

media capture in a democracy the role of wealth concentration abstract since objective news coverage is vital to democracy captured media can seriously distort collective decisions the current paper develops a voting model where citizens are uncertain about the welfare effects induced by alternative policy options and derive information about those effects from the mass media the media might however secretly collude with interest groups in order to influence the public opinion in the case of voting over the level of a productivity enhancing public bad it is shown that an increase in the concentration of firm ownership makes the occurrence of media bias more likely although media bias is not always welfare worsening conditions for it to raise welfare are restrictive

career concerns of mutual fund managers we examine the labor market for mutual fund managers using data from 1992 1994 we find that termination is more performance sensitive for younger managers we identify possible implicit incentives created by the termination performance relationship the shape of the termination performance relationship may give younger managers an incentive to avoid unsystematic risk direct effects of portfolio composition may also give younger managers an incentive to herd into popular sectors consistent with these incentives we find that younger managers hold less unsystematic risk and have more conventional portfolios promotion incentives and market responses to managerial turnover are also studied

stock price manipulation it is generally agreed that speculators can make profits from insider trading or from the release of false information both forms of stock price manipulation have now been made illegal in this article the authors ask whether it is possible to make profits from a different kind of manipulation in which an uninformed speculator simply buys and sells shares they show that in a rational expectations framework where all agents maximize expected utility it is possible for an uninformed manipulator to make a profit provided investors attach a positive probability to the manipulator being an informed trader article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

quality disclosure and certification theory and practice this essay reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on quality disclosure and certification after comparing quality disclosure with other quality assurance mechanisms and describing a brief history of quality disclosure we address two sets of theoretical issues first why don t sellers voluntarily disclose through a process of unraveling and given the lack of unraveling is it desirable to mandate seller disclosure second when we rely on certifiers to act as the intermediary of quality disclosure do certifiers necessarily report unbiased and accurate information we further review empirical evidence on these issues with a particular focus on healthcare education and finance the empirical review covers quality measurement the effect of third party disclosure on consumer choice and seller behavior as well as the economics of certifiers jel d18 k32 l15 m31

stock recommendation of an analyst who trades on own account this paper analyzes how to provide information acquisition and truthful reporting incentives to a financial analyst who privately trades on own account the analysis exploits the observation that for a given report the analyst s reward scheme essentially provides him with a portfolio endowment traded in the market for every signal the analyst makes the report that corresponds to the portfolio endowment with maximum market value given security prices the principal cannot make the analyst strictly prefer to report the true signal the analyst is truthful only when indifferent between the two reports the analyst s information acquisition incentive is driven only by private portfolio considerations he acquires information only if he will be holding a large enough position in the stock he covers the paper also presents a general separation of the optimal report from private information result and illustrates that performance based reward schemes can fail to induce any information revelation when the analyst privately trades

information acquisition and reputation dynamics we study dynamic incentives and behaviour in markets with costly discovery of past transactions in our model a sequence of short lived customers interact over time with a single long lived firm that privately knows its type good or opportunistic customers must pay to observe the firm s past behaviour we characterize the equilibrium structure that features accumulation consumption and restoration of reputation the opportunistic firm deliberately builds its reputation up to a point where the maximum periods of information acquired by customers do not reveal past opportunistic behaviour and exploits the customers who most trust the firm copyright 2011 oxford university press

price and advertising signals of product quality we present a signaling model based on ideas of phillip nelson in which both the introductory price and the level of directly uninformative advertising or other dissipative marketing expenditures are choice variables and may be used as signals for the initially unobservable quality of a newly introduced experience good repeat purchases play a crucial role in our model a second focus of the paper is on illustrating an approach to refining the set of equilibria in signalling games with multiple potential signals

when second opinions hurt a model of expert advice under career concerns we augment the standard career concerns model by introducing i an action that blocks the information about the true state of the world and ii a second opinion interim news after the initial consultation with the expert in this model the principal s action as well as the expert s message endogenously determine the observability of the states and consequently the assessment of the expert s ability by the principal we show that having access to better interim news could reduce the welfare of the principal due to its strategic effect on the expert s recommendation we also discuss the implication of the results for possible delegation of decision making to another person with different decision parameters

ratings shopping and asset complexity a theory of ratings inflation abstract many identify inflated credit ratings as one contributor to the recent financial market turmoil we develop an equilibrium model of the market for ratings and use it to examine possible origins of and cures for ratings inflation in the model asset issuers can shop for ratings observe multiple ratings and disclose only the most favorable before auctioning their assets when assets are simple agencies ratings are similar and the incentive to ratings shop is low when assets are sufficiently complex ratings differ enough that an incentive to shop emerges thus an increase in the complexity of recently issued securities could create a systematic bias in disclosed ratings despite the fact that each ratings agency produces an unbiased estimate of the asset s true quality increasing competition among agencies would only worsen this problem switching to an investor initiated ratings system alleviates the bias but could collapse the market for information

optimal contracts under costly state falsification we examine an exchange economy with two agents one risk neutral with a certain endowment and a second risk averse with a random endowment the realization of the endowment is public but can be falsified by the second agent at a cost for a broad class of falsification cost functions the optimal no falsification contract is noncontingent on a left hand interval and strictly increasing with a slope strictly less than one on a right hand interval under a mild further restriction optimal no falsification contracts are in addition piece wise linear optimal contracts may in general require falsifying the state but for a set of the highest endowment realizations there is no falsification we find simple conditions under which the optimal contract is a no falsification contract the model has applications that include financial insurance and employment contracts and tax policy

conflicts of interest information provision and competition in the financial services industry abstract in some markets sellers have better information than buyers over which products best serve a buyer s needs depending on the market structure this may lead to conflicts of interest in the provision of information by sellers this paper studies this issue in the market for financial services the analysis presents a new model of competition between banks where price competition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation we also compare conflicts of interest in two different firm structures specialized banking and one stop banking

the front men of wall street the role of cdo collateral managers in the cdo boom and bust i study the incentives of the collateral managers who selected securities for abs cdos securitizations that figured prominently in the financial crisis specialized managers without other businesses that could suffer negative reputational consequences invested in low quality securities underwritten by the cdo s arranger these securities performed significantly worse than observationally similar securities managers investing in these securities were rewarded with additional collateral management assignments diversified managers who did assemble cdos suffered negative reputational consequences during the crisis institutional investors withdrew from their mutual funds overall the results are consistent with a quid pro quo between collateral managers and cdo underwriters this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

credit rating industry a helicopter tour of stylized facts and recent theories the recent subprime crisis and the ongoing euro zone crisis have generated an enormous interest in the credit rating industry not only among economists but also among average citizens as a consequence we have seen an explosion of the economic literature on the industry the objective of this survey is to introduce readers to the key stylized facts of the credit rating industry and to the recent theoretical economic literature on this industry

public trust and government betrayal abstract this study presents a simple model of government reputation in which government type cannot be directly observed by households with the variation that government type rather than being permanent follows an exogenous markov process this formulation captures three characteristics of bad policy outcomes governments which betray public trust do so erratically public trust is regained only gradually after a betrayal and governments with recent betrayals betray with higher probability than other governments

competitive bluffing an examination of a common practice and its relationship with performance bluffing a common and consequential form of competitive behavior has been comparably ignored in the management literature even though misleading one s rivals is suggested to be an advantageous skill in a multifaceted and highly competitive environment to address this deficiency and advance scholarship on competitive dynamics our study investigates the moral reasoning behind competitive bluffing and using a simulated market entry game examines the performance effects of bluffing findings suggest that decision makers views on the ethicality of bluffing competitors differ from their beliefs on the ethicality of misleading other organizational stakeholders analysis also indicates that decision makers who view competitor bluffing as more ethical less unethical are more willing to engage in competitive bluffing finally while bluffing is often thought to be an effective business practice results show that in the context of repeated interaction bluffing is not conducive to high levels of performance and in fact can have undesirable consequences

manipulation and the allocational role of prices it is commonly believed that prices in secondary financial markets play an important allocational role because they contain information that facilitates the efficient allocation of resources this paper identifies a limitation inherent in this role of prices it shows that the presence of a feedback effect from the financial market to the real value of a firm creates an incentive for an uninformed trader to sell the firm s stock when this happens the informativeness of the stock price decreases and the beneficial allocational role of the financial market weakens the trader profits from this trading strategy partly because his trading distorts the firm s investment we therefore refer to this strategy as manipulation we show that trading without information is profitable only with sell orders driving a wedge between the allocational implications of buyer and seller initiated speculation and providing justification for restrictions on short sales

information percolation momentum and reversal abstract we propose a joint theory of time series momentum and reversal based on a rational expectations model we show that a necessary condition for momentum to arise in this framework is that information flows at an increasing rate we focus on word of mouth communication as a mechanism that enforces this condition and generates short term momentum and long term reversal investors with heterogeneous trading strategies contrarian and momentum traders coexist in the marketplace although a significant proportion of investors are momentum traders momentum is not completely eliminated word of mouth communication spreads rumors and generates price run ups and reversals our theoretical predictions are in line with empirical findings

cheap talk in the classroom how biased grading at school explains gender differences in achievements career choices and wages in this paper i provide a theoretical explanation for the gender differences in education and on the labour market that are observed empirically in most oecd organisation for economic cooperation and development countries including the us within a cheap talk model of grading i show that biased grading in schools results in 1 boys outperforming girls in maths and sciences 2 boys having more top and more bottom achievers in maths and sciences than girls 3 girls outperforming boys in reading literacy 4 female graduates enrolling in university studies more often than male graduates 5 the predominance of female students in arts and humanities at the university 6 the predominance of male students in maths and sciences at the university and 7 the gender wage gap on the labour market for the highly educated copyright 2009 wiley blackwell

private equity returns and disclosure around the world to obtain more funds from the institutional investors private equity pe fund managers may report inflated valuations of private investee companies that are not yet sold however such overvaluations may result in a reputational cost when those investments are realized using evidence from 39 countries we show that there are significant systematic biases in managers reporting of fund performance we find that these biases depend on the accounting and legal environment in a country and on proxies for the degree of information asymmetry between institutional investors and pe fund managers

new like new or very good reputation and credibility we show that sellers may earn reputation for their ability to deliver high quality goods on average by honestly announcing the realised quality of items for sale every period as the expected revenue stream from continuing with honest communication increases with their ability high ability sellers remain honest while low ability sellers find it too costly and sometimes lie about quality for short term gain thus cheap talk communication facilitates the market s learning of a seller s ability and strengthens reputation effects we study this new reputation mechanism and the induced market dynamics first when sellers cannot restart with a new identity and then when they can we extend the analysis to various other situations such as voluntary refund and moral hazard

strategic communication with lying costs i study a model of strategic communication between an uninformed receiver and an informed but upwardly biased sender the sender bears a cost of lying or more broadly of misrepresenting his private information the main results show that inflated language naturally arises in this environment where the sender almost always claims to be of a higher type than he would with complete information regardless of the intensity of lying cost there is incomplete separation with some pooling on the highest messages the degree of language inflation and how much information is revealed depend upon the intensity of lying cost the analysis delivers a framework to span a class of cheap talk and verifiable disclosure games unifying the polar predictions they make under large conflicts of interest i use the model to discuss how the degree of manipulability of information can affect the trade off between delegation and communication copyright 2009 wiley blackwell

using privileged information to manipulate markets insiders gurus and credibility access to private information is shown to generate both the incentives and the ability to manipulate asset markets through strategically distorted announcements the fact that privileged information is noisy interferes with the public s attempts to learn whether such announcements are honest it allows opportunistic individuals to manipulate prices repeatedly without ever being fully found out this leads us to extend sobel s 1985 model of strategic communication to the case of noisy private signals our results show that when truthfulness is not easily verifiable restrictions on trading by insiders may be needed to preserve the integrity of information embodied in prices

information reliability and welfare a theory of coarse credit ratings abstract an enduring puzzle is why credit rating agencies cras use a few categories to describe credit qualities lying in a continuum even when ratings coarseness reduces welfare we model a cheap talk game in which a cra assigns positive weights to the divergent goals of issuing firms and investors the cra wishes to inflate ratings but prefers an unbiased rating to one whose inflation exceeds a threshold ratings coarseness arises in equilibrium to preclude excessive rating inflation we show that competition among cras can increase ratings coarseness we also examine the welfare implications of regulatory initiatives

lying for strategic advantage rational and boundedly rational misrepresentation of intentions starting from hendricks and mcafee s 2000 example of the allies decision to feint at calais and attack at normandy on d day this paper models misrepresentation of intentions to competitors or enemies allowing for the possibility of bounded strategic rationality and rational players responses to it yields a sensible account of lying via costless noiseless messages in many cases the model has generically unique pure strategy sequential equilibria in which rational players exploit boundedly rational players but are not themselves fooled in others the model has generically essentially unique mixed strategy sequential equilibria in which rational players strategies protect all players from exploitation