the collateral channel how real estate shocks affect corporate investment abstract what is the impact of real estate prices on corporate investment in the presence of financing frictions firms use pledgeable assets as collateral to finance new projects through this collateral channel shocks to the value of real estate can have a large impact on aggregate investment to compute the sensitivity of investment to collateral value we use local variations in real estate prices as shocks to the collateral value of firms that own real estate over the 1993 2007 period the representative us corporation invests 0 06 out of each 1 of collateral jel d22 g31 r30

labor force participation interest rate shocks and unemployment dynamics in emerging economies abstract emerging economies emes have highly volatile unemployment and real wages standard models with interest rate shocks can generate higher unemployment volatility but still fall quantitatively short of matching the empirical volatility of unemployment a small open economy search model with endogenous participation and self employment a feature of emes generates 90 percent of the volatility of unemployment in the data highly volatile wages and quantitatively consistent cyclical aggregate dynamics amid productivity and interest rate shocks of plausible magnitudes endogenous participation amplifies shocks and plays a critical role in overcoming a key limitation of standard search models for emes

the hold up problem in government contracting a two period procurement model is considered in an incomplete contract framework in contrast to o hart and j moore 1988 the welfare maximizing government as the buyer is able to accomplish ex ante optimal contracts which guarantee first best specific investments of both buyer and seller these contracts are precisely characterized regardless of the underlying supports of cost and benefit distributions renegotiation inevitably occurs in some states of nature this renegotiation always increases the ex ante fixed trade price hence the empirical observation of soft budget constraints in government contracting can be rationalized furthermore in accordance with common beliefs the seller s rents accrue only at the production stage copyright 1996 by the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

knowledge accumulation within an organization in this article we consider a knowledge accumulation problem within an organization that cannot prevent the worker from quitting and using the knowledge outside the organization we show that knowledge accumulation is delayed the fraction of working time allocated to knowledge creation is highest at the early career stage falls gradually then rises again before falling finally toward zero we determine the effect of a change in the severity of the enforcement problem or the specificity of knowledge we also discuss the form of the optimal life cycle wage profiles the role of the initial knowledge level and the role of discounting

differential awareness ambiguity and incomplete contracts a model of contractual disputes we focus on aspects of differential awareness that give rise to contractual disputes parties to a contract are boundedly rational as the state space available to them is coarser than the complete state space hence they may disagree as to which state of the world has occurred and therefore as to what actions are required by the contract such disagreement leads to disputes we show that the agents may prefer simpler less ambiguous contracts when facing potential disputes

investor valuation of the abandonment option abstract we investigate whether investors price the option to abandon a firm at its exit value theory prices this real option as an american put with both a stochastic strike price exit value and a stochastic value of the underlying security the value of cash flows the empirical implications are that firm value increases in exit value after controlling for expected going concern cash flows and that more generalizable assets produce more abandonment option value using discounted earnings forecasts to proxy for expected cash flows and prior literature to categorize asset generalizability we find strong support for the predictions of abandonment option theory

simple contracts renegotiation under asymmetric information and the hold up problem abstract in this article it is demonstrated that voluntary bargaining over a collective decision under asymmetric information may well lead to ex post efficiency if the default decision is non trivial it is argued that the default decision may be interpreted as a simple contract that the parties have written ex ante this result is used in order to show that simple unconditional contracts which are renegotiated may allow the hold up problem to be solved even if the parties valuations are private information

contractual solutions to the hold up problem this paper considers a general version of the hold up problem where n agents first make relation specific investments and then must agree on some collective action it is shown that first best solutions exist under a variety of different assumptions about the nature of information asymmetries

two remarks on the property rights literature we first point out that the recent property rights literature is based on three assumptions 1 that contracts are always subject to renegotiation 2 that the exercise of a property right confers a private benefit and 3 that parties are risk neutral building on hart moore 1999 we provide conditions under which an optimal contract consists of nothing more than an assignment of property rights we also examine the robustness of some of the literature s standard predictions about asset ownership to the introduction of mechanisms for eliciting parties ex post willingness to pay for the assets such as options or financial markets to illustrate the issue we revisit the hart moore 1990 proposition that joint ownership is suboptimal and argue that ownership by a single party is dominated by joint ownership with put options

unforeseen contingencies and incomplete contracts we scrutinize the conceptual framework commonly used in the incomplete contract literature this literature usually assumes that contractual incompleteness is due to the transaction costs of describing or of even foreseeing the possible states of nature in advance we argue however that such transaction costs need not interfere with optimal contracting i e transaction costs need not be relevant provided that agents can probabilistically forecast their possible future payoffs even if other aspects of the state of the nature cannot be forecast in other words all that is required for optimality is that agents be able to perform dynamic programming an assumption always invoked by the incomplete contract literature the foregoing optimality result holds very generally provided that parties can commit themselves not to renegotiate moreover we point out that renegotiation may be hard to reconcile with a framework that otherwise presumes perfect rationality however even if renegotiation is allowed the result still remains valid provided that parties are risk averse

securitized markets international capital flows and global welfare we study the effect of collateralized lending and securitization on the global supply of securitized assets welfare and international net and gross capital flows in a two country general equilibrium model with idiosyncratic investment risk the financial sectors in the two countries home and foreign differ by the collateral requirement for investment loans with home requiring lower margins in autarky home endogenously supplies more assets and enables more risk sharing upon financial integration capital flows from foreign to home leading to lower interest rates and an increase in the global supply of assets foreign enjoys substantial welfare gains through better risk sharing and portfolio reallocation while the welfare experience for home is ambiguous gross capital flows arise when agents face aggregate shocks to the expected payoff to investment projects but can collapse when shocks concern the variance of returns

organizational design and technology choice under intrafirm bargaining comment the authors consider a wide number of applications of an intrafirm bargaining game within organizations where employees and the firm engage in wage negotiations under their presumption that contracts cannot bind employees to the organization the resulting stable wage and profit profiles give rise to an objective function for the firm that places weight on inframarginal profits in an economically significant manner the authors in turn employ this methodology to explore applications of organizational design hiring and capital decisions training and cross training the importance of labor and asset specificity managerial hierarchies preferences for unionization responses to competition and internal capital budgeting copyright 1996 by american economic association

efficient informal trade theory and experimental evidence from the cape town taxi market informal sectors in developing countries are often thought of as responses to rigid and cumbersome market regulations in this paper i study informal trade as a first best outcome in the model i propose rigid regulations can be necessary to achieve efficiency even though they are always sidestepped the key assumption is that the regulations define the trading parties fall back position in case the informal bargaining process breaks down i set up a field experiment to test the model s mechanisms in the cape town market for metered taxis consistent with the model i find that sidestepping the regulations increase cost efficiency taxis take the shortest route the price is however unaffected suggesting informal bargaining leads to a pareto improvement

quasi experimental evidence on the effect of aircraft noise on apartment rents inferring the implicit price of an environmental good hinges on ceteris paribus conditions that are often hard to justify this paper uses an unexpected change in flight regulations as source of exogenous variation and identifies aircraft noise effects from price adjustments in the market for rental apartments controlling for spatial and apartment heterogeneity we find that aircraft noise reduces apartment rents by about 0 5 per decibel our results indicate i that noise discounts are overestimated in cross sectional studies because aircraft noise tends to be negatively correlated with omitted neighborhood and housing amenities and ii that noise effects are unlikely to be constant over the entire noise range

does hazardous waste matter evidence from the housing market and the superfund program this paper uses the housing market to develop estimates of the local welfare impacts of superfund sponsored cleanups of hazardous waste sites we show that if consumers value the cleanups then the hedonic model predicts that they will lead to increases in local housing prices and new home construction as well as the migration of individuals that place a high value on environmental quality to the areas near the improved sites we compare housing market outcomes in the areas surrounding the first 400 hazardous waste sites chosen for superfund cleanups to the areas surrounding the 290 sites that narrowly missed qualifying for these cleanups we find that superfund cleanups are associated with economically small and statistically insignificant changes in residential property values property rental rates housing supply total population and types of individuals living near the sites these findings are robust to a series of specification checks including the application of a regression discontinuity design based on knowledge of the selection rule overall the preferred estimates suggest that the local benefits of superfund cleanups are small and appear to be substantially lower than the 43 million mean cost of superfund cleanups

ambiguity aversion and incompleteness of financial markets it is widely thought that incomes risks can be shared by trading in financial assets but financial assets typically carry some risk idiosyncratic to them hence disposing incomes risk using financial assets will involve buying into the inherent idiosyncratic risk however standard theory argues that diversification would reduce the inconvenience of idiosyncratic risk to arbitrarily low levels this argument is less robust than what standard theory leads us to believe ambiguity aversion can exacerbate the tension between the two kinds of risks to the point that classes of agents may not want to trade some financial assets thus theoretically the effect of ambiguity aversion on financial markets is to make the risk sharing opportunities offered by financial markets less complete than it would be otherwise

is there a paradox of pledgeability abstract we show that in the limited commitment framework of donaldson et al 2019 firm value always increases in the fraction of cash flows that can be pledged as collateral that is pledgeability increases investment efficiency and relaxes a firm s financing constraint we derive this conclusion using the same contracts considered by the authors and generalize the result to an arbitrary number of states we also show that the first best can always be implemented by a nonstate contingent secured debt contract which differs from the ones they consider

a matter of interpretation ambiguous contracts and liquidated damages we consider the optimality of liquidated damages contracts in a setting of contractual ambiguity and potential for disputes we show that when parties are ambiguity averse enough they will optimally choose liquidated damages contracts and sacrifice risk sharing opportunities

airport expansions and property values the case of chicago o hare airport abstract the paper adds to the empirical literature by providing up to date estimates of the effect of airport noise on property values around one of the world s busiest airports chicago o hare the results indicate that home values were about 9 lower within a 65 db noise contour band of o hare in 1997 opponents of airport expansions argue that increased noise will reduce property values and lower tax bases the results of this paper suggest that aircraft are becoming so much quieter that the airport can be expanded without causing a drop in local property values or tax bases estimates suggest that house prices may rise by as much as 284 6 million in the densely populated area around o hare after a new runway is added to the airport

repossession and the democratization of credit we exploit a 2004 credit reform in brazil that simplified the sale of repossessed cars used as collateral for auto loans we show that the reform expanded credit to riskier self employed borrowers who purchased newer more expensive cars the legal change has led to larger loans with lower spreads and longer maturities although the credit reform improved riskier borrowers access to credit it also led to increased incidences of delinquency and default our results shed light on the consequences of a credit reform and highlight the crucial role that collateral and repossession play in the liberalization and democratization of credit

valuing rail access using transport innovations this paper uses a powerful empirical method to evaluate the benefits of rail access to consumers we study the effects on house prices of a transport innovation that altered the distance to the nearest station for some households but left others unaffected the transport innovation we study is the construction of new stations in london in the late 1990s using this innovation we implement a quasi experimental approach that allows us to avoid the biases inherent in cross sectional valuation work our evidence on distance station effects on local prices identified through distance changes induced by the transport innovation suggests that households value rail access and that these valuations are large compared to the valuations of other local amenities

depreciation of housing capital maintenance and house price inflation estimates from a repeat sales model abstract the rate at which physical capital depreciates is fundamental to investment in the economy nevertheless although housing capital accounts for one third of the total capital stock the rate at which housing capital depreciates has only rarely been directly estimated in part because prior studies do not control for maintenance for that same reason widely publicized measures of house price appreciation overstate the capital gain from homeownership using data from the american housing survey we examine these issues over the 1983 to 2001 period results indicate that gross of maintenance housing depreciates at roughly 2 5 percent per year while net of maintenance housing depreciates at approximately 2 percent per year moreover although the typical home appreciated at an annual real rate of roughly 0 75 percent after allowing for depreciation and maintenance the average homeowner experienced little capital gain

the paradox of pledgeability abstract we develop a model in which collateral serves to protect creditors from the claims of other creditors we find that paradoxically borrowers rely most on collateral when pledgeability is high this is when taking on new debt is easy which dilutes existing creditors creditors thus require collateral for protection against possible dilution by collateralized debt there is a collateral rat race but collateralized borrowing has a cost it encumbers assets constraining future borrowing and investment there is a collateral overhang our results suggest that policies aimed at increasing the supply of collateral can backfire triggering an inefficient collateral rat race likewise upholding the absolute priority of secured debt can exacerbate the rat race

ex post renegotiation proof mechanism design we study what kind of equilibria of which mechanisms are ex post renegotiation proof eprp i e robust against the possibility of ex post renegotiation under a variety of renegotiation procedures and which social choice functions are eprp implementable in complete information environments with two agents only budget balanced groves allocations are eprp implementable while with three or more agents all ex post efficient allocations are in environments with independent private values essentially only the budget balanced groves in expectations allocations are eprp implementable while with three or more agents and correlated beliefs all ex post efficient allocations are

hedonic valuation of the perceived risks of nuclear power plants we use the 2011 fukushima accident to evaluate the impact of the perceived risks of nuclear power plants on apartment rents in switzerland using online advertisements over 12 years and a difference in differences approach we find a 2 3 price discount after the accident for apartments near nuclear power plants

procurement and renegotiation parties bound by an incomplete contract have an incentive to renegotiate after acquiring new information the issue of the parties investment in the relationship before renegotiation is analyzed in a simple two period procurement model the firm invests in the first period it then learns its production cost and the sponsor learns its value for the project williamson s underinvestment presumption is shown to hold under very general assumptions about bargaining and about the ex post asymmetry of information as long as the firm s investment is not observable by the sponsor the introduction of a cancellation fee may well lead to even less investment contrary to what is sometimes argued the role of ex ante price fixing as an alternative way to reintroduce some form of commitment and the problem of cost overruns are discussed last it is shown that if investment is observable by the sponsor andthus may become a joint decision variable the two parties may choose to under or overinvest

adverse selection and renegotiation in procurement as was shown by dewatripont optimal long term contracts are generally not sequentially optimal the parties ex post renegotiate them to their mutual advantage this paper fully characterizes the equilibrium of a simple two period procurement situation and studies the extent to which renegotiation reduces ex ante welfare i a central result is that like in the non commitment case the second period allocation is optimal for the principal conditionally on his posterior beliefs about the agent ii the first period allocation exhibits an increasing amount of pooling when the discount factor grows iii with a continuum of types it is never optimal to induce full separation the paper also analyzes whether renegotiated long term contracts yield outcomes resembling those under either unnegotiated long term contracts or a sequence of short term contracts and it links the analysis with the multiple unit durable good monopoly problem

ambiguity aversion and incompleteness of contractual form subjective uncertainty is characterized by ambiguity if the decision maker has an imprecise knowledge of the probabilities of payoff relevant events in such an instance the decision maker s beliefs are better represented by a set of probability functions than by a unique probability function an ambiguity averse decision maker adjusts his choice on the side of caution in response to his imprecise knowledge of the odds the non additive expected utility model allows a formal characterization of such behaviour using this model this paper shows that ambiguity aversion can explain the existence of incomplete contracts the setting for the demonstration is the investment hold up model which has been the focus of much of the recent research on the implications of incomplete contracts

courts and banks effects of judicial enforcement on credit markets the cost of enforcing contracts is a key determinant of market performance we document this point with reference to the credit market in a model of opportunistic debtors and inefficient courts according to the model improvements in judicial efficiency should reduce credit constraints and increase lending with an ambiguous effect on interest rates that depends on banking competition and on the type of judicial reform these predictions are supported by panel data on italian provinces in provinces with longer trials or large backlogs of pending trials credit is less widely available

contractual signaling relationship specific investment and exclusive agreements i analyze a model of hold up with asymmetric information at the contracting stage the asymmetry of information concerns the value of trade with external parties i show that contractual signaling and efficiency of investment can conflict if only quantity is contractible this conflict generates inefficient equilibria in terms of investment contracting on exclusivity in addition to quantity resolves the conflict and consequently eliminates the inefficiency of investment

complexity and renegotiation a foundation for incomplete contracts the paper considers a hold up model where only one of n future trading opportunities will prove to be efficient and where ex post renegotiation of the ex ante contract cannot be prevented as the environment becomes more complex n the outcome under any message contingent long term contract converges to that of the incomplete contracting model where trade is contractible ex post but not ex ante when trades are costly to describe both ex ante and ex post the incomplete contracting result is extended to a broader class of environments

the legal environment banks and long run economic growth this paper examines the relationship between the legal system and banlding development and traces this connection through to long run rates of per capita gdp growth capital stock growth and productivity growth the data indicate that countries where the legal system 1 emphasizes creditor rights and 2 rigorously enforces contracts have better developed banks than countries where laws do not give a high priority to creditors and where enforcement is lax furtherrnore the exogenous component of banking development the component defined by the legal environment is positively and robustly associated with per capita growth physical capital accumulation and productivity growth this paper addresses two questions first do crosscountry differences in the legal rights of creditors the efficiency of contract enforcement and the origin of the legal system explain cross country differences in the level of banking development second do better developed banks cause faster economic development that is is the component of banking development defined by the legal environment positively associated with long run rates of economic growth capital accumulation and productivity growth examining the relationship between the legal system and banking development is valuable irrespective of issues associated with long run growth first banks may influence the level of income per capita and the magnitude of cyclical fluctuations bernanke and gertler 1989 1990 second many economists stress that understanding the evolution of legal and financial systems is essential for understanding economic development north 1981 engerman and sokoloff 1996 consequently quantitative information on the relationship between the legal environment and banks will improve our understanding of business cycles and the process of economic development furthermore examining the causal links between banks and economic growth has both conceptual and policy implications on the conceptual front a long literature debates the importance of banks in economic development starting as early as bagehot 1873 economists have argued that better banks banks that are better at identifying creditworthy firms mobilizing savings pooling risks and facilitating transactions

the design of contracts and remedies for breach in the first part of this article hypothetical contracts providing for all possible uncertain contingencies are considered in the next part contracts providing for only some contingencies are examined and are shown to be advantageous due both to difficulties that could arise in making and enforcing contingent terms and to the presence of implicit substitutes for them in the following major part of the article two of these substitutes for contingent terms are analyzed remedies for breach and the opportunity for renegotiation the existence of both is demonstrated to induce parties to behave approximately as they would under detailed contracts

real options with ex post division of the surplus abstract this paper examines a real option model where two vertically related firms are involved in a specific investment project that is subject to an uncertain payoff while ex post bargaining between a seller and a buyer leads to underinvestment by the seller in a standard model where timing of the seller s investment is exogenous we show that this need not be the case when the seller s timing of investment is endogenous however bargaining with a buyer leads to excessive waiting more severe holdup and higher uncertainty will lead to vertical integration of activities to avoid timing inefficiencies

a cardinal characterization of the rubinstein safra thomson axiomatic bargaining theory in a recent paper rubinstein safra and thomson rst have provided an interesting re examination of the widely applied nash solution for a two person bargaining problem they recast the usual nash bargaining problem into a more natural setting of feasible alternatives with a disagreement outcome the two players are then described by their risk preferences defined on the set of lotteries over the alternatives and the disagreement outcome this enables them to define an ordinal nash solution in terms of the agents risk preferences essentially their ordinal solution is an outcome that is immune against possible objections freeing the definition of the nash solution from utility naturally led rst to extending its scope to non expected utility neu preferences we contend however that the family of neu preferences considered by rst is unduly restrictive the assumptions imposed on the risk preferences by rst essentially exclude any members of the rank dependent expected utility rdeu and betweenness families that can accommodate the very choice paradoxes that stimulated the development of neu theory as these are two of the most extensively analyzed and widely applied neu models in the literature this seems to cast doubt on how broad an extension to neu preferences the rst approach affords we demonstrate however that rst s analysis can be modified so that their conclusion is valid in a wider class of preferences that can include examples of rdeu preferences this class consists of preferences that admit what we term a disagreement linear representation

valuing school quality better transport and lower crime evidence from house prices housing prices within urban areas exhibit highly localized variation that cannot be explained solely by differences in the physical attributes of dwellings we consider the role of local amenities and disamenities in generating price variation within urban areas focusing on three highly policy relevant urban issues transport accessibility school quality and crime our survey of the recent empirical literature highlights what is known and what is not known on these issues and considers the relevance and reliability of this evidence for policy design and evaluation although there are serious empirical challenges we argue that research on housing values based on careful research designs can offer credible estimates of the social value of place specific attributes and amenities

the effect of power plants on local housing values and rents abstract this paper uses restricted census microdata to examine housing values and rents for neighborhoods in the united states where power plants were opened during the 1990s compared to neighborhoods with similar housing and demographic characteristics neighborhoods within 2 miles of plants experienced 3 7 decreases in housing values and rents with some evidence of larger decreases within 1 mile and for large capacity plants in addition there is evidence of taste based sorting with neighborhoods near plants associated with modest but statistically significant decreases in mean household income educational attainment and the proportion owner occupied

holdups simple contracts and information acquisition abstract in a typical procurement setup several recent papers have shown that when complete contracting is not possible simple noncontingent contracts may suffice to solve the under investment problem this paper points out that a noncontingent contract offer such as a fixed price contract may induce the seller to acquire information on the future course of costs and only to accept the offer if the cost is low it is shown that sometimes the buyer prefers to wait and buy on the spot market than to offer a long term contract when the seller rejects a contract offer or the buyer chooses not to make one the seller will not make efficient investments because he expects to be held up on the spot market

enlarging the contracting space collateral menus access to credit and economic activity recent reforms across eastern european countries have given more flexibility and information to parties to engage in secured debt transactions the menu of assets legally accepted as collateral was enlarged to include movable assets e g machinery and equipment generalized difference in differences tests show that firms operating more movable assets borrowed more as a result those firms also invested more hired more and became more efficient and profitable following the changes in the contracting environment the financial deepening we document triggered important reallocation effects firms affected by the reforms increased their share of fixed assets and employment in the economy

efficient reliance and damage measures for breach of contract this article considers a situation where the buyer or the seller of a good must engage in expenditures on specific capital before the exchange either to prepare to use the product or to prepare to sell it it is assumed that postbreach bargaining is possible and carried out in a cooperative fashion and that buyers and sellers form expectations about the outcome of such bargaining in a specific way without enforceable contracts the potential appropriability of specific rents results in inefficiently low levels of investment three damage measures commonly used to enforce contracts are shown to produce inefficiently high levels of investment and to be pareto ranked from best to worst as follows specific performance expectation damages and reliance damages

investments and bargaining in a model with positive consumption externalities abstract this paper analyzes the investment decisions of the members of a committee when a subsequent bargaining process determines the distribution of a divisible good among them the shares allocated to investing agents generate positive consumption externalities we show that agents investments improve their bargaining position this induces rent seeking behavior that generates a negative external effect on other investing agents in this setting the effects of rent seeking counterbalance the effects of positive consumption externalities so that equilibria may be efficient or display either over or under investment

renegotiation proof implementation and time preferences this paper explores how the requirement that the implementation of contracts be renegotiation proof affects the set of contracts that can be implemented in a seller buyer scenario in which the information regarding the agents valuations is nonverifiable this paper explicitly adds a time dimension to an implementa tion problem and introduces a natural criterion of renegotiation proofness for the case of time consuming renegotiation the main insight gained is that the addition of the time dimension enlarges significantly the set of contracts that can be implemented in a renegotiation proof manner jel c70 d23 this paper explores how the requirement that the implementation of contracts be renegotiation proof affects the set of con tracts that can be implemented in a seller buyer scenario in which the informa tion regarding the agents valuations is non verifiable the paper s main contributions are that first it explicitly adds a time di mension to an implementation problem and second it introduces a natural criterion of renegotiation proofness for the case of time consuming renegotiation for concreteness the discussion will be conducted in the context of the following example there are two agents a seller and a buyer who sign a contract for the sale of one unit in the future their valuations for the unit denoted by s and b respectively are not known when they sign the contract they become known to both parties after the contract is signed and before it is imple mented thus when it comes to implement ing the contract the parties information is complete but it is assumed to be nonverifi able i e not observable to third parties such as a court 1 when they sign the con tract the parties want to specify for any possible realization of the valuations s b whether or not there will be trade and the price p s b at which it will take place the contract describes the procedure that will be followed after the valuations are real ized the purpose of this procedure is to make sure that the original intentions of the parties are indeed carried out the idea is that the steps laid out in the contract are independent of s b and hence are en forceable by a third party or by a social convention in game theoretic terms a contract specifies a game form that imple ments the function p in the sense that for all s and b p s b is the resulting game s unique subgame perfect equilibrium out come in the context of this scenario we shall investigate the set of price functions p s b that can be so implemented by a contract and examine how this set is affected by the requirement that the contract be renegotia

estimates of the impact of crime risk on property values from megan s laws abstract we estimate the willingness to pay for reductions in crime risk using the location and move in dates of sex offenders we find significant effects of sex offenders locations that are geographically localized house prices within 0 1 miles of a sex offender fall by 4 percent on average we then use this finding to estimate the costs to victims of sexual offenses and find costs of over 1 million per victim far greater than previous estimates however we cannot reject the alternative hypotheses that individuals overestimate risks posed by offenders or that living near an offender poses significant costs exclusive of crime risk jel k42 r23 r31

the right of first offer abstract this paper examines the right of first offer which requires a seller to bargain with the contracted buyer before subsequent buyers arrive the contract also prevents the seller from selling his unique asset to subsequent buyers at a price below what he offers to the contracted buyer the right of first offer makes the seller less aggressive in bargaining with the contracted buyer who is privately informed about his valuation such a contract can reduce inter temporal misallocation in which a subsequent buyer gets the asset when the contracted buyer has higher valuation but it also may cause misallocation in which the contracted buyer gets the asset when subsequent buyers have higher valuations overall whether the right of first offer can increase the joint surplus for the seller and the contracted buyer as well as social welfare depends on the contracted buyer s renegotiation power and the distribution of the buyers valuations this paper also discusses the differences between the right of first offer and the most favored customer clause

the mirrlees approach to mechanism design with renegotiation with applications to hold up and risk sharing the paper studies the implementation problem first analyzed by maskin and moore 1999 in which two agents observe an unverifiable state of nature and may renegotiate inefficient outcomes following play of the mechanism we develop a first order approach to characterizing the set of implementable utility mappings in this problem paralleling mirrlees s 1971 first order analysis of standard mechanism design problems we use this characterization to study optimal contracting in hold up and risk sharing models in particular we examine when the contracting parties can optimally restrict attention to simple contracts such as noncontingent contracts and option contracts where only one agent sends a message

ease vs noise long run changes in the value of transport dis amenities for a complete cost benefit analysis of durable infrastructures it is important to understand how the value of non market goods such as transit time and environmental quality changes as incomes rise in the long run we use difference in differences and spatial differencing to estimate the land price capitalization effects of metro rail in berlin germany today and a century ago over this period the negative implicit hedonic price of rail noise tripled our results imply income elasticities of the value of noise reduction and transport access of 2 2 and 1 4 substantially exceeding cross sectional contingent valuation estimates

optimal information transmission in a holdup problem this article examines the optimal contract in a bilateral trade model with unobservable relationship specific investment and renegotiation in such a setting a contract plays an additional role that it does not have in the standard holdup model namely that of transmitting information between the parties the article shows that a partial disclosure contract may be optimal and describes the optimal contract if the investment is cooperative and the information between the trading parties is asymmetric the optimal contract generally cannot result in the first best but dispensing with either of these assumptions makes the first best achievable

do liquidation values affect financial contracts evidence from commercial loan contracts and zoning regulation we examine the impact of asset liquidation value on debt contracting using a unique set of commercial property loan contracts we employ commercial zoning regulation to capture the flexibility of a property s permitted uses as a measure of an asset s redeployability or value in its next best use within a census tract more redeployable assets receive larger loans with longer maturities and durations lower interest rates and fewer creditors controlling for the property s type sale price and earnings to price ratio these results are consistent with incomplete contracting and transaction cost theories of liquidation value and financial structure

incomplete contracts specific investments and risk sharing an optimal contract design problem is considered contracts which are incomplete and simple are used to investigate the extent to which constrained revisions can mitigate inefficiencies resulting from contractual incompleteness an optimal contract is characterized in two cases first when a contract is being used to facilitate trade between two risk neutral parties who must make relationship specific investments it is possible to implement the first best by a simple contract second when a contract is being used to share risk it is generally not possible to implement the first best when one party is risk neutral however it is possible to implement the first best by assigning all the ex post decision rights to that party

sunk costs and the inefficiency of relationship specific investment it is well known that relationship specific investment will be inefficient when the parties are unable to write binding long term contracts in this note i exploit some of the recent developments in strategic bargaining theory in order to explore the relationship between the degree of inefficiency in the level of such relationship specific investment and the degree of sunkness in the cost of investment one result obtained is that the underinvestment result is not sensitive to the degree of sunkness in the cost of investment another result is that each player may actually overinvest when the cost of investment is not sunk

the economic effects of a borrower bailout evidence from an emerging market this paper studies the credit market implications and real effects of one the largest borrower bailout programs in history enacted by the government of india against the backdrop of the 2008 2009 financial crisis the study finds that the stimulus program had no effect on productivity wages or consumption but led to significant changes in credit allocation and an increase in defaults post program loan performance declines faster in districts with greater exposure to the program an effect that is not driven by greater risk taking of banks loan defaults become significantly more sensitive to the electoral cycle after the program suggesting the anticipation of future credit market interventions as an important channel through which moral hazard in loan repayment is intensified

does the source of capital affect capital structure prior work on leverage implicitly assumes capital availability depends solely on firm characteristics however market frictions that make capital structure relevant may also be associated with a firm s source of capital examining this intuition we find firms that have access to the public bond markets as measured by having a debt rating have significantly more leverage although firms with a rating are fundamentally different these differences do not explain our findings even after controlling for firm characteristics that determine observed capital structure and instrumenting for the possible endogeneity of having a rating firms with access have 35 more debt copyright 2006 oxford university press

expectation damages divisible contracts and bilateral investment this paper examines the efficiency of expectation damages as a breach remedy in a bilateral trade setting with renegotiation and relationship specific investment by the buyer and the seller as demonstrated by edlin and reichelstein 1996 no contract that specifies only a fixed quantity and a fixed per unit price can induce efficient investment if marginal cost is constant and deterministic we show that this result does not extend to more general payoff functions if both parties face the risk of breaching the first best becomes attainable with a simple price quantity contract

strategic ex ante contracts rent extraction and opportunity costs this article cosiders the possibility that a seller can contract with one uninformed buyer prior to an auction involving two potential buyers the seller s optimal strategic ex ante contract more accurately reflects joint opportunity costs of the seller and the contracted buyer and therefore extracts more rent from the entrant moreover this ex ante contract mitigates the seller s ex post rent seeking vis a vis the contracted buyer accordingly it may create more social welfare than the absence of ex ante contracts depending upon the contracted buyer s financial constraint and the distributions of trade surplus implementation of the optimal strategic ex ante contract and policy implications are discussed

noise versus access the impact of an airport in an urban property market the effects of a major airport are unlikely to exhibit a uniform spatial distribution the benefits to industries and individual households may extend well beyond the local economy whereas many of the costs are spatially concentrated in the immediate environment in particular the problems of noise and traffic generation can be expected to fall principally upon adjacent populations this paper addresses the general question of whether the costs to local economies of airport proximity which are in the nature of externalities outweigh the benefits of access employment and improved infrastructure based on data relating to manchester airport and its surrounding areas the specific approach adopted in the paper involves an investigation of the extent to which such proximity effects are capitalised into residential property prices our results provide some evidence to suggest that circumstances may exist where positive attributes such as improved access and employment opportunities may be more highly va

homevoters vs leasevoters a spatial analysis of airport effects we use a public referendum on a new aviation concept in berlin germany as a natural experiment to analyze how the interaction of tenure and capitalization effects influences the outcome of direct democracy processes we distinguish between homevoters i e voters who are homeowners and leasevoters i e voters who lease their homes we expect that homevoters would be more likely to support initiatives that positively affect the amenity value of a neighborhood because some of the related benefits of leasevoters are neutralized by adjustments in market rents likewise homevoters would be more likely to oppose initiatives that negatively affect the amenity value of a neighborhood our empirical results are consistent with these expectations implying that public votes on local public goods do not necessarily reflect the spatial distribution of welfare effects in mixed tenure environments