estimating the tax advantage of corporate debt this paper presents estimates of the effective tax value of incremental interest deductions for corporations taking into account that they may not be able to utilize all their interest deductions fully because of either insufficient taxable income or the availability of nondebt tax shields after describing particular features of the tax code which may drive a wedge between statutory and effective tax rates for debt finance we present estimates using the treasury corporate tax model of effective tax rates for a variety of industry groupings our estimates suggest that the after tax cost of debt varies widely across industries the magnitude of the effective tax advantage to debt finance has important implications for corporate financial behavior one issue which has been examined extensively in the corporate finance literature is whether the value of the firm is affected by the firm s leverage ratio in a recent contribution deangelo and masulis 3 have shown that financing decisions can affect the value of the firm if the effective tax advantage to debt finance varies among firms or is reduced by the presence of nondebt tax shields such as investment tax credits and depreciation deductions the effective tax advantage to debt is also an important determinant of leverage related costs gordon and malkiel 5 have recently used the statutory tax rate to estimate expected bankruptcy costs induced by the corporate tax when the firm is assumed to balance the marginal tax advantage to debt with marginal expected bankruptcy costs if however the effective tax rate for interest deductions falls short of the statutory rate the magnitude of these costs may be overstated this paper presents detailed estimates of the marginal effective tax advantage to debt finance our estimates based on data in the treasury 1978 corporate master statistical file and on simulations done with the treasury corporate tax model quantify the impact of increasing interest deductions without changing other items on the corporation s income statement 1 we simulate the impact of a change in a firm s capital structure holding its investment and production decisions constant this is an appropriate procedure for estimating the marginal

estimates of effective marginal tax rates on factor incomes this chapter describes a method of calculating summary measures of effective factor income tax rates in the united states using readily available data the numbers resulting from application of this method in a study are reported in the chapter and some of their possible uses are discussed the estimated factor income tax rates behave over time in a manner quite consistent with the behavior of other broad measures of federal tax policy the postwar movement in the tax rate on income from labor relative to that on income from capital or more accurately the relevant components of these tax rates provides suggestive support for the miller scholes hypothesis that the federal personal income tax has been moving in the direction of a pure consumption tax the tax rates reported in the chapter are consistent with other studies that show a decrease since the 1950s in rates of taxation at the corporate level of income from corporate held capital they are also consistent with the view that rates of taxation of such income at the noncorporate level have risen but not quite sufficiently to offset the decline in the corporate tax burden

taxation and the allocation of risk inside the multinational firm abstract this paper provides the first theoretical and empirical analysis of how taxation shapes the joint allocation of risk and profits inside the multinational firm theoretically we identify three mechanisms through which corporate taxes may shape the within firm allocation of risk 1 transfer pricing rules requiring risk to be compensated with higher expected returns create incentives to shift risk to low tax jurisdictions as a means to shift profits 2 risk averse owners create incentives to allocate risk to high tax affiliates to maximize risk sharing with governments 3 limited loss offset creates incentives to shift risk to affiliates in other countries empirically we show that multinational firms disproportionately allocate risk to low tax countries and that the key mechanism is the nexus between risk and profits established by transfer pricing rules within firm differences in risk explain a significant fraction of the well established correlation between profits and tax rates suggesting that risk shifting is a quantitatively non negligible channel for profit shifting

some nonlinear tax effects on asset values and investment decisions under uncertainty abstract tax system nonlinearities are often ignored but with uncertainty may have important implications for the magnitude and direction of tax effects this paper studies a particular nonlinear tax rule the policy subsidizes asset values but may discourage some investments and encourage earlier shutdown of some projects the marginal effective tax rate varies with project risk furthermore a corporate cash flow tax can encourage investment due to interactions with the nonlinear policy the paper also presents a general statement of the stochastic equilibrium valuation method which can be used to analyze other nonlinear taxes numerical examples demonstrate computational feasibility

tax adjusted discount rates this paper develops models for discount rates that are adjusted for the interest tax shields of an infra marginal firm in a general tax equilibrium where there is cross sectional variation in corporate tax rates under the assumption that the firm optimally maintains a predetermined debt ratio a tax adjusted riskless discount rate model is given for valuing certainty equivalents and a tax and risk adjusted discount rate model is given for valuing expected cash flows for the latter case the asset equity debt and tax shield betas are derived and a weighted average cost of capital interpretation is given the tax adjusted capm apt security market lines for expected returns in stock and bond markets both have the same slope but different intercepts a formula is also provided for the present value of the interest tax shield when the firm optimally maintains a predetermined debt level the analysis here also differs from the existing literature in the following respects it allows for cross sectional variation in corporate tax rates and personal tax rates it shows that the market values of risky and riskless interest tax shields differ only to the extent that tax laws provide for nonlinear taxation of gains and losses it also shows that interest tax shields should be discounted at a tax adjusted discount rate that reflects the fact that they accrue to equity investors rather than debt investors continuous time simplifications of the formulas in this paper and the previous literature are also given

the effects of tax convexity on default and investment decisions the objective of this article is to examine how default and investment triggers change under different levels of tax asymmetry when firms face nonlinear tax schedules under a convex tax schedule profits are taxed at a higher rate while losses are taxed or rebated at a lower rate thus reducing the risk shared by the government this article presents a dynamic model based on the contingent claims framework to explore the impacts of tax convexity on the triggers and we find that the impacts vary significantly depending on several countervailing forces tax convexity has a nonmonotonic relationship with both the default and investment triggers because of the government s risk sharing role the default trigger is higher when tax convexity increases while the growth option exerts a counteracting effect that lowers this trigger creating an ambiguity in the investment trigger when changing the level of tax asymmetry

the importance of reporting conventions for the theory of corporate taxation abstract this paper shows that for the analysis of a tax policy it is important to be explicit about the reporting convention to which a corporation tax is required or allowed to adhere the paper shows that the corporation tax cannot be used to alter capital formation under uniform reporting a convention required by the majority of the oecd countries this tax is however a more useful policy tool in those oecd countries that have created the privilege of separate reporting fiscal depreciation makes the marginal valuation of equity differ from the marginal valuation of capital use of tax allowances directed to investment stimulus operates rather differently under the two reporting conventions

a median voter model of social security this paper presents a theoretical median voter analysis of the determination of the level of social security the framework for the analysis is a continuous time overlapping generations model with nonaltruistic households facing borrowing constraints in the capital market a majority voting equilibrium is shown to exist in which the median voter is liquidity constrained the desired level of social security for each voter is a declining function of the preexisting level of social security as a consequence in a sequence of votes on social security beginning with a zero level the program initially overshoots its steady state value copyright 1989 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the welfare effects of balance of payments reform a macro micro simulation of the cost of rent seeking this article proposes a methodology for analysing the effect of balance of payments liberalisation on measures of poverty and distribution and applies it to the case of jamaica in the 1990s the methodology consists of a macro micro simulation in which a cge model provides labour market outcomes which in turn are used to manipulate the sectoral allocation of employment to generate the income distribution consistent with the new labour market outcome in the application to jamaica we find that the reallocation of resources away from rent seeking activities in the presence of exchange controls is significant and has large macroeconomic effects opening up of the current account has little effect on poverty but liberalisation of the capital account reduces poverty especially amongst the very poor neither policy change taken separately nor the combination of the two has more than a negligible effect on the distribution of income

irreversible investment and endogenous financing abstract we evaluate the effects of corporate taxation on firms investment and financing choices we focus on how the asymmetry of the corporate tax imperfect loss carry overs endogenous financing with credit constraints and different degrees of investment irreversibility affect both incremental investment and entry decisions we find that as long as capital can be financed with debt at the margin the tax distortions on the marginal investment decision are small this is particularly so if the technology is flexible in contrast the tax distortions on the entry decision are substantial the ability of firms to carry over their losses and choose their financial structure endogenously are important for reducing both types of distortions

the significance of tax law asymmetries an empirical investigation this study uses tax return data for u s nonfinancial corporations for the period 1971 1982 to estimate the importance of restrictions on the ability of firms to use tax credits and to obtain refunds for tax losses our results suggest that the incidence of such unused tax benefits increased substantially during the early 1980s though we do not find these increases attributable to increased investment incentives during that period we present estimates of the marginal tax rate on interest payments which take into account unused tax benefits and emphasize the importance of distinguishing current tax payments from marginal tax rates in estimating the incentive to invest

bankruptcy risk and optimal capital structure this study finds shortcomings in empirical tests of the capital structure irrelevance hypothesis the alternative hypothesis is that firms choose value maximizing mixes of debt and equity on account of bankruptcy costs and the tax deductibility of interest payments based upon the cross sectional implications of the tax shelter bankruptcy cost hypothesis an alternative test of the irrelevance hypothesis is performed the test examines the relationship between failure rates and leverage ratios for 36 lines of business the results are inconsistent with the irrelevance hypothesis in their landmark paper modigliani and miller 26 demonstrate that under certain assumptions the market value of a firm is independent of its capital structure these assumptions include the absence of taxes transactions costs and bankruptcy costs recently miller 24 has argued that the introduction of corporate and personal taxes does not alter the capital structure irrelevance result in the absence of bankruptcy costs 1 the inclusion of bankruptcy costs generally considered in conjunction with the tax deductibility of interest payments has led others to conclude that capital structure will affect the value of the firm 2 in this case value maximizing firms may choose optimal capital structures consisting of both debt and equity there have been numerous attempts to discriminate empirically between the miller irrelevance mi hypothesis and the tax shelter bankruptcy cost ts bc hypothesis several are discussed in section i of this paper there it is argued that studies attempting to measure directly the effect of changes in capital structure on firm values are subject to serious complications and are unable to discriminate between the mi and ts bc hypotheses other studies focus on cross sectional implications of the mi and ts bc hypotheses the cross sectional tests are based on the assertion that bankruptcy costs may tend to induce firms with greater business risk to include less debt in their capital structures whereas the mi hypothesis does not predict such a relationship unfortunately the existence of positive bankruptcy costs is not sufficient to ensure that the ts bc hypothesis will predict the inverse relation

social security and retirement decision a positive and normative approach social insurance for the elderly is judged responsible for the widely observed trend towards early retirement in a world of laissez faire or in a first best setting there would be no such trend however when first best instruments are not available because health and productivity are not observable the optimal social insurance policy may imply a distortion on the retirement decision the main point we make is that while there is no doubt that retirement systems induce an excessive bias towards early in many countries a complete elimination of this bias i e a switch to an actuarially fair system is not the right answer this is so and for two reasons first some distortions are secondbest optimal this is the normative argument second and on the positive side the elimination of the bias might be problematic from a political perspective depending on the political process it may either not be feasible or alternatively it may tend to undermine the political support for the pension system itself

a positive theory of environmental quality regulation this paper demonstrates that environmental quality regulation may enhance producer wealth while simultaneously reducing an externality problem by restricting access to common property regulation not only corrects a resource misallocation but it creates a scarcity rent as well in the recent history of environmental quality the common access problem has been addressed by federal and state agencies through a standards based approach rather than through the enforcement of tradable property rights as a consequence rents from the right to use these assets have accrued to producers the data are convincing that there is a strong interplay between producers consumers and the victims of pollution each party has some influence on the outcome and one sided analysis neglects many important aspects of regulation environmental quality regulation is complicated but many of the observed perplexities are consistent with a rent seeking self interest theory of government 46 references 1 figure 7 tables

strategic responses a survey experiment on opposition to pension reforms the responses given in opinion polls on future policy reforms reflect both subjective expectations and preferences we disentangle these factors using data from a controlled survey experiment conducted in germany at the time of the experiment an increased retirement age had been proposed as part of a pension reform thus the survey respondents faced an incentive to give biased responses by understating their expected work ability at the age of retirement they could make the increase of the retirement age a less attractive policy option we find evidence for such strategic response behavior and this strategic bias appears to be stronger in former communist east germany

the structure and incentive effects of corporate tax liabilities this paper describes situations in which tax liabilities assume the form of a negative position in a call option this structure motivates an examination of the investment decisions of taxed corporations in the presence of risk it is shown that the structure of the tax liability creates an incentive to underinvest in more risky projects and an incentive for conglomerate merger these effects are then evaluated in the presence of conflicts of interest between stockholders and bondholders and under alternative assumptions about the tax code and about the timing of investment and financing decisions this paper makes an observation regarding the functional form assumed by the tax liabilities of corporations with potentially redundant deductions and evaluates its consequences for investment incentives interest and other deductions against taxable income can be taken for the most part only to the extent of that income in a single period model this gives the net tax liability a familiar structure it can be viewed as a call option where the exercise price on the call is the allowable deductions the tax paying entity holds a positive position in the assets which generate the taxable income and a negative position in a call option on those assets the analogy between options and the structure of tax liabilities calls attention to some interesting incentive effects concerning risk using their model of option valuation black and scholes 5 showed that the value of an option is increasing in the variance of the asset it is written on other authors have generalized this result and studied its implications for corporate financing see jagannathan 16 jensen and meckling 17 and green 15 the importance of the risk attributes of the underlying asset in option valuation suggests that taxation may have important incentive consequences for investment decisions involving risk it has been recognized in the public economics literature for some time that asymmetries in the tax schedule can affect risk taking behavior early papers by mossin 20 and stiglitz 25 studied individual portfolio decisions over a riskless and a risky asset our analysis differs from these in a number of respects the most important of these is our use of market valuation rather than expected utility in the decision maker s objective function this is surely a more appropri

a model of capital structure when earnings are mean reverting a multiperiod model of optimal capital structure is developed under the assumption that earnings follow an autoregressive process firm value and leverage vary through time and at each date the firm achieves an optimal debt level that is a function of the full state contingent debt policy the reversion parameter of the earnings series is shown to be positively related to various measures of variability and negatively related to leverage if earnings processes are not homogeneous across firms then standard earnings risk measures in capital structure studies do not adequately represent crosssectional differences in variability in firm value

how big is the debt overhang problem abstract i re examine the debt overhang problem where the flexible investment level rather than the irreversible decision whether or not to operate is used to measure the underinvestment caused by debt financing i measure a large overhang cost with long term debt or short term debt as is standard underinvestment with long term debt is more severe when investment opportunities are poor and is mitigated as opportunities improve in contrast underinvestment with short term debt remains significant even when investment opportunities are good firms lever up as opportunities improve to take advantage of tax shields so that equity claimants still face the incentive to underinvest

the cyclical and secular behaviour of the labour input comparing efficiency units and hours worked summary a monthly labour input series designed to correct for the fact that all hours worked are not of the same quality is constructed and its properties compared with unadjusted hours worked this efficiency units series is constructed from bls data on hours worked and earnings by age and sex the cyclical fluctuations displayed by the efficiency units series are smaller on average than those displayed by hours worked although the difference is not large however the secular behaviour of the series is quite different hours worked per capita displays a significant positive trend while efficiency units per capita does not

optimal capital structure a multi period programming model for use in financial planning abstract this paper describes a multi period chance constrained mathematical programming model to compute for each period the firm s optimal debt to equity ratio and the optimal maturity distribution of its debt the model assumes that the firm s objective is to maximize total value of the firm and that the firm operates in a world of uncertainty with corporate income taxes and bankruptcy costs finally the actual coupon rate paid by the firm which is commensurate to the risk of default is endogenously determined by the model

intradaily price volume adjustments of nyse stocks to unexpected earnings the speed and path of adjustment in stocks to the degree of earnings surprise in their quarterly announcements are studied using price volume transactions data a differential price adjustment process was observed with stocks having large positive earnings surprises experiencing a faster adjustment compared with those stocks with negative earnings surprises volume transaction frequency and size were found to be directly related to the absolute degree of surprise but very favorable earnings surprise stocks experienced initially a large number of smaller trades while stocks with large unfavorable earnings surprises had relatively fewer transactions but higher volume per trade the stock market s microstructure has received increasing attention from researchers especially from an empirical perspective as transaction data on prices and volume have become more readily available 1 an important subset of this research has been the study of stock price adjustments to significant news events specifically publicly announced information with economic content should be quickly reflected in prices in an unbiased manner this paper contains a study of the intradaily adjustment in stocks to the informational content of earnings reports using price changes trading volume and transaction frequency and size we examine the transaction to transaction and time series stock behavior associated with different degrees of earnings surprise embedded in earnings announcements the degree of surprise is measured by a comparison of actual with forecasted earnings for 325 new york stock exchange nyse firms these firms are subdivided into five earnings surprise categories in order to determine whether the speed and path of their price volume adjustment processes are different one question of interest is whether the adjustment process for favorable versus unfavorable earnings surprises is similar or different another is whether any adjustment is distinguished by a few large trades or a large number of smaller

can tax convexity be ignored in corporate financing decisions abstract the standard modeling practice in corporate finance has been to assume a linear tax schedule this paper extends the structural contingent claim model of corporate finance to incorporate a more realistic convex tax schedule it is shown that tax convexity raises the optimal default boundary and thus increases the likelihood of default and also reduces the optimal leverage ratio while the former effect seems insignificant in general the effect of tax convexity on the optimal leverage ratio can be quantitatively significant we conclude that tax convexity should not be ignored in corporate financing decisions and theoretical models should use a convex tax schedule instead of a linear one thus the short answer to the question in the title is no

a little fairness may induce a lot of redistribution in democracy we use a model of self centered inequality aversion suggested by fehr and schmidt 1999 to study voting on redistribution we theoretically identify two classes of conditions when an empirically plausible amount of fairness preferences induces redistribution through referenda we test the predictions of the adapted inequality aversion model in a simple redistribution experiment and flnd that it predicts voting outcomes far better than the standard model of voting assuming rationality and strict self interest

corporation tax asymmetries and investment evidence from uk panel data theoretical work has emphasised the potentially powerful impact of corporation tax asymmetries on investment behaviour but empirical work has mainly been confined to the measurement of effective tax rates this paper uses panel data from 597 u k companies to ask are tax asymmetries important to understanding observed investment behaviour an optimising investment model is developed and estimated both as a q equation and a euler equation in which the cost of capital appears careful modelling of asymmetries does not noticeably improve the empirical performance of these equations possible explanations are discussed

leasing taxes and the cost of capital abstract a model of firm financial and investment behaviour when there is a possibility of tax exhaustion is used to analyse the incentives for firms to act as lessees or lessors and the determination of the equilibrium rental rate in the leasing market a number of results emerge which are relevant for public policy it is shown that i leasing may diminish aggregate investment by comparison with the situation when it does not occur ii rents are likely to be earned on leasing activities and iii a purely tax induced positive relationship exists between aggregate investment and corporate profits

asymmetnc taxation and the theory of the competitive firm under uncertainty this paper examines the implications of the asymmetries in the tax treatment of corporate profits and losses for the theory of the competitive firm under uncertainty it is shown that the tax asymmetry introduces a curvature into the firm s target function which affects its behaviour in the short run in long run industry equilibrium however most of the effects disappear at the firm level but still remain at the industry level

miller s irrelevance mechanism a note this note attempts to clarify miller s 12 capital structure irrelevance mechanism using a geometric edgeworth box diagrams presentation such an exercise is useful because miller s proposition is founded on analytically complex equilibrium arguments that tend to mask the intuition and logic behind his result since miller s original discussion unnecessarily assumed a zero tax on equity income and since miller did not prove his clientele effects rigorously we also focus our attention on the deangelo and masulis 8 9 henceforth d m generalization of the miller model the d m framework is also important because it assumes a proportional tax code as we shall see whether the tax code is proportional or progressive is an important factor in understanding miller s proposition

government debt and private leverage an extension of the miller theorem abstract this paper shows how government financing decisions can influence the corporate decision to use debt or equity finance in particular it is shown that an increase in the stock of taxable government debt reduces the equilibrium quantity of corporate debt and that an increase in the stock of tax free government debt reduces the equilibrium quantity of corporate equity the effects of inflation rate and tax rate changes are also considered

corporate financial policy with personal and institutional investors abstract in this paper we present a simple general equilibrium model of the portfolio behavior of households and institutions paying particular attention to the influence of differences in tax rates and attitudes toward risk under the plausible assumptions that households are more risk averse than institutions and possess a greater relative tax preference for equity versus debt we are able to characterize the equilibria which may result when debt is subject to bankruptcy risk

corporate tax holidays and investments governments of developing countries commonly adopt tax holidays to encourage investment this article evaluates the incentives provided by company income tax holidays and explains the importance of the timing of depreciation allowances in determining the effective tax rates and the cost of capital to firms considering additional investment during the holiday if an asset is long lived and depreciation allowances for tax purposes are accelerated the tax holiday by preventing depreciation deductions during the periods of peak profits may actually penalize a company for investing during the holiday the closer the investment to the end of the holiday period the more severe the penalty if instead depreciation allowances may be deferred until after the holiday this program of incentives is quite generous to the firm how these sharply contrasting results may emerge is illustrated through estimation of effective tax rates and user costs of capital under tax holiday systems in bangladesh cote d ivoire malaysia morocco and thailand

an empirical estimate of corporate tax refundability and effective tax rates the provisions of generous tax incentives during the 1970s and the recession of the early 1980s led to a marked increase in the number of nontaxable corporations in canada during the 1977 to 1982 period over 40 percent of investment was done by corporations that were rarely taxable 30 percent by corporations that were normally taxable and the balance undertaken by corporations that were taxable about half the time 1 the degree to which taxable losses can be used to shelter other forms of taxable income has important implications with regard to the study of effective tax rates on capital income this paper attempts to quantify the impact of imperfect loss offsetting or refundability on industry effective tax rate measurements section ii of this note provides an estimate of the extent to which tax losses are written off current or future taxable income in a present value sense refundability is measured by discounting the estimated proportion of a taxable loss written off by companies through carryback and carryforward provisions section iii uses the refundability measures to estimate effective tax rates on canadian firms by industry three cases are compared i the taxpaying firm this firm expects to use all deductions and credits immediately ii the nontaxpaying firm this firm expects to be nontaxpaying with probability 1 in the period in which new investment is undertaken marginal tax losses on new investment are used up slowly over time

the rationality of u s regulation of the broadcast spectrum in his classic 1983 technologies of freedom ithiel de sola pool so elucidated the prevailing wisdom concerning broadcast licensure in the united states while the key legal questions surrounding this institution involve important first amendment questions hence pool s scarcity analogy to paper ink and presses economists and other policy analysts have often remarked on the more general incongruity in federal licensing while spectrum is regulated on the physical scarcity premise it is awarded to private users on a no fee basis thus conferring significant economic rents on private parties at substantial opportunity cost to the fisc moreover federal communications commission fcc 2 policies have openly sought virtually throughout the agency s entire life span to restrict broadcast licenses and competition for broadcasters particularly cable television to far below the quantity technically available 3 the

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

taxes investment and q this paper attempts to provide a unified analysis of the effects of taxation on the equilibrium value of marginal q under alternative financial policies it is shown that the q approach does not avoid all the specification problems associated with analyses based on the cost of capital the theoretically and empirically crucial relationship between average and marginal q is also examined and it is shown that under uk and us tax rules the possibility of winding up precludes persistent undervaluation in equilibrium there have now been a considerable number of empirical studies of investment behaviour based on some variant of tobin s q defined as the ratio of the firm s market value to the value of its capital stock see for instance jenkinson 1981 oulton 1981 poterba and summers 1981 summers 1981 and von furstenberg 1977 the q approach is seen as having the empirical advantage compared in particular with the more traditional approach based on the cost of capital of allowing expectations to be brought directly into the study of investment behaviour by relying on asset prices to digest all relevant expectations and reflect them in observable data an immediate difficulty however is that whilst the incentive to invest is related to the effect on shareholder wealth at the margin and hence to marginal q only the value of average q is directly observable the consequent difficulty of implementation is not however considered here see bailey and scarth 1980 and hayashi 1982 for discussion of conditions under which marginal q can be inferred from average q rather this paper is concerned with the prior question of how personal and corporate taxation affects the equilibrium value of marginal q for there has as yet been no systematic analysis of the effects of taxation on the equilibrium value of marginal q comparable with the analysis of the relationship between taxation and the cost of capital in king 1974 thus auerbach 1979a b bradford 1981 and edwards and keen 1984 have all considered how taxes affect q when the marginal source of funds is either retained profit or the sale of new equity and the distinction between these two cases has also been recognized in the empirical work of poterba and summers 1983 but the important case in which debt is the marginal source has been ignored the effects on marginal q of the constraints that typically need to be imposed in modelling financial policy have also been neglected this paper attempts to fill these gaps in the literature by providing a general analysis of the relationships between taxation financial policy investment and q the paper also examines the implications of the special tax provisions that may apply in the event in the firm s ceasing operations winding up this bears upon one of the unresolved issues associated with the new view of equity finance auerbach 1983 namely the suggestion that if dividends are taxed more heavily than capital gains

the dynamic effects of tax law asymmetries under the laws of most countries a distinction is made between gains and losses by businesses losses that must be carried forward are subjept to two penalties a loss of interest and expiration previous examinations have focused on the higher expected tax payments such a tax system without full loss offset imposes on risky projects this paper presents a dynamic analysis of the impact of taxation on investment when gains and losses are treated asymmetrically the results demonstrate how firm characteristics and the timing of taxes can influence behaviour under current u s tax law a distinction is made between gains and losses by businesses for corporations gains are taxed at what is essentially a flat rate of 46 while losses do not necessarily qualify for a refund at the same rate to obtain an immediate refund the taxpayer must have had taxable income during the three previous years in excess of the current loss any losses that cannot be carried back in this fashion must be carried forward subject to two implicit penalties such loss carryforwards earn no interest and they expire after fifteen years similar provisions apply in other countries hence businesses investing in risky projects for which the probability of having to carry losses forward is positive can expect to pay higher taxes than they would under a system with full loss offset i e the immediate refund of taxes for losses incurred many corporations

the empirical measurement of rent seeking costs this survey focuses on the efforts carried out mainly by public choice scholars to measure the social cost of rent seeking the concept introduced by gordon tullock in 1967 and coined by anne krueger in 1974 is well known and accepted by the profession but its empirical measurement has fallen behind with respect to its theoretical formulation an often criticized lack in the literature although there are good general surveys none has specifically focused on reviewing the empirical efforts made to measure the phenomenon the purpose of this paper is to provide such a survey it could be said that the rent seeking concept has been fully integrated into economic jargon it is commonly used when some agent seeks to obtain an artificial transfer usually from government and covers all the actions efforts or expenses that the agent has to carry out to obtain the prize the key issue however is the possible social waste that arises in these situations the empirical efforts to measure such waste constitute the main purpose of this survey the concept of rent seeking was introduced by tullock 1967 although the term was first coined by krueger 1974 in a paper not related to the former in a recent paper tullock himself wrote of the history of the concept and the intellectual context within which it arose tullock 2003 starting with the pioneering work by harberger 1954 several studies were conducted during the 1950s in which the calculation of the social cost of monopolies and tariffs always gave the result of very modest figures the first response to these results was made by leibenstein 1966 and his x efficiency which refers to a hypothetical loss in efficiency due to the absence of competition shortly after leibenstein s paper appeared tullock argued that the deadweight costs of monopoly and tariffs understate the true social cost because the expenditures made to capture related rents have to be included so rectangles as well as harberger s triangles have to be included in the calculations let us see this argument once more figure 1 depicts the iconic tullock graphic analysis of rent seeking it represents the demand schedule d for a monopolized good where pm is the monopoly

investment incentives and corporate tax asymmetries abstract recent facts on the importance of corporate losses motivate more careful study of the impact of tax incentives for investment on firms that lose money i model firm investment decisions in a setting featuring financing constraints and carrybacks and carryforwards of operating losses i estimate investment responses to tax incentives allowing effects to vary with cash flows and taxable status results suggest that asymmetries in the corporate tax code could have made recent bonus depreciation tax incentives at most 4 less effective than they would have been if all firms were fully taxable cash flows have more important effects on the impact of tax incentives recent declines in cash flows would predict a 24 decrease in the effectiveness of bonus depreciation results thus suggest that tax incentives have the smallest impact on investment exactly when they are most likely to be put in place during downturns in economic activity when cash flows are low

on perfect rent dissipation if economists are united on anything it is the proposition that monopoly prices reduce economic welfare by preventing the realization of the maximum gains from trade in any market the extent of such distortions to efficiency are often called harberger costs after arnold harberger s 1954 provocative attempt to measure the extent of these losses in the u s economy more recent analysis has revealed that when monopoly power is achieved via regulation at least part of the monopoly rents so gained will not be simple transfers from consumers to producers but will be dissipated by producers rent seeking activity since such activity employs real resources there are additional costs to monopolization beyond the harberger costs as emphasized by gordon tullock 1967 and richard posner 1975 indeed posner and others have argued that if competition for the monopoly rents is perfect all of the expected rents from regulation will be converted to welfare losses while franklin fisher s 1985 comment has qualified this conclusion somewhat the upshot of the debate is that the rent seeking or tullock costs may greatly exceed the harberger costs 1 another recent strand of the analysis concerns the time pattern over which monopoly returns are dissipated by competition to gain and hold the monopoly right robert mccormick et al 1984 emphasize that to the extent such expenditures are sunk they are forever lost and not recoverable by deregulation while conceding the point martin cherkes et al 1986 argue that most rentseeking expenditures are recurring not sunk and therefore large gains from deregulation remain the purpose of this essay is to point out that recurring or sunk even the largest specification of the harberger and tullock costs of regulatory monopolization may fall far short of the actual welfare costs this is because the analysis concentrates on the rent seeking tullock costs and largely ignores the parallel rent defending2 tullock costs a proper assessment of such rent defending tullock costs might more than double the maximum welfare costs of regulation suggested by posner

miller s equilibrium shareholder leverage clienteles and optimal capital structure the purpose of this paper is twofold first we examine the individual portfolio decisions when income from stocks and bonds is taxed at different rates second a rationale for the existence of risky debt in the presence of leverage related costs and differential personal income taxation is provided previous studies on capital structure with differential personal income taxation have ignored either the portfolio risk consideration and or the possibility of losing personal and corporate interest tax shields due to insufficient taxable earnings e g 8 2 3 14 13 6 7 1 9 19 20 21 23 in section i of this paper both the portfolio risk consideration and the possibility of losing personal and corporate interest tax shields are explicitly introduced this enables us to provide a rationale for the shareholder leverage clientele phenomenon within a mean variance framework we also demonstrate a non corner solution for the optimal corporate capital structure in a tax environment similar to that of miller s debt and taxes 14 in sections ii and iii of this paper miller s world is further modified to include risky debt and the attendant costs we re examine and synthesize recent studies on the theory of optimal capital structure which have appeared since the publication of debt and taxes e g 4 6 7 13 19 20

some empirical evidence on rent seeking we tested for the capture of net gains by winners in rent seeking competitions using the most prominent announcements of government favors in the canadian economy over a twelve year period stockholders returns were not significantly different from zero one possible explanation is that government assists firms only when assistance creates political gains refusing to transfer economic rents to firms maximmizes the resources available to serve political purposes this kind of behavior by government officials would imply that government has market power which is consistent with several well known theories of government

the value of the tax subsidy on risky debt the effect of corporate taxes on the market value of a levered firm continues to be a central issue in recent contributions in finance theory e g miller 1977 deangelo and masulis 1980 kim 1982 modigliani 1982 in these and other studies e g krause and litzenberger 1973 scott 1976 brennan and schwartz 1978 kim 1978 the relationship between market value and capital structure is established by formulating a tax subsidy function that specifies the partial effect of debt on the expected tax savings at the corporate level under the existing u s tax code a working assumption in most of these studies is that both principal and interest are tax deductible this assumption is made in the spirit of the original modigliani and miller 1963 formulation in which debt is taken to be perpetual and riskless indeed it is well known that the tax shield provided by the deduction of principal in a singleperiod framework has the same value as the tax shield from interest deductions in the case of perpetual and riskless debt under this assumption it is shown that in the absence of non debtthis paper examines the relationship between leverage and the value of the firm when non debt related tax shields are available and the corporate tax is levied as an income tax in a previous paper de angelo and masulis argue that in the presence of nondebt related tax shields the relationship between debt and firm value is concave resulting in an interior optimal capital structure when there is a tax induced differential in the cost of corporate debt their result derives from the fact that they assume the payment of debt principal and non debt related depreciation charges are deductible however the former deduction is consistent with a wealth tax while the latter is consistent only with an income tax we show that if the interest alone is deductible the debt firm value function is convex resulting in corner solutions to the capital structure problem the authors wish to thank richard castanias richard green lemma senbet and especially an anonymous referee for helpful comments and richard green and robert dammon for computational assistance

taxation and the cost of capital the uk experience since the 1960s the uk has witnessed a series of reforms to its corporation tax system these include the creation of corporation tax as an independent tax in 1965 the gradual introduction of generous capital allowances in the early 1970s the introduction of the partial imputation system in 1973 and stock relief in 1975 and the 1984 reforms which reduced the tax rate and capital allowances and abolished stock relief a number of these reforms were designed with the specific intention of influencing company decisions regarding investment and finance through the real cost of capital

the kennedy round evidence on the regulation of international trade in the united states the purpose of this paper is to analyze and provide empirical evidence regarding the regulation of international trade flows our goal is to provide an explanation of the changes in the interindustry pattern of trade restrictions which emerged from the kennedy round of tariff negotiations the principal conclusion of the analysis is that the pattern of protection which resulted from the kennedy round was shaped to minimize the domestic political disruption resulting from liberalization industries which faced significant import threats and whose characteristics enhanced their potential political influence were able to maintain tariff protection in the face of overall liberalization the potential impact of the agreed upon tariff reductions was partially undermined by the introduction of offsetting nontariff trade barriers ntbs in addition ntbs were introduced systematically in industries that were becom

an empirical analysis of the stock price volume relationship abstract this paper investigates the empirical relationship between absolute stock price changes and trading volume in the stock market using granger causality tests we find that there is a significant causal relationship between absolute price changes and volume at the firm level and that this relationship is stronger in periods surrounding earnings announcements we view this as suggesting that information arrival follows a sequential rather than a simultaneous process although the results do not support an extreme version of either information arrival model

taxation portfolio choice and debt equity ratios a general equilibrium model this paper explores the portfolio behavior of investors differing with respect to both tax rates and risk aversion emphasizing the role of constraints on individual and firm behavior in ensuring the existence of and characterizing portfolio equilibrium under certain conditions on the securities available in the market which also are necessary for shareholders to be unanimous in supporting firm value maximization investors will be segmented by tax rate into two groups one specialized in equity and the other in debt though the relative wealths of the two groups determine the aggregate debt equity ratio each firm will be indifferent to its financial policy

corporation tax finance and the cost of capital this paper examines the influence of corporate tax exhaustion on the firm s financial and investment decisions a dynamic programming model is used to establish effective marginal tax rates in the presence of a tax system that permits the carry forward of losses to future periods the paper demonstrates that internal optimal financial structures may result which do not require the imposition of external constraints the cost of capital is highly sensitive to the current taxable earnings of the firm and the implications of this for such tax transfer activities as leasing are discussed

proxies for the corporate marginal tax rate abstract this paper focuses on how best to measure the corporate marginal tax rate which is an important input into financial analysis of the cost of capital financing policy corporate hedging and corporate reorganizations the results indicate that the simulated tax rate used by shevlin 1990 and graham 1996 although difficult to calculate is the best available proxy for the true marginal tax rate if the simulated rate is unavailable an easy to calculate trichotomous variable or the statutory marginal tax rate which captures the progressivity in the tax schedule are reasonable alternatives better than most commonly used tax variables

modelling companies debt and dividend decisions with company accounts data reliable empirical models of company financial decisions have proved hard to construct using aggregate data this paper uses company specific data drawn from the published accounts of a large sample of uk companies to estimate a model of debt and dividend decisions an attempt is made to assess the relative importance of costs of funds the tax system the balance sheet and profitability of the company and of statutory controls in determining these key financial decisions diversity of behaviour is analysed by allowing for unobserved company specific effects and by examining subsets of the full sample

taxes and firm size abstract firm size has been used as a proxy for the firm s political costs and hence managers proclivity to choose income reducing accounting procedures this study provides additional evidence on this topic by examining the association between firm size and effective corporate tax rates the latter are one component of a firm s political costs the roughly fifty largest u s exchange listed firms in particular oil and gas companies and manufacturing firms have significantly higher worldwide tax rates than other firms these higher tax rates are observed primarily after the implementation of the u s 1969 tax reform act and after the opec countries raised their tax rates on u s oil producers the findings which are insensitive to alternative sources of data alternative measures of firm size and alternative measures of effective tax rates are consistent with the use in previous studies of firm size as a proxy for the firm s political costs

the capital structure puzzle revisited corporate finance researchers have long been puzzled by low corporate debt ratios given debt s corporate tax advantage this article recognizes that firm value typically reflects a growing stream of earnings while current debt reflects a nongrowing stream of interest payments debt to value is therefore a distorted measure of corporate tax shielding even with very small debt related costs this may explain the observed magnitude and cross sectional variation of debt ratios since this variation may be independent of tax shielding debt ratios provide an inappropriate framework for empirically examining the trade off theory of capital structure article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

rentless rent seeking and abnormal returns the assumption that seekers of a monopoly privilege from government will dissipate the expected value of future related rents by costly pursuit of the privilege is frequently used though subject to a growing debate tullock has described a set of plausible circumstances where strategic bidding for a single prize leads to net gains for the rent seeking participants 2 that is even with competition for rents less than full dissipation of future gains may obtain tullock also identifies other circumstances where the process is a zeroor negative sum game if the theory of rentless rent seeking holds under any set of circumstances empirical work designed to identify wealth effects associated with a regulatory event is destined to fail indeed such empirical analysis may find no effect when in fact a regulatory restriction has occurred yet reports of empirical research on regulatory effects have supported the hypothesis that rents have been generated 3 do such empirical results implicitly support tullock s theory of efficient rent seeking are such results purely random observations of one of many discrete regulatory processes involving the same firms where the overall expected value is zero 4 or is there an explanation of such results that is consistent with full dissipation of rents and systematic observation of abnormal positive returns for shareholders of directly affected firms this article offers another explanation for observing profitable rent seeking that is compatible with tullock s observations and rent dissipation theory the next section gives the explanation that section is followed by a brief summary

the textile bill of 1985 the determinants of congressional voting patterns the following tables show the results of the probit analysis for the senate and the house a table including results for different combinations of the independent variables is included in an unpublished appendix available from the authors upon request the results of the probit analysis for the senate are shown in table 1 all the variables except exp had the expected signs however the results indicate that the two other employment variables and party affiliation are the only factors which we can say with confidence influenced a senator s decision to vote for or against this bill the coefficients reported and labeled der of prob measure the derivative of the probability of a yes vote evaluated at the means of the independent variables in question thus for example the coefficient for unemp in the top line of table 1 should be interpreted as indicating that a one percentage point increase in a state s unemployment rate will cause a 5 89 increase in the probability that the senator will vote for the bill the result for dr the party of the senator shows that in general democrats are more apt to vote for protectionist policies than are republicans this is consistant with president reagan s negative stand on the bill and his threat to veto it should it pass the amendment in question passed the senate on 24 october 1985 by a vote of 54 for to 42 against but the bill it was attached to has been postponed indefinitely the house bill which was passed on 10 october 1985 by a vote of 262 for to 159 against was vetoed by reagan on 17 december 1985 the results of the probit analysis for the house of representatives are shown in table 2 state employment data was used for the house as opposed to data for each voting district this was done for three reasons first employment data is usually reported by state or by county since counties are often divided by congressional district boundaries much personal judgement would be necessary to assign employment figures second the most recent county industry employment data is from 1981 while the data used in this analysis is from 1984 third we feel that in general logrolling is prevalent among a state s representatives for this bill the representatives from twenty six states voted as a block and in all but six states one third or less of that state s representatives voted contrary to the majority all of the probabilities are significant at the 05 confidence level representative s voting patterns are influenced by all of the included factors when unionization is added to the equation its coefficient is very small and negative although it is significant at the 05 confidence level one would expect more significance here since there are more degrees of freedom for the house analysis than for that of the senate when the data from the house and senate are pooled the results are similar to those of the house alone the null hypothesis that the data cannot be pooled was tested using a statistic with eight degrees of freedom 9 721 meaning that the null hypothesis is rejected as in the senate the state unemployment rate and the percent employed in textiles are important influences on the representative s vote and democrats in the house are more likely to vote for protectionist bills than republicans however unlike the senate the percent of a representative s campaign contributions that are donated by industry special interest groups has a significant effect on voting patterns although the point estimates for the magnitudes of the influence are very similar in both cases seventy four percent of the house received campaign contributions from these special interest groups while only 54 of the senate received contributions from these same sources this is probably because only one third of the senate was up for reelection during the time period considered while the entire house was in the process of campaigning for reelection exports also play a role in influencing the probability of a yes vote reducing this probability as employment in export industries increases but the magnitude of the coefficient is only 11 of that for textile employment the significance of this variable in the house is probably due to fear of retaliation expressed by both democrats and republicans this variable was not significant in the senate model most likely because the senate version excluded from the 1 import quota growth rate many countries who might have retaliated representatives appear to respond to a wider variety of constituent interests than do senators while senators voting patterns are only significantly influenced by their political affiliation their state s unemployment rate and the importance of textiles to their state the voting behavior of representatives is influenced by these factors as well as the importance of exports to their state and campaign contributions by textile special interest groups these results affirm the validity of the approach used by baldwin and coughlin they differ from baldwin who finds exports are not a significant influence on the house and from coughlin who does not include export employment as an explanitory variable or analyze the differences in voting patterns between the house and the senate

the cost of annuities implications for saving behavior and bequests the fact that most elderly u s individuals maintain a flat age wealth profile rather than buy individual life annuities contradicts the standard life cycle consumption model average expected yields on individual life annuities in the united states during 1968 1983 were lower by 4 21 6 13 percent or 2 43 4 35 percent after allowing for adverse selection than yields on plausible alternative investments simulations of a model of saving and portfolio allocation show that during the early retirement years such yield differentials can account for the absence of annuity purchases even without a bequest motive at older ages the combination of such yield differentials and a bequest motive can do so it is common experience that as we grow older and nearer to eternity we become more not less anxious about money derek brewer chaucer and his world p 213

money income and causality in the united kingdom an empirical reexamination since the reduced form econometric exercises of friedman and meiselman 2 considerable research has been undertaken to determine the nature of the relationship running from money to income as well as the importance of reverse causation from income to money using an empirically testable defintion of causality proposed by granger 4 sims 7 developed an econometric technique to test for unidirectional causality in a two variable system in an application to u s nominal gnp and money data from 1949 iii to 1968 iv he reported that the main empirical finding is that the hypothesis that causality is unidirectional from money to income agrees with the postwar u s data whereas the hypothesis that causality is unidirectional from income to money is rejected 7 p 540 to examine the generality of sims s results williams goodhart and gowland 8 w g g undertook a similar study using u k data from 1958 i to 1971 iii a period when the bretton woods fixed exchange rate system prevailed they found that neither the causal relationship from money to income nor reverse causality from

lease valuation when taxable earnings are a scarce resource in this paper we examine leasing as a tax arbitrage instrument analysis of a sample of uk leases presented in this paper suggests that lessors earn large positive npvs our theoretical model seeks to explain these positive npvs in terms of a market price for a scarce resource that we identify as scarce taxable earnings using these prices the model permits a lessor to determine whether the profitability of a proposed set of lease contracts can be improved by writing e different set of contracts that makes better use of the lessor s taxable earnings there may be two reasons why an initial portfolio of contracts may be suboptimal either there may be clienteles or the leasing market may be inefficient subsequently we discuss reasons why the leasing market may be characterized by clienteles and using two different samples of leases we test whether the leasing market is segmented and efficient in this paper we examine leasing as a tax arbitrage instrument with asymmetrical tax positions between lessors and lessees there will be positive net present values npvs to lease transactions see myers dill and bautista 21 analysis of a sample of united kingdom uk leases presented in this paper suggests that lessors earn large positive npvs our theoretical model seeks to explain these positive npvs in terms of a market price for a scarce resource that we identify as scarce taxable earnings there are two implications of our model one for financial intermediaries that act as lessors and the other for financial economists interested in the leasing market the model permits a lessor to determine whether the profitability of a proposed set of lease contracts can be improved upon by writing a different set of contracts that makes better use of the lessor s taxable earnings there may be two reasons why an initial portfolio of contracts that a lessor is about to write may be suboptimal either there may be clienteles because the leasing market

life cycle economies and aggregate fluctuations do the implications for business cycle issues change when we switch from studying infinitely lived representative agent models to more sophisticated demographic structures with finitely lived agents this article addresses that question by using a large overlapping generations model that is calibrated to u s demographic properties microeconomic evidence and national income and product accounts the finding is that the answers obtained are basically the same for the two kinds of models the article also explores the relative volatility of hours across age groups an issue that cannot be addressed by using the infinitely lived representative agent abstraction

domestic content legislation house voting and the economic theory of regulation house voting on domestic content legislation provides a rare opportunity to examine the political economy of protectionism with respect to a particular issue rather than by using the traditional interindustry approach the results indicate that a representative s vote in favor of the content legislation and the intensity of the legislator s preferences are positively related to the importance of the auto and steel industries in the representative s district an increasing unemployment rate campaign contributions from labor groups affiliation with democratic party and a liberal ideology despite ideology s statistical significance the results suggest this variable can be disregarded because neither the predictive accuracy nor the explanatory power of the model is improved by its inclusion the estimates also provide insights concerning the impact of changes in the independent variables upon voting patterns

on the implications of introducing cross border loss offset in the european union abstract this article investigates a tax competition model where countries compete for capital and profits of multinational enterprises mnes through statutory tax rates and cross border loss offset provisions which allow a transfer of foreign subsidiaries losses to the parent company a joint implementation of full cross border loss relief is welfare maximizing because it ensures production efficiency and no profit shifting in equilibrium local governments choose zero level of the loss relief in a noncooperative equilibrium if only capital is mobile and relax the loss offset when mnes engage in profit shifting therefore allowing multinationals to undertake international tax planning activities may be welfare improving in our model

voting when money and morals conflict an experimental test of expressive voting abstract moral considerations may matter much in voting because the costs of expressing support for a morally worthy cause may be low in a referendum these costs depend on whether a voter expects to affect the outcome of the referendum to test the low cost theory of expressive voting we experimentally investigate a proposal to tax everyone and to donate tax revenues the analysis of expectations and voting decisions shows that the low cost theory fails to explain voting decisions instead we find that voters tend to approve of the proposal if they expect others to approve too

the political feasibility of pension reform options the case of switzerland this paper investigates the political feasibility of different hypothetical reform options of an unsustainable pay as you go public pension system in calibrating the model to the swiss economy we find that low internal rates of return and high distortions can reduce political support for an increase in earmarked taxes up to a point where a reduction in the size of the social security program receives a majority of votes our simulations show that the consideration of non social security taxes is crucial in welfare analysis this is especially true for countries in which the public pension system is explicitly or implicitly subsidized

testing for short termism in the uk stock market a comment in the november i 993 issue of thisjournal david miles estimates and tests for the presence of short termism in the united kingdom using data from i980 to i988 based on a sample of 477 non financial firms he modestly declines to claim that he has detected the presence of shorttermism but concludes that those who believe it does not exist do need to explain something about the operation of security markets which makes longerterm cash flow appear to be discounted at much higher rates than shorter term flows the purpose of this note is to provide a model which gives such an explanation we shall also show that such a model is consistent with the empirical realities of the early i980s j we believe that the miles paper has two serious defects the first is the assumption that the risk premia per unit time varies across firms but is constant through time over under discounting is then detected relative to this base to quote miles

monopolistic competition and the q theory of investment abstract in this paper we analyse the implications for q models of investment of replacing the assumption of perfect competition in the output market with the assumption of monopolistic competition the structural investment equation that can be derived in this case has a richer dynamic structure than the conventional one and it contains in addition to present and future q output as an explanatory variable in the applied section we discuss the extent to which monopolistic competition helps in providing a remedy for the empirical weaknesses of q models the estimates are obtained using aggregate data for u k industrial and commercial companies for the period 1951 1979

an examination of the empirical relationship between the dividend and investment decisions a note this paper empirically examines the separation principle which asserts that investment decisions are not influenced by dividend decisions existing empirical evidence on this proposition is inconclusive in this paper we employ causality tests to examine whether investment decisions are in fact statistically exogenous with respect to dividend decisions these tests are undertaken using both firm specific and aggregate data the results indicate no causal relationship from dividends to investment which provides support for the separation principle as an empirical proposition miller and modigliani 12 m m have demonstrated that in perfect capital markets the value of a firm is independent of the way the firm chooses to finance its investments one implication of this theorem is that investment decisions should not be influenced by dividend decisions although dividend decisions may or may not be influenced by investment decisions fama and miller 6 chapter 4 term this result the separation principle although extant capital markets are not perfect the validity of the separation principle as an empirical proposition has some natural appeal the empirical evidence on the subject is limited two of the better known studies dhrymes and kurz 4 and fama 5 use two stage least squares to estimate explicit models of the dividend and investment decisions dhrymes and kurz find that dividend investment decisions affect investment dividend decisions while fama concludes that no significant relationship exists between the two decisions fama suggests that the difference in results arises because dhrymes and kurz omitted certain lagged variables constrained the parameters of the dividend and investment models to be equal for all firms and chose inappropriate deflators fama admits however that his own results may be influenced by sampling errors that obscure the true relationship between dividends and investment thus the existing empirical evidence must be considered inconclusive

public policies pressure groups and dead weight costs abstract this paper presents a model of competition among special interest groups for political influence each active group exerts pressure to affect its taxes and subsidies where activities of different groups are related by the equality between total tax collections and total tax subsidies the dead weight costs and benefits of taxes and subsidies play a major role in our model an increase in the dead weight cost of taxation encourages pressure by taxpayers while an increase in the dead weight costs of subsidies discourages pressure by recipients various applications of the analysis are discussed