inefficient credit booms this paper studies the welfare properties of competitive equilibria in an economy with financial frictions hit by aggregate shocks in particular it shows that competitive financial contracts can result in excessive borrowing ex ante and excessive volatility ex post even though from a first best perspective the equilibrium always displays under borrowing from a second best point of view excessive borrowing can arise the inefficiency is due to the combination of limited commitment in financial contracts and the fact that asset prices are determined in a spot market this generates a pecuniary externality that is not internalized in private contracts the model provides a framework to evaluate preventive policies which can be used during a credit boom to reduce the expected costs of a financial crisis copyright 2008 wiley blackwell

do soccer players play the mixed strategy nash equilibrium mixed strategy nash equilibrium msne is a commonly used solution concept in game theoretic models in various fields in economics management and other disciplines but the experimental results whether the msne predicts well actual play in games is mixed consequently the evidence for naturally occurring games in which the msne predicts the outcome well is of great importance as it can justify the vast use of msne in models the game between the kicker and the goalkeeper in soccer penalty kicks is a real world game that can be used to examine the application of the msne concept or its accuracy because payoffs are a common knowledge the players have huge incentives to play correctly the game is simple enough to analyse its nash equilibrium is in mixed strategies and players actions can be observed we collected and analysed the data on the direction of kicks and jumps in penalty kicks in various top leagues and tournaments our analysis suggests that the msne predictions are the closest to the act

ten little treasures of game theory and ten intuitive contradictions this paper reports laboratory data for games that are played only once these games span the standard categories static and dynamic games with complete and incomplete information for each game the treasure is a treatment in which behavior conforms nicely to predictions of the nash equilibrium or relevant refinement in each case however a change in the payoff structure produces a large inconsistency between theoretical predictions and observed behavior these contradictions are generally consistent with simple intuition based on the interaction of payoff asymmetries and noisy introspection about others decisions

loss aversion and learning to bid bidding challenges learning theories even with the same bid experiences vary stochastically the same choice can result in either a gain or a loss in such an environment the question arises of how the nearly universally documented phenomenon of loss aversion affects the adaptive dynamics we analyse the impact of loss aversion in a simple auction using the experienced weighted attraction model of learning our experimental results suggest that individual learning dynamics are highly heterogeneous and affected by loss aversion to different degrees apart from that the experiment shows that loss aversion is not specific to rare decision making

on eliciting beliefs in strategic games several recent studies in experimental economics have tried to measure beliefs of subjects engaged in strategic games with other subjects using data from one such study we conduct an experiment where our experienced subjects observe early rounds of strategy choices from that study and are given monetary incentives to report forecasts of choices in later rounds we elicit beliefs using three different scoring rules linear logarithmic and quadratic we compare forecasts across the scoring rules and compare the forecasts of our trained observers to forecasts of the actual players in the original experiment we find significant differences across scoring rules the improper linear scoring rule produces forecasts closer to 0 and 1 than the proper rules and these forecasts are poorly calibrated the two proper scoring rules induce significantly different distributions of forecasts we find that forecasts by observers under both proper scoring rules are significantly different from the forecasts of the actual players in terms of accuracy calibration and the distribution of forecasts we also find evidence for belief convergence among the observers

predicting how people play games a simple dynamic model of choice we use the simple dynamic model developed in sarin and vahid 1999 games and economic behavior 28 294 309 to explain the experiments reported in erev and roth 1998 american economic review 88 848 881 in an earlier paper sarin and vahid 1998 mimeo texas a m university and monash university we showed that the model predicted behavior in repeated coordination games remarkably well and better than equilibrium theory or reinforcement learning models in this paper we show that the same one parameter model can also explain behavior in games with a unique mixed strategy nash equilibrium better than alternative models hence we obtain further support for the simple dynamic model journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 d8

a theoretical analysis of altruism and decision error in public goods games abstract we formalize an equilibrium model in which altruism and decision error parameters determine the distribution of contributions for linear and quadratic public goods games the equilibrium density is exponential for linear games and normal for quadratic games our model implies i contributions increase with the marginal value of the public good ii total contributions increase with the number of participants iii mean contributions lie between the nash prediction and half the endowment these predictions which are not implied by a nash analysis are consistent with laboratory data maximum likelihood estimates of altruism and error parameters are significant and plausible

a simple general equilibrium model of large excess reserves abstract in a general equilibrium macroeconomic model with a banking system that can hold large excess reserves and is subject to possibly binding capital constraints i study how the quantity of government provided monetary assets is related to the price level in steady state when the central bank does not pay interest on reserves the price level moves one for one with the monetary base if instead the central bank can pay interest on reserves at market rates the price level can decouple from the quantity of monetary assets in the economy a larger monetary base need not imply a higher price level however for large enough levels of reserves the capital constraint binds and the tight link between money and prices reemerges

games with unique mixed strategy equilibria an experimental study abstract the results of an experiment studying the choices of subjects playing mixed extensions of three variants of simple 2 2 non constant sum strictly competitive games of the same form matching pennies are presented subjects exhibited a variety of behavioral adaptive learning strategies this heterogeneity of individual behavior produced aggregate dynamics whose estimated steady states are quite different from those predicted by the nash equilibria of those stage games with asymmetrical payoff functions the observed aggregative dynamics are well accounted for both by a quantal equilibrium model of mckelvey and palfrey and by a learning model of roth and erev journal of economic literature classification number c72

banking a new monetarist approach we develop a model where i banks take deposits and make investments ii their liabilities facilitate third party transactions other models have i or ii not both although we argue they are intimately connected we show that they both emerge from limited commitment we describe an environment characterize desirable allocations and interpret the outcomes as banking arrangements banks are essential without them the set of feasible allocations is inferior as a technical contribution we characterize dynamically optimal credit allocations with frictions show they involve backloading and analyse how this interacts with banking we also confront the theory with economic history copyright 2013 oxford university press

testing mixed strategy equilibria when players are heterogeneous the case of penalty kicks in soccer the concept of mixed strategy is a fundamental component of game theory and its normative importance is undisputed however its empirical relevance has sometimes been viewed with skepticism the main concern over the practical usefulness of mixed strategies relates to the indifference property of a mixedstrategy equilibrium in order to be willing to play a mixed strategy an agent must be indifferent between each of the pure strategies that are played with positive probability in the mixed strategy as well as any combination of those strategies given that the agent is indifferent across these many strategies there is no bene t to selecting precisely the strategy that induces the opponent to be indifferent as required for equilibrium why an agent would in the absence of communication between players choose exactly one particular randomization is not clear of course whether agents in real life actually play nash equilibrium mixed strategies is ultimately an empirical question the evidence to date on this issue is based almost exclusively on laboratory experiments e g barry o neill 1987 amnon rapoport and richard b boebel 1992 dilip mookherjee and barry sopher 1994 jack ochs 1995 kevin a mccabe et al 2000 the results of these experiments are mixed o neill 1987 concludes that his experimental evidence is consistent with nash mixed strategies but that conclusion was contested by james n brown and robert w rosenthal 1990 with the exception of mccabe et al 2000 which looks at a three person game the other papers generally reject the nash mixedstrategy equilibrium while much has been learned in the laboratory there are inherent limitations to such studies it is sometimes argued that behavior in the simpli ed arti cial setting of games played in such experiments need not mimic real life behavior in addition even if individuals behave in ways that are inconsistent with optimizing behavior in the lab market forces may discipline such behavior in the real world finally interpretation of experiments rely on the assumption that the subjects are maximizing the monetary outcome of the game whereas there may be other preferences at work among subjects e g attempting to avoid looking foolish that distort the results tests of mixed strategies in nonexperimental data are quite scarce in real life the games played are typically quite complex with large strategy spaces that are not fully speci ed ex ante in addition preferences of the actors may not be perfectly known we are aware of only one paper in a similar spirit to our own research using data from classic tennis matches mark walker and john wooders 2001 test whether the probability the player who serves the ball wins the point is equal for serves to the right and chiappori department of economics university of chicago 1126 east 59th street chicago il 60637 levitt department of economics university of chicago groseclose graduate school of business stanford university 518 memorial way stanford ca 94305 the paper was presented at games 2000 in bilbao and at seminars in paris and chicago we thank d braun j m conterno r guesnerie d heller d mengual p reny b salanie and especially j l ettori for comments and suggestions and m mazzocco and f bos for excellent research assistance any errors are ours 1 the theoretical arguments given in defense of the concept of mixed strategy equilibria relate either to puri cation john c harsanyi 1973 or to the minimax property of the equilibrium strategy in zero sum games for recent elaborations on these ideas see authur j robson 1994 and phil reny and robson 2001 2 the ultimatum game is one instance in which experimental play of subjects diverges substantially from the predicted nash equilibrium robert slonim and alvin e roth 1998 demonstrate that raising the monetary payoffs to experiment participants induces behavior closer to that predicted by theory although some disparity persists

an experiment to evaluate bayesian learning of nash equilibrium play abstract we report on an experiment designed to evaluate the empirical implications of jordan s model of bayesian learning in games of incomplete information a finite example is constructed in which the model generates unique predictions of subjects choices in nearly all periods when the true game defined by players private information was one with a unique equilibrium in pure strategies the experimental subjects play converged to the equilibrium as jordan s theory predicts even when the subjects had not attained complete information about one another but when there were two pure strategy equilibria the theory s predictions were not consistent with observed behavior journal of economic literature classification numbers d83 c72 c92

transaction services inflation and welfare this paper is motivated by empirical observations on the comovements of currency velocity inflation and the relative size of the credit services sector we document these comovements and incorporate into a monetary growth model a credit services sector that provides services that help people economize on money our model makes two new contributions first we show that direct evidence on the appropriately defined credit service sector for the united states is consistent with the welfare cost measured using an estimated money demand schedule second we provide estimates of the welfare cost of inflation that have some new features

stationary concepts for experimental 2 x 2 games comment reinhard selten and thorsten chmura 2008 recently reported laboratory results for completely mixed 2 x 2 games used to compare nash equilibrium with four other stationary concepts quantal response equilibrium action sampling equilibrium payoff sampling equilibrium and impulse balance equilibrium we reanalyze their data correct some errors and find that nash clearly fits worst while the four other concepts perform about equally well we also report new analysis of other previous experiments that illustrate the importance of the loss aversion hardwired into impulse balance equilibrium when the other non nash concepts are augmented with loss aversion they outperform impulse balance equilibrium

on the social usefulness of fractional reserve banking abstract in this paper we argue that if monetary policy has insufficient deflation private agents have incentives to set up alternative payment systems like fractionally backed bank deposits which pay interest on the means of payment in a competitive environment with free entry these alternative systems are inherently fragile in the sense that they are subject to socially costly bank runs these social costs are not internalized by private individuals and banks and may exceed their social benefits we argue that as communication technologies improve the social benefits of fractional reserve banking decrease but the private benefits may still exceed the private costs so that such systems continue to be used in such situations 100 reserve requirements are optimal

an investigation into the demand for alcoholic beverages in canada a choice between the almost ideal and the rotterdam models in this article i investigate the historical pattern of interactions in the demand for three categories of alcoholic beverages in canada using both the differential almost ideal and the differential rotterdam demand systems i evaluate these models based on several decision criteria including model encompassment based on the j test structural stability conformity with demand theory and the credibility of the estimated price and income responses in an attempt to determine which of these models is better suited for explaining the demand for alcoholic beverages the results reveal that both models satisfy the restrictions of demand theory and of structural stability but the rotterdam model is preferable on grounds of the remaining two criteria

a payoff uncertainty explanation of results in experimental centipede games abstract this paper investigates how well a simple two sided incomplete information game with a full support prior can be used to explain non nash equilibrium outcomes observed in the centipede game experiments i estimate the variance of the uncertainty about preferences in several versions of the model select two models and compare these models to the estimation results of the altruism model and the quantal response models it is shown that the two selected models have a better fit than the one parameter altruism and quantal response models and that the estimated variance can explain all qualitative features of these experimental results journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c19 c 44 c91

application of flexible function forms in climate change research theoretical regularity and model selection abstract demand systems are widely applied to the energy and fuel demand research as result of growing concerns over climate change and global warming especially these issues in cities however in existing literature on consumer demand the authors too often ignore the theoretical regularity conditions or do not report the results of full regularity checks as a consequence the duality theory and second order conditions for optimizing behavior are invalid in face of the real world problem and the conclusions or suggestions proposed based on the empirical researches are thereby inappropriate and even misleading driven by the gap between theoretical models and practical problems we estimate the demand for road passenger transport in china which is considered to be one of the most important sources of air pollution in city using three flexible functional forms the rotterdam model the almost ideal demand system aids and the quadratic aids quaids we focus on all theoretical regularities positivity monotonicity curvature adding up homogeneity and symmetry and argue that unless there is a coincidence flexible functional forms are subject to certain theoretical regularities and that all these regularities are equally important both in theory and in practice empirical estimation shows that the aids model is the only model that is able to provide theoretically consistent estimation of the demand for road passenger transport in china our results also imply that the private transportation is elastic in price changes compared to urban public transportation and intercity public transportation we bridge the gap between theoretical modelling and empirical research on consumer energy fuel demand especially in the research about consumer demand for energy intensive products and services our study points out a crucially important fact that the researchers and policy makers must pay attention to the regularities of the theoretical modelling in the practical applications

rationalizable strategic behavior the notion of equilibrium proposed by nash 19 has come to play a dominant role in economic applications of noncooperative games while analyses of nash equilibria have unquestionably contributed to our understanding of economic behavior it would be unreasonably optimistic to maintain that nash solved the problem of noncooperative strategic choice there is a small literature beginning with ellsberg 6 and a much larger oral tradition which argues that nash behavior is neither a necessary consequence of rationality nor a reasonable empirical proposition in this paper i take the view that although there may be various reasons why an agent might select a nash strategy the notion of an equilibrium has little intrinsic appeal within a strategic context when an agent reaches a decision in ignorance of the strategies adopted by other players rationality consists of making a choice which is justifiable by an internally consistent system of beliefs rather than one which is optimal post hoc this point of view is not original indeed most serious justifications of the nash hypothesis embrace such an approach arguing that agents will expect the game to yield a nash outcome and consequently will choose their equilibrium strategies nevertheless when we think in terms of maximizing utility subject to expectations rather than realizations it becomes clear that the nash hypothesis far from being a consequence of rationality arises from certain restrictions on agents expectations which may or may not be plausible depending upon the game being played we are then quite naturally led to ask are there any restrictions of individuals expectations and hence choices which are required by rationality alone rather than by subjective plausibility this paper is concerned with defining justifying characterizing and refining a criterion for rational strategic choice which i label rationalizability

noisy directional learning and the logit equilibrium we specify a dynamic model in which agents adjust their decisions toward higher payoffs subject to normal error this process generates a probability distribution of players decisions that evolves over time according to the fokker planck equation the dynamic process is stable for all potential games a class of payoff structures that includes several widely studied games in equilibrium the distributions that determine expected payoffs correspond to the distributions that arise from the logit function applied to those expected payoffs this logit equilibrium forms a stochastic generalization of the nash equilibrium and provides a possible explanation of anomalous laboratory data

heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies we explore an equilibrium model of games where behavior is given by logit response functions but payoff responsiveness and beliefs about others responsiveness are heterogeneous we study two substantively different ways of extending quantal response equilibrium qre to this setting 1 heterogeneus qre where players share identical correct beliefs about the distribution of payoff responsiveness and 2 truncated qre where players have downward looking beliefs systematically underestimating others responsiveness we show that the cognitive hierarchy model is a special case of truncated qre we conduct experiments designed to differentiate these approaches we find significant evidence of payoff responsive stochastic choice and of heterogeneity and downward looking beliefs in some games

the demand for alcohol in the united kingdom using the aids model we show that there exists for the uk a stable long run relationship between expenditure shares on beer cider spirits and wine alcohol prices total alcohol expenditure and a range of non economic variables relating to advertising licensing the employment social class and demographic characteristics of consumers and climate our estimates of key price and income elasticities generally lie between those found from other time series studies which exclude most of these non economic variables and those found from cross section studies which generally include them however the restrictions required for separability homegeneity and symmetry although not those for perfect price aggregation are decisively rejected

rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection this paper explores the fundamental problem of what can be inferred about the outcome of a noncooperative game from the rationality of the players and from the information they possess the answer is summarized in a solution concept called rationalizability strategy profiles that are rationalizable are not always nash equilibria conversely the information in an extensive form game often allows certain unreasonable nash equilibria to be excluded from the set of rationalizable profiles a stronger form of rationalizability is appropriate if players are known to be not merely rational but also cautious what constitutes rational behavior in a noncooperative strategic situation this paper explores the issue in the context of a wide class of finite noncooperative games in extensive form the traditional answer relies heavily upon the idea of nash equilibrium nash 17 the position developed here however is that as a criterion for judging a profile of strategies to be reasonable choices for players in a game the nash equilibrium property is neither necessary nor sufficient some nash equilibria are intuitively unreasonable and not all reasonable strategy profiles are nash equilibria the fact that a nash equilibrium can be intuitively unattractive is well known the equilibrium may be imperfect introduced into the literature by selten 20 the idea of imperfect equilibria has prompted game theorists to search for a narrower definition of equilibrium while this research some of which will be discussed here has been extremely instructive it remains inconclusive theorists often agree about what should happen in particular games but to capture this intuition in a general solution concept has proved to be very difficult if this paper is successful it should make some progress in that direction the other side of the coin has received less scrutiny can all non nash profiles really be excluded on logical grounds i believe not the standard justifications for considering only nash profiles are circular in nature or make gratuitous assumptions about players decision criteria or beliefs the following discussion of these points is extremely brief due to space constraints more detailed arguments may be found in pearce 18

risk averse behavior in generalized matching pennies games in experimental studies of behavior in 2 2 games with unique mixed strategy equilibria observed choice frequencies are systematically different from mixed strategy nash predictions this paper examines experimental results for a variety of such games and shows that a structural econometric model which incorporates risk aversion into a quantal response equilibrium explains the data very well moreover risk aversion estimates are stable across the different games and are close to those obtained from laboratory and field auction data as well as from individual lottery choice experiments

anomalous behavior in a traveler s dilemma the notion of a nash equilibrium has joined supply and demand as one of the two or three techniques that economists instinctively try to use first in the analysis of economic interactions moreover the nash equilibrium and closely related game theoretic concepts are being widely applied in other social sciences and even in biology where evolutionary stability often selects a subset of the nash equilibria many people are uneasy about the stark predictions of the nash equilibrium in some contexts where the extreme rationality assumptions seem implausible kaushik basu s 1994 traveler s dilemma is a particularly convincing example of a case where the unrelenting logic of game theory is at odds with intuitive notions about human behavior the story associated with the dilemma is that two travelers purchase identical antiques while on a tropical vacation their luggage is lost on the return trip and the airline asks them to make independent claims for compensation in anticipation of excessive claims the airline representative announces

cross country alcohol consumption comparison an application of the rotterdam demand system this paper analyses the consumption patterns of the three beverages beer wine and spirits in nine countries australia canada finland japan new zealand norway sweden the uk and the us using the rotterdam demand system a cross country comparison of the results shows that in most countries i wine consumption has grown at a fasteer rate than beer and spirits ii the proportion of consumers expenditure on alcohol is declining iii beer is a necessity and spirits is a luxury iv the demand for the three beverages is price inelastic and iv all three beverages are pair wise substitutes we also investigated the hypothesis of identical parameters for all countries by pooling the data across countries and found that the data do not support the hypothesis

david vs goliath an analysis of asymmetric mixed strategy games and experimental evidence mixed strategies are widely used to model strategic situations in diverse fields such as economics marketing political science and biology however some of the implications of asymmetric mixed strategy solutions are counterintuitive we develop a stylized model of patent race to examine some of these implications in our model two firms compete to develop a product and obtain a patent however one firm values the patent more because of its market advantages such as brand reputation and distribution network contrary to some intuition we find that the firm that values the patent less is likely to invest more aggressively in developing the product and will also win the patent more often we argue that the reason for these counterintuitive results is inherent in the very concept of mixed strategy solution in a laboratory test we examine whether subjects behavior conforms to the equilibrium predictions we find that the aggregate behavior of our subjects is consistent with the game theoretic predictions with the help of the experience weighted attraction ewa learning model proposed by camerer and ho 1999 we show that adaptive learning can account for the investment behavior of our subjects we find that the ewa learning model tracks the investment decisions of our subjects well whether we hold out trials or an entire group of subjects

an experimental investigation of unprofitable games we investigate behavior in two unprofitable games where maxmin strategies do not form a nash equilibrium yet guarantee the same payoff as nash equilibrium strategies that vary in the riskiness of the nash strategy we find that arguments for the implausibility of nash equilibrium are confirmed by our experiments however claims that this will lead to maxmin play are not neither solution concept accounts for more than 53 of choices in either game the results indicate that the tension between the nash and maxmin strategies does not resolve itself over the course of the experiment moreover the relative performance of the solution concepts is sensitive to the riskiness of the nash strategy journal of economic literature

modeling the psychology of consumer and firm behavior with behavioral economics abstract marketing is an applied science that tries to explain and influence how firms and consumers behave in markets marketing models are usually applications of standard economic theories which rely on strong assumptions of rationality of consumers and firms behavioral economics explores the implications of the limits of rationality with the goal of making economic theories more plausible by explaining and predicting behavior more accurately while maintaining formal power this article reviews six behavioral economics models that are useful to marketing three models generalize standard preference structures to allow for sensitivity to reference points and loss aversion social preferences toward outcomes of others and preference for instant gratification the other three models generalize the concept of game theoretic equilibrium allowing decision makers to make mistakes encounter limits on the depth of strategic thinking and equilibrate by learning from feedback the authors also discuss a sp

model choice in consumer analysis taiwan 1970 89 expenditure data were used to study how income and prices influenced consumer demand in taiwan during the last decade alternative differential demand models combining the features of the rotterdam model and the almost ideal demand system aids were tested aids type demand responses describe taiwanese consumer behavior better than do the other specifications

money and interest in a cash in advance economy the authors analyze an aggregative general equilibrium model in which the use of money is motivated by a cash in advance constraint applied to purchases of a subset of consumption goods the system is subject to both real and monetary shocks which are economy wide and observed by all they develop methods for verifying the existence of characterizing and explicitly calculating equilibria copyright 1987 by the econometric society

the effects of payoff magnitude and heterogeneity on behavior in 2 2 games with unique mixed strategy equilibria the logit version of quantal response equilibrium predicts that equilibrium behavior in games will vary systematically with payoff magnitudes if all other factors are held constant including the nash equilibria of the game we explore this in the context of a set of asymmetric 2x2 games with unique totally mixed strategy equilibria the data provide little support for the payoff magnitude predictions of the logit equilibrium model we extend the theoretical quantal response equilibrium model to allow for heterogeneity and find that the data fit the heterogeneous version of the theory significantly better

a unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis search theoretic models of monetary exchange are based on explicit descriptions of the frictions that make money essential however tractable versions of these models typically make strong assumptions that render them ill suited for monetary policy analysis we propose a new framework based on explicit micro foundations within which macro policy can be studied the framework is analytically tractable and easily quantifiable we calibrate the model to standard observations and use it to measure the cost of inflation we find that going from 10 percent to 0 percent inflation is worth between 3 and 5 percent of consumption much higher than previous estimates

what s to know about laboratory experimentation in economics abstract experimental economics has grown as a discipline from near non existence 50 years ago to a full fledged field within economics in the present much of experimental economics research involves experimental methods as a tool applied to problems in other fields of economics however some of this research is inward looking focusing on questions of the methodology of experimental economics in this note i briefly discuss two methodological issues in experimental economics that might benefit from meta analysis the pool from which experimental participants are drawn university undergraduate students versus other populations and the scale of monetary incentives faced by participants large small or hypothetical

testing restrictions in a flexible dynamic demand system an application to consumers expenditure in canada traditionally restrictions on systems of demand equations have been tested using static models whilst being estimated with time series data this paper develops a vector time series model of expenditure shares in the context of a singular dynamic demand system the model allows for non symmetric and non homogeneous short run behaviour the homogeneity and symmetry restrictions are only examined in the long run structure results based on canadian time series data are presented and reject the current practise of static modelling while restrictions suggested by economic theory are not rejected when imposed on the long run structure

learning about learning in games through experimental control of strategic interdependence we report experiments in which humans repeatedly play one of two games against a computer program that follows either a reinforcement learning or an experience weighted attraction algorithm our experiments show these learning algorithms detect exploitable opportunities more sensitively than humans also learning algorithms respond to detected payo increasing opportunities systematically however the responses are too weak to improve the algorithms payos human play against various decision maker types doesn t vary signicantly these factors lead to a strong linear relationship between the humans and algorithms action choice proportions that is suggestive of the algorithm s best response correspondence these properties are revealed only by our human versus computer experiments and not by our standard human versus human experiments nor our model simulations jel classication c72 c92 c81

on the welfare properties of fractional reserve banking monetary economists have long recognized a tension between the benefits of fractional reserve banking such as the ability to undertake more profitable long term investment opportunities and the difficulties associated with it such as the risk of insolvency for each bank and the associated losses to bank liability holders i show that a specific banking arrangement a joint liability scheme provides an effective mechanism for ensuring the ex post transfer of reserves from liquid banks to illiquid banks so it is possible to select a socially efficient reserve ratio in the banking system that preserves the safety of bank liabilities as a store of value and maximizes the rate of return paid to bank liability holders

an experimental study of the repeated trust game with incomplete information in the trust game first player 1 decides between non cooperation or trust in reciprocity only in the latter case player 2 chooses between exploiting or rewarding player 1 in our computerized experiment player 2 can be always rewarding implemented as a robot strategy or decide opportunistically to allow for reputation formation this base game is played repeatedly learning can be analyzed since participants play successively several repeated games with changing partners participants can explicitly rely on mixed strategies which allows testing the qualitative and quantitative aspects of reputation equilibria also at an individual level

expectation based loss aversion and strategic interaction abstract by extending the equilibrium concepts of k szegi and rabin 2006 k szegi and rabin 2007 this paper analyzes the strategic interaction of expectation based loss averse players for loss averse players with choice acclimating expectations the utility from playing a mixed strategy is not linear but convex in the probabilities they assign to their pure strategies as a consequence they are generally unwilling to randomize and an equilibrium may fail to exist for players with choice unacclimating expectations by contrast randomizing over their pure strategies may indeed constitute a credible best response and an equilibrium always exists building upon these insights we delineate how expectation based loss averse players differ in their strategic behavior from their counterparts with standard expected utility preferences derive novel strategic effects discuss equilibrium selection and derive equilibrium play for some simple games

private money and banking regulation we show that the regulation of lending practices is desirable for the optimal provision of private money in an environment in which bankers cannot commit to repay their creditors neither an unregulated banking system nor a form of narrow banking in which banks hold 100 in reserves can provide the socially efficient amount of money if bankers provided such an amount then they would prefer to default on their liabilities we show that a regulation that increases the value of the banking sector s assets e g by limiting competition in credit markets will mitigate the commitment problem if the return on the banking sector s assets is made sufficiently large then it is possible to implement an efficient allocation

debt constrained asset markets we develop a theory of general equilibrium with endogenous debt limits in the form of individual rationality constraints similar to those in the dynamic consistency literature if an agent defaults on a contract he can be excluded from future contingent claims markets trading and can have his assets seized he cannot be excluded from spot markets trading however and he has some private endowments that cannot be seized all information is publicly held and common knowledge and there is a complete set of contingent claims markets since there is complete information an agent cannot enter into a contract in which he would have an incentive to default in some state in general there is only partial insurance variations in consumption may be imperfectly correlated across agents interest rates may be lower than they would be without constraints and equilibria may be pareto ranked

the silence of the lambdas a test of the almost ideal and rotterdam models during the past decade the linear approximate la almost ideal demand system and the rotterdam model have been adopted by agricultural economists as the demand systems of choice in most applications the apparent explanation is that the two models are both second order locally flexible and compatible with demand theory they have identical data requirements and are equally parsimonious with respect to parameters and both are linear in the parameters while the two models are thus equally attractive in most respects and indeed appear very similar in structure they lead to different results in some applications this article develops a test of each against the other in an illustrative application to u s meat demand the almost ideal model is rejected while the rotterdam model is not

stationary concepts for experimental 2x2 games five stationary concepts for completely mixed 2 x 2 games are experimentally compared nash equilibrium quantal response equilibrium action sampling equilibrium payoff sampling equilibrium martin j osborne and ariel rubinstein 1998 and impulse balance equilibrium experiments on 12 games 6 constant sum games and 6 nonconstant sum games were run with 12 independent subject groups for each constant sum game and 6 independent subject groups for each nonconstant sum game each independent subject group consisted of four players 1 and four players 2 interacting anonymously over 200 periods with random matching the comparison of the five theories shows that the order of performance from best to worst is as follows impulse balance equilibrium payoff sampling equilibrium action sampling equilibrium quantal response equilibrium nash equilibrium

last place aversion evidence and redistributive implications we present evidence from laboratory experiments showing that individuals are last place averse participants choose gambles with the potential to move them out of last place that they reject when randomly placed in other parts of the distribution in modified dictator games participants randomly placed in second to last place are the most likely to give money to the person one rank above them instead of the person one rank below last place aversion suggests that low income individuals might oppose redistribution because it could differentially help the group just beneath them using survey data we show that individuals making just above the minimum wage are the most likely to oppose its increase similarly in the general social survey those above poverty but below median income support redistribution significantly less than their background characteristics would predict jel codes h23 d31 c91