occupational choice and the process of development this paper models economic development as a process of institutional transformation by focusing on the interplay between agents occupational decisions and the distribution of wealth because of capital market imperfections poor agents choose working for a wage over self employment and wealthy agents become entrepreneurs who monitor workers only with sufficient inequality however will there be employment contracts otherwise there is either subsistence or self employment thus in static equilibrium the occupational structure depends on distribution since the latter is itself endogenous we demonstrate the robustness of this result by extending the model dynamically and studying examples in which initial wealth distributions have long run effects in one case the economy develops either widespread cottage industry self employment or factory production employment contracts depending on the initial distribution in the other example it develops into prosperity or stagnation

dynamic interaction between markets for leasing and selling automobiles we develop a model of dynamic interactions between price variations in leasing and selling markets for automobiles our framework assumes a differential game between multiple bertrand type competing firms which offer differentiated products to forward looking agents empirical analysis of our model using monthly us data from 2002 to 2011 shows that variations in selling cash market prices lead rapidly dissipating changes of leasing market prices in the opposite direction we discuss the practical implications of these results by augmenting a standard leasing valuation formula the additional terms represent the leased asset value changes that can be expected on the basis of past variations in automobile selling market prices

the american put option valued analytically an analytic solution to the american put problem is derived herein the hedge ratio and other derivatives of the solution are presented the formula derived implies an exact duplicating portfolio for the american put consisting of discount bonds and stock sold short the formula is extended to consider put options on stocks paying cash dividends a polynomial expression is developed for evaluating these formulae values and hedge ratios for puts on both dividend and nondividend paying stocks are calculated tabulated and compared with values derived by numerical integration and binomial approximation as with european options evaluating an analytic formula is more efficient than approximating the stock price process or the partial differential equation by binomial or finite difference methods finally applications of this american put solution are discussed

the value of embedded real options evidence from consumer automobile lease contracts under the common assumption of constant interest rates we show that penalties for early termination of a lease are often structured in such a way that the cancellation option embedded in consumer automotive leases has little value furthermore our estimates drawn from a sample of three popular car models over 1990 to 2000 indicate that the stand alone value of the lease end purchase option is on average about 16 of the market value of underlying used vehicles or about 1 462 per contract finally we examine the sensitivity of our option value estimates to model parameters and default risk recent years have witnessed a dramatic growth in the leasing of automobiles for instance overall industry sales data indicate that about a third of the new vehicles and trucks sold in the united states are leased hendel and lizzeri 2002 and miller 1995 and the federal reserve board survey of family finances reports that the use of leased vehicles by individuals nonbusiness consumers has risen from 2 9 to 5 8 over the 1992 to 2001 period azicorbe kennickell and moore 2003 consumer automobile lease contracts for new cars often include two embedded options that are not associated with a typical debt contract the first is a cancellation option that allows the lessee to terminate the lease early the second is a european call option which gives the lessee the right but not the obligation to purchase the leased used vehicle at the scheduled termination of the lease at a predetermined exercise price both of these options are simple examples of real options because the asset underlying these options is a used car that is a real asset however these options constitute a special case of real options since they are embedded in the lease contract which is a financial credit instrument theoretical analyses of lease contracts show that the cancellation option is quite valuable schallheim and mcconnell 1985 with respect to the purchase option hendel and lizzeri 2002 argue that they can play an important role in

income distribution and macroeconomics this paper analyzes the role of wealth distribution in macroeconomics through investment in human capital it is shown that in the presence of credit markets imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital the initial distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and investment both in the short and in the long run as there are multiple steady states this paper therefore provides an additional explanation for the persistent differences in per capita output across countries furthermore the paper shows that cross country differences in macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate shocks can be attributed among other factors to differences in wealth and income distribution across countries

high school graduation performance and wages using data from the panel study of income dynamics and a proprietary sample of semiskilled production workers this paper investigates the reasons for the discontinuous increase in wages associated with graduation from high school i find a discontinuous decrease in workers propensities to quit or be absent however i do not find that high school graduates have a comparative advantage in production jobs requiring more training nor in either sample is there a discontinuous increase in required training associated with the jobs held by high school graduates the wage premium associated with graduation from high school appears to be procyclical falling during slumps periods in which employers are likely to be hoarding labor and in which quits and absences are least important to firms there is also some evidence suggesting that prior quits have a larger effect on the wages of high school graduates than on the wages of high school dropouts

interdependent preferences and the competitive wage structure this article shows by example that when workers care about relative income and are free to choose their coworkers the equilibrium distribution of wages within firms must be less dispersed than the corresponding distribution of marginal products an implicit market for within firm status is shown to produce welfare gains by sorting workers among firms in accordance with how much they are willing to pay for high rank the resulting equilibrium pareto dominates allocations in which each worker is paid his marginal product

the term structure of lease rates with endogenous default triggers and tenant capital structure theory and evidence this paper focuses on the defaultable lease rate term structure with endogenous default we combine the competitive lease market argument proposed by grenadier 1996 and the endogenous default structural model proposed by leland and toft 1996 to examine the interaction between the lessee s capital structure and the equilibrium lease rate under this framework determining the lease rate is a simultaneous equation problem that captures the tradeofi between debt and lease flnancing using data on 2 482 real estate lease transactions we empirically conflrm the predictions derived from the numerical analysis of the model

social status education and growth this paper investigates the implications of social rewards on the allocation of talent in society and consequently on the process of economic growth we consider two sources of heterogeneity among workers nonwage income and innate ability a greater emphasis on status may induce the wrong individuals that is those with low ability and high wealth to acquire schooling causing workers with high ability and low wealth to leave the growth enhancing industries this crowding out effect taken alone discourages growth growth may be enhanced by a more egalitarian distribution of wealth which reduces the demand for status

optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital abstract this paper is concerned with the structure and time consistency of optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital in a dynamic context optimal taxation means distributing tax distortions over time in a welfare maximizing way for a barter economy our main finding is that with debt commitments of sufficiently rich maturity structure an optimal policy if one exists is time consistent in a monetary economy the idea of optimal taxation must be broadened to include an inflation tax and we find that time consistency does not carry over an optimal inflation tax requires commitment by rules in a sense that has no counterpart in the dynamic theory of ordinary excise taxes the reason time consistency fails in a monetary economy is that nominal assets should from a welfare maximizing point of view always be taxed away via an immediate inflation in a kind of capital levy this emerges as a new possibility when money is introduced into an economy without capital

social status culture and economic performance in analysing the differences in productive capacity among economies it is usual to concentrate on the physical aspects of the population the different attributes of capital including human capital and on the available production technologies societies also differ in culture in ways which are relevant for economic performance the sociological literature recognises that different occupations have different social status and that workers benefit not only from the wage they receive but also from being associated with a particular occupation cultural differences among societies may translate into different status of occupations and can therefore affect the choice of education and occupation and consequently the equilibrium level of output and wages conversely the economic choices of individuals influence the social status of occupations in particular it is well established by sociological research that the social status of an occupation is influenced by economic attributes such as the average wage and the average level of education in the occupation a major objective of our work is to illustrate that sociological and economic approaches can be combined within a unified framework this is in contrast to some social scientists who view the two approaches as competing with each other phelpsbrown i 977 ch 4 in this paper we construct a simple general equilibrium model in which both wages and status are determined endogenously we show that changes in the demand for status triggered by changes in preferences or in income distribution influence the wage structure the level of aggregate output and economic welfare the link between status and aggregate output is created by the fact that differences in occupational status imply occupational wage differences among workers of the same skill the larger is the demand for status the larger is the wage gap and the lower is aggregate output our discussion of status is closely related to the economic analysis of discrimination against ethnic or racial groups becker i 97 i arrow i 973

design innovation and fashion cycles a model of fashion cycles is developed in which designs are used as a signaling device in a dating game a monopolist periodically creates a new design over time the price of the design falls as it spreads across the population once sufficiently many consumers own the design it is profitable to create a new design and thereby render the old design obsolete this paper gives conditions under which all consumers would be better off by banning the use of fashion competition among designers may lead to less frequent changes in fashion and to higher prices than monopoly copyright 1995 by american economic association

the design of an optimal insurance policy almost every phase of economic behavior is affected by uncertainty the economic system has adapted to uncertainty by developing methods that facilitate the reallocation of risk among individuals and firms the most apparent and familiar form for shifting risks is the ordinary insurance policy previous insurance decision analyses can be divided into those in which the insurance policy was exogenously specified see john gould jan mossin and vernon smith and those in which it was not see karl borch 1960 and kenneth arrow 1971 1973 in this paper the pioneering work of borch and arrow the derivation of the optimal insurance contract form from the model is synthesized and extended

time consistency of fiscal and monetary policy the problem of time inconsistency arises from two different sources first as shown by guillermo a calvo 1978 the re is an incentive for each government to engage in an initial unanti cipated inflation second as discussed by robert e lucas and nancy l stokey 1983 there is an incentive for each government to deviat e from the path of taxes announced by the preceding government in th is paper it is shown that these two sources of time inconsistency ca n be removed by a particular method of debt management involving bot h nominal and indexed government bonds of various maturities copyright 1987 by the econometric society

why a government might want to consider foreign currency denominated debt abstract as the real value of foreign currency denominated debt is not affected by domestic inflation such debt eliminates the discretionary incentive to inflate this in turn will reduce the expected and thus equilibrium rate of inflation however as foreign currency debt is affected by foreign inflation such debt could be an attractive alternative to indexed bonds if the foreign country inflates when the domestic one would like to

social norms savings behavior and growth we argue that many goods and decisions are not allocated or made through markets we interpret an agent s status as a ranking device that determines how well he or she fares in the nonmarket sector the existence of a nonmarket sector can endogenously generate a concern for relative position in for example the income distribution so that higher income implies higher status moreover it can naturally yield multiple equilibria it is thus possible to explain differences in growth rates across countries without recourse to differences in underlying preferences technologies or endowments different social organizations lead to different reduced form preferences which lead to different growth rates

the determination of fair profits for the property liability insurance firm although the property liability insurance industry has been subject to price regulation for many years surprisingly little research has been directed at producing valuation models of a property liability insurance firm although property liability price regulation has historically involved setting minimum prices to reduce the risk of insolvency some commissions have begun to move toward setting prices more in the spirit of public utility regulation 1 if in an effort to promote efficiency the working objective of such regulation requires the determination of prices that would prevail under competition then regulation must be founded on some model of the costs of regulated firms under competition with free entry prices just cover all economic costs including the opportunity costs of investment by suppliers of capital and a valuation model is required to explain how the market value of the firm and therefore the cost of capital reacts to changes in the prices it charges our objective in this chapter is to provide such a framework

keeping one step ahead of the joneses status the distribution of wealth and long run growth assuming that the utility of each agent depends on its relative wealth position in the society this chapter constructs an endogenous growth model it is shown that even if the subjective discount rates differ across agents there exists a unique balanced growth equilibrium in which each agent owns a positive share of the world wealth it is also shown that if the agents are identical then an increase in savings incentives always raises the long run growth rate but if they are heterogeneous then an increase in savings incentives may lower the long run growth rate

institutions transaction costs and economic growth this essay develops a theoretical framework which explores the historical obstacles to economic growth these obstacles are examined in the context of the political economic institutional framework of economies in history and consequent transaction costs that determine economic performance and growth the essay concludes with specific suggestions for the study of economic growth

signalling inequality and the social structure this paper proposes a theory of endogenous transmission of social status through signalling in the labour market a signalling game is analysed in which education acting as a signalling good determines one s position in society the economy s degree of inequality is shown to be a determinant of whether a society is aristocratic where high income is the source of social standing or meritocratic bestowing status on high ability each social structure shows a different balance between production efficiency and social factors such as equality or mobility

the debt burden and debt maturity at low and moderate levels of government debt there appears to be little relation between the level of debt and its maturity but at high levels of debt a strong inverse relation emerges we start the paper by documenting this inverse relation for those oecd countries which have reached very high levels of debt we then provide a theory of the joint movements of debt and maturity which can explain both sets of facts it is based on the idea that at high levels of debt the government may need to decrease the maturity of the debt as debt increases in order to maintain the credibility of its anti inflation stance this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

a model for the determination of fair premiums on lease cancellation insurance policies lease cancellation insurance protects the lessor against early termination of a cancellable operating lease this paper presents a contingent claims model for determining the fair premium for this type of insurance policy comparative statics are considered and some numerical examples are presented to illustrate the model among other things the insurance premium is sensitive to the expected rate of economic depreciation of the leased asset and to the leased asset s systematic and nonsystematic risk

veblen effects in a theory of conspicuous consumption the authors examine conditions under which veblen effects arise from the desire to achieve social status by signaling wealth through conspicuous consumption while veblen effects cannot ordinarily arise when preferences satisfy a single crossing property they may emerge when this property fails in that case budget brands are priced at marginal cost while luxury brands though not intrinsically superior are sold at higher prices to consumers seeking to advertise wealth luxury brands earn strictly positive profits under conditions that would with standard formulations of preferences yield marginal cost pricing the authors explore factors that induce veblen effects and they investigate policy implications copyright 1996 by american economic association