estimating willingness to pay for housing characteristics an application of the ellickson bid rent model abstract the purpose of this paper is to estimate willingness to pay for housing characteristics using the discrete choice bid rent framework developed by b ellickson j urban econom 9 56 79 1981 and modified by s r lerman and c r kern j urban econom 13 358 363 1983 the paper provides an initial empirical test of the lerman and kern modifications using household level data from bogota colombia the results of the model are evaluated by comparing forecasted bid rents to actual rents and forecasted dwelling occupants to actual occupants by examining the demand prices which emerge from the analysis and by comparing the results to previous housing demand research which uses a hedonic type approach to analyze identical data the findings of the study show that the bid rent model works reasonably well in its predictions and in its estimates of the demand for attributes and in some ways it may perform better than a hedonic type model in forecasting the demand for housing attributes

a contractual remedy to premature innovation the vertical integration of brand name specific research is there any private contractual mechanism which can reduce premature innovation vertical integration of inventors and manufacturers is shown to be an answer so is exclusive dealing between inventors and manufacturers the prospect of getting ahead of other manufacturers and the fear of being left behind would induce a manufacturer to contract for an inventor s output inventors assured of markets for their results can focus more on the quality than on the completion dates of their work the paper examines contractual remedies for premature innovation consistent with the idea of competition the analysis develops from the conventional rushing model first it is shown that self interest of consumers manufacturers and inventors contradicts the intrinsic consequences of the rushing model correction requires exclusive commitments by manufacturers to the innovating results of winning inventors second it is hypothesized that vertical integration of inventors with production facilities of manufacturers is a form of prior commitment discouraging premature innovation viewed this way an entry barrier raised by brand name advertising may not be entirely undesirable

price decontrol the microeconomic case for the big bang approach the paper presents the microeconomic case for rapid and comprehensive price decontrol as the appropriate first step in the transition to the market to make our point we consider the likely impact of the big bang price decontrol on a former socialist economy with particular attention to the welfare consequences for the consumer of eliminating shortages and queues the costs of monopoly power of state enterprises the possibility of major disruptions in the intermediate goods markets and the politico economic issues involved copyright 1991 by oxford university press

aggregate returns to scale in greek manufacturing this paper takes an imperfect competition model of the economy in order to investigate for retuns to scale in greek manufacturing and examines through a small scale macroeconomic model the implication of estimates for this purpose a price wage and demand for output equations are estimated using annual data for the period 1954 94 prices come through the profits maximization process and depend on wage capital rental demand and a number of other variables denoing technology and market competition results are clearly in favour of increasing returns to scale hypothesis although alternative explanations for the negative demand effect on prices cannot be excluded

asymmetric adjustment costs in simple general equilibrium models abstract this paper demonstrates that the introduction of asymmetric adjustment costs in a simple general equilibrium framework establishes a meaningful link between factor price determination and output determination breaking the analytically convenient dichotomy of the heckscher ohlin samuelson model the possibility of trade between seemingly similar countries that differ in their adjustment technologies is visited

the transaction costs paradigm 1998 presidential address western economic association 1998 presidential address western economic association though the idea can be traced to david hume and adam smith the path breaking first economic analysis of transaction costs did not occur until 1937 when ronald coase published the nature of the firm 1 stigler and boulding perspicaciously reprinted coase s paper in the famous aea readings in price theory 1952 but for a quarter of a century it had no real impact on the profession in the 1940s two significant works were published which touched on transaction costs but these sparks did not ignite a fire 2 the transaction costs paradigm began to blossom in the early 1960s again it was coase who supplied the primum mobile his great paper on social cost was published in early 1961 though aaron director dated that issue of journal of law and economics as 1960 ronald had company this time george stigler s article on information cost came out later the same year and kenneth arrow s work on the appropriability of returns to inventions appeared in 1962 3 the combined wisdom of three brilliant men would perhaps not have been enough except that by the early 1960s science was on their side jargonistic articles on economic development flooded the journals throughout the 1950s but by 1960 economists were beginning to question the explanatory power of this kind of economics after the clarion call of friedman s work on the consumption function a few years earlier in 1957 the great methodological debate began 4 the demand for testable implications was becoming more vociferous by the day and the tendency for economists to be policy oriented was losing hold as the keynesian revolution waned 5 the tide of economic explanation was beginning to swell and the transaction costs paradigm was the beautiful goddess who emerged from the foam i began graduate work at ucla in 1961 and after my ma a year later i turned to audit the price theory lectures of jack hirshleifer and armen alchian the straight as student who knew by heart everything about market imperfections was told that this kind of knowledge did not count by 1963 graduate students at ucla s department of economics were all talking property rights and transaction costs now i knew coase and stigler by heart and could even handle the questions on pricing behavior and mergers at the end of friedman s price theory 1962 moreover i was the luckiest of the lot because in late 1963 armen gave me a copy of a manuscript by harold demsetz 6 one of the great expositors of our time harold wrote about property rights and transaction costs with such clarity and force that i decided then and there to work on these topics for my doctorate since that time my research has all been on the same track in this address i shall confine discussion of the transaction costs paradigm to my own involvement this limitation is imposed by necessity i like to sail the strange seas of thought alone and have seldom read other people s publications with the seriousness they deserve after i left chicago in 1969 from 1976 to 1982 i spent my time on contracts in the petroleum industry and from 1982 to now my research has concentrated on economic reforms in china although these works are all transaction costs oriented the former is not in print because it is proprietary while the latter has mostly been published in chinese after more than half a lifetime on the seashore however i feel it is time to share my small collection of pebbles with colleagues in the wea still you would not be wrong if you feel that i am addressing the subject as if i were a stranger returning from another planet i the nature of transaction costs transaction costs must be defined to be all the costs which do not exist in a robinson crusoe economy this broad definition is necessary because it is often impossible to separate one type of transaction cost from another the toll collector of a bridge serves not only transacting customers but also police against trespassers

the bias in centrally planned prices the historical verdict must be surely in on the great central planning experiment soviet block economies are fleeing central planning philosophy in droves nonetheless the brute fact constraining movement from central planning to market economy is the necessity of vastly increasing prices kurtzman 1988 the point of this note is to look back on the central planning debate of the 1930s and 40s with the perfect wisdom of hindsight and ask why none of the participants predicted this answer by an easy process of elimination we focus on the anti central planning side of the debate after all if disinterested members of the pro central planning side of the debate after all if disinterested members of the pro central planning side had reached the correct answer surely they would have switched sides the brunt of the anti central planning position was carried by two alone von mises and hayek so we reconsider their arguments using a bit of statistical notation to sharpen the points at issue the argument is that von mises and hayek focused on the complex technical issues in involved in central planning and ignored the simple incentives facing planners a concluding speculation is offered as to why neither von mises nor hayek got it right

structure and performance the task of economic history jhe cliometric revolution in ecoknomic history wedded neoclassical economics and quantitative methods in order to describe and explain the performance of economies in the past economic history gained in rigor and scientific pretension but at the expense of exploring a much more fundamental set of questions about the evolving structure of economies that underlies performance 2 cliometricians have turned their backs on a long tradition stretching back from joseph schumpeter to karl marx to adam smith these scholars regarded economic history as essential because it added a dimension to economics its purpose was to analyze the parameters held constant by the economist if economics is a theory of choice subject to specified constraints a task of economic history was to theorize about those evolving constraints the failure of economic historians to provide their colleagues with a historical dimension to their perspective has reduced the effectiveness of economists in dealing with contemporary problems failure of economists to appreciate the transitory character of the assumed constraints and to understand the source and direction of these changing constraints is a fundamental handicap to further development of economic theory the challenge to the economic historian which has equally compelling implications for the economic theorist is to explain the transformation of the structure of the american economy in the past century 3 in the rest of this essay i shall explore this issue in order to specify some of the dimensions of the economic historian s task

hedonic theory bid rents and willingness to pay some extensions of ellickson s results abstract an alternative to ellickson s multinomial logit model of household bids for dwelling units is derived by making use of observable information on the price paid by the winning bidder the alternative specification makes it possible to estimate willingness to pay for housing attributes which cannot be obtained from ellickson s model some methodological issues arising from ellickson s method of grouping households are also examined

some observations on power and property rights in the inland fisheries of bangladesh abstract this paper examines the causes behind the failure of the fishermen to establish property rights over fishing grounds in the inland fisheries of bangladesh property rights are eventually transferred to socially powerful agents called the lessees who are not part of the fishing community differential costs of establishing and maintaining property rights have been observed as the key element behind the transfer of rights this differential cost stems from power asymmetries and consequently more rent is generally realizable by the lessees differential capacity to realize rent creates the potential for an exchange of rights between them 1997 elsevier science ltd all rights reserved

divergence in alternative hicksian welfare measures the case of revealed preference for public amenities this paper investigates the divergence between the two hicksian welfare measures of non traded amenity improvement associated with housing first the hicksian surplus measures for amenity changes are analytically developed based on explicit specification of utility structures a hedonic two stage approach is then applied to empirically show that for quantity changes in contrast to hypothetical markets divergence in real market is small the paper also analytically develops expressions for the income and substitution effects and empirically shows that for a given income effect the greater the substitution effect the smaller the divergence between the two measures copyright 2002 john wiley sons ltd

a coasian perspective on informal rights assignment among waste pickers in the philippines this paper examines in light of the coase theorem how delineation of a degree of enforceable rights for a previously open access dumpsite in the philippines would affect market transactions of waste pickers it shows that a simplistic exclusion solution was not enough to constrain rent dissipation of recyclables in the primeval land fill some intervention of non government organisations backed by some initial government assistance were found helpful in reducing transaction costs to sustain operations and promote innovations and initiatives from the scavengers themselves despite obvious external economic difficulties

the estimation of demand parameters in hedonic price models this paper shows that the econometric problem of estimating hedonic demand parameters is not a standard identification problem caused by demand supply interaction as has been often assumed estimation procedures based on this assumption lead to biased results the hedonic estimation problem is instead caused by the endogeneity of both prices and quantities when households face a nonlinear budget constraint an instrumental variables solution to this problem is suggested using instruments that exogenously shift the budget constraint

new institutional economics in the post socialist transformation debate the paper suggests that there is a tension between the basic tenant of new institutional economics nie and the manner in which it has been applied in the debate on post socialist transformation this tension is explored in the context of four main perspectives on nie i property rights ii transaction costs economics iii new economic history and iv evolutionary economics there are two main arguments the first is that the transformation phase should be seen as open ended rather than a closed process where the pure market is the inevitable end result the second is that although the nie literature touches on most of the issues which are relevant to post socialist transformation the insights that it offers are still too general for policy guidance

price distortion and shortage deformation or what happened to the soap the model of this paper generalizes the classical theory of consumer behavior to the more general case of prices that are not necessarily market clearing suppose that in addition to the money cost some sort of search waiting or other quasi fixed effort cost is needed to obtain goods the presence of this quasi fixed cost element will trigger an inventory policy a shortage equilibrium occurs when effort costs are such that in the corresponding inventory policy the flow of desired consumption does not exceed the available supply flow stock hoarding a critical phenomenon in the economics of shortage emerges as a natural component of this model a complete characterization of a stationary shortage equilibrium is given comparative statics and welfare analysis are performed the dynamic transition between steady states is analyzed to give insight into the mechanics of how shortages develop copyright 1991 by american economic association

households willingness to pay for public housing in the presence of price controls nonmarket housing allocation mechanisms such as queueing prevent households from revealing their marginal willingness to pay for housing through market prices we derive the households marginal willingness to pay using the intuitive idea that the length of the queue for a specific house reflects the households willingness to pay for housing characteristics we apply our methodology to public housing in the amsterdam metropolitan area and show that on average the households marginal willingness to pay for a unit of public housing is close to its marginal costs this suggests that the welfare loss of public housing through distortions in housing supply is rather limited and is mainly through distortions in housing demand we provide indirect evidence of the latter by showing that queueing induces inefficient matching of households and housing

implicit taxes collected by state liquor monopolies state monopolization or taxation aresupposedly justified because of negativeexternalities from alcohol consumption butrecent research questions the efficacy ofsuch policies suggesting that their actualgoals may be revenue generation consideration of this hypothesis isfacilitated by estimates of the implicittaxes charged in monopoly states whichgenerally are substantially higher thantaxes in non monopoly states evidencethat monopolization and high taxes do notaffect the level of externalities is alsoexplained by adjustments that rationalindividuals make to avoid the consequencesof such policies thus providing furthersupport for the revenue maximizationhypothesis

the impact of rent control on rents in the free sector in most cases rent control covers only a part of the housing stock this note provides a simple analysis of the impact which rent control and non price rationing exert on the rent in the free sector it is shown that depending on the rationing mechanism rents in the free sector can be higher or lower than in the absence of rent controls

deriving benefit measures with higher precision a study of economic values of air quality a calibration strategy using ridge regression to generate more precise estimates for a particular parameter in a model is proposed formulae to compute the proposed ridge estimates from standard ordinary least squares ols results are provided the strategy is applied to recomputing marginal effects of air pollution on property values for 30 housing studies results show that ridge estimates are superior to the ols estimates under the mean squared error criterion the same strategy can be used to reestimate key parameters of interest in other applications such as price elasticities for demand forecasts or the value of a statistical life from hedonic wage regressions

economists and public policy chicago political economy versus conventional views both conventional welfare economics and public choice analysis suggest that economists have an important educational role to play in the public policy process in improving the decision making process in sharp contrast information and incentive problems related to voting rules the bureaucracy and the legislature do not arise in cpe because these processes are all perfect agents of interest groups consequently the political process is efficient and there is no scope for beneficial economic analysis as it relates to the sugar program or other public policies that is the polity is efficient or it would be reordered by competing interest groups to make it so but as mitchell 1989 290 stresses the important unanswered question in cpe remains if there is no scope for improvement how and why does change occur

rationing and rent dissipation in the presence of heterogeneous individuals this paper discusses the implications of rationing by waiting when consumers have different time costs and personal valuations the joint distribution function of time costs and personal valuations is used to characterize market equilibrium it is argued that under certain conditions an increase in the variance of time costs will reduce the dissipation of rent furthermore it is shown that introducing a secondary market for a rationed good does not necessarily improve welfare because total surplus under rationing by waiting depends more on the variance than on the level of time costs and personal valuations the model is also used to discuss other institutions that involve rent seeking activities such as the patent system and import quotas

an alternative test of the hedonic theory of housing markets abstract in this paper the hedonic theory of housing markets is used to generate a multinomial logit model of household behavior in an urban housing market application of hedonic theory to housing markets is by now fairly familiar and a link to multinomial logit has also been established however by emphasizing more heavily the bid price interpretation of hedonic theory this paper develops a new connection to econometric estimation that essentially involves running the usual logit equations in reverse one advantage of this approach is that the link between the logit equations and hedonic theory involves bid price rather than utility functions and this in turn permits the empirical results to be given an extremely clear interpretation furthermore in contrast to the standard logit model the extreme value distribution required to justify the estimation technique emerges endogenously as part of the analysis

state business cycles and their relationship to the national cycle structural and institutional determinants during business cycles state and regional incomes fluctuate in the same direction as national income in some states and regions income fluctuates more than the national average in other states and regions it fluctuates less although no general explanation for differences in business cycles across states exists an influential set of explanations focuses on differences in price flexibility gordon 2 3 has discussed the employment implications of sticky prices and made some international comparisons of unemployment rates his results imply that decreased price flexibility leads to increased variability of income and employment olson 6 7 and colander and olson 1 have suggested that differences in state unemployment rates arise from differences in price flexibility differences in price flexibility in turn originate in differences in structural characteristics and institutions 2 if a state s structure and institutions allow prices to be flexible most of the adjustment to changes in aggregate demand will be made by prices rather than output if a state s institutions tend to enforce price rigidity most of the adjustment to changes in aggregate demand will be made by output rather than prices the absence of acceptable state price indices prevents direct tests of the hypothesis that differences in price flexibility explain differences in income variability across states the inability to measure price flexibility by state turns out not to be a serious problem however because we are primarily interested in what determines the magnitude of fluctuations in state income institutional and structural differences across states lead to the differences in price flexibility that cause differences in the business cycle price flexibility is merely the transmission mechanism moreover it may not be the only transmission mechanism structural and institutional factors may affect state business cycles through a host of channels we will therefore focus directly on the relationship between structures and institutions and state business cycles by adopting such a procedure we may miss a particular transmission variable but we will be more likely to identify the total effect of structure and institutions on performance institutional and structural variables will be compared across states rather than regions an attractive alternative we used states rather than regions because states embody the political

the decline of township and village enterprises in china s economic transition summary a paradoxical phenomenon in china s transitional economy is that markets developed under predominant public ownership which nevertheless has declined with the development of markets previous studies reveal that initial political and economic conditions of reform and fiscal decentralization gave rise to local public enterprises leading role in early marketization this paper explains the subsequent fall of such a role building and expanding on recent studies of privatization we argue that market development and competition have constrained the abilities of local public enterprises to address revenue and employment imperatives whereas local governments sales oriented growth strategies have exacerbated governance problems panel data are analyzed to provide provisional test of pertinent hypotheses

combining revealed and stated data to examine housing decisions using discrete choice analysis abstract this paper uses stated preference and revealed preference data separately and jointly to examine individuals housing choices in particular it combines an established revealed preference approach discrete choice analysis of actual housing purchases and a relatively new stated preference approach choice based conjoint analysis of hypothetical housing purchases to provide us with a better understanding of the factors driving housing decisions these methods are appropriately combined since they reflect the same decision process households select the dwelling that provides the best combination of attributes from the feasible set of alternatives in total this paper analyzes three data sets only actual housing purchases only hypothetical housing purchases and both types of purchases combined analysis finds that actual and hypothetical housing purchases are similar decision processes with respect to some attributes yet are dissimilar with respect to other attributes nevertheless combining the two types of data improves identification of both categories of attributes journal of economic literature classification number r21

job search and cyclical unemployment a model economy is described that integrates job search and signal extraction analysis equilibrium differs from search models without signal extraction in that even with a fixed real sector unemployment fluctuates stochastically it differs from standard signal extraction models because search introduces persistence in fact unemployment follows a second order difference equation with coefficient that are functions of current and lagged values of the stochastic shocks thus the model has the potential to mimic actual business cycle data despite the fact that the underlying shocks are independently and identically distributed policy implications are discussed

might makes rights a theory of the formation and initial distribution of property rights this paper is a theoretical and empirical investigation into the formation and initial distribution of property rights violence is singled out as a major constraint on this formation process its role is explicitly modeled in a choice theoretic framework and some of the implications are tested using data collected from contracts written during the california gold rush of 1848

institutions and economic growth an historical introduction abstract in this essay the interdependence of political and economic institutions is examined against premises in neoclassical theories of economies which maintain that population and savings are the principal determinants of economic growth that institutions matter in the development of economies is the difference in assumptions i examine i look at the institutional frameworks that preceded adoption of the united states constitution and the northwest ordinance in early america i then trace the precedents of these american institutions to the evolution of common law in england where interests unconcerned with the crown coalesced to form competing political units i then contrast england s institutional development with the comparatively centralized enforcement mechanisms of spain to examine the hypothesis that institutional differences produce economic consequences

state governance evolution in resource rich transition economies an application to russia and kazakhstan following a decade of transition in the former soviet union fsu governance of the oil and gas sectors has evolved to economic nationalism in the newly independent states this has manifested itself through greater direct state ownership or participation in oil and gas production at the expense of both domestic in the case of russia and international oil companies as well as legislative developments that increase the flow of oil and gas value to the state here we analyse some of the dynamics giving rise to economic nationalism within a model of a state capacity and the ability to implement policy and extract value our analysis is based on the institutional and economic functioning of the oil and gas sector we analyse a vector of institutions and examine production sharing agreements and national oil companies

the productivity slowdown the oil shocks and the real cycle f ive facts stand out about economic performance in the united states since world war ii the first is that for most of the postwar period the u s has had a slower rate of economic growth than the other major developed democracies except great britain and much lower rates of growth than germany japan and italy the gap between the growth of per capita income of the united states and comparable countries has however tended to diminish over time and the united states has lately grown at about the same rate as most other developed countries the second outstanding fact is that the united states has fallen far behind in many mass production industries in which it used to lead the world whereas it is ahead of other nations in many new and especially high technology industries in automobiles steel tires household appliances and earth moving and farm equipment for example u s production has fallen dramatically in relation to output in most comparable countries and the country has become a net importer of most such products by contrast in newer industries such as computers jet aircraft sophisticated weaponry and high technology in general the united states is often dominant both as producer and exporter the third outstanding fact is that most of the older heartland of american industry roughly the area north and east of an arc drawn from baltimore to st louis to milwaukee has declined dramatically in comparison with the south and the west this change in regional fortunes has been due in large part to migration motivated by differences in economic prospects from the declining to the advancing

appropriation violent enforcement and transaction costs a critical survey this paper focuses on the extension of transaction costs to appropriative activity and coercive power in the property rights approach it has been argued that including the costs of appropriation and violent enforcement in transaction costs is based on the assumption that coaseian bargaining can be extended to any institutional scenario i e voluntary as well as coercive exchange however voluntary transactions cannot capture the logic of coercive power this means that the assumption of an efficient political market is not valid and that the political coase theorem lacks the logical consistency to provide a cornerstone for political theory

valuing air quality with hedonic and discrete choice models environmental economists have been using property values in attempts to measure the value residents place on air quality as far back as the 1960s however in the years since then we have learned a great deal about how complex valuing nonmarginal changes in air quality is rosen presented a hedonic model that is still extremely influential today but the estimation strategy he outlined in that paper had some shortcomings many of these identification and endogeneity issues were corrected subsequently in papers such as palmquist 1984 parsons and bartik but none of these papers concentrated on environmental issues a central issue in estimating the demand or marginal willingness to pay functions for characteristics of housing is the identification of those behavioral functions as distinct from

explaining differences in state growth catching up versus olson in this paper we have tested various explanations for differences in rates of economic growth across states we found no evidence consistent with olson s hypothesis that differences in state age a proxy for the strength of special interest groups can explain differences in state growth furthermore our results indicate that a regression containing only initial income explains most of the variation in the growth of state income in sum a good part of the more rapid growth of southern and other fast growing states is simply a convergence to the national average this convergence is an expected result of basic economic theory given free trade in goods and factors our results are however not necessarily a rejection of the olson hypothesis it may well be that the hypothesis should only be applied to comparisons between nation states not to comparisons between political divisions of the same nation state the institutional and political similarities of the american states may swamp the differences and make the olson hypothesis inapplicable the tendencies cited by olson may indeed be present in the american economy but their differential effect is much too small to explain any of the variation in economic performance across states

adjustment costs production functions and capital labour substitution in greek manufacturing 1958 80 treating adjustment costs as part of the decision maker s objective function a differential system of factor demand equations is derived and estimated jointly with a ces production function using data for greek manufacturing estimates of production function parameters and adjustment cost functions are thus obtained the results show that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is slightly higher than one increasing or constant returns to scale exist for most manufacturing branches there is considerable technical progress of around 4 adjustment cost due to investment and employement changes are responsible for an annual loss of 8 54 of output whereas labour seems to be used inefficiently in greek manufacturing

dynamic factor demands under imperfect competition the greek manufucturing industry 1958 1981 the intertemporal maximization problem of the firm under adjustment costs for its factors of production and imperfect competition in the output market is considered the first order conditions with respect to capital and labour the production function and the demand equation have been jointly estimated using greek manufacturing data and values for the structural parameters have been obtained the estimates are plausible and most of them significant tests of the overidentifying restirctions are unable to reject the overall specification of the model at conventional levels of significance

the misallocation of housing under rent control the standard analysis of price controls assumes that goods are efficiently allocated even when there are shortages but if shortages mean that goods are randomly allocated across the consumers that want them the welfare costs from misallocation may be greater than the undersupply costs we develop a framework to empirically test for misallocation the methodology compares consumption patterns for demographic subgroups in rent controlled and free market places we find that in new york city which is rent controlled an economically and statistically significant fraction of apartments appears to be misallocated across demographic subgroups jel c25 d12 d61 r20

why economic reforms fail in the soviet system a property rights based approach jan winiecki why do economic reforms fail in soviet type systems despite the obvious interest of ruling groups in improving the performance of their ailing economies the author applies a property rights based analysis stressing modes of rent maximization by ruling groups as a crucial explanatory variable party apparatchiks and economic bureaucrats particularly benefit from persistent interference in the economic sphere and consequently are most interested in maintaining the status quo the author surveys the impact of these motivations on the content of economic reforms outlines the strategies of counterreformers and predicts the future of reforms in soviet type economies 1 introduction in analyzing the disequilibrium characteristics of contemporary western economies mancur olson 1982 1984a 1984b agrees with the neoclassical macroeconomists in finding that given the tendencies of markets to clear and given the rational expectations of economic agents any disequilibrium indicates that all mutually advantageous transactions have not been consummated having made this point however he asks what can make agents ignore the potential gains from unconsummated transactions and turns his attention toward the structure of incentives and thus of institutions and policies olson insists and rightly so that a satisfactory static and dynamic macroeconomic theory has to explain who among key actors has the incentive to generate economic growth and equilibrate the economy and who does not furthermore no government even an authoritarian one has an incentive to generate serious recessions or disequilibria olson 1984a 637 writes that even in dictatorial systems the dictator has an incentive to make the economy of the country he controls work better since this will generate more tax receipts he can use as he pleases and usually also reduce dissent olson s arguments about incentives institutions and disequilibria offer an ideal basis for an inquiry into why reforms fail in soviet type economies stes in olson s theories of incentives the old roman principle of criminal law cui prodest who gained is applied to modem economies and the results suggest that contrary to widespread opinion it is not necessarily the small but powerful group of high and highest leaders that stands to gain most in terms of power and privilege from the preservation of the existing order a powerful political elite could satisfy its desires for both power and privilege through an alternative undemocratic system one which involves authoritarian don ts rather than totalitarian do s in that perspective the inefficient system of economic control typical in stes involving centrally planned production goals and input rationing would not be a condition sine qua non of an authoritarian solution since totalitarian command and control systems persist however one must seek groups other than the powerful and privileged few which have incentives to resist reforms and keep the economy inefficient the following sections identify the membership and motives of groups having strong incentives to keep the stes inefficient and prevent successful i e market oriented reforms we show how those groups operate and analyze their effects on the economic performance of their countries first the incentives for these groups to prevent decentralized management in the state sector are spelled out then their incentives to prevent the expansion of the more efficient private sector are outlined third having identified who benefits from the status quo and why the paper discusses when and how market oriented reforms are aborted limited or reversed by those who stand to gain from the reforms failure the last two sections consider the prospects of current attempts at economic reform in three specific countries poland the ussr and china and the prospects for economic reform in stes more generally

take the money and run political turnover rent seeking and economic growth abstract we find a negative and significant relationship between gubernatorial turnover and u s state economic growth although our finding of an inverse relationship between growth and political instability may seem to contradict olson s 1982a famous hypothesis regarding the growth retarding nature of political stability such constitutional political changes were not primarily what olson had in mind we argue that enhanced political turnover is associated with more rent seeking since payoffs to focusing on special interest redistributive policies vs general growth enhancing ones are greater for less durable regimes therefore we interpret our evidence as supportive of olson s broader argument concerning the negative affect of rent seeking behavior on growth

a theory of price control price or rent control is but one of many forms of legislative action which interfere with private contracting in the market place to delimit the scope of my analysis i shall use the term price control to refer only to any set of regulations which satisfies the following three conditions first the control must fix the price or income terms of private contracts this categorically excludes any laws which regulate the distribution of income among the contracting parties on a share or percentage basis 2 second the control must involve no appropriation of proceeds to or from the government taxation and subsidization are thus excluded finally the fixing of price must not be associated with direct government sales purchases or manipulation of resources so as to maintain the regulated price 3 by this stipulation price support is also excluded even on such terms legal regulations to control price are still many and varied to evaluate our understanding of the class of phenomena which we seek to explain it is essential that we discover implications refutable by facts by this criterion the available body of economic theory pertaining to price control is deficient indeed the massive literature on the subject offers few such implications 4 an alternative approach to analyzing the observable effects of price control is presented here

an empirical investigation into the performance of ellickson s random bidding model with an application to air quality valuation abstract this paper compares ellickson s random bidding model to the standard hedonic model in estimating benefits due to marginal and non marginal changes in housing attributes using data on the chicago housing market the paper shows that the benefit estimates obtained using the two models are very close in addition various categorizations based on household characteristics are tested in the case of the random bidding model the study shows that the effect of categorization on the overall benefit estimates are negligible moreover the results from the random bidding model reveal that increased income leads to greater demand for environmental quality

estimating the structural equations of implicit markets and household production functions whenever marginal prices are nonconstant as in most hedonic and household production function markets ordinary least squares estimates of the price elasticities of structural equations will be biased a two stage least squares estimation procedure is developed and applied to estimate hedonic and potentially household production function demand functions when price gradients are nonlinear

public sector pricing and the real exchange rate we examine the effects of consumption subsidies public enterprise pricing and price controls on the real exchange rate under plausible assumptions we show that permanent reform in these areas leads to a permanent real exchange rate appreciation an empirical application to the 1990 fujimori plan in peru is discussed redistribution purposes sometimes even to buy votes by populist leaders since economic reform usually requires the shutting down of loans from the central bank to parastatals reducing consumption subsidies and increasing public enterprise prices price reform plays an important role in imf and world bank programmes edwards 1989a for example found that public enterprise price increases and reductions in consumption subsidies were involved in 79 and 44 per cent respectively of imf programmes between 1983 and 1985 trade reforms in contrast were present in just 35 per cent of cases to date the real exchange rate effects of public sector price policies have

government manipulation of constitutional level transaction costs a general theory of transaction cost augmentation and the growth of government transaction costs are pivotal to the ongoing political choice of where to draw the line between the private sector and the public sector contrary to the dominant paradigm politically important transaction costs are actively manipulated in the public sector by those who perceive potential personal gain from such action over time transaction cost changes so created by government decision makers may fundamentally redefine the role and scope of government to analyze the role of transaction costs in the growth or decline of government it is essential to distinguish transaction costs that are unavoidable realworld constraints from those that are contrived in the sense that they are created by government officials use or extension of their existing authority once discretionary power is vested in the government its officials have both the capacity and the incentive to restructure the transaction costs constraining the revision ofgovernrnental authority this restructuring of transaction costs may take two forms 1 altering people s perceptions of the costs and benefits of governmental authority in a given sphere an information cost problem 1 2 altering the cost of acting upon one s perceptions of the costs and benefits of collectivization in order to procure revision of the scope of governmental authority 2

hedonic prices and implicit markets estimating demand and supply functions for differentiated products in choosing the level of quality to purchase the buyer of a differentiated product also chooses a point on the marginal price schedule for that product hence in general the demand functions for product characteristics cannot be consistently estimated by ordinary least squares market equilibrium results in a matching of characteristics of demanders and suppliers this matching restricts the use of buyer and seller characteristics as instruments when estimating demand and supply functions for product characteristics the paper develops these issues a stochastic structure for hedonic equilibrium models is then proposed identification results are presented and estimation procedures are outlined

empirical advances in political economy editor s note i wish to thank coeditor mark zupan who took responsibility for organizing and implementing both the special symposium on public choice and the processing of papers through the refereeing and editorial process for this special section on behalf of all the editors i also would like to express thanks to carolyn williams editorial coordinator for taking on yet another responsibility in arranging the conference symposium meetings and the management of the files the symposium on public choice was held at lake tahoe during the 1993 we a meetings the many efforts of authors referees editors and staff have resulted in an exciting complement to this year s economic inquiry offerings

lottery or waiting line auction abstract this paper studies the efficiencies of the two most widely used non price allocation mechanisms lotteries and waiting line auctions as our analysis suggests in addition to the fairness of the mechanism the use of lotteries in lieu of waiting line auctions can be also justified from an efficiency point of view in particular we show that the less dispersed consumers time valuations are the more efficient is a lottery relative to a waiting line auction in addition we identify four conditions under which a lottery dominates a waiting line auction in expected social surplus preserving furthermore the numerical simulations we conduct indicate that over a predominantly wide range of circumstances a lottery is more socially efficient than a waiting line auction as an allocative mechanism in the absence of a conventional price system

beyond keynesianism and monetarism though there is consensus among economists about microeconomic theory neither the keynesian nor the monetarist theory of macroeconomics has attracted a consensus presumably because neither is compelling enough to persuade the skeptical a new approach to the subject that combines insights from each of the familiar schools with considerations that both schools have overlooked is accordingly offered here this argument accepts the evidence that involuntary unemployment and depressions sometimes occur and thus rejects the finding of the new classical or equilibrium macroeconomics that markets always clear and that all individuals and firms are in equilibrium it also rejects the keynesian assumption of wages or prices arbitrarily fixed at disequilibrium levels and insists that any adequate theory must show what interests are served by the existence of involuntary unemployment the theory offered here shows that an institutional or organizational arrangement common in all societies which have experienced widespread unemployment and deep recessions entails that many firms and individuals will be in disequilibrium this disequilibrium becomes more severe when there is unexpected deflation or disinflation the disequilibrium is of precisely the type commonplace in recessions and entails involuntary unemployment the theory also shows how groups of individuals and firms can gain from practices that entail involuntary unemployment and underutilization of resources for others