endogenous timing in games of commercial policy this paper analyzes various equilibria associated with intervention in trade in the context of noncooperative policy games with endogenous timing it is shown that while the subgame perfect equilibria in quota games always involve sequential play that is not necessarily the case in tariff games one implication of the analysis is that in contrast to existing theory trade is not eliminated in quota games another implication is that quotas are not necessarily inferior to tariffs the paper also examines the ways policy leaders and followers differ in their preferences over instruments and allows the choice over instruments to be determined endogenously this paper analyses various equilibria associated with intervention in trade in the context on non cooperative policy games with endogenous timing it is shown that while the subgame perfect equilibria in quota games always involve sequential play that is not necessarily the case in tariff games one implication of the analysis is that in contrast to existing theory trade is not eliminated in quota games another implication is that quotas are not necessarily inferior to tariffs the paper also examines the ways policy leaders and followers differ in their preferences over instruments and allows the choice over instruments to be determined endogenously

rent seeking in u s government budgets 1900 88 a measure of waste from the competitive rent seeking activity of special interest groups in federal state and local budgets was calculated over the period 1900 88 this period in u s fiscal history is characterized by constitutional changes that have made for more transparency in governmental fiscal activities and for greater diffusion of taxes the xvi amendment to the constitution created the progressive individual income tax the corporate income tax was judged to be an excise tax in 1909 and passed the test of constitutionality high marginal tax rates are a justification for a high average level of taxation the full employment act of 1946 insitutionalized government deficits as a means of meeting a political objective as a result opportunities for rent seeking through budgetary reallocations rose in the united states in the first two decades of the 20th century waste at all levels of government represented about 10 percent of incremental national output today waste is three times that amount the transparency and diffusion of taxes are highest at the federal level and least at the local level rent seeking through budgetary reallocation has followed the public purse one explanation for the observed centralization of government in the 20th century may be that opportunities to concentrate benefits and diffuse taxes are highest at the federal level finally the withdrawal of resources from the productive economy to pursue rent seeking in government budgets lowers the rate of real economic growth i find that rent seeking through budget reallocations has had a significant and large negative effect on the growth rate

contests with multiple rounds this paper studies contests where players have the flexibility to add to their previous efforts after observing their rivals most recent effort in an intermediate stage it is found that 1 contrary to previous findings the stackelberg outcome where the underdog leads and the favorite follows cannot be an equilibrium 2 there are multiple subgame perfect equilibria all occurring on the underdog s usual one shot reaction function in between and including the one shot cournot nash and stackelberg outcome with the favorite leading 3 the total equilibrium effort is typically greater than or equal to what a one shot cournot nash play would predict and 4 in settings where players can choose whether or not to disclose their early actions to the rival both the favorite and the underdog disclose in equilibrium applications in sports lobbying and r d races are discussed

efforts in two sided contests the degree of rent dissipation is studied in extended two sided contests that in volve two types of efforts while usual contestants expend resources in trying to win the contested prize potential recipients of the rent seeking efforts also participate in the con test this is due to uncertainty regarding the source of power in the contest that induces the bureaucrats to expend resources to increase their share in the rent seeking efforts by try ing to appear as the party controlling the allocation of the prize we show that the existing theoretical and empirical studies are incomplete and may underestimate the extent of rent dissipation

beyond capital fundamentalism harrod domar and the history of development economics the origins of capital fundamentalism the notion that physical capital accumulation is the primary determinant of economic growth have been often ascribed to harrod s and domar s proposition that the rate of growth is the product of the saving rate and of the output capital ratio it is argued here that development planners in the 1950s reinterpreted and adapted the growth formula to their agenda in order to calculate capital requirements development economists at the time lewis hirschman rostow and others were aware that harrod s and domar s growth models addressed economic instability based on keynesian multiplier analysis which differed from their concern with long run growth in developing economies harrod eventually applied his concept of the natural growth rate to economic development he claimed that the growth of developing economies was determined by their ability to implement technical progress not by capital accumulation subject to diminishing returns domar pointed out that the incremental capital output ratio was more likely a passive result of the interaction between the propensity to save and technological progress instead of a causal factor in the determination of growth

perfectly secure property rights and production inefficiencies in tullock contests from the point of view of institutional economics property rights are an instrument to shape individual incentives efficiently for the case of a tullock contest with endogenously determined rent i analyze the circumstances under which perfectly secure property rights emerge in an economy where the security of property is endogenously determined i analyze different sequential structures for the determination of defensive and appropriative investments and determine the equilibrium sequence of moves if the sequential structure is endogenous it turns out that in subgames where perfectly secure property rights emerge incentives for production are still inefficient in addition it can be shown that the endogenous determination of moves leads to a sequence of events that result in open conflict even if perfectly secure property rights would have been an alternative

what is the aggregate economic rate of return to foreign aid in recent years academic studies have been converging towards the view that foreign aid promotes aggregate economic growth we employ a simulation approach to i validate the coherence of empirical aid growth studies published since 2008 and ii calculate plausible ranges for the rate of return to aid our results highlight the long run nature of aid financed investments and the importance of channels other than accumulation of physical capital we find the return to aid lies in ranges commonly accepted for public investments and there is little to justify the view that aid has had a significant pernicious effect on productivity

the distribution of income in the presence of appropriative activities we examine the distribution of income when agents allocate their initial endowments between production and appropriation arms investments influence or rent seeking activities final output depends on the productive contributions of the agents but is divided between them according to their relative contributions in appropriation various possible improvements in an agent s useful productivity reduce the agent s equilibrium share of income but increases in initial endowments increase an agent s share we contrast our results to those that would obtain in the competitive counterpart to our model and discuss its relevance both for history and for the present the results extend to a class of models where distribution is determined between two groups of agents with agents within each group behaving non cooperatively but without exhibiting the free rider problem

environmental conflicts and the slapp abstract a citizen has the right to challenge a firm s actions regarding development plans or violations of environmental laws firms have responded with the slapp strategic lawsuit against public participation fearing the loss of the constitutional right to petition several u s states have or are considering explicitly restricting the slapp for a class of environmental conflict models with one sided asymmetric information our results suggest that restricting the slapp does not increase the efficiency of the dispute

comprehensive wealth and future consumption accounting for population growth economic theory predicts that the current change in national wealth broadly defined to include natural and human capital as well as produced capital genuine savings determines whether the present value of future changes in consumption is positive or negative theoretical research has focused on the effects of population growth on this relation but no rigorous empirical investigation has been conducted panel data for 64 developing countries during 1970 82 are used to test the effects of three adjustments for population growth including one that controls for omitted wealth although the adjustments have substantial impacts on estimates of genuine savings they lead to only limited improvements in the relation between those estimates and subsequent consumption changes even without adjustments for population growth adjustments for natural resource depletion improve the relation significantly policymakers and economists can interpret published estimates of genuine savings as signals of future consumption paths if and only if the estimates include adjustments for natural resource depletion but better estimates of capital stocks are needed before it can be confidently said that adjustments for population growth significantly improve the accuracy of those signals

reexamining efficient rent seeking in laboratory markets given millner and pratt s 1989 finding of behavior inconsistent with theory we reexamine efficient rent seeking in experimental markets we show that a when r 3 no nash equilibrium exists and therefore behavior has no theoretical benchmark to judge consistency and b when r 1 with a new experimental design utilizing an explicit expected payoff matrix rent seeking behavior is consistent with both nash equilibrium and dissipation hypotheses

the dynamic implications of foreign aid and its variability abstract the paper examines the effects of aid and its volatility on consumption investment and the structure of production in the context of an intertemporal two sector general equilibrium model calibrated using data for aid dependent countries in africa a permanent flow of aid mainly finances consumption rather than investment consistent with the historical failure of aid inflows to translate into sustained growth large aid flows are associated with higher real exchange rates and smaller tradable sectors because aid is a substitute for tradable consumption aid volatility results in substantial welfare losses providing a motivation for recent discussions of aid architecture stressing the need for greater predictability of aid these results are also consistent with evidence from cross country regressions of manufactured exports presented later in the paper

fixed capital stock depreciation in developing countries some evidence from firm level data previous growth accounting studies suggest severe capital underutilisation and mismeasurement of the stocks of capital in some developing countries using the firm level data sets from the world ba

orchestrating rent seeking contests contests have different sometimes quite complex organisational structures in particular while most of the existing literature focusses on simultaneous contests multistage contests are also quite frequently encountered this paper seeks to provide a rationale for the latter by endogenising the choice of a contest structure which is made by an organiser of a contest interested in maximising the efforts expended by the contenders

strategic investment with asymmetric spillovers this paper investigates the implications of asymmetric spillovers on noncooperative strategic investments in a duopoly with quadratic pay offs a unique equilibrium in the announcement of the leader follower role exists in the case where one firm absorbs large spillovers while the other at most is able to receive only small spillovers the leader in this equilibrium is the firm that absorbs the large spillovers other asymmetries in initial costs or efficiency in research and development do not affect this outcome

aid intensity in africa abstract aid to sub saharan africa ssa is falling rapidly after reaching historically high levels in the early 1990s we provide a critical review of aid data and place the resource intensity of current flows in crosscountry and intertemporal perspective aid to ssa is not unusually high given the structural characteristics of african countries but it rose more rapidly than predicted until the mid 1990s we introduce the concept of transactions intensity and show that by some measures the management costs accompanying each dollar of aid to africa are comparatively high

to fight or not to fight an analysis of submission struggle and the design of contests this paper considers the players behaviour in an asymmetric two player contest when do they decide to struggle and when to subjugate analysing contest success functions it is found that two crucial prerequisites for struggle or war have to be met thus such an equilibrium is possible but restrictive if a self interested rule setter chooses the contest success function endogenously we show that one player will always subjugate applications to rent seeking and environmental regulation are discussed

do all countries grow alike abstract this paper investigates the driving forces of output change in 77 countries during the period 1970 2000 a flexible modeling strategy is adopted that accounts for i the inefficient use of resources and ii different production technologies across countries the proposed model can identify technical efficiency and input change for each of three endogenously determined regimes membership in these regimes is estimated rather than determined ex ante this framework enables explorations into the determinants of output growth and convergence issues in each regime

the cost of rent seeking evidence from cellular telephone license lotteries the inventors of the theory of rent seeking used an analogy with competitive markets to conclude that all monopoly rents would be dissipated in the competition to obtain the property rights to them 23 29 subsequent theorists showed that this conclusion is quite sensitive to assumptions about foresight risk aversion conjectures and bias 15 21 30 since little quantitative information about actual rent seeking competitions is available the theory has developed in an empirical vacuum in this paper we attempt to fill that vacuum with an estimate of rent seeking expenditure by applicants in the federal communications commission s fcc cellular telephone license lotteries held between 1986 and 1989 we go on to compare expenditures with estimates of the value of the licenses at stake these lotteries constitute a unique natural experiment any u s citizen was eligible to enter each geographic lottery once and only once for an expense which we calculate as modest the lotteries were widely publicized and heavily entered there were over 320 000 applications one per market filed for 643 cellular licenses and third party application preparers entered the market rapidly because licenses were awarded sequentially prospective participants in later lotteries could find out that expected net returns from earlier lotteries were positive because of undersubscription the value of the prize was known because sales of previously awarded licenses had begun to take place before later lotteries were held and market analysts were using such sale prices to value licenses not yet awarded the later lotteries seem almost optimally contrived to maximize the dissipation of rents yet comparing the resources invested in entry the price of a fully prepared application with the rents available the market value of cellular telephone licenses shows that dissipation was far short of complete

the incidence of overdissipation in rent seeking contests tullock s analysis of rent seeking and overdissipation is reconsidered we show that while equilibrium strategies do not permit overdissipation in expectation for particular realizations of players mixed strategies the total amount spent competing for rents can exceed the value of the prize we also show that the cross sectional incidence of overdissipation in the perfectly discriminating contest ranges from 0 50 to 0 44 as the number of players increases from two to infinity thus even though the original analysis of overdissipation is flawed there are instances in which rent seekers spend more than the prize is worth

strategic behavior in contests comment in an influential paper avinash dixit 1987 considers a class of symmetric two player contests in which each player s effort xi influences the probability of winning a prize valued at k 0 letting p x1 x2 denote the probability 1 that player 1 wins the expected payoffs of the two players are p1 5 p x1 x2 k 2 x1 and p2 5 1 2 p x1 x2 k 2 x2 dixit s main result is that if there is perfect symmetry between the players and each player s effort has a positive but diminishing marginal effect on his or her probability of winning i e

comparative statics of contests and rent seeking games this paper develops the comparative statics properties of a contest encountered in patent races and rent seeking games the author shows that symmetric equilibrium expenditure and profit per player decrease with the number of competitors and the discount rate but increase with the value of the prize a fundamental lemma established in the paper shows that a stability condition usually imposed on the model is automatically satisfied the author identifies a class of likelihood or hazard rate functions for which aggregate expenditure increases with the number of competitors and total profits converge to zero copyright 1997 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

effort levels in contests with two asymmetric players a contest is a situation in which players compete with one another by expending effort to win a prize examples abound firms compete by spending rd 26 krueger 14 posner 20 rogerson 23 appelbaum and katz 1 hillman and riley 12 hirshleifer 13 ellingsen 8 nitzan 18 and baik 2 3 have studied rent seeking contests lazear and rosen 15 o keeffe viscusi and zeckhauser 19 and rosen 24 have examined performance incentives associated with reward schemes riley 22 has analyzed the war of attrition and auctions dixit 7 has considered strategic commitments in contests with different applications these are only a part of the literature on the theory of contests despite the vast literature however the effects of asymmetries between players have not been clarified except by harris and vickers 11 who analyze in a patent race model the strategic consequences of asymmetries the purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of asymmetries between two players on individual and total effort levels in a model with a logit form probability of winning function effort levels expended by the players deserve attention effort in a rent seeking contest is interpreted as social costs and thus total effort level is a measure of economic efficiency effort in an r d contest is interpreted as r d expenditures and thus effort levels determine the expected date of invention we focus on asymmetries between the players resulting from their different valuations of the prize their different abilities to convert effort into probability of winning or both such asymmetries are common in contests for example people in different locations may receive different

when is foreign aid policy credible aid dependence and conditionality the author studies foreign aid policy within a principal agent framework he shows that one reason for foreign aid s poor overall record may be a moral hazard problem that shapes the aid recipient s incentive to undertake structural reform the model s basic prediction is a two way relationship disbursements of foreign aid are guided in part by the needs of the poor anticipating this recipients have little incentive to improve the welfare of the poor preliminary econometric work shows that the data support this hypothesis in principle conditionality could partly solve this problem but only if the donor can make a binding commitment to increase disbursements in good relative to bad states without such a commitment technology aid disbursements remain guided by the needs of the poor and recipient countries maintain a low effort to reduce poverty contrary to the conventional wisdom found in the aid literature the author shows that the welfare of all parties might be improved by using tied project aid or by delegating part of the aid budget to an international agency with less aversion to poverty

the strategic equivalence of rent seeking innovation and patent race games abstract we establish the strategic equivalence of a variety of rent seeking contests innovation tournaments and patent race games the results allow us to disentangle negative and positive externalities and to apply theorems and results intended for rent seeking games to other games and vice versa we conclude with several examples that highlight the practical utility of our results

reinventing foreign aid for inclusive and sustainable development kuznets piketty and the great policy reversal this survey essay reviews over 200 papers in arguing that in order to achieve sustainable and inclusive development foreign aid should not orient developing countries towards industrialisation in the perspective of kuznets but in the view of piketty abandoning the former s view that inequality will fall with progress in industrialisation and placing more emphasis on inequality in foreign aid policy will lead to more sustainable development outcomes inter alia mitigate short term poverty address concerns of burgeoning population growth train recipient governments on inclusive development fight corruption and mismanagement and avoid the shortfalls of celebrated kuznets conjectures we discuss how the essay addresses post 2015 development challenges and provide foreign aid policy instruments with which discussed objectives can be achieved in summary the essay provides useful policy measures to avoid past pitfalls output may be growing and yet the mass of the people may be becoming poorer lewis 1955 lewis led all developing countries to water proverbially speaking some african countries have so far chosen not to drink amavilah 2014 piketty 2014 has led all developing countries to the stream again and a challenging policy syndrome of our time is how foreign aid can help them to drink

on the measurement of rent seeking and its social opportunity cost utilizing 4 digit industry data by county we compare the allocation of resources across industries in state capital areas with noncapital areas we are able to identify which industries are expanded and contracted relative to noncapital areas our results provide the first direct evidence and measurement of the forgone productive activity resulting from resources being reallocated toward rent seeking and interest group activity our data also allow us to measure total rent seeking and also to isolate the extent of indirect and in kind rent seeking which can account for part of the tullock paradox

valuation by conflict abstract nonmarket valuation remains a central issue in ecological and environmental economics this paper examines the properties of an ex post revealed preference approach to value nonmarket goods valuation through observed effort expended in an environmental conflict we consider the strategic interaction between players in a conflict address the implied nash equilibrium and report a benchmark 4x rule as an ex post valuation estimate for a symmetric player conflict we then illustrate the degree of bias that exists once one allows for asymmetries in delegation ability and valuation the benchmark tends to overestimate value if a firm hires a powerful delegate who receives a large contingency fee

strategic behaviour in contests evidence from the 1992 barcelona olympic games analyses of strategic behaviour in contests conclude that the manner in which a contest participant exerts effort over time is systematically related to her status as a pre race underdog or favourite recently baik and shogren 1992 extented dixit s 1987 original work by incorporating endogenous order of moves by the race participants they conclude that it is always in the best interest of the underdog to move first while the favourite s optimal strategy is to wait moving second the particular economic context in which this work was framed e g research and development races makes it extremely difficult to subject the game theoretic conclusions to empirical scrutiny we solve this problem by applying the theoretical hypotheses to the track and field events held during the 1992 barcelona olympics using a fixed effects estimation procedure we find ample support for the conclusions of baik and shogren that favourites tend to start slowly in races and increase effort as the event transpires whi

always vote for principle though you may vote alone explaining united states political support for multilateral development loans summary what motivates the u s when casting votes and to what degree does its formal influence matter in final outcomes in multilateral development banks we first assess the formal influence of the u s on final decisions and find that 64 of projects lacking u s support were nevertheless approved suggesting u s influence is not as strong as previously thought we then test several hypotheses explaining how the u s votes on projects in mdbs we find recipient need is strongly related to u s support and some evidence for both economic and political factors such as trade relations and human rights

risk aversion in rent seeking and rent augmenting games the effects of risk aversion are examined for two types of expenditures in rent seeking contests a rent seeking expenditures which improve the probability that the rent is obtained and b rent augmenting expenditures which increase the size of the rent to be awarded risk aversion is shown to reduce expenditures of type b unambiguously while having an indeterminate effect on those of type a these two contrasting results are shown to derive from the very different effects rent seeking and rent augmenting expenditures have on the riskiness of a player s position

adjustment with growth abstract this paper describes and examines simple versions of the analytical approaches employed by the international monetary fund and the world bank in designing adjustment programs that support their lending activities in the case of the bank this means essentially a variant of the two gap growth model and for the fund a model derived from the monetary approach to the balance of payments an attempt is also made to merge the fund and bank approaches within a consistent framework to demonstrate their complementarity

rent seeking with asymmetric valuations this paper analyzes tullock s rent seeking game with asymmetric valuations for a variable range of the returns to scale parameter a necessary and sufficient condition for a unique pure strategy nash equilibrium is established equilibrium effort and expected profits are determined and subjected to comparative statics analysis increasing the underdog s valuation induces both players to increase their efforts increasing the favorite s valuation increases his effort but decreases the effort of the underdog expected profits increase with a player s valuation but decreases with the valuation of the competitor the impact of the returns to scale parameter is also analyzed

inefficiency as a strategic device in group contests against dominant opponents i introduction many strategic situations in economics and politics can be understood as contests rd nitzan and ueda 2009 a private good nitzan 1991a 1991b nitzan and ueda 2009 or a mixed good esteban and ray 2001 nitzan and ueda 2011 to a large extent the intensity of free riding or conversely the motivation for individuals to exert effort in a contest is shaped by the intra group incentive scheme or governance structure in standard contests incentives are inseparably linked to the sharing rule i e to the usually exogenous procedure by which the rents acquired in the contest are distributed within the group 1 in a number of economic applications however incentives to exert effort appear to be separate or are even willfully separated from the sharing rule phenomena such as team spirit akerlof and kranton 2005 identification with the group sherif 1966 bornstein and ben yossef 1994 peer pressure kandel and lazear 1992 or social norms to contribute to the social good elster 1989 are examples for this separation alternatively groups could apply selective incentive schemes based on relative performance lazear and rosen 1981 or marginally align individual and group incentives nitzan and ueda 2009 in all these scenarios individuals behave cooperatively i e in the interest of the entire group even if the final distribution of rents follows a standard sharing rule mechanisms to induce cooperation often are costly sanchez pages and straub 2010 may only work under restrictive conditions che and gale 2003 require strategic coordination among individuals hardin 1995 or cannot be ensured to be obeyed unanimously oliver 1980 this might explain why they do not emerge universally or automatically the point we make in this article is even stronger even if there existed perfect and costless solutions to within group free riding problems which will henceforth be called intra group efficient incentive schemes igeis they might not always be adopted why would a group for which an igeis is freely available not wish to utilize it but rather adopt an apparently inefficient governance structure by definition an igeis internalizes all within group externalities and seems to be a safe way to increase one s payoffs however this reasoning ignores repercussions that arise in strategic environments like contests suppose for example that the competing groups have sufficiently unequal strengths say due to unequal sizes or different comparative advantages then the weaker group may refrain from implementing a costless igeis to avoid the contest from heating up adoption of an igeis makes a group more efficient and consequently more aggressive in the contest on one hand higher efforts constitute a cost on the other they affect the share of the rent that this group can hope to acquire or the likelihood of succeeding in the contest 2 an igeis clearly enhances a group s prospects if the other group did not change its behavior however if members of the opponent group reply with a sufficiently strong increase in their contest efforts this diminishes and may potentially more than offset the gains from one s own increased efforts whether this happens depends on the direction of the strategic interaction between groups the detrimental firing back effect can only become relevant if the other group s efforts are sufficiently strong strategic complements to one s own efforts

ambiguous political power and contest efforts when there is incomplete information on the source of power in a contest the contestants may divide their lobbying efforts between the potential centers of power only one of which determines the contests winning probabilities our analysis focuses on the effect of ambiguity regarding the source of power on the contestants aggregate effort in a symmetric simple lottery contest with two potential centers of power specifically we examine the effects of varying the informativeness of the contestants private signals i e the probability that a signal is correct and the degree of correlation between them our benchmark case is the standard tullock s model in which the source of power is known i e the contestants signals are perfectly informative we show that the level of aggregate effort in this case is reached also when the signals are perfectly uninformative however in any intermediate case the contestants aggregate effort is lower provided that the signals are not perfectly correlated in other words there is a u shape relationship between the informativeness of the signals and the aggregate effort in the contest the lowest level of effort is spent when the signals are independent and the probability that a signal is true is about 0 85 in this case efforts are reduced by about one fifth in comparison with the benchmark case from a rent dissipation of 50 to slightly over 40

strategic behavior in contests comment almost by definition contests involve strategy this is especially true in contests between unevenly matched contenders in a recent article avinash dixit 1987 explored strategic commitment in contests between a favorite and an underdog the favorite is defined as the player whose chance of victory exceeds one half at the nash equilibrium an underdog s chance is less than one half dixit concludes that if the favorite has the opportunity to move first then he will overcommit effort compared with the nash equilibrium an important implication of the favorite overcommitting effort is that strategic behavior leads to greater social costs see gordon tullock 1980 the opposite holds if the underdog has the opportunity to move first this paper demonstrates that the favorite will never overcommit effort given endogenous order of moves the favorite finds it advantageous to wait until the underdog moves surprisingly the underdog s best strategy is not to wait but to make the first move throwing the first punch the equilibrium order of play is for the underdog to move before the favorite in this equilibrium one never observes overcommitment of effort consequently extending dixit s model to allow for endogenous order of moves suggests that strategic behavior in contests will lead to undercommitment compared with nash behavior

on the endogeneity of cournot nash and stackelberg equilibria games of accumulation abstract we characterize equilibria of games with two properties i agents have the opportunity to adjust their strategic variable after their initial choices and before payoffs occur but ii they can only add to their initial amounts the equilibrium set consists of just the cournot nash outcome one or both stackelberg outcomes or a continuum of points including the cournot nash outcome and one or both stackelberg outcomes a simple theorem that uses agents standard one period reaction functions and the one period cournot nash and stackelberg equilibria delineates the equilibrium set applications include contribution oligopoly and rent seeking games

distributional preferences in probabilistic and share contests we analyze nash equilibria of probabilistic and share contests where players have distributional preferences if players are sufficiently similar distributional preferences create multiple equilibria for the case of only mildly heterogeneous players equilibrium effort can be lower as well as higher than effort exerted by players with selfish preferences these findings can explain the following three anomalies observed in empirical tests of probabilistic and share contests the large variance of effort levels overspreading individual spending that exceeds the nash equilibrium prediction overspending and aggregate spending that exceeds the value of the prize overdissipation if players are sufficiently heterogeneous the game has a unique equilibrium that is more egalitarian than the selfish nash equilibrium it turns out that the less talented competitor may win the larger share of the prize if his inequality aversion is sufficiently strong we analyze how the equilibria evolve if the number of players becomes larger and how sequential moves influence behavior two new insights follow from the analysis of the sequential move game first sequential moves act as a coordination device in case of multiple simultaneous equilibria and second inequality aversion of the more egalitarian player can be used as a commitment device for low effort this effect can reverse the conventional wisdom that the underdog should lead

choosing to target what types of countries get different types of world bank projects well governed countries are more likely to make use of foreign aid for the purposes of economic development and poverty alleviation therefore if aid agencies are providing funds for the sake of development these countries should receive more aid and categorically different types of aid as compared with poorly governed countries in poorly governed countries aid should be given in forms that allow for less discretion using an original data set of all world bank projects from 1996 to 2002 the author distinguishes programmatic projects from investment projects and national from subnational investment projects if the world bank allows more discretion in well governed countries then it will choose to provide programmatic and national aid for these recipients the author presents evidence that the world bank provides a larger proportion of national investment lending in better governed countries with regard to programmatic lending he finds mixed evidence among counties eligible for international development association ida aid good governance surprisingly is associated with a lower proportion of programmatic aid whereas for international bank for reconstruction and development ibrd borrowers good governance is associated with a higher proportion the author subjects these results to a number of robustness checks although he confirms the existing result in the literature that the world bank provides larger overall amounts of aid to better governed countries his examination of the disaggregated data leads to questioning whether both lending wings of the world bank are designing aid programs in the most prodevelopment way possible

endogenous timing in contests with delegation i introduction contests with delegation where each player hires a delegate to expend effort or resources on the player s behalf to win a prize are common 1 an example is litigation between a plaintiff and a defendant in which each litigant hires an attorney who expends his effort to win the lawsuit on behalf of his client another example is a rent seeking contest in which each firm hires a lobbyist who expends his effort to acquire a monopoly or a procurement contract from the government on behalf of his client yet another example is a patent contest in which each firm hires a group of independent researchers or university professors who conduct research to obtain a patent on behalf of their employer delegation is attractive to players because they each can use superior ability by hiring a delegate with more ability than herself and achieve strategic commitments through delegation in such contests with delegation we believe delegates decide endogenously when to expend their effort after signing delegation contracts indeed pursuing their self interest the delegates may well endogenize the order of their moves and communicate it with each other before they expend their effort we believe also that players take it into account when designing their contracts for the delegates that the delegates will endogenize the order of their moves it is these ideas that motivate this paper accordingly the purpose of this paper is to systematically study contests with delegation in which delegates decide endogenously when to expend their effort after signing delegation contracts and before they expend their effort we study two player contests with delegation focusing on not only the equilibrium delegation contracts between players and their delegates but also the equilibrium orders of the delegates moves specifically we set up and analyze the following three stage game in the first stage two players each hire a delegate and they simultaneously announce their contracts written with their delegates each player s contract specifies how much her delegate will be paid if he wins the contest and how much if he loses it in the second stage each delegate decides when to expend his effort and the delegates announce their decisions simultaneously in the third stage the delegates expend their effort according to their decisions in the second stage to win the prize on behalf of their employers we show that in equilibrium the delegate hired by the higher valuation player chooses his effort level after observing his counterpart s and his expected payoff is greater than that of his counterpart this advantage of the delegate of the higher valuation player can be explained by the fact that his employer the higher valuation player offers better contingent compensation as it will be defined in section ii to him than the lower valuation player does to her delegate we compare the outcomes of the endogenous timing framework the three stage game presented above with those of the simultaneous move framework the game which is the same as the three stage game with the exception that the delegates choose their effort levels simultaneously and this order of their moves is given exogenously an interesting result is that each player offers her delegate a better contract in the endogenous timing framework than in the simultaneous move framework another interesting result is that unless the valuation for the prize of the higher valuation player is significantly greater than that of the lower valuation player then each delegate s expected payoff is greater in the endogenous timing framework than in the simultaneous move framework whereas each player s expected payoff is less in the endogenous timing framework than in the simultaneous move framework in summary pursuing their self interest the delegates decide endogenously when to expend their effort given contracts between the players and the delegates

does foreign aid really raise per capita income a time series perspective we analyze the relationship between per capita income and foreign aid we employ annual data and five year averages and carefully examine the time series properties of the data panel estimations with dynamic feasible generalized least squares dfgls show that aid generally has an insignificant or minute negative significant impact on per capita income particularly in highly aid dependent countries this holds true for countries with different levels of human development and income as well as for different regions we also find that aid has a small positive impact on investment but a significant negative impact on domestic savings crowding out and the real exchange rate appreciation jel classification f35 o11 c23 c51 on analyse la relation entre le revenu per capita et l aide etrangere on utilise des donnees annuelles et des moyennes quinquennales et on examine les proprietes de ces series chronologiques des estimations d un modele dynamique utilisant des donnees de panel a l aide de la methode des moindres carres quasi generalises montrent que l aide a generalement un effet negatif minime ou insignifiant sur le revenu per capita particulierement dans les pays qui dependent beaucoup de l aide etrangere ce resultat tient tant pour des pays a divers niveaux de developpement et de revenus que pour differentes regions on decouvre que l aide a un petit effet positif sur l investissement mais un effet negatif significatif sur l epargne effet d encombrement et sur le taux de change reel appreciation

rent dissipation and efficiency in a contest with asymmetric valuations this paper introduces contest efficiency as an alternative to rent dissipation when measuring efficiency in a contest with asymmetric valuations contest efficiency is defined as the expected proportion of the maximum obtainable benefit captured by the contest and differs from rent dissipation because it values the expected winner of the contest therefore rent dissipation and contest efficiency may suggest contradictory conclusions when agents have asymmetric valuations this result is illustrated when comparing alternative equilibria in contests with asymmetric reimbursement and when analyzing the comparative static effect of a change in the relative benefit of two agents in a cournot nash contest

risk attitudes and heterogeneity in simultaneous and sequential contests we prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in rent seeking contests in which players are heterogeneous in both risk preferences and production technology given identical linear production technology if the number of risk loving players is large enough the aggregate investment in equilibrium will exceed the rent and all risk neutral and risk averse players will exit the contest in simultaneous and sequential contests with two players we can identify the favorite and underdog based on both players preference parameters our theoretical results suggest that subjects in some recent contest experiments behaved as if they were risk loving

a two stage model of research and development with endogenous second mover advantages this paper describes a simple two stage model of research and development in which the winner of the research stage has the option of moving first in the development stage some unexpected results emerge in equilibrium the leader in the development stage invests less than each follower and is consequently least likely to collect the patent moreover the leader receives a lower expected payoff than each of the followers thus there are endogenous second mover advantages using a game of timing in which the identity of the stackelberg leader is determined to link the two stages i find that firms face quite different incentives in the research stage although the leader invests less than each follower in the research stage as well the leader enjoys higher expected revenue from the complete two stage game than does each follower the equilibrium is inefficient because there is a lag between the time at which research is completed and the time at which development is begun and because aggregate investment is inefficiently asymmetrically distributed across firms

binding constraint on economic growth under export oriented industrialization and globalization the two gap model of economic growth implies that different constraints on economic growth namely the savings and the foreign exchange availability are binding at different times this article estimates these varying binding constraints in 16 countries in east and southeast asia and latin america and explores their differences across countries regions and periods i show that the east and southeast asian countries which are recognized to be successful in export oriented industrialization are less constrained by the foreign exchange availability with reinforced export capacity than the latin american countries which had carried some inertia of import substituting industrialization policy until the 1980s in addition the economic growth turns out to be more constrained by the domestic savings in recent years which can be a reflection of capital account liberalization policies typically implemented in the late 1980s and 1990s and or a diminishing return to export led growth in either case this mi

contests with multi tasking the standard contest model in which participants compete in a single dimension is well understood and documented multi dimension extensions are possible but are liable to increase the complexity of the contest structure mitigating one of its main advantages simplicity in this paper we propose an extension in which competition ensues in several dimensions and a competitor that wins a certain number of these is awarded a prize the amount of information needed to run the contest is hence limited to the number of dimensions won by each player we look at the design of this contest from the point of view of maximising effort in the contest per dimension and totally and show that there will be a tendency to run small contests with few dimensions the standard tullock model and its results are encompassed by our framework

the ghost of financing gap testing the growth model used in the international financial institutions abstract the harrod domar growth model supposedly died long ago still today economists in the international financial institutions ifis apply the harrod domar model to calculate short run investment requirements for a target growth rate they then calculate a financing gap between the required investment and available resources and often fill the financing gap with foreign aid the financing gap model has two simple predictions 1 aid will go into investment one for one and 2 there will be a fixed linear relationship between growth and investment in the short run the data soundly reject these two predictions of the financing gap model

can the west save africa in the new millennium the western aid effort toward africa has surged due to writ ings by well known economists a celebrity mass advocacy campaign and decisions by western leaders to make africa a major foreign policy priority this survey contrasts the predominant transformational approach west comprehensively saves africa to occasional swings to a marginal approach west takes one small step at a time to help individual africans evaluation of one step at a time initiatives is generally easier than that of transformational ones either through controlled experiments although these have been oversold or simple case studies where it is easier to attribute outcomes to actions we see two themes emerge from the literature survey 1 escalation as each successive western transformational effort has yielded disappointing results as judged at least by stylized facts since again the econometrics are shaky the response has been to try an even more ambitious effort and 2 the cycle of ideas rather than a progressive testing and discarding of failed ideas we see a cycle in aid ideas in many areas in africa with ideas going out of fashion only to come back again later after some lapse long enough to forget the previous disappointing experience both escalation and cyclicality of ideas are symptomatic of the lack of learning that seems to be characteristic of the transfor mational approach in contrast the marginal approach has had some successes in improving the well being of individual africans such as the dramatic fall in mortality

economies of scope and scale in green advocacy environmental advocacy is a large and growing activity whilst a number of economists have analysed the advocacy process no systematic attempt has been made to understand the factors influencing the organisation of the sector we explore the relationship between economies of scale and scope in advocacy under the most popular specification of a tullock type contest economies of scope arise when and only when the scale of that activity is sufficiently large the incentives for merger are socially efficient implying no need for policy intervention

contests a comparison of timing and information structures we study a model of imperfectly discriminating contests with two ex ante symmetric agents we consider four institutional settings contestants move either sequentially or simultaneously and in addition their types are either public or private information we find that an effort maximizing designer of the contest prefers the sequential to the simultaneous setting from an ex ante perspective moreover the sequential contest pareto dominates the simultaneous one when the contestants types are sufficiently negatively correlated regarding the information structure the designer ex ante prefers private information while the contestants prefer public information

contest efforts in light of behavioural considerations this study shows that distortion of probabilities is a possible reason for rent under dissipation incontests with relatively small number of participants such distortion may also result however inover dissipation of the contested rent focusing on contests with homogeneous contestants and thecommonly studied contest success function our main results clarify under what circumstances i rents are more under dissipated relative to the standard situation where probabilities are notdistorted ii rents are under dissipated yet less intensely relative to the standard situation whereprobabilities are not distorted iii rents are over dissipated and iv the contest does not possess asymmetric interior equilibrium in pure strategies

bidding in hierarchies this paper reconsiders the comparison between hierarchical contests and single stage contests a condition is given that characterizes whether and when the aggregate equilibrium payoff of contestants is higher in the single stage contest and when the single stage contest is more likely to award the prize to the contestant who values it most highly the outcome depends on inter and intra group heterogeneity and is not driven by free rider incentives

reasonable expectations and the first millennium development goal how much can aid achieve summary using a calibrated neoclassical growth model we address three questions i how much growth should aid flows have produced in sub saharan africa over the last three decades ii how much aid would be needed to attain the first millennium development goal mdg 1 of cutting poverty in half by 2015 iii taking proposed aid flows as given how much would structural characteristics such as domestic savings rates and productivity have to change in order to reach the mdg 1 our analysis indicates that past and future expectations for aid in fostering growth and poverty reduction have been too high

effort levels in a cournot nash contest with asymmetric information abstract many contests exist where one player does not know his opponent s value of a fixed prize e g unobservable non market preferences for preservation this paper explores how changes in the nature of a one sided information asymmetry affect effort levels in a cournot nash contest the results indicate that the uninformed player s effort is an uncertain input such that his effort is inversely related to risk this reduces his average odds of success comparative static results are driven by the perceived odds of success and risk for the uninformed player and the actual odds of success for the informed player

to deter or to moderate alliance formation in contests with incomplete information we consider two players choice about the formation of an alliance ahead of conflict in a framework with incomplete information about the strength of the potential ally when deciding on alliance formation players anticipate the self selection of other players and the informational value of own and other players choices in the absence of these signaling effects strong players have an incentive to stand alone which leads to a separating equilibrium this separating equilibrium can be destabilized by deception incentives if beliefs are updated on the basis of endogenous alliance formation choices weak players may find it attractive to appear strong in order to deter competitors from positive effort choices strong players may find it attractive to appear weak in order to give their competitors a false sense of security and then beat them with little effort moreover appearing weak allows players to free ride when alliances are formed jel d72 d74

war and natural resource exploitation abstract we build a theoretical framework that allows for endogenous conflict behaviour i e fighting efforts and for endogenous natural resource exploitation i e speed ownership and investments while depletion is spread in a balanced hotelling fashion during peace the presence of conflict creates incentives for rapacious extraction as this lowers the stakes of future contest this voracious extraction depresses total oil revenue especially if world oil demand is relatively elastic and the government s weapon advantage is weak some of these political distortions can be overcome by bribing rebels or by government investment in weapons the shadow of conflict can also make less efficient nationalized oil extraction more attractive than private extraction as insecure property rights create a holdup problem for the private firm and lead to a lower license fee furthermore the government fights less intensely than the rebels under private exploitation which leads to more government turnover without credible commitment to future fighting efforts private oil depletion is only lucrative if the government s non oil office rents are large and weaponry powerful which guarantees the government a stronger grip on office and makes the holdup problem less severe

strategic behavior in contests reply in my 1987 paper i modeled contests where the probability of each player winning a prize depends on all players efforts and examined the first order benefits to one player of making a commitment to a strategy slightly different from his nash equilibrium strategy in the special case of a two player symmetric contest i found that this first order effect was zero michael r baye and onsong shin 1999 have taken the useful further step of finding the second order conditions which ensure that the local stationary point is a local maximum they also find an example where such a commitment has a third order benefit whether this is of any substantive economic interest remains to be seen i used the phrase no local effect to mean zero first order effect which was clearly a sloppy use of language but some such restriction on the use of local is essential if the phrase x has no local effect on f x at x 5 a were to mean that all derivatives f a are zero then a taylor series expansion would show that f x 5 f a for all x and no local effect would be the same as no global effect most importantly symmetric contests were only a very special case of my model the focus was on the much more interesting and more general situation of asymmetry among the players where one player s commitment to a strategy different from his nash equilibrium strategy does bring him a first order benefit the favorite benefits by committing to excessive effort and the underdog from committing to too little others for example kyung h baik and jason f shogren 1992 have extended the analysis to endogenize the order of moves and found that it can be in the interests of both contestants to let the underdog make the commitment in my view these are the more interesting economic issues to do with contests than are third order effects in the symmetric case

strategic restraint in contests abstract economic policy is modelled as the outcome of a political game between two interest groups the possible ex post realized outcomes in the game correspond to the proposed policies in the literature policy proposals are exogenous we extend such games by allowing the endogenous determination of the proposed policies in a first stage the groups decide which policy to lobby for and then in a second stage engage in a contest over the proposed policies our main result is that competition over endogenously determined policies induces strategic restraint that reduces polarization and in turn wasteful lobbying activities

shipwrecks and treasure hunters we examine dynamic search as a game in which two rivals explore an island for a hidden prize of known value in every period until its discovery the players decide how much of the unsearched area to comb if a player finds the prize alone he wins it and the game ends players have a per period discount factor and costs proportional to the area they search first as a benchmark for efficiency we solve the one player search problem second in the two player setting we show that typically there is inefficient over search a result akin to the tragedy of the commons however for players with intermediate levels of patience there is the possibility of inefficient under search as players incorporate the expected future payoffs in their current search decisions finally with patient players several counterintuitive results can arise for example players might be better off searching a larger island or looking for a less valuable prize

a three gap model of foreign transfers and the gdp growth rate in developing countries abstract a simplified macroeconomic framework is developed for the fiscal gap which is considered to be an important stumbling block for adjustment with growth in highly indebted developing countries distinctive characteristics of a fiscally constrained economy are compared with those of economies constrained either by the availability of savings or foreign exchange tentative implications for external conditionality accompanying debt relief measures are derived

a general model of rent seeking for public goods this paper generalizes the model of collective rent seeking over a public good expanding the rent seeker s consumption bundle to include preferences over the public good and a private good our results suggest collective rent seeking is positively related to group size although free riding exists within a group there is not a one for one tradeoff in addition rent seeking increases with wealth finally total effort expended by both groups increases if either group increases in membership size except in the case of an extremely lopsided contest the key condition underlying these results is that the marginal utility of the public good is not inversely related to the private good

war labor tournaments and contest payoffs abstract when prizes change with effort contestants adjust effort to mitigate that change net payoffs remain unchanged respectively can be larger if prizes are linear concave in effort contest designers can facilitate desired outcomes by making the prize concave in effort

uncertain preassigned non contestable and contestable rents abstract potential beneficiaries of government commitments often face the problem of guaranteeing that the commitments are carried out for example funds can be allocated via the budget but not disbursed the disbursement may be subject to the ambiguities of non specified timing or non specified appropriate conditions potential beneficiaries then have incentives to undertake activities that affect the timing of disbursement of the prespecified funds this paper studies the ensuing rent seeking game against the uncertain behavior or discredibility of the government we show that the resources expended by potential beneficiaries of government rents can be substantial but they cannot exceed 30 of the preassigned rents the extent of rent dissipation is incomplete and approaches unity for the critical value of government discredibility that still induces the individual to engage in rent seeking contestability of the allocated funds now referred to as contestable rents increases the extent of rent seeking outlays nevertheless delayed uncertain contestable rents cannot be overdissipated

repeated contests a general parameterization abstract contests often involve players vying for the same prize year after year this paper characterizes equilibrium effort both individual and aggregate in a general parameterization of such repeated contests

the structural adjustment of politics in africa abstract it has long been recognized that the structural adjustment programs currently being proposed by the world bank and the international monetary fund in africa have important political consequences however there has been almost no attention devoted to what structural adjustment if implemented means for the way that politics is actually carried out in african nations the failure to examine the long term consequences of economic reform for politics is particularly surprising given that the major instruments of structural adjustment public sector reform devaluation elimination of marketing boards threaten to change not only the constituencies that african leaders look to for support but the way in which leaders relate to their supporters in the countries south of the sahara the paper examines how structural adjustment if actually implemented would affect politics in african countries the paper finds that structural adjustment makes the political climate much riskier for leaders while weakening the central apparatus of the state on which rulers have long relied to stay in power the implications of the analysis for donors are also discussed

dynamic multi activity contests in many contests players can influence the outcome through efforts in multiple activities several of which can be chosen before others in this paper we develop a model of dynamic multi activity contests players simultaneously choose efforts in long run activities observe each other s efforts in these activities and then simultaneously choose efforts in short run activities a player s long run and short run efforts complement each other in determining the player s probability of winning we compare the outcomes of this two stage model to those of the corresponding model in which players do not observe each other s first stage efforts before the second stage and thus effectively choose efforts in all activities simultaneously interestingly effort expenditures are always lower in the sequential multi activity contest than in the simultaneous multi activity contest the implications of this result for the organization of military litigation innovation academic and sporting contests are highlighted

rent seeking firms consumer groups and the social costs of monopoly i introduction when a positive monopoly rent is secured under government protection firms compete with one another to win the monopoly by expending resources the opportunity costs of such rent seeking activities the values of goods and services that could be produced with resources expended on such rent seeking activities are part of the social costs of monopoly many economists have examined the social costs of monopoly defining them as the sum of the deadweight loss and the firms rent seeking costs examples include tullock 1967 krueger 1974 posner 1975 rogerson 1982 and fisher 1985 1 recently several economists such as wenders 1987 ellingsen 1991 and schmidt 1992 have pointed out that consumers do not always allow government protection of a monopoly rather consumers often seek government protection of themselves they try to defend their consumer surplus against a monopoly by spending resources for example consumers often lobby politicians for government regulation that requires a natural monopolist to set its price below the unregulated profit maximizing level the opportunity costs of such consumer surplus defending henceforth cs defending activities are also part of the social costs of monopoly an interesting question then becomes whether consumers cs defending activities increase or decrease the social costs of monopoly as compared with those incurred in the case of inactive consumers wenders 1987 argues that consumers cs defending activities lead to higher social costs of monopoly on the other hand ellingsen 1991 and schmidt 1992 show that consumers participation to defend their consumer surplus lowers the social costs of monopoly this paper also addresses the question of whether consumers cs defending activities increase or decrease the social costs of monopoly but differs from previous research by analyzing a model in which the government decides first whether or not to regulate a monopoly and then decides which firm to be the monopolist 2 we compare the social costs of monopoly in the case of active consumers with those incurred in the case of inactive consumers we demonstrate that given just one rent seeking firm consumers cs defending activities generally increase the social costs of monopoly but given two or more rent seeking firms such activities generally reduce the social costs of monopoly section ii sets up the basic model we consider a rent seeking and cs defending henceforth rcs contest with one consumer group it has two stages in the first stage firms and the consumer group compete by expending outlays to win their prizes 3 the prize for each firm is an unregulated monopoly and that for the consumer group is a regulated monopoly each firm and the consumer group choose their outlays simultaneously and independently in the second stage after knowing the government s decision on the form of the monopoly the firms compete against each other to win the monopoly they expend their outlays simultaneously and independently at the end of the second stage the government chooses the winning firm ellingsen 1991 argues that his sequential move framework is more realistic than his simultaneous move framework since in most cases consumers compete against existing monopolists rather than potential ones over the forms of monopolies in his sequential move framework potential monopolists first compete to win the monopoly and then the winner and consumers compete over the form of the monopoly however consider a situation in which the government periodically reassigns a monopoly in this situation consumers compete against potential monopolists including the incumbent monopolist over the form of the monopoly and the firms periodically compete to be the monopolist the sequential move game in this paper is more appropriate for this situation than the sequential move game of ellingsen 1991

seeking rents by setting rents the political economy of rent seeking in recent years there has been a large number of papers on the subject of rent seeking most such works on rent seeking have taken the rent as exogenously determined by regulators regulators howeve r may also be expected and indeed have been shown to be rent seeke rs and hence the determination of the rent itself should be endogeniz ed to reflect the fact that the rent setters are themselves rent se ekers in this paper the authors do this by presenting an analysis o f the interaction of regulators firms and consumers within a rent s eeking framework where all three groups are assumed to be self motiva ted the analysis is carried out under alternative assumptions regard ing the nature of the market and the reaction functions of the partic ipants policy implications are drawn where appropriate copyright 1987 by royal economic society

conflicts over property rights and natural resource exploitation at the frontier abstract competition for land at the frontier is analyzed by considering a game between a first settler and a contestant although the first settler is the legitimate owner of a plot of land his remoteness from the government s administrative center makes it difficult to prove it this creates incentives for a contestant to dispute his claims both contenders will expend resources in order to secure ownership due to transport costs the more remote a plot of land is the lower its output value this tends to discourage appropriative activities land degradation is sometimes used as a substitute to appropriative activities a lower discount rate may encourage land degradation

aid catastrophes and the samaritan s dilemma this paper discusses the impact of foreign aid on the recipient country s preparedness against natural disasters the theoretical model shows that foreign aid can have two opposing eects on a country s level of mitigating activities in order to test the theoretical propositions we analyse the eect of foreign aid dependence on ex ante riskmanagement activity proxied by the death toll from major storms floods and earthquakes occurring worldwide between 1980 and 2002 we find evidence that the crowding out eect of foreign aid outweighs the preventive eect in the case of storms while there is mixed evidence in the case of floods and earthquakes

asymmetry and corrective public policy in contests the proposal of an inefficient policyusually stimulates a political strugglebetween the affected interest groups theresulting wasteful lobbying activities mayreduce welfare even if the proposed policyis not approved in this paper weshow that sufficient asymmetry in payoffsnot only tends to reduce lobbying effortsin standard rent seeking contests as iswell known but it is in fact a necessarycondition for the implementation of asuccessful effective correctivetax transfer policy that complements theproposal of the inefficient policy such apolicy induces an efficient equilibriumoutcome which is in addition optimal fromthe viewpoint of the players that take partin the public policy game

a simple theory of economic growth these migration experiments prove not that all labor forces are equally skilled but that these shortcomings of skill and so on in countries with poor educational systems are not even close to being sufficient to explain the gigantic differences in per capita income with richer countries i believe that the larger part of the story is the quality of the arrangements that the rich countries adopt poor countries are typically misgoverned or are anarchies with no government at all which is even worse m olson

endogenous timing in the presence of non monotonicities the aim of this paper is to generalize the endogenous timing game proposed by hamilton and slutsky games and economic behavior 1990 2 pp 29 46 by allowing the payoff or the marginal payoff of a player to become non monotonic with respect to the strategy of the opponent we propose a taxonomy of the subgame perfect nash equilibria based on the characteristics of the payoff functions proposed by eaton canadian journal of economics 2004 37 pp 805 29 we determine under which conditions of the initial payoff functions commitment has a social value and when the simultaneous move nash equilibrium is commitment robust and discuss its pareto efficiency

dynamic aid allocation abstract this paper introduces a framework for studying the optimal dynamic allocation of foreign aid among multiple recipients we pose the problem as one of weighted global welfare maximization a donor in the north chooses an optimal path for international transfers anticipating that consumption and investment decisions will be made by optimizing households in the south and accounting for limits in the extent to which recipients can effectively absorb aid we present quantitative results on optimal aid policy by applying our approach to a neoclassical growth model where the scope for aid funded growth is determined by the recipients distance from steady state

do rent seeking groups announce their sharing rules i introduction rent seeking can be seen all around us firms or coalitions of firms expend resources to influence government officials who have authority to award monopoly rights self interested pressure groups lobby for government subsidies foreign producers exert effort to avoid imposing tariffs or quotas on their products interest groups or lobbyists contribute to the election of politicians who promise to advance favorable legislation research and development rd then the groups announce their decisions simultaneously before choosing their sharing rules we examine the groups decisions on releasing sharing rule information their sharing rules and the effort levels and payoffs of the individual players in equilibrium we formally consider the following three stage game in the first stage each group decides and announces whether it will release to the rival group the information about its sharing rule which will be determined in the second stage in the second stage the players in each group jointly choose their sharing rule and then each group releases the information about its sharing rule if it decided to do so in the first stage in the third stage all the players in both groups choose their effort levels simultaneously and independently at the end of this third stage the winning player is chosen and the winner shares the prize with the other players in his group according to the sharing rule on which they agreed in the second stage solving the game we find the following first the case where both groups release their sharing rule information never occurs in equilibrium second the case where neither group releases its sharing rule information occurs only if the players are evenly matched third when the players are unevenly matched one group releases its sharing rule information and the other does not

aid growth and devolution summary this paper examines whether the degree of fiscal decentralization in aid receiving countries matters in explaining aid effectiveness the decentralization theorem predicts that the devolution of powers should increase aid effectiveness since local decision makers are better informed about local needs thereby decentralization may also have reverse effects e g through coordination problems excessive regulation administrative costs and local capture we use panel data for up to 60 countries and find that aid contributes to economic growth in centralized developing economies whereas it is less effective or even harmful in decentralized countries the cases of indonesia the philippines and uganda support our findings our results imply that donor countries should carefully consider how the two development instruments foreign aid and decentralization interact

endogenous timing in general rent seeking and conflict models we examine simultaneous versus sequential choice of effort in a two player contest the timing of moves determined in a preplay stage prior to the contest subgame as well as the value of the prize is allowed to be endogenous contrary to endogenous timing models with an exogenously fixed prize the present paper finds the following 1 players may decide to choose their effort simultaneously in the subgame perfect equilibrium spe of the extended game 2 the spe does not need to be unique in particular there is no unique spe with sequential moves if the direct costs of effort are zero 3 symmetry among players does not rule out incentives for precommitment to effort locally away from the cournot nash level 4 finally there may be no correlation between win probability and strategic incentives in our framework a finding most central in the analysis of fixed prize contests