computation of the beveridge nelson decomposition for multivariate economic time series abstract this note shows how the result of newbold 1990 newbold p 1990 precise and efficient computation of the beveridge nelson decomposition of economic time series journal of monetary economics 26 453 457 can be extended to the computation of the beveridge nelson decomposition in the multivariate case where series are generated by vector arima models a separate treatment is provided for the cointegrated case

cournot oligopoly with information sharing this paper studies the incentives for information sharing among firms in a cournot oligopoly facing a linear uncertain demand and an affine conditional expectation information structure no information sharing is found to be the unique equilibrium in two cases in which the signals with equal precision are assumed indivisible and infinitely divisible however the nonpooling equilibrium converges to the situation where the pooling strategies are adopted as the amount of information increases hence the efficiency is achieved in the competitive equilibrium as the number of the firm become large

cost reduction competition and industry performance in many markets firms compete over time by expending resources with the purpose of reducing their costs sometimes the cost reducing investments operate directly on costs in many instances they take the form of developing new products that deliver what customers need more cheaply therefore product development can have the same ultimate effect as direct cost reduction in fact if one thinks of the product as the services it delivers to the customer in the way that lancaster pioneered then product development often is just cost reduction

information transmission cournot and bertrand equilibria we examine how incentives for two duopolists to honestly share information change depending upon the nature of competition cournot or bertrand and the nature of the information structure while in earlier papers uncertainty is about an unknown common demand intercept in the present paper uncertainty is about unknown private costs the different information structure reverses the incentives to share information while with unknown common demand sharing is a dominant strategy with bertrand competition and concealing is a dominant strategy with cournot competition with unknown private costs sharing is a dominant strategy with cournot competition and concealing is a dominant strategy with bertrand competition

markets for pollution control when firms are noncompliant the problem of noncompliance and enforcement in transferable discharge permit tdp markets has not received much attention this paper examines the consequences of noncompliance for a tdp market given fairly general assumptions about the characteristics of the enforcement policy in place the analysis reveals that when firms are noncompliant tdp markets retain their efficiency property only under some fairly stringent conditions the effect of noncompliance on the equilibrium permit price raises some important questions about the ability of a tdp market to achieve and remain in equilibrium when firms are noncompliant

tradeable permits missing markets and technology this paper examines the effects of missing markets heterogeneous pollutants and the pollution technology of firms on the efficacy of transferable pollution permits under the assumption of perfect competition in all markets we show that if firms can substitute among pollutants then setting the optimal number of permits for only one pollutant will not in general lead to an efficient outcome the degree of the inefficiency will depend on the information set available to the regulator and the substitutability among pollutants by firms when establishing transferable pollution rights regulators should therefore consider the technology of firms if firms discharge pollutants in the same fixed proportions then the regulator need only set a market for one of the pollutants to ensure an efficient outcome where firms can substitute among pollutants however establishing a market for only one pollutant provides an incentive for firms to substitute to unregulated ones this is an important policy issue as substitutability among pollutants within and across production processes may dampen the dynamic advantages of a tradeable permit policy

implementing marketable emissions permits the environmental protection agency is introducing bubbles offsets and banks as a way of controlling pollution with market incentives to obtain standards for each source and guide the reallocation of emissions the new method is not a true market because polluters must go through the permitting procedure in order to trade emission allowances this study examines whether an efficient market without source by source review is feasible it considers the importance of enough participants competitiveness sensitivity to geographic emission patterns and trading flexibility to sustain marketable permits the design features that address these problems are permit life market definition market initiation and market operation a stable permit market eliminates some of the uncertainties in decision making because it allows firms to select a preferred level of risk 9 references dck

the beveridge nelson decomposition of economic time series a quick computational method this note describes a much simpler computational method for carrying out the beveridge and nelson decomposition of economic time series into permanent and cyclical components

trading for the future signaling in permit markets abstract permit markets are celebrated as a policy instrument since they allow i firms to equalize marginal costs through trade and ii the regulator to distribute the burden in a politically desirable way these two concerns however may conflict in a dynamic setting anticipating the regulator s future desire to give more permits to firms that appear to need them firms purchase permits to signal their need this raises the price above marginal costs and the market becomes inefficient if the social cost of pollution is high and the government intervenes frequently in the market the distortions are greater than the gains from trade and non tradable permits are better the analysis helps to understand permit markets and how they should be designed

sulfur dioxide control by electric utilities what are the gains from trade title iv of the 1990 clean air act amendments caaa established a market for transferable sulfur dioxide so2 emission allowances among electric utilities this market offers firms facing high marginal abatement costs the opportunity to purchase the right to emit so2 from firms with lower costs and this is expected to yield cost savings compared to a command and control approach to environmental regulation this paper uses econometrically estimated marginal abatement cost functions for power plants affected by title iv of the caaa to evaluate the performance of the so2 allowance market specifically we investigate whether the much heralded fall in the cost of abating so2 compared to original estimates can be attributed to allowance trading we demonstrate that for plants that use low sulfur coal to reduce so2 emissions technical change and the fall in prices of low sulfur coal have lowered marginal abatement cost curves by over 50 percent since 1985 the flexibility to take advantage of these chan

pollution from the electric power sector in japan and efficient pollution reduction abstract under the scheme of the kyoto protocol there are plans for the efficient reduction of carbon dioxide emissions in the electric power sector nuclear power generation which emits no carbon dioxide in the process of generating electricity has come under scrutiny however this energy produces a new environmental issue the disposal of radioactive waste first we derive shadow prices of carbon dioxide and low level waste as marginal abatement costs in the case of the electric power sector in japan employing a directional output distance function it is found that the shadow prices are us 39 per tonne for carbon dioxide and us 1531 per liter for low level waste secondly we calculate the indirect morishima elasticity between carbon dioxide and low level waste in order to identify their substitutability and it is found that the substitution of low level waste for carbon dioxide is easier than the reverse this result suggests that with the amount of generated electricity fixed carbon dioxide can be substituted more easily by low level waste when the relative price of carbon dioxide increases for example as a result of implementation of a carbon dioxide tax or an emissions trading system

capacity utilization and new source bias evidence from the us electric power industry abstract while prior research has shown that new source bias has increased construction costs and delayed the building of new electric power plants this research explores the empirical question of whether increased operating costs caused by new source bias are larger than the cost savings of newer technology if new sources do have higher operating costs an incentive exists to utilize order plants more intensively statistical evidence of these differing utilization rates is found

fiscal interactions and the costs of controlling pollution from electricity i quantify the costs of controlling so 2 carbon and nox emissions from power generation accounting for interactions between environmental policies and the broader fiscal system i distinguish a dirty technology coal that satisfies baseload demand and a clean technology gas that is used at peak period and i distinguish sectors with and without regulated prices estimated emissions control costs are substantially lower than in previous models of fiscal interactions that assume a single constant returns technology and competitive pricing the results are reasonably robust to alternative scenarios such as full price deregulation and market power in the deregulated sector

what can we learn from the grand policy experiment lessons from so2 allowance trading stable url http links jstor org sici sici 0895 3309 28199822 2912 3a3 3c69 3awcwlft 3e2 0 co 3b2 tthe journal of economic perspectives is currently published by american economic association your use of the jstor archive indicates your acceptance of jstor s terms and conditions of use available athttp www jstor org about terms html jstor s terms and conditions of use provides in part that unless you have obtainedprior permission you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles and you may use content inthe jstor archive only for your personal non commercial use please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work publisher contact information may be obtained athttp www jstor org journals aea html each copy of any part of a jstor transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission the jstor archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long term preservation and access to leading academicjournals and scholarly literature from around the world the archive is supported by libraries scholarly societies publishers and foundations it is an initiative of jstor a not for profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology for more information regarding jstor please contact support jstor org http www jstor orgtue jun 26 16 25 17 2007

the benefits of spatially differentiated regulation the response to acid rain by u s states prior to the acid rain program location is a crucial driver of both the marginal abatement and damage costs of sulfur dioxide emissions by u s coal fired power plants before the start of the acid rain program in 1995 old boilers were subject to emission rate standards set by individual states we investigate how individual states adjusted their sulfur regulation laws in response to acid rain and whether they accounted for differences in marginal abatement costs vulnerability to agricultural damages special industry interests or inter state externalities the welfare gain compared to a uniform reduction in emission rate standards is estimated to be 21 million in 1995 dollars annually

a new approach to measuring shadow price reconciling engineering and economic perspectives abstract shadow price is one of the most important pieces of information in environmental decision making two different approaches namely economic and engineering have been applied to obtain the shadow price of undesirable outputs while using different methodological backgrounds and perspectives the current study proposes a new conceptual framework and an economic estimation model to reconcile the shadow price estimates derived via the two approaches we also suggest a new mapping rule that incorporates the concept of abatement level which is a basic element in the engineering approach as a result the proposed model generates continuously changing estimates i e comprising a shadow price curve based on the abatement level we further investigate the determinant factors of shadow price by using second step regression the suggested methodology is used to investigate the shadow price of carbon emissions in south korean electricity generating plants thus yielding relevant policy implications

the costs of water pollution regulation in the pulp and paper industry this paper studies plant level data on actual and permitted levels of water pollution emissions for the pulp and paper industry there is widespread and substantial overcompliance with the relevant regulations aggregate bod emissions in 1992 were only 50 of the amount allowed overcompliance appears to imply a zero marginal abatement cost and its prevalence therefore has the potential to substantially change the debate over the costs of regulation we show instead that plants incurred substantial costs to overcomply marginal abatement costs were roughly 13 000 ton in 1992 we discuss possible explanations for costly overcompliance and their implications for estimation

a new approach to decomposition of economic time series into permanent and transitory components with particular attention to measurement of the business cycle abstract this paper introduces a general procedure for decomposition of non stationary time series into a permanent and transitory component allowing both components to be stochastic the permanent component is shown to be a random walk with drift and the transitory or cyclical component is a stationary process with mean zero the decomposition methodology which depends only on past data and therefore is computable in real time is applied to the problem of measuring and dating business cycles in the portwar u s economy we find that measured expansions and contractions are of roughly equivalent duration and that our dating of cyclical episodes tends to lead the traditional nber dating and to a lesser extent the growth cycle chronology of zarnowitz and boschan 1977

precise and efficient computation of the beveridge nelson decomposition of economic time series abstract this note shows how the beveridge nelson decomposition of economic time series can be precisely computed without the necessity for truncating infinite sums the algorithm includes those of beveridge and nelson 1981 and miller 1988 as special cases for particular models correcting an error in the latter

exchange of cost information in oligopoly when do oligopolists gain by sharing their private information about their costs with one another what are the social welfare effects of such information exchange i study these questions by comparing the oligopolists expected profits under a cost sharing agreement with their expected profits in the bayesian equilibrium that would arise without cost sharing i also analyse the firms decisions to form a trade association to share their cost data under conditions of linear demand and cournot behaviour industrywide information exchange is the unique point in the core of the trade association membership game the exchange of cost data increases expected profits and welfare but reduces expected consumer surplus cost sharing increases efficiency by raising the market shares of lower cost firms and reducing the variability of aggregate output consumer surplus is diminished however because the variance of output is reduced and consumer surplus is a convex function of output

assessment of initial emission allowance allocation methods in the korean electricity market abstract korea will introduce an emission trading policy from 2015 the rules for the initial allocation of emission allowances have not been decided yet this paper assesses the effect of various initial emission allowance allocation methods of the korean electricity market this study employs the mixed complementarity problem which is able to incorporate operation investment and emission trade decisions in the deregulated electricity market in order to provide more realistic results in particular the allocation rules to existing plants and new entrants are modeled separately in this study the model quantifies the impacts of different allocation rules on emissions capacity mix emission allowance prices electricity prices and social welfare we examine typical allocation rules such as auction to all power plants best available technology bat benchmark to all power plants fuel specific benchmark to existing power plants along with bat benchmark to new entrants and fuel specific benchmark to all power plants we find that giving free allocations to new power plants prompts more new investment and this raises overall social welfare even though the direct cost of achieving the emission reduction target rises while the auction is the most powerful policy to reduce emissions in the electricity sector giving away permits to all power plants based on a fuel specific benchmark encourages investment increases output and leads to a greater level of welfare from an imperfectly competitive industry

emissions trading with updated allocation effects on entry exit and distribution allocation of emissions allowances may have significant distributional and efficiency effects it is well known that cost efficiency may be achieved if allowances are auctioned or distributed in a lump sum manner e g based on emissions levels before the start of the system grandfathering bohringer and lange eur econ rev 49 2041 2055 2005 show that a cost effective outcome can also be achieved if the base year for allocation is continually updated updating given that banking and borrowing are prohibited in this paper we examine whether updating alters the entry and exit conditions for firms compared to grandfathering and how it affects profits for new and existing firms we find that the two schemes function surprisingly similar first the incentives to entry and exit are identical second the total value of free quotas to existing firms based on emissions before the system starts is also identical without any auctioning with updating initial claims for free allowances have a shorter lifetime compared to grandfathering but quota prices are higher as firms anticipate the effect of current emissions on future claims to free allowances the two effects exactly cancel each other out if there is some combination of auction and free allocation the total value of free quotas will always be highest under grandfathering if the auction rate is the same entry and exit incentives are still equal

the effect of sulfur regulations on the u s electric power industry a generalized cost approach abstract this paper estimates the effects of sulfur dioxide emission regulations on the us electric power industry during the 1975 1990 period by utilizing a generalized cost function along with shadow input prices in the presence of various regulations including those intended to control sulfur dioxide emissions firms will likely fail to minimize production costs the null hypothesis of cost minimization is rejected implying that the use of a neoclassical cost function is inappropriate for this study a comparison of the results obtained by estimating a generalized cost function and those obtained with a neoclassical cost function reveals that the use of a neoclassical restriction brings an underestimation of the average percentage increase in cost by 1 1 percentage points

potential cost savings from internal external co2 emissions trading in the korean electric power industry abstract korea plans to introduce an emissions trading scheme for the controlling greenhouse gas emissions in 2015 using shephard s 1970 output distance function we first estimate the shadow price of co 2 for power generators in the korean fossil fueled electric generation industry then by assuming that each power generator is required to reduce co 2 emissions by one ton we compute the potential cost savings from internal trading among generators within the same plant and from external trading across plants at prevailing market prices the results indicate that on average the generators paid 14 63 to abate one ton of co 2 emissions in 2007 plants realized additional gains through external trading in particular cost savings from trades between different fuel fired plants were substantial

permanent vs transitory components and economic fundamentals any non stationary series can be decomposed into permanent or trend and transitory or cycle components typically some atheoretic pre filtering procedure is applied to extract the permanent component this paper argues that analysis of the fundamental underlying stationary economic processes should instead be central to this process we present a new derivation of multivariate beveridge nelson permanent and transitory components whereby the latter can be derived explicitly as a weighting of observable stationary processes this allows far clearer economic interpretations different assumptions on the fundamental stationary processes result in distinctly different results but this reflects deep economic uncertainty we illustrate with an example using garratt et al s 2003a small vecm model of the uk economy

mergers and investments in cost reduction with private information abstract we present a model of cost reducing r d investments where the marginal cost realization is private information of the innovating firm the main contribution is the conclusion according to which with merger anticipations the innovating firm does not have ex ante incentives to reveal its cost realization prior to the takeover interestingly we also find the expected consumer surplus to be higher for the regime characterized by incomplete information as compared to a regime based on information sharing

abatement and allocation in the pilot phase of the eu ets we use historical industrial emissions data to assess the level of abatement and over allocation that took place across european countries during the pilot phase 2005 2007 of the european union emission trading scheme using a dynamic panel data model we estimate the counter factual business as usual emissions scenario for eu member states comparing this baseline to allocated and verified emissions we find that both over allocation and abatement occurred along with under allocation and emissions inflation over the three trading years of the pilot phase we find over allocation of approximately 280 million euas and total abatement of 247 mt co2 however we calculate that emissions inflation of approximately 73 mt co2 also occurred possibly due to uncertainty about future policy design features

regulatory constraints on environmental markets abstract there have been several recent regulatory reforms aimed at promoting economic efficiency these reforms fall into two broad categories those aimed at promoting competition in specific industries and those aimed at addressing problems that cut across several industries this analysis examines two reforms that fall into the latter category both of these policies are specifically designed to enhance environmental quality while promoting cost savings the analysis focuses on the biases and inefficiencies associated with the use of these policies the paper concludes with a discussion of the possibility of designing more efficient alternatives in light of the political constraints that are imposed on regulators

incentives and prices in an emissions trading scheme with updating abstract emissions trading schemes where allocations are based on updated baseline emissions give firms less incentive to reduce emissions for a given quota or allowance price nevertheless according to bohringer and lange on the design of optimal grandfathering schemes for emission allowances europ econ rev 49 2005 2041 2055 such allocation schemes are cost effective if the system is closed and allocation rules are identical across firms in this paper we show that the cost effective solution may be infeasible if marginal abatement costs grow too fast moreover if a price cap or banking borrowing is introduced the abatement profile is no longer the same as in the case with an auction or lump sum allocation in addition we show that with allocation based on updated emissions the quota price will always exceed marginal abatement costs possibly misguiding policy makers and investors about abatement costs numerical simulations indicate that the quota price most likely will be several times higher than marginal abatement costs unless a significant share of allowances is auctioned

computation of the beveridge nelson decomposition in the case of cointegrated systems with i 0 variables abstract this paper shows how the result of arino and newbold economics letters 61 1998 37 for the multivariate bn decomposition in the cointegrated case can be extended when i 0 variables are considered in the vec model an application of the extended procedure to the spanish peseta french franc real exchange rate is also provided

the beveridge nelson decomposition of economic time series another economical computational method abstract this note describes a simple and an economical computational procedure for generating the permanent cyclical decomposition of economic time series proposed by beveridge and nelson 1981 our procedure is a more complete alternative than the method suggested by cuddington and winters 1987

taxes versus tradable discharge permits a review in the light of the u s and european experience the u s and west european environmental protection programs have incorporated different economic instruments for controlling pollution the u s has made extensive use of tradable permits of several forms but has never used direct pollution taxes the countries of the european community have long used an array of pollution taxes but have never used tradable permits a review and critique of these experiences and an analysis of the attributes of taxes and tradable permits seeks identify the strengths and weaknesses of each instrument and to provide guidelines for the successful implementation of each system

tradeable carbon permit auctions how and why to auction not grandfather abstract an auction of carbon permits is the best way to achieve domestic carbon caps designed to limit global climate change to minimize administrative costs permits would be required at the level of oil refineries natural gas pipe lines natural gas liquid sellers and coal processing plants to maximize liquidity in secondary markets permits would be fully tradable and bankable the government would conduct quarterly auctions a standard ascending clock auction in which price is gradually raised until there is no excess demand would provide reliable price discovery an auction is preferred to grandfathering giving companies permits based on historical output or emissions because it allows reduced tax distortions provides more flexibility in distribution of costs provides greater incentives for innovation and reduces the need for politically contentious arguments over the allocation of rents

cost minimizing regulation of sulfur emissions regional gains in electric power environmental regulations set maximum allowable rates for sulfur dioxide emissions from electric utilities by ignoring firm differences in marginal abatement costs and preventing emissions trading these standards do not minimize the cost of reducing einissions this paper estimates marginal abatement cost functions for 56 utilities for 1973 79 marginal costs vary substantially across firms due to differences in the price of low and high sulfur fuels and the intensity of regulation the potential savings from a cost minimizing reallocation of abatement resources are estimated for five regions current expenditures are found to be 47 higher than cost minimizing levels i mplementation of the 1970 clean air act amendments relies extensively on technology based emission standards economists long have recognized that these standards can result in an inefficient allocation of pollution control resources engineering based restrictions ignore or oversimplify differences in abatement costs among polluters limited empirical research suggests that current standards result in substantially higher costs as much as ten times higher than a cost minimizing regulatory scheme 2 these studies however are based on engineering estimates of marginal abatement costs the models often assume that all polluters adopt control technologies that are required only for new plants and that have been largely unadopted by polluting firms 3 the impact of changing factor prices on marginal abatement costs typically is ignored the difficulty is that the resulting estimates of the cost of regulation neither adequately reflect the range of control options available to polluters nor take into account how polluters actually have responded to environmen

the political economy of pollution markets historical lessons for modern energy and climate planners this article explores some of the central economic and political problems with the use of tradable permits to solve environmental problems drawing from transaction cost economics political economy and market theory it does so by looking at the history of three programs for curbing pollution in the united states the clean air act the leaded gasoline phase out and water permits in wisconsin the article begins by briefly summarizing the history of each of these programs before looking at a host of challenges related to political compromises in program design transaction costs spatial distortions such as geographic sensitivity and wrong way trading of credits temporal distortions such as the episodic nature of pollution and volatility of market prices and market abuses these concerns are raised with an eye for how historical experience may inform the current debate about how to design effective market mechanisms to respond to climate change and other forms of energy related environmental degradation

fishing quota markets abstract in 1986 new zealand responded to the open access problem by establishing the world s largest individual transferable quota itq system using a 15 year panel dataset from new zealand that covers 33 species and more than 150 markets for fishing quotas we assess trends in market activity price dispersion and the fundamentals determining quota prices we find that market activity is sufficiently high in the economically important markets and that price dispersion has decreased we also find evidence of economically rational behavior through the relationship between quota lease and sale prices and fishing output and input prices ecological variability and market interest rates controlling for these factors our results show a greater increase in quota prices for fish stocks that faced significant reductions consistent with increased profitability due to rationalization overall this suggests that these markets are operating reasonably well implying that itqs can be effective instruments for efficient fisheries management

impacts of alternative allowance allocation methods under a cap and trade program in power sector emission trading is considered to be a cost effective environmental economic instrument for pollution control however the policy design of an emission trading program has a decisive impact on its performance allowance allocation is one of the most important policy design issues in emission trading not only for equity but also for policy performance in this research an artificial market for sulfur dioxide so2 emission trading was constructed by applying an agent based model the performance of the jiangsu so2 emission trading market was examined under different allowance allocation methods and transaction costs the results showed that the market efficiency of emission trading would be affected by the allocation methods when the transaction costs are positive the auction allowance allocation method was more efficient and had the lowest total emission control costs than the other three allocation methods examined however the use of this method will require that power plants pay for all of their allowance and doing so will increase the production costs of power plants on the other hand output based allowance allocation is the second best method

mergers and investments in cost reduction with private information revisited abstract this paper re examines the model developed by stenbacka 1991 which addresses the investment incentives of an innovating firm operating in anticipation of a merger with its rival in a cournot duopoly setting in contrast to stenbacka we find that the innovating firm need not always invest more should it conceal rather than reveal its r d outcome prior to the takeover furthermore we show that the ex ante incentive for the innovating firm to conceal its private information is perfectly consistent with earlier findings in the information sharing literature

a ten year rule to guide the allocation of eu emission allowances abstract member states in the european union eu are responsible for national allocation plans governing the initial distribution of emission allowances in the co2 emission trading system including rules governing allocations to installations that close and to new entrants the european commission has provided guidelines to discourage the use of allocation methodologies that provide incentives affecting firms compliance behavior for example by rewarding one type of compliance investment over another we find that the treatment of closures and new entrants by member states is inconsistent with the general guidelines provided by the eu we propose stronger eu guidance regarding closures and new entrants a more precise compensation criterion on which to justify free allocations and a ten year rule as a component of future eu policy that can guide a transition from current practice to an approach that places greater weight on efficiency

bretton woods blueprint for a greenhouse gas agreement abstract this paper describes the remarkable parallels between the problems faced in the drafting of the 1944 bretton woods agreement which established the rules and institutions governing the international financial system and the problems faced in drafting a greenhouse gas agreement the parallels include the need to induce countries to sacrifice economic sovereignty in order to provide a public good the need to facilitate capital investment and provide adjustment loans to be fair to developing versus developed nations to offer technical assistance monitor behavior punish offenders and promote a globally efficient allocation of resources it is claimed that between them the organizations which emerged from the bretton woods agreement namely the imf gatt and world bank have the necessary attributes of the needed global atmospheric control agency furthermore it is argued that there are striking parallels between the reserve accounts at the imf and the crediting and debiting of greenhouse gas emissions and absorptions between special drawing rights sdrs and rights for greenhouse gas emissions as well as in numerous other characteristics the paper concludes by noting that the almost half century of influence of the bretton woods institutions suggests we might borrow from their charters organizational designs membership incentives and procedures for adaptation and change

how emission certificate allocations distort fossil investments the german example despite political activities to foster a low carbon energy transition germany currently sees a considerable number of new coal power plants being added to its power mix there are several possible drivers for this dash for coal but it is widely accepted that windfall profits gained through free allocation of ets certificates play an important role yet the quantification of allocation related investment distortions has been limited to back of the envelope calculations and stylized models so far we close this gap with a numerical model integrating both germany s particular allocation rules and its specific power generation structure we find that technology specific new entrant provisions have substantially increased incentives to invest in hard coal plants red to natural gas at the time of the ets onset more precisely disproportionate windfall profits compared more than half the total capital costs of a hard coal plant moreover shorter periods of free allocations would not have turned investors favours towards the cleaner natural gas technology because of pre existing economic advantages for coal in contrast full auctioning of permits or a single best available technology benchmark would have made natural gas the predominant technology of choice