collusion collective action and protection theory and evidence this paper provides a novel explanation forthe formation of protectionist lobby groupsin imperfectly competitive sectors thelevel of collusion is shown to be a crucialdeterminant of the ability of firms tosustain lobbying we show that greatercollusion reduces firm contributionsto tariff lobbying when the governmentvalues welfare sufficiently and thecross price elasticity between the domesticand foreign goods is sufficiently high the empirical evidence from the u s supports the theory greater collusionreduces the level of pac contributions

dynamic adverse selection a theory of illiquidity fire sales and flight to quality we develop a dynamic equilibrium model of asset markets with adverse selection there exists a unique equilibrium in which better quality assets trade at higher prices but with a lower price dividend ratio in less liquid markets sellers of high quality assets signal quality by accepting a lower trading probability we show how the distribution of sellers private information affects an asset s price and liquidity how a change in that distribution can cause a re sale and a ight to quality and how asset purchase and subsidy programs may raise prices and liquidity and reverse the ight to quality jel d82 g12 this paper develops a dynamic equilibrium model of asset markets with adverse selection the owners of heterogeneous assets are privately informed about the quality of their assets sellers set prices for their assets recognizing that sales may be rationed at high prices buyers set prices recognizing that the quality of available assets may depend on the price selected in equilibrium sellers of high quality assets are willing to set a high price despite the low sale probability because the continuation value from failing to sell a high quality asset is high conversely sellers of low quality assets opt for a low price buyers are indifferent between paying a low price for a low quality asset and a high price for a high quality asset we prove these results in a deliberately stylized dynamic general equilibrium framework assets are perfectly durable and pay a constant dividend each period some amount of a perfectly perishable consumption good better quality assets pay a higher dividend but only the asset s current owner observes the dividend this is the source of private information and the root of the adverse selection problem as in akerlof 1970 the only permissible trades are between the consumption good and the asset individuals are risk neutral and have a discount factor that changes over time independently across individuals creating gains from trade finally discount factors are observable which ensures that patient individuals never sell assets since there are no gains from trade we believe this framework is useful for capturing

determinants of bilateral trade protection in this paper determinants of bilateral protection levels are empirically identified when controlling for multilateral trade regulation and importing country specific factors strong empirical support is provided of that three bilateral factors are influencing the bilateral protection level specifically a country s protection level on goods from a trade partner is positively affected by the domestic import penetration of goods produced by the trade partner negatively influenced by the intra industry traded share of these imports and positively affected by the trade partner s protection level on domestic goods moreover very high explanatory values are provided in the cross section estimations indicating that these determinants policy regulations and importer specific factors jointly explain almost all of the variation in bilateral protection levels the results are general in the sense that estimations are performed for a large sample of bilateral trade relations including 22 trade partners that are highly differentiated in terms of country characteristics the overall results indicate that to the extent that policy makers can affect bilateral protection levels under multilateral trade regulation they act on political economy rather than economic goals

conflict cooperation and commerce the effect of international political interactions on bilateral trade flows the public choice approach to political economy is employed to gain insight into the connection between international politics and trade flows a model is constructed in which importers are assumed to be rational utility maximizers who seek to satisfy international security as well as economic welfare objectives this model of bilateral trade flows reflects contemporary theory in the field of international economics and it explicitly incorporates the general foreign policy orientation of importers among its determinants the model is tested in 16 annual crosssectional estimations 1960 75 for a complete network of 25 countries the findings show considerable support for the hypothesis that trade flows are significantly influenced by broad political relations of amity and enmity between nations the author concludes that nations adjust trade ties to satisfy security as well as economic welfare goals and that a formal political economy of trade should reflect this fact

a liquidity based model of security design we consider the problem of the design and sale of a security backed by specified assets given access to higher return investments the issuer has an incentive to raise capital by securitizing part of these assets at the time the security is issued the issuer s or underwriter s private information regarding the payoff of the security may cause illiquidity in the form of a downward sloping demand curve for the security the severity of this illiquidity depends upon the sensitivity of the value of the issued security to the issuer s private information thus the security design problem involves a tradeoff between the retention cost of holding cash flows not included in the security design and the liquidity cost of including the cash flows and making the security design more sensitive to the issuer s private information we characterize the optimal security design in several cases we also demonstrate circumstances under which standard debt is optimal and show that the riskiness of the debt is increasing in the issuer s retention costs for assets

special purpose entities and bank loan contracting abstract in this study we show that a firm s use of special purpose entities spes is associated with unfavorable loan contract terms including higher loan rates collateral requirements and restrictive covenants further analyses suggest that the association between the use of spes and unfavorable loan contract terms is primarily due to the increase in the information risk faced by lenders as firm managers can easily use spes to manipulate earnings and hide losses specifically we find that the use of spes has a more pronounced effect on increasing the cost of loans and causing more stringent non price loan terms when managers have a stronger incentive to manipulate earnings and when banks have less knowledge about the spe sponsor firms due to the lack of prior lending relationship in addition we find that the use of spes is associated with a greater likelihood of accounting restatements and greater information asymmetry between inside managers and outside capital suppliers

understanding international trade policies an emerging synthesis the international trade problems of the 1980s stimulated an expansion of scholarship on trade policies by economists and political scientists at least four distinct theoretical perspectives weave their way through recent literature that concentrates on the united states emphasizing market conditions policy beliefs and values national political institutions and global structures respectively new studies in each of these traditions advance beyond the work of their predecessors but none of the perspectives has yet proved adequate as a single unifying vehicle nevertheless we can also see clear movement toward a synthesis with single works blending insights from several traditions thus the books under review do not all fall neatly into the familiar exclusive categories of economics or political science the emerging synthesis needs strengthening in several ways including the development of conditioning hypotheses that will reduce remaining apparent confusions

prepayment and the valuation of mortgage backed securities this paper puts forward a valuation framework for mortgage backed securities rather than imposing an optimal value minimizing call condition we assume that at each point in time there exists a probability of prepaying this conditional probability depends upon the prevailing state of the economy to implement our valuation procedure we use maximum likelihood techniques to estimate a prepayment function in light of recent aggregate gnma prepayment experience by integrating this empirical prepayment function into our valuation framework we provide a complete model to value mortgagebacked securities given an optimal value minimizing call policy a mortgage should never be called when its market value is less than its call price similarly a mortgage should be called if it is worth more than its call price however mortgagors often call their loans when the prevailing refinancing rate exceeds the contract rate on the loan dunn and mcconnell 1981 in addition some mortgagors do not call their loans when the loan s contract rate exceeds the prevailing refinancing rate the purpose of this paper is to put forward a valuation framework for mortgagebacked securities consistent with these stylized facts associated with mortgage prepayments the mortgagor s prepayment decision is integral to our valuation framework however we do not impose an optimal value minimizing call condition to price these securities rather we assume that at each point in time there exists a probability of prepaying this conditional probability depending upon the prevailing state of the economy by integrating this prepayment function into our valuation framework we provide a complete model to value mortgage backed securities to implement our valuation procedures we estimate a prepayment function given recent gnma prepayment experience we follow green and shoven 1986 by using a proportional hazards model to estimate the influence of various explanatory variables or covariates on the mortgagor s prepayment decision distinct from green and shoven we explicitly model the effects of seasoning as well as investigating the influence of interest cost savings from refinancing in addition we also consider the effects of lagged refinancing rates heterogeneity

the political economy of declining industries senescent industry collapse revisited many observers have noted a strong tendency for protection once it is instituted to persist over time this paper first shows that persistent protection arises whenever lobbying is an alternative to costly adjustment with endogenous protection the level of tariffs is an increasing function of past tariffs the more an industry lobbies the greater the current protection it receives and the less it adjusts and the less the industry adjusts the more effective it is as a lobby in the future when the costs of lobbying and adjustment are fully variable declining industries contract more slowly over time and never fully adjust however the paper shows that adding a fixed cost of lobby formation or maintenance is sufficient to generate an endogenous collapse of protection such as that predicted by cassing and hillman 1986 american economic review 76 516 523 in which an industry abruptly terminates its lobbying and loses its protection finally the paper examines the well documented bias against growing industries in the lobbying process

policy choice theory and evidence from commitment via international trade agreements abstract why do governments employ inefficient policies when more efficient ones are available for the same purpose we address this puzzle in the context of redistribution toward special interest groups sigs by focusing on a set of important policies tariffs and non tariff barriers ntbs in our policy choice model a government can gain by committing to constrain tariffs through international agreements even if this leads to the use of less efficient ntbs commitment has political value because it improves the bargaining position of a government that is weak relative to domestic sigs using detailed data we find support for several of the model s predictions including i tariff commitments in trade agreements increase the likelihood and restrictiveness of ntbs but not enough to offset the original tariff reductions ii tariff commitments are more likely to be adopted and more stringent when the government is weaker relative to a sig thus the results can explain the use of inefficient policies for redistribution and suggest that the bargaining motive is an important source of the political value of commitment in international agreements

is environmental policy a secondary trade barrier an empirical analysis should international trade agreements be extended to include negotiations over environmental policy the answer depends on whether countries distort levels of environmental regulations as a secondary means of providing protection to domestic industries our results suggest that they do previous studies of this relationship have treated the level of environmental regulation as exogenous and found a negligible correlation between environmental regulation and trade flows in contrast we find that when the level of environmental regulation is modelled as an endogenous variable its estimated effect on trade flows is significantly higher than previously reported jel classification fl f14 f18 est ce que la politique environnementale est une barriere commerciale secondaire une analyse empirique est ce que les accords commerciaux internationaux doivent etre etendus pour couvrir la politique environnementale la reponse depend du degre de distorsion que les pays introduisent dans leur politique environnementale pour proteger leurs industries nationales nos resultats suggerent que cet impact est important des etudes anterieures de cette relation ont traite la politique environnementale comme exogene et ont montre qu il existe une co relation negligeable entre politique envir onnementale et flux commerciaux au contraire nous revelons que quand la politique environnementale est consideree comme variable endoge ne son effet sur les flux com merciaux est plus eleve de maniere significative que ce qu on a note anterieurement

resisting the protectionist temptation industry and the making of trade policy in france and the united states during the 1970s why were advanced industrial states able to keep their economies relatively open to foreign trade in the 1970s and the early 1980s despite declining u s hegemony and increasing economic difficulties this article argues that an international level change affected domestic trade politics and contributed to the maintenance of a liberal trading system examining the united states and france the argument proceeds in two steps showing first how domestic trade politics were changed and second how this change affected the policy process initially i argue that aspects of the increased international economic interdependence of the postwar period altered domestic trade politics by creating new anti protectionist preferences among certain firms firms with extensive international ties through exports multinational production and global intra firm trade have come to oppose protectionism since it is very costly for them evidence for these new preferences was apparent among both american and french industries despite different contexts firms in the two countries reacted similarly to the growth of interdependence next i ask whether firms preferences affected trade policy outcomes and show how these preferences were integrated into the policy process in both countries trade policy structures in neither country prevented firms preferences from affecting the policies adopted even in france a so called strong state firms preferences were a key influence on policy in the trade policy area then the french and american states did not appear to differ greatly in their susceptibility to industry influence even though their policy processes were different

exchange rates and industry demands for trade protection the recent confrontation between china and the united states over currency policy illustrates a broader phenomenon exchange rate misalignments tend to spill over into trade policy although previous studies have shown that aggregate protectionist activity is positively related to the level of the real effective exchange rate we explore this relationship at the industry level several industry specific characteristics determine the protectionist response to exchange rate changes including the degree of exchange rate pass through the level of import penetration and the share of imported intermediate inputs in total industry inputs we find that the marginal effect of currency appreciation on the number of industry level antidumping petitions is positive and significant only for industries with high pass through therefore exchange rates appear to induce demands for trade barriers only in industries where competitiveness is directly harmed by currency appreciation

on the incidence of us tariffs this paper provides evidence on the incidence of tariffs on products of export interest to developing countries by investigating the relationship between per capita incomes of us trading partners and tariff rates it constitutes the first attempt to assess the incidence of tariffs imposed by the us on countries that span the entire range of per capita incomes average tariff rates are lower for the poorest and richest countries and higher for countries in the middle of the income distribution this finding is not consistent with the widely held view that tariffs used by industrial nations bear more heavily on products of export interest to poorer developing countries than on imports from industrial nations it is consistent with the tariff escalation pattern reported in earlier studies if advanced countries account for most products at the high end of the fabrication scale results show that poorest countries will find it difficult to escape tariffs by attaining higher levels of economic development

explanations of protectionism in international trade votes in this study we analyze the voting records of u s senators on three recent international trade bills our objective is to assess the importance of ideology and constituent interest as forces that influence protectionist vs free trade voting behavior the methodology uses discriminant analysis supplemented with expert judgement the first conclusion is that ideology is the more important force in generic protectionism issues and local constituent interests are more important for commodity specific issues second we find that protectionism is especially associated with liberal ideology high import impact and low export dependence although the discriminant analysis outperforms expert judgement in classifying protectionist vs free trade votes in two of the three bills studied the best explanation is obtained by using both methods together

rational prepayment and the valuation of mortgage backed securities this article presents a new model of mortgage prepayments based on rational decisions by mortgage holders these mortgage bolders face beterogeneous transaction costs which are explicitly modeled the model is estimated using a version of hansen s 1982 generalized method of moments and is sbown to capture many of the empirical features of mortgage prepayment estimation results indicate that mortgage holders act as tbougb tbey face transaction costs tbat far exceed tbe explicit costs usually incurred on refinancing they also wait an average of more than a year before refinancing even when it is optimal to do so the model fits observed prepayment behavior as well as thee recent empirical model of schwartz and torous 1989 implications for pricing mortgage backed securities are discussed

optimal security design how should new securities be designed traditional theories have little to say on this the literature on capital structure and general equilibrium theories with incomplete markets take the securities firms issue as exogenous this paper explicitly incorporates the transaction costs of issuing securities and develops a model where the instruments that are traded are chosen optimally and the economy s market structure is endogenous among other things it is shown that the firm s income stream should be split so that in every state all payoffs are allocated to the security held by the group that values them most this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

incremental protection and efficient political choice between tariffs and quotas this paper offers a new political economy explanation for the increasing use in recent years of quotas instead of or in combination with tariffs as a form of trade protection we show that under domestic monopoly the comparative efficiency of tariffs and quotas in achieving political objectives will vary depending on the nature of the mark et and the level of protection at high levels of protection quotas can become more politically efficient than tariffs we also show that at low levels of protection a price equivalent quota may not exist

u s corporate interests and the political economy of trade policy this paper examines the behavior of american corporations with respect to international trade policy initiatives during the 1970s using survey generated data on revealed corporate trade policy interests and firmand industry level data on company characteristics direct or proxy variables were developed and applied in linear regression equations using an ordered probit specification and in an alternative approach using factor analysis to construct a composite dependent variable hypothesized relationships were verified between corporate positions on trade liberalization and the intensity of competition from imports the benefits from improved access to foreign markets and internal risk pooling capabilities of firms firms exposed to the international competitive environment inevitably have a stake in national trade policy this paper explores the revealed behavior of u s corporations on matters of trade policy in the 1970s it develops a set of hypotheses linking corporate trade policy positions to a series of company and industry attributes these hypotheses are tested using survey generated information regarding corporate behavior on trade policy matters beginning with the protectionist burke hartke initiatives of the early 1970s through the post tokyo round period at the end of the decade studies of the political economy of protection typically begin with the proposition that import barriers create rents that can be appropriated by the protected industry the size of the rents to be obtained and their probable division among the various participants in the industry partly determine the intensity of protection seeking behavior lobbying undertaken by participants in the industry brock and magee 1978 the intensity is also influenced by the degree of success expected in the political arena and by imperfections in the lobbying process for instance the incentive to be a free rider on the lobbying efforts of others walter and jones 1981 the actual outcome of protection seeking activity is conditioned by a variety of political considerations as well for instance politicians may be constrained by the possibility of repercussions from groups adversely affected by protection including consumers and export oriented industries foreign competitors are also affected so that issues concerning foreign relations enter into the decision process in addition politicians may be influenced more generally by ideology party platforms or attitudes toward equity a number of researchers including ball 1967 fieleke 1976 clark 1980 and ray 1981a 1981b have verified that a significant positive correlation exists between nominal tariff rates or effective rates of protection across manufacturing industries and low skilled labor intensity taken to be an indicator of the intensity of import competition and thus related to the size of the rents that could be obtained by protection cheh 1974 and bale 1977 analyzed the determinants of the percentage reductions in rates of duty resulting from the kennedy round tariff cuts concluding that the cuts were determined in such a way as to minimize labor adjustment costs see also allen lewis and tower 1980 marvel and ray 1983 also explored the determinants of kennedy round tariff cuts finding the size of tariff cuts tended to be smaller if an industry was more concentrated or sold a larger fraction of its output to household consumers and larger if the industry was more intensive in research and development r d or more highly unionized the result for r d presumably represents the desire at the industry level for improved access to export markets achievable through larger reciprocal reductions in protection on the part of foreign countries along somewhat different lines baldwin 1976 analyzed several key congressional votes on the received for publication november 21 1983 revision accepted for publication december 14 1984 new york university the authors are grateful to robert lipsey robert j levenson j peter jarrett and james green for providing data that contributed to this study to jang ro lee ashok chatterjee and monica kaufmann for research assistance and to bill greene for providing advice on the estimation technique and computer program used to perform the statistical analysis thomas a pugel is also grateful for the support of an esmee fairbaim research fellowship at the university of reading 1 in both studies ray also explores nontariff barriers ntbs across u s manufacturing industries aside from finding a positive relationship between tariff rates and ntbs the results are not easily interpreted however there is some inferential evidence in walter 1971 which finds a significant positive relationship between ntb incidence and presumably relatively low skill intensive developing country exports

the political economy of the tariff cycle how can protectionism and free trade succeed one another our answer focuses on the changing balance of private actors political demands these actors acquire interests in tariff policies because their assets are spatially concentrated and trade in these assets is subject to various limitations actors in regions experiencing no new investment in an established industry old regions have interests that sometimes differ from those in regions where there is new investment we show that old regions have no reason to be involved in tariff politics at business cycle peaks during troughs whether a state becomes more or less protectionist depends ceteris paribus on the relative political strength of old import competing and old exporting interests if old import competing industries outweigh the old exporters then protection will tend to increase at the trough and decrease at the peak of a business cycle the opposite result occurs when old exporters are more influential

securitization and loan performance ex ante and ex post relations in the mortgage market this study examines the relation between securitization and loan performance using a comprehensive dataset from a major national mortgage lender loans remaining on the bank s balance sheet ex post incurred higher delinquency rates than sold loans contrasting the negative relation between screening efforts and ex ante probability of loan sale explored by prior studies moreover the performance gap between sold and retained loans was wider among the subsample of loans that were perceived as easier to resell the investors seeming advantage over the originating bank can mostly be explained by information revealed during the time between loan origination and sale

unprotective tariffs ineffective liberalization and other mysteries an investigation of the endogenous dimensions of trade policy formation in australia 1 introductionsince its formation as a federation in 1901 australia embraced a fairly comprehensive tariff schedule in relation to imported manufactures 1 tariff rates fluctuated considerably over the years however over the course of the century they remained sufficiently high to earn australian manufacturing the reputation of one of the most heavily protected manufacturing sectors in the industrialized world 2 in recent years a number of liberalization waves have surfaced the most notable of these took place in 1973 1977 1988 1991 and most recently in 1994 with the signing of the uruguay round of the gatt agreement still tariffs remain a principal actor in australia s menu of industrial policies in a recent edition of the annual report of the productivity commission 3 published in november 1999 it is noted that although tariffs have dropped considerably since 1994 they remain an important form of assistance tariff assistance still accounts for around 90 of measured effective assistance to the manufacturing sector 4 p 52 given the pervasiveness of australian tariff policy the significant welfare implications of changes in that policy and the particular importance of international trade for this country ensuing from its idiomorphic cultural resource endowment and geographic characteristics 5 considerable research effort has been invested in the examination of various dimensions of this issue at the forefront of pertinent empirical research two items have attracted considerable interest 1 the host of determinants of the highly dispersed tariff concessions and 2 the impact of liberalization on imports research that falls in the category that examines the former including anderson 1980 conybeare 1984 aislabie 1988 and feaver and wilson 1998 is consistent at varying degrees with the theory of endogenous trade policy formation 6 according to the foundations of this theory tariff concessions may be viewed as public outcomes that facilitate a political equilibrium the mechanics are rather elementary when the profit loss that arises from import competition exceeds the transaction cost of a successful lobbying campaign for protection private interests will undertake such lobbying activities the higher the loss from foreign competition the more fervent the lobbying effort hence an increase in import penetration is likely to trigger greater protection7 trefler 1993 p 139 unlike this line of inquiry the critical causal relationship of interest to studies that fall in the category that investigates item 2 including simmons and smith 1994 relates to the effects of tariff changes on imports rather than the reverse the causal directions of the nature examined by studies that investigate issues 1 and 2 are of course not mutually exclusive higher import penetration increases tariffs and higher tariffs in turn decrease import penetration however despite the simultaneity of these variables studies of australia s trade policies associated with research lines 1 and 2 followed separate paths by only considering unidirectional causal relationships and yet these paths do converge the meeting point perplexing results on the one hand studies of endogenous protection such as anderson 1980 and aislabie 1988 have consistently failed to establish the expected result that an increase in import penetration will lead to higher tariffs on the other studies of trade liberalization often find that tariff reduction shave asurprisingly small effect on imports with a study by simmons and smith 1994 concluding that at least in relation to the examined industry removal of the tariff would have no effect on the level of imports p 57 it is important to note that analogous and equally puzzling findings pertaining to improbably smalle ffect so fliberalization on imports have been identified in the caseofothercountries suchastheunitedstates byanumberofauthors

making markets for structured mortgage derivatives abstract this paper distinguishes between securitization in which simple pass through instruments are created and structuring in which mortgages derivative claims are created the point is to explain how structuring a transaction brings value to a deal s underwriter briefly an underwriter must defeat arbitrage between pass throughs and derivatives the potential for market segmentation and price discrimination by the underwriter is used to analyze the structuring process in the course of the analysis the legal rules for trusts the algebraic rules for structuring and the limits on permissible price discrimination are discussed results for an actual transaction illustrate the important features of the analysis

investment tobin s q and interest rates the interest rate is a key determinant of rm investment we integrate a widelyused term structure model of interest rates cir cox ingersoll and ross 1985 with the q theory of investment hayashi 1982 and abel and eberly 1994 we show that stochastic interest rates have signicant eects on investment and rm value because capital is medium long lived capital adjustment costs have a rst order eect on investment and rm value we use duration to measure the interest rate sensitivity of rm value decompose a rm into assets in place and growth opportunities and value each component by extending the model to allow for endogenous capital liquidation we nd that the liquidation option provides a valuable protection against the increase of interest rates we further generalize the model to incorporate asymmetric adjustment costs a price wedge between purchasing and selling capital xed investment costs and irreversibility we nd that inaction is often optimal for an empirically relevant range of interest rates for rms facing xed costs or price wedges finally marginal q is equal to average q in our stochastic interest rate settings including one with serially correlated productivity shocks

do non strategic sanctions obey the law of demand the demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism abstract the prospect of receiving a monetary sanction for free riding has been shown to increase contributions to public goods we ask whether the impulse to punish is unresponsive to the cost to the punisher or whether like other preferences it interacts with prices to generate a conventional demand curve in a series of experiments we randomly vary the cost of reducing the earnings of other group members following voluntary contribution decisions in our design new groups are formed after each interaction and no subject faces any other more than once so there is no strategic reason to punish we nonetheless find significant levels of punishment and we learn that both price and the extent to which the recipient s contribution is below the group mean are significant determinants of the quantity of punishment demanded moreover punishment is mainly directed at free riders even when it costs nothing to the punisher

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

unemployment collective bargaining and the demand for protection there is a widespread consensus among nonacademic observers that labor unions with large numbers of unemployed members have been central actors in political coalitions demanding protectionist trade policies since the mid 1970s in advanced industrial societies yet trade unions and unemployment are hardly mentioned in most theories of the politics of international trade the purpose of this paper is to develop a theoretical framework for understanding the importance of unemployment as a determinant of protectionist demands that is consistent with optimizing behavior on the part of union members and firms models of labor negotiations derived from cooperative bargaining theory are used to illustrate why the material benefits of protection received by union members and their employers in protected industries increase when union members are unemployed even when workers are risk neutral and capital is immobile

emotion venting and punishment in public good experiments experimental studies have shown that sanctions effectively deter free riding within groups however the over use of costly punishment may actually harm overall welfare a main reason for over punishment is that free riders generate negative emotions that likely favor excessive punishments in this paper we ask whether the venting of one s emotions in different ways can reduce the level of excessive punishment in a standard vcm with punishment environment while preserving the norm enforcement properties of punishment we find that venting emotions reduces excessive punishment and under certain conditions the net effect is an increase in final payoffs i e welfare to the group

issuer credit quality and the price of asset backed securities following the financial market crisis of the past few years critics and scholars have identified numerous problems related to all parties associated with securitization including investors rating agencies issuers underwriters and borrowers some of this research focuses on the rating process itself adam ashcraft paul goldsmith pinkham and james vickery 2009 show that observable credit fundamentals deteriorated relative to ratings between 2005 and 2007 efraim benmelech and jennifer dlugosz 2009 find that collateralized debt obligations cdos rated by only one rating agency are more likely both to be downgraded and to suffer more severe downgrades than cdos rated by more than one agency joshua coval jakub jurek and erik stafford 2009a point out that ratings of cdos were highly unreliable due to models that were highly sensitive to even small errors in economic projections or losses and that underestimated the correlation of risks across various debt securities other research focuses on the conflicts of interest between parties who participate in the underlying processes of originating and bundling loans and collecting payments from delinquent borrowers chris downing dwight jaffee and nancy wallace 2009 find that some residential mortgage backed securities trade in a market for lemons where originators can use private information to determine which mortgage issuer credit quality and the price of asset backed securities

trade policy making in a model of legislative bargaining in democracies trade policy is the result of interactions among many agents with different agendas in accordance with this observation we construct a dynamic model of legislative trade policy making in the realm of distributive politics an economy consists of different sectors each of which is concentrated in one or more electoral districts each district is represented by a legislator in the congress legislative process is modeled as a multilateral sequential bargaining game a la baron and ferejohn 1989 some surprising results emerge bargaining can be welfare worsening for all participants legislators may vote for bills that make their constituents worse off identical industries will receive very different levels of tariff the results pose a challenge to empirical work since equilibrium trade policy is a function not only of economic fundamentals but also of political variables at the time of congressional negotiations some of them random realizations of mixed bargaining strategies

the economics of special interest politics the case of the tariff this paper investigates the interaction of politicians and special interest lobbies the goal is to model the equilibrium levels of redistributive policies such as taxes subsidies tariffs and regulatory decisions the model is applied throughout to the setting of tariffs by contributing to political campaigns special interest lobbies generate economic returns higher tariffs generate revenue for import competing industries through higher product prices higher milk support prices raise dairy farm income and so forth the lobby invests to maximize these net economic returns in evaluating their chances of election politicians weigh the favorable effects of special interest money against the unfavorable association with the lobby and the social cost of the redistributive policy section i explores the lobby s problem it describes a formalization of mancur olson s discussion of the voluntary provision of public goods and optimal contributions by lobbies to political campaigns section ii describes determination of the equilibrium tariff positions of each politician in a political campaign

the kennedy round evidence on the regulation of international trade in the united states the purpose of this paper is to analyze and provide empirical evidence regarding the regulation of international trade flows our goal is to provide an explanation of the changes in the interindustry pattern of trade restrictions which emerged from the kennedy round of tariff negotiations the principal conclusion of the analysis is that the pattern of protection which resulted from the kennedy round was shaped to minimize the domestic political disruption resulting from liberalization industries which faced significant import threats and whose characteristics enhanced their potential political influence were able to maintain tariff protection in the face of overall liberalization the potential impact of the agreed upon tariff reductions was partially undermined by the introduction of offsetting nontariff trade barriers ntbs in addition ntbs were introduced systematically in industries that were becom

firm participation in steel industry lobbying firm participation in steel industry lobbying i introduction what are the causes of recent protectionist pressure exerted by u s import competing firms studies by coughlin terza and khalifah 1989 feigenbaum and willett 1985 and takacs 1981 examine the empirical relationship between macroeconomic conditions and the aggregate frequency of escape clause petitions file by u s manufacturing firms although the results are mixed as to whether international macroeconomic performance influences the demand for protection the studies indicate that domestic macroeconomic conditions significantly influence the frequency of escape clause petitions 1 as important as these are to understanding the underlying sources of protectionist pressure they do not address another equally important aspect of protectionist pressure the determinants of a single industry s demand for protection the fact that most protectionist pressure results from actions taken by individual industries underscores the importance of understanding the determinants of industry pressure indeed most trade legislation is designed to respond to the problems of individuals sectors of the economy in this paper we empirically examine the microeconomic determinants of the protectionist pressure exerted by the u s steel industry in antidumping and countervailing duty cases from 1982 after the trigger price mechanism was abolished to 1986 the steel industry is a particularly attractive subject for empirical analysis since no other industry pushed more aggressively for protection during the 1980s in recognizing that the degree of pressure exerted by an industry is the aggregate result of decisions made by individual firms to contribute to a collective action the microeconomic approach offers two advantages over previous studies 2 first to explain industry pressure we model the decision of the representative firm taking into account the incentives that a firm faces in a collective setting for example we recognize that the benefits of antidumping and countervailing duties have characteristics of a public good so that individual firms may have an incentive to free ride a proposition supported by the empirical results second we specify microeconomic variables that reflect the economic conditions facing the representative firm in the steel industry rather than macroeconomic variables which may not accurately measure the economic performance of specific industries or the international pressures they face in contrast to previous studies which found a significant relationship between macroeconomic performance and aggregate pressure we do not find that the steel industry s economic performance influences the degree of industry pressure our second objective is to examine the policy implications of free riding by testing the relationship between the effectiveness of a coalition of firms and the degree of protection actually received if an effective coalition of firms can influence the policy outcome then antidumping and countervailing duties are more likely to be provided to segments of the steel industry that can minimize the free rider problem since these segments are not necessarily those that absorb the greatest injury u s trade policy may not be meeting its goal of providing greater relief to firms most injured by dumped or subsidized imports the results confirm the proposition that segments of the steel industry which are injured by dumped or subsidized imports and which can organize an effective coalition do in fact receive greater protection than those segments that are merely injured ii the representative firm s decision to contribute to a less than fair value action to obtain protection from alleged less than fair value lfv imports imports that are either dumped by foreign firms or subsidized by foreign governments firms representing a domestic industry must file a complaint of foreign dumping or export subsidization with the international trade administration ita which then determines the magniture of dumping or subsidization

the valuation of complex derivatives by major investment firms empirical evidence this article examines the auction of a portfolio of collateralized mortgage obligations cmos to major broker dealers and institutional investors the unique data set allows us to analyze a number of important empirical questions related to the valuation of cmos by the bidders and the elasticity of demand for the securities the results reveal that the valuations differ substantially implying a significant elasticity of demand this article is designed to shed light on two related questions first it extends the work of bagwell 1991 1992 brown and ryngaert 1990 and bradley desai and kim 1988 among others on shareholder heterogeneity and the elasticity of the demand for financial assets to date the empirical research on investor heterogeneity has focused on common stock this article supplements previous work by examining an auction of another class of securities complex collateralized mortgage obligations cmos to major securities dealers and institutional investors second it provides perspective on fixed income valuation models in the spirit of cox ingersoll and ross 1985 and black derman and toy 1990 virtually all of these models even those that specify relatively complex interest rate processes assume homogeneous beliefs this implies that within the constraints imposed by estimation error sophisticated investors should place equal values on fixed income securities bagwell observes that investors can be heterogeneous along several dimensions first heterogeneity can be induced by tax rules to the extent that different investors are taxed in different ways their demand for securities will be affected second transaction costs can cause heterogeneity by driving a wedge between buyers sellers and owners of a security third investors can differ in their assessments of the value of a security either because they possess different information or because they analyze that information in different ways fourth investors can face different nontradeable risks and thus can have different assessments of the value of a security depending on how it interacts with these risks finally it has been suggested by lee shleifer and thaler 1991 among others that investors may differ for idio

the impact of special interests on preferential tariff concessions by the united states this paper provides empirical evidence on the rela tive impact of the generalized system of preferences gsp adopted in 1975 and the caribbean basin initiative cbi adopted in 1983 on the pattern of u s imports of manufac tured goods from the target areas at the four digit level in 1984 imports from brazil mexico south america the carib bean basin and from all eligible countries are each analyzed we provide evidence that existing preferential agreements have failed to offset the bias in u s protection against competitive exports from developing countries we also explain why one might have predicted such an outcome

is the market for mortgage backed securities a market for lemons this paper models and provides empirical evidence for the quality of assets that are securitized through bankruptcy remote special purpose vehicles spvs the model predicts that assets sold to spvs will be of lower quality lemons compared to assets that are not sold to spvs we find strong empirical support for this prediction using a comprehensive data set of sales of mortgage backed securities freddie mac participation certificates or pcs to spvs over the period 1991 through 2002 valuation estimates based on a structural two factor model indicate that pcs sold to spvs are on average valued 0 39 lower per 100 of face value relative to pcs not so sold for the four largest coupon groups in our full sample of freddie mac pcs we find a lemons spread of 4 6 basis points in terms of yield to maturity and this spread accounts for 13 45 of the overall prepayment spread of these securities jel d82 g13 g14 g21

jobs jobs jobs a new perspective on protectionism this paper analyzes the determinants of protectionism in a small open economy with search frictions in this environment jobs generate rents whose access depends on the level of trade protection by raising the domestic price of a good a government may attract more firms in a particular industry this raises the probability that workers will find jobs in this sector and in turn will benefit from the associated rents though simple this channel may help explainavarietyofstylizedfactsonthestructureoftradeprotectionandindividualtrade policy preferences jel f130 f160

environmental regulations transfers and trade theory and evidence abstract this paper develops a theory of compensation of producers for the costs associated with environmental regulations we show that the existence of transfers can give counter intuitive effects of environmental policy on both output and trade flows in particular the compensation obtained by producers neutralizes the effect of environmental policy on output and consequently on trade flows this may help explain why previous empirical research has found weak evidence that environmental regulations affect trade patterns the theory is tested using agricultural sector data the evidence supports the hypothesis that environmental regulations and transfers are positively correlated

optimal incentives and securitization of defaultable assets abstract we study optimal securitization in the presence of an initial moral hazard a financial intermediary creates and then sells to outside investors defaultable assets whose default risk is determined by the unobservable costly effort exerted by the intermediary we calculate the optimal contract for any given effort level and show the natural emergence of extreme punishment for defaults under which investors stop paying the intermediary after the first default with securitization contracts optimally designed we find securitization improves the intermediary s screening incentives furthermore the equilibrium effort level and the surplus converge to their first best levels with sufficiently many assets

a dynamic model of endogenous trade policy empirical evidence suggests that past levels of protection are significant determi nants of current levels of protection we investigate dynamic interactions among interest groups and resulting endogenous links between current and future trade policies we explore these intertemporal links in a small open economy in which lobbying and tariff policies are the outcome of a dynamic game among factor owners the model can generate cycles with prolonged periods of free trade and or prolonged periods of restricted trade i e persistent trade policies an interesting aspect of the environment is the role of lobbying as a partial

industry rent seeking and the filing of unfair trade complaints abstract this paper adopts a rent seeking framework to explain the incidence of antidumping and countervailing duty complaints brought to the u s international trade commission and the department of commerce tobit analysis on all 3 digit sic industries is employed to examine the relationship between the frequency of unfair trade complaints and such factors as industry concentration unionization capital intensity and levels and or changes in employment price cost margins and import penetration large capital intensive industries particularly those facing employment losses and rising import shares are found to be most likely to file complaints protection of quasi rents accruing to capital and labor rather than protection of monopoly returns appears to be the primary impetus behind the filing of unfair trade complaints

emotional arousal as a source of bounded rationality abstract this paper proposes an alternative psychological explanation for bounded rationality according to herbert simon bounded rationality arises from human cognitive limitations following the suggestion of institutional economist john r commons i argue that extremes in emotional arousal also contribute to bounded rationality this idea is formalized and developed using the yerkes dodson law from psychology examples from the popular press and the academic literatures of law management and economics are presented to illustrate the impact of this type of bounded rationality on human behavior

divided government and u s trade policy theory and evidence if different parties control the u s congress and white house the united states may maintain higher import protection than otherwise this proposition follows from a distributive politics model in which congress can choose to delegate trade policymaking to the president when the congressional majority party faces a president of the other party the former has an incentive to delegate to but to constrain the president by requiring congressional approval of trade proposals by up or down vote this constraint forces the president to provide higher protection in order to assemble a congressional majority evidence confirms that 1 the institutional constraints placed on the president s trade policymaking authority are strengthened in times of divided government and loosened under unified government and 2 u s trade policy was significantly more protectionist under divided than under unified government during the period 1949 90

the textile bill of 1985 the determinants of congressional voting patterns the following tables show the results of the probit analysis for the senate and the house a table including results for different combinations of the independent variables is included in an unpublished appendix available from the authors upon request the results of the probit analysis for the senate are shown in table 1 all the variables except exp had the expected signs however the results indicate that the two other employment variables and party affiliation are the only factors which we can say with confidence influenced a senator s decision to vote for or against this bill the coefficients reported and labeled der of prob measure the derivative of the probability of a yes vote evaluated at the means of the independent variables in question thus for example the coefficient for unemp in the top line of table 1 should be interpreted as indicating that a one percentage point increase in a state s unemployment rate will cause a 5 89 increase in the probability that the senator will vote for the bill the result for dr the party of the senator shows that in general democrats are more apt to vote for protectionist policies than are republicans this is consistant with president reagan s negative stand on the bill and his threat to veto it should it pass the amendment in question passed the senate on 24 october 1985 by a vote of 54 for to 42 against but the bill it was attached to has been postponed indefinitely the house bill which was passed on 10 october 1985 by a vote of 262 for to 159 against was vetoed by reagan on 17 december 1985 the results of the probit analysis for the house of representatives are shown in table 2 state employment data was used for the house as opposed to data for each voting district this was done for three reasons first employment data is usually reported by state or by county since counties are often divided by congressional district boundaries much personal judgement would be necessary to assign employment figures second the most recent county industry employment data is from 1981 while the data used in this analysis is from 1984 third we feel that in general logrolling is prevalent among a state s representatives for this bill the representatives from twenty six states voted as a block and in all but six states one third or less of that state s representatives voted contrary to the majority all of the probabilities are significant at the 05 confidence level representative s voting patterns are influenced by all of the included factors when unionization is added to the equation its coefficient is very small and negative although it is significant at the 05 confidence level one would expect more significance here since there are more degrees of freedom for the house analysis than for that of the senate when the data from the house and senate are pooled the results are similar to those of the house alone the null hypothesis that the data cannot be pooled was tested using a statistic with eight degrees of freedom 9 721 meaning that the null hypothesis is rejected as in the senate the state unemployment rate and the percent employed in textiles are important influences on the representative s vote and democrats in the house are more likely to vote for protectionist bills than republicans however unlike the senate the percent of a representative s campaign contributions that are donated by industry special interest groups has a significant effect on voting patterns although the point estimates for the magnitudes of the influence are very similar in both cases seventy four percent of the house received campaign contributions from these special interest groups while only 54 of the senate received contributions from these same sources this is probably because only one third of the senate was up for reelection during the time period considered while the entire house was in the process of campaigning for reelection exports also play a role in influencing the probability of a yes vote reducing this probability as employment in export industries increases but the magnitude of the coefficient is only 11 of that for textile employment the significance of this variable in the house is probably due to fear of retaliation expressed by both democrats and republicans this variable was not significant in the senate model most likely because the senate version excluded from the 1 import quota growth rate many countries who might have retaliated representatives appear to respond to a wider variety of constituent interests than do senators while senators voting patterns are only significantly influenced by their political affiliation their state s unemployment rate and the importance of textiles to their state the voting behavior of representatives is influenced by these factors as well as the importance of exports to their state and campaign contributions by textile special interest groups these results affirm the validity of the approach used by baldwin and coughlin they differ from baldwin who finds exports are not a significant influence on the house and from coughlin who does not include export employment as an explanitory variable or analyze the differences in voting patterns between the house and the senate

short term safety or long term failure empirical evidence of the impact of securitization on bank risk based on a sample of u s commercial banks from 2002 to 2012 this paper shows that bank loan securitization has a significant and positive impact on both z scores and the likelihood of bank failure indicating a short term risk reduction and a long term risk increase effect we also find disparate impacts between mortgage and non mortgage securitization loan sale activities are found to have a similar impact to securitization

the political economy of the european customs classification customs classification is an important element in a country s trade policy how a good is classified can affect the rate of duty that applies the coverage of non tariff barriers and the formulation and application of rules of origin reclassifications can occur because of the introduction of a new product but also because of protectionist motives this paper is the first attempt at explaining these reclassifications focusing on the european union i examine whether the number of tariff lines in an industry result from the introduction of new products or from protectionist lobbying the analysis focuses on 90 manufacturing industries over 12 years results suggest that protectionist lobbying does play a role in explaining changes in the eu s customs classification

the determinants of exit in an open economy in this paper the determinants of exit are investigated for the manufacturing sector of the united states economy which has been subjected to growing international influences the analysis uses united states cross sectional data the results of the exit equation suggest that low profitability declining industry growth and displacement of incumbents by entrants foster exit international influences are also seen to have an impact on u s manufacturing exit specifically imports into an industry have a small effect on exit and protection has little influence in stemming exit

subprime mortgage default abstract this paper constructs a reduced form credit risk model of mortgage default the data used is of privately securitized subprime arms adjustable rate mortgages originated between 1997 and 2008 and observed between 2000 and 2009 the period studied thus encompasses the beginning of the subprime crisis given the estimated model contractual properties of the loans are then used to infer the market price of default risk for the various quarters of origination it is empirically determined that a change in the inherent nature of borrowers led to a deterioration in their default performance a change which can be first detected in late 2004 on the other hand the evidence also indicates that the secondary mortgage market became aware of this change at about this same time the large rise in defaults in 2007 cannot therefore be attributed to any surprise other than the unexpectedly large fall in housing prices

domestic content legislation house voting and the economic theory of regulation house voting on domestic content legislation provides a rare opportunity to examine the political economy of protectionism with respect to a particular issue rather than by using the traditional interindustry approach the results indicate that a representative s vote in favor of the content legislation and the intensity of the legislator s preferences are positively related to the importance of the auto and steel industries in the representative s district an increasing unemployment rate campaign contributions from labor groups affiliation with democratic party and a liberal ideology despite ideology s statistical significance the results suggest this variable can be disregarded because neither the predictive accuracy nor the explanatory power of the model is improved by its inclusion the estimates also provide insights concerning the impact of changes in the independent variables upon voting patterns

adverse selection and liquidity distortion this article develops a tractable model with two dimensional asymmetric information in asset markets sellers are privately informed about their asset quality and distress positions illiquidity arises endogenously and manifests itself through two distinct market outcomes the first outcome features limited market participation resulting in a dry up in trading volume the second outcome involves a large volume at a depressed price only in the latter outcome do distressed sellers engage in fire sales quickly unwinding their positions at a steep price discount the article further establishes that this equilibrium can arise only when buyers expect that sellers with a higher need for immediacy will on average have higher quality assets hence both the information structure and the distribution of sellers distress are crucial for the existence of fire sales

between free trade and protectionism strategic trade policy and a theory of corporate trade demands conventional theories of the political economy of trade argue that industries in import competing businesses favor protectionism while multinational firms and export dependent corporations advocate unconditional free trade however many multinational industries have recently advocated strategic trade policies that is they are willing to support free trade at home only if foreign markets are opened or foreign governments reduce subsidies to their firms if demands for strategic trade policy were adopted by the united states they could represent a threat to the general agreement on tariffs and trade gatt and the multilateral trading system this article seeks to explain the emergence of these new corporate trade demands and thereby broaden theories of the political economy of trade the article begins with the widely supported position that multinational and export oriented firms prefer unconditional free trade building on concepts from theories of industrial organization and international trade the article then hypothesizes that rising economies of scale and steep learning curves will necessitate that these firms have access to global markets via exports if growing dependence on world markets is combined with foreign government subsidies or protection the trade preferences of firms will shift from unconditional free trade to demands that openness at home be contingent on openness overseas the manner in which firm demands then get translated into industry demands will vary with the industry s structure if the industry consists of firms with symmetric strategies it will seek strategic trade policy but if the industry is highly segmented it will turn toward protectionism the article concludes with a preliminary test of these hypotheses in four brief studies of the politics of trade in the semiconductor commercial aircraft telecommunications equipment and machine tool industries

lobbying and adjustment in declining industries abstract this paper explains the persistence of protection in terms of interaction between industry adjustment lobbying and the political response faced with a trade shock owners of industry specific factors can respond in two ways they can undertake costly adjustment or they can lobby politicians for trade protection and thereby mitigate the need for adjustment the choice will depend on the relative returns from adjusting relative to lobbying by introducing an explicit lobbying process it can be shown that the current level of protection is an increasing function of past protection and that declining industries contract more slowly over time the more responsive are politicians to lobbying in addition the model makes clear that the type of senescent industry collapse predicted by cassing and hillman 1986 is only possible under fairly special assumptions about the technology of lobbying

public policies pressure groups and dead weight costs abstract this paper presents a model of competition among special interest groups for political influence each active group exerts pressure to affect its taxes and subsidies where activities of different groups are related by the equality between total tax collections and total tax subsidies the dead weight costs and benefits of taxes and subsidies play a major role in our model an increase in the dead weight cost of taxation encourages pressure by taxpayers while an increase in the dead weight costs of subsidies discourages pressure by recipients various applications of the analysis are discussed