standardization and variety abstract in the tradeoff between standardization and variety there can be too much or too little variety the latter possibility can only happen if there are several equilibria

asymmetric international minimum quality standards and vertical differentiation this paper develops a two country model of a vertically differentiated duopoly that spans two countries which are not integrated without additional costs equilibrium qualities prices profits and consumer s surplus are compared when 1 minimum quality standards are identical and 2 standards differ across countries both markets turn out to be connected by the quality choices of the two firms both firms prices in the two countries and their profits are lower whereas consumer s surplus and the two offered qualities are higher in both countries if no firm is forced out of the country s market with the more demanding minimum quality standard copyright 1995 by blackwell publishing ltd

policies and international trade agreements on technical compatibility for industries with network externalities abstract the paper considers a country home in which consumers have heterogeneous preferences over ex ante incompatible domestic and imported products and benefit from a network externality we analyze the cases with trade under perfect competition and the international duopoly in which both governments strategically use policies toward compatibility but cannot use conventional trade policies in both cases the equilibrium outcome of the non cooperative game depends upon the strength of the network externality effect and involves either an excessively high equilibrium level of compatibility in combination with either too much or too little trade or very low equilibrium levels of both compatibility and trade the paper concludes with the analysis of the international agreements on policies toward compatibility and evaluates the existing provisions in the wto legal system aimed at minimizing the trade inhibiting impact of standards and regulations in the area of technical compatibility

the competitive effects of partial equity interests and joint ventures abstract antitrust authorities should consider the trade off between enhanced efficiency and reduced competition in cases of partial ownership this paper examines the competitive effects side of that trade off in the context of a modified cournot model we show that in markets where entry is difficult partial ownership arrangements could result in less output and higher prices than otherwise even if the ownership shares are relatively small these effects arise solely because these arrangements link the fortunes of actual or potential competitors producing a positive correlation among their profits in this sense the effects are purely structural they arise not because of increased opportunities for collusion or changes in the concentration of control but because the linking of profits reduces each firm s incentive to compete since these links internalize free rider problems associated with policing collusion and investing in entry deterrence however they could also enhance cartel stability and profitability

product quality consumption externalities and the role of national treatment abstract article iii of the wto national treatment limits domestic policy in an effort to curtail protectionist discrimination against foreign products in this paper we examine the role of national treatment and prominent article xx exceptions when goods are vertically differentiated and generate consumption externalities we study the domestic policy choices of two countries first stage problem and quantity and price equilibria in two product markets second stage problem under a strict application of article iii and compare them to the policy choices and product market equilibria prevailing when countries can misrepresent external damages and discriminate while one may expect that high externalities would lead to a greater need for exceptions to equal treatment we show that this is often not the case and furthermore that non discrimination can lead to a cleaner world environment

minimum quality standards with more than two firms abstract this paper studies the effects of introducing a minimum quality standard mqs in a vertically differentiated market it is shown that previous results indicating beneficial effects of a mqs heavily depend on the duopolistic set up they had been developed in an example with three firms is then provided showing that not all reaction functions in quality levels are increasing we also show that the introduction of the standard decreases the profit levels of all firms the maximum quality level and the average quality consumed as a consequence despite the increase in consumer surplus any effective mqs would reduce welfare

installed base and compatibility innovation product preannouncements and predation a good is often more valuable to any user the more others use compatible goods the authors show that this effect may inhibit innovation if an installed base exists and transition to a new standard must be gradual early adopters bear a disproportionate share of transient incompatibility costs this can produce excess inertia the installed base however is stranded if the new standard is adopted this may create excess momentum these dynamic effects have strategic implications temporary price cutting can permanently prevent entry and product preannouncements can be critical in innovation these strategic actions have ambiguous welfare effects

desirability of compatibility in the absence of network externalities i compare the incentives firms have to produce individual components compatible with components of other manufacturers instead of systems composed of components that are incompatible with components of competing manufacturers i show that even in the absence of positive consumption externalities network externalities prices and profits will be higher in the regime of compatibility equilibrium total surplus could be higher in either regime both regimes overprovide variety compared to the surplus maximizing solution in today s environment many products are complex specified by a long array of characteristics part of the decision of the firm is to choose if it should break this long array of features into two or more smaller parts and produce the products corresponding to the smaller arrays instead of the product that embodies the full array we will call the products that correspond to these smaller arrays components and the product that corresponds to the full array a system note that components are by their definition complements components produced by different manufacturers are compatible if it is feasible for the consumers to combine them costlessly into a working system in this paper we will assume that there are two components which make up a system we will discuss competition under full compatibility when components produced by all firms are compatible with each other and under incompatibility when no components produced by different firms are compatible and no hybrid systems can exist 2 assuming availability of the same

the multinational firm direct investment is incorporated into a simple general equilibrium model of international trade the analysis focuses on an attempt to endogenize the internalization decision it is argued that a reasonable approach assumes that arm s length contracts must be simple so that complex arrangements require internalization the model relates direct investment to the degree of underlying uncertainty and to fundamental trade determinants such as relative factor endowments the behavior of the model contrasts sharply with that of the markusen helpman model which takes internalization for granted

optimal pricing and quality choice when investment in quality is irreversible this paper examines the price and quality choice of a single product risk neutral monopolist who can delay irreversible investments required for market entry it is shown that the price and quality she chooses at entry increase with uncertainty about the size of future demand in a stackelberg leader follower game the leader and follower pre commit immediately up to a certain level of uncertainty in this case the leader produces the higher quality good when uncertainty is higher than this threshold the follower will wait and enter the market later with a higher quality good

technological asymmetry among foreign investors and mode of entry how does the preferred entry mode of foreign investors depend on their technological capability relative to that of their rivals the authors develop a simple model of entry mode choice and evaluate its main testable implication using data on foreign investors in eastern european countries and the successor states of the former soviet union the model considers competition between two asymmetric foreign investors and captures the following tradeoffs while a joint venture helps a foreign investor secure a better position in the product market compared with its rival it also requires that profits be shared with the local partner the model predicts that the efficient foreign investor is less likely to choose a joint venture and more likely to enter directly relative to the inefficient investor the authors empirical analysis supports this prediction foreign investors with more sophisticated technologies and marketing skills relative to other firms in their industry tend to prefer direct entry to joint ventures this empirical finding is robust to controlling for host country specific effects and other commonly cited determinants of entry mode

assisting domestic industries under international oligopoly the relevance of the nature of competition to optimal policies optimal trade and industrial policies are derived for a home market that is supplied by a domestic firm and a foreign firm the optimal policy combination can be quite sensitive to the nature of the duopoly s competition for example for some cost and demand s tructures the optimal policy under cournot competition consists of a domestic production tax and a tariff but that under bertrand compet ition consists of a production subsidy and free trade copyright 1988 by american economic association

contracts intellectual property rights and multinational investment in developing countries abstract the policy debate between multinational firms favoring strong contract law and host country governments who often oppose such protection motivates the paper local agents managers learn the multinational s technology and can defect to start a rival firm contract enforcement including binding the multinational itself makes the multinational better off outcomes for the host country are more complex depending on mode switches induced by enforcement if enforcement induces the multinational to switch from exporting to local production welfare improves if local production was occurring anyway enforcement may result in the loss of rents to local agents and lower welfare

privatization policy in an international oligopoly this paper studies privatization policy in an international oligopoly the argument that equal treatment of foreign investors will be detrimental to domestic welfare by shifting profits from domestic to foreign firms is shown to be less relevant in privatization auctions than in greenfield fdi models since these profi ts hifts are partly paid for by the foreign firms in the bidding competition effects of local equity requirements trade and investment policies are also studied it is for instance shown that small local equity requirements are likely to be beneficial but large ones are counterproductive by preventing welfare enhancing foreign acquisitions

network effects software provision and standardization in this paper we examine the software provision decision of software firms the provision decision by software firms determines the value and hence the market share of competing hardware technologies we show how the provision decision by software firms determines whether multiple hardware technologies are supported in equilibrium or whether there is de facto standardization with only one hardware technology supplied with software in equilibrium we show that when consumers place a high value on software variety there is a suboptimal amount of standardization by the market

adoptions and orphans in the early microcomputer market in this paper we examine the development of the microcomputer market in the early 1980s cp m a widely adopted operating system was orphaned by the user and the development communities a new operating system dos and a new hardware platform the ibm pc became the predominant industry standard we examine the statistical relationship between data that reflects hardware and software sales for the competing platforms we conclude that the economic processes underlying the development of dos differed from those underlying cp m and that many of these differences related to the role of software development

cross border acquisitions and taxes efficiency and tax revenues we develop a theoretical oligopoly model to study how international differences in profit and capital gains taxes affect foreign acquisitions reductions in foreign profit taxes tend to trigger inefficient foreign acquisitions while reductions in foreign capital gains taxes may trigger efficient foreign acquisitions foreign acquisitions can increase domestic tax revenues even when profit taxes are evaded the reason is that bidding competition between foreign firms ensures that all benefits from the acquisition including tax advantages are captured by a domestic seller paying capital gains taxes tax code issues such as the treatment of goodwill are shown to affect the pattern of foreign acquisitions jel classification f23

compatibility standardization and network effects some policy implications given the dramatic growth of the internet and information technology industries in general and the importance of interconnection in these networks the economics of compatibility and standardization has become mainstream economics in this paper i examine several key policy aspects of standard setting in industries with network effects copyright 2002 oxford university press

standardization in decentralized economies this paper presents a dynamic model inspired by evolutionary game theory of how standards and norms emerge in decentralized economies it shows that standardization outcomes depend on adopters attitudes to problems caused by incompatibility if individuals display aversion to incompatibility standardization never fails to happen eventually but societies sometimes end up picking inferior standards in this case official action can be useful to quickly achieve sensible standardization on the other hand when individuals display tolerance or neutrality to incompatibility there is neither path dependency nor a lock in problem and regulation seems a poor alternative to laissez faire

revisiting the effects of regional trade agreements on trade flows with proper specification of the gravity model this paper uses a gravity model to assess ex post regional trade agreements the model includes 130 countries and is estimated with panel data over the period 1962 1996 the introduction of the correct number of dummy variables allows for identification of vinerian trade creation and trade diversion effects while the estimation method takes into account the unobservable characteristics of each pairs of trade partner countries the endogeneity of some of the explanatory variables as well as a potential selection bias in contrast to previous estimates results show that regional agreements have generated a significant increase in trade between members often at the expense of the rest of the world

quality leadership when regulatory standards are forthcoming in many markets governments set minimum quality standards while some sellers compete on the basis of quality by exceeding them such quality leadership strategies often win public acclaim especially when they involve environmental attributes using a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation we show that if the high quality firm can commit to a quality level before regulations are promulgated it induces the regulator to weaken standards and welfare falls our results raise doubts about the social benefits of corporate self regulation and highlight the dangers of lengthy delays between legislative mandates for new regulations and their implementation

the economics of joint ventures in less developed countries the paper examines the microeconomic partial equilibrium behavior of joint ventures established between transnational corporations and domestic partners in less developed countries it focuses on issues relating to resource allocation and profit distribution under various institutional scenarios the analysis places special emphasis on the role of bargaining power transfer pricing stock ownership and profit shares of the parties and the responsiveness of joint ventures to national development goals some of the results apply to wholly owned subsidiaries of transnational corporations local firms and licensing arrangements which emerge as special cases

price and variety in the spokes model the spokes model of nonlocalized spatial competition provides a new analytical tool for dierentiated oligopoly and a representation of spatial monopolistic competition an increase in the number of rms leads to lower equilibrium prices when consumers have relatively high product valuations but surprisingly to higher equilibrium prices for in termediate consumer valuations new entry alters consumer and social welfare through price market expansion and matching eects with free entry the market may pro vide too many or too few varieties from a social welfare perspective and the equilibrium price remains above marginal cost even when the number of rms is arbitrarily large

host country policy transfer pricing and ownership distribution in international joint ventures a theoretical analysis abstract this paper develops a simple model of an international joint venture in which the ownership shares are endogenously determined as the outcome of nash bargaining between a multinational firm and a host firm it shows how tax subsidy policy by the host country s government and transfer pricing of inputs by the multinational firm may influence the equity distribution of the joint venture insofar as the optimal level of these policies is dependent on the primitives the model generates empirical hypotheses regarding the impact of the primitives on the equity distribution

the limits of monopolization through acquisition we address the question of whether competitive acquisition of firms by their rivals can result in complete or partial monopolization of a homogeneous product industry this question is modeled in terms of two distinct three stage noncoopera tive games analysis of subgame perfect pure strategy nash equilibria of these games discloses that under simplifying assumptions monopolization of an industry through acquisition is limited to industries with relatively few firms partial monopolization is either limited in scope or can be completely eliminated by prohibiting any owner from acquiring over 50 percent of the firms in the industry

insecurity and the pattern of trade an empirical investigation corruption and imperfect contract enforcement dramatically reduce international trade this paper estimates the reduction using a structural model of import demand in which insecurity acts as a hidden tax on trade we find that inadequate institutions constrain trade as much as tariffs do we also find that omission of indices of institutional quality biases the estimates of typical gravity models obscuring a negative relationship between per capita income and the share of total expenditure devoted to traded goods finally we argue that cross country variation in the effectiveness of institutions and the consequent variation in the prices of traded goods offer a simple explanation for the stylized fact that high income capital abundant countries trade disproportionately with each other

the boundaries of multinational enterprises and the theory of international trade this paper begins with a review of empirical evidence on multinational firms conceptual underpinnings of a theory are developed relying in particular on the notion of knowledge capital as a mobile joint input into geographically separated production facilities this idea is embedded in a simple two country general equilibrium model that supports multinational production in equilibrium under conditions consistent with the empirical evidence the final section examines internalization and shows why certain properties of knowledge capital also imply a preference for transferring technologies internally within the firm rather than through arm s length markets

public finance of private goods the case of college education this paper describes a contract theory of public finance of college education that explains why everyone pays for the college education of a lucky minority the contract provides gambles that families desire optimizing the contract determines the taxes paid by all members of society fees paid by those whose children go to college the fraction of children who are admitted to college and the quality of college education changes in wealth lead to changes in taxes and admissions but fees and quality are invariant the practice of using a cutoff level of precollege achievement to determine admission to college is justified by the theory

trade and the impact of innovations and standards the case of germany and the uk the effects of patents as indicators for innovations and standards on german trade performance are analysed in general and german british trade in detail the latter analysis goes a step further than the approach of swann et al 1996 and is based on a broader and more detailed database the results show that germany s export performance can primarily be explained by its innovative capacity and only to a small extent by its strength in standards furthermore the results underscore the common view of the trade fostering effect of international standards while idiosyncratic standards have ambiguous effects on exports

the importance of eu 15 borders for ceecs agri food exports the role of tariffs and non tariff measures in the pre accession period abstract this paper assesses the evolution of the eu 15 market access for the agri food products originating from ceecs a gravity model technique has been used to assess the overall trade resistance border effect and to weight its various components such as tariff and non tariff measures sanitary and phytosanitary standards other quality measures in the pre accession period 1999 2004 the findings reveal despite the undertaken integration and trade liberalisation processes a persisting and significant trade resistance for the ceecs agri food exports to the eu market even just prior their accession in 2004 still present difficulties in market access at the time are partially explained by tariff and non tariff measures while a large part of border effect remains in the domain of other presumably non trade policy related factors home bias consumer preferences etc these results indicate that despite the accession process customs union and adoption of the eu standards the trade integration of the enlarged eu market was not yet completed in 2004

foreign direct investment and host country policies a rationale for using ownership restrictions abstract this paper examines host governments motivation for restricting ownership shares of multinational firms mnfs in foreign direct investment fdi projects an mnf with a productivity advantage is willing to invest in a host country the host government wants to capture the mnf s surplus yet cannot observe it due to the mnf s private information about its firm specific advantage in contrast a joint venture jv partner might observe this surplus depending on its ownership share the host government can alleviate its informational constraints by using ownership restrictions to force a jv this calls into question the wisdom of calls for liberalizing fdi flows by the wholesale elimination of domestic jv requirements we show that the optimal mechanism involves ownership restrictions that decrease as the size of the mnf s firm specific advantage increases

strategic choice of quality when quality is costly the persistence of the high quality advantage in a two firm two stage model of vertical product differentiation i show that for every convex fixed cost function of quality the firm that chooses the higher quality at the first stage earns the higher profits the result holds for the pure strategy equilibrium in the simultaneous quality game and it holds as well if firms choose their qualities in sequential order

strategic trade policy with endogenous choice of quality and asymmetric costs abstract this paper examines strategic trade and joint welfare maximizing incentives towards investment in the quality of exports by an ldc and a developed country firms first compete in qualities and then export to an imperfectly competitive third country market under bertrand competition unilateral policy involves an investment subsidy by the low quality ldc and an investment tax by the developed country whereas jointly optimal policy calls for the reverse so as to reduce price competition by increasing product differentiation under cournot competition unilateral policy is also reversed from the bertrand outcome but jointly optimal policy involves a tax in both countries

competing networks and proprietary standards the case of quadraphonic sound quadraphonic audio systems failed to replace stereo in the 1970s despite backing from all the major manufacturers and recording houses network externalities played a significant role in this episode and the author uses the installed base model of j farrell and g saloner 1986 to explain quad s failure the author finds that the introduction of competing incompatible quadraphonic systems hindered the development of a viable user base and he argues that the systems sponsors introduced their products in a technologically premature state in order to prevent one another from preemptively establishing the quad standard as a result self fulfilling consumer and retailer expectations doomed quadraphonic sound copyright 1990 by blackwell publishing ltd

a comparative institutional analysis of agreements on product standards abstract the wto and the eu have chosen two different agreements on product standards while the wto s approach is primarily based on a national treatment nt principle the eu s approach crucially relies on a principle of mutual recognition mr this paper offers a first look at the comparative performance of these two principles we show that standards are imposed for levels of externalities that are too low under nt and too high under mr this suggests that nt should be preferred to mr when the amount of trade in goods characterized by high levels of externalities is large

warning labels as cheap talk why regulators ban drugs abstract one explanation for drug bans is that regulators know more than consumers about product quality but why not just communicate the information in their ban perhaps via a would have banned label because product labeling is cheap talk any small market failure tempts regulators to lie about quality inducing consumers who suspect such lies to not believe everything they are told in fact when regulators expect market failures to result in under consumption of a drug and so would not ban it for informed consumers regulators ex ante prefer to commit to not banning this drug for uninformed consumers

optimal policies with strategic distortions abstract this paper analyzes the jointly optimal levels of a variety of policy instruments when markets are imperfectly competitive a targeting principle to identify optimal policies under imperfect competition is derived using the concept of a strategic distortion this allows us to interpret when trade policy is first best and links the literature on optimal policies with imperfect competition to the standard targeting literature we show that optimal tax subsidy policy depends crucially on the presence of other regulations and assumptions about market segmentation

trade restrictions as facilitating practices abstract the effect of quantitative restrictions in oligopolistic markets is shown to depend on whether imports are substitutes or complements for domestic products in the former case they have profound effects even when set at free trade levels because they impede the ability of the foreign firm to compete in the domestic market thereby acting to facilitate collusion and raise prices and profits for this reason tariffs and quotas are fundamentally non equivalent with substitute goods when goods are complements a voluntary export restriction ver at the free trade level has no effect and tariffs and quotas are equivalent

the provision of two way converters in the transition process to a new incompatible technology this paper analyzes the dynamic provision of converters in the transition process between two incompatible technologies i derive the equilibrium behavior in the provision of converters and compare it to the socially optimal outcome i find that there can be two types of market inefficiency in the provision of converters first converters can be supplied by the wrong group second the timing of provision may be too late since the providers of converters ignore the positive externality that their provision would confer on the users of the rival technology

risky quality choice abstract in vertical product differentiation with a stochastic research technology firms should target their research at different quality levels for efficiency in a natural monopoly where the top firm finds it most profitable to sell to the whole market the incentives for risk taking and for firms to differentiate their targeted qualities are optimal in a natural oligopoly which results when there is sufficient dispersion of tastes the relationship between a firm s payoff and its quality improvement over other firms is weakened this diminishes the firms incentives to differentiate and the targeted qualities are too low and too close together

national treatment in the gatt the national treatment nt clause is the first line defense in the gatt and in most other trade agreements against opportunistic exploitation of the inevitable incompleteness of the agreement this paper examines the role of nt as it applies to internal taxation under the gatt it is shown that despite severely restricting the freedom to set internal taxes nt may improve government welfare but it will not completely solve the incomplete contract problem it is meant to remedy furthermore it requires a high degree of economic sophistication on behalf of trade negotiators in order for this beneficial effect to materialize

contracting problems and the adoption of regulatory cartels since 1966 a usd a marketing order has governed the sales volume of domestic hop growers despite offering cartel like advantages a hop marketing order proposal was defeated in a 1965 referendum of growers using individual grower votes from this referendum this paper identifies the sources of opposition to the 1965 marketing order the analysis proceeds to examine the types of recontracting that transpired enabling the adoption of a revised proposal in 1966

coordination in heterogeneous federal systems abstract we compare centralized and decentralized policy making in a federation in which policy heterogeneity is inherently costly and preferences vary across jurisdictions all jurisdictions agree that some harmonization is desirable but no one agrees on the direction of harmonization this type of collective choice problem arises when members of a federal system have to coordinate nonbudgetary policies such as laws regulations standards or diplomatic policies contrary to the common wisdom decentralization becomes optimal when coordination becomes very important when coordination costs are symmetric decentralization dominates centralization irrespective of the magnitude of externalities and the heterogeneity of preferences in the case of discontinuous network effects standardization never pareto dominates decentralization

rational incompatibility with international product standards abstract international product standardization enables traditional price based competition but the existence of redesign costs or network effects creates market frictions that diminish the incentive to standardize if there already exists a different technology in an established market this leads to multi attribute competition between products and will generally reduce trade flows not only do incumbent firms using a different technology have an incentive to deviate from an international standard but a host country government concerned for its consumers welfare has no incentive to enforce the international standard and may even value deviation from the international standard through technical barriers to trade

gambles and the shadow price of death recent papers on the value of life involve preferences of the sort introduced by milton friedman and leonard savage 1948 1 given the choice between undergoing a particular gamble in wealth and possessing the mathematical expectation of the payoffs of the gamble the consumers in these studies may prefer the gamble the presence of such risk loving preferences is inferred from two well established facts life is an indivisible commodity in the models and indivisibility leads to preference for gambles the former fact is made clear by philip cook and daniel graham the latter was first noted by yew kwang ng 1965 and is widely known in spite of the obvious connection the implications of risk loving tastes in this area have not been explored this paper examines some implications of such risk loving the idea that indivisibility produces friedman savage preferences and that such preferences create a demand for gambles is extended in section i to a theory of demand for indivisible goods and derived demand for associated optimum gambles this theory suggests that the price of an indivisible good will not compensate for possessing or not possessing the good section ii applies the demand theory to an equilibrium model of labor supply that is relevant to the determination of the value of life in this model the wage diflerential is useful in guiding policy toward public risks in spite of the fact that the differential is not compensating i demand for gambles and demand for goods

cross border externalities and trade liberalization the strategic control of pollution the authors examine international trade in a commodity whose production creates a negative externality for the importing country and they consider the nations strategic policy choices when they can restrict trade and when they are bound by a free trade agreement when pollution abatement technology is available the exporting country induces its adoption despite national indifference to the externality in order to reduce the tariff in a free trade agreement environmental policy is used to exploit monopoly power in trade an alternative policy instrument a process standard is introduced national competition in controlling emissions leads to very restrictive antipollution measures we examine international trade in a commodity whose production creates a negative externality for the importing country and we consider the nations strategic policy choices when they can restrict trade and when they are bound by a free trade agreement when pollution abatement technology is available the exporting country induces its adoption despite national indifference to the externality in order to reduce the tariff in a free trade agreement environmental policy is used to exploit monopoly power in trade an alternative policy instrument a process standard is introduced national competition in controlling emissions leads to very restrictive anti pollution measures

technology revolutions in the presence of network externalities abstract the purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of varying consumer preferences over technology advance and network size on the timing and frequency of new technology adoption in the presence of installed bases resulting from network externalities the paper shows that the duration of each adopted technology and the frequency of technology adoptions depend on a whether in consumers perspectives the network size effect is a substitute for or a complement to the quality of the technologies b the degree of compatibility of new technologies with the old technology and c the technology growth rate and consumer population size

domestic policies national sovereignty and international economic institutions to what extent must nations cede control over their economic and social policies if global efe ciency is to be achieved in an interdependent world this question is at the center of the debate over the future role of the wto formerly gatt in the realm of labor and environmental standards in this paper we establish that the market access focus of current wto rules is well equipped to handle the problems associated with choices over labor and environmental standards in principle with relatively modest changes that grant governments more sovereignty not less these rules can deliver globally efe cient outcomes i introduction to what extent must nations cede control over their economic and social policies if global efe ciency is to be achieved in an interdependent world at a broad level this question probes the limits of any international economic institution whether geared toward real or e nancial concerns that is designed to promote global efe ciency while respecting national sovereignty naturally the answer depends upon the particular problem that the institution is meant to solve in other words the answer depends upon the inefe ciency that would arise under unilateral policy choices at a more specie c level this question is at the center of the debate concerning the appropriate scope of the world trade organization wto formerly gatt recently member countries have considered ways to broaden the wto s orientation beyond conventional trade policy measures to include labor and environmental standards there are now initiatives to introduce the issue of labor standards directly onto the negotiating agenda of the wto with the purpose of creating a wto social clause the social clause would specify a set of minimum international labor standards and then permit restrictions to be placed against imports from countries not complying with these minimum standards with regard to environmental policies a wto committee on trade and environment has been established to identify the relationships between trade and environmental measures and to

monopolistic competition and international trade reconsidering the evidence we test some propositions about international trade flows that are derived from models of monopolistic competition developed by elhanan helpman and paul krugman we investigate whether the volume of trade between oecd countries is consistent with the predictions of a model in which all trade is intraindustry trade in differentiated products we then repeat the test with non oecd countries we also investigate whether the share of intraindustry trade is consistent with a more general theoretical model in which some but not all trade is intraindustry trade our results lead us to question the apparent empirical success of these models

minimum quality standards and market dominance in vertically differentiated duopoly abstract the paper establishes conditions for low quality dominance within a vertically differentiated duopoly and studies the consequences for minimum quality standard policies gross surplus from unit consumption consists of a benefit from quality and a baseline benefit consumers are heterogeneous homogeneous with regard to the former latter marginal cost increases in quality the quality then price equilibrium exhibits low quality dominance first in market share and then in profit as baseline benefit increases relative to the willingness to pay for quality the preference structure determines the effect of a minimum quality standard in a way related to the pattern of dominance the standard reduces increases welfare under conditions that lead to low high quality dominance

national treatment at the wto the roles of product and country heterogeneity this paper analyzes the world trade organization s wto s national treatment nt clause in a two country model where quality of goods and or market size are heterogenous across countries when market size is symmetric across countries a reciprocal nt agreement i benefits the high quality country ii hurts the low quality country and iii delivers higher aggregate world welfare however such an agreement can arise in equilibrium if the high quality country s market is relatively bigger and the quality gap between goods is small i e goods are sufficiently alike the qualitative nature of these results does not change when quality is endogenously determined

the economic effects of supply controls the simple analytics of the u s peanut program a gricultural commodity programs employ a wide variety of policy tools to regulate u s agriculture price supports are the most common form of intervention but rights to sell at the supported price are allocated very differently under different commodity programs under recent feed grain programs for example the right to sell at the supported price is linked to acreage set asides agreements not to produce on certain acres in other programs sales by individual farmers are controlled under marketing orders sponsored by the u s department of agriculture usda 2 a third method is through permanent maketing quotas that directly limit output only two major commodity programs those for tobacco and peanuts currently allocate the right to sell in this way the peanut program is the subject of this article 3

anti dumping and countervailing duties under oligopoly abstract this paper constructs a conjectural variations model of international oligopoly in which the home country s optimal policy responses to the foreign government s subsidies and foreign firms dumping can be calculated some theoretical support is found for tariffs that countervail part of the foreign export subsidy the optimal fraction depends on the size of own and cross effects in demand and on the extent of market competition however no normative case is found for anti dumping duties

quantification of sanitary phytosanitary and technical barriers to trade for trade policy analysis this paper presents promising methodologies for modeling and quantifying non tariff barriers ntb to trade in the agricultural and food sectors we limit the analysis to sanitary phytosanitary and technical regulations that can have an impact on trade and to methods that provide some quantitative estimates of the impact of such barriers on market equilibrium trade flows economic efficiency and welfare given the heterogeneous nature of these regulations a unifying methodology does not exist quantification of the effects of such measures has focused on a particular product and has relied on methods that belong to different fields of the economic literature we provide a concise description and evaluation of the various methods available for a more comprehensive assessment of the impact of ntbs on trade and welfare we conclude by identifying promising areas for future applied research

is there a case for non discrimination in the international protection of intellectual property abstract we evaluate the case for non discrimination in international patent protection when trade is not subject to any frictions barriers requiring national treatment nt does not affect the rate of innovation and welfare since unfavorable discrimination suffered abroad by innovators in the absence of nt is fully offset by favorable discrimination enjoyed by them at home when trade barriers exist however such international offsetting in patent protection is incomplete and innovation incentives are actually lower under nt by lumping domestic and foreign patent protection together nt blunts the overall effectiveness of patent protection in incentivizing innovation in the presence of trade barriers

indivisibilities inferior goods and giffen goods the paper shows how the presence of an indivisible good can cause a divisible good to be inferior and possibly giffen indivisibility is shown to be central to a discussion by j r hicks on inferior goods

cartel enforcement with uncertainty about costs what cartel agreements are possible when firms have private information about production costs in order for a cartel agreement to work it must take into account the incentives for firms to misrepresent their cost information and it must provide sufficient reward so that no firm wishes to defect for private cost uncertainty we characterize the set of cartel agreements with side payments that can be supported as bayesian nash equilibria we show that if defection results in either cournot or bertrand competition the incentive problems in large cartels are severe enough to prevent the cartel from achieving the monopoly outcome in contrast with common cost uncertainty the incentive problems become less severe in large cartels allowing perfect collusion

when are private standards more stringent than public standards retailers private standards are increasingly important for addressing consumer concerns about safety quality and social and environmental issues empirical evidence shows that these private standards are frequently more stringent than their public counterparts this article develops a political economy model that helps explain this stylized fact we show that if producers exercise their political power to persuade the government to impose a lower public standard retailers may apply their market power to install a private standard at a higher level than the public one depending on several factors

competing compatibility standards and network externalities in the pc software market this paper is an empirical study of the value of four file compatibility standards for transferring data in the personal computer software market the results are that only the lotus file compatibility standard is significant in explaining price variations and it is significant in both the spreadsheet and database management system markets this supports the hypothesis that the personal computer software market exhibits complementary network externalities copyright 1995 by mit press

network effects without network externalities abstract the network externalities hypothesis postulates that consumers prefer to purchase brands which are bought by more consumers compared with brands with a low market share in this paper we show that increasing returns to scale in the production of complementary products can substitute for the network externalities assumption we develop a model for the computer industry in which the production of complementary software requires a large fixed cost of development relative to the cost of duplicating and marketing the software the increasing returns to scale in the production of software yields consumers behavior which is very similar to consumers who have preferences exhibiting network externalities

the impact of iso 9000 diffusion on trade and fdi a new institutional analysis the effects of iso 9000 diffusion on trade and foreign direct investment fdi have gone understudied we employ panel data reported by oecd nations over the 1995 2002 period to estimate the impact of iso adoptions on country pair economic relations we find iso diffusion to have no effect in developed nations but to positively pull fdi i e enhancing inward fdi and positively push trade i e enhancing exports in developing nations

a tale of two cities and a giffen good a scenario is provided in which a house in eden mills ontario is a giffen good the conditions derived in the example apply to other indivisible goods as well jel classification d11

insurance as a giffen good abstract can insurance be a giffen good this can never happen if the coefficient of relative risk aversion is less than or equal to one if this coefficient is greater than one it is possible but not empirically plausible

driving forces for standardization at standardization development organizations this paper investigates sector specific driving forces for the standardization activities at national standardization organizations in the first part theoretical hypotheses concerning sector specific standardization are derived the empirical test is performed by a two step procedure first based on 19 sectors these hypotheses are tested empirically for germany the results show that rd additionally intellectual property rights play an important role furthermore standardization increases with the concentration of the enterprises up to a certain threshold where standardization activities decline again finally export intensive sectors tend to standardize more secondly because of the small data base these hypotheses are empirically tested in a pool model an international cross section approach based on 20 sectors and seven countries these results are generally in concordance with the findings of germany after a summary of the results recommendati

trade disputes and settlement we develop a model of trade agreements with renegotiation and imperfectly verifiable information in equilibrium trade disputes can occur and can be resolved in a variety of ways governments may settle early or trigger a court ruling and in the latter case they may implement the ruling or reach a post ruling settlement the model yields predictions on how the dispute outcome depends on the contracting environment and how it correlates with the optimal contract form we find support for a key prediction of our model using data on the outcomes of actual trade disputes in the general agreement on tariffs and trade world trade organization

r d in the presence of network externalities timing and compatibility two rival firms decide on the time of r d and whether the new products should be compatible i show that network externalities may induce the firms to introduce new incompatible technologies early which is socially harmful as the r d costs increase and de facto standardization becomes less likely compared with the equilibrium outcome both firms may gain by delaying the introduction of incompatible technologies by agreeing on common standards before product introduction entry is delayed and profit may increase an ex post optimal standardization policy may increase the incentives for early product introduction and consequently be an undesirable policy ex ante

contracting problems and regulation the case of the fishery the inefficiencies of common property fisheries are of continuing concern to economists the early work by scott gordon 1954 and anthony scott 1955 outlined the problem and later studies by james crutchfield and giulio pontecorvo 1969 and frederick bell 1972 provided empirical estimates of the losses that result those studies were followed by the dynamic models of colin clark 1976 and james quirk and vernon smith 1970 of optimal harvest rates and the use of corrective taxes or quotas to achieve them but in spite of a large and growing literature and the persuasiveness of the outlined efficiency criteria most fisheries retain common property aspects with overcapitalization and excessive labor input why those conditions persist and the failure of the regulatory response to them are the issues addressed in this paper we examine a number of fisheries but focus on the texas shrimp industry which is one of the nation s most valuable fisheries for a single species and which shares the common property characteristics observed elsewhere it is considered overcapitalized and catch per unit of effort is falling 2 examination of the fishery reveals the many margins along which rent dissipation occurs and the nature of the regulations necessary for controlling fishing effort to avoid those losses the regulatory environment in texas is complicated by conflict within the fishery between inshore and offshore fishermen the latter assert that bay shrimping reduces the number of shrimp that successfully migrate to the gulf the inshore fishery is highlighted by another issue the recent resettlement of some 30 45 000 vietnamese refugees including many fishermen along the texas coast marine advisory service paul starr their entry has been met by hostility and violence from existing shrimpers who recognize that they are in an environment characterized by the absence of property rights bay shrimpers have lobbied the texas legislature for broad limits on new entrants yet ironically the sale of additional boats by individual shrimpers to the vietnamese has facilitated entry of the refugees into the fishery regulations in the texas shrimp and other fisheries are incomplete leaving many options for rent dissipation uncontrolled because of high contracting costs among fishermen and political factors that mold government actions contracting costs are high among heterogeneous fishermen who vary principally with regard to fishing skill 3 montana state university and texas a m university respectively we benefitted from comments by terry anderson raymond c battalio gardner brown oscar burt micha gisser wade griffin john r moroney anthony d scott peter temin and participants in workshops at texas a m university and the university of washington research assistance was provided by scott barnhart and phil mizzi funding was provided by sea grant texas a m university throughout this paper we use the terms common property and open access interchangeably here the terms describe a situation where no property rights group or individual exist s for the resource 2catch per unit of effort in the inshore texas gulf and federal gulf waters is presented for 1963 77 by w l griffin c g tydlacka and w e grant they show catch per unit of effort generally falling in inshore and offshore waters while catch per unit of effort fluctuates from year to year it falls from approximately 360 kg shrimp per unit of effort to 220 kg from 1963 to 1977 the common property nature of the fishery is reflected in the following statistics since 1975 the number of vessels has grown by 23 percent nelson swartz for fish houses the record of entry is similar between 1970 a d 1977 the number of firms grew from 259 to 287 though during that period many left the industry as others entered the number of fish houses was calculated from license data supplied by the texas parks and wildlife department the record of entry by fish houses suggests that monopsony as discussed by colin clark and gordon munro is absent in the fishery 3there may be minor differences in labor leisure choices and capital but our statistical evidence and discussions with fishermen indicate that catch variations are largely due to skill government regulations in the texas bays restrict capital and our empirical evidence shows boats to be relatively homogeneous

strategic investments and the development of multinationals a model of multinational behavior is presented in which either the existence or absence of multinationals can be a nash equilibrium outcome the key determinant is the relationship between plant scale economies a force for geographic centralization and multiplant economies plus transport costs leading to multinationality the model predicts that multinational enterprise production arises when firm specific and transportation costs are large relative to plant scale economies the latter are both a technological and a strategic variable in the entry decision copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

private voluntary standards in the food system the perspective of major food retailers in oecd countries abstract the paper examines the main economic and institutional incentives which have driven major oecd food retailers in their use of private voluntary standards and discusses their growing role in shaping the agri food system it is based on interviews with quality and safety directors of major oecd retailers and a brief survey of retailers actual buyer practices though not all retailers are included these firms account for over 70 of retail food sales in oecd countries we find that the growing voice of civil society changing legal and institutional frameworks increased market concentration and buying power as well as their integration with financial markets has provided the setting for development of private standards while food safety and quality standards are seen as key to maintaining and improving reputation as well as against legal liabilities additional standards such as labour environmental and animal welfare are also gaining ground as strategies for customer loyalty and market shares the grass roots retailer move in the harmonization of food safety standards is seen as an initial step towards a global approach to managing the food system with harmonization of other standards likely in the future given their buyer power these developments can be viewed as a way of governing the food system and will be important for both oecd and non oecd food and agricultural sector evolution in the coming years

international r d rivalry and industrial strategy this paper presents a theory of government intervention which provides an explanation for industrial strategy policies such as r d or export subsidies in imperfectly competitive international markets domestic net welfare is improved by the capture of a greater share of the output of rent earning industries although the subsidy ridden noncooperative international equilibrium is jointly suboptimal behaviour of governments and firms is modelled as a three stage subgame perfect nash equilibrium the assumption that the government is the first player in this game allows it to influence equilibrium outcomes by altering the set of credible actions open to firms

systems competition and network effects this paper discusses firm behavior market performance and the public and private institutions that arise in systems markets i e markets where consumers use compatible components together to generate benefits in such markets which include communications networks and hardware software networks popular products are inherently more valuable these network effects can drive corporate strategies and are critical in understanding innovation in many high technology markets the discussion here emphasizes the dynamics of consumer adoption decisions in the presence of network effects competition between incompatible systems and how suppliers choose which components are compatible and which are not

technical compatibility and the mode of foreign entry with network externalities we examine the preferences of a foreign firm and a local government over two modes of foreign direct investment de novo entry and acquisition of the domestic incumbent two crucial features of the model are network externalities and partial incompatibility between the domestic and the foreign technology the relative welfare impact of the two entry modes depends on the degree of market competition and the strength of the network externality the clash between the foreign firm s choice and the local government s ranking of the two entry modes can motivate limits on the degree of foreign ownership of the local firm ce texte examine les preferences d une firme etrangere et d un gouvernement du pays hote quant a deux modes d investissement direct de l etranger entree de novo de la firme etrangere versus acquisition d une firme domestique en place deux facteurs pris en compte sont la presence d externalites de reseau et d incompatibilite partielle entre la technologie locale et celle introduite par la firme etrangere l impact relatif des modes d entree sur le mieux etre local depend du degre de concurrence sur le marche et de l importance des externalites de reseau le conflit entre les preferences de l entreprise etrangere et les preferences du gouvernement local peuvent etre a la source de politiques qui limitent le degre de proprieteetrangere permis

standardization policy and international trade abstract we analyze governments incentives to recognize foreign standards when there are potentially both network effects and conversion costs when government policy is limited to either recognizing all foreign standards or not recognizing any foreign standard recognition is always the outcome we then consider a setting in which countries can form standardization unions when conversion costs are relatively large two countries can increase their welfare by forming a standardization union that does not recognize the standard of the third nonmember country when network effects are significant all countries mutually recognize all standards and have no incentives to form standardization unions

international standards and international trade empirical evidence from iso 9000 diffusion abstract empirical scholarship on the standards trade relationship has been held up due to methodological challenges measurement varied effects and endogeneity considering the trade effects of one particular standard iso 9000 we surmount methodological challenges by measuring standardization via national penetration of iso 9000 allowing standardization to manifest via multiple quality signaling information compliance cost and common language channels and using instrumental variable multilateral resistance and panel data techniques to overcome endogeneity we find evidence of common language and quality signaling augmenting country pair trade yet iso rich nations benefit the most from standardization while iso poor nations find iso 9000 to represent a trade barrier due to compliance cost effects

attitudes towards foreign products and international price competition in this paper we analyse price competition between firms established in different countries when demand is sensitive to national biases the intensity of this bias varies across consumers in this context trade arises because of the dispersion of consumers perception of the foreign good when consumer attitudes are diverse enough one firm concentrates on consumers with an intensive bias leaving room for the other which will serve consumers with a low bias next an increase in import tariff will unambiguously lead to a general increase in price since in equilibrium the domestic firm will decide to increase margins finally we identify conditions under which buy domestic campaigns increase local welfare and output attitudes envers les produits etrangers et concurrence internationale par les prix dans ce memoire les auteurs analysent la concurrence par les prix entre firmes etablies dans divers pays quand la demande est sensible a certaines preferences de caractere national l intensite de ce biais varie selon les consommateurs dans ce contexte le commerce international est possible parce que il y a une certaine dispersion de la perception du produit etranger par les consommateurs locaux quand les attitudes des consommateurs varient beaucoup une firme se concentre sur les consommateurs qui ont un biais important laissant assez d espace a l autre firme pour qu elle puisse servir les consommateurs qui ont un biais plus faible un accroissement du niveau des droits de douane entraine inevitablement un accroissement general du niveau de prix puisque en equilibre la firme locale va decider d augmenter ses marges on identifie les conditions qui vont faire que les campagnes d achat chez soi vont accroitre les niveaux de bien etre et de production dans l economie locale

the political economy of the pharmaceutical industry e conomicsis a practical science since its inception as an independent discipline it has probed the major policy issues of the day the topics that aroused the interests of its practitioners have generally been those that presented government officials with critical choices the modern literature on the economics of the pharmaceutical industry is no exception this body of material originated with the investigations of the kefauver committee in late 1959 public interest was aroused by the spectacle of confrontation between committee and industry the record made by this committee and its successors grew to tens of thousands of pages as claims and counterclaims were offered regarding industry conduct and performance the primary line of attack concerned pharmaceutical prices and profits the committee demonstrated that prices generally exceeded direct costs of manufacturing for 22 major pharmaceutical firms in 1958 costs of goods sold were merely 32 percent of total sales u s senate report 1961 p 31 the committee argued that this fact alone demonstrated the presence of monopoly power while the substantial difference between revenues and production costs permitted high expenditures on research and development it also paid for even higher selling outlays moreover reported rates of return after taxes during this period on the order of 21 to 22 percent exceeded twice the average for all manufacturing the industry replied that on the contrary prices were low relative to the value afforded consumers and high returns on successful products were required to balance the losses from the large numbers of unsuccessful ones the relevant concept of marginal costs according to the industry position must include the costs of developing and marketing new products and therefore prices were not excessive at all although it admitted earning substantial profits the industry argued that without these returns research outlays would be limited and the number of new drugs reduced the committee countered that little of social value arose from industry research molecules were manipulated and the new drugs that resulted were therapeutically similar to those already on the market indeed it suggested that much