cost uncertainty and the rate of investment abstract this paper examines the effect of cost and price uncertainty on the optimal rate of investment by firms within a general equilibrium framework former works which have studied this issue like hartman 1972 and abel 1983 1984 1985 have come to the conclusion that this effect is positive since increased price uncertainty raises expected profitability but these studies assume a fixed discount rate which is equivalent to assuming that consumers are risk neutral this paper shows that if consumers are risk averse the effect of uncertainty may be reversed and investment may be depressed when price or cost uncertainty is increased

political economy and contingent protection the growing interest in the political economy of protection and the extensive literature which has already developed around the theme are mainly due to the wide gap between what policy makers practice and what economists preach notwithstanding the interesting nuances brought forth by the new trade theory most economists do not seriously contest the superiority of free trade over protection but policy makers in almost all countries practice some form of trade protection further the context within which such practices occur the extent to which they are resorted or the industries that benefit from them do not often seem to conform to the traditional explanations of protection such as optimal tariffs infant industry protection or the new arguments in favour of international rent shifting in specific strategic sectors this being the case the study of the positive theory of trade policy determination has continued to gain ground with economists borrowing concepts from political science most but not all such analyses have attempted to explain tariff protection particularly inter industry differences in nominal or effective tariff rates but successive multilateral trade negotiations have brought down average tariffs to single digit figures also agreement has been reached through the uruguay round negotiations to reduce the levels of some important types of non tariff barriers such as agricultural subsidies and export restraints although the trend has thus been clearly towards a reduction of the levels of protection the use of certain selective unilateral protectionist measures such as anti dumping and countervailing duty ad cvd measures are very much on the increase this has raised genuine fears that the codes and regulations which were meant for a corrective purpose are now being increasingly used for legitimising selective unilateral protection although the political economy analysis of this type of contingent protection is still in its infancy from the trade policy point of view this is an area of considerable importance

could tariffs be pro cyclical abstract conventional wisdom says that tariffs are counter cyclical we analyze the relationship between business cycles and applied mfn tariffs using a disaggregated product level panel dataset covering 72 countries between 2000 and 2011 strikingly and counter to conventional wisdom we find that tariffs are pro cyclical further investigation reveals that this pro cyclicality is driven by the tariff setting behavior of developing countries tariffs are acyclical in developed countries we present evidence that pro cyclical market power drives the pro cyclicality of tariffs in developing countries providing further evidence of the importance of terms of trade motivations in explaining trade policy

positive feedback the impact of trade liberalization on industry demands for protection contrary to widely accepted theories of interest group demand for protection industries that experience high and rising import competition after a reduction in trade barriers often become less rather than more protectionist in the long term to unravel this paradox i propose and test a theory that explains variation in domestic producer groups demand for protection over time this model of industry behavior suggests that trade liberalization has a positive feedback effect on the policy preferences and political strategies of domestic industries compelling them to adjust to more competitive market conditions and thereby reducing their future demand for protection

a political economic analysis of congressional voting patterns on nafta this paper delves into the question of the determinants of congressional voting on nafta it uses a logit model to examine both house and senate votes and is able to use district specific estimates in the former it finds only very limited support for the thesis that narrowly defined employment gainers and losers were important determinants of congressional voting patterns though some substantial support that districts that were highly agricultural or already possessed a substantial hispanic population and skilled labor force and had the most to gain from the general effects of nafta lead to a positive effect on the probability that a member of the house would vote affirmatively contributions from labor unions lowered the likelihood of affirmative votes political partisanship and ideological positions apparently had little effect on the votes a representative s political capital had a marginally significant effect on the probability on an affirmative vote but it performed positively in the senate and negatively in the house

understanding international trade policies an emerging synthesis the international trade problems of the 1980s stimulated an expansion of scholarship on trade policies by economists and political scientists at least four distinct theoretical perspectives weave their way through recent literature that concentrates on the united states emphasizing market conditions policy beliefs and values national political institutions and global structures respectively new studies in each of these traditions advance beyond the work of their predecessors but none of the perspectives has yet proved adequate as a single unifying vehicle nevertheless we can also see clear movement toward a synthesis with single works blending insights from several traditions thus the books under review do not all fall neatly into the familiar exclusive categories of economics or political science the emerging synthesis needs strengthening in several ways including the development of conditioning hypotheses that will reduce remaining apparent confusions

exchange rate volatility and foreign trade evidence from thirteen ldc s this article investigates empirically the impact of real exchange rate volatility on the export flows of 13 less developed countries ldc s over the quarterly period 1973 1996 estimates of the cointegrating relations are obtained using johansen s multivariate procedure estimates of the short run dynamics are obtained for each country using the error correction technique the major results show that increases in the volatility of the real effective exchange rate approximating exchange rate uncertainty exert a significant negative effect on export demand in both the short run and the long run in each of the 13 ldc s these effects may result in significant reallocation of resources by market participants

what happened to fortress europe external trade policy liberalization in the european union in an era when many fear the breakdown of the global trading order through the emergence of relatively closed regional trading blocs assessing the effects of european integration on external european union trade is particularly important surprisingly despite a severe recession accompanied by record levels of unemployment a history of increasing protection under similar economic circumstances and alarming predictions about fortress europe external trade policy in the region has liberalized in recent years prominent trade policy explanations emphasizing changing interest group demands or changing ideas of policymakers are inadequate to account for this significant change in trade policy instead much of this liberalization can be best understood as an unforeseen consequence of the single european act completing the single market undermined the effectiveness of national trade measures and made it difficult to enact new trade barriers thus producing a liberal bias in european policy

trade and search generated unemployment we argue that trade economists should begin to seriously consider environments in which unemployment is carefully modeled we introduce such a model derive several results and compare them to results derived in full employment models we argue that some traditional results are probably too narrow the determinants of comparative advantage and that some results do not generalize to models with unemployment the link between trade and income distribution for employed factors we also show that in some important cases results do generalize there is an extended stolper samuelson theorem that links trade to the distribution of income for searching factors and that our model allows us to address issues that traditional models cannot handle the impact of trade on unemployment and the welfare of the unemployed 1999 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

resisting the protectionist temptation industry and the making of trade policy in france and the united states during the 1970s why were advanced industrial states able to keep their economies relatively open to foreign trade in the 1970s and the early 1980s despite declining u s hegemony and increasing economic difficulties this article argues that an international level change affected domestic trade politics and contributed to the maintenance of a liberal trading system examining the united states and france the argument proceeds in two steps showing first how domestic trade politics were changed and second how this change affected the policy process initially i argue that aspects of the increased international economic interdependence of the postwar period altered domestic trade politics by creating new anti protectionist preferences among certain firms firms with extensive international ties through exports multinational production and global intra firm trade have come to oppose protectionism since it is very costly for them evidence for these new preferences was apparent among both american and french industries despite different contexts firms in the two countries reacted similarly to the growth of interdependence next i ask whether firms preferences affected trade policy outcomes and show how these preferences were integrated into the policy process in both countries trade policy structures in neither country prevented firms preferences from affecting the policies adopted even in france a so called strong state firms preferences were a key influence on policy in the trade policy area then the french and american states did not appear to differ greatly in their susceptibility to industry influence even though their policy processes were different

protectionist pressures and aggregate economic conditions comment on takacs this paper explores the influence of u s macroeconomic conditions and the international trade position on protectionist pressures as measured by escape clause cases brought before the international trade commission several possible difficulties with takacs pioneering empirical study of this topic are considered it is argued that while further support is found for her principal conclusion that the state of the domestic economy is a significant determinant of such protectionist pressures the quantitative strength of such aggregate factors is less than was suggested by takacs original study

the political economy of the tariff cycle how can protectionism and free trade succeed one another our answer focuses on the changing balance of private actors political demands these actors acquire interests in tariff policies because their assets are spatially concentrated and trade in these assets is subject to various limitations actors in regions experiencing no new investment in an established industry old regions have interests that sometimes differ from those in regions where there is new investment we show that old regions have no reason to be involved in tariff politics at business cycle peaks during troughs whether a state becomes more or less protectionist depends ceteris paribus on the relative political strength of old import competing and old exporting interests if old import competing industries outweigh the old exporters then protection will tend to increase at the trough and decrease at the peak of a business cycle the opposite result occurs when old exporters are more influential

the political economy of nontariff barriers a cross national analysis nontariff barriers to trade are most pervasive when deteriorating macroeconomic conditions give rise to demands for protection by pressure groups when countries are sufficiently large to give policymakers incentives to impose protection and when domestic institutions enhance the ability of public officials to act on these incentives statistical results based on a sample of advanced industrial countries during the 1980s support the argument that the incidence of nontariff barriers tends to be greatest when the preferences of pressure groups and policymakers converge more attention should be devoted to the interaction between societal and statist factors in cross national studies of trade policy

on the investment uncertainty relationship in a real options model abstract it appears to be widely accepted in the real options literature that an increase in uncertainty should have an inhibiting effect on investment our article demonstrates that the notion of a negative uncertainty investment relationship is not always correct we show that in certain situations an increase in uncertainty can actually increase the probability of investing and thereby have a positive impact on investment

macro economic determinants of antidumping a comparative analysis of developed and developing countries abstract this study examines how macro factors influence the use of antidumping in developed and developing countries a panel data analysis of 99 countries over 1980 2000 reinforces the view that the primary jurisdiction for the antidumping law is really more political than economic furthermore it suggests that once the wto is fully enforced the use of antidumping will spread among developing countries not only due to greater liberalization pressures but also as many countries would like to create an antidumping ability so as to counter its use against them this may reverse the trade gains that liberalization may ensure to them this paper thus calls for the granting of the special and differential treatment to developing countries in this provision finally based on its findings the paper argues that future negotiations should be directed toward revising safeguard rules and replacing antidumping by this new clause

the political economy of ec protectionism national protectionism based on article 115 treaty of rome this paper investigates the trade policy of the ec based on art 115 treaty of rome it is shown that politicians and bureaucrats take advantage of the significant discretion the procedure allows political and bureaucratic self interest are the underlying motives for national trade barriers against non member countries based on art 115 the empirical results support this hypothesis

unemployment collective bargaining and the demand for protection there is a widespread consensus among nonacademic observers that labor unions with large numbers of unemployed members have been central actors in political coalitions demanding protectionist trade policies since the mid 1970s in advanced industrial societies yet trade unions and unemployment are hardly mentioned in most theories of the politics of international trade the purpose of this paper is to develop a theoretical framework for understanding the importance of unemployment as a determinant of protectionist demands that is consistent with optimizing behavior on the part of union members and firms models of labor negotiations derived from cooperative bargaining theory are used to illustrate why the material benefits of protection received by union members and their employers in protected industries increase when union members are unemployed even when workers are risk neutral and capital is immobile

the march of an economic idea protectionism isn t counter cyclic anymore conventional wisdom holds that protectionism is counter cyclic tariffs quotas and the like grow during recessions while that may have been a valid description of the data before the first world war it is now inaccurate since the second world war protectionism has not been counter cyclic tariffs and non tariff barriers simply do not rise systematically during downturns i document this new stylised fact with a panel of data covering over 180 countries and 40 years using over a dozen measures of protectionism and six of business cycles i test and reject a number of potential reasons why protectionism is no longer counter cyclic a diagnosis of exclusion leads me to believe that modern economics may well be responsible for the decline in protectionism s cyclic behaviour economists are more united in their disdain for protectionism than virtually any other concept this in turn leaves one optimistic that the level of protectionism will continue to decline along with its cyclicality andrew k rose

the effect of national culture on the choice of entry mode characteristics of national cultures have frequently been claimed to influence the selection of entry modes this article investigates this claim by developing a theoretical argument for why culture should influence the choice of entry two hypotheses are derived which relate culture to entry mode choice one focusing on the cultural distance between countries the other on attitudes towards uncertainty avoidance using a multinomial logit model and controlling for other effects the hypotheses are tested by analysing data on 228 entries into the united states market by acquisition wholly owned greenfield and joint venture empirical support for the effect of national culture on entry choice is found

subsidizing rent seeking antidumping protection and the byrd amendment abstract this paper argues that a recent u s law which distributes the tariff revenue resulting from successful antidumping petitions to firms that supported the petitions increases the amount of antidumping protection requested by u s firms in two ways first by increasing the total benefits accruing to industries filing successful petitions the law subsidizes rent seeking second by awarding these subsidies only to those firms that actively support the petition it mitigates the free rider problem traditionally associated with collective actions empirical results provide strong evidence that industries have filed more antidumping petitions under the new law moreover the average proportion of firms in the industry filing these petitions increased under the law suggesting that the law at least partially alleviates free riding incentives

on the sign of the investment uncertainty relationship understanding the effects of uncertainty over any decision variable has fascinated economists for a long time risk aversion and incomplete markets are likely to make the investment uncertainty relationship negative e g roger craine 1989 joseph zeira 1989 what happens in the absence of risk aversion and incomplete markets is however ambiguous richard hartman 1972 and andrew b abel 1983 1984 1985 found that in the presence of symmetric convex costs of adjustment mean preserving increases in price uncertainty raise investment of a competitive firm as long as the profit function is convex in prices on the other hand the recent literature on irreversible investment e g robert s pindyck 1988 giuseppe bertola 1988 has shown that increases in uncertainty lower investment all these results have been derived under either risk neutrality or complete markets intuition suggests that the explanation for such a difference lies with the asymmetric nature of adjustment costs in the irreversible investment case as compared with the symmetry of the adjustment cost mechanisms proposed by abel and hartman although this intuition is confirmed in this paper asymmetric adjustment costs are shown not to be sufficient to explain why the results differ in fact a more hidden but at least as important difference between these two literatures is that the former assumes perfect competition and constant returns to scale whereas the latter assumes either imperfect competition or decreasing returns to scale or both 2 the purpose of this paper is to highlight the role of the decreasing marginal return to capital assumption due to either imperfect competition or decreasing returns to scale or both in determining the effects of adjustment cost asymmetries on the sign of the response of investment to changes in uncertainty under risk neutrality for this the paper develops a simple model with a cost of adjustment mechanism general enough to consider both symmetric convexity and irreversibility as special cases one of the most important findings is the lack of robustness of the negative relationship between investment and uncertainty under asymmetric adjustment costs3 to changes in the degree of competition in fact when firms are nearly competitive the conclusion of hartman and of abel holds no matter how asymmetric adjustment costs are studying adjustment cost mechanisms has a central role in understanding the dynamics of investment and its business cycle implications but conclusive results about the sign of the instantaneous relationship between uncertainty and investment should not be department of economics columbia university new york ny 10027 i am grateful to giuseppe bertola prajit dutta glen hubbard anil kashyap richard lyons and the referees for their useful comments 1the financial literature on investment has considered risk aversion through a premium in the discount rate determined by the capm capital asset pricing model intertemporal capm or consumption capm however often this discount rate is left unchanged when studying the response of investment to uncertainty changes e g pindyck 1988 pp 974 5 thereby omitting the effect of changes in uncertainty on investment due to risk aversion and incomplete markets 2in the typical version of the irreversible investment problem there is no cost of upward adjustments thus imperfect competition and or decreasing returns to scale are required to bound the size of the firm 3in this paper asymmetric adjustment cost refers to the case in which it is more expensive to adjust downward than upward certainly the opposite case is a trivial extension of the case studied in this paper

exchange rate uncertainty and the level of investment in selected south east asian countries the effect of real exchange rate uncertainty on aggregate private investment in indonesia malaysia the philippines and thailand is examined using time series data from 1972 2000 since the use of non stationary time series data may produce spurious results the data series are tested for stationarity using the augmented dickey fuller and phillips perron tests after establishing the stationarity of the data series cointegration tests are performed the cointegration test results reject the hypothesis of no cointegration therefore an error correction model is developed and estimated the estimated results point to an inconclusive empirical relationship between real exchange rate volatility and aggregate private investment

firm participation in steel industry lobbying firm participation in steel industry lobbying i introduction what are the causes of recent protectionist pressure exerted by u s import competing firms studies by coughlin terza and khalifah 1989 feigenbaum and willett 1985 and takacs 1981 examine the empirical relationship between macroeconomic conditions and the aggregate frequency of escape clause petitions file by u s manufacturing firms although the results are mixed as to whether international macroeconomic performance influences the demand for protection the studies indicate that domestic macroeconomic conditions significantly influence the frequency of escape clause petitions 1 as important as these are to understanding the underlying sources of protectionist pressure they do not address another equally important aspect of protectionist pressure the determinants of a single industry s demand for protection the fact that most protectionist pressure results from actions taken by individual industries underscores the importance of understanding the determinants of industry pressure indeed most trade legislation is designed to respond to the problems of individuals sectors of the economy in this paper we empirically examine the microeconomic determinants of the protectionist pressure exerted by the u s steel industry in antidumping and countervailing duty cases from 1982 after the trigger price mechanism was abolished to 1986 the steel industry is a particularly attractive subject for empirical analysis since no other industry pushed more aggressively for protection during the 1980s in recognizing that the degree of pressure exerted by an industry is the aggregate result of decisions made by individual firms to contribute to a collective action the microeconomic approach offers two advantages over previous studies 2 first to explain industry pressure we model the decision of the representative firm taking into account the incentives that a firm faces in a collective setting for example we recognize that the benefits of antidumping and countervailing duties have characteristics of a public good so that individual firms may have an incentive to free ride a proposition supported by the empirical results second we specify microeconomic variables that reflect the economic conditions facing the representative firm in the steel industry rather than macroeconomic variables which may not accurately measure the economic performance of specific industries or the international pressures they face in contrast to previous studies which found a significant relationship between macroeconomic performance and aggregate pressure we do not find that the steel industry s economic performance influences the degree of industry pressure our second objective is to examine the policy implications of free riding by testing the relationship between the effectiveness of a coalition of firms and the degree of protection actually received if an effective coalition of firms can influence the policy outcome then antidumping and countervailing duties are more likely to be provided to segments of the steel industry that can minimize the free rider problem since these segments are not necessarily those that absorb the greatest injury u s trade policy may not be meeting its goal of providing greater relief to firms most injured by dumped or subsidized imports the results confirm the proposition that segments of the steel industry which are injured by dumped or subsidized imports and which can organize an effective coalition do in fact receive greater protection than those segments that are merely injured ii the representative firm s decision to contribute to a less than fair value action to obtain protection from alleged less than fair value lfv imports imports that are either dumped by foreign firms or subsidized by foreign governments firms representing a domestic industry must file a complaint of foreign dumping or export subsidization with the international trade administration ita which then determines the magniture of dumping or subsidization

cumulation and itc decision making the sum of the parts is greater than the whole in 1984 congress amended the antidumping and countervailing duty laws man dating that the international trade commission itc cumulate imports across countries when determining injury we estimate that cumulation increases the probability of an affirmative injury determination by 20 to 30 percent and has changed the itc s decision from negative to affirmative for about one third of cumulated cases we also show that the protective effect of cumulation increases as the number of countries involved increases holding import market share constant that is cumulated imports have a super additive effect on itc decision making

a referendum on trade theory voting on free trade in costa rica research on mass opinion in international political economy overwhelmingly relies on survey data this poses problems of external validity especially for a frequently low salience issue such as trade policy to examine whether survey findings about attitudes toward economic openness apply outside of surveys this note considers patterns of voting in the 2007 costa rican plebiscite about joining the central american free trade area several extant theories appear to explain voting patterns but the results are less in line with traditional economic models based on locally important economic sectors

real exchange rate uncertainty private investment in ldcs this paper examines empirically the link between real exchange rate uncertainty and private investment in developing countries using a large cross country time series data set the paper builds a garch based measure of real exchange rate volatility and finds that it has a strong negative effect on investment after controlling for other standard investment determinants and taking into account their potential endogeneity the effect of uncertainty is not uniform however there is some evidence of threshold effects so that uncertainty only matters when it exceeds some critical level in addition the negative effect of real exchange rate uncertainty on investment is significantly larger in economies that are highly open and in those with less developed financial systems

industry rent seeking and the filing of unfair trade complaints abstract this paper adopts a rent seeking framework to explain the incidence of antidumping and countervailing duty complaints brought to the u s international trade commission and the department of commerce tobit analysis on all 3 digit sic industries is employed to examine the relationship between the frequency of unfair trade complaints and such factors as industry concentration unionization capital intensity and levels and or changes in employment price cost margins and import penetration large capital intensive industries particularly those facing employment losses and rising import shares are found to be most likely to file complaints protection of quasi rents accruing to capital and labor rather than protection of monopoly returns appears to be the primary impetus behind the filing of unfair trade complaints

increased protection in the 1980s exchange rates and institutions the strong appreciation of the u s dollar between 1980 and 1985 encouraged the substitution of imports for domestically produced goods for a variety of products this in turn increased the demand for trade protection many of these demands were satisfied via apolitical u s antidumping and countervail regulations yieldingad valorem tariffs well above current average statutory duties the supply of trade protection is developed via a principal agent model that describes the potential gains to both the regulatory agency and the legislator empirical results support the model specification finding both exchange rate and political cycles in the use of apolitical trade protection

an analysis of factors influencing the anti dumping behaviour in india the use of anti dumping measures as a trade protection tool has increased phenomenally during the last decade one significant aspect of this new trend is the increasing involvement of developing countries india is one such country which has emerged as a very frequent user of anti dumping measures surpassing even the traditional users it had initiated more than 300 anti dumping cases by the end of 2002 03 many of these cases are against developing countries most of the cases are concentrated in narrow range product groups like chemicals and petrochemicals iron and steel pharmaceuticals and textiles this study examines india s experience with anti dumping measures the main objective of the study is to identify the factors which might have influenced the anti dumping behaviour in india discussion of these factors shows that imports have increased considerably this is particularly true for a number of developing countries facing dumping charges in india at the same time many of the domestic producers of the like products have performed poorly during the last decade such trends may instigate the import competing industries to seek anti dumping protection and may also influence the authority to provide that however the results of our statistical exercise show that although imports and performance of the domestic industry might have influenced the initiation of anti dumping cases these factors did not seem to significantly influence the final decision of the authority the results rather indicated a tendency on the part of the authority to provide anti dumping protection to industries which are characterised by a large number of firms

divided government and u s trade policy theory and evidence if different parties control the u s congress and white house the united states may maintain higher import protection than otherwise this proposition follows from a distributive politics model in which congress can choose to delegate trade policymaking to the president when the congressional majority party faces a president of the other party the former has an incentive to delegate to but to constrain the president by requiring congressional approval of trade proposals by up or down vote this constraint forces the president to provide higher protection in order to assemble a congressional majority evidence confirms that 1 the institutional constraints placed on the president s trade policymaking authority are strengthened in times of divided government and loosened under unified government and 2 u s trade policy was significantly more protectionist under divided than under unified government during the period 1949 90

free trade fair trade strategic trade and protectionism in the u s congress 1987 88 what conditions led the one hundredth congress of the united states to enact fair trade and strategic trade policies into law during 1987 88 political partisanship is an important force with democrats supporting and republicans opposing all types of trade intervention otherwise the coalitions of support for and opposition to the various trade policies differ particularly in the senate in that body international business is associated with support for fair trade policies and with opposition to classical protectionism while domestic u s business is associated with support for classical protectionism liberalism is strongly associated with support for fair and strategic trade policies but is not associated with classical protectionism in the house of representatives the long standing protectionist coalition remains an influence few forces in support of free trade remain in u s politics changing international market conditions rapidly affect the making of u s trade policy

the textile bill of 1985 the determinants of congressional voting patterns the following tables show the results of the probit analysis for the senate and the house a table including results for different combinations of the independent variables is included in an unpublished appendix available from the authors upon request the results of the probit analysis for the senate are shown in table 1 all the variables except exp had the expected signs however the results indicate that the two other employment variables and party affiliation are the only factors which we can say with confidence influenced a senator s decision to vote for or against this bill the coefficients reported and labeled der of prob measure the derivative of the probability of a yes vote evaluated at the means of the independent variables in question thus for example the coefficient for unemp in the top line of table 1 should be interpreted as indicating that a one percentage point increase in a state s unemployment rate will cause a 5 89 increase in the probability that the senator will vote for the bill the result for dr the party of the senator shows that in general democrats are more apt to vote for protectionist policies than are republicans this is consistant with president reagan s negative stand on the bill and his threat to veto it should it pass the amendment in question passed the senate on 24 october 1985 by a vote of 54 for to 42 against but the bill it was attached to has been postponed indefinitely the house bill which was passed on 10 october 1985 by a vote of 262 for to 159 against was vetoed by reagan on 17 december 1985 the results of the probit analysis for the house of representatives are shown in table 2 state employment data was used for the house as opposed to data for each voting district this was done for three reasons first employment data is usually reported by state or by county since counties are often divided by congressional district boundaries much personal judgement would be necessary to assign employment figures second the most recent county industry employment data is from 1981 while the data used in this analysis is from 1984 third we feel that in general logrolling is prevalent among a state s representatives for this bill the representatives from twenty six states voted as a block and in all but six states one third or less of that state s representatives voted contrary to the majority all of the probabilities are significant at the 05 confidence level representative s voting patterns are influenced by all of the included factors when unionization is added to the equation its coefficient is very small and negative although it is significant at the 05 confidence level one would expect more significance here since there are more degrees of freedom for the house analysis than for that of the senate when the data from the house and senate are pooled the results are similar to those of the house alone the null hypothesis that the data cannot be pooled was tested using a statistic with eight degrees of freedom 9 721 meaning that the null hypothesis is rejected as in the senate the state unemployment rate and the percent employed in textiles are important influences on the representative s vote and democrats in the house are more likely to vote for protectionist bills than republicans however unlike the senate the percent of a representative s campaign contributions that are donated by industry special interest groups has a significant effect on voting patterns although the point estimates for the magnitudes of the influence are very similar in both cases seventy four percent of the house received campaign contributions from these special interest groups while only 54 of the senate received contributions from these same sources this is probably because only one third of the senate was up for reelection during the time period considered while the entire house was in the process of campaigning for reelection exports also play a role in influencing the probability of a yes vote reducing this probability as employment in export industries increases but the magnitude of the coefficient is only 11 of that for textile employment the significance of this variable in the house is probably due to fear of retaliation expressed by both democrats and republicans this variable was not significant in the senate model most likely because the senate version excluded from the 1 import quota growth rate many countries who might have retaliated representatives appear to respond to a wider variety of constituent interests than do senators while senators voting patterns are only significantly influenced by their political affiliation their state s unemployment rate and the importance of textiles to their state the voting behavior of representatives is influenced by these factors as well as the importance of exports to their state and campaign contributions by textile special interest groups these results affirm the validity of the approach used by baldwin and coughlin they differ from baldwin who finds exports are not a significant influence on the house and from coughlin who does not include export employment as an explanitory variable or analyze the differences in voting patterns between the house and the senate

combining rent seeking and public choice theory in the analysis of tariffs versus quotas economists continuing criticisms of protectionism make a valuable contribution to the general interest element of the forces which operate to keep propensities to protect somewhat in check mckenzie rightly warns however that proposals by economists for giving protection in more efficient forms run the danger of increasing the total supply of protection thus we agree that serious consideration should be given to the political economy responses which may be induced before one advocates ways of doing more efficiently what one believes should not be done in the first place it does not follow however that all such policies will have net negative unanticipated consequences in the case of tariffs versus quotas we do not believe that we have yet sufficient knowledge of all of the relevant political economy considerations to predict about the full effects of legislation which allowed trade protection to only take the form of tariffs we are doubtful however that such a measure would increase the total quantity of protection through the channels outlined by mckenzie we believe that the same type of basic public choice analysis of the individual incentives to lobby which suggests that consumer taxpayers will not force the political process to operate so as to maximize aggregate economic efficiency with respect to the level of protection also suggests that the net lobbying for quotas is likely to be higher on average than the net lobbying for tariffs political effectiveness and ability to overcome free riding on the part of tariff revenue seekers is likely to be low at the margin furthermore issues of visibility and institutional structure are likely to lessen the ability of anti protection forces to lobby against quotas placed within a broader framework public choice and rent seeking theory is consistent with the empirical evidence that where quotas are used protection is high

the value of administered protection a capital market approach the focus of this paper i s on the escape clause petitions filed under the trade act of 1974 section 201 first the capital marketevent study method is used to analyze the effects of protection decisions then cross section regressions are performed to examine the influence of key variables on the observed market reaction the authors conc lude that while protection is beneficial to beleaguered industries the extent o f such benefits is quite narrowly circumscribed and is conditional on internal v ariables for each firm protection is thus not the panacea that its advocates cl aim copyright 1986 by mit press

antidumping decisions and macroeconomic variables in the usa this paper investigates the macroeconomic factors that explain antidumping decisions in the us international trade commission johansen s cointegration test results show that there is a long run equilibrium relationship between growth of the percentage of affirmative antidumping decisions and trade balance the error correction model shows that there is a causality running from the latter to the former growth of the percentage of affirmative antidumping decisions is revealed to cause slowdown in economic growth partisan characteristics are observed in the commissioners antidumping decisions

empirical advances in political economy editor s note i wish to thank coeditor mark zupan who took responsibility for organizing and implementing both the special symposium on public choice and the processing of papers through the refereeing and editorial process for this special section on behalf of all the editors i also would like to express thanks to carolyn williams editorial coordinator for taking on yet another responsibility in arranging the conference symposium meetings and the management of the files the symposium on public choice was held at lake tahoe during the 1993 we a meetings the many efforts of authors referees editors and staff have resulted in an exciting complement to this year s economic inquiry offerings

effects of u s trade remedy law enforcement under uncertainty the case of steel this paper investigates the impact of u s trade remedy law enforcement on import penetration of foreign manufactured steel into the u s steel market given the quasi judicial process for implementation of the two provisions relevant to u s steel imports section 701 countervailing duty and section 731 antidumping duty i derive the probability augmented model to be used as the theoretical basis for the research the results obtained in this paper indicate that the trade remedy policy was effective however the elasticity measured degree of effectiveness was small