learning wage dynamics and firm specific human capital we introduce a dynamic and fully strategic model of wage determination in the presence of firm specific human capital in this model human capital is interpreted as information we show that equilibrium exists and is efficient and that it gives rise to a unique distribution of the social surplus we show further that the equilibrium wage is determined by three factors consideration of these factors allows us to determine when and how the market mechanism enables the worker to capture some of the returns to firm specific human capital we relate our findings to the ongoing empirical debate concerning the return to tenure

the opportunistic approach to monetary policy and financial market conditions we test the concept of the opportunistic approach to monetary policy in south africa post 2000 inflation targeting regime the article contributes to the current debate on central banks having additional objectives over and above inflation and output by incorporating a measure of financial conditions in the modelling framework our findings support the two features of the opportunistic approach first we find that the models that include an intermediate target that reflects the recent history of inflation rather than simple inflation target improve the fit of the models second the data supports the view that the south african reserve bank sarb behaves with some degree of nonresponsiveness when inflation is within the zone of discretion but react aggressively otherwise recursive estimates from our preferred model reveal that overall there has been a subdued reaction to inflation output and financial conditions amidst the increased economic uncertainty of the 2007 2009 financial crisis

spillovers investment incentives and the property rights theory of the firm this paper examines the property rights theory of the firm when a manager s relationship specific investment can be partially appropriated by the owner of an asset even if cooperation breaks down the investments of non owners may then be devalued but are seldom wholly lost to the owner with such spillovers the outside option principle can be incorporated into the grossman hart moore framework without implying that ownership demotivates enriched predictions on the determinants of integration emerge

efficient non contractible investments in large economies abstract do investors making complementary investments face the correct incentives especially when they cannot contract with each other prior to their decisions we present a two sided matching model in which buyers and sellers make investments prior to matching once matched buyer and seller bargain over the price taking into account outside options efficient decisions can always be sustained in equilibrium we characterize the inefficiencies that can arise in equilibrium and show that equilibria will be constrained efficient we also show that the degree of diversity in a large market has implications for the extent of any inefficiency journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 d41 d51

knowledge accumulation within an organization in this article we consider a knowledge accumulation problem within an organization that cannot prevent the worker from quitting and using the knowledge outside the organization we show that knowledge accumulation is delayed the fraction of working time allocated to knowledge creation is highest at the early career stage falls gradually then rises again before falling finally toward zero we determine the effect of a change in the severity of the enforcement problem or the specificity of knowledge we also discuss the form of the optimal life cycle wage profiles the role of the initial knowledge level and the role of discounting

two remarks on the property rights literature we first point out that the recent property rights literature is based on three assumptions 1 that contracts are always subject to renegotiation 2 that the exercise of a property right confers a private benefit and 3 that parties are risk neutral building on hart moore 1999 we provide conditions under which an optimal contract consists of nothing more than an assignment of property rights we also examine the robustness of some of the literature s standard predictions about asset ownership to the introduction of mechanisms for eliciting parties ex post willingness to pay for the assets such as options or financial markets to illustrate the issue we revisit the hart moore 1990 proposition that joint ownership is suboptimal and argue that ownership by a single party is dominated by joint ownership with put options

the pre marital investment game abstract two sides of a finite marriage market engage in costly investment and are then matched assortatively the purpose of the investment is solely to improve the quality of the match that the trader can attain in the second stage the paper studies the limits of equilibrium of these finite matching games as the number of traders gets large it is shown that mixed nash equilibria in the finite games converge to degenerate pure strategy equilibria in the limit in which both sides of the market invest too much

investments holdup and the form of market contracts the authors analyze incomplete contracts to induce efficient investment with exogenous switching costs fixed price contracts are efficient generate some rigidity in prices are renegotiated intermittently by possibly small amounts and when inflation is positive generate asymmetric responses to shocks all consistent with evidence on prices and wages with two sided specific investments efficiency requires prices to have sufficient escalator clauses to avoid renegotiation as observed in many long term contracts a third case with one sided specific investments can generate take or pay contracts and explain why firms sometimes pay for specific investments that appear to benefit employees directly

competitive search equilibrium in this paper i construct an equilibrium for markets with frictions which is competitive in the sense that all agents are price takers and maximize utility subject to a set of market parameters i show that the equilibrium allocation is socially optimal i also show how the competitive search equilibrium can be achieved if employers with vacancies can advertise publicly the wages they pay

lumpy investment and corporate tax policy in the presence of both convex and nonconvex capital adjustment costs in a dynamic general equilibrium model corporate tax policy generates both intensive and extensive margin effects via the channel of marginal q i ts impact is determined largely by the strength of the extensive margin effect which in turn depends on the cross sectional distribution of firms depending on the initial distribution of firms the economy displays asymmetric responses to tax changes moreover an anticipated increase in the future investment tax credit reduces investment and adjustment rate initially

market microstructure and incentives to invest market organization significantly affects total output and incentives for firms to invest i compare three types of market organization in a market with search and random matching total output is excessive and there are incentives for inefficient underinvestment in a market with a monopoly dealer total output is insufficient and underinvestment also occurs competition between the search market and the dealer market improves incentives to invest and competition between dealers yields efficient total output and investment this suggests that additional entry of wholesalers and other interbusiness dealers should stimulate aggregate business investment

lumpiness capital adjustment costs and investment dynamics aggregate investment in the us economy displays a hump shaped pattern in response to shocks and the autocorrelation of aggregate investment growth is positive for the first few quarters turning negative for the later quarters this paper shows that this feature of the data is the natural outcome of a two sector consumption investment model designed and calibrated to reproduce plant level evidence on capital accumulation

the predictive power of the term structure of interest rates in europe and the united states implications for the european central bank abstract this paper examines the relationship of the term structure of interest rates to monetary policy instruments and to subsequent real activity and inflation in both europe and the united states the results show that monetary policy is an important determinant of the term structure spread but is unlikely to be the only determinant in addition there is significant predictive power for both real activity and inflation the yield curve is thus a simple and accurate measure that should be viewed as one piece of useful information which along with other information can be used to help guide european monetary policy

nonconvex factor adjustments in equilibrium business cycle models do nonlinearities matter recent empirical analysis has found nonlinearities to be important in understanding aggregated investment using an equilibrium business cycle model we search for aggregate nonlinearities arising from the introduction of nonconvex capital adjustment costs we find that while such costs lead to nontrivial nonlinearities in aggregate investment demand equilibrium investment is effectively unchanged our finding based on a model in which aggregate fluctuations arise through exogenous changes in total factor productivity is robust to the introduction of shocks to the relative price of investment goods

appropriation and efficiency a revision of the first theorem of welfare economics the first theorem of welfare economics rests on the assumption that individuals have neither price making nor market making capacities we offer a revision in which individuals have such capacities the revision emphasizes two keys for market efficiency i the need to align private rewards with social contributions called full appropriation and ii the need for an assumption to counter the possibility of coordination failures in the choice of produced commodities called noncomplementarity we also emphasize that information about prices of unmarketed commodities involves decentralized knowledge available only to product innovators and that pecuniary extemalities are important potential sources of market failure jel d51 d60 d62

a theory of buyer seller networks this paper introduces a new model of exchange networks rather than markets of buyers and sellers it begins with the empirically motivated premise that a buyer and seller must have a relationship a link to exchange goods networks buyers sellers and the pattern of links connecting them are common exchange environments this paper develops a methodology to study network structures and explains why agents may form networks in a model that captures characteristics of a variety of industries the paper shows that buyers and sellers acting strategically in their own self interests can form the network structures that maximize overall welfare

power in a theory of the firm transactions take place in the firm rather than in the market because the firm offers power to agents who make specific investments past literature emphasizes the allocation of ownership as the primary mechanism by which the firm does this within the contractibility assumptions of this literature we identify a potentially superior mechanism the regulation of access to critical resources access can be better than ownership because i the power agents get from access is more contingent on their making the right investment and ii ownership has adverse effects on the incentive to specialize the theory explains the importance of internal organization and third party ownership

explaining investment dynamics in u s manufacturing a generalized s s approach we are grateful to olivier blanchard whitney newey james stock an editor three anonymousreferees and seminar participants at brown cepr champoussin chicago columbia econometric society meetings caracas and tokyo efcc harvard impa lse nber princeton rochester site toronto u de chile and yale for their comments financial support to caballero from the national science and sloan foundations and to engel from fondecyt grant 195 510 and the mellon foundation grant 9608 is gratefully acknowledged 2since plants entry is excluded from their sample these statistics are likely to represent lowerbounds on the degree of lumpiness in plants investment patterns 3we use the word project to emphasize the fact that the actual implementation of a projectmay cover more than a year observation realistic time to build aspects of investment are not incontradiction with the view that investment episodes are lumpy in nature 4 see chirinko 1994 for a survey of the empirical investment literature

investment tax incentives prices and the supply of capital goods using data on the prices of capital goods this paper shows that much of the benefit of investment tax incentives does not go to investing firms but rather to capital suppliers through higher prices the reduction in the cost of capital from a 10 percent investment tax credit increases equipment prices 3 5 7 0 percent this lasts several years and is largest for assets with large order backlogs low import competition or with a large fraction of buyers able to use investment subsidies capital goods workers wages rise too instrumental variables estimates of the short run supply elasticity are around 1 and can explain the traditionally small estimates of investment demand elasticities in absolute value the demand elasticity implied here exceeds 1

opportunistic and deliberate disinflation under imperfect credibility one strategy for disinflation prescribes a deliberate path towards low inflation a contrasting opportunistic approach eschews deliberate action and instead waits for unforeseen shocks to reduce inflation this paper compares the ability of these two approaches to achieve disinflation and at what cost we analyze these issues using the federal reserve s frb us model which allows alternative assumptions to be made about expectations held by agents in the economy hence the credibility of the central bank can be considered in assessing the cost of deliberate and opportunistic disinflations

sorting through search and matching models in economics toward understanding assortative matching this is a self contained introduction to research on search and matching we first explore the nontransferable and perfectly transferable utility matching paradigms and then a unifying imperfectly transferable utility matching model motivated by some unrealistic predictions of frictionless matching we flesh out the foundational economics of search theory we then revisit the original matching paradigms with search frictions we finally allow informational frictions that often arise such as in college student sorting

should central banks respond to movements in asset prices in recent decades asset booms and busts have been important factors in macroeconomic fluctuations in both industrial and developing countries in light of this experience how if at all should central bankers respond to asset price volatility we have addressed this issue in previous work bernanke and gertler 1999 the context of our earlier study was the relatively new but increasingly popular monetary policy framework known as inflation targeting see e g bernanke and frederic mishkin 1997 in an inflation targeting framework publicly announced medium term inflation targets provide a nominal anchor for monetary policy while allowing the central bank some flexibility to help stabilize the real economy in the short run the inflation targeting approach gives a specific answer to the question of how central bankers should respond to asset prices changes in asset prices should affect monetary policy only to the extent that they affect the central bank s forecast of inflation to a first approximation once the predictive content of asset prices for inflation has been accounted for there should be no additional response of monetary policy to assetprice fluctuations in use now for about a decade inflationtargeting has generally performed well in practice however so far this approach has not often been stress tested by large swings in asset prices our earlier research employed simulations of a small calibrated macroeconomic model to examine how an inflation targeting policy defined as one in which the central bank s instrument interest rate responds primarily to changes in expected inflation might fare in the face of a boom and bust cycle in asset prices we found that an aggressive inflationtargeting policy rule in our simulations one in which the coefficient relating the instrument interest rate to expected inflation is 2 0 substantially stabilizes both output and inflation in scenarios in which a bubble in stock prices develops and then collapses as well as in scenarios in which technology shocks drive stock prices intuitively inflation targeting central banks automatically accommodate productivity gains that lift stock prices while offsetting purely speculative increases or decreases in stock values whose primary effects are through aggregate demand conditional on a strong policy response to expected inflation we found little if any additional gains from allowing an independent response of central bank policy to the level of asset prices in our view there are good reasons outside of our formal model to worry about attempts by central banks to influence asset prices including the fact that as history has shown the effects of such attempts on market psychology are dangerously unpredictable hence we concluded that inflationtargeting central banks need not respond to asset prices except insofar as they affect the inflation forecast in the spirit of recent work on robust control the exercises in our earlier paper analyzed the performance of policy rules in worst case discussants robert shiller yale university glenn rudebusch federal reserve bank of san francisco kenneth rogoff harvard university

marriage and class here we consider a matching model where agents are heterogeneous and utilities nontransferable we utilize this framework to study how equilibrium sorting takes place in marriage markets we impose conditions that guarantee the existence of a steady state equilibrium and then characterize it several examples are developed to illustrate the richness of equilibria the model reveals an interesting sorting externality that can support multiple steady state equilibria even with constant returns to matching excerpt

learning and strategic pricing we consider the situation where a single consumer buys a stream of goods from different sellers over time the true value of each seller s product to the buyer is initially unknown additional information can be gained only by experimentation for exogeneously given prices the buyer s problem is a multi armed bandit problem the innovation in this paper is to endogenize the cost of experimentation to the consumer by allowing for price competition between the sellers the role of prices is then to allocate intertemporally the costs and benefits of learning between buyers and sellers we examine how strategic aspects of the oligopoly model interact with the learning process all markov perfect equilibria mpe are efficient we identify an equilibrium which besides its unique robustness properties has a strikingly simple seemingly myopic pricing rule prices below marginal cost emerge naturally to sustain experimentation intertemporal exchange of the gains of learning is necessary to support efficient experimentation we analyze the asymptotic behavior of the equilibria

competing premarital investments this paper studies premarital parental investments in children s wealth where spousal wealth is a public good in marriage by investing in their children s wealth parents increase the wealth of their children and the quality of the spouses that their children can marry in large marriage markets the hedonic return to investment internalizes all the external benefits of premarital investment in wealth so that the competitive equilibrium is efficient marriage market competition also increases investments in small marriage markets relative to no competition but equilibrium investments are not efficient

dynamic effects of permanent and temporary tax policies in a q model of investment abstract this paper incorporates the tax policy analysis of hall and jorgenson into a dynamic optimizing model with adjustment costs to develop a q model of investment this framework is particularly useful for analyzing the dynamic effects on investment of permanent and temporary changes in tax policy it is shown that contrary to the conventional intertemporal substitution argument a temporary investment tax credit need not be nore expansionary than a permanent investment tax credit the role of depreciation allowances in determining the dynamic response of investment to temporary changes in the tax rate is also investigated

the feedback effect in two sided markets with bilateral investments abstract agents in a finite two sided market are matched assortatively based on costly investments besides signaling privately known complementary types the investments also directly benefit the match partner the bilateral external benefits induce a complex feedback cycle that amplifies the agents signaling investments our main results quantify how the feedback effect depends on the numbers of competitors on both sides of the market this yields detailed insights into the equilibria of two sided matching contests with incomplete information in particular for markets of small or intermediate size it also allows us to shed some new light on the relationship between finite and continuum models of pre match investment

is lumpy investment relevant for the business cycle the lumpiness of investment activity at the plant level is a well established fact previous research has suggested that such discrete and occasional adjustments have significant aggregate implications in particular it has been argued that changes in plants willingness to invest in response to aggregate shocks can at times generate large movements in total investment demand in this study i reassess these predictions in a general equilibrium environment specifically assuming nonconvex costs of capital adjustment i derive generalized s s adjustment rules yielding lumpy plant level investment within an otherwise standard equilibrium business cycle model in contrast to previous partial equilibrium analyses model results reveal that the aggregate effects of lumpy investment are negligible in general equilibrium households preference for relatively smooth consumption profiles offsets changes in aggregate investment demand implied by the introduction of lumpy plant level investment as a result

income and wealth heterogeneity in the macroeconomy how do movements in the distribution of income and wealth affect the macroeconomy we analyze this question using a calibrated version of the stochastic growth model with partially uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and movements in aggregate productivity our main finding is that in the stationary stochastic equilibrium the behavior of the macroeconomic aggregates can be almost perfectly described using only the mean of the wealth distribution this result is robust to substantial changes in both parameter values and model specification our benchmark model whose only difference from the representative agent framework is the existence of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk displays far less cross sectional dispersion and skewness in wealth than u s data however an extension that relies on a small amount of heterogeneity in thrift does succeed in replicating the key features of the wealth data furthermore this extension features aggregate time series that depart significantly from permanent income behavior

transplants and implants the economics of self improvement this article examines equilibrium self improvement and marriage proposal strategies in a two sided search model with nontransferable utility singles are vertically differentiated some make better marriage partners than others a complete characterization of equilibrium is provided it is shown there are two externalities to self improvement decisions further these externalities may support multiple pareto rankable equilibria by encouraging everybody to self improve society can create a situation where everybody is forced to improve to remain acceptable but a preferred equilibrium may exist where there is less costly self improvement

learning and price discovery in a search market we introduce learning into an otherwise standard two sided search and bargaining market there is uncertainty about the price distribution due to uncertainty about an underlying exogenous state of relative demand in the high state buyers are on the long side otherwise they are on the short side in equilibrium prices are on average higher in the high state individual agents learn about the distribution while searching agents typically start out by experimenting with a tough bargaining position buyers may initially insist on a low price and sellers on a high price after successive failures to trade agents become increasingly pessimistic about the market conditions and soften their bargaining stance when frictions are small equilibrium transaction prices are approximately market clearing despite aggregate demand being unknown thus the search and bargaining procedure enables price discovery in a decentralized market

do central banks act asymmetrically empirical evidence from the ecb and the bank of england the paper attempts to exploit whether monetary authorities have a different behaviour during recession and expansion to this end a multivariate extension of hamilton markov switching model is adopted first regime dependent taylor type rules are estimated for the euro area and the united kingdom in order to capture the systematic behaviour of central banks then impulse response functions that account for the different phases of the business cycle are analysed in addition a comparative analysis concerning the estimated rules as well as the different reaction of real economy to monetary shocks is implemented the study strongly suggests that central banks cannot neglect the regime where the monetary action takes place it follows that the phase of business cycle is an important matter in monetary policy decision process

holdups and efficiency with search frictions a natural holdup problem arises in a market with search frictions firms have to make a range of investments before finding their employees and larger investments translate into higher wages in particular when wages are determined by ex post bargaining the equilibrium is always inefficient recognizing that capital intensive production relations have to pay higher wages firms reduce their investments this can only be prevented by removing all the bargaining power from the workers but this in turn depresses wages below their social product and creates excessive entry of firms in contrast to this benchmark we show that efficiency is achieved when firms post wages and workers can direct their search toward more attractive offers this efficiency result generalizes to an environment with imperfect information where workers only observe a few of the equilibrium wage offers we show that the underlying reason for efficiency is not wage posting per se but the ability of workers to direct their search toward more capital intensive jobs

investment and competitive matching we study markets in which agents first make investments and are then matched into potentially productive partnerships equilibrium investments and the equilibrium matching will be efficient if agents can simultaneously negotiate investments and matches but we focus on markets in which agents must first sink their investments before matching additional equilibria may arise in this sunk investment setting even though our matching market is competitive these equilibria exhibit inefficiencies that we can interpret as coordination failures all allocations satisfying a constrained efficiency property are equilibria and the converse holds if preferences satisfy a separability condition we identify sufficient conditions most notably quasiconcave utilities for the investments of matched agents to satisfy an exchange efficiency property as well as sufficient conditions most notably a single crossing property for agents to be matched positive assortatively with these conditions then forming the core of sufficient conditions for the efficiency of equilibrium allocations

term structure evidence on interest rate smoothing and monetary policy inertia abstract numerous studies have used quarterly data to estimate monetary policy rules or reaction functions that appear to exhibit a very slow partial adjustment of the policy interest rate the conventional wisdom asserts that this gradual adjustment reflects a policy inertia or interest rate smoothing behavior by central banks however such quarterly monetary policy inertia would imply a large amount of forecastable variation in interest rates at horizons of more than 3 months which is contradicted by evidence from the term structure of interest rates the illusion of monetary policy inertia evident in the estimated policy rules likely reflects the persistent shocks that central banks face

prosperity and depression prosperity and depression are relative concepts today both france and japan are depressed relative to the united states equivalently the united states is prosperous relative to these countries i say these countries are depressed relative to the united states because their output per working age person is 30 percent less than the u s level an interesting and important policy question is why are these countries depressed the answers for these two countries turn out to be very different the united states is prosperous relative to france because the u s intratemporal tax wedge that distorts the trade off between consumption and leisure is much smaller than the french wedge i will show that if france modified its intratemporal tax wedge so that its value was the same as the u s value french welfare in consumption equivalents would increase by 19 percent consumption would have to increase by 19 percent now and in all future periods to achieve as large a welfare gain as that resulting from this tax reform the united states is prosperous relative to japan because production efficiency is higher in the united states in the united states total factor productivity is approximately 20 percent higher than in japan if japan suddenly became as efficient in production as the united states its welfare gain in consumption equivalents would be 39 percent equally interesting and important are big changes over time in relative output per working age person across countries why are new zealand s and switzerland s economies depressed by over 30 percent relative to their 1970 trend corrected levels both of these countries have small populations but depressions are not restricted to small countries japan with its 125 million people is now depressed by 20 percent relative to its 1991 trend corrected level on the prosperity side why are ireland and south korea so prosperous now relative to their 1970 trend corrected levels this lecture is concerned primarily with big international differences among relatively rich industrial countries and changes in these differences over time the countries that receive primary attention all have market economies and healthy well educated populations in the countries considered the variations in aggregate output per working age person are large and reasonably good measures of the factor inputs are available this permits in many cases the identification of the change in policy or the difference in policy that gave rise to prosperity or depression this is in contrast to business cycle theory which provides little guidance to policy except for the important policy implication that a stabilization effort will have either no effect or a perverse effect the output variations studied and analyzed in this lecture are big an order of magnitude larger than the much studied business cycle fluctuations the variations studied however are an order of magnitude smaller than the muchstudied differences between the richest and poorest countries surprisingly only recently have depressions been systematically studied from the perspective of growth theory which is the theory used university of minnesota and federal reserve bank of minneapolis i thank my colleagues at the university of minnesota and the federal reserve bank of minneapolis for helpful discussions and comments in particular i thank tim kehoe ellen mcgrattan and nancy stokey for their help i also thank martin weale and franck portier for providing some british and french tax information used in this lecture thanks also go to sami alpanda and james macgee for research assistance and helpful discussions this lecture draws heavily on collaborative research with fumio hayashi i thank the economic and social research institute cabinet office government of japan and the u s national science foundation for financial support the views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the federal reserve bank of minneapolis or the federal reserve system

incomplete contracts vertical integration and supply assurance this paper extends the analysis of transactions cost models of vertical integration to multilateral settings its main focus is on supply assurance concerns which arise when several downstream firms are competing for inputs in limited supply integration reduces supply assurance concerns for an integrating firm but it may increase them for others therefore to explain the scope of any firm one must consider the overall network of production and distribution relations three fundamental questions are addressed 1 what are the effects of different integration structures 2 what are the determinants of the socially efficient integration structures 3 in what way do equilibrium integration structures differ from socially efficient structures

competitive search equilibrium with multidimensional heterogeneity and two sided ex ante investments abstract we analyze a competitive price taking search model where workers and firms make costly investments e g in education and physical capital respectively before they enter the labor market the environment features transferable utility and symmetric information a key novelty with respect to existing work is that we allow for multidimensional heterogeneity on both sides of the market the probabilities of finding and filling different jobs and the corresponding wages are determined endogenously in equilibrium we show that constrained efficient allocations can be determined as optimal solutions to a linear programming problem whereas the prices supporting these allocations and the associated expected payoffs for workers and firms correspond to the solutions of the dual of that linear program we use this characterization to show that an equilibrium exists and is constrained efficient under very general conditions the fact that linear programming techniques are used for the structural estimation of frictionless matching models suggests that our framework is potentially useful for empirical studies of labor markets and other markets where search frictions are prevalent

lumpy investment sticky prices and the monetary transmission mechanism abstract smoothness in aggregate capital accumulation is a necessary condition for new keynesian nk models to imply a quantitatively relevant monetary transmission mechanism see e g woodford 2005 firm specific capital and the new keynesian phillips curve international journal of central banking 2 1 46 can that aggregate smoothness be entertained in the context of an nk model featuring lumpy plant level investment our answer is yes imperfect competition in goods markets and or sticky prices are identified as economic mechanisms which render lumpy investment relevant in general equilibrium

the mirrlees approach to mechanism design with renegotiation with applications to hold up and risk sharing the paper studies the implementation problem first analyzed by maskin and moore 1999 in which two agents observe an unverifiable state of nature and may renegotiate inefficient outcomes following play of the mechanism we develop a first order approach to characterizing the set of implementable utility mappings in this problem paralleling mirrlees s 1971 first order analysis of standard mechanism design problems we use this characterization to study optimal contracting in hold up and risk sharing models in particular we examine when the contracting parties can optimally restrict attention to simple contracts such as noncontingent contracts and option contracts where only one agent sends a message

the welfare cost of capital income taxation in a growing economy the welfare cost of capital income taxation is analyzed in a general equilibrium framework where the private sector is represented by a competitive household endowed with perfect foresight and an infinite life the value of the welfare cost depends essentially on the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in the production function numerical estimates are presented for different values of the parameters of the model the welfare gain obtained by the abolition of the capital income tax is smaller when the private sector is not endowed with perfect foresight it is reduced by about 40 percent when expectations are myopic the allocation efficiency cost of the corporate tax dwarfs the intertemporal welfare cost

the welfare cost of factor taxation in a perfect foresight model this paper examines the marginal efficiency cost of various factor taxes in a dynamic general equilibrium model the au thor solves for the excess burden of anticipated and unanticipated t emporary and permanent tax policies using a range of estimates for taste and technology parameters he finds excess burdens larger than those indicated by previous studies that use static models these exc ess burdens are sensitive to parameter values and timing however th e rankings of alternative tax policies turn out to be insensitive to structural parameter values copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

does competition solve the hold up problem in an environment in which heterogeneous buyers and sellers undertake ex ante investments the presence of market competition for matches provides incentives for investment but may leave inefficiencies namely hold up and coordination problems this paper shows using an explicitly non cooperative model that when matching is assortative and investments precede market competition buyers investments are constrained efficient while sellers marginally underinvest with respect to what would be constrained efficient however the overall extent of this inefficiency may be large multiple equilibria may arise one equilibrium is characterized by efficient matches but there can be additional equilibria with coordination failures

rationalizability learning and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities we study a rich class of noncooperative games that includes models of oligopoly competition macroeconomic coordination failures arms races bank runs technology adoption and diffusion r d competition pretrial bargaining coordination in teams and many others for all these games the sets of pure strategy nash equilibria correlated equilibria and rationalizable strategies have identical bounds also for a class of models of dynamic adaptive choice behavior that encompasses both best response dynamics and bayesian learning the players choices lie eventually within the same bounds these bounds are shown to vary monotonically with certain exogenous parameters we study the class of noncooperative supermodular games introduced by topkis 1979 and further analyzed by vives 1985 1989 who also pointed out the importance of these games in industrial economics supermodular games are games in which each player s strategy set is partially ordered the marginal returns to increasing one s strategy rise with increases in the competitors strategies so that the game exhibits strategic complementarity 2 and if a player s strategies are multidimensional marginal returns to any one com ponent of the player s strategy rise with increases in the other components this class turns out to encompass many of the most important economic applications of noncooperative game theory in macroeconomics diamond s 1982 search model and bryant s 1983 1984 rational expectations models can be represented as supermodular games in each of these models more activity by some members of the economy raises the returns to increased levels of activity by others in oligopoly theory some models of bertrand oligopoly with differentiated products qualify as supermodu lar games in these games when a firm s competitors raise their prices the marginal profitability of the firm s own price increase rises a similar structure is present in games of new technology adoption such as those of dybvig and spatt 1983 farrell and saloner 1986 and katz and shapiro 1986 when more users hook into a communication system or more manufacturers adopt an interface standard the marginal return to others of doing the same often rises similarly in some specifications of the bank runs model introduced by diamond and dybvig 1983 when more depositors withdraw their funds from a bank it is more worthwhile for other depositors to do the same in the warrant exercise

state dependent pricing and the general equilibrium dynamics of money and output economists have long suggested that nominal product prices are changed infrequently because of fixed costs in such a setting optimal price adjustment should depend on the state of the economy yet while widely discussed statedependent pricing has proved difficult to incorporate into macroeconomic models this paper develops a new tractable theoretical state dependent pricing framework we use it to study how optimal pricing depends on the persistence of monetary shocks the elasticities of labor supply and goods demand and the interest sensitivity of money demand

idiosyncratic shocks and the role of nonconvexities in plant and aggregate investment dynamics we examine a model of lumpy investment wherein establishments face persistent shocks to common and plant specific productivity and nonconvex adjustment costs lead them to pursue generalized s s investment rules we allow persistent heterogeneity in both capital and total factor productivity alongside low level investments exempt from adjustment costs to develop the first model consistent with available evidence on establishment level investment rates reassessing the implications of lumpy investment for aggregate dynamics in this setting we find that they remain substantial when factor supply considerations are ignored but are quantitatively irrelevant in general equilibrium the substantial implications of general equilibrium extend beyond the dynamics of aggregate series while the presence of idiosyncratic shocks makes the time averaged distribution of plant level investment rates largely invariant to market clearing movements in real wages and interest rates we show that the dynamics of plants investments differ sharply in their presence thus model based estimations of capital adjustment costs involving panel data may be quite sensitive to the assumption about equilibrium our analysis also offers new insights about how nonconvex adjustment costs influence investment at the plant when establishments face large and weakly persistent idiosyncratic productivity shocks consistent with existing estimates we find that nonconvex costs do not cause lumpy investments but act to eliminate them