does employment protection create its own political support this paper investigates the ability of employment protection to generate its own political support a version of the mortensen pissarides model is used for this purpose if wages are set through nash bargaining workers value employment protection because it strengthens their hand in wage negotiations workers in high productivity matches benefit most from higher wages as they expect to stay employed for longer by reducing turnover employment protection shifts the distribution of match specific productivity toward lower values thus stringent protection in the past actually reduces support for employment protection today introducing involuntary separations reverses this conclusion now workers value employment protection because it delays involuntary dismissals workers in low productivity matches gain most since they face the highest risk of dismissal the downward shift in the productivity distribution is now a shift towards supporters

fishing effort its testing specification and internal structure in fisheries economics and management abstract the concept of fishing effort is central to fisheries economics and management however effort is an aggregate index of inputs which can be consistently formed only under the condition on production technology of homothetic separability of inputs this paper develops the conditions under which effort can be consistently formed it then provides the first empirical test for effort and jointness in inputs in a fishery by estimating a multiproduct function for the new england otter trawl fleet after not rejecting input output separability and rejecting nonjointness in inputs the construction of a superlative index for effort is demonstrated through estimating a translog production function the implications of effort s internal structure for fisheries management are then considered

political support and tax reforms with an application to italy in 2001 the italian government introduced a personal income tax reform to be implemented in successive phases in 2004 taxes were reduced to all income levels with higher gains for low income and high income individuals than for middle income ones a large debate arised this paper explores the political economy reasons under this tax reform mainly the attempt of the government to attract the uncertain voters swing voters a probabilistic voting model is introduced to capture the importance of swing voters the model predicts that the average personal income tax rate tends to be lower for groups of lower income higher preference for leisure and containing more politically mobile voters swing voters however data from italian polls show that while the tax reform was a good strategy to attract swing voters the specific design of the reform which favored high income and low income individuals but not the middle class was not the more appropriate strategy

state dependence and heterogeneity in fishing location choice to explore the distinction between state dependence and heterogeneity in repeated decisions this paper combines a mixed logit model with a state dependence parameterization from the marketing literature to study fishing location choices of commercial sea urchin divers in california it examines implications of ignoring either effect and finds in all cases that true state dependence is an important determinant of location choice consequently spatial policies like marine reserves can lead to differences in the short and long run behavioral responses of the fishing fleet under some specifications random preference parameters are statistically significant when state dependence is excluded from the model but when it is included random preference parameters are not significant in other specifications including state dependence only dampens the variability in preference parameters these results highlight the importance of gathering and analyzing diary type data for commercial fisheries as well as for similar choice problems in recreation demand

natural resources curse or blessing are natural resources a curse or a blessing the empirical evidence suggests that either outcome is possible this paper surveys a variety of hypotheses and supporting evidence for why some countries benefit and others lose from the presence of natural resources these include that a resource bonanza induces appreciation of the real exchange rate deindustrialization and bad growth prospects and that these adverse effects are more severe in volatile countries with bad institutions and lack of rule of law corruption presidential democracies and underdeveloped financial systems another hypothesis is that a resource boom reinforces rent grabbing and civil conflict especially if institutions are bad induces corruption especially in nondemocratic countries and keeps in place bad policies finally resource rich developing economies seem unable to successfully convert their depleting exhaustible resources into other productive assets the survey also offers some welfare based fiscal rules for harnessing resource windfalls in developed and developing economies

electoral outcomes with probabilistic voting and nash social welfare maxima abstract this paper provides unexpected support to nash s view of how bargaining determines the social choice we first present a spatial model of electoral competition with probabilistic voting and a very close relation between voters preferences and their choice probabilities the outcome of the electoral competition game is then shown to be precisely the social alternative that maximizes a nash type social welfare function theorem 1 this electoral outcome is also interpreted as a unanimity likelihood maximum corollary 1 within our framework existence and uniqueness of such an outcome are guaranteed corollaries 2 and 3

renewable resource economists and policy what differences have we made abstract this paper surveys developments in fisheries economics and fisheries policy over the past half century early work clarified the nature of the economic issues associated with open access laying the groundwork for changes in policies after coastal nations expanded their jurisdictions in 1976 perhaps the most important point made by economists is that property rights matter and that open access conditions create economic as well as biological problems the policy process has begun to create property rights systems although many of the world s fisheries still operate under mixed systems of regulations and open access incentives

dictators walking the mogadishu line how men become monsters and monsters become men history offers many examples of dictators who worsened their behavior significantly over time like zimbabwe s mugabe as well as dictators who displayed remarkable improvements like rawlings of ghana the authors show that such mutations can result from rational behavior when the dictator s flow use of repression is complementary to his stock of wrongdoings past wrongdoings then perpetuate further wrongdoings and the dictator can unintentionally get trapped in a repressive steady state where he himself suffers from ex post regret this then begs the question why such a dictator would ever choose to do wrong in the first place the authors show that this can be explained from the dictator s uncertainty over his degree of impunity in relation to wrongdoing which induces him to experiment along this dimension this produces a setting where any individual rising to power can end up as either a moderate leader or as a dreaded tyrant since derailment is accidental and accompanied by ex post regret increasing accountability can be in the interest of both the public and the dictator

redistribution policy and the expansion of the public sector abstract during the first part of this century life cycle and insurance type considerations seem to have dominated redistribution policy in particular when we look at the consequences for the expansion of public spending by contrast during recent decades fragmented horizontal redistributions between various minority groups have probably been the most important mechanisms the self interest of different groups of the electorate seems to have provided the most powerful motive behind these various policies although welfare altruism and what in this paper are called considerations of consequential externalities have probably been important motives behind redistribution in favor of the poor

stochastic production and heterogeneous risk preferences commercial fishers gear choices we present a model of fishers gear choice which allows for heterogeneity both in production technology and risk preferences and apply it on a panel of swedish trawlers stochastic revenue functions are estimated and used to predict the mean and standard deviation of revenue for each trip in a random parameters logit model we test if these predicted values explain gear choice a majority of fishers respond positively to increased mean and negatively to increased variability of expected landing values indicating risk aversion but also show a strong tendency to choose the same gear used on the previous trip

representative democracy and marginal rate progressive income taxation abstract this paper develops a political economy model that is consistent with the fact that democracies have a preference for increasing marginal tax rates on income we present a model in which there is an exogenous set of political parties with preferences over the set of admissible tax schedules this set contains virtually any increasing and piecewise linear continuous function each party decides whether or not to present a candidate for election there is a fixed cost of running the elected candidate implements one of her preferred tax policies our main results provide conditions under which a strong nash equilibrium exists and a tax schedule with increasing marginal tax rates is implemented in some nash equilibria and in any strong nash equilibrium

transparency and economic policy we provide a two period model of political competition in which voters imperfectly observe the electoral promises made to other voters imperfect observability generates an incentive for candidates to offer excessive transfers even if voters are homogeneous and taxation is distortionary government spending is larger than in a world of perfect observability transfers are partly financed through government debt and the size of the debt is higher in less transparent political systems the model provides an explanation of fiscal churning it also predicts that groups whose transfers are less visible to others receive higher transfers and that imperfect transparency of transfers may lead to underprovision of public goods from the policy perspective the main novelty of our analysis is a separate evaluation of the transparency of spending and the transparency of revenues we show that the transparency of the political system does not unambiguously improve efficiency transparency of spending is beneficial but transparency of revenues can be counterproductive because it endogenously leads to increased wasteful spending

a note on merton s optimum consumption and portfolio rules in a continuous time model in the paper optimum consumption and portfolio rules in a continuous time model by r c merton j econ theory 3 1971 373 413 solutions obtained in cases when marginal utility at zero consumption is finite are not feasible while they do satisfy the hamilton jacobi bellman equations they do not represent appropriate value functions because the boundary behavior near zero wealth is not satisfactorily dealt with in this note we specify the boundary behavior and characterize optimal solutions journal of economic literature classification numbers 022 213

the logic of political violence this paper offers a unified approach for studying political violence whether it emerges as repression or civil war we formulate a model where an incumbent or opposition can use violence to maintain or acquire power to study which political and economic factors drive one sided or two sided violence repression or civil war the model predicts a hierarchy of violence states from peace via repression to civil war and suggests a natural empirical approach exploiting only within country variation in the data we show that violence is associated with shocks that can affect wages and aid as in the theory these effects are only present where political institutions are non cohesive

openness external risk and volatility implications for the compensation hypothesis a central assumption in the globalization literature is that economic openness generates economic insecurity and volatility based on this assumption schol ars of international political economy have proposed the compensation hypothesis which claims that globalization bolsters rather than undermines the welfare state by increasing public demand for social protection against externally generated eco nomic instability the openness volatility link is dubious however on both theoret ical and empirical grounds in this study i revisit the volatility assumption focusing on a crucial difference between openness and external risk in their effect on volatil ity my statistical analysis of a panel data set from 175 countries 1950 2002 finds a consistent effect of external risk on volatility of the major economic aggregates but a largely insignificant effect of openness these findings suggest that economic volatility may be a mistaken link in explaining the openness spending nexus calling for further research on the causal mechanisms linking the two the general growth of government in the post world war ii era is one of the most important empirical regularities in political science measured by general govern ment consumption or sectoral expenditures government size grew dramatically during most of the postwar period intrigued by this phenomenal government growth political scientists offered numerous accounts some viewing this growth as a corollary of economic phenomena such as modernization industrialization income distribution or fiscal illusion and others attributing government growth to political causes such as bureaucratization interest group politics and electoral competition 1

interjurisdictional redistribution and public goods with increasing returns to scale this paper builds upon probabilistic voting theory to examine vote maximizing interjurisdictional redistribution with increasing returns to scale in the production of regional public goods we find that with interregional differences in the per capita cost of public goods the vote maximizing interregional redistribution will seem incoherent and unfair when judged on the basis of the availability of public goods or regional incomes

the principle of minimum differentiation holds under sufficient heterogeneity the so called principle of minimum differentiation stated by hotelling has been challenged by many authors this paper restores the principle by showing that n firms locate at the center of the market and charge prices higher than the marginal cost of production when heterogeneity in consumers tastes is large enough

social ideology and taxes in a differentiated candidates framework many observers argue that political polarization particularly on social and cultural issues has increased in the united states how does this influence the political competition on economic issues we analyze this question using a framework in which two officemotivated candidates differ in their fixed ideological position and choose a level of government spending to maximize their vote share in equilibrium candidates cater to a set of swing voters who contain socially conservative and economically liberal voters as well as socially liberal and economically conservative voters we analyze how voters cultural preferences and candidates cultural positions influence equilibrium economic positions jel d72 e62 h50 z13 many observers have argued that polarization between the two major parties in the united states particularly on noneconomic cultural matters has increased this is reflected both at the elite level in particular in congress poole and rosenthal 1984 1985 2000 and among democratic and republican activists and voters abramowitz and saunders 2008 harbridge and malhotra 2011 in the american national election survey respondents report their own ideological position on a scale from 1 very liberal to 7 very conservative the number of respondents who report one of the extreme positions 1 2 6 or 7 has grown from 20 and 21 percent in 1972 and 1976 to 31 and 30 percent in the 2004 and 2008 respectively moreover liberal and conservative voters have become considerably more reliable supporters of democrats and republicans respectively over the last generation 1 if we accept the widespread view that reagan s conservative revolution has created a cultural wedge between the parties that only widened in the 1990s and 2000s what consequences for the parties economic policies should we expect

a theory of political transitions we develop a theory of political transitions inspired by the experiences of western europe and latin america nondemocratic societies are controlled by a rich elite the initially disenfranchised poor can contest power by threatening revolution especially when the opportunity cost is low for example during recessions the threat of revolution may force the elite to democratize democracy may not consolidate because it is redistributive and so gives the elite an incentive to mount a coup highly unequal societies are less likely to consolidate democracy and may end up oscillating between regimes and suffer substantial fiscal volatility

dynamic asset allocation when bequests are luxury goods abstract luxury bequests impart systematic effects of age to an investor s optimal allocation the expected percentage allocation to equities rises throughout retirement when bequests are luxuries the marginal utility of bequests declines more slowly than the marginal utility of consumption this is essentially lower risk aversion as a retiree approaches death her expected remaining lifetime utility is increasingly composed of bequest utility and thus generates progressively lower risk aversion a retiree responds by increasingly favoring the higher return risky asset compared to standard preferences luxury bequests elevate a retiree s average exposure to the risky asset but the difference is small in early retirement

why do some resource abundant countries succeed while others do not on average resource abundant countries have experienced lower growth over the last four decades than their resource poor counterparts but the most interesting aspect of the paradox of plenty is not the average effect of natural resources but its variation for every nigeria or venezuela there is a norway or a botswana why do natural resources induce prosperity in some countries but stagnation in others this paper gives an overview of the dimensions along which resource abundant winners and losers differ in light of this it then discusses different theory models of the resource curse with a particular emphasis on recent developments

applied welfare economics with discrete choice models economists have been paying increasing attention to the study of situations in which consumers face a discrete rather than a continuous set of choices such models are potentially very important in evaluating the impact of government programs upon consumer welfare but very little has been said in general regarding the tools of applied welfare economics indiscrete choice situations this paper shows how the conventional methods of applied welfare economics can be modified to handle such cases it focuses on the computation of the excess burden of taxation and the evaluation of quality change the results are applied to stochastic utility models including the popular cases of probit and logit analysis throughout the emphasis is on providing rigorous guidelines for carrying out applied work this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the dutch disease and intergenerational welfare governments in resource abundant economies face a tradeoff between transferring wealth to present generations and saving for future generations employing an overlapping generations framework with endogenous growth this article analyses the intergenerational welfare effects of 1 a wealth transfer policy where the entire wealth is transferred to the generations alive at present 2 an income transfer policy where the wealth is saved and the permanent income of the wealth is transferred to all present and future generations forever not surprisingly present generations are unambiguously better off with the wealth transfer policy less trivially however the wealth transfer policy can be associated with higher welfare also for future generations the intuition for this result is that while a wealth transfer depresses growth only in the periods subsequent to the transfer income transfers constitute a permanent drag on growth perhaps counter to the naive intuition the policy of saving the wealth and

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

property rights and the political organization of agriculture we propose a general equilibrium model where the economic organization of agriculture and the political equilibrium determining the security of property rights are jointly determined in particular because the form of organization may affect the probability and distribution of benefits from future property challenges it may be shaped in anticipation of this impact property rights security may then be secured at the expense of economic efficiency the model provides a framework for understanding why in some contexts land is redistributed primarily via land sales and tenancy markets but via politics and conflict in others we test some implications of the theory using a five decade panel dataset that traces changes in the extent of tenancy and tenancy reform across 15 indian states

a theory of civil conflict and democracy in rentier states the effects of resource rents on the political equilibrium have been studied in two main types of models the first tradition uses models of conflict and studies how resource rents affect the intensity and duration of civil conflict the second tradition uses political economy models where resource rents affect the political equilibrium due to changes in the costs and benefits of buying votes although they provide considerable insight these traditions have little to say about when democracy emerges and about when conflict emerges in this paper by integrating the earlier model traditions we suggest the simplest possible framework we can think of to study the choice between conflict and democracy we show how factors such as resource rents the extent of electoral competition and productivity affect economic and political equilibria

explicit solution of a general consumption portfolio problem with subsistence consumption and bankruptcy this paper solves a general continuous time single agent consumption and portfolio decision problem with subsistence consumption in closed form the analysis allows for general continuously differentiable concave utility functions the model takes into consideration that consumption must be no smaller than a given subsistence rate and that bankruptcy can occur thus the paper generalizes the results of karatzas lehoczky sethi and shreve 1986

on the form of transfers to special interests an important question in political economy concerns the form of transfers to special interests the chicago view is that political competition leads politicians to make such transfers efficiently the virginia position is that lack of information on the part of voters leads politicians to favor inefficient sneaky methods of redistribution this paper analyzes the form of transfers in a model of political competition in which politicians have incentives to make transfers to special interests it shows that when voters have imperfect information about both the effects of policy and the predispositions of politicians inefficient methods of redistribution may be employed

free and slave labor in the antebellum south perfect substitutes or different inputs the substitutability between free and slave labor is examined and the permissibility of aggregating the two in to a single labor variab le is investigated using a translog production function slaves on large cotton farms worked in gangs free labor was not observed to do so despite this previous research has aggregated free and slave labor and employed functional forms imposing strong restrictions on substitution estimation of the translog function shows that simple additive aggregation is not acceptable on large farms slaves and free labor were complements while on small nongang farms they were substitutes copyright 1988 by mit press

a generalized harvest function for fishing allocating effort among common property cod stocks a generalized harvest function abstract simple harvest functions such as the schaefer or the biomass and effort cobb douglas function have been the foundation of most dynamic fishery models the intent of this article is to question these simple harvest functions by theoretically specifying and estimating a general harvest technology the harvest from a particular stock is assumed to be a function of 1 the amount of fishing effort applied 2 the stock s biomass 3 the size of the recruit class and 4 an index of other characteristics of the stock data are available for a number of common property cod stocks in the north atlantic the harvesting technology is estimated by developing a general stochastic variable cost function to explain how a country allocates its fishing effort among these common property stocks both the schaefer harvest function and the biomass and effort cobb douglas function are rejected on empirical grounds

the hidden cost of raising voters expectations reference dependence and politicians credibility abstract two politicians compete to get elected each politician is characterized by a valence which is unobservable to the electorate and can take one of two values high or low the representative voter prefers politicians with high valence but random shocks may lead him to appoint a low valence politician politicians make statements concerning their valence if the voter is a standard expected utility maximizer politicians statements lack any credibility and no information transmission takes place by introducing reference dependence and loss aversion we show that truthful communication is possible in equilibrium and we characterize the conditions under which it can arise intuitively these behavioral biases introduce a cost of overstating one s valence as overstatements may shift the electorate s preferences toward better skilled opponents

the quality of political institutions and the curse of natural resources we propose a theoretical model to explain empirical regularities related to the curse of natural resources which emphasises the behaviour and incentives of politicians we extend the standard voting model to give voters political control beyond the elections this gives rise to a new restriction that policies should not give rise to a revolution our model clarifies when resource discoveries might lead to revolutions namely in countries with weak institutions it also suggests that for bad political institutions human capital depends negatively on natural resources while for high institutional quality the dependence is reversed this finding is corroborated in cross section regressions

pareto optimality of policy proposals with probabilistic voting this paper studies the pareto optimality properties of policy proposals and electoral outcomes when there is probabilistic voting theorem 1 proves that when the position of one candidate is taken as fixed the other candidate will propose a pareto optimal alternative this implies that whenever there is an electoral equilibrium in pure strategies the electoral outcome is pareto optimal it also implies that even if there is no such equilibrium the electoral outcomes from a sequence of elections will be pareto optimal except possibly for an initial status quo

a conceptional analysis of dynamics and production in bioeconomic models harvesting functions and stock dynamic equations in age structured bioeconomic models are generalized in order to incorporate density dependence using this generalization anything from completely uniformly distributed fish to extreme schooling can be analyzed the classical beverton holt model comes out as a special case of the generalized model the generalization can be applied both for simulation as well as for optimization purposes given appropriate software conceptual analysis indicates that pulse fishing seems to become less and less economically profitable as we move from uniformly distributed fish to schooling species this has important implications for how fish stocks ought to be managed copyright 2010 oxford university press

the voracity effect abstract we analyze an economy that lacks a strong legal political institutional infrastructure and is populated by multiple powerful groups powerful groups dynamically interact via a fiscal process that effectively allows open access to the aggregate capital stock in equilibrium this leads to slow economic growth and a voracity effect by which a shock such as a terms of trade windfall perversely generates a more than proportionate increase in fiscal redistribution and reduces growth we also show that a dilution in the concentration of power leads to faster growth and a less procyclical response to shocks jel f43 o10 o23 o40

an empirical analysis of production distortions in the mid atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery this paper presents empirical evidence of production distortions under controlled access management in the mid atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery results indicate that vessels harvested multiple clam species even though the harvest technology exhibits diseconomies of scope vessels also operated in a region of the production surface where the marginal product of vessel capital services was negative these distortions are explained by perverse regulations which restricted vessel capital replacement and severely limited fishing times

budget deficits and redistributive politics this paper proposes a new view of the forces in the political process that cause governments to accumulate debt the analysis builds on a model of redistributive politics that contrary to median voter models does not restrict the set of policies that politicians can propose i show that deficits occur even in an environment where voters and periods are homogeneous this is an environment where previous political theories of debt would predict budget balance in the model deficits are a way for candidates to better target promises to voters and are therefore used as tools of redistributive politics the main contribution of the analysis is to show that the same forces that push candidates to redistribute resources across voters to pursue political advantage are forces that generate budget deficits most countries have sizeable national debts indeed thinking of governments as debtors seems so customary that it feels awkward to talk about a national credit this suggests that there are systematic forces pushing governments to regularly borrow to cover the excess of spending over receipts at the same time a significant amount of government spending consists of transfers to special interest groups that are hard to justify on efficiency or equity grounds this paper presents a political economic model that suggests that these two phenomena are connected debt is at least in part caused by the fact that in order to get elected candidates need to appeal to groups of voters with promises of transfers debt allows candidates a finer control over the promises they make to these groups

optimal consumption and portfolio policies when asset prices follow a diffusion process abstract we consider a consumption portfolio problem in continuous time under uncertainty a martingale technique is employed to characterize optimal consumption portfolio policies when there exist nonnegativity constraints on consumption and on final wealth we also provide a way to compute and verify optimal policies our verification theorem for optimal policies involves a linear partial differential equation unlike the nonlinear partial differential equation of dynamic programming the relationship between our approach and dynamic programming is discussed we demonstrate our technique by explicitly computing optimal policies in a series of examples in particular we solve the optimal consumption portfolio problem for hyperbolic absolute risk aversion utility functions when the asset prices follow a geometric brownian motion the optimal policies in this case are no longer linear when nonnegativity constraints on consumption and on final wealth are included by these examples one can see that our approach is much easier than the dynamic programming approach

renewable resource policy when distributional impacts matter the standard assumption in bioeconomic resource models is that optimal policies maximize the present value of economic surplus to society this assumption implies that regulatory agencies should not be concerned with the distributional consequences of management strategies both contemporary welfare theoretic and rent seeking approaches suggests distributional issues are important in designing resource management policies this paper explores resource management when the managing agency has preferences defined over the economic welfare of various groups with a direct economic interest in the use of resources policy schemes consistent with this approach are derived and compared with standard results

natural resources rent seeking and welfare abstract a new and very simple mechanism to explain why natural resource abundance may lower income and welfare is developed in a model with rent seeking a greater amount of natural resources increases the number of entrepreneurs engaged in rent seeking and reduces the number of entrepreneurs running productive firms with a demand externality it is shown that the drop in income as a result of this is higher than the increase in income from the natural resource more natural resources thus lead to lower welfare

stock size harvesting costs and the potential for extinction the case of sealing starting in the 1960s considerable opposition to the canadian and norwegian harp seal hunt off newfoundland developed it was alleged that the seal hunt was unethical and that the seal population had been seriously depleted the purpose of this paper is to analyze the production function for the seal hunt based on data for the norwegian seal hunt particular attention is paid to the question whether free entry to the fishery will cause overexploitation this depends critically on the characteristics of the production function in particular the extent to which harvesting costs depend on stock size

spatial search and fishing location choice methodological challenges of empirical modeling recent work in ecology emphasized the spatial patchiness of marine resources fish and shellfish populations often occur in clumps or discrete patches of habitat with different population levels and dynamics in each patch patches are linked through a set of complex biological and oceanographic factors this new view has given rise to spatial marine management proposals including permanent marine reserves and rotating spatial closures reserve proposals are particularly popular among ecologists because closed areas can presumably augment the biomass in areas that were overharvested due to stochas

the monopoly of violence evidence from colombia many states in latin america africa and asia lack the monopoly of violence even though this was identified by max weber as the foundation of the state and thus the capacity to govern effectively in this paper we develop a new perspective on the establishment of the monopoly of violence we build a model to explain the incentive of central states to eliminate nonstate armed actors paramilitaries in a democracy the model is premised on the idea that paramilitaries may choose to and can influence elections since paramilitaries have preferences over policies this reduces the incentives of the politicians they favor to eliminate them we then investigate these ideas using data from colombia between 1991 and 2006 we first present regression and case study evidence supporting our postulate that paramilitary groups can have significant effects on elections for the legislature and the executive next we show that the evidence is also broadly consistent with the implication of the model that paramilitaries tend to persist to the extent that they deliver votes to candidates for the executive whose preferences are close to theirs and that this effect is larger in areas where the presidential candidate would have otherwise not done as well finally we use roll call votes to illustrate a possible quid pro quo between the executive and paramilitaries in colombia language en

sea bass angling in ireland a structural equation model of catch and effort abstract the relationship between angling effort and catch is well recognised in particular that effort influences catch rates but increased catch which can be considered an attribute of fishery quality may influence effort in terms of number of fishing trips this suggests bi directional feedback between catch and effort in many travel cost applications little attention has been given to this endogeneity problem in this paper we expand the application of structural equation models to address this issue by jointly estimating demand effort and catch functions using a cross section dataset of sea bass anglers we propose two separate joint models first we include expected catch as an explanatory variable in the demand equation in the second we reverse the causality and use the expected number of fishing days as a covariate in the catch function the two approaches produce similar model estimates and perform better at predicting anglers catch and effort than standard models the findings confirm that sea bass angling is highly valued with a consumer surplus of about 282 318 per angler per day though this is likely to be biased upwards furthermore higher catches result in more days fished on average in a 2 1 ratio whereas on average an additional fishing day results in 3 4 additional bass caught

optimal dynamic tax evasion abstract we study optimal dynamic tax evasion in the framework proposed by lin and yang 2001 and dzhumashev and gahramanov 2011 with some modifications a more flexible utility function a more realistic audit process and a penalty function which can be defined both on evaded income and evaded taxes in the former case the elasticity between tax rate and tax evasion is positive unless the subsistence consumption level is higher than a given threshold in the latter case the relationship is usually negative but the value of elasticity depends on the form of absolute risk aversion in particular we show that for increasing relative risk aversion for a tax rate higher than 50 the elasticity may even become positive us data are consistent with irra preferences

varieties of clientelism machine politics during elections although many studies of clientelism focus exclusively on vote buying political machines often employ diverse portfolios of strategies we provide a theoretical framework and formal model to explain how and why machines mix four clientelist strategies during elections vote buying turnout buying abstention buying and double persuasion machines tailor their portfolios to the political preferences and voting costs of the electorate they also adapt their mix to at least five contextual factors compulsory voting ballot secrecy political salience machine support and political polarization our analysis yields numerous insights such as why the introduction of compulsory voting may increase vote buying and why enhanced ballot secrecy may increase turnout buying and abstention buying evidence from various countries is consistent with our predictions and suggests the need for empirical studies to pay closer attention to the ways in which machines combine clientelist strategies

the effects of adaptation measures on hurricane induced property losses which fema investments have the highest returns abstract this paper evaluates the relative effectiveness of fema expenditures on hurricane induced property losses we find that spending on fema ex ante mitigation and planning projects leads to greater reductions in property losses than spending on ex post adaptation programs specifically a one percent increase in annual spending on ex ante risk reduction and warning projects reduces damages by 0 21 percent while a one percent increase in ex post recovery and clean up spending reduces damages by 0 12 although both types of program spending are effective we find the marginal return from spending on programs that target long term mitigation and risk management to be almost twice that of spending on ex post recovery programs with the predicted increases in the frequency and severity of north atlantic hurricanes in the future our findings suggest there are important potential gains that could be realized from the further diversification of fema spending across project categories

unraveling the multiple margins of rent generation from individual transferable quotas individual transferable quotas itqs induce changes along both the extensive margin via consolidation of quota among fewer vessels and the intensive margin as harvesters adjust their behavior to itq incentives we use itq introduction in the bering sea crab fishery to decompose the sources of rent generation across both margins we embed an empirically calibrated structural model of the harvesting process into a sector level model allowing us to experimentally unravel the itq treatment we show that the magnitude and source of rent generation under itqs critically depends on the manner and degree of rent dissipation before itqs are implemented

potential economic benefits from gear restrictions and license limitation in fisheries regulation the economic analysis of various fisheries management tools has been the subject of an enormous economic literature a large portion of which has been produced since the passage of extended fisheries jurisdiction laws in the majority of the countries of the world crutchfield 1961 anderson 1977 pearse 1979 rettig and ginter 1980 clark 1980 clark 1981 anderson 1981 sturgess and meany 1982 beddington and rettig 1984 the general conclusion of this literature is that traditional management techniques such as closed seasons closed areas gear restrictions and total quotas are economically inefficient in that directly or indirectly potential gains are dissipated through increases in costs

consumption and investment under constraints abstract we study the problem of an investor who is endowed with a deterministic level of initial capital and must use this endowment to consume and invest in a financial market the investor is constrained to consume at a minimum rate throughout the period and has to maintain his wealth over a lower bound at all times both these minimal requirements may be stochastic an example of such an investor would be an investment firm with cash flow commitments and subject to regulatory capital constraints in addition the investor s portfolio choices are limited to a convex constraint set this accounts for prohibitions on short selling and incompleteness of the market using the space of associated risk neutral measures we construct portfolio policies to support target consumption investment plans we also consider a utility maximization problem for the investor and provide a related dual minimization problem over the space of measures the solution of this dual problem provides a price system under which the investor can solve for his optimal consumption investment policy in general however we are not assured of existence due to the fact that the investor s minimal requirements may themselves be beyond the span of the constrained portfolios

distributive politics and electoral competition abstract within the framework of pure redistribution dividing one unit of a homo geneous good among identical individuals the paper analyses the redistribution that arises from downsian two party electoral competition it appears that the strategic behavior of vote maximizing parties leads them to propose divisions which are not far from the egalitarian one journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d63 d72

why did the west extend the franchise democracy inequality and growth in historical perspective during the nineteenth century most western societies extended voting rights a decision that led to unprecedented redistributive programs we argue that these political reforms can be viewed as strategic decisions by the political elite to prevent widespread social unrest and revolution political transition rather than redistribution under existing political institutions occurs because current transfers do not ensure future transfers while the extension of the franchise changes future political equilibria and acts as a commitment to redistribution our theory also offers a novel explanation for the kuznets curve in many western economies during this period with the fall in inequality following redistribution due to democratization i introduction the nineteenth century was a period of fundamental political reform and unprecedented changes in taxation and redistribution britain for example was transformed from an oligarchy run by an elite to a democracy the franchise was extended in 1832 and then again in 1867 and 1884 transferring voting rights to portions of the society with no previous political representation the decades after the political reforms witnessed radical social reforms increased taxation and the extension of education to the masses moreover as noted by kuznets inequality which was previously increasing started to decline during this period the gini coefficient for income inequality in england and wales had risen from 0 400 in 1823 to 0 627 in 1871 but fell to 0 443 in 1901 two key factors in the reduction in inequality were the increase in the proportion of skilled workers williamson 1985 and the redistribution of income toward the poorer segments of the society for example taxes rose from 8 12 percent of national product in 1867 to 18 8 percent by 1927 and the progressivity of the tax system increased substantially see lindert 1989

transferable quotas enforcement costs and typical firms an empirical application to the norwegian trawler fleet an alternative to traditional regulations of fisheries to avoid rent dissipation is the use of individual transferable quotas itqs where prices in the quota market provide the necessary information to owners of harvest rights to contract with each other however even under such a decentralized regime information on the underlying technology of the fishing vessels is also necessary first since most fisheries consist of many interrelated production processes in order to avoid rent dissipation by discarding wrong output mix etc the structure of production in the multispecies fishery must be known to design a proper quota system second an itq system may create incentives for misreporting by understating the actual catch this may especially be the case where the expected degree of self enforcement is low the paper proposes a way to reduce the information requirements under regulation with asymmetric information by constructing a typical firm and comparing performance for the other vessels to this firm based on the typical firm and if the industry is relatively homogenous the performance and hence catch of any other firm in the industry can be predicted within a certain range further the paper applies this idea to the norwegian trawler fleet to assess the production structure in terms of jointness input output separability and the supply and demand elasticities for the fishing firms this information characterizes the fishery and thus how the quota system may be designed and how to construct a yardstick in order to reduce the enforcement cost under a decentralized regulation of itqs

estimating the elasticity of substitution between restricted and unrestricted inputs in a regulated fishery a probit approach abstract catch effort vessel and skipper characteristic data for a sample of boats involved in the tasmanian rock lobster fishery in the 1983 1984 season are used to estimate a fishing effort production function nested in a cobb douglas fishery production function the initial effort function is translog but tests suggest that the ces form cannot be rejected the vessel s choice of fishing ground is modeled by a probit equation the output from which is included in the ols estimation of the production function the elasticity of substitution between the inputs which are restricted by regulation and the other inputs is of particular interest as it determines whether input restriction is an efficient form of regulation for the fishery the results suggest a value significantly less than unity

kleptocracy and divide and rule a model of personal rule many developing countries have suffered under the personal rule of kleptocrats who implement highly inefe cient economic policies expropriate the wealth of their citizens and use the proceeds for their own glorie cation or consumption we argue that the success of kleptocrats rests in part on their ability to use a divide and rule strategy made possible by the weakness of institutions in these societies members of society need to cooperate in order to depose a kleptocrat yet such cooperation may be defused by imposing punitive rates of taxation on any citizen who proposes such a move and redistributing the benee ts to those who need to agree to it thus the collective action problem can be intensie ed by threats which remain off the equilibrium path in equilibrium all are exploited and no one challenges the kleptocrat kleptocratic policies are more likely when foreign aid and rents from natural resources provide rulers with substantial resources to buy off opponents when opposition groups are shortsighted when the average productivity in the economy is low and when there is greater inequality between producer groups because more productive groups are more dife cult to buy off jel o12 h00

multi output nonfrontier primal measures of capacity and capacity utilization this article implements an econometric approach for generating primal capacity output and utilization measures for fisheries in situations where regulatory environmental and resource conditions affect catch levels but are not independently identified in the data frontier based capacity models may interpret such impacts as production inefficiency however if such inefficiencies are unlikely to be eliminated the implied potential output increases may be unrealistic we develop a multi output multi input stochastic transformation function framework that permits various assumptions about how output composition may change when operating at full capacity we apply our model to catcher processor vessels in the alaskan pollock fishery

more oil less democracy evidence from worldwide crude oil discoveries this article exploits variations in the timing and size of oil discoveries to identify the impact of oil wealth on democracy i find that discovering 100 billion barrels of oil approximately the initial endowment of iraq pushes a country s democracy level almost 20 percentage points below trend after three decades the estimated effect is larger for oilfields with higher quality oil and lower exploration and extraction costs however the estimates become less precise when oil abundance is measured by oil discovery per capita suggesting politicians may care about the level instead of the per capita value of oil wealth

economic backwardness in political perspective government policies and institutions shape economic incentives and via this channel have a first order impact on economic development why then do many societies adopt policies that discourage investment and maintain institutions that cause economic backwardness perhaps politically powerful groups elites are not in favor of economic growth but why it would appear that economic growth would provide more resources for these groups to take over or tax increasing their economic returns so why don t powerful groups always support economic development in this paper we develop a theory of inefficient government policies and institutions all else equal politically powerful groups would welcome superior institutions and technologies but in practice all else is not equal because superior institutions and technologies may reduce their political power and make it more likely that they will be replaced at the center of our theory is therefore the idea that changes in institutions or the introduction of new technologies often create turbulence eroding the political advantages and future economic rents of incumbent elites alternatively new technologies may enrich competing groups increasing their threat to incumbents these considerations make politically powerful groups fear losing power and oppose economic and political change even when such change will benefit society as a whole to understand the mechanism at work and its potential applications consider a concrete example industrialization in the nineteenth century bairoch 1982 estimates that between 1830 and 1913 world manufacturing output increased by a factor of 5 see table 1 panel a nevertheless this process was highly uneven across regions and countries bairoch also calculates that over the same period manufacturing output in developed countries europe and north america increasedbyafactorofover10 whereasitdeclinedinthe third world among developed countries there were

political foundations of the resource curse in this paper we argue that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse we show 1 politicians tend to over extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they discount the future too much and 2 resource booms improve the efficiency of the extraction path however 3 resource booms by raising the value of being in power and by providing politicians with more resources which they can use to influence the outcome of elections increase resource misallocation in the rest of the economy 4 the overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends critically on institutions since these determine the extent to which political incentives map into policy outcomes countries with institutions that promote accountability and state competence will tend to benefit from resource booms since these institutions ameliorate the perverse political incentives that such booms create countries without such institutions however may suffer from a resource curse

public regulation and the structure of production in multiproduct industries an application to the new england otter trawl industry this article considers the problem of managing multispecies fishing industries as one of regulating the production of individual multiproduct firms the multispecies new england otter trawl industry is examined within this framework empirical results derived from estimating a multiproduct profitfunction indicate that management consistent with the structures ofmultiproduct production and costs would directly regulate inputs little support is provided for applying the traditional bioeconomic model to the fishery studied

fishing effort validation and substitution possibilities among components the case study of the viii division european anchovy fishery command and control regulation programmes particularly input constraints typically fail to achieve stated objectives because fishermen may substitute unregulated for regulated inputs it is thus essential to have an understanding of the internal structure of production technology a primal formulation is used to estimate a translog production function at the vessels level that includes fishing effort and fisherman s skill the flexibility of the selected functional permits the analysis of the substitution possibilities among inputs by estimating the elasticity of substitution with no prior constraints particular attention is paid to the empirical validation of fishing effort as an aggregate input which implies either the acceptance of the joint hypothesis that inputs making up effort are weakly separable from the inputs out of the subgroup or considering that effort is an intermediate input produced by a non separable two stage technology cross sectional data from the spanish purse seine fleet op

clientelism and voting behavior evidence from a field experiment in benin the author conducted a field experiment in benin to investigate the impact of clientelism on voting behavior in collaboration with four political parties involved in the 2001 presidential elections clientelist and broad public policy platforms were designed and run in twenty randomly selected villages of an average of 756 registered voters using the survey data collected after the elections the author estimated the effect of each type of message by comparing voting behavior in the villages exposed to clientelism or public policy messages treatment groups with voting behavior in the other villages control groups the author found that clientelist messages have positive and significant effect in all regions and for all types of candidates the author also found that public policy messages have a positive and significant effect in the south but a negative and significant effect in the north in addition public policy messages seem to hurt incumbents as well as regional candidates finally the evidence indicates that female voters tend to have stronger preference for public policy platforms than male voters

production in a schooling fishery the case of the north sea herring fishery the purpose of this paper is to undertake an empirical analysis of the harvest production function for the north sea herring fishery the approach of the paper is to specify a general production function where output harvest is a function of variable inputs and fixed factors in particular output elasticities and returns to scale will be analyzed moreover the effect of fisheries regulations on harvesting will be investigated the empirical work is based on cross sectional data for 1968 1971 and 1975 for empirical estimation different functional forms as well as statistical procedures are employed the empirical results indicate that there is a rising marginal product to the variable input in the fishery this somewhat surprising result which is not commonly seen in the literature and indicates that the boats operate in stage one is attributed to interactions between pre postand main season fisheries fishery regulations that were in force including total quotas and closed seasons are found to be either ineffective or causing boats to operate inefficiently in section i the fishery and the data are described while the model is specified in section ii empirical results from estimating the production function are presented in section iii while the work is briefly summarized in section iv

policy divergence and voter polarization in a structural model of elections abstractone of the most widely discussed phenomena in american politics today is the perceived increasing partisan divide that splits the u s electorate a contested question is whether this diagnosis is actually true and if so what the underlying cause might be we propose a new method that simultaneously estimates voters preferences and parties positions on economic and cultural issues we apply the model to u s presidential elections between 1972 and 2008 the model recovers candidates positions from voters behavior and decomposes changes in the overall political polarization of the electorate into changes in the distribution of voters ideal positions voter radicalization and consequences of elite polarization sorting

technical efficiency effects of input controls evidence from australia s banana prawn fishery this paper provides the first ex post estimates of the effects of input controls on technical efficiency in a fishery using individual vessel data from the northern prawn fishery of australia for the years 1990 1996 and 1994 2000 stochastic production frontiers are estimated to analyse the efficiency impacts of input controls on engine and vessel size the results indicate that technical efficiency is increasing in a measure of vessel size and engine capacity that was controlled by the regulator from 1985 to 2001 and decreasing in an unregulated input gear headrope length the study shows that fishers have substituted from regulated to unregulated inputs over the period 1990 2000 and technical efficiency has declined coincident with increasing restrictions on vessel size and engine capacity the decline in technical efficiency indicates that the goal of the regulator to increase economic efficiency has not been realized

discrete modelling of supply response under uncertainty the case of the fishery abstract in the absence of complete control in a regulated industry effective management requires prediction of firms behavioral responses to public policy this paper develops a discrete choice model of supply response under uncertainty and applies it to fishery choice problems of new england fishing firms while fishermen demonstrate a bias towards remaining within the same fishery sufficient incentives in terms of changes in expected returns and risk are shown to elicit response due to extreme uncertainty concerning population dynamics of fish stocks a satisficing approach to management facilitated by this type of modelling may be more appropriate than bioeconomic optimization

the long run effects of oil wealth on development evidence from petroleum geology we estimate the long run effects of oil wealth on development by exploiting spatial variation in sedimentary basins areas where petroleum can potentially form instrumental variables estimates indicate that oil production impedes democracy and fiscal capacity development increases corruption and raises gdp per capita without significantly harming the non resource sectors of the economy we find no evidence that oil production increases internal armed conflict coup attempts or political purges in several specifications failure to account for endogeneity leads to substantial underestimation of the adverse effects of oil suggesting that countries with higher quality political institutions and greater fiscal capacity disproportionately select into oil production

clientelism and vote buying lessons from field experiments in african elections electoral clientelism and vote buying are widely perceived as major obstacles to economic development this is because they may limit the provision of public goods in this paper we review the literature on clientelism and vote buying and propose the use of field experiments to evaluate empirically the consequences of these phenomena we provide an overview discuss implementation and interpret the main results of recent field experiments conducted by the authors in west african countries clientelism and vote buying seem to be effective and to enjoy widespread electoral support the results suggest that increased access to information and political participation by women may limit clientelism in addition voter education campaigns may undermine the effects of vote buying on voting behaviour we argue that our findings may inform the design of development aid interventions as a way effectively to increase public good political accountability we also discuss directions for fruitful future research copyright 2009 oxford university press