new hedonic technique for estimating attribute demand an application to the demand for automobile fuel efficiency a new hedonic procedure is applied to estimate the effects of gasoline price on the demand for automobile attributes and fuel efficiency direct application of a comparative statics analysis circumvents the problems of identification and severe multicollinearity affecting previous hedonic studies the results indicate that the effect of induced changes in automobile attributes in response to increases in the price of gasoline is to substantially increase fuel efficiency the estimated elasticities of fuel efficiency with respect to the price of gasoline imply that the long run own price elasticity of demand for gasoline is greater than unity 31 references

rent seeking with bounded rationality an analysis of the all pay auction the winner take all nature of all pay auctions makes the outcome sensitive to decision errors which we introduce with a logit formulation the equilibrium bid distribution is a fixed point the belief distributions that determine expected payoffs equal the choice distributions determined by expected payoffs we prove existence uniqueness and symmetry properties in contrast to the nash equilibrium the comparative statics of the logit equilibrium are intuitive rent dissipation increases with the number of players and the bid cost overdissipation of rents is impossible under full rationality but is observed in laboratory experiments our model predicts this property

tax policy and aggregate demand management under catching up with the joneses this paper examines the role for tax policies in productivity shock driven economies with catching up with the joneses utility functions the optimal tax policy is shown to affect the economy countercyclically via procyclical taxes i e cooling down the economy with higher taxes when it is overheating in booms and stimulating the economy with lower taxes in recessions to keep consumption up thus models with catching up with the joneses utility functions call for traditional keynesian demand management policies but for rather unorthodox reasons

producer attitudes toward peanut market alternatives an application of multivariate probit joint estimation attitudes of peanut producers toward different market alternatives were analyzed assuming the absence of the government support program a multivariate probit joint estimation model for ungrouped data was utilized to ascertain profiles of producers favoring private treaty markets and proposed organized markets the joint estimation model allows for and measures correlation among market alternatives for greater accuracy in profile analysis the analysis suggests considerable support for all three of the proposed organized markets however choice of alternatives should be considered by a group of potential traders selected on the basis of the profile analysis

portfolio manager behavior and global financial crises abstract i develop a two market agent based model to study how global portfolio managers affect global financial crises and stability first i create an agent based model where fund managers make their allocation decisions between two markets and a risk free asset based on the mean variance framework simulation results reveal that global managers do not create global financial crises second i extend the base model by incorporating insights from behavioral finance where risk is instead determined by fund manager losses simulation results reveal that slight global manager losses can trigger a widening of both markets risk premium accelerating the decline in asset prices worldwide statistical analysis reveals that global managers are a stabilizing force in smaller numbers however they become destabilizing in larger numbers the ability to reduce risk by diversifying across markets results in excessive risk taking if global managers exist in larger numbers systematic over leverage may result such that a deleveraging process can lead to the spreading of financial crises

selling at the farmgate or traveling to market using detailed survey data from uganda this article examines whether coffee producers sell to itinerant traders or directly to markets where they can get a higher price but must incur a transport cost we find that selling to the market is more likely when the quantity sold is large and the market is close by wealthy farmers are less likely to sell to the market possibly because the shadow value of their time is higher but if they have a large quantity of coffee for sale they are more likely to sell it to the market they are also more likely to travel to a distant market these findings are consistent with their better ability to pay for public transportation we find no evidence that the decision to sell at the farmgate is driven by a self control motive

social status in economic theory social distinction or status is an important motivation of human behaviour this paper provides a selective survey of recent advances in the economic analysis of the origins and consequences of social status concerns first a selection of empirical research from a variety of scientific disciplines is discussed to underpin the further theoretical analysis i then consider the origins and determinants of tastes for status discuss the endogenous derivation of such preferences for relative standing and assess the different formalizations of these preferences subsequently the consequences of preferences for status are studied for a variety of problems and settings the last section discusses a number of implications of status concerns for normative economics and public policy

conspicuous consumption dynamics abstract we formalize veblen s idea of conspicuous consumption as two alternative forms of interdependent preferences dubbed envy and pride agents adjust consumption patterns gradually in the direction of increasing utility from an arbitrary initial state the distribution of consumption among agents with identical preferences converges to a unique equilibrium distribution when pride is stronger the equilibrium distribution has a right skewed density when envy is stronger the equilibrium is concentrated at a single point and the adjustment dynamics involve a shock wave that can be interpreted as a growing moving homogeneous middle class

occupational mobility and the distribution of occupational success among young men interpretation of the distribution of occupational success depends crucially on an understanding of the process of mobility if the holders of low paying jobs this year are just as likely as anyone else to hold good jobs next year then the lower tail of the earnings distribution is not a matter of great social concern further if the distribution of success is primarily determined by a random process the prospects for a significant reduction in the inequality of earnings are unfavorable on the other hand high mobility in the short run may conceal systematic stratification of the labor force it may be that the same individuals spend most of their time in the worst jobs if so luck and random events may play a small role in the distribution of well being inequality may be a major issue and the elimination of stratification may hold out the promise of an important reduction in inequality simple tabulation of distributions of success and of mobility among categories of success cannot answer the basic question of the role of stratification in this paper we develop a model and statistical method for studying mobility and relating it to characteristics upon which stratification may be based our study rests on annual interviews conducted from 1966 through 1969 with about 3 000 white males born between 1942 and 1952 1 we find that mobility is closely related to personal characteristics especially intelligence and education men with high iqs and extensive education are more likely to move to high paying jobs and are more likely to remain in them nevertheless random events dominate the distribution of occupational success in the short run our results strongly support the finding of christopher jencks and his collaborators that redistribution of the determinants of earnings would do almost nothing to reduce the observed inequality of annual earnings

running to keep in the same place consumer choice as a game of status if individuals care about their status defined as their rank in the distribution of consumption of one positional good then the consumer s problem is strategic as her utility depends on the consumption choices of others in the symmetric nash equilibrium each individual spends an inefficiently high amount on the status good using techniques from auction theory we analyze the effects of exogenous changes in the distribution of income in a richer society almost all individuals spend more on conspicuous consumption and individual utility is lower at each income level in a more equal society the poor are worse off

the value of environmental status signaling how much are consumers willing to pay to signal their environmental consciousness we identify the signaling value of an environmental public good by focusing on hybrid cars and exploiting the physical uniqueness of the toyota prius relative to hybrids that look identical to their non hybrid counterparts we deploy a quasi experimental hedonic model to estimate this willingness to pay we find that controlling for observable and unobservable factors the prius commands an environmental signaling value of 587 or 4 5 of its value our research provides lessons for economists and policymakers and contributes to the literature on identifying signaling values

pricing efficiency in centralized and noncentralized markets pricing efficiency in centralized markets is compared with that in noncentralized markets on the basis of a price formation model centrally discovered prices are hypothesized to adjust more slowly to equilibrium but to have lower unpredictable variability than noncentrally discovered prices these hypotheses are borne out strongly in market experiments mean squared error is found to be lower in centralized than in noncentralized trading suggesting centralized markets are the more price efficient

social norms savings behavior and growth we argue that many goods and decisions are not allocated or made through markets we interpret an agent s status as a ranking device that determines how well he or she fares in the nonmarket sector the existence of a nonmarket sector can endogenously generate a concern for relative position in for example the income distribution so that higher income implies higher status moreover it can naturally yield multiple equilibria it is thus possible to explain differences in growth rates across countries without recourse to differences in underlying preferences technologies or endowments different social organizations lead to different reduced form preferences which lead to different growth rates

the equilibrium distribution of income and the market for status this paper explores the implications for risk taking behavior and the equilibrium distribution of income of assuming that the desire for status positions is a powerful motive and that it raises the marginal utility of consumption in contrast to previous analyses we consider the case in which status positions are sold in a hedonic market we show that such a complete hedonic market in status positions can be perfectly replicated by a simpler arrangement with a status good and a social norm that assigns higher status to those that consume more of this good the main result is that for a wide range of initial conditions the equilibrium distribution over income status and consumption is the same that this allocation requires inequality of income and consumption and that this allocation coincides with the optimum of a utilitarian planner

status the distribution of wealth private and social attitudes to risk this paper supposes an individual cares about his her own wealth not only directly but also via the relative standing that this wealth induces the implications for risk taking are investigated in particular such a model provides a natural explanation of the concave convex concave utility described by friedman and savage however there are a number of key differences between the present model and any model based on own wealth alone for example an equilibrium wealth distribution here may have a middle class further the status interaction involves an externality and an equilibrium wealth distribution may be pareto inefficient but also about the implied relative standing in the distribution of wealth has a long but checkered history an early exponent of such ideas was of course veblen 1899 it is indeed a notion which most economists reject albeit usually without explicit comment a notable and articulate exception however is frank 1985 for example see also the references frank cites on pp 33 34 it is however a notion with substantial intuitive appeal and it seems useful to ascertain its consequences before coming to a final judgement as to its merits the present paper is concerned with deriving the consequences of such valuation of status for risk taking what seems to be the sharpest possible model is adopted here this assumes that what is essentially ordinal rank in the wealth distribution enters von neumann morgenstern utility as an argument in addi tion to wealth itself thus higher wealth increases utility not only directly but also indirectly via higher status in the interests of both simplicity and drama it is typically assumed here that all individuals have identical utility functions which are concave in wealth but convex in status section 2 discusses how the model provides a natural explanation of the fundamental phenomenon addressed by friedman and savage 1948 that individuals may simultaneously purchase insurance and participate in lotteries although each individual here has a utility function which is concave in wealth itself utility can nevertheless be convex in wealth over some range when the indirect effect via status is included this effect is enhanced by the convexity of utility in status but will follow in any case if increasing wealth entails moving up in status much more rapidly than losing wealth entails moving down it is shown

veblen effects in a theory of conspicuous consumption the authors examine conditions under which veblen effects arise from the desire to achieve social status by signaling wealth through conspicuous consumption while veblen effects cannot ordinarily arise when preferences satisfy a single crossing property they may emerge when this property fails in that case budget brands are priced at marginal cost while luxury brands though not intrinsically superior are sold at higher prices to consumers seeking to advertise wealth luxury brands earn strictly positive profits under conditions that would with standard formulations of preferences yield marginal cost pricing the authors explore factors that induce veblen effects and they investigate policy implications copyright 1996 by american economic association

hedonic prices and implicit markets estimating demand and supply functions for differentiated products in choosing the level of quality to purchase the buyer of a differentiated product also chooses a point on the marginal price schedule for that product hence in general the demand functions for product characteristics cannot be consistently estimated by ordinary least squares market equilibrium results in a matching of characteristics of demanders and suppliers this matching restricts the use of buyer and seller characteristics as instruments when estimating demand and supply functions for product characteristics the paper develops these issues a stochastic structure for hedonic equilibrium models is then proposed identification results are presented and estimation procedures are outlined

measuring product prices under conditions of quality change the case of passenger cars in greece the envelope curve of the bid functions for car characteristics in greece is used to analyze the relationship between nominal and quality adjusted car prices for 1965 85 it is estimated using the box cox flexible functional form technique in a modification of s rosen s hedonic price model the authors find that quality adjusted prices of imports from west germany france italy and japan decline d from 1965 to 1970 and increased continuously thereafter the quality of cars from france italy and to a lesser extent japan responded favorably following the two oil shocks and low priced cars offer more quality for money copyright 1988 by blackwell publishing ltd

bubbles and crashes gradient dynamics in financial markets abstract fund managers respond to the payoff gradient by continuously adjusting leverage in our analytic and simulation models the base model has a stable equilibrium with classic properties however bubbles and crashes occur in extended models incorporating an endogenous market risk premium based on investors historical losses and constant gain learning when losses have been small for a long time asset prices inflate as fund managers increase leverage then slight losses can trigger a crash as a widening risk premium accelerates deleveraging and asset price declines