legislative district configurations and fiscal policy in american states in accordance with the median voter theorem the median legislator is decisive in representative democracy if the preferences of the median legislator differ from the preferences of the median voter in the polity fiscal policy choices will predictably diverge from those favored by the median voter this paper seeks to identify the median district and therein the preferences driving the median legislator in american state legislatures using economic characteristics of constituents we find substantial differences between the median district and the statewide median as the income of the median district rises above the median income of the polity government expenditures increase in addition the degree to which income is skewed across legislative districts affects spending for redistribution programs finally we find that direct democracy procedures which allow the statewide median voter to check legislative decisions limit the impact of differences between the district and polity medians

electoral equilibria with entry some simulations the objective of this paper is to investigate by means of simulation the impact of third party entry on the spatial separation of candidates specifically we do real time simulations of palfrey s 1984 model of electoral equilibria with entry after relaxing some of its assumptions our finding that the threat of third party entry can induce virtually the same spatial separation of the major party candidates as entry with certainty is both a strong and interesting result

on the mis measurement of legislator ideology and shirking in this paper we show that current statistical measures of legislator s shirking are implicitly based on the electoral concept of a unique majority rule equilibrium point in the policy space where elections are contested we note that such equilibria do not exist generically and present statistical results showing that cross sectional regressions where legislators voting indices are predicted by district average demograhic and economic data are mis specified we also discuss a weaker equilibrium construct the uncovered set and present statistical evidence showing that differences in voting behavior between senators from the same state are positively related to the heterogeneity of the electorate we argue that current evidence alleged to show shirking by senators is equally consistent with senators who perfectly represent an idiosyncratic constituency that cannot be represented by district average data

endogenous competence and a limit to the condorcet jury theorem the seminal contribution known as the condorcet jury theorem observes that under a specific set of conditions an increase in the size of a group tasked with making a binary decision guilty or innocent say leads to an improvement in the group s ability to make the correct choice an assumption that is not properly appreciated in the relevant literature is that the competency of the group members is assumed to be exogenous in numerous applications members of the group make investments to improve the accuracy of their decision making e g pre meeting efforts we consider the collective action problem that arises we show that if individual competence is endogenous then increases in the group size encourages free riding this trades off with the value of information aggregation thus the value of the larger group size is muted extensions illustrate that if committee members are allowed to exit not participate the equilibrium committee size is reduced additionally supermajority voting rules encourage investments and consequently individual competence

a nonequilibrium analysis of unanimity rule majority rule and pareto i introduction voting theory is important for understanding economics as well as politics international organizations vote on trade regulations legislatures vote on minimum wage and governments vote on the provision of public goods voting also affects industrial organization for instance limited partnerships may vote on the allocation of resources to various units and shareholders may vote on investment decisions carrera and richmond 1988 what voting rule best achieves pareto optimal outcomes in such cases in the absence of transactions costs it is widely believed that unanimity rule is the best voting rule for promoting pareto efficiency berggren 1996 buchanan and tullock 1962 mueller 2003 buchanan 1967 writes it is evident that unanimous consent is the political counterpart of the pareto criterion for optimality p 285 traditionally viewed unanimity rule guarantees more efficient outcomes than majority rule because unanimity rule only passes proposals that make everyone better off other voting rules like majority rule can pass proposals that make some individuals worse off one of the assumptions that is either explicit or implicit in the these studies is the assumption of rational proposals we define a proposal as rational if it helps maximize the proposer s utility at the end of the game in our analysis proposals are not rational instead they are generated either randomly or sincerely in a single dimensional voting model and evaluated by the pareto criterion or pareto optimality this produces two striking results with regard to pareto optimality first if proposal generation is random then majority rule is usually more likely to select a pareto optimal outcome than unanimity rule second if individuals propose their ideal points then majority rule always selects pareto optimal outcomes at least as well as unanimity rule considering all possible proposals as done in our random generation models has a long tradition in social choice literature arrow 1951 caplin and nalebuff 1988 niemi and weisberg 1968 riker 1982 sen 1979 it also has the advantage of modeling certain types of incomplete information modeling votes where bills are introduced for reasons other than making them pass see stewart 2001 pp 338 41 modeling exogenously generated proposals and for allowing mistakes by the proposer such foundational work should be of interest to those who relate unanimity rule to pareto principles in the study of public goods cornes and sandler 1996 lindahl 1967 political parties aldrich 1995 and legislative institutions colomer 2001 niou and ordeshook 1985 tsebelis 2002 to name a few ii previous studies perhaps the first in depth study of the relationship between unanimity rule and a pareto principle was buchanan and tullock s calculus of consent 1962 buchanan and tullock argued that if decision making costs were negligible unanimity rule would always be the most desirable k majority rule simply because it preserved the pareto principle p 88 although the exact pareto principle they had in mind is not entirely clear it seems that buchanan and tullock were arguing for the criteria of accepting a change from the status quo only if it lead to a pareto improvement otherwise the status quo should be preferred pp 92 93 sen 1979 p 25 1 mueller 2003 pp 138 and 140 41 further compared unanimity rule to majority rule and concluded that unanimity rule typically performs better in terms of the pareto criterion to illustrate his reasoning mueller describes a community voting on both the purchase of a new firehouse and the taxes needed to pay for it in a single bill if the decision was made under unanimity rule the distribution of taxes would be redefined until the firehouse benefited all otherwise the bill would not pass if the decision was made under majority rule a majority might distribute the taxes on a minority such that members of the majority would be net gainers and members of the minority would be net losers

schooling fertility and the labour market experience of married women a model of career path choice is constructed for a sample of women taken from the 1991 us national household education survey this allows for simultaneity and selection effects in the relationship between regime choice and earning it is established that inter alia expected earnings have a significant impact on the career path and the hours of work chosen by american women the role played by formal schooling and by childrearing in the determination of carrier path is highlighted and implications are discussed

why has u s inflation become harder to forecast we examine whether the u s rate of price inflation has become harder to forecast and to the extent that it has what changes in the inflation process have made it so the main finding is that the univariate inflation process is well described by an unobserved component trend cycle model with stochastic volatility or equivalently an integrated moving average process with time varying parameters this model explains a variety of recent univariate inflation forecasting puzzles and begins to explain some multivariate inflation forecasting puzzles as well

searching for equilibrium positions in a game of political competition with restrictions this paper considers a problem of political economy in which a nash equilibrium study is performed in a proposed game with restrictions where the two major parties in a country vary their position within a politically flexible framework to increase their number of voters the model as presented fits the reality of many countries moreover it avoids the uniqueness of equilibrium positions the problem is stated and solved from a geometric point of view

constrained after college student loans and early career occupational choices abstract in the early 2000s a highly selective university introduced a no loans policy under which the loan component of financial aid awards was replaced with grants we use this natural experiment to identify the causal effect of student debt on employment outcomes in the standard life cycle model young people make optimal educational investment decisions if they are able to finance these investments by borrowing against future earnings the presence of debt has only income effects on investment decisions we find that debt causes graduates to choose substantially higher salary jobs and reduces the probability that students choose low paid public interest jobs we also find some evidence that debt affects students academic decisions during college our estimates suggest that recent college graduates are not life cycle agents two potential explanations are that young workers are credit constrained or that they are averse to holding debt we find suggestive evidence that debt reduces students donations to the institution in the years after they graduate and increases the likelihood that a graduate will default on a pledge made during her senior year we argue this result is more likely consistent with credit constraints than with debt aversion

house prices home equity based borrowing and the u s household leverage crisis us household leverage sharply increased in the years preceding the 2007 eco nomic recession the top panel of figure 1 shows the steady rise in household debt since 1975 which accelerated beginning in 2002 in just five years the household sector doubled its debt balance in comparison the contemporaneous increase in corporate debt was modest the middle panel shows that the increase in household debt from 2002 to 2007 translated into a striking rise in household leverage as mea sured by the debt to income ratio during the same time period corporate leverage declined the dramatic absolute and relative rise in us household leverage from 2002 to 2007 is unprecedented compared to the last 25 years one reason for the rapid expansion in household leverage during this period is that mortgage credit became more easily available to new home buyers mian and sufi 2009 strong house price appreciation from 2002 to 2006 however which may have been fueled by the availability of mortgage credit to a riskier set of new home buyers could also have had an important feedback effect on household lever age through existing homeowners given that 65 percent of us households already owned their primary residence before the acceleration in house prices the feedback from house prices to borrowing may be an important source of the rapid rise in household leverage that preceded the economic downturn our central goals in this study are to estimate how homeowner borrowing responded to the increase in house prices and to identify which homeowners responded most aggressively we examine this home equity based borrowing channel using a dataset consisting of anonymous individual credit files of a national consumer credit bureau agency we follow a random sample of over 74 000 us homeowners who owned their homes as of 1997 at an annual frequency from the end of 1997 until the end of 2008 the bottom panel of figure 1 plots the growth in debt of 1997 homeowners over time and shows that existing homeowners borrow significantly more debt as their house prices appreciate from 2002 to 2006 while the aggregate trend is suggestive

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

nash equilibrium strategies in directional models of two candidate spatial competition the standard approach to two party political competition in a multi dimensional issue space models voters as voting for the alternative that is located closest to their own most preferred location another approach to understanding voter choice is based on preferred direction of change with respect to some specified neutral point e g an origin or status quo point

home is where the equity is mortgage refinancing and household consumption applying a permanent income model with exogenous liquidity constraints and mortgage behavior household refinancing when mortgage interest rates are historically high and rising a persistent empirical puzzle is explained using data from the panel study of income dynamics households experiencing an unemployment shock and having limited initial liquid assets to draw upon are shown to have been 25 more likely to refinance 1991 94 on average such liquidity constrained households converted over two thirds of every dollar of equity they removed into current consumption as mortgage rates plummeted 1991 94 producing an estimated expenditure stimulus of at least 28 billion

sophisticated sincerity voting over endogenous agendas the empirical findings on whether or not legislators vote strategically are mixed this is at least partly due to the fact that to establish any hypothesis on strategic voting legislators preferences need to be known and these are typically private data in this note it is shown that under complete information if decision making is by the amendment procedure and if the agenda is set endogenously then sophisticated strategic voting over the resulting agenda is observationally equivalent to sincere voting the voting strategies however are sophisticated this fact has direct implications for empirical work on sophisticated voting

a bargaining model of collective choice we present a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo is an arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space in contrast to other bargaining models the status quo is not assumed to be bad and delay may be pareto efficient we prove existence of stationary equilibria the possibility of equilibrium delay depends on four factors risk aversion of the legislators the dimensionality of the policy space the voting rule and the possibility of transfers across districts if legislators are risk averse if there is more than one policy dimension and if voting is by majority rule for example then delay will almost never occur in one dimension delay is possible if and only if the status quo lies in the core of the voting rule and then it is the only possible outcome this core selection result yields a game theoretic foundation for the well known median voter theorem our comparative statics analysis yield two noteworthy insights i if the status quo is close to the core t hen equilibrium policy outcomes will also be close to the core a moderate status quo produces moderate policy outcomes and ii if legislators are patient then equilibrium proposals will be close to the core legislative patience leads to policy moderation

house prices and credit constraints making sense of the us experience most us house price models break down in the mid 2000s due to the omission of exogenous changes in mortgage credit supply associated with the sub prime mortgage boom from house price to rent ratio and inverted housing demand models previous models lack data on credit constraints facing first time home buyers incorporating a measure of credit conditions the cyclically adjusted loan to value ratio for first time buyers into house price to rent ratio models yields stable long run relationships more precisely estimated effects reasonable speeds of adjustment and improved model fits

the economics of uk teacher supply the graduate s decision the problem of teacher supply in the united kingdom has generated considerable concern recently this paper studies a large cohort of graduates and their decision whether to become teachers or not a full structure model of the individual s decision is estimated which corrects for possible sample selection bias and models endogenously the role of relative earnings the findings provide support for the estimation procedure used and attest to the importance of relative pay in the individual graduate s career decision copyright 1990 by royal economic society

covering dominance and institution free properties of social change this paper shows that different institutional structures for aggregation of preferences under majority rule may generate social choices that are quite similar so that the actual social choice may be rather insensitive to the choice of institutional rules specifically in a multidimensional setting where all voters have strictly quasi concave preferences it is shown that the uncovered set contains the outcomes that would arise from equilibrium behavior under three different institutional settings the three institutional settings are two candidate competition in a large electorate cooperative behavior in small committees and sophisticated voting behavior in a legislative environment where the agenda is determined endogenously because of its apparent institution free properties the uncovered set may provide a useful generalization of the core when a core does not exist a general existence theorem for the uncovered set is proven and for the downsian case bounds for the uncovered set are computed these bounds show that the uncovered set is centered around a generalized median set whose size is a measure of the degree of symmetry of the voter ideal points

polarization politics and property rights links between inequality and growth most efforts to trace the effects of income inequality on growth have focused on redistribution however empirical investigation has not substantiated either the positive association of income inequality with redistribution or the negative association of redistribution with economic growth the authors analyze the effects of inequality in the broader context of social polarization they argue that social polarization whether rooted in income inequality or in ethnic tension makes large changes in current policies including those guaranteeing the security of contract and property rights more likely under a wide range of institutional arrangements the resulting uncertainties in the policy and contractual environment hinder growth they find strong empirical support for both parts of this argument the policy implications of their argument are quite distinct from those of arguments that inequality reduces growth by increasing pressures for redistribution if redistributive policies per se were to blame for the low growth resulting from inequality governments that seek to mitigate income inequality must inevitably confront a tradeoff between equity and growth if on the other hand the insecurity of property rights slows growth in unequal or otherwise polarized societies governments that commit over the long run to particular redistributive policies incur less risk of slowing economic growth fiscal redistribution that reduces inequality may actually increase growth by reducing the risks of political uncertainty

uncovering evidence of conditional party government reassessing majority party influence in congress and state legislatures temporary american legislatures our use of a new analytic technique a grid search program for characterizing the uncovered set enables us to begin with a better model of legislative proceedings that abandons the simple one dimensional spatial models in favor of the more realistic two dimensional version our conclusions are based on the analysis of real world data rather than on arguments about the relative merits of different theoretic assumptions our analysis confirms that when legislators preferences are polarized outcomes will generally be closer to the majority party s wishes even if the majority party leadership does nothing to influence the legislative process this conclusion notwithstanding our analysis also shows that at the margin of the majority party s natural advantage agenda setting by the majority party remains a viable and efficacious strategy in the debate over party organizations in the american congress one side e g aldrich and rohde 1998 2001 argues that the majority party can influence the outcome of legislative proceedings through agenda control or the ability to determine which proposals are considered the other side e g krehbiel 1999 2000 argues that agenda control conveys no power and that the majority party s apparent influence

do alternative opportunities matter the role of female labor markets in the decline of teacher quality abstract this paper documents the widely perceived but little investigated notion that teachers today are less qualified than they once were evidence of a marked decline in the quality of young women going into teaching between 1960 and 1990 is presented using standardized test scores undergraduate institution selectivity and positive assortative mating characteristics as indicators of quality in contrast the quality of young women becoming professionals increased the roy model of self selection highlights how occupational differences in the returns to skill determine teacher quality estimates suggest the significance of increasing professional opportunities for women in affecting the decline in teacher quality

stability and centrality of legislative choice in the spatial context majority rule spatial voting games lacking a core still always present a near core outcome more commonly known as the copeland winner this is the alternative that defeats or ties the greatest number of alternatives in the space previous research has not tested the copeland winner as a solution concept for spatial voting games without a core lacking a way to calculate where the copeland winner was with an infinite number of alternatives we provide a straightforward algorithm to find the copeland winner and show that it corresponds well to experimental outcomes in an important set of experimental legislative voting games we also provide an intuitive motivation for why legislative outcomes in the spatial context may be expected to lie close to the copeland winner finally we show a connection between the copeland winner and the shapley value and provide a simple but powerful algorithm to calculate the copeland scores of all points in the space in terms of the modified power values of each of the voters and their locations in the space

cycle avoiding trajectories strategic agendas and the duality of memory and foresight an informal exposition this paper considers the notion of cycle avoiding trajectories in majority voting tournaments and shows that they underlie and guide several apparently disparate voting processes the set of alternatives that are maximal with respect to such trajectories constitutes a new solution set of considerable significance it may be dubbed the banks set in recognition of the important paper by banks 1985 that first made use of this set the purpose of this paper is to informally demonstrate that the banks set is a solution set of broad relevance for understanding group decision making in both cooperative and non cooperative settings and under both sincere and sophisticated voting in addition we show how sincere and sophisticated voting processes can be viewed as mirror images of one another embodying respectively dmemory and foresight we also show how to develop the idea of a sophisticated agenda one in which the choice of what alternatives to propose is itself a matter of strategic calculation

a model of farsighted voting i present a new method of interpreting voter preferences in settings where policy remains in effect until replaced by new legislation in such settings voters consider not only the utility they receive from a given policy today but also the utility they will receive from policies likely to replace that policy in the future the model can be used to characterize both long term preferences and distributions over policy outcomes in situations where policy is ongoing and voters are farsighted

conference on housing stability and the macroeconomy international perspectives this article provides an introduction to the jmcb special issue on housing bubbles the global financial crisis and the ensuing recessions in countries that experienced housing busts we focus on five themes that are important for policymakers and researchers alike the domestic and international factors driving housing booms and busts the relevance of the housing sector for the real economy how monetary policy should react to housing booms and busts how housing and mortgage finance reform could affect financial stability and the broad lessons learned for macroeconomics and macroprudential policy

an experimental study of the efficiency of unanimity rule and majority rule scholars traditionally claim that unanimity rule is more capable of producing pareto optimal outcomes than majority rule dougherty and edward public choice 151 3 655 678 2012 make the opposite claim assuming proposals are either random sincere or strategic we test these competing hypotheses in a two dimensional framework using laboratory experiments our primary results suggest 1 majority rule enters the pareto set more quickly than unanimity rule 2 majority rule leaves the pareto set at the same rate as unanimity rule and 3 majority rule is more likely to select a pareto optimal outcome than unanimity rule at the end of the game

veto games spatial committees under unanimity rule there exists a large literature on two person bargaining games and distribution games or divide the dollar games under simple majority rule where in equilibrium a minimal winning coalition takes full advantage over everyone else here we extend the study to an n person veto game where players take turns proposing policies in an n dimensional policy space and everybody has a veto over changes in the status quo briefly we find a nash equilibrium where the initial proposer offers a policy in the intersection of the pareto optimal set and the pareto superior set that gives everyone their continuation values and punishments are never implemented comparing the equilibrium outcomes under two different agendas sequential recognition and random recognition we find that there are advantages generated by the order of proposal under the sequential recognition rule we also provide some conditions under which the players will prefer to rotate proposals rather than allow any specific policy to prevail indefinitely

inflation hedging properties of regional chinese real estate market evidence from 35 cities in china the housing markets in china have been gaining considerable interest from investors but the inflation hedging characteristics of housing remain ambiguous based on chinese city level data this study evaluates different inflation hedging properties in eastern middle and western real estate markets using panel vector autoregressive pvar models findings suggest middle real estate markets afford the best hedging opportunities for expected inflation which is robust considering housing market heterogeneity financial crisis and the 2010 purchase restriction order moreover hedging efficacy of anticipated inflation differs between markets with low and high supply demand ratio

formal versus informal legislative bargaining we study how the formality of a bargaining procedure affects its outcome we compare a formal baron ferejohn bargaining procedure to an informal procedure where players make and accept proposals in continuous time both constitute non cooperative games corresponding to the same bargaining problem a three player median voter setting with an external disagreement point this allows us to study formality in the presence and absence of a core and provides a natural explanation for the effects of preference polarization our results show that polarization hurts the median player and that formality matters the median player is significantly better off under informal bargaining

distributive politics and electoral competition abstract within the framework of pure redistribution dividing one unit of a homo geneous good among identical individuals the paper analyses the redistribution that arises from downsian two party electoral competition it appears that the strategic behavior of vote maximizing parties leads them to propose divisions which are not far from the egalitarian one journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d63 d72

legislator voting and shirking a critical review of the literature we set out to critically review the progress in answering two related questions what determines how legislators vote and how can shirking by legislators be measured in the first category the hypothesis that legislators shirk in order to indulge their personal ideological preferences has led researchers astray the theoretical underpinning is shaky on two counts first legislators who indulge their preferences at the expense of their constituents preferences put themselves at a competitive electoral disadvantage second the original two stage procedure used to measure ideological shirking is severely flawed among many other problems the residual measure of shirking implicitly assumes that the median voter is the relevant constituent principal for the legislator agent

centripetal and centrifugal incentives in electoral systems this paper investigates how electoral laws affect the position taking incentives of parties and candidates it seeks to extend the finding presented in the classical median voter theorem to a wide class of electoral systems or to show the limits of such extension the factors examined are the district magnitude the electoral formula the number of votes each voter is allowed to cast whether voters can cumulate their votes and whether voters can partially abstain i suggest a crude division of electoral systems into those producing predominantly centripetal incentives and those producing predominantly centrifugal incentives among the factors found to produce centripetal incentives at least in noncumulative systems are the following increases in the number of votes per voter outlawry of partial abstention and decreases in the district magnitude in systems allowing the cumulation of votes matters are a bit different

housing and the macroeconomy inflation and the financial accelerator three themes connecting housing and the macroeconomy are discussed first evidence is presented for the property market as one of the drivers of u s consumer price inflation second key drivers of house prices are explained to account for the remarkable diversity of international experience finally three potential links between housing credit and the financial accelerator are discussed these are the consumption channel the investment channel and feedback between bad loans and risk spreads via the financial system and how institutional differences between countries can explain the presence absence and magnitudes of these linkages

the value of formalism re examining external costs and decision costs with multiple groups several authors have examined the optimal k majority rule using a variety of criteria we formalize and extend the original argument laid out by buchanan and tullock the calculus of consent logical foundations of constitutional democracy 1962 using a decision theoretic analysis from the perspective of an individual voter unlike previous formalizations voters in our study are members of one or more groups this allows us to examine cases wherein different voters have starkly different interests furthermore voters in our study can err in their judgments of proposals allowing us to model potential irrationalities in the choice of an optimal k majority rule we consider both up or down votes on a single proposal as well as votes over a series of proposals we find that the optimal k majority rule depends on a number of parameters most notably the number of rounds needed to create a proposal that will pass group membership has almost no affect furthermore if two groups are at odds then the external cost function can actually rise over some range of k if voters err systematically in their judgment more inclusive k majority rules such as unanimity rule can fail to pass pareto preferred proposals our results should help advance a classic work in public choice

allocative efficiency of markets with zero intelligence traders market as a partial substitute for individual rationality we report market experiments in which human traders are replaced by zero intelligence programs that submit random bids and offers imposing a budget constraint i e not permitting traders to sell below their costs or buy above their values is sufficient to raise the allocative efficiency of these auctions close to 100 percent allocative efficiency of a double auction derives largely from its structure independent of traders motivation intelligence or learning adam smith s invisible hand may be more powerful than some may have thought it can generate aggregate rationality not only from individual rationality but also from individual irrationality

female labour force participation and the choice of occupation abstract this paper examines the relationship between occupational choice and participation decisions by women it is motivated by recent policy debate in the u k concerning the supply of teachers where about sixty per cent of teachers are female and the recruitment of women is vital to the maintenance of the labour force in teaching models of earnings determination occupational choice and labour force participation are estimated for a large sample of female graduates the choice of occupation and labour market status is modelled as a joint decision between i teaching and non teaching and ii working and not working estimates from alternative models show that participation decisions are correlated with occupational choice with individuals who choose teaching being more likely to work the choice of occupation is also affected by the earnings differential between teaching and non teaching suggesting that teacher shortages could be alleviated by raising teacher s earnings

housing wealth and consumption a micro panel study there is strong evidence that house prices and consumption are synchronised there is however disagreement over the causes of this link this study examines if there is a wealth effect of house prices on consumption using a household level panel data set with information about house ownership income wealth and demographics for a large sample of the danish population in the period 1987 96 we model the dependence of the growth rate of total household expenditure with unanticipated innovations to house prices controlling for factors related to competing explanations we find little evidence of a housing wealth effect

do differences in presidential economic advisers matter using data on members on the council of economic advisors as well as us treasury secretaries and omb directors from 1952 through 2005 i investigate the effect of economic advisors educational and employment backgrounds on the time series performance of several policy variables ivy league advisors appear to raise non defense government spending although the size of the impact differs by president while voter preferences appear to matter for a wider variety of policy variables changes in federal regulation and marginal tax rates the share of ivy league advisors is at least as important as voter preferences in explaining non defense spending

political rents and voter information in search equilibrium abstract political parties committed to grab rents may run for election and even win if citizens are uninformed but how is the political equilibrium affected if citizens can mitigate this information problem through costly information search we propose a political equilibrium theory with endogenous information search and turnout we show that i the political equilibrium generates political uncertainty characterized by a distribution of rent policies i i the expectation of this rent distribution is inversely u shaped in the information search cost i i i turnout is lower and rents are higher the more proportional is the electoral system

voting for pareto optimality a multidimensional analysis we compare unanimity rule and majority rule in their abilities to produce pareto superior and pareto optimal alternatives in fixed number of rounds of voting using a two dimensional spatial voting model with random proposals sincere proposals and strategic proposals our findings show that for random or sincere proposals majority rule is at least as likely to select a pareto optimal outcome as unanimity rule for strategic proposals the subgame perfect equilibrium under unanimity rule is pareto optimal for other k majority rules the outcome is pareto optimal or very close to it for outcomes that are both pareto optimal and pareto superior unanimity rule outperforms majority rule

estimation of a labour supply model with censoring due to unemployment and underemployment this study proposes and implements a method of labour supply estimation which is appropriate when the sample contains unemployed and underemployed workers the estimation method consists of excluding unemployed and underemployed workers from the sample and then using to avoid selection bias an extension of heckman s approach to the case where two correlated selection rules generate the sample hausman s specification test is then used to determine whether ignoring constrained workers has led to biases in traditional labour supply estimates and the empirical results suggest that previous estimates of several important parameters are biased since the biases go in the direction that would be predicted by the hypothesis that the unemployed and underemployed are constrained the results support this hypothesis