spectrum auction designs and revenue variations this study examines a sample of 93 national 3g spectrum auctions for the period 2000 2011 to identify the sources of substantial revenue variations an implied reduced form econometric model that recognises the censored nature of the sample relates per capita winning bid per mhz per million populations values to regulator determined auction design characteristics auction competitiveness mobile wireless market conditions and spectrum package attributes identified from tender documents the analysis reveals that among other factors all auction design characteristics independently impact on realized 3g spectrum auction revenues

empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first price symmetric common value auctions this paper studies federal auctions for wildcat leases on the outer continental shelf from 1954 to 1970 these are leases where bidders privately acquire at some cost noisy but equally informative signals about the amount of oil and gas that may be present we develop tests of rational and equilibrium bidding in a common values model that are implemented using data on bids and ex post values we also use data on tract location and exposr values to test the comparative static prediction that bidders may bid less aggressively in common value auctions when they expect more competition we find that bidders are aware of the winner s curse and their bidding is largely consistent with equilibrium

disaggregating the developing welfare state provincial social policy regimes in china summary local variation in social welfare provision appears in myriad contexts around the world and yet our attempts at conceptualizing welfare regimes focus on the national level in china local authorities have shaped social policy implementation since economic reforms in this paper i answer three questions about subnational variation in social policy provision in china 1 have chinese provinces diverged in their social policy provision 2 how do provincial social policy regimes differ from one another 3 what explains variation in provincial social policy spending to answer the first question i conduct a cluster analysis of provincial social policy spending data i find that provinces systematically diverge in their social policy priorities while some provinces invest in education to develop human capital and promote economic growth others emphasize poverty alleviation i propose a typology to conceptualize these tendencies i then test for these divergent approaches using between effects regression models of provincial social policy spending although provincial wealth and needs sometimes play a role in allocations for social policy i find that economic development strategy and social instability are associated with distinct approaches to social welfare spending these distinct provincial welfare regimes have implications for the adoption implementation and ultimately effectiveness of social policy in china

the weitzman price corner abstract the standard theoretical approach to comparing price and quantity policies is strictly interior we extend the comparison to account for the possibility of corner outcomes where a polluting industry responds to a tax by abating either completely or not at all we show that when the uncertainty in marginal costs is high the inclusion of corner outcomes confers an extra and unnoticed advantage upon an emissions tax in situations where the standard approach would recommend a quantity policy the possibility of corners can reverse that recommendation

using a policy mix for pollution control a review of economic literature this article provides a review of economic studies analyzing the use of multiple policies a socalled policy mix to cope with single pollution problems to guide and structure the review an analytical framework is developed and applied the framework integrates transaction costs into the analysis of pollution problems and policies to overcome them moreover it understands a pollution externality not only as a market failure but more generally as the failure of private governance structures based on this insight two rationales for using a policy mix are identified first a policy mix may help to correct for multiple reinforcing failures of private governance structures such as pollution externalities and technological spillovers second a policy mix can be employed if the implementation of single first best policies brings about high transaction costs e g when marginal pollution damages are heterogeneous or polluters are unlikely to comply with the policy for each rationale the relevant literature is presented based on the review avenues for future research are identified

losses from effluent taxes and quotas under uncertainty recent theoretical papers by adar and griffin j environ econ manag 3 178 188 1976 fishelson j environ econ manag 3 189 197 1976 and weitzman rev econ studies41 477 491 1974 show that different expected social losses arise from using effluent taxes and quotas as alternative control instruments when marginal control costs are uncertain key assumptions in these analyses are linear marginal cost and benefit functions and an additive error for the marginal cost function to reflect uncertainty in this paper empirically derived nonlinear functions and more realistic multiplicative error terms are used to estimate expected control and damage costs and to identify empirically the mix of control instruments that minimizes expected losses

regulating stock externalities under uncertainty abstract using a simple analytical model incorporating benefits of a stock costs of adjusting the stock and uncertainty in costs we uncover several important principles governing the choice of price based policies e g taxes relative to quantity based policies e g tradable permits for controlling stock externalities as in weitzman rev econom stud 41 4 1974 477 the relative slopes of the marginal benefits and costs of controlling the externality continue to be critical determinants of the efficiency of prices relative to quantities with flatter marginal benefits and steeper marginal costs favoring prices but some important adjustments for dynamic effects are necessary including correlation of cost shocks across time discounting stock decay and the rate of benefits growth applied to the problem of greenhouse gases and climate change we find that a price based instrument generates several times the expected net benefits of a quantity instrument

a non expected utility model and its application in practical auctions this article presents a non expected utility decision model which is nonlinear in the winning probabilities the model not only explicitly expresses bidders attitudes to risk but also addresses t

structural estimation of the affiliated private value auction model we consider the structural estimation of the affiliated private value apv model in first price sealed bid auctions the model allows for bidders individual efficiencies and opportunity costs while permitting dependence among bidders private values through affiliation we establish the nonparametric identification of the apv model characterize its theoretical restrictions and propose a computationally convenient and consistent two step nonparametric estimation procedure for estimating the joint private value distribution from observed bids using simulated bid data we provide a step by step guide on how to implement our procedure and show the good behavior of our estimator in small samples

a note on emissions taxes and incomplete information in contrast with what we perceive is the conventional wisdom about setting a second best emissions tax to control a uniformly mixed pollutant under uncertainty we demonstrate that setting a uniform tax equal to expected marginal damage is not generally efficient under incomplete information about firms abatement costs and damages from pollution we show that efficient taxes will deviate from expected marginal damage if marginal damage is increasing and there is uncertainty about the slopes of the marginal abatement costs of regulated firms moreover tax rates will vary across firms if a regulator can use observable firm level characteristics to gain some information about how the firms marginal abatement costs vary

federalism chinese style the political basis for economic success in china china s remarkable economic success rests on a foundation of political reform providing a considerable degree of credible commitment to markets this reform reflects a special type of institutionalized decentralization that the authors call federalism chinese style this form of decentralization has three consequences first it fosters competition not only in product markets but also among local governments for labor and foreign capital this competition in turn encourages local government experimentation and learning with new forms of enterprises regulation and economic relationships second it provides incentives for local governments to promote local economic prosperity finally it provides a significant amount of protection to local governments and their enterprises from political intrusion by the central government

collusion via signalling in simultaneous ascending bid auctions with heterogeneous objects with and without complementarities collusive equilibria exist in simultaneous ascending bid auctions with multiple objects even with large complementarities in the buyers utility functions the bidders collude by dividing the objects among themselves while keeping the prices low in the most collusive equilibrium the complementarities are never realized the scope for collusion however narrows as the ratio between the number of bidders and the number of objects increases

the european umts auctions abstract in this paper we review and draw some lessons from the umts auctions that have taken place in europe during 2000 and 2001 we address several design issues and in particular focus attention on asymmetries between the bidders and on possibilities for collusion an outlook is provided to several other auctions in which the stakes may not be so high but the design issues perhaps somewhat more complex

rent creation and rent seeking in environmental policy rents and political motives are present in many aspects of public policy this article considers the role of rents rent seeking and the political choice of environmental policy rents are introduced into the political choice of price and quantity regulation under conditions of uncertainty the model shows how political economy aspects affect the choice between price and quantity regulation the contesting of rents associated with different policies affects the regulatory structure and influences the political choice of an environmental policy target the primary conclusion is that the political choice of environmental policy depends on the interaction between the efficiency of rent transfer and the size of rent seeking groups within the economy

a test that discriminates between two models of the dutch first auction non isomorphism abstract previous experiments reject the hypothesis that the dutch and first auctions are isomorphic two alternatives to the standard normal form analysis of the dutch auction are formalized 1 bidders violate bayes rule 2 bidders experience a utility of suspense that is additive with the utility of monetary reward paired comparisons of bidding behavior between groups in which the treatment is to triple the payoff of the baseline group yields no significant effect of this treatment we therefore reject the utility of suspense model

precautionary principle and the optimal timing of environmental policy under ambiguity i consider a problem in environmental policy design in which i focus on stock pollutants in particular i consider stock pollutants that cause severe damage on the environment and do not depreciate at all once they are released into the atmosphere and the ocean the purposes of this paper are 1 to provide an economic foundation for environmental policies based on the precautionary principle and the 1992 rio declaration on environment and development and 2 to show that this optimal timing rule has a reservation property furthermore i analyze the effect of an increase in ambiguity on the optimal timing of adopting some environmental policy and show that an increase in ambiguity decreases the optimal timing of adopting the environmental policy

precautionary principle and robustness for a stock pollutant with multiplicative risk the interest shown by policy makers and economists in the precautionary principle indicates the importance of model uncertainty in global warming policy i show that through robust control policy makers can implement the precautionary principle to regulate a stock pollutant and i analyze its effect on expected steady state pollution taxes stocks and welfare the paper is broadly comprised of a theoretical part and an application to global warming policy i find that 1 an increase in either uncertainty about the model or risk about abatement cost increases expected steady state pollution taxes 2 a robust policy is preferred for any level of model uncertainty and this preference increases for either higher model uncertainty or higher multiplicative risk and 3 the effect on expected steady state pollution taxes and stock of introducing model uncertainty is relatively small for high levels of model uncertainty these results advocate using robust policies for a stock pollutant in the presence of model uncertainty

coupled economic ecological systems with slow and fast dynamics modelling and analysis method the purpose of this article is to contribute to the exploration of non convex dynamics in coupled human nature systems we study welfare issues associated with the management of a human nature complex adaptive system with a threshold and a stochastic driver we exemplify with a specific system where we link changes in the number and diversity of birds to the abundance of a pest insects that causes damages to goods and services valuable to human beings we present a method that simplifies the analysis and helps us discuss different management models that combine direct and indirect controls of the pest this allows us to show that 1 the choice of control method depends in a highly non linear way on biodiversity characteristics and 2 the socially optimal outcome may not be reachable using price instruments hence the price vs quantity debate needs to be revisited using a complex adaptive system lens

independent private value auctions bidder behaviour in first second and third price auctions with varying numbers of bidders the symmetric equilibrium of third price auctions is characterized it makes a number of contrasting predictions relative to firms and second price auctions bids exceed private values the marginal effects on bids of an increase in private values is greater than one increasing numbers of bidders reduces bids and risk aversion requires bidding below the risk neutral nash equilibrium in the experiment bidders do not always satisfy the point predictions of the theory however the game theoretic models correctly anticipate at least directionally the important effects of the price rule changes copyright 1993 by royal economic society

efficiency in auctions with private and common values an experimental study this discussion has resulted in a publication in the american economic review 2002 92 3 625 43 auctions are generally not efficient when the object s expected value depends on private and common value information we report a series of first price auction experiments to measure the degree of inefficiency that occurs with financially motivated bidders while some subjects fall prey to the winner s curse they weigh their private and common value information in roughly the same manner as rational bidders with observed efficiencies close to predicted levels increased competition and reduced uncertainty about the common value positively affect revenues and efficiency the public release of information about the common value also raises efficiency although less than predicted

correlated uncertainty and policy instrument choice abstract for two decades environmental economists have generally maintained that benefit uncertainty is irrelevant for choosing between price and quantity instruments but that cost uncertainty matters with the identity of the efficient instrument depending upon the relative slopes of the marginal benefit and cost functions but in the presence of simultaneous correlated uncertainty such policy instrument recommendations may be inappropriate with plausible values of relevant parameters the conventional identification of a price instrument will be reversed to favor instead a quantity instrument the opposite reversal from the choice of a quantity instrument to a price instrument seems less likely to occur

dynamic environmental policy with strategic firms prices versus quantities abstract environmental regulators often have imperfect information about regulated firms abatement costs in this paper we compare taxes and emissions permits in a dynamic setting in which firms behave strategically the regulator updates policy over time based upon previous aggregate industry performance assuming that firms are not strategic we find that strategic firms facing an emissions tax have an incentive to overabate in order to obtain a lower tax in the future firms that trade emissions permits have a strategic incentive to reveal an artificially high permit price to obtain more permits in the future whether permits or taxes are preferred from a welfare standpoint depends upon how permit prices are determined taxes generate higher welfare when the low cost firm sets the permit price but permits generate higher welfare when the high cost firm sets the permit price

theory experiment and the federal communications commission spectrum auctions abstract the fcc uses the simultaneous multi round auction sma to assign spectrum licenses congress mandated that the sma be compared to an auction that allows combinatorial bids we review the theoretical and experimental evidence relevant to the sma procedures and their inherent defects results from experiments evaluating the sma in comparison to a combinatorial auction designed by charles river and associates show that several of the sma rules hinder efficiency and create a trade off between efficiency and auction length the combinatorial auction outperforms the sma when license values are superadditive but requires more time to complete and is not robust

can decentralized planning really achieve first best in the presence of environmental spillovers abstract it is generally accepted that decentralized policy choice in the presence of interjurisdictional spillovers is inefficient strikingly ogawa and wildasin 2009 find that in a model with heterogenous jurisdictions interjurisdictional capital flows and interjurisdictional environmental damage spillovers decentralized planning outcomes are equivalent to that under a centralized planner we first show the critical importance of two key assumptions no retirement of capital fixed environmental damages per unit of capital in obtaining this result second we consider a more general model allowing for capital retirement and abatement activities and show that the outcome of a decentralized market generally differs from the solution of a centralized planner s social welfare maximizing problem

a cost benefit analysis of slowing climate change there are many conflicting views regarding the true dimensions of the climate change problem often these viewpoints are based on different estimates of key parameters with little indication as to why parameter estimates vary so much and which ones might be the more reliable the prospects for a co ordinated strategy to tackle climate change appear dim little consensus has emerged for example regarding the costs of abating carbon emissions some take the view that considerable improvements in energy efficiency are available at negative cost by setting minimum efficiency standards for vehicles and domestic appliances e g mills et al 1991 others regard the macroeconomic costs of even small reductions in carbon emissions as substantial manne and richels 1993 in the judgement of other researchers a proportion of carbon emissions arise purely as a result of institutional failings either at a regional level in the subsidies paid to fossil fuel energy producers in the erroneous belief that this promotes economic growth shah and larsen 1994 in failure to deal with air pollution glomsrod et al 1992 and vehicle congestion in urban areas hughes 1994 or at a global level in failing to make appropriate transfers to those countries whose forests contain rich biodiversity which we would wish to preserve pearce 1991

energy prices and carbon taxes under uncertainty about global warming this paper extends the strategic interactions between producers of fossil fuels concerned about their profits and a taxing government concerned about the consumers welfare for uncertainty global warming follows an ito process stochasticity requires to differentiate between reversible and irreversible emissions in contrast to the deterministic version the unconstrained reversible case allows for a closed form solution but not the more realistic and constrained case nevertheless interesting analytical properties e g about when to stop emissions implicit conservation due to monopolistic supply are derived and complemented by a numerical example

the economics of controlling stock pollutants an efficient strategy for greenhouse gases abstract optimal control theory is applied to develop an efficient strategy to control stock pollutants such as greenhouse gases and hazardous waste the optimal strategy suggests that at any time the marginal costs of abatement should be equated with the present value of the marginal damage of timely unabated emission the optimal strategy calls for increasingly light abatement over time as the pollutant stock accumulates the optimal policy applied to greenhouse gases suggests moderate abatement efforts at present with the potential for much greater future efforts

state corroding federalism competition among local governments in a decentralized political system is often thought to discipline lazy or corrupt officials improving public good provision and increasing welfare some scholars note possible distortions due to spillovers or a race to the bottom but suggest that central transfers or regulations can remedy these both arguments take for granted a framework of constitutional order in which the central government can collect taxes allocate transfers and enforce regulations autonomously but what if it can t we show that if central enforcement capacity is endogenous interjurisdictional competition may itself erode the center s ability to channel competition in welfare enhancing directions regional governments may compete for capital by shielding firms from central tax collectors bankruptcy courts or regulators the equilibrium result is weaker central law enforcement and usually lower welfare interjurisdictional competition corrodes the state we illustrate with three examples from russia china and the us of cases in which such competition apparently encouraged subnational politicians to help firms evade central taxes or regulations

the effect of bidders asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions abstract bidders asymmetries are widespread in auction markets yet their impact on behavior and ultimately revenue and profits is still not well understood this paper defines a natural benchmark auction environment to which to compare any private values auction with asymmetrically distributed valuations the main result is that the expected revenue from the benchmark auction dominates that from the asymmetric auction both in the first price auction and the second price auction moreover for classes of distributions that lend themselves to a quasi ordering of more or less asymmetric configurations we prove that the expected revenue is lower the more asymmetric bidders are these results formalize the idea that competition is reduced by bidders asymmetries applications to merger analysis joint bidding and investment are discussed

regulation with anticipated learning about environmental damages a regulator anticipates learning about the relation between environmental stocks and economic damages for a model with linear quadratic abatement costs and environmental damages and a general learning process we show analytically that anticipated learning decreases the optimal level of abatement at a given information set if learning causes the regulator to eventually decide that damages are higher than previously thought learning eventually increases abatement learning also favors the use of taxes rather than quotas using a model that is calibrated to describe the problem of global warming we show numerically that anticipated learning causes a significant reduction in first period abatement and a small increase in the preference for taxes rather than quotas even if the regulator s initial priors about environmental damages are much too optimistic he is able to learn quickly enough to keep the expected stock trajectory near the optimal trajectory

empirical testing of auction theory given the state of affairs in auction theory there is at least one model for instance to support any position one would care to take concerning the revenue of sealed bid vs open auctions it should not come as a surprise that a fair amount of empirical work in auctions is underway this paper reports the results of some recently completed research i first discuss papers in which the predictions being tested derive directly from the pure theory of auctions and then papers in which the predictions arise out of an application of auction theory to a related institution

5 information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values a laboratory study in affiliated private value auctions each bidder has perfect information regarding his her own value for the object at auction but higher values of the item for one bidder make higher values for other bidders more likely we report on a series of experiments examining three key implications of these auctions i in a first price auction public information about rivals values increases expected revenue ii an english auction increases expected revenue compared to a first price auction and iii a second price auction is isomorphic to an english auction in examining these issues we compare predictions of some ad hoc bidding models with nash equilibrium predictions in the first price auction experiments nash equilibrium bidding theory organizes the data better than either of two ad hoc bidding models public information about others valuations does increase average revenue but the increase in revenue is smaller and less reliable than predicted under risk neutral nash equilibrium bidding lower average revenue might be attributed to risk aversion while the high variability is attributed to a sizable frequency of individual bidding errors relative to the theory bidding theory precisely organizes english auction outcomes after a brief initial learning period the dominant strategy equilibrium does not organize second price auctions nearly as well as market prices persistently exceed predicted prices the difference between english and second price outcomes is attributed to effects of different information flows inherent in the structure of the two institutions on eliminating bidding errors revenue impacts of these two institutions relative to a first price auction are examined in light of observed bidding patterns

entry and competition effects in first price auctions theory and evidence from procurement auctions motivated by several interesting features of the highway mowing auction data from the texas department of transportation tdot we study three competing procurement auction models with endogenous entry our entry and bidding models provide several interesting implications for the first time we show that even within an independent private value paradigm as the number of potential bidders increases bidders equilibrium bidding behaviour can become less aggressive and the expected procurement cost may rise because the entry effect is always positive and may dominate the negative competition effect we then develop structural models of entry and bidding corresponding to the three models under consideration controlling for unobserved auction heterogeneity and use the recently developed semi parametric bayesian estimation method to analyse the data we select the model that best fits the data and use the corresponding structural estimates to quantify the entry effect and the competition effect with regard to the individual bids and the procurement cost copyright 2009 wiley blackwell

regulation by prices quantities or both a review of instrument choice choosing appropriate policy instruments is an important part of successful regulation once objectives are agreed and suitable targets adopted policy makers can employ command and control regulation and or economic instruments and choose between fixing a price or a quantity this paper examines the relative advantages of price quantity and hybrid instruments according to their efficiency under uncertainty the trade off between credible commitment and flexibility implementation international considerations and political economy various illustrations of the theory are provided with two detailed applications to climate change and transport policy specifically congestion and safety pricing

field experiments on the effects of reserve prices in auctions more magic on the internet i present experimental evidence on the effects of minimum bids in first price sealed bid auctions the auction experiments manipulated the minimum bids in a preexisting market on the internet for collectible trading cards from the game magic the gathering i examine a number of outcomes including the number of participating bidders the probability of sale the levels of individual bids and the auctioneer s revenues the benchmark theoretical model is one with symmetric risk neutral bidders with independent private values the results verify a number of the predictions concerning equilibrium bidding many bidders behave strategically anticipating the effects of the reserve price on others bids

managing partially protected resources under uncertainty it is common wisdom that open access leads to the inefficient use of resources and private ownership of resources improves efficiency however the impact of enclosure and efficient management of some resource pools on other open access resource pools is poorly recognized the problem is common to many congestion prone facilities including roads parks fisheries antibiotics grazing lands and wilderness areas in this paper we analyze the optimality of price and quantity instruments in regulating resource use when there is uncertainty about congestion costs price instruments are found to be preferable to quantity instruments and strictly so when demand is less than perfectly elastic we also explore the effect of market power by resource owners on the relative efficiency of the two instruments

auction theory with private values for many centuries auctions have been a common form of selling procedure although auction methods vary across country and product the two most frequently observed are the open ascending bid or english auction and the sealed bid auction recent theoretical research has led to a theory of equilibrium bidding in these two auctions and a wide range of alternatives as well as a result it has been possible to compare the revenue extracted by the seller under different auction methods and even to characterize the revenue maximizing auction the revenue equivalence theorem see for example william vickrey 1961 roger myerson 1981 and riley and william samuelson 1981 asserts that when each bidder s reservation price for a unit of an indivisible good is an independent draw from the same distribution and bidders are risk neutral the sealed bid auction generates the same expected revenue as the open auction much recent research has involved weakening each of the main hypotheses risk neutrality identically distributed values and independence of values in turn we shall illustrate some of the principal conclusions of this work by considering the properties of open and sealed bid auctions in a model of two bidders whose reservation prices can assume only two values and by comparing these auctions to the optimal or revenuemaximizing auction i revenue equivalence

regulation of stock externalities with correlated abatement costs we study a dynamic regulation model where firms actions contribute to a stock externality the regulator and firms have asymmetric information about serially correlated abatement costs with price based policies such as taxes or if firms trade quotas efficiently the regulator learns about the evolution of both the stock and costs this ability to learn about costs is important in determining the ranking of taxes and quotas and in determining the value of a feedback rather than an open loop policy for a range of parameter values commonly used in global warming studies taxes dominate quotas regardless of whether the regulator uses an open loop or a feedback policy and regardless of the extent of cost correlation

reputation in repeated second price auctions abstract a model in which two bidders take part in a series of second price comon value auctions is examined the question of an optimal auction from an auctioneer s standpoint in a repeated auction setting is partially addressed it is shown that the results from single auction models do not carry over to repeated auctions when one of the bidders is endowed with a reputation for bidding aggressively second price auctions with two bidders are highly susceptible to manipulative behaviour by an aggressive bidder and yield much lower revenues to the auctioneer

pollution control with uncertain stock dynamics when and how to be precautious abstract the precautionary principle pp applied to environmental policy stipulates that in the presence of uncertainty society must take robust preventive action to guard against worst case outcomes it follows that the higher the degree of uncertainty the more aggressive this preventive action should be this normative maxim is explored in the case of a stylized dynamic model of pollution control with uncertain in the knightian sense stock dynamics using the robust control framework of hansen and sargent 12 optimal investment in damage control is found to be increasing in the degree of uncertainty thus confirming the conventional pp wisdom optimal mitigation decisions however need not always comport with the pp in particular when damage control investment is both sufficiently cheap and sensitive to changes in uncertainty damage control investment and mitigation may act as substitutes and a pp with respect to the latter can be unambiguously irrational the theoretical results are applied to a calibrated linear quadratic model of climate change the analysis suggests that a reversal of the pp with respect to mitigation while theoretically possible is very unlikely

pennies from ebay the determinants of price in online auctions this paper presents an exploratory analysis of the determinants of prices in online auctions for collectible united states one cent coins at the ebay web site starting with an initial data set of 20 000 auctions we perform regression analysis on a restricted sample of 461 coins for which we obtained estimates of book value we have three major findings first a seller s feedback ratings reported by other ebay users have a measurable effect on her auction prices negative feedback ratings have a much greater effect than positive feedback ratings do second minimum bids and reserve prices have positive effects on the final auction price in particular minimum bids appear only to have a significant effect when they are binding on a single bidder as predicted by theory third when a seller chooses to have her auction last for a longer period of days this significantly increases the auction price on average

cooperation on climate change mitigation abstract we analyze conditions under which it is possible to achieve efficient mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions with a self enforcing international agreement in which all countries find it in their self interest to abide by the agreement we model the choice of emissions by countries as a dynamic game we use a two part punishment scheme for deviations from an agreement that is renegotiation proof and show when this scheme supports the efficient outcome as a subgame perfect equilibrium using numerical examples we show that an efficient subgame perfect equilibrium exists for a range of reasonable parameter values the existence of such equilibrium may be non monotonic in the discount rate and the ratio of slope of marginal abatement cost and marginal damages

optimal reservation prices in auctions the risk neutral independent private values ipv auction model produces curious results regarding the use of reservation prices no matter how many bidders the seller should announce a fixed reservation price above his true value this is notable since the seller gains by adopting an inefficient institution and puzzling because it conflicts with common practice the authors relax the ipv assumption characterize optimal reservation prices in a richer class of auctions and show that when information is correlated the seller s optimal reservation price converges to his true value often monotonically and rapidly as the number of bidders grows copyright 1996 by royal economic society

a 4 stated dice quantitatively addressing uncertainty effects in climate change we introduce a version of the dice 2007 model designed for uncertainty analysis dice is a wide spread deterministic integrated assessment model of climate change climate change long term economic development and their interactions are highly uncertain the quantitative analysis of optimal mitigation policy under uncertainty requires a recursive dynamic programming implementation of integrated assessment models such implementations are subject to the curse of dimensionality every increase in the dimension of the state space is paid for by a combination of exponentially increasing processor time lower quality of the value or policy function approximations and reductions of the uncertainty domain the paper promotes a state reduced recursive dynamic programming implementation of the dice 2007 model we achieve the reduction by simplifying the carbon cycle and the temperature delay equations we compare our model s performance and that of the dice model to the scientific aogcm models emulated by magicc 6 0 and find that our simplified model performs equally well as the original dice model our implementation solves the infinite planning horizon problem in an arbitrary time step the paper is the first to carefully analyze the quality of the value function approximation using two different types of basis functions and systematically varying the dimension of the basis we present the closed form continuous time approximation to the exogenous discretely and inductively defined processes in dice and we present a numerically more efficient re normalized bellman equation that in addition can disentangle risk attitude from the propensity to smooth consumption over time

tax versus trading and efficient revenue recycling as issues for greenhouse gas abatement abstract we give empirical welfare results for global greenhouse gas emission abatement using the first multi party model to include both tax versus trading under uncertainties and revenue recycling including multiple independent parties greatly reduces the welfare advantage of an emissions tax over emissions permit trading in handling abatement cost uncertainties from that shown by existing single party literature but a previously ignored and much bigger advantage of a tax from better handling uncertainties in business as usual emissions greatly boosts the overall tax versus trading advantage yet the degree to which each mechanism is used to raise and recycle revenue efficiently by lowering distortionary taxes rather than recycle revenue as lump sums or not raise revenue by giving tax thresholds or free permits may in turn dominate any tax versus trading advantage choosing the best greenhouse abatement mechanism should thus consider the issues of tax versus trading and efficient revenue recycling together

business cycles and emission trading with banking abstract we propose an emission cap adjustment policy for an emission trading system ets that allows banking of allowances for later use and faces business cycle uncertainty the forward looking banking decisions cause a commitment problem with respect to regulator s next period allowance supply decision we tackle the commitment problem by focusing on the markov equilibrium of the policy the equilibrium policy has a surprisingly simple structure combining features from both price and quantity instruments the regulator s ability to choose a new cap for each period does not render banking obsolete but on the contrary makes banking an integral part of the equilibrium policy using data from the eu ets to calibrate the model we solve the markov equilibrium policy for the case of carbon emissions regulation and compare markov policies with and without the possibility to bank allowances a counterfactual analysis of the eu ets during the period of 2009 2013 shows that the optimal markov policy would have led to a steadier allowance price level and a stricter emission regulation than what was actually observed in the eu ets

the winner s curse reserve prices and endogenous entry empirical insights from ebay auctions internet auctions have recently gained widespread popularity and are one of the most successful forms of electronic commerce we examine a unique data set of ebay coin auctions to explore the determinants of bidder and seller behavior we begin by documenting a number of empirical regularities in our data set of ebay auctions next we specify and estimate a structural econometric model of bidding on ebay using our parameter estimates from this model we measure the extent of the winner s curse and simulate seller revenue under different reserve prices

revenue equivalence revisited the conventional wisdom in the auction design literature is that first price sealed bid auctions tend to make more money while ascending auctions tend to be more efficient we re examine these issues in an environment in which bidders are allowed to endogenously choose in which auction format to participate our findings are that more bidders choose to enter the ascending auction than the first price sealed bid auction and this extra entry is enough to make up the revenue difference between the formats consequently we find that both formats raise approximately the same amount of revenue they also generate efficiency levels and bidder earnings that are roughly equivalent across mechanisms though the earnings in the ascending might be slightly higher

taxes and quotas for a stock pollutant with multiplicative uncertainty we compare taxes and quotas when firms and the regulator have asymmetric information about the slope of firms abatement costs damages are caused by a stock pollutant we calibrate the model using cost and damage estimates of greenhouse gasses taxes dominate quotas as with additive uncertainty this model with multiplicative uncertainty allows us to compare expected stock levels under the two policies and to investigate the importance of stock size and the magnitude of uncertainty on the policy ranking

awarding telecom licences the recent european experience this paper analyses the procedures used by different european countries for awarding spectrum licences to potential operators of third generation 3g mobile telephone networks we contrast market based methods such as auctions with bureaucratic methods such as beauty contests they have been used for decisions about two major questions 1 how many licences should be awarded and how much spectrum should each licence give access to 2 which companies should receive which licences and how much should they pay for their licences most countries used a bureaucratic process to answer the first question however germany austria and greece were different and constructed auctions in which the number and size of licences were determined by the auction itself as for the second question there was much variation between countries and both auctions and beauty contests were popular methods we have four main findings first the bureaucratic procedure used by most countries to answer the first question led to companies concealing relevant information from the authorities second while firms may have tried to manipulate the procedures used in germany austria and greece to deter entry to their markets they were surprisingly unsuccessful in this third the traditional economic criticisms of beauty contests seem to apply to some but not to all those that were conducted finally the bidding strategies adopted by the telecom companies were often more complex than those predicted by economic theory

designing carbon markets part ii carbon markets in space this paper analyses the design of carbon markets in time i e intertemporally it is part of a twin set of papers that ask starting from first principles what an optimal global carbon market would look like by around 2030 our focus is on firm level cap and trade systems although much of what we say would also apply to government level trading and carbon offset schemes we examine the first principles of temporal design that would help to maximise flexibility and to minimise costs including banking and borrowing and other mechanisms to provide greater carbon price predictability and credibility over time

strategic climate policy with offsets and incomplete abatement carbon taxes versus cap and trade abstract this paper provides a first analysis of a policy bloc of fossil fuel importers which implements an optimal climate policy faces a non policy fringe of other fuel importers and an exporter bloc and purchases offset from the fringe we compare a carbon tax and a cap and trade scheme for the policy bloc in either case accompanied by an efficient offset mechanism for reducing emissions in the fringe the policy bloc is shown to prefer a tax over a cap since only a tax reduces the fuel export price and by more when the policy bloc is larger offsets are also more favorable to the policy bloc under a tax than under a cap the optimal offset price under a carbon tax is below the tax rate while under a cap and free quota trading the offset price must equal the quota price the domestic carbon and offset prices are both higher under a tax than under a cap when the policy bloc is small when the policy bloc is larger the offset price can be higher under a cap fringe countries gain by mitigation in the policy bloc more under a carbon tax since the fuel import price is lower

collusion and the choice of auction auctions are used in many different markets including the leasing of a substantial fraction of the natural resources in the united states the procedures used in the auctions conducted by the federal government have been a continuing source of controversy one of the concerns has been the possibility of collusion among bidders this article shows that cartels are stable if the seller uses open ascending bid oral auctions but not if he uses sealed high bid auctions this may help to explain the frequent use of sealed high bid auctions

electoral competition globalization and subnational education spending in mexico 1999 2004 this article examines the determinants of primary education spending among 29 mexican states from 1999 to 2004 there is wide variation in spending despite expectations of policy convergence due to market forces associated with globalization and in spite of the unique potential of education spending to complement economic strategies in achieving equitable growth this study exploits significant advantages of subnational analysis in exploring political and economic variables that have been useful in explaining spending levels cross nationally consistent with these studies this article shows that greater electoral competition leads to increased spending in contrast to other work however this study finds that exposure to the global economy has distinctly mixed effects on education spending these findings thus further highlight the positive returns to higher quality democracy while underscoring the need to examine the effects of many different aspects of globalization representing a wide variety of strategies employed by governments in engaging the international economy

dynamic taxes and quotas with learning we compare dynamic taxes and quotas when a regulator and non strategic firm have asymmetric information the regulator learns by using either a tax or a quota that can be slack with a tax the information asymmetry is resolved in one period optimal learning using a quota is less transparent but we show that learning never takes place gradually in the first period the regulator either acts myopically or he tries to improve his information but he never experiments in subsequent periods we use this result to assess the informational advantage of taxes compared to quotas under asymmetric information

on environmental taxation under uncertain environmental damage this paper addresses optimal taxation when therelationship between the consumption of a dirty good and the resulting environmentaldamage is uncertain and treated as a randomvariable by policy makers the main purpose isto analyze how increased uncertainty measuredas a mean preserving increase in the spread ofthis random variable affects the optimalcommodity tax on the dirty consumption good incase the only task of government is to correctthe environmental externality and if thepreferences are characterized by nondecreasingabsolute risk aversion we find that thecommodity tax on the dirty consumption goodincreases in response to additionaluncertainty if on the other hand thegovernment provides a public good and uses alump sum tax in addition to the commodity tax it is possible that the commodity tax decreasesas a response to additional uncertainty evenif the preferences are characterized bynondecreasing absolute risk aversion a similarresult emerges although for different reasons if the lump sum tax is replaced by a laborincome tax

how not to run auctions the european 3g telecom auctions abstract there were enormous differences in the revenues from the european third generation 3g or umts mobile phone license auctions from 20 euros per capita in switzerland to 650 euros per capita in the uk though the values of the licenses sold were similar poor auction designs in some countries facilitated collusion between firms and failed to attract entrants the sequencing of the auctions was also crucial we discuss the auctions in the uk netherlands germany italy austria switzerland belgium greece and denmark

the purchasing power parity debate originally propounded by the 16th century scholars of the university of salamanca the concept of purchasing power parity ppp was revived in the interwar period in the context of the debate concerning the appropriate level at which to re establish international exchange rate parities broadly accepted as a long run equilibrium condition in the post war period it first was advocated as a short run equilibrium by many international economists in the first few years following the breakdown of the bretton woods system in the early 1970s and then increasingly came under attack on both theoretical and empirical grounds from the late 1970s to the mid 1990s accordingly over the last three decades a large literature has built up that examines how much the data deviated from theory and the fruits of this research have provided a deeper understanding of how well ppp applies in both the short run and the long run since the mid 1990s larger datasets and nonlinear econometric methods in particular have improved estimation as deviations narrowed between real exchange rates and ppp so did the gap narrow between theory and data and some degree of confidence in long run ppp began to emerge again in this respect the idea of long run ppp now enjoys perhaps its strongest support in more than 30 years a distinct reversion in economic thought

alternative approaches to cost containment in a cap and trade system we compare several emissions reduction instruments including quantity policies with banking and borrowing price policies and hybrid policies safety valve and price collar using a dynamic model with stochastic baseline emissions the instruments are compared under the design goal of obtaining the same expected cumulative emissions across all options based on simulation analysis with the model parameterized to values relevant to proposed us climate mitigation policies we find that restrictions on banking and borrowing including the provision of interest rates on the borrowings can severely limit the value of the policy depending on the regulator chosen allowance issuance path although emissions taxes generally provide the lowest expected abatement costs a cap and trade system combined with either a safety valve or a price collar can be designed to provide expected abatement costs near those of a tax but with lower emissions variance than a tax consistently a price collar is more cost effective than a safety valve for a given expected cumulative emissions outcome because it encourages inexpensive abatement when abatement costs decline

effects of seller supplied prices on buyers product evaluations reference prices in an internet auction context a field experiment investigated the impact of two external reference points under the seller s control on the final price of an auction when an item s seller specified a high external reference price a reserve price the final bid was greater than when the seller specified a low external reference price a minimum bid when the seller provided both high and low reference prices the reserve influenced the final bid more the low reference price led to a lower outcome compared to when the seller did not communicate any reference price the number of bidders influenced outcomes in the absence of seller supplied reference prices

managing permit markets to stabilize prices the political economy of environmental policy favors the use of quantity based instruments over price based instruments e g tradable permits over green taxes at least in the united states with cost uncertainty however there are clear efficiency advantages to prices in cases where the marginal damages of emissions are relatively flat such as with greenhouse gases the question arises therefore of whether one can design flexible quantity policies that mimic the behavior of price policies namely stable permit prices and abatement costs we explore a number of quantity plus policies that replicate the behavior of a price policy through rules that adjust the effective permit cap for unexpectedly low or high costs they do so without necessitating any monetary exchanges between the government and the regulated firms which can be a significant political barrier to the use of price instruments

the role of stocks and shocks concepts in the debate over price versus quantity recent literature showed that the choice between a price or quantity control depends in part on the dynamic structure of cost uncertainty temporary shocks to abatement cost favors the use of a price control while permanent shocks favor a quantity control unfortunately the importance of this assumption to the optimal choice has not yet received wide attention among economists we analyze the regulatory sproblem in an alternative setting and reproduce these results our contribution is the simplicity of the model and the accessibility of the results which reinforce the critical role played by the assumed structure of uncertainty

the damage costs of climate change toward more comprehensive calculations it is argued that estimating the damage costs of a certain benchmark climate change is not sufficient what is needed are cost functions and confidence intervals although these are contained in the integrated models and their technical manuals this paper brings them into the open in order to stimulate discussion after briefly reviewing the benchmark climate change damage costs region specific cost functions are presented which distinguish tangible from intangible losses and the losses due to a changing climate from those due to a changed climate furthermore cost functions are assumed to be quadratic as an approximation of the unknown but presumably convex functions results from the damage module of the integrated climate economy model fund are presented next uncertainties are incorporated and expected damages are calculated it is shown that because of convex loss functions and right skewed uncertain ties the risk premium is substantial calling for more action than analysis based on best guess estimates the final section explores some needs for further scientific research

optimal climate change mitigation under long term growth uncertainty stochastic integrated assessment and analytic findings abstract economic growth over the coming centuries is one of the major determinants of today s optimal greenhouse gas mitigation policy at the same time long run economic growth is highly uncertain this paper is the first to evaluate optimal mitigation policy under long term growth uncertainty in a stochastic integrated assessment model of climate change the sign and magnitude of the impact depend on preference characteristics and on how damages scale with production we explain the different mechanisms driving optimal mitigation under certain growth under uncertain technological progress in the discounted expected utility model and under uncertain technological progress in a more comprehensive asset pricing model based on epstein zin weil preferences in the latter framework the dominating uncertainty impact has the opposite sign of a deterministic growth impact the sign switch results from an endogenous pessimism weighting all of our numeric scenarios use a dice based assessment model and find a higher optimal carbon tax than the deterministic dice base case calibration

bounds on revenue distributions in counterfactual auctions with reserve prices measuring auction revenues under counterfactual reserve prices or formats requires knowledge of distributions of bidders values and private signals this poses a challenge when bids are observed from rst price common value auctions i bound counterfactual revenue distributions without imposing parametric restrictions on the model structure using data from u s municipal bond auctions i nd rst price and second price auctions under optimal reserve prices lead to little improvement in revenues over existing rst price formats the number of bidders has a more signi cant impact on revenues in optimal auctions i also nd invoking an incorrect assumption of private values in counterfactual analyses results in small errors in predicting revenues from optimal sp auctions

sealed bid versus open auctions the evidence data from u s forest service timber auctions are used to test vickrey s original proposition that sealed bid and open auctions yield equal revenue models for the high bid in an auction are specified and estimated using three different procedures ordinary least squares two stage least squares and maximum likelihood the second two procedures include a second equation which accounts for the forest service s auction choice and therefore control for selection bias these two procedures which unlike ordinary least squares yield consistent estimators imply a statistically and economically insignificant difference in high bids between sealed bid and open auctions

asymmetric information and collusive behavior in auction markets we present a theoretical and empirical analysis of the behavior of a bidder s cartel in a multiperiod auction market in which the purchaser is relatively uninformed our work establishes a tentative connection between the economics of information and collusion by concentrating on the cartel s informational monopoly and its ability to both increase profits and mask its presence by passing misinformation to the purchaser in the models we develop costs are assumed to be stochastic and projects awarded in adjacent periods to be substitutes for one another as a result the purchaser will have incentive to intertemporally reallocate his demand buying more or less of the current period s project depending upon whether the current market price is lower or higher than the price which he expects to prevail in the future a purchaser who needs to form such price expectations yet is ignorant about production costs and market structure will be particularly attracted to the auction mechanism because the data contained in past auctions bids can apparently be incorporated into an explicit structural model of expected future price in fact such a purchaser may hold auctions frequently merely to acquire information such pleasant appearances are deceiving once the auction s bidders become aware of the informational use to which their bids are being put they will have incentive to form a cartel thereby extracting a premium for their knowledge by misinforming the purchaser and skewing his intertemporal decision making to their advantage in some respects the mechanics of our model resemble the case of a multiproduct monopolist selling goods that are substitutes for one another what is unique to our analysis is the dependence of one of the goods future demand on price expectations which are an information resource we are suggesting that information that is distributed asymmetrically among market participants is susceptible to the inefficiencies of collusion in some ways the implications of our work are considerably stronger than this because our cartel never reveals its true knowledge and thus our market may be more inefficient than more standard monopolies in which the good is always traded albeit at noncompetitive prices furthermore by explicitly modeling the purchaser s rational structural approach to price forecasting we point out that complete rational expectations models may be more susceptible to exploitation by informational cartels than simpler forecasting techniques we have tested the implications of our model in a case study of north carolina highway construction cartels the highway construction industry is an auction market characterized by government procurement agencies who are uninformed relative to suppliers and comes complete with a substantial record of known collusion in recent years thus it seems an ideal hunting ground for verification of our theoretical findings our paper proceeds as follows in section i we model a multiperiod competitive auction market and describe a bayesian mechanism through which the purchaser uses past data to improve the accuracy of his price expectations section ii establishes theoretical results for the bidders cartel which has incentive to form in this market we describe massachusetts institute of technology cambridge ma 02109 and university of arizona tucson az 85721 respectively nold was formerly of rhodes associates and is now deceased we thank richard schmalensee and the participants of the economic and legal organization workshop at the university of chicago for valuable suggestions part of this research was supported under research grant 81 ij cr0062 from the national institute of justice

collusive practices in repeated english auctions experimental evidence on bidding rings the repeated meeting of buyers at english auctions where multiple units are sold is a common occurrence the art auctions at sotheby s christie s and other prestigious auction houses are attended by a regular group of institutional buyers more mundanely the same taxicab buyers meet at vehicle auctions for used police cars jon p nelson 1995 commission order buyers attend the same livestock and agricultural commodity auctions these buyers may be agents for multiple meat processors u s department of agriculture grain inspection packers and stockyards administration 2001 the 1946 american tobacco antitrust case american tobacco co et al v united states 328 u s 781 1946 is a well known account of how buyers of tobacco operated to hold down the price of auctioned leaf tobacco at various sites buyers for the big three cigarette manufacturers had developed facilitating practices that helped them purchase raw tobacco at relatively low prices these buyers voluntarily restricted themselves to attend the same auctions buyers were aware of the amount of leaf and the tobacco grades available at auction sites they had instructions from the cigarette makers on the highest bid prices they could pay and communication among these buyers seemed evident from a coordinated practice of buying low grade tobacco that was not used by the makers in the sale of livestock cattle producers have claimed that packer buyers act to hold down cattle prices at the auction site there are a few large processors who give their agents buy orders these orders along with further communication between the processor and agent instruct the agent on the number of cattle to purchase during a given week and provide a schedule of prices they can pay for varying types of cattle some agents represent more than one processor or packer and therefore have multiple buy orders agents repeatedly meet each other at regional cattle auctions they may not be the only buyers but they are the largest purchasers of slaughter cattle brought to market and at most auction sites have substantial monopsony power this paper documents the impacts of several practices that may facilitate low sale prices when multiple units are sold at repeated english auctions laboratory english auction markets are created the number of symmetric buyers attending the auction is either six or two with total demand in these two environments held constant the six buyer market is intended to represent a relatively competitive environment while auctions with two buyers represent rivalry with substantial monopsony power held by each agent we use these two market environments to study how selected treatments or facilitating influences affect the behavior of buying agents the six buyer market generally is viewed as a control for comparison to the dominant twobuyer environment but very collusive behavior may be observed in the six buyer auctions depending upon market practices phillips department of economics and finance university of wyoming p o box 3985 laramie wy 82071 e mail owenphil uwyo edu menkhaus department of agricultural and applied economics university of wyoming p o box 3354 laramie wy 82071 e mail menkhaus uwyo edu coatney u s department of agriculture grain inspection packers and stockyards administration competition branch aurora co 80011 e mail kalyn t coatney usda gov this work has been supported by the u s department of agriculture under grant numbers usdagipsnc5418 and usdag00354009126 the findings and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the funding agency 1 these are regional auctions houses where slaughter cattle primarily cull cows and fed steers and heifers and feeder cattle are sold cull cows are animals taken out of a herd and slaughtered because of age inability to produce calves or reduced milk production concerns regarding slaughter cow possessors sharing common purchasing agents have been raised in assessment of the cattle and hog industries calendar year 2000 u s department of agriculture grain inspection packers and stockyards administration june 2001

low revenue equilibria in simultaneous ascending bid auctions low revenue equilibria allow participants in an auction to obtain goods at prices lower than would prevail in a competitive market these outcomes are generated as perfect equilibria of ascending bid multiunit auctions we show that these equilibria are possible under mild conditions conditions that are likely to prevail in many situations where auction formats have recently been adopted we argue that these equilibria could explain the low revenues of some recent auctions and discuss potential remedies to eliminate low revenue equilibria

prices vs quantities technology choice uncertainty and welfare technological improvements have proven essential in mitigating environmental problems such as climate change depletion of the ozone layer and acid rain while it is well known that price and quantity based regulatory instruments provide different investment levels the effects on the choice between different technologies have received scant attention this paper expands on the prices versus quantities literature by investigating firms technology choice in the face of demand and supply side uncertainty i show that the regulator can not design tradable emissions permits and an emissions tax such that the two regimes are equivalent even in terms of expected values moreover a tax encourages the most flexible abatement technology if and only if stochastic costs and the equilibrium permit price have sufficiently strong positive covariance compared with the variance in consumer demand for the good produced finally the firms technology choices are socially optimal under tradable emissions permits but not under an emissions tax