the structure of unemployment we test for a unit root in postwar unemployment rates for sixteen oecd countries when a one time structural break is incorporated the unit root hypothesis can be rejected for most of the countries and the measured persistence of unemployment falls dramatically we then test for multiple structural changes and find evidence of one or two breaks for those countries for which the unit root hypothesis could be rejected almost all of the breaks are positive reflecting the sustained rise in european unemployment the major exception is the united states where long term unemployment rose in the 1970s and fell in the 1980s

prices and the winner s curse we usually assume that increases in supply allocation by rationing and exclusion of potential buyers reduce prices but all these activities raise the expected price in an important set of cases when common value assets are sold furthermore when we make the assumptions needed to rule out these anomalies for symmetric buyers small asymmetries among the buyers necessarily cause the anomalies to reappear our results help explain rationing in initial public offerings and outcomes of spectrum auctions we illustrate our results in the wallet game and in another new game we introduce the maximum game

efficiency and information aggregation in auctions the tension between allocative efficiency and information aggregation is explored in the context of an auction k identical objects of unknown quality are auctioned off to n bidders whose tastes affect their valuation of an object of given quality bidders receive a signal about the quality of the objects the k highest bidders get an object and pay a price equal to the k first highest bid we find conditions under which in the limit objects are allocated efficiently to those with the highest tastes and price converges in probability to the value of an object to the marginal taste type

almost common values auctions revisited in almost common value auctions one bidder the advantaged bidder has a valuation advantage over all other regular bidders it is well known that in second price auctions with two bidders even a slight private value advantage can have an explosive effect on auction outcomes as the advantaged bidder wins all the time and auction revenue is substantially lower than in a pure second price common value auction we explore the robustness of these results to the addition of more regular bidders in second price auctions and the extent to which these results generalize to ascending price english auctions in an effort to provide insight into when and why one ought to be concerned about such slight asymmetries

optimal selling strategies when buyers may have hard information abstract consider a revenue maximizing seller who can sell an object to one of n potential buyers each buyer either has hard information about his valuation i e evidence that cannot be forged or is ignorant the optimal mechanism is characterized it turns out that more ignorance can increase the expected total surplus even when the buyers are ex ante symmetric the object may be sold to a buyer who does not have the largest willingness to pay nevertheless an additional buyer increases the expected total surplus in the symmetric case whereas more competition can be harmful if there are ex ante asymmetries

optimal auction with resale this paper investigates the design of seller optimal auctions when winning bidders can attempt to resell the good in that case the optimal allocation characterized by myerson 1981 cannot be achieved without resale i find a sufficient and necessary condition for sincere bidding given the possibility of resale in two bidder cases i prove that the myerson allocation can be achieved under standard conditions supplemented with two assumptions with three or more bidders achieving the myerson allocation is more difficult i prove that it can be implemented in special cases in those cases the myerson allocation is generated through a sequence of resale auctions each optimally chosen by a reseller

first price auctions with resale abstract we present a simple model of first price auction with two bidders whose valuations are not identically distributed and where resale is possible between the bidders and given an explicit expression for the equilibrium strategies

recent developments of solar energy in india perspectives strategies and future goals abstract power is the most paramount ingredient of infrastructure for growth in economics and welfare of a nation development for sustaining the growth of the indian economy in the existing infrastructure is crucial the power sector of india is one of the largest expanded power sectors in the world due to the continuous increment in electricity demand day by day indian power sector is interfacing some challenges to maintain the balance between the power generation and demand with suffering from supply constraints and shortages in power for maintaining the ratio of generation and demand of power moving from conventional sources to non conventional sources is not only an option it is a necessity the importance of using solar as an energy source in india s perspectives in not only to increase power generation but also to expand energy reliability with considering the environmental social independent and financial beneficial properties this paper analyzes the recent scenario strategies availability future potential policies and development of solar energy in emerging indian power sector

wage aspirations and unemployment persistence abstract we use panel data to examine the empirical determinants of the reservation wage in particular the influence of previous wages and consider what this implies for the evolution of the natural rate of unemployment we find that previous wages have a significant but relatively small effect on reservation wages an elasticity between 0 15 and 0 47 we also find considerable differences across genders with previous wages being more important for men and market wages being more important for women overall our results suggest that the reservation wage will adjust quite quickly to shocks

second price common value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty the literature has demonstrated that second price common value auctions are sensitive to the presence of asymmetries among bidders in a two bidder model bikhchandani 1988 reputation in repeated second price auctions j econ theory 46 97 119 has shown that if it is common knowledge that one bidder has a disadvantage compared to her opponent that bidder almost surely never wins the auction employing a similar two bidder model this paper shows that this result does not carry over when one allows for two sided uncertainty in such case in every equilibrium the disadvantaged type bidder needs to win the auction with strictly positive probability we then solve for the equilibria in two cases one with two types and another with a continuum of types and we show that they converge to the symmetric equilibria of the corresponding symmetric auctions we thus reestablish a lost linkage in the analysis of common value and almost common value auctions

optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator we consider a multi period auction with a seller who has a single object for sale a large population of potential buyers and a mediator of the trade the seller and every buyer have independent private values of the object the mediator designs an auction mechanism which maximizes her revenue subject to certain constraints for the traders in each period the seller auctions the object to a set of buyers drawn at random from the population the seller can re auction the object infinitely many times if it is not sold in previous interactions we characterize the class of mediator optimal auction mechanisms one of such mechanisms is a vickrey auction with a reserve price where the seller pays to the mediator a fixed percentage from the closing price

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

standard auctions with financially constrained bidders we develop a methodology for analyzing the revenue and efficiency performance of auctions when buyers have private information about their willingness to pay and ability to pay we then apply the framework to scenarios involving standard auction mechanisms in the simplest case where bidders face absolute spending limits first price auctions yield higher expected revenue and social surplus than second price auctions the revenue dominance of first price auctions over secondprice auctions carries over to the case where bidders have access to credit these rankings are explained by differences in the extent to which financial constraints bind in different auction formats

optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective abstract the game theoretic perspective in auction bidding has provided a powerful normative framework for the analysis of auctions and it has generated an impressive volume of research contributions tracing this research we review key recent advances which have greatly expanded our understanding of the operation of auctions and produced a more accurate analysis of mechanism design and optimal bidding we follow various experimental studies which have shown that the predictive power of auction theory remains in many cases limited for this reason we concentrate on research themes which enhance the applicability of auction theory leading to more realistic descriptions of bidding behaviors we identify important innovations which expand the environment of auction bidding and carry us beyond rational decision making we conclude providing directions of future research and discussing their implications

the returns to mobility and job search by gender using data from the national longitudinal survey of youth the authors estimate the returns to job search mobility and the interaction of search and mobility for young men and women they find st

on the value of competition in procurement auctions it is commonly stated that ascending price or second price auctions allocate goods e ciently to those who value them most this implies that the more bidders at the auction stage the more e cient the nal allocation we review this statement when bidders have private information both on a private element and a common element while the nal allocation need not be ex post e cient we show that when bidders are ex ante symmetric more competition at the auction yields higher e ciency on expectation when bidders are ex ante asymmetric in particular with respect to the information on the common element the statement need no longer be true

a learning approach to auctions we analyze a repeated first price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the first round it is proved that if every player is using either a belief based learning scheme with bounded recall or a generalized fictitious play learning scheme then for sufficiently large time the players bids are in equilibrium in the one shot auction in which the types are commonly known

are disadvanteged bidders doomed in ascending auctions a bidder is said to be advantaged if she has a higher expected valuation of the auction prize than her competitor when the prize has a common value component a bidder competing in an ascending auction against an advantaged competitor bids especially cautiously and hence the advantaged bidder wins most of the time however contrary to what is often argued a disadvantaged bidder still wins with positive probability even if his competitor s advantage is very large and even if the disadvantaged bidder has the lowest actual valuation ex post therefore the disadvantaged bidder has an incentive to participate in the auction and the presence of a bidder with a small advantage does not have a dramatic effect on the seller s revenue

the effect of bidders asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions abstract bidders asymmetries are widespread in auction markets yet their impact on behavior and ultimately revenue and profits is still not well understood this paper defines a natural benchmark auction environment to which to compare any private values auction with asymmetrically distributed valuations the main result is that the expected revenue from the benchmark auction dominates that from the asymmetric auction both in the first price auction and the second price auction moreover for classes of distributions that lend themselves to a quasi ordering of more or less asymmetric configurations we prove that the expected revenue is lower the more asymmetric bidders are these results formalize the idea that competition is reduced by bidders asymmetries applications to merger analysis joint bidding and investment are discussed

partial pooling at the reserve price in auctions with resale opportunities abstract two features common to many auctions are the use of reserve prices and the existence of secondary markets for the goods being sold even in simple symmetric settings the combination of these features can preclude existence of an equilibrium in symmetric separating bidding strategies with a reserve price sufficiently far below the maximum endogenous valuation a symmetric equilibrium still exists but with some types pooling at the reserve the optimal reserve price depends not only on the joint distribution of bidders information before and after the auction but also on how surplus is divided in the secondary market journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 c7 l1 d82

measuring the gender disparities in unemployment dynamics during the recession evidence from portugal abstractthis article researches gender differences in the incidence and persistence of unemployment during the debt crisis and recession in portugal through estimating a dynamic random effects prob

an experimental investigation of the explosive effect in almost common value auctions abstract with only two bidders a slight private value advantage in a common value auction is predicted to have an explosive effect on the allocation and revenue of the auction when using a second price and or english clock mechanism this paper uses the wallet game in an english clock mechanism with two players to test these predictions the results show that the effect is proportional not explosive confirming the results of past experiments a behavioral model with two types of players naive and sophisticated is developed and tested against the experimental data in the model naive players use a rule of thumb bidding function while the sophisticated players are fully rational and when forming their strategy choosing the best response correctly account for the probability that a rival is naive or sophisticated we use cluster analysis to classify the players in the symmetric auctions as naive or sophisticated and a strict win lose criteria to classify players in the asymmetric auctions we find that those players classified as sophisticated are more aggressive in responding to high signals or advantaged status than their naive counterparts but do not lower their bids relative to the naive players when receiving low signals or when regular

unemployment rate dynamics and persistent unemployment under rational expectations this paper develops a model of unemployment rate dynamics that provides an explanation of persistent cyclical unemployment that does not involve persistent expectational errors or other nonoptimizing behavior our results are based on the interaction of search dynamics and inventory adjustments an important element in these dynamics appears to be heterogeneity in the labor force which can be characterized as consisting of a relatively small group of high turnover individuals who comprise the bulk of normal unemployment and a larger group of low turnover individuals who dominate movements in cyclical unemployment our empirical results provide support for this theory as we demonstrate that the appropriately measured probability of becoming employed during a recovery falls relative to normal because of the unusually high proportion of low turnover individuals who have lost permanent jobs as aresult recovery is much slower than is indicated by normal relationships although each individual is searching optimally this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

piecewise procurement of a large scale project this paper studies the optimal piecewise procurement of a large scale project in the unique markov perfect equilibrium mpe of the dynamic procurement game it is found that 1 unlike the static setting the procurer s optimal strategy depends on the number of suppliers and more importantly it is nonmonotonic as one more supplier participates in the procurement auction the procurer softens competition in the initial stages by including more cost btypesq while increasing competition in the mature stages 2 this in turn implies that existing suppliers might favor participation of additional suppliers 3 absent scheduling and or resource constraints the procurer prefers to procure the project as one piece if the suppliers technology exhibits constant or increasing returns and no additional suppliers are enticed to bid and 4 the optimal dynamic mechanism can be easily implemented via a sequence of dominant strategy auctions of the vickrey type d 2004 elsevier b v all rights reserved

non cooperative bargaining theory an introduction the paper provides an informal introduction to some of the main themes of the recent literature on non cooperative or sequential bargaining models it focuses in particular on the relationship between the new approach and the traditional axiomatic approach exemplified by nash bargaining theory it illustrates the new insights offered by the non cooperative approach by reference to a detailed analysis of the manner in which the presence of an outside option available to one of the parties will affect the negotiated outcome finally the difficulties which arise in extending this analysis to two person bargaining with incomplete information and to n person bargaining are discussed this is a revised version of the fourth review of economic studies lecture presented in april 1985 at the joint meeting of the association of university teachers of economics and the royal economic society held in oxford the choice of lecturer is made by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay and the paper is refereed in the usual way this paper aims to provide an informal and elementary introduction to an approach to bargaining which has received a great deal of attention over the past few years the approach involves writing down some particular sequence of moves offers and replies to be made over time in the course of negotiations and then looking for a non cooperative equilibrium in the game thus specified in practice a perfect equilibrium or in games of incomplete information a sequential equilibrium while the approach appears at first sight to be very different in spirit from the traditional axiomatic approach in which a bargaining solution is specified by appealing to a number of general requirements which are deemed appropriate on the basis of some a priori considerations the two approaches are in fact complementary while the

on the failure of the linkage principle in multi unit auctions it is shown that the linkage principle milgrom and weber 1982 does not extend to the multi unit auction setting an analysis of the equilibium bidding strategies is carried out for the general two agent two unit vickrey auction in order to provide economic insight into the nature of the failure in addition an explicit counterexample is provided both authors acknowledge support from the binational science foudation grant 9500023 1 reny also acknowledges support from the national science foundation grant sbr 970932 and the university of pittsburgh s faculty of arts and sciences

rational expectations information acquisition and competitive bidding most rational expectations market equilibrium models are not models of price formation and naive mechanisms leading to such equilibria can be severely manipulable in this paper a bidding model is developed which has the market like features that bidders act as price takers and that prices convey information higher equilibrium prices convey more favorable information about the quality of the objects being sold than do lower prices bidders can benefit from trading only if they have a transactions motive or if they have access to inside information apart from exceptional cases prices are not fully revealing a two stage model is developed in which bidders may acquire information at a cost before bidding and for which the equilibrium price is fully revealing resolving a well known paradox

speculation and demand reduction in english clock auctions with resale many auctions are followed by a resale market which occurs when the winner of the auction resells the item won to one of the participants from the original auction the existence of such transactions may initially appear counter intuitive however this paper will show that active inter bidder resale results from payoff maximizing decisions in the auction that take into account the incentives of a resale opportunity specifically i examine how the existence of an inter bidder resale opportunity impacts bidder behavior in an english clock auction and to what extent altering the bargaining power of the final buyer and reseller in the resale market determines the strategies followed in the initial auction in an attempt to understand the existence of these inter bidder transactions theoretical and behavioral analysis is used to develop hypotheses of speculation bidding above value and demand reduction bidding below value which are directly tested in a controlled experimental setting while value bidding is a dominant strategy in a standard english clock auction without resale when resale is allowed this theoretical claim is weaker demand reduction is observed when the bargaining power is shifted to the final buyer in resale and when the bargaining power is shifted toward the reseller speculation is observed the revenue achieved in the initial auction depends on the behavior observed in the auction regardless of bargaining power revenue is shown to decrease below what would have been earned in an english auction without resale due to demand reduction when the reseller has the bargaining power and speculation is observed this loss in revenue is somewhat mitigated by increased speculation

bidding in a possibly common value auction abstract we analyze a second price auction with two bidders in which only one of the bidders is informed as to whether the object is valued commonly we show that any equilibrium strategy of the bidder who is uninformed must be part of an equilibrium when both bidders instead know that the auction is not common value regardless of the way in which the values are different we derive sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence

reputation in repeated second price auctions abstract a model in which two bidders take part in a series of second price comon value auctions is examined the question of an optimal auction from an auctioneer s standpoint in a repeated auction setting is partially addressed it is shown that the results from single auction models do not carry over to repeated auctions when one of the bidders is endowed with a reputation for bidding aggressively second price auctions with two bidders are highly susceptible to manipulative behaviour by an aggressive bidder and yield much lower revenues to the auctioneer

economic guideline about financial utilization of flat plate solar collectors fpscs for the consumer segment in the city of eskisehir abstract solar energy systems yield energy savings relative to conventional systems by considering the ecological balance although it still has barriers the most commonly used system of this type is fpsc in turkey which produces hot water by absorbing solar energy through fpscs this study is a kind of guidance about utilization of fpscs in eskisehir that concentrates on a consumer segment the aim of the study is displaying the necessity of transition to renewable energy systems in the local free markets where the place of domestic resources the data is supplied from an original hand collected survey and turkish governmental institutions such as the central bank of the republic of turkey cbrt and the turkish statistical institute turkstat that is used for a possible scenario to show how these systems can become an extensive investment and financed in the city the most significant finding is purchasing a fpsc device which is a rational and profitable investment decision for households in the economic conditions of eskisehir this type of energy system has certain costs including installation credit and annual maintenance costs however after they have been set up fpsc systems yield many ecological advantages that more than offset the associated costs such as fuel savings over the long term and exemptions from tax payments that apply to other types of fuels these advantages benefit both the environment on a global scale and the region in which the system is constructed therefore the global and local economy can improve its structure by utilizing fpscs

equilibria in open common value auctions abstract a sufficient condition for uniqueness of nash equilibrium in second price common value auctions is identified we establish that there exists a continuum of equilibria in irrevocable exit common value auctions for the case of two bidders we provide plausible sufficient conditions under which the expected seller revenue is maximized at the symmetric equilibrium an example in which the auctioneer s revenue at the symmetric equilibrium in a second price auction is strictly greater than the revenue at many asymmetric equilibria in the corresponding irrevocable exit auction is provided

multi object auctions with resale theory and experiment abstract we study multi object auctions in the presence of post auction trade opportunities among bidders who have either single or multi object demand we focus on two formats vickrey auctions where package bidding is possible and simultaneous second price auctions we show that under complementarities the vickrey format has an equilibrium where the objects are allocated efficiently at the auction stage whether resale markets are present or not the simultaneous second price on the other hand leads to inefficiency with or without resale possibility our experimental findings show that the possibility of resale in second price auctions decreases the efficiency rate at the auction stage compared to the no resale case however after resale the efficiency rate in second price is as high as that of vickrey auction without resale outcomes in the experiment preventing resale neither benefits nor hurts auction revenues in a second price format

on the profitability of reducing competition in all pay auctions with risk averse bidders abstract in an all pay auction with risk averse bidders the seller s revenue is decreasing in the number of competitors if either the bidders are very risk averse or the distribution for the valuations attaches probability almost one to a single value

asymmetric auctions with resale we study first and second price auctions with resale in a model with indepen dent private values with asymmetric bidders the resulting inefficiencies create a motive for post auction trade which in our model takes place via monopoly pricing the winner makes a take it or leave it offer to the loser we show a a first price auction with resale has a unique monotonic equilibrium and b with resale the expected revenue from a first price auction exceeds that from a second price auction the inclusion of resale possibilities thus permits a gen eral revenue ranking of the two auctions that is not available when these are excluded jel d44

the persistence of unemployment in the usa and europe in terms of fractionally arima models this article examines the persistence of unemployment in the usa and four european countries by means of fractionally integrated arma arfima models in doing so a type of flexibility in modelling low frequency dynamics not achieved by non fractionally arima models can be provided the results indicate that the unemployment series are much more persistent in some countries such as the uk and france than in others including germany or the usa

evidence on the dynamics of unemployment by gender we present empirical evidence regarding unemployment dynamics for women and men in eight oecd countries unit root tests are used to examine the unemployment dynamics of women and men failure to reject the unit root hypothesis is consistent with unemployment hysteresis rejection of the unit root hypothesis indicates that unemployment dynamics are best explained by the natural rate of unemployment or the structuralist view we find evidence of gender differences in unemployment dynamics in canada germany and the us but not in other countries while there are some differences in the extent of persistence across gender and across countries the degree of persistence for both female and male unemployment rates is fairly low in all countries our results therefore contrast with substantial empirical evidence of high levels of unemployment persistence in european countries

auctions with resale markets an application to u s forest service timber sales when bidders anticipate an opportunity for resale trade the value of winning an auction is determined in part by the option values of buying and selling in the secondary market one implication is that a bidder s willingness to pay at an auction increases with the expected level of competition between resale buyers empirical evidence from auctions of timber contracts supports this prediction and rejects standard models that ignore resale the estimated effect is smaller after policy changes expected to diminish the prevalence of resale additional evidence supports the predicted presence of a common value element introduced by the resale opportunity

current status and analysis of renewable promotional policies in indian restructured power sector a review restructuring has changed the traditional mission and mandates of power utilities in complex ways and had large impacts on environmental social and political conditions for any particular country at the same time new regulatory approaches are being found for reducing environmental impacts in restructured power sectors india has a vast supply of renewable energy resources and it has one of the largest programs in the world for deploying renewable energy based products and systems so this paper attempts to review the various policies and measures undertaken by indian government for promotion of renewable energy the aim of this paper is also to review the current policy mechanisms especially investment or generation based price driven and capacity driven mechanisms ranging from investment incentives for the development of renewable energy projects feed in tariffs production tax incentives tradable green certificates and their effects upon the prospects of encouraging as well as expanding the development of renewable energy in indian restructured power sector this will make renewable more attractive in the indian future electricity market

resale in second price auctions with costly participation abstract we study sealed bid second price auctions with costly participation and resale each bidder chooses to participate in the auction if her valuation is higher than her optimally chosen participation cutoff if resale is not allowed and the bidder valuations are drawn from a strictly convex distribution function the symmetric equilibrium where all bidders use the same cutoff is less efficient than a class of two cutoff asymmetric equilibria existence of these equilibria without resale is sufficient for existence of similarly constructed two cutoff equilibria with resale moreover the equilibria with resale are more asymmetric and under a sufficient condition more efficient than the corresponding equilibria without resale

introduction of renewable energy certificate in the indian scenario abstract generation deficit in india is in the range of 9 and the scenario is expected to get grimmer in the context of high growth rate of the country with peak power shortage as high as 15 2 source annual report fy08 mop the nation needs to harness all forms of generation including renewables which currently has a meager share of 8 of the total generation in the country at present shooting price of crude oil reaching up to 135 may 2008 per barrel along with increasing awareness and concerns about environment the stage seems to be set for an increased mix of renewable energy re into the overall energy requirement in the country keeping the concern for environment and energy security for the country in mind government of india has been putting emphasis on promotion of renewable energy sources central and state government policies have always been instrumental in the propagation of capacity additions in renewable energy power one of the main aims of these policies has been on increasing the private sector participation in this sector in the pre reform period the state governments took policy decisions regarding financial incentives buy back tariff and other measures targeting investment in renewable energy however the state electricity regulatory commissions sercs are now responsible for many of these tasks sercs have come up with a host of initiatives inline with their functions laid down in the electricity act 2003 to increase the share of renewable energy inside their respective states despite the efforts of sercs large potential of renewable energy generation remains untapped there is lack of clarity on how to promote renewable energy generation inside states which are not having significant renewable energy generation potential this paper explores the way in which sercs can introduce measures to further promote renewable energy generation inside the country we discuss in detail the framework to promote renewable energy through a framework which puts into place renewable purchase obligation rpo mechanism the framework includes setting of rpo targets provisions for a surcharge levied upon non compliance of rpo targets and also a mechanism to meet rpo through trading of certificates

bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions an experimental study abstract we review an asymmetric auction experiment based on plum int j game theory 20 1992 393 private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions one of which first order stochastically dominates the other we test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric auctions in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more aggressively than the strong and then test bidders preference for first vs second price auctions

bidding to lose auctions with resale a losing bidder can still purchase the prize from the winner after the auction we show why a strong bidder may prefer to drop out of the auction before the price has reached her valuation and acquire the prize in the aftermarket a strong bidder may be in a better bargaining position in the aftermarket if her rival won at a relatively low price so it can be common knowledge that in equilibrium a weak bidder will win the auction and even without uncertainty about relative valuations resale will take place the possibility of reselling to a strong bidder attracts weak bidders to participate in the auction and raises the seller s revenue

hybrid auctions revisited abstract we examine hybrid auctions with affiliated private values and risk averse bidders and show that the optimal hybrid auction trades off the benefit of information extraction in the ascending bid phase and the cost of reduced competition in the sealed bid phase

how not to run auctions the european 3g telecom auctions abstract there were enormous differences in the revenues from the european third generation 3g or umts mobile phone license auctions from 20 euros per capita in switzerland to 650 euros per capita in the uk though the values of the licenses sold were similar poor auction designs in some countries facilitated collusion between firms and failed to attract entrants the sequencing of the auctions was also crucial we discuss the auctions in the uk netherlands germany italy austria switzerland belgium greece and denmark

speculation in standard auctions with resale in standard auctions resale creates a role for a speculator a bidder who is commonly known to have no use value for the good on sale we study this issue in environments with symmetric independent private value bidders for second price and english auctions the efficient value bidding equilibrium coexists with a continuum of inefficient equilibria in which the speculator wins the auction and makes positive profits first price and dutch auctions have an essentially unique equilibrium and whether or not the speculator wins the auction and distorts the final allocation depends on the number of bidders the value distribution and the discount factor speculators do not make profits in first price or dutch auctions

modeling competitive bidding a critical essay in analyzing bidding modeling matters this paper is a critical analysis of the models available to aid competitive bidding decision making bidding strategy and auction design in real transactions after an introductory overview this paper describes the contexts in which auctions arise reviews the mainstream theory of single isolated auctions and discusses the important work involved in enrichment of this theory in doing so it indicates results that have been obtained and the sort of changes in analytical approach that are needed to tackle other critical enrichments the paper summarizes briefly what is known about the direct use of models by bidders and auction designers a general theme of this paper is that enriched models are needed to bring bidding theory closer to direct applicability in decision making

auctions versus negotiations which is the more profitable way to sell a company an auction with no reserve price or an optimally structured negotiation with one less bidder we show under reasonable assumptions that the auction is always preferable when bidders signals are independent for affiliated signals the result holds under certain restrictions on the seller s choice of negotiating mechanism the result suggests that the value of negotiating skill is small relative to the value of additional competition the paper also shows how the analogies between monopoly theory and auction theory can help derive new results in auction theory jel d44 g34 there are close analogies between standard price theory and the theory of auctions in an absolute english auction in which the price rises continuously until only one bidder remains and the seller is required to accept the final bid the sale price equals the lowest competitive price at which supply equals demand in the theory of optimal auctions the seller is treated as a monopolist who can choose any

experimental comparisons of auctions under single and multi unit demand i introduction the study of multiple unit auctions is important because of their widespread use and the high value of goods sold examples include auctions of u s treasury debt cut flowers wine foreign exchange and other financial and monetary instruments moreover since auctions are often proposed by economists as a method of sale for other goods as in mcmillan 1994 the use of auctions can be expected to increase in the future many different auction rules are used to sell these diverse commodities and auction rule changes are often suggested usually with the intention of increasing revenue or improving the allocations and thus there is a considerable and increasing number of known auction formats evaluating new or comparing different auction mechanisms using field tests can be very costly and risky however experimental methods can and have been used by economists to study the behavioral characteristics of different auction procedures kagel 1995 provides a recent comprehensive survey most experimental studies consider the behavior of auctions when there is a single unit to be sold a few studies such as cox et al 1984 1985 and mccabe et al 1990 1991 study multiple unit auctions in environments in which each bidder demands at most one object from a set of identical objects being sold the studies of smith 1967 belovicz 1979 miller and plott 1985 and burns 1985 consider multi unit demand environments these are environments in which bidders have demand for multiple identical units and are permitted to purchase multiple units of the commodity sold the extension to multi unit demand is important since the presence of multi unit demand is a characteristic of many auctions in the field including all of the examples above in this study we consider the behavior of two types of multi unit auction under both single unit and multi unit demand we construct a laboratory environment which we use to study an english clock ec which is a special type of english auction and a sealed bid auction with lowest accepted bid pricing sb in the sb each bidder pays a per unit price equal to the lowest accepted bid the ec was chosen because it is known to provide highly efficient allocations in auctions of single unit goods and therefore is likely to be suggested for many field applications the sb was chosen because of its widespread use which makes its outcomes a useful basis of comparison for the outcomes of the english clock auction 1 however we do not attempt to represent a particular field situation here instead since our interest is in understanding the basic properties of the auctions we chose an experimental design that enables us to make simple comparisons across treatments and with previous and possibly future studies the design enables us to perform simple testing of game theoretic models in some of the treatments in our view the difference between single and multi unit demand is critical as we discuss in section ii many of the results of auction theory that are valid in single unit demand environments no longer apply in multi unit demand environments suggesting that the observed behavior of auctions might also differ between the two environments therefore we isolate the effects of multi unit demand by conducting single unit demand experiments under identical market demand and supply conditions as the multi unit demand experiments these and other aspects of the experimental design are described in detail in section iii the results and a discussion are given in sections iv and v respectively ii institutions theory and previous studies the english clock auction this variant of the english auction was modeled by milgrom and weber 1982 and studied by mccabe et al 1990 1991 in our version the auction begins with all bidders publicly and simultaneously announcing their initial quantity demanded at price zero if there is excess demand the price is increased by a small increment and the bidders then announce new quantities demanded

high bids and broke winners abstract this paper analyzes auctions where budget constrained bidders have options to declare bankruptcy it predicts a bidding equilibrium that changes discontinuously in a borrowing rate available to bidders when the borrowing rate is above a threshold high budget bidders win and the likelihood of bankruptcy is low when the borrowing rate is below the threshold the winner is the most budget constrained bidder and is most likely to declare bankruptcy this result explains the high bids and broke winners anomaly in the c block fcc spectrum auction based on its equilibrium analysis the paper proves that a seller can profit from offering to finance the highest bidder at a below market interest rate even with default risk journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 d45 d82 g33 l96

market structure and incomplete information price formation in a real world repeated english auction abstract this paper examines the effect of buyer size on price formation in an english auction of used state police cars while open auctions generally favor competitive pricing bikhchandani 1988 develops a model of a second price common value auction in which bidders can use strategic behavior based on repeated sales to develop an aggressive reputation and as a result pay lower prices in equilibrium the paper tests this hypothesis by examining sales of 340 used automobiles sold at 13 public auctions conditional on the volume of purchases made by the three largest buyers at the auctions the empirical results show that the number of buyers plays a stronger role in price formation than does buyer size

on some myths about sequenced common value auctions abstract equilibria are constructed for classes of game models of sequenced second price auctions having identical common valued objects in some of these the equilibrium price falls on average and in others the seller loses on average by committing to announce publicly something that he knows both of these possibilities are surprises journal of economic literature classification number d44

structural econometric analysis of descending auctions since vickrey s 1961 paper the theory of auctions has considerably expanded particularly over the last decade see e g milgrom 1985 1986 and mcafee and mcmillan 1987 for recent surveys in contrast except for some experimental work only a few empirical studies have attempted to validate the new theoretical auction models using field auction data two approaches have emerged the first has concentrated upon testing some implications of the theory of auctions using reduced form econometric models with observed bids as the explained variables explanatory variables might then be the reservation price the number of potential bidders when observed and some characteristics of the auctioned object examples are hansen 1985 1986 hendricks et al 1987 and hendricks and porter 1988 the second approach which is structural has a long tradition in econometrics starting from the work of the cowles commission this approach is followed in this paper the basic idea is simple and relies upon

repeated common value auctions with asymmetric bidders abstract this paper considers a first price common value auction with one sided private information among bidders an object is rented each period to the highest bidder without revealing the bids made in previous periods the paper extends single crossing arguments used in static games to show the existence of equilibrium in this repeated auction the model predicts that bidders bid more aggressively in a repeated auction than in a static auction because a higher bid increases the amount of information learned through bidding the aggressive bidding behavior also implies that the per period revenue of the repeated auction is higher than that of the one period counterpart this bidding behavior leads to a theoretical explanation for the winner s curse in repeated auctions in addition the model yields predictions like an increasing wage schedule over time and the institution of a signing bonus that are consistent with labor market observations