public sector pay and corruption measuring bribery from micro data abstract this study provides the first systematic measure of bribery using micro level data on reported earnings household spending and asset holdings we use the compensating differential framework and the estimated sectoral gap in reported earnings and expenditures to identify the size of unobserved unofficial compensation i e bribes of public sector employees in the case of ukraine we find that public sector employees receive 24 32 less wages than their private sector counterparts the gap is particularly large at the top of the wage distribution at the same time workers in both sectors have essentially identical level of consumer expenditures and asset holdings that unambiguously indicate the presence of non reported compensation in the public sector using the conditions of labor market equilibrium we develop an aggregate measure of bribery and find that the lower bound estimate of the extent of bribery in ukraine is between 460 million and 580 million u s dollars 0 9 1 2 of ukraine s gdp in 2003

public private sector wage differentials in canada evidence from the 1991 and 1982 surveys of consumer finance this paper extends the work of gunderson and shapiro and stelcner that considered wage differentials between public and private sector workers in canada using the 1971 and 1981 censuses respectively here the survey of consumer finances from 1991 and 1982 is used which allows for better distinction between public and private sector workers the estimated public sector premium is decomposed into an endowments component and a residual term estimates are corrected for sample selection bias with respect to the choice between full time and part time work in the two sectors tests for bias caused by self selection into the private and public sectors revealed no such bias as a benchmark the overall wage premium calculated for 1981 compares very well with that of shapiro and stelcner during the 1980s no significant increases in the public sector wage premium for males are found but the female premium increased significantly this may be due to changes in pay equity legislation in the public sector relative

of networks and markets the rise and rise of a south indian town the example of tiruppur s cotton knitwear industry abstract tiruppur town is the center of a tightly clustered range of activities related to the cotton knitwear industry the successful and dramatic expansion which has taken place over the last 15 years has meant many more jobs limited technological improvement improved quality in yarn and fabric and an increasingly diverse range of garments for the larger firms in the industry access to export markets has been the driving force to improving their competitiveness wages remain low and working conditions poor however perhaps partly because capital concentration has not on the whole been accompanied by centralized vertically integrated production nevertheless clustering and dense interfirm networks provide advantages for firms of all sizes since process specialization is spatially divisible

industrial restructuring facilitating organizational change at the firm level in 1991 the dominican republic committed itself to an industrial strategy involving a transition from mass production and the widespread introduction of organizational change in individual firms in relationships between firms and in the linkages between firms and the institutional infrastructure supporting industrial activity the general statement of policy was not however reflected at the productive level consequently steps were taken to promote the diffusion of organizational change through training courses and a pilot plant program this paper describes the techniques utilized during the first phase of this policy intervention given the dominican republic s per capita income less than 700 and its low level of human resource development it is argued that this form of policy intervention is of widespread relevance to other less developed countries

long run competition in capacity short run competition in price and the cournot model in this article we investigate the nature of equilibrium in markets in which firms choose the scale of operation before they make pricing decisions we analyze a duopoly model in which firms choose their capacities before engaging in bertrand like price competition we demonstrate that the cournot outcome is unlikely to emerge in such markets and that the equilibrium tends to be more competitive than the cournot model would predict in addition our results indicate a tendency toward asymmetric firm sizes and price dispersion that results from the mixed strategies firms use in equilibrium

networks trust and innovation in tanzania s manufacturing sector abstract the social dimensions of innovation are examined for a group of manufacturers in mwanza tanzania social networks of businesspeople in mwanza are found to support innovation in manufacturing firms trust in these relations is especially important as it improves the quality of information exchanges and encourages the development of strong intracommunity ties and weak intercommunity relations a typology of manufacturers demonstrates how different social strategies relate to innovation the findings suggest that openness to social relations enhances innovation but that weak formal institutions discourage manufacturers from extending their social relations beyond core networks

sunk costs and strategic commitment a proposed three stage equilibrium dixit s i980 paper in this journal the role of investment in entry deterrence has attracted considerable interest from economists concerned with constructing a modern theory of strategic behaviour towards entry in fact the paper has spawned quite an industry of commitment models in which the equilibrium payoffs in some final period game can be influenced by strategic commitments made by the players in an earlier period for similar models with important insights into strategic entry deterrence see eaton and lipsey i980 i98i schmalensee i98i the purpose of this note is to argue that when the instrument of stragetic commitment takes the form of sunk costs which both entrant and incumbent have to bear as it does in dixit s paper and in many other examples a three stage model rather than the two stage model presented by dixit is required although the proposed equilibrium differs from dixit s its qualitative features are the same it may or may not be profitable to deter entry and if it is the first mover may still prefer to play an accommodation strategy and allow entry to take place following dixit we restrict our attention to the asymmetric case in which one firm the incumbent makes the first move the two stage game involves the first mover sinking part of its costs in advance so that in the second stage equilibrium it will have a current cost advantage over the entrant which must incur the full cost of producing any desired output level the second period cost asymmetry ensures the incumbent a lar ger share of the post entry market which may be sufficient to deter entry altogether the problem with the two stage game lies in the nature of sunk costs sunk costs by definition are committed before the production period takes place if they were expended as a flow simultaneously with production they would not be sunk the installation of capacity is the natural example employed by dixit and well illustrates the point if installed capacity is a sunk cost which it must be for the incumbent to acquire any strategic advantage at all then the entrant s installed capacity is equally sunk and must also be committed before the production period takes place given this observation the post entry final period equilibrium should not be modelled as if the entrant were simultaneously incurring both variable and sunk costs but the incumbent only incurs variable costs this implies too great an asymmetry in favour of the incumbent the final period equilibrium should involve both firms incurring only variable

bootstrapping statistical inferences of decomposition methods for gender earnings differentials applying the standard bootstrapping technique with corrections for heteroskedasticity for a sample of the 1997 urban household survey in china the present article attempts to test 1 whether the commonly used decomposition methods for gender earnings differentials give significantly different results and 2 whether the explained component is significantly different from the unexplained component which is commonly referred to as discrimination within each decomposition method based on a national data set the empirical results indicated some significant differences in both tests the implication of the results is that the proposed bootstrapping technique can be regarded as a guideline on applying which approach to decompose gender earnings differentials among different methods without losing important information and on evaluating the relative importance of the decomposition components for any chosen method

the transition to flexible specialisation in the us film industry external economice the division of labour and the crossing of industrial divides there is increasing evidence that mass production methods are losing their dominance in the advanced industrial economies and that various forms of flexible production organization are on the rise the transition from mass production organization to flexible specialization is analyzed in detail through a case study of the film industry where it is shown that a system of production once based on product standardization high levels of vertical integration and stable oligopolistic market structures has after a period of vertical disintegration given way to a production system based on a deep division of labor between firms and high levels of flexibility in both product design and output levels the transition may be the result of increasing external economies of scale stemming from the development of the industry s social division of labor copyright 1989 by oxford university press

excess capacity and collusion in this paper the authors analyze a restricted class of equilibria in the dynamic model of j p benoit and v krishna 1987 in which firms choose their scale of operation before engaging in a repeated game of price competition benoit and krishna established that all firms carry excess capacity in all collusive equilibria as the authors are interested in the relationship between excess capacity and collusion in price they examine equilibria in which firms tacitly collude in price but not in investment decisions copyright 1990 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the distribution of the male female earnings differential 1970 1990 the authors examine the male female earnings differential between 1970 and 1990 their objective is to provide consistent estimates that can be compared and interpreted over time and to assess the sensitivity of their results to alternative specifications the authors find that women made modest gains over the period standard decomposition techniques reveal that gender differences in observable characteristics do not explain much of the earnings differential most of the improvement in women s relative earnings has come by a decline in the unexplained component the authors also find that the differential varies systematically across age and education groups and across high and low income women coauthors are dwayne benjamin andree desaulniers and mary grant

changes in the male female wage gap 1976 85 this study uses detailed information on work experience tenure and on the job training collected in the 1976 and 1985 questionnaires of the panel study of income dynamics to account for changes in wage differentials between white men and white women over these nine years decompositions of changes in the wage gap are used to illustrate the contribution of individual factors between 1976 and 1985 the wage gap between white men and women narrowed by approximately 4 percent this study finds that nearly 50 percent of this reduction was due to average changes in job tenure and other work history variables over this period

an inquiry into the development process of village industries the case of a knitwear cluster in northern vietnam abstract while village industries are known to have high potential to grow their growth process has seldom been analysed this study explores the development process of a rapidly growing village based garment cluster in northern vietnam we found that both the human capital and social capital measured by the kinship ties with overseas vietnamese traders of the proprietors facilitated their innovative entry into new export markets furthermore general human capital acquired by schooling and specific human capital acquired by management experience are found to have contributed to the adoption of a vertically integrated production system which in turn contributed to enhanced enterprise performance

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games ii applications in part i of this study we established two existence theorems for mixed strategy equilibrium in games with discontinuous payoff functions see theorems 4 4 and 5 5 in dasgupta and maskin 1986 hereafter d m 1986 in this second part we use the second of these two theorems to prove the existence of mixed strategy equilibrium in some wellknown discontinuous economic games that fail to have pure strategy equilibria the models we analyse are the bertrand edgeworth example of price setting duopolists with capacity constraints see section 2 2 price competition among firms producing differentiated products hotelling 1929 and d aspremont gabszewicz and thisse 1979 see section 2 3 spatial competition eaton and lipsey 1975 and shaked 1975 see section 3 and models of market dependent information rothschild and stiglitz 1976 and wilson 1977 section 4 the paper concludes section 5 with a classification of these models

would nonprofit workers accept to earn less evidence from france this article focuses on wage differentials between french nonprofit for profit and public sectors considering the public sector allows testing more extensively the labour donation theory preston 1989 the findings support this theory because nonprofit workers accept to earn significantly less than they would earn in the for profit and public sectors they also suggest differences in the motivations of workers in these sectors nonprofit workers are attracted to their work for reasons transcending material compensation

the triple c approach to local industrial policy abstract in both developed and developing countries there is mounting evidence that clustering and networking help small and medium sized manufacturers to raise their competitiveness the role of public policy in this process is less clear the european experience suggests that local and regional government can play an important role equally if not more interesting experiences can be found in developing countries their analysis constitutes the core of this paper the lessons can be summarized as the triple c which stands for customer oriented collective and cumulative

price competition in a capacity constrained duopoly abstract this paper characterizes the set of nash equilibria in a model of price setting duopoly in which each firm has limited capacity and demand is continuous and decreasing in general there is a unique equilibrium so that comparative static exercises are meaningful the properties of the equilibrium conform with a number of stylized facts the equilibrium prices are lower the smaller is demand relative to capacity when demand is in an intermediate range the firms use mixed strategies they randomly hold sales if capacities are chosen simultaneously before prices the set of equilibrium capacities coincides with the set of cournot quantities

bertrand edgeworth duopoly with proportional residual demand a complete characterization is given for the prices charged by bertrand edgeworth duopolists with capacity constraints in general for the game in which firms strategy spaces consist of price offers nash equilibrium involves nondegenerate mixed strategi es equilibria never extend below the highest competitive price with tw o firms the bertrand edgeworth model displays a bias for the highest of several market clearing prices moreover these strategies never stop short of the lowest monopoly price if firms are of unequal siz e the larger firm assigns positive probability to a monopoly price possibly even to several monopoly prices copyright 1993 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

union wage differentials in the public and private sectors a simultaneous equations specification the paper attempts to integrate new approaches to estimating union wage effects with the analysis of public private sector wage differentials estimates of the union differential in both public and private sectors allowing for the endogeneity of union status are presented the hypothesis that the recently measured rents to public sector employment primarily reflect the recent increase in unionization in that sector is examined and receives considerable empirical support there was evidence of positive selection into the union sector especially for private sector workers union status appears to be strongly influenced by the expected wage gain from joining the union sector

collective efficiency growth path for small scale industry this study is concerned with the growth of small local industry in developing countries and explores one particular route for understanding and fostering such growth it focuses on the clustering of firms and the competitive advantage which they derive from local external economies and joint action captured in the concept of collective efficiency following a conceptual discussion the article explores the economic and institutional conditions which enhance or hinder collective efficiency this includes a case study which suggests that responding to opportunity and crisis requires shifting from mere reliance on external economies to joint action and from ascribed to earned trust

the impact of unionization on male female earnings differences in canada the impact of unionization on male female earnings differences in canada is analyzed using data spanning 1981 to 1988 a period in which the male female unionization gap narrowed considerably gender differences in union density union wages and nonunion wages are decomposed into characteristics related and discriminatory components we find that the drop in the gender unionization gap prevented an increase of 7 percent in the overall wage differential between men and women also male female earnings differences in the nonunion sector make a substantially larger contribution to the gender earnings gap than do those in the union sector

trust and inter firm relations in developing and transition economies the role of trust in facilitating economic growth has been highlighted in previous contributions to this journal in order to take this debate forward this article argues 1 that more attention needs to be given to the relationship between sanctions and trust and 2 that it is worth distinguishing between the minimal trust for making markets effective and the extended trust required for deeper kinds of inter firm co operation to work the article goes on to ask why minimal trust is lacking and so hard to construct in the republics of the former soviet union it then examines how extended trust grows or can be made to grow in industrial supply chains and clusters in developing countries

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games i theory the article presents information about the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games in this paper and its sequel presents study the existence of nash equilibrium in games where agents payoff functions are discontinuous the enquiry is motivated by a number of recent studies that have uncovered serious existence problems in seemingly innocuous economic games in the sequel to this paper authors have explained the utility function in the economic games referred to earlier are neither continuous nor quasi concave however they demonstrate that the payoff functions in mildly modified versions of these constructs exhibit two weaker forms of continuity which together with the requirement of quasi concavity suffice for the existence of an equilibrium from this one may conclude that at least in the modified versions of these models discontinuities in the payoff functions are not the real source of the problem rather it is the failure of the payoff functions to the quasi concave which is responsible for the non existence of equilibrium these observations bear on the existence of nash equilibrium in pure strategies

small firms and their helpers lessons on demand abstract small enterprise se programs are currently the rage because of their potential to create employment they are typically supply driven providing standardized training technical assistance credit but most cases of se based growth have involved demand driven support provided by large customers firms traders government agencies state enterprises this article argues that such inherently customized support constitutes a better way to deliver services to ses and is more likely to stimulate sustained se growth with respect to se favoring procurement by government in particular we show that this can be done without running up against the problems of similar attempts in the past and in a way that also reduces the costs of running government we draw for illustration from a successful case of se favoring procurement in the brazilian state of ceara

selective spatial closure and local economic development what do we learn from the argentine local currency systems summary this paper discusses local currency systems as an instrument of selective spatial closure to mitigate impacts of externally induced changes and to promote endogenous local economic development drawing on data collected in argentina it was found that local currency systems provided relatively protected economic spaces thus enabling poor households and especially women to launch micro enterprises and diversify income sources they also supported existing enterprises by offering an emergency market outlet and when combined with other measures by building local trading and production networks following recent theory on local economic development the argentine case represents an example of local economic regeneration

the role of large producers in industrial districts a case study of high technology systems houses in southern california scott a j 1992 the role of large producers in industrial districts a case study of high technology systems houses in southern california reg studies 26 265 275 a generalized concept of industrial districts is proposed the concept hinges on the intertwined notions of the social division of labour external economies and locational agglomeration it is argued that large production units often play an important part in sustaining the growth and development of industrial districts and that such districts need not be composed solely of small production units the argument is illustrated by means of a case study of the role of large systems houses within the high technology industrial districts of southern california it is concluded that neither large establishments nor the internationalization of the economy necessarily threaten the continued viability of industrial districts it is also suggested that industrial districts represent a very widely developed phenomenon in time and space scott a j

a modified switching regression model for earnings differentials between the public and private using dutch 1986 data the wage differentials between public sector and private sector workers are investigated by employing a variation of the switching regression model this model imposes fewer identification restrictions on the parameters of the model than the standard switching regression model the estimation results show that some categories of public sector workers earn substantially less than private sector workers copyright 1993 by mit press

holding idle capacity to deter entry in this journal dixit i980 carefully analysed the extent to which an established firm facing a prospective entrant might make an investment in capacity beyond that which is optimal for its pre entry output in his model both the established firm and prospective entrants understand that a quantity setting nash equilibrium would be established in any post entry game dixit showed that spence i977 had studied an imperfect equilibrium that is an equilibrium that depended upon a threat that was not credible to obtain his result that firms might hold excess capacity to deter entry in a perfect equilibrium a firm would not wish to install capacity that would be left idle if entry did not occur dixit s conclusion however depends on his assumption that each firm s marginal revenue is always decreasing in the other s output this is quite a restrictive assumption for example it is never satisfied in the relevant range for economists second favourite demand curve constant elasticity demand the basic point is unchanged if the firms anticipate price competition with differentiated products rather thanquantity competition in any post entry game under quite plausible conditions rational firms facing rational potential entrants may install capacity that will certainly be left idle we are thus able to rehabilitate spence s original proposition in a perfect equilibrium setting

capacity output and sequential entry two crucial assumptions frequently made in industrial organization are that an established firm deters entry either by a constant high output the sylos postulate or by high excess capacity the excess capacity hypothesis these assumptions may be an accurate description of the observed conduct of firms in some industries however when the rules of the post entry game are clearly specified the optimal output and investment strategies of an established firm may depart considerably from these behavioral assumptions because of this possible inconsistency with rational behavior any conclusions about the formation of industry based upon either assumption are highly suspect what is more these assumptions avoid the main issue of whether entry deterrence is worthwhile at all this paper presents a dynamic model of entry in which established firms pursue a cournot nash alternatively stackelberg strategy toward a potential entrant the entrant behaves in cournot nash fashion and chooses output on the basis of expected postentry profits at the equilibrium of the post entry game within this framework a constant output entry deterring strategy would involve maintenance of an entry deterring output level before and after entry is threatened an excess capacity entry deterring strategy would involve holding excess capacity at an entry deterring level and increasing output to that level after entry is threatened special conditions are presented under which the sylos postulate or the excess capacity hypothesis will accurately describe optimal entry deterring strategies in addition special conditions are examined under which the established firm maintains a constant output or holds pre entry excess capacity when large scale entry does in fact take place the analysis shows that in general established firm reactions to entry are quite different from these special cases the sylos postulate see joseph bain paolo sylos labini franco modigliani 1958 asserts not only that potential entrants expect established firms to maintain their output constant as entry occurs but that established firms keep output constant at a level that deters entry whether or not it is profitable to do so hailed as a welcome major breakthrough on the oligopoly front modigliani 1958 the sylos postulate underlies many papers in the large theoretical and empirical literature on limit pricing yet the sylos postulate ignores both the strategic interaction between firms and the dynamic aspects of entry 2 unless the established firm s monopoly output exceeds the entrydeterring level the established firm with a general cost function able to choose an entry deterring output level will instead always desire a lower output level before entry for the special case where capacity is an upper bound on output and the established firm is a stackelberg leader in the post entry game

government wage differentials a sample selection approach this paper uses the econometrics of sample selection to estimate the net wage differential between workers in the public and private sectors of the united states the results indicate workers self select by systematically locating in the sector which offers them the higher expected wage as a consequence previous research based on the assumption of random allocation between sectors is subject to serious specification bias the present estimation indicates government workers are slightly underpaid taking into account their observed characteristics and the selection process

an analysis of public and private sector wages allowing for endogenous choices of both government and union status a general selection model is estimated in which workers select across four labor markets private nonunion private union public nonunion and public union evidence is found of positive selection bias in the private nonunion sector and of negative selection bias in the public union sector union wage differentials in the public and private sectors as well as public private wage differentials are then calculated two different types of wage differentials are contrasted we discuss when it is appropriate to use each type of differential

capacity precommitment as an entry barrier for price setting firms abstract for a bertrand edgeworth framework this paper considers whether investmentin capacity may serve as a barrier to entry when firms are identical except for the first mover precommitment possibilities that the incumbent enjoys subgame perfect nash equilibria are examined for a three stage non cooperative game in which the incumbent sets a capacity level the potential entrant chooses its capacity and then firms set prices using mixed strategies for some parameter values entry is blockaded positive profits for the entrant are precluded for other parameter values the incumbent may increase its capacity to prevent entry and maintain non negative profits

bertrand edgeworth oligopoly in large markets the relation between perfectly competitive and monopolistically competitive equilibria is analysed for a bertrand edgeworth model of a single market in which capacity constrained firms choose prices as strategies the market always has a nash equilibrium in pure or mixed strategies as the number of firms increases the corresponding equilibria converge in distribution to a perfectly competitive price this result provides a justification for perfect competition that is based on an explicit account of price formation however monopoly prices persist with a positive but vanishing probability regularity or well defined inverse demand functions are not required

microenterprise clusters in rural indonesia industrial seedbed and policy target abstract this paper shows the importance of clustering at early stages of development when clustering is still largely a rural phenomenon and may serve as a survival strategy it argues first that dismally poor but clustered rural microenterprises may have a seedbed function for industrial development and second that clustering policy has brought about some success in indonesia data on more than 4 000 rural clusters provide insights in the various forces behind cluster gestation prosperity and dissolution it is argued that social capital is crucial for the achievement of transaction cost reductions which attract traders to the clustered enterprises ubiquitous search and reach advantages in marketing trigger clustering processes but these advantages diminish with overcrowding further external economies arise from specialization and technical indivisibilities but vary significantly by subsector consequently only specific clusters might benefit from public intervention in technology and organization

knowledge diffusion and modernization of rural industrial clusters a paper manufacturing village in northern vietnam summary this article tests the role of social learning in the modernization of a rural nonfarm industry using data from a paper manufacturing village that was transformed from a traditional handicraft industry into a modern industrial cluster knowledge diffusion through kinship networks is shown to have played a significant role in the dissemination of mechanized production by helping the followers to overcome subjective risk during the initial investment stage the financial support through kinship networks also had a demonstrably positive impact on the diffusion of the technology which removed financial constraints on the initial fixed investments

decentralised production organisation and institutional transformation large and small firm networks in chile and nicaragua this paper analyses changing production organisation and new governance that contribute to productive upgrading in developing economies it discusses research conducted in chile and nicaragua focused on agroindustrial clusters recent analyses of small firms in developing countries highlight the important presence of clusters and local factors in building global competitiveness this paper argues for an approach that focuses on the institutional arrangements to coordinate decentralised production networks it emphasises the role of learning by monitoring as the key to successful adjustment in the face of liberalisation and globalisation it identifies the institutional reshaping of relations between firms and between the state and the economy copyright 2003 oxford university press

from ascribed to earned trust in exporting clusters abstract this paper is concerned with the role of trust in export manufacturing it asks how trust has developed in two industrial clusters which are located in developing countries and export most of their output to north america and europe the main conclusion is that trust was based initially on socio cultural ties between clustered firms and later on conscious investments in inter firm relationships