government as a discriminating monopolist in the financial market the case of china abstract we show that the many unusual features of china s financial markets are consistent with a government choosing regulations to maximize a standard type of social welfare function under certain conditions these regulations are equivalent to imposing explicit taxes on business and interest income yet should be much easier to enforce the observed implicit tax rates are broadly in line with those observed in other countries the theory also forecasts however that china will face increasing incentives over time to shift to explicit taxes

the microfinance promise in the past decade microfinance programs have demonstrated that it is possible to lend to low income households while maintaining high repayment rates even without requiring collateral the programs promise a revolution in approaches to alleviating poverty and spreading financial services and millions of poor households are served globally a growing body of economic theory demonstrates how new contractual forms offer a key to microfinance success particularly the use of group lending contracts with joint liability for the most part however high repayment rates have not translated into profits and studies of impacts on poverty yield a mixed picture in describing emerging tensions the paper highlights the diversity of innovative mechanisms beyond group lending contracts the measurement of financial sustainability the estimation of economic and social impacts the costs and benefits of subsidization and the potential to reduce poverty through savings programs rather than just credit the promise of microfinance has pushed far ahead of the evidence and an agenda is put forward for addressing critical empirical gaps and sharpening the terms of policy discussion

competition under credit rationing theory and evidence from rural china abstract we present a duopoly model of financial competition to describe the conditions under which competition leads to greater bank effort when repressed financial systems ration credit the model features an entrant that freely sets its interest rate and an incumbent that must charge a rate below that which is market clearing both players may exert costly effort to inform themselves about borrower types using data on rural financial institutions in china we test empirically the effects of competition on deposit growth loan portfolio composition repayment rates and other effort measures finding positive effects of competition on effort and financial performance

normal mixture diffusion with uncertain volatility modelling short and long term smile effects this paper introduces a parameterization of the normal mixture diffusion nmd local volatility model that captures only a short term smile effect and then extends the model so that it also captures a long term smile effect we focus on the binomial nmd parameterization so called because it is based on simple and intuitive assumptions that imply the mixing law for the normal mixture log price density is binomial with more than two possible states for volatility the general parameterization is related to the multinomial mixing law in this parsimonious class of complete market models option pricing and hedging is straightforward since model prices and deltas are simple weighted averages of black scholes prices and deltas but they only capture a short term smile effect where leptokurtosis in the log price density decreases with term in accordance with the stylised facts of econometric analysis on ex post returns of different frequencies and the central limit theorem however the last part of the paper shows that longer term smile effects that arise from uncertainty in the local volatility surface can be modeled by a natural extension of the binomial nmd parameterization results are illustrated by calibrating the model to several euro us dollar currency option smile surfaces

is grameen lending efficient repayment incentives and insurance in village economies many believe that a key innovation by the grameen bank is to encourage borrowers to help each other in hard times to analyse this we study a mechanism design problem where borrowers share information about each other but their limited side contracting ability prevents them from writing complete insurance contracts we derive a lending mechanism which efficiently induces mutual insurance it is necessary for borrowers to submit reports about each other to achieve efficiency such cross reporting increases the bargaining power of unsuccessful borrowers and is robust to collusion against the bank copyright 2004 wiley blackwell

credit union policies and performances in latin america this paper presents a conceptual framework for explaining credit unions cus loan delinquency and profitability in developing countries it also offers an empirical estimation for a unique sample of cus in latin america

enhancing capabilities through credit access creditworthiness as a signal of trustworthiness under asymmetric information article i nfo creditworthiness and trustworthiness are almost synonyms because under asymmetric information the act of conferring a loan has the indirect effect of signaling the trustworthiness of the borrower we test the creditworthiness trustworthiness nexus in an investment game experiment on a sample of participants non participants in a microfinance program in argentina and find that trustors give significantly more to and believe they will receive more from microfinance borrowers the first and second order beliefs of trustees are also consistent with this picture our findings then show that mf participants appear more trustworthy and this may help microfinance to work a related consequence is that if and only if borrower s trustworthiness is not public information the mere loan provision acts as a reputation enhancing signal increasing the borrower s attractiveness as a business partner in such case we have a channel through which a private financial intermediary contributes to the provision of a public good like information thereby

the effect of social capital on group loan repayment evidence from field experiments an important question to microfinance is the relevance of existing social capital in target communities to the performance of group lending this research presents evidence from field experiments in south africa and armenia in which subjects participate in trust and microfinance games we present evidence that personal trust between group members and social homogeneity are more important to group loan repayment than general societal trust or acquaintanceship between members we also find some evidence of reciprocity those who have been helped by other group members in the past are more likely to contribute in the future during the past decade exploring the role that social capital plays in economic behaviour has emerged as one of the most fascinating and fertile areas of economic research although precise definitions of social capital are notoriously difficult to pin down one of the early pioneers of the concept coleman 1988 defines social capital as social structure that facilitates certain actions of actors within the structure in his definition coleman specifically highlights the roles of mutual obligation expectations and trustworthiness social norms social sanctions and the transmission of information important studies in both developed and developing countries have analysed the impact of social capital in economic relationships putnam s celebrated work making democracy work civic traditions in modern italy 1993 and bowling alone america s declining social capital 1995 brought attention to the role that social capital plays in the development of the modern state udry s ground breaking 1994 work in nigeria illustrated how the social capital existing in traditional societies may allow for more efficient credit contracts than in developed economies with weaker social

rural finance and agricultural technology adoption in ethiopia does the institutional design of lending organizations matter summary it has now become almost a stylized fact that sustained agricultural growth is central to rapid poverty reduction and economic development yet world poverty is largely concentrated in the agrarian societies which have the potential for agricultural productivity growth this is particularly true for sub saharan african countries where the gaps between potential and actual yields remain high minimizing this gap through the promotion of modern inputs such as fertilizer and modern seeds has been at the core of almost all development strategies in ethiopia among other initiatives the country has promoted microfinance institutions and member owned financial cooperatives to alleviate credit constraints of the smallholder farmers this paper analyzes the impacts of these institutions using household survey data and a propensity score matching technique we examine the effects that institutional financial services have on farmers adoption of agricultural technology in ethiopia the results suggest that access to institutional finance has a significant positive impact on both the adoption and extent of technology use however when impacts are disaggregated by type of financial institution and farm size heterogeneities are observed in particular financial cooperatives have a greater impact on technology adoption than microfinance institutions and the results appear to vary depending on farm size and types of inputs the paper concludes with implications for policies to promote adoption of modern agricultural inputs

banking competition good or bad the case of promoting micro and small enterprise finance in kazakhstan competition is claimed to be beneficial in development projects promoting micro and small enterprise finance although there are still doubts as to whether these loans can be developed into a pro

ldc agriculture nonparametric malmquist productivity indexes abstract this paper examines changes in agricultural productivity in 18 developing countries over the period 1961 1985 we use the nonparametric output based malmquist index to examine whether the results from such an approach confirm results from other methods that have indicated declining agricultural productivity in less developed countries ldcs the results confirm previous findings indicating that at least half of these countries have experienced productivity declines in agriculture we also found that those countries that tax agriculture most heavily had the most negative rates of productivity change

an analysis of offer functions of banks and credit unions in guatemala economists have sought to identify institutions which might fill the gap in household access to credit arising from rationing by formal lenders credit unions have been identified as institutions which might use informational and monitoring advantages to fill that gap using information on household perceptions of their access to credit this article analyses the impact of certain credit unions on the access to credit of households in guatemala regression results indicate that credit unions serve markets unserved by formal lenders and that information on household perceptions of their access to credit is important in making inferences about lender lending activities

moral hazard and peer monitoring in a laboratory microfinance experiment abstract this paper reports the results from a laboratory microfinance experiment of group lending in the presence of moral hazard and costly peer monitoring we compare peer monitoring treatments in which credit is provided to members of the group to individual lending treatments with lender monitoring we find that if the cost of peer monitoring is lower than the cost of lender monitoring peer monitoring results in higher loan frequencies higher monitoring and higher repayment rates compared to lender monitoring in the absence of monitoring cost differences however lending monitoring and repayment behavior is mostly similar across group and individual lending schemes within group lending contrary to theoretical predictions simultaneous and sequential lending rules provide equivalent empirical performance

imperfect substitutes the local political economy of informal finance and microfinance in rural china and india abstract banking authorities in both china and india have attempted to limit most forms of informal finance by regulating them banning them and allowing certain types of microfinance institutions the latter policy aims to increase the availability of credit to low income entrepreneurs and eliminate their reliance on usurious financing nonetheless the intended clients of microfinance continue to draw on informal finance in both rural china and india this article argues that the persistence of informal finance may be traced to four complementary reasons the limited supply of formal credit limits in state capacity to implement its policies the political and economic segmentation of local markets and the institutional weaknesses of many microfinance programs

microcredit and mechanism design individual microcredit loans are not necessarily simple fixed debt obligations but rather may have contingencies and procedures suggested by the theory of mechanism design further group or joint liability lending may not be the single miracle cure practitioners claim nor operate the way the logic of a single theory might suggest there are multiple theories these theories can be distinguished in data on repayment rates and the best fit theory may vary with the environment finally the debate about whether to lend to individuals or lend to groups may be misplaced under simple theories of selection the pareto superior regime which is predicted to emerge varies with exogenous environmental characteristics jel d5 d82 g2 o17

the decline of township and village enterprises in china s economic transition summary a paradoxical phenomenon in china s transitional economy is that markets developed under predominant public ownership which nevertheless has declined with the development of markets previous studies reveal that initial political and economic conditions of reform and fiscal decentralization gave rise to local public enterprises leading role in early marketization this paper explains the subsequent fall of such a role building and expanding on recent studies of privatization we argue that market development and competition have constrained the abilities of local public enterprises to address revenue and employment imperatives whereas local governments sales oriented growth strategies have exacerbated governance problems panel data are analyzed to provide provisional test of pertinent hypotheses

social connections and group banking lending to the poor is expensive due to high screening monitoring and enforcement costs group lending advocates believe lenders overcome this by harnessing social connections using data from finca peru i exploit a quasi random group formation process to find evidence of peers successfully monitoring and enforcing joint liability loans individuals with stronger social connections to their fellow group members i e either living closer or being of a similar culture have higher repayment and higher savings furthermore i observe direct evidence that relationships deteriorate after default and that through successful monitoring individuals know who to punish and who not to punish after default

the statistics of sharpe ratios the building blocks of the sharpe ratio expected returns and volatilities are unknown quantities that must be estimated statistically and are therefore subject to estimation error this raises the natural question how accurately are sharpe ratios measured to address this question i derive explicit expressions for the statistical distribution of the sharpe ratio using standard asymptotic theory under several sets of assumptions for the return generating process independently and identically distributed returns stationary returns and with time aggregation i show that monthly sharpe ratios cannot be annualized by multiplying by 12 except under very special circumstances and i derive the correct method of conversion in the general case of stationary returns in an illustrative empirical example of mutual funds and hedge funds i find that the annual sharpe ratio for a hedge fund can be overstated by as much as 65 percent because of the presence of serial correlation in monthly returns and once this

managers and efficiency in banking abstract this paper presents evidence on the impact of managers on cost efficiency in banking stochastic frontier analysis is applied to a unique finnish data set manager age and education have strong yet complicated effects on efficiency the impact of age on efficiency depends on education a university degree is useful mainly in the largest banks of the sample educational background seems to be less important for young managers than for mature ones managing director changes are systematically followed by efficiency changes retirement typically causes an efficiency improvement whereas other manager changes can either improve or weaken efficiency however in many cases mature managers outperform their young colleagues

persistent parochialism trust and exclusion in ethnic networks decentralized groups such as close knit residential neighborhoods and ethnically linked businesses often achieve high levels of cooperation while engaging in exclusionary practices that we call parochialism we investigate the contribution of within group cultural affinity to the ability of parochial groups to cooperate in social dilemmas we analyze parochial networks in which the losses incurred by not trading with outsiders are offset by an enhanced ability to enforce informal contracts by fostering trust among insiders we show that there is a range of degrees of parochialism for which parochial networks can coexist with an anonymous market offering unrestricted trading opportunities

using repayment data to test across models of joint liability lending theories rationalising joint liability lending are rich in implications for repayment rates we exploit this fact to test four diverse models we show that the models repayment implications do not always coincide for example higher correlation of output and borrowers ability to act cooperatively can raise or lower repayment depending on the model data from thai borrowing groups suggest that repayment is affected negatively by the joint liability rate ceteris paribus and social ties and positively by the strength of local sanctions and correlated returns further the relative fit of the adverse selection versus informal sanctions models varies by region

optimal partial group liability in microfinance lending abstract this paper develops a model of group borrowing that incorporates partial group liability where borrowers are penalized if their group members default but are not held responsible for the entirety of the failed loan the model illustrates a trade off of group liability lending while higher levels of group liability increase within group risk sharing if liability is too high borrowers strategically default the model predicts the existence of an optimal partial liability that maximizes transfers between group members while avoiding strategic default consistent with this prediction loan officers from a large microfinance institution in southern mexico who rarely allow one group member to repay while the other defaults achieve substantially lower default rates than loan officers for whom the practice is commonplace or for those for whom it has never occurred structural estimation using repayment data suggests that while a partial liability below full liability may reduce default rates the incidence of strategic default is rare

do risky microfinance borrowers really invest in risky projects experimental evidence from bolivia abstractthis paper reports the results of an experiment testing a fundamental assumption in stiglitz and weiss 1981 model of credit rationing that defaulting borrowers are associated with investment in risky projects through an artefactual field experiment with 200 bolivian microfinance borrowers we observe that subjects from real world delinquent borrowing groups do not prefer risky projects to safer ones significantly more than subjects from repaying groups instead our results support more recent behavioural theories of credit market failure implications are that defaulting microfinance borrowers may be those who take too little investment risk rather than those who take too much

long memory and efficiency of bitcoin under heavy tails the long memory is usually defined via auto covariances which further connect with hurst exponent the heavy tails in bitcoin returns can cause infinite auto covariances which make the analysis of

group lending with sequential financing contingent renewal and social capital this paper focuses on the dynamic aspects of group lending in particular sequential financing and contingent renewal we examine the efficacy of these two schemes in harnessing social capital we find that for the appropriate parameter configurations there is homogenous group formation so that the lender can ascertain the identity of a group without lending to all its members thus screening out bad borrowers partially moreover under certain parameter configurations negative assortative matching occurs as a robust phenomenon

bank reputation bank commitment and the effects of competition in credit markets this article discusses the effects of credit market competition on a bank s incentive to keep its commitment to lend to a borrower when the borrower s credit quality deteriorates it is shown that unlike in the borrower s commitment problem to keep borrowing from the same bank in good times the increased competition may strengthen a bank s incentive to keep its commitment banks offer loans with commitment to the highest quality borrowers but when faced with competition from bond markets they also give these loans to lower quality borrowers an increase in the number of banks has a nonmonotonic effect new banks reinforce a bank s incentive only if there are small number of banks the inability to contract across all contingencies may result in inefficiencies in bank lending the borrower may not undertake efficient investments if future refinancing is difficult to obtain in the case of temporary distress the lender may not provide funds when the borrower is in distress if the surplus cannot be shared in the long run 1 this problem can be mitigated however if the lender and the borrower interact repeatedly for example a bank s concern to maintain a good reputation can induce the bank to keep its commitment to a costly action see e g sharpe 1990 boot greenbaum and thakor 1993 aoki 1994 chemmanur and fulghieri 1994 indeed the use of bank reputation as an enforcement mechanism seems to be widespread 2

delegated monitors large and small germany s banking system 1800 1914 banks play a greater role in the german financial system than in those of the united states or britain germany s large universal banks are admired by those who advocate bank deregulation in the united states others admire the universal banks for their supposed role in corporate governance and industrial finance many discussions distort the german banking system by overstressing one of several types of banks and ignore the competition and cooperation between the famous universal banks and other banking groups tracing the historical development of the german banking system from the early nineteenth century places the large universal banks in context

evaluation by the aumann and serrano performance index and sharpe ratio bitcoin performance abstractwe compare bitcoin performance based on the aumann and serrano performance index and sharpe ratio assuming that asset returns follow the class of discrete normal mixture distributions the aumann and serrano performance index can take into account higher moments of the underlying distribution of assets and is relevant for risk averse investors we evaluate bitcoin performance based on the aumann and serrano index relative to the performance of other assets our evaluation shows that bitcoin is rated highly by the sharpe ratio but rated very poorly by the aumann and serrano index we also find some stock assets can beat bitcoin by the sharpe ratio when an investment horizon is monthly

asset restructuring strategies in bank acquisitions does distance between dealing partners matter abstract one of the most lively debated effects of banking acquisitions is the change in lending and asset allocation of the target bank in favour of transaction based products at the expense of small and informationally opaque borrowers these changes may be the result of two distinct restructuring strategies pursued by the acquirer with respect to the asset portfolio of the acquired bank a cleaning strategy cs in which the acquirer makes a clean sweep of all the negative net present value activities in the portfolio of the acquired bank and a portfolio strategy ps in which the acquiring bank permanently changes the portfolio allocation of the acquired bank in this paper we focus on italian bank acquisitions and test which asset restructuring strategy was predominantly pursued over the period 1997 2003 moreover we distinguish acquisitions according to their geographic diversifying character and to the physical and cultural distances that separate acquiring from acquired banks when we look at the mean value we do not find clear evidence of a primacy either of css or pss when we separate in market from out of market bank acquisitions however results show that the css prevail only in the former type of deals while in the latter the portfolio of acquired banks is subject to pss finally we find that differences in asset restructuring strategies can be explained by differences in corporate culture and the workplace environment of the dealing partners

announcement effects in the cryptocurrency market cryptocurrencies have gained popularity as new economic investment assets globally in recent years this study examines market reactions to major news events associated with cryptocurrencies abnor

thy neighbor s keeper the design of a credit cooperative with theory and a test economists now appreciate that resource allocation in less economically developed economies is profoundly influenced by non firm economic institutions however our theories of non firm institutions often suggest different answers to many questions including those of policy this paper illustrates a method for discriminating between alternative theories using data from german credit cooperatives from the nineteenth and early twentieth century germany we build a model of credit cooperatives designed to provide monitoring incentives and test this using nineteenth century data authors

microfinance and investment a comparison with bank and informal lending summary comparing the impact of different types of credit on households investment in bangladesh we find that loans from microfinance institutions are likely to be channeled toward non agricultural activities while both informal and bank lending are associated to a higher expenditure in agricultural inputs estimated effects are net of the differences in the amount borrowed interest rates and collateral results suggest that features which are specific to microfinance such as tight repayment schedules and land based eligibility rules may reduce the suitability of this source of funds for the farming sector

outreach sustainability and leverage in monitored and peer monitored lending abstract i study the contract design problem facing microfinance lending organizations mfos that want to maximize the impact and outreach of their lending activities to a target population of poor borrowers while remaining financially sustainable tradeoffs between outreach sustainability and financial leverage are shaped by the endogenous monitoring and delegation costs that arise within a chain of agency relationships subject to moral hazard between borrowers loan staff mfo equity owners and outside investors all else equal sustainable mfos that target poorer borrowers must charge higher interest rates have higher staff costs per dollar loaned and are less leveraged analysis of data for 72 mfos tends to support the findings

finance and growth for microenterprises evidence from rural china using a survey dataset of chinese rural households we find that access to external finance is positively associated with the decision to become entrepreneur and the initial investment for microenterprises also we find that use of informal finance especially financing from friends and family is positively associated with sales growth of microenterprises with employees but not of self employed we do not find any significant relationship between the use of formal finance and firm growth our findings underline the importance of finance for entrepreneurship and microenterprise growth and the role of informal finance in the absence of efficient formal financial institutions

collateral and rationing sorting equilibria in monopolistic and competitive credit markets the authors examine how market structure affects credit allocation under universal risk neutrality and asymmetric information about borrowers they consider both monopolistic and perf ectly competitive banks and examine the role of collateral in each ca se when a bank is a monopolist on the loan side they find collatera l is never used and asymmetric information results in reduced bank le nding under perfect competition collateral has a useful sorting rol e moreover rationing is possible even with collateral availability and perfectly elastic deposit supply in this setting the authors sh ow co signers are valuable social welfare properties of the monopoly and competitive equilibria are also compared copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

policies and impact an analysis of village level microfinance institutions this paper uses variation in policies and institutional characteristics to evaluate the impacts of village level microfinance institutions in rural thailand to identify impacts we use policies related to the successful unsuccessful provision of services as exogenous variation in effective financial intermediation we find that institutions particularly those with good policies can promote asset growth consumption smoothing and occupational mobility and can decrease moneylender reliance specifically cash lending institutions production credit groups and especially women s groups are successful in providing intermediation and its benefits to members while buffalo banks and rice banks are not the policies identified as important to intermediation and benefits the provision of savings services especially pledged savings accounts emergency services and training and advice surprisingly much publicized policies such as joint liability default consequences or repayment frequency had no measured impacts jel 012 016

the political economy of policies for smallholder agriculture summary as the experience of the 20th century has shown implementing policies that increase agricultural productivity among smallholders is a particularly promising strategy to achieve pro poor growth however history also reveals major political challenges to adopting this strategy the paper compares the experience of asian countries that were able to launch a smallholder based green revolution with the experience of african countries that are still struggling with this goal it then reviews the political economy literature to identify the factors that account for these divergent experiences finally the paper develops a conceptual framework to guide empirical research to close the knowledge gaps identified by the review

contract structure risk sharing and investment choice few microfinance funded businesses grow beyond subsistence entrepreneurship this paper considers one possible explanation that the structure of existing microfinance contracts may discourage risky but high expected return investments to explore this possibility i develop a theory that unifies models of investment choice informal risk sharing and formal financial contracts i then test the predictions of this theory using a series of experiments with clients of a large microfinance institution in india the experiments confirm the theoretical predictions that joint liability creates two potential inefficiencies first borrowers free ride on their partners making risky investments without compensating partners for this risk second the addition of peer monitoring overcompensates leading to sharp reductions in risk taking and profitability equity like financing in which partners share both the benefits and risks of more profitable projects overcomes both of these inefficiencies and merits further testing in the field

moneylenders and bankers price increasing subsidies in a monopolistically competitive market abstract in many areas of the world a significant part of the cost of obtaining a good or service is the cost of enforcing the contracts entailed in its provision we present models of markets with endogenous enforcement costs motivated by studies of rural credit markets we show that subsidies may have perverse effects under monopolistic competition increasing prices or inducing exit higher prices interest rates result from the loss of scale economies or from negative externalities among suppliers the models are consistent with the puzzling evidence that infusions of government subsidized formal credit have not improved the terms offered by moneylenders

formal informal sector interaction in rural credit markets abstract the majority of small cultivators in the less developed countries are not regarded as credit worthy by the formal sector financial institutions and are forced to borrow from the moneylenders in the informal credit market this paper shows that when such borrowers differ in their likelihood of default and the moneylenders are asymmetrically informed about the client specific degree of risk the policy of providing cheap credit through the formal sector can generate adverse composition effects which worsen the terms of credit and the availability of loans in the informal sector

bank firm relationships and allocative efficiency in northeastern and central italy and in the south abstract we make two contributions on the extent and impact of relationship banking based on close and long lasting bank firm customer relationships in the three sub systems in which italy may be subdivided first we show that relationship banking is more extensive in both sub systems where small businesses prevail the fast growing northeast and center nec and the south the marginal area of dependent development second we demonstrate that relationship banking improves the allocation of credit in the nec but worsens it in the south this evidence suggests that relationship banking may be beneficial or detrimental depending on the socio economic structure

liability structure in small scale finance evidence from a natural experiment microfinance the provision of small individual and business loans has witnessed dramatic growth reaching over 150 million borrowers worldwide much of its success has been attributed to overcoming the challenges of information asymmetries in uncollateralized lending yet very little is known about the optimal contract structure of such loans there is substantial variation across lenders even within a particular setting this paper exploits a plausibly exogenous change in the liability structure offered by a microfinance program in india which shifted from individual to group liability lending the analysis finds compelling evidence that contract structure matters for the same borrower required monthly loan installments are 6 percent less likely to be missed under the group liability setting relative to individual liability in addition compulsory savings deposits are 19 percent less likely to be missed under group liability contracts

rural banking in china geographically accessible but still financially excluded abstractrural banking in china geographically accessible but still financially excluded regional studies based on the distribution patterns of rural credit cooperatives in about 2200 counties in 2009 this paper examines two aspects of financial exclusion in rural china after the restructuring of the banking industry despite the state s efforts to ensure financial inclusion in rural areas poor farmers could be spatially included while still being denied loans due to their inability to provide collateral and the lack of formal credit records the mismatch between the supply and demand of credit has led to informal loans substituting for formal loans and thus contributed to the proliferation of informal banking in china

the life cycle of a microfinance institution the irish loan funds abstract ireland s loan funds were a long lived self sustaining large scale microfinance organization that made millions of loans without collateral to the poor during the first 100 years of their life cycle a period of growth ending in the 1840s they adapted constantly and obtained improvements to their legal structure because they were complementary to the banking system and seen as effective in relieving poverty in their 2nd century they became ossified in part because of competition with commercial banks the loan funds provide an example of sustainable microfinance under harsh economic conditions and illustrate how organizations change incrementally and when successful alter their institutional framework

assortative matching adverse selection and group lending abstract this note reconsiders a theoretical result asserted to explain the success of group lending programs in ldcs it has been claimed that if groups are allowed to form themselves risky and safe borrowers will sort themselves into relatively homogenous groups this positive assortative matching can be exploited by lenders to solve an adverse selection problem that would otherwise undermine the effectiveness of such lending programs i show that the positive assortative matching result does not necessarily hold if earlier models are extended to incorporate dynamic incentives

screening by the company you keep joint liability lending and the peer selection effect we look at an economic environment where borrowers have some information about the nature of each other s projects that lenders do not we show that joint liability lending contracts similar to those used by credit cooperatives and group lending schemes will induce endogenous peer selection in the formation of groups in a way that the instrument of joint liability can be used as a screening device to exploit this local information this can improve welfare and repayment rates if standard screening instruments such as collateral are unavailable

the dynamic efficiency of regulatory constitutions in this article we model regulation as a repeated game between a utility facing a random sequence of demands and a regulator tempted to underreward past investment rate of return regulation designed with a constitutional commitment to an adequate rate of return on capital prudently invested is able to support an efficient investment program as a subgame perfect nash equilibrium for a larger set of parameter values than rate of return regulation without such a commitment furthermore rate of return regulation is superior to price regulation according to the same criterion assuming that the regulator is unable to make state contingent transfer payments

group lending sequential financing lender monitoring and joint liability abstract we develop a simple model of group lending based on peer monitoring and moral hazard we find that in the absence of sequential financing or lender monitoring group lending schemes may involve under monitoring with the borrowers investing in undesirable projects moreover under certain parameter configurations group lending schemes involving either sequential financing or a combination of lender monitoring and joint liability are feasible in fact group lending schemes with sequential financing may succeed even in the absence of joint liability though the repayment rate will be lower in the absence of joint liability however group lending with lender monitoring is unlikely to be feasible

equilibrium credit rationing of small farm agriculture it is often argued that externally imposed contractual restrictions lead to inequitable credit rationing this paper argues that unrestricted laissez faire markets may also inequitably ration credit a formal model which grants borrowers autonomy in credit application and use demonstrates that adverse incentive and selection effects may cause banks to endogenously impose interest rate restrictions and ration small farms out of the credit market consequently liberalization of financial markets may be insufficient to guarantee small farms access to credit

reciprocal supervision collusion and organizational design we study the design of supervisory functions in an organization with one principal and two agents each agent can perform supervision activities regarding the other agent we characterize the way the principal must structure incentive payments to avoid any collusive activity between agents in particular it is shown that better mutual information between agents may hurt the principal the other main result is the possibility that it may be better to give up one supervisory function or to have a third party be the supervisor if possible finally we show that such a dual supervisory structure raises the possibility that letting collusion happen may be the best policy

group lending and the role of the group leader this paper investigates strategic monitoring behavior within group lending we show that monitoring efforts of group members differ in equilibrium due to the asymmetry between members in terms of future profits in particular we show that the entrepreneur with the highest future profits also puts in the highest monitoring effort moreover monitoring efforts differ between group members due to free riding one member reduces her level of monitoring if the other increases her monitoring effort this effect is also at play when we introduce a group leader into the model the individual who becomes the group leader supplies more monitoring effort than in the benchmark case we empirically test the model using data from a survey of microfinance in eritrea and show that the group leader attaches more weight to future periods than nonleaders in the group which may explain why a large part of total monitoring is done by the leader

how to reform a planned economy lessons from china the countries of eastern europe and the former soviet union have been flooded with advice from the west on how to liberalize their planned econo mies this advice is unfortunately offered in an empirical vacuum no one knows how these econo mies will react to the proposed liberalization meas ures there exists however a neglected source of information china offers a long time series of data over a decade s worth on the effects of reforms on a planned economy china s reforms were gradual but their cumulative effect has been large and they have been remarkably successful china s experiments provide some practical les sons on what kinds of reforms can work elsewhere the dominant school of thought among economists favours the big bang policy of reforming quickly and according to a comprehensive plan partial reforms in this view are useless they will be negated by the remnants of the planning system the proponents of big bang reform have been influential with poland czechoslovakia and rus sia announcing plans for a rapid transition to capi talism

the federal deposit insurance fund that didn t put a bite on u s tax payers abstract unlike the federal savings and loan insurance corporation and the bank insurance fund the national credit union share insurance fund ncusif survived the 1980s without falling into a state of accounting insolvency this paper analyzes how differences in incentive structure constrain the attractiveness of interest rate speculation and other risk taking opportunities to managers and regulators of credit unions despite these better incentives robust present value calculations establish that ncusif fell into economic insolvency during the mid 1980s besides calculating the extent of this insolvency the paper also seeks to explain why after ncusif became insolvent it could rebuild its reserves without an explicit or implicit taxpayer bailout our explanation turns on cross industry coinsurance responsibilities and the shallowness of the fund s observed insolvency relative to industry net worth we identify forces in the decisionmaking environment tending to limit the depth and duration of unresolved insolvencies at individual credit unions managerial opportunities to benefit personally from taking risks that would flow through to ncusif are constrained by difficulties in converting a credit union to stockholder form and by the intensity of proactive monitoring of troubled credit unions by sister institutions and other private coinsurers we conjecture that expanded use of coinsurance and private monitoring could reduce taxpayer loss exposure elsewhere in government deposit insurance systems