bond indenture provisions and the risk of corporate debt abstract this paper examines the effect of alternative bond indenture provisions on the allocation of risk among the firm s claimants the approach taken here differs from that of earlier studies in that risk allocation is examined while the firm s leverage in market value terms is held constant in this context four indenture provisions are examined 1 the time to maturity 2 the promised payment schedule 3 financing restrictions and 4 priority rules it is concluded that risk is transferred from stockholders to bondholders as the time to maturity and promised payment increase appropriately furthermore substitution of longer term debt for an equal amount of shorter term debt also increases the risk to bondholders while decreasing the risk to stockholders the analysis shows that a coupon bond can be represented by a unique discount bond with the same risk and value this permits the characterization of the effective maturity of a risky debt issue a concept analogous to the stochastic duration of a default free coupon bond these results are shown to be independent of the means used to finance the debt issue finally it is concluded that the relative risk associated with different bonds issued by the same firm cannot be determined by the structure of priority rules alone it is also necessary to consider the timing of the promised payments compared to that of the other debt issues in the firm s capital structure

financial intermediary coalitions abstract in this article an environment in which the investment opportunities of agents are private information is studied and it is shown that financial intermediaries arise endogenously within that environment it is established that financial intermediaries are part of an efficient arrangement in the sense that they are needed to support the authors private information core allocations these intermediaries which are coalitions of agents exhibit the following characteristics in equilibrium they borrow from and lend to large groups of agents they produce information about investment projects and they issue claims that have different state contingent payoffs than claims issued by ultimate borrowers

private information deposit interest rates and the stability of the banking system abstract the regulation of deposit interest rates has received little support from economists the same is true for the original rationale for such regulation that bank competition for deposits generates inherent instability in the banking system this paper develops an adverse selection model of banking in which this rationale is correct moreover in this model instability in the banking system can arise despite the presence of a lender of last resort and despite the absence of any need for deposit insurance however in the world described the regulation of deposit interest rates is shown to be an appropriate response to instability in the banking system finally it is argued that adverse selection models of deposit interest rate determination can confront a number of observed phenomena that are not readily explained in other contexts

trade credit bank lending and monetary policy transmission this paper investigates the role of trade credit in the transmission of monetary policy most models of the transmission mechanism allow the firm to access only financial markets or bank lending according to some net worth criterion in our model we introduce trade credit as an additional source of funding we predict that when monetary policy tightens there will be a reduction in market and bank lending and an increase in trade credit this is confirmed with an empirical investigation of 16 000 manufacturing firms

do banks provide financial slack we study the decision to choose bank debt rather than public securities in a firm s marginal financing choice using a sample of 500 firms over the 1980 to 1993 time period we find that firms are relatively more likely to choose bank loans when variables that measure asymmetric information problems are elevated the sensitivity of the likelihood of choosing bank debt to information problems is greater for firms with no public debt outstanding these results are consistent with the hypothesis that banks help alleviate asymmetric information problems and that firms weigh these information benefits against a wide range of contracting costs when choosing bank financing why do some firms borrow from public sources while others rely exclusively on private lenders the answer to this question is not well understood existing theories suggest that a firm must consider the tradeoff between the benefits and costs of bank debt financing relative to other potential financing choices the potential benefits of bank financing include low moral hazard and adverse selection costs and ease of renegotiation in financial distress 1 the potential costs of bank financing include monitoring costs suboptimal liquidation outcomes and distortions induced by information monopolies 2 the goal of this paper is to identify whether adverse selection problems influence a firm s choice between new bank debt public debt or common stock in particular we are interested in assessing the empirical validity of the hypothesis that banks have the ability to accurately price a firm s claims thus inducing a preference for firms that are undervalued by the market to

the economics of small business finance the roles of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle abstract this article examines the economics of financing small business in private equity and debt markets firms are viewed through a financial growth cycle paradigm in which different capital structures are optimal at different points in the cycle we show the sources of small business finance and how capital structure varies with firm size and age the interconnectedness of small firm finance is discussed along with the impact of the macroeconomic environment we also analyze a number of research and policy issues review the literature and suggest topics for future research

does competition from new equity mitigate bank rent extraction insights from japanese data previous research shows that bank information production mitigates asymmetric information problems however this literature has ignored the concern that firms with better growth prospects are more vulnerable to bank rent extraction this paper points out that funding competition from new equity as an effective natural mechanism solves this important concern using japanese data from 1983 to 1997 we show that the relationship between loan to debt ratio and growth while starting significantly negative consistent with holdup theory turns significantly positive towards the high end of the growth spectrum we confirm that high growth firms raise more new equity than do low growth firms and use more equity relative to bonds in external finance this is consistent with a generalized myers majluf framework these results suggest that for high growth firms when competition from public debt lessens due to increased growth based valuations competition from new equity steps in to restrain bank rent extraction

when do banks take equity in debt restructurings this article examines the conditions under which bank lenders make concessions by taking equity in financially distressed firms i show that the role banks play in debt restructurings depends on the financial condition of the firm the existence of public debt in the firm s capital structure and the ability of public debt to be restructured empirically i find that for firms with public debt outstanding banks never make concessions unless public debtholders also restructure their claims when banks do take equity on average they obtain a substantial proportion of the firm s stock and they maintain their position for over two years article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

embeddedness and contractual relationships in china s transitional economy interfirm contracts represent common economic relations in the marketplace they are also deeply embedded in social relations and social institutions in the context of china s transitional economy this study examines how three mechanisms economizing transaction costs network based social relations and institutional links affect interfirm contractual relationships in 1 the choice of search channels for contractual partners 2 the formality and provisions in a contract and 3 the intensity of social interaction in contract implementation empirical evidence is drawn from information collected on 877 contracts from 620 firms in two chinese cities beijing and guangzhou the authors find distinct roles of social relations institutional links and regulatory environments in the initiation of contractual partners and the forms of contracts adopted whereas transaction specific factors play a significant role in the intensity of social interaction in contract implementation these findings suggest the interplay among economic calculativeness social networks and institutional links and the complementarity in the underlying theoretical ideas

lending to small businesses the role of loan maturity in addressing information problems we investigate what determines the maturity of lines of credit to small businesses our results provide strong support for the hypothesis that shorter loan maturities serve to mitigate the problems associated with borrower risk and asymmetric information that are typical of small business lending we find that maturity is shorter for firm owners that have poor credit histories are older and less experienced and for firms that are more informationally opaque supporting the notion that collateral and maturity are substitute mechanisms in mitigating agency problems we also find strong evidence that maturity increases with collateral pledges that personal collateral is associated with longer maturities than business collateral and that collateral types that better mitigate agency problems reduce the sensitivity of loan maturity to informational asymmetries and risk finally while it is argued that relationship lending may mitigate information asymmetry we find no relation between loan maturity and stronger firm creditor ties

financial intermediary capital we propose a dynamic theory of financial intermediaries that are better able to collateralize claims than households that is have a collateralization advantage intermediaries require capital as they have to finance the additional amount that they can lend out of their own net worth the net worth of financial intermediaries and the corporate sector are both state variables affecting the spread between intermediated and direct finance and the dynamics of real economic activity such as investment and financing the accumulation of net worth of intermediaries is slow relative to that of the corporate sector the model is consistent with key stylized facts about macroeconomic downturns associated with a credit crunch namely their severity their protractedness and the fact that the severity of the credit crunch itself affects the severity and persistence of downturns the model captures the tentative and halting nature of recoveries from crises

costly monitoring financial intermediation and equilibrium credit rationing abstract this paper establishes a link between equilibrium credit rationing and financial intermediation in a model with asymmetrically informed lenders and borrowers costly monitoring and investment project indivisibilities intermediation is shown to dominate borrowing and lending between individuals and these financial intermediaries exhibit several of the important features of intermediaries as we know them equilibrium interest rates and the aggregate quantity of loans respond quite differently to changes in taste and technology parameters depending on whether or not there is rationing in equilibrium

syndicated lending under asymmetric creditor information abstract this paper explores how asymmetric information about borrower quality among syndicated lenders alters the incentive to refinance illiquid borrowers we use a model in which lenders enter the market sequentially in two rounds of lending between the two rounds a shock separates borrowers into good ones and bad ones and early entrants acquire information about individual borrower type while late entrants know only the distribution of borrower types the asymmetric information structure gives rise to both signalling and screening issues we show that self selecting contracts do not exist and that there is always a pooling perfect bayesian equilibrium in which late entrants lend to both good and bad types without borrower type being exposed before final clearing at the terminal time based on this framework we argue that prior to the 1982 international debt crisis it was possible for banks with heavy exposure to troubled debtors to attract rational newcomers in syndicated loans which were with positive probability bailout loans

investment ramifications of distortionary tax subsidies abstract this paper examines the investment effects of tax subsidies for which some assets and not others are eligible distortionary tax subsidies concentrate investments in tax favored assets thereby reducing the expected pre tax profitability of investment and reducing payoffs to bondholders in the event of default anticipation of asset substitution encourages lenders to require covenants in debt contracts which only imperfectly address asset substitution and distort investment the result is that borrowing is made more expensive which in turn discourages investment borrowing rates can react so strongly that aggregate investment may rise very little or even fall in response to higher tax subsidies debt issued by u s firms in risk of default after the 2002 introduction of bonus depreciation for u s equipment investment contained many more covenants than in other periods a pattern that reversed when bonus depreciation was discontinued after 2004 furthermore firms at risk of default borrowed less and were more apt to lease capital than were other firms during the bonus depreciation period

sleep and the allocation of time using aggregated data for 12 countries a cross section of microeconomic data and a panel of households we demonstrate that increases in time in the labor market reduce sleep our theory of the demand for sleep differs from standard models of time use by assuming that sleep affects wages by affecting labor market productivity estimates of a system of demand equations demonstrate that higher wage rates reduce sleep time among men but increase their waking nonmarket time by an equal amount among women the wage effect on sleep is negative but very small

bank information monopolies and the mix of private and public debt claims this article examines the determinants of the mix of private and public debt using detailed information on the debt structure of 250 publicly traded corporations from 1980 through 1990 we find that the relationship between bank borrowing and the importance of growth opportunities depends on the number of banks the firm uses and whether the firm has public debt outstanding for firms with a single bank relationship the reliance on bank debt is negatively related to the importance of growth opportunities in contrast among firms borrowing from multiple banks the relationship is positive

competitiveness of regions from an evolutionary perspective boschma r a 2004 competitiveness of regions from an evolutionary perspective regional studies38 993 1006 do regions compete as firms do how does one deal with the fact that regions unlike organizations are entities that do not act does it make sense to talk about the ability of regions to generate new variety this paper aims to address these questions from an evolutionary perspective it is meaningful to talk about regional competitiveness when the region affects the performances of local firms to a considerable degree this is especially true when the competitiveness of a region depends on intangible non tradable assets based on a knowledge and competence base embedded in a particular institutional setting that are reproduced and modified through the actions and repeated interactions of actors although regions are increasingly becoming collective players actively responding to an increasing exposure to extra regional competition the paper explains why there are serious limits in enhancin

information reliability and a theory of financial intermediation this paper is an analysis of when it will be beneficial for agents engaged in the production of information to form coalitions the model is cast in a financial market framework thus leading to an identification of conditions sufficient for the existence of financial intermediaries intermediation is shown to improve welfare if informational asymmetries are present and the information generated to rectify these asymmetries is potentially unreliable the usual appeal to transactions costs to explain intermediation is not needed

guanxi versus the market ethics and efficiency guanxi refers to a chinese system of doing business on the basis of personal relationships and it is representative of the way that business is done throughout much of the non western world in this paper we first evaluate guanxi from an ethical perspective and then attempt to shed light on the sources of its economic advantages and disadvantages through the use of a simple mathematical model finally we point out how eastern and western business practices may already be converging toward systems based on more complete models of trust to deal with the conditions of progress coupled with uncertainty that form our new economic reality

bond covenants and delegated monitoring this paper examines alternative contracting arrangements available to a firm seeking to finance an investment project the authors consider the choice between loan contracts with covenants based on noisy indicators of the firm s financial health and loan contracts enforced by a monitoring specialist in one interpretation the specialist is a financial intermediary the firm s choice is shown to depend upon the firm s credit rating the accuracy of financial indicators of the firm s condition the loss from premature liquidation of the firm s project and the cost of monitoring

financial contracting and the choice between private placement and publicly offered bonds the financial contracting in private placement bonds and publicly offered bonds are different our data show that private placement bonds are more likely to have restrictive covenants than public bonds private placement bonds are also more likely to be issued by smaller and riskier firms for investment grade firms that issue bonds in both markets our analysis shows that firms select the bond type to minimize financing costs we find significant differences in the pricing of private placement and publicly offered bonds and some of these differences appear to be related to the different institutional features between the two markets

assets subsistence and the supply curve of labor the backward bending supply curve of labor is now accepted as a matter of course by most economists it has no doubt been perplexing to observe that the most commonly employed types of utility functions do not yield such curves under the usual textbook analysis of the problem 1 particular preference maps have been found that generate backward bending curves 2 however they are nonparametric leading to difficulties of estimation and upon closer examination seem to imply counter intuitive results we will show that taking into account the wealth position of an individual on the one hand and survival consideration on the other greatly expands the variety of shapes that can be derived for the supply curve from some simple utility functions the use of a specific simple utility function also implies some severe restrictions on the form the supply curve can take rendering it testable empirical evidence is shown to support the conclusion that the supply curve is monotonic we will also show that the notion that the aggregate supply curve of labor slopes down rests in part on an error of aggregation and that the empirical evidence usually cited in support of the negative slope when correctly interpreted cannot be so construed

deregulation disintermediation and agency costs of debt evidence from japan abstract many japanese firms reduced dependence on banks following financial deregulation in the 1980s the financial architecture of japanese firms after liberalization provides an opportunity to investigate the choice of financing with public bonds versus monitored bank loans examination of accounting and stock price data for a sample of japanese firms in the late 1980s suggests that debt structure is related to variables that serve as proxies for agency costs of debt in particular we find that the proportion of bond debt is inversely related to growth opportunities while the proportion of bank debt is positively related to growth opportunities

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

an empirical analysis of the determinants of corporate debt ownership structure i examine the relation between corporate debt ownership structure and several firm characteristics suggested by recent theory the results demonstrate the importance of monitoring and information costs the likelihood and costs of inefficient liquidation and borrowers incentives in affecting firms debt source preferences several theoretical predictions receive support while others do not the results also suggest important differences between bank and private non bank debt which contrasts with most theoretical models additionally i find evidence of systematic use of bank debt by firms with access to public debt suggesting the benefits attributed to bank debt in theoretical models remain important after firms gain access to public debt markets although different lenders appear to have different maturity preferences the results also suggest debt maturity and debt ownership decisions may be separable

a more complete conceptual framework for sme finance abstract we propose a more complete conceptual framework for analysis of sme credit availability issues in this framework lending technologies are the key conduit through which government policies and national financial structures affect credit availability we emphasize a causal chain from policy to financial structures which affect the feasibility and profitability of different lending technologies these technologies in turn have important effects on sme credit availability financial structures include the presence of different financial institution types and the conditions under which they operate lending technologies include several transactions technologies plus relationship lending we argue that the framework implicit in most of the literature is oversimplified neglects key elements of the chain and often yields misleading conclusions a common oversimplification is the treatment of transactions technologies as a homogeneous group unsuitable for serving informationally opaque smes and a frequent misleading conclusion is that large institutions are disadvantaged in lending to opaque smes

alternative information sources and the information content of bank loans this paper examines the information content of bank loan agreements we differentiate borrowers according to financial analysts percentage earnings forecast errors and most recent forecast revisions the empirical results suggest that banks rely on other indicators as initial screening devices to determine where to best deploy their evaluation and monitoring efforts if these other indicators are reliable and signalimproving prospects banks do little further investigation however if the indicators are noisy and signal declining prospects banks have incentives to expend resources to investigate the borrowers resulting in the production of valuable information recent theories of financial intermediation concentrate on the role of banks in reducing informational asymmetry leland and pyle 1977 suggest that informational asymmetries may be the primary reason that intermediaries exist campbell and kracaw 1980 demonstrate that an important function of financial intermediation is the production of information diamond 1984 develops a model which shows that financial intermediaries can exist simply because they provide an efficient means of evaluating and monitoring borrowers these information transmission theories argue that banks provide unique information production services in an imperfect capital market they suggest that banks know more about the prospects of the firms they lend to than do others thus bank loan agreements should convey useful information to the market a number of researchers empirically examine the uniqueness of bank loans fama 1985 approaches the issue by examining the rates on certificates of deposit and other high grade commercial papers he concludes that since bank borrowers bear the cost of reserve requirements there must be something special about bank loans james 1987 conducts an event study around the announcement of bank credit agreements and reports a significantly positive two day announcement return his results provide evidence support

pareto optima and competitive equilibria with adverse selection and moral hazard this paper explores the extent to which standard general equilibrium analysis of pareto optima and of competitive equilibria can be applied to environments with moral hazard and adverse selection problems allowing for lotteries contracts with random components we first establish that an adverse selection insurance economy a moral hazard insurance economy a signaling economy and a private information labor market economy are all special cases of a simple general structure we then show that techniques for characterizing pareto optimal contracts as solutions to concave programming problems are useful and nice and appear to be broadly applicable allowing for lotteries we show how to characterize the optimal allocations for the adverse selection insurance and labor market economies we then show that standard existence and optimality theorems for competitive equilibria apply in the linear space containing lotteries if agents with characteristics which are distinct and privately observed at the time of initial trading enter the economy wide resource constraints in a homogeneous way other kinds of diversity are not critical for economies with moral hazard which satisfy the homogeneity condition competitive contract markets single out a subset of the optima and thus can be consistent with apparent unemployment and with a random allocation of labor supplied though all households are averse to risk the adverse selection insurance and signaling economies however do not satisfy the homogeneity condition and are difficult to decentralize efficiently with a price system

on the positive role of financial intermediation in allocation of venture capital in a market with imperfect information this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation that highlights the contribution of intermediaries as informed agents in a market with imperfect information we consider a venture capital market where the entrepreneurs select the qualities of projects and their perquisite consumptions about which the investors are imperfectly informed it is shown that when all investors have positive search costs the entrepreneurs are induced to offer the unacceptable inferior projects lemons only and the investors will not enter the venture capital market but put their funds in other low return investments an undesirable allocation of resources beginning with an initial undesirable situation the financial intermediaries may evolve as informed agents that induce a pareto preferred allocation leading the investors to a higher welfare state we focus our analysis on the existence of intermediation equilibra when the market for intermediation services is competitive the distribution of returns on projects the fees charged by intermediaries and the fraction of institutional holdings are all endogenous in equilibrium it is shown that i there cannot be a competitive intermediation equilibrium with very high institutional holdings and ii in other cases multiple equilibra may exist but the one with the highest institutional holdings dominates the others in a pareto sense

bank skin in the game and loan contract design evidence from covenant lite loans in a model of dual agency problems where borrower lender and bank nonbank incentives may conflict we predict a hockey stick relation between bank skin in the game and covenant tightness as bank participation declines covenant tightness increases until reaching a low threshold at which point the relation sharply reverses and covenant protection is removed with a commensurate increase in spread we find support for the hockey stick relation with bank s stake in covenant lite loans averaging 8 0 median we also find that covenant lite loans are more likely when borrower moral hazard is less severe and when bank relationship rents are high

valuation and systemic risk consequences of bank opacity abstract we examine the effects of opacity on bank valuation and synchronicity in bank equity returns over the years 2000 2006 prior to the 2007 financial crisis as expected investments in opaque assets are more profitable than investments in transparent assets and taking profitability into account have larger valuation discounts relative to transparent assets the valuation discounts on opaque asset investments decline over the 2000 2006 period only to be followed by a sharp reversal in 2007 the decline is coincident with a rise in bank equity share prices decrease in transparent asset holdings by banks and greater return synchronicity evidence consistent with a feedback effect

subsistence first farm allocation decisions in senegal abstract this paper examines a problem suggested by the senegalese experience but common to many countries of joint production of a subsistence crop millet which is subject to stringent marketing constraints and a cash crop groundnuts sold through established channels empirical implications for the intertemporal pattern of land allocation are drawn and evidence is provided to support the proposed approach

economic status of households and labour supply to market and non market activities mdash some results from a poor rural economy assuming a given underlying utility structure for all households we have demonstrated that the differential labour supply behaviour among household categories results owing to the different sets of constraints they face depending on their economic status and asset ownership using the criteria implied by the theoretical model four household gorups are defined the labour supply functions estimated for these four groups support the theoretical result of significantly different supply behaviour the empirical exercise as expected indicates that the labour supply decision of the subsistence group is guided by their need to achieve the minimum level of consumption while the middle income households who do not have enough non labour income to meet their minimum subsistence need tend to work longer hours in market activities than the workers from high income households however market labour supply by high income households is found to be relatively more sensitive to changes in the wage rate the behaviou

bank loan terms and conditions for eurozone smes the evolution of bank loan price and non price terms and conditions t cs for the 2009 2011 period are investigated using firm level survey data for a sample of eurozone small and medium sized enterprises the raw firm responses which are of a discrete nature denoting tightening or easing of the t cs or no change at all are modeled by a bivariate ordered probit model according to the results obtained there are sizeable differences between countries with the protagonists of the sovereign debt crisis greece ireland portugal spain exhibiting predicted probabilities of tightening that are considerably above the eurozone average in addition price t cs exhibit a substantial tightening over time finally firms net interest expenses and profitability emerge as important determinants in explaining the cross sectional variation in bank loan t cs that they face

interactive learning informal networks and innovation evidence from electronics firm survey in the pearl river delta china learning by interacting defines the endogenous path of economic development in modern innovation studies in this paper we aim to investigate the way that firms undertake interactive learning in the chinese context by introducing the role of informal guanxi network in this way this paper tries to bridge the gap between studies on firm innovation activities and those on the role of informal network for business performance based on an electronics firm survey in the pearl river delta china this article demonstrates that firms undertaking the highest intensity of interactive learning with the widest scope of business partners such as foreign customers domestic customers parent companies universities and sales agents tend to achieve better innovation outcomes it also verifies a more important role of interactive learning in incremental product innovation than in discontinuous innovation as electronics firms operate in highly modularized value chains furthermore the intensive interactive learning firms have a much higher tendency to apply informal guanxi networks with long term business partners as a complement to deficient formal institutions in interactive learning than other firms overall this paper contributes to the understanding of the form and effect of interactive learning in the chinese context finally the paper addresses the possible lock in issue and points out further research questions on the changing pattern of interactive learning within a maturing institutional framework

collateral and the choice between bank debt and public debt this paper tests how collateral value affects a firm s choice between bank debt and public debt by considering the exogenous variation in the market value of a firm s real estate assets caused by fluctuations in local real estate prices using local land supply elasticities as an instrument for local real estate prices i estimate that a one standard deviation increase in collateral value causes bank debt as a fraction of total debt to increase by six percentage points this paper was accepted by wei jiang finance

some evidence on the uniqueness of initial public debt offerings debt initial public offerings ipos represent a major shift in a firm s financing policy by both extending debt maturity and altering the public private debt mix in contrast to findings for seasoned debt offerings we document a significantly negative stock price response to debt ipo announcements this result is consistent with debt maturity and debt ownership structure theories the equity wealth effect is negatively related to the offer s maturity and positively related to the degree of bank monitoring we find that firms with less information asymmetry and firms with higher growth opportunities experience a less adverse stock price response the decision to access the public debt market for the first time represents a major change in a firm s financing policy an initial public debt offer alters the firm s debt structure in two significant ways not only does this policy choice affect the firm s debt ownership structure by altering its mix of public relative to private debt but it also extends the average debt maturity of the firm substantially this study provides empirical evidence on the validity of some important debt structure theories by focusing on the information content of initial public debt offers debt ipos two major strands of theories have evolved in the literature the debt ownership choice theories model corporate choice of private and public debt mix see e g fama 1985 diamond 1991a and rajan 1992 while the other set of theories models corporate debt maturity choice easterbrook 1984 flannery 1986 and kale and noe 1990 a number of recent studies empirically test some of the predictions of these models barclay and smith 1995 guedes and opler 1996 houston and james 1996 johnson 1997 and stohs and mauer 1996

corporate financial policy and the theory of financial intermediation this paper examines the optimal structure of financial contracts in an economy subject to two forms of moral hazard multiple information problems are shown to generate a role for multiple classes of financial claimants we then show that economic efficiency is enhanced if the financial structure of the economy consists of both direct and intermediated financial contract markets consequlently our results demonstrate a motivation for the complementarity between capital markets and depository financial institutions the purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of the complementary roles of direct financial contract markets and intermediated financial contract markets in the modern theory of corporate finance the need to formulate such a model has been emphasized elsewhere by stiglitz 1985 and fama 1985 among others however an adequate explanation of this phenomenon has yet to be formulated the model described in this paper focuses on the role of multiple information problems in a theory of complex financial structure specifically in an environment with private action i e unobservable investment allocations and private information i e partially unobservable project cash flows multiple claimant classes arise to resolve the separate inefficiencies induced by moral hazard in our model the interaction of project risk and observability creates investment distortions which can be mitigated by increasing the number of outside claimant classes our results demonstrate explicitly the way in which a firm s optimal financial structure depends on the assumed configuration of an investment project s risk and observability characteristics under certain conditions we show that the optimal contractuai allocation in an economy with only direct financial contract markets consists of a debt contract and an outside equity claim this contractual configuration restores the efficient investment allocation decision we then consider the feasibility of an intermediated financial contract market in this setting we show that the existence of an intermediated financial contract market improves economic efficiency due to the reduced aggregate costs of

the maturity structure of corporate debt we provide an empirical examination of the determinants of corporate debt maturity our evidence offers strong support for the contracting cost hypothesis firms that have few growth options are large or are regulated have more long term debt in their capital structure we find little evidence that firms use the maturity structure of their debt to signal information to the market the evidence is consistent however with the hypothesis that firms with larger information asymmetries issue more short term debt we find no evidence that taxes affect debt maturity

what determines outstanding corporate debt mix evidence from fractional multinomial logit estimation abstractthis study employs the fractional multinomial logit setting proposed by papke and wooldridge 1996 to examine factors driving the choice among nonbank private 144a debt bank loans and public debt made by 988 nonfinancial firms during 1993 2007 we document that the majority of firm level factors have persistent effects on corporate outstanding debt mix across economic conditions we also highlight the importance of macroeconomic variables on firms borrowing decisions as predicted by diamond 1991 finally we document a substitution effect among debt financing sources due to credit rating downgrades which is inconsistent with rauh and sufi 2010