ambition versus conscience does corporate social responsibility pay off the application of matching methods in this article we examine the effect of corporate social responsibility csr on firms financial performance csr effect two competing hypotheses social impact hypothesis and shift of focus hypothesis are proposed to investigate this issue where the former suggests that csr has a positive relation with performance and the latter are opposite in order to ensure the csr effect is not contaminated by other factors or samples are randomly drawn we employ four matching methods nearest caliper mahala and mahala caliper to match the samples of csr csr firms and without csr noncsr firms with similar characteristics although four methods yield slightly different results firms engaging in csr activities tend to obtain significantly higher values on pretax income to net sales and profit margin and adopting csr at the very least not deteriorate the performance of firms making our conclusion favors the social impact hypothesis and against shift of focus hypothesis in taiwan thus ambition and conscience are not conflicting with each other

what drives corporate social performance the role of nation level institutions based on whitley s national business systems nbs institutional framework we theorize about and empirically investigate the impact of nation level institutions on firms corporate social performance csp using a sample of firms from 42 countries spanning seven years we construct an annual composite csp index for each firm based on social and environmental metrics we find that the political system followed by the labor and education system and the cultural system are the most important nbs categories of institutions that impact csp interestingly the financial system appears to have a relatively less significant impact we discuss implications for research practice and policymaking

efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

efficient and durable decision rules with incomplete information we compare six concepts of efficiency for economies with incomplete information depending on the stage at which individuals welfare is evaluated and on whether incentive constraints are recognized an example is shown in which an incentive efficient decision rule may be unanimously rejected by the individuals in the economy we define durable decision rules which can resist such unanimous rejection and show that efficient durable decision rules exist

does corporate social responsibility matter in asian emerging markets this study addresses the question whether corporate social responsibility csr matters in asian emerging markets based on csr scores compiled by credit lyonnais securities asia we assess the csr performance of major asian firms over a period of 3 years from 2001 to 2004 the results show that there is a positive and significant relation between csr and market valuation among asian firms we further find that csr is positively related to the market valuation of the subsequent year more importantly asian firms are rewarded by the market for improving their csr practice

individually rational budget balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus abstract we investigate the issue of implementation via individually rational ex post budget balanced bayesian mechanisms we show that all decision rules generating a nonnegative expected social surplus are implementable via such mechanisms if and only if the probability distribution of the agents type profiles satisfies two conditions the well known condition of cremer and mclean 1988 full extraction of the surplus in bayesian and dominant strategy auctions econometrica 56 1247 1257 and the identifiability condition introduced in this paper we also show that these conditions are necessary for ex post efficiency to be attainable with budget balance and individual rationality and that the expected social surplus in these mechanisms can be distributed in any desirable way lastly we demonstrate that like cremer mclean condition the identifiability condition is generic if there are at least three agents

optimality versus practicality in market design a comparison of two double auctions we consider a market for indivisible items with m buyers and m sellers traders privately know their values costs which are statistically dependent two mechanisms are considered the buyer s bid double auction collects bids and asks from traders and determines the allocation by selecting a market clearing price it fails to achieve all possible gains from trade because of strategic bidding the designed mechanism is a revelation mechanism in which honest reporting of values costs is incentive compatible and all gains from trade are achieved this optimality however comes at the expense of plausibility i the monetary transfers among the traders are defined in terms of the traders beliefs about each other s value cost ii a trader may suffer a loss ex post iii the mechanism may run a surplus deficit ex post we compare the virtues of the simple yet mildly inefficient buyer s bid double auction to the flawed yet perfectly efficient designed mechanism

pollution claim settlements under private information abstract the classical problem of resolving a nuisance dispute between a pollution generating firm and nearby residents is modelled here as a mechanism design problem we assume that the designer of the mechanism is the firm that it is uncertain about the actual losses suffered by residents and that the initial assignment of property rights is one where each resident is entitled to prevail we derive a profitmaximizing scheme under the individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints and examine its properties it is shown that the outcomes it yields are sometimes inefficient moreover when many residents are affected by pollution and the degree of uncertainty with respect to the losses they suffer is large these inefficiencies become rampant

balanced bayesian mechanisms in the transferable utility case a number of authors have identified conditions on beliefs that guarantee the existence of bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with balanced transfers we present a new easy to interpret condition and we show that it is strictly more general than all the other conditions found in the literature we also study conditions guaranteeing the bayesian implementability of all social decision rules with balanced budget mechanisms

on governing multilateral transactions with bilateral contracts bilateral contracts while neither negotiated nor enforced in an integrated way are nevertheless often interrelated both economically and strategically owing to production or consumption complementarities and to asymmetric information a set of bilateral contracts forms a mechanism with special properties this mechanism forms a contract equilibrium if there is no joint incentive for a supplier and any individual customer unilaterally to alter the terms of their contract if agents preferences are risk neutral in money income and if their private information is independent then there exists a contract equilibrium that implements efficient transactions if in addition preferences are strictly concave and differentiable in goods and services and technologically feasible sets are suitably convex then this equilibrium is essentially unique

the liability of foreignness in capital markets sources and remedies the accelerating pace of global capital market integration has provided new opportunities for firms to raise capital abroad through global debt issues cross listings and initial public offerings in foreign stock exchanges however existing empirical evidence suggests that foreign firms tend to be at a disadvantage compared with domestic firms and they often suffer from investors home bias the objective of this paper is to understand why firms are facing problems when accessing capital in foreign markets and possible mechanisms that can help to mitigate these problems it expands the liability of foreignness lof research beyond the product market domain to include liabilities faced by firms attempting to secure resources in foreign capital markets we identify key differences between product and capital markets related to information environment time structure of transactions and linkages between buyers and sellers we analyze institutional distance information asymmetry unfamiliarity and cultural differences as the main sources of capital market lof cmlof we suggest possible mechanisms that managers can employ to mitigate cmlof and overcome investors home bias bonding signaling organizational isomorphism and reputational endorsements we also outline directions for further theoretical and empirical development of the cmlof research

asset stock accumulation and sustainability of competitive advantage given incomplete factor markets appropriate time paths of flow variables must be chosen to build required stocks of assets that is critical resources are accumulated rather than acquired in strategic factor markets barney barney j 1986 strategic factor markets expectations luck and business strategy management sci october 1231 1241 sustainability of a firm s asset position hinges on how easily assets can be substituted or imitated imitability is linked to the characteristics of the asset accumulation process time compression diseconomies asset mass efficiencies inter connectedness asset erosion and causal ambiguity

polling mechanisms and the demand revelation problem we consider a revelation mechanism for the production of public goods a sample of consumers is drawn at random each member of the sample is asked to reveal her his preferences agents are subjected to transfers of the groves class and any surplus of taxes collected on sampled agents is redistributed to non sampled agents this polling mechanism is non parametric revealing in dominant strategies budget balanced and approximately efficient if the consumer population is large when applied to a public good with exclusion this mechanism in combination with consumer free mobility yields approximately optimal allocations

shareholder value stakeholder management and social issues what s the bottom line we test the relationship between shareholder value stakeholder management and social issue participation building better relations with primary stakeholders like employees customers suppliers and communities could lead to increased shareholder wealth by helping firms develop intangible valuable assets which can be sources of competitive advantage on the other hand using corporate resources for social issues not related to primary stakeholders may not create value for shareholders we test these propositions with data from s p 500 firms and find evidence that stakeholder management leads to improved shareholder value while social issue participation is negatively associated with shareholder value copyright 2001 john wiley sons ltd

mechanism design with interdependent valuations efficiency ggagents valuations are interdependent if they depend on the signals or types of all agents under the implicit assumption that agents cannot observe their outcome decision payoffs previous literature has shown that with interdependent valuations and independent signals efficient design is impossible this paper shows that an efficient mechanism exists in an environment where first the final outcome e g allocation of the goods is determined then the agents observe their own outcome decision payoffs and then final transfers are made

the ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects in a differential information economy with quasi linear utilities monetary transfers facilitate the fulfillment of incentive compatibility constraints the associated ex ante core is generically non empty however we exhibit a wellbehaved exchange economy in which this core is empty even if goods are allocated through random mechanisms

the signaling effect of corporate social responsibility in emerging economies what signals do firms in emerging economies send to stakeholders when they adopt corporate social responsibility csr practices we argue that in emerging economies firms that adopt csr practices positively signal investors that their firms have superior capabilities for filling institutional voids from an institution based view we hypothesize that the institutional environment moderates the signaling effect of csr on a firm s financial performance based on a sample of firms from ten asian emerging economies we find a positive relationship between csr practices and financial performance this positive relationship is stronger in the less developed capital market than in the more developed one the financial benefits of csr practices are also more salient in the low information diffusion market than in the high one we emphasize that signaling theory and the institution based view can jointly contribute to the csr literature

efficiency despite mutually payoff relevant private information the finite case individuals have or observe partly private information they independently choose acts possibly including messages the center may also act individuals utilities may depend on all acts and information including others private information are there incentives depending only on public information that make desired behavior a bayesian equilibrium assume incentive payments are separable and fully transferable appropriate incentives exisit either if the center s information depends stochastically however slightly on all relevant private information or if individuals relative valuations of acts however divergent are not too dissimilarly affected by different states of nature more generally one gives necessary and sufficient conditions for existence whenever the strategy profile asks agents to reveal all private knowledge relevant to their beliefs about the center s information

the dutch disease in a developing country oil reserves in cameroon abstract noting that most of the literature on the dutch disease refers to developed countries this paper looks at the impact of an oil boom on a developing country when certain features of developing countries particularly the imperfect substitutability between domestic and imported goods are incorporated one of the standard dutch disease results can be reversed not all the traded goods sectors will contract a simulation with a computable general equilibrium model of cameroon reveals that the agricultural sector is most likely to be hurt whereas some of the manufacturing sectors will benefit this suggests possible areas for government intervention should it be warranted and may explain the differential performance between the agricultural and industrial sectors of oil exporting countries in the post 1973 period

truthful equilibria in dynamic bayesian games this paper characterizes an equilibrium payoff subset for markovian games with private information as discounting vanishes monitoring might be imperfect transitions depend on actions types correlated or not values private or interdependent it focuses on equilibria in which players report their information truthfully this characterization generalizes those for repeated games and reduces to a collection of one shot bayesian games with transfers with independent private values the restriction to truthful equilibria is shown to be without loss except for individual rationality in the case of correlated types results from static mechanism design can be applied resulting in a folk theorem

role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information we investigate the adverse selection problem where a principal delegates multiple tasks to an agent we characterize the virtually implementable social choice functions by using the linking mechanism proposed by jackson and sonnenschein 2007 that restricts the message spaces the principal does not require any incentive wage schemes and can therefore avoid any information rent and welfare loss we show the resemblance between the functioning of this message space restriction and that of incentive wage schemes we also extend the results of the single agent model to the multi agent model

no news is bad news sensegiving activities media attention and venture capital funding of new technology organizations a significant body of research has examined how new organizations gain legitimacy and how gaining it affects their subsequent access to resources less attention has been given to the problem of how new organizations attract collective attention although related to legitimation the problem of attracting attention is distinct as attention and evaluation are distinct cognitive processes in this study we examine the allocation of collective attention to new organizations in a system of relationships within which new organizations seek to attract attention through their sensegiving activities the information properties of their sensegiving activities affect the level of attention they receive from different types of media and media attention in turn increases their perceived value potential in the eyes of venture capital investors vcs we examine these relationships in a sample of 398 information technology start ups that have obtained different levels of venture capital funding our results show that new organizations that engage in more intense and diverse sensegiving activities attract higher levels of industry media attention and that these effects are enhanced by the human capital of their founders and leaders diverse sensegiving activities are also associated with higher levels of attention from the general media but only the attention of specialized industry media is positively associated with the level of vc funding obtained these findings extend current research on information intermediation and institutional legitimation by demonstrating that media attention early in the life of new organizations affects how they are valued by a well informed expert audience such as vcs they also contribute to entrepreneurship research on the effects of new organizations strategies on their ability to secure resources and to research on vc funding decisions

the scope of anonymous voluntary bargaining under asymmetric information we present a model of anonymous collective bargaining where individuals preferences and information may be significantly interdependent we show that the bargaining outcome becomes independent of individuals preferences and information as the bargaining group increases in size as a corollary we show that anonymous voluntary bargaining completely fails in large groups either the difference between the bargaining outcome and the status quo vanishes as the size of the group becomes larger or the bargaining becomes coercive and results in a violation of at least some individuals rights the result provides a rationale for the inherent difficulty of reform in the presence of asymmetric information

bargaining under incomplete information this paper presents and analyzes a bargaining model of bilateral monopoly under uncertainty under the bargaining rule proposed the buyer and the seller each submit sealed offers that determine whether the good in question is sold and the transfer price the nash equilibrium solution of this bargaining game implies an offer strategy of each party that is monotonic in its own reservation price and depends on its assessment of the opponent s reservation price issues of relative bargaining advantage and efficiency are examined for a number of special cases finally we discuss the appropriateness of the nash solution concept

ex post renegotiation proof mechanism design we study what kind of equilibria of which mechanisms are ex post renegotiation proof eprp i e robust against the possibility of ex post renegotiation under a variety of renegotiation procedures and which social choice functions are eprp implementable in complete information environments with two agents only budget balanced groves allocations are eprp implementable while with three or more agents all ex post efficient allocations are in environments with independent private values essentially only the budget balanced groves in expectations allocations are eprp implementable while with three or more agents and correlated beliefs all ex post efficient allocations are

financial institutions and markets across countries and over time the updated financial development and structure database this article introduces the updated and expanded version of the financial development and structure database the database includes indicators on the size efficiency and stability of banks nonbank financial institutions and equity and bond markets over 1960 2007 it also contains indicators of financial globalization

the contributions of the economics of information to twentieth century economics in the e eld of economics perhaps the most important break with the past one that leaves open huge areas for future work lies in the economics of information it is now recognized that information is imperfect obtaining information can be costly there are important asymmetries of information and the extent of information asymmetries is affected by actions of e rms and individuals this recognition deeply affects the understanding of wisdom inherited from the past such as the fundamental welfare theorem and some of the basic characterization of a market economy and provides explanations of economic and social phenomena that otherwise would be hard to understand i introduction the century coming to a close has seen vast changes in economics in both ideas and methodology upon ree ection it is remarkable however how many of the seeds of advances in this century were sowed in the previous i would argue that perhaps the most important break with the past one that leaves open huge areas for future work lies in the economics of information the recognition that information is imperfect that obtaining information can be costly that there are important asymmetries of information and that the extent of information asymmetries is affected by actions of e rms and individuals has had profound implications for the wisdom inherited from the past and has provided explanations of economic and social phenomena that otherwise would be hard to understand in this essay i wish to argue that information economics has had directly and indirectly a profound effect on how we think about economics today eighteenth and nineteenth century antecedents to be sure marshall and other nineteenth century economists talked about problems of imperfect information but with one exception discussions of information were obiter dicta caveats at the end of the analysis they were never at the center

correlated types and bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with budget balance abstract this note presents a condition which guarantees the existence of a bayesian incentive compatible mechanism with budget balance when agents have quasi linear utility functions this condition requires correlation among agents private signals types and is 1 simple and easy to verify 2 good for any decision rule whether efficient or not 3 valid even if agents types are mutually payoff relevant and 4 true for almost every probability distribution of agents types journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c72 d82

do corporate global environmental standards create or destroy market value arguments can be made on both sides of the question of whether a stringent global corporate environmental standard represents a competitive asset or liability for multinational enterprises mnes investing in emerging and developing markets analyzing the global environmental standards of a sample of u s based mnes in relation to their stock market performance we find that firms adopting a single stringent global environmental standard have much higher market values as measured by tobin sq than firms defaulting to less stringent or poorly enforced host country standards thus developing countries that use lax environmental regulations to attract foreign direct investment may end up attracting poorer quality and perhaps less competitive firms our results also suggest that externalities are incorporated to a significant extent in firm valuation we discuss plausible reasons for this observation

incomplete information incentive compatibility and the core abstract we consider an exchange economy in which agents possess private information at the time of engaging in state contingent contracts while communication of private information is permitted the true information state is not verifiable the enforcement of contracts is therefore limited by incentive compatibility constraints we formalize a notion of the core for such an economy our analysis can be viewed as an attempt to incorporate incentive compatibility in the coarse core of r wilson 1978 econometrica46 807 816 or as an attempt to introduce coalitional contracts in the notion of incentive efficiency of b holmstrom and r myerson 1983 econometrica51 1799 1819 while there are some special cases in which the incentive compatible core is non empty our main result shows that is not generally true journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c71 c72 d51

ex ante efficient ex post individually rational trade abstract consider a bilateral trade model with two sided incomplete information for a general set of independent beliefs an ex post individually rational mechanism generating the same level of ex ante expected gains from trade as an ex ante efficient interim individually rational mechanism is constructed thus imposing the stronger notion of ex post individual rationality on this mechanism design problem generates no loss of efficiency

alarmist decisions with divergent risk information receipt of multiple sources of risk information ideally should foster sounder decisions under uncertainty this paper s original survey results for environmental risks suggest that the learning process is reasonable in many respects bur it does not accord with a rational bayesian learning model divergent risk assessments from different sources produce extreme violations of rationality as there is inordinate weight on the high risk assessment this alarmist reaction holds for both government and industry information sources this phenomenon may account for the commonly observed phenomenon of public overreaction to highly publicised risks

linear inequality methods to enforce partnerships under uncertainty an overview we review different generic conditions on stochastic outcome functions to enforce either efficient or nearly efficient partnerships their logical relationship is explored two kinds of conditions are considered however the property for an action profile to be compatible plays a crucial role in both kinds also two kinds of enforcement mechanisms are considered enforcement through utility transfers and enforcement through repetition

bringing institutions into performance persistence research exploring the impact of product financial and labor market institutions this study challenges the implicit assumption of homogeneity in national institutional environments made in past studies of firm performance persistence we propose that home country institutions matter we focus on the impact of formal institutions in the product financial and labor markets arguing that they affect the size of pools of exchange partners and the types of exchanges allowed and condoned ultimately these restrictions affect competitive intensity among firms and firm performance persistence using data for over 10 000 firms from 33 countries over a 10 year time frame we show that antitrust law strength a product market institution designed to prevent collusion among firms is associated with decreases in performance persistence unskilled labor market flexibility a labor market institution that reduces legal constraints imposed on residual claimants managers and owners to take necessary actions to maintain or enhance profitability is associated with increases in performance persistence product liability law effectiveness another product market institution and corporate control market development a financial market institution are positively associated with performance persistence only in the case of mnes the two remaining financial and labor market institutions public equity market development respectively skilled labor market availability have a positive respectively negative impact for domestic firms only

correlated information and mechanism design in models of asymmetric information possession of private information leads to rents for the possessors this induces mechanism designers to distort away from efficiency the authors show that this is an artifact of the presumption that information is independently distributed rent extraction in a large class of mechanism design games is analyzed and a necessary and sufficient condition for arbitrarily small rents to private information is provided additionally the two person bargaining game is shown to have an efficient solution under first order stochastic dominance and a hazard rate condition similar conditions allow full rent extraction in milgrom weber auctions

estimating the performance effects of business groups in emerging markets business groups confederations of legally independent firms are ubiquitous in emerging economies yet very little is known about their effects on the performance of affiliated firms we conceive of business groups as responses to market failures and high transaction costs in doing so we develop hypotheses about the effects of group affiliation on firm profitability affiliation could either boost or depress firm profitability and members of a group are likely to earn rates of return similar to other members of the same group using a unique data set compiled largely from local sources we test for these effects in 14 emerging markets argentina brazil chile india indonesia israel mexico peru the philippines south africa south korea taiwan thailand and turkey we find evidence that business groups indeed affect the broad patterns of economic performance in 12 of the markets we examine group affiliation appears to have as profound an effect on profitability as does industry membership yet strategy scholars have a much clearer grasp of industries than of groups moreover membership in a group raises the profitability of the average group member in several of the markets we examine this runs contrary to the wisdom conventional in advanced economies that unrelated diversification depresses profitability overall our findings suggest that the roots of sustained differences in profitability may vary across institutional contexts conclusions drawn in one context may well not apply to another copyright 2001 john wiley sons ltd

the impact of macroeconomic policies on income distribution an empirical study of the philippines there has been a growing awareness of the income distribution dimension of macroeconomic policies this paper studies this issue empirically considering the case of the philippines and using data available from integrated surveys of households after estimating a reduced form equation it was found that underemployment inflation and government spending worsen income distribution while productivity gains the real interest rate and the real exchange rate were found to improve distribution a similar pattern emerges when the effects of these variables on the absolute incidence of poverty are estimated excerpt

does social performance really lead to financial performance accounting for endogeneity the empirical relationship between a firm s social performance and its financial performance is still not well established in the literature despite more than 30 years of research and more than 100 empirical studies on the issue the results are still mixed we argue that the heterogeneous results found in previous studies are not due exclusively to problems related with the measurement instruments or the samples used instead we posit that a more fundamental problem related with the endogeneity of social strategic decisions could be driving most of the empirical findings we show that using a panel data of 658 firms from 1991 to 2005 how some of the results found in previous research change and some are even reversed when endogeneity is properly taken into account

information immobility and foreign portfolio investment we examine how residents of the united states allocate their stock portfolios internationally we find that a large u s foreign direct investment fdi position in a destination country in 1990 is associated with a relatively large stock portfolio position in that country in the 2001 2006 period moreover a change in the u s fdi position from 1980 to 1990 helps predict the change in the u s foreign portfolio investment position from 1994 to 2006 these results are rationalized by van nieuwerburgh and veldkamp s 2009 equilibrium model of learning and portfolio choice under an information processing constraint fdi establishes marginal differences in the endowments of information about different countries which later translate into differences in stock portfolio holdings we control for cross country differences in capital controls proximity along different dimensions corporate governance and economic and capital market development our results also hold for the g6 countries collectively jel f21 f36 g11

auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types abstract this paper studies optimal auction design when the seller can affect the buyers valuations through an unobservable ex ante investment the key insight is that the optimal mechanism may have the seller play a mixed investment strategy so as to create correlation between the buyers otherwise conditionally independent valuations assuming that the seller announces the mechanism before investing the paper establishes conditions on the investment technology so that a mechanism exists which leaves buyers no information rent and leaves the seller indifferent between his investments under these conditions the seller can in fact extract the first best surplus almost fully

subgame perfect implementation under information perturbations we consider the robustness of extensive form mechanisms to deviations from common knowledge about the state of nature which we refer to as information perturbations first we show that even under arbitrarily small information perturbations the moore repullo mechanism does not yield even approximately truthful revelation and that in addition the mechanism has sequential equilibria with undesirable outcomes more generally we prove that any extensive form mechanism is fragile in the sense that if a non maskin monotonic social objective can be implemented with this mechanism then there are arbitrarily small information perturbations under which an undesirable sequential equilibrium also exists finally we argue that outside options can help improve efficiency in asymmetric information environments and that these options can be thought of as reflecting ownership of an asset

incentives and the existence of pareto optimal revelation mechanisms abstract from the characterization of strongly and bayesian incentive compatible paretooptimal mechanisms with transferable utilities we derive the following results if there are only two types per individual then a strongly incentive compatible paretooptimal mechanism exists if there are only two individuals with more than three types then there are sets of beliefs open in the class of all beliefs for which no bayesian incentive compatible pareto optimal mechanism exists if there are more than two individuals then the class of beliefs for which such mechanisms exist is open and dense in the class of all beliefs

on public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget abstract consider a mechanism for the binary public good provision problem that is dominant strategy incentive compatible dsic ex post individually rational epir and ex post budget balanced epbb it is well known that if there are only two agents then any such mechanism must have a threshold or fixed cost sharing form providing the public good if and only if both agents have values that are at least their respective thresholds when there are more than two agents there are mechanisms that are dsic epir and epbb that are not of the threshold form any dsic epir and epbb mechanism that additionally satisfies that the lowest types expect zero net utility from participating are again of the threshold form this additional condition arises endogenously when maximizing expected welfare subject to dsic epir and epbb

adjustment and income distribution in an agricultural economy a general equilibrium analysis of cameroon abstract to distinguish policy packages that have favorable characteristics for both structural adjustment and income distribution this paper uses static and dynamically optimizing simulations of a computable general equilibrium cge model based on detailed country and household data from cameroon model results indicate that public spending to reduce transport and marketing costs are beneficial for the poor and for economic growth even at the expense of competing public investments

cartel enforcement with uncertainty about costs what cartel agreements are possible when firms have private information about production costs in order for a cartel agreement to work it must take into account the incentives for firms to misrepresent their cost information and it must provide sufficient reward so that no firm wishes to defect for private cost uncertainty we characterize the set of cartel agreements with side payments that can be supported as bayesian nash equilibria we show that if defection results in either cournot or bertrand competition the incentive problems in large cartels are severe enough to prevent the cartel from achieving the monopoly outcome in contrast with common cost uncertainty the incentive problems become less severe in large cartels allowing perfect collusion

the relevance of private information in mechanism design abstract recent results in mechanism design show that as long as agents have correlated private information and are sufficiently risk neutral it is possible to design mechanisms that leave agents with arbitrarily small information rents we show that these full rent extraction results hinge on the implicit assumption that the agents beliefs uniquely determine their preferences we present an example of the voluntary provision of a public good in which this assumption is relaxed and consequently even in highly correlated environments if agents beliefs do not uniquely determine their preferences then the extraction of the agents entire information rents is impossible

equilibria of the sealed bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information we study the nash equilibria of the sealed bid bargaining mechanism with incomplete information a nonzero sum game for the case of uniform priors we describe two uncountably numerous families of equilibria the first has differentiable strategies in the second the strategies are step functions the efficiencies of these equilibria range from second best to zero for independent nonuniform priors we show that a similar situation obtains these results seem discouraging with regard to using the sealed bid mechanism in practice the mechanism might be salvaged however if bargainers turn out to confine themselves to linear strategy equilibria

perspective explaining influence rents the case for an institutions based view of strategy research in strategy has identified and tried to explain four types of rents monopolistic rents efficiency rents quasi rents and schumpeterian rents building on previous work on political and institutional strategies we add a fifth type of rent influence rents influence rents are the extra profits earned by a firm because the rules of the game laws regulations and informal rules are designed or changed to suit it to aid the analysis of the relationship between institutional context and firm performance and to provide a structure to guide research we develop a framework with five key components a an identification of the five fundamental problems of a market economy b a typology that describes the five different types of institutions that emerge to solve these problems c the market ordering mechanisms used by institutions to solve these problems d the common causes of weak institutional performance and e generic strategies used by firms to exploit these weaknesses of an institutional context to enhance firm performance we highlight potential applications of the framework as well as an illustrative research agenda that can advance the development of theory to explain the emergence and persistence of influence rents

threshold cointegration and causality relationship between energy use and growth in seven african countries abstract the paper investigates the long run and the causality relationship between energy consumption and economic growth for seven sub saharan african countries during the period 1970 2007 using the gregory and hansen 1996a 1996b testing approach to threshold cointegration we find that energy consumption is cointegrated with economic growth in cameroon cote d ivoire ghana nigeria and south africa moreover this test suggests that economic growth has a significant positive long run impact on energy consumption in these countries before 1988 and this effect becomes negative after 1988 in ghana and south africa furthermore causality tests suggest bidirectional causality between energy consumption and real gdp in cote d ivoire and unidirectional causality running from real gdp to energy usage in the case of congo and ghana

informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty in mclean and postlewaite econometrica 56 1992 p 2421 we analyzed pure exchange economies with asymmetrically informed agents we defined a notion of informational size and showed that when the aggregate information of all agents resolves nearly all the uncertainty regarding the state of nature the conflict between incentive compatibility and ex post efficiency can be made small if agents have sufficiently small informational size this paper investigates the relationship between informational size and efficiency for the case in which nontrivial aggregate uncertainty is present i e when significant uncertainty about the world persists even when the information of all agents is known

the political feasibility of rural poverty reduction abstract policies oriented at the reduction of rural poverty will only be introduced if politically feasible computable general equilibrium and multimarket models have been widely used to measure the complex economic and welfare effects of these policies based on the body of theoretical and empirical knowledge on the determinants of influence by groups in civil society and on the role of the state in policy making an index of the political feasibility of policy outcomes is constructed use of this index with data from india and ecuador allows to identify a number of promising avenues to politically feasible reforms in particular by choosing policies that induce the emergence of supportive coalitions dominated by the nonpoor the general equilibrium effects and the leakages of antipoverty instruments are key in inducing emergence of these coalitions

asymmetric information bargaining problems with many agents a yes or no decision must be made about some issue all agents must agree the coase theorem asserts that the efficient outcome will always result suppose the value positive or negative that an individual attaches to an affirmative decision is privately known to that individual it is proved under very mild conditions that with independent types as the number of agents increases the probability of an affirmative efficient decision goes to zero an example in which it is common knowledge that an affirmative decision is efficient and yet the probability of such a decision goes to zero is given

public goods participation constraints and democracy a possibility theorem abstract it is well known that ex post efficient mechanisms for the provision of indivisible public goods are not interim individually rational however the corresponding literature assumes that agents who veto a mechanism can enforce a situation in which the public good is never provided this paper instead considers majority voting with uniform cost sharing as the relevant status quo efficient mechanisms may then exist which also satisfy all agents interim participation constraints in this case ex post inefficient voting mechanisms can be replaced by efficient ones without reducing any individual s expected utility intuitively agents with a low willingness to pay have to contribute more under majority rule than under an efficient mechanism with a balanced budget although this possibility theorem is not universal in the sense of schweizer 2006 an asymptotic possibility is obtained for certain type distributions

eliciting informative feedback the peer prediction method many recommendation and decision processes depend on eliciting evaluations of opportunities products and vendors a scoring system is devised that induces honest reporting of feedback each rater merely reports a signal and the system applies proper scoring rules to the implied posterior beliefs about another rater s report honest reporting proves to be a nash equilibrium the scoring schemes can be scaled to induce appropriate effort by raters and can be extended to handle sequential interaction and continuous signals we also address a number of practical implementation issues that arise in settings such as academic reviewing and online recommender and reputation systems

incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability abstract we consider the bayesian collective choice problem with side payment we introduce the regularity condition which describes the case that agents have mutually correlated private information under the regularity condition we construct a transfer rule with budget balancing which together with the efficient public decision rule is incentive compatible truth telling may be a unique iteratively undominated strategy profile in our direct mechanism

filling the institutional void the social behavior and performance of family vs non family technology firms in emerging markets family businesses fbs are said to treat their employees with unusual consideration to form a cohesive internal community they are also claimed to develop deeper more extensive connections or relationships with outside stakeholders both behaviors may increase the viability of a business intended to support an owning family and its later generations such social linkages we believe may compensate for the lack of capital product and labor institutional infrastructures in dynamic emerging economies this survey study of a most challenging emerging market sector namely korean hightechnology businesses argues three major points 1 relationships of community and connection will be more common in fbs than in non fbs 2 these relationships will enhance performance in emerging market hightechnology sectors which because of their competitive complex and everchanging nature rely on significant expert knowledge and social capital within and outside the organizational community 3 the performance of fbs will benefit more from these community and connection relationships than the performance of non fbs because in these personally intimate settings employees and external partners will be especially likely to return the generosity of a visibly active owning family or to penalize its selfishness significant empirical support was found for most of these hypotheses

efficiency in partnerships we provide the necessary and sufficient condition for a partnership to be able to sustain efficiency when the output is stochastic when limited liability is imposed we show that only the level of the average liability of the partnership is important the individual levels of liability are irrelevant however the allocation of the total liability among the partners is crucial when additional conditions such as neutrality or individual rationality are imposed

informational size and efficient auctions we develop an auction model for the case of interdependent values and multidimensional signals in which agents signals are correlated we provide conditions under which a modification of the vickrey auction which includes payments to the bidders will result in an ex post efficient outcome furthermore we provide a definition of informational size such that the necessary payments to bidders will be arbitrarily small if agents are sufficiently informationally small the efficiency of market processes has been a central concern in economics since its inception auction mechanisms constitute a very important class of market processes yet the analysis of auctions has typically focused on their revenue generating properties rather than their efficiency properties this is partly due to the fact that for many of the problems typically studied efficiency is trivial when bidders have private values a standard vickrey auction guarantees that the object will be sold to the buyer with the highest value for the object in the case of pure common values that is when all buyers have the same value for the object any outcome that with probability one assigns the object to some bidder will be efficient the intermediate case in which bidders values are not identical but may depend on other bidders signals is more problematic when bidders values are interdependent in this way any single bidder s value may depend on the information of other agents and hence he may not even know his own value it is not clear what it would mean for an agent to bid his true value even before we ask if it is optimal for him to do so several papers have studied efficient auctions with interdependent values and independent types 1 while this is a natural place to begin the independence assumption is not compelling for many problems a prototypical problem is one in which an object is to be sold and individual bidders have private information about the object say the quantity or quality of oil in a tract to be sold that affects other agents values for the object when bidders types include information about objective characteristics of the object being sold their types will typically not be independent when agents types are statistically dependent we show that there exist efficient auction mechanisms for interdependent value auction problems that are essentially vickrey auctions augmented by payments to not from the agents most importantly we link the

informational size and incentive compatibility we examine a general equilibrium model with asymmetrically informed agents the presence of asymmetric information generally presents a conflict between incentive com patibility and pareto efficiency we present a notion of informational size and show that the conflict between incentive compatibility and efficiency can be made arbitrarily small if agents are of sufficiently small informational size the incompatibility of pareto efficiency and incentive compatibility is a central theme in economics and game theory the issues associated with this incompatibility are particularly important in the design of resource allocation mechanisms in the presence of asymmetrically informed agents where the need to acquire information from agents in order to compute efficient outcomes and the incentives agents have to misrepresent that information for personal gain come into conflict despite a large literature that focuses on these issues there has been little work aimed at understanding those situations in which informational asymmetries are quantitatively important virtually every transaction is characterized by some asymmetry of information any investor who buys or sells a share of stock generally knows something rel evant to the value of the share that is not known to the person on the other side of the transaction in order to focus on more salient aspects of the problem many models rightly ignore the incentive problems associated with informa tional asymmetries in the belief that for the problem at hand agents are infor mationally small however few researchers have investigated the circumstances under which an analysis that ignores these incentive problems will yield results similar to those obtained when these problems are fully accounted for in this paper we study a class of mechanism design problems our goal is to formalize informational size in a way that when agents are informationally small 1 early versions of this paper circulated under the titles informational smallness and pareto effi ciency and informational smallness and incentive compatibility we thank jacques cremer dean foster andreu mas colell stephen morris david schmeidler and particularly faruk gul for help ful conversations and rajiv vohra for a very careful reading we also thank the numerous partici pants in seminars at which this paper was presented for helpful comments we also thank an editor and the referees for very helpful comments and thank ichiro obara for pointing out an error in an earlier version postlewaite gratefully acknowledges support from the national science foundation

corporate social responsibility in europe and the u s insights from businesses self presentations the paper compares the extent and content of businesses communications about corporate social responsibility csr in france the netherlands the u k and the u s in particular the study investigates the nature of csr principles processes and stakeholder issues discussed in web pages the results show that businesses in the four countries do not display the same eagerness to appear as socially responsible and employ diverse means to convey social responsibility images

to steal or not to steal firm attributes legal environment and valuation data on corporate governance and disclosure practices reveal wide within country variation that decreases with the strength of investors legal protection a simple model identifies three firm attributes related to that variation investment opportunities external financing and ownership structure using firm level governance and transparency data from 27 countries we find that all three firm attributes are related to the quality of governance and disclosure practices and firms with higher governance and transparency rankings are valued higher in stock markets all relations are stronger in less investor friendly countries demonstrating that firms adapt to poor legal environments to establish efficient governance practices

full extraction of the surplus in bayesian and dominant strategy auctions we consider auctions for a single indivisible object in the case where the bidders have information about each other which is not available to the seller we show that the seller can use this information to his own benefit and we completely characterize the environ ments in which a well chosen auction gives him the same expected payoff as that obtainable were he able to sell the object with full information about each bidder s willingness to pay we provide this characterization for auctions in which the bidders have dominant strate gies and for those where the relevant equilibrium concept is bayesian nash in both set ups the existence of these auctions hinges on the possibility of constructing lotteries with the correct properties we consider the situation in which an agent the seller possesses one indivisible unit of a good to which he attaches no value but the good has value to a number of potential buyers and its transfer to one of them would increase social welfare in particular the transfer to the buyer with the highest valuation maximizes social welfare in this paper we completely characterize environments in which the seller can design an auction that will enable him to capture for himself the full increase in social welfare induced by the transfer of the good to the bidder with the highest willingness to pay if the seller had full information about the reservation prices of potential buyers his optimal selling strategy would be very simple he would announce a price equal or very close to the highest reservation value the optimal strategy for the bidder with the highest evaluation would be to accept the offer note that we are treating a situation in which the seller can commit himself to a price as a result of the exchange the utility of the seller increases by the full amount of the increase in social welfare and he has been able to fully extract the surplus in many circumstances however a seller has only imperfect knowledge of the buyers willingnesses to pay in this case he must find some mechanism or auction which will enable him to maximize his benefit from the sale of the object the auction literature starts with this observation and shows how the seller can by an astute choice of auction extract the largest possible fraction of the surplus in general the literature has shown that this proportion is strictly less than one in some circumstances the bidders will have information about each other which is not available to the seller for instance in auctions for petroleum drilling rights bidders know the results of geological tests which they have

bilateral trade with the sealed bid k double auction existence and efficiency for k in the unit interval the k double auction determines the terms of trade when a buyer and a seller negotiate transfer of an item the buyer submits a bid b and the seller submits an offer s trade occurs if b exceeds s at price kb 1 k s we model trade as a bayesian game in which each trader privately knows his reservation value but only has beliefs about the other trader s value existence of a multiplicity of equilibria is proven for a class of trader s beliefs for generic beliefs however these equilibria are shown to be ex ante inefficient

cultural dimensions ethical sensitivity and corporate governance the economic globalization process has integrated different competitive markets and pushes firms in different countries to improve their managerial and operational efficiencies given the recent empirical evidence for the benefits to firms and stakeholders of good corporate governance cg practice it is expected that good cg practice would be a common strategy for firms in different countries to meet the increasingly intense competition however this is not the case this study examines the differences in cg practices in firms across different countries using the concept of ethical sensitivity through the regression analysis of 271 firms in 12 countries and regions it is found that hofstede s cultural dimensions can explain the differences in cg practices furthermore the results demonstrate the influence of culture on ethical sensitivity which eventually determines the cg practices in different regions

uncertainty asymmetric information and bilateral contracts on considere un monopole bilateral avec incertitude et information asymetrique on donne les conditions necessaires et suffisantes a l existence de contrats qui soient efficaces et a la fois stimulants

the liability of good reputation a study of product recalls in the u s automobile industry in this paper we explore opposing theoretical claims about how organizational reputation affects market reactions to product defects on the one hand good reputation could be a disadvantage because expectations about product quality are more likely to be violated by defects in highly reputed products on the other hand a good reputation could be an advantage because of strong inertial effects on reputation orderings we empirically test these competing hypotheses using data on product recalls in the u s automobile industry from 1975 to 1999 our results support for the idea that reputation can be an organizational liability in that highly reputed firms suffer more market penalty as a result of their product recalls we also propose that the reputational effects are moderated by two important factors substitutability and generalism specialism our results show that having few substitutes with an equivalent level of reputation or a focused product identity stemming from specialism buffers the negative market reactions to product recalls we conclude with a discussion on the implications of these results for institutional reputation and status theories

the corporate social performance financial performance link strategic managers are consistently faced with the decision of how to allocate scarce corporate resources in an environment that is placing more and more pressures on them recent scholarship in strategic management suggests that many of these pressures come directly from sources associated with social issues in management rather than traditional arenas of strategic management using a greatly improved source of data on corporate social performance this paper reports the results of a rigorous study of the empirical linkages between financial and social performance corporate social performance csp is found to be positively associated with prior financial performance supporting the theory that slack resource availability and csp are positively related csp is also found to be positively associated with future financial performance supporting the theory that good management and csp are positively related 1997 by john wiley sons ltd