getting ahead of the joneses when equality increases conspicuous consumption among bottom tier consumers it is widely believed that increasing the equality of material possessions or income in a social group should lead people at the bottom of the distribution to consume less and save more however this prediction and its causal mechanism have never been studied experimentally five studies show that greater equality increases the satisfaction of those in the lowest tier of the distribution because it reduces the possession gap between what they have and what others have however greater equality also increases the position gains derived from status enhancing consumption since it allows low tier consumers to get ahead of the higher proportion of consumers clustered in the middle tiers as a result greater equality reduces consumption when consumers focus on the narrower possession gap but it increases consumption when they focus on the greater position gains i e when consumption is conspicuous social competition goals are primed and the environment is competitive

commuting transport tax reform and the labour market employer paid parking and the relative efficiency of revenue recycling instruments in this paper the welfare effects of a budget neutral increase in taxes on car commuters are studied in a model that takes into account the presence of employer paid parking at the workplace it is found that the presence of employer paid parking substantially increases the welfare effect of such a tax reform independent of the use of the revenues congestion taxes not only correct congestion externalities they also reduce the inefficiency caused by employer paid parking moreover different congestion effects of alternative recycling instruments and the presence of employer paid parking jointly imply that recycling the tax revenues via higher public transport subsidies may yield much more favourable welfare effects than previously believed it can easily outperform recycling the tax revenues via lower labour taxes finally cashing out parking costs to public transport users is found to generate substantial positive welfare effects numerical analysis confirms the theory

falling behind the joneses relative consumption and the growth savings paradox abstract concern for individual consumption relative to per capita consumption can induce a fear of falling behind which increases precautionary savings this fear intensifies as societal income growth increases allowing for a positive effect of growth on savings rates

cautious risk takers investor preferences and demand for active management actively managed mutual funds have distinct return distributions from their passive benchmarks and our theoretical analysis using tail sensitive risk preferences suggests that active value and growth funds may serve to reduce downside risk and capture upside potential respectively furthermore tail sensitivity measures estimated from the empirical pricing kernel have significant explanatory power for active fund flows even after controlling for business cycles and market wide sentiment finally active funds unlike their passive counterparts have exposures to option strategies hedging downside risk or capturing upside potential

long run welfare under externalities in consumption leisure and production a case for happy degrowth vs unhappy growth in this paper we contribute to the debate on the relationship between growth and well being by examining an endogenous growth model where we allow for externalities in consumption leisure and production we analyze three regimes a decentralized economy where each household makes isolated choices without considering their external effects a planned economy where a myopic planner fails to recognize both leisure and consumption externalities but recognizes production externalities and a planned economy with a fully informed planner we first compare the balanced growth paths under the three regimes and then we numerically investigate the transition to the optimal balanced growth path we provide a number of findings first in a decentralized economy growth or labor or both are greater than in the regime with a fully informed planner and hence are sub optimal from a welfare standpoint second a myopic intervention which overlooks consumption and leisure externalities leads to more growth and labor than in both the decentralized and the fully informed regime third we provide a case for happy degrowth a transition to the optimal balanced growth path that is associated with downscaling of production a reduction in private consumption and an ongoing increase in leisure and well being

tax evasion on a social network abstract we relate tax evasion behavior to a substantial literature on social comparison in judgements taxpayers engage in tax evasion as a means to boost their expected consumption relative to others in their social network the unique nash equilibrium of the model relates optimal evasion to a bonacich measure of network centrality more central taxpayers evade more given that tax authorities are now investing heavily in big data tools that aim to construct social networks we investigate the value of acquiring network information we do this using networks that allow for celebrity taxpayers whose consumption is seen widely and who are systematically of higher wealth we show that there are pronounced returns to the initial acquisition of network information especially in the presence of celebrity taxpayers

the social basis of interdependent preferences abstract most economists are sympathetic to the idea that concerns for relative position are an important aspect of many economic problems there has traditionally been a reluctance to include such concerns primarily because models that included them often allow such a broad range of behavior that there are few if any restrictions on equilibrium behavior and hence such models would have little or no predictive power in this paper we discuss how reduced form models may naturally give rise to utility functions that depend in part on relative standing there are several advantages of modelling concern for relative standing in reduced form utility functions even when there is no similar concern in the deep preferences it provides structure and constraints on the way that relative standing affects utility and further it can yield testable implications about the way that changes in the underlying environment affect the concern for relative standing we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of modelling social concerns in this way and provide examples that illustrate how concerns for relative standing can affect savings investment and labor choice decisions

social comparisons and contributions to online communities a field experiment on movielens we design a field experiment to explore the use of social comparison to increase contributions to an online community we find that after receiving behavioral information about the median user s total number of movie ratings users below the median demonstrate a 530 percent increase in the number of monthly movie ratings while those above the median decrease their ratings by 62 percent when given outcome information about the average user s net benefit score above average users mainly engage in activities that help others our findings suggest that effective personalized social information can increase the level of public goods provision

merit approbation and the evolution of social structure in this paper we study a society in which individuals gain utility from income and from social approbation income is correlated with class approbation is given to an unobservable trait which must be signalled through the agent s social mobility i e class change mobility is driven by a simple mechanism involving inheritance effort and ability thus social structure class composition is affected by individuals quest for approbation and we study how that affects the emergence and multiplicity of long run social organizations including hybrid forms of dynasties and meritocracies specifically we observe that even though social mobility is driven purely by a meritocratic mechanism pure dynasties can emerge we then introduce a feedback between the size of the upper class and its income value so that effort levels and social structure are jointly endogenous we derive results on equilibrium effort levels and stationary when they exist social structures social organization can converge to a unique steady state multiple long run equilibria or cycles

are positional concerns stronger in some domains than in others for more than one hundred years economists have discussed the concept of positional goods that the utility conferred by many perhaps even most goods depends not only on the amount the individual consumes but also on the amount others consume e g thorstein veblen 1899 james duesenberry 1949 john k galbraith 1958 robert frank 1985 while economic interest in positional goods is increasing e g mark pingle and mike mitchell 2002 kenneth arrow et al 2004 ed hopkins and tatiana kornienko 2004 the literature remains largely theoretical rather than empirical if status concerns affect all items in the utility function equally leisure as well as goods the positional effect would operate like a lump sum tax reducing well being without changing the allocation of time or money arrow et al 2004 however if positional concerns are stronger for some things than for others then in order to understand how people can become better off in well being not simply in wealth we must investigate how interpersonal competition interacts with material gains frank 1997 evidence about what goods are more positional than others is essential for correct policy recommendations gregory besharov 2002 but little is actually known about the relative positional rankings of items in the typical consumer s utility function four hypotheses proposed in the literature are

the evolution of engel curves and its implications for structural change theory the tendency for expenditure engel curves to flatten out at high income levels is frequently cited as evidence that major shifts in household spending patterns take place as households become more affluent empirically little has been done to examine i how pervasive this tendency is across the engel curves of different goods and services ii whether the rate at which engel curves flatten out may significantly change over time and iii how robust engel curves are in the face of changes in the income distribution of households using data from the uk family expenditure survey we find evidence that the tendency for engel curves to flatten out which we dub saturation is indeed widespread across a wide range of goods and services however a tendency for their shape to shift over time and for these shifts to co move with changes in the income distribution of households casts some doubt on whether the declining slope of engel curves can be used to predict slowdowns in the growth rate of demand for particular goods and services

costly search and mutual fund flows this paper studies the flows of funds into and out of equity mutual funds consumers base their fund purchase decisions on prior performance information but do so asymmetrically investing disproportionately more in funds that performed very well the prior period search costs seem to be an important determinant of fund flows high performance appears to be most salient for funds that exert higher marketing effort as measured by higher fees flows are directly related to the size of the fund s complex as well as the current media attention received by the fund which lower consumers search costs

do positional goods inhibit saving evidence from a life cycle experiment abstract we investigate the effect of positional goods goods for which one s consumption relative to others matters on saving based on results from a life cycle consumption saving experiment in a group treatment we allow inter personal comparisons by assigning subjects to groups and displaying rankings based partly on consumption a baseline individual treatment is similar but without the additional information we find more under saving saving less than the optimal amount and lower money earnings for subjects in the group treatment both effects are economically relevant with magnitudes of roughly 6 7 of expected income and 7 8 of average earnings respectively additional analysis shows that the result is driven by those subjects who are not ranked in the top three in their group keeping up with the joneses and males in particular

the logit equilibrium a perspective on intuitive behavioural anomalies costs associated with deviations from the nash equilibrium these payoff asymmetry effects are incorporated in an approach that introduces noisy behavior via a logit probabilistic choice function in the resulting logit equilibrium behavior is characterized by a probability distribution that satisfies a rational expectations consistency condition the beliefs that determine players expected payoffs match the decision distributions that arise from applying the logit rule to those expected payoffs we prove existence of a unique symmetric logit equilibrium and derive comparative statics results the paper provides a unified perspective on many recent laboratory studies of games in which nash equilibrium predictions are inconsistent with both intuition and experimental evidence

ranking games and gambling when to quit when you re ahead it is common for rewards to be given on the basis of a rank ordering so that relative performance amongst a cohort is the criterion in this paper we formulate an equilibrium model in which an agent makes successive decisions on whether or not to gamble and is rewarded on the basis of a rank ordering of the final position amongst competing players one application of this model is to the behavior of mutual fund managers who are paid depending on funds under management which in turn are greatly influenced by annual or quarterly rank orderings our model deals with a situation in which fund managers can elect either to pick stocks or to use a market tracking strategy in equilibrium the distribution of the final position will have a negative skew we explore how this distribution depends on the number of players the probability of success when gambling the structure of the rewards and on information regarding the performance of other players

inequality and growth in the presence of competition for status abstract we investigate a simple endogenous growth model where agents care about their social status as greater equality tends to provide greater incentives to differentiate oneself redistribution may increase wasteful competitive consumption and lead to lower growth

infrastructure privatization and changes in corruption patterns the roots of public discontent abstract this paper offers a theory of how the degree of corruption that prevails in a society responds to changes in the ownership structure of major public service providers we show that there are cases in which privatization even though it fosters investments in infrastructure also opens the door to more corruption the public dissatisfaction towards privatization is then crucially affected by the changes in the degree and pattern of corruption our model thus helps understand the seemingly paradoxical situation prevailing in latin america where most studies find that privatizations have been efficiency enhancing and have fostered investments and at the same time popular dissatisfaction with the process is extremely high especially among the middle class we show that this line of explanation is consistent with the evidence from surveys in the region

capital asset prices with and without negative holdings prize lecture to the memory of alfred nobel december 7 1990 this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

on the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings abstract a sufficient condition for uniqueness is identified on the preferences in the marriage problem i e two sided one to one matching with non transferable utility for small economies this condition is also necessary this class of preferences is broad and they are of particular relevance in economic applications

tournaments without prizes evidence from personnel records we use a quasi experimental research design to study the effect of giving workers feedback on their relative performance the setting is a firm in which workers are paid piece rates and where for exogenous reasons management begins to reveal to workers their relative position in the distribution of pay and productivity we find that merely providing this information leads to a large and long lasting increase in productivity that is costless to the firm our findings are consistent with the interpretation that workers incipient concerns about their relative standing are activated by information about how they are performing relative to others this paper was accepted by olav sorenson organizations

on relative wealth effects and the optimality of growth abstract we present a model of endogenous growth in which a desire for social status lead individuals to care about their relative wealth the growth rate of the economy is socially optimal if the status motive is sufficiently important but the presence of status seeking may also lead to excessive growth

payoff complementarities and financial fragility evidence from mutual fund outflows the paper provides empirical evidence that strategic complementarities among investors generate fragility in financial markets analyzing mutual fund data we find that consistent with a theoretical model funds with illiquid assets where complementarities are stronger exhibit stronger sensitivity of outflows to bad past performance than funds with liquid assets we also find that this pattern disappears in funds where the shareholder base is composed mostly of large investors we present further evidence that these results are not attributable to alternative explanations based on the informativeness of past performance or on clientele effects we analyze the implications for funds performance and policies

of tournaments and temptations an analysis of managerial incentives in the mutual fund industry we test the hypothesis that when their compensation is linked to relative performance managers of investment portfolios likely to end up as losers will manipulate fund risk differently than those managing portfolios likely to be winners an empirical investigation of the performance of 334 growth oriented mutual funds during 1976 to 1991 demonstrates that mid year losers tend to increase fund volatility in the latter part of an annual assessment period to a greater extent than mid year winners furthermore we show that this effect became stronger as industry growth and investor awareness of fund performance increased over time

tariff and environmental policies with product standards for a small open economy with consumption based pollution emissions the first best optimal policy prescription is free trade along with a pigouvian tax on emissions therefore a package of coordinated tax reform by replacing tariffs with emission taxes can lower pollution emissions and increase market access and hence improve residents welfare and government revenue as long as the initial tariffs are relatively high numerical simulations confirm the results obtained abstract from author

occupational mobility and the distribution of occupational success among young men interpretation of the distribution of occupational success depends crucially on an understanding of the process of mobility if the holders of low paying jobs this year are just as likely as anyone else to hold good jobs next year then the lower tail of the earnings distribution is not a matter of great social concern further if the distribution of success is primarily determined by a random process the prospects for a significant reduction in the inequality of earnings are unfavorable on the other hand high mobility in the short run may conceal systematic stratification of the labor force it may be that the same individuals spend most of their time in the worst jobs if so luck and random events may play a small role in the distribution of well being inequality may be a major issue and the elimination of stratification may hold out the promise of an important reduction in inequality simple tabulation of distributions of success and of mobility among categories of success cannot answer the basic question of the role of stratification in this paper we develop a model and statistical method for studying mobility and relating it to characteristics upon which stratification may be based our study rests on annual interviews conducted from 1966 through 1969 with about 3 000 white males born between 1942 and 1952 1 we find that mobility is closely related to personal characteristics especially intelligence and education men with high iqs and extensive education are more likely to move to high paying jobs and are more likely to remain in them nevertheless random events dominate the distribution of occupational success in the short run our results strongly support the finding of christopher jencks and his collaborators that redistribution of the determinants of earnings would do almost nothing to reduce the observed inequality of annual earnings

only winners in tough times repeat hedge fund performance persistence over different market conditions we provide novel evidence that hedge fund performance is persistent following weak hedge fund markets but is not persistent following strong markets specifically we construct two performance measures downsidereturns and upsidereturns conditioned on the level of overall hedge fund sector returns after adjusting for risks funds in the highest downsidereturns quintile outperform funds in the lowest quintile by about 7 in the subsequent year whereas funds with better upsidereturns do not outperform subsequently the downsidereturns can predict future fund performance over a horizon as long as 3 years for both winners and losers and for funds with few share restrictions

the welfare effects of environmental taxation recent literature has investigated whether the welfare gains from environmental taxation are larger or smaller in a second best setting than in a first best setting this question has mainly been addressed indirectly by asking whether the second best optimal environmental tax is higher or lower than the first best pigouvian rate even this indirect question has itself been approached indirectly comparing the second best optimal environmental tax to a proxy for its first best value marginal social damage msd on closer examination however msd becomes ambiguously defined and variable in a second best setting making it an unreliable proxy for the pigouvian rate given these observations the current analysis reevaluates these welfare questions and finds that when compared directly to its first best value the second best optimal environmental tax generally rises with increased revenue requirements even in cases where the second best environmental tax is lower than its first best value the welfare gains may be greater than in a first best setting these results suggest that the marginal fiscal benefit revenue recycling effect exceeds the marginal fiscal cost tax base effect over a range of environmental tax rates that for benchmark models extends above the first best pigouvian rate these findings reinforce the intuition that environmental policy complements rather than competes with the provision of other public goods

prices vs quantities public finance and the choice of regulatory instruments abstract since montgomery 1972 markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs journal of economic theory 5 395 418 and weitzman 1974 prices vs quantities review of economic studies 41 477 491 it has generally been assumed that in a full information setting tradable quotas and taxes are equivalent regulatory instruments we demonstrate that if the government is movitated by public finance concerns this equivalence holds only if quotas are short lived moreover the government prefers quotas with the shortest possible lifetime or what is equivalent in our setting taxes

on limiting the market for status signals abstract in many societies individuals care how others view them in their efforts to impress such individuals engage in consumption signals which attempt to establish higher levels of status than their true status type this leads to an inefficiency which offers the possibility of a pareto improving tax policy the impacts of tax policy and benefits on the signalling equilibrium are considered

forced gifts the burden of being a friend abstract in many developing countries gift expenses escalate with income growth and account for a substantial share of household expenditure we develop a theoretical model to demonstrate how unequal income growth may trigger gift competition and drive up the financial burden associated with gift exchange we use unique census type panel data from rural china to test our model predictions and demonstrate that 1 the value of gifts responds to the average gift in the community 2 the escalation of gift giving may have adverse welfare implications especially for the poor and 3 escalating gift expenses crowd out expenditures on other consumption items

running to keep in the same place consumer choice as a game of status if individuals care about their status defined as their rank in the distribution of consumption of one positional good then the consumer s problem is strategic as her utility depends on the consumption choices of others in the symmetric nash equilibrium each individual spends an inefficiently high amount on the status good using techniques from auction theory we analyze the effects of exogenous changes in the distribution of income in a richer society almost all individuals spend more on conspicuous consumption and individual utility is lower at each income level in a more equal society the poor are worse off

behavioral portfolio theory we develop a positive behavioral portfolio theory bpt and explore its implications for portfolio construction and security design the optimal portfolios of bpt investors resemble combinations of bonds and lottery tickets consistent with friedman and savage s 1948 observation we compare the bpt efficient frontier with the mean variance efficient frontier and show that in general the two frontiers do not coincide optimal bpt portfolios are also different from optimal capm portfolios in particular the capm twofund separation does not hold in bpt we present bpt in a single mental account version bpt sa and a multiple mental account version bpt ma bpt sa investors integrate their portfolios into a single mental account while bpt ma investors segregate their port folios into several mental accounts bpt ma portfolios resemble layered pyramids where layers are associated with aspirations we explore a two layer portfolio where the low aspiration layer is designed to avoid poverty while the high aspiration layer is designed for a shot at riches

is more always better a survey on positional concerns abstract we use survey data to provide some empirical information about concerns regarding relative standing respondents chose between a world where they have more of a good than others and one where everyone s endowment of the good is higher but the respondent has less than others questions asked about education attractiveness and intelligence for one s child and oneself income vacation time approval and disapproval from a supervisor and papers to write half of the respondents preferred to have 50 less real income but high relative income concerns about position were strongest for attractiveness and supervisor s praise and weakest for vacation time

economic and social class voting in a model of redistribution with social concerns we investigate how concerns about social status may affect individuals preferences for redistribution in our model agents are heterogeneous across two dimensions productivity and social class and an individual s social status is de ned as his relative standing in terms of a weighted average of these two components the weight on each component depends positively on its standard deviation redistribution thus simultaneously affects labor supply and the weights that determine social status as such taxation not only redistributes resources from the rich to the poor but also becomes a way of preserving or modifying social status thus individuals who have the same productivity but belong to different social classes support different tax rates we characterize the equilibrium of the political game as the solution of a system of non linear equations and identify the interclass coalition of voters who support the equilibrium tax rate

a theory of anticipated utility abstract a new theory of cardinal utility with an associated set of axioms is presented it is a generalization of the von neumann morgenstern expected utility theory which permits the analysis of phenomena associated with the distortion of subjective probability

environmental levies and distortionary taxation pigou taxation and pollution i note an important distinction between the optimal price of environmental quality in a second best world and the optimal level of environmental quality using an analytical general equilibrium model i show that for reasonable parameter values an increase in tax distortions arising from an increase in required tax revenues leads to a fall in the optimal pigouvian tax rate even while environmental quality improves in general knowledge of the direction of changes in optimal environmental tax rates due to changes in the economy is not sufficient for understanding the impact on environmental quality 2003 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

social norms savings behavior and growth we argue that many goods and decisions are not allocated or made through markets we interpret an agent s status as a ranking device that determines how well he or she fares in the nonmarket sector the existence of a nonmarket sector can endogenously generate a concern for relative position in for example the income distribution so that higher income implies higher status moreover it can naturally yield multiple equilibria it is thus possible to explain differences in growth rates across countries without recourse to differences in underlying preferences technologies or endowments different social organizations lead to different reduced form preferences which lead to different growth rates

positional concerns and social network structure an experiment abstract we experimentally study the positional concerns of individuals embedded in social networks in the game individuals compete for positional advantage with their direct neighbors by purchasing a positional good the nash equilibrium consumption is determined by the katz bonacich centrality of the individual s network position while the efficient outcome requires a lower consumption level for most network positions the gameplay converged to the nash equilibrium except for local centers that consumed less of the positional good than the nash prediction despite this the consumption of the positional good increased in the individual s centrality the evolution of the gameplay was explained by the myopic best response dynamics model

land division a lab in the field bargaining experiment abstract we design a framed bargaining experiment to explore how farmers allocate inherited land in the experiment two players with heterogeneous productivity inherit a land plot yielding a risky production and some tokens to bargain over a land allocation we conduct this experiment in colombia with 256 participants from rural municipalities and 120 undergraduate students although the efficient the non cooperative and the cooperative solutions of this game predict that the most productive player accrues most of the land we find that 75 of the bargaining interactions yield egalitarian but inefficient land divisions we implemented a treatment variation in which a costly disagreement is the only outcome leading to land equality the single disagreement observed in this treatment weakens the support for preferences for egalitarian outcomes as the driver of inefficient allocations we discuss alternative explanations based on the salience of equality heuristics over valuation of land and sequential cooperative bargaining

optimal dynamic carbon taxes in a climate economy model with distortionary fiscal policy how should carbon be taxed as a part of fiscal policy the literature on optimal carbon pricing often abstracts from other taxes however when governments raise revenues with distortionary taxes carbon levies have fiscal impacts while they raise revenues directly they may shrink the bases of other taxes e g by decreasing employment this article theoretically characterizes and then quantifies optimal carbon taxes in a dynamic general equilibrium climate economy model with distortionary fiscal policy first this article establishes a novel theoretical relationship between the optimal taxation of carbon and of capital income this link arises because carbon emissions destroy natural capital they accumulate in the atmosphere and decrease future output consequently this article shows how the standard logic against capital income taxes extends to distortions on environmental capital investments second this article characterizes optimal climate policy in sub optimal fiscal settings where income taxes are constrained to remain at their observed levels third this article presents a detailed calibration that builds on the seminal dice approach but adds features essential for a setting with distortionary taxes such as a differentiation between climate change production impacts e g on agriculture and direct utility impacts e g on biodiversity existence value the central quantitative finding is that optimal carbon tax schedules are 8 24 lower when there are distortionary taxes compared to the setting with lump sum taxes considered in the literature

household portfolio diversification a case for rank dependent preferences the proliferation of novel preference theories in financial economics is hampered by a lack of non experimental evidence and by the theories additional complexity which has not been shown to be critical in applications in this article i present arguments in support of preferences with rank dependency using the survey of consumer finances data i document two widespread patterns inconsistent with expected utility i many households simultaneously invest in well deversified funds and in poorly diversified portfolios of stocks and ii some households with substantial savings do not invest anything in equities i show that portfolio choice models with rank dependent preferences plausibly parameterized and under fully rational assumptions are quantitatively consistent with the observed diversification these results call for further efforts to integrate the models of rank dependent preferences in portfolio theory and asset pricing the decision theoretic literature has long acknowledged the shortcomings of the expected utility theory of von neumann and morgenstern 1944 several generalizations of the theory are inspired by the experimental evidence and aimed at improving its descriptive accuracy however there are few applications of new models of preferences in finance and expected utility continues to dominate the field 1 two principal hurdles slow the proliferation of novel preferences in financial economics first the lack of empirical non experimental or field data confirming that the behavior motivating non expected utilities is widespread outside the laboratory settings second the additional and often significant complexity of the alternative preferences which has not been shown to be critical in applications where the models based on expected utility fall short of reasonable predictions this article presents empirical and theoretical this paper was previously circulated under the title household portfolio diversification the paper has benefited from the comments of shlomo benartzi luca benzoni markus brunnermeier john dickhaut maria perozek raj singh hersh shefrin and workshop participants at minnesota finance bag lunch 2003 wharton conference household financial decision making and portfolio choice and 2003 summer meetings of econometric society i would like to thank cam harvey the editor and an anonymous referee for many helpful comments and suggestions a special thanks to jack kareken for comments and editorial help on an earlier draft i am grateful to donna zerwitz for editorial assistance the views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily of the federal reserve bank of minneapolis or the federal reserve system all errors and omissions are the sole responsibility of the author address correspondence to valery polkovnichenko finance 3 122 csom 319 19 th

dynamic asset allocation with relative wealth concerns in incomplete markets abstract in dynamic portfolio choice problems stochastic state variables such as stochastic volatility lead to adjustments of the optimal stock demand referred to as hedge terms or merton breeden terms by deriving an explicit solution in a two agent framework with a stochastic opportunity set we show that relative wealth concerns give rise to new hedge terms beyond the ordinary ones this is because the agents hedge against both exogenous changes in the state variable and endogenous decisions of the other agent depending on the parametrization of the model these new terms can significantly change the investors hedging demands we also show that both heterogeneity in risk aversion or relative wealth concerns can have similar effects on the heterogeneity in portfolio decisions formally we study a non cooperative non zero sum stochastic differential game for which we prove a verification theorem in a setting with an unspanned state variable

paternalism and tax competition when consumers make mistakes the government may wish to use paternalistic taxation as a corrective measure we analyse the extent to which tax competition undermines the feasibility of paternalistic taxation we show that the paternalistic component of a tax on a harmful good is reduced when there is cross border shopping but it does not disappear altogether in a model with tax competition between two countries only one of which has a paternalistic objective we show that a minimum tax rate requirement can be pareto improving despite the divergence in policy objectives tax harmonization however reduces welfare in the non paternalistic country

environmental tax reform efficiency and political feasibility although market based environmental measures like uniform co2 taxes reach a given standard at minimal cost they do not prevail in real world policies an effciency oriented environmental policy fails as it involves a redistributen of pollution rights resulting in a strong and generally effective opposition of the groups that forego economic rents the present paper analyzes the tradoff between efficiency and political feasibility of several co2 tax and reimbursement schemes using a computable general equilibrium model of switzerland the simulation results indicate that a policy combining a uniform co2 tax with differentiated labor subsidies preventing intersectoral redistribution is a better solution for the tradeoff than the presently existing tax schemes in various countries

empirical evidence on satisfaction with privatization in latin america since the 1980s privatization of formerly state owned firms has been extensively implemented by governments across latin america despite the fact that most evaluations of the process fail to find significant adverse efficiency and welfare effects there has been a strong surge in public discontent with such policy in the region this paper performs a systematic empirical analysis of the determinants of such dissatisfaction using survey data from latinobarometro covering 17 countries over the period 1998 2008 complemented by country level data on macroeconomic political and institutional aspects as well as data on privatization dissatisfaction appears to respond to absolute and relative welfare effects and the authors find a robust u shaped effect in term of education and income levels with individuals in the middle of such distributions being more critical with the outcome of privatizations

developments in non expected utility theory the hunt for a descriptive theory of choice under risk this article reviews recent developments in the economic theory of individual decision making under risk since the 1950s it has been known that individual choices violate the standard model of expected utility in predictable ways considerable research effort has now been devoted to the project of developing a superior descriptive model following an overview of non expected utility theories which distinguishes between conventional and non conventional approaches the paper seeks to assess these alternative models in terms of empirical success using laboratory and field data and theoretical usefulness the closing sections reflect on some new directions emerging in this literature

conspicuous conservation the prius halo and willingness to pay for environmental bona fides abstract this paper develops a theory of conspicuous conservation a phenomenon related to conspicuous consumption in which individuals seek status through displays of austerity amid growing concern about environmental protection we identify a statistically and economically significant conspicuous conservation effect in vehicle purchase decisions and estimate a mean willingness to pay for the green signal provided by the distinctively designed toyota prius in the range of 430 4200 depending upon the owner s location results are related to the growing literature on green markets and suggest that policy should target less conspicuous conservation investments that will be under provided relative to those that confer a status benefit

why does implied risk aversion smile implied risk aversion estimates reported in the literature are strongly u shaped this article explores different potential explanations for these smile patterns i preference aggregation both with and without stochastic volatility and jumps in returns ii misestimation of investors beliefs caused by stochastic volatility jumps or a peso problem and iii heterogeneous beliefs the results reveal that preference aggregation and misestimation of investors beliefs caused by stochastic volatility and jumps are unlikely to be the explanation for the smile although a peso problem can account for the smile the required probability of a market crash is unrealistically large heterogeneous beliefs cause sizable distortions in implied risk aversion but the degree of heterogeneity required to explain the smile is implausibly large jel g12 g13 in a representative agent economy equilibrium asset prices reflect the agent s preferences and beliefs rubinstein 1994 showed that any two of the following imply the third i the representative agent s preferences ii his subjective probability assessments and iii the state price density therefore essentially any state price density can be reconciled with the distribution of asset prices by using an appropriate set of preferences for the representative agent building on this insight a number of papers have derived estimates of the representative agent s risk aversion from the state price density and the subjective probability density ao t sahalia and lo 2000 jackwerth 2000 and rosenberg and engle 2002 report implied risk aversion estimates that have similar shapes with some differences they all found that implied risk aversion varies strongly across s p 500 index values and is u shaped around the futures price jackwerth 2000 and rosenberg and engle 2002 even obtained negative risk aversion estimates for a range of index values centered around the futures price the aim of this article is to explore different potential explanations for the implied risk aversion smile by investigating the properties of implied

returns of claims on the upside and the viability of u shaped pricing kernels abstract when the pricing kernel is u shaped then expected returns of claims with payout on the upside are negative for strikes beyond a threshold determined by the slope of the u shaped kernel in its increasing region and have negative partial derivative with respect to strike in the increasing region of the kernel using returns of i s p 500 index calls ii calls on major international equity indexes iii digital calls iv upside variance contracts and v a theoretical construct that we denote as kernel call we find broad support for the implications of u shaped pricing kernels a possible theoretical reconciliation of our empirical findings is explored through a model that accommodates heterogeneity in beliefs about return outcomes and short selling

first price auctions in the asymmetric n bidder case i consider the first price auction when the bidders valuations may be differently distributed i show that every bayesian equilibrium is an essentially pure equilibrium formed by bid functions whose inverses are solutions of a system of differential equations with boundary conditions i then prove the existence of an equilibrium i prove its uniqueness when the valuation distributions have a mass point at the lower extremity of the support i give sufficient conditions for uniqueness when every valuation distribution is one of two atomless distributions i establish inequalities between equilibrium strategies when relations of stochastic dominance exist between valuation distributions

a signaling explanation for charity this article examines a novel but plausible motive for charitable giving charitable donations which are observable can signal wealth or income the signaling equilibrium of charitable donations has attractive properties donations increase proportionally with population size governmental funding for public goods affects private charity only through an income effect crowding out need not be complete income redistribution is generically nonneutral increasing the spread between the poorest and richest person in a community tends to increase private donations our theory are based on the assumption that people are willing to make charitable donations even if they will not increase provision of the public good the data on charitable giving support the hypothesis that donors donate at least partly for signaling purposes rather than only to aid the recipient or to obtain satisfactions unrelated to status though charitable organizations usually report donations within categories thus not allowing perfect revelation for analytical tractability we shall consider an equilibrium with perfect revelation and a continuum of types as characterized in george j mailath 1987 and norman j ireland 1994

status the distribution of wealth private and social attitudes to risk this paper supposes an individual cares about his her own wealth not only directly but also via the relative standing that this wealth induces the implications for risk taking are investigated in particular such a model provides a natural explanation of the concave convex concave utility described by friedman and savage however there are a number of key differences between the present model and any model based on own wealth alone for example an equilibrium wealth distribution here may have a middle class further the status interaction involves an externality and an equilibrium wealth distribution may be pareto inefficient but also about the implied relative standing in the distribution of wealth has a long but checkered history an early exponent of such ideas was of course veblen 1899 it is indeed a notion which most economists reject albeit usually without explicit comment a notable and articulate exception however is frank 1985 for example see also the references frank cites on pp 33 34 it is however a notion with substantial intuitive appeal and it seems useful to ascertain its consequences before coming to a final judgement as to its merits the present paper is concerned with deriving the consequences of such valuation of status for risk taking what seems to be the sharpest possible model is adopted here this assumes that what is essentially ordinal rank in the wealth distribution enters von neumann morgenstern utility as an argument in addi tion to wealth itself thus higher wealth increases utility not only directly but also indirectly via higher status in the interests of both simplicity and drama it is typically assumed here that all individuals have identical utility functions which are concave in wealth but convex in status section 2 discusses how the model provides a natural explanation of the fundamental phenomenon addressed by friedman and savage 1948 that individuals may simultaneously purchase insurance and participate in lotteries although each individual here has a utility function which is concave in wealth itself utility can nevertheless be convex in wealth over some range when the indirect effect via status is included this effect is enhanced by the convexity of utility in status but will follow in any case if increasing wealth entails moving up in status much more rapidly than losing wealth entails moving down it is shown

diversification and its discontents idiosyncratic and entrepreneurial risk in the quest for social status social status concerns influence investors decisions by driving a wedge in attitudes toward aggregate and idiosyncratic risks i model such concerns by emphasizing the desire to get ahead of the joneses which implies that aversion to idiosyncratic risk is lower than aversion to aggregate risk the model predicts that investors hold concentrated portfolios in equilibrium which helps rationalize the small premium for undiversified entrepreneurial risk in the model status concerns are more important for wealthier households consequently these households own a disproportionate share of risky assets particularly private equity and experience greater volatility of consumption consistent with empirical evidence diversification and risk sharing are fundamental principles of modern finance and macroeconomics however empirical evidence suggests that household portfolios are poorly diversified with many people reporting substantial holdings of a single stock for the wealthiest households large shares in closely held businesses constitute a particularly important source of risk e g heaton and lucas 2000a it is not surprising that entrepreneurs bear substantial undiversified risk since it is important for mitigating moral hazard and or adverse selection problems yet from a standpoint of portfolio theory entrepreneurship does not appear to be well compensated implying that many investors are willing to take poorly rewarded risks despite the availability of superior investment opportunities such as public equity that earns a large risk premium e g moskowitz and vissing j0rgensen 2002 hall and woodward 2007

veblen effects in a theory of conspicuous consumption the authors examine conditions under which veblen effects arise from the desire to achieve social status by signaling wealth through conspicuous consumption while veblen effects cannot ordinarily arise when preferences satisfy a single crossing property they may emerge when this property fails in that case budget brands are priced at marginal cost while luxury brands though not intrinsically superior are sold at higher prices to consumers seeking to advertise wealth luxury brands earn strictly positive profits under conditions that would with standard formulations of preferences yield marginal cost pricing the authors explore factors that induce veblen effects and they investigate policy implications copyright 1996 by american economic association

status effects and negative utility growth this paper explains the observed stagnation of happiness measures through a growth model in which agents care about conspicuous consumption normal goods confer direct utility while status goods confer utility only at the expense of others firms can improve the quality of both goods through r d the nash equilibrium of the consumer game results in the share of expenditure on status goods increasing with the number of times the status good has been improved as the economy grows resources for innovation are transferred entirely to status good r d the resulting long run rate of utility growth is negative

social comparisons status and driving behavior abstract the establishment of desirable social norms is an integral part of a well functioning civil society while recent evidence has demonstrated that social comparison can affect behavior in a variety of contexts it is not clear what type of comparative social information is most effective using a large scale field experiment to study driving practices we sent text messages containing different types of social information to drivers in tsingtao china we find two types of social information to be particularly effective in reducing traffic violations the driving behavior of those similar to oneself and the driving behavior of those with high status cars our results indicate that the combination of descriptive norms with social status is a cost effective yet powerful intervention for establishing better driving behavior in emerging markets

why do people care about social status abstract this paper shows that complementary interaction can induce people to care about social status because it serves as a signal of non observable abilities there is a unique separating equilibrium in which everyone cares about social status in this equilibrium a person s social status perfectly reveals his abilities and everyone matches with a person of like ability the analysis shows that people s instrumental concern for social status has important welfare and policy implications indeed peoples efforts to keep up with the joneses may be welfare enhancing