inefficient credit booms this paper studies the welfare properties of competitive equilibria in an economy with financial frictions hit by aggregate shocks in particular it shows that competitive financial contracts can result in excessive borrowing ex ante and excessive volatility ex post even though from a first best perspective the equilibrium always displays under borrowing from a second best point of view excessive borrowing can arise the inefficiency is due to the combination of limited commitment in financial contracts and the fact that asset prices are determined in a spot market this generates a pecuniary externality that is not internalized in private contracts the model provides a framework to evaluate preventive policies which can be used during a credit boom to reduce the expected costs of a financial crisis copyright 2008 wiley blackwell

institution induced productivity differences and patterns of international capital flows abstract this paper studies theoretically how the cross country differences in the institutional quality iq of the domestic credit markets shape the patterns of international capital flows when such iq differences cause productivity differences across countries iq affects productivity by changing productivity agency cost trade offs across heterogeneous investment projects which have opposite effects on the investment and capital flows from exogenous productivity differences the overall effect of iq could generate u shaped responses of the investment and capital flows this means that capital could flow from middle income to low income and high income countries and starting from a low iq a country could experience both growth and a current account surplus after an institutional reform more generally the results here offer some cautions when interpreting the evidence on the role of productivity and institutional differences on capital flows and question the validity of using financial frictions as a proxy for the quality of financial institutions

safe assets as commodity money this paper presents a model in which safe assets are systemic because they are the medium of exchange in risky assets it connects the literature from banking and finance on safe assets to the monetary literature on alternative monetary systems involving commodity money interest bearing money and private money creation because safe assets have intrinsic value changes in their supply lead to changes in market efficiency additionally because safe assets are costly to produce there is overproduction of safe assets relative to the social optimum when the model is calibrated to plausible liquidity premiums the resulting inefficiencies are not large

the demand for beer wine and spirits a survey of the literature the demand for alcohol literature is vast and much conflicting information about the nature of the demand for alcoholic beverages has been published this paper presents a survey of the literature and then uses the technique of meta regression analysis to establish insights into the nature of the demand for beer wine and spirits unlike previous meta studies of the demand for alcoholic beverages this study adjusts for the precision of each elasticity estimate the analysis presented suggests reported elasticity estimates will be influenced by such factors as estimation technique data frequency and time period under consideration with respect to time the findings suggest that the demand for alcoholic beverages has become less inelastic since the mid 1950s and that the income elasticity has been falling since the mid 1960s the analysis also found support for the idea that alcohol as a commodity group is a necessity and that consumers respond to price discounting with inventory behaviour rather than true substitution behaviour little support is found for the idea that the demand for alcoholic beverages varies fundamentally across most countries although wine may be an exception language en

building a bric stock market opening and investment finance in india since liberalization portfolio equity inflows have been a feature of india s improved growth performance in recent years this study examines a possible connection through the equity financing of capital formation by manufacturing firms emphasis is placed on the funding preferences of owner controlled enterprises with the empirical results connecting equity issues to the management of gearing and the availability of internal funds this context suggests strongly that equity and debt are complementary choices although two channels of influence macroeconomic and allocative combine to encourage investment spending with pro cyclical implications

the interaction of monetary and macroprudential policies i analyze a new keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model where the financing of productive investment is affected by a moral hazard problem i solve for jointly ramsey optimal monetary and macroprudential policies i find that when a financial friction is present in addition to the standard nominal friction the optimal policy can replicate the first best allocation if the social planner can conduct both monetary and macroprudential policy using monetary policy alone is not enough a policy trade off between stabilizing inflation and output gap emerges when policy follows simple rules the source of fluctuations is relevant for the choice of the appropriate policy mix

investment prices and exchange rates some basic facts this paper documents four basic facts about investment goods and investment prices first investment has a very significant nontradable component in the form of construction services second distributions services wholesaling retailing and transportation are much less important for investment than for consumption third the import content of investment is much larger than that of consumption finally in the aftermath of three large devaluations the rate of exchange rate pass through is perhaps not surprisingly highest for imported equipment and lowest for construction services jel f41

entrepreneurship financiership and selection we develop an equilibrium model of the market for entrepreneurial finance in which all agents have some personal wealth and a project whose quality is their private information all agents choose whether to invest either as entrepreneurs or financiers or to invest in storage technology we find that a binding economy level wealth constraint which renders credit scarce can create advantageous selection where productive agents become entrepreneurs and unproductive agents become their financiers if funding is easier to obtain entrepreneurship also attracts unproductive agents in our model individual wealth and entrepreneurship are positively negatively correlated if financial market participation is complete incomplete

breaking free of the triple coincidence in international finance the traditional approach to international finance is to view capital flows as the financial counterpart to savings and investment decisions assuming further that the gdp boundary defines both the decision making unit and the currency area this triple coincidence of gdp area decision making unit and currency area is an elegant simplification but misleads when financial flows are important in their own right first the neglect of gross flows when only net flows are considered can lead to misdiagnoses of financial vulnerability second inattention to the effects of international currencies may lead to erroneous conclusions on exchange rate adjustment third sectoral differences between corporate and official sector positions can distort welfare conclusions on the consequences of currency depreciation as macroeconomic risks may be underestimated this paper illustrates the pitfalls of the triple coincidence through a series of examples from the global financial system in recent years and examines alternative analytical frameworks based on balance sheets as the unit of analysis

information constrained optima with retrading an externality and its market based solution this paper studies the efficiency of competitive equilibria in environments with a moral hazard problem and unobserved states both with retrading in ex post spot markets the interaction between private information problems and the possibility of retrade creates an externality unless preferences have special restrictive properties the externality is internalized by allowing agents to contract ex ante on market fundamentals determining the spot price or interest rate over and above contracting on actions and outputs then competitive equilibria are equivalent with the appropriate notion of constrained pareto optimality examples show that it is possible to have multiple market fundamentals or price islands created endogenously in equilibrium

the demand for alcoholic drink in the united kingdom 1963 78 1983 the demand for alcoholic drink in the united kingdom 1963 78 applied economics vol 15 no 1 pp 125 140

the pecking order of segmentation and liquidity injection policies in a model of contagious crises we study a two country setting in which leveraged investors generate fire sale externalities leading to financial crises and contagion governments can affect the incidence of financial crisis and the degree of contagion by injecting public liquidity and additionally by segmenting the countries liquidity markets we show that segmentation allows a country to avoid contagion and fend off mild financial crises caused by a small shock to its liquidity demand at the cost of exposing it to more severe financial crises caused by a large shock we derive a pecking order result whereby segmentation is a second best measure that coordinated governments should use only when tax capacity constrains them from injecting liquidity even when segmentation is welfare enhancing it should be applied to public liquidity alone never restricting the free flow of private liquidity across countries uncoordinated governments tend to use segmentation excessively

uncertainty economic reforms and private investment in the middle east and north africa during the 1980s and the 1990s private investment in the middle east and north africa mena has on average shown a decreasing or stagnant trend this contrasts with the situation of the asian economies where private investment has always been more dynamic in this paper it is empirically shown for a panel of 39 developing economies among which four mena countries that in addition to the traditional determinants of investment such as the growth anticipations and the real interest rate government policies explain mena s low investment rate insufficient structural reforms which have most of the time led to poor financial development and deficient trade openness have been a crucial factor for the deficit in private capital formation the economic uncertainties of the region have represented another factor of the firm s decisions not to invest these uncertainties have consisted of the external debt burden and various measures of volatility

multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design abstract incentive compatibility conditions are characterized in general for problems in which several goods are to be allocated and agents types are multidimensional two questions of monopoly pricing under multidimensional uncertainty are then analyzed first we find the optimal nonlinear pricing scheme when the monopolist knows only the distribution of an arbitrarily parameterized family of demand curves and second we solve for the optimal bundling policy for a multiproduct monopolist

financial intermediary capital we propose a dynamic theory of financial intermediaries that are better able to collateralize claims than households that is have a collateralization advantage intermediaries require capital as they have to finance the additional amount that they can lend out of their own net worth the net worth of financial intermediaries and the corporate sector are both state variables affecting the spread between intermediated and direct finance and the dynamics of real economic activity such as investment and financing the accumulation of net worth of intermediaries is slow relative to that of the corporate sector the model is consistent with key stylized facts about macroeconomic downturns associated with a credit crunch namely their severity their protractedness and the fact that the severity of the credit crunch itself affects the severity and persistence of downturns the model captures the tentative and halting nature of recoveries from crises

inefficient investment waves we show that firms individually optimal liquidity management results in socially inefficient boom and bust patterns financially constrained firms decide on the level of their liquid resources facing cash flow shocks and time varying investment opportunities firms liquidity management decisions generate simultaneous waves in aggregate cash holdings and investment even if technology remains constant these investment waves are not constrained efficient in general because the social and private value of liquidity differs the resulting pecuniary externality affects incentives differentially depending on the state of the economy and often overinvestment occurs during booms and underinvestment occurs during recessions in general policies intended to mitigate underinvestment raise prices during recessions making overinvestment during booms worse however a well designed price support policy will increase welfare in both booms and recessions

capital regulation and credit fluctuations we provide a rationale for imposing counter cyclical capital ratios on banks in our simple model bankers cannot pledge the entire future revenues to investors which limits borrowing in good and bad times complete markets do not sufficiently stabilize credit fluctuations as banks allocate too much borrowing capacity to good states and too little to bad states as a consequence bank credit output capital prices or wages are excessively volatile imposing a stricter capital ratio in good states corrects the misallocation of the borrowing capacity increases expected output and can be beneficial to all agents in the economy although in our economy all agents are risk neutral counter cyclical capital ratios are an effective stabilization tool to ensure this effectiveness capital ratios have to be based on ex ante equity capital as classical capital ratios can be bypassed

learning under fear of floating in recent years a large fraction of economies overcame the fear of floating we study a model that describes the policy of a central bank uncertain about whether currency depreciations cause output to expand textbook model or contract balance sheet model we conclude that the movement away from fear of floating may not be explained by bayesian or robust policies when the private sector anticipates the central bank s policy and endogenously determines the model central banks may fall in a learning trap an increase in financial volatility provides an escape to such trap that replicates patterns in the data

simple menus of contracts in cost based procurement and regulation in an influential paper jean jacques laffont and jean tirole 1986 formulated a principal agent model of cost based procurement and regulation and showed that the principal can implement the optimal mechanism by offering the agent a menu consisting of a continuum of linear contracts two related problems with applying this theory in practice have been that the economic logic and the underlying mathematics involved in calculating the optimal menu are quite complex and the principal must be able to specify the agent s entire disutility of effort function in order to calculate the optimal menu as a result the model has not been widely used in practice to either calculate actual incentive contracts or even to develop useful qualitative guidance about the nature of the optimal solution and how it is affected by various economic factors the purpose of this paper is to show that dramatically simpler menus which are easy to understand and calculate and which have lower informational requirements can at least in some cases capture a substantial share of the gains achievable by the fully optimal complex menu in particular this paper considers two item menus where one item is a cost reimbursement contract and the other item is a fixed price contract such menus are called fixed price cost reimbursement fpcr menus for the case where the agent s utility is quadratic and the agent s type is distributed uniformly it is shown that the optimal fpcr menu always captures at least three quarters of the gain that the optimal complex menu achieves where the gain is measured relative to the result of using a cost reimbursement contract this paper s research was originally motivated by a policy issue in defense procurement in the united states the department of defense dod purchases almost all major weapons systems from sole source contractors using contracting methods that essentially amount to using cost reimbursement contracts the best way to understand why dod uses costreimbursement contracting methods is that they perform precisely the function identified in laffont and tirole s principal agent model they guarantee in a situation that amounts to a bilateral monopoly that dod and the firm can reach an agreement i e they guarantee that the agent will always produce the good of course the use of cost reimbursement contracting methods

from bottom of the barrel to cream of the crop sequential screening with positive selection in a number of interesting environments dynamic screening involves positive selection in contrast with coasian dynamics only the most motivated remain over time the paper provides conditions under which the principal s commitment optimum is time consistent and uses this result to derive testable predictions under permanent or transient shocks it also identifies environments in which time consistency does not hold despite positive selection and yet simple equilibrium characterizations can be obtained

cross section estimation of us demand for alcoholic beverage a flexible limited dependent variable model is used to examine us demand for alcoholic beverage parameterization and distributional assumptions of the double hurdle model cragg 1971 and tobit model tobin 1958 are rejected findings suggest that price income household composition and other characteristics have significant effects on alcohol consumption income and own price elasticities are significant but relatively small

bubbles and capital flow volatility causes and risk management emerging market economies are fertile ground for the development of real estate and other financial bubbles despite these economies significant growth potential their corporate and government sectors do not generate the financial instruments to provide residents with adequate stores of value capital often flows out of these economies seeking these stores of value in the developed world bubbles are beneficial because they provide domestic stores of value and thereby reduce capital outflows while increasing investment but they come at a cost as they expose the country to bubble crashes and capital flow reversals we show that domestic financial underdevelopment not only facilitates the emergence of bubbles but also leads agents to undervalue the aggregate risk embodied in financial bubbles in this context even rational bubbles can be welfare reducing we study a set of aggregate risk management policies to alleviate the bubble risk we show that prudential banking regulation sterilization of capital inflows and structural policies aimed at developing public debt markets and property rights all have a high payoff in this environment

monetary policy bank leverage and financial stability abstract this paper shows that with limited liability banks lever up excessively to finance new loans lower monetary policy rates can worsen or reduce these incentives depending on the size of the shock when equity financing is ruled out when this constrained is relaxed but the bank faces costly dividend adjustment lower monetary policy rates always worsen risk taking incentives and the effect is persistent the reason is that costly dividend adjustment lowers the opportunity cost of lending in this model capital requirements are closer to the source of the distortion and thus work better than loan to value caps in reducing excessive risk taking

informational contagion of bank runs in a third generation crisis model abstract this paper highlights the international spread of bank runs in a third generation model of financial crises through an informational channel banks short term liabilities include loans granted by foreign creditors who have imperfect information about the liquidation costs of banks assets a bank panic in a country induces lenders to downgrade early liquidation yields in other countries and thus to require higher interest rates to enable their banks to roll over their maturing debt those banks become therefore more prone to self fulfilling depositors runs the paper then studies the effect on contagion of increased transparency and bailouts

financial development international capital flows and aggregate output abstract we develop a tractable two country overlapping generations model and show that cross country differences in financial development can explain three recent empirical patterns of international capital flows financial capital flows from relatively poor to relatively rich countries while foreign direct investment flows in the opposite direction net capital flows go from poor to rich countries despite its negative net international investment positions the united states receives a positive net investment income international capital mobility affects output in each country directly through the size of domestic investment and indirectly through the aggregate saving rate under certain conditions the indirect effect may dominate the direct effect so that international capital mobility raises output in the poor country and globally although net capital flows are in the direction to the rich country we also explore the welfare and distributional effects of international capital flows and show that the patterns of capital flows may reverse along the convergence process of a developing country our model adds to the understanding of the costs and the benefits of international capital mobility in the presence of domestic financial frictions

myth sin and redemption in capital account liberalisation the fund s argument that capital account liberalisation in developing countries might appeal for justification to the recognised gains from free trade in goods and services was seriously undermined by the asian financial crisis perhaps the most remarkable critique in view of his pre eminence in the development of international trade theory and policy was a short paper by jagdish bhagwati in which the fund s parallel was described as a myth taking up the argument he advanced this article explores further the underlying weakness of the fund s case jagdish emphasised the discrepancy between the nebulous long term benefits from capital flow liberalisation and the painful consequences of the crises that they had recently occasioned the relevance of the original sin hypothesis in determining the magnitude of these costs is therefore discussed here with attention drawn to country inability to borrow readily in their own currencies as a reason for their acute exposure to exchange rate speculation redemption for borrowers is then sought through an identification of sources of genuine comparative advantage in financial trade net flows of finance are not required for the realisation of these gains and a final section argues that there should be no presumption that net transfers improve welfare just as jagdish claimed

sovereign defaults information investment and credit abstract why would a sovereign government immune from bankruptcy procedures and with few assets that could be seized in the event of a default ever repay foreign creditors and correspondingly why do foreign creditors lend to sovereigns this paper finds general conditions under which even in the absence of sanctions lending to sovereigns can emerge in a single shot game furthermore it shows that positive borrowing can be sustained both in pooling and separating equilibria in this way it makes clear that neither sanctions nor reputation considerations the two classical explanations are necessary to enforce repayment information revelation is the crucial mechanism for these results the repayment default decision is interpreted as a signal used by the government to communicate information to domestic and foreign agents about the fundamentals of the economy governments repay to affect agents expectations about them a default through its effect on expectations about fundamentals can generate a decline in foreign and domestic investment and a credit crunch in domestic credit markets governments repay to avoid these costs but may default in equilibrium when hit by a negative shock

can miracles lead to crises the role of optimism in emerging markets crises emerging market financial crises are abrupt and dramatic usually occurring after a precrisis bonanza this paper develops an equilibrium asset pricing model with informational frictions in which crisis itself is a consequence of the investor optimism in the period preceding the crisis if preceded by a sequence of positive signals a small negative noise shock can trigger a downward adjustment in investors beliefs asset prices and consumption the magnitude of this downward adjustment increases with the level of optimism attained prior to the negative signal moreover with informational frictions asset prices display persistent effects in response to transitory shocks

asset prices and twin crises abstract emerging market crises have been characterized by two key features i banking crises generally precede currency crises and ii asset prices decline in advance of currency crises this paper argues that asset prices provide a key link between banking and currency crises it is shown that a prospective currency crisis due to an unanticipated increase in the public debt triggers an asset price decline banks exposure to asset prices in turn deteriorates their balance sheets and precipitates a banking crisis under the assumption of government bailout of banks it is shown that the twin crises are self fulfilling and their time line follows i and ii described above the timing of currency crisis is decreasing in the ratio of government s bailout to banks loss of capital

endogenous public information and welfare in market games this paper performs a welfare analysis of markets with private information in which agents can condition on noisy prices in the rational expectations tradition pricecontingent strategies introduce two externalities in the use of private information a payoff pecuniary externality related to aggregate volatility and a learning externality the impact of the first depends on whether competition is of the strategic substitutes or complements variety and the second induces agents to put too little weight on private information we find that with strategic substitutes and when the learning externality is not very strong agents put too much weight on private information and prices are too informative this will happen in the normal case where the allocational role of price prevails over its informational role under strategic complementarity there is always under reliance on private information the welfare loss at the market solution may be increasing in the precision of private information the analysis provides insights into optimal business cycle policy and a rationale for a tobin like tax for speculators in financial markets

reputation risk taking and macroprudential policy abstract this paper examines the role of macroprudential capital requirements in preventing inefficient credit booms in a model with reputational externalities in our model unprofitable banks have strong incentives to invest in risky assets when macroeconomic fundamentals are good in order to avoid the stigma of being assessed as low ability by the market we show that across the system countercyclical capital requirements that deter such gambling are constrained optimal when fundamentals are neither extremely weak nor extremely strong

financial amplification of foreign exchange risk premia abstract theories of financial frictions in international capital markets suggest that financial intermediaries balance sheet constraints amplify fundamental shocks we present empirical evidence for such theories by decomposing the u s dollar risk premium into components associated with macroeconomic fundamentals and a component associated with financial intermediary balance sheets relative to the benchmark model with only macroeconomic state variables balance sheets amplify the u s dollar risk premium we discuss applications to financial stability monitoring

a model of financial market liquidity based on intermediary capital we present a model ofnancial market liquidity provided bynanciallyconstrained inter mediaries we show that market liquidity increases with the level of intermediary capital we also characterize conditions under which intermediaries play a stabilizing or destabi lizing role in markets finally we sketch a number of areas including welfare and public policy on which the model can shed light jel g01 g11 g12 g15 g18

limited liability contracts between principal and agent abstract the optimal strategy of the principal is examined in an environment where there are ex post limitations on the maximum penalty that can be imposed on a riskneutral agent contrary to the case in which such limitations are not imposed it is in the principal s interest to deliberately forego the opportunity to induce socially efficient behavior and to instead design a contract that induces the agent to realize an efficient outcome only in the most productive state of nature and perhaps in certain very unproductive states the properties of the contract are examined in detail

procurement with asymmetric information about fixed and variable costs we investigate optimal rationing of resources and organizational slack when a principal procures from an agent with private information about fixed and variable costs we study the problem in a two period setting with persistent types and investigate how the optimal rationing and slack depend on whether production increases or decreases over time we find that rationing in a dynamic model with persistent types is extra costly since the types that are eliminated in period 1 might have been attractive in period 2 the cost of rationing increases with the variability of production if production levels are increasing decreasing the principal will be cautious when eliminating types with low variable fixed costs in period 1 since these types are particularly profitable in period 2 when production is more stable over time harsher rationing can be applied in period 1 followed by less harsh rationing if any in period 2

liquidity traps capital flows abstract motivated by debates surrounding international capital flows during the great recession we conduct a positive and normative analysis of capital flows when a region of the global economy experiences a liquidity trap capital flows reduce inefficient output fluctuations in this region by inducing exchange rate movements that reallocate expenditure towards the goods it produces restricting capital mobility hampers such an adjustment from a global perspective constrained efficiency entails subsidizing capital flows to address an aggregate demand externality associated with exchange rate movements absent cooperation however dynamic terms of trade manipulation motives drive countries to inefficiently restrict capital flows impeding aggregate demand stabilization

uncertainty capital flows and maturity mismatch abstract this paper explores a how the financial uncertainty generated by volatile international capital flows interacts with maturity mismatch on the balance sheets of nonfinancial firms to increase the volatility of output investment and total factor productivity tfp in emerging market economies i build a model of a small open economy in which financial frictions force firms to fund long term projects with short term debt in response to changes in the level of uncertainty regarding the availability of foreign borrowing firms adjust their long term investment contributing to the volatility of investment and output as well as generating endogenous fluctuations in aggregate productivity using data from a panel of major emerging markets i show that the volatility of portfolio debt flows negatively affects output by dampening investment while the volatility of equity flows which do not generate maturity mismatch has no effect consistent with the mechanism in the model the negative impact of capital flow volatility is larger at low levels of financial development and in industries with longer time to build lags my estimates imply that shocks to capital flow volatility account for one fifth of the excess output volatility of the emerging markets in my sample relative to a set of small open advanced economies

central bank independence and macro prudential regulation when a central bank is in charge of both price and financial stability a new time inconsistency problem may arise monetary policy may be abused to reduce the private sector s real debt burden after a financial shock materializes

optimal conservation programs asymmetric information and the role of fixed costs an increasing number of environmental protection programs offers financial compensation to farmers in exchange for conservation services incentive compatible contracts can be designed to mitigate excess compensation but the extant literature suggests that outcomes are always second best so that other instruments such as conservation auctions may be preferred we argue that the claim regarding the first best solution never being incentive compatible is correct if all conservation costs are variable in nature if there are fixed costs too the first best compensation scheme may be incentive compatible after all given the relevance of fixed costs in conservation issues we conclude that incentive compatible contracts should be given a second chance as a policy measure to induce conservation

exchange rates and monetary policy in emerging market economies this paper investigates the effects of exchange rate regimes and alternative monetary policy rules for an emerging market economy that is subject to a volatile external environment in the form of shocks to world interest rates and the terms of trade in particular we highlight the impact of financial frictions and the degree of exchange rate pass through in determining the relative performance of alternative regimes in stabilizing the economy in the face of external shocks our results are quite sharp when exchange rate pass through is high a policy of non traded goods inflation targeting does best in stabilizing the economy and is better in welfare terms when exchange rate pass through is low however a policy of strict cpi inflation targeting is better in all cases a fixed exchange rate is undesirable in addition financial frictions have no implications for the ranking of alternative policy rules

modeling the demand for alcoholic beverages and advertising specifications in this paper the demand for beer wine spirits and soft drinks in ontario is modeled in two parts an equation is specified to endogenize group expenditures and a demand system is set up to allocate budgeted group expenditures across types of beverages advertising is allowed to influence both the level of group expenditures and its allocation three popular advertising specifications are compared using the j test and the likelihood dominance criterion even though all three specifications fitted well according to standard criteria the calculated expenditure price and advertising elasticities were sensitive to the manner with which advertising is specified this clearly highlights the need to rely on a sound criterion to identify a dominant specification from the identified dominant specification we found that advertising has very subtle effects on expenditures on alcoholic beverages group and individual beverages thus advertising is not effective in enlarging markets and this suggests that firms especially breweries use advertising to compete in zero sum market share games from a public policy perspective our results are comforting but future research should investigate whether the neutral effect of advertising on aggregated expenditures hide substantial offsetting changes in the drinking habits of individuals 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

thresholds in the process of international financial integration abstract the financial crisis has re ignited the fierce debate about the merits of financial globalization and its implications for growth especially for developing countries the empirical literature has not been able to conclusively establish the presumed growth benefits of financial integration indeed a new literature proposes that the indirect benefits of financial integration may be more important than the traditional financing channel emphasized in previous analyses a major complication however is that there seem to be certain threshold levels of financial and institutional development that an economy needs to attain before it can derive the indirect benefits and reduce the risks of financial openness in this paper we develop a unified empirical framework for characterizing such threshold conditions we find that there are clearly identifiable thresholds in variables such as financial depth and institutional quality the cost benefit trade off from financial openness improves significantly once these threshold conditions are satisfied we also find that the thresholds are lower for foreign direct investment and portfolio equity liabilities compared to those for debt liabilities

optimal time consistent macroprudential policy collateral constraints widely used in models of financial crises feature a pecuniary externality agents do not internalize how borrowing decisions made in good times affect collateral prices during a crisis we show that under commitment the optimal financial regulator s plans are time inconsistent and study time consistent policy quantitatively this policy reduces sharply the frequency and magnitude of crises removes fat tails from the distribution of asset returns and increases social welfare in contrast constant debt taxes are ineffective and can be welfare reducing while an optimized macroprudential taylor rule is effective but less so than the optimal time consistent policy

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

international capital flows and credit market imperfections a tale of two frictions the nancial crisis of 2007 08 has underscored the importance of adverse selection in nancial markets this friction has been mostly neglected by macroeconomic models of nancial imperfections however which have focused almost exclusively on the eects of limited pledgeability in this paper we ll this gap by developing a standard growth model with adverse selection our main results are that by fostering unproductive investment adverse selection i leads to an increase in the economy s equilibrium interest rate and ii it generates a negative wedge between the marginal return to investment and the equilibrium interest rate under nancial integration we show how this translates into excessive capital inows and endogenous cycles we also extend our model to the more general case in which adverse selection and limited pledgeability coexist we conclude that both frictions complement one another and show that limited pledgeability exacerbates the eects of adverse selection

asymmetric information incentives and intrafirm resource allocation this paper considers the question how should a firm allocate a resource among divisions when the productivity of the resource in each division is known only to the division manager obviously if the divisions as represented by their managers are indifferent among various allocations of the resource the headquarters can simply request the division managers to reveal their private information on productivity knowing that the managers have no incentive to lie the resource allocation problem can then be solved under complete or at least symmetric information this aspect is a flaw in much of the recent literature on this topic i e there is nothing in the models considered which makes divisions prefer one allocation over another thus although in some cases elaborate allocation schemes are proposed and analyzed they are really unnecessary in the model we develop a division can produce the same output with less managerial effort if it is allocated more resources and effort is costly to the manager we further assume that this effort is unobservable by the headquarters so that it cannot infer divisional productivity from data on divisional output and managerial effort given these assumptions we seek an optimal resource allocation process our results show that certain types of transfer pricing schemes are optimal in particular if there are no potentially binding capacity constraints on production of the resource then an optimal process is for each division to choose a transfer price from a schedule announced by the headquarters division managers receive a fixed compensation minus the cost of the resource allocated to them at the chosen transfer price resources are allocated on the basis of the chosen transfer prices if there is a potentially binding constraint on resource production a somewhat more complicated but similar scheme is required

financial development and the instability of open economies this paper introduces a framework for analyzing the role of financial factors as a source of instability in small open economies our basic model is a dynamic open economy model with a tradeable good produced with capital and a country specific factor we also assume that firms face credit constraints with the constraint being tighter at a lower level of financial development a basic implication of this model is that economies at an intermediate level of financial development are more unstable than either very developed or very underdeveloped economies this is true both in the sense that temporary shocks have large and persistent effects and also in the sense that these economies can exhibit cycles thus countries that are going through a phase of financial development may become more unstable in the short run similarly full capital account liberalization may destabilize the economy in economies at an intermediate level of financial development phases of growth with capital inflows are followed by collapse with capital outflows on the other hand foreign direct investment does not destabilize

multiproduct nonlinear pricing typically work on mechanism design has assumed that all private information can be captured in a single scalar variable this paper explores one way in which this assumption can be relaxed in the context of the multiproduct nonlinear pricing problem it is shown that the firm will choose to exclude some low value consumers from all markets a class of cases that allow explicit solution is derived by making use of a multivariate form of integration by parts in such cases the optimal tariff is cost based

contractual externalities and systemic risk we study effort and risk taking behaviour in an economy with a continuum of principal agent pairs where each agent exerts costly hidden effort principals write contracts based on both absolute and relative performance evaluations ape and rpe respectively to make individually optimal risk return trade offs but do not take into account their impact on endogenously determined aggregate variables this results in contractual externalities when these aggregate variables are used as benchmarks in contracts contractual externalities have welfare changing effects when principals put too much weight on ape or rpe due to information frictions relative to the second best if the expected productivity is high risk averse principals over incentivize their own agents triggering a rat race in effort exertion resulting in over investment in effort and excessive exposure to industry risks the opposite occurs when the expected productivity is low inducing pro cyclical investment and risk taking behaviours

the balance of payments and borrowing constraints an alternative view of the mexican crisis in this paper we develop a model in which a country faces a balance of payments crisis if constraints on its international borrowing bind we use the model to describe the dynamics of the trade balance capital account and balance of payments of a country that borrows to finance consumption following sweeping macroeconomic and structural reforms and then hits constraints on its international borrowing we compare the predictions of this theoretical example with events in mexico from 1987 through 1995

why does bad news increase volatility and decrease leverage a recent literature shows how an increase in volatility reduces leverage however in order to explain pro cyclical leverage it assumes that bad news increases volatility that is it assumes an inverse relationship between first and second moments of asset returns this paper suggests a reason why bad news is more often than not associated with higher future volatility we show that in a model with endogenous leverage and heterogeneous beliefs agents have the incentive to invest mostly in technologies that become more volatile in bad times agents choose these technologies because they can be leveraged more during normal times together with the existing literature this explains pro cyclical leverage the result also gives a rationale to the pattern of volatility smiles observed in stock options since 1987 finally the paper presents for the first time a dynamic model in which an asset is endogenously traded simultaneously at different margin requirements in equilibrium

credit cycles redux theoretical studies have shown that under unorthodox assumptions on preferences and production technologies collateral constraints can act as a powerful amplification and propagation mechanism of exogenous shocks we investigate whether or not this result holds under more standard assumptions we find that collateral constraints typically generate small output amplification large amplification is obtained as a knife edge type of result

banks and liquidity crises in emerging market economies abstract this paper presents and analyzes a simple banking model in which banks have access to international capital markets and domestic asset markets the model generates two types of equilibria a no default equilibrium and a mixed equilibrium in the no default equilibrium all banks are symmetric and always solvent while in the mixed equilibrium some banks can be internationally illiquid and default simultaneously the latter equilibrium captures the basic features of banking crises after financial liberalization in emerging market economies in this case a large capital inflow leads to high asset price volatility and magnifies a banking crisis

a corporate balance sheet approach to currency crises this paper presents a general equilibrium currency crisis model of the third generation in which the possibility of currency crises is driven by the interplay between private firms credit constraints and nominal price rigidities despite our emphasis on microfoundations the model remains sufficiently simple that the policy analysis can be conducted graphically the analysis hinges on four main features i ex post deviations from purchasing power parity ii credit constraints a la bernanke gertler iii foreign currency borrowing by domestic firms iv a competitive banking sector lending to firms and holding reserves and a monetary policy conducted either through open market operations or short term lending facilities we derive sufficient conditions for the existence of a sunspot equilibrium with currency crises we show that an interest rate increase intended to support the currency in a crisis may not be effective but that a relaxation of short term lending facilities can make this policy effective by attenuating the rise in interest rates relevant to firms

the structural determinants of external vulnerability the authors examine empirically how domestic structural characteristics related to openness and product and factor market flexibility influence the impact that terms of trade shocks can have on aggregate output for this purpose they apply an econometric methodology based on semi structural vector auto regressions to a panel of 90 countries with annual observations for the period 1974 2000 using this methodology the authors isolate and standardize the shocks estimate their impact on gdp and examine how this impact depends on the domestic conditions outlined above they find that larger trade openness magnifies the output impact of external shocks particularly the negative ones while improvements in labor market flexibility and financial openness reduce their impact domestic financial depth has a more nuanced role in stabilizing the economy it helps reduce the impact of external shocks particularly in environments of high exposure that is when trade and financial openness are high firm entry is unrestricted and labor markets are rigid

international and domestic collateral constraints in a model of emerging market crises abstract we build a model of emerging markets crises which features two types of collateral constraints firms in a domestic economy have limited borrowing capacity from international investors they also have limited borrowing capacity with respect to each other we study how the presence and changes in these collateral constraints affect financial and real variables a binding international constraint in the aggregate leads to a sharp rise in interest rates and fire sales of domestic assets while limited domestic collateral can lead to wasted international collateral these two collateral constraints can interact in important ways the first is disintermediation a fire sale of domestic assets causes banks to fail in their function of reallocating resources across the economy leading to wasted international collateral the second is a dynamic effect we show that firms in an economy with limited domestic collateral and a binding international collateral constraint will not adequately precaution against adverse shocks increasing the severity of these shocks

financial markets intermediaries and intertemporal smoothing in an overlapping generations economy with incomplete financial markets but no intermediaries there is underinvestment in safe assets in an economy with intermediaries and no financial markets accumulating reserves of safe assets allows returns to be smoothed nondiversifiable risk to be eliminated and an ex ante pareto improvement compared to the allocation in the market equilibrium to be achieved in a mixed financial system however competition from financial markets constrains intermediaries so that they perform no better than markets alone

heterogeneity and stability bolster the strong not the weak we first study a stylized model of self fulfilling panic among agents with differing fragilities to strategic risk and show that depending on the severity of coordination problems the panic trigger threshold can depend only on one type s fragility we then present a model of systemic panic among financial institutions with heterogeneous fragilities to financial spillovers concerns about potential spillovers generate strategic interaction triggering a pre emption game in which one tries to exit the market before others to avoid spillovers although financial contagion originates in weaker institutions systemic risk can critically depend on financial health of stronger in the contagion chain in this case bolstering the strong rather than the weak more effectively enhances systemic stability

capital controls and foreign exchange market intervention abstract high level of capital controls and volatile exchange rates in developing countries are considered suboptimal in classical trilemma frameworks the paper presents a new keynesian small open economy model that assesses middle ground policies such as partial capital controls and managed exchange regimes the paper introduces a policy endogenous risk premium which creates financial frictions breaking exchange rate peg exposes foreign investors to exchange rate risk and even signals the country s economic instability and financial sector responds by raising the country s exchange rate risk premium contrary to the classical theory the results suggest that implementing both capital controls and managed exchange regimes can be optimal while maintaining domestic monetary policy sovereignty

sovereign risk and secondary markets conventional wisdom says that in the absence of default penalties sovereign risk destroys all foreign asset trade we show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption that assets cannot be retraded in secondary markets without this assumption foreign asset trade is possible even in the absence of default penalties this result suggests a broader perspective regarding the origins of sovereign risk and its remedies sovereign risk affects foreign asset trade only if default penalties are insufficient and secondary markets work imperfectly to reduce its effects one can either increase default penalties or improve the working of secondary markets jel f34 g12 g15

financial liberalization credit constraints and collateral investment in the mexican manufacturing sector abstract we examine the impact of financial liberalization on fixed investment in mexico using establishment level data from the manufacturing sector in addition to analyzing changes in cash flow sensitivities an innovative approach explores the role of real estate as collateral and addresses a potential censoring problem the results suggest that financial constraints were eased for the smallest firms but not for larger ones however the importance of possessing real estate increased given banks reliance on collateral in their lending the results also provide microeconomic evidence consistent with the role attributed to financial accelerator mechanisms during lending booms and during post crisis recessions

internal debt crises and sovereign defaults internal and sovereign debt crises occur together and happen more frequently in economies with weak bankruptcy institutions this paper provides a novel explanation internal crises arise because of the inability to liquidate private debtors when many default in an optimal contract a successful entrepreneur repays yet an unsuccessful one defaults and liquidates his assets the bounds on liquidation generate however a second equilibrium where domestic borrowers default because others are also defaulting during these coordinated defaults tax collections fall which increases sovereign default risk in the model joint debt crises are an optimal response to informational problems in private sector lending

fiscal imbalances and the dynamics of currency crises abstract this paper analyzes links between the fiscal theory of the price level ftpl and the first generation models after krugman journal of money credit and banking 11 1979 311 325 exploring the idea that a synthesis between the two can become a new framework to analyze the fiscal dimension of currency crises working in a simple synthetic framework we show how external nominal shocks can cause a fiscal imbalance and undermine currency stability resolve two well known paradoxes of the first generation model discuss the role of seigniorage revenues and illustrate how fiscal and interest rate policies interact to determine the magnitude and the timing of speculative attacks and devaluations

credit externalities macroeconomic effects and policy implications financial crises are often preceded by peri ods of credit expansion during which firms and households become increasingly vulnerable to a reversal in economic conditions when eco nomic conditions actually worsen financing constraints become tighter causing a deeper contraction of economic activity these events have led to policy proposals for preventing excessive borrowing during normal times if rational agents evaluate financing decisions from a privately optimal standpoint why would the debt level not be socially efficient the theoretical literature has offered an answer to this question based on a pecuniary externality that arises due to the presence of financial frictions private agents tend to under value net worth during a period of financial distress because they fail to internalize the fact that additional net worth would have positive spillovers on other agents balance sheets 1 as a result private agents borrow excessively the quantitative implications of these credit exter nalities however remain largely unknown in particular these key questions have not been addressed

the capital budgeting process incentives and information we study the capital allocation process within firms observed budgeting processes are explained as a response to decentralized information and incentive problems it is shown that these imperfections can result in underinvestment when capital productivity is high and overinvestment when it is low we also investigate how the budgeting process may be expected to vary with firm or division characteristics such as investment opportunities and the technology for information transfer there is general agreement that investment decisions are the most important decisions made by corporations the choice of projects and the level of investment is critical not just for stakeholders of the firm but also for the economic well being of society as a whole it has been alleged that u s firms invest too little and tend to overemphasize short term results for example porter 1992 citing poterba and summers 1992 asserts that u s firms use hurdle rates to evaluate investment projects that are higher than their estimated costs of capital to understand the investment behavior of firms one must consider both the process by which external capital is made available to firms and the process by which internally and externally raised capital is allocated to investment projects within the firm considerable attention has been paid to how firms raise external capital the fundamental insight in this area is the celebrated result of modigliani and miller mm that capital structure is irrelevant in the absence of capital market frictions accordingly in the three decades since their contribution research on how external capital is raised has focused on market frictions including information and incentive problems relatively little research has focused on the internal allocation process and its relationship to the organization of the firm modern finance theory prescribes allocating capital according to the net present value npv rule just as the mm result itself provides no theory of the arrangements under which

a censored system of cigarette and alcohol consumption many previous studies of us cigarette and alcohol consumption have focused on single equations however the addictive nature of consumption suggests that it is more appropriate to model these products as a system we propose a two step estimation procedure and apply the procedure to a system of equations for cigarette beer and wine consumption results differ from those derived from an existing two step procedure findings suggest that consumption of cigarettes beer and wine is responsive to income changes but the elasticities are rather small personal physiques education age race ethnicity health gender employment status and regions also play significant roles in consumption

excessive dollar debt financial development and underinsurance we propose that the limited financial development of emerging markets is a significant factor behind the large share of dollar denominated external debt present in these markets we show that when financial constraints affect borrowing and lending between domestic agents agents undervalue insuring against an exchange rate depreciation since more of this insurance is present when external debt is denominated in domestic currency rather than in dollars this result implies that domestic agents choose excessive dollar debt we also show that limited financial development reduces the incentives for foreign lenders to enter emerging markets the retarded entry reinforces the underinsurance problem

debt constrained asset markets we develop a theory of general equilibrium with endogenous debt limits in the form of individual rationality constraints similar to those in the dynamic consistency literature if an agent defaults on a contract he can be excluded from future contingent claims markets trading and can have his assets seized he cannot be excluded from spot markets trading however and he has some private endowments that cannot be seized all information is publicly held and common knowledge and there is a complete set of contingent claims markets since there is complete information an agent cannot enter into a contract in which he would have an incentive to default in some state in general there is only partial insurance variations in consumption may be imperfectly correlated across agents interest rates may be lower than they would be without constraints and equilibria may be pareto ranked

alcohol advertising bans consumption and control policies in seventeen oecd countries 1975 2000 this article uses cross country panel data to study the effects of advertising bans and other control policies on alcohol demand the null hypothesis is that advertising bans do not decrease alcohol consumption the study addresses several shortcomings in four previous cross country studies first an explanatory variable is included for other alcohol control policies second the study examines the history of advertising bans in oecd countries third the study also examines differences in cross country trends that characterize developed countries including aging of the population increased tourism higher unemployment rates and increased consumption of wine the mediterranean wine drinking countries are shown to be categorically distinct from the beer drinking countries and nordic spirits drinking countries fourth the study examines the panel data for unit roots and employs model specifications that correct for nonstationary data the empirical results indicate a significantly negative effect for th

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

are asset price guarantees useful for preventing sudden stops a quantitative investigation of the globalization hazard moral hazard tradeoff abstract an implication of the globalization hazard hypothesis is that sudden stops caused by global financial frictions could be prevented by offering foreign investors price guarantees on emerging markets assets these guarantees create a tradeoff however because they weaken globalization hazard while creating international moral hazard we study this tradeoff using a quantitative equilibrium asset pricing model without guarantees margin calls and trading costs cause sudden stops driven by a fisherian deflation price guarantees prevent this deflation by propping up foreign demand for assets the effectiveness of price guarantees their distortions on asset markets and their welfare implications depend critically on whether the guarantees are contingent on debt levels and on the price elasticity of foreign demand for domestic assets

structural change in the demand for meat economists have long thought that shocks in the economy sometimes lead to permanent changes in behavioral relationships hence supply or demand elasticities estimated from econometric models may change over time the source of such structural change may be technological adoption a shift in consumer preferences or an institutional change one way to handle this problem in linear models is to allow the parameters to change as the situation changes so that the model provides a local approximation of the behavioral relationship this approach is an attractive way to deal with structural change problems econometricians have extended the classical

monetary policy in a financial crisis what are the economic effects of an interest rate cut when an economy is in the midst of a financial crisis under what conditions will a cut stimulate output and employment and raise welfare under what conditions will a cut have the opposite effects we answer these questions in a general class of open economy models where a financial crisis is modeled as a time when collateral constraints are suddenly binding we find that when there are frictions in adjusting the level of output in the traded good sector and in adjusting the rate at which that output can be used in other parts of the economy then a cut in the interest rate is most likely to result in a welfare reducing fall in output and employment when these frictions are absent a cut in the interest rate improves asset positions and promotes a welfare increasing economic expansion

capital rationing and organizational slack in capital budgeting this paper reconciles three stylized facts about capital budgeting in firms and shows that they are tied to the presence of asymmetric information among the several members of the firm each with his or her own objectives and decisions the facts of interest are 1 the existence of organizational slack 2 the rationing of resources within organizations 3 the stated cut off rate for accepting capital projects in firms is often greater than the market rate of interest organizational slack is defined as the excess of resources allocated over the minimum necessary to accomplish the tasks assigned resource rationing is defined as the under allocation of resources i e an increase in the amount allocated would generate revenues in excess of its costs rationing and slack are both manifestations of ex post inefficiencies an lp model is used to show that these inefficiencies can occur in ex ante efficient organizational designs when asymmetric information is present the optimal allocation policy involves a hurdle rate criterion in which the hurdle rate is strictly in excess of the cost of capital thus inducing rationing in some states of the world typically resources are optimally allocated such that slack exists in other states the optimal allocation policy trades off these two inefficiencies