a principal agent problem with heterogeneous demand distributions for a carbon capture and storage system abstract mechanism design problems optimize contract offerings from a principal to different types of agents who have private information about their demands for a product or a service we study the implications of uncertainty in agents demands on the principal s contracts specifically we consider the setting where agents demands follow heterogeneous distributions and the principal offers a menu of contracts stipulating quantities and transfer payments for each demand distribution we present analytical solutions for the special case when there are two distributions each taking two discrete values as well as a method for deriving analytical solutions from numerical solutions we describe one application of the model in carbon capture and storage systems to demonstrate various types of optimal solutions and to obtain managerial insights

comment on inflation dynamics with search frictions a structural econometric analysis by krause lopez salido and lubik abstract the implications of search frictions on the inflation dynamics are shown here for the case with wage adjustments typically belonging to the new keynesian model not to the mortensen pissarides framework in that model variant i identify the role of search frictions by an additional term entering the slope coefficient of the inflation equation after a numerical exercise i find results that are in line with those obtained by krause et al 2008 inflation dynamics with search frictions a structural econometric analysis journal of monetary economics 55 doi 10 1016 j jmoneco 2008 05 003

characterization of a class of moral hazard adverse selection games abstract studying a principal agent game in which the agent alone observes the state of the world and reports it but the moral hazard is not reducible shows that if the principal uses all signals then no solution exists i e there is no contract that elicits truth telling and motivates the agent to exert effort when the principal does not use signals on the state of the world that seem irrelevant a solution exists in which some of the ex post signals on outcome are not used even though they obey the informativeness condition of holmstrom bell journal of economics 1979 10 74 91

the relation between price and marginal cost in u s industry a contradiction in a recent article in this journal hall 1988 examined productivity shocks at the industry level derived from constant returns to scale production functions in which firms were assumed to be competitive hall had two important conclusions first he showed that productivity shocks i e solow residuals were correlated with aggregate demand variables implying that the former are not exogenous impulses second his results implied that firms persistently charge prices above marginal costs making inappropriate the constant returns to scale competitive production function assumed in many theoretical frameworks because of the importance of hall s findings the article has led to many extensions evans 1992 confirms the empirical finding of significant correlations between productivity shocks and aggregate demand variables burnside eichenbaum and rebelo 1993 show that this correlation can be explained by introducing labor hoarding into a theoretical model with competitive firms and constant returns to scale production functions the markups above marginal cost are explained by eden and griliches 1991 and galeotti and schiantarelli 1991 by modifying the theoretical production function caballero and lyons 1992 using the hall data and methodology examine the possibility of external economies in the aggregate manufacturing production finally waldmann 199 1 argues in this journal that the

equilibrium properties of auctions and alternative procedures for allocating transferable permits abstract this paper examines the equilibrium properties of a range of auctions and related procedures placing emphasis on the types of procedures that are likely to be of special interest in environmental management applications nash equilibrium properties are first derived for a very general class of auctions for multiple homogeneous or heterogeneous objects or permits next it is shown that given appropriate assumptions three broad classes of public allocation procedures that do not generate revenues for the government would yield participants equal expected profits these classes are 1 incentive compatible auctions where bidders receive equal lump sum refunds 2 non incentive compatible procedures where refunds are a function of participants bids and 3 free initial distribution of permits on a lump sum basis followed by trading via a competitive market the applicability of the general results is then demonstrated by examining the particular non incentive compatible fair division procedure originally suggested by knaster finally implications of the theoretical results for applications including the allocation of transferable discharge permits and water rights are discussed

the role of firm size in bilateral bargaining a study of the cable television industry we examine the effect of buyer merger on bilateral negotiations between a supplier and n buyers merger may have bargaining effects in addition to the usual efficiency effects the effect of merger on the buyers bargaining position depends on the curvature of the supplier s gross surplus function merger enhances worsens the buyers bargaining position if the function is concave convex based on a panel of advertising revenue in the cable television industry our estimates indicate that the gross surplus function for suppliers of program services is convex this result suggests that cable operators integrate horizontally to realize efficiency gains rather than to enhance their bargaining position vis a vis program suppliers

production function regressions returns to scale and externalities a number of recent papers have used simple linear regressions in an attempt to identify market structure the extent of returns to scale and possible external effects in u s manufacturing industries the results obtained from these regressions have important implications for several branches of modern macroeconomics as a result the macro literature frequently cites specific numerical evidence from caballero and lyons 1992 and hall 1990 which suggests that there are quantitatively significant increasing returns to scale or external effects in u s manufacturing in contrast it is the argument of this paper that this evidence is not convincing the most robust evidence suggests that the typical u s manufacturing industry displays constant returns with no external effects on the other hand there is significant heterogeneity across industries

estimating demand for local telephone service with asymmetric information and optional calling plans in this paper i study the theoretical and econometric implications of agents uncertainty concerning their future consumption when a monopolist offers them either a unique mandatory nonlinear tariff or a choice in advance from a menu of optional two part tariffs agents uncertainty is resolved through individual and privately known shocks to their types in such a situation the principal may screen agents according to their ex ante or ex post type by offering either a menu of optional tariffs or a standard nonlinear schedule the theoretical implications of the model are used to evaluate a tariff experiment run by south central bell in two cities in kentucky in 1986 the empirical approach explicitly accounts for the existence of informational asymmetries between local telephone users and the monopolist leading to different nested econometric specifications under symmetric and asymmetric information the empirical evidence suggests that there exists a significant asymmetry of information between consumers and the monopolist under both tariff regimes all expected welfare components failed to increase with the introduction of optional tariffs for the estimated value of the parameters copyright 2002 wiley blackwell

the licensing of patents under asymmetric information abstract this paper seeks to explain the use of royalty payments rather than fixed fees in the licensing of patents by the presence of asymmetric information the licensee is assumed to know the value of the patent and makes a single offer of a contract to the licensor it is shown that there is a unique equillibrium satisfying cho and kreps intuitive criterion qualitative properties of the equilibrium contract are derived by considering a continuum of types

cyclical productivity in a model of labor hoarding abstract this paper develops a dynamic model of labor hoarding to explain two empirical facts the cyclical behavior of total factor productivity and the dynamic correlations of sectoral productivity with aggregate variables the model features convex costs of adjusting the labor force which induce firms to vary the intensity of labor utilization over the cycle in particular cyclical variations in labor effort take place as a response to expected future changes in industry conditions i test the restrictions imposed by the model for several two digit manufacturing industries under different assumptions about market structure and returns to scale then using the assumption that aggregate variables carry information about future changes in industry conditions i simulate the model s dynamic response of hours and productivity to aggregate innovations and compare them to those estimated from the data

the principal agent relationship with an informed principal ii common values in many circumstances a principal may have relevant private information when she proposes a contract to an agent we analyze such a principal agent relationship as a noncooperative game the principal proposes a contract which is accepted or rejected by the agent who for most of our analysis has no private information the contract is executed if accepted otherwise the reservation allocation takes effect this allocation may be determined by a pre existing contract which the principal by her proposal is attempting to renegotiate or it may simply be the no trade point in this paper we assume that the principal s information directly affects the agent s payoff before solving the game we discuss pareto efficiency with asymmetric information we define an incentive compatible allocation to be weakly interim efficient wie if there exists no alternative incentive compatible allocation that both parties prefer for all possible beliefs that the agent might have about the principal s private information type we show that any wie allocation is interim efficient ie for some beliefs the rothschild stiglitz wilson rsw allocation relative to the reservation allocation l is the allocation that maximizes the payoff of each type of principal within the class of incentive compatible allocations that guarantee the agent at least the utility he gets from a irrespective of his beliefs about the principal s type the equilibrium set of the contract proposal game consists of the allocations that weakly pareto dominate the rsw allocation thus there is a unique equilibrium outcome if and only if the latter is ie and the equilibrium outcome is the rsw allocation itself after characterizing the equilibrium allocations we study those that are renegotiation proof when either the principal or the agent leads the renegotiation we then compare our contract proposal game which is a signaling model with its screening counterpart we conclude by extending our results to the case in which the agent as well as the principal has private information under the assumption of quasi linear preferences

on the instability of the r d portfolio in a dynamic monopoly or one cannot get two eggs in one basket abstract firms innovation portfolios include several dimensions ranging from organizational aspects to cost reduction and product characteristics all of these efforts take place during the product life cycle and interact with each other in determining the spectrum of features of the product and its performance on the market this paper contributes to the related theoretical debate focussing on the possibility of having superior product quality levels at lower marginal production cost over time to deal with this issue we investigate the optimal r d portfolio of a single product monopolist investing in cost reducing activities accompanied by efforts improving the quality of its product over an infinite time horizon it turns out that the firm s relative incentives along the two directions are conditional upon market affluence measured by consumers willingness to pay for quality and r d efforts are complements in the neighbourhood of the steady state equilibrium however the dynamics of the two r d controls depend on both quality and marginal cost at every instant consequently as the stability analysis reveals the steady state equilibrium is indeed unstable due to the dynamics of marginal cost thereby implying that one should not expect the firm to supply an increasing quality level at a decreasing production cost hence the dynamic interplay between r d controls and the resulting instability affecting production costs also imply that one may not expect to observe product quality to increase and market price to decrease over the product life cycle

optimal pricing of a congestible good with random participation abstract this paper studies the optimal pricing of a congestible network good offered by a monopoly who faces a double asymmetry of information concerning both users valuations and users unit waiting costs which leads to a random participation problem we show that the textbook price is lower than the price with random participation

symbiosis vs crowding out the interaction of formal and informal credit markets in developing countries abstract it is a common observation in many developing countries that enterprises are active borrowers in both formal and informal credit markets we propose a model in which the formal sector s superior ability in deposit mobilization is traded off against the informational advantage that lenders in the informal sector enjoy the formal sector can screen borrowers by providing only partial financing for projects thereby forcing borrowers to resort to the informal sector for the remainder of the loan we use the model to predict how the market structure responds to changes in the environment and we consider the policy implications of various forms of government intervention

how optimal nonlinear income taxes change when the distribution of the population changes abstract the impacts of changing the number of individuals of a particular skill level on the solutions to two versions of the finite population optimal nonlinear income tax problem are investigated in one version preferences are quasilinear in leisure for this version it is shown that it is possible to sign the directions of change in everyone s optimal consumptions and optimal marginal tax rates in the other version preferences are quasilinear in consumption for this version it is shown that it is possible to sign the directions of change in everyone s optimal before tax incomes and optimal marginal tax rates moreover the directions of change in the optimal marginal tax rates are the same for the two specifications of preferences

nonlinear pricing of information goods this paper analyzes optimal pricing for information goods under incomplete information when both unlimited usage fixed fee pricing and usage based pricing are feasible and administering usage based pricing may involve transaction costs it is shown that offering fixed fee pricing in addition to a nonlinear usage based pricing scheme is always profit improving in the presence of nonzero transaction costs and there may be markets in which a pure fixed fee is optimal this implies that the optimal pricing strategy for information goods is almost never fully revealing moreover it is proved that the optimal usage based pricing schedule is independent of the value of the fixed fee a result that simplifies the simultaneous design of pricing schedules considerably and provides a simple procedure for determining the optimal combination of fixed fee and nonlinear usage based pricing the introduction of fixed fee pricing is shown to increase both consumer surplus and total surplus the differential effects of setup costs fixed transaction costs and variable transaction costs on pricing policy are described these results suggest a number of managerial guidelines for designing pricing schedules for instance in nascent information markets firms may profit from low fixed fee penetration pricing but as these markets mature the optimal pricing mix should expand to include a wider range of usage based pricing options minimum fees quantity discounts and adoption levels across the different pricing schemes are characterized strategic pricing responses to changes in market characteristics are described and the implications of the paper s results for bundling and vertical differentiation of information goods are discussed

an empirical analysis of competitive nonlinear pricing abstract we estimate a model of competitive nonlinear pricing with multidimensional preference heterogeneity using individual level data on advertisements bought by local businesses e g doctors electricians from two yellow page directories in one u s city market variation in individual choices and payments allows us to identify the joint density of preferences marginal costs of publishing and common utility parameters our estimates suggest substantial welfare loss due to asymmetric information comparing duopoly outcomes with counterfactual monopoly outcomes we find that with less competition i producer surplus increases substantially ii more low type consumers are excluded iii product variety increases but benefits accrue only to the high type consumers iv total consumer surplus decreases v but its distribution across consumers does not change

cyclical productivity in europe and the united states evaluating the evidence on returns to scale and input utilization this paper studies procyclical productivity growth at the industry level in the united states and three european countries france germany and the netherlands industry specific demand side instruments are used to examine the prevalence of non constant returns to scale and unmeasured input utilization for the aggregate us economy unmeasured input utilization seems to explain procyclical productivity however this correction still leaves one in three us industries with procyclical productivity this failure of the model can also be seen in europe and is mostly concentrated in services industries

hiring and leasing with nonlinear prices this paper examines the problem of a monopolist setting an optimal nonlinear pricing schedule in the face of consumers of unknown type who arrive randomly over time and self select a choice of hire period the major determinant of pricing policy is the customer arrival distribution with the overall level of price higher than in the atemporal yield management nonuniform pricing solution by a margin which increases with the average frequency with which potential customers arrive by contrast the solution is generally fairly insensitive to variations in the time rate of discount although there is a tendency for the rate of price discount to increase with increases in the time discount rate

information exchange and distributional implications of price discrimination with internet marketing in agriculture a price discrimination model is proposed to explain why firms provide extraneous information on internet sites selling agricultural inputs whether an informative site is offered depends on price discrimination potential which depends on how much farmers reveal heterogeneity by internet behavior price discrimination is greater if information benefits are negatively correlated with farm size or other characteristics explaining why extraneous not product related information is offered on internet sales sites price discrimination adversely affects some farmers but may be beneficial on average because it generates free information outcomes depend on whether internet users are aware of price differentials on the basis of clickstream information

sectoral patterns of technical change towards a taxonomy and a theory abstract the purpose of the paper is to describe and explain sectoral patterns of technical change as revealed by data on about 2000 significant innovations in britain since 1945 most technological knowledge turns out not to be information that is generally applicable and easily reproducible but specific to firms and applications cumulative in development and varied amongst sectors in source and direction innovating firms principally in electronics and chemicals are relatively big and they develop innovations over a wide range of specific product groups within their principal sector but relatively few outside firms principally in mechanical and instrument engineering are relatively small and specialised and they exist in symbiosis with large firms in scale intensive sectors like metal manufacture and vehicles who make a significant contribution to their own process technology in textile firms on the other hand most process innovations come from suppliers these characteristics and variations can be classified in a three part taxonomy based on firms 1 supplier dominated 2 production intensive 3 science based they can be explained by sources of technology requirements of users and possibilities for appropriation this explanation has implications for our understanding of the sources and directions of technical change firms diversification behaviour the dynamic relationship between technology and industrial structure and the formation of technological skills and advantages at the level of the firm the region and the country

price discrimination using linear and nonlinear pricing simultaneously abstract price discrimination practiced by using linear and nonlinear pricing simultaneously raises the average price for heterogenous consumers paying linear price but lowers for homogeneous group who pay nonlinear price discrimination lowers consumer surplus for both groups but increases total surplus

optimal nonlinear pricing by a monopolist with information ambiguity we consider the optimal nonlinear pricing by an ambiguity averse monopolist the monopolist s subjective belief about the distribution of buyers is described by contamination of an additive probability we find that under a maxmin utility decision rule and with a continuum of buyers ambiguity aversion leads to bunching at the bottom in the optimal contract and the distortion at the bottom is reduced other high valuation buyers are offered the same quantity as in the case without ambiguity but they get a greater discount

price discrimination through refund contracts in airlines this paper shows how an airline monopoly uses refundable and non refundable tickets to screen consumers who are uncertain about their travel our theoretical model predicts that the difference between these two fares diminishes as individual demand uncertainty is resolved using an original data set from u s airline markets we find strong evidence supporting our model price discrimination opportunities through refund contracts decline as the departure date nears and individuals learn about their demand

weak instrument robust tests in gmm and the new keynesian phillips curve we discuss weak instrument robust statistics in gmm for testing hypotheses on the full parameter vector or on subsets of the parameters we use these test procedures to reexamine the evidence on the new keynesian phillips curve model we find that u s postwar data are consistent with the view that inflation dynamics are predominantly forward looking but we cannot rule out the presence of considerable backward looking dynamics moreover the phillips curve has become flatter recently and this is an important factor contributing to its weak identification

optimal labour contracts under asymmetric information an introduction the review of economic studies has instituted a new series of lectures to be given annually by a younger british economist at the association of university teachers of economics meetings the choice of lecturer is determined by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay this paper is a revised version of the first lecture in the series it was presented at the aute meeting held at the university of surrey in april 1982 and was refereed in the usual way mak

cost functions in non linear pricing abstract this paper compares the optimal selling strategies with symmetric and asymmetric information when monopolist s cost function depends both on individual and aggregate production we show how standard underproduction and higher exclusion with incomplete information are affected

revenue implications of money creation under leviathan most governments possess a monopoly franchise in the creation of money economists provide an analytical justification for this institutional arrangement either in terms of the use of monetary aggregates for macro economic stabilization or in terms of the alleged inability of competitive markets to generate tolerably efficient monetary results any complete case for the government s monetary monopoly must however depend on a comparison of market and political arrangements a comparison that requires predictions about how governments are likely to behave once a monopoly franchise is assigned similarly such predictions are crucial in evaluating restrictions that might be imposed on the government s exercise of its money creation power in designing a monetary constitution in the analysis of political arrangements the revenue implications of the money creation power are probably more significant than considerations of either macro economic stability or optimality in the money supply although those revenue implications are incidental to demonstrating the nature of market failure in monetary arrangements they are fundamental in understanding how the government might exploit a monopoly in money creation once granted our interest in the revenue effects of money creation stems from a broader study of constitutional restrictions on the revenueraising authority of government see our book the power to create money is naturally encompassed in this restrictions on the revenue raising power must embody restrictions on the power to create money consequently the fiscal constitution has important implications for the monetary constitution in this paper we examine both the revenue implications of money creation and desirable consitutional restrictions on the money creation power within the context of a specific model of political processes

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

optimal nonuniform prices we consider optimal nonuniform pricing schedules where the price depends upon the amount purchased such schedules are regularly used by public utilities and other services welfare optimal nonuniform prices are related to the theory of optimal uniform prices developed by ramsey we characterize situations in which upward or downward discontinuities in pricing schedules are optimal our results are applicable to a number of related problems including optimal taxation insurance and incentives economic theory has confined most of its attention to markets with uniform prices in which the price per unit charged is invariant to the level of a customer s purchases this focus is warranted when goods are resellable since any attempt to charge nonuniform prices could be circumvented by reselling amongst customers but when goods are not resellable nonuniform prices are not only possible but common public utilities have declining block pricing with lower unit charges for large levels of consumption many agencies providing services including communications transportation even education use two part pricing with a fixed entry or retainer charge and a further charge per unit consumption nonuniform price schedules can be expected to be ever more common as services become a larger fraction of total output the increasing prevalence of nonuniform pricing policies have made them the focus of recent public and economic attention oi 1971 feldstein 1972 and ng and weisser 1974 have examined optimal two part pricing policies leland and meyer 1976 examine block pricing and show by example that optimal welfare policies may require nonuniform prices if zero profit constraints are binding in this paper we consider arbitrary nonuniform pricing policies using variational techniques two part and block pricing schedules are of course special cases of the environment we consider the work most closely related to our examination is the seminal paper by spence 1978 and subsequent analysis by roberts 1979 spence however does not pay explicit attention to the key role played by constraints on optimal pricing schedules roberts considers upward price discontinuities which lead to bunching of consumers at a given level of consumption but not downward price discontinuities which lead to regions in which no consumer chooses to consume gaps bunching or gaps may appear in the optimal price schedule even when underlying demand and cost functions are smooth and well behaved the prevalence of discontinuous pricing schedules e g the block pricing structures of public utilities argues that these questions are of practical as well as theoretical interest

the simple economics of extortion evidence from trucking in aceh this paper tests whether the behavior of corrupt officials is consistent with standard industrial organization theory we designed a study in which surveyors accompanied indonesian truck drivers on 304 trips during which they observed over 6 000 illegal payments to police soldiers and weigh station attendants using plausibly exogenous changes in the number of checkpoints we show that market structure affects the level of illegal payments we further show that corrupt officials use complex pricing schemes including third degree price discrimination and a menu of two part tariffs our findings illustrate the importance of considering the market structure for bribes when designing anticorruption policy

contract theory and implications for perennial energy crop contracting abstract this article provides an overview of modern contract theory and discusses the implications of the theory for contracting for perennial dedicated energy crops we discuss some of the unique challenges of contracting for dedicated energy crops used for the production of advanced biofuels and survey some of the relevant concepts and research from the contract theory literature to address these challenges we focus primarily on the mechanism design or complete contracts approach to contracting which involves optimizing some objective function e g profits costs etc with respect to contract terms subject to important incentive constraints the solution to these optimization problems typically highlight important tradeoffs that a contract designer needs to consider in order to maximize profits and or minimize costs

when are local incentive constraints sufficient we study the question of whether local incentive constraints are sufficient to imply full incentive compatibility in a variety of mechanism design settings allowing for probabilistic mechanisms we give a unified approach that covers both continuous and discrete type spaces on many common preference domains including any convex domain of cardinal or ordinal preferences single peaked ordinal preferences and successive single crossing ordinal preferences local incentive compatibility suitably defined implies full incentive compatibility on domains of cardinal preferences that satisfy a strong nonconvexity condition local incentive compatibility is not sufficient our sufficiency results hold for dominant strategy and bayesian nash solution concepts and allow for some interdependence in preferences

a reduced form optimal nonlinear income tax problem abstract for a finite population with quasilinear preferences it is shown how mirrlees optimal nonlinear income tax problem can be simplified to a reduced form problem involving only the allocation of the consumption good this result is a finite version of a proposition established in the continuum by s lollivier and j c rochet

intertemporal quality discrimination of a durable good monopolist abstract consider a durable good monopolist facing the technology constraint that when he introduces a new product he cannot produce a cheaper variant without a time lag we show that the qualities of his high end and low end products are higher than their efficient quality levels

productivity growth and the structure of the business cycle abstract over the recent years opportunity cost oc models of growth have argued that recessions are times when firms engage in productivity improving activities because of intertemporal substitu tion this paper tests whether this approach is correct the technique used to disentangle the trend from the cycle is semi structural vector autoregression the results are mildly supportive of the oc theory there tends to be a negative impact of demand shocks on productivity both in the short run and in the long run and the short run impact is stronger in those countries where fluctuations are more transitory however there is no significant response of r d to demand shocks

factor hoarding and the propagation of business cycles shocks this paper analyzes the role of variable capital utilization rates in propagating shocks over the business cycle to this end we formulate and estimate an equilibrium business cycle model in which cyclical capital utilization rates are viewed as a form of factor hoarding we find that variable capital utilization rates substantially magnify and propagate the impact of shocks to agents environments the strength of these propagation effects is evident in the dynamic response functions of various economy wide aggregates to shocks in agents environments in the statistics that we construct to summarize the strength of the propagation mechanisms in the model and in the volatility of exogenous technology shocks needed to explain the observed variability in aggregate u s output other authors have argued that standard real business cycle rbc models fail to account for certain features of the data because they do not embody quantitatively important propagation mechanisms these features include the observed positive serial correlation in the growth rate of output the shape of the spectrum of the growth rate of real output and the correlation between the forecastable component of real output and various other economic aggregates allowing for variable capital utilization rates substantially improves the ability of the model to account for these features of the data

internal versus external economies in european countries in this paper sectoral production functions are estimated with a two digit disaggregation for eight european countries corresponding to the period 1978 1992 distinguishing between internal economies of scale and intersectoral external effects in order to avoid the possibility that the regressions carried out by way of panel data techniques are spurious the integration order of each variable has been identified using unit root similarly the hausman procedure has been applied to test the exogeneity of the variables and determine whether the most appropriate estimations should be sur or three stage least squares

strategic environmental policy under incomplete information this paper introduces incomplete information into recent analyses of strategic environmental policy it is shown how asymmetric information between planners and producers affects national incentives to impose strategic environmental standards on domestic industries in international oligopolistic competition relative to the full information case incomplete information is likely to mitigate allocative distortions originating from strategic behaviour a countervailing effect tending to raise distortion is however revealed from the analysis this effect is absent when governments intervene in free trade through direct production subsidies the results suggest that incentives to capture foreign rents are less reduced due to private information when environmental standards rather than direct production subsidies are the strategic instrument

profitable pricing when market segments overlap in this paper we analyze profitable pricing strategies when market segments overlap overlapping markets are segments that are not perfectly sealed and leakage between them can occur different consumers are assumed to incur possibly different transaction costs if they choose to purchase in the low price market a monopolist seller knows the distribution of transaction costs across consumers and must choose an optimal pricing strategy in particular the monopolist must decide whether to charge a single price or to price differentiate conditions are derived under which price differentiation will be the most profitable strategy when price differentiation is optimal the equilibrium amount of leakage is determined endogenously unlike the standard economics textbook model of price discrimination in which zero leakage is determined exogenously and is usually given as a necessary condition for price discrimination we show that zero leakage is not necessary for differential pricing to be optimal and that

profit maximizing nonlinear pricing if the preferences of the consumers are represented by utility functions that are differentiable quasi linear and satisfy the single crossing condition the characteristics of the profit maximizing nonlinear outlay schedule for a monopolist are well known we demonstrate that these characteristics are robust against weaker assumptions on the utility functions

group buying on the web a comparison of price discovery mechanisms web based group buying mechanisms are being widely used for both business to business b2b and business to consumer b2c transactions we survey currently operational online group buying markets and then study this phenomenon using analytical models we build on the literatures in information economics and operations management in our analytical model of a monopolist offering web based group buying under different kinds of demand uncertainty we derive the monopolist s optimal group buying schedule under varying conditions of heterogeneity in the demand regimes and compare its profits with those that obtain under the more conventional posted price mechanism we further study the impact ofproduction postponement by endogenizing the timing of the pricing and production decisions in a two stage game between the monopolist and buyers our results have implications for firms choice of price discovery mechanisms in e markets and for the scheduling of production and pricing decisions in the presence and absence of scale economies of production

nonlinear pricing and price cap regulation abstract this paper analyzes profit maximizing nonlinear pricing by a firm that is subject to price cap regulation two forms of regulatory constraint are considered i a cap on the firm s average revenue and ii a constraint that the firm must continue to offer each consumer the option of buying at the uniform price optimal nonlinear price schedules in these regimes are shown to have simple characterizations that are related to the nonlinear tariffs that an unregulated monopolist would charge of the regulatory regimes the firm prefers the average revenue constraint to the option constraint and likes uniform pricing least consumers in aggregate prefer the option regime to uniform pricing and like the average revenue constraint least but there are also distributional effects between consumers although the optional tariff regime pareto dominates uniform pricing it is ambiguous whether welfare is higher under uniform pricing or under the average revenue regime an example is used to illustrate the nature of the ambiguity

quantifying the impact of ict capital on output growth a heterogeneous dynamic panel approach using industry data for the united states and the united kingdom we provide new evidence on the impact of information and communications technology ict capital on real output growth the traditional industry panel data analysis fails to find a positive contribution we argue that this is due to heterogeneity across industries particularly in the time dimension pooling the data for the two countries and using a dynamic panel data estimation method yield a positive and significant effect of ict on output growth individual country estimates suggest a strong impact in the united states while results are less conclusive in the united kingdom

equivalence between the diamond dybvig banking model and the optimal income taxation model abstract it is shown that the diamond dybvig journal of political economy 96 1983 768 banking model with a continuum of types of agents has the same analytical structure as the standard optimal income taxation model review of economic studies 38 1971 175 review of economic studies 43 1976 261 insights from the income taxation literature immediately imply that a bank run equilibrium exists in the banking model as long as the long term project is sufficiently costly to liquidate

durable products time inconsistency and lock in many durable products cannot be used without a contingent consumable product e g printers require ink ipods require songs razors require blades etc for such products manufacturers may be able to lock in consumers by making their products incompatible with consumables that are produced by other firms we examine the effectiveness of such a strategy in the presence of strategic consumers who anticipate the future prices of both the durable product and the contingent consumable under a lock in strategy the manufacturer has pricing power over the contingent consumable which she can use to extract additional rents from higher valuation consumers but such pricing power may also reduce consumers willingness to pay for the durable because it subjects them to being held up with higher consumables prices in the future restricting our attention to linear pricing policies we find that if the manufacturer can commit to shutting down production of her durable after an initial one time sale then competition from another consumable of an appropriately degraded level of quality can benefit the manufacturer by mitigating consumers fears of being held up on the other hand when the manufacturer cannot commit to shutting down production of her durable then her own output of additional durables gives her an incentive to keep consumables prices low and competition in the consumables market is less beneficial this paper was accepted by pradeep chintagunta and preyas desai special issue editors this paper was accepted by pradeep chintagunta and preyas desai special issue editors

modelling a regional economic system the case of lombardy baussola m 2007 modelling a regional economic system the case of lombardy regional studies 41 19 38 during recent years the demand for quantitative economic investigation to be used for policy analysis has grown rapidly in addition the european economic and monetary integration process has increased the economic impact of regional economies thus calling for analytical instruments aimed at supporting the decision making process a regional econometric model of lombardy s labour market was set up in which both labour demand and supply are endogenously determined and thus unemployment is determined by their interaction therefore labour demand in both the industrial sector and in private services is modelled while labour supply is split into two components that define respectively the participation rate and self employment the model simulations evaluate the response of the regional labour market in comparison with the national one to exogenous shocks depending on shocks in either demand or

on firm level industry level and aggregate employment fluctuations employment fluctuations are examined at different levels of aggregation in a model with firm specific hiring decisions due to search frictions and sticky pricing the results indicate that firm level employment dispersion rises with higher price stickiness and higher demand elasticity whereas it falls with more convexity of search costs and with a higher labor supply elasticity industry level employment is more volatile and less procyclical than aggregate employment and a larger industry size reduces volatility and raises co movement with output the calibrated model is able to match the volatility autocorrelation and cyclical correlation of us industry level employment when incorporating firm specific technology shocks

competitive screening under heterogeneous information we study the interplay between informational frictions and second degree price discrimination our theory recognizes that consumers differ in their tastes for quality as well as in the information they possess about available offers which leads to dispersion over price quality menus in equilibrium while firms are ex ante identical we show that their menus are ordered so that more generous menus leave more surplus to consumers of all valuations we explore the cross section of equilibrium menus and variations in market conditions to generate empirical predictions on prices qualities and markups across firms and within a firm s product line for instance more competition may raise prices for low quality goods yet consumers are better off as the qualities they receive also increase the predictions of our model illuminate empirical findings in many markets such as those for cell phone plans yellow pages advertising cable tv and air travel

involuntary unemployment and worker self selection abstract consider a firm that lacks information about the reservation wage or ability of any specific worker but is aware that workers with higher reservation wages tend to be more able on average we show that under a simple condition that the efficiency wage exceeds the lowest reservation wage the optimal hiring policy for the firm involves 1 no wage discrimination and 2 rationing of jobs when demand for its product is low the result also extends to the case where hours of work are variable provided each worker is most productive when working a strictly positive number of hours per week

optimal number of standards under economies of scope in quality abstract stivers stivers andrew e 2003 quality standards with exogenously distributed quality economics letters 80 1 130 136 finds the optimal segmentation of quality when the distribution of quality is exogenous this paper characterizes the optimal number of standards as the cost of information falls both the number of standards and the market coverage of the firm rise

the target incentive system vs the price incentive system under adverse selection and the ratchet effect abstract in a dynamic adverse selection type of principal agent relationship where the principal is committed over time to a particular incentive system with fixed structure but variable parameters but not to any intertemporal incentive scheme with both fixed structure and parameters the ratchet effect arises but varies with different incentive systems we show that compared with using prices as the sole planning mode the principal can attenuate the ratchet effect by stipulating targets as well as a result the target incentive system entails higher expected welfare than the price incentive system in a perfect bayesian equilibrium

the multiproduct firm quality choice and regulation a monopolist facing a market of heterogeneous consumers will distort the quality a rray this paper explores three regulatory remedies minimum quality s tandards mqs maximum price regulation mpr and rate of return re gulation rorr that can counteract this distortion mqs and mpr rais e the quality offered to consumers with a low willingness to pay for quality while mqs have no effect on the quality offered to consumers with a high willingness to pay mpr decreases the quality offered to this group if production of high low quality goods is capital i ntensive rorr increases decreases the quality offered to both grou ps copyright 1988 by blackwell publishing ltd

productivity shocks and real business cycles abstract productivity shocks play a central role in real business cycles as an exogenous impulse to macroeconomic activity however measured solow prescott residuals do not behave as an exogenous impulse rather econometric evidence provided in this paper indicates that 1 money interest rates and government spending granger cause these impulses and 2 a substantial component of the variance of these impulses between one quarter and one half is attributable to variations in aggregate demand these results are robust to a number of econometric issues including measurement errors specification of the production function and certain forms of omitted real variables

excess labour and the business cycle a comparative study of japan germany the united kingdom and the united states against the background of firm specific human capital theory this paper investigates empirically the relative propensity of manufacturing industries in japan germany the united kingdom and the united states to hold excess labour over the business cycle both stock and utilization dimensions of the labour input are integrated into the study throughout discussion is linked to earlier research that has analysed the relative international performance of the japanese labour market

increasing returns labour utilization and externalities procyclical productivity in the united states and japan this paper investigates procyclical productivity and attempts to discriminate among several competing explanations the study focuses on the united states and japan since the different industrial relations in these two economies serve to cast a sharper light on the procyclical productivity debate labour hoarding evaluated through the introduction of a labour utilization proxy proves to be an important influence the interpretation of the role of external economies remains an open issue

reverse price discrimination with bayesian buyers this paper studies price discrimination under the situation in which buyers prior valuations are initially observable by a seller but buyers receive further information about a product or service which remains private thereafter the buyers interpret new information via bayes rule we show that in this environment prices are not monotone in buyers prior valuations interestingly this results in the possibility that a seller intentionally offers a higher price to a low valuation buyer rather than a high valuation buyer reverse price discrimination we derive this result in both monopoly and duopoly markets

endogenous growth and the procyclical behaviour of productivity abstract in this paper a model with endogenous growth is used to explain the procyclical behaviour of productivity periods when the marginal return to goods production is high are associated with low levels of human capital formation and other investment like activities in particular the model successfully explains the surges in productivity exhibited in the uk during wartime and the apparently permanent effect of the level of defence spending on the growth of total factor productivity

efficiency properties of non linear pricing schedules without the single crossing condition this paper investigates efficiency properties of profit maximizing non linear outlay schedules it demonstrates that some well known efficiency characteristics of the profit maximizing non linear outlay schedule may not continue to hold when the single crossing condition is relaxed

all units discounts and double moral hazard abstract an all units discount is a price reduction applied to all units purchased if the customer s total purchases equal or exceed a given quantity threshold since the discount is paid on all units rather than marginal units the tariff is discontinuous and exhibits a negative marginal price cliff at the threshold that triggers the discount this paper shows that all units discounts arise in optimal agency contracts between upstream and downstream firms that face double moral hazard i present conditions under which all units discounts dominate two part tariffs and other continuous tariffs i also examine these tariffs when the upstream market faces a threat of entry in the case considered all units discounts deter entry by less efficient rivals without distorting price and investment whereas continuous tariffs either accommodate such entry or deter it by distorting price and investment

does growth vary over the business cycle some evidence from the g7 countries in this paper we analyse the dynamics of business cycles in the g7 countries our aim is to answer the question of whether growth varies in an absolute sense over the business cycle and hence to examine whether the simple two phase characterization downturn upturn is an appropriate description of the business cycle to study growth over the cycle we estimate single country equations and then a pooled regression that takes into account the important interactions of international business cycles the results confirm the steepness asymmetry of the growth cycles and show that growth varies systematically within upturns and downturns these are consistent with the notion of deepness asymmetry which implies that contractions are more pronounced in the later stages of a downturn whereas expansions are stronger immediately after troughs

inventories layoffs and the short run demand for labor this paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of the short run employment layoff and inventory strategies of firms on average more than two thirds of all layoffs in american manufacturing end in a rehire by the employer of origin martin feldstein 1975 david lilien 1980 these temporary layoffs have recently accounted for about half of all ongoing employer initiated spells of unemployment in that sector see table 1 and have led to a revised interpretation both of the involuntary nature of these separations costas azariadis 1975 feldstein 1976 martin baily 1977 and of the durability of employment relationships evidently a significant proportion of unemployed workers know that the conditions that generated their separations are temporary and so they expect to be recalled within some reasonable time the point of departure for this paper is in interpreting these findings as evidence of a privately and socially efficient stock of excess capacity held against contingent future demands that is as an inventory of a productive input this view leads to empirically refutable hypotheses regarding both the role of temporary layoffs and the circumstances under which they will be important in particular both excess capacity idle resources and inventories are devices by which firms may economize on the costs of rapid adjustments when faced with unstable market conditions george stigler 1939 in such an environment the demands for layoffs and for other buffer stocks are jointly determined elements of long run technology the choice among alternative stocks will depend on relative profitabilities and firms may choose to hold stocks of inputs as a substitute for inventory accumulation especially if the costs of varying capacity or of storage are important this reasoning implies that i the structure of short run employment and layoff decisions will vary across firms and industries and ii differences in these structures will be systematically related to the role of inventories in firms dynamic strategies some perspective is warranted at least since charles holt et al 1960 economists have recognized the production smoothing role of inventories and the necessity of predicting future demand in making current decisions david belsley 1969 gerald childs 1967 michael ward 1978 similarly one of the contributions of recent work on implicit labor contracts is in viewing the exchange of labor services as a bilateral and durable commitment both these lines of analysis are concerned with the methods firms use to respond to fluctuating demand yet the underlying interrelated nature of employment and inventory decisions has rarely been recognized roger miller 1968 m ishaq nadiri and sherwin rosen 1973 r g crawford 1979 robert hall 1972 this paper aims to provide a framework for evaluating these decisions and in so doing to explain some interesting features of observed labor markets the notion of substitution between inventories of human and physical capital suggests a more disaggregated look at the data table 2 shows the importance of temporary layoffs in the distribution of unemployment among manufacturing industries it reports layoff and total unemployment rates for twelve representative industries over the period 197376 and average layoff rates and recall frequencies for 1958 76 among all 21 twodigit manufacturing industries the correlation between layoff and rehire rates is 6 and the table illustrates this evidently industries with larger than normal layoff rates also tend to have larger rehire frequencies from firm initiated spells of unemployment this university of chicago i am indebted to gary becker robert cotterman sherwin rosen jose scheinkman michael ward finis welch the managing editor and an anonymous referee for discussions and comments at various stages the usual disclaimer applies

why do amusement parks only charge a fixed admission fee abstract we come up with some explanations on why amusement parks adopt pass pricing even when no additional transaction costs exist for implementing non linear pricing schemes the related factors include much fun generated by any ride and a higher transportation cost

monopoly and quality distortion effects and remedies a monopolist that sells in a market in which consumers differ in their willingness to pay for quality will distort and enlarge the range of products offered for sale we examine the positive and normative impacts of remedies used to counteract such distortions for the case of a price ceiling the monopolist improves quality at the low quality end of the market offsetting the distortion induced by the unregulated exercise of monopoly power social welfare can be shown to increase for a sufficiently slight degree of price regulation for minimum quality standards the social welfare implications are ambiguous because the standards may exclude some consumers from the market

non uniform pricing output and welfare under monopoly which the price varies with the quantity purchased than by charging a uniform price in general the profit maximizing non uniform price schedule and the welfare maximizing schedule do not coincide thus there may be scope for improving market performance through regulation the paper considers a regulator who has limited information and authority the issues addressed centre around the question of whether the level of total market output can be taken as a measure of market performance conditions under which welfare is a monotonic function of the level of total output are derived

why do larger buyers pay lower prices intense supplier competition abstract the paper provides a theoretical explanation of the common claim that larger buyers pay lower prices in the model suppliers compete more aggressively for the business of larger buyers much as they do in boom periods of rotemberg and saloner

search frictions real rigidities and inflation dynamics the standard new keynesian model suffers from the so called macro micro pricing conflict in order to match the dynamics of inflation implied by macroeconomic data the model needs to assume an average duration of price contracts which is much longer than what is observed in micro data here i show how departing from the standard model s assumption of a perfectly competitive labor market can help resolve the pricing conflict i do so by assuming search frictions in the labor market in this framework labor becomes firm specific and marginal cost curves become upward sloping this mechanism reduces the slope of the new keynesian phillips curve given a frequency of price adjustment conversely given an estimate of this slope my model implies shorter price durations than the standard model for a plausible calibration and for different slope values my model consistently delivers price durations that are roughly half of those implied by the standard model

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had