the marginal cost of public funds and tax reform in africa abstract in this paper we propose estimates of the marginal cost of public funds mcf in 38 african countries we develop a simple general equilibrium model that can handle taxes on five major tax classes and can be calibrated with little more than national accounts data a key feature of our model is the explicit recognition of the informal economy our base case estimate of the average mcf from marginal increases in all five tax instruments is 1 2 focusing on the lowest cost tax instruments in each country commonly the vat but not always the average mcf is 1 1 finally extending the tax base to include sections of the informal economy by removing some tax exemptions offers the potential for a low mcf source of public funds and a lowering of mcfs on other tax instruments

distortionary taxes and the provision of public goods economists have long been concerned with finding an efficient level of public expenditure the classic statement of the problem was given by paul samuelson 1954 an optimal level of expenditure is where the sum of the marginal rates of substitution between the public good and a reference good equals the marginal rate of transformation between the public good and the reference good mrs mrt however samuelson s formula assumes that all of the revenue needed to finance public goods can be raised with lump sum taxes since this is not generally possible the formula must be modified to account for the distortionary effects of the tax system an appropriate modification is to multiply the cost side of the equation by a term that is commonly called the marginal cost of public funds mcf in the case of samuelson s formula where government is entirely financed with lump sum taxes the mcf would be exactly 1 0 in the traditional view of economists distortionary taxes cause the mcf to be greater than one thus raising the cost of providing public goods in this paper we discuss some cases where the mcf may be less than one we will illustrate this possibility using numerical examples for labor taxes

tax competition between developed emerging and developing countries same same but different abstract this paper analyzes tax competition between countries which differ in their country specific risks we show that the outcome of asymmetric tax competition crucially depends on the ability of multinational firms to shift profits with high costs of profit shifting higher risk countries set lower tax rates than lower risk countries whereas the opposite is true if the costs of profit shifting are low the results provide an explanation for the patterns observed in the corporate income tax policies across countries differing in their level of development moreover for intermediate costs of profit shifting we show that countries absolute risk level plays an important role in tax rate setting these results carry important implication for the empirical tax competition literature

the informal sector and the political economy of development this paper takes an initial step in integrating insights from two sets of literature which have focused on central aspects of development with unfortunate independence it highlights politically valuable resources which are identified in the political economy literature and shows that the informal sector literature provides ample evidence that these resources in general are i scarcely available to informal entities ii poorly valued in their possession and iii more often collectively unexploited by them overall there seems to be an important though neglected bias in how the political system in less developed countries formulates crafts and implements policy

rules communication and collusion narrative evidence from the sugar institute case detailed notes on weekly meetings of the sugar refining cartel show how communication helps firms collude and so highlight the deficiencies in the current formal theory of collusion the sugar institute did not fix prices or output prices were increased by homogenizing business practices to make price cutting more transparent meetings were used to interpret and adapt the agreement coordinate on jointly profitable actions ensure unilateral actions were not misconstrued as cheating and determine whether cheating had occurred in contrast to established theories cheating did occur but sparked only limited retaliation partly due to the contractual relations with selling agents jel l13 l41 this paper reexamines the cartel problem by studying the private discussions within one cartel while we find much that is in accord with george j stigler s 1964 basic insight that firms would structure an agreement conscious of their later incentive to cheat on it we also uncover puzzles for established theory and identify elements that a richer theory should encompass especially regarding the role of communication in collusion our window into the inner workings of a cartel is a remarkable series of notes on the weekly meetings of the sugar institute this trade association was formed in december 1927 in the wake of several years of falling margins and excess capacity by 14 firms comprising nearly all the cane sugar refining capacity in the united states it operated until 1936 when the supreme court ruled its practices illegal among the top executives in regular attendance at the meetings was louis v place vice president of mccahan a midsize refinery in philadelphia place who was in charge of all activities of the company except production and raw sugar purchases wrote over 500 pages of single spaced detailed

the marginal welfare cost of public funds theory and estimates abstract we derive a general analytic formula for the marginal welfare cost mwc of public funds without imposing restrictive assumptions on preferences or technologies the framework encompasses the various special cases previously considered and reconciles the disparities among the reported estimates of mwc unresolved differences in existing estimates are fully explained by appropriate interpretations of intended thought experiments and alternative assumptions about the elasticity of labor supply with respect to public spending further progress in measuring mwc requires empirical estimation of labor supply functions that include government spending as an explanatory variable

the informal sector in developed and less developed countries a literature survey the main goal of this study is two fold 1 to provide ageneral overview of the contributions to the literature on theinformal sector with a special focus on the public choiceapproach and 2 to compare these contributions across twoinstitutionally different types of countries developed andless developed developing and transition countries thepaper focuses on the criteria used to define the informalsector the relationship between the formal and informaleconomy tax evasion and public choice analysis it isstressed throughout this paper that the distinction betweenthe two types of countries is of key importance

toward a theory of regulation for developing countries following jean jacques laffont s lead the efficient operation and expansion of infrastructures in developing countries is crucial for growth and poverty reduction however recent reforms aimed at improving the performance of these sectors have had limited success evidence suggests that in many instances this was because the traditional regulatory theory relied on by policymakers was not suitable for the institutional context in developing countries this article surveys more recent theoretical work focusing on problems with regulation in these countries at the heart of the survey is the work of jean jacques laffont who in the last decade of his life set about developing a theoretical framework for regulation in developing countries we consider the implications of his work which focused on the key institutional limitations faced in developing countries we then discuss where experience suggests that there are important omissions from this modeling bringing in extensions and alternative approaches pursued by other authors we conclude by summarizing the key ways in which regulatory policy will be different when institutions are weak overall we find that an understanding of the institutional context and its implications are crucial when designing a regulatory framework for developing countries

informal firms in developing countries entrepreneurial stepping stone or consolation prize the potential dynamic benefits of a firm having the option to adopt informal status are analysed informality may be a stepping stone without which formality may never be achieved this result is obtained for a broad range of realistic parameter values suggesting a potential dynamic case for government support of informal firms informality may alternatively play a converse role as a consolation prize with a firm only entering an industry formally because it recognizes that if profitability is disappointing it can switch to informality however this result is obtained for a range of parameter values so narrow as to be of no practical significance

the theory of taxation for developing countries tax policy has far reaching implications for economic development and public administration this book which presents a modern theory of public finance brings together many of the most distinguished economists who have written on the subject they provide coherent principles for tax design and a systematic framework for the analysis of practical questions of tax reform and pricing policy in developing countries the book is especially timely as countries experience increasing shortages of government revenue and the distortions brought about by poorly designed tax systems it pays particular attention to the special problems of developing countries such as the taxation of agriculture the aim throughout is to develop techniques that can be quantitatively applied given the data available and empirical case studies illustrate the methods in action the authors analyze the links between tax theory social cost benefit analysis and the pricing of publicly supplied goods and services they also explore the empirical and econometric problems of identifying the tradeoffs between equity and efficiency other topics treated include the analysis of labor markets the taxation of foreign private investment and of fuel and the pricing of education although the models used concentrate on developing countries most of the methods and discussion apply as well to the problems of more affluent countries

coming out of the shadows estimating the impact of bureaucracy simplification and tax cut on formality in brazilian microenterprises abstract this paper evaluates the impact of a program of bureaucracy simplification and tax reduction on formality among brazilian microenterprises the simples program we document an increase of 13 percentage points in formal licensing among retail firms created after the program when compared to firms in ineligible sectors the impact on retailers is robust to a series of tests we find no impact on construction transportation services and manufacturing sectors

infrastructure and public utilities privatization in developing countries should governments in developing countries promote private ownership and deregulated prices in noncompetitive sectors or should they run publicly owned firms and regulate prices at the expense of rents to insiders a theoretical model is used to answer these normative questions the analysis focuses on the tradeoff between fiscal benefits and consumer surplus during privatization of noncompetitive sectors privatization transfers control rights to private interests and eliminates public subsidies yielding benefits to taxpayers at the cost of increased prices for consumers in developing countries where budget constraints are tight privatization and price liberalization may be optimal for low profitability industries but suboptimal for more profitable industries and once a market has room for more than one firm governments may prefer to regulate the industry without a credible regulatory agency regulation is achieved through public ownership

tax base erosion in developing countries it is widely believed that the tax base in most developing countries has been severely eroded by legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion brought about largely by poor tax administration 1 this erosion it is thought has had a variety of fiscal effects tax revenues are lost and the growth of the tax base is dampened the progressivity implied by the statutory rate structure is not achieved the costs of tax administration are increased and horizontal and vertical equity suffer because the effective tax rates faced by individuals depend largely upon their success in playing the tax compliance game it is not surprising therefore that virtually all fiscal reform programs in developing countries start with the promise to improve administration better administration is a discretionary government action that at once can lower the tax rate increase revenues slow capital flight and improve the fairness of the system yet tax base erosion in developing countries is something about which precious little is known and in particular the empirical evidence about the severity and the nature of the problem is all but nonexistent 2 why do we know so little about the dimensions of the evasionavoidance problem one reason is conceptual problems in measuring erosion of the tax base for example how does one estimate the substitution of nontaxable for taxable compensation in response to the tax structure or the extent to which a higher marginal tax rate has induced individuals to report less of their taxable income another reason is the problem of comparability across countries the many legal and

state regulation of takeovers and shareholder wealth the case of new york s 1985 takeover statutes past studies of takeover regulations have found that such rules increase the premiums paid to the shareholders of successfully acquired targets jarrell and bradley argue that these higher premiums harm shareholders by discouraging takeover activity and protecting inefficient managers bebchuk argues that the higher premiums do not significantly reduce the number of takeovers so that shareholders benefit on average from the higher premiums paid in successful acquisitions this article uses the event study method to measure the net effect of two takeover statutes passed by the new york state legislature in 1985 the results support the conclusion of jarrell and bradley that despite the higher premiums paid to successfully acquired target shareholders ex post these laws on average harm shareholders ex ante

state intervention in the market for corporate control abstract this study investigates the impact of pennsylvania senate bill 1310 on the share prices of pennsylvania corporations considered the most severe of the second generation antitakeover laws the statute limits the ability of shareholders to challenge management through the proxy process and eliminates the traditional fiduciary obligation of directors to promote shareholders interests we find that pa sb1310 significantly decreased share values and estimate the loss to shareholders of pennsylvania firms at 4 billion however firms with antitakeover charter amendments already in place were less affected and firms that exempted themselves from pa sb1310 recovered a portion of shareholders wealth

on the marginal welfare cost of taxation this paper develops a rigorous partial equilibrium analysis of the determinants of margin al welfare cost mwc of taxes on labor earnings it shows that four key parameters interact to determine the magnitude of mwc using aggregate data and plausible ranges of values for the parameters mwc can vary from under 10 percent to more than 300 percent of marginal tax revenue intermediate parameter values sugge st mwc is in the 25 50 percent range however the more extreme estimates cannot be ruled out on the basis of available evidence suggesting that mwc cannot yet be copyright 1987 by american economic association

tax evasion and the marginal cost of public funds tax evasion and deadweight loss have similar implications for the rules of public finance the optimal mix of taxes can be derived from the minimization of the sum of aggregate deadweight loss and aggregate cost of tax evasion similarly the marginal cost of public funds includes allowances for marginal deadweight loss and marginal cost of tax evasion per dollar of public revenue acquired

small enterprise and firm level technical efficiency in the indonesian garment industry this paper examines technical efficieny in the indonesian garment industry based on the country s 1986 census of small industry drawing on a sample of 2250 firms our analysis suggests that inter firm variations in efficiency are very considerable the paper then investigates the correlates of these variations finding in particular a positive correlation between technical efficiency and each of export orientation financial integration and female participation in the workforce it is also found that there is a significant level of labour capital substitution in the industry

public procurement and rent seeking the case of paraguay summary a model of entrepreneurial choices in an economy with a corrupt public procurement sector is built providing predictions along two dimensions first corrupt public institutions operate by offering contracts without competition and more corrupt entities channel larger share of their budget in this way second these firms enjoy extra returns so that procurement related activities attract the best entrepreneurs a large scale microeconomic database including all public procurement operations over a 4 year period in paraguay amounting annually to approximately 6 of the country s gdp is then used to corroborate these predictions

what determines cartel success following george stigler 1964 many economists assume that incentive problems undermine attempts by firms to collude to raise prices and restrict output but the potential profits from collusion can create a powerful incentive as well theory cannot tell us a priori which effect will dominate whether or when cartels succeed is thus an empirical question we examine a wide variety of empirical studies of cartels to answer the following questions 1 can cartels succeed 2 if so for how long 3 what impact do cartels have 4 what causes cartels to break up we conclude that many cartels do survive and that the distribution of duration is bimodal while the average duration of cartels across a range of studies is about five years many cartels break up very quickly i e in less than a year but there are many others that last between five and ten years and some that last decades limited evidence suggests that cartels are able to increase prices and profits to varying degrees cartels can also affect other non price variables including advertising innovation investment barriers to entry and concentration cartels break up occasionally because of cheating or lack of effective monitoring but the biggest challenges cartels face are entry and adjustment of the collusive agreement in response to changing economic conditions cartels that develop organizational structures that allow them the flexibility to respond to these changing conditions are more likely to survive price wars that erupt are often the result of bargaining issues that arise in such circumstances sophisticated cartel organizations are also able to develop multipronged strategies to monitor one another to deter cheating and a variety of interventions to increase barriers to entry

shadow economies size causes and consequences using various methods the size of the shadow economy in 76 developing transition and oecd countries is estimated average size varies from 12 percent of gdp for oecd countries to 23 percent for transition countries and 39 percent for developing countries increasing taxation and social security contributions combined with rising state regulations are driving forces for the increase of the shadow economy especially in oecd countries according to some findings corruption has a positive impact on the size of the shadow economy and a growing shadow economy has a negative effect on official gdp growth

voting power in the proxy process abstract the likelihood that a firm will enact a management sponsored antitakeover charter amendment depends on ownership structure this implies that the adoption of antitakeover amendments may be anticipated then announcement returns provide a biased estimate of wealth effects an estimator that corrects for the bias induced by anticipation indicates that the enactment of an antitakeover amendment is associated with a statistically significant decrease in shareholder wealth the voting power of employee stock ownership plans and the chief executive officer plays a prominent role in determining whether a firm will adopt this type of takeover defense

informal sector and economic development the credit supply channel i introduction a popular idea in policy circles holds that granting potential entrepreneurs access to formal credit markets by improving public institutions and specific regulations is an important condition for economic development in particular reforms allowing economic agents to formalize and therefore gain better access to formal credit markets should naturally lead them to invest more and increase their productivity ultimately the benefits of higher overall growth would ensue such reforms typically include strengthening property rights on land and housing and reducing burdensome registration procedures 1 this article examines in a general equilibrium framework the chain of causality behind that line of thinking it does so by modeling individual agents decisions to become formal in relation to their access to a credit market plagued by moral hazard and examining the effect of these decisions on the size of the formal sector and the level of output the main insight is that while better property rights and less burdensome regulations under certain conditions may facilitate agents access to formal loans such reforms interact with the characteristics of the credit market and its environment in ways that crucially shape the ultimate magnitude of the effect on formality and output in a nutshell the modeling strategy relies on an overlapping generations model where economic agents when young undertake productive projects deciding whether to work in the formal or informal sector these decisions depend on the trade off between the costs of entry and the benefits of accessing the formal credit market which itself is a function of the quality of enforcement and property rights that allow for efficient loan recovery by lenders entrepreneurs save part of their profits for future consumption and these savings constitute the next period s supply of credit in the economy in this context the equilibrium interest rate that results from the interaction between the supply of lendable funds and the demand for credit is a key variable in determining the equilibrium level of formality indeed lower entry costs and better contract enforcement unambiguously imply a larger formal sector a higher demand for credit and higher output as long as an infinitely elastic supply of funds is available at the prevailing interest rate e g an open economy with no barriers to international capital flows and a competitive banking sector however absent these conditions an increase in demand resulting from a higher rate of formality increases the interest rate which weakens the links among reform formality and output finally we present empirical evidence related to the implications of our model we find that countries with lower entry costs or a higher quality of enforcement tend to have larger credit markets and smaller informal sectors and that this relationship is stronger when the banking sector is more competitive and the economy is more open to international capital flows using industry level measures of financial dependence and controlling for country fixed effects we show that the results on credit supply also hold in a cross and within industry setting a related literature the argument above is composed of two parts first is the link between better regulations and access to credit at the individual level which results in increased incentives to enter formality and second is the link between these individual decisions and output or growth it is relatively well understood how light registration procedures and strong property rights interact to provide the necessary conditions to access the credit market as de soto 1990 showed in the case of peru and further documented by djankov et al 2002 for 85 countries firms first face significant entry costs in the form of registration and license fees to be able to operate formally

the effect of poison pill securities on shareholder wealth abstract this paper examines empirical evidence about the effect of poison pill takeover defenses on shareholder wealth i find evidence that announcements of the most restrictive forms of the pill defense are associated with stock price declines also the most restrictive forms of the pill defense are associated with abnormally high rates of defeat of unsolicited tender offers although this evidence is consistent with managerial entrenchment the evidence implies that on average poison pill defenses have seemingly had only a modest effect on firm valuation

estimating the second economy in tanzania abstract the official national accounts of tanzania suffer from two serious weaknesses incomplete coverage as well as inaccurate estimates of the activities covered this arises because many of the activities especially those in the informal sector are either misreported or underrecorded often however the required information is deliberately concealed from public authorities either because the agents are involved in illegal black market activities or where such parallel market activities are legal there is a deliberate intention to evade government controls the misstatement and omission of these second economy activities from official statistics imply that macroeconomic measures are not robust enough for meaningful analysis development planning policy and program formulation this paper attempts to estimate the magnitude of and changes in the second economy in tanzania to establish the extent to which official statistics misstate actual production of goods and services

on corporate governance a study of proxy contests abstract this paper examines a sample of firms experiencing proxy contests for seats on their board of directors dissident shareholders usually fail to obtain a majority of board seats nevertheless they capture some seats via mechanisms such as cumulative voting in over half of the sample contests regardless of proxy contest outcome positive and statistically significant share price performance is associated with the contest that finding is predicted by the standard economic analysis of proxy contests in which the challenges benefit shareholders by improving corporate performance the finding runs counter to the claim of berle 1962 that the economists view of proxy contests is a wholly imaginary picture a portion of the positive share price changes taking place in the early stages of some proxy contests is not permanent however and as suggested by manne 1962 is at least partially attributable to temporary increases in the market value of the vote attached to corporate shares

informal sector the credit market channel abstract we build a model of firms choice between formality and informality complying with costly registration procedures allows the firms to benefit from key public goods enforcement of property rights and contracts that make the participation in the formal credit market possible in a moral hazard framework with credit rationing their decision is shaped by the interaction between the cost of entry into formality and the relative efficiency of formal versus informal credit mechanisms and their related institutional arrangements the model is consistent with existing stylized facts on the determinants of informality

managerial share ownership and the stock price effects of antitakeover amendment proposals studies that test for an average stock price effect of antitakeover amendments present different results disagreeing with respect to both the significance and the direction of the effect this study determines whether effects can be identified when managerial share ownership and amendment type are considered results suggest a negative relation between managerial share ownership and the stock price reaction to all but fair price amendment proposals managerial control over voting rights has been the focus of recent studies in the finance literature for example dann and deangelo 1988 present evidence on managerial actions taken to enhance voting control while stulz 1988 suggests ways that managers can increase control of voting rights by adopting antitakeover amendments or dual classes of common stock that reduce the voting power of outside shareholders since antitakeover amendments may be one way to effectively increase managerial control over voting rights this paper investigates the relation between managerial share ownership the type of antitakeover amendment proposed and the stock price reaction to the amendment proposal this study is motivated partially by existing evidence regarding the stock price effect of antitakeover amendments empirical studies are inconclusive regarding the amendments effects on shareholder wealth disagreeing with respect to both significance and direction deangelo and rice 1983 find statistically insignificant negative abnormal returns surrounding the amendment proposals while linn and mcconnell 1983 find statistically significant positive abnormal returns jarrell and poulsen 1987 find a statistically insignificant negative reaction to amendment proposals for exchange listed firms while mcwilliams 1988 finds an insignificant positive reaction at proposal announcement these results

the role of demandable debt in structuring optimal banking arrangements demandable debt finance by banks warrants explanation because it entails costs of bank suspension liquidation and idle reserve holdings an explanation is developed in which demandable debt provides incentive compatible intermediation where the banker has comparative advantage in allocating investment funds but may act against the interests of uninformed depositors demandable debt attracts funds by giving depositors an option to force liquidation its usefulness in transacting follows from information sharing between monitors and nonmonitors copyright 1991 by american economic association

shareholder wealth effects of directors liability limitation provisions the adoption of liability limitation provisions llps is associated with insignificant stock price reactions for all firms but with positive stock price reactions for poorly performing firms this result is consistent with the hypothesis that the net benefit of llps is larger for financially troubled firms than for other firms because outside directors are valuable to the distressed firm and llps substantially affect experts expected costs of serving as directors

quality signaling through certification in developing countries this paper studies how signaling the credence attributes of consumer goods distorts their market equilibrium in developing countries costs of certification sunk in order to achieve credibility play a key role in producing an oligopolistic market leading to high prices that form a barrier for consumers in the south to lower the cost certification is better achieved by a single independent body which can be financed either by end consumers through a fee or by public subsidies the paper identifies the conditions under which each funding mechanism is most efficient taking into account the government s budget constraint the theoretical analysis is motivated with reference to agricultural seed certification

openness lobbying and provision of infrastructure casual empirical evidence suggests that infrastructure provision is higher in economies that are open to world trade we develop a model of imperfect competition to show that open economies are likely to provide more infrastructure than closed economies if infrastructure is financed by taxing a producer lobby the open economy will overprovide while the closed economy will underinvest an open economy approaches optimal provision when this lobby group is small in size if financing of infrastructure is done by taxing the whole population the closed economy outcome may be preferred relative to that of the open economy

income tax compliance in india an empirical analysis abstract aggregate data are used to study determinants of income tax revenues and taxpayer compliance in india during 1965 1966 to 1992 1993 the estimates show that both revenues collected and compliance were significantly affected by tax structure marginal tax rates and exemption limit in addition inflation as well as declining assessment intensity had a significant negative effect while traditional enforcement tools searches penalties and prosecution activity had only a limited effect best practice enforcement assessment and tax structure policies could have yielded at most a 90 revenue increase leaving india s income tax performance below the average of countries with similar gdp per capita thorough reform of tax administration is therefore needed to raise income tax collection in india to international standards

openness country size and government abstract this paper shows that smaller countries have a larger share of public consumption in gdp and are also more open to trade these empirical observations are consistent with recent theoretical models explaining country formation and break up and may account for the observed positive empirical relationship between trade openness and government size

taxation base in developing countries abstract informal sectors are larger in developing countries than in rich countries this is a result of higher fixed costs of entry into the formal economy in developing countries we show that raising barriers to entry is consistent with a deliberate government policy for raising tax revenue by generating market power and hence rents for the permitted entrants market entry fees foster the emergence of large taxpayers the rents can be readily confiscated by the government through entry fees and taxes on profits at a low administrative cost the relevance of the theory is assessed with a sample of 64 countries empirical analysis supports the results of the paper

large shareholders and the monitoring of managers the case of antitakeover charter amendments this paper examines the role of large shareholders in monitoring managers when they propose antitakeover charter amendments we attempt to distinguish between two competing hypotheses the active monitoring hypothesis and the passive voting hypothesis we find a statistically significant positive relation between institutional ownership and the stockholder wealth effects of various types of amendments after controlling for ownership concentration among institutions managerial ownership and firm size our empirical evidence lends support to the active monitoring hypothesis proposed by demsetz 1983 and shleifer and vishny 1986 that the existence of large shareholders leads to better monitoring of managers

tax revenue and the marginal cost of public funds in sweden abstract we assess the welfare cost of raising a marginal unit of tax revenue in a balanced budget general equilibrium framework the calculated social cost of an increment of public funds is sensitive to both the specific type of tax increase and the type of public spending used on the margin best guess assumptions on labor supply elasticities yield marginal costs of public funds for different fiscal mixes of between 0 67 and 4 51 at prevailing tax rates in sweden alternative labor supply assumptions well within the range of current estimates substantially affect the results and can imply infinite marginal welfare costs marginal welfare costs are also sensitive to assumptions about both the income and substitution effects of labor supply

takeover threats and managerial myopia this paper examines the familiar argument that takeover pressure can be damaging because it leads managers to sacrifice long term interests in order to boost current profits if stockholders are imperfectly informed temporarily low earnings may cause the stock to become undervalued increasing the likelihood of a takeover at an unfavorable price hence the managerial concern with current bottom line the magnitude of the problem depends on a variety of factors including the attitudes and beliefs of shareholders the extent to which corporate raiders have inside information and the degree to which managers are concerned with retaining control of their firms

halving global poverty the goal of central importance to this paper is to cut in half the proportion of people living below 1 a day from around 30 percent of the developing world s population in 1990 to 15 percent by 2015 based on population projections in 1990 this would correspond to around one billion people exiting poverty this paper begins by discussing poverty trends on a global scale where the poor are located in the world and how their numbers have been changing over time it then discusses the relationship of economic growth and income distribution to poverty reduction finally it suggests an evidence based agenda for poverty reduction in the developing world full text available at official url

event study methodologies and the size effect abstract this study of 862 press recommendations demonstrates that the size effect can distort longer term performance measures and hence event studies relative to similar sized companies post publication performance is neutral however market adjustments the capm and market model with equally or capitalization weighted indexes all produce biased results event studies are most exposed to such bias when the measurement interval is long event securities differ systematically in size or weighting from the index constituents the size effect is large and or volatile and when capm type methodologies are used these distortions are avoided by explicitly controlling for size

an empirical analysis of the reincorporation decision the literature suggests two competing explanations for reincorporations efforts at managerial entrenchment and attempts to improve contractual efficiency the empirical evidence to date is inconclusive to seek further evidence we examine a large sample of firms that changed their state of incorporation over the period 1980 1992 we find that shareholder wealth is decreased by reincorporations that erect takeover defenses but is increased by reincorporations that establish limits on director liability firms that claim they reincorporate to limit the personal liability of their board members and thereby attract better qualified outside directors do in fact expand the outside representation on their boards whereas firms citing other motives do not

regulation of entry labor market institutions and the informal sector abstract this paper develops a two sector matching model that incorporates the main features of latin american labor markets it has an innovation in its matching structure that makes it more consistent with some key stylized facts of the informal sector in these countries the model is numerically solved using brazilian data and several policy simulations are performed reducing formal sector s entry cost significantly reduces the size of the informal sector and improves overall labor market performance increasing enforcement significantly reduces informality but has strong adverse effects on unemployment and welfare thus the results indicate that the tradeoff between lower informal employment and higher unemployment rates is not present when one looks at policies that aim at reducing the costs of being formal as opposed to policies that simply increase the costs of being informal

does conditionality mitigate the potential negative effect of aid on revenues this paper assesses whether conditionality in imf supported programmes has helped offset the potential negative effect of foreign aid on tax revenues the analysis carried out on panel data covering 1993 2012 for 111 low and middle income countries shows that growing use of revenue conditionality by low income countries partially offsets the depressing effect of foreign grants on tax revenue particularly on taxes on goods and services the impact of conditionality is strong in countries where aid dependence is high and where institutions are strong suggesting that revenue conditionality cannot substitute for weak institutions in mitigating any negative effect of aid on tax revenue collection

inequality the politics of redistribution and the tax mix political economy literature generally predicts a positive relationship between income inequality and redistribution however there is no clear empirical evidence supporting such a relationship by incorporating an informal sector that evades income taxes we account for the tax base effect that along with the political channel determines the equilibrium redistribution and tax mix we find a non monotonic relationship between inequality and redistribution and explore under which conditions an unequal society relies more heavily on indirect taxes to finance redistribution ultimately this paper shows the limitations of the income tax to finance redistribution in developing countries even when taxes are democratically chosen

on tax efforts and colonial heritage in africa abstract one commonly observed phenomena about taxation in africa are regional differences and the fact that southern african countries have higher levels of shares of taxation in gdp this article argues that the major source of differences in tax effort is the colonial histories of various countries using standard measures of tax effort in a panel data framework and dividing colonial africa along forms of incorporation into the colonial system it shows that african countries and others with similar colonial histories have higher levels of tax effort however the difference disappears when we control for the colonial factor these results hold under different model specifications

taxing the informal economy the current state of knowledge and agendas for future research abstractthis paper reviews the literature on taxation of the informal economy taking stock of key debates and drawing attention to recent innovations conventionally the debate on whether to tax has frequently focused on the limited revenue potential high cost of collection and potentially adverse impact on small firms recent arguments have increasingly emphasised the more indirect benefits of informal taxation in relation to economic growth broader tax compliance and governance more research is needed we argue into the relevant costs and benefits for all including quasi voluntary compliance political and administrative incentives for reform and citizen state bargaining over taxation

signaling managerial optimism through stock dividends and stock splits a reexamination of the retained earnings hypothesis the retained earnings hypothesis predicts that stock distributions accounted for by reducing retained earnings are a more credible signal of managerial optimism than stock distributions that do not reduce retained earnings this study examines the costs of false signaling that are a necessary precondition for the hypothesis and finds them to be generally very small the absence of the requisite costs of false signaling calls the validity of the hypothesis into question for most firms however prior studies have reported broad based market evidence consistent with the retained earnings hypothesis to resolve this apparent inconsistency this study replicates and extends tests of the retained earnings hypothesis contained in three prior studies it shows that the findings in support of the retained earnings hypothesis can be attributed to specification and measurement choices that bias the results in favor of the hypothesis the support for the retained earnings hypothesis is weaker when the sources of the bias are removed however some support for the hypothesis remains for a limited set of distributing firms

an empirical investigation of the impact of antitakeover amendments on common stock prices abstract antitakeover amendments are amendments to a corporation s charter that impede the ability of an outsider to gain control of the firm a number of individuals and institutions have onjected to such amendments on the grounds that they are not in the best interests of the shareholders of the firms that adopt them this paper employs event time methodology to investigate the impact of antitakeover amendments on the common stock prices of firms that adopt them the results indicate that the announcement of such amendments is associated with a positive revaluation of stock price contrary to the concerns of their critics we conclude that antitakeover amendments are proposed by managers who seek to increase the value of the firm and are approved by stockholders who share that objective