tradeable permits missing markets and technology this paper examines the effects of missing markets heterogeneous pollutants and the pollution technology of firms on the efficacy of transferable pollution permits under the assumption of perfect competition in all markets we show that if firms can substitute among pollutants then setting the optimal number of permits for only one pollutant will not in general lead to an efficient outcome the degree of the inefficiency will depend on the information set available to the regulator and the substitutability among pollutants by firms when establishing transferable pollution rights regulators should therefore consider the technology of firms if firms discharge pollutants in the same fixed proportions then the regulator need only set a market for one of the pollutants to ensure an efficient outcome where firms can substitute among pollutants however establishing a market for only one pollutant provides an incentive for firms to substitute to unregulated ones this is an important policy issue as substitutability among pollutants within and across production processes may dampen the dynamic advantages of a tradeable permit policy

china s carbon emissions trading overview challenges and future because china has emerged as the largest greenhouse gas ghg emitter in total annual emissions to accelerate the pace of ghg emission reduction in china is important to the success of global efforts in addressing climate change carbon trading is a market mechanism and key instrument in the mitigation of climate change this paper explores the policy process and development state to date of china s carbon trade market to understand the emergence and development of that market and to understand what barriers are hampering china s carbon trade market development to achieve this goal this paper introduces and analyzes china s status in the international market examines the factors driving carbon market launching by the chinese government and traces the development of mandatory carbon emission trading and voluntary emission trading it is argued that china s carbon trading market is confronted with challenges such as the absence of a functional carbon trading market inaccuracy of the quota allocation an imperfect trading mechanism and lagging legislation at the present stage shortcomings such as having no real time carbon price and dominated spot transactions differentiate china s trade market substantially from a functional system a quick market integration of china s carbon market appears remote it is suggested that specific measures be taken to promote the development of the chinese carbon trading market

debt maturity and the international financial architecture this paper presents a theory of the maturity of international sovereign debt and derives its implications for the reform of the international financial architecture the analysis is based on a model in which the need to roll over external debt disciplines the policies of debtor countries but makes them vulnerable to unwarranted debt crises due to bad shocks the paper presents a welfare analysis of several measures that have been discussed in recent debates such as international lending in last resort or the establishment of a mechanism for suspending payments on the external debt of crisis countries jel f34 o19

sovereign debt as a contingent claim a quantitative approach abstract we construct a dynamic equilibrium model with contingent service and adverse selection to quantitatively study sovereign debt in the model benefits of defaulting are tempered by higher future interest rates for a wide set of parameters the only equilibrium is one in which the sovereign defaults in all states additional output losses however sustain equilibria that resemble the data we show that due to the adverse selection problem some countries choose to delay default to reduce loss of reputation moreover although equilibria with no default imply greater welfare levels they are not sustainable in highly indebted and volatile countries

the imf a bird s eye view of its role and operations the international monetary fund imf is the world s premier international financial institution with 184 member countries and active programmes in a significant number of them at any one time the fund attracts a great deal of attention much of it critical but the discussion is often polemic in style strongly held but frequently opposing views are expressed this survey attempts to examine in an objective way the theory and evidence relating to the fund s operations many aspects of the empirical research are relatively recent and a universal consensus is yet to emerge as a consequence there is scope for disagreement to persist however the research is also gradually clarifying many important issues the format for the survey is to examine the life cycle of imf arrangements what makes a country turn to the fund for assistance should the imf be lending what influences the outcome of negotiations and the design of programmes are imf programmes effective and why do some countries make prolonged use of imf resources for completeness there is also some discussion of the history of the imf the extent to which fund policies have been influenced by advances in economic theory and the fund s systemic role important organisational and governance issues are also covered briefly although primarily adopting an economist s perspective the survey reflects the growing recognition that in order to understand the imf s operations economics has to be combined with politics examining the imf is an exercise in applied political economy copyright 2007 the author journal compilation 2007 blackwell publishing ltd

debt maturity without commitment i analyze how lack of commitment afiects the maturity structure of sovereign debt governments balance beneflts of default induced redistribution and costs due to income losses in the wake of a default their choice of short versus longterm debt afiects default and rollover decisions by subsequent policy makers the equilibrium maturity structure is shaped by revenue losses on inframarginal units of debt that re ect the price impact of these decisions the model predicts an interior maturity structure with positive gross positions and a shortening of the maturity structure when debt issuance is high output low or a cross default more likely these predictions are consistent with empirical evidence

a quantitative model of sovereign debt bailouts and conditionality in times of sovereign debt crises international financial institutions provide temporary financial support contingent on the implementation of specific macroeconomic policies this paper develops a model of sovereign debt and default with endogenous participation rates in bailout programs conditionality enters as a constraint on fiscal policy in the model the insurance character of bailouts generates incentives for debt accumulation quantitative results suggest that bailouts prevent sovereign defaults in the short run but may come at a cost of a greater default probability in the long run increasing the intensity of conditionality lowers the bailout participation rate and generates a hump shaped pattern of sovereign default risk

harmonization of carbon taxes in international climate agreements the use of some kind of carbon tax is often proposed as part of an international climate policy one possibility could be an international climate agreement requiring a harmonization of domestic carbon taxes it is shown that there are several practical difficulties with such an agreement and that it therefore is unlikely that co2 emissions will be allocated efficiently between countries with this type of agreement alternative types of agreements include an international carbon tax in which the governments of the participating countries pay a tax in proportion to their co2 emissions to an international agency a very similar arrangement would be to introduce a system of emission permits which are internationally tradeable between governments under quite general conditions agreements of these two types can be designed so that they are both efficient and satisfy whatever distributional objectives one might have under both of these systems the choice of domestic policies could be left to the individual countries a domestic carbon tax is an obvious policy response from a country participating in an agreement of this type

firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control reply abstract the process of technological change in pollution control is broken into three basic steps innovation diffusion and optimal agency response firm incentives to promote these steps are then examined under five regulatory regimes direct controls emission subsidies emission taxes free marketable permits and auctioned marketable permits on a relative basis emission taxes and auctioned permits provide the highest firm incentives to promote technological change at times free permits generate lower incentives direct controls which are common regulatory tools usually provide the lowest relative firm incentives to promote technological change

is it punishment sovereign defaults and the decline in trade sovereign defaults are associated with declines in defaulting countries trade are these declines the result of trade sanctions as the trade sanctions argument of sovereign borrowing would suggest we devise an empirical strategy to evaluate this issue based on the idea that if trade sanctions are causing the declines bilateral trade with creditor countries should fall more than trade with other countries we find that this is not the case the analysis does not yield much evidence of broader punishment strategies including a league of major creditors either these results contradict the predictions of the trade sanctions theory of sovereign borrowing

sovereign debt structural adjustment and conditionality abstract the lack of a proper enforcement mechanism for sovereign debt generates a commitment failure as a result a sovereign may seek to improve its position in debt renegotiations and thus evade its debt obligations by reducing exports conditionality seeks to provide a solution to the incentive problem by addressing the commitment failure formalizing this argument we show that conditionality helps the repayment of sovereign debt in certain circumstances it can eliminate debt overhang especially when it is coupled with concessionary lending of sufficient magnitude it is however unable to restore first best when it is anticipated by lenders conditionality may get international financial institutions and sovereign debtors into a trap where the debt overhang persist debt rescheduling takes place periodically and conditionality continues indefinitely

the growth of social security electoral push or political pull the growth of social security electoral push or political pull i introduction during the post world war ii period the social security program was among the fastest growing programs in the federal budget surpassing defense spending as the largest category of expenditures in the mid seventies the program which disbursed only 132 million dollars in 1942 disbursed more than 156 billion dollars forty years late a thousand fold increase as a consequence of this growth and the program s recent financial problems a number of economists have turned their attention to the economics of social security recent examples include kahn 1988 boskin et al 1987 and veall 1986 yet only weaver 1982 and turner 1984 attempt to analyze the growth of the social security program weaver s legislative history of the program suggests that special interest groups had a major impact on social security programs turner argues that program benefit levels are affected by demographic changes which affect the cost of intergenerational redistribution in this paper we use the public choice approach to explain increases in benefit levels from 1946 1980 we develop and test three alternative public choice models of the politics of retirement benefit levels our analysis thus sheds light on an important question neglected by previous research have social security expenditures grown because special interest groups have effectively captured the congress or is congress simply responding to demands placed on it by the electorate the answer to this question is relevant to normative analysis of existing programs and to alternative proposals for reform in addition our study of the principal determinants of the growth of program benefit levels serves as an event study for assessing the merits of alternative theories of political decision making borcherding 1985 discusses two public choice explanations for the growth of public expenditures first public programs may expand as a result of the voting rules which underlie the political process when decisions are made by majority rule an increase in the median voter s demand for public services tends to increase public service levels because prospective candidates will revise their policy positions in order to be elected the wagner 1958 hypothesis for example maintains that increases in real income cause individuals to prefer both absolutely and relatively larger public expenditures borcherding notes that about 40 percent of the rate at which public sector spending has replaced private sector spending over the past eighty years can be explained with a median voter approach such an approach does better in what borcherding calls traditional areas of public expenditure where a median voter model can account for about 73 percent of the rate at which public expenditures excluding transfers have displaced private expenditures the median voter might favor public transfers to the elderly for two reasons first he may have an interdependent utility function in which the plight of the elderly poor arouses a charitable response while the redistribution from young to old does not simply target the old poor as a group the elderly do seem to be relatively less wealthy than the middle aged and the yound if one considers the average capitalized value of future income receipts from labor and capital second to the extent that the social security program offers a connection between reductions in current consumption and increases in future consumption it is a rather complex savings and insurance program the median voter s motivation for transferring monies to today s elderly may be a vehicle for ensuring future transfers to himself while this explanation is difficult to motivate at the individual level since a savings program for future retirement need not pay anything to today s elderly a continuing program of tax funded transfers is plausible method of establishing the moral constitution necessary to ensure that future transfers do in fact take place

rent capture in a rights based fishery abstract the paper compares four methods of rent capture in a fishery managed with individual transferable quotas using simulations from a unit profit function some theoretical properties of a quota rental charge profit charge lump sum charge and an ad valorem royalty are examined and then compared in simulations in terms of the distribution of profits distortions to the fishery the relative burden on fishers and flexibility to adjust to changes in the fishery

cost manipulation games in oligopoly with costs of manipulating we analyze a class of two stage games where rival firms incur real resource costs in manipulating their marginal costs so as to influence the outcome of the game they want to play in stage two marginal costs may be manipulated by various means such as redistribution of productive assets choice of location or creation of an internal input market a general formulation of the game is provided and several applications are analyzed we show that the optimal allocation of resources within an oligopoly can be asymmetric even for ex ante symmetric firms this is an additional explanation of heterogeneity in oligopoly

bureaucratic discretion or congressional control regulatory policymaking by the federal trade commission this paper extends stigler and peltzman s approach to regulation by incorporating a legislature the model yields comparative statics results and hence testable implications the paper then tests between two opposing approaches about regulatory agency behavior the first assumes agencies operate independently of the legislature and hence exercise discretion the second assumes that congress controls agency decisions the recent behavior of the federal trade commission provides the empirical setting substantial evidence is found for the specific predictions of the model including the hypothesis of systematic congressional influence over ftc decisions

globalization and risk sharing we study the effects of globalization on risk sharing and welfare like the previous literature we assume that governments cannot commit to enforce the repayment of debts owed by their citizens unlike the previous literature we assume that governments cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign creditors when enforcing debt payments this creates novel interactions between domestic and international trade in assets i increases in domestic trade raise the benefits of enforcement and facilitate international trade in fact in our set up countries can obtain international risk sharing even in the absence of default penalties ii increases in foreign trade raise the costs of enforcement and hamper domestic trade as a result globalization may worsen domestic risk sharing and lower welfare we show how these effects depend on various characteristics of tradable goods and explore the roles of borrowing limits debt renegotiations and trade policy

tradeable emission permits and the control of greenhouse gases this article reiterates the case for tradeable permits as a global policy option for limiting greenhouse gas emissions and considers the detailed design of a global tradeable permit regime emphasising the importance of the initial assignment of property rights and arguing that the relevant property rights in this case are the rights of every member of the world community to share in a sustainable global atmosphere and climate the allocation of permits should therefore be done on a per capita basis across the world community with the result that rents generated by the process of reducing carbon emissions would accrue to non polluters most of whom live in the south the international transfers of income and wealth implied by the proposed scheme are large but feasible there is therefore a real prospect that an international convention on carbon dioxide emissions could end the debt crisis and finance sustainable development in the south

sovereign defaults and liquidity crises abstract sovereign debt crises in emerging markets are usually associated with liquidity and banking crises the conventional view is that the domestic turmoil is the consequence of foreign retaliation although there is no clear empirical evidence on classic default penalties this paper emphasizes instead a direct link between sovereign defaults and liquidity crises building on two natural assumptions i government bonds represent a source of liquidity for the domestic private sector and ii the government cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign creditors in the event of default in this context external debt emerges even in the absence of classic penalties and government default is countercyclical triggers a liquidity crunch and amplifies output volatility in addition a reform that involves a substitution of government bonds with privately sourced liquidity instruments could backfire by restricting governments access to foreign credit

paying for pollution permits and charges tradeable emission permits are becoming an increasingly important instrument for controlling emissions for a variety of reasons emission permits are often allocated gratis conferring a windfall gain on the first generation of permit holders this paper examines how a regulator may capture this rent four different methods of rent capture profit output and input charges and an emission permit rental charge are compared with respect to their effects on efficiency and the relative burden placed on cleaner and dirtier firms in addition to generating revenue for the regulator certain charges coupled with emission permits may result in a better instrument than permits alone

understanding the costs of sovereign default american state debts in the 1840 s the defaults of u s states in the 1840s provide a powerful test of competing models of sovereign debt the eleventh amendment to the u s constitution prevented foreign creditors from obtaining payment in the federal courts moreover because the defaulting states were part of a large and economically integrated nation creditors could not enforce payment by imposing military or trade sanctions in spite of the lack of sanctions however most states eventually repaid in full it appears that the states repaid in order to maintain access to capital markets much as in reputational models of sovereign debt copyright 1996 by american economic association

auctions and alternative procedures for allocating pollution rights this paper considers two different types of auctions which the government could use to sell discharge rights 1 an auction where rights are sold for a single clearing price and 2 a special type of discriminating auction that discourages strategic manipulation of bids by individual dischargers based on both theoretical and practical considerations there appears to be a fundamental trade off between reducing the financial burden of rights purchases and eliminating the incentives for strategic behavior very few discharges in either case study would have lower expenses under government sales of rights than under uniform treatment the simulations also suggest that there may be opportunities for strategic behavior under nonincentive compatible procedures because of small numbers of dischargers despite its problems with respect to incentive compatibility the right allocation approach of free distribution followed by exchange may offer the most desirable package of features this approach can yield dischargers savings over the expenses of present uniform regulations as well as provide incentives for efficient allocation of treatment efforts 25 references 1 figure 5 tables

marketable emission permits efficiency profitability and substitutability research on marketable emission rights as a mechanism for controlling pollutants in the environment has intensified in recent years the resurgence of interest in this mechanism is in no small measure due to the 1990 amendments of the u s clean air act which introduced the most comprehensive tradeable permit scheme to date for s02 emissions canada is also flirting with the possibility of following suit with for instance the government of ontario now allowing ontario hydro to conduct some limited emissions trading across its plants nera 1992 however the literature often ignores two basic questions how permits are allocated and what substances should be covered by the permits there are two ways of allocating pollution permits by selling them e g by auction or by giving them away the advantages of auctions are that they can generate sizeable revenues for the regulator and they conform to the widely endorsed principle of polluter pays a frequently cited problem with auctions however is that they impose immediate financial burdens on emitting firms in the absence of perfect capital markets these burdens erect a formidable entry barrier to new and existing firms thus permits are usually freely distributed on the basis of historical market share however by allocating permits gratis policy makers are ignoring both the important polluter pays principle as well as an important source of revenue generation for example should emission permits be used to reduce nitrogen oxide emissions in accordance with recent canadian government proclamations the total value of these permits in ontario alone could be as much as c 300 million nera 1992 in this paper we examine the effects on efficiency and the burden imposed on heterogeneous firms from rent capture when permits are allocated gratis

taxes versus tradable discharge permits a review in the light of the u s and european experience the u s and west european environmental protection programs have incorporated different economic instruments for controlling pollution the u s has made extensive use of tradable permits of several forms but has never used direct pollution taxes the countries of the european community have long used an array of pollution taxes but have never used tradable permits a review and critique of these experiences and an analysis of the attributes of taxes and tradable permits seeks identify the strengths and weaknesses of each instrument and to provide guidelines for the successful implementation of each system

sovereign default risk and commitment for fiscal adjustment abstract this paper studies fiscal policy in a model of sovereign debt and default a time inconsistency problem arises since the price of past debt cannot be affected by current fiscal policy and governments cannot credibly commit to a certain path of tax rates debtor countries choose suboptimally low fiscal adjustments an international organization capable of designing a contract that coaxes debtors into a tougher fiscal stance via the provision of cheap senior lending in times of crisis can work as a commitment device and improve social welfare

market power and transferable property rights the appeal of using markets as a means of allocating scarce resources stems in large part from the assumption that a market will approximate the competitive ideal when competition is not a foregone conclusion the question naturally arises as to how a firm might manipulate the market to its own advantage this paper analyzes the issue of market power in the context of markets for transferable property rights first a model is developed that explains how a single firm with market power might exercise its influence this is followed by an examination of the model in the context of a particular policy problem the control of particulate sulfates in the los angeles region

congressional committees and the political economy of federal outlays the literature on the organization of the united states congress has been dominated by distributive and informational theory one important source of disagreement between these two theories is their characterization of whether individual legislators can engage in pork barrel activities here we provide evidence which indicates that the pork barrel is alive and well in the contemporary united states congress we focus on whether members of power and constituency committees can direct disproportionate federal expenditures to their districts finding strong and systematic evidence of pork barrel activities by committee members provides empirical support for distributive theories of legislative organization

optimal maturity of nominal government debt an infinite horizon model the role of debt maturity is analyzed in a framework that blends tax smoothing with time inconsistency of optimal policy when policymakers have an incentive to use unanticipated inflation to reduce the real value of nominal government liabilities three conclusions emerge 1 nominal debt leads policymakers to resort to inflation even though in equilibrium inflation collects no revenue 2 when under full precommitment the optimal policy calls for complete tax smoothing and a constant debt level the equilibrium policy without precommitment calls for anticipating tax collection and early debt repayment and 3 management of debt maturity is an essential component of the equilibrium policy copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

coordination failures and the lender of last resort was bagehot right after all the classical doctrine of the lender of last resort lolr elaborated by bagehot 1873 asserts that the central bank should lend to illiquid but solvent banks under certain conditions several authors have argued that this view is now obsolete in modern interbank markets a solvent bank cannot be illiquid this paper provides a possible theoretical foundation for rescuing bagehot s view our theory does not rely on the multiplicity of equilibria that arises in classical models of bank runs we built a model of banks liquidity crises that possesses a unique bayesian equilibrium in this equilibrium there is a positive probability that a solvent bank cannot find liquidity assistance in the market we derive policy implications about banking regulation solvency and liquidity ratios and interventions of the lender of last resort furthermore we find that public bailout and private bail in involvement are complementary in implementing the incentive efficient solution and that bagehot s lender of last resort facility must work together with institutions providing prompt corrective action and orderly failure resolution finally we derive similar implications for an international lender of last resort ilolr jel g21 g28

why do emerging economies borrow short term the authors argue that emerging economies borrow short term due to the high risk premium charged by international capital markets on long term debt they first present a model where the debt maturity structure is the outcome of a risk sharing problem between the government and bondholders by issuing long term debt the government lowers the probability of a liquidity crisis transferring risk to bondholders in equilibrium this risk is reflected in a higher risk premium and borrowing cost therefore the government faces a tradeoff between safer long term borrowing and cheaper short term debt second the authors construct a new database of sovereign bond prices and issuance they show that emerging economies pay a positive term premium a higher risk premium on long term bonds than on short term bonds during crises the term premium increases with issuance shifting toward shorter maturities this suggests that changes in bondholders risk aversion are important to understand emerging market crises

the debt burden and debt maturity at low and moderate levels of government debt there appears to be little relation between the level of debt and its maturity but at high levels of debt a strong inverse relation emerges we start the paper by documenting this inverse relation for those oecd countries which have reached very high levels of debt we then provide a theory of the joint movements of debt and maturity which can explain both sets of facts it is based on the idea that at high levels of debt the government may need to decrease the maturity of the debt as debt increases in order to maintain the credibility of its anti inflation stance this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

governance of the commons a role for the state the paper examines property regimes and common pool resources using examples and case studies the relative merits of private community and state based rights are detailed the insights from the case studies and an analysis of institution costs provide a tentative framework for understanding the role of the state in the governance of the commons

transitional politics emerging incentive based instruments in environmental regulation abstract this paper proposes a positive theory of environmental instrument choice we study a democratic society that seeks to lower the level of pollution from industrial sources to a pre specified target the target can be implemented by one of three instruments s uniform emission standards p tradeable permits and t emission taxes the conflict of interest between special interests representing polluters and the electorate is resolved by an elected politician we characterize when each of the three policy instruments is chosen in political equilibrium and show that the transition observed in many countries from s to either p or t can be understood as a natural consequence of increasingly ambitious environmental targets

income inequality and sovereign default abstract in this paper we study how income inequality matters for government borrowing and default decisions we extend a standard endogenous sovereign debt default model to allow for heterogeneous agents and stochastic variability in the dispersion of income we calibrate the model to match a number of stylized facts for argentina we show that i rising income inequality within a country increases the probability of default significantly ii the effect of output shocks is larger than the effect of inequality shocks iii the joint effect of these two shocks can generate a high default probability consistent with the argentine data iv the model can match the high volatility of consumption by the poor relative to the rich and v more progressive income taxes lead to lower default risk

haircuts estimating investor losses in sovereign debt restructurings 1998 2005 abstract we calculate investor losses haircuts and recovery values in recent debt restructurings in russia ukraine pakistan ecuador argentina and uruguay haircuts are computed as the percentage difference between the present values of old and new instruments discounted at the yield prevailing immediately after the exchange recovery value means value received in terms of outstanding principal we find average npv haircuts ranging from 13 uruguay external exchange to 73 2005 argentina exchange recovery values range from 30 to about 75 we also find within exchange variations in haircuts and recovery values depending on the bond tendered with a few exceptions domestic residents do not appear to have been treated systematically better or worse than foreign residents

the political economy of the essential air service program we find that congressional influences affect the amount of airport subsidies that a congressional district receives through the essential air service eas program the eas program was passed with the goal of helping to continue commercial air service to rural communities following deregulation in the 1970s using data from 1998 2014 we find strong and consistent evidence that subsidies are higher in districts having congressional representation on the house transportation and ways and means committees our empirical results when combined with news reports of members claiming credit for securing eas funding are consistent with the eas serving private and public interests

catalytic finance when does it work in a model of debt crisis caused partly by creditor coordination failure we show that bailouts that reduce ex post inefficiency will sometimes enhance the incentives for governments to take costly adjustment effort this model helps us understand a debate about the role of the imf in catalyzing lending to developing countries

sovereign default interest rates and political uncertainty in emerging markets abstract a large body of the empirical literature shows that high turnover rates length of tenure of policymakers and the degree of conflict within a country affects sovereign spreads debt and default rates we help to rationalize such claims by including these political features in a dynamic stochastic small open economy model of sovereign debt and default in this way we offer a complementary approach to the econometric analyses in the literature consistent with the data the quantitative analysis shows that politically unstable and more polarized economies experience higher default rates and larger level and volatility of sovereign interest rate spreads