contracts as a barrier to entry it is shown that an incumbent seller who faces a threat of entry into his or her market will sign long term contracts that prevent the entry of some lower cost producers even though they do not preclude entry completely moreover when a seller possesses superior information about the likelihood of entry it is shown that the length of the contract may act as a signal of the true probability of entry

modeling charitable giving using a box cox standard tobit model there is a large literature investigating the determinants of charitable giving in particular price and income elasticities we find that many of the most often reported results from this literature rely on a model specification that is inappropriate when applied to recent federal tax file data we develop a standard tobit model with a box cox transformation parameter that nests a number of other specifications the box cox model yields estimates of price elasticities and expected charitable contributions that differ from those obtained using the typical specification additionally we find that the use of sample weights provides potentially important policy insights copyright 1991 by mit press

the analytics of the pricing of higher education and other services in which the customers are inputs many services provide outputs that depend partially on the customers as inputs the presence of other customers often contributes to the output experienced by each purchaser higher education is the premier example others are legion we provide a simple model that addresses the questions of competitive pricing and allocative efficiency for these types of services prices that charge customers for what they get on net output minus input from the firm both are competitive and support efficient allocations these prices internalize the apparent external effects of customers on each other few examples of such prices exist in the real world

negotiation and renegotiation of optimal financial contracts under the threat of predation this paper examines the effect of renegotiation on the ability of financial contracts between a lender and entrant to deter an incumbent s predation in the presence of renegotiation it is more difficult for the entrant to obtain financing and more difficult for the contract to deter predation contracts successfully deter predation in some cases however even if renegotiation occurs at a stage with symmetric information between the entrant and lender giving the entrant constrained by limited liability stronger bargaining power vis a vis the lender improves the efficiency of the optimal contract but the results concerning renegotiation are unchanged copyright 1996 by blackwell publishing ltd

a theory of contracts with limited enforcement we present a theory of contracts under costly enforcement in the context of a dynamic relationship between an uninformed buyer and a seller who is privately informed on his persistent cost at the outset public enforcement relies on remedies for breach private enforcement comes from severing relationships we first characterize aggregate enforcement constraints ensuring that trading partners do not breach contracts unduly whether a long term contract is enforceable does not depend on the distribution of penalties for breach between the buyer and the seller while under complete information the optimal contract would remain stationary non stationarity might arise under asymmetric information enforcement constraints are time dependent and easier to satisfy as time passes indeed a high cost seller may be tempted to trade high volumes at high prices at the beginning of the relationship before breaching the contract later on yet such take the money and run strategy becomes less attractive as time passes and can be prevented with backloaded payments the optimal contract thus goes through two different phases first quantities and prices increase at the inception of the relationship later on the contract looks more stationary the public and private sides of enforcement plays different roles in determining the length of the earlier phase of contracting long run screening distortions encapsulate the quality of enforcement offering de facto a link between the quality of the legal system and contractual performances

product market competition and optimal debt contracts the limited liability effect revisited abstract this paper shows that asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers plays a crucial role in the existence of interactions between financial decisions and output market strategies lenders offer an optimal renegotiation proof financial contract which resembles a standard debt contract computing cournot equilibria debt causes firms to compete less aggressively the usual positive limited liability effect on quantities is offset by a negative one due to endogenous financial costs

an economic model of teaching effectiveness the literature on the determinants of good teaching performance has been largely devoted to empirical measurement a complete review of the publications in this area would require at least an entire issue the size of this journal yet it is virtually impossible to discover attempts to derive hypotheses about the determinants of good teaching from explicit models of behavior this has led researchers into the trap of exploring only the empirical determinants of good teaching performance typically the results of student evaluations are correlated with affective personality traits of the teachers with peer evaluations of psychological compositions or even with the results of various psychological tests examples are the works of robert isaacson et al frank costin et al and wilbert mckeachie et al in most of these studies no substantive conclusions are reached regarding the determinants of effective teaching in the few studies which do contain significant findings the independent variable in question is difficult to explain as a direct determinant of teaching effectiveness for example isaacson et al find that virtually the only statistically significant determinant of effective teaching is the personality characteristic which they label culture this may imply that simply wearing a tweed jacket and taking up pipesmoking is sufficient to improve teaching this paper takes a somewhat different approach to the analysis of teaching assume that the individual in question wishes to maximize teaching effectiveness clearly there are constraints on this maximization process one must necessarily be the time budget constraint a second constraint however adds a good deal of interest to the model this constraint is best described as the bundle of characteristics available to the individual these characteristics could be termed the components of the individual s personality such attributes include physical appearance psychological makeup speaking ability and a myriad of other variables thus this model bears a resemblance to the standard economic models of monopolistic competition see a michael spence before proceeding to a formal statement of the problem a philosophical issue must be addressed what is meant by teaching effectiveness generally this is interpreted as maximizing student evaluations of teachers however this is clearly not always equivalent to maximizing student learning unfortunately the latter variable is difficult but not impossible to measure preand posttesting with standardized tests is becoming increasingly accepted for example the meaning of teaching effectiveness in this paper must unfortunately remain ambiguous some teachers concerned perhaps with obtaining tenure will interpret good teaching as obtaining good evaluations the criterion by which they are judged others may take a more eclectic viewpoint since the problem below is an individual maximization problem the precise definition of effective teaching may simply vary from individual to individual see w r allen formally this problem is exactly analogous to one first addressed by kelvin lancaster he assumes that the consumer attempts to maximize satisfaction through purchase of bundles of attributes each commodity is possessed of certain of these characteristics by consuming various combinations of these commodities the consumer is assistant professor department of economics and director center for economic education california state university hayward i would like to thank alex cassuto nancy sanders and an anonymous referee for helpful discussion in a previously unreported experiment in the department of economics california state universitybakersfield faculty members were required to wear coats and ties in classes it was subsequently observed that teaching evaluations improved unfortunately no detailed statistical results of this experiment are available for analysis

production and innovation when techniques are tacit the case of education abstract the central theme of this paper is that the conventional economic theory of production does not hold even approximately in a field like education after examining the result of input output studies in education and the effect of government attempts to enhance education effectiveness we provide a sketch of a new production theory for sectors where techniques are poorly articulated and idiosyncratic

schooling and economic well being the role of nonmarket effects standard estimates of the economic value of additional schooling based on earnings differences associated with differences in the level of schooling attained cover only a portion of the total effects of education that are valued by citizens we first identify a catalog of nonmarketed effects many of which have been recently studied by economists and then propose a procedure for estimating a willingness to pay value for these effects using empirical estimates of the magnitude of a selection of these effects found in the literature we calculate willingness to pay values using our proposed procedure these illustrative calculations suggest that standard estimates of the benefit of incremental schooling substantially understate the full value of such investments

renegotiation and optimality in agency contracts we analyse renegotiation in a hidden action principal agent model contract renegotiation offers are made by the agent a refinement is imposed on the principal s beliefs if precisely one action is optimal with respect to both the principal s and the agent s contracts the principal believes that that action has been taken with the refinement imposed perfect bayesian equilibrium allocations are identical to the second best in the classical principal agent model without renegotiation when renegotiation is led by the agent and when equilibria satisfy the refinement equilibrium allocations are ex ante efficient incentive contracting is a common mechanism for promoting ex ante investments and for avoiding ex post opportunistic behaviour in a long term or continuing economic relationship the classical principal agent model holmstrom 1979 grossman and hart 1983 is a natural framework for this class of problem in such a model a risk averse agent performs an action on behalf of a risk neutral principal the agent s action is unobservable and affects the principal s revenue in a random fashion the derivation and characterization of efficient compensation schemes have been the major focus in the principal agent literature generally the incentives to motivate a costly action from the agent take the form of profit sharing the agent s reward is made contingent on his random performance outcomes

the economics of schooling production and efficiency in public schools n recent years public and professional interest in schools has been heightened by a spate of reports many of them critical of current school policy these policy documents have added to persistent and long standing concerns about the cost effectiveness and fairness of the current school structure and have made schooling once again a serious public issue as in the past however any renewed interest in education is likely to be short lived doomed to dissipate as frustration over the inability of policy to improve school practice sets in this frustration about school policy relates directly to knowledge about the educational production process and in turn to underlying research on schools although the educational process has been extensively researched clear policy prescriptions flowing from this research have been difficult to derive 2 there exists however a consistency to the research findings that does have an immediate application to school policy schools differ dramatically in quality

a simple model of primary commodity price determination 1900 80 this article specifies and estimates a model of the determination of the real price of primary commodities over the period 1900 to 1980 the empirical evidence reported in the article suggests that the long run behaviour of real commodity prices is significantly influenced by both demand and supply side forces as represented by the level of world production and a distributed lag of previous real prices respectively

financial innovations and managerial incentive contracting the top executives demands for financial instruments that enable them to hedge the risk exposure in their compensation has increased drastically in the last decade we analyse the implications of a manager s hedging ability for effort incentives we show that if the manager s hedging opportunity is limited to a known fixed number of trading rounds with risk neutral third parties then the equilibrium effort is not affected at all if the manager has the opportunity to hedge without committing to a last trading round however she hedges completely and no effort incentives can be sustained therefore limiting the manager s opportunity to hedge to a fixed known number of trading rounds is crucial for sustaining incentives jel classification g30 g32

does it pay to attend an elite private college cross cohort evidence on the effects of college type on earnings although a substantial and rising labor market premium is associated with college attendance in general little is known about how this premium varies across institutions of different types and across time in this paper we explicitly model high school students choice of college type characterized by selectivity and control based on individual and family characteristics including ability and parental economic status and an estimate of the net costs of attendance we estimate selectivity corrected outcome equations using data from both the national longitudinal study of the high school class of 1972 and high school and beyond which permit us to determine the effects of college quality on wages and earnings and how this effect varies across time even after controlling for selection effects strong evidence emerges of a significant economic return to attending an elite private institution and some evidence suggests this premium has increased over time

subsidies hierarchy and peers the awkward economics of higher education higher education is a business it produces and sells educational services to customers for a price and it buys inputs with which to make that product production is subject to technological constraints costs and revenues discipline decisions and determine the long run viability of a college or university but higher education is not just a business while that statement is often meant to imply that higher education is nobler than business more decent and humane in the purposes it serves it can also mean that even in economic terms higher education is in important ways simply different from a business this paper asks how well our extensive experience with commercial businesses and the microeconomic theory of firms and markets that has evolved to describe them helps in understanding the economics of higher education that experience and those insights will be used by trustees politicians administrators lawyers reporters and the public as well as by economists to understand and evaluate the behavior of colleges and universities so it is useful to ask how safe it is to use the economic analogy in the context of higher education drawing parallels between universities and firms students and customers faculty and labor markets and so on the discussion here seeks to identify the key economic features of higher education that make it different from familiar for profit industries and to ask what difference those differences make this is a stick that can be picked up from either end one approach is to start with meticulous economic theory and see how far it can be made to encompass the economic realities of higher education an excellent recent paper by rothschild and white 1995 does that in their matching model students and colleges meet

the commitment value of contracts under dynamic renegotiation we examine why different renegotiation processes can lead to opposite results regarding the commitment value of third party contracts in the presence of asymmetric information our main result is that a contract loses all strategic value if renegotiation is allowed during the production stage rather than only before production begins this result casts serious doubt on the relevance of previous findings which emphasize how contracts can have commitment value even in the presence of renegotiation our analysis can also be used to understand the differences between many of the results in the renegotiation literature

the strategic choice of managerial incentives do firms with separate owners and managers maximize profits we address this question for an oligopoly where managers compete in quantities or prices as in the cournot or bertrand models and owners choose their managers incentives we find that there is a strategic aspect in the problem of selecting incentives and that profit maximizing behavior does not result in particular in the oligopoly we study the behavior of firms competing in quantity price more closely resembles perfectly competitive collusive behavior than cournot bertrand behavior

schools and housing values this study combines historical and quantitative methods to determine the market response to a major nineteenth century american urban architectural form the speculatively built row house the paper estimates a hedonic price index which decomposes the

the long run behavior of the relative price of primary commodities statistical evidence and policy implications abstract this paper is concerned with both the statistical and policy issues surrounding the long run behavior of the ratio of primary commodities prices to those of manufactured goods seen as a measure of the barter terms of trade between primary producers and the producers of manufacturers the statistical evidence reported is found to offer support for the secular deterioration hypothesis the policy implications of this finding for less developed countries are explored

the determinants of donative revenue flows from alumni of higher education an empirical inquiry institutions of higher education are increasingly relying upon alumni giving and endowment earnings as sources of funding this paper utilizes a new database on average alumni donations at the institutional level and institutional characteristics to explore the role that lagged institutional characteristics and policy have on subsequent donations to the institution our results confirm the noncontemporaneous effects of variations in the average scholastic achievement of matriculated students a proxy for both student quality and student socioeconomic status on subsequent donative revenue flows and indirectly address some of the open questions left by previous theoretical inquiries

on the contract curve a test of alternative models of collective bargaining the traditional model of collective bargaining confines unions to settlements constrained by the employer s labor demand curve but an alternative model places wage employment outcomes on a contract curve that extends beyond the labor demand curve this paper derives a multidimensional hedonic contract curve model in which employment security provisions are used to maintain efficient bargains outside the employer s demand curve and distinguishes empirically between the contract curve and demand constraint models using data for public school teachers in new york state estimates clearly support the contract curve model over the demand constraint model by linking the gap between compensation and the value of the marginal product to the strength of employment security provisions

the statistical debate on the net barter terms of trade between primary commodities and manufactures a comment and some additional evidence i950 p s hypothesis according to this hypothesis the net barter terms of trade nbtt between primary products and manufactures have over the longrun exhibited a downward trend spraos presented a detailed and thorough analysis of both the adequacy of the various statistical series available to proxy the nbtt s behaviour over the long run and the wide range of conceptual including quality problems involved in such an exercise on the basis of his analysis spraos concluded that the balance of the evidence for the seventy year period ending with the outbreak of world war ii supported the p s hypothesis of a secular deterioration in the nbtt it should however be noted that the evidence also suggested that the particular series cho sen for analysis by prebisch i950 himself did appear to exaggerate possibly to a large extent the rate of deterioration however when the analysis was extended to include the post world war ii period spraos found that while the deteriorating tendency cannot be decisively refuted it is open to doubt when the record up to the i970s is taken into account i980 p i26 as we shall see in this paper closer scrutiny reveals a statistical problem with spraos s analysis and the purpose of this paper is to show that once appropriate action is taken to overcome this problem some quite strong evidence in support of the p s hypothesis emerges the paper is organised as follows section i briefly discusses spraos s methodology and section ii discusses an econometric issue arising from this analysis section iii presents our empirical evidence while section iv summarises the main findings of the paper

the quality of schooling quantity alone is misleading although much research discusses the quantity of schooling as an effective impact on productivity and earnings most such research leaves out the idea of the quality of schooling which may cause biases in the estimated returns to schooling this paper consequently attempts to extend the standard mincerian approach to incorporate school quality as well as quantity it demonstrates how exclusion of quality in the standard procedure may cause biases in the estimated returns to years of schooling probably in the upward direction the paper explores the implications of this extension of the standard model for the case of young brazilian males it shows that the estimate of the private return to years of schooling using the preferred quality inclusive specification is only one half the estimate using the standard procedure indicating substantial upward bias in the standard estimates it further outlines a method for estimating a social return to quality and finds that it exceeds substantially the social return to quantity the paper then shows why this in turn suggests there may be an equity productivity trade off in schooling investments