consumption effects of genetic modification what if consumers are right this paper develops a model of differentiated consumers to examine the consumption effects of genetic modification gm under alternative labelling regimes and segregation enforcement scenarios analytical results show that if consumers perceive gm products as being different than their traditional counterparts gm affects consumer welfare and thus consumption decisions when the existence of market imperfections in one or more stages of the supply chain prevents the transmission of cost savings associated with the new technology to consumers gm results in welfare losses for consumers the analysis shows that the relative welfare ranking of the no labelling and mandatory labelling regimes depends on i the level of consumer aversion to gm products ii the size of marketing and segregation costs under mandatory labelling iii the share of the gm product in total production and iv the extent to which gm products are incorrectly labelled as non gm products

grading minimum quality standards and the labeling of genetically modified products we relate the labeling of genetically modified gm products to the theory of grading and minimum quality standards the model represents three stages in the supply chain assumes a vertical product differentiation framework allows for the accidental commingling of non gm products and treats regulation as a purity threshold for non gm products we find that a non gm purity level that is too strict leads to the disappearance of the non gm product and that some quality standard benefits farmers indeed the standard that is optimal from the perspective of producers is stricter than what is optimal for consumers and for societal welfare

inserting gm products into the food chain the market and welfare effects of different labeling and regulatory regimes the purpose of this article is to examine the system wide effects of the introduction of genetically modified gm products with and without labeling and to compare these two regimes to a third regime where gm products are not present either because they have not yet been developed or because they have been banned for each regime the decisions and welfare of consumers producers and life science companies are examined the article explicitly incorporates the consumer response to the introduction of gm technology and considers different market structures of the life science sector

minimum quality standards with more than two firms abstract this paper studies the effects of introducing a minimum quality standard mqs in a vertically differentiated market it is shown that previous results indicating beneficial effects of a mqs heavily depend on the duopolistic set up they had been developed in an example with three firms is then provided showing that not all reaction functions in quality levels are increasing we also show that the introduction of the standard decreases the profit levels of all firms the maximum quality level and the average quality consumed as a consequence despite the increase in consumer surplus any effective mqs would reduce welfare

innovation and trade with endogenous market failure the case of genetically modified products a partial equilibrium two country model is developed to analyze implications from the introduction of genetically modified gm products in the model innovators hold proprietary rights farmers are competitive adopters some consumers deem gm food to be inferior in quality to traditional food and the mere introduction of gm crops affects the costs of non gm food because of costly identity preservation among the results derived it is shown that although gm innovations have the potential to improve efficiency some groups can be made worse off indeed it is even possible that the costs induced by gm innovations outweigh the efficiency gains

price quantity strategic market games this paper is yet another in a rapidly growing series e g 2 11 on strategic approaches to economic equilibrium our aim here is to make precise the remark implicitly due to bertrand 1 or 10 ch 4 5 that if the agents in an economy use price setting strategies then the strategic nash equilibria will in fact be walrasian and this without any assumption of a large number of small agents however in our models not only prices but also quantities are set by the agents thus it might actually be more appropriate to call them bertrand cournot types of models we begin with a standard walras exchange economy with a finite number of traders and commodities this is recast as a game in strategic form in essentially two different ways there is a trading post for each commodity to which traders send contingent statements about how much they wish to buy and sell and at what prices in model 1 the trading point is determined by the intersection of the aggregate supply and demand curves in model 2 trade takes place so as to meet as many contingent statements as possible each buyer whose orders are filled pays the price he quoted using a fiat money which can be borrowed costlessly and limitlessly but after trade is over there is a settlement of accounts and a penalty is levied on those who are bankrupt no attempt is made to model the penalty in any detail it is simply described in the form of a disutility but this in turn may be imagined to stem from confiscation of assets see remark 5 or the necessity of procuring highly priced loans etc call a noncooperative equilibrium active if it turns out that no trader is isolated i e trapped as the sole buyer or seller at some trading post then our results may be described as follows in model 1 the active2 n e of the game coincide with the c e of the market furthermore there is a subset of tight active n e which also coincide with the c e and each n e in this subset is strong

the rate of convergence to efficiency in the buyer s bid double auction as the market becomes large a trader who privately knows his preferences may misrepresent them in order to influence the market price this strategic behaviour may prevent realization of all gains from trade in this paper trade in a simple market with an explicit rule for price formation is modelled as a bayesian game we show that the difference between a trader s bid and his reservation value is maximally 0 1 m where m is the number of traders on each side of the market competitive pressure as m increases thus quickly overcomes the inefficiency private information causes and f ces the market towards an efficient allocation

surplus distribution from the introduction of a biotechnology innovation we examine the distribution of welfare from the introduction of bt cotton in the united states in 1996 the welfare framework explicitly recognizes that research protected by intellectual property rights generates monopoly profits and makes it possible to partition these rents among consumers farmers and the innovating input firms we calculate a total increase in world surplus of 240 3 million for 1996 of this total the largest share 59 went to u s farmers the gene developer monsanto received the next largest share 21 followed by u s consumers 9 the rest of the world 6 and the germplasm supplier delta and pine land company 5

downstream labeling and upstream price competition this paper analyses the economic consequences of labeling in a setting with two vertically related markets labeling on the downstream market affects upstream price competition through two effects a differentiation effect and a ranking effect the magnitude of these two effects determines who in the supply chain will receive the benefits and who will bear the burden of labeling for instance whenever the ranking effect dominates the differentiation effect the low quality upstream firm loses from labeling while all downstream actors are individually better off by decreasing the low quality input price the label acts as a subsidy and leads to an increase of the downstream market welfare this analysis furthers our understanding of the economic consequences of labeling in cases like those of gmos or restaurants

taming systemically important financial institutions we model a systemically important financial institution sifi that is too big or too interconnected to fail without credible regulation and strong supervision the shareholders of this institution might deliberately let its managers take excessive risk we propose a solution to this problem showing how insurance against systemic shocks can be provided without generating moral hazard the solution involves levying a systemic tax needed to cover the costs of future crises and more importantly establishing a systemic risk authority endowed with special resolution powers including the control of bankers compensation packages during crisis periods

seller incentive properties of epa s emission trading auction abstract the new clean air act amendments instruct the environmental protection agency epa to conduct annual sealed bid offer auctions of emission allowances the auction pricing rules are discriminative and sellers with the lowest asking prices receive the highest bids this paper assesses the seller incentives of this auction and demonstrates that the auction rules cause sellers to choose asking prices that under reveal their cost of emission control furthermore increasing the number of sellers intensifies this misrepresentation if the number of buyers remains fixed the epa s rules can therefore generate significantly biased price signals and reduce the efficiency of the allowance trading market

minimum quality standards as a barrier to innovation abstract most models of minimum quality standards do not deal with the dynamic nature of regulation this note shows that presence of minimum quality standards may reduce firm incentives to innovate leading to a lower level of social welfare under regulation

designing organizations for trading pollution rights regulators and academicians have recently become interested in using a marketable permits program as a new way to control aggregate pollution emissions our research focuses on choosing a permit trading mechanism that is both economically efficient and politically viable we consider an organized trading process and a revenue neutral auction both of which involve an initial allocation of permits based on past history each is tested in a competitive and in a non competitive environment to determine which mechanism performs best the results of our research suggest that overall the organized trading process outperforms the revenue neutral auction

too connected to fail inferring network ties from price co movements we use extreme value theory methods to infer conventionally unobservable connections between financial institutions from joint extreme movements in credit default swap spreads and equity returns estimated pairwise co crash probabilities identify significant connections among up to 186 financial institutions prior to the crisis of 2007 2008 financial institutions that were very central prior to the crisis were more likely to be bailed out during the crisis or receive the status of systemically important institutions this result remains intact also after controlling for indicators of too big to fail concerns systemic systematic and idiosyncratic risks both credit default swap cds based and equity based connections are significant predictors of bailouts supplementary materials for this article are available online

extreme us stock market fluctuations in the wake of 9 11 we apply extreme value analysis to us sectoral stock indices in order to assess whether tail risk measures like value at risk and extremal linkages were significantly altered by 9 11 we test whether semi parametric quantile estimates of downside risk and upward potential have increased after 9 11 the same methodology allows one to estimate probabilities of joint booms and busts for pairs of sectoral indices or for a sectoral index and a market portfolio the latter probabilities measure the sectoral response to macro shocks during periods of financial stress so called tail s taking 9 11 as the sample midpoint we find that tail s often increase in a statistically and economically significant way this might be due to perceived risk of new terrorist attacks copyright 2008 john wiley sons ltd

strength of protection for geographical indications promotion incentives and welfare effects we address the question of how the strength of protection for geographical indications gis affects the gi industry s promotion incentives equilibrium market outcomes and the distribution of welfare geographical indication producers engage in informative advertising by associating their true quality premium relative to a substitute product with a specific label emphasizing the gi s geographic origin the extent to which the names words of the gi label can be used and or imitated by competing products which depends on the strength of gi protection determines how informative the gi promotion messages can be consumers heterogeneous preferences vis a vis the gi quality premium are modeled in a vertically differentiated framework both the gi industry and the substitute product industry are assumed to be competitive with free entry the model is calibrated and solved for alternative parameter values results show that producers of the gi and of the lower quality substitute good have divergent interests gi producers are better off with full protection whereas the substitute good s producers prefer intermediate levels of protection but they never prefer zero protection because they benefit indirectly if the gi producers incentives to promote are preserved for consumers and aggregate welfare the preferred level of protection depends on the model s parameters with an intermediate level of protection being optimal in many circumstances

credit contagion from counterparty risk standard credit risk models cannot explain the observed clustering of default some times described as credit contagion this paper provides the first empirical analysis of credit contagion via direct counterparty effects we find that bankruptcy announce ments cause negative abnormal equity returns and increases in cds spreads for credi tors in addition creditors with large exposures are more likely to suffer from financial distress later this suggests that counterparty risk is a potential additional channel of credit contagion indeed the fear of counterparty defaults among financial institu tions explains the sudden worsening of the credit crisis after the lehman bankruptcy in september 2008

a simple analysis of the us emission permits auctions we examine a stylized version of epa auctions when agents know the list of values of sellers and buyers there are inefficient equilibria where no goods are traded and efficient equilibria where all exchange occurs at a uniform price we also provide examples under incomplete information when the uniform price equilibrium holds and when it does not hold c 1999 elsevier science s a all rights reserved jel classification d44 q29

on the economics of labels how their introduction affects the functioning of markets and the welfare of all participants are labels good or bad for consumers and firms the answer may seem straightforward since labels improve information yet economic theory reveals situations where their introduction reduces the welfare of at least some market participants this essay reviews the theoretical literature on labels in order to identify and explain the main reasons that may cause labeling to produce undesirable side effects in contrast to earlier reviews that either concentrate on narrow topics or treat the subject in a more or less informal way we bring together the main results from all the relevant topics by presenting and discussing the assumptions and model building techniques that underpin them the advantage of this approach is that it identifies the origin of the differences between results thus allowing the synthesis of results that sometimes appear even to be contradictory we focus on quality labels and examine the impact of labeling on market structure the side effects of costly certification issues related to the label s trustworthiness the rationale for mandatory vs voluntary labeling the level at which the label s standard is set according to the agency that selects it the political economy of labels that is pro or anti label lobbying lobbying to affect the label s standard and lobbying in favor or against the label s mandatory imposition these topics cover a wide range of applications including genetically modified organism gmos organic produce geographic indicators controlled origin eco labels etc we conclude by identifying topics that require further research

pollution permits and compliance strategies abstract this paper analyzes the impact of spot and futures markets for tradeable pollution permits on the potential polluters compliance decisions polluters can buy permits invest in pollution abatement or else stop production or source out we show that stand alone spot markets induce excessive investment the introduction of a futures market reduces this incentive to invest but is not the optimal way to control pollution a menu of options on pollution rights possibly coupled with intertemporally bundled sales yields higher welfare because of its focus on long run demand elasticities and rent extraction this paper can be applied to a variety of situations such as demand side management public transportation bypass in telecommunications or forward sales by a private monopolist

an experimental investigation of the seller incentives in the epas emission trading auction the clean air act requires the epa to conduct annual auctions of emission allowances under the discriminative auction rules sellers with the lowest asking prices receive the highest bids this paper studies an inverted version of this auction in which buyers face the same incentives as sellers in the epa auction consistent with theoretical predictions buyers bid above their valuation auction outcomes are inefficient and increasing the number of buyers increases bids buyers facing human opponents compete more aggressively than the risk neutral prediction but bids do not differ systematically from this prediction when buyers face computerized nash robots copyright 1995 by american economic association

systemic risk in financial systems we consider default by firms that are part of a single clearing mechanism the obligations of all firms within the system are determined simultaneously in a fashion consistent with the priority of debt claims and the limited liability of equity we first show via a fixed point argument that there always exists a clearing payment vector that clears the obligations of the members of the clearing system under mild regularity conditions this clearing vector is unique next we develop an algorithm that both clears the financial system in a computationally efficient fashion and provides information on the systemic risk faced by the individual system firms finally we produce qualitative comparative statics for financial systems these comparative statics imply that in contrast to single firm results even unsystematic nondissipative shocks to the system will lower the total value of the system and may lower the value of the equity of some of the individual system firms

geographical indications and the competitive provision of quality in agricultural markets the economics of geographical indications gis is assessed within a vertical product differentiation framework that is consistent with the competitive structure of agriculture it is assumed that certification costs are needed for gis to serve as collective credible quality certification devices and production of high quality product is endogenously determined we find that gis can support a competitive provision of quality and lead to clear welfare gains although they fall short of delivering the constrained first best the main beneficiaries are consumers producers may also accrue some benefit if production of the high quality products draws on scarce factors that they own copyright 2008 oxford university press

the welfare implications of minimum quality standards previous analysis of the social welfare implications of minimum quality standards has yielded no decisive results in this paper the specific nature of consumer and producer responses to quality standards is incorporated into the analysis both consumer and producer gains are shown to be impossible when consumers can perceive quality before purchase even if low quality produce is diverted to secondary markets standards unambiguously reduce net social benefits the paper explores the possibility that minimum quality standards are a form of rent seeking behavior