longevity risk subjective survival expectations and individual saving behavior abstract we provide evidence of individuals awareness of longevity risk the uncertainty about future survival probabilities based on subjective survival expectations elicited in the survey of health ageing and retirement in europe share and matching data on longevity risk from the human mortality database we find a positive relationship between the forecast dispersion in subjective survival estimates and longevity risk which indicates that individuals are to some extent aware of longevity risk our analysis of savings behavior shows that the dispersion in survival estimates is primarily explained by individuals disagreeing on the survival probability and not by their true awareness of the underlying uncertainty individuals do not save more on average when faced with longevity risk although theory suggests they should

the cost of pollution on longevity welfare and economic stability this paper presents an overlapping generations model where pollution private and public health expenditures are all determinants of longevity public expenditures financed through labour taxation provide both public health and abatement we study the role of these three components of longevity on welfare and economic stability at the steady state we show that an appropriate fiscal policy may enhance welfare however when pollution is heavily harmful for longevity the economy might experience aggregate instability or endogenous cycles nonetheless a fiscal policy which raises the share of public spending devoted to health may display stabilizing virtues and rule out cycles this allows us to recommend the design of the public policy that may comply with the dynamic and welfare objectives

wealth effects distribution and the theory of organization abstract we construct a general equilibrium model of firm formation in which organization is endogenous firms are coalitions of agents providing effort and investment capital effort is unobservable unless a fixed monitoring cost is paid and borrowing is subject to a costly state verification problem because incentives vary with an agent s wealth different types of agents become attractive firm members under different circumstances when borrowing is not costly firms essentially consist of one type of agent and are organized efficiently but when the costly state verification problem is sufficiently severe firm organization will depend on the distribution of wealth with enough inequality it will tend to be dictated by incentives of rich agents to earn high returns to wealth even if the chosen organizational form is not a technically efficient way to provide incentives journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d2 d31 j41 l2

on the distribution and dynamics of health care costs using data from the health and retirement survey and the assets and health dynamics of the oldest old survey we estimate the stochastic process that determines both the distribution and dynamics of health care costs we find that the data generating process for log health costs is well represented as the sum of a white noise process and a highly persistent ar 1 process we also find that the innovations to this process can be modelled with a normal distribution that has been adjusted to capture the risk of catastrophic health care costs simulating this model we find that in any given year 0 1 of households receive a health cost shock with a present value of at least 125 000 copyright 2004 john wiley sons ltd

health related life cycle risks and public insurance abstract based on a dynamic life cycle model this study analyzes health related risks of consumption and old age poverty the model allows for health effects on employment risks on productivity on longevity the correlation between health risks productivity and preferences and the financial incentives of the german public insurance schemes the estimation uses data on male employees and an extended expectation maximization algorithm simulations suggest that health shocks induce average losses in annual consumption of about 10 and account for more than two thirds of the cases of old age poverty annuity markets that account for differences in the longevity risk by health status can effectively reduce the consumption risks but only slightly decrease old age poverty a policy analysis of minimum pension benefits indicates that a means test mitigates the associated moral hazard problem substantially

theories of share tenancy a critical survey for the past 2 decades the problems of agricultural tenancy have attracted a great deal of attention not only from agricultural economists but also from economists in general as a typical example of agencyprincipal contract relations despite the prolific growth of literature both theoretical and empirical there has been little convergence in opinions on tenancy contracts the divergence has been especially great on the understanding of the causes and the effects of sharecropping tenancy much confusion underlying the widely divergent perspectives has stemmed from partial treatments of contractual choice which unduly limit the optimizing behavior of contracting parties and the options of contract forms this essay aims at clarifying the sources of the confusion by reviewing the past literature in light of the more general theory of agency principal relations the agency theory in order to examine the problems of various theoretical models in a unified framework in section ii we first develop the basic framework of a general model of tenancy contract in section iii we clarify in terms of the general model contradictions latent in the traditional marshallian theory which asserts that share tenancy is inefficient because of the disincentive effect of cropsharing on the tenant s work effort in section iv we attempt to show that recent efforts to reconstruct the theory based on the traditional assumption have not yet been quite successful section v draws implications and testable hypotheses from more general theories incorporating the aspects of risk and uncertainty section vi tests allocational and distributional implications of those alternative hypotheses based on the summary of evidence col

what does she see in him the effect of sharing on the choice of spouse all husbands and wives share in the spoils of marriage sharing makes each partner a residual claimant and encourages spouses to provide marital inputs however because each spouse is only a partial residual claimant each may be inclined to provide a suboptimal level of marital inputs the choice of spouse influences the level of distortion and under some circumstances the eficient mating is between individuals of equal value people tend to end up choosing partners of approximately their own social worth romantic choices appear to be a delicate compromise between one s desire to capture an ideal partner and one s realization that he must eventually settle for what he deserves

matching to share risk without commitment this paper studies the effect of limited commitment on sorting when two sides of a frictionless market form pairs to share risk on each side agents are identical except for their risk preferences first we provide analytical results when transfers do not condition on the history of shocks more risk averse agents can commit to larger transfers as long as their consumption is less risky than their endowment with sufficiently large idiosyncratic risk and sufficient discounting of the future matching is positive assortative unlike under full commitment second we find positive assortative stable matchings when transfers are history dependent using a numerical algorithm

land reforms poverty reduction and economic growth evidence from india recognition of the importance of institutions that provide security of property rights and relatively equal access to economic resources to a broad cross section of society has renewed interest in the potential of asset redistribution including land reforms empirical analysis of the impact of such policies is however scant and often contradictory this paper uses panel household data from india together with state level variation in the implementation of land reform to address some of the deficiencies of earlier studies the results suggest that land reform had a significant and positive impact on income growth and accumulation of human and physical capital the paper draws policy implications especially from the fact that the observed impact of land reform seems to have declined over time

life cycle responses to health insurance status this paper studies the lifetime effects of exogenous changes in health insurance coverage e g medicare ppaca termination of employer provided plans on the dynamic optimal allocation consumption leisure health expenditures status health and wealth and welfare we solve simulate and structurally estimate a parsimonious life cycle model with endogenous exposure to morbidity and mortality risks and exogenous health insurance by varying coverage we identify the marginal effects of insurance when young and or when old on allocations statuses and welfare our results highlight positive effects of insurance on health wealth and welfare as well as mid life substitution away from healthy leisure in favor of more health expenses caused by peaking wages and accelerating health issues

contractual structure in agriculture with endogenous matching we analyze optimal contractual forms and equilibrium matching in a double sided moral hazard model of sharecropping similar to eswaran and kotwal 1985 we show that with endogenous matching the presence of moral hazard can reverse the matching pattern relative to the first best and that even if sharecropping is optimal for an exogenously given pair of agent types it may not be observed in equilibrium with endogenous matching the economy with endogenous matching features less sharecropping compared to an economy with agent types drawn at random from the same distribution this suggests that studies of agency costs in sharecropping may underestimate their extent if focusing only on the intensive margin and ignoring the extensive margin

on the existence of share contracts under limited liability abstract in a principal agent relationship under limited liability the agent in general receives the full share of revenue we show that when the agent exerts effort in multiple tasks the effort substitution effect helps explain the existence of share contracts even under limited liability

do international rulings have spillover effects the view from financial markets how influential are international courts can their rulings reach beyond a given case and affect the behavior of countries not party to the dispute international law is clear on the matter rulings have no formal authority beyond the case at hand this tenet is consistent with the incentives of sovereign states wary of delegating too much authority to courts by contrast the authors claim that even in the absence of formal authority the rulings of international courts can affect behavior by mobilizing pro compliance groups in countries not party to a dispute they test these beliefs in the context of the world trade organization wto through a novel approach because wto rulings have implications for the fortunes of publicly traded firms they examine whether financial markets bet on there being spillover effects beyond the case at hand they rely on two quantitative case studies to test for a cross border and a cross industry spillover effect can rulings have effects in countries and on industries other than those at issue in the initial dispute the results suggest that the answer is a tentative yes the spillover effects of international rulings may be a matter of scholarly contention but their existence is something that financial markets appear willing to bet on

endogenous matching and the empirical determinants of contract form empirical work on contracts typically regresses contract choice on observed principal and agent characteristics if i some of these characteristics are unobserved or partially observed and ii there are incentives whereby particular types of agents end up contracting with particular types of principals estimated coefficients on the observed characteristics may be misleading we address this endogenous matching problem using a data set on agricultural contracts between landlords and tenants in early renaissance tuscany controlling for endogenous matching has an impact on parameters of interest and tenants risk aversion appears to have influenced contract choice

saving and liquidity constraints this paper is concerned with the theory of saving when consumers are not permitted to borrow and with the ability of such a theory to account for some of the stylized facts of saving behavior the models presented in the paper seem to account for important aspects of reality that are not explained by traditional life cycle models copyright 1991 by the econometric society

contingent credibility the impact of investment treaty violations on foreign direct investment during the past few decades governments have signed nearly 2 700 bilateral investment treaties bits with one another in an attempt to attract greater levels of foreign direct investment fdi by signing bits which contain strong enforcement provisions investment seeking governments are thought to more credibly commit to protecting whatever fdi they receive which in turn should lead to increased confidence among investors and ultimately greater fdi inflows our unique argument is that the ability of bits to increase fdi is contingent on the subsequent good behavior of the governments who sign them bits should increase fdi only if governments actually follow through on their bit commitments that is if they comply with the treaties bits allow investors to pursue alleged treaty violations through arbitration venues like the international centre for the settlement of investment disputes icsid a heavily utilized and widely observed arbitral institution that is part of the world bank being taken before icsid then conveys negative information about a host country s behavior to the broader investment community which could result in a sizeable loss of future fdi into that country we test these contingent effects of bits using cross sectional time series analyses on all non oecd countries during a period spanning 1984 2007 we find that bits do increase fdi into countries that sign them but only if those countries are not subsequently challenged before icsid on the other hand governments suffer notable losses of fdi when they are taken before icsid and suffer even greater losses when they lose an icsid dispute

risk sharing vs incentives contract design under two sided heterogeneity we study the matching patterns between heterogeneous principals and agents in a principal agent model the resulting equilibrium relationship between risk and incentives could be negative positive or u shaped these results may provide an explanation for the absence of systematic empirical support for the standard risk model d 2005 elsevier b v all rights reserved

land acquisition for industrialization and compensation of displaced farmers this paper addresses the question of how farmers displaced by acquisition of agricultural land for the purpose of industrialization ought to be compensated prior to acquisition the farmers are leasing in land from a private owner or local government with a legally mandated sharecropping contract compensation rules affect the decision of the landlord to sell the land ex post to an industrial developer and ex ante incentives of tenants and landlord to make specific investments in agricultural productivity efficiency considerations are shown to require farmers be over compensated in the event of conversion

mortality health status and wealth in this paper we use the two waves of the british retirement survey 1988 1989 and 1994 to quantify the relationship between socioeconomic status and health outcomes we find that even after conditioning on the initial health status wealth rankings are important determinants of mortality and the evolution of the health indicator in the survey for men aged 65 moving from the 40th percentile to the 60th percentile in the wealth distribution increases the probability of survival by between 1 0 and 1 9 percentage points depending on the measure of wealth used a similar effect is found for women of between 1 1 and 1 3 percentage points in the process of estimating these effects we control for nonrandom attrition from our sample

the risk and duration of catastrophic health care expenditures the authors measure the time series property of catastrophic medical costs facing the elderly using information on medical deductions from a panel of tax returns during the period of analysis 1968 73 taxpayers could deduct medical expenses above 3 percent of income they correct for the resulting censoring bias using multivariate tobit estimated with a variant of the smoothed simulated maximum likelihood method the estimated coefficients imply a 1 00 increase in out of pocket medical spending is associated with 2 65 in future out of pocket spending copyright 1994 by mit press

population age structure saving capital flows and the real exchange rate a survey of the literature this paper surveys the existing literature on the effects of population age structure on saving capital flows and the real exchange rate we build on previous surveys of age structure and saving behaviour by including extensive discussion of international linkages specifically the impact on capital flows and real exchange rates we also point to unresolved issues that need to be addressed given that population aging has serious policy implications in the developed economies these days

introduction the global economy fdi and the regime for investment the world economy has maintained or enhanced its integration in the past decade even in the face of the global financial crisis a large part of this globalization has been driven by capital flows this symposium focuses on one element of these capital flows foreign direct investment fdi and on the regime in place to safeguard and promote such investments around the globe the articles by allee and peinhardt and simmons focus on the nature and evolution of the bilateral investment treaties bits that have been developed to protect such investments and that have proliferated since the 1990s the final article by buthe and milner turns its attention to the ways in which international trade agreements affect fdi the comparison between the investment and trade agreements is instructive since they seem to have different effects fdi has become one of the most important economic flows in the global economy it is a critical source of capital for developing countries and remains a significant source of investment in the developed world fdi has grown in part because countries changed their policies toward it dramatically after the 1980s governments in developing countries made unilateral policy changes that opened up markets across the globe and increased competition among countries for fdi

does the quality of investment protection affect fdi flows to developing countries evidence from latin america studies on the impact of international investment agreements iias including bilateral investment treaties bits on foreign direct investment fdi inflows have been inconclusive this paper contributes to the debate about the effectiveness of iias using an original database that differentiates between investment agreements according to the quality of investor protection and which covers a wide variety of trade and investment agreements signed and ratified in the americas we find evidence that in the least likely case of south south fdi flows high quality international investment treaties have a demonstrable effect on foreign direct investment inflows moreover international investment agreements appear to be most effective in a context of deeper economic integration that is they work better when they provide higher quality protection to investors and when they are combined with other preferential economic integration agreements such as trade agreements

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

contractual structure in agriculture abstract this paper develops a generalized double sided moral hazard model of contract choice in agricultural production with mutual monitoring of each other by the landlord and the tiller who generally have different levels of farming efficiency and are risk averse using this model we formally prove that the optimal contract maximizes the output net of the risk bearing and agency costs of both the parties and carry out a simulation exercise which helps explain many of the tenancy related issues the difference in the farming efficiency of the two sides often ignored in previous analysis turns out to be the principal determinant of the contract offered to a tiller

is informal risk sharing less effective for the poor risk externalities and moral hazard in mutual insurance abstract poor farm households are less keen to adopt high risk high return technologies than rich households yet the poor are more vulnerable to income shocks we develop a model of endogenous risk taking to explain these facts in autarky poor households adopt less risky production plans and obtain lower expected returns but face higher relative risk than the rich the introduction of risk sharing generates negative risk externalities between agents at the first best the social planner imposes a homogeneous level of risk taking in the group at the second best risk taking is not enforceable and increases with insurance generating moral hazard interestingly the poor s risk taking behavior is more sensitive to insurance the social planner thus mitigates risk taking by applying a lower insurance coverage in poor groups the introduction of risk sharing therefore reinforces the gap between rich and poor in terms of expected income and absolute risk while the effect on relative risk is ambiguous

when the claim hits bilateral investment treaties and bounded rational learning using the international investment regime as its point of departure the article applies notions of bounded rationality to the study of economic diplomacy through a multimethod approach it shows that developing countries often ignored the risks of bilateral investment treaties bit s until they themselves became subject to an investment treaty claim thus the behavior of developing country governments with regard to the international investment regime is consistent with that routinely observed for individuals in experiments and field studies they tend to ignore high impact low probability risks if they cannot bring specific vivid instances to mind

reversal of fortunes democratic institutions and foreign direct investment inflows to developing countries does increased democracy promote or jeopardize foreign direct investment fdi inflows to less developed countries we argue that democratic institutions have conflicting effects on fdi inflows on the one hand democratic institutions hinder fdi inflows by limiting the oligopolistic or monopolistic behaviors of multinational enterprises facilitating indigenous businesses pursuit of protection from foreign capital and constraining host governments ability to offer generous financial and fiscal incentives to foreign investors on the other hand democratic institutions promote fdi inflows because they tend to ensure more credible property rights protection reducing risks and transaction costs for foreign investors hence the net effect of democracy on fdi inflows is contingent on the relative strength of these two competing forces our argument reconciles conflicting theoretical expectations in the existing literature empirical analyses of fifty three developing countries from 1982 to 1995 substantiate our claims we find that both property rights protection and democracy related property rights protection encourage fdi inflows after controlling for their positive effect through property rights protection democratic institutions reduce fdi inflows these results are robust against alternative model specifications statistical estimators and variable measurements

tenancy and family resources a model and some empirical analysis abstract in this paper we discuss with the help of a simple model the role of family resource endowments in determining the extent of land leased in or leased out by a household this becomes important when the market for some of these resources is either not functioning at all or is functioning imperfectly we focus on three such resources which have some relevance in indian agriculture these are 1 the family s managerial skill 2 its endowment of human labour and 3 its endowment of draft animal labour household level data from six villages of maharashtra and andhra pradesh are also utilized to test some of the hypotheses

double sided moral hazard and the nature of share contracts contractual arrangements involving revenue profit sharing are often based on fairly simple often linear rules in addition in many contexts these contracts are not finely adjusted to the particular circumstances of individual agents or markets nor do they vary over time to the extent current theories based on optimal contracting suggest they should we develop a simple model of such revenue or profit sharing arrangements based on double sided moral hazard and show that this model can account for many of these stylized facts more specifically the model shows that linear contracts can be optimal and that benefits from customizing terms can in some cases be quite limited if not zero

tenure systems in traditional china i a general equilibrium model of tenure preference classical marginalists at least after john clark provide an unequivocal solution for the conventional factor market where people sell the productive services of their resources to producers the productexhaustion theorem says that if factors are priced according to their marginal products incomes of all resource owners will exactly exhaust the value of total products in the long run competitive equilibrium this holds true regardless of which factor is variable and which is fixed and regardless of which group of resource owners perform as producers who buy productive services of other resources in the market and claim residuals for themselves in an agrarian economy with land and labor as the inputs a land owner may cultivate his land and purchase the labor input from outside paying a wage rate in accordance with labor s marginal product the land owner is then the residual claimant alternatively he may lease out his land and receive a fixed rental rate per unit of area equal to the marginal product of land in this case the tenant is the producer and claims the residual income distribution between the two parties remains the same under each land arrangement wage and rent are therefore identical conceptually the classical marginal analysis has not presented a satisfactory theory of share tenancy which instead of being a seller buyer transaction in a conventional factor market is essentially a partnership arrangement between two persons who own complementary factors hence the term land renting will hereafter denote the fixed rent system exclusively in fact the direct application of marginal analysis to share tenancy has created considerable confusion in early economic literature only recently some general equilibrium models of land tenure systems have been developed for better understanding of the

contract choice in modern agriculture cash rent versus cropshare e conomists have expended enormous effort examining the rationale for various contractual arrangements in agriculture particularly sharecropping while economists have made considerable theoretical efforts to understand agricultural contracts few empirical studies have been undertaken the dearth of empirical analyses of agricultural contracts is particularly striking for modern western agriculture this is an important omission not only because the existing empirical work tends to focus on the question of efficiency but also because the theoretical models tend to examine contracts that bear little resemblance to those found in the united states today

credit layering in informal financial markets abstract informal lenders with access to markets or capital often find it attractive to delegate loan provision to downstream lenders who have an information or enforcement advantage in dealing with particular borrowers in this paper we examine the conditions under which such an arrangement is preferred by two informal lenders a landlord and a merchant who compete in loan provision to tenant farmers differentiated by wealth we show that credit layering is preferred only when tenants are sufficiently poor in this case the trader lends to tenant farmers via a contract with their landlord otherwise only the trader lends as a consequence a pattern of borrowing emerges in which relatively wealthy tenants borrow from merchants while poor tenants borrow mainly from their landlords interlinkage between land and credit thus arises only for a subset of tenants and purely as a consequence of credit layering this pattern is shown to be supported empirically

conceptual proposals for measuring the impact of international regimes on energy security abstract the paper proposes two concepts to assess the effect of international regimes on energy security existing indicators focus mainly on state level factors excluding international influences international relation scholars on the other hand see a clear connection between international regimes and stable energy relations international regimes stabilise energy relations by providing frameworks for negotiations defining controlling and sanctioning compliance and allowing the actors to engage in package deals the researcher needs to include these factors in a complete assessment of political energy security risks as first step the paper uses the effectiveness of control mechanisms as basis for such consideration it refers specifically to international arbitration as the most important control mechanism in international energy relations the simplest measurement option is the share of a county s energy imports covered by a certain regime the paper applies the oslo potsdam solution to account for outcome effectiveness it applies a variant of the international regimes data base protocol to account for effective regime structures in a last section the paper proposes some possible paths for future research

double moral hazard and resale price maintenance incentives for resale price maintenance rpm are studied in a wholesaler retailer relationship in which both firms make a nonprice choice subject to moral hazard the best attainable contract has vertical externalities in both nonprice choices and the choice of consumers price if delegated to the retailer rpm controls the latter externality but interacts with the other externalities as well as a consequence either minimum or maximum vertical price fixing can be optimal in spite of a successive monopoly specification similar incentives exist for writing other variables into contract such as the capital input of the retailer

medicaid insurance in old age the old age provisions of the medicaid program were designed to insure retirees against medical expenses we estimate a structural model of savings and medical spending and use it to compute the distribution of lifetime medicaid transfers and medicaid valuations across currently single retirees compensating variation calculations indicate that current retirees value medicaid insurance at more than its actuarial cost but that most would value an expansion of the current medicaid program at less than its cost these findings suggest that for current single retirees the medicaid program may be of the approximately right size

the long reach of cotton in the us south tenant farming mechanization and low skill manufacturing abstract this paper examines the long run impact of cotton agriculture on local development in the us south focusing on a novel aspect of structural change exploiting climate based variation in cotton production i show that cotton specialization in the late 19th century had a negative impact on local development that lasts through 2010 this negative relationship however only became evident in the second half of the 20th century i argue that the change was caused by the mechanization of cotton production which began in the 1950s after the mechanization local manufacturing absorbed displaced cotton tenants with low human capital in response to the inflow of cotton tenants labor productivity in manufacturing began to decline and the effects persisted in the long run the persistent decline in manufacturing productivity is explained by directed technical change that reduced demand for skills in manufacturing these results indicate that depending on the agricultural background structural change can negatively affect the evolution of technology and productivity in the industrial sector

health and other asset holdings despite clear evidence of correlations between financial and medical statuses and decisions most models treat financial and health related choices separately this article bridges this gap by proposing a tractable dynamic framework for the joint determination of optimal consumption portfolio holdings health investment and health insurance we solve for the optimal rules in closed form and capitalize on this tractability to gain a better understanding of the conditions under which separation between financial and health related decisions is sensible and of the pathways through which wealth and health determine allocations welfare and other variables of interest such as expected longevity or the value of health furthermore we show that the model is consistent with the observed patterns of individual allocations and provide realistic estimates of the parameters that confirm the relevance of all the main characteristics of the model

profit sharing and the role of professional partnerships when it is hard to assess service quality firms will suboptimally hire low ability workers we show that organizing as a profit sharing partnership can alleviate these problems our theory explains the relative scarcity of partnerships outside of professional service industries such as law accounting medicine investment banking architecture advertising and consulting it also sheds light on features of partnerships such as up or out promotion systems the use of noncompete clauses and recent trends in professional service industries

monotone matching in perfect and imperfect worlds we study frictionless matching in large economies with and without market imperfections providing sufficient conditions for monotone matching that are weaker than those previously known necessary conditions which depend on a key analytical object we call the surplus function are also offered changes in the surplus yield valuable information about the comparative statics of matching patterns across environments we apply our framework to some examples adapted from the literature accounting for and extending several comparative static and welfare results we also explore the dependence of the matching pattern on the type distribution

the effect of pension reform on pension benefit expectations and savings decisions in japan using the japanese study of aging and retirement jstar which is a new japanese panel survey of people aged 50 and over we find that more japanese in their early 50s expect their level of public pension benefits to decline compared with those in their late 50s and early 60s we also find that recent pension reforms that raised the pensionable age affected the japanese population by increasing the age at which they expect to claim their benefits by almost the exact same amount as the increase in the pensionable age the reforms have also decreased the population s expectations about receiving public pension benefits although this effect is not necessarily significant we also find evidence that anxiety about the public pension programme s future increases private savings

competition and incentives with motivated agents a unifying theme in the literature on organizations such as public bureaucracies and private nonprofits is the importance of mission as opposed to profit as an organizational goal such mission oriented organizations are frequently staffed by motivated agents who subscribe to the mission this paper studies incentives in such contexts and emphasizes the role of matching the mission preferences of principals and agents in increasing organizational efficiency matching economizes on the need for high powered incentives it can also however entrench bureaucratic conservatism and resistance to innovations the framework developed in this paper is applied to school competition incentives in the public sector and in private nonprofits and the interdependence of incentives and productivity between the private for profit sector and the mission oriented sector through occupational choice jel d23 d73 h41 l31 the late twentieth century witnessed a historic high in the march of market capitalism with unbridled optimism in the role of the profit motive in promoting welfare in the production of private goods moreover this generated a broad consensus on the optimal organization of private good production through privately owned competitive firms when it comes to the provision of collective goods no such consensus has emerged debates about the relative merits of public and private provision still dominate this paper suggests a contracting approach to the provision of collective goods it focuses on two key issues how to structure incentives and the role of competition between providers at its heart is the idea that organizations that provide collective goods cohere around a mission 2 thus production of collective goods can be viewed as mission oriented

estimating strategic models of international treaty formation this article develops an empirical framework for analysing the timing of international treaties a treaty is modelled as a dynamic game among governments that decide on participation in every period the net benefit of treaty membership increases over time spillovers among members and non members accelerate or delay treaty formation by transforming participation into a strategic complement or substitute respectively the predictions of the model inform the estimation of the structural parameters based on a cross section of treaty ratification dates with this approach i estimate the sign and magnitude of strategic interaction in the ratification of the montreal protocol in the formation of europe s preferential trade agreements and in the growth of germany s network of bilateral investment treaties through a series of counterfactual experiments i explore different mechanisms that give rise to strategic interaction in the formation of these treaties

revenue sharing in movie exhibition and the arrival of sound i introduction at least since adam smith economists have been intrigued by share contracts there has been a proliferation of models most of which tend to explain the share contract as resulting from some mix of optimal risk bearing and optimal effort motivation 1 a large number of researchers have attempted to test these models empirically sharecropping contracts not surprisingly are the most intensively examined the bibliography in knoeber 2000 but similar studies have been conducted in many other areas for example martin 1988 and lafontaine 1992 examine franchise arrangements hallagan 1978 investigates contracts used to lease gold claims leffler and rucker 1991 analyze a sample of private timber sale contracts goldberg and erickson 1987 study long term contracts for the sale of petroleum coke aggarwal and samwick 1999 investigate incentive contracts between firms and their executives and chisholm 1997 goldberg 1997 and weinstein 1998 all examine profit sharing contracts between fi lm companies and the talent this article differs in an important respect from most previous studies which analyze a cross section of contracts in an attempt to determine how or whether they vary according to the attributes of the contracting parties or the products being contracted for instead it investigates an area where a sudden technology shock led to the rapid and widespread replacement of one form of contracting by another the industry is the motion picture business and the shock was the arrival of sound during the silent film era the vast majority of first run feature films were rented to cinemas for flat daily or weekly payments within two years of the release of the first sound picture revenue sharing contracts were the norm and they remain the norm to this day 2 my goal is to investigate the degree to which the standard economic concerns moral hazard risk sharing and measurement problems can explain this change because the contracting parties remained the same the question becomes what was altered in the nature of the product or in its provision so as to have altered correspondingly the incentives faced i conclude the following first the advent of sound fundamentally changed the inputs live music and other acts supplied by the exhibitor and central to the show were replaced by a soundtrack and short sound films supplied by the film company the benefit of deterring exhibitor shirking through the use of flat rental fees which made the exhibitor full residual claimant declined accordingly the party whose effort makes the largest contribution to marginal product generally receives the largest proportion of the residual claims and in the decades following the arrival of sound the proportion of residual claims collected by film companies rose steadily in addition average revenue per film increased with sound whereas the cost of ensuring that exhibitors reported attendance revenue honestly done by locating a film company s representative in the theater remained the same the ex post division of revenue necessary for revenue sharing thus became cheaper on a per film basis finally uncertainty ab out the value in terms of expected attendance revenue of the early sound films appears to have raised the cost of negotiating lump sum rental fees and thus promoted experiments with revenue sharing however although this may have contributed initially it cannot explain the practice s persistence uncertainty about film values declined as talking films became better known ii the nature of the problem a film company contracts with an exhibitor so that they may jointly produce the final good a movie presentation 3 to that end each supplies essential inputs the film company provides the movie itself assembled from a variety of inputs and some sort of national advertising support the exhibitor provides the theater which consists of seating projection equipment a refreshment stand and other support activities and some form of local advertising

agricultural workers credit rationing and family networks in rural mexico abstractwe use mixed methods and first hand household data in mexico to investigate credit practices by households engaged in agricultural wage employment quantitative analysis shows evidence of rationing in the formal sector but also suggests the existence of mitigating mechanisms qualitative analysis provides additional insights first income patterns associated with agricultural wage generate income smoothing needs that are sometimes better met by the informal sector second family networks can perform key functions as gateways to the formal sector through specific informal arrangements that inject flexibility into formal rules and procedures

life expectancy and old age savings rich people women and healthy people live much longer than their poor male and sick counterparts two extremes taken from our analysis of single people in the assets and health dynamics of the oldest old ahead dataset illustrate this point an unhealthy 70 year old male at the twentieth percentile of the permanent income distribution expects to live only 6 more years that is to age 76 in contrast a healthy 70 year old woman at the eightieth percentile of the permanent income distribution expects to live 16 more years thus making it to age 86 such significant differences in life expectancy could all else equal lead to significant differ ences in saving behavior a related observation is that people with high permanent incomes keep large amounts of assets until very late in life table 1 also based on the

the retirement savings puzzle reviewed the role of housing and bequests the so called retirement savings puzzle is a phenomenon by which contrary to what the standard life cycle model predicts households do not run down their wealth significantly during retirement in this review paper we survey the literature on the retirement savings puzzle and we connect it with the literature on housing equity during retirement to establish a link between these two streams of literature we use as a framework the work of nakajima and telyukova 2013a home equity in retirement ucsd working paper and nakajima and telyukova 2017 reverse mortgage loans a quantitative analysis journal of finance 72 911 950 who find that home ownership interacts with factors that explain the retirement savings puzzle notably with the bequest motive we complement the results by nakajima and telyukova by relating them to the literature on altruistic bequests strategic bequests and housing as a commitment device all of which give further insights on the connection between home ownership and bequests we complement our review of the literature with descriptive evidence using the netherlands as a case study

the economics of polygyny in sub saharan africa female productivity and the demand for wives in cote d ivoire polygyny is still practiced throughout much of sub saharan africa with important social consequences this paper makes the first attempt to link african polygyny directly to the productivity of women in agriculture using micro data i develop a structural model of the demand for wives that disentangles wealth and substitution effects using a large household survey from cote d ivoire i find that marked geographic diversity in cropping patterns leads to regional variation in female labor productivity i also find that conditional on wealth men do have more wives when women are more productive that is cheaper this substitution effect may explain why polygyny declined in rural areas of cote d ivoire during agricultural development

empowerment and efficiency tenancy reform in west bengal the paper analyzes the effect of agricultural tenancy laws offering security of tenure to tenants and regulating the share of output that is paid as rent on farm productivity theoretically the net impact of tenancy reform is shown to be a combination of two effects a bargaining power effect and a security of tenure effect analysis of evidence on how contracts and productivity changed after a tenancy reform program was implemented in the indian state of west bengal in the late 1970s suggests that tenancy reform had a positive effect on agricultural productivity there

collective agricultural production a solution for transition economies abstract the paper examines theoretical reasons and provides examples for productivity differences between agricultural service cooperatives and collectives service cooperatives can utilize economies of scale enhance competitiveness and provide technical information advantages that often outweighed problems of free riding low investment and excessive political intervention agricultural collectives while not adding substantial advantages are in addition associated with problems of supervision and effort supply tendencies to substitute casual workers or mechanization for regular members and low investment incentives while collective forms of organization in transition economies respond to high risk and market imperfections they do so inefficiently policies that create conditions for service cooperatives to compete may lead to large productivity gains

off farm work technical efficiency and rice production risk in taiwan this article investigates the differences in yield production production efficiency and yield risk for farmers both with and without off farm work using a nationwide survey of rice farmers in taiwan we estimate two stochastic production frontier models that accommodate technical inefficiency and production risk simultaneously for farmers both with and without off farm work the stochastic dominance criterion is then applied to compare the differences in the distributions of the estimated technical efficiency and yield risk between groups the empirical results indicate that these two groups of farmers use resources in different ways and off farm work is not necessarily associated with lower technical efficiency for farmers in the lower percentiles of the efficiency distribution those with off farm work are more efficient than their counterparts without off farm work in addition farmers with off farm work face higher production risk and this result is robust for the entire distribution