political instability corruption and policy formation the case of environmental policy abstract this paper develops a theory of environmental policy formation taking into consideration the degree of corruptibility and political turbulence the predictions that emerge are that the interaction between the two variables is important political instability has a negative effect on the stringency of environmental regulations if the level of corruption is low but a positive effect when the degree of corruption is high corruption reduces the stringency of environmental regulations but the effect disappears as political instability increases the empirical findings are fully consistent with the predictions of the model

an institution based view of international business strategy a focus on emerging economies leveraging the recent research interest in emerging economies this perspective paper argues that an institution based view of international business ib strategy has emerged it is positioned as one leg that helps sustain the strategy tripod the other two legs consisting of the industry and resource based views we then review four diverse areas of substantive research 1 antidumping as entry barriers 2 competing in and out of india 3 growing the firm in china and 4 governing the corporation in emerging economies overall we argue that an institution based view of ib strategy in combination with industry and resource based views will not only help sustain a strategy tripod but also shed significant light on the most fundamental questions confronting ib such as what drives firm strategy and performance in ib

learning to carry the cat by the tail firm experience disasters and multinational subsidiary entry and expansion we investigate whether firm experience with discontinuous risks particularly high impact disasters that are episodic and difficult to anticipate moderates the relationship between disasters foreign entry and expansion decisions using a panel data set with 57 500 observations from 106 large european multinational corporations and their subsidiaries operating across 109 countries from 2001 to 2007 we find that although discontinuous risk was negatively related to firm entry and expansion firms that had experience with high impact disasters were more likely to expand in countries experiencing disasters

assessing the case for social experiments rs ecent academic debates pit two alternative approaches to policy evaluation against one another the first is the experimental approach based on the random assignment of accepted program applicants to a recipient or treatment group and a non recipient or control group the second is the nonexperimental or econometric approach that uses a variety of microdata sources statistical methods and behavioral models to compare the outcomes of participants in social programs with those of nonparticipants the central question addressed in this paper is whether or not randomized social experiments aid in securing answers to basic questions about the evaluation of social programs there are many distinct and complementary approaches to the study of the impact of public policy including full general equilibrium analysis of policy impacts tinbergen 1956 auerbach and kotlikoff 1987 shoven and whalley 1992 kydland and prescott 1991 and less ambitious partial equilibrium microeconomic structural research programs such as those designed to estimate the impact of taxes on labor supply both approaches offer answers to many interesting counterfactual policy questions but their credibility rests critically on the quality of the empirical input used to generate their answers

mne strategic intervention in violent conflict variations based on conflict characteristics since the end of the cold war there has been a substantial increase in the number of intrastate conflicts around the world during the last two decades there have been more than 125 violent conflicts resulting in 7 million deaths smith 2003 given the prevalence of these conflicts the inability of some governments to resolve them and the reluctance of multilateral institutions to intervene multinational enterprises mnes engaged in international ventures may find themselves in situations where they must respond to violent conflict to minimize investment risk and to promote stability in countries where they operate research on business response to violent conflict has tended to treat conflict as a homogeneous problem when in fact conflicts vary on several dimensions the purpose of this article is to extend the research with a focus on how the characteristics of the conflict affect mne intervention strategies drawing on insights from the research on conflict resolution and the risk that violent conflict poses to the firm we develop a framework and propositions that provide guidance to mnes confronting violent conflict with respect to existing projects or facilities

a framework for integrated risk management in international business treatments of risk in the international management literature largely focus on particular uncertainties to the exclusion of other interrelated uncertainties this paper develops a framework for categorizing the uncertainties faced by firms operating internationally and outlines both financial and strategic corporate risk management responses

place space and geographical exposure foreign subsidiary survival in conflict zones this study focuses on the role of geography in foreign subsidiary survival in host countries afflicted by political conflict we argue that survival is a function of exposure to conflicts and depends on the characteristics of place the conflict zone and space geographic concentration and dispersion of other home country firms the roles of place and space are explored using street level analysis of geographic information systems data for 670 japanese multinational enterprises mne subsidiaries in 25 conflict afflicted host countries over 1987 2006 through dynamic modeling of conflict zones as stretchable and shrinkable places relative to subsidiary locations we develop a means of characterizing a foreign subsidiary s exposure to multiple threats in its geographic domain our results show that greater exposure to geographically defined threats in both a static and a dynamic sense reduces the likelihood of mne survival the findings indicate moreover that both concentration and dispersion with other firms affect survival however the effects depend on where the firm is spatially located whether the firm is in a conflict zone and with whom home country peers or sister subsidiaries

high powered performance pay and crowding out of nonmonetary motives a previous literature cautions that paying workers for performance might crowd out nonmonetary motives to work hard empirical evidence from the field however has been based on between subjects designs that are best suited for detecting crowding out due to low powered incentives high powered incentives in the workplace tend to increase output but it is unknown whether this masks crowding out this paper uses a within subject experimental design and finds evidence that crowding out also extends to high powered incentives in a real work setting with paid workers there is individual heterogeneity however with a minority of workers reporting crowding in of motivation thus the impact of performance pay might depend on the mix of worker types data and the online appendix are available at https doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2017 2846 this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behavioral economics

the response to incentives and contractual efficiency evidence from a field experiment abstract we use data from a field experiment to estimate worker reaction to incentives and the optimality of piece rate contracts our estimate of the elasticity of output with respect to piece rates is 0 39 regression methods cannot predict performance under hypothetical contracts therefore we apply structural econometric methods without imposing profit maximization to evaluate observed contract optimality using profit as a metric we estimate the distance between observed and profit maximizing contracts to be negligible this suggests that observed contracts closely approximate optimal contracts under asymmetric information about worker ability under complete information the firm could increase expected profits by 14 percent keeping workers indifferent to the observed piece rate contract profits could increase between 44 and 49 percent if the firm exploited information about ability to reduce worker utility to the outside alternative

terrorism and international business a research agenda terrorism threatens international business ib through its direct and indirect effects as governments tighten security at public sites businesses have become more attractive terrorist targets with important implications for the operations and performance of multinational firms while terrorism has been substantially studied in other fields there has been little scholarly research to address terrorism and the distinctive challenges that it poses for ib in this article we conceptualize terrorism in relation to ib we provide background on the dimensions and effects of terrorism and develop a theoretical grounding for terrorism research by drawing on the literature from ib economics political science and other fields after discussing findings from the literature review we offer a comprehensive agenda for future research regarding the relationship between terrorism and ib our agenda emphasizes the effects of terrorism organizational preparedness company strategy and performance global supply chain and distribution channels and human resource issues our review helps establish a baseline for future empirical research consistent with the early stages of research ib scholars are encouraged to offer useful perspectives and effective solutions that shed needed light on terrorism and help reduce its destructive effects for ib and multinational firms

explicating political hazards and safeguards a transaction cost politics approach we apply the logical of comparative institutional analysis to the question of the governance of the relationship between private investors and the government we consider two strategies that investors may follow lobbying for the creation of a specialized political governance structure or the reliance on more general political mechanisms to influence policy in that sector on an ongoing basis we identify political hazards as crucial determinant of the choice of political governance and the transactional attributes that give rise to such hazards finally we highlight shift parameters in a nation s institutional environment that influence the choice between specialized and generalized political governance mechanisms

gift giving and worker productivity evidence from a firm level experiment abstract we present results from a field experiment designed to measure worker response to a monetary gift from their employer the experiment took place inside a tree planting firm paying its workforce incentive contracts firm managers told a crew of tree planters they would receive a pay raise for one day as a result of a surplus not attributable to past planting productivity we compare planter productivity the number of trees planted per day on the day the gift was handed out with productivity on previous and subsequent days of planting on the same block and thus under similar planting conditions we find direct evidence that the gift had a significant and positive effect on daily planter productivity controlling for planter fixed effects weather conditions and other random daily shocks

piece rates fixed wages and incentives evidence from a field experiment data from a field experiment are used to estimate the gain in productivity that is realized when workers are paid piece rates rather than fixed wages the experiment was conducted within a tree planting firm and provides daily observations on individual worker productivity under both compensation systems unrestricted statistical methods estimate the productivity gain to be 20 since planting conditions potentially affect incentives structural econometric methods are used to generalize the experimental results to out of sample conditions the structural results suggest that the average productivity gain outside of the experimental conditions would be at least 21 7

uncovering the complex relationships between political risk and mne firm legitimacy insights from libya using the before after natural experiment occasioned by the arab spring in libya we explore how market and non market activity affect foreign firm legitimacy in times of political turmoil although all mnes in libya had to cultivate strong ties to qadhafi to succeed during his 40 years of rule we found that those that also invested in social benefit projects and in social ties with families with few ties to the qadhafi family earned a broad based legitimacy that helped them survive qadhafi s overthrow our findings contribute to the political risk and political behavior literature the notion that the pursuit of firm legitimacy in general and especially in the eyes of social sector actors is an effective hedge against political risk more theoretically our findings support the addition of a social sector based path to firm legitimacy in the host country that complements and may at times substitute for the government based path to foreign firm legitimacy practically our findings suggest that mnes facing severe political risk can improve their prospects for survival by investing in relationships with influential social groups and by offering goods or services that are perceived as socially valuable

holding on ethnic divisions political institutions and the duration of economic declines abstract we analyze the duration of large economic declines and provide a theory of delayed recovery we show theoretically that uncertain post recovery incomes lead to a commitment problem which limits the possibility of cooperation in ethnically heterogeneous countries strong constraints on the executive solve this problem by reducing the uncertainty associated with cooperative behavior we test the model using standard data on linguistic heterogeneity and detailed data on ethnic power configurations our findings support the central theoretical prediction countries with more constrained political executives experience shorter economic declines the effect is large in ethnically heterogeneous countries but virtually non existent in homogeneous societies our main results are robust to a variety of perturbations regarding the estimation method the estimation sample measures of heterogeneity and measures of institutions

extending the bargaining power model explaining bargaining outcomes among nations mnes and ngos participants in international bargaining include different types nation states mnes ngos and multilateral organizations and different numbers of these actors our theoretical contribution is to extend the bargaining power paradigm with a framework that models bargaining in this complex environment as a network the configuration of supports and constraints among all participating actors in the bargaining environment is captured in the structure of the network antecedents of an actor s bargaining influence in the network include the actor s basis of power network position bargaining outcome preferences and motivation to influence bargaining the network bargaining power nbp model uses network theory to build upon and integrate insights from previous literature in a way that allows us to simultaneously apply these different insights to explain bargaining outcomes these insights include effects of coalitions strategies of less powerful actors leveraging more powerful allies integration of international and domestic politics and applicability to mne related issues beyond fdi finally we illustrate nbp in a scenario of privatized utilities in the dominican republic in which the bargaining power outcome predicted by nbp differs from that of the canonical bargaining power perspective

endogenous matching and the empirical determinants of contract form empirical work on contracts typically regresses contract choice on observed principal and agent characteristics if i some of these characteristics are unobserved or partially observed and ii there are incentives whereby particular types of agents end up contracting with particular types of principals estimated coefficients on the observed characteristics may be misleading we address this endogenous matching problem using a data set on agricultural contracts between landlords and tenants in early renaissance tuscany controlling for endogenous matching has an impact on parameters of interest and tenants risk aversion appears to have influenced contract choice

theorising from case studies towards a pluralist future for international business research the literature on case studies both in the field of international business ib and in the social sciences more generally has tended to focus on the methods of data production and analysis suited to this research strategy in contrast in this paper we investigate methods of theorising from case studies we seek to understand how case researchers theorise and how future ib research might utilise case studies for theorising by means of a qualitative content analysis of case studies published in journal of international business studies academy of management journal and journal of management studies we construct a typology of theorising from case studies two dimensions of the case study namely causal explanation and contextualisation form the basis for our typology we distinguish four methods of theorising inductive theory building interpretive sensemaking natural experiment and contextualised explanation only the first of which has been widely used in jibs in the period that we investigate on the basis of our own qualitative analysis we show the limitations of inductive theory building and argue that greater utilisation of the other methods of theorising would enhance the case study s explanatory power and potential for contextualisation we argue for a more pluralist future for ib research

gift exchange incentives and heterogeneous workers by incorporating reciprocity in an otherwise standard principal agent model i investigate the relation between monetary gift exchange and incentive pay while allowing for worker heterogeneity i assume that some but not all workers care more for their principal when they are convinced that the principal cares for them the principal can be egoistic or altruistic absent worker heterogeneity an altruistic principal signals his altruism by offering relatively weak incentives and a relatively high expected total compensation however the latter is not always required to credibly signal altruism furthermore since some workers do not reciprocate the principal s altruism the principal may find it optimal to write a contract that simultaneously signals his altruism and screens reciprocal worker types such a contract is characterised by excessively strong incentives and a relatively high expected total compensation

policy uncertainty and the sequence of entry by japanese firms 1980 1998 we extend the stages model of internationalization to incorporate a sophisticated consideration of temporal and cross national variation in the uncertainty of the policy environment using a sample of 6465 international expansions of 665 japanese manufacturing firms in 49 countries we develop arguments from internationalization and bargaining power perspectives to show how japanese firms manage policy uncertainty in host country environments through the within country sequencing of investments although a distribution to manufacturing entry sequence tends to prevail in countries with low levels of policy uncertainty as uncertainty in the policy environment increases initial entry by distribution is increasingly likely to be eschewed in favor of an initial entry by a joint venture manufacturing plant we suggest that this change in investment sequence occurs as firms shift from an emphasis on developing knowledge about local markets and consumers in low hazards markets to an international expansion strategy in uncertain policy environments that places knowledge development of the policy environment at the forefront of a firm s strategy

high level politically connected firms corruption and analyst forecast accuracy around the world the international business ib literature has widely recognized political forces as major factors that complicate the strategic decisions of multinational enterprises mnes analyses by financial intermediaries can help to reduce the risk of information asymmetry caused by such factors using firm level data from 17 jurisdictions between 1997 and 2001 this study investigates the association between a firm s high level political connections and earnings forecasts made by financial analysts an important group of financial intermediaries we find that after controlling for other determinants of forecast accuracy analysts experience greater difficulty in predicting the earnings of firms with political connections than those of firms with no such connections however in jurisdictions in which corruption level is relatively high earnings forecast accuracy is influenced more by a firm s political connections our findings contribute to the ib literature by demonstrating that political connections exacerbate the information asymmetry between investors and managers and also that anti corruption measures can curb the adverse effect of political connections on the corporate information environment these findings bear the practical implication that mnes must consider political issues when making resource allocation decisions

the labor supply of fixed wage workers estimates from a real effort experiment abstract fixed wage workers comprise the bulk of the labor force and yet little is known about how they respond to changes in their wage given recent interest in theories of reciprocity and intrinsic motivation and their implications for effort provision the neoclassical prediction seems less obvious today to better understand the motivation of these workers i estimate their labor supply using a real effort experiment two results stand out first no one theory seems to fit the pooled data on average people work considerably harder than the minimum but they do not respond to changes in the wage second pooling the data is deceptive because there seem to be distinct types with differing responses to the wage most workers can be classified as reciprocal or intrinsically motivated and indeed these types respond as theory would predict reciprocators return wage gifts with increased effort and extrinsic incentives crowd out motivation for intrinsic workers

explaining gift exchange the limits of good intentions this paper explores the limitations of intention based social preferences as an explanation of gift exchange between a firm and a worker in a framework with one self interested and one reciprocal player gift giving never arises in equilibrium instead any equilibrium in a large class of multistage games must involve mutually unkind behavior of both players besides gift exchange this class of games also includes moral hazard models and the rotten kid framework even though equilibrium behavior may appear positively reciprocal in some of these games the self interested player never benefits from reciprocity we discuss the relation of these results to the theoretical and empirical literature on gift exchange in employment relations

the effect of national context on perceptions of risk a comparison of planned versus free market managers a model is developed to explain the effect of national context on risk related decisions an essential feature of risk related decisions is substantial uncertainty or inadequate information as well as significant consequences regarding future outcomes we argue that differences in information flows and consequences across national institutional environments affect the perceived uncertainty of decision situations for this reason the institutional environment in which managers reside should play a fundamental and systematic role in influencing their perceptions of risk we test our model on managers from two environments that contrast in terms of information and consequences related to risk a free market economy the u s and a centrally planned economy the czech republic in 1992 our results indicate that the institutional environment does indeed play a strong and systematic role in explaining managers risk related decisions thus national environment appears to be an important contextual condition to which the propensity to take risks is sensitive

transforming disadvantages into advantages developing country mnes in the least developed countries we analyze the advantages and disadvantages of developing country multinational enterprises mnes in comparison with developed country mnes developing country mnes tend to be less competitive than their developed country counterparts partly because they suffer the disadvantage of operating in home countries with underdeveloped institutions we argue that this disadvantage can become an advantage when both types of mne operate in countries with difficult governance conditions because developing country mnes are used to operating in such conditions the empirical analysis shows that although developing country mnes rarely appear among the largest mnes in the world they are more prevalent among the largest foreign firms in the least developed countries ldcs especially in ldcs with poorer regulatory quality and lower control of corruption

government intervention in the venezuelan petroleum industry an empirical investigation of political risk two important aspects of political risk analysis that have not received much attention in the literature are a the reasons why multinational firms experience different types of intervention and b the timing of intervention in order to address these issues this research develops a conceptual model of political risk based on the premise that host government intervention is related to specific objectives of the government vis a vis multinational firms information reflecting the attainment of objectives motivates the government to intervene in a given manner the application of this model to the case of the venezuelan petroleum industry from years 1947 to 1976 provides some support for this model and gives insight into the timing of specific types of intervention

assessing the impact of a school subsidy program in mexico using a social experiment to validate a dynamic behavioral model of child schooling and fertility this paper uses data from a randomized social experiment in mexico to estimate and validate a dynamic behavioral model of parental decisions about fertility and child schooling to evaluate the effects of the progresa school subsidy program and to perform a variety of counterfactual experiments of policy alternatives our method of validation estimates the model without using post program data and then compares the model s predictions about program impacts to the experimental impact estimates the results show that the model s predicted program impacts track the experimental results our analysis of counterfactual policies reveals an alternative subsidy schedule that would induce a greater impact on average school attainment at similar cost to the existing program

the institutional environment for infrastructure investment the empirical evidence that links political institutions to economic outcomes has grown dramatically in recent years however virtually all of this analysis is undertaken using data from the past three decades this paper extends this empirical framework by performing a two century long historical analysis of the determinants of infrastructure investment in a panel of over 100 countries the results demonstrate that political environments that limit the feasibility of policy change are an important determinant of investment in infrastructure copyright 2002 oxford university press

enhancing the obsolescing bargain theory a longitudinal study of foreign ownership of u s and european multinationals this research attempts to enhance the obsolescing bargain theory for manufacturing companies by statistically testing the effects of nine explanatory variables on the static and dynamic manifestations of bargaining success with longitudinal firm level data in order to highlight those effects it develops a conceptual framework that provides a broader context in which the primary variables operate it demonstrates that the obsolescing bargain took effect in india over a fifteen year period following restrictive legislation unlike previous research this study measures the effect of benefits received by multinationals from the host government in exchange for equity dilution american companies are found to retain a smaller share of their foreign ownership over time than british and other european multinationals some explanatory variables that have previously been found to influence level of foreign ownership static bargaining success are found to be less important or have a different effect in explaining proportion of foreign ownership retained dynamic bargaining success

friends or foes optimal incentives for reciprocal agents abstract widely used performance based contracts put positive or negative externalities on co workers these externalities have been proven to shape an organization s working climate especially when workers exhibit social preferences however it is a priori unclear whether a more friendly or a more competitive working environment should be encouraged in this paper we develop a theoretical model in which a self interested principal has to motivate a set of agents to work hard agents are symmetric potentially risk averse and exhibit reciprocity concerns towards each other we show that the principal reduces the cost of achieving high effort provision by designing a psychological gift exchange game thereby replacing monetary with psychological incentives we find that the optimal incentive scheme depends on the interplay between the agents attitudes towards risks and their preferences for reciprocity in particular the optimal scheme implements i a relative performance compensation scheme which induces an exchange of unkindness if agents are relatively little risk averse and ii a joint performance compensation scheme which induces an exchange of kindness if agents are sufficiently risk averse our findings can explain some puzzling empirical results

bridging history and reductionism a key role for longitudinal qualitative research longitudinal qualitative research combining grounded theorizing and insights from modern historical methods can generate novel conceptual frameworks that establish theoretical bridges between historical narratives and reductionist quantitative models to capitalize fully on this potential theory bridging role qualitative scholars should seek to study social systems characterized by complexity and nonlinear causation effectively serving this theory bridging role provides a basis for securing a distinctive place for qualitative research in the social sciences in general and for international business research in particular

from a distance and generalizable to up close and grounded reclaiming a place for qualitative methods in international business research journal of international business studies 2011 42 573 581 doi 10 1057 jibs 2011 19 it is exhilarating to write the introduction to this special issue as it presents an important opportunity for qualitative research to reclaim its position as an integral part of international business ib research the field of ib was founded on a rich qualitative research legacy e g bartlett 1979 crozier 1965 fayerweather 1969 johanson vahlne 1977 kindleberger 1956 prahalad 1975 wilkins 1970 1974 over time however such methods have been progressively marginalized in our field as quantitative methods have become the norm this shift in emphasis has mirrored the broader trend toward more positivistic empirical methods in the social sciences the field of ib is multidisciplinary in scope and interdisciplinary in content and methodology statement of jibs editorial policy however as our respective home disciplines came under growing pressure to solidify their legitimacy as scientific endeavors that merit scholarly attention it is not surprising that we began to take on the norms propagated within our own academic communities that typically equated quantitative data with hard science while there are clear merits associated with quantitative methods the multi cultural multi dimensional and dynamic nature of the field of ib lends itself to a broad range of research methodologies qualitative methods being one of them in order to understand the complexities of emergent and evolving phenomena scattered over distance and the differentiated contexts typical to many topics under investigation in ib it is often inappropriate to engage in large scale cross sectional studies or reductionist methods in the absence of well developed theory rather thick description exploratory research and comparative case analysis that focus on inductive theory building and hypotheses generation may be more suitable

the determinants of mne subsidiaries political strategies evidence of institutional duality in this study we develop and test a model of the determinants of political strategies used by foreign subsidiaries of multinational enterprises mnes using recent theoretical advances in institutional theory that recognize that mne subsidiaries are confronted with pressures for isomorphism within the corporation internal legitimacy and within the host country external legitimacy we integrate international business and political strategy literatures to create a multilevel model of subsidiary host country and parent determinants of political strategy our hypotheses are tested using survey and archival data from western european subsidiaries of us mnes

sorting incentives and risk preferences evidence from a field experiment abstract we conducted experiments within a firm to measure the risk preferences of workers who face substantial daily income risk we find that these workers are significantly more risk tolerant than individuals from the broader population this is consistent with sorting risk tolerant workers are attracted to high risk occupations

on the relevance and composition of gifts within the firm evidence from field experiments we investigate the economic relevance and the composition of gifts within a firm where output is contractible we develop a structural behavioral model that identifies workers optimal reaction to monetary gifts received from their employer we estimate the model using data from two separate field experiments conducted within a tree planting firm we use the estimated structural parameters to generalize beyond the experiment simulating how workers would react to different gifts on the part of the firm within different labor market settings we find that gifts have a role to play within this firm increasing in importance when the workers outside alternatives deteriorate profit maximizing gifts would increase profits within slack labor markets by up to 10 on average and by up to 17 for certain types of workers

institutional cultural and transaction cost influences on entry mode choice and performance in this study we examine foreign market entry mode choice and firm performance for a sample of european union firms examining both financial and non financial performance measures we attempt to determine if firms that select their entry mode based on transaction cost institutional context and cultural context variables perform better than firms that make other mode choices we found that mode choice did matter firms whose mode choice could be predicted by the extended transaction cost model performed significantly better on both financial and non financial measures than did firms whose mode choice could not be predicted by the extended transaction cost model implications for future research are discussed

implicit contracts incentive compatibility and involuntary unemployment this paper considers the enforceability of employment contracts when employees performance cannot be verified in court so that piece rate contracts are not legally enforceable part i shows that there exists a variety of self enforcing implicit contracts modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and characterizes all the wage and performance outcomes that can be implemented implementation requires a strictly positive surplus from employment the form of the contract depending on how this surplus is divided between firm and employee piece rate contracts and contracts with an informally agreed bonus can be made self enforcing but the use of severance pay and bonding does not extend the set of implementable allocations the resulting contracts resemble actual labor contracts more than do the contracts in standard principal agent models part ii analyses market equilibrium with these contracts also modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and shows that many such equilibria exist unfilled vacancies and unemployed workers can co exist despite the existence of contracts that are potentially mutually beneficial for those jobs that are filled any division of the potential surplus is possible so that the market can have at the same time involuntary unemployment and vacancies that are unfilled despite filled jobs earning positive profits as a criterion for selecting equilibria a notion of renegotiation proofness is applied then either all workers are employed or all jobs filled but any division of the potential surplus is still possible the paper explores what further restrictions on beliefs give rise to a walrasian outcome in which all the potential surplus goes to the short side of the market and to an efficiency wage type outcome in which the potential surplus goes to the long side

the uppsala internationalization process model revisited from liability of foreignness to liability of outsidership the uppsala internationalization process model is revisited in the light of changes in business practices and theoretical advances that have been made since 1977 now the business environment is viewed as a web of relationships a network rather than as a neoclassical market with many independent suppliers and customers outsidership in relation to the relevant network more than psychic distance is the root of uncertainty the change mechanisms in the revised model are essentially the same as those in the original version although we add trust building and knowledge creation the latter to recognize the fact that new knowledge is developed in relationships

financial and political risks in us direct foreign investment this paper examines the risk of us direct foreign investments over the period 1982 98 in 59 host countries the first part of the analysis builds an empirical model to explain the time series and cross country patterns of return on capital the estimation then uses the return on assets roa as a measure of the return on capital and investigates its determinants there are four main findings first the roa in a majority of countries does not simply track the worldwide roa second some cross country differences are explained by financial risks third unexplained country risk is qualitatively and quantitatively related to unobserved political risk fourth unexplained country risk is also compensated with a higher roa enhancing its credibility as a measure of political risk the unexplained country risk is thus used to calculate a new index of political risk ratings for 56 host countries that may be useful to managers investors policymakers and academics

political behavior social responsibility and perceived corruption a structuration perspective this study unites the three lenses political behavior corporate social responsibility and corruption and evaluates the way in which multinational enterprises mnes manage political and social forces in a foreign emerging market using the theory of structuration as the conceptual foundation we propose that an mne s propensity to cooperate with the host government is positively related to its philanthropic contribution and resource accommodation whereas its propensity to be assertive with the host government is positively associated with its emphasis on ethics and organizational credibility we argue that when perceived corruption in the business segment increases an mne s propensity to cooperate and be assertive with the government decreases its focus on ethics heightens and its philanthropic contribution diminishes as to the three way interactions when perceived corruption in the business segment increases mnes that focus more on ethics have a greater propensity to use arm s length bargaining to deal with the government whereas those focusing less on ethics have a greater propensity to use social connections to deal with the government our analysis of sample mnes in china generally supports these propositions