new human resource management practices complementarities and the impact on innovation performance in this paper we take our theoretical point of departure in recent work in organisational economics on systems of human resource management hrm practices we develop the argument that just as complementarities between new hrm practices influence financial performance positively there are theoretical reasons for expecting them also to influence innovation performance positively we examine this overall hypothesis by estimating an empirical model of innovation performance using data from a danish survey of 1 900 business firms using principal component analysis we identify two hrm systems which are conducive to innovation in the first one seven of our nine hrm variables matter almost equally for the ability to innovate the second system is dominated by firm internal and firm external training of the total of nine sectors that we consider we find that the four manufacturing sectors correlate with the first system firms belonging to wholesale trade and to the ict intensive service sectors tend to be associated with the second system

the effect of contemporaneous reserve accounting on the market for federal funds abstract this paper evaluates the effect of the transition from lagged to contemporaneous reserve accounting for the determination of bank reserve requirements through its impact on the market for federal funds the results indicate that increased target reserve uncertainty resulting from the implementation of the contemporaneous reserve accounting system cra caused an initial increase in intraday federal funds rate variance and daily interest rate differences however subsequent to a learning period intraday variance appears to be less pronounced and daily differentials appear to be narrower than under the previously used lagged reserve accounting system lra these results are attributed to the lengthening of the accounting period from one to two weeks therefore while not costless the new system does not appear to have seriously disrupted the federal funds market

an empirical procedure to evaluate monetary management under exogenous changes in the money supply this article proposes an empirical procedure to evaluate central banks monetary management in a presence of exogenous changes in the money supply monetary shocks deviate the market intere

a model of target changes and the term structure of interest rates abstract we investigate the effects of short term rate targeting by the federal reserve on the term structure of interest rates and make contributions at two levels using a new series of interest rate targets made available by the federal reserve bank of new york we develop a family of models that highlight the implications of discrete changes in interest rate targets for the term structure of interest rates we show that spreads between short term rates and the overnight federal reserve funds rate are mainly driven by expectations of changes in the target not by the transitory dynamics of the overnight rate around the target hence the bias in tests of the expectations hypothesis that we document can be mainly attributed to the erroneous anticipation of future changes in monetary policy our modeling assumptions and newly available data make it possible to extract a series of market expectations of the next target change which are compared with a series of realized target changes

the use of stock based pay for sorting an empirical analysis of compensation for new ceos examining stock based compensation for newly hired ceos this article finds that the sensitivity of stock based pay to performance is higher for new economy young and volatile firms of the components of stock based pay it is option grants that generate such variation across firms it also finds that this cross firm variation in pay performance sensitivity is more pronounced for the ceo s first year in office these findings support the view that firms use stock based pay to new ceos for sorting

the liquidity trap and u s interest rates in the 1930s most current literature assumes that a central bank loses the ability to influence interest rates through variations in reserve supply as soon as overnight rates have been driven to zero i argue that reserve supply can be directly related to longer term rates when overnight rates are zero because banks reserve demand is then defined by the role of cash as an asset free of interest rate risk i present evidence that reserve supply affected longerterm interest rates in the u s from 1934 through 1939 while overnight rates were at the zero floor even when the changes in reserve supply reflected factors unlikely to have affected expectations of future overnight rates

sources procedures and microeconomic effects of innovation fabio arcangeli paul david frank engelman christopher freeman massimo moggi richard nelson luigi orsenigo nathan rosenberg michele salvati g n von tunzelman two anonymous referees and the participants at the meeting of the committee on distribution growth and technical progress of the italian national research council cnr rome november 16 1985 have helped with various redraftings a particularly grateful acknowledgment is for the insightful and patient help of moses abramovitz this work has been undertaken at the science policy research unit spru university of sussex as part of the research program of the designated research centre sponsored by the economic and social research council esrc earlier support to the research that led to this paper by the italian national research council cnr is also gratefully acknowledged the statistical research has been undertaken with the assistance of stephano brioschi ilaria fornari and giovannu prennushi

an empirical analysis of risk incentives and the delegation of worker authority the authors empirically test prendergast s 2002 theory that incorporates the delegation of worker authority into the principal agent model to explain the lack of consistent empirical support for a tradeoff between risk and incentives using data from the 1998 british wers the authors investigate whether there is 1 evidence of a risk incentives tradeoff as predicted by the principal agent model 2 evidence of a positive relationship between incentive pay and the delegation of worker authority 3 evidence of a positive relationship between risk and authority 4 support for the main testable implication of prendergast s model namely that the evidence favoring a risk incentives tradeoff should strengthen when authority controls are added to the empirical model the answers are affirmative for all four questions thereby providing evidence clarifying the relationship between risk and incentive pay and how managers optimally bundle incentive pay and the delegation of worker decision rights to cope with

money market integration we use transaction level data and detailed modeling of the high frequency behavior of federal funds eurodollar spreads to provide evidence of strong integration of the u s markets for federal funds and eurodollars the two core components of the dollar money market our evidence of negligible federal funds eurodollar premia contrasts with previous findings of large and predictable premia which have been interpreted as evidence of segmentation between the markets for federal funds and eurodollars our results however are consistent with possible persistent segmentation within the global eurodollar market we document several patterns in the behavior of federal funds eurodollar spreads including liquidity effects from trading volume to yield spreads volatility

the interbank market after august 2007 what has changed and why after the onset of the financial crisis spreads between interbank interest rates on unsecured and secured deposits for the major world currencies became exceptionally large and volatile first we find that the phenomenon was mainly driven by aggregate rather than bank specific factors notably risk aversion and accounting practices by contrast funding liquidity capital shortage and central bank interventions were not important determinants second prior to august 2007 the spread was broadly insensitive to key borrower characteristics whereas afterward it became somewhat more reactive to measures of creditworthiness third conditions for big borrowers became relatively more favorable during the crisis suggesting that moral hazard risks related to the too big to fail argument have increased these results are discussed in the light of theories on the interbank market during a crisis

an analysis of the use of accounting and market measures of performance in executive compensation contracts prior research has provided useful insights into the structure of compensation plans and their incentive effects however one important limitation of these studies is the virtual absence of any cross sectional analyses of the attributes of compensation contracts 2 this absence is related in part to the problems associated with controlling for other factors that affect compensation that is compensation contracts are

agency theory and franchising some empirical results this article provides an empirical assessment of various agency theoretic explanations for franchising including risk sharing one sided moral hazard and two sided moral hazard the empirical models use proxies for factors such as risk moral hazard and franchisors need for capital to explain both franchisors decisions about the terms of their contracts royalty rates and up front franchise fees and the extent to which they use franchising in this article i exploit several new sources of data on franchising to construct a cross section of 548 franchisors involved in various business activities in the united states in 1986 the data are most consistent with a model based on two sided moral hazard the empirical models are also more successful at explaining the extent to which franchisors choose to franchise stores than at explaining the terms of franchise contracts finally contrary to the predictions of several theoretical models i find that royalty rates and franchise fees are not negatively related

a micro model of the federal funds market this paper demonstrates that valuable insights into the determination of federal funds rates can be gained through modeling the micro decisions of market participants fed fund demand functions are derived for different bank valuation functions and several implications are discussed specifically it is i possible to rationalize the observation that large banks are net purchasers and small banks net sellers of fed funds ii to explain the positive spread of fed funds rates over other short term money market rates and iii to link the size of this spread to the federal reserve s underlying monetary policy strategy

sectoral patterns of technical change towards a taxonomy and a theory abstract the purpose of the paper is to describe and explain sectoral patterns of technical change as revealed by data on about 2000 significant innovations in britain since 1945 most technological knowledge turns out not to be information that is generally applicable and easily reproducible but specific to firms and applications cumulative in development and varied amongst sectors in source and direction innovating firms principally in electronics and chemicals are relatively big and they develop innovations over a wide range of specific product groups within their principal sector but relatively few outside firms principally in mechanical and instrument engineering are relatively small and specialised and they exist in symbiosis with large firms in scale intensive sectors like metal manufacture and vehicles who make a significant contribution to their own process technology in textile firms on the other hand most process innovations come from suppliers these characteristics and variations can be classified in a three part taxonomy based on firms 1 supplier dominated 2 production intensive 3 science based they can be explained by sources of technology requirements of users and possibilities for appropriation this explanation has implications for our understanding of the sources and directions of technical change firms diversification behaviour the dynamic relationship between technology and industrial structure and the formation of technological skills and advantages at the level of the firm the region and the country

discipline and liquidity in the interbank market using 20 years of panel data i demonstrate that high risk banks have consistently paid more than safe banks for interbank loans and have been less likely to use these loans as a source of liquidity the economic importance of this effect was relatively small until the mid 1990s when regulatory and institutional changes began to impose more of the costs of bank failure on uninsured creditors subsequently interbank market price discipline roughly doubled and risk based rationing effects increased by a factor of six in imposing this discipline lenders seem to care most about credit risk at borrowing institutions

an empirical analysis of sales force compensation plans among the array of direct and indirect methods of motivation and control available to the sales manager is sales force compensation in this article the authors summarize theoretical predictions from the economics marketing finance and accounting literatures on the structure of optimal sales force compensation plans guided by these insights they then construct empirical models to quantify the effect of various sales force factors firm and product factors and market factors on compensation using data from 286 firms in 39 industries the authors examine determinants of incentive components and total pay and the optimal horizon for incentive pay copyright 1992 by university of chicago press

comovements in volatility in the euro money market abstract this paper assesses the sources of volatility persistence in euro area money market interest rates and the existence of linkages relating volatility dynamics the main findings of the study are as follows firstly there is evidence of stationary long memory of similar degree in all series secondly there is evidence of fractional cointegration relationships relating all series except the overnight rate the common long memory factor analysis points to a two factor volatility curve the most important factor in terms of proportion of total variance explained can be interpreted as a level factor 64 of total variance while the other as a slope factor 13 of total variance impulse response analysis and forecast error variance decomposition finally point to non significant forward transmission of liquidity shocks

does delegation increase worker training we model a principal firm offering training to its agent worker under two alternative organizational structures integration where the principal retains authority to overrule the investment project recommended by the worker and delegation where the principal cannot overrule the worker s preferred investment project we assume that training reduces the worker s effort cost of assembling information about alternative projects payoffs and identify the conditions under which delegation increases the profit maximizing intensity of training empirical estimates from matched employer employee data show that workplaces delegating authority do provide more worker training this result persists in two cross sections in panel fixed effect estimates and critically in an instrumental variable exercise that also controls for establishment fixed effects jel d21 d22 d23 m53 m54

integration of the sales force an empirical examination this article develops and tests a model of integration of a marketing function personal selling the model derived from transaction cost analysis as developed principally by williamson is formulated as a logistic function which is estimated with data from the electronic components industry as expected integration is associated with increasing levels of asset specificity difficulty of performance evaluation and the combination of these two factors contrary to the transaction cost model neither frequency of transactions nor interaction of specificity and environmental uncertainty is significantly related to integration the transaction cost model improves significantly upon the fit of a simple model relating integration to company size alone these results suggest that for studying transactions of this kind it is fruitful to view the firm as a governance structure

endogenous matching and the empirical determinants of contract form empirical work on contracts typically regresses contract choice on observed principal and agent characteristics if i some of these characteristics are unobserved or partially observed and ii there are incentives whereby particular types of agents end up contracting with particular types of principals estimated coefficients on the observed characteristics may be misleading we address this endogenous matching problem using a data set on agricultural contracts between landlords and tenants in early renaissance tuscany controlling for endogenous matching has an impact on parameters of interest and tenants risk aversion appears to have influenced contract choice

interest rate dispersion and volatility in the market for daily funds abstract the purpose of this paper is to study the determinants of equilibrium in the market for daily funds we use the eonia panel database which includes daily information on the lending rates applied by contributing commercial banks the data clearly show an increase in both the time series volatility and the cross section dispersion of rates towards the end of the reserve maintenance period these increases are highly correlated we design a model to account for these empirical facts our theoretical model shows how the operational framework of monetary policy causes a reduction in the elasticity of the supply of funds by banks throughout the reserve maintenance period this reduction in the elasticity together with market segmentation and heterogeneity is able to generate distributions for the interest rates and quantities traded with the same properties as in the data we also investigate the effects of the changes in the eurosystem s operational framework enacted on march 2004 for interest rate behaviour

franchising and risk management franchising is an important and controversial form of vertical integration allegations of opportunistic behavior by franchisors have led to calls for public regulation and in some states fairness in franchising laws the advisability of such regulation depends on the long run incentives to franchise if franchising is a temporary step on the path to complete ownership integration regulation may be called for alternatively if complete or partial franchising is a permanen t market solution regulation is at least contestable this paper offer s new evidence on the incentives to franchise copyright 1988 by american economic association

cross country differences in monetary policy execution and money market rates volatility abstract volatility patterns in overnight interest rates display differences across industrial countries that existing models designed to replicate the features of individual countries markets cannot account for this paper presents an equilibrium model of the overnight interbank market that matches cross country differences in patterns in interest volatility by incorporating differences in how central banks manage liquidity in response to shocks our model is consistent with central banks practice of rationing access to marginal facilities when the objective of stabilizing short term interest rates conflicts with another high frequency objective such as an exchange rate target

clubs local public goods and transportation models a synthesis abstract clubs local public goods and transportation models are analyzed within a unified model the emphasis is on the derivation of optimal allocation pricing and the size of the sharing group we derive the conditions under which optimal prices will yield surplus or deficit as well as those under which competitive provision will be efficient given heterogeneous tastes we prove that segregation according to tastes is generally efficient although several cases where this result does not hold are also discussed we show that the existing literature is unnecessarily restrictive and that the unified approach suggested here considerably extends the existing analysis of clubs local public goods and the transportation problems

entrepreneurial orientation risk and incentives the case of franchising the standard principal agent model predicts a trade off in contract design between the protection against risk and incentive motivations distinguishing two types of risks we show that contrary to this traditional view the relationship between risk and incentives can be positive in franchise contracting this implies that the royalty rate decreases with the risk faced by the franchisee on the local market using a unique panel dataset combining french franchise and financial data we address this issue empirically alongside performance outcomes the data support the hypothesis of a negative relationship between risk and the royalty rate which contradicts the prediction of the standard agency theory furthermore our estimations provide evidence that chain performance increases with an adjusted royalty rate this paper has important implications for contract design showing that with increasing local market uncertainty and low risk aversion franchisors should reduce the royalty rate

agency costs and innovation abstract stylized facts indicate that small firms are responsible for a disproportionate share of innovative research there are many possible explanations for this fact the paper seeks to understand this phenomenon as the outcome of an optimal assignment of tasks across individuals and organizations it is shown that incentive costs associated with a given task depend on the total portfolio of tasks that an individual or an organization undertakes mixing hard to measure activities innovation with easy to measure activities routine is particularly costly since it will either lead to misallocation of attention across tasks or to misallocation of risk larger firms are at a comparative disadvantage in conducting highly innovative research because of the costs associated with managing a heterogeneous set of tasks it is further argued that optimal organizational responses to coordination and control of routine tasks will lead to bureaucratization within the firm and to financial constraints imposed by capital markets both of which are hostile to innovation

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

the tenuous trade off between risk and incentives empirical work testing for a negative trade off between risk and incentives has not had much success the data suggest a positive relationship between measures of uncertainty and incentives rather than the posited negative trade off i argue that the existing literature fails to account for an important effect of uncertainty on incentives through the allocation of responsibility to employees when workers operate in certain settings firms are content to assign tasks to workers and monitor their inputs by contrast when the situation is more uncertain they delegate responsibility to workers but to constrain their discretion base compensation on observed output

uncertainty task environment and organization design an empirical investigation the paper addresses two broad research questions 1 how do internal uncertainty associated with the task environment and external uncertainty arising from market volatility impact organization design 2 what are the relationships among various elements of organization design delegation of decision making incentives monitoring and internal labor market practices promotion training employment security we expand on prendergast 2002a who challenged the conventional view of a tradeoff between risk and incentives and build a single unified framework for answering our two research questions using a uniquely rich dataset that contains detailed information about the task environment of core employees and organization design at the individual group and firms levels in 530 minnesota firms in the mid 1990s we first find support for prendergast s key argument that internal uncertainty over which employees have control affects directly the allocation of decision making and only indirectly incentives via allocation of decision making this confirms similar findings by foss and laursen 2005 devaro and kurtulus 2010 and shi 2011 we also find that internal uncertainty has much impact on organization design through the choice of delegation of decision making at the employee level less so at the group level and very little at the firm level whereas external market uncertainty has little effect on organization design especially at the individual and group level decision making monitoring various internal labor market practices and incentives are strongly related to each other through substitution and complementarity

liquidity regulation and the implementation of monetary policy in addition to revamping existing rules for bank capital basel iii introduces a new global framework for liquidity regulation one part of this framework is the liquidity coverage ratio lcr which requires banks to hold sufficient high quality liquid assets to survive a 30 day period of market stress as monetary policy typically involves targeting the interest rate on loans of one of these assets central bank reserves it is important to understand how this regulation may impact the efficacy of central banks current operational frameworks we introduce term funding and an lcr requirement into an otherwise standard model of monetary policy implementation our model shows that if banks face the possibility of an lcr shortfall then the usual link between open market operations and the overnight interest rate changes and the short end of the yield curve becomes steeper our results suggest that central banks may want to adjust their operational frameworks as the new regulation is implemented

an opposing responses test of classic versus market based promotion tournaments we use a systems based econometric method to show that classic and market based tournament models are empirically distinguishable since the role of risk differs across these models implementing the method using a large finnish worker firm matched panel we find support for classic tournaments given that promotions depend on relative performance the firm s wage structure is convex promotion probabilities are decreasing in the number of competitors performance is increasing in the wage spread and workers and firms adjust their choice variables in opposite directions when the variance of the stochastic component of worker performance changes

interest on reserves and the flexibility of monetary policy in the euro area this paper shows that remunerating required reserves can increase the flexibility of monetary policy the remuneration at the current policy rate implies constant net marginal interest costs of holding required reserves this allows the central bank to change the policy rate also within a reserve maintenance period without inducing a problematic reserve shifting on behalf of the banks in the euro area required reserves are remunerated at an average rate therefore the way in which reserves are remunerated has to be changed in order to make use of the advantage of a higher flexibility of monetary policy

interest rate corridors and reserves abstract this paper evaluates reserves regimes versus interest rate corridors which have become competing frameworks for monetary policy implementation rate corridors relying on lending and deposit facilities to create ceilings and floors for overnight interest rates evince mixed results on controlling volatility reserve requirements allow period average smoothing of interest rates but even if remunerated are subject to reserve avoidance activities a system of voluntary period average reserve commitments could offer equivalent rate smoothing advantages if central banks created symmetric opportunity costs of meeting or falling short of period average reserve requirements or commitments they could achieve flat reserve demand on settlement day

day of the week effects in federal funds rates further empirical findings abstract we extend the spindt and hoffmeister 1988 model of the daily operation of an institution s federal reserve account to show strong inter and intra period incentives to borrow and lend in the federal funds market at predictable points in the 10 trading day settlement period using intraday high and low prices we demonstrate changes in the federal funds rate consistent with our model s predictions we provide evidence of predictable changes in the variance of fed funds returns on a daily and intraday basis our analysis confirms that federal reserve requirements result in daily and intraday variances which are not constant

contract choice in modern agriculture cash rent versus cropshare e conomists have expended enormous effort examining the rationale for various contractual arrangements in agriculture particularly sharecropping while economists have made considerable theoretical efforts to understand agricultural contracts few empirical studies have been undertaken the dearth of empirical analyses of agricultural contracts is particularly striking for modern western agriculture this is an important omission not only because the existing empirical work tends to focus on the question of efficiency but also because the theoretical models tend to examine contracts that bear little resemblance to those found in the united states today

an empirical look at franchising as an organizational form franchise contracts are identified as a hybrid form of economic organization motives for the dominance of franchise arrangements are identified by examining the theoretical literature on franchising and related literatures on the theory of the firm firm growth managerial and employee selection a nd brand name capital empirical tests are performed on the incidence of franchise contracts across states for three industries in which f ranchising is prominent and data are readily available the results s uggest that both principal agent incentives and informational incenti ves favor the use of franchise arrangements copyright 1988 by the university of chicago

are supply and plant inspections complements or substitutes a strategic and operational assessment of inspection practices in biotechnology this paper theoretically and empirically examines the conventional wisdom in procurement management that often portrays supply inspections and supplier plant inspections as substitutes we develop a theoretical model that focuses on potential internal spillover costs of the buyer receiving low quality inputs and external spillover costs should low quality inputs go undetected key to our analysis is the condition of whether a buyer can commit to the intensity of supply inspection if a buyer cannot commit supply inspections and plant inspections are substitutes as widely believed the two types of inspections however may become complements when a buyer is able to commit to the intensity of supply inspection complementarity is especially likely when a external spillovers are smaller than expected internal spillovers which depends on the level of buffer inventory b when knowledge sharing between buyer and supplier becomes more effective as the supplier allocates more resources to learning for quality improvement or c when hiding aspects of the production processes is easier for suppliers we empirically evaluate our model with a new data set drawn from a large biotechnology manufacturer empirical results provide broad support for theory which we argue might help to explain variation in inspection practices across industries our theory and empirical analysis contribute to the literatures on strategic management organizational economics and procurement management by highlighting the organizational and strategic use of inspection practices

the salesperson as outside agent or employee a transaction cost analysis this descriptive study explores the reasons for integration of the personal selling function i e the use of employee direct salespeople rather than manufacturers representatives reps a hypothesized model is developed based on both transaction cost analysis and the sales force management literature data from 13 electronic component manufacturers covering 159 u s sales districts are used to estimate a logistic model of the probability of going direct in a given district results are shown to be stable across specification and estimation methods and to fit the data well the transaction cost model is generally supported the principal finding is that the greater the difficulty of evaluating a salesperson s performance the more likely the firm to substitute surveillance for commission as a control mechanism i e to use a direct sales force among other findings direct sales forces are also associated with complex hard to learn product lines and with districts that demand considerable nonselling activities several factors prove unrelated including company size the amount of travel a district requires and the importance of key accounts this article was originally published in marketing science volume 4 issue 3 pages 234 254 in 1985

a daily view of yield spreads and short term interest rate movements daily data on short term interest rates are used to show how changes in federal reserve operating procedures have affected the term structure yield spreads were helpful in predicting short term interest rate movements during the nonborrowed reserves targeting period 1979 82 but not during the earlier federal funds targeting period since the adoption of contemporaneous reserves accounting in 1984 yield spreads have been informative about short term interest rate movements principally because of the interplay between the market determination of the overnight funds rate on reserve settlement wednesdays and the fed s apparent commitment to stabilizing the funds rate on other days copyright 1996 by ohio state university press

the micromechanics of the federal funds market implications for day of the week effects in funds rate variability the federal funds rate arguably is the most important interest rate in the u s capital market because it plays a central role in monetary policy and the term structure this paper examines the micromechanics of the funds market we show that in a continuous market with asynchronous trading regulatory constraints and accounting conventions that focus agents attention on discrete time instants have important implications for the dynamics of trading activity and realized market prices we also exhibit a model of the market that explains observed regularities in the intertemporal behavior of the funds rate

interest rate targeting and the dynamics of short term rates a feature of u s monetary policy has been active targeting of overnight fed funds rates the authors show that during a period of tight targeting 1989 96 term fed funds spreads from the target displayed pronounced volatility and persistence which increase with the maturity of the loan they show that the increase in persistence is consistent with a model of infrequent but predictable revisions of the target in the authors model the autoco variance of the spreads of term fed funds rates from the target increases with the maturity because longer term rates reflect persistent expectations of the next target change coauthors are giuseppe bertola silverio foresi and leora klapper

decentralization in replicated club economies with multiple private goods abstract we show that exhaustion of blocking opportunities is a sufficient condition such that every allocation in the core of a replicated club economy can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium and that a related condition efficient scale is necessary and under an assumption on endowments sufficient such that competitive equilibrium exists and the core is nonempty these results do not require the euclidean structure and monotonicity assumed in lindahl equilibrium do not require convexity of preferences or costs and do not require the strong assumption that private goods are essential journal of economic literature classification numbers d46 d50 d61 h40

the response of term rates to fed announcements in february 4 1994 the federal reserve began the practice of announcing changes in the targeted level for the federal funds rate immediately after such decisions were made this paper investigates to what extent the policy of the announcement affected a key ingredient in the monetary transmission mechanism the term structure of nominally risk free treasury securities we find that term rates react much more in unison during announcement days than at any other time moreover the practice of circumscribing almost all changes in the federal funds rate target to federal open market committee fomc meeting dates regiments the formation of market expectations in the overnight rate and the price discovery process of term rates thus facilitating the fed s goal of controlling long term rates

corridor system and interest rates volatility and asymmetry the corridor system in its current form is believed to reduce the volatility of overnight interest rates and to eliminate any chance of persistent upward or downward bias the model presented here serves to highlight two main findings one is that a central bank can further reduce the volatility of overnight interest rates by allowing banks some flexibility to meet their reserve targets within a small range as observed in the uk data the second is that a seemingly symmetric corridor may be asymmetric in practice due to several distortions as the uk and euro area data suggest

day to day monetary policy and the volatility of the federal funds rate we propose a model of the interbank money market with an explicit role for central bank intervention and periodic reserve requirements and study the interaction of profit maximizing banks with a central bank targeting interest rates at high frequency the model yields predictions on biweekly patterns of the federal funds rate s volatility and on its response to changes in target rates and in intervention procedures such as those implemented by the fed in 1994 theoretical results are consistent with empirical patterns of interest rate volatility in the u s market for federal funds

a critique of tiebout s theory of local public expenditures the last section of this paper presents a rigorous version of tiebout s theory of local public goods it is shown that equilibria exist and are pareto optimal this rigorous theory follows closely the more rigorous part of tiebout s work this rigorous theory makes a number of very special assumptions which make local public goods essentially private the body of this paper presents a series of examples which show that if one tries to generalize the rigorous version of tiebout s theory in a number of interesting directions then equilibria may no longer exist or may not be pareto optimal the conclusion is that tiebout s idea does not lead to a satisfactory general theory of local public goods the goal of this paper is to point out that tiebout s notion of equilibrium with local governments does not have the nice properties of general competitive equilibrium except under very restrictive assumptions tiebout 39 suggested that there are competitive forces which tend to make local governments allocate resources in a pareto optimal fashion consumers choose to live in those towns with the mix of taxes and public goods they prefer local governments choose this mix so as to attract inhabitants this idea may seem intriguing for it suggests that the invisible hand solves an important part of samuelson s perplexing public goods problem 32 tiebout in fact makes an argument which is nearly rigorous i give a rigorous version of his argument at the end of the paper however in this rigorous version so many restrictive assumptions are made that public goods become essentially private in the body of the paper i give a series of examples with which i try to convince the reader that one is forced to adopt tiebout s restrictive assumptions the idea is that if one changes any of his assumptions then either equilibria may not exist or may not be pareto optimal my examples are presented in the context of a general class of tiebout models i consider several subclasses one of which is the special case considered by tiebout in each of the subclasses except that considered by tiebout i give a counterexample either to the existence of equilibrium or to its pareto optimality the subclasses are so chosen that the difficulties they reveal would be shared by any reasonable tiebout model which differed from his special case i believe that my examples controvert tiebout s suggestion 39 last paragraph that his theory compares favorably with competitive equilibrium theory most of the examples in this paper have already appeared in the literature i cite related work as i go along what is new here is that i assemble the examples in a unified argument

accounting earnings and top executive compensation abstract this paper investigates the role of accounting earnings in top executive compensation contracts it provides evidence in support of the hypothesis that earnings based incentives help shield executives from market wide factors in stock prices the paper demonstrates that earnings reflect firm specific changes in value but are less sensitive to market wide movements in equity values as a result the inclusion of earnings based performance measures in executive compensation contracts helps shield executives from fluctuations in firm value that are beyond their control the hypothesis is shown to explain cross sectional variation in the use of earnings based incentives

monetary policy predictability in the euro area an international comparison we evaluate the ability of market participants to anticipate monetary policy decisions in 14 countries first by looking at both the magnitude and volatility of changes in the money market rates we show that the days of policy meetings are special days for financial markets second we find that the predictability of federal reserve fed bank of england and european central bank ecb is fully comparable finally an econometric analysis of the ability of market participants to incorporate in the current short term interest rates the expected policy changes shows that in the euro area and in other countries policy decisions are anticipated well in advance

performance pay delegation and multitasking under uncertainty and innovativeness an empirical investigation it has been recently noted that the trade off between risk and incentives that agency theory predicts turns out to be rather weak we examine predictions from agency theory on the basis of data from a data set encompassing close to 1000 danish firms we find that the relation between performance pay and environmental uncertainty is indeed weak we examine the relation between delegation and environmental uncertainty and find that this relation is confirmed we also examine the multi tasking agency hypothesis that as risk increases the flexibility of agents is restricted we fail to find support for this hypothesis

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

the impact of corporate governance practices on r d efforts a look at shareholders rights cross listing and control pyramid the paper considers the impact of multiple shareholder oriented governance practices on rd decisions based on a sample of 5 528 firms belonging to 110 large french listed business groups our results substantiate the idea that shareholder oriented governance practices and a lower position in a control pyramid are better for rd investment the introduction of any additional shareholder oriented practice is found to result in more rd we show however that this anglo americanization of the french corporate governance system is only partial we provide evidence of the co existence of an old french system of corporate governance with a hybrid model of corporate governance the lack of concrete results on complementarity among shareholder oriented governance practices casts doubt on the stability of this hybrid model in the french context