control rights in complex partnerships this paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two players who are in a complex partnership that is a partnership which produces impure public goods we show that the optimal allocation depends on technological factors the parties valuations of the goods produced and the degree of impurity of these goods when the degree of impurity is large control rights should be given to the main investor irrespective of preference considerations there are some situations in which this allocation is optimal even if the degree of impurity is very low as long as one party s investment is more important than the other party s if the parties investments are of similar importance and the degree of impurity is large shared authority is optimal with a greater share going to the low valuation party if the importance of the parties investments is similar but the degree of impurity is neither large nor small the low valuation party should receive sole authority we analyze an extension in which side payments are infeasible we check for robustness of our results in several dimensions such as allowing for multiple parties or for joint authority and apply our results to interpret a number of complex partnerships including those involving schools and child custody jel d02 o23 h41 l31

children as collective goods and divorce settlements the failure of many divorced fathers to comply with court mandated child support awards has been identified as a major reason why a growing number of children live in poverty in female headed households this paper presents a model that seeks to explain why so many divorced fathers allow their children s welfare to suffer as a consequence of divorce the point of departure is the recognition that children are collective consumption goods from the point of view of the father and mother within marriage proximity and altruism serve to overcome the free rider problem associated with the provision of public goods however on divorce the noncustodial parent suffers a loss of control over the allocative decisions of the custodial parent and it is not feasible for the couple to achieve a pareto optimal allocation of their joint resources a model of optimal marriage contracts is constructed in which a couple decides on the allocation of resources within marriage and on the terms of a settlement in the event

the effect of child support payments on the labor supply of female family heads an econometric analysis recent census bureau statistics show that women who receive child support payments have higher earnings and work longer hours than women who do not does this suggest that child support unlike all other nonwage income does not deter work effort or are women who receive it simply different we use 1979 1982 cps data on divorced or separated women to estimate the determinants of hours worked when afdc participation and child support are endogenous we find evidence of unobservable differences between women who receive child support and those who do not controlling for these both child support and other nonwage income appear to reduce hours worked but the deterrent effect of child support is considerably less

budgetary units a weberian approach to consumption1 established consumption theory relies heavily on application of individualistic frames and market models of behavior a framework built around consumption oriented groups would facilitate progress toward a more general theory of consumption this article reintroduces and extends weber s budgetary unit concept to address this gap correcting key problems dogging the consumption literature the budgetary unit concept 1 offers a new framework for theorizing and better accounting for observed consumption patterns 2 reveals how consumption units have organizational logics preferences strengths and vulnerabilities that are consequentially distinct from market logic of production and profit and 3 focuses attention on social processes and features enabling theorization of general social patterns of consumption across diverse contexts this article highlights the explanatory power and broad applicability of weber s budgetary unit approach using the conventionally dissimilar cases of russian organized

labor market opportunities and women s decision making power within households abstract despite the perceived importance of labor market opportunities in shaping married women s outside option and their bargaining power within households as a result this link has received very little empirical attention using longitudinal data on who makes the decision on a wide range of issues within mexican households and data from the administrative records of the mexican social security institute this paper identifies the effects of relative changes in labor market opportunities for men and women on both working and non working women s decision making power i find that increases in labor market opportunities improve women s decision making power as well as children s health using differential labor demand shocks across mexican industries caused by china s admission to the wto gives similar results

rationalizing child support decisions the authors provide a framework within which the child support compliance decisions of noncustodial fathers and the child support awards set by institutional agents can be coherently interpreted the model of child support transfers is able to capture qualitatively the features of the monthly payment distribution estimated parental decision rules are used to infer the implicit weights given by institutional agents to the postdivorce welfare of parents and children the authors find that the weight attached to the combined welfare of the custodial mother and child is significantly less than the weight given to the father s welfare in most sample cases copyright 1995 by american economic association

the effect of child support policies on visitations and transfers recent research on child support issues has been concerned with normative problems involvingthe distribution of welfare between divorced parents and their children as well as with the assess ment of the behavioral responses of parents to child support orders and custody arrangements see e g del boca and flinn 1995 gar nkel and klawitter 1990 bartfeldt and gar nkel 1996 del boca 1996 del boca and ribero 1998 and flinn 2000 while there is bynow an extensive literature analyzing the e ects of child support policies on monetary transfersof noncustodial parents and the extent of compliance with child support orders little researchhas been done on the relationship between monetary transfers between parents and the divisionof the child s time while income transfers to the custodial parent are no doubt importantfor the child s consumption and general well being there exists considerable empirical evidencesuggesting that the division of the child s time between the parents has important e ects on thechild s welfare beller and graham 1993 there have been few analyses of this relationship weiss and willis 1985 provide one theoretical motivation for the positive relationship betweenthe noncustodial parent s contact time with the child and their level of transfers they claimthat increased contact time allows better monitoring of the custodial parent s expenditures onthe child which induces higher levels of transfers to the custodial parent we have developed a model del boca and ribero 1999 in which visitations and childsupport are the outcomes of a negotiation process whereby the father exchanges income forvisitation time institutional agents such as judges state legislatures etc can impact thewelfareofthemembersofthenonintactfamilybyalteringtheendowmentsofeachofthe1

what have we learned from the economics of the family the family is distinguished from other social institutions such as firms by its crucial role in the production and nurture of children and its rationale is ultimately to be found in the preferences of individuals for own children sexual reproduction means that the production of one s own child requires the participation of another person of the opposite sex the production of a child who will survive become a successful adult and produce his or her own children requires the expenditure of both personal and purchased resources over a lengthy period of time although interesting insights on the family can be culled from the classics systematic development of the economics of the family is a recent phenomenon beginning in the late 1950 s when harvey leibenstein 1957 and gary becker 1960 attempted to address the determinants of fertility behavior within the framework of consumer theory in this paper i provide a brief overview of the history of family economics since 1960 and along the way offer a selective assessment of what has been learned from it i attempt this assessment by asking how far we have progressed in answering a few of the larger theoretical empirical and policy questions that have motivated economists interests in an area customarily studied by sociologists and demographers or that have caused economists dealing with more traditional subject matter to incorporate the family into their work among the set of questions that have been addressed within the literature during the past twenty five years are 1 what are the causes of the historical association between economic growth and development and demographic transition from high to low levels of fertility and mortality of what relevance is the historical experience of currently developed countries to contemporary ldcs should fertility reduction be a primary goal of policy in the developing countries are the developed countries in danger of extinction because of fertility below replacement levels 2 what was the cause of the post world war ii baby boom and subsequent baby bust was the baby boom a one time aberration from a secular decline in fertility or can we expect substantial fluctuations in the birth rate in the future what are the consequences of the baby boom for the economic welfare of cohorts born during and after the boom 3 is the traditional family dead in the united states and other developed countries why did the divorce rate double in a decade why the growth in female headed households why do so many divorced fathers fail to support their children has the sexual division of labor within the family changed as a consequence of the growth of female labor supply to what extent are these changes in the family caused by social policy and to what extent are they a product of basic market forces associated with modern economic development what are the consequences of these changes for the welfare of future generations i attempt to touch on some issues from each of the three areas in which the questions are grouped however constraints imposed by limitations of space time and most imtdiscussants kenneth wolpin ohio state university robert pollak university of pennsylvania t paul schultz yale university

estimation of the internal adjustment costs model using longitudinal establishment data this paper develops estimates of the internal costs measured in terms of foregone current output associated with the introduction of new plant and equipment into manufacturing establishments using the census bureau s longitudinal establishment data file a very large and rich source of production and investment data our estimates provide strong support for the internal adjustment costs hypothesis they indicate that one dollar increases in expansion and replacement investment cause on the average 35and 21 cent reductions respectively in current output the internal cost of adjusting to equipment appears to be higher than the cost of adjusting to plant

intra household allocation of resources inferences from non resident fathers child support payments a large proportion of divorced and separated fathers form new partnerships the new partner s preferences are not likely to put much weight on expenditures on the man s children from his previous union thus his own and his partner s income would have different impacts on his child support payments if partners relative incomes affect bargaining power in household decisions this article exploits within father variation in the british household panel survey 1991 2005 to estimate the impacts of the intra household income distribution on child support payments and the father s welfare we find that a higher share of father s income in household income increases the probability of paying child support and its amount relative to household income

real flexibility and financial structure an empirical analysis i examine the empirical relation between real flexibility and financial structure i test whether real flexibility increases debt capacity by lowering default risk and making assets more marketable or decreases debt capacity by facilitating risk shifting and asset substitution i measure real flexibility as the sensitivity of marginal production and investment decisions to variations in the economic environment i find that financial leverage is negatively related to production flexibility but positively related to investment flexibility this split in results suggests that although asset substitution facilitated by investment flexibility can be prevented contractually risk shifting facilitated by production flexibility is intractable copyright 2003 oxford university press

child support and partnership dissolution this article studies the determinants of partnership dissolution and focuses on the role of child support we exploit the variation in child support liabilities and entitlements driven in part by the introduction of a new set of complex rules that determined child support liability in the uk and by their interaction with welfare rules our panel has the virtue that the post 1993 variation in child support liability for all couples in partnerships formed prior to 1993 is unanticipated we find strong evidence that the resulting large child support liabilities significantly reduced dissolution risks

family specific investments and divorce with dynamically inconsistent households marital contracts and policy abstract this paper bridges two distinct areas of inquiry the economic theory of the family and behavioral research on time inconsistent preferences motivated by anecdotal and survey evidence suggesting that present bias plays a role in intra household decision making we propose a model in which hyperbolic discounting couples engage in home production activities thereby accumulating family specific capital over time at any given point in time the gains to continued marriage depend on the accumulated stock of this capital and a temporary random shock to match quality couples whose match quality deteriorates may choose to divorce and this is more likely to happen if past investments in family specific capital have been low we obtain three main sets of results first present biased preferences induce couples to underinvest in family specific capital and to overdivorce second sophisticated couples but not naive ones may choose to enter marriage on terms which make divorce more costly to obtain third the inefficiencies in the behavior of time inconsistent couples can be completely undone by means of earnings and divorce taxes that vary over the marital life cycle

law property and marital dissolution this paper challenges the view that legal rights are not important in affecting whether people divorce but it puts as much emphasis on property rights given for example by the law on alimony as on dissolution rights in the united states the paper sets out two stylised models of marriage and examines the consequences of fuller compensation for economic sacrifices made during marriage if the dominant economic issue in a marriage is who undertakes household tasks then a law giving fuller compensation makes divorce more likely if the dominant issue is child custody divorce is less likely excerpt

testing among models of intrahousehold resource allocation households are the locus for much economic decision making households function as producers investors in human and physical capital managers of risk and as consumers many resources are allocated within households and the effects of many policies depend on the dynamics of household decision making for example household decisions about allocating food among individual household members may determine who benefits from programs to improve health nutrition or welfare in many microeconomic studies the household is treated as an individual for analytical purposes in other words it is assumed that a household acts as a single entity with a single set of preferences recently however a number of economists have recognized that households are sites of conflict as well as cooperation and have begun to use new classes of models to explain how resources are allocated among household members this literature has especially improved our understanding of households in which income is not completely pooled in such a setting standard household models may offer misleading conclusions about the effects of policies on individual household members i this paper goes beyond recent surveys of intrahousehold issue by explicitly examining the assumptions predictions and empirical implications of different intrahousehold models in particular it analyzes empirical tests that distinguish among competing models by clarifying the similarities and differences among alternative models this paper also clarifies what has actually been demonstrated and what has not been demonstrated by previous empirical studies in so doing the paper points to specific topics in need of further research this paper is organized as follows section 2 analyzes the assumptions and predictions of each of the five main classes of intrahousehold resource allocation models section 3 describes empirical tests of these assumptions along with an analysis of empirical work that has been generated sections 4 and 5 discuss the questions that remain unanswered and directions for future research

marital division of labor with risk of divorce the role of voice enforcement of contracts it is assumed that emotional ties can be relied on to enforce implicit marital contracts by voice therefore in the present model divorce has economic consequences not only because the economies of scale from living together are destroyed but also because the scope for such voice enforcement is weakened moreover perhaps surprisingly i find that it is ambiguous how an increase in the probability of divorce influences predivorce allocation of time even when preferences are assumed to be homothetic

can adequate child support be legislated responses to guidelines and enforcement i introduction in response to the high levels of poverty faced by children of divorced parents federal and state governments adopted a number of policies during the 1980s aimed at increasing child support awards and payments these laws required all states to have numerical child support guidelines to be used by parents who could not agree on their own and to increase state enforcement of delinquent child support awards implicit in much of the policy discussion about divorce is the assumption that within marriage parents will jointly act in the best interest of their children but that after divorce children may not be adequately provided for and legislative action is required in the extreme this view is represented by the stereotype of the deadbeat dad a term that describes a father who doesn t care enough about his children to continue any involvement with them either in terms of time or money similarly economic models often assume a noncooperative outcome in which the non custodial father will not provide what he did during marriage e g weiss and willis 1985 our article makes several contributions to the literature on the determinants of child support by absent fathers in contrast to almost all of the work on this topic that has been based on noncooperative models we develop a theoretical model in which some families may be able to achieve a cooperative outcome which increases the total resources available to children in particular our model identifies three different types of outcomes 1 cooperative and self enforcing 2 noncooperative and self enforcing and 3 noncooperative and state enforced each of these outcomes has different implications for the well being of children and for the level of government involvement in divorce settlements we then derive the conditions under which families can achieve each of these outcomes and we specifically model how policy variables affect whether or not a particular outcome is achieved the levels of payments and levels of compliance conditional on the type of outcome our empirical work provides reduced fo rm evidence that is consistent with a model that distinguishes these different types of outcomes and we find that policies can affect the type of outcome as well as the level of child support awards and payments section ii of this article provides background and motivations for our topic we develop a general theoretical framework in section iii and compare outcomes under assumptions of symmetric versus asymmetric information section iv incorporates the legal environment by modeling the impact of guidelines and state enforcement efforts on the probability the custodial parent cp will impose the guidelines the level of child support awards and the noncustodial parent s ncp s compliance in section v we interpret comparative statics section vi examines the determinants of reduced form models of the probability of a court ordered child support award and shows that the predictions of the model are consistent with data on the characteristics of divorce settlements and parental behavior for those with voluntary versus court ordered settlements a summary of the findings and policy implications concludes ii background and motivation in contrast to the marriage literature which predominately uses cooperative bargaining models the literature on divorce generally assumes that divorcing parents are unable to reach cooperative agreements for example weiss and willis 1985 model parental expenditures on children after divorce as a principal agent problem in which the absent father cannot verify the child expenditures made by the mother this problem of asymmetric information leads to an inefficient noncooperative outcome del boca and flinn 1995 also use a noncooperative model to examine the government s choice of compliance outcomes others have analyzed compliance with child support awards using an economics of crime framework beron 1988 beller and graham 1991 chambers 1979

household bargaining over fertility theory and evidence from malaysia we develop and test a model of household bargaining over fertility when transfers between spouses are possible the model makes precise how the fertility preferences of each spouse translate into fertility outcomes we show this depends on whether or not spouses can commit to their future actions within marriage if couples bargain with commitment fertility outcomes take account of both spouses fertility preferences and do not depend on the threat point in marital bargaining if couples bargain without commitment the influence of each spouse s fertility preference on fertility outcomes depends on the relevant threat point in marital bargaining and the distribution of bargaining power we test the models using household data from the malaysia family life survey this data set contains information on each spouse s desired fertility level as well as fertility outcomes we exploit differences in threat points in marital bargaining across ethnic groups to help identify the underlying bargaining model the evidence suggests couples bargain without commitment

the economics of child custody i develop a model of marriage in which spouses decide on investments in child quality during marriage and on the allocation of child custody should they divorce the custodial allocation determines the share of the marital surplus each spouse appropriates which in turn influences spouses investment incentives the custodial allocation therefore has both distributional and efficiency consequences i derive the equilibrium investments and optimal custodial allocation and identify three channels through which making divorce easier affects child welfare investments in child quality during marriage the likelihood of divorce and the allocation of custody if divorce occurs

divorce and the cognitive achievement of children children of divorced parents exhibit lower test scores and educational attainment have these correlations a causal interpretation parents who divorce may be less likely to invest in their children while together or they may divorce to shield their children from the effects of marital conflict i study the relationship between children s achievement and the marital status of their parents within a dynamic framework in which partners decide on whether to remain married how to interact with or without conflict and child investments i then assess whether a child whose parents divorced would have been better off had divorce not occurred

intra family distribution of paid work time this article analyses the intra family distribution of paid work time in five european countries france germany italy spain and the uk to that end we formulate a collective model which allows us to characterize the efficient labour supply decisions of each spouse this two equation model is then simultaneously estimated by using national panel data drawn from the european community household panel echp 1994 2001 empirical results clearly show that in all sample countries the labour supply of wives is affected by own wages household and own nonlabour incomes and the number of children whereas evidence for husbands differs across countries

the effect of incomes wages and afdc benefits on marital disruption this paper uses a choice based model to estimate the effects of a broad set of economic factors including afdc benefit levels husband s earnings and a woman s wage rate on the probability of marital dissolution we find that the probability of divorce is lower for marriages in which the husband s labor income is higher we also find that while afdc income has a substantial effect on welfare receipt by a divorced woman it has a relatively small effect on the probability that a married woman will become divorced finally we find no support for the hypothesis that rising wages for women have increased marital instability

differntial fecundity markets and gender roles women are fecund for a shorter period of their lives than men this paper investigates how differential fecundity interacts with marriage labor and financial markets to affect gender roles the main findings of the paper are as follows i fecund women are relatively scarce men will behave differently than women in response to this scarcity in the most fundamental way demand and supply conditions in the marriage market affect gender roles ii differential fecundity does not have any market invariant gender effect gender roles depend on the way in which marriage labor and financial markets interact iii gender differences in the labor market can occur without corresponding differences in labor market opportunities productivities in child rearing or social norms iv with uncertainty in human capital accumulation and no insurance against this uncertainty the model s predictions are consistent with observed gender roles

child support welfare dependency and poverty female headed families have among the highest poverty rates of any major demographic group in the united states the purpose of this paperis to investigate empirically the effectiveness of current child support enforcement policies and to determine their role in reducing poverty and welfare dependency a special supplement to the april 1982 current population survey provides the data for the analysis the results indicate that child support enforce ment may represent an effective means for re ducing welfare program costs but isunlikely to have a dramatic effect on either welfare de pendency or poverty copyright 1986 by american economic association

should we write prenuptial contracts abstract a successful marriage requires for both parties to make investments in their relationship and marital assets how such assets would be divided if and when the parties divorce is an important factor determining each party s ex ante investment incentives using the incomplete contracting approach we characterize the optimal asset division rule one that provides the parties with the best investment incentives we then discuss the circumstances under which the spouses would agree in equilibrium to contract out state imposed rules governing the allocation of marital assets upon divorce we conclude by exploring the implications of our results in the context of various asset division rules currently discussed by policy makers

divorce remarriage and child support there is some evidence that children of divorced parents do not perform as well as comparable children in intact families but that this gap declines with the aggregate divorce rate we develop a model in which the higher expectations for remarriage associated with higher divorce rates can trigger an equilibrium in which divorced fathers make more generous transfers that benefit their children and the mother in the aftermath of divorce as a result the welfare loss of children from the separation of their parents can be lower when divorce and remarriage rates rise

family policy with non cooperative families we consider a non cooperative model of a family s time allocation between market work and providing a home produced family public good such as child care or care for the elderly the model predicts underprovision of the public good because of crowding out this does not necessarily warrant public provision in contrast to other approaches in family economics we find that attempts to redistribute between spouses may alter the final distribution within the marriage and that such a policy may be pareto improving we also find that some degree of progressivity of the income tax can be welfare improving

child support payment behavior an econometric decomposition growing concern about the cost to families and society from child support noncompliance has resulted in a flurry of scholarly articles and in welfare reform legislation addressing child support the attention has been drawn from reports showing that almost 2 3 million women of the 4 4 million owed support in 1985 did not receive all they were owed many receiving no payment at all 17 the implications of this are far reaching it is well known that over half of all female headed families have children in poverty and many of these families will end up drawing aid to families with dependent children payments child support could help shift the burden from general tax revenues to the responsible father for the family the benefits of additional income may result in reduced stress on the mother and less disruption in the lives of the children taking a longer run view greater family income has been linked to more years of schooling and higher wage rates in the early part of a child s career 7 higher payments of child support then may serve to increase current parental income and help reduce future poverty in this paper we use a more efficient estimator to model child support behavior than has been used the technique allows the extraction of more information from the data than previously has been possible in particular the marginal impact of changes in variables on the probability of being a nonpayer partial payer or full payer and on the expected amounts paid we show the usual practice of combining individuals who only pay a part of their order with those who pay all of their order into one group may lead to misleading policy conclusions the combining of these groups does give a sense of the total amount that can be collected across individuals often as important though are compliance issues centered on those not paying all of their support order while attention has been paid to those paying none of their order partial payers have been ignored in the literature in the course of our work we find support for the effectiveness of the federal child support enforcement program csep in increasing compliance with support

the effects of in work benefit reform in britain on couples theory and evidence this paper examines the effects of the working families tax credit wftc on couples in britain we develop a simple model of household decisions which explicitly accounts for the role played by the tax and benefit system its main implications are then tested using panel data from the british household panel survey collected between 1991 and 2002 overall the financial incentives of the reform had negligible effects on a wide range of married mothers decisions such as eligible working at least 16 hours per week and full time employment working at least 30 hours per week employment transitions childcare use and divorce rates women s responses however were highly heterogeneous depending on their partners labour supply and earnings mothers married to low income men showed larger responses in employment especially if they had younger children they were more likely to remain in the labour force and had higher rates at which they entered it while more likely to receive the tax credit they also experienced a greater risk of divorce we find virtually no effect for women with higher income husbands likewise there are no statistically significant responses among married men