economic deregulation days of reckoning for microeconomists economic deregulation of american industry is one of the most important experiments in economic policy of our time 1 in 1977 17 percent of u s gnp was produced by fully regulated industries 2 by 1988 following ten years of partial and complete economic deregulation of large parts of the transportation communications energy and financial industries that total had been cut significantly to 6 6 percent of gnp 3 the political forces behind the decision to change the market conditions under which roughly 600 billion of u s output is produced were strong and varied but according to political scientists martha derthick and paul quirk 1985 p 36 deregulation would never have occurred if economists especially microeconomists had not generally supported it through their research 4 in retrospect it is fair to ask were microeconomists able to develop a theoretical and empirical framework to explain regulation and its effects and to form predictions of deregulation s effects were they able to predict the actual effects of deregulation this paper surveys the evidence to address these questions and of

wall street occupations many finance jobs entail the risk of large losses and hard to monitor effort we analyze the equilibrium consequences of these features in a model with optimal dynamic contracting we show that finance jobs feature high compensation up or out promotion and long work hours and are more attractive than other jobs moral hazard problems are exacerbated in booms even though pay increases employees whose talent would be more valuable elsewhere can be lured into finance jobs while the most talented employees might be unable to land these jobs because they are too hard to manage

testing the morale theory of nominal wage rigidity this paper tests the morale theory of nominal wage rigidity according to which firms resist making nominal cuts to workers pay even in adverse economic conditions because such cuts hurt worker morale and productivity the authors analyze data from an employer employee survey they conducted in japan in 2000 that year coincided with a rare spell of deflationary recession which the authors argue is a good setting in which to study how nominal pay cuts affect morale they find that a nominal annual pay freeze experienced by 21 of the sampled workers demoralized workers by reducing their trust in the firm and that even greater demoralization not wholly attributable to reduced trust was associated with a nominal pay cut which affected 17 of the workers the observed negative relationship between nominal pay cuts and morale persists even when the estimation includes controls and firm fixed effects

personality attributes and optimal hierarchical compensation gradients abstract managers of equal ability differ with respect to risk aversion and with respect to the degree of optimism with which they assess their personal chances of promotion conversely firms differ with respect to their need for managers with inclinations for caution or risk taking and with respect to their ability to reward risk taking the paper develops a model to explain which firms get which managers in terras of the above attributes in the process it shows how the optimal degree of inequality in compensation varies systematically across firms

an experimental examination of labor supply and work intensities estimated negative substitution effects on work hours question the empirical validity of the classical labor supply model estimates are reconciled by allowing a dual choice of hours and effort for piecerate workers in such a model these negative substitution effects result from substituting on and off the job leisure we test our model using controlled experimentation on human subjects these experiments while not naturally occurring environments represent real economic choices and can generate data unavailable elsewhere e g effort data the results support our model and they have implications both for labor management and for empirical research focusing only on the hours choice the classical static model of the labor leisure choice offers positive compensated wage effects on hours of work as its main testable implication previous attempts to test this hypothesis with field data have cast doubt on the empirical validity of the static labor supply model due to the frequency of negative estimated compensated wage elasticities a limitation of the model is that it views the choice of hours of work as the only

agent compensation and the limits of bonding agents in positions of trust may engage in malfeasance which is difficult to detect this paper develops a model in which employers seek to control malfeasance by paying wages contingent on imperfect monitoring and agents may be required to pay entry fees or post bonds we conclude that entry fees which exceed agents assets are ineffective in controlling malfeasance as a result conditions exist in which it is optimal to pay agents more than their opportunity cost such conditions lead to an excess supply of applicants and allow employers to engage in discrimination at zero cost to themselves

wage changes and intrafirm job mobility over the business cycle two case studies despite the many reasons to expect sluggish wage adjustment recent evidence suggests that real wages are quite procyclical growing more rapidly during economic expansions than during recessions and that this wage procyclicality pertains even to workers who stay with the same employer one possible explanation for these findings is the old hypothesis that a portion of firms cyclical adjustment of labor costs is achieved not by changing the wages paid in particular jobs but by changing the quality of labor assigned to those jobs the authors analysis of interwar personnel data from the ford motor company and the a m byers company supports that hypothesis the authors recognize that case studies of only two firms cannot be definitive but they conclude that cyclicality in workers job assignments deserves further attention

a model of efficiency wages as a signal of firm value we consider performance contracts with firm private information the verifiable components of the contract an up front wage and employment may serve both as a signal and a performance incentive job rent may be necessary for signaling and since efficient signaling is multidimensional there is an inextricable link between job rent and underemployment signaling can explain the lack of explicit bonding in actuality though our basic model is static our underemployment result is not a consequence of firm myopia when the firm is farsighted it will not maximize the joint future surplus if it cannot extract the worker s share at present copyright 1993 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

effort observability and worker productivity towards an explanation of economic dualism this paper suggests an explanation of the wage and productivity differentials between formal and informal sectors in developing countries this explanation is based on differences in the observability of effort that arise from technological differences such as size of operation the authors argue that observability of effort is lower in the formal sector and then show that under reasonable conditions this leads to higher wages and higher effort productivity this is because with lower observability the marginal cost of effort is lower when existing employees are induced to work harder than when more workers are hired explanations for intersectoral differences in factor intensities and sector specific unemployment rates also follow from the authors basic assumptions copyright 1989 by royal economic society

gender differences in training capital and wages this paper constructs an equilibrium job matching model where workers differ in their attachment to the labor force the model predicts that workers with weaker attachment to the labor market will receive lower starting wages and lower post training wages and will be placed in jobs that offer less training and use less capital the implications of the model for gender differences in pay and job assignment are tested with the eopp data set ourfindings suggest that while training intensity during the first three months of employment is similar in positions filled by males and females females are employed in positions that have a shorter duration of on the job training and that use less capital these differences in on the job training and capital in positions filled by men and women as well as a lower market value for women s prior labor market experience account for a substantial part of the gap in wages between males and females

dynamic contracts with worker mobility via directed on the job search this article proposes a model with dynamic incentive contracts and on the job search in a frictional labor market the optimal long term contract exhibits an increasing wage tenure profile with increasing wages worker effort also increases with tenure these two features imply that the probabilities of both voluntary and involuntary job separation decrease with both job tenure and the duration of employment given these results workers experience differing labor market transitions between employment unemployment and across different employers and the equilibrium generates endogenous heterogeneity among ex ante homogeneous workers abstract from author

the british low wage sector and the employment prospects of the unemployed abstractare low wages a way for the unemployed to switch to higher paying jobs using data from the british household panel survey the labour market dynamics of unemployed low paid and higher paid employed men are analysed moreover the respective un employment duration and occupational skill level are accounted for results show that in general low wages significantly reduce the risk of future unemployment and increase the chances of ascending the salary ladder especially in the case of long term unemployment 360 days furthermore the occupational skill level has a substantial influence on the upward mobility of low paid jobs individuals working in the initial period in a low paid and higher skilled occupation have on average an 11 percentage points higher probability of entering higher pay compared to when working in a low paid and low skilled occupation

demographic effects on the natural rate of unemployment or baby booms and unemployment abstract this paper establishes the importance of demographics on both the actual rate and the natural rate of unemployment the actual dynamics can be quite complex and the natural rate is shown to depend crucially on population shifts

dynamic natural monopoly regulation time inconsistency moral hazard and political environments this paper quantitatively assesses time inconsistency moral hazard and political ideology in monopoly regulation of electricity distribution we specify and estimate a dynamic model of utility regulation featuring investment and moral hazard we find that 1 there is under investment in electricity distribution capital aiming to reduce power outages 2 more conservative political environments have higher regulated returns and 3 more electricity is lost in distribution in more conservative political environments we quantify the value of regulatory commitment in inducing more investment conservative regulators mitigate welfare losses due to time inconsistency but worsen losses from moral hazard

earnings profile and monitoring under asymmetric information abstract this paper considers a two period wage contract model in which the firm has private information about productivity and chooses the intensity of monitoring the worker s effort it shows that the optimal earnings job tenure profile is increasing

firm specific human capital a skill weights approach the theory of human capital is agnostic on what constitutes firm specific skills the theory specifies that specific skills contribute to productivity only at the current firm a broader approach lets all skills be general but firms use them with different weights attached for example computer programming economics and accounting are general skills but there may be only one firm that wants workers trained in all three one implication is that wage profiles and the split of human capital costs depend on thickness of the market another is that firms pay for what appears to be general training

on the job search and moral hazard we analyze the interaction between intertemporal incentive contracts and search frictions associated with on the job search in our model agency problems call for wage contracts with deferred compensation at the same time workers do on the job search deferred compensation improves workers incentives to exert effort but distorts their on the job search decisions we show that deferred compensation is less attractive when the value to the worker firm pair of on the job search is high moreover the interplay between search frictions and wage contracts creates feedback effects if firms in equilibrium use contracts with deferred compensation fewer firms with vacancies enter the on the job search market and this in turn reduces the distortions created by deferred compensation these feedback effects between the incentive contracts used and the activity level in the search markets can lead to multiple equilibria a low turnover equilibrium where firms use deferred compensation and a high turnover equilibrium where they do not furthermore the model predicts that firms are more likely to use deferred compensation when search frictions are high and when the gains from on the job search are small

political economy of mechanisms we study the optimal mirrlees taxation problem in a dynamic economy in contrast to the standard approach where the taxation mechanism is operated by a benevolent planner with full commitment power we focus on economies in which policy decisions are made by self interested politicians who cannot commit to policies the society controls politicians using elections we show that the provision of incentives to politicians can be partly separated from redistribution across agents and that political economy constraints can be modeled as introducing additional aggregate distortions in the dynamic mirrlees problem we provide conditions under which the political economy distortions persist or disappear in the long run if the politicians are as patient as the agents the best sustainable mechanism leads to an asymptotic allocation where the aggregate distortions arising from political economy disappear in contrast when politicians are less patient than the citizens positive aggregate labor and capital taxes remain even asymptotically we conclude by providing a brief comparison of centralized

signaling and the design of delegated management contracts for public utilities this article analyzes the shape of contracts between local governments and the contractors they hire to run public facilities on their behalf governments are privately informed about the quality of the facility while risk neutral contractors undertake a non verifiable operating eort the design of the contract signals the quality of the facility in such a way that the better this quality the greater the share of operating risk kept by the government this feature reduces the agent s marginal incentives creating a trade o between signaling and moral hazard we provide extensions of our framework in several directions allowing for risk aversion on the agent s side double moral hazard and political delegation the model is supported by some stylized facts from the water industry

the firm as a dedicated hierarchy a theory of the origins and growth of firms in the formative stages of their businesses entrepreneurs have to provide incentives for employees to protect rather than steal the source of organizational rents we study how the entrepreneur s response to this problem determines the organization s internal structure growth and its eventual size large steep hierarchies will predominate in physical capital intensive industries and will have seniority based promotion policies by contrast e at hierarchies will prevail in human capital intensive industries and will have up or out promotion systems furthermore e at hierarchies will have more distinctive technologies or cultures than steep hierarchies the model points to some essential differences between organized hierarchies and markets at the root of most enterprises generating economic surplus is an entrepreneur with a unique critical resource such as an idea good customer relationships a new tool or superior management technique a fundamental problem of entrepreneurship is how to enlist the cooperation of the many agents necessary for production without ceding to them too much of the surplus generated by the enterprise the risk of being expropriated however is always inherent in production in particular the entrepreneur has to give her employees whom we call managers close proximity or access to the critical resource for them to learn to produce effectively for example a manager has to understand the idea be in contact with the key customers and suppliers or even learn the entrepreneur s unique managerial techniques in order to work effectively but access also gives the manager the opportunity to expropriate this critical resource and compete against the entrepreneur managers may steal the idea walk away with clients or mimic the entrepreneur s management style and start up a rival concern the greater the access a manager has the more he can appropriate and the more effectively he can compete this paper explores the role of organizational design in

should i stay or should i go career choices for young workers in latin america labor market institutions shape the return to workers skills they define the incentives of firms and workers to invest in general and specific skills affecting the returns to experience and tenure this paper presents an empirical assessment of this hypothesis we take advantage of rich administrative data from brazil and chile two countries with different regulatory frameworks we focus on young workers as they face to a greater extent the trade off between accumulating general or specific skills the analysis is motivated by a simple conceptual framework from which we derive empirical predictions it takes into account the potential endogeneity of occupational choices while allowing for heterogenous returns to tenure and experience we find positive average returns to both dimensions in both countries with larger returns to tenure in brazil and larger returns to experience in chile this is consistent with the original conjecture as the more rigid labor market legislation in brazil encourages firms to carry out additional investments in young workers s specific skills chile s institutions on the contrary promote the acquisition of general skills we further examine how these returns differ by educational attainment an important policy consideration in the region and find that more educated workers in both countries face larger returns to experience and tenure relative to their less educated counterparts

the size and scope of government comparative politics with rational politicians we try to demonstrate how economists may engage in research on comparative politics relating the size and composition of government spending to the political system a downsian model of electoral competition and forward looking voting indicates that majoritarian as opposed to proportional elections increase competition between parties by focusing it into some key marginal districts this leads to less public goods less rents for politicians more redistribution and larger government a model of legislative bargaining and backward looking voting indicates that presidential as opposed to parliamentary regimes increase competition between both politicians and voters this leads to less public goods less rents for politicians less redistribution and smaller government we confront these predictions with cross country data from around 1990 controlling for economic and social determinants of government spending we nd strong and robust support for the prediction that the size of government is smaller under presidential regimes and weaker support for the prediction that majoritarian elections are associated with less public goods

moral hazard in high office and the dynamics of aristocracy both aristocratic privileges and constitutional constraints in traditional monarchies can be derived from a ruler s incentive to minimize expected costs of moral hazard rents for high officials we consider a dynamic moral hazard model of governors serving a sovereign prince who must deter them from rebellion and hidden corruption which could cause costly crises to minimize costs a governor s rewards for good performance should be deferred up to the maximal credit that the prince can be trusted to pay in the long run we find that high officials can become an entrenched aristocracy with low turnover and large claims on the ruler dismissals for bad performance should be randomized to avoid inciting rebellions but the prince can profit from reselling vacant offices and so his decisions to dismiss high officials require institutionalized monitoring a soft budget constraint that forgives losses for low credit governors can become efficient when costs of corruption are low

the costs of worker displacement this study identifies part of the social loss attendant upon displacement as the remaining value of the assets specific to the severed employment relationship a bargaining model is used to link wage tenure profiles to the amount of information firms and workers possess about the duration of that relationship if information is good the profile will flatten as displacement approaches using psid data for workers separated between 1977 and 1981 wage tenure profiles are found not to change this suggests that either workers or both firms and workers are surprised by the displacement the present value of that part of the social loss attributable to the worker s share of firm specific capital is around 7 000 1980 dollars

wage premiums and profit maximization in efficiency wage models abstract the standard shirking model of efficiency wages is essentially a continuous time repeated prisoners dilemma game thus to sustain an equilibrium with employment requires sufficient gains from future co operation each division of these gains corresponds to some equilibrium efficiency wages correspond to employees receiving the gains bonds allow firms to receive them in markets well informed about agents pasts employment is independent of the distribution of gains but in anonymous markets with more workers than jobs employment is highest in efficiency wage equilibria efficiency wages thus arise naturally as the unique efficient equilibrium without recourse to assumptions that limit bonding

job assignments signalling and efficiency this article analyzes a model in which information about a worker s ability is only directly revealed to the firm employing the worker other firms however use the worker s job assignment as a signal of ability three results recur throughout the analysis first wage rates tend to be more closely associated with jobs than with ability levels second there is frequently an inefficient assignment of workers to jobs i e even when a firm has complete information about a worker s output third the severity of this inefficiency tends to be negatively correlated with the level of firm specific human capital in the economy

implementing high powered contracts to motivate intertemporal effort supply we characterize the optimal contract between a principal and a risk neutral wealth constrained agent when an adverse selection problem follows a moral hazard problem the optimal contract in this setting often is more steeply sloped for the largest output levels than is the optimal contract in either the standard moral hazard setting or the standard adverse selection setting the large incremental rewards for exceptional performance motivate the agent to deliver substantial effort both before and after he acquires privileged information about the production environment

managers and efficiency in banking abstract this paper presents evidence on the impact of managers on cost efficiency in banking stochastic frontier analysis is applied to a unique finnish data set manager age and education have strong yet complicated effects on efficiency the impact of age on efficiency depends on education a university degree is useful mainly in the largest banks of the sample educational background seems to be less important for young managers than for mature ones managing director changes are systematically followed by efficiency changes retirement typically causes an efficiency improvement whereas other manager changes can either improve or weaken efficiency however in many cases mature managers outperform their young colleagues

are wages habit forming evidence from micro data although utility functions play a central role in economics the axiom that utility depends only on the absolute levels of its arguments is rarely tested this paper uses panel data on 2000 british employees who remain with the same employer and who are not promoted from one wave to the next it is shown that one important measure of well being overall job satisfaction is strongly positively correlated with the change in the worker s pay between waves but is unrelated to the current level of pay empirical tests suggest that a reference dependent satisfaction function where individual well being depends on current pay relative to past pay is more consistent with these regression results than are productivity or agency explanations of increasing wage profiles some evidence is presented of greater job satisfaction effects of pay rises for lower paid less well educated and younger workers these results provide some micro evidence consistent with the theory widespread in social science of habituation individuals may become used to any given level of consumption or income as such they tie in with the finding that a country s well being as measured by the average happiness of its citizens is only weakly correlated with its per capita gnp

the importance of lifetime jobs differences between union and nonunion workers the authors use cps micro data to derive estimates of retention rates and eventual lifetime tenure probabilities for union and nonunion workers although both groups enjoy a considerable degree of

the wage effects of cumulative job mobility this analysis of data from the national longitudinal survey of youth shows that cumulative job mobility had statistically significant effects on wages in the years 1979 88 the direction of the wage effects positive or negative and their magnitude varied depending on the type of cumulative mobility examined employee initiated versus employerinitiated separations economic versus family related quits layoffs versus discharges the results also indicate that although men and women had different mobility histories men for example had been discharged more often than women and women had quit for family related reasons more often than men the wage effects of each type of cumulative mobility economic quits family related quits layoffs and discharges were similar for men and women tn this paper we examine the impact of cumulative job mobility on the subsequent wages of young men and women most previous work on this subject has focused on the impact of specific mobility events such as quits or layoffs rather than on the impact of total job history on wages researchers looking at single mobility decisions have consistently reported evidence that a change in employers does affect a worker s subsequent wage therefore it is reasonable to ask whether the impact ofjob change is cumulative that is does a worker s current wage reflect the impact of all past mobility decisions quits layoffs and discharges also since most of the

carrots and sticks pay supervision and turnover the efficiency wage model ewm has been advanced as an explanation for large and persistent wage differentials the shirking version of the ewm assumes a trade off between self supervision and external supervision the turnover version assumes turnover is costly to the firm variation across firms in the cost of monitoring shirking or turnover then is hypothesized to account for wage variations across firms for homogeneous workers using a new sample of firm data this paper presents empirical evidence of the trade off of wage premiums for supervisory intensity and turnover little evidence is found to support either version of the ewm

salaries and piece rates compensation can take many forms remuneration can come as pecuniary payments as fringes such as health and pension benefits or as a nonpecuniary reward such as plush office furniture that costs the firm less than it benefits the worker a significant literature has examined the trade offs between pecuniary and nonpecuniary compensation the modern work having been pioneered by rosen 1974 more recently another body of literature has examined the selection of method of total compensation ignoring the distinction between pecuniary and nonpecuniary payment this work has focused on risk and incentive factors it has resulted in comparisons of compensation based on absolute output levels to that based on relative performance it has also led to explorations of the relation of compensation to experience over the work life 2 little attention has been paid to what may be among the most important and obvious distinction in methods of compensation namely the choice between a fixed salary for some period of time that is paying on the basis of input and some workers receive compensation that is specified in advance and not directly contingent on performance instead it depends on an input measure such as hours worked for others compensation is directly related to output this essay is an attempt to predict a firm s choice of compensation method piece rates are defined more rigorously among the more important factors discussed are worker heterogeneity incentives sorting considerations monitoring costs and asymmetric information one result is that salary workers tend to be of lower quality and more homogeneous than are their piece rate counterparts numerous additional results are provided helpful comments by victoria lazear and yoram weiss are gratefully acknowledged support was provided by the department of labor and the national science foundation 1 see lazear and rosen 1981 stiglitz 1981 holmstrom 1982 green and stokey 1983 2 see lazear 1979 1981 and harris and holmstrom in press

implicit contracts explicit contracts and wages over the past decade the search for an explanation of aggregate money wage stickiness in the face of substantial shifts in the marginal revenue product of labor of the kind that was associated with an increase in real wages in the depression of the 1930 shas led to an extensive examination of explicit union and implicit nonunion employment contracting arrangements this distinction can be exaggerated long term union contracts have an implicit element in the sense that they specify only a limited number of contingencies to which wages will be adjusted moreover the implicit contracting branch of the literature has pushed in the direction of implying that the explicit contracts observed in the union sector may be formalizations of common informal arrangements in the nonunion sector so that differences between the sectors in the behavior of wages and employment may be more apparent than real the purpose of this paper is to examine the empirical basis for some of the key propositions of implicit contract theories and to note some important differences in the outcome of implicit and explicit contracting

limited liability contracts between principal and agent abstract the optimal strategy of the principal is examined in an environment where there are ex post limitations on the maximum penalty that can be imposed on a riskneutral agent contrary to the case in which such limitations are not imposed it is in the principal s interest to deliberately forego the opportunity to induce socially efficient behavior and to instead design a contract that induces the agent to realize an efficient outcome only in the most productive state of nature and perhaps in certain very unproductive states the properties of the contract are examined in detail

an empirical study of labor market equilibrium under working hours constraints predictions of economic theory for the equilibrium condition of workers in three labor markets with differing working hours constraints are tested original data allow the marginal rate of substitution of income for leisure to be estimated directly in two markets working hours constraints resulting from high fixed employment costs and the overtime premium respectively cause workers to desire fewer and more hours in the third market agricultural labor constraint factors are absent the predicted relationship between the wage and the marginal rate of substitution of income for leisure holds in each case implications for agency and human capital models are investigated additionally in the agricultural case preferences and equilibria are indistinguishable for legal and illegal workers copyright 1990 by mit press

dynamic labor market competition and wage seniority abstract we design an overlapping generations model of the labor market experienced workers bear costs of switching employers whereas the segment for junior workers is horizontally differentiated the literature typically explains wage seniority premia with reference to productivity gains generated by the accumulation of worker experience or mechanisms associated with incomplete information in contrast this paper characterizes how the wage seniority premium depends on the relative intensities of competition in the markets for junior and senior workers in particular we show that a wage seniority premium may prevail even under circumstances where senior workers are less productive than junior workers

unionization and plant closure in canada this paper examines for the first time the role of unionization as a determinant of plant closings in canada using the 1999 to 2001 canadian workplace and employee survey the paper contributes to the north american evidence by showing that the share of a plant s workers covered by collective bargaining has a robust positive partial correlation with the probability of larger plants closing for smaller plants the extent of unionization tends to be much lower and its variation plays no role in plant closure the study highlights the theoretical and statistical importance of examining closure separately for large and small plants ce memoire examine pour la premiere fois le role de la syndicalisation en tant que determinant de la fermeture d usines au canada a l aide des resultats de l enquete sur le milieu de travail et les employes de 1999 et de 2001 emte le texte contribue a enrichir le dossier qui montre qu il y a correlation positive partielle robuste entre la portion des travailleurs d usines couverts par une convention collective et la probabilite de fermeture des grandes usines pour les plus petites usines le degre de syndicalisation tend aetre plus faible et sa variation ne joue pas de role dans le processus de fermeture d usines cette etude montre l importance theorique et pratique qu il y a aetudier separement les fermetures des grandes et des petites usines

an empirical look at franchising as an organizational form franchise contracts are identified as a hybrid form of economic organization motives for the dominance of franchise arrangements are identified by examining the theoretical literature on franchising and related literatures on the theory of the firm firm growth managerial and employee selection a nd brand name capital empirical tests are performed on the incidence of franchise contracts across states for three industries in which f ranchising is prominent and data are readily available the results s uggest that both principal agent incentives and informational incenti ves favor the use of franchise arrangements copyright 1988 by the university of chicago

employer seniority discrimination evidence from enterpreneurial occupational choice abstract this research examines the theories presented in the human capital literature by becker 1975 lazear 1979 1981 and others that the relative paths of earnings and value of marginal product henceforth vmp diverge over the worklife the findings support lazear s work incentive theory for professionals but reject its application to non professionals as predicted by orthodox human capital theory documentation is also developed that earnings for non professionals equal their vmp over the job life cycle on the other hand the analysis provides no support to becker s specific training model

seniority rules and productivity an empirical test the primary purpose of this paper is to test empirically the effect of labor quality on short run manufacturing productivity in doing so the study makes major advances in two areas for the first time a job tenure function is estimated and a time series of job tenure in manufacturing is developed this estimated tenure series empirically verifies the use of seniority rules in the firm worker employment relationship having generated a tenure series the authors then test whether tenure enhances productivity in manufacturing the results clearly indicate that seniority rules have a statistically significant positive impact on productivity and the pattern of the seniority rules is reminiscent of a model where human capital has a specific component copyright 1989 by the london school of economics and political science

pensions wage profiles and retirement rules specific human capital approach abstract this paper clarifies how the loss of profits by quit related work force disturbances and the endogeneity of the length of contracts play a critical role in determination of the compensation structure such a loss of profits is demonstrated to be a necessary and sufficient condition which induces non vested pensions and mandatory retirement synchronously mandatory or pensioned retirement however does not always entail upward tilted wage profiles except in the firms in which workers quitting creates a serious work force disturbance the optimal length of contract is determined as a function of market opportunities and firm specific characteristics finally based on our analysis policy implications in japan s contemporary industrial relations are derived

does rising productivity explain seniority rules for layoffs seniority rules for layoffs are a widespread feature of the union and nonunion workplace many explanations have been offered for their existence some emphasize the role of unions but others argue that seniority rules can promote economic efficiency in this context the rules are simple easy to implement and widely regarded as fair they may help control turnover and conserve valuable investments in specific capital they may also be a response to the higher reliability of more experienced workers or they may reflect the higher value young workers place on their time at home or at search in this company a new explanation is hardly needed and this note will not provide one rather i will show that one of the most commonly accepted explanations is based on an assumption that is quite unrealistic one of the most plausible explanations for seniority rules seems to follow directly from human capital theory 2 senior workers having had more time to invest in on the job training are likely to be more productive the seniority rule may therefore be a convenient rule of thumb which ensures that on average it is the less productive workers who are let go while the more productive ones are hoarded until business picks up this argument has been given added weight by some results from implicit contract theory when workers differ in skill levels but share the same value of time at home efficient contracts will always lay off the unskilled workers before the skilled ones the natural corollary again seems to be that where senior workers are more skilled they should be last to go 3 i show in this paper however that when skill grows with experience as human capital models predict this corollary is false in fact human capital growth by itself predicts that it is the most senior workers who should be laid off first previous writers have missed this result because they have implicitly and unrealistically assumed that workers continue to gain productive skills while sitting at home on layoff my analysis will also shed light on some aspects of collective bargaining contracts and on the phenomenon of early retirement the results are first derived in the context of an implicit contract model which is stripped of all but the barest essentials subsequently the robustness of the conclusions is examined in a series of extensions finally some implications of the analysis are discussed

oversight of long term investment by short lived regulators certain regulators of economic activity like utility regulators and government procurement officers typically serve for relatively short periods of time the authors consider how to best motivate long term investment in the presence of short lived regulators a firm s investment decision is overseen by one regulator whether the investment is ultimately adopted is determined by a second distinct regulator each regulator is concerned with the welfare of its own contemporary population transfer payments between populations are limited and relevant data cannot be verified by third parties underadoption and underinvestment on average result although overinvestment may also occur under the optimal regulatory charter copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

returns to seniority among public school teachers returns to seniority account for a substantial share of public k 12 expenditures over the first ten to 15 years of a career public school teachers enjoy average wage growth at least equivalent to that of other white collar workers explanations for this structure in terms of human capital or costly monitoring lack theoretical and empirical support a steeper wage tenure profile reduces turnover but it is doubtful that the costs of turnover are high enough to make this an optimal use of school resources we conclude that the structure of teacher pay in public education is more consistent with rent seeking than efficient contracting

intertemporal incentives under loss aversion this paper studies the intertemporal allocation of incentives in a repeated moral hazard model with reference dependent preferences as in k oszegi and rabin 2009 besides consumption utility the agent experiences utility from the change in his beliefs about present and future eort and income when eort plans are rational the prospect of being disappointed by the outcome realization equals that of being pleasantly surprised and hence the loss averse agent is on net hurt by news in contrast to the prediction with classical preferences but consistent with real world contracts if consumption utility is not too concave and news about present income carries suciently larger weight in utility than news about future income a contract setting a current

some evidence on the relationship between performance related pay and the shape of the experience earnings profile we investigate the relationship between performance related pay prp and the shape of workers experience earnings profiles in particular we argue that the slope of the profile depends critically upon the degree of equity held by workers in their enterprise as measured by the extent of prp the implication is that the slope of the profile for prp workers falls between those of their zero equity fixed wage and one hundred per cent equity self employed counterparts our empirical analysis of three british data sets namely the british social attitudes survey the british household panel survey and the british family expenditure survey supports this prior in this paper we explore the shape of the experience earnings profile for individuals employed under different types of contracts fixed wage performance related pay prp and self employment contracts we follow lazear 1979 1981 and lazear and moore 1984 in hypothesizing that the slope of the experience earnings profile reflects agency costs and the reduction thereof with increased agency costs inducing steeper profiles if monitoring costs are high firms may implement compensation schemes designed to encourage employees to self select behavior in the firms interests one such scheme defers a substantial amount of compensation until the later years of tenure the resulting experience earnings profile provides a penalty for shirking lazear and moore 1984 we therefore presume that the profiles of workers employed under fixed wage contracts are steeper than those of self employees for whom the issue of agency does not arise because of the duality of principal and owner lazear and moore 1984 the interesting case is that of workers employed under prp if such contracts represent a hybrid between fixed wage and self employment then one would expect their experience earnings profiles to lie somewhere between these two extreme

the multiprincipal nature of government abstract one of the theoretical tools required to open the black box of the government organization is the theory of multiprincipals which describes how different incentive mechanisms compete with each others in viewing the set of relationships between several government bodies and the entities they regulate as a set of competing contracts in which the control of the regulatory process is shared amongst these different regulators we can address the question of the costs and the possible benefits of such structural separation first this paper surveys the previous literature on the topic then it traces out the possible benefits of such structures to the non benevolence of regulators we discuss also how regulatory rights of control and communication channels must be designed all together to deal with this problem

performance responses to competition across skill levels in rank order tournaments field evidence and implications for tournament design tournaments are widely used in the economy to organize production and innovation we study individual data on 2775 contestants in 755 software algorithm development contests with random assignment the performance response to added contestants varies nonmonotonically across contestants of different abilities precisely conforming to theoretical predictions most participants respond negatively whereas the highest skilled contestants respond positively in counterfactual simulations we interpret a number of tournament design policies number of competitors prize allocation and structure number of divisions open entry and assess their effectiveness in shaping optimal tournament outcomes for a designer

employment tenure job expectancy and earnings profile in japan the purpose of this study is to examine the relationships between employment tenure and earnings profile in japan since the japanese labour market has recently experienced substantial changes it is natural for the japanese employment and compensation system to be influenced by such changes in this study the changes that have happened to the japanese employment and compensation system in recent years have been considered empirically by focusing on the relationships between employment tenure and earnings profiles to do this a forward looking variable called expected job tenure or job expectancy is introduced and the effects of it on earnings profile

do workers prefer increasing wage profiles we present survey data challenging the assumption implicit in analyses of labor supply that all else being equal workers prefer declining over increasing wage profiles we test several explanations for our results including that a there is something special about wages e g their association with productivity as opposed to other types of payments that induces the preference for increasing wages b utility depends not only on absolute levels of consumption but also on changes in consumption over time and c respondents who prefer increasing wage profiles are irrational and would change their behavior if the rationale for preferring declining wages were explained

human capital vs signalling explanations of wages increases wages by directly increasing the worker s productivity this learning explanation is usually associated with human capital theory however it seems unlikely that learning explains all the wage differences associated with schooling and work history better educated workers are not a random sample of workers they have lower propensities to quit or to be absent are less likely to smoke drink or use illicit drugs and are generally healthier it is unlikely that employers make full use of differences in propensities to quit or to be absent or sick when hiring workers these characteristics are often not directly observed and the americans with disabilities act precludes firms from using either poor health or the likelihood of future sickness as a hiring criterion unless it is directly related to job performance however if low levels of education are associated with these unfavorable employee characteristics and employers are allowed to take education into account when hiring workers we would expect employers to favor better educated workers as a means of reducing their costs of sickness and job turnover in turn students will take these hiring criteria into account when deciding how long to stay in school students will choose a length of schooling to signal their ability to employers and employers will demand a minimum level of schooling

tenure unions and the relationship between employer size and wages the unionization rate in a worker s industry and the worker s tenure are interacted with employer size in wage regressions using current population survey data the results provide insight into the relatively small size wage relationship in the union sector nonunion tenure profiles steepen sharply with establishment size while union profiles flatten also the effect of industry unionization increases with firm size in the nonunion sector a pattern indicative of threat effects a separate analysis of nonunion wages indicates that size wage relationships are stronger in occupations associated with high monitoring costs

endogenous deregulation evidence from oecd countries abstract this paper presents empirical evidence regarding the effect of endogenous deregulation on productivity we find that treating deregulation across oecd countries as an exogenous event overestimates the competitive impact of deregulation on productivity by as much as 40

minimum wage legislation in a dual labor market the paper studies the equilibrium effects of minimum wage legislation in an economy with coexisting primary and secondary labor markets owing to difficulties in monitoring relative wages and the threat of job loss play a functional role in eliciting effort from primary sector workers minimum wage laws hence affect the primary wage and employment level even if the law only binds in the secondary labor market furthermore interaction between the two sectors can also alter the secondary outcome relative to the standard analysis and has implications for participation decisions and for the level of unemployment

promotions as work incentives i introduction why do professional partnerships like law firms accounting practices and management consulting groups to name a few rely almost exclusively on promotions for incentives and do not typically use incentive pay to motivate their associates we offer a possible explanation for this observation that is based upon the fact that these firms face similar capital constraints that is when capital is required in professional partnerships the funds are usually obtained internally from the firm s partners since partnerships are legally prohibited from incorporating and selling shares to the public it is this common capital restriction which may explain the widespread use of promotion based contests in this class of firms 1 we argue that principals cannot effectively set compensation rules without at least some knowledge of the production environment while such knowledge is costly to acquire it is jointly produced while performing supervisory services supervision may also provide information on the states of the world knowledge which is important for the design of compensation mechanisms it appears therefore that principals are likely to be active participants in supervision rather than passive bystanders who delegate all production responsibilities this improves the efficiency of owner managed firms relative to that of firms owned by passive shareholders most papers in the literature such as lazear and rosen 1981 nalebuff and stiglitz 1983 and holmstrom 1982 concentrate on the moral hazard arising from the inability of the passive principal to observe workers effort we allow for a similar moral hazard on the part of the supervising principal generally within the type of organization considered here it is at least as difficult for workers to observe supervisory effort as it is for the supervisor to observe worker s effort hence both workers and their supervisor are subject to moral hazard which must be resolved by the appropriate choice of compensation scheme lazear and rosen 1981 green and stokey 1983 and nalebuff and stiglitz 1983 have shown that where the agents and principal are risk neutral both piece rates which are related to an individual s measured output and tournaments which pay a monetary prize to the highest producers yield first best results in contrast when workers are risk averse neither mechanism is efficient the relative efficiency of each compensation mechanism has been shown to depend upon the relative magnitude of the common errors in the measurement of total group output and the individual errors associated with the measurement of the individual s effort on the one hand and the degree of workers risk aversion on the other hand we believe such comparisons between economic contests and piece rates are unduly restrictive and may obscure some important elements in the theory of compensation both tournaments and individualistic piece rates are imperfect instruments which omit different pieces of relevant information tournaments ignore information on quantitative differences among participants while individualistic piece rates ignore information about the group it is quite straightforward to show that the existence of common error and risk aversion cannot explain the prevalence of tournaments in these firms relative piece rates for example will reduce the variance in compensation due to errors in the measurement of effort associated with group output without the additional variance associated with the discrete nature of the tournament reward risk averse employees would therefore prefer relative piece rate schemes to tournaments what we see however is the widespread use of contests as compensation mechanisms in the type of firms examined in this paper to explain this phenomenon it is necessary to focus on the often ignored fact that most contests in these firms take the form of promotions to partnership which in turn entails supervisory responsibilities

wage settlements and wage setting results from a multi level model which dimensions of wage setting differ across establishments applying collective contracts and uncovered establishments the empirical analysis reported here utilizes german linked employer employee data for the years 1990 1995 and 2001 and is restricted to workers without supervisory functions in larger manufacturing firms results show that the expected wage of an average worker is higher in firms applying collective contracts while returns to human capital and the gender wage gap are reduced moreover during the 1990s these effects became stronger

the dynamic efficiency of regulatory constitutions in this article we model regulation as a repeated game between a utility facing a random sequence of demands and a regulator tempted to underreward past investment rate of return regulation designed with a constitutional commitment to an adequate rate of return on capital prudently invested is able to support an efficient investment program as a subgame perfect nash equilibrium for a larger set of parameter values than rate of return regulation without such a commitment furthermore rate of return regulation is superior to price regulation according to the same criterion assuming that the regulator is unable to make state contingent transfer payments

intergenerational conflicts of interest and seniority systems in organizations this paper studies the role of a proposed seniority system in an organization the organization consists of at least three overlapping generations of short lived members and chooses either a shortsighted or a farsighted action in each period this results in intergenerational conflicts of interest the old generation desires to obtain an immediate profit while the middle and young generations have incentives to invest for future profits we use a model of infinitely repeated games and demonstrate that the seniority system solves these conflicts in the sense that the farsighted action profile is sustainable in equilibrium

the incentive effects of tournaments with positive externalities among workers much recent research concerning work incentives has analyzed tournaments or contests between workers for rewards based on a comparison of their relative performance 3 5 8 9 12 bull schotter and weigelt 2 2 argue that tournaments are empirically pervasive characterizing incentives for many salespeople competing for bonuses managers vying for high level positions academics striving for limited tenured positions and politicians whose election hinges on relative votes received contrarily nalebuff and stiglitz 12 40 suggest that tournaments are rare for example many employees face incentives produced by upward sloping age earnings profiles 6 individual piece rates profit sharing or group bonus schemes 14 or potential firing 11 responding to this lack of agreement over the pervasiveness of tournaments recent theoretical research has begun to identify circumstances where tournaments fail or succeed the corpus of such work generalizes the conditions under which tournaments are optimal for example tournaments can respond effectively to common environmental shocks to productivity 5 12 heterogeneous workers 13 employee and employer moral hazard problems 3 monitoring difficulties 9 and inefficiencies associated with firing as an incentive 11 less work has addressed circumstances where tournaments may fail the question which concerns us here to date three circumstances where tournaments fail have been identified first as lazear and rosen noted in their seminal article on tournaments such incentives fail if individual effort can be measured perfectly or precisely inferred from output as they put it a difference of opinion is necessary for a horse race 8 845 if the winner is known before the race only the winner will run and slowly at that second lazear 7 analyzes circumstances where agents can engage in sabotage or increase the probability of winning by reducing their opponent s measured output tournaments then fail because the saboteur can reduce his or her own output while

renegotiation design with multiple regulators abstract one striking feature of the internal organization of governments is the existence of multiple regulators this paper explains this organizational choice as coming from the government s limited ability to commit the separation of powers between two regulators is modeled as a stackelberg common agency game with respect to the case of a single regulator the allocative efficiency and the regulated firm s informational rent are both reduced in the unique equilibrium of this game however when regulators have a limited ability to commit this static cost of regulators separation becomes a dynamic benefit separation makes renegotiation harder and improves commitment journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 l51

health insurance market reform and employee compensation the case of pure community rating in new york abstract pure community rating which was enacted to improve access to health insurance in new york s small group market in 1993 prevents carriers from charging different premiums based on the ages of a firm s workers if small firms were adjusting compensation packages prior to reform to offset higher health care costs of older workers then community rating could lead to greater relative wages for older workers post reform and not necessarily induce adverse selection that results in changes in who is insured i present evidence showing that relative wages of older workers in small firms increased in comparison with other states and with large firms within new york following reform

the impact of the threat of bankruptcy on the structure of compensation this article builds and tests a model of the impact of a firm s bank ruptcy probability on its propensity to offer deferred compensation schemes using 1983 current population survey data we find that ceteris paribus lower failure rates raise the incidence of pensions for nonunion workers outside manufacturing further we find some evidence that among those workers with a pension a higher industry failure rate steepens tenure earnings profiles jointly controlling for union nonunion and pension no pension selectivity such a result suggests that workers discount implicit promises of future earnings increases by the likelihood that the firm will not survive

gradualism in trade agreements with asymmetric countries this paper uses recursive methods to characterize the payoff frontier of self enforcing trade agreements between countries of asymmetric size we show that at points on the frontier where only one country s incentive constraint binds the efficient agreement will be a non stationary one that starts with a positive trade distortion but eventually reaches free trade our analysis illustrates how i relative country size ii consumption smoothing incentives and iii sunk investments affect the form of efficient trade agreements in contrast to previous work on gradualism our results are obtained from a model in which the economic environment is stationary