declining values and the afternoon effect evidence from art auctions we study the order of sale in art auctions the final bid relative to the auctioneer s estimated price declines throughout the course of an auction a theoretical model shows that in an auction ordered by declining valuation even in the presence of risk neutral strategic bidders the price received relative to the estimate for later items in an auction should be less than the price relative to the estimate for earlier items furthermore ordering heterogeneous items by value maximizes revenue for the auctioneer

frictionless commerce a comparison of internet and conventional retailers there have been many claims that the internet represents a new nearly frictionless market our research empirically analyzes the characteristics of the internet as a channel for two categories of homogeneous products books and cds using a data set of over 8 500 price observations collected over a period of 15 months we compare pricing behavior at 41 internet and conventional retail outlets we find that prices on the internet are 9 16 lower than prices in conventional outlets depending on whether taxes shipping and shopping costs are included in the price additionally we find that internet retailers price adjustments over time are up to 100 times smaller than conventional retailers price adjustments presumably reflecting lower menu costs in internet channels we also find that levels of price dispersion depend importantly on the measures employed when we compare the prices posted by different internet retailers we find substantial dispersion internet retailer prices differ by an average of 33 for books and 25 for cds however when we weight these prices by proxies for market share we find dispersion is lower in internet channels than in conventional channels reflecting the dominance of certain heavily branded retailers we conclude that while there is lower friction in many dimensions of internet competition branding awareness and trust remain important sources of heterogeneity among internet retailers

how to set minimum acceptable bids with an application to real estate auctions in a general auction model with affiliated signals common components to valuations and endogenous entry we compute the equilibrium bidding strategies and outcomes and derive a lower bound on the optimal reserve price this lower bound can be computed using data on past auctions combined with information about the subsequent sales prices of unsold goods we illustrate how to compute the lower bound using data from real estate auctions

updating the reserve price in common value auctions we consider a common value auction model with bidder participation determined jointly by nature and by bidder optimization in this framework an increase in the reserve price as two effects it deters marginal bidders and it deters bidders from becoming informed we then derive a test statistic for establishing when it is optimal to raise the reserve price this statistic is independent of the distribution of valuations we then apply the analysis to u s offshore oil sales and find evidence that the reserve price is dramatically too low this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

sealed bids sunk costs and the process of competition how do firms recover precontract costs for example suppose 10 firms compete in a sealed bid auction for the right to explore and develop an offshore oil field each spends 500 000 to estimate the value of the field and to prepare its bid suppose this investigation reveals that the tract is worth approximately 20 million if sunk costs do not matter competition dictates that the winner must bid 20 million but if the winner is to recover its prebid costs the maximum offer can be only 19 5 million furthermore long run industry equilibrium considerations suggest that the highest bid will be only 15 million 20 million minus the total bid preparation costs of 5 million if competition forces firms to charge marginal cost why do firms ever invest in resources which become sunk in some industries inframarginal rents can be used to recover these costs however the example above as well as many others involves an all or none deci

cultural differences in consumer impatience abstract in this article the authors examine cross cultural variations in how people discount the future specifically they predict that people from western cultures are relatively less patient and therefore discount the future to a greater degree than do people from eastern cultures and thus westerners value immediate consumption relatively more furthermore on the basis of regulatory focus theory the authors predict that when easterners are faced with the threat of a delay in receiving a product i e a prevention loss they are more impatient whereas when westerners are faced with the threat of not being able to enjoy a product early i e a promotion loss their impatience increases this enhanced impatience manifests in preference for expedited consumption of a product purchased online in two studies in both studies the authors used a priming methodology on bicultural singaporean participants the results support the predictions in the second study they also found evidence in support

comparing optima do simplifying assumptions affect conclusions consider a family of maximization models in which the optimum trades off beneficial and costly effects then comparative statics derived under many kinds of simplifying assumptions about the benefits technology are also true for general convex and nonconvex technologies for example any comparative statics conclusion about investment by a risk averse decision maker under uncertainty that holds when expected returns are described by a general linear function also holds for an arbitrary nonlinear expected return function

the demand for and impact of learning hiv status this paper evaluates an experiment in which individuals in rural malawi were randomly assigned monetary incentives to learn their hiv results after being tested distance to the hiv results centers was also randomly assigned without any incentive 34 percent of the participants learned their hiv results however even the smallest incentive doubled that share using the randomly assigned incentives and distance from results centers as instruments for the knowledge of hiv status sexually active hiv positive individuals who learned their results are three times more likely to purchase condoms two months later than sexually active hiv positive individuals who did not learn their results however hiv positive individuals who learned their results purchase only two additional condoms than those who did not there is no significant effect of learning hiv negative status on the purchase of condoms

equilibrium in auctions with entry the authors model entry incentives in auctions with risk neutral bidders and characterize a symmetric equilibrium in which the number of entrants is stochastic the presence of too many potential bidders raises coordination costs that detract from welfare the authors show that the seller and society can benefit from policies that reduce market thickness i e the relative abundance of buyers their analysis extends well known revenue equivalence and ranking theorems but also demonstrates that variations in the auction environment affect optimal policies e g reservation prices in ways not anticipated by models that ignore entry copyright 1994 by american economic association

anticipation of future variety reduces satiation from current experiences abstractsatiation frequently occurs from repeated consumption of the same items over time however results from five experiments show that when people anticipate consuming something different in the future they satiate at a slower rate in the present the authors find the effect in both food and nonfood consumption settings using different approaches to measure satiation this effect is cognitive specifically anticipating variety in future consumption generates positive thoughts about that future experience the authors find two boundary conditions the future consumption outcome must be 1 in a related product category and 2 at least as attractive as the present consumption outcome the authors rule out potential alternative explanations such as mere exposure to variety the possibility that the future experience is more attractive rather than just different than the current one and perceptions of scarcity associated with the item consumed in the present

a simple impossibility result in behavioral contract theory abstract this paper studies a contract between an optimistic agent and a realistic principal both risk neutral even with complete contracts and ex ante symmetric information it may be impossible to achieve the first best unless the weight on emotions is sufficiently low

challenges for wholesale electricity markets with intermittent renewable generation at scale the us experience the supply of intermittent wind and solar generation with zero marginal operating cost is increasingly rapidly in the us these changes are creating challenges for wholesale markets in two dimensions short term energy and ancillary services markets built upon mid twentieth century models of optimal pricing and investment which now work reasonably well must accommodate the supply variability and energy market price impacts associated with intermittent generation at scale these developments raise more profound questions about whether the current market designs can be adapted to provide good long term price signals to support investment in an efficient portfolio of generating capacity and storage consistent with public policy goals the recent experience of the california iso caiso is used to illustrate the impact of intermittent generation on supply patterns supply variability and market based energy prices reforms in capacity markets and scarcity pricing mechanisms are needed if policy makers seek to adapt the traditional wholesale market designs to accommodate intermittent generation at scale however if the rapid growth of integrated resource planning subsidies for some technologies but not others mandated long term contracts and other expansions of state regulation continue more fundamental changes are likely to be required in the institutions that determine generator and storage entry and exit decisions

discount rates and credit markets theory and evidence from rural india three models of credit markets 1 the permanent income model 2 upward sloping credit supply to individual borrowers and 3 constrained credit due to imperfect enforcement are tested using credit market data and an experimental study of individuals discount rates in south india the permanent income model is rejected by both the discount rate and the credit market data the discount rate data are consistent with either of the other two models while the credit market data are consistent with a combination of these two models other explanations are found to be insufficient to explain the results of this study

discounting behaviour and the magnitude effect evidence from a field experiment in denmark we evaluate the claim that individuals exhibit a magnitude effect in their discounting behaviour where higher discount rates are inferred from choices made with lower principals all else being equal if the magnitude effect is quantitatively significant it is not appropriate to use one discount rate that is independent of the scale of the project for cost benefit analysis and capital budgeting using data from a field experiment in denmark we find statistically significant evidence of a magnitude effect that is much smaller than is claimed this evidence surfaces only if one controls for unobserved individual heterogeneity in the population

on negative time preferences abstract survey data show that subjects positively discount both gains and losses but discount gains more heavily than losses this holds for monetary and non monetary outcomes these results do not confirm the findings of two earlier studies about negative time preferences for non monetary outcomes

economic insights from internet auctions this paper surveys recent studies of internet auctions four main areas of research are summarized first we survey several studies that document and attempt to explain the frequently observed sniping or last second bidding behavior in these auctions second we summarize several methods proposed to quantify the distortions caused by asymmetric information in these markets most notably due to the winner s curse third we explore research about the role of reputation mechanisms installed to help combat these distortions finally we discuss what internet auctions have to teach us about auction design

is there one unifying concept of utility an experimental comparison of utility under risk and utility over time the nature of utility is controversial whereas decision theory commonly assumes that utility is context specific applied and empirical decision analysis typically assumes one unifying concept of utility applicable to all decision problems this controversy has hardly been addressed empirically because of the absence of methods to measure utility outside the context of risk we introduce a method to measure utility over time and compare utility under risk and utility over time we distinguish between gains and losses and also measure loss aversion in two experiments we found that utility under risk and utility over time differed and were uncorrelated utility under risk was more curved than utility over time subjects were loss averse both for risk and for time but loss aversion was more pronounced for risk loss aversion over risk and time were uncorrelated this suggests that loss aversion although important in both decision contexts is volatile and subject to framing

price dispersion in the small and in the large evidence from an internet price comparison site this paper examines four million daily price observations for more than 1 000 consumer electronics products on the price comparison site http shopper com we find little support for the notion that prices on the internet are converging to the law of one price in addition observed levels of price dispersion vary systematically with the number of firms listing prices the difference between the two lowest prices the gap averages 23 per cent when two firms list prices and falls to 3 5 per cent in markets where 17 firms list prices these empirical results are an implication of a general clearinghouse model of equilibrium price dispersion

generation capacity adequacy in interdependent electricity markets this paper deals with the practical problems related to long term security of supply in regional electricity markets with transmission constraints differences between regulatory policies and market designs in terms of generation adequacy policies may distort the normal functioning of the neighboring markets as well as the reliability of supply we test the effect of heterogeneous regulatory design between two interdependent markets energy only market price capped market without capacity mechanisms and price capped markets with forward capacity contracts obligation we rely on a long term market simulation model in system dynamics that characterizes expansion decision in a competitive regime the results show that differences in market designs affect both price and reliability of supply in the two markets we examine both the short and long terms effect and how free riding may occur where capacity adequacy policies are adopted in one market but not the other the main finding is that the lack of harmonization between local markets in policies to ensure capacity adequacy may lead to undesirable side effects

rationales for capacity remuneration mechanisms security of supply externalities and asymmetric investment incentives economics so far provides little conceptual guidance on capacity remuneration mechanisms crm in deregulated electricity markets ubiquitous in real world electricity markets crms are introduced country by country in an ad hoc manner lacking the theoretical legitimacy and the conceptual coherence enabling comparability and coordination they are eyed with suspicion by a profession wedded to a theoretical benchmark model that argues that competitive energy only markets with voll pricing provide adequate levels of capacity while the benchmark model is a consistent starting point for discussions about electricity market design it ignores the two market failures that make crms the practically appropriate and theoretically justified policy response to capacity issues first energy only markets fail to internalize security of supply externalities as involuntary curbs on demand under scarcity pricing generate social costs beyond the private non consumption of electricity second when demand is inelastic and the potential capacity additions are discretely sized investors face asymmetric incentives and will underinvest at the margin rather than overinvest after presenting the key features of the theoretical benchmark model this paper conceptualizes security of supply externalities and asymmetric investment incentives and concludes with some consideration regarding design of crms

selling online versus live a seller choosing between auctioning online and live faces a tradeoff lower transaction costs online against more rents left with the bidders we model this tradeoff and apply the theory to auctions of art the crucial parameter for whether the seller does better online than live is not the expected price but the valuation uncertainty

time preference and life cycle consumption with endogenous survival we provide a structural theory of time preference and derive a functional form of intertemporal preferences by postulating that individuals make their life cycle consumption choices as if to maximize expected lifetime this yields a nontime separable expected utility representation where the inverse of the coefficient of intertemporal substitution exceeds the coefficient of relative risk aversion the rate of time preference depends on the inverse of expected remaining lifetime and the effect of age on the productivity of consumption in affecting health the preference formulation is applied in a standard intertemporal consumption model to illustrate the implied life cycle consumption choices

how auctions work for wine and art interview auctioneers and even to buy a little wine in the meantime i have also had the opportunity with john abowd 1988 to observe and collect data on the auction sale of impressionist and contemporary paintings this paper reports on some of the empirical regularities that i and others have observed in the actual operation of the auction markets for these items in view of the rich and diverse array of theoretical literature on auctions it seems high time economists began to spell out precisely what facts it is meant to explain 2

the time vs money effect shifting product attitudes and decisions through personal connection the results of five field and laboratory experiments reveal a time versus money effect whereby activating time vs money leads to a favorable shift in product attitudes and decisions because time increases focus on product experience activating time vs money augments one s personal connection with the product thereby boosting attitudes and decisions however because money increases the focus on product possession the reverse effect can occur in cases where merely owning the product reflects the self i e for prestige possessions or for highly materialistic consumers the time versus money effect proves robust across implicit and explicit methods of construct activation

decision making over time and under uncertainty a common approach this paper considers a number of parallels between risky and intertemporal choice we begin by demonstrating a one to one correspondence between the behavioral violations of the respective normative theories for the two domains i e expected utility and discounted utility models we argue that such violations or preference reversals are broadly consistent with three propositions about the weight that an attribute receives in both types of multiattribute choice specifically it appears that 1 if we add a constant to all values of an attribute then that attribute becomes less important 2 if we proportionately increase all values of an attribute or if we change the sign of an attribute from positive to negative then that attribute becomes more important the generality of these propositions as well as the constraints they would impose on separable representations of multiattribute preferences is discussed

public support for economic reforms in poland using monthly surveys the author examines the impact of aggregate economic conditions on the dynamic of support for the polish program of economic reforms the balcerowicz plan to highlight the ambiguity of the standard retrospective model the author analyzes the impact of subjective perceptions of economic conditions on postures toward the reform program asking if people were extrapolating the past when forming predictions about the future then the effect of these predictions on the postures toward reform is studied finally the author focuses on the distributional effects substantive conclusions concerning the impact of economic conditions on the support of economic reform programs under democracy close the article

art as an investment the market for modern prints repeat sales of modern prints at auction are used to estimate a semiannual index of prices for the period 1977 92 as in other studies of art as an investment prints do not compare favorably to traditional financial assets there is substantial noise in auction prices but little or no support for the proposition that some artists command higher prices in certain countries or that masterpieces outperform the market one puzzle is the continuing tendency for prices realized at certain auction houses to exceed those realized at others notably at sotheby s relative to christie s in new york copyright 1993 by american economic association

life cycle individual thrift and the wealth of nations this paper provides a review of the theory of the determinants of individual and national thrift that has come to be known as the life cycle hypothesis lch of saving applications to some current policy issues are also discussed part i deals with the state of the art on the eve of the formulation of the lch some 30 years ago part ii sets forth the theoretical foundations of the model in its original formulation and later amendment calling attention to various implications distinctive to it and sometimes counter intuitive it also includes a review of a number of crucial empirical tests both at the individual and the aggregate level part iii reviews some applications of lch to current policy issues though only in sketchy fashion as space constraints prevent fuller discussion this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

optimal beliefs in the long run an overlapping generations perspective abstract people have the natural tendency to be optimistic and believe that good outcomes in the future are more likely but also want to avoid overestimation that could result in bad decision making brunnermeier brunnermeier and parker 2005 and brunnermeier et al 2007 established an optimal beliefs framework that balances these two incentives this paper follows and extends the optimal beliefs framework to consider optimal beliefs in the long run in an overlapping generations sense assuming no short selling results show that in almost all cases there does not exist a stable and interior long term optimal belief

a market approach to long term security of supply the problem of ensuring that there is enough generation capacity to meet future demand has been an issue in market design since the beginning of the deregulation process although ideally the market itself should be enough to provide adequate investment incentives there are several factors that prevent this result from being achieved and some actual markets have already experienced problems related with a lack of generation capacity a regulatory framework to address this question is presented the procedure is based on an organized market where reliability contracts based on financial call options are auctioned so both their price and their allocation among the different plants are determined through competitive mechanisms this results in a stabilization of the income of the generators and provides a clear incentive for new generation investment with a minimum of regulatory intervention additionally the method represents a market compatible mechanism to hedge demand from the occurrence of high market prices

repeated games with general discounting we introduce a general class of time discounting which includes time inconsistent ones into repeated games with perfect monitoring a strategy prole is called an agent

rational expectations information acquisition and competitive bidding most rational expectations market equilibrium models are not models of price formation and naive mechanisms leading to such equilibria can be severely manipulable in this paper a bidding model is developed which has the market like features that bidders act as price takers and that prices convey information higher equilibrium prices convey more favorable information about the quality of the objects being sold than do lower prices bidders can benefit from trading only if they have a transactions motive or if they have access to inside information apart from exceptional cases prices are not fully revealing a two stage model is developed in which bidders may acquire information at a cost before bidding and for which the equilibrium price is fully revealing resolving a well known paradox

adapting electricity markets to decarbonisation and security of supply objectives toward a hybrid regime abstract the policy objectives of decarbonisation of the electricity sector whilst maintaining security of supply have led to a new wave of market reforms in many jurisdictions which liberalised their industry there is a wide range of models under this new hybrid regime which essentially combine the energy market with planning and long term risk transfer arrangements this paper takes an institutionalist approach in terms of modularity of the market design and reviews the issues with the standard historical market model which led to the introduction of additional long term modules we then study the interactions between the existing and new modules and identify ways in which the initial market modules can be improved to address inconsistencies with the new modules we conclude by discussing the conditions under which the various changes in market architectures could converge toward a hybrid regime structured around a two step competition with a competition for the market via the auctioning of long term contracts to support investment followed by competition in the market for short term system optimisation via the energy market

auctions and the price of art the value of most important works of art is established by public auction either directly by an actual sale or indirectly by reference to other sales how the auction system works is thus a critical determinant of how the public s preferences are translated into the evaluation of artistic work the auction system is central in the determination of the incentives for artistic work and the efficiency of the auction system is a key determinant of the cost of creating and distributing works of art this paper contains a review of the burgeoning new research of the last decade that has been designed to shed light on how the art auction system actually works what it indicates about price formation and how well it performs we begin our discussion in section 2 with a short description of the mechanics of the auction system and then organize the remainder of our discussion around two major topics the first topic concerns how auction prices can be used to determine and compare overall price movements within the art market and other markets and the second topic concerns how the auction mechanism influences prices we

modeling the psychology of consumer and firm behavior with behavioral economics abstract marketing is an applied science that tries to explain and influence how firms and consumers behave in markets marketing models are usually applications of standard economic theories which rely on strong assumptions of rationality of consumers and firms behavioral economics explores the implications of the limits of rationality with the goal of making economic theories more plausible by explaining and predicting behavior more accurately while maintaining formal power this article reviews six behavioral economics models that are useful to marketing three models generalize standard preference structures to allow for sensitivity to reference points and loss aversion social preferences toward outcomes of others and preference for instant gratification the other three models generalize the concept of game theoretic equilibrium allowing decision makers to make mistakes encounter limits on the depth of strategic thinking and equilibrate by learning from feedback the authors also discuss a sp

procrastination of enjoyable experiences abstract the tendency to procrastinate applies not only to aversive tasks but also to positive experiences with immediate benefits the authors propose that models of time discounting can explain this behavior and they test these predictions with field data and experiments a multicity study shows that people with unlimited time windows delay visiting desirable landmarks however procrastination is reduced when the window of opportunity is constrained similarly people procrastinate in redeeming gift certificates and gift cards with long deadlines more than those with short deadlines resulting in overall lower redemption rates these results run counter to participants predictions and typical models of impulsive behavior

it s not what you get but when you get it the effect of gift sequence on deposit balances and customer sentiment in a commercial bank abstract the authors examine the impact of gifts on deposit balances and customer satisfaction in a longitudinal field experiment conducted at a commercial bank they find that gifts increased deposit balances survey response rates and customer satisfaction compared with the no gift control they manipulated several factors within the gift treatment gift type the accompanying message and the sequence of gift value which improved 35 then 100 gift worsened 100 then 35 gift or was a single gift a highly detrimental effect of decreasing gift value occurred on deposit balances this deterioration aversion persisted in a long term follow up analysis of deposit balances a vignette experiment replicates deterioration aversion and extends the results demonstrating increased effectiveness of improving gifts over constant gift sequences and indicating that the mechanism underlying deterioration aversion involves the violation of expectations

a critical assessment of the different approaches aimed to secure electricity generation supply abstract since the very beginning of the power systems reform process one of the key questions posed has been whether the market of its own accord is able to provide satisfactory security of supply at the power generation level or if some additional regulatory mechanism needs to be introduced and in the latter case which is the most suitable approach to tackle the problem this matter is undoubtedly gaining importance and it has taken a key role in the energy regulators agendas in this paper we critically review and categorize the different approaches regulators can opt for to deal with the problem of guaranteeing or at least enhancing security of supply in a market oriented environment we analyze the most relevant regulatory design elements throughout an updated assessment of the broad range of international experiences highlighting the lessons we have learned so far in a variety of contexts based on the analysis we conclude by providing a set of principles and criteria that should be considered by the regulator when designing a security of supply mechanism

pigs in cyberspace a natural experiment testing differences between online and offline club pig auctions we find sale prices and net revenues received by sellers in the midwestern club pig market are higher at traditional face to face auctions than at comparable internet auctions the comparison overcomes endogenous selection issues that commonly plague such analyses by using data from sellers that allocated pigs to both markets based on exogenous differences in dates between online and offline auctions auction theory suggests that the higher prices and net revenues from traditional auctions are attributable to remaining differences in auction format and buyer characteristics copyright 2011 oxford university press

positive time preference the case for positive time preference is absolutely compelling unless there is an infinite time horizon with the expectation of unending technological advance combined with what we call drastically diminishing marginal utility this finding holds both in the positive and normative senses a corollary is that savings are interest elastic

anticipation and the valuation of delayed consumption this paper presents a model of intertemporal choice that incorporates savoring and dread i e utility from anticipat ion of delayed consumption the model explains why an individual with positive time preference may delay desirable outcomes or get unpleas ant outcomes over with quickly contrary to the prediction of convent ional formulations of intertemporal choice implications of savoring and dread for savings behavior empirical estimation of discount rate s and public policy efforts to combat myopic behavior are explored the model provides an explanation for common violations of the indepe ndence axiom as applied to intertemporal choice copyright 1987 by royal economic society

toward an understanding of dynamic moral decision making model free and model based learning in business settings decision makers facing moral issues often experience the challenges of continuous changes this dynamic process has been less examined in previous literature on moral decision making we borrow theories on learning strategies and computational models from decision neuroscience to explain the updating and learning mechanisms underlying moral decision processes specifically we present two main learning strategies model free learning wherein the values of choices are updated in a trial and error fashion sustaining the formation of habits and model based learning wherein the brain updates more general cognitive maps and associations thus sustaining flexible and state dependent behaviors we then summarize studies explaining the neuro computational processes of both learning strategies the calculation of prediction errors and valuation we conclude by emphasizing how the incorporation of dynamic aspects in moral decision making could open new avenues for understanding moral behaviors in a changing world

gain loss asymmetric stochastic differential utility abstract this study examines a gain loss asymmetric utility in continuous time in which the investor discounts their utility gain by more than the utility loss by employing the theory of stochastic differential utility the model allows an endogenously time varying subjective discount rate in addition the model can express various forms of utility functions including a version of the epstein zin utility under the model even if the state variables do not have any jump in their paths the optimal consumption wealth ratio and portfolio weight can change non smoothly

reputation in an internet auction market i introduction without transmission of credible information asymmetries may lead to underproduction of goods or even market failure reputation mitigates inefficiencies associated with information asymmetries by providing an informative signal of quality 1 the difficulty in quantifying reputation means that few studies can analyze empirically the role of reputation in markets our analysis of a quantified market observed measure of reputation provides direct evidence of the effect of a seller s reputation on the terms of a onetime real world transaction thereby contributing empirical support to a fundamental economic principle this study empirically examines person to person transactions within the internet market known as ebay in this virtual market of unseen participants and products buyers and sellers face the risks of repudiation as the counter party may deny the agreement after the fact buyers assume risks associated with lack of seller integrity and asymmetric information about the particular product as the buyer is typically required to send payment before the seller ships the product in addition for many ebay transactions the cost of enforcing a contract is high relative to the transaction s value resulting in a practical absence of legal enforcement 2 by providing a history of trade execution information ebay benefits market participants by reducing information asymmetries while achieving substantial transaction cost economies market participants relate personal experiences which ebay uses to calculate a numerical reputation measure for each user market participants in turn can use this reputation measure to assess counter party risk and adjust bidding behavior accordingly in a sample of 460 auctions held between january 1998 and july 1998 we find a positive relation between prices and ebay s reputation measure higher reputation sellers experience higher auction prices ceteris paribus our findings suggest that repeat players are rewarded for building reputation consistent with the belief that the high reputation seller s value of future transactions outweighs the value of taking advantage of the buyer in the current transaction buyers are willing to pay more to a higher reputation seller this article contributes to the literature not only by providing quantitative support of long accepted reputation theories but also by illustrating the use of nontraditional markets as a natural laboratory for experiments this article is an example of how a newly formed electronic market can provide the elements necessary for analytical research we find that ebay transactions for this item exhibit characteristics similar to transactions in more conventional markets namely 1 prices are higher when there is less quantity supplied when fewer of the items are available the same day 2 prices are lower during periods of lower demand times less likely to have high traffic 3 sellers with higher shipping and handling costs receive lower prices and 4 sellers failing to provide information about shipping and handling fees i e larger information asymmetries receive fewer bids dramatic innovations in online market structure and increasing availability of online market data should enable researchers to examine directly other traditionally non quantifiable economic ideas this article is organized as follows section ii describes how reputation can be used to facilitate transactions in the presence of asymmetric information section iii describes the ebay market summarizes the listing and bidding processes and discusses the reputation mechanism for this market section iv presents the price and reputation descriptive statistics associated with a consistently auctioned item and reports the empirical findings of how this item s highest bid price varies with the level of the seller s reputation we conclude in section v with a discussion of ebay s continued attempts to add value to the market through recent structural changes

auctions versus negotiations which is the more profitable way to sell a company an auction with no reserve price or an optimally structured negotiation with one less bidder we show under reasonable assumptions that the auction is always preferable when bidders signals are independent for affiliated signals the result holds under certain restrictions on the seller s choice of negotiating mechanism the result suggests that the value of negotiating skill is small relative to the value of additional competition the paper also shows how the analogies between monopoly theory and auction theory can help derive new results in auction theory jel d44 g34 there are close analogies between standard price theory and the theory of auctions in an absolute english auction in which the price rises continuously until only one bidder remains and the seller is required to accept the final bid the sale price equals the lowest competitive price at which supply equals demand in the theory of optimal auctions the seller is treated as a monopolist who can choose any

when choosing makes a good thing better temporal variations in the valuation of hedonic consumption abstract this research investigates how the valuation of delayed consumption of hedonic products such as concerts and chocolate varies with the passage of time between choice and consumption the authors find that when consumers make their own choices they exhibit increases in evaluations of delayed consumption but only if the interval between choice and consumption is relatively short the effect attenuates over longer periods resulting in an inverted u shaped relationship between evaluations and time in contrast when somebody else chooses the same option for the consumer evaluations decrease with the passage of time these effects depend on the extent of intrinsic motivation toward the object of consumption and occur only for consummatory consumption that is of inherent interest moreover anticipatory increases in evaluations before consumption have ironic negative effects on postconsumption evaluations the authors discuss implications and directions for further research

endogenous beliefs in models of politics in the standard rational choice model actors have exogenously given beliefs that perfectly match objective probabilities as such these beliefs cannot be optimistic or motivated by preferences even though substantial empirical evidence indicates that human beliefs routinely satisfy neither of these criteria i present a tractable endogenous beliefs model and apply it to three different political environments from across the subfields of political science in the model players form beliefs that maximize a utility function that represents preferences over outcomes and the anticipatory experience of uncertainty applications include voter turnout taxation and collective choice and crisis bargaining the model captures the empirical evidence about belief formation much better than the standard model moreover these applications show how rigidly insisting on the standard rational choice model rejects otherwise reasonable explanations by fiat precisely because of its implausible assumptions about beliefs

the winner s curse reserve prices and endogenous entry empirical insights from ebay auctions internet auctions have recently gained widespread popularity and are one of the most successful forms of electronic commerce we examine a unique data set of ebay coin auctions to explore the determinants of bidder and seller behavior we begin by documenting a number of empirical regularities in our data set of ebay auctions next we specify and estimate a structural econometric model of bidding on ebay using our parameter estimates from this model we measure the extent of the winner s curse and simulate seller revenue under different reserve prices