control rights in complex partnerships this paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two players who are in a complex partnership that is a partnership which produces impure public goods we show that the optimal allocation depends on technological factors the parties valuations of the goods produced and the degree of impurity of these goods when the degree of impurity is large control rights should be given to the main investor irrespective of preference considerations there are some situations in which this allocation is optimal even if the degree of impurity is very low as long as one party s investment is more important than the other party s if the parties investments are of similar importance and the degree of impurity is large shared authority is optimal with a greater share going to the low valuation party if the importance of the parties investments is similar but the degree of impurity is neither large nor small the low valuation party should receive sole authority we analyze an extension in which side payments are infeasible we check for robustness of our results in several dimensions such as allowing for multiple parties or for joint authority and apply our results to interpret a number of complex partnerships including those involving schools and child custody jel d02 o23 h41 l31

cost versus control understanding ownership through outsourcing in hospitals for profit hospitals in california contract out services much more intensely than either private nonprofit or public hospitals to explain why we build a model in which the outsourcing decision is a trade off between cost and control since nonprofit firms are more restricted in how they consume net revenues they experience more rapidly diminishing value of a dollar saved and they are less attracted to a low cost but low control outsourcing opportunity than a for profit firm is this difference is exaggerated in services where the benefits of controlling the details of production are particularly important but minimized when a fixed cost shock raises the marginal value of a dollar of cost savings we test these predictions in a panel of california hospitals finding evidence for each and that the set of services that private non profits are particularly interested in controlling physician intensive services is very different from those than public hospitals are particularly interested in labor intensive services these results suggest that a model of public or nonprofit make or buy decisions should be more than a simple relabeling of a model derived in the for profit context

risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public private partnerships we study the agency costs of delegated public service provision focusing on the link between organizational forms and uncertainty at project implementation we consider a dynamic multitask moral hazard environment where the mapping between efiort and performance is ex ante uncertain but new information may come along during operations our analysis points out at the e ciency gains that bundling planning and implementation as under public private partnerships can bring in terms of better project design and lower operational costs bundling also results in increasingly better performance as uncertainty is reduced by growing experience in the sector bundling should instead be viewed with caution when the private sector seeks to radically innovate on public service provision or to introduce new services but lacks the knowledge and expertise to anticipate the impact of the innovative design procedure technology on the cost of operations the compounding of asymmetric information ex post plus moral hazard and renegotiation may generate diseconomies of scope in agency costs which for high operational risk can make unbundling optimal in this context the use of private flnance can help re establishing the beneflt of bundling only if lenders have su cient expertise to help assessing project risks

dynamic procurement under uncertainty optimal design and implications for incomplete contracts we characterize the optimal dynamic contract for a long term basic service when an uncertain add on is required later on introducing firm risk aversion has two impacts profits for the basic service can be backloaded to induce cheaper information revelation for this service an income effect which reduces output distortions the firm must also bear some risk to induce information revelation for the add on this risk effect reduces the level of the add on but hardens information revelation for the basic service the interaction between these effects has important implications for the dynamics of distortions contract renegotiation and the value of incomplete contracts

moral hazard with several agents abstract we consider a situation in which a principal hires two agents whose cooperation is technically profitable and study three models that incorporate different assumptions about the agents cooperative behavior we find a close relationship between the agents commitment capacity and the characteristics of the optimal contract a greater capacity to cooperate leads to more efficient outcomes we also show that unless agents form a team the efficient level of mutual help is not achieved in equilibrium

renegotiation of concession contracts in latin america evidence from the water and transport sectors abstract high rates of contract renegotiation have raised serious questions about the viability of the concession model to attract private participation in infrastructure in developing countries after extending in reduced form a standard regulation model in which renegotiation occurs due to the imperfect enforcement of concession contracts we use a unique data set of 307 concessions awarded in latin america from 1989 to 2000 covering the sectors of transport and water to analyze the determinants of this high incidence of renegotiations of infrastructure contracts we look in details at the impact on the probability of renegotiation of a concession of regulatory institutions institutional features economic shocks and of the characteristics of the concession contracts themselves we then derive some policy implications of our work

optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic r d alliances we explore the dynamic evolution of property rights regimes in r d alliances using the incomplete contract approach pioneered by grossman hart and moore in contrast to the standard analysis the productive asset is an excludable public good such as a patent moreover both firms can decide whether to disclose their know how and invest effort know how that has once been released cannot be concealed later we characterize different scenarios in which the optimal ownership structure may change over time due to a trade off between inducing know how disclosure and ensuring maximum effort

toward a theory of regulation for developing countries following jean jacques laffont s lead the efficient operation and expansion of infrastructures in developing countries is crucial for growth and poverty reduction however recent reforms aimed at improving the performance of these sectors have had limited success evidence suggests that in many instances this was because the traditional regulatory theory relied on by policymakers was not suitable for the institutional context in developing countries this article surveys more recent theoretical work focusing on problems with regulation in these countries at the heart of the survey is the work of jean jacques laffont who in the last decade of his life set about developing a theoretical framework for regulation in developing countries we consider the implications of his work which focused on the key institutional limitations faced in developing countries we then discuss where experience suggests that there are important omissions from this modeling bringing in extensions and alternative approaches pursued by other authors we conclude by summarizing the key ways in which regulatory policy will be different when institutions are weak overall we find that an understanding of the institutional context and its implications are crucial when designing a regulatory framework for developing countries

building and managing facilities for public services abstract we model alternative institutional arrangements for building and managing facilities for provision of public services including the use of the private finance initiative pfi by exploring the effects on innovative investment activity by providers the desirability of bundling the building and management operations is analyzed and it is considered whether it is optimal to allocate ownership to the public or the private sector we also examine how the case for pfi is affected by the voluntary or automatic transfer of ownership from the private to the public sector when the contract expires asset specificity and service demand risk play critical roles

optimal regulation of network expansion we model the optimal regulation of continuous irreversible capacity expansion where a regulated firm has private information about capacity costs investments are financed from the firm s cash flows and demand is stochastic the optimal mechanism can be implemented as a revenue tax that increases with the level of the price cap if the asymmetric information has large support then the optimal mechanism consists of a laissez faire regime for low cost firms that is the firm s price cap corresponds to that of an unregulated monopolist and it is not taxed this maximal distortion at the top is necessary to provide information rents as direct subsidies are not feasible

optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective abstract the game theoretic perspective in auction bidding has provided a powerful normative framework for the analysis of auctions and it has generated an impressive volume of research contributions tracing this research we review key recent advances which have greatly expanded our understanding of the operation of auctions and produced a more accurate analysis of mechanism design and optimal bidding we follow various experimental studies which have shown that the predictive power of auction theory remains in many cases limited for this reason we concentrate on research themes which enhance the applicability of auction theory leading to more realistic descriptions of bidding behaviors we identify important innovations which expand the environment of auction bidding and carry us beyond rational decision making we conclude providing directions of future research and discussing their implications

signaling and the design of delegated management contracts for public utilities this article analyzes the shape of contracts between local governments and the contractors they hire to run public facilities on their behalf governments are privately informed about the quality of the facility while risk neutral contractors undertake a non verifiable operating eort the design of the contract signals the quality of the facility in such a way that the better this quality the greater the share of operating risk kept by the government this feature reduces the agent s marginal incentives creating a trade o between signaling and moral hazard we provide extensions of our framework in several directions allowing for risk aversion on the agent s side double moral hazard and political delegation the model is supported by some stylized facts from the water industry

production and innovation when techniques are tacit the case of education abstract the central theme of this paper is that the conventional economic theory of production does not hold even approximately in a field like education after examining the result of input output studies in education and the effect of government attempts to enhance education effectiveness we provide a sketch of a new production theory for sectors where techniques are poorly articulated and idiosyncratic

bundling decisions in procurement auctions with sequential tasks abstract this paper investigates the principal s bundling decision during a procurement auction for a project consisting of two sequential tasks in which task externality exists and information arrives sequentially we show that although increasing the number of bidders in the market for the second task always tilts the principal s choice toward unbundling increasing the number of consortiums that can perform both tasks tilts the principal s preference toward bundling if the externality is negative

schooling and economic well being the role of nonmarket effects standard estimates of the economic value of additional schooling based on earnings differences associated with differences in the level of schooling attained cover only a portion of the total effects of education that are valued by citizens we first identify a catalog of nonmarketed effects many of which have been recently studied by economists and then propose a procedure for estimating a willingness to pay value for these effects using empirical estimates of the magnitude of a selection of these effects found in the literature we calculate willingness to pay values using our proposed procedure these illustrative calculations suggest that standard estimates of the benefit of incremental schooling substantially understate the full value of such investments

government versus private ownership of public goods there has been a dramatic change in the division of responsibility between the state and the private sector for the delivery of public goods and services in recent years with an increasing trend toward contracting out to the private sector and public private partnerships this paper analyzes how ownership matters in public good provision we show that if contracts are incomplete then the ownership of a public good should lie with a party that values the beneets generated by it relatively more this is true regardless of whether this party is also the key investor or other aspects of the technology

should lotteries offer discounts on multiple tickets in a complete information setting we show that the standard lottery in which each lottery ticket is offered for the same price is an optimal fundraising mechanism in the presence of strong asymmetries in the way bettors value the prize and the public good provided with the lottery proceeds when participants are more homogeneous it is optimal to offer discounts for the purchase of multiple tickets

to build or not to build normative and positive theories of public private partnerships abstract this paper analyzes whether the two tasks of building infrastructures which are socially useful in providing public services and managing these assets should be bundled or not when performance contracts can be written both tasks should be performed altogether by the same firm if a better design of the infrastructure helps also to save on operating costs otherwise tasks should be kept apart and undertaken by different units in incomplete contracting environments we isolate conditions under which either the traditional form of public provision of services or the more fashionable public private partnership emerges optimally the latter dominates when there is a positive externality and the private benefits from owning assets are small enough finally we take a political economy perspective and study how incentive schemes are modified under the threat of capture of the decision makers much of the gains from bundling may be lost in this case

child care choices and children s cognitive achievement the case of single mothers we evaluate the effect of child care versus maternal time inputs on child cognitive development using single mothers from the nlsy79 to deal with nonrandom selection of children into child care we exploit the exogenous variation in welfare policy rules facing single mothers in particular the 1996 welfare reform and earlier state level policy changes generated substantial increases in their work child care use we construct a comprehensive set of welfare policy variables and use them as instruments to estimate child cognitive ability production functions in our baseline specification we estimate that a year of child care reduces child test scores by 2 1

how not to raise money we show that standard winner pay auctions are inept fund raising mechanisms because of the positive externality bidders forgo if they top another s high bid revenues are suppressed as a result and remain finite even when bidders value a dollar donated the same as a dollar kept this problem does not occur in lotteries and all pay auctions where bidders pay irrespective of whether they win we introduce a general class of all pay auctions rank their revenues and illustrate how they dominate lotteries and winner pay formats the optimal fund raising mechanism is an all pay auction augmented with an entry fee and reserve price

the economics of schooling production and efficiency in public schools n recent years public and professional interest in schools has been heightened by a spate of reports many of them critical of current school policy these policy documents have added to persistent and long standing concerns about the cost effectiveness and fairness of the current school structure and have made schooling once again a serious public issue as in the past however any renewed interest in education is likely to be short lived doomed to dissipate as frustration over the inability of policy to improve school practice sets in this frustration about school policy relates directly to knowledge about the educational production process and in turn to underlying research on schools although the educational process has been extensively researched clear policy prescriptions flowing from this research have been difficult to derive 2 there exists however a consistency to the research findings that does have an immediate application to school policy schools differ dramatically in quality

managerial incentive contracts with a production externality abstract a multi agent model is extended to examine the optimal incentive contract when a production externality is significant in team production a situation is described where relative performance evaluation is ineffective

information management in incentive problems we extend the standard procurement model to examine how an agent is optimally induced to acquire valuable planning information before he choose an unobservable level of cost reducing effort concer

do peer groups matter peer group versus schooling effects on academic attainment this paper estimates an educational production function educational attainment is a function of peer group parental input and schooling conventional measures of school quality are not good predictors for academic attainment once we control for peer group effects parental qualities also have strong effects on academic attainment this academic attainment is a then a key determinant of subsequent labour market success as measured by earnings the main methodological innovation in this paper is the nomination of a set of instruments very broad regions of birth which as a whole pass close scrutiny for validity and permit unbiased estimation of the production function

the value of information and optimal organization the paper addresses the issue of optimal organization of production i compare three organizational forms centralization one agent produces difierent inputs decentralization each of the two agents produces a difierent input and contracts directly with the principal and delegation two agents produce difierent inputs the principal contracts with one of them only the optimal organizational form depends on the degree of complementarity substitutability between the inputs in the flnal use the degree of complementarity substitutability also determines whether delegation is payofi equivalent to the two agent mechanism from the point of view of the principal in the context of delegation i consider which of the two agents should serve as the primary contractor i also address the issue of collusion between the agents in a decentralized organization and characterize the conditions under which a stake of collusion exists jel fields d2 d82 l23

optimal capital structure in agency relationships we analyze the optimal design of capital structure in agency relationships when a risk averse principal controls the agent s capital structure she awards a larger equity stake to outsiders the smaller the agent s productivity when she controls both the timing and the terms of the agent s financing the principal shifts to equityholders all risk associated with stochastic production and with the agent s unknown productivity when the principal dictates only the terms of financing only the former risk is borne by equityholders when the principal is sufficiently averse to risk she affords the agent no choice among incentive schemes

financing infrastructure in developing countries this article develops a theoretical framework to analyse options for financing infrastructure in developing countries we build a basic model that gives motivations for using a combination of public finance private debt and private equity the model is then extended in a number of ways to examine factors that are important for developing countries we focus in particular on key institutional weaknesses that are often important for infrastructure investment overall we show that such weaknesses can be key in determining financing choices but that they do not all push in the same direction financing schemes must therefore be adapted to consider the institutional limitations that are most pertinent in any given context

does school quality matter returns to education and the characteristics of public schools in the united states this paper estimates the effects of school quality measured by the pupil teacher ratio average term length and relative teacher pay on the rate of return to education for men born between 1920 and 1949 using earnings data from the 1980 census we find that men who were educated in states with higher quality schools have a higher return to additional years of schooling rates of return are also higher for individuals from states with better educated teachers and with a higher fraction of female teachers holding constant school quality measures however we find no evidence that parental income or education affects average state level rates of return

ethnic capital and intergenerational mobility this paper analyzes the extent to which ethnic skill differentials are transmitted across generations i assume that ethnicity acts as an externality in the human capital accumulation process the skills of the next generation depend on parental inputs and on the quality of the ethnic environment in which parents make their investments or ethnic capital the empirical evidence reveals that the skills of today s generation depend not only on the skills of their parents but also on the average skills of the ethnic group in the parent s generation

rank order competition in the voluntary provision of impure public goods publicly provided goods often create differential payoffs due to timely or spatial distances of group members we design and test a provision mechanism which utilizes rank competition to mitigate free riding in impure public goods in our rank order voluntary contribution mechanism rank order vcm group members compete via observable contributions for a larger share of the public good high contributors receive preferential access a larger share while low contributors receive restricted access a lower share in a laboratory experiment rank order vcm elicits median contributions equal to the full endowment throughout the finitely played games with constant groups in the control treatment with randomly assigned ranks the contributions are significantly lower and decline over time we thus provide evidence of rank competition in situations where discriminatory access to public goods is possible being efficiency enhancing

limited liability and incentive contracting with multiple projects i examine a principal agent model with multiple projects where a risk neutral manager is protected by limited liability the analysis has several interesting implications i incentive problems are shown to be a natural source of economies of scope as combining multiple projects under the management of a single manager relaxes the limited liability constraint ii as a result managers may be overloaded with work and exert inefficiently high effort and iii the analysis has implications for the optimal allocation of projects to different managers copyright 2001 by the rand corporation

from global savings glut to financing infrastructure summary samama and joseph stiglitz this paper proposes an institutional solution that can help unlock the flow of low yielding long term savings towards high return infrastructure investments the solution is to transform public private partnerships ppps in infrastructure as well as the classic model of multilateral development banks instead of thinking of ppps as bilateral contracts between a private concession operator and a government agency we argue that they should be conceived as partnerships that also involve a development bank and long term institutional investors as partners we propose a new model for development banks which is to transform them into originate and distribute banks for ppp infrastructure projects the new model allows them to conserve their valuable capital and leverage their expertise and capabilities by making them available to long term institutional investors

schools and housing values this study combines historical and quantitative methods to determine the market response to a major nineteenth century american urban architectural form the speculatively built row house the paper estimates a hedonic price index which decomposes the

decentralization and collusion abstract we consider a model where agents work in sequence on a project share information not available to the principal and can collude due to limited liability the coase theorem does not apply the distribution of surplus among the agents is therefore an important control variable for the principal which gives us a theory of how to delegate in an organization subject to moral hazard the optimal distribution of surplus can always be achieved by delegating in the right way decentralization without using message games journal of economic literature classification numbers d23 d82 l14 l22

identification of endogenous social effects the reflection problem this paper examines the reflection problem that arises when a researcher observing the distribution of behaviour in a population tries to infer whether the average behaviour in some group influences the behaviour of the individuals that comprise the group it is found that inference is not possible unless the researcher has prior information specifying the compisition of reference groups if this information is available the prospects for inference depend critically on the population relationship between the variables defining reference groups and those directly affecting outcomes inference is difficult to implossible if these variables are functionally dependent or are statistically independent the prospects are better if the variables defining reference groups and those directly affecting outcomes are moderately related in the population

the organization of supplier networks effects of delegation and intermediation in a one principal two agent model with adverse selection and collusion among agents we show that delegating to one agent the right to subcontract with the other agent always earns lower profit for the principal compared with centralized contracting delegation to an intermediary is also not in the principal s interest if the agents supply substitutes it can be beneficial if the agents produce complements and the intermediary is well informed

delegated monitoring versus arm s length contracting abstract this paper analyzes the optimal organization of input suppliers in a procurement context we discuss when a top firm chooses to induce information sharing and active coordination between its suppliers consolidation rather than having them contract at arm s length delegation in designing the organization the firm anticipates that different supplier networks have different costs of inducing information revelation from suppliers when the cost of information sharing varies the optimal organization exhibits various discrete degrees of consolidation there is excessive arm s length contracting compared to the case where the top firm controls this organizational choice itself the paper offers also a methodology to study in a unified framework various organizational forms separately analyzed in the literature

the effect of competition on the efficiency of secondary schools in england abstract in this paper we calculate the technical efficiencies based upon multiple outputs school exam performance and attendance rates of all secondary schools in england over the period 1993 1998 we then estimate models to examine the determinants of efficiency in a particular year and the determinants of the change in efficiency over the period our results suggest that the greater the degree of competition between schools the more efficient they are the strength of this effect has also increased over time which is consistent with the evolution of the quasi market in secondary education competition is also found to be an important determinant of the change in efficiency over time there is however some evidence of conditional convergence between schools

regulating complementary products a comparative institutional analysis optimal regulation subject to informational constraints is analyzed for industries for which production requires complementary inputs an issue for regulatory policy is whether supply in these industries should be bundled or unbundled bundled supply calls for regulation of an integrated industry unbundled supply has each component regulated separately a main result is that unbundling introduces into regulation an additional component of information cost that is similar to double marginalization in the monopoly pricing of complementary products unbundling may be advantageous if it allows sufficient competition in nonmonopoly services but the information cost can exceed the benefits of competition

government versus private ownership of public goods the role of bargaining frictions abstract the government and a non governmental organization ngo can invest in the provision of a public good who should be the owner of the public project in an incomplete contracting model in which ex post negotiations are without frictions the party that values the public good most should be the owner regardless of technological aspects however under the plausible assumption that there are bargaining frictions the optimal ownership structure depends on technological aspects and on the parties valuations we show that the differences between incomplete contracting models with public goods and private goods are thus smaller than has previously been thought

optimal incentives for teams much of the existing theory of incentives describes a static relationship that lasts for just one transaction this static assumption is not only unrealistic but the resulting predictions appear to be at odds with many work organizations the current paper introduces possible long term interaction among agents and studies how the design of explicit incentives and work organizations can exploit and interact with the implicit incentives generated by the repeated interaction of the agents the optimal incentive scheme is shown to display observed features of the increasingly popular teams such as the use of low powered group incentives

how lotteries outperform auctions in their recent paper goeree et al 2005 determine that all pay auctions are better for fundraising activities than lotteries we show that the introduction of asymmetry among participants with complete information could reverse this result complete information seems well suited to some charity environments

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

lottery versus all pay auction models of lobbying i first provide a complete characterization of the unique equilibrium of the lottery game by n lobbyists with asymmetric valuations and then compare the lottery and the all pay auction models of lobbying i show that the exclusion principle discovered by baye kovenock and de vries 1993 for all pay auction does not apply to lottery i also show that the perverse effect that an exogenous cap may increase the total lobbying expenditure in a two bidder all pay auction discovered by che and gale 1998 does not apply to lottery

job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered a principal wants two sequential tasks to be performed by wealth constrained agents suppose that there is an outcome externality i e a first stage success can make second stage effort more or less effective if the tasks are conflicting the principal s profit maximizing way to induce high efforts is to hire one agent to perform both tasks so that the prospect to get a larger second stage rent after a first stage success motivates the agent to work hard in the first stage in contrast when there is an effort externality i e first stage effort reduces or increases the probability of a second stage success then the principal prefers to hire two agents whenever the tasks are conflicting

the quality of schooling quantity alone is misleading although much research discusses the quantity of schooling as an effective impact on productivity and earnings most such research leaves out the idea of the quality of schooling which may cause biases in the estimated returns to schooling this paper consequently attempts to extend the standard mincerian approach to incorporate school quality as well as quantity it demonstrates how exclusion of quality in the standard procedure may cause biases in the estimated returns to years of schooling probably in the upward direction the paper explores the implications of this extension of the standard model for the case of young brazilian males it shows that the estimate of the private return to years of schooling using the preferred quality inclusive specification is only one half the estimate using the standard procedure indicating substantial upward bias in the standard estimates it further outlines a method for estimating a social return to quality and finds that it exceeds substantially the social return to quantity the paper then shows why this in turn suggests there may be an equity productivity trade off in schooling investments

the trade off between child quantity and quality an empirical investigation of trade offs between number of children and their scholastic performance confirms that family size directly affects children s achievement though parents show no favori

peer group effects on the academic performance of italian students we analyse peer effects among students of a middle sized italian public university we explain students average grade in exams passed during their second level degree course on the basis of their pre determined measures of abilities personal characteristics and peer group abilities thanks to a rich administrative data set we are able to build a variety of definitions of peer groups describing different kinds of students interaction based on classes attended together or exams taken in the same session self selection problems are handled through two stage least squares estimations using as an instrument the exogenous assignment of students to different teaching classes in the compulsory courses attended during their first level degree course we find statistically significant positive peer group effects which are robust to the different definitions of peer group and to different measures of abilities

how to design infrastructure contracts in a warming world a critical appraisal of public private partnerships we analyze how long term uncertainty for example regarding future climate conditions affects the design of concession contracts and organizational forms in a principal agent context with dynamic moral hazard limited liability and irreversibility constraints the prospect of future uncertain productivity shocks on the returns on the firm s effort creates an option value of delaying efforts a course that exacerbates agency costs contracts and organizational forms are drafted to control this cost of delegated flexibility the possibility for the agent to delay investment in response to uncertainty and irreversibility also elicits preference for unbundling different stages of the project through short term contracts our analysis is relevant to infrastructure sectors that are sensitive to changing weather conditions and sheds a pessimistic light on the relevance of public private partnerships in this context

coalitions incentives and risk sharing abstract this paper analyzes the effects of coalitional behavior in principal multiagent relationships with moral hazard and identifies cases where the principal prefers agents to form a coalition via side contracting it is shown that the principal can implement given efforts via non individualistic incentive contracts at a lower cost when the agents can monitor each other s efforts perfectly and hence coordinate their effort choice than when the agents behave independently permitting the principal to utilize more complex communication mechanisms does not alter the result for there is no coalition proof revelation mechanism improving the principal s welfare journal of economic literature classification number d82