the informational role of stock and bond volume in a kyle 1985 model the sign of the correlation between a firm s debt and equity returns is the same as the sign of the cross market kyle s lambda the sign is positive negative if private information concerns the mean risk of the firm s assets we show empirically that information conveyed by order flows is primarily about asset means the cross market lambdas are quite large consequently the portions of bond and stock returns explained by order flows are highly correlated even though the order flows themselves are virtually uncorrelated

efficient and durable decision rules with incomplete information we compare six concepts of efficiency for economies with incomplete information depending on the stage at which individuals welfare is evaluated and on whether incentive constraints are recognized an example is shown in which an incentive efficient decision rule may be unanimously rejected by the individuals in the economy we define durable decision rules which can resist such unanimous rejection and show that efficient durable decision rules exist

a liquidity based model of security design we consider the problem of the design and sale of a security backed by specified assets given access to higher return investments the issuer has an incentive to raise capital by securitizing part of these assets at the time the security is issued the issuer s or underwriter s private information regarding the payoff of the security may cause illiquidity in the form of a downward sloping demand curve for the security the severity of this illiquidity depends upon the sensitivity of the value of the issued security to the issuer s private information thus the security design problem involves a tradeoff between the retention cost of holding cash flows not included in the security design and the liquidity cost of including the cash flows and making the security design more sensitive to the issuer s private information we characterize the optimal security design in several cases we also demonstrate circumstances under which standard debt is optimal and show that the riskiness of the debt is increasing in the issuer s retention costs for assets

stable shareholdings and japan s bubble economy an historical overview this is an exploratory study aimed at establishing the existence of a strategy utilized by large japanese industrial groups to protect themselves against external threats a measure is developed to assess the stability of the top 10 shareholders of 134 leading companies in the six japanese industrial groups mitsui mitsubishi sumitomo dkb sanwa and fuyo over the 1973 93 period the results demonstrate the use by these companies of their networks of stable shareholdings as a strategic response to deal with threats to group company governance structures arising from the stock market and property boom of the late 1980s known in japan as the bubble economy and its aftermath some theoretical and practical reflections are presented 1998 john wiley sons ltd

product and international diversification among japanese multinational firms this paper examines the relationship of performance with product and international diversification on japanese multinational firms from 1977 to 1993 we show the relationships between diversification and performance change over time through the use of multiple time periods and accounting for keiretsu membership results show that while diversity strategies vary between keiretsu and non keiretsu firms performance is not much different across time periods performance varies considerably but strategies are less variable product diversity has weak effects on firm performance only in one time period while international diversification has negative profitability and positive growth consequences in in some periods these results suggest first that diversification strategies and their effects on performance vary across time periods and generally produce some unexpected findings we do not find strong interactive diversity effects copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

financial contracting under imperfect enforcement we develop a model ofnancial contracting under imperfect enforcement financial contracts are designed to keep entrepreneurs from diverting project returns but enforce ment is probabilistic and penalties are limited the model rationalizes the prevalence of straight debt and common stock and its predictions are consistent with a host of empirical capital structure regularities across countries acrossrms and across time

institutional investment patterns and corporate financial behavior in the united states and japan abstract this paper examines the agency problem between shareholders and debtholders of japanese and u s firms whereas u s institutional investors are restricted from doing so japanese financial institutions take large equity positions in firms to which they lend particularly in firms more susceptible to the agency problem debt ratios of u s firms are negatively related to the firm s potential to engage in risky suboptimal investments whereas japanese debt ratios show no such relation the evidence is consistent with the notion that the agency problem is mitigated to a greater degree in japan than in the u s

skin in the game and moral hazard what determines securitization levels and should they be regulated to address these questions we develop a model where originators can exert unobservable effort to increase expected asset quality subsequently having private information regarding quality when selling abs to rational investors absent regulation originators may signal positive information via junior retentions or commonly adopt low retentions if funding value and price informativeness are high effort incentives are below first best absent regulation optimal regulation promoting originator effort entails a menu of junior retentions or one junior retention with size decreasing in price informativeness zero retentions and opacity are optimal among regulations inducing zero effort

optimal security design how should new securities be designed traditional theories have little to say on this the literature on capital structure and general equilibrium theories with incomplete markets take the securities firms issue as exogenous this paper explicitly incorporates the transaction costs of issuing securities and develops a model where the instruments that are traded are chosen optimally and the economy s market structure is endogenous among other things it is shown that the firm s income stream should be split so that in every state all payoffs are allocated to the security held by the group that values them most this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

debt versus equity under asymmetric information in a world of asymmetric information in which only the insiders know the quality of the firm it is claimed that debt even if it is risky is more advantageous than outside equity because issuance of debt is less attractive to inferior firms the advantage to debt arises from the fact that it can keep unprofitable firms out of the market thus improving the average quality of firms in the market this advantage exists even if the firms cannot be perfectly sorted in the signaling equilibrium

optimal financial instruments debt and equity are developed as optimal financial instruments in a model where cash flows and control rights are allocated to investors endogenously when investment decisions must be made by a single party the debtholder s cash flows are fixed in order to provide the equityholder with efficient incentives for investment ownership of control may be transferred to the debtholder to attenuate the impact of asymmetric information concerning the investment opportunity on the efficiency of the decision making since the classic article by modigliani and miller 1958 a great deal of attention has been focused on the problem of determining the optimal capital structure of the firm spanning taxes and or transaction cost agency cost and signalling arguments have been offered as explanations for why a firm s cash flows might be split between debt and equity claimants in a particular way here we address the more basic question of the optimal design of the securities that firms issue the majority of the existing literature takes the form of the allowable financial instruments as given in defense of this approach it may be noted that to a first approximation firms have used two standard financial instruments debt and equity we argue here however that the characterization of the standard instruments used in much of the literature has been incomplete and that the incentives of decision makers within the firm cannot be completely understood until the problem is addressed from a more basic level than is typically done by concentrating on the cash flow characteristics of these instruments the equally important issue of the way the standard instruments distribute the control rights of the firm has been ignored as a consequence the objectives in corporate decision making have been assumed rather than developed endogenously we consider the allocation of cash flows and the distribution of control rights to optimal financial instruments in a security design problem by considering the design of securities in this way we are able to consider the

adverse selection and security design this paper studies the problem of optimal security design by a privately informed entrepreneur in the context of a simple parametric model it is shown that the entrepreneur does not find it profitable to float an asset that affords her an informational advantage the reason is that with rational uninformed outside investors the entrepreneur faces adverse selection in the security market which prevents her from exploiting her position as an insider this is true whether or not she has market power in trading the asset consider a risk averse entrepreneur who is contemplating what security to issue the entrepreneur anticipates that during subsequent trading in the secondary market she will have private information on the payoff of her investment as well as on other risks in the economy the design of the asset is therefore influenced not only by a desire to share risk but also by informational considerations involving the potential for insider trading profits this paper studies the problem of optimal security design in the context of a simple parametric model with gaussian risks and cara utility trading in the secondary market is modelled via the static reduced form concept of rational expectations equilibrium in which uninformed outside investors use market prices to try to infer the private information of the entrepreneur or insider as she will sometimes be called it is shown that the entrepreneur does not find it profitable to float an asset that affords her an informational advantage an optimal asset entails a fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium and is perfectly correlated with the issuer s endowment risk the reason is that with rational outside investors the entrepreneur faces adverse selection in the security market which prevents her from exploiting her position as an insider she is better off foregoing her informational advantage and concentrating on her hedging motive alone in the particular setting described in the paper equity2 is an optimal asset since the entrepreneur has no privileged information regarding its payoff and it allows efficient risk sharing the issue of security design when prices have an informational role to play is just beginning to be researched closely related to this paper is the work of demange and laroque 1995 who use a competitive rational expectations model with noise traders to analyse the problem posed above except for some special cases however they are able to get only numerical results in comparison the present paper obtains partially revealing equilibria in a model in which all agents are rational furthermore demange and laroque

learning and complementarities in speculative attacks we study a model where the aggregate trading of currency speculators reveals new information to the central bank and affects its policy decision we show that the learning process gives rise to coordination motives among speculators leading to large currency attacks and introducing non fundamental volatility into exchange rates and policy decisions we show that the central bank can improve the ex ante effectiveness of its policy by committing to put a lower weight ex post on the information from the market and that transparency may either increase or decrease the effectiveness of learning from the market depending on how it is implemented

capital structure and signaling game equilibria in this article we model the financing decisions of a firm as a sequential signaling game we prove that when insiders have perfect information regarding the firm s future case flows the application of refinements to the set of admissible equilibria leads to the dominance of debt over equity financing however we show that when insiders observe the firm s cash flows imperfectly there may exist sequential equilibria in which this pecking order breaks down and some firms strictly prefer equity to debt financing we also prove that despite the breakdown of the pecking order the announcement effect of equity financing will be negative relative to debt financing

the pecking order debt capacity and information asymmetry abstract we quantify the empirical relevance of the pecking order hypothesis using a novel empirical model and testing strategy that addresses statistical power concerns with previous tests while the classificatory ability of the pecking order varies significantly depending on whether one interprets the hypothesis in a strict or liberal e g modified pecking order manner the pecking order is never able to accurately classify more than half of the observed financing decisions however when we expand the model to incorporate factors typically attributed to alternative theories the predictive accuracy of the model increases dramatically accurately classifying over 80 of the observed debt and equity issuances finally we show that what little pecking order behavior can be found in the data is driven more by incentive conflicts as opposed to information asymmetry

a comment on the economics of labor adjustment mind the gap reply in earlier contributions ricardo j caballero and eduardo m r a engel 1993 hereafter ce and caballero et al 1997 hereafter ceh investigate labor dynamics using a methodology which postulates that employment changes depend on a gap between the actual and target levels of employment both studies find evidence of nonlinearities in aggregate timeseries data employment growth depends on the cross sectional distribution of employment gaps this finding is taken as evidence that nonlinear adjustment at the microeconomic level matters for aggregate time series this is important for business cycle and policy analysis as it implies macroeconomics must take the cross sectional distribution of employment gaps into account this paper questions the methodology and thus the conclusions of these studies we argue that these reported aggregate nonlinearities may be the consequence of mismeasurement of the gap rather than nonlinearities in plant level adjustment both ce and ceh rely upon a hypothesis that employment growth responds to a gap z between the desired and actual number of workers at a plant the advantage to the gap approach is that the choice of employment an inherently difficult dynamic optimization problem is characterized through a nonlinear relationship between and z that is the adjustment rate z is postulated to be a nonlinear function of z however there is no free lunch the desired number of workers and hence the employment gap is unobservable thus in order to confront data this approach needs an auxiliary theory to infer z from observed variables both ce and ceh use observed hours variations to infer the employment gap this inference is one element of our critique of the gap methodology to assess this methodology we simulate data from the solution of a dynamic model of labor adjustment assuming quadratic adjustment cooper department of economics university of texas austin tx 78712 e mail cooper eco utexas edu willis research department federal reserve bank of kansas city kansas city mo 64198 e mail jonathan willis kc frb org we are grateful to seminar participants at boston university emory university the university of british columbia the federal reserve bank of boston the university of haifa the university of iowa the university of michigan the university of pennsylvania the university of texas at austin the 2002 nber ef meeting and the 2000 cmsg conference at mcmaster university for comments and suggestions discussions with eduardo engel john haltiwanger daniel hamermesh peter klenow and christopher ragan were much appreciated the authors thank the nsf for financial support we also appreciate comments from the referees cooper thanks the federal reserve bank of minneapolis for its hospitality during revisions of this manuscript the views expressed herein are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the federal reserve bank of kansas city the federal reserve bank of minneapolis or the federal reserve system 1 daniel hamermesh 1989 uses a gap methodology as well but does not adopt the approach of estimating a nonlinear hazard function explained below to infer the nature of adjustment costs hence we focus on ce and ceh in this discussion of methodology 2 we do not contest the general view of nonlinear employment adjustment at the plant level this finding is consistent with other evidence that points to inactivity as well as bursts of employment adjustment at the plant level for example hamermesh 1989 provides a revealing discussion of lumpy labor adjustment at a set of manufacturing plants steven davis and john haltiwanger 1992 document large employment changes at the plant level ceh also report evidence of inactivity in plant level employment adjustment there seems little doubt that an explanation of plant level employment dynamics requires a model of adjustment that is richer than the quadratic adjustment cost structure and includes some forms of nondifferentiability and or nonconvexity 3 as the gap approach is used in numerous other applications capital adjustment durable adjustment price adjustment to approximate the solution to dynamic optimization problems our concerns may be relevant for those exercises as well

explaining investment dynamics in u s manufacturing a generalized s s approach we are grateful to olivier blanchard whitney newey james stock an editor three anonymousreferees and seminar participants at brown cepr champoussin chicago columbia econometric society meetings caracas and tokyo efcc harvard impa lse nber princeton rochester site toronto u de chile and yale for their comments financial support to caballero from the national science and sloan foundations and to engel from fondecyt grant 195 510 and the mellon foundation grant 9608 is gratefully acknowledged 2since plants entry is excluded from their sample these statistics are likely to represent lowerbounds on the degree of lumpiness in plants investment patterns 3we use the word project to emphasize the fact that the actual implementation of a projectmay cover more than a year observation realistic time to build aspects of investment are not incontradiction with the view that investment episodes are lumpy in nature 4 see chirinko 1994 for a survey of the empirical investment literature

deregulation disintermediation and agency costs of debt evidence from japan abstract many japanese firms reduced dependence on banks following financial deregulation in the 1980s the financial architecture of japanese firms after liberalization provides an opportunity to investigate the choice of financing with public bonds versus monitored bank loans examination of accounting and stock price data for a sample of japanese firms in the late 1980s suggests that debt structure is related to variables that serve as proxies for agency costs of debt in particular we find that the proportion of bond debt is inversely related to growth opportunities while the proportion of bank debt is positively related to growth opportunities

positive information from equity issue announcements abstract the myers and majluf 1984 model predicts a nonpositive price reaction to an announcement of a new issue of equity this paper shows that the myers and majluf result is a direct outcome of their assumption that all potential projects facing the firm have a nonnegative net present value refining the myers and majluf model by allowing for the realistic possibility of potential projects having negative net present values leads to different predictions the refined model predicts positive as well as negative stock price responses consistent with recent empirical evidence concerning the stock price effects of new stock issues

estimating the performance effects of business groups in emerging markets business groups confederations of legally independent firms are ubiquitous in emerging economies yet very little is known about their effects on the performance of affiliated firms we conceive of business groups as responses to market failures and high transaction costs in doing so we develop hypotheses about the effects of group affiliation on firm profitability affiliation could either boost or depress firm profitability and members of a group are likely to earn rates of return similar to other members of the same group using a unique data set compiled largely from local sources we test for these effects in 14 emerging markets argentina brazil chile india indonesia israel mexico peru the philippines south africa south korea taiwan thailand and turkey we find evidence that business groups indeed affect the broad patterns of economic performance in 12 of the markets we examine group affiliation appears to have as profound an effect on profitability as does industry membership yet strategy scholars have a much clearer grasp of industries than of groups moreover membership in a group raises the profitability of the average group member in several of the markets we examine this runs contrary to the wisdom conventional in advanced economies that unrelated diversification depresses profitability overall our findings suggest that the roots of sustained differences in profitability may vary across institutional contexts conclusions drawn in one context may well not apply to another copyright 2001 john wiley sons ltd

informed lending and security design we examine the role of security design when lenders make inefficient accept or reject decisions after screening projects lenders may be either too conservative in which case they reject positive npv projects or too aggressive in which case they accept negative npv projects in the first case the uniquely optimal security is debt in the second case it is levered equity in equilibrium profitable projects that are relatively likely to break even are financed with debt while less profitable projects are financed with equity highly profitable projects are financed by uninformed arm slength lenders professional lenders have specialized expertise in screening projects unlike the typical entrepreneur to whom they lend they have been exposed to a wide variety of projects in the past professional lenders have experienced loan officers and analysts who know precisely what information is relevant how to treat soft information such as management quality and how to weigh the various pieces of information in making a forecast of the project s cash flows and default risk this paper examines how securities should be optimally designed when lenders make inefficient accept or reject decisions after screening projects in our model screening generates an informative albeit private signal about the project s profitability high signals indicate a positive net present value npv and low signals indicate a negative npv where the project s npv is increasing

shareholding in the keiretsu japan s financial groups largest debtholders in keiretsu member companies hold more stock if the companies have high debt to equity ratios or have weaker collateral greater prospects of growth or unique aspects all are factors associated with the agency problems of debt that stockholding by a debtholder can help to resolve the stockholding also induces greater borrowing by these same companies ceteris paribus copyright 1993 by mit press

the persistence and implications of japanese keiretsu organization this paper examines two important research questions 1 to what extent have recent economic and regulatory changes influenced the japanese inter corporate network 2 have the patterns of firm performance fostered by the japanese inter corporate system remained stable or has there been an evolution to more north american performance profiles using hierarchical regressions to compare patterns of networking and firm performance with data from the periods 1987 to 1991 and 1992 to 1997 we find little evidence to support the existence of significant changes in the patterns and implications of japanese industrial organization we conclude that the keiretsu system remained strongly in place throughout the first half of the 1990s nevertheless we suggest that the continued move toward globalization of capital markets in japan and ongoing regulatory change may potentially impact networking and performance implications in the 21st century

filling institutional voids in emerging economies the impact of capital market development and business groups on m a deal abandonment business groups may fill institutional voids in emerging economies but empirical research is lacking as to when and how institutional voids affect economic behavior of individual firms we examine the effect of institutional voids in capital markets on individual transactions in emerging economies focusing on m a deals that were abandoned after being publicly announced m a deals may fall through when unexpected information is brought to light or financing difficulties arise at the country level capital market development can lower the probability of m a deal abandonment by facilitating the flow of information and capital at the firm level when acquirers are affiliated with business groups development of internal capital markets can also lower this probability facilitating completion of the transaction and the flow of information this effect of business groups however decreases as the external capital market the institution replaced by their internal markets develops and its benefits become widely available to non business groups the results of our empirical analyses on m a transactions in nine emerging economies over 21 years support our arguments

design and marketing of financial products marketing costs are introduced into the security design environment outlined in allen and gale 1988 it is shown that splitting the firm s cash flow between products enhances their investor appeal and reduces marketing costs we also explain how the extremal product design in allen and gale is thereby avoided and how in simple cases debt equity or warrants can be optimal furthermore we illustrate in general terms how the optimal solution employs portfolios of option type products and we give an example of two optimal products that share profits in seven of eight states article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

extreme screening policies abstract we show that a lender often experiences increasing marginal returns to screening in a standard setting where the lender decides how intensively to screen the projects of prospective borrowers the increasing marginal returns imply that even small changes in industry parameters can produce large changes in equilibrium screening intensity in particular a small reduction in the expected return from borrowers projects can produce a pronounced increase in the screening of prospective borrowers with substantial corresponding welfare effects

financing patterns around the world are small firms different using a firm level survey database covering 48 countries we investigate how financial and institutional development affects financing of large and small firms our database is not limited to large firms but includes small and medium size firms and data on a broad spectrum of financing sources including leasing supplier development and informal finance small firms and firms in countries with poor institutions use less external finance especially bank finance protection of property rights increases external financing of small firms significantly more than of large firms mainly due to its effect on bank finance small firms do not use disproportionately more leasing or trade finance compared with larger firms so these financing sources do not compensate for lower access to bank financing of small firms we also find that larger firms more easily expand external financing when they are constrained than small firms finally we find suggestive evidence that the pecking order holds across countries

trading frenzies and their impact on real investment we study a model in which a capital provider learns from the price of a firm s security in deciding how much capital to provide for new investment this feedback effect from the financial market to the investment decision gives rise to trading frenzies in which speculators all wish to trade like others generating large pressure on prices coordination among speculators is sometimes desirable for price informativeness and investment efficiency but speculators incentives push in the opposite direction so that they coordinate exactly when it is undesirable we analyze the effect of various market parameters on the likelihood of trading frenzies to arise

microeconomic adjustment hazards and aggregate dynamics the basic premise of this paper is that understanding aggregate dynamics requires considering that agents are heterogeneous and that they do not adjust continuously to the shocks they perceive we provide a general characterization of lumpy behavior at the microeconomic level in terms of an adjustment hazard function which relates the probability that a unit adjusts to the deviation of its state variable from its moving target we characterize rich cross sectionally dependent aggregate dynamics generated by nonconstant hazards we present an example based on u s manufacturing employment and job flows and find that increasinghazard models outperform constant hazard partial adjustment models in describing aggregate employment dynamics

optimal incentives and securitization of defaultable assets abstract we study optimal securitization in the presence of an initial moral hazard a financial intermediary creates and then sells to outside investors defaultable assets whose default risk is determined by the unobservable costly effort exerted by the intermediary we calculate the optimal contract for any given effort level and show the natural emergence of extreme punishment for defaults under which investors stop paying the intermediary after the first default with securitization contracts optimally designed we find securitization improves the intermediary s screening incentives furthermore the equilibrium effort level and the surplus converge to their first best levels with sufficiently many assets

aggregate employment dynamics building from microeconomic evidence this paper studies quarterly employment flows of approximately 10 000 u s manufacturing establishments the authors use establishments hours week to construct measures of the deviation between desired and actual employment and use these as the establishments main state variables the main findings are 1 microeconomic adjustment functions are nonlinear with plants adjusting disproportionately to large shortages 2 adjustments are often either large or nil suggesting the presence of nonconvexities in the adjustment cost technologies 3 the bulk of average employment fluctuations is accounted for by aggregate rather than reallocation shocks and 4 microeconomic nonlinearities amplify the impact of large aggregate shocks copyright 1997 by american economic association

financial structure and bankruptcy risk in japanese companies financial structure and the nature of financial risk in japanese companies differ substantially from those of u s firms as a result the application of u s standards is likely to produce misleading conclusions for creditors investors and competitors this article examines the unique institutional relationships and the nature of debt and equity claims that are central to understanding financial risk in japan it reports the results of empirical testing of the types of measures that more accurately reflect bankruptcy risk in large japanese firms the findings indicate that measures of a company s social importance and the strength of its bank relationship may be more important at financially crucial moments than accounting information the results are of practical value to foreign creditors and analysts as well as to researchers

adverse selection and convertible bonds informational asymmetries between a firm and investors may lead to adverse selection in capital markets this paper demonstrates that when the market obtains noisy information about a firm over time this adverse selection problem can be costlessly solved by issuing callable convertible bonds with restrictive call provisions such securities can be designed to make the payoff to new claimholders independent of the private information of the manager this eliminates the possibility of any dilution of equity or underinvestment and implements the symmetric information outcome in either a pooling or a separating equilibrium the same first best efficient outcome can also be implemented by issuing floating price and mandatory convertibles

secondary market liquidity and security design theory and evidence from abs markets we develop and empirically test a theory of optimal security design under adverse selection accounting for strategic trading by uninformed investors who will liquidate a security in secondary markets only if their idiosyncratic carrying costs exceed the security s expected trading loss such investors demand primary market discounts equaling expected carrying costs borne plus trading losses incurred issuers minimize the total illiquidity discount by splitting cash flow into tranched debt claims with liquidity predicted to increase with seniority while the optimal number of tranches increases with underlying cash flow risk empirical tests confirm our model predictions

market based corrective actions many economic agents take corrective actions based on information inferred from market prices of firms securities examples include directors and activists intervening in the management of firms and bank supervisors taking actions to improve the health of financial institutions we provide an equilibrium analysis of such situations in light of a key problem if agents use market prices when deciding on corrective actions prices adjust to reflect this use and potentially become less revealing we show that market information and agents information are complementary and discuss measures that can increase agents ability to learn from market prices the author 2009 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please email journals permissions oxfordjournals org oxford university press

a comment on the economics of labor adjustment mind the gap evidence from a monte carlo experiment reply this comment addresses a point raised in russell cooper and jonathan willis 2003 2004 which discusses whether the gap approach is appropriate to describe the adjustment of production factors they show that this approach to labor adjustment as applied in ricardo j caballero eduardo engel and john c haltiwanger 1997 and caballero and engel 1993 can falsely generate evidence in favor of nonconvex adjustment costs even if costs are quadratic simulating a dynamic model of firm level employment decisions with quadratic adjustment costs and estimating a gap model from the simulated data they identify two factors producing this spurious evidence approximating dynamic adjustment targets by static ones and estimating the static targets themselves this comment reassesses whether the first factor indeed leads to spurious evidence in favor of fixed adjustment costs we show that the numerical approximation of the productivity process is pivotal for cooper and willis s finding with more precise approximations of the productivity process it becomes rare to falsely reject the quadratic adjustment cost model due to the approximation of dynamic targets by static ones jel e24 j3

feedback effects and asset prices feedback effects from asset prices to firm cash flows have been empirically documented this finding raises a question for asset pricing how are asset prices determined if price affects fundamental value which in turn affects price in this environment by buying assets that others are buying investors ensure high future cash flows for the firm and subsequent high returns for themselves hence investors have an incentive to coordinate which may generate self fulfilling beliefs and multiple equilibria using insights from global games we pin down investors beliefs analyze equilibrium prices and show that strong feedback leads to higher excess volatility

public trading and private incentives this article studies the link between public trading and the activity of a firm s large shareholder who can affect firm value public trading results in the formation of a stock price that is informative about the large shareholder s activity this increases the latter s incentives to engage in value increasing activities indeed if he has to liquidate part of his stake before the effect of his activity is publicly observed a more informative price rewards him for his activity implications are derived for the decision to go public capital structure and security design we consider a firm with a large shareholder and otherwise dispersed shares which are publicly traded the block holder is an insider in the sense that he can undertake actions that directly affect the firm s value moreover the insider might not take all value increasing actions as at least some of them involve a private cost for him in other words there is an incentive problem the article s main premise is that public trading as part of the price formation process generates information not only about exogenous factors affecting firm value but also about the insider s activity for instance as a result of public trading a firm s stock price will incorporate the market s evaluation of how a controlling shareholder allocates corporate resources we identify two sources of incentives for the insider to engage in activities that will increase firm value the first one is his stake in the firm since the insider participates in a value increase in proportion to his equity stake a larger stake increases the benefit to him from the firm value being high the view that large shareholders affect firm value is indeed widespread shleifer and vishny 1997 they alleviate the free rider problem pervasive in firms with passive dispersed investors unable or unwilling to affect the firm s operations that is outsiders

information production dilution costs and optimal security design abstract we investigate the problem of a firm wishing to finance a project by issuing securities under asymmetric information we find that when outside investors can produce noisy information on the firm s quality the degree of information asymmetry resulting in equilibrium is endogenous and depends on the information sensitivity of the security issued thus in contrast to the prediction of the pecking order theory see e g myers and majluf j financial econom 13 1984 187 a security with low sensitivity to private information such as debt does not always dominate one with high information sensitivity such as equity a firm s preference for equity rather than debt depends on the costs of information production the precision of the information production technology and the extent of the information asymmetry we also study the optimal security design problem and find that depending on the cost and precision of the information production technology risky debt or a composite security with a convex payoff emerges as optimal securities

optimality of debt under flexible information acquisition we study the optimality of debt through the interaction between se curity design and information acquisition an impatient seller designs an asset backed security and a buyer decides whether to buy it to provide liquidity facing dierent securities the buyer has incentives to acquire in formation from dierent aspects of the fundamental which in turn aects security design speci cally the buyer bene ts from information acqui sition at the expense of the seller through adverse selection the seller hence deliberately designs the security to induce the buyer to acquire the information least harmful to the seller s interest since securities can be designed in arbitrary ways the resulting incentive to acquire information is very exible thus we introduce exible information acquisition to capture this interaction we show that debt is uniquely optimal com pared with the security design literature we neither assume monotonicity of the feasible securities nor impose various distributional assumptions on the fundamental or information structures fixed aggregate cash ow and homogeneous information cost are two key factors driving the results jel d86 d82 g32

optimal design of securities under asymmetric information a firm must decide what security to sell to raise external capital to finance a profitable investment opportunity there is ex ante asymmetry of information regarding the probability distribution of cash flow generated by the investment in this setting we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a security to be optimal uniquely optimal that is for pooling at this security to be an the unique equilibrium outcome using these conditions we show that the debt contract is uniquely optimal if and only if cash flows are ordered by strict conditional stochastic dominance finally we derive an equivalence relationship between optimal security designs and designs that minimize mispricing