politics growth and inequality in rural china does it pay to join the party abstract economic reform is often constrained because rank and file bureaucrats responsible for implementation have vested interests that oppose change drawing on an unusual longitudinal survey data set for a representative rural county in northern china we show an alternative positive scenario consistent with the presence of an implicit performance based incentive contract that ties the household incomes of local officials to market liberalization increases in consumer demand and the provision of local public goods the mechanisms appear to be tolerated as the fruits of growth are shared fairly equitably thus allowing implementation of a politically and economically self reinforcing reform process

the long run effects of income taxation under endogenous technical progress abstract this study examines the long run effects of income taxation by using a perfect foresight optimizing model unlike the existing literature we assume that technical progress is endogenously evolved under this assumption income taxation will affect not only capital accumulation but also inventive activity of private agents we demonstrate that a rise in income tax could increase the level of income in the long run

regulatory discretion and the unofficial economy johnson kaufmann and shleifer 1997 find that the share of the unofficial economy in gdp is determined by the extent of control rights held by politicians and bureaucrats in post communist economies exploring in more detail the role of bribes and using a broader data set from the oecd latin america and transition economies we find that the unofficial economy accounts for a larger share of gdp when there is more corruption and when the rule of law is weaker while these findings are consistent with the earlier results for transition economies in the larger country sample we find it is not necessarily the case that more regulation or higher taxes directly increases the size of the unofficial economy the problem appears to be not regulation or taxation per se but whether the state administrative system can operate without corruption a high level of regulatory discretion helps create the potential for corruption and drive firms into the unofficial economy

dodging the grabbing hand the determinants of unofficial activity in 69 countries across 69 countries higher tax rates are associated with less unofficial activity as a percent of gdp but corruption is associated with more unofficial activity entrepreneurs go underground not to avoid official taxes but to reduce the burden of bureaucracy and corruption dodging the grabbing hand in this way reduces tax revenues as a percent of both official and total gdp as a result corrupt governments become small governments and only relatively uncorrupt governments can sustain high tax rates 2000 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

interfirm relationships and informal credit in vietnam trading relations in vietnam s emerging private sector are shaped by two market frictions the difficulty of locating trading partners and the absence of legal enforcement of contracts examining relational contracting we find that a firm trusts its customer enough to offer credit when the customer finds it hard to locate an alternative supplier a longer duration of trading relationship is associated with larger credit as is prior information gathering customers identified through business networks receive more credit these network effects are enduring suggesting that networks are used to sanction defaulting customers

asymmetric information and options in an extension of the kyle 1985 model of continuous insider trading it is shown that asymmetric information can make it impossible to price options by arbitrage even when an option would appear to be redundant its introduction into the market can cause the volatility of the underlying asset to become stochastic this eliminates the potential for dynamically replicating the option the change in the price process of the asset reflects a change in the information transmitted by volume and prices when the option is traded article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

investor heterogeneity asset pricing and volatility dynamics abstract we provide an explicit characterization of the equilibrium when investors have heterogeneous risk preferences given market completeness investors can achieve full risk sharing thus a representative agent can be constructed though this agent s risk aversion changes over time as the relative wealths of the individual investors change we show that volatility depends on the covariance of aggregate risk aversion and stock returns we find that heterogeneity increases volatility produces volatility clustering arch effects and leverage like effects option prices exhibit implied volatility skews there is predictability and we assess the magnitude of investors hedging demands and trading volume further diversity is beneficial to all agents and entails welfare gains that can be substantial

why do firms hide bribes and unofficial activity after communism abstract our survey of private manufacturing firms finds the size of hidden unofficial activity to be much larger in russia and ukraine than in poland slovakia and romania a comparison of cross country averages shows that managers in russia and ukraine face higher effective tax rates worse bureaucratic corruption greater incidence of mafia protection and have less faith in the court system our firm level regressions for the three eastern european countries find that bureaucratic corruption is significantly associated with hiding output

chinese institutional innovation and privatization from below one of the most distinctive features of china s transition to a market economy has been the role played by rural township and village enterprises tve s in the face of sustained rapid growth of tve s the share of total industrial output produced by state owned enterprises soe s has fallen below half despite steady state sector growth and the absence of significant privatization yet most tve s are collectives a form of publicly owned enterprise this feature seems to make them unique in no other transitional economy has public ownership played such a dynamic role china presents the unusual picture of an economy that has made a transition to a primarily market economy but in which publicly owned enterprises still produce the bulk of manufacturing output surprisingly also the collective ownership form does not have a precise legal definition in china leading to some uncertainty about ultimate property rights martin weitzman and chenggang xu 1993 point out that public ownership with vaguely defined ownership ought to represent a recipe for economic disaster to them tve success suggests instead advantages to the internal institutional form of tve s which are seen to facilitate cooperation through implicit contracts among community members locked into an ongoing relationship victor nee 1992 advances a similar interpretation arguing that long time community residents create forms of income sharing that may be optimal in the absence of an independent legal system an alternative perhaps complementary view is presented here the success of tve s i argue is due largely to a set of external conditions to which tve s are an effective adaptation tve s are responses to one of the most distinctive characteristics of the chinese transition as a whole the early creation of product markets which exist for a prolonged period without well developed markets for factors of production or assets tve s are a flexible and effective but basically ordinary adaptation to this environment

option volume and stock prices evidence on where informed traders trade this paper investigates the informational role of transactions volume in options markets we develop an asymmetric information model in which informed traders may trade in option or equity markets we show conditions under which informed traders trade options and we investigate the implications of this for the linkage between markets our model predicts an important informational role for the volume of particular types of option trades we empirically test our model s hypotheses with intraday option data our main empirical result is that negative and positive option volumes contain information about future stock prices the information content of trading activity is a subject of widespread interest if trades are correlated with private information then the outcome of the transaction process may portend future movements in price the extension of trading to different venues or to derivative instruments however means that this link between transactions and information need not be easily discernible if there are alternative markets in which informed traders can profit from their information then where informed traders choose to trade may have important implications not only for security p rice movements but for the behavior of related prices as well this suggests that transactions in derivative markets may be an important predictor of future security price movements in this paper we investigate the informational role of transactions volume in options markets for some readers this focus may seem puzzling an option is a derivative security so its price should be dictated unilaterally by the behavior of the stock price this unidirectional linkage is only true however in complete markets if information is impounded into prices by trading then the ability of informed traders to transact in options markets mearns

the invisible hand and the grabbing hand evidence from a survey of 105 shop owners in moscow and warsaw shows that the reliance on private protection as well as the burden of regulation and corruption are much greater in moscow the evidence suggests that the invisible hand model of government better fits the warsaw local government and the grabbing hand model is more appropriate for moscow the evidence implies that the singular focus on the speed of economic reforms to understand the success of transition is misplaced and that the quality of government may be as essential this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

heterogeneous beliefs and the effect of replicatable options on asset prices we present two ways in which trading in a replicatable option can affect the price process of the underlying asset in the first situation trading an option that each investor views as pay off redundant breaks a non fully revealing equilibrium that exists when the option market is absent the second situation involves a market that is dynamically complete without options but in which introducing an option market allows self confirming conjectures of additional uncertainty about the future price of the underlying asset heterogeneous beliefs play important though different roles in both situations article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

on the past and future of china s township and village owned enterprises abstract this paper proposes an explanation of the historical success of industrial enterprises owned by township and village governments in china i argue that conditions peculiar to china s prereform economy fostered the growth of a skilled workforce and high savings created unusual market niches and encouraged entrepreneurial undertakings by local political elites especially in areas adjacent to certain cities i then discuss the allocative and technical efficiency of local public enterprises in china from a theoretical standpoint and review some relevant econometric findings finally i consider proposals for reform of town and village enterprise tve ownership and discuss the possible advantages of cooperative forms

who buys and who sells options the role of options in an economy with background risk abstract in this paper we derive an equilibrium in which some investors buy call put options on the market portfolio while others sell them since investors are assumed to have similar risk averse preferences the demand for these contracts is not explained by differences in the shape of utility functions rather it is the degree to which agents face other non hedgeable background risks that determines their risk taking behavior in the model we show that investors with low or no background risk have a concave sharing rule i e they sell options on the market portfolio whereas investors with high background risk have a convex sharing rule and buy these options journal of economic literature classification numbers d52 d81 g11 g13

spanning and completeness with options the role of ordinary options infacilitating the completion of securities markets is examined in the context of a model of contingent claims sufficiently general to accommodate the continuous distributions of asset pricing theory and option pricing theory in this context it is shown that call options written on a single security approximately span all contingent claims written on this security and that call options written on portfolios of call options on individual primitive securities approximately span all contingent claims that can be written on these primitive securities in the case of simple options explicit formulas are given for the approximating options and porfolios of options these results are applied to the pricing of contingent claims by arbitrage and to irrelevance propositions in corporate finance

income taxation and endogenous growth abstract this paper examines the long run effects of income taxation by using a perfect foresight optimizing model in which the steady state rate of economic growth is endogenously determined due to technical progress activities of private agents we show that a rise in the rate of income tax depresses the rate of economic growth in the long run we also show that the assumption concerning production structure of technical knowledge is crucial to our main conclusion

property rights and finance which is the tighter constraint on private sector investment weak property rights or limited access to external finance from a survey of new firms in post communist countries we find that weak property rights discourage firms from reinvesting their profits even when bank loans are available where property rights are relatively strong firms reinvest their profits where they are relatively weak entrepreneurs do not want to invest from retained earnings

welfare effects of financial innovation in incomplete markets economies with several consumption goods abstract we show that in almost every incomplete markets economy with more than one consumption good and with sufficiently many uninsured states of nature at any general equilibrium of this economy it is possible to arbitrarily perturb the equilibrium utilities merely by introducing the appropriate asset making for example all agents worse off this result demonstrates that the examples given by hart on the optimality of equilibrium when the market structure is incomplete j econ theory11 1975 418 443 and others are actually general phenomena and is in sharp contrast to the intuition that innovation since it expands financial opportunities should benefit all agents journal of economic literature classification numbers d52 d60 g10

a general equilibrium analysis of option and stock market interactions the traditional pricing methodology in finance values derivative securities as redundant assets that have no impact on equilibrium prices and allocations this paper demonstrates that when the market is incomplete primary and derivative asset markets generically interact the valuation of derivative and primary security prices depend on the contractual characteristics of the derivative assets available in a version of the mossin mean variance model the authors analyze an equilibrium in which a call option derivative asset is traded and the equilibrium stock price primary asset increases when the options market is opened copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

campaign contributions as investments the u s house of representatives 1980 1986 this paper treats the market for special interest campaign contributions and political favors as a simple asset market the model yields a simple equilibrium relationship among three variables the total amount of investor contributions a candidate receives the monetary value of the favors he has promised and his probability of winning using data on open seat races for the u s house of representatives i confront the model with a series of tests despite the starkness of the model the results of these tests are highly supportive

optimal consumption and portfolio policies when asset prices follow a diffusion process abstract we consider a consumption portfolio problem in continuous time under uncertainty a martingale technique is employed to characterize optimal consumption portfolio policies when there exist nonnegativity constraints on consumption and on final wealth we also provide a way to compute and verify optimal policies our verification theorem for optimal policies involves a linear partial differential equation unlike the nonlinear partial differential equation of dynamic programming the relationship between our approach and dynamic programming is discussed we demonstrate our technique by explicitly computing optimal policies in a series of examples in particular we solve the optimal consumption portfolio problem for hyperbolic absolute risk aversion utility functions when the asset prices follow a geometric brownian motion the optimal policies in this case are no longer linear when nonnegativity constraints on consumption and on final wealth are included by these examples one can see that our approach is much easier than the dynamic programming approach

the equilibrium allocation of diffusive and jump risks with heterogeneous agents abstract we study a two agent pure exchange equilibrium subject to both nondiversifiable diffusive and jump risks agents can trade in a financial market consisting of a stock market a money market and an insurance market for jump risk heterogeneity is introduced through different levels of relative risk aversion in the framework of standard expected utility we find the surprising result that the less risk averse agent purchases insurance contracts against jump risk from the more risk averse agent this equilibrium allocation is linked to the non linear wealth sharing rule in such an economy and preserves the wealth effects studied by dumas rev financ stud 2 1989 157 in the case of pure diffusive risk since the benchmark economy with homogeneous agents generates no excess uncertainty in the stock market we study the effect on excess volatility and excess jump size solely due to different levels of relative risk aversion we observe 3 excess uncertainty in jump sizes for a reasonable specification of economic fundamentals

production growth and business cycles ii new directions abstract this paper outlines new directions for investigations of real business cycle models consideration of stochastic growth of exogenous and endogenous forms analysis of suboptimal outcomes arising due to externalities of distorting taxes and implications of labor market heterogeneity

do lenders favor politically connected firms rent provision in an emerging financial market corruption by the politically connected is often blamed for economic ills particularly in less developed economies using a loan level data set of more than 90 000 rms that represents the universe of corporate lending in pakistan between 1996 and 2002 we investigate rents to politically connected rms in banking classifying a rm as political if its director participates in an election we examine the extent nature and economic costs of political rent provision we nd that political rms borrow 45 percent more and have 50 percent higher default rates such preferential treatment occurs exclusively in government banks private banks provide no

information trade and derivative securities hellwig s 1980 model is used to analyze the value of improving trading opportunities by more frequent trading in the underlying asset or by trading in a derivative asset with multiple trading sessions uninformed investors behave as rational trend followers while more informed investors follow a contrarian strategy as trading becomes continuous pareto efficiency is achieved with trading in an appropriate derivative security pareto efficiency may be achieved in only a single round of trading all derivative claims are then priced on black and scholes 1973 principles and in the absence of further supply shocks no trading will take place in subsequent trading rounds article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

monetary policy overlapping generations and patterns of growth this paper investigates the role of monetary policy in economic growth using an infinitely lived overlapping generations model with a simple convex technology that can yield endo genous growth we show that money supply behaviour of the government may have significant effects on the long run economic growth in addition to the effect on the long term growth rate of the economy the policy may determine whether the economy stays in the exogenous growth process restricted by the growth rate of labour supply or realizes the endogenous growth that sustains continuous growth of pep capita income and consumption effect of inflation on capital accumulation has been one of the central topics in macroeconomics using an ad hoc model tobin shows that a rise in the rate of inflation deepens capital formation whereas sidrauski presents an opti mizing model in which money is superneutral that is inflation has no effect on capital formation in the long run these studies have been extended by a number of studies such as dornbusch and frenkel 1973 and wang and yip 1992 however the concern of these studies is restricted to the analysis of the level effect of inflation on capital accumulation recent developments in endogenous growth theory present a useful analytical framework for re examin ing the effect of inflation on capital accumulation and economic growth in contrast to the strong emphasis on the importance of fiscal policy for long run economic growth seen in mino 1989 barro 1990 and king and rebelo 1990 the role of monetary policy has been mostly ignored in the endogenous growth literature recalling that the effect of money growth on capital formation has been the central issue in money and growth literature it is rather curious that recent studies on endogenous economic growth focus exclusively on the real side of the economy there is however a small number of authors investigating the role of money in endogenously growing economies marquis and reffet 1991 and mino 1991 introduce money into two sector models involving human capital accumulation via a cash in advance constraint they conclude that an increase in the rate of nominal money supply generally depresses the long term economic growth as long as the cash in advance con straint applies to investment demand for either physical or human capital wang and yip 1991 extend the uzawa lucas model of endogenous growth by assuming that households allocate their available time between production transaction and human capital formation the transaction time is assumed to be a decreasing function of real money balances and therefore a reduction in real balances arising from an increase in the monetary expansion rate increases c the london school of economics and political science 1995

red tape and corruption abstract we study the emergence and interaction of red tape and corruption in a principal bureaucrat agent hierarchy the principal is to provide the agent with a unit of a good that involves externalities so that market mechanisms fail to achieve first best red tape produces information but is costly to the agent and is administered by a corrupt bureaucrat first the bureaucrat may extort bribes from the agent in exchange for reducing the amount of red tape second the bureaucrat may take bribes to conceal the information produced through red tape even though the former kind of corruption tends to reduce red tape we show that the equilibrium level of red tape is above the social optimum

equilibrium open interest abstract this paper analyses what determines an individual investor s risk sharing demand for options and aggregating across investors what the equilibrium demand for options we find that agents trade options to achieve their desired skewness specifically we find that portfolio holdings boil down to a three fund separation theorem that includes a so called skewness portfolio that agents like to attain our analysis indicates also however that the common risk sharing setup used for option demand and pricing is incompatible with a stylized fact about open interest across strikes

player and referee roles held jointly the effect of state ownership on china s regulatory enforcement against fraud this article examines the impact of the prevailing state ownership in the chinese stock market on corporate governance and the financial regulatory system respectively as the internal and external monitoring mechanisms to deter corporate fraud and protect investors in line with the literature that state ownership exaggerates the agency problem we find that the retained state ownership in privatised firms increases the incidence of regulatory enforcements against fraud for the state owned enterprises soes however larger state ownership is associated with a lower incidence of enforcement actions this is attributed to the mutual political affiliation of the fraudulent soes and the regulatory commission a new regulation solutions for listed firm checks promulgated in march 2001 has mitigated this effect by empowering the regulatory commission to increase the severity of regulatory conditions our evidence confirms the improvement in the regulatory environment and investor protection in the chinese stock market brought about by the regulatory reform and development

spanning and completeness in markets with contingent claims abstract we characterize financial markets that are complete or that contain portfolios which span all measurable functions of a particular asset payoffs either finite and infinite dimensional these results are then employed to describe the extent to which options trading is sufficient to complete markets to investigate the existence of efficient funds and to establish the extent of market completeness required to ensure the unanimity and irrelevance results of modern corporation finance

government in transition abstract the speed of economic reforms is not the only important determinant of the success of the transition to a market economy the transition of government from a communist state to an institution supporting a market economy is as critical survey evidence shows that russia lags significantly behind poland in the transition of its government which may account for its inferior economic performance despite adopting similar economic reforms i argue that the lack of turnover of old communist politicians and the creation of inappropriate electoral and fiscal incentives for these politicians may account for the poor performance of the russian government and suggest some strategies for improving the situation

precautionary saving in the small and in the large the theory of precautionary saving is shown to be isomorphic to the arrow pratt theory of risk aversion making possible the application of a large body of knowledge about risk aversion to precautionary saving and more generally to the theory of optimal choice under risk in particular a measure of the strength of the precautionary saving motive analogous to the arrow pratt measure of risk aversion is used to establish a number of new propositions about precautionary saving and to give a new interpretation of the dreze modigliani substitution effect copyright 1990 by the econometric society

why do entrepreneurs enter politics evidence from china this article examines the determinants of the entrepreneur s political participation by employing a unique matched firm institution data set from china we find that the likelihood of an entrepreneur s participation can be explained by the underdevelopment of markets and market supporting institutions according to our estimates the probability of entering politics decreases by 8 20 from the mean when the institutional indices improve by one standard deviation our findings support the view that the institutional environment shapes the private entrepreneur s motivation to participate in politics they also provide an example of how private entrepreneurs respond to state market failure in developing and transition countries jel g1 h00 o10 p2 p3

public versus private ownership of firms evidence from rural china why are many of china s successful rural enterprises publically owned by local communities using a set of provincial data we find that the share of community public firms township village enterprises or tves relative to private enterprises is higher where the central government s influence is greater the community government s power is stronger and the level of market development is lower we also find that tves help achieve the community government s goals of increasing government revenue rural nonfarm employment and rural income however tves do not increase rural income given the levels of nonfarm employment and local public goods provision indicating possible inefficiency as compared with private enterprises