trade liberalization antidumping and safeguards evidence from india s tariff reform abstract this paper is the first to use product level data to examine empirically whether countries use antidumping and safeguard exceptions to unwind commitments to lower tariffs in the face of domestic political economic pressure we focus on the case of india a country that underwent a major exogenous tariff reform program in the early 1990s and subsequently initiated substantial use of safeguard and antidumping import restrictions we first estimate structural determinants of india s import protection using the grossman and helpman 1994 model and provide evidence from its pre reform tariff data of 1990 that is consistent with the theory we then re estimate the model on the indian tariff data after the trade liberalization is complete and find that the model no longer fits a result consistent with theory and evidence provided in other settings that india s 1991 1992 imf arrangement can be interpreted as resulting in an exogenous shock to india s tariff policy however when we re estimate the model on data from 2000 2002 that more completely reflects india s cross product variation in import protection by including both its post reform tariffs and its additional non tariff barriers of antidumping and safeguard import protection the significance of the grossman and helpman model determinant estimates is restored we interpret these combined results as evidence that india unwound its commitment to reduce tariffs through use of antidumping and safeguard protection in the face of political economic pressure the estimates are also economically important and provide one explanation for separate results in the literature that the magnitude of import reduction associated with india s use of antidumping is similar to the initial import expansion associated with its tariff reform finally we interpret the implications of our results for the burgeoning research literature examining the effects of liberalization on india s micro level development

implicit contracts moral hazard and unemployment this paper considers a firm whose marginal revenue product of labor is a random variable we derive the form of an optimal long term contract between workers and the firm under the assumption that labor s marginal product is observed by the firm but not by the workers we show that the existence of asymmetric information causes unemployment to be greater than in a situation where information about labor s marginal product is public or where employment is determined in spot markets in particular unemployment can occur when the marginal product of labor exceeds the reservation wage

china and intellectual property rights a challenge to the rule of law china is not meeting its international obligations to protect intellectual property rights iprs harming the innovation process in china and elsewhere we review the benefits of ipr protection and discuss the magnitude and cost of china s ipr violations we also emphasize that these violations undermine the international rule of law and impair china s legitimacy as a leader in evolving global governance institutions we criticize the argument that china will endogenously improve ipr protection due to internal pressures from its domestic ip sector as the united states and some other countries did in the past china s governance institutions are very different from those of the liberal western democracies past and present as china has a weak internal rule of law a fragmented governance system and cultural traditions that favor collective over individual rights as china s ip sector develops its ipr governance regime might even be used as a strategic tool to further disadvantage foreign ipr holders we argue that china should play a lead role in any international ipr reforms but that it must first establish legitimacy by meeting its current international ipr commitments we conclude that other countries should take action to pressure china to meet its ipr obligations

a theoretical analysis of altruism and decision error in public goods games abstract we formalize an equilibrium model in which altruism and decision error parameters determine the distribution of contributions for linear and quadratic public goods games the equilibrium density is exponential for linear games and normal for quadratic games our model implies i contributions increase with the marginal value of the public good ii total contributions increase with the number of participants iii mean contributions lie between the nash prediction and half the endowment these predictions which are not implied by a nash analysis are consistent with laboratory data maximum likelihood estimates of altruism and error parameters are significant and plausible

down with mne centric theories market entry and expansion as the bundling of mne and local assets both anderson and gatignon and the uppsala internationalization model see the initial mode of foreign market entry and subsequent modes of operation as unilaterally determined by multinational enterprises mnes arbitraging control and risk and increasing their commitment as they gain experience in the target market oli and internalization models do recognize that foreign market entry requires the bundling of mne and complementary local assets which they call location or country specific advantages but implicitly assume that those assets are freely accessible to mnes in contrast to both of these mne centric views i explicitly consider the transactional characteristics of complementary local assets and model foreign market entry as the optimal assignment of equity between their owners and mnes by looking at the relative efficiency of the different markets in which mne and complementary local assets are traded and at how these two categories of assets match i am able to predict whether equity will be held by mnes or by local firms or shared between them and whether mnes will enter through greenfields brownfields or acquisitions the bundling model i propose has interesting implications for the evolution of the mne footprint in host countries and for the reasons behind the emergence of dragon mnes

foreign actors and intellectual property protection regulations in developing countries international agreements and institutions affect innovation in developing countries we analyze the impact of advanced country multinational enterprises amnes and supranational organizations on the regulatory adoption of global intellectual property protection standards in particular we investigate 60 developing countries that signed the trade relate aspects of intellectual property rights trips agreement of the world trade organization in 1994 our empirical findings show that a greater involvement of amnes in the domestic innovation systems of developing countries results in more stringent trips adoption and convergence to advanced country ip protection standards this relationship is positively moderated by country dependency on supranational organizations such as the international monetary fund this analysis contributes to the literature on institutional change and institutional voids it provides insights into the influence of external actors on the underlying change processes

subjective performance measures in optimal incentive contracts objective measures of performance are seldom perfect in response incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures this paper explores the combined use of subjective and objective performance measures in respectively implicit and explicit incentive contracts naturally objective and subjective measures often are substitutes sometimes strikingly so we show that if objective measures are sufficiently close to perfect then no implicit contracts are feasible because the firm s fallback position after reneging on an implicit contract is too attractive we also show however that objective and subjective measures can reinforce each other if objective measures become more accurate then in some circumstances the optimal contract puts more weight on subjective measures because the improved objective measures increase the value of the ongoing relationship and so reduce the firm s incentive to renege we also analyze the use of subjective weights on objective performance measures and provide case study evidence consistent with our analyses

public sector organizations and agricultural catch up dilemma in emerging markets the orchestrating role of embrapa in brazil abstract how can an emerging economy beset by political economic and resource challenges jump start the technology catch up process in the agricultural sector and then forge an ecosystem to facilitate the continual generation and dissemination of innovations equally important how can it maintain the viability and salience of its catch up initiatives subsequent to the entry and inevitable dominance of multinational companies we answer these questions by studying catch up in brazil s soy seeds sector over four decades 1973 2015 in an environment of political and economic uncertainty embrapa a public sector organization forged partnerships to first develop absorptive capacity and innovation capabilities and then build an ecosystem of diverse organizations to generate and disseminate catch up outcomes to farmers and other end users embrapa also developed critical tacit knowledge and complementary assets that along with its emphasis on environmental sustainability and protecting national interests helped maintain its salience even after the entry and market dominance by multinational agribusinesses in addition to demonstrating critical roles for public sector organizations and public private networks in technological catch up in an emerging economy s agricultural sector our study calls into question the prevalent notion of technological catch up as a rush to reach the technological frontier at any cost

toward resource independence why state owned entities become multinationals an empirical study of india s public r d laboratories in this paper we build on the standard resource dependence theory rdt and its departure suggested by vernon to offer a novel explanation for why state owned entities soes might seek a global footprint and global cash flows to achieve resource independence from other state actors in the context of soes the power use hypothesis of standard rdt can be used to analyze the dependence of soes on other state actors such as government ministries and government agencies that have ownership and control rights in the soe building on vernon we argue that the soe can break free from this power imbalance and establish resource independence from other state actors by becoming a multinational firm and or by generating global cash flows we leverage a natural experiment in india and outline both quantitative and qualitative evidence from 42 indian state owned laboratories to support this argument

political losers as a barrier to economic development per capita income in many sub saharan african countries such as chad and niger is less than 1 30th of that of the united states most economists and social scientists suspect that this is in part due to institutional failures that stop these societies from adopting the best technologies a particularly interesting historical example comes from the diffusion of railways in the 19th century while railways are regarded as a key technology driving the industrial revolution there were large lags in their diffusion for example in 1850 the united states had 14 518 km of track britain 9 797 km and germany 5 856 km in the russian and hapsburg empires there were just 501 km and 1 357 kim respectively all data from brian r mitchell 1993 why do societies as in this example fail to adopt the best available technologies one answer is that existing powerful interest groups block the introduction of new technologies in order to protect their economic rents and societies are able to make technological advances only if they can defeat such groups economic monopolies may be one example a monopolist might wish to block the introduction of a new technology by a rival that will capture the market this idea which we call the economic losers hypothesis was discussed by simon kuznets 1968 developed at length by joel mokyr 1990 in the context of technology adoption and formalized by per krusell and jose victor rios rull 1996 and stephen l parente and edward c prescott 1997 related ideas are widely discussed in the literature on international trade policy with many formal models e g gene m grossman and elhanan helpman 1994 there are problems with this story however first despite the intuitive appeal of the idea there are relatively few instances where major economic change was blocked by economic losers mokyr 1990 emphasizes the attempts of many skilled artisans to block the introduction of new machines the most famous example is the luddites skilled weavers who were thrown out of work by mechanization interestingly however many of these groups including the luddites were ultimately unable to block economic progress equally important the economic losers hypothesis relies on the presumption that certain groups have the political power to block innovation but if so why not use this power to simply tax the gains generated by the introduction of the new technology this might be because there are limits on the nature of fiscal instruments though it seems plausible that groups with sufficient political power to block innovation would be able subsequently to lobby effectively for redistribution a more important reason however may be that the introduction of new technology and economic change more generally may simultaneously affect the distribution of political power we argue that the effect of economic change on political power is a key factor in determining whether technological advances and beneficial economic changes will be blocked in other words we propose a political loser hypothesis we argue that it is groups whose political power not economic rents is eroded who will block technological advances if agents are economic losers but have no political power they cannot impede technological progress if they have and maintain political power i e are not political losers then they have no incentive to block progress it is therefore agents who have t discussant gene grossman princeton university

reaping what you sow an empirical analysis of international patent harmonization abstract this paper extends analysis of the gatt uruguay round by quantifying the impact of international patent harmonization as implied by the trips agreement patent harmonization has the capacity to generate large transfers of income between countries the us being the major beneficiary developing countries are major contributors to these transfers but canada the uk and japan also make sizable contributions

the role of cooperation and reciprocity in structuring carbon sequestration contracts in developing countries the reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation redd presents a key opportunity for developing countries to mitigate global warming and to help meet long term global climate objectives however the success of a redd strategy in a post kyoto protocol regime depends primarily on the design and implementation of a financial mechanism that is feasible and effective in providing the right incentives to land holders to manage forests in a sustainable manner that contributes to climate goals optimal redd contracts must not only properly reward agents who reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation dd but also account for technical issues such as permanence and additionality of carbon offsets in many countries national authorities may not have the institutional capacity and the proper technology for measuring the delivery of carbon offsets furthermore contract enforcement becomes complex because the effort and outcomes described in such contracts are difficult for a third party to monitor and verify therefore contracts need to provide sufficient incentives to all parties to participate and perform in the long term i e to be self enforcing however the structure of the contracts may vary depending on the presence of selfish and altruistic agents this paper studies the role of cooperation and reciprocity on the structure of carbon sequestration contracts in the context of developing countries where legal enforcement may be impractical we examine if the optimal structure of self enforcing contracts differs if the paula cordero salas is a ph d candidate and brian roe is the mccormick professor of agricultural marketing and policy aede department the ohio state university this project was supported by the world bank s development research group energy and environment team under the contract a mechanism for reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation redd a framework to design cost effective contracts

a cross country index of intellectual property rights in pharmaceutical inventions abstract building on the seminal work of ginarte and park 1997 research policy 26 283 301 we develop an index of property rights in pharmaceutical inventions the pharmaceutical intellectual property protection pipp index for 154 countries spanning 1960 to 2005 it incorporates five types of property rights in pharmaceuticals six statutory measures of enforcement and adherence to three international agreements providing for the grant and enforcement of rights to foreigners for both developed and developed countries the pipp index starts at low levels in 1960 increases slowly through the early 1990s and then sharply increases due to minimum standards set by the 1995 trips agreement

uncovering the complex relationships between political risk and mne firm legitimacy insights from libya using the before after natural experiment occasioned by the arab spring in libya we explore how market and non market activity affect foreign firm legitimacy in times of political turmoil although all mnes in libya had to cultivate strong ties to qadhafi to succeed during his 40 years of rule we found that those that also invested in social benefit projects and in social ties with families with few ties to the qadhafi family earned a broad based legitimacy that helped them survive qadhafi s overthrow our findings contribute to the political risk and political behavior literature the notion that the pursuit of firm legitimacy in general and especially in the eyes of social sector actors is an effective hedge against political risk more theoretically our findings support the addition of a social sector based path to firm legitimacy in the host country that complements and may at times substitute for the government based path to foreign firm legitimacy practically our findings suggest that mnes facing severe political risk can improve their prospects for survival by investing in relationships with influential social groups and by offering goods or services that are perceived as socially valuable

relational incentive contracts standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced this paper studies the design of self enforced relational contracts i show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form but that self enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision with hidden information it may be optimal for an agent to supply the same inefficient effort regardless of cost conditions with moral hazard optimal contracts involve just two levels of compensation this is true even if performance measures are subjective in which case optimal contracts terminate following poor performance jel c73 d82 l14

drivers of institutional change around the world the case of ifrs today more than ever it is crucial to understand the dynamic and intricate institutional landscape that mnes operate in however the drivers of institutional change are still little understood we focus on a recent fundamental institutional change the worldwide switch to international financial reporting standards ifrs the switch to ifrs was unexpected and not particularly welcomed by mnes given that most national accounting systems in the pre ifrs period were considered to be well aligned to the local cultural and environmental characteristics of each country we test the drivers of this institutional change in a sample of 168 countries between 2002 and 2012 using empirical constructs from policy diffusion theory our findings show that the country level decisions to adopt ifrs are not driven by local determinants but instead by adoption decisions by other neighbouring countries and influential organizations we find evidence for competition learning and emulation as driving forces for the international spread of ifrs we conclude that the switch to ifrs was not driven by an economic rationale only and diffused beyond the influence and interest of mnes understanding these drivers is essential because it enables management to anticipate and respond to institutional changes and consequently enhance performance and create competitive advantage

the uppsala internationalization process model revisited from liability of foreignness to liability of outsidership the uppsala internationalization process model is revisited in the light of changes in business practices and theoretical advances that have been made since 1977 now the business environment is viewed as a web of relationships a network rather than as a neoclassical market with many independent suppliers and customers outsidership in relation to the relevant network more than psychic distance is the root of uncertainty the change mechanisms in the revised model are essentially the same as those in the original version although we add trust building and knowledge creation the latter to recognize the fact that new knowledge is developed in relationships

unraveling the mne wage premium whereas ib has extensively studied mnes generic positive impact on host economies but rarely on employee wages economics research has only shown an overall mne wage premium we unravel this premium considering multiple levels of analysis and accounting for host country contextual contingencies to unveil mnes different positive or negative distributional effects using unique micro level data from over 40 000 employees in 13 countries we examine mnes distributional effects for employees gender experience and immigrant status the influence of host country property rights protection and labor regulation and interplays with region and industry effects mnes distributional effects show marked differences that largely depend on the host country context and that are positive for experienced and foreign born employees in developed countries but negative for females working in developing countries whereas in developed countries the gender wage gap is smaller in mnes than in domestic firms as hypothesized we find evidence of a larger wage gap in developing countries the analysis also reveals that the higher host countries level of property rights protection the lower the mne wage premium our study points at the need to reassess statements about the generic positive impact of mnes in host countries particularly in developing countries and discusses further research implications

an evolutionary approach to understanding international business activity the co evolution of mnes and the institutional environment this paper examines the co evolution of mne activities and institutions external and internal to the firm we develop a theoretical framework for this analysis that draws on the more recent writings of douglass north on institutions as a response to complex forms of uncertainty associated with the rise in global economic interconnectedness and of richard nelson on the co evolution of technology and institutions we link historical changes in the character of mne activities to changes in the institutional environment and highlight the scope for firm level creativity and institutional entrepreneurship that may lead to co evolution with the environment we argue that the main drivers for institutional entrepreneurship are now found in the increasing autonomy of mne subsidiaries thus mne agency derives from more decentralized forms of experimentation in international corporate networks which competence creating nodes of new initiatives can co evolve with local institutions unlike most other streams of related literature our approach connects patterns of institutional change in wider business systems with more micro processes of variety generation and experimentation within and across individual firms this form of co evolutionary analysis is increasingly important to understanding the interrelationships between mne activities and public policy

the impact of higher standards in patent protection for pharmaceutical industries under the trips agreement a comparative study of china and india a comparative study is undertaken that explores chinese and indian pharmaceutical industries under different patent regimes it is found that relative to india which had implemented process patent protection until 2005 china with a product patent regime since 1993 suffers from both lower drug accessibility and availability the latter is a missing parameter in the literature also china lags behind in both lower r d investment and patents filed by chinese nationals based on these findings and associated legal interpretation we conclude that higher patent protection in china generates negative impacts on the pharmaceutical industries thus governments should utilise trips flexibilities and other regimes such as price control to offset the anticompetitive effect in designing patent policies

do national patent laws stimulate domestic innovation in a global patenting environment a cross country analysis of pharmaceutical patent protection 1978 2002 this paper evaluates the effects of patent protection on phar maceutical innovations for 26 countries that established pharmaceutical patent laws during 1978 2002 controlling for country characteristics through matched sampling techniques to establish two proper comparison sets among 92 sampled countries and through country pair fixed effects regressions this study yields robust results national patent protection alone does not stimulate domestic innovation as estimated by changes in citation weighted u s patent awards domestic r d and pharmaceutical industry exports however domestic innovation accelerates in countries with higher levels of economic development educational attainment and economic freedom additionally there appears to be an optimal level of intellectual property rights regulation above which further enhancement reduces innovative activities

conservation payments under uncertainty the decision of whether to retain forest or convert to another land use is affected by uncertainty over future land use returns this paper examines the design of conservation payments to landowners under uncertainty payments are either indexed to the returns from deforestation agriculture or to a market value associated with forest nonuse benefits payment size depends on the degree of correlation between payments and agricultural returns and their relative volatility market based payments for reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation redd are simulated for brazilian soybean growers payments indexed to carbon prices are larger than those indexed to international soybean prices

regime switching stochastic volatility evidence from the crude oil market this paper incorporates regime switching into the stochastic volatility sv framework in an attempt to explain the behavior of crude oil prices in order to forecast their volatility more specifically it models the volatility of oil return as a stochastic volatility process whose mean is subject to shifts in regime the shift is governed by a two state first order markov process the bayesian markov chain monte carlo method is used to estimate the models the main findings are first there is clear evidence of regime switching in the oil market ignoring it will lead to a false impression that the volatility is highly persistent and therefore highly predictable second incorporating regime switching into the sv framework significantly enhances the forecasting power of the sv model third the regime switching stochastic volatility model does a good job in capturing major events affecting the oil market

international patent protection 1960 2005 abstract this note provides an update to the index of patent protection published in this journal in 1997 the original paper presented the index for 1960 1990 for 110 countries the index has now been updated to 2005 and extended to 122 countries the adoption of stronger patent laws and the composition of patent rights vary across countries by level of economic development

unemployment and the efficiency wage hypothesis there has been much recent discussion of the reasons why prices in certain markets and in particular in labour markets may not adjust to eliminate excess supply the absence of speedy adjustment of prices is an essential feature of the recent models of disequilibrium macroeconomics but for the most part no explanation for this absence is provided from within those models one explanation that has been around in the literature for some time and has been receiving increasing attention recently is the efficiency wage hypothesis initially applied to developing economies see leibenstein i957 it has more recently been adapted to developed economies by weiss i 980 and used in the context of a keynesian macroeconomic model by hart i 980 similar concepts have been applied to the credit market by stiglitz and weiss i98i the purpose of the present paper is to explore further the conditions under which the notion of an efficiency wage is applicable and can provide an explanation of involuntary unemployment the essential feature of the efficiency wage hypothesis is that the productivity of a firm s employees increases as their wage is increased at least over an economically relevant part of its range if the wage paid by the firm is denoted by w the number of employees by l and the productivity of each employee by p w where p w o then the effective labour force of the firm e can be represented by

reversal of fortunes democratic institutions and foreign direct investment inflows to developing countries does increased democracy promote or jeopardize foreign direct investment fdi inflows to less developed countries we argue that democratic institutions have conflicting effects on fdi inflows on the one hand democratic institutions hinder fdi inflows by limiting the oligopolistic or monopolistic behaviors of multinational enterprises facilitating indigenous businesses pursuit of protection from foreign capital and constraining host governments ability to offer generous financial and fiscal incentives to foreign investors on the other hand democratic institutions promote fdi inflows because they tend to ensure more credible property rights protection reducing risks and transaction costs for foreign investors hence the net effect of democracy on fdi inflows is contingent on the relative strength of these two competing forces our argument reconciles conflicting theoretical expectations in the existing literature empirical analyses of fifty three developing countries from 1982 to 1995 substantiate our claims we find that both property rights protection and democracy related property rights protection encourage fdi inflows after controlling for their positive effect through property rights protection democratic institutions reduce fdi inflows these results are robust against alternative model specifications statistical estimators and variable measurements

which countries protect intellectual property the case of software piracy david g steel using data on software piracy we examine how protection of intellectual property varies across countries consistent with other studies we find that intellectual property receives greater protection in developed economies high income countries have lower piracy rates we also find that protection depends on cultural factors countries with an individualist culture have lower piracy rates than do countries with a collectivist culture piracy rates are also lower in countries that have strong institutions that enforce contracts and protect property from expropriation these results suggest that national policies toward intellectual property reflect not only economic concerns but also national culture and institutions jel 034 l86 i introduction intellectual property rights are a recurring focus of international negotiation developed nations argue that such rights are essential for promoting innovation and economic growth many developing nations on the other hand argue that intellectual property rights inhibit economic development by restricting use of existing knowledge a generation of theoretical research has demonstrated that there is truth in both arguments depending on circumstances individual countries may reasonably favor different levels of protection for intellectual property 1 surprisingly little is known however about how such protection is actually determined only a handful of previous studies have analyzed cross national variation in intellectual property rights 2 these studies relate patent rights as formalized in the laws of individual countries to a range of social and economic variables the main empirical finding is that developed countries provide stronger patent protection in this article we extend this line of research by examining cross national variation in piracy of computer software the business software alliance and the software publishers association 1998 have estimated piracy rates the ratio of illegally copied units to total units for business software in more than 70 countries for 1994 97 these rates vary substantially in some countries essentially all new software was pirated in other countries less than 40 of software was pirated what explains these differences consistent with previous studies we find that developed countries provide greater protection for intellectual property than do developing countries high income countries tend to have lower piracy rates this is true both in a simple comparison of piracy rates with per capita income and to a lesser extent in regressions that control for other factors as we discuss below the causal interpretation of this correlation is not obvious the correlation is consistent with the hypothesis that intellectual property rights promote economic development however it may also reflect reverse causality e g if developing nations offer less protection so that they can use the intellectual property of developed nations or common causation by other factors many commentators have suggested that culture may also explain differences in piracy rates western countries they argue have individualist cultures that naturally embrace individual ownership of intellectual property whereas many non western countries have collective cultures that emphasize sharing over individual ownership as a result these societies have been reluctant to adopt western conceptions of intellectual property rights to test whether differences in culture lead to differences in intellectual property rights we relate piracy rates to an index of individualism and collectivism developed by hofstede 1980 1983 we find strong evidence that culture matters 3 countries with a tradition of individualism pirate much less than do countries with a tradition of collectivism this is true both in simple comparisons of piracy rates with individualism and in regressions that control for other factors

unspanned stochastic volatility and the pricing of commodity derivatives commodity derivatives are becoming an increasingly important part of the global derivatives market here we develop a tractable stochastic volatility model for pricing commodity derivatives the model features unspanned stochastic volatility quasi analytical prices of options on futures contracts and dynamics of the futures curve in terms of a low dimensional affine state vector we estimate the model on nymex crude oil derivatives using an extensive panel data set of 45 517 futures prices and 233 104 option prices spanning 4082 business days we find strong evidence for two predominantly unspanned volatility factors jel g13

organizations firms and institutions in the generation of innovation abstract the purpose of this paper is to develop the innovation system analysis by bringing together the institutional and organizational dimensions of the process of innovation at the firm level the objective is to start elaborating a systemic theory of innovation in firms the paper summons up the contributions and limits of organizational and institutional approaches to innovation this preliminary investigation leads to a series of relevant questions in a second section an attempt is made to overcome the dichotomy and make progress towards a more exhaustive and better articulated representation of the innovation process considered at the firm level

the evolutionary view of the mne and the future of internalization theory kogut and zander s 1993 jibs article which developed an evolutionary perspective on the multinational enterprise mne has had three critical impacts on mne research first it has stimulated scholars to conduct more eclectic empirical analyses which should include both transaction cost related parameters and broader learning competence related variables second it has usefully argued that the rigorous study of mne behavior does not need to reply upon the williamsonian behavioral assumption of opportunism third it has implicitly suggested a new path to be followed by internalization theory scholars in order to remain relevant to the field of international business the transaction cost economics lens adopted in internalization theory clearly remains critical to any analysis of mne strategy with impacts on the boundaries of the firm in addition the co evolution of the mne s governance structure and its technological competences determines present and future strategy choices here both transaction cost considerations and learning effects influence strategy selection

time frequency dynamics of return spillover from crude oil to agricultural commodities we explore return spillover from crude oil to ethanol corn soybean and wheat on daily data during 17 may 2005 27 june 2018 this study is unique in capturing the time frequency dynamics of return

motivation and markets many workers receive pay based on subjectively assessed performance yet the shirking model of efficiency wages excludes it this paper incorporates such pay with the following results performance pay is more efficient than efficiency wages when the costs of having a job vacant are low and qualified workers in short supply more capital intensive industries pay more than less capital intensive industries as observed in studies of interindustry wages differentials sustaining an efficient outcome requires a social convention similar to the notion of a fair wage the model also makes predictions about the relationship between turnover wages growth and unemployment copyright 1998 by american economic association

a common factor of stochastic volatilities between oil and commodity prices abstractthis article analyses the multivariate stochastic volatilities svs with a common factor influencing volatilities in the prices of crude oil and agricultural commodities used for both biofuel and nonbiofuel purposes modelling the volatility is crucial because the volatility is an important variable for asset allocation risk management and derivative pricing we develop a sv model comprising a latent common volatility factor with two asymptotic regimes with a smooth transition between them in contrast to conventional volatility models svs are generated by the logistic transformation of latent factors which comprise two components the common volatility factor and an idiosyncratic component we present a sv model with a common factor for oil corn and wheat from 8 august 2005 to 10 october 2014 using a markov chain monte carlo method to estimate the svs and extract the common volatility factor we find that the volatilities of oil and grain markets are persistent according to the estimated

jumps and stochastic volatility in oil prices time series evidence abstract in this paper we examine the empirical performance of affine jump diffusion models with stochastic volatility in a time series study of crude oil prices we compare four different models and estimate them using the markov chain monte carlo method the support for a stochastic volatility model including jumps in both prices and volatility is strong and the model clearly outperforms the others in terms of a superior fit to data our estimation method allows us to obtain a detailed study of oil prices during two periods of extreme market stress included in our sample the gulf war and the recent financial crisis we also address the economic significance of model choice in two option pricing applications the implied volatilities generated by the different estimated models are compared and we price a real option to develop an oil field our findings indicate that model choice can have a material effect on the option values

speculation and volatility spillover in the crude oil and agricultural commodity markets a bayesian analysis this paper assesses factors that potentially influence the volatility of crude oil prices and the possible linkage between this volatility and agricultural commodity markets stochastic volatility models are applied to weekly crude oil corn and wheat futures prices from november 1998 to january 2009 model parameters are estimated using bayesian markov chain monte carlo methods speculation scalping and petroleum inventories are found to be important in explaining the volatility of crude oil prices several properties of crude oil price dynamics are established including mean reversion an asymmetry between returns and volatility volatility clustering and infrequent compound jumps we find evidence of volatility spillover among crude oil corn and wheat markets after the fall of 2006 this can be largely explained by tightened interdependence between crude oil and these commodity markets induced by ethanol production

multinational enterprises and public policy the interaction between governments and multinational enterprises is analyzed using a new conceptual framework this captures the key aspects of richard caves normative and behavioral approaches to the literature but also develops a more contemporary strategic approach our framework uses insights from the resource based theory of the firm to analyze managerial aspects of multinational enterprises and public policy neglected by caves in particular we incorporate strategies of national responsiveness

the dubious role of institutions in international business a road forward our commentary returns to the conundrum of how institutions matter in international business ib by revisiting the 2018 jibs decade award article by jackson and deeg 2008 on comparing capitalisms we first synthesize their main insights around institutional diversity and track its significant impact within ib and other management fields we then suggest three main takeaways that could move jackson and deeg s agenda further in terms of developing a more nuanced approach to institutions in ib we close with suggestions for future research and urge ib scholars to be more cautious when drawing on different strands of institutions theory

the end of the opportunism vs trust debate bounded reliability as a new envelope concept in research on mne governance modern transaction cost economics tce thinking has developed into a key intellectual foundation of international business ib research but the williamsonian version has faced substantial criticism for adopting the behavioral assumption of opportunism in this paper we assess both the opportunism concept and existing alternatives such as trust within the context of ib research especially work on multinational enterprise mne governance case analyses of nine global mnes illustrate an alternative to the opportunism assumption that captures more fully the mechanisms underlying failed commitments inside the mne as a substitute for the often criticized assumption of opportunism we propose the envelope concept of bounded reliability brel an assumption that represents more accurately and more completely the reasons for failed commitments without invalidating the other critical assumption in conventional tce and internalization theory thinking namely the widely accepted envelope concept of bounded rationality brat bounded reliability as an envelope concept includes two main components within the context of global mne management opportunism as intentional deceit and benevolent preference reversal the implications for ib research of adopting the bounded reliability concept are far reaching as this concept may increase the legitimacy of comparative institutional analysis in the social sciences

an institution based view of global ipr history leveraging the use of history to advance international business research this article focuses on the crucial debate over intellectual property rights ipr between the united states and china ironically during the 19th century the united states was not a leading ipr advocate as it is today but was a leading ipr violator developing an institution based view of ipr history we identify three underlying theoretical mechanisms that help to explain ipr in the two countries path dependence long term processes and institutional transitions we argue that both the us refusal to protect foreign ipr in the 19th century and the current chinese lack of enthusiasm to meet us ipr demands embody rational responses to their respective situations however given long term processes with intensifying isomorphic pressures institutional transitions in favor of better ipr protection are quite possible finally going above and beyond these two countries we draw on the ipr history in over ten other countries to develop a more globally generalizable framework which in turn contributes to the key question of how history matters

implicit contracts incentive compatibility and involuntary unemployment this paper considers the enforceability of employment contracts when employees performance cannot be verified in court so that piece rate contracts are not legally enforceable part i shows that there exists a variety of self enforcing implicit contracts modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and characterizes all the wage and performance outcomes that can be implemented implementation requires a strictly positive surplus from employment the form of the contract depending on how this surplus is divided between firm and employee piece rate contracts and contracts with an informally agreed bonus can be made self enforcing but the use of severance pay and bonding does not extend the set of implementable allocations the resulting contracts resemble actual labor contracts more than do the contracts in standard principal agent models part ii analyses market equilibrium with these contracts also modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and shows that many such equilibria exist unfilled vacancies and unemployed workers can co exist despite the existence of contracts that are potentially mutually beneficial for those jobs that are filled any division of the potential surplus is possible so that the market can have at the same time involuntary unemployment and vacancies that are unfilled despite filled jobs earning positive profits as a criterion for selecting equilibria a notion of renegotiation proofness is applied then either all workers are employed or all jobs filled but any division of the potential surplus is still possible the paper explores what further restrictions on beliefs give rise to a walrasian outcome in which all the potential surplus goes to the short side of the market and to an efficiency wage type outcome in which the potential surplus goes to the long side

international business responses to institutional voids for nearly two decades scholars in international business and management have explored the implications of institutional voids for firm strategy and structure although institutional voids offer both opportunities and challenges they have largely been associated with firms efforts to avoid or mitigate institutional deficiencies and reduce the transaction costs associated with operating in settings subject to those institutional shortcomings the goal of this special issue is to advance scholarship on this topic by a exploring institutional voids that are new to the literature b providing a deeper assessment of the different ways in which firms respond to these voids and c utilizing diverse disciplines and theoretical approaches to do so in this introduction we first review and synthesize extant research on institutional voids tracking the evolution of institutional void scholarship since the inception of the concept khanna palepu journal of economic literature 45 2 331 372 1997 and providing our perspective on its contributions and limitations we then summarize the contributions of the articles included in this special issue in addition to identifying an array of institutional voids economic and social the articles highlight four different strategies for responding to them internalization substitution borrowing and signaling drawing on these we develop new insights on the implications of institutional voids for firm behavior we conclude with suggestions for future research

additionality when redd contracts must be self enforcing this paper examines self enforcing contracts as a financial mechanism for reducing carbon emissions from deforestation and forest degradation when the opportunity cost of the land i e landholder type is private information and is imperfectly correlated over time i e partially persistent types because self enforcement limits the feasible incentives the conservation levels are constrained by the surplus created regardless of the degree of persistence of such opportunity costs across contracting periods a first best self enforcing contract can deliver additional carbon sequestration beyond the business as usual scenario only if the value of forest conservation is sufficiently high otherwise self enforcing contracts can induce some suboptimal level of carbon sequestration the degree of persistence of opportunity costs across periods does not affect the amount of total payments provided in the optimal menu of contracts but greater persistence of opportunity cost types leads to contracts that feature more of the total payment as a bonus in contracts for landholders with a high opportunity cost for their land and more of the total payment as an upfront fixed payment for landholders with a low opportunity cost

self enforcing wage contracts we examine long term wage contracts between a risk neutral firm and a risk averse worker when both can costlessly renege and buy or sell labour at a random spot market wage a self enforcing contract is one in which neither party ever has an incentive to renege in the optimum self enforcing contract wages are sticky they are less variable than spot market wages and positively serially correlated they are updated by a simple rule around each spot wage is a time invariant interval and the contract wage changes each period by the smallest amount necessary to bring it into the current interval