bank runs liquidity costs and investment distortions abstract in this paper we extend the diamond and dybvig 1983 model of intermediation to study further the conditions under which bank runs can occur and to consider how private parties might adjust to the existence of bank run equilibria we provide weaker necessary conditions for runs we then characterize how banks respond to the possibility of runs in their design of deposit contracts and investment decisions banks might choose to offer contracts that prevent runs but under some conditions the second best contracts will involve accepting some risk of runs in order to achieve higher expected returns from their investments

banking panics information and rational expectations equilibrium this paper shows that bank runs can be modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon we demonstrate that some aspects of the intuitive story that bank runs start with fears of insolvency of banks can be rigorously modeled if individuals observe long lines at the bank they correctly infer that there is a possibility that the bank is about to fail and precipitate a bank run however bank runs occur even when no one has any adverse information extra market constraints such as suspension of convertibility can prevent bank runs and result in superior allocations banking panics were a recurrent phenomenon in the united states until the 1930s they have re emerged as a source of public concern and much theoretical research recently in this paper we provide an information theoretic rationale for bank runs the traditional story is that contagion is an important aspect of bank runs the idea seems to be that when the general public observes large withdrawals from the banking system fears of insolvency grow resulting in even larger withdrawals of deposits in our model some individuals withdraw because they get information that future returns are likely to be low uninformed individuals observing this also have an incentive to liquidate their investments in addition some individuals need to withdraw deposits for other than informationally based reasons thus if the random realization of such a group of individuals is unusually large then the uninformed individuals will be misled and will precipitate a run on the bank the technology is such that a large volume of withdrawals involves liquidation costs consequently runs on the bank do impose social costs a mechanism that may reduce these costs in our model is to suspend convertibility if withdrawals are high however those individuals who need to withdraw their assets for liquidity reasons are worse off ex post our model provides a rationalization for restrictions in demand deposits that were widespread prior to 1929 friedman and schwartz 7 suggest that restrictions of payments ensured

implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation abstract in a finite trader version of the diamond and dybvig j polit econ 91 1983 401 model the ex ante efficient allocation is implementable by a direct mechanism i e each trader announces the type of his own ex post preference in which truthful revelation is the strictly dominant strategy for each trader when the model is modified by formalizing the sequential service constraint cf wallace fed reserve bank minneapolis quart rev 12 1988 3 the truth telling equilibrium implements the symmetric ex ante efficient allocation with respect to iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies

financial intermediary coalitions abstract in this article an environment in which the investment opportunities of agents are private information is studied and it is shown that financial intermediaries arise endogenously within that environment it is established that financial intermediaries are part of an efficient arrangement in the sense that they are needed to support the authors private information core allocations these intermediaries which are coalitions of agents exhibit the following characteristics in equilibrium they borrow from and lend to large groups of agents they produce information about investment projects and they issue claims that have different state contingent payoffs than claims issued by ultimate borrowers

on avoiding bank runs abstract can bank runs be avoided and should they be avoided i analyze a banking environment where bank runs can occur as a result of negative signals about the bank s investments in this environment banks can make sure that runs do not occur by designing the deposit contract appropriately i show that there are conditions under which it is profit maximizing for the bank to avoid runs and others under which occasional runs are part of optimal bank behavior i also compare the banking arrangement to an arrangement based on trading in equity

private information deposit interest rates and the stability of the banking system abstract the regulation of deposit interest rates has received little support from economists the same is true for the original rationale for such regulation that bank competition for deposits generates inherent instability in the banking system this paper develops an adverse selection model of banking in which this rationale is correct moreover in this model instability in the banking system can arise despite the presence of a lender of last resort and despite the absence of any need for deposit insurance however in the world described the regulation of deposit interest rates is shown to be an appropriate response to instability in the banking system finally it is argued that adverse selection models of deposit interest rate determination can confront a number of observed phenomena that are not readily explained in other contexts

state and prospect of public choice a european view the victory of public choice may not yet have arrived and the share of european contributions may still be small it has nevertheless been argued that there is a great future in public choice three especially promising areas have been indicated by way of example the theory of economic policy politico economic models and international political economy

models of banking instability a partial review of the literature abstract this paper critically examines the theoretical literature on banking instability that has followed diamond and dybvig 1983 it explores the extent to which it a explains banking instability within a theoretical context in which financial intermediaries improve on unintermediated markets and b justifies government involvement in the financial intermediation industry it suggests that the literature has yet to provide a satisfactory theoretical basis for banking instability as such since the intermediaries which arise from it are peculiar mutual funds that bear little resemblance to real world banks in addition the paper challenges the widespread belief that this literature provides a sound foundation for government involvement in the industry it suggests that arguments for government intervention are open to objection on various grounds the most important one being that they are inconsistent with the existence of properly motivated financial intermediation in these models

financial contagion and depositor monitoring this paper analyzes market discipline in a many bank economy where contagion and bank runs interact we present a model with differently informed depositors where those depositors that are more informed have incentives to monitor banks investments it is shown that when banks are undercapitalized and the probability of success of the risky asset is low depositors might prefer a contract that is subject to bank runs in the interim period to a contract that allows banks to gamble with their funds and maintain their investment the results of the paper emphasize the benefits of private monitoring of banks in order to promote market discipline

a model of the interactions between banking crises and currency crises abstract a second generation model of currency crises is combined with a standard banking model in a pegged exchange rate regime after funds have been committed to the banks news arrives about the quality of the banks assets and about the exchange rate fundamentals a run on the banks may cause a currency crisis or vice versa there are multiple equilibria with either twin crises or no crisis depending on depositors expectations of other depositors actions suspension of deposit convertibility can prevent a speculative attack on the currency but last resort lending to solvent banks can induce one

the expectations management approach to stabilization in argentina during 1976 1982 abstract the main goals of the economic authorities in argentina during 1976 1982 were to open the economy to foreign trade and to reduce inflation the stabilization plan relied first on the control of money and wages later on a preannounced schedule of a declining future exchange rate actions that were supposed to be accompanied by a fiscal policy to reduce the public sector deficit the stabilization plan was abandoned in the first quarter of 1981 for two reasons an important financial crisis during the second quarter of 1980 and a deterioration of fiscal discipline that could no longer assure coherence between the deficit and the preannouncement schedule the paper also argues that the political situation in argentina undermined the credibility of the reforms and particularly the stabilization attempts with the abandonment of the stabilization schedule new commercial and exchange rate measures were gradually introduced reversing the policy of opening the economy to foreign trade the financial reform was reversed in 1982 with the virtual nationalization of deposits the experience of argentina suggests that capital inflows responding to interest rate arbitrage play a fundamental role in the short run dynamics of real exchange rates they can promote the adjustment or they can precipitate a run on the foreign exchange market the lesson is that a stabilization plan based on the preannouncement of future exchange rates is highly risky for an economy like argentina s

the impact of the euro on risk exposure of the world s major banking industries abstract in this paper we examine if the introduction of the euro impacted the risk exposures risk premiums and hence the cost of equity of the banking industry of 11 eurozone countries five non eurozone european countries and three non european countries using a multi factor asset pricing model that allows time variation in the risk exposures we find a statistically significant and economically large decline in the cost of equity of the banking industry across the three groups of countries following the introduction of the euro though we find an increase in the market and currency exposures after the euro consistent with increased competition among banks the fall in the cost of equity arises from an economically large decline in the currency premium as expected the eurozone banking industry experienced the largest decrease our results are inconsistent with the argument that increased banking competition arising from the legislative changes accompanying the introduction of the euro would result in an increase in the overall risk premium of the banking sector

should bank runs be prevented abstract this paper extends diamond and dybvig s model j political economy 91 1983 401 to a framework in which bank assets are risky there is aggregate uncertainty about the demand for liquidity in the population and some individuals receive a signal about bank asset quality others must then try to deduce from observed withdrawals whether an unfavorable signal was received by this group or whether liquidity needs happen to be high in this environment both information induced and pure panic runs will occur however banks can prevent them by designing the deposit contract appropriately it is shown that in some cases it is optimal for the bank to prevent runs but there are situations where the bank run allocation may be welfare superior

uncertain liquidity and interbank contracting we study a version of the diamond and dybvig journal of political economy 1983 91 401 419 model where banks would like to obtain insurance against shocks on returns on liquid assets through an interbank borrowing and lending program we show that if investments in liquid assets and their realized returns are private information to individual banks the first best allocation is not incentive compatible we then characterize the second best interbank contract

sources of panics evidence from the weekly data abstract we use weekly data 1867 1933 to investigate the sources of banking and financial panics we find that while a panic s exact starting date is unpredictable one can identify environments conducive to panics a lack of liquidity in financial markets seems to be a key source results also reveal the effectiveness of the aldrich vreeland act inelastizing the money supply and shortening the panic of 1914 and suggest that the panic of 1933 may have been caused by a speculative attack on the gold backed us dollar via the banks as opposed to a run on the banks directly

distinguishing panics and information based bank runs welfare and policy implications in this paper we contrast panics and information based bank runs in an effort to provide a robust and empirically plausible model of how bank runs are triggered the model of information based runs is characterized by two sided asymmetric information the bank cannot observe the true liquidity needs of the depositors while depositors are asymmetrically informed about bank asset quality we also examine the relative degrees of risk sharing provided by bank deposit contracts and traded equity contracts we show that the choice of deposit or equity depends on the attributes of and information about the underlying investment returns

us high technology multinationals and silicon glen haug p 1986 us high technology multinationals and silicon glen reg studies 20 103 116 future growth and investment by high technology industries have generated increasing interest in the agglomeration tendencies of high technology firms governments throughout the world are seeking to develop high technology firm concentrations similar to silicon valley in california an area that represents one of the largest high technology industry clusters outside the united states is scotland s silicon glen this article is based on interviews conducted at fourteen us owned manufacturing plants in silicon glen and sets out to 1 define the terms high technology industry and silicon glen 2 summarize research on the origins of silicon valley boston s route 128 silicon fen or the cambridge phenomenon and the m4 corridor near london and 3 present evidence on the location and investment activities of us multinational enterprises in silicon glen the results indicate that the attributes attracting high te

runs versus lemons information disclosure and fiscal capacity we study the optimal use of disclosure and fiscal backstops during financial crises providing information can reduce adverse selection in credit markets but negative disclosures can also trigger inefficient bank runs in our model governments are thus forced to choose between runs and lemons a fiscal backstop mitigates the cost of runs and allows a government to pursue a high disclosure strategy our model explains why governments with strong fiscal positions are more likely to run informative stress tests and paradoxically how they can end up spending less than governments that are more fiscally constrained

optimal financial crises empirical evidence suggests that banking panics are related to the business cycle and are not simply the result of sunspots panics occur when depositors perceive that the returns on bank assets are going to be unusually low we develop a simple model of this in this setting bank runs can be first best efficient they allow efficient risk sharing between early and late withdrawing depositors and they allow banks to hold efficient portfolios however if costly runs or markets for risky assets are introduced central bank intervention of the right kind can lead to a pareto improvement in welfare from the earliest times banks have been plagued by the problem of bank runs in which many or all of the bank s depositors attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously because banks issue liquid liabilities in the form of deposit contracts but invest in illiquid assets in the form of loans they are vulnerable to runs that can lead to closure and liquidation a financial crisis or banking panic occurs when depositors at many or all of the banks in a region or a country attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously prior to the twentieth century banking panics occurred frequently in europe and the united states panics were generally regarded as a bad thing and the development of central banks to eliminate panics and ensure financial stability has been an important feature of the history of financial systems it has been a long and involved process the first cerntral bank the bank of sweden was established more than 300 years ago the bank of england played an especially important role in the development of effective stabilization policies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by the end of the nineteenth century banking panics had been eliminated in europe the last true panic in england was the overend gurney company crisis of 1866

bank suspension of convertibility abstract a banking panic occurs when depositors at all banks seek a large reduction in their deposit holdings suspension of convertibility of demand deposits into currency was the banking system s response to a banking panic when depositors are incompletely informed about the state of bank investments a panic can occur when depositors expect capital losses conditional on having observed noisy indicators of the state of bank investments banks with superior information about the investments can signal to depositors by suspending convertibility that continuation of the long term investments is mutually beneficial

currency elasticity and banking panics theory and evidence existing models of banking panics contain no role for monetary factors and fail to explain why some banking systems experienced panics while others did not a monetary model is constructed where seasonal variations in the demand for liquidity and credit play a critical role in generating banking panics these panics occur when there are restrictions on the issue of currency in private banks but they do not occur if banks are unrestricted empirical evidence from canada and the united states for the period 1880 1910 is largely consistent with the predictions of the model

boom and bust patterns in the adoption of financial innovations we develop a dynamic model of the adoption of financial innovations each period firms decide whether or not to adopt an innovation of uncertain value and the profitability of each period s adoptions reveals information about the innovation s value we show that characteristics of financial innovation waves cited by critics as evidence of irrational excess are in fact consistent with fully rational behavior we also show that social welfare is enhanced when more firms adopt innovations of questionable value and that financial intermediaries base an incentive to encourage such adoption article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

imperfect competition risk taking and regulation in banking abstract we asses the welfare implications of banking competition under various deposit insurance regimes in a model of imperfect competition with social failure costs and where banks are subject to limited liability we study the links between competition for deposits and risk taking incentives and conclude that the welfare performance of the market and the appropriateness of alternative regulatory measures depend on the degree of rivalry and the deposit insurance regime specifically when competition is intense and the social failure costs high deposit rates are excessive both in a free market and with risk based insurance if insurance premiums are insensitive to risk then the same is true even if there is no social cost of failure we find also that in an uninsured market with nonobservable portfolio risk or with flat premium deposit insurance deposit regulation rate regulation or deposit limits and direct asset restrictions are complementary tools to improve welfare in an uninsured market with observable portfolio risk or with risk based insurance deposit regulation may be a sufficient instrument to improve welfare

bank runs and currency run in a system without a safety net argentina and the tequila shock abstract this paper tests the random withdrawals vs informed based theories of bank runs in the context of the bank panic that took place in argentina as a consequence of the mexican devaluation of december 20 1994 this evidence is unique in several ways it is the case of a contemporary banking system with virtually no explicit safety net a currency board with no deposit insurance scheme and a case in which the bank runs were triggered by a currency run the findings of the paper provide support to the informed based theories and show that depositors are concerned with the impact of a currency run on bank solvency

financial fragility liquidity and asset prices we define a financial system to be fragile if small shocks have disproportionately large effects in a model of financial intermediation we show that small shocks to the demand for liquidity cause either high asset price volatility or bank defaults or both furthermore as the liquidity shocks become vanishingly small the asset price volatility is bounded away from zero in the limit economy with no shocks there are many equilibria however the only equilibria that are robust to the introduction of small liquidity shocks are those with non trivial sunspot activity

aspects of monetary and banking theory and moral hazard we consider two problems in monetary and banking theory in this paper the first of these deals with differences between monetary and tax transfer resolutions of risk sharing problems in overlapping generations 12 15 models of fiat money under uncertainty our second contribution the scenario for which is also motivated in part by interventions needed for risk sharing reasons is an attempt to provide a rationale for interest rate controls on the liabilities of intermediaries that invest in risky assets both models consider environments in which uncertainty exists private markets are incomplete and most importantly some material payoff relevant actions are not perfectly observable the goal of this research is to provide further momentum to theoretical developments that serve to integrate information based models of investment and intermediation with theories of unbacked fiat money and the control of monetary institutions in recent years there has been a great deal of research interest in explicating the micro economic foundations of fiat money i e valued government created assets which are unbacked by payoffs from productive investments or taxes and the uniqueness and criteria for regulation of depository intermediary firms important contributions have been among others the works of bryant 3 the papers in kareken and wallace 7 fama 6 merton 10 and diamond and dybvig 5 asymmetric information based foundations of intermediary functioning have been provided by the papers of leland and pyle 9 followed by diamond 4 in most of this work there has usually been a dichotomy between models that focus on providing and analyzing a role for fiat money and those which analyze the rationale regulation and pricing of capital market intermediaries and their contracts regrettably we persist in having this dichotomy in our work some recent work like fama 6 does merge these two aspects however by emphasizing perfect information complete market environments in which the financial structure irrelevance theorems of modigliani and miller 10 apply models of unbacked fiat money many different types of which are to be found in kareken and wallace 7 can be usefully dichotomized as being of two types in the first fiat money serves the function of opening up or expanding trading opportunities among contemporaneously living agents who have endowment

route 128 the development of a regional high technology economy abstract a corner of massachusetts not far from boston s route 128 has become a world center of high technology hundreds of enterprises mainly in electronics based industries employ over 250 000 people 75 000 of whom were added between 1975 and 1980 enterprises founded after world war ii have spearheaded growth in the state with a rapid rate of new firm formation continuing through the 1970s this paper examines the state s high tech growth to determine what caused it to happen where it did and assess the special role of new enterprises in promoting it the development is found to have been largely indigenous and spontaneous rather than the result of a concerted effort to attract industry massachusetts distinguished universities and their research laboratories an inherited technological infrastructure the importance of agglomeration externalities and the good fortune of having a home grown firm become the world s leading manufacturer of minicomputers were major contributors to the state s success but the enormous opportunities for new enterprises which the electronics revolution generated and the tendency for such firms to start up mainly as spin offs from other high tech firms or from university laboratories and to remain close to their sources fueled the tendency towards spatial concentration

truthful revelation in the diamond and dybvig banking environment abstract the welfare analysis in the diamond and dybvig banking literature has been conducted by appealing to the revelation principle the best banking arrangement that induces truthtelling by depositors is characterized and it is asserted presumably by appeal to the revelation principle that no other arrangement could give higher welfare this appeal to the revelation principle is however not straightforward because the diamond and dybvig environment includes a sequential service constraint which is not present in standard formulations of the revelation principle this paper justifies the use of the revelation principle in sequential service environments

liquidity banking and bank failures a multiperiod model with risk neutral agents is constructed in which a liquidity problem arises in an equilibrium with decentralized tradin g in capital which banking institutions are able to alleviate depos it contracts provide for early withdrawal banks hold debt and agent s who borrow from banks hold compensating balances institutional col lapse or a state of the world when bank failures are experienced is associated with a high demand for liquidity low output and a lower than average level of welfare bank failure is symptomatic of a part icular state of endowments preferences and technology and governme nt intervention is undesirable copyright 1988 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the 1985 ohio thrift crisis the fslic s solvency and rate contagion for retail cds this paper uses both an arima transfer function intervention model and a panel data analysis to examine the effect of the ohio deposit insurance crisis in 1985 on the pricing of six month retail certificates of deposit cds for federally insured ohio banks and savings and loans adjusting for pricing reactions due to changes in market rates we find a significant unanticipated rise in cd rate premiums on the initial event week of the crisis that continued for approximately seven weeks consistent with a contingent insurance guarantee hypothesis rate premiums are found to be risk based from both a regulator s and a bank manager s perspective it is important to understand the nature of depositors reactions to a depository institution crisis recent events including large real estate loan losses for major banks the rhode island deposit insurance crisis and the general accounting office s gao announcement that a large bank failure or a severe recession could jeopardize the solvency of the federal deposit insurance corporation fdic have renewed debate over the potential for a widespread loss of confidence in the banking system in particular concern has been expressed over the potential for instability in retail deposit markets in a deregulated environment see smith 1984 1

spatial competition in the banking system localization cross subsidies and the regulation of deposit rates abstract the paper analyses a spatial competition model of the banking sector banks offer two kind of services deposits and credit and can either borrow or lend on the money market we investigate the consequences of the regulation of rates paid on deposits the main conclusions are as follows regulation first increases network size beyond social optimum in the long run it results in lower equilibrium credit rates because of increased competition secondly regulation generates tied sales contracts by which banks propose bundles of credit and deposit services tied sales in turn motivate the introduction of cross subsidies between the two activities the rent levied upon regulated deposits financing lower rates in the credit market finally it is shown that in a regulated environment the effectiveness of monetary policy is reduced in the sense that fluctuations of money market rates are less than fully transmitted in credit rates

bank panics suspensions and geography some notes on the contagion of fear in banking bank panics suspensions and geography some notes on the contagion of fear in banking recent attempts to understand bank panics tend to emphasize informational asymmetries or the possibilities of multiple equilibria such approaches stand in contrast to historical research that emphasizes legal factors influencing the organization of the banking system this paper constructs a model of a banking system operating under regulations similar to those in effect under the national banking system and in which information is complete in all other respects the model resembles that of diamond and dybvig 1983 the results indicate that given the regulatory environment it would have been surprising if suspensions of convertibility had not recurred periodically i introduction traditional explanations of panics under the national banking system 1863 1913 offered both by scholars and contemporaries stressed three factors 1 limitations on branching created incentives for the development and heavy use of correspondent banking relations 2 regulations favored holding interbank deposits with a relatively small group of new york banks this concentrated the reserves of the banking system in one location guaranteeing that heavy withdrawals of interbank balances from any source would affect new york banks and through them the entire banking system 3 legal restrictions prevented banks especially those holding large interbank deposits from adjusting interest rates in order to protect those deposits during periods of heavy withdrawal demand 1 this traditional explanation of the periodic recurrence of panics which emphasizes the organization of the banking system stands in marked contrast to more recent theories of panics which tend to focus on various informational asymmetries between banks and depositors 2 most of the recent literature on panics follows diamond and dybvig 1983 in modelling banks as a mechanism for pooling liquidity risks faced by depositors more specifically potential depositors can invest in the same primary assets available to banks however primary assets are costly to liquidate and depositors face random future liquidity needs at the time they make their investment decisions in such a framework the role of banks is to create and issue liabilities more liquid than their assets this activity provides insurance to depositors against random liquidity needs in diamond and dybvig s paper exogenous shocks to agents liquidity preference motivate withdrawal demand contracts between banks and depositors allow agents with liquidity needs to liquidate deposits at a lower cost than would be incurred in liquidating the primary asset however for each withdrawal due to inopportune liquidity needs a bank must liquidate primary assets and bear these costs hence the provision of liquidity by banks is feasible only if withdrawal demand is restricted to those actually requiring liquidity in the model of diamond and dybvig 3 panics can occur because the liquidity needs of individuals are private information in particular banks are assumed to be unable to observe whether any individual needs liquidity and hence cannot limit payments to individuals who actually need to withdraw funds banks are thus subject to runs as the result of self fulfilling prophecies if all depositors fear a run and they all seek to withdraw it will not be feasible for the banking system to provide liquidity to all of them thus the banking system must either suspend payments or be rendered insolvent of course a crucial component of this reasoning is that banks cannot distinguish legitimate from panic motivated withdrawals and hence cannot ration funds on this basis this model of panics provides no role for the organization of the banking system it therefore suggests that different countries or different regulatory regimes within the same country should have similar histories with respect to panics so long as they had similar deposit insurance schemes and similarly behaving lenders of last resort

financial intermediation in an overlapping generations model with transaction costs abstract we analyze an overlapping generations economy where agents interact to share liquidity risk we show that a pure exchange economy has excessive trade in equilibrium because agents interact to rebalance their portfolios intergenerational financial intermediaries reduce the number of interactions because agents only transact when they face liquidity needs in the absence of asset risk intermediaries match redemptions with deposits and dividends and never sell assets if the economy is subject to transaction costs the intermediated economy can sustain higher stationary investment and welfare we also find that dead weight transaction costs can increase welfare because it protects banks from interbank arbitrage and dampens the inherent cyclicality of market economies

solvency runs sunspot runs and international bailouts abstract this paper introduces a model of intervention by an international financial institution ifi under asymmetric information the ifi is unable to distinguish between runs due to fundamentals and those which are the result of pure sunspots however it maximizes global welfare by offering a relending package consistent with generating a separating equilibrium where voluntary creditor participation implies that underlying fundamentals are good the need for direct ifi lending in the package is shown to depend on the commitment capacity of creditors this adverse selection problem provides an alternative rationale for bagehot s principle of last resort lending at high rates of interest to the moral hazard motivation commonly found in the literature

bank competition and financial stability in asia pacific the impact of bank competition on financial stability has been a focus of academic and policy debate over the last two decades and particularly since the 2007 08 global financial crises beck 2008 oecd 2011 under the traditional competition fragility view banks cannot earn monopoly rents in competitive markets and this results in lower profits capital ratios and charter values this makes banks less able to withstand demand or supply side shocks and encourages excessive risk taking marcus 1984 alternatively the competition stability view suggests that competition leads to greater stability a less competitive banking market may lead to more risk taking if the big banks are deemed too important to fail and as such obtain implicit or explicit subsidies via government safety nets mishkin 1999 in addition banks with more market power tend to charge higher loan rates which may induce borrowers to assume greater risk leading to greater default in competitive banking markets loan rates are lower too big to fail issues and safety net subsidies are smaller and this results in a positive link between bank competition and stability boyd and de nicolo 2005 it could also be the case as noted by martinez miera and repullo 2010 that bank competition and stability are linked in a non linear manner and in a similar vein berger et al 2009 argue that competition and concentration may coexist and can simultaneously induce stability or fragility

regional clustering of high technology based firms opto electronics in three countries hendry c brown j and defillippi r 2000 regional clustering of high technology based firms opto electronics in three countries reg studies 34 129 144 industrial districts are seen as generating significant advantages in production and innovation however the way concentrations of firms actually relate to one another is often assumed this paper draws on an international study into the opto electronics industry to examine the extent and significance of localized inter company trading and network relationships in six regions national and international relationships are found to be much stronger than local ones this is a function of customer and supplier markets which derive from the technological characteristics of the industry and the way its markets have been created such factors are important for understanding the potential for the development of industrial districts in high technology sectors hendry c brown j et defillippi r 2000 grappes regionales d entreprises a la pointe de la

liquidity uncertainty and intermediation the paper performs a welfare comparison between demand deposit and equity contracts in the presence of intrinsic aggregate uncertainty in this framework the welfare dominance of deposit contracts emerges under corner preferences it is shown that aggregate uncertainty creates high price volatility of ex dividend equity claims traded in a secondary market and the resulting consumption allocations offer less risk sharing opportunities to risk averse consumers than tailor made deposit contracts the contingency of early payoffs on depositors withdrawal order reinforces the welfare performance of deposit contracts whereas costly liquidation of productive long term investments deteriorates their welfare performance relative to equity contracts

bank failure contagion in historical perspective abstract bank failures are contagious due to the lack of bank specific information depositors who lack financial information on individual banks make withdrawal decisions based on the condition of the banking system as a whole a high ratio of bank failures then signals an adverse condition within the banking sector and triggers systemwide bank runs this paper looks at bank panics in u s history and shows the importance of solvency information specific to individual banks the major empirical finding is that the government or banks stopped bank panics mainly by providing financial information on banks

exogenous shocks contagion and bank soundness a macroeconomic framework abstract in a model where all banks are initially solvent an exogenous shock affects confidence causing a flight from deposits into domestic and foreign currency real interest rates increase unexpectedly affecting firms and raising the share of the banks nonperforming assets this contagion causes a bank run simulations show that compensatory monetary policy mitigates the bank run but causes macroeconomic imbalances combining compensatory monetary policy with tight fiscal policies slows the bank run and mitigates insolvency a devaluation combined with compensatory monetary policy reduces insolvencies and increases the growth of real income but at the cost of increased inflation

agglomeration economies among high technology firms in advanced production areas the case of denver boulder lyons d 1995 agglomeration economies among high technology firms in advanced production areas the case of denver boulder reg studies 29 265 278 research on the agglomeration economies generated by high technology industry has tended to focus on either core high technology areas or fabrication clusters this paper directs attention to intermediate or advanced production areas through an investigation of the agglomeration advantages generated by high technology firms in the denver boulder region the results suggest that advanced production areas are characterized by relatively robust and innovative high technology sectors with significant agglomeration advantages derived from the division of labour new firm formation and to a lesser extent local forward and backward linkages although small firms account for the majority of firms in the denver boulder area a small number of large firms are crucial to the future economic health of the area lyons d 1995 les economies d agglomeration des entre

schumpeter and public choice part i precursor to public choice what schumpeter might have done had he lived say another twenty years cannot be known whether he might have continued the line of thought initiated in capitalism socialism and democracy or returned to pure economics cannot be ascertained likewise whether he would have shown interest in and how he might have responded to modern public choice is unknowable still it does seem possible to develop logical implications of his theories that is what i propose to do one other preliminary point needs emphasis the fact that no schumpeterian school of public choice has been initiated by followers is not without importance and requires an explanation that a very distinctive public choice has been developed by others only one of whom downs has indicated any schumpeterian influence is perhaps of greater significance schumpeter is difficult to categorize for he was not only a methodological deviant within the austrian school of economics but a deviant as well from their general normative strictures about capitalism socialism and democracy in any event a schumpeterian public choice would be distinctive and likely to combine highly disparate themes methods and his usual fascinating paradoxes i begin by characterizing those features of modern public choice that would either be downplayed or rejected and then attempt a sketch of the positive content of a schumpeterian public choice

bank runs deposit insurance and capital requirements diamond and dybvig provide a model of intermediation in which deposit insurance can avoid socially undesirable bank runs we extend the diamond dybvig model to evaluate the costs and benefits of deposit insurance in the presence of moral hazard by banks and monitoring by depositors we find that complete deposit insurance alone will not support the first best outcome depositors will not have adequate incentives for monitoring and banks will invest in excessively risky projects however an additional capital requirement for banks can restore the first best allocation

an experimental exploration of self fulfilling banking panics their occurrence persistence and prevention this article tests the possibility and the degree of persistence of self fulfilling banking panics through an experimental protocol panics are proved to be persistent phenomena that are difficult to prevent however it seems possible to curb them through a learning effect caused by a temporary but sufficient suspension of the deposit availability combined with a narrow banking solution which makes banks more liquid additionally panic prevention requires a full deposit coverage to be effective this suggests that the moral hazard issue should not be tackled through a lower deposit coverage especially in emerging countries banking systems where depositors are likely to lose confidence

factors governing the development of high tech industry agglomerations a tale of three cities glasmeier a 1988 factors governing the development of high tech industry agglomerations a tale of three cities reg studies 22 287 301 high tech industries are thought to precipitate structural change in local economies through the creation of backward and forward linkages and new firm spinoffs case studies of high tech firms and products indicate interindustry linkage development is closely associated with product type and organizational structure of firms three product configurations one of a kind customized and standardized generate differing levels of linkage and spinoff potential firms producing customized products with highly variable input structures and established subcontracting relationships are more amenable to linkage and spinoff creation than firms producing one of a kind or standardized products the potential for linked industry development is further diluted because the spatial expansion path of high tech firms has been through the creation of technical branch plants which a

the causes of free bank failures a detailed examination abstract in this paper we propose and test a new explanation of bank behavior during the free banking era 1837 1863 arguing against the conventional view that free bank failures were due to wildcat banking we claim they were caused by falling asset prices confronting both explanations with our new and detailed data set developed from state auditor reports we find that the falling asset price explanation of free bank failures explains far more failures than does the wildcatting hypothesis

avoiding bank runs in transition economies the role of risk neutral capital abstract in a general equilibrium model with risk neutral and risk averse agents we show that if banks issue both demand deposits and equity then free banking is run proof and efficient in particular we obtain the first best insurance solution if there is adequate risk neutral capital if sufficient risk neutral capital is unavailable then a partial suspension of convertibility is optimal in general therefore policies like capital adequacy norms and deposit insurance are neither necessary nor desirable