contract enforcement and trade liberalization in mexico s footwear industry abstract the wave of formal legal system reforms sweeping developing countries provides only a partial solution to the problem of enforcing agreements between firms informal institutions govern the majority of interfirm transactions economic reform also necessitates changes in these institutions this paper examines the evolution of contract enforcement in the mexican footwear industry as trade barriers were removed in the closed economy geographic agglomeration of manufacturing allowed the manufacturers trade associations to maintain information about the behavior of retailers and gave retailers strong incentives to maintain reputations by providing an alternative source for procurement trade liberalization weakened the power of manufacturers

price adjustment in long term contracts the case of coal in two recent papers i examined the effects of relationship specific investment on the duration of contracts negotiated between electric utilities and coal suppliers that work demonstrated that when relationshipspecific investment is important for a cost minimizing supply relationship contracts are frequently utilized that specify ex ante the terms and conditions of trade over many future years in this article i examine the characteristics of the price adjustment provisions specified in these long term coal contracts i utilize a sample of about 250 coal contracts to analyze the structure of formal price adjustment provisions in coal contracts in order to determine the factors that affect initial negotiated contract prices and to examine actual transaction price behavior over time there has been much recent theoretical work as well as some related empirical work that has focused on the benefits of long term contracts when relationship specific investments are important 2 there has also been some theoretical work that focuses on the contractual arrangements that may be chosen to mitigate opportunism problems and guard against

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

how does women s life satisfaction respond to retirement a two stage analysis we quantify the adjustment of women s life satisfaction to retirement as a two stage process the transition to retirement leads to an immediate increase in women s life satisfaction after becoming retired their life satisfaction declines with the duration of retirement

a theory of contracts with limited enforcement we present a theory of contracts under costly enforcement in the context of a dynamic relationship between an uninformed buyer and a seller who is privately informed on his persistent cost at the outset public enforcement relies on remedies for breach private enforcement comes from severing relationships we first characterize aggregate enforcement constraints ensuring that trading partners do not breach contracts unduly whether a long term contract is enforceable does not depend on the distribution of penalties for breach between the buyer and the seller while under complete information the optimal contract would remain stationary non stationarity might arise under asymmetric information enforcement constraints are time dependent and easier to satisfy as time passes indeed a high cost seller may be tempted to trade high volumes at high prices at the beginning of the relationship before breaching the contract later on yet such take the money and run strategy becomes less attractive as time passes and can be prevented with backloaded payments the optimal contract thus goes through two different phases first quantities and prices increase at the inception of the relationship later on the contract looks more stationary the public and private sides of enforcement plays different roles in determining the length of the earlier phase of contracting long run screening distortions encapsulate the quality of enforcement offering de facto a link between the quality of the legal system and contractual performances

efficient adaptation in long term contracts take or pay provisions for natural gas to mitigate the inflexibility of long term contracting for natural gas parties will look for terms that minimize the need for costly adjudication while maintaining incentives for appropriate adaptation the authors examine the incident of take or pay provisions in contracts between natural gas producers and pipelines from this perspective they argue that take obligations can be viewed as a mechanism for effecting appropriate incentives for contractual performance and show that efficient breach considerations define an optimal take percentage as a function of characteristics of the transaction these incentives are distorted by regulated price ceilings which cause the adoption of take obligations in excess of optimal levels the findings refute the common perception that take or pay provisions are just an artifact of wellhead price regulation and serve no useful purpose in the absence of regulation 20 references 1 figure 1 table

should we be worried about the green paradox announcement effects of the acid rain program this paper presents the first empirical test of the green paradox hypothesis according to which well intended but imperfectly implemented environmental policies may lead to detrimental outcomes due to supply side responses we use the introduction of the acid rain program in the u s as a case study the theory predicts that owners of coal deposits expecting future sales to decline would supply more of their resource between the announcement of the acid rain program and its implementation moreover the incentive to increase supply would be stronger for owners of high sulfur coal this would all else equal induce an increase in sulfur dioxide emissions using data on prices heat input and sulfur content of coal delivered to u s power plants we find strong evidence of a price decrease and of an increase in the sulfur premium some indication that the amount of coal used might have increased and no evidence of fuel switching towards higher sulfur coal overall our evidence suggests that while the mechanism indicated by the theory might be at work market conditions and concurrent regulation largely prevented a green paradox from arising these results have implications for the design of climate policies

disentangling the theories of firm boundaries a path model and empirical test theories on the motivation underlying firm boundaries have recently sparked renewed debate what best explains whether a firm relies on market control or hierarchical control to secure required resources how do the characteristics of the resources come into play in this study we consider a comprehensive path model of the governance mode decision for sourcing technological know how by integrating different perspectives on firm boundaries including transaction cost economics a resource based view and an options perspective we link characteristics of the technology i e uniqueness barriers to imitation commercial uncertainty technological dynamism to the perceived threat of opportunism the potential for sustainable advantage and the pursuit of a licensing agreement vis a vis the outright acquisition of the firm that possesses the desired know how we use structural equation modeling to analyze 127 sourcing arrangements our results show that technological dynamism and barriers to imitation indirectly influence the governance mode decision by increasing the perceived threat of opportunism commercial uncertainty directly influences the governance mode and decreases the likelihood of an acquisition vis a vis a licensing agreement although uniqueness and barriers to imitation are also positively associated with the perceived potential for sustainable advantage the potential for sustainable advantage had no direct effect on governance mode implications and suggestions for further research are offered

retirement effects on health in europe what are the health impacts of retirement as talk of raising retirement ages in pensions and social security schemes continues around the world it is important to know both the costs and benefits for the individual as well as the governments budgets in this paper we use the survey of health ageing and retirement in europe share dataset to address this question in a multi country setting we use country specific early and full retirement ages as instruments for retirement behavior these statutory retirement ages clearly induce retirement but are not related to an individual s health exploiting the discontinuities in retirement behavior across countries we find significant evidence that retirement has a health preserving effect on overall general health our estimates indicate that retirement leads to a 35 percent decrease in the probability of reporting to be in fair bad or very bad health and an almost one standard deviation improvement in the health index while the self reported health seems to be a temporary impact the health index indicates there are long lasting health differences

the effect of land tenure governance on technical efficiency evidence from three provinces in eastern china this study aims to identify the mechanisms through which land tenure governance affects the technical efficiency of grain production in an integrated framework and to examine the impacts of the public governance village self governance and relational governance of land tenure on the technical efficiency of contracted land and rented in land farm level survey data collected from liaoning jiangxi and jiangsu provinces covering the years of 2014 and 2015 is used for the empirical analysis the findings indicate that i public governance associated with land certification significantly increases the technical efficiency of grain production ii village self governance and administrative land reallocations can serve as substitutes for the land rental market in optimizing the distribution of land resources and improving technical efficiency and iii compared to multi year transfer contracts both annual and open ended transfer contracts have negative impacts on technical efficiency

accessing modern science policy and institutional options for agricultural biotechnology in developing countries the paper highlights the complexity of the challenge in developing forms of collaboration between a variety of actors in the biotechnology area in developing countries national research systems with diverse capacities in biotechnology international research centers local private research and development companies and advanced research institutes in both industrialized and developing countries case studies are provided from strong programs such as india china and brazil which will be tool developers as well as users programs that are developing an adaptive capacity in biotech to use tools and methods in a large number of countries whose research systems have virtually no capacity in molecular biology each type program presents challenges and opportunities for accessing new technologies based on facilitation of private investments public private partnerships and local capacity to design proprietary technologies working with the consultative group on international agricultural research centers as intermediaries and partners and with regional consortia policy and institutional issues for accessing modern science are then discussed and many of the challenges involve developing strategies in intellectual property management while pubic research organizations will need to develop innovative means of segmenting markets to complement private sector interests

non contractible investments and vertical integration in the mexican footwear industry abstract this paper examines patterns of integration among manufacturers and retailers using data from a survey of footwear manufacturers in mexico the property rights framework developed in papers by grossman and hart 1986 j polit econ 94 691 and hart and moore 1990 j polit econ 98 1119 is differentiated from the standard empirical transactions cost framework in the context of this industry the most relevant distinction between the two frameworks is that the property rights framework addresses both the benefits and costs of integration while the transactions cost framework focuses only on variation in the benefits of integration we show that the costs of integration are highest where the retailer s non contractible investment has an important effect on the overall profits from the relationship consistent with the property rights framework the data suggest that integration is less likely in these circumstances

healthier when retiring earlier evidence from france this paper contributes to the literature on the health retirement relationship by looking at the effect of retiring before legal age on health in later life in france to account for the endogeneit

subjective performance measures in optimal incentive contracts objective measures of performance are seldom perfect in response incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures this paper explores the combined use of subjective and objective performance measures in respectively implicit and explicit incentive contracts naturally objective and subjective measures often are substitutes sometimes strikingly so we show that if objective measures are sufficiently close to perfect then no implicit contracts are feasible because the firm s fallback position after reneging on an implicit contract is too attractive we also show however that objective and subjective measures can reinforce each other if objective measures become more accurate then in some circumstances the optimal contract puts more weight on subjective measures because the improved objective measures increase the value of the ongoing relationship and so reduce the firm s incentive to renege we also analyze the use of subjective weights on objective performance measures and provide case study evidence consistent with our analyses

contract duration and relationship specific investments empirical evidence from coal markets this paper examines the importance of specific relationship investments in determining the duration of coal contracts negotiated between coal suppliers and electric utilities data for 277 coal contracts are used to perform the analysis the results provide strong support for the view that buyers and sellers make longer commitments to the terms of future trade at the contract execution stage and rely less on repeated bargaining when relationship specific investments are more important

what explains the difference in the effect of retirement on health evidence from global aging data this paper analyzes the reasons for differences in the effect of retirement on health estimated results in previous studies we investigate these differences by focusing on the analysis methods used by these studies using various health indexes numerous researchers have examined the effects of retirement on health however there are no unified views on the impact of retirement on various health indexes consequently we show that the choice of analysis method is one of the key factors in explaining why the estimated results of the effect of retirement on health differ moreover we re estimate the effect of retirement on health by using a fixed analysis method controlling for individual heterogeneity and endogeneity of the retirement behavior we analyze the effect of retirement on health parameters such as cognitive function self report of health activities of daily living adl depression and body mass index in eight countries we find that the effects of retirement on self report of health depression and adl are positive in many of these countries

does retirement age impact mortality the relationship between retirement and mortality is studied with a unique administrative data set covering the full population of norway a series of retirement policy changes in norway reduced the retirement age for a group of workers but not for others difference in differences estimation based on monthly birth cohorts and treatment group status show that the early retirement programme significantly reduced the retirement age this holds true also when we account for programme substitution for example into the disability pension instrumental variables estimation results show no effect on mortality of retirement age neither do estimation results from a hazard rate model

an empirical investigation of oliver williamson s organization of work oliver williamson argues that the attributes of the employment contract like intermediate transactions in general are essentially driven by the specificity of assets in the case of the organization of work it is the particular attributes of labour that determines the transaction costs of any given governance structure the paper presents a stylized account of the transaction cost model of the efficient organization of work stressing an underlying tension and ambiguity in the transaction cost framework the paper exploits a unique dataset to test for the first time with british data williamson s transaction cost predictions concerning the nature of employment contracts williamson tacitly assumes that asset specificity is exogenous in general however there is evidence in the literature that labour specificity is endogenous to employment contracts the paper endeavours to demonstrate that there is empirical evidence to suggest that specialized labour is indeed endogenous in the transaction cost mode

presidential address antitrust restrictions on single firm strategies this article offers an overview of selected developments in the law and economics of antitrust regulation of single firm strategies the strategy generating the most cases historically is resale price maintenance here the law has moved sharply in both canada and the u s towards more solid economic foundations yet a gap between the law and economics remains the economics of resale price maintenance is reviewed within a framework that is much simpler and more general than the existing literature the law on a second strategy predatory pricing represents in my view a success story for the influence of economic theory in spite of the absence of a single accepted theory of predatory pricing the remaining single firm strategies are concerned largely with the exclusion by a dominant firm of rivals from a market i review with application to cases the two most basic questions concerning exclusionary strategies are exclusionary anticompetitive contracts ever entered into voluntarily by market participants on the other hand is complete or substantial foreclosure of a market through exclusionary strategies necessarily anticompetitive cette allocution presidentielle a l association canadienne d economique presente une vue d ensemble des developpements dans le droit et l economie de la reglementation antitrust sur les strategies d une firme unique la loi sur la strategie qui genere historiquement le plus de cas le maintien du prix de revente a change dramatiquement au canada et aux etats unis et derive vers une politique qui a des assises economiques solides mais il reste un ecart entre le droit et l economie on reexamine l economie du maintien du prix de revente a l aide d un cadre d analyse qui est a la fois plus simple et plus general que ce qui existe dans la litterature specialisee la loi pour ce qui est d une seconde strategie prix d eviction est a mon avis une grande reussite pour la science economique malgre l absence d une seule theorie du prix d eviction generalement acceptee un troisieme ensemble de strategies concerne l exclusion de ses rivaux d un marche par la firme dominante l auteur reexamine avec un recours extensif aux cas les deux questions de base pour ce qui est des strategies d exclusion est ce que les participants sur un marche entrent jamais volontairement dans un arrangement contractuel qui exclut et est anticoncurrentiel d autre part est ce que la saisie complete ou substantielle d un marche par des man uvres d exclusion est necessairement anticoncurrentielle

evolution of the u s natural gas industry in response to changes in transaction costs the u s natural gas industry traditionally had producers interstate pipelines and distributors linked together via bilateral long term contracts recently the federal energy regulatory commission has encouraged buyers and sellers to deal directly with each other leading first to a spot market and marketers then to market hubs and a slight trend back to longer term contracts marketers and pipelines have consolidated to take advantage of economies of scope and systems effects which larger networks provide we use transaction cost economics to explain the evolution of exchange relationships with open access to transportation and the unbundling of transportation and storage from sales

the stability of joint ventures reciprocity and competitive rivalry the focus of the following empirical analysis is the influence of reciprocity and long term relationships on the stability of joint ventures these cooperative incentives are offset by industry structural conditions which may promote competitive rivalry among the partners to separate these effects on joint venture survival the hypothesized relationships are proxied by variables drawn from industry and questionnaire data and estimated under a hazard model specification a theoretical implication of the findings is to suggest a shift of attention from the transaction to the economic relationship as the unit of analysis copyright 1989 by blackwell publishing ltd

the adoption of genetically modified papaya in hawaii and its implications for developing countries 1 abstract as agricultural biotechnology becomes increasingly commercialised numerous constraints limit adoption by developing country producers these include technology access impacts on farmers yields and profits privatisation of research and intellectual property biosafety regulatory frameworks and trade related market restrictions this essay analyses development of the genetically modified papaya and its commercialisation in hawaii as a response to a virulent plant disease papaya ringspot virus results of a survey of hawaiian papaya growers suggest that the unprecedentedly rapid adoption of gm papaya is due to this technology s having addressed many of these key constraints facing growers the implications for developing country adoption of gm varieties are explored

how to deliver foreign aid the case of projects governed by the spanish international agency summary international agencies use two alternative modes of governance to deliver international aid projects under bilateral agreements with recipient governments in house or through incumbent ngos through the lenses of institutional and transaction cost economics this article examines 95 international aid projects delivered in morocco and ecuador by the spanish international agency finding that those projects delivered in house present different features than those projects outsourced through incumbent ngos specifically international aid projects delivered in house involve important investments in specific assets are much more complex and can turn the public agency into a hostage of its own disbursement

instabilities of strategic alliances an internal tensions perspective the instabilities of strategic alliances have been examined in the literature through a number of theoretical approaches alliance instabilities refer to major changes or dissolutions of alliances that are unplanned from the perspective of one or more partners although the literature identifies certain characteristics of strategic alliances that may lead to their unplanned dissolution the extent of our understanding of this subject appears to be fragmented and incomplete in this article we propose a comprehensive framework for adequately understanding alliance instabilities based on the notion of internal tensions we suggest that strategic alliances are sites in which conflicting forces develop and which can be viewed as being constituted by three key pairs of competing forces namely cooperation versus competition rigidity versus flexibility and short term versus long term orientation this tensions framework helps us in explaining the intrinsic vulnerability of alliances in terms of a wide range of internal contradictions and enables us to examine in an integrated manner the incidence dynamics and eventual dissipation of the inherent instabilities we discuss the interrelationships among the different internal tensions and their impacts on different types of strategic alliances we also examine the termination of alliances through mergers acquisitions and dissolution finally we suggest ways to empirically test the various ideas and propositions developed here and indicate directions for further research

the british electricity experiment the privatization of the electricity supply industry esi in britain which began 1990 is in itself an unremarkable event much of the esi is privately owned in several european countries and in the united states and the u k privatization program has embraced utilities since 1984 when british telecom was privatized the thing that is remarkable about recent policy toward the industry is the radical nature of the regulatory reform accompanying privatization a vertically integrated administered generation and transmission structure was replaced overnight on march 31 1990 by one that is deintegrated and market based generation and transmission have been separated and there has been an attempt to establish competition in generation a number of countries have been moving gradually in the direction of encouraging competition but nowhere else have such dramatic changes been implemented so quickly

the market for tradable renewable energy credits abstract as states seek to foster the development of renewable energy resources some have introduced renewable portfolio standards rpss which require retailers of electricity to derive a specified amount of their energy supply from renewable energy resources rpss in texas arizona wisconsin and nevada allow for or require the use of tradable renewable energy credits the price of such credits is expected to reflect the cost premium for generating electricity from renewable resources relative to the market price of conventionally generated electricity using the market to trade renewable energy credits exposes buyers and sellers to risks of imperfect information poor performance and opportunism these risks can be managed through contractual arrangements and regulatory requirements pertaining to property rights in credits pricing term of the contract and assurance of performance

mitigating procurement hazards in the context of innovation this paper extends the transaction cost economics framework to examine the contractual hazards that arise in the course of technological innovation we identify three main strategic hazards related to future technological opportunities that may develop in business transactions loss of technological pacing possibilities on the technological frontier loss of technological control at or behind the frontier and design omissions in examining these hazards we focus on the increasingly common phenomenon of vertically integrated firms supplying downstream competitors we then analyze how constellations of safeguards particularly relational safeguards can augment transaction specific safeguards in many instances to ensure high powered incentives are maintained we also consider under what conditions downstream divestiture is a desirable economizing option supportive illustrations are drawn from the desktop laser printer and telecommunications industries this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

cooperation in community interaction without information flows we study cooperative behaviour in communities where the flow of information regarding past conduct is limited or missing players are initially randomly matched with no knowledge of each other s past actions they endogenously decide whether or not to continue the repeated relationship there is incomplete information regarding player types a subset of the population is myopic while the remainder have discount factors that permit cooperation in principle we define social equilibrium in such communities such equilibria are characterized by an initial testing phase followed by cooperation if the test is successful it is precisely the presence of myopic types that permit cooperation by raising barriers to entry into new relationships we examine the implications of increased patience which takes two forms an increase in the number of non myopic types and an increase in the discount factor of non myopic types these two notions turn out to have strikingly different implications for the degree of cooperation that can be sustained

a transaction costs analysis of innovations in the organization of pharmaceutical r d abstract this paper uses transaction costs economics to analyze the increasing importance of vertical disintegration of r d by large pharmaceutical and chemical firms first it discusses three characteristics of the research based pharmaceutical industry then it shows that market failures related to long term joint venture r d contracts between firms and university laboratories are less significant than appears at first and may account for their striking increase over the past fifteen years

mitigating contractual hazards unilateral options and contract length in this article we consider the ways in which the desire for efficient low cost adaptation to change influences the tradeoff between the design and duration of long term contractual relationships we examine the distortions in contract terms occasioned by nonprice competition for natural gas in the presence of wellhead price regulation deviations from optimal contract incentives significantly raise the cost of being bound to long term agreements and shorten the duration of contracts the approach we adopt suggests a method for empirically assessing the efficiency of alternative contracting practices and legal standards

buyer investment export variety and intrafirm trade abstract this paper studies a model of buyer investment and its effect on the variety and vertical structure of international trade a distinction is made between two types of buyer investment flexible and specific which differ in the ability of a buyer to match with a seller the interaction of buyer investment with the entry and pricing incentives of suppliers are analyzed it is shown that i there can be multiple equilibria in the variety of products traded and ii less product variety is associated with more intrafirm trade the possibility of multiple equilibria is consistent with the observation that some similar economies such as taiwan and south korea differ substantially in their export varieties to the u s a cross country empirical analysis confirms the negative correlation between export variety and intrafirm trade

long term relationships governed by short term contracts this paper studies the effects of contract duration on the incentive to invest in a relationship when its parties are rational and have perfect information and contracts are complete ex cept that short term contracts specify only current period actions t hen short term contracting distorts investment decisions only when t he efficient plan involves mainly sunk cost investment and the relati onship plays a consumption smoothing role there is a general but no t universal tendency to underinvest copyright 1988 by american economic association

playing for keeps pay and performance in the nba i introduction a basic insight of agency theory is that properly designed incentive contracts can align the interests of agents with those of the principal and recent empirical work shows that workers do indeed respond to financial incentives 1 contractual incentives however are not the only force motivating workers workers also have incentives to vary effort at different points of their contract cycle to increase effort just before a new contract is signed to lock in a more lucrative deal and then reduce it after a multi year contract is secured these types of contract related incentives create clear moral hazard problems but have received little empirical attention the motivating hypothesis in this paper is that imperfect information and multi year contracts create an implicit incentive for workers to strategically alter effort over the contract cycle in the year prior to signing the contract their contract year workers may exert above average effort to convince employers that they are high quality and thus raise long term compensation once the contract is signed however workers may exert less effort because wages are effectively independent of contemporaneous performance an empirical difficulty is that this moral hazard may be obscured by two factors a selection effect may lead only high quality workers to receive contracts and career concerns may provide additional incentives and dampen the post contract decline 2 this paper employs a unique dataset for professional basketball players in the national basketball association nba from 1988 to 2002 to examine the contract related incentive effects the data include contract information year signed length of contract and value of contract for every active player in 2000 and performance measures points scored rebounds assists etc throughout each player s career contract related incentive effects are estimated from changes in individual performance over the contract cycle if performance systematically improves just before signing a new contract and falls afterward some of the fluctuation is likely due to contract related incentives i also examine the traditional link between pay and past performance which is necessary for these types of incentives to be relevant the critical advantage of this data is the detailed information on individual performance individual contract status and individual pay 3 in contrast previous work on individual incentives for example lazear 2000 paarsch and shearer 2000 and shearer 2004 studied changes infirmwide compensation plans while the empirical literature on executive pay and performance for example murphy 1985 1986 jensen and murphy 1990 gibbons and murphy 1992 kaplan 1994 and hall and liebman 1998 typically examined the link between individual pay and firm performance the individual level data constructed here have the critical variation across individuals which is needed to identify the impact of these contract related incentive effects the empirical work begins with a test of the link between pay and performance which is necessary for contract related incentives to be operational not surprisingly better performers in the nba are rewarded with higher salaries and longer contracts more relevant to the incentive issue players are strongly rewarded for improvements in performance in their contract year a one point increase in a player s scoring average for example is associated with an annual salary increase of over 300 000 this link provides the crucial motivation for the hypothesis that players will exert additional effort in their contract year to lock in the better contracts that they expect to follow the data then provide strong evidence of contract related incentive effects as overall performance does in fact improve relative to a player s long run average in the contract year and then declines after a long run contract is signed

oligopsony power asset specificity and hold up evidence from the broiler industry in this article we look for empirical evidence of hold up in broiler industry production contracts by using the cross sectional national survey of broiler growers first we focus on the problem of under investment and hypothesize that the degree of agent s grower s under investment systematically depends on the principal s integrator s market power and the level of asset specificity second we provide an indirect test of hold up by looking at the grower contract payoffs as a function of the frequency of the housing facilities upgrade requests and the principal s market power the results show moderate empirical support for the presence of hold up

on the survival of contracts assessing the stability of technology licensing agreements in the brazilian seed industry abstract the present study focuses on contract duration as defined ex post meaning that the survival of contractual relationships is observed over time our empirical study employs hazard rate models with time varying covariates using data from technology licensing contracts between seed companies and a governmental rd 2 decrease as a function of past satisfactory outcomes 3 increase with the extent of disturbances affecting the technology s demand and other things being equal 4 increase rather than decrease over time

when competition eclipses cooperation an event history analysis of joint venture failure why do so many joint ventures fail despite the fact that their success is the exception rather than the rule the literature on why joint venture performance has been so poor remains fragmentary we address this issue adopting a transaction cost economics perspective and modeling joint ventures as governance structures that blend the advantages and drawbacks of both markets and hierarchies using a data base on electronics industry ventures and event history analysis we identify several predictors of joint venture failure and test for their influences a key finding is that the presence of competition between joint venture partners outside of the agreement significantly impairs chances for the operation s chance of survival we also find clear evidence that the failure rate of joint ventures is nonmonotonic rising to a peak in the middle term and then declining finally we compare and contrast predictors of terminations due to failure to those due to acquisition of the joint venture by one of its partners our overall conclusions highlight implications for strategic choice theory building and the management of joint ventures

mental retirement and schooling we assess the validity of differences in eligibility ages for early and old age pension benefits as instruments for estimating the effect of retirement on cognitive functioning because differences in eligibility ages across country and gender are correlated with differences in years of schooling which affect cognitive functioning at old ages they are invalid as instruments without controlling for schooling we show by means of simulation and a replication study that unless the model incorporates schooling the estimated effect of retirement is negatively biased this explains a large part of the mental retirement effects which have recently been found

ageing cognitive abilities and retirement we investigate the relationship between ageing cognitive abilities and retirement using the survey on health ageing and retirement in europe share a household panel that offers the possibility of comparing several european countries using nationally representative samples of the population aged 50 the human capital framework suggests that retirement may cause an increase in cognitive decline since after retirement individuals lose the market incentive to invest in cognitive repair activities our empirical results based on an instrumental variable strategy to deal with the potential endogeneity of retirement confirm this key prediction they also indicate that education plays a fundamental role in explaining heterogeneity in the level of cognitive abilities

the seeds of dissolution discrepancy and incoherence in buyer supplier exchange in this research we examine a novel mechanism of interorganizational relationship dissolution incoherence in a partner s behavior we propose that the discrepancy between an exchange partner s opportunistic behavior and the focal firm s expectations may create a state of incoherence and uncertainty and that this effect can be damaging to the exchange even when the partner s behavior is better than expected using nearly 500 longitudinal confidential reports of industrial buyers and sellers we find supportive evidence that 1 the net effect of the discrepancy is initially positive when behavior is better than expected but becomes rapidly negative thereafter and 2 the net effect of the discrepancy is always negative when behavior is worse than expected thus these effects will generally damage the exchange even as the partner tries to improve the relationship this gives insight into why exchange relationships that hit a downward spiral can be difficult if not impossible to salvage we also show that the dysfunctional consequences of discrepancy are mitigated through exchange structures such as the magnitude of dependence on an organizational partner the development phase of the relationship and the presence of bilateral idiosyncratic investments implications for theory and the management of interorganizational relationships are developed

choice of contracts in the british national health service an empirical study following major reforms of the british national health service nhs in 1990 the roles of purchasing and providing health services were separated with the relationship between purchasers and providers governed by contracts using a mixed multinomial logit analysis we show how this policy shift led to a selection of contracts that is consistent with the predictions of a simple model based on contract theory in which the characteristics of the health services being purchased and of the contracting parties influence the choice of contract form the paper thus provides evidence in support of the practical relevance of theory in understanding health care market reform

corporate environmentalism and environmental statutory permitting abstract studies have shown that despite infrequent inspections and low penalties for statutory violations a large fraction of firms comply with environmental restrictions what then motivates compliance i investigate this question by focusing on the length of time it takes environmental agencies to process and issue new source construction permits pursuant to clean air act regulations and new industrial discharge permits pursuant to clean water act regulations i find that plants or firms with fewer instances of noncompliance receive permits for major projects more quickly in addition i find that permit delays are sensitive to economic conditions as well such as local area unemployment as far as voluntary pollution control behavior is concerned i find that regulators that issue permits for plant modifications focus primarily on statutory compliance but when permitting new plant construction where there is no plant compliance history to go on voluntary pollutant releases do matter

natural gas contracts in an emerging competitive market natural gas is being viewed by many as the fuel of the 1990s and beyond because of its environmental qualities relatively low cost and significant domestic resource base however in the fall of 1991 a group of electric utility executives met with then deputy secretary of energy henson moore and asserted that an inability to obtain long term gas contracts meant that supplies are unreliable and construction of gas fueled generating stations is being discouraged this study was requested by the deputy secretary to address the issues surrounding long term gas contracts and supply reliability the relationship between supply reliability and contracts is explained in terms of the number of buyers and sellers in a market with the appropriate state regulatory policies utilities can contract for gas and obtain reliable supplies at competitive market prices public utility commissioners are encouraged to permit utilities a free choice in signing gas contracts but to allow only competitive market prices to be reflected in allowable fuel costs

the choice of organizational form the case of franchising abstract we examine companies that franchise some units and centrally operate own others the agency problems confronting these two organizational forms are analyzed testable hypotheses are developed the empirical results support the notion that owning versus franchising reflects a trade off among agency related problems the cost of monitoring store managers appears to be especially important in the own franchise decision the level of repeat business and initial investment requirements per unit also appear to be important

networks versus vertical integration we construct a theory to compare vertically integrated firms to networks of manufacturers and suppliers vertically integrated firms make their own specialized inputs in networks manufacturers procure specialized inputs from suppliers that in turn sell to several manufacturers the analysis shows that networks can yield greater social welfare when manufacturers experience large idiosyncratic demand shocks individual firms may also have the incentive to form networks despite the lack of long term contracts the analysis is supported by existing evidence and provides predictions as to the shape of different industries

implementing supplier codes of conduct in global supply chains process explanations from theoretic and empirical perspectives western buying companies impose supplier codes of conduct scc on their suppliers in developing countries however many suppliers cannot fully comply with scc and some of them even cheat in scc in this research we link contract characteristics price pressure production complexity contract duration to the likelihood of supplier s commitment to scc through a mediating process how the buying companies govern their suppliers our structural equation model analysis shows that the hierarchy relational norms governance is a perfect mediator of contract characteristics effects on the likelihood of supplier s commitment the market governance an insignificant one the managerial implications are provided for successfully implementing scc in global supply chains

licensing duration in foreign markets a real options perspective licensing can be considered an initial trial of a foreign market before a firm fully commits to it through other investment modes the length of trial has great importance because licensing duration represents part of the licensing agreement when it is too short the firm may not acquire the necessary experience and knowledge of the foreign market but if it is too long the firm misses optimal expansion timing arguing that licensing can be considered as a european style real option with a fixed holding period we develop and test a model of the determinants of licensing duration in foreign markets empirical results based on a sample of firms in various countries show that uncertainty and threat of competitive pre emption in the foreign market are related to shorter duration of the technology licensing agreements we also find that irreversibility of the impending investment moderates the relationships between uncertainty and duration specifically market and technology uncertainties in the foreign market induce shorter contracts under low levels of irreversibility

changing locus of agricultural research will the poor benefit from biotechnology and privatization trends over the past decade the locus of agricultural research and development has shifted dramatically from the public to the private multinational sector three interrelated forces are transforming the system for supplying improved agricultural technologies to the world s farmers the first is the strengthened and evolving environment for protecting intellectual property in plant innovations the second is the rapid pace of discovery and growth in importance of molecular biology and genetic engineering finally agricultural input and output trade is becoming more open in nearly all countries these developments have created a powerful new set of incentives for private research investment altering the structure of the public private agricultural research endeavor particularly with respect to crop improvement

why hold ups occur the self enforcing range of contractual relationships one of my most enjoyable intellectual experiences was working with armen alchian on the klein crawford and alchian 1978 hold up paper in this paper i extend the basic framework presented in that paper pointing out what i now consider to be its shortcomings and providing insights into the nature of hold ups and the form of contracts chosen by transactors to avoid hold ups the major analytical extension entails combining hold up analysis with my work on private enforcement because private enforcement capital is limited and written contract terms are necessarily imperfect transactors must optimally combine court enforced written terms together with privately enforced unwritten terms to define what i call the self enforcing range of their contractual relationship hold ups occur when unanticipated events place the contractual relationship outside the self enforcing range this probabilistic framework where transactors enter contractual relationships knowing that a hold up may take place but believing that the expected gains from trade outweigh the expected rent dissipating costs associated with the hold up risk is shown to have important implications for understanding the structure of contracts adopted by transactors in the marketplace i why do hold ups occur i begin with a simple example that illustrates the basic economic forces involved in a hold up assume that a builder constructs a house on a piece of land the builder does not own but rather only leases short term after the initial land lease expires the landowner could hold up the builder by raising the land rent to reflect the costs of moving the house to another lot this example illustrates all the hold up factors emphasized in klein crawford and alchian a the builder has made an investment that is highly specific to a particular piece of land and b the landowner has taken advantage of the incompleteness of the contract that governs the relationship in particular the fact that the lease does not cover future years to c expropriate the quasi rents on the builder s specific investment the obvious question is why anything like this would ever occur that is why would someone be so naive as to build a house on land for which they had only a short term lease our primary goal in klein crawford and alchian was not to explain the existence of hold ups but rather the institutions adopted by transactors to avoid hold ups for example we would expect that builders anticipating a potential hold up problem would decide to purchase the land or at least to sign a long term ground lease before starting construction however we do present some examples in the paper of hold ups that actually occurred the implicit reason we give for the occurrence of these hold ups is transactor ignorance apparently transactors are not always smart enough to choose the contractual arrangement that would eliminate the hold up problem oliver williamson provides a similar but much more explicit answer to the question of why hold ups occur when defining opportunism he states by opportunism i mean self interest seeking with guile this includes but is scarcely limited to more blatant forms such as lying stealing and cheating opportunism more often involves subtle forms of deceit more generally opportunism refers to the incomplete or distorted disclosure of information especially to calculated efforts to mislead distort obfuscate or otherwise confuse 1 for example the hold up may have occurred in our illustrative house construction example because the landowner deceived the builder with a low up front land rental price and vague promises about the future relying on the ability of one transactor to take advantage of the naivete or ignorance of another transactor is a highly unsatisfactory way to explain the incidence of hold ups simple examples of deception such as a builder constructing a house on land that is only rented short term rarely if ever occur

complementarity and evolution of contractual provisions an empirical study of it services contracts an increasing volume of business activity appears to be occurring via alliances or other interfirm arrangements in which complex contracts are featured yet there has been relatively little study of contract design in the strategy or management literatures the economics literature on contracting has been extensive but it has been less concerned with learning and evolution phenomena in which strategy and organization scholars are deeply interested in this paper we investigate the relationship between two types of contractual provisions that are important in high technology contracts or contracts for which environmental uncertainty or technological complexity are significant namely contingency planning and task description previous research suggests that contracts can vary significantly in the degree of detail with which such key provisions are written and that they are each subject to learning in this paper we find evidence from a sample of 386 contracts that contingency planning and task description behave as complements in contractual design we argue that this complementarity reflects patterns of learning to contract we also find that repeated exchange between two firms leads to greater effort at contingency planning in subsequent contracts a finding that is also consistent with learning effects but not with frequently made claims that contracts and trust are substitutes

why are different services outsourced to different countries the tradability revolution in services has led to a dramatic expansion of offshore outsourcing of services allowing firms to take advantage of lower production costs in foreign countries however production costs alone cannot explain the location determinants of offshore outsourcing of services in this paper we argue that minimizing transaction costs is also an important determinant of the location of offshore outsourcing of services we empirically analyze characteristics of services and characteristics of foreign countries that may impact on transaction costs in an outsourcing relationship and hence determine where services will be outsourced offshore we derive measures of service characteristics routineness complexity and interactiveness based on the tasks required to provide them further we posit that there are interaction effects between service and country characteristics using bureau of economic analysis data on us service outsourcing across 11 types of services to 31 countries between 1992 and 2005 we find that 1 services that are more routine less complex or less interactive are outsourced more to foreign countries 2 services are outsourced more to countries with higher institutional quality and greater cultural proximity 3 non routine complex and interactive services are outsourced relatively more to countries with a better institutional quality