brazilian development in long term perspective brazil is now the eighth largest market economy in the world its 1979 per capita income of over 1 500 in current dollars its sophisticated industrial structure and its recent dynamism combine to give it a prominent place among the advanced developing countries not surprisingly recent brazilian experience has been an important subject for the analysis of economic development not all of it uncritical such a focus on the brazilian miracle and its aftermath is too limited brazilian growth and industrialization have a long history as do the regional and personal income inequalities that today increasingly command attention understanding the origins of brazilian growth in the nineteenth century export economy and the subsequent patterns of import substitution will not yield better rules for short term debt management or monetary policy but the longer perspective makes clear that sustained economic development requires more than following the dictates of the international market and getting prices right indeed it may on occasion involve rejecting such signals i shall interpret four significant episodes

an experimental study of truth telling in a sender receiver game a recent experimental study of cai and wang 2005 on strategic information transmission reveals that subjects tend to transmit more information than predicted by the standard equilibrium analysis to evidence that this overcommunication phenomenon can be explained in terms of a tension between normative social behavior and incentives for lying we show in a simple sender receiver game that subjects incurring in costs to punish liars tell the truth more often than predicted by the logit agent quantal response equilibria whereas subjects that do not punish liars after receiving a deceptive message play on the aggregate equilibrium strategies thus we can partition the subject pool into two groups one group of subjects with preferences for truth telling and one taking into account only material incentives

the other margin do minimum wages cause working hours adjustments for low wage workers this paper estimates the impact of the introduction of the uk minimum wage on the working hours of low wage employees using difference in differences estimators the estimates using the employer based new earnings surveys indicate that the introduction of the minimum wage reduced the basic hours of low wage workers by between one and two hours per week the effects on total paid hours are similar indicating negligible effects on paid overtime and lagged effects dominate the smaller and less significant initial effects within this estimates using the employee based labour force surveys are typically less significant

empirical measures of inflation uncertainty a cautionary note a direct ex ante measure of inflation uncertainty in the us is compared with a number of proxies used in empirical studies the direct estimate is the root mean subjective variance of the probability distributions for inflation reported by respondents to the asa nber survey the proxies include forecast standard deviations from arima arch and structural models of inflation these proxies are not significantly correlated with the direct measure nor with one another use of the proxies leads to incorrect inferences about the correlation between inflation and inflation uncertainty and between inflation uncertainty and the real interest rate

the economics of credence goods an experiment on the role of liability verifiability reputation and competition credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies such as under and overtreatment or market breakdown we study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets while theory predicts that liability or verifiability yield efficiency we find that liability has a crucial but verifiability at best a minor allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence as predicted seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated jel d12 d82

hedonic wages and labor market search this article investigates the consequences of labor market search for the theory of hedonic wages we find that the introduction of search has surprising consequences for the theory of hedonic wages in particular we demonstrate that the equilibrium distribution of wage and nonwage amenity bundles generally bears little resemblance to workers underlying preferences a consequence of this analysis is that estimates of workers marginal willingness to pay derived from the conventional hedonic wage methodology are biased in addition we demonstrate that search generates differences between firm level and employee level data that can cause substantial deviations in the estimates of hedonic wage equations

the impact of the minimum wage on other wages in this paper i explore how changes in the minimum wage affect various occupational wages i postulate that other wages increase for two reasons first firms try to mitigate the deterioration in a worker s relative wage which would cause him to reduce his work effort and second there is an increase in the demand for nonminimum wage workers wage adjustment patterns are examined to ascertain whether wage comparisons play a role in the adjustment process the empirical work shows a short run wage compression among white collar occupations which is consistent with the wage comparison model however large standard errors make inferences weak

gift giving and worker productivity evidence from a firm level experiment abstract we present results from a field experiment designed to measure worker response to a monetary gift from their employer the experiment took place inside a tree planting firm paying its workforce incentive contracts firm managers told a crew of tree planters they would receive a pay raise for one day as a result of a surplus not attributable to past planting productivity we compare planter productivity the number of trees planted per day on the day the gift was handed out with productivity on previous and subsequent days of planting on the same block and thus under similar planting conditions we find direct evidence that the gift had a significant and positive effect on daily planter productivity controlling for planter fixed effects weather conditions and other random daily shocks

in search of workers real effort reciprocity a field and a laboratory experiment we present a field experiment to assess the effect of own and peer wage variations on actual work effort of employees with hourly wages work effort neither reacts to an increase of the own wage nor to a positive or negative peer comparison this result seems at odds with numerous laboratory experiments that show a clear own wage sensitivity on effort in an additional real effort laboratory experiment we show that explicit cost and surplus information that enables an exact calculation of an employer s surplus from the work contract is a crucial prerequisite for a positive wage effort relation this demonstrates that an employee s reciprocity requires a clear assessment of the surplus at stake jel c91 c92 j41

dealing with monopsony power employment subsidies vs minimum wages abstract we show in a monopsony model that accounting for changes in hours a minimum wage has ambiguous effects on employment and welfare when all workers have the same preference ordering over leisure and consumption employment subsidies unambiguously improve welfare many countries have minimum wages and also tax minimum wage workers

measuring lying aversion abstract we introduce a new method for measuring the decision to lie in experiments in the game the decision to lie increases own payment independent of the counterpart s decision but potentially at a cost for the counterpart we identify at the individual level the decision to lie and measure how individuals react to different incentives to lie furthermore we investigate how lying behavior changes over time our method allows us to classify people into types including those who never lie those who always lie and those who react to incentives to lie we suggest this method as a useful instrument for examining factors that influence the decision to lie

rewards in an experimental sender receiver game we show in a sender receiver game with strictly opposing interests that rewards enhance trust but do not influence truth telling subjects who reward tend to tell the truth and trust more often in the presence and absence of reward opportunities the amount of obtained rewards thereby enhances truth telling

competition through commissions and kickbacks in markets for retail financial products and health services consumers often rely on the advice of intermediaries to decide which specialized offering best fits their needs product providers in turn compete to influence the intermediaries advice through hidden kickbacks or disclosed commissions motivated by the controversial role of these widespread practices we formulate a model to analyze competition through commissions from a positive and normative standpoint the model highlights the role of commissions in making the advisor responsive to supply side incentives we characterize situations when commonly adopted policies such as mandatory disclosure and caps on commissions have unintended welfare consequences jel d21 d82 d83 g21 l15 l25

the effect of the minimum wage on the fast food industry using a longitudinal survey of fast food restaurants in texas the authors examine the impact of recent increases in the federal minimum wage on a low wage labor market less than 5 of fast food restaurants were using the new youth subminimum wage in july august 1991 even though the vast majority paid a starting wage below the new hourly minimum wage immediately before it became effective although some restaurants increased wages beyond the level needed to comply with higher minimum wages in both 1990 and 1991 those federal minimum wage increases greatly compressed the distribution of starting wages in the texas fast food industry two findings at variance with conventional predictions are that 1 employment increased more in those firms likely to have been most affected by the 1991 minimum wage increase than in other firms and 2 price changes were unrelated to mandated wage changes

the newly industrializing countries in the international system explanations of the growth of the newly industrializing countries nics by neoclassical economists and dependency theorists neglect the role of politics in shaping development strategies different social configurations state structures and ideas about development help explain the divergent policy choices made by the export oriented east asian nics korea and taiwan and the more inward looking countries of latin america particularly mexico and brazil these different strategic choices in turn account for variations in the patterns of external dependency that characterize countries in the two regions

minimum wages for ronald mcdonald monopsonies a theory of monopsonistic competition recent empirical work on the effects of minimum wages has called into question the conventional wisdom that minimum wages invariably reduce employment we develop a model of monopsonistic competition with free entry to analyse the effects of minimum wages and our predictions fit the empirical results closely under monopsonistic competition we find that a rise in the minimum wage raises employment per firm causes firm exit and may increase or reduce industry employment minimum wages increase welfare if they raise industry employment but welfare effects are ambiguous if employment falls

seniority and monopsony in the academic labor market workers with high seniority usually have higher wages than workers with low seniority and the same total labor marke t experience in contrast the results of this paper indicate that higher seniority is associated with lower salaries for university professors the author documents this finding for national surveys a nd individual institutions and explains it as due to monopsonistic discrimination by employers copyright 1993 by american economic association

do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice an experimental deception game abstract the market for retail financial products e g investment funds or insurances is marred by information asymmetries clients are not well informed about the quality of these products they have to rely on the recommendations of advisors incentives of advisors and clients may not be aligned when fees are used by financial institutions to steer advice we experimentally investigate whether voluntary contract components can reduce the conflict of interest and increase truth telling of advisors we compare a voluntary payment upfront an obligatory payment upfront a voluntary bonus afterwards and a three stage design with a voluntary payment upfront and a bonus after advisors are most truthful when mutual opportunities to reciprocate exist and when the voluntary payment is largest our analysis identifies the third stage bonus payment as the key feature for success as it allows for an interplay of reciprocal behavior between clients and advisors

monopsony in the labor market this paper surveys recent theoretical and empirical research on monopsony in labor markets broadly defined as upward sloping labor supply to an employer we compare older monopsony models based on small numbers of employers with newer models based on labor market frictions such as moving costs and search we also compare older econometric approaches that focus on static wage concentration relationships with newer approaches that focus on dynamics our review of empirical estimates suggests that monopsony power based on small numbers of employers is probably rare but occasionally large while monopsony power based on frictions is probably widespread but small on average

guilt in games a clear conscience is a good pillow why does this old proverb contain an insight the emotion of guilt holds a key psychologists report that the prototypical cause of guilt would be the infliction of harm loss or distress on a relationship partner roy baumeister arlene m stillwell and todd f heatherton 1994 245 june price tangney 1995 moreover guilt is unpleasant and may affect behavior to render the associated pangs counterfactual baumeister stillwell and heatherton state if people feel guilt for hurting their partners and for failing to live up to their expectations they will alter their behavior to avoid guilt in ways that seem likely to maintain and strengthen the relationship avoided guilt is the down of the sound sleeper s bolster how can guilt be modeled how are human interaction and economic outcomes influenced we offer a formal approach for providing answers start with an extensive game form which associates a monetary outcome with each end node say that player i lets player j down if as a result of i s choice of strategy j gets a lower monetary payoff than j expected to get before play started player i s guilt may depend on how much he lets j down player i s guilt may also depend on how much j believes i believes he lets j down we develop techniques to analyze equilibria when players are motivated in part by a desire to avoid guilt the intellectual home for our exercise is what has been called psychological game theory this framework originally developed by john geanakoplos david pearce and ennio stacchetti 1989 and recently extended by battigalli and dufwenberg 2005 henceforth b d allows players utilities to depend on beliefs about choices states of nature

strategic communication with lying costs i study a model of strategic communication between an uninformed receiver and an informed but upwardly biased sender the sender bears a cost of lying or more broadly of misrepresenting his private information the main results show that inflated language naturally arises in this environment where the sender almost always claims to be of a higher type than he would with complete information regardless of the intensity of lying cost there is incomplete separation with some pooling on the highest messages the degree of language inflation and how much information is revealed depend upon the intensity of lying cost the analysis delivers a framework to span a class of cheap talk and verifiable disclosure games unifying the polar predictions they make under large conflicts of interest i use the model to discuss how the degree of manipulability of information can affect the trade off between delegation and communication copyright 2009 wiley blackwell

wage differentials employer size and unemployment the unique equilibrium solution to a game in which a continuum of individual employers choose permanent wage offers and a continuum of workers search by sequentially sampling from the set of offers is characterized wage dispersion is a robust outcome provided that workers search while employed as well as when unemployed the unique nondegenerate equilibrium distribution of wage offers is constructed for three cases 1 identical workers and employers 2 identical employers and an atomless distribution of worker supply prices and 3 identical workers and an atomless distribution of job productivities copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the response of hours of work to increases in the minimum wage this paper examines the effect of minimum wage increases on the hours of work of teenagers ages 16 to 19 using monthly data from the current population survey our findings are consistent with the prediction from neoclassical theory that minimum wage increases have a negative effect on labor demand however the estimates we provide here for the elasticity of hours of teen labor demanded with respect to the minimum wage suggest that alternative estimates based on aggregate employment consistently understate the total impact of minimum wage increases on teenage labor utilization

the returns to labour services in west german manufacturing industry production functions distinguishing between the stock and utilisation dimensions of factor labour and capital inputs are critically surveyed an extension to the existing literature is suggested whereby normal and overtime hours are separated within an appropriate non linear functional specification the econometric performance of this model is then compared with the main alternatives from the existing literature the empirical work is based on pooled cross section time series data which refer to west german manufacturing industries 1968 1978 estimates of the returns to labour services are also discussed in the light of related theoretical aspects of factor demand functions