some macroeconomic implications of alternative compensation systems a basic theme of this paper is the idea that some structural reform of employee compensation arrangements is necessary to make reasonable price stability compatible with reasonably full employment in this view even the best designed macroeconomic policies are much too aggregative to get at the heart of the stagflation problem the ultimate solution involves going inside the workings of a modern capitalist economy and correcting the underlying structural flaw directly on the level of the individual firm stagflation represents an especially intractable policy dilemma for macroeconomics without a decisive tendency of the economic system to remain near full employment there is a strong prima facie case for fighting recessions by exogenously stimulating aggregate demand but the usual keynesian expansionary policies tend to impart an inflationary inertia that is difficult to choke off and of course the basic strategy for fighting inflation is to cool down the economy by restrictive monetary and fiscal policy thereby increasing unemployment and closing the viscous circle because the practical macroeconomic policies for dealing with unemployment and inflation are so diametrically opposed stagflation is a pervasive structural problem when for whatever reason there is basically an unfavourable short run tradeoff between unemployment and inflation economic policy tends to vacillate between expansion of demand to fight unemployment and restriction of demand to fight inflation polarising the electorate and distracting society from dealing effectively with its underlying real economic problems even the difficulty of attaining external balance in foreign accounts is largely a spillover into the international payments arena of an inability to achieve an acceptable internal balance between full employment and price stability this paper takes what might be called a comparative systems approach to the problem of stagflation at the heart of modern industrial capitalism is an incredibly complicated system of overlapping monopolistic competitors 2 a starting point for the paper is the realisation that the coordination difficulty which can cause some systems to suffer involuntary unemployment is not inherent in laissez faire private enterprise per se it is closely tied to one particular property of a conventional wage payment system namely compensation of each firm s employees is stuck to an outside numeraire whether money or a cost of

macroeconomic policy in a large unionised economy this paper models an economy with many sectors in each sector a monopoly union sets the nominal wage and then firms choose output the economy is large in that all agents treat the general price level as fixed the paper focusses on policy effects on employment an increase in government expenditure in one sector will increase decrease total employment as sectoral employment is above below average a general increase in government expenditure in fixed proportions will have a positive employment multiplier below unity policy which increases employment will lead to higher welfare

unions w ages and employment evidence from finland reduced form wage and employment equations derived from a bargaining model are estimated using the two step method proposed by engle and granger 1987 econometrica 55 251 276 wages and employment arinfluenced by varriables which determine profits on the one hand and the utility of the union on the other hand in addition bargaining power appears to matter union strength was discovered to have a positive effect on both wages and employment in the manufacturing industry the a positive effect on both wages and employment in the manufacturing industry the two step method made it possible to evaluate both the long run elasticities and shortrun adjustment step response functions indicate that adjustment is not particularly slow in general this papers to be true for wages but especially for employment hence if the actual real wage employment combination is considered inappropriate it is not primarily due to too slow adjustment rather it implies that the equilibrium is inappropriate

an economic analysis of acting white this paper formalizes a widely discussed peer eect entitled acting white acting white is modeled as a two audience signaling quandary signals that induce high wages can be signals that induce peer group rejection without peer eects equilibria involve all ability types choosing dierent levels of education acting white alters the equilibrium dramatically the possibly empty set of lowest ability individuals and the set of highest ability individuals continue to reveal their type through investments in education ability types in the middle interval pool on a common education level only those in the lower intervals are accepted by the group the model s predictions t many stylized facts in the anthropology and sociology literatures regarding social interactions among minority group members

consumption smoothing and the welfare consequences of social insurance in developing economies studies of risk in developing economies have focused on consumption fluctuations as a measure of the value of insurance a common view in the literature is that the welfare costs of risk and benefits of social insurance are small if income shocks do not cause large consumption fluctuations we present a simple model showing that this conclusion is incorrect if the consumption path is smooth because individuals are highly risk averse hence social safety nets could be valuable in low income economies even when consumption is not very sensitive to shocks

a test of the insider outsider hypothesis in union preferences in this paper a model of wage and employment determination in a unionized industry is developed and estimated the model incorporates rules governing union membership so that an insider outsider model can be estimated this approach allows the trade off the union makes between wages and employment to vary depending on whether membership is growing or contracting the model is estimated using data on the international woodworkers of america and the wood products industry in british columbia canada the insider outsider model is consistently rejected in favor of models in which some positive weight is placed on all levels of employment the results do suggest however that the weight the union places on employment decreases with the level of employment copyright 1995 by the london school of economics and political science

a generalised wage rigidity result abstract this paper provides an alternative explanation of the empirically observed wage rigidity in industrialized economies we provide sufficient conditions under which the negotiated wage in unionized imperfectly competitive industries is independent of a number of product market features as well as of the bargaining institution right to manage or efficient bargains as long as negotiations are centralised at the industry level the wage rate turns out to be the same independently of e g the number of firms the degree of product substitutability or the intensity of market competition and this result is shown to hold in a broad class of industry specifications widely used in the literature

evaluating unemployment policies what do the underlying theories tell us the paper surveys unemployment policies for advanced market economies and evaluates them by examining the predictions of the underlying macroeconomic theories the basic idea is that for the most part different unemployment policy prescriptions rest on different macroeconomic theories and our confidence in the prescriptions should depend at least in part on theories ability to predict some salient stylized facts about unemployment behavior the paper considers four types of policies laissez faire demand management policies supply side policies and structural policies copyright 1995 by oxford university press

who is against immigration a cross country investigation of individual attitudes toward immigrants abstract this paper empirically analyzes economic and noneconomic determinants of individual attitudes toward immigrants within and across countries the two survey data sets used covering a wide range of developed and developing countries make it possible to test for interactive effects between individual characteristics and country level attributes in particular theory predicts that the correlation between pro immigration attitudes and individual skill should be related to the skill composition of natives relative to immigrants in the destination country skilled individuals should favor immigration in countries where natives are more skilled than immigrants and oppose it otherwise results based on direct and indirect measures of the relative skill composition are consistent with these predictions noneconomic variables also are correlated with immigration attitudes but they don t alter significantly the labor market results

manual wage differentials collective bargaining and multi locational firms an analysis using northern ireland nes data harris r 1994 manual wage differentials collective bargaining and multilocational firms an analysis using northern ireland nes data reg studies 28 483 493 a number of studies have appeared in the literature which consider the impact on the wage distribution of for example gender and ethnic differences of union membership or coverage by collective agreements of firm size of belonging to the private vis a vis public sector of being self employed as opposed to an employee another potentially important determinant of wages is whether the firm employing an individual is locally owned or whether it is part of a multiregional or multinational organization which operates branches in various locations this paper sets out to investigate the size of this locational wage differential across all sectors for a region of the uk using a bivariate sample selectivity model where the choice of firm type i e locally owned or externally owned and union coverage are endogenous the results confirm that

multifirm unions and the incentive to adopt pattern bargaining in oligopoly abstract this paper develops a model of wage bargaining between an industry wide trade union and firms in an oligopoly and considers the circumstances under which the union prefers pattern bargaining that is negotiating contracts in a sequential manner to simultaneous bargaining with the firms the paper goes on to consider the importance of the bargaining order in pattern bargaining when the firms are asymmetric the analysis shows that the union gains by first targeting a firm which is in a relatively weak bargaining position i e impatient to settle or a firm with relatively large profits

the contributions of amartya sen to welfare economics agencies the ilo and the world bank at the same time he takes a broad view of the subject and has done much to enlarge the perspective of economists he is as much at home writing for the journal of philosophy as for the economic journal at harvard he was both professor of economics and professor of philosophy the unusually wide range of sen s research means that it is impossible to do justice to his contributions in the space available the nobel citation refers specifically to social choice welfare distributions and poverty but this is still a vast domain even leaving aside social choice and other areas covered by kenneth arrow in his article i have had to be highly selective section ii deals with welfare economics and sen s critique of welfarism section iii with the measurement of economic inequality and poverty section iv with sen s contributions to development economics and the implementation of his concept of capabilities this division into sections is inevitably somewhat artificial and in the final section x i seek to bring together the different fields of research and some others not covered in detail in an attempt to identify the key qualities of sen s contribution in choosing these areas of sen s work i am leaving out in addition to social choice and rationality much of his writing on social political and legal philosophy and i scarcely refer to his articles and books on the indian economy and society but then sen is prolific to a degree which is remarkable even for winners of the nobel memorial prize the biblio

assimilation patterns in cities abstract do ethnic minority individuals assimilate to the majority s norm or reject it by trading off higher productivity and wages with a greater social distance to their culture of origin we develop a model in which oppositional ethnic minority individuals reside in more segregated areas have worse outcomes in terms of income but are not necessarily worse off in terms of welfare than assimilated ethnic minority individuals who live in less segregated areas a policy that reduces transportation cost decreases rather than increases assimilation in cities when there are more productivity spillovers between the two groups ethnic minority individuals are more likely not to assimilate and to reject the majority s norm finally we show that ethnic minority individuals tend to assimilate more in bigger and more expensive cities

pollution taxation and revenue recycling under monopoly unions a model where a given number of firms determine their pollution reducing production technologies upon establishment and workers form monopoly unions is used to study the possibility of double dividends i e simultaneous reductions in pollution and increases in employment when the pollution tax is increased and tax revenues recycled in alternative ways in all cases pollution is reduced when output is subsidized the effect of a pollution tax increase on employment is always neutral when employment and investments are subsidized employment increases when investments are respectively relatively insensitive and sensitive to pollution taxes of the three subsidy instruments the employment subsidy is always the most and the investment subsidy the least efficient solution

an integration of trade union models in a sequential bargaining framework this paper aims to embed two popular models of trade union behavior the monopoly model and the efficient bargaining model in a more general framework it does this by analyzing sequential bargaining models where wages are determined before employment and the power of the union in the two stages of the bargain differs as well as finding that the monopoly and efficient bargain models are special cases of this model a new class of models is also discovered this framework is used to analyze the relationship between union pow er and efficiency the empirical analysis of trade unions and the effects of trade union legislation copyright 1987 by royal economic society

unions power collective bargaining and optimal monetary policy we study ramsey policies and optimal monetary policy rules in a model with sticky prices and unionized labour markets collective wage bargaining and unions monopoly power dampen wage uctuations and amplify employment uctuations relatively to a dnk model the optimal

collective bargaining firm heterogeneity and unemployment abstract we compare labor market outcomes under firm level and sector level bargaining in a one sector mortensen pissarides economy with firm specific productivity shocks our main theoretical results are two fold first unemployment is lower under firm level bargaining due both to a lower job destruction rate and a higher job finding rate key to this result is the interplay between firm heterogeneity and wage compression under sector level bargaining second introducing efficient opting out of sector level agreements suffices to bring unemployment down to its level under decentralized bargaining

segregation in friendship networks we analyze a network formation model where agents belong to different communities both individual benefits and costs depend on direct as well as indirect connections benefits of an indirect connection decrease with distance in the network while the cost of a link depends on the type of agents involved two agents from the same community always face a low linking cost while the cost of forming a relationship between two agents from different communities diminishes with the rate of exposure of each of them to the other community we find that socialization among the same type of agent can be weak even if the cost of maintaining links within one s own type is very low our model also suggests that policies aimed at reducing segregation are socially desirable only if they reduce the within community cost differential by a sufficiently large amount

hours of work and trade unionism this article is concerned with hours worked per employee in unionized labor markets first the determination of hours is examined in the context of various bargaining models and in the process these models are nested in a general framework then cross section and time series data are drawn on to quantify the effects of unionism on hours worked the time series data from 1920 to 1980 imply a negative impact of unionism on full time hours while cross section data for 1978 suggest some notable differences in both the direction and the magnitude of this impact across occupations and industries

monopolistic competition as a foundation for keynesian macroeconomic models a general equilibrium macroeconomic model based on monopolistic competition is presented the model exhibits a traditional multiplier in the short run but due to free entry the multiplier disappears in the long run by construction all agents are fully rational the keynesian results are a consequence of the assumption of monopolistic competition which creates a divergence between optimal private behavior and optimal social behavior

to be unionized or not to be a case for cost raising strategies under cournot oligopoly abstract this paper analyses the decision by firms under cournot oligopoly as to recognize unions in order to gain market power despite higher costs considering classical models of union firm bargaining namely right to manage rtm and efficient bargaining eb we show that for a sufficiently low level of union power eb firms might adopt cost raising strategies this theoretical prediction is compatible with some empirical evidence in favour of eb and adds to the theoretical finding that eb might dominate rtm under unionized cournot nash oligopoly it also suggests closer antitrust scrutiny as whether unions can provide cartel like services to oligopoly firms allowing them to distort product market competition at the expense of consumers

rent sharing holdup and wages evidence from matched panel data rent sharing by workers can reduce the incentives for investment if some of the returns to sunk capital are captured in higher wages we propose a simple measure of this holdup effect based on the size of the wage offset for firm specific capital accumulation using social security earnings records for workers in the veneto region of italy linked to detailed financial data for their employers we find strong evidence of rent sharing with an elasticity of wages with respect to potential rents per worker of around 4 arising mainly at larger firms with higher price cost margins on the other hand we find little evidence that bargaining lowers the return on investment instead firm level bargaining appears to split the rents after deducting the full cost of capital

menu costs and the neutrality of money a model of endogenous price adjustment under money growth is presented firms follow s s pricing policies and price revisions are imperfectly synchronized in the aggregate price stickiness disappears and money is neutral the connection between firm price adjustment and relative price variability in the presence of monetary growth is also investigated the results contrast with those obtained in models with exogenous fixed timing of price adjustment

alert at maradi preventing food crises by using price signals national early warning systems of sahelian countries are mainly based on biophysics models to predict agricultural production shortages and prevent food crisis the objective of this paper is to show that cereal market prices also bring useful information on future food availability that could complete current early warning disposals indeed at any point in time prices are informative not only on the state of present food availability but also on agents expectations about future availability the research is based on the exploitation of the statistical properties of price series it aims at detecting movements in the prices trend signalling a coming crisis we first identify markets playing a leading role in price formation at the national and regional level through the estimation of var models the second step consists in identifying crisis periods and then the price shocks characterises during the period which precedes a crisis this analysis leads to the identification of early warning indicators whose relevance is tested using panel data qualitative choice models the data set encompasses 50 markets belonging to three countries mali burkina faso and niger over the period 1990 2008 the results show that past price shocks on a few number of leading marketplaces can help preventing coming crises

to be or not to be stereotypes identity choice and group inequality abstract we extend a model of stereotyping by allowing agents to exert control over their perceived identities the logic of individuals identity choices induces a positive selection of the more talented individuals into a group with a superior reputation thus the inequality deriving from the stereotyping of endogenously constructed groups can be greater than the inequality that can emerge when perceived identity is not malleable moreover when identity manipulation is sufficiently easier to undertake an equality across social groups may not be achievable even with strong egalitarian interventions among the human behaviors illuminated by this theory are 1 the selective out migration from a stigmatized group and 2 the production of the indices of differentiation by better off members of the negatively stereotyped group we also examine the welfare implications of these identity manipulation activities

my end of the bargain are there cross district effects in teacher contract provisions a large literature on teacher collective bargaining describes the potential influence of the provisions in collectively bargained teacher union contracts on teachers and student achievement but li

long term unemployment and macroeconomic policy this paper bears a simple double message when incumbent workers have some power in wage determination then a there may be no natural rate of unemployment and b both supply side and demand side policies may have lasting effects on the unemployment rate however our analysis implies that demand side policies in the produet market may be mueh less reliable and opera te through more complex ehannels than the traditional keynesians envisaged

a near rational model of the business cycle with wage and price inertia this paper presents a model in which insignificantly suboptimal behavior causes aggregate demand shocks to have significant real effects the individual loss to agents with inertial price wage behavior is second order in terms of the parameter describing the shock while the effect on real economic variables is first order thus significant changes in business activity can be generated by anticipated money supply changes provided that some agents are willing to engage in nonmaximizing behavior which results in small losses

economic development and the escape from high mortality summary this paper studies the characteristic features of the escape from high mortality as recorded from the historical experience of northwestern europe and from the current experience of less developed countries the paper documents stylized facts of mortality change and measures the contribution of economic development represented by income per capita to the mortality decline during the second half of the 20th century the paper argues that improvements in economic conditions since the 18th century are an important factor behind the decline in death rates in developed countries and in the subsequent reduction of death rates in less developed countries we show that economic development lowers mortality through differential effects in infectious disease mortality and that quantitatively income growth is able to account for between one third and one half of the recent mortality decline

contractual union firm agreements and the theory of the firm under uncertainty abstract this article analyzes the consequence of introducing union firm contractual agreements in the theory of the firm under uncertainty generalizing the works on the labor managed firm it is shown that the risk averse firm produces more than the risk neutral firm or the firm operating under certainty as long as equilibrium employment is negatively related to union wages that is when union power over wages is higher than that over employment

unemployment and the labour management conspiracy we study a model in which management and a union bargain sequentially first choosing a rule that will later determine the level of employment and then choosing a wage the government then chooses an output or an employment subsidy an exogenous natural turnover rate in the unionized sector creates unemployment whenever the union wage exceeds the competitive wage government intervention can increase both the equilibrium amount of unemployment and worsen the intersectoral allocation of labour because of the induced change in the endogenous wage unemployment weakens but does not eliminate the possibility of a labour management conspiracy

the great leap forward anatomy of a central planning disaster the great leap forward disaster characterized by a collapse in grain production and a widespread famine in china between 1959 and 1961 is found attributable to a systemic failure in central planning wishfully expecting a great leap in agricultural productivity from collectivization the chinese government accelerated its aggressive industrialization timetable grain output fell sharply as the government diverted agricultural resources to industry and imposed an excessive grain procurement burden on peasants leaving them with insufficient calories to sustain labor productivity our analysis shows that 61 percent of the decline in output is attributable to the policies of resource diversion and excessive procurement

tests of alternative wage employment bargaining models with an application to the uk aggregate labour market abstract in this paper we propose a test that discriminates among alternative models of bargaining for wages and employment the test rests on a theoretical framework which encompasses both the labour demand and the efficient bargain models of wage and employment determination it is based on testing the cross equation restrictions implied for the coefficients of union power variables in reduced form wage and employment equations the test is illustrated for the layard and nickell model of the aggregate uk labour market for which it is found that one can reject both the labour demand model and the hypothesis that wage employment bargains are efficient in favour of a generalised model of inefficient bargaining for wages and employment

educated preferences explaining attitudes toward immigration in europe recent studies of individual attitudes toward immigration emphasize concerns about labor market competition as a potent source of anti immigrant senti ment in particular among less educated or less skilled citizens who fear being forced to compete for jobs with low skilled immigrants willing to work for much lower wages we examine new data on attitudes toward immigration available from the 2003 european social survey in contrast to predictions based on conventional argu ments about labor market competition which anticipate that individuals will oppose immigration of workers with similar skills to their own but support immigration of workers with different skill levels we find that people with higher levels of educa tion and occupational skills are more likely to favor immigration regardless of the skill attributes of the immigrants in question across europe higher education and higher skills mean more support for all types of immigrants these relationships are almost identical among individuals in the labor force that is those competing for jobs and those not in the labor force contrary to the conventional wisdom then the connection between the education or skill levels of individuals and views about immigration appears to have very little if anything to do with fears about labor market competition this finding is consistent with extensive economic research show ing that the income and employment effects of immigration in european economies are actually very small we find that a large component of the link between educa tion and attitudes toward immigrants is driven by differences among individuals in cultural values and beliefs more educated respondents are significantly less racist and place greater value on cultural diversity than do their counterparts they are also more likely to believe that immigration generates benefits for the host economy as a whole

good jobs bad jobs and redistribution we analyse the question of optimal taxation in a dual economy when the policy maker is concerned about the distribution of labour income income inequality is caused by the presence of sunk capital investments which creates a good jobs sector due to the capture of quasi rents by trade unions with strong unions and high planner preference for income equality the optimal policy is a combination of investment subsidies and progressive income taxation if unions are weaker the policy maker may instead choose to tax investment

non atomistic wage setters and monetary policy in a new keynesian framework this paper extends an otherwise standard new keynesian nk model to allow for the presence of large wage setters building on monetary models from an earlier generation i contribute to the nk literature by adding some new insight it is shown that once the presence of large wage setters is taken into account the degree of wage setting centralization and the aggressiveness of the central bank in stabilizing inflation jointly affect steady state employment because of this interaction the benefits associated with inflation stabilization increase in the centralization of the wage bargaining process

do poverty traps exist assessing the evidence why did per capita incomes not increase in burundi haiti and nicaragua countries one possible explanation is a poverty trap which can be understood as a set of self reinforcing mechanisms whereby countries start poor and remain poor poverty begets poverty so that current poverty is itself a direct cause of poverty in the future it implies that much poverty is needless in the sense that a different equilibrium is possible and also that one time policy efforts that break the poverty trap may have lasting effects the concept of a poverty trap at the level of national economies is related to and sometimes based on microeconomic foundations that argue for the existence of poverty traps at the household level the authors discuss behavioral poverty traps as a recent area of research for which the evidence is just starting to accumulate and geographic poverty traps as the most likely form of a trap the policy prescriptions that result are then quite different from the calls for a big push in aid or expansion of microfinance to allow people to overcome credit constraints

a real target model of wage inflation with variable union power the uk experience 1962 1984 this paper offers a reassessment of the hypothesis that nominal wage determination involves union real wage targets whose attainment depends on the bargaining process the conventional model is augmented by the introduction of employer targets as well as nonlinear specification for relative power empirical evidence suggests that our estimates of union power can partially explain share price fluctuations

economics and identity this paper considers how identity a person s sense of self affects economic outcomes we incorporate the psychology and sociology of identity into an economic model of behavior in the utility function we propose identity is associated with different social categories and how people in these categories should behave we then construct a simple game theoretic model showing how identity can affect individual interactions the paper adapts these models to gender discrimination in the workplace the economics of poverty and social exclusion and the household division of labor in each case the inclusion of identity substantively changes conclusions of previous economic analysis

estimation of price policies in senegal an empirical test of cooperative game theory abstract a game theoretic framework rationalizes the political economy of food and agricultural price policies in senegal policies are the outcome of a cooperative bargaining process among three archetypal players a farmer growing cash and staple crops an urban consumer buying imported cereals and a government marketing board intervening in agricultural markets the game is estimated and the bargaining strength of the players is recovered the axioms underlying the game are tested to discriminate among various bargaining game solutions the symmetry and efficiency axioms are rejected

discrimination and assimilation at school abstract i present a theory of assimilation among students of two different backgrounds with unequal status students with a disadvantaged background face an incentive to assimilate into the more advantaged group the advantaged group chooses the cost of assimilation strategically to screen those who seek to assimilate in equilibrium only the most skilled disadvantaged students assimilate this theory provides a novel explanation of the acting white problem acting white refers to a social phenomenon in which students from disadvantaged ethnicities suffer social sanctions if they obtain good grades these sanctions raise the cost of acquiring the skills that make it easier to assimilate disadvantaged students with low ability impose these sanctions in order to induce their more able co ethnics to stay in the disadvantaged group

endogenous scope of firm union bargaining with vertical pay comparisons abstract there is strong evidence that employees motivation and incentives in the workplace are affected by vertical pay comparisons in a stylized cournot duopoly model with firm specific unions that institutionalize workers vertical fairness concerns we show that universal wage employment w e bargaining may arise as the equilibrium scope of bargaining institution we thus propose that intra firm vertical fairness concerns may resolve the mismatch between recent findings in the empirical literature on labor market institutions and the predictions of traditional models that universal w e bargaining will never arise in equilibrium the scope of bargaining puzzle we derive a number of testable hypotheses that address the recent shift towards more decentralized bargaining institutions the decline in unions bargaining power and the prevalence of w e bargaining

mass migration unions and government intervention the widening gap between the dismal economic situation in the less developed economies and the economic prospects of migrants to western economies has generated a potential for mass migration at the same time the developed economies have experienced high and persistent unemployment among their unskilled workers who would have to compete with new immigrants we use a model that distinguishes labor markets by skill and concentrate on the imperfectly competitive mechanism of wage determination in the unskilled labor market to demonstrate that additional immigration might be beneficial precisely because of potential replacement effects if the wages of skilled workers are positively affected by additional unskilled labor this may lead to higher employment and output our results thus qualify standard economic reasoning based on competitive models or on the literature on rural urban migration in developing countries

profit sharing unions and investments the pay parameters in a profit sharing system are likely to be determined by collective bargaining between unions and employers in this case employment will not necessarily be higher under profit sharing than under a fixed wage system for a fixed capital stock the most likely case is that profit sharing is better for unions and worse for employers than a fixed wage system with endogenous investments both parties may be worse off under profit sharing than under a fixed wage system this might be one of the reasons why we in fact do not observe much profit sharing under collective bargaining

food availability entitlements and the chinese famine of 1959 61 food availability decline and sen s entitlement are two leading approaches in understanding causes of famine previous research based on case studies has given independent support to each approach this paper analyses the chinese famine of 1959 61 by considering jointly the urban bias and the decline in food availability as causes we find that both factors contributed significantly to the increase in death rates during this famine to our knowledge this paper is the first econometric study to assess the importance of famine causes using the entitlement approach

famines and economics famines have happened with and without crop failures or wars but they invariably entail a collapse in the command over food of vulnerable subgroups within a society whether through loss of endowment or a contraction in the amount of food that can be acquired from given endowments thus economic analysis can help understand famines viewed as tragic aperiodic magnifications of normal market and governmental failures recent literature in economics and other fields has reflected this change in the conceptualization of famines and it has come with policy implications for famine relieve and prevention

a century long perspective on agricultural development this article strategically surveys the past century s literature on agricultural development we organize the discussion around three grand themes that reveal the richness of agricultural development as an intellectual endeavor first we explore the role of agriculture in the broader development process from a macroeconomic and political economy perspective we then examine the role of technological and institutional change in successful agricultural development finally the focus turns to a microeconomic perspective on agricultural household decision making and the problems of imperfect and missing markets asymmetric information and transactions costs that lead to widespread apparent inefficiency and disequilibrium

trade unions nonneutrality and stagflation the claim that in policy games nonneutrality and a stagflation bias emerge in equilibrium if the unions care about inflation per se is discussed this assumption is shown to be not necessary to obtain a stagflation bias the same applies to nonneutrality if a government acts in the economy the question of whether unions should be envisaged as institutions i e interested in variables unrelated to wages and employment is also addressed two model based alternatives providing microeconomic foundations versus macroeconomic foundations to unions behaviour are presented the conclusion is that the modelling of unions remains an unsettled problem

the equilibrium and optimal timing of price changes this paper studies the welfare properties of the equilibrium timing of price changes staggered price setting has the advantage that it permits rapid adjustment to firm specific shocks but the disadvantages that it causes unwanted fluctuations in relative prices and that by creating price level inertia it can increase aggregate fluctuations because each firm ignores its contribution to these problems staggering can be a stable equilibrium even if it is highly inefficient in addition there can be multiple equilibria in the timing of prices changes indeed whenever there is an inefficient staggered equilibrium there is also an efficient equilibrium with synchronized price setting

calories and poverty during a prolonged crisis abstract we study how calorie intake changes during prolonged crises by studying the calorie intake of households when exposed to short term and long term income and price shocks we use data from household surveys of mexican households during the income and price crises periods of 1994 to 1998 and 2006 to 2010 our focus is on low income mexican households those with the lowest 25 of expenditure per capita there is little effect on calorie intake following an income decline in the short run once households are exposed to reduced incomes for a longer period calorie intake falls households are able to weather short term fluctuations in income by shifting consumption to food items that are cheaper per calorie such as staple foods by consuming more foods at home instead of outside the home and by postponing expenditures on durable and semi durable goods when exposed to the income shock over a longer period of time we posit that households are not able to defer durable and semi durable purchases any more so their calorie consumption drops our results suggest that mexican households may be able to sustain calorie intake when faced with an income shock but it is less likely that they are able to do so if the income shock persists the government may want to support poor constituents when they are faced with prolonged crises

wages and the length of the working day an empirical test based on norwegian quarterly manufacturing data a simple framework is specified which is suitable for testing the relationship between the length of the working day and wages per hour the relationship is tested on norwegian manufacturing data using both dynamic modeling and cointegration techniques both methods provide empirical support for a hypothesis of long run independence of real wages and hours conditional on constant productivity and unemployment the results from dynamic modeling confirm that there are significant short run effects of changes in normal hours corresponding to the income compensation schemes usually introduced along with reduction in the length of the working day

a dynamic model of union power wages and employment the traditional approach to modelling the effects of trade union power on wages and employment has paid very little attention to how the form of union power affects the outcome in this paper wage and employment determination is considered in a dynamic model where some workers e g non union members continue to work in the event of a dispute to see whether this practice can be justified the predictions of the model are very different from the standard one for example both wages and employment may be a nonmonotonic function of union density the model can also explain situations in which unions are sustainable in the long run

employment determination in british industry investigations using micro data this paper derives and then estimates a model of employment where unions and firms bargain over wages and possibly employment and efficiency wage considerations may be important it illustrates the difficulties associated in interpreting many existing attempts to discriminate between alternative models the results based on over 200 u k firms suggest that employment is negatively related to the firm s own wage and the change in the own wage relative to outside opportunities the latter may be an efficiency wage effect various financial factors are also seen to have a significant effect on employment

wage employment determination and a union tax on capital can theory and evidence be reconciled if unions appropriate quasi rents from relation specific capital observed factor prices no longer reflect effective costs unionism has effects akin to a partial factor tax on capital demand curve settlements need not imply higher k l among union firms

are there lessons for africa from china s success against poverty at the outset of china s reform period the country had a far higher poverty rate than for africa as a whole within five years that was no longer true this paper tries to explain how china escaped from a situation in which extreme poverty persisted due to failed and unpopular policies while acknowledging that africa faces constraints that china did not and that context matters two lessons stand out the first is the importance of productivity growth in smallholder agriculture which will require both market based incentives and public support the second is the role played by strong leadership and a capable public administration at all levels of government

international charity for the poor i introduction charities transfer billions of dollars annually to help people in other countries survive famines and other hardships due to natural and man made disasters such as droughts and civil wars in this article we address the difficulties charities have ensuring the survival of the life threatened poor overseas without exacerbating income inequality encouraging free riding or undermining recipient countries incentives to invest in the kinds of public works that could reduce their needs international charitable activities are subject to moral hazard principal agent and adverse selection problems due to information asymmetries thus too little charity can go to the truly needy and too much to countries that exaggerate their needs and or shirk indeed the empirical literature is rich with evidence of these effects for example lele and jain 1991 ruttan 1993 kanbur et al 1994 maren 1997 and the world bank 1998 document the disincentive effects of aid alesina and weder 1999 show that more aid goes to countries that are more corrupt cashel cordo and craig 1997 provide empirical evidence that the more aid a country receives the less it taxes cashel cordo and craig 1997 found statistically significant evidence of an inverse relationship between the amount of soft aid grants received and the amount of tax revenues subsequently collected by recipient governments in addition to this evidence of shirking they also found significant evidence of fungibility in which the recipient government spends released funds on other nontargeted budget items furthermore they show that donors appear to be complicit in this fungibility larger soft aid is associated with higher institutional spending such as for public administrators salaries inflows of hard aid loans targeted explicitly to economic development or public works projects show up in expanded spending on social services not expanded investment in public works alesina and weder 1999 found statistically significant evidence of a positive relationship between the share of aid in a government s budget and corruption they argued that high corruption may imply that domestically raised public resources are low and that a higher fraction of public resources are covered by foreign aid 14 also according to tornell and lane s 1999 voracity effect when power over redistributive mechanisms is highly concentrated aid encourages shirking by recipient governments thus in this article we model charities that expect recipients to reallocate revenues but not to reduce tax collections or spending on public works to formally analyze this international income transfer problem we apply the mechanism design techniques of laffont and tirole 1986 that have proven very useful in the design of domestic income maintenance programs there is a long tradition of optimal tax income maintenance program design literature about how aid encourages personal choices that are socially inefficient or self enriching see for example mirlees 1971 besley and coate 1992 or crane 1996 the key issue is that participants may reduce work effort or migrate to qualify for more benefits the impacts of information asymmetries on domestic program costs and implementation are also well known as in besley and coate 1991 1995 but with the exception of besley and coate 1998 the emphasis in that literature is on the design of domestic policies with respect to the incentives of individuals in this article we focus on charity with respect to the incentives of national governments our work on this problem is motivated by the desire to design programs that can address acute life threatening poverty defined as the inability to acquire the level of consumption goods necessary for life as in sen 1985 or ravaillon 1997 we assume that the charitable objective is that everyone has at least a minimum income

a model of the natural rate of unemployment since the publication of edmund phelps volume the new macroeconomics has treated the labor market as a dynamic process of rational search by unemployed workers for available vacancies wages are viewed as at least potentially flexible though free contracting between workers and firms may lead to fixed wages in the short run imperfect information is a crucial element of the theory for it implies both a need for contracting and a need for rational search rather than simple market clearing in each period a positive rate of frictional unemployment may exist in equilibrium denoted as the natural rate this unemployment is due to the frictions in the search process and imperfections in information rather than to any deficiency in aggregate demand milton friedman defined the natural rate as the level that would be ground out by the walrasian system of general equilibrium equations provided there is embedded in them the actual structural characteristics of the labor and commodity markets including market imperfections stochastic variability in demands and supplies the cost of gathering information about job vacancies and labor availabilities the costs of mobility and so on p 8 this paper reexamines the micro foundations of the natural rate in a model of labor market equilibrium in which turnover flows and imperfect information are explicitly considered workers may quit their current jobs to enter the unemployment pool in order to search among available vacancies for a more preferred position firms economize on turnover by an appropriate wage policy

is school segregation good or bad it has been well documented that segregation across schools denying access to resources inferior educational production functions and so on exacerbates racial differences in achievement using an individual measure of social connections within schools we have shown that this form of segregation asian kids sitting together in the cafeteria has a substantively unimportant relationship with academic achievement or social behavior in school or later in life there are important caveats to our analysis a our estimates of the relationship between within school segregation and outcomes are not causal and b friendships may not be the only relevant cross race social interaction that occurs within a school

an empirical analysis of acting white abstract using a newly available data set which allows one to construct a novel measure of a student s social status we demonstrate that there are potentially important racial differences in the relationship between social status and academic achievement the effect is concentrated among students with a grade point average gpa of 3 5 or higher and more pronounced in schools with more interracial contact earlier studies showing a positive relationship between popularity and academic achievement for blacks are sensitive to the inclusion of more continuous achievement measures we argue that the data are most consistent with a model of acting white in which investments in education are taken as a signal of one s opportunity costs of peer group loyalty though imprecise estimates make definitive conclusions difficult

strategic delegation with endogenous costs a duopoly with wage bargaining abstract this paper examines the owners problem of strategic delegation when managers choose the level of sales and are responsible for cost control fershtman and judd american economic review 1987 77 927 940 and vickers economic journal 1985 95 1387ndash 147 showed that when managers are responsible for sales alone in oligopolistic markets then owners will want managers to maximise sales rather than profits in this paper the cost structure as well as sales depends on the choices of managers owners want managers to act more like profit maximisers when cost control is important this issue is analysed in the context of a model with union bargaining in the model it is shown that stronger unions may benefit owners because of the strategic incentive setting process and that the need for cost control can actually raise profitability

addressing the food aid curse abstract the food aid curse arises because humanitarian aid agencies that are devoted to save lives cannot commit not to intervene in case of man made famines we propose a solution to this curse in models of agrarian economies with kleptocratic governments