information disadvantage in linear cournot duopolies with differentiated products abstract we focus on a class of linear cournot duopolies with differentiated products and prove that whether there is an information advantage or disadvantage depends on firms information setup specifically we show that when the cross effects are common value the uninformed firm that commits to quantity will not have lower ex ante profits than a firm that has complete information about its cross effects this result contrasts to the information advantage that holds in the same duopolies with independent cross effects

information advantage in cournot oligopoly abstract consider an oligopolistic industry where firms have access to the same technology but are asymmetrically informed about the environment even though it is commonplace to think that in this context superior information leads to higher profits we find that under cournot competition this is not generally the case it holds when firms technology exhibits constant returns to scale but it does not necessarily hold otherwise journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d43 l13

efficient methods of measuring welfare change and compensated income in terms of ordinary demand functions a utility maximizing consumer with a completely known system of ordinary demand functions q h p c is considered let p qo and p q be two arbitrary equilibrium situations the problem is to evaluate in which of the situations the utility is higher without knowing the utility function revealed preference theory tells that the ordinary demand functions which are in principle observable contain enough information to solve the problem remaining difficulties are therefore mainly computational we present how the compensated income c i c p qo and the compensated demand h p cl1 are calculated with arbitrary accuracy using only the ordinary demand system our two efficient algorithms also have interesting interpretations in terms of index numbers and consumer surplus measures

testing the efficient redistribution hypothesis an application to japanese beef policy we discuss and model the structure of the political economy of japanese beef markets and we apply bullock s statistical test of the efficient redistribution hypothesis to our model to study the pareto efficiency of japanese beef policy in 1990 and 1991 we found that under the hypothesis that our modeled political economy adequately reflects the true japanese beef political economy we could not reject at the 5 significance level that japanese beef policy was inefficient in 1990 and in 1991 however we could reject inefficiency in 1991 at a 7 level of significance

the finance growth nexus evidence from bank branch deregulation this paper provides evidence that financial markets can directly affect economic growth by studying the relaxation of bank branch restrictions in the united states we find that the rates of real per capita growth in income and output increase significantly following intrastate branch reform we also argue that the observed changes in growth are the result of changes in the banking system improvements in the quality of bank lending not increased volume of bank lending appear to be responsible for faster growth

second mover disadvantages in a three player stackelberg game with private information abstract i consider a three player stackelberg game where each player has its private signal concerning stochastic demand i show that at a perfectly revealing equilibrium the second mover earns the lowest and the third mover the highest expected profit of the three i characterize this result by the strategic substitutes or complements relationships among three firms at the equilibrium journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d82 and l13

advertising and pricing to deter or accommodate entry when demand is unknown abstract we consider the advertising and pricing strategies of an incumbent firm who is concerned with deterring or accommodating entry and privately informed as to the level of market demand our fundamental result is that a demand exaggerating distortion occurs if the incumbent seeks to signal a low high demand then he behaves as if there were complete information but demand were lower higher than it is pre entry pricing and demand enhancing advertising are therefore distorted downward upward as a consequence of signaling purely dissipative advertising is thus not employed as a signal refinements of sequential equilibrium are featured

the rosse panzar statistic and the lerner index in the short run abstract the lerner index or price cost margin is derived in terms of the rosse panzar statistic thereby broadening our understanding of the latter and affording a way of empirically estimating the former

payoff uncertainty bargaining power and the strategic sequencing of bilateral negotiations this article investigates the sequencing choice of a buyer who negotiates with the sellers of two complementary objects with uncertain payoffs the possibility of inefficient trade may generate strict sequencing preference the buyer begins with the weaker seller if the sellers have diverse bargaining powers and with the stronger one if both sellers are strong bargainers this sequencing is likely to increase the social surplus moreover the buyer may find it optimal to raise her own acquisition cost by committing to a minimum purchase price or outsourcing the first and second mover advantages for the sellers are also identified

nonparametric tests of market structure an application to the cigarette industry the revealed preference approach is used to construct a nonparametric test of the monopoly model and some simple generalizations of it and the test is applied to data for the cigarette industry it exploits the maintained hypothesis that variations in the excise tax charged on a package of cigarettes allow us to assess seller reactions to common exogenous variations in marginal cost results indicate that the monopoly hypothesis and other simple models that do not embody at least a moderate amount of competition serve as poor predictors of the effects of excise tax changes on cigarette prices sales and revenues copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

the strategic peril of information sharing in a vertical nash supply chain a note abstract conventional wisdom suggests that information sharing benefits at least one of the participants however we find that information sharing can be strategically detrimental to both members in a vertical nash supply chain comparative statics show that each supply chain member s beneficial areas are smaller when its information source becomes more variable and larger as its signal is less accurate furthermore the pareto inferior areas in which both supply chain members get worse are non monotonic in exogenous parameters

one leader and multiple follower stackelberg games with private information this study analyzes one leader and multiple follower stackelberg games with demand uncertainty we demonstrate that the weight on public information regarding a follower s estimation of demand uncertainty determines the strategic relationship between the leader and each follower when the relationship is strategic complement the leader can exit from a market the threshold is determined by the intensity of cournot competition among the followers

testing hypotheses about firm behavior in the cigarette industry data on the effects of excise taxes are used to investigate the level of competition in the cigarette industry a lower bound on the numbers equivalent of firms in the context of the conjectural variations model is derived and estimated results point to at least a moderately high level of competition and in particular allow for the rejection of the perfect cartel model this paper relies on comparative statics results and hence circumvents recent criticisms of a study of monopoly behavior in the cigarette industry

imperfect information and dynamic conjectural variations this article analyzes oligopoly interaction in an environment where firms are imperfectly informed about the evolution of the market demand curve the analysis develops a two period cournot framework under the assumptions that demand shifts are positively serially correlated that firms never directly observe the demand curve and that firms never observe the previous quantity decisions of rivals firms do draw inferences about the position of the demand curve from past observations on prices consequently the current output of a firm will influence the current market price which will then influence rivals inferences about future demand the future output decisions of rivals will respond accordingly the theory predicts negative dynamic conjectural variations essentially a firm perceives that an increase in its output will lower the current market clearing price which will cause rival firms to think that the demand curve has shifted down and hence induce them to lower their outputs in the future

simultaneous and sequential price competition in heterogeneous duopoly markets experimental evidence abstract we investigate simultaneous and sequential price competition in duoply markets with differentiated products and random matching of symmetric firms we find that second movers gain from the sequential structure in comparison to simultaneous move markets whereas first movers do not as predicted by the theory there is a significant first mover disadvantage in the sequential game finally we report the results of control treatments varying the matching scheme and the mode of eliciting choices strategy method vs standard sequential play

first mover disadvantages with private information we consider a leader follower game with output quantities as strategies so as to demonstrate the reduced advantages of the stackleberg leader in a stochastic environment with private information at the equilibrium the strategy of the leader reveals to the follower information about the demand in an attempt to signal low demand the leader contracts his output nevertheless unless the leader s information is infinitely noisy the follower can always correctly infer his signal we find a wide range of parameter values over which the follower is better off compared to the leader

the impact of asymmetric information on entry deterrence an example abstract a simple non pathological example demostrates that when an incumbent firm has private information about the state of demand an entrant s profits and the likelihood of entry may be decreasing in the state of demand

endogenous price leadership and the strategic acquisition of information we model a differentiated bertrand duopoly in which a firm s earlier knowledge of market demand than its competitor results in endogenous price leadership with the information advantaged firm leading in such a setting with second mover advantage we then study the firms incentives to acquire information and analyze an information acquisition game both i neither firm acquiring information and ii one firm acquiring information can arise as subgame perfect equilibrium but both firms acquiring information is never an equilibrium outcome even if information is free information may have a negative value if it causes a change in the timing of price competition

banking competition and macroeconomic performance this paper uses an equilibrium model to study the costs in terms of macroeconomic performance of imperfect competition in banking the social welfare effects of increased bank competition are complicated and ambiguous in general but measuring the consequences of increased bank competition with standard gauges of macroeconomic performance provides a clear conclusion increased bank competition raises the level of income and reduces the severity of business cycles the quantitative effect on macroeconomic performance of less competition in banking can be large for instance an imperfectly competitive banking system can produce a worse macroeconomic outcome than if the economy had no banks

assessing bank competition for consumer loans abstract based on frontier analysis we derive inferences of bank consumer loan competition from estimating a revenue cost competition efficiency ce frontier the competitiveness of the 400 billion u s bank consumer loan market is then assessed by comparing results from our frontier ce measure with other competition measures such as hhi lerner index and h statistic these measures are weakly related to one another and only half of them identify banks with the highest loan price as also being the least competitive this is the opposite of what is expected using the frontier ce measure the most and least competitive banks are not located in the most populous states and the largest banks are underrepresented overall the hhi should not be used to indicate competition

first versus second mover advantage with information asymmetry about the profitability of new markets is it better to move first or second to innovate or to imitate we show that if one player s information about the profitability of new markets is only modestly superior the possibility of foreclosing the market can lead to a first mover advantage on the other hand more extreme information superiority can reverse this leading to a second mover advantage knowing more surely what is the best choice the better informed player wants to delay to keep his information private and the less informed player wants to delay to learn because of this more accurate information can actually lead to inefficiency by increasing the incentive to delay and exogenous costs of delay can aid efficiency by neutralizing that strategic incentive in fact in some circumstances a player may purposely coarsen his information to deter imitation

acquisition and dissemination of information in imperfectly competitive markets i introduction does the market mechanism always generate incentives for the acquisition and dissemination of information about market conditions the efficiency of prices in aggregating and disseminating information has been extensively studied in competitive models of financial markets 1 an important result is the so called information paradox described by grossman and stiglitz 1980 according to which a revealing competitive equilibrium may fail to exist when the costs of acquiring information are small information problems are however as prevalent in product markets as they are in financial markets firms continually act to acquire information on market conditions such information is generally not solely of firm specific value but also of relevance to other firms hence there is a problem in how incentives for information acquisition among firms interact considering this problem naturally leads us to consider situations of imperfect competition rather than the competitive markets which might be more relevant for financial markets whether or not prices fully reflect the state of the market also has implications for macroeconomic models built on the presumption that prices do not fully adjust to all potentially available information recent attempts to explain why prices would not fully adjust to market conditions have focused on explicit costs either of acquiring information about market conditions see e g eden 1981 or adjusting prices see rotemberg 1986 we show here that information problems have significant effects on price adjustment due to the role prices play in disseminating information to illustrate the effects of strategic information transmission on the information content of prices we consider a static stackelberg model with two price setting firms producing a differentiated good this is the simplest conceivable setting where the price of one firm the leader may be used as an informative signal by another firm the follower and thus create a strategic problem of information dissemination to focus on the strategic interaction in the acquisition of information we disregard the explicit costs of adjusting prices once firms are assumed to possess market power it is possible that a firm will try to influence the information revealed by its actions and hence the information content of its prices in an attempt to distort the information being disseminated a firm may bias its price decision which may not only affect profits but also its decisions regarding information acquisition we consider here an information problem created by demand conditions which are subject to random shocks we endogenize the information structure by allowing both firms to acquire information on demand conditions prior to any price decisions information costs are fixed and possibly zero in so far as the leader s price decision is based on private information the follower may be able to infer information about demand for its good from the price chosen by the leader if the follower attempts to infer information from the price of the leader the leader has an incentive to mislead the follower by its choice of price 2 if the follower is rational it understands the leader s incentives and in the unique separating equilibrium is able to unravel the bias and correctly infer the information because the leader is rationally expected to bias its price relative to the price chosen if the firms shared the private information it cannot choose the unbiased price to avoid this bias the leader essentially has to be able to announce its information credibly at the same time as its price an action for which there is no obvious mechanism hence when information is private the leader has a biased price but the follower still infers the private information correctly considering pure strategy equilibria of the information acquisition game in the case of costless information we find that a pure strategy nash equilibrium need not exist although if one does exist only the leader acquires information

assessing the competition in angola s banking industry abstractthis article analyses the level of competition in angola s banking industry using the panzar rosse model with data from 2005 to 2014 competition is a vital aspect of the banking market and therefore it is central to policy making the results reveal that angola banking competition is monopolist and therefore lower competition is found in angola banks policy implication is derived

research note cost uncertainty is bliss the effect of competition on the acquisition of cost information for pricing new products we examine the optimal acquisition of information about a common uncertain cost factor by two competing firms seeking to price a new product we show that existing findings regarding the acquisition of demand information or the acquisition of either cost or demand information related to quantity decisions do not extend to this case for cost information with price competition the information acquisition strategies are strategic substitutes even though the price decisions that are based on the information are strategic complements competition decreases the expected value of cost information moreover when competition is intense and the cost of information low identical firms do not acquire the same amount of cost information even when information is free cost uncertainty acts like a fog that lessens the destructive effect of price competition when products are close substitutes and thus increases expected profits buyers on the other hand are better off when competing firms are informed about cost even though the expected value of cost information strictly decreases with competition the optimal price for industry specific cost information set by an information vendor increases with competition when the firms products are sufficiently substitutable

a two stage model of research and development with endogenous second mover advantages this paper describes a simple two stage model of research and development in which the winner of the research stage has the option of moving first in the development stage some unexpected results emerge in equilibrium the leader in the development stage invests less than each follower and is consequently least likely to collect the patent moreover the leader receives a lower expected payoff than each of the followers thus there are endogenous second mover advantages using a game of timing in which the identity of the stackelberg leader is determined to link the two stages i find that firms face quite different incentives in the research stage although the leader invests less than each follower in the research stage as well the leader enjoys higher expected revenue from the complete two stage game than does each follower the equilibrium is inefficient because there is a lag between the time at which research is completed and the time at which development is begun and because aggregate investment is inefficiently asymmetrically distributed across firms

the competitive conditions in the oecd manufacturing industry the goal of this study was to assess the intensity of competition in the oecd manufacturing industry by using the panzar and rosse index over the period 1970 2011 for this purpose we use the fully modified ols method and second generation unit root analysis to investigate the level of competition across two digit manufacturing sectors the results are robust and consistent with similar studies leading to the rejection of perfect collusion and perfect competition while providing evidence in favour of monopolistic competition similarly to other empirical studies h statistics are shown to be heterogeneous across manufacturing sectors we argue that more concentrated sectors such as food and beverages motor vehicles and furniture have low levels of h statistic being thus less competitive than other industries i e computers transportation equipment printing and chemicals where the h statistic is closer to unity lastly our analysis will be a useful policy tool to achieve structural micro economic

competition in banking and the lending channel evidence from bank level data in asia and latin america abstract this paper examines how banking competition affects the transmission of monetary policy through the bank lending channel we apply a two step estimation procedure using bank level panel data for commercial banks in 10 asian and 10 latin american countries during the period from 1996 to 2006 in the first step we measure the degree of banking competition by applying the methodology proposed by panzar and rosse 1987 in the second step we estimate a loan growth equation where the explanatory variables include the panzar rosse measure of banking competition the estimation results provide consistent evidence that increased competition in the banking sector weakens the transmission of monetary policy through the bank lending channel this is especially true for banks in latin american countries and banks of small size low liquidity and low capitalization we also discuss the policy implications of the main findings of this paper

does deposit insurance increase banking system stability an empirical investigation based on evidence of 61 countries in 1980 97 the authors find that explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is weak the adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank stability tends to be stronger the more extensive is the coverage offered to depositors and where the scheme is funded and run by the government rather than the private sector

testing static oligopoly models conduct and cost in the sugar industry 1890 1914 we explore the widespread methodology of using demand information to infer market conduct and unobserved cost components under the hypothesis of static oligopoly behavior direct measures of marginal cost and conduct indicating small market power serve as benchmarks the more competitive models yield better cost estimates the best cost estimates occur when conduct is estimated as a free parameter which in turn only slightly underestimates our direct measure it also tracks the decline in market power accompanying the industry s structural changes the methodology is largely validated although partial cost information can improve its predictive power conclusions are robust to demand function

asymmetric demand information and foreign direct investment we examine the fdi versus exports decision of firms competing in an oligopolistic quantitysetting market under demand uncertainty and asymmetric information compared to a firm that chooses to export a firm that chooses to set up a plant in the host market has superior information about local market demand in addition to the well known tension between the fixed set up costs of investment the additional variable costs of exports and oligopoly sizes the incentive to invest abroad is explained by the strategic learning effect fdi may be observed even if trade costs are zero the analysis is robust to price competition and to the possibility that a foreign firm can engage in both fdi and exports

competitive conditions and sectors productive efficiency a conditional non parametric frontier analysis abstract the scope of this paper is to build an appropriate nonparametric frontier framework by using time dependent conditional efficiency estimators to investigate how competition and time affect the process of technological change and technological catch up our empirical analysis utilizes a sample of 462 u s 6 digit manufacturing sectors over the period 1958 2009 contrary to the existing studies we apply the probabilistic approach of efficiency measurement to evaluate the dynamic effects alongside with the effects of competition on the sectors technological change and technological catch up levels moreover we estimate the sectors idiosyncratic efficiencies which are an approximation of solow s residual representing the unexplained part of the time dependent conditional measures the empirical results shed new light on the topic and signify that the dynamic effect of competitive conditions has a nonlinear effect on the sectors estimated performance specifically we unveil a u shaped curve between market concentration and technological change implying that the sectors higher concentration levels enhance their technological change levels e g innovation capacity having however a downsize effect on their technological catch up ability moreover the relationship between the sectors market concentration and technological catch up although non linear exhibits an n shaped curve with two turning points lastly the above findings remain robust when we limit our analysis to the capital intensive sectors

rice trade liberalization and implications for u s policy the u s government s rice program treats rice as a homogeneous commodity even though rice s two primary subspecies indica and japonica are differentiated commodities in world markets trade liberalization under the uruguay round of gatt is expected to increase demand for japonica more than for indica we develop a u s rice model which treats rice as a differentiated product u s government programs are modeled and trade liberalization scenarios are analyzed under alternative policies compared to the current policy a more flexible u s policy that treats rice as a differentiated commodity could result in both higher farm incomes and lower government expenditures after trade liberalization

mergers and investments in cost reduction with private information abstract we present a model of cost reducing r d investments where the marginal cost realization is private information of the innovating firm the main contribution is the conclusion according to which with merger anticipations the innovating firm does not have ex ante incentives to reveal its cost realization prior to the takeover interestingly we also find the expected consumer surplus to be higher for the regime characterized by incomplete information as compared to a regime based on information sharing

causes of u s farm commodity programs this paper i s an attempt to explain variations by commodity in producer protection afforded by farm price support programs since the1930s particularly emphasized are theideas that these programs are essentially income redistributional measures and that given political forces the programs are attempts to redistribute efficiently variables associated with the cost to producers of generating political pressure and the social cost deadweight losses of redistribution are both found to be empirically important copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

is there a first mover advantage in science pioneering behavior and scientific production in nanotechnology this article investigates whether pioneers in a research field have a sustainable first mover advantage in publications combining bibliometric publications citations co authorship with survey data on 495 nanotechnology researchers we analyzed career attributes professional context and production overtime our econometric estimates highlight two main results first pioneering behavior is not exogenous it is more probable among scientists who are already established in their mother discipline before entering nanotechnology have a strong collaboration network and have easy access to field specific resources second even after controlling for the endogeneity of entry timing we find a strong first mover advantage pioneers in the emerging field exhibit significantly higher scientific production in that field in the long run

bootstrapping in applied welfare analysis bootstrapping procedures are used to estimate the statistical properties of common empirical welfare measures results from a monte carlo experiment indicate that welfare estimates such as marshallian consumer surplus often exhibit significant bias standard errors of welfare estimates are found to often exceed the magnitude of the point estimate for typical cross section data sets and are generally larger than the difference between comparable hicksian and marshallian measures precision of welfare estimates can be markedly enhanced through generating larger data sets obtaining better model fits and through imposition of innocuous inequality restrictions on the demand function parameters

competition conduct and demand elasticity abstract this paper demonstrates the relationship between the rosse panzar test for competitive conduct and the firm s elasticity of demand and develops a method of increasing the test s discriminating power

enjoying the quiet life under deregulation evidence from adjusted lerner indices for u s banks abstract the quiet life hypothesis posits that firms with market power incur inefficiencies rather than reap monopolistic rents we propose a simple adjustment to lerner indices to account for the possibility of forgone rents to test this hypothesis for a large sample of u s commercial banks we find that adjusted lerner indices are significantly larger than conventional lerner indices and trending upward over time instrumental variable regressions reject the quiet life hypothesis for cost inefficiencies however lerner indices adjusted for profit inefficiencies reveal a quiet life among u s banks

competitive capacity expansion under demand uncertainty abstract we analyze the capacity expansion behavior of firms in a duopoly faced with an uncertain new market the market demand may be high or low with a given probability mass function firms obtain private information about the market size and build their capacity before the market demand is known once the demand is revealed firms enter a capacity constrained price competition phase which determines their revenues two scenarios are considered first when firms choose their capacities simultaneously in the investment phase and second when they do so sequentially for each case we determine the unique symmetric nash equilibrium excess capacity can occur in equilibrium in the industry it is seen that preempting the competitor in the capacity expansion phase offers first mover benefits we argue that the sequential moves game is more prone to equilibrium excess capacity compared to the simultaneous case we show that preemption is a good strategy if the investing environment is either highly optimistic or highly pessimistic if the industry outlook is only moderately optimistic a capacity planner is still better off preempting his competitor however the industry may encounter overcapacity as a consequence

a dynamic duopoly model with asymmetric information this paper investigates the impact of asymmetric information on the set of equilibria of a two period duopoly game with price competition it turns out that all admissible sequential equilibria of this game share a collusive character i e ex ante expected profits for a firm of any type are higher than in the complete information case for small uncertainties the results are asymmetric a small probability of a good type firm does not make much difference on the set of equilibrium payoffs but a small probability of a bad type firm does these results survive the introduction of kohlberg and martens 1986 stability concept copyright 1990 by blackwell publishing ltd

information value under demand uncertainty and endogenous market leadership in an oligopoly model with firms choosing to produce in one of two periods we identify the circumstance under which a firm s having early information regarding stochastic demand results in market leadership high demand volatility leads to stackelberg competition with the information advantaged firm leading in the n firm case an equilibrium with multiple leaders and multiple followers emerges endogenously in a duopoly information acquisition game we identify conditions that determine whether neither one or both firms will pay to acquire early information and note that one firm s obtaining early information may generate a positive externality benefitting its competitor both symmetric and asymmetric outcomes are possible and stackelberg market leadership may occur in equilibrium but only when firms have different costs of information our finding that an information advantage may convey leadership which then affects the value of information to the players applies to other settings exhibiting first mover advantage such as certain public good provision games jel c72 d82 l13

in search of rational government what political preference function studies measure and assume political preference function ppf studies assume that policy making can be described by a mathematical problem in which a rational government maximizes a function of interest groups welfares the purpose of my paper is to explain in depth ramifications of ppf study assumptions and methodology ppf studies that attempt to measure interest group political power do so by measuring marginal rates of transformation along a pareto frontier one can estimate political power with a ppf only if observed policies are pareto efficient which may depend on the assumed number of interest groups and policy instruments marginal rates of transformation need not reveal anything meaningful about interest group political power and may incorrectly measure the direction of transfers

comment on what drives bank competition some international evidence the question of bank competition is vitally important for a number of reasons the essential role of bank credit and other financial services as an input in the production of most other goods and services places banks in a unique and influential position such that any allocative inefficiency or other market distortions in banking are almost certain to be felt throughout the economy moreover recent history has provided numerous instances where the textbook paradigm of atomistic competition has proven inadequate as a policy guide for efficient banking either because there are simply too few banks to rely on sheer numbers as a guarantee of vigorous competition as in canada or because of evidence that there can be such a thing as too much competition in banking as suggested by several studies or because of instances where nearly competitive pricing has been observed in markets containing only one or two banks or because conversely substantially noncompetitive pricing has sometimes been deduced in banking products such as credit cardswith thousands of suppliers thus the study of bank competition remains an urgent field of research claessens and laeven 2004 this issue of jmcb make two key contributions here first they extend a proven empirical method to an unprecedentedly large and varied crosscountry sample second they offer the logical and policy relevant additional step of seeking to identify factors associated with variations in measured conduct this step is needed to assess the empirical validity of the traditional structure conductperformance paradigm in their sample and is especially important where that paradigm is found lacking as a predictor of bank conduct indeed although the authors

simultaneous vs sequential price competition with incomplete information abstract we compare equilibria with sequential and simultaneous moves under homogeneous good bertrand competition when unit costs are private information under an alternative interpretation we examine the consequences of awarding a right of first refusal in a first price procurement auction with endogenous quantity

contestable markets an uprising in the theory of industry structure presents a transcript of the presidential address delivered at the 94th meeting of the american economic association on december 29 1981 discussion of developments in the theory of industry structure welfare attributes of contestable markets behavior characteristics of oligopoly equilibrium intertemporal vulnerability to inefficient entry ebsco

are government transfers efficient an alternative test of the efficient redistribution hypothesis the efficient redistribution hypothesis says that no available government policies are pareto superior to observed government policies efficient redistribution from government policy is a central tenet of much recent theoretical and applied political economy literature in this paper limitations of previous attempts to test the efficient redistribution hypothesis are discussed and an alternative test of the efficient redistribution hypothesis that uses vector optimization theory and bootstrap methodology is presented

competition in the turkish banking industry this study employs the panzar rosse h statistic to assess the competitive environment of the turkish banking industry over the period 1990 to 2000 the results indicate that for the period under consideration bank revenues behaved as if they were earned under conditions of monopolistic competition therefore the observed high profitability of the turkish banking sector does not seem to be an indication of an increase in monopoly power the liberalization process and deregulation measures appear to have beneficial effects on competition

estimation of price policies in senegal an empirical test of cooperative game theory abstract a game theoretic framework rationalizes the political economy of food and agricultural price policies in senegal policies are the outcome of a cooperative bargaining process among three archetypal players a farmer growing cash and staple crops an urban consumer buying imported cereals and a government marketing board intervening in agricultural markets the game is estimated and the bargaining strength of the players is recovered the axioms underlying the game are tested to discriminate among various bargaining game solutions the symmetry and efficiency axioms are rejected

competitive pricing in markets with different overhead costs concealment or leakage of cost information this paper experimentally investigates how leaders and followers in a duopoly set prices for two product markets that have different overhead costs in a fully crossed two by two design we manipulate the participants private cost report quality as either low or high representing the extent to which these reports reveal that product markets have different overhead costs we show that when only the leader is given a high quality cost report private cost information of higher quality is better incorporated into market prices that are observable to participants both the leader and follower improve in profits and their prices better reflect the differences in overhead costs because the follower infers information from the leader s prices information leakage in contrast when only the follower receives a high quality cost report the leader s profits and prices do not improve this occurs because the follower conceals cost information when the leader has a low quality cost report

assessing competition with the panzar rosse model the role of scale costs and equilibrium the panzar rosse test has been widely applied to assess competitive conduct often in specifications controlling for firm scale or using a price equation we show that neither a price equation nor a scaled revenue function yields a valid measure for competitive conduct moreover even an unscaled revenue function generally requires additional information about costs and market equilibrium to infer the degree of competition our theoretical findings are confirmed by an empirical analysis of competition in banking using a sample containing more than 100 000 bank year observations on more than 17 000 banks in 63 countries during the years 1994 2004

judging agricultural policies a survey this survey provides a structured picture of 40 years of literature which uses welfare economic tools to judge agricultural policy challenges and developments of normative agricultural policy analysis are discussed in an easily accessible graphical framework it is shown how the literature has gone from examining a very small discrete set of simple policies to a much broader often continuous set of policies that combine policy instruments simultaneously the importance of the pareto criterion used to explore the limits of how government can affect welfare is revealed moreover given the importance of the objective of income redistribution in agricultural policy agricultural economists have often departed from the purely efficiency oriented tradition in economics it is shown that they have tried to incorporate equity considerations by either adding these criteria as constraints to the social welfare function or directly incorporating these criteria in the functional form of the social welfare function

does firm investment respond to peers investment we study whether how and why the investment of a firm depends on the investment of other firms in the same product market using an instrumental variable based on the presence of local knowledge

price support acreage controls and efficient redistribution this study is concerned with the combination of target price and acreage controls as the two major mechanisms of farm policy acreage controls are shown to enhance the efficiency of redistribution under a target price program more specifically this study demonstrates that if the traditional cobb douglas production function is assumed acreage controls do not enhance the efficiency of target price programs in the process of redistributing income to the farm sector the study proves that if the elasticity of substitution between land and all other inputs is less than one then the income redistributional costs are likely to be reduced moreover by using an empirical estimate of the elasticity of substitution and farm data for the time period 1984 88 this study demonstrates that acreage control programs have drastically reduced the deadweight losses associated with income redistribution flowing from target price programs these results lend strong support to the public choice notion that politicians favo

competition and efficiency in the mena banking region a non structural dea approach abstractthe goal of this article is to empirically assess the relationship between competition and efficiency in the banking sector of middle east and north african mena countries spanning the period 1997 2011 to measure the level of competition the article estimates the non structural indicator known as the h statistic while the level of bank efficiency is estimated through the nonparametric methodology of the data envelopment analysis dea and the bootstrap data envelopment analysis bdea respectively the empirical results are robust under six econometric methodologies providing sufficient evidence for the presence of a one way negative granger causality running from efficiency to competition the empirical findings lead to the rejection of the efficient structure hypothesis implying that increases in competition do not precede increases in cost efficiency

financial opening deposit insurance and risk in a model of banking competition abstract we study the impact of competition on banks risk taking behavior under different assumptions about deposit insurance and the dissemination of information while financial opening increases banks riskiness a risk based deposit insurance or alternatively the public disclosure of financial information are likely to mitigate this effect moreover the limiting cases of uninsured but fully informed depositors and risk based full deposit insurance yield the same equilibrium risk level although the welfare consequences of increased competition depend on its impact on risk financial opening unambiguously improves welfare as we approach the limiting cases

rationalizing agricultural export subsidies export subsidies are an important form of agricultural policy especially for large traders such as the united states and the european community a number of small countries also use export subsidies in effect e g saudi arabian wheat or canadian dairy products in that the domestic price is set well above world levels and surplus production is dumped onto the world market a number of recent contributions to trade theory have argued that export subsidies can be welfare enhancing for the subsidizing country and by implication that the policy choice is consistent with the hypothesis that a benevolent government is pursuing pareto efficiency in the present paper we examine these arguments and present an alternative explanation of export subsidies utilizing the concept of efficient redistribution becker gardner 1983 in standard trade models arguments in favor of global export subsidies arise from failure to exploit market power in another good itoh and kiyono feenstra itoh and kiyono use a threegood model to show that subsidies on marginal goods defined as goods not exported at all or exported in small quantities can increase welfare in the subsidizing country a subsidy on marginal goods causes their production to increase and the supply of nonmarginal goods to decrease thereby raising the price of the nonmarginal goods and increasing the exporter s terms of trade feenstra also employs a threegood model and demonstrates that it is possible for the pattern of substitutability and complementarity across goods to allow subsidies to increase welfare the necessary condition is that the subsidized export be a stronger substitute for another exported good or a stronger complement for an imported good in the subsidizing country than abroad the export subsidy increases welfare by improving the terms of trade in the other imported or exported good the distortion in feenstra s model is the failure to exploit market power in the second or third market as an alternative to global export subsidies abbott paarlberg and sharples aps have examined targeted export subsidies and found that in some circumstances they can be welfare improving dutton later showed the aps result arises because they first constrain the export tax to the rest of the world to be zero so that it becomes theoretically possible for the best export tax to the targeted country to be negative the aps result hinges on differences in import demand elasticities and the exporting country s use of market power in order to price discrim

competitive conditions among the major british banks this paper reports an empirical assessment of competitive conditions among the major british banks during a period of major structural change specifically estimates of the rosse panzar h statistic are reported for a panel of 12 banks for the period 1980 2004 the sample banks correspond closely to the major british banking groups specified by the british banking association the robustness of the results of the rosse panzar methodology is tested by estimating the ratio of lerner indices obtained from interest rate setting equations the results confirm the consensus finding that competition in british banking is most accurately characterised by the theoretical model of monopolistic competition there is evidence that the intensity of competition in the core market for bank lending remained approximately unchanged throughout the 1980s and 1990s however competition appears to have become less intense in the non core off balance sheet business of british banks

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

the failure of competition in the credit card market the bank credit card market containing 4 000 firms and lacking regulatory barriers casually appears to be a hospitable environment for the model of perfect competition nevertheless this article reports that credit card interest rates have been exceptionally sticky relative to the cost of funds moreover major credit card issuers have persistently earned from three to five times the ordinary rate of return in banking during the periods 1983 88 the failure of the competitive model appears to be partly attributable to consumers making credit card choices without taking account of the very high probability that they will pay interest on their outstanding balances copyright 1991 by american economic association

non structural measures of competition toward a synthesis of alternatives abstract procedures for detecting or measuring market power have been suggested in recent years by iwata rosse and panzar and bresnahan this paper integrates elements from all three approaches to provide a single more unified alternative to the structure conduct performance paradigm

measuring the marginal cost of nonuniform environmental regulations a method is presented for measuring the marginal welfare cost of environmental regulations affecting agriculture the method incorporates output market effects and recognizes diversity in production conditions among crops regions and seasons an important advantage of the method is that only regional outputs and changes in regional production costs are needed to calculate deadweight loss thus simplifying the measurement of welfare changes this feature of the model is significant since the complexity and substantial data requirements of most existing impact models cause many environmental regulations to be enacted with inadequate analysis of their economic impacts the method also disaggregates welfare impacts by crop place and time thus encouraging the implementation of nonuniform interventions that achieve a given level of environmental quality more efficiently than uniform policies

endogenous diffusion of technology abstract this paper presents a positive theory of diffusion of technology it examines a two period model strategic firms are confronted by a process technology with an uncertain reduction in marginal costs the uncertainty is automatically resolved between the two periods adoption in the first period yields a leadership advantage relative to firms that do not adopt while simultaneous adoption by firms results in a cournot equilibrium the firms strategies are both production quantities and adoption timings these decisions are made at the same time thus firms face a trade off between early adoption and possibly reaping first mover advantages on one hand and deferring the adoption decision until after all the uncertainty is resolved but face the possibiity of being a follower in the market interestingly an endogenously determined diffusion rate is obtained as a pure strategy nash equilibrium of this game this means that while adoption and diffusion of technology results with probability one diffusion of a bad innovation is also possible it is also shown that in a market with one large firm and a nonatomic continuum of small firms there is a unique nash equilibrium in which the large firm adopts first and is a stackelberg leader and all the small firms decide whether or not to adopt after the uncertainty is resolved the implication of this result is simply that the diffusion of technology is to some extent determined by the relative size of firms in the industry

equilibrium entry patterns under uncertainty abstract in this paper we develop a model in which incumbency patterns are determined endogenously we consider a two period duopoly game under uncertainty and show that the equilibrium entry patterns are determined by the costs and benefits of early entry and the strategic interactions between the firms we also show that under quite plausible cost conditions incumbency may not arise as an equilibrium pattern of the duopoly game

price versus production postponement capacity and competition this article presents a comparative analysis of possible postponement strategies in a two stage decision model where firms make three decisions capacity investment production inventory quantity and price typically investments are made while the demand curve is uncertain the strategies differ in the timing of the operational decisions relative to the realization of uncertainty we show how competition uncertainty and the timing of operational decisions influence the strategic investment decision of the firm and its value in contrast to production postponement price postponement makes the investment and production inventory decisions relatively insensitive to uncertainty this suggests that managers can make optimal capacity decisions by deterministic reasoning if they have some price flexibility under price postponement additional postponement of production has relatively small incremental value therefore it may be worthwhile to consider flexible ex post pricing before production postponement reengineering while more postponement increases firm value it is counterintuitive that this also makes the optimal capacity decision more sensitive to uncertainty we highlight the different impact of more timely information which leads to higher investment and inventories and of reduced demand uncertainty which decreases investment and inventories our analysis suggests appropriateness conditions for simple make to stock and make to order strategies we also present technical sufficiency and uniqueness conditions under price postponement these results extend to oligopolistic and perfect competition for which pure equilibria are derived interestingly the relative value of operational postponement techniques seems to increase as the industry becomes more competitive

multimarket contact competition and pricing in banking abstract in this paper we assess the impact of multimarket contact of banks on their market power by means of a simultaneous equation model in which the divergence of price from marginal cost is a function of multimarket linkages the model is estimated using aggregate data from the italian regions for the years 1997 2009 our results show that multimarket contact is positively and significantly correlated to the market power index and is also connected to both home and non home market concentration the evidence is robust to changes in model specification and multimarket contact measures and supports the idea that firms which have a greater amount of contact are more likely to collude

assessing competition in the banking industry a multi product approach abstract this paper investigates the competitive aspects of multi product banking operations extending panzar and rosse s 1987 model to the case of a multi product banking firm we show that higher economies of scope in multi product banking are associated with lower panzar rosse measures of competition in the banking sector to test this empirical implication and determine the impact of multi production on market power we use a new dataset on the brazilian banking industry consistent with our theoretical prediction we find that banks that offer classic banking products i e loans and credit cards and other banking products i e brokerage services insurance and capitalization bonds have substantially higher market power than banks that offer only classic products these results suggest a positive bias in the traditional estimates of competition in which multi output actions are not considered

market structure and the role of consumer information in the physician services industry an empirical test abstract this paper applies panzar and rosse s 1987 econometric test of market structure to examine two long debated issues what is the market structure for physician services do more physicians in a market area raise the search cost of obtaining consumer information and increase prices satterthwaite 1979 1985 for primary care and general and family practice physicians the monopolistically competitive model prevailed over the competing hypotheses monopoly perfect competition and monopolistic competition characterized by consumer informational confusion although less conclusive there is some evidence to support the monopolistically competitive model for surgeons and the consumer informational confusion model for internal medicine physicians

the value of commitment with imperfect observability and private information the idea that commitment is valuable plays a key role in many economic models however bagwell 1995 has shown that commitment may have no value if there is even a slight noise in the observation of the leader s action thus casting doubt on the notion that commitment has strategic value here i reconsider the commitment story in a model where the leader s action is imperfectly observed and the leader has private information and i examine how it is affected by uncertainty about the leader s type and by the observation noise

bank competition and crises revisited new results abstract we study the relationship between bank competition and stability for 145 countries over the period 1997 2010 we use three measures of bank competition namely the boone indicator the lerner and the adjusted lerner indices and two econometric methods our results show that bank competition is detrimental to bank stability and it also shortens the survival time of banking systems