a dynamic theory of collective goods programs a collective goods program such as an entitlement program distributes benefits and costs according to constituents characteristics this paper presents a dynamic theory of the legislative choice of collective goods programs based on a sequential model of proposal making and voting in a majority rule legislature where the status quo in a session is given by the program last enacted a stationary markov perfect equilibrium is characterized for a unidimensional collective goods program and yields a generalized median voter theorem comparative statics on preferences and legislative procedures and a characterization of the dynamics of such programs equilibrium programs can expand or contract over time but they ultimately converge to the median on the path to that point legislators may act strategically to address the durability problem that a future legislature can undo the actions of the present legislature by strategically positioning the status quo to limit the changes that future legislatures can make

unanticipated aggregate disturbances and tests of the life cycle consumption model several recent studies have used data on food consumption from the panel study of income dynamics psid to test t he rational expectations life cycle hypothesis against the alternative of prevalent liquidity constraints these tests invoke the rational expectations restriction that income forecast errors are independent of lagged information this restriction however applies only in a time series context it is possible that unanticipated macroeconomic disturbances cause forecast errors to be correlated with lagged information in a cross section of families the authors present evidence of such a correlation in the psid data show that this correlation biases previous tests of the life cycle model toward rejection and derive a proper test of the life cycle model using pa nel data copyright 1993 by mit press

three party competition in parliamentary democracy with proportional representation this article studies the long run dynamics of policy choices government formations and voting behavior under a parliamentary constitution and proportional representation i develop an infinite period game where in each period voters participate in a proportional representation election and three farsighted parties bargain over one dimensional policy programs and government positions the model incorporates the interaction between elections and coalition bargaining which is the essence of politics in most parliamentary systems as well as a dynamic environment of policymaking a policy once implemented remains in effect until another replaces it i find a markov perfect equilibrium in which 1 there is no majority party in any election 2 election results converge over time to a stable vote distribution 3 policy outcomes change over time but eventually stay within a set of three points 4 minimal winning coalitions and minority governments are formed with positive probability and alternate over time

are consumption taxes really better than income taxes abstract we use political equilibrium theory and the neoclassical growth model to compare consumption and income tax systems if government outlays are used for redistribution through transfers then steady state equilibria in societies that use income taxes are not necessarily worse in welfare terms and may even be better income taxes are attractive precisely because they are more distortionary since this implies low equilibrium transfer levels we also find that switching tax systems typically does not benefit the median voter moreover a change from income to consumption taxes may make everybody worse off

models of inflation expectations formation a comparison of household and economist forecasts the recent appreciation of the critical role played by expectations of inflation in the behavior of macromodels has stimulated empirical studies of the formation of expectations by different groups time series survey data on expectations of inflation exist now for economists households and businesses these data have been used as independent variables in explaining wage behavior gordon 16 turnovsky and wachter 34 and de menil and bhatta 5 prices turnovsky and wachter 34 and wachtel 36 interest rates gibson 14 hendershott and van horne 19 pearce 30 and mishkin 27 and consumption wachtel 36 generally with a significant improvement in explanatory power they have also been used as dependent variables in attempts to determine how expectations are formed by gordon 15 mullineaux 28 jacobs and jones 20 and figlewski and wachtel 9 for the economist survey van duyne 35 for the household survey and leonard 23 and de leeuw and mckelvey 4 for businesses given their different levels of knowlege of economics and perspectives one might expect that the models used by the different groups to forecast inflation would

public versus private investment in human capital endogenous growth and income inequality in this paper we present an overlapping generations model with heterogeneous agents in which human capital investment through formal schooling is the engine of growth we use simple functional forms for preferences technologies and income distribution to highlight the distinction between economies with public education and those with private education we find that income inequality declines more quickly under public education on the other hand private education yields greater per capita incomes unless the initial income inequality is sufficiently high we also find that societies will choose public education if a majority of agents have incomes below average

direct measurement of popular price expectations expectations are an important determinant of economic behavior the analysis of economic expectations however has suffered from inadequate measurement throughout the literature expectations have been treated as unobservable and have therefore been measured only indirectly the object of this paper is to develop and test a direct measure of the expectations of inflation a particularly critical economic variable a direct measure of inflationary expectations is here taken to be one constructed from a sample survey in which individuals are asked to state their expectations explicitly the paper focuses on a popular forecast of the rate of change of consumer prices in the forthcoming year as calculated from responses to the survey of consumer finances scf this measure is presented in section i the scf and others like it have existed for some time but a few recent studies notwithstanding most economists continue to regard survey measures as inherently unreliable their principal criticism is that the opinions an individual expresses

the variable choice set logit model applied to the 2004 canadian election formal work on the electoral model often suggests that parties should locate at the electoral mean recent research has found no evidence of such convergence in order to explain non convergence the stochastic electoral model is extended by including a competence and sociodemographic valance in a country where regional and national parties compete in the election that is the model allows voters to face different sets of parties in different regions we introduce the notion of a convergence coefficient c for regional and national parties and show that when c is high there is a significant centrifugal tendency acting on parties an electoral survey of the 2004 election in canada is used to construct a stochastic electoral model of the election with two regions quebec and the rest of canada the survey allows us to estimate voter positions in the policy space the variable choice set logit model is used to built a relationship between party position and vote share we find that in the local nash equilibrium for the election the two main parties with high competence valence the liberals and conservatives locate at the national electoral mean and the bloc quebecois with the highest competence valence locates at the quebec electoral mean the new democratic party has a low competence valence but remains at the national mean the greens with lowest competence valence locate away from the national mean to increase its vote share

optimum subsidies for education in two sector economies abstract this note presents a view on educational subsidies based on the recognition that educational cost is a kind of turnover cost from unskilled to skilled labor the level of optimum educational subsidies is given for three types of two sector economies a pure two sector economy economy of income sharings in the traditional sector economy with unemployment in the manufactural sector

performance indicators in higher education a survey of recent work this article surveys recent work on the construction of performance indicators in higher education focusing particular attention on degree results student wastage and research output performance indicators ought to provide measures of value added by the various institutions under review as such crude measures of output which fail to take account of input differences across institutions are inappropriate so it is necessary to investigate what factors underlie inter institution differences in measured output in order to correct for input variations in assessing overall performance the absence of market prices for teaching and research outputs severely hinders the construction of composite measures of the performance of higher education institutions since in their absence no objective weights can be assigned to the different roles of these institutions the resource implications of performance measurement exercises need to be clarified if rankings exercises are to have the desired incentive effects copyright 1992 by oxford university press

testing the rationality of inflation forecasts from survey data another look at the src expected price change data this paper develops a unified econometric approach for testing the rationality of expectations from survey data series the paper employs the estimation techniques of hansen 1982 and eichenbaum hansen and singleton 1982 to conduct tests of unbiasedness efficiency and orthogonality for the src expected price change data in contrast to the existing literature the analysis takes careful account of serial correlation and conditional heteroskedasticity in the disturbance terms the results do not reject the properties of unbiasedness efficiency or othogonality for this survey data series copyright 1989 by mit press

farsighted coalitional stability abstract i define the largest consistent set a solution concept which applies to situations in which coalitions freely form but cannot make binding contracts act publicly and are fully farsighted in that a coalition considers the possibility that once it acts another coalition might react a third coalition might in turn react and so on without limit i establish weak nonemptiness conditions and apply it to strategic and coalitional form games and majority rule voting i argue that it improves on the von neumann morgenstern stable set as it is usually defined but is consistent with a generalization of the stable set as in the theory of social situations journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c71

do actions speak louder than words household expectations of inflation based on micro consumption data survey data on household expectations of inflation are routinely used in economic analysis yet it is not clear how accurately households are able to articulate their expectations in survey interviews we propose an alternative approach to recovering households expectations of inflation from their consumption expenditures we show that these expectations measures have predictive power for consumer price index cpi inflation they are better predictors of cpi inflation than household survey responses and more highly correlated with professional inflation forecasts except for highly educated consumers consistent with the view that more educated consumers are better able to articulate their expectations we also document that households inflation expectations respond to inflation news as measured by the unpredictable component of inflation predictions in the survey of professional forecasters the response to inflation news tends to increase with households level of education consistent with the existence of constraints on household s ability to process this information

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

survey measures of expected u s inflation of real interest rates and cash flows for decisions concerning investment expenditures international capital flows and exchange rate movements hinge in large part on expected real yield differentials across countries the federal reserve needs reliable measures of expected inflation to formulate and gauge the thrust of monetary policy in fact inflation expectations have become more important to the fed given the diminished stability of the link between the monetary aggregates and gdp expenditures since the early 1980s and the greater role which has been thrust upon expected real short term interest rates in the implementation of federal reserve policy the issue of rationality of inflation expectations that is the extent to which agents form expectations without making systematic mistakes in their beliefs about what inflation will be is important if inflation expectations are formed rationally labor and financial markets will strongly tend to neutralize the potential redistributive effects of inflation over time financial capital will flow efficiently within and across national borders moreover some of the stronger claims of new classical macroeconomics like the claim that only unexpected monetary policy actions will

dynamic legislative policy making abstract we prove existence of stationary markov perfect equilibria in an infinite horizon model of legislative policy making in which the policy outcome in one period determines the status quo for the next we allow for a multidimensional policy space and arbitrary smooth stage utilities and we assume preferences and the status quo are subject to arbitrarily small shocks we prove that equilibrium continuation values are differentiable and that proposal strategies are continuous almost everywhere we establish upper hemicontinuity of the equilibrium correspondence and we provide weak conditions under which each equilibrium of our model determines an aperiodic transition probability over policies we establish a convergence theorem giving conditions under which the invariant distributions generated by stationary equilibria must be close to the core in a canonical spatial model finally we extend the analysis to sequential move stochastic games and to a version of the model in which the proposer and voting rule are determined by play of a finite perfect information game

the power of the last word in legislative policy making we examine legislative policy making in institutions with two empirically relevant features agenda setting occurs in real time and the default policy evolves we demonstrate that these institutions select condorcet winners when they exist provided a sufficient number of individuals have opportunities to make proposals in policy spaces with either pork barrel or pure redistributional politics where a condorcet winner does not exist the last proposer is effectively a dictator or near dictator under relatively weak conditions

elections governments and parliaments in proportional representation systems this paper presents a theory of parliamentary systems with a proportional representation electoral system a formateur selected based on party representation in parliament and parties that cannot commit to the policies they will implement once in government government formation involves efficient proto coalition bargaining and elections yield unique strong nash equilibrium outcomes depending on the status quo minimal majority surplus or consensus governments can form if parties and voters are myopic and the status quo is subject to shocks consensus governments and centrist policies occur only in a crisis otherwise governments are minimal winning and policies reflect only the preferences of the government parties

politico economic equilibrium and economic growth abstract we propose a notion of dynamic politico economic equilibrium which builds on two key assumptions policies are determined sequentially and agents are fully rational in their roles as both consumers and voters we examine a simple model of endogenous growth and infinitely lived agents where taxes on income are endogenous and where growth critically depends on the initial distribution of asset holdings we relate our equilibrium definition and results to existing literature on time consistency and on political economy and growth we show that our equilibria are time consistent and we argue that the choice of equilibrium concept might have important quantitative implications

characterization of the von neumann morgenstern stable set in a non cooperative model of dynamic policy making with a persistent agenda setter abstract we generalize the dynamic bargaining game of diermeier and fong 2011 to arbitrary quota rules to provide a non cooperative characterization of the von neumann morgenstern stable set assuming that players are sufficiently patient and have strict preferences a pure strategy stationary equilibrium exists and in any such equilibrium a policy is a steady state if and only if it is in the stable set the result provides a non cooperative foundation of stable sets in settings with dynamic policy making and a persistent agenda setter

voting for pareto optimality a multidimensional analysis we compare unanimity rule and majority rule in their abilities to produce pareto superior and pareto optimal alternatives in fixed number of rounds of voting using a two dimensional spatial voting model with random proposals sincere proposals and strategic proposals our findings show that for random or sincere proposals majority rule is at least as likely to select a pareto optimal outcome as unanimity rule for strategic proposals the subgame perfect equilibrium under unanimity rule is pareto optimal for other k majority rules the outcome is pareto optimal or very close to it for outcomes that are both pareto optimal and pareto superior unanimity rule outperforms majority rule

inflation expectations and behavior do survey respondents act on their beliefs we compare the inflation expectations reported by consumers in a survey with their behavior in a financially incentivized investment experiment the survey is found to be informative in the sense that the beliefs reported by the respondents are correlated with their choices in the experiment more importantly we find evidence that most respondents act on their inflation expectations showing patterns consistent with economic theory respondents whose behavior cannot be rationalized tend to have lower education and lower numeracy and financial literacy these findings help confirm the relevance of inflation expectations surveys and provide support to the microfoundations of modern macroeconomic models

linking consumption externalities with optimal accumulation of human and physical capital and intergenerational transfers abstract this paper opens a new perspective from which one can explain the presence of government intervention in education even in the absence of human capital externality it argues that consumption externalities can provide rationale for government intervention in education within the context of overlapping generations economy it has also been shown that competitive equilibrium either underaccumulates both physical and human capital or overaccumulates both thus the result rules out the possibility of competitive equilibrium deviating from the social optimum in its allocation of physical and human capital in opposite directions immediate policy issues have also been discussed

inefficiency in legislative policymaking a dynamic analysis this paper develops an infinite horizon model of public spending and taxation in which policy decisions are determined by legislative bargaining the policy space incorporates both productive and distributive public spending and distortionary taxation the productive spending is investing in a public good that benefits all citizens e g national defense and the distributive spending is district specific transfers e g pork barrel spending investment in the public good creates a dynamic linkage across policymaking periods the analysis explores the dynamics of legislative policy choices focusing on the efficiency of the steady state level of

is inflation sticky abstract new keynesian sticky price models predict that monetary policy can affect real variables however they also predict that inflation can be reduced without depressing output or employment in fact bringing down inflation is costly presenting a challenge to the new keynesian model two departures from the new keynesian model predict costly disinflation one assumes sticky inflation rather than sticky prices while the other assumes less than perfectly rational expectations taking into account information from surveys of inflation expectations i find the evidence suggests that inflation is not sticky and that inflation expectations are less than perfectly rational

political equilibrium income distribution and growth this paper analyzes the impact of income distribution on growth when investment in human capital is the source of growth and individuals vote over the degree of redistribution in the economy the model has three main features first very different patterns of income distribution are conducive to high growth at different levels of per capita income second growth is associated with an externality whereby investment in human capital by one group increases the productivity of other groups thus potentially enabling them to invest in human capital third the initial pattern of income distribution and the resulting political equilibrium are crucial in determining whether the transmission of this externality is promoted in which case growth is enhanced or prevented in which case growth is stopped using a non overlapping generations model with voting i derive several empirical implications in particular the model implies an inverted u relation between levels of inequality and levels of income in cross sections but not necessarily in time series a result that seems consistent with a number of empirical studies

covering dominance and institution free properties of social change this paper shows that different institutional structures for aggregation of preferences under majority rule may generate social choices that are quite similar so that the actual social choice may be rather insensitive to the choice of institutional rules specifically in a multidimensional setting where all voters have strictly quasi concave preferences it is shown that the uncovered set contains the outcomes that would arise from equilibrium behavior under three different institutional settings the three institutional settings are two candidate competition in a large electorate cooperative behavior in small committees and sophisticated voting behavior in a legislative environment where the agenda is determined endogenously because of its apparent institution free properties the uncovered set may provide a useful generalization of the core when a core does not exist a general existence theorem for the uncovered set is proven and for the downsian case bounds for the uncovered set are computed these bounds show that the uncovered set is centered around a generalized median set whose size is a measure of the degree of symmetry of the voter ideal points

monetary policy for inattentive economies we offer a contribution to the analysis of optimal monetary policy we begin with a critical assessment of the existing literature arguing that most work is based on implausible models of inflation output dynamics we then suggest that this problem may be solved with some recent behavioral models which assume that price setters are slow to incorporate macroeconomic information into the prices they set a specific such model is developed and used to derive optimal policy in response to shocks to productivity and aggregate demand optimal policy is price level targeting base drift in the price level which is implicit in the inflation targeting regimes currently used in many central banks is not desirable in this model when shocks to desired markups are added optimal policy is flexible targeting of the price level that is the central bank should allow the price level to deviate from its target for a while in response to these supply shocks but it should eventually return the price level to its target path optimal policy can also be described as an elastic price standard the central bank allows the price level to deviate from its target when output is expected to deviate from its natural rate

borrowing constraints and progress through school evidence from peru this paper investigates the effect of borrowing constraints on the timing of human capital investment in a developing country by looking at how quickly children with different family backgrounds progress through the primary school system in peru the main findings are that children start withdrawing from school earlier as indicated by repetition of grades in households with lower income and durable good holdings and when children are more closely spaced behavior also differs as predicted between children from households that appear to be borrowing constrained and those that appear unconstrained copyright 1994 by mit press

vintage human capital growth and the diffusion of new technology we develop a model of vintage human capital in which each technology requires vintage specific skills we examine the properties of a stationary equilibrium for our economy the stationary equilibrium is characterized by an endogenous distribution of skilled workers across vintages the distribution is shown to be single peaked under general conditions there is a lag between the appearance of a technology and its peak usage a phenomenon known as diffusion an increase in the rate of exogenous technological change shifts the distribution of human capital to more recent vintages thereby increasing the diffusion rate

proposal rights and political power in a canonical model of sequential collective bargaining over a divisible good we show that equilibrium expected payoffs are not restricted by players voting rights or their impatience for all monotonic voting rules and discount factors and for all divisions of the good among players there exists a stationary proposal making rule such that this division represents players expected payoffs in a stationary subgame perfect nash equilibrium in pure strategies the result highlights the significance of proposal rights in determining political power in collective deliberations t he purpose of this article is to further our understanding of political power in a committee environment we consider the problem of a group of two or more agents who must split a fixed divisible good agents cannot use physical force to divide this good our goal is to clarify the role and relative significance of other features of the political environment such as voting rights proposal rights agents patience etc in determining political power following shapley and shubik 1954 we gauge political power in terms of expected outcomes rather than a priori equate it with individual prerogatives 1 in that spirit political power is the share of the divisible good that agents can expect to obtain when their behavior conforms to an appropriately defined equilibrium notion 2 we model committee interaction using a canonical sequential bargaining game in each period a member of the committee is recognized with some probability that is fixed across periods and proposes a division of the good committee members then vote on the proposal if the proposal is approved in accordance with the underlying voting rule the proposed division is implemented and the

inflationary expectations and rationality revisited abstract we find evidence indicating cointegration between each of three survey measures of inflation expectations and actual inflation using johansen s framework we confirm weak form rationality for each survey and estimate significant speeds of adjustment for both inflation and inflation expectations

expectations heterogeneous forecast errors and consumption micro evidence from the michigan consumer sentiment surveys the household data underlying the michigan index of consumer sentiment are used to test the rationality of consumer expectations and their usefulness in forecasting expenditure the results can be interpreted as characterizing the shocks that hit different types of households over time expectations are found to be biased and inefficient at least ex post people underestimated the disinflation of the early 1980s and the severity of recent business cycles people s forecast errors are also systematically correlated with their demographic characteristics in part because of time varying group level shocks further sentiment helps forecast consumption growth some of this rejection of the permanent income hypothesis is due to the systematic demographic components in forecast errors

demographic structure and the political economy of education subsidies this paper investigates the politico economic impact of a society s age structure on the extent of public funding of education education subsidies serve to internalize positive spillovers of human capital investment but redistribute resources from the working old to the non working young thus creating a conflict of interest between the two generations the political process is characterized by a representative democracy

heterogeneous consumers and fiscal policy shocks this paper studies empirical facts regarding the effects of unexpected changes in aggregate macroeconomic fiscal policies on consumers that are allowed to di er depending on their individual characteristics we use data from the consumption expenditure survey cex to estimate individual level impulse responses as well as multipliers for government spending the main empirical finding of this paper is that unexpected fiscal shocks have substantially different effects on consumers depending on their income and age levels in particular the wealthiest individuals tend to behave according to the predictions of standard rbc models whereas the poorest individuals tend to behave according to standard is lm non ricardian models most likely due to credit constraints furthermore government spending policy shocks tend to decrease consumption inequality forthcoming in journal of money credit and banking

aggregate consumption and saving in the postwar united states two commonly used sources of aggregate expenditure data are personal consumption expenditures in the national income and product accounts and the consumer expenditure surveys administered by the bureau of labor statistics we adjust both data sources to incorporate the service flows from owner occupied housing and other consumer durables a comparison of the two estimates of aggregate expenditure reveals that the differences between the two data sets have been growing over time by 1989 the level of aggregate expenditure in the national accounts exceeds that reported in the consumer expenditure surveys by 1224 billions less than half of this difference can be attributed to definitional differences in the two data sources

dynamic pivotal politics we analyze a dynamic extension of a parsimonious model of lawmaking in which preferences evolve over time and today s policy becomes tomorrow s status quo unlike in existing models of pivotal politics policy makers voting behavior depends on the institutional environment and on their expectations about future economic and political shocks relative to sincere voting the equilibrium behavior exhibits a strategic polarization effect which increases with the degree of consensus required by the institution the volatility of the policy environment and the expected ideological polarization of the future policy makers the equilibrium behavior also exhibits a strategic policy bias which works against any exogenous policy bias embedded in the voting rule our analysis implies that the existing literature underestimates the inertial effect of checks and balances and overestimates the impact of institutional biases such as fiscally conservative budget procedures

a theory of voting in large elections this paper provides a game theoretic model of probabilistic voting and then examines the incentives faced by candidates in a spatial model of elections in our model voters strategies form a quantal response equilibrium qre which merges strategic voting and probabilistic behavior we first show that a qre in the voting game exists for all elections with a finite number of candidates and then proceed to show that with enough voters and the addition of a regularity condition on voters utilities a nash equilibrium profile of platforms exists when candidates seek to maximize their expected margin of victory this equilibrium 1 consists of all candidates converging to the policy that maximizes the expected sum of voters utilities 2 exists even when voters can abstain and 3 is unique when there are only 2 candidates

a three player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game this file contains two sets of calculations first we report the calculations of demands and continuation values of proposition 1 second the mixing probabilities of proposition 1 are shown to be well defined

a model of farsighted voting i present a new method of interpreting voter preferences in settings where policy remains in effect until replaced by new legislation in such settings voters consider not only the utility they receive from a given policy today but also the utility they will receive from policies likely to replace that policy in the future the model can be used to characterize both long term preferences and distributions over policy outcomes in situations where policy is ongoing and voters are farsighted

a dynamic theory of public spending taxation and debt this paper presents a dynamic political economy theory of public spending taxation and debt policy choices are made by a legislature consisting of representatives elected by geographically defined districts the legislature can raise revenues via a distortionary income tax and by borrowing these revenues can be used tofinance a national public good and district specific transfers interpreted as pork barrel spending the value of the public good is stochastic reflecting shocks such as wars or natural disasters in equilibrium policy making cycles between two distinct regimes business as usual in which legislators bargain over the allocation of pork and responsible policy making in which policies maximize the collective good transitions between the two regimes are brought about by shocks in the value of the public good in the long run equilibrium tax rates are too high and too volatile public good provision is too low and debt levels are too high in some environments a balanced budget requirement can improve citizen welfare

new keynesian economics and the phillips curve models with sticky prices are an important part of new keynesian economics the author shows that several of the new keynesian models imply a formulation that is similar to the expectations augmented phillips curve of milton friedman and edmund phelps he then presents new estimates of the new keynesian phillips curve the author uses two proxies for price expectations survey based measures and an econometric based measure originally developed by bennett mccallum 1976 overall the results are consistent with the model but the survey based results are more precise suggesting that the surveys may be better measures of actual expectations copyright 1995 by ohio state university press

slow development and special interests this article argues that a natural implication of an innovation based theory of growth is that slow development facilitates the formation of special interest groups we demonstrate this in a growth model where innovations take the form of new goods and new production processes and where factor suppliers in individual industries can organize to form rent extracting special interest groups we then examine the effect these groups have on an economy s subsequent development we find that these groups can retard an economy s development for extended periods but not permanently their long run effect is to increase the volatility of the development process

rent seeking market structure and growth we study the role of productive and unproductive entrepreneurship in economic growth in a setting where firms compete in both economic and political markets specifically firms compete for market share through cost reducing technological innovation and they vie for influence over government transfer policy through rent seeking activities we find that rent seeking affects growth in two ways it allows firms to ignore economic competition leading to less innovation and it alters the number of firms that are supported in equilibrium the former effect is negative while the latter is ambiguous we show how these effects depend on various characteristics of economic and political markets

uncertainty and the demand for education the impact of uncertainty in future income on the demand for education from both theoretical and empirical points of view is analyzed theoretical results deviate substantially from their counterparts in models of human capital formation with certain future income the theory is tested with a sample of high school graduates that contains data on subjective expectations empirical evidence from binomial logit analysis does not entirely support the behavioral implications of the theoretical model

biases in macroeconomic forecasts irrationality or asymmetric loss empirical studies using survey data on expectations have frequently observed that forecasts are biased and have concluded that agents are not rational we establish that existing rationality tests are not robust to even small deviations from symmetric loss and hence have little ability to tell whether the forecaster is irrational or the loss function is asymmetric we quantify the exact trade off between forecast inefficiency and asymmetric loss leading to identical outcomes of standard rationality tests and explore new and more general methods for testing forecast rationality jointly with flexible families of loss functions that embed quadratic loss as a special case an empirical application to survey data on forecasts of nominal output growth demonstrates the empirical significance of our results and finds that rejections of rationality may largely have been driven by the assumption of symmetric loss

on dynamic compromise abstract most legislatures require the consent of only a simple majority to pass a proposal so why don t legislative outcomes favor only a bare majority we show that compromise can be achieved if legislators are neither too impatient nor too patient and initial allocations are not too unequal the compromise is only sustainable if starting from the unequal allocations there is a possibility of spiraling towards a complete absence of compromise we find that the range of discount factors for which the equilibrium exists increases as the number of legislators increases in this sense compromise is easier in larger legislatures

the survival of the welfare state this paper provides an analytical characterization of markov perfect equilibria in a model with repeated voting where agents vote over distortionary income redistribution a key result is that the future constituency for redistributive policies depends positively on current redistribution since this affects both private investments and the future distribution of voters the model features multiple equilibria in some equilibria positive redistribution persists forever in other equilibria even a majority of beneficiaries of redistribution vote strategically so as to induce the end of the welfare state next period skill biased technical change makes the survival of the welfare state less likely

barriers to entry and development we ask whether barriers to entry are a quantitatively important reason for the income gap between developing countries and the united states we develop a tractable general equilibrium model that captures the effects of barriers to entry and the other main distortions typically considered in the development literature we carry our model to the data and ask it to match the main development facts from the penn world table we find that this requires large barriers to entry in developing countries which account for about half of the income gap with the united states

credible communication in dynastic government abstract this paper studies information disclosure in a model of dynastic government when information about past policy choices comes exclusively from the reports of previous administrations each administration has an incentive to choose its suboptimal one shot expenditure policy and then misrepresent its choice to its successor consequently it has been suggested that horizontal accountability i e a system of governance where auditing functions lie outside the executive branch can ensure credible disclosure of a government s activities this paper suggests a cautious approach to that view the baseline model examines the reporting incentives of an external auditor who can independently verify the information each period even with auditing credible disclosure is shown to be problematic various extensions to this baseline model are examined in one extension liberal i e those prefering larger government expenditures and conservative those prefering smaller expenditures regimes and auditors evolve over time it is shown that conservative liberal auditors are not credible when the current regime is also conservative liberal moreover because information transmission stops when the auditor s and the regime s biases coincide effective deterrents even in the good periods when the auditor s and the administration s biases differ are difficult to construct in all periods the equilibrium requirement of auditor neutrality constrains the dynamic incentives for efficient policy choices these constraints are shown to bind away from optimal policies in standard constructions of equilibrium various ways in which auditing protocols can overcome these problems are discussed

exogenous oil supply shocks how big are they and how much do they matter for the u s economy abstract the paper proposes a new measure of exogenous oil supply shocks the timing the magnitude and the sign of this measure may differ greatly from current state of the art estimates it is shown that only a small fraction of the observed oil price increases during oil crisis periods can be attributed to exogenous oil production disruptions exogenous oil supply shocks cause a sharp drop of u s real gdp growth after five quarters rather than an immediate and sustained reduction in economic growth and a spike in cpi inflation after three quarters overall exogenous oil supply shocks made remarkably little difference for the evolution of the u s economy since the 1970s although they did matter for some historical episodes

macroeconomic expectations of households and professional forecasters economists have long emphasized the importance of expectations in determining macroeconomic outcomes yet there has been almost no recent effort to model actual empirical expectations data instead m acroeconomists usually simply assume that expectations are rational this paper shows that while empirical household expectations are not rational in the usual sense expectational dynamics are well captured by a model in which households views derive from news reports of the views of professional forecasters which in turn may be rational the model s estimates imply that people only occasionally pay attention to news reports this inattention generates stickyness in aggregate expectations with important macroeconomic consequences

permanent income current income and consumption evidence from two panel data sets in this article i estimate euler equations that is the first order conditions of the consumers maximization problem using data from two data sets consumption data are taken from the consumer expenditure survey income data are taken from the panel study of income dynamics because the data for the estimation come from two samples i use a generalization of the instrumental variables estimator the two sample instrumental variables estimator i find evidence that consumption is excessively sensitive to predictable income growth the estimates of the coefficient of excess sensitivity for three consumption measures range from 2 to 5

direct and indirect effects of parental education level on the demand for higher education this paper investigates empirically the impact of parental education level family income scholastic ability and expectations on earnings and employment on the demand for higher education in the netherlands in theory the factors mentioned are important determinants of educational choice the wald or distance test is used to discriminate between direct and indirect effects of the parental education level and other background variables on the demand for higher education we find that family income ability and expectations have a direct effect on earnings and employment while the parental education level exerts indirect effects only

the demand for education under capital market imperfections this paper studies the theoretical implications of the demand for education assuming the same regime for financing consumption and the direct costs of education when the capital market is not perfect it is motivated by the policy concerns on the financing of post secondary education in case of an imperfect capital market the separation theorem see e g wallace and ihnen 1975 is not valid and the theoretical implications substantially deviate from their counterparts under a perfect capital market regime for example in a capital market with credit rationing the borrowing rate exerts a positive effect on the demand for education whereas this effect is negative in case of a perfect capital market the theoretical results are used to discuss the effects of government policy on the demand for post compulsory education

legislative bargaining with reconsideration we present a dynamic model of legislative bargaining with an endogenously evolving default policy and a persistent agenda setter policy making proceeds until the agenda setter can no longer pass a new policy to replace an approved bill we prove existence and necessary conditions of pure strategy stationary equilibria for any finite policy space any number of players and any preference profile in equilibrium the value of proposal power is limited compared to the case that disallows reconsideration as voters are induced to protect each other s benefits to maintain their future bargaining positions the agenda setter in turn would prefer to limit his ability to reconsider the lack of commitment due to the possibility of reconsideration however enhances policy efficiency

unemployment expectations and human capital formation abstract this paper analyses the demand for education in the framework of the human capital theory extended with employment prospects that depend on the amount of education unemployment considerations are especially important for the european countries in the 1980s by using comparative statics we derive the theoretical properties of the model in a number of important respects these results differ from their counterparts in the traditional human capital literature by fitting a binomial logit model to a sample of educational choices of dutch high school graduates we find substantial empirical support for the theory high unemployment by itself does not drive youth towards additional education but youth strives for more education in order to improve their employment prospects

the culture of entrepreneurship abstract we study the cultural process through which a society inculcates an entrepreneurial spirit people work for a guaranteed wage or operate a firm whose risky return depends on business expertise the latter is culturally acquired within the family or outside and people may choose an occupation different from the one they were socialized into a cultural bias towards safer occupations from colonial and post colonial policies leads to stagnation where entrepreneurs do not upgrade technology because of their proficiency with existing methods an aggregate productivity shock can tip this economy towards growth led by established businesses a human capital shock where existing business expertise is less useful is more disruptive growth occurs through the emergence of a new class of entrepreneurs we conclude that culture is not destiny it adapts even when some cultural traits do not

vested interests in a positive theory of stagnation and growth we study a positive theory of stagnation and growth aimed at understanding the large variations in growth outcomes across actual economies the theory points to the fundamental role played by vested interests in determining policies which are key to the growth process some agents seek to prevent the adoption of new technologies we develop a model of technology adoption and show how technological innovation may sow the seeds of its own destruction in particular we find that the equilibrium is characterized by a long cycle of stagnation and growth over this cycle incumbents are phased out of the economy will new innovation occur in formalizing our theory we make a methodological contribution by characterizing dynamic voting equilibria when voters must forecast the effects of different current policies on future prices and policy outcomes

factor shares and savings in endogenous growth in models of steady investment driven growth an individual s propensity to save depends on how much of his income is drawn from accumulated factors of production capital rather than from nonaccumulated factors when agents are heterogeneous in this respect growth oriented policies have distributional consequences and in the absence of lump sum redistribution their implementation faces political constraints if the median voter is capital poor relative to the economy s representative agent political interactions tend to slow down growth when policy acts on capital s income share and tend to accelerate it when investment subsidies are the policy instrument of choice copyright 1993 by american economic association

life cycle economies and aggregate fluctuations do the implications for business cycle issues change when we switch from studying infinitely lived representative agent models to more sophisticated demographic structures with finitely lived agents this article addresses that question by using a large overlapping generations model that is calibrated to u s demographic properties microeconomic evidence and national income and product accounts the finding is that the answers obtained are basically the same for the two kinds of models the article also explores the relative volatility of hours across age groups an issue that cannot be addressed by using the infinitely lived representative agent abstraction

distributive politics and economic growth a crude distinction between economics and politics would be that economics is concerned with expanding the pie while politics is about distributing it in this paper we analyze the relationship between the two we focus on how an economy s initial configuration of resources shapes the political struggle for income and wealth distribution and how that in turn affects long run growth our main conclusion is that inequality is conducive to the adoption of growth retarding policies we derive this result from a simple political economy model of growth and present cross country evidence consistent with it the key feature of our model is that individuals differ in their relative factor endowments we distinguish between two types of factors an accumulated factor called capital and a nonaccumulated factor called labor growth is driven by the expansion of the capital stock which is in turn determined by individual saving decisions long run growth is endogenous as the aggregate production function is taken to be linearly homogeneous in capital and productive government services taken together the provision of government services is financed by a tax on capital because government services are productive a small tax on

the intertemporal elasticity of substitution an exploration using a us panel of state data this paper uses state level consumption data to estimate the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption ies in contrast to the results of hall 1988 and campbell and mankiw 1989 we provide evidence indicating that the ies is significantly different from zero and probably close to one since inference about the ies in the context of the standard euler equation is problematic as a result of mis specification bias we cast most of our discussion in the context of the framework developed by campbell and mankiw this modifies the euler equation in that a fraction of agents simply consume their income the use of panel data to examine the relationship between interest rates and consumption growth has two advantages first we achieve a significant increase in precision which in particular allows us to rule out a zero ies second we can use the panel aspect of the data to bypass asset return measurement problems in particular we identify a common time component in expected consumption growth that is associated with movements in interest rates when the ies is positive

implications of rational inattention abstract a constraint that actions can depend on observations only through a communication channel with finite shannon capacity is shown to be able to play a role very similar to that of a signal extraction problem or an adjustment cost in standard control problems the resulting theory looks enough like familiar dynamic rational expectations theories to suggest that it might be useful and practical while the implications for policy are different enough to be interesting

income variance dynamics and heterogeneity recent theoretical work has shown the importance of measuring microeconomic uncertainty for models of both general and partial equilibrium under imperfect insurance in this paper the assumption of i i d income innovations used in previous empirical studies is removed and the focus of the analysis is placed on models for the conditional variance of income shocks which is related to the measure of risk emphasized by the theory we first discriminate amongst various models of earnings determination that separate income shocks into idiosyncratic transitory and permanent components we allow for education and time specific differences in the stochastic process for earnings and for measurement error the conditional variance of the income shocks is modelled as a parsimonious arch process with both observable and unobserved heterogeneity the empirical analysis is conducted on data drawn from the 1967 1992 panel study of income dynamics we find strong evidence of sizeable arch effects as well as evidence of unobserved heterogeneity in the variances

models of inflation expectations formation a comparison of household and economist forecasts comment in the third section of his paper models of inflation expectations formation a comparison of household and economist forecasts gramlich 1983 presents statistics suggesting that two survey measures of inflation expectations are biased and inefficient in this comment we show that the main results presented in his table 1 are generated using a misspecified model when the specification error is corrected we find that the michigan survey of household inflation expectations passes the standard tests for unbiasedness and weak tests for efficiency 1 however there remains doubt about the properties of the inflation expectation series derived from the livingston survey of professional economists 2 the particular results we review were presumably generated from ordinary leastsquares ols estimation of the following equation equation 2 in gramlich