sustainability of the friedman rule in an international monetary policy game this article develops a two country monetary economy model in order to analyze the international monetary policy game between governments and the domestic monetary policy game between each government and its private sector we prove that if governments can commit to their own private sectors the cooperative equilibrium of the game between governments is for them to follow the friedman rule when governments lack such ability to commit we find that the friedman rule is more likely to be sustained in our open economy model than in the closedeconomy model of ireland jel e31 e52 e61 one recurring theme in the analysis of policy making is that in many situations policymakers can benefit from the opportunity to make a binding commitment to restrict their activities one such situation is what is known as the time consistency problem in monetary policy making a government or its monetary authority out of good intention may find it beneficial to generate unexpected inflation to fix some nonmonetary distortion in the economy for example goods market inefficiency due to monopoly power that is characterized by higher than efficient product prices this first best monetary policy however is not time consistent in the sense that firms foresee the government s incentive to impose monetary surprises and set their nominal prices at a higher level as a result the government s attempts to remedy the

inflation and reputation in many macroeconomic models with rational expectations optimal policy is time inconsistent and therefore announced policy may not be credible this paper models the government s credibility explicitly using kreps and wilson s analysis time consistent optimal government policy emerges as a sequential equilibrium in a repeated game this policy is at least as good as the inconsistent optimal policy and dominates the consistent policy when reputational effects are ignored thus the analysis resolves the problem of specifying a credible optimal policy in such models the results show why attempts to disinflate may lead to recession even with perfectly flexible prices this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

sustainable monetary policies abstract this paper uses a model with utility maximizing households monopolistically competitive firms and sticky goods prices to derive a version of barro and gordon s time consistency problem for monetary policy where the government s objectives are consistent with a representative household s preferences the paper applies the methods of chari and kehoe to characterize the entire set of time consistent or sustainable outcomes it goes on to find conditions under which the friedman rule the optimal policy under commitment can be supported when the government lacks a commitment technology

macroeconomic policy in a two party system as a repeated game this paper considers the interaction of two parties with different objectives concerning inflation and unemployment and rational and forward looking wage setters if discretionary policies are followed an economic cycle related to the political cycle results in equilibrium this cycle is significantly different from the traditional political business cycle reputational mechanisms due to the repeated interaction of the two parties and the public or commitments to a common policy rule can improve upon the discretionary outcome by reducing or eliminating the magnitude of the economic fluctuations

large scale econometric models of national economies macroeconometric models are in continuous use in macroeconomic forecasting and policy analysis and are continuously developing part 1 of this paper focuses on some current developments in both economic theoretic and econometric aspects including supply side modelling the treatment of expectations dynamic specification and testing model comparisons and glasnost part 2 is a comparative study of the properties of five nordic models highlighting key structural contributions to their supply side responses differences in modelling approach rather than differences in the underlying economies explain most of the differences in overall model properties these then form an agenda for future comparative research

should renewable energy policy be renewable political flexibility brings about trade offs for policy makers aiming to support the deployment of renewable energy sources res on the one hand it allows incorporating new information on ex ante uncertain benefits and costs of res policy on the other hand it may deter res investments this paper scrutinizes how these trade offs play out economically and politically when res policy makers choose the degree of flexibility as well as the instruments to implement flexibility the analysis builds on a theoretical framework distinguishing between flexibility by design and by adjustment it is complemented by a discussion of three case studies res support schemes in germany and the united kingdom and the eu emissions trading scheme theoretical as well as empirical results suggest that the politically chosen degree of flexibility by policy design may be sub optimally low in contrast flexibility by policy adjustment is often excessively high

an investigation of the gains from commitment in monetary policy this paper proposes a simple framework for analyzing a continuum of monetary policy rules characterized by differing degrees of credibility in which commitment and discretion become special cases of what we call quasi commitment the monetary policy authority is assumed to formulate optimal commitment plans to be tempted to renege on them and to succumb to this temptation with a constant exogenous probability known to the private sector by interpreting this probability as a continuous measure of the lack of credibility of the monetary policy authority we investigate the welfare effect of a marginal increase in credibility our main finding is that in a simple model of the monetary transmission mechanism most of the gains from commitment accrue at relatively low levels of credibility in our benchmark calibration a commitment expected to last for only 6 quarters is enough to bridge 75 of the welfare gap between discretion and commitment this seems to justify the well known concern of monetary policy makers about their credibility even in a world with limited access to commitment technologies

time consistent collection of optimal seigniorage a unifying framework this paper reviews the existing literature on the time consistency problem of seigniorage collection when monetary policy is determined by optimal taxation considerations it develops a unifying accounting framework and suggests a general measure for seigniorage which encompasses the standard measures employed in the literature in addition the ex ante optimal solution to the optimal taxation problem is derived and interpreted in relation to the ramsey principle we show that the different recommendations of the public finance literature i e the friedman rule of optimal deflation moderately positive inflation and seigniorage maximizing inflation are specific solutions to the optimal taxation problem the paper continues with a formal illustration of the time consistency problem of the ex ante optimal policy and the characterization of the time consistent solution under discretion as possible solutions to the time consistency problem we consider reputational forces institutional reforms that establish central bank independence and specific ways of asset and debt management in particular it is formally shown that a modified version of the asset and debt management scheme suggested by persson persson and svensson is not only necessary but also sufficient for optimality although this did not hold in their model

exchange rate policy wage formation and credibility abstract since the collapse of the bretton woods system some european countries have pursued discretionary exchange rate policies in order to maintain or enhance the international competitiveness of the traded goods sector these countries which typically feature centralized wage setting have also tended to experience high nominal wage increases the overall outcome may be described as a devaluation wage spiral this paper applies two models of repeated games to analyze the strategic interaction between an exchange rate setting policy maker and a wage setting trade union it is shown how a devaluation wage spiral may result from a conflict of interest over the real wage it is also shown how reputational forces may provide a way out of the devaluation wage spiral

the political economy of policy credibility the new classical macroeconomics and the remaking of emerging economies the criterion of policy credibility is invoked with increasing frequency today by new classical development economists in debates over economic and institutional reform in developing and transitional countries the paper argues that the credibility criterion is used to privilege neoliberal economic policies and associated institutions the paper demonstrates that the credibility criterion is theoretically anti pluralist and politically anti democratic in this connection the paper argues that a policy s credibility is always secured endogenously through political and economic power rather than exogenously by virtue of the epistemiological status of the theory that promotes it the paper concludes by suggesting two alternative criteria by which policy regimes and the governance structure of monetary institutions could be adjudicated these alternative criteria are termed the principle of democratic credibility and the principle of fallibility copyright 2000 by oxford university press

a test of strategic interaction in monetary policy beginning with an example provided by kydland and prescott 29 a large literature has evolved concerning strategic interaction between the public and a monetary authority in the conduct of monetary policy we undertake a direct test of a fundamental assumption of the strategic monetary policy literature monetary policy games suppose that the monetary authority and the public are aware of the strategic interdependence between them that is these models suppose that the monetary authority chooses an inflation rate that is a function of the public s expected inflation rate and that the public is sophisticated enough to realize that the inflation rate chosen by the monetary authority is a function of its beliefs below we extend cukierman and meltzer s 18 model of ambiguity and credibility in monetary policy to nest other models we then use a novel data set that permits a test of the assumption of strategic awareness for agents in the u s we find support for our extension of the cukierman and meltzer model the new data brought to bear is the federal reserve s forecast of inflation conditional on the monetary policy it chose throughout the sample period the federal open market committee fomc met from eight to twelve times per year to consider various short term monetary policies data on the forecasted paths for the inflation rate growth rate in output and unemployment rate associated with the different monetary policies under consideration is available for some of their meetings it seems reasonable to suppose that the chosen monetary policy satisfies revealed preference in the forecasts of these variables that it and the rejected monetary policies imply therefore in referring to the data we use the terms inflation rate forecast by the federal reserve and inflation rate chosen by the federal reserve interchangeably since theories of time consistent monetary policy have always been cast in the latter terminology the data are especially well suited to a direct test of the theory section i briefly reviews the theoretical literature on monetary policy games and empirical

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

the role of expectations in stabilization policy abstract this paper develops and tests a theory of the process by which private agents in an economy form expectations about government policy agents form and update their beliefs about the true state of government policy in a bayesian fashion the credibility of a policy is defined to be the subjective probability that the government is pursuing a reform policy rule the credibility of a reform of monetary or exchange rate policies is a function of the parameters of both monetary and fiscal policies the theory is applied to the chilean and argentine exchange reforms of the late 1970 s

a theory of ambiguity credibility and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information this paper develops a positive theory of credibility ambiguity and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information the monetary policymaker maximizes his own politically motivated objective function that is positively related to economic stimulation through monetary surprises and negatively related to monetary growth the relative importance he assigns to each target shifts stochastically through time his current preference trade off is known to him but not to the public when choosing the state contingent path of money growth for the present and the future the policymaker compares the benefits from current stimulation with the costs associated with higher future inflation expectations current monetary growth conveys information to the public about future money growth because there is persistence in the policymaker s objectives although expectations are rational information is imperfect because monetary control procedures are imprecise as a result the public cannot correctly distinguish persistent changes of emphasis on different policy objectives from transitory monetary control errors the public becomes aware of changes gradually by observing past monetary growth credibility is defined in terms of the speed with which the public recognizes changes in the objectives of the policymaker credibility is lower the noisier monetary control and the more stable the objectives of the policymaker looser monetary control and a higher degree of time preference on the part of the policymaker induce him to produce higher and more variable monetary growth when the policymaker is free to determine the accuracy of monetary control he does not always choose the most effective control available in spite of the fact that monetary surprises always have an expected value of zero the reason is that ambiguous control procedures enable the policymaker to generate positive surprises when he cares more than on average about economic stimulation he leaves the inevitable negative surprises for periods in which he cares more about inflation prevention this result provides an explanation for the fed s preference for ambiguity recently documented by goodfriend 1986 the policymaker is more likely to pick more ambiguous control procedures the more uncertain his objectives and the higher his time preference the paper also provides a theoretical underpinning for the well documented crosscountry positive correlation between the level and the variability of inflation

economic policy precommitment and social welfare abstract the claim that economic policy precommitment is advantageous is investigated in a context in which the welfare basis of the government s objectives is explicit three results are demonstrated each one defining a class of welfare functions and a class of models such that precommitment would not raise welfare in models of that class it is concluded that if a purely welfare economic argument for precommitment is to be found attention will have to be paid either to conflicts asymmetries and differences within the private sector or to multiple equilibria

religion and economic performance summary this paper investigates the relationship between religion and economic performance in both cross country and within country regressions the null hypothesis that religious affiliation is uncorrelated with performance can frequently be rejected i e religion matters though the regressions do not yield a robust pattern of coefficients with respect to particular religions the results with respect to islam do not support the notion that it is inimical to growth on the contrary virtually every statistically significant coefficient on muslim population shares reported in this paper in both cross country and within country statistical analyses is positive if anything islam promotes growth

macroeconomic policy design and control theory a failed partnership my subject is the applicability of control theory to the pressing questions of macroeconomic policy design that face us both domestically and in the international arena i approach the issue with some trepidation conscious that i am a relative amateur in control matters i am also mindful of the dangers of claiming too much in the field of policy design those were nicely stated in a broader context by that eminent biologist sir peter medawar i984 when he wrote

the political theory of the business cycle two strands of recent empirical work pose a challenge for the macro theorist when brought together one is the rational expectations interpretation of the business cycle the other is the political theory of the business cycle this paper attempts a reconciliation of these two strands in a theory where national political parties have to satisfy the preference of their own supporters as well as the floating voter the implications are that party voters evaluate government performance with respect to expected inflation and output and their variances and that parties will pursue different feedback rules

does exchange rate pegging enhance credibility evidence from the european monetary system the european monetary system ems has been credited with immediately enhancing the credibility of onetary policy among its member countries however there is little empirical evidence to support this view this study provides evidence from exchange rate data that political actions taken to support the ems enhanced rate arangement further empirical results were sensitive to the specification of the estimating equations and varied dramatically if risk premia discounts were absent from estimating equations

loss of monetary discretion in a simple dynamic policy game abstract we analyze a simple policy game featuring monetary credibility problems and argue that loss of monetary discretion is not advantageous two elements form the basis of our analysis firstly we endogenize the source of credibility problems and secondly we consider a dynamic framework where credibility problems are not time invariant by doing this we are able to demonstrate that credibility problems are temporary and in steady state the government has removed these through sound policies a binding policy rule will only serve as an obstacle towards this steady state

optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital abstract this paper is concerned with the structure and time consistency of optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital in a dynamic context optimal taxation means distributing tax distortions over time in a welfare maximizing way for a barter economy our main finding is that with debt commitments of sufficiently rich maturity structure an optimal policy if one exists is time consistent in a monetary economy the idea of optimal taxation must be broadened to include an inflation tax and we find that time consistency does not carry over an optimal inflation tax requires commitment by rules in a sense that has no counterpart in the dynamic theory of ordinary excise taxes the reason time consistency fails in a monetary economy is that nominal assets should from a welfare maximizing point of view always be taxed away via an immediate inflation in a kind of capital levy this emerges as a new possibility when money is introduced into an economy without capital

intervention bias in agricultural policy abstract this paper re examines the motivation for government intervention in agriculture to support farm prices and incomes a model is outlined in which the government has a preference for higher farm incomes but fails to provide farmers with the socially optimal level of price support even when one accepts the government s income redistribution goals as a valid reflection of social preference it is shown that agricultural policy has an intervention bias government price supports generally are higher than would be socially optimal the source of the intervention bias is a time inconsistency in optimal agricultural policy formation caused by the government s inability to precommit to a rule for setting future price support levels simulation results indicate that in some circumstances the intervention bias in agricultural policy can be substantial

reputation and credibility in the european monetary system ems credibility axel weber this article provides a quantitative assessment of the credibility of the european monetary system during the disinflation period of the 1980s the results contradict the widely held view that the ems has operated as a dm zone it is shown that after a brief early phase the ems has functioned as a bipolar system with a hard currency option supplied by the german bundesbank and a soft currency option offered by the banque de france whilst from the onset the netherlands have chosen the hard currency option at least in a first stage the remaining smaller economies belgium denmark and ireland adopted the soft currency alternative at a later stage of the ems however the soft currency block has disintegrated and some countries most noticeably ireland and to a lesser extent france have shifted towards the hard currency standard it is argued that this increased tightening of the ems provides a favourable starting condition for the transition to economic and monetary union

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

time consistency of fiscal and monetary policy the problem of time inconsistency arises from two different sources first as shown by guillermo a calvo 1978 the re is an incentive for each government to engage in an initial unanti cipated inflation second as discussed by robert e lucas and nancy l stokey 1983 there is an incentive for each government to deviat e from the path of taxes announced by the preceding government in th is paper it is shown that these two sources of time inconsistency ca n be removed by a particular method of debt management involving bot h nominal and indexed government bonds of various maturities copyright 1987 by the econometric society

limits to rational learning a long standing open question raised in the seminal paper of kalai and lehrer 1993 is whether or not the play of a repeated game in the rational learning model introduced there must eventually resemble the play of exact equilibria and not just the play of approximate equilibria as demonstrated there this paper shows that play may remain distant in fact mutually singular from the play of any equilibrium of the repeated game we further show that the same inaccessibility holds in bayesian games where the play of a bayesian equilibrium may continue to remain distant from the play of any equilibrium of the true game

political parties and the business cycle in the united states 1948 1984 this paper tests the existence and the extent of a politically induced business cycle in the u s in the post world war ii period the cycle described in this paper is different from the traditional political business cycle of nordhaus it is based on a systematic difference between the monetary policies of the two parties in a model with labor contracts from an explicit optimization problem we derive a system of equations for output and money growth then we successfully test the non linear restriction imposed by the theory on the parameters of the system of equations we cannot reject the hypothesis that money growth has been systematically different under the two types of administration and that this difference contributes to explain output fluctuations

does the time consistency problem explain the behavior of inflation in the united states abstract this paper derives the restrictions imposed by barro and gordon s theory of time consistent monetary policy on a bivariate time series model for inflation and unemployment and tests those restrictions using quarterly us data from 1960 through 1997 the results show that the data are consistent with the implications of the theory for the long run behavior of the two variables indicating that the theory can explain the initial rise and subsequent fall of inflation over the past four decades the results also suggest that the theory must be extended to account more fully for the short run dynamics that appear in the data

credibility and changes in policy regime this paper addresses the issue of credibility from an econometric perspective it develops a rational expectations model of inflation in which the dynamics are driven by the level of government spending and by the effect of past inflation rates on the value of real taxes government expenditure is modeled as an exogenous autoregressive process subject to discrete changes in regime the regimes are defined by whether the level of spending is or is not consistent with the rate of inflation targeted by the government as part of a stabilization program in making their money demand decision the agents need to construct probability inferences regarding the state of the expenditure process credibility is quantified by the agents inferred probability that the joint observation of inflation the nominal interest rate and government spending is generated by the reformed expenditure regime in an application to israel results indicate that the failed stabilization program of november 1984 was less than fully c

monetary policy and policy credibility theories and evidence within the past decade there has been a significant shift in attitude by many western industrialized countries toward the objectives and conduct of national economic policy the events of the 1970s accelerating inflation and stagnant economic growth motivated the view that inflation had created its own stubborn self sustaining momentum that either was not amendable to the influences of conventional macroeconomic policy or else would yield to such influences only at unacceptable costs this led to the development of a program aimed at reestablishing control over prices while minimizing any adverse consequences of anti inflationary policies on output and employment seen as a new monetary experiment the essential ingredients included prudent financial management abstinence from discretionary intervention commitment to intermediate targets and above all prior announcement of these policies evidence of this program and its effects can be found oni the continents of europe north america and latin america and provide further important lessons in anti inflationary management this paper is a survey of recent theoretical developments in monetary policy which among other issues attempt to explain one rationale for this program and the likely consequences thereof to the extent that the new program of monetary and fiscal reform was deliberately made public and impressed upon citizens as an overriding commitment of governments in advance of its execution reflects a prevailing opinion that economic policies are more effective if they are credible to private economic agents this view emphasized forcefully by william fellner 1976 1979 may be seen as being mainly due to the assimilation of the rational expectations hypothesis

governance structures and the durability of economic reforms evidence from inflation stabilizations abstract this paper investigates the relationship between a country s political economic and institutional environment and its ability to implement sustainable economic reform programs the policy issue on which the study focuses is inflation stabilization it consists principally of econometric estimations of the relationship between the success of stabilizations in a large sample of countries and several political and economic explanatory variables the hypotheses tested are drawn both from the recent macroeconomic literature on policy credibility and from political science the major findings include the following 1 a despite the conventional wisdom to the contrary political repression does not appear to be an effective means for implementing sustainable stabilization policies durable economic reforms and political freedoms appear to be complementary 2 b as has been previously argued theoretically and demonstrated empirically political instability is detrimental to policy reform 3 c the political will and popular consensus for stabilization policies are enhanced during a severe economic crisis 4 d there is weak evidence that intervention by the international monetary fund rather than supporting reform programs can undermine their credibility

new macroeconomics and credibility analysis this paper gives a general view of the new macroeconomics the new keynesian macroeconomics the real business cycle models and the analysis of credibility of monetary policy an outline of the chief technical features that distinguish the new keynesian and the real business cycle formulations is provided highlighting the specific characteristics that have been reconciled by the recent literature on credibility analysis the point to be illustrated is that the combination of new keynesian market failures and the new classical general equilibrium approach to macroeconomics leads to better microeconomic foundation for the credibility analyses of monetary policy that follow the barro gordon notion of inflation bias of discretionary monetary policy

central bank independence and inflation corporatism partisanship and alternative indices of central bank independence a well developed theoretical literature suggests that central bank independence causes low inflation empirical work supporting this hypothesis is unsatisfactory however for two reasons statistical analysis has only recently begun to include control variables and important political variables that are related to inflation have not yet been included analysis has not yet undertaken a systematic comparison of alternative indices of central bank independence this paper addresses both weaknesses by testing the explanatory power of eight indices of central bank independence in a political economic model of inflation the results suggest that while support for the central bank independence hypothesis survives a relatively inclusive set of control variables support for the hypothesis is not independent of the particular index upon which analysis relies