the retrenchment hypothesis and the extension of the franchise in england and wales does an extension of the voting franchise always increase public spending or can it be a source of retrenchment we study this question in the context of public spending on health related urban amenities in a panel of municipal boroughs from england and wales in 1868 1871 and 1886 we find evidence of a u shaped relationship between spending on urban amenities and the extension of the local voting franchise our model of taxpayer democracy suggests that the retrenchment effect was related to enfranchisement of the middle class through nation wide reforms and that these reforms might have been pareto inferior in the average borough

violence during democratization and the quality of democratic institutions abstract this paper investigates the impact of violent civil conflicts during the process of democratization on the institutional quality of the emerging democracies we propose a theory of endogenous regime transition in which violent conflict can arise in equilibrium peaceful transitions lead to a social contract that provides all groups with political representation and leads to better protection of civil liberties than violent transitions empirical evidence from the third wave of democratization based on a difference in difference methodology supports the theoretical predictions the findings suggest that compared to peaceful transitions violent conflicts during the democratic transition have persistent negative effects on the institutional quality of the emerging democracies

statehood democracy and preindustrial development this paper proposes a growth model linking state history to economic development it considers three state systems non statehood authoritarian statehood and democratic statehood these differ in the way a public good is provided which in turn determines growth rates under certain assumptions democratic states grow faster than authoritarian ones which in turn grow faster than non states all societies start with non statehood and transition into authoritarian statehood at some point but the timing is random when later given the opportunity only those societies that transitioned relatively recently to authoritarian statehood transition to democracy when they do they begin to grow faster eventually overtaking older and still authoritarian states this generates an inversely u shaped cross sectional relationship between development and state history consistent with modern cross country data

democratisation and tax structure in the presence of home production evidence from the kingdom of greece abstract this paper examines the impact of democratisation on tax structure in an agrarian economy where goods can be produced at home for self consumption we first develop a model of optimal taxation with heterogeneous agents where the good produced in the market is subject to a consumption tax whereas the homogeneous good produced at home is burdened by a direct tax such as land tithes contrary to conventional theory our model suggests that extension of the voting franchise to poorer segments of the population exerts a negative impact on the share of direct to indirect taxes using unique national and regional tax data for the kingdom of greece a typical agrarian economy where universal male suffrage was established in 1864 we provide consistent empirical evidence greek governments adjusted tax policy in order to meet the preferences of the newly enfranchised electorate that constituted mostly peasants and farmers this group was harmed substantially by direct taxes on land but was able to avoid indirect taxes through self consumption we also analyse a sample of 12 european countries over the same period and provide evidence for a similar change in the tax structure when the agricultural sector dominates the economy

partisan competition growth and the franchise we present an argument for changes in the franchise in which an elite split along economic interests uses the suffrage to influence implemented policies through the influence of these policies on the character of industrialization we analyze the effects of franchise changes on economic growth we identify in the social structure of society an explanation for the connection between enfranchisement and growth when 1 there exists an economic conflict among the elite 2 landed classes are not politically strong and 3 there exists a critical mass of industrial workers we observe both growth and democratization the lack of conditions 1 or 2 resolves in stagnant autocracies while the absence of condition 3 drives growth deterring democratic expansions we provide historical support for our argument by analyzing the experience of eleven countries

vote buying supermajorities and flooded coalitions in a recent paper banks 2000 adopting the framework of our model groseclose and snyder 1996 derives several new and noteworthy results in addition he provides a counterexample to our proposition 4 here we explain the error in our proposition but note that we can correct it easily if we invoke an additional assumption in equilibrium the winning vote buyer constructs a nonflooded coalition that is she does not bribe every member of her coalition we conclude with a brief discussion of the substantive implications of banks s proposition 1 we note that it provides additional support for our general claim that minimal winning coalitions should be rare in a vote buying game

new parties and policy outcomes evidence from colombian local governments abstract in many democracies increasing political competition has changed the traditional party system and brought new parties into the political arena this study examines whether the presence of politicians from new parties affects the size of government measured by public spending and tax revenue the study focuses on colombian municipalities where new parties have been numerous and successful in recent years regression discontinuity estimates show that public spending and tax revenues are significantly higher in municipalities governed by a mayor from a new party using information about local politics and the features of the new parties i argue that this result is not associated with new party ideology but instead relates to new parties having lower probability of reelection which raises the incentives to increase short term rent seeking

the political economy of financial systems evidence from suffrage reforms in the last two centuries initially voting rights were limited to wealthy elites providing political support for stock markets the franchise expansion induces the median voter to provide political support for banking development as this new electorate has lower financial holdings and benefits less from the uncertainty and financial returns from stock markets our panel data evidence covering 1830 1999 shows that tighter restrictions on the voting franchise induce a greater stock market development whereas a broader voting franchise is more conducive towards the banking sector consistent with perotti and von thadden 2006 our results are robust to controlling for other political determinants and endogeneity

the dual policy in the dual economy the political economy of urban bias in dictatorial regimes in many developing countries public resource allocation is often biased against the rural population since a vast majority of the poor live in rural areas the bias is highlighted as one of the most important institutional factors contributing to poverty this paper develops a political economy model of urban bias in a dictatorial regime a novel result of the model is that urban bias can emerge in predominantly agrarian economies even if there is no bias in political power toward urban residents the empirical evidence from a recently compiled country level panel dataset on agricultural taxes subsidies is consistent with the prediction of the model

the geography of linguistic diversity and the provision of public goods abstract this paper analyzes the importance of local interaction between individuals of different ethnolinguistic groups for the provision of public goods at the national level the conceptual framework we develop suggests that a country s public goods i decrease in its overall ethnolinguistic fractionalization and ii either increase or decrease in its local global ethnolinguistic complementarity a measure of how local interaction affects antagonism towards other groups in the society at large after constructing a 5 km by 5 km dataset on language use for 223 countries we empirically explore these theoretical predictions while overall fractionalization worsens public goods outcomes local interaction mitigates this negative association conditional on a country s overall diversity public goods outcomes are maximized when there are a few large sized groups and the diversity of each location mirrors that of the country as a whole

inequality democracy and the protection of property rights motivated by the observed relevance of institutional quality such as strong property rights for economic performance this research considers the emergence of property rights protection as a political outcome it argues that the support for such protection is greater the more equal income distribution and the smaller political bias when these conditions initially hold the politically influential rich elite may prefer to relinquish its power through democratisation in order to commit future policy makers to the enforcement of property rights thus ensuring larger investment and faster growth along the transition path in a very unequal economy however such democratisation will not take place

social ideology and taxes in a differentiated candidates framework many observers argue that political polarization particularly on social and cultural issues has increased in the united states how does this influence the political competition on economic issues we analyze this question using a framework in which two officemotivated candidates differ in their fixed ideological position and choose a level of government spending to maximize their vote share in equilibrium candidates cater to a set of swing voters who contain socially conservative and economically liberal voters as well as socially liberal and economically conservative voters we analyze how voters cultural preferences and candidates cultural positions influence equilibrium economic positions jel d72 e62 h50 z13 many observers have argued that polarization between the two major parties in the united states particularly on noneconomic cultural matters has increased this is reflected both at the elite level in particular in congress poole and rosenthal 1984 1985 2000 and among democratic and republican activists and voters abramowitz and saunders 2008 harbridge and malhotra 2011 in the american national election survey respondents report their own ideological position on a scale from 1 very liberal to 7 very conservative the number of respondents who report one of the extreme positions 1 2 6 or 7 has grown from 20 and 21 percent in 1972 and 1976 to 31 and 30 percent in the 2004 and 2008 respectively moreover liberal and conservative voters have become considerably more reliable supporters of democrats and republicans respectively over the last generation 1 if we accept the widespread view that reagan s conservative revolution has created a cultural wedge between the parties that only widened in the 1990s and 2000s what consequences for the parties economic policies should we expect

political economy of growth with a taste for status abstract this paper investigates the political economy of growth when individuals prefer high levels of relative consumption a pivotal voter determines the equilibrium tax on capital the revenues from which fund the provision of productive public goods the taste for status and the distributions of wealth and political power interact to generate stylized versions of oligarchies middle class democracies and populist democracies a rise in the taste for status increases the role of distributional concerns in policy preferences lowering growth in an oligarchy or populist democracy but increasing it in a middle class democracy in addition the egalitarian redistribution of wealth or political power causes growth to first rise and then fall as the equilibrium tax rate approaches and then exceeds its growth maximizing level generating inverse u shaped relationships between democracy and growth and inequality and growth

a theory of political transitions we develop a theory of political transitions inspired by the experiences of western europe and latin america nondemocratic societies are controlled by a rich elite the initially disenfranchised poor can contest power by threatening revolution especially when the opportunity cost is low for example during recessions the threat of revolution may force the elite to democratize democracy may not consolidate because it is redistributive and so gives the elite an incentive to mount a coup highly unequal societies are less likely to consolidate democracy and may end up oscillating between regimes and suffer substantial fiscal volatility

why did the elites extend the suffrage democracy and the scope of government with an application to britain s age of reform a new rationale is presented for why an elite may want to expand the franchise even in the absence of threats to the established order expanding the franchise can turn politicians away from particularistic politics based on ad personam redistribution within the elite and foster competition based on programs with diffuse benefits if these programs are valuable a majority of the elite votes in favor of an extension of the franchise despite the absence of a threat from the disenfranchised we argue that the evolution of public spending and of political competition in nineteenth century britain is consistent with our model i introduction at the beginning of the nineteenth century in most countries narrow elites had a disproportionate influence on public affairs even in england where parliament was an influential institution suffrage was mostly the privilege of the wealthy and some members of parliament were elected in boroughs with as few as 100 voters while cities such as manchester did not have any representative a century later most western countries had universal male suffrage with female suffrage to arrive shortly thereafter what brought about this democratic revolution in many cases the elites were forced out of power after violent revolutions however there are important examples such as england where democratization took the form of gradual extensions of the suffrage and these were accompanied by little overt violence it is the peculiar pride of england that the record of social and political reform is to be found on the statute book not in the annals of revolution cheyney 1931 p vii such peaceful democratizations are difficult to rationalize within the benchmark political economic models in those models extending the franchise dilutes the elite s power to influence policy and results

did women s suffrage change the size and scope of government this paper examines the growth of government during this century as a result of giving women the right to vote using cross sectional time series data for 1870 1940 we examine state government expenditures and revenue as well as voting by u s house and senate state delegations and the passage of a wide range of different state laws suffrage coincided with immediate increases in state government expenditures and revenue and more liberal voting patterns for federal representatives and these effects continued growing over time as more women took advantage of the franchise contrary to many recent suggestions the gender gap is not something that has arisen since the 1970s and it helps explain why american government started growing when it did

endogenous enfranchisement when groups preferences conflict in their seminal paper aumann kurz and neyman found the surprising result that the choice of levels of public goods in a democracy is not affected by the distribution of voting rights this implies that groups of individuals may not value the franchise this conclusion however does not correspond to what we commonly observe we propose a new model to address the question of enfranchisement the main feature of our model is that it takes into account natural affinities such as religion or class that may exist between voters this allows us to show that while individuals may not value the vote they nonetheless value the franchise we also show that in the presence of nonconvexities it is more likely that the group in power will grant the franchise when preferences are severely opposed

competition for jobs in a growing economy and the emergence of dualism we aim to explain the rising share of short term employment in europe using a matching model with growth we find that a slow down in growth of labour productivity leads to the emergence of temporary short term jobs that explains their increasing share in total employment lower growth rates also shift the beveridge curve to the right and weaken the bargaining position of workers these effects generate a relation between growth and unemployment which can be negative when the adverse effect of growth on wage setting dominates over its positive effect on labour demand in addition higher population growth increases the share of temporary jobs and unemployment finally the often blamed firing costs are found to be neutral when there is no floor on wages

the effect of the expansion of the voting franchise on the size of government this paper examines the claim that expansion of the voting franchise has been an important factor in the growth of government state government spending and state and local spending are explained using a panel of 46 states for 1950 88 elimination of poll taxes and literacy tests led to higher turnout particularly among the poor and a poorer pivotal voter as predicted we find that these changes a fall in the income of voters relative to state income and the ouster of republicans from state government led to a sharp rise in welfare spending but no change in other spending

inequality in landownership the emergence of human capital promoting institutions and the great divergence this paper suggests that inequality in the distribution of landownership adversely affected the emergence of human capital promoting institutions e g public schooling and thus the pace and the nature of the transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy contributing to the emergence of the great divergence in income per capita across countries the prediction of the theory regarding the adverse effect of the concentration of landownership on education expenditure is established empirically based on evidence from the beginning of the 20th century in the u s

on the faustian dynamics of policy and political power this paper examines the faustian dynamics of policy and power we posit a general class of dy namic games in which current policies affect the future distribution of political power resulting in the following faustian trade off if the current ruler chooses his preferred policy he then sacrifices future political power yet if he wants to preserve his future power he must sacrifice his present policy objec tives the trade off comes from the fact that the current political ruler pivotal voter cannot uncouple the direct effect of his policy from its indirect effect on future power a policy endogenous pe equilibrium describes this endogenous transfer of power and the resulting evolution of policy and political power over time we show that the faustian trade off in a pe equilibrium is decomposed into two basic rationales the political preservation effect induces more tempered policy choices than if one s policy choice did not affect one s political fortunes however the reformation effect induces more aggressive policies in order to exploit the productivity gains from policies chosen by even more aggressive successors we distinguish between political systems that give rise to monotone faustian dynamics political power that progressively evolves towards more fiscally liberal types of leaders and cyclical faustian dynamics political power that oscillates between liberal and conservative types of leaders in each case we show that the faustian trade off moderates the choices of each type of leader

has democratization reduced infant mortality in sub saharan africa evidence from micro data does democracy help babies survive in sub saharan africa by using retrospective fertility surveys conducted in 28 african countries i compare the survival of infants born to the same mother before and after democratization to disentangle the effect of democracy from that of changes in population characteristics which is infeasible with country level statistics on infant mortality i find that infant mortality falls by 1 2 percentage points 12 of the sample mean after democratization in the post cold war period relevant aspects of democracy appear to be the combination of multiparty elections and leadership change

the coevolution of economic and political development from monarchy to democracy this article establishes a unified political economy model to analyze the democratization process from monarchy to oligarchy and to democracy in the context of dynamic economic development as the predominant source of wealth evolves from land to physical capital and finally to human capital the relative economic and hence coercive power of land owners capitalists and workers shifts accordingly inducing the transition of the political system where political power is expanded from landlords to capitalists and finally to workers a smooth transition through political compromise facilitates efficient allocation of savings in physical capital followed by efficient investment in human capital

the provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives politicians who care about the spoils of office may underprovide a public good because its benefits cannot be targeted to voters as easily as pork barrel spending we compare a winner take all system where all the spoils go to the winner to a proportional system where the spoils of office are split among candidates proportionally to their share of the vote in a winner take all system the public good is provided less often than in a proportional system when the public good is particularly desirable we then consider the electoral college system and show that it is particularly subject to this inefficiency

immigration quotas and skill upgrading a reason why immigration policy is such a contended issue is that often immigrants end up obtaining the right to vote and hence may affect future policies this paper offers a dynamic general equilibrium model of immigration policy in each period a heterogeneously skilled population chooses an immigration policy by majority vote voters anticipate that immigration affects the skill premium and the skill composition of the electorate the main insight is the existence of a trade off between skill complementary immigration and the resulting shift in political power i argue that a reasonably parameterized version of the model is consistent with the main features of us immigration

incentives to cultivate favored minorities under alternative electoral systems a simple model is used to compare under different electoral systems the incentives for candidates to create inequalities among otherwise homogeneous voters by making campaign promises that favor small groups rather than appealing equally to all voters in this game model each candidate generates offers for voters independently out of a distribution that is chosen by the candidate subject only to the constraints that offers must be nonnegative and have mean 1 symmetric equilibria with sincere voting are analyzed for two candidate elections and for multicandidate elections under rank scoring rules approval voting and single transferable vote voting rules that can guarantee representation for minorities in multiseat elections generate in this model the most severely unequal campaign promises

workers of the world unite franchise extensions and the threat of revolution in europe 1820 1938 abstract we test the hypothesis that the extension of the voting franchise in europe was related to the threat of revolution we contend that international diffusion of regime contention and information about revolutionary events happening in neighboring countries generate the necessary variation in the perceived threat of revolution using two samples of european countries covering the period from 1820 to 1938 we find robust evidence which is consistent with the threat of revolution hypothesis we also find some evidence that war triggered suffrage reform

social class and the spirit of capitalism one of the key social transformations that accompanied the british industrial revolution was the economic decline of the aristocracy standard theories of wealth inequality cannot explain why the aristocrats in spite of their superior wealth and education failed to be the main protagonists and beneficiaries of industrialization we discuss recent research based on a model of endogenous preferences that is consistent with the demise of aristocracy jel 010 040

the political consequences of income shocks explaining the consolidation of democracy in france abstract this study analyzes the circumstances that enabled france to become in the late nineteenth century the first stable parliamentary democracy with universal male suffrage in europe it establishes a causal relationship between short term variations in local income and the electoral support for the coalition of republican parties that represented the newly established regime the results suggest the republican coalition won the parliamentary elections because most french regions did not suffer from transitory negative income shocks stemming from heavy precipitations they thus raise questions about the rationality of voters and ultimately the actual causes of the consolidation of democracy in france

democracy collective action and intra elite conflict we analyze a model where there is uncertainty about the future power of two ex ante symmetric elites to appropriate surplus and ex ante surplus sharing agreements are not binding we show that in an oligarchy the stronger elite appropriates the entire available surplus whereas a democracy results in a more balanced surplus allocation between the two elites in a democracy the newly enfranchised non elite organize to act collectively so that the weaker elite can credibly threaten to form a coalition with the organized non elite against the stronger elite such a threat ensures that the more balanced surplus sharing proposal chosen by majority voting is renegotiation proof therefore sufficiently risk averse elites unanimously choose democracy as a form of insurance against future imbalances in relative power we emphasize that franchise extension to and low cost of organizing collective political activity for the non elite are both necessary features of a democracy our formal analysis can account for the stylized facts that emerge from a comparative analysis of indian and western european democracies

the size and scope of government comparative politics with rational politicians we try to demonstrate how economists may engage in research on comparative politics relating the size and composition of government spending to the political system a downsian model of electoral competition and forward looking voting indicates that majoritarian as opposed to proportional elections increase competition between parties by focusing it into some key marginal districts this leads to less public goods less rents for politicians more redistribution and larger government a model of legislative bargaining and backward looking voting indicates that presidential as opposed to parliamentary regimes increase competition between both politicians and voters this leads to less public goods less rents for politicians less redistribution and smaller government we confront these predictions with cross country data from around 1990 controlling for economic and social determinants of government spending we nd strong and robust support for the prediction that the size of government is smaller under presidential regimes and weaker support for the prediction that majoritarian elections are associated with less public goods

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

international migration and the role of institutions we study the determinants of international migration with special attention to the role of institutional factors other than economic and demographic fundamentals we evaluate the impact of political institutions and of those institutions specifically targeted at attracting migrants for a dataset on 19th century migration we find that economic and demographic differentials play a major role but that the quality of institutions also matter we produce evidence that both political and migration institutions represent significant factors of attraction even after controlling for their potential endogeneity through a set of instruments exploiting colonial history and the institutions inherited from the past

do natural resources fuel authoritarianism a reappraisal of the resource curse a large body of scholarship finds a negative relationship between natural resources and democracy extant cross country regressions however assume random effects and are run on panel datasets with relatively short time dimensions because natural resource reliance is not an exogenous variable this is not an effective strategy for uncovering causal relationships numerous sources of bias may be driving the results the most serious of which is omitted variable bias induced by unobserved country specific and time invariant heterogeneity to address these problems we develop unique historical datasets employ time series centric techniques and operationalize explicitly specified counterfactuals we test to see if there is a long run relationship between resource reliance and regime type within countries over time both on a country by country basis and across several different panels we find that increases in resource reliance are not associated with authoritarianism in fact in many specifications we generate results that suggest a resource blessing

the control of politicians in divided societies the politics of fear autocrats in many developing countries have extracted enormous personal rents from power in addition they have imposed inefficient policies including pervasive patronage spending i present a model in which the presence of ethnic identities and the absence of institutionalized succession processes allow the ruler to elicit support from a sizeable share of the population despite large reductions in welfare the fear of falling under an equally inefficient and venal ruler that favours another group is enough to discipline supporters the model predicts extensive use of patronage ethnic bias in taxation and spending patterns and unveils a new mechanism through which economic frictions translate into increased rent extraction by the leader these predictions are consistent with the experiences of bad governance ethnic bias wasteful policies and kleptocracy in post colonial africa

dynamic stability and reform of political institutions abstract this paper examines endogenous institutional change in a class of dynamic political games the political aggregation rules used at date t 1 are instrumental choices under rules at date t effectively rules are players who can strategically delegate future policy making authority to different rules a political rule is stable if it selects itself a reform occurs when an alternative rule is selected the stability of a political rule is shown to depend on whether its choices are dynamically consistent for instance simple majority rules can be shown to be dynamically consistent in many common environments where wealth weighted voting rules are not the result extends to political rules that incorporate private activities such as extra legal protests threats or private investment the approach is one way of understanding various explanations of institutional change proposed in the literature a parametric model of public goods provision gives an illustration

prices profits and pass through of costs along a supermarket supply chain bargaining and competition in this paper we present an empirical study of a supermarket supply chain to understand the determinants of prices and profits enjoyed by farmers processors and supermarkets we study the liquid milk market which has seen much controversy about both the distribution of rents and the mechanisms firms have used to influence the distribution we discuss insights from a series of interviews we conducted with executives and farmer representatives our interviews suggest a model in which the farmer s price is determined mainly by the sterling value of international commodity prices the retail price is determined by marginal costs and the intensity of supermarket competition and the wholesale price is determined in private bilateral negotiations between retailers and processors which are characterized by well informed agents and a high level of efficiency we present a simple theoretical model that captures these features and bring it to data on supply chain prices for the period 1994 2014 we find that over this period there has been great variation in the intensity of retail price competition and in the sterling value of international commodity markets which together result in large changes both to the overall surplus in the supply chain and to its distribution between farmers and the other firms after farmers have been paid the sterling value of international commodity prices the profit that remains to be split between processors and retailers mostly goes to supermarkets because of competition between processors

social mobility and stability of democracy re evaluating de tocqueville an influential thesis often associated with de tocqueville views social mobility as a bulwark of democracy when members of a social group expect to join the ranks of other social groups in the near future they should have less reason to exclude these other groups from the political process in this article we investigate this hypothesis using a dynamic model of political economy as well as formalizing this argument our model demonstrates its limits elucidating a robust theoretical force making democracy less stable in societies with high social mobility when the median voter expects to move up respectively down she would prefer to give less voice to poorer respectively richer social groups our theoretical analysis shows that in the presence of social mobility the political preferences of an individual depend on the potentially conflicting preferences of her future selves and that the evolution of institutions is determined through the implicit interaction between occupants of the same social niche at different points in time

autocracy democracy and trade policy abstract this paper develops a politico economic model for use in studying the role of intra elite conflict in the simultaneous determination of a country s political regime trade policy and income tax based redistribution scheme three socioeconomic groups are involved two elite groups and workers whose preferences regarding trade policy and income taxation are derived from a simple open economy model the critical point is that income taxation induces a rich poor elite workers political cleavage while trade policy opens the door to intra elite conflict in this model when there is no intra elite conflict changes in trade policy are associated with political transitions coups democratizations open up the economy if and only if both elite groups are pro free trade protectionist however in the presence of intra elite conflict autocracies respond to popular revolts by changing trade policy and reallocating political power within the elite to the elite group with the same trade policy preference as the workers rather than offering to democratize the country the change in trade policy is credible because the elite group with the same trade policy preference as the workers controls the autocracy moreover in the presence of intra elite conflict coups tend to result in the maintenance of the existing trade policy unless popular demands are extremely radical and or the elite group with the same trade policy preference as the workers is exceptionally weak

perverse committee appointments may foster divide and rule abstract a plurality rule spatial committee can select an extreme decision if a bare minority of members prefer the opposite extreme decision the majority who prefer a moderate decision are immobilised by internal divisions consequently a nominator may appoint candidates with the opposite preference ordering so as to build up the bare minority our results may explain why disraeli extended the franchise to skilled male workers in 1867 against centrist opposition and why an electorate whose preferences are not polarized may have to choose between extremist candidates

property rights and competing for the affections of demos the impact of the 1867 reform act on stock prices the 1867 reform act in britain extended the electoral franchise to the skilled but propertyless urban working classes using stock market data and exploiting the fact that foreign and domestic equities traded simultaneously on the london market this paper finds that investors in british firms reacted negatively to the passage of this act we suggest that this finding is consistent with investors foreseeing future alterations of property rights arising from the pressure that the large newly enfranchised group would bring to bear on government policy we also suggest that our findings appear to be more consistent with the tory political competition explanation for the act rather than the whig threat of revolution explanation

women s liberation what s in it for men the nineteenth century witnessed dramatic improvements in the legal rights of married women given that these changes took place long before women gained the right to vote they amounted to a voluntary renouncement of power by men in this paper we investigate men s incentives for sharing power with women in our model women s legal rights set the marital bargaining power of husbands and wives we show that men face a tradeoff between the rights they want for their own wives namely none and the rights of other women in the economy men prefer other men s wives to have rights because men care about their own daughters and because an expansion of women s rights increases educational investments in children we show that men may agree to relinquish some of their power once technological change increases the importance of human capital we corroborate our argument with historical evidence on the expansion of women s rights in england and the united states

why are gender quota laws adopted by men the role of inter and intraparty competition in nearly every case of quota law adoption the support of party elites is critical but this raises a puzzle what can motivate predominantly male elites to put these policies in place this artic

a quantitative theory of political transitions we develop a quantitative theory of repeated political transitions driven by revolts and reforms in the model the beliefs of disenfranchised citizens play a key role in determining revolutionary pressure which in interaction with preemptive reforms determine regime dynamics we study the quantitative implications of the model by fitting it to data on the universe of political regimes existing between 1946 and 2010 the estimated model generates a process of political transitions that looks remarkably close to the data replicating the empirical shape of transition hazards the frequency of revolts relative to reforms the distribution of newly established regime types after revolts and reforms and the unconditional distribution over regime types

religious co option in autocracy a theory inspired by history abstract the relationship between religion and politics is explored from a theoretical standpoint assuming that religious clerics can be co opted by the ruler acting as an autocrat the comparative effects of decentralized versus centralized religions on the optimal level of cooperation between the autocrat and the religious clerics which itself impinges upon political stability is analysed the paper shows that the presence of a decentralized body of clerics makes autocratic regimes more unstable it also shows that in time of stability the level of reforms is larger with a centralized religion than with a decentralized one when the autocrat in the decentralized case pushes more reforms than in the centralized one he always does so at the cost of stability historical case studies are presented that serve to illustrate the main results

the origins of democracy a model with application to ancient greece abstract this paper seeks to provide an improved understanding of the origins of democracy it begins by developing a theoretical model to demonstrate how exogenous economic conditions can influence the incentives to establish democratic institutions the model predicts that democratic institutions will expand where they mitigate important time inconsistency problems and therefore encourage investment exogenous conditions determine the magnitude of those time inconsistency problems and hence the likelihood of democracy a comparison of ancient greek city states suggests that the conditions under which democracy first emerged support the model other potential applications are discussed

information cascades and revolutionary regime transitions we combine acemoglu and robinson s model of the economic origins of democracy with lohmann s model of political mass protest this allows us to analyse the economic causes of political regime change based on the microfoundations of revolution we are able to derive conditions under which democracy arises peacefully when it occurs only after a revolution and when oligarchy persists we model these possibilities in a world of asymmetric information where information cascades are possible and where these cascades may involve errors in the sense that they make everyone worse off

why did the west extend the franchise democracy inequality and growth in historical perspective during the nineteenth century most western societies extended voting rights a decision that led to unprecedented redistributive programs we argue that these political reforms can be viewed as strategic decisions by the political elite to prevent widespread social unrest and revolution political transition rather than redistribution under existing political institutions occurs because current transfers do not ensure future transfers while the extension of the franchise changes future political equilibria and acts as a commitment to redistribution our theory also offers a novel explanation for the kuznets curve in many western economies during this period with the fall in inequality following redistribution due to democratization i introduction the nineteenth century was a period of fundamental political reform and unprecedented changes in taxation and redistribution britain for example was transformed from an oligarchy run by an elite to a democracy the franchise was extended in 1832 and then again in 1867 and 1884 transferring voting rights to portions of the society with no previous political representation the decades after the political reforms witnessed radical social reforms increased taxation and the extension of education to the masses moreover as noted by kuznets inequality which was previously increasing started to decline during this period the gini coefficient for income inequality in england and wales had risen from 0 400 in 1823 to 0 627 in 1871 but fell to 0 443 in 1901 two key factors in the reduction in inequality were the increase in the proportion of skilled workers williamson 1985 and the redistribution of income toward the poorer segments of the society for example taxes rose from 8 12 percent of national product in 1867 to 18 8 percent by 1927 and the progressivity of the tax system increased substantially see lindert 1989

how to get the snowball rolling and extend the franchise voting on the great reform act of 1832 this paper suggests a new approach to analyzing the causes of franchise extension based on a new dataset it provides a detailed econometric study of the great reform act of 1832 in the united kingdom the analysis yields four main results first modernization theory receives limited support second the reform enjoyed some measure of popular support third the threat of revolution had an asymmetric impact on the voting behavior of the pro reform whigs and the anti reform tories while the threat might have convinced reluctant reformers among the whig politicians and among their patrons to support the bill it seems to have hardened the resistance to reform among the tories fourth ideology played a critical role nevertheless it also appears that self interest and political expedience explained the votes of many members of parliament

elites and corruption a theory of endogenous reform and a test using british data eighteenth century britain displayed patterns of corruption similar to those of developing countries today reforms enacted in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries eliminated many of these patterns this article develops a theoretical argument that seeks to explain why the british elite enacted anticorruption reforms and provides evidence using a new data set of members of the house of commons the author argues that the shock that pushed the british elite from preferring the old corrupt regime to preferring the reformed one was an increase in government spending and a corresponding increase in the costs of tolerating corruption features unique to britain allowed the reformist outcome to emerge and illuminate why such an outcome is difficult to achieve in general

the political class and redistributive policies we study the eect of the composition of the political class on the size of government first we use a citizen candidate model to show that the extension of surage may be inconsequential for government spending when there are pre existing stricter requirements for holding oce we then test this prediction empirically using data from the 13 u s original colonies we nd that the extension of the franchise did not aect government spending or the composition of the political class however the subsequent elimination of economic qualications to hold oce increased government spending and enriched the class heterogeneity

efficiency welfare and political competition we study political competition in an environment in which voters have private information about their preferences our framework covers models of income taxation public goods provision or publicly provided private goods politicians are vote share maximizers they can propose any policy that is resource feasible and incentive compatible they can also offer special favors to subsets of the electorate we prove two main results first the unique symmetric equilibrium is such that policies are surplus maximizing and hence first best pareto efficient second there is a surplus maximizing policy that wins a majority against any welfare maximizing policy thus in our model policies that trade off equity and efficiency considerations are politically infeasible jel codes c72 d72 d82 h21 h41 h42

dynamics and stability of constitutions coalitions and clubs a central feature of dynamic collective decision making is that the rules that govern the procedures for future decision making and the distribution of political power across players are determined by current decisions for example current constitutional change must take into account how the new constitution may pave the way for further changes in laws and regulations we develop a general framework for the analysis of this class of dynamic problems under relatively natural acyclicity assumptions we provide a complete characterization of dynamically stable states as functions of the initial state and determine conditions for their uniqueness we show how this framework can be applied in political economy coalition formation and the analysis of the dynamics of clubs the explicit characterization we provide highlights two intuitive features of dynamic collective decision making 1 a social arrangement is made stable by the instability of alternative arrangements that are preferred by sufficiently many members of the society 2 efficiency enhancing changes are often resisted because of further social changes that they will engender

social conflict and gradual political succession an illustrative model this paper studies the evolution of political institutions in the face of conflict we examine institutional reform in a class of pivotal mechanisms institutions that behave as if the resulting policy were determined by a pivotal decision maker drawn from the potential population of citizens and who holds full policy making authority at the time a rule ofsuccession describes the process by which pivotal decision makers in period t 1 are themselves chosen by pivotal decision makers in period t t wo sources of conflict class conflict arising from differences in wealth and ideological conflict arising from differences in preferences are examined in each case we characterize the unique markov perfect equilibrium of the associated dynamic political game and show that public decision making authority evolves monotonically downward in wealth and upward in ideological predisposition toward the public good we then examine rules of succession when ideology and wealth exhibit correlation

chiefs economic development and elite control of civil society in sierra leone we study the effect of constraints on chiefs power on economic outcomes citizens attitudes and social capital a paramount chief in sierra leone must come from a ruling family originally recognized by british colonial authorities in chiefdoms with fewer ruling families chiefs face less political competition and development outcomes are significantly worse today variation in the security of property rights over land is a potential mechanism paradoxically with fewer ruling families the institutions of chiefs authority are more highly respected and measured social capital is higher we argue that these results reflect the capture of civil society organizations by chiefs