multimarket contact imperfect monitoring and implicit collusion abstract this paper presents a theoretical foundation to the possibility that multimarket contact enhances firms ability to sustain implicit collusion when firms operate in a single market and cannot perfectly monitor their opponents choices it is impossible to achieve efficiency even if these firms have a long term strategic relationship we show that when firms encounter each other in a number of distinct markets and the extent of this market contact is large efficiency can be approximately sustained by a perfect equilibrium this efficiency with imperfect monitoring holds under almost the same condition on the discount factor as with perfect monitoring journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c72 c73 d43 l11 l22 l41

collusion in multiproduct oligopoly games under a finite horizon applying recent results on finitely repeated games to oligopoly theory the author finds that there exists a class of finite horizon output games in which collusion can be achieved as a subgame perfect equilibrium trigger strategies prevent defection from the cooperative outcome by credibly threatening that the defector will be forced to exit the industry for the case of a multiproduct oligopoly it is shown that collusion in one market can be enforced by the threat of punishment in a second market if someone defects even though the two markets are structurally independent the firms make them strategically interdependent through their strategies copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

private demands for public capital evidence from school bond referenda abstract this paper develops a framework for estimating demand for school infrastructure investment that is financed through local bond referenda our framework takes explicit account of the irregular and discrete nature of local capital investment and the objective functions of local school boards our empirical model consists of a three equation system composed of a proposed spending equation a vote equation and a selection equation estimated income and price elasticities of demand for school infrastructure are similar to those found in studies of current school spending we also find that school boards act like risk averse budget maximizing agenda setters

fiat money as a store of value in an experimental market abstract the time path of the value of fiat money is studied in an experimental market in this market players can achieve pareto superior allocations by trading goods for money at fixed nominal prices however the finite horizon makes the value of money unstable as players learn not to hold money near the horizon we investigate the value of money in stationary replications of the model where subjects trade off the increased value of money as a medium of exchange against the chances of holding worthless money as the role of money as a store of value deteriorates

a search model of money and circulating private debt with applications to monetary policy a search theoretic model is used to examine the coexistence of money and circulating private debt money is still valued even though there coexists credit which circulates among agents and dominates in the rate of return when there coexist multiple equilibria the equilibrium with credit pareto dominates the one without credit if money supply is not extremely plentiful this article also provides some predictions about the effects of monetary policies a policy of open market operations whereby government discounts less for second hand debt decreases the value of money credit and interest rate prevailing in the market this policy can also improve welfare by making credit trade feasible when the only equilibrium entails no credit without intervention

international antitrust enforcement and multimarket contact this article analyzes cartel formation and international antitrust enforcement when multinational firms operate in several jurisdictions with local antitrust authorities we are concerned with how the sustainability of collusion in one local market is affected by the existence of collusion in other markets when they are linked by a negative demand relationship the interdependence of cartel stability across markets leads to potential externalities in antitrust enforcement across jurisdictions local antitrust enforcement equilibrium enforcement may exhibit a nonmonotonicity in the degree of market integration we compare it with globally optimal antitrust enforcement policy and discuss the role of international antitrust coordination

why do households without children support local public schools linking house price capitalization to school spending while residents receive similar benefits from many local government programs only about one third of all households have children in public schools we argue that capitalization of school spending into house prices can encourage even childless residents to support spending on schools we identify a proxy for the extent of capitalization the supply of land available for new development and show that towns in massachusetts with little undeveloped land have larger changes in house prices in response to a plausibly exogenous spending shock towns with little available land also spend more on schools we extend these results using data from school districts in 46 states showing that per pupil spending is positively related to the percentage of developed land this positive correlation persists only in districts where the median resident is a homeowner and is stronger in districts with more elderly residents who do not use school services and have a shorter expected duration in their home our findings support models in which capitalization encourages the provision of durable local public goods and provides an additional reason why some elderly support local school spending

market regulation and multimarket rivalry multimarket contact between duopolists in an x and y market is modelled with a trigger strategy we show that mildly restrictive price cap regulation in the x market decreases y market quantities but restrictive caps in the x market have a positive impact on y market outputs behavior in laboratory markets confirms these propositions regulation that lowers x market prices by a small amount results in a statistically significant reduction in y outputs when the regulated x market price is reduced to the cournot nash level y market outputs rise to a point statistically indistinguishable from the unregulated quantities

imperfectly mobile households and durable local public goods does the capitalization mechanism work abstract a complication in the decision making of local governments is that a community s residents may move before the future benefits associated with current tax and expenditure policies are fully realized it has been argued that the capitalization of these benefits into current property values can induce local governments to behave efficiently this paper drops two assumptions behind the capitalization hypothesis perfect labor mobility and the absence of uncertainty about the future benefits it is shown that these benefits may be overcapitalized or undercapitalized depending on a critical aspect of the uncertainty consequently there is underinvestment in some projects but overinvestment in others

group dynamics in experimental studies the bertrand paradox revisited abstract different information provision in experimental markets can drastically change subjects behavior considering the repeated bertrand duopoly game of dufwenberg and gneezy dufwenberg m gneezy s u 2000 price competition and market concentration an experimental study international journal of industrial organization 18 7 22 we find that population feedback about the prices in other markets outside a subjects own current market causes group dynamics that prevent prices from convergence to nash equilibrium limited information comprising only the decisions of a subject s own opponent in contrast leads to competitive behavior when we extend the number of periods from 10 to 25 in the full information treatment full we observe a very robust cyclical up and down movement of prices we can explain tacit coordination in our experiment with an extended learning direction model and leadership by example

collusion in finitely repeated oligopolies abstract explaining collusion in infinitely repeated oligopolies is problematic because of the backward induction argument the usual response to this has been to consider infinitely repeated games and treat these as approximations of long finite repetitions or to introduce a modicum of irrationality in firm decision making the present paper explores a third avenue which introduces some extensive form structure to the cournot game itself hence the supergame constructed in this paper is one in which the stage game is itself an extensive form game in particular the stage game is a cournot oligopoly in which firms can observe each others initial production and respond by producing more before the product is sold on the market with this structure it is possible to devise a discriminating trigger strategy which generates collusive behaviour among fully rational firms with finite lives

an overlapping generations model of electoral competition this paper presents a dynamic model of political competition between two parties with different policy preferences a party is explicitly modeled as a sequence of overlapping generations of candidates all of whom face finite decision horizons in general there is a conflict between the interests of the individual policymakers and those of the party which includes subsequent generations of candidates we characterize this conflict and suggest a scheme of intergenerational transfers within the party which can resolve or mitigate this conflict the paper shows how the overlapping generations model can be usefully applied to the political arena this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

managing local commons theoretical issues in incentive design local commons encompass a wide range of resources whose shared feature is the need for some form of collective management in what follows we shall be concerned mainly with the problems of implementing a collective management plan whatever the mechanisms invoked many recent contributions to the literature have stressed that relatively informal collective management of common property resources can in the right circumstances avoid the severe resource degradation predicted by the tragedy of the commons nevertheless both empirical and theoretical arguments suggest that cooperative behavior may be only partial and the incentives of short term self interest only partially held in check under what circumstances then can more formal implementation mechanisms make good the deficiency and given that formal incentives are typically stronger than informal ones are there any reasons why informal incentives might nevertheless sometimes be preferred

do meetings in smoke filled rooms facilitate collusion the sherman act prohibits firms from discussing prices in meetings traditional thought suggests that this prohibition makes it harder for firms to collude and economists have concluded that the sherman act operates in the public interest i provide an alternative explanation for the act that also accounts for the small sanctions chosen by the legislature when firms interact in a dynamic environment in which the law helps them to prevent renegotiation the firms may benefit from the law that makes it costly but not very costly to meet to discuss prices the sherman act may help firms to collude

inside and outside money as alternative media of exchange we study a random matching model of money in which a subset of people called bankers have known histories and the rest called nonbankers have unknown histories earlier we showed that if there are no outside assets then an optimal arrangement has bankers issuing objects banknotes that are used in trades involving nonbankers here the same model is used to compare such exclusive use of inside money to the exclusive use of outside money we show that the set of implementable outcomes using outside money is a strict subset of the set using inside money

oligopoly supergames some empirical evidence on prices and margins this paper is a panel data study on the behavior of prices and margins of oligopolies involved in repeated games the authors examine two supergame models which generate very different predictions about the cyclical behavior of prices and margins evidence on the levels of price cost margins indicates that oligopolies achieve equilibria that more closely resemble a one shot cournot nash outcome than monopoly the authors find however that industries with high price cost margins exhibit cyclical price behavior which is quite different from that of unconcentrated industries little evidence of price wars during either recessions or booms is found copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

the risk of contagion from multimarket contact abstract it is conventional wisdom that the strategic linkage of markets that is enabled by multimarket contact typically increases the profitability of cooperation among rivals we find to the contrary that a strong force against strategic linkage results from imperfect monitoring of adherence to cooperation with such imperfections strategically linking markets can lower payoffs by permitting the impact of adverse shocks in one market to spread to others consequently players of repeated games on more than one front may find it strictly advantageous to avoid linking strategies on a front with clear monitoring to outcomes on a front with error prone monitoring one implication is that antitrust competitive strategy and foreign policy analyses have presumed too broadly that multimarket contact fosters cooperation the game theoretic equilibria characterized here shed light on why players such as firms and nations sometimes strategically link fronts in their rivalry and sometimes take care to articulate that some fronts of particularly volatile conflicting interests will not trigger broader adverse moves against the rival

search bargaining money and prices the goal of this paper is to extend existing search theoretic models of fiat money which until now have assumed that the price level is exogenous by explicitly incorporating bilateral bargaining this allows us to determine the price level endogenously and leads to additional insights concerning the role of money for example we find that monetary equilibria are generally inefficient in the sense that output and prices differ from the solution to a social planner s problem although the difference can become small as the discount rate or search friction vanishes we also find that there exist nonstationary inflationary equilibria

mutual forbearance in experimental conglomerate markets we conduct economic experiments to gauge the level of cooperation between conglomerate rivals first we run control experiments to observe cooperation between subjects acting as duopolists in one of two markets in the control experiments subject pairs choose a quantity xi or yi from a payoff matrix in a repeated game relatively less cooperation is observed in the y market than in the x market a second series of experiments then combines the two payoff matrices to create a conglomerate setting facing each other in two markets opponents now choose an xi yi pair each period we find that conglomeration encourages more coperation in the y market but less cooperation in the x market time series analysis of our conglomerate subjects choices strongly supports the recent game theoretic propositions in bernheim and whinston 1990

money and credit redux do we need both money and credit in models with explicit roles for payment instruments we show the answer is no if credit is easy money is useless if credit is tight money can be essential but then credit is irrelevant and changes in debt limits are neutral real balances respond endogenously to leave total liquidity constant this is true for exogenous or endogenous policy and debt limits secured or unsecured credit and fairly general preferences and pricing mechanisms while we also show how to overturn some results the benchmark model suggests credit conditions matter less than some people think

perfect nash equilibria in finite repeated game and uniqueness of nash equilibrium in the constituent game abstract it is shown that when the nash equilibrium of a particular game is unique then in a perfect nash equilibrium of the finite repetition of this game the set of actions in each of the successive plays of the game must be a nash equilibrium of the constituent game the uniqueness of the nash equilibrium in the constituent game is crucial for this implication except in the last play of the repetition

taxation and the tiebout model the differential effects of head taxes taxes on land rents and property taxes on the theory of state and local public finance is the seminal paper by charles tiebout 1956 tiebout constructed a multijurisdictional model in which independent local governments offer a wide variety of expenditure and tax policies and perfectly mobile consumers reveal their preferences for local public goods through their choice of residential community he argued that under such circumstances local public service provision would be efficient the tiebout model has formed the basis of a vast number of subsequent articles in the state and local public finance literature and has also been very influential in urban and regional economics the efficiency properties of various tiebout type models of local public good provision have been examined and the role of politics in these models has been debated at length in this literature of more direct relevance to this paper however is the fact that although tiebout had little to say directly about taxation simply assuming the existence of head taxes subsequent analyses have used adaptations of this model to examine the effects of local head taxes land taxes and property taxes it is the literature on the efficiency and distributional effects of alternative local taxes that is the subject of this survey 1

class systems and the enforcement of social norms abstract we analyze a model in which there is socially inefficient competition among people in this model self enforcing social norms can potentially control the inefficient competition however the inefficient behavior often cannot be suppressed in equilibrium among those with the lowest income due to the ineffectiveness of sanctions against those in the society with the least to lose we demonstrate that in such cases it may be possible for society to be divided into distinct classes with inefficient behavior suppressed in the upper classes but not in the lower

another example of a credit system that co exists with money we study an economy in which exchange occurs pairwise there is no commitment and anonymous agents choose between random monetary trade or deterministic credit trade to accomplish the latter agents can exploit a costly technology that allows limited record keeping and enforcement an equilibrium with money and credit is shown to exist if the cost of using the technology is sufficiently small anonymity record keeping and enforcement limitations also permit some incidence of default in equilibrium

multi market collusion with demand linkages and antitrust enforcement this paper analyzes dynamic cartel formation and antitrust enforcement when firms operate in demand related markets we show that cartel prosecution can have a knock on effect bringing down a cartel in one market reduces profits and cartel stability and leads to the break up of the cartel in the adjacent market cartel prosecution can also have a waterbed effect disrupting a cartel increases cartel stability in the adjacent market and induces cartel formation in previously competitive markets we discuss the impact of dynamic cartel formation on consumer surplus explore antitrust spillovers the optimal scope of antitrust interventions and cartel formation with local firms

intertemporal product choice and its effects on collusive firm behavior this study analyzes the collusive behavior of firms in markets characterized by horizontal product differentiation the special features are that product choice is endogenized and that firms may redesign their products intertemporally at a fixed cost the main objective is to examine the relationships between the extent of product differentiation the product redesigning cost and the degree of collusion supportable the findings indicate that flexible product design makes collusion more difficult to sustain since in the event collusion breaks down firms have an incentive to mitigate the severity of punishment by redesigning their products and thus reducing price competition copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

new housing supply and the dilution of social capital this paper examines the role of local housing supply conditions for social capital investment using an instrumental variables approach and data from the social capital community benchmark survey it is documented that the positive link between homeownership and individual social capital investment is largely confined to more built up neighborhoods with more inelastic supply of new housing the empirical findings provide support for the proposition that in these localities house price capitalization provides additional incentives for homeowners to invest in social capital the findings are also largely consistent with the proposition that built up neighborhoods provide protection from inflows of newcomers that could upset a mutually beneficial equilibrium involving reciprocal cooperation however the results do not appear to be driven by selection based on inherent differences in social aptitudes or by tiebout sorting

multiproduct activity in an experimental differentiated oligopoly in a symmetric differentiated experimental oligopoly with multiproduct firms we test the predictive power of the corresponding bertrand nash equilibria subjects are not informed on the specification of the underlying demand model in the presence of intense multiproduct activity and provided that a parallel pricing rule is imposed to multiproduct firms strategies tend to confirm the non cooperative multiproduct solution

collusion and predation under almost free entry abstract this study investigates the degree of cooperation that firms can support in the absence of significant barriers to entry a free entry subgame perfect equilibrium is defined by q n where q is the collusive output rate and n is the number of active firms such that there is no incentive for an active firm to deviate output from q and there is no incentive for a potential entrant to enter the industry it is shown that for all n 1 if the discount factor is sufficiently high there exists a free entry equilibrium in which active firms sustain a non trivial degree of cooperation cooperation is supported by active firms credibly threatening to respond to entry with a period of aggressive competition

cooperative equilibria in finite horizon noncooperative supergames abstract it is well known that cooperative outcomes can be supported by noncooperative equilibrium strategy combinations in games that are infinitely repeated however the example of the repeated prisoner s dilemma has led people to conclude that such cooperative outcomes cannot be sustained if the game is repeated finitely often in this paper it is proved that the belief about finitely repeated games is false conditions are given that allow the existence of cooperative outcomes in finitely repeated games that are supported by subgame perfect noncooperative equilibrium strategies

leniency programs for multimarket firms the effect of amnesty plus on cartel formation we examine the effect of amnesty plus on dynamic cartel formation in a multimarket setting the amnesty plus program has been adopted as part of the us corporate leniency policy in 1999 and is now vigorously advertised as one of the most compelling tools in generating successful cartel investigations amnesty plus is aimed at attracting amnesty applications by encouraging firms convicted in one market to report their collusive agreements in other markets we show that amnesty plus has two opposite effects on firms ability and incentives to collude which are both increasing in the fine reduction granted first amnesty plus can reduce the deterrence of cartel activities by making it easier for firms to sustain multimarket collusion through strategies involving self reporting after a first cartel detection second it can reduce the expected duration of cartels or delay their formation by increasing firms incentives to self report after a first cartel detection

multimarket contact and collusive behavior traditional analyses of industrial behavior typically link the exercise of market power in an industry to internalfeatures such as demand conditions concentration and barriers to entry nevertheless some economists have remained concerned that external factors such as contact across markets may also play a significant role in determining the level of competitiveness in any particular industry in this article we examine the effect of multimarket contact on the degree of cooperation that firms can sustain in settings of repeated competition we isolate conditions under which multimarket contact facilitates collusion and show that these collusive gains are achieved through modes of behavior that have been identified in previous empirical studies of multimarketfirms

internal cartel stability with time dependent detection probabilities abstract to account for the illegal nature of price fixing agreements per period detection probabilities that can vary over time are introduced in a dynamic oligopoly the resulting iccs for internal cartel stability indicate that for discount factors up to 10 per period detection probabilities of 5 are needed to reduce the number of cartel members by 50 for the special case of stationary supergames with constant per period detection probabilities p elegant rules emerge internal cartel stability requires the discount factor to increase with 100 p 1 p percent while a fixed fine of 100 1 p p percent of incremental cartel profits is required for making the icc always binding

price fixing the probability of getting caught the authors estimate the probability that a price fixing conspiracy will be indicated by federal authorities to be at most between 0 13 and 0 17 in a given year the authors estimate is based on conspiracy durations calculated from data reported for a large sample of department of justice cases and a statistical birth and death process model describing the onset and duration of conspiracies copyright 1991 by mit press

equilibrium selection in imperfectly competitive economies with multiple equilibria this paper investigates the selection of an equilibrium in an economy with multiple pareto ranked nash equilibria a history dependent selection criterion is proposed which induces correlated behavior in equilibrium even though agents are playing one shot games and disturbances are not correlated over time the model economy may experience prolonged periods in which a low productivity technology is in use and then as a consequence of a large real disturbance may switch to an alternative equilibrium in which a high productivity technology is utilized thus the model qualitatively matches observations of serially correlated movements in output and employment and generates procyclical productivity though there are no exogenous technology shocks copyright 1994 by royal economic society

strategic leniency and cartel enforcement the cornerstone of cartel enforcement in the united states and elsewhere is a commitment to the lenient prosecution of early confessors a burgeoning game theoretical literature is ambiguous regarding the impacts of leniency i develop a theoretical model of cartel behavior that provides empirical predictions and moment conditions and apply the model to the complete set of indictments and information reports issued over a 20 year span statistical tests are consistent with the notion that leniency enhances deterrence and detection capabilities the results have implications for market efficiency and enforcement efforts against cartels and other forms of organized crime jel d43 l12 l13 k21 in 1993 the department of justice doj introduced a new leniency program with the intent of destabilizing existing cartels and deterring new cartels the program commits the doj to the lenient prosecution of early confessors in particular it guarantees complete amnesty from federal prosecution to the first confessor from each cartel provided that an investigation into the confes sor s cartel is not already underway it also offers discretionary penalty reductions to conspirators who confess when an investigation is already ongoing the new leniency program has become the cornerstone of cartel enforcement efforts in the united states e g scott d hammond 2004 and recently has inspired antitrust authorities in australia canada the european union japan south korea and elsewhere to introduce similar programs oecd 2002 2003 this paper tests the efficacy of the new leniency program the results have implications for market efficiency and enforcement efforts against cartels and other forms of organized crime a burgeoning game theoretical literature is ambiguous regarding the impacts of leniency a common finding is that leniency may destabilize cartels because conspirators can simultane

fiscal consequences of electoral institutions abstract there are more than 500 000 elected local government officials in the united states the most electorally dense county has more than 20 times the average number of elected officials per capita this paper offers the first systematic investigation of the link between electoral density and fiscal outcomes electoral density presents a tradeoff between accountability and monitoring costs increasing the number of specialized elected offices promotes issue unbundling reducing slack between citizen preferences and government policy but the costs of monitoring a larger number of officials may offset these benefits producing greater latitude for politicians to pursue their own goals at the expense of citizen interests we predict diminishing returns to electoral density and a documentclass aastex usepackage amsbsy usepackage amsfonts usepackage amssymb usepackage bm usepackage mathrsfs usepackage pifont usepackage stmaryrd usepackage textcomp usepackage portland xspace usepackage

on the feasibility of maximal collusion abstract this note explores when joint profit maximizing behavior between firms can be supported by arbitrary subgame perfect equilibrium strategies we show that for a large class of games maximal collusion is feasible if and only if a simple discount parameter condition is satisfied

games of perfect information predatory pricing and the chain store paradox the thesis of this paper is that finite noncooperative games possessing both complete and perfect information ought to be treated like one player decision problems that is players ought to assign at every move subjective probabilities to every subsequent choice in the game and ought to make decisions via backward induction this view is in contrast with the gametheoretic approach of nash equilibrium after expanding on this view for games in the abstract in sections 2 and 3 attention is turned in section 4 to an example due to reinhard selten called the chain store paradox which possesses the flavor of a situation involving a predatory pricing monopolist it is argued that for the chain store game the decision analytic approach leads under certain assumptions to more realistic outcomes than the standard nash equilibrium approach

the political legislation cycle the economic theory of legislation holds that laws even when they do not involve financial resources redistribute property rights politicians supply legislation to groups with the highest political return by the same logic politicians should supply legislation when doing so has the highest political return the dynamics of the supply of legislation should follow the pattern suggested by the political business cycle theory we develop a model of government s and voters behavior where a legislation cycle is the strategy to hold the government coalition together under certain assumptions the model predicts that the approbation of laws should be concentrated at the end of the legislature and be positively related to the fragmentation of the government coalition we test these restrictions on data about the supply of legislation by the italian parliament during legislatures from i to xiii 1948 to 2001 the empirical analysis provides strong support to the theory a legislation cycle occurs when the conditioning phenomena that the model indicates are satisfied

migration with fiscal externalities abstract this paper analyses the distribution of a country s population among regions when migration involves fiscal externalities the main question addressed is whether a decentralized decision making of regional governments can produce an optimal population distribution as recently asserted or a centralized intervention is indispensable as argued before in the literature in analysing this issue it is assumed that migration is costly and accordingly the problem is modelled in a dynamic setup it turns out that while with costless mobility the fiscal externality is fully internalized by voluntary interregional transfers with costly mobility centrally coordinated transfers still remain indispensable for achieving the socially optimal allocation

public debts and fiscal politics how to decide the phenomenal growth in our public deficits over the past twenty years is a matter of public and professional concern see symposium 1989 while this concern may indeed be well founded particularly given current deficit levels public deficits are not always bad certainly in times of deep recessions short term deficit financing can stimulate aggregate demand increase national income and reduce unemployment in a keynesian fashion see richard startz 1989 second long term deficit financing may be needed to sustain a long term path of optimal consumption see peter diamond 1965 third public deficits including pay as yougo social security can offer welfare gains for significant subsets of consumers who have been liquidity constrained r glenn hubbard and kenneth judd 1986 who have been unable to purchase indexed private annuities alan blinder 1988 or who have been unable to sufficiently diversify their investment portfolios away from human capital robert merton 1983 finally robert barro 1979 has argued that public deficits may be an important policy instrument to insure intertemporal welfare maximization when public expenditures are stochastic and public taxes are economically inefficient taxes can be smoothed to reduce the lifetime excess burden of public financing the concern today is not that we have deficits but rather that we may be overdoing a good thing if this is the issue then we need to ask why and what can be done about it this is my agenda here i the political economy of recent deficits

collusive equilibria in oligopolies with finite lives abstract it is generally accepted that collusive agreements cannot be sustained in oligopolies with finite lives in this paper it is shown that provided the number of competitors is neither too small nor too large the most restrictive output i e the monopoly output can be sustained as a perfect nash equilibrium if the number of firms is too small only sequences of the nash equilibria of the constituent market game can appear as perfect nash equilibria if the number of firms is too large the power of the cartel falls sharply

a repeated game with finitely lived overlapping generations of players abstract this paper analyzes infinitely repeated noncooperative games where the players have finite but overlapping terms thus the nature of the game remains constant but the identity of the players changes over time this type of scenario depicts the situation facing firm managers in regulated or oligopolistic environments despite finite lives which lead players to always choose opportunistic actions at the end of their careers it is shown that there are equilibria where cooperative behavior emerges in this noncooperative setting further a folk theorem result is obtained any individually rational payoffs can be realized as a subgame perfect equilibrium journal of economic literature classification numbers 022 026

the impact of leniency and whistle blowing programs on cartels antitrust authorities have set up leniency programs for cartel members that denounce their collusive agreements these programs help prosecute participants and can thereby deter collusion we compare the impact of reduced fines and positive rewards and argue that rewarding individuals including firm employees can deter collusion in a more effective way we discuss possible adverse effects of whistle blowing programs on firms behavior and particularly on turnover incentives to innovate and cooperation we also explore explanations for the puzzling fact that managers keep incriminating evidence and argue reward programs actually provide additional incentives for keeping such evidence

demons and repentance abstract this paper presents a new explanation for the stability of cartels for a large class of repeated cournot duopoly games with discounting strategies are constructed which have the property that cheating on the cartel is followed by repentance it is shown than these repentance strategies are subgame perfect equilibrium strategies and that in the presence of demons infrequently irrational behavior on the part of both players they lead to pareto superior expected discounted payoffs in comparison with either friedman s trigger strategies or abreu s stick and carrot strategies

data breaches and identity theft abstract an environment is analyzed in which agents join clubs payment networks in order to facilitate trade the networks compile personal identifying data pid so as to match transactors to transactions histories technological limitations cause the networks data management practices to impact each other s incidence and costs of identity theft too much data collection and too little security arise in equilibrium with noncooperative networks compared to the efficient allocation a number of potential remedies are analyzed 1 reallocations of data breach costs 2 mandated security levels and 3 mandated limits on the amount of data collected

intermediaries and payments instruments abstract we study an economy in which intermediaries have incentives to issue circulating liabilities as part of an equilibrium we show that with arbitrarily small transactions costs only the liabilities of intermediaries will circulate and not those of other private sector agents therefore our model connects intermediation activity with the issuance of payments media a connection that has not been made in earlier literature we use our model to suggest a resolution of the banknote underissue puzzle of cagan in d carson ed banking and monetary studies richard d irwin publishing homewood il 1963

attachment to home and efficient purchases of population in a fiscal externality economy abstract this paper examines the efficiency properties of an economy characterized by strategically competing regions and individuals with varying degrees of attachment to home in an otherwise standard fiscal externality setting regional authorities may make interregional transfers in purchasing preferred populations however there is a range of distributions of resources over which neither region makes transfers nevertheless all equilibrium allocations resulting from the nash behavior of regional authorities including those that involve no transfers are efficient therefore in contrast to the standard conclusions of the fiscal externality literature there is no efficiency role for a central authority

incomplete record keeping and optimal payment arrangements abstract we study a random matching absence of double coincidence environment in which people cannot precommit and in which there are two imperfect ways to keep track of what other people have done in the past money and a public record of all past actions that is updated with an average lag we study how the magnitude of that lag affects the allocations that are optimal from among allocations that are stationary and feasible and that satisfy incentive constraints which arise from the absence of commitment and the imperfect ways of keeping track of what others have done in the past journal of economic literature classification numbers e40 c73 d82

money and prices a model of search and bargaining abstract this paper makes commodities divisible and incorporates bargaining into the search theoretic model of money to determine the purchasing power of money or price it is shown that two monetary equilibria always coexist where fiat money is universally accepted the two equilibria differ in price output welfare and the velocity of money sunspot monetary equilibria exist in which money is universally accepted in all states of the economy multiplicity has novel implications on the effectiveness of currency substitution and exchange market intervention journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 e40

finite rationalizability and cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma abstract using the concept of k point rationalizability it is shown that cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma can be explained as the outcome of rational behavior if the beliefs of players are limited in terms of their complexity

renegotiation in the repeated cournot model abstract we explore a new concept of renegotiation proofness in the symmetric repeated cournot model with several players we show that this concept significantly limits the cooperative outcomes that can be sustained in equilibrium in particular the symmetric monopoly outcome cannot be sustained when the number of players is high enough 9 in the case of the linear demand function when the number of players tends to infinity i the collusive benefits that could be sustained are at most four times the cournot benefits and ii the reasonable price that can be sustained in equilibrium tends to the cournot price

imperfect mobility and local government behaviour in an overlapping generations model abstract this paper reconsiders the implications of land value maximizing local governments in an overlapping generations model with imperfect mobility specifically residents develop an attachment to place or location specific capital once they reside in a town for a single time period the analysis shows that attempts by governments to capture the resulting rents from less mobile individuals create inefficient migration leave all workers worse off in an ex ante sense and place relatively high burdens on those workers who have high migration costs public good levels are also inefficiently chosen

credit and money in a search model with divisible commodities this paper examines the competition between money and credit in a search model with divisible commodities it is shown that fiat money can be valuable even though it yields a lower rate of return than the coexisting credit the competition between money and credit increases efficiency the monetary equilibrium with credit pareto dominates the monetary equilibrium without credit whenever the two coexist when a credit is repaid with money the competition also bounds the purchasing power of money from below by that of credit and so eliminates the weak inefficient monetary equilibrium found in previous search models with numerical examples three different monetary equilibria are ranked and the properties of the interest rate are examined

public employee pensions and the local labor budget abstract this paper examines the causes and consequences of public employee pension funding by local governments the pension funding decision is analyzed within the context of two models one where current taxpayers stay and pay employees future retirement benefits and a second model where current taxpayers move and thereby hope to avoid paying future retirement benefits the empirical results test the alternative models for a sample of 60 large u s cities using data for local police and fire services the effects of underfunding on local wages and employment is then examined and found to be significant implications for national pension funding policy are drawn

money is memory abstract this paper examines the sets of feasible allocations in a large class of economic environments in which commitment is impossible following myerson 8 the standard definition of feasibility is adapted to take account of the lack of commitment the environments feature either memory or money memory is defined as knowledge on the part of an agent of the full histories of all agents with whom he has had direct or indirect contact in the past money is defined as an object that does not enter utility or production functions and is available in fixed supply the main proposition is that any allocation that is feasible in an environment with money is also feasible in the same environment with memory depending on the environment the converse may or may not be true hence from a technological point of view money is equivalent to a primitive form of memory journal of economic literature classification numbers e40 c73 d82

price discrimination or uniform pricing which colludes more abstract conventional wisdom attributes different economic outcomes of uniform pricing and price discrimination to the heterogeneity in market conditions or market participants such as differences in demand elasticity or production costs we offer a new explanation for the observed differences that relates to behavioral aspects rather than demand or supply side effects in particular in a symmetric bertrand duopoly laboratory experiment for which theory predicts no differences between the two pricing regimes we find that tacit price collusion is systematically higher under price discrimination than under uniform pricing

liquidity a new monetarist perspective this essay surveys the new monetarist approach to liquidity work in this literature strives for empirical and policy relevance plus rigorous foundations questions include what is liquidity is money essential in achieving desirable outcomes which objects can or should serve in this capacity when can asset prices differ from fundamentals what are the functions of commitment and collateral in credit markets how does money interact with credit and intermediation what can and should monetary policy do the research summarized emphasizes the micro structure of frictional transactions and studies how institutions like monetary exchange credit arrangements or intermediation facilitate the exchange process

wage determination in rural labour markets the theory of implicit co operation abstract this paper argues that the process of determination of daily wage rate in rural labour markets is best seen as an act of implicit co operation among workers using the framework of repeated non cooperative game it is argued that this hypothesis can explain better than existing theories several known features of a typical south asian rural labour market e g the co existence of involuntary unemployment with responsiveness to supply and demand plasticity of wage rate in some cases co existing with rigidity in others etc

private and public circulating liabilities abstract legal and technological changes have made private banknote issue or its electronic equivalent possible we construct a model where private liabilities circulate either by themselves or alongside outside money we provide results on existence and multiplicity of equilibria and characterize dynamics near steady states our results support friedman in that circulating private liabilities are associated with endogenous volatility but implementing friedman s advice the government should ban private currency substitutes causes significant inefficiency the proposal of hayek that the government should leave currency creation to the market also is often constrained suboptimal both public and private circulating liabilities are required for optimality journal of economic literature classification numbers e3 e4 e5

limited commitment money and credit abstract this paper studies limited commitment and adverse selection in an economy in which private liabilities inside money can be used as instruments of intertemporal trade the results suggest that in conjunction with adverse selection the limited commitment problem may affect the behavior of intrinsically higher quality debtors more severely than lower quality ones nonetheless a credit economy may function better when both problems are present than under limited commitment alone adding a fixed amount of money eases frictions associated with the credit market journal of economic literature classification numbers d8 e0 e5

coalition proof nash equilibria ii applications abstract in bernheim peleg and whinston coalition proof equilibria i concepts j econ theory 42 1987 1 12 we proposed the notion of coalition proof nash equilibrium and perfectly coalition proof nash equilibrium as solution concepts for strategic environments in which players can freely discuss their strategies but cannot make binding commitments this paper undertakes applications to several economic problems including the behavior of cournot oligopolists oligopolistic entry deterrence cooperation in finite horizon games and social choice rule implementation

infrastructural competition among jurisdictions abstract this paper models jurisdictions that compete for an industry by building infrastructure more rapidly than their identical neighbors such competition can waste resources lucrative prizes the tax revenues and the value of jobs that an incoming firm would provide stimulate infrastructural spending and waste low initial levels of infrastructure discourage infrastructural competition the paper urges a cautious approach toward federal subsidies of local expenditures on infrastructure

optimal corporate leniency programs this study characterizes the corporate leniency policy that minimizes the frequency with which collusion occurs though it can be optimal to provide only partial leniency plausible sufficient conditions are provided whereby the antitrust authority should waive all penalties for the first firm to come forward it is also shown that restrictions should be placed on when amnesty is awarded though it can be optimal to award amnesty even when the antitrust authority is very likely to win the case without insider testimony