monetary integration and economic reform recent research in contract theory views ownership as a substitute for complete contracts here this approach is applied to monetary integration countries face a coordination problem conducting monetary policy negative spillovers ensure uncoordinated policy generates too high inflation ex ante policy makers can undertake politically costly economic reform this has a positive spillover because it improves the outcome of the monetary policy game ex post contracting over policy may be possible but it supposed that ex ante contracting over reform and monetary policy is not this paper analyses when monetary union is a good substitute for this inability to commit

monetary union and labor market reform abstract policy makers incentives to undertake costly labor market reform depend on the international monetary system a regime of noncooperative monetary policy is compared with monetary union we find that noncooperative policy leads to more reform of factors that affect the inflation bias which regime leads to more reform of factors affecting labor market flexibility depends on the size of monetary policy spillovers and the degree of correlation of supply shocks we show that monetary union produces higher expected inflation but a lower variance of inflation welfare can be higher or lower with monetary union

optimal shutdown decisions in resource extraction abstract in this letter we give an analytic solution to the problem of when to stop production in resource extraction the shutdown decision is irreversible both price and production follow geometric diffusion processes while extraction costs are fixed

evaluating natural resource investments notwithstanding impressive advances in the theory of finance over the past 2 decades practical procedures for capital budgeting have evolved only slowly the standard technique which has remained unchanged in essentials since it was originally proposed see dean 1951 bierman and smidt 1960 derives from a simple adaptation of the fisher 1907 model of valuation under certainty under this technique expected cash flows from an investment project are discounted at a rate deemed appropriate to their risk and the resulting present value is compared with the cost of the project this standard textbook technique reflects modern theoretical developments only insofar as estimates of the discount rate may be obtained from crude application of single period asset pricing theory but see brennan 1973 bogue and roll 1974 turnbull 1977 constantinides 1978 the inadequacy of this approach to capital budgeting is widely acknowledged although not widely discussed its obvious deficiency is its the evaluation of mining and other natural resource projects is made particularly difficult by the high degree of uncertainty attaching to output prices it is shown that the techniques of continuous time arbitrage and stochastic control theory may be used not only to value such projects but also to determine the optimal policies for developing managing and abandoning them the approach may be adapted to a wide variety of contexts outside the natural resource sector where uncertainty about future project revenues is a paramount concern

unemployment labor market reform and monetary union monetary union such as the economic and monetary union in europe emu may affect incentives for labor market reform and thus equilibrium unemployment through several mechanisms if an inflation bias exists there is usually a stronger incentive to reduce equilibrium unemployment through national reform outside rather than inside the emu absent such a bias emu membership could lead to more reform one reason is that reform may increase wage flexibility which can substitute for monetary policy in the emu another reason could be a precautionary motive for low equilibrium unemployment to reduce the utility cost of increased macroeconomic variability in the emu

a note on the empirical effectiveness of formal fiscal restraints abstract an important agrument in the current debate over european monetary integration is that a monetary union requires formal fiscal restraints limiting individual member states budgetary powers to reduce the common monetary authority s risk of having to bail out insolvent member governments this note presents empirical evidence on the effectiveness of fiscal restraints on state budgets in the united states nonparametric tests reveal that fiscal restraints significantly affect the probability of fiscal choices and performance without however preventing extreme outcomes fiscal restraints induce substitution of nonrestricted for restricted debt instruments

how to reform europeâ s fiscal policy framework the current budgetary problems of some eu member states have intensified the debate on europe s fiscal policy framework it is not enough to change the interpretation of the stability and growth pact more fundamental revisions of the eu treaty are needed in order to strike a reasonable balance between longrun sustainability and short run flexibility the ceiling on budget deficits should be conditioned on the government debt level such that the scope for stabilisation policy in downswings is increased in low debt countries in addition the enforcement of the rules should be depoliticised decisions on sanctions against states violating the rules should be transferred from the political level of the council of ministers to the judicial level of the european court of justice

good bad or ugly on the effects of fiscal rules with creative accounting abstract do fiscal rules lead to fiscal adjustment or do they encourage the use of creative accounting this question is studied with a model in which fiscal rules are imposed on measured fiscal variables which can differ from true variables because there is a margin for creative accounting the probability of detecting creative accounting depends on its size and the transparency of the budget the model studies the effects on fiscal policy of a budget rule separating structural from cyclical effects and examines how these effects depend on the underlying fiscal distortion and on the degree of transparency of the budget

transition problems in economic reform agriculture in the north american free trade agreement investigates the effecto of the north american free trade agreement on agriculture in mexico implications on policy design for the absence of efficient capital markets on the welfare costs of reforming gradually on incentive problems created by trade adjustement policies and on the redistribution aspects of policy reform

voting on the budget deficit comment textabstractin this comment it is argued that a balanced budget rule may cause underinvestment as a consequence such a rule is not ex ante efficient in order to achieve the ex ante optimal outcome it would be necessary to add an extra rule for the level of public investment unfortunately however such an investment rule is likely to be very difficult to implement in practice when there are no rules to prevent underinvestment it is no longer clear whether a balanced budget rule is beneficial or not in some cases the cost of low levels of investment outweigh the benefits of a balanced budget

a positive theory of fiscal deficits and government debt this paper considers an economy in which policymakers with different preferences alternate in office as a result of elections government debt is used strategically by each policymaker to influence the choices of his successors if different policymakers disagree about the desired composition of government spending between two public goods the economy exhibits a deficits bias that is debt accumulation is higher than it would be with a social planner the equilibrium level of debt is larger the larger is the degree of polarization between alternating governments and the less likely it is that the current government will be re elected

an analysis of the stability and growth pact we use a stylised model to analyse the stability and growth pact for countries that have formed the european monetary union emu in our model shortsighted governments fail to internalise the consequences of their debt policies for the common inflation rate fully therefore while governments have no incentive to sign a stability pact in the absence of a monetary union they do so with monetary union to restrain this externality with uncertainty a monetary union combined with an appropriately designed pact will be strictly preferred to autonomy with differences in initial conditions conflicts of interest arise we study the nash bargaining solution

the short run shutdown decision when output price and initial wealth are random abstract this paper extends the research of hori 1983 and chavas 1985 by investigating the short run shutdown decision of the competitive firm under output price risk when initial wealth is random central to this endeavor are the results of doherty and schlesinger 1986 and doherty et al 1987 concerning global and local risk premia under multiple sources of risk using a local risk premium two novel and intuitively pleasing results are reported here the reservation price of the shutdown decision varies a according to the diversification of the decision maker s cash flows and b if the decision maker exhibits dara then according to the depth of decision maker s pockets

the new stability and growth pact a first assessment abstract the paper proposes a theoretical model of fiscal policy offering new insights on some of the key policy trade offs involved in the recent reform of the stability and growth pact as suggested by the proponents of the reform greater room for case specific economic judgment in the implementation of the pact may improve welfare in our model these gains occur because the consolidation path implied by the implementation of the pact does not discourage high quality measures in practice however the difficulty to extract true policy intent from budget figures may hinder the qualitative assessment of fiscal policy hence reforming a rules based fiscal framework with a view to enhance its economic rationale would also require closer monitoring a better grasp of the policies underlying the budget and ultimately stricter enforcement in that sense recent reforms are at best unhelpful

simple rules to order irreversible income alternatives sequentially abstract we identify a simple sufficient condition for optimal sequential exploitation of a set of income generating alternatives if these are identical except for differences in the standard deviation of income the condition implies that the optimal ordering is obtained by always setting the most uncertain alternative up front if the alternatives are identical except for differences in flow fixed operating costs then depending on the magnitudes of cost differentials the optimal sequential ordering may or may not be to produce in order of increasing costs

unemployment and labor market reform a contract theoretic approach why do many democracies fail to reform their labor market institutions to answer this question we study the feasibility of reforms that include compensation to insiders for the removal of labor market regulations under asymmetric information a reformer who wants to buy the approval of voters has to pay them an informational rent in addition to the pure costs of compensation that would arise under symmetric information in this setting unemployment may be constrained pareto efficient labor market reforms may fail politically because none of the reform packages proposed wins the approval of a majority of voters we also discuss the role of capital taxation in a reform program jel classification d70 e61 j68

the volatility effect of diaspora s location remittances can transmit volatility from host to home countries for some common patterns of diaspora s geographical distribution in a migration portfolio model the overall risk of volatility of any set of diaspora location is decomposed into a contagion and a concentration risks a diaspora located in more volatile destinations induces a higher contagion risk while a diaspora located in few destination countries increases the concentration risk a series of estimations on a large panel of developing countries over 1995 2015 provide evidence for these two risks estimation of a structural model confirms that the geography of diaspora has an indirect impact on the origin country s aggregate instability through remittances

voting on the budget deficit this paper analyzes a model in which a group of rational individuals votes over the composition and time profile of public spending all voters agree that a balanced budget is ex ante optimal however if there is disagreement between current and future majorities a balanced budget is not a political equilibrium under majority rule under certain conditions a majority of the voters favors a budget deficit and the equilibrium deficit is larger the greater is the polarization among voters copyright 1990 by american economic association

what do deficits tell us about debt empirical evidence on creative accounting with fiscal rules in the eu fiscal rules such as the excessive deficit procedure and the stability and growth pact sgp aim at constraining government behavior milesi ferretti 2003 develops a model in which governments circumvent such rules by reverting to creative accounting the amount of this depends on the reputation cost for the government and the economic cost of sticking to the rule we provide empirical evidence of creative accounting in the european union we find that the sgp rules have induced governments to use stock flow adjustments a form of creative accounting to hide deficits the tendency to substitute stock flow adjustments for budget deficits is especially strong for the cyclical component of the deficit as in times of recession the cost of reducing the deficit is particularly large

valuing oil properties integrating option pricing and decision analysis approaches there are two major competing procedures for evaluating risky projects where managerial flexibility plays an important role one is decision analytic based on stochastic dynamic programming and the other is option pricing theory or contingent claims analysis based on the no arbitrage theory of financial markets in this paper we show how these two approaches can be profitably integrated to evaluate oil properties we develop and analyze a model of an oil property either a developed property or a proven but undeveloped reserve where production rates and oil prices both vary stochastically over time and at any time the decision maker may terminate production or accelerate production by drilling additional wells the decision maker is assumed to be risk averse and can hedge price risks by trading oil futures contracts we also describe extensions of this model that incorporate additional uncertainties and options discuss its use in exploration decisions and in evaluating a portfolio of properties rather than a single property and briefly describe other potential applications of this integrated methodology

optimal sequencing of resource pools under uncertainty abstract this paper characterizes the optimal scheduling of extraction from two reserves under price and production uncertainty an essential step in the analysis is the characterization of the optimal switching date and the associated flexibility value i e the value of the option to switch production from the first to the second reserve