pension portability and labor mobility evidence from the survey of income and program participation abstract the evidence presented in this paper casts doubt on the proposition that pension backloading is responsible for the low job mobility rates observed for pension covered workers it corroborates earlier findings by the authors based on different data that pension covered jobs offer higher levels of compensation than workers can obtain elsewhere and it is this compensation premium rather than non portability that accounts for lower turnover among pension covered workers this evidence is further bolstered by the finding that defined contribution plans which are not backloaded and defined benefit plans bear similar negative relations to mobility

credit market imperfections and patterns of international trade and capital flows this paper offers two simple models to illustrate how corporate governance contractual enforcement and the balance sheet condition of the business sector etc can affect the patterns of international trade and capital flows in the presence of credit market imperfections jel d52 f15 f21 f40

institution induced productivity differences and patterns of international capital flows abstract this paper studies theoretically how the cross country differences in the institutional quality iq of the domestic credit markets shape the patterns of international capital flows when such iq differences cause productivity differences across countries iq affects productivity by changing productivity agency cost trade offs across heterogeneous investment projects which have opposite effects on the investment and capital flows from exogenous productivity differences the overall effect of iq could generate u shaped responses of the investment and capital flows this means that capital could flow from middle income to low income and high income countries and starting from a low iq a country could experience both growth and a current account surplus after an institutional reform more generally the results here offer some cautions when interpreting the evidence on the role of productivity and institutional differences on capital flows and question the validity of using financial frictions as a proxy for the quality of financial institutions

liquidity constraints in a monetary economy this article presents a microfounded model of money with a consumption and an investment market we consider an economy in which only part of the investment returns can be pledged a liquidity constraint arises when the pledgeable part of the returns are not enough to pay for investment costs we show that when the liquidity constraint is binding agents may make a cash downpayment and money can perform two roles as a provider of liquidity services and exchange services the liquidity constraint constitutes a channel though which underinvestment occurs even at low inflation rates

the case for gdp indexed bonds gds indexed bonds this paper seeks to revive the case for countries to insure against economic growth slowdowns by issuing bonds indexed to the rate of growth of gdp we show that gdp indexed bonds could provide substantial benefits in reducing the likelihood of default crises and allowing countries to avoid pro cyclical fiscal policies we simulate the effects of gdp indexed bonds under different assumptions about fiscal policy reaction functions and their output effects and find that they could substantially reduce the likelihood of debt gdp paths becoming explosive the insurance premium would likely be small because cross country comovement of gdp growth rates is low and cross country gdp growth risk is thus largely diversifiable for an investor holding a portfolio of gdp indexed bonds potential obstacles to the emergence of a market for these bonds include the verifiability of gdp data the trade off between insurance and moral hazard and the need for liquidity theory and past experience suggest that financial innovation often requires official intervention and its timing and form are difficult to predict we discuss institutional fixes and suggest an approach for attempting to start up a market eduardo borensztein and paolo mauro

incentive problems and the pattern of international risk sharing abstract this paper analyzes the implications of moral hazard and a lack of contract enforcement for risk sharing across countries and regions we demonstrate that both incentive problems can considerably restrict efficient risk sharing however we show that the cross sectional risk sharing component is much more affected than the intertemporal component we argue that this may help to explain several stylized facts of international risk sharing such as the low degree of insurance against permanent shocks

ready for capital account convertibility abstract this paper investigates whether the impact of capital account convertibility on the long term volatility of economic growth depends on financial development it estimates a system of three simultaneous equations mean growth volatility of growth and financial development this allows for the study of both the impact of capital account liberalization on volatility as well as its direct impact on financial development results indicate that economies with low financial development fall prey to excess volatility arising from capital account openness while capital account openness itself has a significant positive impact on financial development the results are robust to alternative measures of financial development and volatility and to the removal of outliers

the demand for liquid assets corporate saving and international capital flows the recent period of capital outflows from emerging economies has coincided with an increase in their corporate saving in this paper we model corporate saving as a demand for liquid assets by credit constrained firms in a dynamic open economy macroeconomic model we find that the implications of this model are very different from standard models because the demand for foreign bonds is a complement to domestic investment rather than a substitute we show that this complementarity is at work when an emerging economy is on its convergence path or when it has a higher tfp growth rate this framework is consistent with a number of stylized facts found in high growth high investment emerging economies

a long view of real rates in light of the large and sustained rise in real interest rates in the late 1970s and early 1980s this paper reviews i the theoretical discussion on the determination of nominal and real interest rates ii the factors determining real interest rates and iii problems of defining and measuring the real rate we go on to examine the historical record of real interest rates in france germany the uk and the usa since 1875 we find that high real rates since 1980 seem to be a return to a long run norm and it is the period from the second world war to 1979 that represents a more natural period in which to investigate an abrupt change of behaviour for real interest rates copyright 1999 by oxford university press

exchange rate variability and asset trade in popular discussion about the merits of different international monetary arrangements it is often maintained that increased exchange rate variability has a negative influence on international tra

the international transmission of credit bubbles theory and policy we live in a new world economy characterized by nancial globalization and historically low interest rates this environment is conducive to countries experiencing credit bubbles that have large macroeconomic eects at home and are quickly propagated abroad in previous work we built on the theory of rational bubbles to develop a framework to think about the origins and domestic eects of these credit bubbles this paper extends that framework to include many countries and general preferences and uses it to study how nancial integration aects the properties of credit bubbles how the latter are transmitted across countries and the role of international policy coordination

it s what you say not what you pay an experimental study of manager employee relationships in overcoming coordination failure we study manager employee interactions in experiments set in a corporate environment where payoffs depend on employees coordinating at high effort levels the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak link game in the absence of managerial intervention subjects invariably slip into coordination failure to overcome a history of coordination failure managers have two instruments at their disposal increasing employees financial incentives to coordinate and communication with employees we find that communication is a more effective tool than incentive changes for leading organizations out of performance traps examining the content of managers communication the most effective messages specifically request a high effort point out the mutual benefits of high effort and imply that employees are being paid well

evaluating the impacts of foreign direct investment aid and saving in developing countries abstract we develop an open economy model to demonstrate how saving aid and direct investment inflows affect investment under asymmetric information the model that relates a firm s net worth to investment suggests that the relative impact of these financial sources depends on a country s income level financial structure and governance infrastructure we estimate the impact of each source using panel data for 64 developing countries the results provide support for the view that net worth matters and suggest that the influence of financial systems can explain why saving investment correlations are high for developed countries and lower for developing countries

international financial intermediation and aggregate fluctuations under alternative exchange rate regimes this paper presents a two country overlapping generations model in which financial intermediation arises endogenously as an incentive compatible means of economizing on monitoring costs because of the existence of transactions costs money markets in the two countries are segmented and investors have differential access to international credit markets the model is used to generate predictions about the role of international intermediation in determining the nature of business cycle phenomena across alternative exchange rate regimes disturbances are propagated by a credit allocation mechanism which also lends a novel flavor to the model s long run properties

transparency efficiency and the distribution of economic welfare in pass through investment trust games we design an experiment to examine behavior and welfare in a multi level trust game representing a pass through investment in an intermediated market in a repeated game an investor invests via an intermediary who lends to a borrower a pre experiment one shot version of the game serves as a baseline and to type each subject we alter the transparency of exchanges between non adjacent parties we find transparency of the exchanges between the investor and intermediary does not significantly affect welfare however transparency regarding exchanges between the intermediary and borrower promotes trust on the part of the investor increasing welfare further this has asymmetric effects borrowers and intermediaries achieve greater welfare benefits than investors we discuss implications for what specific aspects of financial market transparency may facilitate more efficiency

independent private value auctions bidder behaviour in first second and third price auctions with varying numbers of bidders the symmetric equilibrium of third price auctions is characterized it makes a number of contrasting predictions relative to firms and second price auctions bids exceed private values the marginal effects on bids of an increase in private values is greater than one increasing numbers of bidders reduces bids and risk aversion requires bidding below the risk neutral nash equilibrium in the experiment bidders do not always satisfy the point predictions of the theory however the game theoretic models correctly anticipate at least directionally the important effects of the price rule changes copyright 1993 by royal economic society

north south lending and endogenous domestic capital market inefficiencies abstract we develop an open economy model of intertemporal trade under asymmetric information capital market imperfections are endogenous and depend on a country s stage of economic development relative to the perfect information benchmark north south capital flows are dampened and possibly reversed and world interest rates are lower whereas riskless rates are equalized across borders the domestic loan rate is higher in poorer countries the model can be applied to a number of policy issues including the debt overhang problem the indexation of foreign public debts and the effect of income distribution on growth

taxes institutions and foreign diversification opportunities abstract investors can access foreign diversification opportunities through either foreign portfolio investment fpi or foreign direct investment fdi the worldwide tax regime employed by the us potentially distorts this choice by penalizing fdi relative to fpi in low tax countries on the other hand weak investor protections in foreign countries may increase the value of control creating an incentive to use fdi rather than fpi by combining data on us outbound fpi and fdi this paper analyzes whether the composition of us outbound capital flows reflects these incentives to bypass home and host country institutional regimes the results suggest that the residual tax on us multinational firms foreign earnings skews the composition of outbound capital flows a 10 decrease in a foreign country s corporate tax rate increases us investors equity fpi holdings by approximately 10 controlling for effects on fdi investor protections also seem to shape portfolio choices though these results are not robust when only within country variation is employed

the effect of health insurance on married female labor supply we investigate the effects of employer provided health insurance on the labor supply of married women because health benefits commonly are restricted to full time workers wives who prefer to work short hours but have no alternate source of insurance may work long hours in order to acquire coverage for their families we use data from the april 1993 current population survey benefits supplement and we exploit variation in coverage under husbands health plans to estimate the magnitude of this effect our reduced form labor supply models indicate a strong negative effect of husbands health insurance on wives work hours particularly in families with children this effect persists when we replace husbands insurance coverage with husbands offered insurance and when we use a multinomial logit model that accounts for unobserved heterogeneity in family labor supply preferences

endogenous inequality and fluctuations in a two country model abstract we study a two country version of matsuyama s k matsuyama financial market globalization symmetry breaking and endogenous inequality of nations econometrica 72 2004 853 884 world economy model as in matsuyama s model symmetry breaking can be observed and symmetry breaking generates endogenously determined levels of inequality in addition we show that when the countries differ in population size their interaction through credit markets may lead to persistent endogenous fluctuations

political vs currency premia in international real interest differentials a study of forward rates for 24 countries abstract different approaches to quantifying the degree of capital mobility for a cross section of currencies particularly saving investment correlations and tests of real interest parity have appeared to show a surprisingly low degree of financial integration we use a new data set forward rate data for 24 countries including many small industrialized countries and seven ldcs to decompose the real interest differential into two parts the covered interest differential or political premium and the real forward discount or currency premium the latter in turn can be decomposed into the exchange risk premium and expected real depreciation we find a high degree of capital mobility across political boundaries for most of the g 11 countries plus hong kong and singapore for our sample period of 1982 to 1987 even for most of the other ldcs and smaller industrialized countries for which covered interest parity clearly fails the political premium is not as big a component of the real interest differential as the currency premium france would appear to have higher capital mobility than most by the criterion of real interest differentials but is seen in fact to have low capital mobility by the criterion of covered interest differentials a clear example of the superiority of the latter criterion

capital flows to developing countries this article focuses on the determinants of the large portfolio flows from the united states to latin american and asian countries during 1988 92 cointegration techniques reveal that both domestic and global factors explain bond and equity flows to developing countries and represent significant long run determinants of portfolio flows the article also investigates the dynamics of portfolio flows by estimating seemingly unrelated error correction models global and country specific factors are equally important in determining the long run movements in equity flows for both asian and latin american countries while global factors are much more important than domestic factors in explaining the dynamics of bond flows u s interest rates are a particularly important determinant of the short run dynamics of portfolio especially bond flows to developing countries

moral hazard under commercial and universal banking many claims have been made about the potential benefits and the potential costs of adopting a system of universal banlcing in the united states we evaluate these claims using a model where there is a moral hazard problem between banks and borrowers a moral hazard problem between banks and a deposit insurer and a costly state verification problem under conditions we describe allowing banks to take equity positions in firms strengthens their ability to extract surplus and exacerbates problems of moral hazard the incentives of universal banks to take equity positions will often be strongest when these problems are most severe for many decades commercial banks in the united states have been prohibited from making equity investments in the firms they serve rather they are restricted to providing them with loans in the form essentially of debt contracts this longstanding regulatory restriction1 results in distinctly different roles for bank lenders and equity investors and has had important implications for the entire financial sector the american system of commercial banking presents a sharp contrast with the banking systems of some other countries most notably germany in which banks are permitted to take equity positions under such universal banking arrangements banks can make equity investments as well as loans vote their equity shares and even hold seats on the boards of directors of nonfinancial firms in general they can be actively involved in all aspects of firm decision malqing in germany the control rights the authors have benefitted from the helpful comments of doug diamond joe haubrich ross levine stan longhofer joao santos and an anonymous referee the views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the federal reserve bank of minneapolis or the federal reserve system 1 the key legislation which constrains u s banks equity investments is the glass steagall act of 1933 however a number of other laws also pertain to this issue particularly the bank holding company act of 1956 and its 1970 amendments incidentally there are some important exceptions to the equity investment prohibition in default situations banks are perrnitted to restructure loans into equity positions with the requirement of divestiture after a few years see james 1993 also bank holding companies are permitted to form separately capitalized venture capital subsidiaries for the expressed purpose of investing in start up enterprises john h boyd is a professor of finance in the carlson school of management at the university of minnesota and an adjunct consultant with the federal reserve bank of minneapolis chun chang is an associate professor of finance in the carlson school of management at the university of minnesota bruce d smith is a professor of economics at the university of texas ataustin

capital flows under moral hazard abstract i analyze a model with moral hazard and limited enforcement in a small open economy i find that when state contingent contracting is allowed adding the moral hazard friction improves the model s predictions along several dimensions first it justifies why non contingent debt is an optimal way to finance an emerging economy second it explains the limited consumption risk sharing and high volatile and counter cyclical interest rates third it generates realistic crisis like dynamics in which capital inflows are brought to a halt and interest rates sky rocket the model also has a strong internal propagation mechanism limited enforcement friction alone or together with moral hazard has nearly no effect on the model s performance i also construct a simple empirical test to distinguish between the two frictions and it favors moral hazard over limited enforcement friction

net foreign assets and international adjustment the united states japan and germany abstract this paper examines external adjustment in the usa japan and germany from the perspective of net foreign asset positions it asks two questions what are in the long run the determinants of net foreign asset equilibrium what are in the short run some of the adjustment mechanisms sustaining that equilibrium an analysis of post war data produces two insights first using a cointegration approach the existence of long run net foreign asset equilibrium can be identified it is a function of demographic variables and public debt second deviations from long run equilibrium give rise to feedback through different components of domestic absorption in the three countries

coordination in the presence of asset markets markets aggregate widely dispersed information and direct resources to where they produce the greatest value friedrich a hayek 1945 adam smith 1776 these dual roles of informational and allocative efficiency help explain why asset markets are often used to guide economic activity such as production and investment many economic contexts involving production and investment are characterized by multiple equilibria john bryant 1983 jack hirshleifer 1983 russell w cooper 1999 colin camerer and marc knez 1997 jordi brandts and david j cooper 2006 when asset markets are linked to such contexts it is important to understand what role they play in aiding coordination and selecting equilibria if asset markets obtain both informational and allocative efficiency in a multiple equilibrium con text then they should coordinate the beliefs of economic agents and guide behavior to an efficient equilibrium indeed some evidence suggests that one sided auction markets may facilitate efficient coordination in an environment with multiple equi libria john b van huyck raymond c battalio and richard o beil 1993 vincent crawford and bruno broseta 1998 however the broader question of whether asset markets generally lead to efficient coordination in environments with multiple equi libria remains an open question in this paper we explore experimentally the influence of two sided futures asset markets on behavior and outcomes in an economic activity characterized by multi plicity of equilibria we use laboratory experiments where we can control impor tant features of both the market and the underlying activity and focus on situations where the outcome of the economic activity is sensitive to the behavior of small numbers of agents the economic activity in our setting consists of a coordination game with pareto ranked equilibria in which the payoff to each player is a function of her own choice or input and group output which is some order statistic such as the minimum of all players input choices see van huyck battalio and beil 1990 van huyck battalio and beil 1991 crawford 1995 players all do better if they coordinate on the highest output efficient equilibrium which is pareto optimal but they also prefer to select a lower input if they believe others will do so coordination games of this kind have been applied widely to model economic activity from the relationship between beliefs and output in macroeconomic models cooper 1999 to public good provision hirshleifer 1983 to firm production

an experimental study of uncertainty in coordination games global games and poisson games have been proposed to address equilibrium indeterminacy in common knowledge coordination games where fundamentals are commonly known by all players global games assume that agents face idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals whereas poisson games model the number of actual players as a poisson random variable to capture population uncertainty in large games the present study investigates in a controlled setup using as controls common knowledge coordination games whether idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals or uncertainty about the number of actual players may influence subjects behavior our findings suggest that uncertainty about the number of actual players has a more significant impact on subjects behavior than idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals furthermore subjects behavior under poisson population size uncertainty is consistent with the theoretical prediction of poisson coordination games

risk sharing in a federation with population mobility and long horizons in this paper risk sharing among individuals within and across regions in a federation with population mobility and infinite horizons is considered it is shown that the regional authorities will not fully exploit gains from interregional risk sharing when population mobility is imperfect in the nash equilibrium there is complete risk sharing among the individuals within each region however which corresponds to the policies of the central authority regional authorities who care about their reputation may be able to commit to an efficient allocation it is possible that improvements in the degree of mobility will make such commitments less likely jel classification h77 e61 and f36 le partage du risque dans une federation ou la population est mobile et l horizon temporel long ce memoire examine le partage du risque entre personnes a l interieur des regions et entre regions dans une federation ou il y a mobilite de la population et horizon temporel infini on montre que les autorites regionales n exploiteront pas pleinement les gains en provenance d un partage inter regional du risque quand la mobilite de la population est imparfaite cependant dans un equilibre a la nash il y a partage complet du risque entre les individus de chaque region ce qui correspond aux politiques des autorites centrales les autorites regionales qui tiennent a leur reputation peuvent etre capables de s engager a une allocation efficace il est possible que les ameliorations dans le degre de mobilite rendent ces engagements moins probables

capital market imperfections international credit markets and nonconvergence abstract we consider a two country growth model with international capital markets these markets fund capital investment in both countries and operate subject to a costly state verification csv problem investors in each country require some external finance but also provide internal finance which mitigates the csv problem when two identical except for their initial capital stocks economies are closed they necessarily convergemonotonicallyto the same steady state output level unrestricted international financial tradeprecludesotherwise identical economies from converging and poor countries are necessarily net lenders to rich countries oscillation in real activity and international capital flows can occur journal of economic literatureclassification numbers e00 f00 f34 g14

is there job lock evidence from the pre hipaa era we estimate discrete time hazard models of employment duration and standard logarithmic wage equations using the 1987 and 1990 panels of the survey of income and program participation sipp to examine the phenomenon of job lock we test for job lock using differences in differences approaches among those with and without employer provided health insurance and family members with and without health problems we find no statistically significant evidence of job lock on employment duration or wages using this approach we do find some evidence of shorter employment spells for those with employer provided health insurance and spouse provided health insurance and longer employment spells for those with employer provided health insurance and large families others have interpreted these findings as evidence of job lock however the wage equation results using these measures are not consistent with job lock although anecdotal evidence makes it clear that some workers have been locked into less than optimal jobs because of the combination of health problems and employer provided health insurance our results do not suggest that this phenomenon is pervasive in the u s economy

domestic or global imbalances rising income risk and the fall in the us current account when default leads to exclusion from financial markets the implied loss of consumption smoothing opportunities is more costly when income volatility is high a rise in income risk thus makes default less attractive allowing creditors to relax borrowing limits i show how in an open economy this endogenous financial deepening may reduce aggregate foreign assets in response to a rise in individual income risk against the precautionary savings intuition conditions for this depend on whether default constrains complete or uncontingent contracts the post 1980 rise in us household income risk strongly reduces foreign assets when domestic markets are complete or world interest rates low

a theory of quits and layoffs with efficient turnover this paper answers the efficient turnover literature s long silence regarding the quit layoff distinction treating quits as worker initiated separations and layoffs as firm initiated separations i establish that the existence of layoffs is compatible with optimizing workers and firms forming and dissolving employment matches to exploit all the gains from trade the efficient turnover approach is shown to be consistent with many empirical regularities that distinguish quits from layoffs structural implications of the model are tested on data from the psid

inefficient foreign borrowing a dual and common agency perspective studying the implications of uncoordinated borrowing the paper first looks at whether and when countries borrow too much in the aggregate it then revisits the original sin debate analyzing whether and when equity portfolio investment international portfolio diversification domestic currency denomination and longer maturities enhance borrowing countries access to international lending the paper thereby relates a country s level and quality of access to international capital markets to a variety of institutional features such as the level of domestic savings their location the extent of control rights held by political authorities and the interests of dominant domestic political forces

volatile capital flows and financial integration the role of moral hazard abstract we study a model in which income and capital flows between countries are jointly determined in a world economy with integrated financial markets in a setting that combines risky entrepreneurial activity with moral hazard we find that a shift from autarky to financial integration leads to boom bust cycles in capital flows output and consumption moral hazard causes cycles because financial intermediaries incentivize effort by insisting entrepreneurs take an equity share in their own projects the size of this stake rises with wealth discouraging entrepreneurship and inhibiting capital formation the reverse is true when wealth falls generating cycles

the impact of employer provided health insurance on dynamic employment transitions we estimate the impact of employer provided health insurance ephi on the job mobility of males over time using a dynamic empirical model that accounts for unobserved heterogeneity previous studies of job lock reach different conclusions about possible distortions in labor mobility stemming from an employment based health insurance system a few authors find no evidence of job lock although most find reductions in the mobility of insured workers of between 20 and 40 percent we use data from the national longitudinal survey of youth which includes variables describing the health insurance an individual holds as well as whether he is offered insurance by his employer this additional information allows us to model the latent individual characteristics that are correlated with the offer of ephi the acceptance of ephi and employment transitions our results provide an estimate of job lock unbiased through correlation with positive job characteristics and individual specific turnover propensity we find no evidence of job lock among married males and produce small estimates of job lock among unmarried males of between 10 and 15 percent

financial development growth and the distribution of income a paradigm is presented in which both the extent of financial intermediation and the rate of economic growth are endogenously determined financial intermediation promotes growth because it allows a higher rate of return to be earned on capital and growth in turn provides the means to implement costly financial structures thus financial intermediation and economic growth are inextricably linked in accord with the goldsmith mckinnon shaw view on economic development the model also generates a development cycle reminiscent of the kuznet hypothesis in particular in the transition from a primitive slow growing economy to a developed fast growing one a nation passes through a stage in which the distribution of wealth across the rich and poor widens

bootstrap inference in econometrics the astonishing increase in computer performance over the past two decades has made it possible for economists to base many statistical inferences on simulated or bootstrap distributions rather than on distributions obtained from asymptotic theory in this paper i review some of the basic ideas of bootstrap inference the paper discusses monte carlo tests several types of bootstrap test and bootstrap confidence intervals although bootstrapping often works well it does not do so in every case

employment based health insurance and job mobility is there evidence of job lock the majority of privately insured americans obtain their health insurance through their own or a family member s employment the rationale for employers to provide health insurance is straightforward by pooling the risks of individuals employers can reduce adverse selection and lower administrative expenses in addition they benefit from tax laws allowing businesses to deduct their health insurance costs these advantages of employer provision however must be weighed against the distortions they may generate in individual labor market decisions in particular health insurance may distort job mobility if employees decide to keep jobs they would rather leave for fear of losing coverage for preexisting conditions a possibility that has been termed job lock this paper attempts to quantify the effect of employer provided health insurance on the labor market mobility of individuals the link between employer provided health insurance and

the pecking order of cross border investment abstract is there a pecking order of cross border investment in that countries become financially integrated through some types of investment rather than others using a novel database of bilateral capital stocks for all types of investment fdi portfolio equity securities debt securities as well as loans for a broad set of 77 countries we show that such a pecking order indeed exists the paper focuses on two key determinants of this pecking order information frictions and the quality of host country institutions overall we find that in particular fdi and to some extent also loans are substantially more sensitive to information frictions than investment in portfolio equity and debt securities we also show that the share as well as the size of fdi that a country receive are largely insensitive to institutional factors in host countries while portfolio investment is by far the most sensitive to the quality of institutions this provides new evidence in favor of some hypotheses but contradicts others put forward in the literature on trade in financial assets

credit constraints job mobility and entrepreneurship evidence from a property reform in china this paper provides new evidence on the impact of private property rights on entrepreneurship i explore this issue in the context of a housing reform in urban china that allowed state employees renting state owned housing the opportunity to buy their homes at subsidized prices using the reform as an exogenous change in the capital constraints and mobility costs that inuence individuals entry

international capital flows and credit market imperfections a tale of two frictions the nancial crisis of 2007 08 has underscored the importance of adverse selection in nancial markets this friction has been mostly neglected by macroeconomic models of nancial imperfections however which have focused almost exclusively on the eects of limited pledgeability in this paper we ll this gap by developing a standard growth model with adverse selection our main results are that by fostering unproductive investment adverse selection i leads to an increase in the economy s equilibrium interest rate and ii it generates a negative wedge between the marginal return to investment and the equilibrium interest rate under nancial integration we show how this translates into excessive capital inows and endogenous cycles we also extend our model to the more general case in which adverse selection and limited pledgeability coexist we conclude that both frictions complement one another and show that limited pledgeability exacerbates the eects of adverse selection

financial development and the instability of open economies this paper introduces a framework for analyzing the role of financial factors as a source of instability in small open economies our basic model is a dynamic open economy model with a tradeable good produced with capital and a country specific factor we also assume that firms face credit constraints with the constraint being tighter at a lower level of financial development a basic implication of this model is that economies at an intermediate level of financial development are more unstable than either very developed or very underdeveloped economies this is true both in the sense that temporary shocks have large and persistent effects and also in the sense that these economies can exhibit cycles thus countries that are going through a phase of financial development may become more unstable in the short run similarly full capital account liberalization may destabilize the economy in economies at an intermediate level of financial development phases of growth with capital inflows are followed by collapse with capital outflows on the other hand foreign direct investment does not destabilize

capital market imperfections and forms of foreign operations abstract we develop a model of foreign operations to determine a parent firm s choice between wholly owned subsidiaries and joint ventures and the degree of equity participation in the latter case we introduce capital market imperfections into the model to capture a positive effect of the firm s net worth on investment this effect plays an important role in determining organization forms because the investment level affects the optimal form which determines technology transfer we show that parent firms with strong technological advantages can be controlling shareholders even if they take minority positions in ventures with local firms

institutions and behavior experimental evidence on the effects of democracy a novel experiment is used to show that the effect of a policy on the level of cooperation is greater when it is chosen democratically by the subjects than when it is exogenously imposed in contrast to the previous literature our experimental design allows us to control for selection effects e g those who choose the policy may be affected differently by it our finding implies that democratic institutions may affect behavior directly in addition to having effects through the choice of policies our findings have implications for the generalizability of the results of randomized policy interventions

financial integration entrepreneurial risk and global dynamics abstract how does financial integration impact capital accumulation current account dynamics and cross country inequality we investigate this question within a two country general equilibrium incomplete markets model that focuses on the importance of idiosyncratic entrepreneurial risk a risk that introduces not only a precautionary motive for saving but also a wedge between the interest rate and the marginal product of capital our contribution is to show that this friction provides a simple explanation for the emergence of global imbalances a resolution to the empirical puzzle that capital often fails to flow from the rich or slow growing countries to the poor or fast growing ones and a set of policy lessons regarding the intertemporal costs and benefits of capital account liberalization

financial structure and aggregate economic activity an overview this paper surveys literature that explores the possible links between the financial system and aggregate economic behavior the survey is in two parts the first reviews the traditional work and the second discusses new research copyright 1988 by ohio state university press

the effects of capital controls on international capital flows in the presence of asymmetric information abstract this paper examines the effects of capital controls on the volume and composition of international capital flows in the presence of asymmetric information in the two period small open economy model stochastic second period output depends on the level of first period investment which cannot be verified by international investors domestic agents obtain external funding by borrowing on international capital markets and by selling equity to international investors the paper investigates the effects of various capital controls on the debt equity choice domestic investment and welfare controls on capital inflows are shown to shift the composition of flows from fixed income instruments towards equity and to reduce the overall volume of inflows

health insurance and job mobility theoryand evidence it is widely hypothesized that health insurance deters job mobility because of imperfections in the labor and health insurance markets this paper describes the nature of the welfare loss attributable to such job lock and reviews several studies that empirically test the job lock hypothesis the authors find that estimates of the magnitude and importance of job lock vary studies that support the job lock hypothesis typically report a 20 to 40 reduction in mobility rates depending on worker marital status and gender their own estimates suggest that although job lock is present in the labor market the proportion of workers affected and the magnitude of the welfare loss are less than generally supposed

the external wealth of nations measures of foreign assets and liabilities for industrial and developing countries abstract although capital flows are closely monitored surprisingly little is known about the accumulated stocks of foreign assets and liabilities held by various countries especially in the developing world this paper constructs estimates of foreign assets and liabilities and their equity and debt subcomponents for a sample of 67 industrial and developing countries it characterizes the stylized facts of international balance sheets and asks whether there are trends in net foreign asset positions and shifts in debt equity ratios over time finally it explores the sensitivity of estimated stock positions to the treatment of valuation effects not captured in balance of payments data

the effects of employer provided health insurance on worker mobility the authors use data from the 1984 survey of income and program participation sipp to investigate whether employer provided health insurance reduced worker mobility a phenomenon termed job lock the sipp provides information on variables particularly pension receipt job tenure and spouse job change that were omitted from previous studies and are the authors argue key to the estimation of welldefined mobility models for dual earner married men and women the authors estimate a model that accounts for the interaction between husbands and wives job change decisions for both married and single individuals the results provide fairly strong evidence ofjob lock among women but only weak indications of job lock among men the authors speculate that this finding reflects higher health care use by women than by men

trade and capital flows a financial frictions perspective the classical heckscher ohlin mundell paradigm states that trade and capital mobility are substitutes in the sense that trade integration reduces the incentives for capital to ow to capital scarce countries in this paper we show that in a world with heterogeneous nancial development the classic conclusion does not hold in particular in less nancially developed economies south trade and capital mobility are complements within a dynamic framework the complementarity carries over to nancial capital ows this interaction implies that deepening trade integration in south raises net capital in ows or reduces net capital out ows it also implies that at the global level protectionism may back re if the goal is to rebalance capital ows when these are already heading from south to north our perspective also has

social preferences and strategic uncertainty an experiment on markets and contracts this paper reports experimental evidence on a stylized labor market the experiment is designed as a sequence of three phases in the first two phases p1 and p2 agents face simple games which we use to estimate subjects social and reciprocity concerns together with their beliefs in the last phase p3 four principals who face four teams of two agents compete by offering agents a contract from a fixed menu then each agent selects one of the available contracts i e he chooses to work for a principal production is determined by the outcome of a simple effort game induced by the chosen contract we find that heterogeneous social preferences are significant determinants of choices in all phases of the experiment since the available contracts display a trade off between fairness and strategic uncertainty we observe that the latter is a much stronger determinant of choices for both principals and agents finally we also see that social preferences explain to a large extent matching between principals and agents since agents display a marked propensity to work for principals with similar social preferences

what drives long term capital flows a theoretical and empirical investigation abstract what drives capital inflows in the long run this paper illustrates how capital movements conform surprisingly well to the predictions of a neoclassical model with credit constraints the most intriguing prediction of this class of models is that contrary to a pure neoclassical model domestic saving should act as a complement rather than a substitute to capital inflows nevertheless this class of models keeps the neoclassical prediction that capital should flow to countries where it is most scarce using foreign debt data from 1970 to 1998 i find qualitative and quantitative evidence that supports these predictions

endogenous incentive contracts and efficient coordination we examine the effects of endogenous assignment to incentive contracts on worker productivity assignment to high performance pay via a market mechanism is roughly twice as effective as imposing the same contract exogenously this positive effect is largely offset by a negative effect for workers that endogenously choose low performance pay we decompose the positive effect of endogenous assignment to high performance pay into effects due to selection and strategic anticipation and find that selection has a greater effect than strategic anticipation we use a reverse sort treatment to show that the effect of selection is sufficiently strong to overcome the direct effect of lower performance pay yielding coordination at high effort levels in spite of low incentives

equilibrium convergence and capital mobility in neoclassical models of growth abstract we study convergence in economies integrated by capital trade equilibrium generates transitional dynamics even in the absence of internal adjustment costs or borrowing constraints trade lowers the speed of convergence of capital importing economies but increases the convergence of capital exporting economies

strategic models of sovereign debt renegotiations the sovereign debt literature has often implicitly assumed that all the power in the bargaining game between debtor and creditor lies with the latter this paper explores that assumption by analyzing three game theoretic models of debt renegotiations in two of the models both of which are built on the traditional one sector growth model all the subgame perfect equilibria have an extreme form in which the game s surplus is captured by the creditor the third game has many subgame perfect equilibria that do not have this feature however the roles of various assumptions in all three games are examined

an equilibrium model of health insurance provision and wage determination we investigate the effect of employer provided health insurance on job mobility rates and economic welfare using a search matching and bargaining framework in our model health insurance coverage decisions are made in a cooperative manner that recognizes the productivity effects of health insurance as well as its nonpecuniary value to the employee the resulting equilibrium is one in which not all employment matches are covered by health insurance wages at jobs providing health insurance are larger in a stochastic sense than those at jobs without health insurance and workers at jobs with health insurance are less likely to leave those jobs even after conditioning on the wage rate we estimate the model using the 1996 panel of the survey of income and program participation and find that the employer provided health insurance system does not lead to any serious inefficiencies in mobility decisions

voluntary public health insurance we look at the consequences of allowing public health insurance puhi to be voluntary when its coverage can be supplemented in the market puhi redistributes with respect to risk and income and the market is affected by adverse selection we argue that making puhi voluntary does not lead to its collapse since individuals always participate in it additionally in some cases a voluntary puhi scheme increases market efficiency because participation in it sends a signal to private insurers of an individual s health risk type the welfare consequences depend on the status quo if in the status quo no political support exists for a compulsory puhi making it voluntary constitutes a pareto improvement and in some cases all individuals are strictly better off if instead the status quo implements compulsory puhi making it voluntary then results in less redistribution

signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice we consider extensions of games where some players have the option of signaling future actions by incurring costs the main result is that in a class of games if one player can incur costs then forwards induction selects her most preferred outcome surprisingly the player does not have to incur any costs to achieve this the option alone suffices however when all players can incur costs one player s attempt to signal a future action is vulnerable to a counter signal by the opponent this vulnerability to counter signaling distinguishes signaling future actions from signaling types

financial market globalization symmetry breaking and endogenous inequality of nations this paper investigates the effects of financial market globalization on the inequality of nations the world economy consists of inherently identical countries which differ only in their levels of capital stock each country is represented by the standard overlapping generations model modified only to incorporate credit market imperfection an integration of financial markets affects the set of stable steady states as it changes the balance between the equalizing force of the diminishing returns technology and the unequalizing force of the wealth dependent borrowing constraint the model is tractable enough to allow for a complete characterization of the stable steady states in the absence of the international financial market the world economy has a unique steady state which is symmetric and stable in the presence of the international financial market symmetry breaking occurs under some conditions that is the symmetric steady state loses its stability and stable asymmetric steady states come to exist in the stable asymmetric steady states the world economy is endogenously divided into the rich and poor countries the borrowing constraints are binding in the poor but not in the rich the world output is smaller the rich are richer and the poor are poorer in any of the stable asymmetric steady states than in the unstable symmetric steady state

savings investment and international capital flows abstract the high correlation between national savings and domestic investment rateshas been interpreted as evidence that capital is not internationally mobile this paper surveys the theory and evidence on the relationship between savings and investment in a sample of 23 oecd countries a positive correlation between savings and investment rates is found in both the short and long runs however a wide variety of models generate such co movements in savings and investment in response to exogenous disturbances even under conditions of complete financial markets thus the savings investment correlation provides little evidence on the question of international capital mobility

deposit insurance a reconsideration abstract this paper undertakes a simple general equilibrium analysis of the consequences of deposit insurance programs the way in which they are priced and the way in which they fund revenue shortfalls in our economy the central issue in analyzing deposit insurance is how the government will make up any fdic losses deposit insurance premia matter only in so far as they affect the level of implied fdic revenue shortfalls moreover local variations in the magnitude of fdic losses will generically be irrelevant for the determination of any equilibrium quantities that affect agent welfare however large enough changes in these losses can matter there is no presumption that keeping these shortfalls low is a good idea finally we show that multiple pareto ranked equilibria can be observed the potential for multiplicity of equilibria may depend on components of fdic policy our analysis provides counterexamples to the following propositions 1 actuarially fair pricing of deposit insurance is always desirable 2 implicit fdic subsidization of banks through deposit insurance is always undesirable 3 large fdic losses are necessarily symptomatic of a poorly designed deposit insurance system 4 risk based deposit insurance premia can easily be used to reduce moral hazard problems associated with deposit insurance provision

what lies beneath the euro s effect on financial integration currency risk legal harmonization or trade abstract although recent research shows that the euro has spurred cross border financial integration the exact mechanisms remain unknown we investigate the underlying channels of the euro s effect on financial integration using data on bilateral banking linkages among twenty industrial countries in the past thirty years we also construct a dataset that records the timing of legislative regulatory harmonization policies in financial services across the european union we find that the euro s impact on financial integration is primarily driven by eliminating the currency risk legislative regulatory convergence has also contributed to the spur of cross border financial transactions trade in goods while highly correlated with bilateral financial activities does not play a key role in explaining the euro s positive effect on financial integration

pensions bonding and lifetime jobs a well known if underappreciated finding in the mobility literature is that turnover is much lower in jobs covered by pensions than in other jobs this could result from capital losses for job changes created by most benefit formulas the tendency of turnover prone individuals to avoid jobs covered by pensions or higher overall compensation levels in such jobs a switching bivariate probit model of pension coverage and turnover is developed to estimate the effect of each of these factors the results show that capital losses are the main factor responsible for lower turnover in jobs covered by pensions but self selection and compensation levels also play an important role this is the first direct evidence that bonding is important for understanding long term employment relationships

a computational approach to liquidity constrained firms over an infinite horizon abstract this paper examines the behavior of liquidity constrained firms in a time series it illustrates that cash shortage expectations induce a firm to hold liquid assets which reveal a nonlinear relationship with the degree of financing constraints this paper also argues that financial constraints could create serial correlation in a firm s internal funds even if exogenous shocks last for a single period of time

what price coordination the efficiency enhancing effect of auctioning the right to play a model is proposed to explain the results of recent experiments in which subjects repeatedly played a coordination game with the right to play auctioned each period in a larger group subjects bid the market clearing price to a level recoverable only in the efficient equilibrium and then converged to that equilibrium although subjects playing the game without auctions converged to inefficient equilibria the efficiency enhancing effect of auctions is reminiscent of forward induction but is not explained by equilibrium refinements the model explains it by showing how strategic uncertainty interacts with history dependent learning dynamics to determine equilibrium selection copyright 1998 by american economic association

asset markets as an equilibrium selection mechanism coordination failure game form auctions and tacit communication abstract in this paper we explore the possibility that asset markets provide a means of tacit communication which may allow subjects to coordinate on the payoff dominant equilibrium in an underlying coordination game we find that the existence of a market price for the right to play does communicate information about the equilibrium selection problem specifically behavior never converged to the efficient outcome when subjects were endowed with the right to participate but always converged to the efficient outcome when subjects purchased the right to participate journal of economic literature classification numbers c720 g120

why doesn t capital flow from rich to poor countries an empirical investigation we examine the empirical role of difierent explanations for the lack of ows of capital from rich to poor countries the lucas paradox the theoretical explanations include difierences in fundamentals across countries and capital market imperfections we show that during 1970i2000 low institutional quality is the leading explanation for example improving peru s institutional quality to australia s level implies a quadrupling of foreign investment recent studies emphasize the role of institutions for achieving higher levels of income but remain silent on the speciflc mechanisms our results indicate that foreign investment might be a channel through which institutions afiect long run development

why does capital flow to rich states abstract the magnitude and the direction of net international capital flows do not fit neoclassical models the fifty u s states comprise an integrated capital market with very low barriers to cap

sorting and incentive effects of pay for performance an experimental investigation agency theory highlights losses in productivity that may occur when the interests of owners and employees are imperfectly aligned pay for performance has been proposed as a solution to this proble

communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games costless pre play communication has been found to effectively facilitate coordination and enhance efficiency in games with pareto ranked equilibria we report an experiment in which two groups compete in a weakest link contest by expending costly efforts allowing intra group communication leads to more aggressive competition and greater coordination than control treatments without any communication on the other hand allowing inter group communication leads to less destructive competition as a result intra group communication decreases while inter group communication increases payoffs our experiment thus provides an example of an environment where communication can either enhance or damage efficiency this contrasts sharply with experimental findings from public goods and other coordination games where communication always enhances efficiency and often leads to socially optimal outcomes

international lending with moral hazard and risk of repudiation in this paper i examine the constrained optimal pattern of capital flows between a lender and a borrower in an environment in which there are two impediments to forming contracts the first impediment to contracting arises from the assumption that lenders cannot observe whether borrowers invest or consume borrowed funds this assumption leads to a moral hazard problem in investment the second impediment arises from the assumption that the borrower as a sovereign nation may choose to repudiate his debts the optimal contract is shown to specify that the borrowing country experience a capital outflow when the worst realizations of national output occur this seemingly perverse capital outflow forms a necessary part of the optimal solution to the moral hazard problem in investment

lost jobs and health insurance an analysis of the impact of employment volatility on firm provided health insurance it is an established fact that there are high levels of employment volatility in the us despite the importance of employer provided benefits in the us health insurance system the impact of prior job instability on one s future ability to obtain insurance coverage is not well understood this article finds a negative relationship between the volatility of a worker s employment and her likelihood of receiving firm provided health insurance previous employment volatility reduces each of the four factors necessary to receive such insurance a worker s subsequent chances of getting a job her chances of getting a job in a firm that offers coverage her chances of staying with the firm long enough to become eligible for coverage and her ability to take up insurance if offered the most important impact is on the last her ability to take up insurance if offered lack of employment is not the only and not even the largest barrier to individual coverage under this system this finding has important policy imp

what drives international financial flows politics institutions and other determinants abstract this paper uses a large panel of financial flow data from banks to assess how institutions affect international lending first employing a time varying composite institutional quality index in a fixed effects framework the paper shows that institutional improvements are followed by significant increases in international finance second cross sectional models also show a strong effect of initial levels of institutional quality on future bank lending third instrumental variable estimates further show that the historically predetermined component of institutional development is also a significant correlate of international bank inflows the results thus suggest that institutional underdeveloped can explain a significant part of lucas lucas robert e 1990 why doesn t capital flow from rich to poor countries american economic review papers and proceedings 80 2 92 96 1990 paradox of why doesn t capital flow from rich to poor countries the analysis also does a first step towards understanding which institutional features affect international banking