competition between multiple asymmetric networks theory and applications this paper presents a tractable model of network competition with many firms elastic subscriber demand off net price discrimination call externalities and cost and market share asymmetries we characterize stability in expectations and equilibrium under firm and market level network effects the model is applied to simulate the effects of termination rates market maturity and retail pricing strategies we show that predictions based on duopoly models can be misleading in particular concerning the effects of termination rates

why is on net traffic cheaper than off net traffic access markup as a collusive device abstract mobile telephony networks typically overcharge each other for the termination of incoming calls leading to high prices for off net traffic the existing theory claims that this behavior reduces profits since high termination charges make firms set high marginal prices thus leading to lower subscription fees and reduced profits this paper bridges the gap between theory and reality by incorporating several assumptions in a model that reflects the reality of mobile telephony markets one of the key assumptions is the fact that subscribers tend to place their calls to a limited number of people consisting mostly of friends and relatives the existence of such calling clubs combined with switching costs supports high access fees at the equilibrium we also discuss the implications of our analysis for eu regulation

promoting network competition by regulating termination charges abstract this paper contributes to the policy debate about the optimal termination charge when penetration rates are explicitly taken into account although lowering termination charges towards cost leads to more efficient usage its impact on consumer surplus is ambiguous since it induces an increase in fixed subscription fee through the so called waterbed effect we show that a reduction in termination charge below cost has two opposing effects on consumer surplus it softens competition but also helps to internalize network externalities hence it can decrease or increase penetration depending on whether or not the first effect dominates the second we show that the first effect dominates the second when networks are weak substitutes or the penetration rate is high

international transfer of localized technology and factor income in the ricardo viner trade model the implications of transferring a superior technology localized at foreign factor proportions are examined within the context of the ricardo viner model we show that such a technology transfer decreases the wage rate and labour demand in the recipient country as well as affecting significantly other properties of the ricardo viner model for instance the neoclassical ambiguity concerning the effect on the real wage of a change in the relative commodity price disappears and an increase in a factor endowment need no longer depress the price of the expanding factor le transfert international d une technologie localisee et le revenu desfacteurs deproduction dans le modee ricardo viner du commerce international l auteur examine les impacts d un transfert de technologie etrangere localise e avec ses ratios de facteurs de production dans le contexte d un modele a la ricardo viner on montre qu un tel transfert de technologie reduit le taux de salaire et la demande de travail dans l economie receptrice en plus d affecter de maniere significative d autres proprietes du modele ricardo viner par exemple l ambiguite neo classique quant a l effet d un changement dans les prix relatifs des biens sur le niveau de salaire reel disparait et i accroissement dans la dotation d un facteur n entraine plus la chute du prix du facteur

mobile termination network externalities and consumer expectations we re examine the literature on mobile termination in the presence of network externalities externalities arise when firms discriminate between on and o net calls or when subscription demand is elastic this literature predicts that profit decreases and consumer surplus increases when termination charges increase this is puzzling since in reality regulators are pushing termination rates down while being opposed to do so by network operators this puzzle is resolved when consumers expectations are assumed passive but required to be fulfilled in equilibrium as defined by katz and shapiro aer 1985 instead of being responsive to non equilibrium prices as assumed until now

network competition and interconnection with heterogeneous subscribers abstract this paper analyses two way access pricing in a telecommunications market where consumers are heterogeneous in their demand for calls and firms are allowed to use non linear tariffs we first investigate how the presence of access charges affects the tariffs offered by firms in symmetric equilibrium next we show that under certain conditions each firm s profit is independent of the level of reciprocal access charge and therefore collusion using access charges is not sustainable this result suggests that efficient call allocations can be achieved under a minimal regulatory intervention i e recommending firms set access charges equal to call termination cost

economies of scale and input substitution in public libraries abstract a translog cost function is applied to 1988 data for 194 indiana public libraries to measure economies of scale and input substitution elasticities book circulation measures library output and costs include noncapital expenditures scale economies exist for libraries with circulations up to 55 000 per year larger libraries exhibit constant returns to scale labor books and supplies services are all substitutes with inelastic own price and cross price elasticities

a retail benchmarking approach to efficient two way access pricing no termination based price discrimination jeon gratefully acknowledges financial support from the spanish government under sej2006 09993 econ and a ramon y cajal grant hurkens gratefully acknowledges the financial support from the spanish ministry of science and technology under sej2006 01717 both authors acknowledge support through grant consolider ingenio 2010 csd2006 00016 and through the net institute netinst org

using bill and keep interconnect arrangements to soften network competition abstract this paper demonstrates that low below marginal cost interconnect or access charges can be used to sustain high subscription prices under network competition with two part tariffs and price discrimination this result stands in contrast to other results in the literature suggesting that high interconnect charges can play a collusive role

economies of scale and inefficiency in county extension councils a case for consolidation current funding mission and organizational difficulties question the long run survival of extension and the land grant system consolidation of county extension offices is seen as a possible remedy for extension s problems this paper estimates scale economies and inefficiencies in county extension offices in kansas using parametric and nonparametric techniques large economies of scale and inefficiencies are found based on the empirical results several simulations are performed to measure the short run cost savings associated with consolidation the results reveal that while all counties would experience significant savings from consolidating rural and less populated counties would experience the greatest per unit savings copyright 2001 oxford university press

local intergovernmental competition and the law of 1 n this article proposes an empirical framework based on a synthesis of the seminal law of 1 n and leviathan theories which models the relationship between government spending and the number of jurisdictions in a federal system as determined by the interplay of the costs related to centralized government which fall as the number of jurisdictions increases and the costs of distributive politics which rise as the number of jurisdictions increases using a panel of u s state and local government spending data empirical tests based on this combined framework show that the effect of intergovernmental competition predicted by the leviathan model is partially offset by the law of 1 n this result helps explain the inconsistent findings in the previous empirical literature

competitive price discrimination we model firms as supplying utility directly to consumers the equilibrium outcome of competition in utility space depends on the relationship u between profit and average utility per consumer public policy constraints on the deals firms may offer affect equilibrium outcomes via their effect on u f rom this perspective we examine the profit utility and welfare implications of price discrimination policies in an oligopolistic framework we also show that an equilibrium outcome of competitive nonlinear pricing when consumers have private information about their tastes is for firms to offer efficient two part tariffs

demand for factors of production in municipal police departments as the fiscal crises of municipalities deepen the search for ways to reduce the cost of providing municipal services increases in the production of police service the use of civilians to handle administrative jobs has mcrease in this regard the studies of demand for productive factors in municipal police departments becomes interesting several attempts have been made to estimate input demands or expenditure functions for police departments carr hill and stern 5 chapman et al 161 vatey and philips 231 pbifips and votey 201 greenwood and wadyeki 1121 ohls and wales 18 and ehrlich ll all have estimated the demand for factors as part of a simultaneous equation system most of these studies were not interested in the factor demands they were only necessary to estimate correctly the supply of offense equations same of the equations are no1 carefully specified and justified there are however some single equation studies hirsch 15 borcherding and deacon 4 bergstrom and goodman l and mcdougall i 61 all estimated police demand equations all the above studies use lhe cobb douglas or the ces functional form functional forms that are too restrictive in particular the assumptions of constant elasticity of substitution between inputs is unacceptable when there are more than two inputs second these studies have created police production as nonjoint even though police departments are considered as multiproduct firms producing a variety of outputs philips 19 has employed the constant difference elasticity production function to estimate factor demands in municipal police departments in

can two part tariffs promote efficient investment on next generation networks abstract we analyze if two part access tariffs solve the dynamic consistency problem of the regulation of next generation networks we model the industry as a duopoly where a vertically integrated incumbent and a downstream entrant that requires access to the incumbent s network compete on hotelling s line the incumbent can invest in the deployment of a next generation network that improves the quality of the retail services we have three main results first we show that if the regulator can commit to a policy a regulatory moratorium may emerge as socially optimal second we show that if the regulator cannot commit to a policy it can induce investment only when the investment cost is low third we show that in this case two part tariffs involve very large payments from the entrant to the incumbent

the institutional and political factors which influence taxation the ability of politicians to concentrate the benefits of spending while dispersing the costs of taxation makes taxation attractive distributive politics but the degree to which it is attractive varies widely among the states the objective of the research was to develop a fully specified model of per capita tax revenues of state governments not state plus local and thereby identify the political and institutional factors which cause the attractiveness of taxation to vary the resulting model includes 17 significant explanatory variables which together account for all but 10 of the variation in per capita tax revenue thirteen of the significant variables are institutional or political factors thus providing decisionmakers specific options for influencing the future size of government

leviathan and fiscal illusion in local government overlapping jurisdictions this paper integrates twomodels of local government behavior leviathan and fiscal illusion into theframework of overlapping jurisdictions estimation of the leviathan and fiscalillusion variables without accounting forvertical effects between overlappingjurisdictions results in overestimation ofthe horizontal effects using a medianvoter model and municipal and county datawe find support for the leviathan modelusing traditional tests these effects arelargely offset however when the test isset within the context of the verticalrelationship we find that municipal percapita expenditures and county per capitaexpenditures are symmetricallycomplementary

welfare improving competition for mobile capital abstract this paper constructs a model in which regions provide firms with a public input financed by taxes that residents choose to levy on capital and wage income self interested government officials face incentives to provide the public input because its positive impact on labor and capital productivity leads to larger tax bases the positive relation between tax revenue and the public input is strengthened if capital is mobile across regions government officials engage in expenditure competition leaving residents better off than they would be in the absence of capital mobility to further enhance public sector incentives residents may choose to tax capital income at a positive rate although investment is discouraged

price regulation of access to telecommunications networks abstract without access of networks to each other competition in the telecommunications sector would hardly have spread so quickly such mutual access is necessary for carriers to provide ubiquitous service and enable endusers to call and be called by anybody without subscribing to a system wide monopolist one way access concerns bottleneck inputs provided by an incumbent network to entrants while two way access concerns the interconnection between networks whereas one way access regulation is exclusively driven by containment of market power two way access is additionally affected by collusion possibilities among the numerous pricing rules discussed none clearly dominates this article provides a roadmap vis a vis the competing policy objectives for access price regulation

large is beautiful the welfare effect of technology transfer reconsidered abstract this paper demonstrates that a technology transfer via foreign owned firms always reduces the host country s national income if the new technology is localized in the atkinson stiglitz sense at a capital labor ratio higher than prevails locally although developing countries can mitigate this negative impact of technology transfer by restricting the activities of foreign firms we argue that complete capital market liberalization yields even higher national income

government size and decentralization evidence from disaggregated data public choice models of government behavior draw heavily from the economics literature of industrial organization following the argument that private monopoly in production leads to relatively high prices and profits the public choice literature suggests that similar analysis of government structure may be useful in the modeling of public production brennan and buchanan 3 4 model government as leviathan a public entity which seeks to maximize its revenue the leviathan hypothesis is motivated by the desire to successfully understand government behavior as well as to recommend effective means of controlling its behavior among other suggestions brennan and buchanan offer the private monopoly corollary that competition among different fiscal units is an effective means of controlling the aggregate size of leviathan the resulting decentralization hypothesis is total government intrusion into the economy should be smaller ceteris paribus the greater the extent to which taxes and expenditures are decentralized 3 15 this paper tests the decentralization hypothesis by examining a data set which considers all units of government by disaggregating federal spending on a state by state basis we construct a cross section of state data on federal state and local government activity all previous examinations of the decentralization hypothesis at the level of the state have excluded the activity of the federal government however given that federal government expenditures greatly exceed those of state and local governments previous cross sectional tests of the decentralization hypothesis may have employed grossly incomplete measures of governmental activity in each state our study provides two extensions to the debate one by testing the decentralization hypothesis at the level of state aggregation we suggest that previous cross sectional studies do not report strong evidence in support of the hypothesis because of their exclusion of the federal sector two our study suggests the importance of including all potential competitors in the government arena state local and federal governments our study does not solve all issues concerning aggregation

is there a bias toward excess in u s government budgets or deficits do the political institutions of a majoritarian representative democracy and in particular those of the united states systematically produce either levels of public spending or budget deficits that are excessive should u s political institutions be altered by constitutional amendment to deal with these problems i will start by examining the issue of public spending and then turn to the question of budget deficits

leviathan in the crosshairs following in the spirit of the leviathan hypothesis this paper empirically examines how the degree of local government market power influences efficiency in the local public sector market power is measured by the number and relative size distribution of similar government units in the same market area to avoid confusing market power with the comparative efficiency or superiority of larger sized organizations the relative size distribution of the individual government unit is held constant in the empirical analysis in the empirical test aggregate property values serve as the measure of efficiency the empirical results suggest that aggregate property values are lower and thus efficiency suffers in more concentrated municipal market areas ceteris paribus thus providing some evidence for leviathan type governments in connecticut

variations on invariance or some unpleasant nonparametric arithmetic the nonparametric approach to production or demand analysis involves testing data for compatibility with restrictions from theory this avoids reliance on particular functional forms when the data are not consistent with utility or profit maximization adjustments in the data using linear programming can restore consistency such adjustments have been interpreted as taste changes or measures of technical change and technical change bias this paper describes nonparametric approaches and shows that the programming methods that have been used yield results that are not invariant to the scaling of prices and quantities a solution is proposed that solves the invariance problem

competition leverage how the demand side affects optimal risk adjustment we study optimal risk adjustment in imperfectly competitive health insurance markets when high risk consumers are less likely to switch insurer than low risk consumers insurers then have an incentive to select even if risk adjustment perfectly corrects for cost differences to achieve first best risk adjustment should overcompensate insurers for serving high risk agents second we identify a trade off between efficiency and consumer welfare reducing the difference in risk adjustment subsidies increases consumer welfare by leveraging competition from the elastic low risk market to the less elastic high risk market third mandatory pooling can increase consumer surplus further at the cost of efficiency

local decentralization and local economic growth a cross sectional examination of us metropolitan areas this paper builds on the growing empirical literature that explores the relationship between government structure and economic growth it uses a new data set of 314 us metropolitan areas to examine the relationship between local decentralization and local economic growth the results indicate a negative relationship between the central city share of metro area population and economic growth and a positive relationship between both the number of municipalities per 100 000 residents and the number of counties per 100 000 residents and economic growth those findings provide support for the hypothesis that decentralization enhances economic growth

examining the relationship between municipal consolidation and cost reduction an instrumental variable approach abstractthis study explores the cost reduction effects of local government consolidation using data from japanese municipalities we use municipal panel data from japan for the years 2000 2005 and 2010 a data set including numerous consolidation cases reverse causality between consolidation decisions and size of municipal expenditure is a concern in the voluntary consolidation of local governments an instrumental variable iv methodology is employed to deal with possible endogeneity associated with consolidation decisions the main finding is that municipal current expenditure per capita increases immediately after consolidation but then gradually declines because consolidation seems to increase per capita expenditure in the absence of the effect of this long term declining trend incorporating this trend into estimation is crucial in cost efficiency analysis of consolidation it is also shown that conventional panel data regressions yield biased consolidation effects suggesting the superiority o

supply demand and technology in a multiproduct industry texas field crops the purpose of this paper is to examine the structure of agricultural production for six texas field crops cotton grain sorghum wheat corn rice and hay which account for nearly 95 of recent field crop value specific objectives are to a test the structure of technology to determine i if output and input utilization choices for individual products are independent of production decisions about other outputs and ii if products and or inputs can be consistently aggregated b estimate a coherent set of interrelated supply functions for the six commodities and input demand functions for fertilizer and hired labor because the empirical focus of this paper is specific to one state the results will be of limited value for interpreting specific production relationships elsewhere however the problem is of common interest in production agriculture and the techniques used demonstrate an important application of dual modeling

network competition in nonlinear pricing previous research assuming linear pricing has argued that telecommunications networks may use a high access charge as an instrument of collusion i show that this conclusion is difficult to maintain when operators compete in nonlinear pricing i as long as subscription demand is inelastic profits can remain independent of the access charge even when customers are heterogeneous and networks engage in second degree price discrimination ii when demand for subscriptions is elastic networks may increase profits by agreeing on an access charge below marginal cost relative to cost based access pricing welfare is typically increased by setting the access charge above marginal cost

nonlinear pricing with random participation the canonical selection contracting programme takes the agent s participation decision as deterministic and finds the optimal contract typically satisfying this constraint for the worst type upon weakening this assumption of known reservation values by introducing independent randomness into the agents outside options we find that some of the received wisdom from mechanism design and nonlinear pricing is not robust and the richer model which allows for stochastic participation affords a more general empirical specification we develop a multidimensional methodology for addressing this class of problems providing two important applications to nonlinear pricing first with nonlinear pricing by a monopolist the familiar nodistortion at the top result persists but in tandem with the surprising conclusion that there is either no distortion at the bottom or bunching second in a simple model of product differentiated duopolists competing with nonlinear pricing we show that generally the duopoly outcome is qualitatively similar to the monopoly outcome however when marginal costs are symmetric and competition is sufficiently intense distortions disappear and the equilibrium outcome takes a remarkably simple form efficient quality allocations with cost plus fee pricing

federalism and the growth of government revisited recent research in public economics has been testing for a relationship in federal states between the decentralization of governments and the total and individual size of government shares in gnp according to one view economic theory offers no unambiguous empirical predictions provided there is a competitive political environment at each government level the rivalry between political parties will result in an outcome that conforms approximately to the preferences of the citizens as interpreted in the conventional median voter model under this scenario it is not certain what differences might be caused by more decentralization oates 1985 to determine any difference we would have to possess considerable knowledge about the distribution of tastes and the location of the populace it has been hypothesized nevertheless that increased decentralization could result in a higher level of government expenditure quoting the economic historian john wallis oates 1985 749 suggests that since individuals have more control over public decisions at the local than at the state or national level they will wish to empower the public sector with a wider range of functions and responsibility where these activities are carried out at more localizedlevels of government

how does fiscal decentralization affect aggregate national and subnational government size abstract beyond conducting the usual regression analysis of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and aggregate government size national and subnational combined this paper makes the first attempt to examine how different fiscal decentralization measures affect the sizes of national and subnational state and local combined governments an econometric analysis using panel data from 32 industrial and developing countries 1980 1994 finds that 1 expenditure decentralization leads to smaller national governments larger subnational governments and larger aggregate governments 2 revenue decentralization increases subnational governments by less than it reduces national governments hence leads to smaller aggregate governments and 3 vertical imbalance tends to increase the sizes of subnational national and aggregate governments

public education supply and student performance this paper develops a model of public exchange whereby voters and education policy makers exchange with one another within school districts because school district consolidation lowers alternatives to voters parents consolidation is hypothesized to raise public education spending because weakened intergovernmental competition allows policy makers to promote their own utility rather than that of constituents models of public education spending and academic performance are estimated over 1988 1990 while evidence indicates little support for the traditional treatment of the leviathan hypothesis that greater competition lowers public spending this paper argues that education spending by itself does not fully provide a valid test of the leviathan hypothesis since spending by itself does not necessarily indicate the quality of public education programmes empirical evidence indicates that greater numbers of schools and school districts promote higher student achievement as evidenced by higher math and v

on the level of persistence in government size time series evidence and implications for the us for most developed countries the study of the long term trend of government size has become a major issue this study employs advanced time series techniques to investigate the long run properties of the government size series for the us by applying the persistence measures developed by campbell and mankiw quarterly journal of economics 102 857 80 1987 and cochrane journal of political economy 96 893 920 1988 this study finds big long term persistence in government size at all levels of the us government the finding indeed explains the fact that the us has gradually taken steps to control the size of government in the 1990s

calling circles network competition with non uniform calling patterns we introduce a flexible model of telecommunications network competition with nonuniform calling patterns accounting for the fact that customers tend to make most calls to a small set of similar people equilibrium call prices are distorted away from marginal cost and competitive intensity is affected by the concentration of calling patterns contrary to previous predictions jointly profit maximizing access charges are set above termination cost in order to dampen competition if calling patterns are sufficiently concentrated we discuss implications for regulating access charges as well as on and off net price discrimination

empirical evidence on the relationship between mobile termination rates and firms profits the theoretical literature on mobile termination rates mtrs is inconclusive on how the level of mtrs affects overall consumer charges and firms profits we show that when firms offer bundles with fixed included usage a tariff structure that has become more common in recent years an identical change in all mtrs does not affect firms retail prices or profits we use a panel dataset from saturated european markets to estimate the effect of mtrs on mobile operators profits as predicted by the theoretical model we cannot reject the fact that firms profits are unaffected by an identical change in all mtrs

termination fees revisited we reconsider the question of the optimal level of termination fees between communication networks in the context of heterogeneous usage and elastic participation the interaction between these two features yields new insights in our model i the profit maximizing reciprocal termination fee is above marginal cost ii the welfare maximizing termination fee is also above cost iii the welfare maximizing termination fee is below the profit maximizing one in the absence of termination based price discrimination but can be above it otherwise

efficiency in the provision of public services a data envelopment analysis of uk public library systems this study assesses the relative efficiency of public library services by examining the relationship between library inputs and library outputs in multi outlet library systems differences in the size of the area and population served are reflected in differences in the number of outlets and mix of outlet types using a data envelopment analysis which controls for the accessibility of library resources this study derives technical and overall efficiency scores for 99 uk public library systems the data are survey observations for 1995 1996 over the decade leading up to the survey library services had been subject to a protracted period of budget restraint and contraction in most areas of activity the distribution of efficiency scores is skewed implying that although many library systems are efficient or near efficient there is a tail of inefficient operations inefficiency is mainly but not exclusively associated with over subscription to serial publications many library systems are scale ineffic

a reconsideration of the welfare economics of a free trade zone abstract this paper presents a model of a free trade zone which incorporates the fact that such zones are often established by government subsidies designed to promote non traditional exports in our model the condition is derived under which the establishment of a free trade zone can increase welfare regardless of the relative factor intensity of a zone based industry however the relative factor intensity of a free trade zone plays a crucial role in determining the change in welfare following economic growth and foreign investment

overlapping jurisdictions substitutes or complements this paper presents a simple model of the demand relationship between the activities undertaken by overlapping governments and uses the framework to estimate the relationship between municipal and county expenditures the empirical results reveal a complementary relationship between county and city general expenditures any public sector expansion effects of monopoly power at the county level will therefore be reinforced by greater municipal spending further expanding the total size of the local public sector on the other hand changes in county police and roads expenditures appear to have no strong stable impact on municipal police and roads expenditures respectively providing no reinforcing or offsetting municipal spending responses to decisions at the county level

learning by doing changes in industrial structure and trade patterns and economic growth in a small open economy abstract this paper presents a simple dynamic model which allows for changes in both industrial structure and trade patterns during the process of economic growth learning by doing in the producer service sector is the source of endogenous growth interesting interdependences between economic growth and the structure of the economy are obtained economic growth is accompanied by changes in industrial structure and comparative advantage while changes in industrial composition of the manufacturing sector accelerate economic growth furthermore this paper analyzes the relationship between economic growth and the endowment structure and the effects of two types of technology transfers on economic growth

nonlinear pricing of telecommunications with call and network externalities abstract this paper investigates how call and network externalities affect a monopolist s optimal nonlinear tariff in a two way telecommunication service market where consumers valuations for outgoing and incoming calls are positively correlated and the firm is not allowed to charge incoming calls it is shown that in contrast to the traditional efficiency on the top result all subscribers including those with the highest willingness to pay make suboptimal quantities of calls in the equilibrium the presence of call externalities may result in the existence of no call making subscribers in equilibrium also the firm may have incentives to sell the service below costs to some low valuation consumers in order to take advantage of the effect of network externalities

centralization and government competition this paper examines the relationship between government size and fiscal centralization with specific focus on the separate influences of centralism and fragmentation on the size of public sector in the united states the empirical findings at the national level provide support to the hypothesis that fiscal decentralization leads to a smaller government the findings at the state and local levels however show no empirical relationship between government size and the degree of centralization

the structure of u s agricultural technology 1910 78 this paper utilizes 1910 78 time series data and a single product aggregate translog profit function to measure the structure of u s agricultural technology duality relations are used to devise a multifactor measure of biased technical change a measure of nonhomotheticity is introduced which indicates the effects scale change has had on aggregate cost shares the empirical analysis finds that different nonhomothetic technologies characterized the prewar and postwar periods differing technical change biases are consistent with relative price trends during the two periods showing that the long run structure of u s agricultural technology has been consistent with the hayami ruttan induced innovation theory

the general validity of the heckscher ohlin theorem despite a number of attempts to extend it the heckscher ohlin theorem remains woefully restricted in terms of the generality of the assumptions needed for its proof in its traditional form as a statement about the commodity composition of trade the theorem is valid only in the highly abstract environment of the two factor two good twocountry model that has been the mainstay of trade theory for half a century a weaker version of the theorem involving the factor content of trade rather than its commodity composition has been proved for any number of factors goods and countries but this generality has so far been bought only at the cost of other and perhaps equally restrictive assumptions 2 the purpose of this paper is to provide statements and proofs of the heckscher ohlin h o theorem that are more general than those currently available the approach taken is similar to that used in my 1980 article for an extension of the theory of comparative advantage in terms of correlations between autarky prices and trade in section i i lay out the assumptions on which the analysis is based these assumptions provide the outlines of a reasonably general model in which there may be any numbers of goods and factors and in which factor prices may be equalized or not trade impediments in the form of tariffs or export taxes are permitted though transportation costs are not 3 in section ii i discuss the difficulty of inferring the factor content of trade in a world of unequal factor prices and i provide several alternative definitions of that concept for use later in the paper these together with the assumptions of section i are used in section iii to prove a theorem on the value at autarky prices of the factor content of trade in section iv this theorem is used to prove a first corollary that makes a more direct statement about the pattern of trade it says that worldwide there must be a negative correlation between the factor content of trade by factor and country and the corresponding autarky factor prices it is precisely these autarky factor prices that constitute the ohlin measure of factor scarcity therefore the corollary provides a formal statement of the general idea that countries tend to export the services of those factors which they have in relative abundance and it may be regarded as a generalization of the factor content version of the h o theorem finally a generalization of the commodity version of the theorem is proved in section v the concept of a covariance is generalized university of michigan i have benefitted greatly from the comments of paul degrauwe wolfgang mayer michael mussa carl simon and robert stern as well as others who participated in seminars at the universities of michigan chicago and cincinnati and at the national bureau of economic research an anonymous referee also made valuable comments with additional goods and factor price equalization the theorem runs afoul of the indeterminacy of production and trade noted by paul samuelson 1953 and james melvin 1968 without factor price equalization trade impediments and intermediate production can cause reversals of the pattern of trade as shown in my 1979 article if additional factors and countries are also added it becomes difficult even to state the theorem let alone to prove it 2melvin stated such a theorem for the three good two factor case and jaroslav vanek 1968 proved it for the general case but only by assuming factor price equalization trent bertrand 1972 and jon harkness 1979 were able to drop the factor price equalization assumption but replaced it with restrictions on consumption of either goods or factors by country of origin it is unclear to me however that these restrictions can ever be met in a model that is otherwise plausible harkness 1978 has also used the factor content version of the theorems as the motivation for a regression equation relating commodity trade to factor intensities this bears some resemblance to my analysis below in section v see however james anderson 1981 and edward leamer and harry bowen 1981 who have criticized his result with a reply by harkness 1981 3for ease of exposition i do not allow here for transportation costs these were included in an earlier version of this paper following the technique in my 1980 article

tariffs foreign capital and national welfare with sector specific factors abstract this paper examines the effect on national welfare of an endogenously determined inflow of foreign capital in the context of a well known model with sector specific inputs both for the case of unrestricted international trade and investment and in the presence of a tariff the second best problem of the optimal tax on foreign investment for a given tariff level is also investigated by application of the concept of shadow prices for primary factors in distorted open economies the results obtained are then related to analogous propositions derived previously for the standard heckscher ohlin model

government size decentralization and growth empirical evidence from italian regions abstractthe aim of this study is to empirically assess the relationship among government size decentralization and economic growth in italian ordinary regions the empirical analysis based on a panel dataset on italian regions provides evidence in support of the existence of an inverted u shaped relationship between public expenditure and economic growth that depends on the degree of fiscal decentralization in particular according to our estimates on the specific italian case the optimal degree of decentralization is around 32 while the optimal government size value is approximately 52

a nonparametric analysis of agricultural technology u s agricultural technology and technical change are analyzed nonparametrically under cost minimization and profit maximization based on annual data for 1948 83 various separability hypotheses concerning the aggregate production function for u s agriculture are investigated the proposed nonparametric approach also provides some insights into the nature of technical change

trade protectionism in australia its growth and dismantling protection from import competition was a defining feature of the birth of the australian federation in 1901 for the next 70 years the extent of protection grew and broadened from mainly tariffs to also involving import licencing after world war ii there was a one off 25 across the board cut in tariffs in 1973 and some dismantling of agricultural subsidies but that was followed by the re imposition of import quotas for the most protected manufactured goods then in the mid 1980s a new reformist government began a long process of dismantling all protection as part of an overall economic reform program that also involved de regulation privatization and moving to a flexible exchange rate the rewards included three decades of faster economic growth and an unprecedented rise in australians living standards this paper provides a history of economic thought on the pros and cons of protectionism for the small distant natural resource rich australian economy and a survey of the literature on the extent effects and political economy reasons behind the growth of australian protection and its eventual dismantling

what should government do problems of social cost externalities and all that public choice as a field introduced the framework for a methodical economic analysis of political markets the output of these markets of course is reflected by the role that government plays that is specifically true with respect to the organization of economic activity gordon tullock has studied a myriad of aspects of this topic for more than half a century we examine his answers to the question of what should government do and how they have influenced and are still impacting the discussion on the proper role of government in the economy

network interconnection in telecommunications this paper discusses industries such as telecommunications where firms each have their own customers and must interconnect with other firms to provide a comprehensive service two scenarios are considered i the case of a symmetric unregulated industry and ii the case of an industry with a dominant regulated incumbent in the first provided there is sufficient product differentiation it is shown that firms agree to set interconnection charges above associated costs in order to obtain the joint profit maximising outcome in the second a formula for the welfare maximizing interconnection charge is derived relations with the efficient component pricing rule are discussed

network competition i overview and nondiscriminatory pricing we develop a model of unregulated competition between interconnected networks and analyze the mature and transition phases of the industry in this deregulated environ ment networks pay negotiated or regulated access charges to each other and com pete in prices for customers we show that a competitive equilibrium may fail to exist for large access charges or for large network substitutability and that freely negotiated access charges may prevent effective competition in the mature phase of the industry and erect barriers to entry in the transition toward competition last we examine the meaning and impact of policies such as the efficient component pricing rule

does fiscal decentralization constrain leviathan new evidence from local property tax competition this paper reexamines whether fiscal decentralization constrains leviathan government using panel data for pennsylvania we compare actual property tax rates to the leviathan revenue maximizing rates for municipalities school districts and counties using spatial econometric methods we also estimate the degree of spatial dependence at the three levels of local government we find that fiscal decentralization results in stronger intergovernmental competition and lower tax rates we also find evidence of collusion among school districts that exhibit high interdependence but also high tax rates this calls into question the current literature s blind use of spatial dependence as a measure of intergovernmental competition

centralization and the size of government in canada the determinants of the growth of government in canada over the period 1926 90 are examined of particular interest is whether changes in the degree of centralization have affected the public sector s share of gdp unlike other studies using time series data the effect of decentralization toward the provincial state and toward the local levels of government are measured separately empirical estimates provide strong support for the conclusion that citizen mobility acts as an important constraint on the growth of government

network competition with income effects i generalize the workhorse model of network competition to include income effects in demand empirical work has shown income effects to be positive and statistically significant income effects deliver theoretical results consistent with regulatory concern about excessive termination rates unregulated network operators competing in nondiscriminatory retail contracts negotiate termination rates above cost for any positive income effect this also holds when operators discriminate between on net and off net calls if networks are differentiated operators profit from increasing termination rates above cost under second degree price discrimination if a sufficient share of consumers prefer on net off net contracts and their subscription demand is relatively inelastic