informational constraints and the overlapping generations model folk and anti folk theorems this paper analyses the sustainability of inter generational transfers in samuelson s consumption loan model when agents are imperfectly informed about past events we find that with mild informational constraints transfers cannot be supported by pure strategy equilibria mixed strategies allow transfers to be sustained even if agents have little information so that a version of the folk theorem holds however these equilibria are not robust if each agent s utility function is subjected to a small random perturbation as in harsanyi 1973 these mixed strategy equilibria unravel and only the zero transfer allocation survives as the unique rationalizable outcome this result is an example of mixed strategy equilibrium of an extensive form game which cannot be purified

how strong is the causal relationship between globalization and energy consumption in developed economies a country specific time series and panel analysis we examine the causal relationship between globalization economic growth and energy consumption for 25 developed economies using both time series and panel data techniques for the period 1970 2014 due to the presence of cross sectional dependence in the panel countries from asia north america western europe and oceania we employ the pesaran 2007 cips test to ascertain unit root properties the westerlund 2007 cointegration test indicates the presence of a long run association between globalization economic growth and energy consumption long run heterogeneous panel elasticities are estimated through the pesaran 2006 common correlated effects mean group cmg estimator and the eberhardt and teal 2010 augmented mean group amg estimator the causality between the variables is examined via dumitrescu and hurlin 2012 and emirmahmutoglu and kose 2011 granger causality tests the empirical results reveal that for most countries globalization increases energy consumption in the usa and uk globalization is negatively correlated with energy consumption the causality analysis indicates the presence of the globalization driven energy consumption hypothesis this empirical analysis suggests insightful policy guidelines for policy makers using globalization as an economic tool to utilize energy efficiently for sustainable economic development in the long run

the environmental consequences of globalization a country specific time series analysis abstract the dynamic relationships among trade income and the environment for developed and developing countries are examined using a cointegration analysis results suggest that trade and income growth tend to increase environmental quality in developed countries whereas they have detrimental effects on environmental quality in most developing countries it is also found that for developed countries the causal relationship appears to run from trade and income to the environment a change in trade and income growth causes a consequent change in environmental quality for most developing countries on the other hand the causality is found to run from the environment to trade and income however the opposite causal relationship holds for china

is trade good or bad for the environment sorting out the causality we seek to contribute to the debate over globalization and the environment by asking what is the effect of trade on a country s environment for a given level of gdp we take specific account of the endogeneity of trade using exogenous geographic determinants of trade as instrumental variables we find that trade tends to reduce three measures of air pollution statistical significance is high for concentrations of so2 moderate for no2 and lacking for particulate matter although results for other environmental measures are not as encouraging there is little evidence that trade has a detrimental effect on the environment

rational inattention dynamics inertia and delay in decision making we solve a general class of dynamic rational inattention problems in which an agent repeatedly acquires costly information about an evolving state and selects actions the solution resembles the choice rule in a dynamic logit model but it is biased towards an optimal default rule that does not depend on the realized state we apply the general solution to the study of i the sunk cost fallacy ii inertia in actions leading to lagged adjustments to shocks and iii the tradeoff between accuracy and delay in decision making

environmental kuznets curve for co2 emissions the case of arctic countries abstract the main new contribution of this paper is to examine the environmental kuznets curve ekc hypothesis using time series data at individual country levels empirical focus is on the assessment of income per capita on co 2 emissions in the arctic countries by taking into account the role of energy consumption an autoregressive distributed lag ardl modeling approach to cointegration is applied to annual data for the period 1960 2010 the results provide little evidence of the existence of the ekc hypothesis for the arctic countries we also find that economic growth has a beneficial effect on the environment only in some arctic countries finally energy consumption is found to have a detrimental effect on the environment in most countries

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

the pollution concern in the era of globalization do the contribution of foreign direct investment and trade openness matter abstract this analysis aims to treat the contribution of the foreign direct investment inflows and trade openness to environmental degradation drawing on the data for 27 african countries over the period from 1990 to 2013 we develop an empirical model based on a set of panel methods this approach includes westerlund 2007 panel cointegration technic common correlated effects mean group cce mg estimation procedure and the granger causality test in terms of long term causality our findings reveal bidirectional long term causality between co2 nox emissions gdp trade openness and foreign direct investment besides in the short run the results recorded a unidirectional causality running from gdp to co2 and from fdi to co2 however bidirectional causality nexus was detected between trade openness and co2 additionally the findings portray bidirectional causality between gdp and nox and between trade openness and nox while a unidirectional causality from foreign direct investment to nox our analysis substantiates the importance of the foreign direct investment inflows and trade openness in mitigating the adverse effect of heavy pollutant activities and resolving the environmental puzzle growing without polluting consistent with the millennium development goals mgds of the un background

trade openness and environmental quality international evidence we examine the relationship between trade openness and the environment in a cross country panel using the emission of particulate matter pm10 as the basic indicator of environmental quality the panel cointegration test results show a long run relationship between particulate matter emissions trade openness and economic growth we find that increased trade openness leads to environmental degradation for the global sample however the results differ according to the income of countries trade openness has a benign effect on the environment in high income countries but a harmful effect in middle and low income countries these results are generally robust to different measures of trade openness and environmental quality interestingly and significantly the results are consistent with the popular notion that rich countries dump their pollution on poor countries finally we find evidence of a feedback effect between trade openness and particulate matter emissions for the global sample as well as different income groups of countries

managerial incentive problems a dynamic perspective the paper studies how a person s concern for a future career may influence his or her incentives to put in effort or make decisions on the job in the model the person s productive abilities are revealed over time through observations of performance there are no explicit output contingent contracts but since the wage in each period is based on expected output and expected output depends on assessed ability an implicit contract links today s performance to future wages an incentive problem arises from the person s ability and desire to influence the learning process and therefore the wage process by taking unobserved actions that affect today s performance the fundamental incongruity in preferences is between the individual s concern for human capital returns and the firm s concern for financial returns the two need be only weakly related it is shown that career motives can be beneficial as well as detrimental depending on how well the two kinds of capital returns are aligned it is well understood by now that informational externalities may place special demands on the organization of economic exchange simple price mediated markets will frequently fail in the presence of asymmetric information in that case more elaborate contractual arrangements have to be used as substitutes for the price system lately considerable effort has been devoted to the analysis of contracting under incomplete information with the objective to understand the range of economic institutions that emerge in response to the failure of the price system the analysis of moral hazard has played a prominent role in this development moral hazard problems arise when for some reason or another transacting parties cannot contract contingent on the delivery of the good for instance in buying labour services it may be that the amount of labour supplied is not directly observable precluding a simple exchange of wage for labour as a partial remedy to this problem an imperfect mutually observed signal about the supply of labour can be used as a proxy in the contract frequently output is taken as such a proxy the drawback is that output is often influenced by other factors than labour input which induce undesirable risk into the contract one is therefore faced with a tradeoff between allocating risk associated with incomplete observability and providing incentives for a proper supply of labour gaining insight into this tradeoff is important not only for understanding contracting in the small e g managerial incentive schemes but also because it is closely related to the fundamental tension between equity and efficiency in the society as a whole while our understanding of moral hazard has advanced a lot in past years it is clear that much work remains an important question that has received little attention until

the impact of energy trade patterns on co2 emissions an emergy and network analysis abstract fossil fuel is considered to be the major cause of co2 emissions and it flows across countries through the international energy trade in this paper we analyse the impact of energy trade patterns on co2 emissions for a global sample from 2000 to 2014 we construct an international fossil fuel trade network based on emergy theory and calculate some corresponding structural parameters then we systematically evaluate the impact of energy trade on co2 emissions from the trade volume and trade relationships perspectives we obtain the following results 1 trade strength mainly affects co2 emissions through the scale effect composition effect and technique effect 2 trade security and trade centre status of one country will significantly affect co2 emissions 3 for high economic level he countries concentrating the trade volume on several finite countries will destroy the environment low economic level le countries that are proximal to the important countries of the energy market will experience an increase in pollution this research also discusses some implications for policy makers

toward a new conception of the environment competitiveness relationship accepting a fixed trade off between environmental regulation and competitiveness unnecessarily raises costs and slows down environmental progress studies finding high environmental compliance costs have traditionally focused on static cost impacts ignoring any offsetting productivity benefits from innovation they typically overestimated compliance costs neglected innovation offsets and disregarded the affected industry s initial competitiveness rather than simply adding to cost properly crafted environmental standards can trigger innovation offsets allowing companies to improve their resource productivity shifting the debate from pollution control to pollution prevention was a step forward it is now necessary to make the next step and focus on resource productivity

is economic growth good or bad for the environment empirical evidence from korea abstract the effects of economic growth on the environment in korea for a given level of energy consumption and fossil fuels and nuclear energy in electricity production are examined in a dynamic cointegration framework to that end the autoregressive distributed lag ardl approach is used we find empirical evidence supporting the existence of the environmental kuznets curve ekc hypothesis for korea that is economic growth indeed plays a favorable role in influencing environmental outcomes it is also found that in both the short and long run nuclear energy has a beneficial effect on environmental quality whereas fossil fuels in electricity production and energy consumption have a detrimental effect on the environment

a foundation for markov equilibria in sequential games with finite social memory we study stochastic games with an infinite horizon and sequential moves played by an arbitrary number of players we assume that social memory is finite every player except possibly one is finitely lived and cannot observe events that are sufficiently far back in the past this class of games includes games between a long run player and a sequence of short run players and games with overlapping generations of players an equilibrium is purifiable if some close by behaviour is consistent with equilibrium when agents payoffs in each period are perturbed additively and independently we show that only markov equilibria are purifiable when social memory is finite thus if a game has at most one long run player all purifiable equilibria are markov

optimal policy with credibility concerns abstract this paper considers a reputation model of optimal taxation in which the public is unsure about the government type a long lived government can be trustworthy meaning that it commits to its announced tax rate or opportunistic meaning that it retains the ability to change its tax rate after announcing it unlike in most prior studies the committed strategy in this model is optimally chosen by the trustworthy type we show that this change has significant consequences for the equilibrium dynamics the optimal committed strategy is found to vary with the time preferences of the two government types the initial reputation of the government and the elasticity of household production this formulation explains differences in policy responses across governments in the face of similar credibility problems

word of mouth communication and social learning this paper studies the way that word of mouth communication aggregates the information of individual agents we find that the structure of the communication process determines whether all agents end up making identical choices with less communication making this conformity more likely despite the players naive decision rules and the stochastic decision environment word of mouth communication may lead all players to adopt the action that is on average superior these socially efficient outcomes tend to occur when each agent samples only a few others i introduction economic agents must often make decisions without knowing the costs and benefits of the possible choices given the frequency with which such situations arise it is understandable that agents often choose not to perform studies or experiments but instead rely on whatever information they have obtained via casual word of mouth communication reliance on this sort of easily obtained information appears to be common in circumstances ranging from consumers choosing restaurants or auto mechanics to business managers evaluating alternative organizational structures this paper studies two related environments in arguing that individuals reliance on word of mouth communication has interesting implications for their aggregate behavior first motivated by the diffusion of new technologies we consider a choice between two competing products with unequal qualities or payoffs and show that the structure of communication is important in determining whether the population as a whole is likely to learn to use the superior product second we consider a choice between two products or practices that are equally good and ask whether consumers are likely to herd onto a single choice or whether diversity will obtain even in the long run we explore the implications of word of mouth communication in a simple nonstrategic environment there is a large population of identical players each of whom repeatedly chooses between two possible actions each player s payoff is determined by his own

limited horizon forecast in repeated alternate games abstract in two player infinite horizon alternating move games a limited forecast n 1 n 2 equilibrium is such that 1 player i chooses actions according to his n i length forecasts so as to maximise the average payoff over the forthcoming n i periods and 2 players equilibrium forecasts are correct with finite action spaces n 1 n 2 solutions always exist and are cyclical and the memory capacity of the players has no influence on the set of solutions a solution is hyperstable if it is an n 1 n 2 solution for all n 1 n 2 sufficiently large hyperstable solutions are shown to exist and are characterized for generic repeated alternate move 2 2 games journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d81

how economic growth renewable electricity and natural resources contribute to co2 emissions abstract this study explores the relationship between economic growth and co2 emissions in the so called european union 5 eu 5 countries germany france italy spain and the united kingdom for the 1985 2016 period in doing so we employ a carbon emission function to investigate the environmental kuznets curve phenomenon which describes a relationship between economic growth and environmental degradation the empirical results confirm the existence of an n shaped relationship between economic growth and co2 emissions in the eu 5 countries we incorporate additional variables such as renewable electricity consumption trade openness natural resource abundance and energy innovation to augment the carbon emission function renewable electricity consumption natural resources and energy innovation improve environmental quality while trade openness and the interaction between economic growth and renewable electricity consumption exert a positive impact on co2 emissions this study is novel in that it presents an interaction between economic growth and renewable electricity consumption we also confirm the need for renewable energy regulations related to increasing renewable sources and promoting energy innovation to reduce the negative effects of energy and fossil energy resources on environmental degradation

investigation of the environmental kuznets curve for carbon emissions in malaysia do foreign direct investment and trade matter abstract environmental degradation has become a central issue of discussion among the economists and environmentalists in view of malaysia s position as one of the main contributors to co2 emissions in asia and its status as a fast growing economy it is vital therefore to conduct a study to identify the relationship between economic growth and co2 emissions for malaysia this study attempts to examine empirically the environmental kuznets curve hypothesis for malaysia in the presence of foreign direct investment and trade openness both in the short and long run for the period 1970 to 2008 the bounds testing approach and granger causality methodology are applied to test the interrelationships of the variables the results of our study indicate that the inverted u shaped relationship does exist between economic growth and co2 emission in both the short and long run for malaysia after controlling for two additional explanatory variables namely fdi and trade importantly the results of the study also provide some crucial policy recommendations to the policy makers

reputation and time consistency recent work has shown that reputational arguments based on trigger strategies can sometimes be used to deal with the problem of time inconsistency in government policy this idea was exploited by robert barro and david gordon 1983 in a model of inflation and by v v chari and patrick kehoe 1988 in a model of capital taxation here it is shown that reputational arguments of this sort are widely applicable 2 a general policy model is developed based on an economy that is stationary over time contains identical households and has no endogenous state variables it is shown in general that the infinite horizon version of this model has equilibria in trigger strategies that yield outcomes strictly better than those attainable as equilibria in the one period model

trade openness carbon emissions nexus the importance of turning points of trade openness for country panels abstract this paper explores the relationship between trade openness and co 2 emissions by incorporating economic growth as an additional and potential determinant of this relationship for three groups of 105 high middle and low income countries we apply the pedroni 1999 and westerlund 2007 panel cointegration tests and find that the three variables are cointegrated in the long run trade openness impedes environmental quality for the global high income middle and low income panels but the impact varies in these diverse groups of countries the panel vecm causality results highlight a feedback effect between trade openness and carbon emissions at the global level and the middle income countries but trade openness granger causes co 2 emissions for the high income and low income countries policy implications are also provided

is the income elasticity of environmental improvements less than one we estimated the income elasticity of environmental improvements for a number of european data sets the value of this parameter is consistently found to be less than one with few exceptions our findings are compared with state of the art contingent valuation studies from other countries we also compared our findings with those reported in the literature on charitable donations and corporate donations these studies show a similar pattern donations decrease as a percentage of income as income increases

repeated games with long run and short run players this paper studies the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with long and short run players and little discounting because the short run players are unconcerned about the future each equilibrium outcome is constrained to lie on their static reaction best response curves the natural extension of the folk theorem to games of this sort would simply include this constraint in the definitions of the feasible payoffs and minmax values in fact this extension does obtain under the assumption that each player s choice of a mixed strategy for the stage game is publicly observable but in contrast to standard repeated games the set of equilibrium payoffs is different if players can observe only their opponents realized actions

imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations we study the long run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring it is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types thus a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for noncredible behavior in the presence of imperfect monitoring

limited records and reputation bubbles abstract this paper offers a tractable and fully rational model to study the economics of reputation in a dynamic market with limited record keeping i e a market in which new entrants observe only the last few periods of play of the long run player instead of the full history of the market we show that trust is gradually granted to the opportunistic long run player despite the fact that his type is perfectly observed by the short run opponents and the perfectly informed short run players ride and drive up reputation bubbles at the expense of their uninformed successors we characterize equilibrium payoffs uniformly over time which is useful for analyzing ongoing repeated relationships where the starting moments have passed

the dynamics of names a model of reputation the article studies reputation of names and its dynamics first the article shows that names backed by nothing intrinsic can bear reputation although the context is purely of adverse selection a mechanism in the spirit of kreps 1990 helps to sustain reputation second it examines how the dynamics of the reputation affects the extent of sorting and the level of social efficiency and derives the dynamics in the equilibria with the highest efficiency finally it empirically predicts that brand names can be fully established sooner in an industry where high end products have larger profit margins

causality between income and emission a country group specific econometric analysis abstract empirical studies of the environmental kuznets curve ekc examine the presence or otherwise of an inverted u shaped relationship between the level of pollution and the level of income customarily in the diagram of ekc the level of income is shown on the horizontal axis and that of pollution on the vertical axis thus it is presumed that the relationship between income and pollution is one of unidirectional causality with income causing environmental changes and not vice versa the validity of this presumption is now being questioned it is being asserted that the nature and direction of causality may vary from one country to the other in this paper we present the results of a study of income co 2 emission causality based on a granger causality test to cross country panel data on per capita income and the corresponding per capita co 2 emission data briefly our results indicate three different types of causality relationship holding for different country groups for the developed country groups of north america and western europe and also for eastern europe the causality is found to run from emission to income for the country groups of central and south america oceania and japan causality from income to emission is obtained finally for the country groups of asia and africa the causality is found to be bi directional the regression equations estimated as part of the granger causality test further suggest that for the country groups of north america and western europe the growth rate of emission has become stationary around a zero mean and a shock in the growth rate of emission tends to generate a corresponding shock in the growth rate of income in contrast for the country groups of central and south america oceania and japan a shock in the income growth rate is likely to result in a corresponding shock in the growth rate of emission finally causality being bi directional for the country groups of asia and africa the income and the emission growth rates seemed to reinforce each other

cointegration how short is the long run abstract when testing for cointegration and faced with short sample periods it is common for researchers to turn to more frequently sampled observations that is to move from annual to quarterly or monthly data in order to increase the number of observations we argue that such a gain in the degrees of freedom is more apparent than real essentially cointegration is a long run concept and hence requires long spans of data to give tests for cointegration much power rather than merely large numbers of observations using monte carlo simulations we demonstrate this for four popular tests for cointegration

carbon dioxide emissions and trade evidence from disaggregate trade data abstract the relationship between trade and environmental quality is a major controversial issue the paper intends to provide robust evidence and new insights into the discussion specifically it examines the effect of trade on carbon dioxide emissions co2 systematically in a north north north south south north and south south context it employs a panel data instrumental variable quantile approach to control for endogeneity and account for potential quantile parameter heterogeneity some important results emerge first trade with the north increases co2 emissions whereas trade with the south mitigates co2 emissions with a relatively larger effect for less polluted host countries second for advanced countries their trade with the south or the north leads to a reduction in co2 emissions the effect that seems relatively stronger for less polluted advanced countries third for developing countries their trade with the north worsens co2 emissions whereas their trade with the south mitigates co2 emissions with a larger effect for less polluted developing countries last the environmental kuznets hypothesis is also detected across quantiles for the full sample and both developing and advanced countries subsamples the findings suggest that trade benefits the advanced countries but could hurt the developing countries when trade with high income trading partners occurs in terms of co2 emissions

income and emission a panel data based cointegration analysis this paper presents the results of an investigation of the causality issue of incomeemission relationship based on time series econometric techniques of unit root test cointegration and related error correction model for a panel data set here the nature of causality between per capita co2 emission pcco2 and per capita gdp pcgdp has been examined using a cross country panel data set covering 88 countries for the period 1960 90 using the panel unit root test procedure of im et al 1997 ips we have found that the hypothesis of unit root i e non stationarity of the time series of pcgdp and pcco2 can not be rejected for individual country groups as both the variables are found to follow i 1 process we next have performed the panel data co integration test and finally we have estimated the ecm for these country groups for which significant income emission cointegration was obtained to explore the nature of dynamics implicit in the given panel data set our findings suggest that there is more or less a bi directional causal relationship between income pcgdp and co2 emission pcco2 for africa central america america as a whole eastern europe western europe europe as a whole and the world as a whole that means the movement of the one variable directly affects the other variable through a feedback system thus the policy makers should be cautious to make proper decision about the control of emission level

reputation and survival learning in a dynamic signalling model we consider the impact of reputation on the survival of a monopolist selling single units in discrete time periods whose quality is learned slowly if the seller learns her own quality at the same rate as customers a sufficiently bad run of luck could induce her to stop selling when she knows her quality a good seller never stops selling though at low reputations a bad seller does with some probability furthermore a seller with positive though imperfect information sells for the same number of periods whether her information is private or public we further consider the robustness of the central result when the seller s opportunities for strategic behaviour are limited

what s in a name reputation as a tradeable asset the author develops a model in which a firm s only asset is its name which summarizes its reputation and studies the forces that cause names to be valuable tradable assets an adverse selection model in which shifts of ownership are not observable guarantees an active market for names with either finite or infinite horizons no equilibrium exists in which only good types buy good names the reputational dynamics that emerge from the model are more realistic than those in standard game theoretic reputation models and suggest that adverse selection plays a crucial role in understanding firm reputation

a game theoretic model for the role of reputation feedback systems in peer to peer commerce abstract we propose a dynamic game theoretic model to study how a reputation feedback system affects a peer to peer p2p trading platform continuums of buyers and sellers with bounded rationalities are paired to trade periodically sellers have private knowledge on their own types that encode tendencies to cheat their reputation scores are on the other hand visible to all and periodically updated by their trading partners a buyer can use a seller s score to assess the latter s characters and decide whether to trade using a continuity based fixed point theorem we first establish the existence of equilibria that convey information on traders behaviors as well as the type score composition on the market we then look into a special case which for model tractability includes two types of sellers with two score levels besides the proportion of prone to cheating sellers it indicates that how much sellers value their future payoffs also plays a major role in determining the prevalence of online frauds therefore reputation feedback systems are especially beneficial under high trading volumes which can in turn for instance be facilitated by attracting more buyers to the online marketplace

the impact of economic globalization on renewable energy in the oecd countries abstract this paper analyzes the determinants of renewable energy consumption in the panel data of 30 oecd countries for the period from 1970 to 2015 the unique role is given to the effect of economic globalization on renewable energy we consider several measures of economic globalization and apply different econometric techniques we find the positive impact of the per capita income the per capita carbon dioxide emissions and the real price of oil on renewable energy also a higher level of economic globalization promotes renewable energy and the evidence is robust to the different measures of economic globalization in line with our findings promoting the economic aspects of globalization will enhance renewable energy thus it can suppress the adverse effect of climate change and global warming on living human beings and natural habitats in the long run therefore we need to enhance our knowledge of how globalization promotes renewable energy not only for the oecd countries but also for other developing and developed economies from a policy perspective we suggest that policymakers and governments in oced countries should consider economic globalization as a renewable energy promoting mechanism while designing their energy demand policy for the protection of natural environmental health

sustainable reputations with rating systems abstract in a product choice game played between a long lived seller and an infinite sequence of buyers we assume that buyers cannot observe past signals to facilitate the analysis of applications such as online auctions e g ebay online shopping search engines e g bizrate com and consumer reports we assume that a central mechanism observes all past signals and makes public announcements every period the set of announcements and the mapping from observed signals to the set of announcements is called a rating system we show that absent reputation effects information censoring cannot improve attainable payoffs however if there is an initial probability that the seller is a commitment type that plays a particular strategy every period then there exists a finite rating system and an equilibrium of the resulting game such that the expected present discounted payoff of the seller is almost his stackelberg payoff after every history this is in contrast to cripps mailath and samuelson 2004 5 where it is shown that reputation effects do not last forever in such games if buyers can observe all past signals we also construct finite rating systems that increase payoffs of almost all buyers while decreasing the seller s payoff

reputation and competition this paper shows how competition generates reputation building behavior in repeated interactions when the product quality observed by consumers is a noisy signal of firms effort level there are two types of firms and good firms try to distinguish themselves from bad firms although consumers get convinced that firms which are repeatedly successful in providing high quality are good firms competition endogenously generates the outside option inducing disappointed consumers to leave firms this threat of exit induces good firms to choose high effort allowing good reputations to be valuable but its uncompromising execution forces good firms out of the market jel c7 d8

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

price and quality cycles for experience goods we explore a dynamic competitive model for experience goods and study an equilibrium for it in which firms plan initially to produce high quality at low price then high quality at high price then low quality at high price each consumer is aware that all firms eventually intend to run down their reputations at customers expense yet he rationally chooses to wait for direct evidence that the firm to which he is attached has already entered into the exploitative phase

cycles of conflict an economic model abstract we propose a model of cycles of conflict and distrust overlapping generations of agents from two groups sequentially play coordination games under incomplete information about whether the other side consists of bad types who always take bad actions good actions may be misperceived as bad and information about past actions is limited conflict spirals start as a result of misperceptions but also contain the seeds of their own dissolution bayesian agents eventually conclude that the spiral likely started by mistake and is thus uninformative of the opposing group s type the agents then experiment with a good action restarting the cycle jel d72 d74 d83 z13

is more information always better a case in credit markets this paper studies the impact of behavioral and non behavioral information contained in consumer credit reports on the credit market a repeated game of incomplete information between a borrower and a sequence of lenders is considered lenders beliefs regarding the borrower s type depend on the borrower s historical loan performance and other informative signals it is established that for low beliefs strategic defaults occur in equilibrium as the borrower defaults on his loans despite having the ability to repay them further as the ancillary signals become increasingly informative of the borrower s type the range of beliefs over which strategic defaults occur expands this increase in strategic defaults highlights an unintended negative effect of allowing informative signals to influence beliefs on the upside the informative signals allow lenders to learn the borrower s type more quickly

incentives through consumer learning about tastes we consider a long lived firm that faces an infinite sequence of finitely lived consumers in each period the firm can exert either high or low effort which is the firm s private information when consumers learn about the firm s talent from the outcomes of previous transactions there exists no equilibrium in which the firm always exerts high effort however when consumers learn about their own tastes such an equilibrium can exist consumer learning about tastes therefore is an alternative to reputational concerns that produces stable incentives we discuss the implications of this mechanism for advertising advertising content and consumer education

myopic deterrence policies and the instability of equilibria we develop a general equilibrium model of crime in which honest workers face an effective tax rate on earnings consisting of an exogenous income tax used to pay for policing and an endogenous crime tax given by the proportion of their disposable income that is stolen when there are two stable equilibria the low crime equilibrium is welfare dominant and furthermore welfare is a decreasing function of the income tax rate however as the income tax rate is reduced the degree of stability of the low crime equilibrium diminishes until for sufficiently low tax rates the low crime equilibrium is unstable with respect to any small positive perturbation in the crime rate thus myopic maximization of social welfare exposes the economy to random shocks in the crime rate that can destroy the preferred low crime equilibrium we argue that this dilemma between economizing on resources used for deterrence and ensuring the stability of the most desirable equilibrium is a fundamental trade off in the design of many institutions intended to control antisocial behavior including rent seeking corruption and theft

the environmental consequences of trade evidence from subnational trade flows abstract the debate over the environmental consequences of free trade is not only quite heated but also entails significant policy ramifications recently cross sectional analysis at the country level has made use of exogenous determinants of trade to identify the causal effect of trade on the environment finding moderate evidence of a beneficial impact of expanded trade on environmental quality given the stakes involved we revisit this finding using subnational data on trade flows across us states and several measures of pollution not only does the analysis shed further light on the debate at the international level but also addresses a heretofore unexamined question does greater inter regional commerce at the subnational level harm the environment our findings are striking providing further evidence against a negative environmental impact of trade for the majority of measures analyzed however several sources of heterogeneity arise that are noteworthy

signaling with costly acquisition of signals in this paper we investigate the consequences of introducing a cost to observe the signal in an otherwise standard signaling game beyond identifying equilibria which we contrast with those of a standard signaling game we study their robustness to two important classes of refinements acting through restrictions on out of equilibrium beliefs and through trembles our results suggest that more prominence should be given to the pooling outcome on the minimum signal

information acquisition and reputation dynamics we study dynamic incentives and behaviour in markets with costly discovery of past transactions in our model a sequence of short lived customers interact over time with a single long lived firm that privately knows its type good or opportunistic customers must pay to observe the firm s past behaviour we characterize the equilibrium structure that features accumulation consumption and restoration of reputation the opportunistic firm deliberately builds its reputation up to a point where the maximum periods of information acquired by customers do not reveal past opportunistic behaviour and exploits the customers who most trust the firm copyright 2011 oxford university press

public trust and government betrayal abstract this study presents a simple model of government reputation in which government type cannot be directly observed by households with the variation that government type rather than being permanent follows an exogenous markov process this formulation captures three characteristics of bad policy outcomes governments which betray public trust do so erratically public trust is regained only gradually after a betrayal and governments with recent betrayals betray with higher probability than other governments

asynchronous choice and markov equilibria we provide a theoretical foundation for the use of markov strategies in repeated games with asynchronous moves if admissible strategies must display finite arbitrarily long memory and each player incurs a complexity cost which depends on the memory length required by her strategy then every nash equilibrium must be in markovian strategies if in addition admissible strategies have uniformly bounded memory every rationalizable strategy must be markovian these results are robust to considerations of perfection and also yield interesting implications for equilibrium selection in simple contexts

who wants a good reputation we examine a market in which long lived firms face a short term incentive to exert low effort but could earn higher profits if it were possible to commit to high effort there are two types of firms inept firms who can only exert low effort and competent firms who have a choice between high and low effort there is occasional exit and competent and inept potential entrants compete for the right to inherit the departing firm s reputation consumers receive noisy signals of effort choice and so competent firms choose high effort in an attempt to distinguish themselves from inept firms a competent firm is most likely to enter the market by purchasing an average reputation in the hopes of building it into a good reputation than either a very low reputation or a very high reputation inept firms in contrast find it more profitable to either buy high reputations and deplete them or buy low reputations

the curse of the haven the impact of multinational enterprise on environmental regulation abstract we analyze the behavior of multinational enterprises in the context of resource rich and poor countries and regarding high and low income countries we depart from the pollution haven hypothesis and the resource curse the pollution haven hypothesis states that multinational enterprises move their dirty operations to countries with weak environmental regulation the resource curse holds that economic growth in countries abundant in natural resources is reduced we find that more polluting firms are relatively more often located in countries with weak environmental regulation however multinational enterprises do not have a significant impact on environmental regulation in the host country it appears that it is mainly the quality of institutions that drives both the pollution haven and the resource curse

reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player a single long run player plays a simultaneous move stage game against a sequence of opponents who play only once but observe all previous play let the stackelberg strategy be the pure strategy to which the long run player would most like to commit himself if there is positive prior probability that the long run player will always play the stackelberg strategy then his payoff in any nash equilibrium exceeds a bound that converges to the stackelberg payoff as his discount factor approaches one when the stage game is not simultaneous move this result must be modified to account for the possibility that distinct strategies of the long run player are observationally equivalent

co2 emissions energy consumption income and foreign trade a south african perspective abstract the effect of trade liberalisation on environmental conditions has yielded significant debate in the energy economics literature although research on the relationship between energy consumption emissions and economic growth is not new in south africa no study specifically addresses the role that south africa s foreign trade plays in this context a surprising fact given trade is one of the most important factors that can explain the environmental kuznets curve this study employs recent south african trade and energy data and modern econometric techniques to investigate this the main finding of interest in this paper is the existence of a long run relationship between environmental quality levels of per capita energy use and foreign trade in south africa as anticipated per capita energy use has a significant long run effect in raising the country s co 2 emission levels yet surprisingly higher levels of trade for the country act to reduce these emissions granger causality tests confirm the existence of a positive bidirectional relationship between per capita energy use and co 2 emissions whilst the study also finds positive bidirectional causality between trade and income per capita and between trade and per capita energy use it appears however that trade liberalisation in south africa has not contributed to a long run growth in pollution intensive activities nor higher emission levels

does trade liberalization harm the environment a new test recent events such as the nafta and the completion of the uruguay round have raised concern over the impact of trade liberalization on the environment in particular it is believed that less stringent environmental standards in developing countries will give them a comparative advantage in pollutionintensive goods using single equation models existing empirical studies have found either no relationship between environment and trade flows or a positive relationship between trade liberalization and the environment this paper develops a simultaneous equations model to estimate this relationship directly incorporating the effects of openness on growth of income and of income growth on environmental damage a two good trade model with endogenous factor supply is estimated using pooled provincial data on chinese water pollution from 1987 1995 estimation of this model reveals that trade liberalization directly aggravates environmental damage via its influence on the terms of trade but indirectly mitigates it via its effect on income growth simulations suggest that trade reform during the period may have had a net beneficial impact on emissions growth

the relationship between the income elasticities of demand and willingness to pay abstract the relationship between income and willingness to pay for collectively provided public environmental goods is investigated we show that while the income elasticity of willingness to pay and the ordinary income elasticity of demand are related knowledge of one is insufficient to determine the magnitude or even the sign of the other the income elasticity of willingness to pay is influenced by additional factors which are generally unobservable examples are provided to illustrate the degree to which the two income elasticities may diverge our results indicate that even when goods are demand luxuries they may or may not have income elasticities of willingness to pay which are greater than one

entrants reputation and industry dynamics this article analyzes entry exit decisions in a market where reputation determines the price that firms may charge within a rational expectation model of competition in a nonatomic market under heterogeneous reputations the analysis focuses on the class of name switching reputational equilibria in which a firm discards its name if and only if its reputation falls below the entrants reputation the main technical result is the existence of a unique steady state equilibrium within this class in which the entrants reputation is endogenous the resulting industry dynamics is largely on agreement with the findings in the empirical literature

maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed this paper studies reputation effects in games with a single long run player whose choice of stage game strategy is imperfectly observed by his opponents we obtain lower and upper bounds on the long run player s payoff in any nash equilibrium of the game if the long run player s stage game strategy is statistically identified by the observed outcomes then for generic payoffs the upper and lower bounds both converge as the discount factor tends to 1 to the long run player s stackelberg payoff which is the most he could obtain by publicly committing himself to any strategy

using privileged information to manipulate markets insiders gurus and credibility access to private information is shown to generate both the incentives and the ability to manipulate asset markets through strategically distorted announcements the fact that privileged information is noisy interferes with the public s attempts to learn whether such announcements are honest it allows opportunistic individuals to manipulate prices repeatedly without ever being fully found out this leads us to extend sobel s 1985 model of strategic communication to the case of noisy private signals our results show that when truthfulness is not easily verifiable restrictions on trading by insiders may be needed to preserve the integrity of information embodied in prices