the second best core an economy with a single output and input is considered for the case of economies of scale in production equilibria are studied for a cooperative game of joint production in which goods are allocated by a price system the paper proposes a second best core in which allocations that are feasible for a coalition must be attainable by a price system existence is examined and properties of second best core allocations are analyzed copyright 1989 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

pure strategy nash equilibrium in a group formation game with positive externalities abstract this paper identifies a domain of payoff functions in no spillover noncooperative games with positive externality which admit a pure strategy nash equilibrium since in general a nash equilibrium may fail to exist in order to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium we impose two additional assumptions anonymity and order preservation the proof of our main result is carried out by constructing for a given game g a potential function over the set of strategy profiles in such a way that the maximum of yields a nash equilibrium in pure strategies of g journal of economics literature classification numbers c72 d62 h73

comparing revenue from auctions and posted prices i analyze the market for compact discs using an original data set of items listed for sale online over 5000 listings of both new and used compact discs were collected from ebay which provides sellers a choice between two mechanisms auction or posted price and its subsidiary half com which features only posted prices despite the often cited revenue dominance property of auctions many sellers choose to post a fixed price to explain this anomaly i examine empirically the determinants of the revenue earned by sellers in this market i find that posted price goods sell for higher prices while auctioned goods sell with a higher probability further results suggest that the size of a seller s inventory is the key factor in the choice between selling in an auction and posting a fixed price in particular sellers with large inventories are more likely to use the posted price mechanism

constitutional rules of exclusion in jurisdiction formation the rules under which jurisdictions nations provinces can deny immigration or expel residents are generally governed by a constitution but there do not exist either positive or normative analyses to suggest what types of exclusion rules are best we stylize this problem by suggesting four constitutional rules of admission free mobility admission by majority vote admission by unanimous consent admission by a demand threshold for public goods in a simple model we characterize the equilibria that result from these rules and provide a positive theory for which constitutional rules will be chosen

game theoretic modeling of increasing returns to scale abstract this paper surveys the analysis by means of cooperative game theory of economies in which there are increasing returns to scale in the first section necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a core of a general equilibrium economy are considered in the second section the partial equilibrium approach to increasing returns production which developed along with the natural monopoly literature is surveyed the close relationship between the general equilibrium and partial equilibrium approaches is emphasized

second best taxation as a game second best theory usually lies in the realm of normative analysis it focuses attention on the best solutions which still can be obtained in problems where constraints of various natures forbid the attainment of first best pareto optimal situations its central concern is the characterization of such second best solutions and a large part of the literature concentrates on the optimal design of taxes or of policies of public firms taking a second best problem we try in this paper to shift the emphasis from normative to positive considerations the solution we are interested in is not optimal with respect to some a priori given social welfare function embodying justice objectives but it is supposed to reflect the power of the different agents in a negotiation process clearly the conceptual tools required for such an analysis are to be found in game theory and it is actually a game theoretical approach that we follow here the model we are looking at is presented in section ii it formalizes one of the simplest second best problems that can be imagined we have a twogood economy with one private good and one public good agents have different wealth in private good and the public good is financed through a wealth tax this latter fiscal system is clearly not flexible enough to adjust contributions with marginal willingnesses to pay so that we actually face a second best situation there is one decision variable in the society the tax rate which determines the public good production about which the agents have conflicting desires to this problem we associate a game which provides a precise framework for the analysis of the power of the agents the positive outcomes of the negotiation process are supposed to belong to the core of this game sections iii and iv concentrate on the analysis of the core the results strongly contrast with those obtained in the classical studies of the core of 67 0022 053 l 81 040067 25 02 00 o

equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy abstract this paper examines the existence of a noncooperative equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy where consumers have quasi linear preferences jurisdictions consist of consumers who chose the same public project and finance the cost of production of public goods through either a proportional income tax or a poll tax we show that under a proportional income tax scheme a nash equilibria may fail to exist under a poll tax scheme an equilibrium always exists but in general nash equilibria violate a very weak efficiency condition we conclude by commenting on the stabilizing effect of zoning policies journal of economic literatureclassification number c71

a theoretical foundation for the undercut proof equilibrium abstract this paper develops a theoretical foundation for the undercut proof equilibrium see shy 1996 shy 2002 morgan and shy 2015 in a general spatial setting the set of undercut proof prices is equivalent to the core of a non transferable utility coalitional game played on the set of outcomes that are feasible in bertrand competition the result depends critically on two conditions first firms must have unlimited capacity and constant marginal costs second the goods produced by firms must only be differentiated by the spatial characteristics of the market an application to network markets shows how the undercut proof equilibrium can be used to describe stable price dispersion and persistent performance differences

auctions versus posted price selling two popular selling methods posted price selling and auctions are compared here in an independent private values model without auctioning costs auctioning is always optimal when auctioning is costly auctions are still preferable if the marginal revenue curve is sufficiently steep the global steepness of the marginal revenue curve is found to coincide with the dispersion around the mean for a number of standard distributions finally the prices of the monopoly seller and of the social optimum are compared copyright 1993 by american economic association

economic theories of political dis integration abstract this paper surveys the recent political economy literature on countries incentives to form international unions and or to disintegrate in smaller jurisdictions the main factors that affect these incentives are i economic integration ii the international order iii international spillovers and iv the institutional setting some implications are drawn for the current debate in europe on the political effects of economic integration on the enlargement process and on the distribution of prerogatives between the european union and national governments

capital markets urban unemployment and land abstract this paper shows that the remarkable result by khan and naqvi that a reduction in the capital rental differential always improves welfare despite the presence of a rigid urban wage can be obtained only for the 2 2 harris todaro model in an extended harris todaro framework incorporating a third specific factor a decrease in a distortion may not necessarily be welfare improving

some simple results on the gains from trade from growth and from public production abstract a simple compact but general revealed preference type of argument is used to derive results on the gains from trade from terms of trade changes and from exogenous resource growth the approach extends to the welfare evaluation of public sector production the relation between the sufficiency conditions for welfare improvement derived from this approach and the necessary and sufficient conditions derived in an alternative approach are briefly discussed most of the argument is conducted in the context of a representative individual economy though it is shown to extend in an essentially unchanged way to cases where redistribution is an issue

buy price english auction abstract consider an english auction for a single object in which there is an option for a bidder to guarantee a purchase at a seller specified buy price b at any time we show that there exist v and v v such that a bidder purchases at the buy price immediately if his valuation v is no less than v or v v v and at least one other bidder is participating in the auction if b v v he purchases at the buy price once the current bid reaches a strategically chosen threshold price a properly set buy price increases expected social welfare and the expected utility of each agent when either buyers or seller are risk averse

growth and welfare in a small open economy the literature on trade and growth provides several examples in which factor augmentation or technical progress can reduce the welfare of an open economy the most famous example of such immiserizing growth is bhagwati s 1958 demonstration that growth that expands the export industry can reduce welfare by causing the terms of trade to deteriorate more recently examples have been provided in which growth due to either factor expansion or technical progress in the presence of domestic distortions can be immiserizing even in a small open economy johnson 1967 for example shows that technical progress in the import competing industry or growth of the factor used intensively in that industry can reduce welfare if the industry is protected by a tariff similarly bhagwati 1969 shows that the presence of factor market distortions also introduces the possibility of immiserizing growth he concludes more generally that growth may be immiserizing in the presence of any of several types of distortions while the possibility of immiserizing growth in the presence of distortions has been recognized little has been said about conditions under which growth is necessarily non beneficial or non harmful the present paper derives sufficient conditions for growth in the form of either factor augmentation or technical progress not to immiserize a small open economy characterized by variable returns to scale vrs production and consumption taxes tariffs and factor market distortions moreover in each case we provide an explicit condition for the effect of growth on welfare when growth takes the form of an infinitesimal increase in a factor supply or improvement in technology 1 our analysis departs from previous treatments of immiserizing growth by considering growth in an m factor n 1 commodity context with non traded goods rather than in the standard two factor two commodity model 2 this generalization allows us to consider for example the welfare effect of growth in the presence of tariffs when not all imports are affected in the same direction 3 we do however provide some additional results for the 2 x 2 case section i sets forth the general model that we use throughout our analysis here we show that under constant returns to scale crs in production and in the absence of commodity or factor market distortions growth cannot immiserize a small open economy while this result is not entirely new the proof provides a useful benchmark for our subsequent analysis section ii introduces vrs in production and considers their implications for the effect of growth on welfare a discussion of these results for the two commodity one factor case follows in section iii here we examine the relationship between factor growth or technical progress and the composition of output in section iv we return to the mr factor n 1 commodity model to analyse the implications of taxes for the relationship between growth and welfare

strong tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain abstract we investigate the existence and give a partial characterization of a strong tiebout equilibrium which consists of an endogenously formed partition of the individuals into disjoint jurisdictions with each jurisdiction producing and financing its own public goods and moreover there exists no group of individuals who can all benefit by establishing their own community in particular no single individual finds it desirable to migrate from his equilibrium jurisdiction the existence proof makes use of the notion of consecutive games which we introduce and show that for such games there always exists a partition with a nonempty core

efficiency in partnership structures abstract consider an economy where agents differ in production skills and abilities and are free to form production coalitions or partnerships with each other farrell and scotchmer 1988 showed that if partners are restricted to equal output sharing in equilibrium the partnerships are inefficiently small we elaborate on another possible source of inefficiency which is due to composition rather than size under the equal sharing constraint high ability agents form partnerships with agents of similar ability levels yet mixing of ability levels may be socially efficient we further investigate whether relaxing the equal sharing constraint corrects the inefficiency of equilibrium

the optimal listing strategies in online auctions this article proposes a unified framework to completely characterize the seller s optimal listing strategy in the online auction as a function of her rate of time impatience specifically the fixed price listing the regular auction and the buy it now bin auction are each a solution of the seller s single optimization problem under different values of the rate of intertemporal discount the perfectly patient seller adopts the regular auction the sellers with a medium range of time impatience adopt the bin auction and the most impatient of sellers adopt the fixed price listing moreover under mild conditions the reverse price is inversely related to the value of the seller s discount factor either within or across formats this in turn implies that the posted price in the fixed price sale is greater than the reserve price of the bin auction followed by that of the regular auction these predictions offer clear empirical implications

proportional taxation nonexistence of stable structures in an economy with a public good abstract guesnerie and oddou j econom theory 25 1981 67 91 raised the open question whether an economy in which the production of a public good is financed via proportional taxation has a stable structure by means of the first example a negative answer to this question is provided the second example shows that a stable structure may fail to exist even if all the individuals have the same initial endowments in private good

coordinated action in local public goods models the case of secession without exclusion abstract this paper investigates threats of coordinated exit secession when coalitions cannot choose their members by exclusion this is modeled by a three stage noncooperative game in which voters choose a proportional tax rate and the level of public services and may choose to exit jointly a modified perfectly coalition proof nash concept is applied to rule out dynamically inconsistent threats and behavior by coalitions that is not self enforcing the major result is that cooption of potential seceding coalitions will not occur this result relies on the assumption that seceding coalitions cannot exclude potential members

on the existence of a pure strategy nash equilibrium in group formation games abstract this paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of pure strategy nash equilibrium in a class of games of group formation the use of potentials allows for a characterization of such an equilibrium

buy prices in online auctions irrationality on the internet abstract buy prices are puzzling it makes sense for a seller at auction to set a minimum bidding level i e a reserve price surely but a maximum we explore the use of maximum bidding levels buy prices in online auctions and provide a rational explanation for this seemingly irrational auction mechanism we show that augmenting an english auction with a buy price can improve the seller s profits by partially insuring and therefore increasing the expected payment from some risk averse bidders perhaps more surprising is that the english auction augmented with a buy price can also be superior even to the first price sealed bid and dutch auctions when bidders are risk averse

mechanism choice and the buy it now auction a structural model of competing buyers and sellers a striking feature of many online sales platforms is the coexistence of multiple sales mechanisms items on ebay for instance are frequently offered through auctions posted prices and buy it now auctions in this article i study how this mechanism multiplicity influences the welfare of buyers and sellers i specify and estimate a structural model of mechanism choice in online markets in which i consider both sides of the market on the demand side buyers choices among available listings are equilibrium outcomes of an entry game on the supply side sellers make equilibrium decisions when choosing sales mechanisms and prices i estimate this model using data from sales of baseball tickets on ebay and calculate consumer and seller rents in three markets the actual market with all three sales mechanisms and two counterfactual markets with auctions and fixed prices or only fixed price listings respectively i find that the addition of auctions to fixed price markets hurts sellers and risk averse buyers but benefits risk neutral buyers additionally the consumer surplus increases when buy it now auctions are offered but the seller surplus is reduced further i discuss the intuition for the cause of this result

the winner s curse reserve prices and endogenous entry empirical insights from ebay auctions internet auctions have recently gained widespread popularity and are one of the most successful forms of electronic commerce we examine a unique data set of ebay coin auctions to explore the determinants of bidder and seller behavior we begin by documenting a number of empirical regularities in our data set of ebay auctions next we specify and estimate a structural econometric model of bidding on ebay using our parameter estimates from this model we measure the extent of the winner s curse and simulate seller revenue under different reserve prices