is the cfa franc zone an optimum currency area summary in this paper we explore the features of the cfa franc zone and compare them to those of the economic and monetary union emu by operationalizing the criteria for an optimum currency area a structural vector autoregression method is used in modeling national outputs as determined by global regional and country specific shocks we find that domestic outputs of the cfa franc zone countries are strongly influenced by country specific shocks while regional shocks are far more important in european countries that have joined the emu the results suggest that the cfa franc zone countries are structurally different from each other and thus are more likely to be subjected to asymmetric shocks they do not appear to form an optimum currency area and the monetary union may have been a costly arrangement for the member countries unless they are compensated with some other benefits

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

strategic delay in bargaining this paper analyses a bargaining model with incomplete information in which the time between offers is an endogenous strategic variable we find equilibria involving a delay to agreement that is due to the use of strategic time delay by bargainers to signal their relative strength under some specifications of the parameters delay is present in the unique sequential equilibrium whose beliefs satisfy one intuitive restriction this delay does not vanish as the minimal time between offers becomes small

participating in african monetary unions an alternative evaluation abstract this paper complementary to that of devarajan and de melo deals with the development strategies and performances of 12 franc zone african countries 11 of them gathered in two monetary unions during 1960 1981 beside the actual rate of growth the relative growth performance is considered this performance measured as a residual of a regression on exogenous factors factors independent of economic policy appears to be close to the average performance of other developing countries and better than that of other african countries the results are explained by the direct influence of the foreign exchange regime of the zone and by its impact on economic policy economic policies of individual countries show however some substantial degree of autonomy

cyclical quality adjustment in the labor market 1 introductionthe u s unemployment rate fell to very low levels during the 1990s even more impressively the unemployment rate for minorities and less educated individuals fell disproportionately convergence of relative unemployment rates in expansions and divergence in recessions has been a feature of the u s economy over the last 30 years there are many possible reasons for this feature for example if the costs of hiring and firing less skilled labor are low one would expect these individuals to have very procyclical employment in this paper i explore an alternative model when there is an excess supply of labor high skilled people take jobs that would normally be occupied by less skilled people in expansions the process reverses with less skilled workers getting access to jobs that they would normally not attain i refer to this process as cyclical quality adjustment reder 1955 p 834 was one of the first to discuss how hiring standards adjust to business cycle conditions quality variations in labor markets arise through upgrading and downgrading of members of the labor force relative to the jobs they are to fill when applicants become scarce employers tend to lower the minimum standards upon which they insist as a condition for hiring a worker to fill a particular job and vice versa when applicants become plentiful since then many papers have developed this idea theoretically and many economic commentators appear to share this view of the labor market for example the economic report of the president states that a strong labor market is particularly important to less advantaged groups in the labor market such as workers with less education younger workers racial and ethnic minorities and immigrants when employers find it hard to fill vacancies they are more willing to hire and train workers whom they might pass over when they have fewer openings and an abundance of applicants council of economic advisors 1999 p 103 likewise the expansion during the 1990s spawned many newspaper articles about the improvement in the types of jobs available to less skilled applicants however there is little systematic empirical work about changes in job assignment in the united states over the business cycle the empirical work in this paper seeks to redress this situation cyclical assignment changes are important for many reasons as mentioned earlier job upgrading is a potential explanation for the greater cyclical variation of employment experienced by less skilled workers it is well known that the unemployment rates of less skilled individuals and minorities are more countercyclical relative to more skilled individuals clark and summers 1981 kydland 1984 keane and prasad 1993 hoynes 1999 the standard explanation for this effect is that low ability workers are more likely to be laid off in downturns because training and hiring costs are lower for these workers no commensurate attention has been paid to the issue of how the decision of who to hire changes over the business cycle however assignment models present a natural explanation for the greater procyclicality of employment of the less skilled both the adjustment cost hypothesis and the upgrading hypothesis imply that less skilled workers will have more procyclical employment empirically they are distinguishable because the upgrading explanation implies that jobs obtained by comparable workers should vary systematically over the cycle the adjustment cost hypothesis relates to the composition of those whose jobs are terminated second these mechanisms suggest a reason why wages are particularly procyclical for job changers recent studies using panel data have indicated that the wages of job starters are much more procyclical than the wages of workers who do not change jobs researchers have suggested various explanations for this result beaudry and dinardo 1991 and macleod and malcomson 1993 present contracting models in which the wages of job starters depend on the state of the labor market when they join the firm

fooling all of the people some of the time a theory of endogenous sequencing in confidential negotiations we analyse a bargaining game in which one party called the buyer has the option of choosing the sequence of negotiations with other participants called sellers when the sequencing of negotiations is confidential and the sellers goods are highly complementary efficient non dissipative equilibria exist in which the buyer randomizes over negotiation sequences in these equilibria the buyer can obtain higher pay offs than in pure strategy equilibria or in public negotiations the degree of sequencing uncertainty that maximizes buyer pay offs is inversely related to the aggregate bargaining power of the sellers

foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture subgame perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period assume zero costs positive interest rate continuum of buyers and some technical conditions if buyers valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique buyers strategies are stationary and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist but at most one with analytic strategies coase s conjecture is verified for stationary strategies reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation connections to bargaining models are described journal qf economic literature classification

monetary co operation and economic growth in africa comparative evidence from the cfa zone countries this article compares economic growth performance of ten african countries all members of the cfa monetary zone with that of 23 non zone sub saharan african ssa countries our descriptive results suggest that overall african economies have experienced similar growth trends which are higher in the 1970s than the 1980s however contrary to previous studies disaggregated comparison of the cfa with the ssa indicate that no significant growth differences exist between these economies moreover our empirical findings suggest that monetary expansion and capital formation have positive impacts on output growth whereas inflation and government spending show negative effects in sum although participating in a monetary union has not necessarily resulted in faster output growth it has enabled the cfa countries to better control price fluctuations and monetary expansion

cyclical variation in the interindustry wage structure this paper presents an analysis of cyclical variation in the interindustry wage structure the study is therefore concerned with changes in relative wages among industries and not directly with the determination of the absolute wage level or changes in the absolute wage level the theory of the wage structure presented here is based on two hypotheses tihe first introduced initially as a maintained hypothesis is that differences among industries in the competitive structure of their product and labor markets result in wage inequalities for given skill levels the second hypothesis and the major finding of the paper is that the size of the wage differentials is a function not only of the extent and nature of the noncompetitive elements but also of the excess demand conditions in the labor market this result is derived from the proposition that under competitive supply conditions labor allocation is based on relative wages to support the theory a wage structure equation is estimated with the coefficient of variation of straight time average hourly earnings in the two digit manufacturing industries as the dependent variable the implications of the study for aggregate and industry wage equations are then discussed

adjustment and economic performance under a fixed exchange rate a comparative analysis of the cfa zone abstract this paper examines the economic performance of the cfa franc zone versus non cfa countries in recent years a modified control group approach is used to compare the evolution of macro economic indicators in the cfa countries vis a vis other sub saharan african countries controlling for initial conditions changing exogenous internal and world environment and policy stance in addition our approach allows for a formal testing of whether zone membership is a random the implication of randomness i e no selection bias is that the cfa zone economies would have performed in the same fashion as the rest of sub saharan africa for example in the absence of the zone our results show that the randomness assumption is only valid for the cases of gdp growth and inflation for other indicators savings investment and export ratios to gdp the decision to participate in the zone is endogenous and is related to the expectation of improved economic performance subsequently in the estimation of the zone s effects on the latter group of indicators we corrected for the ensuing sample selectivity bias by estimating that status indicator participation versus non participation via a probit model our estimation results indicate a weakening competitive position of the cfa members during the second half of 1980s relative to the first half compared with the non cfa countries in terms of output growth as well as the performance of exports investment and savings the exception is domestic inflation with the cfa countries faring better on that front results for a longer term comparison the 1970s versus the 1980s are somewhat mixed while the estimated coefficients for the marginal effect of zone participation corroborates a better performance for the cfa zone over the group of comparators in terms of exports domestic savings and investment and inflation the zone failed to distinguish itself with regard to economic growth in the long run

dynamic bargaining in a supply chain with asymmetric demand information we analyze a dynamic bargaining game in which a seller and a buyer negotiate over quantity and payment to trade for a product both firms are impatient and they make alternating offers until an agreement is reached the buyer is privately informed about his type which can be high or low the high type s demand is stochastically larger than the low type s in the dynamic negotiation process the seller can screen whereas the buyer can signal information through their offers and the buyer has an endogenous and type dependent reservation profit with rational assumptions on the seller s belief structure we characterize the perfect bayesian equilibrium of the bargaining game interestingly we find that both quantity distortion and information rent may be avoided depending on the firms relative patience and the seller may reach an agreement with either the high type or the low type first or with both simultaneously furthermore we explore our model to characterize the effect of demand forecasting accuracy on firm profitability we find that improved demand forecast benefits the buyer but hurts the seller when the buyer s forecasting accuracy is low however once the buyer s forecasting accuracy exceeds a threshold both firms will benefit from further improvement of the forecast this observation makes an interesting contrast to previous findings based on the one shot principal agent model in which improvement of forecasting accuracy mostly leads to a win lose outcome for the two firms and the buyer has an incentive to improve his forecasting accuracy only when it is extremely low this paper was accepted by yossi aviv operations management

sectoral shifts and cyclical unemployment a substantial fraction of cyclical unemployment is better characterized as fluctuations of the frictional or natural rate than as deviations from some relatively stable natural rate shifts of employment demand between sectors of the economy necessitate continuous labor reallocation since it takes time for workers to find new jobs some unemployment is unavoidable this paper presents evidence that most of the unemployment fluctuations of the seventies unlike those in the sixties were induced by unusual structural shifts within the u s economy simple time series models of layoffs and unemployment are constructed that include a measure of structural shifts within the labor market these models are estimated and a derived natural rate series is constructed

cyclical variations in wage differentials and unemployment this paper attempts to reformulate in a general equilibrium framework reder s model which explains cyclical variations in wage differentials and their general tendencies to narrow specifically i focus on the three aspects of his model the microeconomic behavior of a firm under imperfect information about labor quality the mechanism of the economy creating unemployment and the interaction between wage differentials and unemployment i also explore its implications for the macroeconomic issues on the characteristics of current unemployment and the question of why aggregate employment fluctuates

reputation in bargaining and durable goods monopoly this paper analyzes durable goods monopoly in an infinite horizon discrete time game we prove that as the time interval between successive offers approaches zero all seller payoffs between zero and static monopoly profits are supported by subgame perfect equilibria this reverses a well known conjecture of coase alternatively one can interpret the model as a sequential bargaining game with one sided incomplete information in which an uninformed seller makes all the offers our folk theorem for seller payoffs equally applies to the set of sequential equilibria of this bargaining game

alternating offer bargaining with two sided incomplete information i study alternating offer bargaining games with two sided incomplete information about the players discount rates for both perfect bayesian equilibrium and a rationalizability style notion i characterize the set of expected payoffs which may arise in the game i also construct bounds on agreements that may be made the set of expected payoffs is easy to compute and incorporate into applied models my main result is a full characterization of the set of perfect bayesian equilibrium payoffs for games in which the distribution over the players discount rates is of wide support yet is in a weak sense close to a point mass distribution i prove a lopsided convergence result each player cannot gain from a slight chance that she is a strong type but the player can suffer greatly if there is a slight chance that she is a weak type

monetary integration in africa a deliberately european perspective abstract several initiatives for monetary integration in africa at the subregional level have recently emerged in terms of orthodox theory the preconditions are not satisfied and the sequencing of these initiatives appears at fault utilizing modern theories the paper examines the case for monetary integration which depends on the prospects for improved macro stability and surveys possible strategies by comparison with europe african countries seeking monetary integration have the advantage that they can peg to an appropriate external anchor external support for such a link perhaps from the european community would be an efficient and cost effective means of promoting such initiatives

price and monetary convergence in currency unions the franc and rand zones abstract theory suggests that a currency union will impose significant macroeconomic disciplines on its members the law of one price for example should lead to convergence of price levels at least for what may be regarded as tradeable goods likewise arbitrage would imply convergence of interest rates this paper looks at the two main surviving currency unions the franc and rand zones in africa to see whether and to what extent these generally accepted propositions find confirmation in the data each of the african currency unions has a dominant or core member france in the case of the franc zone and the republic of south africa rsa in the case of the rand zone our focus is on the small members in the periphery and for them there is the additional presumption that inflation and interest rates will be imported from the core despite some rather wide short run divergences and although convergence is slow we find that in the long run consumer price inflation is largely determined in the core the limited evidence available suggests that uncontrolled interest rates also converge to core country levels jel f31

aid and performance a reassessment two visions of aid effectiveness and allocation are compared the first corresponding to the new aid paradigm argues that aid is only effective if domestic policies are appropriate the second in contrast argues that aid effectiveness depends on the external and climatic environment the worse this environment or the more vulnerable the recipient countries the greater the effectiveness of aid cross sectional econometric tests related to gdp growth on two 12 year pooled periods clearly favour the second view the two views can be reconciled through the principle of performance based aid allocation where performance is defined as outcomes adjusted for the impact of environmental factors performance can then be measured in several manners which are subject to comparison one approach would lead one to allocate more aid the worse the external environment is for a given policy and the better the policy is for a given environment

evaluating participation in african monetary unions a statistical analysis of the cfa zones abstract thirteen african nations are engaged in two monetary unions with france often referred to as the cfa zone despite the acknowledged benefits of zone membership a convertible currency pooled resources and greater monetary and fiscal discipline several observers have questioned whether particular aspects of the zone such as the lack of autonomy of the two central banks and the surrender of the exchange rate as a policy instrument have impeded its members growth this paper addresses that question by testing whether cfa zone countries had different gnp growth rates from selected comparator countries during 1960 1982 results show that cfa countries grew significantly faster than comparator sub saharan african countries but usually slower and often significantly so than the whole sample of developing countries when the comparison is made by subperiod before and after 1973 cfa countries performance vis a vis that of their comparators improved during the 1973 1982 period casting further doubt on the claim that the monetary union is not functioning adequately

uncertainty and delay in bargaining this paper investigates the relationship between uncertainty and delay of agreement in the one sided offer bargaining model with two sided uncertainty where the seller makes offers we construct a weak stationary equilibrium in which different types of the seller charge different prices in every period we completely characterize the separating equilibrium by three regularity conditions and show that the time interval between offers converges to zero the seller s initial price offer in a separating equilibrium converges with probability 1 to the lowest valuation of the buyer if and only if the gain from trading is common knowledge we have witnessed a proliferation of sequential bargaining models that with a few remarkable exceptions fudenberg and tirole 1983 cramton 1984 and chatterjee and samuelson 1987 are based on models with one sided uncertainty the importance of studying bargaining models with one sided uncertainty is that despite their highly special informational structure we can derive valuable insights into the role of uncertainty in the delay in reaching an agreement while keeping the computational exercise tractable however the assumption of one sided uncertainty essentially excludes the situation where the buyer s actual reservation value is lower than the seller s actual reservation value though they are still engaged in the bargaining process the primary objective of this paper is to investigate the role of uncertainty about the gain from trading in a sequential bargaining model with two sided incomplete information in the models with one sided incomplete information important studies fudenberg levine and tirole 1985 and gul sonnenschein and wilson 1986 are often based on weak stationary equilibria where the equilibrium strategy of each player only depends upon the posterior conjecture about the other player and the previous period s offer although the importance of two sided uncertainty and the weak stationary equilibrium is well recognized previous research on sequential bargaining models has not combined the two features within the same framework studies on the models under two sided uncertainty have not focused on weak stationary equilibria for example cramton 1984 computes a specific sequential equilibrium with interesting properties in which the equilibrium strategies of both players depend upon histories in a rather complex fashion on the other hand it is only in models under one sided uncertainty that the weak stationary equilibrium has been extensively studied this paper computes and analyzes the weak stationary equilibria in a model under two sided uncertainty in order to investigate the effect of uncertainty on the delay in agreement we will extend the results from previous studies of one sided uncertainty models the computation of the equilibrium in models with two sided uncertainty is generally very complicated furthermore we must identify a sensible outcome if more than one equilibrium exists in the model to simplify the analysis we choose a standard bargaining

is africa different abstract africa s macroeconomic response to external shocks was significantly differrent from that of other developing countries during 1976 1986 nonparametric tests that correct for differing initial conditions indicate significantly lower economic growth in african economies average inflation was also significantly lower while current account deficits were larger economic policies in african countries are characterized by significantly larger budget deficits and government current expenditure as a share of gross domestic product and by greater inward orientation african economies in the cfa franc zones are distinguished by relatively lower inflation budget deficits and less reduction in investment gnp ratios

a model of the natural rate of unemployment since the publication of edmund phelps volume the new macroeconomics has treated the labor market as a dynamic process of rational search by unemployed workers for available vacancies wages are viewed as at least potentially flexible though free contracting between workers and firms may lead to fixed wages in the short run imperfect information is a crucial element of the theory for it implies both a need for contracting and a need for rational search rather than simple market clearing in each period a positive rate of frictional unemployment may exist in equilibrium denoted as the natural rate this unemployment is due to the frictions in the search process and imperfections in information rather than to any deficiency in aggregate demand milton friedman defined the natural rate as the level that would be ground out by the walrasian system of general equilibrium equations provided there is embedded in them the actual structural characteristics of the labor and commodity markets including market imperfections stochastic variability in demands and supplies the cost of gathering information about job vacancies and labor availabilities the costs of mobility and so on p 8 this paper reexamines the micro foundations of the natural rate in a model of labor market equilibrium in which turnover flows and imperfect information are explicitly considered workers may quit their current jobs to enter the unemployment pool in order to search among available vacancies for a more preferred position firms economize on turnover by an appropriate wage policy

on the harris todaro model with intersectoral migration of labour aspects of labor migration in developing countries are examined using the approach developed by j r harris and m p todaro in particular the author attempts to model the process of labor turnover between the urban unemployed and urban firms and between the rural sector and the urban unemployed the model includes a dynamic system of wage rates and urban unemployment rates annotation

sequential bargaining with incomplete information this paper describes a simple two person two period bargaining game and solves it using the concept of perfect bayesian equilibrium in which the actions of each player convey information which is used by his opponent the paper examines the effects of changes in bargaining costs the size of the contract zone and the length of the bargaining process on such aspects of the solution as the probability of impasse and the likelihood of concessions the combination of information transfer and the lack of pre commitment embodied in perfectness yields many surprising results common perceptions about the effects of parameter changes on bargaining processes are suspect and should be checked in the particular game being discussed

on delay in bargaining with one sided uncertainty recently attention has been given to a model of two person bargaining in which the parties alternate making offers and there is uncertainty about the valuation of one party the purpose of the analysis has been to identify delay to agreement with a screening process where agents with relatively lower valuations distinguish themselves by waiting longer to settle we point out a fundamental difficulty with this program by demonstrating that the assumptions used in the literature allow for delay only in so far as the time between offers is significant

economic growth in africa abstract this paper draws on the recent endogenous growth methodology to study the factors behind differences in per capita growth rates across africa the results indicate that various economic factors including initial conditions investment population growth trade orientation inflation financial development and the growth of the government sector contribute significantly to economic growth in addition to economic variables we find the degree of political freedom to be a significant contributor to economic growth finally we find some evidence that economic growth by the members of the cfa franc zone has not fared well in comparison to other african countries

bargaining and the right to remain silent this paper analyzes a class of alternating offer bargaining games with one sided incomplete information for the case of no gap if sequential equilibria are required to satisfy the additional restrictions of stationarity monotonicity pure strategies and no free screening we establish the silence theorem when the time interval between successive periods is made sufficiently short the informed party never makes any serious offers in the play of alternating offer bargaining games a class of parametric examples suggests that the time interval required to assure silence is not especially brief as a byproduct of the analysis we also prove under the same set of assumptions a uniform version of the coase conjecture when the time interval between successive periods is made sufficiently short the initial serious offer by either party in an alternating offer bargaining game must be less than e times the highest possible buyer valuation for an entire family of distribution functions