consistent voting rules for competitive local public goods economies abstract we establish the existence of a voting market equilibrium for a large class of local public goods economies where faced with prices of the private goods and with the public goods produced by the local governments each firm maximizes its profits and each individual maximizes his utility subject to his budget constraint in addition each local government taking the prices of private goods as given i has a balanced budget and ii chooses its production of public goods in such a way that no group that contains more than q q 1 of its residents where q denotes the number of public goods produced will unanimously prefer another affordable vector of public goods

equilibrium incentive contracts and efficiency wages we analyze the optimal efficiency wage contract when output is contractible but firms neither observe the workers effort nor their match specific productivity firms offer wage contracts that optimally trade off effort and wage costs as a result employed workers enjoy rents which in turn creates unemployment nonetheless the incentive power of the equilibrium wage contract is constrained efficient in the absence of taxes and unemployment benefits we also show that more high powered incentive contracts tend to be associated with higher equilibrium unemployment rates jel e24 j30 j41

the value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly we study the value of commitment in contests and tournaments when there are costs for the follower to observe the leader s behavior in a contest the follower can pay to observe the leader s effort but cannot observe the effectiveness of that effort in a tournament the follower can pay to observe the effectiveness of the leader s effort but not the effort itself we show that this distinction matters significantly when observation is costly the value of commitment vanishes entirely in sequential and endogenous move contests regardless of the size of the observation cost by contrast in tournaments the value of commitment is preserved completely provided that the observation costs are sufficiently small

contests with limited resources abstract many interesting phenomena electoral competition r d races lobbying are instances of multiple simultaneous contests with unconditional commitment of limited resources specifically the following game is analyzed two players compete in a number of simultaneous contests the players have limited resources budgets and must decide how to allocate these to the different contests in each contest the player who expends more resources than his adversary wins a corresponding prize mixed strategy equilibria are characterized in the case of identical values and budgets and the connections with the classical blotto game are analyzed

rational escalation of costs by playing a sequence of unfavorable gambles the martingale playing the martingale strategy is an anomaly reverse to that observed in the st petersburg paradox this paper rationalizes the demonstrated irrationality of playing by characterizing necessary and sufficient conditions under which a utility maximizing decision maker would play the strategy an individual willing to play the martingale may not be deterred by a finite cap on wagers individuals will continue with the strategy in the face of mounting consecutive losses which is thus sequentially rational these results give insight into instances of escalating commitment to a losing cause by analyzing one specific instance of such behavior

oligopoly and cost sharing in economies with public goods we study economies that involve both small and large traders as well as the choice of a public project within this framework we establish two sufficient conditions under which the set of competitive allocations coincides with the core our first core equivalence result holds under the assumption that there is a countably infinite set of large traders similar to each other the second result independent of the number of large traders requires the existence of a coalition of small traders with the same characteristics of the large traders finally we show how the generalized aubin approach to cooperation may dispense with both conditions

on the continuous equilibria of affiliated value all pay auctions with private budget constraints abstract we consider all pay auctions in the presence of interdependent affiliated valuations and private budget constraints for the sealed bid all pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of n bidders budget constraints encourage more aggressive bidding among participants with large endowments and intermediate valuations we extend our results to the war of attrition where we show that budget constraints lead to a uniform amplification of equilibrium bids among bidders with sufficient endowments an example shows that with both interdependent valuations and private budget constraints a revenue ranking between the two auction formats is generally not possible equilibria with discontinuous bidding strategies are discussed

patent races and the persistence of monopoly patent races are important determinants of market structure for a new firm a patent can be an entry ticket into the market for an incumbent firm already in the market patents for related technologies can ensure that no new firm enters in this spirit recent work has explored the implications of patenting for the persistence of monopoly see for example dasgupta i982 gilbert i98i gilbert and newbery i982 much attention has been given to pre emptive patenting the strategic acquisition of patents by an incumbent firm solely to prevent potential rivals from entering the market in this context it is important to distinguish between two kinds of patent race a standard race is a competition in which a prize is awarded to the first player to reach the finishing line an asymmetrical race is a competition in which one player loses something of value if one of his rivals reaches the finishing line he is content if nobody wins but a prize is won by the first of the other players to reach the finishing line if any of them does so a patent race in which an incumbent firm s sole concern is to prevent potential rivals from entering his market is an asymmetrical race and not a standard race the distinction between the two kinds of race can be captured only in models with a sufficiently rich dynamic structure this and other advantages of a properly dynamic model are explained in section ii a model of an asymmetrical race with two firms is presented in section iii in this model the challenger wins a prize and the incumbent loses a prize if the challenger is first to reach the finishing line it is shown that the challenger is often automatically deterred from making any effort to win the race because the strategic interactions between the players are such that the incumbent would outdo any reasonable effort made by the challenger in order to stop the challenger being first to reach the finishing line then the incumbent has no need to make any effort in the race in order to maintain his existing monopoly the reason is that the incumbent unlike the challenger does not need to go all the way to the finishing line to achieve his objective on the other hand it may be truedepending on the parameters describing the firmsthat the challenger wins the patent proceeding to the finishing line just as if he were the only contender for the patent of particular interest is the case in which the firms are identical

cournot nash and lindahl equilibria in pure public good economies using a general equilibrium framework this paper analyzes the equilibrium provision of a pure public bad commodity for example pollution considering a finite economy with one desired private good and one pure public bad we explicitly introduce the concept of lindahl equilibrium and the lindahl prices into a pure public bad economy then the lindahl provision is analyzed and compared with the cournot nash provision the main results for economies with heterogeneous agents state that the asymptotic lindahl allocation of the pure public bad is the null allocation in contrast the asymptotic cournot nash provision of the public bad might approach infinity other results were obtained in concert with the broad analysis of the large finite economies with pure public bad commodities

preemptive adoptions of an emerging technology many oligopolies exhibit continuing technological change and lumpy costs of adopting new technologies if firms choose adoption dates in a game of timing and if the downstream market structure is a bertrand duopoly the equilibrium adoption pattern displays rent dissipating increasing dominance i e all adoptions are by the same firm and the discounted value of profits is zero these results need not hold for other market structures including cournot duopoly copyright 1994 by blackwell publishing ltd

patent competition rent dissipation and the persistence of monopoly the role of research budgets abstract the paper investigates how patent rights can contribute to the persistence of monopoly patent competition is modelled as a dollar auction game between two firms incumbent and entrant any bid expenditure on r d in the game constitutes sunk cost whose total amount is constrained by fixed research budgets the explicit solution subgame perfect equilibrium determines who wins the patent and how the winning expenditures depend on order of play and budgets of firms the entrant can win if he moves first and has the higher budget rent may or may not be dissipated by the competition

the impact of employment tax cuts on unemployment and wages the role of unemployment benefits and tax structure abstract i model and simulate the effects of employment tax cuts on unemployment and wages in four equilibrium models competitive union bargaining search and efficiency wages i find that if the ratio of unemployment compensation to wages is fixed the effect of the tax cut is mainly on wages but if income out of work is fixed in real terms there are substantial employment effects when wages are determined by bargaining revenueneutral reforms that make the tax more progressive also reduce unemployment thus policy towards unemployment compensation and tax structure are key influences on the effect of taxes on unemployment

multi battle contests abstract we study equilibrium in a multistage race in which players compete in a sequence of simultaneous move component contests players may win a prize for winning each component contest as well as a prize for winning the overall race each component contest is an all pay auction with complete information we characterize the unique subgame perfect equilibrium analytically and demonstrate that it exhibits endogenous uncertainty even a large lead by one player does not fully discourage the other player and each feasible state is reached with positive probability in equilibrium pervasiveness expected effort in the component contests may be non monotonic in the closeness of the race and realized individual effort may exceed the value of the prize by a factor that is proportional to the maximum number of stage victories required

collective action in an asymmetric world abstract a central authority possessing tax and expenditure responsibilities can readily provide an efficient level of a public good absent a central authority voluntary arrangements must replace coercive ones and significant under provision must be expected international public goods are particularly challenging due to the substantial asymmetries among nations small interest nations have strong incentives to ride cheaply our empirical results reveal cheap riding intentions in providing for climate change mitigation a critical international public good the evidence is provided by individual nations intended nationally determined contributions voluntarily pledged for the paris climate change conference we find that larger nations made much larger pledges in proportion to both their gross national incomes and their historical emissions implications for the nordhaus climate club and carbon tax proposals are discussed to achieve pareto optimality despite disparate cheap riding incentives we propose the cheap riding efficient equilibrium that solution takes the nash equilibrium as a base point and then applies the principles of either the nash bargaining solution or the lindahl equilibrium to proceed to the pareto frontier

mixed strategy play in single stage first price all pay auctions with symmetric players abstract we consider sealed bid first price all pay auctions with complete information discrete strategy space budget constraint and symmetric players and then construct the equilibrium solution in mixed strategies for both fixed and variable prizes the equilibrium solution yields predictions concerning the effects of group size and value of the prize that are tested experimentally the experimental results support equilibrium play on the aggregate but not individual level adaptive learning on the individual level accounts for the major trends in the aggregate expenditures over time

multi battle contests an experimental study this study examines behavior of subjects in simultaneous and sequential multi battle contests in simultaneous contests subjects make positive bids in each battle 80 of the time and bids fall within the predicted boundaries however 35 of the time subjects make positive bids in only two instead of all three battles and they significantly overuse moderately high bids in sequential contests theory predicts sizable bids in the first battle and no bids in the subsequent battles contrary to this prediction subjects significantly underbid in the first battle and overbid in subsequent battles consequently instead of always ending in the second battle contest proceeds to the third battle 38 of the time finally in both simultaneous and sequential settings subjects make higher aggregate bids than predicted resulting in negative expected payoffs

multi stage sequential all pay auctions abstract we study multi stage sequential all pay contests auctions where heterogeneous contestants are privately informed about a parameter ability that affects their cost of effort we characterize the perfect bayesian equilibrium of these contests and analyze the effect of the number of contestants and their types on the contestants expected highest effort

the war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information we provide a simple example demonstrating that the unconditional revelation information in a war of attrition with private budget constraints can decrease expected revenue our example suggests that information non revelation can counteract the adverse revenue impact of budget constraints and almost counterbalance their otherwise negative impact

preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly this article takes a different tack and inquires whether institutions such as the patent system create opportunities for firms with monopoly power to maintain their monopoly power the results apply to other situations such as brand identification spatial location and capacity expansion which share the characteristic that early or preemptive actions may lower the returns to potential competitors

war and conflict in economics theories applications and recent trends we review the main economic models of war and conflict these models vary in details but their implications are qualitatively consistent highlighting key commonalities across a variety of conflict settings recent empirical literature employing both laboratory and field data in many cases confirms the basic implications of conflict theory however this literature also presents important challenges to the way economists traditionally model conflict we finish our review by suggesting ways to address these challenges

to fight or not to fight an analysis of submission struggle and the design of contests this paper considers the players behaviour in an asymmetric two player contest when do they decide to struggle and when to subjugate analysing contest success functions it is found that two crucial prerequisites for struggle or war have to be met thus such an equilibrium is possible but restrictive if a self interested rule setter chooses the contest success function endogenously we show that one player will always subjugate applications to rent seeking and environmental regulation are discussed

efficiency wage models of unemployment keynesian economists hold it to be self evident that business cycles are characterized by involuntary unemployment but construction of a model of the cycle with involuntary unemployment faces the obvious difficulty of explaining why the labor market does not clear involuntarily unemployed people by definition want to work at less than the going wage rate why don t firms cut wages thereby increasing profits

voluntary provision of a public good and individual morality abstract we examine both in general games in strategic form and in games of voluntary provision of a public good some implications of the assumption that individuals may obey ethical codes of conduct the notion of morality considered captures the intuition often attributed to kant that a moral action leads to the best outcome when it is properly universalized we propose a formalization of this idea which generalizes earlier attempts made in this direction in the literature by allowing the players to differ both in their strategy sets and their preferences we show that it is easy to find examples of games in which no moral behavior of this type exists or where the only existing kantian code of conduct leads to a pareto inefficient outcome we then more specifically examine the issues of existence and pareto efficiency of kantian norms of behavior in games of voluntary provision of a public good we find in this context that there is no conflict between morality and pareto efficiency since any kantian norm of behavior is pareto efficient we also prove the existence of a kantian norm of individual contribution

preemption and rent equalization in the adoption of new technology we study the adoption of a new technology to illustrate the effects of preemption in games of timing we show that the threat of preemption equalizes rents in a duopoly but that this result does not extend to the general oligopoly game if the gain to preemption is sufficiently small then the optimal symmetric outcome which involves late adoption is an equilibrium this contrasts with reinganum s result that in precommitment equilibria there must be diffusion we develop a new and richer formalism for modeling games of timing which permits a continuoustime representation of the limit of discrete time mixed strategy equilibria

a model of the natural rate of unemployment since the publication of edmund phelps volume the new macroeconomics has treated the labor market as a dynamic process of rational search by unemployed workers for available vacancies wages are viewed as at least potentially flexible though free contracting between workers and firms may lead to fixed wages in the short run imperfect information is a crucial element of the theory for it implies both a need for contracting and a need for rational search rather than simple market clearing in each period a positive rate of frictional unemployment may exist in equilibrium denoted as the natural rate this unemployment is due to the frictions in the search process and imperfections in information rather than to any deficiency in aggregate demand milton friedman defined the natural rate as the level that would be ground out by the walrasian system of general equilibrium equations provided there is embedded in them the actual structural characteristics of the labor and commodity markets including market imperfections stochastic variability in demands and supplies the cost of gathering information about job vacancies and labor availabilities the costs of mobility and so on p 8 this paper reexamines the micro foundations of the natural rate in a model of labor market equilibrium in which turnover flows and imperfect information are explicitly considered workers may quit their current jobs to enter the unemployment pool in order to search among available vacancies for a more preferred position firms economize on turnover by an appropriate wage policy

workers as creditors performance bonds and efficiency wages from the standpoint of economic theory the difficulty in regulating workers performance distinguishes labor markets from commodity markets commodities do not respond to incentives workers in contrast can quit steal be hung over refuse to cooperate with other workers or generally work at low effort levels since direct monitoring is often costly and unreliable it may not be the profit maximizing solution to this problem economists have discussed various schemes to make productive behavior incentive compatible for workers the most frequently discussed schemes fall into two broad categories efficiency wages and deferred compensation or bonding schemes these schemes have been suggested as explanations for a wide variety of labormarket features that appear anomalous from the conventional supply and demand perspective efficiency wage models can generate equilibria in which there is involuntary unemployment and in which identical workers are paid different wages in jobs that are otherwise equally attractive george a akerlof and janet l yellen 1985 have argued that they can provide an important component of a model of business cycles deferred compensation schemes have been proposed as explanations for upward sloping age earnings profiles mandatory retirement pensions and hierarchical tournament promotion structures 2 because bonding is costless to firms efficiency wage and bonding strategies are often viewed as mutually incompatible profit maximizing firms should offer efficiency wages only in situations where bonding is impossible one widely held view argues that in labor markets where agency issues arise these problems are effectively solved by various bonding arrangements and moreover that this observation helps to explain otherwise peculiar features of some labor markets as mentioned above it follows that efficiency wages do not generally exist proponents of efficiency wage theory argue that there is considerable evidence of widespread agency problems e g large expenditures by many firms on monitoring and that there are barriers to the use of bonds notably moral hazard on the part of firms or legal constraints efficiency wages cannot therefore be ruled out a priori as an equilibrium solution to these agency problems 3 in this paper we study these issues surrounding efficient worker compensation in a framework that allows heterogeneity among firms and integrates the financial and

electronic data interchange competitive externalities and strategic implementation policies electronic data interchange edi is an emerging type of standardized inter organizational information system we analyze the impact of edi on the upstream suppliers competitive position in a simple two level hierarchical market structure where the buyer faces a linear demand curve and the competing heterogeneous suppliers have an upward sloping marginal cost function we show that a suppliers adoption of edi can generate positive externalities for the buyer and negative or competitive externalities for other suppliers as a result the buyer provides a price premium to those suppliers who adopt edi and increases their sales volume and market share moreover when the benefits that the buyer can derive from implementing edi are substantial and the suppliers edi adoption costs are high it may be in the buyer s best interest to subsidize the suppliers so as to encourage them to adopt edi instead of mandating them to do so regardless of whether the buyer employs a mandatory or a subsidizing policy the buyer and the end consumers may be the only ones who gain from this new technology consequently a partial adoption by the supplier base may be optimal for the buyer when the suppliers adoption costs are sufficiently high we also show that while edi reduces the transaction costs of the buyer the upstream market tends to become more concentrated as a result of increased cost differentials these results provide one economic explanation of the fact that many companies have actually reduced their supplier base after implementing edi despite a significant reduction in their market transaction costs