investment and market dominance we analyze a model of oligopolistic competition with ongoing investment special cases include incremental investment patent races learning by doing and network externalities we investigate circumstances under which a firm with low costs or high quality will extend its initial lead through investments to this end we derive a new comparative statics result for general games with strategic substitutes which applies to our investment game finally we highlight plausible countervailing effects that arise when investments of leaders are less effective than those of laggards or in dynamic games when firms are sufficiently patient

optimal nonparametric estimation of first price auctions this paper proposes a general approach and a computationally convenient estimation procedure for the structural analysis of auctioni data considering first price sealed bid auction models within the independent private value paradigm we show that the underlying distribution of bidders private values is identified from observed bids and the number of actual bidders without any parametric assumptions using the theoiy of minimax we establish the best rate of uniform convergence at which the latent density of private values can be estimated nonparametrically from available data we then propose a two step kernel based estimator that converges at the optimal rate

does foreign direct investment impede environmental quality in high middle and low income countries abstract under a multivariate framework this paper aims to investigate the nonlinear correlation between foreign direct investment and environmental degradation for high middle and low income countries with economic growth and energy consumption as additional determinants of environmental degradation all variables were found to be nonstationary and cointegrated based on recent panel data unit root tests and cointegration techniques on applying fully modified ordinary least squares fmols the long run results suggest the presence of an environmental kuznets curve in turn foreign direct investment increases environmental degradation thus confirming the pollution haven hypothesis phh moreover the bidirectional causality between co2 emissions and foreign direct investment is observed globally the findings are sensitive to different income groups and regional analyses in particular these empirical findings aid sound economic policymaking for improving environmental quality and sustainable economic development

investigating bid preferences at low price sealed bid auctions with endogenous participation abstract at procurement auctions with bid preferences qualified firms are treated special a common policy involves scaling the bids of preferred firms by a discount factor for the purposes of evaluation only introducing such an asymmetry has three effects first preferred firms may inflate their bids yet still win the auction second nonpreferred firms may bid more aggressively than in the absence of preferences third the preference policy can affect participation for different cost distributions we solve numerically for the equilibrium bid functions under different discounts and then simulate behaviour our approach allows us to quantify the relative importance of the three effects we find that the participation effect is relatively unimportant and in most cases a positive cost minimizing preference rate exists download download video 34mb video 1

deciding between competition and collusion we develop an approach to identify and test for bid rigging in procurement auctions first we introduce a general auction model with asymmetric bidders second we study the problem of identie cation in our model we state a set of conditions that are both necessary and sufe cient for a distribution of bids to be generated by a model with competitive bidding third we discuss how to elicit a prior distribution over a e rm s structural cost parameters from industry experts given this prior distri bution we use bayes s theorem to compare competitive and collusive models of industry equilibrium finally we apply our methodology to a data set of bidding by construction e rms in the midwest the techniques we propose are not computationally demanding use e exible functional forms and can be programmed using most standard statistical packages

exploring the relationship among co2 emissions real gdp energy consumption and tourism in the eu and candidate countries evidence from panel models robust to heterogeneity and cross sectional dependence a major criticism to the existing energy growth environment literature we notice is the selection of methodology panel estimation techniques that fail to consider both heterogeneity and cross sectional dependence across countries may cause forecasting errors the other concern related to the literature is that only a small number of studies analyze the influence of tourism on co2 emissions even though tourism sector has potential for affecting the environment to fulfill the mentioned gaps in the literature this study analyzes the relationship among carbon emissions real income energy consumption and tourism for a panel of the eu and candidate countries over the period 1995 2011 by using heterogeneous panel estimation techniques with cross sectional dependence results from the cadf and the cips panel unit root tests show that the analyzed variables become stationary at their first differences the lm bootstrap panel cointegration test indicates the presence of a long run relationship among the analyzed variables results from the ols with fixed effects the fmols the dols and the group mean estimator reveal that energy consumption contributes to the level of emissions while real income and tourism mitigate co2 emissions the emirmahmutoglu kose panel granger causality test suggests that there is one way causality running from tourism to carbon emissions and two way causality between co2 emissions and energy consumption and between real income and co2 emissions policy implications are further discussed

an r d race with knowledge accumulation i develop a model of an r d race with knowledge accumulation my model does not inherit the memorylessness property of the exponential distribution that troubles existing models of r d races hence firms knowledge stocks are no longer irrelevant to their behavior during the r d race and knowledge accumulation has strategic implications in this more general setting i obtain results that stand in marked contrast to the previous literature in particular under some conditions the firm that is behind in the race engages in catch up behavior this pattern of strategic interactions action reaction is consistent with empirical research copyright 2003 by the rand corporation

asymmetric private values auctions with application to joint bidding and mergers abstract much of the theoretical auction literature assumes that there are no observable differences between the bidders of an auction in this paper i present an asymmetric auction model where the distribution of a bidder s value depends on some commonly observed characteristics the model is applied to joint bidding and mergers in auction markets the results provide additional evidence that first price auctions are less susceptible to the acquisition and exercise of market power than open auctions

an empirical analysis of entrant and incumbent bidding in road construction auctions this paper explores differences in the bidding patterns of entrants and incumbents in road construction auctions we find that entrants bid more aggressively and win auctions with significantly lower bids than incumbents the differences in their bidding patterns are consistent with a model of auctions in which the distribution of an entrant s costs exhibits greater dispersion than that of an incumbent s and relations of stochastic dominance in the distributions do not persist for the entire range of estimated costs we also find that more efficient firms bid on average more aggressively and firms with greater backlogs bid less aggressively

investment incentives in procurement auctions this paper investigates firms incentives to invest in cost reduction in the first price sealed bid auction a format largely used for procurement two central features of the model are that we allow firms to be heterogeneous and that investment is observable we find that firms will tend to underinvest in cost reduction because they anticipate fiercer head on competition using the second price auction as a benchmark we also find that the first price auction will elicit less investment from market participants and that this is socially inefficient these results have implications for market design when investment is important different market institutions provide different incentives for firms to reduce costs acquire information expand and so on in short to undertake any activity that affects their competitive positions accordingly the performance of these market institutions should be judged not only from a static perspective taking firms competitive positions as given but also from a dynamic perspective auction markets are a natural competitive environment to study because there is a clear sense in which we can design such markets by choosing appropriate rules for competition in this paper we study how the first price auction fpa a format commonly used for procurement affects firms incentives to invest in cost reduction many procurement markets are characterized by a small number of participants heterogeneity among firms and low rates of turnover therefore it is interesting to investigate to what extent the format used for the auction contributes to these characteristics the basic ingredients of our model are as follows there are n firms and one of them has the opportunity prior to the auction to make an investment we model this investment as an improvement in the ex ante distribution of costs for this firm the main question we ask is what are the firm s incentives to invest given that this investment is observed by its competitors clearly the benefits of such investment depend on how the firm s competitors react in other words to determine the firm s incentive to invest we need to compare the equilibrium at the procurement stage if it makes this investment and if it does not in section 3 we derive new comparative statics results for the fpa we find that after the investment the investor s opponents will bid collectively more aggressively this result holds generally when there are only two bidders or when the investor s opponents are symmetric proposition 1 otherwise a sufficient condition is that investment changes market leadership proposition 2 in the language of industrial organization investment has a negative strategic effect in the fpa this erodes 1

the relationship between economic growth and electricity consumption from renewable and non renewable sources a study of turkey abstract the main objective of this study is to analyze the short and long run estimates as well as the causality relationships between economic growth gr electricity consumption from renewable sources relc and electricity consumption from non renewable sources nrelc for turkey in a multivariate model wherein capital k and labor l are included as additional variables using the autoregressive distributed lag ardl approach to cointegration the johansen cointegration test and the gregory hansen cointegration test with structural break we show that gr relc nrelc k and l are cointegrated although nrelc has a long run positive effect on gr the long run estimate of relc is negative but insignificant at 5 level of significance the granger causality test based on the vector error correction model reveals the evidence of neutrality hypothesis between relc and gr and between nrelc and gr in turkey in the short run in addition the granger causality runs from relc nrelc k and l to gr as well as from gr relc k and l to nrelc in the long run which supports the existence of growth hypothesis between relc and gr and feedback hypothesis between nrelc and gr in the long run it is advised that policy makers in the turkish government should continue to reduce the share of electricity consumption from renewable sources and encourage the usage of electricity from non renewable sources to have sustainable long run growth rates it is also essential to promote the investment projects to increase the efficiency of electricity generation from non renewable sources

snow removal auctions in montreal costs informational rents and procurement management using semiparametric and nonparametric estimation techniques we infer cost distributions and informational rents from 457 snow removal contracts o ered for tender by the city of montreal our results are compatible with standard received theory of competitive auctions there is a positive correlation between costs and bids and rents increase with the variance of costs bids and costs have decreased over the sample period while rents remained relatively constant the city deserves credit for these results as it has succeeded in exploiting economies of scale and triggering innovations while maintaining competition further it has been successful in adjusting its reserve prices to keep up with the decreasing cost of snow removal

competition in interregional taxation the case of western coal markets for many products are dominated by small group of states or countries with a natural advantage in the marketplace because of some initial endowment of resources favorable climate or location the purpose of this paper is to explore how such markets involving a few political jurisdictions interact noncooperatively we examine how such a market might be structured and operate and the extent of monopoly rent that can be extracted in the absence of collusion we answer these questions for an empirically estimated model of western u s coal in which two states montana and wyoming dominate production we demonstrate that in this market the amount of rent that can be extracted is greatly reduced through competition relative to a cartel nevertheless even with two producing states competing against each other significant rents can be captured significant enough to refute the contention that little rent can accrue without a cartel

reserve prices in a dynamic auction when bidders are capacity constrained abstract allowing for a reserve price in a dynamic auction with capacity constrained bidders changes the equilibrium in an unexpected way the distribution of winning bids contains a mass point several bidder types bunch at the reserve price

avoiding market dominance product compatibility in markets with network effects as is well recognized market dominance is a typical outcome in markets with network effects a firm with a larger installed base offers a more attractive product which induces more consumers to buy its product which produces a yet bigger installed base advantage such a setting is investigated here but with the main difference that firms have the option of making their products compatible when firms have similar installed bases they make their products compatible in order to expand the market nevertheless random forces could result in one firm having a bigger installed base in which case the larger firm may make its product incompatible we find that strategic pricing tends to prevent the installed base differential from expanding to the point that incompatibility occurs this pricing dynamic is able to neutralize increasing returns and avoid the emergence of market dominance

can affirmative action be cost effective an experimental examination of price preference auctions one of the most controversial questions facing our economy and society in recent years is the question of affirmative action the debate centers around an issue of minority representation in which the rights of the majority are depicted as being compromised by affirmative action programs set up to increase the welfare of minorities implicit in this discussion is the assumption that all affirmative action programs must be cost increasing this result it is claimed follows trivially from economic theory since any interference into the competitive process which prevents the most capable from being chosen must be wasteful and costly in this paper we challenge this claim with experimental results demonstrating that pricepreference auctions in which high cost minority firms are given preferential treatment in the awarding of contracts in such a way that it is possible for these firms to win a contract but not have submitted the lowest bid can be programs that both enhance minority representation and are cost effective in that they decrease the cost of government procurement in the theoretical literature on asymmetric auctions eric maskin and john riley 1995 and the optimal auction literature roger myerson 1981 it has been shown that in asymmetric auctions in which firms draw their costs from

the effect of bidders asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions abstract bidders asymmetries are widespread in auction markets yet their impact on behavior and ultimately revenue and profits is still not well understood this paper defines a natural benchmark auction environment to which to compare any private values auction with asymmetrically distributed valuations the main result is that the expected revenue from the benchmark auction dominates that from the asymmetric auction both in the first price auction and the second price auction moreover for classes of distributions that lend themselves to a quasi ordering of more or less asymmetric configurations we prove that the expected revenue is lower the more asymmetric bidders are these results formalize the idea that competition is reduced by bidders asymmetries applications to merger analysis joint bidding and investment are discussed

how auctions work for wine and art interview auctioneers and even to buy a little wine in the meantime i have also had the opportunity with john abowd 1988 to observe and collect data on the auction sale of impressionist and contemporary paintings this paper reports on some of the empirical regularities that i and others have observed in the actual operation of the auction markets for these items in view of the rich and diverse array of theoretical literature on auctions it seems high time economists began to spell out precisely what facts it is meant to explain 2

is subsidizing inefficient bidders actually costly a widespread practice particularly in public sector procurement and dispersal is to subsidize a class of competitors believed to be at an economic disadvantage arguments for such policies vary but they typically assume that benefits of subsidization must be large enough to outweigh a presumed economic cost of the subsidy when disadvantaged competitors compete in auctions the subsidy serves to make them more competitive rivals other bidders rationally respond by bidding more aggressively we consider a model of procurement auctions and show that a policy of subsidizing inefficient competitors can lower expected project cost and also enhance economic efficiency some subsidy is generally better than no subsidy for a wide range of parameters

dynamic auction environment with subcontracting this article provides evidence on the role of subcontracting in the auction based procurement setting with private cost variability and capacity constraints we demonstrate that subcontracting allows bidders to modify their costs realizations in a given auction as well as to control their future costs by reducing backlog accumulation restricting access to subcontracting raises procurement costs for an individual project by 12 and reduces the number of projects completed in equilibrium by 20 the article explains methodological and market design implications of subcontracting availability

uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions abstract for the case of two buyers we show that equilibrium in the sealed high bid auction is unique when i buyers reservations prices are drawn independently from distributions with finite support and positive mass at the lower endpoint ii buyers have private values and iii buyers preferences are log supermodular for more than two buyers we obtain the same result under the additional assumptions that iv buyers with the same reservation price have the same preferences v buyers are risk neutral or risk averse with non increasing absolute risk aversion and vi the supports of the different buyers distributions of reservation prices have the same upper endpoint

numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions abstract we propose numerical algorithms for solving first price auction problems where bidders draw independent valuations from heterogeneous distributions the heterogeneity analyzed in this work is what might naturally emerge when subsets of distributionally homogeneous bidders collude bid functions and expected revenues are calculated for two special cases extensions to more general asymmetric first price auctions are discussed journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 c63 c72 d82

entry decisions and bidding behavior in sequential first price procurement auctions an experimental study abstract though many real life auctions are run independently of each other from the bidders point of view they often form sequences of auctions we investigate how behavior responds to the additional incentives that are present in such auction sequences comparing subjects decisions in single first price procurement auctions with their decisions in a game consisting of two subsequent first price procurement auctions we find that in line with the theoretical prediction entry and bidding behavior is crucially affected by the opportunity cost of early bid submission though entry decisions and average bids in the auction sequence systematically deviate from the perfect bayesian equilibrium prediction while the nature of the opponent human being or computer has no significant effect on these findings giving subjects additional feedback on winners and prices seems to reduce the deviations from the equilibrium prediction

learning by doing organizational forgetting and industry dynamics learning by doing and organizational forgetting have been shown to be important in a variety of industrial settings this paper provides a general model of dynamic competition that accounts for these economic fundamentals and shows how they shape industry structure and dynamics previously obtained results regarding the dominance properties of flrms pricing behavior no longer hold in this more general setting we show that forgetting does not simply negate learning rather learning and forgetting are distinct economic forces in particular a model with learning and forgetting can give rise to aggressive pricing behavior market dominance and multiple equilibria whereas a model with learning alone cannot

non cooperative and cooperative responses to climate catastrophes in the global economy a north south perspective the optimal response to a potential productivity shock which becomes more imminent with global warming is to have carbon taxes to curb the risk of a calamity and to accumulate precautionary capital to facilitate smoothing of consumption this paper investigates how differences between regions in terms of their vulnerability to climate change and their stage of development affect the cooperative and non cooperative responses to this aspect of climate change it is shown that the cooperative response to these stochastic tipping points requires converging carbon taxes for developing and developed regions the non cooperative response leads to a bit more precautionary saving and diverging carbon taxes we illustrate the various outcomes with a simple stylized north south model of the global economy

piecewise procurement of a large scale project this paper studies the optimal piecewise procurement of a large scale project in the unique markov perfect equilibrium mpe of the dynamic procurement game it is found that 1 unlike the static setting the procurer s optimal strategy depends on the number of suppliers and more importantly it is nonmonotonic as one more supplier participates in the procurement auction the procurer softens competition in the initial stages by including more cost btypesq while increasing competition in the mature stages 2 this in turn implies that existing suppliers might favor participation of additional suppliers 3 absent scheduling and or resource constraints the procurer prefers to procure the project as one piece if the suppliers technology exhibits constant or increasing returns and no additional suppliers are enticed to bid and 4 the optimal dynamic mechanism can be easily implemented via a sequence of dominant strategy auctions of the vickrey type d 2004 elsevier b v all rights reserved

government procurement and international trade abstract we model the bidding for a government contract in which there is imperfect competition each bidder is better informed about his own costs than either his rival bidders or the government and the distribution of the domestic firms costs differs from the distribution of foreign firms costs because of comparative advantage effects we find that the government minimizes its expected procurement cost by operating a price preference policy not necessarily purchasing from the lowest bidder

managing dynamic competition in many important high technology markets including software development data processing communications aeronautics and defense suppliers learn through experience how to provide better service at lower cost this paper examines how a buyer designs dynamic competition among rival suppliers to exploit learning economies while minimizing the costs of becoming locked in to one producer strategies for controlling dynamic competition include the handicapping of more efficient suppliers in procurement competitions the protection and allocation of intellectual property and the sharing of information among rival suppliers jel c73 d44 l10

scale economies and the dynamics of recurring auctions we analyze the dynamics of a game of sequential bidding in the presence of stochastic scale effects either economies or diseconomies of scale we show that economies of scale give rise to declining expected equilibrium prices whereas the converse is not generally true moreover first and second price auctions are not always revenue equivalent economies of scale make second price auctions more profitable for the seller whereas revenue equivalence may be preserved in the case of diseconomies

a study of participation in dynamic auctions this article studies repeated entry and bidding decisions in construction procurement auctions i find evidence in the data that suggests the presence of significant cost savings from entering contracts of the same type i estimate a dynamic auction model to measure the gains to experience for bidders i allow for endogenous entry synergies in entry and unobserved auction heterogeneity i find that a bidder can halve entry costs by focusing on specific contract types an auctioneer can increase competition by awarding contracts of the same type in sequence as a result procurement costs for each contract can be lowered by 7 a saving of 110 000

equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions there is a voluminous theoretical literature on sealed high bid auctions auctions in which bids are sealed and the high bidder pays his bid see for example vickrey 1961 myerson 1981 riley and samuelson 1981 milgrom and weber 1982 matthews 1983 maskin and riley 1984 holt 1980 cox smith and walker 1988 a critical property on which this literature relies is the existence of equilibrium in which buyers bidding strategies are monotonic in their types this enables the analyst to perform comparative statics as the distribution of types changes and to compare the welfare properties of the high bid auction with those of other auction institutions one case in which the existence of monotonic equilibrium is readily established is that in which buyers types are distributed smoothly independently and symmetrically in this case there exists a symmetric equilibrium one in which all bidders share the same bidding behaviour as a function of their valuations and this bid function is the solution to a first order differential equation

bid preference programs and participation in highway procurement auctions we use data from highway procurement auctions subject to california s small business preference program to study the effect of bid preferences on auction outcomes our analysis is based on an estimated model of firms bidding and participation decisions which allows us to evaluate the effects of current and alternative policy designs we show that incorporating participation responses significantly alters the assessment of preferential treatment policies

conjectural variation and the indeterminancy of duopolistic equilibria the purpose of this article is to investigate the basic premise that the various oligopoly models result in an unacceptable divergence in market equilibria in the first half of the paper a theoretical model of a static conjectural variation duopoly with symmetric costs is presented using this model we define the coefficient of dispersion of equilibria and show that it is solely a function of the basic conditions of the market costs and demand this result is of empirical significance because it is possible to determine ex ante from easily observable information the extent to which conjectural variation market conduct will influence market equilibrium variation conjecturale et indetermination des equilibres duopolistiques l objectif de cet article est d analyser la proposition fondamentale que les divers modeles d oligopole se resolvent en une divergence inacceptable d equilibres de marche dans la premiere partie du m6moire on presente un modele theorique de duopole avec variation conjecturale statique et couits symmetriques avec l aide de ce modele on definit le coefficient de dispersion des equilibres et on montre qu il est seulement fonction des conditions du marche cofits et demande ce resultat a une importance empirique significative parce qu il devient possible de determiner ex ante a partir de renseignements facilement observables jusqu a quel point la variation conjecturale la conduite sur le marche va influencer l equilibre du marche

endogenous asymmetry in a dynamic procurement auction we show how to numerically solve for a markov perfect equilibrium of a dynamic auction game where a procurer repeatedly purchases construction services from capacity constrained firms we find that the procurer is best off scheduling frequent auctions for small project sizes otherwise firm capacity utilization rates become larger and more asymmetric which softens competition and increases procurement costs we also find that forward looking bidding dampens the competition softening effects of asymmetry farsighted firms compete more intensely than myopic ones this can undermine the goal of a bid preference style affirmative action program more farsighted firms respond less to the asymmetry induced via bid preferences

jurisdictional tax competition and the division of nonrenewable resource rents this paper presents a model of nonrenewable resource extraction across multiple jurisdictions which engage in strategic tax competition the model incorporates rents due to both resource scarcity and capital scarcity as well as intra region ricardian rents regions set taxes on nonrenewable resource production strategically to balance tax revenues and local benefits from investment conditional on other regions tax rates a representative extraction firm then allocates production capital across regions and time to maximize the present value of profits generally we find that the division of resource rent between firms and regional governments ultimately depends on the relative scarcity of natural and production capital relative costs across space and the value regional governments place on economic activity this theoretical result provides policymakers with information on the determinants of optimal tax rates and motivates future empirical research on the factors influencing the division of resource rent in practice

asymmetry in procurement auctions evidence from snow removal contracts differences in cost efficiency and productivity across firms may introduce asymmetries in procure ment auctions relying on a structural approach this article investigates potential asymmetry among firms bidding for snow removal contracts in montrthe empirical results show that firms located in close proximity have a cost advantage relative to other firms in the most urbanised part of montrbecause of prohibitive equipment storage costs the extent of inefficiency due to asym metry is empirically assessed various policy experiments are performed a bidding preference policy shows that the city could expect to reduce its costs for allocating snow removal contracts when bidders willingness to pay depends in part on observable variables the princi pal s interest is not best served by creating a level auction playing field this article studies procurement auctions for snow removal contracts in montrit investigates the degree to which companies in disadvantageous locations should win even if they do not submit the lowest bid from the submitted bids a novel empirical methodology estimates the extent of cost variation across firms along with its variation within loca tion although the dispersion is substantial the gain from treating bidders unequally is limited when observed individual characteristics affect the firms costs and their bidding strategies all bidders cannot be treated alike these differences in characteristics or asymmetries among bidders may arise from their size as noted by laffont et al 1995 their capacity constraints as in jofre bonet and pesendorfer 2003 or the possession of better information as in hendricks and porter 1988 and hendricks et al 1994

strategy and market structure in western coal taxation this paper analyzes the potential market power of western states in setting coal severance taxes and the emphasis placed by these states on the development of their coal resources vs obtaining tax revenues three market structures are analyzed one involves a western regional cartel setting taxes collectively the other cases are noncooperative tax equilibria with montana and wyoming competing against each other we conclude that the western states seem to be primarily concerned with revenue collection and are very efficient extractors of economic rent

designing tax policy in federalist economies an overview abstract the emerging economic federations of the european union russia and south africa along with the established federations in australia canada and the united states confront the task of designing the institutions for federal fiscal policy this paper reviews the literature on the design of tax policy in federalist economies we conclude that taxation by lower level governments can lead to significant economic inefficiencies and inequities the usual assignment view of federalis recommends central government policies for example resident based taxation or grants in aid to correct these failures these recommendations assume that the central government will act as a benevolent social planner the political economy view of federalism suggests that this assumption is in error and that additional federalist institutions must be considered alternative legislative structures and constitutional rules are considered

bottom fishing and declining prices in sequential auctions abstract we study standard sequential auctions in which the seller chooses the order of sale and right to choose auctions in which the winner chooses her preferred item from the remaining items empirically prices in sequential auctions tend to decline and sellers often hold right to choose auctions in our setting the right to choose format guarantees declining prices and efficiency in the standard auction a buyer may submit a low bid for the first item bottom fishing despite its being her less preferred item an example shows that the standard auction has declining prices is inefficient and gives lower expected revenue than the right to choose journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 d82

the economics of western coal severance taxes the recent upheavals in fuel markets have altered competitive relationships between fuels rising prices and government regulations have eliminated oil and gas from consideration as fuels for new electric utility plants further public acceptance of nuclear power has diminished to the point that coal is the only practical alternative source of energy for new base load generation facilities this change in market structure creates opportunities for those with market power the demand for coal has become less elastic and those in a position to exert market power can take advantage of the situation to raise prices the coal industry itself is competitive coal producers will in the long run be forced to sell at long run marginal cost where marginal cost reflects the cost of production as well as the competitive rent accruing to owners of depletable resources labor supply is to an extent controlled by the united mine workers union yet competition from nonunion miners limits the union s ability to act 1 other elements of the inincreases in oil and gas prices and the decline of nuclear power have led to an increase in the competitiveness of coal this change in relative economics has been particularly great for the six western coalproducing states where large low cost deposits of environmentally acceptable low sulfur coal are found montana and wyoming have responded to this situation by raising severance taxes substantially and other states are considering similar actions this has led to congressional attempts to limit state coal taxes using an integrated model of the u s coal and electric utility industries this paper estimates how high coal severance taxes might rise with and without such legislation competition and incentives for cooperation between montana wyoming and other western states are examined efficiency and distributional implications are discussed an earlier and much different version of this paper was issued as hoover institution working paper e80 9 we are indebted to george rozanski and carol bugbee for help in implementing the model described herein and to an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions we are also indebted to the m i t center for energy policy research for the support that allowed us to complete this revised version and to the hoover institution for its initial support 1 western coal production has expanded most rapidly and miners there are largely nonunion

first price auctions in the asymmetric n bidder case i consider the first price auction when the bidders valuations may be differently distributed i show that every bayesian equilibrium is an essentially pure equilibrium formed by bid functions whose inverses are solutions of a system of differential equations with boundary conditions i then prove the existence of an equilibrium i prove its uniqueness when the valuation distributions have a mass point at the lower extremity of the support i give sufficient conditions for uniqueness when every valuation distribution is one of two atomless distributions i establish inequalities between equilibrium strategies when relations of stochastic dominance exist between valuation distributions

capacity constraints and information revelation in procurement auctions i introduction procurement auctions are one of the most widely used mechanisms in modern economies to disburse funds for public works projects a substantial portion of these funds are spent on the construction and maintenance of roads and highways an activity on which the u s government for instance spends 160 billion annually in this article we examine the bidding behavior of experimental participants in order to shed light on the strategic incentives generated by these auctions our investigation is centered on two observations made in the existing literature in a typical state level procurement auction held in the united states firms submit sealed bids for a particular project that has been advertised in advance by the state s department of transportation subject to some qualifications the lowest bidder wins the project and is paid the amount of its bid empirical work analyzing these auctions has found that construction firms suffer from capacity constraints whereby a firm with a larger backlog of preexisting work commitments finds it more costly to add new work to its roster de silva dunne and kosmopoulou 2003 jofre bonet and pesendorfer 2003 1 bidders with larger backlogs therefore tend to submit higher bids and win fewer auctions because a typical department of transportation auctions off hundreds of such projects a year capacity constraints create an intertemporal linkage between adjacent auctions a bidder that wins a given auction incurs an opportunity cost in terms of forgoing expected profits in future auctions on account of its anticipated higher costs our first research question therefore is how does the presence of capacity constraints affect the bidding behavior of experiment participants our second research question is inspired by the fact that procurement markets have been found to be vulnerable to collusion by bidders bajari and ye 2003 porter and zona 1993 in most states contracts are typically won by a small set of firms that interact repeatedly in procurement auctions over the course of the year this can provide an ideal setting for a bid rigging scheme in procurement auctions where firms compete by setting prices observing the prices set by one s rivals can be crucial to the feasibility of any collusive scheme porter 2005 if bidders are not colluding and if past bids are not correlated with current costs then observing a rival s past bids will not lead to observable variation in a firm s bids if however firms are attempting to collude a change in the bid revelation policy of the procurer might lead to a measurable change in bids thus revealing the past bids of players can influence their strategic behavior as it alters the ways in which they can provide information to each other about their strategies even in the absence of explicit collusion when all bids are revealed a firm may be able to signal its desire to tacitly collude by submitting noncompetitive bids 2 this leads us to the question what is the effect of varying the amount of information revealed about past bids on the current bids of experimental participants competing in dynamic auctions the answer to this question may be useful for policy makers given that currently most state departments of transportation in the united states publicize all the bids from past auctions the central contribution of our article is to answer the two questions posed with evidence collected from laboratory economic experiments in the experimental sessions bidders play one shot two round and infinite horizon procurement auction games where winning an auction can increase a bidder s cost in the next auction in half of the experimental sessions only the winning bid is revealed after each auction this is done to restrict the amount of information that is shared between bidders explicit communication is not allowed in the other half of the sessions we reveal winning and losing bids at the conclusion of each auction

are bid preferences benign the effect of small business subsidies in highway procurement auctions abstract bid preferences in procurement auctions allow firms from an identifiable group an advantage in bidding against unfavored firms while economic efficiency is expected to fall as a result of bid preferences government procurement costs may either increase or decrease depending on the competitive response of favored and unfavored firms this paper uses data from california auctions for road construction contracts where small businesses receive a 5 percent bid preference in auctions for projects using only state funds and no preferential treatment on projects using federal aid i show that while firms bidding behavior matches theoretical predictions procurement costs are 3 8 percent higher on auctions using preferences the higher procurement cost in preference auctions is attributed to reduced participation by lower cost large firms structural estimates of latent firm costs are then used to evaluate how efficiency and the division of surplus between firms and the government are impacted by bid preferences firm profits are 3 1 percent lower under bid preferences however this is overwhelmed by the efficiency loss due to reduced large firm participation the efficiency loss conditional on firm participation is estimated to represent around 0 1 percent of overall procurement costs including the adverse effect of preferences on the participation of large firms increases the estimated efficiency loss to 3 6 percent which represents 27 cents for each additional dollar awarded to small businesses through the program counterfactual simulations indicate that if participation were instead inelastic to bid preferences the 5 percent bid preference would be close to the optimal level

spatially variable taxation and resource extraction the impact of state oil taxes on drilling in the us abstract we estimate the responsiveness of nonrenewable resource firms to taxes on output using spatially explicit data from the oil sector in the united states using a model of resource firm capital allocation over space we show that responses to spatially varying taxes differ from responses to equivalent changes in the common output price a larger response to tax rates occurs because the tax change only affects the returns to drilling in a single state whereas a price change affects both the returns to drilling in a state and the opportunity cost of not drilling in other states econometrically we estimate the effect of severance taxes on oil drilling we find that the response to a one dollar increase in tax per unit of production has an effect at least eight times as large as the effect of an equivalent decrease in output price the tax response is inelastic implying that an increase in state tax rate would increase revenue we do not find evidence of spillovers between states in the local areas near state borders

how costly is affirmative action government contracting and california s proposition 209 abstract this paper investigates the effect of disadvantaged business enterprise subcontractor goals on the winning bids for highway construction contracts using california s proposition 209 which prohibited the consideration of race or gender in awarding state funded contracts after proposition 209 prices on state funded contracts fell by 5 6 relative to federally funded projects for which preferences still applied most of the price decline after proposition 209 resulted from the mix of subcontractors employed which seems to arise from the higher costs of firms located in high minority areas finally short run barriers to entry and expansion may increase the cost of affirmative action

capacity dynamics and endogenous asymmetries in firm size empirical evidence suggests that there are substantial and persistent differences in the sizes of firms in most industries we propose a dynamic model of capacity accumulation that is consistent with the observed facts the model highlights the mode of product market competition and the extent of investment reversibility as key determinants of the size distribution of firms in an industry in particular if firms compete in prices and the rate of depreciation is large then the industry moves toward an outcome with one dominant firm and one small firm industry dynamics in this case resemble a preemption race contrary to the usual intuition this preemption race becomes more brutal as investment becomes more reversible