advance notice and job search the value of an early start recent studies of the effect of advance notice on jobless duration following displacement misspecify the relationship between these two variables by treating advance notice as a dummy regressor in conventional survival time models job search theory however suggests that the major impact of advance notice is not to alter the efficiency of search after job loss but rather to allow workers to begin search before job loss the authors develop a sequential regimes job search model which allows search prior to displacement for workers with advance knowledge of layoff with different search intensities before and after layoff maximum likelihood estimates of the model are then computed using a pooled data set from the 1984 and 1986 displaced worker surveys advance knowledge is found to significantly shorten jobless duration for most labor force groups using these estimates the authors simulate the effect of various levels of advance knowledge on jobless duration their results indicate that relatively modest advance notice substantially benefits many displaced workers

share contracts and their rationale lessons from marine fishing most of the existing literature on share contracts is based explicitly or implicitly on agriculture a sector in which share contracts are seldom dominant and apparently on the decline moreover since agricultural activities have some rather special characteristics the purpose of the present article is to analyse contractual choice and especially the choice of share contracts in a sector in which share contracts are dominant namely fishing in the process of explaining the dominance of share contracts in fishing the article also explains a some heretofore neglected features of these share contracts such as the way in which shares are calculated and the treatment of repair and maintenance expenditures b the nature and extent of interlinked transactions c the exceptional cases where share contracts are not used and d the relevance of varying environmental conditions and especially those of poor developing countries to the nature of contracts in fishing and to the differences therein between

interregional redistribution and budget institutions under asymmetric information empirical evidence from the u s and the european union suggests that regions which contribute to interregional redistribution face weaker borrowing constraints than regions which benefit from interregional redistribution this paper presents an argument in favor of such differentiated budget institutions it develops a two period model of a federation consisting of two types of regions the federal government redistributes from one type of regions contributors to the other type recipients it is shown that a fiscal constitution with lax budget rules for contributors and strict budget rules for recipients solves the self selection problem the federal government faces in the presence of asymmetric information regarding exogenous characteristics of the regions

unemployment insurance and the rate of re employment of displaced workers the rate of transition from unemployment to re employment for a sample of displaced workers is estimated using a semiparametric specification which allows the effects of unemployment insurance benefits to vary over time three results which would be missed by more restrictive specifications demonstrate the value of this approach 1 the effects of ui benefits decline and eventually disappear as the date of expiration approaches 2 expiration of ui benefits are an inadequate explanation of the spikes commonly observed in nonparametric sample hazard rates for re employment 3 ui benefits do not significantly affect the rate at which a displaced worker becomes re employed in his or her previous industry but reduce the rate for transitions to other industries copyright 1991 by mit press

politicians as experts electoral control and fiscal restraints we propose an argument for fiscal restraints that is based on the premise that the services of politicians are credence goods politicians are experts who specialize in observing the true state of the economy budget maximizing politicians are better informed than the electorate about the level of public spending necessary to manage public affairs voters who are able to observe the size of the budget but not the necessary level of spending affect the government s spending behavior via electoral control a fiscal restraint limits the maximum spending a government can choose we identify conditions under which such a fiscal restraint improves voter welfare and discuss the role of the political opposition as a second expert in situations in which the state of the economy requires a level of spending which exceeds the fiscal restraint

institutional quality and capital inflows theory and evidence abstract this paper analyzes both theoretically and empirically the link between capital inflows and the quality of economic institutions to this purpose we construct a small open economy model of the soft budget constraint syndrome wherein persistently cheap funding from abroad i raises the prevalence of extractive projects and ii expands their support by the benevolent government ex post while the government may in principle limit the prevalence of extractive projects ex ante the incentives to do so is limited when foreign borrowing is cheap using a large sample of countries and controlling for reverse causality and omitted variable bias we confirm empirically that capital inflows are followed by a decline in the quality of domestic economic institutions our model and empirical analysis help explain the divergence between southern european countries spain portugal italy and greece and the rest of oecd countries since the mid 1990s

efficiency and equity tradeoffs incentive compatible contracts revisited abstract while the efficiency of certain contractual choices has been well established less attention has been given to the distributional outcomes of contracting in natural resource based industries data from a case study of seed gatherers in honduras demonstrates that workers paid under a relative payment system receive an earnings premium of about 25 of which 40 cannot be explained by observed differences in worker productivity a theoretical agency model is outlined in the appendix to explain why workers under tournaments necessarily enjoy a higher return than those under piece rates implying a more skewed income distribution as suggested in the efficiency wage literature

can unemployment insurance spur entrepreneurial activity evidence from france we evaluate the effect of downside insurance on self employment we exploit a large scale reform of french unemployment benefits that insured unemployed workers starting businesses the reform significantly increased firm creation without decreasing the quality of new entrants firms started postreform were initially smaller but their employment growth productivity and survival rates are similar to those prereform new entrepreneurs characteristics and expectations are also similar finally jobs created by new entrants crowd out employment in incumbent firms almost one for one but have a higher productivity than incumbents these results highlight the benefits of encouraging experimentation by lowering barriers to entry

monetary fiscal policy interactions and commitment versus discretion in a monetary union abstract we consider monetary fiscal policy interactions in a monetary union if monetary and fiscal authorities have different ideal output and inflation targets the nash equilibrium output or inflation or both are beyond the ideal points of all authorities leadership of either authority is better fiscal discretion entirely negates the advantage of monetary commitment the optimal monetary rule is equivalent to discretionary leadership of monetary over fiscal policy agreement about ideal output and inflation creates a monetary fiscal symbiosis yielding the ideal point despite disagreement about the relative weights of the two objectives for any order of moves without fiscal co ordination and without monetary commitment

the impact of the potential duration of unemployment benefits on the duration of unemployment abstract this paper examines the impact of the potential duration of unemployment insurance ui benefits on unemployment in the united states first we use a large sample of household heads to examine differences in the unemployment spell distributions of ui recipients and nonrecipients sharp increases in the escape rate from unemployment both through recalls and new job acceptances are apparent for ui recipients around the time of benefits exhaustion such increases are not apparent at similar points of spell duration for nonrecipients second our analysis of accurate administrative data from 12 states indicates that a one week increase in potential benefit duration increases the average duration of the unemployment spells of ui recipients by 0 16 to 0 20 weeks

european monetary unification a tour d horizon this article takes stock of the literature and debate over european monetary unification in contrast to other papers where it is argued that the issues and prospects remain shrouded in uncertainty i argue that in a number of important areas a reasonable degree of consensus now exists as the result of a decade of scholarship the subsequent stock taking concentrates on areas where significant questions remain starting with the implications of surrendering the exchange rate and an independent national monetary policy as instruments of adjustment the conduct of fiscal policy under the excessive deficit procedure and the stability pact and how quickly the european union is likely to develop an eu wide system of fiscal federalism to accompany its monetary union turning from fiscal to monetary issues i ask whether the european central bank ecb will be as inflation averse as the bundesbank what exchange rate policy the ecb will pursue and whether the euro will be a leading reserve currency i conclude with what may be the most contentious issue of all namely whether europe s monetary union could collapse after it begins

the role of networks in antitrust investigations antitrust investigations typically focus on the competitive pressures coming from within the defined markets of interest however competitive pressures can also come from other markets even when individually these markets place only weak constraints on one another collectively they may matter a networks approach to modelling competition permits a systemic view of competition that can sometimes paint a more accurate picture we demonstrate this through some simple examples and show more generally how tools from the networks literature can be applied to capture competition across a system of interrelated markets as a leading example we consider antitrust investigations into supermarkets where local geographic markets have been used as the basis of investigation

discrimination and the unemployment durations of white and black males in this study we develop a model to decompose the longer unemployment duration of blacks into discriminatory and non discriminatory components by extending becker s theory of discrimination to job search theory the discriminatory component is seen to be the result of two separate effects first a white treatment advantage shortens the unemployment duration of whites because they receive more frequent and higher wage offers than would prevail in the absence of discrimination for working alongside blacks second a black treatment disadvantage lengthens the jobless spell of blacks because blacks receive lower wage offers than would prevail without discrimination as discriminating employers extract quasi rents from their labour we estimate our model using date from the cps displaced workers survey the results show that 3 81 of the 4 58 weeks longer unemployment spell for blacks is due to discrimination with 3 11 weeks resulting from the white treatment advantage and 0 7 weeks emanating from the black

compensating wage differentials and the optimal provision of unemployment insurance between 1970 and 1987 the number of workers covered by unemployment insurance nearly doubled and benefit payments increased from 3 8 billion to 14 2 billion annually economists attribute this increased coverage in part for the sizable increase in the long run natural unemployment rate over the same period 17 the adequacy of unemployment insurance benefits is a major social and political concern with repercussions extending to individual welfare and to the profits and productivity of american industries yet there has been no statistical investigation to test the adequacy of benefit levels or to determine the net financial burden on firms taking the wage offset for benefits into account viscusi and moore 22 developed a test for the optimality of social insurance benefits based on the tradeoff between wages and workers compensation benefits their argument states that if benefit levels were adequate individuals would be willing to trade wages for benefits at an actuarially fair rate adjusted for the level of insurance loading if benefits were too low individuals would be willing to forego more than the efficient amount of wages to increase the level of insurance if benefits were excessive an individual would not be willing to pay the efficient rate in exchange for increased coverage this paper evaluates unemployment insurance benefits using a parallel approach with further attention given to moral hazard considerations and using an alternative risk measure that accounts for the average duration of unemployment spells as well as their frequency the results of this research estimate the price that workers would pay to insure their income against unemployment in the presence of an efficient competitive insurance market that price provides a reference point for implicit insurance rates as established under the existing unemployment insurance program related studies have considered the effect of unemployment insurance on wages topel 19 used the pooled 1977 80 current population surveys to estimate the impact of unemployment risk on wages controlling for unemployment insurance ui benefits as well as the effect of ui on the propensity for agents to enter and leave spells of unemployment on which a large literature exists he did not however evaluate insurance levels in regard to their optimal rates or consider

bargaining in dynamic markets abstract we study non stationary markets in which traders are randomly matched to bargain over the price of a heterogeneous good or the terms of a partnership the economy consists of a continuum of players drawn from a finite set of types players exogenously enter the market over time and exit upon trading at every date matching probabilities for each pair of types are determined by the endogenous distribution of trader types in the market the balance of bargaining power at any stage depends on variations in potential gains from trade the inflows of new traders the structure of agreements at future dates and the induced frequency of trading opportunities we establish that an equilibrium always exists moreover all equilibria that lead to the same evolution of the economy are payoff equivalent however we show that multiple self fulfilling expectations about the trajectory of the economy generating distinct equilibrium dynamics and payoffs may coexist

rethinking social insurance economics 1 social insurance programs have become the most important the most expensive and often the most controversial aspect of government domestic policy not only in the united states but also in many other countries including developing and industrialized nations in the united states these programs include social security retirement disability and survivor insurance unemployment insurance and medicare insurance for those age 65 and older together these programs accounted for 37 percent of federal government spending and more than 7 percent of gdp in 2003 these ratios have increased rapidly in the past and are projected to increase even faster in the future because of the more rapid aging of the population i will discuss how the major forms of social

overturning mundell fiscal policy in a monetary union central to ongoing debates over the desirability of monetary unions is a supposed trade off outlined by mundell 1961 a monetary union reduces transactions costs but renders stabilization policy less effective if shocks across countries are sufficiently correlated then according to this argument delegating monetary policy to a single central bank is not very costly and a monetary union is desirable this paper explores this argument in a setting with both monetary and fiscal policies in an economy with monetary policy alone we confirm the presence of the trade off and find that indeed a monetary union will not be welfare improving if the correlation of national shocks is too low however fiscal interventions by national governments combined with a central bank that has the ability to commit to monetary policy overturn these results in equilibrium such a monetary union will be welfare improving for any correlation of shocks

the credibility revolution in empirical economics how better research design is taking the con out of econometrics since edward leamer s memorable 1983 paper let s take the con out of econometrics empirical microeconomics has experienced a credibility revolution while leamer s suggested remedy sensitivity analysis has played a role in this we argue that the primary engine driving improvement has been a focus on the quality of empirical research designs the advantages of a good research design are perhaps most easily apparent in research using random assignment we begin with an overview of leamer s 1983 critique and his proposed remedies we then turn to the key factors we see contributing to improved empirical work including the availability of more and better data along with advances in theoretical econometric understanding but especially the fact that research design has moved front and center in much of empirical micro we offer a brief digression into macroeconomics and industrial organization where progress by our lights is less dramatic although there is work in both fields that we find encouraging finally we discuss the view that the design pendulum has swung too far critics of design driven studies argue that in pursuit of clean and credible research designs researchers seek good answers instead of good questions we briefly respond to this concern which worries us little

employment spells and unemployment insurance eligibility requirements in this paper we examine whether the requirements that workers must satisfy to qualify for unemployment insurance ui benefits in any succeeding period of joblessness affect the duration of employment spells this behavioral consequence of a ui system has been neglected in empirical research which has instead focused on the effects of ui parameters on the actions of the unemployed the effect is identified by a unique change in the eligibility requirements of the canadian ui system in 1990 which increased the weeks of employment required to establish ui eligibility we provide a variety of estimates of this behavioral effect in our preferred set of results we find a significant increase in the employment hazard in the week that an individual satisfies the eligibility requirement in many regions of the country in the spirit of feldstein s 1976 study of temporary layoffs the results provide new evidence of the impact of ui system parameters on the actions of employers and workers

politics institutions and fiscal performance in a federal system an analysis of the argentine provinces abstract we posit that the fiscal behavior of argentine provinces is determined by a common pool game at two levels within each province and across political units in the latter game the national government has a greater incentive than the provincial governments to internalize the negative externality of fiscal imprudence given relatively strong party discipline the president is able to induce governors from his party to internalize a portion of the externality to a greater extent than opposition governors in argentina party matters for fiscal behavior but it does so for reasons different from those identified in studies of oecd countries

bargaining and efficiency in networks abstract we study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain over a unit surplus players who reach agreement are removed from the network without replacement the global logic of efficient matchings and the local nature of bargaining in combination with the irreversible exit of player pairs following agreements create severe hurdles to the attainment of efficiency in equilibrium for many networks all markov perfect equilibria of the bargaining game are inefficient even as players become patient we investigate how incentives need to be structured in order to achieve efficiency via subgame perfect but non markovian equilibria the analysis extends to an alternative model in which individual players are selected according to some probability distribution and a chosen player can select a neighbor with whom to bargain

grand corruption instead of commitment reconsidering time inconsistency of monetary policy abstract this paper suggests that inflation may be affected differently by grand corruption compared to its positive nexus with petty corruption in an extended barro and gordon 1983a model grand corruption may serve as a quasi commitment device a cheating expropriating government may actually deter a monetary authority from cheating reneging furthermore rogoff s 1985 conservative central banker has an unambiguously beneficial effect she reduces the inflationary bias even more while also rendering fiscal policy more effective the model nests the standard fiscal monetary interaction logic with and without expropriation as well as the diametrical symbiosis result obtained by dixit and lambertini 2003a

capitalism and kinship do institutions matter in the labor market this study examines the determination of employment and pay on capitalist and kinship vessels in the new england fishing industry capitalist vessels resemble standard competitive firms in the way that employment and pay respond to changing market conditions kinship vessels operate under work guarantees and income sharing rules these differences in institutional rules lead to different patterns of income employment growth and labor adjustment the study shows how an understanding of the institutional structure of labor markets can contribute to the design of public policies to facilitate adjustment to change and to promote industrial growth

excessive deficits sense and nonsense in the treaty of maastricht maastricht s fiscal rules willem buiter giancarlo corsetti and nouriel roubini the maastricht treaty on economic and monetary union in the ec has specified limits on both government debt and fiscal deficits satisfying these criteria is necessary for getting into emu once inside violating these limits will also incur penalties the fiscal requirements especially the debt criterion are much tougher than is required to ensure public sector solvency trying to attain these targets will force the ec initially into substantial deflation and recession failure to correct for real growth inflation and the business cycle makes the nominal deficit a poor basis for any policy or target ambiguity about how fiscal targets will in fact be interpreted might provide a way out but cannot today be relied upon to do so supranational fiscal rules are sometimes claimed to be justified by externalities in national fiscal policies we find this justification wanting both in theory and empirically a better case might be built on the imposition of external commitments to offset domestic political distortions that systematically induce excessive deficits even so we conclude that the fiscal convergence criteria on balance are harmful and should be disregarded or applied very loosely to avoid the risk of serious fiscal overkill

benefits and unemployment in an open economy an equilibrium analysis this paper examines the relation between uemployment compensation and unemployment in the netherlands this relation is studied by menas of a small macroeconomic model for an open economy that assumes equilibrium in the labour market and on the current account the model yields an elasticity of unemployment to benefits of 1 0 which is high compared to microeconomic research and the outcomes of disequilibrium models for the netherlands according to the model a rise in the wedge i e the difference betweenn real labour cost and real net wages leads to an increase in unemployment whilst shifting this wedge from the employers to the employees induces a fall in unemployment

international coordination of fiscal policy in limiting economies we examine the limiting behavior of cooperative and noncooperative fiscal policies as countries market power goes to zero we show that these policies converge if countries raise revenues through lump sum taxation however if there are unremovable domestic distortions such as distorting taxes there can be gains to coordination even when a single country s policy cannot affect world prices these results differ from the received wisdom in the optimal tariff literature the key distinction is that contrary to the tariff literature the spending decisions of governments are explicitly modeled

an analysis of the stability and growth pact we use a stylised model to analyse the stability and growth pact for countries that have formed the european monetary union emu in our model shortsighted governments fail to internalise the consequences of their debt policies for the common inflation rate fully therefore while governments have no incentive to sign a stability pact in the absence of a monetary union they do so with monetary union to restrain this externality with uncertainty a monetary union combined with an appropriately designed pact will be strictly preferred to autonomy with differences in initial conditions conflicts of interest arise we study the nash bargaining solution

federalism fiscal restraints and european monetary union a prominent feature of the maastricht treaty on european union is the restrictions it places on fiscal policy under the provisions of the excessive deficit procedure or edp the success of member states in avoiding excessive deficits during the transition to economic and monetary union emu is one of four criteria governing admission to the monetary union once monetary union has begun member states are unconditionally required to avoid excessive deficits a state has an excessive deficit when it is so declared by the european council upon a report by the european commission and a judgment by the monetary committee the edp is set in motion if a country s deficit and general government debt respectively exceed 3 percent and 60 percent of gdp the justification for these procedures is that member states participating in the monetary union must be restrained from overborrowing to avoid destabilizing the common currency if excessive deficits cause a debt crisis the european central bank ecb will come under pressure to bail out the imperiled government the bailout could be ex post in which case the ecb would monetize the government s debt or ex ante in which case it would keep interest rates low to lighten the debt service burden either way unfettered fiscal policies could create inflationary pressures that the ecb will find difficult to resist

fiscal decentralization a political theory with latin american cases theories of fiscal federalism explain the efficiency and other economic gains from decentralization but do not explain its extent and nature in practice the authors develop a political theory of decentralization that focuses on the lines of political accountability between politicians at different levels of government the more accountable central level politicians presidents and legislators are to subnational politicians the greater the extent of decentralization and the more it will conform to the preferences of subnational politicians for example with respect to the degree of the center s discretion the model is tested on five latin american countries that although formally decentralized in fact exhibit wide differences in the distribution of spending and revenue responsibilities the theory also helps explain a number of problems governments have encountered in decentralizing including subnational debt crises and a mismatch between responsibilities and resources

work incentive effects of taxing unemployment benefits before 1979 unemployment insurance ui benefits were not treated as taxable income in the united states several economists criticized this policy on the ground that not taxing ui benefits while taxing earned income allegedly encourages unemployed persons to conduct longer than socially optimal job searches since 1979 however ui benefits received by persons in higher income families have been subject to income tax this paper investigates whether the introduction of benefit taxation has had the predicted effect of reducing unemployment duration the study uses data on a sample of persons that filed for ui in 1978 or 1979 to examine whether high income claimants collected benefits for shorter periods after the tax change than they did before benefits became taxable as part of the empirical analysis the paper develops a generalization of the weibull distribution and applies a limited dependentvariable technique for this distribution similar to the tobit technique for the normal distribution despite some variation in the results from different model specifications the analysis presents persuasive evidence of a tax effect on unemployment duration the 1979 policy change is estimated to have reduced average compensated unemployment duration among the sampled high income claimants by about one week

time inconsistency and free riding in a monetary union in monetary unions a time inconsistency problem in monetary policy leads to a novel type of free rider problem in the setting of non monetary policies the free rider problem leads union members to pursue lax non monetary policies that induce the monetary authority to generate high inflation free riding can be mitigated by imposing constraints on non monetary policies without a time inconsistency problem the union has no free rider problem then constraints on non monetary policies are unnecessary and possibly harmful this theory is here detailed and applied to several non monetary policies labor market policy fiscal policy and bank regulation

a unified welfare analysis of government policies we conduct a comparative welfare analysis of 133 historical policy changes over the past half century in the united states focusing on policies in social insurance education and job training taxes and cash transfers and in kind transfers for each policy we use existing causal estimates to calculate both the benefit that each policy provides its recipients measured as their willingness to pay and the policy s net cost inclusive of long term impacts on the government s budget we divide the willingness to pay by the net cost to the government to form each policy s marginal value of public funds or its mvpf comparing mvpfs across policies provides a unified method of assessing their impact on social welfare our results suggest that direct investments in low income children s health and education have historically had the highest mvpfs on average exceeding 5 many such policies have paid for themselves as governments recouped the cost of their initial expenditures through additional taxes collected and reduced transfers we find large mvpfs for education and health policies amongst children of all ages rather than observing diminishing marginal returns throughout childhood we find smaller mvpfs for policies targeting adults generally between 0 5 and 2 expenditures on adults have exceeded this mvpf range in particular if they induced large spillovers on children we relate our estimates to existing theories of optimal government policy and we discuss how the mvpf provides lessons for the design of future research

government finance in a common currency area abstract european integration in 1992 may require greater exchange rate coordination thatn currently exists the delors report goes as far as to recommend the eventual adoption of a single currency however the formation of a common currency area raises fears that independent fiscal policies may produce inferior outcomes this paper shows that lack of cooperation in fiscal policy leads to too little inflation too high taxes and too much government spending jel f33

business cycles unemployment insurance and the calibration of matching models this paper theoretically and empirically documents a puzzle that arises when an rbc economy with a job matching function is used to model unemployment the standard model can generate sufficiently large cyclical fluctuations in unemployment or a sufficiently small response of unemployment to labor market policies but it cannot do both variable search and separation finite ui benefit duration efficiency wages and capital all fail to resolve this puzzle however either sticky wages or match specific productivity shocks can improve the model s performance by making the firm s flow of surplus more procyclical which makes hiring more procyclical too

fiscal policy rules and the sustainability of public debt in europe the sustainability of public debt is interpreted as the result of the interaction of fiscal policy with the economic environment and not as a statistical concept as in most of the recent literature if debt is not to explode over time policymakers have to respond to the changing conditions in the macroeconomic environment this article defines the conditions that will ensure compliance of fiscal policy with the intertemporal budget constraint in the context of europe s fiscal policy rules the empirical part of the article reveals that european public debt is sustainable in this respect but questions regarding long run liquidity requirements remain unresolved

sub nationals risk premia in fiscal federations fiscal performance and institutional design the recent debt crisis in europe highlighted the importance of institutional design and in particular bail out clauses in determining states risk premia in fiscal or quasi fiscal federations this paper examines the determinants of sub national governments risk premia in fiscal federations using secondary market data for the usa canada australia and germany it finds that as for central governments fiscal fundamentals matter in the pricing of risk and sub national governments with higher public debt and larger deficits pay higher premia however this relationship is not uniform across federations and it differs with institutional arrangements in particular market pricing mechanisms are less effective in presence of explicit or implicit guarantees from the central government we show that when sub national governments depend on high transfers from the central government i e when there is some form of implicit guarantee from the center markets are less responsive to sub national governments fiscal fundamentals using primary market data the paper also shows that high transfer dependency lowers the probability of sub national governments to borrow on capital markets

the redistributive roles of unemployment insurance and the dynamics of voting abstract public unemployment insurance is analyzed as the majority voting equilibrium policy of a dynamic stochastic economy abstracting from incentive effects we focus on redistribution some results are because of the distribution of heterogeneous employment opportunities public insurance may be democratically chosen even if complete private markets exist and because of the dynamics even when agents are intrinsically homogeneous the equilibrium benefit level or duration benefit schedule deviates from what has been described as optimal in the literature the effects of differences in the average frequency or duration of unemployment on equilibrium taxes and benefits are investigated with some unanticipated results

monetary and fiscal policies interaction in monetary unions in this paper the literature on the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union is surveyed by adopting the concept of symbiosis as a starting point the paper highlights the importance of uncertainty policy makers preferences and targets then the role of commitment to policy rules and coordination is addressed the analysis also focuses on the importance of the data considered for the generation of the policy mix as a final step the paper discusses the main results in the literature on public debt management in a monetary union all the reported theoretical results are then adopted to retrieve policy and institutional implications for the european monetary union

when do cooperation and commitment matter in a monetary union abstract this paper offers a framework to study strategic interactions between private players national fiscal authorities and a common central bank in monetary unions we establish general conditions in terms of restrictions on spillover effects of actions by private and public players under which games that differ in the degree of cooperation and commitment can admit the same equilibrium outcome we use these conditions to characterize benchmark results on the irrelevance of cooperation and commitment established in recent literature moreover we show for a general setting in which the benchmark results do not apply that gains from fiscal cooperation depend on the number of countries and increase as this number gets larger

unemployment insurance and unemployment spells this paper tests the effects of the level and length of unemployment insurance benefits on unemployment durations the paper particularly studies individual behavior during the weeks just prior to when benefits lapse higher unemployment insurance benefits are found to have a strong negative effect on the probability of leaving unemployment however the probability of leaving unemployment rises dramatically just prior to when benefits lapse individual data are used with accurate information of spell durations and the level and length of benefits the semiparametric estimation techniques used in the paper yield more plausible estimates than conventional approaches and provide useful diagnostics copyright 1990 by the econometric society

on the need for fiscal constraints in a monetary union the desirability of fiscal constraints in monetary unions depends critically on whether the monetary authority can commit to following its policies if it can commit then debt constraints can only impose costs if it cannot commit then fiscal policy has a free rider problem and debt constraints may be desirable this type of free rider problem is new and arises only because of a time inconsistency problem

some estimates of the effects of unemployment insurance on re employment duration abstract this paper examines how re employment spell durations are affected by the potential unemployment benefit period an ex ante notion and benefit exhaustion an ex post notion the extent to which benefit duration affects re employment duration is found to depend on the nature of the separation

fiscal federalism in argentina policies politics and institutional reform argentine fiscal federalism is considered to be very inefficient by all specialists its allocation of tax and spending authorities and its system of intergovernme ntal transfers do not correspond to any economic criteria and provide all sorts of perverse incentives and obstacles for sound economic policies agreeing with the above diagnostic we attempt to take a step further and to provide an explanation for the many inefficient features of argentine fiscal federalism in order to do that we apply and further develop an approach presented in spiller and tommasi 2000 that tries to explain public policies as the outcome of political transactions these approach argues that the nature and characteristics of the observed policies will be conditioned by the rules of the political game under which those t policies are made hence it re focuses policy recommendations from the level of policy reform to the level of institutional reforms with emphasis on political institutions

on the empirical relationship between unemployment duration unemployment insurance and voluntary unemployment abstract this paper is concerned with the detection of the empirical consequences of nonstationarity in the search behavior of the unemployed initially workers are laid off and forced to search while unemployed upon re employment individuals may choose an employment search strategy continue search for better offers or initiate unemployment voluntarily by quitting their job if it is optimal to do so we refer to this strategy as voluntary unemployment we analyze how this decision is related to benefit exhaustion or more generally to the completed duration of unemployment and we are therefore able to find a relationship between unemployment duration and the incidence of voluntary unemployment the model is estimated from a panel of young canadian labor force participants

time consistency of optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a small open economy abstract this paper characterizes conditions under which optimal monetary and fiscal policy is time consistent in a stylized small open economy with a flexible foreign exchange rate regime it shows that these conditions depend on the way in which leisure is assumed to enter preferences and or on the process which productivity is assumed to follow this paper further argues that these conditions may fail to be sufficient if the small open economy implements a fixed foreign exchange rate regime thus a credible fixed exchange rate regime does not necessarily help render optimal policy time consistent

markov equilibria in a model of bargaining in networks abstract we study the markov perfect equilibria mpes of an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain players who reach agreement are removed from the network without replacement we establish the existence of mpes and show that mpe payoffs are not necessarily unique a method for constructing pure strategy mpes for high discount factors is developed for some networks we find that all mpes are asymptotically inefficient as players become patient