not all price endings are created equal price points and asymmetric price rigidity abstract we document an asymmetry in the rigidity of 9 ending prices relative to non 9 ending prices consumers have difficulty noticing higher prices if they are 9 ending or noticing price increases if the new prices are 9 ending because 9 endings are used as a signal for low prices price setters respond strategically to the consumer heuristic by setting 9 ending prices more often after price increases than after price decreases 9 ending prices therefore remain 9 ending more often after price increases than after price decreases leading to asymmetric rigidity 9 ending prices are more rigid upward than downward these findings hold for both transaction prices and regular prices and for both inflation and no inflation periods

input price discrimination in the presence of downstream vertical differentiation abstract this paper investigates the competitive effects of input price discrimination ipd in a setting in which an upstream monopolist produces an essential input supplied to the downstream market where there is competition between two vertically differentiated retailers two different input pricing regimes are investigated i the uniform pricing regime in which third degree input price discrimination is prohibited and i i a discriminatory pricing regime under which the upstream monopolist may charge different prices to the two downstream firms we find that despite favoring the low quality firm ipd is welfare enhancing if and only if the quality gap is sufficiently high

a comment on price endings when prices signal quality stiving 2000 proposes an interesting model to explain price endings his analysis shows that even when customer demand increases at 9 ending price points certain firms that use high prices to signal quality are more likely to set those prices at round numbers this comment raises two issues about the model first it appears that the original paper imposes a condition that has the effect of eliminating a broad range of legitimate separating equilibria from the analyses second it appears that the original model does not include constraints to ensure that the demand for each market segment will be nonnegative when these constraints on demand are included one obtains different aggregate demand curves which leads to different equilibrium prices using the revised model and analysis we find that 71 of the prices end in 9 and only 12 in 0 this contrasts with only 3 ending in 9 and 58 ending in 0 for the original study therefore 9 endings still prevail even though high prices can be used by firms to signal high quality

signaling quality with a money back guarantee the role of transaction costs direct marketing is witnessing explosive growth as consumers increasingly purchase products from their homes their ability to judge the quality of products they buy is significantly reduced in this paper we study how money back guarantees can signal product quality in such environments we interpret product quality broadly to mean both the level of attributes promised as well as the firm s consistency in delivering on those promises key aspects of our formulation are the explicit consideration of transaction costs and alternative signals of product quality transaction costs are the costs the seller or buyer faces when redeeming a money back guarantee we show that money back guarantees signal quality by exploiting the higher probability of returns for a lower quality product and the attendant higher transaction costs however if the seller s transaction costs are very large then there are less costly ways to signal namely charging a high price we compare the signaling performance of 1 price 2 price with uninformative advertising and 3 price with a money back guarantee whereas uninformative advertising does not work at all in our model under certain conditions a money back guarantee is necessary to signal and under other conditions a money back guarantee is a useful supplement to price

colluding on relative prices firms sometimes agree to limit the discounts they offer a class of customers i e they collude on the price differences across consumer classes why courts have struck down agreements to limit discounts as violations of the laws against price fixing are these collusive agreements in fact efficient this article addresses these questions in a multiproduct duopoly model under one interpretation the incentive to collude on relative prices can be traced to heterogeneity in consumers time costs under fairly general conditions total surplus increases with the collusion this efficiency effect is most striking in the case where collusion raises the prices faced by all consumers over which firms compete

round prices and price rigidity evidence from outlawing odd prices abstract this paper exploits a legal change in israel that banned the use of non zero digit price endings e g 6 99 to study the relationship between digit price endings and price rigidity we compare the propensity of product prices to change before and after the ban while distinguishing between products whose prices ended with a zero and products whose prices did not end with a zero digit before the ban we find that before the ban zero digit price endings were more likely to change typically upward compared with products with non zero digit price endings after the legal change these differences disappeared overall these findings support the price point theory blinder 1991

do subjects from high and low context cultures attribute different meanings to tourism services with 9 ending prices abstract four symbolic meanings have been associated with 9 ending prices discount price enhanced value low quality and misleading action scales were developed to measure each meaning and the relative strength of these meanings in influencing tourists purchases among samples from the u s korea and china was investigated the analyses found no differences in the likelihood of tourists selecting 9 ending rather than even ending prices when purchasing a sandwich a pizza or show tickets in their relative importance across cultures or in the influence on purchase decisions of different symbolic meanings associated with 9 endings however a 9 ending discount was perceived to be more effective when compared to even ended price discounts in the context of a hotel room again however its effectiveness could not be explained by the different symbolic meanings associated with 9 ending prices

the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination in the author examines third degree price discrimination by an upstream monopolist in an intermediate good market discrimination is motivated by the fact that downstream firms differ in their abilities to integrate backward into supply of the input the author shows that under reasonable specifications of equilibrium price discrimination leads to all buyers facing higher input prices in other cases discrimination raises some prices and lowers others the author derives conditions under which discrimination lowers welfare by reducing total output and shows that in some markets discrimination will raise welfare by preventing socially inefficient backward integration copyright 1987 by american economic association

reward structures and the allocation of talent as relative rewards that different professions receive are a key factor in the allocation of talent what determines the reward structure of a society is an important question this paper develops an equilibrium model of the allocation of talent between productive and unproductive activities such as rent seeking the existence of rent seeking creates a negative externality on productive agents and implies that relative rewards are endogenously determined the same externality can also lead to the existence of multiple equilibria each with different reward structures in a dynamic setting allocations of past generations as well as expectations of future allocations influence current rewards and the society may get trapped in a rent seeking steady state equilibrium the paper also discusses how the non pecuniary reward structure can be influenced by equilibrium selection and a historical example that suggests the presence of a causal link from the allocation of talent to non pecuniary rewards

third degree price discrimination with interdependent demands this paper analyzes the price output and welfare effects of third degree price discrimination for a monopolist who sells in two interdependent markets the case where the two goods sold by the monopolist are complements is analyzed as well as the more typical case where the two goods are substitutes the economic effects of price discrimination are shown to depend on the type and strength of demand interdependence the curvature of the demands and the slope of marginal cost the circumstances under which price discrimination causes both market prices to either rise or fall are also analyzed

high and declining prices signal product quality high and declining prices signal a high quality product high prices are the efficient means of signaling because the consequent loss of sales volume is most damaging for lower cost lower quality products as time passes and the number of informed consumers increases the signaling distortion lessens resulting in a declining price profile the prediction of high and declining prices is robust across a variety of dynamic models and is consistent with recent empirical findings copyright 1991 by american economic association

third degree price discrimination under economies of scale there has long been a controversy in economics about whether or not a firm with monopoly power should be allowed to exploit its monopoly power by engaging in third degree price discrimination the effect of third degree price discrimination on welfare is two fold 1 output under price discrimination is misallocated because different groups are charged different prices but 2 if total output is different under price discrimination than under uniform pricing this will also affect welfare 2 schmalensee 8 varian 11 12 and schwartz 9 have shown that price discrimination must decrease welfare if output under price discrimination is the same or less than output under uniform pricing this fundamental result is quite robust and holds regardless of the number of sub markets or the behavior of marginal cost rising constant or falling it also holds even if the sub market demands are interdependent a necessary but not sufficient condition for price discrimination to be beneficial is that it increase total output perhaps the most common situation in which price discrimination will be beneficial is the case where only one sub market is served under uniform pricing but two or more sub markets are served under price discrimination in this case hausman and mackie mason 3 have pointed out that price discrimination will result in a pareto welfare improvement if marginal cost is constant or falling even when price discrimination does not open up new markets hausman and mackie mason 3 and nahata ostaszewski and sahoo 5 have shown that price discrimination can result in a pareto improvement by lowering prices in all sub markets hausman and mackie mason 3 257 argue that price discrimination is most likely to be beneficial when economies of scale are present 3

pareto price discrimination abstract as the collection of consumer data becomes more common online merchants are better equipped to price discriminate now more than ever before while standard first degree price discrimination benefits merchants and harms consumers relative to uniform pricing i derive an alternative first degree pricing strategy that achieves efficiency and pareto improves upon the uniform pricing equilibrium furthermore i show that price ceilings can enforce these pareto price discrimination strategies making pareto price discrimination a viable option for merchants and policy makers

the economic lives of the poor in what turned out to be a rhetorical master move the 1990 world development report from the world bank defined the extremely poor people of the world as those who are currently living on no more than 1 per day per person measured at the 1985 purchasing power parity ppp exchange rate in 1993 the poverty line was updated to 1 08 per person per day at the 1993 ppp exchange rate which is the line we use in this paper poverty lines have always existed indeed 1 per day was chosen in part because of its proximity to the poverty lines used by many poor countries 1 however the 1 a day poverty line has come to dominate the conversations about poverty to a remarkable extent

price discrimination and patent policy patent and antitrust policy are often presumed to be in conflict as an important example there is ongoing controversy about whether price discrimination by a patent holder is an illegal or socially undesirable exploitation of monopoly power in this article we show that no conflict exists in many price discrimination cases even ignoring the dynamic effects on incentives for innovation third degree price discrimination by patent holders can raise static social welfare in fact pareto improvements may well occur welfare gains occur because price discrimination allows patent holders to open new markets and to achieve economies of scale or learning further even in cases where discrimination incurs static welfare losses it may be efficient relative to other mechanisms such as length of patent life for rewarding innovators with profits

efficient durable good pricing and aftermarket tie in sales i introduction a number of alternative theories currently exist to explain the use of tying arrangements in general incentives involving price discrimination foreclosure variable proportions protection of franchise system goodwill and so on have all been shown to motivate tying under various market conditions 1 interestingly however most of these theories do not appear to apply directly to the tying of aftermarket sales to the purchase of a durable good in a competitive environment such tying or equivalently aftermarket monopolization was a central issue in the widely debated kodak case and continues to be a highly controversial aspect of a series of subsequent antitrust cases 2 the two predominant theories employed by opposing parties at trial in the kodak case were the so called installed based opportunism theory and the systems theory 3 the former posits conditions under which a durable good producer may find it profitable to raise aftermarket prices for maintenance and repair services above the competitive level to its locked in customers regardless of the intensity of competition in the equipment or fore market the latter in turn demonstrates the conditions under which such opportunistic behavior is either a not profitable or b profitable but very limited in its competitive effects 4 while both these theories provide some useful guidance regarding the question of post sale exploitation of purchasers of durable goods neither provides an explicit theory of aftermarket tie in sales that is driven by any sort of efficiency considerations in the wake of the controversy sparked by the kodak decision two important developments have emerged first the courts have demonstrated a strong reluctance to embrace the economic logic embodied in that decision despite a large number of similar claims that have subsequently been filed there have not yet been any decisions that clearly adopt the customer lock in argument that prevailed in kodak 5 second in response to some dissatisfaction with the state of the economic theory relevant to aftermarket tying or monopolization at the time the case was decided a series of articles has emerged that present newer and perhaps more relevant theories of kodak type behavior 6 these include inter alia aftermarket monopolization incentives that derive from a variable proportions production as in elzinga and mills 2001 b the time inconsistency problem of durable good pricing as in morita and waldman 2004 c price discrimination as in klein 1995 and chen and ross 1993 1999 d socially excessive maintenance as in carlton and waldman 2001 and e economies of scope in remanufacturing of used parts as in carlton and waldman 2001 the common thread that connects these theories is that most contain some sort of efficiency based motivation for aftermarket monopolization which results in an unambiguous improvement in social welfare 7 as a consequence considerable doubt has been cast on the legitimacy of kodak s broad condemnation of aftermarket monopolization this article attempts to contribute to this general line of research like the above mentioned articles it offers an efficiency driven motivation for aftermarket tie in sales or monopolization unlike these articles however the incentive arises directly from the contracting problem faced by buyers and sellers of durable goods specifically like the systems theory the model presented here assumes that buyers make their purchase decisions rationally on the basis of the expected life cycle or total ownership costs of the competing durable goods available at the time of purchase similarly sellers make offers that incorporate the life cycle profits anticipated from the sale including both the price received for the initial durable good purchase and the future stream of revenues from any subsequent aftermarket services provided by the seller

savings and predation we contrast the relationship between predation and the savings of its potential victim in two different simple models in the first model predation is an exogenous event in which savings are expropriated with some fixed probability in such a setting the higher the probability of expropriation the lower are savings in the second model we endow the predatory agent with a decision whether to expropriate or to devote his efforts to some productive endeavor in this second model the endogenous probability of expropriation can easily be positively correlated with savings in addition we show that predation is more damaging to the savings and utility of the victim in the second model jel d91 d74

bounding the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination under pigouvian third degree price discrimination a profit maximizing monopolist typically charges different groups of customers different prices resale between groups is assumed to be impossible these differences in price entail a loss of efficiency because marginal valuations of the output are not equal across buyers the net welfare effect of allowing price discrimination is ambiguous though because the total output under discrimination may exceed that under uniform pricing nevertheless under quite general conditions third degree price discrimination by a monopolist can increase static welfare only if total output is greater under discriminatory pricing than under uniform pricing richard schmalensee 1981 hal r varian 1985 marius schwartz 1990 although there has been much analysis of whether price discrimination raises or lowers total output or welfare the size of these effects has remained largely unexplored varian 1985 compares discriminatory pricing to uniform pricing for a monopolist and provides some bounds for the change in welfare in terms of market prices and outputs but these relationships give little sense of the relative size of welfare changes resulting from third degree price discrimination i address this issue by asking what can be said about the ratio wd wu where wd and wu denote welfare under discriminatory and uniform pricing respectively welfare is measured as the sum of producer surplus and marshallian consumer surplus section i provides two examples showing that this ratio can range from zero to infinity in these examples all markets are served under uniform pricing and demand in one of the markets is strictly convex considering a two market model in which a monopolist with constant marginal cost serves two independent markets under uniform pricing i show in section iii that if demands in both markets are concave then wd w is bounded below by 2 the assumptions of constant marginal cost and independent demands allow producer surplus and consumer surplus to be identified separately for each market separability across markets is central to the approach taken in this paper following joan robinson 1933 i call a market strong weak if the discriminatory price in that market is at least as great as no greater than the profit maximizing uniform price surprisingly the key to bounding wd wu is that the demand function in the weak market be concave if one market is strong the other is weak and demand in the weak market is concave then wd w can be bounded above by 2 5 or even 1 75 or 1 6 with additional assumptions on the demand functions these bounds arise for several reasons first the monopolist s profit under uniform pricing must be at least as large as the profit in the weak market under discrimination moreover if at all prices demand in the strong market is as great as in the weak market then profit under uniform pricing must be at least twice as great as profit in the weak market under discrimination otherwise the monopolist could do better by charging the monopoly price for the weak market second this relationship between profits in the two markets is useful in bounding welfare because welfare in each market can be related to profit in that market section ii shows that if demand is con department of economics and a b freeman school of business tulane university new orleans la 70118 i thank marius schwartz and two anonymous referees for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper

costly price discrimination abstract standard theory neglects that enacting price discrimination is costly to firms when this costliness is accounted for perfect price discrimination is often socially inefficient for pure monopolists it is sometimes socially inefficient for monopolistic competitors it is always socially inefficient

reply to a comment on price endings when prices signal quality although the comment provides some additional insight it in no way diminishes the contribution of the original paper that paper is the first and only theoretical explanation for why firms behave as though they use round prices to signal quality further the paper provides empirical evidence in support of this explanation

price discrimination and social welfare studies the effect of price discrimination on social welfare using methods from duality theory features of the reservation model presented quasi linear utility and consumers surplus upper and lower bounds on welfare change bounds on welfare change with optimal price discrimination from ebsco

quality differences third degree price discrimination and welfare we propose a model with two markets to analyze the welfare implications of price discrimination with quality differences in each market a local firm that operates in that market only competes against a global firm that operates in both markets local firms produce higher quality goods than the global firm if the quality levels of the local firms products are the same price discrimination is never welfare decreasing if they differ discrimination is welfare increasing if quantity increases because of a positive allocation effect of price discrimination there are parameter values such that welfare increases while total output decreases with price discrimination jel d43 d60

the voracity effect abstract we analyze an economy that lacks a strong legal political institutional infrastructure and is populated by multiple powerful groups powerful groups dynamically interact via a fiscal process that effectively allows open access to the aggregate capital stock in equilibrium this leads to slow economic growth and a voracity effect by which a shock such as a terms of trade windfall perversely generates a more than proportionate increase in fiscal redistribution and reduces growth we also show that a dilution in the concentration of power leads to faster growth and a less procyclical response to shocks jel f43 o10 o23 o40

third degree price discrimination consumption externalities and social welfare this paper analyses monopolistic third degree price discrimination in the presence of consumption externalities within two separate markets assuming linear inverse demands we investigate an associated change in social welfare the sum of the consumers surpluses and the producer s profit with the regime change from uniform pricing to price discrimination when both markets are open under either regime it is shown that social welfare can improve even if total output is unaffected by the regime change moreover it is possible that the sum of the consumers surpluses also increases

an empirical analysis of price endings with scanner data several consumer behavior theories have been offered to explain the preponderance of prices that end in the digit 9 this study attempts to incorporate these proposed behaviors into the implicit utility function of consumer choice models resulting in both a more accurate tool for managerial decision making and additional insights into how consumers actually behave toward price endings an attempt is made to compensate for both level effects those effects in which consumers may underestimate the value of a price and image effects those effects in which consumers may infer meaning from the right hand digits the models are estimated using scanner panel data for two frequently purchased products tuna and yogurt the results support the importance of accounting for the digits in consumer choice models providing evidence for both image effects and level effects

consumer myopia standardization and aftermarket monopolization abstract in this paper i show that the standard bertrand competition argument does not apply when firms compete for myopic consumers who optimize period by period i develop the model in the context of aftermarket with overlapping generations of consumers simultaneous product offerings in the primary market and aftermarket establishes a price floor for the primary good this constraint prevents aftermarket rents from being dissipated by the primary market competition duopoly firms earn positive profits despite price competition with undifferentiated products nonetheless government interventions to reinforce aftermarket competition such as a standardization requirement may lead to the partial collapse of the primary market

declining predation during development a feedback process empirical evidence suggests that poorer countries have larger portions of predation we formulate a neoclassical growth model in which agents devote time either to produce or predate when the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is lower than one the labor share rises with capital reducing the incentive to predate and increasing the incentive to produce throughout the transition consequently a feedback process between capital accumulation and predation arises which ampli es income di erences generated by di erences in productivity thus this paper helps understand why di erences among countries have remained stable and the key role that institutions play in development

workers warriors and criminals social conflict in general equilibrium we incorporate appropriation activities social conflict into canonical models of trade and study how economic shocks and policies affect the intensity of conflict we show that not all shocks that could make society richer reduce conflict positive shocks to labor intensive industries diminish conflict while positive shocks to capital intensive industries increase it the key requirement is that conflict activities be more labor intensive than the economy as this determines how shocks affect the returns and costs of conflict our theory is consistent with several observed patterns of conflict and implies that empirical work should take into account the relative factor intensities of the productive and conflict sectors in each country incorporating appropriation into a canonic general equilibrium model affects what policies may be deemed desirable in order to reduce conflict and generate pareto improvements policy must be distortionary while reforms that appear efficiency enhancing under the unrealistic assumption of perfect property rights may backfire this offers one explanation for why reforms based on traditional models without appropriation may be delayed and become unpopular when implemented and why societies may sympathize with seemingly inefficient redistribution

price endings when prices signal quality this paper provides a theoretical explanation for why firms behave as though they use round prices to signal quality by replacing the linear demand curve in bagwell and riordan s 1991 price as a signal of quality model with a kinked demand curve and analyzing what price endings firms are most likely to use the following observations can be made 1 firms that are using high prices to signal quality are more likely to set those prices at round numbers and 2 price endings themselves are not necessarily signals of quality a simulation was conducted to demonstrate that these findings generally hold true even in the presence of demand spikes at 9 ending prices e g schindler and kibarian 1996 finally empirical evidence is provided to demonstrate that firms tend to use more round prices for higherquality products and that this relationship is even stronger for product categories where consumers are less able to detect the true level of quality prior to purchase

parallel imports demand dispersion and international price discrimination parallel imports goods imported by unauthorized resellers are advocated worldwide for undermining international price discrimination for a continuum of markets we find that uniform pricing by a monopolist yields lower global welfare than third degree discrimination if demand dispersion across markets is large though uniform pricing avoids output misallocation too many markets go unserved mixed systems permitting discrimination across but not within designated groups of markets yield significantly higher welfare than uniform pricing or unrestricted multimarket discrimination and can pareto dominate uniform pricing thus while parallel imports might benefit some countries our results weaken the multilateral case for allowing them

durable goods monopoly with limited choice of commitment strategy when should the monopolist precommit consider a firm a monopolist offering a unique product to a fixed number of potential customers suppose that no consumer desires more than one unit of the good within a given period or across periods that is there is no value to repeat purchases in addition suppose that customers vary with respect to their initial reservation prices which decline over time a natural interpretation is that the monopolist is selling a good that is durable alternatively the firm is providing an entertainment or fashion good consumers may place a premium on obtaining the product quickly before it becomes less useful less stylish or less novel coase 7 conjectured that this firm s ability to extract surplus is limited because the firm has to compete with itself across time periods high valuation customers would be unwilling to pay a high initial price because they would anticipate that over time the firm will be reducing the price in order to sell to lower valuation customers subsequent literature formalizes this as a time inconsistency problem faced by a monopolist unable to make intertemporal commitments a separate strand of the literature proceeds from the polar assumption that the monopolist can precommit to any multiperiod pricing strategy comparison to coase s monopolist is simple higher profits are obtainable under precommitment because more surplus is extracted from high valuation customers an important proposition due to stokey 22 is that it will be optimal for the monopolist to precommit to a declining intertemporal price schedule if consumers with higher initial valuations have a higher rate of time preference 2 otherwise the optimal strategy is to hold price constant at the static monopoly level and to sell no more than the static monopoly quantity 3

the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination in intermediate good markets the case of bargaining this article examines the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination by a monopolist selling to downstream firms with bargaining power one of the downstream firms the chain store can integrate backward at lower cost than rivals bargaining powers also depend on disagreement profits bargaining weights and concession costs if the chain s integration threat is not credible price discrimination reduces the input price charged symmetric downstream firms and often reduces the average input price charged asymmetric downstream firms

parallel imports and repair services abstract this study explores the welfare effects of parallel imports when the producer may refuse to provide repair services for parallel imported units which reduces the degree of price convergence between countries if the probability of the product s breakdown is endogenously determined by the producer permitting parallel imports could increase the probability because a higher probability leads to a larger price gap as a result it is possible that prices increase and welfare deteriorates in both countries this negative welfare effect is more likely to emerge as the liberalization of trade in goods proceeds the prohibition of service discrimination recovers the positive welfare effect

price discrimination in australia s retail electricity markets an analysis of victoria southeast queensland when capital intensive monopoly industries are restructured and deregulated consumer prices commence a natural drift from regulated uniform average cost tariffs to competitive differential prices and this can raise problems for policymakers deep discounts are welcomed high standing offers are not but price discrimination is unremarkable in economics indeed in industries where fixed sunk costs represent a significant portion of total cost discriminatory pricing is usually welfare enhancing conversely theory predicts and empirical evidence confirms that regulatory efforts to cherry pick differential prices in asymmetric markets will damage consumer welfare in this article we analyse differential retail electricity offer prices in the australian states of victoria and queensland and contrast these with industry average total cost and the marginal cost of retail supply we find deregulated victoria displays high price dispersion with standing offer tariffs 10 above industry average total cost and marginal offers at break even prices i e 20 below average total cost in the semi regulated southeast queensland market where a regulated price cap exists there is lower dispersion but marginal offers include a 6 7 retail mark up efficient pricing requires the marginal unit produced to be priced at marginal cost and victoria meets this criteria but we identify an episode of inter consumer misallocation due to high standing offers we conclude policy initiatives designed to help firms shift vulnerable households from standing offer tariffs is desirable

robert bork s contributions to antitrust perspectives on tying behavior abstractrobert bork was one of the key proponents of the traditional chicago school view of tying and antitrust which is that tying can never be used to extend or leverage market power from one market to another so it should also never be an antitrust violation in this paper we review the traditional chicago school perspective and in particular bork s arguments on the topic and then discuss how these arguments relate to the more recent theoretical literature on the subject which takes a game theoretic approach we then discuss bork s later views on tying concerning the microsoft case we include a discussion of whether these later views of tying and antitrust were different from his earlier views or instead whether it was the nature of the cases that had changed

upstream and downstream pollution taxations in vertically related markets with imperfect competition when two markets are vertically related the government can control pollution at the upstream as well as the downstream market levels this paper employs the stylized model of input price discrimination and compares the effectiveness of upstream and downstream pollution taxations we consider the situation in which downstream firms have heterogeneous abatement technologies and an upstream monopolist performs input price discrimination against them in order to mitigate pollution the government imposes input tax on the intermediate inputs and emission tax on the pollutant we show that the degree of input price discrimination decreases with a rise in the input tax and increases with a rise in the emission tax we further examine the effect of a green tax reform in which the government changes the source of taxation from input tax to emission tax we argue that although this green tax reform may reduce the tax revenue of the government it will certainly increase social welfare

a note on third degree price discrimination with interdependent demands by incorporating symmetric interdependency into linear demands this note shows that monopolistic third degree price discrimination can improve social welfare even if total output remains the same a result that counters one of the main results presented in layson this journal 1998 it is also shown that this positive change in social welfare benefits the monopoly side but that consumers surplus decreases as a whole

price discrimination in input markets quantity discounts and private information we consider a monopolistic supplier s optimal choice of wholesale tariffs when downstream firms are privately informed about their retail costs under discriminatory pricing downstream firms that differ in their ex ante distribution of retail costs are offered different tariffs under uniform pricing the same wholesale tariff is offered to all downstream firms in contrast to the extant literature on price discrimination with nonlinear wholesale tariffs we find that banning discriminatory wholesale contracts often improves welfare this also holds if the manufacturer is not an unconstrained monopolist moreover uniform pricing increases downstream investments in cost reduction in the long run

price and advertising signals of product quality we present a signaling model based on ideas of phillip nelson in which both the introductory price and the level of directly uninformative advertising or other dissipative marketing expenditures are choice variables and may be used as signals for the initially unobservable quality of a newly introduced experience good repeat purchases play a crucial role in our model a second focus of the paper is on illustrating an approach to refining the set of equilibria in signalling games with multiple potential signals

refusals to deal and orders to supply in competitive markets abstract a number of recent antitrust cases in north america and europe have involved allegations that manufacturers of durable products have refused to supply parts to independent service organizations apparently to monopolize the market for repairs of their products this paper analyzes such refusals in a competitive market and connected aftermarket in this model the refusals help to support higher prices for high intensity high value users however these higher charges permit the recovery of higher costs incurred during an initial warranty period since full prices equal full marginal costs in equilibrium the refusals permit the attainment of a first best outcome and an attempt by antitrust authorities to force supply will be welfare reducing

product warranties and double moral hazard this article explores a model of warranties in which moral hazard problems play a key role the goal is to understand the important characteristics of warranties including their provision of incomplete insurance and the relationship between product quality and coverage we analyze a model in which buyers and sellers take actions that affect a product s performance since these actions are not cooperatively determined an incentives problem arises we characterize the optimal warranty contract and undertake comparative statics to determine the predicted correlation of warranty coverage and product quality

property rights corruption and the allocation of talent a general equilibrium approach we consider an economy where contracts are necessary to encourage investments contract enforcement requires that a fraction of the agents work in the public sector and do not accept bribes we find that 1 it may be optimal to allow some corruption and not enforce property rights fully 2 less developed economies may choose lower levels of property right enforcement and more corruption 3 there may exist a free lunch such that over a certain range it is possible simultaneously to reduce corruption increase investment and achieve a better allocation of talent bureaucratic corruption is widespread in many societies casual empiricism and case studies suggest that corruption distorts the allocation of resources and discourages investment and the creation of new firms e g mydral 1968 desoto 1989 cross country studies also find that countries with high corruption or long bureaucratic delays suffer lower growth e g mauro 1996 sartre 1997 it is therefore tempting to conclude that government policies and bureaucratic corruption are at least partly responsible for the lack of development or slow growth of many economies e g shleifer and vishny 1993 nevertheless governments and bureaucracies do not exist only to seek rents they perform a number of useful functions including provision of public goods correction of market failures and redistribution without understanding why the state exists it is difficult to assess why corruption arises what its consequences are and whether and how it should be prevented in this paper we analyse how the employees of the state bureaucrats can misuse their power to enforce property rights the protection of property rights is commonly viewed as one of the most important roles of the state by political philosophers as diverse as david hume karl marx and robert nozick while a number of social scientists including north and thomas 1973 and rosenberg and bridzell 1989 emphasise the importance of secure property rights in the development of western societies for the state to have a role in enforcing property rights some contractual problems must exist between private parties in our economy these contractual problems are between entrepreneurs in particular production requires two agents and one of the entrepreneurs needs to undertake an investment but the returns accrue to the other one this can be thought as a partnership with the first agent as an upstream supplier providing an input of variable

defensive weapons and defensive alliances we examine the effects of defensive weapons and their interaction with preemption in a complete information setting where attacks only occur as a consequence of predatory incentives a unilateral acquisition of defensive weapons always destabilizes under strategic risk where players might launch preemptive strikes defensive weapons can help sustain peace however this only happens when such defensive systems are much more effective against a sneak attack than in an open war otherwise defensive weapons are likely to also be destabilizing we contrast these results with the effect of signing defensive alliances which unambiguously bolsters the prospects of peace in both strategic settings

the use of odd ending numbers in the pricing of five tourism services in three different cultures abstract the study measured the extent to which the 1 through 9 digits were used as price endings by suppliers of five tourism services in three different cultures represented by new york city seoul and shanghai four results emerged the first confirmed the hypothesis but the other three results were contrary to expectations first 9 and 8 ending prices were dominant in new york city and in shanghai respectively second these culture specific endings were complemented by the universality of the 0 and 5 digit endings of prices which were ranked first and second respectively in seoul second and third in shanghai and third and second in new york third 9 ending prices were not used more frequently when they resulted in a lowering of the leftmost digit fourth dominant cultural specific price endings were not used more frequently in lower than in higher priced tourism services

a free press is bad news for corruption abstract this paper tests the proposition that a free press may be a powerful control on corruption we find evidence of a significant relationship between more press freedom and less corruption in a large cross section of countries this result is robust to specification and sample and the relationship is not sensitive to the choice of a particular measure of corruption or of press freedom furthermore we present evidence which suggests that the direction of causation runs from higher press freedom to lower corruption

end of 9 endings price recall and price perceptions prices that end with 9 also known as psychological price points are common comprising about 70 of the retail prices they are also more rigid than other prices we take advantage of a natural experiment to document an emergence of a new price ending that has the same effects as 9 endings in january 2014 the israeli government passed a new regulation prohibiting the use of non 0 ending prices bringing an end to 9 ending prices we find that seven months after 9 ending prices have disappeared 90 ending prices acquired the same status as 9 ending prices had before the new regulation was adopted thus 90 ending prices became the new psychological price points partially eliminating the regulation s intended effect

the influence of preciseness of price information on the travel option choice abstract 159 99 159 38 or 160 00 the phenomenon of pricing around a rounded number with apparent preciseness is commonly observed in the marketplace much research has been conducted in the general area and has established that the use of precise prices those without a zero ending tends to lead to increased sales and to a more positive customer attitude to date the best explanation offered is that most people read from left to right so the last numbers of a price may be less salient than the leading numbers in an endeavor to establish a better understanding of the phenomenon this research consists of five experiments in a tourism context to first clarify the phenomenon and account for possible alternative explanations and then to provide empirical evidence that different representations of price can imply different construal levels and thus influence consumers choice preference in tourism marketing

independent service organizations and economic efficiency david e mills i introduction many manufacturers of capital equipment provide maintenance service to their equipment users sometimes equipment and service are sold separately and at other times they are bundled for example through leases and rental agreements numerous recent antitrust cases revolve around allegedly anti competitive practices used by some manufacturers to deter independent service organizations isos from servicing the manufacturer s equipment indeed the volume of cases brought by isos in the past decade exceeds litigation in more conventional antitrust areas like antimerger disputes and cases under the robinson patman act 1 the controversial practices in these cases include tying sales of equipment and service tying sales of service and other aftermerket products refusals to sell replacement parts to isos and refusals to license operating or diagnostic software to isos the pivotal issue in these cases is whether practices that deter isos injure competition in the service aftermarket 2 manufacturers claim their customers shop for equipment and service simultaneously that is customers choose a proprietary system comprised of equipment service and other components instead of merely choosing a brand of equipment this line of reasoning holds that interbrand competition for systems disciplines the pricing of every component in tile system and therefore is sufficient to protect equipment users welfare if one manufacturer s equipment is priced above rivals the high priced equipment manufacturer must supply service at a lower price than its rivals to remain competitive on a total cost of ownership tco basis 3 brand specific intrabrand competition in the service aftermarket is not necessary to maximize equipment users welfare because systems competition is sufficient manufacturer practices that deter isos or discourage intrabrand service competition canno t injure competition isos claim that systems competition does not adequately discipline manufacturers service pricing once customers acquire a piece of durable equipment they cannot replace it with another brand without incurring switching costs thus as salop argues such customers become locked in to the manufacturer for maintenance service and are left vulnerable to opportunistic service pricing throughout the useful life of the equipment 1993 the only protection customers enjoy from exploitation by manufacturers in the service aftermarket is the protection afforded by isos in the much cited kodak decision 4 the supreme court rejected the notion that inter brand competition in systems or equipment is always sufficient to prevent the exercise of monopoly power in the service aftermarket the court was influenced by recent economic research that highlights theoretical opportunities for equipment manufacturers to exploit their locked in customers these theoretical opportunities stem from information costs faced by customers and incomplete contracts between manufacturers and their customers 5 carl shapiro recounted the available theories of antitrust injury 1995 485 that apply to these circumstances these theories include i incomplete information where customers who are poorly informed about the tco of competing brands of equipment are exploited by manufacturers once they become locked in ii opportunistic pricing where manufacturers break trust with their locked in customers and sacrifice their reputations by implementing unanticipated increases in service pricing iii inability to commit where higher than competitive service pricing and lower than competitive equipment pricing arise because manufacturers cannot provide contractual assurances about future service prices 6 and iv better opportunities for price discrimination afforded by the absence of independent maintenance providers the price discrimination theory of lock in exploitation differs from the previous three in that price discrimination often improves rather than impairs market performance

patterns of rightmost digits used in advertised prices implications for nine ending effects analysis of the rightmost digits of selling prices in a sample of retail price advertisements confirmed past findings indicating the overrepresentation of the digits 0 5 and 9 the high cognitive accessibility of round numbers can account for the overrepresentation of 0 and 5 ending prices and suggests the existence of two effects that could account for the overrepresentation of 9 ending prices 1 a tendency of consumers to perceive a 9 ending price as a round number price with a small amount given back and 2 a tendency of consumers to underestimate a 9 ending price by encoding it as the first round number evoked during incomplete left to right processing analysis of the patterns of rightmost digits observed in the sample provides supportive evidence particularly for the second of these two 9 ending effects

factor substitution and factor augmenting technical progress in the united states a normalized supply side system approach abstract using a normalized ces function with factor augmenting technical progress we estimate a supply side system of the u s economy from 1953 to 1998 avoiding potential estimation biases that

welfare and output in third degree price discrimination a note abstract one main result on the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination by a monopolist is that an increase in total output is a necessary condition for welfare improvement this note provides two examples showing that this proposition does not generalize to an oligopoly with heterogenous firms in these examples price discrimination makes competition more favorable to the low cost firm this induces a cost saving that overcomes the welfare loss associated with price discrimination

third degree price discrimination in linear demand markets effects on number of markets served and social welfare author affiliation victor kaftal department of mathematical sciences 839 c old chemistry building university of cincinnati cincinnati oh 45221 usa victor kaftal uc edudebashis pal department of economics 1204 crosley tower university of cincinnati cincinnati oh 45221 debashis pal uc edu corresponding author acknowledgment we are grateful to rick harbaugh laura razzolini david sappington and two anonymous reviewers debashis pal is also grateful to taft research center for financial support 1 introductiondoes monopolistic third degree price discrimination reduce social welfare the question has continued to intrigue economists and policy makers for more than half a century the seminal work of robinson 1933 shows that if a monopolist with a constant marginal cost sells in two distinct and independent markets having linear demands then welfare falls with third degree price discrimination almost half a century later schmalensee 1981 reexamines robinson s result and demonstrates that for any number of markets with linear demands third degree price discrimination lowers welfare schmalensee 1981 also establishes more generally that price discrimination increases welfare only if it increases aggregate output subsequently using ingenious duality approaches varian 1985 and schwartz 1990 generalize the results for correlated demands and nonlinear marginal costs 1it is therefore well known that for linear market demands and constant marginal costs monopolistic third degree price discrimination indeed lowers welfare it is important to note however that the welfare reducing effect of third degree price discrimination is derived under a crucial assumption it is assumed that if the monopolist is forced to charge the same price in all markets uniform pricing the monopolist would sell a positive quantity in each market in a recent article cowan 2007 considers various forms of nonlinear demands and presents the necessary and sufficient and or sufficient conditions for price discrimination to reduce welfare cowan 2007 however also assumes that all markets are served under uniform pricing yet when this assumption does not hold the welfare effects of monopolistic third degree price discrimination turn out to be significantly more intricate observe that when all markets are not served under uniform pricing price discrimination may increase welfare because price discrimination may serve markets that would not be served under uniform pricing thus relative to uniform pricing price discrimination has two countervailing effects on welfare aggregate welfare goes down in those markets that are originally served under uniform pricing whereas welfare goes up in those markets that are not served under uniform pricing therefore the additional welfare from the new markets under price discrimination may offset any loss of welfare in the markets that are originally served under uniform pricing the point is strongly emphasized in schmalensee s 1981 seminal work in the context of prescription drugs an identical sentiment is recently echoed in varian 2000 in the context of two markets the possibility of price discrimination opening up new markets is first analyzed graphically by battalio and ekelund 1972 layson 1994 also considers two markets but includes nonlinear demands and presents conditions for opening of new markets based on endogenous features such as elasticities in the context of patent policy opening of new markets by price discrimination is explicitly incorporated by hausman and mackie mason 1988 using two markets they show that price discrimination by a patent holder is socially desirable in many cases because it allows the patent holder to open new markets there is a related literature in spatial economics beginning with greenhut and ohta 1972 and holahan 1975 that deals with spatial price discrimination and market opening with linear demand

primary market and aftermarket competition in the bicycle component industry this study examines the bicycle component industry this industry is characterized by one dominant firm shimano inc and four or five smaller players firms in the component industry produce components for sale in two related markets the market for original equipment manufacturers oem and the component aftermarket a unique data set containing information on aftermarket prices and oem market shares is used to determine whether or not market power in the aftermarket is a function of oem market power the results indicate that concentration in the oem market is positively related to aftermarket price while an individual firm s oem market share is inversely related to aftermarket price

dynamic pricing in the presence of inventory considerations research overview current practices and future directions the benefits of dynamic pricing methods have long been known in industries such as airlines hotels and electric utilities where the capacity is fixed in the short term and perishable in recent years there has been an increasing adoption of dynamic pricing policies in retail and other industries where the sellers have the ability to store inventory three factors contributed to this phenomenon 1 the increased availability of demand data 2 the ease of changing prices due to new technologies and 3 the availability of decision support tools for analyzing demand data and for dynamic pricing this paper constitutes a review of the literature and current practices in dynamic pricing given its applicability in most markets and its increasing adoption in practice our focus is on dynamic intertemporal pricing in the presence of inventory considerations

monopolistic third degree price discrimination under vertical product differentiation this paper shows in a vertical product differentiation model with variable costs of quality that monopolistic third degree price discrimination always reduces welfare regardless of whether the quality is fixed or is endogenous the results provide rich implications for antitrust policy

the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination in a differentiated oligopoly this article examines the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination under oligopolistic competition with horizontal product differentiation we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for price discrimination to improve social welfare the degree of substitution must be sufficiently greater in the strong market where the discriminatory price is higher than the uniform price than in the weak market where it is lower it is verified however that consumer surplus is never improved social welfare improves solely owing to an increase in the firms profits in the case of linear demands jel d43 l11 l13 i introduction this article examines the welfare effects of oligopolistic third degree price discrimination explicitly considering product differentiation as a source of market power and strategic interaction product differentiation is one of the main reasons why firms can enjoy market power it enables them to sell products that are no longer perfect substitutes for example coca cola and pepsico sell similar types of soda although it is arguable that they differ in taste each firm thereby attracts some consumers over another as a form of price discrimination coca cola was once reported to be testing a vending machine that would automatically raise prices in hot weather 1 although the plan triggered nationwide controversy and coca cola had to abandon the project as a result it could have changed the regime of uniform pricing to one of price discrimination in the soda market how would the resulting change affect consumer welfare and firms profits in other words is third degree price discrimination good or bad answering this question is important because it helps us to evaluate price discrimination under oligopoly in this article we focus on horizontal product differentiation to consider substitutability as well as complementarity 2 by assuming a linear quadratic utility function of a representative consumer and focusing on the symmetric equilibrium of a pricing game we characterize the conditions relating to such demand properties as substitutability and complementarity required for price discrimination to improve social welfare more specifically we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for price discrimination to improve social welfare the degree of substitution must be sufficiently greater in the strong market where the discriminatory price is higher than the uniform price than in the weak market where it is lower it is also shown that aggregate output must increase for price discrimination to improve social welfare we verify however that consumer surplus is never improved by price discrimination welfare improvement from price discrimination is solely owing to an increase in firms profits in the example above the degree of substitution would be higher in the strong market i e when the temperature is high because consumers care less about which brand when it is hot weather our analysis below implies that social welfare might improve in this case the degree of substitution can vary across markets even if consumers in each market face exactly the same products because consumers taste depends on various market specific factors such as geographical and natural conditions if the strong market is where consumers demand a product more eagerly caring less about which brand in the above example individuals demand soda more eagerly in hot weather then our results suggest that price discrimination has large potential to improve social welfare 3 why does allowing price discrimination improve social welfare notice that there are two forces that determine equilibrium prices in price setting oligopoly a larger market size raises the price whereas a larger substitutability parameter lowers the price for price discrimination to raise social welfare it is necessary that a high degree of substitutability mitigates an increase in the discriminatory price in the larger market

taxation and the output and welfare of third degree price discrimination the literature on third degree price discrimination dates back to the work by pigou 14 and joan robinson 15 over half a century ago the subsequent works on the output effect can be seen in edwards 3 silberberg 19 battalio and ekelund 1 greenhut and ohta 7 finn 4 smith and formby 20 formby et al 6 and shih mai and liu 18 the welfare effect by yamey 26 was expanded and generalized by schmalensee 16 varian 24 and schwartz 17 in addition nahata ostaszewski and sahoo 12 demonstrate a sufficient condition for price changes that guarantees a welfare increase with the twice differentiable and monotonically decreasing demand functions previous work on third degree price discrimination has not addressed the issue of taxation governments often levy excise taxes on firm s sales under conditions of third degree price discrimination such taxes can have depending upon the form of the tax quite different output and welfare effects this paper investigates the joint effects of third degree price discrimination and excise taxation in several different ways first in a fashion analogous to suits and musgrave s analysis of simple non discriminating monopoly 22 we consider the effects of ad valorem and unit specific excise taxes at a constant level of output but in a third degree price discrimination environment second in a similar manner we compare cost and demand ad valorem taxes and the so called musgravian transformation 11 27 under discriminatory conditions finally we compare the output and welfare effects of a specific cost ad valorem and demand ad valorem excise tax that generate the same level of revenues in a third degree price discrimination environment

third degree price discrimination in input markets output and welfare if price discrimination is realized the economy shifts from one equilibrium to another it clearly involves welfare effects the price discriminator clearly gains some consumers may also gain from the price cut but others may lose faced with higher prices etc traditionally the change in social welfare is known to be closely related to the change in total output in the case of third degree price discrimination it is well known that an increase in total output is a necessary condition for welfare improvement richard schmalensee 1981 proves this fact in a model in which the monopolist with constant marginal cost can perfectly separate markets further hal r varian 1985 extends this result to the case of interdependent markets permnitting increasing marginal cost of the monopolist and finally the assumption of nondecreasing marginal cost is eliminated by marius schwartz 1990 roughly speaking this proposition says that if there is a welfare gain from price discrimination there has to be some gain to offset the distortion involved on the other hand the vast majority of legal and other policy disputes over the price discrimination concern input markets not final good markets thus it seems important to investigate the situation in which a discriminating monopolist is not a final good supplier but an input supplier and the buyers of the input are downstream producers of a final good as is assumed in this paper if the downstream firms have different technologies their input demand functions will be different and thus the monopolist has an incentive to price discriminate in this scenario michael l katz 1987 and patrick degraba 1990 study the effect of inputmarket price discrimination and show that price discrimination always lowers welfare because it involves the distortion that a lower cost downstream firm is assigned a higher price unfortunately in their simple settings on the technology of downstream industry price discrimination can never change total output of the input or of the final good 1 thus we must say that welfare effect of input market price discrimination remains open to question if it has some effect on total output in particular we are curious as to whether we can obtain some close relationship between the changes in welfare and total output as we have obtained in the final good market settings with this motivation we will construct a model which involves change in total output of the final good in the next section the model and assumptions are provided in section ii after we extend the result of katz 1987 and degraba 1990 we find a relationship between the changes in welfare and total output strikingly it states that an increase in the total output of the final good is a sufficient condition for welfare deterioration this result contrasts with that obtained by schmalensee 1981 varian 1985 and schwartz 1990 from usual models of price discrimination in a final good market section iii concludes the analysis

orders to supply as substitutes for commitments to aftermarkets a number of recent antitrust cases in canada and other countries have involved durable goods manufacturers refusing to supply proprietary parts to independent service or ganizations earlier work suggested that the inability of manufacturers to commit to low aftermarket prices creates an inefficiency that might be removed by a judicial order to supply this paper examines this view critically with a specific model of repairs and demonstrates that under plausible conditions there is no welfare loss due to the inability to commit it goes on to show that an order to supply can create its own distortion and welfare loss if it encourages