taxation government spending and labor supply a diagrammatic exposition the effects of a change in the level of taxation on labor supply are examined under the assumption that the government budget balances the government spends tax revenues either on redistributions which are assumed to have an income effect on labor supply or on other government goods which are assumed not to influence labor supply in order for a rise in the tax rate to increase the quantity of labor supplied it must be that i the labor supply function bends backward and ii sufficiently little of the increased tax revenues are redistributed the quantity of labor supplied must fall if all marginal tax revenues are redistributed

distortionary taxes and the provision of public goods economists have long been concerned with finding an efficient level of public expenditure the classic statement of the problem was given by paul samuelson 1954 an optimal level of expenditure is where the sum of the marginal rates of substitution between the public good and a reference good equals the marginal rate of transformation between the public good and the reference good mrs mrt however samuelson s formula assumes that all of the revenue needed to finance public goods can be raised with lump sum taxes since this is not generally possible the formula must be modified to account for the distortionary effects of the tax system an appropriate modification is to multiply the cost side of the equation by a term that is commonly called the marginal cost of public funds mcf in the case of samuelson s formula where government is entirely financed with lump sum taxes the mcf would be exactly 1 0 in the traditional view of economists distortionary taxes cause the mcf to be greater than one thus raising the cost of providing public goods in this paper we discuss some cases where the mcf may be less than one we will illustrate this possibility using numerical examples for labor taxes

economies of traffic density in the deregulated airline industry this article estimates a structural model of competition among hub and spoke airlines in order to measure the strength of economies of traffic density on individual route segments we find that economies of density were strong during the sample period fourth quarter 1985 stronger than previous estimates by douglas caves laurits christensen and michael tretheway derived from traditional cost function methods we also find that the airlines competitive behavior was far from collusive in the markets under study markets requiring a connection at a hub airport our structural model also provides plausible estimates of demand elasticities we use our estimates to provide a cost based rationale for the major changes in the structure of the industry following deregulation for example the increase in airport and industry wide concentration and the increase in competition at the city pair market level and to simulate the effects of a merger of airlines that share a hub

a dynamic game of airline network competition hub and spoke networks and entry deterrence article in a hub and spoke network the profit function of an airline is supermodular with respect to the airline s own entry decisions for different city pairs this source of complementarity implies that a hub and spoke network can be an effective strategy for deterring the entry of competitors this paper presents an empirical dynamic game of airline network competition that incorporates this entry deterrence motive for using hub and spoke networks we summarize the results of the estimation of the model with special attention to empirical evidence regarding the entry deterrence motive

inter firm technology transfer partnership embedded licensing or standard licensing agreements when companies decide to engage in technology transfer through licensing to other firms they have two basic options to use standard licensing contracts or to set up more elaborate partnership embedded licensing agreements we find that broader partnership embedded licensing agreements are preferred with higher levels of technological sophistication of industries with greater perceived effectiveness of secrecy as a means of appropriability and when licensors are smaller than their licensees innovative differentials between companies innovative supremacy of the licensor and market and technological overlap between partners appear to have no effect on the preference for a particular form of licensing

airport presence as product differentiation there is now widespread recognition that an airline s operation at a given airport greatly affects its competitive position on routes flown out of that airport see m levine 1987 s borenstein 1989 s morrison and c winston 1989 and myself 1989 among many others airlines typically defend any competitive advantage as stemming from the lower costs and better service that are said to be generated by hub and spoke route systems airline critics typically respond that airlines gain market power by dominating individual airports both views are at least plausible huband spoke transportation networks reduce the number of round trips necessary to carry a given number of passengers on a given set of itineraries while increasing the number of passenger miles flown if there are sufficient economies of scale in plane size then the advantages of hubbing can overcome the disadvantage in passenger miles resulting in lower total costs by pooling passengers with different ultimate destinations a hubbed system can also offer more frequent flights than would be economically feasible under a nonstop system it also appears however that airlines gain other advantages from a large presence at an airport incumbent airlines are the major source of financing for many airports and therefore gain a large degree of bureaucratic control over airport operations this control may enable them to block the entry or expansion of rivals airlines with a large presence in a given city also gain advantages from frequent flyer plans and nonlinear travel agent commission schedules see again levine and others if the bureaucratic and marketing advantages of airport presence are sufficient to prevent most attempts at entry then incumbents may gain the ability to exercise traditional market power by restricting output and driving up prices this paper argues that both simple costreducing and naive market power stories are inappropriate for the airline industry i present a model in which consumers are willing to pay a premium for the services of the dominant airline this premium may be related to a number of factors including flight frequency frequent flier miles and travel agent commission overrides this model has the advantage of treating oligopoly product differentiation in an explicit way of treating price as an endogenous variable and of allowing for airport presence to affect both costs and demand

the marginal welfare cost of public funds theory and estimates abstract we derive a general analytic formula for the marginal welfare cost mwc of public funds without imposing restrictive assumptions on preferences or technologies the framework encompasses the various special cases previously considered and reconciles the disparities among the reported estimates of mwc unresolved differences in existing estimates are fully explained by appropriate interpretations of intended thought experiments and alternative assumptions about the elasticity of labor supply with respect to public spending further progress in measuring mwc requires empirical estimation of labor supply functions that include government spending as an explanatory variable

does competition reduce price dispersion new evidence from the airline industry we analyze the effects of competition on price dispersion in the airline industry using panel data from 1993 q1 through 2006 q3 competition has a negative effect on price dispersion in line with the textbook treatment of price discrimination this effect is pronounced for routes with consumers characterized by relatively heterogeneous elasticities of demand on routes with a homogeneous customer base the effects of competition on price dispersion are smaller our results contrast with those of borenstein and rose who found that price dispersion increases with competition we reconcile the different results by showing that the cross sectional estimator suffers from omitted variable bias

retail price cycles and the presence of small firms abstract in many canadian cities retail gasoline prices remain unchanged for weeks at a time while in other cities retail prices cycle increasing sharply and declining slowly in maskin and tirole econometrica 56 1988 571 both price cycles and rigid prices can exist in equilibrium in this article i demonstrate that the existence of these equilibria is dependent on the number of retail outlets operated by the firms constant price equilibria are found to exist only when firms are of similar size however cycle equilibria can be constructed for a wide range of relative sizes

competition privatisation and productive efficiency evidence from the airline industry we use data from the airline industry to examine the extent to which the costs of airline operations are affected by rents accruing to workers and the extent to which these rents depend inter alia upon the degree of competition in the industry our empirical results based on a panel of twelve european and seven major united states airlines confirm that state ownership substantially increases rents to labour while the effects of competition are more subtle and ambiguous airline profits tend to be associated with higher rents to employees the gains from further privatisation and liberalisation may be quite large does competition have significant effects on productive as well as allocative efficiency convincing empirical answers to this question have been hard to find for two reasons first data of the quality required for robust estimation of productive efficiency are only rarely available secondly there is frequently no convincing standard against which the efficiency of an industry or a firm may be compared since when the degree of competition varies many other things such as technology network structures and firm sizes typically vary as well these problems do not automatically make comparison impossible but they compound the need for high quality data one industry which is likely to be well suited to investigating questions of this kind is the international airline industry the industry contains a large number of firms thus ensuring at least enough potential competition to make questions about the effects of competition interesting but the scope for these firms to compete with one another has been influenced to varying degrees over the years by different national and international regulatory regimes in particular deregulation of the united states industry in 1978 provided a kind of natural experiment that has led not only to comparisons of the before and after variety but also to comparisons between the united states industry and that of other global regions notably europe such comparisons are far from straightforward but they are facilitated by the fact that the technology of civil aviation is more or less internationally standardised and by the relatively high quality of available data in the industry

tax effects versus budget effects on labor supply this paper analyzes the effects on labor supply of parallel changes in taxes and public spending of various types a number of important recent developments in the labor supply behavior of households are highlighted by such a study of various types of budget effects rather than isolated tax effects this comes out in particular when considering cross substitution effects on labor supply of changes in public spending on goods and services or of the subsidization of goods and services provided by private markets moreover the income effects of tax changes are often mitigated or possibly even removed by the income effects of the accompanying expenditure changes

the economics of hubs the case of monopoly in this paper we study the optimization problem of an unregulated air carrier which is given the exclusive right to satisfy demand for air travel between any pair of cities it chooses a network of connections and a set of prices to maximize profits thus both network design and prices are endogenous we characterize the solution to this optimization problem when demands and costs are symmetric our main result is that if there are economies of density in the number of individuals travelling between two directly connected cities the optimal network is either a hub of size n 1 or one in which every pair of cities is connected directly

price discrimination in free entry markets using a spatial model of monopolistic competition we investigate price discrimination in free entry zero profit markets we show that when brands are heterogeneous competition does not prevent discrimination the power to earn economic profits is not necessary for a firm to maintain discriminatory prices our model treats formally the fact that consumers difer not only in the utility they derive from a good but also in how strongly they prefer one brand over all others in markets where firms are very competitive sorting consumers on the strength on brand preference produces larger price differentials between groups than sorting on the basis of consumers reservation prices for the good when firms sort customers on the basis of strength of brand preference however we find that the output and welfare effects are generally less favorable than when sorting is more closely related to consumers reservation prices

on the possibility of an inverse relationship between tax rates and government revenues abstract when arthur laffer and other supply side advocates plot total tax revenue as a function of a particular tax rate they draw an upward sloping segment called the normal range followed by a downward sloping segment called the prohibitive range a brief literature review indicates that tax rates on the prohibitive range in theoretical and empirical models have been the result of particularly high tax rates high elasticity parameters or both the labor tax rate which maximizes total revenue for example will depend on the assumed labor supply elasticity this paper introduces a new curve which summarizes the tax rate and elasticity combinations that result in maximum revenues separating the normal area from the prohibitive area a general purpose empirical u s general equilibrium model is used to plot the laffer curve for several elasticities and to plot the newly introduced curve using the labor tax example results indicate that the u s could conceivably be operating in the prohibitive area but that the tax wedge or labor supply elasticity would have to be much higher than most estimates would suggest

localized market power in the u s airline industry this paper tests whether the observed dominance of most city pair markets and airports in the u s domestic airline industry by single carriers confers any pricing power on the dominan t firms the results of fixed effects estimation indicate that airport dominance by a carrier does confer upon it substantial pricing power whereas dominance at the route level seems to confer no such pricing power additionally the authors find a positive yet small correlation between both route concentration and price and airport concentration and price the quantitative importance of airport dominance reveals that the most promising direction for public polic y aimed at improving the industry s performance is to ensure equal acc ess to sunk airport facilities copyright 1993 by mit press

deregulating european airlines deregulating european airlines francis mcgowan and paul seabright one of the industries with the greatest potential to benefit from the single european market is civil aviation which has been highly regulated by european governments the deregulation of civil aviation in the us since the late 1970s has provided valuable evidence about the nature of the airline industry and its response to the liberalization of conditions of entry by new carriers we examine the us experience and look at the changing regulatory framework for the european industry we also consider the main sources of market failure in air transport the lessons of the us experience are threefold first deregulation can in principle produce major gains to consumers without damaging the long run profitability of carriers by reducing the high costs of operation of european airlines second congestion problems especially the availability of landing slots at airports need to be managed effectively to prevent incumbent carriers squeezing out new entrants we recommend a system of slot auctions to achieve this third in spite of relatively low sunk costs of entry to the industry there remain significant opportunities for the exercise of market power by incumbent carriers deregulation of entry needs therefore to be supplemented by a vigorous competition policy especially with regard to the approval of mergers

excess capacity and collusion in this paper the authors analyze a restricted class of equilibria in the dynamic model of j p benoit and v krishna 1987 in which firms choose their scale of operation before engaging in a repeated game of price competition benoit and krishna established that all firms carry excess capacity in all collusive equilibria as the authors are interested in the relationship between excess capacity and collusion in price they examine equilibria in which firms tacitly collude in price but not in investment decisions copyright 1990 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

spatial multiproduct pricing empirical evidence on intra european duopoly airline markets this paper estimates a model of spatial multiproduct duopoly pricing when the location patterns differ across markets the theoretical model suggests that the neighbouring configuration yields less competitive nash prices than the interlaced configuration i apply this model to data for intra european duopoly airline markets the empirical results support the theoretical model since i find that fares are higher on intra european markets that exhibit neighbouring configurations in the time domain this result suggests that price competition is reduced when each airline operates on a specific segment of the timetable e g the first 12 hours of the day clearly this result has several implications for policy makers and or airport authorities in charge of awarding slots

some analytics of the laffer curve abstract it is shown that in a general equilibrium model with one private good one public good labour and an income tax certain widely assumed properties of the laffer curve do not necessarily hold for well behaved functional forms it may not be continuous and may not have an interior maximum its slope depends on technology as well as on the tax elasticity of labour supply for certain technologies a more negative elasticity may imply a more positive slope moreover the relevant tax elasticity is a general equilibrium one which may differ in sign from the widely quoted partial equilibrium one

the evolution of u s airline competition studies by academic economists were a significant force in the movement towards deregulation of the domestic airline industry in the early 1970s levine 1965 jordan 1970 keeler 1972 douglas and miller 1974 during the critical 1977 78 period in which deregulation was imposed first de facto by the civil aeronautics board cab and then de jure by congress the chairman and vice chairman of the cab were economists for the 14 years since deregulation economists have continued intensive study of the industry in part because of the unusual availability of reliable firm and transaction level data and in part because of the rare opportunity to observe an industry as it evolves from strict economic regulation to fairly unimpeded competition and strategic behavior the simplest prediction of economists about airline deregulation and one of the few on which nearly all economists agreed was that deregulation would improve consumer welfare in comparison to continued price and entry regulation fourteen years later nearly all economists still agree on this though the degree of enthusiasm for the deregulation outcome varies considerably there was substantial disagreement among economists about the market structure that would result because studies of scale economies in the airline industry had concluded that none existed beyond the scale of the smaller major airlines of the 1970s caves 1962 eads et al 1969 many economists argued that deregulation would result in more than the 11 major airlines that existed at the time of deregulation others predicted that only a few or possibly only one airline would survive at a large scale two noted university of chicago economists sam peltzman and lester telser made a bet in 1979 on whether

air travel choices in multi airport markets abstract we study how air travel consumers departing from a multi airport region trade off across airport and airline supply characteristics we empirically investigate this trade off by estimating a weighted conditional logit model of airport airline choice using survey data on travels departing from one of three san francisco bay area airports and arriving at one of four airports in greater los angeles in october 1995 non price characteristics like airport access time airport delay flight frequency the availability of particular airport airline combinations and early arrival times are found to strongly affect choice probabilities we calculate marginal effects and counterfactual scenarios to compare the values of these characteristics among each other and across traveler type in order to examine the robustness of the conditional logit model we estimate a mixed logit model and find that the results are similar we attribute the similarity to our strictly defined travel market and to our distinction between leisure and business travelers thus controlling for two important sources of consumer heterogeneity we consider the implications of our empirical findings on vertical integration between airlines and airports on the effectiveness of airport dominance and on the competitive effect of entry by low cost carriers

product line rivalry and firm asymmetry we extend the brander and eaton 1984 model of product line rivalry to study the effects of asymmetry between firms on the equilibrium outcome our analysis shows that market interlacing can emerge as the equilibrium outcome even in situations where market segmentation would have been the only possible outcome had the firms been symmetric we identify two strategic factors that lead to such an outcome

the marginal cost of raising tax revenue and redistributing income we present analytic formulas for calculating marginal welfare costs when taxes are levied against the wages of a heterogeneous population of households and marginal tax revenue finances either the supply of a public good or lump sum transfers the formulas are applied to explain the wide discrepancy between estimates of marginal welfare costs for redistribution previously obtained through computer simulation procedures our calculations reveal that these procedures introduced lump sum transfers that were not specified as part of the reforms to be simulated but explain most of the differences between their estimates we also show that welfare cost estimates are quite sensitive to the elasticity of labor supply with respect to exhaustive public spending

barriers to entry in the airline industry a multidimensional regression discontinuity analysis of air 21 abstract we investigate the success of legislation aimed at increasing competition at highly concentrated u s airports mainly by forcing these airports to increase the availability of scarce facilities we use a multidimensional regression discontinuity approach to exploit a sharp discontinuity in the law s implementation and identify its effects we find that fares decrease by 13 4 20 2 in markets with one both end point s covered approximately half of the decline is driven by the entry of low cost carriers we find little evidence that the fare declines were accompanied by a diminished quality of service and passenger volumes increased which suggests the legislation improved consumer welfare

concentration potential entry and performance in the airline industry airline markets do not satisfy the theoretical conditions for perfect contestability and theory does not indicate which deviations from perfect contestibilty significantly affect performance thus the effect of potential entry on performance in airline markets is explored empirically the best model for explaining fares is found to be one in which the measure of market concentration takes into account not only the number and size distribution of incumbents but also the number of potential entrants not significantly disadvantaged due to economies of scale and scope the hypothesis that all city pair markets are perfectly contestable is rejected coauthors are richard l johnson andrew s joskow gregory j werden and michael a williams copyright 1989 by blackwell publishing ltd

entry and competitive structure in deregulated airline markets an event study analysis of people express this paper proposes an alternative approach to the study of competitive structure in deregulated airline markets that avoids some of the weaknesses of previous studies this approach uses reactions of incumbent airlines stock prices to announcements of entry by people express to shed light on competitive structure these stock reactions reveal significant route specific profits or sunk costs and also provide evidence on the degree of competitive localization present in the industry the conclusions emerging from this analysis are corroborated by an examination of price sales quantity and schedule changes that followed people express entry

the equity and efficiency of runway pricing abstract this paper poses and answers the following question if an airport authority is assumed to choose landing fees that maximize a weighted sum of airline consumers surpluses subject to a revenue requirement what set of weights is implied by currently observed fees the model is loosely applied to san francisco international airport the main result is that commuter airlines are much more favored than others

tax rates and labor supply in fiscal equilibrium tax rates and labor supply in fiscal equilibrium i introduction if the government changes the tax on wage income what happens to aggregate labor supply this question is at the core of debates between proponents of supply side and keynesian approaches to government fiscal policy it is unfortunate therefore that previous attempts to resolve the issue have obscured decisive assumptions regarding the preference relation between leisure and public spending one argument exposited recently by gwartney and stroup 1983 1986 and ehrenberg and smith 1988 179 80 descends from an older literature represented by the works of friedman 1949 1954 goode 1949 scitovsky 1951 and bailey 1954 and emphasizes the importance of a balanced budget framework for addressing the question this approach reveals the presence of an income effect caused by the change in government spending that must accompany the tax change at optimum according to this view this income effect exactly offsets the income effect of the tax change so that only the substitution effect of the tax remains as a consequence a balanced budget increase in the wage tax unambiguously decreases economy wide labor supply provided the increase in public spending is valued the same as the forgone private spending a different approach was initiated by winston 1965 and subsequently elaborated upon by lindbeck 1982 fullerton 1982 hanson and stuart 1983 bohanon and van cott 1986 and gahvari 1986 this approach stresses the importance of the preference relation between public spending and private spending rather than the role of the public spending income effect in determining the change in aggregate labor supply as a special example gahvari 1986 assumes a preference structure which implies that public spending does not have any influence on labor supply so there is only the partial equilibrium effect of the tax however the general conclusion of this line of reasoning is that the theoretical ambiguity of the labor supply response arises from both tax and spending effects in this paper a simple formal model is used to develop a careful accounting of the various income and substitution effects the model is sufficiently general to permit a rigorous comparison of earlier studies and to expose implicit assumptions responsible for their conclusions we show that the two approaches outlined above are associated respectively with the focal cases of compensated independence and ordinary independence between leisure and public spending the pan of the paper is as follows section ii contains a model of labor supply in the presence of wage taxation and public spending in section iii the effect on aggregate labor supply of a balanced budget change in wage taxation is analyzed section iv provides an interpretation of several previous analyses of these issues section v contains a summary of our results ii the model consider an economy with n identical consumers who derive utility from leisure l a pure private good x which serves as numeraire and a publicly provided good z the utility function u l x z is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable and strictly quasi concave everyone is endowed with t units of time which are allocated either to labor market work or leisure nonmarket activities the marginal product of labor in producing the private good is the constant real gross of tax wage rate w because agents are identical we can confine attention to allocations of equal consumption as a consequence the production possibilities frontier assumed to be linear can be expressed in per capita terms as wl x p n z wt 1 where p is the constant marginal cost of z with identical agents and only two goods not publicly provided it may be assumed without loss of generality that public spending is financed by a wage tax with constant marginal and average ad valorem rate t

family labor supply with taxes over the period 1960 1983 the proportion of federal tax revenue raised by taxation of labor supply has risen from 57 77 percent in this paper we specify and estimate a model of family labor supply which treats both federal and state taxation husbands and wives labor supply are treated jointly rather than in aseparate manner as in previous research a method to calculate the virtual wage for nonworking spouses is used within a utility maximizing framework to treat correctly the joint family labor supply decision joint family efforts are found to be important the efficiency cost deadweight loss of labor taxation is estimated to be 29 6 of tax revenue raised the effect of the new 10 deduction to ease the marriage tax for working spouses leads to a prediction of 3 8 increase in wives labor supply and a 9 decrease in husbands labor supply overall taxes paid are predicted to decrease by 3 4 this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

airline network rivalry in this paper the effects of the strategic interaction between deregulated airlines on their network choice are analyzed the authors examine whether switching from a linear to a hub spoke network confers a strategic advantage because it saves costs and improves service quality they find that if hubbing lowers total cost which includes both airline and passenger inconvenience costs the pursuit of strategic advantages usually intensifies the extent of hubbing even if hubbing raises total cost it might be pursued by the airline either because hubbing is a dominant strategy in an oligopolistic setting or because hubbing will be useful in deterring entry

labor supply and tax rates reply the comments of firouz gahvari and of cecil bohanon and t norman van cott provide useful extensions of our earlier analysis nonetheless our central point remains intact the traditional labor leisure analysis is invalid because it ignores the effects of changes in government spending on individual welfare gahvari points out that in the case of public goods the linkage between changes in tax rates and labor supply is more complex than we implied individuals unable in the large number case to transform leisure into public goods will be affected differently when the government provides a public good rather than an income transfer in gahvari s world where government goods are irrelevant to all private decisions complete separability in the utility functions and no ability to purchase public goods privately the quantity of government goods can be safely ignored in the analysis of private decisions the decision proceeds as it would if tax revenues were totally wasted even though the citizens total utility is assumed constant when tax revenues change with changes in government goods exactly offsetting the utility impacts of the change in private goods however we think it is misleading to label the ambiguously signed element beyond the substitution effect as an income effect how can there be an income effect when total utility remains constant as the quotes cited by gahvari from our initial paper p 447 illustrate this is not the income effect envisioned by the traditional work leisure analysis which refers to a change in standard of living utility and reflects the notion that a tax cut will encourage individuals to work less consume more leisure by giving them a higher standard of living through more after tax pay implicitly this view ignores the negative impact on living standards associated with the reduction in the supply of government provided goods or income transfers gahvari recognizes that when government goods replace private goods such as public education medical services food stamps or cash and ignoring any cross elasticities our original analysis stands and there is only the substitution effect bohanon and van cott make another refinement pointing out some secondary effects of government s tax transfer activity while changes in tax rates and in government provided goods will influence the individual s budget constraint or ability to trade off among goods a complete analysis must also account for the fact that any such shift will move the individual into a new region of his indifference surface his willingness to trade off among the goods may well change the individual s view of the substitutability or complementarity among government provided goods private goods and leisure becomes relevant if the government good is strongly enough complementary to leisure and or substitutable for private goods the standard substitution effect could indeed be overcome returning to our original paper we reiterate its central point the income effect component of traditional work leisure analysis for an individual ignores the individual s utility derived foregone from increased decreased government spending accompanying changes in revenues to treat that indi

airline code share alliances and their competitive effects abstract code share alliances have become a prominent feature in the competitive landscape of the airline industry however policy makers are extremely hesitant to approve proposed code share alliances when the potential partners route networks have significant overlap the main concern is that an alliance may facilitate price collusion on partners overlapping routes this article shows how policy makers can use a structural econometric framework to quantify the competitive effects of proposed code share alliances where potential alliance partners compete on overlapping routes in the prealliance industry as an example i apply the econometric model to the delta continental northwest alliance this proposed alliance was initially greeted with skepticism by the u s department of transportation owing to the potential partners unprecedented level of route network overlap for the markets considered in my analyses it appears as though the ultimate approval of the alliance by policy makers was justified

domestic airline alliances and consumer welfare this article investigates the consumer welfare consequences of the recent code share agreement between continental airlines and northwest airlines we develop a discrete choice model based on individual flight characteristics this structural model recognizes that consumers i may have heterogeneous preferences for flight attributes and ii may face different prices for the same flight the empirical methodology also deals with the measurement error problem stemming from the absence of consumer level data on prices the estimation results suggest that whereas the code share agreement did not impact consumers significantly on average it increased the average surplus of connecting passengers but decreased the average surplus of nonstop passengers interestingly the magnitude of our welfare results may be attributed in large part to changes in product characteristics other than prices

dynamic oligopoly behaviour in the airline industry abstract this paper examines the dynamic interaction between united airlines and american airlines on a set of duopoly routes we estimate quarterly conduct parameters or conjectural variations and test constant behaviour bertrand cournot and collusive models we also test two regimeswitching models derived from the green porter price war model one based on reversion to bertrand behaviour during price wars the other on reversion to cournot behaviour the three constant behaviour models are all rejected the regime switching models can both describe the data but the cournot based version is preferred

estimation of a model of entry in the airline industry this paper considers the effect of an airline s scale of operation at an airport on the profitability of routes flown out of that airport the empirical methodology uses the entry decisions of airlines as indicators of underlying profitability the results extend the empirical literature on airport presence by providing a new set of estimates of the determinants of city pair profitability these estimates imply that city pair profits increase in airport presence and decrease rapidly in the number of entering firms the literature on empirical models of oligopoly entry is also extended via a focus on the role of differences between firms

inflation interest rates and the balance of payments during a financial reform the case of argentina abstract in order to evaluate the impact of recent financial reforms on the argentine economy this paper presents the results of estimating a small monthly structural model of the argentine economy which emphasizes the linkages between the financial system inflation and the balance of payments the results are used to examine the portfolio interest rate elasticities of both the financial and non financial sectors the determinants of the real levels of and spread between the loan and deposit interest rates and the responsiveness of inflation and the balance of payments to various policy measures

firm size inequality and market power abstract in this paper we reexamine the relationship between firm size inequality fsi and market power in light of modern oligopoly theory using a model with capacity constraints and endogenous conduct we show that the market power fsi relationship is more complex than the positive link traditionally predicted we show that two separate effects are at work leading to a u shaped relationship between market power and fsi we also show that prices should be more unstable in markets where fsi is high we test these predictions on data for the u s airline industry and find results that support them

labor supply taxes and government spending a microeconometric analysis the effect of government spending on labor supply behavior is critical to predicting the balanced budget effect of income taxes and to estimating the marginal social cost of public funds yet its very existence not to mention direction and magnitude has not been empirically investigated this research estimates a labor supply function that incorporates income taxation and government spending using microeconomic data for men and women the empirical results suggest that public sector spending may have a significant effect on labor supply thereby leading to estimates of the marginal social cost of public funds that differ from those typically calculated

market power and rents in global supply chains market power and competition policy in food supply chains has emerged as an important economic issue in economics and a highly sensitive item on the policy agenda consolidation is taking place in the food industry both in high income countries and in emerging economies but the impact of concentration in global food chains on efficiency and rent distribution is more nuanced and complex than often claimed we review the literature and extend it by developing a model which explicitly takes into account market imperfections and contract enforcement problems in supply chains increased competition benefits farms by improving contract conditions but contract enforcement becomes more complicated

how do incumbents respond to the threat of entry evidence from the major airlines this paper examines how incumbents respond to the threat of entry of competitors as distinguished from their response to competitors actual entry it uses a case study from the passenger airline industry specifically the evolution of southwest airlines route network to identify particular routes where the probability of future entry rises abruptly when southwest begins operating in airports on both sides of a route but not the route itself this dramatically raises the chance they will start flying that route in the near future we examine the pricing of the incumbents on threatened routes in the period surrounding such events we find that incumbents cut fares significantly when threatened by southwest s entry into their routes this is true even after controlling in several ways for airport specific operating costs the response of incumbents seems to be limited only to the threatened route itself and not to routes out of nearby competitor airports where southwest does not operate e g fares drop on routes from chicago midway but not chicago o hare the largest responses appear to be restricted to routes that were concentrated beforehand incumbents do experience short run increases in their passenger loads concurrent with these fare cuts this is consistent with theories implying incumbents will try to generate some longer term loyalty among current customers before the entry of a new competitor we examine evidence relating this demand building motive to frequent flyer programs and find suggestive evidence in favor of this notion there is only weak evidence that incumbents increase capacity on the routes

models of financially repressed developing economies abstract the past decade has witnessed an explosion of research on financial sector models of financially repressed developing economies for the most part financial repression is interpreted to be the technique of holding interest rates particularly deposit rates of interest below their free market equilibrium levels the recent spate of activity in this field was produced by the simultaneous publication in 1973 of books by mckinnon and shaw both authors demonstrate how economic theory can be applied to the analysis of the effects of financial conditions on investment and the real rate of economic growth since 1973 models of financially repressed developing economies have been formalized mathematically extended to open economies in order to analyse exchange rate policies and tested empirically this paper presents a critical survey of the major contributions to the literature in this field since 1973

value of an additional firm in monopolistic competition the paper develops a model of monopolistic competition in which the satisfaction levels consumers get from products are independently and identically distributed potential substitution among products then generates demand curves through the mechanism of order statistics the value of extra variety can be calculated directly pareto lognormal and beta distributions are investigated using numerical integration some but not all cases support the argument that the optimal number of firms exceeds the equilibrium number

market structure and u s trade flows abstract using samples of input output table detailed industries we test the impact of various elements of market structure on u s trade flows at the industry level holding factor proportions constant industry demand characteristics and the extent of scale economies have significant impacts on trade flows labor intensity at the industry level has the effects on trade flows which are predicted by the factor proportions theory capital intensity increases both import and export flows this result together with certain others suggests the importance of trade among industrialized countries in producer goods

an ex post welfare analysis of natural gas regulation in the industrial sector the current structure of the us natural gas industry is a result of the evolution of regulatory policy over the past three decades which began with the deregulation of natural gas prices at the wellhead ngpa of 1978 and culminated with the deregulation of interstate transportation of natural gas ferc order 636 focusing on the industrial sector this paper estimates the welfare and price effects associated with the changes in regulatory policy overtime actual prices converge towards estimated equilibrium prices consequently deadweight losses diminished an estimated 15 47 billion 2003 dollars of welfare loss had been incurred from 1977 to 2000

advance purchase discounts and monopoly allocation of capacity optimal pricing by a monopoly airline that faces capacity constraints during the peak demand period is studied the existence of capacity constraints means that in order to expand output the airline must divert demand from the peak period to the off peak period a particular advance purchase discount policy is shown to be the profit maximizing method of selling tickets if the advance purchase requirement were infeasible output and total surplus would both be lower jel l12 substantial discounts for air travel are generally available to travelers who are willing to purchase tickets a week or more in advance of the departure date this paper demonstrates why the imposition of an advance purchase requirement may be a profit maximizing strategy for a monopoly airline facing capacity constraints during times of peak demand 1 the practice of imposing an advance purchase requirement on discount tickets is also placed in a favorable light in terms of its impact on social

pricing and performance in monopoly airline markets since the airline deregulation act of 1978 ada much has been learned about the performance characteristics of airline markets functioning free of governmental control contrary to the initial expectations of many airline markets do not appear to conform well to the contestable markets model numerous empirical studies of the industry have concluded that performance depends on the level of actual competition a result incompatible with perfect contestability 2 in a perfectly contestable

national and international aspects of financial policies in ldcs a prologue after a period of animated controversy between keynesians advocating policies of low interest rates and monetary expansion and monetarists who insisted on the importance of the distinction between nominal and real interest rates economists have now almost reached a consensus on the role of money in the development process this consensus has arisen because it was increasingly felt that what was called for was not new concepts so much as new ways of looking at them in ldcs money s role need be neither denigrated nor exaggerated money s traditional functions as a medium of exchange and a store of value remain important in ldcs but its function as a conduit of resources from savers to investors is more central to an inderstanding of its contributions to development coats and khatkhate 1980 p 3 the body of the consensus derives from the framework set up by mckinnon and shaw fleshed out by the earlier work of goldsmith and patrick goldsmith 1969 patrick 1966 and extended by the theoretical and empirical output of a large number of younger economists fry 1981 this analysis attached central importance to financial policies of higher real interest rates which were supposed to encourage the build up of real money balances increased financial intermediation and unification of financial markets eventually such a policy would lead to the efficient utilization of resources and particularly of scarce capital this new paradigm has contributed to an improved understanding and perception of the economies of ldcs their problems and how these problems are accentuated by distortions arising from interventionist policies for a while it was believed that the programme contained the secret of how to reconcile stabilization objectives with those of development roe 1982 however the accumulation of empirical evidence on several developing countries where the prescribed set of policies was adopted has raised doubts about the validity of this conclusion in the presence of distortions in the financial markets it is no doubt a sensible policy to raise real interest rates the problematic issue is how far to go raising real interest rates without any regard for the rates of return on investment may run counter to the requirements of development to argue that once funds are generated through the accumulation of real balances investment can take care of itself ignores the very dynamics of development thus the hiatus between stabilization and development has not really been bridged this is evident from the recent concern with supply side policies rather than demand management policies a dichotomy which parallels the distinction between the stabilization and development problems it is this dual distinction which provides the theme of this special issue of world development

airline mergers airport dominance and market power effects of northwestrepublic and twaozark mergers on fares at minneapolisst paul and st louis

market structure and multiple equilibria in airline markets we provide a practical method to estimate the payoff functions of players in complete information static discrete games with respect to the empirical literature on entry games originated by bresnahan and reiss 1990 and berry 1992 the main novelty of our framework is to allow for general forms of heterogeneity across players without making equilibrium selection assumptions we allow the effects that the entry of each individual airline has on the profits of its competitors its competitive effects to differ across airlines the identified features of the model are sets of parameters partial identification such that the choice probabilities predicted by the econometric model are consistent with the empirical choice probabilities estimated from the data we apply this methodology to investigate the empirical importance of firm heterogeneity as a determinant of market structure in the u s airline industry we find evidence of heterogeneity across airlines in their profit functions the competitive effects of large airlines american delta united are different from those of low cost carriers and southwest also the competitive effect of an airline is increasing in its airport presence which is an important measure of observable heterogeneity in the airline industry then we develop a policy experiment to estimate the effect of repealing the wright amendment on competition in markets out of the dallas airports we find that repealing thewright amendment would increase the number of markets served out of dallas love

hubs and high fares dominance and market power in the u s airline industry this article estimates the importance of route and airport dominance in determining the degree of market power exercised by an airline the results indicate that an airline s share of passengers on a route and at the endpoint airports significantly influences its ability to mark up price above cost the high markups of a dominant airline however do not create much of an umbrella effect from which carriers with smaller operations in the same markets can benefit the article suggests a number of possible explanations for this asymmetry

the effects of third degree price discrimination in oligopoly retail firms and restaurants commonly offer senior citizen discounts i suspect this practice is not motivated by altruism rather the behavior can be better explained as profit maximizing price discrimination these firms are setting a low price in a market which probably has high elasticity of demand but why should the demand of senior citizens be more elastic than average one possibility is that elderly people have below average income and they would not eat out if restaurant prices were high perhaps a more plausible explanation is that retired people simply have more time on their hands to spend commuting across town to take advantage of discounts the purpose of these discounts may then be to lure senior citizens away from other restaurants rather than to get them out of the house the analysis of third degree price discrimination has a long history a c pigou 1920 joan robinson 1933 and two articles on the subject have recently appeared in this review richard schmalensee 1981 hal varian 1985 the industry structure in these analyses is monopoly but an explicit model of some form of competition is obviously needed to study discriminatory discounts meant to attract customers from rival firms and even discounts meant to get people out of the house may have an oligopoly analysis which is qualitatively different from their monopoly anlysis in this paper i present a simple duopoly model of a differentiated products industry i show that a firm s price elasticity of demand in a market can be expressed as the sum of two parts the industry demand elasticity and the cross price elasticity the first measures the tendency of consumers in a market to stay home when the price goes up the second the tendency to switch suppliers in the monopoly case in which the crossprice elasticity is zero and the collusive case in which the cross price elasticity is irrelevant discrimination between markets is due to differences in industry demand elasticity in the noncooperative oligopoly case equilibrium price differentials can be accounted for both by differences in cross price elasticity as well as differences in industry demand elasticity total industry output when the firms can discriminate between two markets is compared to what it would be if discrimination were impossible which regime has larger output depends on the sum of the adjustedconcavity condition and the elasticity ratio condition the first predominates when the rival products are poor substitutes and the firms have approximate monopoly power while the second predominates at the other extreme where the products are close substitutes and the firms have almost no market power the adjusted concavity condition compares the relative curvature of demands in the two markets and was originally discovered by robinson 1933 in her analysis of monopoly price discrimination the elasticity ratio condition compares the relative difference in industry demand elasticity between the two markets with the relative difference in cross price elasticity according to the elasticity ratio condition a discriminatory discount due to high industry elasticity of demand would be more likely to increase total output than one due to high cross price elasticity the effect of discrimination on profit is also discussed the distinction made here department of economics university of wisconsin madison madison wi 53706 this paper is a revision of part of my doctoral dissertation i am grateful to steve matthews ken judd and john panzar for guidance in this research i also thank seminar participants at wisconsin the justice department and the 1986 econometric society meetings in new orleans and the discussant martin perry the excellent comments of the referees improved the exposition of the paper

capacity and product market competition measuring market power in a puppy dog industry abstract in this paper we specify and estimate a structural model which accounts for competition in two variables capacity and prices the model has a two stage setup in the first stage firms make capacity decisions followed by a product differentiated price setting game in the second stage since costs are endogenized through the first stage this has important implications for the measurement of market power in the product market in particular simpler one stage specifications would result in a bias in the measurement of market power which can be linked to the taxonomy for two stage games given in fudenberg and tirole 1984 fudenberg d tirole j 1984 the fat cat effect the puppy dog ploy and the lean and hungry look american economic review paper and proceedings 74 361 366 we then estimate this model demand cost short and long run and conduct for the european airline industry using data for the period of 1976 1990 we perform a number of specification tests and reject a simple one stage specification in favor of our two stage set up in particular we find that some degree of market power in the product market exists however market conduct in the two stage set up is significantly less collusive than in the more widely employed one stage specification which is consistent with the direction of bias in puppy dog games this illustrates that collusiveness of firms market conduct in the product market is significantly overestimated whenever capacity competition is not accounted for

endogenous costs and price cost margins an application to the european airline industry this paper allows for endogenous costs in the estimation of price cost margins in particular we estimate price cost margins when firms bargain over wages we extent the standard two equation set up demand and first order condition in the product market to include a third equation which is derived from bargaining over wages in this way price cost margins are determined by wages and vice versa we implement the model using data for eight european airlines from 1976 1994 and show that the treatment of endogenous costs has important implications for the measurement of price cost margins and the assessment of market power our main result is that observed prices in europe are virtually identical to monopoly prices even though observed margins are consistent with nash behavior apparently costs had been inflated to the point that the european consumers were faced with a de facto monopoly prices

financing constraints on the size distribution of industrial firms the chinese experience abstractwe investigate whether financing constraints affect the size distribution of chinese industrial firms from 1998 to 2007 although the firm size distribution does not follow zipf distribution in china it is approaching zipf distribution over time in general financing constraints have a robustly negative effect on the size distribution of firms furthermore firms in western china grow significantly more equally after controlling for financing constraints however the effect of financing constraints in central china is significantly negative and the effect of financing constraints on firm size distribution in eastern china is insignificant we thus expect a non linear relationship between financing constraints and firm size distribution

living by the golden rule multimarket contact in the u s airline industry this paper examines empirically the effects of multimarket contact on pricing in the u s airline industry the analysis of the time series and cross sectional variability of airline fares in the 1000 largest domestic city pair routes reveals the presence of statistically significant and quantitatively important multimarket effects fares are higher in city pair markets served by carriers with extensive interroute contacts these findings are consistent with the claims of industry experts that airlines live by the golden rule i e that they refrain from initiating aggressive pricing actions in a given route for fear of what their competitors might do in other jointly contested routes during his testimony mr steven b elkins senior director of marketing systems development for northwest airlines cited an example in which northwest lowered fares on night flights that were flying with empty seats in a number of routes from minneapolis and upper midwest cities to various west coast cities he said that continental airlines swiftly responded by cutting prices in important northwest markets mr elkins s memo advises northwest pricing analysts we will live by the golden rule in his testimony he explained that the golden rule in that context was that i did not want my pricing analyst initiating actions in another carrier s market like chicago for fear of what that other carrier might do to retaliate wall street journal october 9 1990 p b1

how do switching costs affect market concentration and prices in network industries i investigate the effects of switching costs on the market outcome in network industries using a dynamic duopoly model of price competition in the presence of an outside option i find that the role of switching costs depends on network effects and the outside option without a viable outside option high switching costs can neutralize the tendency towards high market concentration associated with network effects but with a viable outside option switching costs increase market concentration furthermore switching costs lower prices if network effects are modest and there exists a viable outside option but generally raise prices otherwise

the dominant firm advantage in multiproduct industries evidence from the u s airlines in many industries the largest firms are most successful in entering and competing in individual markets or submarkets while this success is often attributed to cost or quality differences it may also reflect reputation advantages or marketing strategies that benefit firms selling a wider variety of products in the industry i present an approach to estimating the advantages of a dominant firm in the airline industry that allows one to effectively control for cost and quality heterogeneity results using data from 1986 indicate that an airline with a dominant presence at an airport will have a significant advantage in attracting customers whose trips originate at that airport regardless of the specific route on which the customer is traveling

competition in european aviation pricing policy and market structure the purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of liberal bilateral agreements on some european air routes in terms of price competition and market structure the author proposes a model that explains firms behavior and shows that after the liberalization firms exploit their cost advantages and differentiate their products more but market structure still depends on access to airport facilities and other ancillary services controlled by the flag carriers these results differ from american evidence in that the author finds that the effect of airport presence on prices through lower costs more than offsets the effect through higher perceived quality copyright 1995 by blackwell publishing ltd