war and natural resource exploitation abstract we build a theoretical framework that allows for endogenous conflict behaviour i e fighting efforts and for endogenous natural resource exploitation i e speed ownership and investments while depletion is spread in a balanced hotelling fashion during peace the presence of conflict creates incentives for rapacious extraction as this lowers the stakes of future contest this voracious extraction depresses total oil revenue especially if world oil demand is relatively elastic and the government s weapon advantage is weak some of these political distortions can be overcome by bribing rebels or by government investment in weapons the shadow of conflict can also make less efficient nationalized oil extraction more attractive than private extraction as insecure property rights create a holdup problem for the private firm and lead to a lower license fee furthermore the government fights less intensely than the rebels under private exploitation which leads to more government turnover without credible commitment to future fighting efforts private oil depletion is only lucrative if the government s non oil office rents are large and weaponry powerful which guarantees the government a stronger grip on office and makes the holdup problem less severe

natural resources and sub national economic performance does sub national democracy matter abstract the differentiation in the impact of resources on economic growth is often explained by the specifics of institutional factors the aim of this paper is to investigate how sub national political differences influence the effect of natural resources on economic growth using a dataset of russian regions this paper demonstrates that sub national democratization influences the growth effects of resources and considers possible mechanisms for this influence the paper finds that in russia natural resources are only capable of promoting growth in the regions with non democratic political systems that at the same time have an efficient and non corrupt bureaucracy

the resource curse revisited governance and natural resources the paper analyzes the impact of natural resource abundance on selected governance indicators we use a panel data set with observations on a large number of countries over an extended period of time and employ an instrumental variable technique to account for endogeneity the results show that exports of natural resources have above all led to an increase in corruption this result is robust to both different model specifications and an alternative indicator for natural resource abundance for other governance indicators such as law and order and bureaucratic quality we either find no results or results that lack robustness

fiscal windfall curse abstract we study the impact of a one off exogenous fiscal windfall on local public finances in the canton of zurich in switzerland in contrast to much of the literature of resource windfalls the windfall occurred in a stable democracy with strong fiscal institutions it was due to the ipo of glencore on the london stock exchange in 2011 as a result its ceo paid an extraordinary tax bill of approximately chf 360 million about chf 238 million of that extra tax revenue entered the municipal resource equalization scheme and rained down on the municipalities of the canton of zurich this quasi experimental setup and our unusually rich dataset allow us to estimate the causal effect of this one off windfall on all municipal accounting positions we show that it triggered large permanent expenditure increases targeting specific groups mostly public employees at the same time as general tax cuts and user charge hikes the resulting imbalances caused a 7 5 fold increase in gross debt relative to the windfall this massive overreaction hints at a substantial fiscal windfall curse even with strong fiscal institutions 178 words

democracy and development the devil in the details does democracy promote economic development this paper reviews recent attempts to address this question that exploited within country variation it shows that the answer is largely positive but also depends on the details of democratic reforms first the sequence of economic vs political reforms matters countries liberalizing their economy before extending political rights do better second different forms of democratic government lead to different economic policies and this might explain why presidential democracy leads to faster growth than parliamentary democracy third it is important to distinguish between expected and actual political reforms taking expectations of regime change into account helps identify a stronger growth effect of democracy

income and democracy existing studies establish a strong cross country correlation between income and democracy but do not control for factors that simultaneously affect both variables we show that controlling for such factors by including country fixed effects removes the statistical association between income per capita and vari ous measures of democracy we present instrumental variables estimates that also show no causal effect of income on democracy the cross country corre lation between income and democracy reflects a positive correlation between changes in income and democracy over the past 500 years this pattern is con sistent with the idea that societies embarked on divergent political economic development paths at certain critical junctures jel d7 e 1

resource wealth and women s economic and political power in the u s states ross argues that oil wealth reduces women s economic and political power but critics maintain that accounting for a community s attitudes toward gender equality makes the gendered resource curse disappear this article disentangles the two perspectives by studying the effects of resource wealth on women s economic and political status in the u s states where resource wealth varies significantly while cultural differences are comparatively small data between 1997 and 2012 reveal evidence of a gendered resource curse consistent with ross i also update the theory of the gendered resource curse by showing via a culture augmented labor leisure model of workforce participation that far from being irrelevant when accounting for varying attitudes toward gender roles resource wealth and those patriarchal attitudes combine to suppress even more women s economic and political influence data from the u s states support this expectation as well

environmental depletion governance and conflict t he link between natural resource dependence and internal conflict has been approached from a variety of angles in a large and growing interdisciplinary literature while there is an expanding consensus as to what matters the most for such intra state violence episodes the feasibility discontent dichotomy still appears to characterize a disciplinary divide between economists and political scientists this paper attempts to help bridge the gap by allowing for both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations of potential rebels simple non cooperative bargaining yields a nonlinear impact of regulatory quality on the likelihood of conflict and shows that corruption and resource depletion jointly affect the outcome the empirical analysis that follows looks at the effect of environmental depletion and government corruption on the emergence of civil conflicts using a large panel dataset resource depletion the quality of governance and their interaction are found to be significant determinants of civil conflict incidence results are robust to several steps taken to address potential endogeneity concerns

causes and effects of corruption what has past decade s empirical research taught us a survey corruption has fierce impacts on economic and societal development and is subject to a vast range of institutional jurisdictional societal and economic conditions it is this paper s aim to provide a reassessment and a comprehensive state of the art survey of existing literature on corruption and its causes and effects a particularly strong focus is put on presenting and discussing insights resulting from empirical research and contrasting recent with older findings

the curse of natural resources in fractionalized countries abstract this paper develops a model that can explain why natural resources are a blessing for some countries but a curse for others in this model natural resources cause fighting activities between rivalling groups fighting reduces productive activities and weakens property rights making productive activities even less attractive the aggregate production decrease exceeds the natural resources direct positive income effect if and only if the number of rivalling groups is sufficiently large the model thus predicts that natural resources lower incomes in fractionalized countries but increase incomes in homogenous countries empirical evidence supporting this prediction is provided

corruption in russia abstractwe analyze the determinants of corruption in russia using law enforcement data on corruption incidents for a panel of 79 russian regions for the period 2004 13 we find that the relative salaries of bureaucrats determine corruption levels corruption declines as relative salaries rise yet at strongly diminishing rates furthermore we show that even very limited media freedom helps to curtail corruption other important determinants are the strength of law enforcement education levels and unemployment rates

administrative overspending in indonesian districts the role of local politics summary we analyze the determinants of the excessive administrative spending of local governments in indonesia in an unbalanced panel data set of 399 districts for 2001 09 we show that the proliferation of districts has not led to increased administrative spending instead a lack of political accountability is responsible for this excess the degree of political competition influences the level of administrative spending significantly newly introduced direct elections of district heads however did not curtail the waste

corruption fertility and human capital abstract we build an overlapping generations model in which reproductive households face a child quantity child quality trade off and bureaucrats are delegated with the task of delivering public services that support the accumulation of human capital by integrating the theoretical analyses of endogenous growth corruption and fertility choices we show that the negative relation between fertility and economic development may also be affected by differences in the magnitude of bureaucratic corruption

rent seeking and resource booms abstract this paper develops a model of rent seeking in which the opportunity cost of rent seeking is foregone entrepreneurship it provides conditions under which resource booms tend to lead to an increase in rent seeking activity and those in which they induce entrepreneurship we identify an important difference between the two activities which leads resource booms to bias gains in favour of rent seeking over entrepreneurship but we also show that this bias depends on the nature of the initial equilibrium

do natural resource revenues hinder financial development the role of political institutions we hypothesize that natural resource revenues may deteriorate contract enforcement if political institutions are weak as poor contract enforcement leads to low financial development resource revenues may hinder financial development in countries with poor political institutions but not in countries with comparatively better political institutions we provide empirical support for this hypothesis based on within country variation in our sample covering the period 1970 2005 and 133 countries our results are robust to the use of additional control variables different samples and alternative measures of financial development and political institutions

the resource curse a statistical mirage abstract a surprising feature of resource rich economies is slow growth it is often argued that natural resource production impedes development by creating market or institutional failures this paper establishes an alternative explanation a slow growing resource sector a declining resource sector is disproportionately reflected in resource dependent countries additionally there is little evidence that resource dependence impedes growth in non resource sectors more generally this paper illustrates the importance of considering industry composition in cross country growth regressions

extending the concept of the resource curse natural resources and public spending on health this paper extends the concept of the resource curse by studying whether and through which transmission channels natural resource wealth affects social spending even though the availability of vast natural capital reserves has commonly been linked to the neglect of human development most of the literature has continued to focus on economic performance this paper is the first to empirically investigate the link between natural resource wealth and public health expenditures in light of the hypothesis that resource wealth as a source of unearned state income enhances state autonomy and increases volatility which leads to policies that fail to prioritize human development using a large panel dataset of world countries covering the period from 1995 to 2009 we find a robust significant inverse relationship between natural resource dependence and even abundance and public health spending over time the effect remains significant after controlling for state autonomy volatility and other factors these findings have implications for national authorities as well as the extractive industry governments should be made accountable for natural resource wealth and correct taxation could provide additional resources earmarked for health the extractive industry could increase their investments in sustainable corporate social responsibility operations specifically in the health sector

globalisation and corruption revisited this paper presents new empirical evidence on the determinants of corruption focussing on the role of globalization and inequality the estimates for a panel of 102 countries over the period 1995 2005 point to three main results i detection technologies reflected in a high level of development human capital and political rights reduce corruption whereas natural resource rents increase corruption ii globalization in terms of both trade and financial openness has a negative eect on corruption which is more pronounced in developing countries iii inequality increases corruption and once the role of inequality is accounted for the impact of globalization on corruption is halved in line with recent theory this suggests that globalization besides reducing corruption through enhanced competition aects corruption also by reducing inequality

political decentralization and corruption evidence from around the world abstract how does political decentralization affect the frequency and costliness of bribe extraction by corrupt officials previous empirical studies using subjective indexes of perceived corruption and mostly fiscal indicators of decentralization have suggested conflicting conclusions in search of more precise findings we combine and explore two new data sources an original cross national data set on particular types of decentralization and the results of a firm level survey conducted in 80 countries about firms concrete experiences with bribery in countries with a larger number of government or administrative tiers and given local revenues a larger number of local public employees reported bribery was more frequent when local or central governments received a larger share of gdp in revenue bribery was less frequent overall the results suggest the danger of uncoordinated rent seeking as government structures become more complex

development paradigm failures over time the international development community has advocated various development paradigms but countries following these paradigms have often performed poorly we provide an explanation for this poor performance in our model the political leader of a developing country chooses a policy and whether to implement it in an honest or corrupt manner these choices affect domestic production and aid inflows production is high when productive capacity is high and when the policy is appropriate in the country specific circumstances and implemented honestly aid inflows are high when the policy is close to the paradigm in equilibrium countries with low productive capacity and high corruption resulting from weak political institutions follow the paradigm more closely hence our model suggests that development paradigms have a tendency to fail because they are primarily followed by countries that would fail anyway we provide empirical evidence in support of the main assumptions and results

the voracity effect abstract we analyze an economy that lacks a strong legal political institutional infrastructure and is populated by multiple powerful groups powerful groups dynamically interact via a fiscal process that effectively allows open access to the aggregate capital stock in equilibrium this leads to slow economic growth and a voracity effect by which a shock such as a terms of trade windfall perversely generates a more than proportionate increase in fiscal redistribution and reduces growth we also show that a dilution in the concentration of power leads to faster growth and a less procyclical response to shocks jel f43 o10 o23 o40

social welfare in a common property oligopoly output in a markov nash cournot equilibrium to a noncooperative differential game in which in oligopolists extract a common property nonrenewable resource is bounded by the output of in firm and in i firm static oligopolies we discuss the welfare effects of the number of firms and of the divergence between private and social discount rates we compare extraction under the markov and open loop equilibria and then offer an explanation for the possibility that the resource is exhausted instantaneously in a continuous time game this explanation does not depend on the fact that the period of commitment is infinitesimal this essay models the extraction by an oligopolistic industry of a common property nonrenewable resource we characterize the markov perfect equilibrium mpe in a game amongst firms and then provide general conditions under which the resource is exhausted instantaneously if there is unrestricted access to a resource agents perceive its shadow value to be 0 and extract too rapidly when access is restricted to a finite number of agents in none of whom possess exclusive property rights an additional complication may arise if firms behave as oligopolists in the product market they have an incentive to extract the resource too slowly in order to increase the price thus where m firms exploit a resource in the absence of property rights there are conflicting tendencies the absence of property rights encourages excessive exploitation whereas the finite number of firms encourages insufficiently rapid exploitation there are a number of situations where the lack of property rights and the presence of market power coexist examples include i national fisheries which are large enough to affect fish populations and output prices ii common exploitation of aquifers or rivers where individual use affects the price of an agricultural output or of another input iii production by oligopolistic firms which degrades the environment we consider the case of nonrenewable resources such as oil this implies a simple equation of motion for the stock of the resource and emphasizes the role of the number of firms and the stock size such models are often appropriate even if the resource is not literally nonrenewable for example tropical forests or groundwater aquifers are potentially renewable given enough time as indeed oil deposits may be however the rate of replenishment may be insignificant given

aid dependence and the quality of governance cross country empirical tests aid dependence can potentially undermine the quality of governance and public sector institutions by weakening accountability encouraging rent seeking and corruption fomenting conflict over control of aid funds siphoning off scarce talent from the bureaucracy and alleviating pressures to reform inefficient policies and institutions analyses of cross country data in this paper provide evidence that higher aid levels erode the quality of governance as measured by indices of bureaucratic quality corruption and the rule of law these findings support the need for donors to develop less costly and less intrusive ways of disseminating state of the art knowledge on public sector reform in developing countries

natural resources education and economic development economic growth since 1965 has varied inversely with the share of natural capital in national wealth across countries four main channels of transmission from abundant natural resources to stunted economic development are discussed a the dutch disease b rent seeking c overconfidence and d neglect of education public expenditure on education relative to national income expected years of schooling for girls and gross secondary school enrolment are all shown to be inversely related to the share of natural capital in national wealth across countries natural capital appears to crowd out human capital thereby slowing down the pace of economic development

natural resources rent seeking and welfare abstract a new and very simple mechanism to explain why natural resource abundance may lower income and welfare is developed in a model with rent seeking a greater amount of natural resources increases the number of entrepreneurs engaged in rent seeking and reduces the number of entrepreneurs running productive firms with a demand externality it is shown that the drop in income as a result of this is higher than the increase in income from the natural resource more natural resources thus lead to lower welfare

institutions and the resource curse countries rich in natural resources constitute both growth losers and growth winners we claim that the main reason for these diverging experiences is differences in the quality of institutions more natural resources push aggregate income down when institutions are grabber friendly while more resources raise income when institutions are producer friendly we test this theory building on sachs and warner s influential works on the resource curse our main hypothesis that institutions are decisive for the resource curse is confirmed our results contrast the claims of sachs and warner that institutions do not play a role

booming sector and de industrialisation in a small open economy this paper presents a theoretical analysis of the dutch disease the phenomenon whereby a boom in one traded goods sector squeezes porfitability in other traded goods sectors both by directly bi

demographic transition in resource rich countries a blessing or a curse summary this study argues that resource wealth is a key factor for understanding income effects of demographic transition we develop a simple model highlighting how the income effect of increased labor supply may depend on resource rents and provide empirical evidence that support the theoretical predictions using panel data covering the period from 1982 to 2006 for more than 120 countries we find a negative interaction effect between resource wealth and demographic transition on national income moreover the negative interaction effect does not depend on institutional quality and is found also across different samples

the varieties of resource experience natural resource export structures and the political economy of economic growth many oil mineral and plantation crop based economies experienced a substantial deceleration in growth following the commodity boom and bust of the 1970s and early 1980s this article illustrates how countries dependent on point source natural resources those extracted from a narrow geographic or economic base such as oil and minerals and plantation crops are predisposed to heightened economic and social divisions and weakened institutional capacity this in turn impedes their ability to respond effectively to shocks which previous studies have shown to be essential for sustaining rising levels of prosperity analysis of data on classifications of export structure controlling for a wide array of other potential determinants of governance shows that point source and coffee and cocoa exporting countries do relatively poorly across an array of governance indicators these governance effects are not associated simply with being a natural resource exporter countries with natural resource exports that are diffuse relying primarily on livestock and agricultural produce from small family farms do not show the same strong effects and have had more robust growth recoveries

what drives the global land rush the authors review evidence regarding the size and evolution of the land rush in the wake of the 2007 8 boom in agricultural commodity prices and authors study the determinants of foreign land acquisition for large scale agricultural investment the use of data on bilateral investment relationships to estimate gravity models of transnational land intensive investments confirms the central role of agro ecological potential as a pull factor however this finding contrasts the standard literature insofar as the quality of the destination country s business climate is insignificant and weak tenure security is associated with increased interest for investors to acquire land in the country policy implications are discussed

oil and entrepreneurship economic theory predicts that rents produced from natural resources especially oil and gas can increase opportunities for entrepreneurship but they may also reduce engagement in entrepreneurial activities as they change incentives towards rent seeking using global entrepreneurship monitor gem annual surveys this study provides empirical evidence that more per capita profit from oil and gas reduces entrepreneurship only in corrupt environments the more the corruption is the larger is the impact the results have important implications for policy makers especially in resource rich developing countries

determinants of democracy a panel study of over 100 countries from 1960 to 1995 finds that improvements in the standard of living predict increase in democracy as measured by a subjective indicator of electoral rights the propensity for democracy rises with per capita gdp primary schooling and a smaller gap between male and female primary attainment for a given standard of living democaracy tends to fall with urbnization and with a greater reliance on natrual resources democracy has little relation to country size but rises with the middle class share of income the apparently strong relation of democracy to colonial heritage mostly disappears when the economic variables are held constant similarly the allowance for these economic variables weakens the interplay between democracy and religious affiliation however negative effects from muslim and non religious affiliations remain intact

from education to democracy the conventional wisdom views high levels of education as a prerequisite for democracy this paper shows that existing evidence for this view is based on crosssectional correlations which disappear once we look at within country variation in other words there is no evidence that countries that increase their education are more likely to become democratic

oil and women a re examination abstract in a seminal article ross 2008 reports a negative correlation between oil production and women s representation in the labour force and politics across countries this article re examines these relationships exploiting variations in oil endowments to address endogeneity concerns we confirm that oil production causes decline in women s representation additionally we show that consistent with dutch disease effects oil production decreases women s employment in the traded sector however it also leads to an increase in women s employment in the nontraded sector we explore some social consequences of oil production and show that it results in women marrying earlier and having more children

clean or dirty energy evidence of corruption in the renewable energy sector this paper studies the link between public policy and corruption for the case of wind energy we show that publicly subsidized renewable energy can attract criminal appetites and favor the formation of criminal associations between entrepreneurs and politicians able to influence the licensing process the insights of a simple model of political influence by interest groups are tested empirically using italian data for the years 1990 2007 using a difference in difference approach we quantify the impact of a green certificate policy aimed at supporting renewables and find robust evidence that criminal association activity increased more in windy provinces after the introduction of the generous policy regime the magnitude of the effect is large the construction of an average wind park is associated with an increase in criminal activity of 6 in the treatment compared to the control group our findings show that in the presence of poor institutions even well designed market based policies can have an adverse impact the analysis is relevant for countries that are generally characterized by heavy bureaucracies weak institutions and by large renewable potential

economics of modern energy boomtowns do oil and gas shocks differ from shocks in the rest of the economy abstract the us shale boom has intensified interest in how the expanding oil and gas sector affects local economic performance research has produced mixed results and has not compared how energy shocks differ from equal sized shocks elsewhere in the economy what emerges is that the estimated impacts of energy development vary by region empirical methodology as well as the time horizon that is considered this paper captures these dimensions to present a more complete picture of energy boomtowns utilizing us county data we estimate the effects of changes in oil and gas extraction employment on total employment growth as well as growth by sector we compare this to the effects of equal sized shocks in the rest of the economy to assess whether energy booms are inherently different the analysis is performed separately for nonmetropolitan and metropolitan counties using instrumental variables we difference over 1 3 6 and 10 year time periods to account for county fixed effects and to assess responses across different time horizons the results show that in nonmetro counties energy sector multiplier effects on total county employment first increase up to 6 year horizons and then decline for 10 year horizons we also observe positive spillovers to the non traded goods sector while spillovers are small or negative for traded goods in metro counties there are no significant effects on total employment although positive spillovers are present in some sectors yet equal sized shocks in the rest of the economy produce more jobs on average than oil and gas shocks suggesting that policymakers should seek more diversified development

real transfers in fixed exchange rate systems and the international adjustment mechanism abstract fixed exchange rates can be maintained by different types of stabilization schemes this paper takes a look at some alternative institutional settings and shows that there is an inherent redistribution mechanism in some of them that will influence the world allocation of consumption an examination of the global adjustment to monetary disturbances illustrates some interesting implications of the institutional differences between alternative systems the results suggest that the description of the international adjustment mechanism under fixed exchange rates given by the monetary approach to the balance of payments is valid only under quite restrictive assumptions

political foundations of the resource curse in this paper we argue that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse we show 1 politicians tend to over extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they discount the future too much and 2 resource booms improve the efficiency of the extraction path however 3 resource booms by raising the value of being in power and by providing politicians with more resources which they can use to influence the outcome of elections increase resource misallocation in the rest of the economy 4 the overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends critically on institutions since these determine the extent to which political incentives map into policy outcomes countries with institutions that promote accountability and state competence will tend to benefit from resource booms since these institutions ameliorate the perverse political incentives that such booms create countries without such institutions however may suffer from a resource curse

natural resources and the tradeoff between authoritarianism and development abstract why do african and middle eastern countries seem cursed by an abundance of natural resources yet usa australia and norway seem blessed a growing literature has argued that the benevolence or malignance of natural resources depends upon the quality of institutions this paper offers a new explanation based on associational freedom and its interaction with the political system the model predicts that natural resources have an adverse impact on economic performance and transition to democracy in authoritarian regimes but not in democracies it also predicts that repression of associational freedom will be increasing in natural resources in authoritarian regimes i test the model s predictions using fixed effects regressions on an international panel from 1975 to 2000 and find support

natural resources democracy and corruption we study how natural resources can feed corruption and how this effect depends on the quality of the democratic institutions our game theoretic model predicts that resource rents lead to an increase in corruption if the quality of the democratic institutions is relatively poor but not otherwise we use panel data covering the period 1980 to 2004 and 124 countries to test this theoretical prediction our estimates confirm that the relationship between resource rents and corruption depends on the quality of the democratic institutions our main results hold when we control for the effects of income time varying common shocks regional fixed effects and various additional covariates they are also robust across different samples and to the use of various alternative measures of natural resources democracy and corruption

do corrupt governments receive less foreign aid critics of foreign aid programs argue that these funds often support corrupt governments and inefficient bureaucracies supporters argue that foreign aid can be used to reward good governments this paper documents that there is no evidence that less corrupt governments receive more foreign aid on the contrary according to some measures of corruption more corrupt governments receive more aid also we could not find any evidence that an increase in foreign aid reduces corruption in summary the answer to the question posed in the title is no

natural resources a curse on education spending abstract in line with the rising interest in harnessing natural resource revenues for economic and human development through productive government investments this paper aims to address an important blind spot in our understanding of the resource curse by contributing innovative insights on how natural resource wealth impacts government priorities and expenditure practices using a large panel dataset of 140 countries covering the period from 1995 to 2009 we find an adverse effect of resource dependence on public education expenditures relative to gdp that is robust to controlling for a range of additional covariates furthermore our findings indicate that this resource curse effect on the government prioritization of education mainly stems from point source natural resources these results are of particular importance for the sustainable management of natural resource wealth in developing countries as they could achieve especially high returns by investing resource revenues in public goods such as education while this paper underlines the importance of institutions and government accountability our findings also raise questions on the role of the private sector as a partner in development as the extractives industry could consider increasing funding for education through corporate social responsibility csr initiatives

does oil corrupt evidence from a natural experiment in west africa abstract this paper explores the oil discovery announcements in sao tome and principe 1997 1999 to assess the role of natural resources in determining corruption for this purpose we use a natural experiment framework which contrasts sao tome and principe to cape verde a control west african country sharing the same colonial past and important recent economic and political shocks our measurement is based on tailored household surveys we conducted in both island countries the unique survey instrument was retrospective and used personal histories to elicit memories from the respondents we analyze changes in perceived corruption across a wide range of public services and allocations we find clearest increases on vote buying education namely in the allocation of scholarships and customs ranging from 31 to 40 of the subjective scale we interpret these findings as symptoms of increased competition for core state resources