forecasting the adoption of residential ductless heat pumps energy efficient technologies have the potential to provide savings to households and utilities but consumers do not always adopt these innovations over traditional technologies the ductless heat pump dhp is one such technology designed to increase energy efficiency and comfort in space conditioning dhp adoption by single family residences in the pacific northwest of the united states is investigated by quantifying the effects of utility provided rebates and expenditures on activities such as advertising and installer training on the number of installations and forecasting installations through 2018 the number of installations is elastic with respect to net installation costs and inelastic with respect to expenditures given the proposed rebate budgets doubling the current rebate is necessary to maximize installations through 2018

the role of feelings in investor decision making abstract this paper surveys the research on the influence of investor feelings on equity pricing and also develops a theoretical basis with which to understand the emerging findings of this area the theoretical basis is developed with reference to research in the fields of economic psychology and decision making recent advancements in understanding how feelings affect the general decision making of individuals especially under conditions of risk and uncertainty e g loewenstein et al 2001 psychological bulletin 127 267 286 are covered by the review the theoretical basis is applied to analyze the existing research on investor feelings e g kamstra et al 2000 american economic review forthcoming hirshleifer and shumway 2003 journal of finance 58 3 1009 1032 this research can be broadly described as investigating whether variations in feelings that are widely experienced by people influence investor decision making and consequently lead to predictable patterns in equity pricing the paper concludes by suggesting a number of directions for future empirical and theoretical research

the strategic implications of scale in choice based conjoint analysis choice based conjoint cbc studies have begun to rely on simulators to forecast equilibrium prices for pricing strategic product positioning and patent copyright valuations whereas cbc research

british bus deregulation competition and demand coordination abstract our framework formally explains some of the recent curious events surrounding deregulation of the british local bus industry the winner takes all nature of this market induces competitive providers to engage in predatory or preemptive behavior in scheduling and pricing unlike previous works we explicitly model consumers responses to firms schedule announcements we show that the market is unstable if demand is uncoordinated but stable otherwise our results highlight the important role played by demand coordinating mechanisms in local bus markets and our results suggest that pure strategy nash equilibria exist in models a la hotelling 1929 whenever demand is effectively coordinated

boundedly rational nash equilibrium a probabilistic choice approach we propose an equilibrium for n person finite games based on bounded rationality using the legit model of discrete choice theory at equilibrium each player uses appropriate choice probabilities given those used by the others rationality is parameterized on a continuum from complete rationality to uniform random choice results on the existence of equilibrium and on convergence to nash as rationality becomes perfect are similar to results due to mckelvey and palfrey we identify conditions such that for a given rationality parameter range the path of choices over time when the players use fictitious play converges to equilibrium c 1997 academic press

sophisticated entry in a model of spatial competition we analyze free entry equilibrium in a model of spatial competition in which locations of established firms are fixed and entrants profit expectations are rational our most interesting results concern large economies economies in which the number of firms is arbitrarily large when the average cost function is u shaped free entry equilibrium is unique socially optimal and characterized by zero profit in contract when there are no diseconomies of scale even large economies are stubbornly imperfect firms can earn substantial pure profit and free entry equilibrium is neither unique nor socially optimal

direct tests of the reservation wage property this paper provides the first direct experimental tests of the reservation wages predicted by finite horizon job search models previous indirect tests were based on search duration and search income the authors show that such indirect tests are weak by demonstrating that a naive rule performs essentially as well as the risk neutral model in predicting search duration in contrast direct tests of predicted reservation wages imply rejections of both the naive rule and the risk neutral model the general concave model survives direct tests with reservation wage data as does a specific logistic concave model copyright 1992 by royal economic society

a probabilistic choice model for market segmentation and elasticity structure marketing scholars commonly characterize market structure by studying the patterns of substitution implied by brand switching though the approach is useful it typically ignores the destabilizing

endogenous quality differentiation in congested markets firms selling a product with congestion externalities to a heterogeneous population of customers have an incentive to offer differentiated levels of quality in a price competitive market differentiation arises endogenously through the prices chosen by firms in equilibrium firms offer a range of prices which induce an efficiency improving range of quality levels and allow customers to self select their preferred price quality combinations additional results suggest that with many firms in the market the choice of prices dominates the choice of service capacities in determining congestion levels copyright 1991 by blackwell publishing ltd

on the nature of competition with differentiated products there is an old debate going back to bertrand 1883 and edgeworth 1925 about the fragility of market equilibrium when competition arises among a few sellers it was hotelling s belief that price instability vanishes when products are differentiated hotelling 1929 recently attention was drawn to the fact that even if product differentiation can weaken the forces leading to price instability it cannot eliminate completely the possibility of price cycles d aspremont et al 1979 the purpose of this paper is to show that vertical and horizontal product differentiation do not operate in the same manner a stable market outcome including an endogenous product specification arises more frequently with the former than with the latter horizontal product differentiation is rooted in taste differences more precisely the potential customers have heterogeneous preferences about the proportion in which the attributes of the product should be combined a wide range of substitute products can then survive in the same market simply because each of them combines the various attributes of the product in a proportion suitable to a particular segment of customers between two products in the range the level of some attributes is augmented while that of others is lowered each variety has its own circle of customers exactly as the inhabitants located around a particular shop form its potential market none the less competitors can raid these privileged market shares by adequate price cuts by contrast vertical product differentiation refers to a class of products which cohabit simultaneously on a given market even though customers agree on a unanimous ranking between them between two products in the range the level of all attributes is augmented or lowered the survival of a low quality product then rests on the seller s ability to sell it at a reduced price compensating thereby for the higher a priori attractiveness of a more desirable quality the seller of a low quality product will specialise in the segment of customers whose propensity to spend on the corresponding range of products is low either because they have relatively lower income or relatively less intensive preferences than other customers at the same time the seller of a high quality product will enjoy an absolute advantage over his competitor 2 interestingly it turns out that price and product competition does not lead to the same results in these two situations regarding the stability of the market equilibrium to stress the differences we have chosen to concentrate on two

the principle of minimum differentiation holds under sufficient heterogeneity the so called principle of minimum differentiation stated by hotelling has been challenged by many authors this paper restores the principle by showing that n firms locate at the center of the market and charge prices higher than the marginal cost of production when heterogeneity in consumers tastes is large enough

spatial competition with a land market hotelling and von thunen unified we introduce into the standard spatial competition model the consumption of land by households and study the spatial competition under the influence of a land market in contrast to the standard assumption of a fixed given distribution of households we introduce the possibility of households relocation in reaction to firms location decisions thus the spatial distribution of households is treated as endogenous and a land market is introduced on which households compete for land use households consume simultaneously land and firms output accordingly the demand of each household becomes in turn endogenous as it depends on the income left after the land rent is paid not surprisingly the results obtained within this more general framework prove to be very different from the standard results for example in the 2 and 3 firm cases the optimal configuration of firms is a nash equilibrium when transport costs are high enough or the amount of vacant land is large enough the existence property is restored in the 3 firm case when the transport costs are high enough the introduction of vacant land causes a discontinuous change in the set of equilibrium configurations

why focusing on the similarity of substitutes leaves a lot to be desired consumers frequently choose substitutes for products that are out of stock unavailable too unhealthy or too expensive a series of studies shows that focusing on differences between the substitute and the unattained alternative reduces the consumer s desire for the unattained alternative more than focusing on similarities between them whether consumers were dieting listening to songs or consuming snacks in the lab focusing on differences reduced their desire for the unattained alternative and subsequent consumption of this item after consuming the substitute more than focusing on similarities this suggests that consumers can reduce overconsumption by focusing on how the substitutes they consume differ from the alternatives they wish to avoid

price matching policy and the principle of minimum differentiation this paper shows that if duopolists are allowed to choose their product locations a price matching policy and their prices sequentially and independently both tacit collusion and minimum differentiation occur copyright 1995 by blackwell publishing ltd

energy tax credits and housing improvement this paper investigates whether federal and state tax credits allowed to households who make energy saving improvements to their residence lead to an increase in improvement activity a two period utility maximization model of household behaviour is used to determine the theoretical influence of tax credits energy prices and other factors on the optimal magnitude of conservation capital improvement regressions using various qualitative measures of conservation improvement as the dependent variable are estimated using household level energy consumption and improvement data consistent with evidence from earlier surveys the empirical results do not support the hypothesis that energy tax credits lead to more widespread or more extensive energy conservation improvement activity

existence and computation of mixed strategy nash equilibrium for 3 firms location problem location problems of firms on a closed interval were introduced by hotelling 3 and later investigated by eaton lipsey 2 firms sell a homogeneous product at a fixed price customers distributed along the interval buy one unit each from the firm nearest to them and firms aim to maximize the number of their customers it is well known that where the customers are evenly distributed along the interval and the number of firms is other than 3 the location problem has a pure strategy nash equilibrium see 2 the case of 3 firms is peculiar in that no pure strategy nash equilibrium exists for in any situation one of the extreme firms not located between the other two can increase its revenue by either moving towards or away from the other two firms the existence of mixed strategies is not obvious because the payoff functions are discontinuous whenever two or more firms are located at the same point in a recent paper dasgupta and maskin 1 investigate a class of games all derived from economic problems and all with some discontinuities in their payoff functions they demonstrate that the discontinuities in the payoff functions do not prevent the existence of mixed strategies nash equilibria in the games investigated in particular location problems of the type described earlier have such weak discontinuities and hence possess a mixed strategy nash equilibrium although their proof is constructive offering a method of approaching these equilibria as a limit of equilibria of finite games the equations involved very quickly become unmanageable in this note we compute a mixed strategy nash equilibrium for the 3 firms location problem let the customers be evenly distributed along 0 1 then a mixed strategy is a probability measure over 0 1 the symmetry of the problem suggests that the solution will be doubly symmetric in that all firms choose the same mixed strategy and that this strategy is symmetric around symmetric locations are given the same probabilities dasgupta and maskin confine their analysis to doubly symmetric solutions and prove that the strategies in any doubly symmetric equilibrium are atomless given the symmetric nature of the game and following the analysis of dasgupta and maskin we shall confine ourselves here to such doubly sym

a location model with preference for variety we propose a new location model where consumers are allowed to make multiple purchases i e one unit from each firm this model may fit many markets e g newspapers credit cards better than existing models a common feature of these markets is that some consumers are loyal to one brand while others consume more than one product our model yields predictions consistent with this observation if firms are allowed to choose their locations on the interval then spatial differentiation may not be maximal and in some cases it may even be minimal thus under certain conditions we restore hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation

on the efficiency of location decisions under discriminatory pricing abstract the paper analyzes the question of whether delivered pricing policies give rise to an inefficient location of firms and in particular to a geographical distribution of capacity which is overly concentrated the analysis adds to the literature on spatial pricing and location decisions the element of uncertainty over the timely delivery of products and therefore the possibility that risk averse consumers may be willing to pay a higher delivered price for products if they can hedge and divide their orders among two suppliers the results are in strong contradiction to the common belief that identical delivered pricing systems produce a highly inefficient distribution and that fob would yield the optimal location however it is shown that in markets with coordination problems the concern about excessive concentration of productive capacity may be legitimate

hotelling s spatial competition as a model of sales abstract hotelling s spatial competition model is used to explain the existence of sales it is shown that 1 an equilibrium in randomized strategies exists when a pure strategy equilibrium fails to exist 2 with more dissimilarity among brands prices are chosen from a wider interval

competition of newspapers and the location of political parties in this paper we suggest a model for an analysis of how newspapers and political parties determine their ideological orientation and how both decisions depend on each other quite naturally dissemination of information plays an important role the model is set up as a two stage game because elements of horizontal as well as vertical product differentiation are present in this model location patterns in ideology space exhibit in general neither maximal nor minimal differentiation although we keep quite close to the downs model with information as the most important distinguishing feature furthermore the model shows by way of example that economic theory can be a useful tool to investigate issues which are central to communication science

a review on biogas technology and its contributions to sustainable rural livelihood in ethiopia abstract biogas technology has uneven dissemination over the globe the technology is at its infant stage of development and dissemination in many developing countries while china has the largest implementation record the principal factors controlling its dissemination include policies and institutions financial constraint subsidies availability of inputs awareness about the technology consumers considerations and success stories about the technology however biogas technology is a multipurpose technology which assists in addressing economic health social and environmental problems simultaneously thus development and dissemination of the technology certainly minimize energy poverty and improve peoples status in the energy ladder in line with this ethiopia has completed implementing the first phase 2009 2013 of its national biogas programme and has started implementing its second phase during the first phase it was able to disseminate 57 6 the total 14 000 domestic biogas plants planned for the period though the technology was introduced about five decades ago into the country biogas installations constructed prior to the establishment of the national biogas programme were having varied digester models lacked standards and central coordination and their entire number was not more than 1000 this paper reviews the status of dissemination of household biogas technology factors influencing the dissemination of the technology benefits of the technology at global scales energy resources consumption patterns and brief account of the technology at national scale ethiopia

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

price induced patterns of competition this research focuses on how price changes influence the observed pattern of brand competition the paper begins with a basic utility model formulation and examines the implications of three major classes of preference distributions on the expected patterns of competition a price tier model is proposed to operationalize the theory and to allow predictive testing the price tier model is estimated on 28 brands across four product categories the results show a specific asymmetric pattern of price competition higher price higher quality brands steal share from other brands in the same price quality tier as well as from brands in the tier below however lower price lower quality brands take sales from their own tier and the tier below brands but do not steal significant share from the tiers above the results are consistent with a bimodal preference distribution with the regular price indifference point being located toward the lower quality end of the preference distribution for the categories analyzed

discrete choice and variable returns to scale in previous studies of the probabilistic theory of qualitative choice e g marschak 1960 and mcfadden 1974 it has been assumed that an individual chooses among various alternatives with their utility levels independent of the number of individuals who choose each alternative there are however many examples in which the utility of a choice depends on the number of individuals who make the same choice for instance the utility of a given spatial choice may depend upon the number of others who choose neighboring locations neighborhood utility may decrease crowding or it may increase agglomerative economies with population size a second example is the automobile traveler s choice of routes the benefit of one route choice over another due to congestion depends on the number of drivers who choose the same route both of the examples suggested above deal with spatial choices of a particular kind but there are even examples from the more traditional macroeconomic theory one such example is of a product produced under variable returns to scale by a number of different sellers the price that each seller charges will depend upon the number of his customers if a buyer must choose to purchase from only one seller the price paid and thus utility will depend upon the total number of buyers choosing the same seller in all of the examples cited a reasonable model of choice is one that postulates uncertainty about the actual utility of each alternative the point of view is that a chooser s notional utility about each choice is a random variable in this case it is not certain which alternative will be chosen but the chosen alternative is the one with the greatest perceived utility it follows therefore that the probability that a given alternative is chosen is the probability that the utility perceived to be associated with it is larger than the utility perceived to be associated with any other alternative

investment in energy efficiency do the characteristics of firms matter the literature on energy efficiency provides numerous examples of apparently profitable technologies that are not universally adopted yet according to the standard neoclassical theory of investment profit maximizing firms should undertake all investments with a positive net present value the standard theory also holds that the discount rate for computing the present value of a project should be the return available on other projects in the same risk class and therefore should not depend on characteristics of the firm this model as applied to energy saving investments is tested by examining whether firms characteristics influence their decision to join the environmental protection agency s voluntary green lights program a discrete choice regression is estimated over a large sample of participating and nonparticipating firms missing values in the data matrix are replaced with multiple imputations from a distribution estimated using the expectation maximization algorithm the results show that 1 sub

taxes and agglomeration economies how are they related to nonprofit firm location author affiliation teresa d harrison department of economics drexel university 3141 chestnut street philadelphia pa 19104 usa tharrison drexel edu1 introductionnonprofits are an ever increasing component of the u s economy from 1997 2001 employment growth in the nonprofit sector averaged 2 5 outpacing both the business 1 8 and the government sectors 1 6 moore 2004 much of this growth stems from new nonprofits yet few studies have investigated possible determinants of nonprofit entry and location decisions most of these studies focus on demand side factors wolch and geiger 1983 downes and greenstein 1996 bielefeld murdoch and waddell 1997 for example downes and greenstein 1996 focus on demographic and religious characteristics of the surrounding community and its relation to private school location in this paper i use firm level data and focus on potentially important supply side variables tax rates and agglomeration economies most nonprofits are exempt from corporate sales and property taxes hansmann 1987 and gulley and santerre 1993 find evidence that higher corporate property and sales taxes are positively related to nonprofit market share however market share measures obfuscate the dynamics of the industry in terms of entry and exit rates if market share for nonprofits increases in response to higher tax rates this could be because new nonprofits are entering or because for profits are leaving the industry identifying these two cases is impossible with market share data using nonprofit tax return data i examine the relation between these tax exemptions and state county location decisions of new nonprofits to my knowledge this is the first paper to study these interactions at the individual firm level nonprofits also receive tax favored status due to the individual tax deduction on charitable contributions gentry and penrod 1998 employees of and donors to the nonprofits will be affected by the individual tax rates this in turn alters the costs to the nonprofit of location in a high or low tax area unlike previous studies i therefore investigate the relation between individual marginal tax rates and nonprofit location another potential supply side determinant of firm location decisions is the existing firm concentration in the area the potential economies of scale generated by proximity to other firms have been extensively examined in for profit industries 1 previous studies have generally found a positive relation between agglomeration and location carlton 1983 bartik 1985 woodward 1992 gius and frese 2002 rosenthal and strange 2003 to my knowledge bielefeld et al 2004 is the only study that examines nonprofit agglomeration finding evidence of agglomeration in dallas texas this warrants additional examination because nonprofit output is generally service driven and less mobile thus agglomeration implies greater direct competition making market saturation a larger issue in the nonprofit market using a nationwide dataset i examine how location and existing firm concentration are related and explore the potential presence of market saturation i also investigate possible differences between inter and intra industry agglomeration my results provide new insight into nonprofit firm behavior in most cases higher tax rates are associated with new firm location but the results for corporate and property taxes vary across the sample years i find that individual tax rates are an important consideration for nonprofits and are positively correlated to location my analysis also contributes to the literature by examining how the sensitivity to tax rates varies according to the sources of revenues for the institution firms that depend highly on individual donations are more likely to locate in high individual tax states while nonprofits with large mission related revenues are more sensitive to the property tax rate

cournot competition yields spatial agglomeration most theoretical models of spatial competition show a strong tendency toward spatial dispersion of firms yet common observations suggest that firms tend to agglomerate in this paper the authors show that competition between cournot type oligopolists that discriminate over space leads to spatial agglomeration one implication is that firms do not necessarily earn supernormal profits at the free entry equilibrium copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

testing competitive market structures an accurate understanding of the structure of competition is important in the formulation of many marketing strategies for example in new product launch product reformulation or positioning decisions the strategist wants to know which of his competitors will be most affected and hence most likely to respond many marketing science models have been proposed to identify market structure in this paper we examine the managerial problem and propose a criterion by which to judge an identified market structure basically our criterion is a quantification of the intuitive managerial criterion that a submarket is a useful conceptualization if it identifies which products are most likely to be affected by our marketing strategies we formalize this criterion within the structure of classical hypothesis testing so that a marketing scientist can use statistical statements to evaluate a market structure identified by 1 behavioral hypotheses 2 managerial intuition or 3 market structure identification algorithms mathematically our criterion is based on probabilities of switching to products in the situation where an individual s most preferred product is not available submarkets are said to exist when consumers are statistically more likely to buy again in that submarket than would be predicted based on an aggregate constant ratio model for example product attributes e g brand form size use situations e g coffee in the morning versus coffee at dinner and user characteristics e g heavy versus light users are specified as hypotheses for testing alternate competitive structures measurement and estimation procedures are described and a convergent approach is illustrated an application of the methodology to the coffee market is presented and managerial implications of six other applications are described briefly

the economics of product variety a survey demand for variety may arise from a taste for diversity in individual consumption and or from diversity in tastes even when each consumer chooses a single variant the full degree of variety potentially demanded will not in general be supplied because scale economies even to a small degree mean that the potential welfare or revenue gain from greater variety must be balanced against the lower unit production costs with fewer variants the economics of product variety consists essentially in analysing the effect of this balance in different situations and comparing the degree of product variety for different market structures with each other and with the optimum the survey commences with the work on market structures with single product firms generalized monopolistic competition tracing modern developments in both the chamberlinian and hotelling traditions the latter has been particularly fruitful due to the expansion of the original locational ideas into virtual spaces in product characteristics the emphasis in recent work on product variety has been on multiproduct firms in both monopolistic and oligopolistic structures including strategic market preemption although most work has been in a full information context there have been advances in product variety under imperfect information either by consumers to properties of the firms products or firms as to consumers demands

equilibrium vertical differentiation in a bertrand model with capacity precommitment both quality differentiation and capacity commitment have been shown to relax price competition however their joint influence on the outcome of price competition has not yet been assessed in this article we consider a three stage game in which firms choose quality then commit to capacity and finally compete in price when the cost of quality is negligible we show that firms do not differentiate their products in a subgame perfect equilibrium in other words capacity precommitment completely eliminates the incentive to differentiate by quality

the logit model of monopolistic competition brand diversity one of the important issues in the literature on monopolistic competition concerns whether the free entry equilibrium will provide sufficient variety of differentiated brands this paper examines variety issue using the logit choice model to capture brand differentiation the consumption value of each brand is drawn from the extreme value distribution and the consumer then purchases the brand with the highest value with the resulting demand structure the authors find that monopolistic competition results in two few firms and thus too few brands from the viewpoint of consumers this result supports the findings of other models with symmetrically differentiated brands copyright 1990 by blackwell publishing ltd

consumer heterogeneity and strategic quality decisions though recent studies show that quality differentiation is an equilibrium outcome products of similar qualities frequently are observed in the marketplace this inconsistency may be explained by incorporating consumer heterogeneity along unobservable attributes into a model of competition in this paper consumers not only take into account the quality and price of a product but also their heterogeneous tastes along other attributes which are unobservable to firms we investigate the effect of heterogeneity along the unobservable attributes on both quality and price equilibrium in a two stage game framework we show that when consumers are sufficiently heterogeneous along the unobservable attributes the firms offer products of identical qualities in equilibrium under low levels of heterogeneity along the unobservable attributes however our results are consistent with past research which argues for quality differentiation

minimal and maximal product differentiation in hotelling s duopoly abstract hotelling s 1929 model of duopolistic competition is re examined a family of utility functions is used which has as a special case hotelling s original utility function in a two stage location price game it is shown that an equilibrium exists when the curvature of the utility functions in the space of characteristics is sufficiently high the subgame perfect equilibrium never exhibits minimum product differentiation on the other hand not all equilibria are at maximal product differentiation

technology adoption subsidies an experiment with managers we evaluate the impact of technology adoption subsidies on investment behavior in an individual choice experiment in a laboratory setting professional managers are confronted with an intertemporal decision problem in which they have to decide whether or not to search for and possibly adopt a new technology technologies differ in the per period benefits they yield and their purchase price increases with the per period benefits provided we introduce a subsidy on the more expensive technologies that also yield larger per period benefits and find that the subsidy scheme induces agents to search for and adopt these more expensive technologies even though the subsidy itself is too small to render these technologies profitable we speculate that the result is driven by the positive connotation affect that the concept subsidy invokes

energy tax credits and residential conservation investment evidence from panel data using panel data on individual tax returns and variation in state tax policy we measure the impact of government tax policies to encourage residential conservation investment on the probability of making these investments unlike previous work we account for unobserved heterogeneity in tastes for energy saving activities and its possible correlation with tax policy at the state level we find that controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is very important based on our preferred point estimate of the tax price coefficient a 10 percentage point change in the tax price for energy investment would lead to a 24 percent increase in the probability of making an investment

economic search an experimental study this paper presents results of experiments designed to test several of the hypotheses present in the theoretical literature on optimal economic search first we test whether the subjects searchers actually search for wages in ways that are consistent with setting an optimal reservation wage we then proceed to determine experimentally the effects of risk aversion increased search costs changes in risk brought about by a mean preserving transformation of the distribution of wage offers the presence or absence of recall the existence of a finite horizon and the searcher s state of knowledge about the underlying distribution of wages in general we find that the searchers exhibit behavior that is consistent with that predicted by theory differences between risk neutral and risk averse searchers are found and the responses of both groups to changes in search costs in the degree of risk or in the state of knowledge are consistent with theoretical predictions

partial collusion fosters minimum product differentiation we investigate a spatial duopoly in which the firms simultaneously select locations at the beginning of time once chosen the locations are fixed forever but the firms will choose prices in each of a countably infinite succession of time periods we are interested in equilibrium behavior when the firms will collusively arrange a trigger strategy equilibrium in prices and will select their locations knowing that a particular such trigger strategy price equilibrium will ensue specifically we restrict our attention to prices that support an outcome on the profit possibility frontier at which the ratio of firm 1 s profits to those of firm 2 is positively related to the similar ratio of profits at the single shot noncooperative equilibrium for these profit sharing rules the resulting location equilibrium is unique and involves the pairing of firms at the market center

search and segregation abstract consumers willingness to pay for an identical product e g as caused by differences in local income or tastes may differ greatly across locations yet while a large literature examines consumers optimal price and product search behavior under various market configurations the equilibrium effects of such consumer segregation remain unexplored to this end i study a stylized model in which two local monopolistic markets differ in size and their consumers willingness to pay after observing their native market s price a subset of flexible consumers may travel to the other market at positive cost hoping for a bargain i show that as long as the proportion of flexible high valuation consumers is not too large active and directed search to the lower valuation market will occur in equilibrium if the higher valuation market is relatively large in size complex mixed strategy pricing emerges in equilibrium for regulators increasing the fraction of flexible consumers tends to be more effective than manipulating search costs

price discrimination and equilibrium in monopolistic competition modern theories of monopolistic competition have borrowed extensively from techniques developed in location theory and the theory of spatial pricing the monopolistically competitive firm is assumed to choose a location and price for its product a subject that has been of increasing concern in this corpus of theory is that there exists no free entry price location equilibrium in this paper we demonstrate that free entry price location equilibrium exists provided only that producers are allowed to price discriminate among customers in a reasonable manner equilibrium is modelled as a two stage game using the selten concept of subgame perfect nash equilibrium it is shown that the equilibrium discriminatory price system is one initially identified by hoover in addition we show that equilibrium is not unique the precise nature of equilibrium in a particular market will be dependent upon the history of that market

modelling demand for crude oil products in spain this paper develops an econometric model for the five most important crude oil products demand in spain the aim is the estimation of a range of elasticities of such demands that would serve as the basis for an applied general equilibrium model used for forecasting energy demand in a broader framework the main distinctive features of the system with respect to previous literature are i it takes advantage of monthly information coming from very different information sources and ii multivariate unobserved components uc models are implemented allowing for a separate analysis of long and short run relations uc models decompose time series into a number of unobserved though economic meaningful components mainly trend seasonal and irregular a module is added to such structure to take into account the influence of exogenous variables necessary to compute price cross and income elasticities since all models implemented are multivariate in nature the demand components are allowed to interact among them through the system noises similar to a seemingly unrelated equations model the results show unambiguously that the main factor driving demand is real income with prices having little impact on energy consumption

market research and innovation strategy in a duopoly we model a duopoly in which ex ante identical firms must decide where to direct their innovation efforts the firms face market uncertainty about consumers preferences for innovation on two product attributes and technology uncertainty about the success of their research and development r d investments firms can conduct costly market research before setting r d strategy we find that the value of market information to a firm depends on whether its rival is expected to obtain this information in equilibrium consequently one firm may forgo market research even though its rival conducts such research and learns the true state of demand we examine both vertical and horizontal demand structures with vertical preferences firms are a priori uncertain about which attribute all consumers will value more in this case a firm that conducts market research always attempts innovation on the attribute it discovers that consumers prefer and expends more on r d than a rival that has not conducted market research with horizontal preferences distinct segments exist each caring about innovation on only one attribute and firms are a priori uncertain how many consumers each segment contains in this case a firm that conducts market research may follow a niche strategy and attempt innovation to serve the smaller segment to avoid intense price competition for the larger segment a firm that conducts market research may therefore invest less in r d and earn lower postlaunch profits than a rival that has forgone such research

product differentiation with consumer arbitrage abstract we determine the equilibrium to a game where two firms set delivered price schedules and consumers simultaneously declare where they want to take delivery of the product equilibrium pricing policies provide incentives for consumers not to demand their preferred varieties but rather to purchase more standard varieties this behavior may decrease market diversity the demanded varieties tend to agglomerate around the market center we also show that it is efficient for the cost of adapting the product to consumers to be shared through arbitrage but oligopoly gives rise to an inefficient level of personal arbitrage

comparability and hierarchical processing in multialternative choice consumer choice research recently moved beyond brand based decisions to study the more noncomparable choices consumers often face noncomparable choice processing in choices involving multiple products is discussed in experiment 1 consumers used attribute based processing at an abstract level and alternative based processing at a concrete level to evaluate more noncomparable alternatives independent of choice set size in experiment 2 the choices from experiment 1 were compared with choices within which products varied in comparability the results suggest that comparability variance within a multialternative choice set facilitates consumers use of product categories and hierarchical processing to eliminate choice alternatives

product differences and prices abstract under assumptions following hotelling s 1929 paper stability in competition the possibility of constructing an example in which equilibrium prices exist everywhere and the two merchants display tendencies to agglomerate is ruled out

mass media competition political competition and public policy if better informed voters receive favourable policies then mass media will affect policy because mass media provide most of the information people use in voting this paper models the incentives of the media to deliver news to different groups the increasing returns to scale technology and advertising financing of media firms induce them to provide more news to large groups such as taxpayers and dispersed consumer interests and groups that are valuable to advertisers this news bias alters the tradeoff in political competition and therefore introduces a bias in public policy the paper also discusses the effects of broadcast media replacing newspapers as the main information source about politics the model predicts that this change should raise spending on government programmes used by poor and rural voters

where to locate in a circular city abstract we study the location choices by cournot oligopolists in a circular market where consumers are located uniformly along the circumference we analyze the subgame perfect nash equilibria spne of a two stage location quantity game we demonstrate that the equidistant location pattern is only one of the many equilibrium location patterns that arise in a circular market nonequidistant multiple or a continuum of location equilibria may also arise both spatial agglomeration and dispersion or a combination of agglomeration and dispersion may occur in equilibrium in the case of infinitely many location equilibria we establish the welfare equivalence of the equilibrium location patterns

cutting calories the preference for lower caloric density versus smaller quantities among restrained and unrestrained eaters the marketplace includes many attractive high calorie indulgent food offerings despite their appeal consumers may often be prompted to consider lower calorie package offerings instead e g 100

aggregation and imperfect competition on the existence of equilibrium we present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products the central result provides general conditions under which there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products this includes products with multi dimen sional attributes in addition to the proof of existence we provide conditions for uniqueness our analysis covers location models the characteristics approach and probabilistic choice together in a unified framework to prove existence we employ aggregation theorems due to prekopa 1971 and borell 1975 our companion paper caplin and nalebuff 1991 introduces these theorems and develops the application to super majority voting rules we present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products the central result is that there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products in addition to the proof of existence we provide conditions for uniqueness our model both unites diverse strands of the earlier literature and opens up uncharted areas for future analysis in particular we expand the traditional one dimensional framework to allow for multi dimen sional product differentiation our approach involves twin restrictions on consumer preferences one on individuals preferences the other on the distribution of preferences across society these are generalizations of the restrictions supporting 64 majority rule presented in caplin and nalebuff 1988 to prove existence we apply a new technique of aggregation this technique is valuable in a variety of other problems in the companion paper we use the aggregation result to generalize our earlier work on 64 majority rule and to characterize the relationship between the distribution of human capital and the distribution of income caplin and nalebuff 1991 there are additional applications in statistics and in search theory we begin with a brief review of the early literature on imperfect competition describing in more detail the existence problem and previous solutions section 3 presents our twin assumptions and shows that they cover many standard cases in section 4 we introduce the aggregation theorem and use it in the analysis of demand functions the proof of existence of equilibrium is in section

two stage perfect equilibrium in hotelling s model hotelling i 929 suggests that his spatial competition model can be used to describe a wide range of differentiation problems he points to the selection of product variety within an industry as a potential application most of the subsequent work in his tradition has taken the equivalence of the two problems for granted in this note we look more closely at this equivalence we distinguish between two types of differentiated products according to the variety of preferences assumed with respect to those products building on this distinction we recognize that the demand faced by a firm locating on hotelling s line is analogous to the demand faced by a firm selecting a horizontally differentiated product it should be emphasized thus that the equivalence between the geographical and the product selection problem is by no means general and relies on specific assumptions about consumers preferences next we formulate a small model close to hotelling s one in which firms select a horizontally differentiated product within this model it will be shown that a pure strategy price equilibrium exists for every pair of products this statement is to be contrasted with the results of d aspremont et al i979 who have shown that in the original hotelling s setting an equilibrium fails to exist when firms are too close together 1 in addition we will examine the product selection problem faced by firms in a two stage game in the first stage each firm selects a product in the second stage the firm defines a price for its product we will seek the existence of a perfect equilibrium in this game a perfect equilibrium in this context can be viewed as a nash equilibrium in a game in which firms select a product aware of the non cooperative price equilibrium that will occur for each of their choices it will be shown that contrary to hotelling s principle the two firms will maximise their differentiation i e firms will locate at opposite ends of the market

delivered pricing fob pricing and collusion in spatial markets in this situation the choice variable for the firm is a price system that specifies a price per unit of product at each location each firm must choose a function p x where x is the distance between the location of the consumer and the location of the firm in practice different industries use different types of pricing systems p x and this suggests that the prevailing pricing system depends on the structural elements of the market when the pricing policy is fob consumers can pick up the product at the mill paying the mill price p and incurring the transportation cost from the producer s to the consumer s location i e p x p t x or the seller may deliver the good to the buyer s location as long as it charges mill price plus transportation costs delivered pricing policies are pricing rules p x that are not based on consumers picking up the product at the mill the firm delivers the product at the consumer s location in a perfectly competitive world with a continuum of firms an fob pricing system would be expected p x c t x where c is the marginal cost of production in the case of a market with two firms located at the

on the strategic choice of spatial price policy the strategic incentives with respect to the choice of price policy in spatial competition are analyzed in a duopoly model price discrimination emerges as the unique equilibriu m outcome in games with either simultaneous choice of policy and pric e or sequential choice where firms may commit first to uniform mill p ricing before the actual market stage nevertheless profits may be h igher with uniform pricing the authors models are applied to analyz e some common business practices that arise in geographical pricing like the basing point system and in the pricing of varieties or opti ons from a base product in a product differentiation context copyright 1988 by american economic association

competition of firms discriminatory pricing and location1 two costlessly mobile firms are to be located in a market region a subset of the plane the firms compete by setting locations and delivered price schedules to study this competitive stiuation an appropriate extensive form game is defined along with an appropri ate noncooperative solution concept existence and general properties of the equilibrium are demonstrated among the results are each firm increases its profit by locating so as to decrease total cost to both firms of serving the market firms will never locate coinciden tally if they have identical production costs and transport cost rates or if these are different and the firms are located in a circular market region having a uniform demand distribution this paper studies competition between two profit maximizing firms in space who are costlessly mobile and may discriminate in price we will allow the firms to set locations and delivered price schedules and we will be concerned with the existence and properties of equilibria in location and price starting with hotelling 9 the spatial competition literature has focused on location on bounded linear markets by two or more firms hotelling assumed identical firms that produced a single good with constant cost of production and considered consumers to be uniformly distributed and to have inelastic demand he also assumed that the consumers pay transport cost and purchase the good from the cheapest source hotelling claimed that a nash equilibrium in locations for the two firm market existed and yielded back to back locations at the center of the market many authors most recently d aspremont gabszewicz and thisse 2 have noted that an equilbrium in prices and location does not exist for hotelling s model however if the firms employ identical exogeneously specified prices hotelling s conclusions hold subsequent work by smithies 14 hartwick and hartwick 7 and eaton 3 claimed to show that a nash equi librium in f o b prices and locations can exist in markets with a uniform distribu tion of consumers each of whom have identical elastic demand functions for the two and three firm problems the work of d aspremont et al casts doubt on these conclusions without the adoption of restrictive conditions our work contrasts with these works and related research which has dealt with linear markets with uniform distributions of customers and with identical firms our work will involve markets that are subsets of the plane having nonuniform distributions of customers our firms will be allowed to be different that is have differences in production and transport costs however the fundamental difference in our approach is that our firms will set discriminatory prices and not price f o b in many ways our work will represent the discriminatory pricing

bertrand equilibrium in a differentiated duopoly this paper studies the stability of price competition in a horizontally differentiated duopoly the firms demand is derived from a distribution of consumer preferences this description of the consumer sector is applicable to a large class of differentiated commodity markets including spatial competition models the author shows that there is a pure price setting equilibrium when consumer tastes are sufficiently dispersed further conditions on the dispersedness of preferences guarantee uniqueness of the equilibrium in addition the author examines the relation between consumer preferences and the competitiveness and efficiency of the equilibrium outcome copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association