are higher education subsidies second best an optimal taxation framework is considered in which part of the population can take advantage of investment in higher education it is shown that social welfare can sometimes be increased by supplementing linear income taxes with a subsidy to material investment in higher education but that social welfare can never be increased by supplementing a nonlinear income tax with such a subsidy

consumer protection and contingent charges contingent charges for financial services such as fees for unauthorized overdrafts are often controversial we study the economics of contingent charges in a stylized setting with naive and sophisticated consumers we contrast situations where the naive benefit from the presence of sophisticated consumers with situations where competition works to subsidize the sophisticated at the expense of the naive arguably unfairly the case for regulatory intervention in these situations depends in good part but not only on the weight placed on distributional concerns the economic and legal issues at stake are well illustrated by a case on bank charges recently decided by the u k supreme court jel d14 d18 g21 g28 l51

a minimum wage can be welfare improving and employment enhancing abstract we examine whether minimum wages can fulfill a useful role as part of an optimal tax transfer scheme the government cannot observe household abilities only their incomes and is constrained to ensure that those working are at least as well off as those not working a minimum wage combined with the institutional features of typical welfare systems allows the incentive constraint to be severed at the ability level associated with the minimum wage if such a scheme can be enforced the government can increase the amount of redistribution from those working to those not working and possibly lower the number of unemployed

bonus culture competitive pay screening and multitasking to analyze the impact of labor market competition on the structure of compensation we embed multitasking and screening within a hotelling framework competition for talent leads to an escalation of performance pay shifting effort away from long term investments risk management and cooperation efficiency losses can exceed those from a single principal who dulls incentives to extract rents as competition intensifies monopsonistic underincentivization of low skill agents first decreases and then gives way to growing overincentivization of high skill ones aggregate welfare is thus hill shaped while inequality tends to rise monotonically bonus caps can help restore balance in incentives but may generate other distortions

the ramsey problem for congestible facilities abstract in recent years a new set of models drawing on vickrey 1969 has been developed to analyze the economics of congestible facilities these models are structural in that they derive the cost function from consumers time of use decisions and the congestion technology standard models in contrast simply assume the general form of the cost function we apply the new approach to analyze the ramsey problem for a congestible facility and show that the solution generally entails cost inefficiency standard models have failed to reveal this result because they treat the cost function as completely determined by technology

equity and efficiency in public sector pricing a case for stochastic rationing a view still widely held among economists is that given the objective of maximizing a paretian social welfare function rationing of private goods is inferior to transfers and subsidies hence existing rationing e g in housing programs involving rent regulation subsidized medical treatment to needy individuals distribution of day care for children according to need etc is often interpreted as a reflection of paternalistic objectives on the part of the government or simply as bad policy see tobin 1970 the purpose of this paper is to challenge the general validity of this conventional wisdom in the context of a traditional model of public sector pricing supplemented by an anonymous rationing scheme which affects individuals consumption patterns significantly as is often the case a government cannot achieve distributional equity i e situations where the social value of marginal utility of income is equal for all individuals by means of taxes and transfers because the use of these instruments is subject to various constraints this is a common feature of many taxation models cf atkinson and stiglitz 1980 from a purely technical point of view there is scope for improving on social welfare in such situations by means of other measures such as rationing but since the use of rationing as well as taxes and transfers is likely to be restricted by the same underlying factors e g information about consumers preferences and endowments or administrative costs it may be questioned whether rationing qualifies as an efficient policy instrument the type of rationing considered in this paper is stochastic rationing when prices are set at levels which generate excess demand some of the potential consumers are randomly barred from the markets entirely so that demand equals supply from the point of view of implementation such a rationing scheme has the desirable property of not requiring the government to have information about preferences and endowments at the individual consumer level nor is extensive administration required another interesting aspect of such a scheme is that in a sense it represents a lower bound on rationing schemes since in most cases actual rationing can be based on some information about consumers therefore if there are cases where a market clearing equilibrium can be improved upon by reducing prices below market clearing levels combined with elimination of excess demand by means of stochastic rationing the argument for rationing as a potentially efficient policy tool is in fact fairly strong in this paper we show that such cases do exist we also indicate that stochastic rationing may still be efficient even in situations where prices can be highly differentiated among different groups of individuals e g income groups we conclude that the absence of costless redistribution of income which indeed seems to be consistent with real world situations is crucial for the results two kinds of policy changes are considered the first involves eliminating a marginal excess demand by means of rationing in the model in this paper there is a continuum of consumers therefore while such a marginal rationing affects some consumers in a nonmarginal fashion it only affects an infinitesimal group of consumers hence it only

taxes redistribution and the minimum wage a theoretical analysis this paper considers a simple general equilibrium model that contains two types of workers with differing levels of ability and a social welfare maximizing government the paper shows that social welfare can sometimes be increased by supplementing an optimal linear income tax with a minimum wage but that social welfare can never be increased by supplementing an optimal nonlinear income tax with a minimum wage

commitment flexibility and optimal screening of time inconsistency this paper develops a theory of optimal provision of commitment devices to people who value both commitment and flexibility and whose preferences differ in the degree of time inconsistency if time inconsistency is observable both a planner and a monopolist provide devices that help each person commit to the efficient level of flexibility however the combination of unobservable time inconsistency and preference for flexibility causes an adverse selection problem to solve this problem the monopolist and possibly the planner curtail flexibility in the device for a more inconsistent person at both ends of the efficient choice range moreover they may have to add unused options to the device for a less inconsistent person and also distort his actual choices this theory has normative and positive implications for private and public provision of commitment devices

financing for climate change abstract this paper argues that the 2009 pledge of 100 billion in 2020 by rich countries for mitigation and adaptation should not be used for mitigation by commercial firms in developing countries since that would artificially create competitive advantage for such firms and provoke protectionist reactions in the rich countries where firms must bear the costs of mitigation thereby undermining the world trading system the costs of heating the earth s surface should be borne by all emitters just as the price of copper and other scarce resources is paid by all users rich or poor that will still leave scope for rich country help in adaptation to climate change and in bringing to fruition new technologies to reduce emissions

price competition under limited comparability this paper studies market competition when firms can influence consumers ability to compare market alternatives through their choice of price formats we introduce random graphs as a tool for modelling limited comparability of formats our main results concern the interaction between firms equilibrium price and format decisions and its implications for industry profits and consumer switching rates we show that narrow regulatory interventions that aim to facilitate comparisons may have adverse consequences for consumer welfare finally we argue that our limited comparability approach provides a new perspective into the phenomenon of product differentiation

tariffs quotas and piecemeal policy reform abstract this paper extends recent results on the welfare implications of piecemeal tariff adjustments to include cases where the initial trade distortions involve both tariffs and quotas it shows that the standard prescriptions for piecemeal tariff reform are largely unaffected by the presence of unalterable quotas on other goods prescriptions for piecemeal quota reform are also derived although they are constrained by the presence of unalterable tariffs

tax incidence when individuals are time inconsistent the case of cigarette excise taxes abstract one of the most cogent criticisms of excise taxes is their regressivity with lower income groups spending a much larger share of their income on goods such as cigarettes than do higher income groups we argue that traditional quantity based measures of incidence are only appropriate under a very restrictive time consistent model of consumption of sin goods a model that is much more consistent with existing evidence on smoking decisions is a time inconsistent formulation where excise taxes on cigarettes serve a self control function that is valued by smokers who would like to quit but cannot this self control function benefits lower income groups more since they have a significantly higher price sensitivity of smoking calibrations show that as a result cigarette taxes are much less regressive than previously assumed and are even progressive for a wide variety of parameter values

topping up or opting out the optimal design of public provision schemes there is extensive public provision of private goods in all developed countries the public provision scheme is often designed so that individuals can opt out but not top up supplement the publicly provided quantity quality using an optimal income ta

non hbox co _2 co 2 generating energy shares in the world cross country differences and polarization the aim of this paper is to examine the spatial distribution of non hbox co 2 generating energy sources in the world for the period 1990 2009 paying special attention to the evolution of cross country disparities to this end after carrying out a classical convergence analysis a more thorough investigation of the entire distribution is presented by examining its external shape the intra distribution dynamics and the long run equilibrium distribution this analysis reveals the existence of a weak rather insignificant convergence process and that large cross country differences are likely to persist in the long run next as polarization indicators are a proper way of appraising potential conflict in international environmental negotiations we test whether or not the distribution dynamics concurs with the presence of polarization our results indicate that two poles can be clearly differentiated one with high and other with low non hbox co 2 generating energy shares in view of these findings and to ensure a fair transition to a sustainable energy system the paper calls for the development of an ambitious clean energy agenda especially in countries with low non hbox co 2 generating energy shares

viewpoint innovations in the theory and practice of redistribution policy we present a survey of key results from second best optimal redistribution theory and their implications for tax transfer policy the core results include the corlett hague theorem the deaton conditions the production efficiency theorem the atkinson stiglitz theorem and the mirrlees saez characterization of the optimal non linear income tax system these have been augmented in recent years by optimal participation tax rates the implications of involuntary unemployment the use of unconventional instruments such as minimum wages in kind transfer and workfare and the optimal taxation of capital income and bequests l auteur presente un survol des principaux resultats theoriques de la redistribution optimale de second ordre et de leurs implications pour les politiques d imposition et de transferts les resultats fondamentaux incluent le theoreme de corlett hague les conditions de deaton les theoremes d efficacite en production le theoreme d atkinson stiglitz ainsi que la caracterisation du systeme optimal d imposition non lineaire du revenu a la mirrlees saez ces derniers resultats ont ete enrichis au cours des dernieres annees par certains autres portant sur les taux d imposition decoulant des allocations conditionnelles les implications du chomage involontaire l usage d instruments non conventionnels tels que le salaire minimum les transferts en nature le workfare ainsi que l imposition optimale des revenus du capital et des legs ces resultats sont exposes et leurs implications pour les politiques d imposition et de transferts sont discutees

equity and efficiency in rationed labor markets the social welfare implications of income tax policy are shown to critically depend on whether or not labor markets are rationed i e on the existence of involuntary unemployment with rationed labor markets raising taxes on the employed and transfers to the unemployed might improve both equity and efficiency it improves equity by redistributing income from the employed to the unemployed it improves efficiency as it encourages people with a small utility surplus of employment to exit the labor market leaving their jobs for people with a higher utility surplus i derive conditions under which this result continues to hold when only part of the labor market is rationed when there is both frictional and rationing unemployment and when rationing endogenously follows from trade unions monopoly power

taxes and employment subsidies in optimal redistribution programs this paper explores how to optimally set taxes and transfers when taxation authorities 1 are uninformed about individuals value of time in both market and non market activities and 2 can observe both market income and time allocated to market employment we show that optimal redistribution in this environment involves distorting market employment upwards for low wage individuals through decreasing wage contingent employment subsidies and distorting employment downwards for high wage individuals through positive and increasing marginal income tax rates in particular we show that whether a person is taxed or subsidized depends primarily on his wage with the optimal program involving a cut off wage whereby workers above the cutoff are taxed as they increase their income while workers earning a wage below the cutoff receive an income supplement as they increase their income finally we show that the optimal program transfers zero income to individuals who choose not to work

minimum wage legislation and unemployment insurance as instruments for redistribution the use of minimum wages and unemployment insurance as instruments for redistributing income is analyzed the government is assumed to be able to implement an optimal income tax in an economy consisting of two types of individuals who differ in ability the effect of introducing a minimum wage which induces involuntary unemployment will be to improve social welfare under weak conditions circumstances under which combining unemployment insurance with the minimum wage will be welfare improving are also considered

pareto price discrimination abstract as the collection of consumer data becomes more common online merchants are better equipped to price discriminate now more than ever before while standard first degree price discrimination benefits merchants and harms consumers relative to uniform pricing i derive an alternative first degree pricing strategy that achieves efficiency and pareto improves upon the uniform pricing equilibrium furthermore i show that price ceilings can enforce these pareto price discrimination strategies making pareto price discrimination a viable option for merchants and policy makers

optimal redistribution with productive social services publicly provided private goods are conventionally considered consumer goods departing from this perspective we analyze the public provision of inputs that improve household productivity e g education and childcare in a two class economy with distorting taxation public provision is always welfare improving with respect to pure taxation given that the public input directly affects household productivity moreover the case for public provision strengthens as households heterogeneity in input demand fades out contrary to consolidated results in the literature the features of optimal provision schemes depend on the nature of publicly provided input namely if it substitutes household productive capacity or just helps households to exploit it

monopoly price discrimination and demand curvature this paper presents a general analysis of the eects of monopolistic third degree price discrimination on welfare and output when all markets are served su cient conditions involving straightforward comparisons of the curvatures of the direct and inverse demand functions in the dierent mar kets are presented for discrimination to have negative or positive eects on

large cash transfers to the elderly in south africa we examine the social pension in south africa where large cash sums about twice the median per capita income of african households are paid to people qualified by age but irrespective of previous contributions we present the history of the scheme and use a 1993 nationally representative survey to investigate the redistributive consequences of the transfers documenting who receive the pensions their levels of living and those of their families we also look at behavioural effects particularly the effects of the cash receipts on the allocation of income to food schooling transfers and savings in south africa a large social pension about twice the median per capita income of african households is paid in cash to people qualified by age irrespective of previous contributions we present the history of the scheme and explain how such large transfers could come about in an economy in which the recipients were not only politically weak but without any political representation whatsoever we then use a 1993 nationally representative survey to investigate the redistributive consequences of the transfers documenting who receive the pensions their levels of living and those of their families we also look at behavioural effects particularly the effects of the cash receipts on the allocation of income to food schooling transfers and savings the pressing policy issue for south africans is whether it makes sense to target seven billion rand nearly 2 billion of social expenditure through the current pension schemes our analysis contributes to the discussion by documenting the redistributive and behavioural effects of the transfers we find that at least as far as immediate incidence is concerned and without allowance for behavioural effects the social pension is an effective tool of redistribution and that the households it reaches are predominantly poor because so many of the elderly among south africa s african population live with children the social pension is also effective in putting money into house

on the optimality of a minimum wage new insights from optimal tax theory we build a theoretical model to study whether a minimum wage can be welfare improving if it is implemented in conjunction with an optimized nonlinear income tax we consider this issue in a framework where search frictions on the labor market generate unemployment workers differ in productivity the government does not observe workers productivity but only their wages hence the redistributive policy solves an adverse selection problem we show that a minimum wage is optimal if the bargaining power of the workers is relatively low however if the government controls the bargaining power then it is preferable to set a sufficiently high bargaining power

addiction and cue triggered decision processes we propose a model of addiction based on three premises 1 use among addicts is frequently a mistake 2 experience sensitizes an individual to environmental cues that trigger mistaken usage 3 addicts understand and manage their susceptibilities we argue that these premises find support in evidence from psychology neuroscience and clinical practice the model is tractable and generates a plausible mapping between behavior and the characteristics of the user substance and environment it accounts for a number of important patterns associated with addiction gives rise to a clear welfare standard and has novel implications for policy

is a minimum wage an appropriate instrument for redistribution textabstractwe analyze the redistributional dis advantages of a minimum wage over income taxation in competitive labor markets without imposing assumptions on the in efficiency of labor rationing compared to a distributionally equivalent tax change a minimum wage increase raises involuntary unemployment but also raises skill formation as some individuals avoid unemployment a minimum wage is an appropriate instrument for redistribution if and only if the public revenue gains from additional skill formation outweigh both the public revenue losses from additional unemployment and the utility losses of inefficient labor rationing we show that this critically depends on how labor rationing is distributed among workers a necessary condition for the desirability of a minimum wage increase is that the public revenue gains from higher skill formation outweigh the revenue losses from higher unemployment we write this condition in terms of measurable sufficient statistics our empirical analysis suggests that a minimum wage increase is undesirable in nearly all oecd countries a reduction in the minimum wage along with tax adjustments that keep net incomes constant would yield a pareto improvement

consistency of higher order risk preferences risk aversion a second order risk preference is a time proven concept in economic models of choice under risk more recently the higher order risk preferences of prudence third order and temperance fourth order also have been shown to be quite important while a majority of the population seems to exhibit both risk aversion and these higher order risk preferences a significant minority does not we show how both risk averse and risk loving behaviors might be generated by a simple type of basic lottery preference for either 1 combining good outcomes with bad ones or 2 combining good with good and bad with bad respectively we further show that this dichotomy is fairly robust at explaining higher order risk attitudes in the laboratory in addition to our own experimental evidence we take a second look at the extant laboratory experiments that measure higher order risk preferences and we find a fair amount of support for this dichotomy our own experiment also is the first to look beyond fourth order risk preferences and we examine risk attitudes at even higher orders

nonlinear income taxation and matching grants in a federation with decentralized in kind transfers we extend to a fiscal federalism setting the literature on redistributive in kind transfers in the presence of nonlinear income taxation local governments have a cost advantage motivating decentralization of the in kind transfer the cost structure varies across regions and the central government cannot observe which region is which we show that decentralized in kind transfers can in this setting be an even more important instrument for relaxing self selection constraints thus helping redistribution than in single government models we characterize the optimal marginal tax rates and matching grants the grants have a very different structure than the one derived in earlier studies

optimal minimum wage policy in competitive labor markets this paper provides a theoretical analysis of optimal minimum wage policy in a perfectly competitive labor market and obtains two key results first we show that a binding minimum wage while leading to unemployment is nevertheless desirable if the government values redistribution toward low wage workers and if unemployment induced by the minimum wage hits the lowest surplus workers first importantly this result remains true in the presence of optimal nonlinear taxes and transfers in that context a binding minimum wage enhances the effectiveness of transfers to low skilled workers as it prevents low skilled wages from falling through incidence effects second when labor supply re sponses are along the extensive margin only the co existence of a minimum wage with a positive tax rate on low skilled work is always second best pareto ineffcient a pareto improving policy consists of reducing the pre tax minimum wage while keeping constant the post tax minimum wage by increasing transfers to low skilled workers and financing this reform by increasing taxes on higher paid workers overall our results imply that the minimum wage and subsidies for low skilled workers are complementary policies pa

shrouded attributes consumer myopia and information suppression in competitive markets bayesian consumers infer that hidden add on prices e g the cost of ink for a printer are likely to be high prices if consumers are bayesian firms will not shroud information in equilibrium however shrouding may occur in an economy with some myopic or unaware consumers such shrouding creates an inefficiency which firms may have an incentive to eliminate by educating their competitors customers however if add ons have close substitutes a curse of debiasing arises and firms will not be able to profitably debias consumers by unshrouding add ons in equilibrium two kinds of exploitation coexist optimizing firms exploit myopic consumers through marketing schemes that shroud high priced add ons in turn sophisticated consumers exploit these marketing schemes it is not possible to profitably drive away the business of sophisticates it is also not possible to profitably lure either myopes or sophisticates to nonexploitative firms we show that informational shrouding flourishes even in highly competitive markets even in markets with costless advertising and even when the shrouding generates allocational inefficiencies

redistribution and employment policies with endogenous unemployment abstract we study optimal redistribution policy in an economy with three types of unemployed persons those unable to work the voluntarily unemployed and the involuntarily unemployed both voluntary and involuntary unemployment are endogenous voluntary unemployment arises because individuals have different preferences while involuntary unemployment results from frictions in the labour market or from an efficiency wage we consider the employment policies of a well informed government when it can and cannot commit to its policies the model is simple yet rich enough to reflect real world policies including transfers to the disabled welfare for non working employables unemployment insurance employment subsidies and taxes on workers and firms

targeting transfers through restrictions on recipients our objective is to design transfer programs that maximize some social welfare function following the optimal income tax formulation we assume that a random process endows individuals with characteristics that influence welfare such as ability to earn income medical condition or unmonitorable income the goal is to maximize the utility of a randomly chosen individual other individualistic social welfare functions would lead to equivalent results if the random characteristics were observable a first best outcome could be achieved by making them the basis for lump sum transfers in practice however we can observe only indicators of these characteristics such as earnings medical expenditures or consumption patterns the challenge for policy is to design an efficient second best transfer program based on indicators in this paper we argue that 1 an optimal transfer program in general must sacrifice productive efficiency to target efficiency this is done by imposing restrictions on the choices made by intended beneficiaries 2 a program that incorporates restrictions such as means tested in kind transfers commodity specific taxes and subsidies and even ordeals i e the imposition of deadweight costs to qualify for a transfer will perform better than programs that rely solely on income taxes and cash transfers

in kind transfers cash grants and the supply of labour abstract this paper corrects the notion that somehow benefits given in kind interfere less with the work leisure choice than cash grants of equivalent monetary value in a simple model the analysis proves that the true effect depends on the extent of the in kind transfer and the substitutability of the good in question with leisure

life insurance and life settlement markets with overconfident policyholders abstract we analyze how the life settlement market the secondary market for life insurance may affect consumer welfare in a dynamic equilibrium model of life insurance with one sided commitment and overconfident policyholders in our model policyholders may lapse their life insurance policies when they lose their bequest motives however they are overconfident in the sense that they may underestimate the probability of losing their bequest motives we show that in the competitive equilibrium without life settlement overconfident consumers will buy life insurance contracts with too much reclassification risk insurance for later periods the life settlement market can impose a limit on the extent to which primary insurers can exploit overconfident consumers we show that the life settlement market may increase the equilibrium consumer welfare of overconfident consumers when they are sufficiently vulnerable in the sense that they have a sufficiently large intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption our result is robust to alternative specifications where i insurers cannot observe the subjective or objective probability that policyholders will lose their bequest motives ii insurers can include health contingent cash surrender values csvs in the life insurance contract and iii policyholders underestimate their future mortality risk

from green growth to sound policies an overview abstract green growth is an attractive slogan with a variety of possible meanings this essay critically examines several potential meanings of this slogan and provides a brief overview of some of the main implications of the other papers in this special issue taken together these papers argue for the importance of careful analysis of energy environmental policies particularly ambitious ones claiming to offer huge benefits with little or no cost

optimal redistributive taxation in a search equilibrium model this paper characterizes optimal non linear income taxation in an economy with a continuum of unobservable productivity levels and endogenous involuntary unemployment due to frictions in the labour markets redistributive taxation distorts labour demand and wages compared to their efficient values gross wages unemployment and participation are lower average tax rates are increasing marginal tax rates are positive even at the top finally numerical simulations suggest that redistribution is much more important in our setting than in a comparable mirrlees type setting

minimum wage legislation as a second best policy mass unemployment is a striking phenomenon of the present economic situation of european market economies although the profession of economists has been criticized for not providing satisfactory cures it has produced a number of different explanations either complementary or contradictory for the occurrence of mass unemployment in this paper we examine the argument that unemployment is the consequence of minimum wage legislation which is socially desirable the observation of current wage legislations suggests that the above argument is broadly at least partly accepted by policy makers curiously enough a defence of this argument meeting the rigorous requirements of modern theory seems to be missing symmetrically attacks against minimum wage legislation often rely upon reasonings of dubious relevance i e the obvious remark that unemployment is a waste with first best efficiency criteria the present paper proposes a second best analysis where second best stems from informational asymmetries which prevent the implementation of lump sum transfers needed for a first best redistribution policy the question under scrutiny can be reformulated in a more precise way as follows does a second best optimal redistribution policy lead to minimum wage legislation and unemployment our elements of answer are gathered in 3 sections in section 2 the principles of the analysis of the desirability of quantity controls and existing results are recalled in section 3 the analysis of section 2 is specified to a simple prototype model for the study of linear income taxation in section 4

the timing of choice enhancing policies abstract recent studies investigate policies motivating consumers to make an active choice as a way to protect unsophisticated consumers we analyze the optimal timing of such choice enhancing policies when a firm can strategically react to them in the model a firm provides a contract with automatic renewal we show that a policy intending to enhance consumers choices when they choose a contract can be detrimental to welfare by contrast a choice enhancing policy at the time of contract renewal increases welfare more robustly our results highlight that policies should be targeted in timing to the actual choice inefficiency

is it legitimate to encourage work sharing a generalization of mirrlees income taxation model is formulated in which qualifications of workers are both endogenous and observable by the government individuals differ by their unobservable abilities which simultaneously affect their disutility of labor and their cost of training in general the optimal tax schedule depends not only on income but also on its components i e wage rate or qualification and labor supply we find conditions under which it is optimal to subsidize lower qualifications or to encourage work sharing

choice and procrastination author s o donoghue ted rabin matthew abstract recent models of procrastination due to self control problems assume that a procrastinator considers just one option and is unaware of her self control problems we develop a model where a person chooses from a menu of options and is partially aware of her self control problems this menu model replicates earlier results and generates new ones a person might forego completing an attractive option because she plans to complete a more attractive but never to be completed option hence providing a non procrastinator additional options can induce procrastination and a person may procrastinate worse pursuing important goals than unimportant ones

cellular service demand biased beliefs learning and bill shock by april 2013 the fcc s recent bill shock agreement with cellular carriers requires consumers be notied when exceeding usage allowances will the agreement help or hurt consumers to answer this question we estimate a model of consumer plan choice usage and learning using a panel of cellular bills our model predicts that the agreement will lower average consumer welfare by 2 per year because rms will respond by raising monthly fees our approach is based on novel evidence that consumers are inattentive to past usage meaning that bill shock alerts are informative and advances structural modeling of demand in situations where multipart taris induce marginal price uncertainty additionally our model estimates show that an

consumer inattention and bill shock regulation for many goods and services such as electricity health care cellular phone service debit card transactions or those sold with loyalty discounts the price of the next unit of service depends on past usage as a result consumers who are inattentive to their past usage but are aware of contract terms may remain uncertain about the price of the next unit i develop a model of inattentive consumption derive equilibrium pricing when consumers are inattentive and evaluate bill shock regulation requiring firms to disclose information that substitutes for attention when inattentive consumers are sophisticated but heterogeneous in their expected demand bill shock regulation reduces social welfare in fairly competitive markets which may be the effect of the federal communication commission s recent bill shock agreement if some consumers are attentive while others naively fail to anticipate their own inattention however then bill shock regulation increases social welfare and can benefit consumers hence requiring zero balance alerts in addition to the federal reserve s new opt in rule for debit card overdraft protection may benefit consumers

price discrimination in input markets quantity discounts and private information we consider a monopolistic supplier s optimal choice of wholesale tariffs when downstream firms are privately informed about their retail costs under discriminatory pricing downstream firms that differ in their ex ante distribution of retail costs are offered different tariffs under uniform pricing the same wholesale tariff is offered to all downstream firms in contrast to the extant literature on price discrimination with nonlinear wholesale tariffs we find that banning discriminatory wholesale contracts often improves welfare this also holds if the manufacturer is not an unconstrained monopolist moreover uniform pricing increases downstream investments in cost reduction in the long run

naivete based discrimination we initiate the study of naivete based discrimination the practice of conditioning offers on external information about consumers naivete knowing that a consumer is naive increases a monopolistic or competitive firm s willingness to generate inefficiency to exploit the consumer s mistakes so naivete based discrimination is not pareto improving can be pareto damaging and often lowers total welfare when classical preference based discrimination does not moreover the effect on total welfare depends on a hitherto unemphasized market feature the extent to which the exploitation of naive consumers distorts trade with different types of consumers if the distortion is homogeneous across naive and sophisticated consumers then under an arguably weak and empirically testable condition naivete based discrimination lowers total welfare in contrast if the distortion arises only for trades with sophisticated consumers then perfect naivete based discrimination maximizes social welfare although imperfect discrimination often lowers welfare if the distortion arises only for trades with naive consumers then naivete based discrimination has no effect on welfare we identify applications for each of these cases in our primary example a credit market with present biased borrowers firms lend more than is socially optimal to increase the amount of interest naive borrowers unexpectedly pay creating a homogeneous distortion the condition for naivete based discrimination to lower welfare is then weaker than prudence

market size and substitutability in imperfect competition a bertrand edgeworth chamberlin model competition is often associated with the idea that there are many traders in the market or that each price maker is small as compared to the market this paper introduces this notion of market size in a model of price competition with imperfect substitutes by constructing a model which creates a bridge between the chamberlin and bertrand edge worth lines of work on price competition we investigate the role of two fundamental parameters in the existence of an equilibrium the market size given by the number n of competitors and the degree of substitutability we prove that a for a given number of n 2 of competitors a sufficiently large but finite degree of substitutability entails nonexistence this thus generalizes the bertrand edgeworth nonexistence result which applies only to perfect substitutes b conversely for a given upper bound on the degree of substitutability a sufficiently large number of competitors ensures existence which thus introduces a significant role for market size in models of imperfect competition we finally investigate the proximity of an equilibrium when it exists to a competitive outcome and we find that both high substitutability and large market size are a condition for competitiveness

unemployment and labor market reform a contract theoretic approach why do many democracies fail to reform their labor market institutions to answer this question we study the feasibility of reforms that include compensation to insiders for the removal of labor market regulations under asymmetric information a reformer who wants to buy the approval of voters has to pay them an informational rent in addition to the pure costs of compensation that would arise under symmetric information in this setting unemployment may be constrained pareto efficient labor market reforms may fail politically because none of the reform packages proposed wins the approval of a majority of voters we also discuss the role of capital taxation in a reform program jel classification d70 e61 j68

public economics and the theory of public policy when james mirrlees and william vickrey were awarded the nobel prize in economics last year it marked only the third time that the award had gone to scholars of public sector economics in contrast to the reception given to the previous two winners ronald coase and james buchanan the news was greeted with some bewilderment by policy specialists once removed from the academic literature who are mirrlees and vickrey and what have they done that has been of lasting benefit to the study of public economics let alone of practical benefit to policy makers this seems to me to be a fair question coase after all had set out a conceptual approach to the study of externalities and transaction costs that has become an implicit part of the methodological baggage carried around by policy economists and policy makers alike buchanan was in part responsible for the welcome emphasis on institutions in public sector decision making and for insisting that politicians bureaucrats and voters are human beings with human motives the legacy of mirrlees and vickrey is less well known but i would argue it is every bit as profound their approach to the theory of economic policy which is grounded on the importance of imperfect information as a constraint on public policy has changed the very nature of public economics research and of its implications for economic

minimum wage policy with optimal taxes and unemployment abstract using a search model i derive a formula that links the welfare gains from the minimum wage to its effect on low skilled labor force participation and employment this formula shows that the minimum wage is welfare improving if pushing the low skilled labor market tightness downwards brings it closer to its efficient level i estimate the causal effect of the minimum wage on low skilled labor force participation and employment using federal and state minimum wage variation i discuss the policy implications of my estimates when viewed through the lens of the marginal welfare gain formula

the failure of competition in the credit card market the bank credit card market containing 4 000 firms and lacking regulatory barriers casually appears to be a hospitable environment for the model of perfect competition nevertheless this article reports that credit card interest rates have been exceptionally sticky relative to the cost of funds moreover major credit card issuers have persistently earned from three to five times the ordinary rate of return in banking during the periods 1983 88 the failure of the competitive model appears to be partly attributable to consumers making credit card choices without taking account of the very high probability that they will pay interest on their outstanding balances copyright 1991 by american economic association

tax competition and tax coordination in an optimum income tax model abstract the paper uses the self selection approach of stiglitz 1982 to study tax competition and tax coordination in a many country optimum income tax model in the model the government can impose a non linear tax schedule on wage income and a source based tax on mobile capital in an uncoordinated equilibrium it turns out that countries can use the capital tax instrument to weaken the self selection constraint the paper presents examples where positive and negative capital taxes are optimal from a single country perspective if the production function is weakly separable between labor and capital it can be shown that the optimal capital tax is zero the paper also shows that contrary to the standard tax competition model the uncoordinated equilibrium can be efficient if the wealth distribution the endowments with capital among individuals is egalitarian a coordination of capital taxes does not affect welfare for non egalitarian wealth distributions a coordinated increase in capital taxes can raise or lower welfare depending on the redistributive impact of a higher capital tax

precautionary saving and consumption fluctuations this paper uses the consumption euler equation to derive a decomposition of consumption growth into four sources these four sources are new information and three sources of predictable consumption growth intertemporal substitution changes in the preferences for consumption and incomplete markets for consumption insurance using household level data we implement this decomposition for the average growth rate of consumption expenditures on nondurable goods in the united states from 1982 to 1997 the economic importance of precautionary saving rivals that of the real interest rate but the relative importance of each source of movement in the volatility of consumption is not precisely measured

the economics of privacy the concept of privacy has received a good deal of attention from lawyers political scientists sociologists philosophers and psychologists but until recently very little from economists this neglect is on the mend see for example my 1978 1979a articles and forthcoming book chs 9 11 george stigler and in this paper i will report on the economic research on privacy in which i and others have been engaged some definitional clarification is necessary at the outset privacy is used today in at least three senses first it is used to mean the concealment of information indeed this is its most common meaning today second it is used to mean peace and quiet as when someone complains that telephone solicitations are an invasion of his privacy third it is used as a synonym for freedom and autonomy it is in this sense that the supreme court has used the word in subsuming the right to have an abortion under the right of privacy see my 1979b article pp 190 200 the third meaning of privacy need detain us only briefly to affix the term privacy to human freedom and autonomy as in jack hirshleifer is simply to relabel an old subject not to identify a new area for economic research the second meaning of the word privacy set out above invites a slightly novel application of economics it suggests an economic reason why certain cerebral workers have private offices and other manual workers do not why aversion to noise is associated with rising education and why certain low level invasions of a person s private space for example shoving a person roughly but without hurting him are tortious see my forthcoming book ch 10 but the range of economic applications in this area seems limited the first meaning of privacy set out above privacy as concealment of informationseems the most interesting from an economic standpoint there is a rich and growing literature on the economics of information it would seem that the same economic factors that determine search behavior by workers and consumers might also determine investments in obtaining and in shielding private information this insight emphasized in my 1978 article provides the starting point for the economic analysis of privacy to relate the economics of privacy to the economics of information in as clear a fashion as possible consider the example of the employer searching across employees and the employee searching across employers the employer is looking for certain traits in an employee that may not be obvious things like honesty diligence loyalty and good physical and mental health to the extent that the employee is deficient in one or more of these characteristics he has an incentivestrictly analogous to the incentive of a seller of goods to conceal product defectsto conceal these deficiencies that is he has an incentive to invoke a right of privacy if the employer tries to pry into his private life the concealment of personal characteristics in the employment contest retards rather than promotes the efficient sorting of employees to employers by reducing the amount of information available to the buyer in the labor market the employer it reduces the efficiency of that market the analysis can easily be generalized moreover to other markets some of them noneconomic in which private information is concealed an example is the marriage market the efficient sorting of females to males in that market is impeded if either spouse conceals material personal information the extended courtship that remains typical of the marriage market may be due in part to the efforts of prospective spouses to conceal their deficiencies from each other university of chicago law school

inter jurisdictional competition for firms regions inhabited with an immobile population of disabled and able individuals compete to attract mobile firms that provide jobs the redistributive goal of regional governments is to support the disabled who cannot work able individuals may work be involuntary unemployed because of frictions in the labor market or choose to be voluntary unemployed labor force participation decisions depend on regional redistributive policies both the size of workforce and tax on firms affect profits and therefore firms location decisions allowing regions to engage in tax competition may be efficient if regions cannot tax firms they compete by implementing inefficient redistributive policies

the limits of price discrimination we analyze the welfare consequences of a monopolist having additional information about consumers tastes beyond the prior distribution the additional information can be used to charge dierent prices to dierent segments of the market i e carry out third degree price discrimination we show that the segmentation and pricing induced by the additional information can achieve every combi nation of consumer and producer surplus such that i consumer surplus is non negative ii producer surplus is at least as high as pro ts under the uniform monopoly price and iii total surplus does not exceed the e cient gains from trade as well as characterizing the welfare impact of price discrimination we examine the limits of how prices and quantities can change under price discrimination we also examine the limits of price discrimination in richer environments with quantity discrimination and limited ability to segment the market

higher order risk attitudes demographics and financial decisions we conduct an experiment to study the prevalence of the higher order risk attitudes of prudence and temperance in a large demographically representative sample as well as in a sample of undergraduate students participants make pairwise choices between lotteries of the form proposed by eeckhoudt and schlesinger 2006 the choices in these lotteries isolate prudent from imprudent and temperate from intemperate behavior we relate individuals risk aversion prudence and temperance levels to demographics and financial decisions we observe that the majority of individuals decisions are consistent with risk aversion prudence and temperance in both the student and the demographically representative sample an individual s level of prudence is predictive of his wealth saving and borrowing behavior outside of the experiment while temperance predicts the riskiness of portfolio choices our findings suggest that the coefficient of relative prudence for a representative individual is approximately equal to two

a pareto improving minimum wage this paper shows that a graduated minimum wage in contrast to a constant minimum wage can provide a strict pareto improvement over what can be achieved with an optimal income tax the reason is that a graduated minimum wage requires high productivity workers to work more to earn the same income as low productivity workers which makes it more difficult for the former to mimic the latter in effect a graduated minimum wage allows the low productivity workers to benefit from second degree price discrimination which increases their income

the redistributive role of unemployment benefits abstract this paper evaluates the role of unemployment benefits as a tool for redistribution in a setting with worker heterogeneity the provision of unemployment benefits achieves two goals it provides insurance to workers in the event of job loss and it redistributes wealth from individuals with more to those with fewer economic opportunities our model features a frictional labour market and an incomplete financial market when calibrated to match stylised facts of the us economy the optimal level of unemployment benefits is broadly similar regardless of whether workers differ in economic opportunities this suggests that taking into consideration the redistributive nature of unemployment benefits has only a limited role in altering the optimal level of unemployment benefits

exploiting naivete about self control in the credit market we develop a model of the credit market where competitive lenders oer long term contracts specifying a non linear schedule of possible repayment schedules to borrowers who may dier both in their taste for immediate gratication and their prior beliefs about that taste the equilibrium contract to a borrower with given beliefs is discontinuous it features an advantageous option involving fast repayment and a penalty for deviating and repaying later these predictions seem to resemble some salient features of many credit card and mortgage contracts for fully sophisticated borrowers the discontinuity acts as a commitment device and yields fast repayment but all other borrowers even those with an arbitrarily small amount of naivete end up delaying repayment despite the penalty and receive little benet from commitment furthermore because they believe they will repay early they underestimate the cost of credit and hence borrow too much non sophisticated borrowers cross subsidize sophisticated borrowers while sophisticated borrowers discipline rms by preventing very exploitative contracts we identify natural conditions under which the above results obtain even if

patent replacement and welfare gains abstract patents were chosen in an era when modern public finance tools were unavailable the same innovation outcomes can be achieved with higher welfare if patent elements are replaced by modern features this paper constructs two theoretical models of product innovation and simulates the welfare effects of replacing patents with an intertemporal bounty arrangement we find that replacing patents with this alternative has the potential to increase welfare in the united states through reform of pharmaceutical patents by 43 9 194 billion when measured in present value terms this is 0 3 1 3 of annual gdp based on simulations involving four selected drug sectors the potential to increase welfare would be higher if applied to the larger sector of drugs as a whole in principal patents could be replaced in other sectors as well

optimum taxation with errors in administration abstract the paper compares the welfare levels which can be achieved by two distinct tax regimes lump sum taxation where one attempts to identify individuals and allocate transfers or subsidies on the basis of characteristics and income taxation where characteristics are not observed but personal incomes are measured and taxed where there are no errors in classifying individuals lump sum taxation is superior but where mistakes are made in the allocation of lump sum grants or subsidies income taxation may be more attractive the level of errors where the regimes are equally desirable in terms of social welfare is computed in simple models following that of feldstein 1973 where there is strong aversion to inequality then income taxation becomes preferable at quite small errors in analysing income taxation it is shown that in the feldstein model with endogenous wages the marginal tax rate in optimum income taxation on the more skilled is negative and that on the less skilled is positive in contrast to the standard results see seade 1977 with exogenous wages

contracting with diversely naive agents in standard contract theoretic models the underlying assumption is that agent types differ in their preference or cost parameters and the principal s objective is to design contracts in order to screen this type we study a contract theoretic model in which the heterogeneity among agent types is of a cognitive nature in our model the agent has dynamically inconsistent preferences agent types differ only in their degree of sophistication that is their ability to forecast the change in their future tastes we fully characterize the menu of contracts which the principal offers in order to screen the agent s sophistication the menu does not exclude any type it provides a perfect commitment device for relatively sophisticated types and exploitative contracts which involve speculation with relatively naive types more naive types are more heavily exploited and generate a greater profit for the principal our results allow us to interpret real life contractual arrangements in a variety of industries

effective demand enterprise reforms and public finance in china economic reform in china athar hussain and nicholas stern this paper examines some problems of transition from a command to a market economy through an analysis of the most important example to date the reforms in the chinese economy since the late 1970s our focus is on the links between enterprise reforms effective demand and public finance the reforms have created a curious and problematic hybrid of market and command economies with serious problems of coordination they have concentrated almost exclusively on the delegation of decision making to enterprises from the higher to lower tiers of the government without taking into account its implications for investment consumption and public finance an understanding of future policy and lessons for other countries requires a careful examination of the effects of these past policies granting discretion to enterprises over investment and wages has resulted in both an investment and consumption boom but paradoxically a fall in profits there are strong reasons to suppose that the investment ratio has been too high in recent years fuelling inflation and slowing additions to supply by prolonging the gestation period of investment there has been a large increase in liquid assets in the hands of households which makes their expectations increasingly important for macroeconomic policy there is need for concerted financial innovation to diversify household wealth away from liquid assets finally the changes in the composition of government revenue and expenditure are disturbing there is an urgent need for a flexible and broad based tax system and for reducing price subsidies and subsidies to loss making enterprises

what do consumers really pay on their checking and credit card accounts explicit implicit and avoidable costs consumers in the united states make billions of transactions each year using cash checks debit cards and credit cards bank and credit card accounts provide consumers with liquidity to clear and settle these transactions in return consumers pay a variety of fees and both explicit and implicit interest charges the importance of retail banking and credit markets to economic activity drives interest in many open policy and research questions do households borrow too much relative to a neoclassical benchmark christopher d carroll 2001 why do many households leave a substantial amount of money on the table in managing their accounts sumit agarwal et al 2006 david gross and nicholas souleles 2002 do firms structure pricing to exploit consumer cognitive biases or limitations stefano dellavigna and ulrike malmendier 2004 xavier gabaix and david laibson 2006 how do learning sumit agarwal john driscoll and gabaix 2008 and disclosure regulation stango and zinman 2009b interact with consumer decision making and firm strategy to determine market outcomes this paper examines some threshold questions that should inform the questions above what do people really pay to use their bank and credit card accounts and which cost components are the largest of all the costs that people pay which could they easily avoid by making different day to day choices and how stable are both the level of costs and the share of costs that are avoidable for a given person over time what do consumers really pay on their checking and credit card accounts explicit implicit and avoidable costs

self selection and pareto efficient taxation abstract this paper analyses the set of pareto efficient tax structures the formulation of the problem as one of self selection not only shows more clearly the similarity between this problem and a number of other problems such as the optimal pricing of a monopolist which have recently been the subject of extensive research but also allows the derivation of a number of new results we establish i under fairly weak conditions randomization of tax structures is desirable ii if different individuals are not perfect substitutes for one another in production then the general equilibrium effects until now largely ignored in the literature of changes in the tax structure may be dominant in determining the optimal tax structure in particular if the relative wage of high ability and low ability individuals depends on the relative supplies of labor the optimal tax structure entails a negative marginal tax rate on the high ability individuals and a positive marginal tax rate on the low ability individuals the marnitude of which depends on the elasticity of substitution iii if individuals differ in their preferences pareto efficient taxation may entail negative marginal tax rates for high incomes while iv if wage income is stochastic the marginal tax rate at the upper end may be 100 our analysis thus makes clear that the main qualitative properties of the optimal tax structure to which earlier studies called attention are not robust to these attempts to make the theory more realistic