organizational design decision rights and incentive contracts where should decision rights be lodged in organizations michael c jensen and william h meckling 1992 argue that moving a decision away from the inherently best informed party involves costs in communication and garbling but may lodge it with someone who has better incentives to make good decisions generally however we expect that incentives are part of the organizational design why not just provide incentives to those with the best information so that they make the right decisions one reason is that the available incentive instruments must serve multiple purposes and designing them to induce better decisions worsens performance against other organizational objectives our experience suggests that this is a common situation in actual organizations the means available to affect one sort of behavior or decision inevitably affect the incentives governing other choices then the design of incentive schemes and the allocation of decision rights become interlinked this paper looks at this idea in the specific context of a principal s problem of inducing agents to provide unobservable effort while also motivating the efficient selection of investments each of these problems has been extensively studied in isolation on inducing effort see e g bengt holmstrom 1979 and holmstrom and paul milgrom 1991 on decisions see e g eugene f fama and jensen 1983 milgrom and roberts 1990a b philippe aghion and jean tirole 1997 matthias dewatripont and tirole 1999 we thus know that motivating effort is done best by rewarding agents on precise measures of their effort not necessarily on the total value created in the firm at the same time it is clear that getting the right investment choices may require that the decision makers rewards be tied to total value created the difficulty is that the available measures do not allow doing both the only available performance measures are aggregates whose component pieces cannot be disentangled while contracts must be written in advance of learning about investment possibilities including many contingencies in the contracts ex ante is impossible and ongoing renegotiation in every ex post eventuality is prohibitively costly more formally we assume that it is not possible to contract on investment projects nor can the principal bargain with the agents over the adoption of these projects once they are identified instead returns to projects are reflected in the performance measures available for use in the effort incentive contracting then the incentives for effort and for decisions are inextricably tied together in this framework we explore the interactions among the design of jobs and assignment of individuals to tasks the shape and intensity of effort incentives and the allocation of authority over project selection we argue that it may indeed be optimal to assign decisions rights to someone other than the best informed party an authority based hierarchy then emerges endogenously with some agents being given the right to make organizational decisions over projects that others discovered moreover as in herbert simon 1951 those in authority will make the decisions in a self interested way simon emphasized that this discussants michael riordan columbia university bengt holmstrom massachusetts institute of technology w bentley macleod university of southern california

food stamp participation among adult only households abstract several recent changes in the food stamp program have been directed toward households without children including new work requirements for able bodied adults without dependents abawds and easier application and recertification procedures for the disabled and the elderly despite their relevance to policy makers adult only households have not been extensively examined we use administrative records from south carolina to investigate how spells of food stamp participation for adult only households vary with abawd provisions recertification intervals and other characteristics we find that households that were subject to abawd policies had shorter spells and lower rates of food stamp participation than other households we also find that households were much more likely to leave the food stamp program at recertification dates than at other dates we further find that time limits were associated with exits with and without earnings suggesting that this policy increased self sufficiency for some households but left others without support

the effect of food stamps on labor supply a bivariate selection model abstract although there is a large literature on the effects of u s transfer programs on labor supply this is the first such study of the food stamp program we model the nonlinearity and nonconvexity of the budget constraint and use maximum likelihood methods to estimate hours of work functions for female heads of household the largest recipient group in the program we also model the joint response to afdc and food stamps and we account for the existence of a significant number of eligible households who do not participate in the programs a three equation bivariate selection model is estimated on a sample of eligible households with maximum likelihood

accounting for the decline in afdc caseloads welfare reform or the economy we use state level monthly panel data to assess the relative contributions of the macroeconomy and welfare reform in accounting for the 1993 96 decline in aid to families with dependent children afdc caseloads our results suggest that the decline in per capita afdc caseloads is attributable largely to the economic conditions in states and not to waivers from federal welfare policies nationwide we attribute 66 percent of the decline to the macroeconomy however we do find substantial heterogeneity in the impact and timing of alternative waivers on afdc caseloads states with waivers impacting parental responsibilities experienced greater caseload declines than states with waivers that made work more attractive overall our model predicts that had it not been for the influence of economic factors welfare reform would not have led to any decrease in aggregate caseloads

how much does the supplemental nutrition assistance program reduce food insecurity nearly 15 of all u s households and 40 of near poor households were food insecure in 2009 the supplemental nutrition assistance program snap is the cornerstone of federal food assistance programs and serves as the first line of defense against food related hardship this paper measures the effectiveness of snap in reducing food insecurity using an instrumental variables approach to control for selection our results suggest that receipt of snap benefits reduces the likelihood of being food insecure by roughly 30 and reduces the likelihood of being very food insecure by 20

the effect of safety net programs on food insecurity we investigate to what extent major safety net program benefits affect food insecurity in families we impute program eligibility and benefits in each state for 2001 2009 accounting for cross program eligibility rules we use simulated eligibility and benefits for a nationally representative sample as instruments for imputed eligibility and potential benefits among nonimmigrant low income single parent families 1 000 in potential cash or food benefits reduces the incidence of food insecurity by 1 1 percentage points on a base of 33 percent cash and food both reduce food insecurity the results highlight the importance of jointly considering a full range of safety net programs

delegation and incentives this article analyzes the relation between authority and incentives it extends the standard principal agent model by a project selection stage in which the principal can either delegate the choice of project to the agent or keep the authority the agent s subsequent choice of effort depends both on monetary incentives and the selected project we find that the consideration of effort incentives makes the principal less likely to delegate the authority over projects to the agent in fact if the agent is protected by limited liability delegation is never optimal

tax reform and automatic stabilization an income tax provides implicit insurance by dampening the variability of disposable income and consumption using an empirical framework derived from the consumption insurance literature and data from the panel study of income dynamics we examine the effect of federal income tax reforms of the 1980 s on automatic stabilization of consumption overall erta and tra86 reduced consumption stability by about 50 percent recently increased eitc generosity restored or enhanced consumption insurance the welfare cost of moving to the post tra86 system is sizable for relatively risk averse households facing large income risk but is much more modest for the typical household jel h21

authority and incentives in organizations the paper analyzes the choice of organizational structure as solution to the trade off between controlling behavior based on authority rights and minimizing costs for implementing high efforts the analysis includes the owner of a firm a top manager and two division heads if it is more expensive to incentivize the division heads the owner will prefer full delegation of authority to them to replace their high incentive pay by incentives based on private benefits of control in that situation decentralization is optimal given that selfish behavior is more important than cooperation for maximizing returns but concentrated delegation of full authority to a single division head is optimal for cooperation being crucial if however incentivizing the division heads is clearly less expensive than creating incentives for the top manager the owner will choose centralization given that cooperation is the dominating issue but partial delegation if selfish behavior is crucial

why do salespeople spend so much time lobbying for low prices in business to business settings a company s sales force often spends considerable time lobbying internally for authorization to charge lower prices these internal lobbying activities are time consuming and divert attention from other tasks such as interacting with customers we explain why internal lobbying activities serve an important role they help the firm elicit truthful reporting of demand information from the sales force as a result it may be profitable for the firm to require lobbying and make the requirement onerous even though lobbying is a nonproductive activity that creates an additional administrative burden and imposes a deadweight loss

the level and quality of value at risk disclosure by commercial banks in this paper we study both the level of value at risk var disclosure and the accuracy of the disclosed var figures for a sample of us and international commercial banks to measure the level of var disclosures we develop a var disclosure index that captures many different facets of market risk disclosure using panel data over the period 1996 2005 we find an overall upward trend in the quantity of information released to the public we also find that historical simulation is by far the most popular var method we assess the accuracy of var figures by studying the number of var exceedances and whether actual daily vars contain information about the volatility of subsequent trading revenues unlike the level of var disclosure the quality of var disclosure shows no sign of improvement over time we find that var computed using historical simulation contains very little information about future volatility

incentives in principal agent relationships this article identifies some of the major issues that have been examined in the literature on incentives the article begins by discussing the frictions that lie at the heart of incentive problems next the principal s optimal response to these frictions is explored taking as given the characteristics of the agents with whom the principal interacts in a nonrepeated setting the design of individualized contracts contests and tournaments is analyzed then the principal s task of selecting the best agent is addressed and repeated agency relationships are considered

if at first you don t succeed applying for and staying on the supplemental nutrition assistance program we examine households applications to and participation in the supplemental nutrition assistance program using administrative records from south carolina we model application resolutions with multinomial logit mnl specifications where the possible outcomes are acceptance denial due to income ineligibility denial due to a failure to provide sufficient information and denial due to other reasons for cases with successful applications we model the durations of participation spells using competing risk hazard specifications that distinguish among exits that result from missed recertifications financial ineligibility incomplete or missing information and other reasons the application and hazard outcomes depend on past programme behaviour and observed characteristics the results indicate that a household s application and participation history affect its subsequent application success and programme tenure

the effects of the macroeconomy and welfare reform on food stamp caseloads since 1994 there has been an unprecedented decline in the number of people receiving food stamp benefits from a record high of 27 5 million in 1994 the number of food stamp recipients fell over 30 to 18 0 million by mid 1999 during this period the united states has experienced the third longest economic expansion of the twentieth century this has resulted in a dramatic growth of new jobs and the lowest unemployment rate in a generation simultaneously the welfare system has undergone a major transformation beginning in the early 1990s when many states made changes to their welfare programs through federal waivers from aid to families with dependent children afdc requirements the personal responsibility and work opportunity reconciliation act of 1996 prwora furthered these changes by replacing afdc where states contributions were matched by the federal government with a block grant program called temporary assistance for needy families tanf prwora introduced new rules on tanf recipients such as terminal time limits work requirements and personal responsibility measures it also directly changed the food stamp program by ending the eligibility of some recipients and reducing average benefit levels at the same time innovative changes in the delivery of food stamp benefits have been taking place with the introduction of electronic benefit trans

food stamp caseloads over the business cycle 1 introduction the onset of the current economic downturn following the longest expansion in u s history has renewed interest in the role of automatic stabilizers designed to insure households against negative cyclical income shocks this system of income and consumption stabilizers includes among others the individual income tax and the panoply of social insurance programs such as unemployment insurance and the food stamp program while the income tax and unemployment insurance have received recent attention gruber 1997 auerbach and feenberg 2000 kniesner and ziliak 2002a b little is known about the role of food stamps as an automatic stabilizer even though the program served over 27 million americans at its peak in 1994 this gap in the literature is particularly acute in light of passage of the personal responsibility and work opportunity reconciliation act of 1996 welfare reform act which introduced new rules on cash assistance recipients and thus the nearly half of food stamp recipients who also receive cash welfare moreover the 1996 welfare reform also had a direct administrative effect on the food stamp program by ending the eligibility of some recipients reducing average benefit levels and requiring states to replace paper coupons with electronic benefit transfer cards importantly the welfare reform act also eliminated the entitlement status of the main cash welfare program aid to families with dependent children afdc thus positioning food stamps as a more prominent countercyclical consumption stabilizer a first task in assessing the possible stabilization role of food stamps in the era of welfare reform is to identify the cyclical sensitivity of food stamp caseloads if food stamp caseloads are acyclical then we would expect no role for food stamps in smoothing consumption over the business cycle if however food stamp caseloads are highly cyclical then food stamps may function as an important antirecessionary tool by the same token the new welfare policies may independently affect food stamp caseload movements and interact with the business cycle thereby altering the possible stabilization role of the program in this paper we specify a dynamic model of food stamp caseloads to estimate the responsiveness of the caseload to the business cycle to welfare policies and to interactions between the business cycle and welfare policies unlike cash welfare there has been scant research on the cyclicality of food stamp caseloads 1 wallace and blank 1999 are a recent exception in their use of both static annual and dynamic monthly food stamp caseload models based on state level panel data for the 1980 to 1998 federal fiscal years with annual data food stamp caseloads were strongly countercyclical and reform of afdc led to weak declines in total caseloads 2 specifically they attribute up to 44 of the 1994 to 1998 food stamp caseload decline to economic conditions and about 6 of the decline to welfare reform they reach broadly similar conclusions with monthly data however wallace and blank calculate that upward of 85 of the post 1996 decline in food stamp caseloads can be attributed to welfare reform if one is willing to ascribe all the unexplained residual to welfare reform which as the authors note is undoubtedly an overestimate of welfare reform s effect on food stamp caseloads p 85 in their static models figlio gundersen and ziliak 2000 reached conclusions similar to wallace and blank s estimates with annual level data in their preferred dynamic models they attribute about 35 of the 1994 to 1998 caseload decline to the macroeconomy and virtually nothing to welfare reform we improve on this previous research on food stamp caseloads along several dimensions first we not only follow other research in estimating the impact of afdc policy changes on food stamp caseloads but also examine the impact of policies that are focused directly on food stamps

do states play welfare games abstract this paper uses a panel of state level annual data from 1983 to 1994 for each of the contiguous united states and the district of columbia to explore the degree to which states simultaneously set welfare benefits using instrumental variables estimation we find substantial empirical evidence that is supportive of the notion of welfare competition furthermore we find that state responses to neighbor benefit decreases tend to be significantly larger in magnitude as their responses to neighbor benefit increases our results therefore have potential implications for public policy in the wake of the increased decentralization of welfare policy associated with the welfare reform of 1996

food stamps as money the macroeconomics of a transfer program food stamps represent nearly 11 billion of personal income in the united states the coupons that are issued to provide purchasing power to recipients are also reserves for the commercial banking system this study asks at what rate these coupons are substitutable for what is usually considered money the results based on estimates for 1959 81 suggest that food stamp coupons are substitutable for m1 on a one for one basis and a revised money supply series including food stamp money is included together with other estimates showing that the marginal propensity to consume out of food stamps is higher than that out of ordinary income the results suggest that the food stamp program is an automatic fiscal and monetary stabilizer under its provisions both the money stock and disposable income are increased during a recession

budget spillovers and fiscal policy interdependence evidence from the states abstract this paper formalizes and tests the notion that states expenditures depend on the spending of similarly situated states we find that even after allowing for fixed state effects year effects and common random shocks among neighbors a state government s level of per capita expenditure is positively and significantly affected by the expenditure levels of its neighbors ceteris paribus a one dollar increase in a state s neighbors expenditures increases its own expenditure by over 70 cents

does delegation increase worker training we model a principal firm offering training to its agent worker under two alternative organizational structures integration where the principal retains authority to overrule the investment project recommended by the worker and delegation where the principal cannot overrule the worker s preferred investment project we assume that training reduces the worker s effort cost of assembling information about alternative projects payoffs and identify the conditions under which delegation increases the profit maximizing intensity of training empirical estimates from matched employer employee data show that workplaces delegating authority do provide more worker training this result persists in two cross sections in panel fixed effect estimates and critically in an instrumental variable exercise that also controls for establishment fixed effects jel d21 d22 d23 m53 m54

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

information management in incentive problems we extend the standard procurement model to examine how an agent is optimally induced to acquire valuable planning information before he choose an unobservable level of cost reducing effort concer

veto based delegation in a principal agent model with hidden information and no monetary transfers i establish the veto power principle any incentive compatible outcome can be implemented through veto based delegation with an endogenously chosen default decision this result demonstrates the exact nature of commitment powers required by the principal 1 to design the default outcome and 2 to ensure that she has almost no formal control over the agent s decisions

on partial contracting this paper investigates contracting situations where giving away some control rights enhances both the donor s and the receiver s incentives to cooperate in the future we define a partial contracting framework with nonverifiable actions for which either control is contractible contractible control actions or the right to transfer control ex post to another party is contractible transferable control actions under incomplete information when control over particular actions is transferable but not contractible it can be optimal to give one party the right to transfer control over a particular action to the other party in order for that party to build a reputation regarding her willingness to cooperate in the future c 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

the tenuous trade off between risk and incentives empirical work testing for a negative trade off between risk and incentives has not had much success the data suggest a positive relationship between measures of uncertainty and incentives rather than the posited negative trade off i argue that the existing literature fails to account for an important effect of uncertainty on incentives through the allocation of responsibility to employees when workers operate in certain settings firms are content to assign tasks to workers and monitor their inputs by contrast when the situation is more uncertain they delegate responsibility to workers but to constrain their discretion base compensation on observed output

policy watch the 1996 welfare reform welfare reform legislation was passed in the summer of 1996 four key research questions that the new law presents to social scientists are as follows 1 can states design and operate better programs than afdc this includes questions about the ability of afdc women to work a significant number of hours the legislation s effect in areas of concentrated urban poverty and the extent to which women will be able to improve their families economic status under the legislation 2 will jobs be available 3 how will the new block grant affect states fiscal situation and 4 what new research methodology questions does this legislation introduce

limited liability contracts between principal and agent abstract the optimal strategy of the principal is examined in an environment where there are ex post limitations on the maximum penalty that can be imposed on a riskneutral agent contrary to the case in which such limitations are not imposed it is in the principal s interest to deliberately forego the opportunity to induce socially efficient behavior and to instead design a contract that induces the agent to realize an efficient outcome only in the most productive state of nature and perhaps in certain very unproductive states the properties of the contract are examined in detail

what causes public assistance caseloads to grow this paper uses state panel data to investigate changes in public assistance caseloads through the end of the afdc program in 1996 with particular attention to the rapid increase in caseloads between 1990 and 1994 previous research has focused on total caseloads with attention to economic and policy variables and does a relatively poor job of explaining this caseload increase this paper utilizes a much richer set of control variables to investigate the causes of caseload change it separates afdc caseloads into three subcomponent programs separately investigating changes within the afdc up program afdc child only cases and the remaining core afdc cases with benefits paid to single mothers and their children and it explores whether this caseload rise was driven by changes in takeup rates versus in eligibility the results indicate a large unexplained rise in total afdc caseloads even with a very rich specification a good share of this is due to sharp increases in child only cases driven by program and demographic shifts to a lesser extent this rise was caused by the expansion of afdc up to all states these two factors explain half of the overall rise and all of the unexplained rise in afdc caseloads the remaining increase in core afdc cases benefits received by single mothers and their children is well explained within the model and is the result of economic demographic political and policy changes these variables appear to have increased eligibility among the core afdc population in the early 1990s during the economic slowdown takeup rates also increased during this time period but not by a large amount

double sided moral hazard and the nature of share contracts contractual arrangements involving revenue profit sharing are often based on fairly simple often linear rules in addition in many contexts these contracts are not finely adjusted to the particular circumstances of individual agents or markets nor do they vary over time to the extent current theories based on optimal contracting suggest they should we develop a simple model of such revenue or profit sharing arrangements based on double sided moral hazard and show that this model can account for many of these stylized facts more specifically the model shows that linear contracts can be optimal and that benefits from customizing terms can in some cases be quite limited if not zero

the significance of federal taxes as automatic stabilizers using the taxsim model for the period 1962 95 we consider the federal tax system s impact as an automatic stabilizer despite the many changes in the tax system there has been relatively little change in its role as an automatic stabilizer we estimate that individual federal taxes offset perhaps as much as 8 percent of initial shocks to gdp we also suggest that the progressive income tax may help to stabilize output via its effect on the supply of labor an additional effect that may even be of similar magnitude to the more traditional path of stabilization through aggregate demand

optimal debt structure and the number of creditors within an optimal contracting framework we analyze the optimal number of creditors a company borrows from we also analyze the optimal allocation of security interests among creditors and intercreditor voting rules that govern renegotiation of debt contracts the key to our analysis is the idea that these aspects of the debt structure affect the outcome of debt renegotiation following a default debt structures that lead to inefficient renegotiation are beneficial in that they deter default but they are also costly if default is beyond a manager s control the optimal debt structure balances these effects we characterize how the optimal debt structure depends on firm characteristics such as its technology its credit rating and the market for its assets

the economics of clear advice and extreme options i study a principal agent model in which the agent collects information and then chooses a verifiable action i show that the principal can find it desirable to constrain the agent s action set even though there is no disagreement about the ranking of actions ex post the elimination or penalization of intermediate actions which are optimal when information is poor improves incentives for information collection i characterize optimal action sets when the agent is infinitely risk averse with respect to income shocks and optimal incentive schemes when the agent is risk neutral copyright 2005 wiley blackwell

warranties durability and maintenance two sided moral hazard in a continuous time model double moral hazard in continuous time generates the familiar warranty pattern with full coverage for an initial block of time the more complete the warranty the better the producer s durability incentives and the worse the consumer s maintenance incentives using continuous time highlights the need for some warranty bound to avoid reaching the first best as an unreasonable limit early in the paper an exogenous bound is used while later the bound arises endogenously from the possibility of abuse and repair a quadratic example shows that the warranty s duration depends on the relative severity of the two moral hazard problems

information incentives and organizational mode we examine the choice of organizational mode for a two stage production process wherein cost realizations at each stage are observed only by the producing party when these costs are positively correlated the principal prefers to undertake second stage production herself when the correlation is negative and sufficiently small she will prefer that the agent who performs the first stage also perform the second for large negative correlation either mode might be preferred when costs are uncorrelated the principal is indifferent between modes

product warranties and double moral hazard this article explores a model of warranties in which moral hazard problems play a key role the goal is to understand the important characteristics of warranties including their provision of incomplete insurance and the relationship between product quality and coverage we analyze a model in which buyers and sellers take actions that affect a product s performance since these actions are not cooperatively determined an incentives problem arises we characterize the optimal warranty contract and undertake comparative statics to determine the predicted correlation of warranty coverage and product quality

do in work tax credits serve as a safety net we test the eitc s response to economic need using irs data we exploit differences in timing and severity of economic cycles across states because the eitc requires earned income there is a theoretical ambiguity in the credit s cyclicality we find higher unemployment leads to increased likelihood of eitc recipiency and in credit amounts received for married couples but has insignificant effects for single individuals the eitc s protective effects are concentrated among skilled workers the eitc mitigates income shocks for married couples with children and groups likely to have moderate earnings but does not for most recipients single parents with children

the tail risk premia of the carry trades abstract we study the relationship between the excess returns of portfolios invested in carry trade positions and an innovative global tail risk factor we find that high interest rate currencies are related to innovations in global currency tail risk they deliver low returns in times of unexpected high tail risk and high returns in times of unexpected low tail risk suggesting a standard asset pricing theory approach to explain the returns to the carry trade our tail risk factor can be understood as the interaction of moment based factors such as volatility skewness and kurtosis our results tend to indicate that the interaction of moments i e tail risk rather than the moments alone drives investor behavior this makes sense since the ultimate risk for carry traders is to reach their funding limits which are set because of the regulations on the back of tail risk statistics value at risk and not simply on the back of the volatility the skewness or the kurtosis alone the result holds in other cross sections of currencies and whether the global tail risk indicators are estimated in the currency the equity or the bond market

why are bad products so hard to kill it is puzzling that firms often continue to invest in product development projects when they should know that demand will be low we argue that bad products are hard to kill because firms face an inherent conflict when designing managers incentives rewarding success encourages managers to forge ahead even when demand is low to avoid investing in low demand products the firm must also reward decisions to kill products however rewarding managers for killing products effectively undermines the rewards for success the inability to resolve this tension forces the firm to choose between paying an even larger bonus for success and accepting continued investment in low demand products we explore the boundaries of this argument by analyzing how the timing of demand information affects product investment decisions

games the states don t play welfare benefits and the theory of fiscal federalism fiscal federalism theory predicts that states will behave strategically in welfare programs because voter demand for welfare is sensitive to tax price while the tax price itself changes because of welfare induced migration this paper tests these propositions on afdc in the united states for a panel from 1982 88 using new models for the determination of the recipiency ratio the tax price and composite neighbors the data do not support any substantial tax price elasticity of demand for welfare estimates of migration effects on tax price are found to be sensitive to specification copyright 1995 by mit press

the role of food stamps in consumption stabilization although the food stamp program is the largest universal entitlement program in the social safety net little is known about its stabilizing role in household income and consumption using data from the panel study of income dynamics spanning 1980 99 we estimate the volatility of income with and without food stamps coupled with a variance decomposition of consumption among families at high ex ante risk of food stamp participation food stamps reduced income volatility by about 12 percent and food consumption volatility by about 14 percent there was however a marked decline in consumption smoothing benefits of the program in the early 1990s relative to the 1980s

the impact of snap on material hardships evidence from broad based categorical eligibility expansions this article examines whether expanding supplemental nutrition assistance program snap eligibility reduces material hardships of low income households during the great recession many states expanded the income threshold of eligibility for snap i show that expansions in eligibility increased the snap participation rate by 3 5 percentage points i also find that the expansion leads to a modest decrease in nonfood hardships such as rent and utility delinquencies however the increase in snap enrollment does not lead to greater food spending or a reduction in food insecurity except for households with children

the optimal allocation of decision and exit rights in organizations we show that in a bilateral relation with conflicting preferences and transferable utility it is unambiguously optimal to assign the authority over project decisions to the privately informed rather than the uninformed party this holds irrespective of the degree of conflict and the distribution of private information under the optimal contract the uninformed party is protected by an exit option which it will exert when the decision maker has not chosen the promised decision exit terminates the relation and diminishes the project surplus we show that the first best efficient solution can be obtained by such a contract

the more things change the more they stay the same the safety net and poverty in the great recession much attention has been given to the large increases in safety net spending during the great recession we examine the relationship between poverty the safety net and business cycles historically and test whether there has been a significant change in this relationship we find that post welfare reform temporary assistance for needy families did not respond during the great recession and extreme poverty is more cyclical than in prior recessions food stamps and unemployment insurance are providing more protection or no less protection in the great recession and there is some evidence of less cyclicality for 100 poverty

delegation to encourage communication of problems we study a principal s choice to centralize or delegate decisions to an agent when delegation can be used to encourage the agent to communicate potential problems we find that the principal may choose centralization either to exercise better control over the agent s actions or to provide stronger incentives delegation emerges in equilibrium only if the costs of effort to acquire information for both the principal and the agent are sufficiently high we find that increases in the principal s penalties for an incorrect decision may increase the principal s expected payoff owing to optimal organizational responses in addition catastrophic risk the risk of incorrectly accepting a defective audit or product may be greater under centralization than under delegation furthermore catastrophic risk can be increased by well intentioned legislative efforts to decrease such risk by for example increasing the agent s penalties for failing to take a corrective action because the organizational structure may change