banking deregulation and industry structure evidence from the french banking reforms of 1985 we investigate how the deregulation of the french banking industry in the 1980s affected the real behavior of firms and the structure and dynamics of product markets following deregulation banks are less willing to bail out poorly performing firms and firms in the more bank dependent sectors are more likely to undertake restructuring activities at the industry level we observe an increase in asset and job reallocation an improvement in allocative efficiency across firms and a decline in concentration overall these findings support the view that a more efficient banking sector helps foster a schumpeterian process of creative destruction many economies around the world are characterized by heavily regulated bank

how important is the capacity of local governments for improvements in welfare evidence from decentralised uganda abstract decentralisation is often claimed to be effective for improvements in welfare and hence the reduction of poverty but empirical evidence is scarce this paper seeks to gain further insights into the relationship between decentralisation and welfare by investigating the role of local governments capacity for household consumption and school enrolment in uganda using household survey data it finds suggestive evidence that both household consumption and school enrolment are positively related with the level of capacity of district governments

collateral in credit rationing in markets with imperfect information note in their 1981 article joseph stiglitz and andrew weiss analyze adverse selection and incentive effects in the loan market the models considered are based on two crucial assumptions borrowers are subject to limited liability and lenders cannot distinguish borrowers projects of different risk stiglitz and weiss show that a bank that raises its interest rate may suffer adverse selection because only risky borrowers will be willing to borrow at the higher rate thus lenders may choose not to raise the interest rate to eliminate excess demand resulting in the possibility of a credit rationing equilibrium stiglitz and weiss also consider briefly the role of collateral in such credit rationing models they conclude that lenders may choose not to use collateral requirements as a rationing device an increase in collateral requirements like an increase in the interest rate potentially leads to a decrease in the lender s expected return on loans because of resulting adverse incentive and selection effects the purpose of this note is to further investigate the role of collateral in these models stiglitz and weiss discussion in section iii establishes that adverse selection effects can result from increases in collateral when borrowers are risk averse i will show by returning to a model they discussed earlier in section i that the adverse selection effects can also occur when borrowers are risk neutral stiglitz and weiss outline a model to consider the use of collateral as a rationing device section iii in that model all potential borrowers face the same array of risky projects each potential borrower chooses at most one of those projects to undertake the individuals are by assumption risk averse with decreasing absolute risk aversion and possess different amounts of initial wealth thus choice of project if any to undertake and the method of finance selffinance from initial wealth or loan finance will differ from one individual to the next stiglitz and weiss show that among those who undertake risky projects and who choose borrowing as the method of finance wealthier individuals undertake riskier projects an increase in collateral has two effects on the market for loans those individuals who remain in the market will choose to undertake less risky projects and those individuals who drop out of the market are less wealthy low risk borrowers if the second effect is sufficiently strong then increased collateral requirements will mean decreased expected returns for the lender thus a credit rationing equilibrium may occur since lenders may not choose to use collateral requirements or the interest rate to eliminate excess demand the adverse selection effect just described does not occur in this model if the individuals are risk neutral consequently the potential for a credit rationing equilibrium is limited to cases where borrowers are risk averse to see that increases in collateral requirements can also result in adverse selection if borrowers are risk neutral consider the model stiglitz and weiss used to analyze the adverse selection effects of increases in the interest rate section i pp 395 99 it differs from the section iii model discussed above in three ways first borrowers are risk neutral second all projects ar loan financed the analogy to the section iii model is that no individuals have sufficient wealth to self finance projects third in the section

on the dynamics of demand for leisure and the production of health our article develops and estimates a structural model of household health production that jointly determines the demand for leisure and the demand for consumption for elderly males we use a stochastic dynamic programming framework based on the assumption that an individual maximizes lifetime utility subject to budget and time constraints and a health production function by choosing hours of leisure and levels of consumption of health related and health neutral goods and services moreover we use a very comprehensive health index that combines four scales measuring a variety of dimensions in the quality of life the euler equations derived from our model are estimated using data from six biennial panels of the retirement history survey

beyond the short versus long accountability route dichotomy using multi track accountability pathways to study performance of rural water services in uganda summary performance of social service delivery is often linked with effective accountability accountability studies increasingly acknowledge that studying one type of accountability relation at a time is too restrictive our study aims to correct for this and explores the effectiveness of combinations of different accountability mechanisms we take the world development report s accountability triangle as a starting point and adapt it in three ways first we refine the long route to accountability into three tracks by differentiating between the three groups of demand side actors political accountability opposition citizen led and civil society led social accountability second for each track we take into account the demand and supply side and the availability of supply demand interfaces finally we adopt a holistic approach through the simultaneous incorporation of both the short and long with the different tracks routes to test its usefulness we use our refined accountability framework to study the accountability constellations and their link to performance in uganda s rural water sector building on qca our findings identify the long three track route supply interface all three demand actors and the citizen led social accountability route as viable routes to high water service performance in ugandan districts additionally a set of new hybrid accountability arrangements are identified while contrary to theoretical assumptions the short route clients to service providers does not prove effective

poverty reduction strategy papers a new convergence abstract poverty reduction strategy papers represent both a primary policy device of international development institutions and an instance of a wider international convergence of public policy around global integration and social inclusion charting the emergence of these approaches this paper argues that this convergence has a number of structural predilections which favor the technical and juridical over the political economic and a disciplinary framework over a practical contest drawing extensively on decentralized governance and poverty reduction programs in uganda this paper shows how these predilections obscure power relations and restrict practical and political options while exacting heavy establishment and compliance costs

competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information abstract we study a competitive credit market equilibrium in which all agents are risk neutral and lenders a priori unaware of borrowers default probabilities admissible credit contracts are characterized by the credit granting probability the loan quantity the loan interest rate and the collateral required the principal result is that in equilibrium lower risk borrowers pay higher interest rates than higher risk borrowers moreover the lower risk borrowers get more credit in equilibrium than they would with full information no credit is rationed and collateral requirements are higher for the lower risk borrowers

the role of collateral in credit markets with imperfect information abstract the paper analyzes the structure of credit market equilibrium under imperfect information collateralization and credit rationing are compared as alternative means to cope with problems of adverse selection and moral hazard it is shown that lenders may use collateral as a self selection and incentive mechanism rationing occurs only if the borrowers collaterizable wealth is too small to allow perfect sorting or to create sufficiently strong incentives whenever there is rationing in an equilibrium some borrowers are charged the maximum amount of collateral

power struggle dispute and alliance over local resources analyzing democratic decentralization of natural resources through the lenses of africa inland fisheries summary this paper is based on a global review of fisheries decentralization programs co management in sub saharan africa partly challenging the current narrative but in line with experience in other sectors e g forestry the review shows that the outcomes of these decentralizations have not been systematically positive in most cases fisheries co management failed to improve governance but simply altered the distribution of power and responsibility amongst the different stakeholders in this new political landscape poorly designed reforms have enabled a variety of usual and new local actors to advance their own agendas often at the detriment of the direct end users fisherfolk

escaping poverty and becoming poor in 36 villages of central and western uganda abstract twenty four per cent of households in 36 village communities of central and western uganda have escaped from poverty over the past 25 years but another 15 per cent have simultaneously fallen into poverty a roughly equal number of households escaped from poverty in the first period ten to 25 years ago as in the second period the last ten years examined here however almost twice as many households fell into poverty during the second period as in the first period progress in poverty reduction has slowed down as a result multiple causes are associated with descent into poverty and these causes vary significantly between villages in the two different regions for nearly two thirds of all households in both regions however ill health and health related costs were a principal reason for descent into poverty escaping poverty is also associated with diverse causes which vary across the two regions compared to increases in urban employment however land related reasons have been more import

citizens preferences and the portfolio of public goods evidence from nigeria summary developing countries have undertaken decentralization reforms to increase the efficiency of public goods provisioning by tailoring the goods to the preferences of smaller groups the reforms aim to ensure that the resulting supply of public goods matches local demands we analyze if local politicians tasked with supplying public goods in a developing country respond to citizens preferences we ask two questions first faced with demands for increased spending on a particular type of public good will politicians increase the overall spending on public goods or keep it constant while reallocating resources between different public goods second if politicians reallocate resources rather than increase overall spending which public good will receive additional funds at the expense of another good we examine these questions using sub national spending and preference data in nigerian districts our empirical strategy accounts for interdependency between spending areas as increased spending in one area can be offset by decreasing expenditures elsewhere we find that local politicians reallocate resources across education health infrastructure and agricultural support to match the preference profile of citizens across these goods but do not increase overall spending for public goods

who receives medical care income implicit prices and the distribution of medical services among pregnant women in the united states the distribution of medical services among pregnant married women in the united states in 1980 is very unequal this distribution is examined to assess the predominant effect of tax transfer and insurance schemes on the implicit prices of medical services facing women differing by socioeconomic status healthiness and race estimates of the determinants of the probability of receiving four major prenatal medical services are obtained controlling both for socioeconomic status and for initial health status as inferred from estimates of health technology determining birthweight results reject the hypotheses that medical services are provided only on the basis of medical need or are allocated in a market in which the implicit price of care is invariant to husband s income the combined effect of taxes and transfers is found to reduce the implicit price paid for these four medical services by rich compared to poor married women in the united states and thus to encourage their use by higher income and education groups

poverty persistence and transitions in uganda a combined qualitative and quantitative analysis despite uganda s impressive reduction in income poverty during the 1990s recent evidence has shown there to be substantial mobility into and out of poverty this paper represents one of the first attempts to combine qualitative and quantitative information to understand the factors and processes underlying poverty transitions and persistence in some instances similar factors are identified by both qualitative and quantitative approaches including lack of key physical assets high dependency ratios and increased household size in other instances though one approach identifies additional factors not so easily identified by the other for example the impacts of excessive alcohol consumption in many cases the paper argues that there is considerable value added in combining the two approaches allowing us to provide a much richer understanding of many of the processes underlying poverty and poverty transitions

does commercialization undermine the benefits of decentralization for local services provision evidence from mexico s urban water and sanitation sector summary decentralization has been promoted as a means to better reflect citizen preferences and improve local services many developing countries decentralized and promoted neoliberal policies such as commercialization simultaneously leaving mayors with the responsibility of improving public services through self financing reforms this study evaluates experiences in three mexican cities to assess whether decentralization and commercialization practices have resulted in improved water and sanitation services it finds that commercialization has increased social conflict surrounding urban services provision and that local institutional constraints further undermine mayor s ability to adopt politically contentious policies the result has been stalled and uneven service improvements

what have we learned about policy and growth from cross country regressions economists have been seeking to comprehend why some countries are rich and others poor for well over 200 years a better understanding of the national policies associated with long run growth would both contribute to our ability to explain cross country differences in per capita incomes and provide a basis for making policy recommendations that could lead to improvements in human welfare recently economists have used cross country regressions to search for empirical linkages between longrun growth and indicators of national policies e g roger kormendi and philip meguire 1985 robert j barro 1991 the large cross country growth literature has identified various fiscal monetary trade exchange rate and financial policy indicators that are significantly correlated with longrun growth yet levine and david renelt 1992 show that many of these findings are fragile to small alterations in the conditioning information set that is small changes in the right hand side variables produce different conclusions regarding the relationship between individual policies and growth in this paper we take stock of what the profession has learned from cross country regression studies of policy and long run growth i limitations

does judicial efficiency lower the cost of credit the authors investigate the effect of judicial efficiency on banks lending spreads for a large cross section of countries they measure bank interest rate spreads for 106 countries at an aggregate level and for 32 countries at the level of individual banks the authors find that after controlling for a number of other country characteristics judicial efficiency in addition to inflation is the main driver of interest rate spreads across countries this suggests that in addition to improving the overall macroeconomic climate in a country judicial reforms through a better enforcement of legal contracts are critical to lowering the cost of financial intermediation for households and firms

computer mediated transactions every now and then a set of technologies becomes available that sets off a period of combinatorial innovation think of standardized mechanical parts in the 1800s the gasoline engine in the early 1900s electronics in the 1920s integrated circuits in the 1970s and the internet in the last decade or so the component parts of these technologies can be combined and recombined by innovators to create new devices and applications since these innovators are working in parallel with similar components it is common to see simultaneous invention there are many well known examples such as the electric light the airplane the automobile and the telephone many scholars have described such periods of innovation using terms such as recombinant growth general purpose technologies cumulative synthesis and clusters of innovation the internet and the web are wonderful examples of combinatorial innovation in the last 15 years we have seen a huge proliferation of web applications all built from a basic set of component technologies the internet itself was a rather unlikely innovation i like to describe it as a lab experiment that got loose since the internet arose from the research community rather than the private sector it had no obvious business model other public computer networks such as aol compuserve and minitel generally used a subscription models but were centrally controlled and offered little scope for innovation at the user level the internet won out over these alternatives precisely because it offered a flexible set of component technologies which encouraged combinatorial innovation

collateral loan quality and bank risk abstract most commercial loans are made on a secured basis yet little is known about the relationship between collateral and credit risk several theoretical studies find that when borrowers have private information about risk the lowest risk borrowers tend to pledge collateral in contrast conventional wisdom holds that when risk is observable the highest risk borrowers tend to pledge collateral an additional issue is whether secured loans as opposed to secured borrowers tend to be safer or riskier than unsecured loans empirical evidence presented here strongly suggests that collateral is most often associated with riskier borrowers riskier loans and riskier banks

repossession and the democratization of credit we exploit a 2004 credit reform in brazil that simplified the sale of repossessed cars used as collateral for auto loans we show that the reform expanded credit to riskier self employed borrowers who purchased newer more expensive cars the legal change has led to larger loans with lower spreads and longer maturities although the credit reform improved riskier borrowers access to credit it also led to increased incidences of delinquency and default our results shed light on the consequences of a credit reform and highlight the crucial role that collateral and repossession play in the liberalization and democratization of credit

liquidation values and the credibility of financial contract renegotiation evidence from u s airlines how do liquidation values affect financial contract renegotiation while the incomplete contracting theory of financial contracting predicts that liquidation values determine the allocation of bargaining power between creditors and debtors there is little empirical evidence on financial contract renegotiations and the role asset values play in such bargaining this paper attempts to fill this gap we develop an incomplete contracting model of financial contract renegotiation and estimate it using data on the airline industry in the united states we find that airlines successfully renegotiate their lease obligations downward when their financial position is sufficiently poor and when the liquidation value of their fieet is low our results show that strategic renegotiation is common in the airline industry moreover the results emphasize the importance of the incomplete contracting perspective to real world financial contract renegotiation

beyond the poverty agenda insights from the new politics of development in uganda summary the politics of development has shifted significantly in recent years with largely negative implications for the poverty agenda this is particularly apparent in countries like uganda where poverty reduction papers have been displaced by national development plans aimed at structural transformation driven by the discovery of oil the growing influence of rising powers vis a vis traditional donors and domestic political shifts although this heralds the possibility of deeper national ownership over development policy international financial institutions have adopted strategies to maintain their influence moreover uganda currently lacks the underlying political capacities and relationships required to roll out this ambitious new agenda

secured lending and default risk equilibrium analysis policy implications and empirical results the authors examine collateral in a competitive equilibrium in which borrowers can choose hidden actions and may additionally possess hidden knowledge apart from explaining the widespread use of collateral despite deadweight costs they show that an increase in the riskless interest rate causes equilibrium loan rates and collateral requirements to increase a decline in the deadweight costs of collateral reduces the equilibrium collateral use under moral hazard and an increase in the borrower s project size reduces equilibrium collateral use under moral hazard some of these predictions are tested and found to be supported by the data copyright 1991 by royal economic society

asymmetric valuations and the role of collateral in loan agreements loan contracts with provision for collateral are of two general types in one the collateral may be an existing asset of the borrowing firm which is pledged to a lender in the event of default in this case collateral does not increase the assets that the borrower would lose if there is default since all the borrower s assets are attachable therefore the expected marginal cost to the borrower of providing an additional unit of collateral includes principally transactions costs associated with the collateral l this describes the usual type of commercial loan arrangement with the collateral being either equipment real estate accounts receivable or inventories in the other type of loan contract the collateral is an additional asset that is given up by the borrower if there is default that is in addition to the usual assets that are available to its lenders the borrower assigns as collateral to a creditor an asset that would normally not be legally attachable this arrangement is more common in small business loans that are secured by a personal asset e g a house of the entrepreneur likewise debt issued by a legally separate subsidiary may be secured by an asset of the parent firrn in these cases the expected marginal cost to the borrower the owner manager of the small firm or the parent corporation in the latter example of providing an additional unit of collateral

the brazilian payroll lending experiment abstract in december 2003 the brazilian congress passed a law that led to a natural personal lending experiment the law allows banks to offer loans with repayment through automatic payroll deduction which in effect turns future income into collateral we estimate the impact of the new law using auto loans as a control group the law has caused a reduction in interest rates and an increase in the volume of personal credit

collateral and competitive equilibria with moral hazard and private information the authors examine equilibrium credit contracts and allocations under different competitivity specifications and explain the economic roles of collateral under these specifications both moral hazard and adverse selection are considered the principal message is that how a competitive equilibrium is conceptualized significantly affects the characterization of equilibrium credit contracts specifically some well known results in the rationing literature are shown to rest delicately on the adopted equilibrium concept two somewhat surprising results emerge first high quality borrowers with unlimited collateral may be priced out of the market despite the bank having idle deposits second high quality borrowers may put up more collateral this paper explores the allocational consequences of alternative credit market competitivity specifications and explains the different economic roles of collateral under these specifications we model banks that lend to borrowers financing projects with payoffs depending on a priori unknown borrower attributes and ex post unobservable borrower actions borrowers are assumed to have unconstrained access to collateral our analysis is based on two concepts of competitive equilibrium under both banks compete in the sense that they earn zero expected profits however under the first concept of equilibrium ti as in jaffee and russell 11 all rents accrue to borrowers whereas under the second concept t2 all rents accrue to depositors as in stiglitz and weiss 17 our research makes two main points first we demonstrate that the manner in which a competitive equilibrium is conceptualized importantly influences the characterization of equilibrium credit allocations specifically one of the findings is that the rationing equilibria of stiglitz and weiss 17 and others should be viewed as rather delicate things in that they are very sensitive to the competitivity specification used for instance

courts and banks effects of judicial enforcement on credit markets the cost of enforcing contracts is a key determinant of market performance we document this point with reference to the credit market in a model of opportunistic debtors and inefficient courts according to the model improvements in judicial efficiency should reduce credit constraints and increase lending with an ambiguous effect on interest rates that depends on banking competition and on the type of judicial reform these predictions are supported by panel data on italian provinces in provinces with longer trials or large backlogs of pending trials credit is less widely available

growth inequality and poverty looking beyond averages the evidence is compelling that the poor in developing countries do typically share in the gains from rising aggregate affluence and in the losses from aggregate contraction but how much do poor people share in growth do they gain more in some settings than others do some gain while others lose does pro poor growth mean more or less aggregate growth recent theories and evidence suggest some answers but deeper microeconomic empirical work is needed on growth and distributed change only then will we have a firm basis for identifying the specific policies and programs needed to complement and possibly modify growth oriented policies

returns to spending on agricultural extension the case of the national agricultural advisory services naads program of uganda the aim of this paper is to assess the direct and indirect impacts of the agricultural extension system of uganda the national agricultural advisory services naads program on household agricultural income data from two rounds of surveys of ugandan rural farm households conducted in 2004 and 2007 as well as different program evaluation methods and model specifications are used to estimate impacts and compute a rate of return the direct and indirect impact of the program is estimated at 37 95 and 27 55 increase in per capita agricultural gross revenue between 2004 and 2007 for households participating directly and indirectly in the program respectively compared to nonparticipants the rate of return on the program s expenditures is estimated at 8 49 the program has been relatively more effective among male headed larger and asset poor households as well as those taking up noncrop high value enterprises and living further away from financial services all weather roads and markets or located in the eastern and northern regions policy implications of the results are drawn

does greater accountability improve the quality of public service delivery evidence from uganda summary it is now widely realized that in many developing countries the low quality of public services and governance can limit the scope for poverty reduction and growth empirical micro level evidence on the scope for improved accountability to help reduce corruption and improve the quality with which critical public services are provided is however limited using a large data set from uganda to address this issue we find that household knowledge on how to report inappropriate behavior by bureaucrats and unsatisfactory quality of services does help to not only reduce the incidence of corruption but is also associated with significant improvements in service quality

balancing rural poverty reduction and citizen participation the contradictions of uganda s decentralization program abstract uganda s ambitious decentralization program is analyzed in terms of a dual mode system of local governance under a technocratic mode conditional funding from the center is earmarked for particular programs but with little local participation in contrast the patronage mode is an elaborate system for local bottom up planning but with limited resources which are largely consumed in administrative costs and political emoluments along with the spoils of a committee system controlling contracts and appointments these resources provide the means for building political alliances and loyalty in the absence of a culture of transparency and civic engagement to assure downward accountability it remains to be seen whether decentralization can promote both efficient service delivery and local empowerment simultaneously

enlarging the contracting space collateral menus access to credit and economic activity recent reforms across eastern european countries have given more flexibility and information to parties to engage in secured debt transactions the menu of assets legally accepted as collateral was enlarged to include movable assets e g machinery and equipment generalized difference in differences tests show that firms operating more movable assets borrowed more as a result those firms also invested more hired more and became more efficient and profitable following the changes in the contracting environment the financial deepening we document triggered important reallocation effects firms affected by the reforms increased their share of fixed assets and employment in the economy

collateral and rationing sorting equilibria in monopolistic and competitive credit markets the authors examine how market structure affects credit allocation under universal risk neutrality and asymmetric information about borrowers they consider both monopolistic and perf ectly competitive banks and examine the role of collateral in each ca se when a bank is a monopolist on the loan side they find collatera l is never used and asymmetric information results in reduced bank le nding under perfect competition collateral has a useful sorting rol e moreover rationing is possible even with collateral availability and perfectly elastic deposit supply in this setting the authors sh ow co signers are valuable social welfare properties of the monopoly and competitive equilibria are also compared copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

optimal debt structure and the number of creditors within an optimal contracting framework we analyze the optimal number of creditors a company borrows from we also analyze the optimal allocation of security interests among creditors and intercreditor voting rules that govern renegotiation of debt contracts the key to our analysis is the idea that these aspects of the debt structure affect the outcome of debt renegotiation following a default debt structures that lead to inefficient renegotiation are beneficial in that they deter default but they are also costly if default is beyond a manager s control the optimal debt structure balances these effects we characterize how the optimal debt structure depends on firm characteristics such as its technology its credit rating and the market for its assets

rural livelihoods and poverty reduction strategies in four african countries this paper compares and contrasts rural livelihoods in uganda kenya tanzania and malawi with a view to informing rural poverty reduction policies within poverty reduction strategy plans prsps low household incomes in rural areas of all countries are associated with low land and livestock holdings high reliance on food crop agriculture and low monetisation of the rural economy these adverse factors are in some instances made more difficult by land sub division at inheritance declining civil security in rural areas deteriorating access to proper agronomic advice and inputs and predatory taxation by decentralised district councils better off households are distinguished by virtuous spirals of accumulation typically involving diverse livestock ownership engagement in non farm self employment and diversity of on farm and non farm income sources lessons for prsps centre on the creation of a facilitating rather than blocking public sector environment for the multiplication of non farm enterprises seeking creative solutions to the spread of technical advice to farmers and examining critically the necessity for and impact of tax revenue collection by district councils on rural incomes and enterprise

the great recession lessons from microeconomic data crises and sharp economic downturns while undesirable provide economists with a unique opportunity to test and hone economic theory indeed some of the most influential advance ments in economic thought including milton friedman s monetarist tradition john maynard keynes fiscal theory and irving fisher s debtdeflation hypothesis emerged from analysis of the great depression the current economic malaise which we refer to as the great recession provides another watershed moment to reevaluate our core economic beliefs however in contrast to our peers in previous crises we are fortunate to have access to large scale microeconomic datasets and advancements in computational capacity these advantages allow for a more rigorous analysis of the current recession and therefore a more informed understanding of its origins propagation and consequences our purpose is to highlight how a micro level analysis of the great recession provides us with important clues to understand the origins of the crisis the link between credit and asset prices the feedback effect from asset prices to the real economy and the role of household leverage in explaining the downturn we hope that our discussion also serves as an example of the useful ness of incorporating microeconomic data and techniques in answering traditional macroeco nomic questions i what were the origins of the credit cycle credit demand or credit supply

blending top down federalism with bottom up engagement to reduce inequality in ethiopia donors increasingly fund interventions to counteract inequality in developing countries where they fear it can foment instability and undermine nation building efforts to succeed aid relies on the principle of upward accountability to donors but federalism shifts the accountability of subnational officials downward to regional and local voters what happens when aid agencies fund anti inequality programs in federal countries does federalism undermine aid does aid undermine federalism or can the political and fiscal relations that define a federal system resolve the contradiction internally this study explores this paradox via the promotion of basic services program in ethiopia the largest donor financed investment program in the world using an original panel database comprising the universe of ethiopian woredas districts the study finds that horizontal geographic inequality decreased substantially donor financed block grants to woredas increased the availability of primary education and health care services in the bottom 20 percent of woredas weaker evidence from household surveys suggests that vertical inequality across wealth groups within woredas also declined implying that individuals from the poorest households benefit disproportionately from increasing access to and utilization of such services the evidence suggests that by combining strong upward accountability over public investment with extensive citizen engagement on local issues ethiopia s federal system resolves the instrumental dissonance posed by aid funded programs to combat inequality in a federation

contract pricing in consumer credit markets we analyze subprime consumer lending and the role played by down payment requirements in screening high risk borrowers and limiting defaults to do this we develop an empirical model of the demand for financed purchases that incorporates both adverse selection and repayment incentives we estimate the model using detailed transaction level data on subprime auto loans we show how different elements of loan contracts affect the quality of the borrower pool and subsequent loan performance we also evaluate the returns to credit scoring that allows sellers to customize financing terms to individual applicants our approach shows how standard econometric tools for analyzing demand and supply under imperfect competition extend to settings in which firms care about the identity of their customers and their postpurchase behavior

consumer default credit reporting and borrowing constraints why do negative credit events lead to long term borrowing constraints exploiting banking regulations in peru and utilizing currency movements we show that consumers who face a credit rating downgrade due to bad luck experience a three year reduction in financing consumers respond to the shock by paying down their most troubled loans but nonetheless end up more likely to exit the credit market for a set of borrowers who experience severe delinquency we find that the associated credit reporting downgrade itself accounts for 25 to 65 of their observed decline in borrowing at various horizons over the following several years

aid growth and devolution summary this paper examines whether the degree of fiscal decentralization in aid receiving countries matters in explaining aid effectiveness the decentralization theorem predicts that the devolution of powers should increase aid effectiveness since local decision makers are better informed about local needs thereby decentralization may also have reverse effects e g through coordination problems excessive regulation administrative costs and local capture we use panel data for up to 60 countries and find that aid contributes to economic growth in centralized developing economies whereas it is less effective or even harmful in decentralized countries the cases of indonesia the philippines and uganda support our findings our results imply that donor countries should carefully consider how the two development instruments foreign aid and decentralization interact

does legal enforcement affect financial transactions the contractual channel in private equity analyzing 210 developing country private equity investments we find that transactions vary with nations legal enforcement whether measured directly or through legal origin investments in high enforcement and common law nations often use convertible preferred stock with covenants in low enforcement and civil law nations private equity groups tend to use common stock and debt and rely on equity and board control transactions in high enforcement countries have higher valuations and returns while relying on ownership rather than contractual provisions may help to alleviate legal enforcement problems these results suggest that private solutions are only a partial remedy

right target wrong mechanism agricultural modernization and poverty reduction in uganda summary household consumption surveys suggest that the downward trend in rural poverty indicators recorded in uganda during the 1990s has been reversed since 2000 this paper examines the ugandan government s strategy to reduce rural poverty the plan for modernization of agriculture pma it argues that while there appear few better choices of target for the pma than to improve incomes of the rural poor through increased agricultural productivity emphasis on decentralization as a mechanism for poverty reduction is misplaced in the current political context of uganda the paper considers what alternative mechanisms might better deliver reductions in rural poverty

regulations market structure institutions and the cost of financial intermediation this paper examines the impact of bank regulations market structure and national institutions on bank net interest margins and overhead costs using data on over 1400 banks across 72 countries while controlling for bankspecific characteristics the data indicate that tighter regulations on bank entry and bank activities boost the cost of financial intermediation inflation also exerts a robust positive impact on bank margins and overhead costs while concentration is positively associated with net interest margins this relationship breaksdownwhencontrolling for regulatory impediments to competition and inflation furthermore bank regulations become insignificant when controlling for national indicators of economic freedom or property rights protection while these institutional indicators robustly explain cross bank net interest margins and overhead expenditures thus bank regulations cannot be viewed in isolation they reflect broad national approaches to private property and competition

making reform work institutions dispositions and the improving health of bangladesh we examine whether local governance can improve social development empirically using good and bad cases of public health outcomes in bangladesh we explore the institutional underpinnings of service provision digging down beneath the rules of the game to analyze the beliefs understandings and dispositions that drive social behavior changes in deep social attitudes led to improvements in social indicators regional variation in health outcomes is explained by the presence or absence of a dense web of relationships that enmeshed reformers in local systems of authority and legitimacy strengthening their actions and making local society more susceptible to change

the stability of household production technology a replication our article develops and estimates a structural model of household health production that jointly determines the demand for leisure and the demand for consumption for elderly males we use a stochastic dynamic programming framework based on the

do liquidation values affect financial contracts evidence from commercial loan contracts and zoning regulation we examine the impact of asset liquidation value on debt contracting using a unique set of commercial property loan contracts we employ commercial zoning regulation to capture the flexibility of a property s permitted uses as a measure of an asset s redeployability or value in its next best use within a census tract more redeployable assets receive larger loans with longer maturities and durations lower interest rates and fewer creditors controlling for the property s type sale price and earnings to price ratio these results are consistent with incomplete contracting and transaction cost theories of liquidation value and financial structure

the benefits of lending relationships evidence from small business data this paper empirically examines how ties between a firm and its creditors affect the availability and cost of funds to the firm we analyze data collected in a survey of small firms by the small business administration the primary benefit of building close ties with an institutional creditor is that the availability of financing increases we find smaller effects on the price of credit attempts to widen the circle of relationships by borrowing from multiple lenders increases the price and reduces the availability of credit in sum relationships are valuable and appear to operate more through quantities rather than prices

credit ratings collateral and loan characteristics implications for yield this article studies how collateral affects bond yields using a large data set of public bonds we document that collateralized debt has higher yield than general debt after controlling for credit rating our model of agency problems between managers and claim holders explains this puzzling result by recognizing imperfections in the rating process we test the model s implications consistent with our model and in results new to the literature we find the yield differential between secured and unsecured debt after controlling for credit rating is larger for low credit rating nonmortgage assets longer maturity and with proxies for lower levels of monitoring

bankruptcy law and bank financing exploiting the timing of the 2005 2006 italian bankruptcy law reforms we disentangle the effects of reorganization and liquidation in bankruptcy on bank financing and firm investment a 2005 reform introduces reorganization procedures facilitating loan renegotiation the 2006 reform subsequently strengthens creditor rights in liquidation the first reform increases interest rates and reduces investment the second reform reduces interest rates and spurs investment our results highlight the importance of identifying the distinct effects of liquidation and reorganization as these procedures differently address the tension in bankruptcy law between the continuation of viable businesses and the preservation of repayment incentives

economic policy distribution and poverty the nature of disagreements abstract the last 20 years have seen growing areas of agreement on poverty reduction strategies but disagreements on economic policy distribution and poverty seem to have intensified this paper tries to identify the underlying nature of these disagreements related to differences in perspective and framework between finance ministry and civil society tendencies it is argued that the deep divisions one sees can be located in differences in the level of aggregation adopted the time horizon considered and assumptions made on market structure and power mutual understanding could be advanced by further exploration of these differences and the adoption by both sides of the approach of dialogue rather than negotiation

the politics of staying poor exploring the political space for poverty reduction in uganda summary despite claims that uganda s recent success in poverty reduction has been significantly related to getting the politics right there are concerns that the poorest may not have benefited from this form of poverty reduction or the types of politics that have helped shape it employing the analytical framework of political space reveals that although some of the poorest groups are represented within the political system political discourse reveals a strong bias toward the economically active leaving the poorest excluded from poverty programs significantly there is an increasing divergence between the regime s political project of modernization and the international poverty agenda with important implications for the poorest

default and renegotiation a dynamic model of debt we analyze the role of debt in persuading an entrepreneur to pay out cash e ows rather than to divertthem in the e rstpartof the paper we study the optimal debt contract specie cally the trade off between the size of the loan and the repayment under the assumption that some debt contract is optimal in the second part we consider a more general class of nondebt contracts and derive sufficient conditions for debt to be optimal among these

an exogeneity test for a simultaneous equation tobit model with an application to labor supply a test of weak exogeneity in the simultaneous equation tobit model is proposed and illustrated using a female labour supply model estimated using cross section data the test statistic can be simply output from any standard tobit maximum likelihood package and is asymptotically efficient the procedure provides consistent estimators for the simultaneous tobit model whose asymptotic covariance matrix is a simple extension of the usual tobit formula we also provide the lagrange multiplier test of weak exogeneity this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

evaluating the effects of optimally distributed public programs child health and family planning interventions this paper develops and tests an optimizing model determining the distribution of family planning and health subsidies across heterogeneous households and assesses the biases in cross area estimates of the health effects of such subsidies due to public resource optimization the model incorporates both health externalities and the endogenous response of the size of the recipient population to program subsidies longitudinal data describing child health and publicly provided family planning and health programs in 20 barrios in laguna province in the philippines are used to estimate the effects of such programs on child health and the relationships between the distribution of the programs and preprogram health levels the impact of a program on a particular childs health status is viewed as dependent upon the childs length of exposure to the program a basic feature of the model is the presence of health externalities which is shown to be sufficient along with plausible features of household behavior to make selective subsidization of fertility control either alone or in combination with health investment subsidies pareto efficient the model suggests that subsidization of fertility control is likely to be pareto efficient in the presence of health or human capital externalities when human capital and family size are gross substitutes and or when any per child human capital subsidies may substitute for direct subsidies to health investment and an equalizing distribution of the subsidies the highest family planning subsidies to the lowest health recipient households is efficient when both health and family planning subsidies are used fertility control subsidies minimize the subsidy burden for donors and are highest when total subsidy expenditures per child are greatest