financial intermediary coalitions abstract in this article an environment in which the investment opportunities of agents are private information is studied and it is shown that financial intermediaries arise endogenously within that environment it is established that financial intermediaries are part of an efficient arrangement in the sense that they are needed to support the authors private information core allocations these intermediaries which are coalitions of agents exhibit the following characteristics in equilibrium they borrow from and lend to large groups of agents they produce information about investment projects and they issue claims that have different state contingent payoffs than claims issued by ultimate borrowers

value function approximation in the presence of uncertainty and inequality constraints an application to the demand for credit cards abstract we present an algorithm for approximating the solution to discrete time stochastic dynamic programs with inequality constraints the algorithm exploits the state preference approach to choice under uncertainty to reduce the dimensionality of the state space and polynomial approximation to improve computational efficiency it is particularly useful in financial applications involving liquidity and credit constraints and more than one asset the algorithm provides information about the derivatives of the value function and therefore risk aversion along with asset demands

competition in interregional taxation the case of western coal markets for many products are dominated by small group of states or countries with a natural advantage in the marketplace because of some initial endowment of resources favorable climate or location the purpose of this paper is to explore how such markets involving a few political jurisdictions interact noncooperatively we examine how such a market might be structured and operate and the extent of monopoly rent that can be extracted in the absence of collusion we answer these questions for an empirically estimated model of western u s coal in which two states montana and wyoming dominate production we demonstrate that in this market the amount of rent that can be extracted is greatly reduced through competition relative to a cartel nevertheless even with two producing states competing against each other significant rents can be captured significant enough to refute the contention that little rent can accrue without a cartel

coalitional bargaining with consistent counterfactuals abstract we propose a new solution concept for tu cooperative games in characteristic function form the scoop which builds on the symmetric nash bargaining solution nbs by adding a consistency requirement for negotiations inside every coalition the scoop specifies the probability of success and the payoffs to each coalition the players share the surplus of a coalition according to the nbs the disagreement payoffs are computed as the expectation of payoffs in other coalitions using a common probability distribution that is derived from the prior distribution the predicted outcome can be probabilistic or deterministic but only an efficient coalition can succeed with probability one we discuss the necessary and sufficient conditions for an efficient solution in either case the scoop always exists is generically unique for superadditive games and is easy to compute moreover in the spirit of the nash program we propose a non cooperative protocol whose stationary equilibrium identifies the scoop as the limit equilibrium outcome

costly monitoring financial intermediation and equilibrium credit rationing abstract this paper establishes a link between equilibrium credit rationing and financial intermediation in a model with asymmetrically informed lenders and borrowers costly monitoring and investment project indivisibilities intermediation is shown to dominate borrowing and lending between individuals and these financial intermediaries exhibit several of the important features of intermediaries as we know them equilibrium interest rates and the aggregate quantity of loans respond quite differently to changes in taste and technology parameters depending on whether or not there is rationing in equilibrium

bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers abstract we analyze bargaining between buyers and sellers who are connected by an exogenously given network players can make repeated alternating public offers that may be accepted by any of the responders linked to each specific proposer our purpose is to find the conditions of the network which drive the price distribution in equilibrium this paper uses graph theory tools to provide necessary and sufficient conditions regarding the architecture of networks for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game to coincide with the walrasian outcome

what s different about banks abstract negotiable certificates of deposit cd s trade in the capital market in competition with other securities like commercial paper and bankers acceptances if cd s must pay lenders competitive monetary interest the reserve tax on cd s is borne by bank borrowers viability of the tax means there must be something special about bank loans that makes some borrowers willing to pay higher interest rates than those on other securities of equivalent risk moreover there must be something special about banks that prevents other intermediaries from competing to assure that it never pays to finance loans with cd s

bargaining dynamics in exchange networks abstract we consider a one sided assignment market or exchange network with transferable utility and the dynamics of bargaining in such a market our dynamical model is local involving iterative updates of offers based on estimated best alternative matches in the spirit of pairwise nash bargaining agents are not strategic in our model we establish that when a balanced outcome a generalization of the pairwise nash bargaining solution to networks exists our dynamics converges rapidly to such an outcome

a clower constraint model of unbacked money abstract the stylized monetary facts 1 money growth causes inflation 2 inflation is bad 3 money demand depends upon the nominal interest rate 4 the real interest rate equals a parametrically fixed rate of time preference and 5 investment depends upon the real interest rate are produced in a grandmont younes modified clower constraint model of money inflation is distorting but is no one s intertemporal rate of substitution inflation discourages trade but not investment as a by product the friedman hypothesis that the optimal deflation equals the rate of time preference is confirmed in the model

financial intermediation business failures and real business cycles in this paper a general equilibrium business cycle model is construct ed that when subjected to real disturbances mimics observed qualita tive comovements among real output money business failures risk pr emia intermediary loans and prices in contrast monetary disturban ces generate cycles that have several inconsistencies with empirical evidence thus providing support for real business cycle theory at th e expense of monetary theories of the business cycle financial inter mediation arises endogenously in the model and intermediation matters for business cycle behavior a credit supply mechanism acts in tande m with an intertemporal substitution effect in propagating stochastic disturbances copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

transactions costs inflation and the variety of intermediation services a general equilibrium model with fixed costs of financial intermediation and costs of transacting with intermediaries is constructed this model is used to show that ignoring fixed costs of in termediation is not innocuous in tobin baumol type transactions cost models of money demand deflation is optimal in spite of the fact that an increase in inflation reduces nominal interest rates and may increase the transactions costs incurred by all groups of economic agents changes in reserve requirements have ambiguous effects the authors obtain novel results due to the fact that the variety of intermediation services is affected by government intervention copyright 1987 by ohio state university press

on efficiency and distribution this paper is a theoretical study of alternative ways of allocating resources in an exchange economy in which individual preferences are subject to unpredictable shocks that cannot be monitored efficiency in this economy requires wealth inequality to increase over time the paper is based on the author s 1991 harry johnson lecture copyright 1992 by royal economic society

saving and liquidity constraints this paper is concerned with the theory of saving when consumers are not permitted to borrow and with the ability of such a theory to account for some of the stylized facts of saving behavior the models presented in the paper seem to account for important aspects of reality that are not explained by traditional life cycle models copyright 1991 by the econometric society

the equilibrium vector of pairwise bargained agency contracts with diverse actors and principals owning a fixed resource abstract the equilibrium vector of agency contracts where actors on both sides of the market are heterogenous and principals own a fixed resource is characterized and analyzed here auction markets are replaced by simultaneous multiple pair wise bargaining between principals and agents it is shown that the traditional analysis focusing on a single contract may lead to serious errors in addition the present analysis yields results concerning the equilibrium matching of principals and agents resource allocation across contracts and intercontract organizational externalities the latter are shown to create system inefficiencies

the relativity ability to tax coal in the western states over the past decade state governments have begun to acknowledge an implicit relationship between states in the tax setting process the recent taxation literature suggests that differences in tax burdens do affect economic decisions and that states do compete with each other when designing tax policy moreover there has been a growing interest in the theoretical models of strategic interactions between regions as they compete for tax revenues natural source laden states enjoy an advantage in the collection of own source revenues reserves of coal oil copper or other natural resources with a national market provide states with an opportunity to exploit their advantage through the imposition of severance taxes the purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between the western states in their relative power to tax the extraction of coal in section ii of this paper we examine earlier work on the taxation of western coal section iii contains the details of the coal model we use in section iv we determine the composition of the western coal market and the strategic tax setting behavior of the state governments involved in section v we discuss our empirical results 17 refs 2 tabs

optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital abstract this paper is concerned with the structure and time consistency of optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital in a dynamic context optimal taxation means distributing tax distortions over time in a welfare maximizing way for a barter economy our main finding is that with debt commitments of sufficiently rich maturity structure an optimal policy if one exists is time consistent in a monetary economy the idea of optimal taxation must be broadened to include an inflation tax and we find that time consistency does not carry over an optimal inflation tax requires commitment by rules in a sense that has no counterpart in the dynamic theory of ordinary excise taxes the reason time consistency fails in a monetary economy is that nominal assets should from a welfare maximizing point of view always be taxed away via an immediate inflation in a kind of capital levy this emerges as a new possibility when money is introduced into an economy without capital

non cooperative bargaining theory an introduction the paper provides an informal introduction to some of the main themes of the recent literature on non cooperative or sequential bargaining models it focuses in particular on the relationship between the new approach and the traditional axiomatic approach exemplified by nash bargaining theory it illustrates the new insights offered by the non cooperative approach by reference to a detailed analysis of the manner in which the presence of an outside option available to one of the parties will affect the negotiated outcome finally the difficulties which arise in extending this analysis to two person bargaining with incomplete information and to n person bargaining are discussed this is a revised version of the fourth review of economic studies lecture presented in april 1985 at the joint meeting of the association of university teachers of economics and the royal economic society held in oxford the choice of lecturer is made by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay and the paper is refereed in the usual way this paper aims to provide an informal and elementary introduction to an approach to bargaining which has received a great deal of attention over the past few years the approach involves writing down some particular sequence of moves offers and replies to be made over time in the course of negotiations and then looking for a non cooperative equilibrium in the game thus specified in practice a perfect equilibrium or in games of incomplete information a sequential equilibrium while the approach appears at first sight to be very different in spirit from the traditional axiomatic approach in which a bargaining solution is specified by appealing to a number of general requirements which are deemed appropriate on the basis of some a priori considerations the two approaches are in fact complementary while the

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

money and asset prices in a cash in advance economy an asset pricing model with money introduced via a cash in advance constraint is presented the monetary velocity is variable hence money demand does not obey the trivial quantity equation the effects of disturbances in output and money growth on real balances the price level and interest rates are examined monetary policy has effects on real asset prices the fisher relation and the premium on nominal bonds are discussed the precise role of the timing of information and transactions for properties of price levels and interest rates are clarified

multilateral bargaining problems abstract in many situations in economics and political science there are gains from forming coalitions but conflict over which coalition to form and how to distribute the gains this paper presents an approach to such multilateral bargaining problems a solution to a multilateral bargaining problem specifies an agreement for each coalition that is consistent with the bargaining process in every coalition we establish the existence of such solutions show that they are determined by reservation prices and characterize these reservation prices as the payoffs of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of a non cooperative bargaining model journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 c72 c78

a price discrimination analysis of monetary policy monetary policy is analysed within a model that appeals to legal restrictions on private intermediation to explain the coexistence of currency and interest bearing default free bonds the interaction between such legal restrictions and monetary policy is illustrated in a version of the overlapping generations model the model shows that legal restrictions and the use of both currency and bonds permit the government to levy a nonlinear inflation tax and that such a tax may be better in terms of the pareto criterion than a linear inflation tax

asymmetric tax competition abstract the paper analyzes nash equilibrium when two jurisdictions set tax rates on a tax base which is mobile between them population differences imply tax differences the smaller jurisdiction levies a lower tax rate in equilibrium and its residents are better off than those in the larger jurisdiction the nash equilibrium is inefficient if the two jurisdictions merged the resulting allocation would be efficient however if differences in population are great enough residents of the small jurisdiction would be made worse off by such a merger

a bargaining model with incomplete information about time preferences etude d un jeu de negociation strategique sequentiel avec information incomplete caracterisation d une classe d equilibres sequentiels appeles equilibres sequentiels de negociation et demonstration de l unicite de cet equilibre

commodity tax competition between member states of a federation equilibrium and efficiency we first describe regional market equilibria whereupon consumers of each region allocate their purchases of private goods between domestic and nondomestic ones according to the structure of relative prices taxes and transportation costs next regional optimal tax levels and public good quantities are derived the tax of the other region being held constant fiscal competition arises from the ability of one region in choosing its tax to alter the tax base of the other

liquidity banking and bank failures a multiperiod model with risk neutral agents is constructed in which a liquidity problem arises in an equilibrium with decentralized tradin g in capital which banking institutions are able to alleviate depos it contracts provide for early withdrawal banks hold debt and agent s who borrow from banks hold compensating balances institutional col lapse or a state of the world when bank failures are experienced is associated with a high demand for liquidity low output and a lower than average level of welfare bank failure is symptomatic of a part icular state of endowments preferences and technology and governme nt intervention is undesirable copyright 1988 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

money and interest in a cash in advance economy the authors analyze an aggregative general equilibrium model in which the use of money is motivated by a cash in advance constraint applied to purchases of a subset of consumption goods the system is subject to both real and monetary shocks which are economy wide and observed by all they develop methods for verifying the existence of characterizing and explicitly calculating equilibria copyright 1987 by the econometric society

the sensitivity of consumption to transitory income estimates from panel data on households we investigate the stochastic relation between income and consumption specifically consumption of food within a panel of about 2 000 households our major findings are 1 consumption responds much more strongly to permanent than to transitory movements of income 2 the response to transitory income is nonetheless clearly positive 3 a simple test independent of our model of consumption rejects a central implication of the pure life cycle permanent income hypothesis the observed covariation of income and consumption is compatible with pure life cycle permanent income behavior on the part of80 percent of families and simple proportionality of consumption and income among the remaining 20 percent as a general matter our findings support the view that families respond differently to different sources of income variations in particular temporary income tax policies have smaller effects on consumption than do other more permanent changes in income of the same magnitude this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

anticipated inflation and the capital stock in a cash in advance economy abstract an economy is constructed in which the steady state capital stock is inversely related to the rate of inflation as a result that is directly opposite the usual conclusion

monetary policy and bank regulations in an economy with financial innovations this is a study of financial innovations and moves towards the cashless society in a general equilibrium cash in advance model it is assumed that a subset of goods cash goods and check goods

the liquidity services of money this paper investigates the liquidity services provided by cash interest bearing check balances and securities which pay higher interest than checks securities must be traded before con sumers know their desired level or composition of consumption cash a nd checks are more liquid since they are available on demand cas h is more liquid than checks since it is more widely useable as a medium of exchange cash will often be used to buy goods which could be bought by check and the demand for cash will be less sensitive t han the demand for checks to the interest paid on check balances copyright 1988 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

on efficient distribution with private information this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with many consumers each of whom is subject to private idiosyncratic taste shocks we propose a recursive method for finding feasible allocations that are incentivecompatible and that are pareto optimal within this set the method is applied to several parametric examples we find that in an efficient allocation the degree of inequality continually increases with a diminishing fraction of the population receiving an increasing fraction of the resources we discuss the extent to which these allocations can be decentralized via market arrangements this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with private information the economy we study has a constant endowment flow of a single non storable consumption good which is to be allocated each period among a large number of consumers each period these consumers experience unpredictable idiosyncratic privately observed taste shocks affecting their marginal utility of current consumption efficiency dictates that more resources be allocated to those consumers who in any given period have a high marginal utility of current consumption

possibilities for the exportation of production taxes a general equilibrium analysis abstract this paper re evaluates previous discussions of inter regional tax incidence and tax exportation a two region general equilibrium model is developed that allows for inter regional capital mobility and explicit commodity price determination where one of the two regions is incompletely specialized conditions are determined under which either region will be able to export a production tax also the link between tax exportation and the welfare of the taxing region is analyzed in the case where taxes are not equal to zero initially tax exportation may be inadvisable even when it is possible

the economics of western coal severance taxes the recent upheavals in fuel markets have altered competitive relationships between fuels rising prices and government regulations have eliminated oil and gas from consideration as fuels for new electric utility plants further public acceptance of nuclear power has diminished to the point that coal is the only practical alternative source of energy for new base load generation facilities this change in market structure creates opportunities for those with market power the demand for coal has become less elastic and those in a position to exert market power can take advantage of the situation to raise prices the coal industry itself is competitive coal producers will in the long run be forced to sell at long run marginal cost where marginal cost reflects the cost of production as well as the competitive rent accruing to owners of depletable resources labor supply is to an extent controlled by the united mine workers union yet competition from nonunion miners limits the union s ability to act 1 other elements of the inincreases in oil and gas prices and the decline of nuclear power have led to an increase in the competitiveness of coal this change in relative economics has been particularly great for the six western coalproducing states where large low cost deposits of environmentally acceptable low sulfur coal are found montana and wyoming have responded to this situation by raising severance taxes substantially and other states are considering similar actions this has led to congressional attempts to limit state coal taxes using an integrated model of the u s coal and electric utility industries this paper estimates how high coal severance taxes might rise with and without such legislation competition and incentives for cooperation between montana wyoming and other western states are examined efficiency and distributional implications are discussed an earlier and much different version of this paper was issued as hoover institution working paper e80 9 we are indebted to george rozanski and carol bugbee for help in implementing the model described herein and to an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions we are also indebted to the m i t center for energy policy research for the support that allowed us to complete this revised version and to the hoover institution for its initial support 1 western coal production has expanded most rapidly and miners there are largely nonunion

consistent bargaining conjectures in marriage and matching abstract in this model of bargaining in marriage markets we assume that each couple bargains in a systematic way over the distribution of the utility of their marriage and that each market participant has accurate conjectures about the utility he or she could obtain through a similar bargaining process with every other potential partner this paper formulates the bargaining model characterizes consistent conjectures and characterizes the matchings which are stable with respect to these conjectures

a noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining the authors explore a sequential offers model of n person coalitional bargaining with transferable utility and with time discounting their focus is on the efficiency properties of stationary equilibria of strictly superadditive games when the discount factor delta is sufficiently large it is shown that delay and the formation of inefficient subcoalitions can occur in equilibrium the latter for some or all orders of proposer however efficient stationary equilibrium payoffs converge to a point in the core as delta approaches one strict convexity is a sufficient condition for there to exist an efficient stationary equilibrium payoff vector for sufficiently high delta

hoarding in general equilibrium hoarding of money supply increases can explain long and variable lags from money supply changes to changes in aggregate expenditure and average prices the archibald lipsey model relies upon differences in income elasticities of demand for real money balances to explain aggregate hoarding of money supply changes consequently there is no presumption that average prices and aggregate expenditure will lag behind money supply increases this paper presents a general equilibrium model where money supply increases are partially hoarded in the short run lagged adjustment results from intertemporal substitution rather than income effects and the adjustment of aggregate expenditure and average prices is monotonic copyright 1990 by the london school of economics and political science

monotonic solutions to general cooperative games etude de jeux cooperatifs qui sont des jeux a plusieurs joueurs mis sous la forme de coalition dans lesquels l utilite n est pas supposee etre transferable

groups collective decisions and markets abstract we consider a general equilibrium model where multi member households make efficient collective consumption decisions and operate in a competitive market environment individuals have the option to leave the household and make it on their own or join another household we study the effect of these outside options on household formation household stability and equilibrium existence

experimental games on networks underpinnings of behavior and equilibrium selection in this paper we describe a series of laboratory experiments that implement specific examples of a general network structure specifically actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements and participants have either complete or incomplete information about the structure of a random network since economic environments typically have a considerable degree of complementarity or substitutability this framework applies to a wide variety of settings we examine behavior and equilibrium selection the degree of equilibrium play is striking in particular with incomplete information behavior closely resembles the theoretical equilibrium whenever this is unique when there are multiple equilibria general features of networks such as connectivity clustering and the degree of the players help to predict informed behavior in the lab people appear to be strongly attracted to maximizing aggregate payoffs social efficiency but there are forces that moderate this attraction 1 people seem content with in the aggregate capturing only the lion s share of the efficient profits in exchange for reduced exposure to loss and 2 uncertainty about the network structure makes it considerably more difficult to coordinate on a demanding but efficient equilibrium that is typically implemented with complete information

cost of business cycles with indivisibilities and liquidity constraints it is almost universally agreed that individuals face incomplete insurance markets and cannot perfectly insure against the idiosyncratic risk in this paper simple general equilibrium models with incomplete insurance markets are examined in order to assess the impact of imperfect insurance on the magnitude of the welfare costs of business cycles two versions of incomplete insurance markets are considered and certain statistical properties of the equilibrium stochastic processes in these environments are compared with those of a perfect insurance economy

income fluctuation and asymmetric information an example of a repeated principal agent problem we examine a simple repeated principal agent model with discounting there are a risk averse borrower with an unobservable random income and a risk neutral lender the efficient contract is characterized it tends to the first best constant consumption contract as the discount factor tends to one and the time horizon extends to infinity if the time horizon is infinite and the contract is legally enforceable the borrower s utility becomes arbitrarily negative with probability one if the borrower has constant absolute risk aversion consumption is transferred between any two states at a constant interest rate which is less than the rate of time preference

a decentralized model of information pricing in networks we propose a recursive method of pricing an information good in a network of holders and demanders of this good the prices are determined via a unique equilibrium outcome in a sequence of bilateral bargaining games that are played by connected agents if the information is a homogenous non depreciating good without network effects we derive explicit formulae which elucidate the role of the link pattern among the players particularly we find out that the equilibrium price is intimately related to the existence of cycles in the network it is zero if a cycle covers the trading pair and it is proportional to the direct and indirect utility that the good generates otherwise

sequential bargaining with incomplete information this paper describes a simple two person two period bargaining game and solves it using the concept of perfect bayesian equilibrium in which the actions of each player convey information which is used by his opponent the paper examines the effects of changes in bargaining costs the size of the contract zone and the length of the bargaining process on such aspects of the solution as the probability of impasse and the likelihood of concessions the combination of information transfer and the lack of pre commitment embodied in perfectness yields many surprising results common perceptions about the effects of parameter changes on bargaining processes are suspect and should be checked in the particular game being discussed

shifting incidence and interstate exportation of production taxes on energy resources this paper analyzes the shifting incidence and interstate exportation of state and local government production taxes on four primary energy resources in the united states coal uranium oil and natural gas results of the analysis are then compared with those obtained from a standard partial equilibrium incidence model although a limited literature in this area does exist the discussion focuses more directly on the ways general incidence models must be modified to be appropriately applied to these natural resources from both a short run and a long run perspective 24 references

interest rates in a credit constrained economy when households face credit constraints in an economy with inside as well as outside money stationary equilibrium real interest rates are below the household rate of time preference they also depend significantly upon household risk aversion the demand for inside versus outside money bank costs bank reserves inflation and the marginal productivity of capital and capital depreciation rates in addition changes in financial variables affect per capita capital and output to a greater extent when households are credit constrained copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

money and banking in a cash in advance economy this paper studies banking and financial innovations in a stochasti c general equilibrium model assuming the existence of two distinct types of goods cash goods which can only be purchased by cash and check goods which can also be purchased by checks drawn against interest bearing bank accounts the authors analyze the effects of changes in the payment s structure i e the share of check goods reserve requirements on banks and changes in the supply of reserves the authors find e g that an increased share of check goods and a decrease of the bank reserve ratio in general both lead to a decrease in the variance of the price level copyright 1988 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association