immobility rationing and price competition a model is studied where firms advertise prices and buyers play a noncooperative search game in an attempt to secure output from firms at the advertised prices firms face rising marginal costs and may not be willing to supply everything demanded at their price if they wind up with many buyers it is shown that rationing will occur in equilibrium no matter how averse buyers are to this possibility the result is specialised to a case where rationing occurs with probability one the equilibrium price and outputs are characterised for this case the theory of search has taken the literature in imperfect competition in an important direction by analysing the behaviour of buyers and sellers in an environment where there is no centralised technique for coordinating the choice decisions of buyers in this paradigm buyers are uninformed about the price that is charged by each different store essentially buyers cannot observe the strategies of individual firms an apparently more common but little analysed problem occurs when buyers can observe the pricing strategies of firms because of advertising but cannot observe the choice strategies of other buyers the ex post utility enjoyed by the buyer is uncertain because he does not know whether capacity constraints or rising costs might force the firm to ration or delay delivery if too many buyers choose the same firm

government spending the balance of trade and the terms of trade in british history abstract this paper investigates the relationship between government spending the balance of trade and the terms of trade using early british data a large open economy intertemporal framework in which ricardian equivalence holds predicts a larger effect of temporary government spending changes on the trade deficit than permanent ones further a pure switch between debt and taxes should have no effect on trade flows the results provide some support for these hypotheses although they are sensitive to sample period and the method of decomposition of government spending a negative relationship between government spending and the terms of trade is also found

open economy implications of two models of business fluctuations a wage contract model and misperceptions model of aggregate fluctuations are shown to have strikingly different implications when applied to a small open economy with a flexible exchange rate positive monetary disturbances reduce the relative price of non traded goods and create a trade surplus in the wage contract model but raise the relative price of non traded goods and create a trade deficit in the misperceptions model they also have different implications for production in each industry consumption nominal prices and the exchange rate open economy applications of macro economic models are shown to be a useful source of additional testable implications

money burning and multiple equilibria in bargaining abstract this paper synthesizes recent work on delay and multiple equilibria in complete information rubinstein bargaining we identify a general principle money burning underlying prior results and develop a general model of the phenomena money burning is a threat by one player to destroy surplus which can serve to enhance that player s bargaining power if it is credible our results show that the uniqueness and efficiency properties of the subgame perfect equilibrium of rubinstein bargaining are vulnerable to players ability to burn money journal of economic literature classification number 026

a new approach to decomposition of economic time series into permanent and transitory components with particular attention to measurement of the business cycle abstract this paper introduces a general procedure for decomposition of non stationary time series into a permanent and transitory component allowing both components to be stochastic the permanent component is shown to be a random walk with drift and the transitory or cyclical component is a stationary process with mean zero the decomposition methodology which depends only on past data and therefore is computable in real time is applied to the problem of measuring and dating business cycles in the portwar u s economy we find that measured expansions and contractions are of roughly equivalent duration and that our dating of cyclical episodes tends to lead the traditional nber dating and to a lesser extent the growth cycle chronology of zarnowitz and boschan 1977

an examination of the effects of government purchases in an open economy this paper examines the effects of permanent and transitory changes in government purchases in the context of a model of a small open economy that produces and consumes both traded and nontraded goods the model incorporates an equilibrium interpretation of the business cycle that emphasizes the responsiveness of agents to intertemporal relative price changes it is demonstrated that transitory increases in government purchases lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate and an ambiguous change although a likely worsening in the current account while permanent increases have an ambiguous impact on the real exchange rate and no effect on the current account when agents do not know whether a given increase in government purchases is permanent or transitory the effect is a weighted average of these separate effects the weights depend on the relative variances of the transitory and permanent components of government purchases in the past few years a considerable amount of effort has been devoted to examining the effects of macroeconomic policy in an open economy such issues as exchange rate overshooting deviations from purchasing power parity sterilization and monetary control the effectiveness of monetary policy and the choice between alternative exchange rate regimes have been at center stage the models that have been employed to study these issues have run the spectrum from variants of the mundell fleming model such as dornbusch 1976 turnovsky 1981 and kimbrough 1983a to wage contracting and indexing models like bhandari 1982b and flood and marion 1982 to equilibrium models of the business cycle along the lines of bhandari 1982a saidi 1982 and kimbrough 1983b to the closely related intertemporal utility maximization models with money of helpman 1981 and stockman 1980 1983 one common thread that in a sense unifies all of these and other recent contributions is that they are concerned primarily with the effects of alternative monetary and exchange rate policies that the central bank might enact in light of the development and refinement during this period of the monetary approach to the balance of payments and the exchange rate it is not surprising i would like to thank phil brock jeremy greenwood gary zarkin and two anonymous

the effects of government spending on non traded goods it is widely believed that fluctuations in government spending influence economic variables such as output consumption investment and real interest rates recent business cycle models have reemphasized that government purchases have a substantial business cycle role works of barro 8 and hall 15 have inspired a great deal of research in identifying and quantifying the effects of government purchases during business cycle episodes this paper pursues this line of research in particular it studies theoretically and empirically the role of government purchases in the cyclical behavior of the relative price of non traded goods in terms of traded goods and output of non traded goods in a two country world following barro 8 it emphasizes the distinction between temporary and permanent government spending since these two components have different implications for wealth and consequently have different effects on the economy this paper illustrates that temporary foreign government spending reduces the home relative price of non traded goods and output of home non traded goods temporary home government spending raises output of home non traded goods the effects of home temporary government spending on the home relative price of non traded goods are in general ambiguous the empirical implementation of the model employs canadian and u s quarterly data for the period 1968 1 1987 111 we treat canada as the home country and the u s as the foreign country and estimate the model by nonlinear least squares the results indicate that temporary u s government spending reduces the canadian relative price of non traded goods and output of non traded goods the results also suggest that temporary canadian government spending raises output of canadian non traded goods and reduces the canadian relative price of non traded

bargaining and reputation the paper develops a reputation based theory of bargaining the idea is to investigate and highlight the influence of bargaining postures on bargaining outcomes a complete information bargaining model a la rubinstein is amended to accommodate irrational types who are obstinate and indeed for tractability assumed to be completely inflexible in their offers and demands a strong independence of procedures result is derived after initial postures have been adopted the bargaining outcome is independent of the fine details of the bargaining protocol so long as both players have the opportunity to make offers frequently the latter analysis yields a unique continuous time limit with a war of attrition structure in the continuous time game equilibrium is unique and entails delay consequently inefficiency the equilibrium outcome reflects the combined influence of the rates of time preference of the players and the ex ante probabilities of different irrational types as the probability of irrationality goes to zero delay and inefficiency disappear furthermore if there is a rich set of types for both agents the limit equilibrium payoffs are inversely proportional to their rates of time preference

output effects of government purchases the theoretical analysis focuses on the distinction between temporary and permanent movements in government purchases under plausible conditions the temporary case involves an output response that is positive less than one to one with the change in government purchases and larger than that generated by an equal sized but permanent shift in purchase the equilibrium real rate of return rise in the temporary case but changes little in the permanent one defense purchases are divided empirically into permanent and temporary components by considering the role of temporary wars no temporary shifts in nondefense purchases were isolated empirical results verify an expansionary output effect for temporary purchases that exceeds that of permanent purchases the results for some other expectational hypotheses are found to be generally supportive of the theory

temporary and permanent government spending in an open economy some evidence for the united kingdom abstract this paper investigates the effects of government spending changes on a small open economy in an intertemporal substitution framework if agents internalize the government s budget constraint temporary and permanent spending have different implications for wealth and consequently different effects on output and the balance of trade estimation of these effects isolates the different channels through which government spending can influence economic activity main findings for the united kingdom are that government spending i crowds out private spending ii is directly productive and iii when rising permanently leads to a negative wealth effect which induces a large rise in work effort

job queues and wages this paper uses job applications data to investigate the relationship between job queues and wage differentials the main finding is that openings for jobs that pay the minimum wage attract more job applicants than jobs that pay either slightly more or slightly less than the minimum wage this spike in the job application rate distribution suggests that ex ante rents generated for employees by an above market level minimum wage are not completely dissipated by reductions in nonwage benefits in addition we find that highly unionized firms large firms and firms in high wage industries tend to receive relatively many job applicants for openings

bargaining with incomplete information an infinite horizon model with two sided uncertainty the resolution of any bargaining conflict depends crucially on the relative urgency of the agents to reach agreement and the information each agent has about the others preferences this paper explores within the context of an infinite horizon bargaining model with two sided uncertainty how timing and information affect the rational behaviour of agents when commitment is not possible since the bargainers are uncertain about whether trade is desirable they must communicate some of their private information before an agreement can be reached this need for learning due to incomplete information about preferences results in bargaining inefficiencies trade often occurs after costly delay thus the model provides an explanation for the inefficient bargaining behaviour that appears to occur often in practice

mechanism design by competing sellers a dynamic model with many sellers and buyers is constructed agents failing to trade may trade in the next period an equilibrium is found where sellers hold identical auctions and buyers randomize over the sellers they visit the distribution of buyer valuations is endogenous an auction with efficient reserve is an optimal mechanism from each seller s point of view in spite of the ability of any seller to alter the distribution of buyer types participating in the seller s mechanism by altering the mechanism copyright 1993 by the econometric society

rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection this paper explores the fundamental problem of what can be inferred about the outcome of a noncooperative game from the rationality of the players and from the information they possess the answer is summarized in a solution concept called rationalizability strategy profiles that are rationalizable are not always nash equilibria conversely the information in an extensive form game often allows certain unreasonable nash equilibria to be excluded from the set of rationalizable profiles a stronger form of rationalizability is appropriate if players are known to be not merely rational but also cautious what constitutes rational behavior in a noncooperative strategic situation this paper explores the issue in the context of a wide class of finite noncooperative games in extensive form the traditional answer relies heavily upon the idea of nash equilibrium nash 17 the position developed here however is that as a criterion for judging a profile of strategies to be reasonable choices for players in a game the nash equilibrium property is neither necessary nor sufficient some nash equilibria are intuitively unreasonable and not all reasonable strategy profiles are nash equilibria the fact that a nash equilibrium can be intuitively unattractive is well known the equilibrium may be imperfect introduced into the literature by selten 20 the idea of imperfect equilibria has prompted game theorists to search for a narrower definition of equilibrium while this research some of which will be discussed here has been extremely instructive it remains inconclusive theorists often agree about what should happen in particular games but to capture this intuition in a general solution concept has proved to be very difficult if this paper is successful it should make some progress in that direction the other side of the coin has received less scrutiny can all non nash profiles really be excluded on logical grounds i believe not the standard justifications for considering only nash profiles are circular in nature or make gratuitous assumptions about players decision criteria or beliefs the following discussion of these points is extremely brief due to space constraints more detailed arguments may be found in pearce 18

alternating offer bargaining with two sided incomplete information i study alternating offer bargaining games with two sided incomplete information about the players discount rates for both perfect bayesian equilibrium and a rationalizability style notion i characterize the set of expected payoffs which may arise in the game i also construct bounds on agreements that may be made the set of expected payoffs is easy to compute and incorporate into applied models my main result is a full characterization of the set of perfect bayesian equilibrium payoffs for games in which the distribution over the players discount rates is of wide support yet is in a weak sense close to a point mass distribution i prove a lopsided convergence result each player cannot gain from a slight chance that she is a strong type but the player can suffer greatly if there is a slight chance that she is a weak type

a letter to the editor on wage bargaining abstract the rubinstein perfect information alternating offers bargaining model is problematic when applied to wage negotiations a strike or any other industrial action is not an automatic consequence of a delay in reaching an agreement because production can continue normally also when negotiations take place this paper extends the rubinstein model to incorporate the choice of calling a strike and it is shown that in this model there is no longer a unique subgame perfect equilibrium and that strikes with a length in real time can occur in equilibrium

the equilibrium approach to fiscal policy this paper lays out a simple model for the purpose of bringing together the various strands of the analysis of fiscal policy in an optimizing competitive equilibrium model the discussion centers on the critic al assumptions lying behind the ricardian equivalence proposition th e role of the time profile and composition of public expenditure and the timing of distortional taxation copyright 1988 by ohio state university press

government spending interest rates prices and budget deficits in the united kingdom 1701 1918 abstract the british data from the early 1700s through wwi provide an unmatched opportunity for studying temporary changes in government purchases temporary increases which appeared mainly as wartime spending raised long term interest rates but significantly increased the growth rates of money and prices only during suspensions of the gold standard 1797 1821 and 1914 1918 temporary changes in military spending accounted for the bulk of budget deficits over the sample of more than 200 years i found only two major non war deficits one associated with compensation payments to slaveowners in 1835 1936 and the other with a dispute over the income tax in 1909 1910 interest rates did not react much to these exogenous deficits

efficient and competitive rationing abstract the contracts that interest us here are called priority service contracts the salient feature of such contracts is that they specify each customer s priority in obtaining service that is they specify the tank order in which a customer is served out of the available supply until all customers are served or supply is exhausted such contracts essentially establish queues for customers in section 1 the author provides some background about priority service section 2 formulates a basic model and offer several illustrations also describes two main examples that motivate the theoretical development section 3 derives some key results that show how the prices of priority service contracts are designed to induce customers to self select efficient service orders in section 4 the author discusses various ways that state enterprises can organize markets that implement priority service efficiently in section 5 we study the operation of competitive markets for priority service section 6 concludes with some summary remarks two themes are emphasized one is that a state enterprise can promote substantial efficiency gains by substituting priority service for absent spot markets the other is that oligopolistic firms may have insufficient incentives to offer efficient product diversity consequently allocative efficiency depends on entry of numerous firms even so dispersal of supplies among many firms can prevent productive efficiency when there are advantages from pooling supplies

rationality nash equilibrium and backwards induction in perfect information games we say that a player is certain of an event a if she assigns probability 1 to a there is common certainty cc of a if the event a occurred each player is certain of a each player is certain that every other player is certain of a and so forth it is shown that in a generic perfect information game the set of outcomes that are consistent with common certainty of rationality ccr at the beginning of the game coincides with the set of outcomes that survive one deletion of weakly dominated strategies and then iterative deletion of strongly dominated strategies thus the backward induction outcome is not the only outcome that is consistent with ccr in particular cooperation in rosenthal s 1981 centipede game and fighting in selten s 1978 chainstore game are consistent with ccr at the beginning of the game next it is shown that if in addition to ccr there is cc that each player assigns a positive probability to the true strategies and beliefs of the other players and if there is cc of the support of the beliefs of each player then the outcome of the game is a nash equilibrium outcome

waiting to persuade i analyze a sequential bargaining model in which players are optimistic about their bargaining power measured as the probability of making offers but learn as they play the game i show that there exists a uniquely predetermined settlement date such that in equilibrium the players always reach an agreement at that date but never reach one before it given any discount rate if the learning is sufficiently slow the players agree immediately i show that for any speed of learning the agreement is delayed arbitrarily long provided that the players are sufficiently patient therefore although excessive optimism alone cannot cause delay it can cause long delays if the players are expected to learn

is public expenditure productive abstract this paper considers the relationship between aggregate productivity and stock and flow government spending variables the empirical results indicate that i the nonmilitary public capital stock is dramatically more important in determining productivity than is either the flow of nonmilitary or military spending ii military capital bears little relation to productivity and iii a core infrastructure of streets highways airports mass transit sewers water systems etc has most explanatory power for productivity the paper also suggests an important role for the net public capital stock in the productivity slowdown of the last fifteen years

subjective games and equilibria applying the concepts of nash bayesian and correlated equilibria to the analysis of strategic interaction requires that players possess objective knowledge of the game and opponents strategies such knowledge is often not available the proposed notions of subjective games and of subjective nash and correlated equilibria replace essential but unavailable objective knowledge by subjective assessments when playing a subjective game repeatedly subjective optimizers converge to a subjective equilibrium we apply this approach to some well known examples including single and multi person multi arm bandit games and repeated cournot oligopoly games journal of economic literature classification numbers c73 and c83

real interest rates home goods and optimal external borrowing the paper investigates the optimal time path of consumption and external borrowing in the dependent economy model the small country faces given world prices and a given world real interest rate the presence of a home goods sector implies that the relevant real interest rate appropriate to consumption decisions depends on the rate of change of the real price of home goods the paper shows how transitory disturbances in output or in the world real interest rate affect the time profile of consumption and the trade balance in particular it is shown that the presence of a home goods sector dampens the consumption effects of changes in the world interest rate

bargaining under strategic uncertainty the role of second order optimism this paper shows that bargainers may reach delayed agreements even in environments where there is no uncertainty about payoffs or feasible actions under such conditions delay may arise when bargainers face direct forms of strategic uncertainty that is uncertainty about the opponent s play the paper restricts the nature of this uncertainty in two important ways first it assumes on path strategic certainty bargainers face uncertainty only after surprise moves second it assumes battigalli and siniscalchi s 2002 rationality and common strong belief of rationality rcsbr a requirement that bargainers are strategically sophisticated the main result characterizes the set of outcomes consistent with on path strategic certainty and rcsbr it shows that these assumptions allow for delayed agreement despite the fact that the bargaining environment is one of complete information the source of delay is second order optimism bargainers do not put forward good offers early in the negotiation process because they fear that doing so will cause the other party to become more optimistic about her future prospects

a walrasian theory of markets with adverse selection the paper describes a walrasian theory of markets with adverse selection and shows how refinements of equilibrium can be used to characterize uniquely the equilibrium outcome equilibrium exists under standard conditions it is shown that under certain conditions a stable set exists and is contained in a connected set of equilibria for generic models there exists a stable outcome that is all the equilibria in the stable set have the same outcome these ideas are applied to markets with one sided and two sided uncertainty under standard monotonicity conditions it is shown that the stable outcome is separating and implies a particular pattern of matches of buyers and sellers

a multistage model of bargaining this paper presents a simple multistage model of bargaining wherein a seller makes an offer that can be either accepted or refused if rejected the process continues how the seller s ability to make commitments affects bargaining outcomes is analysed by comparing the commitment equilibria to those arising when commitment is impossible the effects of increasing uncertainty about preferences and varying the length of the bargaining horizon are analysed the ways in which the bargaining environment can be changed to improve outcomes are discussed

strategic delay in bargaining this paper analyses a bargaining model with incomplete information in which the time between offers is an endogenous strategic variable we find equilibria involving a delay to agreement that is due to the use of strategic time delay by bargainers to signal their relative strength under some specifications of the parameters delay is present in the unique sequential equilibrium whose beliefs satisfy one intuitive restriction this delay does not vanish as the minimal time between offers becomes small

on the equivalence of walrasian and non walrasian equilibria in contract markets the case of complete contracts this paper explores two models of an economy in which contracts are exchanged in the first model contracts are exchanged on a competitive market in which traders expectations concerning conditions that prevail within specific markets adjust until markets clear in the second model contract designers compete directly against one another by offering alternate contracts it is shown that walrasian allocations correspond with the equilibrium allocations in the model with direct competition when the number of traders is made large furthermore the expectational assumptions that drive the walrasian analysis coincide with off the equilibrium path conjectures in the problem with direct competition