entry into pharmaceutical submarkets a bayesian panel probit analysis summary we study entry into pharmaceutical submarkets by using a dynamic panel probit model we develop a bayesian version of wooldridge s approach to dealing with unobserved heterogeneity we distinguish between greenfield entry entry with first product and undifferentiated entry which may take the form of introducing further products we extend the standard reduced form model to consider company size in the submarket and across all submarkets we find that greenfield and undifferentiated entries have different determinants that global and submarket size measures have different effects and that sunk costs often have positive effects on entry due to a commitment mechanism copyright 2012 john wiley sons ltd

beyond the racial census the political salience of ethnolinguistic cleavages in south africa careful attention to social demographics can be valuable in understanding how patterns of interethnic competition vary between countries but social demographics can also vary across different levels of social aggregation within the same polity it may be improper to draw conclusions about the political importance of a particular cleavage based on data from only one level of social aggregation in south africa race is considered to be the primary cleavage around which political competition is organized intraracial ethnolinguistic cleavages are often dismissed as unimportant especially at the national level by focusing the analysis on the local level this article demonstrates that ethnolinguistic identities are in fact broadly salient in south africa these subracial identities appear to influence aggregate political outcomes and individual vote choices the article thereby offers substantive lessons for students of south african politics and methodological lessons for students of ethnic politics more

financial development and financing constraints international evidence from the structural investment model this article provides evidence that financial development impacts growth by reducing financing constraints that would otherwise distort efficient allocation of investment the financing constraints are inferred from the investment euler equation by assuming that the firm s stochastic discount factor is a function of the firm s financial position specifically the stock of liquid assets the magnitude of the changes in the cost of capital is twice as large in a country with a low level of financial development as in a country with an average level of financial development the size effect business cycles and legal environment effects are also considered copyright 2003 oxford university press

selection and influence interest groups and congressional voting on trade policy studies of the effects of interest groups on congressional roll call voting typically view party and ideology as competing factors and rely on a factoral model of interests or a sectoral model including only interest groups with a direct stake in the vote we depart from that strategy in several ways we define interest groups at the level of standard industrial classification two digit codes and observe the universe of interests for 1979 90 we use measures of geographically and nongeographically based economic interests to estimate the representative s party and ideology we also consider the factor endowments of individuals within a district to examine their impact on floor votes we then investigate the influence of these interests on members party affiliation and ideology as well as a pool of five floor votes on foreign trade using instrumental variables for party and ideology economic interests account for a substantial portion of the variance in all cases and models that also include other explanatory variables are highly accurate in estimating floor votes

do price earnings ratios explain investment decisions better than tobin s q evidence from german firm level data abstractthis article tests the additional information content of price earnings ratios with respect to tobin s q in explaining firms investment behaviour while tobin s q describes the expected future earnings related to those projected by the book value the price earnings ratio compares future growth of earnings based on the projection of current earnings in other words a high price earnings ratio might indicate that investors are willing to rely on future earnings growth even though current earnings are low by using an unbalanced panel of about 500 listed firms from germany over the period 1987 2007 we find that including the price earnings ratio in the investment equation does not change the explanatory power of tobin s q most notably the price earnings ratio exerts a positive and significant impact on investment these results are robust to the inclusion of a measure of the firm s internal funds and of fixed effects and also to the use of different estimators

constituent interest vs legislator ideology the role of political opportunity cost this paper applies the economic model of legislative voting to the automobile industry domestic content vote in the u s house of representatives in 1982 we consider constituent interests for and against the ml and compare the predictive powers of alternative indicators of ideological preferences we also examine the role of political opportunity cost and find that lame ducks were significantly less likely to vote for the bill than were returnees to congress given the political advantages of voting for the bill this is consistent with the view that legislators were influenced by the case for freer trade

does electoral competition exacerbate interethnic or interpartisan economic discrimination evidence from a field experiment in market price bargaining does political competition exacerbate economic discrimination between citizens on ethnic or partisan cleavages individuals often discriminate on group lines in ordinary economic activities especially in low income settings political competition and thus mobilization of partisan and ethnic groups waxes and wanes over the electoral cycle this study therefore investigates discrimination over the electoral cycle in a commonplace yet consequential economic activity market price bargaining by conducting field experiments on taxi fare bargaining at three points in time around ghana s 2008 election the research reveals that drivers accept lower prices from coethnics regardless of temporal proximity to the election however only at election time drivers accept lower prices from copartisans and demand higher prices from noncopartisans in sum political competition affects commonplace economic transactions between citizens on the partisan cleavage this study is the first to show evidence of interpartisan discrimination in everyday behavior and expands our knowledge of electoral cycle effects

voters information heterogeneity and the dynamics of aggregate economic expectations theory it is argued here that previous studies analyzing the formation of voters economic expectations overlook important subtleties found in a differentiated heterogeneous electorate since different segments of the electorate possess varying information capabilities it is asserted that they will form their prospective economic evaluations differently from one another hypotheses the impact of expectational electoral cycles news coverage of the economy reported by voters retrospective economic evaluations and personal financial expectations are hypothesized to have a differential impact on their economic expectations based on varying levels of information education among subsets of the electorate methods time series multiple regression analysis is conducted for the monthly period between january 1978 and december 1990 the empirical analysis involves testing for the properties of the statistical time series i e integration and cointegration as well as specification of an error correction mechanism ecm that captures long run statistical relationships in appropriate circumstances results these findings uncover electoral heterogeneity based on information education differences with respect to voters prospective economic evaluations specifically the information capabilities of voters is inversely related to their reliance on past retrospective sources of information when forming both egocentric and sociotropic economic expectations the main implication of this research is that the assumption of electoral homogeneity contained in previous longitudinal analyses of aggregate economic opinion formation provides misleading results that either overlook intra electoral variations introduce aggregation bias or possibly both

the political economy of expenditures by the peruvian social fund foncodes 1991 95 the peruvian social fund foncodes was created by president alberto fujimori in 1991 with the stated objectives of generating employment alleviating poverty and improving access to social services this article uses province level data on monthly expenditures socioeconomic indicators and electoral outcomes to analyze political influences on the timing and geographic distribution of foncodes expenditures between 1991 and 1995 i reach three main conclusions first these expenditures increased significantly before national elections second foncodes projects were directed at provinces in which the marginal political effect of expenditures was likely to be largest third these projects favored the poorest provinces which suggests that the program also had a redistributive function the results are robust to a large number of specifications and controls the peruvian data support predictions made in the literature on political business cycles as well as the literature on political influences on the allocation of discretionary funds

what drives the swing voter in africa what makes african voters up for grabs existing approaches to the swing voter have several liabilities this article introduces a new measure enabling a more comprehensive assessment of swing voting including the differentiation between clientelistic and collective goods motivations the issue of swing voting is then brought to an environment where voters are rarely considered persuadable africa using a count model estimation technique and original survey data from ghana s critical 2008 elections the analysis challenges the near consensus in african politics on clientelism as the only electoral strategy when voters perceive politicians as providing collective developmental goods the efficacy of clientelism as a tool to win over voters is reduced many persuadable voters can also be won over by both clientelistic and collective goods thus contradicting the literature presenting these as mutually exclusive finally the analysis shows that incumbents do better when they provide collective goods even in highly clientelistic environments

u s corporate interests and the political economy of trade policy this paper examines the behavior of american corporations with respect to international trade policy initiatives during the 1970s using survey generated data on revealed corporate trade policy interests and firmand industry level data on company characteristics direct or proxy variables were developed and applied in linear regression equations using an ordered probit specification and in an alternative approach using factor analysis to construct a composite dependent variable hypothesized relationships were verified between corporate positions on trade liberalization and the intensity of competition from imports the benefits from improved access to foreign markets and internal risk pooling capabilities of firms firms exposed to the international competitive environment inevitably have a stake in national trade policy this paper explores the revealed behavior of u s corporations on matters of trade policy in the 1970s it develops a set of hypotheses linking corporate trade policy positions to a series of company and industry attributes these hypotheses are tested using survey generated information regarding corporate behavior on trade policy matters beginning with the protectionist burke hartke initiatives of the early 1970s through the post tokyo round period at the end of the decade studies of the political economy of protection typically begin with the proposition that import barriers create rents that can be appropriated by the protected industry the size of the rents to be obtained and their probable division among the various participants in the industry partly determine the intensity of protection seeking behavior lobbying undertaken by participants in the industry brock and magee 1978 the intensity is also influenced by the degree of success expected in the political arena and by imperfections in the lobbying process for instance the incentive to be a free rider on the lobbying efforts of others walter and jones 1981 the actual outcome of protection seeking activity is conditioned by a variety of political considerations as well for instance politicians may be constrained by the possibility of repercussions from groups adversely affected by protection including consumers and export oriented industries foreign competitors are also affected so that issues concerning foreign relations enter into the decision process in addition politicians may be influenced more generally by ideology party platforms or attitudes toward equity a number of researchers including ball 1967 fieleke 1976 clark 1980 and ray 1981a 1981b have verified that a significant positive correlation exists between nominal tariff rates or effective rates of protection across manufacturing industries and low skilled labor intensity taken to be an indicator of the intensity of import competition and thus related to the size of the rents that could be obtained by protection cheh 1974 and bale 1977 analyzed the determinants of the percentage reductions in rates of duty resulting from the kennedy round tariff cuts concluding that the cuts were determined in such a way as to minimize labor adjustment costs see also allen lewis and tower 1980 marvel and ray 1983 also explored the determinants of kennedy round tariff cuts finding the size of tariff cuts tended to be smaller if an industry was more concentrated or sold a larger fraction of its output to household consumers and larger if the industry was more intensive in research and development r d or more highly unionized the result for r d presumably represents the desire at the industry level for improved access to export markets achievable through larger reciprocal reductions in protection on the part of foreign countries along somewhat different lines baldwin 1976 analyzed several key congressional votes on the received for publication november 21 1983 revision accepted for publication december 14 1984 new york university the authors are grateful to robert lipsey robert j levenson j peter jarrett and james green for providing data that contributed to this study to jang ro lee ashok chatterjee and monica kaufmann for research assistance and to bill greene for providing advice on the estimation technique and computer program used to perform the statistical analysis thomas a pugel is also grateful for the support of an esmee fairbaim research fellowship at the university of reading 1 in both studies ray also explores nontariff barriers ntbs across u s manufacturing industries aside from finding a positive relationship between tariff rates and ntbs the results are not easily interpreted however there is some inferential evidence in walter 1971 which finds a significant positive relationship between ntb incidence and presumably relatively low skill intensive developing country exports

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

what determines individual trade policy preferences abstract this article provides new evidence on the determinants of individual trade policy preferences using individual level survey data for the united states there are two main empirical results first we find that factor type dominates industry of employment in explaining support for trade barriers second we find that home ownership also matters for individuals trade policy preferences independent of factor type home ownership in counties with a manufacturing mix concentrated in comparative disadvantage industries is correlated with support for trade barriers this finding suggests that in addition to current factor incomes driving preferences as in standard trade models preferences also depend on asset values

the articulation of price earnings ratios and market to book ratios and the evaluation of growth this paper interprets the price earnings ratio pie and the marketto book ratio pib and describes how they articulate it also describes the role of book rate of return on equity the ratio of their denominators in the determination of the ratios and the relation between them although both are reported regularly there is not a common understanding of these issues for example the pie ratio has been interpreted as an earnings growth indicator cragg and malkiel 1982 and litzenberger and rao 1971 a risk measure ball 1978 and an earnings capitalization rate graham dodd and cottle 1962 boatsman and baskin 1981 and alford 1992 derivations based on the gordon 1962 model describe it as determined by return on equity beaver and morse 1978 show that this ratio indicates transitory earnings the molodovsky effect from molodovsky 1953 it has also been interpreted as an indicator of mispriced stocks basu 1977 and jaffee keim and westerfield 1989 and as a product of accounting principles craig johnson and joy 1987 the p b ratio received less academic attention until fama and french 1992 traditionally it was interpreted as indicating expected return on equity see for example graham dodd and cottle 1962 this interpretation is given expression in the standard formula reconciling price to book value in preinreich 1938 edwards and bell 1961 and peasnell 1982 for example like pie p b has been modeled as a growth

revisiting the evidence on trade policy preferences abstract past literature has found evidence that labor market attributes affect individuals trade policy preferences in a manner consistent with theories of international trade this paper shows that with the exception of education the relationships between labor market attributes and trade policy preferences are not robust in us survey data this suggests that either our proxies of labor market attributes are poor or our theories for what drives trade policy preferences need to be revisited

votes and violence evidence from a field experiment in nigeria following the wave of democratization during the 1990s elections are now common in low income societies however these elections are frequently flawed we investigate the nigerian general election of 2007 which is to date the largest election held in africa and one seriously marred by violence we designed and conducted a nationwide field experiment based on randomized anti violence grassroots campaigning we find direct effects on violence outcomes from exploring both subject surveying and independent data sources crucially we establish that voter intimidation is effective in reducing voter turnout and that the violence was systematically dissociated from incumbents we suggest that incumbents have a comparative advantage in alternative strategies vote buying and ballot fraud voter intimidation may be a strategy of the weak analogous to terrorism

computing power indices for large voting games voting power indices enable the analysis of the distribution of power in a legislature or voting body in which different members have different numbers of votes although this approach to the measurement of power has been known for a long time its application to large games has been limited by the difficulty of computing these indices this paper presents a new method for computing power indices that combines exact methods with an approximate method due to owen this method is of most utility in situations where the number of players is large and the voting weights are concentrated in the hands of a small number of members

capital market information and industrial performance the role of west german banks in orthodox theory external capital markets play a dual role supplying various forms of investment finance and disciplining firms which are inefficient or fail to pursue profit goals an extensive literature speaks of the efficiency of external capital markets meaning that firms can make production investment decisions and investors can choose among the securities that represent ownership of firms activities under the assumption that security prices at any time fully reflect all available information fama i970 1 however this concept of efficiency is purely technical it depends critically on what information is available and we know there are problems of appropriability and failure in information markets deriving ultimately from certain peculiarities of information as a commodity arrow i962 thus another growing literature focusses on problems of achieving equilibrium in markets where agents are imperfectly or asymmetrically informed amongst other things this literature shows that informational failures of the kind in question can lead to capital rationing in loan and credit markets and the use of strict collateral requirements as screening devices jaffee and russell i976 stiglitz and weiss i98i cable and turner i983 these may then be expected to affect the efficiency of individual firms and the system as a whole capital shortage implies that some profitable investment opportunities are foregone and production choices may also be distorted by the need to satisfy additional financial constraints contrived to elicit signals of creditworthiness of the firms undertaking them similarly the disciplining role of external capital markets can be impaired by information impactedness williamson i975 and the costs of mobilising and giving effect to shareholders preferences thus in the principal agent framework developed by jensen and meckling i976 and fama i980 the degree of constraint on managerial pursuit of non profit goals as posited by managerial theorists depends on the transactions costs of stock owner intervention the result is an optimal degree of departure from cost minimising profit maximising behaviour determined by the level of transactions costs institutional factors which affect the way information is distributed amongst agents can therefore have an important bearing on allocative and technical efficiency and the west german system of industrial finance provides an in

testing uncertainty s effect in real options with multiple capital goods the irreversible investment theory with heterogeneous capital predicts a negative relationship between uncertainty and the investment extensive margin we empirically explore this prediction using plant level data for investment across multiple fixed assets and employ a discrete ordered choice model our results indicate that uncertainty even after controlling for financial constraints induces a negative effect on the extensive margin thereby decreasing the likelihood of investment triggering in more types of capital this effect takes the form of both a higher probability of investment inactivity but also a lower probability of investment triggering in a higher number of capital types

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

economic interests and voting on the omnibus trade bill of 1987 this paper presents an econometric analysis of the votes on five pivotal amendments to the omnibus foreign trade bills of the u s house and senate in 1987 probit estimation is used to identify the relationships between geographic variations in employment in trade sensitive industries and congressional voting on changes in foreign trade policy procedures the implied pattern of expected net benefits for the industries from the five amendments is highly consistent with qualitative evidence on the costs and benefits at stake two general conclusions stand out 1 procedural foreign trade policy proposals can have very specific beneficiaries 2 diffuse export interests can be influential in opposition to procedural protectionism

electoral motives and the subnational allocation of foreign aid in sub saharan africa abstract this paper examines how electoral motives shape the subnational allocation of foreign aid commitments by employing a newly constructed geocoded dataset for 14 sub saharan african countries over the period 2000 2012 our results provide strong evidence of a core voter strategy african leaders diverting chinese aid towards regions with a high concentration of political supporters however no evidence of such preferential treatment is found for world bank aid suggesting that aid from traditional donors is less vulnerable to political manipulation our results also reveal that checks and balances in recipient countries are an important mediating factor of aid misallocation while copartisan regions receive larger amounts of chinese aid in environments with weak checks and balances these effects disappear when stronger checks and balances are in place this paper also offers case study evidence from ghana exploiting the 2009 regime change in ghana and using a difference in differences framework we provide further support of copartisan targeting and confirm that chinese aid is more manipulable than world bank aid in this respect

capital markets and corporate control a study of france germany and the uk this paper examines the relation between capital markets and corporate control in france germany and the uk it compares levels of takeover activity in the three countries and describes the degree to which takeovers are associated with changes in corporate control the paper examines the influence of regulation on forms of corporate ownership and control it compares regulation pertaining to the rights of employees managers and shareholders in the three countries and finds that regulatory rules are related to patterns of ownership and control changes the paper suggests that a fundamental objective of control changes is to correct managerial failure and that takeovers are suited to the correction of particular classes of managerial failure that cannot be readily rectified by contracts thus markets with low levels of takeovers may suffer from a low level of correction of managerial failure however by changing ownership takeovers may give rise to an inability of owners to commit themselves to the long term interests of managers and employees as a consequence financial systems with active takeover markets may be associated with inadequate investment in firm specific assets and an unduly short term investment horizon there is therefore a tradeoff between alternative methods of correcting managerial failure this is particularly important for european countries facing an extension of uk takeover activity to the continent the process is being encouraged by the european commission which aims to harmonize regulation on a uk style takeover code harmonization of regulation may have far reaching consequences for the structure of different countries capital markets and in view of the tradeoff is of uncertain merit

outsourcing labor market pooling and labor contracts this paper considers the interaction between input sharing and labor market pooling in urban areas in particular it examines the impact of the size of a city and business risks on the organizational structures of firms located in urban agglomerations and it also discusses the impact of organizational structure on incentives to insure workers against income risks it is shown that manufacturing firms suffer from a coordination game in their decision to outsource production the existence of idiosyncratic risks causes manufacturers to refrain from outsourcing the incentives to offer wage and employment protection to workers are more pronounced when manufacturers outsource the production of their inputs to a local market which mitigates the impact of labor market pooling

tobin s q and financial policy abstract recent research in macroeconomics has emphasized the importance of linking the financial and real sectors and working with optimizing models tobin s q model of investment would appear to provide a framework satisfying these two criteria in contrast to the original presentation of the q model the formal development has not recognized that the firm actively participates in a number of financial markets in this broader context q may be an uninformative and possibly misleading signal for investment expenditures we then endeavor to turn this negative theoretical result to positive advantage in resolving a number of empirical problems with q models

when is gibrat s law a law the purpose of this article is to investigate if the industry context matters for whether gibrat s law is rejected or not using a dataset that consists of all limited firms in five digit nace industries in sweden during 1998 2004 the results reject gibrat s law on an aggregate level since small firms grow faster than large firms however gibrat s law is confirmed about as often as it is rejected when industry specific regressions are estimated it is also found that the industry context e g minimum efficient scale market concentration rate and number of young firms in the industry matters for whether gibrat s law is rejected or not

democracy stability and dichotomies an early debate in the empirical study of political democracy concerned the measurement of democracy initial work employed dichotomous indicators and incorporated stability into political democracy measures evidence accumulated showing that this approach could adversely affect analyses particularly in the study of income inequality despite this some recent studies have renewed the flawed practices we draw upon recent work to highlight the confusion that can result when democracy and stability are confounded and the problems with dichotomous indicators we propose that stability is analytically distinct from political democracy and should be treated as such empirically and we suggest ways to estimate incremental effects of political democracy we further argue that political democracy is continuous and that measures of it should reflect this it is important that the measurement history of this construct not repeat itself

investment default propensity score and cash flow sensitivity in six eu member states evidence based on firm level panel data abstractusing a panel data set covering six european countries and 119700 firms 582153 observations over the period 2008 2013 we analyse the cash flow sensitivity of investment spending as most

is trade policy for sale congressional voting on recent trade bills this paper examines voting by u s representatives onthe north american free trade agreement the uruguayround agreement and most favored nation status forchina using recent political economy models of tradepolicy to formulate an empirical specification ofcongressional voting behavior we find evidence thatcampaign contributions influenced legislators voteson the nafta and uruguay round bills labor groupcontributions were associated with votes against freertrade while business contributions were associatedwith votes in favor of freer trade economicconditions in each member s district as well as thebroad policy views of the legislators also affectedrepresentatives voting decisions

evidence on the role of cash flow for investment abstract recent work in macroeconomics argues that imperfections in capital markets may lead to business cycle fluctuations by propagating relatively modest shocks evidence for such a mechanism also known as the financial accelerator consists largely of firm level studies showing that cash flow is an important predictor of investment but this evidence is often viewed with skepticism because cash flow is also a good indicator of investment opportunities in this paper we develop a framework for estimating the extent to which the predictive power of cash flow can be attributed to its role as a fundamental versus its role in alleviating credit frictions for firms with access to commercial paper and bond markets we find that the perfect capital markets model of investment can fully account for the role of cash flow for firms with only limited access to capital markets as indicated by lack of participation in public debt markets however investment appears to be excessively sensitive to fluctuations in cash flow these results thus clarify the role of cash flow in investment equations and provide support for the existence of a financial accelerator

the textile bill of 1985 the determinants of congressional voting patterns the following tables show the results of the probit analysis for the senate and the house a table including results for different combinations of the independent variables is included in an unpublished appendix available from the authors upon request the results of the probit analysis for the senate are shown in table 1 all the variables except exp had the expected signs however the results indicate that the two other employment variables and party affiliation are the only factors which we can say with confidence influenced a senator s decision to vote for or against this bill the coefficients reported and labeled der of prob measure the derivative of the probability of a yes vote evaluated at the means of the independent variables in question thus for example the coefficient for unemp in the top line of table 1 should be interpreted as indicating that a one percentage point increase in a state s unemployment rate will cause a 5 89 increase in the probability that the senator will vote for the bill the result for dr the party of the senator shows that in general democrats are more apt to vote for protectionist policies than are republicans this is consistant with president reagan s negative stand on the bill and his threat to veto it should it pass the amendment in question passed the senate on 24 october 1985 by a vote of 54 for to 42 against but the bill it was attached to has been postponed indefinitely the house bill which was passed on 10 october 1985 by a vote of 262 for to 159 against was vetoed by reagan on 17 december 1985 the results of the probit analysis for the house of representatives are shown in table 2 state employment data was used for the house as opposed to data for each voting district this was done for three reasons first employment data is usually reported by state or by county since counties are often divided by congressional district boundaries much personal judgement would be necessary to assign employment figures second the most recent county industry employment data is from 1981 while the data used in this analysis is from 1984 third we feel that in general logrolling is prevalent among a state s representatives for this bill the representatives from twenty six states voted as a block and in all but six states one third or less of that state s representatives voted contrary to the majority all of the probabilities are significant at the 05 confidence level representative s voting patterns are influenced by all of the included factors when unionization is added to the equation its coefficient is very small and negative although it is significant at the 05 confidence level one would expect more significance here since there are more degrees of freedom for the house analysis than for that of the senate when the data from the house and senate are pooled the results are similar to those of the house alone the null hypothesis that the data cannot be pooled was tested using a statistic with eight degrees of freedom 9 721 meaning that the null hypothesis is rejected as in the senate the state unemployment rate and the percent employed in textiles are important influences on the representative s vote and democrats in the house are more likely to vote for protectionist bills than republicans however unlike the senate the percent of a representative s campaign contributions that are donated by industry special interest groups has a significant effect on voting patterns although the point estimates for the magnitudes of the influence are very similar in both cases seventy four percent of the house received campaign contributions from these special interest groups while only 54 of the senate received contributions from these same sources this is probably because only one third of the senate was up for reelection during the time period considered while the entire house was in the process of campaigning for reelection exports also play a role in influencing the probability of a yes vote reducing this probability as employment in export industries increases but the magnitude of the coefficient is only 11 of that for textile employment the significance of this variable in the house is probably due to fear of retaliation expressed by both democrats and republicans this variable was not significant in the senate model most likely because the senate version excluded from the 1 import quota growth rate many countries who might have retaliated representatives appear to respond to a wider variety of constituent interests than do senators while senators voting patterns are only significantly influenced by their political affiliation their state s unemployment rate and the importance of textiles to their state the voting behavior of representatives is influenced by these factors as well as the importance of exports to their state and campaign contributions by textile special interest groups these results affirm the validity of the approach used by baldwin and coughlin they differ from baldwin who finds exports are not a significant influence on the house and from coughlin who does not include export employment as an explanitory variable or analyze the differences in voting patterns between the house and the senate

bank loan terms and conditions for eurozone smes the evolution of bank loan price and non price terms and conditions t cs for the 2009 2011 period are investigated using firm level survey data for a sample of eurozone small and medium sized enterprises the raw firm responses which are of a discrete nature denoting tightening or easing of the t cs or no change at all are modeled by a bivariate ordered probit model according to the results obtained there are sizeable differences between countries with the protagonists of the sovereign debt crisis greece ireland portugal spain exhibiting predicted probabilities of tightening that are considerably above the eurozone average in addition price t cs exhibit a substantial tightening over time finally firms net interest expenses and profitability emerge as important determinants in explaining the cross sectional variation in bank loan t cs that they face

loan availability and investment can innovative companies better cope with loan denials this study examines the consequences of loan denials for the investment performance of small and medium sized german enterprises as a consequence of a loan denial innovative companies experience a smaller drop in the share of actual to planned investment than noninnovative companies the nonrandomness of loan denials is controlled for with a selection equation employing the intensity of banking competition at the district level as an exclusion restriction we can explain the better performance of innovative companies by their ability to increase the use of external equity financing such as venture capital or mezzanine capital when facing a loan denial

does firm size matter evidence on the impact of liquidity constraints on firm investment behavior in germany abstract this paper examines the link between liquidity constraints and investment behavior for german firms of different sizes from 1970 to 1986 results indicate that medium sized firms appear to be more liquidity constrained in their investment behavior than either the smallest or largest firms in the study suggesting that the unique german infrastructure designed to assist the small firm has indeed succeeded in alleviating to some degree such liquidity constraints findings also support the hypothesis that the emerging competition and internationalism which characterized the german financial markets in the 1980s have been improving access to capital for some groups of firms

legislators and interest groups how unorganized interests get represented this paper derives a supply price for public policy using a constrained maximization model in the model three sets of agents each have preferences over outcomes organized interest groups offer campaign contributions to improve their own wealth voters offer votes to obtain outcomes closer to their most preferred outcomes and legislators seek both campaign contributions and votes to obtain reelection a given legislator s supply price for policy is shown to depend on the productivity of his effort as determined by committee assignments priority and ability and by the preferences of his unorganized constituency in the home district two extreme assumptions about the effectiveness of campaign spending in eliciting votes are used to illustrate the comparative statics properties of the model the prediction of the model is that interest groups will in general seek out legislators whose voters are indifferent to the policy the interest group seeks thus voters who do have preferences over policy are in effect represented even though they are not organized

domestic content legislation house voting and the economic theory of regulation house voting on domestic content legislation provides a rare opportunity to examine the political economy of protectionism with respect to a particular issue rather than by using the traditional interindustry approach the results indicate that a representative s vote in favor of the content legislation and the intensity of the legislator s preferences are positively related to the importance of the auto and steel industries in the representative s district an increasing unemployment rate campaign contributions from labor groups affiliation with democratic party and a liberal ideology despite ideology s statistical significance the results suggest this variable can be disregarded because neither the predictive accuracy nor the explanatory power of the model is improved by its inclusion the estimates also provide insights concerning the impact of changes in the independent variables upon voting patterns

clientelism and voting behavior evidence from a field experiment in benin the author conducted a field experiment in benin to investigate the impact of clientelism on voting behavior in collaboration with four political parties involved in the 2001 presidential elections clientelist and broad public policy platforms were designed and run in twenty randomly selected villages of an average of 756 registered voters using the survey data collected after the elections the author estimated the effect of each type of message by comparing voting behavior in the villages exposed to clientelism or public policy messages treatment groups with voting behavior in the other villages control groups the author found that clientelist messages have positive and significant effect in all regions and for all types of candidates the author also found that public policy messages have a positive and significant effect in the south but a negative and significant effect in the north in addition public policy messages seem to hurt incumbents as well as regional candidates finally the evidence indicates that female voters tend to have stronger preference for public policy platforms than male voters

a north american free trade agreement analytical issues and a computational assessment abstractthe following sections are included introductionissues in analyzing the economic impact of the naftathe computational modelcomputational resultsconclusionsstudy questionsreferencessuggested further reading this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

does electoral competition affect politicians trade policy preferences evidence from japan this study examines the effect of electoral competition on politicians trade policy preferences using candidate observations from the house of representatives in japan s 2012 general election the study clarifies the effects of constituency size and the electoral strength of constituencies on candidates political stances the empirical results provide evidence that politicians preferences for trade policy are sensitive to electoral pressure but their reactions differ depending on the characteristics of each constituency the results reveal that for a broad constituency with a large concentration of agricultural workers election candidates are more likely to support protectionism than their counterparts running in a narrow constituency for city district election candidates electoral strength measured by the vote margin significantly affects their trade policy preferences candidates in close elections are more likely to be protectionist than candidates elected by a substantial majority suggesting that electoral pressures deter politicians from supporting trade liberalization

the swing voter s curse the authors analyze two candidate elections in which some voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters they demonstrate the existence of a swing voter s curse less informed indifferent voters strictly prefer to abstain rather than vote for either candidate even when voting is costless the swing voter s curse leads to the equilibrium result that a substantial fraction of the electorate will abstain even though all abstainers strictly prefer voting for one candidate over voting for another copyright 1996 by american economic association

solving the mystery of the africa dummy abstract most empirical studies have reported a negative effect on growth of being an african country even when accounting for ethnic heterogeneity modeling policy choices has reduced this effect in recent studies but these have begged the question of why africa appears adverse to developmental policies this paper uses a cross sectional data set to show that the governments of arbitrary postcolonial states as are most african states face substantial limitations to their power and are constrained in their responses deriving greater relative power payoffs from neo patrimonial than from developmental policies differing levels of state legitimacy account therefore largely for the policy choices which characterize most of africa

the importance of equity finance for r d activity this article analyzes the importance of equity finance for the r d activity of small and medium sized enterprises we use information on almost 6 000 german smes from a company survey using the intensity of banking competition at the district level as an instrument to control for endogeneity we find that a higher equity ratio is conducive to a higher r d intensity owners may only start r d activities if they have the financial resources to sustain them until successful completion we find a larger influence of the equity ratio for young companies equity may be more important for young companies which have to rely on the original equity investment of their owners since they have not yet accumulated retained earnings and can rely less on bank financing