competitive coupon targeting with the advent of panel data on household purchase behavior and the development of statistical procedures to utilize this data firms can now target coupons to selected households with considerable accuracy and cost effectiveness in this article we develop an analytical framework to examine the effect of such targeting on firm profits prices and coupon face values we also derive comparative statics on firms optimal mix of offensive and defensive couponing the number of coupons distributed redemption rates face values and incremental sales per redemption among our findings when rival firms can target their coupon promotions at brand switchers the outcome will be a prisoner s dilemma in which the net effect of targeting is simply the cost of distribution plus the discount given to redeemers

colluding on relative prices firms sometimes agree to limit the discounts they offer a class of customers i e they collude on the price differences across consumer classes why courts have struck down agreements to limit discounts as violations of the laws against price fixing are these collusive agreements in fact efficient this article addresses these questions in a multiproduct duopoly model under one interpretation the incentive to collude on relative prices can be traced to heterogeneity in consumers time costs under fairly general conditions total surplus increases with the collusion this efficiency effect is most striking in the case where collusion raises the prices faced by all consumers over which firms compete

why do manufacturers issue coupons an empirical analysis of breakfast cereals we explore the relationship between shelf prices and manufacturers coupons for 25 readyto eat breakfast cereals we find that shelf prices are lower during periods when coupons are available this result is inconsistent with static monopoly price discrimination under a broad range of assumptions we present evidence that is inconsistent with both dynamic theories of price discrimination and explanations of couponing based on the vertical relationship between manufacturers and retailers we find support for models of price discrimination in oligopoly settings as well as suggestions that firmwide incentives may induce managers to use coupons and price cuts simultaneously finally lagged coupons have a positive effect on current sales suggesting that coupons are used to induce repurchase

a note on optimal replenishment policies for non instantaneous deteriorating items with price and stock sensitive demand under permissible delay in payment abstract soni 2013 int j prod econ 146 1 259 268 proposed optimal replenishment policies for non instantaneous deteriorating items i e the product starts deteriorating after a period of no deterioration with price and stock sensitive demand with a stock dependent demand it is desirable to have non zero ending inventory due to potential profit resulting from the increased demand however soni 2013 int j prod econ 146 1 259 268 treated those ending inventory as fresh stocks to go through another period of non deterioration again additionally he assumed for simplicity that the replenishment cycle time t must be longer than the period of non deterioration t d i e t t d in reality one should consider all possible replenishment cycle time to maximize the profit in this note we complement the shortcomings of his model by i selling those ending inventory as salvages and ii considering all possible replenishment cycle time which may be shorter than the period of non deterioration with these modifications the repeatability of the replenishment cycle is ensured and the applicability of soni s model is strengthened the numerical examples indicate that the global optimal solution is indeed possible in the case of t t d

on two part tariff competition in a homogeneous product duopoly abstract we explore aspects of two part tariff competition between duopolists providing a homogeneous service when consumers differ with respect to their usage levels competition in only one price component the fee or the rate may allow both firms to enjoy positive profits if the other price component has been set at levels different enough between firms fixing one price component alters the nature of competition indirectly introducing an element of product differentiation endogenous market segmentation emerges with the heavier users choosing the lower rate firm and the lighter users choosing the lower fee firm when no price component can be negative competition becomes softer profits tend to be higher but there is also a disadvantage for the firm that starts with a higher fee than that of its rival

a review of trade credit literature opportunities for research in operations abstract trade credit arises when a buyer delays payment for purchased goods or services its nature has predominantly been an area of inquiry for researchers from the disciplines of finance marketing and economics but it has received relatively little attention in other domains in our article we provide an integrative review of the existing literature and discuss conflicting study outcomes we organize the relevant literature into seven areas of inquiry and analyze four in detail trade credit motives order quantity decisions credit term decisions and settlement period decisions additionally we derive a detailed agenda for future research in these areas

price discrimination in free entry markets using a spatial model of monopolistic competition we investigate price discrimination in free entry zero profit markets we show that when brands are heterogeneous competition does not prevent discrimination the power to earn economic profits is not necessary for a firm to maintain discriminatory prices our model treats formally the fact that consumers difer not only in the utility they derive from a good but also in how strongly they prefer one brand over all others in markets where firms are very competitive sorting consumers on the strength on brand preference produces larger price differentials between groups than sorting on the basis of consumers reservation prices for the good when firms sort customers on the basis of strength of brand preference however we find that the output and welfare effects are generally less favorable than when sorting is more closely related to consumers reservation prices

an eoq model with partial backordering and advance payments for an evaporating item abstract in the classic economic order quantity model the purchasing cost of an order is paid at the time of its receipt in some cases retailers ask purchasers to pay all or a fraction of the purchasing cost in advance and may allow them to divide the prepayment into several equal sized parts in this paper an economic order quantity model for an evaporating item with partial backordering and partial consecutive prepayments is developed with a real case study of a gasoline station real numerical examples illustrate the proposed model and the solution method

pricing to preclude sabotage in regulated industries abstract we characterize the optimal access price and retail price for a vertically integrated incumbent supplier v that faces limited competition from a new entrant in the retail sector the optimal prices provide v with a relatively high wholesale profit margin and a relatively low retail profit margin consequently v has no incentive to raise the costs of its retail rival

consumer choice and competition policy a study of uk energy markets consumer choice is increasingly recognised as a crucial factor in competition policy to illustrate the implications of such choice we present an investment model of the switching choice in the uk residential natural gas market and examine responses to a specially commissioned survey of nearly seven hundred consumers identifying search and switching costs through an assessment of the savings which consumers say they require to switch supplier together with an evaluation of consumer switching behaviour we deduce that the incumbent retained considerable market power suggesting that some continued regulation may be necessary

a supergame theoretic model with consumer loyalty abstract the paper shows in a supergame theoretic framework how the relative market power firms achieve by having loyal consumers hinders collusion furthermore increasing concentration decreases the sustainability of the agreement

the evolution of u s airline competition studies by academic economists were a significant force in the movement towards deregulation of the domestic airline industry in the early 1970s levine 1965 jordan 1970 keeler 1972 douglas and miller 1974 during the critical 1977 78 period in which deregulation was imposed first de facto by the civil aeronautics board cab and then de jure by congress the chairman and vice chairman of the cab were economists for the 14 years since deregulation economists have continued intensive study of the industry in part because of the unusual availability of reliable firm and transaction level data and in part because of the rare opportunity to observe an industry as it evolves from strict economic regulation to fairly unimpeded competition and strategic behavior the simplest prediction of economists about airline deregulation and one of the few on which nearly all economists agreed was that deregulation would improve consumer welfare in comparison to continued price and entry regulation fourteen years later nearly all economists still agree on this though the degree of enthusiasm for the deregulation outcome varies considerably there was substantial disagreement among economists about the market structure that would result because studies of scale economies in the airline industry had concluded that none existed beyond the scale of the smaller major airlines of the 1970s caves 1962 eads et al 1969 many economists argued that deregulation would result in more than the 11 major airlines that existed at the time of deregulation others predicted that only a few or possibly only one airline would survive at a large scale two noted university of chicago economists sam peltzman and lester telser made a bet in 1979 on whether

inventory models with ramp type demand rate partial backlogging and weibull deterioration rate in this paper an inventory model with general ramp type demand rate time dependent weibull deterioration rate and partial backlogging of unsatisfied demand is considered the model is studied under the following different replenishment policies a starting with no shortages and b starting with shortages the model is fairly general as the demand rate up to the time point of its stabilization is a general function of time the backlogging rate is any non increasing function of the waiting time up to the next replenishment the optimal replenishment policy for the model is derived for both the above mentioned policies

commodity market dynamics and the joint executive committee 1880 1886 using weekly spot and future commodity prices in chicago and new york we construct expected transportation rates for grain between these two cities expected inventory levels in new york and realized errors in the expectations of such variables we incorporate these exogenous commodity market dynamics into porter s 1983 structural modeling of the joint executive committee railroad cartel as in porter we model marginal cost as a parametric function of instrumented output among other factors unlike porter we model pricing over marginal cost as a nonparametric function of a set of variables which include expectations of deterministic demand cycles and cartel stability we estimate the pricing and demand equation simultaneously and semiparametrically our estimated weekly markups during periods of cartel stability are shown to reflect optimal collusive pricing over deterministic business cycles as modeled in haltiwanger and harrington 1991 periods of cartel instability are proven to be trigger

review of inventory systems with deterioration since 2001 abstract this paper presents an up to date review of the advances made in the field of inventory control of perishable items deteriorating inventory the last extensive review on this topic dates back to 2001 goyal s k and giri b c recent trends in modeling of deteriorating inventory european journal of operational research 134 1 16 since then over two hundred articles on this subject have been published in the major journals on inventory control indicating the need for a new review we use the classification of goyal and giri based on shelf life characteristics and demand characteristics contributions are highlighted by discussing main system characteristics including price discounts backordering or lost sales single or multiple items one or two warehouses single or multi echelon average cost or discounted cash flow and payment delay

entry deterrence in markets with consumer switching costs in many markets consumers have transaction or learning switching costs between functionally undifferentiated brands new entry into such markets may be deterred either by large customer bases and or large switching costs which deny customers to an entrant or by small customer bases and or small switching costs which mean an incumbent will respond aggressively to an entrant an incumbent threatened by entry may therefore price either lower or higher than otherwise a firm with the right to enter early may make less profits over time than an otherwise identical firm that is unable to enter the market until later

revisiting dynamic duopoly with consumer switching costs abstract the degree of collusiveness of a market with consumer switching costs is analyzed in an infinite horizon model of duopolistic competition in contrast with previous analyses we assume that firms compete for the demand for a homogeneous good by setting prices simultaneously in each period this problem is formulated as a simple stochastic game and a symmetric stationary markovian perfect equilibrium with distinctive economic features is studied we show that switching costs unambiguously relax price competition in equilibrium but that on the contrary they may make tacit collusion more difficult to sustain journal of economic literature classification numbers c73 d43 l13

celebrating a century of the economic order quantity model in honor of ford whitman harris abstract this writing presents a brief introduction to the papers included in the special issue celebrating a century of the economic order quantity model in honor of ford whitman harris published by the international journal of production economics forty one papers covering an extensive scope of inventory management have been incorporated in this volume from contributing authors from 20 countries located in america asia europe and africa this special issue also provides a basis for new directions in inventory management research

price discrimination and social welfare studies the effect of price discrimination on social welfare using methods from duality theory features of the reservation model presented quasi linear utility and consumers surplus upper and lower bounds on welfare change bounds on welfare change with optimal price discrimination from ebsco

optimal order quantity and selling price over a product life cycle with deterioration rate linked to expiration date it is evident that the lower the price the higher the demand therefore price is an important factor in a consumer s purchasing decision additionally for today s health conscious consumers product freshness is another important factor in purchasing decisions since product freshness declines over time today s health conscious consumers prefer a perishable product with a longer sell by date to a shorter one moreover a product s demand rate moving through its life cycle can be approximately represented by a trapezoid type pattern which includes constant demand increasing demand and decreasing demand as special cases in existing literature several researchers have developed inventory models for trapezoidal demand however they failed to consider pricing strategy product freshness linked to expiration date and purchasing cost in this study we enhance previous models by 1 taking pricing into consideration 2 exploring deterioration rate linked to expiration date and 3 adding an appropriate non constant purchasing cost we then derive theoretical results and run numerical examples to obtain managerial insights for instance the total profit without purchasing cost is significantly lower than that with purchasing cost included also if the cost of lost sales is improperly low then the total profit may become negative due to a large amount of lost sales

fighting collusion by permitting price discrimination we investigate the effect of a ban on third degree price discrimination on the sustainability of collusion we build a model with two firms that may be able to discriminate between two consumer groups two cases are analyzed i best response symmetries so that profits in the static nash equilibrium are higher if price discrimination is allowed ii best response asymmetries so that profits in the static nash equilibrium are lower if price discrimination is allowed in both price discrimination scenarios firms discount factor has to be higher in order to sustain collusion in grim trigger strategies than under uniform pricing

economic production quantity models for deteriorating items with up stream full trade credit and down stream partial trade credit abstract in practice in order to reduce default risks with credit risk customers a seller e g a manufacturer or a retailer frequently requests its credit risk customers to pay a fraction of the purchase amount at the time of placing an order as collateral deposit and then grants a permissible delay on the outstanding balance i e a down stream partial trade credit by contrast the seller usually receives a permissible delay on the entire purchase amount from the supplier i e an up stream full trade credit in this paper we propose an economic production quantity epq model for deteriorating items in a supply chain with both up stream and down stream trade credit financing by using fractional programming results we can prove that the optimal solution not only exists but also is unique moreover we propose three discrimination terms to identify the optimal solution among possible alternatives finally some numerical examples are presented to highlight the theoretical results and managerial insights

retailer s economic order quantity when the supplier offers conditionally permissible delay in payments link to order quantity abstract trade credit financing is increasingly recognized as an important strategy to increase profitability in inventory management we revisit an economic order quantity model under conditionally permissible delay in payments in which the supplier offers the retailer a fully permissible delay of m periods i e there is no interest charge until m if the retailer orders more than or equal to a predetermined quantity w however if the retailer s order quantity is less than w then the retailer must make a partial payment to the supplier and enjoy a permissible delay of m periods for the remaining balance in this paper we extend the mentioned eoq under conditionally permissible delay in payments to complement some shortcomings of the model by contrast to the differential calculus method we propose a simple arithmetic geometric method to solve the problem furthermore we establish some discrimination terms to identify the unique optimal solution among three alternatives and explain those theoretical results by simply economical interpretations finally we solve several numerical examples to illustrate the theoretical results and obtain some managerial implications

the welfare impacts of discriminatory price tariffs this paper looks at the use of asymmetric tariffs as a regulatory instrument we use a monopolistic market setup with two markets and we introduce price controls in one of the two the purpose of the regulator is to maximise consumer welfare through this price discriminatory practice we consider cases where the welfare of the consumers in the two markets is weighted equally and cases where it is not in some cases we allow for the two markets to be linked through a monopsonistic input market the paper focuses on the welfare implications of this regulatory approach with the firm operating under a profit restriction results suggest that having only one price controlled market is in certain cases a good option from a welfare perspective

how many parts to make at once reprinted from factory the magazine of management volume 10 number 2 february 1913 pp 135 136 152 interest on capital tied up in wages material and overhead sets a maximum limit to the quantity of parts which can be profitably manufactured at one time set up costs on the job fix the minimum experience has shown one manager a way to determine the economical size of lots

inventory models for deteriorating items with maximum lifetime under downstream partial trade credits to credit risk customers by discounted cash flow analysis abstract getting loans from banks are almost impossible after 2008 global financial crisis as a result about 80 of companies in united kingdom and united states offer their products on various short term free interest loans i e trade credit to customers numerous researchers and academicians apply discounted cash flow dcf analysis merely to compute the interest earned and charged during the credit period but not to the revenue and other costs which are considerably larger than the interest earned and charged for a rigorous analysis the dcf on all relevant costs is applied in addition many products deteriorate continuously and cannot be sold after their maximum lifetimes or expiration dates however very few researchers and investigators have implemented the product lifetime expectance into their models in this paper a supplier retailer customer chain system is developed in which the retailer gets an upstream full trade credit from the supplier whereas offers a downstream partial trade credit to credit risk customers the deterioration rate is non decreasing over time and near 100 particularly close to its expiration date and dcf analysis is applied to compute all relevant costs this paper demonstrates that the retailer s optimal replenishment cycle time not only exists but also is unique thus the search of the global optimal reduces to finding a local solution finally several numerical examples and sensitivity analysis are performed in order to illustrate the problem and obtain managerial insights

third degree price discrimination in oligopoly all out competition and strategic commitment price discrimination by imperfectly competitive firms may intensify competition leading to lower prices for all consumers the tradeoff of consumer groups welfare that is characteristic of monopolistic discrimination need not arise this escalation of competition may make firms worse off and as a result firms may wish to avoid the discriminatory outcome under conditions similar to those in which unambiguous price and welfare effects may arise unilateral commitments not to price discriminate including the adoption of everyday low pricing or no haggle policies may raise firm profits by softening price competition

non discrimination clauses in the retail energy sector the british energy regulator will soon review a non discrimination licence condition which it imposed to ensure that energy retailers charge the same mark up in different regions many consumers are loyal to incumbent firms necessitating heavy discounting by entrants to attract customers which had led to regional price discrimination matching characteristics of the energy market to models of discrimination we identify the necessary conditions for the licence condition to have a positive effect for consumers and explore whether the policy has helped potentially vulnerable consumers we conclude that the most likely effect of the licence condition is to reduce competition in the mainstream energy markets and welcome the regulator s latest review of the retail market

customer poaching and advertising this paper is a first look at the dynamic effects of customer poaching in homogeneous product markets where firms need to invest in advertising to generate awareness when a firm is able to recognize customers with different purchasing histories it may send them targeted advertisements with different prices it is shown that only the firm which advertises the highest price in the first period will engage in price discrimination a practice that clearly benefits the discriminating firm this poaching gives rise to the race for discrimination effect through which price discrimination may act actually to soften price competition rather than intensify it as a result all firms may become better off even when only one of them can engage in price discrimination this paper offers a first attempt to evaluate the effects of price discrimination on the efficiency properties of advertising in markets with low or no advertising costs allowing firms to price discriminate leads them to provide too little advertising which is not good for consumers and overall welfare only in markets with high advertising costs might firms overadvertise regarding the welfare effects price discrimination is generally bad for welfare and consumer surplus though good for firms

competitive promotional strategies this article analyzes the equilibrium pricing strategies of brands engaged in a pricing game each brand has a monopoly market loyal consumers and competes with others in a common market called brand switchers in the case of a duopoly it is shown that the behavior of the brand switchers characterizes the equilibrium behavior of the duopolists this article focuses on two key comparative statics namely the depth of discounts away from a regular high price and the probability of giving a deal or the frequency of deals how these properties vary with the size of the loyal markets and the behavior of the brand switching population is discussed copyright 1988 by the university of chicago

price discrimination in australia s retail electricity markets an analysis of victoria southeast queensland when capital intensive monopoly industries are restructured and deregulated consumer prices commence a natural drift from regulated uniform average cost tariffs to competitive differential prices and this can raise problems for policymakers deep discounts are welcomed high standing offers are not but price discrimination is unremarkable in economics indeed in industries where fixed sunk costs represent a significant portion of total cost discriminatory pricing is usually welfare enhancing conversely theory predicts and empirical evidence confirms that regulatory efforts to cherry pick differential prices in asymmetric markets will damage consumer welfare in this article we analyse differential retail electricity offer prices in the australian states of victoria and queensland and contrast these with industry average total cost and the marginal cost of retail supply we find deregulated victoria displays high price dispersion with standing offer tariffs 10 above industry average total cost and marginal offers at break even prices i e 20 below average total cost in the semi regulated southeast queensland market where a regulated price cap exists there is lower dispersion but marginal offers include a 6 7 retail mark up efficient pricing requires the marginal unit produced to be priced at marginal cost and victoria meets this criteria but we identify an episode of inter consumer misallocation due to high standing offers we conclude policy initiatives designed to help firms shift vulnerable households from standing offer tariffs is desirable

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games i theory the article presents information about the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games in this paper and its sequel presents study the existence of nash equilibrium in games where agents payoff functions are discontinuous the enquiry is motivated by a number of recent studies that have uncovered serious existence problems in seemingly innocuous economic games in the sequel to this paper authors have explained the utility function in the economic games referred to earlier are neither continuous nor quasi concave however they demonstrate that the payoff functions in mildly modified versions of these constructs exhibit two weaker forms of continuity which together with the requirement of quasi concavity suffice for the existence of an equilibrium from this one may conclude that at least in the modified versions of these models discontinuities in the payoff functions are not the real source of the problem rather it is the failure of the payoff functions to the quasi concave which is responsible for the non existence of equilibrium these observations bear on the existence of nash equilibrium in pure strategies

price discrimination in grocery trade evidence from italy this paper investigates the determinants of price dispersion between staple and non staple goods in grocery retailing as the result of pricing decisions by multiproduct firms theoretical predictions about the nature of supermarkets pricing behaviour are compared and tested empirically using disaggregated data from the italian grocery trade over the period 1990 1992 the empirical results provide evidence for the existence in all types of retail organization of the form of price discrimination suggested by bliss particularly for specialist shops the results are consistent with discrimination due to the exploitation of consumers switching costs

matching own prices rivals prices or both many retailers promise that they will not be undersold by rivals and extend their promise to include their own future prices that is many retailers combine elements of both price matching guarantees and retroactive most favored customer clauses this is puzzling because the extant literature has shown that each practice independently has the potential to facilitate supracompetitive prices and thus one might think the two practices are substitutes in this paper we show that price matching guarantees and most favored customer clauses complement each other when offered unilaterally by a single firm and can lead to higher prices than either one could have facilitated by itself

joint pricing and inventory model for deteriorating items with expiration dates and partial backlogging under two level partial trade credits in supply chain abstract this paper develops an inventory model for deteriorating items under a two level partial trade credit with allowable shortages this paper considers a supplier retailer customer supply chain in which a for settling the cost of purchasing the retailer receives a partial trade credit from the supplier and at the same time the retailer offers a separate partial trade credit to the customer b the downstream credit period not only increases demand but also opportunity cost c the deterioration rate is non decreasing over time and the product is fully deteriorated close to its expiration date and d shortages are allowed the objective of the problem is to determine the optimal selling price the optimal replenishment cycle time and the time taken for the inventory to reach zero at the same time such that the total profit per unit is maximized theoretical results are established a numerical example is provided to illustrate the theoretical results and yield some managerial insights

bilateral most favored customer pricing and collusion in a two period differentiated products duopoly model most favored customer mfc pricing policies allow firms to commit to prices above the bertrand prices it is shown here however that unless a restrictive and unappealing assumption is made about demand there is no equilibrium in which both firms adopt mfc policies the restrictive assumption is that at least one firm s demand is more responsive to changes in its opponent s price than to changes in its own price otherwise firms have an incentive to deviate from a greater than bertrand price in the first period

a model of price leadership based on consumer loyalty this paper analyzes a duopolistic price setting game in which firms have loyal consumer segments but cannot distinguish them from price sensitive consumers the authors adapt a variant of h varian s 1980 simultaneous price setting game to analyze price leader equilibria the properties of the price leader equilibria with an exogenously specified leader motivate the construction of a game of timing in which the firm with the larger segment of loyal consumers becomes an endogenous price leader this demonstrates that consumer loyalty may play an important role in establishing the existence and identity of a price leader copyright 1992 by blackwell publishing ltd

reverse price discrimination with bayesian buyers this paper studies price discrimination under the situation in which buyers prior valuations are initially observable by a seller but buyers receive further information about a product or service which remains private thereafter the buyers interpret new information via bayes rule we show that in this environment prices are not monotone in buyers prior valuations interestingly this results in the possibility that a seller intentionally offers a higher price to a low valuation buyer rather than a high valuation buyer reverse price discrimination we derive this result in both monopoly and duopoly markets

mixed pricing in oligopoly with consumer switching costs abstract in this paper we develop an alternative and more natural two period model of duopolistic competition with switching costs we find that overall competition is always less severe when consumers find switching suppliers expensive however the relationship between the strength of competition and the importance of switching costs is not monotonic interestingly competition between ex ante identical firms naturally results in firms having asymmetric market shares in equilibrium

optimal replenishment policies for non instantaneous deteriorating items with price and stock sensitive demand under permissible delay in payment abstract this study is motivated by the paper of chang et al international journal of production economics 123 2010 62 68 we extend their inventory model from two aspects 1 the demand rate as multivariate function of price and level of inventory 2 delay in payment is permissible under these assumptions we first formulated a mathematical model and then some useful theoretical results have been derived to characterize the optimal solutions for non zero and zero ending inventory system numerical examples are presented to illustrate the theoretical results the sensitivity analysis of a suitable example is performed and some managerial insights are proposed our analysis revels that it is more beneficial to keep higher inventory level hoping to stimulate more demand even if it results in non zero ending inventory

the effects of third degree price discrimination in oligopoly retail firms and restaurants commonly offer senior citizen discounts i suspect this practice is not motivated by altruism rather the behavior can be better explained as profit maximizing price discrimination these firms are setting a low price in a market which probably has high elasticity of demand but why should the demand of senior citizens be more elastic than average one possibility is that elderly people have below average income and they would not eat out if restaurant prices were high perhaps a more plausible explanation is that retired people simply have more time on their hands to spend commuting across town to take advantage of discounts the purpose of these discounts may then be to lure senior citizens away from other restaurants rather than to get them out of the house the analysis of third degree price discrimination has a long history a c pigou 1920 joan robinson 1933 and two articles on the subject have recently appeared in this review richard schmalensee 1981 hal varian 1985 the industry structure in these analyses is monopoly but an explicit model of some form of competition is obviously needed to study discriminatory discounts meant to attract customers from rival firms and even discounts meant to get people out of the house may have an oligopoly analysis which is qualitatively different from their monopoly anlysis in this paper i present a simple duopoly model of a differentiated products industry i show that a firm s price elasticity of demand in a market can be expressed as the sum of two parts the industry demand elasticity and the cross price elasticity the first measures the tendency of consumers in a market to stay home when the price goes up the second the tendency to switch suppliers in the monopoly case in which the crossprice elasticity is zero and the collusive case in which the cross price elasticity is irrelevant discrimination between markets is due to differences in industry demand elasticity in the noncooperative oligopoly case equilibrium price differentials can be accounted for both by differences in cross price elasticity as well as differences in industry demand elasticity total industry output when the firms can discriminate between two markets is compared to what it would be if discrimination were impossible which regime has larger output depends on the sum of the adjustedconcavity condition and the elasticity ratio condition the first predominates when the rival products are poor substitutes and the firms have approximate monopoly power while the second predominates at the other extreme where the products are close substitutes and the firms have almost no market power the adjusted concavity condition compares the relative curvature of demands in the two markets and was originally discovered by robinson 1933 in her analysis of monopoly price discrimination the elasticity ratio condition compares the relative difference in industry demand elasticity between the two markets with the relative difference in cross price elasticity according to the elasticity ratio condition a discriminatory discount due to high industry elasticity of demand would be more likely to increase total output than one due to high cross price elasticity the effect of discrimination on profit is also discussed the distinction made here department of economics university of wisconsin madison madison wi 53706 this paper is a revision of part of my doctoral dissertation i am grateful to steve matthews ken judd and john panzar for guidance in this research i also thank seminar participants at wisconsin the justice department and the 1986 econometric society meetings in new orleans and the discussant martin perry the excellent comments of the referees improved the exposition of the paper

stackelberg solution in a vendor buyer supply chain model with permissible delay in payments abstract in practice vendors or sellers often offer their buyers a fixed credit period to settle the account the benefits of trade credit are not only to attract new buyers but also to avoid lasting price competition on the other hand the policy of granting a permissible delay adds not only an additional cost but also an additional dimension of default risk to vendors in this paper we will incorporate the fact that granting a permissible delay has a positive impact on demand but negative impacts on both costs and default risks to establish vendor buyer supply chain models then we will derive the necessary and sufficient conditions to obtain the optimal solution for both the vendor and the buyer under non cooperative stackelberg equilibrium finally we will use two numerical examples to show that 1 granting a permissible delay may significantly improve profits for both the vendor and the buyer 2 the sensitivity analysis on the optimal solution with respect to each parameter and 3 the comparisons between nash and stackelberg solutions

a comprehensive extension of optimal ordering policy for stock dependent demand under progressive payment scheme in a recent paper soni and shah 2008 presented an inventory model with a stock dependent demand under progressive payment scheme assuming zero ending inventory and adopting a cost minimization objective however with a stock dependent demand a non zero ending stock may increase profits resulting from the increased demand this work is motivated by soni and shah s 2008 paper extending their model to allow for 1 a non zero ending inventory 2 a profit maximization objective 3 a limited inventory capacity and 4 deteriorating items with a constant deterioration rate for the resulted model sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the optimal solution are provided finally several economic interpretations of the theoretical results are also given

an empirical investigation of the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination rand 054 rand2007 cls 1994 07 13 v1 2u standard latex document class rand rand 054 dispatch 12 7 2008 ce n a journal msp no no of pages 26 pe sharon rand journal of economics vol 40 no 1 spring 2009 pp 20 45 an empirical investigation of the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination sofia berto villas boas economic theory does not provide sharp predictions on the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination if downstream cost differences exist then discrimination shifts production inefficiently toward high cost retailers so a ban increases welfare if differences in price elasticity of demand across retailers exist discrimination may increase welfare if quantity sold increases so a ban reduces welfare using retail prices and quantities of coffee brands sold by german retailers i estimate a model of demand and supply and separate cost and demand differences simulating a ban on wholesale price discrimination has positive welfare effects in this market and less if downstream cost differences shrink or with less competition introduction wholesale price discrimination means that an upstream firm sets different prices for the same product for various downstream retailers wholesale price discrimination is commonly practiced in many markets examples include markets such as petroleum distribution steel heavy trucking tobacco and pharmaceuticals in several countries milk and other dairy products are sold using government administered or sanctioned discriminatory pricing schemes wholesale price discrimination practices are also used for services such as loans insurance and advertising 1 competition authorities have been concerned with wholesale price discrimination the european union treaty s article 82 c prohibits practices where a dominant firm would place trading partners at a competitive disadvantage the u s robinson patman act forbids discriminat ing in price between different purchasers where the effect may be to lessen competition unless the university of california berkeley sberto are berkeley edu i thank the editor igal hendel and two anonymous referees for many helpful comments and max auffhammer cyndi berck peter berck gal hochman silke januszewski forbes george judge kai uwe k uhn diana lazo mark muendler aviv nevo ariel pakes jeff perloff andrew sweeting miguel villas boas and participants at uc san diego university of michigan the inra idei conference in toulouse and the university of british columbia summer conference in industrial organization for their suggestions i thank daniel klapper for letting me have access to the data support from the giannini foundation and from an aes grant are gratefully appreciated see for gasoline markets texaco v hasbrouck 496 us 543 no 87 2048 1990 and the new york state motor fuel marketing practices act for steel chan hall and rust 2003 for heavy trucking volvo trucks north america inc v reeder simco gmc inc docket no 04 905 for tobacco brooke group ltd v brown and williamson tobacco corp 509 us 209 no 92 466 1993 for wholesale pharmaceuticals see http www datcp state wi us trade business unfair comp drug price jsp for dairy markets see for example gardner 1984 and for services see givens 1983 c 2009 rand copyright

lot sizing policies for deteriorating items with expiration dates and partial trade credit to credit risk customers abstract in practice a credit worthy retailer frequently receives a permissible delay on the entire purchase amount without collateral deposits from his her supplier i e an up stream full trade credit by contrast a retailer usually requests his her credit risk customers to pay a fraction of the purchase amount at the time of placing an order and then grants a permissible delay on the remaining balance i e a down stream partial trade credit in addition many products such as blood banks pharmaceuticals fruits vegetables volatile liquids and others deteriorate constantly and have their expiration dates however not many researchers have taken the expiration date of a deteriorating item into consideration the purpose of this paper is to establish optimal lot sizing policies for a retailer who sells a deteriorating item to credit risk customers by offering partial trade credit to reduce his her risk the proposed model is a generalized case of many previous models by applying theorems in pseudo convex fractional functions we can easily prove that the optimal solution not only exists but is also unique moreover we propose three discrimination terms which can easily identify the optimal solution among all possible alternatives finally some numerical examples are presented to highlight the theoretical results and managerial insights

sustainable trade credit and replenishment decisions with credit linked demand under carbon emission constraints abstract in this paper we consider issues of sustainability in the context of joint trade credit and inventory management in which the demand depends on the length of the credit period offered by the retailer to its customers we quantify the impacts of the credit period and environmental regulations on the inventory model starting with some mild assumptions we first analyze the model with generalized demand and default risk rates under the carbon cap and trade policy and then we make some extensions to the model with the carbon offset policy we further analytically examine the effects of carbon emission parameters on the retailer s trade credit and replenishment strategies finally a couple of numerical examples and sensitivity analysis are given to illustrate the features of the proposed model which is followed by concluding remarks

equilibrium incentives for most favored customer clauses in an oligopolistic industry abstract this paper analyzes the economics of contemporaneous most favored customer clauses mfcc in a non cooperative n firm oligopoly in the first stage of a two stage game each firm independently decides whether to adopt mfcc in the second stage firms set prices non cooperatively given the first stage choices in contrast to work on retroactive mfcc by cooper the rand journal of economics 1986 17 377 388 our analysis shows that not adopting mfcc can be a dominant strategy the difference between our results and cooper s highlights important differences between retroactive and contemporaneous mfcc and suggests that mfcc are a less powerful facilitating practice than retroactive mfcc our analysis also sheds new light on grether and plott s economic inquiry 1984 22 497 507 experimental results regarding the effects of mfcc on average industry prices

on the strategic choice of spatial price policy the strategic incentives with respect to the choice of price policy in spatial competition are analyzed in a duopoly model price discrimination emerges as the unique equilibriu m outcome in games with either simultaneous choice of policy and pric e or sequential choice where firms may commit first to uniform mill p ricing before the actual market stage nevertheless profits may be h igher with uniform pricing the authors models are applied to analyz e some common business practices that arise in geographical pricing like the basing point system and in the pricing of varieties or opti ons from a base product in a product differentiation context copyright 1988 by american economic association

competition of firms discriminatory pricing and location1 two costlessly mobile firms are to be located in a market region a subset of the plane the firms compete by setting locations and delivered price schedules to study this competitive stiuation an appropriate extensive form game is defined along with an appropri ate noncooperative solution concept existence and general properties of the equilibrium are demonstrated among the results are each firm increases its profit by locating so as to decrease total cost to both firms of serving the market firms will never locate coinciden tally if they have identical production costs and transport cost rates or if these are different and the firms are located in a circular market region having a uniform demand distribution this paper studies competition between two profit maximizing firms in space who are costlessly mobile and may discriminate in price we will allow the firms to set locations and delivered price schedules and we will be concerned with the existence and properties of equilibria in location and price starting with hotelling 9 the spatial competition literature has focused on location on bounded linear markets by two or more firms hotelling assumed identical firms that produced a single good with constant cost of production and considered consumers to be uniformly distributed and to have inelastic demand he also assumed that the consumers pay transport cost and purchase the good from the cheapest source hotelling claimed that a nash equilibrium in locations for the two firm market existed and yielded back to back locations at the center of the market many authors most recently d aspremont gabszewicz and thisse 2 have noted that an equilbrium in prices and location does not exist for hotelling s model however if the firms employ identical exogeneously specified prices hotelling s conclusions hold subsequent work by smithies 14 hartwick and hartwick 7 and eaton 3 claimed to show that a nash equi librium in f o b prices and locations can exist in markets with a uniform distribu tion of consumers each of whom have identical elastic demand functions for the two and three firm problems the work of d aspremont et al casts doubt on these conclusions without the adoption of restrictive conditions our work contrasts with these works and related research which has dealt with linear markets with uniform distributions of customers and with identical firms our work will involve markets that are subsets of the plane having nonuniform distributions of customers our firms will be allowed to be different that is have differences in production and transport costs however the fundamental difference in our approach is that our firms will set discriminatory prices and not price f o b in many ways our work will represent the discriminatory pricing

dynamic targeted pricing with strategic consumers abstract we investigate in this paper whether dynamic targeted pricing based on consumer purchase history could benefit a practicing firm even when consumers are strategic in that they actively seek to avail themselves of a low price in the future such strategic behavior on the part of consumers has been shown in the literature to render such dynamic targeted pricing unprofitable even for a monopoly firm we show that dynamic targeted pricing can benefit competing firms when they actively pursue customer recognition based on consumer purchase history this is because in order to pursue customer recognition competing firms need to price high to screen out price sensitive consumers and hence price competition is moderated as a result all competing firms can become better off with targeted pricing than without even when consumers behave strategically interestingly because of this competition moderation effect the paradoxical outcome occurs where dynamic targeted pricing may not benefit a monopolist but it may benefit competing firms we also show that dynamic targeted pricing can expand the market such that social welfare unambiguously improves

cartel stability and product differentiation abstract this paper employs a supergame theoretic model of collusion to analyze the effects of different levels of product differentiation on cartel stability in contrast to earlier work the ability of the parties to reach an agreement is assumed here the focus is on how greater product homogeneity increases both the gain to cheating on a collusive agreement and the magnitude of the punishments that follow a defection the total effect on the likelihood a cartel is stable is therefore unclear two particular differentiated products models are then used to demonstrate that contrary to the conventional view greater homogeneity can reduce cartel stability