what drives deregulation economics and politics of the relaxation of bank branching restrictions this paper investigates private interest public interest and political institutional theories of regulatory change to analyze state level deregulation of bank branching restrictions using a hazard model we find that interest group factors related to the relative strength of potential winners large banks and small bank dependent firms and losers small banks and the rival insurance firms can explain the timing of branching deregulation across states during the last quarter century the same factors also explain congressional voting on interstate branching deregulation while we find some support for each theory the private interest approach provides the most compelling overall explanation of our results

do interest groups reward politicians for their votes in the legislature evidence from the great recession interest groups lobby politicians in various ways to influence their policy decisions especially their voting decisions in the legislature most if not all of the studies on this issue examine

the political economy of corporate control and labor rents in a democracy a political majority can influence both the corporate governance structure and the return to human and financial capital we argue that when financial wealth is sufficiently concentrated there is political support for high labor rents and a strong governance role for banks or large investors the model is consistent with the great reversal phenomenon in the first half of the twentieth century we offer evidence that in several financially developed countries a financially weakened middle class became concerned about labor income risk associated with free markets and supported a more corporatist financial system

occupational choice and the process of development this paper models economic development as a process of institutional transformation by focusing on the interplay between agents occupational decisions and the distribution of wealth because of capital market imperfections poor agents choose working for a wage over self employment and wealthy agents become entrepreneurs who monitor workers only with sufficient inequality however will there be employment contracts otherwise there is either subsistence or self employment thus in static equilibrium the occupational structure depends on distribution since the latter is itself endogenous we demonstrate the robustness of this result by extending the model dynamically and studying examples in which initial wealth distributions have long run effects in one case the economy develops either widespread cottage industry self employment or factory production employment contracts depending on the initial distribution in the other example it develops into prosperity or stagnation

is protection for sale evidence on the grossman helpman theory of endogenous protection grossman and helpman 1994 present a theory of endogenous protection by explicitly modeling government industry interactions for which mere black box models previously existed they obtain a ramsey pricing type solution to the provision of protection which emphasizes the role of inverse import penetration ratios and import elasticities on the lobbying side the model makes predictions about lobbying competition and lobbying spending according to deadweight costs from protection the model not only makes for richer theory in terms of rigor and elegance but its predictions are directly testable whether the grossman helman model stands up to real world data is investigated in this paper predictions from both the protection side and lobbying side are tested using cross sectional u s nontariff barrier data we also compare the second generation grossman helpman model with a more traditional specification our results call for serious consideration of this model in the political economy literature

foreclosures house prices and the real economy from 2007 to 2009 states without a judicial requirement for foreclosures were twice as likely to foreclose on delinquent homeowners analysis of borders of states with differing foreclosure laws reveals a discrete jump in foreclosure propensity as one enters nonjudicial states using state judicial requirement as an instrument for foreclosures we show that foreclosures led to a large decline in house prices residential investment and consumer demand from 2007 to 2009 as foreclosures subsided from 2011 to 2013 the foreclosure rates in nonjudicial and judicial requirement states converged and we find some evidence of a stronger recovery in nonjudicial states

regulation and the theory of legislative choice the interstate commerce act of 1887 this article concerns the economic incidence of the interstate commerce act of 1887 ica our focus is the short haul pricing constraint a provision of the ica that prohibited railroads from charging higher rates to isolated primarily agrarian shippers than it charged to intercity shippers of similar commodities utilizing the event study methodology we find that the impending passage of the ica generated a distribution of abnormal returns to railroads and shipping firms that is consistent with the theoretical implications of our analysis of the short haul pricing constraint shpc however early interpretations of the shpc by the interstate commerce commission reduced some of the abnormal returns to railroads in a manner that is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the short haul pricing constraint was an important mechanism of early railroad regulation the analysis does support a multiple interest interpretation of the interstate commerce act and has implications for the positive theory of regulation

political intervention in debt contracts this paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model of an agricultural economy in which poor farmers borrow from rich farmers because output is stochastic we allow for idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks there may be default ex post we compare equilibria with and without political intervention intervention takes the form of a moratorium and is decided by voting when bad economic shocks are highly likely state contingent debt moratoria always improve ex post efficiency and may also improve ex ante efficiency moreover the threat of moratoria enhances efficiency when adverse macro shocks are unlikely state contingent moratoria always improve ex ante welfare by completing incomplete debt contracts

inequality democracy and the protection of property rights motivated by the observed relevance of institutional quality such as strong property rights for economic performance this research considers the emergence of property rights protection as a political outcome it argues that the support for such protection is greater the more equal income distribution and the smaller political bias when these conditions initially hold the politically influential rich elite may prefer to relinquish its power through democratisation in order to commit future policy makers to the enforcement of property rights thus ensuring larger investment and faster growth along the transition path in a very unequal economy however such democratisation will not take place

dealing with debt abstract this paper explores the menu of options for renormalizing public debt levels relative to nominal activity in the long run should governments eventually decide to do so although debt ratios may need to rise further in some cases a vision of longer term options is key to weighing alternative medium term stabilization strategies orthodox ones the standard fare of officialdom include enhancing growth running primary budget surpluses and privatizing government assets heterodox polices include restructuring debt contracts generating unexpected inflation taxing wealth and repressing private finance advanced countries have relied far more on heterodox approaches than many observers choose to remember

is the glass steagall act justified a study of the u s experience with universal banking before the glass steagall act of 1933 removed commercial banks from the securities underwriting business we evaluate the argument for the separation of commercial and investment banking that conflicts of interest induce commercial banks to fool the public into investing in securities which turn out to be of low quality a comparison of the performance of securities underwritten by commercial and investment banks prior to the act shows no evidence of this instead the public appears to have rationally accounted for the possibility of conflicts of interest and this appears to have constrained the banks to underwrite high quality securities jel g21 g24 n22

income distribution political instability and investment abstract this paper successfully tests on a sample of 71 countries for the period 1960 85 the following hypotheses income inequality by fuelling social discontent increases sociopolitical instability the latter by creating uncertainty in the politico economic environment reduces investment as a consequence income inequality and investment are inversely related since investment is a primary engine of growth this paper identifies a channel for an inverse relationship between income inequality and growth we measure socio political instability with indices which capture the occurrence of more or less violent phenomena of political unrest and we test our hypotheses by estimating a two equation model in which the endogenous variables are investment and an index of socio political instability our results are robust to sensitivity analysis on the specification of the model and the measure of political instability and are unchanged when the model is estimated using robust regression techniques

capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics the economic theory of regulation long ago put public interest theories of politics to rest these theories have correctly been viewed as normative wishings rather than explanations of real world phenomena they have been replaced by models of political behavior that are consistent with the rest of microeconomics anthony downs 1957 james buchanan and gordon tullock 1965 george stigler 1971 sam peltzman 1976 recently however debate has arisen over whether some version of a public interest theory of regulation will have to be readmitted to our thinking about actions and results in the political arena what is at issue is the empirical importance of the altruistic publicly interested goals of rational actors in determining legislative and regulatory outcomes james kau and paul rubin 1979 kalt 1981 peltzman 1982 this study assesses the nature and significance of publicly interested objectives in a particular instance of economic policymaking u s senate voting on coal strip mining regulations the existence of such objectives is of course no contradiction of the economic view of human behavior kenneth arrow 1972 gary becker 1974 and may well be rooted in genetic biological history becker 1976 jack hirshleifer 1978 generally however individuals altruistic publicly interested goals have been given little attention this reflects the judgment that such goals are so empirically unimportant as to allow the use of occam s razor in positive models or well founded apprehensions that these goals are unusually difficult to identify measure and analyze notwithstanding the latter problem we find that approaches which confine themselves to a view of political actors as narrowly egocentric maximizers explain and predict legislative outcomes poorly the tracking and dissecting of the determinants of voting on coal strip mining policy suggest that the economic theory of politics has been prematurely closed to a broader conception of political behavior

some talk money in politics a partial review of the literature the financing of political campaigns is an area of active scholarly study i review some of the recent literature and discuss important methodological issues that arise in empir ical research on campaign expenditures and campaign contributions the effects of campaign expenditures and advertising on candidate and ballot measure elections are summarized as are the impacts of contributions on contributors welfare many states have changed their campaign finance laws in the past few years and i describe work that exploits variations in these laws a discussion of the strategies used by interest groups to allocate their campaign contributions provides insights into contributors motives

a theory of political transitions we develop a theory of political transitions inspired by the experiences of western europe and latin america nondemocratic societies are controlled by a rich elite the initially disenfranchised poor can contest power by threatening revolution especially when the opportunity cost is low for example during recessions the threat of revolution may force the elite to democratize democracy may not consolidate because it is redistributive and so gives the elite an incentive to mount a coup highly unequal societies are less likely to consolidate democracy and may end up oscillating between regimes and suffer substantial fiscal volatility

committee assignments constituent preferences and campaign contributions committee assignments constituent preferences and campaign constributions the familiar economic model of regulation as developed by stigler 1971 peltzman 1976 and becker 1983 posits an essentially frictionless market process for regulatory policy formation in which a single regulator legislator chooses policy to maximize net support from competing groups in this paper we extend the supply side of this model by considering the effect of legislative institutions and unorganized constituent preferences on the ability of incumbents in the house of representatives to serve specific interest groups we then test this formulation by examining the recent history of interest group campaign contributions to these legislators our theoretical model concentrates on how a legislator allocates time between serving specific interest groups outside his district and serving his constituency we do not model interest group decisions directly assuming simply that they purchase their desired amount of service from the lowest cost suppliers our model sorts legislators by the supply price at which they can serve a particular group this price depends on the preferences of the voters in the legislators district and the productivity of the legislator in producing policy service for each group 1 the empirical section tests the model by examining the pattern of interest group campaign contributions to house incumbents from 1978 through 1984 our regression analysis tends to confirm both implications of the theory first the pattern of campaign contributions from specific interest groups to legislators is shaped by the division of substantive legislative and regulatory jurisdictions represented by the system of house standing committees second voter preferences influence the pattern of contributions by affecting the supply price at which a legislator can offer policy to interest groups legislators with sympathetic or indifferent constituencies are able to offer a lower price and are therefore able to attract larger sums than those with hostile constituencies these results are important for two reasons first the influence of congressional institutions such as committees on policy is not widely accepted while several studies faith levins and tollison 1982 weingast and moran 1983 weingast 1984 grier 1989 and robert 1990 have documented the effects of changes in a particular committee on policies under its jurisdiction this work considers the jurisdiction of only a single committee in each case 2 by examining the linkages between congressional committees and political action committees pacs we investigate whether interest groups act as if committees have power second while the chicago model of regulation emphasizes correctly in our view that policy is the result of vote maximizing calculations and the incremental balancing nature of any equilibrium the model is imprecise about which sets of preferences are most important in determining the levels of policy or the size of changes in policies focusing on committees promotes a parsimonious specification of both the political players members of the relevant committee rather than the entire congress and the pivotal voters committee members constituencies more than the nation determining specific policy outcomes the paper is organized as follows section i reviews some issues on the nature and sources of committee influence in the u s congress the second section incorporates committee assignments into a theory of decision making by interest group investors sections iii and iv describe our data and estimation technique and present the empirical results the fifth and final section discusses some implications and conclusions of this research i committee power in congress legislators differ substantively by virtue of their committee assignments committees in congress and particularly in the house of representatives possess disproportionate power over the policy areas in their respective jurisdictions have the right to hold hearings and recommend budget allocations for the bureaus in their jurisdiction goodwin 1970

the politics of m a antitrust antitrust regulators play a critical role in protecting market competition we examine whether the political process affects antitrust reviews of merger transactions we find that acquirers and targets located in the political districts of powerful u s congressional members who serve on committees with antitrust regulatory oversight receive relatively favorable antitrust review outcomes to establish causality we use plausibly exogenous shocks to firm politician links and a falsification test additional findings suggest congressional members incentives to influence antitrust reviews are affected by three channels special interests voter and constituent interests and ideology in aggregate our findings suggest that the political process adversely interferes with the ability of antitrust regulators to provide independent recommendations about anticompetitive mergers

voting technology political responsiveness and infant health evidence from brazil this paper studies the introduction of electronic voting technology in brazilian elections estimates exploiting a regression discontinuity design indicate that electronic voting reduced residual error ridden and uncounted votes and promoted a large de facto enfranchisement of mainly less educated citizens estimates exploiting the unique pattern of the technology s phase in across states over time suggest that as predicted by political economy models it shifted government spending toward health care which is particularly beneficial to the poor positive effects on both the utilization of health services prenatal visits and newborn health low weight births are also found for less educated mothers but not for the more educated

on the severity of economic downturns lessons from cross country evidence abstract we measure the severity of recessions as a function of their amplitude and duration within a quantile regression framework we assess what causes economic downturns to be more or less severe we find that the most severe downturns have striking similarities regarding cumulated domestic credit and large current account deficits

income distribution and macroeconomics this paper analyzes the role of wealth distribution in macroeconomics through investment in human capital it is shown that in the presence of credit markets imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital the initial distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and investment both in the short and in the long run as there are multiple steady states this paper therefore provides an additional explanation for the persistent differences in per capita output across countries furthermore the paper shows that cross country differences in macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate shocks can be attributed among other factors to differences in wealth and income distribution across countries

new ways of looking at old issues inequality and growth abstract the paper uses new cross country data on income and asset land distribution to show that i there is a strong negative relationship between initial inequality in the asset distribution and long term growth ii inequality reduces income growth for the poor but not for the rich and iii available longitudinal data provide little support for the kuznets hypothesis policies that increase aggregate investment and facilitate acquisition of assets by the poor might thus be doubly beneficial for growth and poverty reduction

the protestant fiscal ethic religious confession and euro skepticism in germany during the european sovereign debt crisis most countries that ran into fiscal trouble had catholic majorities whereas countries with protestant majorities were able to avoid fiscal problems we find that christian conservative members of the german parliament from constituencies with higher shares of protestants were more likely to vote against a third bailout for greece survey data show that views on the euro differ between german protestants and non protestants at the individual level too among protestants concerns about the euro have compared to non protestants increased during the crisis we show that this increase in concern is linked to a reduction of protestants subjective well being we use the timing of survey interviews and news events in 2011 to account for the endogeneity of euro concerns emphasis on moral hazard concerns in protestant theology may thus still shape economic preferences jel d72 e00 i31 z12

policy influence and private returns from lobbying in the energy sector in this article i quantify the extent to which lobbying expenditures by firms affect policy enactment to achieve this end i construct a novel dataset containing all federal energy legislation and lobbying activities by the energy sector during the 110th congress i then develop and estimate a game theoretic model where heterogeneous players choose lobbying expenditures to affect the probability that a policy is enacted i find that the effect of lobbying expenditures on a policy s equilibrium enactment probability to be statistically significant but very small nonetheless the average returns from lobbying expenditures are estimated to be over 130

do interest groups affect us immigration policy while anecdotal evidence suggests that interest groups play a key role in shaping immigration policy there is no systematic empirical analysis of this issue in this paper we construct an industry level dataset for the united states by combining information on the number of temporary work visas with data on lobbying activity associated with immigration we find robust evidence that both pro and anti immigration interest groups play a statistically significant and economically relevant role in shaping migration policy across sectors barriers to migration are lower in sectors in which business interest groups incur larger lobbying expenditures and higher in sectors where labor unions are more important

regulation and market liquidity we examine the effects of postcrisis financial regulation encompassing the dodd frank act and basel iii on market liquidity of the u s fixed income market we estimate structural breaks in a large panel of liquidity measures of corporate and treasury bonds our methodology does not require a priori knowledge of the timing of breaks can capture not only sudden jumps but also breaks in slow moving trends and displays excellent power properties against the popular claim that postcrisis regulation hurt liquidity we find no evidence of liquidity deterioration during periods of regulatory intervention instead breaks toward higher liquidity are often detected the online appendix is available at https doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2017 2876 this paper was accepted by tomasz piskorski finance

finance and income inequality what do the data tell us although there are distinct conjectures about the relationship between finance and income inequality little empirical research compares their explanatory power we examine the relationship between finance and income inequality for 83 countries between 1960 and 1995 because financial develop ment might be endogenous we use instruments from the literature on law finance and growth to control for this our results suggest that in the long run inequality is less when financial development is greater consistent with galor and zeira 1993 and banerjee and newman 1993 although the results also suggest that inequality might increase as financial sector development increases at very low levels of financial sector development as suggested by greenwood and jovanovic 1990 this result is not robust we reject the hypothesis that financial development benefits only the rich our results thus suggest that in addition to improving growth financial development also reduces inequality

are legislators ideologues or the agents of constituents abstract legislatures often make important economic decisions a decade ago economists viewed each legislator as the agent if not of the median voter of some pivotal voter in a party constituency therefore the voting decision of a legislator could readily be predicted if one could measure the preferences of the relevant pivotal voter models where interests on specific issues can be simply linked to votes on the same issues are questionable however since votes will be traded across issues political parties are one important vehicle for organizing such trades a simple empirical test for the united states senate however clearly rejects the notion that the representative is the agent of the median voter or a local party constituency even if vote trades are allowed thus there is ample opportunity for politicians even under reelection constraints to either voice their own ideology or that of idiosyncratic support coalitions the relevant theory and empirical evidence is summarized and some validating tests for european parliaments are suggested

securitization and distressed loan renegotiation evidence from the subprime mortgage crisis abstract we examine whether securitization impacts renegotiation decisions of loan servicers focusing on their decision to foreclose a delinquent loan conditional on a loan becoming seriously delinquent we find a significantly lower foreclosure rate associated with bank held loans when compared to similar securitized loans across various specifications and origination vintages the foreclosure rate of delinquent bank held loans is 3 to 7 lower in absolute terms 13 to 32 in relative terms there is a substantial heterogeneity in these effects with large effects among borrowers with better credit quality and small effects among lower quality borrowers a quasi experiment that exploits a plausibly exogenous variation in securitization status of a delinquent loan confirms these results

is the 2007 u s sub prime financial crisis so different an international historical comparison the first major financial crisis of the twentyfirst century involves esoteric instruments unaware regulators and skittish investors it also follows a well trodden path laid down by centuries of financial folly is the special prob lem of sub prime mortgages really different our examination of the longer historical record which is part of a larger effort on cur rency and debt crises finds stunning qualitative and quantitative parallels across a number of standard financial crisis indicators to name a few the run up in us equity and housing prices that graciela l kaminsky and reinhart 1999 find to be the best leading indicators of crisis in countries experiencing large capital inflows closely tracks the average of the previous 18 post world war ii banking crises in industrial countries so too does the inverted v shape of real growth in the years prior to the crisis despite widespread concern about the effects on national debt of the tax cuts of the early 2000s the run up in us public debt is actually some what below the average of other crisis episodes in contrast the pattern of us current account deficits is markedly worse at this juncture the book is still open on how the current dislocations in the united states will play out the precedent found in the aftermath of other episodes suggests that the strains can be quite severe depending especially on the initial degree of trauma to the financial system and to some extent the policy response the average drop in real per capita output growth is over 2 percent and it typically takes two years to return to trend for the five most catastrophic cases which include episodes in finland japan

policymakers horizon and trade reforms the protectionist effect of elections this paper shows that electoral incentives deter politicians from supporting trade liberalization we focus on all major trade liberalization bills introduced since the early 1970s in the u s congress in which house and senate members serve respectively two and six year terms and one third of senators face elections every two years we show that senators are more likely to support trade liberalization than house representatives however this result does not hold for the last generation of senators who face elections at the same time as house members suggesting that inter cameral differences are driven by term length considering senators alone we find that the last generation is less likely to support trade liberalization than the previous two this result is pervasive and holds both when comparing the behavior of different senators voting on the same bill and that of individual senators voting on different bills the protectionist effect of election proximity disappears for senators who are retiring or hold safe seats

insurance demand and country risks a nonlinear panel data analysis abstract this paper investigates the impact of country risks including political financial and economic risks on the income elasticity of insurance demand using the panel smooth transition regression model we find that there is a significant regime switching effect concerning the impact of country risks on the income elasticity of insurance demand a full sample analysis shows that the income elasticity of insurance demand decreases when country risks diminish in a subsample analysis based on income level legal origin and restriction on banks participation in insurance activities we find that the elasticity diminishes in general when economic risk drops when political risk is lower the elasticity decreases in countries with high income common law origin and insurance activities permitted by banks whereas a clear pattern cannot be identified in the case of financial risk

a new data set measuring income inequality this article presents a new data set on inequality in the distribution of income the authors explain the criteria they applied in selecting data on gini coefficients and on individual quintile groups income shares comparison of the new data set with existing compilations reveals that the data assembled here represent an improvement in quality and a significant expansion in coverage although differences in the definition of the underlying data might still affect inter temporal and international comparability based on this new data set the authors do not find a systematic link between growth and changes in aggregate inequality they do find a strong positive relationship between growth and reduction of poverty

gifts of the immigrants woes of the natives lessons from the age of mass migration in this article i jointly investigate the political and the economic effects of immigration and study the causes of anti immigrant sentiments i exploit exogenous variation in european immigration to u s cities between 1910 and 1930 induced by world war i and the immigration acts of the 1920s and instrument immigrants location decision relying on pre existing settlement patterns i find that immigration triggered hostile political reactions such as the election of more conservative legislators higher support for anti immigration legislation and lower redistribution exploring the causes of natives backlash i document that immigration increased natives employment spurred industrial production and did not generate losses even among natives working in highly exposed sectors these findings suggest that opposition to immigration was unlikely to have economic roots instead i provide evidence that natives political discontent was increasing in the cultural differences between immigrants and natives results in this article indicate that even when diversity is economically beneficial it may nonetheless be socially hard to manage

dissecting the cycle a methodological investigation following burns and mitchell we define the cycle as a pattern in the level of aggregate economic activity an algorithm to locate turning points is developed as is a new measure of pro cyclicality a link between turning points and the moments of the series is established thereby providing the statistical foundation that burns and mitchell s work lacked using these tools we are able to dissect cycles in terms of the contributions made by trend growth volatility serial correlation and non linear effects we dissect several models and find little evidence that certain non linear effects are important to the nature of business cycles

an assessment of tarp assistance to financial institutions six years after the passage of the 2008 troubled asset relief program commonly known as tarp it remains hard to measure the total social costs and benefits of the assistance to banks provided under tarp programs tarp was not a single approach to assisting weak banks but rather a variety of changing solutions to a set of evolving problems tarp s passage was associated with significant improvements in financial markets and the health of financial intermediaries as well as an increase in the supply of lending by recipients however a full evaluation must also take into account other factors including the risks borne by taxpayers in the course of the bailouts moral hazard costs that could result in more risk taking in the future and social costs related to perceived unfairness our evaluation is organized in five parts 1 what did policymakers do 2 what are the proper objectives of interventions like tarp assistance to financial institutions 3 did tarp succeed in those economic objectives 4 were tarp funds allocated purely on an economic basis or did political favoritism play a role 5 would alternative policies either alongside or instead of tarp and alternative design features of tarp have worked better

taxation of economic rents economic rents have long been identified as an efficient tax base in addition the recent literature documents that rent income is highly concentrated and that rents are quickly increasing rent taxation thus seems attractive for reasons of both efficiency and equity nevertheless rent taxation remains a marginal topic in research and policy making in a systematic review of the neoclassical literature on different rent types we find that some types of rents reflect inefficiencies and should thus be minimized while others reward investments and should be supported in line with social welfare what remains for taxation are land rents one of the few true scarcity rents land rents have significant potential to improve the efficiency of the tax system we then begin to develop a comprehensive theory of land rent taxation by identifying relevant efficiency and equity effects the interaction of many of these effects remains unexplored which might explain policymakers hesitation in using land taxes to date

growth inequality and poverty looking beyond averages the evidence is compelling that the poor in developing countries do typically share in the gains from rising aggregate affluence and in the losses from aggregate contraction but how much do poor people share in growth do they gain more in some settings than others do some gain while others lose does pro poor growth mean more or less aggregate growth recent theories and evidence suggest some answers but deeper microeconomic empirical work is needed on growth and distributed change only then will we have a firm basis for identifying the specific policies and programs needed to complement and possibly modify growth oriented policies

a new database on the structure and development of the financial sector this article introduces a new database of indicators of financial structure and financial development across countries and over time the database is unique in that it combines a wide variety of indicators that measure the size activity and efficiency of financial intermediaries and markets it improves on previous efforts by presenting data on the public share of commercial banks introducing indicators of the size and activity of nonbank financial institutions and constructing measures of the size of bond and primary equity markets this article introduces a new database the first to provide comprehensive measures of the development structure and performance of the financial sector this database is the first to define and construct indicators of the size and activity of nonbank financial intermediaries such as insurance companies pension funds and non deposit money banks it is also the first to include indicators of the size of primary equity markets and primary and secondary bond markets in constructing the database authors carefully deflate measures and match stock and flow variables

a closer look at financial development and income distribution this paper analyzes the under investigated relationship uniting financial development and income distribution we use a novel approach taking into account for the first time the specific channels linking banks capital markets and income inequality the time varying nature of the relationship and reciprocal causality we construct a set of annual indicators of banking and capital market size robustness efficiency and international integration we then estimate the determinants of income distribution using a panel bayesian structural vector autoregressive svar model for a set of 49 countries over the 1994 2002 period we uncover a significant causality running from financial sector development to income distribution in addition the banking sector seems to exert a stronger impact on inequality finally the relationship appears to depend on characteristics of the financial sector rather than on its size

financial development growth and the distribution of income a paradigm is presented in which both the extent of financial intermediation and the rate of economic growth are endogenously determined financial intermediation promotes growth because it allows a higher rate of return to be earned on capital and growth in turn provides the means to implement costly financial structures thus financial intermediation and economic growth are inextricably linked in accord with the goldsmith mckinnon shaw view on economic development the model also generates a development cycle reminiscent of the kuznet hypothesis in particular in the transition from a primitive slow growing economy to a developed fast growing one a nation passes through a stage in which the distribution of wealth across the rich and poor widens

do lenders favor politically connected firms rent provision in an emerging financial market corruption by the politically connected is often blamed for economic ills particularly in less developed economies using a loan level data set of more than 90 000 rms that represents the universe of corporate lending in pakistan between 1996 and 2002 we investigate rents to politically connected rms in banking classifying a rm as political if its director participates in an election we examine the extent nature and economic costs of political rent provision we nd that political rms borrow 45 percent more and have 50 percent higher default rates such preferential treatment occurs exclusively in government banks private banks provide no

the political economy of ownership housing markets and the welfare state the major economic story of the last decade has been the surge and collapse of house prices worldwide yet political economists have had little to say about how this critical phenomenon affects citizens welfare and their demands from government this article develops a novel theoretical argument linking housing prices to social policy preferences and policy outcomes i argue that homeowners experiencing house price appreciation will become less supportive of redistribution and social insurance policies since increased house prices both increase individuals permanent income and the value of housing as self supplied insurance against income loss political parties of the right will responding to these preferences cut social spending substantially during housing booms i test these propositions using both microdata on social preferences from panel surveys in the usa the uk and a cross country survey of 29 countries and macrodata of national social spending for 18 countries between 1975 and 2001

legal theories of financial development this paper describes and empirically ex amines legal theories of international differences in financial development the law and finance theory stresses that legal traditions differ in terms of 1 their emphasis on the rights of private property owners vis a vis the state and 2 their ability to adapt to changing commercia l and financial conditions so that historically determined legal traditions shape financial deve lopment today other theories reject the centrality of legal tradition in accounting for cross country differences in financial development the results are broadly consistent with legal th eories of financial development though it is difficult to identify the precise channel through which legal tradition influences financial development

interest groups campaign contributions and probabilistic voting this essay develops a simple model to analyze the impact of campaign contributions on electoral policy decisions of candidates for office interest groups here are firms that select contributions under the assumption that candidates policies and opposing groups donations remain unaltered candidates however recognize that their policy choices affect contributions campaign contributions are used by candidates to affect policy oriented voters perceptions of candidates positions in this framework the introduction of campaign contributions may affect candidates electoral policies and if they do then they benefit surely exactly one of the two interest groups

votes or money theory and evidence from the us congress abstract this paper investigates the relationship between the size of interest groups in terms of voter representation and the interest group s campaign contributions to politicians we uncover a robust hump shaped relationship between the voting share of an interest group and its contributions to a legislator this pattern is rationalized in a simultaneous bilateral bargaining model where the larger size of an interest group affects the amount of surplus to be split with the politician thereby increasing contributions but is also correlated with the strength of direct voter support the group can offer instead of monetary funds thereby decreasing contributions the model yields simple structural equations that we estimate at the district level employing data on individual and pac donations and local employment by sector this procedure yields estimates of electoral uncertainty and politicians effectiveness as perceived by the interest groups our approach also implicitly delivers a novel method for estimating the impact of campaign spending on election outcomes we find that an additional vote costs a politician on average 145

the real effects of government owned banks evidence from an emerging market using plant level data for brazilian manufacturing firms this paper provides evidence that government control over banks leads to significant political influence over the real decisions of firms i find that firms eligible for government bank lending expand employment in politically attractive regions near elections these expansions are associated with additional favorable borrowing from government banks further these persistent expansions take place just before competitive elections and are associated with lower future employment growth by firms in other regions the analysis suggests that politicians in brazil use bank lending to shift employment towards politically attractive regions and away from unattractive regions

the great recession lessons from microeconomic data crises and sharp economic downturns while undesirable provide economists with a unique opportunity to test and hone economic theory indeed some of the most influential advance ments in economic thought including milton friedman s monetarist tradition john maynard keynes fiscal theory and irving fisher s debtdeflation hypothesis emerged from analysis of the great depression the current economic malaise which we refer to as the great recession provides another watershed moment to reevaluate our core economic beliefs however in contrast to our peers in previous crises we are fortunate to have access to large scale microeconomic datasets and advancements in computational capacity these advantages allow for a more rigorous analysis of the current recession and therefore a more informed understanding of its origins propagation and consequences our purpose is to highlight how a micro level analysis of the great recession provides us with important clues to understand the origins of the crisis the link between credit and asset prices the feedback effect from asset prices to the real economy and the role of household leverage in explaining the downturn we hope that our discussion also serves as an example of the useful ness of incorporating microeconomic data and techniques in answering traditional macroeco nomic questions i what were the origins of the credit cycle credit demand or credit supply

how do senators vote disentangling the role of voter preferences party affiliation and senate ideology this paper develops a methodology for consistently estimating the relative weights in senator utility functions despite the fact that senator ideologies are unobserved the empirical results suggest that voter preferences are assigned only one quarter of the weight in senator utility functions the national party line also has some influence but the senator s own ideology is the primary determinant of roll call voting patterns these results cast doubt on the empirical relevance of the median voter theorem estimation of the model requires only roll call voting data making it widely applicable copyright 1996 by american economic association

taking credit redistribution and borrowing in an age of economic polarization several recent studies link rising income inequality in the united states to the global financial crisis arguing that us politicians did not respond to growing inequality with fiscal redistribution instead americans saved less and borrowed more to maintain relative consumption in the face of widening economic disparities this article proposes a theory in which fiscal redistribution dampens the willingness of citizens to borrow to fund current consumption a key implication is that pretax inequality will be more tightly linked with credit in less redistributive countries the long run partisan composition of government is in turn a key determinant of redistributive effort examining a panel of eighteen oecd democracies the authors find that countries with limited histories of left wing participation in government are significantly more likely see credit expansion as prefisc inequality grows compared to those in which the political left has been more influential

financial development income inequality and country risk abstract this study explores the non linear effects of both finance development and country risks on income inequality when countries risk changes through a broad sample of 59 countries over the period 1985 2015 using the panel smooth transition regression model our results present evidence of the different relationships among income inequality finance development and country risks under different degrees of country risk for the full sample we find evidence of the inequality widening hypothesis under unstable economic stable financial and stable political environments for the sub samples under stable economic and financial environments high income countries income inequality can be improved through financial development moreover we find a positive relationship between financial development and income inequality for low income countries

farm foreclosure moratorium legislation a lesson from the past and the calls for legislation to prevent farm foreclosures are not without precedent farm foreclosures were high throughout the 1920 s and 1930 s in large part because farmers had to make mortgage payments fixed in nominal dollars while their earnings were falling in response many state legislatures sought to aid farmers by passing legislation that postponed foreclosure by creditors scholars have given little attention to these various state emergency measures and their impact on creditors and debtors 2 this article is a step toward filling this void the first section contains a general description of the moratorium legislation and hypotheses about the causes of moratorium legislation are proposed and tested in section ii the economic consequences of moratorium legislation are addressed and the hypotheses are formally specified and tested

the political economy of the us mortgage default crisis we examine the effects of constituents special interests and ideology on congressional voting on two of the most significant pieces of legislation in us economic history representatives whose constituents experience a sharp increase in mortgage defaults are more likely to support the foreclosure prevention act especially in competitive districts interestingly representatives are more sensitive to defaults of their own party constituents special interests in the form ofhigher campaign contributions from the financial industry increase the likelihood of supporting the emergency economic stabilization act however ideologically conservative representatives are less responsive to both constituent and special interests jel d72 g21 g28

reconciling hayek s and keynes views of recessions recessions often happen after periods of rapid accumulation of houses consumer durables and business capital this observation has led some economists most notably friedrich hayek to conclude that recessions often reflect periods of needed liquidation resulting from past over investment according to the main proponents of this view government spending or any other form of aggregate demand policy should not be used to mitigate such a liquidation process as doing so would simply result in a needed adjustment being postponed in contrast ever since the work of keynes many economists have viewed recessions as periods of deficient demand that should be countered by activist fiscal policy in this paper we reexamine the liquidation perspective of recessions in a setup where prices are flexible but where not all trades are coordinated by centralized markets the model illustrates why liquidations likely cause recessions characterized by deficient aggregate demand and accordingly suggests that keynes and hayek s views of recessions may be closely linked in our framework interventions aimed at stimulating aggregate demand face a trade off whereby current stimulus postpones the adjustment process and therefore prolongs the recessions but where some stimulative policies may nevertheless remain desirable

the political economy of adjustment and rebalancing abstract debt and balance of payments crises are politically controversial in the aftermath of such crises conflict typically breaks out over how the burden of adjustment will be distributed there is international conflict between debtor nations and creditor nations over how outstanding debts will be resolved and there is conflict within nations over who will make the sacrifices necessary to get economies back on track these political conflicts often become so bitter and protracted that they impede productive bargaining over the adjustment process the characteristics of socio economic and political divisions within societies affect the battles over economic adjustment as well as who will emerge victorious from these battles and how difficult it may be to arrive at a productive resolution of the crisis

the simultaneous evolution of growth and inequality research on inequality and growth can be divided into two strands one deriving from kuznets and lewis has tried to identify a mechanistic relationship between growth or level of income and inequality the other has tried to find causal explanations of growth and inequality treating each independently in this paper we draw from both strands to test whether growth and inequality are the joint outcomes of other variables and processes we find that simultaneous examination of growth and inequality yields significantly different results and has different consequences for policy from previous independent studies the empirical literature on growth and inequality can be divided into two broad strands one following the pioneering work of kuznets and lewis is motivated by the pessimistic conjecture that the process of growth and development somehow requires increasing inequality at least in the early stages this has led to many efforts to identify a mechanical relationship between the level of development and inequality anand and kanbur 1993 or to determine whether faster growth requires higher or lower inequality the second strand has sought to identify the causal factors influencing the evolution of growth and inequality independently this research has looked either at growth for example barro and sala i martin 1995 or at inequality li et al 1997 but has not tried to identify those factors that might simultaneously influence both growth and inequality 2 thus the literature that looks simultaneously at growth and inequality descending most notably from kuznets 1955 relates them in a mechanistic manner that ignores or minimises the role of other causal factors including policy while the literature that incorporates other causal factors including policies looks independently at growth and inequality neither approach is particularly convincing from a theoretical standpoint the evolution of growth and inequality must surely be the outcome of similar processes in addition neither approach is particularly useful for the policy maker who needs to balance the impact of policies on both growth and distribution in this paper we investigate whether growth and inequality are simultaneously determined and if so whether or not they are subject to

explaining international and intertemporal variations in income inequality this paper explores the propositions that income inequality is relatively stable within countries and that it varies significantly among countries a new and expanded data set provides broad support for both propositions drawing on a political economy and capital market imperfection arguments to explain the intertemporal and international variation in inequality the empirical analysis shows that the predicted variables associated with the first argument a measure of civil liberties and the initial level of secondary schooling and the second argument a measure of financial depth and the initial distribution of land are indeed important determinants of inequality this paper explores two propositions regarding income inequality they are first income inequality is relatively stable within countries and second it varies significantly across countries to illustrate note that the gini coefficient in india remained almost constant for forty years 1951 92 with mean 32 6 and standard deviation 2 0 2 in contrast the variation in gini coefficients across countries is large 61 9 in honduras in 1968 compared with 17 8 in bulgaria in 1976 if substantiated these propositions have potentially significant implications for poverty the significance of the first is obvious barring any fundamental socio political change poverty reduction will depend crucially on the rate of economic growth given this the significance of the second is that in inegalitarian economies the poor will enjoy a smaller share of any national increment in income than in more egalitarian ones drawing on a new and expanded data set on inequality deininger and squire 1996a the first of the paper s three sections conducts standard statistical tests of the two propositions the sample comprises 573 observations on the most common measure of inequality the gini coefficient for 49 developed and developing countries covering the period 1947 94 the results broadly confirm our two propositions specifically analysis of variance anova shows that about 90 of the total variance in the gini coefficients

do voters affect or elect policies evidence from the u s house there are two fundamentally different views of the role of elections in policy formation in one view voters can affect candidates policy choices competition for votes induces politicians to move toward the center in this view elections have the effect of bringing about some degree of policy compromise in the alternative view voters merely elect policies politicians cannot make credible promises to moderate their policies and elections are merely a means to decide which one of two opposing policy views will be implemented we assess which of these contrasting perspectives is more empirically relevant for the u s house focusing on elections decided by a narrow margin allows us to generate quasi experimental estimates of the impact of a randomized change in electoral strength on subsequent representatives roll call voting records we find that voters merely elect policies the degree of electoral strength has no effect on a legislator s voting behavior for example a large exogenous increase in electoral strength for the democratic party in a district does not result in shifting both parties nominees to the left politicians inability to credibly commit to a compromise appears to dominate any competition induced convergence in policy

finance and the sources of growth the authors evaluate whether the level of development in the banking sector exerts a causal impact on economic growth and its sources total factor productivity growth physical capital accumulation and private saving they use 1 a pure cross country instrumental variable estimator to extract the exogenous component of banking development and 2 a new panel technique that controls for country specific effects and endogeneity they find that banks do exert a large causal impact on total factor productivity growth which feeds through to overall gdp gross domestic product growth the long run links between banking development and both capital growth and private savings are more tenuous

financial development and economic growth views and agenda this critique argues that the preponderance of theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence suggests a positive first order relationship between financial development and economic growth the body of work would push even most skeptics toward the belief that the development of financial markets and institutions is a critical and inextricable part of the growth process and away from the view that the financial system is an inconsequential sideshow responding passively to economic growth many gaps remain however and the paper highlights areas in acute need of additional research

bailout for sale the vote to save wall street this paper provides a public choice analysis of the 2008 banking bailout in the united states the paper introduces heterogeneity of congressional districts into the common agency problem in special interest politics district heterogeneity implies district specific electoral constraints on legislators ability to collect rents from and cast dissonant votes in support of special interests an empirical analysis examines legislative voting on the initial bailout proposal using campaign contributions to legislators from special interest groups and the importance of financial services for employment within congressional districts as the main explanatory variables the empirical analysis corrects for possible endogeneity bias using valid instruments and considers several intuitive sub sample estimations as alternative methods for addressing the endogeneity issue the paper provides empirical evidence that campaign contributions from the financial services sector influenced legislative voting on the banking bailout