pocketbook voting social preferences and expressive motives in referenda we develop and test a theory of voting and turnout decisions that integrates self interest social preferences and expressive motives our model implies that if pocketbook benefits are relevant voters either perceive their impact on the outcome to be non negligible or expressive motivations do not play a role in the decision on how to vote conversely if own pocketbook benefits do not explain voting then voting is expressive if the perceived probability of being pivotal is non negligible social preferences and expressive concerns are observationally equivalent our empirical analysis studies collective choices which are analogous to decisions on local public goods we consider referenda among university students on whether to collectively purchase deeply discounted flat rate tickets for public transportation and cultural amenities individual usage data allow quantifying the monetary benefits associated with each ticket as voters had precise information on the individual costs and benefits our setting comprises a real world laboratory of direct democracy we find that monetary benefits strongly influence participation and voting however social or expressive motives such as stated altruism environmental concerns and paternalism are decisive for a significant minority our results rule out purely expressive voting and imply that a substantial share of the electorate perceived their impact on the outcome to be non negligible

how words and money cultivate a personal vote the effect of legislator credit claiming on constituent credit allocation the district affect how constituents allocate credit legislators use credit claiming messages to influence the expenditures they receive credit for and to affect how closely they are associated with spending in the district constituents are responsive to credit claiming messages they build more support than other nonpartisan messages but contrary to expectations from other studies constituents are more responsive to the total number of messages sent rather than the amount claimed our results have broad implications for political representation the personal vote and the study of u s congressional elections p articularistic spending a large literature argues cultivates a personal vote for incumbents cain ferejohn and fiorina 1987 ferejohn 1974 lazarusandreiley2010 levittandsnyder1997 mayhew 1974 to build this support legislators are assumed to direct projects and programs to their districts constituents in turn are thought to reward their legislator for the level of federal spending in the district levitt and snyder 1997 str omberg 2004 or the

academic earmarks and the returns to lobbying abstract in this paper we estimate the returns to lobbying by universities to motivate our empirical work we develop a simple theoretical model of university lobbying for academic earmarks our statistical analysis shows that universities represented by a house appropriations committee hac or senate appropriations committee sac member spend less money on lobbying than those that are not represented in addition using instrumental variables estimations we show that universities without hac or sac representation may receive some benefit to lobbying for earmarks although in many estimations this benefit is not statistically different from zero however for universities with hac or sac representation a 10 percent increase in lobbying yields an additional 2 8 percent or 3 5 percent increase in earmarks respectively this suggests that there are large returns to lobbying for academic earmarks if a university is represented by a member of one the hac or sac but little or no return if not

granting votes exposing the political bias of intergovernmental grants using the within between specification for panel data instead of alleviating fiscal inequalities intergovernmental grants are often used to fulfill the grantors political goals this study uses a unique panel dataset on more than 500 croatian municipalities over a 12 year period to uncover the extent to which grant distribution is biased owing to grantors electoral concerns instead of the default fixed effects approach to modelling panel data we apply a novel within between specification aimed at uncovering the contextual source of variation focusing on the effects of electoral concerns on grant allocation within and between municipalities we find evidence of a substantial political bias in grant allocations both within and between municipalities particularly when it comes to local level electoral concerns the paper offers researchers a new perspective when tackling the issue of politically biased grant allocation using panel data particularly when they wish to uncover the simultaneous impact of time variant and time invariant factors or when they cannot apply a quasi experimental approach because of specific institutional contexts

erratum standards versus standards the effects of different pollution restrictions when economists refer to pollution standards they almost universally mean uniform restrictions on pollution emissions e g william j baumol and wallace e oates 1975 ch 13 susan rose ackerman 1973 david besanko 1978 however in practice standards take many forms not only emissions restrictions but restrictions on pollution per unit of output or per unit of an input restrictions on the use of a polluting input or mandated use of a particular pollution control technology these specifications of regulations will have a variety of effects on a firm s resource allocation decisions for instance allowing pollution per unit of output as the standard instead of directly restricting the level of pollution gives the firm some choice in addition to reducing pollution it can increase its output to dilute the pollution this paper examines the effects of five different forms of pollution standards on input decisions the level of production and firm profits the results show that the different standards by providing firms with different incentives change the firm s allocation decisions and affect the relative profitability of the standards section i reviews the existing literature on the incentives of different instruments the following section describes the model to be used five different forms of pollution constraints are individually examined in section iii using a graphical approach their relative effects as well as some special cases are assessed in section iv finally section v raises the case of different standards when firms are not identical

the value of shorting abstract this paper assesses the effects of short sale constraints on asset prices the analysis focuses on a particular period in sweden during which shorting stocks was impossible but stock options were traded firstly the effect on both stock options and the underlying stock was investigated jointly by considering deviations from put call parity secondly the effects on only the derivatives were investigated by considering their implied volatilites the main findings are i the impact on pricing are consistent with a short sale constraint ii these effects are much more pronounced when shorting is not possible iii these effects are not solely attributable to the mispricing of the stock as previous research indicates and iv access to international shorting markets can alleviate local short sale constraints

european environmental taxes and charges recent experience issues and trends abstract the use of environmental taxes and charges in oecd countries increased by over 50 between 1987 and 1994 while revenues raised by environmental taxes and charges remain small relative to overall taxation they comprise a rising proportion in most european countries several european countries have either undertaken or are considering systematic shifts in taxes away from labour and onto the use of environmental resources potential negative effects on competitiveness and regressive distributional effects are the major cause of concern with regard to the introduction of environmental taxes a number of ways of mitigating such effects exist and have been implemented

on the vote purchasing behavior of incumbent governments a couple of months before the swedish election in 1998 the incumbent government distributed 2 3 billion sek to 42 out of 115 applying municipalities this was the first wave of a four year long grant program intended to support local investment programs aimed at an ecological sustainable development this temporary grant program differs from traditional intergovernmental grants in several aspects most importantly in the sovereign decision making power given to the incumbent central government in this paper we investigate whether there were any tactical motives behind the distribution of these grants we find support for the hypothesis that the incumbent government used the grant program under study in order to win votes in particular we find strong support for the lindbeck weibull dixit londregan model in which parties distribute transfers to regions where there are many swing voters this result is statistically as well as economically significant we do however not find any support for the model that predicts that the incumbent government transfer money to its own supporters

price and investment dynamics theory and plant level data we construct a model of a firm competing for market share in a customer market and making investments in physical capital the firm is financially constrained and there are implementation lags in investment our model predicts that product prices should depend on costs and competitors prices but respond weakly to demand shocks also prices should be strongly related to investment we estimate price and investment equations on panel data for swedish manufacturing plants and find results that are qualitatively in line with these predictions though the relation between investment and prices is stronger than predicted by our model

party government and the cohesive power of public plunder we argue that party government in the u s house of representatives rests on two pillars the pursuit of policy goals and the disbursement of particularistic benefits existing theories of party government argue that the majority party in the house is often successful in biasing policy outcomes in its favor in the process it creates policy losers among its own members who nevertheless support their party on procedural votes we posit that the majority party creates an incentive for even the policy losers to support a procedural coalition through judicious distribution of particularistic benefits that compensates policy losers at a rate commensurate with the policy losses that they suffer we evaluate our theory empirically using the concept of roll rates in conjunction with federal domestic outlays data for the period 1983 96 we find that within the majority party policy losers are favored in the distribution of pork barrel spending throughout this period

do voters demand responsive governments evidence from indian disaster relief abstract using rainfall public relief and election data from india we examine how governments respond to adverse shocks and how voters react to these responses the data show that voters punish the incumbent party for weather events beyond its control however fewer voters punish the ruling party when its government responds vigorously to the crisis indicating that voters reward the government for responding to disasters we also find evidence suggesting that voters only respond to rainfall and government relief efforts during the year immediately preceding the election in accordance with these electoral incentives governments appear to be more generous with disaster relief in election years these results describe how failures in electoral accountability can lead to suboptimal policy outcomes

one market stocks futures and options during october 1987 we provide new evidence regarding the degree of integration among markets for stocks futures and options prior to and during the october 1987 market crash where previous analyses have resulted in recommendations for the implementation of circuit breakers the coordination of margin requirements across markets and changes in regulatory jurisdiction our analysis indicates that delinkage between markets during the crash was primarily caused by an antiquated mechanism for processing stock market orders the results suggest that market integration may be better served by efficient order execution than by further restricting markets

worldwide reach of short selling regulations abstract we characterize legality and incidence of short selling in a worldwide multimarket framework home country short selling restrictions curtail home market stock borrowing by 45 and reduce short selling of the country s american depository receipts adrs by 68 due to regulatory reach also the 2008 us ban on short selling of financial firms reduced borrowing in foreign locations these findings are robust to controls for option availability enforcement returns firm size trading volume dividends adr level volatility days to cover and industry sector further we show that investor conduct resulting from adherence to professional standards is a more powerful mechanism of regulatory reach than intergovernment cooperation

pork barrel politics and electoral returns at the local level does the targeted spending of public resources provide electoral benefits for incumbents despite the attention of scholars to that question the empirical results are mixed thus far the present paper supplies insights into the electoral benefits of discretionary funding on local elections i study the consequences of pork barrel politics in 7355 competitive mayoral elections in slovakia between 2006 and 2018 finding that more grants from the central government enhance the likelihood of mayors winning reelection the same advantage applies to mayors whose municipalities receive grants in local election years the effects of the number of grants obtained as well as the timing of their distribution are however moderated by municipal population more specifically a larger number of grants and resources obtained near the end of the mayoral term provides electoral benefits only to small town mayors but give no advantage to the mayors of larger urban areas

media markets special interests and voters abstract this paper examines the role of mass media in countering special interest group influence i use the concentration of campaign contributions from political action committees to proxy for special interests capture of us senate candidates from 1980 to 2002 and compare the reaction of voters to increases in concentration in two different types of media markets in state media markets and out of state media markets unlike in state media markets out of state markets focus on neighboring states politics and elections thus if citizens punish political capture increases in concentration of special interest contributions to a particular candidate should reduce his vote share in in state counties relative to the out of state counties where the candidate receives less coverage i find that a one standard deviation increase in concentration of special interest contributions to incumbents reduces their vote share by about 0 5 to 1 5 percentage points in in state counties relative to the out of state counties robustness checks suggest that these results are not driven by omitted senator characteristics or by differences between in state and out of state counties along dimensions other than the media environment

legislative budget cycles recent literature suggests that electoral budget cycles are a phenomenon of new rather than established democracies what part of the democratization process explains the amelioration of the political budget cycle we argue the answer lies in part in the development of a strong party system we extend the classic rogoff siebert model to show that political budget cycles are possible in a legislative context with rational voters we then demonstrate that the development of a strong party system can restrain political budget cycles in a majoritarian electoral system finally we follow prior work in using vote share volatility as a measure of the institutionalization of the party system using newly collected vote share data for 433 elections for 90 democracies from 1980 2007 we calculate a measure of party institutionalization we then use this data to demonstrate that institutionalized party systems are associated with mitigated political budget cycles especially in majoritarian electoral systems

why should majority voting be unfair the common use of majority rule in group decision making is puzzling in theory it inequitably favors the proposer and paradoxically it disadvantages voters further if they are inequity averse in practice however outcomes are equitable the present paper analyzes data from a novel experimental design to identify the underlying social preferences our experiment compares one shot and indefinite horizon versions of random proposer majority bargaining the baron ferejohn game which allow us to disentangle behaviors compatible with altruism inequity aversion and reference dependent altruism most subjects are classified as reference dependent altruists around 10 are inequity averse subjects are egoistic when their payoff is below their reference point they become efficiency concerned when satisfied and the reference point is either the ex ante expectation or the opponent s payoff finally we successfully test rda out of sample on a number of distribution and bargaining games from three seminal social preference experiments

coattail voting in recent presidential elections this article presents a method for analyzing the extent and strength of coattail voting in presidential elections this method allows the authors to estimate the magnitude of coattail voting and then to decompose this estimate into more basic elements estimates are given for presidential elections beginning with 1956 the determination of the coattail vote and its decomposition depend on the theory of the voting decision that is assumed in this article we present a model of vote determination that is similar in most respects to the traditional src model the vote for congressional representation in a presidential election year is determined jointly by partisan affiliation attitudes toward the presidential candidates and local forces unique to the congressional race such as may be captured by an incumbency variable this model permits the separate estimation of the strength of short term forces and of the efficiency of the presidential coattails application of the model to survey data since 1956 indicates that efficiency of presidential coattails has declined during this period furthermore the 1980 election does not appear to be an exception to this trend on the other hand there has not been any particular trend in the strength of short term forces during this period instead events peculiar to the context of a specific election generate short term forces at the level of the presidential election but the degree to which these forces are carried over to local races seems to have declined

the behavior of the volatility implicit in the prices of stock index options abstract we examine stock market volatility around the quarterly expirations of stock index futures contracts and nonquarterly expirations of stock index options using estimates of the volatility implicit in the option prices the option prices reflect increases in the volatility of the underlying stock indexes around both quarterly and nonquarterly expiration dates analysis of the residual returns on index options provides evidence consistent with an unexpected increase in market volatility around expiration dates

the president and the distribution of federal spending scholarship on distributive politics focuses almost exclusively on the internal operations of congress paying particular attention to committees and majority parties this article highlights the president who has extensive opportunities both ex ante and ex post to influence the distribution of federal outlays we analyze two databases that track the geographic spending of nearly every domestic program over a 24 year period the largest and most comprehensive panels of federal spending patterns ever assembled using district and county fixed effects estimation strategies we find no evidence of committee influence and mixed evidence that majority party members receive larger shares of federal outlays we find that districts and counties receive systematically more federal outlays when legislators in the president s party represent them

party control of state government and the distribution of public expenditures this paper examines the effects of party control of state governments on the distribution of intergovernmental transfers across counties from 1957 to 1997 we find that the governing parties skew the distribution of funds in favor of areas that provide them with the strongest electoral support this is borne out in two ways i counties that traditionally give the highest vote share to the governing party receive larger shares of state transfers to local governments ii when control of the state government changes the distribution of funds shifts in the direction of the new governing party we find only weak evidence that parties reward electorally pivotal counties or counties in electorally pivotal legislative districts finally we find that increased spending in a county increases voter turnout in subsequent elections this suggests that parties have an electoral incentive to skew the distribution of funds to influence future election results and the mechanism through which this works is mobilization rather than conversion of voters in a fixed electorate

seniority political experience and support for government spending in the us house a culture of spending payne 1991a postulates that there is a culture of spending in the us congress whereby members of congress are socialized to increase their roll call support for more spending as a function of length of service and exposure to the washington culture in this article we develop and test an expanded model of roll call voting on spending matters focusing on two potential sources of socialization effects 1 exposure to the washington culture of spending primarily through seniority and proximity to washington dc and 2 previous political experiences developed before members are elected to congress using data for us house members from the 93rd through the 107th congresses we estimate a series of models in which we explain national taxpayer union scores as a function of seniority previous political experience personal attributes and a range of constituency variables we find strong and consistent seniority and political experience effects with senior members and those with extensive political experience more likely to support greater spending than other members these findings withstand a range of robustness tests

does the size of the legislature affect the size of government evidence from two natural experiments this paper makes use of regression discontinuity designs to estimate the effect of the number of legislators on the size of government the results indicate a negative effect i e the larger the size of the legislature the smaller is the size of government this runs counter to conventional wisdom one potential explanation is that more legislators can better control a budget maximizing bureaucracy i present evidence that is consistent with the proposed mechanism

selecting permit allocation rules for agricultural pollution control a bargaining solution abstract one of the primary justifications for using transferable permits for pollution control is that they achieve a given level of emission reduction at the lowest cost although the initial allocation of pollution permits may have no impact in terms of efficiency it does have a significant impact on equity in this paper we examine a variety of permit allocation rules for a small catchment in south west england an asymmetric nash bargaining framework is employed to characterise agents co operative behaviour and to explain their likely preferences over permit allocation rules the results indicate that the preferred allocation scheme depends upon the relative bargaining power of the agents furthermore some potential links between ex ante and ex post equity criteria were also discussed

the value of early exercise in option prices an empirical investigation previous studies in the valuation of american options apparently undervalue the right of early exercise this study uses actual prices from the cboe s s p 100 option instead of model generated values deviations from the theoretical put call parity relationship are caused by the possibility of early exercise these deviations are used to infer the value of early exercise the actual value of early exercise is both statistically and economically significant as expected from theoretical considerations the value of early exercise for put options is greater than for call options

voting retrospectively critical junctures and party identification abstract this paper provides evidence for retrospective voting in the very long term by exploiting a unique quasi natural experiment of history we trace the origins of party identification to a critical juncture in the local history of sasun a mountainous region of the ottoman empire located in eastern turkey sasun received vital support from the armenian revolutionary federation arf both during the great massacres against armenians at the end of the 19th century and during the armenian genocide 1915 1917 with the help of the arf some of the survivors from sasun were resettled in various villages in modern day armenia although the party was not active in armenia during seven decades of soviet rule we find that villages with sasun ancestry display substantially higher electoral support for the arf than other villages evidence from first names of current residents and our field work suggest that this differential support can at least in part be explained by historical gratitude and sympathy for the party we offer suggestive evidence to explain why this sympathy might have endured over generations

legislative representation bargaining power and the distribution of federal funds evidence from the us congress this article investigates the relationship between representation in legislatures and the geographic distribution of federal funds in a legislative bargaining model we demonstrate that funds are concentrated in high representation areas and two channels underlie this result the proposal power channel reflects the role of representation in committee assignments and the vote cost channel reflects the role of representation in coalition formation in our empirical analysis we find that small states relative to large states receive more funding in the us senate relative to the house we also find empirical support for the two channels underlying this relationship throughout the history of federations and international organisations a key consti tutional design question involves how jurisdictions of different sizes are represented in legislative bodies and how their votes will ultimately be weighted large jurisdictions typically argue for delegation sizes or voting weights that are roughly proportional to population whereas small jurisdictions typically argue for an equal number of delegates or votes for each jurisdiction this conflict over representation is presumably driven at least in part by a belief that increased representation strengthens bargaining power in the battle over the geographic distribution of funds authorised by these legislative bodies in this article i analyse the relationship between legislative representation bar gaining power and the geographic distribution of federal funds from both a theoretical and empirical perspective in addition to investigating the existence of a relationship between representation and federal funds i also explore the underlying mechanisms that is i ask which political institutions such as agenda control provided to commit tees and the formation of coalitions under majority rule shape the bargaining power of jurisdictions in central legislatures and thus facilitate the relationship between repre sentation and the distribution of federal spending to provide a framework for analysing these issues i begin by developing a simple theoretical model of a central legislature that determines the crossjurisdiction distri bution of local public goods which are financed by a national tax base both delegation sizes and population are variable allowing me to consider a variety of institutional arrangements for jurisdictional representation legislators represent local interests and given the common pool problem associated with concentrated benefits and dis persed tax costs attempt to increase ownjurisdiction spending but to restrain spending elsewhere the model follows a recent literature on legislative bargaining in which a proposer must secure a majority of votes in order to pass legislation and due to the

short sales and speed of price adjustment evidence from the hong kong stock market abstract we present empirical evidence that short sales contribute to market efficiency by increasing the speed of price adjustment to not only private public firm specific information but also market wide information shortable stocks are characterized by weaker trade continuity and stronger quote reversals they adjust faster to new information than non shortable counterparts these findings remain robust even in an up market condition in which short sales are not binding the amount of information incorporated in each trade is also significantly higher for shortable than non shortable stocks in both up and down market conditions after controlling for firm size trading volume liquidity price and option trading short sales stand out as one of the significant factors that speed up the price adjustment

derivatives traders reaction to mispricing in the underlying equity this article examines trading behavior in the options market conditioned on mispricing in the underlying stock we investigate the price equilibrium between the observed equity asset and the options implied synthetic share as well as the relative divergence between the two prices we find a consistently positive relation between the level of stock mispricing and violations of the upper boundary condition using derivatives along with an increase in price divergence to control for the effect of shorting limitations on mispricing we further examine prices during the short sale ban in 2008 the results hold and in many instances are more significant during the ban period given the persistent disequilibria between the synthetic and observed stock prices we argue the results are evidence of informed trading in the derivatives market

energy polarization and popular representation evidence from the russian duma in this article we introduce the term energy polarization to explain the politics of energy market reform in the russian duma our model tests the impact of regional energy production party cohesion and ideology and electoral mandate on the energy policy decisions of the duma deputies oil gas and electricity bills and resolution proposals between 1994 and 2003 we find a strong divide between single member district smd and proportional representation pr deputies high statistical significance of gas production is demonstrated throughout the three duma terms and shows gazprom s key position in the post soviet russian economy oil production is variably significant in the two first dumas when the main legislative debates on oil privatization occur there is no constant left right continuum which is consistent with the deputies proclaimed party ideology the pro and anti reform poles observed in our poole based single dimensional scale are not necessarily connected with liberal and state oriented regulatory policies respectively party switching is a solid indicator of russia s polarized legislative dynamics when it comes to energy sector reform

options short sale constraints and market efficiency a new perspective this paper undertakes a new investigation of the potential for options to mitigate short sale constraints i find that option introduction alleviates 79 of the price adjustment efficiency disparity between short sale constrained and unconstrained stocks in relation to negative news no significant improvement in adjustment efficiency is found in response to positive information these results are robust to controls for endogeneity biases associated with the option introduction selection process further i find evidence that post option improvement in efficiency is similar in relation to private and public information this suggests that short sale constraint effects stem at least in part from an irrational optimism bias or another behavioral source as suggested theoretically by miller 1977 collectively these results suggest that options act as an effective substitute to short sales significantly contributing to the informational efficiency of the market

electoral goals and center state transfers a theoretical model and empirical evidence from india we construct a model of redistributive politics where the central government is opportunistic and uses its discretion to make transfers to state governments on the basis of political considerations these considerations are the alignment between the incumbent parties at the central and state levels and whether a state is a swing state or not a testable prediction from the model is that a state that is both swing and aligned with the central government is especially likely to receive higher transfers we test this prediction using indian data for 14 states from 1974 75 to 1996 97 we find that a state which is both aligned and swing in the last state election is estimated to receive 16 higher transfers than a state which is unaligned and non swing

intergovernmental grants as a tactical instrument empirical evidence from swedish municipalities are grants to swedish municipalities tactical in this essay i derive testable implications from a theoretical voting model and test these on a panel of 255 swedish municipalities 1981 1995 in order to decide which regions that are politically powerful both election results and survey data from the swedish election studies are used the results although somewhat ambiguous support the hypothesis that intergovernmental grants are used in order to win votes

strategic behavior by federal agencies in the allocation of public resources how do government agencies allocate program resources some authors presume that agencies seek to maximize program objectives others suggest agencies favor the districts important to the president s election in addition agencies may distribute larger program resources to those districts whose congressional representatives are best positioned to help the agency we examined how federal government agencies responded both to the 2006 election when control of congress shifted from the republican to the democratic party and to the 2010 election when the house switched from democratic to republican control we used a difference in difference analysis to evaluate the impact of each election on the agencies allocations of contracts agencies generally responded to the elections by allocating more contract resources to districts represented by the winning party however federal agencies reacted differently to changing political environments depending on the characteristics of the agency for example after the 2006 election those agencies with programs favored by republican members of congress allocated more resources to democratic districts these republican agencies presumably are the most vulnerable to the risk of losing future appropriations democratic agencies and neutral agencies facing no significant threats to their appropriations did not respond to the election as strongly finally more vulnerable districts received the most support especially by the republican agencies we reaffirmed these results by using the 2010 congressional elections in which the political orientations of the districts favored with more contract distributions was reversed

electoral misgovernance cycles evidence from wildfires and tax evasion in greece we present detailed empirical evidence from greece that around elections misgovernance results in significant increases in wildfires and tax evasion and has important economic implications these effects have led to the destruction of property or loss of government revenue estimated at 8 of gdp there are two plausible reasons why misgovernance might intensify around elections i attention and effort of elected officials is directed to campaigning instead of governing and ii the misgovernance may benefit special interests and serve as a pork barrel transfer that is hard to monitor or control empirically we find that redistributive politics are likely a dominant cause of electoral misgovernance in the case of wildfires we also find evidence that political competition tends to increase electoral misgovernance furthermore electoral misgovernance helps incumbents get reelected while misgovernance may manifest differently among countries our analysis suggests that electoral cycles everywhere may be much more multifaceted and harmful than previous literature suggests

estimating the value of proposal power this paper investigates the role of proposal power in the allocation of transportation projects across u s congressional districts in 1991 and 1998 the evidence supports the key qualitative prediction of legislative bargaining models members with proposal power those sitting on the transportation authorization committee secure more project spending for their districts than do other representatives support for the quantitative restrictions on the value of proposal power is more mixed i then empirically address several alternative models of legislative behavior including partisan models informational roles for committees models with appropriations committees and theories of committees as preference outliers

do formula based intergovernmental transfer mechanisms eliminate politically motivated targeting evidence from ghana abstract various countries have adopted formulas for determining intergovernmental transfers as a strategy to limit the role of political considerations in resource allocation in this paper we investigate a formula based system of allocating resources from a central government to local governments to determine whether the political characteristics of recipient areas have any bearing on their allocation specifically we study the sharing of resources of the district assemblies common fund dacf in ghana amongst the country s district governments over the period 1994 to 2005 we find evidence that the mechanism does not eliminate politically motivated targeting of the grants per capita dacf grants were higher in districts where vote margins in the previous presidential election were lower suggesting that swing districts were targeted we find evidence that dacf formula indicators and their weighting were chosen and amended to produce politically desired patterns of transfers

the effects of discretionary federal spending on parliamentary election results i introduction three compelling reasons to expect that discretionary federal spending will have a different impact on incumbent majority and opposition candidates in the canadian parliamentary system of government are only the prime minister and his appointed cabinet may propose spending or taxing initiatives the electorate only votes directly for their local member of parliament mp and if the prime minister declares a vote of confidence all majority party mps must vote with the prime minister or leave the party these three characteristics combined with the fact that the opposition does not have enough votes to successfully prevent passage of legislation make it very difficult for opposition mps to influence discretionary spending if the electorate is aware of this situation majority party candidates regardless of incumbency stand to reap the electoral benefits of additional federal discretionary spending furthermore opposition incumbents will lose votes as a consequence if majority candidates receive additional votes to some extent this must be at the expense of votes for opposition incumbents the purpose of this paper is to empirically test these two hypothesis the idea that discretionary spending can be used to influence election outcomes verges on the trite mass media discussions are rife with accusations of pork barrel politics this idea is implicitly contained the entire interest group theory of political decision making and it is formally modeled in papers such as weingast shepsle and johnsen 1981 despite the general agreement on the electoral motivations of discretionary spending empirical findings have been relatively unsuccessful in documenting either important or significant effects of discretionary spending or various other district level explanatory variables typical of this literature jacobson 1978 finds a negative and small effect of incumbent campaign spending and johannes and mcadams 1981 find no effect of case work on election outcomes as explained by fiorina 1981 rivers and fiorina 1989 and stein and bickers 1994 the presence of a simultaneous equation system has biased the empirical estimates since politicians are apt to shift resources towards those electoral districts where the election is expected to be closest ordinary least squares will underestimate the true effect stein and bickers demonstrate a negative correlation between the closeness of elections and the amount of pork barrel spending in congressional races in a more recent article case 2001 finds that federal block grants are negatively influenced by the expected closeness of the election in albania despite the recognition of a simultaneity bias attempts to overcome the problem have generally been unsuccessful a notable exception is that of levitt and snyder 1997 who uses spending outside of a district but inside a state as an instrument for spending in the district levitt and snyder find a positive and significant impact of discretionary spending on the share of the vote for incumbents in u s house elections this paper contributes to the discretionary spending and election literature in two ways using a newly created data set of canadian federal spending at the electoral district level the analysis of discretionary spending can be extended beyond the u s border and presidential system of government to a parliamentary system additionally the results contained herein provide a robustness check of levitt and snyder s methodology using instruments similar to those proposed by nagler and leighley 1992 and levitt and snyder 1997 consistent estimates indicate that increases in federal government spending and national gross domestic product gdp per capita have positive and significant effects on the share of the vote received by majority incumbents yet insignificant effects on opposition incumbents the sign of the point estimates are negative

government subsidies and presidential election outcomes evidence for a developing country summary we explore the effects of government subsidies on presidential elections in chile in 1989 99 we use a panel with three periods the elections of 1989 1993 and 1999 and 229 counties we correct for the potential simultaneity problem deriving from the fact that an incumbent facing a difficult political scenario might react by increasing subsidies to improve his her electoral performance our results indicate that the greater the coverage of these types of programs i e the percentage of people receiving subsidies the higher the votes for the incumbent

the impact of federal spending on house election outcomes while it is widely believed by academics politicians and the popular press that incumbent members of congress are rewarded by the electorate for bringing federal dollars to their district the empirical evidence supporting that claim is extremely weak one explanation for the failure to uncover the expected relationship between federal spending and election outcomes is that incumbents who expect to have difficulty being reelected are likely to exert greater effort in obtaining federal outlays since it is generally impossible to adequately measure this effort the estimated impact of spending is biased downward because of an omitted variable bias we address this estimation problem using instrumental variables for each house district we use spending outside the district but inside the state containing the district as an instrument for spending in the district federal spending is affected by a large number of actors e g governors senators mayors and other house members in the state delegation

politicians bureaucrats and targeted redistribution abstract the paper argues that for political reasons elected politicians are more likely to be engaged in targeted redistribution than appointed bureaucrats it uses the example of patronage jobs in the u s local governments to provide empirical support for this claim it shows that the number of public employees is higher for elected chief executives this difference is stronger in public services with bigger private public wage differential and it increases during election years it also finds that the number of public employees increases with the age of bureaucrats while there is no such relationship in the case of politicians which is consistent with younger bureaucrats having stronger career concerns

equitably slicing the pie water policy and allocation abstract non point source pollution is deteriorating water quality throughout the world new zealand is addressing this issue by regulating land based nutrient losses with debates over how to allocate limits across a heterogeneous landscape we develop a spatially explicit economic land use model to investigate efficiency and equity issues from seven approaches to allocate nutrient discharges across two new zealand watersheds we find that the preferred allocation differs across land use land characteristics and regulation stringency and that there is no universal best allocation option therefore decision makers should focus on at least efficiency and equity and on how to compensate those most affected

exploring the links between equity and efficiency in payments for environmental services a conceptual approach this paper addresses the relationship between equity and efficiency in pes schemes from a conceptual point of view emphasis is placed on the role of the institutional setting social perceptions about economic fairness or distributive justice of the payments uncertainty and interactions between agents including power relations we introduce the heuristic concept of the efficiency equity interdependency curve to illustrate potential combinations between equity and efficiency that may be theoretically possible the paper argues that different types of institutional factors determine which equity efficiency combinations may be potentially feasible influence the actual combination that will be achieved on the ground and condition possible changes in that combination due to exogenous factors by stressing the role of institutional aspects in shaping the equity efficiency relationship the paper attempts to go beyond the dominant coasean vision of pes