spillovers investment incentives and the property rights theory of the firm this paper examines the property rights theory of the firm when a manager s relationship specific investment can be partially appropriated by the owner of an asset even if cooperation breaks down the investments of non owners may then be devalued but are seldom wholly lost to the owner with such spillovers the outside option principle can be incorporated into the grossman hart moore framework without implying that ownership demotivates enriched predictions on the determinants of integration emerge

price setting power vs private information an experimental evaluation of their impact on holdup abstract this paper investigates the extent of the holdup problem in a buyer seller relationship in which the seller has private information about his alternative opportunities theory predicts that compared to a situation in which outside options are publicly observed the seller obtains an informational rent whereas the buyer bears an informational loss as a result the seller is predicted to invest more while the buyer is expected to invest less in contrast to this private information has no impact on the investment levels observed in the experiment but actual investments do increase with the price setting power of the investor these findings are roughly consistent with a model in which agents are inequality averse overall the results question some recent theoretical suggestions that private information rents might substitute for price setting power in mitigating holdup

creative destruction and firm specific performance heterogeneity traditional u s industries with higher firm specific stock return and fundamentals performance heterogeneity use information technology it more intensively and post faster productivity growth in the late 20 th century we argue that this mechanically reflects a wave of schumpeter s 1912 creative destruction disrupting a wide swath of industries with successful it adopters unpredictably undermining established firms this validates endogenous growth theory models of creative destruction e g aghion and howitt 1992 and suggests intensified creative destruction as explaining findings associating greater firm specific performance variation with higher per capita gdps economy growth rates accounting standards financial system development and property right protection

slow boom sudden crash abstract many asset markets exhibit slow booms and sudden crashes this pattern is explained by an endogenous flow of information in the model agents undertake more economic activity in good times than in bad economic activity generates public information about the state of the economy if the economic state changes when times are good and information is abundant asset prices adjust quickly and a sudden crash occurs when times are bad scarce information and high uncertainty slow agents reactions as the economy improves a gradual boom ensues data from u s and emerging credit markets support the theory

predicting u s business cycle regimes this article examines the use of logistic classification methods for the identification and prediction of postwar u s business cycle expansion and contraction regimes as defined by the national bureau of economic research nber reference turning point dates we present a coherent theoretical framework for this task using measures of discriminatory information the analysis encompasses model selection parameter estimation and classification decision rules we examine the performance of logistic procedures in reproducing the nber regime classifications and in predicting one and three months ahead using leading indicator variables our models are shown to provide substantially more accurate business cycle regime predictions than markov switching specifications

noncooperative bargaining hostages and optimal asset ownership this paper re examines the effect of asset ownership on investment decisions for a joint relationship in the absence of contracts on investment levels it obtains some results which contradict findings by sanford j grossman oliver d hart and john moore in particular it finds that the loss of ownership of an asset may increase the asset loser s investment incentive the difference between this paper and those authors papers stems from the different interpretations of the roles of the threat point and outside options in bargaining this paper also clarifies the role of relationship specific investments as a cause of integration copyright 1998 by american economic association

what s different about banks abstract negotiable certificates of deposit cd s trade in the capital market in competition with other securities like commercial paper and bankers acceptances if cd s must pay lenders competitive monetary interest the reserve tax on cd s is borne by bank borrowers viability of the tax means there must be something special about bank loans that makes some borrowers willing to pay higher interest rates than those on other securities of equivalent risk moreover there must be something special about banks that prevents other intermediaries from competing to assure that it never pays to finance loans with cd s

bargaining and the joint cost theory of strikes an experimental study this article reports on an experiment that was designed to test predictions about the frequency of disagreement strikes in games with complete information an empirical test of the joint cost theory which relates strike activity to the marginal cost of striking is based on a set of shrinking pie games in which subjects bargained in consecutive periods over how to divide a sum of money strike activity was a frequent occurrence in these games and moreover did not disappear over time the joint cost theory received some support indicating that further tests may be useful

information markets and the comovement of asset prices traditional asset pricing models predict that covariance between prices of difierent assets should be lower than what we observe in the data this model generates high covariance within a rational expectations framework by introducing markets for information about asset payofis when information is costly rational investors will not buy information about all assets they will learn about a subset because information production has high flxed costs competitive producers charge more for low demand information than for high demand information a price that declines in quantity makes investors want to purchase a common subset of information if investors price many assets using a common subset of information then a shock to one signal is passed on as a common shock to many asset prices these common shocks to asset prices generate excess covariance the cross sectional and time series properties of asset price covariance are consistent with this explanation

negotiation under possible third party resolution abstractthe effect of a possible third party resolution on negotiation behavior is studied in an economic bargaining experiment the bargaining phase is preceded by a production phase that allows for different fairness principles to guide the division of the total production value the experimental results show that a possible third party resolution lowers the dispute costs by reducing the number of rounds of alternating offers in the presence of a third party negotiators make first offers that are more strongly related to their production which reduces the number of bargaining rounds the production phase has an effect on the distributional property of the agreements in negotiations in which third party resolution is an option the negotiation outcome shifts toward a more unequal outcome more in line with each person s contribution

do high stakes and competition undermine fair behaviour evidence from russia abstract this paper reports the results of a series of competitive labour market experiments in which subjects have the possibility to reciprocate favours in the high stake condition subjects earned between two and three times their monthly income during the experiment in the normal stake condition the stake level was reduced by a factor of ten we observe that both in the high and the normal stake condition fairness concerns are strong enough to outweigh competitive forces and give rise to non competitive wages there is also no evidence that effort behaviour becomes generally more selfish at higher stake levels therefore our results suggest that fairness concerns may play an important role even at relatively high stake levels

creditor protection laws debt financing and corporate investment over the business cycle we examine how legal creditor rights are related to debt financing and corporate investment over the business cycle using firm level data from 40 countries we find that creditor rights are associated with greater debt financing and investment during economic downturns but creditor rights have a significantly smaller effect during expansions the beneficial effects of creditor rights during recessions are stronger for firms that are more likely to have severe shareholder bondholder agency problems we also find that during recessions relative to expansions strong creditor rights are associated with a smaller decline in net capital flows our findings are consistent with credit market frictions increasing during recessions and with stronger creditor rights decreasing the negative effects of these frictions overall the results suggest that better creditor protection laws help moderate the decline in debt financing and investment during recessions

why company specific risk changes over time company specific risk climbed steadily between 1962 and 1999 in the u s market but fell sharply between 2000 and 2003 this article explores the hypothesis that three factors are primarily responsible for observed changes in company specific risk changes in the market weights of riskier industries changes in the relative role of small capitalization stocks in the market and measurement error associated with changes in within industry concentration empirical tests reveal that each factor contributes to changes in company specific risk over time and that combined these three factors largely explain changes in company specific risk over the past 40 years

learning asymmetries in real business cycles when a boom ends the downturn is generally sharp and short when growth resumes the boom is more gradual our explanation rests on learning about productivity when agents believe productivity is high they work invest and produce more more production generates higher precision information when the boom ends precise estimates of the slowdown prompt decisive reactions investment and labor fall sharply when growth resumes low production yields noisy estimates of recovery noise impedes learning slows recovery and makes booms more gradual than downturns a calibrated model generates growth rate asymmetry similar to macroeconomic aggregates fluctuations in agents forecast precision match observed countercyclical errors of forecasters

the impact of expenditure rules on budgetary discipline over the cycle we study the impact of expenditure rules on the propensity for governments to deviate from their expenditure plans in response to surprising cyclical developments theoretical considerations suggest that due to political fragmentation in the budgetary process expenditure policy might be prone to a procyclical bias however this tendency may be mitigated by strictly enforced expenditure rules these hypotheses are tested against data from a panel of eu member states our key findings are that 1 deviations between actual and planned government expenditure tend to be positively related to output gap surprises and 2 expenditure rules reduce this procyclical bias these results are particularly pronounced when the analysis is confined to spending items with a high degree of budgetary flexibility

dissecting the cycle a methodological investigation following burns and mitchell we define the cycle as a pattern in the level of aggregate economic activity an algorithm to locate turning points is developed as is a new measure of pro cyclicality a link between turning points and the moments of the series is established thereby providing the statistical foundation that burns and mitchell s work lacked using these tools we are able to dissect cycles in terms of the contributions made by trend growth volatility serial correlation and non linear effects we dissect several models and find little evidence that certain non linear effects are important to the nature of business cycles

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

specific investments holdup and the outside option principle according to the outside option principle the holdup problem can be solved when the non investor has a binding outside option the investor then becomes residual claimant creating efficient investment incentives this paper reports about an experiment designed to test this we find that when the outside option is binding investment levels fall short of the efficient level but holdup is less of a problem than predicted when the outside option is non binding

disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings this article disentangles the incentive and entrenchment effects of large ownership using data for 1 301 publicly traded corporations in eight east asian economies we find that firm value increases with the cash flow ownership of the largest shareholder consistent with a positive incentive effect but firm value falls when the control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash flow ownership consistent with an entrenchment effect given that concentrated corporate ownership is predominant in most countries these findings have relevance for corporate governance across the world

a new database on the structure and development of the financial sector this article introduces a new database of indicators of financial structure and financial development across countries and over time the database is unique in that it combines a wide variety of indicators that measure the size activity and efficiency of financial intermediaries and markets it improves on previous efforts by presenting data on the public share of commercial banks introducing indicators of the size and activity of nonbank financial institutions and constructing measures of the size of bond and primary equity markets this article introduces a new database the first to provide comprehensive measures of the development structure and performance of the financial sector this database is the first to define and construct indicators of the size and activity of nonbank financial intermediaries such as insurance companies pension funds and non deposit money banks it is also the first to include indicators of the size of primary equity markets and primary and secondary bond markets in constructing the database authors carefully deflate measures and match stock and flow variables

idiosyncratic return volatility cash flows and product market competition over the past 40 years the volatility of the average stock return has drastically outpaced total market volatility thus idiosyncratic return volatility has dramatically increased we estimate this increase to be 6 per year consistent with an efficient market this result is mirrored by an increase in the idiosyncratic volatility of fundamental cash flows we argue that these findings are attributable to the more intense economy wide competition various cross sectional and time series tests support this idea economic competitiveness facilitates reinterpretation of the results from the cross country r2 literature as well as the us idiosyncratic risk literature jel g12 g14

on the merit of equal pay performance manipulation and incentive setting abstract work performance is often difficult to assess thus leaving room for manipulation of commonly used metrics we created a laboratory workplace in which we can precisely assess both work performance along with manipulation activities using two independent experiments we show that whenever pay for performance is used manipulation is pervasive leading to both a waste of organizational resources and a weakening of incentives by contrast paying organizational members equally effectively deters manipulation attempts leading to higher organizational production

liquidity based competition for order flow we present a microstructure model of competition for order flow between exchanges based on liquidity provision we find that neither a pure limit order market plm nor a hybrid specialist limit order market hm structure is competition proof a plm can always be supported in equilibrium as the dominant market i e where the hybrid limit book is empty but an hm can also be supported for some market parameterizations as the dominant market we also show the possible coexistence of competing markets order preferencing that is decisions about where orders are routed when investors are indifferent is a key determinant of market viability welfare comparisons show that competition between exchanges can increase as well as reduce the cost of liquidity active competition between exchanges for order flow in cross listed securities is intense in the current financial marketplace examples include rivalries between the new york stock exchange nyse crossing networks and ecns and between the london stock exchange the paris bourse and other continental markets for equity trading and between eurex and london international financial futures and options exchange liffe for futures volume while exchanges compete along many dimensions e g payment for order flow transparency execution speed liquidity and price improvement will in our view be the key variables driving competition in the future over time high cost markets should be driven out of business as investors switch to cheaper trading venues moreover market structure is increasingly singled out by regulators exchanges and other market participants as a major determinant of liquidity 1

comovement information production and the business cycle abstract recent theoretical research suggests that information production is a positive externality of aggregate economic activity veldkamp 2005 both the quantity and quality of information increase during periods of economic expansion and decrease during periods of contraction based on this insight we hypothesize and confirm that time varying information production drives the comovement patterns observed in stock returns we examine stock return comovement in 36 countries from 1980 to 2007 and show that consistent with the theory comovement patterns are countercyclical that is when information production is high low comovement is low high we also find that the relation between comovement and the business cycle is stronger in countries that experience large intertemporal swings in information production finally we show that the relation between business cycle and comovement is stronger in poor countries countries with less developed financial markets and countries with weaker accounting and transparency standards these results suggest that financial development and transparency are conducive to a steady flow of financial information over the business cycle

does asset ownership always motivate managers outside options and the property rights theory of the firm this paper studies the grossman hart moore ghm property rights approach to the theory of the firm under alternating offers bargaining when managers can pursue other occupations while negotiating over the division of the gains from cooperation the ghm results obtain if taking the best alternative job terminates bargaining outcomes are very different sometimes an agent with an important investment decision should not own the assets he works with sometimes independent assets should be owned together sometimes strictly complementary assets should be owned separately

on the relation between asset ownership and specific investments experimental results are presented for a simplified version of hart s 1995 theory of the firm theory predicts that investment levels remain constant when investors no trade pay offs increase if these pay offs are threat points while they may decrease when no trade pay offs are outside options our results support these predictions in a relative sense average investment levels exceed the predicted level actual investment behaviour is consistent with the outcomes of the bargaining stage the play of the game is supported by a reciprocity mechanism in which non investors consider higher investment levels as fair behaviour which deserves a reward investors anticipate this

the association between financial accounting measures and real economic activity a multinational study abstract we investigate how cross country differences in financial accounting standards affect the relation between financial accounting earnings and real economic value relevant events that underlie those earnings based on previous research and economic theory we hypothesize that because of differences in legal systems and the demand for accounting information differences in legal protection for external shareholders and differences in the degree of tax conformity in our sample countries accounting earnings in the uk and the us will be more closely related to underlying economic activity than will accounting earnings in france and germany empirical results are generally consistent with our hypothesis

incomplete contracts vertical integration and supply assurance this paper extends the analysis of transactions cost models of vertical integration to multilateral settings its main focus is on supply assurance concerns which arise when several downstream firms are competing for inputs in limited supply integration reduces supply assurance concerns for an integrating firm but it may increase them for others therefore to explain the scope of any firm one must consider the overall network of production and distribution relations three fundamental questions are addressed 1 what are the effects of different integration structures 2 what are the determinants of the socially efficient integration structures 3 in what way do equilibrium integration structures differ from socially efficient structures

financial development and economic growth views and agenda this critique argues that the preponderance of theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence suggests a positive first order relationship between financial development and economic growth the body of work would push even most skeptics toward the belief that the development of financial markets and institutions is a critical and inextricable part of the growth process and away from the view that the financial system is an inconsequential sideshow responding passively to economic growth many gaps remain however and the paper highlights areas in acute need of additional research