informational asymmetries strategic behavior and industrial organization one of the most active and exciting areas of economic research over the last several years has been the use of noncooperative games of incomplete information to model industrial competition this work has yielded not only a remarkable number of papers but also several new insights on and explanations of fundamentally important issues the purpose of this paper is to attempt an appreciation and evaluation of this work because most of our individual and joint work since about 1979 has been in this mode it will come as no surprise that we are proponents of this line of research however there are several questions and potential problems that we see as arising in connection with this methodology and we will attempt to address these first a disclaimer we are not attempting a survey of the applications of asymmetric information games aig to industrial organization although we will refer in a highly selective fashion to a number of prominent strands in this literature in particular where any references are provided at all they are typically only to the earliest contributions to a subject even more we do not deal with work in which informational asymmetries are important but the analysis is not game theoretic for example search and price dispersion or the early work on the lemons problem and on moral hazard and adverse selection in insurance markets or with game theoretic treatments that assume complete information i aig methods and applications

non monetary incentives and opportunistic behavior evidence from a laboratory public good game this study reports data from a laboratory experiment that investigates the incentive effect of three distinct social communication schemes on free riding behavior we use performance based approval and disapproval ratings and a linear public good game to address the above issues the treatments vary in terms of subjects opportunities to anonymously assign 1 only the approval ratings to other group members 2 only the disapproval ratings to other group members and 3 either the approval or the disapproval ratings to other group members but not both to the same group member after they play a standard linear public good game despite the nash prediction of zero individual contribution in all three treatments the data show that the disapproval points generate significantly higher contribution than the approval points the treatment in which subjects could communicate either the approval or the disapproval points produces the highest level of contribution we discuss the implications that these findings may have for efficient design of organizations jel d03 h41 c72 c92

switching regression models with imperfect sample separation information with an application on cartel stability an exogenous switching regression model with imperfect reginme classificationi information is specified and applied to a study of cartel stability an efficient estimation method is proposed which takes this imperfect information into account the consequences of misclassification are analyzed the direction of the least squares bias is derived an optimal regime classification rule is obtained and compared theoretically and empirically with other classification rules we then examine the joint executive committee a railroad cartel in the 1880 s the econometric evidence indicates that reversions to noncooperative behavior did occur for the firms in our sample and these reversions involve a significant decrease in market price this article is concerned with the possibility of estimating a switching regression model and its application to a study on cartel stability the switching regression model is the exogenous switching model proposed by quandt 24 which generalized a problem of mixture distributions day 4 the sample in this model is generated from distinct regression equations or regimes for each time period if the investigator has a priori information on how the sample is partitioned into the underlying regimes it is a switching regression model with known sample separation otherwise it is a model with unknown sample separation estimation of these latter models has been considered by quandt 24 goldfeld and quandt 8 and kiefer 14 16 among others a switching regression model is appropriate for the study of cartel behavior when there are price wars as firms will revert from cooperative to noncooperative behavior and so the industry supply function shifts occasionally this model will allow us to exploit the fact that there will be periodic stochastic switches or reversions between cooperative and noncooperative conduct in order to identify collusive episodes

the cyclical behavior of the department of justice s antitrust enforcement activity abstract we study the cyclical behavior of antitrust enforcement as measured by the number of cases initiated by the us department of justice the key result is that antitrust case activity is countercyclical this finding is robust across alternate indicators of economic activity which include stock prices corporate profits and business cycles and across different types of cases the finding of countercyclical case activity does not appear to lend support to interest group theories that predict greater regulatory protection towards producers during economic contractions one interpretation of our result would be that antitrust violations tend to increase during economic downturns leading to an increase in the number of cases initiated the broad implication being that the antitrust division primarily acts as an antitrust law enforcement agency our results show that politics as measured by the party of the president and the republican versus democrat composition of the house and senate does not have a clear impact on case activity finally the number of cases initiated are significantly affected by the extent of funding

types and patterns an experimental east west german comparison of cooperation and solidarity abstract in a study of public good and solidarity experiments conducted in eastern and western germany we found in both games that eastern subjects behave in a significantly more selfish manner than do western subjects besides that we found that many qualitative results of both data sets are similar since our experiments were conducted in two parts of one nation we present an unusually well controlled cross cultural study by avoiding difficulties that usually arise in multinational settings we conclude that cooperation and solidarity behavior seem to depend strongly on different culture specific norms resulting from opposing economic and social histories in the two parts of germany

regulation and the theory of legislative choice the interstate commerce act of 1887 this article concerns the economic incidence of the interstate commerce act of 1887 ica our focus is the short haul pricing constraint a provision of the ica that prohibited railroads from charging higher rates to isolated primarily agrarian shippers than it charged to intercity shippers of similar commodities utilizing the event study methodology we find that the impending passage of the ica generated a distribution of abnormal returns to railroads and shipping firms that is consistent with the theoretical implications of our analysis of the short haul pricing constraint shpc however early interpretations of the shpc by the interstate commerce commission reduced some of the abnormal returns to railroads in a manner that is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the short haul pricing constraint was an important mechanism of early railroad regulation the analysis does support a multiple interest interpretation of the interstate commerce act and has implications for the positive theory of regulation

a study of cartel stability the joint executive committee 1880 1886 this article employs weekly time series data on the joint executive committee railroad cartel from 1880 to 1886 to test empirically the proposition that observed prices reflected switches from collusive to noncooperative behavior an equilibrium model of dynamic oligopoly with asymmetric firms together with explicit functional form assumptions about costs and demand determines the estimating equations and stochastic structure of the econometric model the hypothesis that no switch took place so that price and quantity movements were solely attributable to exogenous shifts in the demand and cost functions is then tested against this alternative and rejected

strategic pricing models and interpretation of price war data abstract price wars cartel breakdowns and other seemingly disequilibrium pricing phenomena are examined questions of interest include when do breakdowns occur how long do they last what determines their severity and are they characterized by increased cross sectional price dispersion and or temporal price volatility the first half of the paper explains how the choice of punishment strategy the specification of the stochastic shocks to the system and the assumptions regarding observability determine the pricing dynamics implicit in several theoretical price war models theories are classified into imperfect monitoring models in which players actions cannot be observed learning models in which structural parameters are unknown to the players and cyclical models in which observability is perfect but business cycles affect the difficulty of colluding the second half in contrast examines data on prices actually set by firms in industries which are subject to periodic wars when the models are confronted with the data we can see how well oligopoly theory explains the behavior of the firms in these industries the object of the exercise is not to pick a winner instead the role of industry characteristics in determining pricing dynamics is assessed and the reasons why simple models may fail to explain complex pricing patterns are examined finally directions for future research are suggested by the empirical regularities which are uncovered

an ecological economic assessment of deregulation of international commerce under gatt this paper discusses the ecological economic implications of deregulation of trade as promoted by the general agreement on tariffs and trade gatt 1 this includes both environmental2 and socio economic factors such as standards of living and equity we outline fifteen overlapping problems with deregulation or free trade we argue that many environmental problems cannot be resolved equitably efficiently or sustainably by unregulated markets and that there is no alternative to public intervention in certain situations we repeat the 1987 brundtland commission s question of how far into international trade should regulation penetrate wced 1987 the commission s call for gatt s environmental reform 3 has not yet been heeded

trade environment and development the issues in perspective abstract this special issue on trade and the environment brings together a number of papers that are constructively critical of the conventional economic wisdom on the topic we think that this criticism is warranted because of the decidely uncritical way in which free trade has been advocated in much of the literature and especially in policy the papers analyse the validity of the underlying assumptions on which the conventional wisdom is based and provide suggestions for ways to facilitate trade that is also adequately protective of the environment sustainability and other social values in this introductory piece we discuss trade the environment and sustainability summarizing arguments in the papers included in this issue and adding a few additional points not covered by them

the usefulness of core theory in economics economic problems it has an undeserved reputation of being too abstract owing mainly to the manner in which it is employed in the theory of general equilibrium in fact core theory is a highly flexible way of looking at practical economic problems especially problems in industrial orga nization this paper seeks to show how simple numerical examples can illus trate the idea of the core and in turn how the core can illustrate basic principles of economics

selecting public goods institutions who likes to punish and reward we study the link between individual attitudes toward uncertainty on the one hand and preferences over as well as behavior within various public goods institutions on the other hand we incentive compatibly elicit preferences over voluntary contribution mechanisms with and without reward and punishment options and then randomly assign subjects to play in one of the four institutions we find that payoffs are significantly greater when punishment is allowed but that only a small minority of participants prefers such an environment somewhat surprisingly preferences over institutions are generally independent of individual characteristics conversely individual characteristics including institutional preferences are significantly predictive of behavior in the public goods game for instance risk averse individuals preemptively punish more often this suggests that when studying sanctions and rewards it is important to consider individual attitudes toward risk and uncertainty although they may not affect the original selection into institutions

a dynamic theory of conjectural variations this paper explores the relationship between dynamic oligopolistic competition and static conjectural variations equilibria using an infinite horizon adjustment cost model the author demonstrates that any steady state closed loop subgame perfect equilibrium coincides with a conjectural variations equilibrium in the case of linear demand and quadratic costs the dynamic conjectures consistent with closed loop steady state equilibria are negative constant symmetric and vary continuously with the discount rate and the adjustment cost parameter in an interval between the static consistent conjectures and zero cournot copyright 1992 by blackwell publishing ltd

crime in the lab detecting social interaction abstract according to the standard economic perspective criminal activities vary with the price of crime which depends on the severity of punishment and the detection probability an alternative view claims that crime is also influenced by social interaction phenomena such as peer pressure or neighbourhood effects detecting social interaction in the field is fraught with difficulties however in this paper we argue that given its extensive control possibilities experiments are well suited to show the potential existence of social interaction effects we present an experimental study where people can engage in criminal activities we find support for the importance of social interaction on average subjects steal the more the more others steal this behaviour can be interpreted in terms of reciprocity

group formation and cooperation in social dilemmas a survey and meta analytic evidence abstract we survey the growing literature on group formation in the context of three types of social dilemma games public goods games common pool resources and the prisoner s dilemma the 62 surveyed papers study the effect of different sorting mechanisms endogenous endogenous with the option to play the game and exogenous on cooperation rates our survey shows that cooperators are highly sensitive to the presence of free riders independently of the sorting mechanism we complement the survey with a meta analysis showing no difference in terms of cooperation between studies implementing an endogenous and exogenous sorting what is more we find that it is no more likely for a cooperator to be matched with like minded partners in endogenously formed groups than in exogenously formed groups these observations are related as we show in the survey the success of a sorting method in matching like minded individuals and the levels of cooperation are closely interlinked

investment cash flow and sunk costs this paper s analysis of u s manufacturing industries confirms previous research showing that cash flow and investment spending are positively correlated even after controlling for investment demand and it makes two new points as well firstly that the effect of cash flow on investment is greater for durable goods industries than for nondurable goods industries and secondly that cash flow s effect is significantly larger in industries with high sunk costs than in those with low sunk costs the latter finding suggests that external financing of capital investment is more difficult when the assets being financed are highly specific or are sunk copyright 1995 by blackwell publishing ltd

trade development and sustainability a critical assessment of the free trade dogma abstract mainstream economic theory argues that trade and especially free trade isbeneficial to everyone involved this fundamental idea which has the character of a dogma still plays an important role in international discussions on trade issues notably in relation to development and environment the purpose of this article is to critically assess the free trade dogma and to investigate the validity of widely used arguments concerning the relations between trade and development and between trade and environment it is argued that the trading system is not something inherently good and especially the developing countries benefits from trade have been very dubious furthermore the trading system has contributed to environmental problems in several ways e g generating undervaluation of natural resources stimulating economic growth with environmental deterioration as a consequence and magnifying and creating externalities the critical approach makes a case for reducing trade

commodity market dynamics and the joint executive committee 1880 1886 using weekly spot and future commodity prices in chicago and new york we construct expected transportation rates for grain between these two cities expected inventory levels in new york and realized errors in the expectations of such variables we incorporate these exogenous commodity market dynamics into porter s 1983 structural modeling of the joint executive committee railroad cartel as in porter we model marginal cost as a parametric function of instrumented output among other factors unlike porter we model pricing over marginal cost as a nonparametric function of a set of variables which include expectations of deterministic demand cycles and cartel stability we estimate the pricing and demand equation simultaneously and semiparametrically our estimated weekly markups during periods of cartel stability are shown to reflect optimal collusive pricing over deterministic business cycles as modeled in haltiwanger and harrington 1991 periods of cartel instability are proven to be trigger

testing static oligopoly models conduct and cost in the sugar industry 1890 1914 we explore the widespread methodology of using demand information to infer market conduct and unobserved cost components under the hypothesis of static oligopoly behavior direct measures of marginal cost and conduct indicating small market power serve as benchmarks the more competitive models yield better cost estimates the best cost estimates occur when conduct is estimated as a free parameter which in turn only slightly underestimates our direct measure it also tracks the decline in market power accompanying the industry s structural changes the methodology is largely validated although partial cost information can improve its predictive power conclusions are robust to demand function

an empirical model of mark ups in a quality differentiated export market abstract this paper develops an empirical model to allow for imperfect competition in the market for traded goods a simultaneous equation model incorporating the demand for and supply of taiwanese footwear exports to the united states is specified and estimated the model allows the identification of two separate sources of mark ups in export prices the first comes from the u s imposed quantitative restriction on these exports the second comes from imperfect competition in the international market for these exports the results suggest competitive behavior by taiwanese footwear exporters the quantitative restriction resulted in a 16 9 percent mark up of prices over marginal cost

collusion in ocean shipping a test of monopoly and empty core models in markets with avoidable fixed costs the core may be empty i argue that a reason for collusion is to impose an equilibrium where none exists i set up a framework for deriving testable implications from the model and compare those implications with those of a cartel model i compare the two models empirically with data from liner shipping conferences legal collusive agreements that have been in force for over a century and i conclude that the evidence supports the theory of the core

the effects of horizontal mergers on competition the case of the northern securities company several recent articles have studied the competitive effects of horizontal mergers by examining rival firms stock price reactions to the merger announcement and subsequent antitrust challenge these articles have consistently failed to find any evidence of anticompetitive effects this article considers two alternative explanations for the previous findings and it sheds some new light on the issue by presenting a case study of the merger that resulted in the formation of the northern securities company in 1901

an empirical investigation of private label supply by national label producers private labels pls are ubiquitous in several categories including groceries apparel and appliances however existing empirical work has not examined the differential impact of various upstream supply arrangements for pl products or the strategic motives for pl supply to do so requires one to model the interaction between private and national label nl products both upstream and downstream while accounting for strategic behavior on the part of manufacturers and retailers and retaining essential differences between nl and pl products we build a model that satisfies these requirements and lets us answer our two research questions first can an nl firm profit from being an outsourced pl supplier second what are the upstream and downstream impacts of different pl supply arrangements we answer these questions by modeling private labels as homogenous products at wholesale but as differentiated products at retail in contrast national label products are differentiated at both wholesale and retail levels using structural model estimates for fluid milk in a major metropolitan area we conduct three counterfactual experiments we find that both nl producers and retailers profit from adding private labels we also find that a vertically integrated supply of pl leads to lower prices for end consumers

what determines cartel success following george stigler 1964 many economists assume that incentive problems undermine attempts by firms to collude to raise prices and restrict output but the potential profits from collusion can create a powerful incentive as well theory cannot tell us a priori which effect will dominate whether or when cartels succeed is thus an empirical question we examine a wide variety of empirical studies of cartels to answer the following questions 1 can cartels succeed 2 if so for how long 3 what impact do cartels have 4 what causes cartels to break up we conclude that many cartels do survive and that the distribution of duration is bimodal while the average duration of cartels across a range of studies is about five years many cartels break up very quickly i e in less than a year but there are many others that last between five and ten years and some that last decades limited evidence suggests that cartels are able to increase prices and profits to varying degrees cartels can also affect other non price variables including advertising innovation investment barriers to entry and concentration cartels break up occasionally because of cheating or lack of effective monitoring but the biggest challenges cartels face are entry and adjustment of the collusive agreement in response to changing economic conditions cartels that develop organizational structures that allow them the flexibility to respond to these changing conditions are more likely to survive price wars that erupt are often the result of bargaining issues that arise in such circumstances sophisticated cartel organizations are also able to develop multipronged strategies to monitor one another to deter cheating and a variety of interventions to increase barriers to entry

the role of asset specificity in the vertical integration decision abstract according to the logic of transaction cost economics several factors determine the most efficient form of economic organization these factors include uncertainty and frequency of transactions involving the transfer of goods or services although the most important factor is asset specificity these characteristics of transactions engender high transaction costs but they also parallel the conditions under which the sunk cost effect is most likely to be observed the potential influence of sunk cost considerations in the choice of corporate governance structure is illustrated with respect to vertical integration and was tested in a laboratory study in which subjects were asked to play the role of a firm s chief strategist the results support the view that asset specificity drives vertical integration but for reasons that may have little to do with transaction cost economizing

sunk costs and cartel formation theory and application to the dyestuff industry we first develop a simple model of entry showing that cartels are more likely to emerge during periods of downturns and in industries with significant sunk costs cartel formation is also accompanied by a decline in profits we then use the framework to investigate the emergence of the swiss dyestuff export cartel during the inter war period and find empirical evidence that supports the main predictions of the model the analysis indicates that sunk costs and entry may be important determinants of cartel formation and are complementary to the traditional cartel stability conditions

conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to public goods we compare a partners condition where the same small group of subjects plays a repeated publi c good game to a strangers condition where subjects play this game in changing group formations subjects in the partners conditi on contribute from t he first period on significantly more to the publi c good than subjects in the strangers conditi on in the strangers conditi on contributions show a continual decay whil e in the partners conditi on contributions fluctuate on a high level until t hey decrease in the final periods we interpret subjects behavior in terms of conditional cooperation which is characterized by both future oriented and reactive behavior

on sunk costs and trade liberalization in appled general equilibrium the authors argue that the rationalization gains often predicted by static applied general equilibrium models with imperfect competition and scale economies are artificially boosted by an unrealistic treatment of fixed costs they introduce sunk costs into one such model calibrated with real world data the authors show how this changes the oligopoly game in a way significant enough to affect both qualitatively and quantitatively the outcome of a trade liberalization exercise copyright 1996 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

play it again partner choice reputation building and learning from finitely repeated dilemma games often the fuller the reputational record people s actions generate the greater their incentive to earn a reputation for cooperation however inability to wipe clean one s past record might trap some agents who initially underappreciate reputation s value in a cycle of bad behaviour whereas a clean slate could have been followed by their reforming themselves in a laboratory experiment we investigate what subjects learn from playing a finitely repeated dilemma game with endogenous symmetric partner choice we find that with a high cooperation premium and good information investment in cooperative reputation grows following exogenous restarts although earlier end game behaviours are observed

tacit collusion free entry and welfare the effect of collusion under free entry has a long history of analysis in economics yet many of the central issues remain unresolved of particular interest is the interaction between the number of firms in the industry and the degree of collusion in the industry there are two relationships that might reasonably exist between the number of firms and collusion on one hand collusion is made easier if the number of firms is small but on the other hand an industry that successfully colludes will earn short run above normal profits and attract new entry until profits are driven to zero in this paper we model the interaction between these two forces and present in a simple diagram an illustration of the determination of equilibrium entry and collusion we are also concerned with the implications of such a structure for public policy in particular direct anti collusive policies and entry fees are examined one preliminary point to address is why collusion should occur at all if profits are going to be driven to zero in any case 1 first of all it is only marginal firms that must earn zero profits so if there are asymmetries between firms inframarginal firms might hope to gain from collusion even in the long run our analysis however focusses on the case of symmetric firms all firms earn zero profits in the long run even in this case the profit that can be earned in the short run implies that the present discounted value of an increase in the degree of collusion is positive furthermore once a collusive zero profit equilibrium is reached industry participants will want to maintain collusion so as to avoid the short run losses that would result from a breakdown in collusive arrangements this is similar to the transitional gains trap described in tullock 9751 certainly a fairly large class of industries seem to be characterized by partial collusion and free entry providers of professional services are an important example there is a wide variation in the ability and income of different providers of the same professional services nevertheless in most professions there are individuals at the margin earning zero economic profit moreover in many countries professionals such as lawyers and dentists are

temporal stability and psychological foundations of cooperation preferences abstract a core element of economic theory is the assumption of stable preferences we test this assumption in public goods games by repeatedly eliciting cooperation preferences in a fixed subject pool over a period of five months we find that cooperation preferences are very stable at the aggregate level and to a smaller degree at the individual level allowing us to predict future behavior fairly accurately furthermore our results provide evidence on the psychological foundations of cooperation preferences the personality dimension agreeableness is closely related to both the type and the stability of cooperation preferences

charitable bequests and taxes on inheritances and estates aggregate evidence from across states and time this paper examines the impact of wealth transfer taxes on charitable bequests we exploit the fact that federal and state taxes on estates and inheritances vary over time states and real wealth levels the effects of taxes are estimated using pooled cross sectional data spanning several decades based on aggregated information from federal estate tax returns under several different specifications we find evidence of a strong incentive effect of estate and inheritance taxes on charitable bequests

social learning and voluntary cooperation among like minded people many people contribute to public goods but stop doing so once they experience free riding we test the hypothesis that groups whose members know that they are composed only of likeminded cooperators are able to maintain a higher cooperation level than the most cooperative randomly composed groups our experiments confirm this hypothesis we also predict that groups of like minded free riders do not cooperate yet we find a high level of strategic cooperation that eventually col lapses our results underscore the importance of group composition and social learning by heterogeneously motivated agents to understand the dynamics of cooperation and free riding

market concentration contestability and sunk costs this paper provides an exploratory assessment of the theory of contestability that is based on a diverse sample of industries and introduces a new important determinant of market concentration the results of the paper indicate that the variables determining the degree of contestability of markets are significant correlates of market concentration sunk costs account for a substantial portion of the sample variance of concentration even after technological factors are controlled for copyright 1990 by mit press

labour force and land distributional effects of agricultural technology a case study of coffee abstract land reform frequently refers to government policies which expropriate large farms and fragment them into smaller units however land reform can also refer to the opposite process that of consolidation of farms which are too small for efficient production in the latter sense that of land consolidation land reform may or may not be socially desirable and prompt government intervention possible gains in efficiency accruing from land consolidation may not be desirable if it entails agricultural unemployment and accelerated rural urban migration in which case governments may try to intervene this paper looks at land reform in the context of one crop coffee new techniques of coffee cultivation will increase output labour output land and labour land ratios offering the prospect for higher coffee employment and output however economic and institutional barries will preclude higher output as a result coffee employment and small coffee farms will be threatened this paper examines the economic implications of the new coffee technology in the context of columbia

diagram for a small planet the production and ecosystem possibilities curve abstract with the development of the gpi there is now an ecological alternative to gdp for measuring a country s economic performance but we still lack an ecological alternative to the ppc for illustrating a country s economic problem the diagram suggested here illustrates a country s production and ecosystem possibilities including climate stability flood control carbon sequestration aquifer recharge scenery recreation biological diversity and so on burning a rainforest to clear the land shifts a country s ppc outward giving the visual impression of an unmitigated improvement but such development causes a movement along the country s pepc as ecosystem services are transformed into gdp the slope of the pepc is the marginal rate of transformation which equals the ratio of the land s marginal marketable product to its marginal ecosystem product changes in technology create substitution and income effects that help explain the enclosure movement and the environmental kuznets curve much as employment of the human resource can be restrained to allow more leisure development of the natural resource can be restrained to preserve more ecosystem services commercial lobbying interests and rivalries for positional goods create distortions that move a country along its pepc to a materialistic misallocation with too little conservation an idealistic misallocation is also possible with too much preservation of the natural environment small is beautiful up to a point and that is evident in this diagram jacob viner s viner j 1937 studies in the theory of international trade harper and brothers new york analytical objections to the ppc are revived

an application of core theory to the analysis of ocean shipping markets he theory of the core implies that competition is frequently unstable and inefficient under some fairly common cost and demand conditions in particular when costs are characterized by indivisibilities for example avoidable costs and demand is finely divisible the core may be empty in other words a competitive equilibrium frequently fails to exist and as a consequence competitive interactions between firms cannot generate an efficient allocation of resources there are various means of addressing the empty core problem collusion between producers for example can limit competition efficiently thus cartelization may be an efficient response to the cost and demand conditions that preclude the existence of a competitive equilibrium in this article i test the ability of the theory to explain the organization of ocean shipping markets an examination of these markets reveals that the theory works well firms in liner shipping markets where costs are indivisible while demand is finely divisible have colluded consistently since the industry s birth in the mid nineteenth century conversely bulk shipping markets where demand is indivisible and hence empty core problems are not a serious concern have always been organized competitively this evidence is consistent with the theory s predictions

tacit collusion with imperfect monitoring in the canadian manufacturing industry an empirical study this article undertakes a cross sectoral analysis of a salient empirical implication of the model of tacit collusion advanced by abreu pearce and stachetti 1986 specifically we assess the prevalence of a first order markovian process for alternating between price wars and collusive periods through nonparametric tests the analysis focuses on 30 different industries in canada the evidence provides weak support for optimal collusion in one industry which is consistent with the idea that such kind of collusive arrangements is unusual or if collusion is all too common that price wars as deviations from collusion are rare

price cost margins exports and productivity growth with an application to canadian industries a model is estimated for oligopolistic industries producing multiple outputs in short run equilibrium outputs are sold domestically and exported while capital is treated as a quasi fixed factor the model is applied to the canadian non electrical machinery electrical products and chemical products industries the results show that there is significant oligopoly power in each of the industries and that the degree of this power differs between the domestic and export markets total factor productivity is decomposed price cost margins exert little influence but the rate of technological change returns to scale and the rate of capital adjustment determine productivity growth

margins concentration unions and the business cycle theory and evidence for britain abstract a number of recent studies have examined the cyclical relationship between price cost margins concentration and unions u s data has concluded that unions reduce margins margins vary over the cycle and concentration unionisation and the cycle interact in their effect on margins however there is almost no theory to account for these results we propose a simple theory that assumes only that there is overhead labour present at the firm this produces theoretical predictions that can explain these results and discriminate between existing theories we present results of our own using u k panel data and show similar findings to the u s

collusion over the business cycle we present a theory of collusive pricing for markets in which demand alternates stochastically between fast growth boom and slow growth recession phases we show that 1 the most collusive prices are weakly procyclical countercyclical when demand growth rates are positively negatively correlated through time and 2 the amplitude of the collusive pricing cycle is larger when the expected duration of boom phases decreases and when the expected duration of recession phases increases we also offer a generalization of rotemberg and saloner s 1986 model interpreting their findings in terms of transitory demand shocks that occur within broader business cycle phases

the impact of cyclical demand movements on collusive behavior recent work by rotemberg and saloner 1986 investigates the effect of the business cycle on optimal collusive pricing by specifying that demand is subject to i i d shocks an implication of the i i d assumption is that firms expectations on future demand are unrelated to the current level of demand we put forth a model that allows for both the level of current demand and firms expectations on future demand to change over time thus it captures two important properties of the business cycle our analysis reveals that while the gain to deviating from a collusive agreement is greatest during booms firms find it most difficult to collude during recessions as the forgone profits from inducing a price war are relatively low an implication of this effect for pricing behavior is that at the same level of demand price is lower when demand is declining than when demand is rising consistent with previous theoretical work we find that firms price countercyclically for a range of values for the discount factor however numerical simulations reveal a greater tendency for firms to price countercyclically during recessions than during booms

cooperation and norm enforcement the individual level perspective abstract we explore the relationship between individuals disposition to cooperate and their inclination to engage in peer punishment as well as their relative importance for mitigating social dilemmas using a modified strategy method approach we identify individual punishment patterns and link them with individual cooperation patterns classifying n 628 subjects along these two dimensions documents that cooperation and punishment patterns are aligned for most individuals however the data also reveal a sizable share of free riders that punish pro socially and conditional cooperators that do not engage in punishment analyzing the interplay between types in an additional experiment we show that pro social punishers are important for achieving cooperation incorporating information on punishment types explains large amounts of the between and within group variation in cooperation

coffee in mexico international market agricultural landscape and ecology abstract the amount of energy and land devoted to the production of export crops in developing countries is associated with the economic behavior of the commodity in the international market stable increments in the international price of cash crops are expected to drive farmers and agricultural institutions in producing countries to increase production and yields of export crops the increase in crop production which can take place by incorporating new land into agricultural production and or by introducing technological innovations to increase yield may in turn affect the regional landscape and ecology the present study examines the effects of the international coffee price during the 1970s and 1980s upon the regional landscape and coffee farm ecology of mexico s coffee regions the effects upon the landscape and ecology of coffee production in mexico are discussed within the framework of the debate on trade and environment