a multiplicative model of optimal ceo incentives in market equilibrium this paper presents a unified theory of both the level and sensitivity of pay in competitive market equilibrium by embedding a moral hazard problem into a talent assignment model by considering multiplicative specifications for the ceo s utility and production functions we generate a number of different results from traditional additive models first both the ceo s low fractional ownership the jensen murphy incentives measure and its negative relationship with firm size can be quantitatively reconciled with optimal contracting and thus need not reflect rent extraction second the dollar change in wealth for a percentage change in firm value divided by annual pay is independent of firm size and therefore a desirable empirical measure of incentives third incentive pay is effective at solving agency problems with multiplicative impacts on firm value such as strategy choice however additive issues such as perk consumption are best addressed through direct monitoring jel d2 d3 g34 j3

income inequality in france 1901 1998 this paper uses data from income tax returns 1915 98 wage tax returns 1919 98 and inheritance tax returns 1902 94 in order to compute homogeneous yearly estimates of income wage and wealth inequality for twentieth century france the main conclusion is that the decline in income inequality that took place during the first half of the century was mostly accidental in france and possibly in a number of other countries as well wage inequality has been extremely stable in the long run and the secular decline in income inequality is for the most part a capital income phenomenon holders of large fortunes were badly hurt by major shocks during the 1914 45 period and they were never able to fully recover from these shocks probably because of the dynamic effects of progressive taxation on capital accumulation and pretax income inequality

sharing the national cake in post reform new zealand income inequality trends in terms of income sources abstract using household economic survey hes data in unit record form this paper examines the trends of household income inequality in new zealand over the period 1984 96 a period that saw new zealand implement a wide range of economic and social policy reform the observed changes in the overall income inequality are then decomposed by income components to measure the contributions of the different sources of personal income to the overall inequality to our knowledge this is the first time that the methodology for disaggregating the gini co efficient including its more recent extensions by lerman and yitzhaki review of economics and statistics 63 1985 151 podder review of income and wealth 39 1993 51 and mookherjee and shorrocks economic journal 92 1982 886 has been applied to micro level new zealand data for computing income inequality and other related indices and measures reported in this study the findings which indicate a steady upward trend in income inequality are examined in the light of the reform policies used at the time their implications for policy are also addressed

extreme wage inequality pay at the very top we provide new evidence on the growth in pay at the very top of the wage distribution in the united kingdom sectoral decompositions show that workers in the financial sector have accounted for the majority of the gains at the top over the last decade new results are also presented on the pay of ceos in the united kingdom we show how improved measurement of pay points to a stronger pay performance link than previously estimated this link is stronger and more symmetric for those firms in which institutional investors play a larger role

what has 20 years of public private pay gap literature told us eastern european transitioning vs developed economies this paper surveys the literature on public private sector pay differentials based on 20 years of research in transitioning countries of eastern europe ee and compares the results with estimates obtained from developed market economies the majority of empirical studies from ee economies found evidence of public sector pay penalties during the period of economic transition from a communist to market based economy in developed economies however the average differential is usually around zero or positive the public sector pay inequality reducing effect relative to the private sector is greater in transitioning economies than in developed economies nevertheless there is evidence that the sign of the public sector pay gap as well as the relative public sector pay distribution change with the progress of economic transition towards those usually observed in developed economies different pay setting arrangements between private and public sectors and competition for workers seem to be major arguments for the existence of systematic pay differences between the two sectors

optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns theory and evidence this paper studies optimal incentive contracts when workers have career concerns concerns about the effects of current performance on future compensation we show that the optimal compensation contract optimizes total incentives the combination of the implicit incentives from career concerns and the explicit incentives from the compensation contract thus the explicit incentives from the optimal compensation contract should be strongest for workers close to retirement because career concerns are weakest for these workers we find empirical support for this prediction in the relation between chief executive compensation and stock market performance

optimal top marginal tax rates under income splitting for couples abstract this paper provides formulas for optimal top marginal tax rates when couples are taxed according to income splitting between spouses consumption is taxed and the skill distribution is unbounded optimal top marginal income tax rates are computed for germany using a dataset that includes the tax returns of all german top taxpayers we find that the optimal top marginal tax rate converges to about 2 3 and convergence obtains at income levels that are substantially higher than those currently subject to the actual top tax rate

top executive pay and firm performance in china the sensitivity of executive pay to share price performance has been the main focus of western executive pay studies reflecting shareholders efforts to reduce agency problems by better aligning the rewards of executives with their own however these studies have ignored motivational effects and possible two way pay performance causation this paper reports chinese executive pay performance sensitivity with international comparisons to examine whether china s unique institutional environment has produced outcomes consistent with those for western market economies this same unique environment makes possible the first estimates of two way causation based on panel data analysis the results show that executive pay and firm performance mutually affect each other through both reward and motivation

the effects of public sector hiring and compensation policies on the egyptian labor market this article examines the combined impact of the employment guarantee for graduates and public sector compensation policies on the egyptian labor market besides contributing to an unsustainable rate of growth in the government labor force these policies have encouraged queuing for government jobs contributed to high graduate unemployment rates and reduced the employment of graduates in the private sector despite substantial wage erosion in the public sector in recent years government wages when appropriately corrected for observed heterogeneity and sample selection are on a par with or higher than private sector wages especially for graduates when combined with the more desirable nonwage aspects of government jobs these compensation levels explain the attractiveness of public sector employment to graduates government pay scales are especially advantageous to female secondary school graduates who appear to face considerable discrimination in the private sector

the exercise and valuation of executive stock options abstract in theory hedging restrictions faced by managers make executive stock options more difficult to value than ordinary options because they imply that exercise policies of managers depend on their preferences and endowments using data on option exercises from 40 firms this paper shows that a simple extension of the ordinary american option model which introduces random exogenous exercise and forfeiture predicts actual exercise times and payoffs just as well as an elaborate utility maximizing model that explicitly accounts for the nontransferability of options the simpler model could therefore be more useful than the preference based model for valuing executive options in practice

revenge of the managers labor cost cutting and the paradoxical resurgence of managerialism in the shareholder value era 1984 to 2001 institutional changes associated with the rise of shareholder value capitalism have had seemingly contradictory effects on managers and managerialism in the united states economy financial critiqu

what explains the rise in ceo pay in germany a panel data analysis for 1977 2009 the compensation of executive board members in germany has become a highly controversial topic since vodafone s hostile takeover of mannesmann in 2000 and it is again in the spotlight since the outbreak of the financial crisis of 2009 based on unique panel data evidence of the 500 largest firms in germany in the period 1977 2009 we test two prominent hypothesis in the literature on executive pay the manager power hypothesis and the efficient pay hypothesis we find support for the manager power hypothesis for germany as executives tend to be rewarded when the sector is doing well rather than the firm they work for we reject however the efficient pay hypothesis as ceo pay and the demand for managers increases in germany in difficult times when the typical firm size shrinks we find further that domestic and global competition for managers has contributed to the rise in executive pay in germany lastly we show that ceos in the banking sector are provided with incentives for performance and that the great recession of 2009 acted as a disciplining devise on ceo pay in germany

the future of personnel economics personnel economics is defined as the application of microeconomic principles to human resources issues that are of concern to most businesses the field now about 20 years old arose for three reasons first those of us who were teaching standard labour economics to business students encountered a disinterested audience business students believe that labour supply and demand unemployment investment in education and other topics which are of primary concern to labour economists are almost irrelevant to their future business careers their boredom with what we had to sell signalled that a change in the product might be warranted second the issues studied by human resources specialists were of interest to economists but the approach taken by the non economist was unsatisfying it was loose unfocused and ad hoc and lacked the general rigorous framework to which economists have grown accustomed the economist s reaction was to enter an industry where it was believed rents existed third the technology of economics changed as a result of some breakthroughs particularly those dealing with agency and contract theory economists were better equipped to tackle problems that had evaded them in the past

testing agency theory with entrepreneur effort and wealth we develop a principal agent model in an entrepreneurial setting and test the model s predictions using unique data on entrepreneurial effort and wealth in privately held firms accounting for unobserved firm heterogeneity using instrumental variables techniques we find that entrepreneurial ownership shares increase with outside wealth and decrease with firm risk effort increases with ownership and effort increases firm performance the magnitude of the effects in the cross section of firms suggests that agency costs may help explain why entrepreneurs concentrate large fractions of their wealth in firm equity

the impact of performance based compensation on misreporting abstract this paper examines the effect of ceo compensation contracts on misreporting we find that the sensitivity of the ceo s option portfolio to stock price is significantly positively related to the propensity to misreport we do not find that the sensitivity of other components of ceo compensation i e equity restricted stock long term incentive payouts and salary plus bonus have any significant impact on the propensity to misreport relative to other components of compensation stock options are associated with stronger incentives to misreport because convexity in ceo wealth introduced by stock options limits the downside risk on detection of the misreporting

top incomes in the netherlands and the united kingdom over the 20th century a method is developed for using income tax data to investigate the evolution of the highest incomes over virtually the entire 20th century the income shares of the top 10 5 1 0 5 0 1 and 0 05 percent are analysed for the uk and the netherlands for considering the top shares among themselves the pareto lorenz coefficient is proposed between the two countries the top shares appear to undergo a strikingly similar and strong decline up to the mid 1970s since then british top shares have increased significantly while dutch shares remained basically unchanged this outcome parallels similar results for the us and france obtained by piketty and saez and poses interesting questions for research jel n34 d31 o15

estimating a household production function heterogeneity the demand for health inputs and their effects on birth weight the household production literature emphasizes that technical or biological processes condition input selection by households in their production activities along with prices and income exogenous variations in health to the extent that they are perceived by individuals heterogeneity lead to correlations between inputs and health outcomes that cannot be used to derive causal conclusions therefore estimates of health technology must be obtained from a behavioral model in which health inputs are themselves choices consistent estimates are reported of the effect of endogenous inputs such as medical care smoking and fertility on birth weight and fetal growth in the presence of health heterogeneity

the interaction of factor and product market distortions in developing countries this essay will examine distortions in product and factor markets in developing countries and the interaction of these distortions in respect to the development strategies applied the analysis will concentrate on policy imposed distortions where departures from efficient resource allocation result from policy actions these contrast with distortions resulting from market imperfections 1

unemployment and infant health times series evidence from the state of tennessee this is the first study that decomposes unemployment into its structural and cyclical components and investigates their impact on income distribution controlling for the influence of inflation increases in structural unemployment have a substantial

are politicians really paid like bureaucrats abstract we provide the first empirical analysis of gubernatorial pay using u s data for 1950 90 we document substantial variation in the wages of politicians both across states and over time gubernatorial wages respond to changes in state income per capita and taxes we estimate that governors receive a 1 percent pay cut for each 10 percent increase in per capita tax payments and a 4 5 percent increase in pay for each 10 percent increase in income per capita in their states there is evidence that the tax elasticity reflects a form of reward for performance the evidence for the income elasticity of pay is less conclusive but is suggestive of rent extraction motives finally we find that democratic institutions play an important role in shaping pay for example voter initiatives and the presence of political opposition significantly reduce the income elasticity of pay and increase tax elasticities of pay

parastatal pay policy in africa abstract public enterprises have grown to represent a significant share of modern sector employment in many african economies with wage and employment issues near the top of the policy agenda in africa attention should be given to public enterprise compensation and employment policies after describing the institutions which govern public enterprise pay in a number of sub saharan countries the paper considers the policy dilemma in choosing between the two basic alternative pay setting regimes for public enterprise enterprise wage autonomy versus unified salary scales with the civil service

on the dynamics of demand for leisure and the production of health our article develops and estimates a structural model of household health production that jointly determines the demand for leisure and the demand for consumption for elderly males we use a stochastic dynamic programming framework based on the assumption that an individual maximizes lifetime utility subject to budget and time constraints and a health production function by choosing hours of leisure and levels of consumption of health related and health neutral goods and services moreover we use a very comprehensive health index that combines four scales measuring a variety of dimensions in the quality of life the euler equations derived from our model are estimated using data from six biennial panels of the retirement history survey

exercise behavior valuation and the incentive effects of employee stock options abstract we use a large database on eso exercises to document characteristics of exercise behavior and calibrate a utility based model for measuring how differences in exercise behavior are manifested in option values and incentives option values and incentives computed from the model calibrations are compared to those computed from models used to value tradable options our analysis provides guidance to both academics and practitioners about how differences in exercise behavior and model choice affect measures of eso values and incentives and underscores the importance of gaining a thorough understanding of the underlying economic forces that affect the behavior of eso holders

the subjective and objective evaluation of incentive stock options owners of incentive options invariably hold undiversified portfolios this paper derives a model for the subjective and objective values of such options the subjective value the value to the holder is less than the market value because the option is held in an undiversified portfolio and because it is exercised suboptimally from the market perspective the objective value is the cost to the firm of issuing the option and lies between the market and subjective values this value recognizes the suboptimal exercise but not the undiversified discount the model which is the black scholes model with modified parameters is simple to use

institutional ownership stability and bhc performance abstract in this study the association between performance of bhcs and institutional ownership stability is investigated and contrasted to those found for the less regulated utility and industrial firms in order to determine whether regulation displaces owner monitoring we employ a simultaneous equations model treating firm performance and institutional ownership stability as endogenous variables several results are obtained first bhc performance is positively associated with institutional ownership stability second this association is weaker for bhcs than for comparable utility and industrial firms possibly because of the substitution of regulation for owner monitoring in banking third this association is stronger in the recent deregulated years and for bhcs with lower likelihood of regulatory intervention

a time series analysis of unemployment and health the case of birth outcomes in new york city abstract the paper presents an aggregate time series analysis of unemployment and infant health that improves on previous work in several ways first the data is monthly as opposed to annual second the measure of health the percentage of low birthweight births and the health inputs are rare specific third because a pregnancy is limited to at most ten months we can specify a lag length with a greater degree of confidence we find no cyclical variation in the percentage of low birthweight births the results are insensitive to changes in lag length health inputs and functional form

comparing earnings profiles in urban areas of an ldc rural to urban migrants vs native workers abstract we use tanzanian data to test a recently proposed hypothesis that rural to urban migrants have an incentive to supply greater work effort than native urban workers because of the migrants positive probability of returning to the low wage rural areas we treat the choice between public and private sector employment as endogenous and for theoretical and empirical reasons distinguish migrants with access to rural land from those without access our results show that migrants in both sectors face lower initial wage offers than native urban workers but the wage gap is eliminated within a decade or less and thereafter migrants surpass the wage offers of native workers

executive option exercises and financial misreporting abstract several recent papers document that the magnitude of potential gains from stock based compensation is positively related to the likelihood of misreporting in a sample of firms that announce restatements of their financial statements from 1997 to 2002 we examine whether managers realize these potential gains occurring from their accounting choices after controlling for diversification needs and stock price impact we find no significant evidence of higher option exercises by executives in the misreported years however for firms that are more likely to have made deliberate aggressive accounting choices we find significant evidence of higher option exercises for these firms option exercises are higher by 20 60 in comparison to industry and size matched nonrestating firms options exercises by executives are also increasing in the magnitude of the restatement as captured by the effect of the restatement on net income these higher option exercises tend to be more pervasive and are not just confined to the ceo and cfo of the firm

wealth and executive compensation using new data on the wealth of swedish ceos i show that higher wealth ceos receive stronger incentives since high wealth excluding own firm holdings implies low absolute risk aversion this is consistent with a risk aversion explanation to examine whether wealth is likely to proxy for power i use lagged wealth typically measured before the ceo was hired and the results remain for one of two incentive measures also the wealth incentive result is not stronger for ceos likely to face limited owner oversight finally wealth is unrelated to pay levels and is hence unlikely to proxy for skill the compensation of chief executives of large listed companies is often largely in the form of risky instruments such as shares and options since share prices are affected by many factors outside management control this exposes ceos to risk according to standard agency theory the risk inherent in incentive compensation should reduce optimal incentives looking across firms the evidence that volatile stock prices reduce incentives in actual compensation has been mixed see e g aggarwal and samwick 1999 core and guay 2001 and prendergast 2002 for different views the importance of risk for incentives is thus in dispute 1 this paper takes another look at ceo incentives exploiting variation in risk aversion rather than risk decreasing absolute risk aversion implies that a wealthy ceo is less risk averse than a similar same coefficient of relative risk aversion but less wealthy ceo wealth should therefore proxy for risk aversion wealth may also be related to ceo skill and power obviously using wealth variation empirically hinges on having adequate data on individual wealth i use swedish tax filings to construct a proxy of wealth in sweden tax authorities provide data on aggregate yearly income

heads i win tails you lose a career analysis of executive pay and corporate performance the paper utilises a novel career perspective to examine managerial theories of organisational control in the context of executive reward principal agent theory managerial power and neo institutionalism are evaluated detailed career histories of boardroom executives in all ftse350 companies between 1996 and 2008 are utilised using both a fixed effects panel and a career based approach rival hypotheses are tested in addition to the payperformance relationship the probability of job loss as a function of performance is also estimated the evidence presented points to the importance of institutional considerations in the standard agency theory and managerial power perspectives and lends support to a social theory of agency the analysis is empirical in nature and an effort is made to draw on qualitative studies to further flesh out the discussion the practical implications of the findings point to the inadequacy of existing arrangements to deliver efficient pay outcomes where performance is poor whilst highlighting dangers of relying on naive policy remedies that ignore the role played by institutional forces in their implementation also highlighted is the distinct advantage of boards adopting a cumulative or career oriented approach when evaluating executive performance from a policy perspective the case is made for truly long term incentives in the form of career shares

the implications of current policies on the production of infant health this study examines the possible link between the current trend to reduce availability of abortion services and the incidence of low birthweight births using current data on births and abortions in atlanta and new york city we update and expand the earlier empirical results of grossman and joyce the journal of political economy 1990 98 5 98 1007 using their latent variable model framework we find some evidence for the cost of abortion model which assumes that increasing the full costs of abortion will be associated with more low birthweight hence less healthy infants these results indicate that current trends towards the reduction of funding for various social services could exacerbate the problem of low birthweight

performance thresholds in managerial incentive contracts performance thresholds are commonly used in executive compensation contracts we examine the contractual nonlinearity associated with performance thresholds and its incentive implications incorporating a performance threshold into a standard principal agent model of a linear contract we show that pay schemes using a performance threshold are optimal by truncating a linear scheme at poor performance the threshold mitigates agency costs associated with the downside risk of production examining ceo compensation data we find evidence of the role of performance thresholds as a consequence of under threshold performance the tobit estimator is shown to increase pay performance sensitivity notably improving upon the standard ols estimator

optimal executive compensation when firm size follows geometric brownian motion this paper studies a continuous time agency model in which the agent controls the drift of the geometric brownian motion firm size the changing firm size generates partial incentives analogous to awarding the agent equity shares according to her continuation payoff when the agent is as patient as investors performance based stock grants implement the optimal contract our model generates a leverage effect on the equity returns and implies that the agency problem is more severe for smaller firms that the empirical evidence shows that grants compensation are largely based on the ceo s historical performance rather than current performance lends support to our model

identifying and testing models of managerial compensation this article analyses the identification and empirical content of the pure moral hazard pmh and the hybrid moral hazard hmh principal agent models the pmh model has hidden actions while the hmh model has hidden information in addition to hidden actions in both models agents are risk averse and principals are risk neutral the article derives the equilibrium restrictions from the optimal contract and uses the restrictions to show that the models have empirical content for any given risk aversion parameter the models other parameters are non parametrically point identified the risk aversion parameter and hence the model are however only partially identified management s ability to manipulate accounting reports arises endogenously within hmh models but not in all versions of pmh models we use our framework to investigate whether shareholders contract with management recognizing that accounting reports are susceptible to manipulation and therefore endogenous to the incentives offered to management the data reject all models in which accounting reports are verifiable furthermore the version of the pmh in which accounting reports can be manipulated is rejected if expected compensation is restricted to be positive

are ceos really paid like bureaucrats a common view is that there is little correlation between firm performance and ceo pay using a new fifteen year panel data set of ceos in the largest publicly traded u s companies we document a strong relationship between firm performance and ceo compensation this relationship is generated almost entirely by changes in the value of ceo holdings of stock and stock options in addition we show that both the level of ceo compensation and the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance have risen dramatically since 1980 largely because of increases in stock option grants

swinging for the fences the effects of ceo stock options on company risk taking and performance we unpack the concept of managerial risk taking distinguishing among three of its major elements the size of an outlay the variance of potential outcomes and the likelihood of extreme loss we

managerial incentives and internal capital markets capital budgeting in multidivisional firms depends on the external assessment of the whole firm as well as on headquarters assessment of the divisions while corporate headquarters may create value by directly monitoring divisions the external assessment of the firm is a public good for division managers who consequently are tempted to free ride as the number of divisions increases the free rider problem is aggravated and internal capital markets substitute for external capital markets in the provision of managerial incentives the analysis relates the value of diversification to characteristics of the firm the industry and the capital market

what happens when you tax the rich evidence from executive compensation this paper examines the responsiveness of taxable income to changes in marginal tax rates using detailed compensation data on several thousand corporate executives from 1991 to 1995 the data confirm that the higher marginal rates of 1993 led to a significant decline in taxable income indeed this small group of executives may account for as much as 20 percent of the aggregate change in wage and salary income for approximately the one million richest taxpayers over this time period one person alone can account for more than 2 percent the decline however is almost entirely a short run shift in the timing of compensation rather than a permanent reduction in taxable income the short run elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net of tax share exceeds one in this sample but the elasticity after one year is at most 0 4 and probably closer to zero breaking out the tax responsiveness of different types of compensation shows that the large short run responses come almost entirely from a large inc

does tax policy affect executive compensation evidence from postwar tax reforms abstract the trends in executive pay and labor income tax rates since the 1940s suggest a high elasticity of taxable income with respect to tax policy by contrast the level and structure of executive compensation have been largely unresponsive to tax incentives since the 1980s however the relative tax advantage of different forms of pay was small during this period using a sample of top executives in large firms from 1946 to 2005 we also find a small short run response of salaries qualified stock options and bonuses paid after retirement to changes in tax rates on labor income even though tax rates were significantly higher and more heterogeneous across individuals in the first several decades following wwii we explore several potential explanations for the conflicting impressions given by the long run and short run correlations between taxes and pay including changes in social norms and concerns about pay equality

public private employment choice wage differentials and gender in turkey abstract the main objective of this article is to examine the factors that explain the employment choice and the wage differentials in public administration state owned enterprises and the formal private wage sector in turkey selectivity corrected wage equations are estimated for each sector for men and women separately oaxaca blinder decomposition of the wage differentials between sectors by gender and between men and women by sector are carried out results indicate that when controlled for observed characteristics and sample selection for men public administration wages are higher than private sector wages except at the university level where the wages are at par state owned enterprise wages for men are higher than private sector wages similar results are obtained for women further while the wages of men and women are at parity in the public administration there is a large gender wage gap in the private sector in favor of men private returns to schooling are found to be lower in the noncompe

public private sector wage gap by gender in egypt evidence from quantile regression on panel data 1998 2018 abstract this paper estimates the public formal private wage gap in egypt using egypt labor market panel survey for the 20 year period of 1998 2018 for men and women separately we estimate the public formal private sector wage gap with wage equations including a public sector indicator both at the mean and at different quantiles of the conditional wage distribution using the panel feature of the data we also address the endogenous employment and the sector of employment selection issue and find a persistent public wage penalty for the males and public wage premium for the females except at the top even after controlling for the observable and the time invariant unobservable characteristics we further examine the public wage gap over time and in different sub samples by potential experience skill levels and regions generally the results are consistent with a decrease in the public wage gap for both men and women over the period considered we further provide evidence on the quality of workers we find that the public sector fails to attract better quality men throughout the conditional wage distribution while it manages to attract better quality women in the lower parts of the conditional wage distribution but not at the top all on the basis of time invariant unobservable attributes these results indicate concern for the efficient provision of public services

the central government private sector wage differential since ehrenberg and schwarz 1986 there has been a plethora of articles investigating the relationship between public and private sector wages this article examines part of this post 1986 literature by reviewing articles that examine central government private sector wage differentials in sum most articles find that there is a premium paid to central government workers although the premium has declined in recent years in developing countries however the differential is usually negative women and minorities tend to do better in the public sector relative to their private sector counterparts the evidence on union premiums between sectors is mixed although the premium tends to be higher in the private sector however public sector union workers do not do much better than private sector union members the magnitude of all of the wage differentials discussed are sensitive to the estimation technique and data source used the most common explanation for the public sector wage premium is economic rent accruing to government workers although the public sector wage determination literature suggests that the differential is due to returns to political and vote producing activities not relevant in the private sector

labor market discrimination in a poor urban economy labor market discrimination by sex and by race in a poor urban economy is analyzed using a survey of manufacturing employees in tanzania there are large differences in mean wages by both sex and race using techniques previously applied to developed countries it is found that whereas the sex difference in mean wages can be explained mainly in terms of sex differences in personal characteristics the race difference is mainly the result of wage and job discrimination an attempt is made to explain the results which run counter to common presuppositions about discrimination

executive compensation strategic competition and relative performance evaluation theory and evidence we examine compensation contracts for managers in imperfectly competitive product markets we show that strategic interactions among firms can explain the lack of relative performance based incentives in which compensation decreases with rival firm performance the need to soften product market competition generates an optimal compensation contract that places a positive weight on both own and rival performance firms in more competitive industries place greater weight on rival firm performance relative to own firm performance we find empirical evidence of a positive sensitivity of compensation to rival firm performance that is increasing in the degree of competition in the industry

a switching regression model for wage determinants in the public and private sectors of a developing country governments in less developed countries face severe budgetary constraints given that public sector employment is a large part of modern sector employment the government wage bill h as come under increased scrutiny the central question is how do gove rnment wages compare with those in the private sector in this paper the authors develop and estimate a model to answer this question an important aspect of this model is the endogenous treatment of sector choice the estimation results full information maximum likelihood sound a strong warning against the use of ordinary least squares est imates that are based on sector specific samples data are from the i vory coast copyright 1988 by mit press

incentives learning and compensation a theoretical and empirical investigation of managerial labor contracts this article analyzes properties and implications of multiperiod managerial labor contracts under two alternative hypotheses incentives in which productivity depends on unobservable effort and learning in which ability is unknown and is revealed over time shared and conflicting implications of these competing models are developed in terms of experienceearnings profiles and the relation between compensation and performance i empirically examine these theoretical results by using a longitudinal sample of 1 488 chief executive officers followed from 1974 1985 the data yield mixed evidence that generally supports the learning hypothesis over the incentive hypothesis

the income and tax share of very high income households 1960 1995 this paper presents new information on the fraction of adjusted gross income and of wages and salaries that is reported by taxpayers in the top one half of one percent of the income distribution this corresponds to roughly five hundred thousand households in the late 1990s this paper relies on data from the treasury s individual income tax model for the period 1960 1995 the definition of adjusted gross income is standardized so that changes in the tax law do not affect the measured concentration of agi the results suggest that the share of agi reported by the highest income households increased significantly between the early 1980s and the mid 1990s with most of the increase taking place in the years immediately following the tax reform act of 1986 while we find some evidence of transitory changes in the concentration of income around major tax changes which may be the result of income retiming by high income taxpayers re timing does not seem to explain most of the changes since 1986 this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

uncertainty risk and incentives theory and evidence uncertainty has qualitatively different implications than risk in studying executive incentives we study the interplay between profitability uncertainty and moral hazard where profitability is multiplicative with managerial effort investors who face greater uncertainty desire faster learning and consequently offer higher managerial incentives to induce higher effort from the manager in contrast to the standard negative risk incentive trade off this learning by doing effect generates a positive relation between profitability uncertainty and incentives we document empirical support for this prediction this paper was accepted by wei jiang finance

income inequality in the united states 1913 1998 this paper presents new homogeneous series on top shares of income and wages from 1913 to 1998 in the united states using individual tax returns data top income and wages shares display a u shaped pattern over the century our series suggest that the large shocks that capital owners experienced during the great depression and world war ii have had a permanent effect on top capital incomes we argue that steep progressive income and estate taxation may have prevented large fortunes from fully recovering from these shocks top wage shares were flat before world war ii dropped precipitously during the war and did not start to recover before the late 1960s but are now higher than before world war ii as a result the working rich have replaced the rentiers at the top of the income distribution

wage differentials in brazil theory and evidence the investigation of wage determination and wage differentials in developing countries has concentrated on the effects of human capital and different sources of segmentation associated with institutional arrangements and structural characteristics on earnings in this article we use micro data for brazil for the 1980s and 1990s to test several competitive theories and models with segmentation explained by efficiency wages we find that unmeasured abilities and efficiency wage models seem to play a role in wage determination while compensating differentials and transitory difference theories were found to be irrelevant to wages formation

understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance comment abstract himmelberg et al j financial econom 53 1999 353 384 argue that fixed effects estimators should be used in examination of the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance i show that managerial ownership while substantially different across firms typically changes slowly from year to year within a company with rational managers maximising long term utility small one year changes in ownership are not likely to reflect notable changes in incentives that would lead to substantive within year changes in performance by relying on within variation fixed effects estimators may not detect an effect of ownership on performance even if one exists

prenatal care and birthweight production evidence from south america research using us data has shown that increases in prenatal care have positive effects on birthweight and that the existence of unobserved health heterogeneity tends to reduce the measured effect of prenatal care this study extends extant research to the south american countries of bolivia brazil columbia and peru using data from the demographic and health surveys finding a positive effect of increased prenatal care use on birthweight furthermore the largest marginal effect of increased prenatal care use is found at low levels of usage the results highlight both the usefulness of existing methodologies for estimating the effect of prenatal care on birthweight and the importance of extending these methodologies to data from countries other than the usa

the distribution of wealth and fiscal policy in economies with finitely lived agents we study the dynamics of the distribution of wealth in an overlapping generation economy with finitely lived agents and intergenerational transmission of wealth financial markets are incomplete exposing agents to both labor and capital income risk we show that the stationary wealth distribution is a pareto distribution in the right tail and that it is capital income risk rather than labor income that drives the properties of the right tail of the wealth distribution we also study analytically the dependence of the distribution of wealth of wealth inequality in particular on various fiscal policy instruments like capital income taxes and estate taxes and on different degrees of social mobility we show that capital income and estate taxes can significantly reduce wealth inequality as do institutions favoring social mobility finally we calibrate the economy to match the lorenz curve of the wealth distribution of the u s economy

optimal exercise prices for executive stock options although exercise prices for executive stock options can be set either below or above the grant date market price in practice virtually all options are granted at the money we offer an economic rationale for this apparent puzzle by showing that pay to performance incentives for risk averse undiversified executives are typically maximized by setting exercise prices at or near the grant date market price we provide an operationally useful alternative to black scholes 1973 for the purpose of both valuing executive stock options and measuring the incentives created by options our framework has implications not only for exercise price policies but also for indexed options option repricings exchanges of cash for stock based compensation and the design of bonus plans

ceo compensation in financially distressed firms an empirical analysis this paper studies senior management compensation policy in 77 publicly traded firms that filed for bankruptcy or privately restructured their debt during 1981 to 1987 almost one third of all ceos are replaced and those who keep their jobs often experience large salary and bonus reductions newly appointed ceos with ties to previous management are typically paid 35 less than the ceos they replace in contrast outside replacement ceos are typically paid 36 more than their predecessors and are often compensated with stock options on average ceo wealth is significantly related to shareholder wealth after firms renegotiate their debt contracts however managers compensation is sometimes explicitly tied to the value of creditors claims

lower salaries and no options on the optimal structure of executive pay we estimate a standard principal agent model with constant relative risk aversion and lognormal stock prices for a sample of 598 us ceos the model is widely used in the compensation literature but it predicts that almost all of the ceos in our sample should hold no stock options instead ceos should have lower base salaries and receive additional shares in their companies for a typical value of relative risk aversion almost half of the ceos in our sample would be required to purchase additional stock in their companies from their private savings the model predicts contracts that would reduce average compensation costs by 20 while providing the same incentives and the same utility to ceos we investigate a number of extensions and modi cations of the standard model but nd none of them to be satisfactory we conclude that the standard principal agent model typically used in the literature cannot rationalize observed contracts one reason may be that executive pay contracts are suboptimal

compensation across executive labor markets what can we learn from cross listed firms there is wide consensus that chief executive officers ceos of us firms earn significantly more than their canadian counterparts using a matched sample we find that the majority of this difference is due to us ceos earning 50 more than ceos of canadian non cross listed firms we find no such us premium for canadian cross listed firms because the use of options allows the cross listed firms to keep pace with their neighbors to the south while firms that list only in canada compete in the labor market defined by their national boundary cross listed firms appear to be competing directly with their us counterparts for executive talent in investigating alternative explanations for the elimination of the compensation differential for canadian cross listed firms we find evidence consistent with both the bonding and the rent extraction hypotheses

wage differentials and moonlighting by civil servants evidence from cote d ivoire and peru as part of their efforts to reduce fiscal deficits many governments have allowed public sector salaries to erode often on the assumption that government workers are overpaid vis a vis those in the private sector that assumption is tested by analyzing public private pay differentials in cote d ivoire and peru switching regressions models are estimated using full information maximum likelihood fiml and the results are compared to those obtained using ordinary least squares ols techniques the ols yields seriously biased estimates of the pay structure suggesting that public wages are higher than private wages the fiml estimates show the opposite our probit analysis also shows that the wage disadvantage of civil servants is a determinant of the greater prevalence of moonlighting among public than private employees the evidence suggests that reductions in employment rather than pay while being less palatable in the short term will be more effective in the long run

networks or neighborhoods correlations in the use of publicly funded maternity care in california abstract this study focuses on network effects in the utilization of publicly funded prenatal care using vital statistics data from california for 1989 2000 networks are defined using 5 digit zip codes and a woman s racial or ethnic group like others we find evidence that the use of public programs is highly correlated within groups defined using race ethnicity and neighborhoods these correlations persist even when we control for many unobserved characteristics by including zip code year fixed effects and when we focus on the interaction between own group behavior and measures of the potential for contacts with other members of the group contact availability however the richness of our data allows us to go further and to conduct several tests of one important hypothesis about networks that the estimated effects represent information sharing within groups the results cast doubt on the idea that the observed correlations can be interpreted as evidence of information sharing in particular we find estimated effects to be as large or larger among women who have previously used the program as among first time users

managerial optimism and earnings smoothing abstract this paper empirically examines how ceo optimism affects earnings smoothing and earnings surprises the main finding is that optimistic managers smooth earnings more than rational managers and are associated with smaller in absolute value earnings surprises a possible theoretical explanation is offered for these results based on a combination of the torpedo effect the innate behavior of optimists and the risk of litigation prosecution for over reporting earnings

the public private wage differential in a poor urban economy the occupational structure of wages is generally more compressed in high than in low income countries the role of non market forces in determining the structure of wages is of interest for reasons of allocative efficiency as well as for distributional concerns this paper considers how wage differentials may be generated between the public and private sectors of a developing economy data from a 1971 household survey of the tanzanian urban wage labor force are used to determine the pattern of wage differences across employer groups after standardizing by worker characteristics public sector employees are found to have earned a substantial wage premium over workers employed in the private sector the non market character of these differentials is examined in light of a number of hypotheses on public sector wage determination

who receives medical care income implicit prices and the distribution of medical services among pregnant women in the united states the distribution of medical services among pregnant married women in the united states in 1980 is very unequal this distribution is examined to assess the predominant effect of tax transfer and insurance schemes on the implicit prices of medical services facing women differing by socioeconomic status healthiness and race estimates of the determinants of the probability of receiving four major prenatal medical services are obtained controlling both for socioeconomic status and for initial health status as inferred from estimates of health technology determining birthweight results reject the hypotheses that medical services are provided only on the basis of medical need or are allocated in a market in which the implicit price of care is invariant to husband s income the combined effect of taxes and transfers is found to reduce the implicit price paid for these four medical services by rich compared to poor married women in the united states and thus to encourage their use by higher income and education groups

top executive rewards and firm performance a comparison of japan and the united states this paper studies top executive turnover and compensation and their relation to firm performance in the largest japanese and u s companies japanese executive turnover and compensation are related to earnings stock returns and to a lesser extent sales performance measures the fortunes of japanese top executives therefore are positively correlated with stock performance and current cash flows or with factors contributing to such performance the relations for the japanese executives are generally economically and statistically similar to those for their u s counterparts there is some evidence however that the fortunes of japanese executives are more sensitive to low income but less sensitive to stock returns than those of u s executives

interest rate management in ldc s the mckinnon argument that higher time deposit rates raise output and lower inflation in the short run and increase medium term growth by raising the savings rate are shown to depend crucially on the assumption that portfolio shifts into td s come out of an asset providing less intermediation than the banking system we show that if instead the shift is out of an asset providing more intermediation e g loans on a curbmarket raising td rates is contractionary in the short run may have negative impacts on growth and can lead to more rather than less inflation in the short run

executive compensation and principal agent theory the empirical literature on executive compensation generally fails to specify a model of executive pay on which to base and test hypotheses regarding its determinants in contrast this paper analy

the effect of competition on executive compensation and incentives evidence from a quasi natural experiment the research was partially funded by fundacao para a ciencia e a tecnologia through the applied microeconomics research unit nima award no pest oe ege ui3181 2014

the roles of corporate governance in bank failures during the recent financial crisis abstract this paper analyzes the roles of corporate governance in bank defaults during the recent financial crisis of 2007 2010 using a data sample of 249 default and 4 021 no default us commercial banks we investigate the impact of bank ownership and management structures on the probability of default the results show that defaults are strongly influenced by a bank s ownership structure high shareholdings of outside directors and chief officers managers with a chief officer position such as the ceo cfo etc imply a substantially lower probability of failure in contrast high shareholdings of lower level management such as vice presidents increase default risk significantly these findings suggest that high stakes in the bank induce outside directors and upper level management to control and reduce risk while greater stakes for lower level management seem to induce it to take high risks which may eventually result in bank default some accounting variables such as capital earnings and non performing loans also help predict bank default however other potential stability indicators such as the management structure of the bank indicators of market competition subprime mortgage risks state economic conditions and regulatory influences do not appear to be decisive factors in predicting bank default

health nutrition and economic growth today the most remarkable instances of rapid economic growth are in asian and latin american countries which together represent more than half of the population of the world this vast expansion of modern economic growth did not get under way until after world war ii but since then has proceeded with lightning speed these changes first became evident in the improvement in life expectancy in the case of india for example life expectancy at birth increased from 29 years in 1930 to 60 years in 1990 an increase of that magnitude required two and a half centuries in england and france the sharp drop in the death rates of developing nations led to an enormous surge in the growth of population which in turn led to widespread fears that the food supply could not keep up with population growth and that industrialization would be thwarted excerpt

educational expansion government policy and wage compression abstract the main objective is to measure the elasticity in the response of relative wages by education to relative supplies of educated labour using rigorously comparable urban wage labour market surveys an econometric comparison is made of kenya and tanzania countries which constitute a natural experiment having different secondary education policies but being similar in other relevant respects post primary educational expansion as kenya is an effective means of compressing wages however the tanzanian scarcity premium on post primary education is held down by the alternative means of public sector pay policy the analysis suggests an important role for occupation in the wage adjustment process

executive option repricing incentives and retention while many firms grant executive stock options that can be repriced other firms systematically restrict or prohibit repricing this article investigates the determinants of firms repricing policies and the consequences of such policies for executive turnover and retention firms that have better internal governance that use more powerful stock based incentives or that face less shareholder scrutiny are more likely to maintain repricing flexibility firms that restrict repricing are more vulnerable to voluntary executive turnover following stock price declines when share price declines are severe restricting firms appear to award unusually large numbers of new options the past several years have witnessed tremendous growth in the use of stock options to compensate corporate executives indeed virtually all of the largest publicly traded u s firms now rely on stock option plans and option grants constitute more than half of the annual pay for chief executive officers murphy 1999 a natural consequence of this growth has been an increasing awareness and sophistication among academics practitioners and the popular press about how the design and administration of option plans can help to enhance or destroy shareholder value although a number of corporate practices pertaining to executive options have elicited controversy perhaps no such practice has been more controversial than repricing which involves effectively lowering the exercise prices of previously granted options on the one hand firms often describe repricing as a useful means for restoring incentives and retaining executive talent and most stock option plans currently in existence permit repricing on the other hand shareholders and institutional investors have voiced intense opposition to the practice on the grounds that it apparently rewards managers for poor performance for instance the council of institutional investors an organization of pension funds controlling over 1 5 trillion in assets has adopted a policy statement calling on companies to restrict repricing according to ann yerger director of research at the council member funds generally detest

corporate performance and managerial remuneration an empirical analysis abstract economic theories of efficient compensation predict a positive relationship between executive pay and corporate performance and yet efforts to document this relationship have been largely unsuccessful in this paper we argue that previous cross sectional studies have omitted important variables which seriously bias their results using data that focus on individual executives over time we find that executive compensation is strongly positively related to corporate performance as measured by shareholder return and growth in firm sales the results are robust to the stock market performance measure utilized

risk aversion performance pay and the principal agent problem this paper calculates numerical solutions to the principal agent problem and compares the results to the stylized facts of ceo compensation the numerical predictions come from parameterizing the models of grossman and hart and of holmstrom and milgrom while the correct incentives for a ceo can greatly enhance a firm s performance providing such incentives need not be expensive for many parameter values ceo compensation need increase only by about 10 for every 1 000 of additional shareholder value for some values the amount is 0 003 cents

fiscal year ends and nonlinear incentive contracts the effect on business seasonality salesperson and executive compensation contracts typically specify a nonlinear relationship between firm revenues and pay these agents therefore have incentive to manipulate prices influence the timing of customer purchases and vary effort over their firms fiscal years this paper empirically establishes results consistent with agents focusing on performance over the fiscal year most notably in addition to varying with the calendar business cycle manufacturing firms sales are higher at the end of the fiscal year and lower at the beginning than they are in the middle further evidence is found in fiscal year price movements and patterns in the industry variation of fiscal year effects

hedging familiarity and portfolio choice we exploit the restrictions of intertemporal portfolio choice in the presence of non nancial income risk to design and implement tests of hedging that use the information contained in the actual portfolio of the investor we use a unique dataset of swedish investors with information broken down at the investor level and into various components of wealth investor income tax positions and investor demographic characteristics portfolio holdings are identi ed at the stock level we show that investors do not engage in hedging but invest in stocks closely related to their non nancial income we explain this with familiarity that is the tendency to concentrate holdings in stocks with which the investor is familiar in terms of geographical or professional proximity or that he has held for a long period we show that familiarity is not a behavioral bias but is information driven familiarity based investment allows investors to earn higher returns than they would have otherwise earned if they had hedged

the stability of household production technology a replication our article develops and estimates a structural model of household health production that jointly determines the demand for leisure and the demand for consumption for elderly males we use a stochastic dynamic programming framework based on the

taxes and bribery the role of wage incentives this paper presents a simple model to evaluate alternative payment schemes for tax inspectors in the presence of corruption we consider problems of both moral hazard which arises because taking bribes cannot be observed without costly monitoring and adverse selection since not all potential tax inspectors can be identified as being honest or dishonest we identify three wage regimes first one could pay the same wage that a tax inspector could earn elsewhere his reservation wage second one could pay a wage which solves the moral hazard problem i e deters bribery this we call an efficiency wage by analogy with recent models examined i n macro economics third the government could pay a wage below the reservation wage at which only the dishonest become tax inspectors the capitulation wage we make precise the conditions under which each yields the greatest amount o f tax revenues net o f administrative costs many countries in the developing world are undergoing structural adjustment programmes which require fundamental fiscal changes outside agencies advise restoration of budget balance a task which involves expenditure cuts and tax increases the treatment of public employee pay scales often poses a particular dilemma i n this process wages and salaries are a significant component of government expenditures and one important question concerns the extent to which wages rather than employment cuts should be used to save money there is sometimes a reluctance to advocate wage cuts stemming in part from a feeling that this might impair the performance of the public sector hence tanzi 1990 argues that a policy of wage cutting is likely to increase the inefficiency of public sector employees especially at a time when the public sector is expected to play a larger role in restructuring the economy p 16 in the context of tax collection the issue is particularly pressing given the need to raise more tax revenues a reduction in efficiency in this branch of the government i s likely t o mean that fewer returns are processed and when individuals living standards are squeezed their incentive to accept bribes in lieu o f collecting taxes i s increased o n this count i t i s even sometimes suggested that wages of tax inspectors should be increased to aid the effort to the comments of henry bienen john hey and two anonymous referees have been helpful in revising this paper the authors are also grateful t o the john m olin program for the study o f economic organization and public policy at princeton university and the pew charitable trusts for financial support mclaren also acknowledges support from the international finance section of princeton university none of the above should be implicated in any way see for example goode 1984 chapter 1 3 and gould and amaro reyes 1983

public private wage differentials in haiti do public servants earn a rent abstract this study uses a newly collected data set on haiti where data are very limited to assess how individuals are selected into the public vs private sectors and to estimate public private sector wage differentials the central question is whether or not public servants are earning a rent the estimation procedure is an extension of heckman s 1979 sample selection technique to the case where two selection rules generate the sample the procedure first estimates by bivariate probit analysis the probability of employment in the public or private sector and then for those in the public sector the probability of employment in the state owned enterprises soes vs public administration wage functions are then estimated for all three sectors using the inverse mills ratios from reduced form probits selectivity bias is found to exist in one sector soes correction for this bias in the wage equations lowers the wage differentials between the soe and the private sector and the soe and public administration as is clearly demonstrated by the oaxaca decomposition of these estimated mean differentials nevertheless the corrected findings still indicate that the public sector especially the soes earn a sizable rent

the effect of risk on the ceo market this article presents a market equilibrium model of ceo assignment pay and incentives under risk aversion and moral hazard each of the three outcomes can be summarized by a single closed form equation in the presence of moral hazard assignment is distorted from positive assortative matching on firm size as firms with higher risk or disutility choose less talented ceos such firms also pay higher salaries in the cross section but economywide increases in risk or the disutility of being a ceo do not affect pay the strength of incentives depends only on the disutility of effort and is independent of risk and risk aversion if the ceo can affect firm risk incentives rise and are increasing in risk and risk aversion we calibrate the losses from various forms of poor corporate governance such as failures in monitoring and inefficiencies in ceo assignment jel g34 j33 this article presents a market equilibrium model of ceo assignment pay and incentives risk averse managers of different talents are hired in a competitive market by heterogeneous firms which vary in their size risk and level of effort required the level of pay drives the assignment of talent to firms the strength of incentives induces the efficient effort level and is determined by an optimal contracting approach our main contribution is to incorporate risk into a ceo market equilibrium in a tractable manner a large empirical literature has shown that risk is a firstorder determinant of compensation contracts demsetz and lehn 1985 garen 1994 core and guay 1999 oyer and schaefer 2004 peters 2009 peters and wagner 2009 but most theories assume risk neutrality this assumption is