bank loan portfolios and the monetary transmission mechanism abstract we study the portfolio behavior of bank loans following a monetary tightening and find that real estate and consumer loans sharply decrease while commercial and industrial c i loans increase these responses are compared with responses following non monetary shocks which also reduce output but keep interest rates roughly unchanged during such a non monetary downturn c i loans sharply decrease while real estate and consumer loans show no substantial response these responses together with the responses of relevant lending rates are hard to reconcile with a decline in the supply of c i bank loans during a monetary downturn as stressed by the bank lending channel several arguments are presented explaining why the supply of c i loans may actually increase after a monetary contraction

bank risk taking securitization supervision and low interest rates evidence from the euro area and the u s lending standards using a unique dataset of the euro area and the u s bank lending standards we find that low monetary policy short term interest rates soften standards for household and corporate loans this softening especially for mortgages is amplified by securitization activity weak supervision for bank capital and low monetary policy rates for an extended period conversely low long term interest rates do not soften lending standards finally countries with softer lending standards before the crisis related to negative taylor rule residuals experienced a worse economic performance afterward these results help shed light on the origins of the crisis and have important policy implications the author 2011 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

the risk taking channel of monetary policy exploring all avenues the literature on the risk taking channel of monetary policy grew quickly leading to scattered evidence we examine this channel through different angles exploring detailed information on loan origination and performance ex ante riskier borrowers receive more funding at the extensive margin when interest rates are lower ex post performance is independent of the level of interest rates at origination still loans granted in periods of very low and stable interest rates show higher default rates once interest rates start to increase risk taking is stronger among banks with lower capital ratios suggesting that this channel may be linked to managerial incentives for risk shifting

collective moral hazard maturity mismatch and systemic bailouts the paper elicits a mechanism by which private leverage choices exhibit strategic complementarities through the reaction of monetary policy when everyone engages in maturity transformation authorities haver little choice but facilitating refinancing in turn refusing to adopt a risky balance sheet lowers the return on equity the key ingredient is that monetary policy is non targeted the ex post benefits from a monetary bailout accrue in proportion to the number amount of leverage while the distortion costs are to a large extent fixed this insight has important consequences first banks choose to correlate their risk exposures second private borrowers may deliberately choose to increase their interest rate sensitivity following bad news about future needs for liquidity third optimal monetary policy is time inconsistent fourth macro prudential supervision is called for we characterize the optimal regulation which takes the form of a minimum liquidity requirement coupled with monitoring of the quality of liquid assets we establish the robustness of our insights when the set of

money liquidity and monetary policy in a market based financial system banking and capital market developments are inseparable and funding conditions are closely tied to fluctuations in the leverage of market based financial intermediaries offering a window on liquidity the balance sheet growth of broker dealers provides a sense of the availability of credit contractions of broker dealer balance sheets have tended to precede declines in real economic growth even before the current turmoil for this reason balance sheet quantities of market based financial intermediaries are important macroeconomic state variables for the conduct of monetary policy

in search for yield survey based evidence on bank risk taking abstract monetary policy can have an impact on economic and financial stability through the risk taking of banks falling interest rates might induce investment into risky activities this paper provides evidence on the link between monetary policy and bank risk taking we use a factor augmented vector autoregressive model favar for the us for the period 1997 2008 besides standard macroeconomic indicators we include factors summarizing information provided in the federal reserve s survey of terms of business lending stbl these data provide information on banks new loans as well as interest rates for different loan risk categories and different banking groups we identify a risk taking channel of monetary policy by distinguishing responses to monetary policy shocks across different types of banks and different loan risk categories following an expansionary monetary policy shock small domestic banks increase their exposure to risk large domestic banks do not change their risk exposure foreign banks take on more risk only in the mid 2000s when interest rates were too low for too long

the hazards of expert control chief risk officers and risky derivatives at the turn of the century regulators introduced policies to control bank risk taking many banks appointed chief risk officers cros yet bank holdings of new complex and untested financial derivatives subsequently soared why did banks expand use of new derivatives we suggest that cros encouraged the rise of new derivatives in two ways first we build on institutional arguments about the expert construction of compliance suggesting that risk experts arrived with an agenda of maximizing risk adjusted returns which led them to favor the derivatives second we build on moral licensing arguments to suggest that bank appointment of cros induced organizational licensing leading trading desk managers to reduce policing of their own risky behavior we further argue that ceos and fund managers bolstered or restrained derivatives use depending on their financial interests we predict that ceos favored new derivatives when their compensation rewarded risk taking but that both ceos and fund managers op

the effect of unconventional monetary policy on cross border bank loans evidence from an emerging market abstract we analyze the impact of quantitative easing by the federal reserve european central bank and bank of england on cross border credit flows relying on comprehensive loan level data we find that fed qe strongly boosts cross border credit granted to turkish banks by banks located in the us euro area and uk while ecb and boe qes work only moderately through banks in the ea and uk respectively in general qe works at short maturities across bank locations and loan currencies more strongly for weaker lenders and borrowers and may have resulted in maturity mismatches in turkish banks searching for yield 99 words

sooner or later timing of monetary policy with heterogeneous risk taking we analyze the effects and interactions of monetary policy tools that differ in terms of their timing and their targeting in a model with heterogeneous agents more productive agents endogenously expose themselves to higher interim liquidity risk by borrowing and investing more two inefficiencies impair the transmission of monetary policy an investment and a hoarding inefficiency heterogeneous agents respond disparately to ex ante conventional and ex post unconventional monetary policy however we show that the two policies are equivalent due to the endogeneity of hoarding in contrast targeted interventions such as discount window lending can alleviate both inefficiencies at the same time

monetary policy bank leverage and financial stability abstract this paper shows that with limited liability banks lever up excessively to finance new loans lower monetary policy rates can worsen or reduce these incentives depending on the size of the shock when equity financing is ruled out when this constrained is relaxed but the bank faces costly dividend adjustment lower monetary policy rates always worsen risk taking incentives and the effect is persistent the reason is that costly dividend adjustment lowers the opportunity cost of lending in this model capital requirements are closer to the source of the distortion and thus work better than loan to value caps in reducing excessive risk taking

the interest rate pass through in the euro area during the sovereign debt crisis abstract we investigate the pass through of monetary policy to bank lending rates in the euro area during the sovereign debt crisis in comparison to the pre crisis period we make the following contributions first we use a factor augmented vector autoregression which allows us to assess the responses of a large number of country specific interest rates and spreads second we analyze the effects of monetary policy on the components of the interest rate pass through which reflect banks funding risk including sovereign risk and markups charged by banks over funding costs third we not only consider conventional but also unconventional monetary policy we find that while the transmission of conventional monetary policy to bank lending rates has not changed with the crisis the composition of the pass through has changed specifically expansionary conventional monetary policy lowered sovereign risk in peripheral countries and longer term bank funding risk in peripheral and core countries during the crisis but has been unable to lower banks markups this was not or not as much the case prior to the crisis unconventional monetary policy helped decreasing lending rates mainly due to large shocks rather than a strong propagation

micro level transmission of monetary policy shocks the trading book channel abstract we open the black box of the monetary policy transmission mechanism with a granular model that considers the balance sheet composition and network relationships of each economic agent though there are several well documented channels through which monetary policy operates we focus on the overlooked trading book channel which arises because of adjustments in the accounting value of trading book exposures on banks balance sheets that have to be marked to market when interest rates change variations in banks net worth due these adjustments are used as input to a network model that incorporates the financial and corporate sectors the framework permits us to determine the effects of interest rate changes on every bank and firm in the economy and any second round contagion effects in the short run we apply the model to a comprehensive database of brazilian banks and firms from 2015 to 2020 we find that interest rate shocks affect more strongly financial stability in periods of monetary policy tightening we also find notable asymmetric effects of positive and negative interest rate shocks in the brazilian economy with positive interest rate shocks affecting more financial stability finally our results also suggest a non linear relationship between interest rate changes and financial stability reinforcing the need to mitigate monetary policy shocks through interest rate smoothing and adequate communication and transparency to society

capital requirements monetary policy and aggregate bank lending theory and empirical evidence capital requirements linked solely to credit risk are shown to increase equilibrium credit rationing and lower aggregate lending the model predicts that the bank s decision to lend will cause an abnormal runup in the borrower s stock price and that this reaction will be greater the more capital constrained the bank i provide empirical support for this prediction the model explains the recent inability of the federal reserve to stimulate bank lending by increasing the money supply i show that increasing the money supply can either raise or lower lending when capital requirements are linked only to credit risk the motivation of this article is first to examine the impact of risk based capital requirements namely those that link mandatory capital to asset ratios for banks to their loans on aggregate bank lending these requirements called the basle capital rules or bis guidelines went into effect in march 1989 for banks in the leading industrialized nations these rules initially required banks to maintain capital equal to 7 25 percent of business and most consumer loans with the requirement increasing to 8 percent by the end of 1992 secondly i wish to understand the link between monetary policy and aggregate bank credit in the presence of risk based capital requirements my curiosity is sparked in part by two recent phenomena one is the experience of the u s economy which displayed sluggish growth during 1989 93 despite a monetary policy that attempted to spur bank lending and economic activity and the other is the striking decline in loans relative to security holdings mostly government bonds in the asset portfolios of u s

credit market competition and capital regulation market discipline for financial institutions can be imposed not only from the liability side as has often been stressed in the literature on the use of subordinated debt but also from the asset side this will be particularly true if good lending opportunities are in short supply so that banks have to compete for projects in such a setting borrowers may demand that banks commit to monitoring by requiring that they use some of their own capital in lending thus creating an asset market based incentive for banks to hold capital borrowers can also provide banks with incentives to monitor by allowing them to reap some of the benefits from the loans which accrue only if the loans are in fact paid off since borrowers do not fully internalize the cost of raising capital to the banks the level of capital demanded by market participants may be above the one chosen by a regulator even when capital is a relatively costly source of funds this implies that capital requirements may not be binding as recent evidence seems to indicate

imperfect competition risk taking and regulation in banking abstract we asses the welfare implications of banking competition under various deposit insurance regimes in a model of imperfect competition with social failure costs and where banks are subject to limited liability we study the links between competition for deposits and risk taking incentives and conclude that the welfare performance of the market and the appropriateness of alternative regulatory measures depend on the degree of rivalry and the deposit insurance regime specifically when competition is intense and the social failure costs high deposit rates are excessive both in a free market and with risk based insurance if insurance premiums are insensitive to risk then the same is true even if there is no social cost of failure we find also that in an uninsured market with nonobservable portfolio risk or with flat premium deposit insurance deposit regulation rate regulation or deposit limits and direct asset restrictions are complementary tools to improve welfare in an uninsured market with observable portfolio risk or with risk based insurance deposit regulation may be a sufficient instrument to improve welfare

social benefit expenditures and stagflation evidence from the united states abstractstagflation refers to the terrible economic malaise associated with declining growth hyperinflation and high unemployment unlike previous cost push explanations such as an overheated labour market and oil prices this article suggests that social benefit expenditures are a potential cause of stagflation we investigate the impact of social benefit expenditures on stagflation in the u s over the 1950 2014 period by employing an autoregressive distributed lag ardl bounds testing approach to cointegration which was developed by pesaran shin and smith the influence of social benefit expenditures on economic growth and inflation and unemployment rates is estimated the empirical results from the u s suggest that economic growth responds negatively to social benefit expenditures while inflation and unemployment rates are both positively associated with social benefit expenditures thus government led rigid welfare could contribute to stagflation in the u s instead of increasing people s hap

bank valuation and accounting discretion during a financial crisis this paper shows that banks overstate the value of distressed assets and their regulatory capital during the us mortgage crisis real estate related assets are overvalued in banks balance sheets especially those of bigger banks compared to the market value of these assets banks with large exposure to mortgage backed securities also provision less for bad loans furthermore distressed banks use discretion over the classification of mortgage backed securities to inflate their books our results indicate that banks balance sheets offer a distorted view of the financial health of the banks and provide suggestive evidence of regulatory forbearance and noncompliance with accounting rules

monetary and macroprudential policy coordination among multiple equilibria abstract the notion of a tradeoff between output and financial stabilization is based on monetary macroprudential models with unique equilibria using a game theory setup this paper shows that multiple equilibria lead to qualitatively different results monetary and macroprudential authorities have tools that impose externalities on each other s objectives one of the tools macroprudential is coarse while the other monetary policy is unconstrained we find that this asymmetry always leads to multiple equilibria and show that under economically relevant conditions the authorities prefer different equilibria giving the unconstrained authority a weight on helping the constrained authority leaning against the wind now has unexpected effects the relation between this weight and the difficulty of coordinating is hump shaped and therefore a small degree of leaning worsens outcomes on both authorities objectives

bailouts and systemic insurance abstract we revisit the link between bailouts and bank risk taking bailout expectations create moral hazard increase bank risk taking however when an individual bank s success depends on both its effort and the overall stability of the banking system bailouts that shield banks from contagion may increase their incentives to invest prudently and so reduce bank risk taking this systemic insurance effect is more important when bailout rents are low while contagion risk is high the optimal policy is then to make bailouts not difficult but effective associated with lower rents we further show that besides better bank resolution a powerful means to reduce bailout rents is higher ex ante bank capital since it implies a larger bank equity cushion that can be expropriated in a resolution this highlights an important complementarity between bank capital regulation and bailouts as tools to enhance financial stability

are the gains from international portfolio diversification exaggerated the influence of downside risk in bear markets the fundamental rationale for international portfolio diversification is that it expands the opportunities for gains from portfolio diversification beyond those that are available through domestic securities however if international stock market correlations are higher than normal in bear markets then international diversification will fail to yield the promised gains just when they are needed most we evaluate the extent to which observed correlations to monthly returns in bear calm and bull markets are captured by three popular bivariate distributions 1 the normal 2 the restricted garch 1 1 of j p morgan s riskmetrics and 3 the student t with four degrees of freedom observed correlations during calm and bull markets are unexceptional compared to these models in contrast observed correlations during bear markets are significantly higher than predicted higher than normal correlations during extreme market downturns result in monthly returns to equal weighted portfolios of domestic and international stocks that are on average more than two percent lower than those predicted by the normal distribution if the extent of non normality during bear markets persists over time then a us investor allocating assets into foreign markets might want to allocate more assets into foreign markets with near normal correlation profiles and avoid markets with higher than normal bear market co movements 2002 published by elsevier science ltd

real interest rates leverage and bank risk taking do low interest rate environments lead to greater bank risk taking we show that when banks can adjust their capital structures reductions in real interest rates lead to greater leverage and higher risk for any downward sloping loan demand function however if the capital structure is fixed the effect depends on the degree of leverage following a decrease in interest rates well capitalized banks increase risk while highly levered banks may decrease it if loan demand is linear or concave further the capitalization cutoff depends on the degree of bank competition this effect therefore should vary across countries and over time

monetary policy as financial stability regulation this paper develops a model that speaks to the goals and methods of financialstability policies there are three main points first from a normative perspective the model defines the fundamental market failure to be addressed namely that unregulated private money creation can lead to an externality in which intermediaries issue too much short term debt and leave the system excessively vulnerable to costly financial crises second it shows how in a simple economy where commercial banks are the only lenders conventional monetary policy tools such as open market operations can be used to regulate this externality while in more advanced economies it may be helpful to supplement monetary policy with other measures third from a positive perspective the model provides an account of how monetary policy can influence bank lending and real activity even in a world where prices adjust frictionlessly and there are other transactions media besides bank created money that are outside the control of the central bank

collateralized borrowing and risk taking at low interest rates abstract empirical evidence suggests financial intermediaries increase risky investments when interest rates are low we develop a model consistent with this observation and ask whether the risks undertaken exceed the social optimum interest rate policy affects risk taking in the model through two opposing channels first low policy rates make riskier assets more attractive than safe bonds second low policy rates reduce the amount of safe bonds available for collateralized borrowing in interbank markets the calibrated model features excessive risk taking at the optimal policy however at low policy rates collateral constraints tighten and risk taking does not exceed the social optimum

monetary policy and long run systemic risk taking as an extension to the literature on the risk taking channel of monetary policy this paper studies the existence of a systemic risk taking channel srtc in the eurozone through an original macroeconomic perspective based on causality measures because the srtc is effective after an incubation period we make a distinction between short and long term causality following the methodology proposed by dufour and taamouti 2010 we find that causality from monetary policy to systemic risk while not significant in the very short term robustly represents 75 to 100 of the total dependence between the two variables in the long run reverse causality is rejected systemic risk did not influence the policy of the european central bank before the global financial crisis however central banks must be aware that a too loose monetary policy stance may be conducive to a build up of systemic risk

unnatural selection perverse incentives and the misallocation of credit in japan we examine the misallocation of credit in japan associated with the perverse incentives faced by banks to provide additional credit to the weakest firms firms are more likely to receive additional bank credit if they arein poor financial condition because troubled japanese banks have an incentive to allocate credit to severely impaired borrowers in order to avoid the realization of losses on their own balance sheets this evergreening behavior is more prevalent among banks that have reported capital ratios close to the required minimum and is compounded by the incentives arising from extensive corporate affiliations

identifying the risk taking channel of monetary transmission and the connection to economic activity abstract i use loan level data from the syndicated loan market in the u s to investigate how monetary policy affects banks sensitivity to risk using loan level data and banks sensitivity to risk enables me to identify the risk taking channel and disentangle it from other monetary channels i show that banks change their behavior toward risk following changes in monetary policy where loose monetary policy reduces banks sensitivity to risk i then provide evidence for the significant contribution of risk taking shocks and changes in banks risk taking behavior to economic outcomes and business cycle fluctuations the paper s primary contribution is in providing new loan level evidence for the existence of the risk taking channel in the u s as well as a possible link between the risk taking channel and business cycle fluctuations

risk taking spillovers of u s monetary policy in the global market for u s dollar corporate loans abstract we study the effects of u s interest rates and other factors on risk taking in the global market for u s dollar syndicated term loans we find that before the global financial crisis both u s and non u s lenders originated ex ante riskier loans to non u s borrowers in response to a decline in short term u s interest rates and after the crisis in response to a decline in longer term u s interest rates after the crisis this behavior was more prominent for shadow banks and less prominent for banks with relatively low capital separately before the crisis lenders originated less risky loans in response to u s dollar appreciation across the periods the responses to risk appetite and economic uncertainty varied to the extent that the federal reserve affects u s interest rates we provide evidence of global risk taking spillovers of u s monetary policy which are important but not dominant factors for risk taking in the market

what can we learn from the implementation of monetary and macroprudential policies a systematic literature review the emergence of macroprudential policies implemented by central banks as a means of promoting financial stability has raised many questions regarding the interaction between monetary and macroprudential policies given the limited number of studies available this paper sheds light on this issue by providing a critical and systematic review of the literature to this end we divide the theoretical and empirical studies into two broad channels of borrowers consisting of the cost of funds and the collateral constraint and financial intermediaries consisting of risk taking and payment systems in spite of the existing ambiguity surrounding coordination issues between monetary and macroprudential policies it is argued that monetary policy alone is not sufficient to maintain macroeconomic and financial stability hence macroprudential policies are needed to supplement monetary in addition we find that the role of the exchange rate is critical in the implementation of monetary and macroprudential policies in emerging markets while volatile capital flows pose another challenge in so far as how the arrangement of monetary and macroprudential policies varies across countries key theoretical and policy implications have been identified

credit booms and macrofinancial stability this paper explores several questions about credit booms and busts when do credit booms occur when do they end up in busts and when do they not what are the implications for different policies if curbing credit growth and or mitigating the associated risks is an objective we find that credit booms are often associated with financial reform and economic growth they also tend to be more frequent in fixed exchange rate regimes only one in three credit boom episodes are followed by a financial crisis these booms tend to be larger and last longer macroprudential tools have at times proven effective in containing booms and more often in limiting the consequences of busts due to the buffers they helped to build

the risk taking channel of monetary policy transmission in the euro area abstract in this paper we provide evidence for a risk taking channel of monetary policy transmission in the euro area that works through the relaxation of lending standards for borrowers our dataset covers the period 2003q1 2016q2 and includes in addition to the standard variables for real gdp growth inflation and the monetary policy stance indicators of bank lending standards and bank lending margins based on vector autoregressive models with i recursive identification and ii sign restrictions we show that banks react aggressively to an expansionary monetary policy shock by lowering their lending standards the banks efforts to keep their lending margin stable however are not successful as we detect a significant compression we document these findings for the euro area as a whole and for its individual member states in particular banks in the netherlands portugal spain and ireland lowered their lending standards after expansionary monetary policy shocks the compression of the lending margin is most pronounced in the five crisis countries greece ireland italy portugal and spain

negative monetary policy rates and systemic banks risk taking evidence from the euro area securities register we show that negative monetary policy rates induce systemic banks to reach for yield for identification we exploit the introduction of negative deposit rates by the european central bank in june 2014 and a novel securities register for the 26 largest euro area banking groups banks with more customer deposits are negatively affected by negative rates as they do not pass negative rates to retail customers in turn investing more in securities especially in those yielding higher returns effects are stronger for less capitalized banks private sector financial and nonfinancial securities and dollar denominated securities affected banks also take higher risk in loans

bank liquidity interbank markets and monetary policy a major lesson of the recent financial crisis is that the interbank lending market is crucial for banks facing large uncertainty regarding their liquidity needs this paper studies the efficiency of the interbank lending market in allocating funds we consider two different types of liquidity shocks leading to di erent implications for optimal policy by the central bank we show that when confronted with a distribu tional liquidity shock crisis that causes a large disparity in the liquidity held among banks the central bank should lower the interbank rate this view implies that the traditional tenet prescribing the separation between prudential regulation and mon etary policy should be abandoned in addition we show that during an aggregate liquidity crisis central banks should manage the aggregate volume of liquidity two di erent instruments interest rates and liquidity injection are therefore required to cope with the two di erent types of liquidity shocks finally we show that failure to cut interest rates during a crisis erodes financial stability by increasing the risk of bank runs