bank competition and ecb s monetary policy in a model of oligopolistic competition in the banking sector we analyse how the monetary policy rule chosen by the central bank can influence the incentive of banks to set high interest rates on loans over the business cycle we exploit the basic model to investigate the potential impact of emu implementation on collusion among banks in particular we consider the possible eaects of the european central bank s policy criteria with regard to the cost of credit in national markets 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

clustering and competition in asset markets economists financial commentators regulatory agencies and the legal community have recently criticized the nasdaq stock market inc because there is greater clustering of stock quotations on even eighths on nasdaq than on the new york stock exchange or the american stock exchange a phenomenon which critics attribute to collusion or some other defect in nasdaq market structure however as this article demonstrates clustering occurs in varying degrees in many other incontestably competitive financial markets including the nyse the amex the london stock exchange the london gold market and the international foreign exchange market this article provides a competitive theory of clustering that emphasizes the effect of uncertainty the size of transactions volatility and the informational and transactional roles of quotations on the degree of clustering in addition the article examines how market structure can affect the degree of clustering and considers the relation between clustering spread

third market reforms the overlooked goal of the sec s order handling rules in 1997 the securities and exchange commission enacted significant reforms in u s markets several studies document that the new order handling rules increased competition for nasdaq stocks but the reforms were designed with an additional goal in mind to increase quote competition for the trading of nyse listed securities on nasdaq i e third market trading an evaluation of the reforms in the third market indicates that they did not achieve this objective instead both quote quality and quoting frequency were diminished due primarily to elimination of the excess spread rule this suggests that more significant changes are needed to increase inter exchange competition

one security many markets determining the contributions to price discovery when homogeneous or closely linked securities trade in multiple markets it is often of interest to determine where price discovery the incorporation of new information occurs this article suggests an econometric approach based on an implicit unobservable efficient price common to all markets the information share associated with a particular market is defined as the proportional contribution of that market s innovations to the innovation in the common efficient price applied to quotes for the thirty dow stocks the technique suggests that the preponderance of the price discovery takes place at the new york stock exchange nyse a median 92 7 percent information share although most of the classic paradigms in market microstructure concern a security that trades in a single centralized market such situations are becoming increasingly rare in practice fragmentation the dispersal of trading in a security to multiple sites has emerged as a dominant institutional trend this process is of concern to financial economists and regulators because price information and price discovery the impounding of new information into the security price arguably the most important products of a security market have many attributes of public goods as the process of fragmentation accelerates it may be important to determine where the price information and price discovery are being produced 1 this paper suggests a practical econometric approach to this problem the technique is illustrated with an application to u s equity markets many stocks listed on the new york stock exchange nyse trade concurrently on the regional exchanges and the national association of securities dealers national market system nasd nms since a share of ibm stock is the same security whether purchased on the midwest or pacific exchange this is a particularly clear instance of multiple markets nevertheless the expres

the demand for beer wine and spirits a survey of the literature the demand for alcohol literature is vast and much conflicting information about the nature of the demand for alcoholic beverages has been published this paper presents a survey of the literature and then uses the technique of meta regression analysis to establish insights into the nature of the demand for beer wine and spirits unlike previous meta studies of the demand for alcoholic beverages this study adjusts for the precision of each elasticity estimate the analysis presented suggests reported elasticity estimates will be influenced by such factors as estimation technique data frequency and time period under consideration with respect to time the findings suggest that the demand for alcoholic beverages has become less inelastic since the mid 1950s and that the income elasticity has been falling since the mid 1960s the analysis also found support for the idea that alcohol as a commodity group is a necessity and that consumers respond to price discounting with inventory behaviour rather than true substitution behaviour little support is found for the idea that the demand for alcoholic beverages varies fundamentally across most countries although wine may be an exception language en

capital budgeting and delegation abstract as part of our ongoing research into capital budgeting processes as responses to decentralized information and incentive problems we focus in this paper on when a level of a managerial hierarchy will delegate the allocation of capital across projects and time to the level below it in our model delegation is a way to save on costly investigation of proposed projects therefore it is more extensive the larger are the costs of such investigations this delegation takes advantage of the fact that the lower level manager s preferences are assumed to be similar though not identical to those of the higher level

capital budgeting in multidivision firms information agency and incentives author s bernardo antonio e cai hongbin luo jiang abstract we consider a firm with two investment projects divisions each run by a manager who can provide i unverifiable information about the quality of either or both projects and ii unverifiable access to valuable resources that can enhance the cash flows of either or both projects we then examine the extent to which capital allocation and managerial compensation schemes can be designed jointly to mitigate the information and incentive problems within the firm we find that the firm underinvests in capital in both projects relative to the first best level optimal managerial profit sharing increases in the quality of both projects and managers underinvest resources in both projects interestingly the underinvestment problem in one project is less severe when the other project is higher quality this effect will be stronger when the moral hazard problem is more acute and project returns are more highly correlated we also predict that multi division firms will invest more less than single division firms when other divisions in the firm perform well poorly

internal capital markets and the competition for corporate resources this article examines the role of corporate headquarters in allocating scarce resources to competing projects in an internal capital market unlike a bank headquarters has control rights that enable it to engage in winner picking the practice of actively shifting funds from one project to another by doing a good job in the winner picking dimension headquarters can create value even when it cannot help at all to relax overall firm wide credit constraints the model implies that internal capital markets may sometimes function more efficiently when headquarters oversees a small and focused set of projects this article analyzes the process by which internal capital markets channel limited resources to different uses inside a company in so doing it seeks to address two related sets of questions first what is the fundamental economic rationale for creating an internal capital market that is under what circumstances can it make sense to combine several technologically distinct projects under one roof and have them seek funding from corporate headquarters as opposed to setting them up as stand alone companies that each raise external financing on their own second given this rationale what is the optimal size and scope of an internal capital market should headquarters be involved in funding a large number of projects or just a few and should these projects be unrelated to one another or in similar lines of business the answers to both sets of questions flow from the insight that in a credit constrained setting where not all positive npv projects can be financed headquarters can create value by actively reallocating scarce funds across projects for example the cash flow generated by one division s activities may be taken and spent on investment in another division where the returns are higher or alternatively one division s assets may be used as collateral to raise financing that is then diverted to the other division simply put individual projects must compete for the scarce funds and headquarters job is to pick the winners and losers in this competition

minimum price variations discrete bid ask spreads and quotation sizes exchange minimum price variation regulations create discrete bid ask spreads if the minimum quotable spread exceeds the spread that otherwise would be quoted spreads will be wide and the number of shares offered at the bid and ask may be large a cross sectional discrete spread model is estimated by using intraday stock quotation spread frequencies the results are used to project 1 16 spread usage frequencies given a 1 16 tick projected changes in quotation sizes and in trade volumes are obtained from regression models for stocks priced under 10 the models predict spreads would decrease 38 percent quotation sizes would decrease 16 percent and daily volume would increase 34 percent article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

dalton improving indirect tax reform a tax reform is dalton improving if it improves social welfare for all possible social welfare functions that conform to hugh dalton s principle of transfers according to this principle there exists a prior social ranking of households and a transfer is approved if it it distributes from high ranking rich to low ranking poor households without altering the ranking itself in this paper the authors develop a procedure for identifying marginal dalton improving reforms in the context of indirect taxation the methodology is illustrated using data on excise taxes in the united kingdom copyright 1995 by american economic association

fragmentation versus consolidation of securities trading evidence from the operation of rule 19c 3 stock exchanges defend their rules requiring members to trade listed stocks on an exchange floor as a means of achieving consolidation of trading which it is argued minimizes trading costs to investors by virtue of the securities and exchange commission s rule 19c 3 however these exchange rules cannot apply to stocks newly listed after april 26 1979 the objective of the securities and exchange commission rule was to end what was viewed as restraint of desirable competition that would more than compensate for any cost saving resulting from consolidation by comparing the cost of trading measured by bid ask spreads and returns variance for the two distinct groups of stocks those listed before april 26 1979 and those listed after we test these competing views we find that rule 19c 3 has not caused any reduction in spreads but may have caused an increase and has had no effect on returns variance

can socialism in internal capital markets occur in the absence of managerial rent seeking socialism in internal capital markets sicm is the phenomenon whereby multi division firms underinvest in high profit segments and overinvest in low profit segments this article modifies and extends the scharfstein and stein 2000 model that explains sicm the major modification is to abstract from rent seeking behaviour a central ingredient that is used by most sicm models and has the side effect of overturning sicm when the underlying rent seeking game is slightly perturbed it is shown that when division managers private benefits are not exactly propotional to their division s production profit as assumed by scharfstein and stein 2000 sicm arises due to the ceo s incentive to extract gain from the trade of capital between his division managers by equalizing their marginal private benefits instead of accommodating rent seeking furthermore we show that diversification discounts exist increase in diversity and decrease in ceo ownership the results are robust to endogenizing the investors

does payment for order flow to your broker help or hurt you the presumption is that a broker executing a stock trade for a retail investor will get the investor the best possible price execution for the transaction in fact the broker often sells the retail investor s trade to an intermediary for cash payment the broker s motivation to generate dealer profits seems to overcome the broker s fiduciary responsibility to obtain the best execution price for the customer raising ethical questions purchasers and internalizers of order flow in the market may cause prices quoted on the nyse to deteriorate making all investors worse off

price discovery and the effects of fragmentation on market quality evidence from cypriot cross listed stocks using a novel high frequency data set we examine the contribution of greek trading to the price discovery process of a pair of cypriot blue chip cross listed stocks during overlapping trading hours additionally we investigate the effects of market fragmentation on the home market s quality as measured by microstructure based liquidity measures contrary to earlier studies from other markets our findings show that foreign stock exchanges can act as the leading contributors to price discovery and can concentrate the majority of trading activity and produce the lowest transaction costs our results also show that market fragmentation can lead to negative effects on market liquidity

option listing and stock returns abstract this article examines the effect of option introductions on the underlying stocks in addition to the price increase and volatility decrease that take place when new options are listed we obtain and explain the following new empirical results i an increase in the value of the market around the listing dates of new options ii an increase in the value of an industry index which excludes the optioned stocks iii the dissipation of the price and volatility effects in recent periods and iv the existence of an announcement effect in one subperiod of our sample and its dissipation in recent periods

internalization and stock price clustering finnish evidence abstract internalization the practice of brokers executing trades in house is a significant phenomenon in the helsinki stock exchange during the continuous trading session 97 5 upstairs market trades are internalized the corresponding figure for after hours upstairs market trades is 73 1 the prices of internalized trades are somewhat more clustered than the prices of other trades during the continuous trading session but they are not more clustered than the prices of negotiated trades in the after hours upstairs market this suggests that finnish brokers do not use a more discrete set of prices for internalized trades than for other upstairs trades

internal competition for corporate resources and incentives in teams invoking thefree rider problem in teams many observersfind profit sharing in large organizations puzzling because it should have negligible incentive effects we show that a firm can be decomposed into two separate teams whose outputs can be observed thenprofit sharing combined with competition between these two teamsfor internal resourcesfrequently solves thefree rider problem using this result we endogenize thefirm s organizational structure and show that in the presence of economies of scale small firms tend to organize as unita y firms while largefirms choose the multidivisional organizationalform

asymmetric information and options in an extension of the kyle 1985 model of continuous insider trading it is shown that asymmetric information can make it impossible to price options by arbitrage even when an option would appear to be redundant its introduction into the market can cause the volatility of the underlying asset to become stochastic this eliminates the potential for dynamically replicating the option the change in the price process of the asset reflects a change in the information transmitted by volume and prices when the option is traded article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

stock price clustering and discreteness stock prices cluster on round fractions clustering increases with price level and volatility and decreases with capitalization and transaction frequency clustering is pervasive price clustering will occur if traders use discrete price sets to simplify their negotiations exchange regulations require that most stocks be traded on eighths clustering on larger fractions will occur if traders choose to use discrete price sets based on quarters halves or whole numbers an econometric model of clustering is derived and estimated projections from the results suggest that traders would frequently use odd sixteenths when trading low price stocks if exchange regulations permitted trading on sixteenths article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

executive effort and selection of risky projects this article examines the incentives of executives to adopt risky projects the agency problem considered is that of motivating the executive to expend effort to generate information about the profitability of projects and to select the best project conditional upon the information that his effort generates we show that the executive and the principal will not always agree regarding which project is best we provide conditions under which this conflict of interest leads from the principal s perspective to either an underinvestment or an overinvestment in risky projects

does the specialist matter differential execution costs and intersecurity subsidization on the new york stock exchange this article tests for differences in execution costs among specialist firms for new york stock exchange listed securities execution cost differences provide a measure of the relative performance of specialist firms we find a substantial difference in effective spreads and order processing costs across specialist firms controlling for stock characteristics while economically significant the differences in execution costs between specialist firms are much smaller than the cross market differences reported by huang and stoll 1996 within a specialist firm there is a positive relation between order processing costs and trading activity that is consistent with the hypothesis that active stocks subsidize inactive stocks this article investigates whether differential execution costs exist across new york stock exchange nyse specialist firms and among stocks traded by the same specialist firm execution costs are paid by investors when completing a trade and are separate from the commission costs paid to a broker execution costs arise from the bid ask spread and the price impact of an investor s order on the future bid ask quote stoll 1985 shows that a transactionally efficient financial market which minimizes execution costs also minimizes the deviation in transaction prices from the true price of the underlying security evidence of differential execution costs for similar securities can be used to identify high cost and low cost liquidity providers on the nyse furthermore differential execution costs among stocks traded by the same specialist firm provide evidence consistent with a subsidy from actively traded to inactively traded stocks

optimal dynamic capital budgeting i study optimal design of a dynamic capital allocation process in an organization in which the division manager with empire building preferences privately observes the arrival and properties of investment projects and headquarters can audit projects at a cost under certain conditions a budgeting mechanism with threshold separation of financing is optimal headquarters 1 allocate a spending account to the manager and replenish it over time 2 set a threshold such that projects below it are financed from the account while projects above are financed fully by headquarters upon an audit further analysis studies when co financing of projects is optimal and how the size of the account depends on past performance of projects

financing a portfolio of projects this article shows that investors financing a portfolio of projects may use the depth of their financial pockets to overcome entrepreneurial incentive problems competition for scarce informed capital at the refinancing stage strengthens investors bargaining positions and yet entrepreneurs incentives may be improved because projects funded by investors with shallow pockets must have not only a positive net present value at the refinancing stage but one that is higher than that of competing portfolio projects our article may help understand provisions used in venture capital finance that limit a fund s initial capital and make it difficult to add more capital once the initial venture capital fund is raised jel g24 g31 venture capital finance takes place in an environment of severe informational asymmetries and incentive problems venture capitalists not only must assess the quality of investment proposals submitted to them for funding but once the initial funding has taken place they must also give the right incentives to the entrepreneurs and monitor the performance of the portfolio companies on an ongoing basis this article departs from most of the existing literature by explicitly recognizing that venture capitalists manage a portfolio of projects the need for portfolio management arises if the amount of capital both financial and human available to a venture capital fund is limited implying that venture capitalists must carefully choose which projects to allocate their scarce financial and human resources to 1 by staging their investments venture capitalists retain the right to deny capital infusions to particular

do competing specialists and preferencing dealers affect market quality we empirically demonstrate that the opportunities the boston stock exchange and the cincinnati stock exchange offer members to take the other side of their customers orders through affiliated market makers to internalize orders have little short run effect on posted or effective bid ask spreads this is true despite substantial movement of order flow away from the new york stock exchange when trading under one of these regional stock exchange programs begins these results contrast with the adverse effects of market fragmentation and internalization predicted by some theoretical market microstructure analyses and the popular financial press article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

competition among markets the repeal of rule 390 abstract the new york stock exchange repealed its rule 390 on may 8 2000 the rule disallowed exchange members from trading stocks listed prior to april 26 1979 outside of an exchange we examine the implications of the rule s repeal on the competition for order flow as well as on measures of market quality such as spreads depth and price improvement for stocks impacted by the rule we use a second sample of stocks not subject to rule 390 rule 19c 3 stocks to control for market wide trends we have three important findings 1 quoted spreads decrease by about 18 for rule 390 stocks three times more than the reduction for rule 19c 3 stocks 2 effective spreads do not change and 3 the nyse lost little market share even in smaller trades that were supposed to migrate following the repeal our results indicate a paradigm shift in the way the nyse specialists make a market prior to the repeal the specialists set wider quotes but provided extensive price improvement following the repeal the specialists set tighter quotes with lesser price improvement possibilities we believe that this shift is a strategic response by the specialists to retain market share not by improving market quality but by making order flow internalization and payment for order flow less profitable as a result competition improves market quality but not in the way we would generally expect

is there a link between alcohol consumption and the level of poverty abstractin many developing countries in addition to household income there are a number of other socio economic determinants of poverty one such hidden socio economic factor is alcohol consumption and some studies argue that there is a link between alcohol consumption and poverty the main aim of this study is to measure the effects of alcohol consumption on the level of poverty in a systematic way using sri lanka as a case study this article demonstrates that the consumption of various types of alcoholic beverages particularly the illegal beverages has a significant positive association with the level of poverty the findings of this study suggest that in sri lanka the consumption of illegal alcoholic beverages increases the likelihood of being in a poor household by 2 3 the results of this study also find that households who are characterized as nonpoor but are just above the poverty line behave more like the poor rather than the nonpoor in terms of alcohol consumption some of the conclusio

why the npv criterion does not maximize npv this article presents a theory of capital allocation that shows how the use of net present value npv as an investment criterion leads to inefficient capital budgeting outcomes and how this criterion may be dominated by other capital budgeting criteria like the internal rate of return and the profitability index the essence of our theory is rooted in the mainstream paradigm of corporate finance while firms use npv to measure the addition to firm value from prospective projects classical informational and agency considerations prevent it from implementing the optimal capital budgeting outcome our theory also identifies conditions when alternative criteria should be used finally we characterize when direct monitoring through capital budgeting dominates compensation contracts in alleviating the agency problem copyright 2004 oxford university press

the initiation and withdrawal of odd eighth quotes among nasdaq stocks an empirical analysis christie and schultz 1994 journal of finance 49 1813 1840 nd that market makers in many active nasdaq stocks avoid odd eighth quotes this paper studies 67 58 nasdaq stocks whose market makers initiate withdraw odd eighth quotes these regime shifts are often completed within the span of a day and coincide with dramatic changes in dollar percentage and e ective spreads in most cases we are unable to identify comparable changes in the costs of making markets we do identify long run changes in average prices that may provide a partial explanation however we also nd

quote based competition and trade execution costs in nyse listed stocks abstract this study examines quotations order routing and trade execution costs for seven markets that compete for orders in large capitalization nyse listed stocks the competitiveness of quote updates from each market varies with measures of the profitability of attracting additional order and with volatility and inventory measures the probability of a trade executing on each market increases when the market posts competitive quotes execution costs for non nyse trades when the local market posts competitive non competitive quotes are virtually the same substantially exceed costs for matched nyse trades collectively these results imply a significant degree of quote based competition for order flow and are consistent with off nyse liquidity providers using competitive quotations to signal when they are prepared to give better than normal trade executions

high frequency trading competition we analyze trading dynamics as successive high frequency trading hft firms begin to trade stocks in an equity market entrants compete with incumbents for volume and there is crowding out

experimentation in financial markets in this paper we use a unique data set on the italian interdealer bond market to empirically estimate the process of strategic experimentation the results show how the information generated in the process of interdealer trading affects the incentive to experiment upon receipt of an order dealers deliberately engage in trade with other dealers either to exploit the information contained in the order they receive or if they are uncertain about its quality to assess it by actively experimenting with other dealers we therefore identify hiding and experimenting as main types of dealer strategies

exact consumer s surplus and deadweight loss consumer s surplus is a widely used tool in applied welfare economics both economic theorists and cost benefit analysis often use consumer s surplus despite its somewhat dubious reputation the basic idea is to evaluate the value to a consumer or his willingness to pay for a change in price of a good from say pricep to pricep because price changes affect consumer welfare an evaluation of this effect is often a key input to public policy decisions yet consumer s surplus is probably the most controversial of widely used economic concepts both paul samuelson and ian little conclude that the economics profession would be better off without it it is my feeling of the situation that substantial agreement exists on the correct quantities to be measured the amount the consumer would pay or would need to be paid to be just as well off after the price change as he was before the price change the quantities correspond to john hicks compensating variation measures an alternative measure which takes ex post price change utility as the basis of comparison is hicks equivalent variation the controversy arises in the measurement of these quantities the usual measurement procedure is to use the area to the left of the marshallian market demand curve between two price levels jules dupuit originated this measure of welfare change and alfred marshall and hicks derived appropriate conditions for its use the primary condition for the area to the left of the demand curve to correspond to the compensating variation is to have constant marginal utility of income marshall gave this condition and if it holds the same quantity will be derived as the area to the left of the compensated hicksian demand curve this area to the left of the compensated demand curve is exactly what the compensating variation and equivalent variation measure thus the constant marginal utility of income is a sufficient condition for marshallian consumer s surplus to be equal to hicks consumer s surplus in this case arnold harberger s plea to use the welfare triangle as one half times the product of the price change times the quantity change to measure deadweight loss corresponds to the correct theoretical amount of welfare change in a recent paper robert willig derives bounds for the percentage difference between the correct measure of either the compensating or equivalent variation and the marshallian measure derived form the market demand curve his bounds which depend on the income elasticity of demand for the single good in the region of price change being considered as well as the proportion of the consumer s income spent on the good demonstrate that the marshallian consumer s surplus is often a good approximation to hicks consumer s surplus the fact that the proportion of the consumer s income spent matters as well as the income elasticity was first pointed out by harold hotelling willig contends that the approximation error will be less than the errors involved in estimating the demand curve thus he hopes to remove the need for apology that applied economists often need to give to theorists who remark on the inappropriateness of using marshallian consumer s surplus to measure welfare change however in this paper i show that for the case primarily considered by willig of a single price change which is also the situation in which consumer s surplus is often used in applied work no approximation is necessary professor of economics massachusetts institute of technology and research associate national bureau of economic research i would like to thank peter diamond erwin diewert daniel mcfadden robert merton robert solow hal varian joel yellin and the referees for help and comments research support from the national science foundation is acknowledged the reason that we still have two rather than one of samuelson s six measures of consumer s surplus arises from an index number problem of the correct basis for the welfare comparison i will give both measures but plan to concentrate on the compensating variation

competition and collusion in dealer markets this article develops a game theoretic model to analyze market makers intertemporal pricing strategies we show that dealers who adopt noncooperative pricing strategies may set bid ask spreads above competitive levels this form of implicit collusion differs from explicit collusion where dealers cooperate to fix prices price discreteness or asymmetric information are not required for collusion to occur rather institutional arrangements that restrict access to the order flow are important determinants of the ability to collude because they reduce dealers incentives to compete on price public policy efforts to increase interdealer competition should focus on such restrictions

competing with the new york stock exchange research on information economics and securities markets dating back to stigler journal of political economy 69 1961 213 225 journal of business 37 1964 117 142 argues that trading will tend to centralize in major market centers such as the new york stock exchange nyse the nyse s recent mergers with archipelago and euronext bring questions about the viability and effects of competition between stock exchanges to the policy forefront we examine the largely forgotten but unparalleled episode of competition between the nyse and the consolidated stock exchange of new york consolidated from 1885 to 1926 the consolidated averaged 23 of nyse volume for approximately forty years by operating a second market for the most liquid securities that traded on the big board our results suggest that nyse bid ask spreads fell by more than 10 when the consolidated began to trade nyse stocks and subsequently increased when the consolidated ceased operations the empirical analysis suggests that this historical episode of stock market competition improved consumer welfare by an amount equivalent to us 9 6 billion today

does order preferencing matter 1we would like to thank david easley eugene kandel the referee g william schwert the editor participants at the dealer markets conference at ohio state university and an anonymous referee for helpful comments we gratefully acknowledge financial support from the johnson graduate school of management and the national science foundation 1 abstract this study examines how order preferencing affects the competitiveness and efficiency of laboratory financial markets we operationalize preferencing by allowing some dealers to execute a portion of the order flow by matching the most favorable quotes available increasing the proportion of order flow that is preferenced can increase bid ask spreads reduce the informational efficiency of prices and benefit dealers at the expense of liquidity traders preferencing has none of these effects however when two or more dealers are not receiving preferencing orders preferencing may significantly degrade market performance if preferencing arrangements affect all or virtually all dealers

empirical application of optimal commodity tax theory to taxation of alcoholic beverages this paper concerns the calculation of optimal taxes on commodities which contain a common externality generating component the first best solution is characterized by a form of marginal cost pricing with production costs increased according to the harm content of commodities valued at marginal external cost an application to finnish alcohol consumption data is made to indicate how the tradeoff between control and revenue requirements affects taxes by bootstrapping the estimates taxes are found to be less sensitive than compensated elasticities

intertemporal capital budgeting abstract this paper analyzes the optimal capital budgeting mechanism when divisional managers are privately informed about the arrival of future investment projects consistent with field study evidence an optimal allocation mechanism can include a stipulation that a capital request for discretionary investment will be declined with positive probability in the period after a significant investment was made even though this is ex post suboptimal the model derives a number of empirical predictions regarding capital budgeting and the investment of financially constrained firms

quotes order flow and price discovery the goal of this article is to examine the impact of 1975 congressional mandate to integrate the trading of nyse listed stocks the conclusions are most of the time the new york stock exchange nyse quote matches or determines the best displayed quote and the nyse is the most frequent initiator of quote changes non nyse markets attract a significant portion of their volume when they are posting inferior bids or offers indicating they obtain order flow for other reasons such as payment for order flow yet when a non nyse market does post a better bid or offer it does attract additional order flow

budget selection when agents compete abstract a principal selects a budget k of how many projects to fund within an organization and then consults n agents each of whom has private information about his own project s value after receiving cheap talk reports from the agents the principal decides which projects to implement subject to the budget and agents report on new i i d projects every period until the budget is exhausted when the budget is small relative to the number of agents each of whom are biased towards their own projects competition between agents degrades the quality of information conveyed in equilibrium and lowers the principal s payoff a larger budget induces less competition and therefore may be selected in order to extract more information from the agents even though this leads to some unprofitable projects being adopted in an extension i find that a policy of never allowing a funded agent to seek funding again increases payoffs compared to when the agent can always re seek funding

third market broker dealers cost competitors or cream skimmers this article compares the bid ask spread for new york stock exchange nyse listed securities before and after a major third market broker dealer bernard l madoff investment securities madoff begins to selectively purchase and execute orders in those securities tests reveal the quoted bid ask spread tightens when madoff enters the market furthermore trading costs as measured by the difference between the transaction price and the midpoint of the contemporaneous bid ask spread do not increase together these results suggest that the adverse selection problem associated with allowing agents to selectively execute orders in exchange listed securities may be economically insignificant

can transparent markets survive abstract this paper investigates whether transparent markets can survive when faced with direct competition from less transparent markets we first construct a game theoretic model in which in equilibrium the low transparency dealers capture early order flow and use the resulting informational advantage to quote narrower spreads and earn more profits than their more transparent competitors we then conduct a laboratory experiment that tests and supports all of these predictions a second experiment shows that most dealers choose to be of lower transparency when they are allowed to do so however the informational advantage of low transparency decreases as there are more such dealers while the high transparency dealers get increasing benefit from informed traders who attempt to broadcast deceptive trades as a result a small number of transparent dealers persist in our markets

antitrust and prices this study examines the effects of antitrust prosecution on prices charged by firms indicted for price fixing in a survey of 25 cases filed between 1973 and 1984 prices are found to gradually rise by about 7 percent over the 4 years following an indictment however the severity of penalties is negatively correlated with prices these two findings suggest either that penalties are too lenient or that prosecution is too broad penalizing economically efficient conspiracies along with those that are inefficient

does the limit order routing decision matter we examine the impact deciding to route limit orders away from the new york stock exchange nyse has on three dimensions of execution quality with methodologies controlling for market conditions and order submission strategies overall differences in limit order execution quality between regional stock exchanges and the nyse are small suggesting that the order routing decision may not affect retail limit order traders substantively conditioning on the distance between the limit order s price and prevailing quotes however reveals systematic differences in execution quality this implies that brokers can strategically route limit orders to improve retail limit order execution quality copyright 2002 oxford university press

preferencing internalization of order flow and tacit collusion evidence from experiments this paper examines preferencing arrangements and tacit collusion in laboratory asset markets in the experiments dealers may internalize by matching the best quote or by passing orders to the dealer posting the best quote although some markets were highly competitive several markets reached a collusive equilibrium with wide spreads and near complete intemalization of order flow the paper further examines the role of market transparency and passed order flow on quote setting behavior and suggests that these affect the mechanism leading to tacitly collusive equilibria

the persistence of dominant firm market share raising rivals cost on the new york stock exchange to explain the persistence of dominant new york stock exchange nyse market share in stock trading of listed securities from 1992 to 2002 we develop a dominant firm price leadership model and hypothesize that nyse specialists raised the costs of rival market makers the model predicts that natural and induced cost advantages will determine the nyse s market share vis a vis the regional exchanges electronic trading systems and nasdaq dealers empirically nyse market share increases with economies of scale and scope abnormal price volatility high asymmetric information and with trading practices that raise rivals costs such as failure to display limit orders that bettered the existing quotes

cross border listings and price discovery evidence from u s listed canadian stocks we examine the contribution of cross listings to price discovery for a sample of canadian stocks listed on both the toronto stock exchange tse and a u s exchange we nd that priceson the tse and u s exchange are cointegrated and mutually adjusting the u s share of price discovery ranges from 0 2 percent to 98 2 percent with an average of 38 1 percent the u s share is directly related to the u s share of trading and to the ratio of proportions of informative tradeson the u s exchange and the tse and inversely related to the ratio of bid ask spreads with the enhanced globalization of nancial markets the number of non u s rms cross listing shares on a u s exchange has substantially increased attracting non u s listings is now a top priority of the u s stock exchanges at the end of 2000 420 non u s rmswere listed on the new york stock exchange nyse the number of foreign rmslisted on nasdaq waseven higher the popularity of international cross listings has prompted many academic studies on the topic 1 most of these studies focus on the bene ts of international cross listings including the reduced cost of capital and the enhanced liquidity of a rm s stock studiessuch asalexander eun and janakiramanan 1987 1988 and foerster and karolyi 1993 suggest that the cost of capital declines because the portion of the risk premium that compensates for cross border investment barriers dissipates miller 1999 and foerster and karolyi 1999 propose increased investor recognition as another possible explanation several studies examine changes in trading volume and costs due to international cross listing foerster and karolyi 1998 nd that the bid ask spreads in canada decrease after the cross listing of canadian stocks in the united states domowitz glen and madhavan 1998 suggest that the impact of cross listing is complex and depends on the degree of quote transparency that is the extent to which price information is observable in the two markets smith and so anos 1997 examine if cross listing is a zerosum game with increased trading in the united states being oiset by reduced

why nasdaq market makers avoid odd eighth quotes recent studies argue that implicit collusion explains the tendency of nasdaq market makers to avoid odd eighth price quotes this paper focuses on the role that preference trading plays in determining quoted spreads under the postulated effects of preference trading an analysis of the relation between spreads and price fractions explains the paucity of odd eighth quotes on nasdaq empirical results from a comprehensive data set show that exogenous economic characteristics explain the distribution of price fractions across securities and illustrate the stability of that distribution over time these results contradict empirical results offered as support for the collusion hypothesis

stock market quality in the presence of a traded option we use an economic experiment to examine the implications of asymmetric information for linkages between a stock and a traded option we find the presence of the option splits price discovery across markets and changes the process by which conditional expectations are updated the time series properties of the stock price depend directly on the intrinsic value of the option when the intrinsic value of the option is positive informational efficiency is higher in the market for the stock and volatility is lower we provide evidence that the introduction of an option improves market quality in the underlying asset

do investors prefer round stock prices evidence from israeli ipo auctions abstract we find round number clustering in orders submitted by investors in israeli ipo auctions explanations offered for price clustering such as dealer collusion or implicit agreement to simplify negotiations cannot explain price clustering in this market therefore this is direct evidence that investors prefer round numbers

an empirical study of the effect of rule 19c 3 the extent to which all orders for common stocks should be consolidated that is sent to a single marketplace and the effect of consolidation on competition in the securities markets have been the subject of much debate in the past quarter century this debate has focused on offboard trading restrictions for member firms for example new york stock exchange nyse rule 390 and american stock exchange amex rule 5 and on the institution of appropriate intermarket linkages for example the consolidated transactions tape the consolidated quotations system and the intermarket trading system while the securities and exchange commission sec has attempted to promote competition in the securities markets the results of its efforts are uncertain consequently the consolidation fragmentation debate continues in this article we examine a very specific case in which the sec tried to increase the degree of competition in market making rule 19c 3 allowed off board trading of nyse listed stocks by exchange members as we will show this rule had both beneficial and adverse effects section i describes rule 19c 3 the environment which led to its introduction and the controversy surrounding it in section ii we examine the effect of rule 19c 3 on over the counter otc market making activity we find that for about 34 percent of the eligible stocks the introduction of exchange member market makers increased the total level and also the continuity of otc market making activity in section iii we find that rule 19c 3 has had a statistically significant effect in reducing percentage bidask spreads which ceteris paribus is desirable in section iv our analysis shows that rule 19c 3 has led to an increase in returns variance which ceteris paribus is undesirable finally our summary and conclusion are presented in section v

asymmetric information incentives and intrafirm resource allocation this paper considers the question how should a firm allocate a resource among divisions when the productivity of the resource in each division is known only to the division manager obviously if the divisions as represented by their managers are indifferent among various allocations of the resource the headquarters can simply request the division managers to reveal their private information on productivity knowing that the managers have no incentive to lie the resource allocation problem can then be solved under complete or at least symmetric information this aspect is a flaw in much of the recent literature on this topic i e there is nothing in the models considered which makes divisions prefer one allocation over another thus although in some cases elaborate allocation schemes are proposed and analyzed they are really unnecessary in the model we develop a division can produce the same output with less managerial effort if it is allocated more resources and effort is costly to the manager we further assume that this effort is unobservable by the headquarters so that it cannot infer divisional productivity from data on divisional output and managerial effort given these assumptions we seek an optimal resource allocation process our results show that certain types of transfer pricing schemes are optimal in particular if there are no potentially binding capacity constraints on production of the resource then an optimal process is for each division to choose a transfer price from a schedule announced by the headquarters division managers receive a fixed compensation minus the cost of the resource allocated to them at the chosen transfer price resources are allocated on the basis of the chosen transfer prices if there is a potentially binding constraint on resource production a somewhat more complicated but similar scheme is required

decision processes agency problems and information an economic analysis of capital budgeting procedures corporations use a variety of processes to allocate capital this article studies the benefits and costs of several common budget procedures from the perspective of a model with agency and information problems processes that delegate aspects of the decision to the agent result in too many projects being approved while processes in which the principal retains the right to reject projects cause the agent to strategically distort his information about project quality we show how the choice of a decision process depends on these two costs and specifically on severity of the agency problem quality of information and project risk capital budgeting would be easy in a world without agency and information problems the decision maker would simply calculate a project s irr and compare it to the cost of capital but in the real world those providing the funds for investment must rely on self interested agents to identify projects and provide information on expected returns as a result the quality of capital allocation depends on how effective the decision process is in attenuating agency problems and bringing forth accurate information corporations employ a variety of decision procedures in practice some decisions are fully delegated to division and plant managers typically expansion of an existing plant some decisions require approval of headquarters typically construction of a new plant and other decisions require approval conditional on the nature of the proposal such as when projects requiring more than 1 million go to headquarters while smaller projects can be approved locally 1

how do exchanges select stocks for option listing we investigate the factors influencing the selection of stocks for option listing exchanges tend to list options on stocks with high trading volume volatility and market capitalization but the relative effect of these factors has changed over time as markets have evolved we observe a shift from volume toward volatility after the moratorium on new listings ended in 1980 using control sample methodology designed to correct for the endogeneity of option listing we find no evidence that volatility declines with option introduction in contrast to previous studies that do not use control samples beginning with a handful of options listed on the chicago board options exchange cboe in april 1973 the exchange traded option market has since matured into a thriving industry in the united states options trade on five exchanges with contracts on stock indices exchange traded funds currencies interest rates and over 3 000 stocks total equities options volume traded on u s exchanges has risen from 5 7 million contracts in 1974 to over 722 million contracts in 2001 options clearing corporation http www optionsclearing com option markets have also thrived in western europe and other economies with well developed capital markets in this paper we study the listing choices made by option exchanges in the united states in an effort to better understand what determines the success of financial innovation and how derivative markets develop understanding this process has important implications for the continuing development of new securities markets domestically and globally in the new century innovation

tick size bid ask spreads and market structure we propose a link between market structure and the resulting market characteristics tick size bid ask spreads quote clustering and market depth we analyze transactions data of stocks traded on the london stock exchange a dealer market we conclude that market charateristics are endogenous to the market structure the london dealer market does not have a mandated tick size and it exhibits higher spreads higher quote clusterings and higher market depth than the nyse auction market clustering of trade prices is similar in london and new york

effects of market reform on the trading costs and depths of nasdaq stocks the relative merits of dealer versus auction markets have been a subject of significant and sometimes contentious debate on january 20 1997 the securities and exchange commission began implementing reforms that would permit the public to compete directly with nasdaq dealers by submitting binding limit orders additionally superior quotes placed by nasdaq dealers in private trading venues began to be displayed in the nasdaq market we measure the impact of these new rules on various measures of performance including trading costs and depths our results indicate that quoted and effective spreads fell dramatically without adversely affecting market quality

market maker quotation behavior and pretrade transparency we examine the impact of differing levels of pretrade transparency on the quotation behavior of nasdaq market makers we find that market makers are more likely to quote on odd ticks and to actively narrow the spread when they can do so anonymously by posting limit orders on electronic communication networks ecns from a public policy perspective our findings suggest that making the level of pretrade transparency on nasdaq more opaque by allowing anonymous quotes could improve price competition and narrow spreads further

episodic liquidity crises cooperative and predatory trading we describe how episodic illiquidity arises from a breakdown in cooperation between market participants we first solve a one period trading game in continuous time using an asset pricing equation that accounts for the price impact of trading then in a multi period framework we describe an equilibrium in which traders cooperate most of the time through repeated interaction providing apparent liquidity to one another cooperation breaks down when the stakes are high leading to predatory trading and episodic illiquidity equilibrium strategies that involve cooperation across markets lead to less frequent episodic illiquidity but cause contagion when cooperation breaks down why is illiquidity rare and episodic pastor stambaugh 2003 detect only 14 aggregate low liquidity months over the time period 1962 to 1999 despite being of significant magnitude most of the episodes were short lived and were followed by long periods of liquidity 1 the origin of this empirical observation still remains a puzzle in this paper we attempt to shed light on this puzzle by developing a theoretical model in which a breakdown in cooperation between traders in the market manifests itself in predatory trading this mechanism leads to sudden and short lived illiquidity we develop a dynamic model of trading based on liquidity needs during each period a liquidity event may occur in which a trader is required to liquidate a large block of an asset in a relatively short time period this need for liquidity is observed by a tight oligopoly whose members may choose to predate or cooperate predation involves racing and fading the distressed trader to the market

make take structure and market quality evidence from the u s options markets we examine the make take structure which compensates liquidity suppliers and charges liquidity demanders in the options markets where it competes with a traditional structure that uses payments for order flow using the introduction of the make take structure as an event we find that execution costs including fees for liquidity demanders decline after the event for the affected options that the make take structure encourages market makers to improve quoted prices and that brokers change their routing behavior to include fees in the routing decision the decline in execution costs is consistent with the benefits of the increased quote competition from the make take structure prevailing over the fees the structure charges to liquidity demanders this paper was accepted by wei jiang finance

symposium on market microstructure focus on nasdaq abstract this special issue of the journal of financial economics includes six articles that analyze the market microstructure of nasdaq in various ways the question of the costs of trading on nasdaq has become contentious in both the academic and legal regulatory arenas since the christie and schultz 1994 article first noted that many actively traded nasdaq stocks were almost never quoted on odd eights the articles in this symposium bring new and interesting insights to this debate

payments for order flow on nasdaq we present a model of nasdaq that includes the two ways in which marketmakers compete for order f low quotes and direct payments brokers in our model can execute small trades through a computerized system preferencing arrangements with marketmakers or vertical integration into market making the comparative statics in our model differ from those of the traditional model of dealer markets which does not capture important institutional features of nasdaq we also show that the empirical evidence is inconsistent with the traditional model which suggests that preferencing and vertical integration are important components in understanding nasdaq

the clustering of ipo gross spreads international evidence patterns of clustering in ipo gross spreads can be identified not only in the u s but also in many other markets across the world the evidence indicates however that these clustering patterns are not necessarily collusive clustering is widespread in many countries with low gross spreads in fact the amount of clustering observed is negatively related to the gross spread level of a country additionally an analysis of abnormal gross spreads following hansen 2001 indicates that few clusters contain abnormal positive surpluses

a comparison of centralized and fragmented markets with costly search how does quotation transparency affect financial market performance biais s irrelevance proposition in 1993 shows that centralized markets yield the same expected bid ask spreads as fragmented markets other things equal however de frutos and manzano demonstrated in 2002 that expected spreads in fragmented markets are smaller and market participants prefer to trade in fragmented markets this paper introduces liquidity traders costs of searching for a better quote into the biais model and derives opposite conclusions to these previous studies expected spreads in centralized markets are smaller and liquidity traders prefer centralized markets while market makers prefer fragmented markets

internal versus external capital markets this paper presents a framework for analyzing the costs and benefits of internal versus external capital allocation we focus pritnarily on comparing an internal capital market with bank lending while both represent centralized forms of financing in the former case the financing is owner provided while in the latter ceise it is not we argue that the ownership aspect of internal capital allocation has three important consequences 1 it leads to more monitoring than bank lending 2 it reduces managers entrepreneurial incentives and 3 it makes it easier to efficiently redeploy the assets of projects that are performing poorly under existing management

cooperation in the budgeting process in this article i analyze the role of cooperation between firm divisions in the budgeting process i study a setting in which cooperation is a necessary condition for information sharing among division managers which in turn benefits the principal the results in this article can help reconcile the differing views between practitioners and academic researchers on the desirability of cooperation in the budgeting process the results also have implications for some common budgeting processes observed in practice including bundling budgeting and bottom up budgeting

anonymity adverse selection and the sorting of interdealer trades this article asks why london security dealers use more than one trading venue to trade with one another we argue that differences in the exclusivity liquidity anonymity and post trade transparency of each system permit a more efficient sorting of interdealer trades than if there were just one system our evidence comes from detailed data on where london dealers chose to place interdealer trades contrary to intuition we show that uninformed interdealer trades as measured by subsequent price impact tend to migrate to third party brokered systems where trade is anonymous by contrast informed interdealer trades tend to migrate to the direct nonanonymous public market additionally we show that this distribution of trades is supported by differences in the price improvement dealers receive in the direct and brokered markets our findings have implications for three strands of the market microstructure literature first they contribute to our understanding of the importance of anonymity and transparency in securities trading most theoretical models of the effects of anonymity and transparency predict that anonymous trading systems will attract more informed trades

the cost of institutional equity trades presented are an overview of the findings from the recent literature on the cost of u s equity trades for institutional investors and new evidence on trading costs from a large sample of institutional trades the findings discussed have important implications for policymakers and investors implicit trading costs are economically significant equity trading costs vary considerably and vary systematically with trade difficulty and order placement strategy and whether a trade price represents best execution depends on detailed data for the trade s entire order submission process especially information on pretrade decision variables such as the trading horizon

a theory of socialistic internal capital markets abstract we develop a model of a two division firm in which the strong division has on average higher quality investment opportunities than the weak division we show that in the presence of agency and information problems optimal effort incentives are less powerful and thus managerial effort is lower in the strong division this leads the firm to bias its project selection policy against the strong division the selection bias is more severe when there is a larger spread in the average quality of investment opportunities between the two divisions

the capital budgeting process incentives and information we study the capital allocation process within firms observed budgeting processes are explained as a response to decentralized information and incentive problems it is shown that these imperfections can result in underinvestment when capital productivity is high and overinvestment when it is low we also investigate how the budgeting process may be expected to vary with firm or division characteristics such as investment opportunities and the technology for information transfer there is general agreement that investment decisions are the most important decisions made by corporations the choice of projects and the level of investment is critical not just for stakeholders of the firm but also for the economic well being of society as a whole it has been alleged that u s firms invest too little and tend to overemphasize short term results for example porter 1992 citing poterba and summers 1992 asserts that u s firms use hurdle rates to evaluate investment projects that are higher than their estimated costs of capital to understand the investment behavior of firms one must consider both the process by which external capital is made available to firms and the process by which internally and externally raised capital is allocated to investment projects within the firm considerable attention has been paid to how firms raise external capital the fundamental insight in this area is the celebrated result of modigliani and miller mm that capital structure is irrelevant in the absence of capital market frictions accordingly in the three decades since their contribution research on how external capital is raised has focused on market frictions including information and incentive problems relatively little research has focused on the internal allocation process and its relationship to the organization of the firm modern finance theory prescribes allocating capital according to the net present value npv rule just as the mm result itself provides no theory of the arrangements under which

sunflower management and capital budgeting in organizations ideas are often delegated for evaluation as a means of efficiently aggregating multiple information signals however those who delegate often find it impossible to separate the evaluation of the ideas they delegate from the evaluation of abilities of those delegated the task of assessing these ideas this commingling of the assessment of the idea with that of the individual agent generates a tendency for the agent to ignore his or her own information and instead attempt to confirm the superior s prior belief we refer to this as sunflower management and examine its effects on capital budgeting practices

samurai accountant a theory of auditing and plunder a risk neutral principal wishes to exact a payment from a risk neutral agent whose wealth he does not know but may verify through a costly auditing procedure we characterize efficient schemes for the principal when he is allowed to choose schedules for preaudit and postaudit payments and audit probabilities subject to the constraint that only monetary incentives can be used and that the principal may never make a net payment to the agent the main results are that efficient schemes involve preaudit payments which are increasing in the agent s wealth audit probabilities are decreasing in the agent s wealth and also satisfy certain constraints as equalities in general such schemes involve stochastic auditing and rebates after an audit in this paper we analyse the problem of a principal extracting wealth from an agent who is reluctant to part with it and is also better informed than the principal as to the amount he owns we assume that the principal has a costly means of discovering the agent s

managerial incentives and capital management the paper shows how career concerns rather than effort aversion can induce a natural incongruity in risk preferences between managers and superiors a model based on learning about managerial talent is developed to study second best contractual remedies we show that the optimal wage contract is an option of the value of the manager s human capital for insurance reasons and that consequently rationing of capital is often required to counterbalance the manager s resulting incentive to overinvest rationing is strictly superior to price decentralization offering one reason for the prevalence of centralized capital budgeting procedures

capital rationing and organizational slack in capital budgeting this paper reconciles three stylized facts about capital budgeting in firms and shows that they are tied to the presence of asymmetric information among the several members of the firm each with his or her own objectives and decisions the facts of interest are 1 the existence of organizational slack 2 the rationing of resources within organizations 3 the stated cut off rate for accepting capital projects in firms is often greater than the market rate of interest organizational slack is defined as the excess of resources allocated over the minimum necessary to accomplish the tasks assigned resource rationing is defined as the under allocation of resources i e an increase in the amount allocated would generate revenues in excess of its costs rationing and slack are both manifestations of ex post inefficiencies an lp model is used to show that these inefficiencies can occur in ex ante efficient organizational designs when asymmetric information is present the optimal allocation policy involves a hurdle rate criterion in which the hurdle rate is strictly in excess of the cost of capital thus inducing rationing in some states of the world typically resources are optimally allocated such that slack exists in other states the optimal allocation policy trades off these two inefficiencies