tournaments with midterm reviews in many tournaments investments are made over time the question whether to conduct a review once at the end or additionally at points midway through the tournament is a strategic decision if the latter course is chosen then the designer must establish both a rule for aggregating the results of the different reviews and a rule for determining compensations we first study the case of a fixed exogenously given prize and then extend the analysis to the case where the prize is not fixed but may vary with the tournament s outcome it is shown that 1 it is always optimal to assign a higher weight to the final review 2 this weight increases with the dominance of the first stage effort in determining the final review s outcome when the prize is not fixed the optimal design generates an asymmetric tournament in the second stage that favors the winner of the midterm review

rain and the democratic window of opportunity according to the economic approach to political transitions negative transitory economic shocks can give rise to a window of opportunity for democratic change we examine this hypothesis using yearly rainfall variation over the 1980 2004 period in 41 sub saharan african countries we find that a 25 drop in rainfall increases the probability of a transition to democracy during the following two years by around 3 percentage points a 5 fall in income due to low rainfall raises the probability of democratization by around 7 percentage points we also find that rainfall does not affect transitions from democracy to autocracy

relational contracts limited liability and employment dynamics this paper studies a relational contracting model in which the agent is protected by a limited liability constraint the agent s effort is his private information and affects output stochastically we characterize the optimal relational contract and compare the dynamics of the relationship with that under the optimal long term contract under the optimal relational contract the relationship is less likely to survive and the surviving relationship is less efficient in addition relationships always converge to a steady state under the optimal long term contract but they can cycle among different phases under the optimal relational contract

the incumbency effects of signalling much literature on political behaviour treats politicians as motivated by re election choosing actions to signal their types to voters we identify a novel implication of incumbent signalling because incumbents only care about clearing a re election hurdle signals will tend to cluster just above the threshold needed for re election this generates a skew distribution of signals leading to an incumbency advantage in the probability of election we also solve for the optimal threshold when voters have the ability to commit

learning from coarse information biased contests and career profiles an organization s promotion decision between two workers is modelled as a problem of boundedly rational learning about ability the decision maker can bias noisy rank order contests sequentially thereby changing the information they convey the optimal final period bias favours the leader reinforcing his likely ability advantage when optimally biased rank order information is a sufficient statistic for cardinal information the leader is favoured in every period in other environments bias in early periods may i favour the early loser ii be optimal even when the workers are equally rated and iii reduce the favoured worker s promotion chances this paper presents a model of boundedly rational learning by an organization the aims are to represent in a simple form the costs of gathering processing or transmitting information and to analyse their implications for the procedures selected to handle information as well as for the decisions actually made like other recent work on the internal organization of firms this work explores to what extent organizational structure and behaviour as well as organizational performance can be explained by adaptation to the costs associated with information in the learning model we formulate the decision maker not only selects a rule specifying what action to take as a function of his observations but also chooses sequentially the information partitions generating those observations this general problem is interpreted in the context of an organization which needs to make an important promotion decision and which attempts to maximize the value of the information generated during the observation periods that precede the decision one of the motivations for this analysis was the finding by organizational sociologists that earnings and promotions in the later stages of a worker s career are strongly correlated with earnings and promotions in the early stages kanter 1977 rosenbaum 1984 later success is positively associated with early success even when one controls for the effect of observable characteristics likely to affect performance such as education one obvious source of this correlation is differences in ability that persist over time and that are not captured by the observable covariates in this paper we focus on differences in ability which are initially unobservable by organizations and their workers as well as by researchers we present a simple model of an organization trying to learn about differences in ability and show

belief precision and effort incentives in promotion contests the career concerns literature predicts that incentives for effort decline as beliefs about ability become more precise holmstr om 1982 1999 in contrast we show that effort can increase with belief precision when agents compete for promotions to better paid jobs that are assigned on the basis of perceived abilities in this case an intermediate level of precision provides the strongest incentive for effort with effort increasing decreasing when beliefs are less more precise

actively learning about demand and the dynamics of price adjustment by observing the quantity demanded at particular prices a firm may learn about the parameters of its demand curve in such an environment price changes obstruct the learning process by inducing additional noise the authors paper constructs a dynamic model where a price setting firm endogenously controls the speed of learning the model provides a possible explanation for price inertia as a stable pricing policy allows the firm to learn more rapidly which improves future expected profits furthermore even in the long run learning continues to affect the firm s optimal price copyright 1990 by royal economic society

job allocation rules and sorting efficiency experimental outcomes in a peter principle environment an important issue in personnel economics is the design of efficient job allocation rules firms often use promotions both to sort workers across jobs and to provide them with incentives however the peter principle states that employees output tends to fall after a promotion lazear 2004 suggests that self selection may improve job allocation efficiency while preserving incentive effects we reproduce this peter principle in the laboratory and compare the efficiency of a promotion standard with subjects self selecting their task we find no evidence of effort distortion as predicted by theory furthermore we find that when the peter principle is not severe promotion rules often dominate self selection efficiency of task assignment results are consistent with imperfect appraisal of transitory ability and a lack of strategic behavior

the architecture of economic systems hierarchies and polyarchies the authors present new ways of looking at economic organizations andsystems individuals judgments entail errors they sometimes reject good projects and accept bad projects the architecture of an economicsystem specifying how the decision making units are organized togetherwithin a system who gathers what information and who communicates what with whom affects its performance both because it influences thenature of errors that individuals make within the system and becauseit has a critical effect on the aggregation of individuals errors theperformance of two polar architectures decentralized polyarchical versus centralized hierarchical decision making authorities are analyzed and compared copyright 1986 by american economic association

learning by helping a bounded rationality model of mentoring abstract within an organization a bounded rational principal organizes a promotion contest based on a sequence of tests regarding candidates relative performances we assume the principal to suffer from limited ability to rank the performances only identifying the best in each test furthermore he satisfies the expected profit from promotion designing the contest such that expected gains do not decrease with the information generated by additional tests then mentoring is shown to improve the information about candidates ability when the principal offers help to the current best candidate provided by a manager promoted after a similar contest

interim performance feedback in multistage tournaments the optimality of partial disclosure workers competing in a tournament for a prize e g a promotion often perform sequentially in multiple stages when the firm is privately informed about the workers performance it can sharpen incentives by strategically disclosing the intermediate results but the policies that enhance final stage effort may dampen incentives at the intermediate stage in our model the optimal disclosure policy has a simple form disclose only if all workers perform poorly this result offers a novel justification for partial disclosure in performance feedback also it contrasts with the existing literature that focuses on the extreme policies of full disclosure and no disclosure

the signaling role of promotions further theory and empirical evidence an extensive theoretical literature investigates the role of promotions as a signal of worker ability we extend the theory by focusing on how the signaling role of promotion varies with education and then investigate the resulting predictions using a longitudinal data set that contains detailed information concerning the internal labor market history of a medium sized firm in the financial services industry our results support signaling being important for understanding the differences between promotion practices concerning bachelor s and master s degree holders while the evidence concerning the importance of signaling for high school graduates and phds is mixed

optimizing information in the herd guinea pigs profits and welfare abstract herding arises when an agent s private information is swamped by public information in what m o jackson and e kalai 1997 games econ behavior 21 102 134 call a recurring game the agent will fail to reveal his own information and will follow the actions of his predecessor and as a result useful information is lost which might have highlighted a better choice for later decision makers this paper evaluates the strategy of forcing a subset of agents to make their decision early from the perspective of a social planner and a firm with a valuable or valueless product promotional activity by firms can be explained as an attempt to overcome the herd externality and maximize sales journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 d83 l15 m30

internal labor markets and worker rents abstract we show that establishing an internal labor market by offering combined contracts across hierarchy levels strictly dominates external recruitment when workers are homogeneous the reason is that only an internal labor market can exploit higher tier rents for incentive provision on lower tiers given unobservable heterogeneity of workers relying on an internal labor market has the further advantage of improving the selection of high ability workers for higher ranks which is complemented by rent based incentive schemes however observable worker heterogeneity gives rise to a trade off between incentive and selection issues and may lead to ports of entry on higher tiers of the hierarchy

foundations for optimal inattention abstract this paper models an agent who has a limited capacity to pay attention to information and thus conditions her actions on a coarsening of the available information an optimally inattentive agent chooses both her coarsening and her actions by maximization of an underlying subjective expected utility preference relation net of a cognitive cost of attention the main result axiomatically characterizes the conditional choices of actions by an agent that are necessary and sufficient for her behavior to be seen as if it is the result of optimal inattention observing these choices permits unique identification of the agent s utility index the information to which she pays attention her attention cost and her prior whenever information is costly

information policy in tournaments with sabotage sabotage is one of the main problems of tournament like reward schemes workers who are leading in a tournament are more dangerous rivals and are therefore sabotaged more heavily this implies that there is an extra cost to becoming a leader and hence to choosing high productive effort in the early stages of a tournament the incentives to exert productive effort are thereby reduced we show that this problem can be solved by concealing intermediate information on the performances of workers i e by clever information management moreover we offer experimental evidence indicating that such information management does increase productive efforts

classic promotion tournaments versus market based tournaments as initially formulated in the seminal analysis of lazear and rosen 1981 an important perspective for understanding the role of promotions in firms is the tournament perspective that is a promotion and in particular the wage increase associated with a promotion is a prize that serves as an incentive for workers to exert effort and take other actions beneficial to the firm such as the accumulation of human capital in this paper i consider whether the best way to model promotion tournaments is by having firms commit to prizes ex ante as in lazear and rosen s initial formulation or whether promotion prizes should be modeled as arising from the signaling role of promotions and the competition between firms for promoted workers

ex post unbalanced tournaments tournaments create strong incentives under the assumption that the competition between the agents is balanced if at the outset one agent is stronger than the other the tournament is ex ante unbalanced and incentives break down handicaps can in this case restore incentives in practice competing agents are often overall equally strong but have different sorts of strengths then competition will typically be unbalanced ex post and incentives break down but handicaps cannot be used we show how a simple means introducing the possibility of a tie can often resolve the problem we examine under what conditions incentives are maximized by ties

biased contests for symmetric players in a biased contest one of the players has an advantage in the winner determination process we characterize a novel class of biased contest success functions pertaining to such contests and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for zero bias to be a critical point of arbitrary objectives satisfying certain symmetry restrictions we however challenge the common wisdom that unbiased contests are always optimal when contestants are symmetric ex ante or even ex post we show that contests with arbitrary favorites i e biased contests of symmetric players can be optimal in terms of various objectives such as expected aggregate effort the probability to reveal the stronger player as the winner or expected effort of the winner

an opposing responses test of classic versus market based promotion tournaments we use a systems based econometric method to show that classic and market based tournament models are empirically distinguishable since the role of risk differs across these models implementing the method using a large finnish worker firm matched panel we find support for classic tournaments given that promotions depend on relative performance the firm s wage structure is convex promotion probabilities are decreasing in the number of competitors performance is increasing in the wage spread and workers and firms adjust their choice variables in opposite directions when the variance of the stochastic component of worker performance changes

variable evaluation costs and the design of fallible hierarchies and polyarchies abstract we show that when there are variable evaluation costs the optimal screening standards in a hierarchy polyarchy should become less more stringent at higher levels also simple reorganization of the optimal hierarchy or polyarchy may not improve net profits although results from information theory show that gross profits can be increased

the optimal amount of discretion to allow in disclosure in this paper a party with private information can verifiably disclose some but not all of his information the optimal amount of discretion to allow the informed party is studied that is should the informed party be allowed unlimited discretion in choosing which elements of his information set to disclose or should restrictions be imposed that limit this discretion the model is formulated in the spirit of a persuasion game it is demonstrated that under certain circumstances rules that limit discretion increase the informativeness of disclosures and thus improve economic decisions

penalizing success in dynamic incentive contracts no good deed goes unpunished we examine optimal dynamic incentive contracts when adverse selection and moral hazard problems are present we find that early success is optimally penalized in the sense that the agent who succeeds early subsequently faces a lower powered incentive contract penalizing success in this manner serves to limit the agent s initial incentive to understate his ability

the internal economics of a university evidence from personnel data using a rich personnel data set of a large european university we find strong evidence for the existence of an internal labor market first there is a strong port of entry at the lowest academic rank and in fact even prior to entering professorship resulting in very long internal careers second wages do not follow external wage developments we subsequently consider various incentive theories regarding the dynamics of promotions as organized through annual tournaments as expected a rigid set of research and teaching criteria determine the speed of promotions at the same time administrative rigidities play an important role

is certainty in carbon policy better than uncertainty abstract uncertainty in the strictness of carbon policy can have significant impacts on power generating firms capacity investment decisions and market outcomes we investigate the effects of this policy uncertainty on firms expected profits consumers surplus and firms cost for reaching a co 2 emission target our results derived from a game theoretical model and applied to realistic data indicate that uncertainty in the carbon policy induces more capacity investments in fossil and renewable technologies we find that it is optimal for firms with higher risk aversion to invest more in renewable technologies than their less risk averse rivals for policy makers our results suggest counter intuitively that retaining the flexibility to update emission targets whilst causing uncertainty in the carbon policy is beneficial this is because it provides higher expected consumer surplus and lower expected electricity price power generating firms are also better off under the policy uncertainty by having lower expected costs for reaching the emission goal and higher expected profits when firms risk aversions are low these results support the approach employed in european power markets to periodically update the co 2 emission cap depending on the prevailing circumstances rather than having certainty in the decrements of the caps over a longer time horizon our insights can help policy makers and firms to make better decisions by understanding how carbon policy uncertainty impacts the optimal capacity investments and how these investments might depend on the firms heterogeneity in risk aversion

demand for slant how abstention shapes voters choice of news media political commentators warn that the fragmentation of the modern media landscape induces voters to withdraw into information cocoons and segregate along ideological lines we show that the option to abstain breaks ideological segregation and generates cross over in news consumption voters with considerable leanings towards a candidate demand information that is less biased towards that candidate than voters who are more centrist this non monotonicity in the demand for slant makes voters ideologies non recoverable from their choice of news media and generates disproportionate demand for media outlets that are centrist or only moderately biased it also implies that polarisation of the electorate may lead to an ideological moderation in news consumption

equilibrium learning in simple contests abstract the paper studies a repeated contest when contestants are uncertain about their true relative abilities when ability and effort are complements a favorable belief about one s own ability stimulates effort and increases the likelihood of success success in turn reinforces favorable beliefs we show that this implies that with positive probability players fail to learn their true relative abilities in equilibrium and one player wins the contest with high probability forever in this case the prevailing player may be the actually worse player and persistent inequality arises we discuss some features of the model when the complementarity assumption is dropped

risk taking in selection contests abstract we study contests where the strategic variable is the degree of risk taking rather than the amount of effort the selection efficiency of such contests is examined we show that the selection efficiency of a contest may be improved by limiting the competition in two ways by having a small number of contestants and by restricting contestant quality

external recruitment and intrafirm mobility i introduction competition for promotion has a very strong effect on employees work incentive in the stereotypic internal labor market described in doeringer and piore 1985 there are only a limited number of ports of entry into a hierarchical firm or organization so that existing employees are insulated to a large extent from external competition in their climb up the corporate ladder however lazear 1992 and baker et al 1994a 1994b find extensive external recruitments at almost all grade levels in their studies of different u s corporations if the boundary between internal and external labor markets is not impervious then the choice between external recruitment and internal promotion in filling openings becomes an important personnel decision with interesting implications on incentives opening up the competition to external applicants discourages collusion among candidates as well as offers a quick channel for absorbing external talents however it also reduces the probability of promotion for existing workers and thus their incentive to exert with adverse effect on the firm s profit in chan 1996 i suggest that work incentive for the internal promotion candidates can be maintained if external competitors are handicapped in the contest such favoritism for existing employees implies that senior positions tend to be filled internally more often than not and that a worker is recruited from the outside only if he or she demonstrates a significant margin of superiority over the internal candidates this is consistent with the observations that external recruits account for only about 15 to 20 of all appointments to top management positions see denis and denis 1995 warner et al 1988 and that roughly the same percentage of chief executive officers ceos of large u s firms are outsiders see agrawal et al 2002 chan 1996 parrino 1997 the handicapping hypothesis of promotion suggests a dilemma in personnel decisions although handicapping external applicants provides incentive for existing employees it also increases the chance of inferior internal contestants being promoted to senior positions where sorting of workers by ability into different particularly senior positions is important efficiency within the organization is compromised this tension between sorting and maintaining work incentive is explored in tsoulouhas et al 2001 unfortunately the gain in realism with the incorporation of sorting is offset by ambiguity in most of the results the ability of the firm to precommit to future compensation the relative abilities of the internal and external contestants the cost of work effort and commonality within the firm and within the industry all have a role in determining the direction and magnitude of the handicap with different combinations of these factors resulting in very different outcomes whether one starts with the chan model or the tsoulouhas model empirical evidence is important to establish the significance of the competitive handicap against external candidates there has been no shortage of empirical investigations of the incentive effects of tournaments most follow one of two different analytic approaches one approach uses cross sectional or nonpanel data such as data on executive salary across firms gibbons and murphy 1990 leonard 1990 main et al 1993 or data from professional sports tournaments see for example ehrenberg 1990 few of these studies address the distinction between internal or external contestants agrawal et al 2002 is an exception it tests implications of the handicapping hypothesis derived in tsoulouhas et al 2001 by analyzing more than 1 000 ceo successions in large u s firms from 1974 to 1995 even though some of the results are also consistent with a traditional human capital interpretation and the key hypothesis can be derived from the tsoulouhas model only under certain conditions they offer some support for the existence and relevance of the competitive handicap against external contestants

performance promotion and the peter principle this paper considers why organizations use promotions rather than just monetary bonuses to motivate employees even though this may conflict with efficient assignment of employees to jobs when performance is unverifiable use of promotion reduces the incentive for managers to be affected by influence activities that would blunt the effectiveness of monetary bonuses when employees are risk neutral use of promotion for incentives need not distort assignments when they are risk averse it may sufficient conditions for this are given the distortion may be either to promote more employees than is efficient the peter principle effect or fewer

favoring the winner or loser in repeated contests should a firm favor a weaker or stronger employee in a contest despite a widespread emphasis on rewarding the best employees managers continue to tolerate and even favor poor performers contest theory reveals that evenly matched contests are the most intense which implies that a contest designer can maximize each player s effort by artificially boosting the underdog s chances we apply this type of handicapping to a two period repeated contest between employees in which the only information available about their abilities is their performance in the first period in this setting employees are strategic and forward looking such that they fully anticipate the potential impact of the first period contest result on the second period contest and thus adjust their behaviors accordingly the manager also incorporates these strategic behaviors of employees when determining an optimal handicapping policy if employees abilities are sufficiently different favoring the first period loser in the second period increases the total effort over both periods however if abilities are sufficiently similar we find the opposite result occurs total effort increases the most in response to a handicapping strategy of favoring the first period winner

strategic promotion and compensation within a hierarchical firm structure this paper details how the composition of a worker s skills and the non observability of a worker s ability affect wage and promotion paths promotionbased compensation schemes derive naturally from the worker s asymmetrically observed ability promotion takes place over time and is inefficient since employers strategically exploit their knowledge of an able worker s ability conversely employers may be unable to efficiently demote and retain bad managers without paying bonuses employers are led to promote educated employees before their equally or more able but uneducated counterparts explanations for fast track promotions plans and other empirical regularities are provided

limited observability as a constraint in contract design limited observability is the assumption that economic agents can only observe a finite amount of information given this constraint contracts among agents are necessarily finite and incomplete in comparison to the ideal complete contract that we model as infinite in detail we consider the extent to which finite contracts can approximate the idealized complete contracts the objectives of the paper are i to identify properties of agents preferences that determine whether or not finiteness of contracts causes significant inefficiency ii to evaluate the performance of finite contracts against the ideal optimal contracts in principal agent and bilateral bargaining models

liquidity constraints and the formation of unbalanced contests abstract we analyze the effects of future liquidity constraints on contestants investment in a dynamic contest model contestants invest in two consecutive contests to win a prize in each period the loser of the first period contest can be liquidity constrained in the second period due to too little remaining wealth the winner of the first contest can reinvest the prize in the second contest we show that future liquidity constraints mainly affect the imbalance of the contest in the future but not today surprisingly larger contest prizes decrease contestants future investments and amplify the imbalance of future contests however the contest organizer can reduce this imbalance by increasing the share of the prize money in the second contest