incomplete wage posting we consider a directed search model in which workers differ in productivity productivity becomes observable to firms after assessing their workers on the job but it is not verifiable firms with vacancies choose between posting a noncontingent wage and leaving wages subject to bargaining with the worker under wage bargaining firms cannot optimize the trade off between paying higher wages and having a larger probability of filling vacancies but wage bargaining makes wages increasing in worker productivity and so may allow firms to attract better workers into the vacancy when workers heterogeneity is large and bargaining powers come close to satisfying hosios s rule firms opt for bargaining yet equilibria with bargaining fail to maximize aggregate net income and sometimes are not constrained pareto optimal

optimal income taxation with adverse selection in the labour market this article studies optimal linear and non linear redistributive income taxation when there is adverse selection in the labour market unlike in standard taxation models firms do not know workers abilities and competitively screen them through non linear compensation contracts unobservable to the government in a miyazaki wilson spence equilibrium adverse selection leads to different optimal tax formulas than in the standard mirrlees 1971 model because of the use of work hours as a screening tool by firms which for higher talent workers results in a rat race and for lower talent workers in informational rents and cross subsidies the most surprising result is that if the government has sufficiently strong redistributive goals welfare is higher when there is adverse selection than when there is not policies that endogenously affect adverse selection are discussed the model has practical implications for the interpretation estimation and use of taxable income elasticities which are central to optimal tax design

do consumers take advantage of common pricing standards an experimental investigation gaudeul and sugden gaudeul a sugden r 2012 spurious complexity and common standards in markets for consumer goods economica 79 314 209 225 have hypothesized that when some but not all competing products are priced in a common standard consumers who are liable to make errors in cross standard price comparisons use decision rules that discriminate in favor of common standard offers such behavior incentivizes sellers to use common standards we report an experimental test of this hypothesis using choice tasks similar to those represented in the gaudeul sugden model we find that offers priced in common standards were more likely to be inspected but less likely to be chosen and that subjects gained little benefit from common pricing standards that applied to some but not all offers most subjects used dominance editing operations that eliminated transparently dominated offers either as an initial shortlisting device or while offers were being sorted because these operations discriminate against

the compromise effect in action lessons from a restaurant s menu the compromise effect refers to individuals tendency to choose intermediate options its existence has been demonstrated in a large number of hypothetical choice experiments this paper uses field data from a specialties restaurant to investigate the existence and strength of the compromise effect in a natural environment despite the presence of many factors that potentially weaken the compromise effect e g a very large choice set the opportunity to choose familiar options we find evidence for it both in descriptive statistics and regression analyses options which become a compromise after a change in the choice set gain on average five percent in market share we also find that the compromise effect is especially pronounced in groups while for single customers it is statistically insignificant

do voters vote ideologically abstract in this paper we address the following question to what extent is the hypothesis that voters vote ideologically i e they always vote for the candidate who is ideologically closest to them testable or falsifiable we show that using data only on how individuals vote in a single election the hypothesis that voters vote ideologically is irrefutable regardless of the number of candidates competing in the election on the other hand using data on how the same individuals vote in multiple elections the hypothesis that voters vote ideologically is potentially falsifiable and we provide general conditions under which the hypothesis can be tested

choice by sequential procedures article history we propose a rule of decision making the sequential procedure guided by routes and show that three influential boundedly rational choice models can be equivalently understood as special cases of this rule in addition the sequential procedure guided by routes is instrumental in showing that the three models are intimately related we show that choice with a status quo bias is a refinement of rationalizability by game trees which in turn is also a refinement of sequential rationalizability thus we provide a sharp taxonomy of these choice models and show that they all can be understood as choice by sequential procedures

generation of household solid waste in oecd countries an empirical analysis using macroeconomic data while there are numerous studies that use household level and community level data to examine the determinants of household solid waste generation rates little empirical work has been previously undertaken using macroeconomic data using a cross sectional time series database of solid waste in countries that are part of the organisation for economic co operation and development oecd we provide evidence on the economic and demographic determinants of generation rates of household solid waste with respect to economic activity and population density the results are largely consistent with results found in previous studies however additional insights are gained on the effects of factors such as household size and composition as well as the degree of urbanization

a primer on mathematical modelling in economics the commission on graduate education in economics had raised several concerns regarding the role of mathematics in graduate training in economics krueger 1991 colander 1998 2005 this paper undertakes a detailed scrutiny of the notion of a utility function to motivate and describe the common patterns across mathematical concepts and results that are used by economists in the process one arrives at a classification of mathematical terms which is used to state mathematical results in economics the usefulness of the classification scheme is illustrated with the help of a discussion of arrow s impossibility theorem common knowledge of the patterns in mathematical concepts and results could be effective in enhancing communication between students teachers and researchers specializing in different sub fields of economics

eliciting welfare preferences from behavioural data sets an individual displays various preference orderings in different payoff irrelevant circumstances it is assumed that the variation in the observed preference orderings is the outcome of some cognitive process that distorts the underlying preferences of the individual we introduce a framework for eliciting the individual s underlying preferences in such cases and then demonstrate it for two cognitive processes satisficing and small assessment errors

welfare criteria from choice an axiomatic analysis abstract we propose an axiomatic approach to the problem of deriving a linear welfare ordering from a choice function admissibility requires that the ordering assigned to a rational choice function is the one that rationalizes it neutrality states that the solution covaries with permutations of the alternatives persistence stipulates that the ordering assigned to two choice functions is also assigned to every choice function in between we prove that these properties characterize the sequential solution the best alternative is the alternative chosen from the universal set the second best is the one chosen when the best alternative is removed and so on we also discuss some alternative axioms and solutions

average cost pricing some evidence and implications we present new survey evidence on pricing behavior for more than 14 000 european firms and study its macroeconomic implications among firms that are price setters roughly 75 respond that their prices are set as a markup on total costs a business practice termed full cost pricing only 25 set prices as markups over variable or marginal costs moreover using industry data for the u s we find that the correlation between changes in output prices and changes in variable input prices is significantly lower when fixed costs are likely to be more important since our results are similar to the findings in the classic and controversial paper of hall and hitch 1939 and subsequent survey evidence we believe it worth studying the implications of full cost pricing for macroeconomics we first propose a problem for the firm where full cost pricing can arise as optimizing behavior we embed this problem featuring an occasionally binding constraint into a simple general equilibrium model we show that when the model is hit by a shock that makes the constraint binding the response of endogenous variables is amplified significantly more than it would be under the unconstrained regime

reminder game indirectness in persuasion abstract a seller wants a buyer to choose a good whose value is the seller s private information the buyer s memory is limited and she decides whether to remember the good conditional on a signal about the value the seller then decides whether to send a costless message that can remind the buyer of the good since the reminder could convey the seller s private information in equilibrium whether to send a reminder is a non trivial question it is shown that costless messages can be informative in equilibrium in spite of the strong conflict of interest between the players in any informative equilibrium silence conveys positive information about the value whereas the reminder conveys negative information

institutional labor economics the new personnel economics and internal labor markets a reconsideration the author illustrates the utility of institutional labor economics and makes a case for a reconsideration of it two recent developments motivate this effort the rise of new personnel economics npe as a significant subfield of labor economics and the substantial shifts in work organization that have taken place since the 1990s understanding how and why firms have reorganized work opens the door for a renewed interest in institutional approaches the author explains that the rules of institutional labor markets ilms emerge from the competition between organizational interest groups unions personnel professionals and the government and competing views of firms objectives resulting in the rise of ilms the slow diffusion of high performance work systems strategies used to obtain a high level of commitment from workers the use of contingent employees and the spread of new promotion rules in response to equal employment opportunity pressures as such the role of power and influence in establishing work rules is of central concern though more conventional npe considerations also remain important

firm specific human capital a skill weights approach the theory of human capital is agnostic on what constitutes firm specific skills the theory specifies that specific skills contribute to productivity only at the current firm a broader approach lets all skills be general but firms use them with different weights attached for example computer programming economics and accounting are general skills but there may be only one firm that wants workers trained in all three one implication is that wage profiles and the split of human capital costs depend on thickness of the market another is that firms pay for what appears to be general training

skill complexity and strategic interaction abstract we present a win loss game between players with explicitly modeled cognitive limitations differences in the players abilities to analyze the available moves induce preferences over the complexity of the environment and hence incentives to manipulate that complexity other things equal higher skill players are more likely to win in a class of long horizon games with constant complexity greater complexity reduces the advantage of the higher skill player when the higher skill player is the last mover when the lower skill player moves last increasing complexity induces countervailing effects either of which may dominate finally when complexity can be manipulated over the course of the game the benefits of strategic manipulation of complexity can override objective considerations about best move choice resulting in purposeful departures from subgame perfect nash equilibrium behavior

preferred personal equilibrium and simple choices abstract this paper studies choices under the preferred personal equilibrium concept introduced by koszegi and rabin 2006 for modeling choice given expectations based reference dependent preferences the main result of this paper shows that when expectations are not observed and parametric assumptions on utility are not made preferred personal equilibrium choice is a special case of the rational shortlist method of manzini and mariotti 2007 building on this connection the paper provides an axiomatization of preferred personal equilibrium choice behavior and discusses the implications of these results for how choices can be used to test and identify the model and for the relationship between preferred personal equilibrium and other models of behavior

does demand for product quality increase worker training abstract we uniquely examine the relationship between firm organized training and the sensitivity of consumer demand to product quality cross section panel fixed effect and instrumental variable estimates confirm that british workplaces provide more intensive training when their product demand is more sensitive to product quality robustness checks including using alternative key variable definitions and a counterfactual analysis examining the importance of competing on price support this confirmation

preentry contacts and the generation of nascent networks in organizations this paper investigates the impact of individuals social ties at organizational entry on the formation of intraorganizational networks when individuals enter organizations with one or more preentry relationships in place i argue they form more extensive networks post entry than their untied counterparts however it is also suggested that under some conditions i e when quality is more certain the relationship between pre and postentry social structure is contingent on individuals quality attributes i test and find support for these hypotheses in a study of new business and law professionals the results indicate that individuals with an initial advantage in social ties form more extensive networks post entry than those without such an advantage and that when certainty about quality is high this effect depends on the quality attributes of the new entrants implications of this study for research on social networks resource accumulation and inequality are discussed

a testable theory of imperfect perception we provide a new characterization of bayesian expected utility maximization the novel feature of the model is our separation of actions from prizes the signature of the resulting theory is the impossibility of raising utility by switching wholesale from one action to another we provide applications to robustness to the recovery of utility from choice data and to model

salience and consumer choice we present a theory of context dependent choice in which a consumer s attention is drawn to salient attributes of goods such as quality or price an attribute is salient for a good when it stands out among the good s attributes relative to that attribute s average level in the choice set or more broadly the choice context consumers attach disproportionately high weight to salient attributes and their choices are tilted toward goods with higher quality price ratios the model accounts for a variety of disparate evidence including decoy effects and context dependent willingness to pay it also suggests a novel theory of misleading sales

towards a new taxonomy of circular economy business models abstract circular economy has undoubtedly become one of the hot topics in public debates about new and more sustainable industrial paradigms and strategies in this respect the fashion of circular economy is in the fact that it aims at overcoming the dominant linear take make disposal economy model i e a traditional open ended economy model developed with no built in tendency to recycle which is reflected by treating the environment as a waste reservoir su et al 2013 circular economy indeed bases on the establishment of closed production systems where resources are reused and kept in a loop of production and usage allowing generating more value and for a longer period despite the interest for circular economy by politicians and practitioners scholars particularly in the strategic management field are still struggling with a lack of a framework explaining how companies willing to become circular adapt their existing business model or create a new one by extensively reviewing through the lens of business model literature the extant contributions on circular economy we propose a taxonomy of circular economy business models based on the degree of adoption of circularity along two major dimensions i the customer value proposition interface i e the implementation of the circularity concept in proposing value to customers ii the value network i e the ways through which interacting with suppliers and reorganizing the own internal activities the taxonomy is then initially tested through some explorative case studies showing in practice the ability of the framework to properly distinguish different modes of adoption of circular economy

inefficient hiring in entry level labor markets hiring inexperienced workers generates information about their abilities if this information is public workers obtain its benefits if workers cannot compensate firms for hiring them firms will hire too few inexperienced workers i determine the effects of hiring workers and revealing more information about their abilities through a field experiment in an online marketplace i hired 952 randomly selected workers giving them either detailed or coarse public evaluations both hiring workers and providing more detailed evaluations substantially improved workers subsequent employment outcomes under plausible assumptions the experiment s market level benefits exceeded its cost suggesting that some experimental workers had been inefficiently unemployed

revealed p reference theory abstract this paper develops axiomatically a revealed preference theory of reference dependent choice behavior instead of taking the reference for an agent as exogenously given in the description of a choice problem we suitably relax the weak axiom of revealed preference to obtain endogenously the existence of reference alternatives as well as the structure of choice behavior conditional on those alternatives we show how this model captures some well known choice patterns such as the attraction effect jel d11 d81

dividing the costs and returns to general training data from the national longitudinal survey of youth indicate that the employer often pays the explicit costs of not only on site training but also off site general training although few of these costs appear to be passed on to workers in the form of a lower wage while in training completed spells of general training paid for by previous employers have a larger wage effect than completed spells of general training paid for by the current employer a model where contract enforcement considerations cause employers to share the costs and returns to purely general training can explain these findings

sequentially rationalizable choice a sequentially rationalizable choice function is a choice function that can be retrieved by applying sequentially to each choice problem the same xed set of asymmetric binary relations rationales to remove inferior alternatives these con cepts translate into economic language some human choice heuristics studied in psychology and explain cyclical patterns of choice observed in experiments we study some properties of sequential rationalizability and provide a full character ization of choice functions rationalizable by two and three rationales

tenable strategy blocks and settled equilibria when people interact in familiar settings social conventions usually develop so that people tend to disregard alternatives outside the convention for rational players to usually restrict attention to a block of conventional strategies no player should prefer to deviate from the block when others are likely to act conventionally and rationally inside the block we explore two set valued concepts coarsely and finely tenable blocks that formalize this notion for finite normal form games we then identify settled equilibria which are nash equilibria with support in minimal tenable blocks for a generic class of normal form games our coarse and fine concepts are equivalent and yet they differ from standard solution concepts on open sets of games we demonstrate the nature and power of the solutions by way of examples settled equilibria are closely related to persistent equilibria but are strictly more selective on an open set of games with fine tenability we obtain invariance under the insertion of a subgame with a unique totally mixed payoff equivalent equilibrium a property that other related concepts have not satisfied

probabilistic dominance and status quo bias abstract decision makers have a strong tendency to retain the current state of affairs this well documented phenomenon is termed status quo bias we present the probabilistic dominance approach to status quo bias an alternative is considered acceptable to replace the status quo only if the chances of a subjectively severe loss relative to the status quo are not too high probabilistic dominance is applied and behaviorally characterized in a choice model that allows for a range of status quo biases general enough to accommodate unanimity but also standard expected utility maximization we present a comparative notion of revealing more bias towards the status quo and study its implications to the probabilistic dominance model of choice lastly the model is applied to the endowment effect phenomenon and to a problem of international portfolio choice when investors are home biased

why do firms train theory and evidence this paper offers a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for the general training they receive the superior information of the current employer regarding its employees abilities relative to other firms creates ex post monopsony power and encourages this employer to provide and pay for training even if these skills are general the model can lead to multiple equlibria in one equilibrium quits are endogenously high and as a result employers have limited monopsony power and provide little training while in another equilibrium quits are low and training is high using microdata on german apprentices we show that the predictions of our model receive some support from the data

training and worker effort a signalling perspective this paper analyzes the interaction between firms investment in general skills training and workers incentives it shows that when a firm has an informational advantage over its workers its provision of free general skills training can serve as a signal that there will be a long term relationship between the firm and its workers this signal induces the workers to exert more effort in learning firm specific skills which enhances the firm s profits in contrast with most of the existing literature the model implies that firms may provide free general skills training even if there is no labour market friction ce memoire analyse l interaction entre l investissement des entreprises dans l acquisition d habiletes generales de leurs employes et les incitations des travailleurs a fournir un effort on montre que quand une firme a un avantage informationnel sur ses travailleurs le fait de fournir gratuitement de la formation qui permette aux employes d acquerir des habiletes generales peut servir de signal qu il va y avoir une relation a long terme entre la firme et ses travailleurs ce signal incite les travailleurs a investir plus d effort dans l acquisition d habiletes specifiques a la firme ce qui augmente les profits de l entreprise ce modele en porte a faux par rapport au gros de la litterature existante suggere que les entreprises peuvent fournir gratuitement de la formation permettant aux employes d acquerir des habiletes generales meme s il n y a pas de friction dans le marche du travail

human capital investment under asymmetric information the pigovian conjecture revisited this article investigates how human capital investment labor turnover and wages are jointly determined when the current employer knows more about a worker s productivity than potential employers results derived are quite different from or unexplored by the standard human capital theory we show that the information asymmetry can cause an externality distortion in human capital investment because higher productivity due to the investment may not be recognized by the market the investment level increases in the degree of firm specificity of human capital the underinvestment problem is more severe when human capital is general than when it is firm specific

household responses to pricing garbage by the bag this paper estimates household reaction to the implementation of unit pricing for the collection of residential garbage we gather original data on weight and volume of weekly garbage and recycling of 75 households in charlottesville virginia both before and after the start of a program that requires an eighty cent sticker on each bag of garbage this data set is the first of its kind we estimate household demands for the collection of garbage and recyclable material the effect on density of household garbage and the amount of illegal dumping by households we also estimate the probability that a household chooses each method available to reduce its garbage in response to the implementation of this unit pricing program we find that households 1 reduced the weight of their garbage by 14 2 reduced the volume of garbage by 37 and 3 increased the weight of their recyclable materials by 16 we estimate that additional illegal or at least suspicious disposal accounts for 0 42 pounds per person per week or 28 of the reduction in garbage observed at the curb this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

investment in general training the role of information and labour mobility following the seminal work of becker i964 it is widely accepted in the literature that firms will be unwilling to finance training which workers may use in other firms this paper takes issue with this prediction and suggests that firms will frequently share in the cost of such general training 1 becker argues that a firm which pays for the training of workers in skills of potential use to other firms will lose these workers since other firms bear none of the costs of general training they can attract a worker with such training by outbidding the firm which trained him recognising this absence of property rights over an investment in general training firms will refuse to provide it hence if general training is to take place the trainee will have to pay for it if potential trainees are unwilling or unable to pay general training will not take place a shortage in general training is likely to emerge this may be especially pronounced in developing countries 2 in contrast the outlook for

observing violations of transitivity by experimental methods the preference reversal phenomenon is usually interpreted as evidence of nontransitivity of preference but has also been explained as the result of the difference between individuals responses to choice and valuation problems the devices used by experimenters to elicit valuations and the random lottery selection incentive system this paper reports an experiment designed so that none of these factors could generate systematic nontransitivities yet systematic violations of transitivity were still found the pattern of violation was analogous with that found in previous preference reversal experiments and is consistent with regret theory copyright 1991 by the econometric society

rational choice with status quo bias abstract motivated by the empirical findings concerning the importance of one s current situation on her choice behavior the main objective of this paper is to propose a rational choice theory that allows for the presence of a status quo bias and that incorporates the standard choice theory as a special case we follow a revealed preference approach and obtain two nested models of rational choice that allow phenomena like the status quo bias and the endowment effect and that are applicable in any choice situation to which the standard static choice model applies

incentives for food waste diversion exploration of a long term successful chinese city residential scheme abstract there are no academic studies of incentives schemes for household recycling which are successful or useful on large scales in the longer term for food waste sorting very few successful schemes have been reported with or without incentives here the authors report findings about a two year old 23 000 household scheme in nanjing china from an exploratory case study designed to identify key factors using observations measurements company data and interviews results indicate that residents were initially motivated by the incentives e g points exchanged for eggs and social influences but habit was the key factor for maintaining their behaviour and cited as the main reason they would continue if the incentives stopped interestingly a perceived improvement in the community site s cleanliness was also cited as an ongoing motivation and social influences was not mentioned the perceived success of the scheme was confirmed via measurements of participation rates 32 the weight of food waste diverted 0 62 kg per household and estimates of the contamination rate

indifference or indecisiveness choice theoretic foundations of incomplete preferences abstract a commonly held belief in economics is that an individual s preferences that are revealed by her choices must be complete this paper takes issue with this position by showing that one may be able to distinguish between indifference and indecisiveness of an agent upon observing her choice behavior we relax the standard weak axiom of revealed preferences warp and show that a potent theory of individual choice with and without risk can be founded on this weaker axiom when it is coupled with some other standard postulates the most notable features here are that an agent is allowed to be indifferent between certain alternatives and indecisive about others moreover an outside observer can identify which of these actually occur upon examining the observable choice behavior of the decision maker as an application we also show how our theory may be able to cope with the classical preference reversal phenomenon

revealed preference rational inattention and costly information acquisition we develop a revealed preference test for optimal acquisition of costly information the test encompasses models of rational inattention sequential signal processing and search we provide limits on the extent to which attention costs can be recovered from choice data we experimentally elicit state dependent stochastic choice data of the form the tests require in simple cases tests con rm that subjects adjust their attention in response to incentives as the theory dictates

self fulfilling mistakes characterisation and welfare this paper incorporates self fullling mistakes into an otherwise classical decision making framework a behavioural agent makes a mistake when he fails to internalize all the consequences of his actions on himself we show that sen s axioms and fully characterize choice data consistent with behavioral agents these two axioms are weaker than sen s axioms and that fully characterize rational agents we oer a welfare benchmark that can be applied to existing behavioural economics models and show the conditions under which our welfare ranking can be used to infer welfare dominated i e mistaken choices using choice data alone

a measure of rationality and welfare evidence showing that individual behavior often deviates from the classical principle of preference maximization has raised at least two important questions 1 how serious are the deviations 2 what is the best way to analyze choice behavior in order to extract information for the purpose of welfare analysis this paper addresses these questions by proposing a new way to identify the preference relation that is closest in terms of welfare loss to the revealed choice

choice and individual welfare we propose an abstract method of systematically assigning a rational ranking to non rationalizable choice data our main idea is that any method of ascribing welfare to an individual as a function of choice is subjective and depends on the economist undertaking the analysis we provide a simple example of the type of exercise we propose namely we define an individual welfare functional as a mapping from stochastic choice functions into weak orders a stochastic choice function or choice distribution gives the empirical frequency of choices for any possible opportunity set framing factors may also be incorporated into the model we require that for any two alternatives x and y if our individual welfare functional recommends x over y given two distinct choice distributions then it also recommends x over y for any mixture of the two choice distributions together with some mild technical requirements such an individual welfare functional must weight every opportunity set and assign a utility to each alternative x which is the sum across all opportunity sets of the weighted probability of x being chosen from the set it therefore requires us to have a prior view about how important or representative a choice of x at a given situation is

why do temporary help firms provide free general skills training the majority of u s temporary help supply ths firms offer nominally free unrestricted computer skills training a practice inconsistent with the competitive model of training i propose and test a model in which firms offer general training to induce self selection and perform screening of worker ability the model implies and the data confirm that firms providing training attract higher ability workers yet pay them lower wages after training thus beyond providing spot market labor ths firms sell information about worker quality to their clients the rapid growth of ths employment suggests that demand for worker screening is rising

efficiency first or equity first two principles and rationality of social choice abstract this paper formalizes two different principles to socially rank allocations under efficiency equity trade off the efficiency first social preference relation ranks an allocation x higher than an allocation y if and only if i x is pareto superior to y or ii x and y are pareto noncomparable and x is equity superior to y the equity first social preference relation reverses the order of application of the two criteria we show that the efficiency first relation may have a cycle whereas the equity first relation is transitive we also characterize and compare the sets of maximal elements for these social preference relations in the edgeworth box and examine the nonemptiness of the sets journal of economic literature classification numbers d71 d63 d61

consideration sets and competitive marketing we present a model of competitive marketing based on the notion that consumers are boundedly rational and that firms use marketing tactics in an attempt to influence consumers decision process the standard model of consumer behaviour assumes that the consumer applies well defined preferences to a perfectly perceived set of available alternatives we retain the assumption that consumers have stable preferences but relax the assumption that they have a perfect perception of what is relevant for their consumption problem thus allowing firms to manipulate that perception our aim is to explore the market implications of this departure from the standard model especially for the way firms deploy marketing strategies in competitive environments the cornerstone of our model is the observation that in the modern marketplace consumers face an overwhelmingly large variety of products and therefore often use screening criteria deliberate as well as unconscious in order to reduce the number of relevant alternatives as a result consumers apply their preferences not to the set of objectively feasible alternatives but to a potentially smaller set which they construct at an earlier stage of the decision process borrowing a term from the marketing literature we refer to this set as the consideration set the basic idea underlying this term is that consumers may be unaware of some of the feasible products and even when they become aware of a new product they still need to be persuaded to consider it as a potential substitute to their currently consumed product

the impact of product market competition on training provision evidence from canada while standard models of training focus on how input market affects firms training decisions this paper investigates the impact of product market competition on training provision using the longitudinal data from statistics canada s workplace and employee survey we find that increased competition is strongly associated with more training provision this association is unlikely to be driven by unobserved heterogeneity specific measures used and other relevant factors to the extent that training is a significant source of human capital and industry competitiveness our results suggest that increasing training is an important channel through which competition raises productivity

does food sorting prevents and improves sorting of household waste a case in sweden this paper analyses household behaviour as response to changes in waste management systems the paper discusses the results of a case study from vellinge municipality sweden where the introduction of separate food waste collection is thought to have a role in reducing the total amount of household waste and improving the sorting of packaging waste the study relies on data from official waste statistics and a survey of 117 municipal residents focusing on households perceptions attitudes and self reflected changes in waste sorting behaviour the respondents mentioned the increased environmental awareness and the convenience of food waste sorting among the primary reasons for the perceived changes in personal waste sorting routines the study also tested the significance of other variables such as income employment economic activity socio demographics infrastructure waste tariffs illegal dumping and awareness raising campaigns most of the variables were static and none showed sufficient correlation to the observed reduction of waste collection rates and the improvements in sorting other waste fractions the analysed case had particularly high income levels which were the main dynamic variable under study the analysis suggests that we may be observing an example of a decoupling between economic growth and waste generation rates this observation is explained by the kuznets phenomena and it is being discussed in this paper less

is firm sponsored training a palliative a common agency approach we analyse the issue of firm sponsored training under product market imperfections in this setting qualification becomes a public good for firms when their profits are increasing in the stock of skilled workers but remains a private good to students workers students have to pay a tuition fee but at the same time firms sponsor education universities sell training to both we prove that the proportion of skilled workers is larger in more competitive economies industries while the share of firms in the financing of training is a monotonically decreasing function of the degree of competition an increase of the latter indeed increases the equilibrium skilled wage while reducing its sensitivity to an increase of the supply of skilled workers the firms aggregate expenditures on training per worker are nevertheless a nonmonotonic function of the competitiveness of the economy

training and union wages abstract this paper investigates whether unions through imposing wage floors that lead to wage compression increase on the job training our analysis focuses on germany based on a model of unions and firm financed training we derive empirical implications regarding apprenticeship training intensity layoffs wage cuts and wage compression in unionized and nonunionized firms we test these implications using firm panel data matched with administrative employee data we find support for the hypothesis that union recognition via imposing minimum wages and wage compression increases training in apprenticeship programs

the growth of temporary services work the temporary help services industry which provides client firms with workers on an as needed basis has expanded at a phenomenal rate over the last 20 years since 1972 the industry s employment has grown at an annual rate of over 11 percent and its share of total u s employment has risen from under 0 3 percent in 1972 to more than 1 8 percent in 1995 the growth of the temporary services industry has fueled controversy some analysts fear that temporary workers may become locked into a labor market underclass with low wages no benefits negligible job security little training and no possibility for advancement others challenge such claims and point to efficiencies created by temporary employment relationships this article will examine the growth of the temporary services industry and discuss the quality of temporary services jobs how such jobs fit into workers careers and some of the forces that may be driving the growth of temporary services work

the economics of private sector training a survey of the literature abstract this survey organizes and summarizes existing theoretical work on private sector training the theoretical models focus on investment efficiency finance and turnover recent developments in the on the job training literature are characterized by strategic interaction between employers and employees and emphasize market imperfections

rationalizing choice with multi self models this paper studies a class of multi self decision making models proposed in economics psychology and marketing in this class choices arise from the set dependent aggregation of a collection of utility functions where the aggregation procedure satises some simple properties we propose a method for characterizing the extent of irrationality in a choice behavior and use this measure to provide a lower bound on the set of choice behaviors that can be rationalized with n utility functions under an additional assumption scale invariance we show that generically at most ve reasons are needed for every mistake

the axiomatic structure of empirical content in this paper we provide a formal framework for studying the empirical content of a given theory we define the falsifiable closure of a theory to be the least weakening of the theory that makes only falsifiable claims the falsifiable closure is our notion of empirical content we prove that the empirical content of a theory can be exactly captured by a certain kind of axiomatization one that uses axioms which are universal negations of conjunctions of atomic formulas the falsifiable closure operator has the structure of a topological closure which has implications for example for the behavior of joint vis a vis single hypotheses the ideas here are useful for understanding theories whose empirical content is well understood for example we apply our framework to revealed preference theory and afriat s theorem but they can also be applied to theories with no known axiomatization we present an application to the theory of multiple selves with a fixed finite set of selves and where selves are aggregated according to a neutral rule satisfying independence of irrelevant alternatives we show that multiple selves theories are fully falsifiable in the sense that they are equivalent to their empirical content

a canonical model of choice with initial endowments we use the revealed preference method to derive a model of individual decision making when the endowment of an agent provides a reference point that may influence her choices this model generalizes the classical rational choice model which views choice as a consequence of utility maximization instead our model sees choice as arising from psychologically constrained utility maximization where the constraints are induced by one s initial endowment in particular this model produces status quo bias as a natural consequence but not necessarily the endowment effect a range of economic applications identify the predictive and explanatory strength of the model in particular we demonstrate that the status quo bias phenomenon reduces the size of the substitution effect in problems of consumption choice

investment in general human capital and turnover intention a key area of personnel economics focuses on the provision of human resource practices by firms such as why one type of compensation is offered over another edward p lazear and paul oyer 2007 while this area of research includes various types of wage compensation it also includes types of nonwage compensation which have been shown to have sizable effects on worker behavior such as mobility in the case of health insurance and traditional pension plans the present analysis examines the effect of employer sponsored investment in general human capital administered through tuition reimbursement programs on employee turnover employer provided tuition reimbursement is a widespread program in which firms provide financial assistance for the direct cost of coursework taken by employees estimates of the percentage of firms that offer this program are as high as 85 percent peter cappelli 2004 these programs support investment in an employee s general human capital skills that are transferable across employers because accredited academic institutions are responsible for curriculum development instruction and certification and serve students employed at a wide variety of establishments these programs represent a puzzle because firms are unlikely to make general human capital investments without some expectation of receiving an ex post return but standard human capital theory human capital work and outcomes

career concerns matching and optimal disclosure policy raiders may suffer from information disadvantage since the current employer is often better informed about his workers quality when workers have career concerns and matching influences productivity the initial employer can strategically disclose information to influence incentives and matching efficiency long term complete contracts induce full disclosure when raiders are perfectly competitive the optimal short term contract induces full disclosure if raiders are perfectly competitive and the workers are risk neutral and are not liquidity constrained these conditions are not only sufficient but also almost necessary for full disclosure partial disclosure may be optimal if any of these conditions is relaxed

costes de contratacion y empresas de trabajo temporal una explicacion de la disparidad regional en espana the temporary work agencies twa industry experienced continuous growth throughout the 90s and now represents around 15 of temporary hiring in spain more interestingly are markable regional disparity in this sector exists across spanish provinces by developing a simple theoretical model and using panel data methodology this article examines the spanish caseand suggests that the costs of recruiting training and screening could explain a large part of the regional disparity this result is supported by the empirical fact that the twa firms have greater success in markets with low unemployment rates where the average duration of unemploymen tis longer and in provinces with higher concentrations of urban population respectively

reconsidering institutional labor economics the author illustrates the utility of institutional labor economics and makes a case for a reconsideration of it two recent developments motivate this effort the rise of new personnel economics npe as a significant subfield of labor economics and the substantial shifts in work organization that have taken place since the 1990s understanding how and why firms have reorganized work opens the door for a renewed interest in institutional approaches the author explains that the rules of institutional labor markets ilms emerge from the competition between organizational interest groups unions personnel professionals and the government and competing views of firms objectives resulting in the rise of ilms the slow diffusion of high performance work systems strategies used to obtain a high level of commitment from workers the use of contingent employees and the spread of new promotion rules in response to equal employment opportunity pressures as such the role of power and influence in establishing work rules is of central concern though more conventional npe considerations also remain important

strategic pricing with rational inattention to quality this paper studies both theoretically and experimentally the pricing strategy of a rm that faces a consumer who is rationally inattentive to product quality sims 2003 in a standard sequential pricing game rational inattention to quality produces two types of mixed strategy perfect bayesian equilibria one where sellers pool at a low price and buyers are fully inattentive to quality and one where there is semi pooling at a high price and buyers are selectively attentive to quality i characterize these

search and satisficing many everyday decisions are made without full examination of all available options and as a result the best available option may be missed we develop a search theoretic choice experiment to study the impact of incomplete consideration on the quality of choices we find that many decisions can be understood using the satisficing model of herbert simon 1955 most subjects search sequentially stopping when a satisficing level of reservation utility is realized we find that reservation utilities and search order respond systematically to changes in the decision making environment jel d03 d12 d83