term limits and electoral accountability abstract periodic elections are the main instrument through which voters can hold politicians accountable from this perspective term limits which restrict voters ability to reward politicians with re election appear counterproductive we show that despite the disciplining effect of elections term limits can be ex ante welfare improving from the perspective of voters by reducing the value of holding office term limits can induce politicians to implement policies that are closer to their private preferences such truthful behavior by incumbents in turn results in better screening of incumbents we characterize under which circumstances two term or even longer term limits are the optimal institution for voters

final voting in legislatures in representative democracies such as the united states legislatures provide the transmission mechanism through which pressure from private interests becomes public policy considerable attention has been given in the literature to explanations of the relevant forces that appear to be driving the legislative process for example much research has focused on the relative impact of economic vs ideological influences on congressional voting behavior in this approach the way that legislators vote on proposed legislation is modeled as a function of the preferences of various economic and ideological interests groups including the legislator s own preferences for wealth and ideology james kau and paul rubin 1979 joseph kalt and mark zupan 1984 sam peltzman 1985 missing from this approach is the idea that when legislatures are the transmission mechanism they are costly and imperfect organizations for generating political influence gary becker 1983 as such rules and institutions will emerge that are related to problems of internal control within the organization of a legislature in this paper we focus on the role of floor voting from the standpoint of legislator organization and control we seek to expand the interpretation of the meaning of floor voting activity by examining the timing sequence and outcomes of such votes specifically we look at final floor voting in the u s congress the patterns described in the analysis below suggest that a broader analytical perspective on the economic function of floor voting is required the findings also suggest that to identify more precisely the forces that are driving legislator voting behavior it is important to recognize the role of legislative transactional costs and institutional constraints in section i the conceptual framework for the empirical results is discussed in more detail the purpose is not to develop a fullblown theory of legislative organization rather it is to focus the reader s attention on several hypotheses about the function of final floor voting as a device for controlling legislator behavior within the legislature empirical results including an explanation of the timing and sequence of final votes on bills are reported in section ii the data for these tests are drawn from legislative activities in the u s house of representatives during the 96th and 98th congresses some concluding remarks are offered in section iii

capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics the economic theory of regulation long ago put public interest theories of politics to rest these theories have correctly been viewed as normative wishings rather than explanations of real world phenomena they have been replaced by models of political behavior that are consistent with the rest of microeconomics anthony downs 1957 james buchanan and gordon tullock 1965 george stigler 1971 sam peltzman 1976 recently however debate has arisen over whether some version of a public interest theory of regulation will have to be readmitted to our thinking about actions and results in the political arena what is at issue is the empirical importance of the altruistic publicly interested goals of rational actors in determining legislative and regulatory outcomes james kau and paul rubin 1979 kalt 1981 peltzman 1982 this study assesses the nature and significance of publicly interested objectives in a particular instance of economic policymaking u s senate voting on coal strip mining regulations the existence of such objectives is of course no contradiction of the economic view of human behavior kenneth arrow 1972 gary becker 1974 and may well be rooted in genetic biological history becker 1976 jack hirshleifer 1978 generally however individuals altruistic publicly interested goals have been given little attention this reflects the judgment that such goals are so empirically unimportant as to allow the use of occam s razor in positive models or well founded apprehensions that these goals are unusually difficult to identify measure and analyze notwithstanding the latter problem we find that approaches which confine themselves to a view of political actors as narrowly egocentric maximizers explain and predict legislative outcomes poorly the tracking and dissecting of the determinants of voting on coal strip mining policy suggest that the economic theory of politics has been prematurely closed to a broader conception of political behavior

televising legislatures some thoughts on whether politicians are search goods the evidence that televising legislative sessions helps politicians from homogeneous districts where everyone agrees with his positions but hurts politicians from heterogeneous districts does not differentiate between whether politicians are search or experience goods while evidence does exist that politicians are search goods e g lott 1987b it relies on the presence of the last period problem if the conclusion that politicians are search goods is correct it has important implications because it contradicts the commonly held belief that it is the threat of re election that prevents politicians from behaving opportunistically it also indicates that there are fundamental differences between firm and political brand names

flexible pensions for politicians it may be difficult to motivate politicians in their last term to solve this problem we suggest a triple mechanism involving political information markets flexible pensions and democratic elections an information market is used to predict the potential reelection chances of the politician pensions depend on the price in the information market and thereby motivate the politician to act in a socially optimal manner we show that on balance the triple mechanism increases social welfare finally we suggest several ways to avoid the manipulation of information markets and we discuss possible pitfalls of flexible pensions

bread and peace voting in u s presidential elections a simple bread and peace model shows that aggregate votes forpresident in postwar elections were determined entirely byweighted average growth of real disposable personal income percapita during the incumbent party s term and the cumulativenumbers of american military personnel killed in action as aresult of u s intervention in the korean and vietnamese civilwars the model is subjected to robustness tests against twenty two variations in functional form inspired by the extensiveliterature on presidential voting not one of these variationsadds value to the bread and peace model or significantly perturbsits coefficients

the distribution of public expenditure on education this paper is an attempt to estimate the distribution of public expenditure on education in england and wales the objective is to discover the extent of differences in the amounts of such expenditure accruing to people within the same age bracket but from different social and economic backgrounds to this end estimates are derived of public expenditure on selected education sectors for different occupational groups per person in the relevant age range section i outlines the basic methodology section ii presents the results section iii provides a conclusion and a brief comparison with other work in the area it should be noted that all that is measured is the distribution of the public costs of the resources consumed by users of the educational system no attempt is made to estimate the distribution of the benefits derived from the use of such resources either private or external

an overlapping generations model of electoral competition this paper presents a dynamic model of political competition between two parties with different policy preferences a party is explicitly modeled as a sequence of overlapping generations of candidates all of whom face finite decision horizons in general there is a conflict between the interests of the individual policymakers and those of the party which includes subsequent generations of candidates we characterize this conflict and suggest a scheme of intergenerational transfers within the party which can resolve or mitigate this conflict the paper shows how the overlapping generations model can be usefully applied to the political arena this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

incentives in organizations n 1975 steven kerr published on the folly of rewarding a while hoping for b the argument was simple you get what you pay for kerr distilled this unifying theme from a disparate set of examples involving politicians soldiers doctors orphanage directors professors and students as well as manufacturing and clerical employees and even human resource managers from these examples kerr pp 77980 concluded that two main causes of distorted incentives are fascination with an objective criterion where individuals seek to establish simple quantifiable standards against which to measure and reward performance and overemphasis on highly visible behaviors when some parts of the task are highly visible while others are not it took agency theory 15 years to express kerr s title not to mention to evaluate or extend his conclusions during this period agency theory was obsessed with the tradeoff between incentives and insurance even though clear eyed observations like kerr s about the design and performance of real incentive contracts suggested that several other issues are at least as important fortunately recent work has brought agency theory not only to kerr s position but beyond in this paper i summarize four new strands in agency theory that help me think about incentives in real organizations as a point of departure i begin with a quick sketch of the classic agency model i then discuss static models of objective performance measurement that sharpen kerr s argument repeated game models of subjective performance assessments incentives for skill development rather than simply for effort and incentive contracts between versus within organizations i con

participation rules for pareto optimal clubs abstract this paper presents a unifying framework for the club participation problem using compensating variation measures of willingness to pay for membership with more prospective club members than the equilibrium club population pareto efficient participation rules are derived which depend upon whether or not individuals are assured of club access sale of lottery tickets offering club membership is shown to be a socially superior club participation allocation mechanism to sale of vouchers guaranteeing membership the willingness to pay format readily encompasses the buchanan case where all prospective club members are assured of club participation

competitive equilibrium and the core in club economies with anonymous crowding in club economies with anonymous crowding competitive equilibrium states of the economy are efficient and coincide with the core when there is only one private good anonymous admission prices permit consumers with different tastes to share facilities consumers might do so when their demands for facility size and crowding coincide in which case sharing is efficient thus similarity of demands is the relevant consideration for efficiently grouping consumers with different tastes

the incidence of government expenditure and redistribution in the united kingdom not choose to produce or will not produce in a socially efficient manner the form of taxation adopted by a government may be influenced by a number of factors but equity considerations are often important thus tax systems frequently aim to alter the distribution of post tax incomes or some other measure of individuals command over goods and services from that of pre tax incomes of course redistribution brought about by taxation can alter individuals command only over marketed goods and services however the effects of the fiscal system as a whole tax and government expenditure on redistribution may be very different from redistribution via taxation alone unfortunately although there have been many attempts to measure the distributional impact of specific taxes or tax systems the theoretical and empirical difficulties experienced when trying to measure the redistributional effect of publicly provided goods and services places severe limitations on attempts to measure fiscal redistribution recent british and us studies of fiscal incidence have tended to allocate the benefits of government expenditure across income groups in line with their estimated consumption of government services government services that cannot be allocated specifically have usually been allocated using various

political shirking and the last term problem evidence for a party administered pension system studies of political shirking have disagreed both over whether the voting behavior of members of congress changes in their last term and over the manner in which last term shirking can be controlled through electoral sorting or through a pension system this paper presents evidence that members of congress who leave the house to run for statewide office do alter their voting behavior between the two sessions of their last house term and that this change includes an ideological shift toward their state party delegations the results suggest that a party driven pension system influences the voting of house members who aspire to higher office but that the pension system is not sufficient to control the last term shirking likely to occur if term limitations were imposed on house members

a critical review and an extension of the political shirking literature after substituting actual and real changes for proposed and nominal changes in budgetary and employment levels it is clear that the size and scope of the federal leviathon had not been reduced over 1982 83 it is also clear that the agencies which witnessed real budget cuts over this period were of minor importance in terms of the total u s budget future research on why only small agencies receive real budget cuts will provide us with a better understanding of the budgetary process

looking beyond reelection revising assumptions about the factors motivating congressional behavior this paper challenges the assumption inherent in most models of legislative behavior namely that congressmen are driven by the desire for reelection i offer an alternative perspective incumbents seek to maximize their discretionary investments and the income generated by the job the only constraint on this behavior is that legislators provide a satisfactory level of constituency service a product that i suggest entails slight opportunity and few manufacturing costs for congressmen and one that is unlikely to lose its value with increased production i also demonstrate that increases in salary and discretionary investments have lengthened congressional careers

when is efficiency separable from distribution in the provision of club goods abstract using the homogeneous of degree zero inverse congestion quality function employed most frequently in the literature we characterise completely the families of utility functions which are then necessary and sufficient for break even utilitarian welfare maximising provision of club goods with self selection to be separable from distribution two types of separation involving alternatively a the price and quality b the price quality facility size and total utilisation are considered when separation is possible utility functions and optimal decisions take simple intuitive forms our results extend the scope of separation results previously obtained only for pure public goods journal of economic literature classification numbers d62 h23 h40

clubs local public goods and transportation models a synthesis abstract clubs local public goods and transportation models are analyzed within a unified model the emphasis is on the derivation of optimal allocation pricing and the size of the sharing group we derive the conditions under which optimal prices will yield surplus or deficit as well as those under which competitive provision will be efficient given heterogeneous tastes we prove that segregation according to tastes is generally efficient although several cases where this result does not hold are also discussed we show that the existing literature is unnecessarily restrictive and that the unified approach suggested here considerably extends the existing analysis of clubs local public goods and the transportation problems

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

shirking representation and congressional behavior voting on the 1983 amendments to the social security act our central goals at the outset of the paper were three 1 to report on the relative significance of a sophisticated measure of constituent economic interest and a commonly used variable ada score that purports to measure the personal ideology of the candidate 2 demonstrate that the constituent economic interest variable should be adjusted to account for the fact thatvoters not citizens are the only effective principals in influencing a legislator s voting activities and 3 call into question on both theoretical and empirical grounds the claim that legislators shirk their responsibilities to voters by voting their own ideological preferences in order to evaluate our efforts consider table 5 for a large majority 15 of the 18 relevant runs the ideological variable is significant our measure of constituent economic interests does not eliminate the explanatory power of the ideological voting variable but this does not indicate shirking as opposed to shirking we may observe ideological voting because 1 it provides brand name capital 2 it represents the ideological preferences of the constituents or 3 it acts as a measure of median voter economic preferences further ada scores do not allow us to differentiate between these competing explanations for 11 of the 18 models one of the economic variables accounts for a significant portion of the variance in the dependent variables the results derived from our measure of constituent economic interests contradict most findings of the lasi school and raise questions about the validity of the empirical characterization of constituent interests in that research a breakdown of the results by chamber indicates that significant differences in the degree of ideological voting between the house and senate may exist this is important in that most research has focused only on the senate where ideological voting is more prevalent for the house table 5 reveals the constituent economic interest variable isalways significant and in fully one half of the relevant regressions it is theonly significant variable knocking ada out of the race as noted earlier the insignificance of ada is some indication of the absence of ideological shirking though its significance may indicate only measurement error voter ideology or reputational capital in the senate the results are more evenly split though it is clear that the adjusted for reelection constituency economic interest variable is an improvement ada is significant in all 12 senate regressions and the respective economic variables are significant in 5 or just under half this side by side comparison is provocative though it remains to be tested in detail but our preliminary conclusions can be stated as follows first as peltzman 1984 suggested a better specification of economic interest and constituency representation reduces though it does not eliminate the role of the ada variable in the senate second we find evidence that ideological shirking if it exists is much smaller in the house in fact from an institutional perspective it can be argued that economic interests are dominant since house districts are smaller and more homogeneous further the shorter terms for house members may make them more directly accountable to voters and smaller groups of voters may force a lesser reliance on pure ideological campaigning and require a more personal presentation of self

econometrics and presidential elections this paper discusses an econometric equation that explains votes for president as a function of economic events and incumbency information the history of the equation is reviewed the update after the 1992 election is discussed and a prediction for the 1996 election is made conditional on an economic forecast

the influence of ideology on congressional voting i introduction the question of what determines congressional voting on legislation has inspired a number of recent empirical analyses all are in agreement that congressional voting on specific bills is correlated with the economic self interest of the representative s constituents and a measure of the representative s ideology as indicated by his broader voting record however the interpretation of the empirical results regarding the influence of ideology has generated more debate than consensus in the current literature kau and rubin 1979 find evidence that a congressman s ideology influences his voting but also find evidence for an alternative but not mutually exclusive hypothesis that a congressman s rating by ideological groups reflects membership in a logrolling coalition kalt and zupan 1984 argue that although a representative s votes are likely to reflect the economic interests and the ideology of his constituents the weak incentive for the constituent principal to monitor the voting behavior of his representative agent gives the representative the opportunity to shirk or vote according to his personal ideology rather than his constituents both nelson and silberberg 1987 and mcarthur and marks 1988 find that the degree of shirking increases as the opportunity cost of shirking decreases in contrast to the above findings peltzman 1984 argues that ideological voting by congressmen need not necessarily reflect shirking but instead may be a way for the representative to cheaply provide his constituents with information about his general position on issues what appears to be shirking allowed by an imperfect principal agent relationship may instead be signaling designed to at least partially overcome the imperfect nature of the relationship lott 1987 extends peltzman s signaling argument by hypothesizing that if politicians are viewed by constituents as search goods rather than experience goods then they will have an incentive to establish a political brand name by establishing a consistent ideological voting record dougan and munger s 1989 approach is similar to lott s they argue that politicians with strongly held views that match those of their constituents make ideal representatives because they are less likely to vote against their constituents interests when pressured by special interest groups an incumbent therefore has an incentive to invest in reputational capital by maintaining the consistency over time of his broader voting record because this reputational capital generates quasi rents in electoral competition with candidates who possess less of it neither lott nor dougan and munger find evidence of shirking in their analyses of congressmen s broader voting records as measured by ideological groups ratings dougan and munger also develop a variable intensity of commitment version of the reputational capital hypothesis this version contends that voters with unambiguously liberal or conservative ideologies may prefer a candidate whose voting record indicates that his views are more extreme than their own such a zealous candidate voters believe is even less likely to be influenced by special interest groups a congressman serving an unambiguously liberal or conservative constituency therefore has an incentive to establish and maintain an extremely ideological overall voting record in contrast a congressman serving a constituency with centrist ideological preferences has an incentive to establish an overall voting record that matches his constituency s ideological leanings the systematic deviation of a congressman s voting record from his constituents preferences when near either extreme of the ideological spectrum is not inconsistent with a faithful principal agent relationship one cannot help but be struck by the observation that those researchers finding evidence consistent with shirking studied voting on specific legislation whereas those researchers finding no evidence of shirking studied representatives broader voting records as measured by ideological ratings

a theory of intergenerational clubs intertemporal pareto efficient conditions for provision and maintenance of the shared good tolls membership size and financing are presented for intergenerational clubs an optimal membership span is also determined for nonlifetime members these pareto efficient conditions account for atemporal crowding intertemporal depreciation due to utilization and the sequence of members adequate incentives exist for privately owned clubs to act with foresight but do not necessarily exist for government owned clubs nevertheless privately owned clubs must be operated by a firm rather than the members if free rider problems regarding maintenance are to be avoided

the ideological component of senate voting different principles or different principals evidence exists on both sides of the question of whether or not legislator specific ideologically driven shirking of constituent interest occurs in this paper we use a well known model of such shirking by senators as our point of departure and add measures of inter state constituent interests the role of campaign contributions and hence the importance of whether or not senators are up for reelection we find some evidence that the model provides a stronger explanation for senators up for reelection than for those who are not and that campaign contributions help determine voting decisions by these legislators finally accounting for inter state constituent interests shirking is not a significant variable in the voting decisions of senators facing reelection thus it appears that the reelection interests of some senators have been mistaken for ideologically driven shirking

legislator voting and shirking a critical review of the literature we set out to critically review the progress in answering two related questions what determines how legislators vote and how can shirking by legislators be measured in the first category the hypothesis that legislators shirk in order to indulge their personal ideological preferences has led researchers astray the theoretical underpinning is shaky on two counts first legislators who indulge their preferences at the expense of their constituents preferences put themselves at a competitive electoral disadvantage second the original two stage procedure used to measure ideological shirking is severely flawed among many other problems the residual measure of shirking implicitly assumes that the median voter is the relevant constituent principal for the legislator agent

voluntary income redistribution with migration abstract this paper examines theoretically the welfare magnet problem brought about by income redistribution in a small area where disparities across jurisdictions in transfer policies may induce both recipient and resource migration we show that the level of redistribution determined by majority rule may either rise or decline as household mobility increases and that this level will be either higher or lower than the efficient level to an extent that depends on local market conditions the social value of migrants and the mobility of both the rich and the poor in particular an economy may benefit from the immigration of transfer recipients we also derive the form of an efficient community specific subsidy to transfers which in some cases will be negative

ideology and legislator shirking we argue that legislator shirking voting on the basis of personal ideology rather than the interests of one s constituents can exist but its appearance should conform to the law of demand we test and confirm this theory using votes on defense expenditure bills in the u s senate in 1982 we assume the cost of shirking is relatively higher on narrowly focused bills on specific weapons systems with well defined beneficiaries and relatively lower on general defense expenditure bills with uncertain final distribution of funds we find greater influence for senators ideology in general versus specific bills

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

legislators and interest groups how unorganized interests get represented this paper derives a supply price for public policy using a constrained maximization model in the model three sets of agents each have preferences over outcomes organized interest groups offer campaign contributions to improve their own wealth voters offer votes to obtain outcomes closer to their most preferred outcomes and legislators seek both campaign contributions and votes to obtain reelection a given legislator s supply price for policy is shown to depend on the productivity of his effort as determined by committee assignments priority and ability and by the preferences of his unorganized constituency in the home district two extreme assumptions about the effectiveness of campaign spending in eliciting votes are used to illustrate the comparative statics properties of the model the prediction of the model is that interest groups will in general seek out legislators whose voters are indifferent to the policy the interest group seeks thus voters who do have preferences over policy are in effect represented even though they are not organized

are contributors rational untangling strategies of political action committees empirical public choice literature and casual observation suggest that the behavior of political action committees is remarkably unsophisticated meaning that pacs give to those legislators who would support their interests anyway thus it is suggested that contributor behavior deviates from rational behavior which is a cornerstone of economic analysis in this paper a switching regression model is estimated that allows for strategies of pacs to vary for different contribution recipients i analyze the behavior of farm pacs over three election cycles in contrast to previous findings i find that contributor behavior is not inconsistent with rational behavior contributors who attempt to influence the voting behavior of members of congress give the most money to legislators whose constituency interest suggests that they are likely to be undecided on how to vote and pacs give less money to legislators who represent districts with larger farm populations because those legislators are likely to vote in con

self interest agency theory and political voting behavior the ratification of the united states constitution two hundred years ago the united states constitution replaced the articles of confederation as the fundamental law of the land when new hampshire became the ninth state to ratify the constitution on june 21 1788 the document represented the successful culmination of a movement to strengthen the national government scholars long have debated the possible causes for this important change in political institutions see james hutson 1984 a change which was to have major consequences for the development of the nation douglass north 1981 ch 14 despite the intense debate few scholars have either offered any theoretical model of the delegates voting behavior or employed formal statistical analysis to test their hypotheses about voting behavior at the 13 state ratifying conventions these omissions are surprising particularly since charles a beard 1913 long ago stated that the contest over ratification represented the ultimate test of the role of economic interests in the making of the constitution a test he never conducted given the recent interest exhibited by economists in explaining political behavior the absence of a rigorous analysis of voting at the 13 ratifying conventions is even more surprising economists and economic historians have all but ignored the ratification process in a progress report on our study of the making of the constitution we robert mcguire and robert ohsfeldt 1984 recently provided a tentative theoretical model and summarized preliminary indications drawn from incomplete data of delegates voting behavior during the drafting and ratification of the constitution more recently we mcguire and ohsfeldt 1986 mcguire 1988 presented the final results of our econometric studies of the voting behavior during the drafting of the constitution at the federal convention of 1787 in the present paper we offer a principalagent model and econometric tests of voting behavior during the ratification of the constitution at the 13 state conventions an analysis of voting at the ratification stage allows for a stronger test of the factors influencing voting behavior than an analysis of the federal convention of 1787 because of a greater number of delegates over 1200 versus 55 and a more straightforward voting process the paper not only addresses an important and controversial issue in economic history the role of economic interests in the ratification of the constitution it also advances our general understanding of polit

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

on the mis measurement of legislator ideology and shirking in this paper we show that current statistical measures of legislator s shirking are implicitly based on the electoral concept of a unique majority rule equilibrium point in the policy space where elections are contested we note that such equilibria do not exist generically and present statistical results showing that cross sectional regressions where legislators voting indices are predicted by district average demograhic and economic data are mis specified we also discuss a weaker equilibrium construct the uncovered set and present statistical evidence showing that differences in voting behavior between senators from the same state are positively related to the heterogeneity of the electorate we argue that current evidence alleged to show shirking by senators is equally consistent with senators who perfectly represent an idiosyncratic constituency that cannot be represented by district average data