competition between telecommunications operators abstract many observers of the telecommunications industry predict that regulation will soon give way to competition policy the paper analyzes unregulated network competition both in the mature and the transition phase of the industry it considers competition in linear or nonlinear prices for customers and also considers both nondiscriminatory pricing and termination based discriminatory pricing the paper investigates whether freely negotiated access charges are compatible with effective competition in the mature phase of the industry and do not erect barriers to entry in the transition towards competition last it analyzes the meaning and impact of the efficient component pricing rule in the context of network competition

privatization in eastern germany management selection and economic transition this paper suggests that management s role in enterprise restructuring and market failures in the managerial labor market help explain important features of the german privatization program a model of adverse selection based on information advantages for private owners demonstrates how privatization can improve the quality and number of western managers in eastern enterprises these benefits can increase with the size of the transition evidence of management replacement and significant differences between state owned and privatized firms from a survey of eastern german firms supports model assumptions and predictions these results suggest the importance of management replacement to successful privatization copyright 1997 by american economic association

infrastructure and development a critical appraisal of the macro level literature this survey reviews the existing macro level empirical literature on the link between infrastructure and development outcomes in a critical light after providing a general framework that casts the relevant terms of the controversy on the real effect of infrastructure on growth in the context of an aggregate production function it signals what are the relevant empirical questions to be addressed this guides the systematic review of a number of empirical studies and the discussion of the main econometric challenges to the identification of the effect of infrastructure on output and productivity finally building on related research in particular in contract theory and political economy the paper spells out several promising research avenues

residual state ownership policy stability and financial performance following strategic decisions by privatizing telecoms we question previous research assuming that privatizing firm performance generally benefits from decreasing state ownership and the passage of time both of which purportedly align principal agent incentives promoting organizational decision making that increases shareholder value when state ownership shifts from majority and controlling to minority and non controlling the performance impact may be positive in the short run particularly where there is instability in the local investment policy environment consistent with this proposition we develop and test hypotheses derived from a minority and non controlling or residual state ownership framework grounded in credible privatization and institutional theory we propose that 1 residual state ownership positively affects shareholder returns after strategic decisions by privatizing firms because it signals state support for managerial initiatives 2 the passage of time since initial privatization negatively affects shareholder returns after strategic decisions by privatizing firms because initial undertakings in support of the privatizing firm are reversed and 3 home country investment policy stability moderates these two effects greater stability obviates the need for residual state ownership and slows policy reversals over time we find empirical support for our residual state ownership framework in event study analyses of cumulative abnormal returns cars associated with 196 major investments announced from 1986 to 2001 by 15 privatizing telecoms from around the world cars are positive at 5 25 state ownership levels but turn negative at higher state ownership levels cars turn sharply negative within 1 2 years from initial privatization dates increasing policy stability diminishes positive ownership and negative time effects on cars results confirm the potential supporting role that residual state ownership can play in enhancing strategic decision making and financial performance by privatizing firms particularly where there is instability in the home country investment policy environment

privatization and globalization an empirical analysis abstract this paper examines the link between globalization measured by foreign direct investment fdi and foreign portfolio investment fpi and privatization of state owned enterprises in a multi country sample that focuses on developing countries we hypothesize that privatization has an effect on fdi fpi as the process of fostering private sector participation is often accompanied by liberalization reforms and by allocations of substantial shares of newly privatized firms to foreign investors similarly we expect fdi fpi to foster privatization efforts as new capital inflows technology and managerial skills that accompany fdi fpi make the environment more prone to competition providing governments with incentives to privatize inefficient firms that need to be turned around this relation is assessed in two ways first in a dynamic panel using a generalized method of moments approach and second through panel causality tests we find a bi directional positive relation between privatization proceeds and globalization particularly in the case of fdi

an economic model of soil conservation by introducing soil depth and soil loss into a simple model of agricultural production this paper seeks to determine when the private path of erosion differs from the socially optimal path considering the depletion of soil only and abstracting from the environmental disruption caused by erosion the paper argues that under most institutional arrangements the social and private rates of erosion are the same the paper concludes that public policy should be directed toward reducing erosion only when it leads to significant pollution externalities

utility consistent discrete continuous choices in soil conservation a utility consistent model of participation and participation intensity choices for a voluntary soil conservation program is developed a modified form of roy s identity is used to derive a two equation system that links the discrete dichotomous choice participation and the continuous choice intensity to the same utility function the model corrects for selectivity bias that arises in single equation approaches an application to a filter strip program in two counties in illinois and michigan demonstrates that different factors affect responses to the program across the sample regions estimated willingness to accept payments for participation in the program suggest policy impacts are not uniform across locations

infrastructure and public utilities privatization in developing countries should governments in developing countries promote private ownership and deregulated prices in noncompetitive sectors or should they run publicly owned firms and regulate prices at the expense of rents to insiders a theoretical model is used to answer these normative questions the analysis focuses on the tradeoff between fiscal benefits and consumer surplus during privatization of noncompetitive sectors privatization transfers control rights to private interests and eliminates public subsidies yielding benefits to taxpayers at the cost of increased prices for consumers in developing countries where budget constraints are tight privatization and price liberalization may be optimal for low profitability industries but suboptimal for more profitable industries and once a market has room for more than one firm governments may prefer to regulate the industry without a credible regulatory agency regulation is achieved through public ownership

economies of diversification a generalization and decomposition of economies of scope abstract the paper investigates the benefits of diversification for a multi product firm it examines economies of diversification reflecting the cost reduction associated with producing outputs in an integrated firm compared to specialized firms the analysis applies under complete specialization as well as partial specialization when firms are not fully specialized and or when the specialization scheme does not cover all outputs it decomposes economies of diversification into four additive parts a part measuring complementarity among outputs a part reflecting economies of scale a part reflecting convexity and a part reflecting the role of fixed cost this new decomposition appears useful in investigating how scale effects complementarity effects and convexity effects can contribute to economies of scope in a multiproduct firm and helps generate valuable insights into the economics of specialization for multiproduct firms

the effects of privatization on efficiency how does privatization work summary uncovering the effects of privatization is difficult because privatization of a particular firm usually is not an accident this paper tests the effects of privatization on productive and allocative market efficiency using a rich panel data set of 22 privatized cement plants from turkey in the 1983 99 period since all public cement firms were privatized and we have pre and post privatization data for all we are able to avoid the problem of endogeneity associated with sample selection our analysis goes beyond just examining the privatization effects and explores how privatization really works changes in objectives of the firm ownership effect and changes in market structure environment effect may both be responsible for privatization outcomes we find that ownership effects are sufficient to achieve improvements in labor productivity our results on allocative efficiency however are dependent on changes in the competitive environment while all plants seem to improve labor productivity through work force reductions plants privatized to foreign buyers also increase their capital and investment significantly

optimal soil conservation and the reform of agricultural pricing policies abstract soil degradation is often blamed for the poor performance of agriculture in developing economies so too are policies which keep the prices of both outputs and inputs artificially low some economists have argued that pricing reforms will encourage soil depletion others say that such reforms will encourage soil conservation to evaluate these claims this paper develops models of the optimal control of soil erosion and soil fertility it is shown that the effect could go either way but that there are strong reasons for suspecting that pricing reforms will not affect soil conservation dramatically

links between rural poverty and the environment in developing countries asset categories and investment poverty abstract this paper presents a framework for analyzing the links between poverty and the environment in rural areas of developing countries it introduces the concept of investment poverty and relates it to other measures of poverty in analysis of these links the notion of poverty is examined in the context of categories of assets and categories of environment change with particular focus on farm household income generation and investment strategies as determinants of the links the strength and direction of the poverty environment links are shown to differ even invert depending on the composition of the assets held by the rural poor and the types of environmental problems they face policy strategies need to focus on conditioning variables that affect market development community wealth infrastructure household asset distribution and the affordability and appropriateness of natural resource conservation technologies

an exact algorithm for the capacitated total quantity discount problem in this paper we analyze the procurement problem of a company that needs to purchase a number of products from a set of suppliers to satisfy demand the suppliers offer total quantity discounts and the company aims at selecting a set of suppliers so to satisfy product demand at minimum purchasing cost the problem known as total quantity discount problem tqdp is strongly np hard we study different families of valid inequalities and provide a branch and cut approach to solve the capacitated variant of the problem capacitated tqdp where the quantity available for a product from a supplier is limited a hybrid algorithm called help heuristic enhancement from lp is used to provide an initial feasible solution to the exact approach help exploits information provided by the continuous relaxation problem to construct neighborhoods optimally searched through the solution of mixed integer subproblems a streamlined version of the proposed exact method can optimally solve in a reasonable amount of time instances with up to 100 suppliers and 500 products and largely outperforms an existing approach available in the literature and cplex 12 2 that frequently runs out of memory before completing the search

vendor selection with price breaks abstract we study the problem of vendor selection where a buyer must choose order quantities to place with vendors in a multiple sourcing network the selection process is influenced by the price delivery and quality objectives of the buyer as well as by the production or rationing constraints of the vendors vendors are assumed to offer price breaks which depend on the sizes of the order quantities each proce break schedule is characterized by two attributes it represents either quantity discounts or surcharges and is either cumulative all units or noncumulative incremental we present linear and mixed binary integer programming models that provide unifying frameworks for models of vendor performance measures from the purchasing literature and models of price breaks from the operations research literature we argue that our models offer viable approaches to vendor selection with price breaks because of the availability of commercial software packages for personal computers that provide flexible and efficient computational tools for solving the models this implies that vendor selection with price breaks can be performed at the fingertips of purchasing managers

the performance of privatized firms in the czech republic abstract with the growing importance of privatizations as a part of government policy most empirical studies of these privatizations conclude that firm performance immediately improves following privatization privatization has been the most important part of the transition from the centrally planned economies of central and eastern europe and has a larger impact on those economies than privatizations in other countries however few studies have looked at the performance of firms following mass privatization this study uses 453 separate firms 101 firms privatized in both waves for a total of 554 observations in the first and second waves of czech voucher privatization using methodology from previous studies we find that while the overall effects from privatization are positive the effects vary by privatization wave size and industry firms privatized in the first wave performed worse decline in performance following privatization than firms privatized in the second wave we also fail to find ownership concentration or debt as an important factor in restructuring the firm i believe that the results are consistent with two hypotheses first economic and political structure surrounding the privatization waves plays an important part in the success of privatization stable environments both political and economic help privatized firms restructure and improve operating performance as well as attract foreign investors and capital even in less developed countries but in transitional economies undergoing mass privatization in rapidly changing and developing economic and political environments hinder firms from restructuring and improving performance following privatization results are also consistent with the hypothesis that firms with a longer preparation period prior to privatization an implicit seasoning improve performance following privatization

impacts on investments and transmission distribution loss through power sector reforms abstract this study analyses original panel data from 86 countries between 1985 and 2006 econometric methods were used to identify the effects of different policy devices of power sector reforms on performance indicators installed capacity per capita transmission and distribution loss in the countries analyzed the research findings suggest that reform variables such as the entry of independent power producers ipps unbundling of generation and transmission establishment of regulatory agencies and the introduction of a wholesale spot market are the driving forces of increasing generation capacity as well as reducing transmission and distribution loss in the respective regions in this study we can assume that firstly different electric industry s reform policies measures have different impacts on geographically and economically diverse countries secondly a country s state of economic development has a different impact on policy effects of reforms thirdly coexistent with independent regulatory agencies reform policy becomes more powerful in realizing sector performances

migration remittances and agricultural productivity in china in our paper we have used the new economics of labor migration framework to trace the complex linkages that exist among migration remittances and agricultural productivity in china constraints in the operation of on farm labor and capital or insurance markets or institutions provide households with a motivation to migrate and distort on farm operations when labor leaves in our household sample the net impact of migration and remittances on maize production is negative excerpt

a note on soil depth failing markets and agricultural pricing abstract due to implementation of structural adjustment programs prices of agricultural products have increased in many developing countries from an environmental point of view it is an open question whether these price increases stimulate sustainable agriculture in the context of a simple model that includes labour intensive investments in soil conservation it is demonstrated that rising prices for agricultural outputs unambiguously increase soil conservation in the steady state with imperfect labour markets the reverse effect may occur giving rise to a conflict between agricultural reform programs and soil conservation

competition in telecommunications this paper discusses the scope for competition in the telecommunications industry taking into account the features of natural monopoly network externalities and customer inertia recent policy towards competition in the industry in the uk is surveyed with an emphasis on access pricing and interconnection finally recent theoretical developments in the economics of access pricing and interconnection are discussed and shown to lend some support for aspects of current policy in the uk copyright 1997 by oxford university press

a multicriteria model for assigning new orders to service suppliers abstract this paper describes a multicriteria model developed to support decisions on the assignment of new orders to service suppliers in this case contractors for the construction or renewal of pipeline networks for gas distribution the model comprises two phases i computation of a quota expressed as a percentage of total work orders budget for each supplier ii assignment of each particular order to a supplier selected on the basis of a multi attribute preference index evaluated for each candidate contractor the first phase is executed at the beginning of each year and then reviewed quarterly and the quotas are defined by a two criteria model the prices quoted by the supplier for standard works and the past performance of the constructor given by a performance appraisal system the paper describes the structuring phase of the model as well as the descriptors and corresponding partial value functions used in each stage to perform the evaluation within an additive aggregation framework

privatisation in developing countries a review of the evidence and the policy lessons privatisation is widely promoted as a means of improving economic performance in developing countries however the policy remains controversial and the relative roles of ownership and other structural changes such as competition and regulation in promoting economic performance remain uncertain this article reviews the main empirical evidence on the impact of privatisation on economic performance in developing economies the evidence suggests that if privatisation is to improve performance over the longer term it needs to be complemented by policies that promote competition and effective state regulation and that privatisation works best in developing countries when it is integrated into a broader process of structural reform

a test for subadditivity of the cost function with an application to the bell system stable url http links jstor org sici sici 0002 8282 28198409 2974 3a4 3c615 3aatfsot 3e2 0 co 3b2 rthe american economic review is currently published by american economic association your use of the jstor archive indicates your acceptance of jstor s terms and conditions of use available athttp www jstor org about terms html jstor s terms and conditions of use provides in part that unless you have obtainedprior permission you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles and you may use content inthe jstor archive only for your personal non commercial use please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work publisher contact information may be obtained athttp www jstor org journals aea html each copy of any part of a jstor transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission the jstor archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long term preservation and access to leading academicjournals and scholarly literature from around the world the archive is supported by libraries scholarly societies publishers and foundations it is an initiative of jstor a not for profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology for more information regarding jstor please contact support jstor org http www jstor orgmon jul 2 16 52 19 2007

a serial inventory system with supplier selection and order quantity allocation given the prevalence of both supplier selection and inventory control problems in supply chain management this article addresses these problems simultaneously by developing a mathematical model for a serial system this model determines an optimal inventory policy that coordinates the transfer of items between consecutive stages of the system while properly allocating orders to selected suppliers in stage 1 in addition a lower bound on the minimum total cost per time unit is obtained and a 98 effective power of two pot inventory policy is derived for the system under consideration this pot algorithm is advantageous since it is simple to compute and yields near optimal solutions

soil conservation as an investment in land abstract most studies on the problem of optimal soil conservation have analyzed soil conservation measures as being time limited in their effect this paper extends previous analyses of the soil conservation decision by allowing farmers to make investments in soil conservation structures such as terraces bundles and ditches it shows that the main conclusions arrived at in previous studies remain valid the long term effects of unanticipated permanent changes in prices and discount rates may go either way independent of whether conservation measures are time limited or have lasting effects on the soil base

bank privatization in sub saharan africa the case of uganda commercial bank previous empirical analyses have found that bank privatizations are more successful when the government fully relinquishes control when the bank is privatized to a strategic investor and when foreign owned banks are allowed to participate in the bidding the privatization of uganda commercial bank ucb to the south african bank stanbic met all these criteria suggesting that it is a likely candidate for success but other features suggest reasons for caution ucb dominated the ugandan banking sector prior to privatization and the institutional environment in uganda was less favorable than in many of the middle income countries looked at in earlier empirical studies despite these concerns the privatization appears to have been relatively successful the portfolio of the privatized bank which was cleaned prior to sale remains relatively strong and profitability and credit growth are now on par with other ugandan banks though market segmentation remains a concern since stanbic faces little or no direct competition in many remote areas some early results suggest that access to credit has improved for some hard to serve groups

consumption risk farm characteristics and soil conservation adoption among low income farmers in the philippines abstract this paper investigates patterns of soil conservation adoption among low income farmers in the philippines a model is presented that focuses attention on the role of assets and consumption risk in influencing soil conservation adoption decisions results from a reduced form probit model of adoption are reported these econometric findings indicate that patterns of soil conservation adoption reflect relative risk considerations in addition to farm and household characteristics farm size tenure security labor availability and land quality all exhibit a positive association with soil conservation adoption in contrast controlling on these and other household characteristics the probability of adoption falls as consumption risk rises these results underscore a need for greater sensitivity among policymakers to the role of consumption risk in influencing soil conservation decisions in low income settings

leviathan resists the endogenous relationship between privatization and firm performance using a panel dataset of privatized cement firms in turkey this paper models and finds support for the simultaneous relationship between privatization and firm performance it is found that favorable short run performance weak market potential higher employment lower socio economic development concentrated voter preferences and weaker representation of right wing parties in the firms locality delay the timing of privatization the paper also finds that privatization increases output in the medium term by reducing the labor stock and promoting the adoption of more advanced technology such that production shifts from constant to decreasing returns to scale

competition and allocative efficiency the case of the u s telephone industry this study investigates the effect of competition on the productive efficiency of the u s telephone industry taking into account the fact that the industry was subject to rate of return regulation it is shown that competition induces the incumbents to use capital inputs closer to the unconstrained optima thereby reducing the allocative inefficiency caused by the averch johnson effect this effect is in addition to the usual technical efficiency improvement induced by competition empirical results based on annual data for the u s telephone industry for the 1951 90 period suggested that competition improved the allocative efficiency of the incumbent firms which had been under a rate of return regulation until 1989 copyright 1995 by mit press

ownership changes and access to external financing this paper examines access to external financing in the privatization context and provides new evidence on the effects of financing constraints on performance and investment ownership reforms increase firms reliance on external financing empirically performance and investment changes around ownership reforms are increasing in country level measures of access to credit the presence of a severe prior public financing constraint contributes to stronger investment growth after privatization privatized enterprises do not outperform publicly owned industries all else given our analyses rely on new international sector and firm level data and correct for potential endogeneity of ownership changes

state owned and privately owned firms an empirical analysis of profitability leverage and labor intensity for some it is an article of faith that governmentowned firms must be less efficient or at least less profitable than privately owned firms maxim boycko et al 1996 argue that politicians cause government owned firms to employ excess labor inputs anne o krueger 1990 suggests that such firms may be pressured to hire politically connected people rather than those best qualified to perform desired tasks more generally government owned firms are thought to forgo maximum profit in the pursuit of social and political objectives such as wealth redistribution in addition the residual cash flow claims of these firms are not readily transferable like the shares of a private corporation this impairs residual claimant incentives to monitor managers and ultimately degrades firm performance as a consequence one expects government owned firms to be technically less efficient and therefore less profitable than private firms the implication is that in competitive markets without significant externalities private ownership is the superior organizational form the view that government firms are inherently less efficient than private ones however remains controversial among economists john vickers and george yarrow 1991 among others point out that agency problems arise in private firms as well as public ones in most large private corporations managers own little of the stock because monitoring managers is costly a divergence arises between their objectives and those of private shareholders private shareholders typically hold a small stake in any one firm and it may not pay any shareholder to bear the cost of monitoring management it follows from this discussion that whether government firms are more or less efficient than private firms is primarily an empirical issue to date the body of empirical evidence is mixed in this paper we report further empirical evidence on the relative efficiency of public and private enterprises we build on previous work by studying larger samples over longer time periods and by allowing for additional factors that influence firm performance in particular our analysis controls for time series variation in the general level of economic activity that may otherwise confound performance comparisons between government and private firms 2 we approach the issue in two different ways first using accounting numbers we conduct a large sample cross sectional comparison of government owned and privately owned corporations this comparison is similar in design to that of boardman and vining 1989 but our sample is three times the size of theirs and includes three

transaction cost economics in global sourcing assessing regional differences and implications for performance this paper addresses two gaps in current research on transaction cost economics tce first the fundamental claim suggesting that firms that align their governance structure to transactions according to tce perform better than those that do not and second the application of tce to global sourcing transactions a research model is presented and evaluated using a set of 150 relationships between swiss buyers and foreign suppliers the findings suggest that there are significant differences in how transactions and governance structures are aligned with varying performance and with suppliers from western europe as compared to suppliers from other regions

unnatural monopolies in local telephone we attempt to overcome the serious data problems of past telecommunications cost studies by focusing on local exchange carriers lecs with enough degrees offreedom to yield precise estimates our global subadditivity tests show that the cost function is definitely not subadditive the results suggest that the benefits to breaking up the monopoly outputs of existing lecs substantially outweigh the potential losses in efficiency they also support permitting entry and increasing competition in local exchange markets furthermore given the competitive nature of long distance service it is doubtful that the predivestiture bell system was a natural monopoly

determination of paths to vendor market efficiency using parallel coordinates representation a negotiation tool for buyers abstract this study demonstrates the use of data envelopment analysis for measuring vendor performance and efficiency an algorithm by inselberg is employed for determining points of vendor efficiency on multiple criteria this study then demonstrates how parallel coordinates graphical representation can be used to display the efficiency of vendors on multiple criteria and in so doing visually identify benchmark values on these criteria for negotiating with inefficient vendors an example of a firm purchasing in a jit manufacturing environment is used to illustrate this approach the results of this approach point to its flexibility for use in vendor negotiations

deregulating with no regulator is the german electricity transmission regime institutionally correct abstract from 1998 to 2005 the german transmission grid has been put under a self regulated arrangement it seems hard to believe that transmission lines can be opened to third party access only with a negotiated access regime and no regulator supervision it seems contradictory with the notion of ex post contractual hazards promoted by v goldberg and o williamson if a weak institutional arrangement is implemented one might assume that it has to be harmful to network and market access if it is not to be inefficient why and how could it work when looking at rules and prices for accessing the transmission network and the corresponding wholesale markets in germany the club arrangement for transmission opening does not appear so harmful accordingly we have to reconsider the ex ante and ex post institutional mechanism of such a club arrangement ex ante we first reconsider skills and strengths of industrial consumers and german business associations in defining and assessing rules of transmission access we underline that incomplete vertical and horizontal integration of german electricity companies impeded extensive cartel collusion ex post we first look at a strong competition authority backing then we discover that ex ante and ex post dimensions are much more mixed and reinforced in an open cumulative pro competition process framed by the competition authority

improving the efficiency of the purchasing process using total cost of ownership information the case of heating electrodes at cockerill sambre s a improving the efficiency of the purchasing process provides important opportunities to increase a firm s profitability in this paper we introduce a mathematical programming model that uses total cost of ownership information to simultaneously select suppliers and determine order quantities over a multi period time horizon the total cost of ownership quantifies all costs associated with the purchasing process and is based on the activities and cost drivers determined by an activity based costing system our approach is motivated by the purchasing problem of heating electrodes at cockerill sambre a belgian multinational steel producer in this case quality issues account for more than 70 of the total cost of ownership making the quality of a supplier a critical success factor in the supplier selection process

a goal programming constrained regression review of the bell system breakup the recently implemented court decision to break up bell american telephone telegraph co to accord with u s anti trust laws represents a highly significant policy decision which is proving to be influential in other countries as well as the u s the telecommunication industry is of such size and importance that even relatively small economies that might be lost with bell s breakup as a natural monopoly could involve substantial welfare losses to consumers and producers studies commissioned by the u s justice department that approached this topic by econometric methods reported that the evidence failed to support the contention that bell was a natural monopoly here a goal programming constrained regression as developed in the management science literature uses the same functional form and the same data but nevertheless reverses the main findings of the econometric studies in every one of the 20 years covered this kind of difference in results obtained by two different methods of analysis poi

the financial and operating performance of newly privatized firms evidence from developing countries this paper examines the change in the financial and operating performance of 79 companies from 21 developing countries that experienced full or partial privatization during the period from 1980 to 1992 we use accounting performance measures adjusted for market effects in addition to unadjusted accounting performance measures both unadjusted and market adjusted results show significant increases in profitability operating efficiency capital investment spending output employment level and dividends we also find a decline in leverage following privatization but this change is significant only for unadjusted leverage ratios our results are generally robust when we partition our data into various subsamples

corporate governance and equity prices evidence from the czech and slovak republics the 1992 czechoslavakia mass privatization program involving about 1 500 eneterprises and implemented through a voucher scheme with competitive bidding was a bold step in changing the ownership and governance of a large part of the economy it represents a clear test case of one approach and other countries may benefit from its lessons at the time much skepticisism was voiced about mass privatization it would lead to diffuse ownership and no effective corporate governance would result but innovative forces led to the emergence of investment funds that collected much of the individuals voucher points leading to a much more concentrated ownership structure it has been expected that this concentrated ownership would lead to improved corporate governance but the jury is still out so far only limited and largely anecdotal evidence is available on the impact investment funds have on the way firms are being managed too little time has passed and too many shocks have occurred for example the split of the czech and slovak republics to expect to find discernible changes in corporate governance on measures of actual firm performance an alternative approach is to investigate whether firms that ended up with more concentrated ownership and possibly improved governance sell for higher prices either in the last voucher round or in the secondary market since then in a forward looking financial market one can expect prices to incorporate the effects of better ownership on future firm performance and associated dividends to shareholders put differently one would expect that two firms with different shareholding structures but otherwise identical would trade at different prices with the firm with a more concentrated ownership and presumably better corporate governance trading at a higher price on a cross sectional basis ownership structure may thus be significant in explaining relative share prices the author explores this line of reasoning controlling for a number of firm and sector specific variables he finds 1 majority ownership by a domestic or foreign investor has a positive influence on firm prices 2 firms with many small owners have lower prices 3 ownership by many small scale investors makes it easier for any single investor to establish effective control but such control does not necessarily translate into higher prices the author also provides two possible explanations of why higher prices appear to be associated only with majority ownership by a single investor he finds 1 the corporate legal framework and the difficulty in collecting proxy votes in the czech and slovak republics may prevent a small investor from making the necessary changes in the way firms are managed thus keeping prices low and 2 commercial banks are both managers of invesment funds and creditors of individual firms funds managers may face conflicts of interest and not be interested in increasing the value of equity alone but also the value of credits this could explain why prices are relatively lower for those firms in which investment funds have effective control

a note on soil depth failing markets and agricultural pricing comment abstract bulte and van soest bulte e van soest d 1999 a note on soil depth failing markets and agricultural pricing journal of development economics 58 245 254 argue that higher agricultural output prices result in greater soil conservation when labor markets function well but have ambiguous effects when labor markets are absent the latter result is not attributable to labor market failure but rather occurs whenever labor supply is less than perfectly elastic consistent with the more general model presented here empirical evidence from a number of developing countries suggests that well functioning labor markets are associated with decreases in investment in soils

a multiobjective approach to vendor selection abstract purchases from vendors involve significant costs for many firms decisions related to these purchases include the selection of vendors and the determination of order quantities to be placed with the selected vendors such decisions are frequently multiobjective in nature that is they are evaluated by more than one criterion at least 23 criteria for various vendor selection problems have been identified in this article we present a multiobjective approach to systematically analyze the inherent tradeoffs involved in multicriteria vendor selection problems the approach is motivated by and demonstrated with an actual purchasing problem facing a division of a fortune 500 company

management ownership and market valuation an empirical analysis we investigate the relationship between management ownership and market valuation of the firm as measured by tobin s q in a 1980 cross section of 371 fortune 500 firms we find evidence of a significant nonmonotonic relationship tobin s q first increases then declines and finally rises slightly as ownership by the board of directors rises for older firms there is evidence that q is lower when the firm is run by a member of the founding family than when it is run by an officer unrelated to the founder

corruption and infrastructure at the country and regional level abstractthis paper examines the relationship between corruption and infrastructure at both the country and regional level using the world bank s enterprise surveys data a statistically significant and considerable relationship is established between the measure of corruption in the macro data and the measures of transportation and electricity infrastructure countries with more corruption tend to have worse infrastructure at the regional level the key result is unchanged the magnitude and significance of this result is shown to vary by global region two stage least squares results using distance from the equator as an instrument at the macro level support the simple ordinary least squares ols finally it is shown that within country variation in corruption has a significant effect on regional infrastructure

toward a theory of regulation for developing countries following jean jacques laffont s lead the efficient operation and expansion of infrastructures in developing countries is crucial for growth and poverty reduction however recent reforms aimed at improving the performance of these sectors have had limited success evidence suggests that in many instances this was because the traditional regulatory theory relied on by policymakers was not suitable for the institutional context in developing countries this article surveys more recent theoretical work focusing on problems with regulation in these countries at the heart of the survey is the work of jean jacques laffont who in the last decade of his life set about developing a theoretical framework for regulation in developing countries we consider the implications of his work which focused on the key institutional limitations faced in developing countries we then discuss where experience suggests that there are important omissions from this modeling bringing in extensions and alternative approaches pursued by other authors we conclude by summarizing the key ways in which regulatory policy will be different when institutions are weak overall we find that an understanding of the institutional context and its implications are crucial when designing a regulatory framework for developing countries

environmental externalities in traditional agriculture and the impact of trade liberalization the case of ghana abstract this paper provides a framework for the evaluation of trade policies that explicitly considers the effects of such policies on the environmental resources biomass in doing this we estimate the effects of biomass as a factor of agricultural production and test the hypothesis that farmers efficiently exploit biomass a resource held in common property the main findings are i biomass is an important factor of production in ghanian agriculture ii the biomass resource is exploited beyond the socially optimal level iii a deepening of trade liberalization is likely to induce further losses of biomass and deforestation and iv national income is likely to fall in response to further trade liberalization

the frontier of telecommunications deregulation small countries leading the pack interconnection equal access unbundling and industry structure are four key determinants of facilities based competition in telecommunications using these building blocks this paper analyzes the differences in telecommunications regulatory regimes in australia chile guatemala and new zealand assessing the effect on competition and consumer welfare some regulation is necessary as incumbents can prolong their market power after demonopolization by exploiting positive externalities inherent to telecommunications networks the authors emphasize the superiority of market mechanisms over traditional regulatory processes to achieve efficient transactions among operators such market mechanisms need clear rules and credible enforcement

concessions of infrastructure in latin america government led renegotiation this paper analyzes government led renegotiations in infrastructure concession contracts in latin america based on the same sample used in guasch laffont and straub 2003 to examine firm led renegotiations after extending the theoretical framework to a multiple period context in which both pareto improving and rent shifting renegotiations at the initiative of the government can occur we develop an original instrumental variable strategy to address the issue of contract endogeneity and derive empirical results while some of the main insights concerning the importance of having a regulator in place when awarding concessions and the fragility of price cap regulatory schemes are unchanged significant differences arise with respect to the effect of investment and financing as well as the corruption variables we provide evidence that a good regulatory framework is especially important in contexts with weak governance and political opportunism copyright 2007 john wiley sons ltd

the implications of the liberalization in telecommunication markets for market structure and price policy evidence from a small open economy this study analyses the impact of liberalization on market structure and pricing in the greek telecommunication market from 1992 to 2005 the data refers to 44 of the most prominent companies of fixed telephony mobile telephony and internet services and was compiled by means of interviews with the help of a questionnaire our descriptive analysis concluded that liberalization of the telecommunication market reduced its concentration degree increased competition and induced price cuts this conclusion is supported by other research studies concerning other countries of the eu since greece as an eu member country has also implemented the respective european policy in the specific industry as far as the econometric level is concerned we used panel feasible generalized least squares fgls fgls is an appropriate tool for samples such as our own composed by intersectoral data that extend to more than one time periods and without correlation between the unobserved effects and the interpretative variable

an evaluation of vendor selection models from a total cost of ownership perspective abstract many different vendor selection models have been published in the purchasing literature however there has been no systematic approach to compare the relative efficiency of the systems in this paper we propose to use the concept of total cost of ownership as a basis for comparing vendor selection models we illustrate the comparison with a real life data set of the purchasing problem of ball bearings at cockerill sambre a belgian multinational company in the steel industry from a total cost of ownership perspective mathematical programming models outperform rating models and multiple item models generate better results than single item models for this specific case study

new evidence on the impact of structural reforms on electricity sector performance abstract the evolution of electricity industry over the last decades has shown substantial differences between oecd countries this paper empirically investigates to what extent different structural forms of regulation competition and privatisation explain these international differences it distinguishes three modes of electricity performance a net generation per capita b installed capacity and c labour productivity the empirical model spans the period 1975 2011 and uses panel data econometric techniques our analysis reveals that there is a strongly significant interaction impact on the level of electricity performance between regulation and competition the empirical findings do confirm that a robust independent regulatory scheme must be implemented in order to achieve a competitive electricity market

political independence accountability and the quality of regulatory decision making recent decades have seen a considerable increase in delegation to independent regulatory agencies which has been justified by reference to the superior performance of these bodies relative to government departments yet the hypothesis that more independent regulators do better work has hardly been tested we examine the link using a comprehensive measure of the quality of work carried out by competition authorities in 30 organisation for economic co operation and development oecd countries and new data on the design of these organizations we find that formal independence has a positive and significant effect on quality contrary to expectations though formal political accountability does not boost regulatory quality and there is no evidence that it increases the effect of independence by reducing the risk of slacking the quality of work is also enhanced by increased staffing more extensive regulatory powers and spillover effects of a more capable bureaucratic system

the financial and operating performance of newly privatized firms an international empirical analysis this study compares the pre and postprivatization financial and operating performance of 61 companies from 18 countries and 32 industries that experience full or partial privatization through public share offerings during the period 1961 to 1990 our results document strong performance improvements achieved surprisingly without sacrificing employment security specifically after being privatized firms increase real sales become more profitable increase their capital investment spending improve their operating efficiency and increase their work forces furthermore these companies significantly lower their debt levels and increase dividend payout finally we document significant changes in the size and composition of corporate boards of directors after privatization the last fifteen years have witnessed a significant global shift away from state socialism towards entrepreneurial capitalism one of the most important and visible aspects of this trend has been the enthusiasm with which governments of all political persuasions have sold their state owned enterprises soes to private investors in hopes that the generally unsatisfactory economic performance of these firms can be improved by the discipline of private ownership this denationalization process given its current title of privatization by the conservative government of margaret thatcher in

incorporating green purchasing into the frame of iso 14000 abstract more and more firms have begun to voluntarily adopt iso 14001 as a tool for continuous improvements to meet the goals of sustainability at the same time these firms have also encouraged their suppliers to apply for the certification of iso 14001 and to regulate the certification as a minimum requirement in selecting suppliers ind mark manage 4 1997 363 j qual manage 4 1999 111 renew energy 23 2001 579 by contrast green purchasing is increasingly being used as an effective tool to mitigate the environmental impacts of consumption and to promote the development of clean production technology am prospect 11 1992 71 it mainly focuses on product design and process improvement acad manage rev 20 1995 18 harv bus rev 75 1997 67 eventually bringing about a competitive advantage in international markets harv bus rev 75 1997 67 harv bus rev 73 1995 120 this paper highlights the role of iso 14000 and green purchasing in achieving sustainable development when firms focus their concerns on improving both financial and environmental performance and asserts the importance of the incorporation of green purchasing into the frame of iso 14000 we propose that 1 environmental purchasing is an effective tool in controlling pollution externalities and provides a positive effect on the implementation of iso 14001 environmental management and 2 with the incorporation of green purchasing into the framework of iso 14000 it can encourage firms to implement pollution prevention from the source and to educate the public to engage themselves in green consumption which leads to the attainments of both environmental and financial performance in this paper we also present a framework of guidelines for green purchasing and the related implementing procedures

privatization in the united kingdom lessons from experience abstract although the reasons for privatization vary across countries in the united kingdom as in other countries it also reflects a renewed belief in market forces the search for policy options that emerges from this renewal however needs to be tempered by an understanding of market as well as regulatory failures although problems facing government enterprises in developed and developing countries may differ the objective of privatization should be to reconstruct these enterprises so as to create conditions that make private sector operations effective and efficient at the same time one should recognize that this may require continued public sector activity in the sector

a re examination of china s share issue privatization abstract previous studies show that in contrast to evidence that share issue privatization sip in most other countries have improved firm profitability china s sip of the 1990s had no such effect we argue that the main reason for the failure of china s sip is likely to have been the weak institutional environment in place at that time we examine china s sip in a more recent period in which the institutional environment was greatly improved using a matching sample method we find that sip firms continued to experience negative post sip profitability changes in our sample period however their performance decline was significantly less than that of their matched non sip soes we also find that the introduction of the independent director rule helped to improve firm performance our results reconcile the findings of the sip effect in china with international evidence and illustrate the importance of a developed capital market to ensuring the success of privatization schemes

controlling for supplier switching in the presence of real options and asymmetric information abstract applying a real option approach this paper examines how asymmetric information alters key variables of a firm s supplier switching process such as the timing of contracting hurried versus delayed contracting transfer payments set up switching and abandonment decisions in a symmetric information setting delayed contracting is unambiguously beneficial abandoning the once established relation with the entrant supplier is never an issue in contrast under asymmetric information hurried contracting with potentially abandoning the relation can be beneficial consistent with adverse selection models we find that under delayed contracting in equilibrium the firm switches less frequently to the entrant supplier switching inertia surprisingly we also find that under hurried contracting the firm switches more frequently to the entrant supplier switching acceleration and may abandon the relation finally we study how these key variables of the supplier switching process change when also the incumbent supplier has private information two sided asymmetric information case

an econometric analysis of telecom competition privatization and regulation in africa and latin america this paper explores the effects of privatization competition and regulation on telecommunications performance in 30 african and latin american countries from 1984 through 1997 fixed effects regressions reveal that competition measured by mobile operators not owned by the incumbent is correlated with increases in the per capita number of mainlines payphones and connection capacity and with decreases in the price of local calls privatization combined with an independent regulator is positively correlated with telecom performance measures privatization alone however is associated with few benefits and is negatively correlated with connection capacity

the consequences of de regulation on employment duration and efficiency an experimental study i introduction when little is known about the future market conditions offering an employment contract that regulates working conditions for many periods can be dangerous if market wages drastically decline one may hire labor more cheaply furthermore an employee may turn out less reliable than expected such risks are by no means farfetched rather they relate to crucial aspects of long term employment 1 so why is long term employment still predominant and short term employment for example in the form of rented labor rare albeit increasing see alewell et al 2007 an explanation might be the increasing institutional flexibility regarding wage adjustments institutional downward flexibility is usually not legally codified but often a consequence of court rulings and thereby based on social norms 2 see for instance bewley 1995 in our paper we want to investigate whether more flexibility in wage adjustment from none to full flexibility increases the duration of accepted employment contracts our first hypothesis hypothesis a which we wish to test experimentally is that contract duration depends on contract flexibility one obvious argument for long term employment is that offering a short term contract reveals distrust in the newly hired worker and encourages shirking but what is wrong with long term employment resulting from both partners employer and employee repeatedly and mutually opting for rematching another reason for long term employment could be that in the long run it allows the interacting parties more easily to overcome efficiency losses due to opportunistic behavior in our experimental scenario regulations prevent efficient employment contracts when workers react opportunistically but do long term employees care more for efficiency and therefore invest more than optimal efforts deregulation 3 has been the major policy recommendation for nearly all developed market economies for the most part the effects of de regulation are predicted by rational choice analyses of labor markets an interesting exception that takes into account the empirical evidence from behavioral labor economics fehr gotte and zehnder 2009 is the analysis of agell 1999 in whose tradition we want to provide a behaviorally informed discussion of de regulation rather than doing this by field data our empirical approach is an experimental one our earlier experimental findings berninghaus bleich and giath 2008 question the idea that labor market efficiency is higher in deregulated markets to determine more systematically whether the usual intuition that wage rigidities undermine efficiency is correct or whether our earlier results are more reliable we analyze more thoroughly the interdependency of wage flexibility and employment duration our second hypothesis claims that long term contracts are substituted by renewable contracts when contracts become more inflexible hypothesis b unlike in our previous study where we varied only the flexibility of fixed wages in this study piece rates may also be adapted periodically in the experiment of brown falk and fehr 2004 where work contracts last for only one period long term relationships between employers and employees can only be established if the employer offers a new contract to the same employee in each period we too allow for voluntary renewal of contracts at the end of each period but also the possibility of offering contracts which extend for more than one period our study is more systematic than previous ones because we do not just compare less with more labor flexibility but distinguish five flexibility treatments which can be at least partially ordered from less to more flexibility for any kind of monotonicity hypothesis this can be viewed as a real stress test note that already the one off interaction of our basic labor market scenario allows for reciprocity 4 since employees choose effort after accepting a more or less favorable employment contract

returns to acquirers of privatizing financial services firms an international examination abstract while the literature reports improved performance for privatizing firms banking markets are different many privatizing financial services firms face unique problems such as an overhang of problem loans and weak credit cultures and legal systems we investigate the returns to successful bidders in privatization acquisitions of financial services firms examine short horizon performance and test whether such acquisitions result in a change in risk for the bidding firm our results show that the cumulative abnormal returns to shareholders of bidding firms are positive perhaps reflecting initial optimism that the foreign firm acquiring the privatizing firm would share in the success associated with privatization bidders also experience an increase in their total risk following the acquisition

post objective determination of weights of the evaluation factors in public procurement tenders in public procurement tenders the awarding criterion of the most economically advantageous bid employs weights to aggregate the numerical scores assigned to each proposal with respect to different evaluation factors typically these weights are fixed and subjectively set in advance methods which objectively determine the weights after the opening of the sealed bids on the basis of the most or least favorable weights for each proposal are developed post objective methods of weight determination are shown to enhance the integrity of the evaluation process and to limit corruption in a public tender the connection of data envelopment analysis which has been extensively applied to measure supplier efficiency with the developed methods is explored average least and most favorable weights are derived and optimal bidding strategies in this setting are presented

regulation competition and liberalization in many countries throughout the world regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries this essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process while stressing the importance of case specific analyses this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are procompetitive from corresponding anticompetitive liberalization policies

the privatization of the fixed line telecommunications operator in oecd latin america asia and africa one size does not fit all summary this paper challenges the idea that there exists a unique model of reform for infrastructure sectors which is equally applicable across regions and countries and expected to yield similar outcomes we perform an empirical analysis of the impact of privatization of the fixed line activity of the traditional telecommunications operator on network expansion tariffs and labor efficiency in a 1985 2007 data set on a selection of 108 countries that we split into regional sub samples we find that the performance of privatization depends to a large extent on regional factors related to market profitability wealth and geography

a procurement decision support system in business volume discount environments emergence of a new discount pricing schedule called business volume discount becomes a major obstacle for procurement managers in finding the best purchasing strategy in the context of business volume discount a supplier offers discounts on total dollar amount of sales volume not on the quantity or variety of the products purchased from the supplier this paper describes a procurement decision support system pdss that has been successfully implemented to improve the purchasing activities of regional bell telephone companies in most purchasing operations a flexible procurement plan is considered a necessity because of the uncertainties associated with product demand and procurement budget pdss provides this flexibility by combining two different purchasing strategies purchasing on an annual commitment basis and on an as ordered basis although the development of the system is motivated by a particular application procurement of transmission plug in in one of the regional telephone companies the system is being used for a variety of procurement decisions involving business volume discount in the telecommunications industry the results of the implementation indicate that cost savings of up to 15 are achieved pdss use is not limited to the companies in the telecommunications industry the pdss model is applicable to any organization having a centralized procurement operation with business volume discount

privatization financial development property rights and growth abstract this study analyzes how prevailing institutional arrangements i e property rights contracting rights political institutions and corporate governance practices affect privatized firms performance capital markets development and economic growth most of the studies surveyed show that privatization enhances privatized firms performance efficiency and profitability which percolates to economic growth privatized firms performed better in countries with better regulatory and legal frameworks partial privatization may be beneficial in countries with weak institutions namely the french civil law countries the stronger the economic and the governing institutions the easier it is for privatized firms to thrive and contribute to economic growth overall privatization allows firms to achieve improved efficiency while driving the development of the financial sector

an improved model for supplier selection under capacity constraint and multiple criteria abstract ghodsypour and o brien 2001 the total cost of logistics in supplier selection under conditions of multiple sourcing multiple criteria and capacity constraint international journal of production economics 73 1 15 27 study multiple sourcing problem with multiple criteria and capacitated suppliers considering the buyer s quality requirements as a constraint they develop a mixed integer non linear programming model to find the least cost cyclic ordering policy for the buyer they propose to solve the model by enumerating over all possible supplier combinations although the problem is interesting and their analysis is correct we point out two issues with their assumptions namely capacitated suppliers and cyclic ordering policy we discuss two different capacitated supplier settings i long run average annual capacity and ii exact annual capacity first under long run average annual capacity assumption we propose a model which provides the same or a better solution and is much easier to solve than their model then we discuss how to modify our and their models to handle exact annual capacity assumption

the tragedy of the commons in cote d ivoire agriculture empirical evidence and implications for evaluating trade policies expansion of cultivated land diminishes the extent of forestlands or reduces the length of fallow periods and hence reduces the amount of natural vegetation the increase in land under cultivation has a direct output increasing effect at the cost of reducing natural capital and agricultural productivity the evidence for western cote d ivoire is consistent with and provides an explanation for the declining agricultural productivity observed in sub saharan africa during the past few decades this article uses a theoretical model to determine the level of land cultivation that maximizes village income using data from cote d ivoire for 1985 87 an important part of the land is under common property usually at the village level the results show that farmers do not internalize even a small fraction of the external cost of biomass in their land allocation decisions the lack of internalization of the social cost of the biomass resource leads to large income losses at the village level as much as 14 percent of village income these losses are many times larger than the usual estimates for conventional distortions

non cooperative negotiation strategies for vendor selection vendor selection decisions are typically multi objective in nature in an environment of competing vendors for a product or service some vendors are selected and some are not this paper describes three approaches for the selection and negotiation with vendors who were not selected furthermore it describes how in certain situations two multi criteria analysis tools multi objective programming and data envelopment analysis can be used together for this selection and negotiation process the paper describes non cooperative vendor negotiation strategies where the selection of one vendor results in another being left out of the solution

the efficiency of state owned and privatized firms does ownership make a difference abstract this paper compares the pre and post privatization efficiency of a sample of state owned enterprises privatized in spain with the efficiency of their closest private competitors we perform a two stage double bootstrap data envelopment analysis model in the first stage the efficiency is estimated through a bootstrapped data envelopment analysis and then followed in the second stage by a bootstrapped truncated regression our results provide evidence that i there were no significant differences in efficiency between the state owned enterprises and their private counterparts before privatization and ii the efficiency of newly privatized firms significantly increased after their privatization while private competitors showed no significant improvement during the same post privatization period

privatization in latin america what does the evidence say privatization is under attack criticisms run from corrupt deals to abuse of market power and social welfare losses we evaluate the empirical record on privatization relying on recent comprehensive studies from latin america the paper presents four main results first the increased profitability of privatized firms is not explained by sample selection biases second in the quest to identify the sources of increased profitability after privatization we find little evidence that validates concerns of generalized market power abuses exploitation of workers and lack of fiscal benefits third the manner in which privatization is carried out matters transparency and homogeneity in procedures speed and limited restructuring prior to privatization lead to better outcomes and less room for corruption and discretion finally privatization s success is enhanced by two complementary policies deregulation or reregulation of industries previously shielded from competitive forces and an effective corporate governance framework that facilitates privatized firms access to capital at lower cost overall the empirical record shows that privatization leads to increased profitability and productivity firm restructuring fiscal benefits output growth and even quality improvements most cases of privatization failure can be linked to poor contract design opaque processes with heavy state involvement lack of reregulation and a poor corporate governance framework

soil erosion and labor shortages in the andes with special reference to bolivia 1953ndash 1991 implications for conservation with development abstract many claims in support of soil conservation policies have been flawed by excessively deterministic reasoning and unwarranted spatial overaggregation a case study remedying these flaws demonstrates that soil erosion in the bolivian andes worsened during recent decades 1953 91 due to changes in production as peasants shifted labor from conservation techniques to nonfarm employment these findings reflect in three policy issues concerning sustainable resource management oriented toward development conservation with development are discussed a environmental consequences and economic causes of increased nonfarm employment by part time peasant farmers b environment related aspects of technology innovation and technique modifications in labor scarce peasant production and c the environmental perceptions of peasant farmers in participatory development planning

share issue privatizations as financial means to political and economic ends abstract this study examines how political and economic factors affect the offer price share allocation and other terms governments choose when they privatize state owned enterprises via a public share offering using a 59 country sample of 630 share issue privatizations sips with total proceeds of over 446 billion during the period 1977 1997 we find that governments consistently underprice sip offers tilt their share allocation patterns to favour domestic investors impose control restrictions on privatized firms and typically use fixed price offers rather than book building or competitive tender offers all to further political and economic policy objectives

lobbies delegation and the under investment problem in regulation abstract a time inconsistency problem in regulation often results in under investment especially where there are high sunk costs in network industries such as electricity gas telecommunications and water this paper provides a new perspective on this hold up problem facing the price regulation of a firm with market power where full commitment to a price regime is not possible we compare a political equilibrium based on a voting model with lobbying with a delegation equilibrium where a government can delegate to a particular type of pro or anti industry regulator our analysis suggests two possible ways in which we may observe price regulation that encourages socially optimal investment in the absence of externally imposed regulatory commitment first there is less than total transparency in which voters receive an optimal amount of information and second the decisions on price are delegated to a sufficiently but not excessively pro industry regulator

nonparametric analysis of cost complementarities in the telecommunications industry the market structure of the telephone industry has been the focus of a large body of empirical research following the divestiture of at t in 1984 using data on local exchange carriers lecs i estimate the total cost function of lecs operating between 1988 and 1995 first i show that cost complementarities can be nonparametrically identi ed in many situations where economies of scope and subadditivity which were the focus of previous empirical research cannot be identi ed next i propose a feasible estimation model taking into account all the properties that a cost function needs to satisfy according to economic theory the telephone companies are treated as multi product rms producing two outputs local and toll calls the results support the assumption that cost complementarities exist in the production of these two outputs the amounts of complementarities are computed and shown to be bigger for small companies

optimizing product assortment under customer driven demand substitution abstract the problem of product assortment and inventory planning under customer driven demand substitution is analyzed and a mathematical model for this problem is provided in this paper realistic issues in a retail context such as supplier selection shelf space constraints and poor quality procurement are also taken into account the performance of three modified models one that neglects customers substitution behavior another that excludes supplier selection decision and one that ignores shelf space limitations are analyzed separately with computational experiments the results of the analysis demonstrate that neglecting customer driven substitution or excluding supplier selection or ignoring shelf space limitations may lead to significantly inefficient assortments the effects of demand variability and substitution cost on optimal assortment and supplier selection decisions as well as on the optimal revenue are also investigated the main contribution of this paper is the development of a practical and flexible model to aid retailers in finding optimal assortments to maximize the expected profit

a theory of privatisation public enterprises around the world have proved to be highly inefficient primarily because they pursue strategies such as excess employment that satisfy the political objectives of politicians who control them privatization of public enterprises can raise the cost to politicians of influencing them since subsidies to private firms necessary to force them to remain inefficient are politically harder to sustain than wasted profits of the state firms in this way privatization leads to efficient restructuring of firms moreover privatization is more effective when combined with a tight monetary policy and when the new owners of firms are profit maximizing investors rather than their employees or even managers copyright 1996 by royal economic society

telecommunications deregulation and subadditive costs are local telephone monopolies unnatural abstract in early 1996 congress passed the telecommunications law providing the foundation for the opening of regulated local telephone monopolies to competition one important premise for introducing competition into local telephone markets is that these markets are not or are no longer natural monopolies this paper reexamines the natural monopoly issue using a cost function that controls for firm heterogeneity our subadditivity tests suggest that local exchange carriers lecs costs are subadditive when there are controls for unobserved heterogeneity suggesting that local telephone markets are natural monopoly markets

trade imbalance in international message telephone services an econometric model is estimated to identify determinants of trade imbalance in international message telephone services markets results indicate that asymmetric market structure is important in explaining bilateral market imbalances for high income country pairs for low and high income country pairs gdp per capita is the dominant cause of traffic imbalances the findings suggest that telecommunications liberalization policies are effective in reducing distortions in international traffic flows and settlement payments however liberalization should be accompanied by developmental programmes that enhance income per capita and telecommunications network investment in developing countries such programmes may be effective in providing a more equitable distribution of the gains from telecommunications reform across countries

public offerings of state owned and privately owned enterprises an international comparison we compare initial offer prices in privatizations to initial prices in public offerings of private companies the evidence indicates that government officials in the united kingdom underprice ipos significantly more than their private company counterparts in canada and malaysia however the opposite is true there does not appear to be a general tendency for privatizations to be underpriced to a greater degree than private company ipos we provide additional evidence on the determinants of privatization initial returns our findings indicate that initial returns are significantly higher in relatively primitive capital markets and for privatized companies in regulated industries

surviving the crisis foreign multinationals vs domestic firms starting from the observation that all firms in ireland foreign and domestic in manufacturing and services industries were hit by the crisis the paper asks whether there is a difference in the behaviour of foreign and domestic firms one hypothesis is that foreign multinationals are less linked into the irish economy so more likely to leave once the economy is hit by a negative shock the paper discusses background hypotheses before giving empirical evidence from firstly aggregate data and secondly firm level observations the analysis of the latter suggests that foreign firms are not more likely to leave during the crisis than irish firms some policy conclusions are offered in the paper