the effects of entry regulation on oligopolistic interaction the uruguayan banking sector this article develops a methodology to test alternative oligopoly models and to analyze the effects of entry restrictions on conduct this methodology is applied to the uruguayan banking sector whose legal entry barriers were significantly relaxed during the late 1970s the results are consistent with a von stackelberg type of industry where the degree of oligopolistic interaction among the leading firms is reduced as a consequence of the relaxation of the legal entry barriers

unauthorized immigration and fiscal competition abstract reflecting upon recent enforcement policy activism of us states and countries within the eu towards unauthorized workers we examine the overlap of centralized federal and decentralized state or regional enforcement of immigration policies in a spatial context among other results we find that if interstate mobility is costless internal enforcement is overprovided and border enforcement and local goods are underprovided when regions take more responsibility in deciding policies this leads to higher levels of unauthorized immigration under decentralization interregional migration costs moderate such over underprovision moreover income distributive motives in the host country may shape the design of immigration policies in specific ways the basic model is extended in several ways first we study how the policies change when regions can exclude unauthorized immigrants from the consuming of regionally provided goods or services second we assume that the potential number of unauthorized immigrants is endogenous and finally we examine the effect of considering an alternative spatial configuration that includes border and interior regions

strategic amnesty and credible immigration reform why do countries that impose employer sanctions to deter the illegal entry of foreign workers nevertheless grant amnesty to illegal immigrants in this article i provide a positive theory of amnesty provision in a model where the constrained optimal immigration reform involving the joint use of employer sanctions and border interdictions is time inconsistent in particular my framework demonstrates that host countries of immigration can enhance the credibility of their immigration reforms by binding their own hands and strategically granting a socially excessive amount of amnesty to illegal workers

downstream merger and welfare in a bilateral oligopoly i analyse the effects of a downstream merger in a differentiated oligopoly when there is bargaining between downstream firms and upstream agents firms or unions bargaining outcomes can be observable or unobservable by rivals when competition is in quantities upstream agents are independent and bargaining is over a uniform input price a merger between downstream firms may raise consumer surplus and overall welfare however when competition is in prices or the upstream agents are not independent or bargaining is over a two part tariff or bargaining covers both the input price and the level of output the standard welfare results are restored a downstream merger always reduces consumer surplus and overall welfare

vertical control opportunism and risk sharing abstract a manufacturer who offers secret contracts faces an opportunism problem she undercuts her own input prices and fails to offset retail competition i show that this problem diminishes when retailers are risk averse and face demand uncertainty risk aversion and uncertainty create a bilateral risk sharing incentive that raises equilibrium input prices above marginal cost the manufacturer can therefore profit from downstream risk aversion when retail competition is fierce

implications of immigration policies for the u s farm sector and workforce i background in 1942 the united states and mexico signed the bracero program a formal agreement to draw seasonal labor to work in u s agriculture which provided employment opportunities to poor rural mexicans 1 however this program was abolished in 1964 ending the legal seasonal labor supply to u s agriculture in the southwestern states concurrently the united states passed the immigration act of 1965 establishing a quota of 120 000 legal immigrants per year the abandonment of the bracero program the new legal immigrants quota limits and economic inequality between the united states and mexico paved the way for steady entry of illegal laborers and led to eventual insurmountable illegal immigration population in the united states because illegal immigration was not a serious problem in the 1960s and 1970s legislation addressed only the number of legal immigrants allowed to enter the united states but in the 1980s illegal immigration began to emerge as a national problem and extensive debates entrenched around issues such as preventing the entry of unauthorized workers providing public services to illegal immigrants and even legalizing these workers consequently the u s congress attempted to address the immigration problems by enacting the 1986 immigration reform and control act irca the goals of irca were to eliminate the stock of undocumented workers through amnesty 2 and domestic enforcement of employer sanctions and curb the influx of illegal immigrants by increasing the border surveillance amnesty failed to eliminate the stock of illegal immigrants because only about half of the illegal immigrants filed for citizenship and it created future expectation of amnesty and more illegal unauthorized entry furthermore domestic sanctions on employers of undocumented workers and deportation of these workers were scantly enforced to stop the influx of immigrants irca focused heavily on tightening border control the irca also legislated the h 2a program which allowed agricultural employers to bring in guest workers during seasonal operations ers 2007 however farmers complained that the cumbersome paperwork of h 2a and bureaucratic delay were not conducive to procure seasonal laborers at the time of peak farm operations such as vegetable and fruit picking 3 in spite of irca s amnesty provision and strengthened control measures illegal immigration continued to rise about 12 million unauthorized immigrants resided in the united states in 2007 martin 2007 which is reaffirmed by many popular press reports leading to an extended congressional debate that began at the start of this decade to solve the illegal immigration problem several bills were proposed by the house of representatives the senate and the white house addressing issues related to increased domestic and border enforcements 4 paths to citizenship and guest worker programs montgomery 2006 these bills were not passed because of major disagreements among lawmakers over providing citizenship and guest worker programs as a result of the failed legislations and the september 11 attack the government primarily focused on border security accordingly funding for border enforcement has steadily increased 5 and resources were diverted from domestic to border enforcement however boucher and taylor 2007 documented that increased funding to secure the border did not deter undocumented workers from crossing the border because determined immigrants eventually find a way to enter the country by repeated attempts following september 11 2001 the u s immigration and customs enforcement ice further decreased the number of human hours devoted to worksite inspection because monitoring critical infrastructure took priority gao 2005 for example from 1999 to 2003 the number of human hours for domestic enforcement decreased from 480 000 to 18 000 6 7 but by late 2005 the u

countervailing power revisited abstract the paper uses the nash bargaining concept to study the predictions of the theory of countervailing power within two theoretical models a cournot model and a model of perfect competition within the cournot model a decrease in the number of retailers unambiguously leads to an increase in equilibrium consumer prices in the model of perfect competition the reverse is true one may thus conclude that countervailing power can have positive effects for the consumers only if competiton at the retail level is very fierce

the welfare effects of illegal immigration abstract this paper extends the work of ethier on illegal immigration by examining the optimal level of enforcement for the labor importing country in a two country model and by considering the effects of allowing capital mobility we derive a formula for the optimal level of enforcement against firms that hire illegal workers and show that the presence of enforcement costs makes the policy less efficient than a wage tax with capital mobility foreign workers gain from an increase in enforcement in the home country because capital is driven out of the home country

a critical appraisal of mckinnon s complementarity hypothesis does the real rate of return on money matter for investment in developing countries this is the post print version of the final paper published in world development the published article is available from the link below changes resulting from the publishing process such as peer review editing corrections structural formatting and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication copyright 2009 elsevier b v

industry profits and competition under bilateral oligopoly abstract we show that contrary to the key result of the standard cournot nash oligopoly model industry profits can increase with the number of firms if input prices are not exogenous but are determined by bargaining in bilateral oligopoly

the terms of trade and the current account the harberger laursen metzler effect the paper examines the effect of terms of trade changes on a small country s spending and current account assuming optimizing behavior in an intertemporal framework with perfect international capital mobility a temporary future terms of trade deterioration implies a deterioration improvement of the trade balance whereas a permanent terms of trade deterioration has an ambiguous effect depending on the rate of time preference nominal and real variables are considered via exact price indexes two periods and an infinite horizon are examined

on the macroeconomic and welfare effects of illegal immigration abstract this paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium model with labor market frictions to explore the economic consequences of illegal immigration in the baseline model native workers and illegal foreign workers compete for jobs in the same market but serve as imperfect substitutes in production the calibrated model generates a u shaped relationship between long run domestic consumption and the population share of illegal immigrants after taking into account both consumption and leisure i found that an increase in illegal immigration can generate significant welfare gains for the natives the baseline model is then extended to include heterogeneous workers in the domestic population

on the welfare effects of vertical integration opportunism vs double marginalization abstract we investigate the welfare effects of vertical integration by an upstream supplier dealing with two downstream firms through secret linear tariffs we show that whether vertical integration is anti or procompetitive depends on the distribution of the bargaining power between firms in the pre integration case in particular when the supplier has all or at least higher bargaining power than downstream firms vertical integration is socially desirable on the contrary when downstream firms have all or at least higher bargaining power than the supplier integration is detrimental to society

price discrimination and bargaining empirical evidence from medical devices many important issues in business to business markets involve price discrimination and negotiated prices situations where theoretical predictions are ambiguous this paper uses new panel data on buyer supplier transfers and a structural model to empirically analyze bargaining and price discrimination in a medical device market while many phenomena that restrict price discrimination are suggested as ways to decrease hospital costs e g mergers group purchasing organizations and transparency i find that 1 non discriminatory pricing actually works against hospitals because competition is more intense under price discrimination and 2 results depend ultimately on a previously unexplored bargaining effect

the effects of financial liberalization on savings and investment in uruguay the following sections are included introductionfinancial reforms financial deepening and financial crisisstylized outcomes savings investment and growthfinancial liberalization savings and investmentfinancial resource allocation at the micro levelconclusions

financial development and poverty reduction can there be a benefit without a cost abstract this article investigates how financial development helps to reduce poverty directly through a distributional effect beyond its indirect effect through economic growth the results obtained with data for a sample of developing countries from 1966 through 2000 suggest that the poor benefit from the ability of the banking system to facilitate transactions and provide savings opportunities through the mckinnon conduit effect but to some extent fail to reap the benefit from greater availability of credit moreover financial development is accompanied by financial instability which is particularly detrimental to the poor nevertheless the benefits of financial development for the poor outweigh the cost

a larger slice or a larger pie an empirical investigation of bargaining power in the distribution channel this research aims to provide insights into the determinants of channel profitability and the relative power in the channel by considering consumer demand and the interactions between manufacturers and retailers in an equilibrium model we use the nash bargaining solution to determine wholesale prices and thus how margins are split in the channel equilibrium margins are a function of demand primitives and of retailer and manufacturer bargaining power bargaining power is itself a function of exogenous retail and manufacturer characteristics the parties bargaining positions are determined endogenously from the estimated substitution patterns on the demand side the more they have to lose in a negotiation relative to an outside option the weaker the bargaining position we use the proposed bargaining model to investigate the role of the three main factors that have been blamed for the power shift from manufacturers to retailers in recent years firm size increases store brand introductions and service level differentiation in our empirical analysis of the german market for coffee we find that bargaining power varies among the different manufacturer retailer pairs this result suggests that bargaining power is not an inherent characteristic of a firm but rather depends on the negotiation partner we are able to confirm empirically previous theoretical findings that there can be cases where the slice of the pie that goes to one of the channel members may decrease but the overall pie increases and compensates for the smaller share of profits

mergers when prices are negotiated evidence from the hospital industry in recent years many hospitals have merged in part to gain bargaining leverage with managed care organizations mcos we investigate the price impact of hospital mergers by formulating and estimating an equilibrium bargaining model between hospital systems and managed care health insurers over prices for inpatient services we estimate the parameters of the model using claims and discharge data from northern virginia in 2006 inova health system proposed to acquire prince william hospital we nd that this merger would have raised prices signicantly and that the remedy of separate bargaining imposed by the ftc in a separate hospital case would have resulted in a larger price increase

financial liberalization in india and a new test of the complementarity hypothesis abstract this article reappraises the financial repression hypothesis for india in light of the partial liberalization of the financial sector in the early 1990s using for the first time state of the art multivariate cointegration and vector error correction models vecm from this more robust testing procedure we find that for the indian economy over the sample period 1951 99 money and capital are complementary suggesting that higher real interest rates will further raise the demand for money and lead to higher levels of investment furthermore testing for a structural break in the early 1990s to coincide with the liberalization of the financial sector in india suggests that these reforms have not significantly changed the complementary relationship between money and capital the policy implication is that further financial liberalization maybe required in india to enhance investment and economic growth

skills and the pattern of migration the role of qualitative and quantitative restrictions on international labor mobility this paper develops a two country model of international migration in an attempt to study the role of both qualitative and quantitative restrictions on international labor mobility individuals are distinguished in terms of their ability and age enabling the model to examine factors which influence the age and skill profile of those who migrate as well as the equilibrium flow of migrants and the pattern of factor rewards in the two economies effects of changes in certain parameters of the model are related to the nature of the immigration policy enforced by the host country the role of emigration restrictions is also considered excerpt

bilateral monopolies and incentives for merger the paper presents a model of duopoly in which firms acquire inputs through bilateral monopoly relations with suppliers it combines a bargaining model with a duopoly model to examine how input pri

competition through commissions and kickbacks in markets for retail financial products and health services consumers often rely on the advice of intermediaries to decide which specialized offering best fits their needs product providers in turn compete to influence the intermediaries advice through hidden kickbacks or disclosed commissions motivated by the controversial role of these widespread practices we formulate a model to analyze competition through commissions from a positive and normative standpoint the model highlights the role of commissions in making the advisor responsive to supply side incentives we characterize situations when commonly adopted policies such as mandatory disclosure and caps on commissions have unintended welfare consequences jel d21 d82 d83 g21 l15 l25

pass through vertical contracts and bargains abstract this paper analyzes the determinants of pass through that are specific to vertical relationships between wholesalers and retailers the type of vertical agreement firms contract upon as well as their relative bargaining power are identified as major determinants of pass through rates

the nash bargaining solution in vertical relations with linear input prices abstract we re examine the nash bargaining solution when an upstream and n downstream firms bargain over a linear input price with unobservable contracts we show that the profit sharing rule is given by a simple and instructive formula which depends on the parties disagreement payoffs the profit weights in the nash product and the elasticity of derived demand a downstream firm s profit share increases in the equilibrium derived demand elasticity which in turn depends on the final goods demand elasticity

how should structural adjustment programs be designed abstract more than seven years have elapsed since the onset of the generalized debt crisis of 1982 yet the affected countries have still not managed to stabilize their economies these countries must now attempt structural adjustment in the midst of pervasive macroeconomic and political instability structural adjustment packages should be designed with this reality in mind this paper argues that structural adjustment programs should strive for sustainability rather than the economic liberalization that they presently stress illiberal policies which do not damage overall macro stability are preferable to liberal policies which are inherently unsustainable or engender macro instability liberalization programs that are not sustainable are likely to bring few benefits but have high costs in terms of private investment the paper discusses some of the chief implications of this opinion for the design of adjustment programs

the financial repression liberalization debate taking stock looking for a synthesis financial repression and liberalization became the object of fierce debates between academics and policy makers since the early 1970s as of the late 1980s financial liberalization became also part of the structural adjustment programs sponsored by the international monetary fund and the world bank however the literature on financial repression and liberalization remains controversial on its theoretical conclusions and policy implications given its importance for both the theory and policy of economic development and growth this paper looks for a possible synthesis after reviewing the theoretical contributions and empirical studies under the headings of the mckinnon shaw and new structuralists models the survey concludes that a new synthesis might be found in the post keynesian attempt to take an institutional perspective within a globalised financial and economic environment

investment spending and interest rate policy the case of financial liberalisation in turkey the purpose of the present study is to analyse the impact of interest rate policy on investment spending in turkey over a period which covers years of both financial repression and financial liberalisation the model presented suggests that investment will be positively correlated with below equilibrium interest rates and negatively correlated with above equilibrium rates the model is tested using a switching regime model with an unknown equilibrium rate of interest the results suggest that setting interest rates too high may be as detrimental to economic health as setting them too low moreover there is evidence of an autonomous downward shift in the investment function during the liberalisation period which may have resulted from heightened uncertainty during the period

strategic delegation and delay in negotiations over the bargaining agenda this paper develops a game theoretic model that endogenizes the items included in the bargaining agenda the model s equilibria suggest two possible sources of inefficiency 1 exclusion of items from the bargaining agenda and 2 delay to agreement due to negotiations over the bargaining agenda evidence from union contract negotiations is provided to demonstrate the relevance of these sources of inefficiency the model also allows strategic delegation by the union in certain equilibria the surplus maximizing union selects wage maximizing delegates such as senior union members to negotiate the contract

countervailing power and consumer prices this paper considers the importance of countervailing power manifested as the effects of increased retail concentration on consumer prices and welfare within a market setting where imperfectly competitive retailers negotiate intermediate prices with a monopoly supplier only when retailer services are regarded as very close substitutes do final prices fall following a reduction in the number of retailers even in these circumstances the social benefits of countervailing power may not be realised as the supplier may seek to protect its profits by using a refusal to supply restraint to engage in exclusive trading

debt crisis adjustment policies and capital formation in developing countries where do we stand abstract this paper documents the decline in investment rates observed in developing countries after 1982 and explores analytically and empirically the factors contributing to explain it the paper focuses on the impact of macroeconomic adjustment and reform measures on private investment particularly in latin america and east asia and underscores the importance of macroeconomic uncertainty policy credibility and potential coordination failures in shaping the response of investment to the changes in economic incentives brought about by structural reforms the analysis concludes with some policy recommendations to improve the design of sustainable growth oriented adjustment programs

the relative profitability of nash bargaining on the labour demand curve or the contract curve abstract given the nash bargaining solution with parametric bargaining strengths and threat points it is shown that profits are often higher if the bargaining agenda between a union and a single firm or two unions and cournot duopolists excludes employment

the theory of international factor flows the basic model abstract the basic model used to discuss the simultaneous international flow of labor and capital is a one commodity model in which a common technology is shared between countries the ramaswami result wherein an optimal restriction of labor inflows is superior to an optimal restriction on capital outflows for a capital abundant country is extended to reveal that optimality requires inflows of both factors box diagrams and iso welfare contours are used to show how optimal policy rankings are reversed if foreign labor must be paid higher home wages

exclusive contracts and bargaining power abstract incorporating nash bargaining into the standard one buyer one supplier framework in the chicago school critique we show a possibility that an inefficient incumbent supplier can deter a socially efficient new supplier entry through exclusive contracts

bargaining ability and competitive advantage empirical evidence from medical devices in markets where buyers and suppliers negotiate supplier costs buyer willingness to pay and competition determine only a range of potential prices leaving the final price dependent on other fac

the interaction of factor and product market distortions in developing countries this essay will examine distortions in product and factor markets in developing countries and the interaction of these distortions in respect to the development strategies applied the analysis will concentrate on policy imposed distortions where departures from efficient resource allocation result from policy actions these contrast with distortions resulting from market imperfections 1

foreign aid and illegal immigration abstract we develop a two country model of illegal immigration we analyse the effect of foreign aid on illegal immigration and consider both exogenous and endogenous income repatriation in the former an increase in aid increases illegal immigration if the total amount of aid is small a transfer of resources from border control to aid increases illegal immigration when the total amount of aid is small under endogenous income repatriation aid has no effect on illegal immigration when the preferences of the immigrants and their family members are the same if the preferences are different aid may increase illegal immigration

bilateral control with vertical contracts when a manufacturer contracts secretly with competing retailers he is subject to opportunism and linear or non linear tariffs may not allow the manufacturer to maintain monopoly prices to analyse the effects of rpm o brien shaffer 1992 use a concept of contract equilibrium which concentrates on pairwise deviations thereby questioning the robustness of the analysis this paper emphasises the distinction between the contract equilibrium and standard non cooperative concepts we advocate for some caution in the use of the former concept as if overlooks an inexistence problem we then confirm the intuition that rpm can help solve the manufacturer s commitment problem this confirms that o brien shaffer s insight is robust and validates the courts reluctance against rpm