a many good many person corlett hague tax rule abstract generalising the corlett hague rule yields an insight into the case for differentiated commodity taxation when the linear income tax is not optimal thus complementing earlier work by deaton

the effects of taxation price control and government contracts in oligopoly and monopolistic competition abstract many government contracts with or policies towards oligopolistic sectors essentially involve private firms selling a given proportion or quantity of output to the government at a fixed price p r with the remainder being sold on the open market often this is combined with consumer rationing examples include cement and sugar in india and health housing and defence in many countries the paper investigates the effects of these schemes including sales and excise taxation on prices output and household welfare under oligopoly and monopolistic competition less government control reduced may raise prices and tax shifting can be above or below 100 percent

comparing the welfare effects of public and private health care subsidies in the united kingdom we use a calibrated analytical model to compare the welfare costs gross of externalities of increasing subsidies for public and private health care in the uk the model incorporates wait costs for rationed public care burdens that subsidies impose on the tax system and distributional weights for different households welfare costs are significantly higher for expanding public health care over a range of parameter scenarios both policies reduce average wait times but for public health care this is offset by new waiting costs incurred on extra treatments and the burden on the tax system is much larger for expanding public health care

an equilibrium model of incentive contracts in the presence of information manipulation abstract this paper develops an agency model in which stock based compensation is a double edged sword inducing managers to exert productive effort but also to divert valuable firm resources to misrepresent performance we examine how the potential for manipulation affects the equilibrium level of pay for performance sensitivity and derive several new cross sectional implications that are consistent with recent empirical studies in addition we analyze the impact of recent regulatory changes contained in the sarbanes oxley act of 2002 and show how policies intended to increase firm value by reducing misrepresentation can actually reduce firm value or increase the upward bias in manipulated disclosures

limited liability and incentive contracting with ex ante action choices abstract this article examines a principal agent model of financial contracting in which a risk neutral entrepreneur agent makes an unobservable ex ante effort choice while employing the investment funds of a risk neutral investor principal the key innovation is that the investment contract is subject to statutory liability limits given these liability limits two settings are considered one in which the investor payoff function is also constrained to be monotonically nondecreasing in firm profit and another in which no such monotonic contract constraint is imposed in the former case a standard debt contract is shown to emerge and a first best effort choice is not achieved in the latter setting the optimum is characterized by a live or die payoff function and a first best effort level may or may not be realized

describing the separability properties of empirical demand systems in empirical demand analysis separability restrictions are usually imposed as maintained hypotheses the separability inflexibility of most functional forms makes parametric tests of these restrictions appear problematic we follow pudney 1981 in stressing the usefulness of a description of the separable structure of preferences underlying an estimated model and propose a non iterative method for the production of such a description an illustration with different models estimated for nine categories of goods on french aggregate time series data is presented

fiscal policy and growth in a small open economy with elastic labour supply endogenizing labour supply leads to fundamental changes in the equilibrium structure of the ak growth model of a small open economy the balanced growth equilibrium is described by two tradeoff loci relating the equilibrium growth rate to the fraction of time devoted to leisure the implications of endogenous labour supply for fiscal policy are addressed the effects of distortionary taxes and government expenditure on the equilibrium growth leisure employment tradeoff are analysed the responses contrast with both those of a closed economy having an elastic labour supply and an open economy with fixed labour supply optimal fiscal policy is also characterized jel classification f41 f43 politique fiscale et croissance dans une petite economie ouverte quand l offre de travail est elastique l endogeneisation de l offre de travail entraine des changements fondamentaux dans la structure d equilibre du modele de croissance du type ak d une petite economie ouverte l equilibre de croissance balancee est decrit par deux lieux de relations d equivalence reliant le taux de croissance d equilibre a la fraction du temps allouee au loisir on examine les implications de cette endogen6isation de l offre de travail pour la politique fiscale on analyse les effets de taxes distorsionnantes et des depenses gouvemementales sur la relation d 6equivalence entre taux de croissance et loisir et donc emploi on obtient des reactions differentes de celles qu on obtient en economie ferm6e quand l offre de travail est elastique et en economie ouverte quand l offre de travail est fixe on proc ede alors a la definition de la politique fiscale optimale

a comparison of event study methodologies using daily stock returns a simulation approach accounting research studies commonly use measures of abnormal security returns to test hypotheses about accounting information and policies alternative methods are used in these studies to detect abnormal performance and thereby examine the information content of identified events the ability of these methods to detect abnormal returns using simulation techniques is examined by brown and warner 1980 1984 morse 1984 addresses this issue analytically the analytical approach presumes that the event study data is generated by the process modeled while the simulation approach uses the security return data generated by the market simulation provides a tractable means of dealing with situations where an analytical approach may yield results suggesting direction but not magnitude or where such techniques are unusually cumbersome both limitations face us in this study brown and warner 1980 use monthly data to examine the comparative abilities of several combinations of return generating models and

the economics of development a survey i the subject our definition of the subject will be the use of economic analysis to understand the economies of poor or developing countries this includes in particular how standards of living in the population are determined and how they change over time and further how policy can or should be used in the influence of these processes the definition contains in principle much or most of analytical methods in economics insofar as they can be put to use in the examination of the issues of interest this is as it should be but it poses a problem for a survey in a journal a comprehensive treatment is infeasible so we shall follow a different route the survey will focus on what i take to be the major themes and approaches which characterise the productive aspects of the subject there is therefore no pretence at being exhaustive the purpose is rather to highlight some of the advances many of these have been of real substance there are a number of possible purposes for a survey and it is important to be clear at the outset for whom it is intended what it is and what it is not this survey is addressed to economists and students of economics who know the tools of their trade but not necessarily how they have been applied to and fashioned for the analysis of the economics of developing countries it is a description of the ways in which problems can be productively formulated and approached in terms of examples chosen for their intrinsic importance and interest the vastness of the subject means that we have to be highly selective it does not seek to provide a summary evaluation of the current view of the appropriate response to immediate policy questions it is not a history of thought nor a research manifesto nor an attempt to adjudicate or settle the major debates where they arise naturally from the major purpose some judgements on these subjects will be offered but they do not themselves constitute the primary intent of this survey there are three lines of enquiry or sets of questions which have i suggest been distinctive of the most fruitful work in development economics they will

rents and the cost and optimal design of commodity taxes this paper numerically investigates the significance of rents for both the welfare costs and the optimal design of commodity taxes using a general equilibrium model calibrated to 1986 canadian data in the data we use ricardian rents are concentrated in agriculture and utilities with market structure rents concentrated in manufacturing different types of rents have different implications for the welfare cost of taxes and hence also for appropriate tax design ricardian rents lower the cost of taxes rents supported by imperfect competition with no free entry raise the cost of taxes rents supported by regulation generate rent seeking costs and if taxed improve resource allocation model results show a markedly nonuniform optimal tax structure and a substantial influence of the treatment of rents on the pattern of optimal tax rates by commodity

the dynamic structure of optimal debt contracts abstract in a two period model of costly state verification the optimal contract is characterized and shown to exist the optimal contract is interpreted as a bond contract the model extends the result of one period models that the verification region must be a left tail interval to a multi period setting conditions are identified for the optimal contract to exhibit features such as call prepayment option coupon payment or sinking fund the optimality of certain bond covenants such as refinancing covenants and dividends covenants is also studied

time consistency of fiscal and monetary policy a solution this paper demonstrates how time consistency of the ramsey policy the optimal fiscal and monetary policy under commitment can be achieved each government should leave its successor with a uniq

pareto efficient taxation and expenditures pre and re distribution abstract this paper shows that there is a presumption that pareto efficient taxation entails a positive tax on capital when tax and expenditure policies can affect the market distribution of income in ways that cannot be directly offset those effects need to be taken into account reducing the burden imposed on distortionary redistribution the paper extends the 1976 atkinson stiglitz results to a dynamic overlapping generations model correcting a misreading of the result on the desirability of a zero capital tax that result required separability of consumption from labor and that the only unobservable differences among individuals were in fixed labor productivities in a general equilibrium model one needs to take into account the effects of policy changes on binding self selection constraints in a simple model with time separability but with non separability between consumption and leisure capital taxation depends on the complementarity substitutability of leisure during work with retirement consumption the final section constructs a simple two class model capitalists who maximize dynastic welfare and workers who save for retirement whose productivity can be enhanced by publicly provided education it derives a simple expression for the optimal capital tax which is positive so long as the social welfare function is sufficiently equalitarian and the productivity of educational expenditures is sufficiently high

optimal taxation and heterogeneous oligopoly this paper examines the effects of firm specific taxes on an oligopoly composed of firms of unequal sizes holding different conjectures operating with nonidentical costs four types of effects are analyzed on profits on industry concentration on total tax revenue and on social welfare the author derives 1 the revenue maximizing taxes 2 the welfare maximizing taxes and 3 welfare maximizing taxes subject to a revenue constraint

monitoring the monitor an incentive structure for a financial intermediary this paper studies financial intermediation i e delegated monitoring in a costly state verification model there are a finite number of agents thus the intermediary cannot fully diversify its portfolio and is subject to default risk the role of the intermediary is to satisfy simultaneously the different portfolio preferences of borrowers and lenders two questions arise when a delegated monitor is subject to non trivial default risk a what arrangement solves the problem of monitoring the monitor b what intermediary portfolio accomplishes optimal asset transformation between borrowers and lenders unlike previous delegated monitoring studies the law of large numbers is not sufficient to obtain our results instead we appeal to a stronger results the large deviation principle which establishes that convergence in the law of large numbers is exponential

surplus maximization and optimality i identify assumptions under which policies that maximize expected surplus are pareto optimal even when expected consumer surplus does not even locally represent preferences over price income lotteries besides the oft made partial equilibrium assumptions that only one price varies and that income changes do not aect demand the two other assumptions are that every consumer s indirect utility function is supermodular in price and income and policies order prices by a single crossing property supermodularity holds precisely if relative risk aversion exceeds the income elasticity of demand a mild condition the single crossing property appears strong but holds in many applications that use expected surplus

tax reform results with different demand systems abstract we calculate the marginal welfare costs for a twelve commodity classification of the belgian indirect tax system price elasticities are estimated with rotterdam aids cbs and the linear expenditure system the ranking of the marginal welfare costs is similar when we use unrestricted estimates of the first three systems after the symmetry condition of the slutsky matrix is imposed the differences become more important however they diminish with increasing inequality aversion

fiscal policy elastic labor supply and endogenous growth abstract endogenizing labor supply leads to fundamental changes in the equilibrium structure of the ak growth model the balanced growth equilibrium can be described in terms of two tradeoff loci relating the equilibrium growth rate to the fraction of time devoted to leisure the implications of endogenous labor supply for fiscal policy are analyzed three issues are addressed first the effects of various distortionary tax changes and government expenditure changes on the equilibrium growth leisure employment tradeoff are analyzed second optimal fiscal policy is characterized finally the formal analysis is supplemented by numerical results focusing particularly on the quantitative welfare implications

tax design in the presence of imperfect competition an example abstract this paper studies the effects upon price output and entry in an oligopolistic market induced by tax policy elsewhere in the economy the results derived are applied to a model of copying to find conditions for which subsidisation of the manufacturers of originals is welfare improving the critical factor is found to be the distribution of consumers tastes

the validity of piecemeal second best policy abstract if there are irreducible distortions in one sector of an economy when is it optimal to set consumer prices proportional to producer prices in the other sector for the case of a single consumer jewitt demonstrated that implicit separability of the consumer s preferences is necessary and sufficient for the optimality of piecemeal second best policy we show that in a multi consumer economy piecemeal policy is optimal if and only if the aggregate compensated demand system has a two sector representation only three broad classes of economies can have two sector representations this considerably restricts the circumstances in which piecemeal second best policies are optimal

labour supply commodity demand and marginal tax reform this paper examines the implications of extending the ahmad stern model of indirect tax reform to include labour supply the inclusion of labour supply alters the basic measure of marginal revenue cost mrc of indirect taxation and introduces the possibility of calculating a mrc for direct taxation the paper derives the expressions for these revised mrcs and provides estimates from irish data it then examines the sensitivity of the results to assumptions regarding functional form and in particular goods leisure sc parability in setting optimal tax rates policy makers face considerable difficulties explicit assumptions must be made regarding the underlying preferences of the consumer i e the functional form for the utility and demand functions and also about how expenditures are distributed sensitivity to underlying preferences is discussed by deaton i 98 i and is empirically examined by ray i986 and ebrahimi and heady i988 policy makers also face the problem that even when they do provide explicit forms for demand functions they face difficulties regarding the reliability of estimates and are also evaluating demand responses at a point possibly quite far away from the optimum the difficulties outlined above led to the development of the marginal tax reform literature with the seminal paper in this area by ahmad and stern i984 this approach has the considerable advantage of not requiring the choice of explicit utility functions nor of distributions of expenditure but instead merely requiring information on the actual position of the economy at a single point in time using actual consumption and distributions of expenditure it must be noted that tax reform does require information on demand responses so that results in this area can still be sensitive to the specification of consumer preferences and demand systems however tax reform results appear to be less sensitive than do tax design results to this

the contributions of angus deaton angus deaton was awarded the 2015 sveriges riksbank prize in economic sciences in memory of alfred nobel for his analysis of consumption poverty and welfare this article reviews his contributions to economics

optimal two part tariffs for inputs the case of imperfect competition abstract traditionally the analysis of optimal two part tariffs has assumed that the regulated firm is selling directly to final consumers in this paper the authors take account of the fact that many of the utility s customers are firms which use the utility s output as an input in their own production process and then sell to final consumers the downstream firms are assumed to be imperfectly competitive and the optimal two part tariff is affected by the need to correct for the consequent divergence between price and marginal cost in the downstream industry

preference structure and piecemeal second best policy abstract this paper examines the question when should prices in a subset of markets be set proportional to marginal costs even if other markets are distorted the conditions on preferences and demand functions are derived they are found to be weaker than have been required by previous authors

costly distortion of information in agency problems anecdotal evidence suggests that agents often spend resources distorting information transmitted to principals we present a model where costly information distortion emerges as equilibrium behavior the information structure we focus on is intermediate between and encompasses the cases of private information and public information the agent can falsify the privately observed state at some cost although the principal can design contracts that induce no falsification these may involve excessive iinformation rents falsification can be beneficial in spite of the waste of resources involved because it helps reduce information rents we examine how optimal contract and equilibrium payoffs change as the information structure ranges from private to public information

from the static to the dynamic some problems in the theory of taxation abstract this paper considers problems and issues that arise when we attempt to extend the static theory of taxation and production planning to a dynamic context and to combine that theory with theories of growth the reasons dynamic theory is less developed include problems with the analytical tractability of even those dynamic models which attempt to retain the basic structure of the static model furthermore difficult and interesting issues arise in a dynamic context which are either not present or are much less severe in the static theory special attention is paid to these new issues and the difficulties they pose

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

the theory of reform and indian indirect taxes abstract given a set of value judgements an initial state and a model of the economy one can ask whether some feasible tax change would increase welfare we do this by defining the marginal cost in terms of welfare of raising an extra rupee from the i th good the inverse optimum problem is the calculation of non negative welfare weights on households which imply that the initial state is optimum if no such welfare weights exist then a pareto improvement is possible we illustrate the concepts and results using data from the indian economy for 1979 1980 directions of tax reform for a number of specific social welfare functions and for pareto improvements are presented

using survey data to assess the distributional effects of trade policy the author develops and applies a methodology to empirically explore the effects of trade policies on the distribution of income and poverty in developing countries he uses a methodology based on two links one connecting trade policies to prices and another connecting prices to household welfare the author applies the methodology to the study of the distributional effects of mercosur on argentine families the main finding is that mercosur benefits the average argentine household across the entire income distribution there is evidence of a pro poor bias of the regional trade agreement on average poor households gain more from the reform than middle income households whereas the effects on rich families are positive but not statistically significant prior to the reform argentine trade policy protected the rich over the poor and after the reform granted some protection to the poor as relative pre mercosur tariffs are higher on relatively skill intensive goods the tariff removals tend to benefit the poor over the rich these findings indicate that trade reforms may actually help improve the distribution of income and reduce poverty in the country

reasonable doubt and the optimal magnitude of fines should the penalty fit the crime models of the enforcement compliance relationship have assumed that both the probability and magnitude of fines are independent choice variables of policy makers these models indicate that it may be optimal to monitor with lowfrequency but to inflict uniformly maximal penalties for all infractions detected this article shows that if the judicial system is built on the reasonable doubt test then the penalty and the probability of conviction are not independent in particular as the penalty increases the probability of conviction falls as a result uniformly maximal penalties may actually encourage crime rather than deter it this article shows that optimal fines should rise with the severity of the infraction that is the penalty should fit the crime models of the enforcement compliance relationship generally treat both the probability and magnitude of fines as independent choice variables of the government this approach has led becker 1968 and others to conclude that it is optimal to set uniformly maximal penalties for all crimes and to set the probability of conviction at the minimum level necessary to enforce compliance with the law while this normative prescription is natural and intuitive there still remains a larger positive question of why in most nations of the world penalties are not uniformly high but rather rise with the severity of the crime one possible resolution of the positive and normative questions may lie in the fact that penalties and probabilities of conviction are not generally independent convictions are typically determined by judges or jurors who are instructed to convict only if the evidence convinces them beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty psychologists however have found that a juror s willingness to convict may be influenced by more than just the evidence jurors are very sensitive to the potential penalties that defendants may pay

managers compensation and misreporting a costly state verification approach i introduction the use of stock options in compensation packages as a way of providing the firm management with the right incentives has been quite popular in the 1990s the favor encountered by options started however to decrease in the past few years the decline in the use of option grants in top executives compensation packages occurred mainly as a reaction to the recent accounting scandals which has prompted the design of alternative stock based compensation schemes e g restricted stock grants or indexed options as reported by hall and murphy 2003 the grant date value of options assigned to all employees of an average standard poor s 500 firm measured in millions of 2002 constant us increased from 22 in 1992 to 238 in 2000 and subsequently decreased to 141 in 2002 although percentages varied from year to year the ceos share of the total grant has fallen from about 7 in the mid 1990s to less than 5 in 2000 2002 1 the decline in the use of options for top management is widely confirmed according to a pearl meyer partners study for the new york times stock option grants that accounted for 52 of the pay of the average ceo of a major company in 2002 were down to an estimated 35 in 2003 a recent watson wyatt report states that the value of new stock option awards granted to ceos at large companies fell by nearly 60 between 2001 and 2003 with the average value of new stock option grants declining from us 10 2 million in 2001 to us 4 2 million in 2003 the decline in options has been softened by the sharp increase in restricted stock grants and other long term incentive award values 2 in this paper we aim to reevaluate the role of stock options as an ingredient of top management compensation packages able to align the interests of managers and shareholders avoiding misreporting of the firm value at the same time 3 in a costly state verification csv model with moral hazard we show that incentive compatible contracts inducing both incentive alignment and truthful revelation of the firm value must entail a strictly convex compensation schedule that is a fixed payment wage when the firm value is sufficiently low and a state contingent claim increasing in the firm value otherwise a simple and commonly observed way to achieve a convex compensation scheme is to design a remuneration including a fixed wage and a call option on the firm equity as we will show such remuneration allows on the one hand to preserve top management incentives providing for a compensation increasing in equity value and on the other hand to reduce the verification costs that must be incurred to avoid misreporting as verification is not needed in the region where the remuneration is fixed 4 options are by no means the only way to achieve a convex compensation however many other schemes having otherwise desirable properties over options do not have the convex shape discussed above for instance combining a fixed wage with restricted stock grants defines a compensation linearly increasing in the firm s equity value which does not allow to reduce misreporting verification costs that always have to be sustained in this case using an incentive compatible compensation scheme fixed wage plus call options we characterize the contract offered by the firm under the assumption of a deterministic and perfect audit technology showing that for any given value of the option package the manager should receive the largest possible number of options at the highest strike price allowing shareholders to reduce the expected verification cost furthermore the strike price of the option turns out to be determined by incentive compatibility i e the option value must be such that the manager is induced to exert the desired level of effort while the magnitude of the fixed wage is defined by individual rationality there are three main policy implications of our analysis

optimal exercise prices for executive stock options although exercise prices for executive stock options can be set either below or above the grant date market price in practice virtually all options are granted at the money we offer an economic rationale for this apparent puzzle by showing that pay to performance incentives for risk averse undiversified executives are typically maximized by setting exercise prices at or near the grant date market price we provide an operationally useful alternative to black scholes 1973 for the purpose of both valuing executive stock options and measuring the incentives created by options our framework has implications not only for exercise price policies but also for indexed options option repricings exchanges of cash for stock based compensation and the design of bonus plans

the optimal gas tax for california this paper calculates the optimal gasoline tax for the state of california according to our analysis the optimal gasoline tax in california is 1 37 gal which is over three times the current california tax when excluding sales taxes the pigovian tax is the largest part of this tax comprising 0 85 gal of this the congestion externality is taxed the most heavily at 0 27 followed by oil security accident externalities local air pollution and finally global climate change the other major component a ramsey tax comprises a full 0 52 of this tax reflecting the efficiency in raising revenues from a tax on gasoline consumption due to the inelastic demand of this consumption good

uniform taxation and consumer preferences abstract diamond and mirrlees american economic review 1971 61 8 27 and 261 278 showed that the first order conditions for the ramsey tax problem do not necessarily characterize tax optima researchers have since become cautious in using the first order conditions this paper establishes the validity of a version of the first order conditions using them to determine when uniform taxation is optimal we show deaton s review of economic studies 1979 46 391 405 conditions to be sufficient but not necessary for our problem we also give a necessary and sufficient condition for uniform taxation to be optimal in terms of the wage compensated supply of labor and a closed form representation for preferences

does environmental regulation create merger incentives this paper studies merger incentives for polluting cournot firms under a competitive tradable emission permits market we find that when firms are symmetric and marginal costs are constant an horizontal merger is welfare enhancing if efficiency gains are high enough for the merger to take place the presence of a competitive or monopolistic outside market that also trades in the permits market makes profitable a merger that would not happen otherwise when firms are vertically related in an input output chain an horizontal merger in one of the markets increases profits in the other market due to the permits price decrease finally we consider an oligopoly fringe model in which firms differ in their marginal production costs a merger between the dominant oligopolistic firms decreases the permits price and is always profitable such setting is relevant to assess the observed mergers between power generators in several market for permits like the regional greenhouse gas initiative rggi allowing us to derive some policy recommendations

sensitivity of optimal commodity tax rates to alternative demand functional forms an econometric case study of india this study investigates on a nine commodity disaggregation of indian budget data nss 28th round the sensitivity of optimal commodity tax rates to alternative demand systems les and rnlps optimality is used here in the very special sense of being conditional on observed expenditure and fixed consumer prices the alternative sets of tax rates agree at low levels of inequality aversion but disagree widely at rawlsian levels les is heavily rejected in favour of its one parameter generalisation rnlps the results suggest that les price elasticities should not be used in optimal tax calculations the optimal tax rates imply only a modest redistribution

minimum wage legislation as a second best policy mass unemployment is a striking phenomenon of the present economic situation of european market economies although the profession of economists has been criticized for not providing satisfactory cures it has produced a number of different explanations either complementary or contradictory for the occurrence of mass unemployment in this paper we examine the argument that unemployment is the consequence of minimum wage legislation which is socially desirable the observation of current wage legislations suggests that the above argument is broadly at least partly accepted by policy makers curiously enough a defence of this argument meeting the rigorous requirements of modern theory seems to be missing symmetrically attacks against minimum wage legislation often rely upon reasonings of dubious relevance i e the obvious remark that unemployment is a waste with first best efficiency criteria the present paper proposes a second best analysis where second best stems from informational asymmetries which prevent the implementation of lump sum transfers needed for a first best redistribution policy the question under scrutiny can be reformulated in a more precise way as follows does a second best optimal redistribution policy lead to minimum wage legislation and unemployment our elements of answer are gathered in 3 sections in section 2 the principles of the analysis of the desirability of quantity controls and existing results are recalled in section 3 the analysis of section 2 is specified to a simple prototype model for the study of linear income taxation in section 4

the phillips curve as a long run phenomenon in a macroeconomic model with complex dynamics abstract in this paper we derive a phillips curve as the image of a chaotic attractor of the state variables of a non linear dynamical system describing the evolution of an economy this has two important consequences the phillips curve in our model is a true long run phenomenon but to exploit the apparent unemployment inflation trade off may require unrealistically complex policy measures the model is based on an overlapping generations non t tonnement approach involving temporary equilibria with stochastic rationing in each period and price adjustment between successive periods in this way we are able to obtain complex sequences of consistent allocations allowing for recurrent unemployment and inflation

when can carbon abatement policies increase welfare the fundamental role of distorted factor markets abstract this paper employs analytical and numerical models to assess the welfare effects of a revenue neutral carbon tax and nonauctioned carbon emissions permits taking into account preexisting tax distortions in factor markets the presence of preexisting taxes significantly raises the general equilibrium costs of both policies this cost increase is much greater under emissions permits since this policy does not generate revenues to reduce distortionary taxes under our central estimates emissions permits cannot increase welfare unless environmental damages exceed about 18 per ton of carbon in contrast an appropriately scaled carbon tax is welfare improving so long as environmental damages are positive

optimal fiscal regime in a spatial duopoly abstract we investigate a horizontally differentiated duopoly in which a public authority can either tax or subsidize firms in order to induce duopolists to choose the socially optimal locations the policy proposed here is such that welfare maximization is achieved by directly affecting firms location without explicitly modifying their price behavior

optimal taxes and the structure of preferences if optimal tax theory is to be the basis for calculating tax rates a close understanding is required of the relationship between the structure of preferences and the configuration of optimal tax rates otherwise hypotheses chosen by the econometrician for practical convenience may completely determine the results independently of measurement this paper explores the relationship between various types of separability particularly weak and implicit separability and optimal tax rates in the various models discussed in the literature the use of distance functions and the antonelli matrix provides a significant unification of previously disparate results in the final analysis optimal tax theory should be the basis for actual calculation of tax rates although recently there have been great advances in theoretical results and in our understanding of their meaning we are still some way from a working knowledge of whether uniform commodity taxes are in practice optimal or if not which commodities should be discriminated against present theoretical formulae do not yield clear cut results except in special cases and it has recently become clear that optimal rates depend crucially on the detailed structure of consumer preferences for example atkinson and stiglitz 3 show that with an optimal nonlinear income tax discriminatory commodity taxes are only necessary to the extent that individual commodities are not weakly separable from leisure more recently deaton 6 has shown that a similar result holds for what is perhaps the most interesting of the standard models that where there are many consumers and only a linear income tax and proportional commodity taxes are allowed in this case separability between goods and leisure together with linear engel curves for goods removes the need for differential commodity taxation in consequence nothing can be learned about commodity taxes from consumer demand studies in which commodity demands are explained conditionally on total expenditure and commodity prices and which assume linear engel curves all such studies require separability from leisure as a maintained hypothesis and so are consistent with uniform commodity taxation these results suggest that the prospects for meaningful empirical calculations of tax rates are bleak econometricians estimating commodity demand and labor supply equations make generous use of separability assumptions to enable estimation at all in consequence it is likely that empirically calculated tax rates based on econometric estimates of parameters will be determined in structure not by the measurements actually made but by arbitrary untested and even unconscious hypotheses chosen by the econometrician for practical convenience to remedy this situation and as a prelude to fruitful empirical work it is necessary to have a more explicit understanding of how preference structure affects optimal tax rates such is the object of this paper three different

evaluating policy interventions with general equilibrium externalities abstract we report on the results of analytical and numerical models that describe the effects of non separable externalities or public goods on public policies with important general equilibrium consequences in the numerical exercise we calibrate a general equilibrium model with non separable air quality benefits in order to measure the excess burden and total net benefits of transportation and energy taxes in the 1995 u s economy the change in the physical level and the economic value in air quality associated with a given policy is a function of the substitution patterns between air quality and market goods that we assume the size of the deadweight loss due to pre existing distortions such as a tax on labor income is substantially affected by these substitution patterns

optimum taxation and the allocation of time abstract a theory of optimal taxation is presented building upon becker s 1965 theory of the allocation of time optimal commodity taxation is governed by factor shares in household activities any market good which requires little household time or even saves time should carry a relatively low tax rate this policy rule does not require the estimation of price elasticities and is therefore more applicable than traditional ramsey rule taxation

tax reform with sub additive and nested additive preferences abstract this paper characterizes the direction of tax reform when preferences are sub additive or nested additive this information should be useful for researchers doing empirical research on tax reform based on some form of additive functions for preferences

second best optimal taxation of capital and labor in a developing economy abstract as commercial integration reduces the reliance on foreign trade taxation raising tax revenue has become a major concern for the governments of developing economies this paper examines how the tax burden in a developing economy should be distributed between capital income and labor income we study a two sector model where the traditional sector is informal and consequently cannot be taxed by the government in this setup we find that the optimal second best tax structure in order to raise a certain amount of revenue requires to tax capital income at least as much as labor income and possibly more

implicit separability characterisation and implications for consumer demands abstract we characterize a general form of separability which we call implicit separability it is more general than all known types of separability and contains them as special cases we provide complete characterisations in terms of the direct preference ordering its dual expenditure function the demand functions and the slutsky

moral hazard renegotiation and debt abstract renegotiation of financial contracts is frequently observed in practice we show how contract renegotiation based on unverifiable information improves efficiency when both ex ante private action and ex post costly state verification moral hazard are present simultaneously we find that the final contract is always debt since renegotiation allows the parties to handle sequentially the two information problems

optimal social health insurance with supplementary private insurance abstract this paper investigates the structure of a national health service in which there is compulsory social insurance covering a package of essentials a given part of individuals health expenditure and supplementary private policy topping up the remaining services the latter insurance contract provides for a co payment by patients limiting the so called third party payer effect thus an individual s health expenditure is divided into three parts the first covered by social insurance the second by a private policy and the third out of pocket such mixed system design has received increasing attention in recent years and has been adopted by several industrialized countries the conditions for optimal rates of social insurance coverage and of private coinsurance are analysed and discussed the optimality requirements refer to efficiency as well as equity concerns

funding transportation spending in metropolitan washington dc the costs of alternative revenue sources abstract this paper develops and implements an analytical framework for estimating the efficiency costs of raising additional revenue from taxes on labor property gasoline peak road use and higher transit fares for the washington dc area the model incorporates driving externalities and interactions between the different policies an economic case can be made for using congestion taxes and possibly gasoline and property taxes to raise extra revenue though it should be qualified for example the inelastic demand for driving limits the congestion benefits per dollar of revenue raised and these taxes have adverse employment effects in the same way that a tax on labor income does

optimal contracts under costly state falsification we examine an exchange economy with two agents one risk neutral with a certain endowment and a second risk averse with a random endowment the realization of the endowment is public but can be falsified by the second agent at a cost for a broad class of falsification cost functions the optimal no falsification contract is noncontingent on a left hand interval and strictly increasing with a slope strictly less than one on a right hand interval under a mild further restriction optimal no falsification contracts are in addition piece wise linear optimal contracts may in general require falsifying the state but for a set of the highest endowment realizations there is no falsification we find simple conditions under which the optimal contract is a no falsification contract the model has applications that include financial insurance and employment contracts and tax policy

inverse demand systems and welfare measurement in quantity space most studies of welfare or cost benefit analyses are concerned with the welfare effects of price changes 11 19 27 33 50 there are however many situations in which policy options are directly related to quantity changes the welfare effects of price changes are analyzed with the traditional demand system in which commodity quantities are determined as functions of their prices the welfare effects of quantity changes on the other hand are associated with the inverse demand system in which commodity prices are dependent on their quantities in conventional welfare analysis of price change prices are taken to be exogenous or predetermined while quantities are endogenous in contrast in welfare analysis of quantity changes quantities are exogenous while prices are endogenous price based or dual welfare measures are relevant when there are well functioning competitive markets and quantities are fully adjusted to changes in prices on the other hand quantity based or primal welfare measures are useful in situations where there are constraints on commodity quantities or when transaction costs impede consumers from fully adjusting to changes in prices the choice between priceand quantity based welfare measures is empirical and proper measurement of welfare effects requires the knowledge as to which variable price or quantity is the exogenous one for individual consumers it may be reasonable to assume that the supply of commodities is perfectly elastic and therefore prices can be taken as exogenous but this assumption may not be tenable for consumers in the aggregate or if highly aggregated economy wide data are used to estimate demand relations at the aggregate level quantities are more properly viewed as exogenous than are prices although individual consumers make their consumption decisions based on given prices the quantities of commodities are predetermined by production at the market level and prices must adjust so that the available quantities are consumed 28 1 2

the current account and the optimal government debt abstract in this paper we analyze the optimal response of the current account and the government debt to real disturbances permanent and temporary lumpsum taxes are not feasible and the government income is raised according to the ramsey rule for optimum taxation we show that permanent disturbances have no effects on either the private or the government current account if initially there are no deficits starting off from the same initial situation both the private sector and the government develop a deficit on current account in response to a temporary disturbance

compensation incentives and the duality of risk aversion and riskiness the common folklore that giving options to agents will make them more willing to take risks is false in fact no incentive schedule will make all expected utility maximizers more or less risk averse this paper finds simple intuitive necessary and sufficient conditions under which incentive schedules make agents more or less risk averse the paper uses these to examine the incentive effects of some common structures such as puts and calls and it briefly explores the duality between a fee schedule that makes an agent more or less risk averse and gambles that increase or decrease risk with the growing interest in executive compensation and agency problems

the transitional dynamics of fiscal policy long run capital accumulation and growth this paper analyzes the effects of fiscal policies in a non scale growing economy with public and private capital the equilibrium dynamics are characterized and we contrast the dynamic effects of government expenditure on investment and expenditure on consumption under four alternative modes of tax financing most of our attention focuses on the numerical simulations of a calibrated economy the results emphasize the lengthy transition periods which implies that policies have sizeable level effects leading to substantial welfare effects even though long run growth rates are unaffected the paper highlights the intertemporal dimensions of fiscal policy and the tradeoffs these involve for economic performance especially growth and welfare

optimal contracts when enforcement is a decision variable this paper analyzes choice theoretic costly enforcement in an intertemporal contracting model with a differentially informed investor and entrepreneur an intertemporal contract is modeled as a mechanism in which there is limited commitment to payment and enforcement decisions the goal of the analysis is to characterize the effect of choice theoretic costly enforcement on the structure of optimal contracts the paper shows that simple debt is the optimal contract when commitment is limited and costly enforcement is a decision variable theorem 1 in contrast stochastic contracts are optimal when agents can commit to the ex ante optimal decisions theorem 2 the paper also shows that the costly state verification model can be viewed as a reduced form of an enforcement model in which agents choose payments and strategies as part of a perfect bayesian nash equilibrium

multivariate risk aversion and consumer choice this paper analyzes the effect of increases in risk aversion on a general consumer choice model with multiple sources of risk sufficient and in the two commodity case necessary conditions for a given demand function to increase or decrease with increased risk aversion are derived these general results are illustrated with a two period consumption savings model copyright 1990 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

agricultural policies in the presence of distorting taxes this article analyzes how distortionary factor taxes affect the welfare impacts of production subsidies production quotas acreage controls subsidies for acreage reductions and cash transfers to farmers pre existing taxes substantially raise the costs of all these policies these additional costs reflect the welfare losses from financing certain policies by distortionary taxes they also reflect interactions with factor markets caused by changes in the costs of producing agricultural output previous studies ignore the latter types of effect consequently they significantly overstate the costs of production subsidies and understate the costs of production quotas acreage controls and subsidies for acreage reductions

is there a link between executive equity incentives and accounting fraud we compare executive equity incentives of firms accused of accounting fraud by the securities and exchange commission sec during the period 1996 2003 with two samples of firms not accused of fraud we measure equity incentives in a variety of ways and employ a battery of empirical tests we find no consistent evidence that executive equity incentives are associated with fraud these results stand in contrast to assertions by policy makers that incentives from stock based compensation and the resulting equity holdings increase the likelihood of accounting fraud

ramsey tax rules for economies with imperfect competition abstract this paper derives optimal commodity tax rules for a general equilibrium model with imperfect competition to achieve this functions are constructed that describe the effects of taxation upon the equilibrium prices and profit levels of imperfectly competitive industries the use of these functions allows existing tax rules to be generalised to accommodate imperfect competition

estimating the effect of tax reform in differentiated product oligopolistic markets abstract the incidence of taxation has been extensively discussed in the public finance literature but mainly within a competitive market setting or within a homogenous good cournot type oligopoly in a differentiated product oligopoly the effect of taxation can be more complex as the rate of taxation may affect not only the prices but also the profile and quality of products that are sold in the market in this paper we examine the effects of changing tax regimes in a differentiated product oligopoly in order to illustrate our approach we employ data from one such market the automobile market in israel

optimal strike prices of stock options for effort averse executives abstract this paper evaluates the common practice of setting the strike prices of executive option plans at the money hall and murphy hall brian murphy kevin j 2000 optimal exercise prices for executive stock options american economic review 90 2 209 214 claim this practice to be optimal since it maximizes the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance however they do not incorporate effort and the possibility that managers are effort averse into their model we revisit this question while explicitly introducing these factors and allowing the reward package to include fixed wages options and stock grants we simulate the manager s effort choice and compensation as well as the value of shareholders equity under alternative compensation schemes and identify schemes that are optimal our simulations indicate that when abstracting from tax considerations it is optimal to award managers with options that will most likely be highly valuable i e substantially in the money on their expiration date prior to 2006 the tax code and financial reporting standards provided incentives to award options that are closer to the money when issued than the options that were optimal in the absence of these considerations recent tax and reporting changes voided these incentives and thus we predict that these changes will induce firms to issue options with lower strike prices than those that were issued prior to 2006

optimum commodity taxation in pooling equilibria abstract this paper extends the standard model of optimum commodity taxation ramsey f 1927 a contribution to the theory of taxation economic journal 37 47 61 diamond p mirrlees j 1971 optimal taxation and public production ii tax rules american economic review 61 261 278 to a competitive economy in which markets are inefficient due to asymmetric information insurance markets are prime examples consumers impose varying costs on suppliers but firms cannot associate costs with individual customers and consequently all are charged equal prices in such a competitive pooling equilibrium the price of each good is equal to the average of individual marginal costs weighted by equilibrium quantities we derive modified ramsey boiteux conditions for optimum taxes in such an economy and show that in addition to the standard formula they include first order effects which reflect the deviations of prices from marginal costs and the response of equilibrium quantities to the taxes levied an explanation of the additional terms is provided it is shown that a condition on the monotonicity of demand elasticities enables to sign the direction of the deviations from the standard case

redistributive taxation in a simple life cycle model an overlapping generations model with rich and poor life cycle planners is developed positive aspects of redistributive capital and labor taxation are then analyzed the conditions required for feldstein s result that the long run capital labor ratio is invariant to wage taxations are discussed the utility frontier is shown to generally have a slope with an absolute value different from one in the neighborhood of a no tax equilibrium labor income is clearly a more efficient base for long run redistribution only if the economy is dynamically inefficient and the rich household benefits from an increase in the gross interest rate even in this case the labor income base may not be considered more desirable when transitional effects are considered copyright 1989 by the london school of economics and political science

the switching effect of environmental taxation within bertrand differentiated duopoly we investigate second best optimal taxation of the polluting variety of a product in a bertrand duopoly with differentiated varieties the analysis provides novel insight on a useful social function of environmental regulation besides internalizing the environmental externality the taxation of the polluting variety improves the matching of consumers and product varieties and so creates a socially desirable business switching between the differentiated varieties

samurai accountant a theory of auditing and plunder a risk neutral principal wishes to exact a payment from a risk neutral agent whose wealth he does not know but may verify through a costly auditing procedure we characterize efficient schemes for the principal when he is allowed to choose schedules for preaudit and postaudit payments and audit probabilities subject to the constraint that only monetary incentives can be used and that the principal may never make a net payment to the agent the main results are that efficient schemes involve preaudit payments which are increasing in the agent s wealth audit probabilities are decreasing in the agent s wealth and also satisfy certain constraints as equalities in general such schemes involve stochastic auditing and rebates after an audit in this paper we analyse the problem of a principal extracting wealth from an agent who is reluctant to part with it and is also better informed than the principal as to the amount he owns we assume that the principal has a costly means of discovering the agent s

quality based price discrimination and tax incidence the market for gasoline and diesel cars in europe the existing tax policies toward gasoline and diesel cars in european countries provide a unique opportunity to analyze quality based price discrimination and the implied tax incidence in my econometric framework consumers choose the type of engine based on their annual mileage prices are set by the manufacturers the relative pricing of gasoline and diesel cars appears to be consistent with monopolistic price discrimination effectively segmenting low mileage from high mileage consumers on average about 75 to 90 of the price differentials between gasoline and diesel cars can be explained by markup differences i draw implications for the effectiveness and the revenue effects of tax policy

uncertainty and optimally uniform commodity taxes this paper examines the implications of uncertainty for the structure of optimal commodity taxes in the presence of a linear income tax consumers face uncertain income and commit to consumption of some goods before the resolution of uncertainty and to others after preferences are separable between labor and consumption goods we prove that optimal commodity taxes are i uniform within the category of noncommitted goods if their subutility is logarithmic ii uniform within the two categories if both subutilities are logarithmic and iii nonzero across categories with the tax rate on precommitted goods being lower than the tax rate on noncommitted goods starting with atkinson and stiglitz 1976 a number of economists have argued that under certain restrictions on preferences e g logarithmic a linear income tax is a sufficient tool for optimal tax policy see atkinson 1977 deaton 1979 and deaton and stern 1986 recently cremer and gahvari 1995a showed that these results do not carry to an economy in which individuals face wage uncertainty in models with uncertainty taxation is useful for the insurance it provides if consumption takes place both before and after the resolution of uncertainty commodity taxes will have different insurance properties depending on when consumption occurs this property makes differential tax treatment of these two types of goods optimal cremer and gahvari 1995a divided commodities into two categories the consumption levels in one category are committed to before the resolution of uncertainty and those in the other after their study pinpoints a fundamental difference between these categories of goods that calls for their tax treatment to be different however their analysis leaves open the question of the uniformity of tax rates within each category the main aim of the current paper is to address this question we shall examine the type of preferences for which the tax rates within each category have to be uniform in this way we will build a bridge between the results of cremer and gahvari 1995a and the literature on uniform taxation in the presence of a linear

optimal fiscal policy in a stochastic growth model although most neoclassical growth models focus on competitive equilibria which are pareto optimal and ignore the role of government recent works by romer 28 29 judd 20 baxter and king s and bizer and judd 7 have shown that government can be introduced into and suboptimal equilibria can be studied in these models as well their studies however are positive analyses of the effects of fiscal policy in competitive equilibria the purpose of this paper is to apply ramsey s 27 theory of optimal taxation to the normative study of fiscal policy in a stocastic growth model ramsey studied a static representative consumer economy with many goods in his formulation a government consumes a fixed amount of these goods which it purchases at market prices and finances by levying flat rate excise taxes prices and quantities are determined in a competitive equilibrium the government is benevolent and its objective is to choose the optimal tax rates to maximize the representative consumer s utility a number of economists among them kydland and prescott 23 barro 3 turnovsky and brock 31 and lucas and stockey 26 have noted that ramsey s formulation can be applied to dynamic economies with uncertainty if one reinterprets the goods in static problems as dated state contingent goods in this framework a fiscal policy is a rule which specifies state contingent tax rates and the amount of public debt issue in each date the optimal fiscal policy is defined as the one which leads to a quantity