law firm expertise and merger and acquisition outcomes abstractusing a comprehensive sample of u s mergers and acquisitions m a bids over 1990 2008 we document that top market share law firms are associated with a number of important bid outcomes and characteristics top bidder law firms are associated with significantly higher offer completion rates in contrast top target law firms are associated with significantly higher offer withdrawal rates top bidder and target law firms are both associated with significantly higher takeover premia these associations are significant even after controlling for selection bias and major offer bidder and investment bank adviser characteristics our interpretation is that top bidder law firms have stronger incentives and abilities to facilitate deal completions while top target law firms have stronger incentives and abilities to help realize higher takeover premia consistent with their clients objectives our findings suggest that law firm market share is an important omitted variable in current economic models

endogenous market structure and competition in the 19th century american brewing industry abstract this study examines market structure and competition in the brewing industry in american frontier states around 1880 although comprehensive firm level data are unavailable available data provide information about the presence of firms in western frontier markets and characteristics of those markets the analysis uses these data in a discrete dependent variable econometric model to estimate the size of a market needed to support a certain number of breweries and the impact of market characteristics on market structure in addition the estimated market sizes needed to sustain different numbers of firms provide information about the competitive effects of entry in the early brewing industry the results indicate that the presence of second and third brewing firms significantly increased competition in a market implying that duopoly markets were not perfectly competitive moreover these findings suggest that brewing firms were not engaged in collusive behavior

from cash in the market pricing to financial fragility we review some recent research that explores the relationship between asset price volatility and financial fragility when markets and contracts are incomplete jel e5 g2

takeover contests toeholds and deterrence we consider a setting in which two potential buyers one with a prior toehold and one without compete in a takeover modeled as an ascending auction with participating costs the toeholder is more aggressive during the takeover process because she is also a seller of her own shares the non toeholder anticipates this extra aggressiveness of the toeholder thus he is deterred from participating unless he has a high valuation for the target company this leads to large inefficiency losses for many configurations expected target returns are first increasing then decreasing in the size of the toehold

entry in monopoly market this paper develops new empirical models of market concentration from game theoretic models of entry we construct our models from inequality conditions that describe entrants equilibrium strategies in simultaneous move and sequential move games and use them to study the effects of entry in isolated monopoly markets for new automobiles from estimates of the market size necessary to support one and two dealers we conclude that monopoly dealers do not block the entry of a second dealer we also find that entry does not cause price cost margins to fall by much

would you like to shrink the welfare state a survey of european citizens welfare state reform a survey of what europeans want the fundamental problems facing european welfare states high unemployment and unsustainable public pensions plans in particular have been in the political debate for years so why have we seen so little reform to find out we surveyed the opinions of citizens in france germany italy and spain on their welfare states and on various reform options this is what we found first most workers underestimate the costs of public pensions though they are aware of their unsustainability second the status quo is a majoritarian outcome a majority of citizens opposes cuts to social security and welfare spending but also opposes further increases since population ageing without reform implies an automatic expansion our results suggest that most citizens would favour reforms that stabilize but do not shrink the current welfare states third many would welcome changes in the allocation of benefits a large number of workers in italy and germany would be willing to opt out of public pensions and replace them with private pensions though the details of how this scheme is formulated matter for its popularity and many italians and spaniards would welcome an extension of the coverage of unemployment insurance fourth conflicts over the welfare state are mainly shaped by the economic situation of the respondent while political ideology plays a limited role disagreements are found along three dimensions young versus old rich versus poor and outsider versus insider in terms of labour market status from a practical point of view this suggests that there is scope to bundle reforms strategically in order to build a large and mixed coalition of supporters tito boeri axel borsch supan and guido tabellini

free bank failures risky bonds versus undiversified portfolios almost 30 of the 872 banks established under the free banking system 1837 62 are considered failures unable to reimburse noteholders for the full value of their bank notes upon closure lacking sufficient data economists have focused on one of two general failure explanations poor regulation design or undiversified bank portfolios i test both explanations within hazard functions using warren weber s annual balance sheet data for almost every antebellum bank my results suggest that free banking s bond secured note issue was the underlying problem but individual banks could have avoided failure by diversifying their assets with loans and controlling their circulation

initial shareholdings and overbidding in takeover contests within the context of takeovers this paper shows that in private value auctions the optimal individually rational strategy for a bidder with partial ownership of the item is to overbid i e to bid more than his valuation this strategy however can lead to i an inefficient outcome and ii the winning bidder making a net loss further the overbidding result implies that the presence of a large shareholder increases the bid premium in single bidder takeovers at the expense of reducing the probability of the takeover actually occurring

optimal toeholds in takeover contests abstract we offer an explanation for why raiders do not acquire the maximum possible toehold prior to announcing a takeover bid by endogenously modeling the target firm s value following an unsuccessful takeover we demonstrate that a raider may optimally acquire a small toehold even if the acquisition does not drive up the pre tender target price this occurs because although a larger toehold increases profits if the takeover succeeds it also conveys a higher level of managerial entrenchment and hence a lower firm value if the takeover fails we derive new predictions regarding the optimal toehold and target value following a failed takeover we also examine the impact of a rival bidder and dilution

a little fairness may induce a lot of redistribution in democracy we use a model of self centered inequality aversion suggested by fehr and schmidt 1999 to study voting on redistribution we theoretically identify two classes of conditions when an empirically plausible amount of fairness preferences induces redistribution through referenda we test the predictions of the adapted inequality aversion model in a simple redistribution experiment and flnd that it predicts voting outcomes far better than the standard model of voting assuming rationality and strict self interest

merger negotiations and the toehold puzzle abstract the substantial control premium typically observed in corporate takeovers makes a compelling case for acquiring target shares a toehold in the market prior to launching a bid moreover auction theory suggests that toehold bidding may yield a competitive advantage over rival bidders nevertheless with a sample exceeding 10 000 initial control bids for us public targets we show that toehold bidding has declined steadily since the early 1980s and is now surprisingly rare at the same time the average toehold is large when it occurs 20 and toeholds are the norm in hostile bids to explain these puzzling observations we develop and test a two stage takeover model where attempted merger negotiations are followed by open auction with optimal bidding a toehold imposes a cost on target management causing some targets to rationally reject merger negotiations optimal toeholds are therefore either zero to avoid rejection costs or greater than a threshold so that toehold benefits offset rejection costs the toehold threshold estimate averages 9 across initial bidders reflecting in part the bidder s opportunity loss of a merger termination agreement in the presence of market liquidity costs a threshold of this size may well induce a broad range of bidders to select zero toehold as predicted the probability of toehold bidding decreases and the toehold size increases with the threshold estimate the model also predicts a relatively high frequency of toehold bidding in hostile bids as observed overall our test results are consistent with rational bidder behavior with respect to the toehold decision

state ownership and market liberalization evidence from china s domestic m a market abstract we study how state ownership affects the post merger performance of chinese acquirers and find that state owned acquirers soes experience a significantly larger long term performance improvement following mergers compared to their non state owned nsoe counterparts when partitioning the sample period into acquisitions made prior to and following china s split share reform of 2005 we find that the post merger performance improvement of soe acquirers is largely attributed to the post reform period in which controlling shareholders converted their non tradable shares into tradable status our results are consistent with the interpretation that state intervention in the form of capital market liberalization and alleviation of governance problems combined with political connections and privileged access to financing may have a positive effect on m a performance that outweighs the inefficiency cost of state ownership in china

choosing justice in experimental democracies with production we examine in a laboratory setting how direct participation in choosing a principle of distributive justice and a tax system impinges on subjects attitudes and subsequent productivity when they participate in a task produce income and then experience losses or gains according to the tax system experience with a redistributive principle and its associated taxation system in a production environment does not detract from overall acceptance of the distributive principle particularly for subjects who participate in choosing the principle participation in discussion choice and production increases subjects convictions regarding their preferences for these subjects especially recipients of transfers productivity rises significantly over the course of the experiments no such effect is evident for subjects who do not participate in setting the regime under which they are to labor the results implications for questions of democratic participation and the stability of income support programs are drawn

individual preferences for political redistribution what drives people s support of governmental reduction of income inequality we employ data from a large international survey in order to evaluate the explanatory power of three competing forces referred to as the homo oeconomicus effect the public values effect and the social rivalry effect the empirical analysis reveals that at the aggregate level all three effects play a significant role in shaping individual preferences for political redistribution attitudes of citizens in formerly socialist countries turn out to differ from those of western citizens in a systematic way 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

a near rational model of the business cycle with wage and price inertia this paper presents a model in which insignificantly suboptimal behavior causes aggregate demand shocks to have significant real effects the individual loss to agents with inertial price wage behavior is second order in terms of the parameter describing the shock while the effect on real economic variables is first order thus significant changes in business activity can be generated by anticipated money supply changes provided that some agents are willing to engage in nonmaximizing behavior which results in small losses

is more always better a survey on positional concerns abstract we use survey data to provide some empirical information about concerns regarding relative standing respondents chose between a world where they have more of a good than others and one where everyone s endowment of the good is higher but the respondent has less than others questions asked about education attractiveness and intelligence for one s child and oneself income vacation time approval and disapproval from a supervisor and papers to write half of the respondents preferred to have 50 less real income but high relative income concerns about position were strongest for attractiveness and supervisor s praise and weakest for vacation time

competing bids target management resistance and the structure of takeover bids we examine the structure of initial takeover bids and the frequency of observing competing bids and target management resistance we find the use of cash is not consistently correlated with the frequency of competition or resistance and that the cost of acquiring information about a target is associated with the likelihood of competition and resistance a high bid premium appears to deter competing offers and is also associated with a lower likelihood of resistance finally target management resistance is associated with an increased likelihood of a competing offer arising and a larger increase in target shareholder wealth between the initial public announcement and outcome dates relative to the not resisted subsample for both successful and unsuccessful acquisition proposals article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

estimation of a model of entry in the airline industry this paper considers the effect of an airline s scale of operation at an airport on the profitability of routes flown out of that airport the empirical methodology uses the entry decisions of airlines as indicators of underlying profitability the results extend the empirical literature on airport presence by providing a new set of estimates of the determinants of city pair profitability these estimates imply that city pair profits increase in airport presence and decrease rapidly in the number of entering firms the literature on empirical models of oligopoly entry is also extended via a focus on the role of differences between firms

takeovers and divergence of investor opinion we test several hypotheses on how takeover premium is related to investors divergence of opinion on a target s equity value we show that the total takeover premium the pre announcement target stock price run up and the post announcement stock price markup are all higher when investors have higher divergence of opinion we obtain identical results with higher market level investor sentiment when divergence of opinion is higher a firm is less likely to be a takeover target although takeover synergy in successful takeovers is higher our results suggest that takeovers may play a role in explaining high contemporaneous stock prices in the presence of high divergence of investor opinion the author 2011 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

bank runs in the free banking period free banks in the united states issued private banknotes without discretionary restriction of entry previous research suggests explanations for noteholders relatively large losses and the substantial number of banks that closed the authors examine these hypotheses and the hypothesis that contagious runs were important the evidence provides no support for the importance of wildcat banking due to par versus market valuation of bond reserves episodic but not general support for the importance of declining bond prices and support for contagion effects and contemporaries knowledge of them with little or no impact on the number of banks that closed copyright 1994 by ohio state university press

political self serving bias and redistribution we explore the impact of the self serving bias on the supply and demand for redistribution we present results from an experiment in which participants decide on redistribution after performing a real effort task dependent on individual performance participants are divided into two groups successful and unsuccessful participants success is exogenously determined because they are randomly assigned to either a hard or easy task however because participants are not told which task they were assigned to there is ambiguity as to whether success or failure should be attributed to internal or external factors participants take two redistribution decisions first they choose a supply of redistribution in a situation where no personal interests are at stake second they choose a redistributive system behind a veil of ignorance our results confirm and expand previous findings on the self serving bias successful participants are more likely to attribute their success to their effort rather than luck and they opt for less redistribution unsuccessful participants tend to attribute their failure to external factors and opt for more redistribution we demonstrate that the self serving bias contributes to a polarization of the views on redistribution

bank entry during the antebellum period a recent study by kenneth ng 1988 challenges the view the free banking laws lowered barriers to entry the authors study examines bank entry and capital formation in free and nonfree banking states during the free banking period a competitive model is developed and used to test if barriers were lowered in free banking states the evidence indicates that entry significantly increased after the enactment of the free banking laws and that entry policy in nonfree banking states appeared to have been liberalized when the free banking laws were enacted in other states copyright 1995 by ohio state university press

back to the future backtesting systemic risk measures during historical bank runs and the great depression abstract we evaluate the performance of two popular systemic risk measures covar and srisk during eight financial panics in the era before fdic insurance bank stock price and balance sheet data were not readily available for this period we rectify this shortcoming by constructing a novel dataset for the new york banking system before 1933 our evaluation exercise focuses on two challenges ranking systemically important financial institutions sifis and financial crisis prediction we find that covar and srisk meet the sifi ranking challenge that is they help identify systemic institutions in periods of distress beyond what is explained by standard risk measures up to six months before panics in contrast aggregate covar and srisk are only somewhat effective at predicting financial crises

when should sellers use auctions the simultaneous bid auction is a standard method for sellers to solicit offers from buyers a simple alternative is for a seller to ask buyers to make offers sequentially if it is costly for buyers to participate the sequential mechanism will tend to be more efficient than the simultaneous auction because later potential buyers can condition their participation decisions on earlier bids however the sequential mechanism s greater efficiency may not produce higher revenues because while the possibility of deterring later potential entrants can lead early bidders to bid aggressively the fact that later firms might be deterred will tend to reduce revenues the relative revenue performance of the mechanisms will therefore depend on whether the threat of potential future competition which can raise bids in the sequential mechanism is more valuable to the seller than actual competition which will tend to be greater in the simultaneous auction the relative revenue performance of these alternative mechanisms has direct implications for how assets should be sold in the case of how to structure the sale of corporations this question has attracted attention from practitioners and commentators since the delaware supreme court s 1986 revlon decision charged a board overseeing the sale of a company with the duty of getting the best price for the stockholders revlon v mcandrews and forbes holdings 1986 in practice

measuring future grandparents preferences for equality and relative standing individuals aversion to risk and inequality and their concern for relative standing are measured through experimental choices between hypothetical societies it is found that on average individuals are both fairly inequality averse and have a strong concern for relative income the results are used to illustrate welfare consequences based on a utilitarian swf and a modified crra utility function it is shown that the social marginal utility of income may then become negative even at income levels that are far from extreme

anyone for higher speed limits self interested and adaptive political preferences swedish survey evidence indicates that variables reflecting self interest are important in explaining people s preferred speed limits and that political preferences adapt to technological development drivers who believe they drive better than the average driver as well as drivers of cars that are newer and hence safer bigger and with better highspeed characteristics prefer higher speed limits in contrast elderly people prefer lower speed limits furthermore people report that they themselves vote more sociotropically than they believe others vote on average indicating that we may vote less sociotropically than we believe ourselves one possible reason for such self serving biases is that people desire to see themselves as socially responsible

limited rationality and strategic complements the implications for macroeconomics this paper considers the implications of heterogeneity in information processing abilities for macroeconomic models that exhibit strategic complements the latter is the same concept that has received much attention in the recent macro literature under the headings keynesian coordination problems and positive trading externalities we consider environments in which agents vary in terms of their ability to form expectations and ask whether it is the sophisticated agents or the naive agents who have a disproportionately large effect on macroeconomic equilibrium we find that if macroeconomic interaction exhibits strategic complementarity then it is the naive agents who have a disproportionate impact

merger negotiations with stock market feedback do preoffer target stock price runups increase bidder takeover costs we present model based tests of this issue assuming runups are caused by signals that inform investors about potential takeover synergies rational deal anticipation implies a relation between target runups and markups offer value minus runup that is greater than minus one for one and inherently nonlinear if merger negotiations force bidders to raise the offer with the runup a costly feedback loop where bidders pay twice for anticipated target synergies markups become strictly increasing in runups large sample tests support rational deal anticipation in runups while rejecting the costly feedback loop

contrasting rational and psychological analyses of political choice we contrast the rational theory of choice in the form of expected utility theory with descriptive psychological analysis in the form of prospect theory using problems involving the choice between political candidates and public referendum issues the results showed that the assumptions underlying the classical theory of risky choice are systematically violated in the manner predicted by prospect theory in particular our respondents exhibited risk aversion in the domain of gains risk seeking in the domain of losses and a greater sensitivity to losses than to gains this is consistent with the advantage of the incumbent under normal conditions and the potential advantage of the challenger in bad times the results further show how a shift in the reference point could lead to reversals of preferences in the evaluation of political and economic options contrary to the assumption of invariance finally we contrast the normative and descriptive analyses of uncertainty in choice and address the rationality of voting

preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities this paper explores how individual preferences for redistribution depend on future income prospects in addition to estimating the impact of individuals socioeconomic background and of their subjective perceptions of future mobility we employ panel data to construct dobjectivet measures of expected gains and losses from redistribution for different categories of individuals we find that such measures have considerable explanatory power and perform better than dgeneral mobilityt indexes we also find that preferences for redistribution respond to individual beliefs on what determines one s position in the social ladder ceteris paribus people who believe that the american society offers equal opportunities are more averse to redistribution d 2004 published by elsevier b v

margin based asset pricing and deviations from the law of one price in a model with heterogeneous risk aversion agents facing margin constraints we show how securities required returns increase in both their betas and their margin requirements negative shocks to fundamentals make margin constraints bind lowering risk free rates and raising sharpe ratios of risky securities especially for high margin securities such a funding liquidity crisis gives rise to bases that is price gaps between securities with identical cash flows but different margins in the time series bases depend on the shadow cost of capital which can be captured through the interest rate spread between collateralized and uncollateralized loans and in the cross section they depend on relative margins we test the model empirically using the credit default swap bond bases and other deviations from the law of one price and use it to evaluate central banks lending facilities jel g01 g12 g13 e44 e50 the paramount role of funding constraints becomes particularly salient during liquidity crises with the one that started in 2007 being an excellent case in point banks unable to fund their operations closed down and the funding problems spread to other investors such as hedge funds that relied on bank funding therefore traditional liquidity providers became forced sellers interest rate spreads increased dramatically treasury rates dropped sharply and central banks stretched their balance sheets to facilitate funding these funding problems had significant asset pricing effects the most extreme example being the failure of the law of one price loop securities with nearly

market structure and multiple equilibria in airline markets we provide a practical method to estimate the payoff functions of players in complete information static discrete games with respect to the empirical literature on entry games originated by bresnahan and reiss 1990 and berry 1992 the main novelty of our framework is to allow for general forms of heterogeneity across players without making equilibrium selection assumptions we allow the effects that the entry of each individual airline has on the profits of its competitors its competitive effects to differ across airlines the identified features of the model are sets of parameters partial identification such that the choice probabilities predicted by the econometric model are consistent with the empirical choice probabilities estimated from the data we apply this methodology to investigate the empirical importance of firm heterogeneity as a determinant of market structure in the u s airline industry we find evidence of heterogeneity across airlines in their profit functions the competitive effects of large airlines american delta united are different from those of low cost carriers and southwest also the competitive effect of an airline is increasing in its airport presence which is an important measure of observable heterogeneity in the airline industry then we develop a policy experiment to estimate the effect of repealing the wright amendment on competition in markets out of the dallas airports we find that repealing thewright amendment would increase the number of markets served out of dallas love

toehold strategies takeover laws and rival bidders abstract prior to the announcement of a tender offer the bidding firm is legally allowed to acquire shares in the open market subject to some limitations these pre announcement purchases are known as toeholds this paper presents a simple model that describes the bidder s optimal toehold acquisition strategy within an environment that closely parallels the present legal institutions the model shows that toeholds and bids interact in a complex manner even without the presence of asymmetric information by examining a simple environment the paper provides a useful alternative hypothesis for tests of other presumably more complex models one of the main implications of our model is that if no competing bidders are expected no toeholds should be purchased the paper also demonstrates that the correct specification of an empirical model can be critical for example under some parameter values toehold purchases may exhibit a negative cross sectional correlation with the pre announcement run up in the stock price this occurs even though prices are strictly increasing the size of the toehold several implications concerning various aspects of merger legislation are considered for example we demonstrate that a rule similar to a fair price provision has the desirable property that a second bidder arrives and wins if and only if he places a higher value on the target than the initial bidder

social preferences self interest and the demand for redistribution preferences for redistribution may be influenced by values and beliefs about distributive justice as well as by self interest people may prefer more redistribution to the poor if they believe that poverty is caused by circumstances beyond individual control therefore beliefs about the causes of income may affect demand for redistribution alternatively the effect of these beliefs on redistributive preferences may be spurious if they are correlated with income and self interest is not properly controlled for they may also measure incentive cost concerns using social survey data i find that self interest cannot explain the effect of these beliefs on redistributive preferences 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

bank panics government guarantees and the long run size of the financial sector evidence from free banking america governments attempt to increase the confidence of financial market participants by making implicit or explicit guarantees of uncertain credibility confidence in these guarantees presumably alters the size of the financial sector but observing the long run consequences of failed guarantees is difficult we look to america s free banking era and compare the consequences of a broken guarantee during the indiana centered panic of 1854 to the panic of 1857 in which guarantees were honored our estimates of a model of endogenous market structure indicate substantial negative long run consequences to financial depth when panics cast doubt upon a government s ability to honor its guarantees

the political feasibility of pension reform options the case of switzerland this paper investigates the political feasibility of different hypothetical reform options of an unsustainable pay as you go public pension system in calibrating the model to the swiss economy we find that low internal rates of return and high distortions can reduce political support for an increase in earmarked taxes up to a point where a reduction in the size of the social security program receives a majority of votes our simulations show that the consideration of non social security taxes is crucial in welfare analysis this is especially true for countries in which the public pension system is explicitly or implicitly subsidized

voting when money and morals conflict an experimental test of expressive voting abstract moral considerations may matter much in voting because the costs of expressing support for a morally worthy cause may be low in a referendum these costs depend on whether a voter expects to affect the outcome of the referendum to test the low cost theory of expressive voting we experimentally investigate a proposal to tax everyone and to donate tax revenues the analysis of expectations and voting decisions shows that the low cost theory fails to explain voting decisions instead we find that voters tend to approve of the proposal if they expect others to approve too

measurement of income inequality experimental test by questionnaire abstract we reconsider some of the basic assumptions of the literature on inequality analysis students views on the meaning of inequality comparisons were elicited by means of a questionnaire involving both numerical and verbal questions the responses suggest that two important axioms the principle of transfers and decomposability are not universally accepted

the causes of free bank failures a detailed examination abstract in this paper we propose and test a new explanation of bank behavior during the free banking era 1837 1863 arguing against the conventional view that free bank failures were due to wildcat banking we claim they were caused by falling asset prices confronting both explanations with our new and detailed data set developed from state auditor reports we find that the falling asset price explanation of free bank failures explains far more failures than does the wildcatting hypothesis