a case study of organizational form and risk shifting in the savings and loan industry abstract i analyze the investment and funding strategies of two thrifts one stock owned and one mutually owned from 1983 to 1988 despite their similarities prior to 1983 the stock thrift implemented a riskier financial strategy and did so only after converting to stock ownership although this strategy ultimately led to its failure the stock thrift still made significant payouts to its controlling shareholders this case study illustrates in stark terms the relation between organizational form and risk shifting in the thrift industry

screening ethics when honest agents care about fairness we analyze a principal s ability to discriminate between honest and dishonest agents who have private information about the circumstances of the exchange honest agents reveal circumstances truthfully as long as the mechanism is suciently fair the probability that an equilibrium allocation is chosen by an agent who is lying should not be too large without intolerance for lying the agent is given proper incentives if dishonest and zero rent if honest with even a small intolerance for lying the optimal mechanism is discontinuously altered it may still involve ethics screening whereby some allocation chosen by a dishonest agent is never chosen by an honest agent it happens either when the dishonest is overstating circumstances or when the principal is forced to allow for some suboptimal announcements due to an excessive intolerance for lying with limited intolerance for lying ethics screening allows for doing better than in the standard setup where the agent is dishonest with certainty even if honesty is unlikely however if intolerance for lying is too strong the principal cannot improve upon the standard setup

debt futures and options optimal price linked financial contracts under moral hazard and limited liability this paper characterizes the optimal financial contract between a risk neutral entrepreneur and risk neutral lender investors when the entrepreneur has limited liability there is moral hazard and the investor payoff function can depend on both output and output price but is nondecreasing in output in this setting the optimal contract is a price contingent commodity bond that can be replicated by combining pure debt commodity futures and commodity call option contracts although a pure commodity bond contract is sometimes optimal a pure debt contract is almost never optimal various properties of the entrepreneur s optimal price contingent promised payment are described copyright 1993 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

state contingent bank regulation with unobserved actions and unobserved characteristics abstract optimal bank regulation is studied in a model where bank quality is private information and bank portfolio choice is subject to moral hazard regulators wish to control bank risk solely because high risk adversely affects a bank incentives to improve its mean return numerical methods are developed to study the model capital regulation alone has a limited ability to separate types including ex post fines achieve separation at lower cost resulting in improved welfare low quality banks are fined on high returns in order to control risk taking high quality banks face fines on lower returns mainly to ensure truth telling by low quality banks high quality banks bear the full cost of regulation

limited liability and incentive contracting with ex ante action choices abstract this article examines a principal agent model of financial contracting in which a risk neutral entrepreneur agent makes an unobservable ex ante effort choice while employing the investment funds of a risk neutral investor principal the key innovation is that the investment contract is subject to statutory liability limits given these liability limits two settings are considered one in which the investor payoff function is also constrained to be monotonically nondecreasing in firm profit and another in which no such monotonic contract constraint is imposed in the former case a standard debt contract is shown to emerge and a first best effort choice is not achieved in the latter setting the optimum is characterized by a live or die payoff function and a first best effort level may or may not be realized

the transatlantic productivity gap is r d the main culprit the literature has pointed to different causes to explain the productivity gap between europe and united states in the last decades this paper tests the hypothesis that the lower european productivity performance in comparison with the us can be explained not only by a lower level of corporate rd however using different estimation techniques the r d coefficients for the us firms always turn out to be significantly higher to see to what extent these transatlantic differences may be related to the different sectoral structures in the us and the eu we differentiated the analysis by sectors the result is that both in manufacturing services and high tech sectors us firms are more efficient in translating their r d investments into productivity increases

financial contracting under imperfect enforcement we develop a model ofnancial contracting under imperfect enforcement financial contracts are designed to keep entrepreneurs from diverting project returns but enforce ment is probabilistic and penalties are limited the model rationalizes the prevalence of straight debt and common stock and its predictions are consistent with a host of empirical capital structure regularities across countries acrossrms and across time

strategic communication with lying costs i study a model of strategic communication between an uninformed receiver and an informed but upwardly biased sender the sender bears a cost of lying or more broadly of misrepresenting his private information the main results show that inflated language naturally arises in this environment where the sender almost always claims to be of a higher type than he would with complete information regardless of the intensity of lying cost there is incomplete separation with some pooling on the highest messages the degree of language inflation and how much information is revealed depend upon the intensity of lying cost the analysis delivers a framework to span a class of cheap talk and verifiable disclosure games unifying the polar predictions they make under large conflicts of interest i use the model to discuss how the degree of manipulability of information can affect the trade off between delegation and communication copyright 2009 wiley blackwell

deductible contracts against fraudulent claims evidence from automobile insurance insurance fraud is now recognized as a significant resource allocation problem in many markets the object of this study is to verify how straight deductible contracts may affect the equilibrium level of falsification in automobile insurance this type of contract is observed in many markets even if it is not optimal under costly state falsification a higher deductible may create incentives to fraud or cheat particularly when the insured anticipates that the claim has a small probability of being audited to verify this proposition we estimate a loss equation for which one of the determinants is the amount of the deductible using a data set of claims filed for damages following an automobile accident with twenty insurance companies in quebec in 1992 because we have access only to reported losses a higher deductible also implies a lower probability of reporting small losses to isolate the fraud effect related to the presence of a deductible in the contract we jointly estimate a loss equation and a

bank bonuses and bail outs this paper shows that bonus contracts may arise endogenously as a response to agency problems within banks and analyzes how compensation schemes change in reaction to anticipated bailouts if there is a risk shifting problem bailout expectations lead to steeper bonus schemes and even more risk taking if there is an effort problem the compensation scheme becomes flatter and effort decreases if both types of agency problems are present a sufficiently large increase in bailout perceptions makes it optimal for a welfare maximizing regulator to impose caps on bank bonuses in contrast raising managers liability can be counterproductive

screening when some agents are nonstrategic does a monopoly need to exclude we characterize the optimal screening mechanism for a monopolist facing consumers with privately known demands some of whom have limited abilities to misrepresent their preferences we show that consumers with better abilities to misrepresent information benefit from the presence of consumers who lack such abilities whenever the fraction of the latter group is positive there is no exclusion the firm supplies a positive quantity of the good to all consumers whose valuations exceed marginal cost of production our analysis is motivated by the evidence indicating that some individuals have limited ability to misrepresent themselves and imitate others

greenwash vs brownwash exaggeration and undue modesty in corporate sustainability disclosure corporate greenwashing has accelerated in recent years bringing in its wake growing skepticism about corporate green claims although a theory of the drivers and deterrents of greenwashing has begun to emerge it is static in nature and does not incorporate the full range of ways in which firms can misrepresent their environmental performance our contribution is threefold first we extend the theory of organizational information disclosure to incorporate the possibility of undue modesty about a firm s environmental social and governance practices second we hypothesize about the drivers of exaggeration and undue modesty based on which of a firm s stakeholders are salient at a given point in time to do so we place the firm within a dynamic context that has largely been missing in the prior literature third we test our hypotheses using a data set that allows us to directly compare corporate green claims against actual performance results reveal that corporate output growth deregulation and low profits under deregulation significantly affect the choice between greenwashing and brownwashing the effects of growth and profits are mitigated by external scrutiny

strategic default in the international coffee market this article studies strategic default on forward sale contracts in the international coffee market to test for strategic default we construct contract specific measures of unanticipated changes in market conditions by comparing spot prices at maturity with the relevant futures prices at the contracting date unanticipated rises in market prices increase defaults on fixed price contracts but not on price indexed ones we isolate strategic default by focusing on unanticipated rises at the time of delivery after production decisions are sunk and suppliers have been paid estimates suggest that roughly half of the observed defaults are strategic we model how strategic default introduces a trade off between insurance and counterparty risk relative to indexed contracts fixed price contracts insure against price swings but create incentives to default when market conditions change a model calibration suggests that the possibility of strategic default causes 15 8 average losses in output significant dispersion in the marginal product of capital and sizable negative externalities on supplying farmers

anticompetitive financial contracting the design of financial claims this paper presents the first model where entry deterrence takes place through financial rather than product market channels in standard models of the interaction between product and financial markets a firm s use of financial instruments deters entry by affecting product market behavior whereas in our model entry deterrence occurs by affecting the credit market behavior of investors towards entrant firms we find that in order to deter entry the claims held on incumbent firms should be sufficiently risky i e equity in contrast to the standard branderlewis 1986 result that debt deters entry the model sheds light on the policy debate on the separation of banking as to whether banks should be permitted to hold equity in firms it also provides an explanation for why venture capitalists hold automatically convertible securities in start up firms

cost padding in regulated monopolies abstract this paper considers the regulated monopoly that pads or falsifies its costs to increase the cost reimbursement it receives from the regulator contrary to the standard literature on cost regulation the firm engages in cost reducing investment before it enters into a regulatory contract this pre contractual investment in cost reduction determines the firm type at the contracting stage the paper derives both the optimum incentive compatible falsification contract and the equilibrium type distribution with the distribution of cost types determined endogenously by the pre contractual investment choice an increase in the cost of falsification has two effects first there is a direct effect that reduces cost padding because it becomes more expensive to do so second there is an indirect effect that increases cost padding because the firm responds by choosing lower investments and lower investments are associated with more cost padding it is demonstrated that the direct effect will dominate and both expected levels of cost padding and expected costs for falsification will be reduced however the indirect effect increases real costs and despite the reduction in cost padding the net effect can reduce welfare it is determined that these conclusions are significantly different from those obtained when the distribution of cost types is exogenously fixed

a note on optimal procurement contracts with limited direct cost inflation abstract laffont and tirole s using cost observation to regulate firms j polit econ 94 1986 614 641 pioneering analysis identifies the optimal procurement contract when the supplier can readily inflate his innate production cost without detection when the buyer has some ability to limit such cost inflation an alternative contract can outperform the contract identified by laffont and tirole the alternative contract induces substantial pooling discontinuous production costs and effort supply and rent that varies non monotonically with innate cost

dualism and macroeconomic volatility this paper develops a simple macroeconomic model that shows that combining capital market imperfections together with unequal access to investment opportunities across individuals can generate endogenous and permanent euctuations in aggregate gdp investment and interest rates reducing inequality of access may be a necessary condition for macroeconomic stabilization moreover countercyclical escal policies have a role to play in our model savings are underutilized in slumps because of the limited debt capacity of potential investors therefore the government should issue public debt during recessions in order to absorb those idle savings and enance investment subsidies or tax cuts for investors the most important single fact about saving and investment activities is that in our industrial society they are generally done by different people and for different reasons for years there might tend to be too little investment leading to deeation losses excess capacity and unemployment for other years there might tend to be too much investment leading to periods of chronic ineation unless prudent and proper public policies in the escal and monetary eelds are followed paul a samuelson economics 8th edition 1970 pp 196 198

security design with status concerns abstract this paper provides a status based explanation for convertible securities an entrepreneur with status concerns inducing risk taking decides how to finance the firm and how to dynamically manage it solving analytically for the optimal security we find that it is substantially similar to a convertible security our model can explain why convertible securities are mainly issued by start ups and small firms as we show that their salient characteristics higher volatility and dynamic flexibility accentuate incentives to issue convertible securities we also provide analytical results relevant to quantifying how status concerns affect credit risk an established factor behind security choice

assessing systemic risks and predicting systemic events abstract the paper develops a framework for assessing systemic risks and for predicting systemic events i e periods of extreme financial instability with potential real costs it contributes to the literature on the prediction of financial crises mainly in two ways first it uses a financial stress index for identifying the starting date of systemic financial crises second it uses discrete choice models that combine both domestic and global indicators of macro financial vulnerabilities to predict systemic financial crises the performance of the models is evaluated in a framework that takes into account policy maker s preferences between missing crises and issuing false alarms our analysis shows that combining indicators of domestic and global macro financial vulnerabilities substantially improves the models ability to forecast systemic financial crises our framework also displays a good out of sample performance in predicting the ongoing global financial crisis

bonuses and managerial misbehaviour abstract profit based bonus payments have been criticised for encouraging managers to take excessively risky actions or to engage in other activities that are not in the firm s best interest we show however that large bonuses may discourage managers from such misbehaviour because they have more to lose in the event that misbehaviour is detected thus large bonuses may be an optimal way for firms to control misbehaviour our finding sheds new light on recent proposals to regulate bonuses

us deficit sustainability revisited a multiple structural change approach in this article we re examine the long run sustainability of us budget deficits using bai and perron s multiple structural change approach while the deficit would have been weakly sustainable over the full sample 1947 1 2005 3 strong sustainability would appear only between january 1982 and february 1996

predicting banking crises with artificial neural networks the role of nonlinearity and heterogeneity studies of the early warning systems ewss for banking crises usually rely on linear classifiers estimated with international datasets i construct an ews based on an artificial neural network ann model and i also account for regional heterogeneity in order to improve the generalization ability of ews models all of the banking crises in my test set are then predictable at a 24 month horizon using information from earlier crises for some countries estimation with a regional dataset significantly improves the predictions the ann outperforms the usual logit regression assessed by the area under the receiver operating characteristics curve

early warning systems and systemic banking crises in low income countries a multinomial logit approach abstract this paper estimates an early warning system ews for predicting systemic banking crises in a sample of low income countries in sub saharan africa since the average duration of crises in this sample of countries is longer than one year the predictive performance of standard binomial logit models is likely to be hampered by the so called crisis duration bias the bias arises from the decision to either treat crisis years after the onset of a crisis as non crisis years or remove them altogether from the model to overcome this potential drawback we propose a multinomial logit approach which is shown to improve the predictive power of our ews compared to the binomial logit model our results suggest that crisis events in low income countries are associated with low economic growth drying up of banking system liquidity and widening of foreign exchange net open positions

private information and inventive activity abstract this paper examines incentives for investment in inventive activity in an environment subject to informational constraints on the one hand the inability of the public to monitor such investments suggests that inventors should bear a high share of the risk associated with their efforts on the other hand the very novelty of an invention could make it difficult to sell to a skeptical public this difficulty could induce an inventor to engage in costly signalling activity this papers considers this friction and the nature of contracts which balance the incentive to invent against the incentive to signal optimal contracts are interpreted in terms of financial arrangements between entrepreneurs and investors

the new econometrics of structural change dating breaks in u s labor productivity we have seen the emergence of three major innovations in the econometrics of structural change in the past fifteen years 1 tests for a structural break of unknown timing 2 estimation of the timing of a structural break and 3 tests to distinguish unit roots from broken time trends these three innovations have dramatically altered the face of applied time series econometrics in this paper we review these three innovations and illustrate their application through an empirical assessment of u s labor productivity in the manufacturing durables sector

on the existence of an optimal capital structure theory and evidence one of the most contentious issues in the theory of finance during the past quarter century has been the theory of capital structure the geneses of this controversy were the seminal contributions by modigliani and miller 18 19 the general academic view by the mid 1970s although not a consensus was that the optimal capital structure involves balancing the tax advantage of debt against the present value of bankruptcy costs no sooner did this general view become prevalent in the profession than miller 16 presented a new challenge by showing that under certain conditions the tax advantage of debt financing at the firm level is exactly offset by the tax disadvantage of debt at the personal level since then there has developed a burgeoning theoretical literature attempting to reconcile miller s model with the balancing theory of optimal capital structure e g deangelo and masulis 5 kim 12 and modigliani 17 the general result of this work is that if there are significant leverage related costs such as bankruptcy costs agency costs of debt and loss of non debt tax shields and if the income from equity is untaxed then the marginal bondholder s tax rate will be less than the corporate rate and there will be a positive net tax advantage to corporate debt financing the firm s optimal capital structure will involve the trade off between the tax advantage of debt and various leverage related costs the upshot of these extensions of miller s model is the recognition that the existence of an optimal capital structure is essentially an empirical issue as to whether or not the various leverage related costs are economically significant enough to influence the costs of corporate borrowing the miller model and its theoretical extensions have inspired several timeseries studies which provide evidence on the existence of leverage related costs trczinka 28 reports that from examining differences in average yields between taxable corporate bonds and tax exempt municipal bonds one cannot reject the miller hypothesis that the marginal bondholder s tax rate is not different from the corporate tax rate however trczinka is careful to point out that this finding does not necessarily imply that there is no tax advantage of corporate debt if the personal tax rate on equity is positive indeed buser and hess 1 using a longer time series of data and more sophisticated econometric techniques estimate that the average effective personal tax rate on equity is statistically positive and is not of a trivial magnitude more importantly they document evidence that is consistent with the existence of significant leverage related costs in the economy

is the 2007 u s sub prime financial crisis so different an international historical comparison the first major financial crisis of the twentyfirst century involves esoteric instruments unaware regulators and skittish investors it also follows a well trodden path laid down by centuries of financial folly is the special prob lem of sub prime mortgages really different our examination of the longer historical record which is part of a larger effort on cur rency and debt crises finds stunning qualitative and quantitative parallels across a number of standard financial crisis indicators to name a few the run up in us equity and housing prices that graciela l kaminsky and reinhart 1999 find to be the best leading indicators of crisis in countries experiencing large capital inflows closely tracks the average of the previous 18 post world war ii banking crises in industrial countries so too does the inverted v shape of real growth in the years prior to the crisis despite widespread concern about the effects on national debt of the tax cuts of the early 2000s the run up in us public debt is actually some what below the average of other crisis episodes in contrast the pattern of us current account deficits is markedly worse at this juncture the book is still open on how the current dislocations in the united states will play out the precedent found in the aftermath of other episodes suggests that the strains can be quite severe depending especially on the initial degree of trauma to the financial system and to some extent the policy response the average drop in real per capita output growth is over 2 percent and it typically takes two years to return to trend for the five most catastrophic cases which include episodes in finland japan

does africa need a rotten kin theorem experimental evidence from village economies this paper measures the economic impact of social pressure to share income with kin and neighbors in rural kenyan villages the authors conduct a lab experiment in which they randomly vary the observability of investment returns the goal is to test whether subjects reduce their income in order to keep it hidden the analysis finds that women adopt an investment strategy that conceals the size of their initial endowment in the experiment although that strategy reduces their expected earnings this effect is largest among women with relatives attending the experiment parameter estimates suggest that women behave as though they expect to be pressured to share four percent of their observable income with others and substantially more when close kin can observe income directly although this paper provides experimental evidence from a single african country observational studies suggest that similar pressure from kin may be prevalent in many rural areas throughout sub saharan africa

the impact of the affiliation of venture capital firms a survey the aim of this paper is to review the theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of the affiliation of venture capital vc firms with a particular focus on the differences between europe and the us a main characteristic of vc firms is their high level of involvement in the management of funded firms however the vc industry is composed of heterogeneous actors the literature has studied to a great degree the independent funds that dominate the us market yet there also exist vc funds affiliated with banks or with industrial firm which can benefit from synergies with their parent corporation several studies have highlighted significant differences between these types of vc firms

costly distortion of information in agency problems anecdotal evidence suggests that agents often spend resources distorting information transmitted to principals we present a model where costly information distortion emerges as equilibrium behavior the information structure we focus on is intermediate between and encompasses the cases of private information and public information the agent can falsify the privately observed state at some cost although the principal can design contracts that induce no falsification these may involve excessive iinformation rents falsification can be beneficial in spite of the waste of resources involved because it helps reduce information rents we examine how optimal contract and equilibrium payoffs change as the information structure ranges from private to public information

the economics of earnings manipulation and managerial compensation this article examines managerial compensation in an environment where managers may take a hidden action that affects the actual earnings of the firm when realized these earnings constitute hidden information that is privately observed by the manager who may expend resources to generate an inflated earnings report we characterize the optimal managerial compensation contract in this setting and demonstrate that contracts contingent on reported earnings cannot provide managers with the incentive both to maximize profits and to report those profits honestly as a result some degree of earnings management must be tolerated as a necessary part of an efficient agreement

contract design and costly verification games abstract in this paper the signalling subgame in costly verification models is studied in the context of the investor entrepreneur contract without assuming the possibility of commitment to verification it is shown that the game has a unique perfect bayesian equilibrium in mixed strategies implying that truth telling and deterministic verification are not an equilibrium behavior when the entire game starting from the stage of contract design is considered it is shown that the contract designed by the informed entrepreneur results in less verification cost than the one designed by the uninformed investor this could be taken as a normative criterion based upon which institutional arrangements as regards the distribution of bargaining initiative are to be designed

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

robust contracting with additive noise abstract we investigate the idea that linear contracts are reliable because they give the same incentives for effort at every point along the contract we ask whether this reliability leads to a microfoundation for linear contracts when the principal is profit maximizing we consider a principal agent model with risk neutrality and limited liability in which the agent observes the realization of a mean zero shock to output before choosing how much effort to exert we show that such a model can indeed provide a foundation for reliable contracts and illustrate what elements are required in particular we must assume that the principal knows a lower bound but not an upper bound on the shocks

stock market reactions to customer and competitor orientations the case of initial public offerings recognizing that initial public offerings ipos represent the debut of private firms on the public stage this study investigates how pre ipo customer and competitor orientations ccos affect ipo outcomes building on information economics we propose that ccos influence investors sentiments toward an ipo and that both ipo specific variables which influence the credibility of cco information and facets of the organizational institutional and task environments which influence the appropriateness of cco information moderate this influence we test the framework using data collected from computer aided text analysis expert coders and secondary sources for 543 ipos across 43 industries between 2000 and 2004 a bayesian shrinkage model which accounts for industry specific effects and uses latent instrumental variables to address cco endogeneity shows that ccos positively influence ipo outcomes furthermore 1 underwriter reputation and venture funding positively moderate the effects of ccos 2 technological and market turbulence positively and institutional complexity negatively moderate the effect of customer orientation and 3 technological turbulence competitive intensity and institutional complexity positively moderate the effect of competitor orientation also accounting for endogeneity using latent instrumental variables substantially improves the predictive validity of the model relative to alternative model specifications

hardball and the soft touch the economics of optimal insurance contracts with costly state verification and endogenous monitoring costs abstract we examine an environment of costly state verification in which insureds possess private information about the magnitude of an insurable loss insurers can verify the actual loss suffered only by incurring a positive resource cost and insureds may verification and may lead to more generous settlements optimal insurance contracts are shown to mitigate the incentives to evade by a combination of incentives which include the overpayment of easily monitored losses and undercompensation for claims exhibiting higher verification costs

optimal insurance under costly falsification and costly inexact verification abstract this paper integrates the often dichotomized models of costly state verification and costly claim falsification it is found that when verification is inexact it is possible for an optimal insurance contract to consist of both positive claim falsification and positive insurer verification provided that falsification cost and verification cost are sufficiently low and the insured is risk averse satisfying constant absolute risk aversion this result certainly contrasts with the common belief that falsification and verification are mutually exclusive in an optimal insurance contract some characteristics of the optimal falsification verification and indemnification profiles including implementability are analyzed

costs of banking system instability some empirical evidence abstract this paper assesses the cross country stylised facts on empirical measures of the losses incurred during periods of banking crises we first consider the direct resolution costs to the government and then the broader costs to the welfare of the economy proxied by losses in gdp we find that the cumulative output losses incurred during crisis periods are large roughly 15 20 on average of annual gdp in contrast to previous research we also find that output losses incurred during crises in developed countries are as high or higher on average than those in emerging market economies moreover output losses during crisis periods in developed countries also appear to be significantly larger 10 15 than in neighbouring countries that did not at the time experience severe banking problems in emerging market economies by contrast banking crises appear to be costly only when accompanied by a currency crisis these results seem robust to allowing for macroeconomic conditions at the outset of crisis in particular low and declining output growth that have also contributed to future output losses during crises episodes

financing and advising optimal financial contracts with venture capitalists this paper analyses the joint provision of effort by an entrepreneur and by an advisor to improve the productivity of an investment project without moral hazard it is optimal that both exert effort with moral hazard if the entrepreneur s effort is more efficient less costly than the advisor s effort the latter is not hired if she does not provide funds outside financing arises endogenously this explains why investors like venture capitalists are value enhancing the level of outside financing determines whether common stocks or convertible bonds should be issued in response to incentives

managers compensation and misreporting a costly state verification approach i introduction the use of stock options in compensation packages as a way of providing the firm management with the right incentives has been quite popular in the 1990s the favor encountered by options started however to decrease in the past few years the decline in the use of option grants in top executives compensation packages occurred mainly as a reaction to the recent accounting scandals which has prompted the design of alternative stock based compensation schemes e g restricted stock grants or indexed options as reported by hall and murphy 2003 the grant date value of options assigned to all employees of an average standard poor s 500 firm measured in millions of 2002 constant us increased from 22 in 1992 to 238 in 2000 and subsequently decreased to 141 in 2002 although percentages varied from year to year the ceos share of the total grant has fallen from about 7 in the mid 1990s to less than 5 in 2000 2002 1 the decline in the use of options for top management is widely confirmed according to a pearl meyer partners study for the new york times stock option grants that accounted for 52 of the pay of the average ceo of a major company in 2002 were down to an estimated 35 in 2003 a recent watson wyatt report states that the value of new stock option awards granted to ceos at large companies fell by nearly 60 between 2001 and 2003 with the average value of new stock option grants declining from us 10 2 million in 2001 to us 4 2 million in 2003 the decline in options has been softened by the sharp increase in restricted stock grants and other long term incentive award values 2 in this paper we aim to reevaluate the role of stock options as an ingredient of top management compensation packages able to align the interests of managers and shareholders avoiding misreporting of the firm value at the same time 3 in a costly state verification csv model with moral hazard we show that incentive compatible contracts inducing both incentive alignment and truthful revelation of the firm value must entail a strictly convex compensation schedule that is a fixed payment wage when the firm value is sufficiently low and a state contingent claim increasing in the firm value otherwise a simple and commonly observed way to achieve a convex compensation scheme is to design a remuneration including a fixed wage and a call option on the firm equity as we will show such remuneration allows on the one hand to preserve top management incentives providing for a compensation increasing in equity value and on the other hand to reduce the verification costs that must be incurred to avoid misreporting as verification is not needed in the region where the remuneration is fixed 4 options are by no means the only way to achieve a convex compensation however many other schemes having otherwise desirable properties over options do not have the convex shape discussed above for instance combining a fixed wage with restricted stock grants defines a compensation linearly increasing in the firm s equity value which does not allow to reduce misreporting verification costs that always have to be sustained in this case using an incentive compatible compensation scheme fixed wage plus call options we characterize the contract offered by the firm under the assumption of a deterministic and perfect audit technology showing that for any given value of the option package the manager should receive the largest possible number of options at the highest strike price allowing shareholders to reduce the expected verification cost furthermore the strike price of the option turns out to be determined by incentive compatibility i e the option value must be such that the manager is induced to exert the desired level of effort while the magnitude of the fixed wage is defined by individual rationality there are three main policy implications of our analysis

identifying and testing models of managerial compensation this article analyses the identification and empirical content of the pure moral hazard pmh and the hybrid moral hazard hmh principal agent models the pmh model has hidden actions while the hmh model has hidden information in addition to hidden actions in both models agents are risk averse and principals are risk neutral the article derives the equilibrium restrictions from the optimal contract and uses the restrictions to show that the models have empirical content for any given risk aversion parameter the models other parameters are non parametrically point identified the risk aversion parameter and hence the model are however only partially identified management s ability to manipulate accounting reports arises endogenously within hmh models but not in all versions of pmh models we use our framework to investigate whether shareholders contract with management recognizing that accounting reports are susceptible to manipulation and therefore endogenous to the incentives offered to management the data reject all models in which accounting reports are verifiable furthermore the version of the pmh in which accounting reports can be manipulated is rejected if expected compensation is restricted to be positive

the relationship between default prediction and lending profits integrating roc analysis and loan pricing abstract in evaluating credit risk models it is common to use metrics such as power curves and their associated statistics however power curves are not necessarily easily linked intuitively to common lending practices bankers often request a specific rule for defining a cut off above which credit will be granted and below which it will be denied in this paper we provide some quantitative insight into how such cut offs can be developed this framework accommodates real world complications e g relationship clients we show that the simple cut off approach can be extended to a more complete pricing approach that is more flexible and more profitable we demonstrate that in general more powerful models are more profitable than weaker ones and we provide a simulation example we also report results of another study that conservatively concludes a mid sized bank might generate additional profits on the order of about 4 8 million per year after adopting a moderately more powerful model

costly monitoring loan contracts and equilibrium credit rationing this paper develops a model with asymmetrically informed agents and costly monitoring of loan contracts where an equilibrium can exhibit credit rationing borrowers are identical ex ante but some receive loans and others do not in contrast to existing credit rationing theories rationing does not occur here due to inflexible prices adverse selection or moral hazard optimizing behaviour produces a standard debt contract in equilibrium the aggregate quantity of loans and equilibrium interest rates respond differently depending on whether there is rationing in equilibrium

the bright and dark side of staging investment performance and the varying motivations of private equity firms previous papers that examined investment decisions by private equity funds are divided on whether staging has a positive or negative effect on returns we believe these opposing views can be reconciled by studying when staging is used during the life of the investment relationship we find that staging has a positive effect on investment returns in the beginning of the investment relationship consistent with the notion that staging helps mitigate information asymmetry however staging appears to be negatively associated with returns when used prior to the exit decision our unique dataset allows us to measure these intertemporal effects precisely

ceo replacement under private information this article examines the optimal ceo compensation and replacement policy when the ceo is privately informed about the firm s continuation value under his leadership ex ante moral hazard implies that the ceo must receive ex post quasi rents which endogenously biases him toward continuation our model shows that to induce bad ceos to quit it may be best to make continuation costly through steep incentive pay rather than simply rewarding quitting through severance pay incentive pay makes continuation attractive for good ceos who can expect high future on the job pay but unattractive for bad ceos who may instead prefer to take their outside option payoff our model generates novel empirical implications that jointly relate ceo compensation and turnover to corporate governance firm size cash flow risk and the informativeness of performance measurement jel g34

international evidence on time variation in trend labor productivity growth this paper provides international evidence on time variation in trend productivity growth based on the dataset for hours worked constructed by ohanian raffo 2012 applying both the endogenous break tests of bai perron 1998 2003 and the stock watson 1996 1998 tvp mub methodology substantial evidence of time variation in trend productivity growth is detected for most countries for either japan or countries belonging to the eurozone evidence points towards a significant growth decline over the last several decades weaker evidence is reported for the united states for which the 1990 s productivity acceleration is estimated to have been overall mild and of a temporary nature

contractual externalities and systemic risk we study effort and risk taking behaviour in an economy with a continuum of principal agent pairs where each agent exerts costly hidden effort principals write contracts based on both absolute and relative performance evaluations ape and rpe respectively to make individually optimal risk return trade offs but do not take into account their impact on endogenously determined aggregate variables this results in contractual externalities when these aggregate variables are used as benchmarks in contracts contractual externalities have welfare changing effects when principals put too much weight on ape or rpe due to information frictions relative to the second best if the expected productivity is high risk averse principals over incentivize their own agents triggering a rat race in effort exertion resulting in over investment in effort and excessive exposure to industry risks the opposite occurs when the expected productivity is low inducing pro cyclical investment and risk taking behaviours

currency crises are they all the same abstract the plethora of currency crises around the world has fueled many theories on the causes of speculative attacks the first generation models focus on fiscal problems while the second generation models emphasize countercyclical policies and self fulfilling crises in the 1990s models pinpoint to financial excesses with the crisis of argentina in 2001 models of sovereign default have become popular again while the theoretical literature has emphasized variety the empirical literature has supported the one size fits all models this paper contributes to the empirical literature by assessing whether the crises of the last 30 years are of different varieties

financial structure and aggregate economic activity an overview this paper surveys literature that explores the possible links between the financial system and aggregate economic behavior the survey is in two parts the first reviews the traditional work and the second discusses new research copyright 1988 by ohio state university press

does the new economy measure up to the great inventions of the past abstract during the four years 1995 99 u s productivity growth experienced a strong revival and achieved growth rates exceeding that of the golden age of 1913 72 accordingly many observers have declared the new economy to be an industrial revolution even more important than the second industrial revolution of 1860 1900 which made the golden age of productivity growth possible this paper dissects the recent productivity revival subtracts out a cyclical component and concludes that there is no revival of the productivity growth trend in the 88 percent of the private economy lying outside of the durables manufacturing sector the paper explains this surprising finding by pointing to limitations in computers and the internet in comparison with the great inventions of the past

competition for talent under performance manipulation abstract we study the effects of introducing competition for ceos assuming that the talent of ceos is not observable and that they can misreport their performance without competition for talent firms maximize their profits by offering inefficiently low powered incentive contracts competition for talent removes those inefficiencies but it leads to excessively high powered incentive contracts causing efficiency losses that can be more severe than the inefficiencies that competition mitigates if misreporting is not a concern however then competition for talent has unambiguously positive effects on efficiency

analysing the effects of labour standards on us export performance a time series approach with structural change the empirical effects of different measures of labour standards on the export performance of the united states are analysed using annual data for the period 1950 1998 applying a time series approach based on the structural change literature hence a model with endogenous breaks is estimated following the methodology proposed by bai and perron econometrica 66 47 78 1998 the results show that the labour standards represented by the number of hours worked the rate of occupational injuries and the unionization rate are all very important to explain the behaviour of exports for the united states in particular it is found that low labour standards may both improve or lead to a deterioration in export performance

rewarding trading skills without inducing gambling this paper develops a model of active portfolio management in which fund managers may secretly gamble in order to manipulate their reputation and attract more funds we show that such trading strategies may expose investors to severe losses and are more likely to occur when fund managers are impatient their trading skills are scalable and generate higher prot per unit of risk we study investment management contracts that deter this behavior if investors are short lived then the manager must leave rents to investors in order to credibly commit not to gamble if investors are long lived contracts that increase but defer expected bonuses after an outstanding performance implement the rstbest our model can explain a number of observed dierences

specialist versus generalist investors trading off support quality investment horizon and control rights abstract we model an entrepreneur s selection of either an active specialist or a passive generalist investor for an innovative venture that requires external equity for startup and expansion financing we assume that the specialist investor provides better support but has a shorter investment horizon than the generalist we particularly focus on the entrepreneur s net present value npv maximizing contract taking into account the specialist s potential moral hazard this latter might try selling his claim in a secondary transaction to an uninformed outside investor even though the project is unsuccessful and should be abandoned we show that the entrepreneur may trade off crucial contract parameters when seeking external financing either type of investor may be preferable contingent on the allocation of control rights the investor s support quality and investment horizon the chances of success and the venture s expected liquidation value

are you a good employee or simply a good guy influence costs and contract design we develop a principal agent model with a moral hazard problem in which the principal has access to a hard signal the level of output and a soft behavioral signal the supervision signal about the agent s level of effort in our model the agent can initiate influence activities and manipulate the behavioral signal these activities are costly for the principal as they detract the agent from the productive task we show that the agent s ability to manipulate the behavioral signal leads to low powered incentives and increases the cost of implementing the efficient equilibrium as a result interestingly the fact that manipulation activities entail productivity losses may lead to the design of influence free contracts that deter manipulation and lead to high powered incentives this result implies that the optimal contract and whether manipulation is tolerated in equilibrium or not depends on the magnitude of the productivity based influence costs we show that it may be optimal for the principal not to supervise the agent even if the cost of supervision is arbitrarily low

the effect of earnings forecasts on earnings management we develop a theory of the association between earnings management and voluntary management forecasts in an agency setting earnings management is modeled as a window dressing action that can increase the firm s reported accounting earnings but has no impact on the firm s real cash flows earnings forecasts are modeled as the manager s communication of the firm s future cash flows we show that it is easier to prevent the manager from managing earnings if he is asked to forecast earnings we also show that earnings management is more likely to follow high earnings forecasts than low earnings forecasts finally our analysis shows that shareholders may not find it optimal to prohibit earnings management earlier results rationalize earnings management by violating some assumption underlying the revelation principle by contrast in our model the principal can make full commitments and communication is unrestricted nonetheless earnings management can be beneficial as it reduces the cost of eliciting truthful forecasts

optimal contracts under costly state falsification we examine an exchange economy with two agents one risk neutral with a certain endowment and a second risk averse with a random endowment the realization of the endowment is public but can be falsified by the second agent at a cost for a broad class of falsification cost functions the optimal no falsification contract is noncontingent on a left hand interval and strictly increasing with a slope strictly less than one on a right hand interval under a mild further restriction optimal no falsification contracts are in addition piece wise linear optimal contracts may in general require falsifying the state but for a set of the highest endowment realizations there is no falsification we find simple conditions under which the optimal contract is a no falsification contract the model has applications that include financial insurance and employment contracts and tax policy

optimal leverage and aggregate investment we analyze the optimal financing of investment projects when managers must exert unobservable effort and can also switch to less profitable riskier ventures optimal financial contracts can be implemented by a combination of debt and equity when the risk shifting problem is the most severe while stock options are also needed when the effort problem is the most severe worsening of the moral hazard problems leads to decreases in investment and output at the macroeconomic level moreover aggregate leverage decreases with the risk shifting problem and increases with the effort problem

towards a new early warning system of financial crises abstract this paper develops a new early warning system ews model based on a multinomial logit model for predicting financial crises it is shown that commonly used ews approaches which use binomial discrete dependent variable models are subject to what we call a post crisis bias this bias arises when no distinction is made between tranquil periods when economic fundamentals are largely sound and sustainable and crisis post crisis periods when economic variables go through an adjustment process before reaching a more sustainable level or growth path we show that applying a multinomial logit model which allows distinguishing between more than two states is a valid way of solving this problem and constitutes a substantial improvement in the ability to forecast financial crises the empirical results reveal that for a set of 20 open emerging markets for the period 1993 2001 the model would have correctly predicted a large majority of crises in emerging markets

corporate structure liquidity and investment evidence from japanese industrial groups this paper presents evidence suggesting that information and incentive problems in the capital market affect investment we come to this conclusion by examining two sets of japanese firms the first set has close financial ties to large japanese banks that serve as their primary source of external finance and are likely to be well informed about the firm the second set of firms has weaker links to a main bank and presumably faces greater problems raising capital investment is more sensitive to liquidity for the second set of firms than for the first set the analysis also highlights the role of financial intermediaries in the investment process

predicting currency crises abstract in recent years a number of researchers have claimed success in systematically predicting which countries are more likely to suffer currency crises most notably kaminsky lizondo and reinhart 1998 this paper evaluates the klr approach to anticipating currency crises and develops and tests an alternative first we try to answer the question if we had been using the klr model in late 1996 how well armed would we have been to predict the asia crisis second we analyze a more general probit based model of predicting currency crises in the process we test several basic assumptions underlying the indicators approach

bidding with securities auctions and security design we study security bid auctions in which bidders compete for an asset by bidding with securities that is they offer payments that are contingent on the realized value of the asset being sold the value depends on investment by the winner thus creating the possibility of moral hazard such auctions are commonly used both formally and informally in formal auctions the seller generally restricts bids to an ordered set such as an equity share or royalty rate by restricting the bids standard auction formats such as first and second price auctions can be used in informal settings with competing buyers the seller does not commit to a mechanism upfront rather bidders offer securities and the seller chooses the most attractive bid based on his beliefs ex post we characterize equilibrium payoffs and bidding strategies in this setting and show that an informal mechanism yields the lowest possible revenues across all mechanisms we also determine the optimal formal mechanism and show that the security design is more important than the auction format we show that the revenue equivalence principle that expected revenues are independent of the auction format holds if the set of permissible securities is ordered and convex such as equity otherwise it need not hold for example when bidders offer standard debt securities a second price auction is superior on the other hand if bidders compete on the conversion ratio of convertible debt a first price auction yields higher revenues finally we examine how different forms of moral hazard impact our results

the delegated lucas tree we analyze the effects of the observed increased share of delegated capital for trading strategies and equilibrium prices by introducing delegation into a standard lucas exchange economy in equilibrium some investors trade on their own account but others decide to delegate trading to professional fund managers flow performance incentive functions describe how much capital clients provide to funds at each date as a function of past performance convex flow performance relations imply that the average fund outperforms the market in recessions and underperforms in expansions when the share of capital that is delegated is low all funds follow the same strategy however when the equilibrium share of delegated capital is high funds with identical incentives employ heterogeneous trading strategies a group of managers borrows to take on a levered position on the stock thus fund returns are dispersed in the cross section and the outstanding amounts of borrowing and lending increase the relation between the share of delegated capital and the sharpe ratio typically follows an inverse u shaped pattern jel g11 g12 g23 d02 d81 over the past thirty years there has been a gradual but profound change in the way money is invested in financial markets while almost 50 of u s equities were held directly in 1980 by 2007 this proportion decreased to approximately 20 see french 2008 what are the equilibrium implications of this shift in particular how does the increased presence of delegation affect trading strategies and prices to analyze the link between the incentives of financial institutions and asset prices we introduce financial intermediaries into a lucas exchange economy rather than study an optimal contracting problem we rely on empirical regularities inflows and assume a convex relation betweenflows and performance relative to the market as documented for example in chevalier and ellison 1997

auditing and competitive bidding in the public sector abstract this paper investigates the impact of a ministry s budget size on the choice between auditing a niskanen bureau and employing competitive bidding in the provision of a publicly funded good the ministry s marginal expected payoff increases fastest with budget size for auctioning as opposed to auditing however the ministry is shown to switch from a purely public provision to a competitive provision as the budget size increases even if expected fixed costs favor the audit the study contributes to the literature by extending the niskanen framework and by endogenizing the institutional arrangements for the provision of public sector goods

recent trends and structural breaks in us and eu15 labour productivity growth this article examines shifts in labour productivity growth in the us and in europe between 1970 and 2007 based on econometric tests of structural breaks additionally it makes use of time series based projections of labour productivity growth up to 2009 in order to detect breaks depending on confidence intervals of the projections the identification of structural breaks in the us labour productivity growth is far from obvious a statistically significant break is found in the late 1990s only if at least the 97 5th percentile of forecasts materializes in the future which means that despite a clear pick up in productivity growth in the second half of the 1990s the size of the hump is not large enough compared with past variations to make this change a statistically significant break however a significant break point is detected in the mid 1990s for the difference in labour productivity growth between the us and the eu15 even when controlling for the convergence of europe towards the us productivity l

investment incentives debt and warrants abstract this paper models and characterizes investment incentive problems associated with debt financing the decision problem of residual claimants is explicity formulated and their investment policies are characterized the paper also analyzes the use of conversion features and warrants to control distortionary incentives these claims reverse the convex shape of levered equity over the upper range of the firm s earnings and this mitigates the incentive to take risk it is shown that under certain conditions such claims can be constructed to restore net present value maximizing incentives and simultaneously meet the financing requirements of the firm

overstatement and rational market expectation abstract when an agent overstates his her true performance a rational market can still correctly guess the true performance this paper shows however that such rational market expectation and a profit maximizing principal can exacerbate the lack of productive effort by the agent

corporate tax evasion with agency costs this paper examines corporate tax evasion in the context of the contractual relationship between the shareholders of a firm and a tax manager who possesses private information regarding the extent of legally permissible reductions in taxable income and who may also undertake illegal tax evasion using a costly state falsification framework we characterize formally the optimal incentive compensation contract for the tax manager and in particular how the form of that contract changes in response to alternative enforcement policies imposed by the taxing authority the optimal contract may adjust to offset at least partially the effect of sanctions against illegal evasion and we find a new and policy relevant non equivalence result penalties imposed on the tax manager are more effective in reducing evasion than are those imposed on shareholders

a theory of debt and equity diversity of securities and manager shareholder congruence this paper shows how the optimal financial structure of a firm complements incentive schemes to discipline managers and how the securities return streams determine the claim holders incentives to intervene in management the theory rationalizes 1 the multipucity of securities 2 the observed correlation between return streams and control rights of securities and 3 the partial congruence between managerial and equity holder preferences over policy choices and monetary rewards as well as the low level of interference of equity in management the theory also offers new prospects for a reappraisal of the earlier corporate finance literature

investor protection optimal incentives and economic growth does investor protection foster economic growth to assess the widely held affirmative view we introduce investor protection into a standard overlapping generations model of capital accumulation better investor protection implies better risk sharing because of entrepreneurs risk aversion this results in a larger demand for capital this is the demand effect a second effect the supply effect follows from general equilibrium restrictions better protection i e higher demand increases the interest rate and lowers the income of entrepreneurs decreasing current savings and next period s supply of capital the supply effect is stronger the tighter are the restrictions on capital flows our model thus predicts that the positive effect of investor protection on growth is stronger for countries with lower restrictions cross country data provide support for this prediction as does the detailed examination of the growth experiences of south korea and india

is honesty the best policy curtailing insurance fraud through optimal incentive contracts an incentive contracting approach is used to characterize optimal contracts when insured individuals possess private information about their losses and are able to misrepresent permanently their loss magnitudes by engaging in the falsification of claims we demonstrate that efficient agreements necessarily induce some falsification but that the extent of such claims inflation is mitigated partially by an indemnification schedule that overcompensates small losses while overpaying larger ones the differential costs of generating insurance claims through falsification provide an avenue by which the heterogencous insureds can credibly signal their underlying losses and are exploited in an optimal contract to implement loss contingent insurance payments

equilibrium subprime lending this paper develops an equilibrium model of a subprime mortgage market our goal is to offer a benchmark with which the recent subprime boom and bust can be compared the model is tractable and delivers plausible orders of magnitude for borrowing capacities as well as default and trading intensities we offer simple explanations for several phenomena in the subprime market such as the prevalence of teaser rates and the clustering of defaults in our model both nondiversifiable and diversifiable income risks reduce debt capacities thus debt capacities need not be higher when a larger fraction of income risk is diversifiable

the effect of risk on the ceo market this article presents a market equilibrium model of ceo assignment pay and incentives under risk aversion and moral hazard each of the three outcomes can be summarized by a single closed form equation in the presence of moral hazard assignment is distorted from positive assortative matching on firm size as firms with higher risk or disutility choose less talented ceos such firms also pay higher salaries in the cross section but economywide increases in risk or the disutility of being a ceo do not affect pay the strength of incentives depends only on the disutility of effort and is independent of risk and risk aversion if the ceo can affect firm risk incentives rise and are increasing in risk and risk aversion we calibrate the losses from various forms of poor corporate governance such as failures in monitoring and inefficiencies in ceo assignment jel g34 j33 this article presents a market equilibrium model of ceo assignment pay and incentives risk averse managers of different talents are hired in a competitive market by heterogeneous firms which vary in their size risk and level of effort required the level of pay drives the assignment of talent to firms the strength of incentives induces the efficient effort level and is determined by an optimal contracting approach our main contribution is to incorporate risk into a ceo market equilibrium in a tractable manner a large empirical literature has shown that risk is a firstorder determinant of compensation contracts demsetz and lehn 1985 garen 1994 core and guay 1999 oyer and schaefer 2004 peters 2009 peters and wagner 2009 but most theories assume risk neutrality this assumption is

executive compensation a modern primer this article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation bringing them together under a simple unifying framework accessible to the general interest reader we analyze assignment models of the level of pay and static and dynamic moral hazard models of incentives and compare their predictions to empirical findings we make two broad points first traditional theories find it difficult to explain the data suggesting that compensation results from rent extraction by ceos however more modern shareholder value theories that arguably better capture the ceo setting do deliver predictions consistent with observed practices suggesting that these practices need not be inefficient second seemingly innocuous features of the modeling setup often made for tractability or convenience can lead to significant differences in the model s implications and conclusions on the efficiency of observed practices we close by highlighting apparent inefficiencies in executive compensation and additional directions for future research