competition and microfinance abstract competition between microfinance institutions mfis in developing countries has increased dramatically in the last decade we model the behavior of non profit lenders and show that their non standard client maximizing objectives cause them to cross subsidize within their pool of borrowers thus when competition eliminates rents on profitable borrowers it is likely to yield a new equilibrium in which poor borrowers are worse off as competition exacerbates asymmetric information problems over borrower indebtedness the most impatient borrowers begin to obtain multiple loans creating a negative externality that leads to less favorable equilibrium loan contracts for all borrowers

the microfinance promise in the past decade microfinance programs have demonstrated that it is possible to lend to low income households while maintaining high repayment rates even without requiring collateral the programs promise a revolution in approaches to alleviating poverty and spreading financial services and millions of poor households are served globally a growing body of economic theory demonstrates how new contractual forms offer a key to microfinance success particularly the use of group lending contracts with joint liability for the most part however high repayment rates have not translated into profits and studies of impacts on poverty yield a mixed picture in describing emerging tensions the paper highlights the diversity of innovative mechanisms beyond group lending contracts the measurement of financial sustainability the estimation of economic and social impacts the costs and benefits of subsidization and the potential to reduce poverty through savings programs rather than just credit the promise of microfinance has pushed far ahead of the evidence and an agenda is put forward for addressing critical empirical gaps and sharpening the terms of policy discussion

group lending repayment incentives and social collateral abstract in this paper we investigate the impact on repayment rates of lending to groups which are made jointly liable for repayment this type of scheme especially in the guise of the grameen bank in bangladesh has received increasing attention we set up and analyze the repayment game which group lending gives rise to our analysis suggests that such schemes have both positive and negative effects on repayment rates the positive effect is that successful group members may have an incentive to repay the loans of group members whose projects have yielded insufficient return to make repayment worthwhile the negative effect arises when the whole group defaults even when some members would have repaid under individual lending we also show how group lending may harness social collateral which serves to mitigate its negative effect

coase versus pacman who eats whom in the durable goods monopoly in standard durable goods monopoly models both the set of buyers and the set of prices are assumed to be continua if the set of buyers is finite the perfectly discriminating monopoly outcome is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium when the seller is sufficiently patient introducing instead a smallest unit of account yields the coasian outcome as a generically unique subgame perfect equilibrium for patient enough buyers a folk theorem is obtained if both sets are finite these results reflect a strategic disadvantage of having to make moves with a large impact on other players payoffs the analysis is extended to durable goods oligopoly

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

potential pitfalls for the purchasing power parity puzzle sampling and specification biases in mean reversion tests of the law of one price the ppp puzzle is based on empirical evidence that international price differences for individual goods loop or baskets of goods ppp appear highly persistent or even nonstationary the present consensus is these price differences have a half life that is of the order of five years at best and infinity at worst this seems unreasonable in a world where transportation and transaction costs appear so low as to encourage arbitrage and the convergence of price gaps over much shorter horizons typically days or weeks however current empirics rely on a particular choice of methodology involving i relatively low frequency monthly quarterly or annual data and ii a linear model specification in fact these methodological choices are not innocent and they can be shown to bias analysis towards findings of slow convergence and a random walk intuitively if we suspect that the actual adjustment horizon is of the order of days then monthly and annual data cannot be expected to reveal it if we suspect arbitrage costs are high enough to produce a substantial band of inaction then a linear model will fail to support convergence if the process spends considerable time random walking in that band thus when testing for ppp or loop model specification and data sampling should not proceed without consideration of the actual institutional context and logistical framework of markets

real exchange rate behavior abstract using random simulations with artificial data with identical sample characteristics to the long sample exchange rate data employed by lothian and taylor lothian j r and taylor m p 1996 the recent float from the perspective of the past two centuries journal of political economy 104 488 509 we show that standard unit root tests have extremely low power over sample sizes corresponding to the recent float the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is false is extremely low with 20 years or even 50 years of data and only reaches an acceptable level over much longer spans

is there a connection between monetary unification and real economic integration evidence from regime switching stationarity tests abstract we investigate the extent of real convergence among g7 economies in terms of long run real interest parity a novel approach is applied where unit root tests of real interest differentials are embedded within a markov regime switching framework whereas standard univariate unit root tests provide little support for parity we find real convergence is present after allowing for regime switches in real interest misalignments however differentials across members of the euro zone are likely to exhibit greater persistence despite nominal convergence it is non sequitur to infer from monetary unification that nominal convergence is necessarily conducive to real interest realignments or preventive of misalignments

a re assessment of the relationship between real exchange rates and real interest rates 1974 1990 abstract this paper uses cointegration techniques and error correction models to re examine the link between real exchange rates and real interest rate differentials the results show that real exchange rates and real interest rates are nonstationary however they are not cointegrated with each other on the other hand the dynamic models indicate that there might be a long run relationship between these variables but this cannot be verified the final conclusion is that there is little empirical evidence in support of a systematic relationship and this result is robust across exchange rates time periods and measures of expected inflation

was it real the exchange rate interest differential relation over the modern floating rate period in this paper we explore the relationship between real exchange rates and real interest rate differentials in the united states germany japan and the united kingdom contrary to theories based on the joint hypothesis that domestic prices are sticky and monetary disturbances are predominant we find little evidence of a stable relationship between real interest rates and real exchange rates we consider both in sample and out of sample tests one hypothesis that is consistent with our findings is that real disturbances such as productivity shocks may be a major source of exchange rate volatility this paper investigates the empirical relationship between major currency real exchange rates and real interest rates over the modern post march 1973 flexible rate experience the exchange rates examined here include the dollar mark dollar yen and dollar pound rates our two major findings are as follows first the data do not indicate a strong correspondence between real interest rate differentials short term or long term and real exchange rates this finding appears to conflict with the predictions of most monetary and portfolio balance models of exchange rate determination though the conflict can be substantially reconciled if aggregate disturbances are primarily real in nature i e changes in productivity tastes etc it is true that in many cases the sign of the estimated exchange rate interest rate differential relationship is consistent with the possible predominance of financial market disturbances but the relationship is not stable enough to be statistically significant second although one does find some evidence of a unit root in both real exchange rates and long term but not shortterm real interest differentials these two series do not appear to be linearly cointegrated hence the nonstationarity or near nonstationarity in the two series cannot be attributed to the same factor in section i we briefly describe a class of small scale monetary models of exchange rate determination the importance of this class of models for empirical work derives from its strong predictions about how the exchange rate will move

reputation in bargaining and durable goods monopoly this paper analyzes durable goods monopoly in an infinite horizon discrete time game we prove that as the time interval between successive offers approaches zero all seller payoffs between zero and static monopoly profits are supported by subgame perfect equilibria this reverses a well known conjecture of coase alternatively one can interpret the model as a sequential bargaining game with one sided incomplete information in which an uninformed seller makes all the offers our folk theorem for seller payoffs equally applies to the set of sequential equilibria of this bargaining game

real exchange rate behavior the recent float from the perspective of the past two centuries using annual data spanning two centuries for dollar sterling and franc sterling real exchange rates we find strong evidence of mean reverting real exchange rate behavior using simple stationary autoregressive models estimated on prefloat data we easily outperform nonstationary real exchange rate models in dynamic forecasting exercises over the recent float such stationary univariate equations explain 60 80 percent of the in sample variation in real exchange rates although the degree of short run persistence may be high the econometric estimates imply a half life of shocks to the real exchange rate of about 6 years for dollar sterling and a little under 3 years for franc sterling

credit information systems in less developed countries a test with microfinance in guatemala abstract increases in formal sector lending among the poor have created a need for credit information systems that provide potential lenders with borrower information in this article we present fixed effects estimations that attempt to measure the effect of a newly implemented credit information system in guatemala our results indicate that improved screening effects from the system caused the level of portfolio arrears to decline approximately 2 percentage points after it was implemented in branch offices we observe an even more substantial and significant effect of the information system in reducing late payments that occur during the loan cycle

does the real interest parity hypothesis hold evidence for developed and emerging markets we present empirical evidence on the real interest parity hypothesis for a set of emerging and developed countries this is done by carrying out a set of unit root tests on the real interest differentials with respect to the us our results support the hypothesis of a rapid reversion towards a zero differential for developed countries and towards a positive one for emerging markets mean reversion is faster for emerging market economies we also find that this adjustment tends to be highly asymmetric and markedly different for developed and emerging markets our evidence reveals a high degree of market integration for developed countries and highlights the importance of risk premia for emerging markets

micro finance competition motivated micro lenders double dipping and default abstract we develop a tractable model of competition among socially motivated mfis so that the objective functions of the mfis put some weight on their own clients utility we find that the equilibrium involves double dipping i e borrowers taking multiple loans from different mfis whenever the mfis are relatively profit oriented further double dipping necessarily leads to default and inefficiency and moreover borrowers who face relatively higher transactions costs optimally decide to double dip interestingly an increase in mfi competition can increase the extent of double dipping and default further the interest rates may go either way with the interest rate likely to increase with more competition if the mfis are very socially motivated

durable goods monopoly with incomplete information this article reconsiders the durable goods monopoly problem when the monopolist s marginal cost is private information we show that the coase conjecture implies the no trade theorem in any equilibrium in which the lowest cost seller s initial offer approaches her marginal cost the aggregate probability of trade must vanish however we also construct non coasean equilibria which approximate the unique outcome of the rental version of the same model these stationary equilibria are comparatively efficient the results are equally applicable to the mathematically equivalent problem of sequential bargaining with two sided incomplete information where one party makes all the offers what are the consequences of monopoly in a market for a durable good present day understanding of this question divides into two strands of thought first the monopolist may effectively lack any ability to credibly precommit on her future output under this scenario the price will drop almost instantaneously to marginal cost apparently yielding the efficient outcome normally associated with perfect competition 1 second the monopolist may possess an explicit e g leasing the good rather than selling2 or implicit e g the maintenance of reputation3 device enabling her to adhere to an output restriction under such circumstances price will be maintained at a non competitively high level suggesting an outcome fraught with all the inefficiency of classical monopoly the conclusions of the first paragraph rest on analysis of a standard model in which the monopolist s payoff function is taken to be common knowledge a single firm with known constant marginal cost sells an infinitely durable good to consumers with a known distribution of valuations for the good 4 the firm has the ability to revise its posted price

microfinance in times of crisis the effects of competition rising indebtedness and economic crisis on repayment behavior this paper analyzes repayment determinants for loans from caja los andes a bolivian mi crolender the analysis focuses on the influence of recent changes in the bolivian microfinance market in particular we examine the effects of the rapidly growing supply of funds for micro loans the increasing competition a rising level of indebtedness among micro entrepreneurs and the recent economic crisis our results show a two fold influence structure of competition and indebtedness firstly clients with loans from multiple sources at the same time are found to be more likely to default than others secondly clients with given characteristics have an overall better repayment behaviour in areas with higher competition and a higher supply of micro loans

group lending with sequential financing contingent renewal and social capital this paper focuses on the dynamic aspects of group lending in particular sequential financing and contingent renewal we examine the efficacy of these two schemes in harnessing social capital we find that for the appropriate parameter configurations there is homogenous group formation so that the lender can ascertain the identity of a group without lending to all its members thus screening out bad borrowers partially moreover under certain parameter configurations negative assortative matching occurs as a robust phenomenon

on the design of a credit agreement with peer monitoring this paper analyses the optimal design of collective credit agreements with joint responsibility first we demonstrate that these agreements can potentially induce peer monitoring reduce the incidence of strategic default and enhance the lender s ability to elicit debt repayments the resulting benefits in terms of extended credit should however be weighted against the higher monitoring effort that such agreements impose upon participant borrowers second we show that the relative benefits from peer monitoring are maximized when risks are positively correlated across borrowers and also when the size of the group is neither too small due to a joint responsibility cost sharing and commitment effects nor too large due to a free riding effect third we compare among different monitoring structures

microfinance and dynamic incentives dynamic incentives where incentives to repay are generated by granting access to future loans is one of the methodologies used by microfinance institutions mfis in this paper i present a model of dynamic incentives where lenders are uncertain over how much borrowers value future loans loan terms are determined endogenously and loans become more favorable as the probability of default becomes lower i show that in all equilibria but one all borrowers default including the most patient ones i then compare equilibria with and without double dipping i show that when credit constrained borrowers have access to multiple loans equilibrium loan terms have to become more favorable to overcome increased gains from default if borrower s access to multiple loans is unforseen by lenders then the default rates go up in the short run finally if lenders use group loans it generates endogenous hyperbolic discounting even though the borrowers are exponential discounters

inefficient sales delays by a durable good monopoly facing a finite number of buyers this article offers a new explanation for unscheduled price cuts and slow adoption of durable goods we study a standard durable good monopoly model with a finite number of buyers and show that this game can have multiple subgame perfect equilibria in addition to the pacman outcome including the coase conjecture of particular interest is a class of equilibria where the seller first charges a high price and only lowers that price once some but not all high valuation buyers purchase this price structure creates a war of attrition between those buyers which delays market clearing and rationalizes unscheduled purchase and price cut dates

real interest parity rip over the 20th century new evidence based on confidence intervals for the largest root and the half life abstract in this paper we employ local to unity asymptotics to investigate the validity of real interest parity rip for three countries relative to the us using long span data we find that deviations from parity are corrected quickly and this is what could in principle be expected to happen in an integrated world where economic forces act rapidly so that discrepancies do not grow systematically over time moreover the observed speed of reversion raises important issues for policy in that the tendency for rates to converge implies that the impact of the domestic authorities stabilization polices might be limited finally there is no clear cut difference in the adjustment to shocks across fixed and floating regimes

non exclusive competition in the market for lemons in order to check the impact of the exclusivity regime on equilibrium allocations we set up a simple akerlof like model in which buyers may use arbitrary taris under exclusivity we obtain the zero profit separating riley rothschilds stiglitz allocation under non exclusivity there is also a unique equilibrium allocation that involves a unique price as in akerlof 1970 these results can be applied to insurance in the dual model in yaari 1987 and have consequences for empirical tests of the existence of asymmetric information

returns to capital in microenterprises evidence from a field experiment small and informal firms account for a large share of employment in developing countries the rapid expansion of microfinance services is based on the belief that these firms have productive investment opportunities and can enjoy high returns to capital if given the opportunity however measuring the return to capital is complicated by unobserved factors such as entrepreneurial ability and demand shocks which are likely to be correlated with capital stock the authors use a randomized experiment to overcome this problem and to measure the return to capital for the average microenterprise in their sample regardless of whether they apply for credit they accomplish this by providing cash and equipment grants to small firms in sri lanka and measuring the increase in profits arising from this exogenous positive shock to capital stock after controlling for possible spillover effects the authors find the average real return to capital to be 5 7 percent a month substantially higher than the market interest rate they then examine the heterogeneity of treatment effects to explore whether missing credit markets or missing insurance markets are the most likely cause of the high returns returns are found to vary with entrepreneurial ability and with measures of other sources of cash within the household but not to vary with risk aversion or uncertainty

real exchange rates and real interest differentials for sectoral data a dynamic sur approach abstract this paper examines the link between real exchange rates and real interest rate differentials for traded and non traded goods with a system method in a dynamic seemingly unrelated cointegrating regression for panel data empirical results show that the link between real exchange rate and real interest differential is more favorable for traded goods than for general and non traded goods

the exchange rate interest differential relationship in six east asian countries abstract this study shows that the real exchange rate real interest differential relation in six east asian economies changes with the nominal regime positive time varying correlations characterize the relation during pegged regimes correlations are negative during freely falling regimes

deviations from purchasing power parity under different exchange rate regimes do they revert and if so how abstract we propose an empirical model for deviations from long run purchasing power parity ppp that simultaneously accounts for three key features i adjustment toward ppp may occur via nominal exchange rates and relative prices at different speeds ii different exchange rate regimes may generate regime shifts in the structural dynamics of ppp deviations iii nonlinear reversion toward ppp in response to shocks this empirical framework encompasses and synthesizes much previous empirical research using over a century of data for the g5 countries we provide evidence that long run ppp holds the relative importance of nominal exchange rates and prices in restoring ppp varies over time and across different exchange rate regimes and reversion to ppp occurs nonlinearly at a speed that is fairly consistent with the nominal rigidities suggested by conventional open economy models

how rising competition among microfinance institutions affects incumbent lenders this article uses data from uganda s largest incumbent microfinance institution to analyse the impact of entry by competing lenders on client behaviour we observe that rising competition does not lead to an increase in client dropout rate but induces a decline in repayment performance and savings deposited with the incumbent suggesting rising multiple loan taking by clients this joint effect on dropout and repayment is consistent with some negative information about clients and is being shared across lenders however the observed decline in repayment rates in a context of rising multiple loan taking shows that information sharing about clients is far from complete

the thai rural credit system public subsidies private information and segmented markets thailand has sought to increase farmers access to credit by government intervention in 1966 it created a government agricultural bank to lend solely to farm households and beginning in the late 1970s it required commercial banks to lend heavily in the rural sector either directly or by making deposits in the agricultural bank the result was an enormous expansion of credit in the rural sector but because formal lenders were either unable or unwilling to solve the information problems involved in the broad range of rural credit transactions the informal credit sector wbich charged interest rates many times higher than the formal sector continued to thrive using household surveys and surveys of moneylenders this article provides a detailed analysis of the ways in which lenders in the informal sector have solved the information problems of providing credit the authors argue that the informal sector is competitive and that high interest rates reflect high information costs not the scarcity of funds this article reports on a set of investigations of the impact of thai government policies to expand bank lending in the rural sector their purpose was to increase farmers access to capital and reduce their dependence on informal lenders fifteen years after the principal government measures were introduced we hope to be able to answer several questions how has the expansion of formal sector lending affected the informal sector did the increase in the supply of formal credit reduce the business of informal lenders and lower interest rates in the informal market what has been the performance of the formal credit system in terms of coverage efficiency and incidence lacking time series data on the informal sector we cannot give a direct answer to these questions but we can with confidence say that the informal lenders are still very much alive by examining the behavior of the rural credit market at the present time we can throw an indirect light on what transpired over the last fifteen years our main findings are the following on the basis of our 1984 85 survey of households and moneylenders

a panel project on purchasing power parity mean reversion within and between countries abstract previous time series studies have shown evidence of mean reversion in real exchange rates deviations from purchasing power parity ppp appear to have half lives of approximately four years however the long samples required for statistical significance are unavailable for most currencies and are potentially inappropriate because of regime changes in this study we re examine deviations from ppp using a panel of 150 countries and 45 annual post wwii observations our panel shows strong evidence of mean reversion that is similar to that from long time series ppp deviations are eroded at a rate of approximately 15 annually i e their half life is around four years such findings can be masked in time series data but are relatively easy to find in cross sections

market frictions and real exchange rates abstract one explanation for the failure of purchasing power parity ppp is that market frictions impede trade allowing departures from ppp to grow quite large without precipitating goods arbitrage if this explanation is correct then other things equal large deviations from ppp should be less persistent than small differences this paper examines this prediction over the modern floating rate era the outcome is surprising between most countries large deviations from ppp appear to be at least as persistent as small deviations and perhaps even more so the exceptions are for some intra ec real exchange rates the implication is that market frictions alone do not explain the chimerical nature of ppp

optimal lending contracts and firm dynamics we develop a general model of lending in the presence of endogenous borrowing constraints borrowing constraints arise because borrowers face limited liability and debt repayment cannot be perfectly enforced in the model the dynamics of debt are closely linked with the dynamics of borrowing constraints in fact borrowing constraints must satisfy a dynamic consistency requirement the value of outstanding debt restricts current access to short term capital but is itself determined by future access to credit this dynamic consistency is not guaranteed in models of exogenous borrowing constraints where the ability to raise short term capital is limited by some prespecified function of debt we characterize the optimal default free contract which minimizes borrowing constraints at all histories and derive implications for firm growth survival leverage and debt maturity the model is qualitatively consistent with stylized facts on the growth and survival of firms comparative statics with respect to technology and default constraints are derived borrowing constraints are an important determinant of firm growth and survival 1 such constraints may arise in connection to the financing of investment opportunities faced by firms or temporary liquidity needs such as those required to survive a recession this paper develops a theory of endogenous borrowing constraints and studies its implications for firm dynamics in our model debt is constrained by the firm s limited liability and option to default a lending contract specifies an initial loan size future financing and a repayment schedule the choice of these variables in turn determines future growth the firm s future borrowing capacity and its ability and willingness to repay hence borrowing constraints and firm dynamics are jointly determined we study this dynamic design problem our model builds on thomas and worral s 1994 model of foreign direct investment at time zero a risk neutral borrower firm or entrepreneur has a project which requires a fixed initial set up cost every period the project yields revenues that increase with the amount of 1 there is considerable evidence suggesting that financing constraints are important determinants of firm dynamics gertler and gilchrist 1994 argue that liquidity constraints may explain why small manufacturing firms respond more to a tightening of monetary policy than do larger manufacturing firms perez quiros and timmermann 2000 show that in recessions smaller firms are more sensitive to the worsening of credit market conditions as measured by higher interest rates and default premia evans and jovanovic 1989 show that the liquidity constraints are essential in the decision to become an entrepreneur fazzari hubbard and petersen 1988 among others view financial constraints as an explanation for the dynamic behaviour of aggregate investment and cabral and mata 1996 are able to fit reasonably well the size distribution of portuguese manufacturing firms by estimating a simple model of financing constraints for surveys see hubbard 1998 and stein 2003

real exchange rates and real interest differentials implications of nonlinear adjustment in real exchange rates abstract this paper investigates the relationship between real exchange rates and real interest differentials while sticky price exchange rate theories predict a relationship empirical evidence on the hypothesized link has proved elusive our conjecture is that the empirical difficulty is due to a failure to recognize nonlinearity in real exchange rate adjustment when we introduce threshold nonlinearity into a traditional model to take account of a transaction cost induced band of inaction for price adjustment only outside the band will the real exchange rate exhibit mean reversion and bear an association with real interest differentials our estimated nonlinear models provide evidence supporting this view

durable goods monopoly with entry of new consumers this paper analyzes a model of a dynamic monopolist who produces at constant unit cost each period a new cohort of consumers enters the market each entering cohort is identical consumers within a cohort have different tastes for the good my main results are if players are sufficiently patient any positive average profit less than the maximum feasible level can be attained in a subgame perfect equilibrium in the subset of subgame perfect equilibria in which players use stationary strategies the seller cannot make sales at prices significantly greater than the lowest willingness to pay when period length goes to zero and the seller attains the maximum profit when commitment is feasible by charging the same static monopoly price in every period this paper analyzes a model of a dynamic monopolist who operates in a market in which there is a regular flow of new consumers the seller produces a durable good at constant unit cost each period a new cohort of consumers enters the market consumers wish to buy exactly one unit of the item but are willing to wait resales are not allowed each entering cohort is identical

durable goods monopoly with discrete demand we analyze a dynamic game between consumers and the sole seller of a durable good unlike previous analyses we assume that there exists a finite collection of buyers rather than a continuum none of the main conclusions of the literature on durable goods monopoly survives this change in assumption coase s conjecture that a durable goods monopolist cannot earn supracompetitive profits in the continuous time limit bulow s proposition that renting a durable is always more profitable than selling it and stokey s proposition that precommitting to a time path of prices is always optimal are all false when the set of buyers is finite thus the assumption of a continuum of consumers so innocuous and useful a simplification in other contexts has proved misleading in the context of durable goods monopoly

a model of exchange rate dynamics this model treats the exchange rate as an asset price that depends on expectations concerning exogenous real and monetary factors that will affect relative prices and absolute price levels in future periods changes in exchange rates reflect both expected changes in these exogenous factors and changes in expectations occasioned by new information the model explains the random component in exchange rate behavior the source of divergences from purchasing power parity the anticipatory response of exchange rates to future expected disturbances and the causes of exchange rate overshooting

transactions costs and nonlinear adjustment in real exchange rates an empirical investigation eolquilibrium models of real exchange rate determination in the presence of transactions costs imply a nonlinear adjustment process toward purchasing power parity ppp conventional cointegration tests which ignore the effect of transactions costs may be biased against the long run ppp hypothesis our results using both monthly data for the interwar period and annual data spanning two centuries clearly reject the linear framework in favor of an exponential smooth transition autoregressive process the systematic pattern in the estimates of the nonlinear models provides strong evidence of mean reverting behavior for ppp deviations and helps explain the mixed results of previous studies

sovereign debt as intertemporal barter author s kletzer kenneth m wright brian d abstract borrowing and lending between sovereign parties is modeled as intertemporal barter that smoothes the consumption of a risk averse party subject to endowment shocks the surplus anticipated in the relationship offers sufficient incentive for cooperation by all parties including any other competitive agents who are potential lenders to the sovereign the sole punishments consist of renegotiation proof changes in the path of future payments we show that intertemporal trade can be sustained in the absence of any exogenous enforcement of lending relationships whatsoever that is borrowing and lending are possible under anarchy and are supported by punishments that consist of cheating any cheater long term implicit relationships may be fulfilled as the continual renegotiation of simple incomplete short term loans the analysis suggests that the crucial role of the explicit loan contract is the identification of the relationship and the parties involved

designing credit agent incentives to prevent mission drift in pro poor microfinance institutions abstract credit agents in microfinance institutions mfis must be given incentives to acquire information on potential borrowers and select them in accordance with the mfi s objectives we show that while giving incentives has no cost in for profit mfis it is costly in pro poor mfis when repayment and wealth are positively correlated a pro poor mfi cannot obtain the selection of poor clients in the proportion it wishes with incentives based solely on repayment it then becomes necessary to audit the share of very poor borrowers selected by an agent in order to provide the latter with adequate incentives when audit costs are large pro poor mfis may have to forego selection on wealth and use other targeting devices such as working in impoverished geographical locations driven by donor concerns with mission drift away from the poor audits on the wealth status of clients have been introduced at the level of mfis we show that introducing pro poor incentives requires extending such audits to the level of credit agents

imperfect durability and the coase conjecture this article considers a market served by a monopolist who sells a durable good that depreciates stochastically over time we show that there exist three types of stationary equilibria a coase conjecture equilibrium a monopoly equilibrium and a reputational equilibrium when the depreciation rate is low the coase conjecture equilibrium is the unique equilibrium for intermediate values of the depreciation rate all three equilibrium types coexist when the depreciation rate is high the monopoly equilibrium is the unique equilibrium consequently when selling a good of sufficiently low durability the monopolist does not lose any of her monopoly power furthermore the steady state output in the reputational equilibrium falls below the monopoly quantity hence in durable goods markets welfare losses due to monopoly power may be larger than in markets for perishables

the real exchange rate and real interest differentials the role of the trend cycle decomposition we propose an alternative model and method to reconcile the puzzling feature in the relationship between the real exchange rate and real interest rate differentials our simple two country model with preset prices along with firms misperception about the future exchange rate implies that the real exchange rate follows an arima 0 1 p process this allows us to compute the exact beveridge nelson decomposition which is a model consistent decomposition in accordance with our model unit roots in the real exchange rates are found and statistical inference is partially found to be affirmative regarding the link between the real exchange rate detrended by the beveridge nelson decomposition and corresponding real interest differentials

information and enforcement in informal credit markets we study loan enforcement in informal credit markets with multiple lenders but no sharing of credit histories and derive the dynamics of loan size and interest rates for relational lending in the presence of a sufficient fraction of natural defaulters the rest of the market can be incentivized against default by micro rationing sharper credit limits and possibly higher interest rates that serve as gateways into new borrowing relationships when there are too few natural defaulters in the market this can be supplemented by macro rationing random exclusion of some borrowers when information collection is endogenized multiple equilibria may arise

experimental evidence on returns to capital and access to finance in mexico a strong theoretical argument for focusing on access to finance is that financial market imperfections can result in large inefficiencies as firms with productive investment opportunities underinvest lack of access to finance is a frequent complaint of microenterprises which account for a large share of employment in developing countries however assessing the extent to which a lack of capital affects their business profits is complicated by the fact that business investment is likely to be correlated with a host of unmeasured characteristics of the owner and firm such as entrepreneurial ability and demand shocks in a randomized experiment that gave cash and in kind grants to small retail firms providing an exogenous shock to capital the shock generated large increases in profits with the effects concentrated among firms that were more financially constrained the estimated return to capital was at least 20 33 percent a month three to five times higher than market interest rates