interpreting economic time series this paper explores some of the implications for econometric practice of the principle that people s observed behavior will change when their constraints change in dynamic contexts a proper definition of people s constraints includes among them laws of motion that describe the evolution of the taxes they must pay and the prices of the goods that they buy and sell changes in agents perceptions of these laws of motion or constraints will in general produce changes in the schedules that describe the choices they make as a function of the information that they possess until very recently received dynamic econometric practice ignored this principle the practice of dynamic econometrics should be changed so that it is consistent with the principle that people s rules of choice are influenced by their constraints this is a substantial undertaking and involves major adjustments in the ways that we formulate estimate and simulate econometric models

media markets and localism does local news en espanol boost hispanic voter turnout the same time the availability of these products reduces the consumption of local news not only because some consumers prefer national and global content to local information but also because local media products that lose a significant number of consumers are forced to cut qual ity and they may even cease to exist if their audience falls below a critical threshold for these reasons some scholars claim that the rise of integrated media markets undermines local civic engagement robert d putnam 2000 against this backdrop many regulatory agencies including the federal communications commission fcc of the united states seek to protect local media and promote localism for instance by limiting ownership concentration 1 however localism is desirable only if there are in fact positive spillovers from the provision of local content that can help justify the loss of private welfare that integrated media markets would provide in this paper we propose a simple test for the existence of spillovers from local news pro gramming asking if the presence of local television news affects civic behavior the ubiq uity of local news programming across all us metro areas makes it impossible to study its effects on the general population in contrast the availability of spanish language news has increased considerably in recent years providing us with an experiment to study the effect of local news on one important measure of civic engagement voter turnout in local elections in particular we use a differencing approach asking whether hispanic voter turnout is higher in relation to non hispanic turnout in metro areas with spanish language local television news our results indicate that spanish language local television news raises hispanic turnout by more than 4 percentage points local news targeted at hispanics has no effect on the participa tion of non hispanics and as one would expect a significantly smaller effect in years with a presidential race in markets with spanish language news about a quarter of hispanics turn to these programs our estimates thus imply that news in spanish caused about a fifth of spanish language news viewers to start voting interestingly hispanics with access to news in spanish do not increase the time they spend watching news content analyses of spanish language news programs in the united states find that these shows are much more likely to report on

turnout across democracies world democracies widely differ in legislative executive and legal institutions different institutional environments induce different mappings from electoral outcomes to the distribution of power we explore how these mappings affect voters participation in an election we show that the effect of such institutional differences on turnout depends on the distribution of voters preferences we uncover a novel contest effect given the preferences distribution turnout increases and then decreases when we move from a more proportional to a less proportional power sharing system turnout is maximized for an intermediate degree of power sharing moreover we generalize the competition effect common to models of endogenous turnout given the institutional environment turnout increases in the ex ante preferences evenness and more so when the overall system has lower power sharing these results are robust to a wide range of modeling approaches including ethical voter models voter mobilization models and rational voter models

political scale and electoral turnout evidence from the less industrialized world this article attempts to bring the politics of scale back into the study of comparative politics explicitly focusing on the question of electoral turnout in the less industrialized world it explo

the influence of the number of statewide legislative referendums on voter participation in the us this empirical study seeks to broaden the interpretation of the rational voter model so as to include the potential effects of the number of statewide legislative referendums this study tests the hypothesis that greater numbers of such referendums increase voter turnout because they elevate the expected gross benefits egb of voting by empowering voters while not significantly increasing the expected gross costs egc of voting using state level data for the 2006 general election in the us as well as the 2004 us presidential election and after allowing for a variety of economic and demographic factors this study finds compelling evidence that the number of statewide legislative referendums does significantly increase voter turnout

adoption of agricultural innovations in developing countries a survey this paper reviews various studies which have provided a description and possible explanation to patterns of innovation adoption in the agricultural sector the survey points out that the tendency of many studies to consider innovation adoption in dichotomous terms adoption nonadoption may not be appropriate in many cases where the actual decisions are defined over a more continuous range more attention needs to be given to the socio cultural and institutional environment in area studies so that their interrelation with economic factors affecting adoption can be inferred the presence of several interrelated innovations is another aspect that needs to be considered more carefully in future research since a number of simultaneous decisions may be involved furthermore the possibility of regular sequential patterns in adopting components of a new technological package should be specifically addressed in future studies finally the impact of differential adoption rates on land holding distribution merits attention in future research

do closeness and stake increase voter turnout evidence from election results in small french towns in brittany abstractdo closeness and stake increase voter turnout evidence from election results in small french towns in brittany regional studies this article explores the determinants of second round voter turnout in small french towns with a focus on two hypotheses first an increase in the closeness of the race may lead to an increase in turnout second a higher seats stake that is a higher proportion of the total number of seats that remain to be filled in the second round of the election may increase turnout results show that increases in both closeness and seats stake lead to higher voter turnout thus evidence is given in favour of the assumption of rationality in voting in local elections

closeness expenditures and turnout in the 1982 u s house elections students of elections have repeatedly found that the closeness of an election is modestly correlated with turnout this may be due to a direct response of instrumentally motivated voters but recent theoretical work casts doubt on the adequacy of this explanation another possibility is that elite actors respond to closeness with greater effort at mobilization we explore the latter possibility by using fec and state data on campaign expenditures in house senate and gubernatorial races our results indicate that closeness has an effect at both the mass and elite levels we also provide quantitative estimates of the effect of senate and gubernatorial expenditure on house turnout

rational choice and turnout turning out to vote is the most common and important act of political participation in any democracy voting is also less well understood and explained empirically than other political acts engaged in regularly by citizens turnout however presents a special problem for rational choice theories of politics for it is taken to be the paradigmatic example of the problem of collective action in which although all may benefit from voting it is rarely in the individual s self interest to vote this paper begins by examining the problem of explaining turnout a basic form of rational choice models of turnout is developed basic in the sense that it is common to all such models this basic model is shown to be incomplete and the two most important models the calculus of voting and the minimax regret model are illustrated as alternative ways to complete this basic model along with mention of game theoretic models their strengths and weaknesses are then assessed the remainder of the paper argues that rational choice accounts of turnout are possible the first step is to argue that turnout is not an especially problematic version of the collective action problem because it is for many a low cost low expected benefit decision a strategic politicians account of turnout and campaigns is examined next a reinterpretation of the intrinsic benefits of voting is then considered and is used to examine the most important substantive problem in the turnout literature its decline these steps i argue make theories of ordinary political decisions at once both more political and more integrated into the politics of the larger system

getting out the vote participation in gubernatorial elections scholarship on electoral turnout has long emphasized two main themes explanations of nonvoting in terms of individual characteristics and in terms of contextual variables these investigations have deeply enriched our understanding of electoral participation but their limitations have also sensitized us to the remaining problems of explanation perusal of the work on american politics exposes a rather striking tendency in studies of participation to ignore or soft pedal the effects of active political mobilization in this article we formulate two models of electoral turnout socioeconomic and political mobilization and apply them to aggregate data on voting in gubernatorial elections of 1978 and 1980 the socioeconomic model of turnout includes such influences as income age and educational attainment to assess the effects of political mobilization we have considered campaign spending partisan competition electoral margin and the presence or absence of a simultaneous race for the united states senate both of the models perform quite well individually producing significant and meaningful coefficients and adequate fits yet in the final analysis we demonstrate that quite apart from major sources of variation in gubernatorial turnout such as region and presidential versus nonpresidential years the mobilizing influences of campaign activism and competitiveness have a strong impact on electoral participation electoral law i e closing date of registration retains a small but significant effect on voting for governor and socioeconomic characteristics included in a fully specified model have little to contribute independently to an explanation of electoral turnout these findings are very much in the same vein as related cross national investigations which emphasize the crucial role of electoral law and political parties and downplay individual characteristics as determinants of electoral participation on the basis of the research reported here we argue that scholars need to pay more attention to political mobilization as an explanation of electoral turnout in the presidential election between cox and harding in 1920 only half of the eligible voters participated this relatively low turnout together with the historically minimal rates of participation in state and local elections created deep concern among those who believed that reasonably high levels of political involvement are crucial in maintaining a healthy democratic politics it was in this atmosphere of worry about low electoral turnout that charles e merriam and harold f gosnell 1924 conducted in the city of chicago the first systematic study of nonvoting subsequently gosnell 1927 went even further and executed the first experimental study in modern political science demonstrating conditions that could stimulate electoral turnout we too worry about low participation in elections today at every level of government and we believe these classic studies

a new approach to measure tactical voting evidence from the british elections although tactical voting attracts a great deal of attention it is very hard to measure as it requires knowledge of both individuals voting choices as well as their unobserved preferences in this article we present a simple empirical strategy to nonparametrically identify tactical voting patterns directly from balloting results this approach allows us to study the magnitude and direction of strategic voting as well as to verify which information voters and parties take into account to determine marginal constituencies we show that tactical voting played a significant role in the 2010 election mainly for liberal democratic voters supporting labour moreover our results suggest that voters seem to form their expectations based on a national swing in vote shares rather than newspaper guides published in the main media outlets or previous election outcomes we also present some evidence that suggests that campaign spending is not driving tactical voting

voter participation and strategic uncertainty the paradox of not voting is examined in a model where voters have uncertainty about the preferences and costs of other voters in game theoretic models of voter participation under complete information equilibrium outcomes can have substantial turnout even when voting costs are relatively high in contrast when uncertainty about preferences and costs is present only voters with negligible or negative net voting costs participate when the electorate is large

economists models of learning abstract economic theorists have intensively studied learning in games and decisions over the last decade this essay puts some of the work in perspective and offers opinions about what still needs to be learned journal of economic literature classification numbers c73 d83

residential mobility and voter turnout we examine the characteristics of a largely ignored low turnout group people who have recently moved we find that neither demographic nor attitudinal attributes explain their lower turnout instead the requirement that citizens must register anew after each change in residence constitutes the key stumbling block in the trip to the polls since nearly one third of the nation moves every two years moving has a large impact on national turnout rates we offer a proposal to reduce the effect of residential mobility on turnout and estimate that turnout would increase by nine percentage points if the impact of moving could be removed the partisan consequences of such a change would be marginal

explaining variation in the competitiveness of u s senate elections 1922 2004 we develop and test predictions about the factors determining the competitiveness of elections to the u s senate to do so we deliberately abstract away from candidate specific conditions that have often been used to study political competitiveness in order to focus on basic structural features of the electoral landscape in our framework party specific constraints on the ideological positioning of local candidates linked to the national party organization and its contributors interact with the heterogeneity of state electorates to determine the number of highly competitive senate contests three hypotheses emerge from this model 1 the greater the diversity of a party s national legislative delegation the more highly competitive senate elections we will observe 2 states in which the ideological heterogeneity of the electorate is relatively high will exhibit a greater number of highly competitive elections and 3 highly competitive senate contests will be more common in states with closed primaries than in states with open primaries we provide strong evidence in support of the first two hypotheses and some evidence in support of the third

everyone likes a winner an empirical test of the effect of electoral closeness on turnout in a context of expressive voting under instrumental voting closer elections are expected to have higher turnout under expressive voting however turnout may increase with decreasing closeness when voters have a preference for winners an empirical test using data on belgian municipal elections supports this we find that turnout reaches a local maximum when the largest party in the election obtains just over 52 of the seats and then falls supporting the instrumental closeness argument there is however another turning point the presence of a highly dominating party receiving at least two thirds of the votes stimulates turnout despite the fact that dominance implies lower closeness

does political knowledge increase turnout evidence from the 1997 british general election a number of recent formal models predict a positive effect of political knowledge on turnout both information acquisition and turnout however are likely to be determined by a similar set of variables rendering hard the identification of a causal link in empirical investigations available empirical regularities should therefore be interpreted as mere correlations i address this problem by using an intrumental variables approach where the instruments are represented by various proxies of information supply on mass media using survey data from the 1997 british general election study i show that political knowledge has a sizeable influence on the probability of voting and that mass media play an important role in influencing political participation

the impact of closeness on electoral participation exploiting the italian double ballot system we investigate whether the degree of political competition affects electoral turnout by using italian municipal election data from 1993 to 2011 relying on elections held using a double ballot system we apply an instrumental variable technique exploiting the actual closeness between the two leading candidates in the first round as an instrument for closeness in the second round the use of this strategy to estimate the impact of closeness on turnout is new to the literature controlling for municipal fixed effects and candidates characteristics we find that expected closeness significantly increases turnout thus supporting the idea that the expected benefits of voting increase in tighter political races the estimated effect is much larger than that found when measuring closeness with ex post electoral results suggesting quite a relevant endogeneity bias in previous studies

media coverage of biotech foods and influence on consumer choice in the last two decades few issues in the global agrifood sector have attracted as much media attention as biotechnology thousands of brief and in depth articles have been written focusing on diverse issues from the spectacle of ecological disasters to the promise of feeding a burgeoning world population among those accounts of alleged health risks could influence consumer perceptions and behavior directly indeed reporters across the globe have continued to draw parallels between biotechnology and other known food hazards such as mad cow disease and chemical contaminants such as dioxin they have also continued to raise the possibility of unknown long term health effects essentially framing biotechnology as a food safety risk marks and kalaitzandonakes marks et al there is evidence that this broad and often negative media coverage of biotechnology has raised public awareness influenced public perceptions and altered the public agenda on biotech foods in europe and elsewhere bauer durant bauer and gaskell this is not surprising as over 90 of consumers receive information about agrifood biotechnology primarily through the popular press and television hoban and kendall despite the apparent influence of media coverage on public perceptions however the question of whether such coverage has also affected consumer purchasing behavior has not been answered the answer to this question is broadly relevant with less than 2 of the u s population now engaged in agricultural production the average food consumer has diminishing personal experience and knowledge of agriculture

recent evolutionary theorizing about economic change this famous passage from marshall s principles of economics it first appeared in the fifth edition which came out in 1907 nicely brings out two issues which are as germane to economics today as they were when marshall wrote the first is the heavy reliance by economists in their formal theorizing on the notion of equilibrium the other is the appeal that biological conceptions3x201d have for many economists particularly when their focus is on economic change

incorporating groups into rational choice explanations of turnout an empirical test this study examines the problem of voter turnout from a rational choice perspective it reviews the paradox of voting and finds one model which incorporates the role of intermediary social groups and leaders to be a promising solution it tests the hypothesis that leader mobilization increases voter turnout using an ecological analysis of turnout in five montreal ethnic communities during three recent elections the 1993 canadian federal the 1994 quebec provincial and the 1994 montreal municipal elections data on mobilization are taken from semi directed interviews with association leaders in each community the results compare predicted and actual rankings of turnout for each community and election the overall results are weak indicating that the model does a poor job of predicting voter turnout

accounting for changes in tastes health concerns are thought by many to have shifted consumption away from red meats though econometric evidence is mixed testing for structural change is difficult especially when one time series is used for both estimating demand equations and testing their stability specification errors may suggest a shift where none has occurred using nonparametric demand analysis we find that meat consumption patterns in the united states and australia can be explained using only relative prices and expenditures only imposing particular functional forms can reverse the conclusion suggesting that specification errors in econometric demand studies can account for findings of taste changes

the performance of rational voter models in recent presidential elections in an economic theory of democracy downs hypothesized that rational utility maximizing citizens would calculate the benefits from voting as opposed to abstaining altogether and then vote if this expected benefit exceeded voting cost this hypothesis is logically derived from economic principles of rational behavior but is counterintuitive even if the utility increment is plausibly large the probability of casting a pivotal tie breaking vote in any sizable polity is minute hence the expected benefit will be less than the time cost of voting and no rational person will vote nevertheless a number of statistical studies have found that voter turnout does respond to differences in the probability of casting a decisive vote even though that probability may be small this article uses data gathered at the state level from the 1968 1972 1976 and 1980 general elections to reestimate the relationship between voter turnout and the probable closeness of the election pooled data least squares dummy variable lsdv regressions are used whenever preliminary tests indicate that such pooling is permissible the empirical results suggest that the relationship between closeness and turnout is weak unstable or nonexistent in all of the models tested

your vote counts on account of the way it is counted an institutional solution to the paradox of not voting when we explicitly lay out all its steps we find that the paradox of not voting since the chance of one vote s making a difference is about zero why trouble to vote rests on a false but hitherto unremarked assumption about the institutional context of elections my solution to the paradox is more conservative than others that have been proposed and it yields a rational choice model of voting whose consequence accord well with empirical findings on turnout

studying the role of political competition in the evolution of government size over long horizons here we argue for the use of cointegration and error correction analysis to combine economic factors that are nonstationary with political factors that are stationary into an empirical model of the evolution of public policy over long periods the approach is applied to disentangle the contributions of economics and politics to the evolution of public expenditure by the government of canada over 130 years political competition emerges as the primary political factor affecting government size

legislators and interest groups how unorganized interests get represented this paper derives a supply price for public policy using a constrained maximization model in the model three sets of agents each have preferences over outcomes organized interest groups offer campaign contributions to improve their own wealth voters offer votes to obtain outcomes closer to their most preferred outcomes and legislators seek both campaign contributions and votes to obtain reelection a given legislator s supply price for policy is shown to depend on the productivity of his effort as determined by committee assignments priority and ability and by the preferences of his unorganized constituency in the home district two extreme assumptions about the effectiveness of campaign spending in eliciting votes are used to illustrate the comparative statics properties of the model the prediction of the model is that interest groups will in general seek out legislators whose voters are indifferent to the policy the interest group seeks thus voters who do have preferences over policy are in effect represented even though they are not organized

demand for coffee in sweden the role of prices preferences and market power there is a widespread belief that consumer coffee prices are high relative to bean prices and that lower consumer prices would lead to substantial increases in bean exports from third world countries this issue is evaluated by analysing how retail prices preferences and market power influence coffee demand in sweden a demand function is estimated for the period 1968 2002 and used together with information on import prices of coffee beans to simulate an oligopoly model this approach gives estimates of the maximum average degree of market power and shows how coffee demand would react to reductions in marginal cost to its minimum level the maximum level of market power is found to be low but it generates large spreads between consumer and bean prices because the price elasticity has low absolute values moreover the impact of a price decrease would be small because long run coffee demand is dominated by changes in the population structure in combination with different preferences across age groups hence a change to perfect competition would only have a negligible effect on bean imports

beyond demand and supply curves in macroeconomics this paper surveys recent issues in macroeconomics from the viewpoint of dynamic economic theory the need to look beyond demand and supply curves and the insights that come from doing so are emphasized examples of issues in debt management and fiscal policy are analyzed

the political participation puzzle and marketing abstract this study shows that one of the most intriguing findings on political participation that the participation rate is higher in close elections is due to the omission of variables namely the marketing activities this relationship between closeness and participation is intriguing because 1 it implies that people participate in elections because their vote might be decisive but 2 such an incentive to vote is unreasonable this study presents a theoretical model that suggests that closeness does not affect the turnout rate directly but rather through the marketing activities of the parties in other words in equilibrium close elections attract higher marketing spending which in turn increases turnout the author uses data on the 1996 2004 presidential elections in the united states to examine the model and its implications using structural and nonstructural estimation the author finds that the data support the model and its implications furthermore the effect of marketing on turnout i