coalitional manipulation on networks abstract we study allocation rules that are robust to coalitional manipulation by transferring merging or splitting individual characteristics among coalition partners e g merging or splitting claims in bankruptcy problems coalition formation is restricted by an exogenous network a non directed graph so that only connected subsets of agents can form a coalition we offer a full characterization of non manipulable rules without any assumption on the network structure this result yields a variety of useful corollaries for specific networks such as complete network trees and networks without a bridge and corollaries for specialized models dealing with bankruptcy surplus sharing cost sharing income redistribution social choice with transferable utility etc

sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture we consider the problem of distributing the proceeds generated from a joint venture in which the participating agents are hierarchically organized we introduce and characterize a family of allocation rules where revenue bubbles up in the hierarchy the family is flexible enough to accommodate a no transfer rule where no revenue bubbles up and a full transfer rule where all the revenues bubble up to the top of the hierarchy intermediate rules within the family are reminiscent of popular incentive mechanisms for social mobilization our benchmark model refers to the case of linear hierarchies but we also extend the analysis to the case in which hierarchies may convey a general tree structure and include joint ownerships

multi issue allocation situations abstract this paper introduces a new class of transferable utility games called multi issue allocation games these games arise from various allocation situations and are based on the concepts underlying the bankruptcy model as introduced by o neill math social sci 2 1982 345 in this model a perfectly divisible good estate has to be divided amongst a given set of agents each of whom has some claim on the estate contrary to the standard bankruptcy model the current model deals with situations in which the agents claims are multi dimensional where the dimensions correspond to various issues it is shown that the class of multi issue allocation games coincides with the class of non negative exact games the run to the bank rule is introduced as a solution for multi issue allocation situations and turns out to be shapley value of the corresponding game finally this run to the bank rule is characterised by means of a consistency property in the spirit of o neill

non manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations abstract when resources are divided among agents the characteristics of the agents are taken into consideration a simple example is the bankruptcy problem where the liquidation value of a bankrupt firm is divided among the creditors based on their claims we characterize division rules under which no group of agents can increase the total amount they receive by transferring their characteristics within the group by allowing agents characteristics to be multi dimensional and choosing the meaning of variables appropriately our model can subsume a number of existing and new allocation problems such as cost sharing social choice with transferable utilities income redistribution bankruptcy with multiple types of assets probability updating and probability aggregation a number of existing and new results in specific problems are obtained as corollaries

housing conditions and their structural determinants comparisons within the enlarged eu housing conditions vary widely across the eu and the fact that new member states are lagging behind in this regard has even come onto the european policy agenda this article examines housing conditions as an outcome of complex social developments and highlights specific reasons why housing conditions vary so much within the eu thus the specific impact is observed of factors which have been identified in the literature as characterising distinctive housing models the eastern european housing model the southern european housing model and the distinction between cost renting and homeowning countries further the impact of these factors along with general socioeconomic development is empirically assessed by a linear regression model based on the eqls 2003 dataset the results clearly support the thesis of economic development playing a decisive role with it being the biggest single factor explaining variations in housing conditions across the eu followed by the significant influence of policy choice

land use and density in cities with congestion abstract it was well documented that monocentric spatial models with congestion require driving tolls to generate market efficiency because driving and location are equivalent tolling congestion is the same as regulating density this paper shows that internalizing the congestion externality always requires upward adjustments to market density which are greatest at the urban center this holds whether or not transportation capacity is optimally provided simulations suggest optimal cities should have central densities that are orders of magnitude greater than market cities

residential construction using the urban growth model to estimate housing supply abstract this article presents an empirical model of housing supply derived from urban growth theory this approach describes new housing construction as a function of changes in house prices and costs rather than as a function of the levels of those variables which previous studies have used empirical tests support this specification over the leading alternative models our estimates show that a 10 rise in real prices leads to an 0 8 increase in the housing stock which is accomplished by a temporary 60 increase in the annual number of starts spread over four quarters

installed base and compatibility innovation product preannouncements and predation a good is often more valuable to any user the more others use compatible goods the authors show that this effect may inhibit innovation if an installed base exists and transition to a new standard must be gradual early adopters bear a disproportionate share of transient incompatibility costs this can produce excess inertia the installed base however is stranded if the new standard is adopted this may create excess momentum these dynamic effects have strategic implications temporary price cutting can permanently prevent entry and product preannouncements can be critical in innovation these strategic actions have ambiguous welfare effects

talking searching and pricing this paper studies a consumers search model with word of mouth communication firms market a homogeneous product and choose prices consumers obtain price information in two ways they can search on their own and they can talk to other consumers in the basic model word of mouth communication is exogenous and the focus is on how the level of word of mouth communication shapes market equilibrium outcomes when search costs are low an intensification in word of mouth communication decreases firms competition the opposite holds when search costs are high the model is then extended to allow for strategic word of mouth communication market equilibria with word of mouth communication have the feature that some consumers acquire information personally while other consumers obtain their information by networking with others a decrease in the costs of word of mouth communication relatively to the costs of searching reduces the fraction of consumers who acquire information personally consequently it decreases firms competition

priority rules and other asymmetric rationing methods in a rationing problem each agent demands a quantity of a certain commodity and the available resources fall short of total demand a rationing method solves this problem at every level of resources and individual demands we impose three axioms consistency with respect to variations of the set of agents upper composition and lower composition with respect to variations of the available resources in the model where the commodity comes in indivisible units the three axioms characterize the family of priority rules where individual demands are met lexicographically according to an exogeneous ordering of the agents in the more familiar model where the commodity is divisible these three axioms plus scale invariance independence of the measurement unit characterize a rich family of methods it contains exactly three symmetric methods giving equal shares to equal demands these are the familiar proportional uniform gains and uniform losses methods the asymmetric methods in the family partition the agents into priority classes within each class they use either the proportional method or a weighted version of the uniform gains or uniform losses methods

hierarchical outcomes and collusion neutrality on networks abstract we investigate tu game solutions that are neutral to collusive agreements among players a collusive agreement binds collusion members to act as a single player and is feasible when they are connected on a network collusion neutrality requires that no feasible collusive agreement can change the total payoff of collusion members we show that on the domain of network games there is a solution satisfying collusion neutrality efficiency and null player property if and only if the network is a tree considering a tree network we show that affine combinations of hierarchical outcomes demange 2004 van den brink 2012 are the only solutions satisfying the three axioms together with linearity as corollaries we establish characterizations of the average tree solution equally weighted average of hierarchical outcomes one established earlier in the literature and the others new

fair allocation of disputed properties we model problems of allocating disputed properties as generalized exchange economies in which agents have preferences and claims over multiple goods and the social endowment of each good may not be sufficient to satisfy all individual claims in this context we investigate procedural and end state principles of fairness their implications and relations to do so we explore procedural allocation rules represented by a composition of a rights assignment mechanism to assign each profile of claims individual property rights over the endowment and walrasian or other individually rational exchange rule using variants of fairness based on no envy as end state principles we provide axiomatic characterizations of the three focal egalitarian mechanisms known in the literature on rationing problems as constrained equal awards constrained equal losses and proportional mechanisms our results are connected to focal contributions in political philosophy and also provide rationale for market based environ mental policy instruments such as cap and trade schemes and personal carbon trading and moral foundation for the three proposals to allocate ghg emission rights known as the equal per capita sharing the polluter pays principle and the equal burden sharing the victims pay principle

the digital provide information technology market performance and welfare in the south indian fisheries sector when information is limited or costly agents are unable to engage in optimal arbitrage excess price dispersion across markets can arise and goods may not be allocated efficiently in this setting information technologies may improve market performance and increase welfare between 1997 and 2001 mobile phone service was introduced throughout kerala a state in india with a large fishing industry using microlevel survey data we show that the adoption of mobile phones by fishermen and wholesalers was associated with a dramatic reduction in price dispersion the complete elimination of waste and near perfect adherence to the law of one price both consumer and producer welfare increased

moral hazard and nonmarket institutions dysfunctional crowding out or peer monitoring the authors examine a situation in which insurance is characterized by moral hazard when market insurance is provided supplementary mutual assistance between family and friends unobservable to market insurers will occur when nonmarket insurers have no better information than market insurers the mutual assistance not only crowds out market insurance but is also harmful and therefore dysfunctional alternatively when nonmarket insurers can observe each other s effort perfectly mutual assistance is beneficial these results point to the potential importance of peer monitoring mechanisms in mitigating moral hazard copyright 1991 by american economic association

an experimental study of the investment implications of bankruptcy laws in bankruptcy laws proportionality is the universal norm when allocating the liquidation value of a bankrupt firm among creditors the theoretical literature on bankruptcy proposes two prominent alternatives to proportionality the equal awards and the equal losses principles we use an experiment to analyze and compare actual creditor behavior under these three principles more specifically we test the following hypotheses replacing proportionality with equal losses increases total investment while replacing proportionality with equal awards decreases total investment under all three principles individual investment choices decrease in response to an increase in the probability of bankruptcy or an increase in risk aversion total investment difference between proportionality and either of the other two principles is independent of the probability of bankruptcy as long as both induce an interior equilibrium the results of the nonparametric tests and random effects tobit regression analyses we conduct on our experimental data offer support for all hypotheses

efficiency pricing tenancy rent control and monopolistic landlords this paper presents a model of tenancy rent control where rent increases on and evictions of sitting tenants are prohibited but nominal rents for new tenants are unrestricted if there is any inflation landlords prefer to take short staying tenants if there is no way for landlords to tell a tenant s type an adverse selection problem arises if landlords have monoply power then they may prefer not to raise the rent even when there is excess demand for housing these efficiency rents show that tenancy rent control can give rise to equilibria that look as if there were a flat ceiling on rents

monotonic redistribution of non negative allocations a case for proportional taxation revisited we reconsider casajus forthcoming characterization of uniformly proportional taxation by three properties of redistribution efficiency symmetry and monotonicity when restricted to non negative income these properties imply proportional taxation in a weaker sense the tax rate may vary with total income but only in an economically reasonable way

manipulation through bribes we consider allocation rules that choose outcomes and transfers based on agents reported valuations of the outcomes a bribing situation exists when one agent could pay another to misreport his valuations resulting in a net gain to both a bribe proof rule eliminates such opportunities we show that under a bribe proof rule each agent s payoff is a continuous function of other agents reported valuations furthermore on connected domains if the set of outcomes is finite or the domain is smoothly connected each agent s payoff is a constant function of other agents reports finally under a domain richness condition a bribe proof rule must be constant the results apply to a broad class of economies journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 d70

game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the talmud abstract for three different bankruptcy problems the 2000 year old babylonian talmud prescribes solutions that equal precisely the nucleoli of the corresponding coalitional games a rationale for these solutions that is independent of game theory is given in terms of the talmudic principle of equal division of the contested amount this rationale leads to a unique solution for all bankruptcy problems which always coincides with the nucleolus two other rationales for the same rule are suggested in terms of other talmudic principles needless to say the rule in question is not proportional division

kinship and financial networks formal financial access and risk reduction kinship networks are beneficial for smoothing consumption and investment but the channels are not well understood we study the financing devices used for consumption and investment by thai households households that are connected to banks achieve significantly better consumption smoothing than unconnected households indirect connections via inter household borrowing are as effective as direct borrowing investment appears to be facilitated by kinship households with kin in the village display reduced sensitivity of investment to income while connections to banks do not significantly reduce sensitivity kin may act as implicit collateral permitting borrowing that would violate repayment constraints in its absence

housing investment in the united states a supply determined model of housing investment is estimated from quarterly data over the 1963 83 period the model is built on dynamic marginal cost pricing considerations and allows short and long run supply elasticities to differ these are estimated as 1 0 and 3 0 respectively but most of the long run response occurs within 1 year rapid adjustment speed and the sizable long run elasticity of supply are important factors in understanding the volatility of housing investment the data also suggest some anomalies in the expected present value theory of asset pricing for housing capital

asymmetric parametric division rules we describe and characterize the family of asymmetric parametric division rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims on a divisible homogeneous good as part of the characterization we present two novel axioms which restrict how a division rule indirectly allocates between different versions of the same claimant we also show that such division rules can alternately be represented as the maximization of an additively separable social welfare function

real estate regulations in accra some macroeconomic consequences ghana has been one of the most rapidly growing economies in sub saharan africa this growth has been aided by ghana s improving policy environment in light of this the paper addresses the question of why given its higher level of per capita income and relatively strong growth the housing conditions of the poor in accra are considerably worse than those in a number of other african cities with lower incomes there are not many data available to answer this question so the method is indirect and takes two approaches first a variant of the monocentric city model is used to calculate accra s housing supply elasticity relative to those of other similarly sized african cities the model suggests that housing supply responsiveness is considerably lower in accra a result consistent with the observed higher housing costs secondly a number of traditional housing demand and reduced form equations are estimated for accra and the other cities this allows the formation of a quantitative judgment about accra

noisy contagion without mutation in a local interaction game agents play an identical stage game against their neighbours over time for nearest neighbour interaction it is established that starting from a random initial configuration in which each agent has a positive probability of playing the risk dominant strategy a sufficiently large population coordinates in the long run on the risk dominant equilibrium almost surely our result improves on blume 1995 ellison 2000 and morris 2000 by showing that the risk dominant equilibrium spreads to the entire population in a two dimensional lattice and without the help of mutation as long as there is some randomness in the initial configuration

networks markets and inequality julien gagnon thanks the gates cambridge trust for financial support sanjeev goyal is grateful to the keynes fellowship and the cambridge inet institute for financial support

differentially monotonic redistribution of income we suggest a differential version of monotonicity for redistribution rules whenever the differential of two persons income weakly increases then the differential of their post redistribution rewards also weakly increases together with efficiency and non negativity differential monotonicity characterizes redistribution via taxation at a fixed rate and equal distribution of the total tax revenue

the demand for housing in developing countries empirical estimates from household data cities in developing countries are growing at extraordinary rates often compressing into decades the urbanization process that has taken centuries in developed countries in coping with this growth public authorities have devised a wide range of policy instruments to influence the rate and character of city expansion to meet the needs of people for shelter and urban services and to allocate resources in ways that redistribute both the costs and benefits of urban growth ideally such policy formulation should be informed by a careful understanding of the behavior of urban markets in fact little information on market behavior is available to the policymakers of developing countries such basic information is needed for improved project design and even more important for improved sector wide policies this paper reports on research conducted at the world bank to increase understanding of developing country housing markets in particular of housing demand behavior while the overall project examines both the demand for housing characteristics and the demand for housing as a composite good this paper addresses only the latter the objectives of this paper are 1 to review briefly previous evidence on housing demand parameters in developing countries 2 to present new evidence on housing demand parameters based on application of standardized models and comparable variable definitions in 16 cities in eight developing countries colombia egypt el salvador ghana india jamaica korea and the philippines and 3 to examine similarities and differences among cities in housing demand and in a preliminary way offer explanations for place to place differences limited comparisons are also made to two u s cities in order to begin comparison of developing and developed country market behavior

networks in economic development this chapter surveys the implications of some studies in network economics research for economic development we focus on information flow and risk sharing two topics where work in theory empirics and policy analysis have been especially intensive and complementary in analysing information we distinguish models of information diffusion and aggregation highlight how different models imply very different guidance regarding the right way to seed information in discussing risk sharing we look at the key frictions that impede efficient informal insurance and some potential unintended consequences when policymakers intervene to help throughout we stress practical insights that can be used with limited measurement of the details of networks

a strategic model of social and economic networks we study the stability and efficiency of social and economic networks when self interested individuals can form or sever links first for two stylized models we characterize the stable and efficient networks there does not always exist a stable network that is efficient next we show that this tension persists generally to assure that there exists a stable network that is efficient one is forced to allocate resources to nodes that are not responsible for any of the production we characterize one such allocation rule the equal split rule and another rule that arises naturally from bargaining of the players

the effects of social networks on employment and inequality we develop a model where agents obtain information about job opportunities through an explicitly modeled network of social contacts we show that employment is positively correlated across time and agents moreover unemployment exhibits duration dependence the probability of obtaining a job decreases in the length of time that an agent has been unemployed finally we examine inequality between two groups if staying in the labor market is costly and one group starts with a worse employment status then that group s drop out rate will be higher and their employment prospects will be persistently below that of the other group

british planning policy and access to housing some empirical estimates there is evidence that the implementation of the planning system creates scarcity rents for land in different uses by acting as a constraint on land supply this paper provides for 1984 estimat

on the investment implications of bankruptcy laws axiomatic analysis of bankruptcy problems reveals three major principles i proportionality pro ii equal awards ea and iii equal losses el however most real life bankruptcy procedures implement only the proportionality principle we construct a noncooperative investment game to explore whether the explanation lies in the alternative implications of these principles on investment behavior our results are as follows i el always induces higher total investment than pro which in turn induces higher total investment than ea ii pro always induces higher egalitarian social welfare than both ea and el in interior equilibria iii pro induces higher utilitarian social welfare than el in interior equilibria but its relation to ea depends on the parameter values however a numerical analysis shows that on a large part of the parameter space pro induces higher utilitarian social welfare than ea

factor costs and factor use substitution among urban land and capital inputs in the production of single family housing this paper uses cost functions to test the hypothesis of constancy of the elasticity of substitution among land and capital inputs in the production of single family housing the findings suggest that the substitution parameter varies over the range of the sample the hypothesis of homotheticity in the production is also rejected this implies that the ces and cobb douglas production functions are not suitable for urban housing production modelling the analysis has been carried out by imposing much weaker restrictions as a part of the maintained hypotheses than has been the case in the recent literature

consumption risk sharing in social networks we develop a model of informal risk sharing in social networks where relationships between individuals can be used as social collateral to enforce insurance payments we characterize incentive compatible risk sharing arrangements and obtain two results 1 the degree of informal insurance is governed by the expansiveness of the network measured by the number of connections that groups of agents have with the rest of the community relative to group size twodimensional networks where people have connections in multiple directions are su ciently expansive to allow very good risk sharing we show that social networks in peruvian villages satisfy this dimensionality property thus our model can explain townsend s 1994 puzzling observation that village communities often exhibit close to full insurance 2 in second best arrangements agents organize in endogenous risk sharing islands in the network where shocks are shared fully within but imperfectly across islands as a result network based risk sharing is local socially closer agents insure each other more

economics of multihabitation housing conditions household occupancy and household structure under rent control inflation and nonmarketability of ownership rights abstract multihabitation in terms of sharing facilities in a dwelling or extended family occupancy is common in parts of the third world this paper uses the ghanaian housing market to assess the impact of multihabitation on house condition and on household occupancy rates per room as distinct from the influence of other factors on these variables multivariate statistical techniques form the method of analysis and the models have a high predictive accuracy the impacts of current government policies such as rent control on house condition and occupancy rates is also discussed along with cultural attitudes to ownership and obligations to the extended family

the effects of a new subway line on housing prices in metropolitan toronto an analysis by means of using the estimation results of a modal choice model and the hedonic price regressions model is conducted in order to identify the effects of a subway line in toronto on the values of housing units the modal choice model is used for the estimation of the direct benefits from the improvement in transportation and the hedonic price equations for the identification of subway effects on housing prices empirical results indicate that the direct savings in commuting costs have been capitalized into housing values