international institutions and the volatility of international trade during the past half century states have established a large number of international trade institutions both multilateral and regional in scope the existing literature on this topic emphasizes that these agreements are chiefly designed to liberalize and increase the flow of overseas commerce yet such institutions have another function that has been largely ignored by researchers namely reducing volatility in trade policy and trade flows exposure to global markets increases the vulnerability of a country s output to terms of trade shocks governments seek to insulate their economies from such instability through membership in international trade institutions particularly the world trade organization wto and preferential trading arrangements ptas we hypothesize that these institutions reduce the volatility of overseas commerce we further hypothesize that because market actors prefer price stability trade institutions increase the volume of foreign commerce by reducing trade variability this article conducts the first large scale multivariate statistical tests of these two hypotheses using annual data on exports for all pairs of countries from 1951 through 2001 the tests provide strong support for our arguments ptas and the wto regime significantly reduce export volatility in so doing these institutions also increase export levels

national animosity and cross border alliances we extend the cross border strategic alliance knowledge base by introducing dyad specific antagonism animosity between nation pairs and hold that the formation and the type of firm level cross border alliances are nontrivially impacted by conflicting relations and animosity between their home nations we examine the formation of alliances between firms among nation dyads with and without a history of conflicts the frequency and magnitude of conflicts increase the perception of likelihood of opportunism and dyad specific risks materially affect the context in which firms make alliance decisions as animosity between two nations increases the number and the probability of forming alliances within the dyad the nations form decreases conditional on the expected number of alliances increased antagonistic actions of nations outside the dyad and dissimilarity in the historical conflicts that each nation has engaged in outside the dyad i increase the number of equity alliances and ii decrease the number of nonequity alliances as a proportion of total alliances we find positive main effects of learning to contract through prior experience only for equity vs nonequity alliances the reputation effects of antagonism based on relationships with nations outside of the dyad negatively moderate the positive learning effects of prior equity alliance experience abstract from author

rationality and deterrence this essay explores the relationship between deterrence theory and two distinct notions of rationality associated with it the author argues that the concept of procedural irrationality which is the basis of many critiques of contemporary deterrence theory is not necessarily inconsistent with the instrumental definition of rationality implicit in many models of deterrence he also argues that some recent rational choice models of deterrence are nonetheless deficient in their application of the rationality postulate finally he provides an outline of a possible resolution of the paradox of deterrence

the institutional roots of american trade policy politics coalitions and international trade the 1934 reciprocal trade agreements act rtaa changed the structure of the making of u s trade policy and made possible a dramatic reduction in tariffs the authors demonstrate that the key institutional innovation in the rtaa was its mandate to lower tariffs through reciprocal agreements with foreign nations the expansion of exports under the rtaa enhanced political support for increasingly lower u s tariffs evidence that export interests were positively associated with congressional votes for free trade supports this view

an exclusive country club the effects of the gatt on trade 1950 94 using data on bilateral trade flows from both before and after world war ii this article examines the impact of the general agreement on tariffs and trade on trade between its members and on the system of interwar trade blocs it shows that the distribution of the benefits produced by the gatt was much more highly skewed than conventional wisdom assumes the article also shows that the gold commonwealth reichsmark and exchange control blocs exerted positive and significant effects on trade after 1945 the authors attribute these effects to the bargaining protocol that governed successive rounds of gatt negotiations the signature element of the postwar trade regime

power politics and international trade r recent literature attributes the relative scarcity of open international markets to the prisoner s dilemma structure of state preferences with respect to trade we argue that the prisoner s dilemma representation does not reflect the most critical aspect of free trade agreements in an anarchic international system namely their security externalities we consider these external effects explicitly doing so leads us to two conclusions 1 free trade is more likely within rather than across political military alliances and 2 alliances are more likely to evolve into free trade coalitions if they are embedded in bipolar systems than in multipolar systems using data drawn from an 80 year period beginning in 1905 we test these hypotheses the results of the analysis make it clear that alliances do have a direct statistically significant and large impact on bilateral trade flows and that this relationship is stronger in bipolar rather than in multipolar systems in the early 1970s students of international relations began what would become a long and heated debate about the political correlates of open international markets recently however an important element of consensus has begun to emerge most contributors to this debate now seem to agree that the prisoner s dilemma structure of state preferences with respect to trade explains the relative dearth of open international markets here we argue that what has become the standard prisoner s dilemma representation neglects the most critical aspect of free trade agreements in the anarchic international system namely their security externalities we consider these external effects explicitly in order to do so we construct and analyze a simple game theoretic model the results of this analysis demonstrate that tariff games between allies differ systematically from those played between actual or potential adversaries these differences imply that free trade is more likely within rather than across political military alliances however our analysis also suggests that the evolutionary prospects of alliances vary those that are the products of bipolar systems are more likely to evolve into free trade coalitions than are their multipolar counterparts less credible exit threats and clearer responsibilities for alliance stability explain the advantage of a bipolar system we test this argument using data drawn from an 80 year period beginning in 1905 the empirical analysis supports our argument it demonstrates that alliances have a direct statistically significant and large effect upon bilateral trade moreover it shows that on average alliances have a much stronger effect on trade in a bipolar than in a multipolar world 2

bilateral treaties and the most favored nation clause the myth of trade liberalization in the nineteenth century textbook accounts of the anglo french trade agreement of 1860 argue that it heralded the beginning of a liberal trading order this alleged success holds much interest from a modern policy point of view for it rested on bilateral negotiations and most favored nation clauses with the help of new data on international trade the ricardo database the authors provide empirical evidence and find that the treaty and subsequent network of mfn trade agreements coincided with the end of a period of unilateral liberalization across the world they also find that it did not contribute to expanding trade at all this is contrary to a deeply rooted belief among economists economic historians and political scientists the authors draw a number of policy lessons that run counter to the conventional wisdom and raise skepticism toward the ability of bilateralism and mfn arrangements to promote trade liberalization

a theory of credibility this paper presents models in which one agent must decide whether to trust another whose motives are uncertain reliability can only be communicated through actions in this context it pays for people to build a reputation based on reliable behaviour someone becomes credible by consistently providing accurate and valuable information or by performing useful services the theory provides a justification for long term arrangements without binding contracts it also describes those situations where it pays an agent to cash in on his reputation many decisions depend on trusting someone consumers must decide whether to believe advertisements banks need to judge the reliability of loan applicants and employers must decide how much responsibility to delegate to their employees this paper attempts to model situations that arise when someone is uncertain about whether to trust the people he deals with in this context reputations for reliability are valuable an agent becomes credible by consistently providing accurate valuable information or by always acting responsibly i analyse a series of simple abstract models of information transmission in the basic model there are two agents the sender s and the receiver r who are to play the game a known finite number of times at each stage both players learn the value of a parameter measuring the importance of that period s play of the game that is the value of making a correct decision and s obtains payoff relevant information s then sends a signal to r who makes a decision that affects the welfare of both players after both players learn the consequences of r s decision the process repeats at each stage r must decide what action to take in order to do that he must assess the credibility of s the difficulty arises because r is uncertain about s s preferences when play begins i model this by assuming that with positive probability s has identical preferences to r s is a friend and with positive probability s has completely opposed preferences to r s is an enemy this uncertainty creates a trade off for enemy senders at each stage providing honest information enhances s s reputation but only at the expense of foregoing an opportunity for immediate gain by duping r the possibility that s is a friend lends credibility to what he says but this credibility may also be exploited by an enemy s the principal equilibrium has the following form in the basic model where s has no control over the importance of a given play s typically conveys accurate information for the first several periods r raises the probability he places on s being friendly after receiving accurate information if he believes that an enemy would have lied to him with positive probability the more important the information the more likely an enemy will attempt to deceive r an enemy will eventually take advantage of r by misleading him when this happens the sender loses all opportunities for deception in the future i

capabilities perception and escalation the evolution of crises depends upon interpreting intentions under uncertainty we model crises as a game of two sided incomplete information players are uncertain about their own payoffs from war because of differences between observable and actual capabilities we derive four hypotheses testing them against crises in europe between 1815 and 1970 we show a nonmonotonic relationship between ex ante observable capabilities and the likelihood of violence in a crisis as well as the ex ante likelihood of a negotiated settlement we answer five questions 1 how do differences in observable capabilities between rivals influence the likelihood of a crisis and the escalation to violence 2 how do intangible capabilities alter the effects of observable capabilities on the likelihood of conflict and violence 3 what do national leaders learn from the responses of their adversaries in crises 4 under what conditions can deterrence succeed 5 under what conditions are the strong likely to give in to the weak or vice versa in a crisis

foreign banks financial crises and economic growth in europe abstract using industry data from eurostat and applying the rajan zingales methodology we investigate the short run real growth effects of foreign bank presence in the european union our sample stretches from 2000 until 2012 and includes the phase of rapid financial integration before the global financial crisis as well as the following phase of financial fragmentation and bank deleveraging we find evidence that foreign bank presence had a more than four times stronger growth effect during the crisis than in normal times growth effects are also stronger in times of domestic bank deleveraging in light of these results we conclude that a reintegration of the european banking sector is an important building block of future growth perspectives in the european union

credibility uncertainty and deterrence in this paper the connection between deterrence stability and threat credibility is examined conceptually and theoretically we formulate as a model of bilateral deterrence a game of incomplete information in which each player is uncertain about its opponent s preferences should it unilaterally alter the status quo uncertainty about the preferences of one s opponent leads to uncertainty about the opponent s willingness to retaliate by identifying the credibility of each player s retaliatory threat with the probability that a player prefers retaliation to capitulation we maintain consistency with both the traditional strategic literature where credibility usually means believability and with game theory where credibility is usually synonymous with sequential rationality i e subgame perfect equilibrium we analyze formally the strategic implications of this conception of credibility and thus explore the critical role played by uncertainty in deterrence by explicitly modeling uncertainty we are able to understand the role of threats in contributing to or detracting from the robustness of a deterrence relationship

politics institutions and trade lessons of the interwar era recent studies cast doubt on the value added of international trade agreements and institutions using a new data set that consists of about 35 000 observations on the trade of fifty four nations between 1919 and 1938 we examine whether this skepticism also applies to the infamous interwar trade blocs traditional historical accounts attribute to them a large drop in international trade and a rise in the political tensions that would later erupt in world war ii in this study we show that no bloc raised trade among its members as a whole or decreased trade between members and nonmembers however our findings are not wholly consistent with the skepticism recent studies express we argue that conflicts of interest among the great powers encouraged the emergence of the bloc system and also gave rise to intrabloc trade shifts consistent with the political interests of their great power hubs the political military alliances these conflicts created also reduced trade between their signatories and we argue more generally that the causal chain runs from politics to trade as a result measuring only the effect of agreements and institutions on aggregate trade between their members can generate inaccurate estimates of their value added

trade blocs currency blocs and the reorientation of world trade in the 1930s we analyze the impact of commercial and financial policies on the reorientation of trade in the 1930s we report evidence that commercial policies attenuated prior connections between income growth and trade and that exchange rate instability marginally discouraged international trade in contrast the tendency toward regionalization commonly ascribed to the formation of trade and currency blocs was already evident to a considerable extent prior to the regional policy initiatives of the 1930s this reorientation is more properly attributed to ongoing historical forces such as commercial and financial links between countries forged over many years

bargaining enforcement and international cooperation neoliberals and their neorealist critics have debated the relative importance of two main obstacles to international cooperation problems of cheating and enforcement and problems of relative gains by contrast i argue that problems of international cooperation have a common strategic structure in which a third distinct obstacle plays a crucial role almost regardless of the issue area states must first resolve the bargaining problem of agreeing on terms before they can implement and begin to enforce an agreement furthermore the bargaining and enforcement problems interact using a game model i show that if states must bargain to determine the deal to be enforced the shadow of the future cuts two ways a high expectation of continued interactions may make enforcing the agreement easier but it can also give states an incentive to bargain harder delaying agreement in hopes of getting a better deal empirical evidence from trade and arms control negotiations suggests that this mechanism may help to explain the costly standoffs that are often observed in international politics and are problematic for received neoliberal theories

the demand for international regimes international regimes can be understood as results of rational behavior by the actors principally states that create them regimes are demanded in part because they facilitate the making of agreements by providing information and reducing transactions costs in world politics increased interdependence among issues greater issue density will lead to increased demand for regimes insofar as regimes succeed in providing high quality information through such processes as the construction of generally accepted norms or the development of transgovernmental relations they create demand for their own continuance even if the structural conditions such as hegemony under which they were first supplied change analysis of the demand for international regimes thus helps us to understand lags between structural change and regime change as well as to assess the significance of transgovernmental policy networks several assertions of structural theory seem problematic in light of this analysis hegemony may not be a necessary condition for stable international regimes past patterns of institutionalized cooperation may be able to compensate to some extent for increasing fragmentation of power

does flexibility promote cooperation an application to the global trade regime do flexibility provisions in international agreements clauses allow ing for legal suspension of concessions without abrogating the treaty promote coop eration recent work emphasizes that provisions for relaxing treaty commitments can ironically make states more likely to form agreements and make deeper conces sions when doing so this argument has particularly been applied to the global trade regime the general agreement on tariffs and trade gatt and its successor the world trade organization wto yet the field has not produced much evidence bearing on this claim our article applies this claim to the global trade regime and its chief flexibility provision antidumping in contrast to prior work this article explic itly models the endogeneity and selection processes envisioned by the theory we find that states joining the wto are more likely to adopt domestic antidumping mech anisms likewise corrected for endogeneity states able to take advantage of the regime s principal flexibility provision by having a domestic antidumping mecha nism in place are significantly more likely to 1 join the wto 2 agree to more tightly binding tariff commitments and 3 implement lower applied tariffs as well

why do some countries get better wto accession terms than others the process by which countries accede to the world trade organization wto has become the subject of considerable debate this article takes a closer look at what determines the concessions the institution requires of an entrant in other words who gets a good deal and who does not i argue that given the institutional design of accession proceedings and the resulting suspension of reciprocity accession terms are driven by the domestic export interests of existing members as a result relatively greater liberalization will be imposed on those entrants that have more valuable market access to offer upon accession something that appears to be in opposition to expectations during multilateral trade rounds where market access functions as a bargaining chit the empirical evidence supports these assertions looking at eighteen recent entrants at the six digit product level i find that controlling for a host of country specific variables as well as the applied protection rates on a given product prior to accession the more a country has to offer the more it is required to give moreover i show how more democratic countries in spite of their greater overall depth of integration exhibit greater resistance to adjustment in key industries than do nondemocracies finally i demonstrate that wealth exhibits a curvilinear effect on the one hand institutionalized norms lead members to exercise observable restraint vis a vis the poorest countries on the other hand the richest countries have the greatest bargaining expertise and thus obtain better terms the outcome as i show using a semi parametric analysis is that middle income countries end up with the most stringent terms and have to make the greatest relative adjustments to their trade regimes

law finance and firm growth we investigate how differences in legal and financial systems affect firms use of external financing to fund growth we show that in countries whose legal systems score high on an efficiency index a greater proportion of firms use long term external financing an active though not necessarily large stock market and a large banking sector are also associated with externally financed firm growth the increased reliance on external financing occurs in part because established firms in countries with well functioning institutions have lower profit rates government subsidies to industry do not increase the proportion of firms relying on external financing the corporate finance literature suggests that market imperfections caused by conflicts of interest and informational asymmetries between corporate insiders and investors constrain firms in their ability to fund investment projects the magnitude of these imperfections depends in part on the effectiveness of the legal and financial systems because these systems differ across countries the literature implies that there should exist systematic cross country differences in firms ability to obtain external capital to finance investment in this paper we examine whether the underdevelopment of legal and financial systems does prevent firms in some countries from investing in potentially profitable growth opportunities in particular we focus on the use of long term debt or external equity to fund growth see our earlier work demirgut kunt and maksimovic 1996a which compares firms financial structures in developed and developing countries and finds the greatest difference to be in the provision of long term credit we estimate a financial planning model to obtain the maximum growth rate that each firm in our thirty country sample could attain without access to long term financing we then compare these predicted growth rates to growth rates realized by firms in countries with differing degrees of development in their legal and financial systems our approach enables us to identify specific characteristics of the legal and financial systems that are associated with long term financing of firm growth thus we provide a micro level test of the hypoth

domestic opposition and signaling in international crises this article explores the effect of domestic political competition on the escalation of international crises it combines an incomplete information model of crisis bargaining with a simple model of two party electoral choice one state has two strategic actors a government and an opposition party both of which declare openly whether they support the use of force to alter the status quo the rival state updates its beliefs and selects its strategy in response to both signals the parties payoffs depend upon a retrospective evaluation by the domestic electorate the model shows that the inclusion of a strategic opposition party decreases the ex ante probability of war by helping to reveal information about the state s preferences this finding has important implications for research on democracy and international conflict since it suggests a mechanism through which democratic states can overcome informational asymmetries which have been identified as a central obstacle to negotiation

distance and private information in lending we study the effects of physical distance on the acquisition and use of private information in informationally opaque credit markets using a unique data set of all loan applications by small firms to a large bank we show that borrower proximity facilitates the collection of soft information leading to a trade off in the availability and pricing of credit which is more readily accessible to nearby firms albeit at higher interest rates ceteris paribus analyzing loan rates and firms decision to switch lenders provides further evidence for banks strategic use of private information however distance erodes our lender s ability to collect proprietary intelligence and to carve out local captive markets suggesting that the requisite soft information is primarily local the author 2010 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oxfordjournals org oxford university press

institutions in international relations understanding the effects of the gatt and the wto on world trade the general agreement on tariffs and trade gatt and the world trade organization wto have been touted as premier examples of international institutions but few studies have offered empirical proof this article comprehensively evaluates the effects of the gatt wto and other trade agreements since world war ii our analysis is organized around two factors institutional standing and institutional embeddedness we show that many countries had rights and obligations or institutional standing in the gatt wto even though they were not formal members of the agreement we also expand the analysis to include a range of other commercial agreements that were embedded with the gatt wto using data on dyadic trade since 1946 we demonstrate that the gatt wto substantially increased trade for countries with institutional standing and that other embedded agreements had similarly positive effects moreover our evidence suggests that international trade agreements have complemented rather than undercut each other an earlier version of this article was presented at the 99th annual meeting of the american political science association philadelphia august 28 31 2003 we thank tim buthe joanne gowa miles kahler andrew rose arthur stein richard steinberg and seminar participants at stanford university the university of chicago pipes the university of california los angeles the university of california san diego and the university of virginia for many helpful comments we especially thank claire adida ashley conner moonhawk kim erin krampetz james morrison mike nardis natan sachs rachel rubinfeld and jessica weeks for excellent research assistance we are grateful for financial support from the national science foundation career grant ses 0548285 to tomz the stanford center for international development and the vice provost for undergraduate education at stanford

does trade still follow the flag t he economic ties between any two nations are frequently affected by a warming or cooling of bilateral diplomatic relations but there is little to be found in modern economics or political science that helps us understand the connections between international politics and commerce the notion that international economics could be studied in isolation from its political underpinnings or consequences would have been quite alien to mercantilist thinkers in the eighteenth century or to the critics or advocates of imperialism in the nineteenth that economics and politics were inextricably intertwined was taken as a matter of course indeed trade follows the flag was central to these people s understanding of world politics and international economics intellectual trends over the past century radically changed this worldview the ascendancy of liberalism in economic thought brought with it a compartmentalization of disciplines that may now be eroding but we are left with theories of international politics and economics that are very weakly bridged the objective of this study is to map one of the many connections between international politics and commercial ties specifically i seek to identify and measure the effect of changes in state to state diplomatic relations on trade flows between those nations theoretical underpinnings of my effort are in the tradition of public choice political economy frey 1984 because i treat importers as rational utility maximizers and their behavior as determined by preferences pursued within a context of specified constraints the model i put forward is wholly consistent with contemporary neoclassical trade theory but i extend the economists notion of welfare and contend that importers take account not only of the price and quantity of goods and services but of the place of origin of these products and the political relationship between the importing and the exporting nation they do so essentially for traditional security reasons that is importers are motivated to manage their trade relations in ways that minimize risks of disruption in supply or the possibility of hurting friends or

financial integration and growth why is emerging europe different abstract using industry level data this paper tries to explain why financial integration raised growth differentials between externally dependent and less dependent industries in european transition countries but not in other developing or advanced countries in the years preceding the current crisis we argue that political integration with countries that have stronger political and economic institutions leads to growth enhancing foreign investments because investors expect an improvement of institutions in the future the empirical evidence supports the importance of political integration within the group of developing countries the effect of financial integration is larger in countries that are more strongly politically integrated such an effect is not found for advanced countries our results suggest that political integration can considerably increase the benefits of financial integration in developing countries even when institutions are still weak

differential and more favorable treatment of developing countries and the international trading system this article argues that differential and more favourable treatment of developing countries in the general agreement on tariffs and trade gatt has been a logical consequence of their own inward looking policies and the gatt s implicit mercantilism the latter implying that liberalization being costly should not be demanded of relatively poor countries time has however reduced both the appeal of the protectionist model of development and the willingness of developed countries to accord differential treatment the upshot has been pressure on more advanced developing countries to graduate and a growing literature recommending fuller and more equal participation of developing countries in the gatt the case for fuller and more equal participation is not self evident it needs to be assessed on its merits in terms of the prospects for improved market access abroad and more efficient policy at home the analysis indicates that the potential benefits should not be oversold on balance however the most advanced developing countries would probably gain from active and more equal participation in both gatt and the multilateral trade negotiations while the remaining developing countries would benefit from graduation by the more advanced iv contracting parties agree that the principle of differential and more favourable treatment embodied in part iv and other relevant provisions of the general agreement and in the decision of contracting parties of november 28 1979 on differential and more favourable treatment reciprocity and fuller participation of developing countries applies to the negotiations in the implementation of standstill and rollback particular care should be given to avoiding disruptive effects to the trade of less developed contracting parties v the developed countries do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other martin wolf is director of studies at the trade policy research centre london the views expressed do not represent those of the staff and council of the trade policy research centre and result partially from a research program on the participation of the developing countries in the international trading system particularly important are two papers prepared under the program by hudec forthcoming and riedel forthcoming the issues addressed in this article have also been considered in a previous paper by the author 1984 pp 201 29 the author is grateful to participants at the bangkok conference for their comments and especially to jagdish n bhagwati muchkund dubey anthony lane and vincent cable copyright 1987 by the international bank for reconstruction and development the world bank

a unified theory and test of extended immediate deterrence we present a unified theory and test of extended immediate deterrence unified in the sense that we employ our theoretical deterrence model as our statistical model in the empirical analysis the theoretical model is a straightforward formalization of the deterrence logic in huth 1988 and huth and russett 1984 coupled with private information concerning utilities our statistical analysis suggests that the attacker and defender s decisions are influenced by the balance of forces nuclear weapons defender protege military alliances arms transfers and trade as well as the regime types of those involved many of these findings contradict previous research by huth 1988 and huth and russett 1988 we find that many of the variables involved in the deterrence calculus are nonmonotonically linked to the probability of deterrence success or war we illustrate the results with case studies of the soviet japanese dispute over manchukuo 1937 1938 and the berlin blockade 1948

a unified method for dynamic and cross sectional heterogeneity introducing hidden markov panel models conventional statistical methods for panel data are based on the assumption that unobserved heterogeneity is time constant despite the central importance of this assumption for panel data methods few studies have developed statistical methods for testing this assumption and modeling time varying unobserved heterogeneity in this article i introduce a formal test to check the assumption of time constant unobserved heterogeneity using bayesian model comparison then i present two panel data methods that account for time varying unobserved heterogeneity in the context of the random effects model and the fixed effects model respectively i illustrate the utility of the introduced methods using both simulated data and examples drawn from two important debates in the political economy literature 1 the identification of shifting relationships between income inequality and economic development in capitalist countries and 2 the effects of the gatt wto on bilateral trade volumes

currency unions and trade how large is the treatment effect currency unions and trade what can the data say the impact of a common currency on trade can be grossly mismeasured if countries that belong to currency unions are systematically different from those that do not and if the relationship between trade and its observable determinants is complex i argue that such complications are plausible and likely to distort the empirical results of a recent economic policy paper by andrew rose issue 30 2000 pp 7 45 using techniques designed to be robust in this situation i find that the effects of common currency on international trade are considerably less dramatic and much less precisely estimated torsten persson i have always maintained that the measured effect of a single currency on trade appears implausibly large but i am not convinced by torsten persson s diagnosis and proposed solution i apply a variety of estimation techniques to a new larger data set where many more instances of currency union creation and abandonment make it possible to rely on time series as well as cross sectional evidence the results are similar to my earlier ones the effect of a single currency on trade is large andrew rose

divided government and u s trade policy theory and evidence if different parties control the u s congress and white house the united states may maintain higher import protection than otherwise this proposition follows from a distributive politics model in which congress can choose to delegate trade policymaking to the president when the congressional majority party faces a president of the other party the former has an incentive to delegate to but to constrain the president by requiring congressional approval of trade proposals by up or down vote this constraint forces the president to provide higher protection in order to assemble a congressional majority evidence confirms that 1 the institutional constraints placed on the president s trade policymaking authority are strengthened in times of divided government and loosened under unified government and 2 u s trade policy was significantly more protectionist under divided than under unified government during the period 1949 90

the divergent effects of joining international organizations trade gains and the rigors of wto accession governments have joined the world trade organization wto in vastly different ways some have taken mere days to join without undertaking any trade liberalization while others have taken more than a decade and been forced to undergo significant liberalization we argue that the more rigorous a state s accession to an international organization io and thus the greater policy change required to join the greater the benefits it will receive from membership in the organization in the trade context states facing greater scrutiny from the wto and thus engaging in greater trade liberalization as part of the wto accession process should experience greater trade on joining compared to those who face little scrutiny and engage in little if any liberalization we develop a three part classification of wto members based on type of accession early automatic and rigorous and then compile detailed original data on the accession experiences of each relevant state including length of time number of veto players rounds of questions and tariff and nontariff commitments results of exhaustive quantitative tests on all countries from 1950 to 2006 which are robust to estimator sample period and model specification choices consistently demonstrate that those who engage in the greatest amount of accession driven liberalization experience the greatest trade increases from wto membership particularly in the years right after joining in contrast those who do little or nothing to join do not see any trade gains from being a wto member these findings reconcile previous findings on the effects of wto membership on trade highlight the causal importance of io accession and illuminate the conditions under which ios will have beneficial effects for member states

the magic bullet the rtaa institutional reform and trade liberalization the reciprocal trade agreements act rtaa of 1934 has long been heralded as a simple institutional reform with revolutionary consequences namely by changing the trade policymaking process in the united states the rtaa is held responsible for the dramatic liberalization in u s policy beginning in the 1930s and 1940s this article takes issue with this conventional wisdom i argue that the standard accounts which emphasize the importance of delegation for overcoming logrolling in congress or for facilitating reciprocity in international trade negotiations fail to provide an adequate explanation for just how the institutional innovation was achieved and sustained in the face of protectionist opposition i suggest instead that trade liberalization was driven by exogenous changes in party constituencies and societal preferences that had crucial effects on congressional votes to extend the rtaa authority and liberalize trade after 1945 the preservation of the rtaa program was symptomatic rather than causal as a consequence it may well be abandoned in the future the evolution of u s trade policy has been and will continue to be powerfully shaped by changes in the preferences of societal groups and in the positions taken by parties on the trade issue

global communications and national power life on the pareto frontier regime analysis has focused on issues of market failure the resolution of which depends upon knowledge and institution building global communications regimes however have been concerned either with issues of pure coordination or with coordination problems with distributional consequences outcomes have been decided by the underlying distribution of national power in those areas where power was asymmetrically distributed and there was no agreement on basic principles and norms radio broadcasting and remote sensing no regime was formed in those areas where distributional issues could not be unilaterally resolved allocation of the radio spectrum and telecommunications regimes were created although both principles and rules changed with alterations in national power capabilities

assessing competing defense postures the strategic implications of flexible response a two stage asymmetric escalation game is developed to explore the connection between stage credibility and deterrence stability there are two players in the model challenger and defender challenger may initiate or not if challenger initiates defender may do nothing respond in kind or escalate challenger may then escalate or counterescalate and so on each player is uncertain about the other s intentions at the final stage of the game escalation represents a choice that both players believe is qualitatively different from other available responses thus the model applies to any situation in which defender may respond by crossing a threshold thereby inducing a psychologically distinct level of conflict the perfect bayesian equilibria are identified and interpreted and inferences are drawn about the viability of limited war options and various competing flexible response deployment policies in general the model reveals that substrategic deployments add little to overall deterrence stability under certain relatively rare conditions a policy called no first use in the super power context offers defender advantages that might conceivably warrant the deployment stance associated with it but a war fighting deployment never benefits defender within the confines of the model therefore limited or substrategic wars are possible but unlikely

the drivers of financial globalization over the past decade emerging markets have accounted for a growing fraction of world gdp and international trade reflecting fast growth in china and india but also strong economic performance across the board and the spec tacular increase in foreign exchange reserve holdings the growing importance of sovereign wealth funds and the pattern of global imbal ances more generally suggest that these coun tries are also playing a major role in financial globalization

capital account liberalization financial development and industry growth a synthetic view this paper synthesizes studies analyzing the effects of capital account liberalization on industry growth while controlling for financial crises domestic financial development and the strength of institutions we find evidence that financial openness has positive effects on the growth of financially dependent industries although these growth enhancing effects evaporate during financial crises further analysis indicates that the positive effects of capital account liberalization are limited to countries with relatively well developed financial systems good accounting standards strong creditor rights and rule of law it suggests that countries must reach a certain threshold in terms of institutional and economic development before they can expect to benefit from capital account liberalization