market watch information and availability cascades among the media and investors in the u s ipo market in this study we advance current research on social influence in markets by examining how the recency and availability of information about others actions within and between different communities influence their allocation of attention and their evaluations specifically we examine how the media and investors allocate attention to and evaluate newly public firms in the days following their initial public offerings ipos our findings have implications for understanding the fieldwide processes through which the value of new firms is established in markets

exploitation and time abstract this paper analyses exploitation and class formation in a dynamic context an intertemporal model of a subsistence economy is set up and among other results it is proved that in an interior equilibrium differential ownership of scarce productive assets is an inherent feature of a capitalist economy while exploitation tends to disappear in the long run asset inequality is therefore proved to be a normatively secondary though causally primary wrong it is also argued that these results raise several doubts about the possibility of providing robust micro foundations to marxian concepts by means of walrasian general equilibrium models

an economic approach to influence activities in organizations members of organizations spend considerable time effort and ingenuity attempting to influence decision makers such influence activities may bring benefits to the organization but they also involve real costs this essay offers an economic rationale for such influence activity as representing rational self interested behavior in the presence of informational asymmetries and an analysis of how the design of the organization s structure and policies should respond to the incentives for attempting influence it is posited that information valuable for the organization s decision making is directly available only to members of the organization who have some personal stake in the decisions these individuals may then have an incentive to try to manipulate the information they develop and provide in order to influence the resulting decisions to their benefits this can be costly both in degrading the quality of decision making and in diverting the attention and effort of the organization s members from more productive activities the organization has three different methods it can employ to discourage excessive influence activities and to encourage more directly productive uses of time and effort it can limit access to decision makers and participation in decision making it can alter its decision making criteria to favor those performing well in productive activities and it can provide direct financial incentives to encourage the desired allocation of effort it is shown that an efficiently designed organization will use such financial incentives only as a last resort instead it will always first alter its decision participation policies and decisionmaking criteria

misselling through agents this paper analyzes the implications of the inherent conflict between two tasks performed by direct marketing agents prospecting for customers and advis ing on the product s suitability for the specific needs of customers when structuring salesforce compensation firms trade off the expected losses from misselling unsuitable products with the agency costs of providing market ing incentives we characterize how the equilibrium amount of misselling and thus the scope of policy intervention depends on features of the agency problem including the internal organization of a firm s sales process the transparency of its commission structure and the steepness of its agents sales incentives jel m31 m37 m52 when purchasing unfamiliar products consumers often rely on information and advice pro vided by representatives of the seller this creates the possibility of misselling the question able practice of a salesperson selling a product that may not match a customer s specific needs 1 this problem is particularly severe in markets for technically complex products such as con sumer electronics auto repairs medical care and retail financial services including securities pensions insurance policies and mortgages an important feature of these markets is that the seller often deals with the customer through an agent rather than directly for example financial brokers typically recommend purchase of a specific product after inquiring about their customers particular circumstances and needs the possibility of abuse has led to regulation in some of these markets most notably for securities transactions the financial industry regulatory authority finra the major self regulatory organization for securities firms operating in the united states mandates that broker dealers make a reasonable effort to obtain information about the individual characteristics of their noninstitutional cus tomers and to ensure that their recommendations are suitable to customers financial situations

media legitimation effects in the market for initial public offerings in this study we argue that media provided information affects investors impressions of newly public firms in 225 initial public offerings ipos the volume of mediaprovided information had a negative diminishing relationship with underpricing and a positive diminishing relationship with stock turnover on the first day of trading the relationship between the tenor of media provided information and underpricing increases at a nonlinear rate and decreases similarly for turnover findings provide important evidence that publicly available information not only reflects ipos legitimacy but also adds to their legitimacy and influences investor behavior in the last 20 years an increasing amount of research on markets has been conducted from a social constructionist perspective emphasizing how social structures enhance the flow of useful and credible information that market participants use to reduce the uncertainty of market exchanges e g aldrich fiol 1994 zuckerman 1999 further recent organizational research has begun to stress the influence of information intermediaries such as financial analysts and the media on mar

bonuses and managerial misbehaviour abstract profit based bonus payments have been criticised for encouraging managers to take excessively risky actions or to engage in other activities that are not in the firm s best interest we show however that large bonuses may discourage managers from such misbehaviour because they have more to lose in the event that misbehaviour is detected thus large bonuses may be an optimal way for firms to control misbehaviour our finding sheds new light on recent proposals to regulate bonuses

optimal contracting with endogenous social norms research in sociology and ethics suggests that individuals adhere to social norms of behavior established by their peers within an agency framework we model endogenous social norms by assuming that each agent s cost of implementing an action depends on the social norm for that action defined to be the average level of that action chosen by the agent s peer group we show how endogenous social norms alter the effectiveness of monetary incentives determine whether it is optimal to group agents in a single or two separate organizations and may give rise to a costly adverse selection problem when agents sensitivities to social norms are unobservable

framing controversial actions regulatory focus source credibility and stock market reaction to poison pill adoption we contribute to the research on organizational accounts by examining the role of different framing languages and the credibility of the frame articulator on justifying controversial organizational actions drawing on regulatory focus theory and the literature on source credibility we develop novel arguments as to how a gains versus nonlosses framing and the perceived credibility of the speaker influence stakeholder responses as well as how the effectiveness of these aspects is influenced by context we test our arguments using data on the framing of the adoption of poison pills by u s firms between 1983 and 2008 using content analysis and an event study we find that a gains framing aligned with the dominant institutional logic leads to a positive stock market reaction while statements emanating from speakers with potentially self serving interests negatively affect the stock market reaction our findings further show that the effectiveness of framing and source credibility are dependent on contextual attributes such as speaker visibility prior performance and practice prevalence

stock related compensation and product market competition this dissertation consists of four self contained essays primarily concerned with incorporating the objectives of real world top managers as revealed by the available empirical evidence in supergame theoretic analyses of long term competition between oligopolistic firms the first essay ownership control and collusion considers how the separation between ownership and control affects firms competitive attitudes when top managers have the preference for smooth profit streams revealed by the evidence on income smoothing and when managerial compensation has the low pay performance sensitivity found in many empirical studies in a similar fashion the second essay stock related compensation and product market competition deals with the effects of the apparently more aggressive managerial incentives linked to stock price e g stock options which have become increasingly common in the u s on long term oligopolistic competition in the third paper debt as a credible collusive device shareholders commitments to reduce conflicts with debtholders by choosing a top manager with a highly valuable reputation or with conservative incentives are considered these forms of commitment have been shown to reduce the agency cost of debt finance this paper characterizes their effects on the relation between firms capital structure and product market competition the fourth paper multimarket contact concavity and collusion addresses the relation between multimarket contact and firms ability to sustain collusive behavior in repeated oligopolies it explores how this relation is affected by the strict concavity of firms objective function induced by managerial objectives and by other features of reality discusses the effects of conglomeration and horizontal mergers and extends the results to non oligopolistic supergames

the effect of poison pill securities on shareholder wealth abstract this paper examines empirical evidence about the effect of poison pill takeover defenses on shareholder wealth i find evidence that announcements of the most restrictive forms of the pill defense are associated with stock price declines also the most restrictive forms of the pill defense are associated with abnormally high rates of defeat of unsolicited tender offers although this evidence is consistent with managerial entrenchment the evidence implies that on average poison pill defenses have seemingly had only a modest effect on firm valuation

how golden parachutes unfolded diffusion and variation of a controversial practice we contribute to a growing focus on variation in diffusion processes by examining the ways in which contested practices are modified as they spread among adopters expanding on prior diffusion accounts we argue that the extensiveness and similarity of a practice will vary in response to both population and organization level mechanisms to examine these issues we study variation in golden parachute contracts a controversial corporate governance practice that emerged and spread widely during the hostile takeover wave of the 1980s using a concept network approach to analyze the composition of parachute plans we find evidence of mechanisms that both increase and decrease extensiveness and variation of golden parachutes our findings hold implications for accounts of practice diffusion over contested terrain by revealing substantial variation in the course of diffusion

annual bonus schemes and the manipulation of earnings abstract using confidential data of executive specific short term bonus plans we investigate the extent to which executives manipulate earnings to maximize the present value of bonus plan payments as such this paper extends the work of healy 1985 like healy we find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that managers manipulate earnings downwards when their bonuses are at their maximum unlike healy we find no evidence that managers manipulate earnings downwards when earnings are below the minimum necessary to receive any bonus we demonstrate that healy s results at the lower bound are likely to be induced by his methodology

large shareholders and the monitoring of managers the case of antitakeover charter amendments this paper examines the role of large shareholders in monitoring managers when they propose antitakeover charter amendments we attempt to distinguish between two competing hypotheses the active monitoring hypothesis and the passive voting hypothesis we find a statistically significant positive relation between institutional ownership and the stockholder wealth effects of various types of amendments after controlling for ownership concentration among institutions managerial ownership and firm size our empirical evidence lends support to the active monitoring hypothesis proposed by demsetz 1983 and shleifer and vishny 1986 that the existence of large shareholders leads to better monitoring of managers

top management compensation and capital structure the interrelationship between top management compensation and the design and mix of external claims issued by a firm is studied the optimal managerial compensation structures depend on not only the agency relationship between shareholders and management but also the conflicts of interests which arise in the other contracting relationships for which the firm serves as a nexus we analyze in detail the optimal management compensation for the cases when the external claims are 1 equity and risky debt and 2 equity and convertible debt in addition to the role of aligning managerial incentives with shareholder interests managerial compensation in a levered firm also serves as a precommitment device to minimize the agency costs of debt the optimal management compensation derived has low pay performance sensitivity with convertible debt instead of straight debt the corresponding optimal managerial compensation has high pay to performance sensitivity a negative relationship between pay performance sensitivity and leverage is derived our results provide a reconciliation of the puzzling evidence of jensen and murphy 1990 with agency theory other testable implications include 1 a relationship between the risk premium in corporate bond yields and top management compensation structures and 2 the announcement effect of adoption of executive stock option plans on bond prices the model yields implications for management compensation in banks and federal deposit insurance reform our results explain the dynamics of top management compensation in firms going through financial distress and reorganization

takeover threats and managerial myopia this paper examines the familiar argument that takeover pressure can be damaging because it leads managers to sacrifice long term interests in order to boost current profits if stockholders are imperfectly informed temporarily low earnings may cause the stock to become undervalued increasing the likelihood of a takeover at an unfavorable price hence the managerial concern with current bottom line the magnitude of the problem depends on a variety of factors including the attitudes and beliefs of shareholders the extent to which corporate raiders have inside information and the degree to which managers are concerned with retaining control of their firms

corporate takeovers the efficiency arguments in recent years the tender offer takeover has been praised and damned with a ferocity suggesting that the survival of capitalism is at stake the truth as in most disputes with substantial metaphysical content is more prosaic some takeovers enhance economic efficiency some degrade it and the balance of effects though not fully known is most likely a close one in this essay i try to lay bare the debate s foundations and bring it back to earth with an injection of evidence

social network effects on the extent of innovation diffusion a computer simulation of innovation diffusion no longer focus exclusively on explaining the rate at which innovations diffuse or the sequence in which they are adopted they also focus on explaining why certain innovations diffuse extensively be coming de facto standards whereas others do so partially or not at all many of these theories specify a bandwagon process a positive feedback loop in which increases in the number of adopters create stronger bandwagon pressures and stronger bandwagon pressures in turn cause increases in the number of adopters factors affecting if and how many times this feedback loop cycles explain if and how many potential adopters jump on a bandwagon we argue that one important factor has not yet been incorporated into theories explaining bandwagons extent the structure of social net works through which potential adopters of innovations find out information about these innovations which can cause them to adopt these innovations we advance a theory of how the structure of social networks affects bandwagons extent we propose that both the number of network links as well as small seemingly insignificant idiosyncracies of their structures can have very large effects on the extent of an innovation s diffusion among members of a social network

optimal leverage and aggregate investment we analyze the optimal financing of investment projects when managers must exert unobservable effort and can also switch to less profitable riskier ventures optimal financial contracts can be implemented by a combination of debt and equity when the risk shifting problem is the most severe while stock options are also needed when the effort problem is the most severe worsening of the moral hazard problems leads to decreases in investment and output at the macroeconomic level moreover aggregate leverage decreases with the risk shifting problem and increases with the effort problem

managerial incentives and collusive behavior abstract i characterize the effects of empirically observed managerial incentives on long run oligopolistic competition when managers have a preference for smooth time paths of profits as revealed by the empirical literature on income smoothing manager led firms can sustain collusive agreements at lower discount factors capped bonus plans and incumbency rents with termination threats make collusion supportable at any discount factor independent of contracts duration when managers have these preferences incentives and demand fluctuates price wars during booms need not occur the most collusive price may then be pro cyclical

event studies in management research theoretical and empirical issues we examined the use of event studies in management research and found that there was inadequate attention paid to theoretical and research design issues this lack of attention may lead to false in

fiscal year ends and nonlinear incentive contracts the effect on business seasonality salesperson and executive compensation contracts typically specify a nonlinear relationship between firm revenues and pay these agents therefore have incentive to manipulate prices influence the timing of customer purchases and vary effort over their firms fiscal years this paper empirically establishes results consistent with agents focusing on performance over the fiscal year most notably in addition to varying with the calendar business cycle manufacturing firms sales are higher at the end of the fiscal year and lower at the beginning than they are in the middle further evidence is found in fiscal year price movements and patterns in the industry variation of fiscal year effects

ceo pay firm size and corporate performance evidence from canada executive compensation of 755 canadian firms is examined over the period 1991 95 and evidence is obtained consistent with previous studies ceo pay rises with firm size and compensation is tied to company performance in addition executives in utilities earn lower pay and their compensation is less responsive to performance than is true for their counterparts in other industries some novel findings are also documented first the sales elasticity of ceo compensation is greater in larger firms second while ceo turnover probability is generally negatively related to the firm s stock performance the threat of dismissal appear to be less pronounced in small firms jel classification g35 j33 salaire des pdg taille de l entreprise et performance des societes resultats pour le canada en etudiant le salaire des pdg de 755 entreprises canadiennes au cours de la periode 1991 95 l auteur confirme certains resultats d etudes anterieures le salaire du pdg croit avec la taille de l entreprise et il est liea la performance de l entreprise il appert aussi que les cadres dans les entreprises de service public gagnent moins relativement parlant et que leur salaire est moins sensible aux ecarts de performance que dans les autres secteurs on met aussi a jour certains resultats inedits d abord il semble que l elasticite du salaire du pdg par rapport au niveau des ventes est plus forte dans les plus grandes entreprises ensuite alors que la probabilite de roulement est en general co reliee negativement a la performance des actions en bourse de l entreprise la menace de renvoi semble moins prononcee dans les petites entreprises

ceos outside employment opportunities and the lack of relative performance evaluation in compensation contracts although agency theory suggests that firms should index executive compensation to remove market wide effects i e rpe there is little evidence to support this theory oyer 2004 journal of finance 59 1619 1649 posits that an absence of rpe is optimal if the ceo s reservation wages from outside employment opportunities vary with the economy s fortunes we directly test and find support for oyer s 2004 theory we argue that the ceo s outside opportunities depend on his talent as proxied by the ceo s financial press visibility and his firm s industry adjusted roa our results are robust to alternate explanations such as managerial skimming oligopoly and asymmetric benchmarking

overstatement and rational market expectation abstract when an agent overstates his her true performance a rational market can still correctly guess the true performance this paper shows however that such rational market expectation and a profit maximizing principal can exacerbate the lack of productive effort by the agent

takeover defenses and wealth effects on securityholders the case of poison pill adoptions abstract this is the first study to examine the valuation effects of any antitakeover amendment on both bondholders and stockholders we present new evidence documenting that on average there is a significant wealth loss experienced by bondholders at poison pill adoption announcement while stockholders are unaffected our finding of significant bondholder losses is consistent with the proposed negative signal hypothesis we document results which indicate that bondholders correctly anticipate the degree of leverage increase at the time of the announcement we also show that the proportion of insider ownership is negatively related to bondholder wealth effect at announcement this supports the notion that higher insider manager ownership leads to a greater alignment of manager stockholder interests while increasing the stockholder bondholder agency costs long run analysis of leverage and performance measures reveal that pill adopting firms are not under leveraged as compared to their industry rivals however supporting the negative signal hypothesis the leverage of sample firms rises significantly after the pill adoption performance measures reveal that sample firms significantly underperform their industry cohorts this result suggests that poison pill adoptions are motivated by poor managers attempting to immunize themselves from the disciplinary actions of the corporate control market

a true american system of finance frame resonance in the u s labor movement 1866 to 1886 principles and philosophy 1 revolutionary american rhetoric the gold standard is associated with aristocracy kings landlords privilege inequality before the law monied aristocracy 46 18 8 2 gold standard gives control of government to bankers financiers bondholders 21 8 6 3 democrats and republicans are both corrupt 35 14 3 4 reference to jefferson 4 1 6 5 reference to jackson or locofocoism 5 2 0 6 gold standard leads to slavery free labor 11 4 5 7 small ownership or middle class is good wage labor is bad 7 2 9 8 growing polarization between rich and poor is bad 13 5 3 9 a strikes are bad should be used as a last resort 11 4 5 b strikes are good necessary 0 0 10 a we don t threaten property only future accumulations i e interest payments 4 1 6 b we threaten property 0 0 specific program and demands 11 free soil land to those willing to till it 21 8 6 12 support for co ops 20 8 2 13 support for 8 hour movement 14 5 7 14 we need a fairer tax system don t exempt bondholders 27 11 0 why workingmen should support greenbacks 15 greenbacks won t hurt workers through inflation because wartime greenbacks which depreciated weren t real greenbacks 4 1 6 16 greenbacks will make co ops possible 2 8 17 greenbacks should be used to create employment through public works government employment 3 1 2 18 greenbacks are good for workers because workers are debtors 2 8