cost uncertainty and the rate of investment abstract this paper examines the effect of cost and price uncertainty on the optimal rate of investment by firms within a general equilibrium framework former works which have studied this issue like hartman 1972 and abel 1983 1984 1985 have come to the conclusion that this effect is positive since increased price uncertainty raises expected profitability but these studies assume a fixed discount rate which is equivalent to assuming that consumers are risk neutral this paper shows that if consumers are risk averse the effect of uncertainty may be reversed and investment may be depressed when price or cost uncertainty is increased

neighborhood information exchange and voter participation an experimental study we study the effect of social embeddedness on voter turnout by investigating the role of information about other voters decisions we do so in a participation game in which we distinguish between early and late voters each late voter is told about one early voter s turnout decision cases are distinguished where the voters are allies support the same group or adversaries with opposing preferences and where they are uncertain about each other s preferences our experimental results show that the social embeddedness matters this information increases aggregate turnout by approximately 50 the largest effect is observed for allies early voters strategically try to use their first mover position and late voters respond to this

price formation in commodity markets this paper develops a theory consistent market model for storable commodities and illustrates its characterization of the data generating process for a set of major traded commodities the dynamics of the system incorporate recent advances in modelling techniques cointegrated variables in the demand functions are represented by the error correction mechanism ecm and expected prices in the stock demand relationship are generated by a rational expectations process the outside sample performance of the model is tested against the pure time series model used to formulate expected prices and is shown to have a smaller mean square error than that of the time series model thus the model provides comparatively efficient forecasts and unlike models constructed in their reduced form permits consideration of key behavioural relationships in commodity markets

relational goods and participation incorporating sociability into a theory of rational action theoretical explanations of why rational individuals would participate in politics remain unsatisfactory this paper addresses the problem by developing and analyzing models which include among citizens payoffs relational goods objectives which depend upon interactions among persons the models predict more participation than do the standard approaches for example under some circumstances persons will be more likely to act if they believe others will act contrary to free rider logic more importantly conditions are identified under which leaders could increase mass activity thus a model is provided of mobilization in terms of the preferences and decisions of a rational individual

a note on competitive investment under uncertainty uncertainty over future output prices or input costs can affect investment by a riskneutral firm in two opposing ways first it can increase the value of the marginal unit of capital which leads to more investment this only requires that the stream of future profits generated by the marginal unit be a convex function of the stochastic variable by jensen s inequality the expected present value of that stream is increased this result was demonstrated by richard hartman 1972 and later extended by andrew abel 1983 and others in their models constant returns to scale and the substitutability of capital with other factors ensure that the marginal profitability of capital is convex in output price and input costs even with fixed proportions however this convexity can result from the ability of the firm to vary output so that the marginal unit of capital need not be utilized at times when the output price is low or input costs are high if investment is irreversible and can be postponed a second effect of uncertainty is to create an opportunity cost of investing now rather than waiting for new information to arrive before committing resources this increases the full cost of investing in a marginal unit of capital which reduces investment 2 hence the net effect of uncertainty on irreversible investment depends on the size of this opportunity cost relative to the increase in the value of the marginal unit of capital the sign of the net effect is significant because of its possible policy implications pindyck 1988 and giuseppe bertola 1989 developed models in which a firm faces a downward sloping demand curve and found the net effect to be negative ricardo caballero 1991 has recently studied investment by an individual firm facing a stochastically shifting demand curve he shows that as returns to scale become constant and the elasticity of demand faced by the firm rises this opportunity cost of investing now rather than waiting approaches zero thus in the limit of constant returns and an infinitely elastic demand curve an increase in uncertainty tends to raise rather than decrease current investment even if that investment is irreversible it is important to stress that caballero s limiting result treats the firm in isolation and describes the effect of a meanpreserving increase in price uncertainty and not an increase in industry wide demand uncertainty this note shows that in a competitive market the key interactions between irreversibility and uncertainty occur at the industry level and can only be understood by making price and industry output endogenous 3 doing so restores the positive opportunity cost associated with irreversible investment in addition caballero s result is based on a model with convex adjustment costs an innovative aspect of the model is that these costs can be asymmetric thereby allowing for partial or complete irreversibility complete irreversibility corresponds to a cost of massachusetts institute of technology cambridge ma 02139 this work was supported by the national science foundation under grant no ses 8618502 and by mit s center for energy policy research my thanks to julio rotemberg and especially ricardo caballero for very helpful comments and discussions 1then the marginal profit of capital at each time t in the future is max o pt ct where ct is variable cost thus a unit of capital represents a set of all options on future production which are worth more the greater the variance of pt or ct 2for a detailed discussion of this point and a survey of the recent literature on irreversibility and its implications for investment and market evolution see pindyck 1991 3studies that make price endogenous include steven lippman and richard rumelt 1985 avinash dixit 1989 1991 and john leahy 1990

investment and uncertainty with time to build evidence from entry into u s copper mining abstract the standard real options model predicts that increased uncertainty discourages investment when projects are large and take time to build however that prediction can be reversed we investigate the investment uncertainty relationship empirically using historical data on opening dates of new u s copper mines large irreversible projects with substantial construction lags both the timing of the decision to go forward and the price thresholds that trigger that decision are assessed in particular we build upon a reduced form analysis to construct a structural model of entry we find that in this market greater uncertainty encourages investment and lowers the price thresholds for many mines

volatility and investment interpreting evidence from developing countries we uncover a significant negative correlation between various volatility measures and private investment in developing countries even when adding the standard control variables no such correlation is uncovered when the investment measure is the sum of private and public investment spending indeed public investment spending is positively correlated with some ineasures of volatility these findings suggest that the detrimental impact of volatility on investment may be easier to detect using disaggregated data we provide several possible interpretations for our findings nonlinearities in preferences or budget constraints can cause volatility to have first order negative effects on private investment

redistribution income and voting a model that reconciles the positive association between income and voting found in cross sectional studies with the negative correlation between income and turnout over time is developed voting is modeled as a group rational activity voter turnout rates in the united states for the 1948 1960 1968 and 1980 elections are used to test the model voter turnout is found first to fall and then to rise as families move up the income distribution voter turnout also rises as real wages fall as educational attainment increases as elections become closer and as poll taxes and literacy tests are removed

turnout across democracies world democracies widely differ in legislative executive and legal institutions different institutional environments induce different mappings from electoral outcomes to the distribution of power we explore how these mappings affect voters participation in an election we show that the effect of such institutional differences on turnout depends on the distribution of voters preferences we uncover a novel contest effect given the preferences distribution turnout increases and then decreases when we move from a more proportional to a less proportional power sharing system turnout is maximized for an intermediate degree of power sharing moreover we generalize the competition effect common to models of endogenous turnout given the institutional environment turnout increases in the ex ante preferences evenness and more so when the overall system has lower power sharing these results are robust to a wide range of modeling approaches including ethical voter models voter mobilization models and rational voter models

real investment decisions under adjustment costs and asymmetric information abstract we study the cost of adjustment model of investment when there is asymmetry of information between owners the principal and managers the agent information asymmetry distorts the relationship between investment and the cost of capital for all agent types and a regime of inaction appears over a certain cost range in an observationally different way than when fixed adjustment costs or irreversibilities cause a similar phenomenon uncertainty in the form of an increase in the spread of agents types tends to reduce investment despite symmetric adjustment cost and perfect competition the model gives a new interpretation of tobin s q under asymmetric information explaining some results of the mergers and acquisition literature

cooperation in ongoing organizations this paper argues that overlapping games can provide a natural theory of long lived organizations it shows that participation in organizations of infinite duration changes the incentives of agents with finite lives and will induce more cooperation than a static model would predict after developing the general theory we apply it to the description of career paths in organizations and show that it can be optimal to give the youngest workers the most arduous tasks

common trends and common cycles in international labor productivity abstract the objective of this paper is to present a trend cycle decomposition of the industrial labor productivity series in six major industrialized countries to study the relationship between trend and cycle innovations and to highlight the role of monetary policy as a possible source of transitory and permanent variations in labor productivity

social incentives and voter turnout evidence from the swiss mail ballot system this paper uses a natural experiment to document the impact of social pressure on voting behavior the main hypothesis is that social pressure creates incentives to vote for the purpose of being seen at the voting act this incentive is particularly high in small and close knit communities empirically i analyze the effect of postal voting on voter participation in switzerland optional postal voting decreased the voting costs but simultaneously removed the social pressure to vote in spite of the large reduction in voting costs the effect on aggregate turnout was small however voter participation was more negatively affected in the smaller communities this lends support to the view that social incentives played a role for certain people s voting decisions jel h0 z13

segregating genetically modified and nongenetically modified corn in a marketing channel the adoption of gm corn in the united states depends on many factors including segregation costs which have minor impacts on aggregate welfare because the demand for nongm corn is small relative to its supply no premium for nongm corn can be generated in excess of the segregation costs an outward shift in the supply of corn resulting from the adoption of gm varieties has a greater impact on aggregate welfare than do the segregation costs required to satisfy the gm free demand a 10 increase in the aggregate supply of gm corn increases aggregate welfare by more than us 250 million however nonadopters of gm corn lose while adopters can gain or lose depending on the nature of the aggregate demand curve for us corn

a theory of participation in elections we analyze a model of participation in elections in which voting is costly and no vote is pivotal ethical agents are motivated to participate when they determine that agents of their type are obligated to do so unlike previous duty based models of participation in our model an ethical agent s obligation to vote is determined endogenously as a function of the behavior of other agents our model predicts high turnout and comparative statics that are consistent with strategic behavior jel d72

endogenous enfranchisement when groups preferences conflict in their seminal paper aumann kurz and neyman found the surprising result that the choice of levels of public goods in a democracy is not affected by the distribution of voting rights this implies that groups of individuals may not value the franchise this conclusion however does not correspond to what we commonly observe we propose a new model to address the question of enfranchisement the main feature of our model is that it takes into account natural affinities such as religion or class that may exist between voters this allows us to show that while individuals may not value the vote they nonetheless value the franchise we also show that in the presence of nonconvexities it is more likely that the group in power will grant the franchise when preferences are severely opposed

uncertainty determinants of firm investment abstract we investigate the impact of measures of uncertainty on firms capital investment behavior using a panel of u s firms increases in firm specific and capm based measures have a significant negative effect on investment spending while market based uncertainty has a positive impact

do political protests matter evidence from the tea party movement can protests cause political change or are they merely symptoms of underlying shifts in policy preferences this paper studies the effect of the tea party movement in the united states which rose to prominence through a series of rallies across the country on april 15 tax day 2009 to identify the causal effect of protests we use an instrumental variables approach that exploits variation in rainfall on the day of the coordinated rallies weather on tax day robustly predicts rally attendance and the subsequent local strength of the movement as measured by donations media coverage social networking activity and later events we show that larger rallies cause an increase in turnout in favor of the republicans in the 2010 congressional elections and increase the likelihood that incumbent democratic representatives retire incumbent policymaking is affected as well representatives respond to large protests in their district by voting more conservatively in congress finally the estimates imply significant multiplier effects for every protester republican votes increase by seven to fourteen votes together our results show that protests can build political movements that ultimately affect policy and they suggest that it is unlikely that these effects arise solely through the standard channel of private information revelation

rational choice and turnout turning out to vote is the most common and important act of political participation in any democracy voting is also less well understood and explained empirically than other political acts engaged in regularly by citizens turnout however presents a special problem for rational choice theories of politics for it is taken to be the paradigmatic example of the problem of collective action in which although all may benefit from voting it is rarely in the individual s self interest to vote this paper begins by examining the problem of explaining turnout a basic form of rational choice models of turnout is developed basic in the sense that it is common to all such models this basic model is shown to be incomplete and the two most important models the calculus of voting and the minimax regret model are illustrated as alternative ways to complete this basic model along with mention of game theoretic models their strengths and weaknesses are then assessed the remainder of the paper argues that rational choice accounts of turnout are possible the first step is to argue that turnout is not an especially problematic version of the collective action problem because it is for many a low cost low expected benefit decision a strategic politicians account of turnout and campaigns is examined next a reinterpretation of the intrinsic benefits of voting is then considered and is used to examine the most important substantive problem in the turnout literature its decline these steps i argue make theories of ordinary political decisions at once both more political and more integrated into the politics of the larger system

inventory and equilibrium adjustments in international commodity markets a multi cointegration approach recent advances in cointegration tests and error correction models are applied to the analysis of commodity inventory behaviour multi cointegration was considered in inventory series of seven internationally traded products in contrast to previous works on inventory behaviour which first hypothesize a relationship and then gather empirical evidence to emulate the postulated behaviour an error correction model was used to represent theoretical inventory relationships which are established by multi cointegration tests the results support the use of this approach to determine the optimal stockpiling rules of producers and consumers

effort and comparison income experimental and survey evidence the authors test the hypothesis that individual effort on the job depends both on one s own income and on the individual s position in the relevant income distribution combining experimental evidence from a gift exchange game with multi country issp survey data they analyze the extent to which relative income affects an individual s effort finding that an individual s rank in the income distribution more strongly determines effort than does others average income which suggests that comparisons are more ordinal than cardinal their experiment also reveals that comparisons over time affect effort individuals who received higher income offers or enjoyed higher income rank in the past exerted lower levels of effort for a given current income and rank

real options delay vs pre emption do industrial characteristics matter this paper presents an empirical study of the channels of influence from uncertainty to fixed investment suggested by real options theory using panel data from the confederation of british industry cbi industrial trends survey we report ols estimates of the impact of uncertainty on investment where the regressors are augmented by cross sectional averages of the dependent variable and of the individual specific regressors as recently suggested by pesaran pesaran m h 2006 estimation and inference in large heterogeneous panels with a multifactor error structure econometrica 74 967 1012 the cross industry pattern of results is checked for consistency with the pattern predicted by real options theory using a specially constructed data set of industrial characteristics we find that irreversibility is able to predict the pattern detected but only when combined with a measure of the information advantage of delay there is also evidence for expansion options effects industries with high r d and advertising intensities tend to have positive uncertainty effects

an expressive voting theory of strikes i introduction economists usually make the realistic assumption that individuals commonly choose to further their material interests other things equal they will choose the higher paying job make the investment with a higher expected return for a given risk and so on recent work however has pointed out that individuals do not always pursue their immediate selfish interests evolutionary pressures for example may promote emotional outbursts which have little immediate benefit social pressures may lead to behavior which is not pareto optimal but which is individually rational in short recent work has shown that behavior which at first looks irrational need not be for further discussion see akerlof 1984 chs 4 and 9 etzioni 1988 frank 1988 simon 1990 this paper considers emotional behavior which cannot be explained by its long term benefits it instead focuses on behavior which is not costly when practiced by one person but is when practiced by many unlike other works i do not require that individuals usually act emotionally or that they do so at significant cost to themselves i only require that when the cost of emotional behavior is sufficiently small individuals will pursue it indeed in my model individuals rationally calculate when to behave emotionally in particular under some circumstances the action of any one individual has negligible effects on his wealth though the similar actions of numerous persons will have significant effects individuals may then free ride letting emotional motives guide their activity this paper presents one important application of such behavior the decision of a union member to vote for a strike indeed it has long been recognized that though union members may vote for strikes to increase wages emotional considerations can also be important in 1921 hansen claimed that strike decisions are motivated primarily by a sense of grievance about wages ashenfelter and johnson 1969 37 write that union leaders may prefer to call a strike because under strike conditions the leadership may at least appear as adversaries against management in a crusade which may even raise their political stock and will unify the workers newspapers tell of strikes that appear to have little economic rationale for example the wall street journal march 17 1989 reported that with the eastern airlines walkout now nearly two weeks old what boils to the surface is an intense highly personal anger a feeling that their self respect honor and dignity have been undercut by a management obsessed with pinching pennies the new york times april 23 1989 reported that four years after the end of a strike against united airlines union pilots were harassing non union pilots the harassment ranged from verbal abuse and refusal to shake hands to more serious breaches like not advising a pilot that he is approaching an altitude assigned by air traffic controllers work by getman goldberg and herman 1976 suggests that a worker in union representation elections is more likely to favor unionization the more effectively the company threatened the loss of jobs following unionization this view of non instrumental union behavior is also consistent with a large body of evidence which finds that union members are less likely to ratify a contract the worse the relations between management and labor indeed cappelli and sterling 1988 find that the state of labor relations in a plant is the strongest predictor of union voting outcomes similarly kaufman and martinez vazquez 1988 find that union members are least likely to vote in favor of wage concessions in plants with adversarial labor relations though much evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that strike votes are not based solely on economic considerations the approach suffers from two faults as a basis for an economic theory first intuition suggests that the emotional gain from a strike is likely to be far smaller than the monetary cost of a strike a strike may cost a worker over 1 000 a week in lost wages 1 yet we rarely find people wasting that much money in emotional outbursts

investment in new activities and the welfare cost of uncertainty abstract recent literature has shown that trade distortions are associated with first order costs stemming from the induced drop in the formation of new activities we demonstrate that uncertainty may induce similar welfare costs and that these costs apply also to a closed economy this argument is illustrated in romer s model of a dependent economy where foreign direct investment is needed to enable the importation of capital goods and intermediate products used in domestic production we show that knightian uncertainty inhibits the formation of new activities leading to first order losses whereas risk aversion alone leads to second order losses

adam smith and the prisoners dilemma in ordinary life we engage in many transactions with other people in which there is potential profit for both parties from some kind of cheating normally we do not see much of this cheating i have no doubt that the merchant will put in the package the merchandise which i buy or which i ordered even though if he put in something else cheaper it is quite dubious that i would be able to win a lawsuit on my part if i decide i did not like the product and returned it with the remark that it was defective having first damaged it so that it is indeed defective i could get a gain neither i nor the merchant worries particularly about this kind of behavior although the merchant worries more than i do for reasons that will become plain below if we worried about it we would both take precautions with the result that socially we would be worse off by the cost of these precautions we have here what appears to be a prisoners dilemma matrix but the two parties are behaving cooperatively what adam smith called the discipline of continuous dealings takes care of the matter the point of this article is to work out adam smith s insight in the terminology of a modern game theory we shall see that smith was right and there are some cases indeed practically very important cases where what appears to be a prisoners dilemma in fact leads to cooperative behavior consider the prisoners dilemma game shown in figure i it is orthodox that if a and b are playing a single turn of this particular game they will end up in the lower right hand corner with a net loss of one dollar each if we go from a single game to a long series of games played by the same players however there is no agreed upon solution experimental evidence seems to indicate that the players play a mixed strategy with some cooperative plays and some noncooperative plays and the mixture can be modified by changing the payoffs 2 all of these situations are simplifications of the real world and it is a point of this article to suggest that if we make the game more like many real world

industry wide versus firm specific uncertainty and investment british company panel data evidence this paper presents evidence on the prediction that the impacts of firm specific and industry wide uncertainty on investment will be different results show that these work in opposing directions and that the effect of industry specific uncertainty is stronger in concentrated industries

the effect of uncertainty on investment timing in a real options model abstract this paper examines the effect of uncertainty on investment timing in a canonical real options model we show that the critical value of a project that triggers the exercise of the investment option exhibits a u shaped pattern against the volatility of the project this is due to the two countervailing risk and return factors in effect we further show that such a u shaped pattern is inherited by the expected time to exercise the investment option thus for relatively safe projects greater uncertainty shortens the expected exercise time and thus enhances investment this is in sharp contrast to the negative investment uncertainty relationship commonly found in the extant literature finally we show that the positive investment uncertainty relationship is more likely for high growth projects than for low growth projects

explaining voter turnout patterns an information theory voting research is rich in empirical regularities yet a parsimonious theory of voter turnout that can match the facts has proven to be elusive this paper argues that voter turnout patterns can be explained by extending the traditional rational voter model to include limited information a model is presented in which utility maximizing consumers receive higher payoffs from voting the more confident they are of their vote choice the model provides an explanation for the most important cross sectional voter turnout patterns in addition it suggests a novel explanation for the post 1960 decline in u s participation

the effects of advertising on resale price maintenance this research combines the market power and market competition perspectives on advertising under the framework of a generalized theoretical model in minimum resale price maintenance rpm in order to investigate the effects of advertising on rpm using the real options approach the effects of advertising on retail price will impact the value of rpm further influence the incentive of manufacturers to impose rpm through brand penetration and promotional pricing effects advertising is likely to influence rpm under the condition of retail price competition when the brand penetration effect is dominant advertising will discourage manufacturers from imposing rpm advertising will encourage manufacturers to impose rpm when the promotional pricing effect is dominant rpm not only substitutes advertising but also complements advertising

investigation of production sales and inventory relationships using multicointegration and non symmetric error correction models the accumulated sum of a stationary series is called integrated if a linear combination of some of the integrated series is stationary it is said to be cointegrated this paper presents empirical results on inventories to consider the possibility of a deeper form of cointegration called multicointegration which is introduced in granger and lee 1989 a vector integrated series is multicointegrated if the accumulated sum of its stationary cointegrated linear combination is again cointegrated with itself inventory which is the accumulated sum of production minus sales is probably cointegrated with production and sales the empirical results generally support the presence of multicointegration of production and sales in many u s industries and industrial aggregates the results also favour the non symmetric error correction model providing evidence that the strength of attraction is different on both sides of the attractor a modified s s rule for inventory control is investigated in the context of a non symmetric error correction model and the results generally do not support the s s rule sufficient evidence is found to conclude that multicointegration is a useful concept in the area of inventory determination

product innovation and the decision to invest in fixed capital assets evidence from an sme survey in six european union member states abstract this work explores the relationship between product innovation and the decision to invest in fixed capital assets among a sample of smes in six european union countries located in both peripheral and more central areas we find that the presence of product innovation reduces the probability to invest a firm s size exerts a direct inverted u shape effect on the probability to invest and an indirect effect through the linear effect of size on the probability to innovate the gap in the probability to invest between innovative and non innovative firms increases with size

a group rule utilitarian approach to voter turnout theory and evidence this paper explores a group rule utilitarian approach to understanding voter turnout inspired by the theoretical work of john c harsanyi 1980 and timothy j feddersen and alvaro sandroni 2002 it develops a model based on this approach and studies its performance in explaining turnout in texas liquor referenda the results are encouraging the comparative static predictions of the model are broadly consistent with the data and a structurally estimated version of the model yields reasonable coefficient estimates and fits the data well the structurally estimated model also outperforms a simple expressive voting model

an evidential decision theory of turnout according to the standard analysis which is grounded in causal decision theory the rational decision to participate in mass elections depends on the probability of affecting the outcome the resulting prediction of abstention is clearly mistaken according to the alternative evidential decision theory voters calculate the conditional expected utility of participating rather than its causal consequences a version of this theory is introduced into a game theoretic model of electoral participation under plausible conditions the model yields positive turnout at equilibrium even as the size of the electorate increases without bound the paper also considers the model s utility in explaining group influences on political behavior and the supply of collective goods

international trade constraints and commodity market models an application to the cotton market this paper presents a model that accounts explicitly for quantitative controls on international trade countries are classified into two groups depending upon whether or not their imports and exports are responsive to world prices with the result that all adjustment burdens are borne by a subset of the world market participants the model is tested with pooled time series cross section data for the cotton market m s odels of world commodity markets differentiate among market participants in a variety of ways single equation approaches make strong implicit assumptions about cross country similarities in consumer preferences and producer responsiveness while in other approaches world markets are disaggregated on the basis of time period income group or type of economic system the present paper develops a model that groups countries in terms of the presence or absence of controls on international trade as johnson and others have noted 1 quantitative controls on trade are prominent in the trade of many primary products with such restrictions domestic prices bear no necessary relationship to international prices and movements in world prices may be of limited relevance to explaining global consumer and producer behavior in the model in this paper countries are classified into two groups depending upon whether their consumers and producers are responsive to international prices the international market is then seen as one in which the burden of adjustment falls on the producers consumers and holders of stocks in the price responsive countries the estimation procedure uses a cross section time series data set in which country specific dummy variables allow for differential behavior among the various trade participants cotton is the focus of the paper as the cotton market is an especially good example of a market with quantitative restrictions cotton production is dominated by less developed countries ldcs and centrally planned economies cpes and exports are largely determined by the decisions of state trading monopolies i a trade constrained model the point of departure in developing the model is to group countries a priori according to whether their consumers producers and inventory holders are world price responsive r or non responsive n if x countries are fully insulated from world prices and z countries are responsive to world prices the global production utilization identity can be written as

rational turnout the neglected role of groups rational choice theories have difficulty accounting for individual participation in collective action voting is among the acts hardest to explain consumption benefits have been proposed to account for nonzero turnout the model presented here establishes a political investment basis for these benefits i argue that voters often act not in isolation but as part of groups with shared interests while individuals still vote because of consumption benefits arising from the act of voting some of these consumption benefits are provided by group leaders out of collective benefits received by the group in return for its votes the collective benefit comes from a candidate adopting policy positions closer to those of the group in passing i show that the widespread availability of public opinion polling increases the candidate s incentive to shift position finally some data from recent off year elections are shown to be consistent with the model

investment and uncertainty is there a potential role for a common european policy abstract this paper contributes to the long running debate on the relationship between uncertainty and investment our results show that uncertainty negatively affects investment they are also favorable towards a common european economic policy oriented both to the support and the stabilization of aggregate demand

firms investment decisions in response to demand and price uncertainty we investigate the effect of demand and price uncertainty on firms planned and realized investment from a panel of manufacturing firms uncertainty measures are derived from firms own expectations about demand and prices and firm s sales we find that demand uncertainty at the time of planning depresses planned and subsequent realized investment firms do not revise their plans due to demand uncertainty at the time of spending suggesting that reducing demand uncertainty will only have lagged effects on investment we do not find any effect of price uncertainty our results are consistent with the behaviour of monopolistic firms with irreversible capital

investment in risky r d programs in the face of climate uncertainty we analyze how the socially optimal technology rd and that uncertainty in damages interacts with uncertainty in the returns to rd and r d that reduces the emissions to output ratio and argue that this is a good representation of r d into fossil fuel technologies for r d programs into non carbon technologies optimal investment is higher in riskier programs our empirical model indicates that the optimal investment in a risky program is about 3 1 2 times larger than in a program with certain returns for r d programs aimed at reducing emissions in fossil fuel based technologies our results show that qualitatively investment is higher in less risky programs under most uncertain damage scenarios our empirical model shows however that the risk profile of fossil fuel based r d programs generally has little quantitative impact on optimal investment the exception is that when the probability of a catastrophe inducing full abatement is very high investment is about twice as high in risky programs compared to programs with certain returns

voter participation and strategic uncertainty the paradox of not voting is examined in a model where voters have uncertainty about the preferences and costs of other voters in game theoretic models of voter participation under complete information equilibrium outcomes can have substantial turnout even when voting costs are relatively high in contrast when uncertainty about preferences and costs is present only voters with negligible or negative net voting costs participate when the electorate is large

on the sign of the investment uncertainty relationship understanding the effects of uncertainty over any decision variable has fascinated economists for a long time risk aversion and incomplete markets are likely to make the investment uncertainty relationship negative e g roger craine 1989 joseph zeira 1989 what happens in the absence of risk aversion and incomplete markets is however ambiguous richard hartman 1972 and andrew b abel 1983 1984 1985 found that in the presence of symmetric convex costs of adjustment mean preserving increases in price uncertainty raise investment of a competitive firm as long as the profit function is convex in prices on the other hand the recent literature on irreversible investment e g robert s pindyck 1988 giuseppe bertola 1988 has shown that increases in uncertainty lower investment all these results have been derived under either risk neutrality or complete markets intuition suggests that the explanation for such a difference lies with the asymmetric nature of adjustment costs in the irreversible investment case as compared with the symmetry of the adjustment cost mechanisms proposed by abel and hartman although this intuition is confirmed in this paper asymmetric adjustment costs are shown not to be sufficient to explain why the results differ in fact a more hidden but at least as important difference between these two literatures is that the former assumes perfect competition and constant returns to scale whereas the latter assumes either imperfect competition or decreasing returns to scale or both 2 the purpose of this paper is to highlight the role of the decreasing marginal return to capital assumption due to either imperfect competition or decreasing returns to scale or both in determining the effects of adjustment cost asymmetries on the sign of the response of investment to changes in uncertainty under risk neutrality for this the paper develops a simple model with a cost of adjustment mechanism general enough to consider both symmetric convexity and irreversibility as special cases one of the most important findings is the lack of robustness of the negative relationship between investment and uncertainty under asymmetric adjustment costs3 to changes in the degree of competition in fact when firms are nearly competitive the conclusion of hartman and of abel holds no matter how asymmetric adjustment costs are studying adjustment cost mechanisms has a central role in understanding the dynamics of investment and its business cycle implications but conclusive results about the sign of the instantaneous relationship between uncertainty and investment should not be department of economics columbia university new york ny 10027 i am grateful to giuseppe bertola prajit dutta glen hubbard anil kashyap richard lyons and the referees for their useful comments 1the financial literature on investment has considered risk aversion through a premium in the discount rate determined by the capm capital asset pricing model intertemporal capm or consumption capm however often this discount rate is left unchanged when studying the response of investment to uncertainty changes e g pindyck 1988 pp 974 5 thereby omitting the effect of changes in uncertainty on investment due to risk aversion and incomplete markets 2in the typical version of the irreversible investment problem there is no cost of upward adjustments thus imperfect competition and or decreasing returns to scale are required to bound the size of the firm 3in this paper asymmetric adjustment cost refers to the case in which it is more expensive to adjust downward than upward certainly the opposite case is a trivial extension of the case studied in this paper

race and the politics of close elections abstract elections between black and white candidates tend to involve close margins and high turnout using a novel dataset of municipal vote returns during the rise of black mayors in u s cities this paper establishes new facts about turnout and competition in close interracial elections in the south but not the north close black victories were more likely than close black losses involved higher turnout than close black losses and were more likely than close black losses to be followed by subsequent black victories these results are consistent with a model in which the historical exclusion of southern blacks from politics made them disproportionately sensitive to mobilization efforts by political elites leading to a black candidate advantage in close elections

zeros and lumps in investment empirical evidence on irreversibilities and nonconvexities the objective of this paper is to investigate if and how capital adjustment departs from the smooth pattern implied by standard model based on convex adjustment costs using norwegian micro data we start by documenting the intermittent and lumpy nature of investment rates we then present two pieces of econometric evidence on these issues first we estimate a discrete hazard model to determine the probability of having an episode of high investment conditional on the length of the interval from the last high investment episode second we estimate a switching regression model that allows for the response of the investment rate to fundamentals to differ across regimes in both cases we investigate the aggregate implications of our results

optimal capital structure and investment with real options and endogenous debt costs we examine the joint optimization of financial leverage and irreversible capacity investment in a real options framework with risky debt and endogenous interest costs higher capacity ceteris paribus increases operating leverage and default probability but lowers ex post adjustment costs and generates larger tax shields a key insight is that financial leverage and capacity are substitutes in the debt market equilibrium we develop novel predictions about the effects of capital adjustment costs operating costs and uncertainty on optimal financial leverage and capacity that may potentially help explain ambiguous empirical results in the literature regarding the determinants of capital structure and investment received march 17 2016 editorial decision july 8 2017 by editor itay goldstein

investment as a process of search this paper analyzes optimal capital accumulation in the face of structural uncertainty in which the firm does not fully know its own profit function and can discover it only through further investment it is shown that under structural uncertainty capital accumulation is gradual even when adjustment costs are linear and not convex it is further shown that structural uncertainty creates an incentive to market research the paper also presents an example of structural uncertainty in which an additional price uncertainty has a negative effect on investment contrary to the standard models

testing the rational expectations hypothesis in an agricultural market a recent survey on models of agricultural supply equations listed over 500 studies in which variants of nerlove s adaptive expectations model were employed one might naively assume that the scientific evidence overwhelmingly favored the adaptive expectations hypothesis but this inference would not be warranted in particular there have been very few studies which have even attempted to estimate a rational expectations version of the traditional agricultural supply models and none that have explicitly tested the rational expectations hypothesis 2 in this paper we estimate a model of agricultural supply and demand for the chicken broiler industry under the maintained assumption of rational expectations in the sense of muth 1961 and provide a series of tests of the model specification we find that in this case the hypothesis of muth rationality receives strong support in recent years there has been increasing interest in models in which economic actors are assumed to form expectations of variables rationally for the most part empirical applications of the rational expectations hypothesis have employed single equation econometric methods these methods have permitted consistent estimation of equations under the assumption of the rational expectations hypothesis but do not allow for any explicit testing of the maintained hypothesis of rationality this paper presents estimates of a simultaneous equation model of the chicken broiler industry using maximum likelihood methods and provides a joint test of the rational expectations hypothesis and the model specification our econometric procedure is related to the recent theoretical work of wallis 1980 and combines time series analysis with traditional econometric estimation techniques under the assumption of rational expectations the model can be solved for the expected price as a function of the expected values of the exogenous variables this function can then be substituted into the model leading to a specification which contains the original endogenous and exogenous variables plus the expected values of the exogenous variables in general following this substitution the model will contain overidentifying restrictions time series analysis is utilized to generate the necessary forecasts of the exogenous variables the complete system of equations is estimated by full information maximum likelihood and the constraints are tested by a log likelihood ratio test the overidentifying constraints arise in the model because the suppliers are assumed to act as if they know both the underlying structure of the model and the stochastic processes governing the exogenous variables the two requirements of rational expectations while the expected price enters only the supply equation of our model it is necessary in the econometric formulation to specify the demand equation the instrumental variable procedures of mccallum 1976 and nelson 1975b are single equation methods and do not permit a test of the rational expectations hypothesis by specifying the complete model the additional structure imposed on the problem allows us to estimate the coefficients and test the implied restrictions there has not been universal agreement that the rational expectations hypothesis is the best theoretical device to model rational behavior according to muth s original formulation economic actors forecast endogenous variables according to the true reduced form equations of the model decanio 1979 and friedman 1979 have argued that the economic actors actually received for publication august 24 1981 revision accepted for publication march 2 1982 university of new mexico and university of california davis respectively we wish to thank g king r l huntzinger r pope and l wegge for advice on this project a nelson and e shaw contributed useful research assistance i the paper by askari and cummings 1977 provides references for these studies 2 huntzinger s 1979 paper is one of the first attempts at estimatitng a rational expectations model of agricultural supply

adjustment costs uncertainty and the theory of investment the case of non renewable natural resources abstract this paper examines the effects of mineral price and extraction cost uncertainty on the investment program of a competitive resource extracting industry that faces convex costs of adjustment the results show that depletion of mineral reserves will slow down if the marginal adjustment cost function is concave or linear whereas the effect will be ambiguous if the function is convex

aggregate uncertainty investment and asymmetric adjustment in the uk manufacturing sector theory suggests that the level of uncertainty facing firms should affect both the rate of adjustment to and the steady state level of investment although there is ambiguity about the sign of the effect a non linear model of investment behaviour incorporating time varying adjustment speeds with threshold effects is estimated for the uk manufacturing sector the most general non linear specification is found to be most congruent with the data uncertainty has a large and significant effect on both levels and rates of adjustment

risk aversion and the uncertainty investment relationship a note abstract this paper demonstrates that the effect of output price uncertainty on firm investment may be negative for a competitive risk averse firm with a constant return to scale technology it shows that a degree of relative risk aversion compared to an elasticity of output to labor in a production function is a crucial factor in determining the sign of the investment uncertainty relationship for a competitive firm

does social capital matter in corporate decisions evidence from corporate tax avoidance we investigate whether the levels of social capital in u s counties as captured by strength of civic norms and density of social networks in the counties are systematically related to tax avoidance activities of corporations with headquarters located in the counties we find strong negative associations between social capital and corporate tax avoidance as captured by effective tax rates and book tax differences these results are incremental to the effects of local religiosity and firm culture toward socially irresponsible activities they are robust to using organ donation as an alternative social capital proxy and fixed effect regressions they extend to aggressive tax avoidance practices additionally we provide corroborating evidence using firms with headquarters relocation that changes the exposure to social capital we conclude that social capital surrounding corporate headquarters provides environmental influences constraining corporate tax avoidance

irreversible investment real options and competition evidence from real estate development abstract we examine the extent to which uncertainty delays investment and the effect of competition on this relationship using a sample of 1214 condominium developments in vancouver canada built from 1979 1998 we find that increases in both idiosyncratic and systematic risk lead developers to delay new real estate investments empirically a one standard deviation increase in the return volatility reduces the probability of investment by 13 percent equivalent to a 9 percent decline in real prices increases in the number of potential competitors located near a project negate the negative relationship between idiosyncratic risk and development these results support models in which competition erodes option values and provide clear evidence for the real options framework over alternatives such as simple risk aversion

if homo economicus could choose his own utility function would he want one with a conscience reply in my model of the evolution of honesty 1 i assumed the existence of a signal a blush perhaps extreme values of which served to identify some individuals as being honest with certainty joseph harrington notes that without this assumption honest individuals have difficulty invading a population initially dominated by defectors for readers who do not wish to work through the algebra in his comment the argument is easily summarized in nontechnical terms suppose two honest mutants a and b arrive in an uncountably large population consisting entirely of dishonest persons and suppose that the probability that an honest person exhibits an intense blush is say 0 999 while the corresponding probability for everyone else is only 0 001 when a sees an intense blush on the face of b what will then be his estimate of the probability that b is honest assuming that a knows the laws of elementary probability and corrects for the base rate of honest persons in the population it will be zero when virtually everyone in the population is dishonest even a person with an intense blush will be pegged as dishonest provided that even the smallest fraction of dishonest persons also shows an intense blush with

declining voter turnout in advanced industrial democracies 1950 to 1997 the effects of declining group mobilization past comparative voting behavior research has revealed that electoral institutions can explain much of the variation in voter turnout between nations this study takes an alternative and dynamic approach by identifying and explaining a pattern of turnout decline within industrial democracies which is beyond purely institutional explanation multivariate analysis of a pooled cross section of 18 industrial democracies between 1950 and 1997 suggests that turnout decline can best be explained in terms of changing patterns of group mobilization and electorate demographics the authors specifically point to the decline of unions and labor parties which have traditionally been associated with the mobilization of peripheral voters and the real increases in the cost of mobilization the authors control for institutional changes and find that they are less useful in explaining variation in turnout within advanced industrial democracies

investment and demand uncertainty this paper investigates the effects of uncertainty on the investment decisions of a sample of italian manufacturing firms using information on the subjective probability distribution of future demand for firms products according to the entrepreneurs the results support the view that uncertainty weakens the response of investment to demand thus slowing down capital accumulation consistent with the predictions of the theory there is considerable heterogeneity in the effect of uncertainty on investment it is stronger for firms that cannot easily reverse investment decisions and for those with substantial market power we show that the negative effect of uncertainty on investment cannot be explained by uncertainty proxying for liquidity constraints

incorporating groups into rational choice explanations of turnout an empirical test this study examines the problem of voter turnout from a rational choice perspective it reviews the paradox of voting and finds one model which incorporates the role of intermediary social groups and leaders to be a promising solution it tests the hypothesis that leader mobilization increases voter turnout using an ecological analysis of turnout in five montreal ethnic communities during three recent elections the 1993 canadian federal the 1994 quebec provincial and the 1994 montreal municipal elections data on mobilization are taken from semi directed interviews with association leaders in each community the results compare predicted and actual rankings of turnout for each community and election the overall results are weak indicating that the model does a poor job of predicting voter turnout

union membership and political inclusion using county level data the author evaluates how labor affected the general population s political behavior during the 2000 u s presidential election voter turnout increased with unionization but at declining rates with higher levels of unionization the unionization voter turnout link was stronger in counties with lower median incomes higher income inequality and lower levels of education suggesting that unions partially closed the political participation gap between low and high ses socioeconomic status populations state right to work laws and the absence of collective bargaining rights for public employees reduced labor s ability to increase voter turnout the union effect on candidate preference had a positive curvilinear association with union membership but this effect was stronger in high ses regions than in low ses regions overall these results imply a paradox for organized labor unions can effectively increase working class voter turnout but they have difficulty persuading the

altruism and voting a large turnout result that does not rely on civic duty or cooperative behavior abstract i propose a game theoretic model of costly voting that predicts significant turnout rates even when the electorate is arbitrarily large the model has two key features that jointly drive the result i some agents are altruistic or ethical ii among the agents who prefer any given candidate the fraction of altruistic agents is uncertain when deciding whether to vote or not an altruistic agent compares her private voting cost with the expected contribution of her vote to the welfare of the society under suitable homogeneity assumptions the asymptotic predictions of my model coincide with those of feddersen and sandroni 12 up to potential differences between the respective parameters that measure the importance of the election i demonstrate with an example that these homogeneity assumptions are not necessary for qualitative predictions of my model i also show that when the fractions of altruistic agents are known turnout rates will typically be close to zero in a large election despite the presence of altruism

the performance of rational voter models in recent presidential elections in an economic theory of democracy downs hypothesized that rational utility maximizing citizens would calculate the benefits from voting as opposed to abstaining altogether and then vote if this expected benefit exceeded voting cost this hypothesis is logically derived from economic principles of rational behavior but is counterintuitive even if the utility increment is plausibly large the probability of casting a pivotal tie breaking vote in any sizable polity is minute hence the expected benefit will be less than the time cost of voting and no rational person will vote nevertheless a number of statistical studies have found that voter turnout does respond to differences in the probability of casting a decisive vote even though that probability may be small this article uses data gathered at the state level from the 1968 1972 1976 and 1980 general elections to reestimate the relationship between voter turnout and the probable closeness of the election pooled data least squares dummy variable lsdv regressions are used whenever preliminary tests indicate that such pooling is permissible the empirical results suggest that the relationship between closeness and turnout is weak unstable or nonexistent in all of the models tested

rational choice and the dynamics of collective political action evaluating alternative models with panel data been hampered by the inability to use perceptions of the costs and benefits of participation at a given time to predict behavior that necessarily occurred in the past and by ambiguities associated with analyzing behavioral intentions instead of actual participation using panel data collected on a national sample in west germany between 1987 and 1989 we show that variables from a collective interest model measured in 1987 individuals dissatisfaction with the provision of collective goods beliefs that group actions can be successful and beliefs in the importance of their own participation predict subsequent participation in collective protest activities variables corresponding to the private selective incentives associated with protest are found to be less relevant furthermore we find that engaging in protest changes many of the perceptions that influence future participation we discuss the implications for theories of political mobilization p erhaps no area in mass political behavior research is beset with such serious methodological difficulties as the study of participation in political protest and other unconventional activities some of the problems such as finding and eliciting truthful responses from the limited number of individuals who engage in these types of behaviors can and have been remedied through better sampling and more sensitive interviewing methods in national and local probability surveys a more fundamental problem however is that unlike voting or campaign participation unconventional behavior does not occur during fixed periods and hence researchers typically cannot plan a study in advance of the specific activities they may wish to analyze this means that almost all previous surveybased research on protest and unconventional political action is prone to what green and shapiro 1994 85 term the pedestrian methodological defect of predicting past behavior from information gathered at the survey s current time this error would be less consequential for causal

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

your vote counts on account of the way it is counted an institutional solution to the paradox of not voting when we explicitly lay out all its steps we find that the paradox of not voting since the chance of one vote s making a difference is about zero why trouble to vote rests on a false but hitherto unremarked assumption about the institutional context of elections my solution to the paradox is more conservative than others that have been proposed and it yields a rational choice model of voting whose consequence accord well with empirical findings on turnout

rational choice theory and the paradox of not voting at least since downs s 1957 seminal work an economic theory of democracy rational choice theorists have appreciated the paradox of not voting in a large election the probability that an individual vote might change the election outcome is vanishingly small if each person only votes for the purpose of influencing the election outcome then even a small cost to vote like a minor schedule conflict or mildly bad weather should dissuade anyone from voting yet it seems that many people will put up with long lines daunting registration requirements and even the threat of physical violence or arrest in order to vote given the central place of voting within political economy the lack of an adequate rational choice model of large elections with costly voting presents an obvious problem for the most part theorists have bypassed the turnout problem either by eliminating voters as strategic actors or by assuming that the decision to vote is independent of other strategic choices the problem with the first approach is that the empirical literature on voting behavior provides considerable evidence of apparently strategic behavior in primary elections there is evidence that voters condition their vote choice on the viability of candidates abramson aldrich paolino and rohde 1992 in a seminal and comprehensive study cox 1997 shows that voting patterns and election outcomes are broadly consistent with patterns of behavior predicted by strategic voting models for example under plurality rule in which the candidate with the most votes wins the election

groups in rational turnout models a model of the strategic calculus of voting that incorporates the behavior of groups is presented if candidates choose different positions positive turnout is possible in partial equilibrium and is generally larger than that without group rationality nevertheless if candidates are probability maximizers and a unique general equilibrium exists the candidates will choose equivalent positions and turnout will be zero even with group rationality but if candidates care about both policy and winning they will choose different positions and cause positive turnout this turnout will be larger than that that would occur without group rationality group rationality alone cannot explain positive turnout in a general equilibrium theory of elections it does imply larger turnout in conjunction with policy oriented candidates than would be predicted solely by individualistic rational behavior

mobilization social networks and turnout evidence from japan the strategic elites model of turnout argues that elites mobilize more when the probability of their effort deciding the electoral outcome is greater although the literature assumes that this probability depends solely on how close the election is logically it depends jointly on how many votes are needed to affect the outcome closeness and on how many additional votes elite efforts are likely to garner vote yield because the vote yield of mobilizational effort varies with the social capital of the district that elites face the level of elite mobilizational effort hence turnout should depend interactively on closeness and social capital the authors test their predictions using data from japanese lower house elections for the years 1967 90 japan is an interesting test case both because its former electoral system differs from that for which the model was first developed and because the literature clearly stresses the role of elite mobilization through social networks but does not examine the particular hypotheses advanced here

a conceptual framework for analysis of primary commodity markets abstract the paper begins with a critique of the traditional neoclassical theory as a tool for analysing commodity markets and suggests that a viable theory needs to be developed from the concept of market power as expressed in the relative bargaining strengths of transnational corporations active in the commodity production and trade of developing countries and of the governments and business interests of host countries a discussion of the principal elements comprising relative bargaining strength divided into commodity specific country specific and international is followed by a brief consideration of alternative policy options for developing countries aimed at improving their share of the benefits from their commodity exports to developed countries

evaluating replacement project of nuclear power plants under uncertainty this paper investigates the valuation of a replacement project of nuclear power plants under the deregulated electricity market the replacement project consists of two components the decision to decommission an existing plant and the decision to construct a new plant in the replacement project the decommissioning decision should be made considering not only the profitability of the existing plant but also the profitability and costs of the construction of the new plant real options theory is used to determine the optimal timing of the decommissioning and construction in order to examine the effect of decommissioning time and decision making one we consider a time lag for these decision making times we show the dependence of the replacement project value on uncertainty and time lag

immigrant group size and political mobilization evidence from european migration to the united states immigration to democratic nations generates new groups of potential voters this paper investigates how the electorate share of immigrant groups influences their likelihood of becoming politically mobilized focusing on the mechanism of coalition formation with the democratic party using newly assembled data on ethnic enclaves in american cities at the start of the twentieth century i show immigrants were more likely to mobilize politically as their share of the local electorate grew larger this effect is driven by political mobilization in voting districts where the democratic party likely needed an immigrant group s vote to win elections i also consider the shape of the electorate share effect showing it is nonlinear and consistent with a political economy model of coalition formation

how a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy this paper shows why a majority of legislators may vote for a policy that benefits a firm but harms all legislators the firm may induce legislators to support the policy by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district where voters or their representative support the policy in equilibrium no one vote may be decisive so each legislator who seeks the firm s investment votes for the policy though all legislators would be better off if they all voted against the policy and when votes reveal information about the district the firm s implicit promise or threat can be credible unlike influence mechanisms based on contributions or bribes the behavior considered is time consistent and in line with the low campaign contributions by special interests

voter participation and the redistributive state the redistributive theory of the state implies that voter participation rates should be highest among those who have the most to gain or lose or a v shaped relationship between income and voting participation should exist we use a data set that contains nearly 21 000 observations on individual survey responses about voting behavior in the u s between 1972 and 1993 to show that the participation rate generally rises monotonically with income perhaps except at very high income levels it does report other findings consistent with an economic theory of voting based on returns to association and with the hypothesis that public employees vote more

time varying impact of uncertainty shocks on the us housing market abstract this paper investigates the impact of uncertainty shocks on the housing market of the united states using the time varying parameter factor augmented vector autoregression tvp favar we use a comprehensive quarterly time series dataset on real economic activity price and financial variables besides housing market variables covering the period 1963 q1 to 2014 q3 in addition to housing prices we also consider variables related to home sales permits and starts in general the results of the cumulative response of housing variables to a one standard deviation positive uncertainty shock at the one four eight and twelve quarter horizon tends to change over time both in terms of sign and magnitude with the uncertainty shock primarily negatively affecting the housing variables in particular prices permits and starts in longer runs i e two and three years ahead horizons