the allocation of inventory risk in a supply chain push pull and advance purchase discount contracts while every firm in a supply chain bears supply risk the cost of insufficient supply some firms may even with wholesale price contracts completely avoid inventory risk the cost of unsold inventory with a push contract there is a single wholesale price and the retailer by ordering his entire supply before the selling season bears all of the supply chain s inventory risk a pull contract also has a single wholesale price but the supplier bears the supply chain s inventory risk because only the supplier holds inventory while the retailer replenishes as needed during the season examples include vendor managed inventory with consignment and drop shipping an advance purchase discount has two wholesale prices a discounted price for inventory purchased before the season and a regular price for replenishments during the selling season advance purchase discounts allow for intermediate allocations of inventory risk the retailer bears the risk on inventory ordered before the season while the supplier bears the risk on any production in excess of that amount this research studies how the allocation of inventory risk via these three types of wholesale price contracts impacts supply chain efficiency the ratio of the supply chain s profit to its maximum profit it is found that the efficiency of a single wholesale price contract is considerably higher than previously thought as long as firms consider both push and pull contracts in other words the literature has exaggerated the value of implementing coordinating contracts i e contracts that achieve 100 efficiency such as buy backs or revenue sharing because coordinating contracts are compared against an inappropriate benchmark often just a push contract furthermore if firms also consider advance purchase discounts which are also simple to administer then the coordination of the supply chain and the arbitrary allocation of its profit is possible several limitations of advance purchase discounts are discussed

prospect theory explains newsvendor behavior the role of reference points current understanding in operations management is that prospect theory as a theory of decision making under uncertainty cannot systematically explain the ordering behavior observed in experiments on the newsvendor problem we suggest this is because the newsvendor s reference point is assumed to be the status quo i e zero payoff we propose an alternative based on newsvendor s salient payoffs and show that prospect theory can in fact account for experimental results this paper was accepted by serguei netessine operations management

modeling customer impatience in a newsboy problem with time sensitive shortages abstract customers across all stages of the supply chain often respond negatively to inventory shortages one approach to modeling customer responses to shortages in the inventory control literature is time dependent partial backlogging partial backlogging refers to the case in which a customer will backorder shortages with some probability or will otherwise solicit the supplier s competitors to fulfill outstanding shortages if the backorder rate i e the probability that a customer elects to backorder shortages is assumed to be dependent on the supplier s backorder replenishment lead time then shortages are said to be represented as time dependent partial backlogging this paper explores various backorder rate functions in a single period stochastic inventory problem in an effort to characterize a diversity of customer responses to shortages we use concepts from utility theory to formally classify customers in terms of their willingness to wait for the supplier to replenish shortages under mild assumptions we verify the existence of a unique optimal solution that corresponds to each customer type sensitivity analysis experiments are conducted in order to compare the optimal actions associated with each customer type under a variety of conditions additionally we introduce the notion of expected value of customer patience information evcpi and then conduct additional sensitivity analyses to determine the most and least opportune conditions for distinguishing between customer behaviors

advanced supply chain planning with mixtures of backorders lost sales and lost contract abstract this paper investigates a supply chain system in which a supplier prepares for the selling season by building stock levels prior to the beginning of the season and shortages realized at the beginning of the season are represented as mixtures of backorders and lost sales backlogged items are replenished as soon as possible through an emergency procurement as opposed to waiting until the next scheduled delivery as in many continuous review scenarios and the backorder rate is modeled as a piecewise linear function of the magnitude of the shortage the often intangible cost associated with lost sales and customer goodwill is also quantified in particular the buyer and supplier are engaged in a contractual agreement and the loss of customer goodwill from the supplier s perspective is represented as the expected cost associated with violating the conditions of the contract the likelihood of contract cancellation is also represented as a function of the magnitude of shortage the optimal solution is derived in closed form for the case of exponential demand distribution and an example problem is illustrated with numerical data in order to demonstrate calculation of the optimal solution and corresponding sensitivity analysis for demand distributions in which the solution cannot be expressed in closed form

optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities this paper considers the pricing decision faced by a producer of a commodity with a short shelf or demand life a hierarchical model is developed and the results of the single period inventory model are used to examine possible pricing and return policies the paper shows that several such policies currently in effect are suboptimal these include those where the manufacturer offers retailers full credit for all unsold goods or where no returns of unsold goods are permitted the paper also demonstrates that a policy whereby a manufacturer offers retailers full credit for a partial return of goods may achieve channel coordination but that the optimal return allowance will be a function of retailer demand therefore such a policy cannot be optimal in a multi retailer environment it is proven however that a pricing and return policy in which a manufacturer offers retailers a partial credit for all unsold goods can achieve channel coordination in a multi retailer environment this article was originally published in marketing science volume 4 issue 2 pages 166 176 in 1985

loss aversion and rationality in the newsvendor problem under recourse option abstract risk neutral assumption in the newsvendor problem under recourse option predicts the order quantity insensitive to the selling price and risk aversion modeled through common utility functions gives decreasing order quantity with increasing selling price in this paper we consider loss aversion to model the choice preference of the decision maker in the newsvendor problem under recourse option and prove that loss aversion predicts the rational ordering behavior of the newsvendor with respect to the changes in price and cost parameters further we find that loss aversion can significantly improve the performance of utility function based models in predicting the rational behavior we extend the analysis to a supply chain setting and establish coordinating contract between a loss averse retailer facing a newsvendor problem and a risk neutral supplier under recourse option we find that the contract parameter does not depend on the loss aversion hence the same contract can be implemented with retailers with different levels of loss aversion

behavioral demand effects when buyers anticipate inventory shortages abstract firms often worry about how buyers will react when there is an inventory shortage but the anticipation of facing a shortage may also impact buyer behavior in this paper we use a combination of theoretical modeling computational methods and laboratory experiments to understand buyers search behavior in markets where there is potential for either a costly or costless inventory shortage when inventory shortages are costly to buyers we find their equilibrium purchasing strategy generates a newsvendor problem among the firms in turn experimental data suggests buyer behavior can be explained by prospect theory better than by standard assumptions of fully rational expected utility maximizing agents indicating that potential inventory shortages generate loss aversion among buyers and there is systematic mis identification of the probability with which they will be able to procure an item using computational methods we find firms are able to extract more surplus from behavioral buyers via higher prices than would be predicted by the standard model on the other hand when inventory shortages are not costly to buyers the effect of behavioral biases on the part of buyers is not relevant but in this case there can be a benefit to reducing inventory via a reduction in price competition

modeling a multi attribute utility newsvendor with partial backlogging abstract traditional newsvendor models usually focus on single profit maximization or cost minimization approaches however making a monetary estimate of the consequences of lost sales as a result of shortages is often a difficult task for many practitioners besides there is still a lack of an explicit account of decision making judgments on the multiple consequences of making decisions with regard to order quantities in order to deal with this problem this paper presents a multi attribute utility model for the newsvendor problem with regard to profit the impacts of service level on corporate image and on customers goodwill and the impact on the environment arising from the disposal of unsold products demand is partially backlogged according to a decreasing exponential function of the waiting time the fundamental principles and limitations related to the application of the model built are also discussed

incentive compatible regulation of foreign owned subsidiaries a tax simulation for the jamaican bauxite industry abstract in 1974 jamaica replaced the corporate income tax on multinationals in the bauxite sector with a production levy on bauxite in order to increase tax revenue the results were mixed tax revenue jumped initially but the multinationsl quickly started shifting production elsewhere we model jamaica s taxation problem assuming that it has incomplete information about the multinationals costs and derive the optimal incentive compatible tax mechanism we simulate and compare the effects on output and tax revenue of the actual and the incentive compatible tax regimes and conclude that there might be substantial benefits to implementing an incentive mechanism

management ownership and market valuation an empirical analysis we investigate the relationship between management ownership and market valuation of the firm as measured by tobin s q in a 1980 cross section of 371 fortune 500 firms we find evidence of a significant nonmonotonic relationship tobin s q first increases then declines and finally rises slightly as ownership by the board of directors rises for older firms there is evidence that q is lower when the firm is run by a member of the founding family than when it is run by an officer unrelated to the founder

does the form of compensation matter abstract the role of fee contracts in the agency relation between investment bankers and client firms in tender offers is investigated using a sample of offers between 1978 and 1986 different fees have different payoff functions which can be used by firms to create incentives and by bankers to signal differences in abilities the effectiveness of fee contracts in resolving agency problems in tested with mixed results the evidence suggests that fee contracts are used as a tool by both firms and bankers and that contracts influence tender offer outcomes but that contracting is only a partial solution to the agency problem

an empirical examination of the relation between debt contracts and management incentives abstract prior research on the factors influencing the use of debt covenants restricting dividends and additional borrowing is extended by considering management incentives when alternative incentive variables are considered separately we find covenants have a significant negative relation to ceo cash compensation an insignificant relation to the value of ceo equity held and significant positive relations to both the ratio of the value of ceo equity holdings to cash compensation and the fraction of equity held by the ceo in two stage simultaneous equations models only the latter is significant when jointly considered with each of the other incentive variables

the impact of foreign board membership on firm value abstract this study examines the effect of foreign anglo american board membership on corporate performance measured in terms of firm value tobin s q using a sample of firms with headquarters in norway or sweden the study indicates a significantly higher value for firms that have outsider anglo american board member s after a variety of firm specific and corporate governance related factors have been controlled for we argue that this superior performance reflects the fact that these companies have successfully broken away from a partly segmented domestic capital market by importing an anglo american corporate governance system such an import signals a willingness on the part of the firm to expose itself to improved corporate governance and enhances its reputation in the financial market

agency relationships in family firms theory and evidence does owner management necessarily eliminate the agency costs of ownership drawing on agency literature and on the economic theory of the household we argue that private ownership and owner management expose privately held owner managed firms to agency threats ignored by jensen s and meckling s 1976 agency model private ownership and owner management not only reduce the effectiveness of external control mechanisms they also expose firms to a self control problem created by incentives that cause owners to take actions which harm themselves as well as those around them jensen 1994 p 43 thus shareholders have incentive to invest resources in curbing both managerialand owner opportunism we extend this thesis to the domain of the family firm after developing hypotheses which describe how family dynamics and specifically altruism exacerbate agency problems experienced by these privately held owner managed firms we use data obtained from a large scale survey of family businesses to field test our hypotheses and find evidence which suggests support for our proposed theory finally we discuss the implications of our theory for research on family and other types of privately held owner managed firms

reference points in revenue sharing contracts how to design optimal supply chain contracts abstract coordinating supply chains is an important goal for contract designers because it enables the channel members to increase their profits recently many experimental studies have shown that behavioral aspects have to be taken into account when choosing the type of contract and specifying the contract parameters in this paper we analyze behavioral aspects of revenue sharing contracts we extend the classical normative decision model by incorporating reference dependent valuation into the decision model and show how this affects inventory decisions we conduct different lab experiments to test our model as a result human inventory decisions deviate from classical normative predictions and we find evidence for reference dependent valuation of human decision makers we also show how contract designers can use the insights we gained to design better contracts

institutional ownership of stock and dimensions of corporate social performance an empirical examination collectively institutions own an increasing proportion of outstanding corporate equities as an emergent force in shaping corporate america the linkages between institutional ownership and corporate social performance csp require empirical examination not only do corporate policy makers need to know those areas where social performance may lure or inhibit capital infusions lawmakers also need a better understanding of the social forces guiding corporate policy as anticipated this study found a positive relationship between the amount of institutional ownership of corporate stock and a company s social responsiveness as measured by the representation of women on its board of directors however no statistically significant relationship with social responsibility as measured by charitable giving was found the exemplar of social issues management compliance with the sullivan principles showed an unexpected negative relationship with the level of institutional ownership

financial systems financing constraints and investment empirical analysis of oecd countries this paper investigates the influence of cash flow on corporate investment in 11 oecd countries we find that the sensitivity of investment levels to internally available funds differs significantly across countries and is lower in countries with predominantly close bank firm relationships than in countries with predominantly arm s length bank firm relationships at the same time we find no relationship of the levels of financial constraints to indicators of overall financial development our results are consistent with the view that information and incentive problems in the capital market have important effects on corporate investment and that close bank firm relationships can reduce these problems and thus improve the access of firms to external finance

would a risk averse newsvendor order less at a higher selling price we model a risk averse newsvendor s decision making behavior with some commonly used classes of utility functions within the expected utility theory eut framework under fairly general conditions of eut we show that a risk averse newsvendor will order less than an arbitrarily small quantity as selling price gets larger if price is higher than a threshold value i e the optimal order quantity decreases as the selling price increases

negotiated block trades and corporate control we identify negotiated trades of large percentage blocks of stock as corporate control transactions when a block trades and the firm is not fully acquired cumulative abnormal returns average 5 6 and 33 of the chief executives are replaced within a year stock price increases are larger when control passes to the new blockholder when management does not resist the blockholder s effort to influence corporate policy and when the block purchaser eventually fully acquires the firm these findings suggest that the specific skills and expertise of blockholders and not just the concentration of ownership are important determinants of firm value we examine 106 negotiated trades of at least 5 of the common stock of new york stock exchange nyse and american stock exchange amex listed corporations our primary objective is to assess the impact of these transactions on the firms whose shares are traded we also investigate the importance of active block investor s specific managerial expertise and incentives for firm value the emerging literature on concentrated ownership focuses on how the level of ownership affects a blockholder s incentives to undertake a variety of corporate decisions although it has been recognized that a blockholder s identity also can be important less attention has been paid to this issue several recent studies however provide evidence that blockholders incentives and expertise are not homogeneous for example holderness and sheehan 1985 find that the stock market reacts more favorably to initial block accumulations by six controversial investors who are often portrayed in the press as raiders than to initial accumulations by a random sample of investors morck shleifer and vishny 1988 find that firm value tends to be lower when the firm is run by a member of the founder s family than when it is run by an officer unrelated to the founder brickley lease and smith 1988 document that institutional blockholders are less willing to vote against management on antitakeover amendments when they are likely to have business dealings with the firm when a block trades the concentration of ownership typically does not change but the blockholder s identity does

the expectation based loss averse newsvendor we modify the classic single period inventory management problem by assuming that the newsvendor is expectation based loss averse according to k szegi and rabin 2006 2007 we show that the expectation based loss averse newsvendor orders less than the profit maximizing quantity moreover the order placed by the expectation based loss averse newsvendor features plausible comparative statics of cost and price changes

the risk averse and prudent newsboy the effects of risk and risk aversion in the single period inventory newsboy problem are examined comparative static effects of changes in the various price and cost parameters are determined and related to the newsboy s risk aversion the addition of a random background wealth and of an increase in the riskiness of newspaper demand are also examined although many of the comparative effects generally are ambiguous some fairly simple restrictions on preferences and or risk increases are shown to lead to qualitatively deterministic results

south korean chaebols and value based management south korean industrial conglomerates chaebols are discussed in the context of value based management vbm recent economics and finance literature on the diversion of corporate resources from the firm to the controlling shareholders tunneling for which chaebols are notoriously known is discussed chaebols have engaged in empire building and expropriation of minority shareholders distorting the process of efficient resource allocation in south korea and became the root cause of the 1997 financial crisis we argue that the 1997 crisis should be viewed as a consequence of chaebols systematic deviation from the guiding principles of vbm we use tunneling within chaebols as an example of the need to directly address prohibition of the expropriation of minority shareholders as a primary postulate of vbm we argue that vbm should require that the value generated by the firm not be expropriated from minorities or any stakeholders by dominant shareholders we also examine moral and ethical considerations and present explanations as to why the unethical practice of tunneling has been tolerated by the south korean public we show that public opinion on tunneling is changing and that the treatment of minority shareholders by chaebols controlling families is becoming increasingly unacceptable to south koreans

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

the asymmetric relationship between executive earnings management and compensation a panel threshold regression approach abstractprior research shows that chief executive officers ceos are rewarded for their earnings management we re examine this issue using a panel threshold regression approach which allows the effect of earnings management on the ceo compensation to change across the level of earnings management and ceo compensation our results show that the effect of ceos discretionary accounting choices on their compensation is not homogeneous across various degrees of earnings management and compensation in particular for firms with moderate inordinate levels of earnings management and ceo compensation earnings management is rewarded penalized

founders heirs and corporate opacity in the united states abstract we argue that information about firm activities can vary substantially in the presence of founder or heir ownership thereby influencing the risks borne by minority investors we explore two hypotheses with regard to these controlling shareholders and corporate transparency focusing on their role as monitor in place and their potential to exploit firm opacity to accrue private benefits of control to test these notions we create an opacity index that ranks the relative transparency of the two thousand largest industrial us firms and find founder and heir ownership in 22 and 25 of these firms respectively our analysis indicates that in large publicly traded companies both founder and heir firms are significantly more opaque than diffuse shareholder firms we also find that founder and heir controlled firms exhibit a negative relation to performance in all but the most transparent firms surprisingly additional tests reveal that concerns about divergences in ownership versus control management type dual class shares and board influence appear to be substantially less important than corporate opacity in explaining the performance impacts of founder and heir control finally we decompose corporate opacity into disclosure and market scrutiny components finding that the disclosure quality component appears to be of greater importance to investors however irrespective of whether these controlling shareholders create or stay in the firm because of corporate opacity our analysis suggests that founders and heirs in large publicly traded firms exploit opacity to extract private benefits at the expense of minority investors

earnings and management incentives comments abstract in the preceding papers pourciau murphy and zimmerman and clinch and magliolo address the role of earnings in evaluating ceo performance for dismissal or compensation decisions and the implications for earnings management this comment evaluates the three papers and suggests avenues for future research into the stewardship role of accounting data and opportunistic financial reporting behavior

an incentive compatible approach to the transfer pricing problem abstract this paper offers an alternative approach to regulating certain types of transfer pricing if the multinational enterprise s transfer price decision is not regulated it will manipulate the transfer price in order to maximize net global profit traditional approaches argue for ad hoc penalty schedules to mitigate manipulative transfer pricing in contrast this paper offers an incentive compatible approach which explicitly incorporates the informational asymmetries that encourage misreports the model has the desirous feature that the optimal regulatory policy has self enforcing properties that is the firm will find it profit maximizing to report true costs

the investment opportunity set and accounting procedure choice abstract this paper provides evidence on the cross sectional relation between firms investment opportunities their debt and compensation contracts their size and financial leverage and their accounting procedure choices this evidence is important because previous studies hypothesize that the link between firms investment opportunities and their accounting choices helps explain extant results on the size debt equity and bonus plan hypotheses however while i find that firms investment opportunities do affect the nature of their contracts i also find that the traditional explanations for accounting choice are important after controlling for the effects of the investment opportunity set

does the influence of institutional investors depend on the institutional framework an international analysis this article analyses the effect of institutional ownership in alleviating or exacerbating the conflicts of interests among stakeholders in different legal and institutional frameworks this analysis is carried out based on two characteristics the concentration of power of institutional ownership and the identification of the main types of institutional investors in common law countries consistent with the convergence and entrenchment hypotheses we find a u shape relation between ownership structure and firm performance in civil law countries consistent with the collusion and contest theories we find an inverted u shape relation we also find that when institutional investors are classified as pressure resistant and pressure sensitive according to the strength of their ties with managers pressure resistant investors who operate more independently are the most capable of improving the value of the firm

the agency problems embedded in firm s equity investment we find that agency problems are embedded in firm s excess and abnormal equity investments that are mainly dictated by controlling shareholder s motives and ethical choices manifested in ownership and board structure the excess equity investment is gauged with respect to industry average the abnormal equity investment is specifically referred to the number of nominal investment companies that are fully controlled by the controlling owners while subject to little governance our empirical evidences of 345 taiwanese non financial listed firms show that firm s excess and abnormal equity investments are negatively correlated with controlling shareholder s cash flow rights while are positively correlated with the control cash flow deviation and board affiliation the results are supportive of the positive incentive hypothesis and the negative entrenchment hypothesis put forth by la porta et al 2002 journal of finance57 1147 1171 and claessen et al 2002 journal of finance57 2741 2742 the negative relation between equity investment and firm s value further supports the agency postulation that corporate excess and abnormal equity investments represent a leeway for controlling shareholder to exploit wealth of minority shareholders this study potentially contributes to the literature of business ethics by portraying an empirically testable linkage from controlling owner s ethical choices to his actions and therefore firm s value

the role of legal status in influencing bank financing and new firm growth this paper examines the characteristics of new firm founders who use loans and overdrafts from the clearing banks to finance initially their business bank lending to new firms appears unrelated to the personal characteristics of founders but related to whether individuals provide personal savings and the legal status of the business this contrasts with the factors which influence the growth of new firms here the founder s age employment status and birthplace are associated with larger firms the only variable which appears to influence consistently both bank lending and the employment growth in firms is whether or not the business is a limited company

multinationals multi plant economies and the gains from trade a general equilibrium model of a multinational enterprise based on economies of multi plant operation is developed these economies are modelled as arising from the existence of a joint input whose productivity in each production facility is independent of the number of facilities maintained by a firm the multinational thus offers the world increased technical efficiency by eliminating the duplication of the joint input that would occur with independent national firms since this technical efficiency may come at the expense of increased market power the full determinants of home country host country and world welfare are considered

ownership and firm innovation in a transition economy evidence from china we examine innovation performance of firms in a transition economy from an ownership perspective we focus specifically on the relationship between ownership structures and firm innovation performance drawing on data from 548 chinese firms we find volume of patent registration to be most strongly influenced by foreign ownership in the firm along with firm affiliation within a business group the influence of state and institutional ownership on innovation performance is positive but lagged contrary to expectations insider ownership leads to lower innovation performance and concentrated ownership has no significant impact our study has two principal contributions firstly we utilize a comprehensive treatment of ownership characteristics overcoming weakness in previous studies that have used a more narrow focus on ownership type secondly we contribute to understanding of how firms in transition economies build indigenous capabilities for innovation by drawing attention to the interplay of foreign and domestic control of agents innovation

does best practice in setting executive pay in the uk encourage good behaviour we examine how uk listed companies set executive pay reviewing the implications of following best practice in corporate governance and examining how this can conflict with what shareholders and other stakeholders might perceive as good behaviour we do this by considering current governance regulation in the light of interviews with protagonists in the debate setting out the dilemmas faced by remuneration setters and showing how the processes they follow can lead to ethical conflicts

the dynamics of incentive contracts the paper studies a simple two period principal agent model in which the principal updates the incentive scheme after observing the agent s first period performance the agent has superior information about his ability the principal offers a first period incentive scheme and observes some measure of the agent s first period performance cost or profit which depends on the agent s ability and unobservable first period effort the relationship is entirely run by short term contracts in the second period the principal updates the incentive scheme and the agent is free to accept the new incentive scheme or to quit the strategies are required to be perfect and updating of the principal s beliefs about the agent s ability follows bayes rule the central theme of the paper is that the ratchet effect leads to much pooling in the first period first for any first period incentive scheme there exists no separating equilibrium second when the uncertainty about the agent s ability is small the optimal scheme must involve a large amount of pooling the paper also gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partition equilibria and looks at the effect of cost uncertainty

a model of expropriation with asymmetric information abstract incomplete information about a multinational enterprise s mne s technology may induce a host country to expropriate the mne s subsidiary even if other policy instruments are available the threat of expropriation does not always deter foreign direct investment so that expropriation may actually occur with nonzero probability perfect sequential equilibria are derived for vertically and for horizontally integrated mnes the model provides predictions regarding the probability of expropriation based on observable mne and host country characteristics countries would be better off if they could commit never to expropriate mnes

the institutional framework and economic development the compound growth rates of per capita output and farrell type efficiency measures for 115 market economies over the period 1960 80 were compared with measures of political civil and economic liberty it was found that the institutional framework has significant and large effects on the efficiency and growth rate of economies politically open societies which subscribe to the rule of law to private property and to the market allocation of resources grow at three times the rate and are two and one half times as efficient as societies in which these freedoms are abridged

management and ownership effects evidence from five countries despite the growing recognition in the corporate governance literature that the relationship between ownership concentration and profitability is context dependent this issue has not yet been subjected to direct empirical investigation using a single cross national sample this study empirically examines the ownership concentration performance relationship across the nations of canada france germany the united kingdom and the united states essentially we argue that the correlation if any between ownership concentration and firm profitability differs across countries in a systematic way determined by the national system of corporate governance results indicate that important and statistically significant differences do in fact exist across the countries studied 1998 john wiley sons ltd

managerial ownership of voting rights abstract managers of firms with dual classes of common stock can choose different quantities of votes for a given cash flow interest by choosing different quantities of the two securities we study managerial stock holdings in 45 dual class firms and find that vote ownership per se is an important motivation for these holdings in that corporate officers and their families hold a median 56 9 of the votes and 24 0 of the common stock cash flows we also find significant family involvement in many sample firms and document four case studies in which explicit acquisition premiums were paid for superior voting shares

investor protection and corporate governance recent research has documented large differences among countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms in the breadth and depth of capital markets in dividend policies and in the access of firms to external finance a common element to the explanations of these differences is how well investors both shareholders and creditors are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms we describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement across countries discuss the possible origins of these differences summarize their consequences and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform we argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank centered and market centered financial systems

testing agency theory with entrepreneur effort and wealth we develop a principal agent model in an entrepreneurial setting and test the model s predictions using unique data on entrepreneurial effort and wealth in privately held firms accounting for unobserved firm heterogeneity using instrumental variables techniques we find that entrepreneurial ownership shares increase with outside wealth and decrease with firm risk effort increases with ownership and effort increases firm performance the magnitude of the effects in the cross section of firms suggests that agency costs may help explain why entrepreneurs concentrate large fractions of their wealth in firm equity

q and the tax bias theory abstract a growing body of literature analyzes the variation in q the ratio of financial market value to asset current replacement cost and makes inferences about attributes such as monopoly power profitability managerial performance etc these studies ignore potential biases embedded in q that result from non neutral tax policies this study examines the association between q and tax biases and establishes that differences in accumulated depreciation tax shields explain significant variation in q the implication that q should be adjusted for tax biases before use in empirical research is examined further adjusting q for tax biases at least with the factors herein leads only to minor changes in econometric analyses

a benchmark solution for the risk averse newsvendor problem in this paper we derive the first order conditions for optimality for the problem of a risk averse expected utility maximizer newsvendor we use these conditions to solve a special case where the utility function is any increasing differentiable function and the random demand is uniformly distributed this special case has a simple closed form solution and therefore it provides an insightful and practical interpretation to the optimal point we show some properties of the solution and also demonstrate how it can be used for assessing the newsvendor utility function parameters

a mechanism design approach to transfer pricing by the multinational firm abstract this paper is about how multinationals choose transfer prices and optimal production levels in the presence of differential corporate income tax rates and local ownership requirements a key featrure of the model is that there is an asymmetric information problem between a parent and its foreign subsidiary we examine the interaction between ownership structure corporate taxes and bargaining power transfer prices induce underproduction compared to the full information case when the parent has the bargaining ability when bargaining is controlled by the subsidiary overproduction obtains the model is used to illustrate how governmental objectives can be accomplished without direct regulation of the transfer price

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

the performance of privatized firms in the czech republic abstract with the growing importance of privatizations as a part of government policy most empirical studies of these privatizations conclude that firm performance immediately improves following privatization privatization has been the most important part of the transition from the centrally planned economies of central and eastern europe and has a larger impact on those economies than privatizations in other countries however few studies have looked at the performance of firms following mass privatization this study uses 453 separate firms 101 firms privatized in both waves for a total of 554 observations in the first and second waves of czech voucher privatization using methodology from previous studies we find that while the overall effects from privatization are positive the effects vary by privatization wave size and industry firms privatized in the first wave performed worse decline in performance following privatization than firms privatized in the second wave we also fail to find ownership concentration or debt as an important factor in restructuring the firm i believe that the results are consistent with two hypotheses first economic and political structure surrounding the privatization waves plays an important part in the success of privatization stable environments both political and economic help privatized firms restructure and improve operating performance as well as attract foreign investors and capital even in less developed countries but in transitional economies undergoing mass privatization in rapidly changing and developing economic and political environments hinder firms from restructuring and improving performance following privatization results are also consistent with the hypothesis that firms with a longer preparation period prior to privatization an implicit seasoning improve performance following privatization

optimal resource royalties with unknown and temporally independent extraction cost structures the authors study optimal nonrenewable resource royalty contracts when the extracting agent has private information on costs this is a dynamic incentive problem in which the repeated relationship between the principal and the agent is constrained by initial reserves commitment is limited to one period and costs are intertemporally independent compared with full information extraction information asymmetry shifts production to the future when the optimal contract requires exhaustion in two periods when exhaustion by all types in two periods is not warranted the effect on the terminal period is ambiguous and the output of even the lowest cost firm is always distorted copyright 1995 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the balance of power in closely held corporations abstract we analyze a closely held corporation characterized by the absence of a resale market for its shares we show that the founder of the firm can optimally choose an ownership structure with several large shareholders to force them to form coalitions to obtain control by grouping member cash flows a coalition internalizes to a larger extent the consequences of its actions and hence takes more efficient actions than would any of its individual members the model has implications for the optimal bundling of cash flow and voting rights and for the optimal number and size of shareholders

an equilibrium model of the supply chain network under multi attribute behaviors analysis abstract this paper studies a supply chain network scn equilibrium model considering decision makers multi attribute behaviors from the perspective of behavioral finance in this paper an equilibrium model of an uncertain snc is constructed in which retailers choose their decisions according to their risk averse behavior loss averse behavior and regret averse behavior by using different weights to represent retailers attitudes to these three behaviors the retailers multi attribute utility functions are developed the equilibrium conditions of the manufacturers the retailers together with the network are established by the finite dimensional variational inequality formulation three numerical examples are solved in the first numerical example we illustrate the effect of each of these three behaviors on the equilibrium decisions the profits and the utilities of the decision makers in the other two numerical examples we explore the effects of changes in attitudes to these three behaviors on the equilibrium decisions profits and utilities of the decision makers the numerical results show that the equilibrium decisions are affected by each of these three behaviors very much moreover they are sensitive to the changes in attitudes to these behaviors

institutional framework and economic development international evidence this paper examines the effect of quality of the institutional framework on economic development our empirical results support the hypothesis that good institutions improve efficiency and accelerate growth the positive effect of institutional quality is more pronounced with mutually reinforcing support of economic freedom our results also indicate that good institutions help developing countries grow faster to achieve conditional convergence we infer from the results that economic development requires not only physical and human capital formation but also freedom to choose and institutional support

corporate performance and managerial remuneration an empirical analysis abstract economic theories of efficient compensation predict a positive relationship between executive pay and corporate performance and yet efforts to document this relationship have been largely unsuccessful in this paper we argue that previous cross sectional studies have omitted important variables which seriously bias their results using data that focus on individual executives over time we find that executive compensation is strongly positively related to corporate performance as measured by shareholder return and growth in firm sales the results are robust to the stock market performance measure utilized

an analysis of the stock price reaction to sudden executive deaths implications for the managerial labor market abstract certain characteristics of managerial employment arrangements and of the managerial labor market make shareholder wealth dependent on an executive s continued employment these wealth effects are investigated by examining the common stock price reaction to unexpected deaths of senior corporate executives abnormal stock price changes are documented for a sample of fifty three events these abnormal stock price changes are associated with the executive s status as a corporate founder and with measures of the executive s talents and decision making responsibility and of the transaction costs associated with renegotiating or terminating the employment agreement

does home bias affect firm value evidence from holdings of mutual funds worldwide this study finds strong evidence that home bias affects firm valuation at both country and firm levels at the country level increasing the bias of domestic investors toward home equity lowers the market valuation of home equity at the firm level firm value increases as the compositions of local equities held by domestic and foreign investors tend toward the firms global market capitalization weights but decreases as their weights deviate from global weights overall the evidence is consistent with the optimal global risk sharing hypothesis that the greater risk sharing between domestic and foreign investors in international capital markets reduces the cost of capital and hence enhances market valuation

manufacturer buyer coordination for newsvendor type products with two ordering opportunities and partial backorders abstract in a recent paper weng z k 2004 coordinating order quantities between the manufacturer and the buyer a generalized newsvendor model european journal of operational research 156 148 161 a newsvendor type coordination model was developed for a single manufacturer single buyer channel with two ordering opportunities this paper further extends the model to the case where the excess demand after the first order is partially backlogged and both parties share the manufacturing setup cost of the second order if happened we show that the decentralized system would perform best if the manufacturer covers utterly the second production setup cost which is opposite to that obtained in weng 2004 another extension in the present paper is that in the centralized system the second order decision is made by the buyer based on the channel s benefit rather than based on the buyer s benefit as in weng 2004 it is proved that the expected profit of the system in our paper is always larger than that in weng 2004 in order to maximize the expected profit of the channel two coordinated policies are proposed to achieve perfect coordination a two part tariff policy for the special case that the buyer pays all the manufacturing setup cost and a revised revenue sharing contract for the case that two parties share the manufacturing setup cost

does the bonding effect matter in a more integrated capital market world abstract this paper examines the bonding effect of cross listing before and after the stock market liberalization reforms in china consistent with the bonding hypothesis we find that chinese firms with foreign listings attain higher valuations than firms without foreign listings we also find that they manage earnings less than comparable purely domestic listed firms and have more informative stock prices further investigation indicates that the divergence in earnings quality between cross listed and non cross listed firms shrinks dramatically after the chinese stock market liberalization reforms in 2001 and 2002 overall the results suggest that the bonding effect is mitigated in an increasingly integrated capital market world

on the costs of a bank centered financial system evidence from the changing main bank relations in japan we examine the effects of bank firm relationships on firm performance in japan when access to capital markets is limited close bank firm ties increase the availability of capital to borrowing firms but do not lead to higher profitability or growth the cost of capital of firms with close bank ties is higher than that of their peers this indicates that most of the benefits from these relationships are appropriated by the banks finally the slow growth rates of bank clients suggest that banks discourage firms from investing in risky profitable projects however liberalization of financial markets reduces the banks market power the close relationship between manufacturing firms and financial institutions in japan has recently been at the center of the debate on the appropriate financial system for the reforming economies of eastern europe as opposed to the anglo saxon separation of finance and industry long term ties between main banks and their client firms involving bank loans bank equity holding and some bank appointed personnel which are common in japan and germany have often been described as a growth oriented financial system that could serve the needs of developing and reformed economiies better than anonymous capital markets modeled after the arnerican and british financial systems the claim that close ties between investmentoriented banks and industrial firms could help overcome the difficulties of relative backwardness dates back to gerschenkron 1962 who investigates european development rosovsky 1961 applies gerschenkron s framework to the analysis of japanese growth more recently aoki patrick and sheard 1994 hoshi kashyap and loveman 1994 and teranishi 1993 among others portray the close ties between finance and industry in japan as an important factor in the international competitiveness of modern japanese

the component procurement problem for the loss averse manufacturer with spot purchase abstract this paper studies the purchasing behaviour of a loss averse engineer to order manufacturer who purchases a key component for his final product from a supplier under a single wholesale price contract with spot purchase opportunities where both the product demand and the component spot price are uncertain through newsvendor type of models we analyze several key issues including the effects of the manufacturer s loss aversion and the effects of demand and spot price uncertainties on the manufacturer s decision behaviour we find that the purchasing behaviour of the loss averse manufacturer differs from those of the risk neutral and risk averse ones specifically we identify some sufficient conditions under which the loss averse manufacturer may purchase a larger order quantity in advance when demand becomes more uncertain or when the price becomes more uncertain we also discuss the two wholesale price contract and show that fixing the emergency supply price may lead to a smaller order quantity

the structure of ownership and the theory of the firm the separation of ownership from control produces a condition where the interests of owner and of ultimate manager may and often do diverge and where many of the checks which formerly operated to limit the use of power disappear in creating these new relationships the quasi public corporation may fairly be said to work a revolution it has divided ownership into nominal ownership and the power formerly joined to it thereby the corporation has changed the nature of profit seeking enterprise 1

inside the family firm the role of families in succession decisions and performance this paper uses a unique dataset from denmark to investigate the impact of family characteristics in corporate decision making and the consequences of these decisions on firm performance we focus on the decision to appoint either a family or an external chief executive officer ceo the paper uses variation in ceo succession decisions that result from the gender of a departing ceo s first born child this is a plausible instrumental variable iv as male firstchild firms are more likely to pass on control to a family ceo relative to female first child firms but the gender of a first child is unlikely to affect firms outcomes we find that family successions have a large negative causal impact on firm performance operating profitability on assets falls by at least four percentage points around ceo transitions our iv estimates are significantly larger than those obtained using ordinary least squares furthermore we show that family ceo underperformance is particularly large for firms in high growth industries and for relatively large firms overall the empirical results demonstrate that professional non family ceos provide extremely valuable services to the organizations they head

optimal shelf space stocking policy using stochastic dominance under supply driven demand uncertainty abstract in this paper we develop an optimal shelf space stocking policy when demand in addition to the exogenous uncertainty is influenced by the amount of inventory displayed supply on the shelves our model exploits stochastic dominance condition and we assume that the distribution of realized demand with higher stocking level stochastically dominates the distribution of realized demand with lower stocking level we show that the critical fractile with endogenous demand may not exceed the critical fractile of the classical newsvendor model our computational results validate the optimality of amount of units stocked on the retail shelves

decision bias in the newsvendor problem with a known demand distribution experimental evidence in the newsvendor problem a decision maker orders inventory before a one period selling season with stochastic demand if too much is ordered stock is left over at the end of the period whereas if too little is ordered sales are lost the expected profit maximizing order quantity is well known but little is known about how managers actually make these decisions we describe two experiments that investigate newsvendor decisions across different profit conditions results from these studies demonstrate that choices systematically deviate from those that maximize expected profit subjects order too few of high profit products and too many of low profit products these results are not consistent with risk aversion risk seeking preferences prospect theory preferences waste aversion stockout aversion or the consequences of underestimating opportunity costs two explanations are consistent with the data one subjects behave as if their utility function incorporates a preference to reduce ex post inventory error the absolute difference between the chosen quantity and realized demand two subjects suffer from the anchoring and insufficient adjustment bias feedback and training did not mitigate inventory order errors we suggest techniques to improve decision making

controlling the conflict of interest in management buyouts a controversial aspect of the management buyouts that were popular throughout the 1980s is the potential for a conflict of interest to arise when a manager bids to acquire the firm he manages this study examines 184 management buyouts and reports three findings first returns to prebuyout shareholders are greater when managers must bid against outside acquirers second bid revisions in the face of competition exceed revisions due to shareholder litigation and negotiations with boards third the incidence of competition is negatively related to the prebuyout share holdings of managers coauthors are ronald f singer anju seth and darla f lang copyright 1994 by mit press

the quantity flexibility contract and supplier customer incentives consider a supply chain consisting of two independent agents a supplier e g a manufacturer and its customer e g a retailer the latter in turn serving an uncertain market demand to reconcile manufacturing procurement time lags with a need for timely response to the market such supply chains often must commit resources to production quantities based on forecasted rather than realized demand the customer typically provides a planning forecast of its intended purchase which does not entail commitment benefiting from overproduction while not bearing the immediate costs the customer has incentive to initially overforecast before eventually purchasing a lesser quantity the supplier must in turn anticipate such behavior in its production quantity decision this individually rational behavior results in an inefficient supply chain this paper models the incentives of the two parties identifying causes of inefficiency and suggesting remedies particular attention is given to the quantity flexibility qf contract which couples the customer s commitment to purchase no less than a certain percentage below the forecast with the supplier s guarantee to deliver up to a certain percentage above under certain conditions this method can allocate the costs of market demand uncertainty so as to lead the individually motivated supplier and customer to the systemwide optimal outcome we characterize the implications of qf contracts for the behavior and performance of both parties and the supply chain as a whole

manufacturer retailer contracting with asymmetric information on retailer s degree of loss aversion abstract in a recent paper wang c webster s 2007 channel coordination for a supply chain with a risk neutral manufacturer and a loss averse retailer decision sciences 38 3 361 389 the authors study a supply chain consisting of a risk neutral manufacturer and a loss averse retailer and show that the supply chain can be coordinated by three contracts buy back bb gain loss sharing gl and gain loss sharing and buy back glb they assume that the retailer s degree of loss aversion is common knowledge however this assumption cannot reflect real situations since in the real industry one party s degree of loss aversion is usually unknown by other parties in the present paper we propose a principal agent model assuming the retailer s degree of loss aversion to be asymmetric information within the principal agent framework we obtain the following results 1 an optimal mgl modified gl contract menu which is based on the gl contract studied in wang and webster 2007 is derived for the manufacturer the principal by mechanism design theory 2 under the mgl contract menu information asymmetry lowers the production quantity decreases the manufacturer s profit and deteriorates supply chain performance while increasing the retailer s utility 3 the mgl contract menu can coordinate the supply chain with asymmetric information in an implementable way if the wholesale price is endogenously determined by the manufacturer and its lower bound is 0

who is afraid of political risk multinational firms and their choice of capital structure this paper investigates how multinational firms choose the capital structure of their foreign affiliates in response to political risk we focus on two choice variables the leverage and the ownership structure of the foreign affiliate and we distinguish different types of political risk such as expropriation unreliable intellectual property rights and confiscatory taxation in our theoretical analysis we find that as political risk increases the ownership share tends to decrease whereas leverage can both increase or decrease depending on the type of political risk using the microdatabase direct investment of the deutsche bundesbank we find supportive evidence for these different effects

entrenchment governance and the stock price reaction to sudden executive deaths abstract to study managerial entrenchment i use the stock price reaction to unexpected senior executive deaths if a highly effective manager dies unexpectedly the stock price reaction should be negative if however death removes an entrenched manager when the board would or could not the stock price reaction should be positive while individually age and tenure only weakly correlate with the stock price reaction to a sudden death the reaction is strongly positive 6 8 if 1 the executive s tenure exceeds 10 years and 2 abnormal stock returns over the last three years are negative

an empirical examination of institutional investor preferences for corporate social performance this study investigates the pattern of institutional shareholding in the u k and its relationship with socially responsible behavior by companies within a sample of over 500 uk companies we estimate a set of ownership models that distinguish between long and short term investors and their largest components and which incorporate both aggregated and disaggregated measures of corporate social performance csp the results suggest that long term institutional investment is positively related to csp providing further support for earlier studies by johnson and greening 1999 academy of management journal 42 564 576 and graves and waddock 1994 academy of management journal 37 1034 1046 disaggregation of csp into its constituent components suggests that the pattern of institutional investment is also related to the form which csp takes investigation of the impact of investment screens on the selection of stocks suggests that long term institutional investors select primarily through exclusion rejecting those firms which have the worst csp