the electricity generation adequacy problem assessing dynamic effects of capacity remuneration mechanisms abstract following liberalization reforms the ability of power markets to provide satisfactory incentives for capacity investments has become a major concern in particular current energy markets can exhibit a phenomenon of investment cycles which generate phases of under and over capacity and hence additional costs and risks for generation adequacy to cope with these issues new mechanisms called capacity remuneration mechanisms crm have been or will be implemented this paper assesses the dynamic effects of two crms the capacity market and the strategic reserve mechanism and studies to what extent they can reduce the investment cycles generation costs and shortage costs of both mechanisms are also compared to conclude on their effectivity and economic efficiency a simulation model based on system dynamics is developed to study the functioning of both crms and the related investment decisions the results highlight the benefits of deploying crms to solve the adequacy issue shortages are strongly reduced compared to an energy only market besides the capacity market appears to be more beneficial since it experiences fewer shortages and generation costs are lower these comparisons can be used by policy makers in particular in europe where these two crms are mainly debated to determine which crm to adopt

ten little treasures of game theory and ten intuitive contradictions this paper reports laboratory data for games that are played only once these games span the standard categories static and dynamic games with complete and incomplete information for each game the treasure is a treatment in which behavior conforms nicely to predictions of the nash equilibrium or relevant refinement in each case however a change in the payoff structure produces a large inconsistency between theoretical predictions and observed behavior these contradictions are generally consistent with simple intuition based on the interaction of payoff asymmetries and noisy introspection about others decisions

on eliciting beliefs in strategic games several recent studies in experimental economics have tried to measure beliefs of subjects engaged in strategic games with other subjects using data from one such study we conduct an experiment where our experienced subjects observe early rounds of strategy choices from that study and are given monetary incentives to report forecasts of choices in later rounds we elicit beliefs using three different scoring rules linear logarithmic and quadratic we compare forecasts across the scoring rules and compare the forecasts of our trained observers to forecasts of the actual players in the original experiment we find significant differences across scoring rules the improper linear scoring rule produces forecasts closer to 0 and 1 than the proper rules and these forecasts are poorly calibrated the two proper scoring rules induce significantly different distributions of forecasts we find that forecasts by observers under both proper scoring rules are significantly different from the forecasts of the actual players in terms of accuracy calibration and the distribution of forecasts we also find evidence for belief convergence among the observers

games with unique mixed strategy equilibria an experimental study abstract the results of an experiment studying the choices of subjects playing mixed extensions of three variants of simple 2 2 non constant sum strictly competitive games of the same form matching pennies are presented subjects exhibited a variety of behavioral adaptive learning strategies this heterogeneity of individual behavior produced aggregate dynamics whose estimated steady states are quite different from those predicted by the nash equilibria of those stage games with asymmetrical payoff functions the observed aggregative dynamics are well accounted for both by a quantal equilibrium model of mckelvey and palfrey and by a learning model of roth and erev journal of economic literature classification number c72

a dynamic analysis of a demand curve based capacity market proposal the pjm reliability pricing model because of high generation adequacy standards in the power industry some peaking capacity operates for a limited time during the year and may not receive sufficient energy revenues to meet its fixed costs this is particularly true when energy prices are capped in order to mitigate market power the northeastern u s independent system operators isos have responded to this issue by establishing capacity obligations for loads and markets for installed capacity thus providing a capacity revenue stream to generators the installed capacity icap markets in the northeastern u s markets are a response to this need for additional incentives to construct generation the federal energy regulatory commission ferc has accepted the pjm interconnection s pjm proposal to replace the present fixed icap requirement that is placed upon load serving entities lses with a demand curve based system in which the iso would be responsible for acquiring residual capacity on behalf of lses the demand curve approach pays more when reserve margins are smaller and provides a reduced incentive for investment when installed reserves are above the target another goal is to make revenues more predictable for generators making investment less costly and ultimately lowering prices for consumers a dynamic representative agent model is presented for projecting effects upon reserve margins generator profitability and consumer costs and is applied to alternative demand curves proposed for the pjm market the consumer costs resulting from a sloped demand curve are robustly lower compared to the present fixed requirement under a wide range of assumptions concerning behavior of generation owners including risk attitudes bidding behavior and willingness to build capacity as a function of forecast profit the cost savings arise from lower capital costs to generators due to reduced risk and risk premiums also average installed capacity is less for the same level of reliability because of reduced fluctuations in installed reserves

regulatory design for res e support mechanisms learning curves market structure and burden sharing drawing from relevant experiences in power systems around the world this paper offers a review of existing policy support mechanisms for res e with a detailed analysis of their regulatory implications while recent studies provide an account of current res e support systems in this paper we focus on some of the impacts these mechanisms have on the overall energy market structure and its performance given the rising importance of res e in systems everywhere these impacts should no longer be overlooked

economic theory of choice and the preference reversal phenomenon a reexamination in a recent issue of this review david grether and charles plott 1979 hereinafter referred to as g p presented a series of experiments that show that individual decisions are made in a manner inconsistent with standard preference theory this inconsistency can be illustrated by the following example individuals under suitable laboratory conditions first have a choice between a lottery with a high probability of winning a small sum of money the p bet probability bet and a lottery with a high stake but low probability of winning the m bet money bet after indicating a preference for one of the lotteries in the pair the same subjects are then asked to place a monetary value on each of the individual lotteries grether and plott found that a large number of participants stated a preference for the p bet in the first round but placed a higher value on the other lottery the m bet in the second round this behavior a preference reversal is inconsistent with the traditional statements of preference theory

understanding the emergence of open science institutions functionalist economics in historical context this essay exposes the limitations of the logical origins approach that has found favour among economists who seek to understand the workings of institutions in the past present it pursues a different approach applying functionalism in historical context to explain the emergence of the characteristic ethos and institutions of open science the emergence during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries of the idea and practice of open science represented a break from the previously dominant ethos of secrecy in the pursuit of nature s secrets it was a distinctive and vital organizational aspect of the scientific revolution from which crystallized a new set of norms incentives and organizational structures that reinforced scientific researchers commitments to rapid disclosure of new knowledge to understand how this came about it is necessary to examine the economics of patronage and the roles of asymmetric information and reputation in the early modern reorganization of scientific activities the rise of cooperative rivalries in the revelation of new knowledge is seen as a functional response to heightened asymmetric information problems posed for the renaissance system of court patronage of the arts and sciences pre existing informational asymmetries had been exacerbated by increased importance of mathematics and the greater reliance upon sophisticated mathematical techniques in a variety of practical contexts of application analysis of the court patronage system of late renaissance europe within which the new natural philosophers found their support points to the significance of the feudal legacy of fragmented political authority in creating conditions of common agency contracting in substitutes these conditions are shown to have been conducive to more favorable contract terms especially with regard to autonomy and financial support for the agent client members of western europe s nascent scientific communities some lessons may be drawn for contemporary science and technology policy debates in which the open science mode of pursuing knowledge often seems to be viewed a robust concomitant of the power of scientific research techniques whereas it is a fragile cultural legacy of western europe s history upon which rests the ascendancy of modern science as a driver of long term economic growth copyright 2004 oxford university press

optimal generation mix with short term demand response and wind penetration demand response defined as the ability of load to respond to short term variations in electricity prices plays an increasingly important role in balancing short term supply and demand especially during peak periods and in dealing with fluctuations in renewable energy supplies however demand response has not been included in standard models for defining the optimal generation technology mix three different methodologies are proposed to integrate short term responsiveness into a generation technology mix optimization model considering operational constraints elasticities are included to adjust the demand profile in response to price changes including cross price elasticities that account for load shifts among hours as energy efficiency programs also influence the load profile interactions of efficiency investments and demand response are also modeled comparison of model results for a single year optimization with and without demand response shows peak reduction and valley filling effects impacting the optimal amounts and mix of generation capacity increasing demand elasticity also increases the installed amount of wind capacity suggesting that demand response yields environmental benefits by facilitating integration of renewable energy

generation capacity adequacy in interdependent electricity markets this paper deals with the practical problems related to long term security of supply in regional electricity markets with transmission constraints differences between regulatory policies and market designs in terms of generation adequacy policies may distort the normal functioning of the neighboring markets as well as the reliability of supply we test the effect of heterogeneous regulatory design between two interdependent markets energy only market price capped market without capacity mechanisms and price capped markets with forward capacity contracts obligation we rely on a long term market simulation model in system dynamics that characterizes expansion decision in a competitive regime the results show that differences in market designs affect both price and reliability of supply in the two markets we examine both the short and long terms effect and how free riding may occur where capacity adequacy policies are adopted in one market but not the other the main finding is that the lack of harmonization between local markets in policies to ensure capacity adequacy may lead to undesirable side effects

green electricity market development lessons from europe and the us this study compares the development and implementation of green electricity policies in germany the netherlands sweden and the united states a set of countries applying a range of policy instruments to encourage electricity from renewable energy sources a general tendency is identified that policies shift emphasis from r d stimulation towards dissemination and market application of renewable energy technologies we argue that in light of the long term nature of policy goals on energy security mitigation of climate change and environmental protection the applied range of policy instruments may be lacking in providing incentives for the long term development of new technologies clarifying policy objectives would allow careful selection of policy instruments including support for r d improved capacity building for policy implementation is also important

implementing the eu renewable target through green certificate markets abstract the european parliament has agreed on a target of a 20 share of renewables in the eu s total energy consumption by 2020 to achieve the target the european council has adopted mandatory differentiated national targets for each of the member states in this paper we consider the use of green certificates to reach the renewable targets and we analyze the potential for cost reductions by allowing for trade in green certificates across member states we show that differentiated national targets cannot ensure a cost effective implementation of the overall target for the eu s renewable energy consumption trade in green certificates can ensure a cost effective distribution of renewable energy production but the national targets prevent a cost effective distribution of energy consumption nevertheless our numerical model indicates that eu wide trade in green certificates may cut the eu s total cost of fulfilling the renewable target by as much as 70 compared with a situation with no trade however the design of green certificate markets may have a large impact on the distribution of costs across countries

renewable generation and electricity prices taking stock and new evidence for germany and austria abstract economic theory predicts that the increase of renewable electricity production should reduce the price of electricity in the short run which is also known as the merit order effect although the merit order effect is only one of several consequences of renewable production on the electricity system it is crucial to determine its size for the economic evaluation of renewable energies in this paper we present a comprehensive overview of relevant past research results on the price effect of renewables additionally we conduct a new empirical analysis of the price effect of renewable production for the austrian german region a market that clearly qualifies for a merit order effect analysis given its characteristics based on the review and our own analysis we show that the merit order effect varies depending on the region and the assessment method chosen we also find that the size of this effect is less dispersed throughout different markets than previously suggested by the literature

endogeneity of alternating offers in a bargaining game we investigate an infinite horizon two person simultaneous move bargaining game with incomplete information and discounted payoffs the game takes the form of a concession game in each period each player chooses to give in or hold out the game continues until at least one of the players chooses to give in at which point agreement has been reached and the game terminates for any discount factor if the players priors about each other s type are sufficiently asymmetric there is a unique nash equilibrium in which the two players alternate in their willingness to give in

the logit equilibrium a perspective on intuitive behavioural anomalies costs associated with deviations from the nash equilibrium these payoff asymmetry effects are incorporated in an approach that introduces noisy behavior via a logit probabilistic choice function in the resulting logit equilibrium behavior is characterized by a probability distribution that satisfies a rational expectations consistency condition the beliefs that determine players expected payoffs match the decision distributions that arise from applying the logit rule to those expected payoffs we prove existence of a unique symmetric logit equilibrium and derive comparative statics results the paper provides a unified perspective on many recent laboratory studies of games in which nash equilibrium predictions are inconsistent with both intuition and experimental evidence

stationary concepts for experimental 2 x 2 games comment reinhard selten and thorsten chmura 2008 recently reported laboratory results for completely mixed 2 x 2 games used to compare nash equilibrium with four other stationary concepts quantal response equilibrium action sampling equilibrium payoff sampling equilibrium and impulse balance equilibrium we reanalyze their data correct some errors and find that nash clearly fits worst while the four other concepts perform about equally well we also report new analysis of other previous experiments that illustrate the importance of the loss aversion hardwired into impulse balance equilibrium when the other non nash concepts are augmented with loss aversion they outperform impulse balance equilibrium

carbon trading in the policy mix the kyoto protocol is stimulating the development of emissions trading schemes at the national and international levels these are being introduced alongside existing policy instruments such as carbon taxes and negotiated agreements leading to complex problems of policy interaction but the topic of policy interaction remains under researched this paper aims to improve understanding of such interactions by examining the conditions under which a cap and trade scheme for carbon dioxide emissions may usefully coexist with carbon energy taxes support mechanisms for renewable electricity and policies to promote energy efficiency the paper argues that each of these instrument combinations may be acceptable provided they contribute to either improving the static or dynamic efficiency of the trading scheme or delivering other valued policy objectives but since the coexisting instruments may raise overall abatement costs while contributing nothing further to emission reductions the objectives and trade offs within the policy mix must be explicit

the danish green certificate system some simple analytical results we formulate a simple static equilibrium model for the electricity market taking account of both green certificates and co2 emission permits the objective is to investigate the relationship between these markets under the existence of upper and lower price bounds on the green certificates both in the short and in the long run we perform various comparative static changes of the parameters of the model and study how these affect the endogenous variables of the model as well as producers and consumers surplus we also investigate the effects of imports and exports of electricity several comparative static results are derived and in particular it is shown that harsher co2 emission constraints and increased import wholesale price both may lead to reduced capacity of green electricity

homogeneity bias in models of discrete choice with bounded rationality abstract quantal response equilibrium captures bounded rationality in a strategic game by adopting a stochastic model of discrete choice along with the traditional rational expectation framework we examine the use of a single agent homogeneous parametric quantal response model e g logit response to describe the aggregate behavior of heterogeneous agents sharing the same parametric form for their quantal response functions but having individual rationality parameters in a symmetric population game for any parametric quantal response function arising from a unimodal distribution of exchangeable payoff disturbances we find that a mis specified homogeneous rationality parameter will have downward bias logit response is one such specification this result implies that empirical work that disregards heterogeneity underestimates subjects rationality

an admm based method for computing risk averse equilibrium in capacity markets uncertainty in electricity markets introduces risk for investors high fixed cost and increased dependency on infrequent and uncertain price spikes characterize investments the risk averse behavior of investors might lead to poor decision making and undermines generation adequacy electricity market models rarely treat the interaction of market design and risk aversion the representation of capacity mechanisms in modeling approaches focusing on risk aversion is limited our contribution addresses two problems first we propose a stochastic market equilibrium model investors are represented as risk averse agents the conditional value at risk is used as risk measure second we propose an algorithm based on the alternating direction method of multipliers to compute a risk averse equilibrium we benchmark our approach with a state of the art solver relying on a mixed complementarity problem reformulation we show that for larger case studies our proposed approach is preferable the algorithm converges in all cases while conventional solvers fail to compute a risk averse equilibrium the methodology is transferable to other risk averse equilibrium models with reference to capacity markets we conclude that they are more beneficial in a risk averse market capacity markets result in lower total cost while avoiding expected energy not served this statement still holds with increased price caps in energy only markets

smart srec a stochastic model of the new jersey solar renewable energy certificate market markets for solar renewable energy certificates srecs are gaining in promi nence in many states stimulating growth of the u s solar industry however srec market prices have been extremely volatile causing high risk to participants and potentially less investment in solar power generation such concerns necessitate the development of realis tic flexible and tractable models of srec prices that capture the behavior of participants given the rules that govern the market we propose an original stochastic model called smart srec to fill this role building on established ideas from the carbon pricing liter ature and including a feedback mechanism for generation response to prices we calibrate the model to the new jersey market and backtest it analyzing parameter sensitivity and demonstrating its ability to reproduce historical dynamics finally we run simulations to investigate the role and impact of regulatory parameters thus providing insight into the crucial role played by market design

intertemporal population ethics critical level utilitarian principles this paper considers the problem of social evaluation in a model where population size individual lifetime utilities lengths of life and birth dates vary across states in an intertemporal framework we investigate principles for social evaluation that allow history to matter to some extent using an axiom called independence of the utilities of the dead we provide a characterization of critical level generalized utilitarian rules as a by product of our analysis we show that social discounting is ruled out in an intertemporal welfarist environment a simple population planning example is also discussed

stationary concepts for experimental 2x2 games a reply this is a reply to stationary concepts for experimental 2 x 2 games comment by brunner camerer and goeree which corrects some computational errors in selten and chmura 2008 and extends the comparison of five stationary concepts to data from previous experimental studies we critically discuss their new findings and relate them to the data of selten and chmura 2008 we conclude that the parametric concepts of action sampling equilibrium and payoff sampling equilibrium perform better than quantal response equilibrium and that the non parametric concept of impulse balance equilibrium performs at least as well as quantal response equilibrium

rawlsian intergenerational justice as a markov perfect equilibrium in a resource technology the rawlsian maximin criterion is combined with nonpaternalistic altruistic preferences in a nonrenewable resource technology the maximin programme is shown to be time inconsistent for a subset of initial conditions a solution to this intergenerational conflict is found under a given assumption as a generically unique subgame perfect equilibrium

tests of a heterogeneous bidders theory of first price auctions abstract this paper reports the results of eight first price sealed bid auction market experiments using cash motivated subjects to test a constant relative risk averse model crram of equilibrium bidding behavior of heterogeneous bidders

decarbonizing europe s power sector by 2050 analyzing the economic implications of alternative decarbonization pathways abstract the european union aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80 95 in 2050 compared to 1990 levels the transition towards a low carbon economy implies the almost complete decarbonization of europe s power sector which could be achieved along various pathways in this paper we evaluate the economic implications of alternative energy policies for europe s power sector by applying a linear dynamic electricity system optimization model in over 36 scenarios we find that the costs of decarbonizing europe s power sector by 2050 vary between 139 and 633 bn 2010 which corresponds to an increase of between 11 and 44 compared to the total system costs when no co2 reduction targets are implemented in line with economic theory the decarbonization of europe s power sector is achieved at minimal costs under a stand alone co2 reduction target which ensures competition between all low carbon technologies if however renewable energies are exempted from competition via supplementary renewable energy res e targets or if investments in new nuclear and ccs power plants are politically restricted the costs of decarbonization significantly rise moreover we find that the excess costs of supplementary res e targets depend on the acceptance of alternative low carbon technologies for example given a complete nuclear phase out in europe by 2050 and politically implemented restrictions on the application of ccs to conventional power plants supplementary res e targets are redundant while in such a scenario the overall costs of decarbonization are comparatively high the excess costs of supplementary res e targets are close to zero

heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies we explore an equilibrium model of games where behavior is given by logit response functions but payoff responsiveness and beliefs about others responsiveness are heterogeneous we study two substantively different ways of extending quantal response equilibrium qre to this setting 1 heterogeneus qre where players share identical correct beliefs about the distribution of payoff responsiveness and 2 truncated qre where players have downward looking beliefs systematically underestimating others responsiveness we show that the cognitive hierarchy model is a special case of truncated qre we conduct experiments designed to differentiate these approaches we find significant evidence of payoff responsive stochastic choice and of heterogeneity and downward looking beliefs in some games

some implications of investment cost reduction policies in energy markets employing green certificate systems around the world green certificate systems are widely employed as support mechanisms for the promotion of renewable energy production due to large initial capital costs for renewable energy projects investment cost reduction policies are often employed by policy makers as complementary support measures in this note we study some implications of the use of investment cost reduction policies in an energy market operated under a green certificate system we demonstrate that paradoxically use of or intensification of investment cost reduction policies results in increased emissions from fossil fuel black producers welfare effects depend on the distribution of costs and benefits to the relevant interest groups however if the policy objective requires maintaining a constant level of emissions investment cost mitigation must be accompanied by a simultaneous upward adjustment in the renewables target

measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games this paper proposes a method to measure strategic uncertainty by eliciting certainty equivalents analogous to measuring risk attitudes in lotteries we apply this method by conducting experiments on a class of one shot coordination games with strategic complementarities and choices between simple lotteries and sure payoff alternatives both framed in a similar way despite the multiplicity of equilibria in the coordination games aggregate behaviour is fairly predictable the pure or mixed nash equilibria cannot describe subjects behaviour we present two global games with private information about monetary payoffs and about risk aversion while previous literature treats the parameters of a global game as given we estimate them and show that both models describe observed behaviour well the global game selection for vanishing noise of private signals offers a good recommendation for actual players given the observed distribution of actions we also deduce subjective beliefs and compare them with objective probabilities

optimal regulation of renewable energy a comparison of feed in tariffs and tradable green certificates in the spanish electricity system abstract incentives for renewable energy based on feed in tariffs have succeeded in achieving high levels of renewable installed capacity however these incentives have not been responsive to market conditions or price signals imposing in some cases a great financial burden on consumers when renewable energy sources reached significant levels a way out of this problem could be a market mechanism where incentives respond to the level of investment on renewables we explore this issue comparing a regulatory system based on tradable green certificates able to react to market changes to a feed in tariffs incentive scheme we model the strategic interaction between participants in the electricity pool and the tradable green certificates market and focus on the optimal regulation for the retailer segment which generates the desired demand for green certificates as a decreasing function of the certificate price we then calibrate our theoretical model with data from the spanish electricity system for the period 2008 2013 simulations show that a green certificate scheme could both achieve the 2020 targets for renewable electricity and reduce regulatory costs however the role of regulators is still important since setting the right target for renewable electricity affects the cost burden of the system

inequality aversion and risk aversion this note shows that for two social welfare functions which are inequality averse and anonymous if one is more inequality averse than the other it induces a more risk averse household through optimal sharing than the other we present examples showing that this comparative static can be reversed if either the property of inequality aversion or anonymity is dropped

electricity markets for energy flexibility and availability impact of capacity mechanisms on the remuneration of generation technologies abstract increased shares of renewable energy sources res to fulfill ambitious european policy targets mothballing or decommissioning of existing units and absent investments lead to concerns about the system and market adequacy to restore market adequacy capacity mechanisms cms are widely discussed and implemented in various types they are intended to provide sufficient and clearly perceivable long term price signals for available capacity as integral part of the market cms interact with the other markets markets like day ahead markets are used to trade energy imbalance markets or reserve requirements are examples for markets for flexibility among others green certificates are in place to value emission neutral injection from res resulting altered prices and shifting remuneration have effects on all generation technologies cms may affect participating technologies by imposing a capacity demand a resulting change in the generation mix may also have an impact on non participating technologies two gaps can be identified in the discussion and modeling of cms in the literature first proposed game theoretic equilibrium models fall short in representing the distinctive features of different types of cms second most models incorporating cms found in the literature only focus on the interaction with the energy based market valid assessments of cm need to consider the interaction of remuneration for available capacity and flexibility and the indirect interaction with the remuneration for emission neutral res two formulations of a game theoretic market equilibrium model are proposed which represent specific cms with its distinctive features in particular a market wide centralized capacity market ccm and targeted strategic reserves srs moreover the equilibrium models explicitly combine the cms with markets for flexibility and indirect with remuneration for res we contribute to the discussion of cms by quantifying the interactions and shifting shares of remuneration based on the interaction between cms and remuneration for emission neutral injection the effect of cms on non participating res is described we conclude based on the case study results that targeted mechanisms like srs implemented with the single purpose of ensuring availability introduce large inefficiencies in the system by missing on the interaction between availability and flexibility in contrast a market wide ccm provides a beneficial outcome for all technologies at the same time it yields a sufficient high reserve margin at lowest cost it provides clear signals for the different values of energy output flexibility availability and emission neutral injection

aggregating infinite utility streams with intergenerational equity the impossibility of being paretian it has been known that in aggregating infinite utility streams there does not exist any social welfare function which satisfies the axioms of pareto intergenerational equity and continuity we show that the impossibility result persists even without imposing the continuity axiom and in frameworks allowing for more general domains of utilities than those used in the existing literature

risk averse behavior in generalized matching pennies games in experimental studies of behavior in 2 2 games with unique mixed strategy equilibria observed choice frequencies are systematically different from mixed strategy nash predictions this paper examines experimental results for a variety of such games and shows that a structural econometric model which incorporates risk aversion into a quantal response equilibrium explains the data very well moreover risk aversion estimates are stable across the different games and are close to those obtained from laboratory and field auction data as well as from individual lottery choice experiments

generation capacity expansion in a risky environment a stochastic equilibrium analysis we cast models of the generation capacity expansion type formally developed for the monopoly regime into equilibrium models better adapted for a competitive environment we focus on some of the risks faced today by investors in generation capacity and thus pose the problem as a stochastic equilibrium model we illustrate the approach on the problem of the incentive to invest agents can be risk neutral or risk averse we model risk aversion through the cvar of plants profit the cvar induces risk adjusted probabilities according to which investors value their plants the model is formulated as a complementarity problem including the cvar valuation of investments an illustration is provided on a small problem that captures several features of today s electricity world a choice often restricted to coal and gas units a peaky load curve because of wind penetration uncertain fuel prices and an evolving carbon market we assess the potential of the approach by comparing energy only and capacity market organizations in this risky environment our results can be summarized as follows a deterministic analysis overlooks some changes of capacity structure induced by risk whether in the capacity market or energy only organizations the risk neutral analysis also misses a shift towards less capital intensive technologies that may result from risk aversion last risk aversion also increases the shortage of capacity compared to the risk neutral view in the energy only market when the price cap is low this may have a dramatic impact on the bill to the final consumer the approach relies on mathematical programming techniques and can be extended to full size problems the results are illustrative and may deserve more investigation

impact of the regulatory framework for transmission investments on the cost of renewable energy in the eu abstract under the current regulatory frame in the eu transmission planning is done at the national level to maximize national welfare rather than european welfare in this paper we develop a competitive equilibrium model that calculates the impact of this imperfect regulatory framework on the cost of renewable energy we apply the model to a power system with two interconnected zones and find that the impact is case specific but significant we also find that the negative impact of national transmission planning on the cost of renewable energy is more significant in a state of the world in which member states trade renewable energy but that this negative effect is much smaller than the positive effect of renewable energy trade between member states we conclude that the imperfect regulatory framework for transmission investment is a significant cost for renewable energy in the eu but that it should not stop member states from trading renewable energy

the effects of payoff magnitude and heterogeneity on behavior in 2 2 games with unique mixed strategy equilibria the logit version of quantal response equilibrium predicts that equilibrium behavior in games will vary systematically with payoff magnitudes if all other factors are held constant including the nash equilibria of the game we explore this in the context of a set of asymmetric 2x2 games with unique totally mixed strategy equilibria the data provide little support for the payoff magnitude predictions of the logit equilibrium model we extend the theoretical quantal response equilibrium model to allow for heterogeneity and find that the data fit the heterogeneous version of the theory significantly better

quantitatively exploring the future of renewable portfolio standard in the korean electricity sector via a bottom up energy model abstract the republic of korea started to apply a new renewable energy policy renewable portfolio standard rps in 2012 but the policy has failed to obtain positive evaluation and some problems have arisen during the first two years in this study we have tried to investigate the current design operational mechanism of the policy to examine the reasons for its problems and to quantitatively predict future outlook for the examination and prediction we use the bottom up model approach which has not been commonly used for the rps policy but is usually utilized for evaluating specific policy options in an energy system therefore the main purpose of this study is not only to introduce a new approach for the exploration of the rps policy a scenario based quantitative analysis based on a bottom up energy system model but also to apply the approach into the policy in korea we develop a multi regional bottom up energy model and explicitly implement the mechanism of the policy in the model such as the transfer of tradable attribute renewable energy certificates recs the results of the model predict a serious disharmony of the current design of the policy under the national basic plan the optimistic fulfillment rate of recs in the entire mechanism will be around 66 in 2022 so the most regulated generators will suffer from the large shortfalls of recs and the total penalty for all regulated generators will be expected up to 1350 billion krw in 2022 we also diagnose the reasons of the disharmony as well as address some suggestions for its continued application as the korean case study we believe that the approach in this study can be utilized when policy makers design or amend the mechanism of rps with recs to help the policy operate efficiently and to prevent potential undesirable consequences

an experimental study of jury decision rules we present experimental results on groups facing a decision problem analogous to that faced by a jury we consider three treatment variables group size three or six number of votes needed for conviction majority or unanimity and pre vote deliberation we find evidence of strategic voting under the unanimity rule a large fraction of our subjects vote for a decision analogous to conviction even when their private information indicates a state analogous to innocence this is roughly consistent with the game theoretic predictions of feddersen and pesendorfer although individual behavior is explained well by the game theoretic model there are discrepancies at the level of the group decision contrary to feddersen and pesendorfer in our experiments there are fewer outcomes analogous to incorrect convictions under unanimity rule than under majority rule in the case of no deliberation we simultaneously account for the individual and group data using quantal response equilibrium

unjust intergenerational allocations abstract an intergenerational allocation is defined to be unjust if there is a feasible allocation with more total consumption and less relative inequality unjust allocations are characterized in technologies satisfying certain regularity conditions after ruling out unjust allocations the consequences of letting generations choose according to a standard form of altruistic preferences are explored in to particular classes of technologies a connection between excluding unjust allocations and maximizing the welfare of the worst off generation is established in these technologies

interactions of a tradable green certificate market with a tradable permits market abstract the reduction of greenhouse gas ghg emissions is an important goal in the energy and environmental policies of the european union eu and its member states according to a recent directive proposal from the eu commission the inclusion of renewable technologies is one of the important ways to achieve this emission reduction more policy instruments are on hand to pursue this objective frequently discussed currently is the establishing of a market for tradable permits for co2 emissions to achieve emission reductions in the power industry in parallel with this is the introduction of a green certificate market to promote the development of renewables if these two instruments are brought into play at the same time two separate markets with two individual targets will co exist in a number of countries with a focus on the green certificate market this paper discusses how these two markets may interact with each other in international trade three different cases are analysed 1 a green certificate market without any tradable permits scheme 2 a green certificate market in combination with a tradable permits scheme based on grandfathering and finally 3 a green certificate market in combination with a tradable permits bidding scheme emphasis is placed on analysing the pricing mechanisms in international trade at the green certificate and tradable permits market in relation to the value of the reductions in ghg emissions actually achieved the influence of the permits scheme on the spot market price of electricity is shown and the benefits of trading green certificates compared to a domestic implementation of renewable technologies are discussed the main conclusion is that only if a green certificate market is combined with a tradable permit scheme based on a bidding procedure will trade in certificates be equivalent to the domestic development of renewables using the bidding system no other country will have to pay for co2 reductions in the home country of the renewable development as would otherwise be the case if a tradable permit system based on grandfathering were introduced or even worse if no tradable permits were introduced at all finally it must be stated that even if the green certificate market were introduced alongside with a tradable permit bidding system there still would be no incentives for international certificate trade on account of the need for ghg reductions in the version of the green certificate market discussed in this paper no ghg credits are attached to certificates this means that the development of renewables will add to ghg reductions only in those countries where the plants are established no matter what kind of tradable permit scheme is adopted

on the effects of capacity payments in competitive electricity markets capacity adequacy price cap and reliability abstract this paper employs a two stage model to assess the consequences of an easy to use form of capacity payments in competitive electricity markets we show that capacity payments increase capacity and expected consumer surplus with little or no effect on expected social welfare expected consumer surplus plus expected profits minus the cost of using capacity payments minus expected outage costs in addition we demonstrate that capacity payments can substantially reduce or sometimes fully eliminate electricity outage costs due to price capping or unexpected failure of some generation capacity thus regulators should consider using this form of capacity payments since in addition to their favorable effect on consumers and on social welfare they mitigate the missing money problem and increase system reliability

cost effectiveness of renewable electricity policies we analyze policies to promote renewable sources of electricity a portfolio standard rps raises electricity prices and primarily reduces gas fired generation a knee of the cost curve exists between 15 and 20 goals for 2020 in our central case and higher natural gas prices lower the cost of greater reliance on renewables a renewable energy production tax credit lowers electricity price at the expense of taxpayers which limits its effectiveness in reducing carbon emissions and it is less cost effective at increasing renewables than a portfolio standard neither policy is as cost effective as a cap and trade policy for achieving carbon emission reductions

optimal interconnection and renewable targets for north west europe we present a mixed integer linear programming model for determining optimal interconnection for a given level of renewable generation using a cost minimisation approach optimal interconnection and capacity investment decisions are determined under various targets for renewable penetration the model is applied to a test system for eight regions in northern europe it is found that considerations on the supply side dominate demand side considerations when determining optimal interconnection investment interconnection is found to decrease generation capacity investment and total costs only when there is a target for renewable generation higher wind integration costs see a concentration of wind in high wind regions with interconnection to other regions

quantal response equilibrium models of the ultimatum bargaining game abstract this paper investigates the implications of quantal response equilibrium qre models mckelvey and palfrey 1995 games econ behav 10 6 38 1998 exper econ 1 9 41 in the ultimatum bargaining game it is shown that in a normal form qre nqre each bargainer s decision depends critically on the anticipated behavior of the other and there is a nqre in which the proposer makes any offer between zero and equal split as a strict best response the application of nqre to the experimental data slonim and roth 1998 econometrica 66 569 596 suggests that the history dependence observed in the experiment is a result of the strategic interactions between bargainers

on the empirical content of quantal response equilibrium the quantal response equilibrium qre notion of mckelvey and palfrey 1995 has recently attracted considerable attention due largely to its widely documented ability to rationalize observed behavior in games played by experimental subjects we show that this ability to t the data as typically measured in this literature is uninformative without ap riori distributional assumptions a qre can match any distribution of behavior by each player in any normal form game we discuss approaches that might be taken to provide valid empirical evaluation of the qre and discuss its potential value as an approximating empirical structure

pigou and future generations a cambridge tradition in the economics of welfare and elsewhere a c pigou took the view that future people should be treated equally with present people he stressed our defective telescopic faculty mortality and weak linkages over time and argued that the present generation would consequently devote too few resources to investment particularly in human capital pigou linked his argument with the then contemporary controversies about natural resource conservation and about eugenics this cambridge tradition holds that issues of generational justice leave an important role for the state and cannot be resolved simply at the level of the individual or the family c 1996 academic press limited copyright 1996 by oxford university press

modelling cognitively bounded rationality an evaluative taxonomy abstract since its origins in the 1950s the notion of bounded rationality has been incorporated into economic theory using an array of methodological approaches this paper presents a taxonomy by which these approaches can be categorized and understood evaluating each approach against a range of important criteria at a time when the foundations of economic theory are being re examined this paper should be viewed as a first step towards an assessment of the appropriate role that this more realistic view of cognition should take in different areas of economic theory and also of the desirable characteristics of models that incorporate it

when does aggregation reduce risk aversion we study the problem of risk sharing within a household or syndicate a household shares risky prospects using a social welfare functional we characterize the social welfare functionals such that the household is collectively less risk averse than each member and satisfies the pareto principle and an invariance axiom we single out the sum of certainty equivalents as the unique member of this family which is quasiconcave over riskless allocations

renewable generation expansion under different support schemes a stochastic equilibrium approach abstract following the deregulation of electricity markets a current challenge of policy makers is to facilitate the transition to a sustainable power system at the highest welfare for society in this paper we investigate the efficiency of different support schemes such as a feed in tariff a feed in premium and tradable green certificates with respect to incentivizing the required investments in renewable generation we consider a number of generation expansion problems and formulate stochastic equilibrium models that account for uncertainty in demand and renewable supply the risk aversion of investors and the competitiveness of the market the problem of the policy maker is formulated as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints mpec and as a non linear complementarity problem ncp for the feed in schemes and the certificate market respectively our models are solved for a small illustrative example and a larger case study based on the danish power system the results confirm that the main driver for the optimal choice of renewable support scheme is the aversion of power producers towards price and volume risk while the competitiveness of the market rarely affects such choice

the policy implications of the different interpretations of the cost effectiveness of renewable electricity support abstract the cost effectiveness of support for renewable electricity is a main criterion to assess the success of policy instruments together with effectiveness the costs of support are also a source of significant concern for governments all over the world however significant confusion exists in the literature on the cost effectiveness of public support for renewable electricity while some authors define the concept of cost effectiveness as that which complies with the equimarginality principle many others including documents from relevant organisations european commission international energy agency intergovernmental panel on climate change define it as the lowest costs of support generally equating it with the minimisation of consumer costs the aim of this paper is to clarify the differences between both approaches and their policy implications regarding the choice of instruments and design elements it is shown that they partly overlap and that their policy implications clearly differ leading to very different policy prescriptions while the former favours technology neutral instruments and design elements the minimisation of consumer costs approach favours instruments and design elements which adjust support levels to the costs of the technologies

planning for the long run programming with patient pareto responsive preferences ethical social welfare functions treat generations equally and respect pareto improvements to non null sets of generations there are perfect optima for such preferences generations facing the same circumstances choose the same actions and all circumstances are treated as possible if each stationary policy determines a unique long run distribution that is independent of the starting point then there is a recursive formulation of policies that are simultaneously optimal for all of the preferences studied here when the ergodic distribution can depend on early events hysteresis the curvature of the social welfare function determines the risks that society is willing to undertake and leads to a variant of the precautionary principle

theory and misbehavior of first price auctions recent experimental evidence appears to reject simple nash equilibrium models of bidding behavior in first price auctions the author presents a methodological critique of this evidence existing tests have concentrated on deviations of subjects from predictions in the message space of the action bid deviations the author suggests that it is more natural to evaluate subject behavior in expected payoff space he concludes that the evidence against the simple models is not significant enough to warrant their rejection copyright 1989 by american economic association

stationary concepts for experimental 2x2 games five stationary concepts for completely mixed 2 x 2 games are experimentally compared nash equilibrium quantal response equilibrium action sampling equilibrium payoff sampling equilibrium martin j osborne and ariel rubinstein 1998 and impulse balance equilibrium experiments on 12 games 6 constant sum games and 6 nonconstant sum games were run with 12 independent subject groups for each constant sum game and 6 independent subject groups for each nonconstant sum game each independent subject group consisted of four players 1 and four players 2 interacting anonymously over 200 periods with random matching the comparison of the five theories shows that the order of performance from best to worst is as follows impulse balance equilibrium payoff sampling equilibrium action sampling equilibrium quantal response equilibrium nash equilibrium