firm optimism and pessimism abstract this paper explores the question of whether firms have systematic expectation biases using microdata from the west german manufacturing subset of the ifo business climate survey we infer quarterly production growth rates at the firm level we then combine this information with production growth expectations over a quarterly horizon to construct quantitative firm specific expectation errors our findings show that at most one third of our firms systematically over or underpredict their production growth one quarter ahead our findings further show that larger and exporting firms tend to have more realistic expectations while firms with higher leverage are more prone to expectations that are biased towards optimism

the brevity and violence of contractions and expansions abstract early studies of business cycles argued that contractions in economic activity were briefer shorter and more violent rapid than expansions this paper systematically investigates this claim and in the process discovers a robust new business cycle fact contractions in employment are briefer and more violent than expansions but we cannot reject the null of equal brevity and violence for expansions and contractions in output the difference arises because employment typically lags output around peaks but they coincide in their troughs we discuss the performance of existing business cycle models in accounting for this fact and conclude that none can fully account for it we then show that a business cycle model with asymmetric adjustment costs on employment and a choice of when to scrap old technologies can account for the business cycle fact both qualitatively and quantitatively

political and institutional determinants of fiscal policy in the european community in recent theoretical and empirical research the variation in political and institutional arrangements which may affect the process of national policy formation is examined in order to explain cross country differences with respect to fiscal policies pursued in this paper we build upon this literature and examine whether and how cross country differences in debt accumulation and public sector size of member countries of the european community during the 1980s can be explained we conclude that the growth of government debt is positively related to the frequency of government changes and negatively to sound budgetary procedures in countries with left wing governments the growth of the share of government spending in total output generally tends to be higher

strong form efficiency with monopolistic insiders we study market efficiency in an infinite horizon model with a monopolistic insider the insider can trade with competitive market makers and noise traders and observes privately the expected growth rate of asset dividends in the absence of the insider this information would be reflected in prices only after a long series of dividend observations thus the insider s information is long lived surprisingly however the monopolistic insider chooses to reveal her information very quickly within a time converging to zero as the market approaches continuous trading although the market converges to strong form efficiency the insider s profits do not converge to zero

traders expectations in asset markets experimental evidence we elicit traders predictions of future price trajectories in repeated experimental markets for a 15 period lived asset we find that individuals beliefs about prices are adaptive and primarily based on past trends in the current and previous markets in which they have participated most traders do not anticipate market downturns the first time they participate in a market and when experienced they typically overestimate the time remaining before market peaks and downturns occur when prices deviate from fundamental values belief data are informative to an observer in predicting the direction of future price movements and the timing of market peaks

can firms see into the future survey evidence from germany abstract this paper presents new evidence on the expectation formation process of firms from a survey of the german manufacturing sector first firms become too optimistic after their business has improved consistent with the over extrapolation of their experience second firms extrapolate improvements in their business more than deteriorations third firms are more optimistic pessimistic than usual during business cycle peaks troughs suggesting that they do not anticipate reversals fourth the german reunification provided a positive exogenous shock to the business of west german products the industries most positively affected by the shock initially over extrapolated the past downward trend just as much as the less affected industries and thus failed to anticipate the reversal fifth more overoptimistic firms subsequently report larger inventories and lower profits suggesting that expectation errors entail opportunity costs sixth older and larger firms show a smaller extrapolation bias indicating that time and resources can alleviate the extrapolation bias seventh firms that expect their business to improve tend to also expect their prices to increase suggesting that firms mostly try to forecast demand shocks as opposed to supply shocks overall these observations suggest that firms have a limited ability to anticipate changes in their activity and extrapolate their experience too much

how to succeed at increasing spending without really trying the balanced budget amendment and the item veto congressional efforts at budgetary reform generally contain procedural impediments designed to limit profligate spending in particular the line item veto and the balanced budget amendment are intended to limit the ability of legislators to pursue their constituents interests through pork barrel politics at the expense of the broader public interest however assuming that legislators remain motivated by local constituent interests we argue that these reforms will promote unexpected results the supermajorities requires by the line item veto and the balanced budget amendment include incentives for log rolling that promote and may indeed increase pork barrel spending

government spending and budget deficits in the industrial economies fiscal policy nouriel roubini and jeffrey sachs this paper examines the evolution of the size of government and of budget deficits in oecd economies we highlight the rapid increase in government spending in the 1970s the sharp rise in budget deficits and public debt after 1973 and the reversal in these trends in the 1980s the increase in the size of government was associated in part with the slowdown in growth after 1973 but also reflected gradual adjustment of the ratio of spending to output towards a long run target which depends on political and institutional characteristics of the economy the political orientation of the government the degree of wage indexation and the degree of stability of the political system such factors also explain the size of budget deficits when faced with an adverse shock subsequent deficit reduction requires a measure of political consensus we note that such consensus is hard to achieve in multi party coalitions in consequence countries with such a political structure tended in consequence countries with such a political structure tended toin consequence countries with such a political structure tended to experience much more rapid increases in their debt gnp ratios

information rigidity and the expectations formation process a simple framework and new facts we propose a new approach to test the full information rational expectations hypothesis which can identify whether rejections of the null arise from irrationality or limited information this approach quantifies the economic significance of departures from the null by quantifying the underlying degree of information rigidity applying this approach to u s and international data of professional forecasters and other agents yields pervasive evidence consistent with models of imperfect information furthermore the proposed approach sheds new light on policies such as inflation targeting and those leading to the great moderation affecting expectations finally we document evidence of state dependence in the expectations formation process

on existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in a class of noisy rational expectations models i study a general class of noisy rational expectations models that nests the standard grossman and stiglitz 1980 and hellwig 1980 models but relaxes the usual assumption of joint normality of asset pay offs and supply and allows for more general signal structures i provide a constructive proof of existence of equilibrium characterize the price function and provide sufficient conditions for uniqueness within the class of equilibria with continuous price functions which are met by both the grossman and stiglitz 1980 models and the hellwig 1980 models with a continuum of investors my solution approach does not rely on the typical conjecture and verify method and i exhibit a number of non normal examples in which asset prices can be characterized explicitly and in a closed form the results presented here open up a broad class of models for applied work to illustrate the usefulness of generalizing the standard model i show that in settings with non normally distributed pay offs shocks to fundamentals may be amplified purely due to learning effects price drifts can arise naturally and the disagreement return relation depends in a novel way on return skewness

divided government fiscal institutions and budget deficits evidence from the states does partisan control of american state government have systematic effects on state spending and taxing levels does divided control affect the government s ability to make hard decisions do institutional rules like legal deficit carryover restrictions matter using a formal model of fiscal policy to guide empirical analysis of data covering the american states from 1968 to 1987 we conclude that 1 aggregate state budget totals are driven by different factors under democrats and republicans the net result being that democrats target spending and taxes to higher shares of state level personal income 2 divided government is less able to react to revenue shocks that lead to budget deficits particularly where different parties control each chamber of the legislature and 3 unified party governments with restricted ability to carry deficits into the next fiscal year outside the south have sharper reactions to negative revenue shocks than those without restrictions

fragmented government effects on fiscal policy new evidence most industrialized countries entered the 1980s with their public finances in disarray at the time persistent deficits pushed up public debt to gdpratios despite such similarities deficit spending varies substantially between countries and within countries over time recent theoretical and empirical research has considered how differences in political arrangements affecting national policy formation might explain variation in fiscal policies pursued using a panel of 22 oecd countries over the 1971 1996 period this paper extends previous literature on the effects of fragmented government on fiscal policy outcomes in various directions first we focus on data relating to central government instead of general government as all theories refer to central government second not only do we analyze the effect of size fragmentation of government we also examine government s position vis a vis parliament and government s political fragmentation we find evidence that more fragmented government defined in terms of the number of political parties in a coalition or the number of spending ministers have higher deficits there is also some evidence that governments that dispose of excess seats in parliament have lower deficits right wing governments appear to have been fiscally more responsible in the seventies political fragmentation does not affect government s budget deficit

why are stabilizations delayed when a stabilization has significant distributional implications e g tax increases to eliminate a large budget deficit socioeconomic groups may attempt to shift the burden of stabilization onto other groups the process leading to stabilization becomes a war of attrition each group attempting to wait the others out and stabilization occurring only when one group concedes and bears a disproportionate share of the burden the authors solve for the expected time of stabilization in a model of rational delay and relate it to several political and economic variables they motivate this approach and its results by comparison to historical and current episodes copyright 1991 by american economic association

monetary policy announcements and expectations evidence from german firms abstract we assess empirically whether monetary policy announcements impact firm expectations two features of our data set are key first we rely on a survey of production and price expectations of german firms that is expectations of actual price setters second we observe the day on which firms submit their answers to the survey we compare the responses of firms before and after monetary policy surprises and obtain two results first firm expectations respond to policy surprises second the response becomes weaker as the surprise becomes bigger a contractionary surprise of moderate size reduces firm expectations while a moderate expansionary surprise raises them large surprises both negative and positive fail to alter expectations consistent with this result we find that many of the ecb s announcements of non conventional policies did not affect expectations significantly overall our results are consistent with the notion that monetary policy surprises generate an information effect which is endogenous to the size of the policy surprise

can households see into the future survey evidence from the netherlands abstract this paper presents new evidence on the expectation formation process from a dutch household survey households become too optimistic about their future income after their income has improved consistent with the overextrapolation of their experience we show that this effect of experience is persistent and that households overextrapolate income losses more than income gains furthermore older households overextrapolate more suggesting that they did not learn over time to form more accurate expectations finally we study the relationship between expectation errors and consumption we find that more overoptimistic households intend to consume more and subsequently report higher consumption even though they do not consume as much as they intended to these results suggest that overextrapolation hurts consumers and amplifies business cycles

theory and evidence of municipal borrowing in chile although chilean municipalities are not permitted to borrow they do so through arrears and leasing contracts a formal model of municipal indebtedness is estimated based on a sample of 345 municipalities with yearly data from 2004 to 2007 variables that are positively and significantly related to borrowing through arrears are mayors closely tied to the ruling central government coalition politically diverse municipal councils years close to elections and deeper municipal involvement in education while leasing contracts appear to be insensitive to political factors they are positively and significantly related to municipal staff managerial skills and municipal revenues per capita

political determinants of budget deficits coalition effects versus minority effects this paper reexamines some recent empirical evidence on the hypothesis that institutional arrangements in the political process affect budget deficits the results of roubini and sachs 1989b are replicated and sensitivity analysis indicate that their results are robust however the main conclusion of roubini and sachs that coalition governments are less capable of budgetary discipline needs to be modified a reformulation of their variable representing political cohesion reveals that it captures the effects of minority governments rather than majority coalition governments the data support the hypothesis that it is harder to negotiate in parliament than within a government

a positive theory of fiscal deficits and government debt this paper considers an economy in which policymakers with different preferences alternate in office as a result of elections government debt is used strategically by each policymaker to influence the choices of his successors if different policymakers disagree about the desired composition of government spending between two public goods the economy exhibits a deficits bias that is debt accumulation is higher than it would be with a social planner the equilibrium level of debt is larger the larger is the degree of polarization between alternating governments and the less likely it is that the current government will be re elected

expectations and bubbles in asset pricing experiments abstract we present results on expectation formation in a controlled experimental environment in each period subjects are asked to predict the next price of a risky asset the realized market price is derived from an unknown market equilibrium equation with feedback from individual forecasts in most experiments prices deviate from the benchmark fundamental and bubbles emerge endogenously these bubbles are inconsistent with rational expectations and seem to be driven by trend chasing behavior or positive feedback expectations of the participants we also analyze individual predictions of participants and find that participants within a group tend to coordinate on a common prediction strategy

do large cabinets favor large governments evidence on the fiscal commons problem for swiss cantons abstract the fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending in political economics for a panel of the 26 swiss cantons over the 1980 1998 periods this paper explores the role of fragmented governments on fiscal policy outcomes we distinguish between two variants of fragmented governments cabinet size and coalition size in addition we analyze whether constitutional rules for executive and legislature as well as formal fiscal restraints shape the size of government and how different rules interact with fragmentation the results indicate that the number of ministers in the cabinet is positively associated with the size of government while fiscal referendums effectively restrict the size of government there is also evidence that fiscal referendums relax the fiscal commons problem to some extent

what goes up must come down experimental evidence on intuitive forecasting do laboratory subjects correctly perceive the dynamics of a mean reverting time series in our experiment subjects re ceive historical data and make forecasts at dif ferent horizons the time series process that we use features short run momentum and long run partial mean reversion half of the subjects see a version of this process in which the momentum and partial mean reversion un fold over 10 periods fast while the other subjects see a version with dynamics that un fold over 50 periods slow typical subjects recognize most of the mean reversion of the fast process and none of the mean reversion of the slow process

inattentive professional forecasters abstract using the ecb survey of professional forecasters to characterize expectations at the micro level we emphasize two new facts forecasters i fail to systematically update their forecasts and ii disagree even when updating it is moreover found that forecasters have predictable forecast errors these facts are qualitatively supportive of recent models of inattention and suggest a setup where agents imperfectly process information due to both sticky information a la mankiw reis and noisy information a la sims however building and estimating such an expectation model we find that it cannot quantitatively replicate the error and disagreement observed in the data

what can survey forecasts tell us about information rigidities a lot we derive common and conflicting predictions from models in which agents face information constraints and then assess their validity using surveys of consumers firms central bankers and professional forecasters we document that mean forecasts fail to completely adjust on impact to shocks leading to statistically and economically significant deviations from the null of full information the dynamics of forecast errors after shocks are consistent with the predictions of models with information rigidities the conditional responses of forecast errors and disagreement among agents can also be used to differentiate between some of the most prominent models of information rigidities

are economic time series asymmetric over the business cycle it has long been argued that major cyclical variables such as the unemployment rate display an asymmetric behavior over various phases of the business cycle the paper provides a statistical test for this hypothesis using the framework of finite state markov processes i implement a test to see if the behavior of the unemployment rate is characterized by sudden jumps and slower drops it is argued that the framework provided in the paper can also be used to test other sample path properties of economic time series

the weak government thesis some new evidence this paper presents new evidence on the hypothesis that coalition governments will find it more difficult to keep their budgets in line after an adverse economic shock than do one party majoritarian governments the estimates are based on a broad sample of oecd countries for the period 1979 1995 using various specifications as suggested in the literature we do not find evidence that the type of government affects cross country variation in fiscal policy however the number of political parties in government affects central government debt growth

why a stubborn conservative would run a deficit policy with time inconsistent preferences a conservative government in favor of a low level of public consumption knows that it will be replaced by a government in favor of a larger level of public consumption we show that the resulting level of public consumption is in between the levels the two governments would choose if each were in power both in the present and in the future in particular we show that if the conservative government is more stubborn in a particular sense than the succeeding government the conservative government will borrow more than it would had it remained in power in the future

the balanced budget amendment clarifying the arguments from the perspective of a supporter this paper responds to the several criticisms that have been raised to the proposed constitutional amendment to require budget balance economists have concentrated on the loss of fiscal flexibility this objection is countered by reference to the political inefficacy of attempted budgetary manipulation lawyers have concentrated on problems of enforcement this objection is countered by reference to observed respect to other constitutional rules

the political economy of benefits and costs a neoclassical approach to distributive politics this essay offers a rational political explanation for the notorious inefficiency of pork barrel projects with an optimization model of legislative behavior and legislative institutions the model emphasizes the economically arbitrary from a welfare point of view importance of the geographic incidence of benefits and costs owing to the geographic basis for political representation we explore the implications of a legislator s objective function and derive conditions under which a representative legislature will select an omnibus of projects each of which exceeds the efficient scale

comments on monetary policy announcements and expectations evidence from german firms abstract enders et al 2019b find that small expansionary monetary policy surprises lead to increases in firms price and production expectations vice versa for small contractionary monetary surprises for larger monetary surprises of either direction the reaction of price and production expectations tends to be dampened back to zero this finding is explained with a differential size dependent mix in monetary policy surprises as regards their actual monetary policy content and their delphic information content about how the monetary authority views the state of the economy policy conclusions from this result for the conduct of monetary policy and its communication are discussed

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

the political determinants of fiscal policies in the states of india an empirical investigation abstract using data from the 14 major states of india we investigate whether state governments fiscal policy choices are tempered by political considerations our principal findings are twofold first we show that certain fiscal policies experience electoral cycles state governments raise less commodity tax revenue spend less on the current account and incur larger capital account developmental expenditures in election years than in all other years second we show that coalition state governments raise less own non tax revenues and spend less on the current account than state governments that are more cohesive in composition in sum the dispersion of political power affects government size

biases in macroeconomic forecasts irrationality or asymmetric loss empirical studies using survey data on expectations have frequently observed that forecasts are biased and have concluded that agents are not rational we establish that existing rationality tests are not robust to even small deviations from symmetric loss and hence have little ability to tell whether the forecaster is irrational or the loss function is asymmetric we quantify the exact trade off between forecast inefficiency and asymmetric loss leading to identical outcomes of standard rationality tests and explore new and more general methods for testing forecast rationality jointly with flexible families of loss functions that embed quadratic loss as a special case an empirical application to survey data on forecasts of nominal output growth demonstrates the empirical significance of our results and finds that rejections of rationality may largely have been driven by the assumption of symmetric loss

fragmented fiscal policy abstract this paper explores on a panel of 19 oecd countries the role of fragmentation in determining fiscal outcomes over the 1970 95 period we first define the notion of fragmentation of fiscal policy making as the degree to which the costs of a dollar of aggregate expenditure are internalized by individual decision makers empirically this notion has two key logical components the number of decision makers and the rules of the game or the budget process in turn the number of decision makers can refer to the number of parties in a coalition or the number of ministers in the cabinet we test all these determinants against each other and against perhaps the oldest explanation of all ideology we show that cabinet size and to a lesser degree coalition size and ideology are significant and robust determinants of fiscal outcomes in particular transfers are the budget items most affected by these factors

the effectiveness of institutional borrowing restrictions empirical evidence from spanish municipalities the need for restrictions on borrowing by subnational governments is a generally accepted notion that is justified both by public choice theory and by the fact that such restrictions are in force in the majority of decentralized countries furthermore recent breaches of the stability and growth pact of the european union have led to the introduction of legislative tools aimed at balancing the budget at all levels of government have come to the forefront of interest in european public finance research this paper is concerned with the financial situation and debt level of spanish municipalities from 1988 to 2000 we have two main objectives the first is to assess the value of mandatory limitations on municipal borrowing and past trends in the borrowing policies adopted by spanish local authorities the second is to develop an econometric model using panel data stratified by population size to measure indebtedness in spanish municipalities these measures enable us to formulate a series of hypotheses to explain municipal borrowing practices which are then tested empirically the evidence thus obtained appears to support the effectiveness of institutional borrowing restrictions to introduce some financial discipline in the borrowing policies adopted by local governments in spain

the political economy of deficit spending in nine industrialized parliamentary democracies the role of fiscal institutions this article analyzes the influence of four sets of factors on deficit spending in 9 industrialized parliamentary democracies during 1958 1990 this article analyzes the influence of these factors and introduces and tests the importance of an additional potential influence on the size of a country s fiscal deficit the strength of fiscal bureaucracy it is argued that the stronger a country s fiscal bureaucracy the lower its deficit ceteris paribus empirically the authors find that the state of a nation s economy heavily affects its deficit little systematic relationship is found between the ideology of the ruling political party and a nation s deficit or between the political strength of the ruling party and deficits in contrast to the findings of roubini and sachs finally it is found that the strength of a country s fiscal bureaucracy is an important influence on the deficit in these 9 industrialized parliamentary democracies

the political economy of inaction abstract this paper develops a simple model of political inaction in a two party democracy i e it shows the conditions under which both parties will prefer to live with an unsatisfactory and inefficient status quo rather than to raise an issue the risk of raising the issue to either party is the fear of ending up with the other party s policy for example by losing the electron regarded as even worse than the status quo the model shows that the problem is likely to be particularly serious the more evenly matched is political competition the more risk averse the parties the less voters trust the parties the more divided is public opinion and the more important the issue the model is illustrated with a number of examples of real world inaction e g on fiscal deficits abortion the transition to socialism and the fall of the weimar republic in general the analysis also suggests that over a range more representation of political viewpoints implies a smaller likelihood of political action so that democracy implies a tradeoff between representation and the capacity for political action

strategic trading and unobservable information acquisition abstract we allow a strategic trader to choose when to acquire information about an asset s payoff instead of endowing her with it when the trader dynamically controls the precision of a flow of information the optimal precision evolves stochastically and increases with market liquidity because the trader exploits her information gradually the equilibrium price impact and market uncertainty are unaffected by her rate of acquisition if she pays a fixed cost to acquire lumpy information at a time of her choosing the market can break down we show that no equilibria exist with endogenous information acquisition our analysis suggests caution when applying insights from standard strategic trading models to settings with information acquisition

firm performance and macro forecast accuracy abstract combining a unique survey of japanese firms gdp forecasts with accounting data for 25 years we find three main results first firms gdp forecasts are associated with their employment investment and output growth in the subsequent year second over optimistic and pessimistic forecast errors predict lower profitability and productivity consistent with our model of input choice under uncertainty third larger and more cyclical firms make forecasts closer to professionals presumably reflecting their higher return to accuracy forecasts by more productive and older firms are also more similar to professional forecasts implying forecasting ability is linked to management ability and experience

insider trading stochastic liquidity and equilibrium prices we extend kyle s 1985 model of insider trading to the case where liquidity provided by noise traders follows a general stochastic process even though the level of noise trading volatility is observable in equilibrium measured price impact is stochastic if noise trading volatility is mean reverting then the equilibrium price follows a multivariate stochastic bridge process which displays stochastic volatility this is because insiders choose to optimally wait to trade more aggressively when noise trading activity is higher in equilibrium market makers anticipate this and adjust prices accordingly more private information is revealed when volatility is higher in time series insiders trade more aggressively when measured price impact is lower therefore execution costs to uninformed traders can be higher when price impact is lower

an empirical investigation of the strategic use of debt the paper examines the accumulation of debt by swedish local governments i find that right wing governments accumulate more debt when facing a higher probability of defeat whereas the opposite occurs for left wing governments these effects are sizable a right wing government increases its level of debt by 15 percent whereas a left wing government decreases its debt by 11 percent if they are both certain of being replaced as compared to when they are certain of remaining in office the results are consistent with the predictions from a strategic debt model developed by persson and svensson

political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries institutions and policies vittorio grilli donato masciandaro and guido tabellini why do countries as similar as the industrialized oecd countries go through such different experience in terms of public deficits and debts or in terms of inflation the answer cannot come from macroeconomic policy responses to different disturbances nor from the principles of optimal taxation but rather from politics this article focuses on the role that particular institutions exert in providing constraints and incentives which shape the actions of policymakers the electoral process and political traditions affect the ability of governments to deal with deficits and mounting debts what seems to matter most it is found is the effect of the durability of governments governments with short horizons act myopically and never quite tackle the hard choices such governments typically exist in countries with an electoral system favouring many small political parties central bank independence promotes low inflation with no apparent costs in terms of real economic performance irrespective of the political institutions in fact there is no link between monetary and fiscal discipline these findings carry powerful implications for countries facing high indebtedness or stubborn inflation but also for the construction of the european economic and monetary union

local government borrowing and repayment in indonesia does fiscal capacity matter abstract most regional government borrowing in indonesia has been conducted via central government mechanisms while the terms and conditions of central lending have been highly favorable to regional borrowers repayment of debt has been very poor the empirical evidence suggests that local governments have borrowed well within their fiscal capacities to repay and that repayment problems are largely a function of unwillingness to repay debts and of central government acquiescence regional borrowing must significantly increase in the years ahead in order to meet growing demand for infrastructure services and lending to regions will have to become more market based reducing systemic credit risk and improving the creditworthiness of regional borrowers are prerequisites to increased and sustained market based lending

charles k rowley william f shughart ii and robert d tollison eds the economics of budget deficits the international library of critical writings in economics 153 ed by mark blaug cheltenham u k and northampton ma u s a edward elgar 2002 2 vols 1 112 pages usd 370 00 gbp 245 00 cloth

business cycle asymmetry a deeper look this paper distinguishes two types of asymmetry in business cycles deepness and steepness deepness is defined as the characteristic that troughs are further below trend than peaks are above most previous research has focused exclusively on steepness which refers to cycles in which contractions are steeper than expansions a test for deepness is proposed and applied to u s post war quarterly unemployment real gnp and industrial production evidence of deepness is found for unemployment and industrial production while the evidence for real gnp is weaker previous evidence of steepness in unemployment is confirmed