digging for golden carrots an analysis of research tournaments contracting for research is often infeasible because research inputs are unobservable and research outcomes cannot be verified by a court sponsoring a research tournament can resolve these problems a model is presented in which contestants compete to find the innovation of highest value to the tournament sponsor the winner receives a prespecified prize the tournament game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium free entry is not optimal because equilibrium effort by each researcher decreases in the number of contestants an optimally designed research tournament balances the probability of overshooting the first best quality level against the probability of falling short copyright 1995 by american economic association

prizes and lemons procurement of innovation under imperfect commitment the literature on r d contests implicitly assumes that contestants submit their innovation regardless of its value this ignores a potential adverse selection problem the present paper analyzes the procurement of innovations when the procurer cannot commit to never bargain with innovators who bypass the contest we compare xed prize tournaments with and without entry fees and optimal scoring auctions with and without minimum score requirement our main result is that the optimal xed prize tournament is more pro table than the optimal auction since preventing bypass is more costly in the optimal auction

contest design and optimal endogenous entry this paper derives the effort maximizing contest rule and the optimal endogenous entry in a context where potential participants bear fixed entry costs the organizer is allowed to design the contest under a fixed budget with two strategic instruments he sets the value of the prize purse and arranges a monetary transfer entry subsidy or fee for each participating contestant in other words the budget can either be used to subsidize participation or an entry fee can be charged to fund the prize purse the results show that the optimally designed contest attracts exactly two participating contestants in its unique subgame perfect equilibrium when there is a positive fixed entry cost and extracts all the surplus from participating contestants the study also shows that the direction and amount of the monetary transfer depend on the magnitude of the entry cost the contest organizer subsidizes entry when contestants bear substantial entry costs but charges an entry fee to fund the prize purse whenever the entry cost is sufficiently low

from production networks to geographical economics abstract although standard economics textbooks are seldom interested in production networks modern economies are more and more based upon supplier customer interactions one can consider entire sectors of the economy as generalised supply chains we will take this view in the present paper and study under which conditions local failures to produce or simply to deliver can result in avalanches of shortage and bankruptcies and in localisation of the economic activity we will show that a large class of models exhibit scale free distributions of production and wealth among firms and that regions of high production are localised

shipwrecks and treasure hunters we examine dynamic search as a game in which two rivals explore an island for a hidden prize of known value in every period until its discovery the players decide how much of the unsearched area to comb if a player finds the prize alone he wins it and the game ends players have a per period discount factor and costs proportional to the area they search first as a benchmark for efficiency we solve the one player search problem second in the two player setting we show that typically there is inefficient over search a result akin to the tragedy of the commons however for players with intermediate levels of patience there is the possibility of inefficient under search as players incorporate the expected future payoffs in their current search decisions finally with patient players several counterintuitive results can arise for example players might be better off searching a larger island or looking for a less valuable prize

cheating in contests i introduction competition to win the rewards attendant to ranking first in a contest motivates effort or performance by agents in all manner of tasks of course competition is also often valued for its own sake as well as for eliciting output from the contestants as evidenced by the popularity of activities as diverse as sports poker tournaments singing contests and the plethora of reality television programs featuring a contest to be the last contestant standing at the end of the season virtually every contest is characterized by rules sometimes implicit regarding acceptable and unacceptable behavior executives within a firm compete for promotion based on their performance but accounting fraud violation of government regulations or simply unprofessional or unethical business conduct unacceptable to the firm may disqualify an individual athletes may cheat by using performance enhancing drugs or banned equipment e g a corked baseball bat firms in a rent seeking contest may go beyond legal forms of buying political influence lobbying to unacceptable bribery wherever competition motivates a desirable activity or productive effort it may also motivate undesirable and therefore prohibited behavior that is cheating that the organizer of the contest must attempt to police if enforcement is sufficiently costly and imperfect cheating will play a role in this article we model cheating behavior in a symmetric rank order tournament contest we ask how the degree of cheating responds to the parameters of the tournament e g the payoff spread the distribution of the random component of output the probability of being caught cheating and the number of contestants and we identify how particular aspects of the design of contests affect cheating since the pioneering work of lazear and rosen 1981 nalebuff and stiglitz 1983 o keeffe viscusi and zeckhauser 1984 and others a large body of literature has modeled the incentives of agents in contests or rank order tournaments the distinguishing features of these models are that contestants are compensated based on the rank of their output compared with others rather than the level of output compensation levels or prizes are set in advance and output or rank is determined by a combination of costly effort and random noise the somewhat distinct literature on all pay auctions differs in that no random component contributes to the outcome and therefore equilibrium behavior may be characterized by mixed strategies see e g baye kovenock and de vries 1996 baye and hoppe 2003 discuss the strategic equivalence of rent seeking innovation and patent race games which are all essentially contests in which each player expends resources in an attempt to win a prize however to our knowledge there have been only limited efforts discussed below to model contestants incentives to cheat in models of contests in our model cheating is deterred through a random audit or inspection process cheating increases a contestant s output but the more a contestant cheats the more likely his cheating will be detected in the event an audit occurs many of the results of our model are quite intuitive the extent of cheating decreases as the probability of detection grows the degree of the randomness increases or the penalty if caught cheating increases however several results are surprising we find that although increasing monitoring intensity drives down the level of cheating it may decrease productive effort in the contest this occurs because effort falls if it becomes more likely that the effort will not determine the outcome and when monitoring is increased from a low level this increases the probability that the outcome of the contest is determined by disqualification we find that the level of cheating is reduced when a contestant can win by default that is if the discovery of cheating on the part of the contestant who finished first results in the next highest ranking contestant winning by default the incentive to cheat is weaker than if no prize is awarded when the top ranked contestant is found to have cheated

the effect of process management on different types of innovations an analytical modeling approach abstract we investigate the trade off between r d efficiency and creativity during the development of a new product a firm s ability to balance efficiency with innovation positively affects its capacity to maintain its competitiveness although the trade off between efficiency and creativity has long been discussed in terms of practical application little analytical research has been performed to enhance theoretical understanding to redress this gap in the literature we present an extreme value model that accounts for innovation type and competition intensity and offer a set of theoretical and practical insights to demonstrate that the effects of process management depend on the nature of the innovation employed we show that the inverse relationship between efficiency and creativity is more pronounced if r d projects represent paradigm shifting innovations rather than incremental innovations we then demonstrate how competition drives firms to decrease investment in innovation activities and improve process efficiency to maximize profit our results suggest that process management activities are less recommended for firms that pursue radical innovation and the acceleration of growth

the strategic equivalence of rent seeking innovation and patent race games abstract we establish the strategic equivalence of a variety of rent seeking contests innovation tournaments and patent race games the results allow us to disentangle negative and positive externalities and to apply theorems and results intended for rent seeking games to other games and vice versa we conclude with several examples that highlight the practical utility of our results

selection of entrepreneurs in the venture capital industry an asymptotic analysis we study a model of entrepreneurs who compete in an auction like setting for venture capital vc funding in a setting where limited capital dictates that the vc can only finance the best entrepreneurs with asymmetric information vcs can only assess entrepreneurs by the progress of development which in equilibrium reveals the quality of the new technology using an asymptotic analysis we prove that in attractive industries having a large number of entrepreneurs competing for vc funding could lead to underinvestment in technology by entrepreneurs as the effort exerted by losing entrepreneurs is wasted the study then proceeds to characterize the conditions under which a greater number of competing entrepreneurs is better the model also demonstrates that vcs could possibly increase their payoff by concentrating on a single industry in addition the study also provides some insights on the effects of multiple investments by vcs and the effects of competition among vcs on the same investments

the rise fall and rise again of industrial location theory m ccann p and sheppard s 2003 the rise fall and rise again of industrial location theory reg studies 37 649 663 in this paper we will argue that new academic fashions new international institutional arrangements new communications technology and new developments in data availability have all renewed the need for a redevelopment of analytical industrial location theory our paper will argue that the microeconomic foundations of industrial location theory must now be reconsidered in particular the methodological basis of traditional industrial location models needs to be reconciled with recent models of clustering the new economic geography literature and also more aggregate systemic levels of analysis we will argue that in order to do this it is necessary first to specify the transactions cost assumptions underlying these various approaches second to adopt broader definitions of spatial transactions costs and third to incorporate environmental characteristics within an orthodox loca

political culture and discrimination in contests abstract many economic and political decisions are the outcome of strategic contests for a given prize the nature of such contests can be determined by a designer who is driven by political considerations with a specific political culture the main objective of this study is to analyze the effect of political culture and of valuation asymmetry on discrimination between the contestants the weights assigned to the public well being and the contestants efforts represent the political culture while discrimination is an endogenous variable that characterizes the mechanism allocating the prize we consider situations under which the optimal bias of the designer is in favor of the contestant with the larger or smaller prize valuation and examine the effect of changes in the political culture and in valuation asymmetry on the designer s preferred discrimination between the contestants focusing on the two most widely studied types of contest success functions deterministic all pay auctions and logit csfs we show that an all pay auction is always the preferred csf from the point of view of the contest designer this result provides a new political economic micro foundation to some of the most commonly used models in the contest literature

ranking games and gambling when to quit when you re ahead it is common for rewards to be given on the basis of a rank ordering so that relative performance amongst a cohort is the criterion in this paper we formulate an equilibrium model in which an agent makes successive decisions on whether or not to gamble and is rewarded on the basis of a rank ordering of the final position amongst competing players one application of this model is to the behavior of mutual fund managers who are paid depending on funds under management which in turn are greatly influenced by annual or quarterly rank orderings our model deals with a situation in which fund managers can elect either to pick stocks or to use a market tracking strategy in equilibrium the distribution of the final position will have a negative skew we explore how this distribution depends on the number of players the probability of success when gambling the structure of the rewards and on information regarding the performance of other players

the assessment the economics of sport the study of sports economics has expanded rapidly in recent years in response to significantly increased demand for sport itself for economic analysis relevant to commercial litigation in sport for lively teaching material in schools and universities and for research into the incentive properties of sporting contests while much of the literature has focused on the issue of competitive balance and how to achieve it there have still been relatively few studies that apply the lessons of the economic theory of contests to the analysis of sports there remain huge opportunities both to develop our theoretical understanding of incentive mechanisms in sport and to conduct empirical research in the operation of incentives in sporting contests copyright 2003 oxford university press

project selection commitment and competition we examine project selection decisions of firms constrained in the number of projects they can handle at once a new project opportunity arises every period taking on a project requires a commitment of uncertain duration preventing the firm from selecting another project in subsequent periods until the commitment ends in our dynamic game when two firms are free of commitment they move sequentially in random order symmetric pure strategy markov perfect equilibria always exist in equilibrium the first mover strategically rejects some projects that are then selected by the second mover even when the value of the project is the same for both firms a monopolist rejects more projects and adopts ones of higher average quality compared to the duopolist duopolists select too few projects compared to their jointly optimal behavior we extend the model to allow for externalities asymmetry and n 2n 2 firms

evidence on agglomeration economies diseconomies and growth conventional urban economic analysis suggests that a local economy s size is closely related to a number of features including levels of human capital and the availability of specialized inputs which are likely to influence positively the rate at which it accumulates further economic activity at the same time urban theory also suggests that once cities reach a certain level of size these agglomeration benefits begin to peter out while diseconomies rise rapidly consequently we should see an inverted u shaped pattern of growth with respect to economic size rates of growth first rise then fall as size increases this paper shows that while such a pattern is largely absent from recent data on growth in metropolitan area population and employment it emerges strikingly in county level data copyright 2002 john wiley sons ltd

difference in interim performance and risk taking with short sale constraints abstract absent much theory empirical works often rely on the following informal reasoning when looking for evidence of a mutual fund tournament if there is a tournament interim winners have incentives to decrease their portfolio volatility as they attempt to protect their lead while interim losers are expected to increase their volatility so as to catch up with winners we consider a rational model of a mutual fund tournament in the presence of short sale constraints and find the opposite interim winners choose more volatile portfolios in equilibrium than interim losers several empirical works present evidence consistent with our model however based on the above informal argument they appear to conclude against the tournament behavior we argue that this conclusion is unwarranted we also demonstrate that tournament incentives lead to differences in interim performance for otherwise identical managers and that mid year trading volume is inversely related to mid year stock return

auctionin entry into tournaments a research tournament model with heterogeneous contestants is presented for a large class of contests the optimal number of competitors is two this insight makes designing the tournament easier and highlights the importance of selecting highly qualified contestants while customary uniform price and discriminatory price auctions are intuitively appealing mechanisms for solving this adverse selection problem in practice they generally will not be efficient mechanism for selecting contestants instead we propose an alternative auction format that is equally simple to implement and efficiently selects the most qualified contestants to compete regardless of the form of contestant heterogeneity

risk taking in contests and the role of carrots and sticks i introduction when individuals compete for promotions bonuses or other rewards tied to their relative performance ranking vis a vis other contestants competition is likely to drive not just work effort but where imperfect monitoring permits other choices at the contestants discretion in this article we ask how rank dependent compensation influences attitudes toward risk or the choice of variance of output when contestants have opportunities to influence this aspect of their output distribution unlike previous literature we assume that it is costly for contestants to alter the variance of output and that identical contestants simultaneously choose both the mean of their output distribution i e work effort and its variance our analysis emphasizes the importance of the number of players and symmetry or lack thereof of payoffs on contestants incentives we find that contestants will engage in risk seeking increasing the variance of their output distribution in contests among three or more players when the payoff structure offers a greater prize for ranking first than the penalty for ranking last as happens in winner take all contests if the tournament organizer or sponsor values the aggregate output of the contestants as is typically assumed in labor market tournaments this risk seeking behavior is inefficient because it is costly but does not increase the expected output however we argue that many contests such as the research and development tournaments first modeled by taylor 1995 may be characterized by an organizer who cares only or primarily about the highest output achieved by a single contestant e g the best submission received in such cases the organizer may benefit from costly risk taking among contestants we show that three payoff levels a prize to the contestant ranked first a penalty to the contestant ranked last and a common intermediate payoff to all others are sufficient to achieve any combination of effort and variance of output that the organizer wishes to induce among contestants so long as the desired output variance does not exceed that which results from a winner take all prize structure therefore the sponsor s problem can be characterized as choosing the optimal mean and variance of the output distribution given the contestants costs of influencing the mean and variance of output in this way our model provides an explanation for the importance of both carrots prizes and sticks penalties in competitive settings only through the combined use of both can a contest organizer determine the effort and the variance of output chosen by contestants and doing so is necessary to achieve optimal performance from contests since the pioneering work of lazear and rosen 1981 nalebuff and stiglitz 1983 o keeffe viscusi and zeckhauser 1984 and others rank order tournaments or contests have been used to model incentives in a variety of economic settings in particular executive compensation has frequently been modeled as a tournament in which low level executives are motivated by the prospect of climbing the corporate ladder and obtaining the large salaries attendant to top ranking executives as in rosen 1986 and bognanno 2001 similarly the behavior of investment fund managers who compete for top fund rankings has been modeled as a tournament by brown harlow and starks 1996 taylor 1995 developed a model of research tournaments in which contestants search for an innovation and the best innovation submitted to the sponsor wins a prize the distinguishing feature of a tournament or contest is that contestants are paid based on the rank of their output relative to others rather than the level of output prize levels are set in advance and competition to win generates the incentive to exert effort to increase output lazear and rosen 1981 showed that rank order tournaments can provide an efficient incentive framework in a labor market setting when workers are risk neutral

zipf s law for cities an explanation zipf s law is a very tight constraint on the class of admissible models of local growth it says that for most countries the size distribution of cities strikingly fits a power law the number of cities with populations greater than s is proportional to 1 s suppose that at least in the upper tail all cities follow some proportional growth process this appears to be verified empirically this automatically leads their distribution to converge to zipf s law

the area and population of cities new insights from a different perspective on cities the distribution of city populations has attracted much attention in part because it constrains models of local growth however there is no consensus on the distribution below the very upper tail because available data need to rely on legal rather than economic definitions for medium and small cities to remedy this difficulty we construct cities from the bottom up by clustering populated areas obtained from high resolution data we find that zipf s law for population holds for cities as small as 5 000 inhabitants in great britain and 12 000 inhabitants in the us we also find a zipf s law for areas jel r11 r12 r23

a theory of grand innovation prizes abstract the past decade has witnessed a resurgence in innovation awards in particular of grand innovation prizes gips which are rewards to innovators developing technologies reaching performance goals and requiring breakthrough solutions gips typically do not preclude the winner also obtaining patent rights this is in stark contrast with mainstream economics of innovation theories where prizes and patents are substitute ways to generate revenue and encourage innovation building on the management of innovation literature which stresses the difficulty to specify ex ante all the technical features of the winning technologies we develop a model in which innovative effort is multi dimensional and only a subset of innovation tasks can be measured and contracted upon we show that in this environment patent rights and cash rewards are complements and that gips are often preferable to patent races or prizes requiring technologies to be placed in the public domain moreover our model uncovers a tendency for patent races to encourage speed of discovery over quality of innovation which can be corrected by gips we explore robustness to endogenous entry costly public funds and incomplete information by gip organizers on the surplus created by the technology

urban accounting and welfare why do people live in particular cities we can list many reasons but two are undoubtedly relevant agents can enjoy the city or be more productive there a combination of life amenities and productivity levels determines the size of cities but the positive effects of these characteristics are capped by the costs and frictions arising from congestion depending on city governance and the flexibility of markets these costs and frictions can be more or less important these city characteristics are in turn enhanced and amplified by the presence of urban externalities understanding the different forces that determine city sizes is crucial for answering a broad set of questions what is the relative importance of these forces in determining the size distribution of cities how much would we gain or lose if cities had similar amenities technology levels or frictions how much reallocation would this cause more generally what are the welfare implications of the location of agents across cities in this paper we provide a simple way of decomposing the characteristics that lead to the size distribution of cities into three main components efficiency amenities and excessive frictions we use a simple urban theory to calculate these components and to carry out a wide set of counterfactual exercises that provide answers to the questions we asked above the theory consists of a multi city model with monocentric cities that produce a single good workers decide how much to work and where to live efficiency is modeled as tfp amenities as directly affecting preferences

performance responses to competition across skill levels in rank order tournaments field evidence and implications for tournament design tournaments are widely used in the economy to organize production and innovation we study individual data on 2775 contestants in 755 software algorithm development contests with random assignment the performance response to added contestants varies nonmonotonically across contestants of different abilities precisely conforming to theoretical predictions most participants respond negatively whereas the highest skilled contestants respond positively in counterfactual simulations we interpret a number of tournament design policies number of competitors prize allocation and structure number of divisions open entry and assess their effectiveness in shaping optimal tournament outcomes for a designer

emerging markets and heavy tails abstract emerging countries are held to be subject to more frequent and more pronounced external and internal shocks than their developed counter parts this suggests that key variables pertaining to their markets including their exchange rates will be marked by greater likelihood of extreme observations and large fluctuations we focus on the hypothesis that compared to developed country exchange rates emerging country exchange rates will be more pronouncedly heavy tailed we find support for the hypothesis using recently proposed robust tail index estimation methods which in particular perform well under heavy tailed dependent garch processes that are often used for modeling exchange rates according to the estimation results reported in the paper variances may be infinite for several emerging country exchange rates tail index values p 2 6 2 8 appear to be at the dividing boundary between the two sets of countries while the moments of order p 2 6 2 8 are finite for most of the developed country exchange rates they may be or are infinite for most of the emerging country exchange rates we also study the impact of the on going financial and economic crisis and find that heavy tailedness properties of most exchange rates did not change significantly with the onset of the crisis at the same time some foreign exchange markets have experienced structural changes in their heavy tailedness properties during the crisis

demand uncertainty and the capital labor ratio evidence from the u s manufacturing sector richard hartman 1976 and duncan m holthausen 1976 showed that firms input choices may be affected by demand uncertainty specifically uncertain demand conditions may lead to firms operating with a lower capital ratio this result has potentially important implications for the analysis of factor demand and factor productivity the author constructs measures of demand uncertainty and examines the above relationship for a sample of 125 u s manufacturing industries results show that there exists a significant negative relationship between demand uncertainty and the capital labor ratio copyright 1991 by mit press

optimal prize allocation in contests the role of negative prizes abstract in this paper we analyze the role of negative prizes in contest design with a fixed budget risk neutral contestants and independent private abilities the effort maximizing prize allocation rule features a threshold when the highest effort is above the threshold all contestants with lower efforts receive negative prizes these negative prizes are used to augment the prize to the contestant with the highest effort which better incentivizes contestants with higher abilities when no contestant s effort exceeds the threshold all contestants equally split the initial budget or a portion of it to ensure their participation we find that allowing negative prizes can increase the expected total effort dramatically in particular if no bound is imposed on negative prizes the expected total effort can be arbitrarily close to the highest possible effort inducible when all contestants have the maximum ability with certainty the above contest is shown to be the optimal mechanism for a more general class of mechanisms