optimal incentive schemes with many agents the grossman hart principal agent model of moral hazard is extended to the multiple agent case to explore the use of relative performance in optimal incentive contracting under the assumption that the principal chooses incentive schemes to implement agent actions as nash equilibria necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for the optimality of independent contracts of rank order tournaments and for attainability of the first best in this context the relation of the principal s welfare to the correlation between the underlying randomness in outputs of different agents is also investigated finally some problems with the nash equilibrium implementation assumption are discussed in this paper we extend the grossman hart analysis of the principal agent problem to a multiple agent setting in this version of the problem a risk neutral principal is assumed to observe the output or a performance index for each risk averse agent the output of any agent depends on a privately observable action chosen by the agent and an exogenous random variable the realization of which is not observed either by the principal or by the agent before choosing its action we especially focus attention on the role of relative performance evaluation in optimal incentive contracts and the way this depends on properties of the underlying production technology and the joint distribution of the random variables affecting the outputs of different agents in section 2 of the paper we consider the principal s problem of finding an optimal incentive scheme and an action tuple for agents subject to the constraint that the latter be implemented as a nash equilibrium between agents by the chosen incentive scheme where agents must attain at least their reservation utilities a characterization of optimal incentive schemes is derived analogous to the grossman hart characterization for the single agent problem this characterization is then utilized to find sufficient and generically necessary conditions for a optimal contracts for any agent to be independent of the performance of other agents and b optimality of rank order tournaments where payments depend solely on ordinal comparisons of output across agents we then describe a necessary and sufficient condition for the principal to extract maximum advantage from relative performance clauses i e achieve the first best level of expected utility in the multiagent situation an implication of this result is that under fairly weak conditions perfect correlation in the underlying production uncertainties for different agents enables the principal to attain the first best if and only if sufficiently heavy penalties can be inflicted on agents we then enquire what happens in intermediate cases of non perfect correlation it turns out that while in general the principal s welfare is a continuous function of the correlation coefficient it is not always nondecreasing in the latter because the correlation coefficient is not a general measure of association between two random variables but rather a measure of linear association between them

r d investments under endogenous cluster formation abstract we provide an innovative theory based explanation for the positive relationship between firms r d intensity and their degree of r d cooperation we show that when oligopolistic firms decide on long term r d investment before forming research clusters among competitors investment incentives are increased by the desire to become a member of an attractive cluster this can result in over investment compared to the welfare optimum and compared to a scenario where research clusters are ex ante fixed thereby as a theoretical contribution we fully characterize the equilibria of the unanimity game on cluster formation with heterogeneous firms

smart grid investments regulation and organization worldwide but in particular in north america and europe the grid infrastructure managers are facing demands for reinvestments in new assets with higher on grid and off grid functionality in order to promote energy efficiency and low carbon conversion of the energy sector to meet societal policy objectives in terms of carbon dioxide emissions both the composition of the generators in favor of distributed energy resources der and the load promoting integration with downstream energy useage will change in this paper we chararcterize some of the effects of new asset investments policy on the network tasks assets and costs and contrast this with the assumptions implicit or explicit in current economic network regulation the resulting challenge is identified as the change in the direction of higher asymmetry of information and higher capital intensity combined with ambiguities in terms of task separation to provide guidance we present a model of investment provision under regulation between a distribution system operator dso and a potential investor generation the results from the model confirm the hypothesis that network regulation should find a focal point should integrate externalities in the performance assessment and should avoid wide delegation of contracting billing for smart grid investments

cooperative and noncooperative r d in duopoly with spillovers contrary to the usual assumption made in most oligopoly models relations among firms are seldom of a wholly cooperative or noncooperative type in many situations they compete in some fields while they cooperate in others an important example is the case of cooperative research efforts bringing fierce competitors together two types of agreement are observed first r d cooperation can take place at the so called precompetitive stage companies share basic information and efforts in the r d stage but remain rivals in the market place 1 a second type of agreement involves an extended collusion between partners creating common policies at the product level the usual justifications of this extension are the difficulties of protecting intellectual property the idea is then to allow partners who have achieved inventions together to also control together the processes and products which embody the results of their collaboration in order to recuperate jointly their r d investments 2 what could be expected from these types of agreement is a reduction in r d expenditures because of less wasteful duplication and a reduction of total production because of more reprinted from the american economic review 78 5 1133 1137 1988 center for operations research econometrics 1348 louvain la neuve belgium we are grateful to jean

liberalisation and r d in network industries the case of the electricity industry abstract electricity sector liberalisation has coincided with a significant decline in r d spending this paper reviews the industrial organisation literature on r d and innovation to explore the likely causes of the decline in r d spending in the electricity sector meanwhile r d productivity and innovative outputs in utilities and equipment suppliers appear to have improved however a lasting decline in r d expenditure can have a negative long term effect on technological progress and innovation in the sector we conclude that the decline in r d could have been predicted from the literature we also discuss the need to reorient the post liberalisation technology policy

values in the smart grid the co evolving political economy of smart distribution investing in smart grid infrastructure is a key enabler for the transition to low carbon energy systems recent work has characterised the costs and benefits of individual smart investments the political economy of the uk electricity system however has co evolved such that there is a mismatch between where benefits accrue and where costs are incurred leading to a problem of value capture and redeployment further some benefits of smart grids are less easy to price directly and can be classified as public goods such as energy security and decarbonisation this paper builds on systemic treatments of energy system transitions to characterise the co evolution of value capture and structural incentives in the electricity distribution system drawing on semi structured interviews and focus groups undertaken with smart grid stakeholders in the uk this leads to an identification of municipal scale values that may be important for business models for the delivery of smart infrastructure municipalities may thus pursue specific economic opportunities through smart grid investment this supports recent practical interest in an expanded role for municipalities as partners and investors in smart grid infrastructures 2014 the authors published by elsevier ltd this is an open access article under the cc by license

moral hazard with several agents abstract we consider a situation in which a principal hires two agents whose cooperation is technically profitable and study three models that incorporate different assumptions about the agents cooperative behavior we find a close relationship between the agents commitment capacity and the characteristics of the optimal contract a greater capacity to cooperate leads to more efficient outcomes we also show that unless agents form a team the efficient level of mutual help is not achieved in equilibrium

the chaotic duopolists revisited the adjustment process of three oligopolists is studied under cournot and stackelberg action it is demonstrated that with an iso elastic demand function and constant marginal costs the system can result in periodic or in chaotic behaviour in particular the case with two identical and one different oligopolists is focused which turns into a virtual duopoly though displaying a wider set of bifurcations than can occur in genuine duopoly

supply chain disruption management and evolutionarily stable strategies of retailers in the quantity setting duopoly situation with homogeneous goods this paper develops an indirect evolutionary game model with two vertically integrated channels to study evolutionarily stable strategies ess of retailers in the quantity setting duopoly situation with homogeneous goods and analyzes the effects of the demand and raw material supply disruptions on the retailers strategies every channel consists of one manufacturer and many a sufficiently large number of retailers that sell products in different markets by adopting two pure marketing strategies profit maximization and revenue maximization we find that revenue maximization strategy may prevail and profit maximization strategy may become extinct two strategies may coexist i e all retailers in one channel will choose profit maximization strategy and all retailers in the other will choose revenue maximization strategy the ess of retailers depends on the relative size of the market scale and unit cost the supply chain disruptions affect the ess of retailers we also introduce a recovery model of the supply chain under disruptions and illustrate the effect of disruptions on the ess and on the average profits of channels in a market using a numerical simulation

global analysis of an expectations augmented evolutionary dynamics we consider a deterministic evolutionary model where players form expectations about future play players are not fully rational and have expectations that change over time in response to current payoffs and feedback from the past we provide a complete characterization of the qualitative dynamics so induced for a two strategy population game and relate our findings to standard evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium selection when agents have rational forward looking expectations

does social capital affect investment in human capital family ties and schooling decisions we analyse whether traditional sharing norms within kinship networks affect education decisions of poor black households in kwazulu natal theory predicts that the size of the kinship network ambiguously impacts on the incentive to invest in human capital due to opposing empathy and free rider effects our empirical analysis based on a range of different estimators suggests the latter effect dominates forced solidarity within the network discourages investments in human capital

evolutionary dynamics and backward induction the backward induction or subgame perfect equilibrium of a perfect information game is shown to be the unique evolutionarily stable outcome for dynamic models consisting of selection and mutation when the mutation rate is low and the populations are large

how risky should an r d program be abstract this paper presents a two stage model describing the optimal choice of r d risk among r d programs with the same expected outcome it demonstrates that the choice of the highest risk r d program is a dominant strategy under bertrand or cournot competition

relationships and traders in madagascar this article documents the role that personal relationships play in economic exchange original survey data show that agricultural traders in madagascar perceive relationships as the most important factor for success in their business evidence details the extent to which relationships are used to serve a variety of purposes such as the circulation of information about prices and market conditions the provision of trade credit the prevention and handling of contractual difficulties the regularity of trade flows and the mitigation of risk of these the regularity of supply and demand and the sharing of risk appear particularly important larger and more prosperous traders are those with quantitatively and qualitatively better relationships family plays little role in business beyond assistance at start up

decentralization hierarchies and incentives a mechanism design perspective separation of ownership from management multidivisional firm organizations delegation of production decisions to worker teams delegation of pricing and advertising decisions to retail franchisers reliance on intermediaries in trade or finance and distribution of regulatory authority across different agencies represent examples of organizations that delegate and distribute decision making authority instead of centralizing it this paper reviews literature on costs and benefits of delegated decision making in hierarchical organizations or contracting networks with regard to problems of incentives and coordination it starts by describing incentive and coordination costs of delegation in simple canonical examples of hierarchies where both information and incentives of different decisionmakers differ one class of models pertain to contexts where the classical revelation principle applies i e where costs of contractual complexity information processing or communication are absent agents do not collude and the mechanism designer can commit to the mechanism delegation may conceivably entail a loss of control and coordination arising from the divergence of information and incentives sufficient and necessary conditions for this loss to be mitigated entirely include risk neutrality top down contracting and monitoring of transfers or production assignments between subordinates the next class of models introduces communication costs that restrict the performance of centralized arrangements relative to delegation owing to a resulting loss of flexibility which has to be traded off against possible control losses of delegation finally consequences of collusion among agents is discussed which typically enlarge the range of circumstances under which delegation can attain optimal second best outcomes the paper concludes with a discussion of the relevance of this theoretical literature to recently emerging empirical studies of industrial organizations where delegated decision making plays an important role adoption of innovative human resource management practices new information technologies and retail franchising

dynamic complexity in duopoly games abstract we discuss the occurrence of periodic and chaotic phenomena in infinite horizon duopoly games where firms maximize their discounted sum of profits and use markov perfect equilibrium strategies in the alternating case their corresponding actions are then constrained orbits of a map similar to a cournot t tonnement we show that any behavior is possible for small discount factors and that one obtains the cournot t tonnement as the discount factor goes to zero in the simultaneous case we show by mean of an example that many cournot t tonnements can be viewed as markov perfect equilibria of an infinite horizon game and that one obtains the nash equilibrium of the static game as the discount parameter goes to zero we are thus led to study in detail the dynamical properties of a cournot t tonnement

dynamic analysis of discontinuous best response with innovation abstract starting from the static analysis in eckert et al 2017 we study a cournot duopoly where firms can decide to incur fixed costs in activities that improve their competitiveness i e product development or process innovation innovation costs generate discontinuities in the firms quantity best response functions and in turn a variety of equilibrium configurations including multiple equilibria we provide a dynamic global analysis of the equilibria and show the way in which firms initial expectations regarding the rivals level of output are crucial in defining the configuration of the long run equilibrium

incentive plans for productive efficiency innovation and learning in many industries where production or sales is delegated to a number of subunits the central management faces the classical problem how to induce continuous efficiency improvements organizational learning and transfer of knowledge with a minimum of control exercised this paper draws on recent results regarding regulatory frameworks to construct simple yet powerful incentive schemes for decentralized production under asymmetric information the theoretical foundation is based on principal agent theory cf laffont and tirole econometrica 56 1986 614 641 and extensions to production theory by bogetoft management science 40 1994 959 968 the proposed incentive system is operational and makes use of available information to provide positive incentives for participation in the dynamic development of the entire organization

analysis of global bifurcations in a market share attraction model in this paper we demonstrate how the global dynamics of an economic model can be analyzed in particular as an application we consider a market share attraction model widely used in the analysis of interbrand competition in marketing theory we analyze the local and global dynamic properties of the resulting two dimensional noninvertible dynamical system in discrete time the main result of this paper is given by the study of some global bifurcations that change the structure of the attractors and their basins these bifurcations are investigated by the use of critical curves a powerful tool for the analysis of the global properties of noninvertible two dimensional maps 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved jel classixcation e32 m30

explaining the role of incumbent utilities in sustainable energy transitions a case study of the smart grid development in china abstract smart grids sgs have been widely recognized as an enabling technology for delivering sustainable energy transitions such transitions have given rise to more complex government utility consumer relationships however these stakeholder relationships remain largely under researched this paper critically examines and explains the role of incumbent utilities in sustainable energy transitions using sg developments in china as a case study we have three major findings first china has developed an incumbent led model for deploying sgs second two incumbents the major state owned grid companies act as enablers of sg deployment they are strategic first movers and infrastructure builders of sgs they have also developed five types of networks as they increasingly reach out to other state actors businesses and electricity consumers thirdly these two grid companies also act as a fundamental block to structural changes in socio technical regimes disincentives to these large existing grid companies coupled with excessive reliance on them to provide public goods have resulted in major weaknesses in china s incumbent led model our findings have clear policy implications innovation in regulating incumbents is needed in order to provide sufficient regulatory incentives for advancing sg developments in china

do people play nash equilibrium lessons from evolutionary game theory evolutionary game theory provides an answer to two of the central questions in economic modeling when is it reasonable to assume that people are rational and when is it reasonable to assume that behavior is part of a nash equilibrium and if it is reasonable which equilibrium the traditional answers are not compelling and much of evolutionary modeling is motivated by the need for a better answer evolutionary game theory suggests that in a range of settings agents do eventually play a nash equilibrium moreover evolutionary modeling has shed light on the relative plausibility of different nash equilibria

ethnic ties in trade relationships and the impact on economic performance the case of small scale producers in the handloom sector in ethiopia abstract this article analyses the importance of ethnic ties in trade relationships of small scale producers in the handloom sector in ethiopia using both a non parametric and a parametric statistical method it is shown how various socio economic characteristics of producers lead to ethnic ties with traders it is also shown that ethnic ties affect the performance of producers negatively apparently the positive effect of ethnic ties through the reduction of transaction costs arising from market imperfections does not outweigh the negative effects of closed social networks

oligopoly games with local monopolistic approximation we propose an oligopoly game where quantity setting firms have incomplete information about the demand function at each time step they solve a profit maximization problem assuming a linear demand function and ignoring the effects of the competitors outputs despite such a rough approximation that we call local monopolistic approximation lma the repeated game may converge at a nash equilibrium of the game played under the assumption of full information an explicit form of the dynamical system that describes the time evolution of oligopoly games with lma is given for arbitrary differentiable demand functions provided that the cost functions are linear or quadratic in the case of isoelastic demand we show that the game based on lma always converges to a nash equilibrium this result compared with best reply dynamics shows that in this particular case less information implies more stability

complicated endogenous business cycles under gross substitutability abstract in this paper we investigate the global behaviour of the output equilibrium time paths in a two dimensional overlapping generations model with productive investment and capital accumulation where agents behave rationally and markets are competitive we show that equilibrium time paths can converge to complicated chaotic attractors as well as periodic attractors when the substitution effect dominates the income effect everywhere the occurrence of complicated equilibrium paths is guaranteed by homoclinic intersections of the stable and unstable manifolds of the autarkic steady state journal of economic literature classificiation number e32

trade credit and productive efficiency in developing countries abstract in developing countries credit shortages are often so severe as to impact a firm s day to day production decisions using firm level data from five african countries i show supplier credit is positively correlated with capacity utilization the result continues to hold when credit access is instrumented using supplier characteristics i claim that this is because firms lacking credit likely face inventory shortages leading to lower rates of capacity utilization this explanation yields several further predictions that are supported by the data there is a positive relationship between supplier credit and inventory holdings moreover raw materials stockouts are positively correlated with capacity utilization particularly in inventory intensive industries

innovation threats and strategic responses in oligopoly markets this paper deals with the strategic reaction of firms to competitive threats stemming from newly developed products of actual competitors product innovation projects go through multiple time consuming stages with several continuation termination decisions hence competitors can react to the threat before the new product is introduced and thereby may prevent or facilitate the product s introduction we consider a duopoly model where firm 1 can start a two stage product innovation project for obtaining a horizontally and vertically differentiated product in between the two stages firm 2 can react by making an investment that improves the competitive position of the current product we find that under weak vertical differentiation firm 2 wants firm 1 to innovate horizontal differentiation softens competition and firm 2 over invests to induce firm 1 to launch the new product second under strong vertical differentiation firm 1 starts the product innovation project triggering under investment by firm 2 but never finishes it the under investment makes firm 2 a weaker competitor which induces firm 1 not to innovate third under very strong vertical differentiation firm 2 prevents a launch of the new product by over investing this results in a strong competitive position of firm 2 it therefore captures such a big market share that firm 1 will not introduce the new product the situation of firm 1 in the old market has worsened the option to complete the innovation created by initiating the first stage of the innovation project has a negative value for firm 1

centralized and decentralized contracts in a moral hazard environment we study the optimal allocation of the contracting capacity in a moral hazard environment centralizing is superior when the principal is able to establish all the contracts with the agents simultaneously and she is able to monitor side contracting between the agents otherwise decentralizing can be a superior strategy we apply our results to a firm s decision on which outlets to franchise they suggest that franchising is more likely to occur the further the store is from headquarters the more isolated it is and in those activities where the risk is low this conclusion is consistent with empirical studies

persistent parochialism trust and exclusion in ethnic networks decentralized groups such as close knit residential neighborhoods and ethnically linked businesses often achieve high levels of cooperation while engaging in exclusionary practices that we call parochialism we investigate the contribution of within group cultural affinity to the ability of parochial groups to cooperate in social dilemmas we analyze parochial networks in which the losses incurred by not trading with outsiders are offset by an enhanced ability to enforce informal contracts by fostering trust among insiders we show that there is a range of degrees of parochialism for which parochial networks can coexist with an anonymous market offering unrestricted trading opportunities

behavior of the firm under regulatory constraint a recent article by akira takayama discusses an earlier paper by harvey averch and leland l johnson on fair rate of return regulation of public utilities although takayama p 255 agrees with averch and johnson s general conclusions that a firm will tend to increase its investment with the introduction of an active constraint on its rate of return he criticizes the a j argument as being confusing ambiguous and in error takayama then attempts a clarification and presents a new formulation which leads to the a j result quoted above this comment will discuss several of takayama s criticisms in addition to showing that the so called a j effect cannot be derived from the basic assumptions made by both averch and johnson and takayama 1 we will show that the very assumptions used to prove the a j effect by defining the region of x require an assumption that the a j effect exists in the first place

selection dynamics asymptotic stability and adaptive behavior selection dynamics are often used to distinguish stable and unstable equilibria this is particularly useful when multiple equilibria prevent a priori comparative static analysis this paper reports an experiment designed to compare the accuracy of the myopic best response dynamic and an inertial selection dynamic the inertial selection dynamic makes more accurate predictions about the observed mutual best response outcomes

cournot duopoly when the competitors operate multiple production plants this article considers a cournot duopoly under an isoelastic demand function and cost functions with built in capacity limits the special feature is that each firm is assumed to operate multiple plants which can be run alone or in combination each firm has two plants with different capacity limits so each has three cost options the third being to run both plants dividing the load according to the principle of equal marginal costs as a consequence the marginal cost functions come in three disjoint pieces so the reaction functions derived on basis of global profit maximization may also consist of disjoint pieces this is reflected in a particular bifurcation structure due to border collision bifurcations and to particular basin boundaries related to the discontinuities it is shown that stable cycles may coexist and the non existence of unstable cycles constitutes a new property we also compare the coexistent short periodic solutions in terms of the resulting real profits

an evaluation of the swedish system of active labour market programmes in the 1990s we investigate the presence of short and long term effects from joining a swedish labor market program vis a vis more intense job search in open unemployment overall the impact of the program system is found to have been mixed joining a program has increased employment rates among participants a result robust to a misclassification problem in the data on the other hand it has also allowed participants to remain significantly longer on unemployment benefits and more generally in the unemployment system this being particularly the case for those entitled individuals entering a program around the time of their unemployment benefits exhaustion

pay equality and industrial politics personnel managers often argue that equitable pay treatment manifested as wage compression is useful because it reduces disharmony among workers but it is far from obvious that a compressed salary structure is morale improving since better workers may feel disenchanted by this scheme however when workers rewards are based on relative comparisons salary compression reduces uncooperative behavior that is detrimental to the firm relative comparisons imply that some reference group must be selected the major result is that within the relevant groups some wage compression is efficient

ethnicity and credit in african manufacturing abstract this paper investigates whether market interaction can by itself perpetuate the lack of ethnic diversity that is observed in the business communities of many developing countries using case study data on manufacturing firms in kenya and zimbabwe we find no evidence that blacks or women are disadvantaged in the attribution of bank credit once we control for firm size and other observable characteristics in contrast an ethnic and gender bias is noticeable in the attribution of supplier credit although we cannot rule out the presence of discrimination the bulk of the evidence indicates that network effects play an important role in explaining this bias

investment confidence corporate debt and income fluctuations in this paper we present a macroeconomic model with new keynesian features which endogenously generates dynamic paths of income and the stock of corporate debt of a cyclic and chaotic nature from the market clearing condition on goods and money markets we derive the dynamic paths of income and corporate debt whose stability properties depend upon the propensity to invest out of the flow of internally generated funds which in turn is a positive function of income if it is relatively low the dynamic paths on income and corporate debt converge to their steady state long run values when the propensity to invest is neither too low nor too high the system can exhibit either bounded cycles or chaotic dynamics finally if it exceeds a critical upper value an explosive growth of debt occurs and a financial crisis is likely to ensue

the incentives for cost reduction in a differentiated industry abstract this paper investigates how the incentives for cost reduction in a differentiated industry depend upon the degree of product substitutability when goods are imperfect substitutes both cournot and bertrand competition result in underinvestment in the sense that a social planner would be willing to pay more for a given cost reduction than a profit maximizing firm overinvestment may occur when the goods are sufficiently close substitutes similarly cournot competition provides a stronger incentive to innovate than bertrand competition if the degree of substitutability is low and a weaker incentive if this degree is high

a dynamic model of quality competition with endogenous prices abstract we develop a dynamic model of price and quality competition in order to analyze the effects of competition on quality provision and to which extent an unregulated market is able to provide a socially optimal quality level our model combines a differential game approach with a hotelling spatial competition framework and our analysis applies in particular to industries such as long term care health care child care and education if providers nursing homes hospitals schools nurseries use closed loop decision rules which imply strategic interaction over time we show that although increased competition leads to higher quality in the steady state quality provision is nevertheless lower than under open loop rules and also suboptimally low from a welfare perspective thus our analysis identifies dynamic strategic interaction between competing providers as a potential source of inefficiency in quality provision

a theory of yardstick competition in the typical regulatory scheme a franchised monopoly has little incentive to reduce costs this article proposes a mechanism in which the price the regulatedfirm receives depends on the costs of identical firms in equilibrium each firm chooses a socially efficient level of cost reduction the mechanism generalizes to cover heterogeneous firms with observable differences medicare s prospective reimbursement of hospitals by using diagnostically related groups is a scheme very similar to the one outlined here

an evolutionary cournot model with limited market knowledge abstract in this paper we analyze a dynamic game of cournot competition with heterogeneous firms choosing between two different adaptive behavioral rules in deciding output strategies the underlying oligopoly structure is standard using a constant return to scale technology n firms produce homogeneous goods which are sold in a market characterized by constant price elasticity in this setup we assume that a fraction of firms employs a quite rough rule of thumb the so called local monopolistic approximation lma whereas the complementary fraction plays best reply br a more demanding strategy in terms of information and computation requirements the model is first considered with exogenously fixed fractions of firms in the two complementary groups then it is generalized by considering an endogenous evolutionary switching process between the two behavioral strategies based on profit driven replicator dynamics the role of the number of firms information costs and inertia or anchoring attitude in production decisions is analyzed as well as the influence in the evolutionary process of random noise in the demand function and memory of past profits global properties of the oligopoly with evolutionary pressure between behavioral rules are discussed with particular regard to cases in which the nash equilibrium is unstable

from ascribed to earned trust in exporting clusters abstract this paper is concerned with the role of trust in export manufacturing it asks how trust has developed in two industrial clusters which are located in developing countries and export most of their output to north america and europe the main conclusion is that trust was based initially on socio cultural ties between clustered firms and later on conscious investments in inter firm relationships

on the dynamic efficiency of bertrand and cournot equilibria abstract this paper compares bertrand and cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with r d research and development competition it shows that cournot competition induces more r d effort than bertrand competition however the price is lower and output is larger in bertrand than in cournot competition furthermore the bertrand equilibrium is more efficient than the cournot equilibrium if either r d productivity is low or spillovers are weak or products are very different if r d productivity is high spillovers are strong and goods are close substitutes then the bertrand equilibrium islessefficient than the cournot equilibrium journal of economic literatureclassification number l13

best response dynamics with level n expectations in two stage games this paper analyzes behavior in repeatedly played two stage games where players choose actions in both stages according to best replies using level n expectations about the opponent s actions in both stages level n expectations are recursively defined in a way that a player holding level n expectations correctly predicts the action of an opponent holding level n 1 expectations a general conceptual framework to study such dynamics for two stage games is developed and it is shown that contrary to results for single stage games the fixed points of the dynamics depend on the level of the expectations in particular for level 0 expectation fixed points correspond to a nash equilibrium of a simultaneous move version of the game whereas under certain conditions fixed points converge towards the subgame perfect equilibrium of the two stage game if the level of expectations goes to infinity the approach is illustrated using a two stage duopoly game where firms in the first stage invest in activities reducing their marginal costs and in the second stage engage in cournot competition conditions for local stability of the fixed points are derived for different levels of expectations and it is shown that level 2 expectations are sufficient to move the fixed point of the dynamics to a close neighborhood of the subgame perfect equilibrium furthermore it is demonstrated that although firms benefit from unilateral increases in the level of expectations an increase of n by all firms reduces all profits

on the efficiency of bertrand and cournot equilibria with product differentation in a differentiated products setting with n varieties it is shown under certain regularity conditions that if the demand structure is symmetric and bertrand and cournot equilibria are unique then prices and profits are larger and quantities smaller in cournot than in bertrand competition and as n grows both equilibria converge to the efficient outcome at a rate of at least 1n if bertrand reaction functions slope upwards and are continuous then even with an asymmetric demand structure given any cournot equilibrium price vector one can find a bertrand equilibrium with lower prices in particular if the bertrand equilibrium is unique then it has lower prices than any cournot equilibrium

the stability of the cournot oligopoly model a reassessment abstract the stability properties of the cournot oligopoly model are examined for the continuous adjustment process sufficient conditions for instability are established which are shown to be of significance when the number of firms n is small local and global stability are shown under appropriate conditions which for global stability include the restriction n 5 the proof of global stability corrects a well known proof by f hahn rev econ stud 29 1962 329 331 results for the discrete time adjustment process are reported and the restrictiveness of the model s assumptions are discussed

learning to play cournot duopoly strategies abstract the paper reports results from experiments designed to determine whether subjects can learn to play cournot duopoly strategies and whether their out of equilibrium play is consistent with the predictions of learning models the experiments include duopolies with constant and with decreasing marginal costs and with theoretically stable and unstable equilibria after a few periods subjects do play stable interior equilibria but they do not play stable boundary equilibria nor unstable interior equilibria subjects out of equilibrium play is inconsistent with the predictions of the learning models

holding idle capacity to deter entry in this journal dixit i980 carefully analysed the extent to which an established firm facing a prospective entrant might make an investment in capacity beyond that which is optimal for its pre entry output in his model both the established firm and prospective entrants understand that a quantity setting nash equilibrium would be established in any post entry game dixit showed that spence i977 had studied an imperfect equilibrium that is an equilibrium that depended upon a threat that was not credible to obtain his result that firms might hold excess capacity to deter entry in a perfect equilibrium a firm would not wish to install capacity that would be left idle if entry did not occur dixit s conclusion however depends on his assumption that each firm s marginal revenue is always decreasing in the other s output this is quite a restrictive assumption for example it is never satisfied in the relevant range for economists second favourite demand curve constant elasticity demand the basic point is unchanged if the firms anticipate price competition with differentiated products rather thanquantity competition in any post entry game under quite plausible conditions rational firms facing rational potential entrants may install capacity that will certainly be left idle we are thus able to rehabilitate spence s original proposition in a perfect equilibrium setting

harvesting dynamics in protected and unprotected areas we propose a dynamic model for studying the time evolution of fish stocks in an environment divided into two adjacent zones with different fishing policies we analyze two particular harvesting methods constant fishing effort and profit maximization in this case some agents engage in competition based on maximization of individual profit whereas others cooperate the asymptotic behavior of the system pinpoints that even if the presence of a reserve area leads to higher levels of sustainability in exploiting fish stocks attention should be paid in properly regulating the harvesting activity in order to avoid severe depletion of the resource

the regulation of privatized monopolies in the united kingdom this article examines the experience in the united kingdom with the regulation of privatized monopolies its conclusions are 1 that there are significant differences between rpi x or price cap and u s rate of return regulation which provides greater scope for bargaining in the former system 2 that u k regulators have taken seriously their duty to promote competition but that the existing economic literature is of limited help in this task 3 that price regulation is likely to be more effective where technology is changing slowly and or where technology is changing rapidly and 4 that the case for rpi x price cap rather than rate of return regulation is strongest in telecommunications gas supply and electricity supply and least strong in gas and electricity transmission grids

social capital inclusive networks and economic performance abstract empirical studies show that the relationship between social capital and economic performance is ambiguous the paper points to the potential trade off between the sustainability of self enforcement and the magnitude of gains from trade in social networks as an explanation based on an infinitely repeated multi player prisoners dilemma it is shown how self enforcement of cooperation within a network is influenced by its inclusiveness its communication capacity and the complexity of the exchange setting the paper shows that inclusive social capital can combine both low enforcement costs and high gains from trade even in a complex exchange setting

trust networks and norms the creation of social capital in agricultural economies in ghana this paper contributes to the continuing debate over the multifaceted concept of trust and its ability to provide a richer explanation of processes of economic activity using case studies of agricultural production marketing and financing systems in brong ahafo region of ghana the analysis documents the means by which trust is created among farmers traders and agricultural input suppliers the mechanisms include formal and informal networks of working relations customer friendships pre existing networks and intermediaries the study shows that trust is necessary for the development of a vibrant private sector based on microenterprises in conditions where actors cannot rely on formal legal institutions at present

indeterminacy of equilibria in a hyperinflationary world experimental evidence the authors design and study an olg experimental economy where the government finances a fixed real deficit through seigniorage the economy has continua of nonstationary rational expectations equilibria and two stationary rational expectations equilibria the authors do not observe nonstationary rational expectations paths observed paths tend to converge close to or somewhat below the low inflation stationary state the adaptive learning hypothesis is consistent with the data in selecting the low inflation stationary state rational expectations equilibrium as a long run stationary equilibrium nevertheless simple adaptive learning models do not capture the market uncertainty or the biases observed in the data copyright 1993 by the econometric society

on the consistency of backward looking expectations the case of the cobweb in dynamic models of economic fluctuations backward looking expectations with systematic forecasting errors are inconsistent with rational behaviour in non linear dynamic models exhibiting seemingly unpredictable chaotic fluctuations however simple habitual rule of thumb backward looking expectation rules may yield non zero but nevertheless non systematic forecasting errors in a chaotic model expectational forecasting errors may have zero autocorrelations at all lags even for rational agents patterns in these forecasting errors may be very difficult to detect especially in the presence of small noise backward looking expectations are then not necessarily inconsistent with rational behaviour we investigate whether simple expectation schemes such as naive or adaptive expectations can be consistent with rational behaviour in the simplest of all non linear dynamic economic models the non linear cobweb model

individual preferences organization and competition in a model of r d incentive provision abstract understanding the organization of rd 2 knowledge is not perfectly appropriable 3 scientists are responsive to both monetary and non monetary incentives and 4 firms compete on the product market we show that both knowledge spillovers and market competition affect the incentives given to scientists and these effects interact first high knowledge spillovers lead firms to soften incentives when product market competition is high and to strengthen incentives when competition is low second the relationship between the intensity of competition and the power of incentives is u shaped with the exact shape depending on the degree of knowledge spillovers we also show that the performance contingent pay for both applied and basic research increases with the non pecuniary benefits that scientists obtain from research while the fixed component decreases we relate our findings to the existing empirical evidence and also discuss their implications for management and public policy

two state capital accumulation with heterogenous products disruptive vs non disruptive goods the paper considers the problem of a firm that while producing a standard product has the option to introduce an innovative product the innovative product competes with the standard product and will therefore reduce revenues of the standard product a distinction is made between innovative products that do or do not become even more relatively appealing as their market share grows e g because of network externalities it is shown that in the former case which we call a disruptive good history dependent long run equilibria can occur which are in line with recent real life economic examples

timing of technology adoption and product market competition abstract this paper examines how product market competition affects firms timing of adopting a new technology as well as whether the market provides sufficient adoption incentives it demonstrates that adoption dates differ not only among symmetric firms but also among markets with different market features more specifically technology adoption can occur earlier in a market with cournot competition than in a market with bertrand competition it can also occur earlier in a market in which goods are not too close substitutes therefore this paper shows that competition toughness does not always reinforce adoption incentives when goods are sufficiently differentiated adoption occurs later than is socially optimal

intensity of competition and the incentive to innovate abstract the effects of intensity of product market competition on r d incentives are analysed in a model capturing the strategic interactions between firms with different cost levels first four axioms are proposed that a measure of intensity of competition should satisfy then the effects of intensity of competition on the value of the innovation are analysed and it is shown that the axioms imply the existence of a non monotone relation between intensity of competition and the value of an innovation

the 11 20 money request game a level k reasoning study we study experimentally a new two player game each player requests an amount between 11 and 20 shekels nis he receives the requested amount and if he requests exactly one shekel less than the other player he receives an additional 20 shekels level k reasoning is appealing due to the natural starting point requesting 20 and the straightforward best response operation nevertheless almost all subjects exhibit at most three levels of reasoning using two variants of the game we demonstrate that the depth of reasoning is not increased by enhancing the attractiveness of the level 0 strategy or by reducing the monetary cost of undercutting the other player

on the markovian efficiency of bertrand and cournot equilibria we characterize and compare closed loop feedback price and quantity strategies within a full fledged dynamic model of oligopolistic competition in which production requires exploitation of a renewable productive asset unlike previous papers on the strategic exploitation of productive assets we allow for imperfect product substitutability which enables us to deal with price competition we show that the traditional result that the bertrand equilibrium is more efficient than the cournot equilibrium does not necessarily hold in a markovian environment either in the short run or at the stationary equilibrium or using the discounted sum of welfare as a criterion for relative efficiency

asymmetric information and the new theory of the firm financial constraints and risk behavior this paper summarizes recent developments in the theory of the firm that have arisen in examining the implications of imperfect information it shows that a wide range of these models have similar implications for the likely reaction of firms to external environmental and policy changes two significant implications are 1 that firms behave as if they are risk averse individuals maximizing a utility function of terminal wealth profitability even when the risks involved are unsystematic and 2 in many circumstances because this utility function is likely to be characterized by decreasing absolute risk aversion firms are likely to respond significantly and positively to changes in cash flow and profitability together these two phenomena are able to account for a wide range of firm behaviors that have been empirically observed both formally and informally and that are difficult to explain in terms of the traditional theory of the firm furthermore the responses of such firms to policy interventions are likely to differ significantly from those of neoclassical firms this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

equilibrium selection in a nonlinear duopoly game with adaptive expectations abstract we analyze a nonlinear discrete time cournot duopoly game where players have adaptive expectations the evolution of expected outputs over time is generated by the iteration of a noninvertible two dimensional map the long run behavior is characterized by multistability that is the presence of coexisting stable consistent beliefs which correspond to nash equilibria in the quantity space hence a problem of equilibrium selection arises and the long run outcome strongly depends on the choice of the players initial beliefs we analyze the basins of attraction and their qualitative changes as the model parameters vary we illustrate that the basins might be nonconnected sets and reveal the mechanism which is responsible for this often neglected kind of complexity the analysis of the global bifurcations which cause qualitative changes in the topological structure of the basins is carried out by the method of critical curves

on modeling and interpreting the economics of catastrophic climate change with climate change as prototype example this paper analyzes the implications of structural uncertainty for the economics of low probability high impact catastrophes even when updated by bayesian learning uncertain structural parameters induce a critical tail fattening of posterior predictive distributions such fattened tails have strong im plications for situations like climate change where a catastrophe is theoretically possible because prior knowledge cannot place sufficiently narrow bounds on overall damages this paper shows that the economic consequences of fat tailed structural uncertainty along with unsureness about high temperature damages can readily outweigh the effects of discounting in climate change policy analysis

cournot competition organization and learning abstract we model firms output decisions in a repeated duopoly framework focusing on three interrelated issues 1 the role of learning in the adjustment process toward equilibrium 2 the role of organizational structure in the firm s decision making and 3 the role of changing environmental conditions on learning and output decisions we characterize the firm as a type of artificial neural network which must estimate its optimal output decision based on signals it receives from the economic environment which influences the demand function via simulation analysis we show 1 how organizations learn to estimate the optimal output over time as a function of the environmental dynamics 2 which networks are optimal for each level of environmental complexity and 3 the equilibrium industry structure

optimal incentives for teams much of the existing theory of incentives describes a static relationship that lasts for just one transaction this static assumption is not only unrealistic but the resulting predictions appear to be at odds with many work organizations the current paper introduces possible long term interaction among agents and studies how the design of explicit incentives and work organizations can exploit and interact with the implicit incentives generated by the repeated interaction of the agents the optimal incentive scheme is shown to display observed features of the increasingly popular teams such as the use of low powered group incentives