the death of the pigovian tax policy implications from the double dividend debate recently economists appear to have abandoned a central precept of environmental policy optimal environmental taxes are equal to marginal environmental damage med as a consequence of labor market distortions optimal environmental taxes are now generally argued to typically lie below med and given realistic policy constraints on optimal tax reform sometimes well below med this new consensus is reflected in over a dozen papers published without rebuttal in prestigious economics journals in important survey articles and in policy oriented manuscripts how was it possible that such a radical transformation of economic thinking occurred with essentially no debate in the literature

pigou meets mirrlees on the irrelevance of tax distortions for the second best pigouvian tax this paper extends the mirrlees 1971 model of optimal income redistribution with optimal corrective taxes to internalize consumption externalities using general utility structures and exploring both linear and non linear taxes it is demonstrated that the optimal second best tax on an externality generating good should not be corrected for the marginal cost of public funds since it equals one in the optimal tax system in the optimum distortions of income taxes are equal to marginal redistributional gains if the government does not have access to a non distortionary marginal source of finance the marginal cost of public funds can be either larger or smaller than one depending on subjective preferences for income redistribution the optimal second best corrective tax is then either higher or lower than the pigouvian level the findings in this paper generalize and amend prior results based on representative agent models shedding new light on the weak double dividend hypothesis and on the welfare gains of recycling revenue from environmental taxes

second best taxation of emissions and polluting goods abstract this paper studies the problem of the design of an integrated system of second best emission and output taxes in a model where production costs are negatively correlated with their emissions it shows that i the first best pigouvian rule of equating the marginal private benefit of emissions in production to the marginal social damage of emissions must be modified in the second best ii implementation of the modified pigouvian rule requires all firms to face the same marginal emission tax equal to the marginal social damage of emissions plus an adjustment term reflecting optimal tax objectives iii it may not be necessary to directly tax the polluting goods the latter taxes can be subsumed in the emission tax function iv output taxes must be set solely on the basis of optimal tax objectives no pigouvian adjustment is required v if emission taxes are restricted to be proportional and commodity taxes are constrained the modified pigouvian rule will no longer be optimal vi if preferences are weakly separable in emissions and other goods the pigouvian rule remains valid the marginal emission tax is pigouvian and emission and commodity tax instruments can be set separately to address different objectives a proportional emission tax corrects for externalities while commodity taxes are determined solely on the basis of optimal tax considerations

optimal tax rules and public sector efficiency with an externality in an overlapping generations model abstract this paper examines optimal tax rules and public sector efficiency integrating them in a second best world with pollution by using an overlapping generations model the second best world is characterized by the comparative statics of green preferences the main results obtained are as follows first the marginal cost of public funds may be reduced by the externalities regardless of the choice of taxes second optimal environmental and non environmental tax rules are additively and directly affected by the dynamic efficiency of capital accumulation per unit labour decal and indirectly by it through the efficiency of the public sector environmental taxes going beyond pigovian ones may be welfare improving if the decal is improved by the environmental tax even optimal non environmental tax rules should additively and directly counter the dynamics of pollution to consider the income effects of the optimal tax system for the future third the additivity property or the principle of targeting does not hold even in the absence of incentive compatibility constraints the essential reasons for this are clarified as follows distortions that should be countered by taxes that is the income effects of the optimal tax system and the decal in this model break the equality between optimal environmental taxes and the externalities measured by governments finally growing environmental concerns may in fact increase pollution the inverse relationship between environmental and labour income taxes may not hold

environmental policy public finance and the labour market in a second best world abstract environmental and tax policies and the optimal provision of clean and dirty public goods are analysed within the context of a second best framework of optimal taxation households consume both clean and dirty commodities degradation of the natural environment occurs due to the consumption of dirty private and public goods but can be offset when the government engages in abatement activities increased environmental concern implies a higher dirt tax a lower tax on labour less employment more public abatement and a cleaner environment if the elasticity of substitution between private consumption commodities and leisure is large and that between clean and dirty goods is small public consumption may expand while private consumption contracts otherwise public consumption falls

carbon taxation when climate affects productivity optimal carbon taxation is evaluated in a model where climate change affects productivity with a numerical us economy model with preexisting taxes the optimal carbon tax is found to exceed marginal social damage by 53 percent and marginal private damage the sum of households marginal willingness to pay by 73 percent the welfare gain from optimal carbon taxation is estimated at 3 58 billion per year when marginal damages are 40 ton employment also increases setting the carbon tax at the pigouvian rate raises welfare by only 3 17 billion the contrasting results in the tax interaction literature are due to the use of marginal private damage when applied to amenity externalities

garbage recycling and illicit burning or dumping abstract with garbage and recycling as the only two disposal options we confirm prior results that the optimal curbside fee for garbage collection equals the direct resource cost plus external environment cost when illicit burning or dumping is a third disposal option that cannot be taxed directly the optimal curbside tax on garbage changes sign the optimal fee structure is a deposit refund system a tax on all output plus a rebate on proper disposal through either recycling or garbage collection the output tax helps achieve the first best allocation even though it affects the choice between consumption and untaxed leisure

optimal environmental taxation from society s perspective much has been made recently of comparisons between the optimal environmental tax and the marginal social damage from pollution when moving from a first best setting to a second best setting involving distortionary taxes bovenberg and de mooij parry bovenberg and goulder generally speaking the recent literature observes that results for a first best setting may not be valid in a secondbest setting the present analysis finds that this same general theme applies when defining social values and in particular when expressing the social marginal rate of substitution mrs between the environment and income on which the definition of marginal social damage msd is based we find that a commonly used expression for msd involving the sum of individuals private marginal rates of substitution between the environment and income is only equal to the social mrs at the first best optimum in a second best setting with distortionary taxes this expression is no longer equal to the social mrs and thus does not provide a consistent measure of relative values from society s perspective when msd is defined based on general analytical expressions for the social mrs ones that are valid in both first best and secondbest settings the optimal environmental tax is found generally to rise above msd as we move from a first best to a second best setting these results are fully consistent with the intuition of revenue recycling and the double dividend

upstream pollution downstream waste disposal and the design of comprehensive environmental policies abstract many policymakers are shifting their focus from media specific pollution problems to product specific life cycle environmental problems in this paper we develop a model of production and consumption that incorporates life cycle externalities and use it to solve for alternative policies to achieve a social optimum in general we find that no single instrument can solve multiple problems contrary to what some observers have suggested however we find that there are alternative ways of reaching the social optimum we also discover that an integrated approach to policy appears to be important no matter what policy options are adopted and finally we find that there is only a limited role for so called product life cycle assessments

environmental policy on the back of an envelope a cobb douglas model is not just a teaching tool abstract to clarify and interpret the workings of a large computable general equilibrium cge model of environmental policy we build an aggregated cobb douglas cd model that can be solved easily and analytically its closed form expressions show exactly how key parameters determine the sign and size of effects from a large new carbon tax on emissions revenue prices output and welfare data and parameters from the detailed dynamic cge model of goulder and hafstead 2018 are used in the cd model to calculate results that can be compared with theirs results from the cd model track aggregates from the large cge model quite closely even though the cd model omits much detail such as the number of sectors intermediate inputs and international trade a cge model is quite useful to generate detailed numerical results and to reflect on particular aspects of environmental policy but the simpler cd model provides a transparent view of exactly how the policy affects key outcomes

optimal control of externalities in the presence of income taxation a substantial literature examines second best environmental policy focusing particularly on how the pigouvian directive that marginal taxes should equal marginal external harms needs to be modified in light of the preexisting distortion due to labor income taxation additional literature is motivated by the possibility that distributive concerns should amend the internalization prescription it is demonstrated however that simple first best rules unmodified for labor supply distortion or distribution are correct in a natural basic formulation of the problem specifically setting all commodity taxes equal to marginal harms and subsidies equal to marginal benefits can generate a pareto improvement likewise a marginal reform in the direction of the first best can yield a pareto improvement qualifications and explanations for differences from previous work are also presented

the welfare effects of environmental taxation recent literature has investigated whether the welfare gains from environmental taxation are larger or smaller in a second best setting than in a first best setting this question has mainly been addressed indirectly by asking whether the second best optimal environmental tax is higher or lower than the first best pigouvian rate even this indirect question has itself been approached indirectly comparing the second best optimal environmental tax to a proxy for its first best value marginal social damage msd on closer examination however msd becomes ambiguously defined and variable in a second best setting making it an unreliable proxy for the pigouvian rate given these observations the current analysis reevaluates these welfare questions and finds that when compared directly to its first best value the second best optimal environmental tax generally rises with increased revenue requirements even in cases where the second best environmental tax is lower than its first best value the welfare gains may be greater than in a first best setting these results suggest that the marginal fiscal benefit revenue recycling effect exceeds the marginal fiscal cost tax base effect over a range of environmental tax rates that for benchmark models extends above the first best pigouvian rate these findings reinforce the intuition that environmental policy complements rather than competes with the provision of other public goods

pollution taxes and revenue recycling abstract discussions of environmental policy and the tax system have emphasized the value of pollution tax revenues which can be used to reduce other tax distortions in the economy however by raising private marginal production costs environmental taxes also tend to reduce gdp and exacerbate the welfare costs of conventional taxes for environmental taxes in consumption goods industries the net welfare change from these two effects is negative unless this good is a relatively weak substitute for leisure an estimate for the optimal pollution tax with full revenue recycling is 63 to 78 of marginal environmental damages

biofuel subsidies versus the gas tax the carrot or the stick abstract this paper provides an analytical framework to examine the relative efficiencies of a revenue neutral biofuel subsidy and a gas tax in the presence of pre existing distortions and growing substitutability between fuels both policies are set to achieve a targeted reduction in gasoline use at the state level the model is then calibrated for a small open economy such as illinois which is one of the largest producers of biofuels such as ethanol in the u s the main result of the paper shows that raising the biofuel subsidy use reduces overall welfare by more than a higher gas tax both aimed to achieve a targeted reduction in pure gasoline the relative efficiency of the higher gas tax is primarily due to it exacerbating the pre existing distortion in the biofuel market by less than the subsidy moreover for current parameter estimates welfare improving policy combinations for achieving a targeted amount of energy security are higher gas taxes combined with lower biofuel subsidies and a lower tax on income however the preference for a gasoline labor tax swap shrinks as the elasticity of substitution between the two fuels rises

environmental levies and distortionary taxation pigou taxation and pollution i note an important distinction between the optimal price of environmental quality in a second best world and the optimal level of environmental quality using an analytical general equilibrium model i show that for reasonable parameter values an increase in tax distortions arising from an increase in required tax revenues leads to a fall in the optimal pigouvian tax rate even while environmental quality improves in general knowledge of the direction of changes in optimal environmental tax rates due to changes in the economy is not sufficient for understanding the impact on environmental quality 2003 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

welfare impacts of alternative public policies for agricultural pollution control in an open economy a general equilibrium framework a general equilibrium approach is used to evaluate the welfare impacts of alternative policies for reducing agricultural pollution in an open economy with preexisting distortions caused by income taxes and agricultural subsidies the policies examined here include the removal of distortionary agricultural subsidies we find that even though these distortions are small compared to others in the economy removing them and imposing nitrogen reduction subsidies and or output taxes can enhance welfare and reduce nitrogen pollution thereby leading to a substantial double dividend the relative efficiency of the alternative policies examined here depends on the level of the nitrogen reduction target copyright 2008 oxford university press

environmental taxes with heterogeneous consumers an application to energy consumption in france abstract this paper constructs a model with four groups of households who have preferences over labor supply consumption of polluting energy related and non polluting non energy goods and emissions it quantifies the model for the french economy and computes its optimal tax equilibria under nine second best tax regimes we find that the redistributive role of environmental taxes requires the polluting goods to be taxed at a rate much below their marginal social damage these goods may even require an outright subsidy if the society values equality a lot secondly if environmental taxes that have an exclusively externality correcting role they benefit all types although the gains are rather modest the gains and losses become more substantial when environmental taxes have a redistributive role as well third setting the environmental tax at its pigouvian level rather than its optimal externality correcting cum redistributive level benefits the high income group at the expense of the low income groups fourth nonlinear taxation of polluting goods and nonlinear commodity taxation in general is a powerful redistributive mechanism fifth introducing environmental taxes in the current french tax system with its suboptimal income taxes results in substantial welfare gains for the highest income group and a sizable loss for the least well off persons

optimal control of externalities in the presence of income taxation optimal control of externalities a substantial literature examines second best environmental policy focusing particularly on how the pigouvian directive that marginal taxes should equal marginal external harms needs to be modified in light of the preexisting distortion due to labor income taxation additional literature is motivated by the possibility that distributive concerns should amend the internalization prescription it is demonstrated however that simple first best rules unmodified for labor supply distortion or distribution are correct in a natural basic formulation of the problem specifically setting all commodity taxes equal to marginal harms and subsidies equal to marginal benefits can generate a pareto improvement likewise a marginal reform in the direction of the first best can yield a pareto improvement for other reforms a simple efficiency test characterizing when a pareto improvement is possible is offered qualifications and explanations for the substantial departure from results in previous work are also elaborated

evaluating policy interventions with general equilibrium externalities abstract we report on the results of analytical and numerical models that describe the effects of non separable externalities or public goods on public policies with important general equilibrium consequences in the numerical exercise we calibrate a general equilibrium model with non separable air quality benefits in order to measure the excess burden and total net benefits of transportation and energy taxes in the 1995 u s economy the change in the physical level and the economic value in air quality associated with a given policy is a function of the substitution patterns between air quality and market goods that we assume the size of the deadweight loss due to pre existing distortions such as a tax on labor income is substantially affected by these substitution patterns

optimal environmental taxation in the presence of other taxes general equilibrium analyses this paper examines the optimal setting of environmental taxes in economies where other distortionary taxes are present we employ analytical and numerical models to explore the degree to which in a second best economy optimal environmental tax rates differ from the rates implied by the pigovian principle according to which the optimal tax rate equals the marginal environmental damages both models indicate contrary to what several analysts have suggested that the optimal tax rate on emissions of a given pollutant is generally less than the rate supported by the pigovian principle moreover the optimal rate is lower the larger are the distortions posed by ordinary taxes numerical results indicate that previous studies may have seriously overstated the size of the optimal carbon tax by disregarding pre existing taxes this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the efficiency value of effluent tax revenues the concept of the efficiency value of effluent tax revenues is developed it is defined as the reduction in excess burden resulting from the substitution of these revenues for current or future resource distorting tax revenues such as those raised from federal corporate and personal income taxes the annual efficiency value of revenues raised by national effluent taxes on two major air pollutants is estimated to range from 0 63 to 3 05 billion if substituted for federal personal income tax revenue and from 1 to 4 87 billion if substituted for corporate income tax revenue expressed in 1982 dollars thus previous estimates of the efficiency gain from substitution of an effluent tax scheme for current pollution regulation policy have been too low because the efficiency value of the tax revenues has been excluded

bank acquisition and stockholders wealth abstract bank mergers are a control mechanism for reallocating resources because regulation has a pervasive influence on bank decision making unlike industrial firms bank mergers are subject to regulatory approval bank shareholder returns are analyzed at the time of federal reserve approval of mergers to assess whether regulation reduces differential information between bank managers and outsiders or reduces managers ability to take advantage of differential information empirical tests indicate there are negative returns to acquiring banks for external mergers but normal returns for internal mergers emergency mergers generate positive returns before and upon announcement more negative results occur in states with branching restrictions and in cases when equity financing is used

substituting pollution taxation for general taxation some implications for efficiency in pollutions taxation abstract earlier papers have recognized that nonenvironmental benefits will be realized if pollution taxes are substituted for other taxes which impose efficiency losses on society the purpose of this paper is to investigate the importance of these nonenvironmental benefits for the design of an efficient pollution tax it is found that the efficient tax may be higher or lower than that conventionally defined as optimal and that the net benefit from unrestrained pollution can have important implications for the size of the tax

the two part instrument in a second best world abstract standard pigovian tax theory has been extended in two directions first many polluting activities are difficult to tax because they are not market transactions and so recent papers have shown that the same effects can be achieved by use of a two part instrument 2pi a tax on output or income and a subsidy for clean alternatives to pollution it is a generalization of a deposit refund system drs second a different literature concerns the second best pollution tax in the presence of other tax distortions here we combine the two extensions by looking at the second best 2pi when government needs revenue is the deposit larger and the rebate smaller we find explicit solutions for each tax and subsidy in a general equilibrium model with other tax distortions and we compare these to the rates in a first best model the tax subsidy combination is explained in terms of a tax effect an environmental effect and a revenue effect the model allows for flexible interpretation to show various applications of the 2pi we also discuss important caveats

labor supply and the double dividend abstract a series of recent articles have argued that environmental taxes and cap and trade permit systems generate large distortions in the labor market the claim is made that the higher prices for dirty goods induced by these incentive based systems generate a tax interaction effect leading to reductions in labor supply that are generally on net welfare reducing for this reason it is argued a double dividend seldom exists however price level increases both by lowering family income and by reducing cross spousal wage substitution effects will tend to have offsetting positive impacts on labor supply these effects are large enough to convert negative labor supply responses to rising prices into positive ones the empirical literature also supports a positive relationship between price level increases and labor supply these observations cast doubt on a central critical assumption underlying the critique of the double dividend in the tax interaction effect literature

two generalizations of a deposit refund system this paper suggests two generalizations of the deposit refund idea in the first we apply the idea not just to solid waste materials but to any waste from production or consumption including wastes that may be solid gaseous or liquid using a simple general equilibrium model we derive the optimal combination of a tax on a purchased commodity and subsidy to a clean activity such as emission abatement recycling or disposal in a sanitary landfill this two part instrument is equivalent to a pigovian tax on the dirty activity such as emissions dumping or litter in the second generalization we consider the case where government must use distorting taxes on labor and capital incomes to help meet the revenue requirement would the optimal deposit be raised and the refund reduced we derive the second best revenue raising drs or two part instrument to answer that question this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

a note on optimal taxation in the presence of externalities abstract i consider the problem of optimal taxation with externalities in a general setup encompassing most of optimal taxation models found in the literature it is demonstrated that when direct taxation of externalities is possible optimal taxes can be expressed as the sum of the optimal pigouvian taxes and the optimal taxes in a related problem without externalities regardless of what other tax instruments are available this result generalizes the so called principle of targeting

fair allocation of indivisible goods and criteria of justice a set of n objects and an amount m of money is to be distributed among m people example the objects are tasks and the money is compensation from a fixed budget an elementary argument via constrained optimization shows that for m sufficiently large the set of efficient envy free allocations is nonempty and has a nice structure in particular various criteria of justice lead to unique best fair allocations that are well behaved with respect to changes of m this is in sharp contrast to the usual fair division theory with divisible goods