patents citations innovations a window on the knowledge economy a b jaffe m trajtenberg eds mit press 2002 478 pp 33 50 isbn 0 262 10095 9

good ipos draw in bad inelastic banking capacity and hot markets we posit that screening ipos requires specialized labor which is in fixed supply a sudden increase in demand for ipo financing increases the compensation of ipo screening labor this results in reduced screening encouraging sub marginal firms to enter the ipo market further fueling the demand for screening labor the model s conclusions are consistent with empirical findings of increased underpricing during hot markets positive correlation between issue volume and underpricing and with tipping points between hot and cold markets finally the model makes sharp predictions relating the ipo market to fundamental values of firms and to investment banking returns

bad times good credit banks limited knowledge about borrowers creditworthiness constitutes an important friction in credit markets is this friction deeper in recessions thereby contributing to cyclical swings in credit or is the friction reduced as bad times reveal information about firm quality we test these alternative hypotheses using internal ratings data from a large swedish cross border bank and credit scores from a credit bureau the ability to classify corporate borrowers by credit quality is greater during bad times and worse during good times soft and hard information measures both display countercyclical patterns our results suggest that information frictions in corporate credit markets are intrinsically countercyclical and not due to cyclical variation in monitoring effort the presence of countercyclical information frictions provides a rationale for countercyclical provisions or capital in banks to smooth credit cycles

on the benefits of concurrent lending and underwriting this paper examines whether there are efficiencies that benefit issuers and underwriters when a financial intermediary concurrently lends to an issuer while also underwriting its public securities offering we find issuers particularly noninvestmentgrade issuers for whom informational economies of scope are likely to be large benefit through lower underwriter fees and discounted loan yield spreads underwriters both commercial banks as well as investment banks engage in concurrent lending and provide price discounts albeit in different ways we find concurrent lending helps underwriters build relationships increasing the probability of receiving current and future business for many years the 1933 glass steagall act prevented commercial banks from underwriting corporate bonds and equities due to the relaxation and recent repeal of the act many commercial banks have acquired investment banks or developed investment banking capabilities internally to create universal banks that can offer an array of financial services the entry of commercial banks into underwriting markets has increased the potential for financial institutions to offer both lending and underwriting services in particular it has become increasingly common for financial intermediaries to provide loans to a firm while also underwriting the firm s public securities in fact concurrent lending and underwriting has increased substantially over time in 1994 only 1 of seasoned equity issuers received a loan from their underwriter at around the time of issuance but by 2001 over 20 of all deals were concurrent the movement toward concurrent lending and underwriting raises a host of interesting questions first why are deals concurrent

the changing landscape of accrual accounting a fundamental property of accrual accounting is to smooth temporary timing fluctuations in operating cash flows indicating an inherent negative correlation between accruals and cash flows we show that the overall correlation between accruals and cash flows has dramatically declined in magnitude over the past half century and has largely disappeared in more recent years the adjusted r 2 from regressing changes in accruals on changes in cash flows drops from about 70 90 in the 1960s to near zero under 20 in more recent years in exploring potential reasons for the observed attenuation we find that increases in non timing related accrual recognition as proxied by one time and nonoperating items and the frequency of loss firm years explain the majority of the overall decline on the other hand temporal changes in the matching between revenues and expenses and the growth of intangible intensive industries play only a limited role in explaining the observed attenuation finally the relative decline of the timing role of accruals does not appear to be associated with an increase in the asymmetrically timely loss recognition role

flight to quality in banking and economic activity abstract recent explanations of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy have emphasized that riskier lower net worth borrowers are more dependent on bank lending than larger less risky borrowers evidence from the federal reserve s survey on terms of bank lending indicates that the proportion of relatively high quality new loans safe moves countercyclically and granger causes gdp and inventory investment in the aftermath of a tightening of monetary policy the safe variable increases and in turn policy tends to relax once safe has risen

the international transmission of credit bubbles theory and policy we live in a new world economy characterized by nancial globalization and historically low interest rates this environment is conducive to countries experiencing credit bubbles that have large macroeconomic eects at home and are quickly propagated abroad in previous work we built on the theory of rational bubbles to develop a framework to think about the origins and domestic eects of these credit bubbles this paper extends that framework to include many countries and general preferences and uses it to study how nancial integration aects the properties of credit bubbles how the latter are transmitted across countries and the role of international policy coordination

depreciation policy changes tax earnings management and investment opportunity incentives abstract contrary to previous studies we find managers change depreciation policies in predictable ways we identify three dimensions of depreciation policy changes whether it is a method change or an estimate revision whether it is income increasing or decreasing and whether it applies to new assets only or both new and existing assets this disaggregation leads to three findings first a 1981 tax law altered the frequency of estimate revisions and method changes second firms adopting income increasing method changes for all assets experience worse performance than those adopting such changes only for new assets finally non income increasing policy changes are associated with changes in investment opportunities

doubts or variability reinterpreting most of the market price of risk as a price of model uncertainty eradicates a link between asset prices and measures of the welfare costs of aggregate fluctuations that was proposed by hansen et al 1999 tallarini 2000 and alvarez and jermann 2004 prices of model uncertainty contain information about the benefits of removing model uncertainty not the consumption fluctuations that lucas 1987 2003 studied a max min expected utility theory lets us reinterpret tallarini s riskaversion parameter as measuring a representative consumer s doubts about the model specification we use model detection instead of risk aversion experiments to calibrate that parameter plausible values of detection error probabilities give prices of model uncertainty that approach the hansen and jagannathan 1991 bounds fixed detection error probabilities give rise to virtually identical asset prices as well as virtually identical costs of model uncertainty for tallarini s two models of consumption growth

the use of accounting flexibility to reduce labor renegotiation costs and manage earnings abstract we investigate the determinants of discretionary sfas 106 choices of non regulated firms we find that more unionized firms are more likely to use immediate recognition consistent with incentives to reduce labor renegotiation costs immediate recognition is more prevalent among post adoption plan modifiers particularly if their transition obligation is large consistent with incentives to increase future reported earnings immediate recognition together with post adoption benefit plan reduction frees future income from the transition obligation amortization expense and adds a positive component as negative prior service costs are amortized immediate recognition is less prevalent among firms with higher potential debt contracting costs

lending terms and aggregate productivity abstract several empirical studies suggest that lending terms are eased in expansions and tightened in recessions thereby influencing the mix of financed entrepreneurs we study a model of adverse selection in competitive financial markets and show that lending terms deteriorate with the aggregate state under two general conditions if exogenous increments to entrepreneurs productivity raise returns to investment and or tighten the credit line needed to screen out a given entrepreneur type competition results in contracts with less screening two endogenous effects on productivity emerge production scales grow closer to optimal but lower productivity entrepreneurs enter the mix of producers the positive negative effect dominates at low high aggregate states

competition and increasing returns to scale a model of bank size this study examines the causal effects of bank size on banks survival asset quality and leverage two forces drive these effects increasing returns to scale derived from banks expertise and competition the first enables bigger banks to survive competition better have higher asset quality and be more leveraged it drives banks into a race for expansion this race toughens competition between banks which edges out small banks and may worsen all banks asset quality consequently the banking industry will be dominated by a small number of highly leveraged banks in this study financial intermediation arises endogenously and co exists with direct finance

model uncertainty and the forward premium puzzle abstract this paper studies the forward premium puzzle in a setting where investors doubt the specification of their models and thus engage in robust portfolio strategies hansen and sargent 2008 it shows that an empirically plausible concern for model misspecification can explain the forward premium puzzle in particular the paper shows that hansen and jagannathan 1991 volatility bounds can be attained with both reasonable degrees of risk aversion and reasonable detection error probabilities hence observed excess returns in the foreign exchange market appear to be primarily driven by a model uncertainty premium

bank competition and credit standards this article offers an explanation for the substantial variation of credit standards and price competition among banks over the business cycle as the economic outlook improves the average default probabilities of borrowers decline this affects the profitability of screening and causes bank screening intensity to display an inverse u shape as a function of economic prospects low screening activity in expansions creates intense price competition among lenders and loans are extended to lower quality borrowers as the economic outlook worsens price competition diminishes and credit standards tighten significantly deposit insurance may contribute to the countercyclical variation of credit standards copyright 2004 oxford university press

implications for gaap from an analysis of positive research in accounting based on extant literature we review the positive theory of gaap the theory predicts that gaap s principal focus is on control performance measurement and stewardship and that verifiability and conservatism are critical features of a gaap shaped by market forces we recognize the advantage of using fair values in circumstances where these are based on observable prices in liquid secondary markets but caution against expanding fair values to financial reporting more generally we conclude that rather than converging u s gaap with ifrs competition between the fasb and the iasb would allow gaap to better respond to market forces

the relative effectiveness of patents and secrecy for appropriation abstract changes in patent law global competition and the rise of several new technologies suggest that patents could be of greater value than secrecy for many innovative firms particularly small firms that are unable to use market power or other factors to appropriate their investments in innovation data from the 1993 european community innovation survey cis for up to 2849 r d performing firms is analysed to determine the relative importance of secrecy vs patents this particular combination of appropriation methods is interesting because secrecy can act as a mutually exclusive alternative to patents the results show that a higher percentage of firms in all size classes rate secrecy as more valuable than patents however ordered logit regressions show that the probability that a firm rates secrecy as more valuable than patents declines with an increase in firm size for product innovations while there is no relationship for process innovations the firm s r d intensity has no effect on the relative value of secrecy vs patents there is weak evidence to show that participation in cooperative r d increases the value of patents over secrecy for product innovations the results are relevant to ongoing debates over changes to the patent system and the need for policies to encourage small firms to patent more

covenants and collateral as incentives to monitor although monitoring borrowers is thought to be a major function of financial institutions the presence of other claimants reduces an institutional lender s incentives to do this thus loan contracts must be structured to enhance the lender s incentives to monitor covenants make a loan s effective maturity and the ability to collateralize makes a loan s effective priority contingent on monitoring by the lender thus both covenants and collateral can be motivated as contractual devices that increase a lender s incentive to monitor these results are consistent with a number of stylized facts about the use of covenants and collateral in institutional lending modern finance theory suggests that financial intermediaries such as commercial banks insurance companies and finance companies monitor and control their borrowers on behalf of other investors 1 this article investigates how the loans made by these institutions can be structured so as to best enhance the institutions role as delegated monitors covenants and collateral are common features of loans made by financial institutions but these features are somewhat difficult to justify consider loan covenants clauses in a loan contract that require the borrower to take or refrain from various actions berlin and mester 1992 magee and sridhar 1994 and park 1994 show that by giving institutions the right to renegotiate or call loans when covenants are violated covenants serve as tripwires that enhance the flexibility and efficiency of financial contracting also as documented in smith and warner 1979 control rights from covenants reduce borrower adverse selection or moral hazard nevertheless by allowing institutions to demand repayment based on any information contractible or not

capital requirements monetary policy and aggregate bank lending theory and empirical evidence capital requirements linked solely to credit risk are shown to increase equilibrium credit rationing and lower aggregate lending the model predicts that the bank s decision to lend will cause an abnormal runup in the borrower s stock price and that this reaction will be greater the more capital constrained the bank i provide empirical support for this prediction the model explains the recent inability of the federal reserve to stimulate bank lending by increasing the money supply i show that increasing the money supply can either raise or lower lending when capital requirements are linked only to credit risk the motivation of this article is first to examine the impact of risk based capital requirements namely those that link mandatory capital to asset ratios for banks to their loans on aggregate bank lending these requirements called the basle capital rules or bis guidelines went into effect in march 1989 for banks in the leading industrialized nations these rules initially required banks to maintain capital equal to 7 25 percent of business and most consumer loans with the requirement increasing to 8 percent by the end of 1992 secondly i wish to understand the link between monetary policy and aggregate bank credit in the presence of risk based capital requirements my curiosity is sparked in part by two recent phenomena one is the experience of the u s economy which displayed sluggish growth during 1989 93 despite a monetary policy that attempted to spur bank lending and economic activity and the other is the striking decline in loans relative to security holdings mostly government bonds in the asset portfolios of u s

time varying risk interest rates and exchange rates in general equilibrium under mild assumptions the data indicate that time varying risk is the primary force driving nominal interest rate differentials on currency denominated bonds this finding is an immediate implication of the fact that exchange rates are roughly random walks a general equilibrium monetary model with an endogenous source of risk variation a variable degree of asset market segmentation can produce key features of actual interest rates and exchange rates in this model the endogenous segmentation arises from a fixed cost for agents to exchange money for assets as inflation varies so does the benefit of asset market participation and that changes the fraction of agents participating these effects lead the risk premium to vary systematically with the level of inflation this model produces variation in the risk premium even though the fundamental shocks have constant conditional variances

informational frictions and the credit crunch in this paper i estimate the magnitude of an informational friction limiting credit reallocation to firms during the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis because lenders rely on private information when deciding which relationship to end borrowers looking for a new lender are adversely selected i show how to separately identify private information from information common to all lenders but unobservable to the econometrician by using bank shocks within a discrete choice model of relationships quantitatively these informational frictions appear to be too small to explain the credit crunch in the u s syndicated corporate loan market

institutional differences and international private debt markets a test using mandatory ifrs adoption institutional differences between countries result in additional information risks between borrowers and lenders in cross border private loans this study examines the effect of these information risks on the structure of optimal debt contracts in international cross border versus domestic private debt markets using mandatory ifrs adoption as an indicator for institutional changes that reduced differences between countries i compare attributes of international versus domestic loans before and after ifrs adoption i find that in the pre ifrs period international loans are associated with a higher credit spread a weaker relationship between the bank and the borrower a more diffuse loan syndicate and less reliance on accounting based covenants than domestic loans these results are consistent with incremental information risks in international debt markets that make it more costly for lenders to screen and monitor borrower credit quality resulting in a more arm s length relationship between borrowers and lenders many of these associations attenuate after ifrs adoption suggesting that the pre ifrs differences in contract terms are driven by incremental information risks related to institutional differences between countries my findings imply that incremental information risks result in a different optimal contract in international debt contracts compared to domestic debt contracts

debt covenant violations and managers accounting responses abstract this paper examines accounting changes costs of default and accounting based covenants violated by 130 firms reporting violations in annual reports i find that managers of firms approaching default respond with income increasing accounting changes and that the default costs imposed by lenders and the accounting flexibility available to managers are important determinants of managers accounting responses i also document that private lending agreements are the first violated that net worth and working capital restrictions are the most frequently violated restrictions and that in 52 percent of the cases lenders require concessions from borrowers to resolve default

empirical research on accounting choice abstract we review research from the 1990s that examines the determinants and consequences of accounting choice structuring our analysis around the three types of market imperfections that influence managers choices agency costs information asymmetries and externalities affecting non contracting parties we conclude that research in the 1990s made limited progress in expanding our understanding of accounting choice because of limitations in research design and a focus on replication rather than extension of current knowledge we discuss opportunities for future research recommending the exploration of the economic implications of accounting choice by addressing the three different reasons why accounting matters

discussion of the implications of unverifiable fair value accounting evidence from the political economy of goodwill accounting abstract ramanna 2007 the implications of unverifiable fair value accounting evidence from the political economy of goodwill accounting journal of accounting and economics provides interesting and novel evidence on how firms use contributions from their political action committees pacs to members of congress as a means of lobbying for preferred positions on the two exposure drafts that led to sfas 141 and sfas 142 my discussion raises some concerns about his main conclusion that pooling firms lobbied the fasb to obtain a fair value based impairment rule to facilitate their ability to manipulate financial statements i offer a more benign explanation and make some other observations about how this line of research could proceed in the future

valuation adverse selection and market collapses we study a market for funding real investment where valuation meaning investors devoting resources to acquiring information about future payoffs creates an adverse selection problem unlike previous models more valuation is associated with lower market prices and so greater returns to valuation this strategic complementarity in the capacity to do valuation generates multiple equilibria with multiple equilibria the equilibrium without valuation is most efficient despite funding some unprofitable investments switches to valuation equilibria valuation runs look like credit crunches a large investor can ensure the efficient equilibrium only if it can precommit to a price and potentially only if subsidized

accounting information in financial contracting the incomplete contract theory perspective this paper reviews theoretical and empirical work on financial contracting that is relevant to accounting researchers its primary objective is to discuss how the use of accounting information in contracts enhances contracting efficiency and to suggest avenues for future research we argue that incomplete contract theory broadens our understanding of both the role accounting information plays in contracting and the mechanisms through which efficiency gains are achieved by discussing its rich theoretical implications we expect incomplete contract theory to prove useful in motivating future research and in offering directions to advance our knowledge of how accounting information affects contract efficiency

alternative information sources and the information content of bank loans this paper examines the information content of bank loan agreements we differentiate borrowers according to financial analysts percentage earnings forecast errors and most recent forecast revisions the empirical results suggest that banks rely on other indicators as initial screening devices to determine where to best deploy their evaluation and monitoring efforts if these other indicators are reliable and signalimproving prospects banks do little further investigation however if the indicators are noisy and signal declining prospects banks have incentives to expend resources to investigate the borrowers resulting in the production of valuable information recent theories of financial intermediation concentrate on the role of banks in reducing informational asymmetry leland and pyle 1977 suggest that informational asymmetries may be the primary reason that intermediaries exist campbell and kracaw 1980 demonstrate that an important function of financial intermediation is the production of information diamond 1984 develops a model which shows that financial intermediaries can exist simply because they provide an efficient means of evaluating and monitoring borrowers these information transmission theories argue that banks provide unique information production services in an imperfect capital market they suggest that banks know more about the prospects of the firms they lend to than do others thus bank loan agreements should convey useful information to the market a number of researchers empirically examine the uniqueness of bank loans fama 1985 approaches the issue by examining the rates on certificates of deposit and other high grade commercial papers he concludes that since bank borrowers bear the cost of reserve requirements there must be something special about bank loans james 1987 conducts an event study around the announcement of bank credit agreements and reports a significantly positive two day announcement return his results provide evidence support

measuring the probability of financial covenant violation in private debt contracts we measure the probability that a borrower will violate financial covenants in private debt contracts we analyze hand coded data and specify standard covenant definitions using compustat data that minimize measurement error for all individual dealscan covenants we use these definitions to create a measure of aggregate probability of violation which can be used across all covenants in a loan or among covenant subsets of interest we provide evidence that our aggregate probability measure is superior to alternatives used in prior literature

the importance of accounting changes in debt contracts the cost of flexibility in covenant calculations abstract in this paper we examine how the exclusion of voluntary and mandatory accounting changes from the calculation of covenant compliance affects the interest rate charged on the loan after controlling for self selection bias and other factors known to affect loan spreads we find that the rate charged is 84 basis points lower when voluntary accounting changes are excluded and 71 basis points lower when mandatory accounting changes are excluded our results suggest that borrowers are willing to pay substantially higher interest rates to retain accounting flexibility that may help them avoid covenant violations and to avoid duplicate record keeping costs

mandated accounting changes and debt covenants the case of oil and gas accounting abstract the relationships among mandated accounting changes bond covenants and security prices has been the focus of several studies these studies have provided mixed evidence on the existence of a bond covenant effect on security prices this paper suggests that inconclusive prior results are a consequence of inappropriately measuring the default risk of debt using an option pricing framework it is shown that the debt to equity alone is not an adequate measure of default risk in particular both the debt to equity ratio and the total risk of the firm are necessary to adequately model the bond covenant effects of an accounting change these theoretical propositions are supported by the empirical analysis of the security market reaction to changes in oil and gas accounting

got rejected real effects of not getting a loan using a lender cutoff rule that generates plausibly exogenous variation in credit supply i investigate a new channel through which funding shocks are transmitted to the real economy based on a sample of more than 15 000 loan applications from small and medium sized enterprises i find that precautionary savings motives can aggravate real effects low liquidity firms whose loan applications were rejected increase cash holdings and cut noncash assets in excess of the requested loan amount these results point to the amplifying effect of precautionary savings motives in the transmission of credit supply shocks received december 11 2016 editorial decision february 22 2018 by editor philip strahan

anxious periods and bank lending we examine the lending behavior of banks during anxious periods the main characteristic of anxious periods is that the perceptions and expectations about economic conditions worsen for economic agents even though the economy is not in a recession we identify distinct periods of anxiety for consumers ceos firms and analysts subsequently we study the lending behavior of us banks during the anxious quarters from 1985 to 2010 using bank level data the results show that banks lending falls when consumers and analysts are anxious and this effect is more pronounced when banks hold a higher level of credit risk these effects are more pronounced in anxious periods that were followed by recessions and in these periods loan growth also responds negatively to the anxiety of ceos yet these effects are quite less prevalent in the period after 2001

how ethical are managers goodwill impairment decisions in spanish listed firms this article provides an analysis of the ethical behavior of managers making goodwill impairment decisions following the adoption of the international financial reporting standard ifrs 3 on business combinations replacing the systematic amortization of goodwill with the impairment only approach has been a highly controversial step although the aim of ifrs 3 was to provide users with more value relevant information regarding the underlying economics of the business it has been criticized for the potential earnings management inherent in impairment testing this study is based on a sample of spanish listed companies between 2005 and 2011 a period that embraces the economic crisis after controlling for the underlying economic factors of the firms the results suggest that managers are exercising discretion in the reporting of goodwill impairment losses and big bath and smoothing strategies are influencing the decisions whether or not to impair goodwill and about the magnitude of the impairment firm size is an attribute that appears significant in the analysis suggesting that the cost and complexity of running the impairment test affect managers decisions additional analyses suggest that the macroeconomic environment influences opportunistic and unethical behaviors

extreme screening policies abstract we show that a lender often experiences increasing marginal returns to screening in a standard setting where the lender decides how intensively to screen the projects of prospective borrowers the increasing marginal returns imply that even small changes in industry parameters can produce large changes in equilibrium screening intensity in particular a small reduction in the expected return from borrowers projects can produce a pronounced increase in the screening of prospective borrowers with substantial corresponding welfare effects

bridging the gap the design of bank loan contracts and distance how do the distance constraints faced by lenders in acquiring borrower information affect the design of bank loan contracts theoretical studies posit that greater information asymmetry leads to the allocation of stronger ex ante decision rights to the lender the uninformed party consistent with this hypothesis we find that upon inception contracts tend to be more restrictive when firms seek loans from remote lenders this finding is robust to potential endogeneity bias and simultaneity of various loan terms overall we establish a strong informational link between distance and loan contract design

academic patent quality and quantity before and after the bayh dole act in the united states abstract this paper summarizes the results of empirical analyses of data on the characteristics of the pre and post 1980 patents of three leading us academic patenters the university of california stanford university and columbia university we complement the analysis of these institutions with an analysis of the characteristics of the patents issued to all us universities before and after 1980 our analysis suggests that the effects of the bayh dole act on the content of academic research and patenting at stanford and the university of california were modest the most significant change in the content of research at these universities one associated with increased patenting and licensing at both universities before and after 1980 was the rise of biomedical research and inventive activity but bayh dole had little to do with this growth both uc and stanford university administrators intensified their efforts to market faculty inventions in the wake of bayh dole this enlargement of the pool of marketed inventions appears to have reduced the commercial yield of this population at both universities but we find no decline in the importance or generality of the post 1980 patents of these two universities the analysis of overall us university patenting suggests that the patents issued to institutions that entered into patenting and licensing after the effective date of the bayh dole act are indeed less important and less general than the patents issued before and after 1980 to us universities with longer experience in patenting inexperienced academic patenters appear to have obtained patents that proved to be less significant in terms of the rate and breadth of their subsequent citations than those issuing to more experienced university patenters bayh dole s effects on entry therefore may be as important as any effects of the act on the internal research culture of us universities in explaining any decline in the importance and generality of us academic patents after 1980

foreign bank lending evidence from the global financial crisis abstract we exploit highly disaggregated bank firm data to investigate the dynamics of foreign vs domestic credit supply in italy around the period of the lehman collapse which brought a sudden and unexpected deterioration of economic conditions and a sharp increase in credit risk taking advantage of the presence of multiple lending relationships to control for credit demand and risk at the individual firm level we show that foreign lenders restricted credit supply to the same firm more sharply than their domestic counterparts a number of exercises testing alternative explanations for this result suggest that such more intense restriction also reflects the functional distance between a foreign bank s headquarter and the italian credit market

discussion of accounting discretion in fair value estimates an examination of sfas 142 goodwill impairments beatty and weber examine an accounting choice that managers made upon adoption of statement of financial accounting standards 142 whether to record a goodwill asset impairment as a cumulative effect of an accounting change at the time of adoption or delay the recognition of such an impairment to the future perhaps indefinitely when they would be recorded as expenses in earnings from continuing operations the authors consider several factors that might influence management s reporting of transition effects including contracting equity market incentives and regulatory forces participants at the 2005journal of accounting research conference questioned whether such a complex accounting decision can be captured with simple linear models and noisy proxy variables while also speculating upon whether the results would generalize to other settings in this discussion i summarize beatty and weber s research highlight its contribution to the accounting literature and provide a record of the main issues raised by the conference participants 1 summary

deregulation and bank financial policy the standard view that banks can value maximize by exploiting non risk rated deposit insurance ignores the potential loss of a valuable bank charter due to insolvency recognition of this effect changes the bank s optimal financial policy and can induce extreme risk averting as well as risk taking behavior however as the value of the bank charter falls the risk taking strategy is more apt to dominate therefore current deregulation of the banking industry by easing entry and devaluing charters holds the potential for increases in the incidence of insolvency unless offsetting policies are instituted

the time and budget constraints of the firm this short paper surveys some recent research on the internal organization of firms with an emphasis on task allocation and synchronization it focuses on an organization facing no incentive problems but time constraints and costs of communication it highlights two motives for communication concern for delay and concern for throughput it also considers the interaction between the time and budget constraints of the firm and its implication for organization design

the implications of unverifiable fair value accounting evidence from the political economy of goodwill accounting abstract i study the evolution of sfas 142 which uses unverifiable fair value estimates to account for acquired goodwill i find evidence consistent with the fasb issuing sfas 142 in response to political pressure over its proposal to abolish pooling accounting the result is interesting given this proposal was due in part to sec concerns over pooling misuse i also find evidence consistent with lobbying support for sfas 142 increasing in firms discretion under the standard agency theory predicts such unverifiable discretion can be used opportunistically

credit booms and lending standards evidence from the subprime mortgage market this paper links the u s subprime mortgage crisis to demand side factors that contributed to the rapid expansion of the u s mortgage market we show that denial rates were relatively lower in areas that experienced faster credit demand growth and that lenders in these high growth areas attached less weight to applicants loan to income ratios the results are robust to controlling for supply side factors including house price appreciation mortgage securitization and other economic fundamentals and to several robustness tests controlling for endogeneity the results are consistent with the notion that a relaxation of lending standards triggered by an increased demand for loans contributed to the boom and the ensuing crisis together with other supply side explanations these findings shed new light on the relationship between credit booms and financial instability

asymmetric timeliness of earnings market to book and conservatism in financial reporting abstract using an accounting conservatism theory that reflects accounting s role in practice we investigate the relation between two extensively used measures of conservatism asymmetric timeliness of earnings and the market to book ratio mtb we predict and observe that when asymmetric timeliness is measured cumulatively over long periods its relation with end of period mtb is positive when asymmetric timeliness is measured over short periods its dependence on beginning of period composition of equity value ev is responsible for its negative association with mtb further asymmetric timeliness appears to measure conservatism more efficiently when it is estimated cumulatively over multiple periods

performance measures in earnings based financial covenants in debt contracts this paper examines how performance measures are defined in major earnings based financial covenants in loan contracts to shed light on the economic rationales underlying the contractual use of performance measures i find an earnings based covenant is typically based on a performance measure close to earnings before interest tax amortization and depreciation expenses ebitda however my empirical analyses show that ebitda is less useful in explaining credit risk than earnings before interest and tax expenses ebit and even the bottom line net income thus measuring credit risk cannot fully explain the choice of accounting performance measures in earnings based covenants i conjecture that contracting parties choose an ebitda related measure instead of a measure calculated after depreciation and amortization expenses e g ebit to make the performance measure less sensitive to investment activities which can be controlled through other contractual terms such as a restriction on capital expenditure and provide empirical evidence consistent with this conjecture

non discretionary conservatism evidence and implications a large body of accounting research finds that various contracting incentives lead managers to engage in conservative accounting practices we extend existing research by modeling the impact of extant accounting rules on conservative accounting accounting rules typically require assets to be written down when their fair values drop sufficiently below their book values we document evidence of the resulting non discretionary conservatism and show that it appears to explain some of the results from previous research on contracting incentives

accounting standards and debt covenants has the balance sheet approach led to a decline in the use of balance sheet covenants abstract recent years have seen a sharp decline in the use of balance sheet based covenants in private debt contracts i hypothesize that changes in accounting standards can explain part of this decline standard setting has shifted towards a balance sheet approach which i predict has made the balance sheet less useful for contracting i measure the effect of the balance sheet approach on specific borrowers using a volatility ratio i find that borrowers with greater volatility ratios are less likely to have balance sheet based covenants this evidence is consistent with reductions in the contracting usefulness of the balance sheet being associated with reductions in balance sheet covenants

a re examination of exposure to exchange rate risk the impact of earnings management and currency derivative usage abstract in an attempt to explain the weak evidence of priced exchange rate risk we hypothesize that in addition to currency derivative usages earnings management serves as another factor contributing to a reduction in exchange rate exposure our evidence reveals that earnings management activities particularly those undertaken for the purpose of income smoothing significantly reduce firm specific exchange rate exposure and that such role is particularly important if appropriate currency derivative instruments are limited these results complement prior attempts to explain the puzzle of unpriced exchange rate risk the investigation also highlights the importance of recognizing different managerial purposes behind discretionary accruals

multiple maturities and time varying risk premia in forward exchange markets abstract this paper derives the necessary conditions for an intertemporal optimization problem faced by an international investor who can enter forward contracts of several maturity dates and simultaneously borrow in domestic money markets the model parameters are estimated and the overidentifying restrictions are tested using hansen s proposed gmm technique the restrictions are strongly rejected when forward premia are used as instruments the risk neutral specification is rejected when expenditures on non durables and services are used as the consumption measure possible explanations for these rejections are provided

robust permanent income and pricing i suppose there exists an extremely powerful and if i may so speak malignant being whose whole endeavours are directed toward deceiving me rene descartes meditations ii 1

accounting discretion in fair value estimates an examination of sfas 142 goodwill impairments this study examines statement of financial accounting standards 142 adoption decisions focusing on the trade off between recording certain current goodwill impairment charges below the line and uncertain future impairment charges included in income from continuing operations we examine several potentially important economic incentives that firms face when making this accounting choice we find evidence suggesting that firms equity market concerns affect their preference for above the line vs below the line accounting treatment and firms debt contracting bonus turnover and exchange delisting incentives affect their decisions to accelerate or delay expense recognition our study contributes to the accounting choice literature by examining managers use of discretion when adopting a mandatory accounting change and by developing and testing explicit cross sectional hypotheses of the determinants of firms preferences for immediate below the line versus delayed above the line expense recognition

explaining rules based characteristics in u s gaap theories and evidence despite debate on the desirability of rules based standards no studies provide evidence on why accounting standards take on rules based characteristics we identify and test five theories from prior research litigation risk constraining opportunism complexity transaction frequency and age that could explain why some u s accounting standards contain rules based characteristics litigation risk and complexity are most consistently related to cross sectional and time series variation in rules based characteristics we find more limited evidence that frequent transactions age and desires by regulators to constrain opportunistic reporting are related to rules based standards we note however that our findings are necessarily descriptive because standards arise endogenously from market and political forces limiting causal interpretation further it is difficult to perfectly separate rules based characteristics of the standard from both the complexity of the standard and the characteristics of the underlying transaction including the complexity of the transaction

credit booms and macrofinancial stability this paper explores several questions about credit booms and busts when do credit booms occur when do they end up in busts and when do they not what are the implications for different policies if curbing credit growth and or mitigating the associated risks is an objective we find that credit booms are often associated with financial reform and economic growth they also tend to be more frequent in fixed exchange rate regimes only one in three credit boom episodes are followed by a financial crisis these booms tend to be larger and last longer macroprudential tools have at times proven effective in containing booms and more often in limiting the consequences of busts due to the buffers they helped to build

why bank credit policies fluctuate a theory and some evidence in a rational profit maximizing world banks should msdntain a credit policy of lending if and only if borrowers have positive net present value projects why then are changes in credit policy seemingly correlated with changes in the condition of those demanding credit this paper argues that rational bank managers with short horizons will set credit policies that influence and are influenced by other banks and demand side conditions this leads to a theory of low frequency business cycles driven by bank credit policies evidence from the banking crisis in new england in the early 1990s is consistent with the assumptions and predictions of the theory

securitization under asymmetric information over the business cycle l auteur etudie l efficience de la titrisation comme moyen d intermediation financiere a l aide d un modele ou sont formalises des projets d investissement heterogenes et l asymetrie de l information sur la qualite des actifs titrises il montre qu en conservant une partie du risque l emetteur des actifs titrises signale de maniere credible leur qualite

incomplete information high low bidding and public information in first price auctions high low bidding refers to auctions of a series of objects where for a subset of the auctioned objects one of two buyers bids high on some objects and low on others while the other buyer does the reverse this paper shows that high low bidding does not imply collusive behavior among buyers in particular through a formal modeling of a noncooperative game of information acquisition and bidding decisions it shows that high low bidding can be obtained the paper also demonstrates that if the cost of information to a seller is less than the equilibrium joint expected information cost of the buyers then it pays the seller to provide public information finally if the provision of public information is not feasible but a seller can know whether buyers have acquired information then it pays the seller to make known to the buyers and to pursue a policy that just prior to the start of an auction the seller will announce which buyer has acquired information