absorptive capacity and the effects of foreign direct investment and equity foreign portfolio investment on economic growth abstract this study examines the effects of foreign direct investment fdi and equity foreign portfolio investment efpi on economic growth using data on 80 countries from 1979 through 1998 the results largely suggest that lagged fdi and efpi do not have direct unmitigated positive effects on growth but some data are consistent with the view that the effects of fdi and efpi are contingent on the absorptive capacity of host countries with particular respect to financial or institutional development moreover extreme bound analysis eba of significant results indicates that the estimates are robust compared to other empirical studies on growth

women as policy makers evidence from a randomized policy experiment in india this paper uses political reservations for women in india to study the impact of women s leadership on policy decisions since the mid 1990 s one third of village council head positions in india have been randomly reserved for a woman in these councils only women could be elected to the position of head village councils are responsible for the provision of many local public goods in rural areas using a dataset we collected on 265 village councils in west bengal and rajasthan we compare the type of public goods provided in reserved and unreserved village councils we show that the reservation of a council seat affects the types of public goods provided specifically leaders invest more in infrastructure that is directly relevant to the needs of their own genders

currency misalignments and growth a new look using nonlinear panel data methods the aim of this article is to investigate the link between currency misalignments and economic growth relying on panel cointegration techniques we calculate real exchange rate rer misalignments as deviations of actual rers from their equilibrium values for a set of advanced and emerging economies estimating panel smooth transition regression pstr models we show that rer misalignments have a differentiated impact on economic growth depending on their sign whereas overvaluations negatively affect economic growth rer undervaluations significantly enhance it this result indicates that undervaluations may drive the exchange rate to a level that encourages exports and promotes growth

political risk institutions and foreign direct investment how do they relate in various european countries this paper examines theoretically and empirically the extent to which the decision by foreign firms to invest in a group of countries is influenced by economic factors as opposed to political risk and institutional performance we consider the importance of these factors as drivers of foreign direct investment fdi for 32 european countries subsequently divided into three pooled clusters by means of panel regression techniques in two specifications over the 1995 2008 period our results suggest that risk and institutional factors considered in both static and dynamic perspectives significantly influence the behaviour of investors policies and institutions that vary widely between countries modify their decision making so that the purely economic factors have different statistical significance and impacts on the intensity of fdi as was revealed by clustering countries into three groups according to levels of economic maturity additionally not all factors of risk have an identical impact on fdi decisions in particular groups of countries however we find that as measures of political risk monetary discipline low regulation effective government and good education prove to be highly significant for most country groupings all of these measures reduce political risk and positively affect the level of fdi this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the logic of political violence this paper offers a unified approach for studying political violence whether it emerges as repression or civil war we formulate a model where an incumbent or opposition can use violence to maintain or acquire power to study which political and economic factors drive one sided or two sided violence repression or civil war the model predicts a hierarchy of violence states from peace via repression to civil war and suggests a natural empirical approach exploiting only within country variation in the data we show that violence is associated with shocks that can affect wages and aid as in the theory these effects are only present where political institutions are non cohesive

does institutional quality matter for trade institutional conditions in a sectoral trade framework summary this article examines the extent to which national institutional quality affects bilateral sectoral trade flows as well as whether the conditioning role of institutions for trade has been waxing or waning with time based on a new trade theory framework we derive a sectoral gravity equation including novel variables corresponding to the exporter s labor competitiveness levels along with importer s price indices and sectoral incomes and analyze industry specific bilateral trade flows of 186 countries for the period 1996 2012 we address potential endogeneity and econometric drawbacks by means of the poisson pseudo maximum likelihood estimation methods the results indicate that both the institutional conditions at destination and the institutional distance between exporting and importing countries are relevant factors for bilateral trade moreover the effect associated with institutional conditions at destination moderately increases over time this is a robust outcome across economic sectors with higher values for agriculture and raw materials than for manufacturing and services

voting technology political responsiveness and infant health evidence from brazil this paper studies the introduction of electronic voting technology in brazilian elections estimates exploiting a regression discontinuity design indicate that electronic voting reduced residual error ridden and uncounted votes and promoted a large de facto enfranchisement of mainly less educated citizens estimates exploiting the unique pattern of the technology s phase in across states over time suggest that as predicted by political economy models it shifted government spending toward health care which is particularly beneficial to the poor positive effects on both the utilization of health services prenatal visits and newborn health low weight births are also found for less educated mothers but not for the more educated

the value of voting rights to majority shareholders evidence from dual class stock unifications we study 84 dual class stock unifications where superior vote shareholders gave up their superior voting status all firm stocks became one share one vote and received in most cases compensation in the form of additional shares unifications are essentially intrafirm transactions of voting rights and afford observation of the intrafirm assessed price of vote the price of vote in unifications 1 increases with the percentage vote lost by the majority shareholders 2 is higher in family controlled firms 3 decreases with institutional investor holdings and 4 is similar to the outside price of vote implicit in the market prices of stocks the value of voting rights is an intriguing topic that has attracted extensive academic and practitioner interest before most of the existing evidence comes from examinations of dual class stocks in the dual class stock system the firm issues two classes of common stock superior and inferior vote stocks previous research documents a price premium of superior vote over inferior vote stocks which illustrates the positive value of voting rights 1 inrecent years manydual classfirmsdecidedtorecapitalizetheirequity into single class stocks this was done by transforming all common stock classesinto oneshareonevote the unification ofstockclassestrendis evidenced in canada amoako adu and smith 2001 and is gaining momentum in europe as well nokia and lufthanza are recent examples we examine 84 dual class share unifications on the tel aviv stock exchange unifications are essentially sales of voting power from one class of investorstoanother bymonitoringtheprices ofthesetransactions thatis by examining the compensation paid for the loss of the superior vote status we hope to provide relatively direct inferences on the value of vote

global capital flows and financing constraints firms often cite financing constraints as one of their primary obstacles to investment global capital flows by bringing in scarce capital may ease the financing constraints of host country firms but if incoming foreign investors borrow heavily from domestic banks foreign direct investment may exacerbate financing constraints by crowding host country firms out of domestic capital markets combining a unique cross country firm level panel with time series data on restrictions on international transactions and capital flows harrison love and mcmillan find that different measures of global flows are associated with a reduction in firm level financing constraints first the authors show that one type of capital inflow foreign direct investment is associated with a reduction in financing constraints second they test whether restrictions on international transactions affects the financing constraints of firms the results suggest that only one type of restriction those on capital account transactions negatively affects firms financing constraints the authors also show that multinational firms are not financially constrained and do not appear to be sensitive to the level of foreign direct investment this implies that foreign direct investment eases financing constraints for non multinational firms finally the authors show that 1 foreign direct investment only eases financing constraints in the non g7 countries and 2 other kinds of flows such as portfolio investment have no impact on financing constraints

when and where does foreign direct investment generate positive spillovers a meta analysis local firms may attract productivity spillovers from foreign investors yet these vary with local firms awareness capability and motivation to react to foreign entry in consequence spillovers vary across countries at different levels of economic development we apply competitive dynamics theory to analyze these contextual moderators of spillovers and test hypotheses thus derived in a meta analysis of the empirical literature on spillovers our analysis suggests a curvilinear relationship between spillovers and the host country s level of development in terms of income institutional framework and human capital

institutional corruption and election fraud evidence from a field experiment in afghanistan w e investigate the relationship between political networks weak institutions and election fraud during the 2010 parliamentary election in afghanistan combining i data on political connections between candidates and election officials ii a nationwide controlled evaluation of a novel monitoring technology and iii direct measurements of aggregation fraud we find considerable evidence of aggregation fraud in favor of connected candidates and that the announcement of a new monitoring technology reduced theft of election materials by about 60 percent and vote counts for connected candidates by about 25 percent the results have implications for electoral competition and are potentially actionable for policymakers jel c93 d02 d72 k42 o17

can mandated political representation increase policy influence for disadvantaged minorities theory and evidence from india accountable governments often fail to reflect the interests of disadvantaged minorities this paper exploits the institutional features of political reservation as practiced in indian states to examine the role of mandated political representation in providing disadvantaged groups influence over policy making ifind that political reservation has increased transfers to groups which benefit from the mandate this finding also suggests that complete policy commitment may be absent in democracies as is found in this case jel d72 d78 hl 1 h50

obtaining a driver s license in india an experimental approach to studying corruption we conduct two experiments to understand the process of obtaining a driver s license in india in the first experiment we randomly assign license candidates to one of three groups bonus offered a financial reward if they could obtain their license fast lesson offered free driving lessons upfront and control the control group alone illustrates bureaucratic failures 71 of the license getters in that group avoided the mandated driving test and 62 failed a surprise driving test the system responds to private needs there are more license getters in the bonus group but at a social cost there are more license getters who cannot drive in the bonus group the system however also appears to respond to social considerations as there are more license getters in the lesson group large extra legal payments are made by license getters those in the control group pay 2 5 times the official fee more of these extra legal payments take place in the bonus group surprisingly these extra legal payments are not direct bribes to bureaucrats but instead payments to agents in the second experiment we perform an audit study to better understand the role of agents the audit shows that agents can provide licenses to individuals even if they cannot drive but the audit also shows that agents cannot as easily circumvent all other rules we argue that our findings are most consistent with agents being the channel for corruption in this system we also report some suggestive evidence that bureaucrats create red tape possibly to induce more license candidates to use agents

exposing corrupt politicians the effects of brazil s publicly released audits on electoral outcomes author s finan frederico ferraz claudio abstract this paper examines the extent to which access to information enhances political accountability based upon the results of brazil s recent anti corruption program that randomly audits municipal expenditures of federally transferred funds it estimates the effect of the disclosure of local government corruption practices upon the re election success of incumbent mayors in municipal elections comparing municipalities which were randomly audited before the elections with those audited after the analysis shows that the disclosure of audit results had a significant impact on the re election rates of mayors found to be corrupt for a one standard deviation increase in reported corruption the audit policy reduced the incumbent s likelihood of re election by 25 percent this effect is more pronounced in municipalities where radio stations are present and higher levels of corruption are identified these findings highlight the value of information and the role of the media in reducing informational asymmetries in the political process thus enabling voters to not only hold corrupt politicians accountable but also to reward non corrupt politicians

the observer effect in international politics evidence from a natural experiment by pressuring governments to hold democratic elections and by becoming directly involved in the electoral process through technical assistance and funding or as election monitors international actors now play a visible role in domestic elections and other democratic processes throughout the developing world although scholars have documented several macrolevel relationships between international level variables and movement toward democracy there has been little attention paid to the microlevel effects of international involvement in the democratization process this article examines the effects of international election observation as a prominent form of international involvement in domestic elections and exploits a natural experiment in order to test whether international observers reduce election fraud using data from the 2003 presidential elections in armenia the article demonstrates that although observers may not eliminate election fraud they can reduce election day fraud at the polling stations they visit the unusual advantage of experiment like conditions for this study offers unique causal evidence that international actors can have direct measurable effects on the level of election day fraud and by extension on the democratization process

growth effect of foreign direct investment in developing economies the role of institutional quality this paper investigates the effect of foreign direct investment fdi on economic growth conditional on the institutional quality of host countries we first develop several theoretical arguments to show that institutional heterogeneity may be an explanation for the mixed results of previous empirical studies second using a panel smooth regression model on a large sample of developing countries we show that fdi has a positive effect on growth only beyond a certain threshold of institutional quality to benefit from fdi led growth institutional reforms should thus precede fdi attraction policies additionally some reforms seem to promote faster marginal effects of fdi while institutional complementarities may lead to an incremental effect on growth

corruption as a gamble abstract in the following model of corruption a simple game is set up whose players are a government official granting a permit conditional on a test and a candidate requesting the permit the game is solved under different assumptions as to the information sets of the players perfect information asymmetric information and imperfect information on both sides in the latter case after characterizing the solution and presenting some important comparative statics results the paper moves on to show the emergence of multiple equilibria in corruption illustrating the interaction of corruption at different hierarchical levels of an administration

marriage institutions and sibling competition evidence from south asia using data from south asia this article examines how arranged marriage cultivates rivalry among sisters during marriage search parents with multiple daughters reduce the reservation quality for an older daughters groom rushing her marriage to allow sufficient time to marry off her younger sisters relative to younger brothers younger sisters increase a girls marriage risk relative to younger singleton sisters younger twin sisters have the same effect these effects intensify in marriage markets with lower sex ratios or greater parental involvement in marriage arrangements in contrast older sisters delay a girls marriage because girls leave school when they marry and face limited earning opportunities when they reach adulthood the number of sisters has well being consequences over the life cycle younger sisters cause earlier school leaving lower literacy a match to a husband with less education and a less skilled occupation and marginally lower adult economic status data from a broader set of countries indicate that these cross sister pressures on marriage age are common throughout the developing world although the schooling costs vary by setting

corruption and cross border investment in emerging markets firm level evidence abstract this paper studies the joint impact of corruption on the entry mode and volume of inward foreign direct investment fdi using a unique firm level data set we find that corruption not only reduces inward fdi but also shifts the ownership structure towards joint ventures the latter finding supports the view that corruption increases the value of using a local partner to cut through the bureaucratic maze however r d intensive firms are found to favor sole ownership

foreign direct investment regulations and growth this paper explores the linkage between income growth rates and foreign direct investment fdi inflows so far the evidence is rather mixed as no robust relationship between fdi and income growth has been established the authors argue that countries need a sound business environment in the form of good government regulations to be able to benefit from fdi using a comprehensive data set for regulations they test this hypothesis and find evidence that excessive regulations restrict growth through fdi only in the most regulated economies this result holds true for different specifications of the econometric model including instrumental variable regressions

electoral accountability and corruption evidence from the audits of local governments we show that political institutions affect corruption levels we use audit reports in brazil to construct new measures of political cor ruption in local governments and test whether electoral account ability affects the corruption practices of incumbent politicians we find significantly less corruption in municipalities where mayors can get reelected mayors with reelection incentives misappropriate 27 percent fewer resources than mayors without reelection incentives these effects are more pronounced among municipalities with less access to information and where the likelihood of judicial punish ment is lower overall our findings suggest that electoral rules that enhance political accountability play a crucial role in constraining politician s corrupt behavior jel d72 k42 017

why doesn t capital flow from rich to poor countries an empirical investigation we examine the empirical role of difierent explanations for the lack of ows of capital from rich to poor countries the lucas paradox the theoretical explanations include difierences in fundamentals across countries and capital market imperfections we show that during 1970i2000 low institutional quality is the leading explanation for example improving peru s institutional quality to australia s level implies a quadrupling of foreign investment recent studies emphasize the role of institutions for achieving higher levels of income but remain silent on the speciflc mechanisms our results indicate that foreign investment might be a channel through which institutions afiect long run development

a multi level panel star model for us manufacturing sectors we introduce a multi level smooth transition model for a panel of time series which can be used to examine the presence of common nonlinear business cycle features across many variables the model is positioned in between a fully pooled model which imposes such common features and a fully heterogeneous model which allows for unrestricted nonlinearity we introduce a second stage model linking the parameters that determine the timing of the switches between business cycle regimes to observable explanatory variables thereby allowing for lead lag relationships across panel members we discuss representation estimation by concentrated simulated maximum likelihood and inference we illustrate our model using quarterly industrial production in 19 us manufacturing sectors and document that there are subtle differences across sectors in leads and lags for switches between business cycle recessions and expansions copyright 2005 john wiley sons ltd