tripartite income employment contracts and coalition incentive compatibility tripartite contracts between workers a firm and an insurance broker pareto dominate the usual bilateral arrangements if coalitions are not feasible they do this by allowing the broker to run surpluses over a reservation expected utility in some states and deficits in others we show that these contracts are manipulable by coalitions this motivates our main contribution the definition and characterization of coalition incentive compatible tripartite contracts we then ask whether broker intermediation can still be useful the answer is that not every coalition incentive compatibility requirement annuls the critical budget breaking property specifically if firm broker coalitions are feasible there is no three party contract that is coalition incentive compatible and pareto superior to bilateral firm worker contracts except in the extreme case where the workers demand for leisure is income inelastic but if only a firm worker coalition can form the addition of a broker to a bilateral arrangement does reduce the welfare losses caused by the existence of asymmetric information

bank runs liquidity costs and investment distortions abstract in this paper we extend the diamond and dybvig 1983 model of intermediation to study further the conditions under which bank runs can occur and to consider how private parties might adjust to the existence of bank run equilibria we provide weaker necessary conditions for runs we then characterize how banks respond to the possibility of runs in their design of deposit contracts and investment decisions banks might choose to offer contracts that prevent runs but under some conditions the second best contracts will involve accepting some risk of runs in order to achieve higher expected returns from their investments

stopping agents from cheating abstract when a principal hires two or more agents to work in a correlated environment each agent s reward will depend on the other s performance unfortunately with just the usual optimal incentive constrained contracts being offered the agents strictly prefer to play equilibrium strategies other than those desired by the principal they cheat however the principal can use a more subtle contractual mechanism to stop them from cheating at no extra cost this mechanism uses one agent to police the other and exploits certain properties of the optimal contracts

defence procurement theory and uk policy since the early 1980s competition as a means of obtaining best value for money has dominated uk defence procurement policy this paper describes the uk defense equipment market and the procurement problem there are sections on the economic theory of procurement contracting regulation and competition the conclusion evaluates uk defence procurement policy and assesses some of the policy issues for the 1990s copyright 1996 by oxford university press

cost allocation revisited an optimality result the resource manager of a firm is faced with capacity and pricing decisions with regard to a congestion prone system such as computer communication facilities difficulties arise since the manager is uninformed of the system demand when the capacity decision is to be made a game theoretic model is developed to analyze the effects of different accounting rules on the elicitation of relevant information and ex post efficiency in acquisition and allocation decisions the key result is that the cost allocation method aided by an anonymous reporting scheme is indeed as asserted by zimmerman zimmerman j 1979 the costs and benefits of cost allocations accounting rev 54 july 504 521 a full information efficient rule achieving optimality both in acquisition and allocation decisions discussions of the main assumptions underlying this result are provided

optimal incentive schemes with many agents the grossman hart principal agent model of moral hazard is extended to the multiple agent case to explore the use of relative performance in optimal incentive contracting under the assumption that the principal chooses incentive schemes to implement agent actions as nash equilibria necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for the optimality of independent contracts of rank order tournaments and for attainability of the first best in this context the relation of the principal s welfare to the correlation between the underlying randomness in outputs of different agents is also investigated finally some problems with the nash equilibrium implementation assumption are discussed in this paper we extend the grossman hart analysis of the principal agent problem to a multiple agent setting in this version of the problem a risk neutral principal is assumed to observe the output or a performance index for each risk averse agent the output of any agent depends on a privately observable action chosen by the agent and an exogenous random variable the realization of which is not observed either by the principal or by the agent before choosing its action we especially focus attention on the role of relative performance evaluation in optimal incentive contracts and the way this depends on properties of the underlying production technology and the joint distribution of the random variables affecting the outputs of different agents in section 2 of the paper we consider the principal s problem of finding an optimal incentive scheme and an action tuple for agents subject to the constraint that the latter be implemented as a nash equilibrium between agents by the chosen incentive scheme where agents must attain at least their reservation utilities a characterization of optimal incentive schemes is derived analogous to the grossman hart characterization for the single agent problem this characterization is then utilized to find sufficient and generically necessary conditions for a optimal contracts for any agent to be independent of the performance of other agents and b optimality of rank order tournaments where payments depend solely on ordinal comparisons of output across agents we then describe a necessary and sufficient condition for the principal to extract maximum advantage from relative performance clauses i e achieve the first best level of expected utility in the multiagent situation an implication of this result is that under fairly weak conditions perfect correlation in the underlying production uncertainties for different agents enables the principal to attain the first best if and only if sufficiently heavy penalties can be inflicted on agents we then enquire what happens in intermediate cases of non perfect correlation it turns out that while in general the principal s welfare is a continuous function of the correlation coefficient it is not always nondecreasing in the latter because the correlation coefficient is not a general measure of association between two random variables but rather a measure of linear association between them

a common agency with incomplete information in the present article i demonstrate that forming a common agency by oligopolistic firms may not be to their advantage if agents have access to private information about their costs bernheim and whinston 1985 1986 pointed out that a common agency allows the firms to sustain the collusive outcome by giving them a vehicle to internalize the externality generated by their pricing or output decisions if agents have access to private information the advantage pointed out by bernheim and whinston may be more than outweighed by the possible existence of an informational disadvantage specifically if the unit costs of different potential agents are correlated the firm may be more successful in extracting the informational rents of its agent if it contracts with an independent agent and not with the same agent as its rival firm when oligopolistic firms contract with independent agents the revenues of one firm reveal implicit information about the unit costs of agents serving competing firms in the same industry however if the unit costs of different agents are correlated revenues also reflect information about the unit cost of the firm s own agent this additional information transmitted by revenues cannot be controlled by the agent s reporting behavior as a result if the firm conditions its agent s payoff upon revenues it can limit the informational rents that this agent can secure due to the existence of private information this possibility of limiting its agent s informational rents is eliminated if the firm contracts with the same agent as its rivals with a common agency the agent can manipulate the reports delivered to all the firms thus reducing the options available to each of them various patterns of agency relationship exist in markets where oligopolistic producers

advertising and prices as signals of quality in a regime of price rivalry abstract this paper addresses the issue of whether firms use price or advertising to signal quality and whether advertising has pro or anti competitive effects we show that when there is price rivalry advertising may be necessary to signal quality in contrast to single firm models signaling through price alone prevails for sufficient inter brand quality differentials joint price advertising signals prevail when the quality differential is small finally advertising in the form of variable rather than fixed costs is shown to increase the feasibility of signaling quality

regulation of multiagent research and development this article focuses on the regulation problems raised by two specific characteristics of research and development first it is normally desirable that several units pursue the same goal and second that only the best of the final products made by these units is worthwhile to society when firms have private information these characteristics are seen to generate a substitution effect which in some situations implies that the resources allocated to r d under asymmetric information are excessive relative to the full information allocation i thus identify asymmetric information as one possible source of excessive allocations to research and development

price dependent profit sharing as a channel coordination device we show how an upstream firm by using a price dependent profit sharing rule can prevent destructive competition between downstream firms that produce relatively close substitutes with this rule the upstream firm induces the retailers to behave as if demand has become less price elastic as a result competing downstream firms will maximize aggregate total channel profit when downstream firms are better informed about demand conditions than the upstream firm the same outcome cannot be achieved by vertical restraints such as resale price maintenance price dependent profit sharing may also ensure that the downstream firms undertake efficient market expanding investments the model is consistent with observations from the market for content commodities distributed by mobile networks

constant and variable returns to scale dea models for socially responsible investment funds abstract in order to evaluate the performance of socially responsible investment sri funds we propose some models which use data envelopment analysis dea and can be computed in all phases of the business cycle these models focus on the most crucial elements of an investment in mutual funds in the literature both constant and variable returns to scale dea models have been used to evaluate the performance of mutual funds we carry out an empirical investigation on european sri equity funds to test the presence of returns to scale rts another aspect taken into account by the empirical investigation is the measurement of the degree of social responsibility of sri equity funds in various european countries in addition we analyse the performance of the funds considered with the different dea models proposed which differ in the way the ethical objective is taken into account moreover the paper focuses on another crucial issue regarding socially responsible investing the comparison of the performances between sri and non sri funds the empirical study suggests that the ethical objective can be pursued without having to renounce financial rewards

mechanism design with incomplete information a solution to the implementation problem the main result of this paper is that the multiple equilibrium problem in mechanism design can be avoided in private value models if agents do not use weakly dominated strategies in equilibrium we show that in such settings any incentive compatible allocation can be made the unique equilibrium outcome to a mechanism we derive a general necessary condition for unique implementation which implies that the positive result for private value models applies with considerably less generality to common value settings and to situations in which an agent s information does not index the agent s preferences

moral hazard with several agents abstract we consider a situation in which a principal hires two agents whose cooperation is technically profitable and study three models that incorporate different assumptions about the agents cooperative behavior we find a close relationship between the agents commitment capacity and the characteristics of the optimal contract a greater capacity to cooperate leads to more efficient outcomes we also show that unless agents form a team the efficient level of mutual help is not achieved in equilibrium

implementation in differential information economies abstract we consider the problem of implementation of social choice correspondences in differential information economies we provide necessary conditions for implementation and slightly stronger conditions which are sufficient to guarantee implementation

optimal contracts with public ex post information abstract we are concerned with the value of public ex post information about a seller s costs to an initially uninformed buyer we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a public ex post signal s s that is correlated with the risk neutral seller s costs to render the initial information asymmetry inconsequential to the buyer the first best outcome for the buyer is shown to be feasible if 1 the dimension of s is at least that of or 2 the conditional likelihood function of s given is for one of its realizations sj a strictly increasing function of and more concave in than is the seller s cost function

financial fragility and over the counter markets abstract this paper studies the interaction between financial fragility and over the counter otc markets i model the financial sector as a large number of investors divided into different groups which i interpret as financial institutions and a large number of dealers financial institutions and dealers trade assets in an otc market a la duffie et al 2005 and lagos and rocheteau 2009 investors receive privately observed preference shocks and financial institutions use the balanced team mechanism proposed by athey and segal 2013 to implement an efficient risk sharing arrangement among their investors when the market is liquid in the sense that search and bargaining are small frictions i show that the economy is likely to have a unique equilibrium and therefore is not fragile when these frictions are severe a run equilibrium exists investors announce low valuation of assets because they believe everyone else in their financial institution is doing the same conditional on bank runs existing the welfare impact of the search friction is ambiguous during runs trade is inefficient and as a result a friction that reduces trade during runs has the potential to improve welfare this result is in sharp contrast with the existing literature which suggests that search friction has a negative impact on welfare

delay cost and incentive schemes for multiple users this paper examines the role of cost application in the presence of delay and agency costs two risk neutral division managers share a common production facility and decide on a the demand usage rates and b productive action each division manager causes costly delays at the common production facility for the other division manager the expected delay depends on the demand rates chosen by the division managers an m g 1 queuing framework is used to characterize delay costs the unobservability of demand rates leads to stochastic choice hazard and the unobservability of productive actions leads to moral hazard problems the headquarters designs incentive schemes such that the use of the common facility is optimal for the firm we show that a franchise contract is necessary to implement the first best solution similar to harris and raviv 1979 but is not sufficient specifically when the action aversion of one division manager is small the use of a franchise contract leads to greedy behaviour by the that division manager the cost application required is greater than the expected marginal cost of delay to preclude the greedy behavior and ensure a stable equilibrium

x inefficiency competition and market information whether competition forces firms toward efficient behaviour is an open question we consider a duopoly with firms run by managers and affected by adverse selection on costs in contrast to recent literature we point out that to have a genuine effect on firm x inefficiency competition must change managerial incentives by introducing the availability of some signal on the rivals behaviour we show that if costs are correlated the contractual use of that signal can render private managerial information uninfluential this result stresses the informational role of the market and suggests scope for future work

the market for knowledge brokers a widely used policy to diminish the market failure on the market for innovations is the provision of rd ii obtaining research proposals iii monitoring the research efforts and iv disseminating the research results it can be expected that creation of such a market yields a better match between demand and supply on the market for r d yields a higher quality research product for a given price and that it increases the dissemination of research results

incentives in principal agent relationships this article identifies some of the major issues that have been examined in the literature on incentives the article begins by discussing the frictions that lie at the heart of incentive problems next the principal s optimal response to these frictions is explored taking as given the characteristics of the agents with whom the principal interacts in a nonrepeated setting the design of individualized contracts contests and tournaments is analyzed then the principal s task of selecting the best agent is addressed and repeated agency relationships are considered

information extraction and norms of mutual protection abstract we study a class of moral hazard economies in which a principal interacts with several agents in these economies first best allocations can be implemented via full information extraction when side trades between agents can be restricted when instead side trades cannot be restricted the ability of the principal to extract information from the agents is severely hampered in this context side trades take the form of informal contracts which can be directly interpreted as norms of mutual protection which are indeed quite common among extended family members as well as inside various social political and religious groups

incentive schemes with multiple agents and bankruptcy constraints abstract we explore the effects of bankruptcy constraints on incentive schemes when two risk neutral agents operate in correlated environments our focus is on the subgame equilibrium in which each agent is induced via a direct mechanism to truthfully reveal his private information as a nash response to truth telling by his counterpart we identify a class of examples in which in contrast to the case where the agents are risk averse the nash constraints induce a subgame dominant strategy equilibrium thus implementation via direct mechanisms is feasible for this class more generally however the truth telling nash equilibrium may be subgame dominated so the question of implementation via direct mechanisms remains a delicate one

efficiency and voluntary implementation in markets with repeated pairwise bargaining we examine a simple bargaining setting where heterogeneous buyers and sellers are repeatedly matched with each other we begin by characterizing efficiency in such a dynamic setting and discuss how it differs from efficiency in a centralized static setting we then study the allocations which can result in equilibrium when the matched buyers and sellers bargain through some extensive game form we take an implementation approach characterizing the possible allocation rules which result as the extensive game form is varied we are particularly concerned with the impact of making trade voluntary imposing individual rationality on and off the equilibrium path no buyer or seller consummates an agreement which leaves them worse off than the discounted expected value of their future rematching in the market finally we compare and contrast the efficient allocations with those that could ever arise as the equilibria of some voluntary negotiation procedure

quasi robust multiagent contracts a criticism of mechanism design theory is that the optimal mechanism designed for one environment can produce drastically different actions outcomes and payoffs in a second even slightly different environment in this sense the theoretically optimal mechanisms usually studied are not robust to study robust mechanisms while maintaining an expected utility maximization approach we study a multiagent model in which the mechanism must be designed before the environment is as well understood as is usually assumed the particular model is of an auction setting with binary private values our main result is that if the prior belief about the correlation in the agents values is diffuse enough the optimal bayesian nash auction must also satisfy dominant strategy incentive constraints furthermore when the optimal auction does provide dominant strategy incentives it takes one of two forms i if perfect correlation and negative correlation are excluded as possibilities the auction incorporates all information about the prior belief over the possible correlations and ii if either perfect correlation or negative correlation is a possibility the auction does not incorporate any correlation information and can be described as a modified vickrey auction

implications of power when the ceo can pressure the cfo to bias reports abstract building on archival anecdotal and survey evidence on managers roles in accounting manipulations i develop an agency model to examine the effects of a ceo s power to pressure a cfo to bias a performance measure like earnings this power has implications for incentive compensation reporting quality firm value and information rents predictions from the model provide potential explanations for the differing results from recent empirical studies on the impact of regulatory interventions like sox and the extent to which the ceo s or cfo s incentives significantly impact on earnings management the model also identifies conditions under which either a powerful or a non powerful ceo can extract rents which can help explain mixed empirical results on the association between ceo power and excessive compensation

a game theoretic approach to behavioral food risks the case of grain producers abstract food risks may be caused by malpractice of suppliers who exploit the fact that their production processes and resulting product properties cannot be directly observed by buyers the probability of malpractice increases with the profits that can be earned through opportunistic behavior in this paper we develop a moral hazard model for the empirical analyses of behavioral risks it accounts for the essential fact that incomplete inspection and tracing increase the profitability of rule breaking behavior and that monitoring tracing and sanctioning are costly using the model we first demonstrate how to design efficient contracts in various situations in a case study we then analyze farmers incentives with regard to the minimum waiting period after fungicide use data are gathered in interviews with three large scale german farmers and a grain dealer we find that while their perception of parameters varies widely high temptations for rule breaking arise in some cases we conclude that empirical moral hazard analyses have significant potential to shed light on behavioral risks

price stabilization as a bonding mechanism in new equity issues abstract underwriters have an incentive to overstate investor interest in order to persuade some investors to purchase shares at a price in excess of their initial estimate of the fair value we show that this incentive is eliminated when the underwriter commits to secondary market price stabilization destroying the underwriter s incentive to overstate interest reduces the total surplus captured by initial investors in initial public offerings further efficiency gains are associated with penalty bid systems that permit the underwriter to make the stabilization commitment selectively price stabilization can thus be viewed as a bonding mechanism that improves the efficiency of the primary equity market

price discrimination using linear and nonlinear pricing simultaneously abstract price discrimination practiced by using linear and nonlinear pricing simultaneously raises the average price for heterogenous consumers paying linear price but lowers for homogeneous group who pay nonlinear price discrimination lowers consumer surplus for both groups but increases total surplus

awarding monopoly franchises the authors analyze how to award a monopoly franchise when the objective is to maximize expected consumers surplus net of transfer payments to the producer potential producers initially possess independent private information about uncertain production costs only the chosen producer subsequently observes realized production costs after awarding the franchise to the producer with the lowest expected costs prices are optimally set above realized marginal cost these ex post distortions foster more competitive bidding ex ante the distortions for any bid cost pair are invariant to the number of bidders n though expected distortions and profits decline with n copyright 1987 by american economic association

unique implementation of incentive contracts with many agents in this paper we consider the problem of implementation when a principal hires many agents and is not able to monitor their actions we distinguish two cases i when actions are mutually observable among agents ii when actions are not observable at all in i there is a mechanism in which the first best arises as a unique perfect equilibrium in ii we show by two examples that typically there are multiple equilibria if the principal merely offers a set of optimal sharing rules however we prove that the principal can use these optimal sharing rules as a starting point and construct a multi stage mechanism that has a unique second best perfect bayesian equilibrium

socially responsible investment a multicriteria approach to portfolio selection combining ethical and financial objectives abstract in a context of socially responsible investment sri this paper deals with portfolio selection for investors interested in ethical policies in the opportunity set there are ethical assets and other assets which are not characterized as ethical two goals are considered the traditional financial goal in the classical utility theory under uncertainty and an ethical goal in the same utility framework a new financial ethical bi criteria model is proposed with absolute risk aversion coefficients and targets depending on the investor s ethical profile this approach is relevant as an increasing number of mutual funds are becoming interested in sri strategies from the proposed model an actual case on green investment is developed concerning this case without generalizing to other contexts an analysis of the numerical results shows that efficient portfolios obtained by the traditional e v model outperform the strong green portfolios in terms of expected return and risk but this does not significantly occur with weak green investment

on the effectiveness of liability rules when agents are not identical this paper is about accidents involving two risk neutral parties both parties engage in actions that are profitable but affect the magnitude of possible bilateral accidents we analyse how the action choices can be decentralized by liability rules that assign the accident costs to the two parties if we allow for punitive damages we can implement the first best actions by a liability rule even if agents are not identical under this liability rule some individuals may be in expectation better off in the event of an accident than in the event of no accident we provide conditions under which this problem does not arise

nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation we study nash implementation when the outcomes of the mechanism can be renegotiated among the agents but the planner does not know the renegotiation function that they will use we characterize the social objectives that can be implemented in nash equilibrium when the same mechanism must work for every admissible renegotiation function and show the importance of allowing the planner to sometimes take away resources from the agents

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

insurance premium allocation and loss prevention in a large firm a principal agent analysis abstract faced with increased insurance costs large firms are turning to a more systematic allocation of premium costs to subsidiaries an approach which capitalizes on economies of scale in a corporate wide management of aggregated risks risk pooled across divisions as well as subsidiaries such practice however raises a number of problems i what part of the aggregate risk should the firm self insure ii how should premium costs be allocated between subsidiaries iii how much effort should subsidiaries invest in loss prevention programs and how should they manage claims i e co insure themselves iv how can the parent firm induce managers of subsidiaries to control subsidiaries risk thereby reducing future premium payments and moral hazard or what premium incentive scheme can the firm devise to penalize or compensate subsidiaries investing less than an optimal effort in loss prevention to deal with these problems a conceptual framework based on a principal agents analysis and the definition of a liability account for each subsidiary is developed which is used to reduce the problems of moral hazard due to a less than perfect or indirect monitoring system specifically assumption regarding the premium allocation incentive scheme are made and explicit solutions are obtained for the control of subsidiaries loss prevention effort allocation

taxing the multinational enterprise on the forced redesign of global value chains and other inefficiencies the taxation of the multinational enterprise mne has been a continuing concern for policymakers we argue that the changing nature of the mobile mne e g its improved ability to fine slice the value chain and disperse it geographically makes it increasingly important to rethink current tax policies first there should be more focus on the inefficiencies that arise when taxation leads to the inefficient location of mne activities thus mnes may shift activities to low tax jurisdictions that offer lucrative pecuniary and non pecuniary incentives but do not enable their investments to maximize their contribution to global value creation second international tax regimes should ensure that mnes pay for their consumption of local public goods and public finance scholars have long known that the taxation based distortions are minimized when the tax objects are immobile however the bulk of current tax policies are aimed at corporate profits that are both poor proxies for the consumption of local public goods as well as extremely mobile integrating theory from international business public finance and economic geography our analysis demonstrates that moving the incidence of taxation from corporate profits to dividends and consumption would unambiguously improve both wealth creation and efficiency

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

implementation in dynamic job transfers abstract the implementation problem in a dynamic incentive contract with job transfers is studied we find that in the job transfers contract there are multiple equilibria in some of which the agents can lie we construct a mechanism to uniquely implement the principal s desired equilibrium under job transfers

how many stocks make a diversified portfolio we show that a well diversified portfolio of randomly chosen stocks must include at least 30 stocks for a borrowing investor and 40 stocks for a lending investor this contradicts the widely accepted notion that the benefits of diversification are virtually exhausted when a portfolio contains approximately 10 stocks we also contrast our result with the levels of diversification found in studies of individuals portfolios

the effect of property rights and audit information quality on team incentives for inventory reduction we analyze how limited contractibility and the informational quality of audits affect inventory levels and the optimality of individual versus team based production we use a two period agency model in which contractibility is limited and agents meet a fixed delivery quota each period a costly audit is triggered in any period if the delivery quota of output for the period is not met we show that the informativeness of the audit plays a crucial role in resolving coordination problems between agents when they are organized as a team when the audit is perfectly informative about agent productivity and inventory levels team based production is optimal the team meets its quota even though in equilibrium the audit never takes place if the audit is not perfectly informative about inventory levels we show that team based production typically induces agents to endogenously reduce inventory levels and could even result in agents adopting a zero inventory policy when the audit is completely uninformative individual production is superior to team based production

on relative performance contracts and fund manager s incentives abstract for pension schemes mutual funds banks and other financial intermediaries large portfolio decisions are increasingly delegated to fund managers recently there has been growing concern that these managers seem to adopt extremely similar investment strategies one possible explanation for this phenomenon may be found in reward schemes based on relative performance we show how relative performance reward schemes may arise as optimal contracts our focus is the fund owners fund manager relationship in which the manager before making a portfolio decision on behalf of the owners may acquire at some cost information that is not available to the owners payment schemes based on relative performance afford the owners tighter control of their manager s activities however if two managers of different funds both accept contracts that depend on their relative as well as absolute performances then there may exist equilibria in the managers subgame that result in undesirable outcomes for the owners

safety first portfolio choice based on financial and sustainability returns the aim of this paper is to expand the methodological spectrum of socially responsible investing by introducing stochastic sustainability returns into safety first models for portfolio choice we provide a foundation of the notion of sustainability in portfolio theory and establish a general model for generalized safety first portfolio management with probabilistic constraints and three specifications of it moreover we prove theorems about conditions for unique optimal solutions and for the constraints of one model being more restrictive than those of another in an empirical part we calculate the costs of investing according to our approach in terms of less financial return

ignorance in a multi agent setting abstract i extend the demski and sappington 1984 model to the case where the agents are with some exogenous probability ignorant i show that an ignorant agent either is not exposed to risk or he receives a lower transfer when the other agent is the informed type the principal wants to discourage choosing the contract designed for an ignorant agent

determinants of the amount and type of corruption in state fiscal bureaucracies an analysis of late imperial china a principal agent model of relations between rulers and state officials is used to derive several propositions concerning the amount and type of corruption in state bureaucracies the model is appl

limited liability contracts between principal and agent abstract the optimal strategy of the principal is examined in an environment where there are ex post limitations on the maximum penalty that can be imposed on a riskneutral agent contrary to the case in which such limitations are not imposed it is in the principal s interest to deliberately forego the opportunity to induce socially efficient behavior and to instead design a contract that induces the agent to realize an efficient outcome only in the most productive state of nature and perhaps in certain very unproductive states the properties of the contract are examined in detail

profit maximizing nonlinear pricing if the preferences of the consumers are represented by utility functions that are differentiable quasi linear and satisfy the single crossing condition the characteristics of the profit maximizing nonlinear outlay schedule for a monopolist are well known we demonstrate that these characteristics are robust against weaker assumptions on the utility functions

subgame perfect implementation this paper examines the use of stage mechanisms in implementation problems and provides a partial characterization of the set of subgam e perfect implementable choice rules it is shown that in many economic environments virtually an y choice rule can be implemented to illustrate the power of this approach the paper discusses a number of models in which it is possible to implement the first best although it wouldn t have been possible to do so without using stage mechanisms the diversity of these models suggests that subgame perfect implementation may find wide application copyright 1988 by the econometric society

markowitz revisited social portfolio engineering abstract in recent years socially responsible investing has become a popular subject with both private and institutional investors at the same time a number of scientific papers have been published on socially responsible investments sris covering a broad range of topics from what actually defines sris to the financial performance of sri funds in contrast to non sri funds in this paper we revisit markowitz portfolio selection theory and propose a modification allowing to incorporate not only asset specific return and risk but also a social responsibility measure into the investment decision making process applied in an a posteriori fashion the model results in a three dimensional capital allocation plane illustrating the complete set of feasible optimal portfolios it enables investors to custom tailor their asset allocations and incorporate all personal preferences regarding return risk and social responsibility in an empirical analysis with a data set of over 6000 international companies including the complete universe of social responsibility rated stocks we find that investors opting to maximize the social impact of their investments do indeed face a statistically significant decrease in expected returns however the social responsibility risk optimal portfolio yields a statistically significant higher social responsibility rating than the return risk optimal portfolio

socially optimal procurement with tight budgets and rationing abstract we investigate the behaviour of a social planner that secures the supply of a good e g an environmental benefit through contracting with private agents while the social planner seeks to maximise net social benefits she is also controlled with a fixed budget private agents are profit maximising and hold private information concerning their variable costs of production they also have known fixed costs of contracting we find that budget constraints and fixed costs change the optimal contract design in more than one way the social planner minimises costs rations high cost contracts to reduce fixed costs and information rents and distorts contracts for all agent types including low cost agents we find that rationing improves social welfare also even though social costs including tax distortion are explicitly taken into consideration they do not affect the design of optimal contracts when budgets are tight in those cases the budget constraint dominates the solution

multi firm regulation without lump sum taxes abstract this paper considers a problem of multi firm regulation where the regulator cannot make monetary transfers to or from firms otherwise the set up is standard two firms charging two part tariffs sell in separate markets and marginal costs are private information without transfers the regulator faces an additional consumer participation constraint that the representative consumer must wish to participate in the market in all states the paper studies the second best optimal regulatory scheme that respects this constraint and shows that it has some surprising properties i the regulator may wish to drive informational rents down to zero even at the cost of some price distortion ii consumer surplus may be zero in some states and iii the price that one firm charges is decreasing in the other s cost

moral hazard in corporate investment and the disciplinary role of voluntary capital rationing this paper compares three capital budgeting rules the npv rule a high hurdle rate and capital rationing and explains why some firms may voluntarily impose capital rationing under both capital rationing and a high hurdle a restrictive investment criterion is used to control managerial shirking however implementation of these budgeting rules requires a mechanism to prevent the firm from expanding the investment scale ex post capital rationing in the form of a predetermined fixed budget differs from the high hurdle rate rule in that the former requires the firm to overcome the cost of raising additional capital before making further investment

asymmetric information incentives and intrafirm resource allocation this paper considers the question how should a firm allocate a resource among divisions when the productivity of the resource in each division is known only to the division manager obviously if the divisions as represented by their managers are indifferent among various allocations of the resource the headquarters can simply request the division managers to reveal their private information on productivity knowing that the managers have no incentive to lie the resource allocation problem can then be solved under complete or at least symmetric information this aspect is a flaw in much of the recent literature on this topic i e there is nothing in the models considered which makes divisions prefer one allocation over another thus although in some cases elaborate allocation schemes are proposed and analyzed they are really unnecessary in the model we develop a division can produce the same output with less managerial effort if it is allocated more resources and effort is costly to the manager we further assume that this effort is unobservable by the headquarters so that it cannot infer divisional productivity from data on divisional output and managerial effort given these assumptions we seek an optimal resource allocation process our results show that certain types of transfer pricing schemes are optimal in particular if there are no potentially binding capacity constraints on production of the resource then an optimal process is for each division to choose a transfer price from a schedule announced by the headquarters division managers receive a fixed compensation minus the cost of the resource allocated to them at the chosen transfer price resources are allocated on the basis of the chosen transfer prices if there is a potentially binding constraint on resource production a somewhat more complicated but similar scheme is required

efficiency in sequential partnerships abstract we consider sequential partnerships in which agents obtain non verifiable information about the actions taken by previous agents for such partnerships a budget balanced sharing rule exists that induces efficient production the sharing rule has many desirable features 1 it uniquely implements efficient production 2 it does not rely on message games 3 it does not rely on unlimited liability and 4 it is robust to renegotiation the rule is furthermore simple intuitive and robust to sabotage coalition formation and noise it also induces efficient production when agents obtain incomplete information about previous actions journal of economic literature classificationnumbers d82 l23

the maturing of socially responsible investment a review of the developing link with corporate social responsibility this paper reviews the development of socially responsible investment sri over recent years and highlights the prospects for an increasingly strong connection with the practice of corporate social responsibility the paper argues that not only has sri grown significantly it has also matured in particular it has become an investment philosophy adopted by a growing proportion of large investment institutions this shift in sri from margin to mainstream and the position in which institutional investors find themselves is leading to a new form of sri shareholder pressure although this bears some resemblance to lobbying campaigns which might take advantage of shareholder rights we seek to distinguish it as an important phenomenon in its own right one to which corporate executives are likely to be paying increasing attention in the years to come we further argue that this approach potentially meets some of the earlier ethical criticisms of certain forms of sri but ironically probably owes its existence to those pioneering approaches we conclude with some suggestions for further research to inform discussion of the issues highlighted in the paper

production externalities and two way distortion in principal multi agent problems this paper studies an otherwise standard principal agent problem with hidden information but where there are positive production externalities between agents the output of any agent depends positively on the effort expended by other agents it is shown that the optimal contract for the principal exhibits two way distortion the effort of any agent is oversupplied relative to the first best when his marginal cost of effort is low and undersupplied taken his marginal cost of effort is high this pattern of distortion cannot otherwise arise in optimal single or multi agent incentive contracts unless there are countervailing incentives however unlike the countervailing incentives case the pattern of distortion we find is robust to the precise form of the externality journal of economic literature classification numbers d21 d28 c 2000 academic press

optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents abstract a setting in which a single principal contracts with two agents who possess perfect private information about their own productivity is considered with correlated productivities each agent s private information also provides a signal about the other agent s productivity in contrast to the setting in which there is only one agent it is shown that such private information may be of no value to the agents it is only if the agents are risk averse that their private information may allow them to command rents moreover when the agents are constrained only to reveal their private information truthfully as a nash equilibrium the pareto optimal incentive scheme may induce the agents to adopt strategies other than truth telling this leads to the consideration of truth telling equilibria that are not pareto dominated in the subgame played by the agents among all such equilibria the one preferred by the principal restricts one agent to tell the truth as a dominant strategy and the other as a nash response to truth

regulation competition and liberalization in many countries throughout the world regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries this essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process while stressing the importance of case specific analyses this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are procompetitive from corresponding anticompetitive liberalization policies

implementing coordinated team play abstract this note studies a moral hazard model of joint production in which there are strong gains to coordination the mechanism we propose for resolving the tacit collusion problem that arises in our setting makes use of at will contracts which provide the agents with the option to quit at any time journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d82

correlation and relative performance evaluation this paper reexamines the issue of relative versus joint incentive schemes in a multi agent moral hazard framework the model allows a full analysis of the information and dependence structure an important result is that the widespread notion that greater correlation in outcomes calls for more competition is not robust first when the dependence structure is effort sensitive the optimal incentive scheme in general mixes elements of relative evaluation and joint evaluation second under limited liability higher equilibrium correlation tends to make joint performance evaluation more desirable examples are provided regarding incentives in firms finance and innovation

promoting fair competition in public procurement abstract if a government cares for local firms profit but not for foreign firms foreign firms will be discriminated against when competing for government procurement contracts foreign firms will be chosen less often and when chosen earn less profit than local firms we analyze a more central authority s policies against such discrimination given a situation in which a government has private information on product quality and the competing firms have private information on own costs necessary and sufficient conditions for free revelation of quality information are derived finally optimal policy when these conditions are not satisfied is characterized and discussed

extraction of surplus under adverse selection the case of insurance markets abstract we consider a principal agent setting with two types of risk averse agents with different abilities to avoid losses abilities types are characterized by two distributions f and g which are agents private information all agents have the same increasing and strictly concave utility function u under which g has a higher certainty equivalent in this environment we derive a characterization of pairs of distributions under which a first best outcome can be achieved or approximated we prove that a first best outcome can be achieved if and only if the distribution f is not absolutely continuous with respect to the distribution g if this condition is not satisfied the first best outcome can be approximated arbitrarily close if and only if the likelihood ratio df dg is unbounded journal of economic literature classification number d82

comarketing alliances should you contract on actions or outcomes comarketing alliances often involve multiple partners and a given partner s marketing efforts on behalf of the alliance can indirectly affect the demand of the other partners individual partners however can ignore the effects of such an externality and invest suboptimally to the detriment of the alliance this paper examines the relative effectiveness of outcome and action based contracts in providing the alliance partners with the incentives to invest appropriately we develop a mathematical model in which a focal firm e g sony contracts with two partners e g mcdonald s and old navy when each of these partners is privately informed about the impact of the alliance on its demand our analysis evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of outcome or output and action based or input based contracts in settings with varying levels of the demand externality we find that when there is either no externality or a relatively weak positive externality there is a strict preference for output based contracts that preference however is reversed with a sufficiently strong positive externality this paper explains the underlying rationale for these findings this paper was accepted by preyas desai marketing

using trembling hand perfection to alleviate the interlinked principal agent problem for a simple interlinked principal agent problem equilibrium may b e inefficient to the principals when each agent s discrete effort and a common random variable observable to agents but not principals jointly determine the principals payoffs in a moral hazard problem agents may tend to shirk however slight uncertainty about the rationality of other agents strategies can reduce incentives to shirk in particular the trembling hand perfect refinement of nash equilibria can result in more effort and higher payoffs to the principal unfortunately these efficiency gains diminish as additional intermed diate effort levels are added to the model copyright 1988 by the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

collusion proof yardstick competition abstract this paper analyses the incentives for collusion among firms when an industry is regulated by means of yardstick competition the central assumption is that firms must write collusive side contracts before the revelation of private correlated information and are unable to communicate later the analysis shows that collusion is costly to society only if firms can commit to side payments third best collusion proof yardstick competition entails more less distortion of efficiency for low productivity high productivity firms than second best yardstick competition the benefit of yardstick competition vanishes in the limit as correlation of private information becomes near perfect

an mcdm approach to portfolio optimization abstract we propose a model for portfolio optimization extending the markowitz mean variance model based on cooperation with standard and poor s we use five specific objectives related to risk and return and allow consideration of individual preferences through the construction of decision maker specific utility functions and an additive global utility function numerical results using customized local search simulated annealing tabu search and genetic algorithm heuristics show that problems of practically relevant size can be solved quickly

cooperation in the budgeting process in this article i analyze the role of cooperation between firm divisions in the budgeting process i study a setting in which cooperation is a necessary condition for information sharing among division managers which in turn benefits the principal the results in this article can help reconcile the differing views between practitioners and academic researchers on the desirability of cooperation in the budgeting process the results also have implications for some common budgeting processes observed in practice including bundling budgeting and bottom up budgeting

parallelism in information production moral hazard and relative performance evaluations we analyse how to design incentive schemes for agents producing information the agents may for example be divisional managers market researchers or consultants financial analysts corporate auditors research scientists or political pollsters we show that an agent should be compensated more for making a correct rather than an incorrect prediction and for agreeing rather than disagreeing with colleagues depending on the environment correctness should be compensated more or less than agreement also compensation should increase with the difficulties of making correct or conforming predictions one consequence of the result is that it may sometimes reduce a principal s total incentive costs to engage with more information producers performing parallel investigations because the possibility to make relative performance evaluations of the agents may substantially reduce the costs of motivating the agents in performing their duties as desired

non uniform pricing output and welfare under monopoly which the price varies with the quantity purchased than by charging a uniform price in general the profit maximizing non uniform price schedule and the welfare maximizing schedule do not coincide thus there may be scope for improving market performance through regulation the paper considers a regulator who has limited information and authority the issues addressed centre around the question of whether the level of total market output can be taken as a measure of market performance conditions under which welfare is a monotonic function of the level of total output are derived

on bayesian implementable allocations this paper identifies several social choice correspondences which are and are not fully implementable in economic environments when agents are incompletely informed about the environment we show that in contrast to results in the case of complete information neither efficient allocations nor core allocations define implementable social choice correspondences we also identify conditions under which the rational expectations equilibrium correspondence is implementable we extend the concepts of fair allocations and lindahl allocations to economies with incomplete information and show that envy free allocations and lindahl allocations are implementable under some conditions while fair allocations are not

tri criterion inverse portfolio optimization with application to socially responsible mutual funds we present a framework for inverse optimization in a markowitz portfolio model that is extended to include a third criterion the third criterion causes the traditional nondominated frontier to become a surface until recently it had not been possible to compute such a surface but by using a new method that is able to generate the nondominated surfaces of tri criterion portfolio selection problems we are able to compute via inverse optimization the implied risk tolerances of given funds that pursue an additional objective beyond risk and return in applying this capability to a broad sample of conventional and socially responsible sr mutual funds we find that after the screening process there appears to be no significant di erence between how assets are allocated in socially responsible and conventional mutual funds which is likely to be di erent from what most sr investors would expect

moral hazard and renegotiation in multi agent incentive contracts when each agent makes a renegotiation offer abstract the purpose of this paper is to explore a mechanism for implementing the desired equilibrium actions in the one principal multi agent model with renegotiation when each agent is allowed to make a renegotiation offer with some belief restriction we show that there exists a mechanism in which the second best strategy is always implemented

selection of socially responsible portfolios using hedonic prices this research presents a novel framework for selecting socially responsible investment sri portfolios the hedonic price method hpm is applied to obtain an evaluation of sri criteria that is integrated into a multi objective mathematical programming model this approach allows us to obtain a portfolio whose financial performance is similar to which the investor would have reached if he or she had not taken into account social ethical and environmental see characteristics when making his or her investment decisions this methodology is applied to portfolios composed of socially responsible and conventional mutual funds domiciled in spain

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

hierarchical structure and responsibility accounting the literature on responsibility accounting offers two broad imperatives first a manager is best evaluated based on what he controls second responsibility follows a hierarchical arrangement the departmental manager is responsible for the controllable departmental activities the plant manager is responsible for the activities in the various departments within the plant the division manager is responsible for the aggregate activities of various plants and so on this literature embodies a variety of theories of behavior and organization examples include expectancy theory ronen and livingstone 1975 and brownell and mcinnes 1968 contingency theory bruns and waterhouse 1975 and merchant 1984 neoclassical economics gordon 1964 and principal agent modeling baiman 1982 principal agent modeling emphasizes information asymmetries in understanding responsibility accounting in particular the link between controllability and informativeness holmstrom 1979 1982 baiman and demski 1980 and antle and demski 1988 has been well explicated and the use of relative performance evaluation antle and smith 1986 demski and sappington 1984 and ma moore and turnbull 1988 has received significant attention 1 far less attention has been afforded the hierarchical aspect of responsibility accounting this is the focus of our analysis