optimal pricing of intraday liquidity abstract this paper presents a general equilibrium model where intraday liquidity is needed because the timing of payments is uncertain a necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium to be efficient is that the nominal intraday interest rate be zero even when the overnight rate is strictly positive because a market for liquidity may not achieve efficiency this creates a role for the central bank i allow for the possibility of moral hazard and study policies commonly used by central banks to reduce their exposure to risk i show collateralized lending achieves the efficient allocation while for certain parameters caps cannot prevent moral hazard

competitive equilibria and the core of overlapping generations economies this paper analyzes whether the well known result that for arrow debreu economies all competitive equilibria belong to the core holds true in overlapping generations economies in these economies competitive equilibria are not a subset of the core we define the classical set as the set of all those competitive allocations which cannot be affected by a monetary tax transfer policy then we demonstrate that every competitive equilibrium in the classical set belongs to the core of the economy further we show that for large economies no monetary equilibrium belongs to the core journal of economic liferature classification numbers 021

the solution to the tullock rent seeking game when r 2 mixed strategy equilibria and mean dissipation rates in tullock s rent seeking model the probability a player wins the game depends on expenditures raised to the power r we show that a symmetric mixed strategy nash equilibrium exists when r 2 and that overdissipation of rents does not arise in any nash equilibrium we derive a tight lower bound on the level of rent dissipation that arises in a symmetric equilibrium when the strategy space is discrete and show that full rent dissipation occurs when the strategy space is continuous our results are shown to be consistent with recent experimental evidence on the dissipation of rents

the incompatibility of valued money and equilibrium policy abstract in an overlapping generations economy an equilibrium is defined such that at each date the young agent determines values for that period s monetary and fiscal instruments a proposition showing money cannot have value in any such equilibrium is proved

a note on the core of a monetary economy this note shows that there are monetary equilibria in the model of overlapping generations that are in the core some equilibria have positive stocks of outside money in every generation these equilibria are thus self enforcing and introducing money into an economy need not be tantamount to contriving a new social institution designed to enforce sequential contracts journal of economic literatureclassification numbers e40 e60 c71

common agency and coordination general theory and application to government policy making we develop a model of common agency with complete information and general preferences with nontransferable utility and we prove that the principals nash equilibrium in truthful strategies implements an efficient action we apply this theory to the construction of a positive model of public finance where organized special interests can lobby the government for consumer and producer taxes or subsidies and targeted lump sum taxes or transfers the lobbies use only the nondistorting transfers in their noncooperative equilibrium but their intergroup competition for transfers turns into a prisoners dilemma in which the government captures all the gain that is potentially available to the parties

competition and corporate performance are people right to think that competition improves corporate performance my investigations indicate first that there are some theoretical reasons for believing this hypothesis to be correct but they are not overwhelming furthermore the existing empirical evidence on this question is weak however the results reported here based on an analysis of around 670 u k companies do provide some support for this view most important i present evidence that competition as measured by increased numbers of competitors or by lower levels of rents is associated with a significantly higher rate of total factor productivity growth

clearinghouse banks and banknote over issue abstract the paper presents a model of banks as clearinghouses of private debt where money is used as the means of payment implications of the model include i the private provision of banknotes or a discount window may be needed to avoid the insufficient debt clearing that results from an inflexible currency stock and ii an uncontrolled total money stock may result in a multiplicity of equilibria including an inflationary banknote over issue

equilibrium policy in an overlapping generations economy abstract this paper offers a mechanism for reducing the number of stationary equilibria that arise in a simple two period lived overlapping generations economy since each equilibrium is associated with a different combination of monetary and fiscal policies i assume that at each date the agent in his second period of life determines how that period s monetary and fiscal instruments will be set i show that the set of stationary equilibria where this occurs is a proper and nonempty subset of the set of stationary competitive equilibria and that at least one such equilibrium is a pareto optimum

the strategic equivalence of rent seeking innovation and patent race games abstract we establish the strategic equivalence of a variety of rent seeking contests innovation tournaments and patent race games the results allow us to disentangle negative and positive externalities and to apply theorems and results intended for rent seeking games to other games and vice versa we conclude with several examples that highlight the practical utility of our results

endogenous transfer institutions in overlapping generations abstract we characterize the set of equilibrium transfers between overlapping generations when transfer institutions are endogenous in stationary economies pareto improving transfers require institutions cost as much to construct as they convey even if less costly institutions exist that make the same transfer if institutions can be built upon they may cost less and convey more but transfers may become excessive interpreting such institutions as social security we introduce private saving with time social security crowds out savings still the potential to save limits any excess transfer endogenous costly to create gold money institutions are examined and the role of compulsion in evolving to costless to create fiat currency detailed

on equilibrium for overlapping generations organizations a necessary feature for equilibrium is that beliefs about the behavior of other agents are rational and indi viduals maximize we argue that in stationary olg environments this implies that any future generation in the same situation as the initial generation must do as well as the initial generation did in that situation we conclude that the existing equilibrium concepts in the literature do not satisfy this condition we then propose an alternative equilibrium concept organizational equilibrium that satisfies this condition we show that equilibrium exists it is unique and it improves over autarky without achieving optimality moreover the equilibrium can be readily found by solving a maximization program rios rull thanks the national science foundation for grant sbr 9309514 and the university of pennsylvania re search foundation for their support prescott thanks the national science foundation for grant sbr 9996201 we thank julio davila igor livshits larry jones dan silverman and attendants at seminars in the penn macro lunch group federal reserve bank of minneapolis cornell penn state university macro theory conference the univer sity of rochester ucla and the 1999 midwest theory meetings for comments the views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the federal reserve bank of minneapolis or the federal reserve system

private capital flows capital controls and default risk abstract what has been the effect of the shift in emerging market capital flows toward private sector borrowers are emerging market capital flows more efficient if not can controls on capital flows improve welfare this paper shows that the answers depend on the form of default risk when private loans are enforceable but there is the risk that the government will default on behalf of all residents private lending is inefficient and capital controls are potentially pareto improving however when private agents may individually default capital flow subsidies are potentially pareto improving

criminal deterrence in new york the relationship between court activities and crime this study provides new evidence on the deterrent effects of criminal justice sanctions the supply of crime function is tested using 1970 cross sectional data for the 62 counties in new york state most studies consider only expected length of sentence when estimating the offender s cost of crime the current analysis includes the length of time needed to dispose of a case and the severity of conviction charge as well as the expected prison sentence

short run core equivalence in an overlapping generations model abstract this essay establishes the equality between the set of competitive equilibrium allocations and the set of allocations which belong to the cores of a sequence of short run economies for an overlapping generations model a short run economy is a finite period economy obtained by truncating the original economy so that the truncated economy is irreducible

a second note on the core of the overlapping generations model abstract this note provides an example of an overlapping generations economy with a pareto optimal walrasian equilibrium and an empty core then in the context of the economy examined by balasko and shell 1980 a sufficient condition is provided for a pareto optimal walrasian equilibrium to be contained in the core

fiat exchange in finite economies the state of the art of rendering fiat money valuable is either to impose a boundary condition or to make the boundary condition unimportant through an infinite sequence of markets so as to circumvent backward induction we show fiat exchange may nevertheless arise in finite economies if agents have incomplete information about their relative position in the trade cycle or when the barter and autarky equilibria of the one shot trading round support a monetary equilibrium with repeated trades

an estimate of resource expenditures on transfer activity in the united states this paper details resource expenditures on nonexchange noncharity transfer activity in the united states in 1985 expenditures designed to facilitate and inhibit nonexchange transfers executed privately or through the state are reported the numbers indicate that individuals plausibly invested nearly a trillion dollars in transfer activity that year nominal gnp in 1985 was just over 4 trillion which includes numerous transfer related resource investments that arguably should be subtracted out transfer activity thus apparently constitutes a much larger fraction of all economic activity conducted in the united states than previously recognized

estimating deterrence effects a public choice perspective on the economics of crime literature following becker s path breaking theoretical work on the economics of crime a large econometric literature has developed to test his implications 3 this literature typically focuses on a supply of offenses in which per capita crimes are related to the probability and severity of punishment for that type of crime the expected income from the criminal activity returns from alternative legal activities and other socio economic factors however the economic theory of crime also implies that the supply of offenses is determined simultaneously with community s demand for enforcement services 24 25 theoretically the crime rate depends on police deterrence efforts police deterrence efforts depend upon the level of police resources and the level of police resources depends on the crime rate as a result the typical econometric model employees data on reported crimes index i crimes and a simultaneous equation estimating technique with at least two and generally three or more equations in which police deterrence efforts are proxied by the probability of arrest 14 1 a series of recent empirical studies of the economics of crime

directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities this paper propses directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities as a general concept that embraces a wide range of recently analyzed economic activities including the subset of rent seeking activities considered by krueger it then proceeds to provide a synthesis and generalization of the welfare theoretic analysis of such activities by developing a fourfold categorization of cases depending on the levels of distortions before and after the dup activity thus a unification and overview of the subject are achieved

the voracity effect abstract we analyze an economy that lacks a strong legal political institutional infrastructure and is populated by multiple powerful groups powerful groups dynamically interact via a fiscal process that effectively allows open access to the aggregate capital stock in equilibrium this leads to slow economic growth and a voracity effect by which a shock such as a terms of trade windfall perversely generates a more than proportionate increase in fiscal redistribution and reduces growth we also show that a dilution in the concentration of power leads to faster growth and a less procyclical response to shocks jel f43 o10 o23 o40

costly transfer institutions and the core in an overlapping generations model we examine an overlapping generations economy with no pre existing intergenerational transfers and study the set of transfer institutions in the core of the economy that is institutions that would be admissible for the first generation to create and would not be rejected by any future generation institution building is assumed to be costly we allow the cost of creating a new institution to vary with the size of the transfer it institutes and show that all institutions in the core must cost as much to build as they transfer in fact the core set is nonempty if and only if the institution that supports the golden rule transfer costs as much to create as it transfers the core set is characterized for various cost functions we conclude that costs associated with the creation of transfer institutions are essential to make intergenerational transfers socially viable but they may induce the choice of institutions making suboptimal transfers

payments systems design in deterministic and private information environments abstract the first setup we study is a deterministic model with spatial separation where we consider alternative payments systems institutions and their implications for allocation and welfare a payments system with period by period settlement in outside money improves on decentralized exchange an efficient allocation is supported by a payments system where settlement is not imposed in the second model there is random matching and unobserved productivity shocks and preference shocks we explore how risk should be shared optimally in this economy and interpret the results in terms of how actual payments systems should operate journal of economic literature classification numbers e4 e5

property crimes and the police an empirical analysis of swedish data the results of a study of the impact of police work on property crimes are reported the data base is a cross section of 278 swedish municipalities during the years 1975 and 1976 a three equation simultaneous model is compared with a simpler two equation model the results indicate that the simpler system is preferable in the estimates of both models most parameters are significant with the expected signs police work seems to deter crime as expected

rent seeking market structure and growth we study the role of productive and unproductive entrepreneurship in economic growth in a setting where firms compete in both economic and political markets specifically firms compete for market share through cost reducing technological innovation and they vie for influence over government transfer policy through rent seeking activities we find that rent seeking affects growth in two ways it allows firms to ignore economic competition leading to less innovation and it alters the number of firms that are supported in equilibrium the former effect is negative while the latter is ambiguous we show how these effects depend on various characteristics of economic and political markets

natural resources rent seeking and welfare abstract a new and very simple mechanism to explain why natural resource abundance may lower income and welfare is developed in a model with rent seeking a greater amount of natural resources increases the number of entrepreneurs engaged in rent seeking and reduces the number of entrepreneurs running productive firms with a demand externality it is shown that the drop in income as a result of this is higher than the increase in income from the natural resource more natural resources thus lead to lower welfare

overlapping generations intermediation and the first welfare theorem abstract the first welfare theorem fails to hold for standard pure exchange overlapping generations economies because no agent exploits the profit opportunities which can arise from mediating intertemporal trade this paper modifies the standard economy by introducing an optimizing corporate intermediary which distributes net earnings back to consumer shareholders the pareto inefficient no trade state which is a stationary equilibrium for the standard economy cannot be an equilibrium for this modified brokerage economy because the intermediary perceives unbounded earnings opportunities if the intermediary seeks to maximize the minimum dividend per share distributed over time then there is a unique pareto efficient stationary equilibrium for the brokerage economy

on dynamics and the core of og models stationary overlapping generations models can exhibit fluctuations however the fluctuations which have been studied by benhabib and day journal of economic dynamics and control 1982 4 37 55 gale journal of economic theory 1973 6 12 36 grandmont econometrica 1985 53 995 1046 and others are not in the core even though they are pareto optimal in the present paper it is shown that general stationary overlapping generation economies can have periodic equilibria in the core

a characterization of the core in overlapping generations economies abstract in this paper we characterize the set of consumption allocations that belong to the core and show that for the case of one agent per generation and one good no monetary equilibrium is in the core for economies with many goods we give bounds on the value of money transactions for competitive equilibria to belong to the core

adaptive behavior and economic theory the relationship between psychological and economic views of behavior once a subject of heavy dispute is now understood in a very similar way by practitioners of both these disciplines and of our sister social sciences in general terms we view or model an individual as a collection of decision rules rules that dictate the action to be taken in given situations and a set of preferences used to evaluate the outcomes arising from particular situation action combinations these decision rules are continuously under review and revision new decision rules are tried and tested against experience and rules that produce desirable outcomes supplant those that do not i use the term adaptive to refer to this trial anderror process through which our modes of behavior are determined if one is interested in modeling particular decisions in any very explicit way it is obviously necessary to think about rather narrow aspects of an individual s entire set of decision rules his or her personality experimental psychology has traditionally focused on the adaptive process by which decision rules are replaced by others in this tradition the influence of the subject s or as an economist says the agent s preferences this essay uses a series of examples to illustrate the use of rationality and adaptation in economic theory it is argued that these hypotheses are complementary and that stability theories based on adaptive behavior may help to narrow the class of empirically interesting equilibria in certain economic models an experiment is proposed to test this idea

special interests and technological change we model an olg economy where productivity growth comes from two alternative sources process innovation and learning by doing there is a trade off between the two in so far as frequent technological updates reduce the scope for learning on existing technologies a conflict is shown to arise between the young and the old because the former favor innovation while the latter prefer learning we model the interaction between different generations and short lived policy makers as a dynamic common agency problem where competing generations invest a certain amount of resources to lobby either for the maintainance of the current technology or the adoption of a new one by focusing on truthful markov perfect equilibria we characterize the political equilibrium and show its dependence on the underlying technological parameters

the bounded core of an overlapping generations economy the bounded core is the set of allocations which are not improved upon by any bounded set of agents we submit that the bounded core does not serve as a criterion for the efficiency of allocations in an overlapping generations economy for it may include allocations which are not even short run pareto optimal we also submit that the bounded core is a weak criterion for the robustness of allocations in an overlapping generations economy for it may not shrink to the set of competitive equilibrium allocations as the individual agents become negligible

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

nominal prices and interest rates in general equilibrium endowment shocks the outstanding problem of neoclassical monetary theory has been to determine the effect of changes in the money stock on nominal prices and interest rates the classic result is that in the absence of money illusion contracts fixed in nominal terms and other such impedimenta money is neutral thus a doubling of the money stock results in a doubling of the nominal price level and in no change in nominal interest rates except at most for a temporary liquidity effect while the price level is rising to its new level during the adjustment period the nominal interest rate might temporarily drop this neutrality result has conventionally been proved in a static framework in intertemporal models it is necessary to distinguish between static neutrality and dynamic neutrality if a model displays dynamic neutrality fluctuations in the money stock immediately induce a proportional change in the nominal price level and no change in nominal interest rates or any real variable this property is different from and stronger than static neutrality which in dynamic models states only that if the money stock at all dates is doubled so will be the price level at all dates the effects of exogenous shocks in the monetary growth rate on nominal prices and interest rates are analyzed a representative individual rational expectations framework is adopted and a demand for money is generated by entering money in the utility function the effects of monetary shocks on inflation and interest rates are shown to depend on the autocorrelation of the monetary growth rate for example under serial independence the inflation rate equals the monetary growth rate and the nominal interest rate is nonrandom while under positive negative autocorrelation the nominal interest rate is affected positively negatively by positive growth rate shocks i am grateful to the staff of the federal reserve bank of philadelphia to the finance groups at the university of southem california and virginia polytechnic institute and to c j lacivita dan peled john seater and jon sonstelie for valuable comments on earlier drafts

vested interests in a positive theory of stagnation and growth we study a positive theory of stagnation and growth aimed at understanding the large variations in growth outcomes across actual economies the theory points to the fundamental role played by vested interests in determining policies which are key to the growth process some agents seek to prevent the adoption of new technologies we develop a model of technology adoption and show how technological innovation may sow the seeds of its own destruction in particular we find that the equilibrium is characterized by a long cycle of stagnation and growth over this cycle incumbents are phased out of the economy will new innovation occur in formalizing our theory we make a methodological contribution by characterizing dynamic voting equilibria when voters must forecast the effects of different current policies on future prices and policy outcomes

an overlapping generations model core equivalence theorem we show that in the overlapping generations model an allocation is a walrasian equilibrium if and only if the allocation belongs to the short term core of every replication of the olg economy and hence we establish a core equivalence theorem for the overlapping generations model

the incidence of overdissipation in rent seeking contests tullock s analysis of rent seeking and overdissipation is reconsidered we show that while equilibrium strategies do not permit overdissipation in expectation for particular realizations of players mixed strategies the total amount spent competing for rents can exceed the value of the prize we also show that the cross sectional incidence of overdissipation in the perfectly discriminating contest ranges from 0 50 to 0 44 as the number of players increases from two to infinity thus even though the original analysis of overdissipation is flawed there are instances in which rent seekers spend more than the prize is worth

sunk costs market structure and growth the author presents a model of endogenous innovation where firms undertake in house research and development r d the concentration of sales and r d resources determines the scale and efficiency of r d operations and rate of productivity growth in zero profit equilibrium r d expenditure is one component of total fixed costs and determines the number of active firms this feedback generates interdependent pricing investment and entry exit decisions the jointly determined rate of growth and number of firms supported in general equilibrium define the economy s balanced growth path multiple equilibria exist and firms expectations about rivalry determine the economy s performance copyright 1996 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

sub optimality of the friedman rule in townsend s turnpike and stochastic relocation models of money do finite lives and initial dates matter abstract the friedman rule a widely studied prescription for monetary policy is optimal in townsend s turnpike model of money it is not so in the overlapping generations version of his stochastic relocation model of money we investigate these monetary models in the light of this disparity to this end we create a modified version of the turnpike model that generates the same stationary monetary equilibria as does the two period overlapping generations model with random relocation we exploit this equivalence to explain the aforementioned disparity we also discuss the importance of whether or not the economy has an initial date

does competition kill corruption corrupt agents officials or gangsters exact money from firms corruption affects the number of firms in a free entry equilibrium the degree of deep competition in the economy increases with lower overhead costs relative to profits and with a tendency toward similar cost structures increases in competition may not lower corruption the model explains why a rational corrupt agent may extinguish the source of his bribe income by causing a firm to exit assessing the welfare effect of corruption is complicated by the fact that exit caused by corruption does not necessarily reduce social welfare