multi issue allocation situations abstract this paper introduces a new class of transferable utility games called multi issue allocation games these games arise from various allocation situations and are based on the concepts underlying the bankruptcy model as introduced by o neill math social sci 2 1982 345 in this model a perfectly divisible good estate has to be divided amongst a given set of agents each of whom has some claim on the estate contrary to the standard bankruptcy model the current model deals with situations in which the agents claims are multi dimensional where the dimensions correspond to various issues it is shown that the class of multi issue allocation games coincides with the class of non negative exact games the run to the bank rule is introduced as a solution for multi issue allocation situations and turns out to be shapley value of the corresponding game finally this run to the bank rule is characterised by means of a consistency property in the spirit of o neill

balanced contributions for tu games with awards and applications abstract calleja et al calleja p borm p hendrickx r 2005 multi issue allocation situations european journal of operational research 164 730 747 introduced multi issue allocation situations with awards in this paper we extend the classical model of cooperative games with transferable utility to the cooperative games with transferable utility and awards we define a run to the bank rule for cooperative games with transferable utility and awards and characterise it in terms of a property of balanced contributions we apply our main result to bankruptcy problems and multi issue allocation situations with awards

the family and the state the immaturity of children sometimes precludes efficient arrangements between children and parents or others responsible for child care the difficulty in establishing efficient relations within families provides the point of departure for our interpretation of the heavy state involvement in the family the authors believe that a surprising number of state interventions mimic the agreements that would occur if children were capable of arranging for their care many regulations of the family improve the efficiency of family activities these interventions include subsidies to education and training social security and other old age support subsidies to births laws that limit access to divorce and the sale of children and laws that require parents permission for early marriage and other choices of children families that leave bequests can force children to repay parents for investments in human capital by reducing bequests therefore these families do not underinvest in childrens human capital by contrast families that do not leave bequests often poorer families do underinvest in children the state may subsidize schools and other training facilities to raise investments in children by poorer families to efficient levels authors modified

an evolutionary approach to technological innovation in agriculture some preliminary remarks abstract this article proposes an interpretation of the process of technological innovation in agriculture we begin with a criticism to the idea of agriculture as a particular environment in economic analysis we argue that some dynamic concepts from economics of innovation especially as seen by the evolutionary literature can be used as an adequate theoretical reference to study innovation in agriculture we then suggest an interpretation in terms of technological trajectories in order to explain the complexity of the technological regime in agriculture finally we discuss the present stage of transformation in this technological regime and the perspectives of the arising new trajectories

bequest and wealth accumulation are some pieces of the puzzle missing the lively debate between laurence j kotlikoff and franco modigliani presented in the spring 1988 issue of this journal concerns an old question what is the main motivation for saving and therefore for the accumulation of wealth more specifically what are the respective contributions to aggregate wealth of 1 saving for retirement also known as hump saving 2 precautionary savings and unintended bequests due to uncertainty about the length of life and 3 planned bequests of course other wealth holding motives are possible but let us follow kotlikoff and modigliani in setting them aside for now if modigliani s life cycle hypothesis is to be viewed as a close to approximation of reality then the bulk of existing wealth should have resulted from some combination of hump and precautionary saving our comment on this dispute attempts to advance two issues first the controversy involves an enormous gap between empirical estimates of the share of inherited wealth in total accumulation even though the estimates are often based on the same data we hope to clarify why the estimates vary so widely second the kotlikoff modigliani dispute is presented as an american issue with little extension abroad we will present some results from other countries that bear on the controversy some of the estimates from kotlikofi s paper originated in a 1981 paper he wrote with lawrence summers which is why we sometimes refer to his position as the kotlikoff summers argument in this comment the problem of conceptualizing the contribution of bequest to aggregate savings can be summarized with a thought experiment assume all bequests were confiscated

the family as an incomplete annuities market families can self insure against uncertain dates of death through implicit or explicit agreements with respect to consumption and interfamily transfers interfamily transfers need have nothing to do with altruistic feelings they may simply reflect risk sharing behavior of completely selfish family members although family annuity markets are incomplete even small families can substitute by more than 70 percent for perfect market annuities given adverse selection and transaction costs family risk pooling may be preferred to public market annuities in the absence of public annuities these risk sharing arrangements provide powerful incentives for marriage and family formation

a reexamination of the strategic bequest motive this paper investigates the strength of the empirical evidence of the strategic bequest hypothesis proposed by bernheim shleifer and summers 1985 at issue is whether bequests are primarily motivated by a desire to influnce the behavior of potential beneficiaries alternatively bequests may be motivated by altruism or risk aversion in the presence of incomplete annuity and health insurnace markets e g tomes 1981 hurd 1989

inter vivos transfers and intended bequests abstract empirical work on intergenerational transfers has focused on distinguishing between altruistic and exchange motivated behavior however these two models are unable to explain the strong tendency for inter vivos transfers to be negatively related to the income of the recipient while bequests bear no relationship to income this paper presents a new framework for analyzing transfers from parents to children that is more consistent with observed behavior than are the altruistic and exchange models alone in particular the model developed here predicts differing behavior with respect to inter vivos transfers and bequests due to liquidity constraints and uncertainty about the recipient s permanent income the empirical work uses data from the health and retirement study and the asset and health dynamics study the patterns observed in these data are consistent with earlier findings that inter vivos transfers go disproportionately to less well off children while bequests are divided equally across children further the results support the predictions of the model in that differences in inter vivos transfers arise from differences in current income while differences in bequests result when indicators of the children s permanent incomes differ

understanding carbon lock in abstract this paper narrative argues that industrial economies have been locked into fossil fuel based energy systems through a process of technological and institutional co evolution driven by path dependent increasing returns to scale it is asserted that this condition termed carbon lock in creates persistent market and policy failures that can inhibit the diffusion of carbon saving technologies despite their apparent environmental and economic advantages the notion of a techno institutional complex is introduced to capture the idea that lock in occurs through combined interactions among technological systems and governing institutions while carbon lock in provides a conceptual basis for understanding macro level barriers to the diffusion of carbon saving technologies it also generates questions for standard economic modeling approaches that abstract away technological and institutional evolution in their elaboration the question of escaping carbon lock in is left for a future paper

the need for policy to address the food system lock in a case study of the finnish context abstract the introduction of synthetic fertilizers transformed the food system into the one we know today in the western world the present paper argues that this transformation has become an irreversible self feeding process referred to as food system lock in which threatens planetary boundaries of nitrogen and phosphorus hence the food security in the future a system in a lock in state can undermine its own existence by deteriorating the capacity to cope with upcoming crises of resource scarcity and environmental instability in this paper the roots of lock in are explored and empirically grounded in the historical narrative of the food system transition in finland in the past 60 years the theoretical framework builds on socio technical studies and the economic theory of increasing returns the aim of the paper is to identify through an evolutionary analysis the processes of increasing returns that have become path inefficient and have reinforced the lock in in the food system three separate but interdependent processes in the production in the policy and institutions and in the supply chain create systematic resistance towards sustainability transition these findings indicate that more attention should be paid at the public policies that are currently too narrow in their scope and do not effectively bridge the entire system from food production to consumption public intervention is critical for the unlocking but individuals in the various parts of the food system are those who create new paths

why are grain legumes rarely present in cropping systems despite their environmental and nutritional benefits analyzing lock in in the french agrifood system grain legume plants fix atmospheric nitrogen in the soil and thus do not need nitrogen fertilizers therefore grain legumes can potentially decrease global warming as nitrogen fertilization is responsible for half of all agricultural greenhouse gas emissions moreover grain legumes have many functional and nutritional properties both as feed and food despite the fact that the european union has granted considerable subsidies to promote grain legume cultivation their production continues to fall and there has been no satisfactory explanation as to why this study provides an answer by showing that a situation of technological lock in has resulted from the co evolution of crop systems based on an agrochemical paradigm public policies and market dynamics that promote cereals this process began with the historical choice by european and french public institutions to relegate grain legumes to feed in direct competition with imported soybeans moreover interrelated factors such as breeding selection public subsidies and food systems have favored increasing returns to adoption for cereals to the detriment of grain legumes finally the evolutionary economics approach used here identified several actions that must be implemented together such as agricultural cost accounting methods nitrogen management institutional innovations and market outlets to promote grain legumes and move towards more sustainable agriculture

the role of intergenerational transfers and life cycle saving in the accumulation of wealth he purpose of this paper is to review what economists know at present about the following question how large a portion of the existing wealth is the result of a bequest motive that is of accumulation for the specific purpose of leaving bequests i will also endeavor to clarify why an answer to this question is of interest in the early keynesian period when the study of national saving first attracted wide interest relatively little attention was paid to what led people to save though it was generally understood that the main systematic reason was to leave bequests j m keynes in the famous chapter 9 of the general theory of employment interest and money 1936 had listed seven distinct motives for saving besides the leaving of bequests but five of these which include to increase one s future income or to insure one s independence and power implied that all or nearly all the accumulation would finally wind up as bequeathed wealth this in turn meant that most private wealth originated through bequests that is it either had been received through bequests or was destined to be bequeathed and indeed how else could society accumulate wealth however keynes 1936 p 107 also mentioned two further motives precaution that is to build up a reserve against unforeseen contingencies and foresight that is to provide for an anticipated future relation between the income and the needs of the individual or his family different from that which exists in the present as for example in relation to old age family education or the maintenance of dependents these motives in contrast to most of the previous ones have the

the axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure we present a unified framework for a broad class of values in transferable utility games with coalition structure including the owen coalitional value and two weighted versions with weights given by the size of the coalitions we provide three axiomatic characterizations using the properties of efficiency linearity independence of null coalitions and coordination with two versions of balanced contributions inside a coalition and weighted sharing in unanimity games respectively

increasing returns path dependence and the study of politics it is increasingly common for social scientists to describe political processes as path dependent the concept however is often employed without careful elaboration this article conceptualizes path dependence as a social process grounded in a dynamic of increasing returns reviewing recent literature in economics and suggesting extensions to the world of politics the article demonstrates that increasing returns processes are likely to be prevalent and that good analytical foundations exist for exploring their causes and consequences the investigation of increasing returns can provide a more rigorous framework for developing some of the key claims of recent scholarship in historical institutionalism specific patterns of timing and sequence matter a wide range of social outcomes may be possible large consequences may result from relatively small or contingent events particular courses of action once introduced can be almost impossible to reverse and consequently political development is punctuated by critical moments or junctures that shape the basic contours of social life

three perspectives on sustainable food security efficiency demand restraint food system transformation what role for life cycle assessment achieving food system sustainability is a global priority but there are different views on how it might be achieved broadly three perspectives are emerging defined here as efficiency oriented demand restraint and food system transformation these reflect different conceptualisations on what is practically achievable and what is desirable underpinned by different values and ideologies about the role of technology our relationship with nature and fundamentally what is meant by a good life this paper describes these emerging perspectives and explores their underlying values highlights lca s role in shaping these perspectives and considers how lca could be oriented to clarify thinking and advance policy relevant knowledge it argues that more work is needed to understand the values underlying different approaches to the food sustainability problem this can shed light on why stakeholders disagree where there are genuine misunderstandings and where common ground is possible and ways forward agreed

intergenerational transfers and savings in recent years the role of intergenerational transfers in the process of wealth accumulation has been the subject of substantial empirical and theoretical analysis the key question stimulating this research is what is the main explanation for savings is it primarily accumulation for retirement as claimed by albert ando richard brumberg and franco modigliani in their celebrated life cycle model of savings is it primarily intentional accumulation for intergenerational transfers or is it primarily precautionary savings much of which may be bequeathed because of imperfections in annuity markets this paper examines a range of findings on the importance of intergenerational transfers the strong conclusion that emerges from this evidence is that intergenerational transfers play a very important if not a key role in aggregate wealth accumulation while intergenerational transfers figure very large in savings the precise motivation for such transfers is unclear intergenerational altruism might appear the most likely candidate but at least sane stylized facts such as the equal allocation of bequests among children are strongly at adds with the altruism model other explanations involving imperfect insurance arrangements or payments for child services do not appear capable of explaining the substantial amounts of transfers actually observed sorting cut the relative contributions of different models to intergenerational transfers and the precise role of intergenerational transfers in the process of wealth accumulation remains an intriguing and exciting enterprise this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

intergenerational trade longevity and economic growth we develop an overlapping generations model of endogenous growth in which human capital is the engine of growth and the generations are linked through material and emotional interdependencies within the family parents invest in their children to achieve both old age support care and emotional gratification and material support from children is determined through self enforcing implicit contracts we show that optimal intergenerational trade can then lead to maximization of growth opportunities our model produces a theory of the demographic transition linking longevity fertility and economic growth we also show that while population aging may raise the growth rate an increase in young age longevity is likely to produce a greater increase in the growth rate and a reduction in the fertility rate in a growth equilibrium these predictions and the model s implications concerning the behavior of private savings during the takeoff period appear consistent with empirical evidence

motives for private income transfers private income transfers are becoming increasingly recognized as a key aspect of the u s economy the majority of private income transfers occur inter vivos i e between living persons but very little is known about this type of transfer behavior this paper tests alternative hypotheses concerning motivation for inter vivos transfers two motives are considered altruism and exchange evidence presented here casts doubt on the altruistic model of transfer behavior observed patterns for inter vivos transfers are more consistent with exchange related motives this finding has important implications for the effects of public transfer programs on the distribution of economic well being

parental altruism and inter vivos transfers theory and evidence this paper uses psid data on the extended family to test whether inter vivos transfers from parents to children are motivated by altruism specifically the paper tests whether an increase by one dollar in the income of parents actively making transfers to a child coupled with a one dollar reduction in that child s income results in the parents increasing their transfer to the child by one dollar this restriction on parental and child transfer income derivatives is derived for the standard altruism model augmented to include uncertainty and liquidity constraints these additional elements pin down the timing of inter vivos transfers the method used to estimate income transfer derivatives takes into account unobserved heterogeneity across families in the degree of altruism the findings strongly reject the altruism hypothesis redistributing one dollar from a recipient child to donor parents leads to less than a 13 cent increase in the parents transfer to the child far less than the one dollar increas

family transfers involving three generations most models of family transfers consider only two generations and focus on two motives altruism and exchange they also assume perfect substitution between inter vivos downward transfers and bequests based on french evidence we show that parent to child transfers belong to three distinct categories investment in child s education financial assistance wealth transmission and advocate a three generation framework thus transfer behavior of parents toward their children is strongly influenced by the behavior of their own parents there is also some evidence of the cox and stark demonstration effect parents help their own parents expecting to receive comparable support from their children such behavior can be regarded as indirect reciprocity the beneficiary does not give back to the initial giver but to a third person of another generation jel classification d10 d31 d63 d64

the dynamic implications of increasing returns technological change and path dependent inefficiency this paper addresses the issue of path dependent selection and inefficiency counterfactual methods and the empirical evidence employed in this research trajectory the general message is basically that the theoretical argument to prove path dependent inefficiency is relatively straightforward while empirical demonstrations as well as the analysis of welfare implications are much more difficult in the first section we briefly state the basic argument explaining how localized learning leads to an incomplete exploration of the variety distribution of a technology we then synthesize the most interesting historical studies which get potential regret results and ask whether these results suggest a large welfare loss to try to answer this question we start from the critical arguments of liebowitz and margolis to discuss the theoretical and empirical difficulties of establishing path dependent inefficiency