war and natural resource exploitation abstract we build a theoretical framework that allows for endogenous conflict behaviour i e fighting efforts and for endogenous natural resource exploitation i e speed ownership and investments while depletion is spread in a balanced hotelling fashion during peace the presence of conflict creates incentives for rapacious extraction as this lowers the stakes of future contest this voracious extraction depresses total oil revenue especially if world oil demand is relatively elastic and the government s weapon advantage is weak some of these political distortions can be overcome by bribing rebels or by government investment in weapons the shadow of conflict can also make less efficient nationalized oil extraction more attractive than private extraction as insecure property rights create a holdup problem for the private firm and lead to a lower license fee furthermore the government fights less intensely than the rebels under private exploitation which leads to more government turnover without credible commitment to future fighting efforts private oil depletion is only lucrative if the government s non oil office rents are large and weaponry powerful which guarantees the government a stronger grip on office and makes the holdup problem less severe

does multilateral lending aid capital accumulation role of intellectual capital and institutional quality abstract this paper investigates whether multilateral lending is more effective in accumulating capital in countries with a higher level of innovation specifically we examine the role of the world bank or imf financing on the capital stock using data from 175 countries over the period 1970 2017 while considering different types of long term external flows namely fdi and debt we find that fdi as a long term inflow influences domestic capital stock positively but non g7 countries even with a higher level of innovation are unable to benefit from greater fdi flows in boosting their capital stock which we explain considering institutional quality differences across countries with regard to foreign debt flows the multilateral lending only benefits the borrowing country if it has a greater level of intellectual capital or if those funds are used in financing innovative activities as opposed to short term imf loans world bank lending tends to be directed more towards long term development goals thereby helping boost productive capital exploiting a policy intervention with trips agreement the paper uncovers that countries with better institutional quality and greater innovation generate a higher level of capital stock

institutional quality and capital inflows theory and evidence abstract this paper analyzes both theoretically and empirically the link between capital inflows and the quality of economic institutions to this purpose we construct a small open economy model of the soft budget constraint syndrome wherein persistently cheap funding from abroad i raises the prevalence of extractive projects and ii expands their support by the benevolent government ex post while the government may in principle limit the prevalence of extractive projects ex ante the incentives to do so is limited when foreign borrowing is cheap using a large sample of countries and controlling for reverse causality and omitted variable bias we confirm empirically that capital inflows are followed by a decline in the quality of domestic economic institutions our model and empirical analysis help explain the divergence between southern european countries spain portugal italy and greece and the rest of oecd countries since the mid 1990s

geopolitics and international organizations an empirical study on imf facilities there is growing awareness that the distribution of imf facilities may not be influenced only by the economic needs of borrowers this paper focuses on the fact that the imf may favour geopolitically important countries in the distribution of imf loans differentiating between concessional and non concessional facilities to carry out the empirical analysis we construct a new database that compiles a wide array of proxies for geopolitical importance for 107 imf countries over 1990 2003 focusing on emerging and developing economies we use a factor analysis to capture the common underlying characteristic of countries geopolitical importance as well as a potential analysis since we also want to account for the geographical situation of the loan recipients while controlling for economic and political determinants our results show that geopolitical factors influence notably lending decisions when loans are non concessional whereas results are less robust and in opposite direction for concessional loans this study provides empirical support to the view that geopolitical considerations are an important factor in shaping imf lending decisions potentially affecting the institution s effectiveness and credibility

collective moral hazard maturity mismatch and systemic bailouts the paper elicits a mechanism by which private leverage choices exhibit strategic complementarities through the reaction of monetary policy when everyone engages in maturity transformation authorities haver little choice but facilitating refinancing in turn refusing to adopt a risky balance sheet lowers the return on equity the key ingredient is that monetary policy is non targeted the ex post benefits from a monetary bailout accrue in proportion to the number amount of leverage while the distortion costs are to a large extent fixed this insight has important consequences first banks choose to correlate their risk exposures second private borrowers may deliberately choose to increase their interest rate sensitivity following bad news about future needs for liquidity third optimal monetary policy is time inconsistent fourth macro prudential supervision is called for we characterize the optimal regulation which takes the form of a minimum liquidity requirement coupled with monitoring of the quality of liquid assets we establish the robustness of our insights when the set of

political credit cycles the case of the euro zone we study the mechanisms through which the adoption of the euro delayed rather than advanced economic reforms in the euro zone periphery and led to the deterioration of important institutions in these countries we show that the abandonment of the reform process and the institutional deterioration in turn not only reduced their growth prospects but also fed back into financial conditions prolonging the credit boom and delaying the response to the bubble when the speculative nature of the cycle was already evident we analyze empirically the interrelation between the financial boom and the reform process in greece spain ireland and portugal and by way of contrast in germany a country that did experience a reform process after the creation of the euro

resource curse or not a question of appropriability this thesis presents three self contained essays focusing on empirical questions in growth and development economics each article addresses specific questions on why countries perform differently in particular i analyse the effect of democracy on economic development the relationship between natural resources and growth and the efficiency of foreign development assistance in the first essay democracy consolidation and growth i analyse the effect of democracy on economic growth in this context i argue that an important aspect to consider is how consolidated political systems are put simply i find that it is not only a question of how democratic countries are but also how long they have been democratic in other words economic performance tends to improve with the duration of uninterrupted democracy the performance of autocracies on the other hand tends to deteriorate over time however for newly established political systems there seems to be a cost of being democratic this implies that democracies only bear their fruit after some time the analysis has important policy implications to overcome initial straits international assistance focused on democratic consolidation may be important and a very good investment in fostering long run development the second essay resource curse or not a question of appropriability together with anne boschini and jesper roine is concerned with the relation between natural resources and economic development for most laymen as well as for most economists it would seem reasonable that countries richly endowed in natural resources also benefit from this wealth however a large literature has found a systematic negative effect of natural resource abundance on economic growth we suggest that this so called resource curse is not determined by resource endowments alone but rather by the interaction between the type of resources a country possesses and the quality of institutions in the country this combination of factors determines what we call the appropriability of a resource the concept of appropriability captures the likelihood of natural resources leading to rentseeking corruption or conflicts which in turn will harm economic development our results suggest that if institutions are good enough the curse may be turned into a blessing this may explain why some countries such as norway and botswana tend to benefit from their resources while others such as angola and sierra leone do not the third and final essay of this thesis foreign sectoral aid fungibility growth and poverty reduction is a contribution to the aid efficiency literature which is concerned with the question of whether aid helps or hinders economic development foreign development assistance is often targeted on specific public expenditure sectors if this aid is not used in the sector for which it was granted e g health education it is said to be fungible and donors may end up financing something completely different from what they intended e g military expenditures the major concern about sectoral fungibility is that the alternative use of aid may be less productive or less socially useful however measuring fungibility is not sufficient to determine whether foreign sectoral aid fungibility is actually harmful what is important is how the funds treated as fungible are used the essay starts by obtaining estimates of fungibility for 57 countries the results suggest that sectoral aid is indeed largely treated as fungible by recipient countries next to assess the economic and health effects of fungibility these estimates are incorporated into an empirical model of aid and growth as well as into a model of aid and infant mortality altogether i find no evidence of more fungible sectoral aid leading to worse performance

an evolutionary analysis of insurance markets with adverse selection abstract the equilibrium nonexistence problem in rothschild and stiglitz s insurance market is reexamined in a dynamic setting insurance firms are boundedly rational and offer menus of insurance contracts which are periodically revised profitable competitors contracts are imitated and loss making contracts are withdrawn occasionally a firm experiments by withdrawing or innovating a random set of contracts we show that rothschild and stiglitz s candidate competitive equilibrium contracts constitute the unique long run market outcome if innovation experiments are restricted to contracts which are sufficiently similar to those currently on the market

optimal dutch disease growth models of the dutch disease such as those of krugman 1987 matsuyama 1992 sachs and warner 1995 and gylfason et al 1999 explain why resource abundance may reduce growth however the literature also raises a new question if the use of resource wealth hurts productivity growth how should such wealth be optimally managed this question forms the topic of the present paper in which we extend the growth literature on the dutch disease from a positive to a normative setting we show that the assumptions in the previous literature imply that the optimal share of national wealth consumed in each period needs to be adjusted down however some dutch disease is always optimal thus lower growth in resource abundant countries may not be a problem in itself but may be part of an optimal growth path the optimal spending path of the resource wealth may be increasing or decreasing over time and we discuss why this is the case

rent seeking and resource booms abstract this paper develops a model of rent seeking in which the opportunity cost of rent seeking is foregone entrepreneurship it provides conditions under which resource booms tend to lead to an increase in rent seeking activity and those in which they induce entrepreneurship we identify an important difference between the two activities which leads resource booms to bias gains in favour of rent seeking over entrepreneurship but we also show that this bias depends on the nature of the initial equilibrium

do natural resource revenues hinder financial development the role of political institutions we hypothesize that natural resource revenues may deteriorate contract enforcement if political institutions are weak as poor contract enforcement leads to low financial development resource revenues may hinder financial development in countries with poor political institutions but not in countries with comparatively better political institutions we provide empirical support for this hypothesis based on within country variation in our sample covering the period 1970 2005 and 133 countries our results are robust to the use of additional control variables different samples and alternative measures of financial development and political institutions

why are stabilizations delayed when a stabilization has significant distributional implications e g tax increases to eliminate a large budget deficit socioeconomic groups may attempt to shift the burden of stabilization onto other groups the process leading to stabilization becomes a war of attrition each group attempting to wait the others out and stabilization occurring only when one group concedes and bears a disproportionate share of the burden the authors solve for the expected time of stabilization in a model of rational delay and relate it to several political and economic variables they motivate this approach and its results by comparison to historical and current episodes copyright 1991 by american economic association

resource intensity institutions and development summary we examine the relationship between resource abundance and several indicators of human welfare consistent with the existing literature on the relationship between resource abundance and economic growth we find that given an initial income level resource intensive countries tend to suffer lower levels of human development while we find only weak support for a direct link between resources and welfare there is an indirect link that operates through institutional quality there are also significant differences in the effects that resources have on different measures of institutional quality these results imply that the resource curse is a more encompassing phenomenon than previously considered and that key differences exist between the effects of different resource types on various aspects of governance and human welfare 2005 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

the dutch disease a disease after all many third world oil producers are encountering serious problems in building up a diversified export base while west european oil and gas producers netherlands united kingdom are suffering a decline in their traded goods manufacturing sector induced by real wage pressures it is becoming increasingly clear that high but temporary oil revenues may be somewhat ora mixed blessing the quip of the economist notwithstanding the mechanism behind this unbalance is clear enough part of the oil revenues is spent on non traded goods which leads to a real appreciation i e a rise in the relative price of non traded goods in terms of traded goods this in turn draws resources out of the non oil traded sector into the non traded goods producing sector corden and neary 1982 van wijnbergen 1980 one may say that this is an efficient response to the increase in income from oil production the united kingdom mexico egypt simply should move into oil derived industries and non traded goods and forget about their manufacturing sector until oil reserves are exhausted however many developing countries are hesitant to take this advice after all the post world war ii success stories in economic development involve without exception countries that promoted their traded goods sector aggressively moreover it is a well established stylised fact that technological progress is faster in the traded non sheltered sectors of an economy than in the non traded sector balassa 1964 is an early reference considering the hypothesis that technological progress rather than taking place exogenously with the passage of time is a function of accumulated experience the concern of countries like egypt mexico or indonesia is much easier to understand since solow 1957 and denison 1962 it is known that capital accumulation explain only a small part of economic growth if most of economic growth is caused by learning by doing induced technologica

rules of origin and the eu med partnership the case of textiles this paper analyses the impact of rules of origin on patterns of trade in the context of the pan european system of diagonal cumulation the paper first highlights the importance of rules of origin in all preferential trading arrangements while arguing that those rules can easily lead to trade suppression and or trade diversion we then focus on the introduction of the pan european system in 1997 and show evidence to suggest that the introduction of the system materially impacted on trade between the eu and its cefta efta and baltic states partner countries the main body of the paper then empirically explores the impact of the lack of cumulation in the textile industry on the countries of the southern mediterranean the results suggest that rules of origin may indeed substantially constrain trade between non cumulating countries possibly by as much as 70 80 per cent in aggregate while preferential trading agreements thus serve to increase intra pta trade through the liberalisation of trade barriers they may also be doing so by effectively raising external barriers to trade through the use of constraining rules of origin to the extent that they do so increases the likelihood of trade diversion and trade suppresion

the quality of political institutions and the curse of natural resources we propose a theoretical model to explain empirical regularities related to the curse of natural resources which emphasises the behaviour and incentives of politicians we extend the standard voting model to give voters political control beyond the elections this gives rise to a new restriction that policies should not give rise to a revolution our model clarifies when resource discoveries might lead to revolutions namely in countries with weak institutions it also suggests that for bad political institutions human capital depends negatively on natural resources while for high institutional quality the dependence is reversed this finding is corroborated in cross section regressions

the voracity effect abstract we analyze an economy that lacks a strong legal political institutional infrastructure and is populated by multiple powerful groups powerful groups dynamically interact via a fiscal process that effectively allows open access to the aggregate capital stock in equilibrium this leads to slow economic growth and a voracity effect by which a shock such as a terms of trade windfall perversely generates a more than proportionate increase in fiscal redistribution and reduces growth we also show that a dilution in the concentration of power leads to faster growth and a less procyclical response to shocks jel f43 o10 o23 o40

effective foreign aid following civil war the nonstrategic desperation hypothesis when does aid foster development after civil war a testable model is needed to account for the uneven outcomes in postconflict development this article proposes and empirically tests the novel nonstrategic desperation hypothesis an explanation based on the varied incentives that fragile postconflict governments face when confronted with donor development goals paradoxically incentives to meet development goals only exist when donors have little strategic interest in the recipients and when recipients lack income from resource rents and are therefore desperate for income ten year data on infant mortality changes following civil wars ending 1970 96 and a variety of robustness checks support the hypothesis by focusing on how income sources constrain the choices of aid recipients and how these constraints can provide incentives to meet donor development goals the nonstrategic desperation hypothesis explains how the good use of aid can take place following civil war when institutions are weak

does foreign aid distort incentives and hurt growth theory and evidence from 75 aid recipient countries foreign aid transfers can distort individual incentives and hence hurt growth by encouraging rent seeking as opposed to productive activities we construct a model of a growing small open economy that distinguishes two effects from foreign transfers i a direct positive effect as higher transfers allow the financing of infrastructure ii an indirect negative effect as higher transfers induce rent seeking competition by self interested individuals in this framework the growth impact of aid is examined jointly with the determination of rent seeking behavior we test the main predictions of the model for a cross section of 75 aid recipient countries there is evidence that aid has a direct positive effect on growth which is however significantly mitigated by the adverse indirect effects of associated rent seeking activities this is especially the case in recipient countries with relatively large public sectors

cursed by resources or institutions natural resource abundant countries constitute both growth losers and growth winners and the main difference between the success cases and the cases of failure lays in the quality of institutions with grabber friendly institutions more natural resources push aggregate income down while with producer friendly institutions more natural resources increase income such a theory finds strong support in data a key question we also discuss is if resources in addition alter the quality of institutions when that is the case countries with bad institutions suffer a double resource curse as the deterioration of institutions strenghtens the negative effect of more natural resources

understanding the soft budget constraint we propose a clarification of the notion of a soft budget constraint a concept widely used in the analysis of socialist transitional and market economies our interpretation is broad enough to embrace most existing approaches to soft budget constraint phenomena and provides a classification of their causes and consequences in light of this interpretation we then review the theoretical literature on the subject and compare it with those on other dynamic commitment problems in economics

remittances deteriorate governance abstract i use a natural experiment of oil price driven remittance flows to poor non oil producing muslim countries to demonstrate that remittances deteriorate the quality of governance especially in countries with weak democratic institutions the results indicate that a 1 standard deviation increase in remittances raises corruption by 1 5 index points on a 6 point scale which is equivalent to a dollar 600 decrease in per capita gdp concomitantly remittances may enable governments to reduce their delivery of public services for example health care school enrollment the results suggest that political institutions may mediate the potentially beneficial socioeconomic effects of remittance inflows

the evolution of walrasian behavior consider an evolutionary context where a given number of quantity setting oligopolists tend to mimic successful behavior occasionally experimenting with some small probability in this context it is shown that the unique long run outcome of the process has all firms playing walrasian i e choosing an output that maximizes profits when taking the market clearing price as given

can foreign aid accelerate stabilization this paper studies the effect of foreign aid on economic stabilization following alesina and drazen 1991 we model the delay in stabilizing as the result of a distributional struggle reforms are postponed because they are costly and each distributional faction hopes to reduce its share of the cost by outlasting its opponents in obstructing the required policies since the delay is used to signal each faction s strength the effect of the transfer depends on the role it plays in the release of information we show that this role depends on the timing of the transfer foreign aid decided and transferred sufficiently early into the game leads to earlier stabilization but aid decided or transferred too late is destabilizing and encourages further postponement of reforms

the narrow moving band the dutch disease and the competitive consequences of mrs thatcher notes on trade in the presence of dynamic scale economies abstract this paper presents a model of trade in which comparative advantage instead of being determined by underlying attributes of countries evolves over time through learning by doing in this model arbitrary patterns of specialization once established tend to become entrenched over time the model sheds light on three widely held views that do not make sense in more conventional models first is the view that temporary protection of selected sectors can permanently alter the pattern of comparative advantage in the protecting country s favor second is the view that seemingly favorable developments such as the discovery of exportable natural resources may lead to a permanent loss of other sectors and reduce welfare in the long run third is the possibility that a temporary overvaluation of a currency due to tight money can lead to a permanent loss of competitiveness in some sectors

history lessons institutions factor endowments and paths of development in the new world the explanations offered for the contrasting records of long run growth and development among the societies of north and south america most often focus on institutions the traditional explanations for the sources of these differences in institutions typically highlight the significance of national heritage or religion we in contrast argue that a hemispheric perspective across the wide range of colonies established in the new world by the europeans suggests that although there were many influences factor endowments or initial conditions had profound and enduring effects on the long run paths of institutional and economic development followed by the respective economies

institutions and the resource curse countries rich in natural resources constitute both growth losers and growth winners we claim that the main reason for these diverging experiences is differences in the quality of institutions more natural resources push aggregate income down when institutions are grabber friendly while more resources raise income when institutions are producer friendly we test this theory building on sachs and warner s influential works on the resource curse our main hypothesis that institutions are decisive for the resource curse is confirmed our results contrast the claims of sachs and warner that institutions do not play a role

natural resources rent seeking and welfare abstract a new and very simple mechanism to explain why natural resource abundance may lower income and welfare is developed in a model with rent seeking a greater amount of natural resources increases the number of entrepreneurs engaged in rent seeking and reduces the number of entrepreneurs running productive firms with a demand externality it is shown that the drop in income as a result of this is higher than the increase in income from the natural resource more natural resources thus lead to lower welfare

increasing returns and the genesis of american resource abundance the usa became the world s leading mineral producing nation between 1870 and 1910 a development paralleled by the rising resource intensity of american manufacturing this paper challenges the premise that resource abundance simply reflected the country s geological endowment of mineral deposits instead in the century following 1850 the usa exploited its natural resource potentials to a far greater extent than other countries and did so across virtually the entire range of industrial minerals the paper argues that natural resource abundance was an endogenous socially constructed condition that was not geologically preordained it examines the complex legal institutional technological and organizational adaptations that shaped the us supply responses to the expanding domestic and international industrial demands for minerals and mineral products it suggests that strong positive feedbacks even in the exploitation of depletable resources were responsible for the explosive growth of the american minerals economy

gold exploitation and socioeconomic outcomes the case of burkina faso abstract in the early 2000s burkina faso launched several legal reforms aimed at increasing gold production this resulted in a gold mining boom making gold the main export product and the main source of economic growth of the country we hypothesize that gold extraction improved population living standards this paper investigates how the gold boom in burkina faso which began in 2007 has affected socioeconomic outcomes we use a simple theoretical model to motivate the testing of several hypotheses regarding these impacts employing a difference in differences strategy as well as panel data models we estimate the impacts using data from household surveys undertaken in 2003 and 2009 and administrative data consistent with our model the results suggest that areas hosting gold extraction have better average living standards in terms of headcount ratios poverty gaps and household expenditures than do areas without gold however the gold boom is also shown to have potentially increased local inequality and child labor in areas with these income gains these results demonstrate the importance of proactive government policy in mitigating negative welfare impacts

local equilibria in economic games we study solution concepts for economic games that are resistant to local deviations strategy spaces are l subsets of r and local deviations are small in the euclidean metric we definelocal nash equilibrium and local evolutionarily stable strategy and present applications to walrasian outcomes in cournot games and separating outcomes in screening models 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

time inconsistency and free riding in a monetary union in monetary unions a time inconsistency problem in monetary policy leads to a novel type of free rider problem in the setting of non monetary policies the free rider problem leads union members to pursue lax non monetary policies that induce the monetary authority to generate high inflation free riding can be mitigated by imposing constraints on non monetary policies without a time inconsistency problem the union has no free rider problem then constraints on non monetary policies are unnecessary and possibly harmful this theory is here detailed and applied to several non monetary policies labor market policy fiscal policy and bank regulation

oil and regime type in latin america reversing the line of causality abstract in its first generation the literature on the resource curse typically posited that resource dependence shapes a country s economy and politics more recent work posits that the effects are mediated by institutions we take this newer approach further by arguing that economic and political institutions not just mediate but actually shape resource dependence our focus is on performance across national oil companies nocs in latin america we explain performance variation by invoking variations in regime and market features nocs that operate in contexts of greater independence from the executive branch stronger checks and balances within and outside the sector and greater market forces though not necessarily private actor dominance exhibit better performance institutions thus influence sector conditions rather than the other way around we advance this argument using original data from colombia and venezuela and supplementary data from mexico brazil and argentina our study focuses on the oil boom bust cycle of 2003 2016

corruption and reduced oil production an additional resource curse factor prominent contributions to the resource curse literature suggest weak governance and corruption are important factors behind the wide welfare variations observed among oil producing countries how weak governance and corruption influence revenue management and expenditure decisions as well as the possible welfare benefits derived from oil are broadly discussed how they impact upon volumes of oil produced has however attracted little attention this paper combines a review of the resource curse and oil production literatures with findings from qualitative interviews with oil sector experts to appreciate the feasibility of connections between corruption and oil production below its potential we make particular reference to environments where regulatory institutions or political accountability are weak and focus primarily on producer government and oil firm relations drawing on insights from geology political science and economics we suggest suboptimal production solutions can impact volumes of oil actually produced and create constraints on long term revenues for oil producing countries we argue greater disclosure of information on oil production efficiency on a field by field and country by country basis will assist further investigation of the relationships between corruption and volumes of oil produced

imf bailouts and moral hazard this paper empirically investigates the extent of investor moral hazard associated with imf bailouts by analyzing the responses of sovereign bond spreads to the changes in the perceived probability of imf bailouts of countries undergoing financial crisis we do not find strong evidence that the extent of investor moral hazard changed after the non bailout of russia in august 1998 that signaled a modification to imf intervention policy in contrast we find evidence that investor moral hazard is intensified for those countries that have stronger political connections to the imf and that are thereby more likely to be bailed out by the imf this pattern prevailed even after the russian crisis

credit and efficiency in centralized and decentralized economies we study a credit model where because of adverse selection unprofitable projects may nevertheless be financed indeed they may continue to be financed even when shown to be low quality if sunk costs have already been incurred we show that credit decentralization offers a way for creditors to commit not to refinance such projects thereby discouraging entrepreneurs from undertaking them initially thus decentralization provides financial discipline nevertheless we argue that it puts too high a premium on short term returns the model seems pertinent to two issues soft budget constraint problems in centralized economies and differences between anglo saxon and german japanese financing practices

the effects of a natural gas boom on employment and income in colorado texas and wyoming improvements in technology have made it profitable to tap unconventional gas reservoirs in relatively impermeable shale and sandstone deposits which are spread throughout the u s mostly in rural areas proponents of gas drilling point to the activity s local economic benefits yet no empirical studies have systematically documented the magnitude or distribution of economic gains i estimate these gains for counties in colorado texas and wyoming three states where natural gas production expanded substantially since the late 1990s i find that a large increase in the value of gas production caused modest increases in employment wage and salary income and median household income the results suggest that each million dollars in gas production created 2 35 jobs in the county of production which led to an annualized increase in employment that was 1 5 of the pre boom level for the average gas boom county comparisons show that ex ante estimates of the number of jobs created by developing the fayetteville and marcellus shale gas formations may have been too large

learning by doing and the dutch disease this paper develops a model of learning by doing and the dutch disease that extends the earlier literature in two ways first it is assumed that both the traded and the non traded sector can contribute to learning second it is assumed that there are learning spillovers between the sectors it is shown that within such a model a foreign exchange gift results in a real exchange rate depreciation in the long run due to a shift in the steady state relative productivity between the traded and the non traded sector in contrast to standard models of the dutch disease production and productivity in both sectors may go up or down the conditions for the different cases are worked out

oil and women a re examination abstract in a seminal article ross 2008 reports a negative correlation between oil production and women s representation in the labour force and politics across countries this article re examines these relationships exploiting variations in oil endowments to address endogeneity concerns we confirm that oil production causes decline in women s representation additionally we show that consistent with dutch disease effects oil production decreases women s employment in the traded sector however it also leads to an increase in women s employment in the nontraded sector we explore some social consequences of oil production and show that it results in women marrying earlier and having more children

avoiding the resource curse indigenous communities and canada s oil sands summary concerns about a resource curse in canada have been raised in response to rapid growth in the petroleum sector in northern alberta in previous research there has been little consideration of how symptoms of the resource curse are experienced and managed at a regional scale and by indigenous communities an analysis of effects and responses is offered using a natural financial human and social capitals framework without consideration of how to manage the symptoms of the resource curse oil and gas activity is likely to further disadvantage indigenous populations already living on the margins of canadian society

social divisions and institutions assessing institutional parameter variation this paper investigates the hypothesis that the association between property rights institutions and income is weaker in countries with high social divisions it argues that social divisions should have a negative effect on perceived institutional inclusiveness which in turn should depress institutional payoffs absent a property rights indicator that captures the perceived inclusiveness of institutions social divisions should then weaken the observed association between property rights institutions and income the empirical results support this hypothesis and highlight the importance of evaluating whether the institutions measure used captures the institutional framework applying to the population at large

the impact of rules of origin on trade flows a great deal of post war trade liberalization resulted from regional preferential trade agreements preferential trade agreements cut tariffs on goods originating only in those nations that have signed the agreement therefore they need rules of origin to determine which goods benefit from the tariff cut rules of origin have long been ignored for two good reasons they are dauntingly complex and at first sight appear mind numbingly dull the third standard reason for ignoring them the assertion that they do not matter much turns out to be wrong we show that rules of origin are important barriers to trade moreover such rules are emerging as an important trade issue for three additional reasons first preferential trade deals are proliferating worldwide second the global fragmentation of production implies complex international supply chains which are particularly constrained and distorted by rules of origin third the extent to which regionalism challenges the wto based trading system depends in part on incompatibilities and rigidities built into rules of origin our empirical results exploit a natural experiment that was created by technical changes to europe s lattice of rules of origin roos in 1997 this change known as diagonal cumulation relaxed the restrictiveness of rules of origin on trade among the eu s free trade agreement fta partners without changing the degree of tariff preference our analysis allows us to establish a lower bound and upper bound estimate of trade impact of roos reduced trade among the eu s trade partners the lower bound we find is something like 10 while the upper bound is around 70 the second part of the paper draws the policy lessons that arise from considering the implications of our empirical findings the most direct lessons are for fta writers we argue that europe s implementation of cumulation is a good way of reducing the welfare reducing impact of overlapping rules of origin without gutting their fraud fighting ability we also suggest a three part procedure for establishing a more multilateral framework for rules of origin which would be more transparent flexible administratively feasible and negotiable patricia augier michael gasiorek and charles lai tong

insecure resources bilateral trade and endogenous predation a game theoretic analysis of conflict and trade this article analyzes how interstate conflict over resources affects the incentives to trade and how greater trade openness affects the endogenous decisions of arming by enemy countries we identify conditions under which there is trade between two adversary countries and show that each adversary s arming affects domestic welfare in three different ways the first is an export revenue effect which increases welfare because arming causes export revenue to go up i e there is an arming induced terms of trade improvement the second is a resource predation effect which increases welfare because arming increases the appropriation of a rival country s resource input to produce a consumption good the third is an output distortion effect which reduces welfare because arming lowers the domestic production of civilian goods based on these effects we show circumstances in which greater trade openness reduces the intensity of arming we also discuss the implications of resource security asymmetry for conflict and trade

cointegrating institutions the time series properties of country institutional measures abstracta country s political and economic institutions are critical for economic prosperity the literature abounds with institutional measures precisely because institutions are multidimensional we use panel unit root and cointegration tests to examine the time series properties of several institutional measures to answer two questions first do institutional changes tend to be permanent second which subsets of institutions tend to converge or move together these answers have important implications for whether permanent institutional reform is possible and whether reforms can be undertaken one institutional area at a time or instead must simultaneously encompass multiple institutional areas

aid policies and growth comment in an extraordinarily influential paper craig burnside and david dollar 2000 p 847 find that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal monetary and trade policies but has little effect in the presence of poor policies this finding has enormous policy implications the burnside and dollar 2000 henceforth bd result provides a role and strategy for foreign aid if aid stimulates growth only in countries with good policies this suggests that 1 aid can promote economic growth and 2 it is crucial that foreign aid be distributed selectively to countries that have adopted sound policies international aid agencies public policy makers and the press quickly recognized the importance of the bd findings this paper reassesses the links between aid policy and growth using more data the bd data end in 1993 we reconstruct the bd database from original sources and thus 1 add additional countries and observations to the bd data set because new information has become available since they conducted their analyses and 2 extend the data through 1997 thus using the bd methodology we reexamine whether aid influences growth in the presence of good policies given our focus on retesting bd we do not summarize the vast pre bd literature on aid and growth we just note that there was a long and inconclusive literature that was hampered by limited data availability debates about the mechanisms through which aid would affect growth and disagreements over econometric specification see gustav f papanek 1972 robert cassen 1986 paul mosley et al 1987 peter boone 1994 1996 and henrik hansen and finn tarp s 2000 review since bd found that aid boosts growth in good policy environments there have been a number of other papers reacting to their results including paul collier and jan dehn 2001 carljohan dalgaard and hansen 2001 patrick guillaumont and lisa chauvet 2001 hansen and tarp 2001 robert lensink and howard white 2001 and collier and dollar 2002 these papers conduct useful variations and extensions some of which had already figured in the pre bd literature such as introducing additional control variables using nonlinear specifications etc some of these papers confirm the message that aid only works in a good policy environment while others drive out the aid policy interaction term with other variables this literature has the usual limitations of choosing a specification without clear guidance from theory which often means there are more plausible specifications than there are data points in the sample we differentiate our paper from these others by not deviating from the bd specification thus we do not test the robustness of the results to an unlimited number of variations but instead maintain the bd methodology this paper conducts a very simple robustness check by adding new data that were unavailable to bd thus we expand the sample used over their time period and extend the data from 1993 to 1997 easterly department of economics new york university 269 mercer street new york ny 10003 center for global development and national bureau of economic research e mail william easterly nyu edu levine department of finance carlson school of management university of minnesota 321 19th avenue south minneapolis mn 55455 and national bureau of economic research e mail rlevine csom umn edu roodman center for global development 1776 massachusetts avenue nw washington dc 20036 e mail droodman cgdev org we are grateful to craig burnside for supplying data and assisting in the reconstruction of previous results without holding him responsible in any way for the work in this paper thanks also to francis ng and prarthna dayal for generous assistance with updating the sachs warner openness variable and to three anonymous referees craig burnside and henrik hansen for helpful comments 1 see for instance the world bank 1994 2001 2002 the u k department for international development 2000 president george w bush s speech march 16 2002 the announcement by the white house on creating the millennium challenge corporation white house 2002 as well as a washington post editorial february 9 2002 a financial times column by alan beattie march 11 2002 and the economist march 16 2002

kleptocracy and divide and rule a model of personal rule many developing countries have suffered under the personal rule of kleptocrats who implement highly inefe cient economic policies expropriate the wealth of their citizens and use the proceeds for their own glorie cation or consumption we argue that the success of kleptocrats rests in part on their ability to use a divide and rule strategy made possible by the weakness of institutions in these societies members of society need to cooperate in order to depose a kleptocrat yet such cooperation may be defused by imposing punitive rates of taxation on any citizen who proposes such a move and redistributing the benee ts to those who need to agree to it thus the collective action problem can be intensie ed by threats which remain off the equilibrium path in equilibrium all are exploited and no one challenges the kleptocrat kleptocratic policies are more likely when foreign aid and rents from natural resources provide rulers with substantial resources to buy off opponents when opposition groups are shortsighted when the average productivity in the economy is low and when there is greater inequality between producer groups because more productive groups are more dife cult to buy off jel o12 h00

minerals institutions openness and growth an empirical analysis competing explanations of the resource curse are tested using panel data the data support the existence of a mineral resource curse for developing countries with weak institutions consistent with the hypothesis that owners of mineral resources use weak institutions and openness to trade to stifle the development of human capital to the detriment of growth in other sectors of the economy manufacturing imports substitute for the development of domestic production so openness to trade correlates with lower growth in mineral dependent economies the dutch disease and debt overhang explanations of the resource curse are not supported

studying the role of political competition in the evolution of government size over long horizons here we argue for the use of cointegration and error correction analysis to combine economic factors that are nonstationary with political factors that are stationary into an empirical model of the evolution of public policy over long periods the approach is applied to disentangle the contributions of economics and politics to the evolution of public expenditure by the government of canada over 130 years political competition emerges as the primary political factor affecting government size

political foundations of the resource curse in this paper we argue that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse we show 1 politicians tend to over extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they discount the future too much and 2 resource booms improve the efficiency of the extraction path however 3 resource booms by raising the value of being in power and by providing politicians with more resources which they can use to influence the outcome of elections increase resource misallocation in the rest of the economy 4 the overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends critically on institutions since these determine the extent to which political incentives map into policy outcomes countries with institutions that promote accountability and state competence will tend to benefit from resource booms since these institutions ameliorate the perverse political incentives that such booms create countries without such institutions however may suffer from a resource curse

economic backwardness in political perspective government policies and institutions shape economic incentives and via this channel have a first order impact on economic development why then do many societies adopt policies that discourage investment and maintain institutions that cause economic backwardness perhaps politically powerful groups elites are not in favor of economic growth but why it would appear that economic growth would provide more resources for these groups to take over or tax increasing their economic returns so why don t powerful groups always support economic development in this paper we develop a theory of inefficient government policies and institutions all else equal politically powerful groups would welcome superior institutions and technologies but in practice all else is not equal because superior institutions and technologies may reduce their political power and make it more likely that they will be replaced at the center of our theory is therefore the idea that changes in institutions or the introduction of new technologies often create turbulence eroding the political advantages and future economic rents of incumbent elites alternatively new technologies may enrich competing groups increasing their threat to incumbents these considerations make politically powerful groups fear losing power and oppose economic and political change even when such change will benefit society as a whole to understand the mechanism at work and its potential applications consider a concrete example industrialization in the nineteenth century bairoch 1982 estimates that between 1830 and 1913 world manufacturing output increased by a factor of 5 see table 1 panel a nevertheless this process was highly uneven across regions and countries bairoch also calculates that over the same period manufacturing output in developed countries europe and north america increasedbyafactorofover10 whereasitdeclinedinthe third world among developed countries there were

how do mineral states learn path dependence networks and policy change in the development of economic institutions summary based on case study methods i draw lessons from the political economy of macroeconomic management in chile and peru to explain how mineral states learn to think long term and eventually escape the resource curse i give an institutionalist account of the rise of countercyclical funds showing how the long term development of elite networks qualifies the contemporary making of curse escapes policy networks compose one central avenue of institutional development for both the reproduction of path dependence and the making of institutional change the exposition challenges political economy of development frameworks which over emphasize structural initial conditions and assume steady rent seeking behavior of state agents

funds from non renewable energy resources policy lessons from alaska and alberta abstract we document the use of energy natural resource funds in alaska and alberta and analyze theirs characteristics for further implementation in resource rich countries such funds allow dealing theoretically with intergenerational equity issues corruption and more general institutional problems the performance of both funds is very different depending on the management and composition choices but some policy lessons can be drawn from these two examples importantly the role of a public dividend policy is highlighted as a way to bypass corrupted institutions and to enhance quality of life for poorest people we also emphasize the need to deal with inflation to make the fund sustainable

corruption and the political economy of resource based development a comparison of asia and sub saharan africa we model how the supply and demand for bribes affects resource use by an economy and the reinvestment of resource rents in other assets this requires adjusting the world bank s measure adjusted net savings for any rent dissipation due to corruption the impacts of corruption on long run changes and periodic growth in the adjusted net savings rate are estimated across african and asian economies from 1970 to 2003 corruption rather than resource dependency per se affects negatively the ability of african countries to reinvest resource rents in the short term but for asian countries corruption is less important than point resources corruption influences long run growth in adjusted net savings rates in all countries and is also the pathway through which this growth is affected by patterns of resource use trade and abundance

trade matters in the fight against poverty narratives perceptions and lack of evidence in the case of fish trade in africa two opposing views exist in the literature on the potential role that international fish trade plays in economic development while some claim that fish trade has a pro poor effect others denounce the negative effect of fish export on local populations food security and doubt its contributions to the macro economy in this paper we explore this debate in sub saharan africa our analysis did not find any evidence of direct negative impact of fish trade on food security neither did it find evidence that international fish trade generates positive pro poor outcomes this paper discusses the possible reasons for this apparent lack of development impact and highlights the unsupported assumptions underlying the current discourse about international fish trade we suggest that given lack of evidence for the development benefits of fish trade between africa and developed countries fisheries policy could consider support for regional africa to africa trade that meets the growing african demand for lower value fish means of overcoming barriers to intra african trade in fish are discussed

natural resources and the tradeoff between authoritarianism and development abstract why do african and middle eastern countries seem cursed by an abundance of natural resources yet usa australia and norway seem blessed a growing literature has argued that the benevolence or malignance of natural resources depends upon the quality of institutions this paper offers a new explanation based on associational freedom and its interaction with the political system the model predicts that natural resources have an adverse impact on economic performance and transition to democracy in authoritarian regimes but not in democracies it also predicts that repression of associational freedom will be increasing in natural resources in authoritarian regimes i test the model s predictions using fixed effects regressions on an international panel from 1975 to 2000 and find support

natural resources democracy and corruption we study how natural resources can feed corruption and how this effect depends on the quality of the democratic institutions our game theoretic model predicts that resource rents lead to an increase in corruption if the quality of the democratic institutions is relatively poor but not otherwise we use panel data covering the period 1980 to 2004 and 124 countries to test this theoretical prediction our estimates confirm that the relationship between resource rents and corruption depends on the quality of the democratic institutions our main results hold when we control for the effects of income time varying common shocks regional fixed effects and various additional covariates they are also robust across different samples and to the use of various alternative measures of natural resources democracy and corruption

rules of origin as commercial policy instruments this article examines the role of rules of origin as a commercial policy instrument that targets the input composition of imports using a three country partial equilibrium structure we demonstrate conditions under which the imposition of a binding rule will be welfare improving for an importer facing competitive export suppliers we further show that employing rules of origin in this way would be complementary to rather than a substitute for conventional optimal tariffs copyright economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association