worker response to a menu of implicit contracts the literature on implicit contracts between workers and firms suggests that workers face a variety of such contracts allowing each to choose the optimal trade off between earnings level and earnings stability this study tests some implications of that theory through an examination of the risk behavior of individual heads of households the data source is the university of michigan panel study of income dynamics which includes a measure of the worker s taste for risk avoidance additionally several predictions derived from arrow s postulate of increasing relative risk aversion are examined the results confirm a tendency of risk averse individuals to choose jobs offering lower wages and lower financial risk the results also provide indirect support for arrow s postulate the paper s findings suggest that studies of the earnings effects of discrimination may possibly understate those effects just as studies of the value of a human life may understate that value

effort observability and worker productivity towards an explanation of economic dualism this paper suggests an explanation of the wage and productivity differentials between formal and informal sectors in developing countries this explanation is based on differences in the observability of effort that arise from technological differences such as size of operation the authors argue that observability of effort is lower in the formal sector and then show that under reasonable conditions this leads to higher wages and higher effort productivity this is because with lower observability the marginal cost of effort is lower when existing employees are induced to work harder than when more workers are hired explanations for intersectoral differences in factor intensities and sector specific unemployment rates also follow from the authors basic assumptions copyright 1989 by royal economic society

teachers unions and wages in the 1970s unionism now pays this paper provides evidence that confirms the results of previous studies that teacher unionism produced relatively small wage gains during the early 1970s but it also shows that union gains increased substantially in the late 1970s the evidence is based on an application of two complementary research designs cross section wage level regressions and cross section wage change regressions to national samples of teacher data for 1974 75 and 1977 78 the authors conclude that the union nonunion wage differential among teachers reached 12 to 22 percent by the late 1970s and during the period 1974 78 the real wages of unionized teachers increased while those of nonunionized teachers declined they offer several possible explanations for these trends

sticky price models of the business cycle can the contract multiplier solve the persistence problem we construct a quantitative equilibrium model with firms setting prices in a staggered fashion and use it to ask whether monetary shocks can generate business cycle fluctuations these fluctuations include persistent movements in output along with the other defining features of business cycles like volatile investment and smooth consumption we assume that prices are exogenously sticky for a short time persistent output fluctuations require endogenous price stickiness in the sense that firms choose not to change prices much when they can do so we find that for a wide range of parameter values the amount of endogenous stickiness is small thus we find that in a standard quantitative model staggered price setting alone does not generate business cycle fluctuations

adverse selection and pay compression a fundamental result of the principal agent literature is that pay will be linked to performance when it is difficult for the principal to monitor the agent s actions however performance pay can lead to adverse incentives in these models high powered incentives encourage workers to neglect some aspects of their job or to sabotage their coworkers efforts this paper offers another explanation for the weak link between pay and performance worker heterogeneity when workers are heterogeneous and labor contracts are contests the nash equilibrium often pools workers i show that this implies that the link between pay and performance is weaker than would be the case if firms could observe workers types before contracting and offer each type their respective optimal contests a fundamental result of the principal agent literature is that pay will be linked to performance when it is difficult for the principal to monitor the agent s actions but in the real world we often find this link to be weak several authors lazear 1989 holmstrom and milgrom 1991 garvey and swan 1992 have shown that weaker incentives may be optimal when performance pay leads to undesired behavior on the part of workers in lazear s tournament model firms weaken the link between pay and performance when workers can sabotage their coworkers efforts holmstrom and milgrom show that straight salaries are optimal when the worker s job includes some activities that cannot be easily monitored and garvey and swan show that a hybrid compensation scheme that is part tournament and part managerial discretion is optimal when workers can sabotage coworkers efforts and managers face adverse incentives the common thread in these papers is that principals weaken the link between pay and performance to mitigate adverse incentives this is what garvey and swan call pay compression in this paper i show that adverse incentives while sufficient are not necessary for pay compression to occur i consider a labor market where workers are heterogeneous with respect to ability measured as cost of effort with more able workers having a lower cost of effort jobs have a single

the permanent effects of fiscal consolidations abstract the global financial crisis has permanently lowered the path of gdp in all advanced economies at the same time and in response to rising government debt levels many of these countries have been engaging in fiscal consolidations that have had a negative impact on growth rates we empirically explore the connections between these two facts by extending to longer horizons the methodology of blanchard and leigh 2013 regarding fiscal policy multipliers our results provide support for the presence of strong hysteresis effects of fiscal policy the large size of the effects points in the direction of self defeating fiscal consolidations as suggested by delong and summers 2012 attempts to reduce debt via fiscal consolidations have very likely resulted in a higher debt to gdp ratio through their long term negative impact on output

effective tax rates in macroeconomics cross country estimates of tax rates on factor incomes and consumption abstract this paper proposes a method for computing tax rates using national accounts and revenue statistics using this method we construct time series of tax rates for large industrial countries the method identifies the revenue raised by different taxes at the general government level and defines aggregate measures of the corresponding tax bases this method yields estimates of effective tax rates on factor incomes and consumption consistent with the tax distortions faced by a representative agent in a general equilibrium framework these tax rates compare favorably with existing estimates of marginal tax rates and highlight important international differences in tax policy

austerity in the aftermath of the great recession abstract cross country differences in austerity defined as government purchases below forecast account for 75 of the observed cross sectional variation in gdp in advanced economies during 2010 2014 statistically austerity is associated with lower gdp lower inflation and higher net exports a multi country dsge model calibrated to 29 advanced economies generates effects of austerity consistent with the data counterfactuals suggest that eliminating austerity would have substantially reduced output losses in europe austerity was so contractionary that debt to gdp ratios in some countries increased as a result of endogenous reductions in gdp and tax revenue

sticky prices in the euro area a summary of new micro evidence this paper summarises the vast evidence on micro price setting recently obtained for euro area countries we consider studies with micro data on consumer and producer prices as well as survey information the main findings are 1 prices in the euro area are sticky and stickier than in the us 2 downward price rigidity is only slightly more marked than upward price rigidity 3 heterogeneity and asymmetries are observed in price setting and 4 the relevance of theories that explain price stickiness such as implicit or explicit contracts marginal costs and coordination failure is confirmed whereas menu costs pricing thresholds and costly information explanations are judged much less relevant by firms jel c25 d40 e31

on imperfect evaluation and earning differentials this paper investigates the relationship between the technology for evaluating performance and optimal contract choice specifically the paper examines the different compensation packages that arise when occupations differ in evaluation technology workers are risk averse work effort is endogenous and there exists asymmetric information in occupations in which it is less difficult to measure output it is shown that compensation is more closely tied to output the implications for work effort the sorting of workers by ability and average compensation are developed analysis of a new data set confirms our predictions concerning earning differentials and wage growth the powerful 1 6 million member national education association and other teacher organizations have traditionally fought the notion of rewarding better teachers with more money arguing that there is no objective way to measure a teacher s competence and that it would lead to favoritism and bad morale time june 20 1983

salaries and piece rates compensation can take many forms remuneration can come as pecuniary payments as fringes such as health and pension benefits or as a nonpecuniary reward such as plush office furniture that costs the firm less than it benefits the worker a significant literature has examined the trade offs between pecuniary and nonpecuniary compensation the modern work having been pioneered by rosen 1974 more recently another body of literature has examined the selection of method of total compensation ignoring the distinction between pecuniary and nonpecuniary payment this work has focused on risk and incentive factors it has resulted in comparisons of compensation based on absolute output levels to that based on relative performance it has also led to explorations of the relation of compensation to experience over the work life 2 little attention has been paid to what may be among the most important and obvious distinction in methods of compensation namely the choice between a fixed salary for some period of time that is paying on the basis of input and some workers receive compensation that is specified in advance and not directly contingent on performance instead it depends on an input measure such as hours worked for others compensation is directly related to output this essay is an attempt to predict a firm s choice of compensation method piece rates are defined more rigorously among the more important factors discussed are worker heterogeneity incentives sorting considerations monitoring costs and asymmetric information one result is that salary workers tend to be of lower quality and more homogeneous than are their piece rate counterparts numerous additional results are provided helpful comments by victoria lazear and yoram weiss are gratefully acknowledged support was provided by the department of labor and the national science foundation 1 see lazear and rosen 1981 stiglitz 1981 holmstrom 1982 green and stokey 1983 2 see lazear 1979 1981 and harris and holmstrom in press

firms choice of method of pay using data from the bls industry wage survey the author tests the theory that firms choose their methods of pay by balancing the gains from more precise links between performance and pay against m

deficits public debt dynamics and tax and spending multipliers cutting government spending can increase the budget defi cit at zero interest rates according to a standard new keynesian model calibrated with bayesian methods similarly increasing sales taxes can increase the budget defi cit rather than reduce it both results suggest limitations of austerity measures at zero interest rates running budget defi cits can be either expansionary or contractionary depending on how they interact with expectations about long run taxes and spending the effect of fi scal policy action is thus highly dependent on the policy regime a successful stimulus therefore needs to specify how the budget is managed not only in the short but also in the medium and long runs

the laffer curve revisited abstract laffer curves for the us the eu 14 and individual european countries are compared using a neoclassical growth model featuring constant frisch elasticity cfe preferences new tax rate data is provided the us can maximally increase tax revenues by 30 with labor taxes and 6 with capital taxes we obtain 8 and 1 for the eu 14 there 54 of a labor tax cut and 79 of a capital tax cut are self financing the consumption tax laffer curve does not peak endogenous growth and human capital accumulation affect the results quantitatively household heterogeneity may not be important while transition matters greatly

why do firms evade taxes the role of information sharing and financial sector outreach tax evasion is a widespread phenomenon across the globe and even an important factor in the ongoing sovereign debt crisis we show that firms in countries with better credit information sharing systems and higher branch penetration evade taxes to a lesser degree this effect is stronger for smaller firms firms in smaller cities and towns firms in industries relying more on external financing and firms in industries and countries with greater growth potential this effect is robust to instrumental variable analysis controlling for firm fixed effects in a smaller panel data set of countries and many other robustness tests

on employer specific information and internal labor markets the human capital literature of which becker s 2 paper is the seminal work stresses the productivity enhancing effects of schooling and on the job training later work by spence 21 and others emphasizes the fact that it is difficult for employers to ascertain the productivity of potential employees and suggests that activities such as schooling may provide employers with signals as to workers productivities in the signalling literature it is assumed that information generated concerning an individual s abilities is general in that it is known to all potential employers yet the information that an employer gathers concerning his workers abilities is not likely to be completely transferable to other employers as a consequence as rosen 18 249 points out there are limitations on the ability of the price system to achieve efficient assignments if the price system is incomplete there is a role for entrepreneurial activity of assembling an optimal work force this paper analyzes the employment relations that arise when employers information concerning new workers abilities is incomplete until after a period of employment the acquisition of such employer specific information is shown to lead to what has been referred to in the literature as internal labor markets internal labor markets as identified by dunlop 5 32 are the complex of rules which determine the movement of workers among job classifications within administrative units these movements may be transfers promotions demotions or layoffs to the exterior labor markets doeringer and piore 3 emphasize skill specificity and on the job training as the key factors in the emergence of the internal labor market along similar lines williamson wachter and harris 22 point out that job idiosyncracy can result in employment relations with attributes like those of internal labor markets by way of contrast this paper emphasizes the role of employer specific information in generating internal labor markets the theory provides an explanation as to why employers dismiss current employees at the same time that new employees are hired evidence that dismissal rates are not insignificant is presented in section iv the theory also provides a new rationale for long term em

output spillovers from fiscal policy in this paper we estimate the cross country spillover effects of government purchases on output for a large number of oecd countries following the methodology in auerbach and gorodnichenko 2012a b we allow these multipliers to vary smoothly according to the state of the economy and use real time forecast data to purge policy innovations of their predictable components we also consider the responses of other key macroeconomic variables our findings suggest that cross country spillovers have an important impact and also confirm those of our earlier papers that fiscal shocks have a larger impact when the affected country is in recession

the output effect of fiscal consolidation plans abstract we show that the correct experiment to evaluate the effects of a fiscal adjustment is the simulation of a multi year fiscal plan rather than of individual fiscal shocks simulation of fiscal plans adopted by 16 oecd countries over a 30 year period supports the hypothesis that the effects of consolidations depend on their design fiscal adjustments based upon spending cuts are much less costly in terms of output losses than tax based ones and have especially low output costs when they consist of permanent rather than stop and go changes in taxes and spending the difference between tax based and spending based adjustments appears not to be explained by accompanying policies including monetary policy it is mainly due to the different responses of business confidence and private investment

hysteresis and fiscal policy abstract empirical studies support the hysteresis hypothesis that recessions have a permanent effect on the level of output we analyze the implications of hysteresis for fiscal policy in a dsge model we assume a simple learning by doing mechanism where demand driven changes in employment can affect the level of productivity permanently leading to hysteresis in output we show that the fiscal output multiplier is much larger in the presence of hysteresis and that the welfare multiplier of fiscal policy the consumption equivalent change in welfare for one dollar change in public spending is positive negative in the presence absence of hysteresis the main benefit of accommodative fiscal policy in the presence of hysteresis is to diminish the damage of a recession to the long term level of productivity and thus output