asymmetry and revenue in first price auctions abstract we show by an example that in first price ipv auctions asymmetry in bidders valuations need not reduce the revenue compared to a benchmark symmetric model with the same amount of social surplus asymmetry need not reduce competition in first price auctions

evaluating split estates in oil and gas leasing taking advantage of randomly assigned federal mineral rights this paper establishes the discount that mineral developers place on oil and gas leases with divided ownership results of 53 bimonthly federal oil and gas lease auctions in wyoming between february 1998 and october 2006 are examined bidders discount split estate by 11 to 14 on average but by as much as 24 for more expensive leases impacts of multiple ownerships and additional leasing stipulations are also explored this discount is interpreted as an expectation of transaction costs incurred in obtaining surface access so total costs remain unaffected on average

auctions with resale when private values are uncertain evidence from the lab and field abstract auction theory represents one of the richest areas of research in economics over the past three decades yet whether and to what extent the introduction of secondary resale markets influences bidding behavior in sealed bid first price auctions remains under researched this study begins by examining field data from a unique data set that includes nearly 3000 auctions over 10 000 individual bids for cutting rights of standing timber in british columbia from 1996 to 2000 in comparing bidding patterns across agents who are likely to have resale opportunities with those who likely do not we find evidence that is consistent with theory critical evaluation of the reduced form bidding model however reveals that sharp tests of the theoretical predictions are not possible because several other differences may exist across these bidder types we therefore use a laboratory experiment to examine if the resale opportunity by itself can have the predicted theoretical effect we find that while it does have the predicted effect a theoretical model based on risk averse bidders explains the overall data patterns more accurately than a model based on risk neutral bidders beyond testing theory the paper highlights the inferential power of combining naturally occurring data with laboratory data

multiple round timber auction design and simulation this paper presents a multiple round timber auction simulation developed in order to study various configurations of auction design in this study simultaneous sequential timber auctions are modelled and analysed using agent based simulation technology as there are many individual items in the auction to be sold the auction designer defines several rounds that are sequential at pre defined intervals at each round the auction designer announces several simultaneous auctions since bidders are offered different items at each round a mathematical linear programing model for selecting the best set of items to bid for is presented different bidding patterns are simulated and compared in various setup configurations the most advanced of these strategies are adaptive and use agent learning capability the comparisons include the success rate of winning the auction and the winning price per m3 this study suggests an efficient bidding pattern for bidders to bid in order to achieve to their goal and increase their profit similarly in order to increase profit the auctioneer i e the government needs to control several auction parameters including the number of auctions per year the lot size the auction periodicity and the number of bidders this study also suggests parameters configurations that to maximise revenue for the auctioneer

the role of information revelation in elimination contests in this article we investigate how information revelation rules affect the existence and the efficiency of equilibria in two round elimination contests we establish that no symmetric separating equilib rium exists under the full revelation rule and find that the non existence result is very robust we then characterise a partially efficient separating equilibrium under the partial revelation rule when players valuations are uniformly distributed we finally investigate the no revelation rule and find that it is both most efficient and optimal in maximising the total efforts from the contestants within our framework more information revelation leads to less efficient outcomes contests are widely used by various organisations wishing to select the best person or the best team sports for example are undoubtedly always in the form of contests science contests in schools are another example we can consider a contest as an auction in which players compete for prizes by submitting bids these bids once submitted have to be paid regardless of winning or losing rd 2 in political competition e g for the us presidency candidates first spend resources to secure their party s nomi nation and later if they are nominated spend more resources to get elected and 3 science contests among university or high school students e g the mathematics olympiad

buyer collusion and efficiency of government intervention in wheat markets in northern india an asymmetric structural auctions analysis this paper uses auction theory to analyze wholesale markets for wheat in northern india this approach enables us not only to characterize the market in terms of buyer asymmetries but also to detect the existence of collusion and to quantify its impact on market prices we show that buyer asymmetries exacerbate the downward impact of collusion on prices the paper also demonstrates the use of auction theory to analyze questions of government efficiency it considers whether the government paid too much for the wheat it procured at the minimum support price and shows that for our sample it did not the paper is based on a primary survey of two wholesale markets in north india

testing for affiliation in first price auctions using entry behavior in this article we show that affiliation among potential bidders private information either private signals or entry costs leads to affiliation among their entry decisions we propose a test for affiliation among potential bidders private information based on the implication of affiliation on the entry behavior which is general and widely applicable to various scenarios the test is implemented using the simulation based method we then apply our method to timber sales in the oregon department of forestry and find a small but strongly significant level of affiliation among all timber companies

poverty comparisons over time and across countries in africa abstract we use demographic and health surveys dhs to compare poverty at two or more points in time within and between african countries our welfare measure is an index resulting from a factor analysis of various household characteristics durables and household heads education an advantage of this measure is that for intertemporal and intraregional comparisons we need not rely on suspect price deflators and currency conversion factors the wide availability and similarity of questionnaires of the dhs facilitate comparisons over both time and countries our results generally show declines in poverty during the previous decade largely due to improvements in rural areas

price continuity rules and insider trading restrictions on transaction price changes are a feature of many security markets this paper analyzes the impact of such price continuity rules on price dynamics and examines possible rationales for their existence contrary to popular belief continuity rules need not reduce price efficiency although they do result in a redistribution of profits among traders and dealers indeed continuity rules may enhance price efficiency because traders have greater incentives to gather costly information we provide a new rationale for continuity rules besides the stated objective of stabilizing prices in particular we show that continuity requirements act to restrict dealers expected profits from trading with liquidity traders the results provide insights into the design of an optimal continuity rule

information revelation in auctions with common and private values we explore the incentives to reveal verifiable private information when there are both common and private components to agents valuations and when private information is held in both dimensions when agents observe only one signal they have no incentive to reveal the signal because such a revelation would negate their information advantage however when agents observe multiple signals they may be incentivized to reveal certain signals that could lower their opponents bids and thereby result in a higher profit from other signals this paper shows that there exists an equilibrium with revelation of common value signals in standard auctions which is an efficient equilibrium that maximizes the social welfare and could provide the seller with a higher profit than a situation with no information revelation

optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator we consider a multi period auction with a seller who has a single object for sale a large population of potential buyers and a mediator of the trade the seller and every buyer have independent private values of the object the mediator designs an auction mechanism which maximizes her revenue subject to certain constraints for the traders in each period the seller auctions the object to a set of buyers drawn at random from the population the seller can re auction the object infinitely many times if it is not sold in previous interactions we characterize the class of mediator optimal auction mechanisms one of such mechanisms is a vickrey auction with a reserve price where the seller pays to the mediator a fixed percentage from the closing price

income distribution political instability and investment abstract this paper successfully tests on a sample of 71 countries for the period 1960 85 the following hypotheses income inequality by fuelling social discontent increases sociopolitical instability the latter by creating uncertainty in the politico economic environment reduces investment as a consequence income inequality and investment are inversely related since investment is a primary engine of growth this paper identifies a channel for an inverse relationship between income inequality and growth we measure socio political instability with indices which capture the occurrence of more or less violent phenomena of political unrest and we test our hypotheses by estimating a two equation model in which the endogenous variables are investment and an index of socio political instability our results are robust to sensitivity analysis on the specification of the model and the measure of political instability and are unchanged when the model is estimated using robust regression techniques

econometrics of ascending auctions by quantile regression this paper suggests an identification and estimation approach based on quantile regression to recover the underlying distribution of bidders private values in ascending auctions under the ipv paradigm the quantile regression approach provides a flexible and convenient parameterization of the private values distribution with an estimation methodology easy to implement and with several specification tests the quantile framework provides a new focus on the quantile level of the private values distribution in particular the seller s optimal screening level which can be very useful for bidders and seller an empirical application using data from the usfs timber auctions illustrates the methodology

timber sale auctions with random reserve prices this paper analyzes first price sealed bid auctions of standing timber organized by the french forest service office national des forets onf a feature of these auctions is that they are held wi

estimation of poverty transition matrices with noisy data summary this paper investigates measurement error biases in estimated poverty transition matrices we compare transition matrices based on survey expenditure data to transition matrices based on measurement error free simulated expenditure the simulation model uses estimates that correct for measurement error in expenditure we find that time varying measurement error in expenditure data magnifies economic mobility roughly 45 of households initially in poverty at time t 1 are found to be out of poverty at time t using data from the korean labor and income panel study when measurement error is removed this drops to between 26 and 31 of households initially in poverty copyright 2016 john wiley sons ltd

when do auctions ensure the welfare maximizing allocation of scarce inputs we determine when an unfettered auction will ensure the welfare maximizing allocation of a scarce input that enhances product quality and may reduce production costs a supplier values the input for this use value and for its foreclosure value because once the input is acquired it is unavailable to rivals an unfettered auction often ensures the welfare maximizing allocation of an input increment however it can fail to do so when the input would increase relatively rapidly the competitive position of a rival with a moderate competitive disadvantage bidder handicapping that ensures auctions generate welfare maximizing input allocations differ from standard handicapping policies

determinants of income mobility and household poverty dynamics in south africa this article analyses household income mobility among africans in south africa s most populous province kwazulu natal between 1993 and 1998 compared to industrialised and most developing countries mobility has been quite high as might have been expected after the transition in south africa this finding is robust when measurement error is controlled for when disaggregating the sources of mobility it is found that demographic changes and employment changes account for most of the mobility observed which is related to rapidly shifting household boundaries and a very volatile labour market in an environment of high unemployment using a multivariate analysis it can be seen that transitory incomes play a large role four types of poverty traps are found associated with large initial household size poor initial education poor initial asset endowment and poor initial employment access that dominate the otherwise observed regression towards the mean

english auctions with resale an experimental study i design and test a simple english auction and two english auctions with resale but with different informational backgrounds all three treatments theoretically have the same equilibrium i find however that the possibility of resale alters behavior significantly in the two treatments with resale subjects deviated from both the nash prediction and the common results about bidding behavior in english auctions subjects tend to overbid when they are certain they can reap the whole surplus in the resale market i employ different models like qre and levels of reasoning and conclude that overbidding can be explained as a rational response to the noisy environment in markets with human participants that is as rational decision making when anticipating others to make errors when the outcome of the resale market is not certain there is significant signaling behavior and auction prices tend to be lower than the nash prediction

comparing open and sealed bid auctions evidence from timber auctions we study entry and bidding patterns in sealed bid and open auctions using data from the u s forest service timber auctions we document a set of systematic effects sealed bid auctions attract more small bidders shift the allocation toward these bidders and can also generate higher revenue a private value auction model with endogenous participation can account for these qualitative effects of auction format we estimate the model s parameters and show that it can explain the quantitative effects as well we then use the model to assess bidder competitiveness which has important consequences for auction design

an empirical study of an auction with asymmetric information this paper examines federal auctions for drain age leases on the outer continental shelf from 1959 to 1969 these are leases that are adjacent to tracts on which a deposit has been discovered the authors find that the data strongly support the hypotheses that neighbor firms are better informed about the value of a lease than nonneighbor firms that neighbor firms coordinate their bidding decisions and that both types of firms bid strategically in accordance with the bayesian nash equilibrium model for first price sealed bid auctions with asymmetric information

partial pooling at the reserve price in auctions with resale opportunities abstract two features common to many auctions are the use of reserve prices and the existence of secondary markets for the goods being sold even in simple symmetric settings the combination of these features can preclude existence of an equilibrium in symmetric separating bidding strategies with a reserve price sufficiently far below the maximum endogenous valuation a symmetric equilibrium still exists but with some types pooling at the reserve the optimal reserve price depends not only on the joint distribution of bidders information before and after the auction but also on how surplus is divided in the secondary market journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 c7 l1 d82

reconsidering carbon permits auction mechanism an efficient dynamic model one of major concerns for china and developing countries is the new international trade rule concerning carbon emissions which one needs to know its suitable mechanism and the possible implication on china s carbon trading market precisely in an emission and trade scheme an important question is whether the auction outcome is efficient since this is closely related with the economic costs of emissions reduction due to the unique features of carbon permits existing auction mechanisms do not seem to be suitable for their distribution inspired by the t tonnement process this paper proposes a new auction mechanism for them for both practical application and theoretical extension the discrete and continuous situations are examined respectively the result shows that the proposed auction converges to pareto optimal equilibria and that without ties the equilibrium is unique for bidders the straightforward bidding strategy is the most preferred one in the sense that the strategy makes them avoid the risk of loss intuitively the auctioneer s utility is increasing in the number of bidders while bidders pay off is increasing in permits to a certain extent the proposed auction mechanism resolves the confliction between efficiency and revenue in the multi item auction theory while it increases people s understanding for carbon emission auction mechanism design

growth and chronic poverty evidence from rural communities in ethiopia abstract what keeps some people persistently poor even in the context of relative high growth in this article we explore this question using a 15 year longitudinal data set from ethiopia we compare the findings of an empirical growth model with those derived from a model of the determinants of chronic poverty we ask whether the chronically poor are simply not benefiting in the same way from the same factors that allowed others to escape poverty or whether there are latent factors that leave them behind we find that this chronic poverty is associated with several initial characteristics lack of physical assets education and remoteness in terms of distance to towns or poor roads the chronically poor appear to benefit from some of the drivers of growth such as better roads or extension services in much the same way that the non chronically poor benefit however they appear to have lower growth in this period related to time invariant characteristics and this suggests that they face a conside

dynamic auction environment with subcontracting this article provides evidence on the role of subcontracting in the auction based procurement setting with private cost variability and capacity constraints we demonstrate that subcontracting allows bidders to modify their costs realizations in a given auction as well as to control their future costs by reducing backlog accumulation restricting access to subcontracting raises procurement costs for an individual project by 12 and reduces the number of projects completed in equilibrium by 20 the article explains methodological and market design implications of subcontracting availability

how much of observed economic mobility is measurement error iv methods to reduce measurement error bias with an application to vietnam research on economic growth and inequality inevitably raise issues concerning economic mobility because the relationship between long run inequality and short run inequality is mediated by income mobility for a given level of short run inequality greater mobility implies lower long run inequality yet empirical measures of both inequality and mobility are biased upward due to measurement error in income and expenditure data collected from household surveys this paper presents a straightforward method to remove this bias using instrumental variable estimates the method is applied to panel data from vietnam the results imply that at least 15 and perhaps as much as 42 of measured mobility is upward bias due to measurement error the results also suggest that measurement error accounts for at least 12 of measured inequality

a survey of recent empirical work concerning auctions in this paper the authors survey some recent empirical work concerning auctions first outlining two complementary approaches to the empirical analysis of auctions and then discussing several recent developments in the econometric analysis of field data concerning auctions

bidding for incomplete contracts an empirical analysis of adaptation costs abstract procurement contracts are often renegotiated because of changes that are required after their execution using highway paving contracts we show that renegotiation imposes significant adaptation costs reduced form regressions suggest that bidders respond strategically to contractual incompleteness and that adaptation costs are an important determinant of their bids a structural empirical model compares adaptation costs to bidder markups and shows that adaptation costs account for 7 5 14 percent of the winning bid markups from private information and market power the focus of much of the auctions literature are much smaller by comparison implications for government procurement are discussed jel d44 d82 d86 h57 l13 l74 r42

data gaps data incomparability and data imputation a review of poverty measurement methods for data scarce environments this paper reviews methods that have been employed to estimate poverty in contexts where household consumption data are unavailable or missing these contexts range from completely missing and partially missing consumption data in cross sectional household surveys to missing panel household data the paper focuses on methods that aim to compare trends and dynamic patterns of poverty outcomes over time it presents the various methods under a common framework with pedagogical discussion on the intuition empirical illustrations are provided using several rounds of household survey data from vietnam furthermore the paper provides a practical guide with detailed instructions on computer programs that can be used to implement the reviewed techniques

entry and subcontracting in public procurement auctions we empirically study how the interplay between entry and subcontracting choices is affected by the use of different auction formats in public procurement the difference in differences strategy used exploits a data set of auctions for public works run alternately under first price and average bid auctions we find that the use of first price auctions causes a marked decline in both entry and subcontracting we also find that the type of firms entering first price auctions changes with firms becoming more likely to bid jointly with other firms in ad hoc joint ventures data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2014 2071 this paper was accepted by teck hua ho behavioral economics

transitory price changes and price limit rules evidence from the tokyo stock exchange we compare the volatility of 24 hour returns computed from the opening and closing prices of a diverse sample of tokyo stock exchange tse stocks we find that volatility at the open is greater than volatility at the close only for the most actively traded tse stocks daytime and overnight return covariances suggest that the volatility patterns are explained by the effect of implicit bid ask spreads at the open and partial price adjustment at the close both of which are related to the intensity of trading our results challenge the view that open to open returns are more volatile than close to close returns for stocks in general and are consistent with the hypothesis that tse price limit rules have a significant impact on the dynamics of security prices

using repeated cross sections to explore movements into and out of poverty movements in and out of poverty are of core interest to both policymakers and economists yet the panel data needed to analyze such movements are rare in this paper the authors build on the methodology used to construct poverty maps to show how repeated cross sections of household survey data can allow inferences to be made about movements in and out of poverty they illustrate that the method permits the estimation of bounds on mobility and provide non parametric and parametric approaches to obtaining these bounds they test how well the method works on data sets for vietnam and indonesia where we are able to compare our method to true panel estimates the results are sufficiently encouraging to offer the prospect of some limited basic insights into mobility and poverty duration in settings where historically it was judged that the data necessary for such analysis were unavailable

recessions and the vulnerable abstract this study evaluates the impact of recessions on households vulnerable to poverty the results indicate that recessions impact vulnerable households asymmetrically in comparison to the impact of growth on poor households we also demonstrate that this outcome is significantly influenced by a country s extent of development we argue that a direct consequence of the foregoing is that the efficacy of growth in poverty reduction tends to be under stated by conventional measures of poor households responses to economic growth and that safety nets need to be constructed to incorporate vulnerability to recessions

the value of information in competitive bidding abstract we consider the situation where two players compete to obtain a valuable object e g a stand of timber in a competitive sealed bid environment prior to submitting a bid each player may sample the stand while incurring a common non zero cost for each observation on one hand a player wishes to take as few observations as possible due to the cost of collecting information however one also wishes to obtain as many observations as possible to avoid a bid that overstates the value of the resource given different assumptions on the sampling process the informational structure and underlying distribution of value we derive equilibrium bidding strategies we use these bidding strategies to solve for equilibrium in an information collection problem from the forest products industry

econometrics of first price auctions in this paper we propose an estimation method for the empirical study of theoretical auction models we focus on first price sealed bid and descending auctions and we adopt the private value paradigm where each bidder is assumed to have a different private value only known to him for the object that is auctioned following mcfadden 1989 and pakes and pollard 1989 our proposed method is based on simulations specifically the method relies on a simulated nonlinear least squares objective function appropriately adjusted so as to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters of interest we illustrate the proposed method by studying a market of agricultural products where descending auctions are used our analysis takes into account heterogeneity of the auctioned objects and the fact that only the winning bid is observed we estimate the parameters that characterize the distribution of the unobserved private values for each auctioned object

price discovery in auction markets a look inside the black box opening mechanisms play a crucial role in information aggregation following the overnight nontrading period this article examines the process of price discovery at the new yorkstockexchange single price opening auction we develop a theoretical model to explain the determinants of the opening price and test the model using order level data we show that the presence of designated dealers facilitates price discovery relative to a fully automated call auction market this is consistent with specialists extracting information from observing the evolution of the limit order book in addition the specialist s opening trade reflects noninformational factors such as price stabilization requirements

the effect of public information and competition on trading volume and price volatility in a one period model of market making with many exogenously informed traders we first show that the variance of prices and expected trading volume depend on the public information released at the start of trading this is accomplished by representing beliefs with elliptically countoured distributions for which the form of optimal decision rules does not depend on the specific distribution used second if the model is altered so that the decision to become informed is made endogenous then the decision rules of the market maker and infomed traders depend on the public information third in a multiperiod model with many informed traders and long lived private information recursion formulas similar to those of kyle 1985 hold for all elliptically contoured distributions trading volume is autocorrelated and unless per period liquidity trading is bounded away from zero as new trading periods are added informed traders profits vanish article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

poverty dynamics in india between 2004 and 2012 insights from longitudinal analysis using synthetic panel data recent national sample surveys point to significant poverty reduction in india since 2004 05 with a marked acceleration between 2009 10 and 2011 12 this paper enquires into important aspects of income mobility between 2004 05 and 2011 12 based on new statistical methods to convert the three pertinent national sample survey rounds into synthetic panels the analysis draws on the synthetic panels to derive a vulnerability line for india that can be used to separate out a population subgroup comprising non poor households facing a heightened risk of falling into poverty the paper documents a strong pattern of upward mobility out of poverty and vulnerability into the middle class with a noticeable acceleration between 2009 10 and 2011 12 the paper further undertakes a careful investigation into the comparability of the survey rounds prompted by the observation that fairly significant modifications had been made to survey questionnaires the findings suggest that changes in questionnaire design have not compromised the comparability of the data

to harvest or not to harvest an analysis of cutting behavior on federal timber sales contracts economists have studied the environmental consequences and competitiveness of alternative sales techniques for publicly owned na tural resources little attention has been paid however to fluctuat ions in revenues resulting from the option nature of public resourc e sales this paper analyzes how the contract structure of public res ource sales leads to defaults and thereby revenue instability data on u s forest service timber sales contracts which were modified i n the early 1980s in response to default problems suggest that reduc ed contract lengths and more stringent requirements for extensions in crease harvest rates but that price adjustment clauses are unlikely to have similar effects copyright 1988 by mit press

bidder collusion at forest service timber sales allegations of bidder collusion at forest service timber sales in the pacific northwest were common in the 1970s of course prices may be low for reasons other than collusion we formulate an empirical model that allows for both bidder collusion and supply effects and in which we control for demand conditions noncooperative behavior in which a single unit is sold the standard auction model is a special case it is found to be definitively outperformed by a model of collusion we also find that supply effects are dominated by collusion in determining the winning bids in the market

auctions with resale opportunities an experimental study we study first price asymmetric private value auctions with resale opportunities presented in seller s and buyer s markets we offer experimental evidence on bidding behavior prices and resource allocation building upon the hafalir and krishna 2008 model we find that bidders will bid higher in an auction if the resale market is a seller s market than a buyer s market there is a price revenue efficiency trade off established theoretically between these two resale regimes in equilibrium however final efficiency is high irrespective of the resale market structure evidence of bid symmetrization and higher final efficiency is found in the buyer advantaged resale case jel d44 c92

the unsupportable support price an analysis of collusion and government intervention in paddy auction markets in north india abstract this paper uses auction theory incorporating buyer asymmetry to analyse the structure of a small market for parmal paddy in north india and to assess the implications of alternative government policies our results suggest that two buyers collude in this market we are able to quantify the extent to which prices are depressed as a consequence such collusion probably characterizes many small grain markets in india government intervention in grain markets in india is pervasive and has in recent years led to its acquiring excessive food stocks and an unwillingness to enforce the support price using simulations we demonstrate that while reducing the support price for paddy may not have the desired effect of reducing government purchases a decrease in the percentage that millers are required to sell as levy to the government will

semiparametric estimation of first price auctions with risk averse bidders in view of the non identification of the first price auction model with risk averse bidders this paper proposes some parametric identifying restrictions and a semiparametric estimator for the risk aversion parameter s and the latent distribution of private values specifically we exploit heterogeneity across auctioned objects to establish semiparametric identification under a conditional quantile restriction of the bidders private value distribution and a parameterization of the bidders utility function we develop a multistep semiparametric method and we show that our semiparametric estimator of the utility function parameter s converges at the optimal rate which is slower than the parametric one but independent of the dimension of the exogenous variables thereby avoiding the curse of dimensionality we then consider various extensions including a binding reserve price affiliation among private values and asymmetric bidders the method is illustrated on u s forest service timber sales and bidders risk neutrality is rejected

identification and inference in ascending auctions with correlated private values we introduce and apply a new nonparametric approach to identification and inference on data from ascending auctions we exploit variation in the number of bidders across auctions to nonparametrically identify useful bounds on seller profit and bidder surplus using a general model of correlated private values that nests the standard independent private values ipv model we also translate our identified bounds into closed form and asymptotically valid confidence intervals for several economic measures of interest applying our methods to much studied u s forest service timber auctions we find evidence of correlation among values after controlling for a rich vector of relevant auction covariates this correlation causes expected profit the profit maximizing reserve price and bidder surplus to be substantially lower than conventional ipv analysis of the data would suggest

do farmers value the environment evidence from a conservation reserve program auction the paper uses data from one conservation reserve program crp auction to elicit farmers attitudes toward the environment by analyzing their bids the crp pays farmers to remove chosen plots of land from agricultural production and put them to a conservation use an interesting aspect of this auction is that winners are determined by a combination of low bids and environmental scores of individual plots using decision theoretic approach to model this auction we show that farmers condition their bids on the strength of their environmental scores and that they value environmental benefits especially those that increase future soil productivity of their land

is poverty in africa mostly chronic or transient evidence from synthetic panel data absent actual panel household survey data this paper constructs for the first time synthetic panel data for more than 20 countries accounting for two thirds of the population in sub saharan africa in this process the analysis employs repeated cross sections that span on average a six year period for each country the analysis suggests that all these countries as a whole have had pro poor growth one third of the poor population escaped poverty during the studied period which is larger than the proportion of the population that fell into poverty in the same period the region also saw a 9 percent reduction in poverty and a 28 percent increase in the size of the middle class however chronic poverty remains high and a considerable proportion of the population is vulnerable to falling into poverty there is some limited evidence that most resource rich and middle income countries have more upward mobility than downward mobility post secondary education is especially strongly associated with higher upward mobility and less downward mobility which holds to some extent for female headed and urban households

experimental evidence on the performance of emission trading schemes in the presence of an active secondary market as auction based emission trading schemes ets become more common in addressing climate change it is of interest to study the effects of bargaining power in resale markets on original as well as post resale allowance allocations in terms of prices and efficiency this article provides an experimental study of first price private value asymmetric auctions followed by a double auction resale market opportunity we compare the double auction to other resale regimes with an uneven distribution of market power and contrast initial bids resale prices and efficiency despite the conventional wisdom that full efficiency requires the absence of market power we find that double auction resale markets lead to lower efficiency than the monopsony resale regime the level of efficiency achieved however is close to the highest across mechanisms that have differential bargaining power at the resale stage

the upstairs market for large block transactions analysis and measurement of price effects this article develops a model of the upstairs market where order size beliefs and prices are determined endogenously we test the model s predictions using unique data for 5 625 equity trades during the period 1985 to 1992 that are known to be upstairs transactions and are identified as either buyer or seller initiated we find that price movements prior to the trade date are significantly positively related to trade size consistent with information leakage as the block is shopped upstairs further the temporary price impact or liquidity effect is a concave function of order size which may result from upstairs intermediation

what is middle class about the middle classes around the world we expect a lot from the middle classes jim frederick writing in time magazine in 2002 stated china s burgeoning middle class holds the key to the future of the country in a more academic vein easterly 2001 concludes based on a comparison of a large number of countries that countries that have a larger middle class tend to grow faster at least if they are not too ethnically diverse in another article birdsall graham and pettinato 2000 rue the shrinking of the middle class the backbone of both the market economy and of democracy in most advanced societies in the face of burgeoning globalization the economic historian david landes writing about the wealth and poverty of nations 1998 explains england s early ascendancy in terms of the great english middle class of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of course there is nothing new about this faith in the middle class it follows a long line of theorizing going back at least to max weber 1905 at least three distinct arguments are traditionally made in one new entrepreneurs armed with a capacity and a tolerance for delayed gratification emerge from the middle class and create employment and productivity growth for the rest of society for a formalization of this argument see acemoglu and zilibotti 1997 in a second perhaps more conventional view the middle class is primarily a source of vital inputs for the entrepreneurial class it is their middle class values their emphasis on the accumulation of human capital and savings that makes them central to the process of capitalist accumulation for example doepke and zilibotti 2005 2007 the third view a staple of the business press emphasizes the middle class consumer the consumer who is willing to pay a little extra for quality in this view the middle class demand for quality consumer goods feeds investment in production and marketing which in turn raises income levels for everyone murphy shleifer and vishny 1989 1 this essay asks what we should make of these arguments in the context of today s developing countries starting from data on patterns of consumption and investment by the middle class we look for what is distinct about the global middle class especially when compared to the global poor defined as those whose per capita daily consumption valued at purchasing power parity exchange rates is below 2 a day who were the subject of a previous essay in this journal banerjee and duflo 2007b in particular is there anything special about the way the middle class spend their money earn their incomes or bring up their children

auctions with resale markets an application to u s forest service timber sales when bidders anticipate an opportunity for resale trade the value of winning an auction is determined in part by the option values of buying and selling in the secondary market one implication is that a bidder s willingness to pay at an auction increases with the expected level of competition between resale buyers empirical evidence from auctions of timber contracts supports this prediction and rejects standard models that ignore resale the estimated effect is smaller after policy changes expected to diminish the prevalence of resale additional evidence supports the predicted presence of a common value element introduced by the resale opportunity

buybacks with costly participation abstract posted price offers and first price auctions along with the multi unit discriminatory auction extension are two widely used mechanisms for allocating conservation contracts the choice between the two typically hinges on the trade off between the posted price s simplicity and the potential revenue gains of the auction in this paper we introduce a novel mechanism that attempts to bridge the gap between the performance of posted price offers and auctions a two price and lottery schedule combines the simplicity of the former with some of the flexibility of the latter using a model that incorporates agents cognitive and information costs of bidding we analyze how the ranking of allocative efficiency and cost effectiveness between the mechanisms varies as the wedge of participation costs increases when the number of bidders is endogenously determined by participation costs bid shading associated with a lack of competition in the auction compromises its cost effectiveness vis a vis the posted price and the lottery schedule we use data from three recent buybacks for fishing licenses conducted in maryland to calibrate our model and identify conditions under which the two price schedule outperforms the other mechanisms

revenue maximizing with return policy when buyers have uncertain valuations abstract this paper examines the optimal mechanism design problem when buyers have uncertain valuations this uncertainty can only be resolved after the actual transactions take place and upon incurring significant post purchase cost we focus on two different settings regarding how the seller values a returned object salvage value we first study the case where the salvage value is exogenously determined we find that the revenue maximizing mechanism is deterministic and separable we illustrate that the optimal revenue can be implemented by a mechanism with a no questions asked return policy in addition we show that linear return policies are suboptimal when the hazard rates of initial estimates are monotone we next examine the case where the salvage value is endogenously determined we demonstrate that separability no longer holds and the recall of buyers is necessary in the optimal mechanism

long lived private information and imperfect competition we develop a multi period auction model in which multiple privately informed agents strategically exploit their long lived information we show that such traders compete aggressively and cause most of their common private information to be revealed very rapidly in the limit as the interval between auctions approaches zero market depth becomes infinite and all private information is revealed immediately these results are in contrast to those of kyle 1985 in which the monopolistic informed trader causes his information to be incorporated into prices gradually and when the interval between auctions is vanishingly small market depth is constant over time fama 1970 defines a strong form efficient market as one in which security prices fully reflect all available information including both publicly and privately held information in a pioneering and influential article kyle 1985 develops a model in which a single privately informed trader with long lived information optimally exploits his monopoly power over time kyle s 1985 main results are i the informed trader trades in a gradual manner so that his information is incorporated into prices at a slow almost linear rate and ii when auctions are held continuously the depth of the market is constant over time however kyle s 1985 assumption of a single informed trader is strong in the sense that in actual financial markets it is reasonable to expect that at least a few players will have access to private information and will trade in the knowledge that they will face competition with other informed agents in the market 1 we develop a multi period auction model in which multiple strategic informed traders optimally exploit their long lived informational advantage we thus explore the restrictiveness of kyle s assumption of a single informed trader and also examine

vulnerability seasonality and poverty in ethiopia most studies examining the dynamics of welfare have found large fluctuations in consumption over relatively short periods suggesting substantial short run movements in and out of poverty the consequence is that cross section poverty research may not be able to identify the poor in this study we explore this short run variability further we use a data set on a panel of 1450 households in different communities in rural ethiopia surveyed thrice over 18 months on average year to year poverty is very similar however we find high variability in consumption and poverty over the seasons and year by year econometric analysis suggests that consumption is affected by idiosyncratic and common shocks including rainfall and household specific crop failure while households respond to seasonal incentives related to changing labour demand and prices the results imply that a larger number of households are vulnerable to shocks than implied by the standard poverty statistics while some of the non poor in the

first price auctions with resale and with outcomes robust to bid disclosure although there exists a pure separating equilibrium of the two bidder first price auction with resale when the bids are kept secret the ratchet effect prevents the existence of such an equilibrium if the bidders are heterogeneous and the bids are fully disclosed nevertheless we construct a behavioral equilibrium under full disclosure that is equivalent to the pure separating equilibrium under no disclosure thus if the bidders follow this equilibrium the choice of the disclosure regime does not affect the final allocation of the item nor the expected payoffs

identification of standard auction models this paper presents new identification results for models of first price second price ascending english and descending dutch auctions we consider a general specification of the latent demand and information structure nesting both private values and common values models and allowing correlated types as well as ex ante asymmetry we address identification of a series of nested models and derive testable restrictions enabling discrimination between models on the basis of observed data the simplest model symmetric independent private values is nonparametrically identified even if only the transaction price from each auction is observed for richer models identification and testable restrictions may be obtained when additional information of one or more of the following types is available i the identity of the winning bidder or other bidders ii one or more bids in addition to the transaction price iii exogenous variation in the number of bidders iv bidder specific covariates while many private values pv models are nonparametrically identified and testable with commonly available data identification of common values cv models requires stringent assumptions nonetheless the pv model can be tested against the cv alternative even when neither model is identified

bidding to lose auctions with resale a losing bidder can still purchase the prize from the winner after the auction we show why a strong bidder may prefer to drop out of the auction before the price has reached her valuation and acquire the prize in the aftermarket a strong bidder may be in a better bargaining position in the aftermarket if her rival won at a relatively low price so it can be common knowledge that in equilibrium a weak bidder will win the auction and even without uncertainty about relative valuations resale will take place the possibility of reselling to a strong bidder attracts weak bidders to participate in the auction and raises the seller s revenue

exclusive dealing through resellers in auctions with stochastic bidder participation this paper demonstrates that a seller prefers to exclude final consumers from an auction and sell only to resellers when these resellers can gain access at a cost to a sufficiently bigger market than the seller himself the intuition is that resellers recoup their expenses for marketing the item by reselling it to final consumers if some consumers participate in the first auction and are outbid by the resellers then their values for the item are relatively low outbidding part of their customer base is bad news for the resellers and this depresses their bids when consumers compete with them the socially optimal and revenue maximizing choices of auction format may not coincide restricting participation of consumers may be socially optimal but privately suboptimal and vice versa the results suggest that i the exclusion of final consumers in some auctions may not be driven by transaction cost considerations and ii sellers should not necessarily sell directly to consumers even though new technologies allow them to do so at essentially zero cost unless they can access a sufficiently large portion of the market

efficient investment in a dynamic auction environment abstract we analyze an environment in which bidders private values change over time due to both private investments and exogenous shocks we demonstrate that a highly decentralized mechanism achieves efficiency the mechanism requires a stage of costly public announcements i e signaling to induce efficient investment for this reason an equilibrium selection issue arises but can be handled by a minor modification in the spirit of virtual implementation

a nonparametric test for comparing valuation distributions in first price auctions this article proposes a nonparametric test for comparing valuation distributions in first price auctions our test is motivated by the fact that two valuation distributions are the same if and only if their integrated quantile functions are the same our method avoids estimating unobserved valuations and does not require smooth estimation of bid density we show that our test is consistent against all fixed alternatives and has nontrivial power against root n local alternatives monte carlo experiments show that our test performs well in finite samples we implement our method on data from u s forest service timber auctions

efficiency in auctions with failed resale abstract the possibility of resale affects efficiency in multi object uniform price auctions with asymmetric bidders we theoretically show that when the exogenous probability of a resale market is sufficiently low final efficiency is lower than in an auction without resale our experimental design consists of four treatments that vary the probability that bidders participate in a resale market resale always increases efficiency compared to the auction allocation but it also induces demand reduction by high value bidders which reduces auction efficiency consistent with theory and in contrast to what is usually argued the possibility of resale may reduce final efficiency and changes in the probability of resale have a non monotonic effect on efficiency we also analyze bargaining chat data to provide insights into the functioning of resale markets

arriving in time estimation of english auctions with a stochastic number of bidders we develop a new econometric approach for the estimation of second price ascending bid auctions with a stochastic number of bidders our empirical framework considers the arrival process of new bidders as well as the distribution of bidders valuations of objects being auctioned by observing the timing of bidder arrival the model is identified even when the number of potential bidders is stochastic and unknown the relevance of our approach is illustrated with an empirical application using a unique dataset of art auctions on ebay our results suggest a higher impact of sellers reputation on bidders valuations than previously reported in cross sectional studies but the impact of reputation on bidder arrival is largely insignificant interestingly a seller s reputation impacts not only the actions of the bidders but the actions of the seller as well in particular experience and a good reputation increase the probability of a seller posting items for sale on longer lasting auctions which we find inc