fair management of social risk we provide a general method for extending social preferences defined for riskless economic environments to the context of risk and uncertainty we apply the method to the problems of managing unemployment allowances in the context of macroeconomic fluctuations and catastrophic risks in the context of climate change the method guarantees ex post fairness and pays attention to individuals risk attitudes while ensuring rationality properties for social preferences revisiting basic ideas from harsanyi s celebrated aggregation theorem harsanyi 1955 the social preferences that we obtain do not always take the form of an expected utility criterion but they always satisfy statewise dominance when we require social preferences to be expected utilities we obtain a variant of harsanyi s result under a weak version of the pareto principle and a maximin criterion under a stronger pareto requirement whenever the ex post social ordering does not depend on people s risk attitudes we also show how non expected utility individual preferences can be accommodated in the approach

economic policy in germany was there a turnaround germany under kohl martin hellwig and manfred neumann chancellor kohl came to power when germany was suffering its greatest post war confidence crisis output was stagnant the trade balance deteriorating unemployment rising and inflation uncomfortably high immediate priority was given to fiscal consolidation to bring the growing budget deficit under control the authors argue that in this instance fiscal contraction sufficiently boosted private sector confidence that overall demand was actually stimulated together fiscal rectitude by the federal government and monetary austerity by the bundesbank made possible sustained output growth against a background of falling inflation lower deficits also crowd in private investment in the longer run thus the authors judge kohl s macroeconomic policy a considerable success however unemployment has remained stubbornly high the authors attribute this to supply side failures the german labour market remains subject to many distortions which the kohl government has done little to remove nor has it seriously pursued deregulation of product markets german unemployment is likely to remain high at least until favourable demographic changes take effect in the 1990s

risk sharing on the labour market and second best wage rigidities the starting point of the analysis is that a significant proportion of the labour force is not covered by efficient labour contracts in particular the non existence of forward labour contracts limits the opportunity of efficient risk sharing through private arrangements among young labour suppliers and capital owners in such a context state dependent labour taxes and employment subsidies would be required to achieve ex ante pareto efficiency in the absence of employment subsidies a certain limited degree of downward wage rigidity is in general pareto superior to full wage flexibility at the second best optimum so defined productive efficiency is sacrificed in some states in order to achieve greater efficiency in risk sharing thus the unemployment associated with wage rigidity is inefficient though voluntary due to the levels of benefits and second best efficient a limited degree of wage discrimination by hiring date is typically part of the second best policy

when borch s theorem does not apply some key implications of market incompleteness with policy relevance today markets are incomplete when the assets available to the agents do not span the space of future contingencies efficiency is then assessed by the weak criterion of constrained efficiency efficiency relative to the set of allocations compatible with the asset structure that criterion requires firms to optimise relative to shadow prices reflecting shareholders preferences yet even when firms do so competitive equilibria on the markets for assets and commodities fail generically to be constrained efficient section 3 pareto superior allocations can be implemented through price wage rigidities and quantity constraints section 4 but nominal rigidities are conducive to multiple equilibria implying endogenous macroeconomic uncertainties that compound the primitive exogenous uncertainties section 5 various policy implications can be drawn which are of some relevance to the current crisis

on the effects of barriers to international investment a simple model is presented in which it is costly for domestic investors to hold foreign assets the implications of the model for the composition of optimal portfolios at home and abroad are derived it is shown that all foreign assets with a beta larger than some beta plot on either one of two security market lines some foreign assets with a beta smaller than are not held by domestic investors even if their expected return is increased slightly while it is obviously not true that asset markets are completely segmented between countries there is evidence of barriers to international investment although reality seems to lie in that grey area between complete segmentation and no segmentation at all most international asset pricing models are concerned with the extreme case of no barriers to international investment no effort seems to have been made to study the effect on portfolio choice of such barriers which make it costly to hold foreign securities as opposed to domestic securities but which do not in general render international diversification so onerous that investors avoid foreign securities completely casual empiricism suggests that models without barriers to international investment should be suspect those models cannot explain why it appears that in every country investors on average hold more domestic securities than would be required if they held the world market portfolio 2 this paper constructs a model of international asset pricing in which there is a cost associated with holding either long or short risky foreign securities for the sake of simplicity in most of the paper we assume that while domestic investors face barriers to international investment foreign investors face no such barriers it turns out that nothing significant is lost with such an assumption the main conclusions of this paper for the case in which foreign investors face no barriers to international investment are 1 in the presence of barriers to international investment some risky foreign

decreasing absolute prudence characterization and applications to second best risk sharing abstract in this paper we provide two basic properties of utility functions u which exhibit decreasing absolute prudence i e u u 0 these properties are used to examine the allocation of risks in an economy when some agents bear non transferable risks we show that it is fair pareto efficient to let those with a non transferable risk bear relatively less of the transferable risk in the economy if and only if absolute prudence is decreasing in another model there is a complete set of contingent markets but some agents have no direct access to them we examine the fair efficient allocation of risk in a pool gathering a trader and a non trader decreasing absolute prudence provides an upper bound to the share of the pool s risk that should be borne by the trader

labour market rigidities and international risk sharing across oecd countries abstract in this paper we examine the role of labour market rigidities in the context of international consumption risk sharing stronger labour market regulation may make it easier to borrow against future income thus allowing shocks to be smoothed to a greater extent in addition rigid labour markets may help to enforce implicit contracts that shift risk from employees to owners of firms who in turn may diversify risk internationally using data for 19 oecd countries we show that labour market rigidities significantly increase consumption correlations and reduce the exposure to country specific shocks these results suggest that labour market rigidities improve the international sharing of consumption risks by fostering a more efficient intra national allocation of risk

walras keynes equilibria coordination and macroeconomics in decentralised market economies supply constrained equilibria may persist as coordination failures sustained but not caused by price rigidities this feature may be arbitrarily severe even at prices compatible with competitive equilibrium the supply constraints may originate in rational expectations some implications for macroeconomics are drawn the possibility of coordination failures explains why organised labour may resist wage flexibility these features are illustrated in elementary macroeconomic prototypes like rbc or barro grossman malinvaud prototypes

arbitrage equilibrium with transaction costs the general topic of this paper is the transmission of disturbances in asset markets the specific topic is the role of transaction costs in this transmission do high transaction costs shelter a market against foreign disturbances while bottling up domestic disturbances at home the question is considered in the context of a small scale general equilibrium model of asset arbitrage with quadratic transaction cost functions the main conclusion is that the transmission of disturbances depends more on the relationships between different transaction cost rates than on their absolute level a progressive decline of transaction costs therefore does not necessarily strengthen the transmission of disturbances nor can artificial increases of transaction costs be relied upon to reduce it copyright 1994 by ohio state university press

optimal minimum wage policy in competitive labor markets this paper provides a theoretical analysis of optimal minimum wage policy in a perfectly competitive labor market and obtains two key results first we show that a binding minimum wage while leading to unemployment is nevertheless desirable if the government values redistribution toward low wage workers and if unemployment induced by the minimum wage hits the lowest surplus workers first importantly this result remains true in the presence of optimal nonlinear taxes and transfers in that context a binding minimum wage enhances the effectiveness of transfers to low skilled workers as it prevents low skilled wages from falling through incidence effects second when labor supply re sponses are along the extensive margin only the co existence of a minimum wage with a positive tax rate on low skilled work is always second best pareto ineffcient a pareto improving policy consists of reducing the pre tax minimum wage while keeping constant the post tax minimum wage by increasing transfers to low skilled workers and financing this reform by increasing taxes on higher paid workers overall our results imply that the minimum wage and subsidies for low skilled workers are complementary policies pa

optimal wage bargains recent attempts to provide a theoretical framework for macroeconomics have focused on the nature of wage employment agreements between firms and workers workers are in general unable to purchase insurance against future income fluctuations on grounds of for example moral hazard and consequently firms may find it profitable to offer workers a contract that provides them with partial insurance as well as employment compensation the seminal papers are those of azariadis 1975 and baily 1974 henceforth a b and a useful survey is provided by azariadis 1981 in their model hiring decisions must be made before uncertainty about product market conditions is resolved if firms are risk neutral and severance payments to the unemployed are disallowed then the optimal contract entails a state invariant real wage and the possibility of ex post involuntary unemployment while this model provides important insights it has been criticized on a number of grounds first akerlof and miyazaki 1980 and pissarides 1981 have pointed out that unemployment can occur in the simple a b model only when the marginal revenue product of labour falls below the reservation wage so that unemployment would also occur in a walrasian model and that in general the level of unemployment will be less than would be experienced in spot markets although it does provide a clue to the involuntary nature of that unemployment second the ad hoc exclusion of payments by the firm to the unemployed can be criticized if these are allowed then the optimal contract involves a topping up of the reservation wage to provide complete income rather than wage stabilization and the ex post efficient level of employment will be sustained these criticisms have prompted a number of authors to examine the implications of assuming asymmetric information about the state of nature an early example of this literature is provided by calvo and phelps 1977 who note that under an a b contract because there is a tendency to overemployment in bad states there will be an incentive for firms to misrepresent the state of nature and lay off more workers than previously agreed but that this incentive may be attenuated by making the wage schedule contingent on the level of employment that is assumed to be observed by workers the properties of these contracts usually depend on the precise assumptions of the model however in some versions unemployment may be greater than would occur in the walrasian model hart 1983 for instance considers a model in which severance payments are allowed but firms as well as workers are risk averse then the optimal contract will involve lower wages in bad states of nature in order to spread risk but the only way this information can be conveyed to workers is by lowering the level of employment the papers by grossman and hart 1981 and by azariadis chari green and kahn and grossman and hart in the symposium in the quarterly journal of economics

the international allocation of savings with quadratic transaction or risk costs abstract quadratic transaction costs are used to explain to what extent the savings of a country are invested in the same country and to what extent they give rise to international capital flows more specifically it is shown that the high across countries correlation between saving and investment observed by feldstein and horioka could at least in part result from differences in transaction costs between internal and external investments this remains true even in the presence of an international asset without such differences in the particular model used transaction costs cannot be distinguished from risk jel f21

targeting incentives to reduce habitat fragmentation the fragmentation of wildlife habitat has long been recognized as a principal threat to terrestrial biodiversity in this paper we develop a theoretical model to analyze the spatial targeting of incentives for the restoration of forested landscapes when land quality is spatially heterogeneous and wildlife habitat can be enhanced by reducing fragmentation we consider a regulator who uses subsidies to encourage the conversion of private agricultural land to forest on a pre defined set of landscapes the regulator can observe land use choices but not the opportunity costs on individual land parcels the important insight to emerge from the theoretical analysis is that solutions at or near corners are a strong possibility on each landscape either none or all of the agricultural land should be converted to forest corner solutions are directly linked to the spatial process determining habitat benefits to verify the theoretical insight we present a simulation of the effects of incentive based policies on the spatial distribution of forests in south carolina the empirical methodology integrates an econometric model of land use change with gis based landscape simulations the empirical findings strongly support our conjecture regarding corner solutions and the optimal targeting policy is shown to produce substantial welfare gains over a spatially uniform incentive

economic and social security in the twenty first century with attention to europe a partly heuristic attempt at exploring long run policies aimed at a second best compromise between ex ante risk sharing efficiency and ex post productive efficiency wage subsidies for low skilled workers financed by taxes on high wages are advocated together with improved risk sharing between capital and labour between generations and between the countries belonging to emu the scope of the advocated policies is limited by considerations of moral hazard time consistency and fiscal competition also estimates of some key economic parameters remain very imprecise several avenues of further research are identified

unemployment and labor market reform a contract theoretic approach why do many democracies fail to reform their labor market institutions to answer this question we study the feasibility of reforms that include compensation to insiders for the removal of labor market regulations under asymmetric information a reformer who wants to buy the approval of voters has to pay them an informational rent in addition to the pure costs of compensation that would arise under symmetric information in this setting unemployment may be constrained pareto efficient labor market reforms may fail politically because none of the reform packages proposed wins the approval of a majority of voters we also discuss the role of capital taxation in a reform program jel classification d70 e61 j68

the trade off between real wages and employment in an open economy belgium abstract the purpose of this paper is twofold first we discuss the nature and quantitative order of magnitude of the trade off between real wages and employment in the small open economy belgium second we draw policy conclusions from our positive analysis and compare income policies with alternative approaches to employment stimulation including shorter working hours and currency depreciation to study the trade off between real wages and employment we treat external balance as a binding constraint on demand management an exogenous increase in real wages affecting adversely the competitiveness of domestic producers on the export and import markets impairs external balance the impact of the wage increase on output and employment is evaluated through the reduction in domestic demand required to restore external balance at the empirical level we endeavour to evaluate separately the influence on exports and imports of domestic costs at unchanged capacity levels and of capacity levels themselves and we endeavour to evaluate the influence of real wages on capacity levels through scrapping and investment all evaluations rely on the foreign trade equations of econometric models of the belgian economy the conclusions from our empirical investigation are first that estimates of the trade off between real wages and employment in belgium are subject to considerable imprecision second that the short run elasticity of employment with respect to real wages keeping capacity constant is probably quite small like 0 2 and definitely less than unity in absolute value third that the corresponding medium run elasticity taking into account capacity adjustments is probably sizeable like 2 and definitely larger than unity in absolute value and fourth that exchange rate adjustments might not make too much difference in either the short run or the medium run turning to a discussion of policy we shall argue that these conclusions give support to a policy of constant real labour incomes of comprehensive efforts to redistribute work through shorter working hours or related schemes and of selective efforts to slow down capacity scrapping

transactions costs and covered interest arbitrage theory and evidence the extent to which deviations from covered interest parity can be attributed to transactions costs has been exaggerated in the economic literature because the swap market in foreign exchange has been ignored it is shown that such deviations should be no greater than the lowest of the transactions costs in one of three markets the swap market or either of the two relevant securities markets this reconciles the theory with the data which show spreads of no more than a few basis points however the empirical results have no direct bearing on the conventional market efficiency hypothesis

implicit contracts a survey 7mplicit contracts resolve the distribution of uncertainty and utilization of specific human capital between risk averse workers and less risk averse firms incomplete contracts are required to yield involuntary layoffs in contract markets otherwise contracts are efficient and pareto optimal by construction there is a close relation between contract theory and neoclassical labor market theory contracts smooth consumption but increase the volatility of labor supply and labor utilization to demand disturbances because contractural insurance eliminates the income effects of socially diversifiable risks this result is similar to the intertemporal substitution hypothesis however the price mechanism in a contract is substantially different contracts embody a nonlinear two part pricing scheme the lump sum part allocates the income consumption consequences of risks and the marginal pricing part allocates production and labor utilization this implicit pricing mechanism is in all respects flexible though the observed average hourly wage combines both parts and may give the outward appearanceof rigidity furthermore the observed average wage rate in a contract does not reflect marginal conditions necessary for structural econometric estimation indivisibilities appear necessary to account for the split between work sharing and layoffs contracts with private information are also considered in the nonlinear pricing context this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

european unemployment lessons from a multi country econometric study the paper summarizes the principal empirical findings of the european unemployment program it draws on 10 country studies which utilize the macroeconomic framework set out by sneessens and dreze 1986 the main conclusions are as follows i a major problem in europe is that productivity gains are quickly absorbed into wages and the effect of unemployment on wage settlements is generally weak ii a wage price productivity spiral means the european economies are inflation prone iii demand pressures spill over into the balance of payments rather than leading to price increases iv the major proximate determinant of employment in the 1 980s is the level of effective demand

equilibrium long term labor contracts the paper presents a labor market equilibrium analysis of implicit contract theory a two period single good model is used to propose consistent notions of labor market equilibrium for long term employment contracts both when labor is specialized and cannot move in the second period and when there is free mobility without costs the result that long term contracts emerge in equilibrium even without mobility costs is novel and contrary to common beliefs the main features of equilibrium are that risk neutral firms will insure risk averse workers against downside risk yielding downward rigid wages wages are not fully rigid as in earlier work on contract theory because workers may quit and wages have to be bid up to retain them the firm gets its return of the insurance deal by paying less than marginal product in the first period the resulting equilibrium is second best and lies between productive efficiency and full insurance workers gain from long term contracts in comparison to spot markets whereas owners may not in the model with specialized skills there exist transfer payments such that both parties are better off within an equilibrium with long term contracts

risk sharing and group decision making in a decision making problem where a group will receive an uncertain payoff which must be divided among the members of the group the ultimate payoff of interest is the vector of individual payoffs received by the members of the group in this paper preferences are quantified in terms of cardinal utility functions for such vectors of payoffs these utility functions can represent preferences concerning equitable and inequitable vectors of payoffs as well as attitudes toward risk the individual utility functions are aggregated to form a group utility function for the vector of payoffs and this latter function is in turn used to generate a group utility function for the overall group payoff and a sharing rule for dividing the group payoff into individual payoffs the resulting group decisions are pareto optimal in utility space properties of the sharing rule and the group utility function are investigated for additive and multilinear group utility functions

on the optimality of a minimum wage new insights from optimal tax theory we build a theoretical model to study whether a minimum wage can be welfare improving if it is implemented in conjunction with an optimized nonlinear income tax we consider this issue in a framework where search frictions on the labor market generate unemployment workers differ in productivity the government does not observe workers productivity but only their wages hence the redistributive policy solves an adverse selection problem we show that a minimum wage is optimal if the bargaining power of the workers is relatively low however if the government controls the bargaining power then it is preferable to set a sufficiently high bargaining power