the local response to tax limitation measures do local governments manipulate voters to increase revenues abstract this paper provides evidence that some cities subject to a statewide tax limit manipulate their mix of productive and administrative services in an attempt to get voters to override the statewide limit when a statewide limit reduces a city s budget one manipulative response is to cut service inputs for example teachers or uniformed police officers by a relatively large amount while cutting administrative inputs by a relatively small amount this approach reveals a relatively large trade off between public and private goods and the severe consequences from a tax limit may encourage local voters to override the statewide limit we provide evidence that cities with local override options tend to adopt this approach manipulation is most prevalent among cities run by city managers as opposed to strong mayors

what do we know about macroeconomics that fisher and wicksell did not the answer to the question in the title is a lot in this essay i argue that the history of macroeconomics during the 20th century can be divided into three epochs

community development with endogenous land use controls abstract when competitive landowners developers control incorporation and zoning decisions efficient patterns of development emerge when by contrast early arrivals control policy they may impose zoning restrictions that force later entrants to pay via the property tax a disproportionate share of the cost of providing public services if new arrivals are sufficiently poor they may choose to reside outside the community while higher quality land within the community remains unoccupied this inefficient and exclusionary outcome can be an equilibrium if boundaries once drawn are irreversible the ex ante introduction of a seemingly natural compensation scheme may not remedy the problem

semi targeted all pay auctions a partial exclusion principle abstract this paper studies the effects of a specific affirmative action policy in complete information all pay auctions when players differ in ability the contest organizer splits the overall prize of the competition into a targeted and an untargeted prize the targeted prize is exclusively for disadvantaged low ability agents and excludes advantaged agents partially from the overall prize we consider a setting with one high ability and two low ability contestants and fully characterize equilibrium assuming that the contest organizer aims to maximize expected total effort we show that i almost any targeted prize is preferable to a standard all pay auction without targeted prize ii the exclusion principle baye et al 1993 can be implemented by a wide range of sufficiently large targeted prizes and iii partial exclusion by means of an appropriately chosen targeted prize benefits the organizer more than complete exclusion we also discuss the robustness of our results in settings with more than three agents

keep on fighting the dynamics of head starts in all pay auctions abstract we investigate a model of a series of contests in which a contestant s past and present success gives a head start over a rival in the future how this advantage from winning affects contestants efforts whether the laggard gives up or keeps on fighting and how the head start develops over time are key issues we find that the expected effort of the laggard will always be higher than the rival at some stage in the series of contests and this is most likely to happen when at a large disadvantage or at a late stage in the series

does federalism matter political choice in a federal republic this paper builds upon some well known facts about state government to generate new conclusions about social choice on the national level of a federal republic citizens vote against national laws that restrict their state s ability to export costs but support laws that reduce the costs imposed on them individuals may seek to extend the laws passed in some states to the entire nation or may oppose preemptive laws because they benefit from variety since these motivations are absent in a unitary system national support for a law will depend upon whether a unitary or a federal structure prevails

reassessment of the tiebout model abstract the tiebout model has been the reference point for the classical approach to fiscal federalism its emphasis on mobility benefit taxation and the advantages of fiscal competition have informed fiscal federalism since the seminal contributions of musgrave and oates this paper reviews the influence that the tiebout model has had on fiscal federalism and argues that while its insights remain relevant for local government it is far from compelling as a positive description of or a normative prescription for fiscal federalism at the state level some aspects of alternative approaches are presented which lead to different perspectives than tiebout inspired ones

factor mobility and income redistribution in a federation abstract jurisdictions in a federation redistribute income by taxing capital and providing transfers to labor capital and labor move to earn higher returns net of taxes or gross of transfer benefits between jurisdictions in determining its redistributive policy the government for each jurisdiction thus takes into account the effects of its policy on the movement of factors from and to the jurisdiction hence the extent of redistribution depends on the mobility of factors the mobility of capital or labor leads to less redistribution than under autarky however mobility of both capital and labor may lead to more redistribution than if only capital moves as a consequence increased mobility of factors is not necessarily harmful to redistribution

centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods a political economy approach abstract this paper takes a fresh look at the trade off between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods it argues that the sharing of the costs of local public spending in a centralized system will create a conflict of interest between citizens in different jurisdictions when spending decisions are made by a legislature of locally elected representatives this conflict of interest will play out in the legislature depending on precisely how the legislature behaves the result may be excessive public spending or allocations of public goods characterized by uncertainty and misallocation across districts the extent of the conflict of interest between districts is affected by spillovers and differences in tastes for public spending thus the relative performance of centralized and decentralized systems depends upon spillovers and differences in tastes for public spending but for different reasons than suggested in the existing literature

snobbery racism or mutual distaste what promotes and hinders cooperation in local public good provision a political jurisdiction may decide to cooperate in public schooling provision with its neighbors or remain independent the determinants of the consolidation decision are compared for the richer and the poorer and for the whiter and the less white jurisdiction in each potential consolidation pair property values and scale economies matter most however poorer jurisdictions prefer merging with richer ones that are less white than themselves whiter jurisdictions prefer to consolidate with less white ones of similar income less white jurisdictions are more open to consolidation with whiter ones if their incomes differ in either direction traditional club theory predictions are not supported

the implications of competition among jurisdictions does tiebout need politics the paper investigates whether compensation among local jurisdiction is by itself sufficient to ensure efficient provision of local public goods jurisdictions have fixed boundaries and each has an entrenched government with the power to tax and supply the public good residents can move costlessly among jurisdictions it is shown that competition among numerous jurisdictions is not sificient to guarantee public sector efficiency though residents can vote with their feet land is immobile hence governments can unsurp some land rents for their own ends increasing the number of jurisdictions limits but cannot completely eliminate the ability to exercise discretionary governmental power

tiebout with politics capital tax competition and constitutional choices this paper examines how capital tax competition affects jurisdiction formation we describe a non cooperative locational model of public goods provision choices where the levels of taxation and the local public good varieties provided within jurisdictions are selected by majority voting and where equilibrium jurisdictions consist of consumers with similar tastes we show that interjurisdictional tax competition results in an enlargement of jurisdictional boundaries and even in the absence of intrajurisdictional transfers can raise welfare for all members of a jurisdiction

does tax competition tame the leviathan abstract we study the impact of tax competition on equilibrium taxes and welfare focusing on the jurisdictional fragmentation of federations in a representative agent model of fiscal federalism fragmentation among jurisdictions with benevolent tax setting authorities unambiguously reduces welfare if however tax setting authorities pursue revenue maximization fragmentation by pushing down equilibrium tax rates may under certain conditions increase citizen welfare we exploit the highly decentralized and heterogeneous swiss fiscal system as a laboratory for the estimation of these effects while for purely direct democratic jurisdictions which we associate with relatively benevolent tax setting we find that tax rates increase in fragmentation fragmentation has a moderating effect on the tax rates of jurisdictions with some degree of delegated government our results thereby support the view that tax competition can be second best welfare improving by constraining the scope for public sector revenue maximization

creating balance in dynamic competitions abstract we consider incentives for organizing competitions in multiple rounds focusing on situations where there is heterogeneity among the contestants ex ante which discourages effort in a single contest heterogeneity evolves across rounds depending upon the outcomes of previous rounds we present conditions under which balance in such a competition can be created by determining the number of rounds and dividing the prize fund carefully across them so that full rent dissipation entails in the model each round is an all pay auction where contestants differ in their abilities to gain a momentum from winning we also discuss the case when negative prizes are feasible demonstrating that this strengthens the full dissipation result and we consider a case where the size of the winner s momentum is related to the size of the prize attained showing that the stronger this linkage the less of the prize is awarded early on

why do households without children support local public schools linking house price capitalization to school spending while residents receive similar benefits from many local government programs only about one third of all households have children in public schools we argue that capitalization of school spending into house prices can encourage even childless residents to support spending on schools we identify a proxy for the extent of capitalization the supply of land available for new development and show that towns in massachusetts with little undeveloped land have larger changes in house prices in response to a plausibly exogenous spending shock towns with little available land also spend more on schools we extend these results using data from school districts in 46 states showing that per pupil spending is positively related to the percentage of developed land this positive correlation persists only in districts where the median resident is a homeowner and is stronger in districts with more elderly residents who do not use school services and have a shorter expected duration in their home our findings support models in which capitalization encourages the provision of durable local public goods and provides an additional reason why some elderly support local school spending

vertical irmbalance in the fiscal systems of federal states a theory of vertical fiscal imbalance in federal states vfi is developed which distinguishes between long run and short run imbalances and between normative and positive interpretations of the concept the analysis is carried out in the context of a simple three sector model where the allocation of national output among sectors results from interaction of a public choice process with an overall resource constraint the paper proposes welfare theoretic definitions of long run and short run vfi in addition it uses the concept as part of a positive analysis in order to reassess broad trends in canadian fiscal history

competition and monopoly power in local government an extension of caplan 2001 caplan 2001 shows that because land is asource of immobile wealth localgovernments can use the property tax toavoid competitive pressures of the tieboutmodel allowing them to deviate fromcitizens preferences in this comment ishow that the property tax is not the onlytax local governments can use to avoidcompetitive pressure most taxes placed onproperty owners allow local governments toextract some rents despite perfect citizenmobility

tax competition and income redistribution an empirical analysis for switzerland tax competition is supposed to lead to thecollapse of the welfare state because first it willbecome difficult for a single jurisdiction to levy aredistribution tax upon the rich and mobile andsecond such a policy if undertaken in onejurisdiction will attract poor individuals from otherjurisdictions and erode internal redistributionpolicies in this paper the impact of personal incometaxes and transfers on residence decisions oftaxpayers is analyzed with swiss subfederal data therelationship of tax competition and the erosion of theswiss welfare state is tested with aggregate data onincome redistribution

leviathan and competition among jurisdictions the case of benefit taxation abstract this paper shows that interjurisdictional competition for mobile factors of production forces the government to raise the efficiency of the public sector and thus helps to tame leviathan governments however this result is derived under some restrictive assumptions concerning the kind of tax policy used by the government in the case of benefit taxes e g user charges a leviathan may be tamed by interjurisdictional competition whereas this is not necessarily true in the case of lum sum taxes

taxation of mobile factors as insurance under uncertainty this paper considers the effects of the taxation of mobile factors i e capital under uncertainty the wages earned by residents of a jurisdiction are uncertain due to random shocks since the uncertain wages in a jurisdiction depend on the amount of mobile capital employed in the jurisdiction and since taxation alters the quantity of capital employed taxation affects the riskiness of uncertain wages in particular the taxation of capital moderates the fluctuation of uncertain wages thereby providing insurance for this reason jurisdictions use distortionary capital taxation even if lump sum taxation is available in addition this insurance effect counteracts the tendency toward too low tax rates on capital arising from tax competition and possibly improves the efficiency of tax competition

regional decentralization and fiscal incentives federalism chinese style abstract aligning the interests of local governments with market development is an important issue for developing and transition economies using a panel data set from china we investigate the relationship between provincial government s fiscal incentives and provincial market development we report three empirical findings first we find that during the period of fiscal contracting system the discrepancy between ex ante contracts and ex post implementation was relatively small suggesting that the fiscal contracts were credible second we find a much higher correlation about four times between the provincial government s budgetary revenue and its expenditure during 1980s and 1990s as compared to 1970s demonstrating that provincial governments faced much stronger ex post fiscal incentives after reform third we find that stronger ex ante fiscal incentives measured by the contractual marginal retention rate of the provincial government in its budgetary revenue are associated with faster development of the non state sector as well as more reforms in the state sector in the provincial economy this holds even when we control for the conventional measure of fiscal decentralization finally we compare federalism chinese style to federalism russian style

political culture and discrimination in contests abstract many economic and political decisions are the outcome of strategic contests for a given prize the nature of such contests can be determined by a designer who is driven by political considerations with a specific political culture the main objective of this study is to analyze the effect of political culture and of valuation asymmetry on discrimination between the contestants the weights assigned to the public well being and the contestants efforts represent the political culture while discrimination is an endogenous variable that characterizes the mechanism allocating the prize we consider situations under which the optimal bias of the designer is in favor of the contestant with the larger or smaller prize valuation and examine the effect of changes in the political culture and in valuation asymmetry on the designer s preferred discrimination between the contestants focusing on the two most widely studied types of contest success functions deterministic all pay auctions and logit csfs we show that an all pay auction is always the preferred csf from the point of view of the contest designer this result provides a new political economic micro foundation to some of the most commonly used models in the contest literature

decentralized taxation and the size of government evidence from swiss state and local governments according to the leviathan model fiscal federalism is seen as a binding constraint on a revenue maximizing government the competitive pressure of fiscal federalism is supposed to reduce public sector size as compared to unitary states however empirical results concerning the leviathan hypothesis are mixed this study uses a state and local level panel data set of swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998 to empirically analyze the effect of different federalist institutions on the size and structure of government revenue because of the considerable tax autonomy of sub national swiss governments it is possible to investigate different mechanisms by which fiscal federalism may influence government size the results indicate that tax exporting has a revenue expanding effect whereas tax competition favors a smaller size of government fragmentation has essentially no effect on the size of government revenue for swiss cantons the overall effect of revenue decentralization leads to fewer tax revenue but higher user charges thus revenue decentralization favors a smaller size of government revenue and shifts government revenue from taxes to user charges

property taxation congestion and local public goods abstract the residential property tax has been viewed as a congestion fee even if it distorts housing decisions this paper shows that the rule for a competitive jurisdiction s optimal public good supply may be written in a form in which no such role appears congestion costs enter the cost side of this rule in the same way that they enter when only a land tax is available the new rule is reconciled with an alternative rule in the literature which contains no congestion costs

the impressive contribution of canadian economists to fiscal federalism theory and policy the study of fiscal federalism has been central to the research of canadian economists since the rowell sirois report to mark the 50th anniversary of the founding of the canadian economics association it is fitting to take stock of their contributions we focus on the period since 1982 and emphasize the main scholarly publications of an inclusive array of canadian economists and economists in canadian universities our attention is devoted to applications in the context of federal and provincial governments setting aside related issues in municipal government finance we briefly discuss instances where the fiscal federalism literature has informed policy debates including through policy research institutes government commissions and international organizations la contribution impressionnante des economistes canadiens a la theorie et a la politique du federalisme fiscal l etude du federalisme fiscal a ete un element central de la recherche des economistes canadiens depuis la commission rowell sirois au moment de celebrer le 50eme anniversaire de la fondation de l association canadienne d economique le moment est approprie pour prendre la mesure de leurs contributions on se concentre sur la periode apres 1982 et on souligne les principales publications savantes d un ensemble inclusif d economistes canadiens et d economistes dans les universites canadiennes une attention particuliere est portee aux applications dans le contexte federal et provincial mettant de cote les enjeux relies a la finance municipale on discute brievement des instances ou la litterature sur le federalisme fiscal a eclaire les debats de politiques publiques y compris a travers les instituts de recherche sur les politiques publiques les commissions gouvernementales et les organisations internationales

optimal favoritism in all pay auctions and lottery contests abstract we analyze the revenue enhancing potential of favoring specific contestants in complete information all pay auctions and lottery contests with several heterogeneous contestants two instruments of favoritism are considered head starts that are added to the bids of specific contestants and multiplicative biases that give idiosyncratic weights to the bids in the all pay auction head starts are more effective than biases while optimally combining both instruments even yields first best revenue in the lottery contest head starts are less effective than biases and combining both instruments cannot further increase revenue as all pay auctions revenue dominate lottery contests under optimal biases we thus obtain an unambiguous revenue ranking of all six combinations of contest formats and instruments

bargaining in the shadow of the ballot box causes and consequences of local voter initiatives this paper provides one of the first empirical analyses of the local voter initiative using a unique and comprehensive dataset from california it analyzes determinants of local initiatives and effects of these measures on municipal finances results indicate that initiatives occur more frequently in large and diverse jurisdictions with more recent movers voters unaffiliated with a major political party and public employees effects of city size are partly offset by district or ward level elections contrary to previous research on statewide initiatives this study detects a positive and weakly significant relationship between local initiative use and own source revenues per capita and no association between initiatives and the proportion of funds raised from fees these divergent findings may reflect distinctive features of the local context including greater latitude for political bargaining and the centrality of land use as well as potential constraining effects of statewide initiatives in california

some evidence on the effect of the separation of spending and taxing decisions it is often argued that separation of public spending and taxing decisions engenders in the voter overoptimistic hopes that someone else will bear the cost of public services thereby inducing an increase in the size of government but are perceived tax prices systematically and persistently reduced by separation although in stock markets all agents expectations may be unbiased they may or may not be unbiased in political markets this paper analyzes the separation created in federal states when the central government finances local expenditures evidence from a dynamic decisive voter model is presented that indicates that the separation introduced by federal grants to canadian provinces did in fact reduce the perceived tax price of provincial public services and raise provincial expenditures the results suggest also that the effect of separation diminished over time

should land and capital be taxed at a uniform rate if jurisdictions are allowed to tax land and capital separately they tax only land because capital taxation distorts the allocation of mobile capital to exploit absentee owners however jurisdictions tax land beyond the efficient level as absentee ownership increases throughout the economy land taxation results in greater inefficiency to alleviate the inefficiency of overtaxing land the higher level government intervenes to require jurisdictions to tax both capital and land at a uniform rate because the desire to attract capital lowers the tax rate uniform taxation of land and capital or property taxation thus may be more efficient than separate taxation jel classification h21 h71 est ce que la terre et le capital devraient etre taxes d une maniere uniforme si on permettait aux diverses juridictions de taxer capital et terre separement elles taxeraient seulement la terre parce que la fiscalite imposee au capital cree des distorsions dans l allocation du capital mobile mais pour exploiter les proprietaires absents les diverses juridictions imposent un fardeau fiscal sur la terre qui va au dela de ce que l efficacite commande a proportion que la propriete absente se developpe dans l economie la fiscalite imposee a la terre devient source de plus en plus grande inefficacite pour reduire cette inefficacite attribuable a la sur taxation de la terre le niveau senior de gouvernement intervient pour forcer les juridictions juniors a taxer capital et terre au meme taux parce que le desir d attirer le capital reduit le taux de taxation il se peut donc que la taxation uniforme de la terre et du capital ou de la taxation sur la propriete soit plus efficace que des taux d imposition differents

iylm a general theory compatible replacement for islm the islm model introduced in 1936 37 to provide interpretations of keynes s general theory subsequently emerged in its hicks hansen form as the workhorse and trained intuition of post war macroeconomists however islm is an essentially orthodox model based on neoclassical foundations and fails completely as an adequate representation of central elements of keynes s macroeconomic thought this article proposes iylm as a replacement for islm the new model being general theory compatible in that it is grounded only on key propositions in that work its purpose is to contribute within the constraints of a two market framework to the resuscitation of keynes s macroeconomics as an alternative to the inadequacies of much current macroeconomics the first part of the article derives the model and argues that those sympathetic to the general theory can accept the iylm framework whilst simultaneously rejecting islm the second part shows that hicks hansen islm is based on an income augmented form of orthodox loanable funds theory

on equilibrium player ordering in dynamic team contests we study equilibrium player ordering in a dynamic all pay contest between two teams the contest lasts two periods and each team consists of two players who perform in different periods on behalf of their teams the team with the higher aggregate output wins the prize which is a public good to its players each team has one stronger player and one weaker player and the two teams can differ in their values of the prize the teams maximize their winning odds by strategically assigning their players to different periods we find that when the intrateam heterogeneity in player ability is not excessive the teams would allocate their stronger players to the late positions as the anchormen when both the intrateam ability gap and interteam heterogeneity in teams values become excessively large the team with high value always places its stronger player in the early position who will place a large bid to preempt late competition jel c7 d7 d8

the flypaper effect and competition in the local market for public goods in this paper we explore how the ability of bureaucrats to extract resources from their community may be limited by competition in the local market for public goods specifically we examine intergovernmental aid as a resource bureaucrats seek to control intergovernmental aid has been found to be more stimulative of local government expenditures than predicted by neo classical economic theory in this research the flypaper effect is used as an indicator of the ability of bureaucrats to control local resources in excess of local demand and preferences we empirically relate variation in the flypaper effect to the extent of competition in the local market for public goods competition does not consistently limit the flypaper effect the implications of this finding for theories of competition in the local market for public goods are then discussed

mobility and redistribution the ability of individuals to move freely from one jurisdiction to another is generally seen as a constraint on the amount of redistribution that each jurisdiction within a system of governments can undertake in this paper we look at this proposition by developing a positive analysis of income redistribution by local governments in a federal system we ask how much redistribution occurs when only local governments can have tax transfer instruments individuals can move freely among jurisdictions and voters in each jurisdiction are fully aware of the migration effects of redistributive policies local redistribution is shown to induce sorting of the population with the poorest households located in the communities that provide the most redistribution while the threat of out migration affects the potential for redistribution our results suggest that significant local redistribution is nonetheless feasible numerical computations indicate that the proportion of residents who are renters is a major factor affecting the local choice of level of redistribution

federalism as a commitment to reserving market incentives the authors advance a new perspective in the study of federalism their approach views federalism as a governance solution of the state to credibly preserving market incentives market incentives are preserved if the state is credibly prevented from compromising on future economic success and from bailing out future failures the salient features of federalism decentralization of information and authority and interjurisdictional competition help provide credible commitment or these purposes in addition the authors suggest that some federalism are self sustaining

budget reform and the theory of fiscal federalism institute of university of ii business and california i economic research berkeley center for real estate and urban economics working paper series working paper 85 io8 budget reform and the theory of fiscal federalism by john m quigley and danlel l rubinfeld these papers are preliminary in nature their purpose 39 to stimulate discussion comm therefore they are n be cited or quoted in publication without th s permission of the aut graduate school of business administration

biased contests for symmetric players in a biased contest one of the players has an advantage in the winner determination process we characterize a novel class of biased contest success functions pertaining to such contests and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for zero bias to be a critical point of arbitrary objectives satisfying certain symmetry restrictions we however challenge the common wisdom that unbiased contests are always optimal when contestants are symmetric ex ante or even ex post we show that contests with arbitrary favorites i e biased contests of symmetric players can be optimal in terms of various objectives such as expected aggregate effort the probability to reveal the stronger player as the winner or expected effort of the winner

economic competition and political competition an empirical note this paper has examined the proposition that more concentrated or consolidated metropolitan areas will produce public goods less efficiently than if there were a greater degree of interjurisdictional competition the empirical evidence garnered in section 3 suggests that interjurisdictional competition does tend to reduce the cost of providing local public services and consequently local government expenditure levels

the roles of jurisdictional competition and of collective choice institutions in the market for local public goods having discovered and neatly portrayed the conditions for efficient provision of public goods paul samuelson concluded that there was no viable mechanism for eliciting the information about preferences required to determine optimal public goods supply much subsequent theorizing about public finance decisions may be viewed as a quest for some demand revealing mechanism which would refute samuelson s assertion charles tiebout in particular countered with the claim that a viable mechanism did exist for determining the optimal supply of local public goods in his view selfinterested individuals reveal their preferences for local public goods by their choice of jurisdiction tiebout reasoned that each individual adopts from the menu of local fiscal environments that local community which most closely reflects his preferences he further argued that the greater the number and variety of communities the more efficient would the public goods provision be without empirical support this ingenious idea lay dormant for several years the question remained as to whether the mechanism described by tiebout even if it existed operated so that local jurisdictions effectively elicited and satisfied preferences for local public goods fundamental to answering this question was the necessity of designing an experiment which would reveal the result of voting with one s feet no such experiment existed until wallace oates 1969 reasoned that operation of the tiebout mechanism would result in the capitalization of differentials in fiscal variables into property values his test findings indicated that indeed such capitalization was evident at first the results obtained by others who repeated and extended his experiment were generally consistent with his findings and hence his interpretation of the link between the tiebout mechanism and the capitalization of fiscal variables it was not long however before an alternative interpretation was suggested by matthew edel and elliot sclar who argued that in the long run the tiebout mechanism would result in no capitalization of differentials in taxes and public service levels their interpretation was precisely the opposite of that offered by oates and their empirical work which indicated little evidence of capitalization supported their interpretation in retrospect conflicting interpretations of the tiebout hypothesis were almost inevitable given the absence of a formal model embodying the tiebout mechanism in an earlier paper with michael visscher we argue that tiebout s hypothesis is as follows if individuals are able to choose from among a multiplicity of local jurisdictions the result will be a pareto efficient provision of local public goods we present two alternative models which differ in the technology for production of local public goods one embodies the efficiency properties claimed by tiebout the other does not using these models we demonstrate that 1 tax capitalization cannot be tested by the procedure proposed by oates because the tax capitalization parameter is not econometrically identified a possible reason for the contradictory empirical findings of oates and of edel and sclar and 2 a test of capitali associate professor carnegie mellon university and assistant professor tulane university respectively

allocation efficiency in a competitive bribery game abstract we consider the selection properties of a competitive bribery model in the presence of two types of asymmetry unevenness between the competitors and unfairness in the contest rules only under very special conditions does the benchmark model yield allocation efficiency in other cases the effect on allocation efficiency of making the contest more unfair is ambiguous and parameter specific we present conditions under which each result obtains our results indicate that it is socially optimal to run an unfair contest in order to redress the allocation inefficiency introduced when contestants are asymmetric we show however that a selfish income maximizing bribee will discriminate in the opposite direction to that which society would prefer

piling on multilevel government and the fiscal common pool this article discusses the common pool problems that arise when multiple territorially overlapping governments share the authority to provide services and levy taxes in a common geographic area contrary to the traditional tiebout model in which increasing the number of competing governments improves efficiency i argue that increasing the number of overlapping governments results in overfishing from the shared tax base i test the model empirically using data from u s counties and find a strong positive relationship between the number of overlapping jurisdictions and the size of the local public sector substantively the overlap effect amounts to roughly 10 of local revenue

you can take it with you proposition 13 tax benefits residential mobility and willingness to pay for housing amenities abstract the endogeneity of prices has long been recognized as the main identification problem in the estimation of marginal willingness to pay mwtp for the characteristics of a given product this issue is particularly important in the housing market since a number of housing and neighborhood features are unobserved by the econometrician this paper proposes the use of a well defined type of transaction costs moving costs generated by property tax laws to deal with this type of omitted variable bias california s proposition 13 property tax law is the source of variation in transaction costs used in the empirical analysis beyond its fiscal consequences proposition 13 created a lock in effect on housing choice because of the implicit tax break enjoyed by homeowners living in the same house for a long time its importance to homeowners is estimated from a natural experiment created by two amendments that allow households headed by an individual over the age of 55 to transfer the implicit tax benefit to a new home indeed 55 year old homeowners have 25 higher moving rates than those of comparable 54 year olds these transaction costs from the property tax laws are then incorporated into a household sorting model the key insight is that because of the property tax laws different potential buyers may have different user costs for the same house the exogenous property tax component of this user cost is then used as an instrumental variable i find that mwtp estimates for housing characteristics are approximately 100 upward biased when the choice model does not account for the price endogeneity

how can we explain the persistence of the great recession a balanced stability approach the great recession gr brings about a stalemate in macroeconomics on the one hand while describing the immediate effects of the gr standard models fail to account for its persistence on the other heterodox approaches do not regain consensus as they fail to devise an alternative method for capturing the deep causes of the gr that account for its persistence in a systematic way this paper fills this gap by proposing a new framework called balanced stability approach unlike standard macro which takes stability for granted it provides a balanced assessment of stability considering both threats and opportunities for phenomena such as the so called new economy ne on a par on these grounds the paper draws the conclusion that the persistence of the gr is due to a low level of aggregate demand rooted in the structural changes generated by the ne

formalism logic and reality a keynesian analysis in the view of many perhaps most economists to state a theory in terms of a formal model is an unambiguous improvement rather than as we see it a matter of costs and benefits the benefits greater rigour more precision demonstrable results are widely understood while the costs are underexplored the costs are associated with the way in which formalising an argument can change its meaning i e with its non neutrality this paper will focus on the particular costs of formalism associated with the obstacles formal ism poses for translating from formalist theory to practical application

the productivity of schools and other local public goods producers abstract i construct an agency model of local public goods producers in which households make tiebout choices among jurisdictions in a world of imperfect information and costly residential mobility i examine producers effort and rent under local property tax finance and centralized finance i show that if there are a sufficient number of jurisdictions conventional local property tax finance can attain about as much productivity as a social planner with centralized finance can even if the social planner is armed with more information than a real social planner could plausibly have the key insight is that decentralized tiebout choices make some information the social planner would need verifiable and other information unnecessary

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

municipal residency laws and local public budgets prior research has shown that residency laws increase the productivity of municipal employees which tends to reduce per unit operating cost however this gain in efficiency appears to have been lost when one considers that public employee groups tend to be high demanders who have a greater tendency to vote in local elections and to support expenditure increases bennett and orzechowski 1983 our results tend to provide additional evidence to support the findings of previous studies that public employee groups tend to exert a disproportionate impact on local budgetary decisions

economic incentives under contract supply of local government services it has been argued that organizations which are unable to directly appropriate any of the firm s residual earnings tend to experience various forms of wealth taking by managers alchian and kessel 1962 this wealth taking has been observed in privately owned regulated firms nelson 1980 as well as in government operated bureaus the results in this paper suggest that the x inefficiency associated with various forms of wealth taking may be constrained when external competitive pressures exist niskanen argued that one strategy for reducing the inefficiency associated with monopoly bureaus would be to set up two bureaus to compete for the sponsor s budget in order to generate better information on cost and production functions at the local level the lakewood plan by generating information on actual production cost to purchasing cities and to unincorporated area residents appears to create the desired effect by generating this flow of information on cost the lakewood plan eases the task of monitoring the performance of county departments second the threat of entry posed by the city bureau which can always produce services in house appears to effectively constrain the x inefficiency of the county supplier bureaus

between anarchy and leviathan a note on the design of federal states abstract recent research suggests a rationale for the autonomy retained by federal states lower and intermediate level governments by encouraging interjurisdictional competition federal structures constrain the pursuit by public officials of private objectives inconsistent with the public weal but using federal structures to achieve this end has a cost the more decentralized a nation s public sector the more likely that some of the externalities generated by the provision of public goods and services will be ignored this note investigates the balance between the costs and benefits of decentralization that must be struck by a federal state s designers

majority choice of tax systems in single and multi jurisdictional economies abstract we examine majority choice of tax instruments in an economy with heterogeneous households in our framework majority voting equilibrium exists despite the multidimensional policy choice set we examine single and multi jurisdictional economies we identify five competing incentives that influence choice of tax instruments equilibria generally entail a mixture of tax types with multiple jurisdictions strong reliance on head taxation in rich communities arises to deter poorer households from immigrating in spite of local incentives to use alternative tax instruments to redistribute wealth if relocation costs preclude inter community mobility the equilibrium tax system is fundamentally affected with redistribution incentives then dominating choice of instruments and tax rates limiting or eliminating head taxation fundamentally alters stratification public good provision levels and tax systems

nimby taxes matter the case of state hazardous waste disposal taxes this paper links the theoretical and empirical literatures on interjurisdictional tax and regulatory competition focusing on the case of state hazardous waste disposal taxes it begins by demonstrating that local environmental taxes can be inefficient and that the inefficiency depends on the tax elasticity of polluters responses the paper then uses panel data from the toxics release inventory to estimate the magnitude of the tax elasticities and to demonstrate the empirical relevance of the theoretical inefficiency of local taxes 1999 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

municipal annexation and local monopoly power we have found that the fiscal power of a city can be increased by extension of its borders within a land area that is homogeneous with respect to earning opportunities even when numerous rival jurisdictions exist in the area we hypothesized that extending municipal boundaries will have a positive effect on discretionary outlays and on expenditures per capita the evidence presented supports these hypotheses furthermore municipal wages appear to be significantly increased in cities experiencing annexation growth therefore we would expect to find that municipal employees are more inclined to favor annexation than the rest of the electorate from a policy standpoint this study suggests that significant perverse effects on fiscal efficiency may follow adoption of legal reforms that facilitate the ability of municipalities to extend their borders or that restrict the formation of new municipalities

the tiebout model bring back the entrepreneurs several recent papers in the literature have reformulltlated the nature of equilibrium in ifiebout mo lels by alssliuim ing an exogenous number of communities inflexible commullity l ou alaries anti in pirticular inactive lantlowners and developers ihis paper argues that these assumptions are unwarranted and resul1t iin in eterminate solutions and incorrect analyses determinate lon1g run1 solutions require equilibrium in intercommui land markets which in turn require giving lantlowners and or entrepreneurial leveloelers an active role in the models the role of politics in these models and its juxtaposition with entrepreneurial activities are also analyzed

local government structure and urban residential location the large research literature on the tiebout model has developed with little attention paid to the urban economic structure in which local government functions this paper attempts to examine the theoretical consequences of local jurisdictions functioning within a conventional monocentric urban model it also discusses a mathematical formulation of a two jurisdiction linear city in which the local service level and local property tax rate might be used as strategic variables in a game theory sense it is concluded that for this to happen the local service level has to have more than one element which is intuitively appealing some references are developed to current british local government and possible changes

the impact of congestion on local public good production abstract this paper models local public goods production where allocation of the publicly provided input occurs simultaneously with production of the final service output the framework models local public goods as developed in club theory where congestion is an increasing function of population central to identification of the model is that the quantities of the input police are differentiated from the produced output safety estimation is across neighborhoods within a single city the results show there is a very low elasticity of congestion on average but safety in some neighborhoods in more congested than private goods

on the political economy of land value capitalization and local public sector rent seeking in a tiebout model abstract the political economy of capitalization in a tiebout model when there is a rent seeking local public sector is examined a new approach to test for the effects of successful local public worker rent seeking on property values is suggested and initial results are presented we find evidence that potential residents are compensated through lower property prices in cities where local public employees earn substantially higher wages than similar local public employees earn on average in other cities finally we expand upon how landowners public workers and renters can use the regulatory process to capture a share of the short run rents associated with a tiebout disequilibrium

coordinated action in local public goods models the case of secession without exclusion abstract this paper investigates threats of coordinated exit secession when coalitions cannot choose their members by exclusion this is modeled by a three stage noncooperative game in which voters choose a proportional tax rate and the level of public services and may choose to exit jointly a modified perfectly coalition proof nash concept is applied to rule out dynamically inconsistent threats and behavior by coalitions that is not self enforcing the major result is that cooption of potential seceding coalitions will not occur this result relies on the assumption that seceding coalitions cannot exclude potential members

investment in the absence of property rights the role of incumbency advantages in many situations the individuals who can generate some output must enter a contest for appropriating this output this paper analyses the investment incentives of such agents and the role of incumbency advantages in the contest depending on the advantages an increase in the productivity of the investment can decrease or increase the amount of investment the results are applied to autocrats investment behavior and job specific investment in organizations

tiebout sorting and neighborhood stratification tiebout s classic 1956 paper has strong implications regarding stratification across and within jurisdictions predicting in the simplest instance a hierarchy of internally homogeneous communities ordered by income typically urban areas are less than fully stratified and the question arises how much do departures from standard tiebout assumptions contribute to observed within neighborhood mixing this paper quantifies the separate effects of employment geography via costly commuting and preferences for housing attributes on neighborhood stratification it does so using an equilibrium sorting model estimated with rich census micro data simulations based on the model and credible preference estimates show that counterfactual reductions in commuting costs lead to marked increases in racial and education segregation and to a lesser degree increases in income segregation given that households now find it easier to locate in neighborhoods with like households while turning off preferences for housing characteristics increases racial segregation especially for blacks doing so reduces income segregation indicating that heterogeneity in the housing stock serves to stratify households based on ability to pay further we show that differences in housing help to accentuate differences in the consumption of local amenities

interjurisdictional competition and local public finance assessing the modifying effects of institutional incentives and fiscal constraints analysts have sought for years to explain the variations in municipal expenditures across communities with only modest success however recent efforts combining core propositions from the leviat

household location and tiebout do families sort according to preferences for locational amenities abstract if households sort efficiently across locations then at a given location families receive the same marginal benefit from the locational amenities we test for such sorting by imposing cross equation restrictions on hedonic regressions that difference away location versus house specific effects estimates are obtained using a unique subset of the american housing survey in which adjacent housing units are grouped together and observed in both 1985 and 1989 rejection of the cross equation restrictions unambiguously implies an inefficient sorting of households in contrast the data support the cross equation restrictions which is a necessary but not sufficient condition for efficient sorting

government organization and power i introduction economists have systematically examined the economics of government finance and long ago established that the means of financing government creates inefficiencies in the market for instance see baumol and bradford 1970 and diamond and mirrlees 1971a 1971b what may be less well examined and understood is that apart from the distortions that arise from the means of government finance government officials can have an incentive to provide a combination of services and taxes that are nonoptimal as in niskanen 1997 the ability of government to exercise coercive and pricing power creates these incentives a growing number of articles explore the effect of government power on its size for example anderson and tollison 1988 and rogers and rogers 1995 examine the implications of pricing power for government size in his work on bureaucracy niskanen 1971 considered the implications of coercive power for government size olson 1991 mcguire and olson 1996 niskanen 1997 and mcguire 2001 examine the implications of the joint exercise of coercive and pricing powers by an autocratic government to our knowledge however no previous work explicitly distinguishes between the coercive and pricing powers of government and none systematically examines all the possible combinations of coercive and pricing powers in the present analysis we develop a simple theoretical framework that allows us to examine on an integrated basis the exercise of government power the framework abstracts from any distortions in the means of government finance and separates government power into two dimensions pure coercive power and pure pricing power pure coercive power is the ability of a government to compel consumers to accept more of the public good than they desire at each tax price through fiat coercive power typically arises when citizens are unable to exit a jurisdiction costlessly and the government is able to push citizens beyond what they would accept in a voluntary relationship pure pricing power is the government s ability to restrict output along a given demand curve and earn rents by doing so pricing power typically arises when the government has limited competition and faces a downward sloping demand curve for its services we consider four polar combinations of coercive and pricing power in comparison to the social optimum lindahl democracy monopoly niskanen bureaucracy and autocracy as shown in figure 1 the government in lindahl democracy exercises neither coercive nor pricing power a monopoly government is able to restrict its output and exercise pricing power to earn rents in a traditional monopolistic fashion but it cannot engage price discrimination or expropriation to obtain any remaining consumer surplus from its citizens a niskanen bureaucracy can exact all of the surplus that consumers obtain from the public goods it provides but it must use the surplus in the production of public goods it cannot exercise pricing power and restrict output to obtain rents as a monopoly would an autocracy exercises both coercive and pricing power in practice democratic governments are likely to have both coercive and pricing powers rather than to conform to the lindahl ideal our analytical framework allows us to clarify and reconcile the differences between some of the previous contributions to the literature on government power and size in democracy a government can simultaneously use its coercive power to grow too large and its pricing power to restrict its output and earn rents furthermore government size or rents alone may be poor indicators of the extent to which government fails to achieve optimality in its provision of services government power may be used to generate rents provide too much government service or a combination of both ii social optimum consider a jurisdiction or economy with n identical individuals and two goods a purely public good and a purely private good

how to make the metropolitan area work neither big government nor laissez faire we study how political boundaries and tax competition among jurisdictions interact with the labor and land markets to determine the economic structure and performance of metropolitan areas contrary to general belief institutional fragmentation and cross border commuting need not be welfare decreasing but the size of the central city matters for welfare under tax competition the central business district is too small tax competition also prevents public policy enhancing global productivity to produce their full impact although our results support the idea of decentralizing the supply of local public services by independent jurisdictions they also highlight the need of coordinating tax policies

capitalisation of fiscal variables and land scarcity fiscal packages usually capitalise into house prices yet if enough land for construction is available housing developers could supply new houses and capitalisation may disappear this paper provides a theoretical model in which income taxes and public services capitalise at lower rates when housing supply elasticity increases using an empirical linear interaction model we estimate the impact of available land for construction on capitalisation rates with a panel of swiss communities results indicate that fiscal variables do not capitalise differently in communities where housing supply is constrained by land availability thus land availability is a necessary but not sufficient condition for capitalisation to disappear

contests with endogenous discrimination abstract this paper builds a complete information contest model with endogenous discrimination we show that a revenue maximizing contest designer will optimally set a bias towards a weaker contestant against a stronger contestant and completely eliminate the asymmetry between the two moreover in contrast to fair contest models where the revenue maximizing contest designer is better off if the weaker contestant becomes stronger or the stronger contestant becomes weaker our model shows that the opposite result may arise

tax competition tax exporting and higher government choice of tax instruments for local governments abstract this paper presents a theoretical model with tax exporting due to external ownership of a fraction of the land in each local jurisdiction there are n local jurisdictions in a metropolitan area n 1 and many metropolitan areas in a world economy the paper examines the usage of business property taxes and source based wage taxes by local jurisdictions first in the presence of and then in the absence of residence based lump sum taxes and how this depends on and n the paper then examines the choice of a world national or state government as to whether to allow local metropolitan or sub metropolitan governments to use business property taxes wage taxes or both assuming that the local governments choose the actual tax rates

do formula based intergovernmental transfer mechanisms eliminate politically motivated targeting evidence from ghana abstract various countries have adopted formulas for determining intergovernmental transfers as a strategy to limit the role of political considerations in resource allocation in this paper we investigate a formula based system of allocating resources from a central government to local governments to determine whether the political characteristics of recipient areas have any bearing on their allocation specifically we study the sharing of resources of the district assemblies common fund dacf in ghana amongst the country s district governments over the period 1994 to 2005 we find evidence that the mechanism does not eliminate politically motivated targeting of the grants per capita dacf grants were higher in districts where vote margins in the previous presidential election were lower suggesting that swing districts were targeted we find evidence that dacf formula indicators and their weighting were chosen and amended to produce politically desired patterns of transfers

local government inefficiency and the tiebout hypothesis does competition among municipalities limit local government inefficiency the tiebout hypothesis has in the past thirty years come to refer to a number of different propositions about local public service provision first there is the point initially stressed by tiebout 15 that the mobility of consumer voters results in a market type of solution to public service provision in which people s demands for public services are revealed as they sort themselves among localities according to their tastes for public services second also discussed by tiebout is the proposition that local public services will tend toward efficient provision finally there is the claim that the mobility of consumers and the competition among the localities for these consumers make politics relatively unimportant in determining local public service provision the bulk of the empirical work on the tiebout hypothesis has attempted to determine if as tiebout suggested local public services are efficiently provided the most common approach has been to estimate the effects of public service provision and tax policy on property values and determine if a balanced budget change in the tax rate changes property values if not then property values are being maximized with respect to public services and public services therefore are efficiently provided studies using this technique include those by oates brueckner and sonstelie and portney 11 1 2 13 these empirical studies while providing evidence about whether or not public services are provided efficiently do not suggest the reasons why local public services are or are not efficiently provided are the limits on inefficiency in the local public sector attributable to local politics or are they the result of the constraints imposed on local governments because of the mobility of residents and capital evidence that local public services are efficiently provided cannot be considered support for the contention that the mobility of people and capital are the factors responsible for this efficiency romer and rosenthal 12 for example provides evidence from

tax competition rent seeking and fiscal decentralization abstract the present paper provides a basis for evaluating fiscal decentralization of expenditure and tax responsibilities by encompassing the literature on tax competition and rent seeking both tax and rent seeking competitions are conceived of as being wasteful and self defeating we find that rent seeking activities account for political distortions which may be mitigated in the process of fiscal decentralization while tax competition results in economic distortions associated with decentralization welfare evaluation should be based on the balance of the political gain and the economic cost

axiomatization and formalism in economics in this paper we address a number of issues in the historiography and methodology of the formalization of economics in the twentieth century we argue that debreu s approach to formalism pursuing his bourbakist programme was based on hilbert s version of finitism the latter project attempted to retain its place in cantor s paradise and in so doing bequeathed serious methodological consequences there was however at the turn of the twentieth century an alternative version of finitism available that provided by poincare which if adopted by economics would have led to a radically different approach to economic theorizing and modelling we argue that these reflections must be embedded in an alternative larger methodological framework copyright 2007 the authors journal compilation 2007 blackwell publishing ltd