network regulation and regulatory institutional reform revisiting the case of australia it is well understood that the success of liberalizing the electricity supply industry depends crucially on the quality and design of the regulatory and institutional framework this paper analyses the regulatory arrangements that underpin the work of the australian energy regulator aer these arrangements are contrasted with the regulatory structure of electricity provision in norway a key difference between the reform processes in the two countries relates to the lack of privatization in norway and the co existence of private and publicly owned generators and distributors in australia this comparative analysis allows us to make several recommendations to improve regulatory arrangements in australia these include greater independence for the aer better coordination among regulatory institutions greater use of benchmarking analysis greater customer involvement and improving market transparency and privatization of government owned corporations however the success of privatization will hinge upon the effectiveness of the regulatory environment

information competition and markets one of the dominant characteristics of modern capitalist economies is the important role played by competition not the peculiar static form of pure price competition embodied in the arrow debreu model but rather a dynamic competition more akin to the kind of competition represented by sports contests and other races including patent races in recent years there have been several attempts to explain why firms often base the pay of their workers and managers on relative performance see for example edward lazear and sherwin rosen 1981 such compensation schemes become desirable when three conditions are satisfied a the input effort of workers managers must not be directly observable at least without cost thus firms must either expend resources to monitor inputs or devise reward structures in which compensation is a function of variables such as output or profits which are themselves functions of inputs but are less costly to observe b the relationship between input and output must be stochastic so that by observing output one cannot perfectly infer what the input was c finally the stochastic disturbances which affect the relationship between input and output of different firms must be correlated by looking at the performance of one worker relative to that of others one can make better inferences about his effort than one can make without using this information not only can competition provide a basis of comparison which enables the design of reward structures that can simultaneously provide a high level of incentives with relatively low level risk but compensation schemes based on relative performance have the further advantage of automatically adjusting incentives to changes in the economic environment we refer to this as built in flexibility in a first best world with perfect information concerning the nature of the technology but where it is still costly to monitor individuals activities the compensation scheme would vary from time to time as the environment changed such changes in the compensation scheme are costly to implement and the information required to do so is seldom available when a task is easier the individual s rewards for performing the task should be reduced if pay is based on relative performance although all individuals perform better when they exert the same level of effort their compensation is automatically adjusted thus teachers frequently grade on the curve and a significant fraction of the pay of successful salesmen often consists of bonuses based on relative performance

limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining this paper models trade as a non coopertative strategic game played at an inlinite sequence of dates a single indivisible commodity is traded buyers and sellers have transferable utility and are characterized by their reservation utilities they meet at random and bargain over the price at which a single unit of the good will be exchanged under a variety of circumstances it is shown that as the costs of search and bargaining become negligible the outcome of the game converges to the competitve flow equilibrium even when there is complete information journal of economic literature classification numbers 022 19x7

separation of powers and development abstract we model separation of powers as an instrument against corruption more specifically as a way to decrease the costs of collusion proofness then we show that the value of this institutional design is higher in developing countries unfortunately the same reasons which are behind this higher value also increase the implementation cost of this institution

existence of steady state equilibria in matching models with search frictions we prove existence of steady state equilibrium in a class of matching models with search frictions

biased signaling and yardstick comparisons in a sovereign debt market abstract this paper develops a sovereign debt model in which governments are privately informed about their likelihood of default but can themselves have a biased perception of this likelihood i show that in this setup government borrowing acts as a signal that is only partially informative about fundamental default probabilities and bond prices do not necessarily reflect true credit risk i also show that in a two country version of the model correlations between the two countries induces yardstick comparisons and the borrowing decision of one government affects the bond price received by the other whether the information spillover increases or decreases the distortion created by the bias depends on the extent to which borrowing signals reinforce each other

quality and competition between public and private firms abstract we study a multistage quality then price game between a public firm and a private firm the market consists of a set of consumers who have different quality valuations the public firm aims to maximize social surplus whereas the private firm maximizes profit in the first stage both firms simultaneously choose qualities in the second stage both firms simultaneously choose prices consumers quality valuations are drawn from a general distribution each firm s unit production cost is an increasing and convex function of quality there are multiple equilibria in some the public firm chooses a low quality and the private firm chooses a high quality in others the opposite is true we characterize subgame perfect equilibria equilibrium qualities are often inefficient but under some conditions on consumer valuation distribution equilibrium qualities are first best various policy implications are drawn

x inefficiency competition and market information whether competition forces firms toward efficient behaviour is an open question we consider a duopoly with firms run by managers and affected by adverse selection on costs in contrast to recent literature we point out that to have a genuine effect on firm x inefficiency competition must change managerial incentives by introducing the availability of some signal on the rivals behaviour we show that if costs are correlated the contractual use of that signal can render private managerial information uninfluential this result stresses the informational role of the market and suggests scope for future work

dynamic yardstick mechanisms abstract this paper shows that the inability of principals to commit to long term contracts is irrelevant when dealing with several agents whose private information is correlated this sharply contrasts with the dynamics of contracting without such correlation the paper also explores what limitations on yardstick mechanisms can justify the use of long term contracts we found that the inability of a principal to commit not to renegotiate long term contracts is without consequence even if there is a bound on transfers that an agent can be asked to pay in contrast short term contracting fails to implement the commitment solution with constraints on transfers second absent current yardstick the possibility of using correlated mechanisms in the future allows the principal to implement the first best with a renegotiation proof long term contract whereas this cannot be achieved with short term contracting

dynamic matching and bargaining games a general approach this paper presents a new characterization result for competitive allocations in quasilinear economies this result is informed by the analysis of non cooperative dynamic search and bargaining games such games provide models of decentralized markets with trading frictions a central objective of this literature is to investigate how equilibrium outcomes depend on the level of the frictions in particular does the trading outcome become walrasian when frictions become small existing specifications of such games provide divergent answers the characterization result is used to investigate what causes these differences and to generalize insights from the analysis of specific search and bargaining games

assortative matching with explicit search costs in this paper i analyze a decentralized search and matching economy with transferable utility composed of heterogeneous agents i explore whether becker s assortative matching result generalizes to an economy where agents engage in costly search in an economy with explicit additive search costs complementarities in joint production supermodularity of the joint production function lead to assortative matching this is in contrast to previous literature which had shown that in a search economy with discounting assortative matching may fail even when the joint production function is supermodular

how acquisitions affect firm behavior and performance evidence from the dialysis industry many industries have become increasingly concentrated through mergers and acquisitions which in health care may have important consequences for spending and outcomes using a rich panel of medicare claims data for nearly one million dialysis patients we advance the literature on the effects of mergers and acquisitions by studying the precise ways providers change their behavior following an acquisition we base our empirical analysis on more than 1 200 acquisitions of independent dialysis facilities by large chains over a 12 year period and find that chains transfer several prominent strategies to the facilities they acquire most notably acquired facilities converge to the behavior of their new parent companies by increasing patients doses of highly reimbursed drugs replacing high skill nurses with less skilled technicians and waitlisting fewer patients for kidney transplants we then show that patients fare worse as a result of these changes outcomes such as hospitalizations and mortality deteriorate with our long panel allowing us to identify these effects from within facility or within patient variation around the acquisitions because overall medicare spending increases at acquired facilities mostly as a result of higher drug reimbursements this decline in quality corresponds to a decline in value for payers we conclude the article by considering the channels through which acquisitions produce such large changes in provider behavior and outcomes finding that increased market power cannot explain the decline in quality rather the adoption of the acquiring firm s strategies and practices drives our main results with greater economies of scale for drug purchasing responsible for more than half of the change in profits following an acquisition

incentive mechanisms for environmental protection under asymmetric information a case study the purpose of this paper is to compare the performance of some instruments of environmental policy using data for a coal fired power plant each decentralized scheme coverages towards the social optimum chosen by a regulator we look at the performance of a changing tax rate on emission of an announcement of the tax formula of an announcement of the tax formula with a tax refund possibility and of a tax cum subsidy scheme our emphasis is on full information concerning the tax and subsidy formulas and on the opportunity for the firm to optimize intertemporally we also test two performance schemes which combine social optimal pricing with optimal abatement decisions our interest is to compare the speed of convergence of the schemes the monetary side payments subsidy bonus required and to look for self financing schemes

bargaining in dynamic markets abstract we study non stationary markets in which traders are randomly matched to bargain over the price of a heterogeneous good or the terms of a partnership the economy consists of a continuum of players drawn from a finite set of types players exogenously enter the market over time and exit upon trading at every date matching probabilities for each pair of types are determined by the endogenous distribution of trader types in the market the balance of bargaining power at any stage depends on variations in potential gains from trade the inflows of new traders the structure of agreements at future dates and the induced frequency of trading opportunities we establish that an equilibrium always exists moreover all equilibria that lead to the same evolution of the economy are payoff equivalent however we show that multiple self fulfilling expectations about the trajectory of the economy generating distinct equilibrium dynamics and payoffs may coexist

dynamic matching two sided incomplete information and participation costs existence and convergence to perfect competition consider a decentralized dynamic market with an infinite horizon and participation costs in which both buyers and sellers have private information concerning their values for the indivisible traded good time is discrete each period has length and each unit of time continuums of new buyers and sellers consider entry traders whose expected utility is negative choose not to enter within a period each buyer is matched anonymously with a seller and each seller is matched with zero one or more buyers every seller runs a first price auction with a reservation price and if trade occurs both the seller and the winning buyer exit the market with their realized utility traders who fail to trade continue in the market to be rematched we characterize the steady state equilibria that are perfect bayesian we show that as converges to zero equilibrium prices at which trades occur converge to the walrasian price and the realized allocations converge to the competitive allocation we also show the existence of equilibria for sufficiently small provided the discount rate is small relative to the participation

equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining this paper considers a market where pairs of agents who are interested in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process and upon meeting initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction the basic bargaining problem is treated with the strategic approach the paper derives the steady state equilibrium agreements analyzes their dependence on market conditions such as the relative numbers of agents of different types and discusses their relations with the competitive equilibrium outcome and other results in the search equilibrium literature this paper considers a market that operates in the following way pairs of agents who have mutual interest in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process when two agents meet they initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction if two agents reach an agreement a transaction takes place and they leave the market of course the bargaining positions and hence the agreement reached in any particular meeting will be affected by the conditions prevailing in the market these will include the chances that each of the negotiating parties have of meeting other partners in the event that the agreement in the current negotiations is delayed also the expected length of time required to achieve an alternative transaction and the expected behavior of alternative partners the study of such a market mechanism is of interest for two reasons firstly it captures some realistic aspects of the trade in certain specific markets e g asset markets such as housing and some labor markets secondly it contributes to an understanding of the micro mechanisms of price formation and their role in shaping market outcomes in both cases the features studied are largely neglected in the traditional market equilibrium analyses the related literature includes the articles by diamond 4 5 diamond and maskin 6 mortensen 8 9 and zusman and bell 13 these articles consider markets of the type described above in which transactions are concluded at pairwise meetings of agents the major difference between our work and these articles is in the approach to the basic bargaining problem in the cited articles it is assumed that a meeting is concluded with an instantaneous agreement which divides the associated surplus in an arbitrary predetermined way when the surplus is assumed to be divided equally the division rule is in fact nash s axiomatic bargaining solution in contrast the present paper treats the basic bargaining problem with the strategic approach see rubinstein 19 which constitutes an attempt to look into the bargaining black box this approach explicitly models the time dimension of the bargaining process describes in detail the bargaining procedure and justifies the agreement as a perfect equilibrium in

how do hospitals respond to price changes this paper examines hospital responses to changes in diagnosis specific prices by exploiting a 1988 policy reform that generated large price changes for 43 percent of medicare admissions i find hospitals responded primarily by upcoding patients to diagnosis codes with the largest price increases this response was particularly strong among for profit hospitals i find little evidence hospitals increased the volume of admissions differentially for diagnoses subject to the largest price increases despite the financial incentive to do so neither did they increase intensity or quality of care in these diagnoses suggesting hospitals do not compete for patients at the diagnosis level

price dispersion in stationary networked markets abstract different sellers often sell the same good at different prices using a strategic bargaining model i characterize how the equilibrium prices of a good depend on the interaction between its sellers costs its buyers values and a network capturing various frictions associated with trading it in contrast to the standard random matching model of bargaining in stationary markets i allow agents to strategically choose whom to make offers to which qualitatively changes how the network shapes prices as in the random matching model the market decomposes into different submarkets and in the limit as bargaining frictions vanish the law of one price holds within but not across them but strategic choice of partners changes both how the market decomposes into different submarkets and the determinants of each submarket s price

sorting through search and matching models in economics toward understanding assortative matching this is a self contained introduction to research on search and matching we first explore the nontransferable and perfectly transferable utility matching paradigms and then a unifying imperfectly transferable utility matching model motivated by some unrealistic predictions of frictionless matching we flesh out the foundational economics of search theory we then revisit the original matching paradigms with search frictions we finally allow informational frictions that often arise such as in college student sorting

a theory of yardstick competition in the typical regulatory scheme a franchised monopoly has little incentive to reduce costs this article proposes a mechanism in which the price the regulatedfirm receives depends on the costs of identical firms in equilibrium each firm chooses a socially efficient level of cost reduction the mechanism generalizes to cover heterogeneous firms with observable differences medicare s prospective reimbursement of hospitals by using diagnostically related groups is a scheme very similar to the one outlined here

effort rewarding incentive mechanisms for public enterprise managers abstract management incentive schemes leading to welfare optimal pricing and efficient production of public enterprises have so far been mainly concerned with the information advantages that public enterprise managers hold over their supervising government or central planning agency managers under these schemes are induced to improve their firm s performance in adjustment processes which in the limit lead to optimal firm decisions such managers are supposed to be income maximizers disregarding any personal effort which could influence their performance and utility in this paper i show that two incentive schemes recently proposed by tam 1981 and finsinger and vogelsang 1982 can also help to induce managers to provide an optimal level of effort here effort is assumed to reduce managers utility and the firm s costs the result depends crucially on myopic managerial utility maximization once managers maximize the discounted value of future utility levels they will deviate from the optimal behavior under tam s scheme this can hold independent of the optimal effort level under the finsinger vogelsang performance index managers will always show suboptimal effort levels in a steady state equilibrium because the index only rewards welfare improvements effort however has to be rewarded even with no improvement in behavior an improved performance index which provides cumulative rewards is shown to be strategy proof and lead to a welfare optimum this reward structure basically treats managers as if they were private entrepreneurs it looks extremely generous in that it gives managers the fruits of all costs reductions due to increases in effort suggestions are made to mitigate this income distributional impact

vertical contracting with informational opportunism we consider vertical contracting arrangements between a manufacturer and a retailing network when retailers have private information and the organization is run through bilateral contracts we highlight a new form of informational opportunism arising when the manufacturer manipulates information learned separately in each relationship we characterize the set of allocations robust to such opportunism by means of simple ex post incentive compatibility constraints those constraints limit the manufacturer s ability to use yardstick competition among retailers they simplify contracts and restore a rent efficiency trade off even with correlated information we show that sell out contracts are optimal under a wide range of circumstances

bargaining in stationary networks we study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players con nected in a network are randomly matched to bargain players who reach agreement are replaced by new players at the same positions in the network we show that all equilibria are payoff equivalent the payoffs and the set of agreement links converge as players become patient several new concepts mutually estranged sets partners and shortage ratios provide insights into the relative strengths of the positions in the network we develop a procedure to deter mine the limit equilibrium payoffs for all players characterizations of equitable and nondiscriminatory networks are also obtained jel c78 d85 competitive equilibrium theory assumes large and anonymous markets in which every buyer can trade with every seller underlying these assumptions are standard goods and services that may be traded at low transaction costs by agents who are not in specific relationships with one another however in many markets goods and services are heterogeneous e g cars apartments or need to be tailored to particular needs e g manufacturing inputs technical support furthermore trad ing opportunities may depend on transportation costs social relationships infor mation advertising trust technological compatibility joint business opportunities free trade agreements etc in such cases it is natural to model the market using a network where only pairs of connected agents may engage in exchange new theories are needed to explore the influence of the network structure on market outcomes many questions arise how does an agent s position in the net work determine his bargaining power and the local prices he faces who trades with whom and on what terms when are prices uniform in the network one possible conjecture is that an agent s bargaining power is determined by his relative number of connections in the network however this simple theory is implausible consider the network of four sellers located at the top nodes and nine buyers located at the bottom nodes depicted in figure 1 assume that each seller supplies one unit of a homogeneous indivisible good each buyer demands one unit of the good and all buyers have identical values for the good the buyer located in the middle has the largest number of links in the network as he is connected to each

steady states in matching and bargaining abstract we establish the existence of steady states in two classic matching and bargaining models with general trader asymmetries search processes and production functions

efficient regulation with little information reality in the limit we present a regulatory scheme that converges to ramsey pricing and productive efficiency even if regulators have little information about technology or demand the model has firms selecting prices subject to the regulator s requirement that the firm earn a fair return on capital at today s capital stock and output levels regulators then review later performance and are more likely to request new rate hearings as the firm s return deviates more from the fair return as long as regulators do not review negative returns too fast relative to positive returns these conditions are sufficient for convergence to ramsey prices and productive efficiency public utility regulators generally set prices not rates of return per se these prices however often are meant to achieve approximately some target rate of return but when projecting how prices will affect rates of return regulators are often at the mercy of the firms for economic projections about the effects of various price vectors e g across customer classes upon profits so if realized rates of return deviate from targets regulators may call new rate hearings and they may expedite these hearings if the deviations are large 2 by formalizing these real world observations some rather surprising efficiency results appear suppose that regulators have no knowledge of demands and technologies but can observe past realizations of prices and quantities if the review probabilities are as noted above and satisfy an asymmetry condition then this regulatory process may converge not only to productive efficiency overcoming averch johnson over capitalization effects but to ramsey prices these conclusions are derived from unifying and extending work by bawa and sibley 1980 and vogelsang and finsinger 1979

regulation competition and liberalization in many countries throughout the world regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries this essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process while stressing the importance of case specific analyses this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are procompetitive from corresponding anticompetitive liberalization policies

transferable quotas enforcement costs and typical firms an empirical application to the norwegian trawler fleet an alternative to traditional regulations of fisheries to avoid rent dissipation is the use of individual transferable quotas itqs where prices in the quota market provide the necessary information to owners of harvest rights to contract with each other however even under such a decentralized regime information on the underlying technology of the fishing vessels is also necessary first since most fisheries consist of many interrelated production processes in order to avoid rent dissipation by discarding wrong output mix etc the structure of production in the multispecies fishery must be known to design a proper quota system second an itq system may create incentives for misreporting by understating the actual catch this may especially be the case where the expected degree of self enforcement is low the paper proposes a way to reduce the information requirements under regulation with asymmetric information by constructing a typical firm and comparing performance for the other vessels to this firm based on the typical firm and if the industry is relatively homogenous the performance and hence catch of any other firm in the industry can be predicted within a certain range further the paper applies this idea to the norwegian trawler fleet to assess the production structure in terms of jointness input output separability and the supply and demand elasticities for the fishing firms this information characterizes the fishery and thus how the quota system may be designed and how to construct a yardstick in order to reduce the enforcement cost under a decentralized regulation of itqs

efficiency gains in danish district heating is there anything to learn from benchmarking abstract facing a market structure of independent heating systems and cost of service regulation the regulator considers ways to create incentives for increasing efficiency in heat production one way is to implement benchmark regulation the aim of this paper is twofold 1 to investigate the potential for increasing productivity in danish district heating production and 2 to examine whether benchmarking has a role to play using data envelopment analysis our analyses show that by assuming variable returns to scale a potential exists to reduce production costs by 5 27 depending on the portfolio of inputs and outputs included in the model further our analyses show that the ranking of producers is much dependent on the combination of inputs and outputs included in the model therefore great care should be taken when deciding on the appropriate model to be used when implementing benchmarking as a regulatory mean

estimation of cost effectiveness of the finnish electricity distribution utilities abstract this paper examines the cost effectiveness of finnish electricity distribution utilities we estimate several panel data stochastic frontier specifications using both cobb douglas and translog model specifications the conventional models are extended in order to model observed heterogeneity explicitly in the cost frontier models the true fixed effects model has been used as a representative of the models which account for unobserved heterogeneity and extended conventional random effect models have been used in analysing the impact of observed heterogeneity a comparison between the conventional random effects model and models where heterogeneity component is entered either into the mean or into the variance of the inefficiency term shows that relative efficiency scores diminish when heterogeneity is added to the analysis the true fixed effects model on the other hand gives clearly smaller inefficiency scores than random effects models in the paper we also show that the relative inefficiency scores and rankings are not sensitive to the cost function specification our analysis points out the importance of the efficient use of the existing distribution network the economies of scale results suggest that firms could reduce their operating costs by using networks more efficiently according to our results average size firms which have high load factors are the most efficient ones all firms have unused capacities so that they can improve cost effectiveness rather by increasing the average distributed volumes than by mergers

specification of merger gains in the norwegian electricity distribution industry electricity distribution often exhibits economies of scale in norway a number of smaller distribution system operators exist and thus there is potential to restructure the industry possibly through mergers however the revenue cap regulatory model in norway does not incentivize firms to merge as merging leads to a stricter revenue cap for the merged company thus the regulator compensates the firms in order to create such incentives the amount of compensation is based on the potential gains of the merger estimated using a data envelopment analysis dea based frontier approach introduced by bogetoft and wang journal of productivity analysis 23 145 171 2005 dea is however only one of many possible frontier estimators that can be used in estimation furthermore the returns to scale assumption the operating environment of firms and the presence of stochastic noise and outlier observations are all known to affect to the estimation of production technology in this paper we explore how varying assumption under two alternate frontier estimators shape the distribution of merger gains within the norwegian distribution industry our results reveal that the restructuring policies of the industry may be significantly altered depending how potential gains from the mergers are estimated

regulatory restructuring and incumbent price dynamics the case of u s local telephone markets prior to the telecommunications act of 1996 many u s states restructured their regulatory framework by replacing rate of return regulation with competition in both the local exchange service and local long distance markets and adopting price regulation price caps and price freezes using a panel data set of incumbent firm prices for three services i investigate whether price regulation and differences in entry conditions affect incumbent operators rate structures i find that competition has prompted a significant amount of rate rebalancing by reducing the amount of cross subsidization present in local telephone markets in addition the added flexibility of price cap regulation speeds the rate rebalance effects of competition

regional differences in electricity distribution costs and their consequences for yardstick regulation of access prices abstract in this paper we estimate an average cost function for a panel of 59 swiss local and regional electricity distribution utilities as a basis for yardstick regulation of the distribution network access prices shleifer 1985 proposed yardstick competition in terms of price to regulate local monopolies producing a homogeneous good the regulated price for the individual firms depends on the average costs of identical firms the yardstick competition concept can also be applied to firms that produce heterogeneous goods if these goods differ only in observable characteristics to correct the yardstick for heterogeneity the regulator can use a multivariate estimation of an average cost function in the case of electricity distribution the heterogeneity of output consists mainly of different characteristics of the distribution service areas in this paper we follow shleifer s suggestion to estimate a multivariate average cost function that can be employed by the regulatory commission to benchmark network access prices at the distribution level several exogenous variables measuring the heterogeneity of the service areas were included in the cost model specification we find that the regional differences of the service areas e g area shares of forests agricultural areas or unproductive land and population density significantly influence electricity distribution costs

frontier estimation how useful a tool for health economics the journal is pleased to publish in this issue three papers that apply frontier estimation techniques to hospitals and nursing homes together with an exchange over the usefulness of those techniques in the health care context the papers represent the current state of the art with respect to applications of frontier estimation in health care because of the growing popularity of the technique no doubt in part from its availability in standard software packages it seems useful to take this opportunity to appraise its usefulness one might begin by asking usefulness for what assuming one could define a frontier with certainty how would one use such knowledge a straightforward application in health care appears to be to reimbursement because both data envelopment analysis dea and stochastic frontier estimation specify the least cost mix of inputs for a given output both methods can in principle be used to determine whether a given firm hospital or nursing home is efficient and if the answer to that question is no the magnitude of any inefficiency it is not a large step from that information to the notion that a regulator should reduce the firm s budget by the amount of the measured inefficiency indeed vitaliano and toren mention the boren amendment s requirement that the medicaid program reimburse hospitals and nursing homes at the cost incurred by an efficiently operated

m form hierarchy with poorly diversified divisions a case of khrushchev s reform in soviet russia we test the premise of the theoretical literature that m form political hierarchies are effective in creating yardstick competition between regional divisions only when those divisions have sufficiently diversified or similar industrial composition the reason for this is that the competition among poorly diversified inter related divisions creates incentives for regional leaders to pursue policies that inhibit industrial growth in neighboring regions in order to make their own region look better from the point of view of the center we use a unique episode in soviet history when a traditional soviet unitary form u form hierarchy was replaced by a multidivisional form m form organization namely khrushchev s sovnarkhoz reform first we demonstrate that during this reform regional leaders were subjected to relative performance evaluation which created incentives to generate industrial growth second we show that these career concerns resulted in higher growth in regions with sufficiently diversified and therefore self contained economies and lower growth in highly specialized regions

robust optimization policy benchmarks and modeling errors in natural gas abstract the problem of regulating natural gas procurement has become a huge burden to regulators especially due to the plethora of complicated financial contracts that are now being used by local distribution companies ldcs for risk management purposes muthuraman aouam and rardin 2008 proposed a new benchmarking scheme called policy benchmarks and showed that these benchmarks do not suffer from the usual criticisms that are made against existing regulatory methods such policy benchmarks based regulation has however faced hurdles in being adopted one of the primary reasons has been concerns over its robustness we demonstrate in this paper that when modeling errors are present the policy benchmarks proposed earlier can backfire and are hence as suspected not well suited for regulation we begin our analysis with a more general model than the one that has been used earlier by accommodating the ldc s ability to reduce cost by exerting effort as in classical economics we derive solutions to the ldcos problem find closed form solutions for the regulator s optimal fee fraction along with risk sharing implications and provide insights into the policy benchmark selection we then construct a robust optimization based policy benchmarking mechanism that inherits all the original benefits we further demonstrate that these unlike the earlier benchmarks are robust against modeling errors

performance and efficiency in colombia s power distribution system effects of the 1994 reform we assess evolution in performance efficiency and productivity of colombia s power distribution utilities before and after the 1994 regulatory reform that introduced electricity market activities for the power sector in 12 distribution companies from 1985 to 2001 performance is evaluated contrasting changes in mean and median by wilcoxon rank sum and pearson tests on financial and other performance indicators technical efficiency is measured by means of data envelopment analysis dea the nature of the dataset allows the estimation of malmquist productivity index and its evolution in time results show a recovery after the reform in the main performance indicators of profitability partial input productivity and output plant efficiency and productivity increased after the reform mainly in the largest utilities used as benchmarks in the dea efficiency scores measures meanwhile the less efficient power distribution companies did not improved after the reform and were not able to undertake plant restructuring to catch up in plant efficiency with respect to the pareto efficient input allocations econometric results on dea efficiency scores suggest a positive effect of policy reform

organizing the health insurance market this paper presents a new approach to organizing universal health insurance first the government divides the entire population into many large groups then the government creates a federal health insurance system healthfed modeled on the federal reserve system to fill the role now played by the benefits office of a large firm the healthfed would create a short menu of alternatives solicit bids for insuring the entire group and price alternatives there would be redistribution between groups and pricing of alterna tives to reflect optimal social insurance principles there would be no connection between health insurance and employment it may seem odd that this presidential address is my first publication in health economics at the time when i might have been working on an alternative address i was chair of an expert panel for the advisory council on social security looking at issues in both retirement income and medical care 2 in the process of this work i have come up with a new approach to organizing universal health insurance that is the subject of this paper before starting on health insurance i will say a few words about a wider context offering what i will say as an example in that setting 3 a great deal of attention has been focused on the exciting issue of reorganizing economies dropping central planning commonly economists from those countries em brace capitalism or more specifically laissez faire competition with an enthusi asm which exceeds that ofwestern economists although not necessarily western businessmen yet laissez faire capitalism has received little serious support in the west for a very long time we all know the fundamental welfare theorem which shows many ways that capitalism can be imperfect we have also seen a growth in discussion and analysis of the many ways governments can mess up resource allocation the real question is the design of arrangements that try to integrate the things that each type of institution does better this is hard for two reasons one is that it is in the realm of second best with many constraints the more the constraints the harder the analysis the second is that we do not have good positive theories of government behavior good examples yes good theories no thus the analysis is more intuitive less theory driven than in our picture of private markets but also in our private market analyses we have been greatly complicating our picture recognizing all sorts of information imperfec tions that affect the way that private markets work so i will present to you a proposal for universal health insurance meant to combine something that