voting equilibria under proportional representation this article studies the consequences of strategic voting by outcome oriented voters in elections under proportional representation pr i develop a model of elections under pr in which voters choose among an arbitrary finite number of parties and the policy outcome is determined in a postelection bargaining stage i use a new solution concept robust equilibrium which greatly mitigates the well known problem of indeterminate predictions in multicandidate competition applying the equilibrium concept to the model i find that pr promotes representation of small parties in general even when voters are strategic however the median voter plays a critical role in shaping policy outcomes which reflects the majoritarian nature of parliamentary policy making rules thus pr may not be incompatible with the majoritarian vision of representative democracy if voters main concern is policy outcomes

decoupling china s carbon emissions increase from economic growth an economic analysis and policy implications as the world s second largest carbon emitter china has long been criticized as a free rider benefiting from other countries efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions but not taking responsibility for its own emissions china has been singled out as one of the major targets at the subsequent negotiations after the kyoto meeting bq analyzing the historical contributions of interfuel switching energy conservation economic growth and population expansion to china s co2 emissions during 1980 97 this article clearly demonstrates that the above criticism is unjustified moreover given the fact that the role of china is an issue of perennial concern at the international climate change negotiations the article envisions some efforts and commitments that could be expected from china until its per capita income catches lip with the level of middle developed countries by emphasizing the it win win strategies these efforts and commitments are unlikely to jeopardize china s economic development and at the same time would give the country more leverage at the international climate change negotiations subsequent to the buenos sires meeting c 2000 elsevier science ltd all rights reserved

blame game politics in a coalition government abstract delays in the adoption of reforms is an important question in political economics this paper explores this issue in the context of a representative democracy where the government is a coalition and citizens observe neither the decision making process nor politicians preferences for a reform we show that a coalition member who favors a reform may nonetheless choose to veto its adoption thus delaying it until after the next election and let his coalition partners share the blame for the non adoption we refer to this strategy as blame game politics we then identify three reasons for a politician to play the blame game one is to make an issue salient in the next election a second reason is to avoid a split in his electorate which is accomplished by hiding his stance on an issue a third reason is to enhance bargaining power during the formation of the next government

why small centrist third parties motivate policy divergence by major parties plurality based elections between two major parties or candidates sometimes feature small cen trist third parties we modify the standard two party spatial model of policy seeking parties to incorporate a centrist third party and we show that the presence of such a party even if it has no chance of winning motivates the major parties to propose policies that are much more divergent than without the third party we derive explicit formulas for party locations at a three party equilibrium and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for existence ofthat equilibrium we show that over time the major parties can be expected to shift their policies in the same direction relative to each other but in the opposite direction relative to the minor party the predictions of this model are compared with estimates of party policy locations during appropriate periods in postwar britain for the past half century a small british party first the liberals now the liberal demo crats has occupied a policy position in between the two major british parties labour and the con servatives during much of the same period the free democrats in germany have held a similar posi tion between the social democrats and the christian democrats in addition recent american presidential elections have featured the candidates john anderson in 1980 and ross perot in 1992 and 1996 who had no realistic chance of winning and who were arguably located between the democratic and republican nom inees 1 what are the policy consequences of the existence of such small centrist parties or candidates on what political institutions do these consequences depend do these consequences benefit the policy aspirations of the centrist party or do they undermine these goals under proportional representation it is well known that a small centrist party such as the free democrats in germany may hold the balance of power bargaining with each of the major players as they attempt to form governing coalitions but in a plurality based system as in britain or the united states the consequences are far

turnout across democracies world democracies widely differ in legislative executive and legal institutions different institutional environments induce different mappings from electoral outcomes to the distribution of power we explore how these mappings affect voters participation in an election we show that the effect of such institutional differences on turnout depends on the distribution of voters preferences we uncover a novel contest effect given the preferences distribution turnout increases and then decreases when we move from a more proportional to a less proportional power sharing system turnout is maximized for an intermediate degree of power sharing moreover we generalize the competition effect common to models of endogenous turnout given the institutional environment turnout increases in the ex ante preferences evenness and more so when the overall system has lower power sharing these results are robust to a wide range of modeling approaches including ethical voter models voter mobilization models and rational voter models

coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game we examine a legislative voting game where decisions are being made over both ideological and distributive dimensions and legislators preferences are separable over the two dimensions in equilibrium legislators prefer to make proposals for the two dimensions together rather than offering sequential proposals on the two dimensions separately the equilibria exhibit interaction between the ideological and distributive dimensions and in any equilibrium there is a positive probability that a proposal is made and approved which excludes the median legislator as defined over the ideological dimension in contrast with a game where no distributive decision is being made moreover in any stationary equilibrium there is more than one ideological decision that has a positive probability of being proposed and approved we show that legislators can gain from forming political parties and consider examples where predictions can be made about the composition of parties we discuss the impact of political parties on the outcome

centripetal and centrifugal incentives under different electoral systems inaseminalarticle cox 1990 suggestedthatelectoralsystemswithlargerdistrictmagnitudesprovideincentivesforparties to advocate more extreme policy positions in this article we put this proposition to the test informed by recent advances in spatial models of party competition we introduce a design that embeds the effect of electoral rules in the utility function of voters we then estimate the equilibrium location of parties as the weight voters attach to the expected distribution of seats and votes changes our model predicts that electoral rules affect large and small parties in different ways we find centripetal effects only for parties that are favorably biased by electoral rules by contrast smaller parties see their vote share decline and are pushed toward more extreme equilibrium positions evidence from 13 parliamentary democracies supports model predictions along with testing the incentives provided by electoral rules results carry implications for the strategies of vote maximizing parties and for the role of small parties in multiparty competition

on the efficiency of equilibria in a legislative bargaining model with particularistic and collective goods this study analyzes the efficiency of equilibria in a multilateral bargaining game in which a legislature divides its budget among collective and particularistic goods in order to disentangle the causes of inefficiency we extend the model of volden and wiseman am polit sci rev 101 79 92 2007 by considering quasi linear utility functions and consensus requirements ranging from simple majority to unanimity although unanimous agreements can be reached under weaker consensus requirements we show that pareto inefficiency is associated with non unanimous consent we also study how i the endogenous selection of the legislature s size or ii a sequential choice of collective and particularistic spending eliminates or attenuates the inefficiency problem

carbon dioxide emissions and economic growth panel data evidence from developing countries in this paper we test the environment kuznet s curve ekc hypothesis for 43 developing countries we suggest examining the ekc hypothesis based on the short and long run income elasticities that is if the long run income elasticity is smaller than the short run income elasticity then it is evident that a country has reduced carbon dioxide emissions as its income has increased our empirical analysis based on individual countries suggests that jordan iraq kuwait yemen qatar the uae argentina mexico venezuela algeria kenya nigeria congo ghana and south africa approximately 35 per cent of the sample carbon dioxide emissions have fallen over the long run that is as these economies have grown emissions have fallen since the long run income elasticity is smaller than the short run elasticity we also examine the ekc hypothesis for panels of countries constructed on the basis of regional location using the panel cointegration and the panel long run estimation techniques we find that only for the middle eastern and south asian panels the income elasticity in the long run is smaller than the short run implying that carbon dioxide emission has fallen with a rise in income

stochastic divergence or convergence of per capita carbon dioxide emissions re examining the evidence this paper revisits the time series literature on the convergence of per capita carbon dioxide co2 emissions and examines the robustness of previous results using a sample of oecd countries for the period 1950 2002 we employ a battery of stationarity and unit root tests including those that allow for cross sectional dependencies within the panel we also correct for inaccuracies in previous studies that could result in a trend stationary series being labelled as converging even if it were actually diverging from the international average the body of evidence provided by our analysis suggests that per capita co2 emissions have not converged among oecd countries during the period under consideration this finding is of importance to both climate change policy makers and to those who construct climate change models

political representation and public contracting evidence from municipal legislatures abstract this study examines how partisan representation in multiparty legislatures affects direct expenditures contract allocation design and selection of politically connected firms as suppliers in public procurement for identification i exploit quasi random variation in partisan electoral outcomes near the effective representation thresholds in czech proportional municipal elections my regression discontinuity estimates suggest that partisan representation matters for public procurement for instance if local level political parties barely enter legislatures at the expense of the national parties municipalities decrease their direct procurement spending and allocate fewer contracts to the corporate donors of the national parties fewer contracts are awarded especially in pre election years and in auctions restricting competition among procurement suppliers the results are not associated with higher government fragmentation or selection of more competent candidates but rather with reduced political power of the national parties

effectiveness of electoral systems for reducing government corruption a game theoretic analysis abstract a theoretical model is developed for predicting the relative effectiveness of different electoral systems for reducing government corruption we consider voting games in which parties with known corruption levels and known positions on a major policy question compete for legislative seats we find that approval voting and proportional representation are fully effective in the sense that all equilibria exclude corrupt parties from legislative seats plurality voting is partly effective in the sense that there always exist some equilibria that exclude corrupt parties borda voting is ineffective because for some political situations no equilibria can guarantee the exclusion of corrupt parties journal of economic literature classification number d72

elections coalitions and legislative outcomes predictions of electoral behavior in a multiparty setting should be a function of the voters beliefs about how parties will perform following an election similarly party behavior in a legislature should be a function of electoral promises and rewards we develop a multistage game theoretic model of three party competition under proportional representation the final policy outcome of the game is generated by a noncooperative bargaining game between the parties in the elected legislature this game is essentially defined by the vote shares each party receives in the general election and the parties electoral policy positions at the electoral stage parties and voters are strategic in that they take account of the legislative implications of any electoral outcome we solve for equilibrium electoral positions by the parties and final policy outcomes

elections governments and parliaments in proportional representation systems this paper presents a theory of parliamentary systems with a proportional representation electoral system a formateur selected based on party representation in parliament and parties that cannot commit to the policies they will implement once in government government formation involves efficient proto coalition bargaining and elections yield unique strong nash equilibrium outcomes depending on the status quo minimal majority surplus or consensus governments can form if parties and voters are myopic and the status quo is subject to shocks consensus governments and centrist policies occur only in a crisis otherwise governments are minimal winning and policies reflect only the preferences of the government parties

co2 emissions from household consumption in india between 1993 94 and 2006 07 a decomposition analysis abstract co 2 emission from anthropogenic activities is one of the major causes of global warming india being an agriculture dependent country global warming would mean monsoon instability and consequent food scarcity natural disasters and economic concerns however with proper policy interventions co 2 emissions can be controlled input output analysis has been used to estimate direct and indirect co 2 emissions by households for 1993 94 1998 99 2003 04 and 2006 07 complete decomposition analysis of the changes in co 2 emissions between 1993 94 and 2006 07 has been done to identify the causes into pollution energy intensity structure activity and population effects according to broad household consumption categories results indicate that activity structure and population effects are the main causes of increase in co 2 emission from household fuel consumption to identify the causes at the sectoral level a second decomposition has been done for changes between 2003 04 and 2006 07 to identify the causes in the next stage finally alternative energy policy options have been examined for each consumption category to reduce emissions combined strategies of technology upgradation fuel switching and market management in order to reduce co 2 emissions for sectors like batteries other non electrical machinery construction and electronic equipments including television for which all the effects are positive need to be adopted

the provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives politicians who care about the spoils of office may underprovide a public good because its benefits cannot be targeted to voters as easily as pork barrel spending we compare a winner take all system where all the spoils go to the winner to a proportional system where the spoils of office are split among candidates proportionally to their share of the vote in a winner take all system the public good is provided less often than in a proportional system when the public good is particularly desirable we then consider the electoral college system and show that it is particularly subject to this inefficiency

redistributing income under proportional representation although majoritarian decision rules are the norm in legislatures relatively few democracies use simple majority rule at the electoral stage adopting instead some form of multiparty proportional representation moreover aggregate data suggest that average income tax rates are higher and distributions of posttax income flatter in countries with proportional representation than in those with majority rule while there are other differences between these countries this paper explores how variations in the political system per se influence equilibrium redistributive tax rates and income distributions a three party proportional representation model is developed in which taxes are determined through legislative bargaining among successful electoral parties and the economic decision for individuals is occupational choice political economic equilibria for this model and for a two party winner take all majoritarian system are derived and compared

incentives to cultivate favored minorities under alternative electoral systems a simple model is used to compare under different electoral systems the incentives for candidates to create inequalities among otherwise homogeneous voters by making campaign promises that favor small groups rather than appealing equally to all voters in this game model each candidate generates offers for voters independently out of a distribution that is chosen by the candidate subject only to the constraints that offers must be nonnegative and have mean 1 symmetric equilibria with sincere voting are analyzed for two candidate elections and for multicandidate elections under rank scoring rules approval voting and single transferable vote voting rules that can guarantee representation for minorities in multiseat elections generate in this model the most severely unequal campaign promises

examining the link between carbon dioxide emissions and the share of industry in gdp modeling and testing for the g 7 countries abstract in this paper the relationship between per capita co 2 emissions and the share of industrial value added in gross domestic product gdp for the g 7 countries is discussed using a novel approach it is assumed that per capita co 2 emissions are correspondent to the share of industrial value added in gdp a model is developed using hidden markov process to search this initial assumption in the model the data for industrial share in gdp are assigned to be the observations while the data for per capita co 2 emissions represent the hidden process which may be then predicted using the ratio of industrial value added to gdp the data set covers the period from 1970 to 2008 and the model is tested for the g 7 countries the study findings show that except in the case of canada the hidden markov model performs reasonably well in tracking per capita co 2 emissions the study results provide also a basis for a number of policy implications

the relation between chinese economic development and energy consumption in the different periods since the 1980s chinese economy grew rapidly with the rapid economic growth chinese energy consumption sharply increased the relation between chinese energy consumption and economic growth is focused on and many researchers have studied this issue by applying the methods such as granger causality test however the results just reveal the relation in a very long period in this paper the history of chinese economy is divided into four periods and the relation between chinese energy consumption and economic growth is examined by applying grey incidence analysis which is one of the most important methods of grey system theory which can be applied to solve the problems with small samples the results show that the relations in different periods are not the same the degree of grey incidences between total energy consumption and values added of secondary industry is larger and the degree of grey incidences between gdp and consumption of coal is larger too and the policy implications of these results are explained

per capita carbon dioxide emissions convergence or divergence understanding and considering the distribution of per capita carbon dioxide co2 emissions is important in designing international climate change proposals and incentives for participation i evaluate historic international emissions distributions and forecast future distributions to assess whether per capita emissions have been converging or will converge i find evidence of convergence among 23 member countries of the organisation for economic co operation and development oecd whereas emissions appear to be diverging for an 88 country global sample over 1960 2000 forecasts based on a markov chain transition matrix provide little evidence of future emissions convergence and indicate that emissions may diverge in the near term i also review the shortcomings of environmental kuznets curve regressions and structural models in characterizing future emissions distributions

convergence of per capita carbon dioxide emissions in the eu legend or reality abstract designing appropriate environmental and energy policies in order to meet the kyoto protocol s carbon dioxide co 2 reduction targets in the european union eu requires a detailed examination and thorough understanding of co 2 emission trends across the eu member states this paper investigates whether co 2 emissions have converged across 22 european countries over the 1971 to 2006 period the bayesian shrinkage estimation method is employed to do this work and the results reveal the following first the hypothesis of absolute convergence in per capita co 2 emissions is supported and a slight upward convergence is observed second the fact that countries differ considerably in both their speed of convergence and volatility in emissions makes it possible to identify different groups of countries third the results with respect to convergence do not vary much once the share of industry in gdp is accounted for in a conditional convergence analysis however a decreasing share of industry in gdp seems to contribute to a decline in per capita emissions these findings may carry important implications for both national and eu environmental policies

the budget process and the size of the budget the new congressional budget process provides members of congress with a new set of institutional mechanisms for making budget decisions this article addresses the question of whether or under what conditions rigid application of the new budget process modeled as first selection of the size of the budget and second its division produces smaller budgets than a piecemeal appropriations process in which the size of the budget is determined residually the theoretical result is that the new process sometimes results in relatively large budgets a testable implication of the theory is that given a choice of how stringently the budget process is to be employed members of congress jointly consider preferences and the expected outcomes under available institutional arrangements and select the arrangement usually a rule that yields the most favorable outcome empirical results from the budget process in the house from 1980 to 1983 are generally supportive of the theoretically derived hypothesis of rational choice of institutional arrangements

estimation of real gdp and unrecorded economy in turkey based on environmental data abstract this paper estimates the real gross domestic product gdp and unrecorded economy for turkey using the kalman filter technique using different tests most of the research articles on energy policy investigate the causal relationship between energy consumption and gdp for different countries on the other hand other studies on climate change try to show the effects of both energy consumption and gdp on carbon dioxide co2 emission since the unreported economy has an important weight in developing countries where the recorded or official gdp suffers from considerable measurement problems investigation of the relationship between the recorded gdp and energy consumption may lead to biased results in this paper the economic variables gdp country population as well as environmental variables co2 emission forest area are used in order to estimate gdp which is an unobserved variable in our model the results clearly indicate that first the true gdp in turkey that our model estimates is higher than the observed recorded gdp in the whole period of observation 1973 2003 and the size of unrecorded economy varies between 12 and 30 percent of the observed gdp second the gap between the true gdp and the observed gdp has an increasing trend third if the change in gdp per primary energy supply is smaller than the change in co2 per primary energy supply then there may exist unrecorded economy

a dyadic perspective on retailer supplier relationships through the lens of social capital abstract social capital theory has received increasing attention as a lens through which to examine supply chain relationships and the value creation process despite the growing application of social capital and its three dimensions namely cognitive structural and relational capital to inter organizational research few studies in reality have taken a dyadic perspective using a paired sample of retailer supplier relationships from korean fast moving consumer goods sector we explore the configuration of social capital dimensions and the impact on strategic and operational performance the results suggest three clusters of relationships which differ significantly on at least two of the dimensions of social capital furthermore these clusters show considerable differences with respect to both operational and strategic performance particularly at the lower levels of social capital we also examine the impact of a disparity between the retailer and supplier with respect to different dimensions of social capital henceforth called dissonance of the four clusters that emerge interestingly only dissonance on the cognitive dimension is related to lower operational and strategic relationship performance in investigating the implications of dissonance for the retailer and supplier individually our results suggest that performance differs based on the magnitude and direction of the dissonance our results show that consequences of having social capital or not are not necessarily the same for the retailer and the supplier

examining carbon emissions economic growth nexus for india a multivariate cointegration approach abstract the study probes cointegration and causality between carbon emissions and economic growth for india using ardl bounds testing approach complemented by johansen juselius maximum likelihood procedure in a multivariate framework by incorporating energy supply investment and employment for time span 1971 2006 the study fails to establish long run equilibrium relationship and long term causality between carbon emissions and economic growth however there exists a bi directional short run causality between the two hence in the short run any effort to reduce carbon emissions could lead to a fall in the national income this study also establishes unidirectional short run causality running from economic growth to energy supply and energy supply to carbon emissions the absence of causality running from energy supply to economic growth implies that in india energy conservation and energy efficiency measures can be implemented to minimize the wastage of energy across value chain such measures would narrow energy demand supply gap absence of long run causality between carbon emissions and economic growth implies that in the long run focus should be given on harnessing energy from clean sources to curb carbon emissions which would not affect the country s economic growth

equilibrium in multicandidate probabilistic spatial voting this paper presents a multicandidate spatial model of probabilistic voting in which voter utility functions contain a random element specific to each candidate the model assumes no abstentions sincere voting and the maximization of expected vote by each candidate we derive a sufficient condition for concavity of the candidate expected vote function with which the existence of equilibrium is related to the degree of voter uncertainty we show that under concavity convergent equilibrium exists at a minimum sum point at which total distances from all voter ideal points are minimized we then discuss the location of convergent equilibrium for various measures of distance in our examples computer analysis indicates that non convergent equilibria are only locally stable and disappear as voter uncertainty increases

learning and protection of proprietary assets in strategic alliances building relational capital one of the main reasons that firms participate in alliances is to learn know how and capabilities from their alliance partners at the same time firms want to protect themselves from the opportunistic behavior of their partner to retain their own core proprietary assets most research has generally viewed the achievement of these objectives as mutually exclusive in contrast we provide empirical evidence using large sample survey data to show that when firms build relational capital in conjunction with an integrative approach to managing conflict they are able to achieve both objectives simultaneously relational capital based on mutual trust and interaction at the individual level between alliance partners creates a basis for learning and know how transfer across the exchange interface at the same time it curbs opportunistic behavior of alliance partners thus preventing the leakage of critical know how between them copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

electoral rules and corruption is corruption systematically related to electoral rules recent theoretical work suggests a positive answer but little is known about the data we try to address this lacuna by relating corruption to different features of the electoral system in a sample of about eighty democracies in the 1990s we exploit the cross country variation in the data as well as the time variation arising from recent episodes of electoral reform the evidence is consistent with the theoretical priors larger voting districts and thus lower barriers to entry are associated with less corruption whereas larger shares of candidates elected from party lists and thus less individual accountability are associated with more corruption individual accountability appears to be most strongly tied to personal ballots in plurality rule elections even though open party lists also seem to have some effect because different aspects roughly offset each other a switch from strictly proportional to strictly majoritarian elections only has a small negative effect on corruption jel e62 h3

optimal districting with endogenous party platforms representation is one of the most important criteria by which to judge electoral systems in this paper i focus on one aspect of representative democracy the formation of electoral district boundaries it is well known that majoritarian systems give rise to highly biased seat vote curves causing representation to be less than ideal what should therefore be the optimal constituency design when the objective is to maximize voters welfare i show that when parties take account of districting while setting platforms then the district design problem reduces to a very simple rule do nothing when voters are risk neutral and when voters are risk averse choose a bias that is against the largest partisan group calibrating the model on data of the u s state legislative elections during the 1990s i show that the welfare gain due to optimal districting is very small

electoral rules strategic entry and polarization abstract how does electoral rule disproportionality affect the structure of the party system i e the number and the policy platforms of the competing parties by studying a model where both party entry and platform choice are endogenous we are able to provide a unified theory an increasing electoral rule disproportionality exhibits a a first order negative effect on platform polarization b a second order negative effect on the number of parties as polarization decreases centrist parties are squeezed between other contenders and prefer not to enter and c an additional third order negative effect on polarization via the reduction of the number of parties we then conduct a laboratory experiment and strongly confirm the theoretical predictions of the model

the electoral sweet spot low magnitude proportional electoral systems can electoral rules be designed to achieve political ideals such as accurate representation of voter preferences and accountable governments the academic literature commonly divides electoral systems into two types majoritarian and proportional and implies a straightforward trade off by which having more of an ideal that a majoritarian system provides means giving up an equal measure of what proportional representation pr delivers we posit that these trade offs are better characterized as nonlinear and that one can gain most of the advantages attributed to pr while sacrificing less of those attributed to majoritarian elections by maintaining district magnitudes in the low to moderate range we test this intuition against data from 609 elections in 81 countries between 1945 and 2006 electoral systems that use low magnitude multimember districts produce disproportionality indices almost on par with those of pure pr systems while limiting party system fragmentation and producing simpler government coalitions

electoral competition with strategic voters a recent literature has found a positive relationship between the disproportionality of the electoral system and the convergence of parties positions such a relationship depends crucially on the assumption that voting is sincere we show that when voters are players in the game and not simply automata that vote for their favorite party two policy motivated parties always take extreme positions in equilibrium

a model of candidate location when one candidate has a valence advantage that under some fairly weak assumptions for all levels of the valence advantage the advantaged candidate chooses a more moderate position than the disadvantaged candidate empirical studies of congressional elections by fiorina 1973 and ansolabehere snyder and stewart 2001 support this result d owns 1957 seminal work presents a puzzle for scholars of u s elections why do candidates not converge to the median voter one of the best explanations is that the candidates themselves have ideological preferences as calvert 1985 and wittman 1977 1983 have shown when candidates have such preferences and they are sufficiently uncertain about the preferences of the median voter then they do not converge although they may moderate their positions from their ideal point the basic version of the calvert wittman model however does not account for another basic fact of u s elections often one of the candidates has an advantage due to a nonpolicy factor such as incumbency greater campaign funds better name recognition superior charisma superior intelligence and so on stokes has dubbed such factors valence factors and he has noted their importance in u s elections stokes 1963 1992 1 in this article i extend the basic calvert wittman model by giving one candidate a valence advantage over the other i show that if the valence characteristics of the candidates are approximately equal then when a candidate s valence advantage increases this causes her to move toward the

socially optimal districting a theoretical and empirical exploration this paper investigates the problem of optimal districting in the context of a simple model of legislative elections in the model districting matters because it determines the seat vote curve which describes the relationship between seats and votes the paperrst characterizes the optimal seat vote curve and shows that under a weak condition there exist districtings that generate this ideal relationship the paper then develops an empirical methodology for computing seat vote curves and measuring the welfare gains from implementing optimal districting this is applied to analyze the districting plans used to elect u s state legislators during the 1990s

policy divergence in multicandidate probabilistic spatial voting existing models of multicandidate spatial competition with probabilistic voting typically predict a high degree of policy convergence yet in actual elections candidates advocate quite divergent sets of policies what accounts for this disparity between theory and empirical observation i introduce two variations on the basic probabilistic vote model which may account for candidate policy divergence 1 a model which incorporates candidate specific variables so that candidates may enjoy nonpolicy related electoral advantages or disadvantages 2 a model which allows nonzero correlations between the random terms associated with voters candidate utilities thereby capturing situations where voters view two or more candidates as similar on nonpolicy grounds i report candidate equilibrium analyses for each model which show far greater policy divergence than exists under the standard probabilistic vote model i then analyze the strategic logic which underlies these results

how many times again will we examine the energy income nexus using a limited range of traditional econometric tools during the last three decades following closely the developments in econometric theory energy and environmental economists have empirically examined the energy income nexus for different countries and time periods however today in spite of the growing interest in this area the state of knowledge is still controversial and unsettled this viewpoint paper attempts to highlight some of the issues related to the existing literature on the long run relationship and causality between energy consumption and economic growth in particular it discusses how it is difficult to make policy recommendations on the basis of inconsistent and conflicting results in the published literature on the subject in order to do so the paper first illustrates the increasing trend in the number of studies published in this area providing also a brief comparison of the conventional methods used to estimate the energy income nexus it then deals with new directions and different viewpoints on the same issue

a model of carbon price interactions with macroeconomic and energy dynamics abstract this paper develops a model of carbon pricing by considering two fundamental drivers of european union allowances economic activity and energy prices on the one hand economic activity is proxied by aggregated industrial production in the eu 27 as it provides the best performance in a preliminary forecasting exercise vs other indicators on the other hand brent natural gas and coal prices are selected as being the main carbon price drivers as highlighted by previous literature the interactions between the macroeconomic and energy spheres are captured in a markov switching var model with two states that is able to reproduce the boom bust business cycle hamilton 1989 first industrial production is found to impact positively negatively the carbon market during periods of economic expansion recession thereby confirming the existence of a link between the macroeconomy and the price of carbon second the brent price is confirmed to be the leader in price formation among energy markets bachmeier and griffin 2006 as it impacts other variables through the structure of the markov switching model taken together these results uncover new interactions between the recently created eu emissions market and the pre existing macroeconomic energy environment

measuring performance of international joint ventures international joint ventures ijvs are increasing in frequency and strategic importance however efforts to identify variables associated with ijv performance have been constrained by disagreements regarding the comparability and reliability of alternative performance measures and methods this study tests several hypotheses regarding the reliability and comparability of a range of objective and subjective measures of ijv performance as well as evaluating the relative utility of different data collection approaches

electoral rule disproportionality and platform polarization despite common perception existing theoretical literature lacks a complete for mal argument regarding the relationship between the electoral rule disproportionality and platform polarization in this paper we build a model that incorporates the disproportionality of the electoral system in a standard downsian electoral competition setup with mainly but not necessarily purely policy motivated parties we first show that in equilibrium platform polarization is decreasing in the level of the electoral rule disproportionality we then argue that the number of parties has a positive effect on platform polarization when polarization is measured by the distance between the two most distant platforms this effect does not hold when polarization is measured by the widely used dalton index constructing a dataset covering more than 300 elections our main theoretical findings are empirically supported pointing towards the electoral rule disproportionality as a major determinant of polarization

are co2 emission levels converging among industrial countries time paths of carbon dioxide emissions intwenty one industrial countries are examinedfrom 1960 1997 to test for stochastic andconditional convergence both panel unit roottests and cross section regressions areperformed overall we find significantevidence that co2 emissions haveconverged

comparing electoral systems a geometric analysis this paper constructs a game theoretic model of elections inalternative electoral systems with three or four candidates each electoral system specifies how the platforms of thecandidates and their scores give rise to an outcome whengeometrical analysis shows that two outcomes can competeagainst each other for victory a pivot probability isassociated to that pair each voter is rational and picks thecandidate that maximizes her expected utility which resultsfrom the balancing of her preferences and beliefs about thepivot probabilities candidate positioning is endogenous andthe result of a nash game the possible equilibria arecomputed for plurality and runoff majority systems

centripetal and centrifugal incentives in electoral systems this paper investigates how electoral laws affect the position taking incentives of parties and candidates it seeks to extend the finding presented in the classical median voter theorem to a wide class of electoral systems or to show the limits of such extension the factors examined are the district magnitude the electoral formula the number of votes each voter is allowed to cast whether voters can cumulate their votes and whether voters can partially abstain i suggest a crude division of electoral systems into those producing predominantly centripetal incentives and those producing predominantly centrifugal incentives among the factors found to produce centripetal incentives at least in noncumulative systems are the following increases in the number of votes per voter outlawry of partial abstention and decreases in the district magnitude in systems allowing the cumulation of votes matters are a bit different

threshold cointegration and causality relationship between energy use and growth in seven african countries abstract the paper investigates the long run and the causality relationship between energy consumption and economic growth for seven sub saharan african countries during the period 1970 2007 using the gregory and hansen 1996a 1996b testing approach to threshold cointegration we find that energy consumption is cointegrated with economic growth in cameroon cote d ivoire ghana nigeria and south africa moreover this test suggests that economic growth has a significant positive long run impact on energy consumption in these countries before 1988 and this effect becomes negative after 1988 in ghana and south africa furthermore causality tests suggest bidirectional causality between energy consumption and real gdp in cote d ivoire and unidirectional causality running from real gdp to energy usage in the case of congo and ghana

structural breaks energy consumption and economic growth revisited evidence from taiwan abstract this paper studies the stability between energy consumption and gdp for taiwan during 1954 2003 we use aggregate as well as various disaggregate data of energy consumption including coal oil gas and electricity to employ the unit root tests and the cointegration tests allowing for structural breaks our main findings are first though gas consumption seems to have structural breaks in the 1960s after considering the structural breaks the series is a stationary variable when taiwan adopted its expansionary export trade policy second we find that different directions of causality exist between gdp and various kinds of energy consumption the empirical result shows unanimously in the long run that energy acts as an engine of economic growth and that energy conservation may harm economic growth third the cointegration between energy consumption and gdp is unstable and some economic events may affect the stability overall we do find the structural breakpoints and they look to match clearly with the corresponding critical economic incidents

energy consumption carbon emissions and economic growth in china abstract this paper investigates the existence and direction of granger causality between economic growth energy consumption and carbon emissions in china applying a multivariate model of economic growth energy use carbon emissions capital and urban population empirical results for china over the period 1960 2007 suggest a unidirectional granger causality running from gdp to energy consumption and a unidirectional granger causality running from energy consumption to carbon emissions in the long run evidence shows that neither carbon emissions nor energy consumption leads economic growth therefore the government of china can purse conservative energy policy and carbon emissions reduction policy in the long run without impeding economic growth

income and co2 emissions evidence from panel unit root and cointegration tests abstract this paper re investigates the stationarity properties of per capita carbon dioxide co 2 emissions and real gross domestic product gdp per capita for 109 countries within seven regional panel sets covering 1971 2003 we apply the recent unit root test of the panel seemingly unrelated regressions augmented dickey fuller suradf test developed by breuer et al 2001 misleading inferences from panel unit root tests with an illustration from purchasing power parity review of international economics 9 482 493 2002 series specific unit root tests with panel data oxford bulletin of economics and statistics 64 527 546 the panel suradf test accounts for the presence of cross country correlations in the data and the parameters in the panel specification vary across countries more importantly this test allows us to identify how many and which members of the panel contain a unit root overall our empirical results illustrate that real gdp and co 2 emissions in these countries are a mixture of i 0 and i 1 processes and that the traditional panel unit root tests could lead to misleading inferences as well as the conduct of cointegration analysis being perhaps inappropriate the results of our analysis carry critical implications for the modeling of co 2 emissions and gdp because of the different orders of integration for the two variables

the curvilinear relationships between structural embeddedness and productive efficiency an exploratory study abstract existing network studies pay much attention to the benefits of structural embeddedness however uzzi 1996 points out the marginal benefits of structural embeddedness may follow a pattern of diminishing returns using major customer disclosure data from compustat this study investigates the curvilinear relationships between multiple aspects of structural embeddedness and productive efficiency applying both wang and ho 2010 and chen and lin 2009 stochastic frontier models we confirm the diminishing returns of eigenvector and betweenness centralities with a partial support for interconnectedness implications from our findings can help decision makers better understand the effects of structural embeddedness and help devise network structural change strategies for productive efficiency

party policy and campaign costs in a multi constituency model of electoral competition in this essay a multi constituency model of electoral competition was developed under the assumption that party candidates possessed no effective autonomy such a model describes the polar extreme opposite that of the more common single constituency framework in which candidates have complete autonomy the existence of a nash equilibrium to the multi constituency election game was established under the assumption that parties maximize the expected number of winning seats or behaved as pure independents under any other reasonable election goal e g maximize probability of winning a majority of constituencies this existence breaks down the nature of any equilibrium was investigated in some detail and the influence of campaign costs both statutory and non statutory on party behaviour analysed this was found to be qualitatively important in particular differingeconomic resources between parties is sufficient to prevent convergence inpolicy space

electoral bias and policy choice theory and evidence this paper develops an approach to studying how bias in favor of one party due to the pattern of electoral districting affects policy choice we tie a commonly used measure of electoral bias to the theory of party competition and show how this affects party strategy in theory the usefulness of the approach is illustrated using data on local government in england the results suggest that reducing electoral bias leads parties to moderate their policies

voting competitions with interested politicians platforms do not converge to the preferences of the median voter we examine equilibrium voting strategies for elections with interested politicians facing uncertainty about voter preferences if politicians utilities are defined over the set of strategies that voters select instead of being dependent only on the probability of winning an election equilibrium strategies will diverge instead of converging to the median voter s preferences as long as politicians have different preferences we present conditions i for political compromise and ii for politicians with different utility functions to merge into parties with complete strategic agreement

distribution dynamics of co2 emissions this paper uses nonparametric methods to examine the convergence in co2 emissions per capita on a sample of 100 countries for the period 1966 1996 industrial countries show a convergence pattern however there is little evidence of convergence for the whole sample

the effects of alternative power sharing arrangements do moderating institutions moderate party strategies and government policy outputs advocates of consensual political institutions i e institutions that promote compromise and powersharing among political parties claim that these institutions promote moderation in government policy outputs to date however there exists little research either theoretical or empirical that evaluates whether consensual institutions promote moderation in parties policy declarations we develop a multiparty spatial model with policy seeking parties operating under proportional representation in which we vary the extent to which government policies reflect power sharing among all parties as opposed to being determined by a single party we determine parties optimal nash equilibrium policy positions and conclude that power sharing does not typically motivate parties to moderate their policy declarations in fact policy positioning under power sharing appears to be similar to or more extreme than under single party dominance consistent with previous research however we find that power sharing does promote moderation in government policy outputs our results have implications for parties election strategies for the design of political institutions and for representative government

vote trading in power sharing systems a laboratory investigation in theory decentralized vote trading in power sharing systems promotes a efficiency by assigning greater decision making power to individuals that care a lot about the election s outcome and b dispersion of benefits since even individuals that have little interest about the electoral result can profit by selling their votes we experimentally test these intuitions in the laboratory and find that indeed allowing real subjects to trade votes for money in such systems increases collective welfare and substantially redistributes it towards those that are less concerned about the election importantly these findings hold true under alternative trading institutions thus reinforcing their empirical relevance

is there an environmental kuznets curve for sulfur abstract most existing estimates of the environmental kuznets curve ekc for sulfur which use samples of mainly high income countries indicate a maximum emissions turning point at middle to lower high income levels of gdp per capita we use a larger and more globally representative sample than previous sulfur ekc studies we find that sulfur emissions per capita are a monotonic function of income per capita when we use a global sample and an inverted u shape function of income when we use a sample of high income countries a model estimated in first differences results in a monotonic ekc when estimated with both high income and global samples reductions in emissions are time related rather than income related

co2 emissions energy consumption and output in france abstract this paper examines the dynamic causal relationships between pollutant emissions energy consumption and output for france using cointegration and vector error correction modelling techniques we argue that these variables are strongly inter related and therefore their relationship must be examined using an integrated framework the results provide evidence for the existence of a fairly robust long run relationship between these variables for the period 1960 2000 the causality results support the argument that economic growth exerts a causal influence on growth of energy use and growth of pollution in the long run the results also point to a uni directional causality running from growth of energy use to output growth in the short run

how do electoral systems affect fiscal policy evidence from cantonal parliaments 1890 2000 using a new data set on swiss cantons since 1890 we analyze how the adoption of proportional representation affects fiscal policy in line with economic theory we show that proportional systems shift spending toward broad goods like education and welfare benefits but decrease spending on geographically targetable goods like roads we find little evidence that proportional representation increases the overall size of government an analysis of the underlying theoretical mechanisms reveals that proportional representation increases electoral turnout left wing representation and political fragmentation these changes in political representation explain a substantial share of the rise in education spending but a small share of the rise in welfare spending or the decline in road expenditures jel h4 h11 i38

a model of political competition with citizen candidates the authors develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates a winner implements her favorite policy the equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of running and positively on the benefits of winning for some parameter values all equilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates whose positions are distinct two candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule than under a runoff system the candidates positions are less differentiated under a runoff system there exist equilibria under both systems in which some candidates have no chance of winning

the perils of polarization economic performance in the postcommunist world perhaps the most striking feature of the postcommunist transformation is the tremendous variation in rates of economic growth across countries to account for these differences this article develops an alternative to the j curve and partial reform views that currently dominate discussions of the politics of economic reform this approach treats economic performance as a political struggle between ex communist and anticommunist factions engaged in a war of attrition over economic and political resources using a pooled time series analysis of economic growth across twenty five postcommunist countries for the period 1990 98 it finds that political polarization between ex communist and anticommunist factions has had a devastating effect on economic growth where these competing factions have had roughly equal power and have struggled over the economic rules of the game as in bulgaria or ukraine economic growth has been slow in contrast where either ex communist or anticommunist factions have dominated the political scene as in estonia or uzbekistan economic performance has been much better in addition economic growth has followed the electoral calendar in polarized countries as elections approach and the odds of a change in economic policy increase growth rates have plummeted in polarized countries these findings have implications for studies of the postcommunist transformation the political business cycle and the politics of economic reform more generally

testing for convergence in carbon dioxide emissions using a century of panel data this paper tests the convergence in per capita carbon dioxide emissions for a collection of developed and developing countries using data spanning the period 1870 2002 for this purpose three recently developed panel unit root tests that permit for dependence among the individual countries are employed the results lend strong support in favor of convergence for the panel as a whole estimates of the speed of this convergence is also provided

electoral institutions and the politics of coalitions why some democracies redistribute more than others standard political economy models of redistribution notably that of meltzer and richard 1981 fail to account for the remarkable variance in government redistribution across democracies we develop a general model of redistribution that explains why some democratic governments are more prone to redistribute than others we show that the electoral system plays a key role because it shapes the nature of political parties and the composition of governing coalitions hence redistribution our argument implies 1 that center left governments dominate under pr systems whereas center right governments dominate under majoritarian systems and 2 that pr systems redistribute more than majoritarian systems we test our argument on panel data for redistribution government partisanship and electoral system in advanced democracies w hy do some countries redistribute more than others most work on the politics of redistribution starts from the premise that democratic institutions empower those who stand to benefit from redistribution the basic logic is succinctly captured in the meltzer richard 1981 model where the voter with the median income is also the decisive voter with a typical right skewed distribution of income the median voter will push for redistributive spending up to the point where the benefit of such spending to the median voter is outweighed by the efficiency costs of distortionary taxation this argument implies that redistibution is much greater in democracies than in nondemocracies at least of the right authoritarian variety and that among the latter inegalitarian societies redistribute more than egalitarian ones there is some evidence to supportthefirstimplication althoughitisdisputed see ross 2005 but most of the variance in redistribution is probably within the same regime type according to datafromtheluxembourgincomestudy forexample the reduction in the poverty rate in united states as a result of taxation and transfers was 13 in 1994 whereas the comparable figure for sweden was 82 thepovertyrateisthepercentageofhouseholdsbelow 50 of the median income to explain this variance we have to look at political and economic differences

non parametric frontier approach to modelling the relationships among population gdp energy consumption and co2 emissions abstract in this paper a non parametric approach based in data envelopment analysis dea is proposed as an alternative to the kaya identity a k a impact this frontier method identifies and extends existing best practices population and gdp are considered as input and output respectively both primary energy consumption and greenhouse gas ghg emissions are considered as undesirable outputs several linear programming models are formulated with different aims namely a determine efficiency levels b estimate maximum gdp compatible with given levels of population energy intensity and carbonization intensity and c estimate the minimum level of ghg emissions compatible with given levels of population gdp energy intensity or carbonization index the united states of america case is used as illustration of the proposed approach