investor protection and equity markets we present a simple model of an entrepreneur going public in an environment with poor legal protection of outside shareholders the model incorporates elements of becker s j political econ 106 1968 172 crime and punishment framework into a corporate finance environment of jensen and meckling j financial econ 3 1976 305 we examine the entrepreneur s decision and the market equilibrium the model is consistent with a number of empirical regularities concerning the relation between investor protection and corporate finance it also sheds light on the patterns of capital flows between rich and poor countries and on the politics of reform of investor protection r 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

an equilibrium model of incentive contracts in the presence of information manipulation abstract this paper develops an agency model in which stock based compensation is a double edged sword inducing managers to exert productive effort but also to divert valuable firm resources to misrepresent performance we examine how the potential for manipulation affects the equilibrium level of pay for performance sensitivity and derive several new cross sectional implications that are consistent with recent empirical studies in addition we analyze the impact of recent regulatory changes contained in the sarbanes oxley act of 2002 and show how policies intended to increase firm value by reducing misrepresentation can actually reduce firm value or increase the upward bias in manipulated disclosures

signal jamming models of fraudulent misreporting and economic prospects an experimental investigation abstract this study uses experimental methodology to examine how the frequency and magnitude with which managers commit fraud varies with economic prospects boom middle and bust the experimental design is based on signal jamming equilibrium sje models of fraud in which managers make potentially inaccurate public reports and investors bid on shares under sje managers always exaggerate reports by a fixed amount up to the maximum possible report independent of the truth shareholders can perfectly correct managers reports except for the maximum possible report in contrast the results of the experiment show four robust deviations from sje predictions 1 managers exaggerate and shareholders correct reports according to dominated mixed strategies with probabilities significantly less than one 2 managers exaggerate more frequently and by more when outcomes are poor 3 shareholders adjust low reports by less than high reports and 4 shareholders correct relatively high reports by more in booms than busts even though managers reporting strategies are invariant to economic prospects

this time is the same using bank performance in 1998 to explain bank performance during the recent financial crisis are some banks prone to perform poorly during crises if yes why in this paper we show that a bank s stock return performance during the 1998 crisis predicts its stock return performance and probability of failure during the recent financial crisis this effect is economically large our findings are consistent with persistence in a bank s risk culture and or aspects of its business model that make its performance sensitive to crises banks that relied more on short term funding had more leverage and grew more are more likely to be banks that performed poorly in both crises

a theory of disclosure in speculative markets this paper presents a theory of disclosure in a market where investors have heterogeneous beliefs and face short sale constraints assets trade above fundamentals reflecting the value of the option to sell to more optimistic investors in the future the initial seller has an incentive to commit to an imprecise disclosure policy despite the negative effect this has on the fundamental value of the asset in order to increase the potential for disagreement and hence the magnitude of the speculative premium i show that there is a strategic complementarity between sellers in their disclosure decisions this explains why financial misreporting and episodes of speculation occur together in waves and demonstrates that the endogenous choice of imprecise disclosure amplifies the extent to which assets are overpriced this paper was accepted by amit seru finance

earnings manipulation and the cost of capital the cost of capital the widespread use of accounting information by investors and financial analysts to help value stocks creates an incentive for managers to manipulate earnings in an attempt to influence short term stock price performance this paper examines the role of earnings management in affecting a firm s cost of capital using an agency model with multiple firms whose cash flows are correlated we demonstrate that the extent of earnings manipulation varies across the business cycle depending on a firm s earnings profile it can have stronger incentives to overstate its performance in good times or in bad times because of this dependence on the state of the economy earnings manipulation can influence a firm s cost of capital despite the forces of diversification

do investors see through mistakes in reported earnings this study investigates whether investors see through materially misstated earnings and whether they anticipate earnings restatements for firms that restate at least one annual report we find that investors are misled by mistakes in reported earnings at the time of initial earnings announcements investors react positively to the component of the favorable earnings surprise that will subsequently be restated and they attach the same valuation to it as to the true earnings surprise we also find that investors anticipate the subsequent downward restatements and start marking stock prices down several months before a restatement announcement so that the full impact of a restatement is about three times as large as the restatement announcement effect indeed we show that investors punish restating firms because the stock price gains that shareholders enjoy when firms initially announce overstated earnings are more than reversed by the time of the restatement announcement

risk ambiguity and the exercise of employee stock options abstract we investigate the importance of ambiguity or knightian uncertainty in executives stock option exercise decisions we develop an empirical estimate of ambiguity and include it in regression models alongside the traditional measure of risk equity volatility we show that each variable has a significant effect on the timing of option exercises with volatility causing executives to hold options longer to preserve option value and ambiguity increasing the tendency for executives to exercise early

market and political regulatory perspectives on the recent accounting scandals not surprisingly the recent accounting scandals look different when viewed from the perspectives of the political regulatory process and of the market for corporate governance and financial reporting we do not have the opportunity to observe a world in which either market or political regulatory processes operate independently and the events are recent and not well researched so untangling their separate effects is somewhat conjectural this paper offers conjectures on issues such as what caused the scandalous behavior why was there such a rash of accounting scandals at one time who killed arthur andersen the securities and exchange commission or the market did fraudulent accounting kill enron or just keep it alive for too long what is the social cost of financial reporting fraud does the united states in fact operate a principles based or a rules based accounting system was there market failure or was there regulatory failure or both was the sarbanes oxley act a political and regulatory overreaction does the united states follow an ineffective regulatory model

individualism and stock price crash risk employing a sample of 26 473 firms across 42 countries from 1990 to 2013 we find that firms located in countries with higher individualism have higher stock price crash risk furthermore individualism can be transmitted by foreign investors from overseas markets to influence local firms crash risk and can exacerbate the impact of firm risk taking and earnings management on crash risk moreover the positive relation between individualism and crash risk is amplified during the global financial crisis and attenuated by enhanced country level financial information transparency and the adoption of international financial reporting standards

bank valuation and accounting discretion during a financial crisis this paper shows that banks overstate the value of distressed assets and their regulatory capital during the us mortgage crisis real estate related assets are overvalued in banks balance sheets especially those of bigger banks compared to the market value of these assets banks with large exposure to mortgage backed securities also provision less for bad loans furthermore distressed banks use discretion over the classification of mortgage backed securities to inflate their books our results indicate that banks balance sheets offer a distorted view of the financial health of the banks and provide suggestive evidence of regulatory forbearance and noncompliance with accounting rules

corporate fraud and investment distortions in efficient capital markets inefficient investment allocation induced by corporate fraud where informed insiders strategically manipulate outside investors beliefs has been endemic historically and has recently attracted much attention we reconcile corporate fraud and investment distortions with efficient capital markets building on shareholder manager agency conflicts and investment renegotiation in active takeover markets because investments that are ex post inefficient are not renegotiation proof the optimal renegotiation proof contract induces overstatements by managers accompanied by overinvestment in low return states and underinvestment in high return states by rational investors our framework also helps explain why easy access to external capital appears to facilitate corporate fraud

the economics of fraudulent accounting we argue that earnings management and fraudulent accounting have important economic consequences in a model where the costs of earnings management are endogenous we show that in equilibrium low productivity firms hire and invest too much in order to pool with high productivity firms this behavior distorts the allocation of economic resources in the economy we test the predictions of the model using firmlevel data we show that during periods of suspicious accounting firms hire and invest excessively while managers exercise options when the misreporting is detected firms shed labor and capital and productivity improves our firm level results hold both before and after the market crash of 2000 in the aggregate our model provides a novel explanation for periods of jobless and investment less growth

supply chain performance under market valuation an operational approach to restore efficiency based on a supply chain framework we study the stocking decision of a downstream buyer who receives private demand information and has the incentive to influence her capital market valuation we first characterize a market equilibrium under a general single buyback contract we show that the buyer s stocking decision can be distorted in equilibrium such a downstream stocking distortion hurts the buyer firm s own performance and it also influences the performances of the supplier and the supply chain we further reveal scenarios where full supply chain efficiency cannot be reached under any single buyback contract then focusing on contract design we characterize conditions under which a menu of buyback contracts can prevent downstream stocking distortion and restore full efficiency in the supply chain our study demonstrates that in a supply chain context a firm s incentive to undertake real economic activities to influence capital market valuation can potentially be resolved through operational means this paper was accepted by yossi aviv operations management

earnings quality evidence from the field abstract we provide insights into earnings quality from a survey of 169 cfos of public companies and in depth interviews of 12 cfos and two standard setters cfos believe that i above all high quality earnings are sustainable and repeatable specific characteristics include consistent reporting choices backing by actual cash flows and absence of one time items and long term estimates ii about 50 of earnings quality is driven by non discretionary factors such as industry and macro economic conditions iii in any given period about 20 of firms manage earnings to misrepresent economic performance and for such firms 10 of eps is typically managed iv earnings manipulation is hard to unravel from the outside but peer comparisons and lack of correspondence between earnings and cash flows provide helpful red flags in addition cfos disagree with current standard setting on a number of issues including the sheer number of promulgated rules the top down approach to rule making the neglect of the matching principle and the emphasis on fair value accounting they indicate that a rules based culture makes the audit function centralized and mechanical and hinders the development of audit professionals a summary impression from our work is that cfos view earnings quality as more of a single and unconditional characteristic in contrast to current research where measures of earnings quality are strongly conditional on the decision setting this cfo view is related to their idea of one number a single earnings metric that shapes both their interactions with external stakeholders and internal decision making

the impact of performance based compensation on misreporting abstract this paper examines the effect of ceo compensation contracts on misreporting we find that the sensitivity of the ceo s option portfolio to stock price is significantly positively related to the propensity to misreport we do not find that the sensitivity of other components of ceo compensation i e equity restricted stock long term incentive payouts and salary plus bonus have any significant impact on the propensity to misreport relative to other components of compensation stock options are associated with stronger incentives to misreport because convexity in ceo wealth introduced by stock options limits the downside risk on detection of the misreporting

earnings manipulation pension assumptions and managerial investment decisions managers appear to manipulate firm earnings through their characterizations of pension assets to capital markets and alter investment decisions to justify and capitalize on these manipulations managers are more aggressive with assumed long term rates of return when their assumptions have a greater impact on reported earnings firms use higher assumed rates of return when they prepare to acquire other firms when they are near critical earnings thresholds and when their managers exercise stock options changes in assumed returns in turn influence pension plan asset allocations instrumental variables analysis indicates that 25 basis point increases in assumed rates are associated with 5 percent increases in equity allocations

what does ceos pay for performance reveal about shareholders attitude toward earnings overstatements if overstatements were a symptom of the agency conflict pay for performance sensitivities should have increased in response to the additional penalties for misreporting imposed by sox our finding of their decrease is inconsistent with the view that overstatements were an unintended consequence of incentive pay prior to 2002 to corroborate our interpretation we show that i ceo pay for performance sensitivities are higher among firms whose shareholders stand to benefit from overstatements ii this cross sectional relationship weakens significantly after sox and iii the within firm decrease in pay for performance sensitivity is most pronounced among firms with high pre sox shareholder benefits from overstatements

tests of exchange market efficiency fragile evidence from cointegration tests abstract several recent papers have employed engle and granger 1987 cointegration tests to determine whether or not markets are efficient we use a new test for cointegration due to johansen 1988 to examine market efficiency with respect to the us dollar exchange rates for canadian japanese and west german currencies the fragile nature of the test indications suggests that cointegration methodologies cannot be relied upon to provide reliable evidence on market efficiency

the relation between earnings and cash flows abstract a model of earnings cash flows and accruals is developed assuming a random walk sales process variable and fixed costs and that the only accruals are accounts receivable and payable and inventory the model implies earnings better predict future operating cash flows than current operating cash flows and the difference varies with the operating cash cycle also the model is used to predict serial and cross correlations of each firm s series the implications and predictions are tested on a 1337 firm sample over 1963 1992 both earnings and cash flow forecast implications and correlation predictions are generally consistent with the data

does competition destroy ethical behavior explanations of unethical behavior often neglect the role of competition as opposed to greed in assuring its spread using the examples of child labor corruption excessive executive pay corporate earnings manipulation and commercial activities by universities this paper clarifies the role of competition in promoting censured conduct when unethical behavior cuts costs competition drives down prices and entrepreneurs incomes and thereby reduces their willingness to pay for ethical conduct nonetheless i suggest that competition might be good for ethical behavior in the long run because it promotes growth and raises incomes higher incomes raise the willingness to pay for ethical behavior but may also change what people believe to be ethical for the better this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

beauty contests and iterated expectations in asset markets in a financial market where traders are risk averse and short lived and prices are noisy asset prices today depend on the average expectation today of tomorrow s price thus iterating this relationship the date 1 price equals the date 1 average expectation of the date 2 average expectation of the date 3 price this will not in general equal the date 1 average expectation of the date 3 price we show how this failure of the law of iterated expectations for average belief can help understand the role of higher order beliefs in a fully rational asset pricing model and explain over reaction to noisy public information

predicting accounting misconduct the role of firm level investor optimism motivated by a large literature on how firm specific resources such as leadership and management skills strategies organizational capabilities and intellectual properties drive firm performance we propose and find that heterogeneity in investor optimism regarding firm specific attributes plays a very important role in influencing the managerial propensity to manipulate financial statements when firm level investor optimism is moderate the incidence of accounting misconduct increases but it decreases when investors are highly optimistic further market reaction to the announcement of financial restatements is more negative when investors held more optimistic firm specific beliefs at the time of initial misstatement these findings are robust to alternative firm specific optimism measures linked to analysts general investors and unsophisticated individual investors controls for market wide consumer sentiment unexplained by macroeconomic factors economy wide and industry level optimism potential selection bias and reverse causality our analysis highlights the importance of firm level investor optimism in predicting preventing and detecting accounting misconduct

virtuous professionalism in accountants to avoid fraud and to restore financial reporting over the past decade a number of accounting and financial reporting frauds have led to lost stock wealth destroyed public trust and a worldwide recession that called for necessary reform regulatory responses and systemic reforms quickly followed and we show that while necessary these reforms are insufficient the purpose of this paper is to forward virtuous professionalism as a necessary path toward restoring financial reporting systems we take the position of external observer and analyze the accounting profession over time to assess what has transpired within our financial reporting systems our analysis reveals that the combined influence of commercialism and regulatory response has led to a systemic decline in accounting s professional ideals and as a result an erosion of public trust we then propose virtuous professionalism as a necessary process for restoring financial reporting systems based on sociological professional and philosophical theories we argue that virtuous professionalism is necessary for restoring the public servant identity of the accounting professional we conclude that efforts to restore financial reporting systems should begin with reforms that restore professional identity shaped by virtues

persistence and reversal in herd behavior theory and application to the decision to go public we model rational herd behavior when the underlying value changes over time with payoffs that are either dependent or independent of the underlying value we show that herding does not last forever and is not monotone in signal quality high correlation among agents actions does not necessarily imply herding this suggests alternative empirical methods are needed to detect herding the model has many applications including the ipo decision in which payoffs are state dependent the model implies that the decision to go public is more likely associated with herding than the decision to delay an ipo copyright 2002 oxford university press

misdeeds matter long term stock performance of firms after the filling of class action lawsuits consistent with theory this study of shareholder litigation found a broad transformation in company characteristics and risk exposures and generally negative short and long term performance effects that differed substantially between two types of allegations the findings have important implications for both regulator and institutional investor monitoring and decision making strategies