the life cycle hypothesis and aggregate household saving betsy white 1978 has argued that simple life cycle models of the kind suggested by albert ando and franco modigliani 1963 must be rejected on the ground that they cannot account for a realistic level of aggregate saving to prove her point white uses the simulation technique in this paper using the same technique it is shown that simple life cycle models can generate a sufficient amount of saving even under conditions known to be unfavorable to personal saving one reason for white s negative result is that she disregards the importance of uncertainty about the time of death the effect of

pricing variation within dual distribution chains the different implications of externalities and signaling for high and low quality brands within many of the multioutlet branded chains that dominate the retail and services landscape the organizational form e g company management franchising used to manage an outlet varies from site to site as do the prices charged at those sites i propose that organizational form and prices may be systematically related as a result of brand externalities in particular i develop logic that the relevant form of externality should differ for upper quality tier brands and lower tier brands using panel data on price and organizational form from more than 6 700 branded u s hotels affiliated with 40 dual distribution brands those brands that simultaneously company manage and franchise individual outlets i find that consistent with the brand externality arguments company managed locations have higher prices within high quality chains whereas franchisees price higher in the lower tiers this paper was accepted by bruno cassiman business strategy

a common agency with incomplete information in the present article i demonstrate that forming a common agency by oligopolistic firms may not be to their advantage if agents have access to private information about their costs bernheim and whinston 1985 1986 pointed out that a common agency allows the firms to sustain the collusive outcome by giving them a vehicle to internalize the externality generated by their pricing or output decisions if agents have access to private information the advantage pointed out by bernheim and whinston may be more than outweighed by the possible existence of an informational disadvantage specifically if the unit costs of different potential agents are correlated the firm may be more successful in extracting the informational rents of its agent if it contracts with an independent agent and not with the same agent as its rival firm when oligopolistic firms contract with independent agents the revenues of one firm reveal implicit information about the unit costs of agents serving competing firms in the same industry however if the unit costs of different agents are correlated revenues also reflect information about the unit cost of the firm s own agent this additional information transmitted by revenues cannot be controlled by the agent s reporting behavior as a result if the firm conditions its agent s payoff upon revenues it can limit the informational rents that this agent can secure due to the existence of private information this possibility of limiting its agent s informational rents is eliminated if the firm contracts with the same agent as its rivals with a common agency the agent can manipulate the reports delivered to all the firms thus reducing the options available to each of them various patterns of agency relationship exist in markets where oligopolistic producers

liberalisation and r d in network industries the case of the electricity industry abstract electricity sector liberalisation has coincided with a significant decline in r d spending this paper reviews the industrial organisation literature on r d and innovation to explore the likely causes of the decline in r d spending in the electricity sector meanwhile r d productivity and innovative outputs in utilities and equipment suppliers appear to have improved however a lasting decline in r d expenditure can have a negative long term effect on technological progress and innovation in the sector we conclude that the decline in r d could have been predicted from the literature we also discuss the need to reorient the post liberalisation technology policy

security of supply and regulation of energy networks abstract in recent years the security of energy supplies has re emerged as a central issue in the energy policy arena in the uk and elsewhere this re emergence takes place against a backdrop of increased liberalisation of the energy markets so that security of supply needs to be revisited within this context security of supply is multifaceted but is often discussed in terms of physical availability of energy sources and their commodity price risk this paper discusses the relationship between security of supply and network regulation that is how the energy networks and appropriate regulation of them can contribute to security of supply in liberalised energy sectors energy networks are predominantly natural monopolies and as a result are generally subject to regulatory oversight we discuss a range of issues and trends that pose challenges and opportunities to network regulation and which call for new and innovative measures the paper identifies a number of areas where network regulation can play a significant role in increasing the security of supply of future energy systems

vertical antitrust policy as a problem of inference the legality of nonprice vertical practices in the u s is determined by their likely competitive effects an optimal enforcement rule combines evidence with theory to update prior beliefs and specifies a decision that minimizes the expected loss because the welfare effects of vertical practices are theoretically ambiguous optimal decisions depend heavily on prior beliefs which should be guided by empirical evidence empirically vertical restraints appear to reduce price and or increase output thus absent a good natural experiment to evaluate a particular restraint s effect an optimal policy places a heavy burden on plaintiffs to show that a restraint is anticompetitive

divide and rule the economic and legal implications of the proposed ownership unbundling of distribution and supply companies in the dutch electricity sector abstract in machiavelli s theory of power the concept of divide and rule forms the main theme the ruler has absolute power and to maintain and increase such power all means are justified when viewed against the background of this theory the current debate in the netherlands on the unbundling of energy electricity gas companies can be observed as an example of divide and rule in which the dutch minister of economic affairs plays a central role yet contrary to machiavelli in his time the dutch government does in fact aim principally at the greater welfare of the dutch people it is therefore noteworthy that while important steps in the decision to unbundled have been taken there is no evidence that the dutch people will indeed benefit from the envisaged unbundling

resale price maintenance and collusion the article revisits the conventional wisdom according to which vertical restrictions on retail prices help upstream firms to collude we analyze the scope for collusion with and without resale price maintenance rpm when retailers observe local shocks on demand or retail costs in the absence of rpm retail prices react to retailers information and deviations from collusive behavior are thus difficult to detect by eliminating retail price flexibility rpm facilitates the detection of deviations but reduces profits and thus increases the short run gains from a deviation overall rpm can facilitate collusion and reduce total welfare when firms adopt it

the role of exclusive territories in producers competition reprinted in cartels stephen salant ed the international library of critical writings in economics edward elgar reference collections

coexistence of strategic vertical separation and integration abstract this paper gives conditions under which vertical separation is chosen by some upstream firms while vertical integration is chosen by others in the equilibrium of a symmetric model a vertically separating firm trades off fixed contracting costs against the strategic benefit of writing a two part tariff exclusive dealing contract with its retailer coexistence emerges when more than two vertical cournot oligopolists supply close substitutes when vertical integration and separation coexist welfare could be improved by reducing the number of vertically separating firms the scope for coexistence diminishes when assumptions on contract observability and commitment are relaxed

parametric efficiency tests economies of scale and input demand in u s electric power generation duality theory has been applied increasingly in recent years to study the structure of production a major advantage of using duality theory is that systems of input demand equations can be derived by simple differentiation facilitating the use of flexible functional forms also use of duality theory makes it possible to choose a representation of the technology which has desirable properties for estimation such as exogeneity of the regressors however the use of a dual representation of production structure is appropriate only if the corresponding maintained hypothesis concerning economic behavior e g cost minimization or profit maximization is valid the perceived advantages of the dual approach to studying production structure have led to some applications in which the maintained hypothesis concerning economic behavior is unlikely to be appropriate for example neoclassical cost functions have been used to study the characteristics of production in regulated industries despite an extensive theoretical literature indicating that a profit maximizing regulated firm would not minimize costs subject to market prices 2 in this paper we propose a generalized cost function that retains the principal advantages of the neoclassical cost function but does not require that cost minimization subject to market prices be imposed as a maintained hypothesis in our model firms are assumed to base their production decisions on unobservable shadow prices which reflect the effects of regulation on the effective prices of inputs parametric tests for cost minimization are obtained by expressing shadow prices as functions of market prices the generalized cost function is estimated with data for regulated electric utilities the parametric restrictions corresponding to cost minimizing behavior subject to market prices are rejected implying that the use of a neoclassical cost function is not appropriate in this application 3

capital costs and profitability abstract the paper estimates a line of business lb cost of capital and derives explicitly its link in long run competitive equilibrium to profitability measured as lb operating income to lb assets the ways that observed profitability differs from what would obtain in competitive equilibrium are explored

delivering a highly distributed electricity system technical regulatory and policy challenges abstract this paper discusses the technical regulatory and policy challenges inherent in planning and operating power systems with high penetrations of distributed energy resources der generators flexible demand and energy storage connected within electricity distribution networks many liberalised electricity systems worldwide are seeing growth in der including significant capacities of distributed renewable generation the paper starts from the premise that optimal distribution networks are those that satisfy the objective of a lowest cost power system whilst meeting customers expectations of reliability and societal desire for sustainability it highlights major challenges that policy makers face in respect of market and regulatory arrangements that support energy and flexibility provision from a large number of small variable and often uncertain resources these challenges include the need to respect the technical limits of the system and ensure its operability development of well designed mechanisms to support innovation and an appropriate share of risk between market actors a key contribution of the paper is to discuss the opportunities offered by more active distribution system operation as a substitute for capital investment and its regulatory and policy implications finally the paper presents priorities for policy to facilitate a highly distributed electricity system

divorce comes at a price an ex ante welfare analysis of ownership unbundling of the distribution and commercial companies in the dutch energy sector vertical unbundling in the electricity sector is a hot political topic in the european union the european commission has decided that the ownership unbundling of transmission networks from other stages in the value chain is the most effective way to ensure fair network access and infrastructure investment while this european unbundling debate has not ended yet and most countries still do not have an independent transmission system operator tso the dutch government has already taken one step further in 2008 it decided that distribution companies should be completely separated from commercial activities that are part of the same holding generation trade and supply this governmental decision has been fiercely debated although the goal is to improve competition as well as security of supply these benefits are uncertain nevertheless it is certain that ownership unbundling comes at a cost in this paper we present an ex ante cost benefit analysis of the dutch unbundling act we conclude that it is unlikely that this act is welfare enhancing divorce comes at a price

vertical integration and firm boundaries the evidence since ronald h coase s 1937 seminal paper a rich set of theories has been developed that deal with firm boundaries in vertical or input output structures in the last twenty five years empirical evidence that can shed light on those theories also has been accumulating we review the findings of empirical studies that have addressed two main interrelated questions first what types of transactions are best brought within the firm and second what are the consequences of vertical integration decisions for economic outcomes such as prices quantities investment and profits throughout we highlight areas of potential cross fertilization and promising areas for future work

the competitive effects of vertical agreements comment recent economic analyses of vertical restraints and integration emphasize the circumstances under which these arrangements are socially efficient efficiency claims have proven contentious however for exclusive dealing a vertical restraint that prohibits any outlet carrying a manufacturer s product from stocking substitute brands this paper analyzes the impact of exclusive dealing on competition and allocative efficiency opinions expressed on the impact of exclusive dealing range from the extreme view that it is invariably anticompetitive to the view that it is always procompetitive the u s supreme court has concluded that in hundreds if not thousands of communities where there is a single retailer for a product

beer and the tie did divestiture of brewer owned public houses lead to higher beer prices in 1989 the united kingdom monopolies and mergers commission mmc recommended measures that eventually led brewers to divest themselves of 14 000 public houses the mmc claimed that their recommendations would lower retail prices and increase consumer choice since that time however retail prices have risen this paper contains an econometric analysis of the transition period the analysis is based on a model of the relationship between retail price and retail organisational form that emphasises how exclusive dealing clauses and strategic factors interact in 1989 in an important decision the united kingdom monopolies and mergers commission mmc recommended measures that eventually led brewers to divest themselves of 14 000 public houses the mmc claimed that their recommendations would lower retail prices and increase consumer choice there is considerable doubt however that their objectives were achieved indeed since the time that the recommendations were implemented retail prices have risen it is not clear however if prices would have increased in the absence of divestiture one goal of my research is to provide an answer to this question the mmc s recommendations created an exceptional opportunity to assess the effects that different contractual arrangements have on retail prices indeed one would like to investigate this relationship ceteris paribus unfortunately however the choice of vertical market structure is normally endogenous and it is impossible to condition on all of the factors that affect the contracting decision in the uk beer industry in contrast the government ordered changes in the type and terms of the contracts under which national brewers could operate their licensed premises increased separation between brewer and publican therefore was not due to changes in economic conditions moreover some premises the free houses that were not owned by a brewer were not affected by the beer orders the existence of a control group facilitates the analysis by strengthening the conclusions that one can draw in recent years economists have moved away from simple theories of vertical

ownership unbundling and investment in electricity markets a cross country study abstract this paper is the first to explicitly test for the presence of a trade off between static and dynamic efficiency and a trade off between vertical economies and competition in a regulated industry the electricity industry we show for 16 european countries over the period 1998 2008 that higher electricity end user prices in a country subsequently lead to larger aggregate investments in the capital stock i e in generation distribution and transmission assets moreover there is a trade off between vertical economies and competition ownership unbundling and forced access to the incumbent transmission grid increases competition but come at the cost of lost vertical economies generally we find that regulation that affects only the market directly like the establishment of a wholesale market or free choice of suppliers increases aggregate investment regulation however that adversely affects the incumbent directly like ownership unbundling decreases aggregate investment spending

separability test for the electricity supply industry this paper examines the vertical integration issue of the electricity industry this industry is typically vertically integrated and heavily regulated the paper investigates the potential technological efficiency loss due to the vertical disintegration using the translog production function three separability hypotheses using the allen uzawa elasticity of substitution are tested to examine the feasibility of various degrees of disintegration of the current industry structure all three separability hypotheses are rejected and the cost of disintegration is estimated further estimates indicate that the electricity industry appears to have exhausted economies of scale unlike other deregulated industries disintegration of the electricity industry will entail technological efficiency loss

market power and joint dominance in u k brewing market power and joint dominance are examined in u k brewing i assess unilateral and coordinated effects where the latter is equated with joint dominance and show how one can distinguish between the two econometrically the application makes use of two demand equations the nested logit of mcfadden 1978a and the distance metric of pinkse slade and brett 2002 the two equations yield very different predictions concerning elasticities and markups nevertheless although there is evidence of market power using either demand model that power is due entirely to unilateral effects in other words neither model uncovers evidence of coordinated effects tacit collusion

aggregate industrial energy consumer response to wholesale prices in the restructured texas electricity market abstract the aggregate response of consumers to wholesale price signals is very limited in the restructured electric reliability council of texas ercot market an overall average own price elasticity of demand of 0 000008 for industrial energy consumers served at transmission voltage is estimated using a symmetric generalized mcfadden cost function model to date ercot has sought to promote demand response to price signals without reliance on stand alone demand response programs but with a market structure that is designed to facilitate economic demand response this very limited responsiveness to wholesale price signals may prove problematic in light of policy decisions to pursue an energy only resource adequacy mechanism for ercot

the measurement of vertical economies and the efficient structure of the electric utility industry in this article the concept of multiproduct cost economies is modified to the case of production at vertically related stages to derive an explicit and general measure of economies of vertical integration the utility of this measure is then demonstrated by estimating the vertical cost structure of the electric utility industry and by carrying out the calculations necessary to determine the magnitude of vertical economies in this industry the results provide empirical evidence of the existence of significant economies of vertical integration between the generation and transmission distribution stages of electricity supply copyright 1991 by blackwell publishing ltd

the competitive effects of exclusive dealing evidence from the u s beer industry abstract several recent theoretical articles have modeled the effects of exclusive dealing contracts that restrict dealers to selling a single brand yet detailed empirical analysis of the impact of exclusivity on actual market outcomes has been lacking i analyze a unique set of firm level data on nearly 400 beer distributors in the united states the impacts of economies of scale and restrictions on distributor promotional activities on the use of exclusive dealing are measured as well as the effects of exclusivity on costs prices and output the results support the view that exclusive dealing serves to minimize manufacturer dealer incentive conflicts and enhances social welfare

mergers coordinated effects and efficiency in the portuguese non life insurance industry we evaluate the impact on market power and efficiency of a series of mergers on three portuguese non life insurance markets we specify and estimate with a panel of firm level data a structural model which includes preferences technology and a market equilibrium condition firms demand curves are not very elastic firms technologies exhibit scale and scope economies and high cost efficiency scores we find that for the period following the mergers there is no evidence of i an increase in market power through coordinated behavior or ii changes in cost efficiency levels in addition social welfare increased

competition and integration among complements and network market structure this article analyzes the competition and integration among complementary products that can be combined to create composite goods or systems the model generalizes the cournot duopoly complements model to the case in which there are multiple brands of compatible components it analyzes equilibrium prices for a variety of organizational and market structures that differ in their degree of competition and integration the model applies to a variety of product networks including automatic teller machines real estate multiple listing services and airlines crs as well as to nonnetwork markets of compatible components such as computer cpus and peripherals hardware and software and long distance and local telephone services copyright 1992 by blackwell publishing ltd

observable contracts strategic delegation and cooperation the role of commitments in noncooperative games is well acknowledged and documented one way to achieve commitments is by letting delegates represent the players of a game in this paper the authors study a delegation game in which the players can use agents strategically to play on their behalf and the contracts they sign with them are common knowledge they show that in such cases every pareto optimal outcome of the game can become the unique subgame perfect nash equilibrium of the delegation game the authors demonstrate this result by discussing the cournot type duopolistic game copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

empirical tests of the life cycle hypothesis comment this comment examines the contention of betsy buttrill white 1976 1978 that a multiperiod life cycle model cannot generate values of aggregate savings as large as in fact observed i argue that her results reflect an entirely arbitrary choice of parameters and that for other equally plausible values of these parameters the life cycle model generates saving similar to or greater than that actually observed hence the model cannot be rejected as white proposes on the basis of such a simple test of plausibility it should be noted at the outset that the argument of this paper is distinct from that of lars soderstrom 1982 who accepts white s basic result and then shows that if the structure is generalized to incorporate stochastic lifetimes the result is not robust my argument here is that white s contention is incorrect when examined on its own terms

revisiting electricity liberalization and quality of service empirical evidence from new zealand abstractwhat effect does the firm structure have on the quality of service delivered by networks and infrastructure industries we answer this question by empirically assessing the impacts of complete vertical separation such as ownership unbundling on the quality of service delivered by a liberalized network industry electricity distribution utilities in new zealand are considered for this purpose and are analysed using panel data econometrics the results show robust evidence that ownership unbundling contributed to a fall in the duration and frequency of supply interruptions in electricity distribution however the results also show that unbundling has no effect on reducing distribution network losses these results overall highlight the nonsimple impacts of ownership unbundling on the quality of electricity distribution we suggest that the quality of service may largely improve when considered in the economic regulation of electricity networks than completely relying on specific reform measures

the cost of capital and the market power of firms reply and correction elements which can be specified when equation 4 was tested the variables used to measure financial leverage size operating leverage and growth were all significant at least at the 5 level in the expected direction but the market power variable then lost significance in the absence of an integrated theoretical model the relationship between market power and systematic risk can only be studied empirically the statistical results reported here suggest that powerful firms do not have any unusual ability to influence their cost of equity capital market power appears to have an impact on equity yields because of investors rational evaluation of managers operating and financial policies

measuring economies of vertical integration in network industries an application to the water sector this paper provides a framework that aims at distinguishing the technological economies of vertical integration from the vertical economies resulting from an inefficient input allocation due to upstream market imperfections to illustrate our analysis we use consistent panel data econometric methods to estimate cost functions on a sample of north american water utilities contrary to what has been found for other network industries electricity and gas for instance we show that the global and technological economies of vertical integration are not significant except for the smallest utilities

testing for subadditivity of vertically integrated electric utilities the public policy debate over electric utility deregulation has a long history and generated a considerable amount of research much of this research focused on estimating the degree of scale economies in generation with little attention given to the effect vertical integration may have on cost structure the vertical integration issue is important because most observers consider the transmission and distribution stages to be natural monopolies according to joskow and schmalensee economics of integration if any would link the production stages together possibly extending natural monopoly conditions from transmission distribution to generation even if the latter exhibited no economies of scale 27 refs 5 tabs

do fast food chains price discriminate on the race and income characteristics of an area this article reports tests for differences in prices charged by fast food restaurants that serve markets with customers of widely divergent incomes and ethnic backgrounds the data contain detailed prices on items sold at over 400 burger king wendy s kfc and roy rogers restaurants in new jersey and pennsylvania locations i find significant differences in price based on the race and income characteristics of a zip code region when income and cost differences are taken into account meal prices rise approximately 5 for a 50 rise in the black population

do vertical mergers facilitate upstream collusion we investigate the impact of vertical mergers on upstream firms ability to collude when selling to downstream firms in a repeated game we show that vertical mergers give rise to an outlets effect the deviation profits of cheating unintegrated firms are reduced as these firms can no longer profitably sell to the downstream affiliates of their integrated rivals vertical mergers also result in an opposing punishment effect integrated firms typically make more profit in the punishment phase than unintegrated upstream firms the net result of these effects in an unintegrated industry is to facilitate upstream collusion we provide conditions under which further vertical integration also facilitates collusion

mergers brand competition and the price of a pint abstract mergers in the uk brewing industry have reduced the number of national brewers from six to four the number of brands in contrast has remained relatively constant we analyze the effects of mergers on brand competition and pricing brand level demand equations are estimated from a panel of draft beers to model brand substitution possibilities we estimate the matrix of cross price elasticities semiparametrically our structural model is used to assess the strength of brand competition along various dimensions and to evaluate the mergers in particular we compute equilibria of pricing games with different numbers of players

intimidating competitors endogenous vertical integration and downstream investment in successive oligopoly this paper examines the interplay of endogenous vertical integration and cost reducing downstream investment in successive oligopoly analyzing a linear cournot model we establish the following key results i vertical integration increases own investment and decreases competitor investment intimidation effect ii asymmetric integration is a non degenerate equilibrium outcome iii compared to a benchmark model without investment complete vertical separation is a less likely outcome we argue that these findings generalize beyond the linear cournot model under reasonable assumptions

tying foreclosure and exclusion in recent years the leverage theory of tied good sales has faced heavy and influential criticism in an important sense though the models used by its critics are actually incapable of addressing the leverage theory s central concerns here the author reconsiders the leverage hypothesis and argues that tying can indeed serve as a mechanism for leveraging market power the mechanism through which this leverage occurs its profitability and its welfare implications are discussed in detail copyright 1990 by american economic association

regulation and investment use newly assembled data on regulation in several sectors of many oecd countries to provide evidence that regulatory reform of product markets is associated with an increase in investment a component of reform that plays a very important role is entry liberalization but privatization also has a substantial effect on investment sensitivity analysis suggests that our results are robust jel e22 l5

searching for a break in gnp it has been suggested that existing estimates of the long run impact of a surprise move in income may have a substantial upward bias due to the presence of a trend break in postwar u s gross national product data this article shows that the statistical evidence does not warrant abandoning the no trend break null hypothesis a key part of the argument is that conventionally computed p values overstate the likelihood of the trend break alternative hypothesis this is because they do not take into account that in practice the date is chosen based on pretest examination of the data

franchising versus corporate ownership abstract this paper uses data on the prices charged at fast food restaurants in the metropolitan pittsburgh and detroit areas to assess the effect of franchising on price dispersion within chains in fairly narrowly defined geographical areas a review of reasons why firms may face more price dispersion under franchising guides the empirical analyses results indicate that 1 franchisors do not aim for fully uniform prices even on the corporate side of their chains 2 the degree of price dispersion is highest for firms with both franchised and company owned units as predicted by models implying a systematic price differential between units operated under these different contracting mechanisms and 3 price dispersion for fully franchised chains is greater than for fully corporate chains these last two results combined with evidence from court cases that franchisors sometimes try to control franchisee prices directly suggest that franchisors indeed lose some amount of control over prices charged to customers when they use franchising as opposed to corporate ownership finally i find a positive effect of the royalty rate on price dispersion this suggests that double marginalization is behind at least some of the higher prices found in franchised units in the existing literature

welfare distribution effect of a price reduction in the dutch gas transport market a scenario analysis of regulatory policy market form and rent allocation as part of the larger energy market deregulation program the dutch energy authority dte has developed the habit to force the dutch gas transport enterprise gas transport services or gts to lower its prices dte s key argument is that lower gas transport prices will benefit the end user indeed that might well be the case this policy in general is in line with european legislation on the liberalization of the gas market we model and simulate the domestic welfare effects of a 5 percent transport price reduction from this we conclude that at least three observations complicate matters substantially first gts is government owned and the dominant shipper gasunie trade supply or gasterra as it was recoined recently is partly so 50 second shippers enter into the competitive game to make profits third not only is the majority of gas transported in the netherlands exported to foreign end users but also foreign owners have a large stake in dutch shippers as a result part of the rents will always be distributed or will leak away to foreign consumers and shippers or their shareholders these three observations together have three important implications first state ownership implies that much rent allocation is simply a matter of circulating money from one government sub budget to the other second given that the industry is imperfectly competitive part of the rents will not be passed on to the end consumers third it is unavoidable that a substantial part of the rents are transferred abroad a general conclusion for policy makers is that market liberalization might not bring ex post what they expected ex ante

retailer power recent developments and policy implications retailing is big business ranking firms by revenue retailing includes belgium s largest company delhaize le lion tesco and j sainsbury from the uk top ten the giant metro group in germany and wal mart stores number four in the usa and the eighth largest company in the world with 119 billion turnover and 825 000 employees fortune 3 8 98 retailing is getting more concentrated over time the top ten grocers in europe were 28 of the market in 1992 but 36 by 1997 1 the behaviour of retailers matters for consumers cross country studies of pricing for near identical products e g cars televisions compact discs branded sportswear groceries find big differences between prices across european countries and between europe and the usa 2 the european commission is to start examining why europeans pay substantially more on average than us consumers

economies of scale and technological progress in electric power production the case of brazilian utilities abstract this paper examined the cost structure of the electricity generation companies in brazil during the period 2000 2010 by using a translog cost function that imposes no restrictions on production technology and allows for the existence of non homotheticity the hypothesis that economies of scale are a typical feature of the generation market in brazil and in general are not exhausted at lower levels of production is not rejected this result supports the vision that indivisibilities restrict efficiency gains from free market competition in the brazilian electricity generation and most of the last restructuring in the industry regulation was based on this assumption furthermore over the sample period technological progress led to cost reductions in electric power supply these technological improvements take the form of both a neutral technological effect as well as a non neutral fuel effect which prevails over the capital and labor saving technical changes

regulation and competition issues in thai electricity sector abstract this paper explores the issues related to regulatory reform and liberalisation leading toward competition in the thai electricity sector which is still under the monopoly control of state owned enterprises soes following an overview of the current market structure of the thai electricity sector the process of liberalisation and deregulation that contributes to the uncompetitive market structure under soes control is examined the author asserts that there are problems within the energy commission and the energy industry act be 2550 2007 that contribute to the continuance of an uncompetitive electricity supply possible reforms to the thai electricity regulation are proposed with the aim of creating market competition and efficiency in the thai electricity sector

demand driven integration and divorcement policy abstract traditionally vertical integration has concerned industrial economists only insofar as it affects market outcomes particularly prices this paper considers reverse causality from prices and more generally from demand to integration in a model of a dynamic oligopoly if integration is costly but enhances productive efficiency then a trend of rising prices and increasing integration could be due to growing demand in which case a divorcement policy of forced divestiture may be counterproductive divorcement can only help consumers if it undermines collusion but then there are dominating policies we discuss well known divorcement episodes in retail gasoline and british beer as well as other evidence in light of the model

deregulation market competition and innovation of utilities evidence from japanese electric sector this paper explores the determinants of electric utility innovation and examines the impact of electric sector deregulation and market competition on it using a balanced panel database of nine japanese utilities from 1978 to 2014 both input r d expenditure and output patent application number and patent quality aspects of innovations are examined the empirical results indicate that deregulation and market competition decrease the former but increase the latter these results are followed by a discussion on why this scenario occurs the results also suggest that after deregulation utilities focus more on short term business oriented r d projects hence we call for governments to support long term public oriented and environmental research in the electric sector

retail contracting theory and practice we summarize a number of regularities that arise in the empirical literature on contractual relationships between manufacturers and their exclusive resellers we do this using studies of traditional and business format franchise relationships as well as studies of salesforce integration decisions some of the patterns that we uncover are consistent with a standard incentive cum insurance theory of organization while others are not we brie y review some theoretical extensions that seem promising in terms of reconciling seeming con icts between theory and practice i introduction manufacturers of retail products must decide whether to sell their products to consumers themselves vertical integration or to sell via independent retailers vertical separation when manufacturers do not perform the sales function internally but want exclusive retailers they usually choose some form of franchising 1 many theories attempt to explain the choice of retail organizational form moreover a considerable body of empirical evidence concerning this choice is accumulating we attempt to evaluate this econometric evidence and relate it to the theories to accomplish this task we assess studies of franchising arrangements as well as studies of sales force organization in industrial settings the paper is organized as follows in the next section we highlight a number of regularities that arise in the empirical literature on retail contracting in particular we nd that i risk is positively related to the use of high powered incentives vertical separation ii the importance of the agent s eiort in production is positively related to the use of high powered incentives

market power and rents in global supply chains market power and competition policy in food supply chains has emerged as an important economic issue in economics and a highly sensitive item on the policy agenda consolidation is taking place in the food industry both in high income countries and in emerging economies but the impact of concentration in global food chains on efficiency and rent distribution is more nuanced and complex than often claimed we review the literature and extend it by developing a model which explicitly takes into account market imperfections and contract enforcement problems in supply chains increased competition benefits farms by improving contract conditions but contract enforcement becomes more complicated

electricity prices and public ownership evidence from the eu15 over thirty years abstract this paper studies the impact of corporate ownership on residential net of tax electricity prices when the ownership effect is separated from the liberalisation effect and from other drivers of change after a discussion of a simple conceptual model and of earlier literature we use iea and oecd data for the eu15 over nearly three decades panel econometrics suggests that after controlling for other factors public ownership is associated with lower residential net of tax electricity prices in western europe the impact of liberalisation on prices is smaller and more uncertain

purposive diversification of r d in manufacturing the r d diversification in manufacturing of large us firms is found to be purposive exploiting complementarities of various research activities and forming groups of related industry categories purposively diversified firms are seen to behave differently than randomly diversified or undiversified firms further the behavioral differences between purposively diversified firms and others result because the former allocate relatively more r d funds to industry categories where appropriability conditions are good and relatively fewer funds to those categories where appropriation of the returns from r d is difficult finally r d expenditure and productivity are more closely linked at the group level than at the industry category level suggesting knowledge spills across industry categories are important

structural reform of japanese electric power industry separation between generation and transmission distribution this study examines the cost structure of japanese electric power industry to investigate whether a structural reform on the industry really enhances a cost saving benefit to consumers a composite cost function model using a panel data set is used for this study the data set consists of nine electric power companies from 1990 to 2008 based upon the estimation results this study examines whether economies of scale and vertical economies exist in the industry then this study conducts a cost subadditivity test that is a necessary condition of natural monopoly the empirical results indicate that the electric power firms exhibit the status of economies of scale in their transmissions and distributions and the operation as a whole however they do not exhibit economies of scale in their generations thus the transmission operation by integration in a large area can improve its economic efficiency furthermore the industry should introduce more competition in both generation and wholesale power markets where more firms can participate in their power trades this study also empirically confirms that vertical economies have existed in the industry moreover this study confirms that all the estimates in the cost subadditivity test satisfy the necessary condition of natural monopoly where each estimate indicates cost saving in cost subadditivity the test does not guarantee a sufficient condition of natural monopoly however it clearly indicates that the functional separation between generation and transmission will increase total production cost in the industry the complete separation may result in a net loss of economic efficiency if a competition benefit does not exceed an expected economic loss consequently this study suggests that the industrial structure of future japanese electric power industry should be evaluated from not only an expected benefit by introducing competition but also an unbundling cost that occurs with a loss of vertical integration

heterogeneous effects of regulation on the efficiency of the electricity industry across european union countries abstract this paper focuses on the relationship between the stringency of regulation oecd indicators and total factor productivity tfp growth in the electricity sectors of 19 european union countries for the period 1994 2007 both the oecd regulatory indicator and the tfp growth index have been decomposed in order to bring to light a complex picture of interrelations in which the negative impact of the overall regulation on productivity is the result of opposite forces estimation results tell us that only the stringency of entry regulation significantly reduces technological change whereas vertical integration exhibits a negative and significant impact only on the catching up process pure efficiency change lastly we found an interesting result concerning the explanatory variables of the scale efficiency change in this case only public ownership matters in other terms high levels of public in the structure ownership of electric companies guarantee improvements in reaching the optimal scale of production these heterogeneous effects are also confirmed when we use a different measure of efficiency that is the distance of the actual from the optimal reserve margin

technological externalities and economies of vertical integration in the electric utility industry abstract this paper investigates economies of vertical integration of the electric utility industry focusing on the technological externality between the generation and transmission distribution stages for this purpose a shadow cost function of the symmetric generalized mcfadden form is estimated using panel data on the transmission distribution stage of nine japanese electric utility firms the results show that there exist the technological externality effects of generation facilities on the cost of the transmission distribution stage suggesting economies of vertical integration

vertical and horizontal scope economies in the regulated us electricity power industry this paper investigates vertical economies between generation and distribution of electric power and horizontal economies between different types of power generation in the u s electric utility industry our quadratic cost function model includes three generation output measures hydro nuclear and fossil fuels which allows us to analyze the effect that generation mix has on vertical economies our results provide sample mean estimates of vertical economies of 8 1 and horizontal economies of 5 4 an extensive sensitivity analysis is used to show how the scope measures vary across alternative model specifications and firm types

ownership form managerial incentives and the intensity of rivalry this study investigates how differences in ownership form between franchised and company owned units affect managerial incentives and competitive pricing in different oligopolistic contexts we arg

allocative distortions technical progress and input demand in u s airlines 1970 1984 this paper generalizes a globally concave and flexible cost function to accommodate allocative distortions these distortions are introduced through shadow prices and are specified as functions of regressors that make distortion factors firm input and time specific the estimated model based on a panel of nineteen u s airlines observed during 1970 84 rejects the hypothesis of no allocative distortions increase in costs due to allocative distortions are calculated for each airline over the entire period the rate of technical progress and economies of scale are also estimated based on models with and without allocative distortions copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

heterogeneous impacts of regulatory policy stringency on the eu electricity industry a bayesian shrinkage dynamic analysis abstract environmental and technical efficiency in the electricity sector is a major focus of regulatory policies aimed at hastening greenhouse gas reduction and lowering energy prices for final consumers understanding the impact of market and environmental regulations on efficiency is crucial for the design and choice of policy packages at the national level the productivity response to regulations depends on unobserved country specific factors that current empirical analyses have not modelled in this framework we analyse the regulation effects on efficiency in the electricity sector for a panel of european union countries we explicitly consider the effects of the environmental regulation along with the market regulation our estimation strategy uses the bayesian shrinkage estimator which can deal with the bias aggregation problem and cross country heterogeneity it allows us to identify the different transmission channels through which regulatory policy is implemented the results highlight divergent behaviours at the country level the direct impacts of the market and environmental regulatory policies on productivity are negative around 2 7 and 2 3 respectively but the countries vary in the degree to which they are able to compensate these negative effects

market foreclosure and vertical merger a case study of the vertical merger between turner broadcasting and time warner abstract we employ an event study methodology the event being the vertical merger between time warner and turner broadcasting distribution and programming respectively in the cable television industry we assess the effects of the merger on final prices subscriptions and carriage and marketing decisions of time warner the analysis finds several interesting facts first foreclosure in time warner markets following the merger is observed for the rival channels that are not integrated with any cable distributors second the turner broadcasting channels that increased market shares because of this merger appeared to be foreclosed by time warner prior to the merger the preference for own channels by time warner persisted despite a lower quality of channel bundles in its markets efficiency gains from the merger were not passed on to consumers

an economic theory of vertical restraints vertical restraints imposed by manufacturers on the prices locations and sales of retail firms represent a puzzling departure from the simple price mediated exchange of conventional markets in this article we analyze the theoretical basis for these restraints in a setting where retailers inform consumers and are imperfectly competitive and where a manufacturer has some monopoly power we identify three potential externalities affecting retailers decisions these externalities lead to the failure of simple uniform price contracts to coordinate the incentives of retailers with the objective of maximizing combined manufacturer and retailer profits we identify the packages of vertical restraints that are minimally sufficient under various conditions to neutralize the externalities and to achieve the joint profit maximum

australian beer wars and pub demand how vertical restraints improved the drinking experience recently australia s two largest brewers carlton and united breweries and lion nathan have been aggressively competing for market share in the state of victoria among other strategies the two breweries have implemented vertical restraints in the form of extensive agreements with retailers and the outright purchase of pubs a key outcome of these purchases and agreements is the renovation of many pubs as brewers attempt to attract increasingly sophisticated drinkers this paper attempts to quantify the value of these renovations and measure their associated impact on consumers relying on insights from the hedonic literature a simple but novel approach is used to estimate the implicit price of the pub environment and the effects of renovations on that price

the making of economic policy a transaction cost politics perspective economic policymaking as a political process the normative approach to policy analysis the positive view of political economy a synthesis the policy process in real time a theme transaction costs the transaction cost politics framework political outcomes and economic efficiency transaction cost analysis in politics mechanisms to cope with transaction costs in politics national differences two case studies to illustrate transaction cost politics tax and expenditure reform in the united states the gatt and national trade politics some reflections and suggestions some lessons for the policy process the role of the economist concluding comments appendix multiprincipal multitask agencies

review of proposals for practical power sector restructuring and reforms in a dynamic electricity supply industry abstract south africa s electricity supply industry esi remains a vertically integrated monopoly despite global trends towards restructuring the monopolistic nature of the esi could hinder the development of distributed power systems as penetration of renewable electricity increases the research aims to rationalise south africa s esi evolution propose practical power sector restructuring in the short to medium term and to determine their potential impact the research methodology included a single case study instrument with embedded sub units of analysis primary research data was gathered using semi structured interviews with industry experts in addition to which secondary data from government documents and archival records were used for triangulation research results conclude that south africa s esi grew due to techno economic industrialisation factors while apartheid era policies influenced the esi in only some specific respects the vertically integrated status quo was sustained in the post transformation period due to government s focus on social imperatives lack of regulatory policy certainty and conflicts in political ideology south africa did not experience the pre conditions that triggered global power sector reforms in the late 20 th century but these pre conditions are now becoming evident privatisation of eskom generation and introduction of wholesale and retail competition are not practical in the short to medium term proving the infeasibility of the standard model of reform locally the introduction of an independent system and market operator ismo using a single buyer model is seen as the most favourable and practical option with the ismo owning transmission infrastructure the research suggests that esi changes will increase system efficiencies economic performance and private sector involvement but will not reduce electricity tariffs the scenarios challenges and proposals identified in this research are also applicable to other countries in africa and other developing regions of the world that have similar social and political backgrounds ensuring sustainable supply of electricity

productivity growth technical change and economies of scale of korean fossil fuel generation companies 2001 2012 a dual approach abstract this paper examines total factor productivity tfp growth technical change and economies of scale measure of korean fossil fuel power generation companies gencos between 2001 and 2012 for the empirical investigation we estimated the cost function along with specification tests in order to find the most appropriate empirical model empirical results show tfp deterioration technical regress and economies of scale for the study period the optimal size of the korean gencos was also found which is employed in developing policies regarding tfp growth and technical advance

the impact of ownership unbundling on cost efficiency empirical evidence from the new zealand electricity distribution sector abstract several countries around the world have introduced reforms to the electric power sector one important element of these reforms is the introduction of an unbundling process i e the separation of the competitive activities of supply and production from the monopole activity of transmission and distribution of electricity there are several forms of unbundling functional legal and ownership new zealand for instance adopted an ownership unbundling in 1998 as discussed in the literature ownership unbundling produces benefits and costs one of the benefits may be an improvement in the level of the productive efficiency of the companies due to the use of the inputs in just one activity and a greater level of transparency for the regulator this paper analyzes the cost efficiency of 28 electricity distribution companies in new zealand for the period between 1996 and 2011 using a stochastic frontier panel data model a total cost function and a variable cost function are estimated in order to evaluate the impact of ownership unbundling on the level of cost efficiency the results indicate that ownership separation of electricity generation and retail operations from the distribution network has a positive effect on the cost efficiency of distribution companies in new zealand the estimated effect of ownership separation suggests a positive average one off shift in the level of cost efficiency by 0 242 in the short run and 0 144 in the long run

the arguments for and against ownership unbundling of energy transmission networks abstract the question this paper addresses is what is the evidence for the superiority of the ownership unbundled transmission models i e uk or nord pool hybrid over other models we assess the theoretical costs and benefits of ownership unbundling and judge these to be generally positive though these may be potentially offset by the actual reorganisation costs of the ownership unbundling process next we assess the empirical evidence this is in two forms econometric evidence from samples of countries and case studies of reforms in particular jurisdictions the econometric evidence is weak due to problems with simultaneity of reform steps and a lack of studies but the case study evidence is compelling we conclude with a discussion of the issues faced by countries considering implementing ownership unbundling we conclude that evidence seems to be that ownership unbundling of transmission is a key part of energy market reform in the most successful reform jurisdictions

equilibrium incentives for exclusive dealing in a differentiated products oligopoly we consider the incentives for oligopolistic manufacturers to adopt exclusive dealing manufacturers producing differentiated brands can choose to distribute through exclusive retail dealerships or nonexclusive dealerships with nonexclusive dealing manufacturers face an interbrand externality because brand enhancing investments made by one manufacturer may benefit the brands of other manufacturers although exclusive dealing eliminates this externality oligopolistic manufacturers may not choose exclusive dealing exclusive dealing enhances the incentive to invest but the promotional investments are a form of competition between manufacturers thus manufacturers might earn higher profits with nonexclusive dealing making lower promotional investments we find cases in which nonexclusive dealing is a dominant strategy we also find cases in which some but not all manufacturers adopt exclusive dealing moreover even if adoption of exclusive dealing by all manufacturers is the equilibrium it can arise from a prisoner s dilemma in that each manufacturer would prefer nonexclusive dealing

heterogeneous policies heterogeneous technologies the case of renewable energy this paper investigates empirically the effect of market regulation and renewable energy policies on innovation activity in different renewable energy technologies for the eu countries and the years 1980 to 2007 we built a unique dataset containing information on patent production in eight different technologies proxies of market regulation and technology specific renewable energy policies our main finding is that compared to privatisation and unbundling reducing entry barriers is a more significant driver of renewable energy innovation but that its effect varies across technologies and is stronger in technologies characterised by potential entry of small independent power producers in addition the inducement effect of renewable energy policies is heterogeneous and more pronounced for wind which is the only technology that is mature and has high technological potential finally ratification of the kyoto protocol which determined a more stable and less uncertain policy framework amplifies the inducement effect of both energy policy and market liberalisation

ideas institutions and interests in the politics of cross border electricity interconnection greenlink britain and ireland abstract increasing electricity interconnection is necessary for both closer market integration and facilitating more renewable generation across the european union however progress on the ground has been slow this paper adds to the literature on the politics of interconnection through a case study of a proposed link between ireland and great britain we analyse how the institutional setting for investment has evolved at eu and member state level and how the influence of stakeholders is mediated by the ability of actors to define their interests and by institutional points of entry using this framework we examine the greenwire greenlink project we find first that developments in the institutional context especially the adoption of a new cap and floor regime for merchant investment by the gb regulator have had both positive and negative impacts on the project second we find that regulators and governments in the two markets have found it hard to define their interests in the project and its net social benefit due to informational complexities and changes in information over time third the project has met with local public opposition that is strong but which has little leverage due to a lack of institutional entry points

markets beer in germany and the united states between 1950 and 2000 the four firm producer concentration ratio for beer increased from 22 to 95 in the united states and anheuser busch s share of domestic output ballooned from 6 to 54 percent in germany concentration has risen but it remains low in 2000 the four firm producer concentration ratio was just 29 and the eight firm ratio in germany was smaller than the one firm ratio in the united states in 2005 after five years of important mergers involving big brewers the german beer industry was still much less concentrated than its american counterpart in this article i discuss several candidate explanations for the failure of beer producer concentration to rise as much in germany as in the united states the relevance of the new technologies to german brewers the preferences of german consumers the rules for advertising on german television and other factors largely absent from the consensus interpretation of american experience i find that market structure depends on a remarkably broad range of factors extending well beyond technological opportunity and market size

consolidation by merger the uk beer market this paper examines the determinants of market structure in the uk brewing industry over 1949 1969 sutton sunk costs and market structure price competition advertising and the evolution of concentration 1991 points to technology and advertising races as two key drivers of market concentration this study uses an own built longitudinal data set of the population of firms and breweries and reveals the importance of institutional factors in explaining the dynamics of market structure the practice of tying outlets to brewers and legal restrictions on opening retail outlets together with a permissive policy towards mergers made acquisition of medium sized firms and brewery closure shortly after acquisition the main driving mechanism towards industry consolidation during this period the number of firms and plants fell sharply by 74 and 60 respectively and production rose by about 25 with no firm entry and just one new brewery opening as a result concentration increased and the market transformed from a highly fragmented one into a stable oligopoly

reforming small electricity systems under political instability the case of nepal this paper assesses the issues and options in reforming small electricity sector systems in general while citing nepal as a specific case political instability and increasing electricity demand are two major complicating factors in power sector reform of small systems such as that of nepal lessons from international experience suggest that measures such as cost reflecting pricing restructuring and independent regulation are important for the success of reforms in small systems the creation of an independent regulatory authority is more important than unbundling of the sector in the present context of nepal accounting separation of the main activities may be a pragmatic restructuring approach given the present political and market condition as the systems gradually grow larger vertical separation of the system and horizontal splitting of the generation segment and competition in organised wholesale market followed by privatisation remains an option in the long run

the leverage theory of tying revisited evidence from newspaper advertising data from the canadian newspaper advertising industry is used to assess the private profitability of tying in a market where the standard efficiency motives e g price discrimination cost saving and quality control are unlikely to apply the empirical assessment is based on a model of leveraging in which suppliers of the tied good are paid a commission rather than a fee for service this model demonstrates that tying is profitable under a wide range of circumstances furthermore it is found that with newspapers tying and monopoly power go hand in hand