banking in computable general equilibrium economies abstract in this paper we develop a computable general equilibrium economy that models the banking sector explicitly banks intermediate between households and between the household sector and the government sector households borrow from banks to finance their purchases of houses and they lend to banks to save for retirement banks pool households savings and they purchase interest bearing government debt and non interest bearing reserves we use this structure to answer two sets of questions one normative in nature that evaluates the welfare costs of alternative monetary and tax policies and one positive in nature that studies the real effects of following a procyclical interest rate policy rule

capital income taxation with housing abstract this paper quantitatively investigates capital income taxation in the general equilibrium overlapping generations model with household heterogeneity and housing housing tax policy is found to affect how capital income should be taxed due to substitution between housing and non housing capital given the existing u s preferential tax treatment for owner occupied housing the optimal capital income tax rate is close to zero 1 contrary to the high optimal capital income tax rate found with overlapping generations models without housing 31 a low capital income tax rate improves welfare by narrowing a tax wedge between housing and non housing capital the narrowed tax wedge indirectly nullifies the subsidies taxes for homeowners renters and corrects over investment to housing naturally when the preferential tax treatment for owner occupied housing is eliminated a high capital income tax rate improves welfare as in the model without housing

estimating elasticities with pims data methodological issues and substantive implications though the pims data have been used extensively to relate profitability both to specific firm marketing actions and to market conditions no attempt has been made to estimate directly the magnitudes of marketing mix elasticities the authors propose and evaluate a simple cross sectional time series regression method that recovers unbiased estimates of the elasticities despite the presence of firm specific disguise factors in the database though measurement error creates instability for certain variables the recovered elasticities compare favorably with those found in previous research and have predictable relationships with market characteristics

on the optimal progressivity of the income tax code this paper computes the optimal progressivity of the income tax code in a dynamic general equilibrium model with household heterogeneity in which uninsurable labor pro ductivity risk gives rise to a nontrivial income and wealth distribution a progressive tax system serves as a partial substitute for missing insurance markets and enhances an equal distribution of economic welfare these bene cial eects of a progressive tax system have to be traded oagainst the e ciency loss arising from distorting endoge nous labor supply and capital accumulation decisions a determination of the optimal progressivity of the income tax code therefore calls for a quantitative exploration using a utilitarian steady state social welfare criterion we nd that the optimal us income tax is well approximated by a at tax rate of19 5 and a xed deduction of about 3 700 the steady state welfare gains from a fundamental tax reform towards this tax system are equivalent to 0 4 higher consumption in each state of the world an explicit computation of the transition path induced by a reform of the current towards the optimal tax system indicates however that a majority of the population currently alive would suer welfare losses calling into question the political feasibility of such

determining the optimal return on investment for an advertising campaign abstract in this this paper we adopt the point of view that advertising is an investment and propose a simple formula for calculating the level of media spending which maximizes the return on investment the information which must be supplied for the calculation is commonly available and we express the optimal expenditure level in terms which are meaningful to media planners we show that when maximizing return on investment not all of the allocated media budget should be spent

optimal advertising with stochastic demand a stochastic sequential model is developed to determine optimal advertising expenditures as a function of product maturity and past advertising random demand for the product depends upon an aggregate measure of current and past advertising called goodwill and the position of the product in its life cycle measured by sales to date conditions on the parameters of the model are established that insure that it is optimal to advertise less as the product matures additional characteristics of the optimal advertising policy are also established

wealth distribution with random discount factors abstract to explain the pareto tail behavior empirically observed in wealth distributions the quantitative macro literature has occasionally assumed that agents have random discount factors this paper formally proves that the stationary wealth distribution in a simple huggett model with random discounting has power law tails and characterizes the pareto exponents analytically i find that in general there is no clear relationship between the return on wealth and inequality and that the pareto exponent is highly sensitive to the persistence of the discount factor process i also provide a practical guidance for how to characterize the pareto exponents in richer models

the transition from payroll to consumption receipts with endogenous human capital abstract the transition from payroll to consumption receipts is simulated in a life cycle growth model featuring adult human capital as in other studies savings are higher under the consumption base however unlike those studies much of the additional savings here take human form human capital production increases for all cohorts in or yet to join the labor market as of the tax change the additional human capital production tends to dampen physical capital accumulation when compared with otherwise identical simulations which hold human capital constant the implications for intergenerational incidence are similar to that found in other examinations of the transition to a consumption base

taxation and household labor supply we evaluate reforms to the u s tax system in a life cycle setup with heterogeneous married and single households and with an operative extensive margin in labor supply we restrict our model with observations on gender and skill premia labor force participation of married females across skill groups children and the structure of marital sorting we concentrate on two revenue neutral tax reforms a proportional income tax and a reform in which married individuals flle taxes separately separate flling our flndings indicate that tax reforms are accompanied by large increases in labor supply that difier across demographic groups with the bulk of the increase coming from married females under a proportional income tax reform married females account for more than 50 of the changes in hours across steady states while under separate flling reform married females account for all the change in hours

an analysis of optimal advertising under uncertainty we examine the firm s optimal advertising behavior under conditions of uncertainty for the static one period model we show that the firm s attitude toward risk may be responsible for the potential divergence between advertising decisions under uncertainty and those under deterministic conditions for the dynamic multi period model the ultimate impact of uncertainty on advertising is further complicated when the sales response function contains an unknown parameter and the firm wishes to gain more information about it through experimentation we demonstrate that whether it is optimal for the firm to experiment at an advertising rate higher equal to or lower than the myopic one period level would depend on the specification of the response function finally we offer some empirical evidence for our assumption of a quadratic sales response function using time series data of twelve major brands of cigarettes

heterogeneity and government revenues higher taxes at the top abstract how effective is a more progressive tax scheme in raising revenues we answer this question in a life cycle economy with heterogeneity across households and endogenous labor supply our findings show that a tilt of the u s income tax schedule towards high earners leads to small increases in revenue maximal revenue in the long run is only 6 8 higher than in our benchmark about 0 8 of initial gdp while revenues from all sources increase by just about 0 6 our conclusions are that policy recommendations of this sort are misguided if the aim is to exclusively raise government revenue

aggregate comparative statics abstract in aggregative games each player s payoff depends on her own actions and an aggregate of the actions of all the players many common games in industrial organization political economy public economics and macroeconomics can be cast as aggregative games this paper provides a general and tractable framework for comparative static results in aggregative games we focus on two classes of games 1 aggregative games with strategic substitutes and 2 nice aggregative games where payoff functions are continuous and concave in own strategies we provide simple sufficient conditions under which positive shocks to individual players increase their own actions and have monotone effects on the aggregate the results are illustrated with applications to public good provision contests cournot competition and technology choices in oligopoly

rent seeking bureaucracies and oversight in a simple growth model abstract following recent cross country empirical work research on public policy and growth has come to examine the impact of inefficient or corrupt bureaucracies most of this work has emphasized the interactions of bureaucracies with private markets by contrast this paper focuses on the relationship between rent seeking bureaucracies and their political authority we show that when oversight is relatively costly as in many developing economies the political authority exercises little monitoring of its agencies which reduces the effectiveness of productive government spending moreover when the technology used to provide public services is poor bureaus better succeed in requesting overly large budgets before triggering any monitoring both of these characteristics contribute to reducing the growth rate of already poor economies

assessing the dynamic efficiency gains of tax reform when human capital is endogenous this paper develops a life cycle growth model with endogenous human capital accumulation and variable leisure which is employed to simulate dynamic equal yield changes from an income tax to a consumption tax although endogenizing human capital investment decisions raises partial equilibrium estimates of the efficiency costs of capital income taxation general equilibrium welfare impacts of unanticipated tax changes are little affected by the inclusion of endogenous human capital this finding cannot be fully explained by the presence of general equilibrium adjustments in factor prices and can be attributed in part to the existence of transitional rigidities in capital stocks copyright 1995 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

bureaucracy investment and growth abstract using data from 21 oecd economies for the period 1960 1990 we construct a measure of bureaucracy and show that it is negatively related to economic growth because it has a negative effect on investment

is growth corrupted or bureaucratic panel evidence from the enlarged eu abstractthis article aims at analysing the issue of conditional convergence in the new enlarged european union eu over the period 1995 2012 by means of panel data techniques we examined the issue of conditional convergence in the enlarged eu giving particular attention to the effects of corruption and bureaucracy on growth controlling for a widely used set of explanatory variables such as investment domestic and foreign human capital formation inflation general government final consumption and trade openness furthermore we examine if growth responds differently to corruption and bureaucracy in the new eu members by means of two group specific interaction variables to capture possible different responses to corruption and bureaucracy the analysis reveals evidence of conditional convergence in the enlarged eu with investment share foreign direct investment human capital and country openness appearing as robust growth drivers in contrast inflation and government consumption rather hamper gro

taxation of human capital and wage inequality a cross country analysis wage inequality has been significantly higher in the united states than in continental european countries ceu since the 1970s moreover this inequality gap has further widened during this period as the us has experienced a large increase in wage inequality whereas the ceu has seen only modest changes this paper studies the role of labor income tax policies for understanding these facts we begin by documenting two new empirical facts that link these inequality differences to tax policies first we show that countries with more progressive labor income tax schedules have significantly lower before tax wage inequality at different points in time second progressivity is also negatively correlated with the rise in wage inequality during this period we then construct a life cycle model in which individuals decide each period whether to go to school work or be unemployed individuals can accumulate skills either in school or while working wage inequality arises from differences across individuals in their ability to learn new skills as well as from idiosyncratic shocks progressive taxation compresses the after tax wage structure thereby distorting the incentives to accumulate human capital in turn reducing the cross sectional dispersion of before tax wages we find that these policies can account for half of the difference between the us and the ceu in overall wage inequality and 76 of the difference in inequality at the upper end log 90 50 differential when this economy experiences skill biased technological change progressivity also dampens the rise in wage dispersion over time the model explains 41 of the difference in the total rise in inequality and 58 of the difference at the upper end

modeling response to advertising and pricing changes for v 8 cocktail vegetable juice this paper is based on a series of studies undertaken for v 8 cocktail vegetable juice over a five year period the studies were a consequence of management questions regarding the effectiveness of a new advertising campaign the best media mix for this campaign and the apparent wear out of the advertising copy the studies included controlled experimentation estimation of advertising response functions and exploration of price sensitivity following major price increases by v 8 it was found that the short term response to advertising was s shaped and that the new creative approach rather than expenditure levels alone accounted for by far the largest component of the impact of advertising on sales it was also found that for a short period following the major price increases v 8 became extremely price sensitive however after about six months the marginal impact of price returned to historical levels the application of results at campbell soup company their relationship to the literature and their implications for both researchers and practitioners are discussed

the effect of taxation on human capital this study finds a significant negative effect of proportional income taxation on human capital of the few earlier studies to address this issue most suggested a negligible effect of taxation on investment in human capital this earlier conclusion is shown to be incorrect by using a model that is more general in several respects than the models used previously

the price elasticity of selective demand a meta analysis of econometric models of sales the author describes a meta analysis of econometric studies that estimated the elasticity of selective sales or market share to price the literature review yielded 367 suitable price elasticities

regression toward mediocrity in economic stature this paper provides estimates of the correlation in lifetime earnings between fathers and sons intergenerational data from the national longitudinal survey are used earlier studies conducted for the united states report elasticities of children s earnings with respect to parent s earnings of 0 2 or less suggesting extensive integenerational mobility these estimates however are biased downward by error contaminated measures of lifetime economic status estimates presented in this paper correct for the problem of measurement error and find the intergenerational correlation in income to be on the order of 0 4 this suggests considerably less intergenerational mobility than previously believed jel j62

rent seeking in a market with morality solving a puzzle about corporate social responsibility rent seeking by lobbying for government favors is generally thought to be wasteful in view of this wastefulness it is puzzling that rent seeking by corporations has not been criticized as a failure to be socially responsible or even as an unethical business practice this article examines the compatibility of rent seeking with corporate social responsibility by utilizing thomas dunfee s idea of a marketplace with morality this idea is useful for solving this puzzle because in considering whether rent seeking is compatible with corporate social responsibility it is necessary first to define rent seeking which this article argues is a normative concept and second to find some principled way of identifying rent seeking behavior it also solves the puzzle about rent seeking by revealing that the concept of rent seeking itself is of little use in determining whether certain conduct is or is not socially responsible since rent seeking activity cannot be identified without first evaluating which activity is rent seeking

the industrial structure of the california assembly committee assignments economic interests and campaign contributions this paper examines the provision of campaign contributions made by economic interests to incumbents seeking reelection in the 1984 1986 and 1988 california assembly elections the study tests whether the distribution of campaign contributions by specific industrial sectors corresponds to legislator possession of the policy property rights associated with membership on relevant assembly standing committees a non parametric statistical model compares the distribution of campaign contributions from groups within a given industrial sector to members of relevant policy committees with the distribution of contributions from all other contributor classes the empirical analysis confirms that committee assignments significantly affect the allocation of special interest resources in assembly elections substantiating the importance of institutional considerations in influencing special interest activity

ideological conviction and persuasion in the rent seeking society abstract the paper develops a model of rent seeking in a democratic political context where voting as well as rent seeking matters in this context the paper demonstrates that voter ideology is a constraint on the rent seeking game as well as a possible avenue of rent seeking in a setting where there are both rent seeking and ideological interest groups rent seekers can free ride on the efforts of ideologues which tends to reduce rent seeking effort in a setting where complementary economic and ideological interest groups coordinate their efforts both rent seeking and ideological conflict tend to increase

collective rent dissipation the theory of rent seeking was initiated by tullock 1967 1980 followed by krueger 1974 and posner 1975 and more recently extended in various directions by allard 1988 appelbaum and katz 1986a b c gradstein and nitzan 1989 hillman and katz 1984 1987 hillman and samet 1987 hillman and riley 1989 katz et al 1990 long and vousden 1987 ursprung 1990 and varian 1989 the purpose of this paper is to extend this theory by introducing the possibility of collective group rent seeking with voluntary individual decisions regarding their extent of participation in the collective rent seeking efforts

a welfare analysis of social security in a dynastic framework in this article we study the welfare effects of unfunded social security in a general equilibrium model populated with overlapping generations of altruistic individuals that differ in lifetime expectancy and earnings ability contrary to previous research our results indicate that steady state welfare increases with social security for most households although by very different amounts this result is mainly due to two factors first the presence of two sided altruism significantly mitigates the crowding out effect of unfunded social security second ability shocks and uncertain lifetimes generate significant heterogeneity among households to yield different induced preferences for social security

international comparisons of the distribution of household wealth this volume reports some of the latest available evidence on inequality in household wealth for canada france sweden the uk the usa and west germany the findings can be summarized under three headings the first is the gradual but persistent decline in the degree of wealth inequality among households during the twentieth century second despite this significant downward trend in inequality household wealth is still highly concentrated today third if social security is also included in the household portfolio it can be seen that the development of retirement systems has equalized wealth holdings academic and government economists and social administrators graduate courses on income distribution

participation in deterministic contests abstract this paper considers participation in deterministic contests for m 1 identical prizes which employ an auction like rule to determine the winners in most papers that investigate such models participation by precisely m 1 players is associated with players having complete information about their opponents characteristics and participation by more than m 1 players is associated with players having incomplete information about their opponents characteristics i show that incomplete information is in fact neither sufficient nor necessary for participation by more than m 1 players

rent seeking with regretful agents theory and experiment abstract we investigate both theoretically and experimentally the role that information disclosure has on behavior in all pay environments in which all agents must exert costly effort but only the winner is rewarded through the lens of all pay auctions we show that bidders who have regret concerns when they lose an auction may alter their bids whether or not information about the winning bid is disclosed all losing bidders regret not bidding 0 however when feedback on the winning bid is provided those bidders who lost at an affordable price may regret not bidding more we show that the former effect causes bidders to lower their bids while the latter effect causes bidders to raise their bids our experimental results indicate overbidding whether or not the winning bid is disclosed to losing bidders however disclosing the winning bid leads to even more aggressive bidding increases revenues decreases the frequency of dropouts and also leads to more efficient allocations thus our results show that information disclosure is a powerful tool that mechanism designers may wish to exploit to extract more rents in all pay environments

beyond education and fairness a labor market taxation model for the great gatsby curve i introduction an intergenerational income elasticity he for a particular country can be thought of as the fraction of a 1 permanent income increase given to a parent that is observed on average in the permanent income of a child thus estimates of the iie are sometimes viewed as a summary measure of the intergenerational economic mobility in a particular country in a 2012 speech then chairman of the u s council of economic advisers alan krueger emphasized the importance of the strong positive cross country correlation between contemporary measures of economic inequality and economic mobility as measured by the iie he further dubbed a graph of this relationship the great gatsby curve although this witty designation is novel the correlation it refers to has been the subject of a great deal of economic research indeed even before the availability of reliable iie data for many countries seshadri and yuki 2004 as well as erosa and koreshkova 2007 provided intergenerational models calibrated to the u s economy that explored potential taxation and transfer mechanisms linking contemporary inequality and mobility however as accurate estimates of this relationship have become available for an increasing number of countries applied researchers investigating the cross country divergence of iies bjorklund and jantti 2009 blanden 2009 corak 2013b have been more heavily influenced by the theoretical model proposed by solon 1999 as later clarified and expanded in solon 2004 which builds on the fundamental model of human capital transmission proposed by becker and tomes 1979 the augmented solon model deliberately focuses on one potential mechanism underlying differences in the iie more specifically differential cross country intergenerational mobility primarily arises in the solon model from the differential government responses to the borrowing constraints faced by the parents of poor children while all parents can choose to make human capital investments in their children they can only finance these investments out of their own lifetime earnings and are unable to borrow against the future earnings of the child these borrowing constraints lead to less investment in human capital by poor parents and subsequently lower earnings for poor children the model also allows governments to address this inequality by investing in the human capital of the future generation in a progressive manner more investment at lower parental incomes thus variations in government policy choices over educational investment combine with existing constraints created by income inequality to produce varying mobility across countries this model is particularly attractive to applied researchers because it provides a clear policy relevant interpretation of the equation parameter most commonly used in the actual empirical estimation of iies another attractive feature of the solon model is that it makes a number of testable empirical claims about this he parameter intergenerational mobility should be positively correlated with cross sectional mobility as well as with government educational investment in the poor the he should also be higher in countries where labor markets provide greater returns to schooling empirical work in highly developed countries has provided preliminary evidence supporting these claims for example ichino karabarbounis and moretti 2011 find a negative relationship between government spending on education particularly at the primary level and he across a dozen countries while mayer and lopoo 2008 find the same pattern holds across u s states blanden 2009 also finds this pattern and goes further to show positive cross country correlations between he and both cross sectional inequality and the returns to education 1 while many predictions of this class of model are borne out in the data there is less evidence in support of the primary mechanism it articulates to produce cross country variation in intergenerational mobility namely a differential response to the borrowing constraints faced by some families in childhood human capital markets

how important is human capital a quantitative theory assessment of world income inequality we develop a quantitative theory of human capital investment in order to evaluate the magnitude of cross country dierences in total factor productivity tfp that explains the variation in per capita incomes across countries we build a heterogeneousagent economy with cross sectional variation in ability schooling and expenditures on schooling quality in our theory the parameters governing human capital production and random ability process have important implications for a set of cross sectional statistics mincer return variance of earnings variance of schooling and intergenerational correlation of earnings these restrictions of the theory and u s household data are used to pin down the key parameters driving the quantitative implications of the theory our main finding is that human capital accumulation strongly amplifies tfp dierences across countries in particular we find an elasticity of output per worker with respect to tfp of 2 8 a 3 fold dierence in tfp explains a 20 fold dierence in output per worker we argue that the cross country dierences in human capital implied by the theory are consistent with a wide array of evidence including earnings of immigrants in the united states average mincer returns across countries and the relationship between average years of schooling and per capita income across countries the theory implies that using mincer returns to measure human capital understates dierences across countries by a factor of 2

time preference and the distributions of wealth and income this paper presents a dynamic competitive equilibrium model in which heterogeneity in time preferences alone can generate the observed patterns of wealth and income inequality in the united states this model generalizes the standard deterministic neoclassical growth model by introducing i a direct preference for wealth by the consumers and ii human capital formation the rst feature prevents the wealth distribution from collapsing into a degenerate distribution the second feature generates a strong positive correlation between earnings and wealth across agents a calibrated version of this model is able to replicate the wealth and income distributions of the united states

on the optimality of age dependent taxes and the progressive u s tax system abstract in life cycle economies where an individual s optimal consumption work plan is almost never constant the optimal marginal tax rates on capital and labor income vary with age conversely the progressivity imbedded in the u s tax code implies that marginal tax rates vary with age because tax rates vary with earnings and earnings vary with age using numerical simulations this paper shows that if the tax authority is prevented from conditioning tax rates on age some degree of progressivity is desirable as progressive taxation better imitates optimal age dependent taxes than an optimal age independent tax system this role for progressive taxation emanates from efficiency reasons and does not rely on any insurance nor re distribution arguments

reexamining efficient rent seeking in laboratory markets given millner and pratt s 1989 finding of behavior inconsistent with theory we reexamine efficient rent seeking in experimental markets we show that a when r 3 no nash equilibrium exists and therefore behavior has no theoretical benchmark to judge consistency and b when r 1 with a new experimental design utilizing an explicit expected payoff matrix rent seeking behavior is consistent with both nash equilibrium and dissipation hypotheses

income and wealth heterogeneity in the macroeconomy how do movements in the distribution of income and wealth affect the macroeconomy we analyze this question using a calibrated version of the stochastic growth model with partially uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and movements in aggregate productivity our main finding is that in the stationary stochastic equilibrium the behavior of the macroeconomic aggregates can be almost perfectly described using only the mean of the wealth distribution this result is robust to substantial changes in both parameter values and model specification our benchmark model whose only difference from the representative agent framework is the existence of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk displays far less cross sectional dispersion and skewness in wealth than u s data however an extension that relies on a small amount of heterogeneity in thrift does succeed in replicating the key features of the wealth data furthermore this extension features aggregate time series that depart significantly from permanent income behavior

diversity and economic performance in a model with progressive taxation is a more heterogeneous population beneficial or harmful to long term economic performance this paper addresses this and other questions in a dynamic general equilibrium model where consumers have different labour productivity and time preference we show how differences in the cross sectional distribution of these characteristics can affect the economy via two channels the first one involves changing the composition of the labour force and the second one involves changing the cross sectional distribution of marginal tax rate we show how these channels are respectively determined by the shape of the labour supply function and the curvature of the marginal tax function

economic performance through time prize lecture to the memory of alfred nobel december 9 1993 this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

flat tax reform a quantitative exploration abstract this paper explores quantitatively the general equilibrium implications of a revenue neutral tax reform in which the current income and capital income tax structure in the u s is replaced by a flat tax as proposed by hall and rabushka 1995 the flat tax 2nd ed hoover the central aspects of such reform the impact of tax reform on capital accumulation and labor supply as well as its distributional consequences are analyzed in a dynamic general equilibrium model main results are that i the elimination of the actual taxation of capital income has an important and positive effect on capital accumulation ii mean labor hours are relatively constant across tax systems but aggregate labor in efficiency units increases iii in all circumstances analyzed the distributions of earnings income and especially wealth become more concentrated

taxing top earners a human capital perspective we assess the consequences of substantially increasing the marginal tax rate on u s top earners using a human capital model we nd that 1 the peak of the model laer curve occurs at a 52 percent top tax rate 2 if human capital were exogenous then the top of the laer curve would occur at a 66 percent top tax rate and 3 applying the theory and methods that diamond and saez 2011 use to provide quantitative guidance for setting the top tax rate to model data produces a tax rate that substantially exceeds 52 percent

analysis of the conditional stock return distribution under incomplete specification abstract the analysis of the distribution of the stock returns plays an important role in financial theory since a distributional assumption is required for mean variance portfolio theory theoretical models of capital asset prices determining the price of derivative products efficient estimation by maximum likelihood procedure and establishing forecasting confidence intervals up to now most of the studies analyze the unconditional distribution of the stock returns using the likelihood ratio test the schwarz information criterion or by graphical analysis however the analysis of the conditional distribution is very important since most of the empirical financial studies use high frequency data and these data present dynamic structure in this paper we focus on the conditional distribution we design different bootstrap mechanisms for comparing the goodness of fit of several functional forms postulated under the null hypothesis for individual spanish stocks and for the general index of the madrid stock market we use the cramer von mises test statistic based on the standardized residuals and assuming that the null distribution can depend on some unknown parameters

tax policy and human capital formation missing from recent discussions of tax reform is any systematic analysis of the effects of various tax proposals on skill formation this gap in the literature in empirical public finance is due to the absence of any empirically based general equilibrium models with both human capital formation and physical capital formation that are consistent with observations on modern labor markets this paper is a progress report on our ongoing research on formulating and estimating dynamic general equilibrium models with endogenous heterogeneous human capital accumulation our model explains many features of rising wage inequality in the u s economy james heckman lance lochner and christopher taber 1998 in this paper we use our model to study the impacts on skill formation of proposals to switch from progressive taxes to flat income and consumption taxes for the sake of brevity we focus on steady states in this paper although we study both transitions and steady states in our research this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

progressive taxation in a dynastic model of human capital abstract we develop a quantitative theory of economic inequality to investigate the effects of replacing the current u s progressive income tax system with a proportional one the cross sectional implications of the theory are used to discipline the assessment of the effects of tax policy and circumvent the lack of conclusive micro evidence on the parameterization of the human capital production technology we find that the elimination of progressive taxation increases steady state level of output by 12 6 capital by 21 8 and consumption by 13 2 moreover it increases economic inequality and its persistence across generations

altruism incomplete markets and tax reform abstract we compute the welfare effects of different revenue neutral tax reforms that eliminate capital income taxation in two general equilibrium models calibrated to the u s economy in our dynastic model the reform with the largest welfare gain is the one that eliminates all income taxation and increases the consumption tax to 35 75 of the population alive at the time of the reform benefit from it individuals use intervivos transfers and bequests to redistribute the long run benefits in a pure life cycle economy that lacks this redistribution technology we find that the same reform would benefit only 9 of the population

minding the gap between schools and universities abstract during the 2000s decade governments in south america reallocated per student public expenditures from tertiary to basic education potentially alleviating the economic gap between students in public schools and public universities to investigate the welfare and macroeconomic effects of such types of policies we build and calibrate a general equilibrium model using brazilian data from the beginning of the 2000s we find that the optimal utilitarian policy allocates per student public expenditures equally across education stages benefits almost the entirety of households delivers significant welfare gains to the poorest families and cuts back income inequality we also use our framework to investigate economic differences between brazil and the united states and find that differences in the supply of vacancies in public universities is the education policy aspect that alone has the highest explanatory power over aggregate earnings and college attendance differences between the two countries

incentive contracts and elections for politicians with multi task problems abstract we consider a model with a politician facing a multi task problem while in office the reelection mechanism distorts the allocation of effort in favor of tasks whose outcomes can be measured more precisely than others we show that a combination of elections and incentive contracts can alleviate this inefficiency the incentive contract does not require direct information about the performance of the politician and is self financing across terms

risk aversion heterogeneity and contests we introduce a novel method of modellingcontests that avoids the complexitiesencountered by the best response function approach we analyse contests in which i there are many risk averse players ii attitudes to risk may differ acrossindividuals and iii the technology thattransforms rent seeking effort intoprobability of winning may also differacross individuals we establish that ifevery player has a constant degree ofabsolute risk aversion a uniqueequilibrium exists we also establishcomparative static results and examine howthe level of rent dissipation is affectedby the heterogeneity of attitudes towardsrisk and the precise nature of the technology

contest efforts in light of behavioural considerations this study shows that distortion of probabilities is a possible reason for rent under dissipation incontests with relatively small number of participants such distortion may also result however inover dissipation of the contested rent focusing on contests with homogeneous contestants and thecommonly studied contest success function our main results clarify under what circumstances i rents are more under dissipated relative to the standard situation where probabilities are notdistorted ii rents are under dissipated yet less intensely relative to the standard situation whereprobabilities are not distorted iii rents are over dissipated and iv the contest does not possess asymmetric interior equilibrium in pure strategies

consumption and risk sharing over the life cycle a striking feature of u s data on income and consumption is that inequality increases with age this paper asks if individual specific earnings risk can provide a coherent explanation we find that it can we construct an overlapping generations general equilibrium model in which households face uninsurable earnings shocks over the course of their lifetimes earnings inequality is exogenous and is calibrated to match data from the u s panel study on income dynamics consumption inequality is endogenous and matches well data from the u s consumer expenditure survey the total risk households face is decomposed into that realized before entering the labor market and that realized throughout the working years in welfare terms the latter is found to be more important than the former

multistage multiproduct advertising budgeting abstract we propose and analyze an effective model for the multistage multiproduct advertising budgeting problem this model optimizes the advertising investment for several products by considering cross elasticities different sales drivers and the whole planning horizon we derive a simple procedure to compute the optimal advertising budget and its optimal allocation the model was tested to plan a realistic advertising campaign we observed that the multistage approach may significantly increase the advertising profit compared to the successive application of the single stage approach

lottery versus all pay auction models of lobbying i first provide a complete characterization of the unique equilibrium of the lottery game by n lobbyists with asymmetric valuations and then compare the lottery and the all pay auction models of lobbying i show that the exclusion principle discovered by baye kovenock and de vries 1993 for all pay auction does not apply to lottery i also show that the perverse effect that an exogenous cap may increase the total lobbying expenditure in a two bidder all pay auction discovered by che and gale 1998 does not apply to lottery

distributional coalitions and the politics of economic reform in latin america for much of the discipline of economics a closed economy is seen as the result of efforts of distributional coalitions and rent seekers to maintain sector specific protections accordingly economic liberalization is explained by the policy consistency of uncompromising reform elites students of the politics of economic adjustment in the developing world in turn have argued that reform programs concentrate costs in the present and disperse benefits in the future hence losers are prepared to engage in collective action whereas prospective winners facing uncertainty about payoffs remain disorganized they thus posit the cohesiveness and insularity of policymakers as the main variable for explaining successful reform both economists and political scientists therefore adopt a collective action approach that overlooks how groups organize in support of liberalization in the recent latin american experience however these reforms have preserved market reserves for firms that provided vital political support to and often colluded with policymaking elites this setting has thus reproduced incentives for rent seeking behavior even in the presence of comprehensive liberalization this evidence supports two interrelated theoretical claims first distributional coalitions may proliferate when the state withdraws from the economy not only when it intervenes second interest based variables retain explanatory power in political economy which state autonomy arguments disregard irrespective of whether the economy is closed or open which neoclassical perspectives overlook to highlight the centrality of interest groups favoring marketization therefore the article suggests modifications to the dominant theories of collective action and the literature on the politics of economic adjustment

cultural institutions and value formation on the art market a rent seeking approach the formation of value in the artistic market can be specifically affected by the behavior of cultural institutions acting on it as monopolistic quality certifiers the rent maximizing strategy limits quantities to sub optimum levels and keeps prices and costs higher this can be worsened by institutional rent seeking the establishment s strategies cannot always be matched through public policies because this can result in an increase of monopoly social losses and of the establishment s lobbying efforts

ambiguous political power and contest efforts when there is incomplete information on the source of power in a contest the contestants may divide their lobbying efforts between the potential centers of power only one of which determines the contests winning probabilities our analysis focuses on the effect of ambiguity regarding the source of power on the contestants aggregate effort in a symmetric simple lottery contest with two potential centers of power specifically we examine the effects of varying the informativeness of the contestants private signals i e the probability that a signal is correct and the degree of correlation between them our benchmark case is the standard tullock s model in which the source of power is known i e the contestants signals are perfectly informative we show that the level of aggregate effort in this case is reached also when the signals are perfectly uninformative however in any intermediate case the contestants aggregate effort is lower provided that the signals are not perfectly correlated in other words there is a u shape relationship between the informativeness of the signals and the aggregate effort in the contest the lowest level of effort is spent when the signals are independent and the probability that a signal is true is about 0 85 in this case efforts are reduced by about one fifth in comparison with the benchmark case from a rent dissipation of 50 to slightly over 40