bargaining over governments in a stochastic environment in this paper i structurally estimate a stochastic bargaining model of government formation in a multiparty parliamentary democracy and i conduct policy experiments to evaluate the effects of changes in the bargaining procedure i show that the model fits well data on the duration of negotiations and government durations in postwar italy also i show that changes in the proposer selection process would not affect either the duration of negotiations or government durations whereas the imposition of a strict deadline would in general reduce the incentives to delay agreement as well as government durations

governance and agricultural productivity a cross national analysis abstract in this study we examine the relationship between governance and agricultural performance by employing the world bank s aggregate governance indicators based on a cross country panel sample two methods are employed to test the hypothesis that better governance fosters agricultural productivity the empirical results of both methods support the hypothesis as for the first method the estimation results of the widely used inter country aggregate agricultural production function show that a country with better governance can produce more agricultural outputs given the same amounts of agricultural inputs the same education level and the same climate condition as for the second method the empirical results of a structural equation model reveal that given the same amounts of agricultural capital stock and land an agricultural worker in a country with better governance produces more better governance can indirectly improve agricultural productivity by driving agricultural capital accumulation our empirical work lends support to the claim of hayami and ruttan hayami y ruttan v 1985 agricultural development an international perspective john hopkins university press baltimore that governance is a basic factor explaining the poor economic performance of many developing countries in order to improve the agricultural performance of many developing countries apart from physical and education investments more emphasis should be placed on improving the governance infrastructure of these countries

optimal aging and death understanding the preston curve does prosperity lead to greater longevity if so what is the strength of the income channel to address these questions we develop a life cycle model in which households are subject to physiological aging in modeling aging we draw on recent research in the elds of biology and medicine the speed of the aging process and thus the time of death are endogenously determined by optimal health investments a calibrated version of the model accounts well for the observed non linear cross country link between longevity and income also known as the preston curve

the effect of income on mortality evidence from the social security notch abstract legislation in the 1970s created a notch in social security payments with those born after january 1 1917 receiving sharply lower benefits using restricted use versions of the national mortality detail file combined with census data we use this quasi experiment to examine the income mortality link in an elderly population estimates from difference in difference and regression discontinuity models show the higher income group has a statistically significantly higher mortality rate contradicting the previous literature we also found that younger cohorts responded to lower incomes by increasing postretirement work effort suggesting that moderate employment has beneficial health effects for the elderly

political and institutional determinants of fiscal policy in the european community in recent theoretical and empirical research the variation in political and institutional arrangements which may affect the process of national policy formation is examined in order to explain cross country differences with respect to fiscal policies pursued in this paper we build upon this literature and examine whether and how cross country differences in debt accumulation and public sector size of member countries of the european community during the 1980s can be explained we conclude that the growth of government debt is positively related to the frequency of government changes and negatively to sound budgetary procedures in countries with left wing governments the growth of the share of government spending in total output generally tends to be higher

an institutional critique of intergovernmentalism most intergovernmentalist analyses of european integration focus on treaty bargaining among european union member governments recent articles also have examined everyday decision making through power index analysis an approach that asserts that a government s ability to influence policy is a function of all possible coalitions in the council of ministers to which it is pivotal this approach suffers from two major weaknesses first it fails to take into account the policy preferences of governments it overestimates the influence of governments holding extreme preferences and underestimates that of more centrist governments second power index analysis fails to consider the important roles of the commission of the european communities and the european parliament in legislative processes today s procedures affect the mix of agenda setting and veto power and this has systematic effects on policy outcomes if intergovernmentalism is to explain choices made during treaty rounds it must take into account these legislative dynamics

socio economic status health and lifestyle abstract the role of lifestyle in mediating the relationship between socio economic characteristics and health has been discussed extensively in the epidemiological and economic literatures previous analyses have not considered a formal framework incorporating unobservable heterogeneity in this paper we develop a simple economic model in which health is determined partially by lifestyle which depends on preferences budget and time constraints and unobservable characteristics we estimate a recursive empirical specification consisting of a health production function and reduced forms for the lifestyle equations using maximum simulated likelihood msl for a multivariate probit mvp model with discrete indicators of lifestyle choices and self assessed health sah on british panel data from the 1984 and 1991 health and lifestyle survey hals we find that sleeping well exercising and not smoking in 1984 have dramatic positive effects on the probability of reporting excellent or good sah in 1991 and that these effects are much larger having accounted for endogeneity the failure of epidemiological analyses to account for unobserved heterogeneity can explain their low estimates of the relevance of lifestyle in the socio economic status health relationship indicators for prudent alcohol consumption and eating breakfast in 1984 are not found to be statistically significant determinants of sah in 1991

estimating the effect of income on health and mortality using lottery prizes as an exogenous source of variation in income a vast literature has established a strong positive relation between income and health status and a negative relation with mortality this paper studies the effects of income on health and mortality using only the part of income variation due to a truly exogenous factor monetary lottery prizes of individuals the findings are that higher income causally generates good health and that this effect is of a similar magnitude as when traditional estimation techniques are used a 10 percent income increase improves health by about 4 5 percent of a standard deviation

the power of the proposal maker in a model of endogenous agenda formation in a distributive setting this study examines a voting procedure for which agenda formation is endogenous it is found not surprisingly that agenda formation is another avenue for strategic manipulation of the voting process and provides the member to first take the floor an asymmetric advantage what is surprising is the degree of this advantage we find that the initial proposal maker earns a share of the fixed resource exceeding 1 for an majority rule and this is regardless of the number of members the voting rule is found to be an effective instrument in at least partially offsetting the power of the proposal maker while maintaining the stability of the voting process

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

wealth and health behavior testing the concept of a health cost wealthier individuals engage in healthier behavior this paper seeks to explain this phenomenon by exploiting both inheritances and lottery winnings to test a theory of health behavior we distinguish between the direct monetary cost and the indirect health cost value of health lost of unhealthy consumption the health cost increases with wealth and the degree of unhealthiness leading wealthier individuals to consume more healthy and moderately unhealthy but fewer severely unhealthy goods the empirical evidence presented suggests that differences in health costs may indeed partially explain behavioral differences and ultimately health outcomes between wealth groups

exploring the health wealth nexus the causal links between health and economic resources have long concerned social scientists we use four waves of data from the panel study of income dynamics psid to analyze the impact of wealth upon an individual s health status the difficulty in approaching this task that has bedeviled previous studies is that wealth may be endogenous a priori it is just as likely that changes in health affect wealth as vice versa we argue that inheritance is a suitable instrument for the change in wealth and implement a straightforward instrumental variables strategy to deal with this problem our results suggest that the causal relationship running from wealth to health may not be as strong as first appears in the data wealth exerts a positive and statistically significant effect on health status but it is very small in magnitude instrumental variables estimation leaves the point estimate approximately the same but renders it insignificantly different from zero and even when the point estimate is increased by twice its standard error s e the quantitative effect is small we conclude that the wealth health connection is not driven by short run changes in wealth

government spending and budget deficits in the industrial economies fiscal policy nouriel roubini and jeffrey sachs this paper examines the evolution of the size of government and of budget deficits in oecd economies we highlight the rapid increase in government spending in the 1970s the sharp rise in budget deficits and public debt after 1973 and the reversal in these trends in the 1980s the increase in the size of government was associated in part with the slowdown in growth after 1973 but also reflected gradual adjustment of the ratio of spending to output towards a long run target which depends on political and institutional characteristics of the economy the political orientation of the government the degree of wage indexation and the degree of stability of the political system such factors also explain the size of budget deficits when faced with an adverse shock subsequent deficit reduction requires a measure of political consensus we note that such consensus is hard to achieve in multi party coalitions in consequence countries with such a political structure tended in consequence countries with such a political structure tended toin consequence countries with such a political structure tended to experience much more rapid increases in their debt gnp ratios

a structural model of government formation in this paper we estimate a bargaining model of government formation in parliamentary democracies we use the estimated structural model to conduct constitutional experiments aimed at evaluating the impact of institutional features of the political environment on the duration of the government formation process the type of coalitions that form and their relative stability

government strength power dispersion in governments and budget deficits in oecd countries a voting power approach we test for the influenceof government strength and dispersion ofpower among the parties of coalitiongovernments on the size of annual debtaccumulation through budget deficits inoecd countries from 1970 to 1999 government strength and power dispersion incoalition governments are measured by thebanzhaf index of voting power respectivelythe standard deviation of banzhaf indicesof coalition parties we believe that theseare better suited proxies than most of whathas been applied so far governmentstrength turns out to be insignificant however coalitions with equally strongpartners run significantly higher deficitsthan coalitions with one dominating party

policies to promote cereal intensification in ethiopia the search for appropriate public and private roles over the past decade policymakers have been searching for an appropriate blend of public and private sector roles to accelerate the intensification of food staple production smallholder commercialization and sustainable market development in sub saharan africa in ethiopia steps taken to liberalize markets in the 1990s and promote fertilizer and seed packages have yet to generate payoffs in terms of higher cereal yields lower food prices or reduced dependency on food aid this raises concern about the performance of the agricultural sector specifically in terms of the systems for providing improved seed fertilizer credit and extension services this paper examines the evolving roles of the public and private sectors in intensifying cereal production in ethiopia findings suggest that while ethiopia has an admirable record of supporting agriculture its state led policies has now outlived their usefulness these findings for ethiopia offer lessons that are potentially applicable to other sub saharan african countries facing similar challenges

the meaning of death some simulations of a model of healthy and unhealthy consumption simulations of a model of healthy and unhealthy consumption are used to investigate the impact of various terminal conditions on life span pathways of health related consumption and health a model in which life span and the death stock of health are fixed is compared to versions in which i the death stock of health is freely chosen ii life span is freely chosen iii both the death stock of health and life span are freely chosen the choice of terminal conditions has a striking impact on optimal plans results are discussed with reference to the existing demand for health literature and illustrate the application of iterative processes to determine optimal life span the role played by the marginal value of health capital in determining optimal plans and the importance of checking the second order conditions for the optimal choice of life span

government turnover in parliamentary democracies in this paper we consider a dynamic model of government formation and termination in parliamentary democracies that accounts for the following phenomena 1 cabinet terminations due to replacement or early election 2 cabinet reshuf es 3 minority and surplus governments 4 the relative instability of minority governments

a model of the demand for longevity and the value of life extension we specify a demand function for longevity or quantity of life along with corresponding demand functions for indicators of quality of life and a value of health and life extension function we show that the demand for health must be derived in conjunction with that for longevity and the related consumption plan and that all choices depend on initial individual endowments and terminal conditions our comparative dynamics predictions indicate that optimal health and longevity are increasing functions of endowed wealth rather than necessarily current income that improvements in opportunities to produce health can accentuate the differences between endowed health and attained longevity levels and that the value individuals ascribe to their health may be increasing over a good portion of their life cycle we use this model to analyze observed empirical variations in levels and trends of life expectancy and in exposure to health risks across different population groups

the effect of inheritance receipt on retirement abstract this paper provides new evidence on how wealth shocks influence retirement behavior economic theory generally posits that leisure is a normal good yet it is difficult to obtain reliable empirical estimates of the wealth effect because wealth is correlated with numerous unobservable characteristics that affect labor supply we use inheritance receipt as a wealth shock and find that it is associated with a significant increase in the probability of retirement especially when the inheritance is unexpected this evidence has important implications for how public policies such as pension or tax reform may influence retirement behavior through the wealth effect

health and wealth of elderly couples causality tests using dynamic panel data models a positive relationship between socio economic status ses and health the health wealth gradient is repeatedly found in many industrialized countries this study analyzes competing explanations for this gradient causal effects from health to wealth health causation and causal effects from wealth to health wealth or social causation using six biennial waves of couples aged 51 61 in 1992 from the us health and retirement study we test for causality in panel data models incorporating unobserved heterogeneity and a lag structure supported by specification tests in contrast to tests relying on models with only first order lags or without unobserved heterogeneity these tests provide no evidence of causal wealth health effects on the other hand we find strong evidence of causal effects from both spouses health on household wealth we also find an effect of the husband s health on the wife s mental health but no other effects from one spouse s health to health of the other spouse

fragmented government effects on fiscal policy new evidence most industrialized countries entered the 1980s with their public finances in disarray at the time persistent deficits pushed up public debt to gdpratios despite such similarities deficit spending varies substantially between countries and within countries over time recent theoretical and empirical research has considered how differences in political arrangements affecting national policy formation might explain variation in fiscal policies pursued using a panel of 22 oecd countries over the 1971 1996 period this paper extends previous literature on the effects of fragmented government on fiscal policy outcomes in various directions first we focus on data relating to central government instead of general government as all theories refer to central government second not only do we analyze the effect of size fragmentation of government we also examine government s position vis a vis parliament and government s political fragmentation we find evidence that more fragmented government defined in terms of the number of political parties in a coalition or the number of spending ministers have higher deficits there is also some evidence that governments that dispose of excess seats in parliament have lower deficits right wing governments appear to have been fiscally more responsible in the seventies political fragmentation does not affect government s budget deficit

stable governments and the allocation of policy portfolios different members of coalition governments typically have responsibility for different aspects or dimensions of policy such responsibilities are allocated as portfolios to government members given a distribution of such portfolios final government policy is derived as the accumulation of individual members decisions in regard to their respective responsibilities we develop a portfolio allocation model of government formation and policy decision in multiparty legislatures in particular we focus on stable portfolio allocations where a stable allocation is one that yields a policy that no legislative coalition is willing or able to overturn several notions of stability are considered and related to the usual concept of the core among the results are that although stable allocations are not guaranteed such allocations can exist with minority governments and that final policy outcomes associated with stable governments need not be centrist

estimating the effect of unearned income on labor supply earnings savings and consumption evidence from a survey of lottery players this paper provides empirical evidence about the effect of unearned income on earnings consumption and savings using an original survey of people playing the lottery in massachusetts in the mid 1980 s the effects of the magnitude of lottery prizes on economic behavior are analyzed the critical assumption is that among lottery winners the magnitude of the prize is randomly assigned it is found that unearned income reduces labor earnings with a marginal propensity to consume leisure of approximately 11 percent with larger effects for individuals between 55 and 65 years old after receiving about half their prize individuals saved about 16 percent

the political economy of fiscal policy an experimental study on the strategic use of deficits field data on the strategic use of deficits to limit thebudgetary scope of future governments are inconclusive aboutthe effects of political polarization or a government sre election probability on fiscal policy therefore wedesigned a controlled experiment to examine the strategic useof deficits using a within subjects design we find thatdeficits rise with a higher degree of polarization and a lowerreelection probability however in a between subjects designneither polarization nor reelection probabilities have asystematic effect we discuss the implications of ourexperimental results for empirical tests of the strategic useof deficits with field data

why are stabilizations delayed when a stabilization has significant distributional implications e g tax increases to eliminate a large budget deficit socioeconomic groups may attempt to shift the burden of stabilization onto other groups the process leading to stabilization becomes a war of attrition each group attempting to wait the others out and stabilization occurring only when one group concedes and bears a disproportionate share of the burden the authors solve for the expected time of stabilization in a model of rational delay and relate it to several political and economic variables they motivate this approach and its results by comparison to historical and current episodes copyright 1991 by american economic association

a theory of rational addiction we develop a theory of rational addiction in which rationality means a consistent plan to maximize utility over time strong addiction to a good requires a big effect of past consumption of the good on current consumption such powerful complementarities cause some steady states to be unstable they are an important part of our analysis because even small deviations from the consumption at an unstable steady state can lead to large cumulative rises over time in addictive consumption or to rapid falls in consumption to abstention our theory also implies that cold turkey is used to end strong addictions that addicts often go on binges that addicts respond more to permanent than to temporary changes in prices of addictive goods and that anxiety and tensions can precipitate an addiction

political determinants of budget deficits coalition effects versus minority effects this paper reexamines some recent empirical evidence on the hypothesis that institutional arrangements in the political process affect budget deficits the results of roubini and sachs 1989b are replicated and sensitivity analysis indicate that their results are robust however the main conclusion of roubini and sachs that coalition governments are less capable of budgetary discipline needs to be modified a reformulation of their variable representing political cohesion reveals that it captures the effects of minority governments rather than majority coalition governments the data support the hypothesis that it is harder to negotiate in parliament than within a government

liberalization of agricultural input markets in bangladesh process impact and lessons abstract the study takes a historical perspective to trace the path of evolutionary reforms in agricultural input markets of bangladesh it estimates the magnitude of the impact of these reforms on rice production the most important crop in bangladesh agriculture it is estimated that the production of rice could have been 20 32 lower than the level of 1992 1993 depending on the rice price that would have prevailed under alternative scenarios the 20 credit to market reform relates to a real rice price level 19 higher than the actual 1992 1993 prices the 32 credit to reform relates to the actual 1992 1993 price levels the lower contribution of reform 20 to increased production implies a loss to consumers not accounted for in the production benefit of reform while the higher contribution 32 of reform entails no loss to consumers the bottom line conclusion is that bangladesh without the market reforms described in the paper would have reverted back to the situation of regular food crisis and high rice prices as was the case historically the analysis of the process of reform provides interesting lessons for developing countries a gradual process based on a well designed sequencing of various steps of market reform particularly in the case of fertilizer was a crucial factor for success careful monitoring during the period of transition is another crucial factor that has to be institutionalized in the system second generation problems of market reforms particularly the emergence of an oligopolistic market structure are possible and warrant a cautionary watch

a positive theory of fiscal deficits and government debt this paper considers an economy in which policymakers with different preferences alternate in office as a result of elections government debt is used strategically by each policymaker to influence the choices of his successors if different policymakers disagree about the desired composition of government spending between two public goods the economy exhibits a deficits bias that is debt accumulation is higher than it would be with a social planner the equilibrium level of debt is larger the larger is the degree of polarization between alternating governments and the less likely it is that the current government will be re elected

the weak government thesis some new evidence this paper presents new evidence on the hypothesis that coalition governments will find it more difficult to keep their budgets in line after an adverse economic shock than do one party majoritarian governments the estimates are based on a broad sample of oecd countries for the period 1979 1995 using various specifications as suggested in the literature we do not find evidence that the type of government affects cross country variation in fiscal policy however the number of political parties in government affects central government debt growth

why a stubborn conservative would run a deficit policy with time inconsistent preferences a conservative government in favor of a low level of public consumption knows that it will be replaced by a government in favor of a larger level of public consumption we show that the resulting level of public consumption is in between the levels the two governments would choose if each were in power both in the present and in the future in particular we show that if the conservative government is more stubborn in a particular sense than the succeeding government the conservative government will borrow more than it would had it remained in power in the future

comparative politics and public finance we propose a model with micropolitical foundations to contrast different political regimes compared to a parliamentary regime the institutions of a presidential congressional regime produce fewer incentives for legislative cohesion but more separation of powers these differences are reflected in the size and composition of government spending a parliamentary regime has redistribution toward a majority less underprovision of public goods and more rents to politicians a presidential congressional regime has redistribution toward powerful minorities more underprovision of public goods but less rents to politicians the size of government is smaller under a presidential regime this last prediction is consistent with cross country data

do political variables affect fiscal policy adjustment decisions new empirical evidence we test eight hypotheses on political factors influencing the likelihood that a fiscal policy adjustment occurs we employ a panel discrete choice model for 20 oecd countries for the period 1970 2003 two different definitions of fiscal adjustments are used to capture the differences between rapid and gradual adjustments we find that these types of fiscal adjustment are primarily driven by economic factors and are hardly affected by political variables the likelihood that a rapid adjustment takes place is only influenced by upcoming elections while the likelihood that a gradual adjustment takes place increases in case of broad policy reform

the countervailing effects of competition on public goods provision when bargaining inefficiencies lead to bad outcomes political competition is widely recognized as a mediator of public goods provision through its salutary effect on incumbents electoral incentives we argue that political competition additionally mediates public goods provision by reducing the efficiency of legislative bargaining these countervailing forces may produce a net negative effect in places with weak parties and low transparency typical of many young democracies we provide evidence of a robust negative relationship between political competition and local public goods using panel data from mali tests of mechanisms corroborate our interpretation of this relationship as evidence of legislative bargaining inefficiencies to explore the generalizability of these findings we analyze cross country panel data and show that political competition leads to better worse public goods provision under high low levels of party system institutionalization the paper sheds light on why political competition is only selectively beneficial and underscores the importance of considering both the electoral and legislative arenas

mechanization in ghana emerging demand and the search for alternative supply models influential studies in the 1980s and early 1990s drew on the boserup ruthenberg theories of farming systems evolution to argue that african countries were not yet ready for widespread agricultural mechanization through applying the theories of farming systems evolution and of induced innovation in technical change this paper shows that demand for certain mechanized farming operations particularly plowing has emerged even among smallholders suggesting that supply issues may now be the main constraint to successful mechanization we therefore adopt a supply chain approach to analyze two types of mechanization practices in ghana i e a recent state led mechanization program and the private sector led service hiring market against an international perspective by drawing on three asian supply models we identify two major flaws in existing policies first the agricultural mechanization service centers that the government promotes fail to use tractors services with sufficient intensity second direct importation of agricultural machinery by the government inhibits imports of appropriate and affordable machinery in contrast the development of mechanized service hiring market in which medium and large scale farmers who are tractor owners provide hiring out services to small scale farmers represents a promising model for sustainable mechanization in ghana this private sector led second model is consistent with international experiences

the impact of income shocks on health evidence from cohort data we study the eect of permanent income innovations on health for a prime aged population using information on more than half a million individuals sampled over a twenty five year period in three dierent cross sectional surveys we aggregate data by date of birth cohort to construct a synthetic cohort dataset with details of income expenditure socio demographic factors health outcomes and selected risk factors we then exploit structural and arguably exogenous changes in cohort incomes over the eighties and nineties to uncover causal eects of permanent income shocks on health we find that such income innovations have little eects on health but do aect health behaviour and mortality

fragmented fiscal policy abstract this paper explores on a panel of 19 oecd countries the role of fragmentation in determining fiscal outcomes over the 1970 95 period we first define the notion of fragmentation of fiscal policy making as the degree to which the costs of a dollar of aggregate expenditure are internalized by individual decision makers empirically this notion has two key logical components the number of decision makers and the rules of the game or the budget process in turn the number of decision makers can refer to the number of parties in a coalition or the number of ministers in the cabinet we test all these determinants against each other and against perhaps the oldest explanation of all ideology we show that cabinet size and to a lesser degree coalition size and ideology are significant and robust determinants of fiscal outcomes in particular transfers are the budget items most affected by these factors

flexible integration emu and relative voting power in the eu this paper studies the implications offlexible integration in the european union itanalyses the voting power of member states in thecouncil of ministers when differently sized subgroupsof the eu are set up european monetary union isreferred to as the most important example of flexibleintegration the banzhaf index is calculated to studythe distribution of voting power in the decisionmaking process according to the stability and growthpact the results show considerable fluctuations especially for smaller countries in relative votingpower the latter being defined as the relationbetween voting power and relative voting weight

market deregulation trade liberalization and productive efficiency in bangladesh agriculture an empirical analysis the impact of trade liberalization and of market deregulation in general on the performance of agriculture remains contentious and empirical issue in the literature following the random coefficient frontier modelling framework this paper attempts to contribute to this debate by computing the farm specific productive efficiency indices in bangladesh agriculture before and after reform it also examines the impact of some farm specific and policy variables on productive efficiency the empirical results show that there are wide variations in productive efficiency across farms and regions and the average efficiency of all regions increased modestly by 8 percentage points from the pre reform to post reform period the efficiency differentials are largely explained by farm size infrastructure households off farm income and the reduction of government anti agricultural bias in relation to trade and domestic policies the implication of these results suggests the need for further policy reform to augment p

everyone likes a winner an empirical test of the effect of electoral closeness on turnout in a context of expressive voting under instrumental voting closer elections are expected to have higher turnout under expressive voting however turnout may increase with decreasing closeness when voters have a preference for winners an empirical test using data on belgian municipal elections supports this we find that turnout reaches a local maximum when the largest party in the election obtains just over 52 of the seats and then falls supporting the instrumental closeness argument there is however another turning point the presence of a highly dominating party receiving at least two thirds of the votes stimulates turnout despite the fact that dominance implies lower closeness

fiscal restraint and the political economy of emu while the principle of delegation has become well established on the national level for monetary policy fiscal policies remain in the hands of policy makers depending on rent seeking interest groups we argue that the maastricht treaty provides a unique international commitment that enables governments to follow restrictive fiscal policies by attributing their negative side effects to europe and to implement austerity measures despite rising unemployment or a decline in growth hence the popularity of the european idea is instrumented to enforce fiscal discipline the paper outlines the political economy framework and presents new econometric evidence

the political economy of deficit spending in nine industrialized parliamentary democracies the role of fiscal institutions this article analyzes the influence of four sets of factors on deficit spending in 9 industrialized parliamentary democracies during 1958 1990 this article analyzes the influence of these factors and introduces and tests the importance of an additional potential influence on the size of a country s fiscal deficit the strength of fiscal bureaucracy it is argued that the stronger a country s fiscal bureaucracy the lower its deficit ceteris paribus empirically the authors find that the state of a nation s economy heavily affects its deficit little systematic relationship is found between the ideology of the ruling political party and a nation s deficit or between the political strength of the ruling party and deficits in contrast to the findings of roubini and sachs finally it is found that the strength of a country s fiscal bureaucracy is an important influence on the deficit in these 9 industrialized parliamentary democracies

the relative size of windfall income and the permanent income hypothesis a reconciliation is offered for the diverse test results on friedman s permanent income hypothesis a large data sample of those receiving windfall income in the bureau of labor statistics 1972 1973 consumer expenditure survey is divided according to the size of the windfall relative to estimated permanent income a pattern of a declining marginal propensity to consume windfall income as the relative size of the windfall increases is apparent these results support the permanent income hypothesis for relatively large windfalls

the value of life and the rise in health spending over the past half century americans spent a rising share of total economic resources on health and enjoyed substantially longer lives as a result debate on health policy often focuses on limiting the growth of health spending we investigate an issue central to this debate is the growth of health spending a rational response to changing economic conditions notably the growth of income per person we develop a model based on standard economic assumptions and argue that this is indeed the case standard preferences of the kind used widely in economics to study consumption asset pricing and labor supply imply that health spending is a superior good with an income elasticity well above one as people get richer and consumption rises the marginal utility of consumption falls rapidly spending on health to extend life allows individuals to purchase additional periods of utility the marginal utility of life extension does not decline as a result the optimal composition of total spending shifts toward health and the health share grows along with income in projections based on the quantitative analysis of our model the optimal health share of spending seems likely to exceed 30 percent by the middle of the century

does early access to pension wealth improve health we examine the health impacts of early access to public pension wealth by exploiting a unique policy in singapore allowing individuals to withdraw a proportion of their pension savings after their 55th birthday for the identification we employ a regression discontinuity design by comparing individuals before and after their 55th birthday to address anticipated and lagged health impacts we adopt the donut regression discontinuity approach using nationally representative monthly panel data we find that early access to pension wealth improves self reported overall health

heterogeneous returns to chemical fertilizer at the intensive margins insights from nepal increased fertilizer use is considered important for agricultural development in low income countries promoting increased use of chemical fertilizer by lowering its price may be ineffective if demand is price inelastic in theory the price elasticity of demand depends on the returns to its use but the evidence is scarce furthermore while returns are often estimated for small changes in chemical fertilizer use returns to larger changes in its use intensive margins are less understood through the inter zonal comparisons in nepal we provide indicative evidence that greater returns to chemical fertilizer are associated with greater price elasticities of demand moreover the evidence suggests that returns at the intensive margins rather than returns to small changes may largely account for inter zonal differences in returns to chemical fertilizer within nepal the results suggest that better understanding the returns at the intensive margins is critical for effective agricultural inputs policies in developing countries

the generalized war of attrition abstract we model a war of attrition with n k firms competing for n prizes in a natural oligopoly context the k 1 lowest value firms drop out instantaneously even though each firm s value is private information to itself in a standard setting context in which every competitor suffers losses until a standard is chosen even after giving up on its own preferred alternative each firm s exit time is independent both of k and of other players actions our results explain how long it takes to form a winning coalition in politics solving the model is facilitated by the revenue equivalence theorem jel d43 d44 l13 o30

an empirical investigation of the strategic use of debt the paper examines the accumulation of debt by swedish local governments i find that right wing governments accumulate more debt when facing a higher probability of defeat whereas the opposite occurs for left wing governments these effects are sizable a right wing government increases its level of debt by 15 percent whereas a left wing government decreases its debt by 11 percent if they are both certain of being replaced as compared to when they are certain of remaining in office the results are consistent with the predictions from a strategic debt model developed by persson and svensson

housing wealth and consumption a micro panel study there is strong evidence that house prices and consumption are synchronised there is however disagreement over the causes of this link this study examines if there is a wealth effect of house prices on consumption using a household level panel data set with information about house ownership income wealth and demographics for a large sample of the danish population in the period 1987 96 we model the dependence of the growth rate of total household expenditure with unanticipated innovations to house prices controlling for factors related to competing explanations we find little evidence of a housing wealth effect

voting on the budget deficit this paper analyzes a model in which a group of rational individuals votes over the composition and time profile of public spending all voters agree that a balanced budget is ex ante optimal however if there is disagreement between current and future majorities a balanced budget is not a political equilibrium under majority rule under certain conditions a majority of the voters favors a budget deficit and the equilibrium deficit is larger the greater is the polarization among voters copyright 1990 by american economic association

political fragmentation party ideology and public expenditures in this paper we propose an original model of competition for effective political power between majority and opposition coalitions the model indicates that the electoral margin of the majority and the fragmentation of both coalitions are key variables that determine their effective political power we estimate the model in the case of the french departements our econometric results support the model and show that the per capita social expenditures in the french departements depend on the effective political power of the majority

coalition governments versus minority governments bargaining power cohesion and budgeting outcomes recent empirical work investigating the role of minoritygovernments in the selection of fiscal policies has shown thatthe majority status does not affect the budget size thispaper presents an analytical framework which accounts for thisresult it combines a government formation game and a budgetgame involving cabinet and parliament a general indifferenceresult applies an exogenous shock to the bargaininigenvironment which absorbes the cohesion of the governmentincreases the demand for expenditures at the same time theconditions for the formation of a minority government arefulfilled if the formateur is strong a minority governmentcan be a device for cutting expenditures

the demand for health some new empirical evidence this paper presents some new estimates of the pure investment and pure consumption models of the demand for health in contrast to previous studies the paper presents parameter estimates of both reduced form and structural demand for health care equations the latter which are obtained by treating health capital as a latent variable in a recursive equation system provide a safer way of checking the consistency of the model s predictions with the data the present analysis of the pure consumption model differs from previous analyses in its recognition of the dependency of the shadow price of initial assets on the entire lifetime profiles of the model s exogenous variables the paper also explores the implications in terms of reliability of parameter estimates of the failure on the part of previous studies to recognize this

political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries institutions and policies vittorio grilli donato masciandaro and guido tabellini why do countries as similar as the industrialized oecd countries go through such different experience in terms of public deficits and debts or in terms of inflation the answer cannot come from macroeconomic policy responses to different disturbances nor from the principles of optimal taxation but rather from politics this article focuses on the role that particular institutions exert in providing constraints and incentives which shape the actions of policymakers the electoral process and political traditions affect the ability of governments to deal with deficits and mounting debts what seems to matter most it is found is the effect of the durability of governments governments with short horizons act myopically and never quite tackle the hard choices such governments typically exist in countries with an electoral system favouring many small political parties central bank independence promotes low inflation with no apparent costs in terms of real economic performance irrespective of the political institutions in fact there is no link between monetary and fiscal discipline these findings carry powerful implications for countries facing high indebtedness or stubborn inflation but also for the construction of the european economic and monetary union

inheritances intergenerational transfers and the accumulation of health research on inheritances has largely focused on the motives of the bequeathing regardless of the motivations of the giving generation prior to death wealth is transferred and this additional money may have an impact on the receiving generation in particular inheritances may be correlated with individuals health for several reasons first there may be a causal effect inheritances provide additional financial resources allowing recipients to purchase inputs to health and health care a large literature on socioeconomic status ses and health investigates the effect of financial resources on health second inheritances may signal the overall strength of a dynasty this dynastic strength would manifest itself in both better health and more ability to leave a bequest inheritances could be associated with better health because parents who will eventually bequeath wealth to their children may have disproportionately higher ses which improves the health outcomes of the children third bequests and a bequest motive may signal a stronger interest in one s child this reminder to the child could improve his emotional well being this paper

a unified model of cabinet dissolution in parliamentary democracies the literature on cabinet duration is split between two apparently irreconcilable positions the attributes theorists seek to explain cabinet duration as a fixed function of measured explanatory variables while the events process theorists model cabinet durations as a product of purely stochastic processes in this paper we build a unified statistical model that combines the insights of these previously distinct approaches we also generalize this unified model and all previous models by including 1 a stochastic component that takes into account the censoring that occurs as a result of governments lasting to the vicinity of the maximum constitutional interelection period 2 a systematic component that precludes the possibility of negative duration predictions and 3 a much more objective and parsimonious list of explanatory variables the explanatory power of which would not be improved by including a list of indicator variables for individual countries

an analysis of the war of attrition and the all pay auction we study the war of attrition and the all pay auction when players signals are affiliated and symmetrically distributed we a find sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric monotonic equilibrium bidding strategies and b examine the performance of these auction forms in terms of the expected revenue accruing to the seller under our conditions the war of attrition raises greater expected revenue than all other known sealed bid auction forms journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 d82 1997 academic press

on the effectiveness and limits of fiscal stabilizers the smoothing impact of fiscal stabilizers proxied by government expenditures on business cycle volatility is studied for a panel of european union eu countries in the period 1970 1999 special emphasis is put on the investigation of possible nonlinearities in the relationship between gross domestic product gdp growth volatility and fiscal stabilizers the results show that the business cycle volatility smoothing effect of fiscal stabilizers may revert at high levels the results hold when using government revenues as a proxy for fiscal stabilizers