too much monitoring not enough performance pay this paper endogenises the internal organisation of competitive firms in a simple general equilibrium framework the options are monitored teams unmonitored teams motivated by collective performance pay and self employment the choice of incentive scheme depends on market price and also affects price through its influence on output as more people opt for self employment pecuniary externalities increase the pressure on the rest to follow suit and pareto rankable multiple equilibria arise the conditions for a competitive equilibrium to be constrained efficient are restrictive and everyone may gain from policies limiting monitoring and self employment and from the imposition of entry taxes

efficiency and equilibria in complementary teams abstract this paper considers a team or partnership where the partners effort levels enter as strict complements in the production function the existence of a linear budget balancing sharing mechanism is demonstrated which implements the team s efficient outcome as a nash equilibrium this result is in contrast to a result derived in holmstrom 1982

a defense of compulsive measures against child labor abstract this research characterizes policies likely to trigger the onset of a growth enhancing fertility transition even for an economy with initially a low per capita income the environment considered is one where children s time has an economic value and schooling and child labor are the main competing claims on a child s time using a one parent family overlapping generations model i argue that compulsive measures against child labor are justifiable as an integral part of an intervention that combines incentives and regulations in order to eliminate child labor the analysis highlights fertility and child labor dynamics as shaped by the relative cost of children

appropriate technology in a solovian nonlinear growth model we propose a solovian growth model with a convex concave production function and international technological spillovers we test the empirical implications of the model analysing the effects of the productivity slowdown that followed the oil shocks of the 1970s we argue that this slowdown altering the world income distribution affected the pattern of international technological spillovers taking the poorest countries further away from the technological leaders and therefore unable to exploit their technologies the result is the emergence of a poverty trap for low income countries

from rent seeking to human capital a model where resource shocks cause transitions from stagnation to growth we present a growth model where agents divide time between rent seeking in the form of resource competition and working in a human capital sector the latter is interpreted as trade or manufacturing rent seeking exerts negative externalities on the productivity of human capital adding shocks in the form of fluctuations in the size of the contested resource the model can replicate a long phase with stagnant incomes and high levels of rent seeking interrupted by small failed growth spurts eventually followed by a permanent transition to a sustained growth path where rent seeking vanishes in the limit the model also generates a rise and fall of the so called natural resource curse before the takeoff an increase in the size of the contested resource has a positive effect on incomes shortly after the takeoff the effect is negative and on the balanced growth path the growth rate of per capita income is independent of resource shocks les auteurs presentent un modele de croissance ou les agents divisent leur temps entre la chasse aux rentes sous la forme de concurrence pour la ressource existante et le travail productif dans le secteur du capital humain cette derniere activite peut se faire dans le commerce ou le secteur manufacturier la chasse aux rentes a des effets externes negatifs sur la productivite du capital humain si l on injecte des chocs prenant la forme de fluctuations dans la taille de la ressource contestee le modele peut generer une longue periode durant laquelle les revenus stagnent et le niveau de chasse aux rentes est eleve periode interrompue par des petits sursauts de croissance qui tournent court et suivie eventuellement par une transition permanente a un sentier de croissance soutenue ou a la limite les activites de chasse aux rentes disparaissent le modele genere aussi l apparition et la disparition de la malediction des ressources naturelles avant que la croissance prenne son envol un accroissement de la taille de la ressource contestee a un effet positif sur les revenus peu apres le decollage l effet est negatif et sur le sentier de croissance equilibree le taux de croissance des revenus per capita est independant des chocs sur la ressource

the economics of child labor if child labor as a mass phenomenon occurs not because of parental selfishness but because of the parents concern for the household s survival the popular argument for banning child labor loses much of its force however this assumption about parental decision making coupled with the assumption of substitutability in production between child and adult labor could result in multiple equilibria in the labor market with one equilibrium where children work and another where adult wage is high and children do not work the paper establishes this result and discusses its policy implications copyright 1998 by american economic association

rewarding performance by promotion to a different job abstract use of promotions rather than performance related pay to provide incentives can be justified if performance is non verifiable information this does not explain why promotion is to a different job rather than simply a better paid job the effectiveness of tournaments is undermined however if unsuccessful workers are equally suited to higher paid jobs and can engage in bribery or other influence activity a promotion based reward structure with pay tied to jobs can be made immune to such activity if misallocations of employees to jobs are costly to the firm

new ventures and their credit terms using uk bank data for 466 new venture loan applications we explore the determinants of interest margin the sanctioning decision and the amount borrowed when these factors are considered simultaneously collateral levels greatly influence the size of credits to new ventures a finding consistent with existing work on firm foundation rates and assets black et al economic journal 106 60 75 1996 de meza and webb the economic journal 109 153 163 1999 evans and jovanovic journal of political economy 97 4 808 827 1989 holtz eakin et al 1994 consistent with the rand journal of economics 25 334 347 diversionary models of debt firms with larger credits enjoy discounted interest margins even when we have controlled for firm size

regression toward mediocrity in economic stature this paper provides estimates of the correlation in lifetime earnings between fathers and sons intergenerational data from the national longitudinal survey are used earlier studies conducted for the united states report elasticities of children s earnings with respect to parent s earnings of 0 2 or less suggesting extensive integenerational mobility these estimates however are biased downward by error contaminated measures of lifetime economic status estimates presented in this paper correct for the problem of measurement error and find the intergenerational correlation in income to be on the order of 0 4 this suggests considerably less intergenerational mobility than previously believed jel j62

is child labor inefficient we build a model of child labor and study its implications for welfare we assume that there is a trade off between child labor and the accumulation of human capital even if parents are altruistic and child labor is socially inefficient it may arise in equilibrium because parents fail to fully internalize its negative effects this occurs when bequests are zero or when capital markets are imperfect we also study the effects of a simple ban on child labor and derive conditions under which it may be pareto improving in general equilibrium we show that the implications of child labor for fertility are ambiguous

efficient and nearly efficient partnerships this paper shows in two ways that the degree to which free riding diminishes the performance of deterministic partnerships may be less than has been generally thought first a necessary and sufficient condition is provided for a partnership to sustain full efficiency it implies that many non trivial partnerships sustain efficiency such as generic ones with finite action spaces and neoclassical ones with leontief technologies second approximate efficiency is shown to be achievable in a large class of partnerships including ones with smooth and monotonic production and disutility functions approximate efficiency is achieved by mixed strategy equilibria one partner takes with small probability an inefficient action the degree to which efficiency is approximated is restricted only by the amount of liability the partners can bear nonetheless their equilibrium payments are not arbitrarily large

intergenerational income mobility in the united states social scientists and policy analysts have long expressed concern about the extent of intergenerational income mobility in the united states but remarkably little empirical evidence is available the few existing estimates of the intergenerational correlation in income have been biased downward by measurement error unrepresentative samples or both new estimates based on intergenerational data from the panel study of income dynamics imply that the intergenerational correlation in long run income is at least 0 4 indicating dramatically less mobility than suggested by earlier research copyright 1992 by american economic association

why is child labor illegal abstract we present a theory of the emergence of laws restricting child labor or imposing mandatory education that is consistent with the fact that poor parents tend to oppose such laws we find that if altruistic parents are unable to commit to educating their children child labor laws can increase the welfare of higher income parents in an ex ante sense on the basis of an empirical analysis of latin american household surveys we demonstrate that per capita income in the country of residence has the predicted effect on child labor supply even after controlling for other household characteristics

industrial development and the convergence question the paper studies endogenous world balanced growth equilibria in which national learning productivity differentials govern relative per capita products learning productivities depend on the national share of world specialized goods production national and world scale and familiarity with the foreign economy familiarity indexes the extent to which imported specialized goods enhance learning productivity we find that mutual familiarization causes per capita products to converge unfamiliar economies diverge substantially and persistently unilateral familiarization of a less developed country ldc with the leading economy causes the ldc to catch up to and even overtake the leader

pay equality and industrial politics personnel managers often argue that equitable pay treatment manifested as wage compression is useful because it reduces disharmony among workers but it is far from obvious that a compressed salary structure is morale improving since better workers may feel disenchanted by this scheme however when workers rewards are based on relative comparisons salary compression reduces uncooperative behavior that is detrimental to the firm relative comparisons imply that some reference group must be selected the major result is that within the relevant groups some wage compression is efficient

parental choice of human capital investment abstract in this paper we present a model in which parents make schooling decisions for their children we compare two educational regimes public and private education in the private education regime all human capital investment decisions are made by individuals under public education the government uses income tax revenue to finance one input to schooling in the private education regime cycles may occur even though there are constant returns to scale in the augmentable factors in the public education regime there are no cycles but poverty traps may occur

on the distributional consequences of child labor legislation this article studies the effects of child labor legislation on human capital accumulation and the distribution of wealth and welfare we calibrate our model to u s data circa 1880 and find that the consequences of restricting child labor or providing tax financed education depend on the main source of individual household income households with significant financial assets unambiguously lose from government intervention whereas high wage workers benefit most from a child labor ban and low wage workers benefit most from free education introducing free education results in substantial welfare gains whereas a child labor ban induces small welfare losses

the effects of integration on regional disparities convergence divergence or both this paper o ers an explanation for the coexistence of convergence across countries and the lack thereof at the regional level in the european union the model shows that even if it accelerates growth and brings convergence across countries the intensi5cation of international knowledge spillovers due to more cross country interaction may exacerbate within country regional disparities if regions with di erent specialization do not bene5t evenly from the exchange of knowledge the empirical evidence supports the implications of the model in particular the data show that regions specialized in advanced sectors at the beginning of the sample period became more similar in terms of per capita income while regions specialized in traditional sectors lagged c 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved jel classi cation o52 o41 o18 f15

income and wealth heterogeneity in the macroeconomy how do movements in the distribution of income and wealth affect the macroeconomy we analyze this question using a calibrated version of the stochastic growth model with partially uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and movements in aggregate productivity our main finding is that in the stationary stochastic equilibrium the behavior of the macroeconomic aggregates can be almost perfectly described using only the mean of the wealth distribution this result is robust to substantial changes in both parameter values and model specification our benchmark model whose only difference from the representative agent framework is the existence of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk displays far less cross sectional dispersion and skewness in wealth than u s data however an extension that relies on a small amount of heterogeneity in thrift does succeed in replicating the key features of the wealth data furthermore this extension features aggregate time series that depart significantly from permanent income behavior

institutions education and development the role of entrepreneurs entrepreneurs are instrumental for structural transformation they create and organize new firms and hire workers with a minimum level of human capital entrepreneurs encourage workers to invest in their own education in order to move into the modern production sector better institutions lead to less income diversion which creates a greater supply of entrepreneurs a larger demand for human capital and faster structural transformation education policy alone is not as effective although it too raises the number of entrepreneurs simulations and evidence from brazilian states support the theory

externalities in economies with imperfect information and incomplete markets this paper presents a simple general framework for analyzing externalities in economies with incomplete markets and imperfect infonnation by identifying the pecuniary effects of these externalities that net out the paper simplifies the problem of determining when tax interventions are pareto improving the approach indicates that such tax interventions almost always exist and that equilibria in situations of imperfect information are rarely constrained pareto optima it can also lead to simple tests based on readily observable indicators of the efficacy of particular tax policies in situations involving adverse selection signaling moral hazard incomplete contingent claims markets and queue rationing equilibria traditional discussions of externalities have emphasized the distinction between technological externalities in which the action of one individual or firm directly affects the utility or profit ofanother and pecuniary externalities in which one individual s or firm s actions affect another only through effects on prices while the presence of technological externalities imply in general that a competitive equilibrium may not be pareto efficient pecuniary externalities hy themselves are not a source of inefficiency the fact that prices change has of course important consequences there are both distributional and allocational effects but the distribution effects net out gains for example hy firms whose prices increase are precisely offset by losses e g to individuals who must pay higher prices and there are no welfare losses from the allocation effects as long as the price changes involved are small if firms are maximizing profits and individuals are maximizing utility both facing prices that correctly refiect opportunity costs then standard envelope theorem arguments imply that changes in profits or utility induced by changes in allocations resulting from any small change in prices are negligible

the moral hazard of budget breaking it has recently been suggested in the agency literature that moral hazard in teams can be dealt with by introducing a third party who breaks the budget balancing constraint and that this facilitates the design of contracts that can sustain the pareto optimum as a perfect nash equilibrium this note offers an explanation for why the use of budget breaking schemes is not so widespread as that of active monitoring despite the fact that such schemes would save the resources expended on supervision the note demonstrates that allowing the budget to be broken introduces the potential for moral hazard on the part of the third party which could render the proposed equilibrium incredible

managerial incentives and product market competition are imperfectly competitive leibenstein 1966 claims that there may be a substantial amount of x inefficiency where x inefficiency measures the degree to which actual profits depart from the maximum of profits that could be obtained if all operations in the firm were carried out at minimal costs he offers empirical evidence from case studies showing that the welfare loss due to organizational slack is of an order of magnitude bigger than the welfare loss due to monopolistic price distortions on imperfectly competitive markets these results support the common presumption that increasing competition reduces organizational and in particular managerial slack however this early literature does not offer a theoretical explanation for the link between competition and managerial incentives in particular it ignores the fact that managerial incentives can be affected by the design of an incentive scheme in this paper i derive the optimal incentive scheme for a manager as a function of the competitiveness of the environment in which his firm operates the basic impact of increased competition is that it reduces the profits of a firm this has two effects in the model first if a firm has high costs then the reduction of profits may be sufficient to render the firm unprofitable so the probability that it has to be liquidated goes up this unambiguously induces the manager of the firm to work harder for a cost reduction in order to avoid liquidation and to keep his job second the reduction in profits may affect

the macroeconomics of child labor regulation we develop a positive theory of the adoption of child labor laws workers who compete with children in the labor market support a child labor ban unless their own working children provide a large fraction of family income fertility decisions lock agents into specific political preferences and multiple steady states can arise the introduction of child labor laws can be triggered by skill biased technological change which induces parents to choose smaller families the theory can account for the observation that in britain regulations were first introduced after a period of rising wage inequality and coincided with rapid fertility decline

risk financial markets and human capital in a developing country this paper explores the link between financial market incompleteness and human capital accumulation we examine how child school attendance responds to seasonal fluctuations in the income of agrarian households using panel data from rural india to pinpoint market imperfections we study responses to aggregate and idiosyncratic as well as to anticipated and unanticipated income shocks our main finding is that seasonal fluctuations in school attendance are a form of self insurance but one which does not result in a substantial loss of human capital on average

efficiency in partnerships we provide the necessary and sufficient condition for a partnership to be able to sustain efficiency when the output is stochastic when limited liability is imposed we show that only the level of the average liability of the partnership is important the individual levels of liability are irrelevant however the allocation of the total liability among the partners is crucial when additional conditions such as neutrality or individual rationality are imposed