can poorly informed regulators hinder competition this paper considers an entry deterrence game in which environmental policy is set without perfectly observing the incumbent firm s costs we investigate if regulators who can have an informational advantage relative to the potential entrant support entry deterring practices the paper demonstrates that while entry deterring equilibria only emerge under restrictive conditions when the regulator is perfectly informed these equilibria arise under larger settings as he becomes uninformed furthermore we show that the regulator is willing to support the incumbent s entry deterring practices regardless of his degree of information if entry costs are sufficiently high however when entry costs are lower the regulator only sustains this type of practices if he is poorly informed

why are there still so many jobs the history and future of workplace automation in this essay i begin by identifying the reasons that automation has not wiped out a majority of jobs over the decades and centuries automation does indeed substitute for labor as it is typically intended to do however automation also complements labor raises output in ways that leads to higher demand for labor and interacts with adjustments in labor supply journalists and even expert commentators tend to overstate the extent of machine substitution for human labor and ignore the strong complementarities between automation and labor that increase productivity raise earnings and augment demand for labor changes in technology do alter the types of jobs available and what those jobs pay in the last few decades one noticeable change has been a polarization of the labor market in which wage gains went disproportionately to those at the top and at the bottom of the income and skill distribution not to those in the middle however i also argue this polarization is unlikely to continue very far into future the final section of this paper reflects on how recent and future advances in artificial intelligence and robotics should shape our thinking about the likely trajectory of occupational change and employment growth i argue that the interplay between machine and human comparative advantage allows computers to substitute for workers in performing routine codifiable tasks while amplifying the comparative advantage of workers in supplying problem solving skills adaptability and creativity

the regulation of non point source pollution and risk preferences an experimental approach many environmental problems notably arising from agriculture can be classified as non point source pollution problems in this paper we present results of an experimental study on the performance of three mechanisms designed to deal with such problems collective fining random fining and a tax subsidy scheme we find that the fining schemes induce under abatement a feature being enforced with experience we further elicit the participants risk attitude and show that the performance of collective fining is not affected by the subjects risk preferences under a system based on random fining the performance of the mechanism worsens in the presence of risk seeking subjects however coordination on over abatement under the tax subsidy can be alleviated if subjects are risk averse c 2011 elsevier b v all rights reserved

cooperation against theft a test of incentives for water management in tunisia water theft carried out by manipulating water meters constrains volumetric pricing in semi arid regions cooperative management can reduce theft and improve incentives for efficient water use by inducing peer monitoring using a theoretical model we show that theft is more likely when prices are high punishments are weak and cooperatives are large we also show how cooperative membership and punishment levels are determined endogenously by constraints on monitoring we test the model on data from tunisia for the years 2001 2003 relying on instruments that proxy for unobservable monitoring costs the results confirm that well designed incentives can reduce theft and that constraints on monitoring costs affect institutional design

moral hazard in risk averse teams holmstrom 1982 has shown that a non budget balancing contract induces a team of risk neutral agents to choose the first best effort levels this is not generally true when agents are risk averse furthermore a massacre contract which punishes all but one agent when the outcome is low can attain the first best over a wider range of parameters than any other budget balancing contract

input versus emission taxes environmental taxes in a mass balance and transaction costs perspective the standard policy recommendation to limit pollution is to use taxes or tradeable quotas on emissions a general emphasis on emissions does not however take proper account of the characteristics of the material flow through the economy an analysis of the relationships between transaction costs and features of this flow shows that it may be less costly to tax inputs into the economy the paper focuses on the advantages of a mass flow perspective in environmental economics the trade off between the precision of an environmental regulation and its implementation costs and develops criteria for choosing between input and emission related instruments

policy for the adoption of new environmental monitoring technologies to manage stock externalities abstract with the development of modern information technologies relying on nanotechnologies and remote sensing a number of systems can be envisaged that allow for monitoring of the negative externalities generated by producers consumers or travelers road pricing schemes or individual emission meters for automobiles are two examples we analyze a dynamic model of stock pollution when the regulator has incomplete information on emissions generated by heterogeneous agents our contribution is to explicitly study a decentralized policy for adoption of monitoring equipment over time we determine the second best tax rates the pattern of monitoring technology adoption and identify conditions for the voluntary diffusion of monitoring technologies over time simulations show the welfare gains compared to alternative policies

nonpoint pollution control inducing first best outcomes through the use of threats abstract this paper develops an economic model to analyze the use of a policy that combines a voluntary approach to controlling nonpoint source pollution with a background threat of an ambient tax if the voluntary approach is unsuccessful in meeting a pre specified environmental goal we show that such a policy can be designed to induce cost minimizing abatement without actually imposing the tax because the threat of imposition of the tax is sufficient to induce voluntary compliance thus the combined policy approach can not only be more effective in protecting environmental quality than a pure voluntary approach but can also be less costly than a pure ambient tax approach however whether the cost minimizing choices are a unique equilibrium or not depends on the design of the tax policy and whether or not it can be applied retroactively all results still hold if the background threat takes the form of a reducing in government subsidies

budget balancing incentive mechanisms abstract a p xepapadeas j environ econom management20 113 26 1991 developed a pollution abatement incentive mechanism that both reduces the information requirements of a regulator and is budget balancing drawing only on the social gains from pollution abatement to encourage firm compliance this paper demonstrates that contrary to xepapadeas the budget balancing system of random penalties cannot be used to induce compliance with the regulator s objectives if firms are risk neutral however the mechanism can be successfully applied if firms are sufficiently risk averse e rasmusen rand j econom 18 428 435 1987

environmental regulation by private contest abstract it is widely expected that the recent trend in the us eu and elsewhere towards an increased role for private agents and agencies in the formulation and enforcement of environmental regulation will continue if environmental regulation is to be privatised in this way it is natural to ask how far the activities of environmental groups on whose shoulders much of the responsibility for defending the environment is likely to fall should be subsidised or taxed in this paper we identify the trade offs involved and characterise the optimal subsidy tax the analysis is argued to have significant implications for how governments should think about the way in which fiscal law treats environmental ngo s

market based systems for reducing chemical use in agriculture in the united states this study uses a computable general equilibrium cge model of the u s economy to estimate the economic effects of agricultural fertilizer and pesticide input reductions on individual farm sectors and on the economy as a whole the costs of reducing agricultural chemicals using a market based approach and a command and control approach are compared the real cost to society of restrictng fertilizer and pesticide use by 20 percent across all uses is estimated to be 2 3 billion a market based approach that would provide incentives to reduce chemical use in the most cost efficient manner would be about 10 percent less costly

correlated uncertainty and policy instrument choice abstract for two decades environmental economists have generally maintained that benefit uncertainty is irrelevant for choosing between price and quantity instruments but that cost uncertainty matters with the identity of the efficient instrument depending upon the relative slopes of the marginal benefit and cost functions but in the presence of simultaneous correlated uncertainty such policy instrument recommendations may be inappropriate with plausible values of relevant parameters the conventional identification of a price instrument will be reversed to favor instead a quantity instrument the opposite reversal from the choice of a quantity instrument to a price instrument seems less likely to occur

pattern formation spatial externalities and regulation in coupled economic ecological systems abstract we study the management of ecosystems in which interacting state variables that are affected by management decisions diffuse in space we study pattern formation first in a setting where economic agents maximize myopic profits and ignore spillovers onto agents at other sites and second in the context of a social planner who internalizes these spillovers we compare patterns under these two institutions and study how the differences in the patterns generated by these two institutions impact the design of regulatory schemes to internalize the externalities at the same time we introduce new methods based on fourier series type decompositions that enable us to turn an intractable infinite dimensional optimal control problem into a countable number of finite dimensional optimal control problems as far as we know these methods are new to the economics literature our theory is applied to the management and regulation of a semi arid system

environmental consciousness and moral hazard in international agreements to protect the environment abstract a group of countries that can potentially commit to cooperation to protect the environment are identified as environmentally conscious countries conditions are examined under which they can provide self financing side payments too a second group of less environmentally conscious countries so that the two groups form a global or partial stable coalition that agrees to reduce emissions a mechanism that detects cheating is also developed in order to induce the desired emissions even when the emissions level of an individual country cannot be observed by the rest of the participating countries

voluntary threat approaches to reduce ambient water pollution this article considers the regulation of nonpoint source water pollution through the use of a voluntary threat approach which allows a polluter group to meet a standard voluntarily but imposes an ambient tax upon noncompliance in particular we develop an endogenous voluntary threat approach that can be parameterized to induce compliance as a unique subgame perfect nash equilibrium and eliminate zero abatement equilibria experimental evidence on the proposed approach as well as the exogenous approach of segerson and wu 2006 suggests that the severity of the threatened tax and the opportunity for communication are critical in determining policy outcomes

performance of the ambient tax does the nature of the damage matter the ambient tax is often considered as an efficient instrument to achieve a first best outcome of ambient pollution when the regulator cannot observe individual emissions or when monitoring costs are prohibitive while this view is supported to a large extent by experimental findings there remains several hurdles that hinder the implementation of the ambient tax in the field one of these hurdles is the nature of the damage experimental findings suggest that the efficiency of the ambient tax is higher under external damage i e if ambient pollution affects non polluters spraggon in j public econ 84 427 456 2002 than under internal damage i e if ambient pollution affects polluters themselves cochard et al in environ resour econ 30 393 422 2005 but this result rests on very different experimental settings therefore we designed a new experiment that allows to compare external and internal damage within a common setting our main finding is that the ambient tax is equally efficient under internal and external damage

voluntary agreements as an environmental policy instrument evaluation criteria abstract as the resource to voluntary action grows wider a question must be held on the factors that influence the performance of a voluntary agreement as an environmental policy instrument our goal in this paper is to answer that question outlining the main variables that make a voluntary agreement simultaneously efficient effective and just using several articles on the subject of voluntary action under the themes of economic regulation and of contracts under asymmetric information as well as available reports on the portuguese and european experience on the use of voluntary agreements we will undertake this objective following three steps i we begin by underlining the main factors that justify the private and public option for voluntary action ii we then present an analysis of the co regulation process under the requirements of the three e criteria efficiency effectiveness and equity iii finally we conclude by presenting an evaluation table that summarises the elements that we found to be the most important for the performance of the voluntary action in each one of those criteria

administrative costs and instrument choice for stochastic non point source pollutants this paper extends the empiricalanalysis of non point source pollution to thecase where the pollutant is stochastic andalternative regulatory instruments havedifferent administrative costs it also appliesa method of stochastic programming whereemissions are log normally distributed forthe kennet catchment in south west england werank a range of policies in terms of abatementcosts alone and total costs abatement andadministrative costs on the basis ofabatement costs alone a uniform emission taxis the cost minimising policy but on the basisof total cost a nitrogen input tax is theleast cost policy furthermore the policyranking based on total costs changes as thereliability standard increases

agricultural runoff as a nonpoint externality a theoretical development the purpose of this paper is to develop and explore a theory dealing with an important facet of agricultural runoff problems agricultural runoff is a nonpoint externality with notable implications for both research and policy a nonpoint externality exists whenever the externality contributions of individual economic agents cannot be practically measured by direct monitoring without monitoring regulations on emissions cannot be enforced and charges or subsidies cannot be assessed thus policies which are usually suggested for pollution abatement are not available there is great need for a theoretical base that can adequately capture these facts such a theory yields some important implications even before specific empirical applications the economic problem of agricultural runoff can be separated into three distinct categories first the sediment nutrients and chemicals removed by runoff represent a loss of resources to the individual farmer these costs are borne privately by farmers second if the discount rate of the individual farmer is greater than the social discount rate or if the farmer has a planning horizon which is shorter than society s the farmer will mine the soil resource at a rate which is more depletive than is socially optimal this is a temporal externality a third category involves the conservation of mass physical resources lost by the individual farm must appear elsewhere in the environment in sufficient quantities these resources are pollutants since water is the primary transport media for these resources it is water that is polluted by soil nutrients and agricultural chemicals this spatial externality has been the focus of much research here we intend to develop a theory for these issues to employ it to suggest a revised research methodology and to provide some important conclusions about alternative runoff policies only two of the three categories of agricultural runoff problems involve externalities and only the spatial externality is considered here

the externalities problem of transboundary and persistent pollution abstract this paper deals with implementing the efficient allocation of transboundary and persistent pollution in particular we adapt varian s compensation mechanism varian a solution to the problem of externalities when agents are well informed amer econ rev 85 1994 1278 1293 to cover situations in which pollutants extend to neighboring regions and their effects persist over time the main contribution of this paper is the design of a mechanism that implements in subgame perfect equilibrium the efficient pollution levels in this context

efficiency of nonpoint source pollution instruments an experimental study in nonpoint source pollution problems the regulator does not observe each polluter s individual emission which prevents him from using the conventional policy instruments therefore new instruments have been designed to regulate this type of pollution in an experiment we compare the efficiency of some of these instruments an input based tax an ambient tax subsidy an ambient tax and a group fine we assume that polluters themselves are affected by environmental damages a control session without any regulation is also carried out in order to study the status quo situation our experimental data show that the input tax and the ambient tax are very efficient and reliable and the group fine is fairly efficient and reliable these instruments improve social welfare with respect to the status quo on the contrary the ambient tax subsidy decreases social welfare with respect to the status quo and its effect is very unreliable

modeling the societal impact of fatal accidents a number of proposals have been put forth regarding the proper way to model the societal impact of fatal accidents most of these proposals are based on some form of utility function asserting that the social cost or disutility of n lives lost in a single accident is a function of n a common view is that a single large accident is more serious than many small accidents producing the same number of fatalities hence 1 drawing upon a number of empirical studies we argue that there is insufficient justification for using any function of n fatalities to model societal impacts the inadequacy of such models is attributed in part to the fact that accidents are signals of future trouble the societal impact of an accident is determined to an important degree by what it signifies or portends an accident that causes little direct harm may have immense consequences if it increases the judged probability and seriousness of future accidents we propose that models based solely on functions of n be abandoned in favor of models that elaborate in detail the significant events and consequences likely to result from an accident

reputation and the control of pollution this paper investigates the effectiveness of reputation in inducing a polluting firm to self regulate its emissions when consumers have imperfect information in particular we ask to what extent must consumers reward and punish the firm before it chooses self regulation as its dominant strategy we find that if payoffs in the stage game are such that both the consumer and the polluting firm have beliefs that are consistent with each others behaviors then the firm has a positive probability of playing clean in each period of a finite game further we find that a weak reward punishment scheme may have an adverse effect on the environment and that there are both environmental and welfare gains associated with strengthening the scheme

the effects of pricing policies on water conservation and drainage a general model of adoption of input conserving technologies by competitive firms is introduced using drip irrigation as an example an environmental regulation such as a drainage effluent charge is shown to influence adoption early adopters are likely to be producers with less efficient fixed assets land of low quality or antiquated capital higher input costs higher water prices or greater depth to groundwater and in more environmentally sensitive regions simulations show that drainage regulations can be expected to play a major role in adoption of more efficient irrigation technologies in california thus conservation may be a key to solving resource scarcity problems and reducing external environmental costs

the regulation of environmental innovations abstract we offer mechanisms to regulate environmental r d projects that are intertemporal and indivisible and involve high monitoring cost screening and contracting the r d performer are based solely on the project completion time when the project duration is ex ante uncertain to all parties including the performing firm the mechanism is formulated in terms of a completion time limit the mechanism extends to other intertemporal public projects as well as to principal agent settings with dynamic agent s tasks

nitrogen land substitution in corn production a reconciliation of aggregate and firm level evidence in this paper we seek to reconcile low farm level substitution elasticity between nitrogen fertilizer and land with larger industry level values for the corn sector this is accomplished with a micro simulation model which identifies twenty three heterogeneous groups of corn farmers based on survey data for indiana after controlling for soil quality slope crop rotation and natural nitrogen sources considerable variation in fertilizer application rates remains model simulations indicate that the estimated substitution elasticity at the state level 1 15 is consistent with very low farm level substitutability the difference is attributable to compositional changes in the wake of relative price shocks these compositional effects are potentially very important but they are ignored in most policy analyses

r d and employment an application of the lsdvc estimator using european microdata abstract the job creation effect of business r d is tested applying the dynamic lsdvc estimator to a longitudinal database covering 677 european companies over the period 1990 2008 job creation is detected in services and high tech manufacturing but not in traditional sectors

innovation and employment an introduction the eight papers of this icc special section address the relationships between innovation of different kinds related to products processes or organizational arrangements in their effects on job creation and job destruction at the level of both firm and whole sectors in a wide range of countries from all continents except north america and oceania the evidence suggests that product innovation as such does not lead to job destruction but possibly to a polarization of jobs the effects of process innovation are more controversial at a purely firm level a significant negative effect on employment is often absent however this does not rule out the possibility of industry wide labor shedding outcomes finally the evidence so far suggests that a driver of employment dynamics in western advanced economies much more powerful than the patterns of innovation has been exerted by globalization and offshoring to competition from emerging economies like china

sustainable farm income in the presence of soil erosion an agricultural hartwick rule soil erosion is a physical and economic problem of natural capital degradation even along an intertemporally efficient trajectory one can have in a loss of soil fertility and a continuous decline of agricultural net revenue moreover soil erosion is a major source of surface water pollution in rural areas erosion control is thus a challenge for sustainable resource management and internalizing external effects to sustain the level of farm income an agricultural hartwick rule is proposed which addresses both on farm and off farm effects of soil erosion first it requires the investment of the soil rents into alternative capital second additional measures are required to comply with an ambient quality target a charge subsidy scheme proves the most adequate from a perspective of cost effectiveness and sustainability if effluent charge revenues are earmarked to subsidize cropland retirement at the watershed scale in combination with the investment of soil rents this enables to maintain the level of farm income constant over time while respecting the ambient quality target altogether this fulfills the requirements of efficiency and sustainability 2003 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

a model of industrial pollution in a stochastic environment abstract standard models of pollution abatement assume that pollution accumulation occurs in a deterministic pattern as a by product of the production process governmental intervention often occurs in the form of taxation or mandatory abatement controls to reduce inefficiency caused by incomplete markets in this paper we assume that the accumulation effect of pollution may be stochastic due for instance to the random absorption capacity of the ecosystem furthermore we assume that the level of pollution may vary with input use as well as output level we proceed to analyze properties of a policy for efficient social management of competitive firms which generate pollution

adverse selection and pigou taxes it id assumed that firms have different technologies and that an environment protection agency knows which technologies exist but not which is used by which firms neither the emissions of individual firms nor their total emissions are observable the output of each individual firm however can be monitored without cost based on this information tax schemes are constructed which induce firms to produce the socially efficient output quantities conditions about cost functions are derived which ensure the existence of tax schemes which yield first best solutions

nonpoint source pollution taxes and excessive tax burden if a regulator is unable to measure firms individual emissions an ambient tax can be used to achieve the socially desired level of pollution with this tax each firm pays a unit tax on aggregate emissions in order for the tax to be effective firms must recognize that their decisions affect aggregate emissions when firms behave strategically with respect to the tax setting regulator under plausible circumstances their tax burden is lower under an ambient tax relative to the tax which charges firms on the basis of individual emissions firms may prefer the case where the regulator is unable to observe individual firm emissions even if this asymmetric information causes the regulator to tax each firm on the basis of aggregate emissions

effectiveness of environmental regulations under imperfect enforcement and the firm s avoidance behavior this paper explicitly defines enforcement quality and develops a model by incorporating enforcement quality and the firm s avoidance behavior the results indicate that the effectiveness of environmental regulations is likely to depend upon the level of enforcement quality as well as upon the nature of the firm s avoidance behavior policy instruments may become incompatible under certain circumstances enforcement quality should be properly targeted to enhance functional harmonization between instruments the condition under which emission tax is more effective under imperfect enforcement than under complete enforcement is also identified

a damage based tax mechanism for regulation of non point emissions in a recent paper segerson 1988 proposed a novel incentive mechanism for stochastic non point emissions based on ambient pollution concentrations in nature for specification of the mechanism when the damage function is nonlinear the regulator must know polluters cost and emission functions the mechanism also gives incentives to form coalitions among polluters which if they are formed render the mechanism inefficient in this paper we propose a revised mechanism which eliminates the need for knowledge of polluters cost and emission functions and reduces the probability of coalition forming a standards and pricing version of the revised mechanism with both properties mentioned is also developed

the regulation of non point source pollution under imperfect and asymmetric information abstract this paper develops a bayesian framework for discussing the role of information in the design of non point source pollution control mechanisms an ambient concentration tax is examined allowing for spatial transport among multiple zones imposition of the tax requires costly measurement of concentrations in selected zones and the selection of zones for measurement must be undertaken without perfect information regarding several parameters of the problem potentially crucial information issues discussed include a the impact of asymmetric priors regarding fate and transport b the cost of measuring ambient concentration and c the optimal acquisition of information regarding fate and transport

environmental policy under imperfect information incentives and moral hazard abstract when net emissions of individual polluters cannot be efficiently monitored then emissions charges controls on emissions levels or subsidies for emissions reduction are not effective as environmental policy instruments this paper proposes instruments that can be applied in such limited information situations these instruments take the form of contracts between a pollution control agency and individual polluters the contracts include a combination of fines and subsidies that induces dischargers to follow optimal environmental policies in the absence of individual monitoring

spatial heterogeneity and the choice of instruments to control nonpoint pollution because it is difficult to monitor emissions and to implement differentialtaxes and standards uniform taxes and standards on agricultural chemicaluse are often proposed and used to control nonpoint source pollution thisarticle analyzes the relative efficiency of these uniform instruments in thepresence of spatial heterogeneity we show that the relative slopes of themarginal pollution cost and marginal profit of chemical use are only one ofthe factors that affect the relative efficiency other factors includecorrelation between marginal pollution costs and marginal profits and theslope and variability of marginal profits in addition a uniform tax mayresult in some farmers not using the chemical and a uniform standard mayhave no effect on low input land we show empirically that the presence ofcorner solutions can reverse a conventional finding of tax or standardsuperiority based on the relative slop rule

what drives labor market polarization in advanced countries the role of china and technology this article explores the effects of offshoring technology and chinese import competition on labor market polarization in european countries we find that polarization occurs mostly as a result of polarization within individual industries while the reallocation of employment away from less polarized industries toward more highly polarized industries contributed only about one third of the total change we find that both technological change and chinese net import competition contributed to labor market polarization but that they did so in distinct ways in european manufacturing industries ict adoption explains a third of within industry polarization while chinese net import competition contributed to a much smaller extent the process of between industry polarization is driven by widespread deindustrialization and servitization in developed countries we find that chinese net import competition explains about a fifth of the employment decline in lowly polarized manufacturing industries and was thus an important driver of the reallocation of labor within economies away from lowly polarized manufacturing industries we present tentative evidence that employment grew faster in initially highly polarized service industries moreover these industries appear unaffected by their indirect input output exposure to chinese net import competition while this was not the case for initially lowly polarized service industries while polarization patterns in different european labor markets show considerable heterogeneity labor market institutions seem to be insufficient to explain these cross country differences

incentives precision technology and environmental protection abstract this paper calls for a reevaluation of the pollution problem in order to devise efficient strategies for its control it contends that a fundamental cause of pollution is inefficiency in input use during the production process this inefficiency manifests itself as input waste and polluting residues precision technologies can increase the effectiveness of inputs used in production and reduce pollution generation despite their potential economic and ecological benefits adoption of precision technologies has been slow this paper presents a conceptual framework to identify and analyze the specific factors that affect their diffusion among microunits these include various heterogeneous characteristics of microunits prices which do not reflect the relevant scarcities due to distortionary regulatory policies and lack of institutional mechanisms for efficient allocation of inputs and outputs it rationalizes the observed variations in the appropriate choice of technology across microunits and argues for the need to broaden the range of incentive based instruments for environmental protection beyond pollution taxes

trade credit for supply chain coordination abstract trade credit is a seller s short term loan to the buyer allowing the buyer to delay payment of an invoice it has been the largest source of working capital for a majority of business to business firms in the united states numerous theories have been proposed to explain trade credit mainly from finance perspectives it has also been an important issue in supply chain management surprisingly most literature in supply chain management has examined the retailer s stocking policies given a supplier s trade credit this paper attempts to shed light on trade credit from a supplier s perspective and presents it as a tool for supply chain coordination specifically we explicitly assume firms financial needs for inventory following a newsvendor framework we assume that the supplier grants trade credit and markdown allowance given the supplier s offer the retailer determines order quantity and the financing option for the inventory either trade credit or direct financing from a financial institution our result shows that the supplier s markdown allowance alone cannot fully coordinate the supply chain if the retailer employs direct financing positive financing costs call for trade credit in order to subsidize the retailer s costs of inventory financing using trade credit in addition to markdown allowance the supplier fully coordinates the retailer s decisions for the largest joint profit and extracts a greater portion of the maximized joint profit

ambient based pollution mechanisms a comparison of homogeneous and heterogeneous groups of emitters abstract over the last two decades ambient based tax mechanisms have been offered as a potential solution to the problem of nonpoint source water pollution previous theoretical analyses suggest that the performance of ambient based tax mechanisms does not depend on firm characteristics such as size whilst policy discussions advocate that such mechanisms are best suited for regulating relatively homogeneous firms using controlled laboratory experiments we provide empirical evidence that the distribution of firm sizes does have a significant impact on observed group decision making and further that heterogeneity has the potential to generate both some relatively desirable outcomes as well as some outcomes that are not attractive these results suggest that richer theoretical models that capture important strategic interactions and social preferences are needed to better describe laboratory behavior and by extension behavior in potential policy settings

regulation of non point emissions a variance based mechanism non point emission problems such as pesticide nitrate and phosphorus pollution of lakes and ground water are often characterised by a small number of polluters convex damage functions and stochastic emissions some regulatory mechanisms proposed in the literature for stochastic non point emissions implement the optimal abatement vector in dominant strategies ensuring that non nash conjectures cannot be rationalized however specification of these mechanisms requires firm level information and differentiated rates when the damage function is convex other mechanisms eliminate the need for firm level information and rate differentiation but only implement optimum in nash strategies where non nash conjectures that cause equilibrium to stray from optimum can be rationalized in this paper we propose a mechanism which eliminates the need for firm level information and rate differentiation while retaining implementation in dominant strategies

job polarization job tasks and the role of firms using detailed swedish matched employer employee data i show evidence of within firm job polarization applying a decomposition framework i find that both within firm and between firm components are important for overall job polarization results also indicate that the degree of routineness is the most important explanation for the observed within firm pattern bringing the analysis down to the firm level seems to confirm the important role played by routine biased technological change

assessment of korean customers willingness to pay with rps abstract to increase the use of renewable energy the korean government will introduce the renewable portfolio standard rps in 2012 the rps places responsibility for extra renewable energy costs on the consumers and allows price competition among different renewable sources accordingly this study analyzes through the contingent valuation cv the willingness of korean households to pay more for electricity generated by wind photovoltaic pv and hydropower our empirical results show that although the willingness to pay or wtp was highest for wind power and lowest for hydropower the differences in wtp among the renewable sources were statistically insignificant this suggests that korean consumers prefer a renewable portfolio that minimizes power supply costs the average wtp for all three energy types was krw 1562 7 usd 1 350 per month per household which was approximately 3 7 of the average monthly electricity bill in 2010 this amount represents only 58 2 of what the korean government allocated in its budget to the new and renewable energy dissemination program in 2010 thus our results imply that the promotion of the new and renewable energy dissemination program may be difficult only with the wtp for electricity generated from renewable sources specifically the mean wtp will not support the set aside dissemination capacity for pv after 2014

ambient taxes when polluters have multiple choices economic research on environmental policy design has largely been concerned with the merits of emissions based economic incentives e g emissions charges emissions reduction subsidies transferable discharge permits ambient based tax subsidy schemes have drawn considerable interest in nonpoint pollution literature as alternatives to emissions based instruments expanding especially on segerson s seminal article this article examines the optimal design and budget balancing properties of ambient tax subsidy schemes under more realistic assumptions about the dimensions of firms choice sets than prior research

the entry deterring effects of inflexible regulation this paper investigates the signalling role of tax policy in promoting or hindering the ability of a monopolist to practise entry deterrence we show that environmental policy can facilitate the incumbent firm s concealment of information from potential entrants thus deterring entry and yet entail welfare improvements furthermore we demonstrate that entry deterrence is more likely to arise when environmental regulation cannot be rapidly revised across time if market conditions change inflexible regimes than when regulatory agencies can adjust environmental policy over time les effets de dissuasion de l entree d une reglementation inflexible ce texte examine le role de signalisation d une politique fiscale qui promeut ou reduit l habilete d un monopole a pratiquer la dissuasion de l entree de concurrents on montre qu une politique environnementale peut faciliter la dissimulation d information par la firme en place vis a vis les concurrents potentiels et donc les dissuader d entrer et pourtant engendrer des ameliorations de bien etre de plus on montre que la dissuasion de l entree est davantage susceptible d emerger quand la reglementation environnementale ne peut pas etre revisee rapidement dans le temps si les conditions de marche se modifient regimes inflexibles que quand les agences de reglementation environnementales peuvent ajuster la politiques dans le temps

the social value of mortality risk reduction vsl vs the social welfare function approach we examine how different welfarist frameworks evaluate the social value of mortality risk reduction these frameworks include classical distributively unweighted cost benefit analysis i e the value per statistical life vsl approach and various social welfare functions swfs the swfs are either utilitarian or prioritarian applied to policy choice under risk in either an ex post or ex ante manner we examine the conditions on individual utility and on the swf under which these frameworks display sensitivity to wealth and to baseline risk moreover we discuss whether these frameworks satisfy related properties that have received some attention in the literature namely equal value of risk reduction preference for risk equity and catastrophe aversion we show that the particular manner in which vsl ranks risk reduction measures is not necessarily shared by other welfarist frameworks jel d81 d61 d63 q51

when does environmental regulation facilitate entry deterring practices abstract this paper evaluates the welfare benefits of introducing environmental regulation in a market that is subject to the threat of entry we consider complete and incomplete information settings where potential entrants use the regulator s tax policy and the incumbent s output decisions in order to infer the incumbent s cost structure when the regulator is absent we show that firms entry deterring practices increase pollution relative to complete information hence under certain conditions environmental regulation becomes more beneficial in incomplete than in complete information contexts our results therefore identify under which cases an under or over estimation of the welfare benefits of environmental regulation arises from ignoring the information setting in which firms interact we also examine how this estimation error increases as firms become more symmetric in their production costs

implementing the efficient allocation of pollution we provide simple mechanisms to implement the efficient allocation of pollution first assuming complete information across firms and then allowing for incomplete information both mechanisms operate by inducing firms to monitor one another using firms reports to determine pollution allotments and transfers the complete information mechanism determines a firm s transfer according to a linear pollution price set by other firms both mechanisms can be modified to be budget balanced in and out of equilibrium the complete information mechanism implements the efficient allocation even when firms are allowed to use mixed strategies under a single crossing condition the same holds for the incomplete information mechanism this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

limits to environmental bonds abstract bonds have recently been promoted as an alternative tool to control environmental damages particularly in those instances when the innovative activities of a firm have uncertain future impacts under this mechanism a firm would post a bond ex ante forfeiting all or a portion of the bond if its activities harmed environmental resources while the benefits of bonds have been developed there has been little systematic effort to explore their limitations in contrast the labor literature has extensively studied the limits of bonds as a mechanism to prevent worker shirking using insights from this parallel problem this paper explores the limits to environmental bonds focusing on the problems of moral hazard liquidity constraints and legal restrictions each limit offers a challenge to the success of environmental bonds we explore the use of bonds in surface mining and agricultural nonpoint pollution as motivating examples we also consider how other incentive schemes suggested by the labor literature might prove useful in the context of environmental management we consider the labor mechanisms of efficiency wages increasing wage profiles trust funds and rank order tournaments

how many us jobs might be offshorable using detailed information on the nature of work done in over 800 us bureau of labor statistics occupational codes this paper ranks those occupations according to how easy hard it is to offshore the work either physically or electronically using this ranking it is estimated that somewhere between 22 and 29 of all us jobs are or will be potentially offshorable within a decade or two no estimate is made of how many jobs will actually be offshored since the rankings are subjective two alternatives are presented one is entirely objective the other is an independent subjective ranking in general they corroborate the rankings albeit not perfectly it is found that there is little or no correlation between an occupation s offshorability and the skill level of its workers as measured either by educational attainment or wages however it appears that controlling for education the most highly offshorable occupations were already paying significantly lower wages in 2004

research issues in nonpoint pollution control research on nonpoint pollution control instruments has focused primarily on incentives applied either to production inputs that affect nonpoint pollution or to ambient pollution concentrations both approaches may in theory yield an efficient solution however input based incentives will generally have to be second best to make implementation practical design issues include which inputs to monitor and the rates to apply to them the limited research indicates that second best input based incentives can be effective in adjusting input use in environmentally desirable ways alternatively ambient based incentives have theoretical appeal because efficient policy design appears to be less complex than for input based incentives these incentives have no track record nor close analogues that demonstrate potential effectiveness however research on how households and firms might react in response to ambient based incentives is needed before these instruments can be seriously considered

catastrophe aversion and risk equity in an interdependent world catastrophe aversion and risk equity are important concepts both in risk management theory and practice keeney keeney rl 1980 equity and public risk oper res 28 3 527 534 was the first to formally define these concepts he demonstrated that the two concepts are always in conflict yet his result is based on the assumption that individual risks are independent it has therefore limited relevance for real world catastrophic events we extend keeney s result to dependent risks and derive the conditions under which more equity and more correlation between two risks imply a more catastrophic situation we then generalize some of the results for multiple correlated risks this paper was accepted by manell baucells decision analysis

asymmetric information and uncertainty the usefulness of logbooks as a regulation measure abstract in many fisheries managed by quota systems fishermen are required to keep a logbook containing information about catches no well functioning enforcement system is set up in connection with the logbooks since the purpose is to assist biologists in making stock assessments in this paper we consider a case where three market failures a stock externality problem a stock uncertainty problem and problems with measuring individual catches arise simultaneously it is shown that a stock tax and a tax on voluntary self reported catches may solve these three problems by taxing voluntary self reported catches we make use of logbook information it is shown using an analytic model that it will be in the interest of risk averse fishermen to report part of their catch voluntarily even without an enforcement policy in addition it is shown that the tax structure can secure optimal expected individual catches and empirical simulations show that the tax payment is relatively low thus the tax system may be useful in practical fisheries management

collective versus random fining an experimental study on controlling ambient pollution this paper presents an experimental study oftwo different pollution compliance games collective vis a vis random fining as ameans to regulate non pointpollution using samples from both costa ricancoffee mill managers and costa rican students we find that the two games perform equivalentlybut although they lead to efficient outcomesthrough nash play in the majority of cases theobserved frequency of nash play is lower thantheoretically predicted moreover we rejectthe hypothesis that managers and studentsbehave equally off the equilibrium managerstend to over abate whereas students tend tounder abate this result suggests theimportance of considering subject pooldifferences in the evaluation of environmentalpolicies by means of experiments particularlyif those policies involve certain forms ofmanagement decisions

attitudes toward catastrophe in light of climate change and other global threats policy commentators sometimes urge that society should be more concerned about catastrophes this paper reflects on what society s attitude toward low probability high impact events is or should be we first argue that catastrophe risk can be conceived of as a spread in the distribution of losses based on this conception we review studies from decision sciences psychology and behavioral economics that explore people s attitudes toward various social risks contray to popular belief we find more evidence against than in favor of catastrophe aversion the preference for a mean preserving contraction of the loss distribution and discuss a number of possible behavioral explanations next we turn to social choice theory and examine how various social welfare functions handle catastrophe risk we explain why catastrophe aversion may be in conflict with equity concerns and other regarding preferences finally we discuss current approaches to evaluate and regulate catastrophe risk

on repeated moral hazard with discounting in this paper we analyze optimal contracts in an infinitely repeated agency model in which both the principal and agent discount the future we show that there is a stationary representation of the optimal contract when the agent s conditional discounted expected utility is used as a state variable this representation reduces the multi period problem to a static variational problem which can be analyzed using standard variational techniques this reduction is used to obtain several properties of the contract

agri environmental schemes adverse selection information structure and delegation this work analyzes alternative designs of agri environmental schemes and how different incentive mechanisms impact on their overall efficiency it focuses on spatial targeting and delegation in an asymmetric information context first the optimal contract under adverse selection is modeled this model underlines the trade off between information rents and allocative efficiency the impact of spatial targeting is then addressed disaggregated information structures increase the optimal efforts asked of the farmers it may also involve higher information rents and may reduce the net contributions of some farmers finally the consequences of delegating authority within the principal agent relationship are investigated the results illustrate that spatial targeting and delegation when combined have asymmetric impacts on farmers payoffs

observability and choice of instrument mix in the control of externalities abstract in controlling environmental externalities pigouvian taxes are an appropriate instrument when individual emissions can be monitored while ambient taxes are deemed appropriate to control non point source pollution when the ambient pollution but not individual emissions can be monitored this paper shows that under uncertainty the efficient regulatory scheme for non point source pollution is a mix of pigouvian and ambient taxes the pigouvian fees are imposed on emissions revealed by the polluting firms in exchange for a lower ambient tax thus a non point source case can be gradually transformed into a point source case