bipolarity multipolarity and free trade recent literature typically attributes the relative scarcity of open international markets to the prisoner s dilemma structure of state preferences with respect to trade i argue that the prisoner s dilemma representation does not reflect the most critical aspect of free trade agreements in an anarchic international system security externalities explicit consideration of these effects suggests that a bipolar international political system has an advantage relative to its multipolar counterpart with respect to the opening of markets among states less credible exit threats and stronger incentives to engage in altruism within its alliances explain the advantage of a two power system the real income gains that motivate free trade are also the source of the security externalities that impede it their ability to internalize these effects makes military alliances the natural basis of agreements to open international markets the evolutionary prospects of alliances vary however ones that are the products of bipolar systems are more likely to evolve into free trade coalitions than are their multipolar counterparts i argue that less credible exit threats and stronger incentives to engage in alliance altruism explain the advantage of a two power system several important limits of the argument should be made clear immediately i argue at the systemic level i attempt to isolate the political and economic incentives for free trade that occur at the level of the international system i do not therefore consider the impact of unitlevel factors on the pursuit of these incentives for example neither the role of special interest groups nor the organization of domestic exchange via hierarchies instead of markets is considered doyle 1986 frieden 1988 ruggie 1982 the conditions i assume are those of standard international trade theory ethier 1983 and illustrative rather than systematic empirical referents are used these restrictions are appropriate given my purpose to demonstrate analytically the advantage of a bipolar international political system with respect to free trade

preferential trading arrangements as strategic positioning abstract we analyze a three country model of trade negotiations in which countries can form bilateral free trade areas bilateral customs unions or a trilateral preferential trading arrangement and can continue negotiating after reaching an agreement in contrast to the literature on multilateral bargaining the set of agreements can form a nonpartitional network while in contrast to the network literature players can reach multilateral agreements patient enough countries only reach bilateral agreements if insiders gain more than outsiders which allows them to manipulate the status quo in subsequent negotiations however a hub and spoke pattern may then emerge and insiders then dissipate the advantages of strategic positioning we also use variants on the model to explain why a us commitment not to bargain bilaterally sustained progress at gatt negotiations and the rarity of open access preferential trading arrangements

conflict cooperation and commerce the effect of international political interactions on bilateral trade flows the public choice approach to political economy is employed to gain insight into the connection between international politics and trade flows a model is constructed in which importers are assumed to be rational utility maximizers who seek to satisfy international security as well as economic welfare objectives this model of bilateral trade flows reflects contemporary theory in the field of international economics and it explicitly incorporates the general foreign policy orientation of importers among its determinants the model is tested in 16 annual crosssectional estimations 1960 75 for a complete network of 25 countries the findings show considerable support for the hypothesis that trade flows are significantly influenced by broad political relations of amity and enmity between nations the author concludes that nations adjust trade ties to satisfy security as well as economic welfare goals and that a formal political economy of trade should reflect this fact

explaining cooperation under anarchy hypotheses and strategies what circumstances favor the realization of mutual interests in the absence of centralized authority and through what strategies can nations foster the emergence of cooperation by altering the circumstances that they confront elementary game theory suggests three sets of conditions that serve as proximate explanations of the incidence of cooperation and discord i payoff structure mutual and conflicting preferences 2 the shadow of the future single play and iterated games and 3 number of players two person and n person games each of these three attributes of context may be subject to willful modification nations may create the preconditions for cooperation through strategies to alter payoffs lengthen the shadow of the future and reduce the number of actors required to realize limited mutual interests

understanding international trade policies an emerging synthesis the international trade problems of the 1980s stimulated an expansion of scholarship on trade policies by economists and political scientists at least four distinct theoretical perspectives weave their way through recent literature that concentrates on the united states emphasizing market conditions policy beliefs and values national political institutions and global structures respectively new studies in each of these traditions advance beyond the work of their predecessors but none of the perspectives has yet proved adequate as a single unifying vehicle nevertheless we can also see clear movement toward a synthesis with single works blending insights from several traditions thus the books under review do not all fall neatly into the familiar exclusive categories of economics or political science the emerging synthesis needs strengthening in several ways including the development of conditioning hypotheses that will reduce remaining apparent confusions

rational hegemons excludable goods and small groups an epitaph for hegemonic stability theory in defining international free trade as a public good hegemonic stability theory posited early in the 1970s that its reliable supply depended upon a distribution of international power analogous to that within a privileged group more recently however critics have challenged three assumptions fundamental to hegemonic theory its premises of free trade public goods and privileged groups they have concluded that hegemony is not necessary for and indeed may be antithetical to a stable world economy based on market exchange the author argues that the critics overstate their case the assumptions they attack allow hegemonic theory to represent analytically several critically important barriers to free trade among states among these are the existence of strategic interdependence among the actors and the prevalence of informational asymmetries the most significant flaw in hegemonic theory is its neglect of the essence of the domain to which it applies the politics of inter state trade in an anarchic world

hegemonic stability theory and 19th century tariff levels in europe although the theory of hegemonic stability has attracted an impressive array of adherents current formulations leave many conceptual issues unresolved existing formulations also fail to draw from the theory any implications concerning the process by which a hegemonic state creates and maintains a regime as an example great britain is generally agreed to have been hegemonic in the nineteenth century but britain s behavior was generally inconsistent with that implied by a theory of hegemonic stability i advance an alternative set of explanations for changes in international tariff levels based on the notion of a political business cycle

vertical foreclosure with the choice of input specifications we develop an equilibrium model of vertical foreclosure with the choice of input specifications vertical foreclosure occurs as the upstream division of the integrated firm makes a specialized input for its sister downstream division while it would as an independent firm provide a generalized input the changes in incentives with vertical integration can be explained by the externalities the choice of a specialized input entails vertical integration allows the upstream firm to internalize the benefit of raising the rival firm s costs at the downstream level we derive conditions for equilibrium vertical foreclosure to occur and discuss its welfare consequences

models of vertical market relations abstract i contrast various models of vertical contracting that view upstream interactions either through the lenses of bilateral contracting and negotiations or through the lenses of a market interface with uniform contractual terms existing models contrast starkly in their policy implications in particular when imperfect horizontal competition on either the upstream or the downstream level interacts with differential buyer power depending on industry characteristics different assumptions on contracting may be appropriate even though the quest for an all encompassing modelling framework seems vain existing models can still be made more flexible so as to be of greater practical usage

the concentration of capabilities and international trade over the course of the previous two decades political scientists have become increasingly interested in the relationship between international politics and global trade much of the literature on this topic centers on the effects of a hegemonic distribution of power on commerce hegemonic stability theorists argue that hegemony is a necessary condition for the existence of a liberal economic order and that in the absence of a hegemon a liberal international economy is particularly difficult to establish and maintain however a growing number of theoretical and empirical critiques have been leveled against the gemonic stability theory and the issue of whether hegemony helps shape patterns of global trade continues to be the topic of heated debate

testing theories of regime change hegemonic decline or surplus capacity two theories explain changes in the international regimes for major economic sectors a theory of hegemonic stability explains sectoral change as a consequence of ebbing hegemony a theory of surplus capacity attributes regime shifts to a serious global problem with excess production capacity in the sector the history of the world automobile industry shows that surplus capacity offers the better prediction and explanation for the timing of regime changes however a synthesis of the two theories is even more satisfactory hegemonic decline is a necessary but not sufficient condition for change surplus capacity in the absence of a hegemon creates the conditions necessary for change

the non existence of pairwise proof equilibrium abstract private bilateral contracting between a supplier and competing customers admits multiple equilibria we show that requiring equilibrium to be pairwise proof immune to bilateral deviations by the supplier and any customer can imply non existence of equilibrium in normal environments

upstream competition between vertically integrated firms we propose a model of two tier competition between vertically integrated firms and unintegrated downstream firms we show that even when integrated firms compete in prices to offer a homogeneous input the bertrand logic may collapse and the input may be priced above marginal cost in equilibrium these partial foreclosure equilibria are more likely to exist when downstream competition is fierce or when unintegrated downstream competitors are relatively inefficient we discuss the impact of several regulatory tools on the competitiveness of the wholesale market

divided opinion on the fair minimum wage act of 2013 random or systematic differences this paper analyses economists support for the fair minimum wage act of 2013 i find systematic differences between those supporting the legislation and those opposing it with support higher among females young labour economists and those located further from chicago

the political economy of the tariff cycle how can protectionism and free trade succeed one another our answer focuses on the changing balance of private actors political demands these actors acquire interests in tariff policies because their assets are spatially concentrated and trade in these assets is subject to various limitations actors in regions experiencing no new investment in an established industry old regions have interests that sometimes differ from those in regions where there is new investment we show that old regions have no reason to be involved in tariff politics at business cycle peaks during troughs whether a state becomes more or less protectionist depends ceteris paribus on the relative political strength of old import competing and old exporting interests if old import competing industries outweigh the old exporters then protection will tend to increase at the trough and decrease at the peak of a business cycle the opposite result occurs when old exporters are more influential

is there a consensus among economists in the 1990 s in a 1976 survey kearl et al 1979 hereafter the 1976 survey concluded that the then widespread perception that there was little agreement among professional economists on matters of theory or policy was simply wrong however the most casual empiricism namely the continuing popularity of jokes about disagreements among economists suggests the perception of noneconomists has not changed much since the 1970 s what is the present state of consensus among economists this question is of interest because more than a decade has elapsed since the 1976 survey and during this time many issues confronting economists and the composition of the profession have changed 1 benjamin m friedman and lawrence h summers 1991 p ix for example have asserted that economic thinking in many subfields of the discipline now differs markedly from what it was in 1970 consensus among european economists has been examined by bruno s frey et al 1984 martin ricketts and edward shoesmith 1990 1992 focus exclusively on british economic opinion this paper provides the first general analysis of opinions of u s economists in more than a decade i the survey and questionnaire

successive oligopolies with differentiated firms and endogeneous entry we develop a model of successive oligopolies with endogenous entry allowing for varying degrees of product differentiation and entry costs in both markets we show that downstream conditions dominate the overall profitability of the two tier structure while upstream conditions mainly affect the distribution of profits we analyze how two part tariffs and resale price maintenance shape the endogenous market structure and study their welfare effects in contrast to previous literature we find that welfare under linear prices can be larger than under twopart tariffs although the latter avoids double marginalization this is because linear prices induce more downstream market entry

vertical integration raising rivals costs and upstream collusion abstract this paper analyzes the impact vertical integration has on upstream collusion when the price of the input is linear as a first step the paper derives the collusive equilibrium that requires the lowest discount factor in the infinitely repeated game when one firm is vertically integrated it turns out this is the joint profit maximum of the colluding firms the discount factor needed to sustain this equilibrium is then shown to be unambiguously lower than the one needed for collusion in the separated industry while the previous literature has found it difficult to reconcile raising rivals costs strategies following a vertical merger with equilibrium behavior in the static game they are subgame perfect in the repeated game studied here

indirect taxation in vertical oligopoly this paper analyzes the effects of specific and ad valorem taxation in an industry with downstream and upstream oligopoly we find that in the short run i e when the number of firms in both markets is exogenous the results concerning tax incidence tend to be qualitatively similar to models where the upstream market is perfectly competitive however both over and undershifting are more pronounced potentially to a very large extent instead in the long run under endogenous entry and exit overshifting of both taxes is more likely to occur and is more pronounced under upstream oligopoly as a result of this a tax increase is more likely to be welfare reducing we also demonstrate that downstream and upstream taxation are equivalent in the short run while this is not true for the ad valorem tax in the long run we show that it is normally more efficient to tax downstream

views among economists professional consensus or point counterpoint to what degree do economists disagree about key economic questions we provide evidence by using the responses to a series of questions posed to a distinguished panel of economists put together by the chicago school of business based on our analysis we find a broad consensus on these many different economic issues particularly when the past economic literature on the question is large any differences are unrelated to observable characteristics of the panel members other than men being slightly more likely to express an opinion these differences are idiosyncratic with no support for liberal versus conservative camps

the effect of the minimum wage on the fast food industry using a longitudinal survey of fast food restaurants in texas the authors examine the impact of recent increases in the federal minimum wage on a low wage labor market less than 5 of fast food restaurants were using the new youth subminimum wage in july august 1991 even though the vast majority paid a starting wage below the new hourly minimum wage immediately before it became effective although some restaurants increased wages beyond the level needed to comply with higher minimum wages in both 1990 and 1991 those federal minimum wage increases greatly compressed the distribution of starting wages in the texas fast food industry two findings at variance with conventional predictions are that 1 employment increased more in those firms likely to have been most affected by the 1991 minimum wage increase than in other firms and 2 price changes were unrelated to mandated wage changes

indirect versus direct constraints in markets with vertical integration for an assessment of market power on the wholesale or merchant market in the presence of vertically integrated firms we analyze the interaction of direct constraints arising from competition on the wholesale market and of indirect constraints arising from substitution on the retail market a vertically integrated firm that still participates in the merchant market exerts both direct and indirect constraints we analyze the factors that determine the importance of indirect constraints we find that in contrast to a common presumption indirect constraints are sometimes more powerful than direct constraints we furthermore analyze the incentives of integrated firms to still participate in the merchant market provided that this is technologically feasible

toward a business cycle model of tariffs a modified interest group model links movements in tariffs to changes in the level of economic activity within nations this model is introduced and tested for tariff behavior in the 19th and early 20th centuries in three nations the united states great britain and germany empirical analysis lends strong support to the model s central thesis that tariffs are sensitive to movements within a business cycle tariff changes occurring in the three nations with the exception of british tariff increases generally conform to the expectations of the model furthermore business cycle sensitivity provides an explanation of the behavior of tariffs superior to two prominent alternatives those based on ideology and on hegemonic stability

what makes people think like economists evidence on economic cognition from the survey of americans and economists on the economy abstract the positive economic beliefs of economists and the general public systematically differ what factors make noneconomists think more like economists using the survey of americans and economists on the economy this paper shows people think more like economists 1 if they are well educated 2 if they are male 3 if their real income rose over the last 5 years 4 if they expect their real income to rise over the next 5 years or 5 if they have a high degree of job security however neither high income nor ideological conservatism have this effect my findings for education gender and income have close parallels in political science on tests of objective political knowledge the better educated and males score higher controlling for numerous other variables and the independent effect of income is minor

does trade still follow the flag t he economic ties between any two nations are frequently affected by a warming or cooling of bilateral diplomatic relations but there is little to be found in modern economics or political science that helps us understand the connections between international politics and commerce the notion that international economics could be studied in isolation from its political underpinnings or consequences would have been quite alien to mercantilist thinkers in the eighteenth century or to the critics or advocates of imperialism in the nineteenth that economics and politics were inextricably intertwined was taken as a matter of course indeed trade follows the flag was central to these people s understanding of world politics and international economics intellectual trends over the past century radically changed this worldview the ascendancy of liberalism in economic thought brought with it a compartmentalization of disciplines that may now be eroding but we are left with theories of international politics and economics that are very weakly bridged the objective of this study is to map one of the many connections between international politics and commercial ties specifically i seek to identify and measure the effect of changes in state to state diplomatic relations on trade flows between those nations theoretical underpinnings of my effort are in the tradition of public choice political economy frey 1984 because i treat importers as rational utility maximizers and their behavior as determined by preferences pursued within a context of specified constraints the model i put forward is wholly consistent with contemporary neoclassical trade theory but i extend the economists notion of welfare and contend that importers take account not only of the price and quantity of goods and services but of the place of origin of these products and the political relationship between the importing and the exporting nation they do so essentially for traditional security reasons that is importers are motivated to manage their trade relations in ways that minimize risks of disruption in supply or the possibility of hurting friends or

u s trade policies in a changing world economy this collection of original essays focuses on issues of international trade and trade policy in a world that is undergoing structural adaptation and in the face of a serious increase in the us trade deficit they bring a new consolidation of analytical perspective to a wide variety of current trade policy issues in their overview chapter alan v deardorff and robert m stern discuss developments in trade and protectionism review the case for free trade and address the arguments in favor of trade intervention rudiger dornbusch and jeffrey frankel analyze the macroeconomic setting in which changes have been made in us tariffs and ntbs stephen p magee and leslie young develop a model of endogenous protection and use it to search for microeconomic and macroeconomic variables that may help to explain changes in tariff and nontariff protection in the us since 1900 paul krugman takes up the question of identifying strategic sectors and the extent to which international competition and national government policies may affect the returns to such sectors under conditions of imperfect competition or when externalities are present avinash dixit analyzes the responses that the us might make to other countries trade policies in terms of how these policies affect us real national income and national security he concludes that the us could use strategic advance responses to alter other countries trade policies in a mutually beneficial way richard n cooper evaluates trade policy as foreign policy by looking at changes through three periods of us history t n srinivasan scrutinizes the national defense argument for government intervention in foreign trade john h jackson in discussing alternative negotiation approaches for the conduct of us trade policies observes that the pursuit of multilateralism may be frustrating and that what may be needed instead is a minilateral approach to trade liberalization in conclusion w max corden offers a package of rules that he believes may be both desirable and possible for the international trading system to attain robert m stern is professor of economics at the university of michigan and director of the institute of public policy studies he is coauthor with allan v deardorff of the michigan model of world production and trade mit press 1985

economists views about parameters values and policies survey results in labor and public economics specialists in labor economics and public economics at 40 leading research universities provided opinions of policy proposals quantitative best estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals for economic parameters and answers to values questions regarding income redistribution efficiency versus equity and individual versus social responsibility their positions on policy are more closely related to their values than to their estimates of relevant economic parameters average best estimates of the economic parameters agree well with the relevant literature but individual best estimates are usually widely dispersed the individual 95 percent confidence intervals are much narrower than the substantial cross respondent variation in estimates would warrant

vertical integration in the presence of upstream competition we analyse vertical integration when there is upstream competition and compare outcomes to the case where upstream assets are owned by a single agent i e upstream monopoly in so doing we make two contributions to the modelling of strategic vertical integration first we base industry structure namely the ownership of assets firmly within the property rights approach to firm boundaries second we model the potential multilateral negotiations using a fully specified non cooperative bargaining model designed to easily compare outcomes achieved under upstream competition and monopoly given this we demonstrate that vertical integration can alter the joint payoffs of integrating parties in ex post bargaining however this bargaining effect is stronger for firms integrating under upstream competition than upstream monopoly we also consider the potential for integration to internalise competitive externalities in manner that cannot be achieved under non integration we demonstrate that ex post monopolization is more likely to occur when there is an upstream monopoly than when there is upstream competition our general conclusion is that the simple intuition that the presence of upstream competition can mitigate and reduce the incentives for socially undesirable vertical integration is misplaced and depending upon the strength of downstream competition i e product differentiation the opposite could easily be the case journal of economic literature classification number l42

hegemons ios and markets the case of the substitution account for eighteen months between 1978 and 1980 the international monetary fund and imf members attempted to reform the international monetary system by establishing a substitution account designed to enhance the stability of the monetary system the proposed substitution account would have accepted dollar deposits from foreign central banks in return issuing certificates denominated in special drawing rights the collapse of negotiations about the account in early 1980 confirms the hypothesis of hegemonic stability theorists that the distribution of systemic costs is problematic in the absence of a hegemonic power the case thereby qualifies recent assertions that a small group of nations can supply stability to the international economy however two factors outside the realm of hegemonic theory also helped produce the outcome of the negotiations the division of power within the united states between congress and the executive and changes in international market conditions during 1979 and early 1980

vertical mergers and market foreclosure ythe model in this paper illustrates three effects of vertical mergers when both stages are oligopolistic and vertically integrated and unintegrated producers coexist first the merging firm increases its final good output second the resulting backward shift in the residual demand curve facing unintegrated final good producers ylowers their demand for the intermediate good third the merged firm withdraws from the intermediate good market the increased concentration pushes the intermediate good price upward which effect dominates depends on market structure under some conditions a vertical merger causes the price of the final good to increase

opportunism in multilateral vertical contracting nondiscrimination exclusivity and uniformity comment an input supplier selling to competing downstream firms would benefit from publicly committing at the outset to all contracts efficient commitment however would require complete contracts the authors study instead bilateral contracting without commitment regarding others terms each firm then fears that the supplier might opportunistically renegotiate another s contract to increase bilateral profit at the firm s expense the authors show that nondiscrimination clauses generally cannot curb such third party opportunism even with symmetric firms to reassure firms crude forms of commitment may be adopted this could explain the pervasiveness of exclusivity arrangements and the striking uniformity and intertemporal rigidity of franchise contracts copyright 1994 by american economic association

coordination versus prisoners dilemma implications for international cooperation and regimes the study of political institutions in general and international cooperation in particular has been beneficially influenced by the prisoners dilemma pd game model but there is a mistaken tendency to treat pd as representing the singular problem of collective action and cooperation by relaxing the assumptions of 2 2 games and developing an alternate model of the coordination game i show how some cooperation problems have very different properties from those found in pd the analytical results of the two games are compared across several important dimensions number of strategies available number of iterations of the game numbers of players and the distribution of power among them the discussion is illustrated with specific problems of international cooperation and the implications of alternative cooperation problems for the formation and performance of international regimes are explored the basic solutions for pd and coordination have divergent ramifications for the institutionalization stability and adaptability of regimes and for the role of hegemony in the international system however the coordination model does not replace the pd model but complements and supplements it as a way to understand the diversity of political institutions these results are widely applicable to areas of politics beyond international relations

divided government and u s trade policy theory and evidence if different parties control the u s congress and white house the united states may maintain higher import protection than otherwise this proposition follows from a distributive politics model in which congress can choose to delegate trade policymaking to the president when the congressional majority party faces a president of the other party the former has an incentive to delegate to but to constrain the president by requiring congressional approval of trade proposals by up or down vote this constraint forces the president to provide higher protection in order to assemble a congressional majority evidence confirms that 1 the institutional constraints placed on the president s trade policymaking authority are strengthened in times of divided government and loosened under unified government and 2 u s trade policy was significantly more protectionist under divided than under unified government during the period 1949 90

incentives for input foreclosure we analyze the incentives of a vertically integrated firm to foreclose downstream rivals in contrast to the extant literature our model allows for upstream price competition between suppliers of only imperfectly substitutable inputs as the integrated firm decides on the degree of foreclosure through the scale of its continued participation in a merchant market the model can be applied also to cases where the foreclosed input is not essential as well as to cases where foreclosure is not complete we find that incentives to foreclose are much lower than in existing models with upstream cournot competition if there is also cournot competition downstream there will never be complete foreclosure in the case of linear demand potentially more important for practical purposes is our criticism of some explicit assertions made in the european commission s 2007 non horizontal merger guidelines we find that pre merger margins on the up and downstream markets are not necessarily good predictors of the incentives for subsequent i e post merger foreclosure

tariff protection in developed and developing countries a cross sectional and longitudinal analysis four political models the international system rational domestic economic policy intragovemmental politics and interest group influence may explain the cross national structure of average nominal levels of tariffs on manufactures using available data measuring or approximating the explanatory variables for the time periods 1902 and 1971 selected hypotheses were tested in regression equations the 1971 tariff levels are best predicted by rational economic policy variables while for 1902 international power variables provide the best predictions of the tariff in general the causal forces influencing the cross national pattern of tariff levels appear to have shifted in the 20th century from those indicating international power to those measuring domestic politico economic development these results provide evidence relevant to some of the general propositions about size and development suggested by the contemporary political economy literature they also lend support to those who argue that a rising level of international interdependence has resulted in long term changes in the pattern of influences on national public policies

market power vertical integration and the wholesale price of gasoline this paper examines empirically the relationship between vertical integration and wholesale gasoline prices we use discrete and differential changes in the extent of vertical integration generated by mergers in west coast gasoline refining and retailing markets to test for incentives to raise rivals costs the research design allows us to test for a relationship between vertical integration and wholesale prices controlling for horizontal market structure cost shocks and trends we find evidence consistent with the strategic incentive to raise competitors input costs this suggests that vertical integration can have a significant impact on wholesale prices

economists policy views and voting in spring 2003 a survey of 1000 economists was conducted using a randomly generated membership list from the american economics association the survey contained questions about 18 policy issues voting behavior and several background variables the response was 264 nonblank surveys the responses show that most economists are supporters of safety regulations gun control redistribution public schooling and anti discrimination laws they are evenly mixed on personal choice issues military action and the minimum wage most economists oppose tighter immigration controls government ownership of enterprise and tariffs in voting the democratic republican ratio is 2 5 1 these results are compared to those of previous surveys of economists we itemize a series of important questions raised by these results

relative gains and the pattern of international cooperation many political situations involve competitions where winning is more important than doing well in international politics this relative gains problem is widely argued to be a major impediment to cooperation under anarchy after discussing why states might seek relative gains i demonstrate that the hypothesis holds very different implications from those usually presumed relative gains do impede cooperation in the two actor case and provide an important justification for treating international anarchy as a prisoner s dilemma problem but if the initial absolute gains situation is not a prisoner s dilemma relative gains seeking is much less consequential its significance is even more attenuated with more than two competitors relative gains cannot prop up the realist critique of international cooperation theory but may affect the pattern of cooperation when a small number of states are the most central international actors

bilateral control with vertical contracts when a manufacturer contracts secretly with competing retailers he is subject to opportunism and linear or non linear tariffs may not allow the manufacturer to maintain monopoly prices to analyse the effects of rpm o brien shaffer 1992 use a concept of contract equilibrium which concentrates on pairwise deviations thereby questioning the robustness of the analysis this paper emphasises the distinction between the contract equilibrium and standard non cooperative concepts we advocate for some caution in the use of the former concept as if overlooks an inexistence problem we then confirm the intuition that rpm can help solve the manufacturer s commitment problem this confirms that o brien shaffer s insight is robust and validates the courts reluctance against rpm

on the welfare impact of mergers of complements raising rivals costs versus elimination of double marginalization abstract a common view in antitrust analysis is that mergers of complements can have raising rivals costs and elimination of double marginalization effects with the net effect on consumer welfare thus unclear we revise this view in the context of a merger between a monopolist in one market and a duopoly producer of a complement good with linear demand and imperfect substitutability while such a merger increases the price of the monopolized component elimination of double marginalization dominates any raising rivals costs effects increasing consumer welfare we discuss a variety of extensions