openness central bank independence and the sacrifice ratio traditional explanations of the negative correlation between openness and inflation presume that an inverse relationship between the degree of openness and the sacrifice ratio reduces the inflation bias of descretionary monetary policy temple 2002 concludes however that such a relationship fails to emerge in cross country data our analysis of the same cross country data considered by temple indicates that once the degree of central bank independence and its interaction with greater openness and the sacrifice ratio in addition increased openness lessens the positive effect of central bank independence on the sacrifice ratio

the output inflation tradeoff and central bank reform evidence from new zealand the 1989 reserve bank of new zealand act provides a natural experiment in which the effects of institutional change on economic relationships can be studied the act set price stability as the single objective of monetary policy and gave the bank great independence reforms of this nature may lead to a greater short run output inflation tradeoff by altering optimal stabilisation policy and wage indexation allowing for environments where learning about the new regime is assumed to be rapid as well as slow we find that a large rise in the new zealand tradeoff has occurre d since implementation of the act

vertical integration market foreclosure and consumer welfare in the cable television industry i examine the effects of vertical integration between programming and distribution in the cable television industry i assess the effects of ownership structure on program offerings prices and subscriptions and i compare consumer welfare across integrated and unintegrated markets the results of this analysis suggest two general conclusions first integrated operators tend to exclude rival program services suggesting that certain program services cannot gain access to the distribution networks of vertically integrated cable system operators second vertical integration does not harm and may actually benefit consumers because of the associated efficiency gains

vertical antitrust policy as a problem of inference the legality of nonprice vertical practices in the u s is determined by their likely competitive effects an optimal enforcement rule combines evidence with theory to update prior beliefs and specifies a decision that minimizes the expected loss because the welfare effects of vertical practices are theoretically ambiguous optimal decisions depend heavily on prior beliefs which should be guided by empirical evidence empirically vertical restraints appear to reduce price and or increase output thus absent a good natural experiment to evaluate a particular restraint s effect an optimal policy places a heavy burden on plaintiffs to show that a restraint is anticompetitive

litigation and settlement in patent infringement cases a patent grants its owner the right to sue intruders that have been identified the patentholder must then supervise the market and react in case of infringement his reaction may be to go to court to settle or to accept entry we investigate how intensive the monitoring effort should be and how it will influence the entry decision in a simultaneous game even if the penalty paid by the infringer in case of a finding of liability is high the patentholder may prefer a settlement to a trial the likelihood of entry may increase with the penalty in sequential games regardless who plays first entry occurs comparatively less often than in the simultaneous game

patent damages and spatial competition this paper analyzes price competition between a spatially difierentiated product patentee and an imitator anticipating the possibility of future patent damages we compare the performance of three damage regimes the reasonable royalty regime the only one that yields symmetric equilibrium pricing maximizes static welfare and yields the highest incentives to innovate when patent enforcement is nearly certain the lost proflts regime the only one that may deter infringement yields the highest incentives to innovate when patent enforcement is less than certain and product value is su ciently high the unjust enrichment regime is weakest our results ofier an e ciency argument for abandoning it we also describe new insights into the hypothetical negotiation that the courts use to construct

the lucas critique and the volcker deflation this paper examines in light of the lucas critique the behavior of the phillips curve and of the term structure of interest rates after october 1979 it starts with an informal account of the policy change and then discusses how we might expect these two relations to shift after such a change it finds little evidence of a direct effect of the policy change on the phillips curve at least until 1982 it finds substantial evidence of a direct effect on term structure this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

mergers and acquisitions between risk averse parties abstract this paper evaluates mergers and acquisitions ma however it may yield a higher price for the consumer moreover we show that a decentralized supply chain can be more beneficial for the parties than a centralized supply chain formed by acquisition

monetary uncertainty strategic wage setting and equilibrium employment abstract an important recent strand of literature has shown that if wages are set strategically by inflation averse non atomistic unions then equilibrium employment is sensitive to the monetary regime this note demonstrates that such sensitivity need not reflect a direct aversion to inflation by unions but instead may result from union concerns for employment objectives in circumstances in which the variance and mean value of inflation are positively related

anticompetitive vertical integration by a dominant firm backward vertical integration by a dominant firm into an upstream competitive industry causes both input and output prices to rise the dominant firm s advantage may or may not offset the negative effect of higher prices on social welfare whether it does depends on a simple indicator derived from input and output market shares and the degree of prior vertical integration a vertical merger is similar to a hypothetical horizontal merger suggesting that vertical merger policy for this industry should be similar to horizontal merger policy the dominant firm model yields an observable sufficient indicator of welfare improving vertical mergers copyright 1998 by american economic association

new evidence on the output inflation trade off from developing economies the case of the cfa franc zone this aim of this paper is to give a contribution to the debate on whether output inflation trade offs are negatively influenced by the mean of inflation as postulated by new keynesians or by the variability of inflation as postulated by neo classical economists to remove any concerns about the arbitrariness of the choice of the sample the analysis will focus on a group of countries belonging to the same currency union the franc zone the results do not provide conclusive evidence on either theory as it was found that there existed a negative relation between the output inflation trade offs and the mean of inflation on the one hand and the variability of inflation on the other

nominal wage flexibility wage indexation and monetary union membership in a monetary union implies stronger incentives for nominal wage flexibility in the form of wage indexation and shorter contract length than non membership this counteracts the stabilisation policy cost of giving up monetary independence but more wage flexibility is only an imperfect substitute for an individual monetary policy it is possible that an increase in wage flexibility is welfare decreasing because of the accompanying rise in price variability the interaction between wage setting and central bank behaviour may result in either multiple equilibria or a unique full indexation equilibrium

damages and injunctions in protecting intellectual property we investigate how liability rules and property rules protect intellectual property infringement might not be deterred under any of the enforcement regimes available however counterintuitively a credible threat of infringement can actually benefit the patentholder we compare the two doctrines of damages lost profit lost royalty and unjust enrichment and argue that unjust enrichment protects the patentholder better than lost royalty in the case of proprietary research tools both can be superior to a property rule depending on how much delay is permitted before infringement is enjoined for other proprietary products end user products cost reducing innovations these conclusions can be reversed

the effect of randomized school admissions on voter participation there is little causal evidence on the effect of economic and policy outcomes on voting behavior this paper uses randomized outcomes from a school choice lottery to examine if lottery outcomes affect voting behavior in a school board election we show that losing the lottery has no significant impact on overall voting behavior however among white families those with above median income and prior voting history lottery losers were significantly more likely to vote than lottery winners using propensity score methods we compare the voting of lottery participants to similar families who did not participate in the lottery we find that losing the school choice lottery caused an increase in voter turnout among whites while winning the lottery had no effect relative to non participants overall our empirical results lend support to models of expressive and retrospective voting where likely voters are motivated to vote by past negative policy outcomes

beer and the tie did divestiture of brewer owned public houses lead to higher beer prices in 1989 the united kingdom monopolies and mergers commission mmc recommended measures that eventually led brewers to divest themselves of 14 000 public houses the mmc claimed that their recommendations would lower retail prices and increase consumer choice since that time however retail prices have risen this paper contains an econometric analysis of the transition period the analysis is based on a model of the relationship between retail price and retail organisational form that emphasises how exclusive dealing clauses and strategic factors interact in 1989 in an important decision the united kingdom monopolies and mergers commission mmc recommended measures that eventually led brewers to divest themselves of 14 000 public houses the mmc claimed that their recommendations would lower retail prices and increase consumer choice there is considerable doubt however that their objectives were achieved indeed since the time that the recommendations were implemented retail prices have risen it is not clear however if prices would have increased in the absence of divestiture one goal of my research is to provide an answer to this question the mmc s recommendations created an exceptional opportunity to assess the effects that different contractual arrangements have on retail prices indeed one would like to investigate this relationship ceteris paribus unfortunately however the choice of vertical market structure is normally endogenous and it is impossible to condition on all of the factors that affect the contracting decision in the uk beer industry in contrast the government ordered changes in the type and terms of the contracts under which national brewers could operate their licensed premises increased separation between brewer and publican therefore was not due to changes in economic conditions moreover some premises the free houses that were not owned by a brewer were not affected by the beer orders the existence of a control group facilitates the analysis by strengthening the conclusions that one can draw in recent years economists have moved away from simple theories of vertical

vertical relationships and competition in retail gasoline markets empirical evidence from contract changes in southern california comment this study examines how much if any of the differences in retail gasoline prices between markets is attributable to differences in the composition of vertical contract types at gasoline stations in each market the purchase of the independent retail gasoline chain thrifty by arco provides a unique opportunity to examine the effects of changes in different vertical contract types on local retail prices this event caused sharp changes in the market share of i fully vertically integrated stations and ii independent stations differentially affecting local markets in the los angeles and san diego metropolitan areas using unique and detailed station level data this study examines how these sharp changes affected local retail prices the detailed data and the research design based on the thrifty station conversions allow for credible estimation of the effects of the market share of independent retailers and vertically integrated retailers on local market prices controlling for any omitted factors at the station level and the city level over time results for the los angeles and san diego metropolitan areas indicate that a decrease in the market share of independent stations has a significant positive impact on local retail price however a change in the market share of refiner owned and operated branded stations does not have a significant impact on local market price these results have important implications as policy makers consider the regulation of vertical contracts as a means to increase competition in gasoline markets the research design and detailed data also allow for inference on the underlying nature of retail gasoline competition

can vertical integration by a monopsonist harm consumer welfare abstract vertical integration by a monopsonist is generally believed not to harm consumers this paper demonstrates in a natural economic setting that this conventional wisdom may not hold we model one on one bargaining between a monopsonist and independent suppliers when the set of suppliers cannot be expanded easily ex post and show that a vertically separated monopolist is vulnerable to holdup without integration we demonstrate that a bottleneck monopsonist has an incentive to encourage more upstream entry than would arise in a pure neoclassical monopoly having more suppliers mitigates the holdup power of any one this however distorts the cost structure of the industry toward greater industry output and hence lowers final good prices vertical integration mitigates the hold up problem faced by the monopsonist it allows it to generate and appropriate a greater level of industry profits at the expense of consumers

the competitive impact of vertical integration by multiproduct firms we study the impact of vertical integration on pricing incentives in multiproduct industries to do so we exploit recent variation in vertical structure in the us carbonated beverage industry while the elimination of double marginalization with vertical integration is normally characterized as procompetitive economic theory predicts that it may cause anticompetitive price increases in multiproduct industries we indeed find that vertical integration causes price decreases in products with eliminated double margins but price increases in the other products sold by the integrated firm these results provide new evidence of anticompetitive effects of vertical mergers

inflation targeting does not matter another look at oecd sacrifice ratios recently in this journal goncalves and carvalho 2009 concluded that inflation targeters were able to bring inflation down at less cost than nontargeters p 242 this comment shows that their conclusion is not robust but instead is the result of comparing a particular subset of inflation targeting it disinflations with nonsimultaneous disinflations that occurred under very different macroeconomic conditions in their sample simple extensions such as justifiably varying the treatment group of it disinflations to control for common time varying effects or to control for the maastricht treaty effects suggest that it does not matter

transparency democratic accountability and the economic consequences of monetary institutions debates about the appropriate mix between autonomy and accountability of bureaucrats are relevant to numerous areas of government action i examine whether there is evidence of a tradeoff between transparency democratic accountability and the gains from monetary delegation i begin by presenting a simple theoretical model which suggests that central banks that are transparent in the sense of publishing their macroeconomic forecasts will find it easier to acquire a reputation despite making central banks more subject to outside scrutiny then monetary transparency can lead to improved economic outcomes i also consider arguments about the effect of accountability provisions involving parliamentary oversight and control over central bankers the paper then uses a new data set to examine these issues empirically focusing on a natural experiment involving disinflation costs under different central banking institutions during the 1990s results suggest that countries with more transparent central banks face lower costs of disinflation while accountability provisions have no clear effect on disinflation costs my results also concord with earlier findings that the effect of monetary institutions is conditional on other features of the political environment

downstream vertical foreclosure and upstream innovation i examine a link between downstream foreclosure and upstream innovation the crucial ingredient of the model is the presence of dynamic economies of scale upstream in the form of competition in r d the reason an upstream supplier has a captive buyer is to force rival suppliers to incur the disadvantages of low scale production and discourage them from innovating the downstream buyer is offered favorable terms and is convinced to sign an exclusive supply contract and accept captivity in this context downstream foreclosure may reduce consumer welfare

the settlement of patent litigation in this article i develop a model to analyze patent licensing that is induced as part of a settlement agreement to avoid litigation of the issue of patent validity the patentee possesses private information about patent validity and makes a take it or leave it settlement offer to a single potential rival an essentially unique sequential equilibrium exists if out of equilibrium beliefs are restricted appropriately the model analyzes the effect of the probability of settlement and litigation

do fast food chains price discriminate on the race and income characteristics of an area this article reports tests for differences in prices charged by fast food restaurants that serve markets with customers of widely divergent incomes and ethnic backgrounds the data contain detailed prices on items sold at over 400 burger king wendy s kfc and roy rogers restaurants in new jersey and pennsylvania locations i find significant differences in price based on the race and income characteristics of a zip code region when income and cost differences are taken into account meal prices rise approximately 5 for a 50 rise in the black population

efficiency effects of exclusive territories evidence from the indiana beer market the welfare effects of vertically imposed exclusive territories and the appropriate antitrust policy toward them have long been debated this paper sheds light on the exclusive territory controversy by examing the effects of indiana s 1979 ban on the grant of exclusive territories to beer wholesalers using time series data for 1948 1990 we find the ban reduced beer consumption in indiana by 6 percent coupled with previous evidence that indiana s ban reduced price our results suggest that exclusive territories in the beer industry increase demand and enhance welfare by stimulating the provision of dealer services

vertical mergers in multi product industries and edgeworth s paradox of taxation when a two product monopolist merges with one of its suppliers thus eliminating the double marginalization for one of its goods three qualitative effects on downstream prices can result the monopolist might 1 lower both prices 2 lower the price of the good for which the double marginalization is eliminated and raise the price of the other good or 3 raise both prices since some and even all prices can increase mergers of successive monopolists in multiproduct industries do not necessarily improve welfare this result differs from the single product case in which such mergers necessarily increase welfare copyright 1991 by blackwell publishing ltd

alternative approaches to evaluation in empirical microeconomics four alternative but related approaches to empirical evaluation of policy interventions are studied social experiments natural experiments matching methods and instrumental variables in each case the necessary assumptions and the data requirements are considered for estimation of a number of key parameters of interest these key parameters include the average treatment effect the treatment on the treated and the local average treatment effect some issues of implementation and interpretation are discussed drawing on the labour market programme evaluation literature

are all the good men married uncovering the sources of the marital wage premium a longstanding and yet unsettled question in labor economics is does marriage cause men s wages to rise cross sectional wage studies consistently find that married men earn significantly higher wages than do men who are not currently married however it is well known that inferring causal relationships from crosssectional analysis is inappropriate because of the biases introduced by unobserved heterogeneity as a means of circumventing this problem this paper uses data on identical twins to control for unobserved heterogeneity our estimates suggest that marriage increases men s wages by as much as 27 and that little if any of the cross sectional relationship between marriage and wages is due to selection in addition we find little evidence that the marital wage premium is a consequence of household specialization

central bank independence and macroeconomic performance some comparative evidence this note uses information on a sample of sixteen oecd countries to assess the relationship between central bank independence and macroeconomic performance as previous work suggests politically controlled central banks are more likely to pursue policies that lead to high and variable inflation however the authors find little evidence that political control of central bank policy has any impact on measures of the level or variability of growth unemployment or the ex ante real interest rate copyright 1993 by ohio state university press

divisionalization franchising and divestiture incentives in oligopoly a two stage game is used to model firms strategic incentives to divide production among autonomous competing units through divisionalization franchising or divestiture firms simultaneously choose their number of competing units which then engage in cournot competition while it is costly to form autonomous units each firm does so in equilibrium thus reducing firm profits and increasing social welfare relative to the case where firms cannot form competing units with linear demand and costs duopolists choose the socially optimal number of competing units oligopolies with larger numbers of firms choose too many the case of nonlinear demand is also examined copyright 1996 by american economic association

inflation targeting and output inflation tradeoffs abstract this article assesses whether the adoption of inflation targeting it helps reduce the output inflation tradeoff we address the self selection problem of it policy adoption by the endogenous switching regressions and show that the output inflation tradeoffs are significantly lower in it countries not only over the whole sample but also across the developed and developing country subsamples in addition we also find strong evidence supporting the positive selection hypothesis i e countries have higher probability of adopting it are exactly those who benefit more larger reduction of output inflation tradeoff from the implementation of it additional results reveal that economies with higher trade openness lower financial openness and less flexible exchange rate regime are associated with larger tradeoff between output and inflation but the effects are only statistically significant in the it regime

centralised wage setting inflation contracts and the optimal choice of central banker the paper examines the appropriate design of central banking institutions in an economy in which the nominal wage is set by an inflation averse monopoly union as a positive mark up over its market clearing value the analysis considers both the optimal choice of central banker and the potential role for a linear inflation contract the optimal set of arrangements is a central banker who attaches less significance to inflation than does society combined with an inflation contract where the value of the contract parameter is related to the union s degree of inflationaversion following the important contribution of rogoff 1985 the appointment of a conservative central banker has been widely accepted as a potential albeit partial solution to the time inconsistency problem associated with discretionary policy making in placing a greater weight on inflation than does the government and society as a whole in the setting of monetary policy the central bank s temptation to create inflation surprises is reduced this then leads to a lower inflation rate in equilibrium than would otherwise prevail whilst in rogoff s stochastic framework this reduction in the inflationary bias has to be weighed against an increase in output variability the appropriate choice of central banker ensures a net improvement in welfare an important feature of rogoff s model is the assumption of an atomistic labour market in which nominal wages embodied in single period contracts reflect interaction between agents who hold no market power such a representation of the labour market also characterises most subsequent extensions of rogoff s analysis e g lohmann 1992 and waller 1992 however a number of recent papers in considering the time inconsistency issue have employed the assumption of unionised wage setting assuming either an allencompassing monopoly union or alternatively a number of individual unions each of which has a non negligible impact on macroeconomic variables examples include agell and ysander 1993 bleaney 1996 cubitt 1992 1995 horn and persson 1988 hutchison and walsh 1998 and skott 1997 these contributions have examined the implications of the assumed labour market imperfection from a variety of perspectives but only those of bleaney and skott directly consider its consequences for the appropriate specification of central bank objectives in what follows we explore the significance of unionised wage setting for

inflation targeting in emerging economies panel evidence abstract this paper shows there is no evidence that the inflation targeting regime it improves economic performance as measured by the behavior of inflation and output growth in developing countries the control of common time effects results in less negative and less significant it impacts on inflation inflation volatility and output growth volatility than previously found in the literature additionally our analysis shows robust evidence of lower output growth during it adoption on balance although lower long run mean inflation signals that the central banks of emerging economies with inflation targeting are more inflation averse the costs of disinflation have not been lower than under other monetary regimes

on a non cooperative theory of technology transfer abstract this paper shows that it might be profitable for a firm with advanced technology to sell the knowledge to a competing firm with less efficient technology and still remain in the business a non corperative equilibrium with technology transfer may pareto dominate the initial equilibrium without technology transfer in this paper it is shown that technology agreement is likely to occur between firms which are reasonably close in terms of their initial technologies such an equilibrium is an interesting possibility in the absence of credibly sustainable collusive outcomes

equilibrium vertical foreclosure the authors formulate a complete but analytically simple equilibrium model of vertical mergers to evaluate the logic of standard vertical foreclosure claims and the criticisms made of those claims the model includes incentives of the integrated firm and unintegrated input suppliers to exclude rivals and the potential holdout problem in this fully specified model vertical foreclosure can emerge in equilibrium copyright 1990 by american economic association

to peg or not to peg a simple model of exchange rate regime choice in small economies abstract the choice of an exchange rate peg often points to a trade off between gaining credibility and losing flexibility we show that the flexibility loss may be reduced if domestic and foreign shocks are correlated and more volatile allowing for a plausible structural change after a peg a flexibility gain may result

market foreclosure and vertical merger a case study of the vertical merger between turner broadcasting and time warner abstract we employ an event study methodology the event being the vertical merger between time warner and turner broadcasting distribution and programming respectively in the cable television industry we assess the effects of the merger on final prices subscriptions and carriage and marketing decisions of time warner the analysis finds several interesting facts first foreclosure in time warner markets following the merger is observed for the rival channels that are not integrated with any cable distributors second the turner broadcasting channels that increased market shares because of this merger appeared to be foreclosed by time warner prior to the merger the preference for own channels by time warner persisted despite a lower quality of channel bundles in its markets efficiency gains from the merger were not passed on to consumers

fees versus royalties and the private value of a patent we compare how much profit an owner of a patented cost reducing invention can realize by licensing it to an oligopolistic industry producing a homogeneous product by means of a fixed fee or a per unit royalty our analysis is conducted in terms of a noncooperative game involving n 1 players the inventor and the n firms in this game the inventor acts as a stackelberg leader and it has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies it is shown that licensing by means of a fixed fee is superior to licensing by means of a royalty for both the inventor and consumers only a drastic innovation is licensed to a single producer

how to license intangible property we examine the optimal licensing strategy of a research lab selling to firms who are product market competitors we consider an independent lab as well as a research joint venture we show that 1 demands are interdependent and hence the standard price mechanism is not the profit maximizing licensing strategy 2 the seller s incentives to develop the innovation may be excessive 3 the seller s incentives to disseminate the innovation typically are too low 4 larger ventures are less likely to develop the innovation and more likely to restrict its dissemination in those cases where development occurs and 5 a downstream firm that is not a member of the research venture is worse off as a result of the innovation

disinflation credibility and price inertia a danish exposition this paper analyses the disinflationary policy pursued in denmark since october 1982 focusing on the phillips curve trade off and the credibility of this disinflationary policy the overall conclusion confirms no significant indication of the disinflationary policy being credible

is new zealand s reserve bank act of 1989 an optimal central bank contract this paper evaluates the reserve bank of new zealand act of 1989 from a principal agent perspective arguing that the act represents a dismissal rule the optimal dismissal rule requires that the central banker be dismissed whenever inflation exceeds a critical level that depends on aggregate supply disturbances and measurement error in the inflation index this is essentially the structure established by the act the scope for renegotiating the target rate however creates an incentive for the government to set the critical rate too high consequently the inflation bias of discretion is reduced but not completely eliminated copyright 1995 by ohio state university press

divisionalization and entry deterrence this paper assumes that incumbent firms can create new independent divisions more cheaply than potential entrants who must incur the additional overhead costs of new entry the main theoretical result is that such divisionalization ability leads perfectly informed incumbents to preempt all rational entry into their industries in contrast existing models of entry deterrence imply that informed incumbents even those with steadily decreasing average costs will often allow rational entry our result may explain why successful large scale entry by firms with no informational advantage is extremely rare the use of divisions to preempt entry may also explain why large firms in high profit oligopolies often divisionalize allowing their divisions to compete freely despite the negative pecuniary externality that each division imposes on others

patent litigation as an information transmission mechanism patent litigation reveals important information about the validity of the contested patent to other potential entrants this paper explores the implications of such informational externalities for entry dynamics in the presence of multiple potential entrants the nature of the entry game can be one of either waiting or preemption depending on the degree of patent protection therefore the payoffs for the patentee and the initial imitator are discontinuous in the degree of patent protection furthermore strengthening intellectual property rights is not necessarily desirable for the patentee the analysis may also help explain the apparently puzzling practice of delaying patent suits copyright 1998 by american economic association