learning to believe in sunspots a number of authors have shown that competitive economies may possess sunspot equilibria that is rational expectations equilibria in which purely extrinsic uncertainty affects equilibrium prices and allocations 2 such results demonstrate that it does not require a lack of faith in the rationality of market participants to believe that competitive markets may be subject to purely speculative fluctuations driven solely by expectations 3 the mere existence of sunspot equilibria as solutions to a system of marketclearing conditions however might not be judged sufficient to indicate that competitive markets with rational participants could ever be subject to speculative instability the sunspot equilibria represent states of affairs in which agents act differently in the case of different realizations of the sunspot variable and it is rational for each agent to do so but it might be thought unlikely that the beliefs of all the participants in the market could ever come to be coordinated so as to bring about an equilibrium of that kind it is rational to believe that sunspots convey information about future states of affairs once the economy is in a sunspot equilibrium but why would rational agents ever begin to believe in such a thing so as to create the conditions under which the belief is rational in order to address such a question one must go beyond the mere statement of the conditions for equilibrium and discussion of what states of affairs satisfy them one must specify an explicit dynamic process according to which the beliefs of agents adjust when out of equilibrium any exercise of this kind is necessarily unsatisfactory as there is no univocal meaning for the postulate of rational behavior outside of an equilibrium it may well be the case that

the information content of security prices a second look abstract beaver lambert and morse 1980 employ a regression of percentage change in prices on percentage change in earnings in which data are grouped by the dependent variable reverse regression offers a more intuitive and direct way to assess the information content of security prices the objective of beaver et al while grouping is asymptotically equivalent reverse regression is a more efficient way of examining the incremental explanatory power of lagged values of percentage change in price with respect to accounting earnings

information in prices about future earnings abstract stock return over a period reflects the market s revision in expectation of future earnings accounting earnings over the same period however have limited ability to reflect such revised expectations therefore returns anticipate earnings changes and the earnings response coefficient from a regression of returns on contemporaneous earnings changes is biased toward zero we reduce this bias by including leading period returns in price earnings regressions the resulting estimated earnings response coefficient magnitudes suggest that the capital market on average views earnings changes to be largely permanent this is consistent with the random walk time series property of annual earnings

an analysis of the relation between the stewardship and valuation roles of earnings in this paper we seek a deeper understanding of how accounting information is used for valuation and incentive contracting purposes we explore linkages between weights on earnings in compensation contracts and in stock price formation a distinction between the valuation and incentive contracting roles of earnings in paul 1992 produces the null hypothesis that valuation earnings coefficients vecs and compensation earnings coefficients cecs are unrelated our empirical analyses of the relations between earnings and both stock prices and executive compensation data at the firm and industry levels over the period 1971 2000 rejects paul s 1992 hypothesis of no relation we also document an increasing weight over time on other public performance information captured by stock returns in the determination of cash compensation specifically we find that the incentive coefficient on returns is significantly higher in the second of two equal sample subperiods relative to the incentive coefficient on earnings

changes in the value relevance of earnings and book values over the past forty years this paper investigates systematic changes in the value relevance of earnings and book values over time we report three primary findings first contrary to claims in the professional literature the combined value relevance of earnings and book values has not declined over the past forty years and in fact appears to have increased slightly second while the incremental value relevance of bottom line earnings has declined it has been replaced by increasing value relevance of book values finally much of the shift in value relevance fiom earnings to book values can be explained by the increasing frequency and magnitude of one time items the increasing frequency of negative earnings and changes in average firm size and intangible intensity across time

why don t poor countries catch up a cross national test of an institutional explanation early neoclassical analyses predicted that poor countries would grow faster than wealthy countries because of technological advances and diminishing returns to capital in the latter the reverse has occurred poor countries are falling back rather than catching up we suggest here that deficient institutions underlie this divergence employing various indicators of institutional quality including the rule of law the pervasiveness of corruption and the risk of expropriation and contract repudiation we show that the ability of poor countries to catch up is determined in large part by the institutional environment in which economic activity in these countries takes place jel o00 o10

intertemporal cost allocation and managerial investment incentives a theory explaining the use of economic value added as a performance measure this paper provides a formal analysis of how managerial investment incentives are affected by alternative allocation rules when managerial compensation is based on accounting measures of income that include allocations for investment expenditures the main result is that there exists a unique allocation rule that always induces the manager to choose the efficient investment level the income measure created by this allocation rule is usually referred to as residual income or economic value added

contracting theory and accounting abstract this paper reviews agency theory and its application to accounting issues i discuss the formulation of models of incentive problems caused by moral hazard and adverse selection problems i review theoretical research on the role of performance measures in compensation contracts and i compare how information is aggregated for compensation purposes versus valuation purposes i also review the literature on communication including models where the revelation principle does not apply so that nontruthful reporting and earnings management can take place the paper also discusses capital allocation within firms including transfer pricing and cost allocation problems

learning convergence and stability with multiple rational expectations equilibria abstract for a linear model with multiple rational expectations equilibria ree we discuss the set of possible ree solutions include i locally unique minimal state variable solutions taking an ar 1 form and ii continua of solutions which may depend on sunspots we analyze the convergence of econometric learning to the different ree there exist cases with more than one stable ar 1 solution it is also possible for a continuum of solutions to be stable but this property is not robust to overparametrization an application is developed and it is suggested that the exhibited phenomena may arise in applied macroeconomic models

an analysis of the use of accounting and market measures of performance in executive compensation contracts prior research has provided useful insights into the structure of compensation plans and their incentive effects however one important limitation of these studies is the virtual absence of any cross sectional analyses of the attributes of compensation contracts 2 this absence is related in part to the problems associated with controlling for other factors that affect compensation that is compensation contracts are

incentives in organizations n 1975 steven kerr published on the folly of rewarding a while hoping for b the argument was simple you get what you pay for kerr distilled this unifying theme from a disparate set of examples involving politicians soldiers doctors orphanage directors professors and students as well as manufacturing and clerical employees and even human resource managers from these examples kerr pp 77980 concluded that two main causes of distorted incentives are fascination with an objective criterion where individuals seek to establish simple quantifiable standards against which to measure and reward performance and overemphasis on highly visible behaviors when some parts of the task are highly visible while others are not it took agency theory 15 years to express kerr s title not to mention to evaluate or extend his conclusions during this period agency theory was obsessed with the tradeoff between incentives and insurance even though clear eyed observations like kerr s about the design and performance of real incentive contracts suggested that several other issues are at least as important fortunately recent work has brought agency theory not only to kerr s position but beyond in this paper i summarize four new strands in agency theory that help me think about incentives in real organizations as a point of departure i begin with a quick sketch of the classic agency model i then discuss static models of objective performance measurement that sharpen kerr s argument repeated game models of subjective performance assessments incentives for skill development rather than simply for effort and incentive contracts between versus within organizations i con

on the optimal relation between the properties of managerial and financial reporting systems we develop a theoretical model of the firm that links properties stewardship vs valuation focus of financial reporting regimes with the informational properties of optimal managerial accounting systems we show that contrary to the standard textbook proposition properties of management and financial accounting systems are not independent significantly we provide an explicit connection between exogenous and observable properties of a firm s financial reporting system and the quality of the managerial accounting system on which manager s base real economic decisions as the quality of those economic decisions can also be inferred from publicly available data our theory generates new opportunities for empirical managerial accounting research on large nonproprietary samples further by being able to identify enhanced performance due to improved managerial accounting information our theory provides opportunities to gain a better understanding of the link between particular managerial accounting practices and the quality of the information produced

contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models abstract settings are considered in which optimal multiperiod contracts can have no memory i e where second period payments do not need to depend on first period outcomes if contracts have no memory a repeated agency game can be played myopically there are no gains to long term relationships conditions on preferences for a no memory contract are presented in an agency game with moral hazard on the act selection preference separability and domain additivity imply the existence of a no memory contract in a setting without moral hazard but with asymmetric information on the outcome domain additivity implies no memory

replicator dynamics in a cobweb model with rationally heterogeneous expectations abstract this paper extends the adaptively rational equilibrium dynamics of brock and hommes brock w a hommes c h 1997 a rational route to randomness econometrica 65 1059 1160 by introducing a generalized version of the replicator dynamic the replicator equilibrium dynamics red couples the price dynamics of a cobweb model with predictor selection governed by an evolutionary replicator dynamic we show that the red supports the conclusion of sethi and franke sethi r franke r 1995 behavioural heterogeneity under evolutionary pressure macroeconomic implications of costly optimisation the economic journal 105 583 600 that costly rational beliefs persist though unlike them these results obtain in the deterministic case numerical evidence shows that complex dynamics exist as in brock and hommes even though no weight is placed on strictly dominated predictors in an red steady state

accounting income stock price and managerial compensation abstract this paper employs an agency model where a manager has a two dimensional action choice to study how the information content of earnings affects the design of compensation contracts based on earnings and price price is modeled as an endogenous variable that reflects all available information including earnings two settings are contrasted in the first earnings and price reflect the same underlying information about firm value while in the second earnings reflect a subset of the information reflected in price it is shown that differences in information content substantially alter the characteristics of compensation contracts based on earnings and price

accounting earnings and future economic rents an empirical analysis abstract this study reexamines competition cost structure and growth opportunities effects on earnings response coefficients and extends this literature in several ways first it presents a more refined theoretical motivation for investigating competition and cost structure effects second it introduces new economic factor proxies that confirm prior findings with respect to competition but differ from prior findings with respect to cost structure and growth opportunities overall the evidence suggests that accounting earnings reflect information about future economic rents generated by firms assets in place the evidence also suggests contrary to prior studies that accounting earnings are not very informative about firms growth opportunities

intrinsic heterogeneity in expectation formation we introduce the concept of misspecification equilibrium to dynamic macroeconomics agents choose between a list of misspecified econometric models and base their selection on relative forecast performance a misspecification equilibrium is a stochastic process in which agents forecast optimally given their choices with forecast model parameters and predictor proportions endogenously determined under appropriate conditions the misspecification equilibrium will exhibit intrinsic heterogeneity in which all predictors are used at all times even in the neoclassical limit in which only the most successful predictors are used this equilibrium is attainable under least squares learning and dynamic predictor selection based on average profits

expectational stability of sunspot equilibria in non convex economies we examine the stability under learning e stability of sunspot equilibria in non convex real business cycle models the production technology is cobbdouglas with externalities generated by factor inputs we establish that with a general utility function the well known benhabib farmer condition benhabib and farmer 1994 that the labor demand curve is upward sloping and steeper than the frisch labor supply curve is necessary for joint indeterminacy and e stability then with a separable utility function and allowing for negative externalities from capital inputs we discover large regions in parameter space corresponding to stable indeterminacy that is learnable sunspot equilibria these existence results overturn the conventional wisdom that sunspot equilibria in rbc type models are inherently unstable and provide concise closure to the stability puzzle of evans and mcgough 2005b

on non uniqueness in rational expectations models an attempt at perspective abstract many macroeconomic models involving rational expectations give rise to an infinity of solution paths even when the models are linear in all variables some writers have suggested that this non uniqueness constitutes a serious weakness for the rational expectations hypothesis one purpose of the present paper is to argue that the non uniqueness in question is not properly attributable to the rationality hypothesis but instead is a general feature of dynamic models involving expectations it is also argued that there typically exists in a very wide class of linear rational expectations models a single solution that excludes bubble or bootstrap effects one that occur only because they are arbitrarily expected to occur a systematic procedure for obtaining solutions free from such effects is introduced and discussed in addition this procedure is used to interpret and reconsider several prominent examples with solution multiplicities including ones developed by fischer black and john b taylor

unfair trade the increasing gap between world and domestic prices in commodity markets during the past 25 years the early literature on international trade has debated extensively the constraints facing exporting countries in the major commodity markets this article goes one step further by suggesting that the final demand for these products can not have increased because the declines in world commodity prices were not transmitted or were transmitted imperfectly to domestic consumer prices in contrast upward movements in world prices were clearly passed on to domestic prices as a result the spread between world and domestic prices almost doubled in all major commodity markets during 1975 94 this asymmetry seldom discussed in the literature does not seem to be caused at least systematically by changes in trade and tax policies or factors such as transport processing and marketing costs this article argues therefore that a special effort should be made to better understand the transmission from world to domestic prices especially the role of large international trading companies that may have the capability to influence such spreads through one or several stages of processing in most major commodity markets

institutions investment and growth new cross country and panel data evidence this paper outlines the alternative channels through which institutions affect growth and studies the empirical relationship between institutions investment and growth the empirical results indicate that i free market institutions have a positive effect on growth ii economic freedom affects growth through both a direct effect on total factor productivity and an indirect effect on investment iii political and civil liberties may stimulate investment iv an important interaction exists between freedom and human capital investment v milton friedman s conjectures on the relation between political and economic freedom are correct vi promoting economic freedom is an effective policy toward facilitating growth and other types of freedom jel o17 o40 p51

on the robustness of bubbles in linear re models the authors analyze the expectational stability e stability of the different solutions of a linear rational expectations model in which the endogenous variable depends on expectations of its current and future values formed in the past and also on its own lagged value it is shown that continuum of bubble solutions cannot be strongly e stable in contrast for certain parameter values a particular solution that would normally be identified as a bubble solution can be strongly e stable the results are applied to a macroeconomic model with real balance effects copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

causality between exports and economic growth abstract this paper utilizes granger causality tests in investigating the relationship between exports and national income from a consistent data set for 47 developing countries in africa new empirical results as well as suggestions for future research are presented

global trade integration and economic convergence of developing countries gerschenkron hypothesized that lower income countries would tend to grow more rapidly than higher income countries and therefore that their average incomes would converge since that time the record indicates that the industrialized nations have had relatively slow growth rates while many less developed countries ldcs have had relatively rapid rates of growth although many others have had slower rates of growth and some have been negative furthermore the rates of growth have varied considerably during the four and one half decades since 1952 both among countries and within a country from one year to the next thus convergence remains an issue among development economists and others interested in the topic with frequent concern being expressed about a growing gap between average incomes in the moreand less developed economies of the world in this article we examine convergence and divergence due to differential rates of growth factors that affect growth the role of international trade in the process the policy frameworks that enhance or detract from growth and the research needs and opportunities for agricultural and resource economists a controversial aspect is the influence of trade on the process since most development economists tend to believe that more

earnings and price based compensation contracts in the presence of discretionary trading and incomplete contracting abstract the paper analyzes the use of reported accounting earnings and price as a basis for compensating a manager when he trades on private information and share price is set rationally based on privately held information publicly available and contractible information and publicly available but noncontractible information in addition we analyze the comparative statics of the compensation on reported earnings and price with respect to changes in the economy

the effect of fair value accounting on the performance evaluation role of earnings abstract we study the effect of fair value accounting on the association between net income and cash pay following the 2005 worldwide adoption of ifrs we find that while ifrs s non fair value provisions are associated with an increase in this association its fair value provisions are associated with a decrease in this association overall we contribute to the literature on the usefulness of fair value accounting by presenting evidence that fair value accounting is associated with a decrease in this association under assumptions that we detail and subject to caveats that we detail our evidence suggests that fair value accounting may reduce the usefulness of earnings in evaluating management performance

on the fragility of sunspot equilibria under learning and evolutionary dynamics abstract in this article we investigate the possibility of sunspot equilibria to emerge from a process of learning and adaptation on agents beliefs we consider both finite state markov sunspots and sunspots in autoregressive form and derive conditions for the existence of an heterogeneous equilibrium where only a fraction of agents condition their forecasts on the sunspot we then show that when the fraction of agents conditioning their forecasts on a sunspot changes over time under evolutionary dynamics these restrictions need to evolve endogenously with population shares we argue that such requirement questions the possibility of sunspot equilibria to emerge through a process of evolution and adaptation on agents beliefs in order for a sunspot equilibrium to emerge all agents must simultaneously coordinate on the same sunspot variable at the same time

are ceos really paid like bureaucrats a common view is that there is little correlation between firm performance and ceo pay using a new fifteen year panel data set of ceos in the largest publicly traded u s companies we document a strong relationship between firm performance and ceo compensation this relationship is generated almost entirely by changes in the value of ceo holdings of stock and stock options in addition we show that both the level of ceo compensation and the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance have risen dramatically since 1980 largely because of increases in stock option grants

exports growth and causality in developing countries abstract previous empirical studies have interpreted results in regressions of output variables on export variables as providing support for an export promotion development strategy such an interpretation is questionable since these regressions provide no means of determining the direction of causality this paper performs causality tests between exports and growth for 37 developing countries the results cast considerable doubt on the validity of the export promotion hypothesis

accounting earnings and top executive compensation abstract this paper investigates the role of accounting earnings in top executive compensation contracts it provides evidence in support of the hypothesis that earnings based incentives help shield executives from market wide factors in stock prices the paper demonstrates that earnings reflect firm specific changes in value but are less sensitive to market wide movements in equity values as a result the inclusion of earnings based performance measures in executive compensation contracts helps shield executives from fluctuations in firm value that are beyond their control the hypothesis is shown to explain cross sectional variation in the use of earnings based incentives

incentive contracting and value relevance of earnings and cash flows accounting performance measures such as earnings and cash flows are useful for both valuation and performance evaluation purposes however little evidence exists on whether there is any association between these two roles in this study we provide large sample empirical evidence that the value relevance of earnings explains a significant amount of the cross sectional variation in the pay sensitivity of earnings and the incremental value relevance of cash flows explains variation in the marginal pay sensitivity of cash flows we document that while both value relevance and compensation weight on earnings decline from the subperiod of 1993 to 1997 to the subperiod of 1998 to 2003 both value relevance and compensation weight on cash flows increase from the earlier subperiod to the later subperiod overall our results provide additional evidence that value relevance of a performance measure plays a significant role in its use for performance evaluation

does eva beat earnings evidence on associations with stock returns and firm values this study tests assertions that economic value added eva is more highly associated with stock returns and firm values than accrual earnings and evaluates which components of eva if any contribute to these associations relative information content tests reveal earnings to be more highly associated with returns and firm values than eva residual income or cash flow from operations incremental tests suggest that eva components add only marginally to information content beyond earnings considered together these results do not support claims that eva dominates earnings in relative information content and suggest rather that earnings generally outperforms eva

have financial statements lost their relevance the authors explore the concern that financial statements no longer have the same relevance to investors that they had in the past they test for value relevance by measuring the total return that could have been earned from prior knowledge of financial statement information and by examining the explanatory power of accounting information on market values and annual market adjusted returns both analyses are applied to a broad sample of exchange listed and nasdaq firms for the 1952 94 period the authors find mixed evidence on value relevance of financial statement reporting during the test period

on the relation between conservatism in accounting standards and incentives for earnings management this paper studies the role of conservative accounting standards in alleviating rational yet dysfunctional unobservable earnings manipulation we show that when accounting numbers serve both the valuation role in which potential investors use accounting reports to assess a firm s expected future payoff and the stewardship role in which current shareholders rely on the same reports to monitor their risk averse manager current firm owners have incentives to engage in earnings management such manipulation reduces accounting numbers stewardship value and leads to inferior risk sharing we then show that risk sharing and hence contract efficiency can be improved under a conservative accounting standard where absent earnings management accounting earnings represent true economic earnings with a downward bias compared with under an unbiased standard where absent earnings management accounting earnings represent true economic earnings without bias

ceo stock based compensation an empirical analysis of incentive intensity relative mix and economic determinants the use of stock based compensation for u s ceos has increased significantly throughout the 1990s research interest in particular on stock option compensation has similarly increased yet contradictory results create questions about the theoretical underpinnings therefore we revisit the controversy surrounding stock option awards and we further the understanding of restricted stock grants which have escaped similar research focus using a recent data set we obtain convincing empirical support for most theoretical predictions about stock option awards we also find that restricted stock due to its linear payoffs is relatively inefficient in inducing risk averse ceos to accept risky value increasing investment projects copyright 2000 by university of chicago press