majority voting and corporate control the rule of the dominant shareholder this paper incorporates a model of corporate control into a general equilibrium framework for production economies with incomplete markets the classical objective of value maximization is extended but is indeterminate instead firms are viewed as being subject to shareholder control via some decision mechanism as long as this decision mechanism is responsive to a unanimous preference by shareholders shareholder control is consistent with but stronger than value maximization next the particular institution of majority voting by shareholders is examined it is shown that for generic economies a majority rule equilibrium for a firm implies that production is optimal for the largest or dominant shareholder finally a more realistic control mechanism is considered in which majority voting by shareholders is constrained by a group of shareholders or board of directors who control the voting agenda the result is that shareholders not on the board have no influence on the equilibrium production choice of the firm

history dependence in concave economies abstract this paper investigates concave intertemporal optimization problems and derives two mechanisms either growth or control state interactions e g due to endogenous preferences that allow for multiple steady states including an unstable one therefore history dependence is possible in a perfectly governed economy subject to the law of diminishing returns if one of these two mechanisms is present this result complements a large amount of literature that attributes history dependence to convexities as a consequence lock ins into undesired evolutions are possible beyond the familiar case of increasing returns

nonconvexities in optimal pollution accumulation abstract with a few exceptions the analysis of optimal pollution accumulation or detrimental stock externalities rests on the assumptions that the level of damage is unbounded and that pollution decay increases monotonically with the level of pollution stock we show that these assumptions are restrictive and that their generalization alters the basic economic properties of optimal pollution control we specify a decay function which is concave with low stock levels and convex when pollution is higher we show that although multiple steady states may exist the globally optimal solution may be independent of the initial pollution level it is also possible that there are cutoff levels which determine the optimal long run equilibrium implying that the feedback control law is discontinuous and nonmonotonic bounded damage may have similar implications but in contrast to concave convex decay they may occur even with zero discounting

private information deposit interest rates and the stability of the banking system abstract the regulation of deposit interest rates has received little support from economists the same is true for the original rationale for such regulation that bank competition for deposits generates inherent instability in the banking system this paper develops an adverse selection model of banking in which this rationale is correct moreover in this model instability in the banking system can arise despite the presence of a lender of last resort and despite the absence of any need for deposit insurance however in the world described the regulation of deposit interest rates is shown to be an appropriate response to instability in the banking system finally it is argued that adverse selection models of deposit interest rate determination can confront a number of observed phenomena that are not readily explained in other contexts

a note on the extinction of renewable resources abstract this paper presents two sets of conditions under which a sole owner of a renewable resource stock who maximizes a nonlinear benefit function would find it more profitable to harvest the stock to extinction than follow a continuous harvesting strategy when the minimum viable resource stock is positive extinction is optimal as long as the initial resource stock is sufficiently small regardless of the discount rate when the minimum viable resource stock is zero and the discount rate exceeds the growth potential of the species extinction is optimal for sufficiently small initial stocks

on conservation of renewable resources with stock dependent return and nonconcave production textabstractthis paper analyzes conservation and extinction of renewable resources when the production function is nonconcave and the return function depends on consumption and the resource stock the paper focuses on the efficiency of global conservation a safe standard of conservation and extinction which outcome obtains depends on the marginal rate of substitution between investment and the stock in addition to the discount factor and the marginal productivity of the resource conservation may be efficient even if the discounted intrinsic growth rate of the resource is less than 1 journal of economic literature classification numbers d90 q20

optimal and open access harvesting of multi use species in a second best world expansion of human populations and activities has caused increased conflicts between wildlife and humans as a result the distinction between resource and pest species has become blurry we propose an economically based classification of species based on a multi use bioeconomic model the classification of the steady state population of a species is shown to depend on both species density and economic factors we extend earlier work on multi use resource pest species by applying the theoretical model to a developing country context where property rights to wildlife are imperfectly enforced so that second best trade measures are often applied by the international community to promote conservation upon calibrating the model using data for the african elephant we derive three further results first when comparing the optimal stock of a multi use species to the open access stock we find that the ranking in terms of abundance is ambiguous second and consistent with existing literature on resource management in a second best world our case study supports the idea that trade bans have ambiguous effectson wildlife abundance third due to a bifurcation effect characterizing the multi use model s solution strategic and temporary subsidizing by the north may enable them to free ride on conservation efforts of the south henceforth

a reexamination on the effect of bank competition on bank non performing loans this article examines whether competition in the deposit and loan markets results in a more stable or fragile banking industry following the assumption that deposit and loan competitions are not s

majority rules and incentives a club s majority rule defines the number of members that must approve a policy proposed to replace the status quo since the majority rule thus dictates the extent to which winners must compensate losers it also determines the incentives to invest in order to become a winner of anticipated projects if the required majority is large members invest too little because of a holdup problem if it is small members invest too much in order to become a member of the majority coalition to balance these opposing forces the majority rule should increase in the project s value and the club s enforcement capacity but decrease in the heterogeneity in preferences externalities can be internalized by adjusting the rule with heterogeneity in size or initial conditions votes should be appropriately weighted or double majorities required

bargaining and value we present and analyze a model of noncooperative bargaining among n participants applied to situations describable as games in coalitional form this leads to a unified solution theory for such games that has as special cases the shapley value in the transferable utility tu case the nash bargaining solution in the pure bargaining case and the recently introduced maschler owen consistent value in the general nontransferable utility ntu case moreover we show that any variation in a certain class of our bargaining procedure which generates the shapley value in the tu setup must yield the consistent value in the general ntu setup

on the efficiency of equilibria in a legislative bargaining model with particularistic and collective goods this study analyzes the efficiency of equilibria in a multilateral bargaining game in which a legislature divides its budget among collective and particularistic goods in order to disentangle the causes of inefficiency we extend the model of volden and wiseman am polit sci rev 101 79 92 2007 by considering quasi linear utility functions and consensus requirements ranging from simple majority to unanimity although unanimous agreements can be reached under weaker consensus requirements we show that pareto inefficiency is associated with non unanimous consent we also study how i the endogenous selection of the legislature s size or ii a sequential choice of collective and particularistic spending eliminates or attenuates the inefficiency problem

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

banking deregulation allocational consequences of relaxing entry barriers abstract we present an equilibrium analysis to predict the long run allocational consequences and risk implications of banking deregulation loan demand and deposit supply functions are derived from primitive assumptions about the preferences of individuals and banks are viewed as differentiated competitors in a spatial context we find that a relaxation of entry barriers into banking improves the welfare of borrowers and savers at the expense of bank stockholders equilibrium loan interest rates fall and equilibrium deposit interest rates rise as banking becomes more competitive despite this the equilibrium debt equity ratios of banks increase as entry barriers are relaxed we also examine the implications of capital standards and find that an increase in the minimum capital requirement benefits borrowers but hurts depositors

renegotiation design with unverifiable information this paper considers a buyer seller relationship with observable but unverifiable investments and or random utility parameters in such situations it is known that contract renegotiation may prevent the implementation of first best outcomes in this paper we show however that efficient investments and optimal risk sharing can typically be achieved provided the initial contract is able to monitor the ex post renegotiation process specifically we focus on the following two features of renegotiation design first default options in case renegotiation breaks down second the allocation of all bargaining power to either contracting party moreover we show that these two features can be obtained in standard rubinstein bargaining games through contractual provisions such as specific performance clauses and penalties for delay or equivalently financial hostages refundable without interest

credence attributes voluntary organizations and social pressure abstract credence attributes of products are unobservable through search or experience some consumers are willing to pay a premium for their provision and in addition citizens can apply social pressure on firms to supply credence attributes firms have formed voluntary organizations to assure the provision of credence attributes and the credible provision provides product differentiation this paper provides a theory of the voluntary provision of credence attributes in the presence of demand pull from consumers and social pressure from ngos where an organization chooses a credence standard and firms compete given the standard the credence standard is lower the larger the organization and social pressure results in a higher standard

the impact of the euro on risk exposure of the world s major banking industries abstract in this paper we examine if the introduction of the euro impacted the risk exposures risk premiums and hence the cost of equity of the banking industry of 11 eurozone countries five non eurozone european countries and three non european countries using a multi factor asset pricing model that allows time variation in the risk exposures we find a statistically significant and economically large decline in the cost of equity of the banking industry across the three groups of countries following the introduction of the euro though we find an increase in the market and currency exposures after the euro consistent with increased competition among banks the fall in the cost of equity arises from an economically large decline in the currency premium as expected the eurozone banking industry experienced the largest decrease our results are inconsistent with the argument that increased banking competition arising from the legislative changes accompanying the introduction of the euro would result in an increase in the overall risk premium of the banking sector

do capital adequacy requirements reduce risks in banking abstract in a dynamic framework it is shown that capital adequacy rules may increase a bank s riskiness in addition to the standard negative effect of rents on risk attitudes of banks a further intertemporal effect has to be considered the intuition behind the result is that under binding capital requirements an additional unit of equity tomorrow is more valuable to a bank if raising equity is excessively costly the only possibility to increase equity tomorrow is to increase risk today

sustainable growth renewable resources and pollution thresholds and cycles abstract ayong le kama j econ dyn control 25 2001 1911 combines within an interesting model optimal saving a la ramsey with optimal intertemporal renewable resource use a la berck j environ econ manage 11 1981 101 this note draws attention to two possible outcomes thresholds and limit cycles that are overlooked in ayong le kama but also in other recent works and that are quite important in this context

uncertainty and amenity values in renewable resource economics in this paper we study the effects of amenities and uncertainty on the optimal exploitation of a renewable resource first if society displays a protection motive in the presence of amenities its optimal harvesting strategy will be more conservative second we show that ecological uncertainty leads society to develop the opposite behavior thus reducing its exposition towards risk a stationary analysis is undertaken to analytically quantify and compare these two effects with a gompertz natural regeneration function and a proportional risk the amenity effect is proved to prevail if and only if stochastic fluctuations on the resource stock are not too large

thresholds in concave renewable resource models abstract a number of renewable resource models some of them just recently published e g about shallow lakes refer to convexities with respect to the resource stock as the source for multiple steady states and associated thresholds this short paper draws attention to the fact that multiple steady states and thresholds are possible in well behaved i e concave models too the ecological consequence is that renewable resource management is sensitive to initial conditions in more cases than so far suggested in the literature

environmental and resource economics a canadian retrospective the paper reviews research contributions to environmental and resource economics by scholars in canada we focus mainly on work from the past 25 years but also highlight earlier pathbreaking work we begin by looking at broad trends in research both internationally and within canada we then review canadian contributions to various topics in the field canadians have played a leading role in the development of the field especially in resource economics international environmental economics and the valuation of environmental amenities

why are stabilizations delayed when a stabilization has significant distributional implications e g tax increases to eliminate a large budget deficit socioeconomic groups may attempt to shift the burden of stabilization onto other groups the process leading to stabilization becomes a war of attrition each group attempting to wait the others out and stabilization occurring only when one group concedes and bears a disproportionate share of the burden the authors solve for the expected time of stabilization in a model of rational delay and relate it to several political and economic variables they motivate this approach and its results by comparison to historical and current episodes copyright 1991 by american economic association

the fear of exclusion individual effort when group formation is endogenous to secure their membership in a popular group individuals may contribute more to the group s local public good than they would if group formation were exogenous those in the most unpopular group do not have this incentive to contribute this may result in substantial differences in individual effort level between groups our model thus provides one explanation for the existence of group specific behavioral norms a principal will prefer exogenous or endogenous group formation depending on whether he prefers high or low levels of the local public good we analyze two stylized examples social interaction in schools and multiple task teamwork

prudence as a competitive advantage on the effects of competition on banks risk taking incentives this paper builds on the notion that corporate borrowers care about the overall riskiness of a bank s operations as their continued access to credit may depend on the bank s ability to roll over loans or to expand existing credit facilities a key implication of this observation is that increasing competition among banks should have an asymmetric impact on banks incentives to take on risk banks that are already riskier will take on yet more risk while their safer rivals will become even more prudent

specific investments and the eu enlargement abstract this paper analyzes a hold up problem in the eu enlargement process eu specific anticipatory investments of private firms lower the government s outside option the eu takes advantage of the applicants increased dependency and extracts more surplus through entrance conditions that benefit it and impose net costs on applicants if private firms pay less than the full entrance fee in taxes enlargement immiserizes the entrant while in practice an applicant may possess sufficient bargaining power to avoid immiserization the hold up problem reduces its potential gains from joining the eu this result suggests that previous calculations ignoring both the applicants costs of joining the eu and the dynamics of their bargaining position during the negotiations overestimate the welfare effects of membership

imperfect competition risk taking and regulation in banking abstract we asses the welfare implications of banking competition under various deposit insurance regimes in a model of imperfect competition with social failure costs and where banks are subject to limited liability we study the links between competition for deposits and risk taking incentives and conclude that the welfare performance of the market and the appropriateness of alternative regulatory measures depend on the degree of rivalry and the deposit insurance regime specifically when competition is intense and the social failure costs high deposit rates are excessive both in a free market and with risk based insurance if insurance premiums are insensitive to risk then the same is true even if there is no social cost of failure we find also that in an uninsured market with nonobservable portfolio risk or with flat premium deposit insurance deposit regulation rate regulation or deposit limits and direct asset restrictions are complementary tools to improve welfare in an uninsured market with observable portfolio risk or with risk based insurance deposit regulation may be a sufficient instrument to improve welfare

the economics of split ticket voting in representative democracies in u s elections voters often vote for candidates from different parties for president and congress voters also express dissatisfaction with the performance of congress as a whole and satisfaction with their own representative the authors develop a model of split ticket voting in which government spending is financed by uniform taxes the benefits from this spending are concentrated while the model generates split ticket voting overall spending is too high only if the president s powers are limited overall spending is too high in a parliamentary system the authors model can be used as the basis of an argument for term limits copyright 1997 by american economic association

the strategic analysis of intermediation the importance and the special character of intermediation were recognized as early as in the eighteenth century and have been stressed by many authors afterwards in spite of this long tradition comparatively little work has been done on the details of the economic theory of intermediation instead it was assumed that intermediation can simply be treated like any other economic activity in contrast i will argue that the theory of intermediation requires a specific game theoretic analysis and moreover that many preconceptions that one might have on the basis of standard microeconomic theory are wrong

market power and banking failures abstract we investigate whether more competition in the banking industry necessarily results in a higher probability of banking failures as it is often suggested in our model borrowers face a moral hazard problem which induces banks to choose between costly monitoring and credit rationing we show that investment decreases with the lending rate and increases with monitoring effort since incentives to monitor are enhanced by market power the relationship between market structure and investment is ambiguous in the presence of non diversifiable risk and decreasing returns to scale more investment implies higher failure rates as a result the relationship between market power and banking failures is ambiguous

self enforcing voting in international organizations some international organizations are governed by unanimity rule some others by a majority system still others have moved from one system to the other over time the existing voting models have a difficult time explaining the observed variation in governance mode and in particular the widespread occurrence of the unanimity system we present a model whose main departure from standard voting models is that there is no external enforcement mechanism each country is sovereign and cannot be forced to follow the collective decision or in other words the voting system must be self enforcing the model yields unanimity as the optimal system for a wide range of parameters and delivers rich predictions on the variation in the mode of governance both across organizations and over time we thank james anderson matt jackson francois maniquet guido tabellini and jean tirole for very helpful comments arnaud costinot provided excellent research assistance we also bene

choosing how to choose self stable majority rules and constitutions constitutional arrangements affect the decisions made by a society we study how this effect leads to preferences of citizens over constitutions and ultimately how this has a feedback that determines which constitutions can survive in a given society constitutions are stylized here to consist of a voting rule for ordinary business and possibly a different voting rule for making changes to the constitution we define an equilibrium notion for constitutions called self stability whereby under the rules of a self stable constitution the society would not vote to change the constitution we argue that only self stable constitutions will endure we prove that self stable constitutions always exist but that most constitutions even very prominent ones may not be self stable for some societies we show that constitutions where the voting rule used to amend the constitution is the same as the voting rule used for ordinary business are dangerously simplistic and there are many societies for which no such constitution is self stable we conclude with a characterization of the set of self stable constitutions that use majority rule for ordinary business

interest rates and bank risk taking abstract a recent line of research views the low interest rate environment of the early to mid 2000s as an element that triggered increased risk taking appetite of banks in search for yield this paper uses approximately 18000 annual observations on euro area banks over the period 2001 2008 and presents strong empirical evidence that low interest rates indeed increase bank risk taking substantially this result is robust across a number of different specifications that account inter alia for the potential endogeneity of interest rates and or the dynamics of bank risk notably among the banks of the large euro area countries this effect is less pronounced for french institutions which held on average a relatively low level of risk assets finally the distributional effects of interest rates on bank risk taking due to individual bank characteristics reveal that the impact of interest rates on risk assets is diminished for banks with higher equity capital and is amplified for banks with higher off balance sheet items

legislative bargaining under weighted voting organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting we analyze this setting using a non cooperative bargaining game based on the baron ferejohn 1989 model unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory we find that each voter s expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight an exception occurs when many high weight voters exist as low weight voters may expect disproportionately high payoffs due to proposal power the model also predicts that ex post the coalition formateur the party chosen to form a coalition will receive a disproportionately high payoff using data from coalition governments from 1946 to 2001 we find strong evidence ofsuch formateur effects

dynamic pivotal politics we analyze a dynamic extension of a parsimonious model of lawmaking in which preferences evolve over time and today s policy becomes tomorrow s status quo unlike in existing models of pivotal politics policy makers voting behavior depends on the institutional environment and on their expectations about future economic and political shocks relative to sincere voting the equilibrium behavior exhibits a strategic polarization effect which increases with the degree of consensus required by the institution the volatility of the policy environment and the expected ideological polarization of the future policy makers the equilibrium behavior also exhibits a strategic policy bias which works against any exogenous policy bias embedded in the voting rule our analysis implies that the existing literature underestimates the inertial effect of checks and balances and overestimates the impact of institutional biases such as fiscally conservative budget procedures

incomplete social contracts there is a long normative social contract tradition that attempts to characterize ex post income inequalities that are agreeable to all behind a veil of ignorance this paper takes a similar normative approach to characterize social decision making procedures it is shown that quite generally some form of majority voting is preferred to unanimity behind a veil of ignorance whenever society faces deadweight costs in making compensating transfers deviations from unanimity or ex post pareto optimality are ex ante efficient to the extent that they economize on costly compensating transfers put another way the optimal decision rule trades off the benefits of minority protection and those from greater flexibility jel h11 g33 g34 d63 p16 p48

flexible integration mandatory and minimum participation rules should a subset of the eu members be allowed to form inner clubs and enhance cooperation or should integration proceed at the same speed for all while flexible cooperation allows members to participate if and only if they benefit it also generates a free rider problem if potential members choose to opt out the analysis shows that flexible cooperation is better only if the heterogeneity is large and the externality small but rigid cooperation will be the political equilibrium too often flexibility and rigidity can be combined by i mandatory participation rules where participation is voluntary unless a super majority requires everyone to participate and ii minimum participation rules where inner clubs must be sufficiently large the combination of mandatory and minimum participation rules may implement the best possible mechanism

on the weights of nations assigning voting weights in a heterogeneous union we study indirect democracy in which countries states or districts each elect a representative who later votes at a union level on their behalf we show that the voting rule that maximizes the total expected utility of all agents in the union involves assigning a weight to each district s vote and then sticking with the status quo unless at least a threshold of weighted votes is cast for change we analyze how the weights relate to the population size of a country and the correlation structure of agents preferences and then we compare the voting weights in the council of the european union under the nice treaty and the recently proposed constitution

climate contracts a game of emissions investments negotiations and renegotiations the paper presents a dynamic game where players can contribute to a public bad invest in technologies and write incomplete contracts despite the n 1 stocks in the model the analysis is tractable and the symmetric markov perfect equilibrium unique the framework helps to analyze emissions investments and international environmental agreements if only the emission levels are contractible then investments are suboptimally small if the contract is short term or close to its expiration date to encourage investments the optimal contract is more ambitious if it is short term and it is tougher to satisfy close to its expiration date and for countries with small investment costs if renegotiation is possible such an incomplete contract implements the rst best the results have important lessons for how to design a climate treaty

committee design with endogenous information this paper is concerned with the arrangements for collective decision making in a world where agents must be motivated to acquire information the analysis identifies some basic forces shaping the design of panels of decision makers referees managers jurors etc in situations where decision makers are useful only in so far as they expend some effort to gain information about the alternatives at hand these situations are common one being the refereeing process where an editor requires the opinions of a number of experts who must read the paper acquire information in order to give an opinion as to publication analogously in committees which screen applicants to a programme the committee members must gain information about the applicant s qualifications and likelihood of success in order to evaluate whether to admit him her finally in trial juries it is important that jurors pay attention to the evidence in order to make an informed judgement 1 we focus on environments where information is a public good in the sense that the social benefits of one decision maker acquiring information exceed the private benefits a good mechanism in this environment must not only aggregate information efficiently but also induce the decision makers to acquire information we analyse the design of voting mechanisms our problem is to choose two parameters which determine both the incentive to acquire information and the efficiency with which information is aggregated the first parameter is the size of the decision making unit the number of committee members the second is the plurality required to overturn the status quo the voting rule our main result is this a voting rule that requires a large plurality in the extreme unanimity to upset the status quo can be optimal only if the information available to each committee member is sufficiently accurate when individual information is noisy the drawback

along the way back from the brink abstract an optimal control model of wildlife management is developed to analyze the transitory dynamics set forth by the reintroduction of animals that provide benefits but can also come into conflict with humans the shadow price of these resources can be positive or negative potentially creating a nonconvexity the conditions under which reintroduction is not desirable are determined and those characterizing the initiation of costly population control are investigated an application to deer management illustrates the relevance of the nonconvexity and the magnitude of losses stemming from delays in implementing optimal management the impact of distributional concerns on efficiency is discussed

spatial competition in the banking system localization cross subsidies and the regulation of deposit rates abstract the paper analyses a spatial competition model of the banking sector banks offer two kind of services deposits and credit and can either borrow or lend on the money market we investigate the consequences of the regulation of rates paid on deposits the main conclusions are as follows regulation first increases network size beyond social optimum in the long run it results in lower equilibrium credit rates because of increased competition secondly regulation generates tied sales contracts by which banks propose bundles of credit and deposit services tied sales in turn motivate the introduction of cross subsidies between the two activities the rent levied upon regulated deposits financing lower rates in the credit market finally it is shown that in a regulated environment the effectiveness of monetary policy is reduced in the sense that fluctuations of money market rates are less than fully transmitted in credit rates

the independent submarkets model an application to the spanish retail banking market abstract the aim of this paper is to test the predictions of sutton s independent submarkets model with data on the spanish retail banking market the prediction of this model for aggregates of submarkets is that the form of equilibrium outcome must involve some minimal degree of size inequality however within each submarket when three conditions hold the only form of equilibrium outcome will be an extreme fragmented structure to test these predictions firstly i propose methods to identify independent submarkets then i analyze the degree of inequality in bank sizes for markets with different levels of aggregation submarkets regions and national market using concentration by towns data i find that in single submarket towns the degree of inequality of the size among banks is zero moreover multimarket towns with a significant degree of concentration are shown to be formed by a different number of independent submarkets where each bank owns one branch nonetheless when the regional and the national bank markets are considered the degree of inequality in bank sizes becomes high these results are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model

deposit insurance and subsidized recapitalizations the 2007 2009 financial crisis saw a vast expansion in deposit insurance guarantees around the world and yet our understanding of the design and consequences of deposit insurance schemes is in its infancy we provide a new rationale for the provision of deposit insurance in our model the banking sector exhibits both adverse selection and moral hazard which implies that the social benefits of bank monitoring must for incentive reasons be shared between depositors and banks consequently socially too few deposits are made in equilibrium deposit insurance or equivalently bank recapitalization corrects this market failure we find that deposit insurance should be funded not by banks or depositors but out of general taxation the optimal level of deposit insurance varies inversely with the quality of the banking system hence when the soundness of the financial sector is uncertain governments should consider supporting deposit insurance schemes and undertaking subsidized recapitalizations

financial opening deposit insurance and risk in a model of banking competition abstract we study the impact of competition on banks risk taking behavior under different assumptions about deposit insurance and the dissemination of information while financial opening increases banks riskiness a risk based deposit insurance or alternatively the public disclosure of financial information are likely to mitigate this effect moreover the limiting cases of uninsured but fully informed depositors and risk based full deposit insurance yield the same equilibrium risk level although the welfare consequences of increased competition depend on its impact on risk financial opening unambiguously improves welfare as we approach the limiting cases

banking competition and market efficiency this paper analyses competition among financial intermediaries in a set up where financial intermediaries economize on duplicated monitoring diamond 1984 we analyse two different games in which both direct trade and indirect trade are available we show that in general equilibrium outcomes are inefficient so that diamond s efficiency result is fragile intermediation may increase rather than decrease transaction costs disintermediation may also be an equilibrium we discuss the role played by the nonconvexities of banks technology and that played by competition for deposits and loans

ownership and the regulation of wildlife ownership and the regulation of wildlife the use of wildlife resources is governed by a combination of private contracts and public regulations most often private landowners control access rights and government agencies regulate hunting and other uses this paper shows that these institutions depend on wildlife values and the ability of private landowners to control access to species that inhabit their land logit regressions and literary sources are used to test implications about private hunting rights and state regulations the data support the view that private legal and political forces have led to institutions that vary in ways consistent with wealth maximization i introduction most resources are not exclusively private or public but are governed by a mixture of private and public institutions in the united states wildlife populations are no exception state governments usually regulate hunting trapping and fishing federal agencies protect endangered species and private landowners largely control access rights to habitat although it is true that owning deer or elk is different from owning cattle or sheep the facts refute the common assertion that wildlife are unowned or have no value existing laws and regulations define property rights to many dimensions of wildlife and in many areas access rights to wildlife are routinely bought and sold economists typically view private contracts as arrangements that maximize the value of resources governed by the contract on the other hand public institutions are given less credit becker 1983 peltzman 1976 stigler 1971 and others have argued that interest groups can influence political decisions and ultimately distort outcomes from an efficiency viewpoint private and public institutions are distinct barzel 1989 becker and murphy 1988 mcmanus 1975 and wittman 1989 have advanced an alternative view that institutions including government not only reflect the optimizing activity of individuals but also maximize the net value of resources alchian 1950 argued that persistent and surviving institutions are likely efficient because most features of american wildlife institutions have persisted for two centuries the likelihood of efficiency seems high relative to the likelihood of pervasive inefficiency in part i test this efficient organization hypothesis by treating both private and public wildlife institutions as the result of efforts to increase the value of wildlife specifically i argue that the content of private wildlife controls and government regulations depends on the value of wildlife stocks as well as on the ability of landowners to contract with each other and with wildlife users to control wildlife stocks and access to them ii the contracting problem with wildlife it is costly to establish ownership of wildlife stocks because the ownership patterns of land do not always coincide with the populations territories if a stock of wildlife is the only valuable attribute of a parcel of land then the value of the land is maximized when land ownership coincides with the population s territory under these conditions wildlife would be quite similar economically to domestic animals the habitat would still be natural however and the species would still be considered wild below i consider the usual case in which wildlife is not the only valued use of land optimal landownership and wildlife territory assume that a homogeneous tract of land has two potentially valuable attributes agriculture and wildlife next assume that the size of the wildlife stock is not influenced by agriculture finally assume that the stock of wildlife is composed of homogeneous units that is individual animals and that the value of wildlife is tied to the value of the animals and not to the value inherent in the existence of a species 1 if the land is used for agricultural production then the optimal size of the land tract in acres is s

competition and risk taking in banking the charter value hypothesis revisited abstract conventional wisdom suggests that greater competition in banking by eroding bank charter values exacerbates banks incentives to take excessive risks this paper presents a model in which contrary to this view competition can cause banks to act more prudently as competition intensifies and profit margins decline banks face more binding threats of failure to which they may respond by taking lower risks nonetheless competition is unambiguously destabilizing in this model the direct effect of lower margins on bank failure rates always outweighs the prudence effect a key implication is that the effects of competition on bank risk taking and on failure risk can move in opposite directions

legislative bargaining with reconsideration we present a dynamic model of legislative bargaining with an endogenously evolving default policy and a persistent agenda setter policy making proceeds until the agenda setter can no longer pass a new policy to replace an approved bill we prove existence and necessary conditions of pure strategy stationary equilibria for any finite policy space any number of players and any preference profile in equilibrium the value of proposal power is limited compared to the case that disallows reconsideration as voters are induced to protect each other s benefits to maintain their future bargaining positions the agenda setter in turn would prefer to limit his ability to reconsider the lack of commitment due to the possibility of reconsideration however enhances policy efficiency

centralized fiscal spending by supranational unions we study fiscal spending by supranational unions where participation is voluntary and countries bargain over contributions to and the allocation of a central budget since decisions are made by unanimity bargaining power over the allocation becomes a function of contributions which generically causes inefficiency in the presence of income asymmetry between member nations this link between the budget allocation and contributions explains patterns of inefficient spending in the eu e g why resources are diverted to low productivity projects in high income countries the option of veto creates a trade off between efficiency on the contributions margin and efficiency on the allocation margin

harmonization and side payments in political cooperation for two districts or countries that try to internalize externalities i analyze a bargaining game under private information i derive conditions for when it is efficient with uniform policies across regions with and without side payments and when it is efficient to prohibit side payments in the negotiations while policy differentiation and side payments allow the policy to better reflect local conditions they create conflicts between the regions and thus delay the results also describe when political centralization outperforms decentralized cooperation and they provide a theoretical foundation for the controversial uniformity assumption traditionally used by the fiscal federalism literature

strategic delegation and voting rules abstract the selection of political representatives depends on the political system principals such as voters or districts may benefit by strategically electing representatives different from themselves while a status quo biased delegate may be a better negotiator an enthusiastic representative has a better chance of being included in the majority coalition a larger majority requirement leads to conservative delegation and hence a status quo bias a poor minority protection does the opposite through strategic delegation the political system also determines whether centralization or decentralization is beneficial

banking on extinction endangered species and speculation many wildlife commodities such as tiger bones bear bladders ivory and rhino horn have been stockpiled in large quantities by speculators who expect that future price increases justify forgoing the interest income associated with current sales when supply from private stores competes with supply from wild populations in nature and when speculators are able to collude it may be optimal to coordinate on an extinction strategy we analyse the behaviour of a speculator who has access to a large initial store and finds that it is optimal to deter poachers entry either by depressing prices carefully timing own supply or by depressing wild stocks which strategy maximizes profits critically depends on the initial wildlife stock and initial speculative stores we apply the model to the case of black rhino conservation and conclude it is likely that banking on extinction is profitable if current speculators are able to collude contrary to conventional wisdom we also find that extinction is favoured by such factors as low discount rates or high growth rates

moral hazard externalities and compensation for crop damages from wildlife abstract a principal multiple agent model is used to examine wildlife damage abatement and compensation programs in a setting in which farmers suffer damages and hunters use the wildlife for recreational purposes in addition to externalities inherent in abatement abatement compensation policy confronts the issue of moral hazard by representing the principal as a wildlife management authority who acts on behalf of hunters we investigate contracts in which transfers of more or less severe hunting regulations a public good that aids in dispersing wildlife and monetary payments from hunting license fees can be used to overcome moral hazard

a noncooperative theory of legislative coalitions this noncooperative theory is based on a model that incorporates an institutional structure that reflects the sequential process of agenda formation and voting in a legislature that has the task of allocating particularistic benefits among legislative districts the theory is intended to identify the incentives for the formation of proposal coordinating coalitions as a function of characteristics of the political system and the rules that govern agenda formation coalition proposals allocate all the benefits to their districts and whenever the coalition has discipline or controls the chair it will be of minimal winning size when proposals are governed by a closed rule when coalition discipline is absent and the chair is neutral the coalition will be comprised of approximately 70 of the legislature a legislative rule that allows amendments may result in larger coalitions coalition composition is also considered

interbank lending and systemic risk systemic risk refers to the propagation of a bank s economic distress to other economic agents linked to that bank through financial transactions banking authorities often prevent systemic risk through an implicit insurance of interbank claims or by reducing interbank transactions and centralizing banks liquidity management this paper investigates whether the flexability afforded by decentralized bank interactions can be preserved while protecting the central banks from the necessity of conducting undesired rescue operations it develops a model in which decentralized interbank leading is motivated by peer monitoring in this context the paper derives the optimal prudential rules and in particular looks at the impact of interbank monitoring on the solvency and liquidity ratios of borrowing and lending banks last it provides conditions which a too big to fail policy is or is not justified and studies the possibility of propagation of a bank s liquidity shock throughout the financial system copyright 1996 by ohio state university press

tinbergen and tipping points could some thresholds be policy induced abstract thresholds and tipping points that are characteristic of dynamic multi stability are increasingly prominent touchstones of the science policy interface prior economic work has shown thresholds arising in convex concave ecological models that exclude humans may disappear in models of coupled economic ecological systems when economic agents are included as part of the system less well understood is how this result may depend on the ability of humans to manage complex systems we examine the role of institutions that condition the available management choices we find institutional restrictions do not generate non convexities when the ecological system is well behaved but that these restrictions may generate non convexities when the ecological system is convex concave these results are tied to the concept of path controllability which is when managers have sufficient controls to guide the system across the state space path controllability is the dynamic version of the tinbergen rule and generally requires separate controls to manage each possible ecological externality we link the concepts of ecosystem externalities thresholds and path controllability to provide new economic insights into problems with the potential for multi stability and we illustrate the importance of institutions for managing convex concave systems

multiproduct monopoly commodity bundling and correlation of values through what selling strategy can a multiproduct monopolist maximize his profits when his knowledge about individual consumers preferences is limited one possibility extensively studied in the context of a single good monopoly is to use quantity dependent pricing as a means of discriminating among customers with differing tastes see for example oi 1971 and maskin and riley 1984 an alternative technique for price discrimination first suggested by stigler 1968 and analyzed further by adams and yellen 1976 is for the monopolist to package two or more products in bundles rather than selling them separately through a series of examples adams and yellen illustrate that bundling can serve as a useful price discrimination device even when all consumers willingnesses to pay for each of the goods individually are unaffected by whether they are also consuming the other product a typical example is illustrated in figure i adapted from figure iv in adams and yellen where there are two goods three consumers ab c who consume at most one unit of each good with reservation values for each good that are independent of whether the other good is consumed and zero costs of production there a bundle offered at a price of 100 fully extracts all potential surplus which would be impossible pricing the goods independently unfortunately though these authors do not provide any general characterization of the circumstances in which bundling is actually a multiproduct monopolist s optimal strategy their examples however such as figure i create the impression that the profitable use of bundling

measuring the existence value of wildlife what do cvm estimates really show two research programs are brought together to contribute to the growing body of work on alternatives to standard welfare based approaches to environmental valuation and policy the first is the theoretical literature undermining the new welfare

bank competition and crises revisited new results abstract we study the relationship between bank competition and stability for 145 countries over the period 1997 2010 we use three measures of bank competition namely the boone indicator the lerner and the adjusted lerner indices and two econometric methods our results show that bank competition is detrimental to bank stability and it also shortens the survival time of banking systems