optimal commercial policy with quality differentiated products abstract this paper examines the optimal tariff policy for an importer of a quality differentiated product when tariff levels are allowed to vary with the quality of the good the deadweight loss due to changes in the matching of consumers to goods under tariffs is emphasized it is shown that if the objective is to transfer income to products there is a presumption that the optimal policy will require consumers to choose lower quality goods than under free trade quality downgrading if all qualities are improved an ad valorem tariff cannot be the optimal policy

europe vs america institutional hysteresis in a simple normative model we show how the differences in us and european institutions can arise in a normative model the paper focuses on the labor market and the government s decision to set unemployment benefits in response to an unemployment shock the government balances insurance considerations with the tax burden of benefits and the possibility that they introduce adverse incentive effects whereby benefits increase unemployment it is found that when an adverse shock occurs benefits should be increased most when the adverse incentive effects of benefits are largest adjustment costs of changing benefits introduce hysteresis and can help explain why post oil shock benefits remained high in europe but not in the us desirable features of the model are that we obtain an asymmetry out of a symmetric environment and that the mechanism yielding hysteresis is both simple requires the third derivative of the utility function to be non negative and self correcting empirical evidence concerning the role of corporatism is discussed

perceptions of inevitability and demand for redistribution evidence from a survey experiment abstract believing that inequality is inevitable may limit demand for redistribution we explore this idea with a survey experiment in south africa one of the most unequal countries in the world inevitability beliefs can be influenced by learning about lower inequality elsewhere we find that the demand for redistributive policies reacts to this information while it is insensitive to other types of information messages our analysis suggests a promising and heretofore unexplored avenue of research for refining our understanding of the determinants of demand for redistribution

immigration redistribution and universal suffrage the effect of immigration on redistribution has been widely debated this paper contributes to this debate by testing two explanations which are that i immigration tends to reduce redistribution due to people s higher levels of xenophobia and that ii immigration affects redistribution because immigrants do not have the right to vote since the demand for redistribution depends on the expected gap between median voter income and mean income immigrants affect the demand for redistribution because as non citizens they do not change the median voter s income but as economic stakeholders they do affect the mean income four empirical consequences of i and ii are tested at the individual level evidence from the european values survey in 45 countries confirms ii showing that immigrants expected competitiveness on the labor market affects preferences for redistribution and that it is amplified when the perceived number of immigrants is high in contrast i is globally rejected since the impact of the citizens declared level of solidarity with immigrants tends to be weak and depends on the type of measurement or specification used

business groups and product variety in trade evidence from south korea taiwan and japan abstract we analyze the impact of market structure on the trade performance of south korea taiwan and japan south korea has many large vertically integrated business groups known as chaebol whereas business groups in taiwan are smaller and more specialized in the production of intermediate inputs we test the hypotheses that a greater presence of business groups leads to less product variety but higher product quality using data on exports from these countries to the united states we find that taiwan tends to export a greater variety of products to the us than korea and this holds particularly for final goods in addition taiwan exports higher quality intermediate inputs whereas korea exports higher quality final goods a comparison with japan is also presented which has greater product variety in its sales to the us than either taiwan or korea due to its larger size

liberalization quality and welfare removing the italian ver on japanese car exports the empirical evidence that evaluates ex post the effects of trade policy confirms the presumption well known in theory that quantitative barriers to trade have an impact on the average quality of exports yet in evaluating ex ante the effects of trade policy reform very few studies take into account the role of the induced change in quality the paper evaluates the effects of liberalization in the italian car market through a calibrated model where the choice of the quality of exports is made endogenous simulating the removal of the ver on japanese exports there are substantial gains from liberalization when only quantity effects are considered results change dramatically if quality effects are taken into account the downgrading in japanese exports entails a strong reduction in consumers gains

social mobility and the demand for public consumption expenditures the collective choice of public consumption expenditure is reconsidered when voters are socially mobile in accordance with previous work on social mobility and political economics the analysis concerns a class of mobility processes that induce mappings from initial income to expected future income that are monotonically increasing and concave the paper abstracts from the explicitly redistributive role of government and concentrates on public consumption which is modeled as a classical public good in equilibrium provision is sensitive to the degree of social mobility theoretically linking social mobility to public consumption further empirical puzzles about the impact of voting franchise extensions on the growth of government spending are addressed within the context of social mobility

spend it like beckham inequality and redistribution in the uk 1983 2004 a main activity of the state is to redistribute resources standard political economy models predict that a rise in inequality will lead to more redistribution this paper shows that for the uk in the period 1983 2004 a plausibly exogenous rise in income inequality has not been associated with increased redistribution we explore this example of the paradox of redistribution using attitudinal data we show that standard political economy models of the individual demand for redistribution do have explanatory power but that other attitudes and beliefs are also very important moreover these attitudes and beliefs change quite quickly so are very important in explaining variation in the demand for redistribution

the economics of voluntary export restraint agreements the three substantive sections of this survey deal with the economic consequences of voluntary export restraint agreements vers e g the multi fibre arrangement and vers on japanese auto exports section 2 focuses on the disposition of quota rents under the assumptions of perfectly competitive markets and the absence of substitute suppliers section 3 considers imperfect competition and the role of vers as cartelization instruments facilitating collusion section 4 analyzes the discriminatory effects of vers when there are third country suppliers a broad conclusion is that the economic consequences of vers are more complex than the standard trade policy analysis based on tariffs because of the issues discussed in sections 3 and 4 copyright 1989 by blackwell publishers ltd

measuring quality change in quota constrained import markets the case of u s footwear abstract theoretical models predict that quantitative import restrictions such as orderly marketing agreements omas lead to substitution into higher quality products within the quotaconstrained import category the country specific nature of omas results in further substitution among supplying countries using index number techniques this paper measures the impact of product and country substitution on the price of u s footwear imports in the period surrounding the 1977 1981 footwear oma with korea and taiwan upgrading of the import bundle was observed in most quota categories throughout the oma period and accounted for 12 percent of the observed rise in the average price of footwear imports

who wants to redistribute the tunnel effect in 1990s russia abstract support for governmental redistribution tended to be greater for the poor than the rich in a representative sample of russian adults in 1996 however support for redistribution is higher amongst those who expect their welfare to fall and this effect is strongest amongst the currently well off a rising trajectory inhibits demand for redistribution support is also stronger in rural areas amongst those with less schooling those who fear losing their job the elderly and amongst women our results are consistent with albert hirschman s idea of a tunnel effect whereby prospects of mobility in both directions influence demand for governmental redistribution

the effects of income mobility and tax persistence on income redistribution and inequality we explore the effect of income mobility and the persistence of redistributive tax policy on the level of redistribution in democratic societies an infinite horizon theoretical model is developed and the properties of the equilibrium tax rate and the degree of after tax inequality are characterized mobility and stickiness of tax policy are both negatively related to the equilibrium tax rate however neither is sufficient by itself social mobility has no effect on equilibrium taxes if tax policy is voted on in every period and tax persistence has no effect in the absence of social mobility the two forces are complementary tax persistence leads to higher levels of post tax inequality for any amount of mobility the effect of mobility on inequality is less clear cut and depends on the degree of tax persistence a laboratory experiment is conducted to test the main comparative static predictions of the theory and the results are generally supportive

income taxation and the diversity of consumer goods a political economy approach after tax income inequality has risen since the mid 1990s as increases in market income inequality have not been offset by greater fiscal redistribution we argue that the substantial increase in the diversity of consumer goods has mitigated mounting political pressures for redistribution within a probabilistic voting framework we demonstrate that if the share of diversified goods in the consumption bundle increases sufficiently with income then an increase in goods diversity can reduce the political equilibrium tax rate focusing on oecd countries we find empirical support for both the model s micro political foundations and the implied relation between goods diversity and fiscal policy outcomes

unequal societies income distribution and the social contract this paper develops a theory of inequality and the social contract aiming to explain how countries with similar economic and political fundamentals can sustain such different systems of social insurance fiscal redistribution and education finance as those of the united states and western europe with imperfect credit and insurance markets some redistributive policies can improve ex ante welfare and this implies that their political support tends to decrease with inequality conversely with credit constraints lower redistribution translates into more persistent inequality hence the potential for multiple steady states with mutually reinforcing high inequality and low redistribution or vice versa

fair inequality attitudes toward pay differentials the united states in comparative perspective are american attitudes toward economic inequality different from those in other countries one tradition in sociology suggests american exceptionalism while another argues for convergence across

partial ordering of unpredictable mobility with welfare implications we propose a partial ordering of unpredictable mobility in the spirit of blackwell s ordering of information structures the proposed ordering ranks mobility matrices according to the degree to which elements in a given set are likely to move from one state to another independently of their origin furthermore for an important class of transition structures our proposed ordering implies ordering thus carrying significant welfare implications moreover whenever it exists our partial ordering functions as a sufficient condition for a class of renowned mobility measures and thereby generates for a subset of transition matrices unanimous ranking among mobility indices that are not generally consistent with one another

taxes and the quality of capital abstract this paper shows that tax policy toward investment by changing the relative prices of capital varieties even within narrow classes of equipment can have a direct effect on the quality composition of capital goods that firms purchase detailed data on farming mining and construction machinery suggest that this impact is economically important firms significantly shift investment toward higher quality varieties when they receive investment subsidies and do not do so when investment is high for other reasons in the aggregate all of the new investment generated by tax subsidies appears to come from firms shifting to higher quality capital goods rather than buying a larger number of their existing capital types the paper also applies a methodology for calculating the implied deadweight loss from the quality distortion and shows that its magnitude may represent a substantial efficiency cost from capital taxation that is neglected in conventional work

education economic growth and brain drain abstract this paper constructs a two sector overlapping generations model of endogenous growth to study the effects of brain drain on growth education and income distribution it is shown that brain drain reduces the economic growth rate and generally hurts the non emigrants through the static income distributional effects and the dynamic damage on economic growth and human capital accumulation if the initial rate of human capital accumulation is relatively low brain drain could deteriorate both the sum of discounted income and lifetime discounted utility of a representative non emigrant the government can choose to spend more on education to lessen the detrimental growth effects of brain drain

redistribution in a model of voting and campaign contributions abstract i propose a framework in which individual political participation can take two distinct forms voting and contributing resources to campaigns in a context in which the negligible impact of any individual s actions on aggregate outcomes is fully recognized by all agents i then use the framework to reassess the relationship between inequality and redistribution the model shows that even though each contribution has a negligible impact the interaction between contributions and voting leads to an endogenous wealth bias in the political process as the advantage of wealthier individuals in providing contributions encourages parties to move their platforms closer to those individuals preferred positions this mechanism can in turn explain why the standard median voter based prediction that more inequality produces more redistribution has received little empirical support higher inequality endogenously shifts the political system further in favor of the rich in equilibrium there is a non monotonic relationship in which redistribution is initially increasing but eventually decreasing in inequality i present some empirical evidence supporting the framework using data on campaign contributions from us presidential elections in particular inequality increases contributions to republicans but not to democrats as predicted by the model

emigration and welfare in an economy with foreign capital abstract this paper examines the effects of emigration on welfare of the remaining residents r in an economy producing traded t and non traded n goods with the aid of foreign and domestic capital while the existing literature has established that emigration reduces the welfare of those left behind when foreign capital is not present in the economy the analysis below suggests that with foreign capital the effect on welfare may well be reversed the paper also compares the welfare implications of remittance flows back to the source country when they are used to finance consumption and when they are used to finance capital accumulation

regression toward mediocrity in economic stature this paper provides estimates of the correlation in lifetime earnings between fathers and sons intergenerational data from the national longitudinal survey are used earlier studies conducted for the united states report elasticities of children s earnings with respect to parent s earnings of 0 2 or less suggesting extensive integenerational mobility these estimates however are biased downward by error contaminated measures of lifetime economic status estimates presented in this paper correct for the problem of measurement error and find the intergenerational correlation in income to be on the order of 0 4 this suggests considerably less intergenerational mobility than previously believed jel j62

intergenerational income mobility in the united states social scientists and policy analysts have long expressed concern about the extent of intergenerational income mobility in the united states but remarkably little empirical evidence is available the few existing estimates of the intergenerational correlation in income have been biased downward by measurement error unrepresentative samples or both new estimates based on intergenerational data from the panel study of income dynamics imply that the intergenerational correlation in long run income is at least 0 4 indicating dramatically less mobility than suggested by earlier research copyright 1992 by american economic association

bridging trade theory and labour econometrics the effects of international migration this paper surveys current theoretical and empirical research on international migration with a particular emphasis on the links between trade theory and labour empirics

voting for redistribution under desert sensitive altruism we endow individuals that differ in skill levels and tastes for working with altruistic preferences for redistribution in a voting model where a unidimensional redistributive parameter is chosen by majority voting in a direct democracy when altruistic preferences are desert sensitive i e when there is a reluctance to redistribute from the hard working to the lazy we show that lower levels of redistribution emerge in political equilibrium we provide empirical evidence based on the issp 1992 dataset that preferences for redistribution are not purely selfish and that desert sensitive motivations play a significant role we estimate that preferences for redistribution are significantly more desert sensitive in the us than in europe we believe that differences in desert sensitive preferences for redistribution help explain the different social contracts that prevail in both continents

an empirical model of mark ups in a quality differentiated export market abstract this paper develops an empirical model to allow for imperfect competition in the market for traded goods a simultaneous equation model incorporating the demand for and supply of taiwanese footwear exports to the united states is specified and estimated the model allows the identification of two separate sources of mark ups in export prices the first comes from the u s imposed quantitative restriction on these exports the second comes from imperfect competition in the international market for these exports the results suggest competitive behavior by taiwanese footwear exporters the quantitative restriction resulted in a 16 9 percent mark up of prices over marginal cost

social mobility and redistributive politics just like economists voters have conflicting views about redistributive taxation because they estimate its incentive costs differently we model rational agents as trying to learn from their dynastic income mobility experience the relative importance of effort and predetermined factors in the generation of income inequality and therefore the magnitude of these incentive costs in the long run left wing dynasties believing less in individual effort and voting for more redistribution coexist with right wing dynasties this allows us to explain why individual mobility experience and not only current income matters for political attiitudes and how persistent differences in perceptions about social mobility can generate persistent differences in redistribution across countries

international migration income taxes and transfers a welfare analysis abstract an important issue in public policy debates is the effect of international migration on welfare in source and host countries we address this issue by constructing a general equilibrium model of a two class source or host country each country produces many traded and non traded goods uses income taxes and distributes the tax receipts equally to all individuals the analysis examines the effects of permanent migration on class and national welfare we show among other things that marginal immigration hurts people already in the country regardless of whether or not non traded goods exist the presence of international capital mobility however may reverse the above result

international migration increasing returns and real wages the present paper makes an exploratory attempt to investigate the impact of emigration on real wages in the presence of increasing returns to scale in production the problem has been posed in the context of a 2 x 2 model of international trade where one of the commodities is a non traded good and is subject to a type of increasing returns to scale that are external to the firm but internal to the industry analysis indicates that in this instance international emigration unambiguously increases real wages in the source country this result which seems to be at odds with the general presumption in this area is quite robust to variations in the underlying assumptions behind the analysis summary in fre excerpt

inequality growth and democracy the analysis of the relationship between inequality and economic growth in distinct politi coeconomic environments has been one of the central preoccupations of the extensive theoretical and empirical work on growth in the last decade the authors argue that the empirical evidence available to date strongly indicates the relevance of this work for understanding the elusive causal connection between economic development and democracy the state of the literature suggests considerable sophistication in conceptualizing the direct economic effects of inequality and contains critical insights into politically unconstrained policy making aimed at the alleviation of their negative economic impact however the political feasibility of the recommended policy measures and the politically mediated effects of inequality and redistributive policy on growth and on the strength and stability of democratic regimes are understood less well the authors discuss the critical factors influencing these effects and sketch several approaches to creating a comprehensive politicoeconomic account of the interaction between inequality redistributive policy making and political regimes

workplace productivity and bonus preferences why do men with low productivity prefer individual pay this paper examines the relationship between workers productivity and preferred bonus scheme the data are from a company where agents work in teams and receive a bonus that depends on individual and team performance standard agency theory predicts that workers with productivity below the team average prefer a team bonus while high productivity agents prefer an individual bonus risk aversion may temper the taste for individual pay this model predicts the observed relationship between productivity and bonus preferences very well there is however one pattern that it cannot explain many low performers especially men prefer individual bonuses

a quantized approach to rational inattention abstract in this paper i propose a model of rational inattention where the choice variable is a deterministic function of the exogenous variables and still only a finite amount of information is being used this holds provided the choice variable is discrete rather than continuous that is the mapping from the realization of the exogenous variables to the endogenous ones is piece wise constant thus limited information is now a source of lumpiness in behavior rather than a source of noise the approach is applied to a simple static model of price setting where individual price setters face aggregate monetary shocks and idiosyncratic productivity shocks the effect of aggregate money shocks on output and prices is studied it is shown that as the variance of idiosyncratic shocks become large the aggregate log price level converges to a linear function of the aggregate money shock with a coefficient which is strictly between 0 and 1 consequently unanticipated aggregate money shocks have real effects on output in contrast to the sticky price model of caplin and spulber 1987 but these effects are smaller than in standard rational inattention models or in the lucas 1972 misperception model

export quota allocations export earnings and market diversification countries facing voluntary export restraints vers often adopt a two tier allocation system for export licenses to the restricted market 1 a basic allocation related to export shares to the restricted market and 2 an open allocation based on export shares to the nonrestricted market such a two tier allocation system increases exports to the nonrestricted market beyond the levels which would exist under a single quota allocation system and has an efficiency cost as it results in some sales being made at less than marginal cost the history of ver negotiations provides a rationale for such a policy and suggests that the recent increase in antidumping cases may be partly associated with the adoption of two tier quota allocation systems nontariff barriers ntbs present a growing threat to a liberal world trading system and slow the relocation of mature industries from developed to developing countries among ntbs voluntary export restraints vers are proliferating and constitute a major element of the new protectionism besides measuring the incidence of ntbs research has concentrated on three aspects of vers the welfare cost to the imposing country their attraction for both exporters and importers and their inefficacy analysis of the first issue has shown that because the exporting country operates the ver there is a rent transfer from the importing country to the exporting country which is often larger than the distortionary costs associated with an equivalent tariff second research indicates that vers have endured because exporting countries receive the rent transfer whereas for importing countries vers can be imposed quickly and lack transparency and therefore attract fewer objections than outright subsidies to the industries seeking protection see for example bhagwati 1986

endogenous indoctrination occupational choices the evolution of beliefs and the political economy of reforms i analyse a model where workers self select in the educational occupation in a way which is correlated with their beliefs about the working of the market economy teachers have a disproportionate effect on the transmission of beliefs therefore they generate a bias which makes it harder for the population to learn the true parameters of the economy if these are favourable to the market economy two parameters determine this bias social entropy defines how predictable one s occupation is as a function of one s beliefs heritability is the weight of the family s beliefs in the determination of the priors of a new generation both heritability and social entropy reduce the bias and make it easier to learn that the market economy is good under the assumption that it is

understanding preferences for income redistribution abstract recent research suggests that income redistribution preferences vary across identity groups we employ statistical learning methods that emphasize pattern recognition classification and regression trees cart and random forests randomforests to uncover what these groups are using data from the general social survey we find that out of a large set of identity markers only race gender age and socioeconomic class are important classifiers for income redistribution preferences further the uncovered identity groupings are characterized by complex patterns of interaction amongst these salient classifiers we explore the extent to which existing theories of income redistribution can explain our results but conclude that current approaches do not fully explain the findings

are people inequality averse or just risk averse individuals preferences for risk and inequality are measured through choices between imagined societies and lotteries the median relative risk aversion which is often seen to reflect social inequality aversion is between 2 and 3 most people are also found to be individually inequality averse reflecting a willingness to pay for living in a more equal society left wing voters and women are both more risk and inequality averse than others the model allows for non monotonic swfs implying that welfare may decrease with an individual s income at high income levels which is illustrated in simulations based on the empirical results

who gives who gains progressivity and preferences the extent to which popular support for the welfare state depends on income varies greatly across nations and policy domains we argue and show formally that these variations largely overlooked yet essential to understanding the politics of redistribution reflect in part the design of tax and transfer policies in terms of progressivity when progressivity is high politics is perceived by income groups as a zero sum game and conflicts over who gets what intensify when progressivity is low and tax contributors and benefit recipients overlap redistributive struggles become politically less salient we test these predictions both across nations and across policy domains within a sample of advanced industrial democracies our findings indicate that the progressivity of the tax and transfer system is a major determinant of the predictive power of income on preferences for redistribution

economic and social class voting in a model of redistribution with social concerns we investigate how concerns about social status may affect individuals preferences for redistribution in our model agents are heterogeneous across two dimensions productivity and social class and an individual s social status is de ned as his relative standing in terms of a weighted average of these two components the weight on each component depends positively on its standard deviation redistribution thus simultaneously affects labor supply and the weights that determine social status as such taxation not only redistributes resources from the rich to the poor but also becomes a way of preserving or modifying social status thus individuals who have the same productivity but belong to different social classes support different tax rates we characterize the equilibrium of the political game as the solution of a system of non linear equations and identify the interclass coalition of voters who support the equilibrium tax rate

why the poor do not expropriate the rich an old argument in new garb we consider a political economy with two partisan parties each party represents a given constituency of voters if one party labour represents poor voters and the other christian democrats rich voters if a redistributive tax policy is the only issue and if there are no incentive considerations then in equilibrium the party representing the poor will propose a tax rate of unity if however there are two issues tax policy and religion for instance then this is not generally the case the analysis shows that if a simple condition on the distribution of voter preferences holds then as the salience of the non economic issue increases the tax rate proposed by labour in equilibrium will fall possibly even to zero even though a majority of the population may have an ideal tax rate of unity 1998 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

the behavioral foundations of social politics evidence from surveys and a laboratory democracy the dominant theoretical approaches in the comparative political economy of the welfare state provide alternative accounts for why some governments spend more on social policies than others in the first poor voters seek to increase their current income by taxing the rich and social policy serves to redistribute income from the rich to the poor in the second account voters seek social insurance against future job loss and social policy serves as an insurance mechanism rather than a redistributive one both of these accounts share the assumption that voters can clearly distinguish between the redistributive and insurance elements of public policy and therefore that individual level characteristics income labor market risks systematically shape preferences over social policy our goal is to examine the soundness of that behavioral assumption we do so with a laboratory experiment that involves economic production voting on taxation and fiscal transfers we treat subjects with social policies that

growing up in a recession does the historical macroeconomic environment affect preferences for redistribution we find that individuals who experienced a recession when young believe that success in life depends more on luck than effort support more government redistribution and tend to vote for left wing parties the effect of recessions on beliefs is long lasting we support our findings with evidence from three different datasets first we identify the effect of recessions on beliefs exploiting time and regional variation in macroeconomic conditions using data from the 1972 2010 general social survey our specifications control for nonlinear time period life cycle and cohort effects as well as a host of background variables second we rely on data from the national longitudinal survey of the high school class of 1972 to corroborate the age period cohort specification and look at heterogeneous effects of experiencing a recession during early adulthood third using data from the world value survey we confirm our findings with a sample of 37 countries whose citizens experienced macroeconomic disasters at different points in history

repeated shocks and preferences for redistribution abstract a society that believes wealth to be determined by random luck rather than by merit demands more redistribution we present evidence of this behavior by exploiting a natural experiment provided by the l aquila earthquake in 2009 which hit a large area of central italy through a series of destructive shakes over eight days matching detailed information on the ground acceleration registered during each shock with survey data about individual opinions on redistribution we show that the average intensity of the shakes is associated with subsequent stronger beliefs that for a society to be fair income inequalities should be leveled by redistribution the shocks however are not all alike we find that only the last three shakes occurred on the fourth and the eighth day of the earthquake have a statistically significant impact overall we find that the timing and repetition of the shocks play a role in informing redistributive preferences

social mobility and the demand for redistribution the poum hypothesis this paper examines the often stated idea that the poor do not support high levels of redistribution because of the hope that they or their offspring may make it up the income ladder this prospect of upward mobility poum hypothesis is shown to be fully compatible with rational expectations and fundamentally linked to concavity in the mobility process a steady state majority could even be simultaneously poorer than average in terms of current income and richer than average in terms of expected future incomes a e rst empirical assessment suggests on the other hand that in recent u s data the poum effect is probably dominated by the demand for social insurance in the future everyone will be world famous for e fteen minutes andy warhol 1968

popular support for progressive taxation abstract the popular support obtained by two parties who propose two qualitatively different tax schemes is analyzed we show that if the median voter is below the mean then any progressive proposal wins over a regressive one

tax and education policy in a heterogeneous agent economy what levels of redistribution maximize growth and efficiency this paper studies the effects of progressive income taxes and education finance in a dynamic heterogeneous agent economy such redistributive policies entail distortions to labor supply and savings but also serve as partial substitutes for missing credit and insurance markets the resulting tradeoffs for growth and efficiency are explored both theoretically and quantitatively in a model that yields complete analytical solutions progressive education finance always leads to higher income growth than taxes and transfers but at the cost of lower insurance overall efficiency is assessed using a new measure that properly reflects aggregate resources and idiosyncratic risks but unlike a standard social welfare function does not reward equality per se simulations using empirical parameter estimates show that the efficiency costs and benefits of redistribution are generally of the same order of magnitude resulting in plausible values for the optimal rates aggregate income and aggregate welfare provide only crude lower and upper bounds around the true efficiency tradeoff

the mercantilist index of trade policy we introduce an index of trade policy restrictiveness defined as the uniform tariff that maintains the same trade volume as a given tariff quota structure our index overcomes the problems of the trade weighted average tariff it avoids substitution bias correctly accounts for general equilibrium transfers and takes import volume instead of welfare as benchmark empirical applications to international cross section and time series comparisons of trade policy confirm our theoretical results trade weighted average tariffs generally underestimate the true height of tariffs as measured by the trade volume equivalent index this in turn always underestimates the welfare equivalent index

price discrimination and markups in export markets abstract imperfect competition in international markets is one of the key explanations for why prices of similar goods might differ among destination countries this paper develops an empirical model to examine the presence of price discrimination stemming from imperfect competition in the international market for a country s exports the model is used to examine the export behavior of taiwanese exporters of footwear the generalized supply relation allows identification of deviations from competitive pricing in each export market in addition the model provides insights into the extent of exchange rate pass through finally the model is modified in order to estimate the effect of the voluntary export restraint imposed in the u s on footwear imports from taiwan

compositional standards import permits and market structure the case of canadian cheese imports the imposition of cheese compositional standards by the canadian authorities has created divisions within the canadian dairy industry and has motivated criticisms from several of canada s trade partners the standards impose minimum limits on the percentage of casein coming from fluid milk we develop a theoretical model to investigate the implications of canada s compositional cheese standards while accounting for canada s trade policy we illustrate why a type of cheese that is not directly impacted by the standards might be the most affected we show that the standards can decrease the domestic demand for milk or the value of imports our empirical investigation identified breaks in the processes determining import unit values shortly before or shortly after the beginning of the implementation of the standards

redistribution and market efficiency an experimental study abstract we study the interaction between competitive markets and income redistribution that reallocates unequal pre tax market incomes away from the rich to the poor majority in one setup participants earn their income by trading in a double auction da with exogenous zero or full redistribution in another setup after trading they vote on redistributive tax policies in a majoritarian election with two competing candidates this results in virtually full redistribution even when participants have the opportunity to influence taxes by transferring money to the candidates we find that the high redistribution reduces trading efficiency but not as much as predicted if market participants trade randomly this is because rather than capitulating to the much lower trading incentives many participants respond to redistribution by asking and bidding more conservatively in the da and in this way help to prevent further efficiency losses

on generalizing the economic analysis of international migration a note the author critically examines an article by kar yui wong concerning two important well known propositions on international factor movements namely first finite international factor movements are beneficial to the nationals of the destination country but detrimental to those who are left behind in the source country and second marginal movements do not have such welfare implications the present paper by utilizing the indirect trade utility function derives results in a manner that is both direct and at once intuitively transparent

product aggregation bias as a specification error in demand systems inherent in all demand studies is some form of product aggregation which can lead to product aggregation bias this article develops a simple procedure for incorporating product aggregation bias in demand systems that permits testing of product aggregation bias with a standard likelihood ratio test an empirical illustration of the procedure demonstrates the importance of proper product aggregation

do exporters gain from vers previous literature has concentrated on the rent transfer accruing to exporting countries when a voluntary export restraint ver is binding this paper studies the efficiency and distributional effects arising when vers force factors out of industries in which they are most productive a theoretical model of the industry under the ver is developed to establish qualitative conditions under which a ver will result in spillovers of exports to unrestricted markets industry contraction and loss in national welfare key parameters of demand and supply are estimated for leather footwear exports from taiwan subject to the u s orderly marketing agreement and their implications explored in a calibrated simulation exercise the results make a strong indictment of vers for most plausible parameter values vers distort exports reduce industry size and cause overall economic losses especially if the affected industry is large

quantity restrictions and endogenous quality choice abstract in a vertical product differentiation model under cournot competition both foreign and domestic firms respond by lowering their investment in long run quality for a quantity restriction at and in the neighborhood of the free trade import level average quality increases only when the low quality foreign firm faces a substantially restrictive quota voluntary export restraint the change in quality depends on whether the foreign firm is of high or low quality and upon the restrictiveness of the quota the imposition of quantity restrictions has important strategic effects on the long run choice of quality

antisocial security the puzzle of beggar thy children policies the u s social security program has irrevocably transferred substantial wealth from workers to their ostensibly altruistic parents after some alternative explanations for this paradox are addressed a formal model is developed to show that a majority of rational voters who care about their descendants can support the preservation of current benefits for themselves but accept the prospect of social security s future retrenchment incorporating elements of tabellini s 2000 positive theory of social security and benabou and ok s 2001 analysis of income mobility the model identifies specific forces affecting this time varying individual support for social security these forces are embodied in three hypotheses related to income mobility relative income level and age an ordered logit analysis of cumulative anes data supports these hypotheses

pricing to market price discrimination or product differentiation we employ a vertical differentiation model to examine the potential bias in pricing to market results when using export unit values aggregating differentiated products our results show that i false evidence of pricing to market is always found when using unit values whether the law of one price holds or not and ii the size of the bias increases with the level of product differentiation our simulation results support those conceptual findings thus some of the positive pricing to market results in the literature could be an artifact of the product heterogeneity embodied in unit values rather than evidence of imperfect competition

preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities this paper explores how individual preferences for redistribution depend on future income prospects in addition to estimating the impact of individuals socioeconomic background and of their subjective perceptions of future mobility we employ panel data to construct dobjectivet measures of expected gains and losses from redistribution for different categories of individuals we find that such measures have considerable explanatory power and perform better than dgeneral mobilityt indexes we also find that preferences for redistribution respond to individual beliefs on what determines one s position in the social ladder ceteris paribus people who believe that the american society offers equal opportunities are more averse to redistribution d 2004 published by elsevier b v

a second chance at success a political economy perspective abstract this paper characterizes a stationary markov perfect political equilibrium where agents vote over income taxation that distorts educational investment agents become rich or poor through educational investment and the poor have a second chance at success the results show the following concerning the cost of a second chance first when the cost is low the economy is characterized by high levels of upward mobility and inequality and a low tax burden supported by the poor with prospects for upward mobility second when the cost is high there are multiple equilibria with various patterns of upward mobility inequality and redistribution numerical examples show that the shift from a high cost economy to a low cost economy may reduce social welfare

price and quality components of imports of food products into the uk this paper analyses the principal factors responsible for the growth in the value of imports of the uk food sector during the period 1985 90 on the basis of estimates of translog multilateral price indices it assesses the relative contribution of changes in the quality of imported products and factors other than quality to growth in import values of food products the main conclusion is that growth in quality appears to be the principal reason for the growth in unit values of imports and the trade deficit incurred by the food manufacturing sector

racism and redistribution in the united states a solution to the problem of american exceptionalism abstract the two main political parties in the united states in the period 1976 1992 put forth policies on redistribution and on issues pertaining directly to race we argue that redistributive politics in the us can be fully understood only by taking account of the interconnection between these issues in political competition we identify two mechanisms through which racism among american voters decreases the degree of redistribution that would otherwise obtain in common with others we suggest that voter racism decreases the degree of redistribution due to an anti solidarity effect that some voters oppose government transfer payments to minorities whom they view as undeserving we suggest a second effect as well that some voters who desire redistribution nevertheless vote for the anti redistributive republican party because its position on the race issue is more consonant with their own and this too decreases the degree of redistribution in political equilibrium this we name the policy bundle effect we propose a formal model of multi dimensional political competition that enables us to estimate the magnitude of these two effects and estimate the model for the period in question we compute that voter racism reduced the income tax rate by 11 18 points the total effect decomposes about equally into the two sub effects we also find that the democratic vote share is 5 38 points lower than it would have been absent racism the magnitude of this effect would seem to explain the difference between the sizes of the public sector in the us and northern european countries

learning about the prospects for mobility economic and political dynamics following fundamental policy reform abstract the political left turn in latin america which lagged its transition to liberalized market economies by a decade or more challenges conventional economic explanations of voting behavior this paper generalizes the forward looking voter model to a broad range of dynamic possibly non concave income processes under full information the model implies support for redistributive policies materializes rapidly if few prospects of upward mobility are present in contrast modeling voters evolving beliefs about an unknown income dynamic process shows a slow and polarizing shift toward redistributive preferences simulation using fitted income dynamics suggests that this imperfect information perspective accounts for latin america s right to left political shift and offers additional insights about political dynamics in the face of economic polarization

reference point dependence and specification bias abstract issues of specification bias arise in deterministic as well as in econometric models this paper shows that such biases depend on the reference point used to evaluate them using numerical general equilibrium models in which the incorporation of quality upgrading in the competitive case increases or reduces the welfare costs of trade barriers depending upon whether a trade distorted equilibrium or free trade is used as the reference point

views of economic inequality in latin america the authors assess the factors that affect judgments about the fairness of the distribution of wealth with pooled public opinion data from latinobarometro surveys conducted in 1997 2001 and 2002

loss aversion in politics we study how loss aversion affects the political equilibrium in a simple majority voting model first we show a status quo bias which leads to path dependence second loss aversion implies a moderating effect on the most extreme voters third in a dynamic setting the effect of loss aversion diminishes with the length of the planning horizon of voters however in the presence of a projection bias majorities are partially unable to understand how fast they will adapt to a new policy this makes changes less likely and induces time inconsistency policy changes are timid at the beginning while in later periods they are made progressively more radical fourth in a stochastic environment loss aversion yields a significant distaste for risk but also a smaller attachment to the status quo the application of these results to a model of redistribution leads to empirically plausible implications

distributive politics and economic growth a crude distinction between economics and politics would be that economics is concerned with expanding the pie while politics is about distributing it in this paper we analyze the relationship between the two we focus on how an economy s initial configuration of resources shapes the political struggle for income and wealth distribution and how that in turn affects long run growth our main conclusion is that inequality is conducive to the adoption of growth retarding policies we derive this result from a simple political economy model of growth and present cross country evidence consistent with it the key feature of our model is that individuals differ in their relative factor endowments we distinguish between two types of factors an accumulated factor called capital and a nonaccumulated factor called labor growth is driven by the expansion of the capital stock which is in turn determined by individual saving decisions long run growth is endogenous as the aggregate production function is taken to be linearly homogeneous in capital and productive government services taken together the provision of government services is financed by a tax on capital because government services are productive a small tax on

welfare effects of migration in societies with indirect taxes income transfers and public good provision abstract we construct a general equilibrium trade model of a two class small open host or source country when consumption tax revenue finances the provision of a public good marginal migration reduces social welfare in the source country and raises it in the host when consumption tax revenue is equally distributed among domestic households in each country then migration has an ambiguous impact on social welfare in either country when tariff revenue in either country is either equally distributed among domestic households or it is used to finance the provision of a public good then migration has an ambiguous effect on social welfare in the host country and is expected to reduce social welfare in the source

income inequality and the taste for revolution abstract although property rights are the cornerstone of market economies throughout history existing claims have been frequently overturned by revolutions one unsettled question is whether income inequality affects the likelihood of revolt this paper takes an approach different from previous studies by introducing data derived from two surveys of revolutionary preferences across a quarter million randomly sampled individuals more people are found to have a preference for revolt when inequality in their nation is high a 1 standard deviation increase in the gini coefficient explains up to 38 percent of the standard deviation in revolutionary support the results hold after controlling for a set of personal characteristics and country and year fixed effects since higher levels of income are found to have a negative impact on the taste for revolt the results suggest that either going for growth or implementing policies that reduce inequality can buy off those individuals with revolutionary preferences

group income and individual preferences for redistribution this paper empirically examines the relationship between group income and an individual s preferences for redistribution first i develop a theoretical framework where an individual s identity is strengthened by the status of their group then utilizing data from the us general social survey i find evidence that the average incomes of one s ethnic and religious groups are negatively correlated with one s preferences for redistribution controlling for household income and a number of other individual level characteristics and additional controls i find that a standard deviation increase in the average income of one s social groups correlates to a weakening of an individual s preferences for redistribution by 7 to 8 this result is robust to the inclusion of rich controls and alternate measures of group status as well as a number of robustness checks such as sample restrictions and the use of additional data

the economic analysis of international migration a generalization this note examines and extends the following two propositions that finite international factor movements are beneficial to the nationals of the destination country but detrimental to those left behind in the source country and that marginal movements do not have such welfare effects using some newly developed techniques the propositions are found to be valid irrespective of the number of goods and factors if the economy starts from the autarky position when only one factor can flow the gain of the nationals loss of those left behind will be positively dependent upon the amount of inflow outflow however if goods trade and or factor flow are initially present the propositions are in general not true summary in fre excerpt

measuring social mobility abstract the paper considers the ranking of mobility matrices in a simple markov model of social mobility the approach is the dynamic counterpart ot the static inequality ranking of income distributions by the lorenz curve the derived partial ordering is motivated by welfare considerations is shown to be equivalent to same intuitive mobility concepts and is used to screen some immobility indices the equivalence of the ranking with the permanent income lorenz ordering gives support to the claim that this approach is the natural extension of kolm s the optimal production of social justice in public economics j margolis and h guitton eds macmillan london 1969 atkinson s on the measurement of inequality j econ theory2 1970 244 263 and dasgupta sen and starrett s notes on the measurement of inequality j econ theory6 1973 180 187 approaches journal of economic literature classification numbers d31 d63 j62

reprint of the insurance value of state tax and transfer programs abstract this paper estimates the total value that individuals derive from their state s tax and transfer program and shows how this value varies by income the paper decomposes this total value into two components redistributive value which is due to predictable changes in income and family circumstances and insurance value which occurs when taxes and transfers compensate for unexpected income shocks our approach is a forward looking one where we examine income and transfers net of taxes over a 10 year period we model state taxes personal income taxes the eitc and sales taxes and state means tested transfers afdc tanf and medicaid schip the calculations are made using the panel study of income dynamics and allow for analysis of the role of changes in tax and transfer programs demographics and income in the value of state net benefits over a period of more than 30 years we find that the redistributive value of state tax and transfer programs sharply declines with income but that the insurance value is increasing in income the resulting total value still declines with income but not nearly as sharply as the redistributive value hence the insurance value mitigates the incentives for mobility that would undo state redistributive spending

does egalitarianism have a future the fall of communism the reassessment of nordic social democracy belt tightening in other advanced welfare states and the worldwide privatization wave have led many to conclude that egalitarianism is a merely utopian ideal the possibility of whose realization is laid to rest by the failure of a series of twentieth century social experiments we survey the evidence both empirical and theoretical and conclude that obituaries are premature key theoretical errors in the design of egalitarian experiments and in some critiques of pro egalitarian policies concern the role of information asymmetries and we argue that their proper understanding re opens possibilities for increasing equality without unacceptable sacrifices in efficiency

endogenous beliefs in models of politics in the standard rational choice model actors have exogenously given beliefs that perfectly match objective probabilities as such these beliefs cannot be optimistic or motivated by preferences even though substantial empirical evidence indicates that human beliefs routinely satisfy neither of these criteria i present a tractable endogenous beliefs model and apply it to three different political environments from across the subfields of political science in the model players form beliefs that maximize a utility function that represents preferences over outcomes and the anticipatory experience of uncertainty applications include voter turnout taxation and collective choice and crisis bargaining the model captures the empirical evidence about belief formation much better than the standard model moreover these applications show how rigidly insisting on the standard rational choice model rejects otherwise reasonable explanations by fiat precisely because of its implausible assumptions about beliefs

voluntary export restraints profits and quality adjustment this paper develops a model of vertical differentiation to assess the impact of output constraints on the profits and quality choices of firms subject to them a competitive environment is developed with the automobile industry in mind multiproduct oligopolists producing differentiated goods who behave as coumot competitors the results show that an output constraint will not induce constrained firms to upgrade their product line when their unconstrained competitors produce higher quality models it is also shown that an output constraint can raise the profits of constrained firms despite output increases by unconstrained firms

the political economy of intergenerational income mobility the intergenerational elasticity of income is considered one of the best measures of the degree to which a society gives equal opportunity to its members while much research has been devoted to measuring this reduced form parameter less is known about its underlying structural determinants using a model with exogenous talent endowments endogenous parental investment in children and endogenous redistributive institutions we identify the structural parameters that govern the intergenerational elasticity of income the model clarifies how the interaction between private and collective decisions determines the equilibrium level of social mobility two societies with similar economic and biological fundamentals may have vastly different degrees of intergenerational mobility depending on their political institutions we offer empirical evidence in line with the predictions of the model we conclude that international comparisons of intergenerational elasticity of income are not particularly informative about fairness without taking into account differences in politico economic institutions jel e24 j62 j68 p16

remittances and social spending remittances are a significant source of foreign exchange for developing economies i argue that remittances due to their compensation and insurance functions will increase the general income level and economic security of recipients thereby reducing their perceived income risk over time this will dampen demand from recipients for government taxation and social insurance therefore i expect increases in income remitted to an economy to result in reduced levels of social welfare transfers at the macro level this dynamic can help us to understand spending patterns in developing democracies and the absence of demand for social security transfers in countries with high levels of inequality and economic insecurity i test this argument with a sample of 18 latin american states over the period 1990 to 2009 and subject the central causal mechanism to a battery of statistical tests the results of these tests provide strong support for this argument