communication networks in markets abstract this paper proposes and tests experimentally a dynamic model of bargaining to analyze decentralized markets where buyers and sellers obtain information about past deals through their social network there is a unique equilibrium in which every individual obtains the same outcome independent of their network position and this outcome depends on the peripheral least connected individuals in the network the main testable predictions are that networks with high density and or low variability in the number of connections across individuals allow their members to obtain a better deal these predictions are tested in a lab experiment through 4 treatments that vary the network that subjects are assigned to the results of the experiment lend support to the theoretical predictions subjects converge to an outcome that is independent of their network position and they fare better if they are assigned to a network that is dense and or has low variability in number of connections across members

agents ability to manage information in centralized markets comparing two wholesale fish markets abstract in this paper we perform an empirical investigation to detect if and how agents behavior changes with the amount of available information they have to this aim we use data from two wholesale fish markets of different thicknesses we tackle the issue by investigating features such as the dynamics of the structure of attendance in auctions the varieties of fish presentations during the seller s turn and the presence of long term relationships between buyers and sellers we perform the investigation in this way instead of focusing on the dispersion and dynamics of prices to prevent unobserved quality differences of the traded fish varieties from biasing the results of the analysis the results of our investigation are consistent with a situation in which the magnitude of phenomena like buyers loyalty to sellers and agents following rules of thumb increases with the market thickness

revenue management with forward looking buyers a seller wishes to sell multiple goods by a deadline for example the end of a season potential buyers enter over time and can strategically time their purchases each period the profit maximizing mechanism awards units to the buyers with the highest valuations exceeding a sequence of cutoffs we show that these cutoffs are deterministic depending only on the inventory and time remaining in the continuous time limit the optimal mechanism can be implemented by posting anonymous prices when incoming demand decreases over time the optimal cutoffs satisfy a one period look ahead property and prices are defined by an intuitive differential equation

residential segregation discrimination and african american theater entry during jim crow abstract we examine the effect of residential segregation on the entry of movie theaters serving african american customers in the 1950s which provided an alternative to the segregated theaters of the jim crow era consistent with preference externalities in racial and ethnic enclaves we find that greater residential segregation was associated with more african american theater entry estimates from a model of firm entry indicate that residential segregation increased the variable profits of african american movie theaters reducing the market size required for theater entry by 13 3 percent for a one standard deviation increase in segregation we also provide evidence that racial bias increased both variable profits and fixed costs and on net reduced african american theater entry an interpretation consistent with this finding is that racial animus forced black customers toward segregated accommodations while also limiting access to key inputs for potential entrants

retail redlining are gasoline prices higher in poor and minority neighborhoods anyone who has ever struggled with poverty knows how extremely expensive it is to be poor go shopping one day in harlem for anything and compare harlem prices and quality with those downtown james baldwin nobody knows my name 1961 it s not that these businesses are saying you black people you get out of my establishment they are saying come on in but we re going to rip you off allison bethel florida assistant attorney general in u s news and world report 2000 i introduction the economics literature on discrimination in consumer markets is dominated by studies of differences in negotiated prices in two markets housing e g myers 2004 ondrich ross and yinger 2003 yinger 1986 1995 and automobiles e g ayres and siegelman 1995 goldberg 1996 a few additional studies examine price differentials in smaller markets in which prices are also negotiated such as trading cards list 2004 car repairs gneezy and list 2004 and fish graddy 1995 less evidence is available from the numerous consumer markets in which prices are publicly posted and fixed in this situation individually targeted racial price discrimination is unlikely because as siegelman 1998 points out it would require the flagrant and illegal display of different prices for whites and minorities however firms may still adopt practices that increase the probability that minorities or other targeted groups will pay higher prices we use data on gasoline prices and station characteristics from three metropolitan areas to test for one such practice commonly referred to as retail redlining following d rozario and williams 2005 we define retail redlining as a practice among retailers that results in lower quality goods and services and or higher prices in areas with large minority or poor populations claims of retail redlining arise regularly in both academic sources and the popular press often involving catch phrases such as the poor pay more the high price of poverty or the poorer you are the more things cost brown 2009 downing 2007 sturdivant 1969 accusations of retail redlining also arise in courtrooms and politics gm walmart burger king domino s pizza and kb toys have been sued for discriminatory practices in minority neighborhoods fuller 1998 jelisavcic 1996 kaplan 2000 smith 1996 in 1992 the mayor of los angeles touted the need for more equal access to supermarkets following the los angeles riots and in 2009 illinois senator roland burris introduced a request to the annual federal appropriations bill for a campaign to fight retail redlining on chicago s south side burris 2009 shaffer 2002 the bulk of the empirical evidence on retail redlining comes from the large grocery gap literature which explores variations across neighborhoods in the accessibility quality and price of food sold at grocery stores much of this evidence suggests that grocery prices are higher in inner city neighborhoods and that this is largely explained by the lack of large chain stores in these areas chung and myers 1999 hall 1983 kaufman et al 1997 shaffer 2002 by contrast hayes 2000 using a large nationally representative sample of price data from the sampling frame used to construct the consumer price index finds that prices are lower in poor neighborhoods but that the discount is not constant across races poor whites and hispanics receive discounts but poor blacks pay similar prices as affluent whites turning to the market for prepared food graddy 1997 finds that fast food meal prices increase by about 5 for a 50 point increase in the percent black in a zip code while food which makes up a large portion of consumer budgets is an important candidate for the study of inter neighborhood price variations accusations of retail redlining extend beyond this single market we provide evidence from a hitherto unexamined market retail gasoline

testing for imperfect competition at the fulton fish market in this article i report the results of a study of the prices paid by individual buyers at the fulton fish market in new york city in principle this is a highly competitive market in which there should be no predictable price differences across customers who are equally costly to service the results indicate that different buyers pay different prices for fish of identical quality for example asian buyers pay 7 less for whiting than do white buyers a result which is inconsistent with the model of perfect competition

price discrimination in free entry markets using a spatial model of monopolistic competition we investigate price discrimination in free entry zero profit markets we show that when brands are heterogeneous competition does not prevent discrimination the power to earn economic profits is not necessary for a firm to maintain discriminatory prices our model treats formally the fact that consumers difer not only in the utility they derive from a good but also in how strongly they prefer one brand over all others in markets where firms are very competitive sorting consumers on the strength on brand preference produces larger price differentials between groups than sorting on the basis of consumers reservation prices for the good when firms sort customers on the basis of strength of brand preference however we find that the output and welfare effects are generally less favorable than when sorting is more closely related to consumers reservation prices

political losers as a barrier to economic development per capita income in many sub saharan african countries such as chad and niger is less than 1 30th of that of the united states most economists and social scientists suspect that this is in part due to institutional failures that stop these societies from adopting the best technologies a particularly interesting historical example comes from the diffusion of railways in the 19th century while railways are regarded as a key technology driving the industrial revolution there were large lags in their diffusion for example in 1850 the united states had 14 518 km of track britain 9 797 km and germany 5 856 km in the russian and hapsburg empires there were just 501 km and 1 357 kim respectively all data from brian r mitchell 1993 why do societies as in this example fail to adopt the best available technologies one answer is that existing powerful interest groups block the introduction of new technologies in order to protect their economic rents and societies are able to make technological advances only if they can defeat such groups economic monopolies may be one example a monopolist might wish to block the introduction of a new technology by a rival that will capture the market this idea which we call the economic losers hypothesis was discussed by simon kuznets 1968 developed at length by joel mokyr 1990 in the context of technology adoption and formalized by per krusell and jose victor rios rull 1996 and stephen l parente and edward c prescott 1997 related ideas are widely discussed in the literature on international trade policy with many formal models e g gene m grossman and elhanan helpman 1994 there are problems with this story however first despite the intuitive appeal of the idea there are relatively few instances where major economic change was blocked by economic losers mokyr 1990 emphasizes the attempts of many skilled artisans to block the introduction of new machines the most famous example is the luddites skilled weavers who were thrown out of work by mechanization interestingly however many of these groups including the luddites were ultimately unable to block economic progress equally important the economic losers hypothesis relies on the presumption that certain groups have the political power to block innovation but if so why not use this power to simply tax the gains generated by the introduction of the new technology this might be because there are limits on the nature of fiscal instruments though it seems plausible that groups with sufficient political power to block innovation would be able subsequently to lobby effectively for redistribution a more important reason however may be that the introduction of new technology and economic change more generally may simultaneously affect the distribution of political power we argue that the effect of economic change on political power is a key factor in determining whether technological advances and beneficial economic changes will be blocked in other words we propose a political loser hypothesis we argue that it is groups whose political power not economic rents is eroded who will block technological advances if agents are economic losers but have no political power they cannot impede technological progress if they have and maintain political power i e are not political losers then they have no incentive to block progress it is therefore agents who have t discussant gene grossman princeton university

the interpretation of instrumental variables estimators in simultaneous equations models with an application to the demand for fish in markets where prices are determined by the intersection of supply and demand curves standard identification results require the presence of instruments that shift one curve but not the other these results are typically presented in the context of linear models with fixed coefficients and additive residuals the first contribution of this paper is an investigation of the consequences of relaxing both the linearity and the additivity assumption for the interpretation of linear instrumental variables estimators without these assumptions the standard linear instrumental variables estimator identifies a weighted average of the derivative of the behavioural relationship of interest a second contribution is the formulation of critical identifying assumptions in terms of demand and supply at different prices and instruments rather than in terms of functional form specific residuals our approach to the simultaneous equations problem and the average derivative interpretation of instrumental variables estimates is illustrated by estimating the demand for fresh whiting at the fulton fish market strong and credible instruments for identification of this demand function are available in the form of weather conditions at sea

price formation on the marseille fish market evidence from a network analysis abstract the empirical analysis of fish markets always reveals strong price dispersion for homogeneous or very similar goods the problem is how to explain this price dispersion on a market where there is no evident arbitrage explanations proposed by different authors include differences in organization the characteristics of the good and the influences of social interactions between buyers and sellers in line with the last of these three approaches we consider the fish market of marseille as a seller seller network we start by examining the influence of market interactions through a static and then a dynamic econometric model we then analyze the role of the seller s position in the network we bring to light a surprising paradox in that the sellers who share the most buyers with competitors i e the most central sellers charge the highest prices

bilateral oligopoly the efficiency of intermediate goods markets abstract we show that intermediate goods markets may be efficient despite the presence of commonly accepted signs of market failure such as high concentration both among sellers and buyers sparse trading networks price dispersion and externalities the results are derived in an extensive form model of bilateral bargaining with multiple buyers and multiple sellers and with externalities between the negotiations we also characterize the structure of the endogenous trading network i e how firms choose trading partners prices are dispersed and depend on both the concentration of capital and the concentration of sales consistent with some stylized facts on buyer power

price discrimination in oligopoly evidence from regional newspapers recent theoretical work has shown that the incentive to target rival firms customers with low prices can increase price discrimination and that the strength of the incentive depends on a firm s market position using data on swedish newspaper subscriptions we find strong support for these predictions newspapers with a local competitor sell a larger part of their circulation at a discount than monopoly newspapers moreover in competitive markets the use of discounts is inversely related to the newspaper s market share we find no evidence that price discrimination based on observable and exogenous characteristics is influenced by the market structure

corporate takeover bids methods of payment and bidding firms stock returns this study explores the role of the method of payment in explaining common stock returns of bidding firms at the announcement of takeover bids the results reveal significant differences in the abnormal returns between common stock exchanges and cash offers the results are independent of the type of takeover bid i e merger or tender offer and of bid outcomes these findings supported by analysis of nonconvertible bonds are attributed mainly to signalling effects and imply that the inconclusive evidence of earlier studies on takeovers may be due to their failure to control for the method of payment recent studies on corporate takeovers provide inconclusive results on the valuation effects of acquisitions on the common stock of bidding firms 1 substantial differences are reported between the studies that analyze acquisitions initiated as tender offers and those that confine their samples to merger proposals the existence of mixed empirical findings for the bidding firms makes it difficult to interpret existing evidence and to draw conclusions about the managers acquisition motivations nevertheless the reason for the substantial difference between empirical findings on mergers and tender offers still remains an unresolved issue it is observed however that mergers are usually common stock exchange offers whereas tender offers are usually cash offers given that different methods of financing a project have different signalling implications myers and majluf 39 the differential stock returns of bidders in mergers and tender offers may be due to the method of acquisition financing

on the effects of group identity in strategic environments abstract we examine differences in behavior between subjects interacting with a member of either the same or different identity group in both a centipede game and a series of stag hunt games we find evidence that subjects interacting with outgroup members are more likely to behave as though best responding to uniform randomization of the partner we conclude that group identity not only affects player s social preferences as identified in earlier research but also affects the decision making process independent of changes in the utility function

market making oligopoly this paper analyzes price competition between market makers who set costly capacity constraints before they intermediate between producers and consumers the unique equilibrium outcome with pure strategies at the capacity stage is the cournot outcome the paper thus provides a rationale for cournot type competition between market makers this contrasts with previous findings in the literature where due to the absence of capacity constraints that are set ex ante the bertrand result typically obtains

inverse demand systems and welfare measurement in quantity space most studies of welfare or cost benefit analyses are concerned with the welfare effects of price changes 11 19 27 33 50 there are however many situations in which policy options are directly related to quantity changes the welfare effects of price changes are analyzed with the traditional demand system in which commodity quantities are determined as functions of their prices the welfare effects of quantity changes on the other hand are associated with the inverse demand system in which commodity prices are dependent on their quantities in conventional welfare analysis of price change prices are taken to be exogenous or predetermined while quantities are endogenous in contrast in welfare analysis of quantity changes quantities are exogenous while prices are endogenous price based or dual welfare measures are relevant when there are well functioning competitive markets and quantities are fully adjusted to changes in prices on the other hand quantity based or primal welfare measures are useful in situations where there are constraints on commodity quantities or when transaction costs impede consumers from fully adjusting to changes in prices the choice between priceand quantity based welfare measures is empirical and proper measurement of welfare effects requires the knowledge as to which variable price or quantity is the exogenous one for individual consumers it may be reasonable to assume that the supply of commodities is perfectly elastic and therefore prices can be taken as exogenous but this assumption may not be tenable for consumers in the aggregate or if highly aggregated economy wide data are used to estimate demand relations at the aggregate level quantities are more properly viewed as exogenous than are prices although individual consumers make their consumption decisions based on given prices the quantities of commodities are predetermined by production at the market level and prices must adjust so that the available quantities are consumed 28 1 2

markets and rent dissipation in regulated open access fisheries abstract using a model of regulated open access resource use with markets we illustrate the potential complexity of interactions between markets product quality excess effort and regulatory behavior in fisheries our model assumes two product types one of which is processed and storable the model describes the equilibrium that results when effort responds to open access incentives and when regulators respond to effort growth by mitigating its potential harmful effects on biomass safety we use numerical simulations to demonstrate a mechanism by which market growth leads to the diversion of raw inputs into the inherently inferior market the result is a scenario in which rents are dissipated not only because excessive inputs raise costs but also because inferior product types reduce revenues we conclude with an illustrative decomposition of rent gains into revenue and cost savings gains from rationalizing a hypothetical fishery demonstrating the potential significance of market side rents

imperfect competition in agricultural markets evidence from ethiopia abstract drawing upon unique transaction level data from rural ethiopia this paper tests for general forms of imperfect competition among rural wholesale traders these are key to the grain distribution system as they purchase from farmers and perform interregional trade tests show that traders in a typical source market engage in imperfectly competitive behavior in purchasing from farmers driving down the price paid to farmers approximately 3 in contrast there is no conclusive evidence of imperfect competition among traders in the larger more centrally located market studied thus efficiency losses due to market structure are likely to be greatest in markets which also have poor road links and lesser volumes of marketed grain

first degree price discrimination goes to school personalized pricing is widely discussed but seldom observed making studies of its efficacy rare yet first degree price discrimination is common in the pricing of higher education and i use data on prices and the characteristics of students admitted to a professional graduate program at a public university to estimate a matriculation demand function i then derive linear pricing functions that maximize revenue for a target number of students by allowing these functions to depend on progressively richer sets of observables i explore the effect of personalization of pricing on profit tailoring prices to a one dimensional measure of student quality would raise revenue by 2 2 per cent above the revenue with uniform pricing pricing based on both student quality and state residency raises revenue by 8 4 per cent and further tailoring based on available observables raises prices 9 0 per cent above the maximum revenue under uniform pricing pricing that obeys current statutory tuition limits raises revenue less but still by just over half as much i also infer the welfare weights that the pricing process implicitly attaches to student characteristics

evidence on discrimination in consumer markets economists have contributed to the measurement of racial and ethnic discrimination in consumption and to the identification of its causes especially in housing markets and car sales to test the hypothesis that discrimination exists economists have turned to regression analysis and to audits a matched pair survey technique economists also have developed audit based measures of the incidence and severity of discrimination audit studies find continuing high levels of discrimination against minorities in the marketing of available housing and in car prices audit studies also find that discrimination can be caused both by economic agents prejudice and by their search for profits

improved instrumental variables estimation of simultaneous equations under conditionally heteroskedastic disturbances in this paper we develop estimation techniques and a specification test for the validity of instrumental variables allowing for conditionally heteroskedastic disturbances we propose modified two stage least squares 2sls and modified 3sls procedures where the conditional heteroskedasticity is taken into account which are natural extensions of the traditional 2sls and 3sls estimators and which achieve a lower variance we recommend the use of these modified 2sls and 3sls procedures in practice instead of alternative estimators like limited information maximum likelihood full information maximum likelihood where the non existence of moments leads to extreme values and also for ease of computation it is shown theoretically and with simulation that in some cases 2sls 3sls and our modified 2sls and 3sls procedures can have very severe biases including the weak instruments case and we present bias correction procedures to apply in practice along the lines of flores lagunes 2007 our new estimation procedures can also be used to extend the test for weak instruments of stock and yogo 2005 and to allow for conditional heteroskedasticity finally we show the usefulness of our estimation procedures with an application to the demand and supply of fish