rational panics and stock market crashes abstract this paper offers an explanation for stock market crashes which focuses on the role of rational but uninformed traders we show that uninformed traders can precipitate a price crash because as prices decline they surmise that informed traders received negative information which leads them to reduce their demand for assets and drive the price of stocks even lower the model yields several implications such as that crashes can occur even when the fundamentals are strong and that the magnitude of the crash depends on the fraction of uninformed investors and the amount of unsophisticated passive investing present in the market

software industry development in the third world policy guidelines institutional options and constraints abstract this paper examines the constraints and opportunities facing developing country software industries it investigates the sources of competitive advantage in software production and scrutinizes the assertion that developing countries will have a competitive advantage in software development due in large part to a presumed labor intensity it concludes that certain countries either possess or can acquire a competitive advantage in the development of software but that governments should temper their efforts in this field with a degree of realism that takes into account what is attainable given existing constraints finally the paper offers some policy guidelines with which governments can help fashion a strategy for this sector s development

sentiments and aggregate demand fluctuations we formalize the keynesian insight that aggregate demand driven by sentiments can generate output fluctuations under rational expectations when production decisions must be made under imperfect information about demand optimal decisions based on sentiments can generate stochastic self fulfilling rational expectations equilibria in standard economies without persistent informational frictions externalities nonconvexities or strategic complementarities in production the models we consider are deliberately simple but could serve as benchmarks for more complicated equilibrium models with additional features

the emergence of new technology enterprises in china a study of endogenous capability building via restructuring this article examines the emergence of a vital non state sector consisting of new technology enterprises ntes spun off from existing r d institutions during the economic reforms in china most ntes are engaged in computer and information technology based on an outline of the development of the ntes this article focuses on an analysis of a few critical aspects of the restructuring process through which the ntes gained entry to a sphere of innovative economic activity the analysis shows that while the newly emerged ntes have to have international levels of competitiveness the restructuring process has been highly specific to the local society the article concludes by stressing the critical importance of the organisational innovation of the economic actors and the creation of institutions to support creative economic activities if developing countries are to cope with the pressing trends of rapid technological progress and economic globalisation

self fulfilling currency crises the role of interest rates abstract we develop a stylized currency crises model with heterogeneous information among investors andendogenous determination of interest rates in a noisy rational expectations equilibrium our modelcaptures three key features of interest rates the opportunity cost of attacking the currency respondsto the investors behavior the domestic interest rate may influence the central bank s preferences fora fixed exchange rate and the domestic interest rate serves as a public signal which aggregatesprivate information about fundamentals we explore the payoff and informational channels throughwhich interest rates determine devaluation outcomes and examine the implications for equilibriumselection by global games methods our main conclusion is that multiplicity is not an artifact ofcommon knowledge in particular we show that multiplicity emerges robustly either when adevaluation is triggered by the cost of high domestic interest rates as in obstfeld 1996 or when adevaluation is triggered by the central bank s loss of foreign reserves as in obstfeld 1986 providedthat the domestic asset supply is sufficiently elastic in the interest rate and shocks to the domesticbond supply are sufficiently small christian helliwigdepartment of economicsuniversity of california los angelesbox 951477los angeles ca 90095 1477arijit mukherjiuniversity of minnesotaaleh tsyvinskidepartment of economicsharvard universitylittauer centercambridge ma 02138 3001

monetary policy and aggregate volatility abstract discretionary conduct of monetary stabilization policy can increase real and nominal aggregate volatility by arbitrary amounts when firms pay limited attention to aggregate shocks a conservative central banker with stronger preference for price stability eliminates the commitment problem thereby reduces output and price volatility and gives rise to a policy induced great moderation increased focus on price stability facilitates firms information processing and aligns their expectations better with policy decisions this coordination effect reduces aggregate real and nominal volatility consistent with empirical evidence the moderation manifests itself through reduced residual variance in vector autoregressions vars involving macroeconomic variables

speculative attacks and the information role of the interest rate this paper models currency attacks as carried out by speculators who condition their actions on private signals about the state and on the market clearing interest rate besides affecting speculators payoffs this interest rate also provides an endogenous public signal for a plausible type of investment strategies the dual role of the interest rate allows the model to explain abrupt and intense speculative attacks solely via economic fundamentals without resorting to sunspot variables this result underlies a novel policy implication an official intervention in the foreign exchange market may reinforce a currency peg by influencing the precision of public information jel d82 d84 f31

creating an environment for venture capital in india abstract the institution of venture capitalism is a difficult one to initiate through policy intervention particularly in developing countries with unstable macroeconomic environments and histories of state involvement in the use of national capital and in the composition of production india has all these constraints the emergence of a thriving software services industry after 1985 created the raw material that venture capital could finance thus achieving a critical precondition for venture capital s growth it was followed by efforts to create a venture capital industry after several setbacks some success has been achieved largely due to a slow process of moulding the environment of rules and permissible institutions the process was assisted by the role of overseas indians in silicon valley s success in the 1990s yet in terms of what is needed most of the work remains to be done inevitably this will be the result of joint work by policymakers and practitioners

large versus small players a closer look at the dynamics of speculative attacks what is the role of large players e g hedge funds in speculative attacks recent work suggests that large players move early to induce smaller agents to attack however many observers argue that large players move late in order to benefit from interest rate differentials we propose a model in which large players can do both using data on currency trading by foreign large and local small players we find that foreign players moved last in three attacks on the norwegian krone during the 1990s during the attack on the swedish krona after the russian moratorium in 1998 foreign players moved early gains by delaying attack were small however because interest rates did not increase

models of currency crises with self fulfilling features the discomfort a government suffers from speculation against its currency determines the strategic incentives of speculators and the scope for multiple currency market equilibria after describing an illustrative model in which high unemployment may cause an exchange rate crisis with self fulfilling features the paper reviews some other self reinforcing mechanisms recent econometric evidence seems consistent with the practical importance of these mechanisms

risk and wealth in a model of self fulfilling currency attacks market participants risk attitudes wealth and portfolio composition in uence their positions in a pegged foreign currency and therefore may have important efiects on the sustainability of currency pegs we analyze such efiects in a global game model of currency crises with continuous action choices generating a rich set of theoretical comparative static predictions related to often discussed but rarely modelled accounts of the onset and timing of currency crises the model can be solved in closed form and the methods could be used to study other economic issues in which coordination and risk aversion play important roles

information acquisition in global games of regime change abstract we study costly information acquisition in global games of regime change that is coordination games where payoffs are discontinuous in the unobserved state and in the agents average action we show that only symmetric equilibria exist and provide sufficient conditions for uniqueness we then characterize the value of information in these games and link it to the underlying parameters of the model we investigate equilibrium efficiency complementarities in information choices and the trade offs between public and private information we show that information acquisition can be inefficient and that strategic complementarities in actions do not always translate into strategic complementarities in information acquisition finally we find that public and private information can be complements these results contrast findings in linear quadratic models where payoffs depend continuously on both the unobserved state and the agents average action

on the impact of fundamentals liquidity and coordination on market stability complex interactions between fundamentals and liquidity during unstable periods in financial markets are succinctly modeled with co ordination games we propose a flexible framework to estimate such a model and use the efficient method of moments as estimation proce dure we illustrate the model by using exchange rates from the yen dollar carry trade induced uncertainty in 1998 interest rate spreads and global market volatility the model fits the data well with ev idence of low information disparities the market is generally very deep where global volatility is more important than fundamental un certainty in the determination of liquidity there is clear evidence of asymmetry between the buy and sell sides of the market

learning from prices public communication and welfare we study the effect of releasing public information about productivity or monetary shocks using a micro founded macroeconomic model in which agents learn from the distribution of nominal prices while a public release has the direct beneficial effect of providing new information it also has the indirect adverse effect of reducing the informational efficiency of the price system we show that the negative indirect effect can dominate thus the public information release may increase uncertainty about the monetary shock and reduce welfare we find that the optimal communication policy is always to release either all or none of the information

knowing what others know coordination motives in information acquisition we explore how optimal information choices change the predictions of strategic models when a large number of agents play a game with strategic complementarity information choices exhibit complementarity as well if an agent wants to do what others do they want to know what others know this makes heterogeneous beliefs di cult to sustain and may generate multiple equilibria in models with substitutability agents prefer to difierentiate their information choices we use these theoretical results to examine the role of information choice in recent price setting models and to propose modeling techniques that ensure equilibrium uniqueness

payoffs from investment in information technology lessons from the asia pacific region abstract this paper examines the factors influencing investment in information technology it and the payoffs from investment in it use on productivity and economic growth in 12 asia pacific countries for 1984 1990 it finds a significant positive correlation between growth in it investment and growth in both gdp and productivity over the seven year period countries with higher growth rates in it investment achieved consistently higher growth rates of gdp and productivity this finding is consistent with the notion of it led development it challenges the so called productivity paradox or the notion that investment in it has not paid off in productivity improvements

coordination and delay in global games abstract what is the effect of offering agents an option to delay their choices in a global coordination game we address this question by considering a canonical binary action global game and allowing players to delay their irreversible decisions those that delay have access to accurate private information at the second stage but receive lower payoffs we show that as noise vanishes as long as the benefit to taking the risky action early is greater than the benefit of taking the risky action late the introduction of the option to delay reduces the incidence of coordination failure in equilibrium relative to the standard case where all agents must choose their actions at the same time we outline the welfare implications of this finding and probe the robustness of our results from a variety of angles

dynamic global games of regime change learning multiplicity and the timing of attacks global games of regime change coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attack it have been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks bank runs debt crises and political change we extend the static benchmark examined in the literature by allowing agents to take actions in many periods and to learn about the underlying fundamentals over time we first provide a simple recursive algorithm for the characterization of monotone equilibria we then show how the interaction of the knowledge that the regime survived past attacks with the arrival of information over time or with changes in fundamentals leads to interesting equilibrium properties first multiplicity may obtain under the same conditions on exogenous information that guarantee uniqueness in the static benchmark second fundamentals may predict the eventual fate of the regime but not the timing or the number of attacks finally equilibrium dynamics can alternate between phases of tranquility where no attack is possible and phases of distress where a large attack can occur even without changes in fundamentals

good luck or good policy an expectational theory of macro volatility switches abstract in an otherwise unique equilibrium model agents are segmented into a few informational islands according to the signal they receive about others expectations even if agents perfectly observe fundamentals rational exuberance equilibria rex can arise as they put weight on expectational signals to refine their forecasts constant gain adaptive learning can trigger jumps between the equilibrium where only fundamentals are weighted and a rex this determines regime switching in macro volatility despite unchanged monetary policy and time invariant distribution of exogenous shocks in this context a tight inflation targeting policy can lower expectational complementarity preventing rational exuberance although its effect is non monotone

social capital and entrepreneurial activity a pseudo panel approach abstract this paper uses a pseudo panel approach at an age based cohort level to investigate the extent to which social capital accounts for differences in entrepreneurial activities the findings suggest that trust measured by trust either in strangers or in public institutions facilitates entrepreneurship we also find that parents emphasis on individual achievement relative to interpersonal relations in raising their child is positively associated with entrepreneurship evidence suggests that both social norms and networks influence entrepreneurship these results do not change when we use social capital measured at the national level

unique equilibrium in a model of self fulfilling currency attacks even though self fulfilling currency attacks lead to multiple equilibria when fundamentals are common knowledge we demonstrate the uniqueness of equilibrium when speculators face a small amount of noise in their signals about the fundamentals this unique equilibrium depends not only on the fundamentals but also on financial variables such as the quantity of hot money in circulation and the costs of speculative trading in contrast to multiple equilibrium models our model allows analysis of policy proposals directed at curtailing currency attacks

market microstructure information aggregation and equilibrium uniqueness in a global game abstract speculators contemplating an attack e g on a currency peg must guess the beliefs of other speculators which they can do by looking at the stock market as shown in earlier work this information gathering process may be destabilising by creating multiple equilibria this paper studies the role played by the microstructure of the asset market in the emergence of multiple equilibria driven by information aggregation to do so we study the outcome of a two stage global game wherein an asset price determined at the trading stage of the game provides an endogenous public signal about the fundamental that affects traders decision to attack in the coordination stage of the game in the trading stage placing a full demand schedule i e a continuum of limit orders is costly but traders may use riskier and cheaper market orders i e order to sell or buy a fixed quantity of assets unconditional on the execution price price execution risk reduces traders aggressiveness and hence slows down information aggregation which ultimately makes multiple equilibria in the coordination stage less likely in this sense microstructure frictions that lead to greater individual exposure to price execution risk may reduce aggregate uncertainty by pinning down a unique equilibrium outcome

information manipulation coordination and regime change this article presents a model of information manipulation and political regime change there is a regime that can be overthrown but only if enough citizens participate in an uprising citizens are imperfectly informed about the regime s ability to resist an uprising and the regime can engage in propaganda that taken at face value makes the regime seem stronger than it truly is this coordination game with endogenous information manipulation has a unique equilibrium and the article gives a complete analytic characterization of the equilibrium s comparative statics holding fixed the number of signals available to citizens if the per unit signal precision is sufficiently high then the regime is harder to overthrow in contrast if the number of signals increases so that both total signal precision and the regime s costs of manipulation rise together then the regime is easier to overthrow unless there are strong economies of scale in information control

learning and complementarities in speculative attacks we study a model where the aggregate trading of currency speculators reveals new information to the central bank and affects its policy decision we show that the learning process gives rise to coordination motives among speculators leading to large currency attacks and introducing non fundamental volatility into exchange rates and policy decisions we show that the central bank can improve the ex ante effectiveness of its policy by committing to put a lower weight ex post on the information from the market and that transparency may either increase or decrease the effectiveness of learning from the market depending on how it is implemented

software industry entry strategies for developing countries a walking on two legs proposition abstract two themes run through the following analysis first countries without a relatively active and up to date software sector will find it increasingly difficult to catch up in terms of capital outlays labor skills and the growing importance of technology changes organization and management in software production they will not have for example software management experience to undertake increasingly large and complex software development projects a quality consciousness and the institutional and support infrastructure for marketing and forming product development alliances with dominant international firms in the sector second the learning curves for domestic and international market activities are quite different the domestic software market being an important base for skills experience and establishing a track record that may later be applied to exports two developing countries india and brazil have used different development strategies for their software industries and as could be expected with disparate results both the brazilian and the indian software industries are trying to walk on one leg the domestic leg in the case of brazil and the export leg in the case of india both countries have at least some potential for moving to a two legged model assessment of these two industries suggests that countries need to pay more attention to domestic opportunities since these have high returns in terms of gaining experience and innovation in software production and provide training that allows a broadening of software exports

social trust and human capital formation abstract social trust positively contributes to secondary education enrollment rates in a cross section of countries country specific characteristics that are significant in explaining secondary school enrollment include the degree of income inequality and the percent of the population identified as muslim

expectations and contagion in self fulfilling currency attacks this paper shows how expectations driven contagion of currency crises can arise even if the currency market has a unique equilibrium when viewed in isolation the model of morris and shin 1998 is extended to allow speculators to trade in a second currency market if speculators believe that a devaluation of this other currency will make a domestic devaluation more likely they will engage in trades that link the two markets a sharp devaluation of the other currency will then be propagated to the domestic market and will increase the likelihood of ac risis there fulfilling the original expectations even though this contagion is driven solely by expectations the model places restrictions on observable variables and these restrictions are broadly consistent with existing empirical evidence

convergence of least squares learning in environments with hidden state variables and private information we study the convergence of recursive least squares learning schemes in economic environments in which there is private information the presence of private information leads to the presence of hidden state variables from the viewpoint of particular agents by applying theorems of ljung we extend some of our earlier results to characterize conditions under which a system governed by leastsquares learning will eventually converge to a rational expectations equilibrium we apply insights from the learning results to formulate and compute the equilibrium of a version of townsend s model

monetary policy judgment and near rational exuberance we study how the use of judgement or add factors in macroeconomic forecasting may disturb the set of equilibrium outcomes when agents learn using recursive methods we examine the possibility of a new phenomenon which we call exuberance equilibria i n the new keynesian monetary policy framework inclusion of judgement in forecasts can lead to self fulfilling fluctuations in a subset of the determinacy region we study how policymakers can minimize the risk of exuberance

the conquest of south american inflation we infer determinants of latin american hyperinflations and stabilizations by using the method of maximum likelihood to estimate a hidden markov model that assigns roles both to fundamentals in the form of government deficits that are financed by money creation and to destabilizing expectations dynamics that can occasionally divorce inflation from fundamentals levels and conditional volatilities of monetized deficits drove most hyperinflations and stabilizations with a notable exception in peru where a cosmetic reform of the type emphasized by marcet and nicolini occurred

information choice and amplification of financial crises we propose an amplification mechanism of financial crises based on the information choices of investors information acquisition makes investors more likely to act against their prior deteriorating public news under an initially strong weak prior increases reduces the value of private information and induces more less information acquisition deteriorating public news increases the probability of a crisis since the initially strong weak prior induces no attacks attacks this effect is amplified with endogenous information choices to enhance financial stability a policy maker affects information acquisition via taxes and subsidies we derive and discuss testable implications for the magnitude of amplification

trust in large organizations several authors suggest that trust is an important determinant of cooperation between strangers in a society and therefore of performance of social institutions we argue that trust should be particularly important for the performance of large organizations in a cross section of countries evidence on government performance participation in civic and professional societies importance of large firms and the performance of social institutions more generally supports this hypothesis moreover trust is lower in countries with dominant hierarchical religions which may have deterred networks of cooperation trust hold up remarkably well on a cross section of countries this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

speculative attacks with multiple sources of public information we propose a speculative attack model in which agents receive multiple public signals it is characterised by its focus on an informational structure which sets free from the strict separation between public information and private information diverse pieces of public information can be taken into account differently by players and are likely to lead to different appreciations ex post this process defines players private value the main result is to show that equilibrium uniqueness depends on two conditions i signals are sufficiently dispersed ii private beliefs about the relative precision of these signals sufficiently differ we derive some implications for information dissemination policy transparency in this context is multi dimensional it concerns the publicity of announcements the number of signals disclosed as well as their precision especially it seems that the central bank has better not publishing its forecast errors in order to maintain stability an illustration to our analysis is the recent debate concerning the optimal monetary policy committee structure of central banks

uneven and combined development understanding india s software exports abstract the evolution of the indian software sector is explained by the larger context of uneven and combined development the imperatives of a market driven global order suggest an open ended process of development making some economic and technological convergence realizable but also generating contradictions at various levels this paper focuses on differential innovative capability the uneven diffusion of technical education in india and the increasing economic integration of the software industry as sources of uneven development the combined nature of the development process is reflected in the coexistence of the successful software sector with several lagging sectors with all of them being functionally integrated as part of indian social formation to cope with the contradictions of such change a balanced development will be critical to make development more inclusive deep structural problems that plague those outside the orbit of the successful software industry must be resolved

public information private information and the multiplicity of equilibria in coordination games abstract i study coordination games with incomplete public and private information and relate equilibrium convergence to convergence of higher order beliefs as the players signals become more and more precise the equilibrium manifold converges to the correspondence of common knowledge equilibria whenever the variance of the public signal converges to 0 at a rate faster than one half the rate of convergence of the variance of private signals the same condition also determines the convergence of common p belief to common knowledge which leads to a simple intuition for its origin and an immediate generalization of the former results about equilibrium convergence journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d82

the computer industry in the third world policy options and constraints abstract the paper examines the conditions for the development of an indigenous computer industry in third world countries it argues that within the existing international division of labor in the industry the opportunities for local computer production are limited for most developing countries increasing levels of automation are likely to result in diminished competitiveness for any but the largest manufacturers only countries with large internal markets can expect to sustain an integrated computer manufacturing base for most countries a niche oriented approach concentrating on the development of software and the configuration of systems for local and possibly regional vertical markets is apt to be the most viable entry strategy selective backward integration into hardware manufacture may be possible but the types of equipment manufactured locally must be carefully selected with a view not only to the potential domestic market but also to the suitability of the existing infrastructure and supplier networks to support cost effective manufacture for the establishment of an industry which is at least semi autonomous technologically policymakers need to take measures to strengthen the r d infrastructure to upgrade scientific and technical education and to induce those nationals working for computer multinationals whether at home or abroad to start up their own local computer ventures skilled and experienced computer specialists as well as a computer literate population are perhaps the two most valuable assets for the development of an indigenous computer industry

signaling in a global game coordination and policy traps this paper introduces signaling in a global game so as to examine the informational role of policy in coordination environments such as currency crises and bank runs while exogenous asymmetric information has been shown to select a unique equilibrium we show that the endogenous information generated by policy interventions leads to multiple equilibria the policy maker is thus trapped into a position in which self fulfilling expectations dictate not only the coordination outcome but also the optimal policy this result does not rely on the freedom to choose out of equilibrium beliefs nor on the policy being a public signal it may obtain even if the policy is observed with idiosyncratic noise

efficient ex ante stabilization of firms abstract distressed firms are vulnerable to inefficient panic based runs of their workers suppliers and customers a policymaker may try to prevent such a run by pledging to protect the interests of these stakeholders should a firm cease to do business however this promise also enables the firm to demand better terms of trade from its stakeholders which blunts the policy s effectiveness we show how to avoid such an adverse response by the use of partial countercyclical insurance under certain conditions such a scheme costlessly implements the first best outcome in the limit as the stakeholders information becomes precise we also identify least cost efficient schemes in the cases of large noise learning and duopoly

macroeconomic expectations of households and professional forecasters economists have long emphasized the importance of expectations in determining macroeconomic outcomes yet there has been almost no recent effort to model actual empirical expectations data instead m acroeconomists usually simply assume that expectations are rational this paper shows that while empirical household expectations are not rational in the usual sense expectational dynamics are well captured by a model in which households views derive from news reports of the views of professional forecasters which in turn may be rational the model s estimates imply that people only occasionally pay attention to news reports this inattention generates stickyness in aggregate expectations with important macroeconomic consequences

monetary policy endogenous inattention and the volatility trade off this paper addresses the output price volatility puzzle by studying the interaction of optimal monetary policy and agents beliefs we assume that agents choose their information acquisition rate by minimizing a loss function that depends on expected forecast errors and information costs endogenous inattention is a nash equilibrium in the information processing rate although a decline of policy activism directly increases output volatility it indirectly anchors expectations which decreases output volatility if the indirect effect dominates then the usual trade off between output and price volatility breaks down this provides a potential explanation for the great moderation that began in the 1980 s

the signaling role of policy actions abstract in an economy affected by shocks that are imperfectly known the monetary instrument takes on a dual stabilizing role as a policy response that directly influences the economy and as a vehicle for information that reveals the central bank s assessment to firms because mark up shocks cannot be neutralized by monetary policy providing firms with more information about these shocks exacerbates their reaction and creates a larger distortion recognizing the signaling role of its instrument the central bank distorts its policy response in order to optimally shape firms beliefs while providing firms with more information is always detrimental to the output gap it has a more subtle effect on price dispersion depending on whether information is provided through the transparency channel or through the signaling channel although more transparency is always detrimental to welfare the information that is conveyed by the monetary instrument improves welfare when firms coordination is highly valuable

rational and self fulfilling balance of payments crises speculative attacks on a pegged exchange rate must sometimes occur ifasset price paths are to be free of abnormal profit opportunities suchattacks are fully rational as they reflect the market s response to aregime breakdown that is inevitable the authors shows that under someexpectations about policy balance of payments crises can also be purely self fulfilling events in such cases even a permanently viableregime may collapse and the economy will possess multiple equilibriacorresponding to different subjective assessments of the probability ofa crisis the behavior of the domestic interest rate will naturally reflect the possibility of a speculative attack copyright 1986 by american economic association

synchronizing export orientation with import substitution creating competitive indigenous high tech companies in china summary this paper examines how the synergy between china s domestic and the international market has affected its most competitive indigenous companies through case study in china s ict sectors in the 1990s the paper shows that when export upgrades and domestic market growth intersect in timing and sectors that is when they synchronize chinese companies found conditions most favorable to compete with foreign companies within the domestic market the synchronization has significant impact on sectors for both mature products and technologically advanced products it is thus necessary to reexamine the role of import substitution practices under the new context of globalization and in conjunction with exports

currency crises with the threat of an interest rate defence while virtually all currency crisis models recognise that the decision to abandon a peg depends on how tenaciously policy makers defend it this is seldom modelled explicitly we add the threat of an interest rate defence to the global game model of morris and shin american economic review 88 1998 with an endogenous defence actions of speculators may become strategic substitutes instead of the usual complements nevertheless our generalised model remains tractable and has a unique threshold equilibrium it provides additional insights for instance the threat of an interest rate defence makes speculation riskier and this may be sufficient to keep speculators out when fundamentals are still relatively strong

good disclosure bad disclosure we study the implications of public information in a model where market prices convey information to relevant decision makers and the uctuation of market prices is driven by multiple factors disclosure has a positive direct eect of providing new information and an indirect eect of changing the price informativeness if disclosure is about a variable of which real decision makers are well informed then the indirect eect is also positive so that the direct eect is ampli ed leading to a positive overall eect on real e ciency if disclosure is about a variable that real decision markers care to learn much then the indirect eect is negative and the direct eect is attenuated moreover in markets which aggregate private information eectively the negative indirect eect can dominate so that disclosure can harm real e ciency

is trust the missing root of institutions education and development we report evidence that trust is the missing root relating education institutions and economic development we observe that more trust both increases education and improves legal and bureaucratic institutions which in turn spurs economic development we substantiate this intuition with a series of regressions that provide evidence that trust determines both education and the quality of institutions and that education and institutions in turn affect gdp per capita

collapsing exchange rate regimes some linear examples abstract we construct a pair of linear examples to study the collapse time of a fixed exchange rate regime the first example is a perfect foresight continuous time model which allows calculation of the exact collapse time and the tracking of reserves the second example is a discrete time stochastic model which yields an endogenous probability distribution over the collapse time and produces a forward discount of the exchange rate

feedback effects and asset prices feedback effects from asset prices to firm cash flows have been empirically documented this finding raises a question for asset pricing how are asset prices determined if price affects fundamental value which in turn affects price in this environment by buying assets that others are buying investors ensure high future cash flows for the firm and subsequent high returns for themselves hence investors have an incentive to coordinate which may generate self fulfilling beliefs and multiple equilibria using insights from global games we pin down investors beliefs analyze equilibrium prices and show that strong feedback leads to higher excess volatility

market liquidity hedging and crashes in the absence of significant news hedging strategies were blamed for the stock market crash of october 1987 but traditional models cannot explain how a relatively small amount of selling could cause so large a price drop the authors develop a rational expectations model in which prices play an important role in shaping expectations markets are much less liquid in their model than in traditional models discontinuities or crashes can occur even with relatively little hedging the model is consistent with theories as disparate as keynes beauty contest insights and thom s catastrophe analysis and suggests means to reduce volatility copyright 1990 by american economic association

coordination risk and the price of debt abstract creditors of a distressed borrower face a coordination problem even if the fundamentals are sound fear of premature foreclosure by others may lead to pre emptive action undermining the project recognition of this problem lies behind corporate bankruptcy provisions across the world and it has been identified as a culprit in international financial crises but has received scant attention from the literature on debt pricing without common knowledge of fundamentals the incidence of failure is uniquely determined provided that private information is precise enough this affords a way to price the coordination failure comparative statics on the unique equilibrium provides several insights on the role of information and the incidence of inefficient liquidation

crises and prices information aggregation multiplicity and volatility crises are volatile times when endogenous sources of information are closely monitored we study the role of information in crises by introducing a financial market in a coordination game with imperfect information the asset price aggregates dispersed private information acting as a public noisy signal in contrast to the case with exogenous information our main result is that uniqueness may not obtain as a perturbation from perfect information multiplicity is ensured with small noise in addition we show that a multiplicity may emerge in the financial price itself b less noise may contribute toward nonfundamental volatility even when the equilibrium is unique and c similar results obtain for a model where individuals observe one another s actions highlighting the importance of endogenous information more generally