credit constraints equity market liberalizations and international trade abstract this paper provides evidence that credit constraints are an important determinant of international trade flows i exploit shocks to the availability of external finance and examine the impact of equity market liberalizations on the export behavior of 91 countries in the 1980 1997 period i show that liberalizations increase exports disproportionately more in financially vulnerable sectors that require more outside finance or employ fewer collateralizable assets this result is not driven by cross country differences in factor endowments and is independent of simultaneous trade policy reforms moreover it obtains with equal strength in the full panel of countries as well as in both panel and event study analyses of countries which removed capital controls during the sample period finally the effects of liberalizations are more pronounced in economies with initially less active stock markets indicating that foreign equity flows may substitute for an underdeveloped domestic financial system similarly opening equity markets has a greater impact in the presence of higher trade costs caused by restrictive trade policies

renegotiations in the greenhouse international climate policies are being shaped in a process of ongoing negotiations this paper develops a sequential game framework to explore the stability of international climate agreements allowing for multiple renegotiations we analyse how the incentives to reach an international climate agreement in the first period will be impacted by the prospect of further negotiations in later periods and by the punishment options related to renegotiations for this purpose we introduce a dynamic model of coalition formation with twelve world regions that captures the key features of the climate economy impacts of greenhouse gas emissions for a model with one round of renegotiations we find that a coalition of china and the united states is the unique renegotiation proof equilibrium in a game with more frequent renegotiations we find that the possibility to punish defecting players helps to stabilise larger coalitions in early stages of the game consequently several renegotiation proof equilibria emerge that outperform the coalition of china and usa in terms of abatement levels and global payoff the grand coalition however is unstable

financial mechanism and enforceability of international environmental agreements we examine how international coordination among countries generates a trend towards establishing an international institution for the provision of global public goods in the present model the forces creating international agreement are a politician s motive for re election and a financial mechanism for compliance if a politician expects another politician in a neighboring country to signal his good performance to his citizen by participating in the agreement and is aware that his ex post deviation will be deterred by the financial mechanism he too decides to participate in the agreement which then corrects externality problems

how delegation improves commitment abstract mccallum 1995 american economic review papers and proceedings 85 2 207 211 conjectures that delegation merely relocates the commitment problem but does not solve it this holds if optimal ex ante policies do not change if additional information becomes available however with a flexibility credibility trade off delegation improves credibility

environmental policy and international trade when governments and producers act strategically some environmentalists express concern that trade liberalization may damage the environment by giving governments incentives to relax environmental policies to give domestic producers a competitive advantage support for such concern may be given by models of imperfectly competitive trade where there may be rent shifting incentives for governments to relax environmental policies but there are also incentives for producers to act strategically e g through their investment in rd ii allowing governments to act strategically increases the incentive for producers to act strategically iii welfare is lower when both parties act strategically and iv strategic behavior by producers and governments is greater when governments use emission taxes than when they use emission standards

bureaucrats or politicians part ii multiple policy tasks abstract policies are typically chosen by politicians and bureaucrats this paper investigates first the normative criteria with which to allocate policy tasks to elected policymakers politicians or non elected bureaucrats politicians are preferable if there is uncertainty about social preferences and flexibility is valuable or if policy complementarities and compensation of losers is important bureaucrats are preferable if time inconsistency and short termism is an issue or if vested interests have large stakes in the policy outcome we then compare this normative benchmark with the case in which politicians choose when to delegate and show that the two generally differ

the biodiversity supergame this paper considers the ability of developed countries to sustain a cooperative agreement to compensate developing countries for the incremental costs of biodiversity conservation it is shown that depending on certain parameter values and the model specification such an agreement could only codify the non cooperative outcome or achieve the full cooperative outcome where global net benefits are maximized however where the agreement can sustain the full cooperative outcome net benefits will be only slightly larger than in the noncooperative outcome

centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods a political economy approach abstract this paper takes a fresh look at the trade off between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods it argues that the sharing of the costs of local public spending in a centralized system will create a conflict of interest between citizens in different jurisdictions when spending decisions are made by a legislature of locally elected representatives this conflict of interest will play out in the legislature depending on precisely how the legislature behaves the result may be excessive public spending or allocations of public goods characterized by uncertainty and misallocation across districts the extent of the conflict of interest between districts is affected by spillovers and differences in tastes for public spending thus the relative performance of centralized and decentralized systems depends upon spillovers and differences in tastes for public spending but for different reasons than suggested in the existing literature

implicit contracts moral hazard and unemployment this paper considers a firm whose marginal revenue product of labor is a random variable we derive the form of an optimal long term contract between workers and the firm under the assumption that labor s marginal product is observed by the firm but not by the workers we show that the existence of asymmetric information causes unemployment to be greater than in a situation where information about labor s marginal product is public or where employment is determined in spot markets in particular unemployment can occur when the marginal product of labor exceeds the reservation wage

financial liberalization and the relationship specificity of exports we investigate the causal impact of equity market liberalizations on sectoral export performance across 91 countries 1980 1997 the increased availability of external finance has boosted trade of industries that intensively use relationship specific inputs and lowered exports of industries using standardized inputs

a non cournot model of voluntary collective action the interaction of selfish rational actors in the provision of a public good is analyzed in an attempt to explain recent experimental findings as well as real world cases of voluntary collective action the model which allows for more sophisticated behavior than that assumed by the conventional cournot theory predicts a higher level of collective action that that theory the impacts of income effects and of the price elasticity of demand for the public good are given special emphasis

equilibrium pollution taxes in open economies with imperfect competition abstract this paper argues that imperfect competition in global markets creates a strategic interaction between governments that can lead to the inefficient distortion of pollution taxes this distortion can be decomposed into a rent capture effect and a pollution shifting effect the rent capture effect lowers equilibrium taxes as each country attempts to gain a competitive advantage over its trading partner and thereby capture foreign rent through net exports the pollution shifting effect raises equilibrium taxes as each country attempts to transfer production and its associated pollution to the other country this effect vanishes if pollution is perfectly transboundary because shifted pollution causes as much damage to the domestic environment as does domestic pollution the net effect on symmetric equilibrium taxes is negative except in the special case of perfect competition with no transboundary pollution in this case the two effects are mutually offsetting and the nash equilibrium is efficient when pollution is at least partially transboundary there also arises the usual transboundary externality and this reinforces the negative net strategic effect giving rise to equilibrium taxes that are lower than what is globally efficient

an economic model of representative democracy this paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office the approach has a number of attractive features first it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by as well as of the people second the model is analytically tractable being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally third it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy

the voluntary provision of a pure public good the case of reduced cfc emissions and the montreal protocol abstract this paper applies the theory of the voluntary provision of a pure public good to the behavior of nations to curb chlorofluorocarbon cfc emissions during the late 1980s by devising an empirical test we determine that these cutbacks in emissions are consistent with nash behavior when taste parameters are controlled the relationship between emission cutbacks and national income is nearly linear as implied by the theory if the sample is purged of potential outliers then the linear relationship results a significant taste parameter is the extent of political and civil freedoms while a marginally significant parameter is geophysical position in terms of latitude

cost uncertainty and unilateral abatement unilateral abatement is sometimes advocated in order to set a good example that will make other countries follow the aim of this paper is to investigate whether existence of correlated cost uncertainty provides an incentive for a country to undertake unilateral abatement the theoretical model is driven by two main mechanisms first a learning effect as the follower country might reduce its risk premium as it can observe the cost level in the leader country second there is the public good effect i e the marginal benefit of abatement declines when abatement is a public good and other countries contribute to pollution reductions results shows that unilateral abatement would be efficient in reducing uncertainty about the unit costs of abatement if a country with low cost uncertainty would undertake abatement first while a country with initially high cost uncertainty would follow however countries may prefer to act simultaneously because of the larger uncertainties that are inherent in a sequential game

strategic transfers and private provision of public goods abstract this paper considers strategic monetary transfers between two agents when these contribute to a mutual public good if the agents differ in their contribution productivity then the less productive agent has an incentive to make large unconditional transfers to the more productive agent although agents move simultaneously in each stage of the game the less productive agent becomes a stackelberg leader furthermore the generic subgame perfect equilibrium is characterized by full specialization

environmental protection and the private provision of international public goods final version received 11 september 2008 international environmental protection like the combat of global warming exhibits properties of publicgoods in the international arena no coercive authority exists that can enforce measures to overcome free rider incentives therefore decentralized negotiations between individual regions serve as an approach topursue ef cient international environmental protection we propose a scheme which is based on the ideasof coasean negotiations and pigouvian taxes the negotiating entities offer side payments to counterpartsin order to in uence their taxation of polluting consumption side payments in turn are self nanced bymeans of externality correcting taxes as we show a pareto ef cient outcome can be attained

optimal labour contracts under asymmetric information an introduction the review of economic studies has instituted a new series of lectures to be given annually by a younger british economist at the association of university teachers of economics meetings the choice of lecturer is determined by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay this paper is a revised version of the first lecture in the series it was presented at the aute meeting held at the university of surrey in april 1982 and was refereed in the usual way mak

endogenous cartel formation experimental evidence in a bertrand oligopoly experiment firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel like communication and if so they may get fined by a cartel authority we find that the four firm industries form cartels more often than the duopolies because they gain less from a hysteresis effect after cartel disruption

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

fiscal restraints and voter welfare this paper explores the logic of fiscal restraints in a political agency model with both moral hazard and adverse selection the role of the political process is both to discipline incumbents who may act against the public interest and to sort in those politicians who are most likely act in voters interests we use the model to examine the optimality of inefficient taxation limits on the size of government increasing transparency and yardstick competition some conclusions are surprising for example we show that some forms of fiscal restraint can only be desirable when incumbents are sufficiently likely to be benevolent

political institutions and pollution control this paper models the selection of environmental policies under authoritarian and democratic regimes and tests the hypothesis that political institutions systematically affect the enactment of environmental regulations the results support the contention that political institutional arrangements rather than resource endowments largely determine policies concerning environmental regulation copyright 1992 by mit press

on vertical relations and the timing of technology adoption we study the timing of new technology adoption in markets with input outsourcing and thus with vertical relations we find that technology adoption can take place earlier when firms engage in input outsourcing than when they produce the input in house hence the presence of vertical relations can accelerate the adoption of a new technology we also find that particular features of a vertically related market such as the distribution of bargaining power and the contract type through which trading is conducted can crucially affect the speed of technology adoption

trade wars and trade talks when governments meet in the international arena their actions reflect the political situations at home previous studies of trade relations have focused on governments that are immune from political pressures and that act as benevolent servants of the public interest here we introduce domestic politics into the analysis of international economic relations we study the interactions between national leaders who are concerned both with providing a high standard of living to the general electorate and collecting campaign contributions from special interest groups our analysis sheds light on the determinants of the structure of protection in non cooperative and cooperative policy equilibria

altruism and global environmental taxes a global externality like the ghg emissions leading to climate change are both due to free riding at the individual level as well as the government level a government aiming to maximise domestic social welfare may make individuals internalise the damage within their country but will free ride on the damage caused to other countries only a global cooperative solution could internalise global damage entirely if individuals have altruistic concern for others but continue to believe that their consumption is negligible relative to the total they will not change their behaviour however this paper shows that in a multi country setting the global equilibrium levels of consumption for both the non cooperative and cooperative solutions are affected by altruism the key results are a that non cooperative governments maximising domestic welfare will internalise some of the damage inflicted on other countries depending on the level of altruistic concern individuals have and b the cooperative global optimum also changes as altruism leads individuals to effectively experience damage in other countries as well as the direct damage to them since altruistic concern for others may vary across countries global welfare then becomes a function of the relative levels of altruistic concern between countries

productivity effects of worker participation in management profit sharing worker ownership of assets and unionization in u s firms abstract in this paper we provide our first econometric estimates of the effect of worker participation in decision making ownership and profits on productive efficiency participation has the potential for exerting several conflicting influences on firm performance simultaneously as a result both the direction and magnitude of its impact are empirical issues previous studies have empirically measured the impact of each of these forms of participation however no prior study has controlled for the influence of the other forms because of the potential for correlation among these forms of participation it is possible that omitted variables bias has affected the previous results using a new panel data set with simultaneous measures of all four types of participation in u s manufacturing establishments we model participation as disembodied technical change and estimate production function coefficients for each type while controlling for the others we use both ols and instrumental variables in order to guard against potential simultaneity the iv results indicate that participation in decision making has a large positive productivity effect while the impacts of unionization and profit sharing depend upon regression specification moderate amounts of indirect worker ownership affect productivity positively while the estimated effect of direct worker ownership is negative however this last result may reflect the industrial concentration of the direct ownership firms in our sample

strategic delegation of environmental policy making a common claim is that nations should cooperate in environmental policy making however there is little empirical support that noncooperative decision making results in too low environmental standards and taxes we develop a theoretical model and show that if the median voter cares sufficiently for the environment she has an incentive to delegate policy making to a politician that cares more for the environment than she does herself by doing so she mitigates the race to the bottom in environmental taxes in contrast if environmental policies are determined cooperatively with other countries the median voter has an incentive to delegate policy making to a politician that cares less for the environment than she does herself so as to free ride on international environmental agreements

after kyoto alternative mechanisms to control global warming after more than a decade of negotiations and planning under the framework convention on climate change fccc the first binding international agreement to control the emissions of greenhouse gases has come into effect in the kyoto protocol the first budget period of 2008 2012 is at hand moreover the scientific evidence on greenhouse warming strengthens steadily as observational evidence of warming accumulates the institutional framework of the protocol has taken hold solidly in the european union s emissions trading scheme ets which covers almost half of europe s carbon dioxide emissions notwithstanding this apparent success the kyoto protocol is widely seen as somewhere between troubled and terminal early troubles came with the failure to include the major developing countries along with lack of an agreedupon mechanism to include new countries and extend the agreement to new periods the major blow came when the united states withdrew from the treaty in 2001 by 2002 the protocol covered only 30 percent of global emissions while the hard enforcement mechanism in the ets accounts for about 8 percent of global emissions even if the current protocol is extended models indicate that it will have little impact on global temperature change unless there is a dramatic breakthrough or a new design the protocol threatens to be seen as a monument to institutional overreach nations are now beginning to consider the structure of climate change policies for the period after 2008 to 2012 some countries states cities companies and even universities are adopting their own climate change policies are there in fact alternatives to the scheme of tradable emissions permits embodied in the protocol the fact is that alternative approaches have not had a serious hearing among natural scientists or among policymakers what are some alternatives for global public goods there are three potential approaches command and control regulation quantity oriented market approaches and taxor price based regimes of these only the tradable quantity and the price like regimes have any hope of being reasonably efficient under a tradable quantity approach an agreement proceeds by setting limits on emissions by different countries the limits are partially or wholly transferable among countries this is the approach taken under the kyoto protocol this approach has very limited international experience under existing protocols such as the cfc chlorofluorocarbon mechanisms and somewhat broader experience under national trading regimes such as the u s sulfur dioxide regime a radically different approach is to use harmonized prices fees or taxes as a method of coordinating policies among countries this approach has no international experience in the environmental area although it has modest experience nationally in such areas as the u s tax on ozone depleting chemicals on the other hand the use of harmonized price type measures has extensive international experience in fiscal and trade policies such as with the harmonization of taxes in the european union and harmonized tariffs in international trade these thoughts on the structure of international agreements to control global warming should not be regarded as negotiating strategies

evidence on incentive effects of subjective performance evaluations the authors investigate the effect of managerial performance evaluation styles on employee work effort using panel data on 4 080 employees in a swiss unit of an international company for the period 1999 2002 they test two hypotheses using paid and unpaid overtime work as effort indicators the company applies two performance based remuneration mechanisms an individual surprise bonus and one in which salary is affected by the extent to which an individual has reached personalized targets the authors hypothesize that effort is higher in departments in which individual performance evaluations are more flexible over time as well as when surprise bonuses are used more frequently both hypotheses are supported and the estimated effects are substantial increases in rating flexibility or bonus payments by one standard deviation above the mean increase average overtime hours by more than 20 the findings are robust and suggest that surprise bonuses and flexible performance evaluations over time provide ef

climate policy negotiations with incomplete information we analyse bargaining over international climate agreements in a setting with incomplete information about abatement costs incomplete information is known as one of the key reasons why negotiations may fail more generally and why efficiency gains cannot be exploited we ask whether unilateral commitment to high abatement reduces or increases the likelihood for an efficient negotiation outcome we find that such commitment behaviour reduces the gains from global cooperation and that in turn this reduces the probability of reaching efficient international environmental agreements

international environmental agreements and strategic voting two anonymous referees have provided very valuable comments and suggestions we have also benefited from discussions at seminars at the universities of bonn dortmund and dresden and at the conferences of euresco the european economic association and the verein fur socialpolitik this paper was partly written while haupt was visiting the economics department at the university of colorado at boulder he is very grateful to the members of the department particularly to eckhard janeba for their hospitality and for stimulating discussions and to the fritz thyssen stiftung for funding his research visit we also thank the deutsche forschungsgemeinschaft dfg for financial support

bureaucrats or politicians part i a single policy task this paper investigates the normative criteria that guide the allocation of a policy task to an elected politician versus an independent bureaucrat the bureaucrat is preferable for technical tasks for which ability is more important than effort or if there is great uncertainty about whether the policymaker has the required abilities the optimal allocation of redistributive tasks is ambiguous and depends on how the bureaucrat can be instructed but irrespective of the normative conclusion the politician prefers not to delegate redistributive policies

bridging the trade environment divide protection for free traders this word represents the consummate evil for environmentalists it is the ultimate good of course for the trade community protection conjures up dark images of smoot and hawley while the environmental camp sees clear mountain streams lush green forests and piercing blue skies one cannot blame all of the tensions at the trade environment interface on linguistic differences but these competing perspectives are emblematic of a deep clash of cultures theories and assumptions trade officials often seek to limit efforts to link trade and environmental policy making and sometimes to prohibit such efforts altogether in this regard the narrow focus and modest efforts of the world trade organization s committee on trade and environment are illustrative 1 the launch of negotiations for a free trade area of the americas with an express decision to exclude environmental issues from the agenda provides an even starker example of the trade community s hostility toward serious environmental engagement economists have been prominent among those arguing that pollution control and natural resource management issues are best kept out of the trade policy making process cooper 1994 bhagwati 1999 other economists however have tried to set trade policy making in a broader context and to build environmental sensitivity into the international trading system runge 1994 rodrik 1997 summers 2000

trade and capital flows a financial frictions perspective the classical heckscher ohlin mundell paradigm states that trade and capital mobility are substitutes in the sense that trade integration reduces the incentives for capital to ow to capital scarce countries in this paper we show that in a world with heterogeneous nancial development the classic conclusion does not hold in particular in less nancially developed economies south trade and capital mobility are complements within a dynamic framework the complementarity carries over to nancial capital ows this interaction implies that deepening trade integration in south raises net capital in ows or reduces net capital out ows it also implies that at the global level protectionism may back re if the goal is to rebalance capital ows when these are already heading from south to north our perspective also has

sorting through affirmative action three field experiments in colombia the use of affirmative action policies to promote female employment remains debated do affirmative action policies attract female applicants and does that come at the expense of deterring highly

the simple macroeconomics of profit sharing this paper is in the spirit of the temporary equilibrium approach to macroeconomics it basically extends that framework to cover a profit sharing system and then compares the macroeconomic characteristics with those of the more familiar wage system a first preliminary step is to demonstrate how a microeconomic model of monopolistic competition can be built up into a junior member of the keynesian macro family the methodology is to create from first principles including a careful formulation of a monopolistically competitive product market structurea natural underpinning for the standard aggregate demand specification the primary goal of the paper is to apply the integrated monopolistic competitionkeynesian type apparatus described above to investigate the macroeconomic properties of a profit sharing economy the existence of a consistent general framework covering both cases invites meaningful comparisons that indicate clearly why an economy based on profit sharing principles possesses natural immunity to stagflation by contrast the wage economya system we have largely accepted without critically examining its macroeconomic consequences is more prone to suffer from unemployment and inflation the policy implications for aggregate demand management in wage and share systems are analyzed and contrasted in writing this paper my philosophy has been to not shirk from using those reasonable parameterizations and functional forms which yield nice crisp results and permit me to focus sharply on the essential logic of basic issues it is certainly possible to present the main results in a somewhat more general formulation as the astute reader will appreciate but i fear only at some cost of distracting attention from those central features i wish to highlight

the political economy of pollution taxes in a small open economy abstract this paper develops a positive theory explaining pollution tax policy outcomes in a small open economy the equilibrium tax rate depends on lobby group membership the relative importance of lobbying activities and the tax elasticity of pollution the equilibrium properties are investigated the model is extended to incorporate pollution abatement and a pollution abatement subsidy we show that total pollution may be increasing in the pollution abatement subsidy rate this effect arises because the equilibrium pollution tax rate may be decreasing in the subsidy rate due to altered political influence of the lobby groups in the political equilibrium

strategic voting for noncooperative environmental policies in open economies in this paper we construct a political economy model of strategic environmental policymaking with different degrees of product differentiation and different market structures and examine how strategic voting decisions are affected by the choice of environmental policy instruments tax or standard we show that in a cournot market structure voters elect tax setting policymakers who are more green than themselves when product differentiation and or environmental externalities are more prominent in a bertrand market structure they elect more green tax setting policymakers than themselves on the other hand they elect standard setting policymakers who are less green than themselves the results confirm the advantage of the overall use of emission tax over that of emission standard regarding the welfare effect of strategic voting

the productivity effects of employee stock ownership plans and bonuses evidence from japanese panel data the authors report the first results for japanese firms on the effects of employee stock ownership plans esops and bonuses by estimating production functions using new panel data they find that the introduction of an esop will lead to a 4 5 percent increase in productivity this productivity payoff takes three to four years there is a modest productivity gain from the bonus system the authors also find evidence that the productivity effect of bonuses is enhanced by the existence of esops suggesting that esops may create a climate conducive to profit sharing by enhancing long term commitment and peer monitoring copyright 1995 by american economic association

the effects of workers participation on enterprise performance empirical evidence from french cooperatives abstract the results of estimating production functions augmented by various measures of workers participation on a large enterprise level data set of french cooperatives are reported value added is found to be an increasing function of participation in profits in collective membership and in ownership even when a wide assortment of enterprise specific and environmental factors are taken into account this finding is very robust surviving tests between alternative specifications of technology for reverse causality for simultaneous equation bias and for multicollinearity the typical productivity effect from participation however is small around 5 of output the results suggest that western policymakers should investigate ways to increase workers participation in capital stakes and profit shares

international public goods and contribution productivity differentials abstract this paper investigates the impacts of productivity differentials in contributing to the public good on national welfare in the context of non cooperative voluntary provision of a pure public good a country with high productivity does not necessarily enjoy high welfare subsidizing the other country in a contribution game may lead to a strong paradoxical result while a lump sum transfer will lead to a weak paradoxical result we also explore the relationship between the price of the public good and the size of an open club in a multi club model

price vs quantity competition in a vertically related market this paper demonstrates that the standard conclusions regarding the comparison of cournot and bertrand competition are reversed in a vertically related market with upstream monopoly and trading via two part tariffs in such a market downstream cournot competition yields higher output lower wholesale prices lower final prices higher consumers surplus and higher total welfare than bertrand competition

unconditional aid and green growth abstract environmentally motivated aid can help developing countries to achieve economic growth while mitigating the impact on emission levels we argue that the usual practice of giving aid conditionally is not effective and we therefore study aid that is given unconditionally our framework is a differential open loop stackelberg game between a fully developed leader country and a developing follower country the leader chooses the amount of mitigation aid given to the follower which the follower either consumes or invests in either costly non polluting capital or cheap high emission capital we show that giving aid conditionally is only rarely effective and if so is based on a forced intertemporal savings effect in all other cases it is ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst moreover we find that the leader gives unconditional mitigation aid only when sufficiently rich or when caring sufficiently about environmental quality if unconditional aid is given in steady state it decreases the steady state level of high emission capital and capital investments in the recipient country as well as the global pollution stock but it has no effect on the levels of non polluting capital and non polluting investments transitional aid accelerates the economic growth of the follower moreover we find that the increase in growth takes place in the non polluting sector

the effects of profit sharing on employment wages stock returns and productivity evidence from uk micro data this paper provides evidence based on u k firm level data that 1 the authors cannot reject the view that profit sharing firms view the total level of remuneration as the marginal cost of labor which is contrary to much of weitzman s analysis 2 there is some support for the popular view that profit sharing raises total remuneration and can therefore be inflationary and 3 the introduction of profit sharing does lead to higher productivity but this combined with the employment reducing consequences of 2 leads the authors to conclude that the net employment effect is small and uncertain copyright 1990 by royal economic society

asymmetric spiders supplier heterogeneity and the organization of firms we consider a property rights model of a firm with two heterogeneous suppliers the headquarters determine the firm s organizational structure and we analyze which sourcing mode outsourcing or vertical integration is chosen for which of the asymmetric inputs if suppliers investment choices are strategic complements the firm may keep the technologically more important input inside its boundaries and outsource the less important supplier the firm also tends to keep more sophisticated inputs in house while choosing an external supplier organization for simpler and for low cost components these theoretical predictions are consistent with numerous case studies and recent empirical evidence on the internal organization of firms

annual bonuses employment and productivity change in taiwan s manufacturing sector abstract taiwanese manufacturing firms have traditionally made annual bonus payments to employees concentrated around the lunar new year holiday this paper uses industry data to investigate the connection between compensation volatility and the volatility and growth rate of employment we observe a significant relationship between employment and seasonally predictable compensation volatility implying that industries in which firms commit themselves to paying regular new year bonuses employ more workers more stably we also investigate the relationship between compensation profits and productivity growth we find a significant role for productivity growth in the determination of profits and for profits in the determination of bonuses however it appears that productivity growth itself is mainly determined by exogenous factors and is only slightly responsive to the bonus system