median voters or budget maximizers evidence from school expenditure referenda some readers may have found these results of greater interest were we able to confirm the directional hypotheses of the certainty setter model in addition to finding that spending is related to the reversion the much weaker prediction of the uncertainty model yet the failure of the certainty when base elections were optional their infrequent occurrence might be expected under either a median voter or a setter model for those districts that did hold base elections the observations appear consistent with a setter model but are either inexplicable by or inconsistent with a median voter model finally both a the relationship between the number of budget elections and the presence of base elections and b the outcome of mandatory base elections in 1978 provide a set of observations that are challenging to either model a similar challenge was posed by our investigation of budget elections when we called attention to the inadequacy of static full information models rather than resolving the question of the simple setter model against the simple median voter model our results indicate that both may be inappropriate and that endeavors dealing with complexities omitted here are warranted

legislative district configurations and fiscal policy in american states in accordance with the median voter theorem the median legislator is decisive in representative democracy if the preferences of the median legislator differ from the preferences of the median voter in the polity fiscal policy choices will predictably diverge from those favored by the median voter this paper seeks to identify the median district and therein the preferences driving the median legislator in american state legislatures using economic characteristics of constituents we find substantial differences between the median district and the statewide median as the income of the median district rises above the median income of the polity government expenditures increase in addition the degree to which income is skewed across legislative districts affects spending for redistribution programs finally we find that direct democracy procedures which allow the statewide median voter to check legislative decisions limit the impact of differences between the district and polity medians

governmental behavior in representative democracy a synthesis of the theoretical literature what is the impact of bureaucratic behaviors on tax rates what is preferable a bureaucrat or a partisan politician does a flypaper effect occur when lobby groups influence public policies this article tries to answer these questions by analyzing and comparing six different models of public choice 1 the median voter model 2 the leviathan model 3 the slack maximizing model 4 a general model of bureaucracy 5 the partisan politicians model and 6 a general model of lobbying among several results it is shown that the median voter s income and tax share almost always play a significant role in the design of the public good tax package even if the government does not explicitly try to maximize the median voter s utility the article also provides a synthesis of the positive analysis of the flypaper effect

has the median voter found a ballot box that he can control this paper examines the appropriateness of the median voter hypothesis within an agenda control framework where the alternative to a proposed expenditure level is the existing level evidence from new york state school districts suggests that within this institutional setting the actual level of public service provision does not differ significantly from the median voter s preferred level the evidence also suggests that demand function parameter estimates for educational expenditures are not sensitive to the assumption that the public service output level corresponds to the median voter s private equilibrium

biased tax price or grant expenditure elasticities abstract minor differences in logarithmic government expenditure function specifications lead to wide swings in elasticity estimates the median voter model is use to identify the biases as well as the appropriate adjustments to bring the elasticities into conformity across model specifications

dynamic processes for public goods an institution oriented survey a nontechnical but nevertheless not informal account is given of dynamic models recently developed in the theory of public goods after a purely descriptive presentation of three basic models section 2 and their many subsequent extensions section 3 various reflections are made in section 4 on issues raised by an institutional perspective first the usual planning interpretation of such processes is presented and commented upon next contrasting normative and positive approaches to public goods it is argued that one category of processes can be given an interpretation much in line with the literature on positive public economics third the planning vs voluntary exchange institutions are contrasted from the point of view of cooperation among the agents in an economy with public goods

government growth in the twenty first century public choice explanations of government growth fall into three main categories budget maximization theories rational choice models and path dependent models like the ratchet hypothesis the strengths and weaknesses of these theories as explanations for government growth are considered along with some facts about the actual growth of government to conjecture about its trajectory in the twenty first century government size seems to have been constrained in the past primarily by its ability to raise revenue growth rates in the new century thus appear to depend on factors constraining government s ability to continue to expand the tax base

price dispersion and incomplete learning in the long run abstract in each period a seller chooses a price and the customer for that period buys either one unit or nothing the relationship between price and purchase probability is one of two linear functions it is shown that the seller behaving optimally does not necessarily learn which function is the actual relationship since there can be a positive probability of sequences of prices converging to the price at which the two functions give the same purchase probability

market socialism the current debate with the decline of command economies in eastern europe china and elsewhere the systemic issue of the feasability of combining the market mechanism with some form of public or collective ownership or control over the distribution of surplus has assumed topical importance the essays in this book aim at advancing the old debate on this issue to a new analytical stage questions of incentive compatability agency problems depoliticization of economic decisions and those of justice and worker autonomy are at the heart of the discussion the defenders as well as critics of market socialist proposals in this book are particularly sensitive to the centrality of these questions

the competitive allocation process is informationally efficient uniquely abstract this paper establishes that the competitive allocation process is the only informationally decentralized mechanism for exchange environments which i achieves pareto optimal allocations ii gives each consumer an allocation which is according to his preferences at least as good as his endowment iii satisfies certain regularity conditions and iv has a message space of the smallest dimension necessary to satisfy i iii

socially optimal social security and education subsidization in a dynastic model with human capital externalities fertility and endogenous growth abstract this paper considers socially optimal government policies in a dynastic family model with physical capital human capital endogenous fertility and positive spillovers from average human capital such spillovers reduce human capital investment but raise fertility from their social optimum we first characterize the social optimum with a non convex feasible set due to the quantity quality tradeoff concerning children we then show that social security and education subsidization together financed by labor income taxes can fully eliminate the efficiency losses of the spillovers and achieve the social optimum under plausible conditions however none of the policies can do so alone

is the median voter decisive evidence from referenda voting patterns abstract this paper examines whether the voter with the median income is decisive in local spending decisions previous tests have relied on cross sectional data while we make use of a pair of california referenda to estimate a first difference specification the referenda proposed to lower the required vote share for passing local educational bonding initiatives from 67 to 50 and 67 to 55 respectively we find that voters rationally consider future public service decisions when deciding how to vote on voting rules however the empirical evidence strongly suggests that an income percentile below the median is decisive for majority voting rules especially in communities that have a large share of high income voters with attributes that suggest low demand for public services based on a model that explicitly recognizes that each community contains voters with both high and low demand for public school spending we also find that an increase in the share of low demand voters is associated with a lower decisive voter income percentile for the high demand group this two type model implies that our low demand types individuals over age 45 with no children have demands that are 45 lower than other voters collectively these findings are consistent with high income voters with weak preferences for public educational services voting with the poor against increases in public spending on education

incentives in the generalized mdp procedure for the provision of public goods malinvaud 1970 1971 and dreze and de la vallee poussin 1971 have independently proposed a well defined planning procedure for an economy with public goods this procedure which has come to be called the mdp procedure has several desirable properties given correct revelation of each participant s preference if each individual truthfully announces his marginal rates of substitution between public goods and a private good every trajectory of the process lies entirely in the space of feasible allocations and monotonically converges to an individually rational pareto optimum moreover as is shown in champsaur 1976 given correct revelation this procedure is neutral to any kind of distributional value judgements in the sense that every individually rational pareto optimum can be attained as a limit of some trajectory defined by the process in connection with the problem of whether the participants in the mdp procedure reveal their correct preferences little literature has so far been written there are now results available which have been derived by dreze and de la vallee poussin 1971 and roberts 1979 that i at every iterative stage telling the truth is a maximin strategy for each individual and at an equilibrium of the process is a nash equilibrium strategy and that ii correct revelation produces a dominant strategy equilibrium at every instant if a society consists of just two individuals nevertheless maximin strategies are played only because of the rather restricted assumption on each participant s behaviour while confinement to the case of a two person society is too severe to give meaningful implications for reality in either case one might be fully justified in believing that truthful revelation will hardly appear in the mdp procedure fortunately almost all the properties of the mdp procedure can be preserved under circumstances where the agents misrepresent their marginal rates of substitution henry 1979 and roberts 1979 have shown that as long as each individual chooses a nash type strategy at each instant the process maintains the same properties as in the case of correct revelation except that the adjustment speeds of public goods are significantly reduced this result implies the mdp procedure is implementable under game theoretic circumstances but at the same time it exposes serious problems in several respects in the first place since the nash equilibrium strategy of each agent is not necessarily the truthful announcement the virtue of honesty is no longer of positive significance in the mdp procedure secondly for the validity of its solution concept if each agent plays a nash equilibrium strategy at all he must have complete knowledge relating to the possible strategies chosen by all the other agents clearly this supposition

the overspending and flypaper effects of fiscal illusion theory and empirical evidence abstract this paper broadens the notion of fiscal illusion to include imperfect information where voters are unsure about how much they must pay for additional services or where they are unsure about the services received in return for higher taxes it shows how each type of voter imperfect information has different effects on public spending and modifies the overspending and flypaper effects predicted by the certainty model an empirical study of municipal expenditures provides support for the broader notion of fiscal illusion as imperfect information

political economy and the social marginal cost of public funds the case of the meltzer richard economy i introduction the marginal cost of public funds mcf is defined as the full cost to the private sector of raising an additional dollar of tax revenue including deadweight loss or excess burden of taxation imposed on taxpayers much of the theoretical literature on the mcf is cast in the framework of a one consumer economy however the main reason why we have distortionary taxes in the first place is precisely because of the need for redistribution or the existence of consumers with heterogeneity in view of this inconsistency several papers including dahlby 1998 and sandmo 1998 have recently started addressing the so called social marginal cost of public funds smcf in models with heterogenous consumers 1 these papers highlight how the redistributive concern may alter the calculation of the smcf 2 in previous studies on the mcf or smcf the existing of status quo tax system has been assumed to be either arbitrary or optimal 3 it is arguable however that the existing tax system is neither arbitrary nor optimal but rather represents a political equilibrium the approach adopted by hettich and winer 1999 and persson and tabellini 2000 corroborates this argument in surveying the political economy of public finance the authors of these two books explicitly portrayed public policy as the equilibrium outcome of some specified political process in this note we study the smcf issue on the basis of the plausible premise that the existing tax system itself represents a political equilibrium the calculation of the smcf is basically a normative exercise the premise that the existing tax system is a policy outcome in political equilibrium will enable us to exploit the positive property of political equilibrium in this normative exercise as an illustration of our approach we revisit the political economy of redistributive taxation as set out in meltzer and richard 1981 hereafter m r the m r model holds a prominent position in the redistribution literature and has been elaborated and extended in many directions persson and tabellini 2000 part ii 4 section ii overviews the m r model sections iii and iv derive and discuss the smcf in the m r economy an interesting feature of our finding is that the degree of income inequality as measured by the ratio of mean to median income can play an important role in estimating the smcf and judging whether the level of redistribution is excessive or inadequate ii the m r model a economy consideran economy in which there are n 1 u sup i u c sup i l sup i i 1 n this utility function is assumed to be smooth and possess the usual properties the income tax system consists of two parameters a marginal tax rate t and a lump sum grant a the tax system pays the lump sum grant or demogrant a to each individual and finances the payment by imposing the marginal tax rate t on all earned income 5 the budget constraint facing individual i is 2 c sup i 1 t w sup i l sup i a i 1 n where l sup i denotes the labor supply with l sup i l sup i 1 from equations 1 and 2 we can derive the indirect utility function 3 v sup i v 1 t w sup i a u 1 t w sup i l sup i a 1 l sup i i 1 n it is assumed that the government budget is balanced denoting per capita pretax income by y we then have 4 ty a where y summation y sup i n with y sup i w sup i l sup i b political economy the preferences of individuals qua voters over income tax policy are represented by the indirect utility function 3

atheoretical macroeconometrics a critique abstract the spurious nature of the restrictions used to identify many macroeconometric models has led some researchers to advocate a style of econometric inquiry that is less dependent on prior theoretical restrictions of the sort that were central to the approach of the cowles commission this development which we call atheoretical macroeconometrics is summarized and evaluated in the current paper it is contrasted with an updated version of the cowles commission approach we conclude that while some of the exercises of atheoretical macroeconometrics are valid those that have attracted the most attention and appear the most innovative exogeneity testing impulse response analysis and policy analysis using estimated vector autoregressions are based on incorrect analysis

locally provided public schooling in brazilian municipalities the objective of this paper is to assess the demand for public schooling in the brazilian municipalities within a median voter framework the quantile regression and spatial techniques proved to be useful to account for the spatial and marginal effects associated with educational services the coefficients attached to the main variables price income and population were significant and had the expected sign the relatively high values for those parameters attest the status for these merit goods as luxuries last but no least the municipal school system in brazil seems to present increasing returns to scale both at the school and the municipality level

the discrete heal algorithm with intermediate goods good i by quantity a it is easy to modify this procedure for the case where final products are not homegeneous but the presence of intermediate production raises considerable difficulties they stem from the requirement that firms be asked about the effect of specific reallocations of inputs because heal type processes require that the aggregate production plan be feasible at each step of the procedure these reallocations must be consistent with each other in the presence of intermediate goods this consistency is difficult to maintain as the answer of one firm will dictate the feasible changes in inputs for other firms it should be possible to solve this problem for some special cases i have not been able to do so in other cases without changing the procedure fundamentally in our version of heal s procedure the planning board asks each firm to provide a local description of its production possibility set and does not commit itself to transfers of certain size the important difference here is between the examination of certain specific reallocations and the study of local approximations to the economy the questions that the centre asks of firms are composed of two parts a prospective production plan and a real number which indicates the maximal size of the reallocation which the planning board has in mind the answers of the firms are also composed of two parts the first corresponds to the vector of marginal rates of transformation in the continuous version of the procedure the second a real number is a measure of the distance between the proposal of the centre and the boundary of the production possibility set hence the sizes of the messages which are transmitted are minimally larger than in the continuous version of the procedure even in the framework where both are applicable the procedure of this paper has two advantages over that of henry and zylberberg first the message space is smaller

evidence on voter preferences from unrestricted choice referendums from 1939 to 1968 florida used a unique referendum system to set property tax rates for public school operating expenditures at the median millage rate selected by voters these referendums revealed the entire distribution of voter preferences which is not possible in the standard up or down referendum we are the first to use the florida referendum data the form of the ballot played an important role in how people voted voting machine elections were much more likely than paper ballots to result in rejections of the recommendations of school boards and produced much greater dispersion of expressed preferences

pervasive shortages under socialism we present a new theory of pervasive shortages under socialism based on the assumption that the planners are self interested because the planners meaning bureaucrats in the ministries and managers offirms cannot keep the official profits that firms earn it is in their interest to create shortages of output and to collect bribes from consumers the theory implies that 1 an increase in the official price of a good might reduce output 2 market socialism is bound to fail even without computational complexities facing the planners and 3 price liberalization will succeed only iffirms get to keep their profits

a characterization of strongly locally incentive compatible planning procedures with public goods this paper provides a systematic study of planning procedures with public goods in which local truthful revelation of preferences is a dominant strategy these procedures are said to be strongly locally individually incentive compatible sliic we first characterize the time invariant continuously differentiable planning procedures that are sliic then we study properties such as balancedness cheatproofness with respect to coalitions neutrality individual rationality and we point out the connection with the mdp procedures

the median voter model across levels of government the median voter model provides a method of aggregating individual voter s demands to obtain community demand although higher level governments are often assumed to be less responsive to voters than lower level governments it remains an open question whether or not the median voter model which has been found to apply to the lowest tier of the federalist system extends to higher level governments we use the cox specification test to find that the ad hoc model dominates the median model for counties and states the county results are sensitive to the time periods budgetary structure and degree of urbanization

co movement of public spending in the g7 abstract the size of government in the g7 countries in the last fifty years follows a common pattern see the left panel of fig 1 below it grows in the first three decades and then turns flat at the beginning of the nineties for all countries alike we highlight this common pattern in a dynamic factor model and argue that a satisfactory explanation for it would be desirable

an iterative process for international negotiations on acid rain in northern europe using a general convex formulation this paper proposes a game theoretical approach of international negotiations on transboundary pollution this approach is distinguished by a discrete time formulation and by a suitable formulation of the local information assumption on cost and damage functions at each stage of the negotiation the parties assign the best possible cooperative state given the available information as an objective for the next stage it is shown that the resulting sequences of states converges from a non cooperative situation to an international optimum in a finite number of stages furthermore a financial transfer structure is also presented that makes the desired sequence of states individually rational and stategically stable the concepts are applied in a numerical simulation of the so2 transboundary pollution problem related to acid rain in northern europe

cost recovery from congestion tolls with random capacity and demand abstract according to the cost recovery theorem the revenues from congestion tolls pay for optimal capacity of a facility if user costs are homogeneous of degree zero in usage and capacity and if capacity is perfectly divisible and supplied with a unit cost elasticity this paper examines the robustness of the theorem to demand and capacity uncertainty in the context of highway travel three main results are derived 1 the theorem holds in expected values when users are perfectly informed about the state and the toll is set optimally as a function of the state 2 the theorem also holds in expected values when users are imperfectly informed about the state the toll is set optimally given the information that users have and the price elasticity of demand is the same in all states 3 the theorem does not hold if the toll is set using less information than users have whether an expected surplus or deficit results depends on the sign of the correlation across states between the pigouvian toll and the ratio of the price elasticity of demand to the price examples show that the correlation can be positive or negative depending on the functional form of the demand and cost curves and the way the curves shift between states

myopic versus intertemporal manipulation in decentralized planning procedures manipulation is studied in abstract planning procedures in exchange economies with private goods and a generalization of the results of champsaur laroque 1980 is obtained when the nash equilibrium corresponding to myopic manipulation is unique the outcome of consistent intertemporal manipulation on a time interval 0 t is characterized it is shown that when t goes to infinity the exists a nash equilibrium only when the initial allocation is pareto optimal

financing capacity in the bottleneck model abstract it is well known that for a congestible facility with constant long run average cost the revenue from the unconstrained optimal congestion charge set so that each individual faces the marginal social cost of a use exactly covers the cost of optimal capacity in the context of vickrey s bottleneck model of morning rush hour auto congestion this paper investigates under what circumstances the first best pricing and investment rules apply when both the time variation of the congestion charge is constrained and users differ in unobservable characteristics so that the same congestion charge must be applied to heterogeneous users

does restricting choice in referenda enable governments to spend more if school boards represent the preferences of the median voter referendums to approve school expenditures should not constrain school expenditures if school boards would choose expenditures larger than the median voter s preference referendums that restrict voters to approving or disapproving a school board s recommended expenditure level will result in expenditures larger than the median voter would prefer however florida used a unique referendum system which guaranteed the median voter s most preferred outcome using florida education expenditures as a benchmark the evidence suggests that spending was slightly higher in restricted choice referendum states than in florida

too much conformity a hotelling model of local public goods supply abstract this paper considers a new dimension in the choice of local public goods quality the quality decision that is made by median voters in a hotelling model of product differentiation leads to too much conformity from a welfare point of view

socialist economics the disequilibrium school and the shortage economy the economics literature about behavior and policy in the stylized socialist economy has passed through three main phases the first phase emanated essentially from the barone lange von mises debate before world war ii its main focus was on how a socialist economy could operate efficiently in the absence of markets and private property the second phase occurring mostly since world war ii has been concerned primarily with coming to grips with the organization institutions and planning process of economies that profess to have realized some form of the ideal socialist economy several writers have sought to generalize on the basis of these empirical features without really aiming at a rigorous formal theory of the various agents in a centrally planned economy the third phase has occurred since the mid 1970s when some began to work out propositions on and formalize models of micro and macroeconomic behavior in stylized centrally planned economies and sought to buttress their theoretical approach with macroeconometric measurements that have since been used as a platform for formulating policy recommendations there have been three main strands in this third type of inquiry ickes 1984

impacts of trade and the environment on clustered multilateral environmental agreements many countries align their environmental policy and environmental regulation by way of multilateral environmental agreements meas previous work in economics provided insights in the economic and political determinants of meas at large this paper distinguishes meas by the main issues covered and classifies them in five clusters biodiversity atmosphere land chemicals and hazardous wastes and seas then the role of environmental economic and political factors and of dynamic and cross cluster effects is studied at the level of mea clusters two findings stand out from this empirical analysis first economic size and multilateral trade liberalisation of countries are found to be the most important drivers of mea participation across all clusters second adjustment costs turn out to deter and in particular cross cluster spillovers turn out to stimulate mea participation across countries and clusters

a direct test of direct democracy new england town meetings representative democracies govern most locales in the us making it difficult to compare performance relative to direct democracy new england states however provide an opportunity to test both direct and representative democracy at the local level this article uses revealed preference axioms to compare spending patterns in new england towns and cities against median voter hypothesis benchmarks contrary to previous evidence we find no differences between direct and representative democracy the results suggest that horizontal competition arising from local fragmentation minimize differences between direct and representative local government providing support for wider applicability of median voter based empirical models of local government behaviour in the us

constitutional political economy in the european union this article surveys recent research in constitutional political economy in europe although not all of theworks discussed necessarily focus only on european constitutional issues or are written by europeans european constitutional issues figure importantly in each area surveyed the article examines the literatures linking constitutional institutions to economic growth government size government deficits and corruption bicameralism direct democracy and federalism three exclusively european topics also are covered constitutional issues in the transition countries the structure of the european union and the draft constitution for the european union

leaving some stones unturned a reassessment of iterative planning theory abstract drawbacks of standard iterative planning algorithms include i planner actions are just on paper calculations without direct economic consequences and may converge very slowly ii planners cannot act systematically on hunches and intuitions and iii planners can observe unrealistically detailed information these problems are addressed through a bayesian learning model it is shown in sharp contrast to the standard literature that planners will not necessarily settle in the long run on even approximately optimal prices in an example the planner can end up setting prices in every period that guarantee chronic shortage this is an outcome of a fully optimizing model

fiscal dynamics of local elected officials the fiscal behavior of local elected officials is examined in a dynamic model where officials maximize an intertemporal objective function in two stages officials first decide upon an optimal mix of revenue and expenditure and then minimize loss and adjustment cost functions the model is tested using data from the 20 most populated u s cities whose mayor was elected on a four year cycle the empirical results support the model fiscal behavior differs between cities and local fiscal decisions made by elected officials are in part dependent on the timing of elections

strategic behavior in decentralized planning procedures noncooperative strategic behaviors are studied in the malinvaud dreze de la vallee poussin decentralized planning procedure we depart from the assumption of myopic behavior by assuming that every agent takes into account the effect over a given period of time 0 t of his answers to the center one shows that for t large every nash equilibrium of the ensuing game in intertemporal strategies approaches i a competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy and ii a lindahl equilibrium in an economy with public goods thus the center loses any significant influence on the income distribution

the median voter model in public choice theory the changing perception by public choice theorists about the relevance of the median voter model is a result of excessive extrapolation of the conclusions of theoretical models to the real world early in the 1970s the median voter model was often accepted as implying that the output produced in the public sector was what was most preferred by the median voter this claim is excessive because the median voter model is only a model of demand aggregation under majority rule and has little to say about the supply side of the public sector in the late 1970s many scholars identified several circumstances under which the model would not apply in theory but these critiques of the model were often viewed as reasons to abandon the median voter model altogether the model went from having excessive claims that made the model appear to be more powerful than it really is to excessive claims that made the model appear to be less powerful than it really is these latter claims were often in response to the earlier claims rather than to the model appropriately applied

the flypaper effect identifying areas for further research the flypaper effect literature dates back three decades it is overwhelmingly neo classical in approach attempting to improve the median voter demand model and or temper it with public choice supply side perspectives whilst this approach provided valuable early substantial analytical insights more recent papers seem to have contributed only marginally to an understanding of the flypaper effect if indeed it exists at all hence as well as providing a long overdue comprehensive review of the literature on the flypaper effect this paper identifies more productive avenues for further research

the role of economics in global management of whales re forming or re founding iwc abstract the global management of whale species identified as an economic mixed good is addressed by means of economic theory of bargaining and institution making i will analyse i why it is important to take into account explicitly both consumptive use and non use values within international conventions on global mixed goods ii the role and nature of institutions dealing with global issues iii the role of bargaining between conflicting interests as a focal feature of the institution making process and iv the role of economic thinking in international conventions co operative and non co operative solutions are discussed and instruments aimed at achieving co operative bargaining analysed the study has both positive and normative implications with insights on social welfare enhancing institutional reforms although the study is broad yet special focus is given to the international whaling commission iwc this paper concludes that we should make economic theory operational within the realm of global institutions on the basis of the bargaining model the conclusion is that iwc should necessarily be re founded or at least re formed changing the convention from whaling to a whale it is suggested that the possibility of introducing compensatory side payments into the bargaining arena in order to increase social welfare and enforceability with respect to a ban scenario be investigated ethical implications of monetary compensations are considered in parallel with economic efficiency the limits and potentialities of economics and economic instruments are also tested globally with respect to the whale and other environmental issues

time consistent shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction we study the problem of allocation over time of total cost incurred by countries in a cooperative game of pollution reduction we compute the characteristic function for all possible coalitions and apply the shapley value to determine a fair distribution of the total cooperative cost among players we design a mechanism for allocation over time of total individual cost so that the initial agreement remains valid for the whole duration of the game

when are anonymous congestion charges consistent with marginal cost pricing abstract there are constraints on pricing congestible facilities first if heterogeneous users are observationally indistinguishable then congestion charges must be anonymous second the time variation of congestion charges may be constrained do these constraints undermine the feasibility of marginal cost pricing and hence the applicability of the first best theory of congestible facilities for an important class of congestible facilities we show that if heterogeneous users behave identically when using the facility and if the time variation of congestion charges is unconstrained then marginal cost pricing is feasible with anonymous congestion charges if however the time variation of congestion charges is constrained optimal pricing with anonymous congestion charges entails ramsey pricing

dynamic procedures and incentives in public good economies in this paper we consider economies involving one public good one private good and convex technology and propose an informationally decentralized dynamic nontatonnement procedure that converges in general from the initial endowments to an allocation in the core of the economy we then consider a general class of procedures and show that there exists none in the class that is locally incentive compatible and individually rational these results show that there exists a trade off between the requirements of local incentive compatibility and equitable cost sharing

theoretical foundations of negotiations and cost sharing in transfrontier pollution problems the negotiations model is described by a dynamic process bearing on a multilateral externality that converges to an individually rational pareto optimum the process embodies a cost sharing rule for pollutant abatement in the countries involved derived from a sharing rule of the surplus that is also shown to have strategic stability in the game theoretic sense of an imputation in the core of some cooperative game associated with the negotiation process the connections are explored between this cost sharing rule and the free rider problem in public goods theory

why so much stability one of duncan black s 1958 more important contributions was a classically simple proof that with complex issues and majority voting a stable outcome is unlikely this very simple proof that there would normally be no motion which can get a majority against all others and hence that any possible outcome is dominated by another has been elaborated and made more precise by later work without most improbable conditions endless cycling would be expected this is particularly true when logrolling is present as it normally is if we look at the real world however we observe not only is there no endless cycling but acts are passed with reasonable dispatch and then remain unchanged for very long periods of time thus theory and reality seem to be not only out of contact but actually in sharp conflict it is the purpose of this article to demonstrate that our existing theory when properly looked at does indeed imply a relatively stable outcome to voting in some cases however this stability will not be a true equilibrium because a random member of a large set will be chosen and then that random outcome will be left unchanged for long periods of time it does not dominate all other outcomes but is retained merely because of its particular history there are already several possible explanations for the observed stability in the literature we will take them up as they become relevant to the general line of reasoning i should however warn the reader that my own previous work including joint work with buchanan will play a major role here this may simply reflect egotism but i think that some of the early work which is now partially forgotten can provide solutions for more modern problems much recent public choice work has involved spatial models and these models frequently ignore logrolling the reason presumably is that it is very hard to put logrolling in a two dimensional diagram we shall begin considering such special models and assume that the issues are the sort that does not lead to logrolling and then turn to more complex logrolling problems with respect to the first situation in which logrolling does not occur there is already one possible explanation for the observed stability in the literature

autonomy switching regimes and super exogeneity abstract in recent years the concept of switching regimes and super exogeneity has played a dominant part in the econometric debate the relevance of this discussion for the theories of economic policy is developed by lucas sargent and others in this article the very close parallel to the debate about autonomy in the 1940s is shown

a tale of two unions divergent platforms and their constituencies the median voter theorem has regularly been used in economics to represent the behaviour of teachers unions little empirical work however tests whether this framework is a good fit for teachers

theory and practice of decentralized planning procedures the paper surveys the theory of decentralized planning procedures dealing with price guided quantity guided and mixed procedures informational and incentive properties of the various procedures are dealt with as is the problem of public goods the practice of planning in the u s s r hungary and india is also discussed copyright 1990 by blackwell publishers ltd

the participation decision versus the level of participation in an environmental treaty a spatial probit analysis abstract this paper represents treaty participation as a two stage game for which nations first decide whether or not to participate and then they choose their level of participation the resulting subgame perfect equilibrium is used to derive a reduced form equation for estimating and separating the influences of the variables at the two decision stages this spatial probit equation forms the basis for a full information maximum likelihood estimator that accounts for the simultaneity bias associated with public good spillins at both stages when the procedure is applied to the helsinki protocol we find that the strategic influence of a variable may drastically differ depending upon which stage is scrutinized

the median voter hypothesis evidence from general purpose local governments the median voter hypothesis mvh represents a much used as well as much criticized tool in the hands of public finance economists to evaluate the mvh this paper applies the cox specification test using data from general purpose municipal governments the cox test allows for possible simultaneous rejection of the mvh and all tested models thus providing stricter criteria than applied to date in empirical mvh analyses the test results reveal that the mvh is appropriate for explaining the aggregate behavior of municipal governments but not specific services further the single service and single tax base assumptions are not critical to the empirical mvh performance

optimal control of acid rain in a federation with decentralized leadership and information abstract we examine some aspects of the acid rain problem in the european union acid rain is a by product of electricity production and the eu is a federal system characterized by decentralized leadership that is regional governments are leaders and the center is a common follower regional governments design environmental policies and the center designs an interregional income redistribution policy in a setting with decentralized information information is decentralized in that an upwind regional power plant is privately informed about its technology we show that the subgame perfect equilibrium of a game with decentralized leadership and information is constrained socially optimal

can neoclassical economics underpin the reform of centrally planned economies te here s a curious symmetry between the arguments propounded over the last century in advocacy of socialism and the present popular discussion of the reform of centrally planned economies in those old discussions the vision of socialism was utopian which was contrasted with the dickensian realities of capitalism now the disasters of central planning are contrasted with the benefits flowing from perfectly functioning markets in the conventional wisdom of reform the vision of markets is utopian and that of central planning concentrates on the awful reality what is largely missing in the conventional wisdom is a satisfactory attempt to come to grips with the central question that should be answered in formulating reform plans how does one explain the differences in performance of market capitalist and centrally planned economies of course capitalism has outperformed central planning the developed west is therefore an obvious source of ideas for reforms but the institutions of capitalism come in many varieties and cannot be put in place instantaneously there are many alternative reform paths depending upon the importance attributed to each of these institutions thus there remains the problem of tracing the source of the superiority of capitalist economies to specific characteristics this point was made clear to me on hearing a vietnamese official justify single party rule by noting the economic success of taiwan and singapore reformers need a filter that interprets the experience of capitalist and socialist systems this is exactly where economic theory plays a vital role

input output prices with endogenous demand abstract this note presents a computable general equilibrium model which may be used for planning purposes in a mixed economy it consists of a sequence of short run equilibria linked by a capacity expansion process in which incomes and profitability are endogenously determined

automobile externalities and policies this paper discusses the nature and magnitude of externalities associated with automobile use including local and global pollution oil dependence traffic congestion and traffic accidents it then discusses current federal policies affecting these externalities including fuel taxes fuel economy and emissions standards and alternative fuel policies summarizing insofar as possible the welfare effects of those policies finally we discuss emerging pricing policies including congestion tolls and insurance reform and summarize the appropriate combination of policies to address automobile externalities

incomplete information income redistribution and risk averse median voter behavior this paper extends the median voter model to include risk aversion an expected utility maximizing median voter with an aversion to risk may behave differently than a median voter who is certain a referendum on income redistribution from the top of the distribution to the bottom which fails when the median voter is certain may pass in the extended median voter model economic inefficiencies and the net losses accompanying redistribution are shown to play a pivotal role in determining the behavior of the risk averse median voter the model is illustrated using a one percent demogrant redistribution

an economic analysis of transboundary air pollution between finland and the former soviet union the net benefits of bilateral cooperation between finland and the former soviet union on reducing sulphur emissions are evaluated for both parties the analysis is based on a sulphur transportation model and on estimated abatement cost functions it is shown that efficient cooperation may entail financial transfers from finland to the soviet union

international environmental problems a simple taxonomy of international environmental problems is developed based on economic considerations the unidirectional externalities are illustrated by the case of one upstream and one downstream country the main problem in this case is an informational one the analysis of regional reciprocal externalities is illustrated by the acid rains in europe it is shown that an efficient solution could be achieved by transferable export rights finally global external problems are discussed with reference to greenhouse effects and extinction of species copyright 1990 by oxford university press

pursuing economic growth in asia the environmental challenge this paper identifies and discusses the five main areas of environmental management public policy that pose serious challenges to asian governments the first is the emerging issue of siting environmentally unfriendly facilities that may be necessary for growth but with the social and environmental costs borne primarily by local host residents and neighbourhood municipalities more commonly known as the not in my backyard syndrome the second issue is the critical need for pricing of non market environmental goods third is the issue of waste generation the fourth challenge is that of transboundary pollution which has become increasingly important with regard to its effects on health and foreign relations lastly the paper discusses global warming and climate change discussions on cost benefit analysis and the more novel method of establishing damage schedules are also presented this is particularly relevant to fundamental differences between developed and less developed countries

international agreements economic sovereignty and exit abstract we develop a model in which realisations of an ex ante uncertain domestic policy environment can make it attractive to a sovereign nation to renege on an international agreement we show in a fairly general setting in which the likelihood of exit is affected by the degree of cooperation that the possibility of exit reduces the optimal degree of initial cooperation full cooperation will never be optimal and the optimal degree of cooperation will never be such as to squeeze out any possibility of exit however an increase in global uncertainty may imply an increase in cooperation when exit risks are already large to begin with

a finnish soviet acid rain game noncooperative equilibria cost efficiency and sulfur agreements abstract this study analyzes cost effectiveness in environmental cooperation between finland and the soviet union it is assumed that the aim of both countries is to attain a given target deposition level at minimum possible sulfur abatement costs cost effective cooperation is compared to noncooperative equilibrium and to the agreement on sulfur emissions between these two countries it is shown that the agreement is not cost effective implies higher abatement costs than under noncooperation and is strategically unstable however the cost differences and the incentives to cheat are small the computations reveal that the main source of potential cooperation benefits is not asymmetrical emission transportation or differences in abatement costs but rather different target deposition levels for finland and the soviet union

the acid rain game as a resource allocation process with an application to the international cooperation among finland russia and estonia we consider optimal cooperation in transboundary air pollution abatement among several countries under incomplete information i e local information only on marginal emission abatement costs and damage costs directions of emission abatement in each country are determined that generate a succession of emissions programs shown to converge to an economic optimum a cost sharing scheme that results from appropriately designed international transfers guarantees that the individual costs of all parties are nonincreasing along the path towards the optimum a version of maler s 1989 acid rain game is used for a numerical application

do cio it budgets explain bigger or smaller governments theory and evidence from u s state governments given the recent concern on big governments and rising budget deficits in the united states and european nations there has been a fundamental economic debate on the proper boundary and role of governments in a society inspired by this debate we study the relationship between information technology it and government size drawing on a broad range of the literature from multiple disciplines such as information systems industrial organization and political sciences we present several theoretical mechanisms that explain the impact of it on government expenditures using a variety of data on it spending and state government expenditures we find that greater it investments made by a state chief information officer cio are associated with lower state government spending it is estimated that on average a 1 increase in state cio budgets is associated with a reduction of as much as 3 49 in state overall expenditures this study contributes to the literature by identifying a key technological factor that affects government spending and showing that it investments can be a means to restrain government growth