an empirical examination of the implications of arbitrage pricing theory abstract this paper presents a comprehensive set of tests of the implications of the arbitrage pricing theory we find unlike previously reported results a very limited relationship between the expected returns and the covariance factor loadings measures of risk furthermore unique variance measures of risk while generally making only small contributions to the explanation of asset returns turn out to be significant about as frequently as the coveriance measures of risk which is inconsistent with the arbitrage pricing theory model the intercept tests are more mixed but provide only limited support to the model

long live the doge death as a term limit on venetian chief executives can an electorate use the projected life expectancy of a lifetime appointed chief executive to enforce binding informal term limits informal term limits based on the life expectancy of a chief executive candidate at election would enable an electorate to exercise discretion in adjusting tenure lengths to minimize expected turnover and tenure length costs while also providing a strictly binding term limit death we provide a detailed historical case study of venice from 1172 to 1797 when the ruling patricians utilized informal term limits on their chief executive the doge relying on the projected life expectancy of ducal candidates

shirking and political support in the u s senate 1964 1984 several empirical studies have suggested that legislators engage in a surprisingly large degree of on the job consumption or ideological behavior these findings cast doubt on the hypothesis that legislators can be modelled as though they seek to maximize political support this paper attempts to determine whether commonly used proxies for ideology in fact represent behavior to which voters are averse the results show that legislators who engage in more of this behavior lose general election support without generally receiving compensating increases in partyprimary support a corollary to this result is that voters punish shirking legislators significantly

a note on factor analysis and arbitrage pricing theory abstract this paper examines some theoretical and empirical properties of factor analysis and spells out their implications for arbitrage pricing theory apt doubts on the appropriateness of conventional factor analytic procedures for testing apt are raised on theoretical as well as empirical grounds

to harmonize or to compete that s not the question abstract neoclassical public economists stress economic distortions induced by differential taxation and therefore favour harmonization political economists focus on political distortions and therefore reject harmonization however policy choices on the possibility frontier between economic and political distortions tend to be biased economic advisers politicians and interest groups typically favour harmonization harmonization is moreover undermined by incentives to re establish tax differences both activities prevent the possibility frontier from being simply a menu of choice popular referenda and functional overlapping competing jurisdictions focjs are institutions able to reduce political distortions and to shift the possibility frontier

brand names and barriers to entry in political markets the most obvious implication of this discussion is that barriers to entry in politics will raise the costs of governments transferring wealth more generally it will raise the cost of public provision of goods and services in the case of transfers the inefficiency created by barriers depends on whether one values government transfers the total transfer the transfer to the beneficiaries plus the politician s commission is maximized by the politician who can create support the most efficiently for other governmental services which are viewed as efficiency creating e g national defense these barriers reduce the amount of a valuable output we desire to purchase this result also supplies a possible efficiency explanation for the limitation on the number of terms imposed on the presidency and many governorships brand names are not really the barriers information costs are what cause brand name to be used and are the more fundamental barrier to entry what we are arguing is that private and not public organizations can in certain respects better overcome these information costs

shirking and sorting in a political market with finite lived politicians this paper analyzes principal agent slack in the context of a political market composed of voters challengers and incumbents the introduction of a last period via finite livedness in combination with voters imperfect information about politicians preferences causes time varying shirking behavior on the part of politicians political markets eventually sort out those politicians with significantly deviant policy preferences potentially providing a solution to the last period problem and enabling politicians to make credible commitments in the extreme sorting can insure that it is not worthwhile for potential shirkers to run for office a systematic relationship between political shirking and number of terms in office may exist and depends on how quickly sorting takes place we show that evidence of little if any shirking is quite consistent with politicians having diverse and strongly held policy preferences in addition if sorting is a significant feature of political markets cross sectional studies will tend to oversample little and non shirking politicians compared to longitudinal studies reinterpretations of existing empirical work are also discussed

leviathan at bay constitutional versus political controls on government a dependence on the people is no doubt the primary control on government but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions james madison federalist no 51 i introduction citizens possess two main methods of controlling politicians elections and constitutional constraints the british system of parliamentary supremacy and america s written constitution with judicial review by the supreme court reflect the contrasting approaches political theorists continue to debate the relative effectiveness of constitutional and electoral controls on politicians these controls seemingly are substitutes if elections effectively control politicians constitutional constraints become redundant and can only lower the effectiveness of government public choice theory separately examines elections and constitutions an extensive literature beginning with barro 1973 analyzes electoral controls but has not considered constitutional controls constitutional political economy examines various constraints on politicians buchanan 1987 brennan and buchanan 1980 yet assumes elections insufficiently control politicians recent studies of term limits i e dick and lott 1993 represent one effort to analyze constitutional and electoral controls together i integrate constitutional limits on government into a model of electoral control of politicians my model features two types of politicians knaves who abuse discretionary powers at their disposal and angels who never misuse power citizens delegate a variable amount of discretionary power to government which provides benefits if properly employed but lowers welfare if abused the interaction between constitutional limits and elections is complicated constraints complement electoral controls based on politician payoffs selection and incentive effects while the screening and sorting effects substitute for constraints i proceed in this paper as follows section ii describes the citizen s constitutional delegation of authority to government and incorporates electoral screening of candidates optimal delegation of power increases with the effectiveness of screening but unless screening is perfect constitutional limits help keep leviathan at bay section iii endogenizes the candidate pool and examines the selection effect constitutional controls the composition of the candidate pool depends on delegation to government which has implications for the propensity of politicians to pursue their personal self interest while constitutional political economy relies heavily on the threat from knavish politicians many political observers contend that most politicians sincerely pursue the public interest as they perceive it i show that politicians observed honesty does not invalidate the argument for chains section iv considers the ability of repeated elections to sort knaves out of office the sorting effect increases optimal delegation of power to government but constraints can still play a useful role if knaves try for office and electoral review is not continuous section v allows knaves to act opportunistically and considers the incentive effect of retrospective voting and post political incentives constitutional constraints complement electoral incentives by limiting opportunistic knaves gain from shirking the final section concludes ii constitutional choice in a model of angels and knaves i adopt a principal agent view of government a representative citizen selects an agent to exercise the powers of government on her behalf the representative citizen framework abstracts from differences amongst the population about the actions the agent should undertake the control of politicians becomes difficult in the absence of a common interest both positively and normatively consequently models of electoral control typically employ this assumption 1 the agency model assumes a conflict of interest between the principal and agent

searching for symptoms of political shirking congressional foreign travel despite the hypothesized propensity for shirking to marklegislative institutions the evidence is rather equivocal moreover most of the research has focused exclusively onlegislator voting thereby constraining whatevergeneralizations might emerge the purpose of this paper is tocontribute to the debate over the question of politicalshirking by extending the range of phenomena examined toinclude congressional foreign travel our analysis providesevidence that opportunism is a problem in congress we findthat last period problems have arisen in the area of foreigntravel and that increased scrutiny to the problem on the partof congress only shifted consumption patterns i e legislators began taking foreign junkets near but not at theend of their legislative careers not all foreign travelshould be construed as worthless junketing since there isstrong evidence that some foreign travel is related tomembers responsibilities on congressional committees

local benefit seeking and national policymaking democrats vs republicans in the legislature a simple economic theory may provide at least a partial explanation for the ticket splitting pattern that has been observed at the federal level in the united states where republicans do better in races for the white house than in contests for congressional seats to the extent that democratic legislators because of their ideology are more willing to forgo national policymaking for local benefit seeking than their republican counterparts rational voters have an investment incentive to 1 lean democratic when it comes to casting ballots for an individual representative to congress thereby attempting to secure as large as possible a slice of the total government spending pie and 2 lean republican when it comes to races for the presidency so as to limit the net losses imposed by the prisoner s dilemma game that local benefit seeking by congressional representatives entails

final voting in legislatures in representative democracies such as the united states legislatures provide the transmission mechanism through which pressure from private interests becomes public policy considerable attention has been given in the literature to explanations of the relevant forces that appear to be driving the legislative process for example much research has focused on the relative impact of economic vs ideological influences on congressional voting behavior in this approach the way that legislators vote on proposed legislation is modeled as a function of the preferences of various economic and ideological interests groups including the legislator s own preferences for wealth and ideology james kau and paul rubin 1979 joseph kalt and mark zupan 1984 sam peltzman 1985 missing from this approach is the idea that when legislatures are the transmission mechanism they are costly and imperfect organizations for generating political influence gary becker 1983 as such rules and institutions will emerge that are related to problems of internal control within the organization of a legislature in this paper we focus on the role of floor voting from the standpoint of legislator organization and control we seek to expand the interpretation of the meaning of floor voting activity by examining the timing sequence and outcomes of such votes specifically we look at final floor voting in the u s congress the patterns described in the analysis below suggest that a broader analytical perspective on the economic function of floor voting is required the findings also suggest that to identify more precisely the forces that are driving legislator voting behavior it is important to recognize the role of legislative transactional costs and institutional constraints in section i the conceptual framework for the empirical results is discussed in more detail the purpose is not to develop a fullblown theory of legislative organization rather it is to focus the reader s attention on several hypotheses about the function of final floor voting as a device for controlling legislator behavior within the legislature empirical results including an explanation of the timing and sequence of final votes on bills are reported in section ii the data for these tests are drawn from legislative activities in the u s house of representatives during the 96th and 98th congresses some concluding remarks are offered in section iii

capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics the economic theory of regulation long ago put public interest theories of politics to rest these theories have correctly been viewed as normative wishings rather than explanations of real world phenomena they have been replaced by models of political behavior that are consistent with the rest of microeconomics anthony downs 1957 james buchanan and gordon tullock 1965 george stigler 1971 sam peltzman 1976 recently however debate has arisen over whether some version of a public interest theory of regulation will have to be readmitted to our thinking about actions and results in the political arena what is at issue is the empirical importance of the altruistic publicly interested goals of rational actors in determining legislative and regulatory outcomes james kau and paul rubin 1979 kalt 1981 peltzman 1982 this study assesses the nature and significance of publicly interested objectives in a particular instance of economic policymaking u s senate voting on coal strip mining regulations the existence of such objectives is of course no contradiction of the economic view of human behavior kenneth arrow 1972 gary becker 1974 and may well be rooted in genetic biological history becker 1976 jack hirshleifer 1978 generally however individuals altruistic publicly interested goals have been given little attention this reflects the judgment that such goals are so empirically unimportant as to allow the use of occam s razor in positive models or well founded apprehensions that these goals are unusually difficult to identify measure and analyze notwithstanding the latter problem we find that approaches which confine themselves to a view of political actors as narrowly egocentric maximizers explain and predict legislative outcomes poorly the tracking and dissecting of the determinants of voting on coal strip mining policy suggest that the economic theory of politics has been prematurely closed to a broader conception of political behavior

an explanation for why senators from the same state vote differently so frequently abstract this paper explains why rational well informed voters elect politicians with divergent platforms given well defined constituencies and the costliness of any individual politician creating transfers across all interest groups we show that different politicians from the same district can successfully represent vastly different constituencies and still have each politician producing the support maximizing level of transfers our explanation focuses on how obtaining wealth transfers reduces successful constituencies returns to obtaining additional transfers the evidence strongly rejects alternative explanations based upon the median voter and polarized policy preference approaches

televising legislatures some thoughts on whether politicians are search goods the evidence that televising legislative sessions helps politicians from homogeneous districts where everyone agrees with his positions but hurts politicians from heterogeneous districts does not differentiate between whether politicians are search or experience goods while evidence does exist that politicians are search goods e g lott 1987b it relies on the presence of the last period problem if the conclusion that politicians are search goods is correct it has important implications because it contradicts the commonly held belief that it is the threat of re election that prevents politicians from behaving opportunistically it also indicates that there are fundamental differences between firm and political brand names

political parties and political shirking using ada roll call voting scores for the 1947 2006 period i find that senators shirk in their last term the degree of shirking is limited by political parties which constrain the politician in his last term and varies by post senate career choices the results highlight the importance of political parties in the repeated game that is electoral politics

evolution of urban housing stocks a model applied to baltimore and houston abstract historical simulations of urban residential growth in baltimore and houston based on a model of the growth process which has two distinct components are presented the vintage component utilizes the growth of income and population and an assumption that housing is putty clay to predict the age distribution of the housing stock in each period the spatial component of the model determines where this housing construction will take place according to 1 housing is built on vacant land and 2 the pattern of construction obeys the rules of the standard monocentric models housing is demolished when economically obsolete the putty clay vintage aspect of the model produces fairly accurate city wide vintage distributions but there is much more mixing of vintages and income in baltimore by location than predicted even under monocentric assumptions most favorable to mixing

some results in the theory of arbitrage pricing this paper derives a stronger version of huberman s recent preference free pricing theorem this pricing result relates the expected return on an asset to its factor responses and the covariance structure of the residuals from a linear factor model it must characterize any infinite asset economy in which no arbitrage opportunities are present whether or not the factor model has uncorrelated residuals this result provides the intuition for the role of residual risk in the pricing model and eliminates some classes of arbitrage opportunities still present under huberman s bound some applications to empirical tests and performance measurement are also discussed the arbitrage pricing theory is one of several financial pricing models which attempts to explain the cross sectional variation in expected returns on assets in certain respects it is similar to the capital asset pricing model but there are both substantive and subtle differences one of the key advantages of the apt is that it derives a simple linear pricing relation approximating that in the capm without some of the latter s objectionable assumptions perhaps the key disadvantage of the apt is that it provides no clues as to what might be important factors nor as to how to interpret the factor premiums which appear in the pricing equation this paper serves several purposes after reviewing the linear factor model formulation in section i it derives in section ii a stronger version of huberman s 9 recent preference free pricing theorem this pricing result relates the expected return on an asset to its factor responses and the covariance structure of the residuals this relation must characterize any infinite asset economy in which no arbitrage opportunities are present whether or not a linear factor model with uncorrelated residuals is the appropriate returns generating mechanism section iii specializes this result by eliminating the effects of residual covariances and compares the results here to those of previous apt models when applied to the standard linear factor model with uncorrelated residuals this new pricing bound eliminates arbitrage opportunities which remain under huberman s bound this result also provides for the first time the intuition for the role of residual risk in the approximate pricing relation section v provides an interpretation of the factor premiums and gives a valid asset pricing model interpretation to the apt which is consistent with merton s

dynastic political privilege and electoral accountability the case of u s governors 1950 2005 i introduction political dynasties which pass on public offices and other political privileges from family member to family member have been important in the united states throughout its history this paper investigates whether dynastic political privilege enhances incumbent accountability to voters as incumbents with family political capital work to maintain favorable reputations even in the incumbents last period this would mitigate last period problems in contrast with earlier empirical results in which incumbents in their last period in office deliver inferior economic results we test the hypothesis that dynastic political privilege increases accountability using data for 1950 2005 on u s governors including a new data set on the family relationships of politicians the constitution of the united states embodies the political ideals of the founders whose goal was to establish a republican national government that was responsible to the nation s people that specified the powers of the federal government that recognized the rights of the states and that incorporated checks and balances which would limit governmental power this new government was to be a direct contrast to and repudiation of monarchy in one of the most explicit repudiations of monarchy the constitution forbids the grant of titles of nobility by both the federal government and the states constitution of the united states article i sections 9 and 10 see the federalist papers number 39 for james madison s statements on the most decisive importance of the ban on titles of nobility library of congress 1961 242 interestingly however the constitution does not directly forbid hereditary office provided that the inheritor of the office is elected to it or appointed to it by constitutional means for example early in the nineteenth century the nation elected john quincy adams son of the second president as its sixth president dal bo dal bo and snyder 2009 carefully examine u s congressional dynasties from 1789 to 1996 and find that political power in the united states is self perpetuating this seems not only contrary to our nation s fundamental political principles but it also seems to hand over opportunities for rent seeking to relatives of successful politicians furthermore it is inefficiently anticompetitive because under such a system many highly qualified candidates are frozen out of office for reasons other than qualifications and anticipated productivity in office thus at first glance this process of family privilege in politics appears repugnant and contrary to the republican principles of our national political system there are however at least two other views of inherited political privilege which see it as socially useful first it is possible that political skills are actually inheritable so that dynastic political privilege may be socially productive that is relatives of office holders may gain special access to knowledge and skills that is only available to other potential office holders at much higher cost if at all the second and perhaps more important way in which inherited political privilege could be socially productive is that it may mitigate public sector principal agent problems the political system of the united states presents substantial principal agent problems as the voters cannot directly control the behavior of incumbent officials this gives office holders opportunities to act against the voters interests through corruption shirking on the job consumption at public expense promoting narrow ideology and others dynastic political privilege may make these behaviors more costly the possibility that opportunistic behavior in office may damage other family members political prospects disciplines current office holders making them more likely to exercise care in serving their constituents interests the main mechanism for voters to discipline incumbents is through elections

an overlapping generations model of electoral competition this paper presents a dynamic model of political competition between two parties with different policy preferences a party is explicitly modeled as a sequence of overlapping generations of candidates all of whom face finite decision horizons in general there is a conflict between the interests of the individual policymakers and those of the party which includes subsequent generations of candidates we characterize this conflict and suggest a scheme of intergenerational transfers within the party which can resolve or mitigate this conflict the paper shows how the overlapping generations model can be usefully applied to the political arena this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

severing the electoral connection shirking in the contemporary congress studies of representation focusing on legislative shirking tend to offer an interesting tension when the opportunity presents itself it seems that exiting members do not change their votinq behavior ideological shirking but do reduce their effort level by voting less participatory shirking our analysis avoids the pitfalls of prior studies by defining a simple quasi experimental research design contrasting those certain that they are seeking reelection with those sure that they are departing the house for the102nd 103rd and 104th congresses 1991 1996 we measure changes in ideology and participation using all roll call votes in the last six months of election years controlling for possible member selection effects and short term influences and show that legislators are disposed toward ideological and participatory shirking while selection effects are unimportant thus we reconcile results seemingly at odds and suggest that policies affecting member turnover such as term limits can interfere with representation a fundamental issue concerning political representation is the extent to which the necessity of reelection constrains officeholders if incumbents plan to retire thus freeing themselves of their electoral shackles or if they pursue higher office and face a distinct constituency will they behave differently or do members continue to behave in the same manner even in the absence of an electoral connection to the districts they represent answers to such questions have important implications for how we understand and model the representative process additionally they have ramifications for the likely impact of public policy choices that affect member turnover rates such as the imposition of term limits on the political system a primary means of drawing inferences regarding shirking which we simply define as legislator behavior that differs from what would be observed given perfect monitoring and effective punishment by constituents is to determine if politicians change their behavior when electoral discipline is removed most notably scholars examine members actions during their last period in office on the grounds that those voluntarily departing can behave according to a distinct set of preferences even if they run afoul of their districts or of their electoral coalitions empirical results on final period behavior are voluminous and sometimes contradictory bender and lott 1996 nevertheless two general inferences seem to have gathered support first there is little evidence for shirking in terms of vote choice ideological shirking while as we will discuss shortly there are a variety of potential explanations for such nonfindings one intuitive and frequently offered reason is that they reflect member specific selection effects this implies that

an analysis of the impact of congressional term limits we examine the impact of a six term tenure limit on members of the u s house of representatives the first part of this study develops a methodological framework for simulating the quantitative impact of term limits the second part of this study uses this framework to estimate the effects of term limits on i the value of holding office ii turnover and iii the size of the democratic majority in the house both steady state and transition period effects are explored i introduction the widespread support for term limitations seems to have caught both popular commentators and academic researchers by surprise 1 why do voters want them and what is the likely impact of such legislation a small but growing literature concentrates on the first of these two questions adams and kenny 1986 dick and loft 1993 in contrast this paper addresses the second in particular it investigates the empirical consequences of imposing a twelve year six term tenure limit on the members of the u s house of representatives both the degree and timing of the impact of the alternative regimes are investigated here the issue of timing arises because term limits can have very different effects depending upon how they treat currently serving congressmen we focus our investigation on the two legislative regimes that we believe have the greatest chance of being implemented limited grandfathering and complete grandfathering 2 assuming term limit legislation is passed in 1992 we trace out the time paths of the effects associated with each of these regimes as we shall see there are important transitional differences between the two the paper proceeds as follows section ii addresses the methodology used in this analysis section iii considers the impact of term limits on i the value of holding office ii turnover and iii the democratic majority in the house section iv concludes ii methodology the first concern of this paper is to model the seniority structure of the house in the absence of congressional term limits let n t identify the number of congressmen in their nth term at time t let r define the proportion of congressmen that successfully move from term n to term n l note that there are a number of reasons for not continuing to an additional term besides electoral defeats there are voluntary departures to seek other elective office or private sector employment retirements and deaths given any set of continuation rates r sub 1 r sub 2 and an initial distribution of representatives across terms n sub 1 t n sub 2 t one can construct what the seniority structure of congress will look like any number of periods into the future for instance the number of congressmen in their jth term at time t m is given by mathematical expression omitted where n sub 1 t 1 m j identifies the number of representatives who enter congress in time period t 1 m j t 1 and j and m o ifj m 1 one simply takes the number of congressmen currently serving their j m th term and multiplies this by the appropriate product of continuation rates if j m 1 one needs to identify the number of congressmen who will enter congress in time period t l m since congress always has 435 members the number of arrivals must always equal the number of departures the number of first term congressmen who leave office at the end of time period t is given by 1 r sub 1 n sub 1 t similarly the number of second term congressmen who leave office at the end of time period t is given by 1 r sub 2 n sub 2 t thus the number of representatives who will enter congress in time period t l is given by mathematical expression omitted equations 1 and 2 allow one to recursively solve for n sub 1 t 1 m j for all m j 1 i

credibility and policy convergence in a two party system with rational voters the traditional approach to modeling political parties behavior based upon the contribution of anthony downs 1957 assumes that the parties unique objective is to win elections thus they maximize their popularity the crucial implication of this assumption for a two party system is that if the two parties have the same information about voters preferences full convergence of policies results from electoral competition this is the crucial implication of the median voter theorem more generally it may be argued that different parties are motivated differently because they represent different constituencies parties may not care only about winning elections per se but also about the quality of the policies resulting from an election in this case the candidates of the two parties view winning an election not only as a goal per se but also as a means of implementing a better policy for their respective constituencies this paper shows that electoral competitions imply dynamic inconsistency if the voters are modeled as rational and forwardlooking agents and parties do not care exclusively about being elected but also about which policy to implement once elected the dynamic inconsistency arises as follows the parties have an incentive to announce convergent platforms to increase their chances of election however if the elected party is not committed to its electoral platform it has an incentive to follow its most preferred policy rather than the policy announced in its platform if voters are rational they account for this incentive thus in general in a one shot electoral game the only timeconsistent equilibrium is one in which no convergence is possible the two parties follow their most preferred policies and the voters rationally expect this outcome full convergence of parties platforms results only as a limiting case when the parties are completely indifferent with respect to the quality of the policies resulting from the election thus these results differ from the existing literature on ideologically motivated politicians for instance donald wittman 1977 1983 randall calvert 1985 which implicitly assumes the possibility of binding commitments to electoral platforms complete or partial policy convergence can be the outcome of political competition if the interaction between the parties and the voters is modeled as an infinitely repeated game in fact if the candidates have concave objective functions the welfare maximizing policy rule implies a complete convergence of parties policies however this cooperative and agreed upon policy may or may not be sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium depending on parameter values in particular it depends on the discount rates of the two parties the degree of polarization of their preferences and the relative popu graduate school of industrial administration carnegie mellon university pittsburgh pa 15213 and national bureau of economic research cambridge ma 02138 this paper is based upon a chapter of my unpublished doctoral dissertation at harvard university i am greatly indebted to jeffrey sachs for directing my attention toward these issues and for many conversations i also wish to thank andrew abel dilip abreu olivier blanchard ramon caminal andrew caplin alex cukierman morris fiorina benjamin friedman herschel grossman howard rosenthal and the referees for very useful comments the responsibilitv af anv n mtnkieis af calrirp nfnlv mine the result of policy convergence in a two party system is more general than the median voter theorem for discussions of convergence results not at the median see john ledyard 1984 peter coughlin 1984 coughlin and shmuel nitzan 1981 melvin hinich 1977 for earlier work on spatial competition see richard mckelvey 1975 hinich ledyard and peter ordeshook 1972 1973 and the references quoted therein the present paper focuses on the result of convergence rather than on the median voter theorem per se

optimal spatial growth of employment and residences abstract this paper examines the location patterns of employment and residences in an urban area characterized by irreversible land use commitments and smoothly growing population it is assumed that all output is shipped to the center of the urban area and that workers have commuting costs of getting to work the optimal solution which is also the equilibrium solution minimizes the present discounted value of aggregate shipping costs plus commuting costs the residential area expands outward over time but a constant fraction of the land is always reserved for future employment development

political shirking and the last term problem evidence for a party administered pension system studies of political shirking have disagreed both over whether the voting behavior of members of congress changes in their last term and over the manner in which last term shirking can be controlled through electoral sorting or through a pension system this paper presents evidence that members of congress who leave the house to run for statewide office do alter their voting behavior between the two sessions of their last house term and that this change includes an ideological shift toward their state party delegations the results suggest that a party driven pension system influences the voting of house members who aspire to higher office but that the pension system is not sufficient to control the last term shirking likely to occur if term limitations were imposed on house members

risk and capital asset prices abstract this paper is an empirical examination of the statistical significance of the residual variance of individual assets as compared with the covariance of returns with various market portfolio proxies in predicting expected return the data and analysis we present suggest that measures of covariance are no more significant than residual variance in predicting expected return in this sense our paper is not supportive of the sharpe lintner or black versions of the capital asset pricing model

working or shirking expenses and attendance in the uk parliament this paper studies the determinants of mps expense claims and of their attendance at parliamentary meetings using a multiple regression framework we correlate the expenses with three sets of variables constituency characteristics political variables and individual characteristics we then look at the ratio of parliamentary expenses claimed to votes cast in parliament as a crude measure of value for money this take on the data provides a somewhat benign view of the usage of expense claims we use the results to reflect on two views of the motivation of mps the public choice view and the public service view

spatial growth and redevelopment with perfect foresight and durable housing abstract in this paper i present a theoretical model of the spatial growth of an urban area with durable housing i combine several assumptions that typically complicate the analysis i housing developers have perfect foresight ii the initial development and many waves of redevelopment are considered in each developer s plan and iii the closed city assumption is made so that the time path of population is exogenous and that of consumer utility is endogenous i still obtain explicit solutions for the spatial pattern of urban growth and for the timing of the initial residential development and each successive redevelopment at each distance from the urban center i compare perfect foresight growth to growth with static expectations and i examine the comparative statics of both

a critical review and an extension of the political shirking literature after substituting actual and real changes for proposed and nominal changes in budgetary and employment levels it is clear that the size and scope of the federal leviathon had not been reduced over 1982 83 it is also clear that the agencies which witnessed real budget cuts over this period were of minor importance in terms of the total u s budget future research on why only small agencies receive real budget cuts will provide us with a better understanding of the budgetary process

majority rule and election models abstract this paper surveys the theoretical work that has been done on majority rule and economic models of elections section i provides an overview of the topic section 2 reviews the most important results that have been obtained about majority rule as an abstract collective choice rule section 3 identifies some alternative inferences that can be made from those results section 4 covers some models that include additional features that are present in political institutions where majority rule is used section 5 concentrates on some alternative election models and equilibrium concepts section 6 focuses on election models with abstentions and or candidate uncertainty about voter behaviour section 7 compares and contrasts models where candidates are certain about what the voters choices will be contingent upon about the choices made by the candidates and models where they are uncertain about those choices section 8 closes the survey by identifying some emerging areas of research

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

a critical reexamination of the empirical evidence on the arbitrage pricing theory this paper demonstrates that the roll and ross rr and other previously published tests of the apt are subject to several basic limitations there is a general nonequivalence of factor analyzing small groups of securities and factor analyzing a group of securities sufficiently large for the apt model to hold it is found that as one increases the number of securities the number of factors determined increases this increase in the number of factors with larger groups of securities cannot readily be explained by a distinction between priced and nonpriced risk factors as it is impermissible to carry out tests on whether a given risk factor is priced using factor analytic procedures the apt model as exposited by ross 17 18 and extended by huberman 9 has provided the basis of an extensive literature as for example brown and weinstein 1 chen 3 hughes 10 ingersoll 11 jobson 12 reinganum 15 roll and ross rr 16 and shanken 17 to mention but a few it has also been treated in a more general context by chamberlain and rothschild 2 our purpose here is not to comment on this collection of papers many of which are unpublished but to reexamine the evidence presented by rr and point out major pitfalls involved in the empirical methodology employed by them and others who have followed their lead rr claim that on theoretical and more importantly on empirical grounds arbitrage pricing theory apt is an attractive alternative to the capital asset pricing model capm the apt it is argued requires less stringent and presumably more plausible assumptions is more readily testable since it does not require the measurement of the market portfolio and may be better able to explain the anomalies found in the application of the capm to asset returns the acceptability of the apt like that of the capm or any other theory ultimately depends on its ability to explain the relevant empirical evidence our subsequent discussion will show that many of the prqblems associated with the capm are also present in the apt context and that its ability to explain the relevant empirical evidence is not markedly superior moreover it raises questions not only about the rr and related empirical investigations of the apt but also about the testability of that theory in the present state of the art a major part of the problem results from the necessity to break down the universe being analyzed through the apt model this is forced upon the investigator by the fact

the empirical foundations of the arbitrage pricing theory abstract this paper uses maximum likelihood factor analysis of large cross sections to examine the validity of the arbitrage pricing theory apt we are unable to explain the expected returns on firm size portfolios although we do explain the expected returns on portfolios formed on the basis of dividend yield and own variance where risk adjustment using the usual capm market proxies fails we also compare alternate versions of the apt and sharply reject the hypothesis that basis portfolios formed to mimic the factors span the mean variance frontier of the individual assets

attendance rates political shirking and the effect of post elective office employment attendance rates political shirking and the effect of post elective office employment i introduction political shirking the degree to which a politican s actions deviate from the wishes of his constituents can take many different dimensions economists e g amacher and boyes 1978 davis and porter 1989 dougan and munger 1989 kalt and zupan 1984 lott 1987d nelson and siberberg 1987 and peltzman 1984 have debated whether shirking exists in how a politician votes when he does vote this divergence is measured through some particular special interest voting ratings e g american conservative union americans for democratic action etc however shirking can obviously take as many forms as there are outputs that a politician produces besides how he votes he also produces services for his constituents involving everything from being personally available to listen to the constituents grievances to ensuring effective handling of case work by his staff see for example fiorina 1977 fenno 1978 and cain et al 1987 1 one dimension that has not been sufficiently examined is the extent to which politicians shirk by failing to vote on pending legislation 2 no attention has been given to which mechanisms will make this particular type of shirking relatively more costly most economists agree that opportunitic behavior by politicians is limited by the threat of reelection e g amacher and boyes 1978 barro 1973 kalt and zupan 1984 nelson 1976 and telser 1976 3 by implication the level of shirking should be the greatest when a politician decides to leave office however this opportunistic behavior might be reduced to the extent that political parties or constituencies impose costs for shirking through affecting politicisns post elective office career or the careers of their children thus a politicians last term in elective office may not represent his last period in any meaningful sense the next section outlines the differing views on how politicians act when they no longer face the threat of reelection section iii describes some empirical evidence on what mechanisms may prevent this last period problem the final section discusses the impliactions of these results ii the last period whether economists view politicians as ideologues e g kau and rubin 1979 and kalt and zupan 1984 or as simply attempting to maximize political support e g barro 1973 ferejohn 1986 nelson 1976 and peltzman 1984 the threat of reelection is seen as preventing shirking as kalt and zupan 1984 298 phrase it it appears that the proximity of the next election inhibits ideological shirking even those who do not view the last period as affecting how a politician votes argue that it will affect how often he votes lott 1987a 1987b has argued that if voters can determine and elect politicians that have ideological preferences corresponding exactly to the wishes of constituents politicians voting patterns should continue to reflect those values even when the cost of shirking in terms of forgone future votes is low the penalty to ideologues of not votingfor their constituency in the last period when they no longer face reelection is the forgone utility from not doing what they personally value assuming that politicians also desire leisure politicians should continue to vote for what they believe in but they should vote less frequently since they no longer receive the additional return of larger future support mechanisms to overcome this last period problem have been suggested by becker and stigler 1974 9 10 they argue that opportunistic behavior can be controlled if officeholders face the loss of a pension or equivalently a posted bond in the event of opportunistic behavior in their last term however the actual pension system does not effectively eliminate the last period for politicians since retirement payments are not based on cheating in the last period

the intensity and timing of investment the case of land the authors model the decision to replace durable capital when intensity is variable decisions of this type include land redevelopment decisions where the density of residential or commercial development is a choice variable as well as capital replacement decisions where capacity is variable the authors provide a general yet simple formation of the problem using an optimal stopping framework they characterize the value of the project the timing of investment and the intensity of development the authors show that intensity interacts in important ways with timing taxes and project values the ability to vary intensity raises hurdle rents and delays development decisions copyright 1994 by american economic association

reconciling voters behavior with legislative term limits a puzzle exists over why voters continually re elect their congressional and state representatives although these same voters often support initiatives to limit the number of terms that their legislators may serve residents of california colorado and oklahoma voted in 1990 to limit the terms of their state legislators to tenures ranging from six to twelve years 1 in california these same voters however re elected 87 of 91 or 96 percent of all incumbent state representatives and senators whose terms they sought to limit 2 among re elected incumbents 67 or 77 percent had served as long as or longer than the maximum term prescribed under their state s term limit initiative voters defeated only two incumbents who would have been removed under the terms of california s tenure restrictions had they been in effect similar voter behavior characterized recent state elections in colorado and oklahoma 3 more generally these seemingly contradictory voter preferences also are apparent in public opinion polls at the federal level while 62 percent of voters immediately prior to the 1990 general elections indicated their intentions to reelect their congressman that same poll showed that only 24 percent said they approve of the way congress is handling its job gallup and newport 1990 pp 36 37 support for term limit initiatives and the low public esteem of legislators as a group both appear to be inconsistent with voters strong preferences for their own representative and the regular reelection of incumbents

urban spatial development with durable but replaceable capital the theory of urban spatial development until recently has been primarily a static theory of economic equilibrium the models of alonso l mills 6 and muth 7 determine a complete spatial equilibrium between the supply and demand for urban land the study of growth or change in such models therefore has been limited exclusively to comparative statics wheaton 8 it should be clear that the central and in many respects unrealistic assumption of such models is that housing capital is neither physically nor economically durable without durability there is no opportunity cost to old capital no barrier to change and no history to an urban area within such a framework a common set of conclusions emerges regarding urban spatial structure residential density and the price per unit of land decline monotonically from the location of employment a greater population results in higher density at all locations while increases in income or decreases in the cost of travel create a more steeply sloped density and price gradient in the last few years there has been a growing awareness that the equilibrium portrayed by such models does not correctly reflect the process of urban development theoretical papers by anas 2 31 and brueckner 4 and an empirical model by harrison and kain 5 develop an alternative theory of urban spatial development in which the process of growth is explicitly modeled and in which capital is completely durable in their models the spatial development of cities occurs incrementally over time in successive rings from the center of employment outwards the development of each ring is done with myopic foresight and is therefore determined exclusively by market conditions at the time of development once built

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

shirking representation and congressional behavior voting on the 1983 amendments to the social security act our central goals at the outset of the paper were three 1 to report on the relative significance of a sophisticated measure of constituent economic interest and a commonly used variable ada score that purports to measure the personal ideology of the candidate 2 demonstrate that the constituent economic interest variable should be adjusted to account for the fact thatvoters not citizens are the only effective principals in influencing a legislator s voting activities and 3 call into question on both theoretical and empirical grounds the claim that legislators shirk their responsibilities to voters by voting their own ideological preferences in order to evaluate our efforts consider table 5 for a large majority 15 of the 18 relevant runs the ideological variable is significant our measure of constituent economic interests does not eliminate the explanatory power of the ideological voting variable but this does not indicate shirking as opposed to shirking we may observe ideological voting because 1 it provides brand name capital 2 it represents the ideological preferences of the constituents or 3 it acts as a measure of median voter economic preferences further ada scores do not allow us to differentiate between these competing explanations for 11 of the 18 models one of the economic variables accounts for a significant portion of the variance in the dependent variables the results derived from our measure of constituent economic interests contradict most findings of the lasi school and raise questions about the validity of the empirical characterization of constituent interests in that research a breakdown of the results by chamber indicates that significant differences in the degree of ideological voting between the house and senate may exist this is important in that most research has focused only on the senate where ideological voting is more prevalent for the house table 5 reveals the constituent economic interest variable isalways significant and in fully one half of the relevant regressions it is theonly significant variable knocking ada out of the race as noted earlier the insignificance of ada is some indication of the absence of ideological shirking though its significance may indicate only measurement error voter ideology or reputational capital in the senate the results are more evenly split though it is clear that the adjusted for reelection constituency economic interest variable is an improvement ada is significant in all 12 senate regressions and the respective economic variables are significant in 5 or just under half this side by side comparison is provocative though it remains to be tested in detail but our preliminary conclusions can be stated as follows first as peltzman 1984 suggested a better specification of economic interest and constituency representation reduces though it does not eliminate the role of the ada variable in the senate second we find evidence that ideological shirking if it exists is much smaller in the house in fact from an institutional perspective it can be argued that economic interests are dominant since house districts are smaller and more homogeneous further the shorter terms for house members may make them more directly accountable to voters and smaller groups of voters may force a lesser reliance on pure ideological campaigning and require a more personal presentation of self

the last period problem in politics do congressional representatives not subject to a reelection constraint alter their voting behavior this study of roll call voting behavior in the u s house of representatives empirically documents the existence of an important simultaneity bias in the heretofore much investigated relationship between legislator ideological shirking and the security with which a legislator holds office the results indicate that while greater security allows a policymaker more leeway for ideological consumption increases in ideological on the job consumption also diminish a policymaker s security in office

a reexamination of the principal agent relationship in politics abstract that senators from the same state often have a large difference in their ideological voting records has proven inconvenient for a literature that has largely relied on a median voter model of elections one exception is palfrey review of economic studies 1984 51 139 156 whose analysis implies the hypothesis that the expected difference in such voting records varies directly with the variance of that state s density function of constituent ideological preferences this paper provides empirical testing consistent with this hypothesis the paper then argues that currently accepted methodology for measuring senatorial shirking is systematically biased towards indicating shirking and provides empirical analysis consistent with this argument

effects of term limits on fiscal performance evidence from democratic nations political reputation models feature forward looking rational voters who re elect incumbents based on their estimate of an incumbent s ability level fiscal policy is one of the ways an incumbent establishes a reputation and thereby signals this ability level to voters the reputation building framework implies that term limits should affect fiscal performance a term limited incumbent places less value on reputation building than an incumbent eligible for re election does we examine differences in fiscal performance in democratic countries under alternative executive term limit regimes our results generally agree with the prior findings of besley and case 1995a who analyzed gubernatorial term limits in the american states we provide new evidence that the fiscal effects of term limits differ under a two term rule versus a single term rule

term limits time horizons and electoral accountability term limits have been known to reduce electoral accountability by removing the possibility of reelection thus affecting economic policy choices i e the lame duck effect we show that the magnitude and statistical significance of this effect is influenced by the expected length of a future career by using incumbent age as a proxy for expected career length we find that the lame duck effect is statistically observable only among those politicians with long careers ahead using data on us governors from 1950 to 2005 we find evidence that the influence of term limits is heterogeneous primarily influencing young incumbents who hope to have long careers and thus have stronger incentives to remain accountable to voters indeed we find little evidence of a lame duck effect among older incumbents suggesting that their already shortened time horizons may offset the term limit effect

evolution and spontaneous uniformity evidence from the evolution of the limited liability company we examine whether the unguided state by state evolution of limited liability company statutes has led to efficient interstate uniformity our evidence suggests significant uniformity has been produced in cases where the net benefits of uniformity are positive and that such uniformity has not been produced by herd behavior our results are consistent with alchian s intuition about the role of market processes and suggests that the survival of efficient rules fostered by the rational behavior of decentralized economic actors are produced by forces beyond the control or foresight of individual lawmakers or legislatures

a model of electoral competition with incomplete information a model of two candidate electoral competition is developed in which voters are uncertain about the policy either candidate would implement if elected candidates simultaneously announce policy positions from which voters attempt to infer the true positions the candidates would adopt announcing a position different from the true position is costly to the winning candidate with these costs increasing as the difference between the true policy and the announced policy increases a refinement of the sequential equilibrium concept is used to describe the behavior of candidates and voters

campaign spending in congressional elections campaign spending in congressional elections i introduction empirical studies of the effects of campaign spending on the outcome of congressional elections have found that campaign spending by incumbents is not as effective as that of their challengers indeed kau and rubin 1982 and jacobson 1985 1987 find that incumbent spending reduces the number of votes they receive and netter 1983 that it increases the challenger s votes incumbents seeking reelection however are very successful winning nine times out of ten in the postwar era if their campaign spending is so inefficient why do incumbents continue to outspend their challengers in a majority of elections we argue that these researchers counterintuitive findings are the result of using models which do not adequately correct for the simultaneous determination of the election outcome and campaign contributions and which do not include an electoral check on incumbent behavior 1 in their studies jacobson and netter as well as lott 1986 and laband and lentz 1985 assume the incumbent s ability to repel challengers is independent of his or her behavior while in office few would agree that the electoral check is so ineffective we develop a simultaneous model to correct these deficiencies it captures the effects of campaign expenditures tenure the consistency of the incumbent s votes with his constituents preferences and the size of the voter turnout on the votes received by incumbents and challengers in four congressional elections between 1978 and 1984 the model is very robust over these four elections the use of primary election data insures model identification ii model and empirical measures we assume that the platforms of any two candidates for a political office can be measured along a single left right spectrum voters know their preferred position on the dimension but cannot observe the positions of the two candidates with certainty because of rational ignorance a theory accepted since downs 1957 following congleton 1986 we assume voters are risk averse and receive more utility from candidates with positions closer to the voters preferred position but lose utility as the candidate s position becomes more uncertain voters compare the candidates and vote for the one that provides them greater expected utility voters can observe the incumbent s performance and are thus less uncertain of his views and credibility uncertainty should decrease with an incumbent s tenure in office tenure provides voters with knowledge of the incumbent s position and the incumbent with political capital this accumulation of political capital may make it more difficult for challengers to mount a successful campaign in this sense tenure acts as a barrier to entry 2 if all incumbents were at the same point on the spectrum as the median voter of their districts all incumbents would win reelection if all potential challengers were aware of this fact they would not challenge since campaigns are costly but one observes many challengers and some defeated incumbents so we proceed from the hypothesis that challengers enter the race when they perceive a gap between the position of the incumbent and that of the median voter and assume this position as their platform a large difference between the incumbent s position and the median voter s position increases the likelihood of a successful challenge if voters were certain of the positions of both candidates and the challenger s assessment was correct the challenger would win but challengers are usually less well known than incumbents and this additional uncertainty gives incumbents an advantage thus the challenger must convince the voters that his or her position is closest to the median voter s position and advertising is the primary means to that end 3 repetition of the message reduces the voters uncertainty over a challenger s position

optimal tenure of elected public officials constitutional limits on the tenure of elected chief executives are a prominent feature of many governments yet they have received little attention from economists working in the field of political behavior this paper develops an analysis of tenure limits and their incidence the analysis assumes that the limits substitute for more familiar electoral controls such as elections recalls and impeachment proceedings we assume that restrictions are imposed if they cause the constitutionally decisive voter to be better off on average this assumption although not a standard one applied to policy in general is fairly common in the literature on constitutional choice where the memberships of interest groups later to be formed are plausibly unknown at the time of the constitutional convention 1 the decision to restrict is undertaken in an environment of uncertainty and naturally it is not without its costs it is clear for instance that restriction substitutes inexperienced politicians for experienced ones moreover a tenure limit generates an incentive problem during the final term in office since no further electoral test remains 2 this lame duck

the stochastic city abstract this paper analyzes a simple model of an urban area with growth and uncertainty household income rents and prices for land follow stochastic processes even though investors are risk neutral uncertainty affects both land rents and land prices in equilibrium because the conversion of land from agricultural to urban use is irreversible growth on the other hand affects urban and agricultural land prices but not the level of rents we show that uncertainty i delays the conversion of land from agricultural to urban use ii imparts an option value to agricultural land iii causes land at the boundary to sell for more than its opportunity cost in other uses and iv reduces equilibrium city size

the ideological component of senate voting different principles or different principals evidence exists on both sides of the question of whether or not legislator specific ideologically driven shirking of constituent interest occurs in this paper we use a well known model of such shirking by senators as our point of departure and add measures of inter state constituent interests the role of campaign contributions and hence the importance of whether or not senators are up for reelection we find some evidence that the model provides a stronger explanation for senators up for reelection than for those who are not and that campaign contributions help determine voting decisions by these legislators finally accounting for inter state constituent interests shirking is not a significant variable in the voting decisions of senators facing reelection thus it appears that the reelection interests of some senators have been mistaken for ideologically driven shirking

favorite sons intergenerational wealth transfers among politicians in this paper we investigate the degree of occupational following in politics and its impact upon the career success and behavior while in office of both sons and fathers we find that sons follow into their politician fathers footsteps to a degree surpassed in the general population only among farmers and self employed proprietors there is substantial indirect evidence which suggests that following is motivated to a large extent by the transfer of valuable name recognition and voter loyalty

a simple approach to arbitrage pricing theory the following sections are included introductionarbitrage pricingdiscussionreferencesdiscussion notes on the arbitrage pricing theorypure arbitrage pricing theoryapproximate arbitrage and the aptapproximate factor modelsthe competitive equilibrium version of the aptconclusionnotereferences this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

new tests of the apt and their implications this paper provides new tests of the arbitrage pricing theory apt test results appear to be extremely sensitive to the number of securities used in the two stages of the tests of the apt model new tests also indicate that unique risk is fully as important as common risk while these tests have serious limitations they are inconsistent with the apt

stock return anomalies and the tests of the apt this paper shows that the empirical tests of the arbitrage pricing theory apt model are very sensitive to the anomalies observed in january in the stock returns data there is a strong seasonal pattern in the estimates of the risk premia from the apt model the most important implication of the findings in this paper is that the apt model can explain the risk return relation mostly for january once the january returns are excluded from the data there is no significant relation between the expected stock returns and the risk measures predicted by the apt model it is now a very well known phenomenon that stock returns exhibit a peculiar seasonal pattern while such a seasonal pattern in stock returns is an interesting phenomenon in itself and has yet to be fully explained there is a serious implication of the observed seasonality in stock returns on the tests of the assetpricing models 1 tinic and west 17 for example report that the risk return relation described by the capital asset pricing model capm also exhibits a similar seasonality in january a result rozeff and kinney 16 report as well more importantly however they show that only one month january shows a consistently positive and reliable relation between expected return and risk once the data for january are excluded from the analysis of the risk return tradeoff the estimates of risk premia are no longer reliably different from zero although tinic and west do not offer an explanation for their findings their results raise serious questions about the empirical tests of the capm and ultimately its validity as a viable model to explain the pricing of risky assets the purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of stock return seasonality on the empirical tests of the arbitrage pricing theory apt a number of researchers argue on both theoretical and empirical grounds that the apt is a good alternative to the capm although there is a growing body of empirical literature on the apt the empirical tests of the apt thus far have produced inconclusive results and a good deal of controversy it now seems appropriate to

legislator voting and shirking a critical review of the literature we set out to critically review the progress in answering two related questions what determines how legislators vote and how can shirking by legislators be measured in the first category the hypothesis that legislators shirk in order to indulge their personal ideological preferences has led researchers astray the theoretical underpinning is shaky on two counts first legislators who indulge their preferences at the expense of their constituents preferences put themselves at a competitive electoral disadvantage second the original two stage procedure used to measure ideological shirking is severely flawed among many other problems the residual measure of shirking implicitly assumes that the median voter is the relevant constituent principal for the legislator agent

a test for pure or apparent ideology in congressional voting a politician s preferences do matter he is not simply a captured agent speaking only for his constituent s interests some latitude exists for him to shirk his responsibility to serve his constituents interests and to cast votes consistent with his own personal ideology more important to our understanding and modeling of voting behavior shirking for ideological consumption is seen to increase with age once a threshold of about 53 years old is reached shirking is not a phenomena of the politicians final term in office rather it likely exists in every term and begins to increase significantly two terms prior to the expected horizon sixty percent of the sample of senators were seen to exhibit increasing ideological consumption with age

economic policy economic performance and elections this paper explores the role of reelection pressures in determining economic policy by assuming that voters are uncertai n as to the efficacy of different policies a reelection process is derived that depends on both a politician s past policies and the level of economic activity during his time in office it is shown th at the less uncertain are voters as to which policy is best the more likely is a politician to manipulate policy for reelection purposes manipulation entails implementing the policy that is more likely to be well received rather than the one that maximizes income copyright 1993 by american economic association

spatial patterns of residential development abstract a simple dynamic model of residential development with durable housing where all households are identical and all developers have perfect foresight is studied it is shown that unlike the case of static models it is quite possible that house size decreases and thus population density increases with distance from the city center and that the house rent curve has positive gradient in certain area

housing quality maintenance and rehabilitation this paper investigates a representative landlord s profit maximization problem in a stationary economy the landlord must decide on the quality of his housing units at the time of construction maintenance expenditure over the life of the building and the time of demolition or rehabilitation the analysis can be applied to other problems with similar economic structure notably equipment and durable good maintenance overhaul and replacement

the influence on congress by the thrift industry abstract the investigation of the influential role of the thrift industry on congress as demonstrated by voting behavior on regulatory policy changes in the eighties is the focus of this study specifically we search for the degree to which the inadequately capitalized component of the thrift industry has captured the house of representatives we examine the influence on congress by the thrift industry using the votes by the house of representatives associated with three different legislative acts the garn st germain act the competitive equality banking act and the financial institutions reform recovery and enforcement act addressing the thrift crisis using a multi chotomous voting model we identify traditional public choice variables that could influence the probability of voting for legislation to capture the variation of the thrifts interests we consider a series of financial variables motivated by the thrift literature of failure prediction models these variables allow us to investigate the influences from the health of the congressional district s thrifts their asset composition characteristics and their reliance on regulatory forbearance

an alternative version of a vintage model of an urban housing market abstract the present paper intends to propose an alternative version of a housing market in order to better represent the urban dynamics involved in this paper we formulate the behavior of households in their demand for housing as a durable good by introducing the new concept of the over time bid rent and show that through the over time bid rent the households have an influence explicitly on the determination of the life span of housing units

ideology and legislator shirking we argue that legislator shirking voting on the basis of personal ideology rather than the interests of one s constituents can exist but its appearance should conform to the law of demand we test and confirm this theory using votes on defense expenditure bills in the u s senate in 1982 we assume the cost of shirking is relatively higher on narrowly focused bills on specific weapons systems with well defined beneficiaries and relatively lower on general defense expenditure bills with uncertain final distribution of funds we find greater influence for senators ideology in general versus specific bills

how pressure groups activate voters and move candidates closer to the median this article shows how uninformed but rational voters can respond intelligently to political advertising the article models a situation where a candidate must rely on a pressure group for financing political advertising and making endorsements the pressure group uses its power over the purse to influence the position chosen by the candidate nevertheless when uninformed voters use a strategic rule of thumb pressure group contributions always move the outcome of the election closer to the median voter by using such a rule of thumb when there is advertising uninformed voters can have the same influence on the election as informed voters how should uninformed but rational voters respond to political advertising can pressure groups with financial resources to fund political campaigns that provide information on the candidates gain at the expense of the median voter this article seeks to answer these and related questions building on the framework introduced by baron 1994 and used extensively by others i model the case where there are two types of voters informed and uninformed i investigate two opposing assumptions regarding candidate preferences

an explicit bound on individual assets deviations from apt pricing in a finite economy abstract ross s arbitrage pricing theory apt is a tractible and reasonable alternative to the mean variance model nonetheless understanding of the theory has been obscured by the complexity of the sequence economy models used for motivation by contrast we give a simple and direct derivation of the apt in a finite economy using an explicit bound on the deviations from apt prices across assets a coarse calculation shows that theoretical deviations from apt pricing are negligible in our economy

term limits and electoral competitiveness evidence from california s state legislative races california s legislative term limits have dramatically reduced campaign expenditures real expenditures during the three general elections after the term limits initiative passed in 1990 were lower than in even 1976 this drop has occurred at the same time that races have become closer contests and more candidates are running for office by any measure term limits have coincided with large changes in the level of political competition even before term limits have forcibly removed a single politician from office the changes are so large that more incumbents are being defeated races are closer more candidates are running and fewer single candidate races than occur at any other time during our sample period from 1976 to 1994

political shirking opponent quality and electoral support several recent papers in the public choice literaturesuggest that legislators shirk or vote in a mannercontrary to constituent interest this paper exploresthe relationship between senatorial shirking andelectoral consequences i model political shirking opponent quality and election outcomes assimultaneous and find significant evidence of arelationship between shirking over the senatorial termand electoral outcomes however i find that voterspunish recent shirking much more than they punishearly term shirking and that senators apparently actconsistently with this relationship

the political costs of tax increases and expenditure reductions evidence from state legislative turnover this paper estimates the political costs of increasing taxes and cutting expenditures for members of a legislature it is found that both costs are individually significant but that they are not significantly different this coincides with the first order condition for maximization of the probability of reelection republican legislatures have a higher political cost for taxes thus the party s relative bias toward smaller government is founded in stronger constituent preferences against taxes not for lower spending additionally by being ideologically conservative republicans lower the political costs of taxes while by being more liberal democrats lower the cost of cutting expenditures

elections and income redistribution this paper has analyzed a model of elections in which each candidate selects a reputation for the distribution of income that can be expected if he is elected the first result established that whenever there are three or more groups of voters and no single group has half or more of the voters if the candidates believe that the voters choices are determined solely by the candidates redistributional reputations then there is no electoral equilibrium the candidates expectations about the voters choices were then reformulated using a qualitative response model the next result established that this alternative model leads to the existence of electoral equilibria the remainder of the paper analyzed the nature of these equilibria for any given electorate among other things the results established that there is always a unique equilibrium provided a simple procedure for finding the precise location of this equilibrium and showed that this location implicitly maximizes the sum of the voters utility functions on the possible income distributions the penultimate sections provided some simple examples which illustrate the main results in the paper and a discussion of these results in terms of the politics of redistribution

do we punish high income criminals too heavily many critics believe that since high income criminals can afford to purchase better legal services they are less severely punished than poor criminals who commit equivalent crimes others are concerned that the penalties imposed on criminals are too small this paper shows that ignoring the effect conviction has on later earnings dramatically underestimates the total monetary penalty paid by those convicted and that the penalty structure is extremely progressive where evidence on the probability of conviction is available it shows that the highest income criminals face the highest expected penalties

an analysis of legislative inefficiency and ideological behavior this paper explores the theory of legislative inefficiency and the role of ideological preferences of legislators it is shown that inefficiency can be caused by many factors other than legislative ideological behavior three major sources are emphasized cost of voting and policy position information asymmetries across groups of voters and barriers to entry in political competition ideological preferences of legislators is not a cause of inefficiency independently legislators who care about both policy and winning will give inefficient representation to their constituents only when groups of voters are prevented from participating equally in the legislative process

political hierarchies and political shirking abstract we analyze how citizens can screen candidates for high political office in a political hierarchy in our model politicians differ in willingness to misuse discretionary powers of office those politicians willing to abuse the powers of office knaves can be induced in a hierarchy to reveal their type while in low office thus disqualifying themselves for advancement hierarchy s capacity for screening knaves out of high office depends on the conditions for reappointment to low office a seemingly perverse rule that reappoints shirking politicians can perform well to demonstrate an empirical application we analyze shirking in the house bank check bouncing scandal

time series evidence on shirking in the u s house of representatives this paper presents time series evidence on the voting behavior of members of the u s house of representatives from 1975 to 1990 the empirical results indicate that voting behavior of individual congressmen is remarkably stable over time we find no evidence of economically significant last term effects on voting behavior nor are there important effects of legislative tenure on voting patterns the most significant deviations in voting behavior occur for congressmen who failed to win their reelection bid suggesting that sizable deviations from previous policy positions may result in swift retribution by constituents in the district

representation voluntary retirement and shirking in the last term there is disagreement over whether or not representatives shirk previous studies however have used raw interest group scores thatdo not allow for accurate comparisons over time i take advantageof recently published indexed ada scores by groseclose levitt andsnyder 1999 that adjust for temporal differences to test forshirking i compare results from adjusted ada scores to poole androsenthal s nominate scores with a simple straightforward test ofdyadic representation i provide additional evidence that shirkingexists among voluntarily retiring members of congress