forward foreign exchange rates and risk premia a reappraisal abstract analysis of the relationship between the forward exchange rate and actual exchange rate realizations has been interpreted by many researchers as evidence of the existence of time varying risk premia we interpret the negative covariation between the forward premium and the depreciation in the spot exchange rate as being consistent with an optimal least squares forecast of the future exchange rate based on two highly correlated forecasts the spot rate and the forward rate our results show that when the contemporaneous spot exchange rate is replaced by alternative filters the efficiency of the forward rate is not rejected although the empirical tests do not constitute unequivocal rejection of the hypothesis of time varying risk premia they do demonstrate that an alternative and economically plausible reason exists for previous results

duopoly supergames with product differentiation abstract when goods are complements or very close substitutes more tacit collusion is supported by trigger strategies in price setting supergames than in quantity setting supergames for moderate or poor substitutes the situation is reversed this contrasts with the static situation where price setting strategies always lead to higher welfare

the control of technology alliances an empirical analysis of the biotechnology industry we examine the determinants of control rights in biotechnology alliances through three case studies and a quantitative analysis aghion and tirole 1994 argue that control rights will be assigned so as to maximize the value of the final output as long as the r d firm has sufficient financial resources consistent with this framework the allocation of control rights to the r d firm increases with the firm s financial resources the empirical evidence regarding the relationship between control rights and the stage of the project at the time the alliance is signed is more ambiguous

do better schools matter parental valuation of elementary education the evaluation of numerous school reforms requires an understanding of the value of better schools given the difficulty of calculating the relationship between school quality and student outcomes i turn to another method and use house prices to infer the value parents place on school quality i look within school districts at houses located on attendance district boundaries houses then differ only by the elementary school the child attends i thereby effectively remove the variation in neighborhoods taxes and school spending i find that parents are willing to pay 2 5 percent more for a 5 percent increase in test scores this finding is robust to a number of sensitivity checks

price setting supergames with capacity constraints this paper examines the role of industry capacity in enforcing collusion in the context of repeated games for a fixed capacity per firm it is shown that changes in the number of firms have a non monotone effect on the best enforceable cartel price this is due to the fact that while an additional firm lowers the share that each of the other firms enjoys at the collusive price it also increases the losses to each firm should the cartel fail

modelling the efficiency of the canadian foreign exchange market a bivariate transfer function analysis the efficient market hypothesis for the canadian foreign exchange market is tested using monthly data on spot and forward exchange rates from january 1973 to october 1995 unlike most previous studies we have estimated a transfer function model which combines the results of the univariate time series models with those of the regression model following the convention equations derived from the market efficiency models have been used in both level and change specifications like many previous studies the results from the transfer function model have failed to provide evidence in support of the efficient market hypothesis these findings suggest that significant arbitraging opportunities existed in the canadian foreign during the period under study

a study of cartel stability the joint executive committee 1880 1886 this article employs weekly time series data on the joint executive committee railroad cartel from 1880 to 1886 to test empirically the proposition that observed prices reflected switches from collusive to noncooperative behavior an equilibrium model of dynamic oligopoly with asymmetric firms together with explicit functional form assumptions about costs and demand determines the estimating equations and stochastic structure of the econometric model the hypothesis that no switch took place so that price and quantity movements were solely attributable to exogenous shifts in the demand and cost functions is then tested against this alternative and rejected

status intertemporal choice and risk taking this paper takes the position that an individual s concern for relative status is expressed in her preferences we embed this hypothesis in an otherwise conventional model of economic growth and examine its consequences the model generates two kinds of equilibrium in the first all individuals always follow a deterministic consumption and investment strategy such a strategy must be linear in output is independent of payo s and technology and only depends on the discount factor this sort of equilibrium exists when the individual cares only about status and the individual production function is convex in investment in contrast the other kind of equilibrium involves convergence to a steady state in which there is persistent and endogenously generated gambling this kind of equilibrium exists in more plausible circumstances the individual has a utility function that may depend on consumption per se as well as implied status and individual production functions are concave we characterize the unique steady state in such a situation and prove that any dynamic equilibrium path must converge to it risk taking arises not from the presumption of a utility function with strictly convex segments as in friedman savage but naturally from a view of utility as depending on relative status our steady state is broadly consistent with the stylized facts that individuals both insure downside risk and to gamble over upside risk and generates similar patterns of risk taking and avoidance across environments with quite di erent overall wealth levels finally in contrast to friedman 1953 endogenous risk taking here is generally pareto ine cient

what are cities worth land rents local productivity and the total value of amenities abstract this paper models how to use widely available data on wages and housing costs to infer land rents local productivity and the total value of local amenities in the presence of federal taxes and locally produced nontraded goods i apply the model to u s metropolitan areas with the aid of visually intuitive graphs the results improve measures of productivity and feature large differences in land rents wage and housing cost differences across metropolitan areas are accounted for more by productivity than quality of life differences regressions using individual amenities reveal that the most productive and valuable cities are typically coastal sunny mild educated and large

theories of cartel stability and the joint executive committee this article reexamines the experience of the joint executive committee an 1880s railroad cartel to assess the applicability of the green and porter 1984 and rotemberg and saloner 1986 theories of price wars after discussing necessary modifications to the theories i estimate a number of dynamic models to explore the causes of price wars the cyclical nature of pricing and the possibility that secret price cuts may have been given the estimates provide some support for the predictions of the first theory

biased perceptions of income distribution and preferences for redistribution evidence from a survey experiment abstract individual perceptions of income distribution play a vital role in political economy and public finance models yet there is little evidence regarding their origins or accuracy this study examines how individuals form these perceptions and explores their potential impact on preferences for redistribution a tailored household survey provides original evidence on systematic biases in individuals evaluations of their own relative position in the income distribution the study discusses one of the mechanisms that may generate such biases based on the extrapolation of information from endogenous reference groups and presents some suggestive evidence that this mechanism has significant explanatory power the impact of these biased perceptions on attitudes toward redistributive policies is studied by means of an experimental design that was incorporated into the survey which provided consistent information on the own ranking within the income distribution to a randomly selected group of respondents the evidence suggests that those who had overestimated their relative position and thought that they were relatively richer than they were tend to demand higher levels of redistribution when informed of their true ranking

a study of the internal organization of a bidding cartel this paper examines bidding in over 1 700 knockout auctions used by a bidding cartel or ring of stamp dealers in the 1990s the knockout was conducted using a variant of the model studied by daniel graham robert marshall and jean francois richard 1990 following a reduced form examination of these data damages induced inefficiency and the ring s benefit from colluding are estimated using a structural model in the spirit of emmanuel guerre isabelle perrigne and quang vuong 2000 a notable finding is that nonring bidders suffered damages that were of the same order of magnitude as those of the sellers

the effect of explicit communication on pricing evidence from the collapse of a gasoline cartel we study the collapse of collusion in quebec s retail gasoline market following a competition bureau investigation and show that it involved two empirical regularities high margins and asymmetric price adjustments using weekly station level prices we test whether collusion was successful and whether asymmetric adjustments were part of the cartel s strategy we do so in the markets targeted by the investigation and in markets throughout the province with similar pre collapse pricing cyclical markets our results suggest that stations in both target and cyclical markets adjusted pricing following the announcement margins fell by 30 15 in target cyclical markets and adjustments became more symmetric

a test of conspicuous consumption visibility and income elasticities abstract this paper shows that consistent with a signaling by consuming model a la veblen income elasticities can be predicted from the visibility of consumer expenditures we outline a stylized conspicuous consumption model where income elasticity is endogenously predicted to be higher if a good is visible and lower if it is not we then develop a survey based measure of expenditure visibility ranking different expenditures by how noticeable they are to others finally we show that our visibility measure predicts up to one third of the observed variation in elasticities across consumption categories in u s data

impossibility of collusion under imperfect monitoring with flexible production we show that it is impossible to achieve collusion in a duopoly when 1 goods are homogenous and firms compete in quantities 2 new imperfect information arrives continuously without sudden events and 3 firms are able to respond to this new information quickly the result holds even if we allow for asymmetric equilibria or monetary transfers the intuition is that the flexibility to respond to new information quickly unravels any collusive scheme and that signals about the aggregate behavior only cannot be used effectively to provide individual incentives via transfers our result applies both to a simple stationary model and a more complicated one with prices following a mean reverting markov process

collusion with almost no information we analyze noncooperative collusion in an infinitely repeated bertrand game where each of the n firms receives a privately observed i i d cost shock in each period and firms only and privately observe whether they have won the unit mass of consumers no other information is available and no communication is allowed we prove that there exist equilibria in private strategies approximating first best profits when firms are sufficiently patient in particular productive efficiency obtains in the limit

excess capacity and collusion in this paper the authors analyze a restricted class of equilibria in the dynamic model of j p benoit and v krishna 1987 in which firms choose their scale of operation before engaging in a repeated game of price competition benoit and krishna established that all firms carry excess capacity in all collusive equilibria as the authors are interested in the relationship between excess capacity and collusion in price they examine equilibria in which firms tacitly collude in price but not in investment decisions copyright 1990 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

choosing your pond location choices and relative income do individuals care about their relative income while this is a long standing hypothesis revealed preference evidence remains elusive we provide a unique test by studying residential choices in

commodity market dynamics and the joint executive committee 1880 1886 using weekly spot and future commodity prices in chicago and new york we construct expected transportation rates for grain between these two cities expected inventory levels in new york and realized errors in the expectations of such variables we incorporate these exogenous commodity market dynamics into porter s 1983 structural modeling of the joint executive committee railroad cartel as in porter we model marginal cost as a parametric function of instrumented output among other factors unlike porter we model pricing over marginal cost as a nonparametric function of a set of variables which include expectations of deterministic demand cycles and cartel stability we estimate the pricing and demand equation simultaneously and semiparametrically our estimated weekly markups during periods of cartel stability are shown to reflect optimal collusive pricing over deterministic business cycles as modeled in haltiwanger and harrington 1991 periods of cartel instability are proven to be trigger

testing static oligopoly models conduct and cost in the sugar industry 1890 1914 we explore the widespread methodology of using demand information to infer market conduct and unobserved cost components under the hypothesis of static oligopoly behavior direct measures of marginal cost and conduct indicating small market power serve as benchmarks the more competitive models yield better cost estimates the best cost estimates occur when conduct is estimated as a free parameter which in turn only slightly underestimates our direct measure it also tracks the decline in market power accompanying the industry s structural changes the methodology is largely validated although partial cost information can improve its predictive power conclusions are robust to demand function

incomplete written contracts undescribable states of nature this paper extends the classic two armed bandit problem to a many agent setting in which n players each face the same experimentation problem the difference with the single agent problem is that agents can now learn from the experiments of others thus experiementation produces a public good and a free rider problem in experimentation naturally arises more interestingly future experimentation by others encourages current individual experimentation the paper provides an analysis of the set of markov equilibria in terms of the free rider effect and the encouragement effect

testing for complementarities in reduced form regressions a note abstract in many cases it is important to know whether choice variables for a decision maker are mutual complements but a structural model cannot be estimated a unified framework for testing for complementarity through reduced form regressions is provided

the covariation of risk premiums and expected future spot exchange rates abstract eugene fama 1984 analyzed the variability and the covariation of risk premiums and expected rates of depreciation we employ three statistical techniques that do not suffer from a potential bias in fama s analysis but we nevertheless conffirms his findings in contrast to his interpretation the results are not necessarily at variance with the predictions of a theoretical model of the risk premium increases in expected rates of depreciation of the dollar relative to five foreign currencies are positively correlated with increases in the expected profitability of purchasing these currencies in the forward market and risk premiums have larger variancies than expected rates of depreciation

acting wife marriage market incentives and labor market investments do single women avoid career enhancing actions because these actions signal undesirable traits like ambition to the marriage market while married and unmarried female mba students perform similarly when their performance is unobserved by classmates on exams and problem sets unmarried women have lower participation grades in a field experiment single female students reported lower desired salaries and willingness to travel and work long hours on a real stakes placement questionnaire when they expected their classmates to see their preferences other groups responses were unaffected by peer observability a second experiment indicates the effects are driven by observability by single male peers

wages rents and the quality of life this study focuses on the role of wages and rents in allocating workers to locations with various quantities of amenities the theory demonstrates that if the amenity is also productive then the sign of the wage gradient is unclear while the rent gradient is positive the theory is extended to include the housing market and nontraded goods these extensions require little modification of the conclusion the empirical work on wages shows that the regional wage differences can be explained largely by these local attributes with the use of site price data implicit prices are estimated and quality of life rankings for the cities are computed

when are cartels stable contracts why do some industry cartels survive for decades while others are quickly undermined by price wars and entry variation in cartels longevity can be explained by differences in their costs of self enforcement and service value to members analyzing legal cartel contracts formed under the webb pomerene export trade act i find that longer lived cartels tended to export to small buyers to have wide industry coverage to operate in periods of stable prices and growing demand and to sell under side agreements with foreign competitors contracts in which the cartel centralized its control through a common sales agency tended to be more stable however cartels usually grew less stable with age and when there was a recent and long history of cartelization in the industry finally cartels whose primary rationale was to fix price tended to be particularly unstable because these contracts invited fringe competition and entry

an empirical model of daily highs and lows of west texas intermediate crude oil prices there is a large collection of literature on energy price forecasting but most studies typically use monthly average or close to close daily price data in practice the daily price range constructed from the daily high and low also contains useful information on price volatility and is used frequently in technical analysis the interaction between the daily high and low and the associated daily range has been examined in several recent studies on stock price and exchange rate forecasts the present paper adopts a similar approach to analyze the behaviour of the west texas intermediate wti crude oil price over a ten year period we find that daily highs and lows of the wti oil price are cointegrated with the error correction term being closely approximated by the daily price range two forecasting models one based on a vector error correction mechanism and the other based on a transfer function framework with the range taken as a driver variable are presented for forecasting the daily highs and lows the results show that both of these models offer significant advantages over the naive random walk and univariate arima models in terms of out of sample forecast accuracy a trading strategy that makes use of the daily high and low forecasts is further developed it is found that this strategy generally yields very reasonable trading returns over an evaluation period of about two years

is more always better a survey on positional concerns abstract we use survey data to provide some empirical information about concerns regarding relative standing respondents chose between a world where they have more of a good than others and one where everyone s endowment of the good is higher but the respondent has less than others questions asked about education attractiveness and intelligence for one s child and oneself income vacation time approval and disapproval from a supervisor and papers to write half of the respondents preferred to have 50 less real income but high relative income concerns about position were strongest for attractiveness and supervisor s praise and weakest for vacation time

when information dominates comparison abstract we propose a micro econometric evaluation of the relation between life satisfaction and income distribution using a balanced panel survey of the russian population russian longitudinal monitoring survey rlms running from 1994 to 2000 covering 4685 individuals we show that in the context of the very volatile russian environment hirschman s q j econ 87 1973 544 tunnel effect conjecture seems to be confirmed variables reflecting income distribution do not influence satisfaction through social comparisons individuals rather seem to use their informational content in order to form their expectations the reference group s income thereby exerts a positive influence on individual satisfaction which contrasts with other studies on the subject inequality indices do not affect individual welfare

multimarket contact and collusive behavior traditional analyses of industrial behavior typically link the exercise of market power in an industry to internalfeatures such as demand conditions concentration and barriers to entry nevertheless some economists have remained concerned that external factors such as contact across markets may also play a significant role in determining the level of competitiveness in any particular industry in this article we examine the effect of multimarket contact on the degree of cooperation that firms can sustain in settings of repeated competition we isolate conditions under which multimarket contact facilitates collusion and show that these collusive gains are achieved through modes of behavior that have been identified in previous empirical studies of multimarketfirms

cartel price announcements the vitamins industry abstract the primary manufacturers of vitamins admitted to participating in international market share agreement cartels for several years during the 1990s their announced price increases appeared in leading trade journals we show that price announcements during the cartel period and the lead times before these prices took effect were fundamentally different in character from price announcements when explicit collusion was less likely these differences are consistent with our model of price announcements where we account for the importance to the cartel of buyer acceptance of or resistance to a price increase acceptance avoids costly market share reallocations among members of an explicit cartel logit estimates show that after 1985 the likelihood of a price announcement is largely driven by the length of time between announcements rather than cost or demand factors suggesting that the price announcements after 1985 stem from cartel meetings

endogenous verifiability and relational contracting for contracting parties it will often be uncertain whether a legal court is able to enforce the real intents of their contract the strict requirements of verifiability make it costly if not impos sible for parties to arrange their transactions and design their contract in a way that makes it completely protected by the court a way out is then to rely on self enforcing relational con tracts through repeated transactions the parties can make it costly for each other to breach the contract by letting breach ruin future trade but the self enforcing range of contracts is limited so the court s ability to enforce a contract is not without consequence for the contracting parties if possible the parties may thus have incentives to take costly actions that affect the ability of the court both ex ante preparations in terms of detailed contracting and ex post revelation of informa tion can increase the probability of fair court enforcement in this paper we focus on the former assuming that the parties are able to improve the verifiability of the contracted actions by care ful ex ante contract specifications we assume that careful contracting can improve the court s ability to verify whether an action conforms to the one described in the contract then we ask what happens to the self enforcing contract equilibrium if a party takes actions ex ante that affect the probability of verification in order to provide some answers we analyze a simple repeated principal agent game where the verifiability of the agent s actions is endogenously determined by the principal s investments in drafting an explicit contract pertaining to the quality of the agent s output the model makes it possible to identify some subtle effects of two key enforcement devices legal courts and repeated interaction note that by endogenizing verifiability we also endog enize the degree of contractual incompleteness and the equilibrium level of incompleteness will depend on the verification technology i e the resource costs that are necessary to achieve various verifiability levels this verification technology will be influenced in an essential way by the quality of courts in fact we can use the model to study relationships between two distinct aspects of courts namely their ability which influences the verification technology and their predictability which manifests itself in the equilibrium level of verifiability i e the probability with which the court in fact will verify the relevant action the repeated game approach formalizes an economic concept of trust and trustworthiness since a party honors trust if the present value of honoring exceeds the present value of abusing it the discount factor is then a proxy for the trust level in the relationship by studying the effect of variations in verification technology and the discount factor we can gain insight into the rela tionship between court ability explicit contracting trust and relational contracting below we summarize the results

obviously strategy proof mechanisms what makes some strategy proof mechanisms easier to understand than others to address this question i propose a new solution concept a mechanism is obviously strategy proof osp if it has an equilibrium in obviously dominant strategies this has a behavioral interpretation a strategy is obviously dominant if and only if a cognitively limited agent can recognize it as weakly dominant it also has a classical interpretation a choice rule is osp implementable if and only if it can be carried out by a social planner under a particular regime of partial commitment i fully characterize the set of osp mechanisms in a canonical setting with one dimensional types and transfers a laboratory experiment tests and corroborates the theory

flexible exchange rates prices and the role of news lessons from the 1970s recent experience with flexible exchange rate systems has led to renewed interest in the operation of foreign exchange markets as reflected in many recent studies of the principal determinants of exchange rates the 1970s witnessed the dramatic alteration of the international monetary system from a regime of pegged exchange rates which prevailed for about a quarter of a century since the bretton woods conference into a regime of flexible though managed rates as a consequence of the emergence of the new legal and economic system traders national governments and international organisations were confronted with new economic problems choices and instruments during the 1970s ex change rates fluctuated widely and inflation rates accelerated the international monetary system had to accommodate extraordinarily large oil related shocks which affected trade flows in goods and assets huge oil payments had to be recycled uncertainties concerning future developments in international politics reached new heights and the prospects for the world economy got gloomier these developments placed unprecedented pressures on the markets for foreign exchange as well as on other asset markets they were associated with a large slide in the value of the us dollar and resulted in speeding up the creation of new institutions like the european monetary system which provided the formal framework for the management of exchange rates among members

measuring future grandparents preferences for equality and relative standing individuals aversion to risk and inequality and their concern for relative standing are measured through experimental choices between hypothetical societies it is found that on average individuals are both fairly inequality averse and have a strong concern for relative income the results are used to illustrate welfare consequences based on a utilitarian swf and a modified crra utility function it is shown that the social marginal utility of income may then become negative even at income levels that are far from extreme

the term structure of the forward premium abstract most studies of the efficiency of the foreign exchange market focus on a single maturity usually a one month forward exchange rate however one observes that forward contracts of many maturities are simultaneously traded in the foreign exchange market the hypothesis that the foreign exchange market uses all available information has implications for the joint behavior of forward exchange rates of various maturities this paper proposes an equilibrium theory of the term structure of the forward premium the model is tested using data on the german and canadian exchange rates the results indicate that the data are consistent with the theory for germany and inconsistent with the theory for canada

a re examination of the unbiased forward rate hypothesis in the presence of multiple unknown structural breaks we test the unbiased forward rate ufr hypothesis using new tests for cointegration developed by hatemi j 2008a that allows for multiple unknown structural breaks we analyse the australian dollar aud euro eur british pound gbp and japanese yen jpy versus the us dollar usd spot rates and forward rates relationship during the period 5 january 1999 to 28 december 2006 we find that the ufr does hold when the effects of the unknown structural breaks are taken into account the parameters that we obtained were close to unity hence taking into account transaction cost and the existence of a risk premium earning arbitrage profits may still not be possible thus the markets for these currencies may still be considered as efficient

the power of communication abstract in this paper i offer two ways in which firms can collude secret monitoring and infrequent coordination such collusion is enforceable with intuitive communication protocols i make my case in the context of a repeated cournot oligopoly with flexible production prices that follow a brownian motion and no monetary side payments an environment where it has previously been argued that any collusion is impossible trade associations can easily facilitate collusion by mediating communication amongst firms jel d21 d43 l12 l13

on the sustainability of collusion in differentiated duopolies abstract we consider a rule designed to maintain collusion in a duopoly made up of firms producing differentiated products we analyse both price setting and quantity setting models and show that product differentiation plays a crucial role in determining the effectiveness of this rule our results contrast with those obtained by earlier writers

collusion in a price quantity oligopoly abstract in the context of an infinitely repeated oligopoly game we study collusion among firms that simultaneously choose prices and quantities we compare a price cartel with a price quota cartel and analyze when and why firms prefer the latter to the former output quota may be required to solve coordination and incentive problems when market demand is sufficiently elastic if market demand is sufficiently inelastic then the cartel faces a trade off between increasing prices and the amount of costly overproduction we find that a price cartel prices consistently below the monopoly price to mitigate excessive production in this case a quota arrangement allows firms to avoid overproduction and to sustain the monopoly price from a policy perspective our findings suggest that an overall price increase in conjunction with more stable prices and market shares is indicative of collusion in industries where production precedes sales and outputs are imperfectly observable

the forward rate as a predictor of the future spot rate a stochastic coefficient approach this paper develops a stochastic coefficient model to examine the unbiased forward rate hypothesis for the period january 1974 to august 1983 tests from the full sample estimations confirm the null hypothesis however the re sults from the brown durbin evans 1975 test and the chow test indic ate that the exchange rate behavior departs from parameter constancy using joint rolling regressions for the subsample estimations the a uthor finds evidence that the unbiasedness hypothesis in most cases s hould be rejected and that the estimated parameters sensitive to new information vary through different subsample periods the out of sa mple test concludes that incorporation of the stochastic properties o f the parameters into the model improves accuracy of exchange rate pr edictions copyright 1988 by ohio state university press

cognition and incomplete contracts thinking about contingencies designing covenants and seeing through their implications is costly parties to a contract accordingly use heuristics and leave it incomplete the paper develops a model of limited cognition and examines its consequences for contractual design

marriage and the city search frictions and sorting of singles this paper develops and tests a model where cities play an important role as marriage markets the idea is simple cities are dense areas where singles can meet more potential partners than in rural areas to enjoy those benefits they are willing to pay a premium in terms of higher housing prices once married the benefits from meeting more potential partners vanish and married couples move out of the city attractive singles benefit most from a dense market and are therefore more likely to move to the city those predictions are tested and confirmed with a unique danish data set

transparency on the consumer side and tacit collusion abstract this paper investigates the effects on tacit collusion of increased market transparency on the consumer side of a market in a differentiated hotelling duopoly increasing market transparency increases the benefits to a firm from undercutting the collusive price it also decreases the punishment profit the net effect is that collusion becomes harder to sustain in the limiting homogeneous market the effect vanishes here market transparency does not affect the possibilities for tacit collusion

dynamic duopoly prices and quantities we study a dynamic model of duopoly in which firms choose both prices and quantities if quantity capacity choices are relatively inflexible firms generally carry excess idle capacity in equilibrium because of this enforcement cost firms are unable to achieve monopoly levels this contrasts with models in which which firms compete in either prices or quantities alone on the other hand if capacities are flexible firms may be able to sustain monopoly behaviour

an anatomy of cartel contracts we study cartel contracts using data on 18 contract clauses of 109 legal finnish manufacturing cartels one third of the clauses relate to raising profits the others deal with instability through incentive compatibility cartel organization or external threats cartels use three main approaches to raise profits price market allocation and specialization these appear to be substitutes choosing one has implications on how cartels deal with instability simplifying we find that large cartels agree on prices cartels in homogenous goods industries allocate markets and small cartels avoid competition through specialization

gender identity and relative income within households band s income we argue that this pattern is best explained by gender identity norms which induce an aversion to a situation where the wife earns more than her husband we present evidence that this aversion also impacts marriage formation the wife s labor force participation the wife s income conditional on working marriage satisfaction likelihood of divorce and the division of home production within marriage markets when a randomly chosen woman becomes more likely to earn more than a randomly chosen man marriage rates decline in couples where the wife s potential income is likely to exceed the husband s the wife is less likely to be in the labor force and earns less than her potential if she does work in couples where the wife earns more than the husband the wife spends more time on household chores moreover those couples are less satisfied with their marriage and are more likely to divorce these patterns hold both cross sectionally and within couples over time

in which industries is collusion more likely evidence from the uk i examine the factors facilitating or hindering collusion using a comprehensive data set on the incidence of price fixing across uk manufacturing industries in the 1950s the econometric results suggest that collusion is more likely the higher the degree of capital intensity and less likely in advertising intensive than in low advertising industries there is also some evidence of a non monotonic relationship between market growth and the likelihood of collusion there is no clear link between concentration and the incidence of collusion

sustainable collusion in oligopoly with free entry we investigate the stability of collusion in a market where firms cannot prevent entry in a symmetric homogeneous oligopoly there are collusive long run equilibria under which the colluders obtain positive economic rents while they do not prevent entry of firms up to a maximum equal to the largest number of firms sustainable at a single shot equilibrium the collusion is not generous to new entrants their profits are a little better than those associated with the discounted single shot equilibrium eventually entrants obtain profits equal to the incumbent firms we extend the results to asymmetric differentiated oligopolies

the effects of product differentiation on collusive pricing abstract using the spatial competition framework of hotelling 1929 this paper explores the relationship between the degree of product differentiation and the ability of firms to collude with respect to price we show that the minimum discount factor required to support the joint profit maximum as an equilibrium outcome monotonically increases as products become better substitutes when the joint profit maximum cannot be supported the optimal collusive price is shown to decline as products become more substitutable these findings suggest that firms producing stronger substitutes tend to find it tougher to collude in terms of their product price

the impact of cyclical demand movements on collusive behavior recent work by rotemberg and saloner 1986 investigates the effect of the business cycle on optimal collusive pricing by specifying that demand is subject to i i d shocks an implication of the i i d assumption is that firms expectations on future demand are unrelated to the current level of demand we put forth a model that allows for both the level of current demand and firms expectations on future demand to change over time thus it captures two important properties of the business cycle our analysis reveals that while the gain to deviating from a collusive agreement is greatest during booms firms find it most difficult to collude during recessions as the forgone profits from inducing a price war are relatively low an implication of this effect for pricing behavior is that at the same level of demand price is lower when demand is declining than when demand is rising consistent with previous theoretical work we find that firms price countercyclically for a range of values for the discount factor however numerical simulations reveal a greater tendency for firms to price countercyclically during recessions than during booms

an empirical model of the medical match abstract this paper develops a framework for estimating preferences in a many to one matching market using only observed matches i use pairwise stability and a vertical preference restriction on one side to identify preferences on both sides of the market counterfactual simulations are used to analyze the antitrust allegation that the centralized medical residency match is responsible for salary depression due to residents willingness to pay for desirable programs and capacity constraints salaries in any competitive equilibrium would remain on average at least 23 000 below the marginal product of labor therefore the match is not the likely cause of low salaries jel c78 i11 j31 j44 k21 l44

last place aversion evidence and redistributive implications we present evidence from laboratory experiments showing that individuals are last place averse participants choose gambles with the potential to move them out of last place that they reject when randomly placed in other parts of the distribution in modified dictator games participants randomly placed in second to last place are the most likely to give money to the person one rank above them instead of the person one rank below last place aversion suggests that low income individuals might oppose redistribution because it could differentially help the group just beneath them using survey data we show that individuals making just above the minimum wage are the most likely to oppose its increase similarly in the general social survey those above poverty but below median income support redistribution significantly less than their background characteristics would predict jel codes h23 d31 c91

cartel stability and product differentiation abstract this paper employs a supergame theoretic model of collusion to analyze the effects of different levels of product differentiation on cartel stability in contrast to earlier work the ability of the parties to reach an agreement is assumed here the focus is on how greater product homogeneity increases both the gain to cheating on a collusive agreement and the magnitude of the punishments that follow a defection the total effect on the likelihood a cartel is stable is therefore unclear two particular differentiated products models are then used to demonstrate that contrary to the conventional view greater homogeneity can reduce cartel stability