representative democracy and capital taxation abstract in this paper we study a political model of capital taxation voters who differ in their relative shares of capital and labor income choose tax policy under majority rule we compare two political regimes direct democracy where the voters vote directly on the policy and representative democracy where they elect a representative who then chooses policy in both regimes some form of commitment by the voters is necessary to avoid excessive taxation of capital but the necessary commitment under representative democracy corresponds closely to that provided by the actual institutions of most democracies

interregional redistribution and budget institutions under asymmetric information empirical evidence from the u s and the european union suggests that regions which contribute to interregional redistribution face weaker borrowing constraints than regions which benefit from interregional redistribution this paper presents an argument in favor of such differentiated budget institutions it develops a two period model of a federation consisting of two types of regions the federal government redistributes from one type of regions contributors to the other type recipients it is shown that a fiscal constitution with lax budget rules for contributors and strict budget rules for recipients solves the self selection problem the federal government faces in the presence of asymmetric information regarding exogenous characteristics of the regions

income redistribution in a common labor market when households are mobile among jurisdictions income redistribution by individual jurisdictions creates fiscal externalities a model of interjurisdictional migration is used to study the nature of this redistributive externality analysis of optimal redistribution and optimal corrective subsidies from higher level governments shows that benefit levels for the recipients of income transfers and tax rates on mobile taxpayers should be equalized across jurisdictions a system of jurisdictions with a common labor market can achieve welfare improvements through coordination of domestic redistributive policy or through the intervention of a higher level government copyright 1991 by american economic association

decentralization and international tax competition abstract this paper models tax competition between two countries that are divided into regions in the first stage of the game the strategy variable for each country is the division of a continuum of public goods between central and regional government provision in the second stage the central and regional governments choose their tax rates on capital a country s decentralization level serves as a strategic tool through its influence on the mix of horizontal and vertical externalities that exists under tax competition in contrast to standard tax competition models decentralizing the provision of public goods may improve welfare

tax competition and revelation of preferences for public expenditure this paper considers a federal country composed of local jurisdictions that differ in their inhabitants tastes for public goods and which finance local public expenditure through a source based tax on capital income the taste for public goods is the private information of local governments the central government seeks an optimal policy in which grants to local governments are conditioned on local tax rates the uninformed central government seeks both to allocate capital efficiently among jurisdictions and to induce jurisdictions to provide an efficient mix of private and public consumption it is shown that there persist at this constrained optimum both some misallocation of capital and some violation of the samuelson rule for optimal public good provision in every jurisdiction c 1998 academic press

a theory of interregional tax competition a general equilibrium model is constructed to study tax competition where local governments compete for capital by holding down property tax rates and public expenditure levels an exact definition of tax competition is provided and both the existence and nonexistence of tax competition are shown to be theoretically possible it is argued however that tax competition must occur under empirically reasonable conditions inefficiency in public production is also explicitly modeled the amount of capital used to produce a given level of public service output is shown to be greater than that which is required to minimize costs evaluated at the prices facing private firms

local public works and intergovernmental transfers under asymmetric information abstract this paper studies local public works decisions in a hierarchical setting under bidimensional asymmetric information a local authority plans to undertake a public work and delegates its construction to a firm the federal government decides whether to fund the project without being informed of either the project s benefit or the constructor s efficiency the local authority knows these values to deal with this informational gap the federal government designs a public work contract specifying transfers to the local authority and to the firm we show under which circumstances cost sharing and compensations emerge as incentive devices then we identify which projects are effectively constructed more works with low high benefits are undertaken shut down than under full information

sharing budgetary austerity under free mobility and asymmetric information an optimal regulation approach to fiscal federalism in the present article tiebout meets laffont and tirole in the land of fiscal federalism a non trivial principal multi agent model is used to characterize the optimal intergovernmental grant schedule when the cost of local public goods depends on hidden characteristics and actions of local governments and under citizen free mobility we show how informational rents landlords interests and citizen mobility interact to produce distortions at both ends of the type space in particular the most efficient jurisdictions should overproduce and overtax in second best optimum informational asymmetries decrease the average production of public goods and increase the inter jurisdictional variance of taxes and public good production

the welfare effects of the introduction of storage this paper examines the welfare effects of introducing storage into a market with stochastic supply in which all agents are competitive profit maximizers with rational expectations these welfare effects are the net result of the initial increase in demand for stock building and the partial and asymmetric reduction in the dispersion of consumption brought about by storage the distributional impacts depend crucially on the information available to producers before storage is introduced the elasticity of supply the specification of the consumption demand curve and the cost of storage

the spatial effects of wage or property tax differentials and local government choice between tax instruments abstract this paper considers the spatial effects on wages employment and business capital as functions of location of a localized differential in source based wage tax rates or business property tax rates between for example a central city and the surrounding suburbs a simple model is used in which business production uses only labor and capital inputs consumers have fixed residential locations but may commute to work wage and property tax differentials have effects that are similar in some ways but different in other ways if given a choice a local government would choose to set its business property tax rate equal to zero and use only a wage tax

optimal regional redistribution under asymmetric information this paper studies optimal redistribution among two different regions in a federal state regional governments supply local public goods financed with distorting local taxes they have better information on their tax bases than the federal government we model this both as an adverse selection problem on the size of local tax bases and or as moral hazard problem on local tax enforcement moral hazard alone does not affect the first best redistribution rule which is a lump sum transfer from the rich to the poor region in all other cases the optimal transfer rule involves a lump sum tax on the rich regions and a premium for fiscal effort by the poor regions with the transfer falling short of the first best level in the equilibrium with moral hazard and adverse selection tax evasion occurs only in the poor region even though the possibility of lax tax enforcement benefits the rich and harms the poor region because it reduces equilibrium redistribution this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

openness imperfect exchange rate pass through and monetary policy abstract this paper analyses the implications of imperfect exchange rate pass through for optimal monetary policy in a linearised open economy dynamic general equilibrium model calibrated to euro area data imperfect exchange rate pass through is modelled by assuming sticky import price behaviour the degree of domestic and import price stickiness is estimated by reproducing the empirical identified impulse response of a monetary policy and exchange rate shock conditional on the response of output net trade and the exchange rate it is shown that a central bank that wants to minimise the resource costs of staggered price setting will aim at minimising a weighted average of domestic and import price inflation

the impressive contribution of canadian economists to fiscal federalism theory and policy the study of fiscal federalism has been central to the research of canadian economists since the rowell sirois report to mark the 50th anniversary of the founding of the canadian economics association it is fitting to take stock of their contributions we focus on the period since 1982 and emphasize the main scholarly publications of an inclusive array of canadian economists and economists in canadian universities our attention is devoted to applications in the context of federal and provincial governments setting aside related issues in municipal government finance we briefly discuss instances where the fiscal federalism literature has informed policy debates including through policy research institutes government commissions and international organizations la contribution impressionnante des economistes canadiens a la theorie et a la politique du federalisme fiscal l etude du federalisme fiscal a ete un element central de la recherche des economistes canadiens depuis la commission rowell sirois au moment de celebrer le 50eme anniversaire de la fondation de l association canadienne d economique le moment est approprie pour prendre la mesure de leurs contributions on se concentre sur la periode apres 1982 et on souligne les principales publications savantes d un ensemble inclusif d economistes canadiens et d economistes dans les universites canadiennes une attention particuliere est portee aux applications dans le contexte federal et provincial mettant de cote les enjeux relies a la finance municipale on discute brievement des instances ou la litterature sur le federalisme fiscal a eclaire les debats de politiques publiques y compris a travers les instituts de recherche sur les politiques publiques les commissions gouvernementales et les organisations internationales

learning about monetary policy rules abstract we study macroeconomic systems with forward looking private sector agents and a monetary authority that is trying to control the economy through the use of a linear policy feedback rule we use stability under recursive learning a la evans and honkapohja learning and expectations in macroeconomics princeton university press princeton new jersey 2001 as a criterion for evaluating monetary policy rules in this context we find that considering learning can alter the evaluation of alternative policy rules

robust control of forward looking models abstract this paper shows how to formulate and compute robust ramsey aka stackelberg plans for linear models with forward looking private agents the leader and the followers share a common approximating model and both have preferences for robust decision rules because both doubt the model since their preferences differ the leader s and followers decision rules are fragile to different misspecifications of the approximating model we define a stackelberg equilibrium with robust decision makers in which the leader and follower have different worst case models despite sharing a common approximating model to compute a stackelberg equilibrium we formulate a bellman equation that is associated with an artificial single agent robust control problem the artificial bellman equation contains a description of implementability constraints that include euler equations that describe the worst case analysis of the followers as an example the paper analyzes a model of a monopoly facing a competitive fringe

a spatial model of tax competition with multiple tax instruments abstract this paper presents a model of tax competition with two local jurisdictions in each metropolitan area located along a line segment and many metropolitan areas in the world economy the residents in each local jurisdiction are allowed to commute at a constant cost per mile to work in the other jurisdiction if a lump sum tax can be used then other taxes are not used if source based wage and business capital taxes can both be used then only the former is used in this case or if only a business capital tax can be used the local public good is underprovided

learning and the monetary policy strategy of the european central bank abstract this paper examines the welfare implications of alternative inflation targeting proposals for the monetary policy of the european central bank we assume that policy makers have to learn the laws of motion of inflation in an economy characterized by stickiness in domestic price setting behavior and subjected to recurring shocks to productivity exports and foreign price we find that a switch from an asymmetric inflation targeting strategy to an symmetric makes little difference in welfare payoffs but it comes at a cost of much higher interest rate variability we also find that there are practically no welfare gains from switching from an inflation targeting strategy based on the harmonized index of consumer prices hicp to a strategy based on the domestic price component of the hicp

state and local tax competition in a spatial model with sales taxes and residential property taxes abstract this paper presents a theoretical model with a uniformly populated line that is divided into local jurisdictions and or states if one level of government imposes sales and residential property taxes and if the spatial extent of each taxing jurisdiction is positive and finite then in nash equilibrium the sales tax rate is less than residential property tax rate housing consumption is suboptimal and the public good is underprovided in each jurisdiction if a very large state or country is divided into local jurisdictions and if both levels of government choose tax rates endogenously then under some assumptions there is an efficient outcome

export promotion through exchange rate policy exchange rate depreciation or stabilization exchange rate movements affect exports in two ways rate depreciation and rate variability risk a depreciation raises exports but the associated exchange rate risk could offset that positive effect the present paper investigates the net effect for eight asian countries using a dynamic conditional correlation bivariate garch m model that simultaneously estimates time varying correlation and exchange rate risk depreciation encourages exports as expected for most countries but its contribution to export growth is weak exchange rate risk contributes to export growth in malaysia and the philippines leading to positive net effects exchange rate risk generates a negative effect for six of the countries resulting in a negative net effect in indonesia japan singapore and taiwan and a zero net effect in korea and thailand exchange rate movements affect exports in two ways rate depreciation and rate volatility risk the two effects have received considerable attention since the collapse of fixed exchange rates in the early 1970s but no research considers the net total effect on exports of the two potentially offsetting effects this paper investigates the net effect for eight asian countries with engle s 2002 dynamic conditional correlation dcc bivariate garch m model that simultaneously estimates time varying correlation and exchange rate risk the net effect relates to the goal of a foreign exchange intervention depreciation lowers the foreign currency price of exports and probably increases the quantity of exports and export revenue in domestic currency conditions may exist however where export revenue falls highly inelastic foreign import demand leads to falling export revenue ambiguity also arises if export production incorporates high import content since the domestic cost or price of exports rises with depreciation during periods of appreciation exporters might price to market lowering their domestic currency price to maintain export market share theory and empirical evidence exhibits ambiguity as to the effect of the exchange rate on exports and export revenue junz and rhomberg 1973 and wilson and takacs 1979 find that devaluation

coordination in heterogeneous federal systems abstract we compare centralized and decentralized policy making in a federation in which policy heterogeneity is inherently costly and preferences vary across jurisdictions all jurisdictions agree that some harmonization is desirable but no one agrees on the direction of harmonization this type of collective choice problem arises when members of a federal system have to coordinate nonbudgetary policies such as laws regulations standards or diplomatic policies contrary to the common wisdom decentralization becomes optimal when coordination becomes very important when coordination costs are symmetric decentralization dominates centralization irrespective of the magnitude of externalities and the heterogeneity of preferences in the case of discontinuous network effects standardization never pareto dominates decentralization

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

the economic role of commodity storage one of the earliest and most successful exainples of economic policy is the oftquoted biblical account of joseph s interpretation of the pharoah s dream joseph foretold that seven years of abundant harvests would precede seven years of drought and recommended that the pharoah accumulate grain during the good years since that time the central role of storage in stabilising the economy in the face of exogenous disturbances has been obvious but our understanding of the nature of that role has not greatly advanced without divine assistance in forecasting stochastic production the storage decision is considerably more complex than the one joseph faced and the role of storage quite different in fact several commonly held impressions about the role of storage of commodities such as grains are incorrect rather than stabilising production storage actually accentuates its variability rather than causing a mean price preserving decrease or a mean output preserving decrease in the dispersion of price storage generally causes a more complex modification of the distribution of price rather than being most effective at eliminating short falls in consumption storage actually is more effective at eliminating the incidence of exceedingly high consumption in this paper we explore the role of storage in a model where production is stochastic and both production and storage are performed by competitive profitmaximisers who form rational expectations about the returns to their activities we derive the subtle but very important interactions among production price expectations and storage which simpler models cannot capture finally we make a comparative statics assessment of the distributional implications of storage these results while confirming the importance of the specification of the demand function and the supply elasticity identified in recent analytical studies e g wright i979 and newbery and stiglitz i979 are surprisingly favourable to consumers considering the asymmetric nature of the effects of storage on consumption and price storage is simply a productive activity one that transfers a commodity from one period to the next like other forms of production it is costly the total cost of storing an amount st from period t to period t i is as of period t i

the robustness and efficiency of monetary policy rules as guidelines for interest rate setting by the european central bank abstract this paper examines the implications of recent research on monetary policy rules for practical monetary policy making with special emphasis on strategies for setting interest rates by the european central bank ecb the paper draws on recent research and new simulations of a large open economy model to assess the efficiency of a simple benchmark rule in comparison with other proposed rules further it stresses new results on the robustness of monetary policy rules in which each rule that is optimal or good according to one model or researcher is tested for robustness by other researchers using different models because of the large increase in the number of economists focussing on econometric evaluation of monetary policy rules for the interest rate instrument and because of the parallel increase in the variety of models being developed for this purpose much more evidence is becoming available on the robustness of simple monetary policy rules for the interest rate than ever before

implementing tax coordination abstract this paper investigates whether tax competition can survive under tax coordination when information is private or nonverifiable we focus on a two jurisdiction model where capital can move across borders and where jurisdictions have different public good requirements but are otherwise identical in this setting coordination may call for a second best allocation supported by differentiated tax rates if however coordination must be achieved via a set of common rules that condition tax rates on jurisdictions choices the second best allocation may not be implementable we show that incentive compatibility requirements will generally affect not only the choice of coordinated rates in states where jurisdictions are different but also the choice of harmonized rates in states where jurisdictions have identical preferences for public consumption

recurrent hyperinflations and learning we use a model of boundedly rational learning to account for the observations of recurrent hyperinflations in the 1980 s in a standard monetary model we replace the assumption of full rational expectations by a formal definition of quasi rational learning the model under learning matches some crucial stylized facts observed during the recurrent hyperinflations experienced by several countries in the 1980 s remarkably well we argue that despite being a small departure from rational expectations quasi rational learning does not preclude falsifiability of the model it does not violate reasonable rationality requirements and it can be used for policy evaluation

the role of exchange rates in a popular model of international trade abstract this paper examines the empirical relationship between the real effective exchange rate and the aggregate real trade balance for five major oecd countries in the post bretton woods era a variety of parametric and non parametric techniques are used there is little evidence that the exchange rate significantly affects the trade balance

why is capital so immobile internationally possible explanations and implications for capital income taxation the evidence on international capital immobility is extensive including the lack of international portfolio diversification real interest differentials across countries and the high correlation between domestic savings and investment the authors develop a model with asymmetric information between countries that helps rationalize all the above observations and then examine the implications of this model for optimal domestic tax policy without asymmetric information past work showed that small open economies should not impose corporate income taxes with asymmetric information the optimal policy instead involves government subsidies to capital imports some omitted factors that argue against subsidizing capital imports are explored briefly copyright 1996 by american economic association

tax competition tax exporting and higher government choice of tax instruments for local governments abstract this paper presents a theoretical model with tax exporting due to external ownership of a fraction of the land in each local jurisdiction there are n local jurisdictions in a metropolitan area n 1 and many metropolitan areas in a world economy the paper examines the usage of business property taxes and source based wage taxes by local jurisdictions first in the presence of and then in the absence of residence based lump sum taxes and how this depends on and n the paper then examines the choice of a world national or state government as to whether to allow local metropolitan or sub metropolitan governments to use business property taxes wage taxes or both assuming that the local governments choose the actual tax rates

a three input model of the spatial effects of a central city wage tax abstract this paper considers the short run and long run spatial effects on wages employment and business capital as functions of location of a localized increase in wage tax rates the model is most applicable to a central city that has a higher wage tax rate than the surrounding suburbs the inclusion of land as a third input in production significantly reduces the long run effects of a central city wage tax on employment near the central city boundary as compared with a model in which labor and capital are the only two inputs the short run effects are significantly less than the long run effects

nonlinear income taxation and matching grants in a federation with decentralized in kind transfers we extend to a fiscal federalism setting the literature on redistributive in kind transfers in the presence of nonlinear income taxation local governments have a cost advantage motivating decentralization of the in kind transfer the cost structure varies across regions and the central government cannot observe which region is which we show that decentralized in kind transfers can in this setting be an even more important instrument for relaxing self selection constraints thus helping redistribution than in single government models we characterize the optimal marginal tax rates and matching grants the grants have a very different structure than the one derived in earlier studies

self selection and pareto efficient taxation abstract this paper analyses the set of pareto efficient tax structures the formulation of the problem as one of self selection not only shows more clearly the similarity between this problem and a number of other problems such as the optimal pricing of a monopolist which have recently been the subject of extensive research but also allows the derivation of a number of new results we establish i under fairly weak conditions randomization of tax structures is desirable ii if different individuals are not perfect substitutes for one another in production then the general equilibrium effects until now largely ignored in the literature of changes in the tax structure may be dominant in determining the optimal tax structure in particular if the relative wage of high ability and low ability individuals depends on the relative supplies of labor the optimal tax structure entails a negative marginal tax rate on the high ability individuals and a positive marginal tax rate on the low ability individuals the marnitude of which depends on the elasticity of substitution iii if individuals differ in their preferences pareto efficient taxation may entail negative marginal tax rates for high incomes while iv if wage income is stochastic the marginal tax rate at the upper end may be 100 our analysis thus makes clear that the main qualitative properties of the optimal tax structure to which earlier studies called attention are not robust to these attempts to make the theory more realistic