the federal funds rate and the channels of monetary transmission the authors show that the interest rate on federal funds is extremely informative about future movements of real macroeconomic variables then they argue that the reason for this forecasting success is that the funds rate sensitively records shocks to the supply of bank reserves that is the funds rate is a good indicator of monetary policy actions finally using innovations to the funds rate as a measure of changes in policy the authors present evidence consistent with the view that monetary policy works at least in part through credit i e bank loans as well as through money i e bank deposits copyright 1992 by american economic association

some empirical evidence on the effects of shocks to monetary policy on exchange rates this paper investigates the effects of shocks to u s monetary policy on exchange rates we consider three measures of these shocks orthogonalized shocks to the federal funds rate orthogonalized shocks to the ratio of nonborrowed to total reserves and changes in the romer and romer index of monetary policy in sharp contrast to the literature we find substantial evidence of a link between monetary policy and exchange rates specifically according to our results a contractionary shock to u s monetary policy leads to i persistent significant appreciations in u s nominal and real exchange rates and ii significant persistent deviations from uncovered interest rate parity in favor of u s interest rates

monetary policy and exchange rate volatility in a small open economy we lay out a small open economy version of the calvo sticky price model and show how the equilibrium dynamics can be reduced to a simple representation in domestic inflation and the output gap we use the resulting framework to analyse the macroeconomic implications of three alternative rulebased policy regimes for the small open economy domestic inflation and cpi based taylor rules and an exchange rate peg we show that a key difference among these regimes lies in the relative amount of exchange rate volatility that they entail we also discuss a special case for which domestic inflation targeting constitutes the optimal policy and where a simple second order approximation to the utility of the representative consumer can be derived and used to evaluate the welfare losses associated with the suboptimal rules

global markets and national politics collision course or virtuous circle increasing exposure to trade foreign direct investment and liquid capital mobility have not prompted a pervasive policy race to the neoliberal bottom among the oecd countries one reason is that there are strong political incentives for governments to cushion the dislocations and risk generated by openness moreover countries with large and expanding public economies when balanced with increased revenues even from capital taxes have not suffered from capital flight or higher interest rates this is because the modern welfare state comprising income transfer programs and publicly provided social services generates economically important collective goods that are undersupplied by markets and that actors are interested in productivity value these range from the accumulation of human and physical capital to social stability under conditions of high market uncertainty to popular support for the market economy itself as a result arguments about the demise of national autonomy in the global economy are considerably overdrawn

tax policy in an era of internationalization explaining the spread of neoliberalism i offer an explanation for the widespread diffusion of neoliberal tax policies in the developed democracies after accounting for the policy influences of commonly experienced domestic and international forces i consider several plausible paths of diffusion of neoliberal tax structure my central argument is that the highly visible 1980s market conforming tax reform in the united states should be especially important in shaping subsequent tax policies in other polities there are substantial reasons to believe however that domestic political and institutional forces will shape policymaker assessment of the benefits and costs of neoliberal reforms the strength of right parties and the degree to which the median voter has moved right should condition adoption of neoliberal tax policy the institutions of national and sector coordinated capitalism should also slow the enactment of neoliberal tax reforms i assess these arguments with empirical models of 1981 98 tax rates on capital in sixteen nations i find that changes in u s tax policy influence subsequent reforms in other polities in the long term all nations move toward the u s neoliberal tax structure analysis also shows however that the short term responsiveness to u s tax reforms is notably greater where uncoordinated market institutions are dominant theory and extensive qualitative and quantitative evidence indicate that pressures to compete for mobile assets as balanced against the economic and political costs of adoption anchor the process of diffusion of neoliberal tax policy there is little evidence for the view that systematic policy learning or social emulation drove tax policy diffusion earlier versions of this article were presented at the center for european studies and weatherhead center for international affairs harvard university center for international studies ucla and yale university as well as the 2002 annual meetings of the american political science association an earlier version was published as minda de gunzburg center for european studies harvard university working paper 120 i thank alex hicks rob franzese torben iversen andy martin cathie jo martin participants in the yale ucla and harvard conferences especially geoffrey garrett helen milner dennis quinn and beth simmons and two anonymous referees and the editors of international organization for helpful comments i also gratefully acknowledge the contribution of sven steinmo that comes by way of our past collaborative work on tax policy

gdp nowcasting application and constraints in a small open developing economy despite data limitations an attempt is made to find out if a gdp nowcasting model can provide reliable forecasts for a small open economy two competing bayesian vector autoregressive models are tested rigorously to obtain the optimal model by minimizing in sample forecasting errors the main finding of this study is that gdp nowcasting can produce reliable results for a small open economy despite the unavailability of sufficient data sets and the lack of high frequency indicators

the new political economy of taxation in advanced capitalist democracies earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 1999 annual meeting of the american political science association september 1 5 atlanta ga and the 2000 annual meeting of the midwest political science association april 27 30 chicago il the authors thank steffen ganghof philip genschel mark hallerberg alex hicks william keech dennis quinn and the anonymous reviewers and editor of this journal for many helpful comments and dennis quinn for generously sharing data duane swank thanks the german marshal fund of the united states and marquette university for support of work incorporated in this paper data utilized in this paper are available from duane swank marquette edu

external shocks u s monetary policy and macroeconomic fluctuations in emerging markets estimated structural vars show that external shocks are an important source of macroeconomic fluctuations in emerging markets furthermore u s monetary policy shocks affect interest rates and the exchange rate in a typical emerging market quickly and strongly the price level and real output in a typical emerging market respond to u s monetary policy shocks by more than the price level and real output in the u s itself these findings are consistent with the idea that when the u s sneezes emerging markets catch a cold at the same time u s monetary policy shocks are not important for emerging markets relative to other kinds of external shocks

concatenate coordination and mutual coordination abstract we tell of the evolving meaning of the term coordination as used by economists the paper is based on systematic electronic searches on coord etc of major works and leading journals the term coordination first emerged in professional economics around 1880 to describe the directed productive concatenation of factors or activities within a firm also transportation economists used the term to describe the concatenation of routes and trips of a transportation system these usages represent what we term concatenate coordination the next major development came in the 1930s from several lse economists hayek plant hutt and coase who extended that concept beyond the eye of any actual coordinator that is they wrote of the concatenate coordination of a system of polycentric or spontaneous activities these various applications of concatenate coordination prevailed until the next major development namely thomas schelling and game models here coordination referred to a mutual meshing of actions game theorists developed crisp ideas of coordination games like battle of the sexes coordination equilibria convention and path dependence this coordination was not a refashioning but rather a distinct concept one we distinguish as mutual coordination as game models became more familiar to economists it was mutual coordination that economists increasingly had in mind when they spoke of coordination economists switched so to speak to a new semantic equilibrium now mutual coordination overshadows the older notion of concatenate coordination the two senses of coordination are conceptually distinct and correspond neatly to the two dictionary definitions of the verb to coordinate both are crucial to economics we suggest that distinguishing between the two senses can help to clarify coordination talk also compared to talk of efficiency and optimality concatenate coordination allows for a richer more humanistic and more openly aesthetic discussion of social affairs the narrative is backed up by excel worksheets that report on systematic content searches of the writings of economics using the worldwide web and using jstor of quarterly journal of economics economic journal journal of political economy american economic review and economica

what price accountability the lucas island model and the politics of monetary policy this paper develops a model of an electoral cycle in inflation and output based on rational inflation expectations and rational retrospective voting voters are heterogeneous and partially informed about aggregate macroeconomic variables they observe precisely how monetary policy stimulates their local economies but their observations of economic activity in other sectors are imprecise voters extract information about the incumbent policymaker s economic competence from cross sectoral spillover effects the incumbent has incentives to generate preelection monetary surprises that stimulate the local economies and generate cross sectoral spillover effects he thereby creates an impression of economic competence and furthers his reelection prospects his policy manipulations are the price of political accountability on a positive note the incumbent is more likely to survive voter scrutiny if he is more competent than the average political candidate

the impacts of public sustainability concerns on length of product line abstract this paper studies how the public sustainability concerns affect a firm s decisions of product line design under different channel structures both centralized distribution channel and decentralized distribution channel are taken into consideration our research shows that the public sustainability concerns can make the centralized firm shorten its product line when the coefficient of consumer mismatching disutility is moderate in addition when the centralized firm makes the decision of product line extension from the aspect of maximizing social welfare a relative low level of the public sustainability concerns can incent it to extend the product line the public sustainability concerns are shown to be able to weaken the positive impact of channel decentralization that has on product line extension when the coefficient of consumer mismatching disutility is moderate as well

sticky prices as coordination failure this paper links the coordination failure and menu cost approaches to the microeconomic foundations of keynesian macroeconomics if a firm s desired price is increasing in others prices then the gain from price adjustment after a nominal shock is greater if others adjust this strategic complementarity leads to multiple equilibria in the degree of rigidity welfare may be much higher in the equilibria with less rigidity thus nominal rigidity arises from a failure to coordinate price changes jel e12 e30 keynesian macroeconomics waned in the 1970 s because economists grew disenchanted with its weak microeconomic foundations the central difficulty was that keynesian models were based on ad hoc rigidities in nominal wages and prices the 1980 s produced two approaches to reviving keynesian theory the menu cost literature n gregory mankiw 1985 george akerlof and janet yellen 1985 seeks to provide rigorous explanations for nominal rigidities these papers argue that small frictions in price setting are enough to produce large nominal rigidities in contrast the coordination failure literature russell cooper and andrew john 1988 abandons nominal rigidities and seeks alternative foundations for keynesian models the central idea is that many economic activities such as production e g john bryant 1983 trade e g peter diamond 1982 and investment e g nobuhiro kiyotaki 1988 exhibit synergism or strategic complementarity one agent s optimal level of activity depends positively on others activity strategic complementarity can lead to multiple equilibria with high activity equilibria superior to low activity equilibria thus an economy may be stuck in an underemployment equilibrium even though a superior equilibrium exists models with nominal rigidities and models with coordination failures are often presented as competing paradigms 1 this paper shows that this view is incorrect we take a step toward unifying the foundations of keynesian economics by showing that the two sets of ideas are highly complementary nominal rigidity arises from a failure to coordinate price changes this failure has the essential features of coordination failures in previous models flexibility in one firm s price increases the incentives for other firms to make their prices flexible this strategic complementarity leads to multiple equilibria in the degree of nominal rigidity equilibria with less rigidity more active price adjustment are often pareto superior to equilibria with more rigidity these results contribute to our understanding both of coordination failure and of nominal rigidity the range of keynesian phenomena explained by coordination failures is greatly expanded previous coordination failure models contain only real variables and thus ascribe no role to monetary policy or other determinants of nominal spending our results suggest that coordination failure is at the root of inefficient nonneutralities of money theories of nominal rigidities gain new empirical and policy im

comparing dsge var forecasting models how big are the differences abstract i generate priors for a vector autoregression var from a standard real business cycle rbc model an rbc model with capital adjustment costs and habit formation and a sticky price model with an unaccommodating monetary authority the response of hours worked to a tfp shock differs sharply across these models i compare the accuracy of forecasts made from each of the resulting dynamic stochastic general equilibrium vector autoregression dsge var models despite having different structural characteristics the dsge vars are comparable in terms of forecasting performance as in previous work dsge vars compare favorably with atheoretical vars

interconnections between eurozone and us booms and busts using a bayesian panel markov switching var model summary the proposed panel markov switching var model accommodates changes in low and high data frequencies and incorporates endogenous time varying transition matrices of country specific markov chains allowing for interconnections an efficient multi move sampling algorithm draws time varying markov switching chains using industrial production growth and credit spread data several important data features are obtained three regimes appear with slow growth becoming persistent in the eurozone turning point analysis indicates the usa leading the eurozone cycle amplification effects influence recession probabilities for eurozone countries a credit shock results in temporary negative industrial production growth in germany spain and the usa core and peripheral countries exist in the eurozone copyright 2016 john wiley sons ltd

political accountability and the room to maneuver a search for a causal chain many studies of the room to maneuver make no provision for popular evaluation of policy they assert rather than demonstrate popular satisfaction with policy choices and macroeconomic outcomes the authors present a framework that explicitly models channels for popular preferences to influence policies and outcomes results for economic policy making in britain do not support the room to maneuver thesis in the authors sample 1981 to 1997 the british government was responsive to changes in political evaluations and its policy choices effectively fed back into popular evaluations of government policy however this accountability mechanism worked outside the real economy shifts in popular evaluations induced changes in policy but had no impact on inflation and economic growth government capacity to shape macroeconomic outcomes was limited and popular influence over economic policy was ineffectual this form of accountability probably existed because british citizens had difficulty gauging the real impacts of their government s policies

mean variance portfolio selection in presence of infrequently traded stocks abstract this paper deals with a mean variance optimal portfolio selection problem in presence of risky assets characterized by low frequency trading and therefore low liquidity to model the dynamics of illiquid assets we introduce pure jump processes this leads to the development of a portfolio selection model in a mixed discrete continuous time setting we pursue the twofold scope of analyzing and comparing either long term investment strategies as well as short term trading rules the theoretical model is analyzed by applying extensive monte carlo experiments in order to provide useful insights from a financial perspective

aggregating infinite utility streams with intergenerational equity the impossibility of being paretian it has been known that in aggregating infinite utility streams there does not exist any social welfare function which satisfies the axioms of pareto intergenerational equity and continuity we show that the impossibility result persists even without imposing the continuity axiom and in frameworks allowing for more general domains of utilities than those used in the existing literature

the dynamic impacts of monetary policy an exercise in tentative identification it is currently popular to identify monetary policy shocks with innovations in some measure of reserves or in the federal funds rate these assumptions about the interest elasticity of the supply of or demand for reserves imply monetary policy shocks that produce dynamic responses of macroeconomic variables that are anomalous relative to traditional monetary analyses this paper tentatively identifies supply and demand shocks in the markets for reserves and m2 for the 1980s and contrasts them with results for the 1970s in the later period identified monetary policy shocks have dynamic impacts that are fully consistent with traditional analyses

valuation of power plants abstract in this paper we develop continuous time stochastic control models for valuation and operation of three stylised types of power plants in an electricity market a renewable plant a conventional plant and a storage plant examples of these types of power plants are respectively wind turbines gas fired generation units and hydroelectric facilities we demonstrate how to derive analytical or quasi analytical solutions in spite of many details in modeling in particular we model uncertainty in electricity prices and in production input output when it is relevant for the technology considered input output is assumed to follow a diffusion process whereas the price process may include jumps our models account for special characteristics of the technologies including a non normal distribution of wind speeds as well as start up and shut down costs of thermal units we use our models to assess the impact of conjectured future market conditions such as increasing average price level price volatility and correlation between renewable production and electricity prices

peasants or bankers the american electorate and the u s economy t he usual model of electoral reaction to economic conditions assumes the retrospective economic voter who bases expectations solely on recent economic performance or personal economic experience voter as peasant a second model assumes a sophisticated economic voter who incorporates new information about the future into personal economic expectations voter as banker using the components both retrospective and prospective of the index of consumer sentiment ics as intervening variables between economic conditions and approval we find that the prospective component fully accounts for the presidential approval time series with aggregate consumer expectations about long term business conditions in the approval equation neither the usual economic indicators not the other ics components matter moreover short term changes in consumer expectations respond more to current forecasts than to the current economy the qualitative result is a rational expectations outcome the electorate anticipates the economic future and rewards or punishes the president for economic events before they happen economics moves political behavior with hard times administrations lose support with good times they gain it we know this to be true but when we ask how by what processes the political translation of economic experience occurs the an

a review of the stern review on the economics of climate change the stern review calls for immediate decisive action to stabilize greenhouse gases because the benefits of strong early action on climate change outweighs the costs the economic analysis supporting this conclusion consists mostly of two basic strands the first strand is a formal aggregative model that relies for its conclusions primari ly upon imposing a very low discount rate concerning this discount rate aspect i am skeptical of the review s formal analysis but this essay points out that we are actual ly a lot less sure about what interest rate should be used for discounting climate change than is commonly acknowledged the review s second basic strand is a more intuitive argument that it might be very important to avoid possibly large uncertain ties that are difficult to quantify concerning this uncertainty aspect i argue that it might be recast into sound analytical reasoning that might justify some of the review s conclusions the basic issue here is that spending money to slow global warming should perhaps not be conceptualized primarily as being about consump tion smoothing as much as being about how much insurance to buy to offset the small change of a ruinous catastrophe that is difficult to compensate by ordinary savings

the political manipulation of macroeconomic policy conventional wisdom and some research indicate that macroeconomic policies follow cycles corresponding to political as well as economic forces using vector autoregression analysis i test three models of monetary policy determination for the united states 1953 1984 the electoral cycle model that reelection motivations on the part of presidents create a policy cycle the party differences model that policy changes reflect revolving presidential party administrations and the referendum model that changes in presidential approval create in effect a continuing referendum allowing presidents to monitor their success and change macroeconomic policies when necessary analysis shows that monetary policies as measured by the monetary base and short term interest rates respond to the election cycle and presidential approval although the effect on macroeconomic outcomes is ambiguous party differences are found in real income but are not very significant in other variables

common drifting volatility in large bayesian vars the general pattern of estimated volatilities of macroeconomic and financial variables is often broadly similar we propose two models in which conditional volatilities feature comovement and study them using u s macroeconomic data the first model specifies the conditional volatilities as driven by a single common unobserved factor plus an idiosyncratic component we label this model bvar with general factor stochastic volatility bvar gfsv and we show that the loss in terms of marginal likelihood from assuming a common factor for volatility is moderate the second model which we label bvar with common stochastic volatility bvar csv is a special case of the bvar gfsv in which the idiosyncratic component is eliminated and the loadings to the factor are set to 1 for all the conditional volatilities such restrictions permit a convenient kronecker structure for the posterior variance of the var coefficients which in turn permits estimating the model even with large datasets while perhaps misspecifi

room to move international financial markets and national welfare states a central research question in international political economy concerns the influence of financial markets on government policy outcomes to what extent does international capital mobility limit government policy choices i evaluate the relationship between international financial markets and government policy outcomes with a focus on the government bond market in developed democracies evidence includes interviews with financial market participants and a cross sectional time series analysis of the determinants of interest rates this evaluation suggests that governments of developed democracies face strong but narrowly defined financial market pressures financial market participants are concerned with a few macroeconomic policy indicators including inflation rates and government deficit gdp ratios but not with micropolicy indicators such as the distribution of government spending across functional categories in these areas governments retain policymaking autonomy i conclude by exploring the role of financial market influences within domestic politics and offering suggestions for further research

identifying monetary policy in a small open economy under flexible exchange rates abstract previous empirical study on the effects of monetary policy shocks in small open economies has generated puzzling dynamic responses in various macroeconomic variables this paper argues that these puzzles derive from an identification of monetary policy that is inappropriate for such economies to remedy this it is proposed that a structural model be estimated to explicitly account for the features of the small open economy such a model is applied to canada with tightly estimated results overall the dynamic responses to the identified monetary policy shock are consistent with standard theory and highlight the exchange rate as a transmission mechanism

new models for new labour the political economy of labour party support january 1992 april 1997 this article uses newly available british time series data to analyze dynamic interrelationships among labour vote intentions perceptions that the labour leader would make the best prime minister and labour party identification error correction models reveal that best prime minister perceptions and party identification have important short and long run influences on vote intentions tests of rival models indicate that personal economic expectations outperform other economic evaluations in the vote intention and party identification analyses national retrospective judgments perform well in analyses of best prime minister perceptions and emotional reactions to economic conditions significantly influence these perceptions as well as party identification

property rights entrepreneurship and coordination abstract the notion of plan coordination enjoys a central place in the analysis of institutions and competitive market processes the conventional wisdom is that institutions and policies vary in the extent to which they promote competition and how quickly and completely they bring individuals plans into closer coordination with one another kirzner has provided the most fully elaborated statement on the use of coordination as a positive analytical device for explaining market dynamics and as a normative criterion for evaluating economic policies we identify the core propositions in his analysis that elucidate how economic coordination depends upon that most fundamental of market institutions the system of private property rights we also probe into kirzner s claims about inherent limitations in our ability to compare the coordinative potential of alternative property rights systems we unpack the consequences of these core propositions using the economic theory of property rights we also examine kirzner s assertion that dynamic competition including schumpeterian innovation is necessarily coordinative in its market effects we find that his argument rests on the implicit assumption that property rights remain constant during the process of market adjustment we provide a case study of the advent of commercial aviation as a potential counterexample to his claims

the sources of financial crises pre and post fed evidence this paper investigates the generation and the propagation mechanism of currency demand and supply shocks before and after world war i the structural determinants of the variability of stock prices and interest rates and the changes introduced by the creation of the fed on the dynamics of the system it is shown that in the pre 1914 era external monetary shocks interacted with a seasonal demand for money to produce financial crises the fed helped to prevent crises by insulating the u s economy from external shocks a structural vector autoregressive model provides evidence for these claims copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

sustainability with uncertain future preferences a feature of the sustainability problem is that the preferences of future generations are uncertain in this paper we put forward a fairness based definition of sustainability that takes this uncertainty into account we analyze the implications of this definition in the context of a model of project evaluation we show that our definition encompasses the concepts of non declining welfare and of weak and strong sustainability furthermore we show that preference uncertainty has a substantial influence on the implications of sustainability

measuring the effects of dollar appreciation on asia a favar approach abstract exchange rate shocks have mixed effects on economic activity in both theory and empirical var models in this paper we extend the empirical literature by considering the implications of a positive shock to the u s dollar in a factor augmented vector autoregression favar model for the u s and three large asian economies korea japan and china the favar framework allows us to represent a country s aggregate economic activity by a latent factor generated from a broad set of underlying observable economic indicators to control for global conditions we also include in the favar a global conditions index which is another latent factor generated from the economic indicators of major trading partners we find that a dollar appreciation shock reduces economic activity and inflation not only for the u s economy but also for all three asian economies this result which is robust to a number of alternative specifications suggests that in spite of their disparate economic structures and policy regimes the dollar appreciation shock affects the asian economies primarily through its impact on u s aggregate demand and this demand channel dominates the expenditure switching channel that affects a country s export competitiveness

stochastic pension funding when the benefit and the risky asset follow jump diffusion processes we study the asset allocation of defined benefit pension plans of the type designed and sponsored by firms with the aim of providing a lifetime pension to the employees at the age of retirement benefits are stochastic combining poisson jumps with brownian uncertainty the sponsor dynamically forms portfolios where the risky asset is also subjected to poisson jumps and brownian uncertainty possibly correlated with the evolution of benefits the objective is to assure future benefits while controlling the contribution made to the fund reserves the problem is solved analytically using dynamic programming techniques

sustainable management of fossil fuels a dynamic stochastic optimization approach with jump diffusion abstract this paper deals with a relevant aspect of energy modeling i e fossil fuels management the issue is faced by using purely operational research techniques which are suitable in this context in particular a dynamic stochastic optimization model is developed to optimally determine use and stock of resources to be employed in consumption and investments in a wide economic sense human and physical capital r d etc it is assumed that a sustainability criterion drives the optimality rules i e decisions are also grounded on the well being of future generations the policymaker maximizes an aggregated intergenerational expected utility under the dilemma of present consumption conservation of natural resources for the future in reference to standard environmental economic theory jump diffusion dynamics for the stock of natural resources and infinite time horizon are assumed extensive numerical experiments complete the analysis and contribute to determine fossil fuels management policies showing that long term investments make the difference for the well being of present and future generations

monetary policy shocks and foreign investment income evidence from a large bayesian var abstract this paper assesses the transmission of monetary policy in a large bayesian vector autoregression based on the approach proposed by banbura et al 2010 the paper analyzes the impact of monetary policy shocks in the united states and canada not only on a range of domestic aggregates trade flows and exchange rates but also foreign investment income the analysis provides three main results first a surprise monetary policy contraction has a statistically important impact on both gross and net foreign investment income flows in both countries against the background of growing foreign wealth and investment income this result provides preliminary evidence that foreign balance sheet channels might play an increasingly significant role for monetary transmission second the impact of monetary policy on foreign investment income flows differs considerably across asset categories and over time suggesting that the investment instruments and the currency denomination of a country s foreign assets and liabilities are potentially relevant for the way in which monetary policy affects the domestic economy finally the results support existing evidence on the effectiveness of large vector autoregressions and the bayesian shrinkage approach in eliminating price and exchange rate puzzles

bayesian methods for dynamic multivariate models if dynamic multivariate models are to be used to guide decisionmaking it is important that probability assessments of forecasts or policy projections be provided when identified bayesian vector autoregression var models are presented with error bands in the existing literature both conceptual and numerical problems have not been dealt with in an internally consistent way in this paper the authors develop methods to introduce prior information in both reduced form and structural var models without introducing substantial new computational burdens their approach makes it feasible to use a single large dynamic framework for example twenty variable models for tasks of policy projections copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

justifying social discounting the rank discounted utilitarian approach the popular discounted utilitarian criterion for infinite horizon social choice has been criticized on the ground that it treats successive generations unfairly i propose to evaluate intergenerational welfare with a rank discounted utilitarian rdu criterion instead the criterion amounts to discounted utilitarianism on non decreasing paths but it treats all generations impartially discounting becomes the mere expression of intergenerational inequality aversion i show that more inequality averse rdu societies have higher social discount rates when future generations are better off i apply the rdu approach in two benchmark economic growth models and i prove that it promotes sustainable policies maximizing discounted utility

changing macroeconomic dynamics at the zero lower bound this article develops a change point var model that isolates four major macroeconomic regimes in the us since the 1960s the model identifies shocks to demand supply monetary policy and spread yield using restrictions from a general equilibrium model the analysis discloses important changes to the statistical properties of key macroeconomic variables and their responses to the identified shocks during the crisis period spread shocks became more important for movements in unemployment and inflation a counterfactual exercise evaluates the importance of lower bond yield spread during the crises and suggests that the fed s large scale asset purchases helped lower the unemployment rate by about 0 6 percentage points while boosting inflation by about 1 percentage point

a computable equilibrium model for the study of political economy theory the need for the development and use of a concept of joint political economic equilibrium is increasingly recognized by students of democracy and markets yet to date no adequate theoretical and methodological synthesis of this kind has been produced the few works which have attempted it suffer from a lack of theoretical balance between economic and political theory unrealistic temporally aggregated conceptions of political economic equilibrium failure to incorporate theoretically meaningful stochastic elements of economic and political processes and the absence of a coherent methodology for gauging the empirical power of political economic models methods in the spirit of the ajps workshop it is shown how these problems can be solved an improved model is built one which fuses a branch of real business cycle theory and the theory of presidential approval this model produces a notion of computable political economic equilibrium that provides for market clearing and simultaneous stochastic optimization by economic and political agents then using data analysis techniques developed in parallel by real business cycle theorists hansen and heckman 1996 kydland and prescott 1990 1996 lucas 1987 prescott 1986a 1986b 1991 sims 1996 and political methodologists brady 1996 jackson 1995 the model is parameterized for the united states more specifically on the basis of estimates from economics and political science and some numerical experimentation certain of its parameters are set so that when simulated the model mimics the united states political economy in the 1980s results the parameterized model is used to study some important counterfactuals the first is the impact of increased approval volatility on political economic equilibration such volatility is expected in view of america s likely involvement in the post cold war era s increasing number of low intensity international conflicts the second is the impact of presidents pursuing relatively high nonminimum winning levels of approval this kind of behavior is attributed to certain presidents along with the claim that it has harmful effects on markets and hence on various facets of social welfare the former

mobile capital domestic institutions and electorally induced monetary and fiscal policy the literature on global integration and national policy autonomy often ignores a central result from open economy macroeconomics capital mobility constrains monetary policy when the exchange rate is fixed and fiscal policy when the exchange rate is flexible similarly examinations of the electoral determinants of monetary and fiscal policy typically ignore international pressures altogether we develop a formal model to analyze the interaction between fiscal and monetary policymakers under various exchange rate regimes and the degrees of central bank independence we test the model using data from oecd countries we find evidence that preelectoral monetary expansions occur only when the exchange rate is flexible and central bank independence is low preelectoral fiscal expansions occur when the exchange rate is fixed we then explore the implications of our model for arguments that emphasize the partisan sources of macroeconomic policy and for the conduct of fiscal policy after economic and monetary union in europe

were there regime switches in u s monetary policy working paper 2004 14 june 2004 abstract a multivariate model identifying monetary policy and allowing for simultaneity and regime switching in coefficients and variances is confronted with u s data since 1959 the best fit is with a model that allows time variation in structural disturbance variances only among models that also allow for changes in equation coefficients the best fit is for a model that allows coefficients to change only in the monetary policy rule that model allows switching among three main regimes and one rarely and briefly occurring regime the three main regimes correspond roughly to periods when most observers believe that monetary policy actually differed and the differences in policy behavior are substantively interesting though statistically ill determined the estimates imply monetary targeting was central in the early 80s but was also important sporadically in the 70s the changes in regime were essential neither to the rise in inflation in the 70s nor to its decline in the 80s jel classification e52 e47 c53 key words counterfactuals lucas critique policy rule monetary targeting simultaneity volatility model comparison i the debate over monetary policy change in an influential paper clarida gali and gertler 2000 cgg presented evidence that us monetary policy changed between the 1970 s and the 1980 s indeed that in the 70 s it was drastically worse they found that the policy rule apparently followed in the 70 s was one that when embedded in most stochastic general equilibrium models would imply non uniqueness of the equilibrium and hence vulnerability of the economy to sunspot fluctuations of arbitrarily large size their estimated policy rule for the later period on the other hand eliminated this indeterminacy these results are a possible explanation of the volatile and rising inflation of the 70 s and of its subsequent decline the cgg analysis has two important weaknesses one is that it fails to account for stochastic volatility us macroeconomic variables and particularly the federal funds rate have gone through periods of tranquility and of agitation with forecast error variances varying greatly from period to period ignoring such variation does not lead to inconsistent estimates of model parameters when the forecasting equations themselves are constant but it strongly biases toward a finding of changed parameters tests of the stability of the forecasting equations the other weakness is that the cgg analysis rests on powerful and implausible identifying assumptions they require that we accept that the response of the monetary authority to expected future inflation and output does not depend on the recent history of inflation money growth or output it is hard to understand why this should be so especially in the 70 s when monetarism was a prominent theme in policy debates congress was requiring reports from the fed of projected time paths of monetary aggregates and financial markets were reacting sensitively to weekly money supply numbers the requirement for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in dynamic models is that the monetary policy rule show a more than unit response of interest rates to the sum of the logs of all nominal variables that appear on the right hand side of the reaction function if we force a particular measure of expected future inflation to proxy for all the nominal variables that actually appear independently in the reaction function we are bound to get distorted conclusions on the one hand because expected future inflation will be a noisy measure of the full set of nominal influences on policy we might get downward bias in our estimates from the usual errorsin variables effect on the other hand to the extent that expected future inflation like most expected future values shows less variation than current nominal variables we could find a mistaken scaling up of coefficients

a political explanation of variations in central bank independence although central banks possess a similar function across the industrial democracies their institutional structures their levels of independence differ greatly my explanation of this variation emphasizes the informational asymmetries of monetary policymaking government ministers have informational advantages in the policy process potentially creating conflicts with backbench legislators and in a multiparty government coalition partners an independent central bank can help alleviate these conflicts politicians will choose an independent bank 1 if government ministers party legislators and coalition partners have different monetary policy incentives and 2 if government ministers fear that party legislators and coalition partners will withdraw their support over a policy dispute i statistically test the argument against the cross national variation of central bank institutions i also use the theoretical framework to examine episodes of institutional choice and reform in germany britain and italy

spite and development in a wide variety of settings spiteful preferences would constitute an obstacle to cooperation trade and thus economic development this paper shows that spiteful preferences the desire to reduce another s material payoff for the mere purpose of increasing one s relative payoff are surprisingly widespread in experiments conducted in one of the least developed regions in india uttar pradesh in a one shot trust game the authors find that a large majority of subjects punish cooperative behavior although such punishment clearly increases inequality and decreases the payoffs of both subjects in experiments to study coordination and to measure social preferences the findings reveal empirical patterns suggesting that the willingness to reduce another s material payoff either for the sake of achieving more equality or for the sake of being ahead is stronger among individuals belonging to high castes than among those belonging to low castes because extreme social hierarchies are typically accompanied by a culture that stresses status seeking it is plausible that the observed social preference patterns are at least partly shaped by this culture thus an exciting question for future research is the extent to which different institutions and cultures produce preferences that are conducive or detrimental to economic development

the economics of convention c onventions regulate much of economic and social life yet they have received surprisingly little attention from economists by a convention we mean a pattern of behavior that is customary expected and self enforcing everyone conforms everyone expects others to conform and everyone has good reason to conform because conforming is in each person s best interest when everyone else plans to conform lewis 1969 familiar examples include following rules of the road adhering to conventional codes of dress and using words with their conventional meanings conventions with direct economic implications include species of money and credit industrial and technological standards accounting rules and forms of economic contracts indeed it would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that almost all economic and social institutions are governed to some extent by convention the main feature of a convention is that out of a host of conceivable choices only one is actually used this fact also explains why conventions are needed they resolve problems of indeterminacy in interactions that have multiple equilibria indeed from a formal point of view we may define a convention as an equilibrium that everyone expects in interactions that have more than one equilibrium the economic significance of conventions is that they reduce transaction costs imagine the inconvenience if whenever two vehicles approached one another the important exceptions are sugden 1986 and ullman margalit 1977 the interested reader might also refer to the symposium on social norms that appeared in the fall 1989 issue of this journal with articles by sugden 1989 and elster 1989

the optimal control of emissions and renewable resource harvesting under uncertainty a model of a renewable resource is developed where the growth and quality of the resource are reduced by pollution ambient pollution concentrations and the renewable resource stock are modeled as stochastic processes conditions for the optimal harvest plan and the optimal emissions rate are derived the effect of stochastic variations on the optimal management of the resource is analyzed the steady state joint probability distribution of the resource and pollution stocks is shown to exist under certain conditions

a review of the stern review on the economics of climate change how much and how fast should we react to the threat of global warming the stern review argues that the damages from climate change are large and that nations should undertake sharp and immediate reductions in greenhouse gas emissions an examination of the review s radical revision of the economics of climate change finds however that it depends decisively on the assumption of a near zero time discount rate combined with a specific utility function the review s unambiguous conclusions about the need for extreme immediate action will not survive the substitution of assumptions that are consistent with today s marketplace real interest rates and savings rates

democracy and markets the case of exchange rates the relationships between the workings of democratic institutions and currency markets are studied severa competing propositions about how political re equilibration affects currency markets are derived and tested the results support the view that democratic politics affects currency markets expectations and uncertainty about electoral outcomes and government survival affect the probability of switching between currency market equilibria additionally opinion polls about chief executive performance have a direct effect on the probabilities of switches between currency regimes suggesting that these polls cause currency traders to revise their expectations about the stability of governments and or the contents of public policies electoral institutions mitigate the impact of politics on currency market equilibria political effects are weaker in countries with proportional representation electoral systems than in countries with majority plurality systems there is less evidence that central bank independence consensual corporatist systems or political coherency reduces the effect of politics on currency markets he study of democracy and markets is at the heart of political economy understanding how political equilibration and economic equilibration are related is one of the main challenges facing this field the size and nature of currency markets make them especially important cases substantively with globalization currency markets have become important constraints on elected governments reducing their room to maneuver analytically in comparison to most goods markets currency markets are informationally efficient asset markets with distinctive equilibria today s exchange rate is determined by currency traders fully informed expectations about tomorrow s exchange rate the sensitivity of these markets to the arrival of new information therefore makes them particularly well suited for studying the effects of political news and uncertainty on economic equilibration 1 this article demonstrates there are informationally relevant political factors insofar as exchange rate determination is concerned factors that directly affect the transition probabilities between currency market equilibria moreover these factors vary in important ways across democracies some electoral institutions lessen the effects of politics on currency

the stochastic rotation problem a generalization of faustmann s formula to stochastic forest growth abstract in the present paper we study the optimal cutting strategy 1 2 for an ongoing forest by using stochastic impulse control we show how faustmann s formula can be generalized to stochastic growing forests the paper extends and clarifies previous studies by miller and voltaire 1983 clarke and reed 1989 and reed and clarke 1990

economic outcomes and political support for british governments among occupational classes a dynamic analysis the first section of the article establishes the political salience of macroeconomic issues to the british electorate reviews the distributional consequences of macroeconomic outcomes and suggests that unemployment outcomes in particular have strong class related distributional effects the second part presents a dynamic model of how rational voters evaluate the governing party based on the idea that voters evaluate the cumulative performance of the governing party relative to the prior performance of the current opposition since the present relevance of prior outcomes decays over time voters weight current performance more heavily than past performance informing contemporaneous political judgments the empirical analyses in the third section include measures of nominal economic performance inflation and exchange rate movements and real economic performance unemployment and real income fluctuations the regression results indicate that the responses of political support among the occupational classes to macroeconomic changes are sizeable and that the cross class variations are consistent with the distributional consequences reviewed at the beginning of the article the concluding section develops the electoral implications of the empirical results and presents a novel interpretation of trends in class related political support for the parties the evidence shows that the argument that there has been a persistent decline of class based political alignments in britain is erroneous

the modern history of exchange rate arrangements a reinterpretation we develop a novel system of reclassifying historical exchange rate regimes one key difference between our study and previous classifications is that we employ monthly data on market determined parallel exchange rates going back to 1946 for 153 countries our approach differs from the imf official classification which we show to be only a little better than random it also differs radically from all previous attempts at historical reclassification our classification points to a rethinking of economic performance under alternative exchange rate regimes indeed the breakup of bretton woods had less impact on exchange rate regimes than is popularly believed

shocks and government beliefs the rise and fall of american inflation working paper 2004 22 september 2004 abstract the authors use a bayesian markov chain monte carlo algorithm to estimate a model that allows temporary gaps between a true expectational phillips curve and the monetary authority s approximating nonexpectational phillips curve a dynamic programming problem implies that the monetary authority s inflation target evolves as its estimated phillips curve moves the authors estimates attribute the rise and fall of post world war ii inflation in the united states to an intricate interaction between the monetary authority s beliefs and economic shocks shocks in the 1970s altered the monetary authority s estimates and made it misperceive the tradeoff between inflation and unemployment that misperception caused sharp rise in inflation in the 1970s the authors estimates indicate that policy makers updated their beliefs continuously by the 1980s policy makers beliefs about the phillips curve had changed enough to account for fed chairman paul volcker s conquest of u s inflation in the early 1980s jel classification e3 e5 key words updating beliefs policy evaluation self confirming equilibrium nash inflation ramsey outcomes i introduction today many statesmen and macroeconomists believe that inflation can largely be determined by a government monetary authority then why did the federal reserve board preside over high us inflation during the late 1960s and the 1970s and why under paul volcker did it rapidly bring inflation down during the early 1980s this paper answers these questions by estimating a model that features a particular process that makes a procession of economic shocks induce the monetary authority to alter its model of inflation unemployment dynamics the phillips curve at each date t the monetary authority updates its beliefs about the phillips curve and then recomputes a first period action recommended by a phelps problem a discounted dynamic programming problem that minimizes the expected value of a discounted quadratic loss function of inflation and unemployment 1 the monetary authority pursues the same objectives at each date using the same structural model with only its estimates of that model changing over time 2 this model of the systematic part of inflation puts the monetary authority s beliefs about the phillips curve front and center 3 we assume that the monetary authority s model of the phillips curve deviates in two subtle but important ways from what it would be in a rational expectations model e g kydland and prescott 1977 the first deviation is that while the true phillips curve is like kydland and prescott s we assume that the monetary authority omits the public s expected rate of inflation from its phillips curve by itself this omission need not prevent the outcomes of our model from coinciding with those of kydland and prescott s nor need it imply that the government s model is wrong in a way that could be detected from even an infinite sample whether the monetary authority s model is wrong in a statistically detectable way depends on how we allow the monetary authority to reestimate the parameters of its model in particular if the monetary authority were to believe that the coefficients of its phillips curve are constant over time then its estimates would converge to ones that support a self confirming equilibrium sce after convergence its estimated phillips curve would correctly describe occurrences along the sce path for inflation and unemployment such an after convergence version of our model has little hope of explaining the rise and fall of us inflation that model would have inflation fluctuating randomly around a constant sce level that coincides with kydland and prescott s time consistent suboptimal i e excessive level 4 this outcome motivates our second subtle deviation from a rational expectations equilibrium