a political economy model of congressional careers our main goal is to quantify the returns to a career in the united states congress we specify a dynamic model of career decisions of a member of congress and estimate this model using a newly collected dataset given estimates of the structural model we assess reelection probabilities estimate the effect of congressional experience on private and public sector wages and quantify the value of congressional seat moreover we assess how an increase in the congressional wage or the imposition of term limits would affect the career decisions of politicians and the returns from a career in congress

the transparency of politics and the quality of politicians politics has always attracted the attention of the media citizens organizations and the general public recent years have also witnessed a global process of spectacularization of politics which among other things has resulted in a dramatic increase in the amount of information available about many facets of political life politicians for example are public figures and much of what they do is now the object of close public scrutiny nevertheless the extent to which various aspects of what goes on within the political sector are observable from the outside which we refer to as the transparency of politics still varies a great deal across countries for example while in some countries all individual votes in the legislature are part of the public record e g the united states and sweden this is not the case in others e g italy and spain also while many democracies have adopted disclosure laws that require political parties and politicians to report all the contributions they receive e g canada and the united kingdom such laws are not in place in several other countries e g austria and finland it is therefore interesting to ask whether the transparency of politics may be systematically related to political outcomes and whether more transparency would lead to better outcomes in particular in this article we analyze the relationship between the transparency of politics and the quality of politicians and focus on the recruitment of politicians by political parties parties represent a fundamental institution of representative democracy and are the political sector analogues of firms in the market sector by and large politicians are affiliated with a party and typically start their political careers by working for party organizations see e g heinrich best and maurizio cotta 2000 hence the recruiting decisions of parties determine the quality of the pool of politicians

the probability of sale and price premiums in withdrawn auctioned properties this paper examines the impact of the auction process of residential properties that whilst unsuccessful at auction sold subsequently the empirical analysis considers both the probability of sale and the premium of the subsequent sale price over the guide price reserve and opening bid the findings highlight that the final achieved sale price is influenced by key price variables revealed both prior to and during the auction itself factors such as auction participation the number of individual bidders and the number of bids are significant in a number of the alternative specifications

politicians outside earnings and electoral competition this paper deals with the impact of electoral competition on politicians outside earnings in our framework politicians face a tradeoff between allocating their time to political effort or to an alternative use generating outside earnings the main hypothesis is that the amount of time spent on outside work is negatively related to the degree of electoral competition we test this hypothesis using a new dataset on outside earnings of members of the german federal assembly and find that politicians facing low competition have substantially higher outside earnings

an economic model of representative democracy this paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office the approach has a number of attractive features first it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by as well as of the people second the model is analytically tractable being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally third it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy

political competition and politician quality evidence from italian municipalities we use data from italian local level governments for the years 1985 2008 to investigate whether political competition affects the quality of politicians as measured by some ex ante characteristics such as educational level and type of job held we handle endogeneity problems through an instrumental variable approach using as an instrument for political competition a variable taking into account whether the previous municipal council survived until the end of its legislative term two stage least square estimates support the view that political competition positively affects politician quality results are robust to different measures of political competition and to different estimation strategies

illegal immigration and resource allocation this paper studies the effects of illegal immigration and the associated expansion of the underground economy on the allocation of resources commodity prices and wages of workers both in the short run when occupational mobility is restricted and in the long run when the skill composition of the labor force is endogenous the paper goes on to consider some of the fiscal implications of illegal immigration and the related expansion of underground activity effects of sanctions against employers hiring illegal aliens and measures to legalize the status of clandestine foreign workers are also examined the geographical focus is on developed countries primarily the united states and europe excerpt

the simple analytics of optimal growth with illegal migrants this paper analyses the impact of illegal migration on the optimal path of domestic resident consumption the analysis draws two important conclusions first if illegal migrants and domestic labour are perfect substitutes illegal migration necessarily lowers the long run per capita consumption of domestic residents second if illegal migrants and domestic labour are imperfect substitutes the effect on the long run per capita domestic consumption is ambiguous however in the cobb douglas case the result is clear cut and per capita domestic consumption rises as a result of illegal migration

implications of immigration policies for the u s farm sector and workforce i background in 1942 the united states and mexico signed the bracero program a formal agreement to draw seasonal labor to work in u s agriculture which provided employment opportunities to poor rural mexicans 1 however this program was abolished in 1964 ending the legal seasonal labor supply to u s agriculture in the southwestern states concurrently the united states passed the immigration act of 1965 establishing a quota of 120 000 legal immigrants per year the abandonment of the bracero program the new legal immigrants quota limits and economic inequality between the united states and mexico paved the way for steady entry of illegal laborers and led to eventual insurmountable illegal immigration population in the united states because illegal immigration was not a serious problem in the 1960s and 1970s legislation addressed only the number of legal immigrants allowed to enter the united states but in the 1980s illegal immigration began to emerge as a national problem and extensive debates entrenched around issues such as preventing the entry of unauthorized workers providing public services to illegal immigrants and even legalizing these workers consequently the u s congress attempted to address the immigration problems by enacting the 1986 immigration reform and control act irca the goals of irca were to eliminate the stock of undocumented workers through amnesty 2 and domestic enforcement of employer sanctions and curb the influx of illegal immigrants by increasing the border surveillance amnesty failed to eliminate the stock of illegal immigrants because only about half of the illegal immigrants filed for citizenship and it created future expectation of amnesty and more illegal unauthorized entry furthermore domestic sanctions on employers of undocumented workers and deportation of these workers were scantly enforced to stop the influx of immigrants irca focused heavily on tightening border control the irca also legislated the h 2a program which allowed agricultural employers to bring in guest workers during seasonal operations ers 2007 however farmers complained that the cumbersome paperwork of h 2a and bureaucratic delay were not conducive to procure seasonal laborers at the time of peak farm operations such as vegetable and fruit picking 3 in spite of irca s amnesty provision and strengthened control measures illegal immigration continued to rise about 12 million unauthorized immigrants resided in the united states in 2007 martin 2007 which is reaffirmed by many popular press reports leading to an extended congressional debate that began at the start of this decade to solve the illegal immigration problem several bills were proposed by the house of representatives the senate and the white house addressing issues related to increased domestic and border enforcements 4 paths to citizenship and guest worker programs montgomery 2006 these bills were not passed because of major disagreements among lawmakers over providing citizenship and guest worker programs as a result of the failed legislations and the september 11 attack the government primarily focused on border security accordingly funding for border enforcement has steadily increased 5 and resources were diverted from domestic to border enforcement however boucher and taylor 2007 documented that increased funding to secure the border did not deter undocumented workers from crossing the border because determined immigrants eventually find a way to enter the country by repeated attempts following september 11 2001 the u s immigration and customs enforcement ice further decreased the number of human hours devoted to worksite inspection because monitoring critical infrastructure took priority gao 2005 for example from 1999 to 2003 the number of human hours for domestic enforcement decreased from 480 000 to 18 000 6 7 but by late 2005 the u

legal status and earnings of agricultural workers agricultural workers who work in the united states earn 15 more on average than do undocumented workers these earnings differentials vary substantially with demographic characteristics for example much of the weekly earnings loss from not having legal status can be offset by language ability most of the earnings differential is due to wage differentials rather than hours differentials

separation of powers and political accountability political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave room for abuse of power in democracies elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials but they are not sufficient separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps to prevent the abuse of power but only with appropriate checks and balances checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy in this way the two bodies discipline each other to the voters advantage under appropriate checks and balances separation of powers also helps the voters elicit information

political selection and persistence of bad governments we study dynamic selection of governments under different political institutions with a special focus on institutional flexibility a government consists of a subset of the individuals in the society the competence level of the government in office determines collective utilities e g by determining the amount and quality of public goods and each individual derives additional utility from being part of the government e g rents from holding office we characterize the dynamic evolution of governments and determine the structure of stable governments which arise and persist in equilibrium in our model perfect democracy where current members of the government do not have veto power over changes in governments always leads to the emergence of the most competent government however any deviation from perfect democracy to any regime with incumbency veto power destroys this result there is always at least one other less competent government that is also stable and can persist forever and even the least competent government can persist forever in office we also show that there is a nonmonotonic relationship between the degree of incumbency veto power and the quality of government in contrast in the presence of stochastic shocks or changes in the environment a regime with less incumbency veto power has greater flexibility and greater probability that high competence governments will come to power this result suggests that a particular advantage of democratic regimes with a limited number of veto players may be their greater adaptability to changes rather than their performance under given conditions finally we show that royalty like dictatorships may be more successful than junta like dictatorships because in these regimes veto players are less afraid of change

stock auction bidding behavior and information asymmetries an empirical analysis using the discriminatory auction model framework abstract this paper empirically analyzes bidding behavior and information asymmetries of stock auctions using a discriminatory auction model framework analyzing stock auctions using auction theory is important because it provides a logical framework for explaining observable behaviors and a solid foundation for empirical testing because of limited availability of stock auction data existing empirical research based on auction theory focus mainly on treasury auctions away from the treasury markets however there is a significant paucity of literature on this subject in this study we make use of a detailed stock auction data set from the taiwan stock exchange to empirically examine the behaviors of the taiwan stock auction market within the framework of the auction theory our results show that the level of competition the dispersion of opinion among bidders and the bidder s risk aversion are significant in determining auction prices results also show that if the offering prices are set equal to the average offering prices the first day post initial public offering abnormal return will be equal to zero additionally we find institutional bidders possess superior bidding skills compared to small bidders and that underwriter s characteristics influence the bidding results

electoral competition and politician turnover abstract in this paper we analyze the selection by opportunistic parties of the candidates who run for election we consider a setting with incomplete but symmetric information about the candidates abilities in which electoral campaigns provide voters with additional information about candidates parties care only about selecting an appropriate candidate to win the election while voters elect the best candidate conditional on their information we first argue that in order to defeat an established very good candidate of its rival a party may favor a new candidate with highly uncertain ability rather than an established good candidate next we establish that the discrepancy between the objective of parties and the objective of the electorate leads to inefficient conservatism in the selection of candidates i e each party keeps its incumbents too often from the voters viewpoint

illegal immigration a supply side analysis abstract this paper analyzes the supply side determinants of illegal immigration using a three sector general equilibrium model of the source country agricultural liberalization raises illegal immigration while liberalization of the high tech sector reduces it in contrast capital mobility in the source country renders trade policy ineffective for controlling illegal immigration paradoxically increased enforcement by the host country may raise source country unskilled wages although illegal immigration falls finally under capital mobility a rise in the source country restrictions on capital inflow raises the level of illegal immigration and reduces the effectiveness of border enforcement efforts by the host country

treasury auction bids and the salomon squeeze recent press accounts claim that collusion is common practice in treasury auctions and that as a result the auction profits are excessive but this paper finds that the auction prices are on average marginally higher than the secondary market bid prices the auction profits however are systematically related to the total fraction of winning bids tendered by banks and dealers the postauction prices of the two year notes in which salomon brothers had a 94 percent holding are also examined the secondary market prices of these notes were significantly higher than the estimated competitive prices in the four week postissue period

the welfare effects of illegal immigration abstract this paper extends the work of ethier on illegal immigration by examining the optimal level of enforcement for the labor importing country in a two country model and by considering the effects of allowing capital mobility we derive a formula for the optimal level of enforcement against firms that hire illegal workers and show that the presence of enforcement costs makes the policy less efficient than a wage tax with capital mobility foreign workers gain from an increase in enforcement in the home country because capital is driven out of the home country

lobbying political competition and local land supply recent evidence from spain abstract we analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition and interpret the findings as indications of the influence wielded by land developer lobbies we use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2 000 spanish municipalities for the period 2003 2007 in spain land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities needing periodically to pass comprehensive land use plans the main policy variable in these plans and the one analyzed here is the amount of land classified for potential development we measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government this variable is however potentially endogenous since not only do votes affect policy but also policy is expected to affect votes to deal with this problem we instrument this variable using the votes at the first national legislative elections following the re establishment of democracy and votes actually obtained regionally at the same type of election the results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development this effect is found to be most marked in suburbs in towns with a high percentage of commuters and homeowners and in municipalities governed by the left

the impact of immigration enforcement on the u s farming sector this paper examines the eects of state and local immigration enforcement eorts on the u s farming sector we use variation in enforcement eorts generated by the timing of adoption of 287 g programs by state and county law enforcement agencies allowing local ocers

managerial incentive problems a dynamic perspective the paper studies how a person s concern for a future career may influence his or her incentives to put in effort or make decisions on the job in the model the person s productive abilities are revealed over time through observations of performance there are no explicit output contingent contracts but since the wage in each period is based on expected output and expected output depends on assessed ability an implicit contract links today s performance to future wages an incentive problem arises from the person s ability and desire to influence the learning process and therefore the wage process by taking unobserved actions that affect today s performance the fundamental incongruity in preferences is between the individual s concern for human capital returns and the firm s concern for financial returns the two need be only weakly related it is shown that career motives can be beneficial as well as detrimental depending on how well the two kinds of capital returns are aligned it is well understood by now that informational externalities may place special demands on the organization of economic exchange simple price mediated markets will frequently fail in the presence of asymmetric information in that case more elaborate contractual arrangements have to be used as substitutes for the price system lately considerable effort has been devoted to the analysis of contracting under incomplete information with the objective to understand the range of economic institutions that emerge in response to the failure of the price system the analysis of moral hazard has played a prominent role in this development moral hazard problems arise when for some reason or another transacting parties cannot contract contingent on the delivery of the good for instance in buying labour services it may be that the amount of labour supplied is not directly observable precluding a simple exchange of wage for labour as a partial remedy to this problem an imperfect mutually observed signal about the supply of labour can be used as a proxy in the contract frequently output is taken as such a proxy the drawback is that output is often influenced by other factors than labour input which induce undesirable risk into the contract one is therefore faced with a tradeoff between allocating risk associated with incomplete observability and providing incentives for a proper supply of labour gaining insight into this tradeoff is important not only for understanding contracting in the small e g managerial incentive schemes but also because it is closely related to the fundamental tension between equity and efficiency in the society as a whole while our understanding of moral hazard has advanced a lot in past years it is clear that much work remains an important question that has received little attention until

use of mip for planning temporary immigrant farm labor force abstract growers of many fruit and vegetable crops in the us are heavily reliant on hand labor to perform all of the necessary operations throughout the growing season when the current supply of domestic hand labor is insufficient growers can employ nonimmigrant foreign workers through the h 2a visa program to perform any additional agricultural tasks a common criticism of the program is that it is an onerous process that places the burden of proof on growers and requires them to demonstrate that there is a shortage of domestic workers this requires growers to start their employment decision making months before the growing season starts using limited knowledge about the upcoming season since no labor focused decision making tools exists for growers a mixed integer programming model is presented in this article which develops tactical level planting harvesting and labor acquisition schedules for use by growers to determine the appropriate number of h 2a workers needed this formulation is applied to an average farm in the yuma arizona region as a case study in addition the study is extended to show how the model can be employed as a regulatory tool to determine the economic impact from modifying the h 2a application policy this analysis in the yuma region demonstrated that increasing the h 2a program provides a positive economic incentive offset by moderate domestic job displacement

on the macroeconomic and welfare effects of illegal immigration abstract this paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium model with labor market frictions to explore the economic consequences of illegal immigration in the baseline model native workers and illegal foreign workers compete for jobs in the same market but serve as imperfect substitutes in production the calibrated model generates a u shaped relationship between long run domestic consumption and the population share of illegal immigrants after taking into account both consumption and leisure i found that an increase in illegal immigration can generate significant welfare gains for the natives the baseline model is then extended to include heterogeneous workers in the domestic population

the expected stop out price in a discriminating auction abstract optimal bidding strategies and expected seller revenues in price discriminating auctions have been derived in previous studies we extend this research by characterizing the behavior of the expected stop out price for such auctions

signalling by underwriter retention rate in the ipo market underwriters in taiwan have to purchase 10 25 of shares offered in initial public offerings ipos for their own accounts we present a signalling model showing that the underwriter retention rate can serve as a signal of firm value to investors because underwriters are investors as well this mechanism can reduce information asymmetry between issuers and investors the model shows that when underwriters retain more proportion of ipo shares in equilibrium the initial return is greater and the subscription success rate is lower we further test the propositions using 616 ipo firms in taiwan for the period 1998 2004 overall the empirical results support the propositions developed from the signalling model

on the form of transfers to special interests an important question in political economy concerns the form of transfers to special interests the chicago view is that political competition leads politicians to make such transfers efficiently the virginia position is that lack of information on the part of voters leads politicians to favor inefficient sneaky methods of redistribution this paper analyzes the form of transfers in a model of political competition in which politicians have incentives to make transfers to special interests it shows that when voters have imperfect information about both the effects of policy and the predispositions of politicians inefficient methods of redistribution may be employed

paying politicians theory and evidence this paper looks at the theory behind the idea that paying politicians better will improve their performance the paper lays out a political agency model with adverse selection and moral hazard where politicians are subject to two period term limits this model provides a number of predictions about how the pay of politicians affects agency problems we also consider what happens when the pool of politicians is endogenous the main ideas in the model are confronted with data on u s governors jel d72 j33

the demand for stocks an analysis of ipo auctions we analyze a unique dataset that includes the full demand schedules of 27 israeli ipos that were conducted as nondiscriminatory uniform price auctions to the best of our knowledge this is the first time the whole demand schedule for any asset is described the demand schedules are relatively flat around the auction clearing price the average elasticity is 27 the elasticity is low when the return distribution contains a large unique component we also find a significant average abnormal return of 4 5 on the first trading day and a positive correlation between the abnormal return and the elasticity of demand article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

political competition policy and growth theory and evidence from the us this paper develops a simple model to analyse how a lack of political competition may lead to policies that hinder economic growth we test the predictions of the model on panel data for the us states in these data we find robust evidence that lack of political competition in a state is associated with anti growth policies higher taxes lower capital spending and a reduced likelihood of using right to work laws we also document a strong link between low political competition and low income growth

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

organised crime institutions and political quality empirical evidence from italian municipalities this article assesses how legal institutions affect the influence of politically active criminal organisations on the human capital of elected politicians using data from over 1 500 southern italian municipalities in the period 1985 2011 it exploits municipal government dissolutions imposed by the national government for presumed mafia infiltration as a source of exogenous variation in the presence of politically active criminal organisations the results support theoretical predictions that the average education level of local politicians significantly increases when active mafia infiltration of local politics is remedied through the implementation of a stricter legal institutional framework

illegal aliens unemployment and immigration policy abstract this paper develops a simple two country model of illegal immigration in an attempt to examine the interaction among variables such as the stock of migrant labor the unemployment rates of the two economies and the rate of spending by the host country on the enforcement of its immigration restrictions the focus of the analysis is on the dynamics of immigration policy and on its role in determining the nature of the mechanism by which disturbances to the labor market of one country are transmitted to that of the other in the short run and in the long run

electoral competition and political selection an analysis of the activity of french deputies 1958 2012 abstract in this paper we study the relation between electoral competition and political selection using a unique dataset containing detailed yearly information about members of the french national assembly from 1958 to 2012 first we innovate by proposing a measure of deputy activity to obtain insight into political selection as we gathered information on the many aspects of deputies individual work we use a nonparametric composite indicator of deputy activity that fully acknowledges the multidimensional nature of parliamentary work we argue that this measure of activity is positively correlated with competence and intrinsic motivation two components of politicians quality second we exploit the large time span of our dataset to study the evolution of the relationship between electoral competition and political selection over time overall our results show that deputies elected in a priori contested districts have a higher overall activity with the intensity of this relationship reaching its peak in the 80 s but constantly decreasing since then

the simple analytics of optimal growth with illegal migrants a clarification abstract this paper reexamines the welfare effects of illegal immigration studied by hazari and sgro the simple analytics of optimal growth with illegal migrants journal of economic dynamics and control 28 1 141 151 in contrast to their negative conclusion we obtain ambiguous welfare prediction which is due to the presence of two opposing effects at work a positive exploitation effect and a negative intertemporal effect with cobb douglas production technology we show that per capita domestic consumption rises in the presence of illegal migration

the valuation of complex derivatives by major investment firms empirical evidence this article examines the auction of a portfolio of collateralized mortgage obligations cmos to major broker dealers and institutional investors the unique data set allows us to analyze a number of important empirical questions related to the valuation of cmos by the bidders and the elasticity of demand for the securities the results reveal that the valuations differ substantially implying a significant elasticity of demand this article is designed to shed light on two related questions first it extends the work of bagwell 1991 1992 brown and ryngaert 1990 and bradley desai and kim 1988 among others on shareholder heterogeneity and the elasticity of the demand for financial assets to date the empirical research on investor heterogeneity has focused on common stock this article supplements previous work by examining an auction of another class of securities complex collateralized mortgage obligations cmos to major securities dealers and institutional investors second it provides perspective on fixed income valuation models in the spirit of cox ingersoll and ross 1985 and black derman and toy 1990 virtually all of these models even those that specify relatively complex interest rate processes assume homogeneous beliefs this implies that within the constraints imposed by estimation error sophisticated investors should place equal values on fixed income securities bagwell observes that investors can be heterogeneous along several dimensions first heterogeneity can be induced by tax rules to the extent that different investors are taxed in different ways their demand for securities will be affected second transaction costs can cause heterogeneity by driving a wedge between buyers sellers and owners of a security third investors can differ in their assessments of the value of a security either because they possess different information or because they analyze that information in different ways fourth investors can face different nontradeable risks and thus can have different assessments of the value of a security depending on how it interacts with these risks finally it has been suggested by lee shleifer and thaler 1991 among others that investors may differ for idio

competition and incentives with motivated agents a unifying theme in the literature on organizations such as public bureaucracies and private nonprofits is the importance of mission as opposed to profit as an organizational goal such mission oriented organizations are frequently staffed by motivated agents who subscribe to the mission this paper studies incentives in such contexts and emphasizes the role of matching the mission preferences of principals and agents in increasing organizational efficiency matching economizes on the need for high powered incentives it can also however entrench bureaucratic conservatism and resistance to innovations the framework developed in this paper is applied to school competition incentives in the public sector and in private nonprofits and the interdependence of incentives and productivity between the private for profit sector and the mission oriented sector through occupational choice jel d23 d73 h41 l31 the late twentieth century witnessed a historic high in the march of market capitalism with unbridled optimism in the role of the profit motive in promoting welfare in the production of private goods moreover this generated a broad consensus on the optimal organization of private good production through privately owned competitive firms when it comes to the provision of collective goods no such consensus has emerged debates about the relative merits of public and private provision still dominate this paper suggests a contracting approach to the provision of collective goods it focuses on two key issues how to structure incentives and the role of competition between providers at its heart is the idea that organizations that provide collective goods cohere around a mission 2 thus production of collective goods can be viewed as mission oriented

pay for politicians and candidate selection an empirical analysis abstract a growing theoretical literature on the effect of politicians salaries on the average level of skills of political candidates yields ambiguous predictions in this paper we estimate the effect of pay for politicians on the level of education of parliamentary candidates we take advantage of an exceptional reform where the salaries of finnish mps were increased by 35 in the year 2000 intended to make the pay for parliamentarians more competitive a difference in differences analysis using candidates in municipal elections as a control group suggests that the higher salary increased the fraction of candidates with higher education among female candidates while we find no significant effect for male candidates

resource security competition for global resources strategic intent and governments as owners we develop a resource security theory by examining the intent of acquisitions of scarce resources by multinational firms results suggest that owners of firms can shape the intent of resource acquisitions specifically state owned enterprises soes tend to acquire and pay more for resources for exploration rather than exploitation this is because soes owners governments are most concerned with securing their country s future we contribute to the literature by suggesting that ownership influences resource acquisitions that resource security is of importance to multinational enterprises and that soes invest abroad to safeguard both their own and their home countries future

us immigration policies and dynamics of cross border workforce in agriculture given the contentious debate on immigration this study develops a dynamic model to analyse the effects of stricter border and domestic enforcement and streamlining the guest worker programme on cross border migration from mexico employment and production in us labour intensive and mexican agriculture and the us and mexican wage rates the model incorporates labour leisure decisions of mexican workers and labour market dynamics and linkages the findings show stricter border and domestic controls exacerbate the labour shortage problems and reduce the us agricultural production streamlining the guest worker programme provides a steady supply of farm workers and has negligible impact on the us wage

an analysis of bidding in the japanese government bond auctions we examine the bidding patterns and auction profits in the japanese government bond jgb auctions and empirically test the predictions of auction theory we find that the average profit in jgb auctions is not reliably different from zero and the degree of competition and the level of uncertainty are insignificant in determining auction profits the winning shares of the u s dealers are positively related to auction profits whereas the winning shares of their japanese counterparts show a negative association we also find that the share of winnings of japanese dealers tends to be correlated with the share of winnings of their compatriot dealers but a similar relation is not found for u s dealers

discriminatory versus uniform treasury auctions evidence from when issued transactions abstract we use when issued transactions data to assess the treasury s current experiment with uniform auctions when issued volume is higher under uniform as compared to discriminatory auctions suggesting a higher information release which should reduce pre auction uncertainty and the winner s curse under uniform auctions when issued volatility falls after the auction and again after the outcome announcement the pattern is the opposite for discriminatory auctions this is further evidence that uniform auctions increase pre auction information and lower the short squeeze a direct comparison of markups in uniform and discriminatory auctions yields mixed results

the making of economic policy a transaction cost politics perspective economic policymaking as a political process the normative approach to policy analysis the positive view of political economy a synthesis the policy process in real time a theme transaction costs the transaction cost politics framework political outcomes and economic efficiency transaction cost analysis in politics mechanisms to cope with transaction costs in politics national differences two case studies to illustrate transaction cost politics tax and expenditure reform in the united states the gatt and national trade politics some reflections and suggestions some lessons for the policy process the role of the economist concluding comments appendix multiprincipal multitask agencies

electoral bias and policy choice theory and evidence this paper develops an approach to studying how bias in favor of one party due to the pattern of electoral districting affects policy choice we tie a commonly used measure of electoral bias to the theory of party competition and show how this affects party strategy in theory the usefulness of the approach is illustrated using data on local government in england the results suggest that reducing electoral bias leads parties to moderate their policies

taxes and bribery the role of wage incentives this paper presents a simple model to evaluate alternative payment schemes for tax inspectors in the presence of corruption we consider problems of both moral hazard which arises because taking bribes cannot be observed without costly monitoring and adverse selection since not all potential tax inspectors can be identified as being honest or dishonest we identify three wage regimes first one could pay the same wage that a tax inspector could earn elsewhere his reservation wage second one could pay a wage which solves the moral hazard problem i e deters bribery this we call an efficiency wage by analogy with recent models examined i n macro economics third the government could pay a wage below the reservation wage at which only the dishonest become tax inspectors the capitulation wage we make precise the conditions under which each yields the greatest amount o f tax revenues net o f administrative costs many countries in the developing world are undergoing structural adjustment programmes which require fundamental fiscal changes outside agencies advise restoration of budget balance a task which involves expenditure cuts and tax increases the treatment of public employee pay scales often poses a particular dilemma i n this process wages and salaries are a significant component of government expenditures and one important question concerns the extent to which wages rather than employment cuts should be used to save money there is sometimes a reluctance to advocate wage cuts stemming in part from a feeling that this might impair the performance of the public sector hence tanzi 1990 argues that a policy of wage cutting is likely to increase the inefficiency of public sector employees especially at a time when the public sector is expected to play a larger role in restructuring the economy p 16 in the context of tax collection the issue is particularly pressing given the need to raise more tax revenues a reduction in efficiency in this branch of the government i s likely t o mean that fewer returns are processed and when individuals living standards are squeezed their incentive to accept bribes in lieu o f collecting taxes i s increased o n this count i t i s even sometimes suggested that wages of tax inspectors should be increased to aid the effort to the comments of henry bienen john hey and two anonymous referees have been helpful in revising this paper the authors are also grateful t o the john m olin program for the study o f economic organization and public policy at princeton university and the pew charitable trusts for financial support mclaren also acknowledges support from the international finance section of princeton university none of the above should be implicated in any way see for example goode 1984 chapter 1 3 and gould and amaro reyes 1983

parties as political intermediaries this paper argues that parties regulate competition among like minded factions so as to enhance reputation building by and voter trust in the politicians standing for a given cause while intra and interparty competition contributes to keeping politicians on their toes unbridled competition may encourage politicians to challenge good platforms and to wage competition along socially suboptimal dimensions for example by privileging form over content the paper builds a simple model of intraparty competition and studies whether various hierarchical or democratic party institutions constitute an efe cient form of party governance the paper shows that intraparty disagreements when they occur hurt the party s position in the general election but that their possibility enhances party image and that parties must be able to avoid behind the scene allocations of portfolios and spoils in order to be credible last it analyzes the impact of political polarization and interparty competition on the choice of party governance

foreign aid and illegal immigration abstract we develop a two country model of illegal immigration we analyse the effect of foreign aid on illegal immigration and consider both exogenous and endogenous income repatriation in the former an increase in aid increases illegal immigration if the total amount of aid is small a transfer of resources from border control to aid increases illegal immigration when the total amount of aid is small under endogenous income repatriation aid has no effect on illegal immigration when the preferences of the immigrants and their family members are the same if the preferences are different aid may increase illegal immigration

a model of political competition with citizen candidates the authors develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates a winner implements her favorite policy the equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of running and positively on the benefits of winning for some parameter values all equilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates whose positions are distinct two candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule than under a runoff system the candidates positions are less differentiated under a runoff system there exist equilibria under both systems in which some candidates have no chance of winning