reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests we analyze reputation effects in two player repeated games of strictly conflicting interests in such games player 1 has a commitment action such that a best reply to it gives player 1 the highest individually rational payoff and player 2 the minmax payoff players have equal discount factors with positive probability player 1 is a type who chooses the commitment action after every history we show that player 1 s payoff converges to the maximally feasible payoff when the discount factor converges to one this contrasts with failures of reputation effects for equal discount factors that have been demonstrated in the literature journal of economic literature classification number c71

the minimum variance hedge ratio under stochastic interest rates in an environment where interest rates are stochastic we examine the case of a pure hedger endowed with a fixed position in a long term bond in contrast to conventional wisdom according to which the difference between hedging through forward contracts and futures is immaterial it turns out that the minimum variance hedge ratio using forwards comprises two terms instead of one only when using futures the magnitude of the difference between the two hedge ratios may be important under some plausible assumptions this result is due to the presence of additional interest rate risk that bears on the profit and loss statement associated with the forward position this sheds some additional light on the respective features of forward and futures contracts written on interest rate sensitive securities

a note on taxes and the pricing of treasury bill futures contracts futures contracts in general and treasury bill futures in particular are taxed in a manner that provides individual investors with an apparent opportunity the irs currently considers all futures contracts to be capital assets unlike other capital assets however the holding period for long term gains is six months for futures contracts but only long positions qualify all gains and losses on short positions are short term regardless of the holding period the asymmetrical tax treatment of short and long positions gives individual investors the opportunity to profit at the expense of the government the investor takes a long position in a futures contract with over six months to maturity and holds the position for six months if at that time he has a loss he sells the position recording a short term loss if he has a gain he holds the position another day and records a long term gain by this strategy all gains are taxed as long term gains and all losses are short term the opportunity is even greater in the treasury bill futures market cash treasury bills are not treated as capital assets so that all gains and losses are ordinary to take advantage of this fact the investor takes a long position in a futures contract with over six months to maturity if he has a gain on the last trading day he liquidates his futures contract and records a long term gain if he has a loss he waits until the contract matures and takes delivery of the bills

forward and futures prices with markovian interest rate processes the authors derive a closed form expression for the differences between forward and futures prices in the framework of a lucas equilibrium model they calculate this difference for fixed income securities in two ways using historic interest rate data to calibrate the matrix of nominal state prices and testing a large sample of randomly generated state price matrices in both cases the authors find few meaningful differences between forward and futures prices larger differences are generated from highly diagonal state price matrices the authors conclude that in economically relevant circumstances the costs of marking to market for fixed income securities are negligible copyright 1994 by university of chicago press

relative pricing of eurodollar futures and forward contracts past research explains observed spreads between futures and forward eurodollar yields as being due to the futures contract s mark to market feature we derive closed form solutions for this yield spread and show that theoretically it should be small also differences in liquidity taxation and default risk cannot account for the large spreads observed we also present evidence that the spreads which are nonnegligible primarily in the first half of the sample period are likely to be attributable to the mispricing of futures contracts relative to the forward rates and that the mispricing was gradually eliminated over time

a two sided reputation result with long run players abstract we establish reputation results under two sided incomplete information for a class of repeated games we consider a repeated game that satisfies the assumptions of either atakan and ekmekci 2012 3 or cripps et al 2005 6 and we assume that both players are stackelberg types with positive probability if the stage game is not a common interest game then equilibrium play converges to the unique equilibrium of a continuous time war of attrition as the stage game is repeated arbitrarily frequently alternatively if the stage game is a common interest game then the players equilibrium payoffs converge to their highest payoffs as the stage game is repeated arbitrarily frequently

reputation and perfection in repeated common interest games abstract we consider a wide class of repeated common interest games perturbed with one sided incomplete information one player the informed player might be a commitment type playing the pareto dominant action as discounting which is assumed to be symmetric and the prior probability of the commitment type go to zero it is shown that the informed player can be held close to her minmax payoff even when perfection is imposed on the equilibrium journal of economic literature classification numbers c73 d83

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

reputation in long run relationships we model a long run relationship as an infinitely repeated game played by two equally patient agents in each period the agents play an extensive form stage game of perfect information with either locally non conflicting interests or strictly conflicting interests there is incomplete information about the type of player 1 while player 2 s type is commonly known we show that a sufficiently patient player 1 can leverage player 2 s uncertainty about his type to secure his highest pay off compatible with player 2 s individual rationality in any perfect bayesian equilibrium of the repeated game copyright 2012 oxford university press

bargaining and reputation the paper develops a reputation based theory of bargaining the idea is to investigate and highlight the influence of bargaining postures on bargaining outcomes a complete information bargaining model a la rubinstein is amended to accommodate irrational types who are obstinate and indeed for tractability assumed to be completely inflexible in their offers and demands a strong independence of procedures result is derived after initial postures have been adopted the bargaining outcome is independent of the fine details of the bargaining protocol so long as both players have the opportunity to make offers frequently the latter analysis yields a unique continuous time limit with a war of attrition structure in the continuous time game equilibrium is unique and entails delay consequently inefficiency the equilibrium outcome reflects the combined influence of the rates of time preference of the players and the ex ante probabilities of different irrational types as the probability of irrationality goes to zero delay and inefficiency disappear furthermore if there is a rich set of types for both agents the limit equilibrium payoffs are inversely proportional to their rates of time preference

an empirical analysis of implicit delivery options in the treasury bond futures contract abstract assuming perfect frictionless and efficient markets this paper develops a framework to estimate the composite value of the quality wild card and end of month options implicit in the t bond futures contract the value of delivery options is shown to be the excess of forward price of the cheapest bond over its conversion factor times the exercise price of futures contract empirical results indicate that the option values over the last quarter of the nearby contract are on average less than 0 5 percent of the mean futures price which is substantially lower than the value reported by previous studies further scrutiny reveals that although the empirical estimates are contaminated by non synchronous bond data they are consistent with certain known theoretical properties of option values

correlated contracts in oligolopoly the author considers a market that consists of two competing franchise systems and focuses attention on franchise agreements that specify the payment of the franchisees as a quantity contingent nonlinear price schedule at the equilibrium the schedule of wholesale prices reflects both an informational and a strategic component where the informational component is weakened if the unit costs of competing franchisees are correlated one of the multiple equilibria that exist with correlation enables each franchiser to extract the complete producer surplus franchisers may prefer however other equilibria where franchisees can earn positive informational rents copyright 1995 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

a continuous time equilibrium model of forward prices and futures prices in a multigood economy abstract this paper is a theoretical investigation of equilibrium forward and futures prices we construct a rational expectations model in continuous time of a multigood identical consumer economy with constant stochastic returns to scale production using this model we find three main results first we find formulas for equilibrium forward futures discount bond commodity bond and commodity option prices second we show that a futures price is actually a forward price for the delivery of a random number of units of a good the random number is the return earned from continuous reinvestment in instantaneously riskless bonds until maturity of the futures contract third we find and interpret conditions under which normal backwardation or contango is found in forward or futures prices these conditions reflect the usefulness of forward and futures contracts as consumption hedges

the temporal price relationship between s p 500 futures and the s p 500 index this paper empirically examines the intraday price relationship between s p 500 futures and the s p 500 index using minute to minute data three stage least squares regression is used to estimate lead and lag relationships with estimates for expiration days of the s p 500 futures compared with estimates for days prior to expiration the results suggest that futures price movements consistently lead index movements by twenty to forty five minutes while movements in the index rarely affect futures beyond one minute

a comparison of futures and forward prices abstract this paper uses the pricing models of cox ingersoll and ross 1981 richard and sundaresan 1981 and french 1982 to examine the relation between futures and forward prices for copper and silver there are significant differences between these prices the average differences are generally consistent with the predictions of the futures and forward price models however these models are not helpful in describing intra sample variations in the futures forward price differences this failure is apparently caused by measurement errors in both the price differences and in the explanatory variables

options on the spot and options on futures this paper analyzes and compares the valuation of two types of options that relate to the same asset options on the asset itself and options on the futures on the asset the early exercise privilege plays a central role in explaining the differences between the values of the two options it is shown that in the case of a cash instrument that does not make interim payments such as gold the value of a call option on the spot is smaller than the call option on the futures contract the opposite is true for put options the early exercise boundaries which characterize when it pays to exercise are also compared and analyzed the financial markets have recently witnessed a proliferation of various types of listed options on commodities and on financial assets commencing with call options on individual common stocks recent innovations have included call and put options on treasury bonds metals foreign currencies and stock market

delivery uncertainty and the efficiency of futures markets this paper examines the effects of the delivery basis risk embedded in nearly all futures contracts on efficiency tests of these markets examining soybean futures contracts we show that delivery basis risk has important implications for market efficiency tests as suming no delivery basis risk the market efficiency hypothesis is rejected however fu tures prices contain signiflcant time varying expected delivery basis and time varying ex pected delivery risk premiums once these expected delivery basis and delivery risk premiums are accounted for the apparent inefficiency is eliminated equilibrium spot prices also contain signiflcant time varying expected delivery risk premiums

an ex post valuation of the quality option implicit in the treasury bond futures contract abstract this paper develops three empirical estimates of the value of the quality delivery option implicit in the treasury bond futures contract a an ex ante value as given by the excess of forward price of the cheapest to deliver bond over its conversion factor times the futures price b an ex post value equal to the payoffs to a strategy of buying and holding a short futures long forward position at the start and delivering the cheapest bond at the expiration of futures contract and c another ex post value equal to the sum of payoffs to a continuous rollover strategy involving a short futures long forward position in the cheapest to deliver bonds three months prior to delivery the average values of the three estimates are 464 329 and 2 075 respectively the differences among the three estimates appear to be largely due to nonsynchronous spot futures data

strategic spin offs of input divisions abstract when a downstream producer enters backward into the input market a helping the rivals effect exists such entry hurts the firm s downstream business as it increases upstream competition and thus benefits its rival downstream firms this negative externality prevents the newly created upstream unit from expanding a spin off enables the firm to credibly expand in the input market thereby forcing its upstream competitors to behave less aggressively spin offs occur in equilibrium if and only if the number of downstream firms exceeds a threshold level when there is more than one integrated firm a spin off by a firm can trigger spin offs by others that would not occur otherwise

forward contracts and futures contracts abstract this paper provides a detailed discussion of the similarities and differences between forward contracts and futures contracts under frictionless markets and continuous trading simple arbitrage arguments are invoked to value forward contracts to relate forward prices and spot prices and to relate forward prices and futures prices we also argue that forward prices need not equal futures prices unless default free interest rates are deterministic

disappearance of reputations in two sided incomplete information games abstract this paper examines the sustainability of reputations in a class of games with imperfect public monitoring and two long lived players both of whom have private information about their own type and uncertainty over the types of the other player this class namely reputation games with one sided moral hazard can capture economic interactions that may involve hidden information or hidden action extending the techniques of cripps et al 2004 it is found that neither player can sustain a reputation permanently for playing a noncredible behavior in these games and the reputations disappear uniformly across all nash equilibria

bargaining and reputation in search markets in a two sided search market agents are paired to bargain over a unit surplus the matching market serves as an endogenous outside option for a bargaining agent behavioral agents are commitment types that demand a constant portion of the surplus the frequency of behavioral types is determined in equilibrium even if the frequency of behavioral types is negligible they aect the terms of trade and eciency in an unbalanced market where the entering

intra day tests of the efficiency of the treasury bill futures market in this paper we use intra day prices to examine the efficiency of the treasury bill futures market the use of intra day data allows us to carefully match in time trades in the futures and cash markets by matching trades and allowing delays between observing apparent inefficiencies and the trade we are examining realistic trading strategies we find profitable arbitrage swaps and a preferred strategy for initial purchase these profits do not depend on an assumption of an equilibrium model hence these tests are direct tests of efficiency rather than a joint test of efficiency and equilibrium t his paper examines the efficiency of the treasury bill futures market this subject has been examined before by capozza and cornell 1979 cornell 1981 lang and rasche 1978 rendleman and carabini 1979 vignola and dale 1979 poole 1978 and puglisi 1978 there are a number of reasons why this paper makes an important contribution to the literature the first reason is that by using trade by trade futures prices we can make more realistic assumptions about the pnces at which trades could have taken place this paper uses intra day prices to examine efficiency prior studies at best used closing prices to examine apparent inefficiencies and assumed that transactions took place at these closing prices there are two problems with this procedure first simultaneous transactions cannot actually occur at closing prices there is almost an hour difference between the closing of the chicago futures and new york spot markets thus when the closing spot market price is observed the futures market has been closed for about an hour closing prices could be used to judge apparent discrepancies however it would be necessary to execute trades at the open making decisions based on closing prices and then assuming trades can take place at these prices is an approximation which could significantly affect results in addition using only closing prices ignores any intra day trades which could lead to profits in this study we match in time intra day prices in the spot and futures market these matched prices are used to identify apparently profitable trading rules we then assume trades take place at prices which are observed later in the day this is a test of a trading rule which an investor could actually follow as we discuss later in the paper our results differ from prior studies these differences are primarily due to using intra day prices and carefully matching times so that information used to initiate trades would actually be available to the investor at the time of the trade the second reason is that we examine more complex trading strategies than those which have been employed in other studies the random walk literature provides a useful analogy the original random walk studies simply correlated past and future prices or returns later studies examined filter rules and other more complicated trading rules in this study we employ alternative trading rules of increased complexity to test for the existence of trading profits finally we explicitly examine the consequence of t bills futures contracts being futures rather than forward contracts futures contracts unlike forward contracts involve flows every settlement day the intermediate cash flows on futures contracts can affect the profitability of any strategy the only prior study that even considered this effect is the one by rendleman and carabini 1979 they used the theoretical model of cox ingersoll and ross 1981 to try to estimate whether the difference between forward and futures prices was likely to be large enough to affect the payoff from alternative trading strategies this is a useful first attempt however ultimately the effect of daily settlement or marking to the market has to be examined directly as part of trading strategies to see if it affects the outcome of these strategies there are other problems with prior studies these involve gross estimates of prices and averaging data in a way that can mask inefficiencies since these problems are discussed in some detail in rendleman and carabini there is no reason to review them further here probably no area in finance has received more attention than the efficiency literature the reader may well wonder why even given the approximareceived for publication august 23 1982 revision accepted for publication may 20 1983 new york university new york university and baruch college respectively the authors would like to thank the center for the study of futures markets at columbia business school for financial support

is more information always better a case in credit markets this paper studies the impact of behavioral and non behavioral information contained in consumer credit reports on the credit market a repeated game of incomplete information between a borrower and a sequence of lenders is considered lenders beliefs regarding the borrower s type depend on the borrower s historical loan performance and other informative signals it is established that for low beliefs strategic defaults occur in equilibrium as the borrower defaults on his loans despite having the ability to repay them further as the ancillary signals become increasingly informative of the borrower s type the range of beliefs over which strategic defaults occur expands this increase in strategic defaults highlights an unintended negative effect of allowing informative signals to influence beliefs on the upside the informative signals allow lenders to learn the borrower s type more quickly

crossing mother entrepreneur franchisees attempts to reduce franchisor influence abstract contractual terms guide many entrepreneur franchisees actions with the franchisor however it is impossible for franchisors to completely specify all future actions they compensate by continually attempting to influence franchisees using what franchisees perceive as suasion in their ongoing interactions we develop a theoretical framework for understanding the informal interaction dynamics between franchisors and franchisees most franchise arrangements include the payment of royalties based on sales this encourages a growth oriented strategy usually appropriate for the franchisees during the initial stages of their operations whereas a franchising strategy can reduce entreprenerial risk for franchisees it does not eliminate it thus as sales of the franchisees increase profit oriented strategies will be favored because they represent the payoffs that accrue to continuing entrepreneurial effort and risk taking these strategies may be in opposition to franchisors sales orientation when market conditions do not allow continual growth without margin penalties a research model is developed depicting the relationship between franchisees strategies and performance and the moderating effect that contractual goals and franchisees perception of franchisors attempts at suasion have on this relationship a set of research hypotheses was then empirically tested using a large sample of franchisees from the commercial truck retailing industry the results indicate that sales growth and profit growth goals are not always congruent balancing the goals of the franchisor and franchisee did not appear to be a popular option either one or the other was emphasized more importantly the results indicate that when franchisees perceive attempts by franchisors to use suasion lower levels of profits result but there is no corresponding increase in the level of sales in the long term franchisors are likely to determine that current contractual arrangements are not protecting their longer term interests thus they will be expected to attempt to modify franchise contracts in ways that force franchisees to implement sales gain strategies this will require that entrepreneur franchisees anticipate future events more carefully at the time they are examining the original franchise contract because most entrepreneurs are concerned with immediate survival at the start up stage this makes examination of the contract less likely to happen the franchise option is attractive because it reduces such risks we recommend that entrepreneurs write ex ante contingent claims contracts that ensure a gradual reduction of franchisor influence although this would assume a power or knowledge balance that favors the franchisees which is unlikely during the start up phase it will change over time as franchisees gain a better understanding of the local competitive dynamics thus it may well serve the franchisees to take a defensive posture or push a royalty arrangement that decreases the emphasis on sales over time this is most likely to be effective where the entrepreneur is considering several competing franchises at the time of the signing of the contract finally we recommend that entrepreneur franchisees should not assume that the expert advice offered by their franchisor is always in their best interests although technical advice is more likely to be unbiased and should be fully exploited as this is what makes the franchise valuable strategic advice or that which relates to goal setting may well be colored by the financial interests of the franchisor franchisors are unlikely to consider the possibility that franchisees would be better served by formulating their own strategies nor are they likely to consider that the franchise network would be better off in the longer term by the collective impact associated with numerous franchisees independently formulating their own strategies in short although we do not suggest that franchisees should always assume that crossing mother is the best response to all perceived franchisor suasion efforts they should carefully examine all strategic advice

bargaining reputation and equilibrium selection in repeated games with contracts consider a two person intertemporal bargaining problem in which players choose actions and offers each period and collect payoffs as a function of that period s actions while bargaining proceeds this can alternatively be viewed as an infinitely repeated game wherein players can offer one another enforceable contracts that govern play for the rest of the game theory is silent with regard to how the surplus is likely to be split because a folk theorem applies perturbing such a game with a rich set of behavioral types for each player yields a specific asymptotic prediction for how the surplus will be divided as the perturbation probabilities approach zero behavioral types may follow nonstationary strategies and respond to the opponent s play in equilibrium rational players initially choose a behavioral type to imitate and a war of attrition ensues how much should a player try to get and how should she behave while waiting for the resolution of bargaining in both respects she should build her strategy around the advice given by the nash bargaining with threats nbwt theory developed for two stage games in any perfect bayesian equilibrium she can guarantee herself virtually her nbwt payoff by imitating a behavioral type with the following simple strategy in every period ask for and accept nothing less than that player s nbwt share and while waiting for the other side to concede take the action nash recommends as a threat in his two stage game the results suggest that there are forces at work in some dynamic games that favor certain payoffs over all others this is in stark contrast to the classic folk theorems to the further folk theorems established for repeated games with two sided reputational perturbations and to the permissive results obtained in the literature on bargaining with payoffs as you go

a comparison of forward and futures prices of an interest rate sensitive financial asset this paper focuses on contractual distinctions as an explanation for the price divergence between futures and forward contracts specifically it investigates the effect of marking to market on the observed price differences using the pricing model described in cox ingersoll and ross cir 1981 journal of financial economics 9 321 346 using previously unavailable data this paper employs eurodollars an interest rate sensitive financial asset to test the cir model unlike prior empirical studies test results support both the weak prediction concerning the sign of the average price difference and the stronger prediction that specific covariances explain the variation in the price differences futures contracts and forward contracts are fundamentally similar both contracts are agreements between two parties to trade a specific good or asset at a future date at a price determined today these agreements facilitate the transfer of risk between contracting parties permitting the creation of hedging strategies in spite of their conceptual similarity the implementation of these two contracts is quite different participants in futures markets trade highly standardized contracts by open outcry on organized exchanges clearing associations tor the exchanges control default risk by assuming the opposite side of each transaction guaranteeing payment to reduce traders incentive to default the exchanges mark positions to market by settling contract gains and losses daily in contrast to the futures market the market for forward contracts is mostly an over the counter market in the absence of a clearinghouse trader reputation helps control default risk unlike futures contracts no markingto market occurs the parties in the contract make no payments until maturity of the contract the forward market for financial interest rate instruments departs even further from the futures market format a trader can use the cash market for interest rate instruments to establish a forward position for example a trader can secure a forward position for a three month t bill beginning three months in the future by buying a t bill with a six month maturity and selling a t bill with a three month maturity

currency risk hedging futures vs forward abstract the objective of this paper is to address the issue of choosing between currency forward and currency futures contracts when hedging against currency risk within a stochastic interest rates environment we compare between the hedging effectiveness of the two derivative assets both within a narrow sense i e volatility minimization and within a wide sense i e risk return trade off when judging hedging effectiveness in the narrow sense forward and futures contracts give identical results even if they do not have identical prices when judging hedging effectiveness in the wide sense the choice between the two contracts is determined by the correlation between the domestic and the foreign term structures dynamics

taxes and the pricing of stock index futures stock index futures prices are generally below the level predicted by simple arbitrage models this paper suggests that the discrepancy between the actual and predicted prices is caused by taxes capital gains and losses are not taxed until they are realized as constantinides demonstrates in a recent paper this gives stockholders a valuable timing option if the stock price drops the investor can pass part of the loss on to the government by selling the stock on the other hand if the stock price rises the investor can postpone the tax by not realizing the gain since this option is not available to stock index futures traders the futures prices will be lower than standard no tax models predict on 24 february 1982 the kansas city board of trade began trading futures contracts on the value line average stock index during the next two months both the chicago mercantile exchange and the new york futures exchange also initiated trading in stock index futures although these contracts are actively traded their prices have puzzled both practitioners and academics the observed

real and nominal interest rates under uncertainty the fisher theorem and the term structure this paper examines the relation between nominal and real interest rates and the nominal and real term structure under uncertainty we show that two separate risk terms cause the fisher theorem to fail one risk term is related only to the variability of money prices while the other is related to the purchasing power riskiness of the nominal bond monetary policy can affect the value of both these risk terms we also show that the pure expectations hypothesis of the term structure fails for both real and nominal bonds because of risk premia even if the economy is neutral with respect to monetary policy monetary policy can alter the nominal term structure

whose sabbath matters or when does the weekend effect occur abstract the weekend effect and other seasonal anomalies in financial markets are now familiar in many countries in searching for explanations for the weekend effect in particular it would be helpful to know when exactly it occurs whatever the it may be that produces the effect since most countries do not have weekend trading in financial assets the timing of it has not been narrowed down israel has trading in all financial assets except currency trading on sunday by examining day of the week effects for israel it appears that the weekend effect occurs on sunday late in the day and not an friday evening ar saturday other seasonal anomalies in israel seem to be similar to those elsewhere the generalizability of the findings to other countries is discussed

direct tests of index arbitrage models previous tests of stock index arbitrage models have rejected the no arbitrage constraint imposed by these models this paper provides a detailed analysis of actual s p 500 arbitrage trades and directly relates these trades to the predictions of index arbitrage models an analysis of arbitrage trades suggests that i short sale rules are unlikely to affect the cashfutures mispricing ii the opportunity cost of arbitrage funds exceeds the treasury bill rate and iii the average price discrepancy captured by arbitrage trades is small tests of the models provide some support for a version ofthe arbitrage model that incorporates an early liquidation option the ability of these models to explain arbitrage trades however is surprisingly low

the relation between forward prices and futures prices abstract this paper consolidates the results of some recent work on the relation between forward prices and futures prices it develops a number of propositions characterizing the two prices these propositions contain several testable implications about the difference between forward and futures prices many of the propositions show that equilibrium forward and futures prices are equal to the values of particular assets even though they are not in themselves asset prices the paper then illustrates these results in the context of two valuation models and discusses the effects of taxes and other institutional factors

price dynamics in foreign currency futures markets abstract nested tests of samuelson s submartingale and martingale models of price behavior in an efficient futures market find significant autocorrelation at low lags in daily changes of log prices for four of ten currency futures contracts satisfying the assumptions of the statistical tests negative serial correlation following large price changes is also found the analysis controls for bias due to institutional limits on daily price movements simulated trading based on out of sample forecasts suggests the dependencies probably could be exploited by traders who are members of the futures exchange to earn net profits greatly exceeding buy and hold

indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts abstract we study whether allowing players to sign binding contracts governing future play leads to reputation effects in repeated games with long run players we proceed by extending the analysis of abreu and pearce 2007 by allowing for the possibility that different behavioral types may not be immediately distinguishable from each other given any prior over behavioral types we construct a modified prior with the same total weight on behavioral types and a larger support under which almost all efficient feasible and individually rational payoffs are attainable in perfect bayesian equilibrium thus whether reputation effects emerge in repeated games with contracts depends on details of the prior distribution over behavioral types other than its support

taxes and the futures forward price difference in the 91 day t bill market this paper investigates a tax based explanation for the futures forward price divergence in the ninety one day t bill the explanation is firstly in terms of the distinction between capital gains and losses and ordinary gains and losses and secondly in terms of investors to whom the above distinction applies and investors such as broker dealers to whom it does not the empirical results are encouraging though more ambiguous in the post 1981 period overall it would seem that other factors in addition to taxes are also at work copyright 1989 by ohio state university press

bayesian repeated games and reputation the folk theorem characterizes the subgame perfect nash equilibrium payoffs of an undiscounted or discounted infinitely repeated game with fully informed patient players as the feasible individually rational payoffs of the one shot game to which extent does the result still hold when every player privately knows his own payoffs under appropriate assumptions private values and uniform punishments the nash equilibria of the bayesian infinitely repeated game without discounting are payoff equivalent to tractable completely revealing equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial bayesian game this characterization does not apply to discounted games with sufficiently patient players in a class of public good games the set of nash equilibrium payoffs of the undiscounted game can be empty while limit perfect bayesian nash equilibrium payoffs of the discounted game as players become infinitely patient do exist these equilibria share some features with the ones of multi sided reputation models