consistent voting rules for competitive local public goods economies abstract we establish the existence of a voting market equilibrium for a large class of local public goods economies where faced with prices of the private goods and with the public goods produced by the local governments each firm maximizes its profits and each individual maximizes his utility subject to his budget constraint in addition each local government taking the prices of private goods as given i has a balanced budget and ii chooses its production of public goods in such a way that no group that contains more than q q 1 of its residents where q denotes the number of public goods produced will unanimously prefer another affordable vector of public goods

political influence motives and the choice between tariffs and quotas abstract tariffs and quotas are not symmetric under a variety of circumstances this paper pursues the implications of one such circumstance domestic market power for the political choice of protectionist instrument in the context of a political support maximization model tariffs dominate quotas in the political model in the absence of revenue seeking motives in the presence of revenue seeking ambiguity arises but limits can be placed on the range of tariff or quota levels also some welfare implications emerge

product and price competition in a duopoly this paper examines the role of consumer preferences costs and price competition in determining the competitive product strategy of a firm in the model studied here there are two identical firms competing on product quality and price they face consumers who prefer a higher quality product to a lower quality product but differ in how much they are willing to pay for quality the consumers can also choose a substitute if they don t like the product price offerings of the two firms for the firms a higher quality product costs more to produce than a lower quality product the paper shows that the equilibrium strategy for each firm should be to differentiate its product from its competitor with the firm choosing the higher quality choosing the higher margin as well this differentiation however is not efficient that is it is possible to choose two other products and offer them at prices that cover their marginal cost and still satisfy consumers needs better in the aggregate a monopolist by contrast would differentiate his product line efficiently this suggests that cannibalization has different effects on product strategy than competition the paper also shows that if one firm enters the market first then it can defend itself from later entrants and gain a first mover advantage by preempting the most desirable product position

quality based competition profitability and variable costs we consider the impact of variable production costs on competitive behavior in a duopoly where manufacturers compete on quality and price in a two stage game in the pricing stage we make no assumptions regarding these costs other than that they are positive and increasing in quality and no assumptions about whether or not the market is covered in the quality stage we investigate a broad family of variable cost functions and show how the shape of these functions impacts equilibrium product positions profits and market coverage we find that seemingly slight changes to the cost function s curvature can produce dramatically different equilibrium outcomes including the degree of quality differentiation which competitor is more profitable the one offering higher or lower quality and the nature of the market itself covered or uncovered our model helps to predict and explain the diversity of outcomes we see in practice something the previous literature has been unable to do

competition and the number of firms in a market are duopolies more competitive than atomistic markets this paper uses a variant of the standard search model to examine market equilibrium and the consequences for market equilibrium of an increase in the number of firms if marginal search costs increase with the number of searches then the demand curve facing any firm will be kinked with the elasticity of demand with respect to price decreases being less than with respect to price increases prices may not change in response to changes in marginal costs as the number of firms increases the maximum price that is consistent with equilibrium increases to the monopoly price but the minimum price decreases on the other hand if marginal search costs decrease with the number of searches equilibrium if it exists is characterized by a

brand equity and vertical product line extent this paper addresses the question of how the vertical structure of a product line relates to brand equity does the presence of premium or high quality products in a product line enhance brand equity conversely does the presence of economy or low quality products in a product line diminish brand equity economists and marketing researchers refer to variation in quality levels of products within a category as vertical differentiation whereas variation in the function or category of the products is referred to as horizontal differentiation much of the existing research on the relationship between product line structure and brand equity has focused on the horizontal structure of the product lineand has been primarily concerned with brand extensions what happens when the product line of a brand is extended horizontally into new categories researchers have been concerned primarily with how the extension fares but the effect of the extension on the core products is also important there is an analogous question of what happens when the product line of a brand is extended vertically either up market or down market this question of vertical extensions is part of the more general issue of how the vertical structure of a product line relates to brand equity the specific research questions addressed in this paper are 1 do premium or high quality products enhance the brand equity associated with the other products in the line 2 conversely do economy or low quality products diminish the brand equity associated with the other products in the line these research questions are relevant to three managerial issues in product line strategy first what are the costs and benefits of including down market products within a brand second what are the implications of including high end models within a brand third when should high end and low end products be offered under an existing brand umbrella and when should these products be offered under separate brands we address these research questions empirically through an analysis of the models and brands within the u s mountain bicycle industry we use price premium above that which can be explained by the physical characteristics of the bicycle as a metric for brand equity we then test several hypotheses related to the relationship between extension of the product line upward and downward and the price premium commanded by the brand we further support this analysis with a simple laboratory experiment the analysis reveals that price premium in the lower quality segments of the market is significantly positively correlated with the quality of the lowest quality model in the brand s product line and that for the upper quality segments of the market price premium is also significantly positively correlated with the quality of the highest quality model in the brand s product line the results of the analysis are supported by the outcome of an experiment in which 63 percent of the subjects preferred a product offered by a high end brand to the equivalent product offered by a low end competitor these results imply that managers wishing only to maximize the equity of their brands would offer only high quality products and avoid offering low quality products however this result must be moderated by the overall objective of maximizing profits maximizing profits is likely to involve a tradeoff between preserving high brand equity and therefore high margins and pursuing the volume typically located in the lower end of the market one of the most significant implications of this research is that product line managers need to be mindful not just of the incremental cannibalization or stimulation of sales of products that are immediate neighbors of an extension to the product line but also the effect of such an extension on the brand equity in other possibly quite different parts of the product line

conspicuous consumption and sophisticated thinking consumers purchase conspicuous goods to satisfy not only material needs but also social needs such as prestige in an attempt to meet these social needs producers of conspicuous goods like cars perfumes and watches highlight the exclusivity of their products in this paper we propose a monopoly model of conspicuous consumption using the rational expectations framework and then examine how purchase decisions are affected by the desire for exclusivity and conformity we show that snobs can have an upward sloping demand curve but only in the presence of consumers who are weakly followers laboratory tests lend support for this model prediction and for the rational expectations framework the experimental results suggest that subjects used some degree of sophisticated thinking to arrive at their first period decisions their behavior in the subsequent trials however can be adequately captured by a purely adaptive learning mechanism we discuss the implications of consumer learning for optimal dynamic pricing policy by a monopolist

research note trading up a strategic analysis of reference group effects reference groups influence product and brand evaluations especially when the product is a publicly consumed luxury good marketers of such luxury goods need to carefully balance two important social forces 1 the desire of leaders to distinguish themselves from followers and 2 the countervailing desire of followers to assimilate with leaders in this paper we examine the theoretical implications of these social forces for firm prices product design and target consumer selection we show that the presence of reference group effects can motivate firms to add costly features which provide limited or no functional benefit to consumers furthermore reference group effects can induce product proliferation on one hand and motivate firms to offer limited editions on the other hand we find that offering a limited edition can increase sales and profits in some cases reference group effects can even lead to a buying frenzy

do consumers search for the highest price oligopoly equilibrium and monopoly optimum in differentiated products markets we develop a model of search among substitutes for the best combination of commodity variant and price in which the structure of search costs is manipulable by the suppliers of these variants e g by joining an existing market or opening a new one we analyze the subgame perfect equilibria arising in a multistage game involving specialized firms choice of entry variant and price and we compare them to a multiproduct monopolist s optimal choice we show that equilibrium prices increase in the number of substitutes sold in one market and that in the situation considered here monopoly increases welfare

existence of equilibrium in a lobbying economy this paper establishes the existence of equilibrium in a model with a central authority that sets relative prices in response to agents political activity to a small open economy we graft a government price setting program that responds to the lobbying pressure of opposing interests the proof involves reformulating the lobbying economy as a noncooperative generalized game establishing the existence of an equilibrium in the game and showing that a game equilibrium is an equilibrium in the economy agents choice sets are found to be nonconvex a difficulty that we resolve by an appropriate restriction on preferences

an experiment on spatial competition with endogenous pricing hotelling s 1929 principle of minimum differentiation and the alternative prediction that firms will maximally differentiate from their rivals in order to relax price competition have not been explicitly tested so far we report results from experimental spatial duopolies designed to address this issue the levels of product differentiation observed are systematically lower than predicted in equilibrium under risk neutrality and compatible with risk aversion the observed prices are consistent with collusion attempts our main findings are robust to variations in three experimental conditions automated vs human market sharing rule for ties individual vs collective decision making and even vs odd number of locations

the east end the west end and king s cross on clustering in the four player hotelling game nicolaas j vriend i introduction despite the popularity of simple location models in industrial economics and voting theory in the tradition following hotelling 1929 and despite the recent rise of the experimental method in economics there have been only few experimental tests of such models brown kruse et al 1993 and brown kruse and schenk 1999 study models with elastic demand while collins and sherstyuk 2000 focus on the simpler case which we address too where demand is inelastic collins and sherstyuk implement a model with three agents who choose locations on a line segment with a uniform density of consumers who due to the assumption of inelastic demand can also be seen as voters with one vote each it is well known that this game has no pure strategy equilibrium see eaton and lipsey 1975 normalizing the line segment to the unit interval the unique mixed strategy equilibrium prescribes uniform randomization over the middle two quarters for all firms see shaked 1982 as it is a well established fact that experimental subjects have difficulties in randomizing see for example rapoport and budescu 1997 it is not very surprising that collins and sherstyuk do not find strong support for the equilibrium hypothesis their empirical distribution of choices is m shaped and has a considerably larger support than the equilibrium distribution in this study we analyze the case of four agents with uniform consumer density and inelastic demand as the equilibrium of this case implies that two firms locate at the edge of the first and second quarters and the other two at the edge of the third and fourth quarters this setup seems ideal for the investigation of various matters first there is no other number of agents where the equilibrium prediction has a better chance to be valid 1 with three competitors the unique symmetric equilibrium is mixed with five the unique equilibrium configuration is asymmetric and implies unequal payoffs and with six and more agents the equilibrium configurations cease to be unique thus only the two and the four agent cases yield unique pure and symmetric equilibrium configurations that give identical payoffs to all agents second the equilibrium in the four agent case has a property that makes it interesting from a behavioral and empirical point of view not only the focal midpoint is empty but the whole middle segment of the linear city is empty as well that is notwithstanding the nice theoretical properties the equilibrium is not entirely intuitive and is also conflicting with casual empirical evidence there are no cities without shops in the center nor are there democracies without parties located in the political middle ground the picture we will discern in our experimental data can be summarized in the following experimental result in the four seller case the equilibrium prediction is of substantial but limited help about one third of all choices are clustered around the equilibrium locations but in no session do we observe convergence to equilibrium at the same time the focal midpoint exerts a considerable attraction with almost 10 of all choices clustered around it consumers profit from this considerably in the form of lower transportation costs the remainder of the article is organized as follows in section ii we give a theoretical account of the model we implement in section iii we present the experimental design in section iv we analyze the results and explain the data and section v concludes ii theory consider a linear city in which four firms produce a good at constant marginal cost the price of the good is fixed due to some unmodeled features of the market consequently costs can be normalized to zero and the price to one to sell the goods the firms simultaneously choose a location on the unit interval 0 1

a comparison of alternative crop response models three parsimonious models are hypothesized to represent com yield response to nitrogen and phosphorus each model imposes specific restrictions with regard to the elasticity of factor substitution and growth plateau nonnested hypothesis tests are used to evaluate the competing hypotheses the results support the restrictions imposed by the mitscherlich baule model for these data corn response is characterized by limited substitution between nitrogen and phosphorus and a growth plateau further the cost of using optimal input levels implied by the mitscherlich baule if it were not true is small relative to the other parsimonious forms and a translog approximation

package size decisions we describe a model examining how a firm might choose the package size and price for a product that deteriorates over time our model considers four factors 1 the usable life of the product 2 the rates at which consumers use the product 3 the relation between package size and the variable cost of the product and 4 the minimum quantities consumers seek to consume for each dollar they spend we call these reservation quantities we allow heterogeneity in the usage rates and reservation quantities for the consumers we show that when the cost increases as a linear or convex function of the package size the firm should make packages of the smallest possible size smaller packages reduce waste and allow consumers to more closely match their purchases with desired consumption this in turn allows the firm to charge a higher unit price and also sell more unit volume the results imply that in a market with multiple package sizes produced by the same or competing firms at least one of the packages must have the smallest possible size provided the fixed cost of making the product is sufficiently low for concave cost functions the firm may find it optimal to make larger than smallest size packages

strategic choice of quality when quality is costly the persistence of the high quality advantage in a two firm two stage model of vertical product differentiation i show that for every convex fixed cost function of quality the firm that chooses the higher quality at the first stage earns the higher profits the result holds for the pure strategy equilibrium in the simultaneous quality game and it holds as well if firms choose their qualities in sequential order

options uncertainty and sunk costs an empirical analysis of land use change abstract in a real option model of land conversion incorporating return uncertainty and sunk costs optimal conversion thresholds are significantly higher than those from expected net present value models not accounting for these factors empirical tests of conversion from agriculture to forest suggest that landowners value the option to convert when making conversion decisions higher uncertainty in returns to all potential uses and lower correlation between shocks to agricultural and forest returns decreases the likelihood of conversion estimates indicate a significant impact on conversion decisions with approximations of option values ranging from 7 to 81 of the expected value of the land asset

why competition may drive up prices abstract we show that the expected price of an incumbent firm may increase in response to increasing competition as it may become more profitable to exploit a rather immobile fraction of consumers instead of capturing a larger but more contested segment of the market to derive this result we consider two approaches of modelling the degree of competition first in a duopolistic setting competition is said to be more intense if the entrant s product becomes more attractive to the mobile fraction of buyers in this case we find that all buyers i e both the mobile and the immobile fraction may lose if the market becomes more competitive secondly in a model with two entrants competition is said to become intense if entrants serve an overlapping segment of the market for mobile buyers

market segmentation self selection and product line design the purpose of this paper is to develop a theory of market segmentation based on consumer self selection the extant theory is based on the third degree price discrimination model of pigou central assumptions of which are that the firm can directly address individual segments and isolate them by using consumer self selection i am relaxing these assumptions in the context of a monopolist designing a product line i show that this relaxation has significant implications for how the products and prices are chosen and what they look like in particular segments may be aggregated even though there are no economies of scale furthermore consumer self selection enables us to model cannibalization and competition among firms

endogeneous protection factor returns and resource allocation we consider a heckscher ohlin samuelson trade model with two lobbies representing the interests of factor owners and two political parties the lobbies contribute resources to politics equating their returns to political and economic activity at the margin while the parties maximize their probability of election trading off general voter dissatisfaction with protection against the electioneering resources that favorable policies attract from the lobbies the equilibrium level of protection of a factor and its expected rate of return increase with its relative endowment if this relative endowment is high low then the factor will be better worse off than under free trade but at intermediate factor endowment ratios both factors will be worse off under parameter changes making lobbies more sensitive to the commodity price the lobbies contribute more resources to politics and can both be worse off even though the parties are proposing lower trade distortions

research note on the profitability of firms in a differentiated industry in a model of vertical differentiation the principal concern of this paper is to identify sufficient conditions for producing a higher or lower quality good to be more profitable in terms of profits and profit margin our basic model considers a short run scenario where the firms quality levels are fixed and they engage in price competition here our results are three first we develop the notion of relative cost efficiency and show that its increasing or decreasing monotonicity in product quality implies that of firm profitability in equilibrium a firm s relative cost efficiency refers to its quality adjusted cost dis advantage relative to its immediate competitors for a given distribution of consumer tastes second selling a higher quality good is more profitable when absolute cost efficiency defined as the ratio between a firm s quality and unit cost is increasing in quality third we also establish a set of lower and upper bounds on each firm s profitability the basic model is then extended in two directions we examine unit cost functions that demonstrate monotone profitability even when both quality and price are endogenous variables we also show that the spirit of relative cost efficiency and its associated sufficient condition hold valid for a logconcave consumer distribution

biodiversity conservation in a dynamic world may lead to inefficiencies due to lock in effects and path dependence abstract although biodiversity is generally diminishing in some areas its conservation is expanding however the exact path of this expansion is uncertain this can lead to problems of path dependence and lock in effects path dependence describes situations where history strongly influences present decisions and lock in effects refer to situations where an earlier decision provides strong incentives to follow a particular path even if more efficient alternatives are available later on we develop a conceptual ecological economic model to investigate which ecological and economic parameters favour the appearance of efficiency losses in biodiversity conservation due to path dependence and lock in effects in a dynamic two period two region model generally we find that efficiency losses occur if there are signals that guide the first period budget into a region that later turns out to be suboptimal if both time periods had been considered right from the beginning to illustrate the conservation relevance of our findings we present potential efficiency losses through path dependence in the hypothetical case of applying offsets to conserving the endangered maculinea teleius butterfly near the city of landau in germany

the existence of low end firms may help high end firms two models of competition between high end and low end products benefiting the high end firms are presented one is a quantity competition model and the other is a price competition model with product differentiation the key factor is the existence of two heterogeneous consumer groups those who demand only high end name brand products and those who care little whether products are high or low end we show that under certain conditions the profits of firms in the high end market are larger when there are firms producing low end products than when there are not the existence of price sensitive consumers who care little about product quality intensifies competition among the high end firms the existence of low end firms functions as a credible threat which induces the high end firms not to overproduce because price sensitive consumers buy products from the low end firms the result provides a new theoretical mechanism concerning the profitability and pricing of national brand firms after the entry of private labels it has an implication for pricing and marketing strategies established firms should not decrease their prices after the entry of nonestablished firms

compensation payments for habitat heterogeneity existence efficiency and fairness considerations abstract compensation payments for voluntary conservation measures have become an important tool for biodiversity conservation worldwide each year substantial financial resources are spent on such measures particularly in the context of agri environmental schemes in europe a debate has started on whether this money is spent effectively in response to this debate it has been suggested that a portfolio of measures leading to habitat heterogeneity be implemented although payments for heterogeneous conservation measures have been analysed in the literature it has never been questioned that payments can be designed in a way that encourages enough land users to carry out each conservation measure within a portfolio of measures the purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that such payments do not always exist moreover in cases where payments for habitat heterogeneity exist the payment scheme may require overcompensation of the land users posing a limit to both efficiency and fairness considerations

from microlevel decisions to landscape changes an assessment of agricultural conservation policies the growth in conservation programs has created a need for modeling frameworks capable of measuring microlevel behavioral responses and macrolevel landscape changes this paper presents an empirical model that predicts farmers production practices and the resulting levels of agricultural runoffs at more than 42 000 agricultural sites in the upper mississippi river basin under alternative conservation policies results suggest that payments for conservation tillage and crop rotations increase the use of these conservation practices however the acreage response is inelastic and the programs are not likely to be cost effective on their own for addressing hypoxia problem in the gulf of mexico

limit qualities and entry deterrence in this article we investigate how the interplay of competition among incumbents and the magnitude of a potential entrant s setup cost determines the configuration of the array of products to be offered in a perfect nash equilibrium we show that incumbents can use limit qualities to deter entry we also demonstrate that rivalry among incumbents may lead to excessive entry deterrence our analysis generates predictions about the correlation between the degree of product differentiation and the size of the entrant s setup costs

the economics of special interest politics the case of the tariff this paper investigates the interaction of politicians and special interest lobbies the goal is to model the equilibrium levels of redistributive policies such as taxes subsidies tariffs and regulatory decisions the model is applied throughout to the setting of tariffs by contributing to political campaigns special interest lobbies generate economic returns higher tariffs generate revenue for import competing industries through higher product prices higher milk support prices raise dairy farm income and so forth the lobby invests to maximize these net economic returns in evaluating their chances of election politicians weigh the favorable effects of special interest money against the unfavorable association with the lobby and the social cost of the redistributive policy section i explores the lobby s problem it describes a formalization of mancur olson s discussion of the voluntary provision of public goods and optimal contributions by lobbies to political campaigns section ii describes determination of the equilibrium tariff positions of each politician in a political campaign

competition in corruptible markets firms seeking business opportunities often face corruptible agents in many markets this paper investigates the marketing strategy implications for firms competing for business and for the buyer in a corruptible market we consider a setting in which a buyer a firm or government seeks to purchase a good through a corruptible agent supplier firms that may or may not be a good fit compete to be selected by the agent only the agent observes whether a firm is a good fit corruption arises due to the agent s incentive to select a nondeserving firm in exchange for bribes intuitively and as expected a sufficiently large monitoring of the agent eradicates corruption interestingly however increasing the monitoring from an initial low level can backfire making the agent more likely to select a nondeserving firm this nonmonotonic agent behavior makes it difficult for the buyer to reduce corruption the implication is that the buyer should choose either to be ignorant or to take drastic measures to limit

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games i theory the article presents information about the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games in this paper and its sequel presents study the existence of nash equilibrium in games where agents payoff functions are discontinuous the enquiry is motivated by a number of recent studies that have uncovered serious existence problems in seemingly innocuous economic games in the sequel to this paper authors have explained the utility function in the economic games referred to earlier are neither continuous nor quasi concave however they demonstrate that the payoff functions in mildly modified versions of these constructs exhibit two weaker forms of continuity which together with the requirement of quasi concavity suffice for the existence of an equilibrium from this one may conclude that at least in the modified versions of these models discontinuities in the payoff functions are not the real source of the problem rather it is the failure of the payoff functions to the quasi concave which is responsible for the non existence of equilibrium these observations bear on the existence of nash equilibrium in pure strategies

competitive promotional strategies this article analyzes the equilibrium pricing strategies of brands engaged in a pricing game each brand has a monopoly market loyal consumers and competes with others in a common market called brand switchers in the case of a duopoly it is shown that the behavior of the brand switchers characterizes the equilibrium behavior of the duopolists this article focuses on two key comparative statics namely the depth of discounts away from a regular high price and the probability of giving a deal or the frequency of deals how these properties vary with the size of the loyal markets and the behavior of the brand switching population is discussed copyright 1988 by the university of chicago

biological conservation in dynamic agricultural landscapes effectiveness of public policies and trade offs with agricultural production article i nfo land use change and land management intensification are major drivers of biodiversity loss especially in agricultural landscapes that cover a large and increasing share of the world s surface incentive based agri environmental policies are designed to influence farmers land use decisions in order to mitigate environmental degradation this paper evaluates the effectiveness of agri environmental schemes for biological conservation in a dynamic agricultural landscape under economic uncertainty we develop a dynamic ecological economic model of agricultural land use and spatially explicit population dynamics we then relate policies subsidies to grassland taxation of agricultural intensity to the ecological outcome probability of persistence of a species of interest we also analyze the associated trade offs between agricultural production in value and biological conservation in probability of persistence at the landscape scale

agricultural public policy green or sustainable the future of agriculture constitutes a major challenge to the achievement of sustainable development there are new perspectives on greening focusing on ecological objectives and sustainability combining both ecological and social goals academic papers rather study the ecological efficiency of agricultural public policies while real public policies such as in the european common agricultural policy examine both ecological and social considerations the objective of this paper is to consider economic social and ecological objectives within the design of agricultural public policies using a bio economic model applied to france we compare different optimal public strategies we show that when the biodiversity objectives are either very limited or very demanding grassland subsidies are the best instruments from both green and sustainable points of view however for medium objectives reducing crops subsidies is the cheapest way to green the cap while subsidies on grasslands are the only strategy from a sustainability perspective our work highlights new trade offs related to policy implementation such as social acceptance or technical difficulties and the spatial equity of performance among regions

using business simulation games in regulatory impact analysis the case of policies aimed at reducing nitrogen leaching in the past regulatory impact analysis was predominantly based on the rational choice assumption of a completely informed and exclusively profit maximizing homo oeconomicus real economic actors however are multiple goal and boundedly rational decision makers an exclusive reliance on rational choice models therefore generates the risk that both the pace and the type of behavioural adaptations to changing institutional environments are misjudged against this background this article addresses three questions first can we use business simulation games as a convincing but low cost experimental tool for policy analysis second how do intentionally varied nitrogen extensification schemes impact the behaviour of students who participate in an explorative business simulation study third do nitrogen reduction policies that are framed as voluntary as opposed to prescriptive schemes have a different impact on behaviour even if they lead to the same profits respectively in our business simulation game th

the optimal allocation of conservation funds abstract this paper presents a framework to evaluate alternative designs of conservation programs and their implications for the allocation of conservation funds we show that the efficient allocation of conservation funds must consider two important pooling effects cumulative effects and interrelationships among alternative environmental benefits ignoring the cumulative effects of environmental benefits may cause conservation funds to be overly dispersed geographically and as a result may result in minimum environmental benefits when the budget is small ignoring the interrelationships among alternative environmental benefits may result in not only misallocation of conservation funds among geographical areas but also incorrect resources being targeted for conservation practices implications of these results for the design of conservation programs are discussed

water quantity management in a heterogeneous landscape with farsighted farmers agricultural production contributes to many environmental problems in semi arid areas agricultural irrigation causes the so called waterlogging phenomenon this phenomenon is both spatial and dynamic since percolation depends on soil quality summed up in landscape heterogeneity and evolves along time furthermore farmers can be farsighted with respect to their contribution to percolation we study regulation schemes to be implemented to restore the socially optimal spatial and temporal production plan of farmers in such a context we show that both a temporal tax on percolation and a spatio temporal tax on inputs both at the extensive and at the intensive margin are efficient for the restoration of the socially optimal solution furthermore a numerical example demonstrates that the consequences of implementing a fiscal scheme designed for myopic farmers whereas they are farsighted depends on the distribution of soil quality

dynamics of retail advertising evidence from a field experiment we use a controlled field experiment to investigate the dynamic effects of retail advertising the experimental design overcomes limitations hindering previous investigations of this issue our study uncovers dynamic advertising effects that have not been considered in previous literature we find that current advertising does affect future sales but surprisingly the effect is not always positive for the firm s best customers the long run outcome may be negative this finding reflects two competing effects brand switching and intertemporal substitution we also find evidence of cross channel substitution with the firm s best customers switching demand to the ordering channel that corresponds to the advertising jel l2 l81 m3 a firm s current advertising is generally associated with an increase in its sales but this effect is generally short lived

price promotions in emerging markets how should price promotion strategies be modified in an emerging market e g india china compared to those employed in developed markets e g usa canada specifically how should the presence of middle class consumers with limited ability to pay prevalent in an emerging market influence the depth and frequency of price promotions offered by competing firms lay intuition suggests that firms should promote more frequently and offer deeper discounts in emerging markets in order to effectively sell to limited income middle class consumers we construct a theoretical model that investigates the effect of the middle class segment on firms price promotion strategies contrary to lay intuition our analysis reveals precisely the opposite results first price promotions offered in an emerging market with middle class consumers are shallower than those offered in a developed market without middle class consumers second relatively deep price promotions occur less frequently in an emerging market compared to a developed market these theoretical findings are consistent with the empirical evidence we gathered from the supermarkets in india and in canada

competing for low end markets recent business research points to the fortune awaiting to be tapped in low end markets in this paper we investigate how the size of the low end market influences a firm s profits and the pioneering firm s quality choice as low valuation consumers increase in a market on average consumers willingness to pay decreases this may lead us to expect firms profits to decrease as the size of the low end market increases our analysis shows that if the size of the low end market is below a threshold an increase in the size of the low end market may actually dampen price competition and improve profits as firms can then strategically choose their quality levels such that their products are more differentiated conventional wisdom also suggests that the pioneering firm will offer a higher quality product and earn more profits compared with the later entrant in contrast to this notion of quality advantage our analysis identifies circumstances in which a pioneer can offer a lower quality product and yet earn more profits an experimental test lends support for some of our model s predictions we further extend the model to consider markets with multiple firms firms with multiple products and consumers with limited purchasing power

ecosystem services and economic development in austrian agricultural landscapes the impact of policy and climate change scenarios on trade offs and synergies we have developed an integrated modeling framework imf to quantify indicators for ecosystem services es and economic development ed in agricultural landscapes austria serves as a case study in which impacts trade offs and synergies of es and ed are assessed for different agricultural policy pathways and regional climate change scenarios agricultural intensification and incentivized use of provisioning es e g biomass production lead to higher macro economic output e g gdp but usually reduce es related to regulation and maintenance e g ecological integrity climate regulation as well as cultural services landscape diversity we revealed both synergies for certain es e g biomass production and soil organic carbon stocks as well as large spatial deviations from the national mean across the heterogeneous agricultural landscapes in austria climate change scenarios i lead to substantial variation in es and ed indicators and ii usually amplify trade offs by stimulating land use intensification our findings depict the complex relationship between different es and ed indicators as well as the importance of considering spatial heterogeneity and regional climate change this assessment can help to improve targeting of agri environmental schemes in order to provide a more balanced and efficient supply of es and to foster rural development

designing sales contests does the prize structure matter abstract sales contests are short term incentives that managers use to raise sales effort the extant marketing theory predicts that the optimal prize structure should have two characteristics 1 the number of prizewinners should be greater than one and 2 prize values should be unique and rank ordered however this theory has not been empirically examined this article presents two empirical studies that examine whether the prize structure of a sales contest affects sales performance in each study the authors investigate the incremental effects of introducing multiple prizewinners and unique rank ordered prizes into a sales contest the first study consists of two laboratory experiments in which participants make decisions that closely reflect the decision trade offs in the theoretical model of sales contests the second study consists of two field economic experiments in which trained salespeople sell fundraising sponsorships to companies the results across the experiments are remarkably consist

primary commodity prices manufactured goods prices and the terms of trade of developing countries what the long run shows the authors revisit in this article the empirical foundation of the alleged secular decline in the prices of primary commodities relative to those of manufactures they use a newly constructed index of commodity prices and two modified indexes of manufactured good prices and find that from 1900 to 1986 the relative prices of all primary commodities fell on trend by 0 5 percent a year and those of nonfuel primary commodities by 0 6 percent a year they thus confirm the sign but not the magnitude of the trend implicit in the work of prebisch but even the more limited secular decline shown by their relative price indexes may be magnified by an incomplete account of quality improvements in manufactures they then show that the evolution of terms of trade of nonfuel primary commodities is not the same as that of the net barter terms of trade of non oil exporting developing countries finally they find that despite the decline that has probably occurred during the current century in the terms of trade of nonfuel primary commodities the purchasing power of total exports of these products has increased considerably similarly the fall that may have occurred after world war ii in the net barter terms of trade of developing countries seems to have been more than compensated for by the steady improvement in their income terms of trade

competitive positioning in markets with nonuniform preferences we investigate the nature of competitive equilibrium for brands competing in a multi attribute product space when consumer preferences for product attributes follow nonuniform distributions we establish subgame perfect equilibria in a two stage game where firms choose positions in the first stage and prices in the second stage two types of entry scenarios are investigated in the first the number of brands is given exogenously and all of them choose positions simultaneously in the second scenario firms enter in sequence and the early entrants can choose strategies to deter the entry of later entrants we find the equilibria for two three and four brands for consumer preferences that follow a beta distribution nonuniform distributions result in equilibrium configurations that are substantially different from those obtained for uniform consumer distributions in the two brands case for sufficiently concentrated distributions we find asymmetric position equilibria with one firm at the corner of the market and one firm at an interior position in the case of three brands for sufficiently concentrated preferences we find symmetric equilibria that do not yield maximal differentiation we also establish an equilibrium for the case of four competing brands in addition we characterize entry deterring positioning strategies and examine how they vary with the distribution of consumer preferences

the marginal cost of species preservation the northern spotted owl abstract because species survival is not certain the decision to save a species is not an all or nothing choice but rather a marginal one the appropriate unit for both benefit and cost functions is the likelihood of survival and the appropriate question is how certain we want to be of species survival the intensity of the species preservation debate is also fired by strong equity concerns we illustrate these points for the case of the northern spotted owl by constructing a marginal cost curve for its survival and by disaggregating welfare loss by region and by market level

agri environmental policies for biodiversity when the spatial pattern of the reserve matters the aim of this paper is to compare different environmental policies for cost effective habitat conservation on agricultural lands when the desired spatial pattern of reserves is a random mosaic we use a spatially explicit mathematical programming model which studies the farmers behavior as profit maximizers under technical and administrative constraints facing different policy measures each farmer chooses the land use on each field which determines the landscape at the regional level a spatial pattern index ripley l function is then associated to the obtained landscape indicating on the degree of dispersion of the reserve we compare a subsidy per hectare of reserve with an auction scheme and an agglomeration malus we find that the auction is superior to the uniform subsidy for cost efficiency the agglomeration malus does better than the auction for the spatial pattern but is more costly

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

endogenous quality choice price vs quantity competition two versions of a vertical product differentiation model one with fixed and the other with variable costs of quality are analyzed to study how the hypotheses of price versus quantity competition affect equilibrium solutions product differentiation arises under all the scenarios considered contrasting previous findings of symmetric quality choices under cournot behavior however to relax harsher market competition firms differentiate more under bertrand than under cournot a simple welfare measure also indicates that the economy is better off when firms compete on prices with fixed costs of quality not only consumer but also producer surplus is higher under price competition copyright 1993 by blackwell publishing ltd

a short note on updating the grilli and yang commodity price index the grilli and yang commodity price index is one of the most widely used commodity price series in the applied economics literature this note provides some practical advice on updating this data series by listing the base period index values identifying relevant data sources and describing a method for computing subindex weights in 1988 enzo grilli and maw cheng yang published their seminal article on the long run development of an index of 24 primary commodity prices gycpi deflated by an index of manufactured goods unit values the sample of average annual primary commodity prices covers about 54 percent of the primary commodity trade in the index reference period 1977 79 the deflators considered for manufacturing prices were the u s manufacturing price index usmpi and the manufacturing unit value index muv 1widely used and discussed the grilli and yang data set has been extended by a number of researchers the data have been employed in a variety of contexts in later studies thus the gycpi data continue to enjoy wide popularity in their own right and as a benchmark for new approaches to empirical studies