equality employment and budgetary restraint the trilemma of the service economy this article presents an analysis of the postindustrial economy from a political economy perspective it identifies a set of specific distributional trade offs associated with the new role played by the services sector as the chief source of employment growth in advanced democracies over the last three decades it is argued that three core policy objectives budgetary restraint wage equality and expansion of employment constitute a political trilemma that allows only two of the goals to be successfully pursued at the same time using a combination of statistical and case oriented analysis the authors demonstrate the political and economic salience of the trilemma the distributional tensions inherent in each strategy to cope with it and the political institutional constraints under which these strategies are chosen

blame game politics in a coalition government abstract delays in the adoption of reforms is an important question in political economics this paper explores this issue in the context of a representative democracy where the government is a coalition and citizens observe neither the decision making process nor politicians preferences for a reform we show that a coalition member who favors a reform may nonetheless choose to veto its adoption thus delaying it until after the next election and let his coalition partners share the blame for the non adoption we refer to this strategy as blame game politics we then identify three reasons for a politician to play the blame game one is to make an issue salient in the next election a second reason is to avoid a split in his electorate which is accomplished by hiding his stance on an issue a third reason is to enhance bargaining power during the formation of the next government

centralized collective bargaining and the problem of compliance lessons from the italian experience according to the neo corporatist approach to the problem of compliance worker control over union policy is incompatible with centralized wage regulation because only associations in which national leaders are insulated from their members are capable of delivering rank and file acceptance of wage moderation this analysis of centralized collective bargaining agreements in italy in the 1980s and 1990s provides a critical re examination of the traditional neo corporatist approach the author drawing on archival research and interviews argues that centralization can be entirely compatible with decision making procedures in which rank and file workers have ultimate decision making power in fact the italian labor movement s adoption of more democratic decision making procedures he claims was instrumental in generating and sustaining centralized collective bargaining arrangements in italy in the early 1990s

the sources of business interest in social insurance sectoral versus national differences when and why have employers supported the development of institutions of social insurance that provide benefits to workers during various employment related risks the analysis developed in this article challenges the dominant explanations of welfare state development which are premised on the assumption that business opposes social insurance the article examines the conditions under which self interested profit maximizing firms support the introduction of a new social policy and it specifies the most significant variables explaining the variation in employers social policy preferences the model is tested in three political episodes of welfare state development in france and germany using policy documents submitted by various employers associations to bureaucratic and parliamentary commissions

equilibrium selection and the dynamic evolution of preferences abstract a population of fully rational agents plays a symmetric 2 player game in biological fitnesses but each agent s play is determined by his payoffs which are free to evolve according to survival of the fittest pressures an equilibrium selection mechanism is assumed to exist and deliver a unique outcome for any given profile of payoffs this allows the evolution of payoffs to be modeled as a well defined replicator dynamics the existing static stability results that efficient strict nash implies stability and stability implies efficiency are translated to this dynamic context although the latter gives way to indeterminacy in the absence of a specific equilibrium selection mechanism a strong form of stability is established for the efficient outcome of games with common interests whilst a weaker stability result is provided for efficient mixed strategy equilibria of doubly symmetric games the results are illustrated using the equilibrium selection mechanism provided by global games

evolution of preferences in an exchange economy abstract we propose an evolutionary theory of how economic environments shape individual preferences consumption is assumed to have both a standard utilitarian payoff and a biological payoff which determines long term survival we show that heterogeneous preference types can co exist in equilibrium

the fragmentation of the bargaining society wage setting in the nordic countries 1950 to 1992 it is commonly believed that corporatist bargaining institutions have been in general decline in the 1980s and 1990s the leading explanations of the purported universal trend toward greater decentralization of collective bargaining are the impact of technological change changes in the occupational structure and growing international economic integration decentralization should be particularly visible in the nordic countries because collective bargaining was more centralized in these countries in the 1960s and 1970s than in any others in western europe in this article the authors present data on the changes in the centralization of wage bargaining in the four nordic countries since 1950 they document that a significant decentralization of collective bargaining has occurred in sweden as is well known but not in the other three the article concludes with a review of possible explanations of swedish exceptionalism

employers and the welfare state the political economic organization of firms and social policy in contemporary capitalist democracies the authors argue that the organization of employers shapes social policy support among firms and in turn affects social policy outcomes specifically the authors argue that the centralization and cohesion of employer groups and economic cooperation across enterprises positively affects social welfare provision empirically the authors assess the impacts of business organization on social welfare effort in 15 developed democracies between the 1970s and 1990s the authors also provide analysis of the impact of employer organization on active labor market policy the authors find that the organization of employers is one of the most important determinants of overall social welfare effort the authors also find that employer organization affects the development of active labor market policies and it influences the degree to which social democratic parties pursue active labor market programs the authors conclude with a discussion of the findings implications for theories of social corporatism and the w

a biological basis for expected and non expected utility abstract a biological model is developed here to determine the fittest attitude to risk with a fixed environment the type maximizing expected offspring is selected this yields the expected utility theorem when translated into a criterion for evaluating gambles over commodities with a random environment however the type selected is strictly less averse to idiosyncratic risk than to risk which is correlated across all individuals the implied criterion for choice over gambles does not satisfy the expected utility theorem and may induce choice of a gamble which is first order stochastically dominated journal of economic literature classification number d81

carrot or stick the evolution of reciprocal preferences in a haystack model this paper studies the evolution and the co evolution of both characteristics of reciprocity the willingness to reward friendly behavior and the willingness to punish hostile behavior firstly both preferences for rewarding and preferences for punishing can survive in evolution provided individuals interact within separate groups this holds even with randomly formed groups and even when individual preferences are unobservable secondly preferences for rewarding survive only in coexistence with self interested preferences but preferences for punishing tend either to vanish or to dominate the population entirely finally the evolution of preferences for rewarding and the evolution of preferences for punishing influence each other decisively the existence of rewarders enhances the evolutionary success of punishers but punishers crowd out rewarders jel classification c72 d63 d64 d83

impact of pension privatization on foreign direct investment summary we explore the causal effect of market oriented pension reform on net foreign direct investment fdi inflows in latin america and among the transitional economies of eastern europe and central asia both of which have experienced waves of pension privatization and fdi over the last two decades with our balanced panel of 42 countries over the 1991 2006 period we implement fixed effects models controlling for the decision to enact full or partial privatization of the public pension system and several other covariates whose choice is informed by the rich empirical literature on fdi our econometric results indicate that pension privatization triggers a significant increase in net fdi inflows and that the effect does not wane over time we estimate that full privatization increases fdi as a percentage of gdp by about 57 ceteris paribus

wage dispersion and productive efficiency evidence for sweden the swedish record of enormous compression of relative wages under centralized solidarity bargaining followed by substantial decompression of wages after central bargaining broke down supplies observations well suited to empirical evaluation of arguments about the response of productive efficiency to shifts in wage distribution we obtain no results supporting fairness morale and cohesiveness theories implying that wage leveling within workplaces and industries may enhance productivity reduction of interindustry wage differentials evidently did however contribute positively to aggregate output and productivity growth most likely for the structural reasons first emphasized by swedish trade union economists almost a half century ago

mixed signals central bank independence coordinated wage bargaining and european monetary union plans for the european monetary union emu are based on the conventional postulate that increasing the independence of the central bank can reduce inflation without any real economic effects however the theoretical and empirical bases for this claim rest on models of the economy that make unrealistic information assumptions and omit institutional variables other than the central bank when signaling problems between the central bank and other actors in the political economy are considered we find that the character of wage bargaining conditions the impact of central bank independence by rendering the signals between the bank and the bargainers more or less effective greater central bank independence can reduce inflation without major employment effects where bargaining is coordinated but it can bring higher levels of unemployment where bargaining is less coordinated thus currency unions like the emu may require higher levels of unemployment to control inflation than their proponents envisage they will have costs as well as benefits and these will be unevenly distributed among and within the member nations depending on the changes they induce in the status of the bank and of wage coordination

evolution population growth and history dependence abstract we consider an evolutionary model with mutations which incorporates stochastic population growth we provide a complete characterization of the effects of population growth on the evolution of play in particular we show that if the rate of population growth is at least logarithmic the stochastic process describing play converges only one equilibrium will be played from a certain point forward if in addition the rate of mutation is taken to zero the probability that the equilibrium selected is the first equilibrium played approaches one thus population growth generates history dependence the contingency of equilibrium selection on historical conditions journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73 o33

distribution and redistribution the shadow of the nineteenth century the authors present an alternative to power resource theory as an approach to the study of distribution and redistribution while they agree that partisanship and union power are important they argue that both are endogenous to more fundamental differences in the organization of capitalist democracies specifically center left governments result from pr consensus political systems as opposed to majoritarian systems while strong unions have their origins in coordinated as opposed to liberal capitalism these differences in political representation and in the organization of production developed jointly in the early twentieth century and explain the cross national pattern of distribution and redistribution the clusters have their origins in two distinct political economic conditions in the second half of the nineteenth century one in which locally coordinated economies were coupled with strong guild traditions and heavy investment in cospecific assets and one in which market based economies were coupled with liberal states and more mobile assets

business against markets employer resistance to collective bargaining liberalization during the eurozone crisis employer organizations have been presented as strong promoters of the liberalization of industrial relations in europe this article in contrast argues that the preferences of employers vis a vis

labor disputes and the economics of firm geography a study of domestic investment in india abstract acrimonious relations between employers and employees in developing countries have often been cited as impediments to progress this article considers various measures of labor disputes and investigates whether these have detrimental effects on the location choice of new domestic investment across the various states of india conventional wisdom holds that an increase in measures such as the number of strikes the number of man days lost in work stoppages and the percentage of unionized workers would hinder the location of new projects using panel data and a fixed effects methodology that controls for the effect of state specific unobservables we find significant evidence that this is indeed the case in india furthermore disaggregation by industrial classifications shows that although labor disputes continue to exert negative effects location choices are also conditioned on factors such as proximity to raw materials and minerals

the evolution of preferences for conflict we consider preference evolution in a class of conflict models with finite populations we show that whereas aggregate conflict effort is always the same in evolutionary equilibrium larger populations have greater individual subjective costs of conflict effort

globalization and taxation challenges to the swedish welfare state many have argued that the increased international mobility of both capital and labor witnessed in recent years will force advanced capitalist democracies to cut taxes and thus ultimately roll bac

public sector unions corporatism and macroeconomic performance what accounts for the apparent breakdown of the positive relationship between powerful trade union organizations and macroeconomic performance is corporatism a relic of a different age a luxury o

the evolution of attitudes to risk lottery tickets and relative wealth abstract individual attitudes to risk are examined in an evolutionary model males obtain more offspring as a consequence of greater wealth both directly and because this attracts more mates the second effect induces gambling driven by relative wealth and can create pareto inefficiency fair bets involving small losses and large gains are taken if any fair bets at all are taken altogether the model accords with observations concerning bets taken and declined by typical individuals despite settings of widely varying per capita wealth journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d81

small states in big trouble state reorganization in australia denmark new zealand and sweden in the 1980s in australia denmark new zealand and sweden in the 1980s coalitions of politicians fiscal bureaucrats and capital and labor in sectors exposed to international competition allied to transform the largest single nontradables sector in their society the state particularly the welfare state they exposed state personnel and agencies to market pressures and competition to reduce the cost of welfare and other state services the impetus for change came from rising foreign public and private debt rising public debt levels and expensive welfare states interacted to create a tax wedge between employers wage costs and workers received wages this undercut international competitiveness worsening current account deficits and leading to more foreign debt accumulation two factors explain variation in the degree of reorganization in each country differences in their electoral and constitutional regimes and the willingness of left parties to risk splitting their core constituencies introduction of market pressures is an effort to go beyond the liberalization of the economy common in industrial countries during the 1980s and both to institutionalize limits to welfare spending and to change the nature of statesociety relations away from corporatist forms of interest intermediation in short not just less state but a different state

labor regulations and job quality evidence from india the authors examine whether measures of job quality in india s manufacturing sector differ systematically across states with varying types of labor regulation their analysis uses repeated cross sections of india s national sample survey organization nsso household survey data from 1983 to 2004 merged with data on state level regulations covering employment adjustment and dispute resolution results from a differences in differences procedure show that restrictions on employment adjustment and dispute settlement in a pro worker direction contribute to improved job quality for women along most measures such regulations yield mixed results for men however results indicate that higher wages come at the expense of fewer hours substitution toward in kind compensation and less job security the authors conclude that india s labor legislation does have a silver lining with respect to job quality but that silver lining applies selectively

the limits of independence and the policy of the ecb it is argued that the european central bank s independence is not as secure as it seems and that as a result it has appreciable institutional incentives to protect and enhance its position it follows that its behaviour should not be understood as being solely determined by the pursuit of price stability one consequence is that certain points on which it has been criticised on the basis that its approach makes for ineffective monetary policy might be better understood as often effective attempts to protect its position another is that making a central bank or any other institution completely independent may be much harder than it seems and failed attempts which come close are not necessarily to be preferred even by the advocates of independence to less ambitious designs

nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences abstract a population of players is randomly matched to play a normal form game g the payoffs in this game represent the fitness associated with the various outcomes each individual has preferences over the outcomes of the game and chooses an optimal action with respect to those preferences however these preferences need not coincide with the fitness payoffs when evolution selects individuals on the basis of the fitness of the actions they take the distribution of aggregate play must be a nash equilibrium of g weak additional assumptions on the evolutionary process imply perfect equilibrium journal of economic literature classification number c72

evolution of preferences1 we endogenize preferences using the indirect evolutionary approach individuals are randomly matched to play a two person game individual subjective preferences determine their behaviour and may differ from the actual objective pay offs that determine fitness matched individuals may observe the opponents preferences perfectly not at all or with some in between probability when preferences are observable a stable outcome must be efficient when they are not observable a stable outcome must be a nash equilibrium and all strict equilibria are stable we show that for pure strategy outcomes these conclusions are robust to allowing almost perfect and almost no observability with the notable exception that inefficient strict equilibria may fail to be stable with any arbitrarily small degree of observability despite being stable with no observability

on the evolutionary stability of altruistic and spiteful preferences abstract this note demonstrates that a result on evolutionary stability presented by bester and guth bester h guth w 1998 journal of economic behavior and organization 34 193 209 applies under more general preference and payoff functions

the evolution of monetary equilibrium abstract the hahn problem is that even if a monetary equilibrium with valued fiat money exists in general equilibrium a nonmonetary equilibrium with a zero price on money generally also exists why should we expect the former over the latter here i consider the preferences that will survive repeated trading in an exchange economy where agents compete in biological fitness with unobservable preferences and positive assortativity in matching evolutionarily stable preferences implement the competitive equilibrium that maximizes the sum of agents fitnesses in a standard bewley townsend model this implies selection of the monetary over the nonmonetary equilibrium and also implies the survival of agents with money in the utility function trust in fiat money is only a recent development and even today such faith is hardly universal cass and shell 1980

the evolution of preferences and competition a rationalization of veblen s theory of invidious comparisons we examine how preferences evolve by natural selection in a competitive environment similar to that characterizing much of our evolutionary past we find that the evolutionarily stable preferences in this context exhibit a concern not only for absolute payoffs but also for relative payoffs and that this intensifies the degree of competition relative to what obtains when players consider only absolute payoffs we argue that this has consequences for the equilibrium population size we argue that the premise of this analysis is consistent with the available anthropological evidence and that the prediction is broadly consistent with the findings of experimental game theory

the limit of equality projects public sector expansion sectoral conflicts and income inequality in postindustrial economies in this study we investigate how structural economic changes constrain an equality project the public sector expansion strategy first we describe a three stage process in which a growing produc

us and them the origin of identity and its economic implications we investigate the origins of identity and the innate proclivity to draw a distinction between insiders and outsiders we propose an evolutionary explanation we argue that identity arises because it facilitates survival in an evolutionary setting we endogenize preferences and demonstrate that the evolutionarily stable preferences fashioned by natural selection would draw a distinction between insiders and outsiders we then work out the implications of such preferences in two contemporary scenarios one entailing rent seeking behavior and the other involving public good provision our results are in conformity with empirical evidence

evolution of preferences we endogenize preferences using the indirect evolutionary approach individuals are randomly matched to play a two person game individual subjective preferences determine their behaviour and may differ from the actual objective pay offs that determine fitness matched individuals may observe the opponents preferences perfectly not at all or with some in between probability when preferences are observable a stable outcome must be efficient when they are not observable a stable outcome must be a nash equilibrium and all strict equilibria are stable we show that for pure strategy outcomes these conclusions are robust to allowing almost perfect and almost no observability with the notable exception that inefficient strict equilibria may fail to be stable with any arbitrarily small degree of observability despite being stable with no observability

characterization of the optimal tax on money when it functions as a medium of exchange abstract this paper compares the relative efficiency of the implicit taxation of money and the explicit taxation of real commodities to finance a given amount of government expenditures in the model used money has the property of reducing transactions costs a sufficient condition for a tax on money to be welfare dominated by a linear tax on consumption expenditures is characterized in terms of a few parameters very familiar in macroeconomics this characterization is especially useful in the cases of heterogeneous consumers and increasing returns to scale in transactions since then the optimal tax on money may in principle be positive

the decentralization of collective bargaining a literature review and comparative analysis the author reviews evidence that the bargaining structure is becoming more decentralized in sweden australia the former west germany italy the united kingdom and the united states although in

the choices for scandinavian social democracy in comparative perspective scandinavian social democracy represents one of the most systematic attempts to shape economic institu tions and policies in pursuit of equality and full employment increasingly however these goals haveeluded governments and their institutional supports have eroded this paper seeks to understand this shiftthrough a comparative analysis that places particular emphasis on the interaction between macroeco nomic policies and wage bargaining institutions it is argued that the nature of this interaction and theassociated economic effects have been changed by new technology capital market integration andservice sector expansion as a result centralized wage bargaining institutions and accommodatingmacroeconomic policy regimes have been undermined and social democracy increasingly faces a choicebetween the promotion of equality and employment for all

money debt and deficits in a dynamic game this paper analyzes a dynamic linear quadratic game between the fiscal and monetary authorities the equilibrium outcome of the game determines the time path of money creation fiscal deficits and public debt the game is solved for different equilibrium concepts the equilibria are then compared and interpreted with reference to alternative institutional arrangements the main results are i coordination increases the speed of adjustment towards the steady state and takes the steady state value of public debt closer to the desired target ii precommitments take the non cooperative equilibrium closer to the coordinated outcome iii increasing the weight that each policymaker assigns to his own private objectives slows down the adjustment process places more burden on the opponent but has ambiguous effects on the steady state value of public debt

the evolutionary logic of honoring sunk costs i introduction economists claim that sunk costs should not figure in current decision making because by definition these expenditures cannot be retrieved and should be treated as bygones but there is a large literature both experimental and anecdotal in which people are observed to waste resources by honoring bygones that could not possibly make them better off see e g arkes and blumer 1985 arkes and ayton 1999 mcafee mialon and mialon 2010 thaler 1980 such excess in wasting resources is unlikely to have been tolerated by nature in the process of evolution if it did not serve some purpose to enhance fitness in our remote past the purpose of this study is to suggest such a function whereby evolutionary processes have hardwired a concern for sunk costs in human decision making 1 the concept of honoring sunk costs has been referred to in the literature as the concorde fallacy 2 arkes and blumer 1985 have a number of other examples of good money being thrown after bad economists have provided various explanations for why sunk costs appear salient to humans kanodia bushman and dickhaut 1989 and prendergast and stole 1996 propose a theory where reputational effects make agents unwilling to change their decisions mcafee mialon and mialon 2010 have suggested several models involving information content reputation or constraints on decision making that provide rational reasons for taking sunk costs into account likewise baliga and ely 2011 have proposed a model in which sunk costs may acquire salience as a memory kludge because they may contain information about the value of a project previously initiated but whose value has now been forgotten carmichael and macleod 2003 have proposed a model where in a bilateral bargaining situation the norm of taking account of sunk costs resolves the hold up problem that typically results in underinvestment thaler 1980 arkes and blumer 1985 and whyte 1986 suggested a prospect theory approach to understanding sunk cost effects arkes and blumer 1985 the philosopher nozick 1993 and others have argued that honoring sunk costs can alleviate problems of time inconsistency and temptation john may believe that going to the theater is a good thing but when the time comes he cannot rouse himself to do so because it would require relinquishing whatever else appears appealing at the time to circumvent this john buys tickets in advance as a precommitment device but to do this he must believe in the first place that his future self is going to honor sunk costs 3 whatever the reason for the time inconsistent preferences say hyperbolic discounting the honoring of sunk costs may be used to remedy the problem of time inconsistency but nozick for example offers no reason for why sunk costs are honored in the first place we offer an evolutionary reason to suggest why nature may have hardwired a proclivity in humans to honor sunks costs a reason that differs from those offered in the articles cited above we propose that the built in salience of sunk costs is an adaptation to the problem of self control self control problems may arise in decision making because contrary to our untutored perceptions the human brain has a triune 4 rather than a unitary structure maclean 1989 panksepp 1998 because of the way the brain has evolved different regions within it defined by their own neuroanatomical and neurochemical features deal with different aspects of action and behavior although interconnected through chemical and neuronal pathways the different control centers tend to act autonomously and may conflict in their responses to stimuli when the emotional or motivational centers which lie in the sub cortical limbic system push us to certain actions that the rational persona in the cortex wishes to deny there is a conflict and the problem of self control arises panksepp 1998 301 notes

small states and skill specificity austria switzerland and interemployer cleavages in coordinated capitalism the varieties of capitalism literature has put skill systems at the center of comparative politics yet its claims about skill specificity are driven by two large coordinated economies germany and

wage setting institutions and pay inequality in advanced industrial societies the distribution of pay differs significantly across countries and over time among advanced industrial societies in this paper institutional and political determinants of pay inequality are studied in sixteen countries from 1980 to 1992 the most important factor in explaining pay dispersion is the level of wage setting i e whether wages are set at the level of the individual the plant the industry or the entire private sector the impact of centralization is the same whether centralization occurs via collective bargaining or via government involvement in private sector wage setting the concentration of unions and the share of the labor force covered by collective bargaining agreements also matter after controlling for wage setting institutions other variables such as the governing coalition the size of government international openness and the supply of highly educated workers have little impact economic political and norm based explanations for the association of centralization with egalitarian outcomes are discussed

learning and evolution of altruistic preferences in the centipede game abstract several studies show that evolution favors non selfish preferences only if preference types are observable we present a new evolutionary scenario applied to the centipede game where we adopt self confirming equilibrium to capture behavior we show that altruism may be evolutionarily successful even if preferences are unobservable

the evolution of preferences why sovereign preferences may not lead to sustainable policies and what to do about it abstract the conventional economic paradigm assumes that tastes and preferences are exogenous to the economic system and that the economic problem consists of optimally satisfying those preferences tastes and preferences usually do not change rapidly and in the short term this assumption makes sense sustainability is an inherently long term problem and in the long run it does not make sense to assume tastes and preferences are fixed and given if preferences are expected to change over time and under the influence of education advertising changing cultural assumptions etc the old assumption of consumer sovereignty is not adequate different criteria of optimality are needed how preferences change how they relate to the goal of sustainability and how they can or should be actively influenced to satisfy the new criteria needs to be determined ecological economics has emphasized the three rank ordered goals of ecological sustainability fair distribution and allocative efficiency this paper examines how preferences evolve and change over time and the implications of this for developing policies that meet these three goals in democratic societies

learning to like what you have explaining the endowment effect the endowment effect describes the fact that people demand much more to give up an object than they are willing to spend to acquire it the existence of this effect has been documented in numerous experiments we attempt to explain this effect by showing that evolution favors individuals whose preferences embody an endowment effect the reason is that an endowment effect improves one s bargaining position in bilateral trades we show that for a general class of evolutionary processes strictly positive endowment effects will survive in the long run

the politics of retrenchment in a social democratic welfare state reform of swedish pensions and unemployment insurance what explains the origins and pattern of retrenchment dynamics in swedish old age pensions and unemployment insurance during the 1990s although the economic crisis created pressure to scale back both programs the author argues that retrenchment only occurred when and where the social democratic party and some segments of the labor movement supported change this finding suggests that the political importance of organized labor in retrenchment politics depends on the relationship between welfare state programs and interest group structure when interest group structure is characterized by solidaristic centralized encompassing organizations the old class based power resource model has more explanatory bite than pierson s new politics of the welfare state approach

cultural integration and its discontents a community s culture is defined by the preferences and equilibrium behaviours of its members contacts among communities alter individual cultures through two interrelated mechanisms behavioural adaptations driven by pay offs to coordination and preference changes shaped by socialization and self persuasion this paper explores the workings of these mechanisms through a model of cultural integration in which preferences and behaviours vary continuously it identifies a broad set of conditions under which cross cultural contacts promote cultural hybridization the analysis suggests that policies to support social integration serve to homogenize preferences across communities thereby undermining a key objective of multiculturalism yielding fresh insights into strategies pursued to influence cultural trends it also shows that communities benefit from having other communities adjust their behaviours

voting on the budget deficit this paper analyzes a model in which a group of rational individuals votes over the composition and time profile of public spending all voters agree that a balanced budget is ex ante optimal however if there is disagreement between current and future majorities a balanced budget is not a political equilibrium under majority rule under certain conditions a majority of the voters favors a budget deficit and the equilibrium deficit is larger the greater is the polarization among voters copyright 1990 by american economic association

political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries institutions and policies vittorio grilli donato masciandaro and guido tabellini why do countries as similar as the industrialized oecd countries go through such different experience in terms of public deficits and debts or in terms of inflation the answer cannot come from macroeconomic policy responses to different disturbances nor from the principles of optimal taxation but rather from politics this article focuses on the role that particular institutions exert in providing constraints and incentives which shape the actions of policymakers the electoral process and political traditions affect the ability of governments to deal with deficits and mounting debts what seems to matter most it is found is the effect of the durability of governments governments with short horizons act myopically and never quite tackle the hard choices such governments typically exist in countries with an electoral system favouring many small political parties central bank independence promotes low inflation with no apparent costs in terms of real economic performance irrespective of the political institutions in fact there is no link between monetary and fiscal discipline these findings carry powerful implications for countries facing high indebtedness or stubborn inflation but also for the construction of the european economic and monetary union

unions employers associations and wage setting institutions in northern and central europe 1950 1992 the eight countries examined in this study austria belgium denmark finland germany the netherlands norway and sweden have long been viewed as exemplifying corporatist industrial relations

the danish miracle luck pluck or stuck the 1980s and 1990s saw employment miracles in denmark australia and the netherlands this article analyzes the dynamics and substance of danish policy responses to poor export employment and fiscal performance to see whether remediation should be attributed to pluck intentional strategic remediation of dysfunctional institutions to make them conform with the external environment luck environmental change that makes formerly dysfunctional institutions suddenly functional or just being stuck endogenous not entirely strategic change that leaves institutions in conformity with the environment it addresses these issues to remedy biases in the literature toward sweden as model toward pessimism about the welfare state s survivability and toward privileging intentional action the analysis finds that stuck endogenous dynamics probably explains as much as pluck strategic choice suggesting only limited transferability for policy lessons from the miracles

the transformation of the swedish model economic ideas distributional conflict and institutional change this article examines the transformation of the swedish model of economic regulation from an ideational perspective while the majority of arguments about the decline of the swedish model have focused on the role of structural factors this article looks to illuminate the ideational factors that made possible both the emergence and the transformation of the swedish model the article details how during the 1930s and 1940s economic ideas provided the swedish state and its trade union allies with the means to construct the institutions of the swedish model by the 1970s however swedish business suffered diminishing returns to continued participation within these institutions and responded to labor s challenges by adopting a two pronged strategy of withdrawal from and ideological contestation of labor s supporting institutions the politics of ideas was key in this regard during the 1980s swedish business marshaled alternative economic ideas to contest and thus delegitimate existing institutions and the patterns of distribution they made possible swedish business thus began the process of overturning the swedish model long before capital mobility or domestic inflation was ever a problem by highlighting these factors the article offers an explanation of the transformation of the swedish model that stresses the centrality of ideational contestation for understanding institutional change in general

the paradox of globalization labor relations in germany and beyond what is the impact of globalization on labor in the advanced industrial countries one body of work holds that globalization pushes all countries toward neoliberalism another argues that the impact of globalization will vary according to prevailing institutional arrangements and predicts continued divergence between the so called liberal and coordinated market economies in an analysis of the german case that combines case study and formal modeling methods we refute the first neoliberal convergence theory showing that globalization in some ways empowers unions by rendering employers extremely vulnerable to industrial unrest furthermore we suggest some revisions to the second varieties of capitalism perspective we show that in germany employers increased vulnerability to conflict has shored up centralized bargaining arrangements in the short run but at the same time has also set in motion feedback effects that are deeply destabilizing to the system in the longer term

efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching abstract this paper investigates the sensitivity of recent evolutionary models of learning to the specification of the matching mechanism we study a literally random matching mechanism combined with a process of strategy adjustment based on the realized average performance of each strategy in the key class of symmetric 2 2 coordination games the pareto efficient equilibrium per se is selected rather than the risk dominant equilibrium as the probability of experimentation or mutation goes to zero furthermore convergence to the equilibrium is relatively fast we extend these results for example to games of common interest journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73

labor markets production strategies and wage bargaining institutions the swedish employer offensive in comparative perspective transformed patterns of labor market governance occupy a central place in the study of contemporary west european political economies here detailed analysis of the dramatic decentralization of wa