electoral politics and the executive veto a predictive theory we argue that winner take all voting in states and the unequal distribution of electoral votes across states in presidential elections makes incumbent presidents rationally place more weight on the preferences of voters in closely contested larger states when making policy decisions this hypothesis is tested by examining whether presidential veto decisions are influenced by the floor votes of senators from these electorally crucial states in a pooled sample of 325 individual bills from 1970 through 1988 we find significant evidence of this behavior by incumbent presidents

does direct democracy reduce public debt evidence from swiss municipalities although some countries have managed toobtain balanced budgets or even budgetsurpluses in recent times public debts ofmany oecd countries remain at high levels since structural reforms of public spendinghave only infrequently taken place in mostcountries fiscal pressure will increaseagain in the future due to society s ageingand the accompanying increases in socialtransfer spending constitutionalrestrictions on debt levels and legal rulesof the budgetary process such as a strongrole of the minister of finance aresupposed to be helping against the debtbias inherent in political decision makingprocedures in addition to such top downbudgetary procedures this paperinvestigates the impact of referendumapproval of budget deficits by the voterson the level of public debt in a crosssection of the 134 largest swissmunicipalities in 1990

electoral incentives public policy and the new deal realignment this paper develops a model of the effects of electoral incentives on policy then applies the model to the new deal realignment in the model policy is the outcome of an agenda setter game between the president and legislators specifically the president sets policy subject to legislative approval the president s ability to concentrate benefits in states with high electoral payoffs depends in part on his or her power to influence legislators prospects for reelection regression analysis shows that new deal spending and roll call voting patterns in the house of representatives support the model historical accounts of other aspects of new deal policy including labor and civil rights issues are consistent with the model together the theoretical results and the empirical evidence help to explain several striking features of the policy and politics of the 1930s including i why a government dominated by the democratic party would provide high benefits to swing states and much lower benefits to the traditionally democratic south ii why favoritism of swing states increased from the 1933 1934 period to the 19371938 period iii why favoritism of swing states decreased from 1938 to 1939 and iv why with the rise of the conservative coalition in congress in the late 1930s it was the representatives from traditionally loyal democratic districts that created the strongest democratic opposition to roosevelt and the new deal this paper develops a model of the effects of electoral incentives on policy then applies the model to the new deal realignment in the model policy is the outcome of an agenda setter game between the president and legislators specifically the president sets policy subject to legislative approval the president s ability to concentrate benefits in states with high electoral payoffs depends in part on his or her power to influence legislators prospects for reelection regression analysis shows that new deal spending and roll call voting patterns in the house of representatives strongly support the model historical accounts of other aspects of new deal policy including positions on labor and civil rights issues are also consistent with the model together the theoretical results and the empirical evidence contribute to the understanding of several striking features of the policy and politics of the 1930s

what ended the great depression re evaluating the role of fiscal policy conventional wisdom contends that fiscal policy was of secondary importance for the economic recovery in the 1930s the recovery is then connected to monetary policy that allowed non sterilised gold inflows to increase the money supply often this is shown by measuring the fiscal multipliers and demonstrating that they were relatively small this paper shows that problems with the conventional measures of fiscal multipliers in the 1930s may have created an incorrect consensus on the irrelevance of fiscal policy the rehabilitation of fiscal policy is seen as a necessary step in the reinterpretation of the positive role of new deal policies for the recovery

work sharing during the great depression did the president s reemployment agreement promote reemployment the president s reemployment agreement pra of 1933 directed firms to reduce workweeks during the great depression so existing jobs could be spread into additional employment opportunities similar work sharing policies have recently been implemented across europe in hopes of reducing unemployment i find that ceteris paribus the work sharing aspects of the pra created nearly 2 5 million new employment opportunities in around four months however the programme also required firms to raise hourly wage rates offsetting close to half of these gains furthermore most of the remaining employment gains were wiped out after cartel oriented industry specific codes of fair competition supplanted the pra

political and institutional determinants of fiscal policy in the european community in recent theoretical and empirical research the variation in political and institutional arrangements which may affect the process of national policy formation is examined in order to explain cross country differences with respect to fiscal policies pursued in this paper we build upon this literature and examine whether and how cross country differences in debt accumulation and public sector size of member countries of the european community during the 1980s can be explained we conclude that the growth of government debt is positively related to the frequency of government changes and negatively to sound budgetary procedures in countries with left wing governments the growth of the share of government spending in total output generally tends to be higher

political stability and fiscal policy time series evidence for the swiss federal level since 1849 this paper explores the role of political stability on fiscal policy in a time series analysis over 158 years at the swiss federal level we argue that the fiscal commons problem of public finances is affected by the number of years a finance minister remains in office because the incentives for an incumbent to maintain a good reputation with sound policy decisions are stronger a finance minister who succeeds to stay a long time in office enjoys a politically powerful position towards the administration parliament and interest groups in contrast frequent government turnover weakens the position of the finance minister

what or who started the great depression abstract herbert hoover i develop a theory of labor market failure for the depression based on hoover s industrial labor program that provided industry with protection from unions in return for keeping nominal wages fixed i find that the theory accounts for much of the depth of the depression and for the asymmetry of the depression across sectors the theory also can reconcile why deflation low nominal spending apparently had such large real effects during the 1930s but not during other periods of significant deflation

how successful was the new deal the microeconomic impact of new deal spending and lending policies in the 1930s the new deal during the 1930s was arguably the largest peace time expansion in federal government activity in american history until recently there had been very little quantitative testing of the microeconomic impact of the wide variety of new deal programs over the past decade scholars have developed new panel databases for counties cities and states and then used panel data methods on them to examine the impact of new deal spending and lending policies for the major new deal programs in most cases the identification of the effect comes from changes across time within the same geographic location after controlling for national shocks to the economy many of the studies also use instrumental variable methods to control for endogeneity the studies find that public works and relief spending had state income multipliers of around one increased consumption activity attracted internal migration reduced crime rates and lowered several types of mortality the farm programs typically aided large farm owners but eliminated opportunities for share croppers tenants and farm workers the home owners loan corporation s purchases and refinancing of troubled mortgages staved off drops in housing prices and home ownership rates at relatively low ex post cost to taxpayers the reconstruction finance corporation s loans to banks and railroads appear to have had little positive impact although the banks were aided when the rfc took ownership stakes

the impact of federal government expenditures in the 1930s there is no shortage of explanations for the depressed conditions of the 1930s most of the recent literature has focused on the causes and severity of the great depression of 1929 33 but the failure of production to expand much beyond its 1929 peak by 1937 and the sharp 1937 38 recession have also received attention at the heart of the discussion has been the debate over monetary versus nonmonetary forces and the role of the federal reserve yet among possible nonmonetary forces little attention has been given to the role of federal government expenditures to cite only one example in the comprehensive study of this era edited by brunner 9 the role of government spending is ignored or at best mentioned only in passing in the volume s seventeen papers and comments

the effect of old age assistance on retirement abstract researchers have devoted considerable attention to analyzing the impact of social security on retirement with mixed findings however the means tested program old age assistance oaa dwarfed social security until the 1950s and coincided with the early decline in elderly labor force participation also oaa benefits were determined by the states a key source of policy variation i estimate the relationship between oaa benefits and elderly participation using individual data from the 1940 and 1950 censuses oaa s impact is found to be strong and implies that participation would have risen slightly instead of falling if benefits had not increased during the 1940s

fiscal policy and economic recovery the case of the 1936 veterans bonus conventional wisdom has it that in the 1930s scal policy did not work because it was not tried this paper shows that scal policy though inadvertent was tried in 1936 and a variety of evidence suggests that it worked a decit nanced veterans bonus provided 3 2 million world war i veterans with cash and bond payments totaling 2 percent of gdp the typical veteran received a payment equal to annual per capita personal income this paper uses time series and cross sectional data to identify the eects of the bonus i exploit four sources of quantitative evidence a detailed household consumption survey cross state and cross city regressions aggregate time series and a previously unused american legion survey of veterans the evidence paints a consistent picture in which veterans quickly spent the majority of their bonus spending was concentrated on cars and housing in particular narrative accounts support these quantitative results a simple calculation suggests that the bonus added 2 5 to 3 percentage points to 1936 gdp growth

comparisons of weekly hours over the past century and the importance of work sharing policies in the 1930s abstract changes in the work week drove a larger portion of changes in total labor input during the great depression of the 1930s than during other decades work sharing policies appear to be responsible herbert hoover created various work sharing committees led by key industrialists which pushed for shorter work weeks and franklin roosevelt s president s reemployment agreement called for sharp cuts in weekly work hours spreading available work amongst more people was the goal during these periods between 50 and 90 percent of declines in labor input were accommodated by falling hours in recent decades employers have instead relied on layoffs to achieve the same end

granting votes exposing the political bias of intergovernmental grants using the within between specification for panel data instead of alleviating fiscal inequalities intergovernmental grants are often used to fulfill the grantors political goals this study uses a unique panel dataset on more than 500 croatian municipalities over a 12 year period to uncover the extent to which grant distribution is biased owing to grantors electoral concerns instead of the default fixed effects approach to modelling panel data we apply a novel within between specification aimed at uncovering the contextual source of variation focusing on the effects of electoral concerns on grant allocation within and between municipalities we find evidence of a substantial political bias in grant allocations both within and between municipalities particularly when it comes to local level electoral concerns the paper offers researchers a new perspective when tackling the issue of politically biased grant allocation using panel data particularly when they wish to uncover the simultaneous impact of time variant and time invariant factors or when they cannot apply a quasi experimental approach because of specific institutional contexts

faith based charity and crowd out during the great depression abstract interest in religious organizations as providers of social services has increased dramatically in recent years churches in the u s were a crucial provider of social services through the early part of the twentieth century but their role shrank dramatically with the expansion in government spending under the new deal in this paper we investigate the extent to which the new deal crowded out church charitable spending in the 1930s we do so using a new nationwide data set of charitable spending for six large christian denominations matched to data on local new deal spending we instrument for new deal spending using measures of the political strength of a state s congressional delegation and confirm our findings using a different instrument based on institutional constraints on state relief spending with both instruments we find that higher government spending leads to lower church charitable activity crowd out was small as a share of total new deal spending 3 but large as a share of church spending our estimates suggest that benevolent church spending fell by 30 in response to the new deal and that government relief spending can explain virtually all of the decline in charitable church activity observed between 1933 and 1939

cartel code attributes and cartel performance an industry level analysis of the national industrial recovery act abstract this paper uses the cartel enabling national industrial recovery act nira of 1933 to gain insight into cartel performance i employ a monthly panel of 66 industries that passed an nira code of fair competition to examine how specific attributes of these cartel codes affected the ability to achieve collusive outcomes i find that output growth was significantly lower during cartel months consistent with cartel theory and that industries with more complex codes were more successful than those with simpler ones furthermore industries with code restrictions on new productive capacity production quotas and requirements to file data with a central board were the most successful at reducing output which suggests that these types of provisions were the most effective in helping firms attain collusive outcomes finally i find that the effectiveness of data filing provisions was limited to the early months of the nira prior to a wave of cartel breakdown occurring in spring 1934

a house of her own old age assistance and the living arrangements of older nonmarried women abstract i investigate the factors that fostered the rise in separate living quarters for older nonmarried women since mid century by examining the impact of old age assistance on living arrangements in 1940 and 1950 i find that old age assistance substantially increased demand for separate living quarters but that demand depended upon the rules of the program in particular whether children were held legally responsible for the care of their aged parents i argue that more than half of the decline in the fraction of older nonmarried women living with kin from 1950 to 1990 can be attributed to rising social security benefits and expanded eligiblity and to the fact that social security benefits were given with no strings attached

great expectations and the end of the depression what ended the great depression in the united states this paper suggests that the recovery was driven by a shift in expectations this shift was triggered by president franklin delano roosevelt s fdr policy actions on the monetary policy side roosevelt abolished the gold standard and announced an explicit policy objective of inflating the price level to pre depression levels on the fiscal policy side roosevelt expanded real and deficit spending which helped make his policy objective credible the key to the recovery was the successful management of expecta tions about future policy roosevelt s rise to power is modeled as a policy regime change as in thomas sargent 1983 and peter temin and barry wigmore 1990 this paper formalizes temin and wigmore s argu ment in a repeated game setting using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model and argues that the regime change can account for the recovery in the model a regime change means the elimination of certain policy dogmas that constrain the actions of the government the regime change generates an endogenous shift in expectations due to a coordination of mon etary and fiscal policy this coordination ended the great depression by engineering a shift in expectations from contractionary i e the private sector expected future economic contrac tion and deflation to expansionary i e the public expected future economic expansion and inflation the expectation of higher future inflation lowered real interest rates thus stimulating demand while the expectation of higher future income stimulated demand by raising permanent income

capital theory and the origins of the elasticity of substitution 1932 35 elasticity of substitution was introduced into economics during the early 1930s it was discovered independendy by hicks in the theory of wages and by joan robinson in the economics of imperfect competition and then was the centre of a polemic involving kahn and sraffa among others the debate focused on imperfect competition and capital theoretical issues some elem ents of the 1950s and 1960s capital theory controversy such as the idea of capital as a giffen good or the difficulties of measuring capital were already discussed at this early stage

a patchwork safety net a survey of cliometric studies of income maintenance programs in the united states in the first half of the twentieth century social welfare programs in the usa are designed to serve as safety nets for people in hard times in contrast with the universal approach found in many other developed western nations in a survey of cliometric studies of social welfare programs in the usa we examine the variation in the safety net in the usa across states in the 20th century the determinants of the variation and its impact on socioeconomic outcomes the usa has always displayed substantial variation in the extent of the safety net because the features of most public social welfare programs have been and currently are determined by local and state governments even after the federal government became involved in the 1930s differences across states persist strongly for typically a decade although the persistence weakens with time and there are some periods when federal intervention led to a re ordering the rankings of state benefits differ from program to program and economic and political factors have different weights in determining benefit levels in panel data estimation of their effects variation in benefits across programs during the early 1900s had significant impact on labour markets economic activity family formation death rates and crime copyright 2010 blackwell publishing ltd

how large is the government spending multiplier evidence from world bank lending this paper proposes a novel method of isolating fluctuations in public spending that are likely to be uncorrelated with contemporaneous macroeconomic shocks and can be used to estimate government spending multipliers the approach relies on two features unique to many low income countries 1 borrowing from the world bank finances a substantial fraction of public spending and 2 actual spending on world bank financed projects is typically spread out over several years following the original approval of the project these two features imply that fluctuations in spending on world bank projects in a given year are in large part determined by fluctuations in project approval decisions made in previous years and so are unlikely to be correlated with shocks to output in the current year world bank project level disbursement data are used to isolate the component of public spending associated with project approvals from previous years which in turn can be used to estimate government spending multipliers in a sample of 29 aid dependent low income countries the estimated multipliers are small reasonably precisely estimated and rarely significantly different from zero

divided government fiscal institutions and budget deficits evidence from the states does partisan control of american state government have systematic effects on state spending and taxing levels does divided control affect the government s ability to make hard decisions do institutional rules like legal deficit carryover restrictions matter using a formal model of fiscal policy to guide empirical analysis of data covering the american states from 1968 to 1987 we conclude that 1 aggregate state budget totals are driven by different factors under democrats and republicans the net result being that democrats target spending and taxes to higher shares of state level personal income 2 divided government is less able to react to revenue shocks that lead to budget deficits particularly where different parties control each chamber of the legislature and 3 unified party governments with restricted ability to carry deficits into the next fiscal year outside the south have sharper reactions to negative revenue shocks than those without restrictions

the value of the vote a model and test of the effects of turnout on distributive policy the most plausible assumption is that if certain groups or classes of citizens habitually do not vote their interest will be neglected in the actions and policies of governments key 1950 506 i introduction this article investigates the effects of voter participation on the distribution of government funds a simple model shows why for some types of distributive policy incumbents will have a greater probability of reelection if high turnout regions receive more funds than do low turnout regions the model predicts therefore that politicians who seek reelection and similarly politicians including the ideologically driven selected into office because they set popular policy will tend to allocate more funds to regions with higher turnout i test the model s predicted relationship between turnout and spending for the south in the 1930s spending data are county level allocations by the federal emergency relief administration fera which was the early new deal s main program to provide relief to the unemployed the evidence suggests that turnout had a substantial effect on fera spending if an individual was a voter rather than a nonvoter it typically led to an increase on the order of 30 in the expected fera allocation for the individual s county the findings shed light both on the role of voting in representative democracies and on the historical role of voting rights in the southern political system elections voter participation and policy representative democracy creates a tendency for government to set policy that improves politicians prospects for reelection this may occur because politicians design policy for the purpose of winning reelection or it may occur because elections sort into office those politicians who for ideological or other reasons tend to set policy that wins votes 1 the type of policy that improves the prospects for reelection depends upon how voters respond to policy to illustrate this point consider the distribution of a fixed sum between different regions e g counties one key consideration is the extent to which voting behavior responds to distributive policy allocating funds to groups that do not respond will be less likely to lead to reelection groups that do not respond include those who will always vote in support of the incumbent those who will always vote in opposition to the incumbent and those who do not vote previous work on distributive politics has examined how distribution is influenced by constituents voting behavior with respect to whom they support when they do vote for example wright 1974 wallis 1984 1987 1991 kiewiet and mccubbins 1985 cox and mccubbins 1986 and fleck 1999 examine favoritism of swing and loyal voters 2 this article takes a different but complementary approach by focusing on the distributive effects of whether people vote quite simply winning the approval of a group of citizens has a larger effect on reelection if those citizens vote in large numbers than if they do not this provides a reason to expect that politicians will tend to allocate relatively little to those who do not vote this is consistent with the long recognized point that nonvoters have little influence on policy a point that key 1950 made clear and that follows naturally from economic models of voting such as that of downs 1957 bennett and mayberry 1979 show a similar effect of legislative representation on interstate redistribution states with more representatives per capita in congress tend to have lower ratios of taxes paid into the federal treasury relative to federal grants in aid received by modeling and estimating the effects of voter participation this article contributes to the general understanding of how voting influences the allocation of resources furthermore the substantial size of the estimated effects underscores the critical role that voting rights played in the southern political system

on government centralization and fiscal referendums abstract several authors have argued that a centralization of fiscal powers in a federation is less likely to occur if citizens have to approve a change in the assignments of responsibilities by a popular referendum this outcome may be due to the fact that logrolling is more difficult under direct than under representative democracy it may also be caused by citizens fear that a centralization of fiscal authority facilitates the extraction of rents by the government or the legislature in this paper we test the hypothesis that centralization is less likely under referendum decision making in the unique institutional setting of switzerland using a panel of swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998 the empirical analysis provides evidence that referendums induce less centralization of fiscal activities

fragmented government effects on fiscal policy new evidence most industrialized countries entered the 1980s with their public finances in disarray at the time persistent deficits pushed up public debt to gdpratios despite such similarities deficit spending varies substantially between countries and within countries over time recent theoretical and empirical research has considered how differences in political arrangements affecting national policy formation might explain variation in fiscal policies pursued using a panel of 22 oecd countries over the 1971 1996 period this paper extends previous literature on the effects of fragmented government on fiscal policy outcomes in various directions first we focus on data relating to central government instead of general government as all theories refer to central government second not only do we analyze the effect of size fragmentation of government we also examine government s position vis a vis parliament and government s political fragmentation we find evidence that more fragmented government defined in terms of the number of political parties in a coalition or the number of spending ministers have higher deficits there is also some evidence that governments that dispose of excess seats in parliament have lower deficits right wing governments appear to have been fiscally more responsible in the seventies political fragmentation does not affect government s budget deficit

the political economy of new deal fiscal federalism in 1930 the average american received somewhat more than 50 percent of his government services from local government 20 percent from state government and the remainder from the federal government by 1940 this pattern had been reversed with the federal government supplying roughly 50 percent state government 20 percent and local government 30 percent figure 1 shows how shares of non military expenditures by the three levels of government shifted dramatically away from local governments toward the national government during the decade the same was true of revenues this transition in the relative importance of state federal and local government was dramatic and from the perspective of the 1990s permanent figure 1 omitted the most important cause of the shift in fiscal terms was the implementation of national relief programs under the new deal the federal emergency relief administration fera the works progress administration wpa the social security programs and others between 1932 and 1940 direct relief expenditures account for roughly 45 percent of the growth in national expenditures 60 percent of the growth in state expenditures and 20 percent of the growth in local expenditures almost all of which came from federal and state grants for relief purposes even more revealing are the figures for the period between 1932 and 1935 in those three years national government expenditures rose by slightly less than 2 billion while expenditures for relief alone reached 2 2 billion in 1935 from zero in 1932 1 the increase in federal expenditures was significant but an important reason why state and national governments grew but local governments did not lay in the fiscal structure of the relief programs the extensive use of matching grants to finance relief expenditures created incentives for states to expand their fiscal effort while local governments were effectively able to substitute national and state relief grants for their own funds matching grants also allowed the states to control the amount spent in each program the national government was and is still today unable to control expenditures on these programs or to equalize welfare standards across states open ended matching grants entitled the states to unencumbered access to the federal treasury 2 the programs also permanently altered the american welfare system the categorical assistance programs of the social security act brought about a basic realignment of financial and administrative responsibilities between the federal state and local governments old age assistance aid to dependent children and aid to the blind were independently administered by state governments the act contained strong restrictions on the ability of the social security board to influence the administration of programs within the states explicitly forbidding the board to set personnel policies 3 why were open ended matching grants and a decentralized administrative structure adopted rather than some other institutional form public finance theory suggests that it may have been the best way for the federal government to support relief expenditures without discouraging continued state and local participation matching grants are usually proposed as a remedy to problems of externalities in this case the spillover is the movement of persons seeking relief from low benefit to high benefit states they solve the externality problem through the use of fiscal incentives as gramlich 1977 276 notes for matching grants the central government is expressly trying to stimulate spending in a certain area as we will see below matching grants did have this effect federal grants expanded rapidly but the state and local sector did not substitute federal grant moneys for state and local tax dollars on a large scale recent empirical studies of matching grants indicate that they result in somewhat less spending than the size of the grant indicating that state and local governments reduce their own expenditures on grant programs slightly in the presence of matching grants in contrast to lump sum grants where state and local governments are able to substitute significant amounts of federal grants for their own tax dollars

money interest and wages collected essays in economic theory anyone who doubts the importance of the work of sir john hicks for the development of economics in the middle decades of the twentieth century should reflect for a moment on what the average undergraduate syllabus would look like had value and capital 1 and mr keynes and the classics never been written on the other hand if anyone believes that hicks s contribution to macroeconomics began and ended with the latter work and to judge from that same average undergraduate syllabus such people do exist he could do no better than read money interest and wages although this collection of twenty four essays written between 1931 81 is by no means comprehensive it is certainly representative of hicks s work on macroeconomic issues over the period moreover because each essay is accompanied by a brief introduction putting it in its place in the canon of hicks s writings the interested reader will always be able to track down other related work if he so wishes

the industrial organization of congress or why legislatures like firms are not organized as markets this paper provides a theory of legislative institutions that parallels the theory of the firm and the theory of contractual institutions like market institutions legislative institutions reflect two key components the goals or preferences of individuals here representatives seeking reelection and the relevant transactions costs we present three conclusions first we show how the legislative institutions enforce bargains among legislators second we explain why given the peculiar form of bargaining problems found in legislatures specific forms of nonmarket exchange prove superior to market exchange third our approach shows how the committee system limits the types of coalitions that may form on a particular issue

local economic development agglomeration economies and the big push 100 years of evidence from the tennessee valley authority we study the long run eects of one of the most ambitious place based economic development policies in u s history the tennessee valley authority using a rich panel dataset of counties we conduct an evaluation of the dynamic eects of the tva on local economies in the seventy years following the program s inception we nd that the tva led to short run gains in agricultural employment that were eventually reversed while impacts on manufacturing employment continued to intensify well after the program s subsidies had lapsed a pattern consistent with the presence of strong agglomeration economies in the manufacturing sector economists have long cautioned that the local gains created by place based policies may be oset by losses elsewhere yielding ambiguous eects on the u s as a whole building on the framework in glaeser and gottlieb 2008 we develop a novel approach to assessing the aggregate consequences of shifting the spatial distribution of manufacturing employment our ndings suggest the aggregate productivity gains associated with relocating manufacturing activity to the tva region were probably minimal

the american welfare system and family structure an historical perspective cross sectional studies find a positive relationship between a state s welfare benefits and single motherhood but is this evidence of a welfare effect or rather of cross state differences in social attitudes that influence both policy and behavior this paper demonstrates that the spatial variation in welfare policy long preceded the spatial correlation of policy and behavior undermining the social norm hypothesis but the findings also raise doubts about the role that welfare policy played in the changes in family structure over the century the correlation between welfare benefits and family structure only appears in 1970 and then only for whites

a history of mechanization in the cotton south the institutional hypothesis the cotton south has always lagged behind the rest of american agriculture in the use and development of large scale machinery this paper formalizes an idea often found in the historical literature in loosely specified form which argues that the institutional structure of the southern plantation economy caused this technological inertia in particular the institutional hypothesis argues that the annual labor contracts used to secure plantation labor discouraged partial mechanization and inventive activity by redirecting the impact of higher labor costs away from the development and adoption of labor saving machinery and toward the adoption of small unmechanizable tenancies this hypothesis is modeled and supporting evidence is presented its larger implications are also discussed

sample selection and treatment effect estimation of lender of last resort policies this article develops a framework for estimating multivariate treatment effect models in the presence of sample selection the methodology deals with several important issues prevalent in policy and program evaluation including application and approval stages nonrandom treatment assignment endogeneity and discrete outcomes this article presents a computationally efficient estimation algorithm and techniques for model comparison and treatment effects the framework is applied to evaluate the effectiveness of bank recapitalization programs and their ability to resuscitate the financial system the analysis of lender of last resort lolr policies is not only complicated due to econometric challenges but also because regulator data are not easily obtainable motivated by these difficulties this article constructs a novel bank level dataset and employs the new methodology to jointly model a bank s decision to apply for assistance the lolr s decision to approve or decline the assistance and the bank s

inter regional redistribution through infrastructure investment tactical or programmatic in this paper we study the political economy of the inter regional allocation of investment in infrastructure in an effort to disentangle tactical and programmatic motives where tactical politics refers to the discretionary allocation of investment to districts with more political clout and programmatic politics refers to the allocation of investment according to certain objective criteria e g income level we use a panel of data from the spanish electoral districts for the period 1964 2004 to estimate an equation in which investment depends both on economic and political variables the results show that tactical politics do matter since the districts receiving the most funds are those in which i the incumbent s vote margin is low ii few votes are needed to win an additional seat in the legislature iii the central and regional governments are controlled by the same party and iv regional parties play a pivotal role in the legislature however the results also show that programmatic politics matter since inter regional redistribution is shown to increase i with the arrival of democracy and european union funds ii under leftist governments and iii the weaker the correlation is between political clout and regional income

radio s impact on public spending if informed voters receive favorable policies then the invention of a new mass medium may affect government policies since it affects who is informed and who is not these ideas are developed in a voting model the model forms the basis for an empirical investigation of a major new deal relief program implemented in the middle of the expansion period of radio the main empirical finding is that u s counties with many radio listeners received more relief funds more funds were allocated to poor counties with high unemployment but controlling for these and other variables the effects of radio are large and highly significant

federalizing benefits the introduction of supplemental security income and the size of the safety net abstract in 1974 supplemental security income ssi federalized cash welfare programs for the elderly blind and individuals with disabilities imposing a national minimum benefit and differentially raising payment levels in states that paid below its benefit floor we show that this increased disability participation but shrank non disability cash transfer programs for every four new ssi recipients three came from other welfare programs each dollar of per capita ssi income increased total per capita transfer income by just over 50 cents federalizing part of a patchwork safety net need not increase redistribution by as much as traditional models of fiscal federalism suggest

the great depression versus the great recession in the u s how fiscal monetary and financial polices compare abstract this study reviews the financial distress that triggered and amplified the financial crises of the great depression and great recession and compares macroeconomic and financial policy responses shadow banking funded the build up of the financial excesses that preceded both the quicker and forceful response of monetary and fiscal policy during the great recession and stronger action to restore market functionality mitigated the downturn and aided recovery nevertheless actions to address the mortgage debt overhang were slower post depression reforms focused on preventing deposit runs and post great recession reforms on preventing runs on bank debt and shadow banks while boosting capital buffers

did workers pay for the passage of workers compensation laws market responses to legislative reforms often mitigate the expected gains that reformers promise in legislation contemporaries hailed workers compensation as a boon to workers because it raised the amount of postaccident compensation paid to injured workers despite the large gains to workers employers often supported the legislation analysis of several wage samples from the early 1900s shows that employers were able to pass a significant part of the added costs of higher postaccident compensation on to some workers in the form of reductions in wages the size of the wage offsets however was smaller for union workers

striking at the roots of crime the impact of welfare spending on crime during the great depression abstractduring the great depression contemporaries worried that people hit by hard times would resort to crime president franklin roosevelt argued that the massive government relief efforts struck at the roots of crime by providing subsistence income to needy families after constructing a panel data set for 81 large american cities for the years 1930 40 we estimate the effect of relief spending by all levels of government on crime rates the analysis suggests that a 10 percent increase in relief spending during the 1930s reduced property crime by roughly 1 5 percent by limiting the amount of relief recipients free time work relief may have been more effective than direct relief in reducing crime more generally our results indicate that social insurance which tends to be understudied in economic analyses of crime should be more explicitly and more carefully incorporated into the analysis of temporal and spatial variations in criminal activity

identifying the effect of unemployment on crime abstract in this paper we analyze the relationship between unemployment and crime using u s state data we estimate the effect of unemployment on the rates of seven felony offenses we control extensively for state level demographic and economic factors and estimate specifications that include state specific time trends state effects and year effects in addition we use prime defense contracts and a state specific measure of exposure to oil shocks as instruments for unemployment rates we find significantly positive effects of unemployment on property crime rates that are stable across model specifications our estimates suggest that a substantial portion of the decline in property crime rates during the 1990s is attributable to the decline in the unemployment rate the evidence for violent crime is considerably weaker however a closer analysis of the violent crime of rape yields some evidence that the employment prospects of males are weakly related to state rape rates

self service activities and formal or informal market services household can provide themselves with services in different ways generally a household can produce a service itself or buy it on a formal or informal market on an informal market services are sold at a price substantially lower than on a formal market because of tax evasion by both consumer and producer this article investigates the choices made by dutch households with respect to three services small home repairs car repair and maintenance and ladies hairdressing the analysis shows that the mode of provision of the services is influenced not only by financial considerations but also by the ability of the household to engage in home production skills for and attitudes towards home production and the availability of informal market services in the local area

the new deal and modern memory summary economists and other social scientists may never be able to explain fully why the greatdepression happened when it did or why it initially was so severe numerous hypotheses havebeen advanced as we have seen and each of them contributes important insights into thecauses of the macroeconomic calamity in which most of the world was mired in 1929 1933 if however one is forced to adopt a monocausal theory it must center on the actions of america scentral bank which presided over an extraordinary expansion in bank credit in the mid to late1920s and then took the punch bowl off the table for the purposes of this article though the key question is why did the great depressionlast longer in the united states than it did in any other nation the answer as laid out in thenext section is presidential politics 23 there will come seven years of great plenty throughout all the land of egypt but after them will arise seven years offamine and all the plenty will be forgotten in the land of egypt the famine will consume the land genesis 41 29 30 nkjv

the arsenal of democracy production and politics during wwii abstract we study the geographic distribution of military supply contracts during world war ii this is a unique case where 3 trillion current day dollars was spent we find robust evidence consistent with the hypothesis that economic factors dominated the allocation of supply contracts and that political factors or at least winning the 1944 presidential election were at best of secondary importance general industrial capacity in 1939 as well as specialized industrial capacity for aircraft production are strong predictors of contract spending across states electoral college pivot probabilities are weak predictors of contract and new facilities spending and under the most plausible assumptions they are essentially unrelated to spending this is true over the entire period 1940 1944 and also for shorter periods leading up to the election in november 1944 that is we find no evidence of an electoral cycle in the distribution of funds

a theory of divided government this paper extends the spatial theory of voting to an institutional structure in which policy choices depend upon not only the executive but also the composition of the legislature voters have incentives to be strategic since policy reflects the outcome of a simultaneous election of the legislature and the executive and since the legislature s impact on policy depends upon relative plurality to analyze equilibrium in this game between voters we apply coalition proof type refinements the model has several testable implications which are consistent with voting behavior in the united states for instance the model predicts a split tickets where some voters vote for one party for president and the other for congress b for some parameter values a divided government with different parties controlling the executive and the majority of the legislature and c the midterm electoral cycle with the party holding the presidency always losing votes in midterm congressional elections

the political determination of intergovernmental grants in australia intergovernmental grants have been conventionally explained on the basis of either equity efficiency and or institutional considerations this paper seeks to model australian intergovernmental grants by including both traditional public finance variables and public choice influences that is grants are used by federal government politicians to purchase political capital thereby enhancing their own chances of reelection the models employed in this paper are tested for six australian states for the period 1981 82 to 1991 92 using unsystematic grant transfers the results provide support for these public choice considerations and highlight the importance of incorporating institutional factors and controlling for misspecification in the error structure in estimates of this type

party control of state government and the distribution of public expenditures this paper examines the effects of party control of state governments on the distribution of intergovernmental transfers across counties from 1957 to 1997 we find that the governing parties skew the distribution of funds in favor of areas that provide them with the strongest electoral support this is borne out in two ways i counties that traditionally give the highest vote share to the governing party receive larger shares of state transfers to local governments ii when control of the state government changes the distribution of funds shifts in the direction of the new governing party we find only weak evidence that parties reward electorally pivotal counties or counties in electorally pivotal legislative districts finally we find that increased spending in a county increases voter turnout in subsequent elections this suggests that parties have an electoral incentive to skew the distribution of funds to influence future election results and the mechanism through which this works is mobilization rather than conversion of voters in a fixed electorate

the incredible holc mortgage relief during the great depression this paper examines the relief provided by the home owners loan corporation holc a new deal program that purchased and refinanced over 1 million distressed residential mortgages i document that the holc paid relatively high prices for its mortgages most likely in an effort to encourage lender participation and stimulate the housing market the consequence was that lenders were able to remove poorly performing assets from their balance sheets at attractive prices while this meant the holc s ability to seek principal reductions was somewhat limited borrowers still received significant relief through the terms of the holc s more modern and forgiving mortgage contracts

public resource allocation and electoral systems in the u s and japan this paper introduces alternative measures of net budgetallocation and legislative representation they are neutral tothe size of total expenditure and tax collection as well as tochanges in the population and the size of the legislature which makes them suitable for panel data exercises andinternational comparative studies regression analyses of 50u s states and 47 japanese prefectures using these indiceshighlight similarities and differences in public resourceallocation between respective democracies that reflect theirpolitical and electoral systems

the american recovery and reinvestment act solely a government jobs program abstract this paper estimates the private and government sector employment effects of american recovery and reinvestment act arra spending via an instrumental variables strategy we argue that this aid was effectively fungible and states used it to offset declines in revenue this enables us to use exogenous variation in states budget positions to identify the act s employment effects we also exploit exogenous variation across states in arra highway funding according to our benchmark estimates average state and local government employment during the 24 months following the program s inception was between 156 000 and 563 000 persons greater as a result of arra spending 90 confidence interval the corresponding estimate for the private sector ranges from a loss of 182 000 to a gain of 1 1 million jobs our point estimate for the implied cost of creating a job lasting one year is 202 000 which is substantially larger than the corresponding estimate from the president s council of economic advisors

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

the political economy of benefits and costs a neoclassical approach to distributive politics this essay offers a rational political explanation for the notorious inefficiency of pork barrel projects with an optimization model of legislative behavior and legislative institutions the model emphasizes the economically arbitrary from a welfare point of view importance of the geographic incidence of benefits and costs owing to the geographic basis for political representation we explore the implications of a legislator s objective function and derive conditions under which a representative legislature will select an omnibus of projects each of which exceeds the efficient scale

lessons from the political economy of the new deal the new deal produced a fundamental change in the structure of american government the national government came to play a much larger role in the financing of social welfare programmes while administration of the programmes was largely located at the states both the purely national and the shared federal parts of the welfare system were characterized by impersonal rules the political economy of how the rules came about and how the new deal experience may have contributed to americans changing their views on the danger of dealing with the national government is the primary focus the paper closes with speculations about the possible effect of changing views on american participation in the second world war after 1939

us monetary and fiscal policy in the 1930s the paper provides a survey of fiscal and monetary policies during the 1930s under the hoover and roosevelt administrations and how they influenced the policies during the recent great recession the discussion of the causal impacts of monetary policy focuses on papers written in the last decade and the findings of scholars using dynamic structural general equilibrium modelling the discussion of fiscal policy shows why economists do not see the new deal as a keynesian stimulus describes the significant shift toward excise taxation during the 1930s and surveys estimates of the impact of federal spending on local economies the paper concludes with discussion of the lessons for the present from 1930s monetary and fiscal policy

can government purchases stimulate the economy this essay briefly reviews the state of knowledge about the government spending multiplier drawing on theoretical work aggregate empirical estimates from the united states as well as cross locality estimates i assess the likely range of multiplier values for the experiment most relevant to the stimulus package debate a temporary deficit financed increase in government purchases i conclude that the multiplier for this type of spending is probably between 0 8 and 1 5 jel e23 e62 h50

the political economy of direct legislation direct democracy and local decision making local fiscal referenda the dampening effect on taxes and spending local and regional governments account for an important share of total government spending and given the decentralization trend in oecd nations this is likely to increase how should this spending be governed this article argues that direct democracy is best suited to organize decision making at the state and local level to support this we present the main theoretical arguments on why and how referenda and initiatives affect fiscal policy outcomes the basic argument concerns voter control under representative democracy citizens only have direct control at election time with referenda and initiatives citizens can selectively control their representatives on specific policies whenever they deviate sufficiently from citizens preferences as a result fiscal policy outcomes are likely to more closely reflect voter preferences we empirically test this on swiss data since switzerland provides a natural laboratory for local governance the governance structures of swiss cantons and localities with respect to fiscal issues range from classic parliamentary democracy to pure direct democracy and an important part of spending and taxation is controlled at these levels specifically we estimate an econometric model of fiscal behaviour using data from 1986 to 1997 for the 26 swiss cantons and 1990 data on 134 local communities it is shown that mandatory referenda on fiscal issues at both levels have a dampening effect on expenditure and revenue and at the local level also on public debt combining this with existing empirical evidence leads to a relatively uncontested result namely that elements of direct democracy are associated with sounder public finances better economic performance and higher satisfaction of citizens lars p feld and gebhard kirchgassner

deviations from constituent interests the role of legislative structure and political parties in the states this paper investigates the determinants of state spending over 1960 1990 recent empirical studies suggest that state government expenditure is greater than the electorate desires our main finding is that expenditure was positively related to the number of seats in a state s legislature this is consistent with the hypothesis that logrolling leads representatives to spend more than their constituents would like we also find that political parties do not have a pronounced effect on overall levels of expenditure but do influence the composition of spending in particular democratic control of state government is associated with higher levels of welfare spending

fragmented fiscal policy abstract this paper explores on a panel of 19 oecd countries the role of fragmentation in determining fiscal outcomes over the 1970 95 period we first define the notion of fragmentation of fiscal policy making as the degree to which the costs of a dollar of aggregate expenditure are internalized by individual decision makers empirically this notion has two key logical components the number of decision makers and the rules of the game or the budget process in turn the number of decision makers can refer to the number of parties in a coalition or the number of ministers in the cabinet we test all these determinants against each other and against perhaps the oldest explanation of all ideology we show that cabinet size and to a lesser degree coalition size and ideology are significant and robust determinants of fiscal outcomes in particular transfers are the budget items most affected by these factors

was v for victory or votes a public choice analysis of world war ii federal spending several studies on the new deal have found that politicalfactors played a significant role in determining 1930s federalspending this suggests that federal spending was not capturedby special interest groups and self interested politiciansrecently but rather that it has been affected by thesefactors since the era of big government began we examinethe military emergency of the 1940s to determine whetherfederal spending during this crisis was similarly affected bypolitics

the political economy of the fair labor standards act of 1938 this paper examines the congressional passage of the american minimum wage law the fair labor standards act of 1938 voting on the act is modeled as a function of the concentration of the constituencies for minimum wage legislation north south differentials and legislator ideology it is shown that the house radically altered the final content of the bill abandoning a proposed wages and hours board with discretionary powers to determine minimum wages in favor of a flat rate following the objections of several interest groups north south divisions over the bill had little influence over congressional voting and the influence of constituent groups increased relative to legislators ideology as the bill became an important election issue

income tax evasion labour supply and the equity efficiency tradeoff abstract this paper is an attempt to incorporate tax evasion into the analysis of optimum income taxation a model of variable labour supply with tax evasion is used to derive supply functions for labour in regular and irregular markets given taxpayer behaviour the government chooses tax rates penalties and the probability of detection to maximize a utilitarian social welfare function the results consist in the derivation of a formula for the optimum marginal tax rate and a characterization of the factors determining the choice between the penalty rate and the probability of detection as instruments for the control of tax evasion

voting weights and formateur advantages in the formation of coalition governments over the last two decades a large and important literature has emerged that uses game theoretic models of bargaining to study legislative coalitions to test key predictions of these models we examine the composition of coalition governments from 1946 and 2001 these predictions are almost always expressed in terms of parties minimal integer voting weights we calculate such weights for all parliamentary parties in addition we develop a statistical model that nests the predictions of many of these models of the distribution of posts we find that for parties that join but did not form the government there is a linear relationship between their share of the voting weight in parliament and their share of cabinet posts the party that forms the government the formateur receives a substantial bonus relative to its voting weight the latter finding is more consistent with proposal based bargaining models of coalition formation and suggests that parties gain disproportionate power not because of their size but because of their proposal power

voter influence and big policy change the positive political economy of the new deal what conditions cause major policy changes under representative government this article addresses that question by providing a theoretically grounded analysis of a massive policy change the new deal it explains how the economic problems of the early 1930s initiated changes on several dimensions of policy federal spending labor market regulation and civil rights the article concludes by considering the broader lessons learned from the political economy of the new deal

what determines the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor a literature review this paper provides the first comprehensive review of the empirical and theoretical literature on the determinants of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor our focus is on the two input constant elasticity of substitution ces production function we start by presenting four concise observations that summarize the empirical literature on the estimation of motivated by these observations the main part of this survey then focuses on potential determinants of capital labor substitution we first review several approaches to the microfoundation of production functions where the elasticity of substitution eos is treated as a purely technological parameter second we outline the construction of an aggregate elasticity of substitution aes in a multi sectoral framework and investigate its dependence on underlying intra and inter sectoral substitution third we discuss the influence of the institutional framework on the extent of factor substitution overall this survey highlights that the effective elasticity of substitution ees which is typically estimated in empirical studies is generally not an immutable deep parameter but depends on a multitude of technological non technological and institutional determinants based on these insights the final section identifies a number of potential empirical and theoretical avenues for future research

the assumption of constant returns to scale nicholas kaldor was right to maintain that this assumption is unrealistic but that does not mean that it is useless there are propositions that can be proved assuming it which would never have been found without it but that look as if they are independent of it two examples 1 paul samuelson s factor price equalization theorem in international trade and 2 the author s theory of relations between factors in production elasticity of substitution in a modern form p and q substitutes complements must be distinguished weakly related factors are p substitutes and q complements this is the only case when no more than two factors are present otherwise two factors out of many may be strong substitutes substitutes both ways or strong complements complements both ways the excluded case when they would be p complements and q substitutes appears in the presence of scale economies to be excluded a fortiori copyright 1989 by oxford university press

tax decentralization and local government size this paper investigates the relationship between fiscal federalism and the sizes of local governments while many empirical studies emphasized that grants encourage the growth of local public spending and local taxes constrain it they are more silent regarding the effects of different types of tax autonomy the paper addresses this issue by arguing that tax decentralization as organized on tax bases used only by local governments tax separation rather than on tax base sharing would restrain local public expenditures using an unbalanced panel of oecd countries the key finding is that only property taxes mostly based on a tax separation scheme seem to favor smaller local governments thus while tax decentralization is a necessary condition for limiting the growth of local governments it does not appear sufficient as tax separation schemes among government levels would in fact be required

american government finance in the long run 1790 to 1990 government in america has gone through three distinct fiscal systems in the last two hundred years each system utilized a dominant revenue source and had a distinctly active level of government the changing structure of government by level seems to be related to changing revenue structures when new taxes become important the relative importance of each level of government changes on the other hand growth in the overall size of government is not directly related to the structure of revenues or the distribution of activity by level of government government growth is the result of long term commitments to provide education transportation social welfare services old age security and military forces

avoiding tax avoidance a repeated game theoretic approach abstract we propose an optimal auditing scheme for the tax authorities who face a given tax and penalty functions and a given budget constraint under our proposed strategy individuals can be classified into one of three groups each group is characterized by two parameters i the probability of being audited in that group and ii into which group will an individual move if ii a he reported truthfully ii b he cheated it is then shown that there is a choice of these parameters so that in equilibrium i e when every individual maximizes his payoff given the auditing strategy the percentage of individuals that cheat is arbitrarily small

employment politics and economic recovery during the great depression in earlier studies economic historians found that political goals rather than social or humanitarian objectives motivated much of new deal spending using new information on annual state level employment for the 1930s this paper shows that while politics are still important responding to the needs of the unemployed was an important determinant of new deal spending

intellectual property rights in china the changing political economy of chinese american interests we review the evolution of modern chinese intellectual property right ipr laws and enforcement and explore economic and political forces involved in international conflicts over chinese ipr protection our analysis considers why the us and china moved from conflict to cooperation over intellectual property rights structural and institutional aspects of the political economy of iprs within each country are considered and data on chinese us trade in intellectual property intensive goods are examined we conclude that although enforcement of iprs within china continues to be relatively weak chinese ipr institutions are converging on those in the oecd nations

the effect of internal migration on local labor markets american cities during the great depression the great depression offers a unique laboratory to investigate the causal impact of migration on local labor markets we use variation in the generosity of new deal programs and extreme weather events to instrument for migrant flows to and from u s cities in migration had little effect on the hourly earnings of existing residents instead in migration prompted some residents to move away and others to lose weeks of work or access to relief jobs for every 10 arrivals we estimate that 1 9 residents moved out 2 1 were prevented from finding a relief job and 1 9 shifted from full time to part time work

inter party competition intra party competition and distributive policy a model and test using new deal data this paper presents a theoreticalmodel examining the influence of two stylized types ofvoters loyal voters and swing voters the model showswhy both types of voters will influence thedistribution of benefits by a reelection seekingincumbent and it predicts how their influence willvary with the importance of the general electionrelative to that of the primary closer competitionbetween parties in the general election ceterisparibus increases the influence of swing votersrelative to that of loyal voters county level dataon the allocation of money and jobs by new deal reliefprograms confirm the model s predictions

do large cabinets favor large governments evidence on the fiscal commons problem for swiss cantons abstract the fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending in political economics for a panel of the 26 swiss cantons over the 1980 1998 periods this paper explores the role of fragmented governments on fiscal policy outcomes we distinguish between two variants of fragmented governments cabinet size and coalition size in addition we analyze whether constitutional rules for executive and legislature as well as formal fiscal restraints shape the size of government and how different rules interact with fragmentation the results indicate that the number of ministers in the cabinet is positively associated with the size of government while fiscal referendums effectively restrict the size of government there is also evidence that fiscal referendums relax the fiscal commons problem to some extent

exchange rate management in emerging markets intervention via an electronic limit order book this paper describes and analyzes the implementation of a crawling exchange rate band on an electronic trading platform the placement of limit orders at the central bank s target rate serves as a credible policy statement that may coordinate beliefs of market participants we find for our sample that intervention increases exchange rate volatility and spread for the next minutes but that intervention days show a lower degree of volatility and spread than non intervention days we also show for intraday data that the price impact of interbank order flow is smaller on intervention days than on non intervention days these stabilizing effects however rely on the conditions of large currency reserves and the existence of capital controls an electronic market seems to support this goal

debts and deficits with fragmented fiscal policymaking abstract this paper develops a political economic model of fiscal policy one in which government resources are a common property out of which interest groups can finance expenditures on their preferred items this setup has striking macroeconomic implications transfers are higher than a benevolent planner would choose them to be fiscal deficits emerge even when there are no reasons for intertemporal smoothing and in the long run government debt tends to be excessively high peculiar time profiles for transfers can emerge with high net transfers early on giving rise to high taxes later on

was the new deal contractionary can government policies that increase the monopoly power of firms and the militancy of unions increase output this paper shows that the answer is yes under certain emergency conditions these emergency conditions zero interest rates and deflation were satisfied during the great depression in the united states the new deal which facilitated monopolies and union militancy was therefore expansionary in the model presented this conclusion is contrary to a large previous literature the main reason for this divergence is that this paper incorporates rigid prices and the zero bound on the short term interest rate jel e23 e32 e52 e62 j51 n12 n42