characterization of a class of moral hazard adverse selection games abstract studying a principal agent game in which the agent alone observes the state of the world and reports it but the moral hazard is not reducible shows that if the principal uses all signals then no solution exists i e there is no contract that elicits truth telling and motivates the agent to exert effort when the principal does not use signals on the state of the world that seem irrelevant a solution exists in which some of the ex post signals on outcome are not used even though they obey the informativeness condition of holmstrom bell journal of economics 1979 10 74 91

optimal redistribution and monitoring of labor supply this paper extends the mirrlees 1971 model of optimal non linear income taxation with a monitoring technology that allows the government to verify labor supply at a positive but non infinite cost we analyze the joint determination of the non linear monitoring and tax schedules and the conditions under which these can be implemented monitoring of labor supply reduces the distortions created by income taxation and raises optimal marginal tax rates possibly above 100 the optimal intensity of monitoring increases with the marginal tax rate and the labor supply elasticity our simulations demonstrate that monitoring strongly alleviates the trade off between equity and efficiency welfare gains of monitoring are around 2 8 of total output the optimal intensity of monitoring follows a u shaped pattern similar to that of optimal marginal tax rates our paper can explain why large welfare states optimally rely on work dependent tax credits active labor market policies benefit sanctions and work bonuses in welfare programs

political institutions and financial development an empirical study summary this paper examines whether political institutional improvement promotes financial development using a panel dataset of 90 developed and developing countries over 1960 99 the empirical evidence reveals a positive effect of institutional improvement on financial development at least in the short run particularly for lower income countries the preliminary evidence by a before after event study indicates that a democratic transformation is typically followed by an increase in financial development

the role of options in the resolution of agency problems a comment the aim of the contracting literature in economics is to explain observed contractual arrangements or organizations as minimizing the costs of incentive conflicts in the agency cost literature of financial economics the contractual arrangement at issue is the mix of securities held by inside management of a firm and outside suppliers of capital the ownership structure of the firm in jensen and meckling s 8 terminology in explaining the ownership structure of a corporation jensen and meckling focus on two sources of agency or incentiveconflict costs a the manager s tendency to consume excessive perquisites and b the manager s tendency to invest in prospects of high risk so as to effect an ex post transfer from bondholders to stockholders a recent article in this journal by haugen and senbet 61 examines the role of stock options in resolving these agency problems and claims to show in particular that a call option in the insider portfolio can eliminate the first type of agency costs this article re examines the role of options in the resolution of agency problems we argue in section i that options cannot eliminate the agency problem of excessive perquisite consumption contrary to haugen and senbet the essential point is that unless outside financing can be provided entirely by riskless debt then outsiders must have a residual claim on the net income of the firm in some states of the world outsiders therefore share in the costs of increased perquisite consumption whatever the ownership structure of the firm this negative externality means that excessive perquisite consumption is inevitable the question remains do call options nonetheless have a role in the mitigation of agency costs an insider portfolio consisting only of equity leaves the manager with the same proportion of residual claim in each state of the world we show using a formal principal agent model that the efficient insider s share of profits is relatively high in favorable high profit states of the world insider call options arise as means of transferring residual claim to the manager in favorable states of the world relative to low profit states the basic agency model has been solved in substantial generality by holmstrom 7 and others we employ here a more specific model that draws on the techniques developed by green and kahn 4 and that is an extension to continuous states of the finite state model of sappington 12 the extension allows a simple characterization of the optimal contract a characterization that

risk taking global diversification and growth this paper develops a continuous time stochastic model in which international risk sharing can yield substantial welfare gains through its effect on expected consumption growth the mechanism linking global diversification to growth is an attendant world portfolio shift from safe low yield capital to riskier high yield capital the presence of these two types of capital captures the idea that growth depends on the availability of an ever increasing array of specialized hence inherently risky production inputs calibration exercises using consumption and stock market data imply that most countries reap large steady state welfare gains from global financial integration copyright 1994 by american economic association

multi period insurance contracts this paper examines the form of insurance contracts in the presence of asymmetric information about consumers accident probabilities our goal is to understand the adjustment in contract terms as a function of accident histories in a finite horizon model we also compare these adjustments between alternative market structures our principal findings indicate that history dependent insurance contracts serve a useful sorting role individuals who declare themselves low risks to insurance companies face adverse contracturai terms if they subsequently have many accidents these adjustments are strongest in the case of a single insurance seller but are present in the competitive model as well

a revelation scheme for allocating organizational resources abstract efficient resource allocation in a hierarchical organization frequently requires top management to obtain information from division managers but division managers may place personal interests above those of the organization and communicate distorted information designing simple and robust optimal game theoretic revelation schemes is difficult instead of making another attempt at this we analyze a project valuation scheme actually used by several us government agencies under certain environments the scheme encourages managers to truthfully reveal the relative benefits of alternative projects while some aspects of these environments do not have nice mathematical properties we argue that they may well represent better characterizations of the way managers actually view their situation

money as the mechanism of exchange abstract the existence and use of money remained an embarrassing puzzle for monetary analysis we observe over man s history that social groups without generally accepted media of exchange exhibit poor survival characteristics most social groups do not use assets or commodities at random in the execution of exchanges one observes that a small subset of assets is dominantly used in transactions these transaction dominating assets are usually referred to as money the literature contains many suggestive attempts to explain the emergence and role of money the classic writers made passing references in somewhat pictorial language to the extension markets and increasing labor productivity induced by the use of a general medium of exchange this idea has never been systematically developed however karl brunner 1971

balanced bayesian mechanisms in the transferable utility case a number of authors have identified conditions on beliefs that guarantee the existence of bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with balanced transfers we present a new easy to interpret condition and we show that it is strictly more general than all the other conditions found in the literature we also study conditions guaranteeing the bayesian implementability of all social decision rules with balanced budget mechanisms

intermediate products and the theory of international trade a generalization of the pure intermediate good case empirical studies of neoclassical factorproportions trade theory have long recognized that hypotheses concerning relative factor intensity must be defined in terms of gross factor intensities accounting for intensities of intermediate products rather than simply in net factor intensity terms i e at the last stage of production only nevertheless development of the pure theory of international trade has generally neglected intermediate products the justification for this convenience has in part been based on a study by jaroslav vanek which demonstrated that the introduction of interindustry flows in a two good model did not affect the traditional theorems rybczynski stolper samuelson or heckscher ohlin defined in net factor intensity terms however in a recent study raveendra batra and francisco casas demonstrated that the introduction of a pure intermediate commodity one that is produced solely for use in the production of final goods complicates the issue considerably thev show in fact that most of the traditional trade theorems defined in net terms may not hold without additional provisions if such intermediate products are introduced in the model p 297 the basic difference between the batra casas model with pure intermediate products and vanek s interindustry flow model is the possibility of a conflict between the net and gross factor intensity ranking of final products 2 the conditions which batra and casas demonstrate are necessary in order to ensure a uniform ranking of final commodities according to net and gross factor intensitv were derived under the explicit assumption that the intermediate good is totally supplied from domestic production the purpose of the present paper is to generalize the batracasas model to allow the intermediate good to be imported in some proportion 3 the analytical approach of the present paper is quite different from that taken by batra and casas however here the problem is treated as a problem of ex post factor intensity measurement although the underlying model and necessary conditions to ensure its proper functioning are implicitly the same as described by batra and casas in section i a measure of gross factor intensity appropriate in an economy importing intermediate inputs is developed in the following section this measure is applied to the batra casas model under alternative assumptions regarding the supply source of the intermediate good it is shown that if some proportion of the intermediate good is imported then net and gross factor intensity rankings can be assured to be uniform if and only if in addition to the

imperfect price discrimination and welfare we develop a model in which a monopolist uses differences across consumers in their valuation of time to imperfectly price discriminate though it is customary to analyse price discrimination problems by the calculus of variations after postulating a continuum of types we assume a finite number of types and exploit the geometry and duality of the contract set and the structure of the programming specification we analyse in detail the qualitative properties of the model s solution and show by construction that our results exhaust the implications of the model for equilibrium contract pairs we show that imperfect discrimination is not bounded in welfare terms between perfect discrimination and single price monopoly and that the deadweight loss consumer surplus and output comparisons between single price monopoly and imperfect discrimination are ambiguous

on governing multilateral transactions with bilateral contracts bilateral contracts while neither negotiated nor enforced in an integrated way are nevertheless often interrelated both economically and strategically owing to production or consumption complementarities and to asymmetric information a set of bilateral contracts forms a mechanism with special properties this mechanism forms a contract equilibrium if there is no joint incentive for a supplier and any individual customer unilaterally to alter the terms of their contract if agents preferences are risk neutral in money income and if their private information is independent then there exists a contract equilibrium that implements efficient transactions if in addition preferences are strictly concave and differentiable in goods and services and technologically feasible sets are suitably convex then this equilibrium is essentially unique

monopoly provision of product quality and warranties an exploration in the theory of multi dimensional screening we address the monopoly problem of designing and pricing a product line of goods distinguished by different quality and warranty levels consumers vary in their evaluations of these attributes so that the problem is one of screening it is sufficiently complex that the local approach commonly used does not work instead we use new techniques for dealing with incentive constraints between nonadjacent consumer types these techniques allow us to characterize optimal allocations that may not be monotonic in particular although the more eager types of buyer do pay higher prices and yield the monopoly higher profit they may receive lower quality or lower warranty coverage we find preference restrictions that restore monotonicity concave risk tolerance implies that warranty coverage increases in type and constant absolute risk aversion implies that quality increases in type

technology and the demand for imports in the pure theory of international trade traded goods are generally viewed as finished products this is in sharp contrast with the fact that the bulk of world trade is in intermediate products to reconcile theory with facts a number of models of trade in intermediate products have been proposed in recent years most of these models have been used to investigate the validity of well known trade theorems in the presence of intermediate products 2 hence most of these models are rather complex generally allowing for two factors of production and two final goods as well as for one or two pure intermediate products 3 another feature common to most of these models and that is borrowed from standard trade theory is the assumption that production is nonjoint in input quantities 4 this assumption leads to a number of remarkable theoretical results but it also greatly increases the number of possible patterns of production and of interindustry flows and it thus adds to the complexity of the models furthermore if the number of goods is larger than the number of factors nonjointness leads to indeterminacy unless additional assumptions are made 6 these assumptions typically are that some goods are not produced domestically 7 or that some goods are not traded internationally 8 this further multiplies the number of possible cases and it explains perhaps why none of the models proposed so far has emerged as the benchmark model much in the same way as for

the dynamic structure of optimal debt contracts abstract in a two period model of costly state verification the optimal contract is characterized and shown to exist the optimal contract is interpreted as a bond contract the model extends the result of one period models that the verification region must be a left tail interval to a multi period setting conditions are identified for the optimal contract to exhibit features such as call prepayment option coupon payment or sinking fund the optimality of certain bond covenants such as refinancing covenants and dividends covenants is also studied

does globalization affect growth evidence from a new index of globalization the study develops an index of globalization covering its three main dimensions economic integration social integration and political integration using panel data for 123 countries in 1970 2000 it is analysed empirically whether the overall index of globalization as well as sub indexes constructed to measure the single dimensions affect economic growth as the results show globalization indeed promotes growth the dimensions most robustly related with growth refer to actual economic flows and restrictions in developed countries although less robustly information flows also promote growth whereas political integration has no effect

inflation thresholds and the finance growth nexus abstract the robustness of the cross sectional relationship between the size of a country s financial sector and its rate of economic growth is by now well established in this article we examine whether the strength of this relationship varies with the inflation rate using five year averages of standard measures of financial development inflation and growth for 84 countries from 1960 to 1995 a series of rolling panel regressions show that there is an inflation threshold for the finance growth relationship that lies between 13 and 25 percent when inflation exceeds the threshold finance ceases to increase economic growth we also find that the level of financial depth varies inversely with inflation in low inflation environments and that disinflation is associated with a positive effect of financial depth on growth

price stabilization as a bonding mechanism in new equity issues abstract underwriters have an incentive to overstate investor interest in order to persuade some investors to purchase shares at a price in excess of their initial estimate of the fair value we show that this incentive is eliminated when the underwriter commits to secondary market price stabilization destroying the underwriter s incentive to overstate interest reduces the total surplus captured by initial investors in initial public offerings further efficiency gains are associated with penalty bid systems that permit the underwriter to make the stabilization commitment selectively price stabilization can thus be viewed as a bonding mechanism that improves the efficiency of the primary equity market

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

a survey of recent developments in the literature of finance and growth this paper provides a survey of the recent progress in the literature of financial development and economic growth the survey highlights that most empirical studies focus on either testing the role of financial development in stimulating economic growth or examining the direction of causality between these two variables although the positive role of finance on growth has become a stylized fact there are some methodological reservations about the results from these empirical studies several key issues unresolved in the literature are highlighted the paper also points to several directions for future research

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

is globalization detrimental to financial development further evidence from a very large emerging economy with significant orientation towards policies abstractthis study attempts to explore the relationship between globalization and financial development by endogenizing economic growth population density inflation and institutional quality for india during the period from 1971 2013 using the more conclusivecombined cointegration method the study provides evidence of cointegration among these variables the long run and short run estimates from the ardl model and causality tests respectively suggest that globalization in its all forms political social and economic and its overall measure as well as inflation are detrimental to financial development while economic growth and population density both promote financial development furthermore the results also point out that institutional quality is not conducive to financial development in india and there exists a feedback effect between financial development and inflation moreover financial development is influenced by economic growth institutional quality and population density

financial development and economic growth convergence or divergence abstract this study tests for convergence in financial development and economic growth by incorporating the interaction between the real and financial sectors into an otherwise traditional test for convergence the results show strong evidence for conditional convergence middle and high income countries conditionally converge to parallel growth paths not only in per capita gdp but also in financial development the mutually reinforcing relationship between financial development and economic growth is stronger in the early stage of economic development and this relationship diminishes as sustained economic growth gets under way as such low income countries with a relatively well developed financial sector are more likely to catch up to their middle and high income counterparts and those with a relatively under developed financial sector are more likely to be trapped in poverty this finding explains the observed great divergence between poor and rich countries another finding is that while human capital is more important to growth in the early stage of economic development economic freedom becomes more important in the later stage

foreign trade and its impact on employment the mexican case abstract this paper discusses the relationship between foreign trade and employment in a small open economy and carries out some empirical work using mexican data it is argued that employment multipliers are not stable if intermediate inputs are imported actual employment multipliers will be given by the relationship between effective demand and installed capacity in each sector and will depend strongly on whether quotas or tariffs are in operation it is also found that mexican exports are capital intensive relative to its imports

markets for risk and openness to trade how are they related if protectionist trade policies aim to insure domestic industries against swings in world market prices the development of financial markets could lead to trade liberalization likewise trade lib

contracts and asymmetric information in the theory of the firm abstract this paper extends the coase notation of firms as intermediaries between consumers and input owners to incorporate asymmetric information we show that in some cases it is optimal for consumers to pay a fixed price for a product and to ignore how the firm operates and the profit that it makes if firms have private information that consumers cannot cheaply obtain however we demonstrate that the optimal contract may require constraints on firms internal operations and profits our work provides conditions under which cost plus contracts are optimal and demonstrates when nonprofit firms are the preferred organization structure

monitoring of performance in organizational contracting the case of defense procurement this paper contains an agency theoretic analysis of procurement contracts in which the government designs optimal linear contracts for a risk averse supplier in the presence of moral hazard private information and imperfect monitoring optimal contracts deviate from first best risk sharing the direction of the deviation depends on the relative severity of the moral hazard and private information problems and on the precision of the monitor in contrast to the usual result in the moral hazard literature the government may in some cases prefer that the effort of the supplier be taxed choice of the precision of the monitor and the categories of costs covered by the monitor are also studied

planning stochastic shocks and labour contracts of female workers and their welfare implications in this paper we analyse labour contracts for female workers when there are planned shifts or stochastic shocks to their leisure preference which arise as a result of planned or unplanned pregnancy it will be shown that when female workers plan their pregnancy contract firms can induce self selection among workers through a contract that stipulates a wage profile steeper than the spot wage profile so that self selected workers who accept the contract will not quit even though information on shifts in leisure preference is asymmetric first best efficiency can be achieved through self selection when female workers do not plan childbirths however self selection contracts are not possible when the stochastic shocks are realized there will be quits planning is pareto superior to no planning at equilibrium workers will be allocated optimally workers who have low marginal value of home time will join contract firms and make specific investments while those who have high marginal value will seek employment in the walrasian market and make no specific investments some implications of these results are also discussed in the paper

size effects on the transmission mechanism from finance to development a study of large emerging economies arge developing countries and emerging economies typically brazil india china and south africa bics demonstrate a strong upward trendin many aspects of their macroeconomic performance in recent decades thisdevelopmental surge has been sometimes attributed to size effects wherebyeconomies of scale and scope and agglomeration impact create productivityimprovements most of the literature studying large countries emphasises thereal economy trade and growth alesina and spolaore 1997 2003 but sayslittle about the interrelationship of real and nancial sectors on development our empirical work is based on and closely linked with the conceptual ideasabout the transmission channel from nance to growth levine 2005 butemphasising that large economies behave in a distinctive fashion we demon strate that real sector variables domestic and foreign have more in uence onaggregate output and its growth compared to nancial sector development animplication of the paper is that the ef cient approach to deal with economicrecession for these countries is to strengthen real sectors instead of helping nancial sectors directly we analyse the interconnections among aggregate output capital formation external trade and developmental nance for these four large developing coun tries in terms of two speci c real sector indicators one internal and one exter nal domestic investment and foreign trade as well as an indicator for

capital rationing and organizational slack in capital budgeting this paper reconciles three stylized facts about capital budgeting in firms and shows that they are tied to the presence of asymmetric information among the several members of the firm each with his or her own objectives and decisions the facts of interest are 1 the existence of organizational slack 2 the rationing of resources within organizations 3 the stated cut off rate for accepting capital projects in firms is often greater than the market rate of interest organizational slack is defined as the excess of resources allocated over the minimum necessary to accomplish the tasks assigned resource rationing is defined as the under allocation of resources i e an increase in the amount allocated would generate revenues in excess of its costs rationing and slack are both manifestations of ex post inefficiencies an lp model is used to show that these inefficiencies can occur in ex ante efficient organizational designs when asymmetric information is present the optimal allocation policy involves a hurdle rate criterion in which the hurdle rate is strictly in excess of the cost of capital thus inducing rationing in some states of the world typically resources are optimally allocated such that slack exists in other states the optimal allocation policy trades off these two inefficiencies

incentive contracting with asymmetric and imperfect precontractual knowledge abstract the pareto optimal contract between principal and risk neutral agent is analyzed for the case in which the agent s information is initially imperfect but better than that of the principal in contrast to the case where precontractual information is symmetric the final contract between principal and agent will not always guarantee an efficient outcome however in contrast to the case where the agent s information is initially perfect the agent may be unable to command rents from his superior information and the outcome will always be efficient the conditions under which efficient or inefficient outcomes are guaranteed differ qualitatively according to whether the random stete of nature follows a continuous or a discrete distribution journal of economic literature classification numbers 022 026 611

adverse selection private information and lowballing in insurance markets recent contributions to the adverse selection literature have focused on a multiperiod competitive environment in this setting a clean distinction arises between the predictions of competing models cooper and hayes extend the model of rothschild and stiglitz to multiple periods the result is a self selecting equilibrium characterized by price highballing or systematically overcharging new business kunreuther and pauly suggest that information asymmetries between competing insurance firms render such price quantity policies infeasible their model results in a pooling equilibrium that is characterized by price lowballing or systematically undercharging new business our evidence is consistent with the kunreuther and pauly model and reveals the persistence of adverse selection in the automobile insurance market copyright 1990 by the university of chicago

financial development industrialization the role of institutions and government a comparative analysis between india and china this research is the first comparative attempt incorporating the role of economic demographic sectoral contribution government and trade in explaining financial development for india and china

dynamic linkages between globalization financial development and carbon emissions evidence from asia pacific economic cooperation countries abstract this study determines the dynamic linkages between globalization financial development and carbon emissions in asia pacific economic cooperation apec countries in the presence of energy intensity and economic growth under the framework of environment kuznets curve ekc this study employs the panel data from 1990 to 2016 westerlund cointegration technique to find long run cointegration and continuously updated bias corrected cup bc and continuously updated fully modified cup fm methods to check the long run elasticities between the variables empirical results indicate that globalization and financial development significantly reduce carbon emissions but economic growth and energy intensity increase them these results support the ekc hypothesis for apec countries the dumitrescu and hurlin causality analysis shows that globalization granger causes co2 emissions globalization also causes financial development and energy intensity a feedback effect exists between financial development and co2 emissions furthermore financial development causes economic growth but similar is not true from opposite side in granger sense finally this study presents important policy implications with respect to apec countries

correlated information and mechanism design in models of asymmetric information possession of private information leads to rents for the possessors this induces mechanism designers to distort away from efficiency the authors show that this is an artifact of the presumption that information is independently distributed rent extraction in a large class of mechanism design games is analyzed and a necessary and sufficient condition for arbitrarily small rents to private information is provided additionally the two person bargaining game is shown to have an efficient solution under first order stochastic dominance and a hazard rate condition similar conditions allow full rent extraction in milgrom weber auctions

implicit contracts with asymmetric information and bankruptcy the effect of interest rates on layoffs this paper develops a model in which a firm writes labour contracts with workers and debt contracts with creditors firms have more information than do the owners of the factors of production and they are also subject to limited liability we show that if the limited liability constraint is binding then the employment level is inefficient relative to a situation of symmetric information the firm is then embedded into a partial equilibrium model in which the real rate of interest is exogenously determined we show that increases in the real rate of interest increase the inefficiency of the optimal employment contract and lead to layoffs in more states of nature than would occur at lower real interest rates recent literature in the area of implicit contracts has shown considerable interest in the assumption of asymmetric information henceforth a i papers by azariadis 1982 green and kahn 1982 and grossman and hart 1981 have all shown that a i will interfere with optimal risk sharing but although these models produce non walrasian outcomes it is not clear that they are capable of explaining the observed variations in employment over the business cycle in the absence of a link between the level of employment and other macroeconomic variables these new versions of contract theory are open to the charge that they are presenting a complicated explanation of frictional unemployment one potential link between variations in output and variations in intertemporal prices is suggested by models which explicitly allow for the possibility of bankruptcy sappington 1983 has shown that bankruptcy will generate inefficient outcomes even between risk neutral agents and farmer 1984 has shown that if sappington type contracts are incorporated into a macroeconomic structure then the resulting model predicts that bankruptcies will vary countercyclically over the business cycle although bankruptcy is important however it is unlikely that bankruptcies alone will account for all of the output loss during a recession the purpose of this paper is to show that the assumptions of a i and limited liability will generate a model in which the employment level is inefficient and in which the magnitude of this inefficiency varies systematically with the expected real rate of interest this model predicts that the observed increase in the incidence of layoffs during recessions is directly attributable to the effects of high interest rates on aggregate supply some evidence of the phenomenon to be explained is presented below

limited liability contracts between principal and agent abstract the optimal strategy of the principal is examined in an environment where there are ex post limitations on the maximum penalty that can be imposed on a riskneutral agent contrary to the case in which such limitations are not imposed it is in the principal s interest to deliberately forego the opportunity to induce socially efficient behavior and to instead design a contract that induces the agent to realize an efficient outcome only in the most productive state of nature and perhaps in certain very unproductive states the properties of the contract are examined in detail

is bioenergy trade good for the environment we analyze the impacts of bioenergy trade on greenhouse gas emissions using a two good three factor model bioenergy is an agricultural good used as a substitute for fossil fuels in industry governments tax domestic pollution without international coordination we assume that northern countries have higher labor productivity than southern ones and that agriculture is less pollution intensive than industry after taxation we show that whereas southern countries impose a lower tax rate than northern ones they do not necessary have a competitive advantage in industry and that compared to autarky trade liberalization either increases or decreases worldwide emissions depending on regional comparative advantages

asymmetric information incentives and intrafirm resource allocation this paper considers the question how should a firm allocate a resource among divisions when the productivity of the resource in each division is known only to the division manager obviously if the divisions as represented by their managers are indifferent among various allocations of the resource the headquarters can simply request the division managers to reveal their private information on productivity knowing that the managers have no incentive to lie the resource allocation problem can then be solved under complete or at least symmetric information this aspect is a flaw in much of the recent literature on this topic i e there is nothing in the models considered which makes divisions prefer one allocation over another thus although in some cases elaborate allocation schemes are proposed and analyzed they are really unnecessary in the model we develop a division can produce the same output with less managerial effort if it is allocated more resources and effort is costly to the manager we further assume that this effort is unobservable by the headquarters so that it cannot infer divisional productivity from data on divisional output and managerial effort given these assumptions we seek an optimal resource allocation process our results show that certain types of transfer pricing schemes are optimal in particular if there are no potentially binding capacity constraints on production of the resource then an optimal process is for each division to choose a transfer price from a schedule announced by the headquarters division managers receive a fixed compensation minus the cost of the resource allocated to them at the chosen transfer price resources are allocated on the basis of the chosen transfer prices if there is a potentially binding constraint on resource production a somewhat more complicated but similar scheme is required

optimal allocation and backup of computer resources under asymmetric information and incentive incompatibility abstract this paper presents the optimal allocation and backup of computing resources in a multidivisional firm in the presence of asymmetric information and incentive incompatibility a game theoretic model is developed and transformed to a linear programming problem the solution to this linear programming problem enables the corporate headquarters to design a resource allocation scheme such that the revelation principle prevails and all divisions tell the truth to cope with the combinatorial explosion of complexity caused by the resource constraint a greedy type algorithm and an averaged version of the original linear programming problem are developed to provide the upper and lower bounds the greedy type algorithm generates exact solutions for a wide range of instances the lower bounds coincide with the exact solutions for the cases where the computer resource is either scarce or abundant the averaged version resource allocation model with slight modifications solves the optimal computer backup capacity problem it determines how much back up capacity the firm should purchase when the firm s computer breaks down

efficient contracting with reliance and a damage measure this article reexamines the problem of breach of contract studied by shavell 1980 1984 and rogerson 1984 by considering explicitly the incentive problems that arise from asymmetric information and transaction specific investment we derive the optimal contract which consists of variable price and damage payment schedules each of which is set before any private information is observed we show that the optimal contract attains full classical efficiency

local financial development and growth using a unique sample of net domestic product data for districts in india i investigate the connection between banking sector development human capital and economic growth at the sub national level using disaggregate data avoids many of the omitted variable problems that plague cross country studies of the finance growth connection and facilitates an instrumentation strategy the findings show that the growth of many districts in india is financially constrained due to lack of banking sector development and that the relationship between finance and growth may be non linear for the districts in the sample moving from the 75th percentile of credit net domestic product to the 25th percentile implies an average loss of 4 percent in growth over the 1990s this indicates that the gains from increased banking sector outreach may be large the analysis shows that human capital deepening can reduce the effect of the financial constraint and help decouple growth from financial development in a district at the 25th literacy percentile the implied growth loss due to a constrained banking sector is twice as large as in a district at the 75th literacy percentile thus higher levels of human capital may activate alternative growth and production channels that are less finance intensive

on delegating price authority to a regulated firm this article models a regulatory environment in which the regulated firm possesses better information about demand conditions than does the regulator the regulator would like to tie prices to the firm s private information in a socially optimal way to do so the regulator must induce the firm either truthfully to reveal private information or equivalently unilaterally to set socially optimal prices this is accomplished by assessing lump sum subsidies or taxes that depend in an appropriate way on the prices announced by the firm this mechanism can be reinterpreted as a two part tariff scheme whereby both the service fee and price per unit respond to shifting demand conditions

globalisation institutional reforms and financial development in east asian economies this study investigates the dynamic effects of globalisation on institutions and financial development in east asian economies using panel data tests our empirical results demonstrate that globalisation has a significant influence on institutional quality and that institutional reforms in turn facilitate and support financial development in particular the development of the banking sector in east asia globalisation is also found to have a favourable direct impact on stock market development without passing through an institutional quality channel

dynamic labor contracts under asymmetric information abstract this paper discusses the distortion of employment within a two period asymmetric information contracting model in which an exogenous demand shock is serially correlated and is known only to firms the obtained results show that serial correlations of the state of nature can cause not only underemployment but also overemployment even when overemployment never occurs in the context of a static asymmetric information contracting model

a note on overemployment underemployment in labor contracts under asymmetric information abstract models of labor contracts under asymmetric information may predict either overemployment or underemployment this paper shows that this result depends crucially on whether or not leisure is a normal good if firms are risk neutral

a rationalization of bonuses penalties and kinked payment functions within an agency model abstract the optimal payment schedule of the simplest principal agent problem can be continuous smooth or kinked or semicontinuous depending on the specifications of objective functions of the principal and or of the agent using the nonsmooth mathematical analysis this article determines a mapping from classes of objective functions into classes of optimal payment functions examples provide illustrations

full extraction of the surplus in bayesian and dominant strategy auctions we consider auctions for a single indivisible object in the case where the bidders have information about each other which is not available to the seller we show that the seller can use this information to his own benefit and we completely characterize the environ ments in which a well chosen auction gives him the same expected payoff as that obtainable were he able to sell the object with full information about each bidder s willingness to pay we provide this characterization for auctions in which the bidders have dominant strate gies and for those where the relevant equilibrium concept is bayesian nash in both set ups the existence of these auctions hinges on the possibility of constructing lotteries with the correct properties we consider the situation in which an agent the seller possesses one indivisible unit of a good to which he attaches no value but the good has value to a number of potential buyers and its transfer to one of them would increase social welfare in particular the transfer to the buyer with the highest valuation maximizes social welfare in this paper we completely characterize environments in which the seller can design an auction that will enable him to capture for himself the full increase in social welfare induced by the transfer of the good to the bidder with the highest willingness to pay if the seller had full information about the reservation prices of potential buyers his optimal selling strategy would be very simple he would announce a price equal or very close to the highest reservation value the optimal strategy for the bidder with the highest evaluation would be to accept the offer note that we are treating a situation in which the seller can commit himself to a price as a result of the exchange the utility of the seller increases by the full amount of the increase in social welfare and he has been able to fully extract the surplus in many circumstances however a seller has only imperfect knowledge of the buyers willingnesses to pay in this case he must find some mechanism or auction which will enable him to maximize his benefit from the sale of the object the auction literature starts with this observation and shows how the seller can by an astute choice of auction extract the largest possible fraction of the surplus in general the literature has shown that this proportion is strictly less than one in some circumstances the bidders will have information about each other which is not available to the seller for instance in auctions for petroleum drilling rights bidders know the results of geological tests which they have

rules or discretion in public sector decision making rules and discretion in public sector decision making are compared in a macroeconomic setting where there is a potential role for an active stabilization policy when the policymaker has private information about nominal shocks the credibility of announcements about the state of nature is shown to depend critically on both the policymaker s preferences over output and inflation and on the institutional setting rules or discretion the issue of rules versus discretion is found to depend on the flexibility lost under a rule relative to the timeinconsistency problem arising under discretion

optimal incentives and asymmetric distribution of information abstract the problem of designing optimal incentive schemes arises if information is asymmetrically distributed among individuals the existence and the welfare properties of optimal incentive schemes are discussed for cases where the information asymmetry refers either to the quality of a product or to the behaviour of an individual

structuring international cooperative ventures we examine the effect of bargaining power and informational asymmetry on the design of international cooperative ventures in the presence of restrictions on equity participation and investment when the bargaining advantage rests with the multinational equity participation restrictions can increase the profits to domestic firms and encourage sub optimal investment policies overinvestment occurs when the multinational s bargaining advantage is reinforced by an informational advantage while underinvestment occurs when the domestic firm possesses the informational advantage in contrast when the bargaining advantage rests with the domestic firm equity participation restrictions do not affect investment levels

finance and the sources of growth the authors evaluate whether the level of development in the banking sector exerts a causal impact on economic growth and its sources total factor productivity growth physical capital accumulation and private saving they use 1 a pure cross country instrumental variable estimator to extract the exogenous component of banking development and 2 a new panel technique that controls for country specific effects and endogeneity they find that banks do exert a large causal impact on total factor productivity growth which feeds through to overall gdp gross domestic product growth the long run links between banking development and both capital growth and private savings are more tenuous

delegation as commitment the case of income tax audits in this article we study the value of delegating authority over income tax audit policy arising from the incompleteness of contracts consider a utilitarian government whose ability to commit is limited to aggregate dimensions of its audit policy as publicly verifiable information about detailed allocations of audit budgets is not available we show that the welfare level associated with the full commitment solution can be attained by delegating authority over audit policy to a manager the latter is offered a simple incentive scheme based only on the aggregate variables which are publicly observable in contrast if the government retains authority direct commitment to these same variables does not allow the full commitment welfare level to be achieved thus despite sharing a common informational basis delegation may perform better than centralized arrangements in the presence of incomplete contracts

the dynamic links between energy consumption economic growth financial development and trade in china fresh evidence from multivariate framework analysis abstract this study investigates the relationship between energy use and economic growth by incorporating financial development international trade and capital as important factors of production function in case of china over the period of 1971 2011 the ardl bounds testing approach to cointegration was applied to examine long run relationship among the series while stationarity properties of the variables was tested by applying structural break test our empirical evidence confirmed long run relationship among the variables the results showed that energy use financial development capital exports imports and international trade have positive impact on economic growth the granger causality analysis revealed that unidirectional causal relationship running from energy use to economic growth financial development and energy use granger cause each other there is bidirectional causality between international trade and energy use the feedback relation exists between financial development and international trade there is also bidirectional causality exists between capital and energy demand financial development and economic growth and international trade and economic growth this paper makes significant contribution in energy economics and opens up new direction for policy makers to explore new and alternative sources of energy which would be helpful in meeting the rising demand of energy due to sustained rate of economic growth

financial development and economic growth views and agenda this critique argues that the preponderance of theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence suggests a positive first order relationship between financial development and economic growth the body of work would push even most skeptics toward the belief that the development of financial markets and institutions is a critical and inextricable part of the growth process and away from the view that the financial system is an inconsequential sideshow responding passively to economic growth many gaps remain however and the paper highlights areas in acute need of additional research

the saving and investment nexus for china evidence from cointegration tests the saving and investment nexus as postulated by feldstein and horioka fh 1980 is revisited the saving investment correlation for china is estimated over the periods 1952 1998 and 1952 1994 the latter culminating in a period of fixed exchange rate regime amongst the key results it is found that saving and investment are correlated for china for both the period of the fixed exchange rate and the entire sample period with high saving investment correlation the results suggest that the chinese economy is in conformity with the fh hypothesis this is a valid outcome for in china capital mobility was fairly restricted over the 1952 1994 period as indicated by the relatively low foreign direct investment

financial development and openness evidence from panel data abstract this paper addresses the empirical question of whether trade and financial openness can help explain the recent pace in financial development as well as its variation across countries in recent years utilising annual data from developing and industrialised countries and dynamic panel estimation techniques we provide evidence which suggests that both types of openness are statistically significant determinants of banking sector development our findings reveal that the marginal effects of trade financial openness are negatively related to the degree of financial trade openness indicating that relatively closed economies stand to benefit most from opening up their trade and or capital accounts although these economies may be able to accomplish more by taking steps to open both their trade and capital accounts opening up one without the other could still generate gains in terms of banking sector development thus our findings provide only partial support to the well known rajan and zingales hypothesis which stipulates that both types of openness are necessary for financial development to take place