premuneration values and investments in matching markets we analyze a model in which agents make investments and then match into pairs to create a surplus the agents can make transfers to reallocate their pretransfer ownership claims on the surplus mailath postlewaite and samuelson 2013 showed that when investments are unobservable equilibrium investments are generally inecient in this paper we work with a more structured model that is suciently tractable to analyze the nature of the investment ineciencies we provide conditions under which investment is ineciently high or low and conditions under which changes in the pretransfer ownership claims on the surplus will be pareto improving as well as examine how the degree of heterogeneity on either side of the market aects investment eciency

optimal selling strategies when buyers may have hard information abstract consider a revenue maximizing seller who can sell an object to one of n potential buyers each buyer either has hard information about his valuation i e evidence that cannot be forged or is ignorant the optimal mechanism is characterized it turns out that more ignorance can increase the expected total surplus even when the buyers are ex ante symmetric the object may be sold to a buyer who does not have the largest willingness to pay nevertheless an additional buyer increases the expected total surplus in the symmetric case whereas more competition can be harmful if there are ex ante asymmetries

secular cost changes and the size of government towards a generalized theory abstract baumol s cost disease account of government growth is contrasted with that of kau and rubin who focus on decreasing costs of tax collection over time the apparent paradox wherein the first theory explains government growth by cost increases and the second by way of cost decreases is technically resolved why both theories seem to be able to stand up to empirical tests even though they use similar data is then explained finally public choice analysis is employed to reveal further potential for the ultimate construction of one all embracing secular cost change theory of government growth

monotone equilibria in bayesian games of strategic complementarities for bayesian games of strategic complementarities we provide a constructive proof of the existence of a greatest and a least bayes nash equilibrium each one in strategies that are monotone in type our main assumptions besides strategic complementarities are that each player s payoff displays increasing differences in own action and the profile of types and that each player s interim beliefs are increasing in type with respect to first order stochastic dominance e g types are affiliated the result holds for general action and type spaces single multi or infinite dimensional continuous or discrete and no prior is assumed we also provide the following comparative statics result the greatest and least equilibria are higher if there is a first order stochastic dominant shift in the interim beliefs we apply this result to strategic information revelation in games of voluntary disclosure

forming coalitions and the shapley ntu value a simple protocol for coalition formation is presented first an order of the players is randomly chosen then a coalition grows by sequentially incorporating new members in this order the protocol is studied in the context of non transferable utility ntu games in characteristic function form if weighted utility transfers are feasible when everybody cooperates then the expected subgame perfect equilibrium payoff allocation anticipated before any implemented game is the shapley ntu value

party polarization and the business cycle in the united states a large literature has studied the trend of greaterpolarization between democrats and republicans in congress this paper empirically examines the extent to which inflationand unemployment explain cyclical movements ofpolarization over time an informal application of thestandard downsian spatial competition model of partiesgenerates the following relationships ceteris paribus 1 inflation should be associated with policy convergence 2 unemployment should be associated with polarization 3 theeffect of unemployment on polarization should be larger inmagnitude than the effect of inflation on convergence and 4 the effect of unemployment on polarization should be strongerin the house than in the senate we estimate the relationshipbetween vote records and business cycle conditions over the1947 1999 period using a gls model with varying lags ourresults are broadly consistent with these business cyclehypotheses of polarization though greater support is found inhouse data than in senate data

exchange of cost information in oligopoly when do oligopolists gain by sharing their private information about their costs with one another what are the social welfare effects of such information exchange i study these questions by comparing the oligopolists expected profits under a cost sharing agreement with their expected profits in the bayesian equilibrium that would arise without cost sharing i also analyse the firms decisions to form a trade association to share their cost data under conditions of linear demand and cournot behaviour industrywide information exchange is the unique point in the core of the trade association membership game the exchange of cost data increases expected profits and welfare but reduces expected consumer surplus cost sharing increases efficiency by raising the market shares of lower cost firms and reducing the variability of aggregate output consumer surplus is diminished however because the variance of output is reduced and consumer surplus is a convex function of output

persuasion by cheap talk we consider the credibility persuasiveness and informativ eness of multidimensional cheap talk by an expert to a decision maker we find that an expert with state independent preferences can always make credible comparative statements that trade off the expert s incentive to exaggerate on each dimension such communication benefits the expert cheap talk is persuasive if her preferences are quasiconvex communication benefits a decision maker by allowing for a more informed decision but strategic interactions between multiple decision makers can reverse this gain we apply these results to topics including product recommendations voting auction disclosure and advertising jel d44 d72 d82 d83 m37

optimal disclosure policy in oligopoly markets this paper examines the private and social optimality of full disclosure of private information in a two period oligopoly model an incumbent firm is privately informed about the market demand and its production cost after operating as a monopolist in the first period and then competes against an entrant in the second period two main results are derived first it is shown that the incumbent is best off by pre committing to disclose both the demand and cost information by disclosing full information the incumbent nullifies its self defeating intertemporal incentives which arise whenever it has private information about the market demand its cost efficiency or both in addition the equilibrium output variance is the largest under full disclosure which benefits the incumbent ex ante second the paper shows that the incumbent s full disclosure of the demand and cost information may or may not be desirable from a social efficiency standpoint in particular the correlation between the firms production costs is crucial to the rank of disclosure policies in terms of their impact on social efficiency

guilty conscience and incentives with performance assessment errors this study examines the effects of guilty conscience on incentive in the situation where an agent performance assessment has errors there are two types of assessment error undervaluation and overvaluation in overvaluation agents will not correct the assessment because their wages would then decrease although agents will want their undervaluation corrected principals will not correct the error due to increased wage cost hence correcting errors is complicated however this type of selfish behavior by agents and principals produces feelings of guilt particularly when others trust them in this situation a high incentive is desirable for conscientious people with a strong sense of guilt or for nonconscientious people who do not feel guilt but it is undesirable for intermediate type people who are conscientious only to a certain extent jel d03 d82 j41

rent seeking and innovation innovations and their adoption are the keys to growth and development innovations are less socially useful but more profitable for the innovator when they are adopted slowly and the innovator remains a monopolist for this reason rent seeking both public and private plays an important role in determining the social usefulness of innovations this paper examines the political economy of intellectual property analyzing the trade off between private and public rent seeking while it is true in principle that public rent seeking may be a substitute for private rent seeking it is not true that this results always either in less private rent seeking or in a welfare improvement when the public sector itself is selfish and behaves rationally we may experience the worst of public and private rent seeking together

modeling cooperation on a class of distribution problems in this paper we study models of cooperation between the nodes of a network that represents a distribution problem the distribution problem we propose arises when over a graph a group of nodes offers certain commodity some other nodes require it and a third group of nodes neither need this material nor offer it but they are strategically relevant to the distribution plan the delivery of one unit of material to a demand node generates a fixed profit and the shipping of the material through the arcs has an associated cost we show that in such a framework cooperation is beneficial for the different parties we prove that the cooperative situation arising from this distribution problem is totally balanced by finding a set of stable allocations in the core of an associated cooperative game in order to overcome certain fairness problems of these solutions we introduce two new solution concepts and study their properties

distributional assumptions in the theory of oligopoly information exchange abstract we analyze the profitability of information sharing among cournot oligopolists receiving private information about random demand in this setting previous authors showed information exchange to be unprofitable when firms marginal costs are constant and outputs are perfect substitutes we introduce a measure of the increase in the accuracy of firms demand forecasts when information is shared we provide two examples showing when this measure is large information exchange is profitable even though firms marginal costs are constant and outputs are perfect substitutes moreover we show that in the linear conditional expectations framework which has been standard in the literature this measure reveals these accuracy gains to be severely limited

disclosure and choice an agent chooses among projects with random outcomes his payoff is increasing in the outcome and in an observer s expectation of the outcome with some probability the agent will be able to disclose some information about the true outcome to the observer we show that choice is inefficient in general we illustrate this point with a characterization of the inefficiencies that result when the agent can perfectly disclose the outcome with some probability and can disclose nothing otherwise as in dye 1985a in this case the agent favours riskier projects even with lower expected returns on the other hand if information can also be disclosed by a challenger who prefers lower beliefs of the observer the chosen project is excessively risky when the agent has better access to information excessively risk averse when the challenger has better access and efficient otherwise we also characterize the agent s worst case equilibrium payoff we give examples of alternative disclosure technologies illustrating other forms the inefficiencies can take for example in a two dimensional setting we demonstrate a hitting for the fences effect where the agent systematically focuses on the harder dimension at the expense of success on the easier

an empirical study on coalition formation and cost savings allocation abstract interest has been raised by the recent identification of potential savings through collaborative planning in logistics operations even though substantial savings can be realized two key questions exist i how should potential savings be divided among a group of collaborating companies and ii among potential collaborating companies how should collaborating group s be formed these two questions are studied in a specific context among potential collaborating companies a subset denoted the leading companies performs collaborative planning on behalf of the others and together they initiate formation of a collaborating group we use the concept of a business model to detail such context based on the literature on network formation where potential savings are modelled by a cooperative game four business models are explored in four different subsets of leading companies we propose a network model as a method to determine the stable collaborating group in each computation a case study including eight forest companies is described and analyzed results show that very different solution characteristics can be achieved depending on the business model selected

quality disclosure formats in a distribution channel firms normally disclose quality information to consumers using two alternative formats either directly to consumers or indirectly through downstream retailers this study investigates optimal disclosure strategies formats in a channel setting with bilateral monopolies it shows that retail disclosure leads to more equilibrium information revelation this is because the manufacturer can through wholesale price cuts partially absorb the retailer s effective disclosure cost and thus increase the retailer s incentive for disclosure the conditions under which a particular disclosure format arises as the manufacturer s optimal choice are also examined even though direct disclosure is the ex post dominated option the manufacturer may benefit from committing ex ante to the direct disclosure format when the cost of disclosure is sufficiently high

competitive pricing in markets with different overhead costs concealment or leakage of cost information this paper experimentally investigates how leaders and followers in a duopoly set prices for two product markets that have different overhead costs in a fully crossed two by two design we manipulate the participants private cost report quality as either low or high representing the extent to which these reports reveal that product markets have different overhead costs we show that when only the leader is given a high quality cost report private cost information of higher quality is better incorporated into market prices that are observable to participants both the leader and follower improve in profits and their prices better reflect the differences in overhead costs because the follower infers information from the leader s prices information leakage in contrast when only the follower receives a high quality cost report the leader s profits and prices do not improve this occurs because the follower conceals cost information when the leader has a low quality cost report

a theory of environmental risk disclosure abstract the regulation of environmental risks increasingly emphasizes the awareness and empowerment of stakeholders the success of this approach however seems to depend crucially on the quality of environmental disclosures in this paper we investigate the amount and quality of the information that would be voluntarily delivered to some stakeholder by a potential polluter we find that information may be hazier when the stakeholder is confident or naive a priori the cost of analyzing the received reports increases little with their complexity or a polluter s net expected payoff from undertaking an industrial activity that would turn out to be unsafe is small a worried stakeholder and a low cost of producing more accurate figures on the other hand favor disclosure of high quality information by delivering information of very good quality safe firms can set themselves apart more easily from dangerous ones the higher the relative ex post payoff from their current industrial activity implications of this framework for the scope and design of public programs of environmental disclosure are briefly examined

cartel enforcement with uncertainty about costs what cartel agreements are possible when firms have private information about production costs in order for a cartel agreement to work it must take into account the incentives for firms to misrepresent their cost information and it must provide sufficient reward so that no firm wishes to defect for private cost uncertainty we characterize the set of cartel agreements with side payments that can be supported as bayesian nash equilibria we show that if defection results in either cournot or bertrand competition the incentive problems in large cartels are severe enough to prevent the cartel from achieving the monopoly outcome in contrast with common cost uncertainty the incentive problems become less severe in large cartels allowing perfect collusion

conflicts of interest information provision and competition in the financial services industry abstract in some markets sellers have better information than buyers over which products best serve a buyer s needs depending on the market structure this may lead to conflicts of interest in the provision of information by sellers this paper studies this issue in the market for financial services the analysis presents a new model of competition between banks where price competition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation we also compare conflicts of interest in two different firm structures specialized banking and one stop banking

technological competition uncertainty and oligopoly abstract in an oligopoly context the present technological choice of a firm which expects to receive private revelant information just prior to the uncertain market stage has both a flexibility value and a strategic commitment value in contrast to some common wisdom ideas we provide a natural two stage competition framework in which an increase in uncertainty always raises the commitment value of the technological choice of the firm and may decrease its flexibility value when the increased uncertainty takes the form of more variable beliefs the first result tends to reinforce therefore the findings of the strategic commitment literature under certainty

implementation with partial provability we extend implementation theory by allowing the social choice function to depend on more than just the preferences of the agents and allowing agents to support their statements with hard evidence we show that a simple condition on evidence is necessary for the implementation of a social choice function f when the preferences of the agents are state independent and sufficient for implementation for any preferences including state dependent with at least three agents if the social planner can perform small monetary transfers beyond those called for by f if transfers can be large f can be implemented in a game with perfect information when there are at least two players under a boundedness assumption for both results transfers only occur out of equilibrium the use of evidence enables implementation which is robust in the sense that the planner needs little information about agents preferences or beliefs and agents need little information about each others preferences our results are robust to evidence forgery at any strictly positive cost

interbank contagion at work evidence from a natural experiment this article tests financial contagion due to interbank linkages for identification we exploit an idiosyncratic sudden shock caused by a large bank failure in conjunction with detailed data on interbank exposures first we find robust evidence that higher interbank exposure to the failed bank leads to large deposit withdrawals second the magnitude of contagion is higher for banks with weaker fundamentals third interbank linkages among surviving banks further propagate the shock finally we find results suggesting that there are real economic effects these results suggest that interbank linkages act as an important channel of contagion and hold important policy implications jel g01 g21 g28 e58 since the onset of the financial turmoil increased uncertainty reflected particularly in counterparty risk has led banks to hoard liquidity this has resulted in a significant decline of trading in the interbank money markets jean claude trichet president of the european central bank december 2008

relying on the information of interested parties we investigate the conventional wisdom that competition among interested parties attempting to influence a decisionmaker by providing verifiable information elicits all relevant information we find that if the decisionmaker is strategically sophisticated and well informed about the relevant variables and about the preferences of the interested party or parties competition may be unnecessary to achieve this result if the decisionmaker is unsophisticated or not well informed competition is not generally sufficient if the interested parties interests are sufficiently opposed however or if the decisionmaker is seeking to advance the parties welfare then competition can reduce or even eliminate the decisionmaker s need for prior knowledge about the relevant variables and for strategic sophistication in other settings only the combination of competition among information providers and a sophisticated skepticism is sufficient to allow effective decisionmaking

secrecy two sided bias and the value of evidence abstract we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on players preferences for a verifiable message game to possess a separating equilibrium and or a pooling equilibrium as well as sufficient conditions for every equilibrium of such a game to be pooling we also characterize all nonseparating equilibria and use this property to show that less information might be conveyed in any equilibrium of a verifiable message game than in some equilibrium of the cheap talk game with the same parameters

optimal preorder strategy with endogenous information control in this paper we investigate the integrated information and pricing strategy for a seller who can take customer preorders before the release of a product the preorder option enables the seller to sell a product at an early stage when consumers are less certain about their valuations we find that the optimal pricing strategy may be highly dependent on the amount of information available at preorder and that a small change in the latter may cause a dramatic change in the proportion of consumers who preorder under optimal pricing furthermore the seller s optimal information strategy depends on a key measure the normalized margin which is the ratio between the expected profit margin and the standard deviation of consumer valuation although the seller may want to release some information or none she should never release all information finally under the optimal information and pricing strategy the benefit of preorder is most pronounced when the normalized margin is in a medium range this paper was accepted by martin lariviere operations management

information revelation in auctions with common and private values we explore the incentives to reveal verifiable private information when there are both common and private components to agents valuations and when private information is held in both dimensions when agents observe only one signal they have no incentive to reveal the signal because such a revelation would negate their information advantage however when agents observe multiple signals they may be incentivized to reveal certain signals that could lower their opponents bids and thereby result in a higher profit from other signals this paper shows that there exists an equilibrium with revelation of common value signals in standard auctions which is an efficient equilibrium that maximizes the social welfare and could provide the seller with a higher profit than a situation with no information revelation

insisting on a non negative price oligopoly uncertainty welfare and multiple equilibria i study cournot competition under incomplete but symmetric information about the intercept of the linear demand function while assuming that market price must be non negative for all demand realizations although the non negativity assumption is very natural it has only rarely been made in the earlier literature yet it has important economic consequences 1 expected demand effectively becomes convex which means that multiple symmetric pure strategy equilibria can exist and 2 expected total surplus can be larger when the firms do not know demand than when they do the arguments of the paper are relevant also for price competition and for uncertainty about e g cost or the number of firms and these issues are discussed

trade association disclosure rules incentives to share information and welfare in this article i propose a monopolistic competition framework to analyze the effects of different disclosure rules used by trade associations on the incentives to share information and on the welfare of consumers firms and society this framework is appropriate whenever a single firm cannot influence aggregate market magnitudes and serves as a benchmark for the analysis of information pooling agreements abstracting from strategic considerations i report two main results first a policy of nonexclusionary disclosure destroys the incentives to share information while exclusionary disclosure preserves them second information sharing increases expected total surplus with cournot competition but decreases it with bertrand competition in the context of a quadratic normal model with demand uncertainty

strategic information revelation we analyze the problem in which agents have non public information and are to play an asymmetric information game the agents may reveal some or all of their information to other agents prior to playing this game revelation is via exogenously specified certifiable statements the equilibria resulting from various revelation strategies are used to determine equilibrium revelation of information sufficient conditions are provided for complete revelation of all private information a number of examples are provided illustrating when revelation will or will not occur in commonly analyzed games many economic problems are characterized by the presence of both strategic behaviour on the part of individuals and by asymmetric information models encompassing both of these characteristics have been used successfully to examine questions in many fields usually using the concept of bayesian nash equilibrium as the solution concept typically the agents information is given exogenously and is fixed throughout the analysis modelling the information structure as static is appropriate for some problems but not for all in particular situations that are inherently dynamic most economic encounters allow for some interchange between the agents before the outcome is settled irrevocably in such circumstances it is possible that at least one or more of the agents possessing non public information may be able to reveal part or all of his information to one or all of the other agents in the economy during the course of their contact to the extent that such a communication is believed by the other agents the priors of the other agents will change and we will have what is in essence a new asymmetric information game new in

productivity information in vertical sharing agreements abstract that firms share information with their rivals is both well known and studied however firms also often share information with their suppliers the firm s incentive to share productivity information with both its supplier and its rival is examined it is found that by sharing productivity information a firm raises its own expected input price which raises the rival s expected input price in contrast sharing cost or demand information does not have this effect through this price effect information sharing can increase expected producer surplus in price competition while in previous work the sharing of cost information always reduced producer surplus

certification and market transparency we provide elementary insights into the effectiveness of certification to increase market transparency in a market with opaque product quality sellers use certification as a signaling device while buyers use it as an inspection device this difference alone implies that seller certification yields more transparency and higher social welfare under buyer certification profit maximizing certifiers further limit transparency but because seller certification yields larger profits active regulation concerning the mode of certification is not needed these findings are robust and widely applicable to for instance patents automotive parts and financial products

voluntary quality disclosure and market interaction marketers disclose quality information directly to potential consumers using a variety of communication channels this study investigates how competition may influence duopoly firms incentive to voluntarily reveal quality information we show that firms in competitive markets reveal less information than a monopoly firm in addition sequential disclosure leads to asymmetric equilibrium disclosure behavior the disclosure leader reveals unambiguously less information than in the simultaneous disclosure case whereas the follower ex ante reveals less more private information than that released by the leader or by the firms in the simultaneous case when the disclosure cost is sufficiently low high we also examine the equilibrium firm profits and social welfare we demonstrate that there may be a u shaped relationship between equilibrium monopoly profits or social welfare under both monopoly and duopoly and the disclosure cost moreover in comparison to the simultaneous disclosure case sequential disclosure can lead to increasingly softened competition improving both firm profitability and social welfare

news management and the value of firms the literature on asymmetric information has been concerned mainly with the problem of the informed party lying to the uninformed parties however in many cases the informed party will stop short of lying but will seek to gain from private information by managing the disclosure of news this article examines the pricing of a firm when there is such manipulation of news i model this situation as a variant of the persuasion game of milgrom and roberts 1986 in which i can parameterize the notion of the degree of credence placed by the market on the disclosures of the informed party an empirical hypothesis thrown up by the theory is that for otherwise identical firms a low price earnings ratio will be associated with a greater degree of positive skewness of the disclosure strategy

recent advances in oligopoly theory from a game theory perspective abstract this paper surveys the contribution that recent developments in game theory have made to the understanding of oligopoly theory it is argued that conventional models suffer from the problem that there are a number of solution concepts offered with little guidance as to which should be selected and this is related to the static nature of the models employed one important development in game theory has been the analysis of repeated games and when applied to oligopoly theory this suggests that outcomes may be more cooperative than conventional theory suggests related to this is the requirement that firms employ credible threats to punish cheating from cooperative outcomes and the paper examines the extent to which imperfect information may restrict the scope of firms to employ such punishments one way in which firms may seek to make threats credible is through strategic investments for example in production capacity and the paper explores how competition over price or output is integrated with competition over instruments for strategic investment

quality disclosure and competition we analyze costly quality disclosure with horizontally differentiated products under duopoly and a cartel and characterize the effect of competition on disclosure and welfare we show that expected disclosure is higher under a cartel than under duopoly and the welfare comparison depends on the level of disclosure cost when the disclosure cost is low welfare is higher under a cartel than duopoly but when the disclosure cost is high welfare is higher under duopoly in either market structure disclosure is excessive in terms of total surplus but insufficient in terms of consumer surplus

uncertainty resolution private information aggregation and the cournot competitive limit a cournot model of oligopoly in which otherwise identical firms have private differential information about the common cost of production and a shared but unknown demand curve is examined a bayesian equilibrium of the corresponding game of incomplete information is solved for explicitly and analysed in the symmetric equilibrium different firms produce at different output levels because they have different information because the information individual firms have is random total output and hence market price is also random for any finite number of firms the main result of the paper relates to the asymptotic properties of the equilibrium when the number of firms becomes large under fairly general conditions on the joint distribution of demand and individual firms information about demand the random equilibrium price converges almost surely to a constant in the limit more importantly this price equals the perfectly competitive price in other words in large markets even if no firm knows the true market demand curve and firms are not price takers and do not use price as a signal to improve their information the competitive price will prevail with certainty in the limit aggregate outcomes are as if all firms shared their private information with each other

cheap talk in games with incomplete information abstract the paper studies bayesian games which are extended by adding pre play communication let be a bayesian game with full support and with three or more players the main result is that if players can send private messages to each other and make public announcements then every communication equilibrium outcome q that is rational i e involves probabilities that are rational numbers can be implemented in a sequential equilibrium of a cheap talk extension of provided that the following condition is satisfied there exists a bayesian nash equilibrium s in such that for each type t i of each player i the expected payoff of t i in q is larger than the expected payoff of t i in s

supply chain coordination perspectives empirical studies and research directions supply chains sc are generally complex and are characterized by numerous activities spread over multiple functions and organizations which pose interesting challenges for effective sc coordination to meet these challenges sc members must work towards a unified system and coordinate with each other a systematic literature review is presented in this paper to throw light on the importance of sc coordination the objectives of this paper are to report and review various perspectives on sc coordination issues understand and appreciate various mechanisms available for coordination and identify the gaps existing in the literature a framework is suggested indicating scope for further research

trending economic factors and the structure of congress in the growth of government 1930 2002 we investigate the role of congress in the growth of federal public expenditure since 1930 building on the work of kau and rubin public choice 113 389 402 2002 the model incorporates majority party strength and the extent of party control of congress in addition to the median ideological position of elected representatives we first provide estimates of the relative importance of the state of congress and of trending supply and demand side economic factors in the evolution of federal spending the resulting models are then used to simulate the consequences of the radical and historically unprecedented shift to the right of congress in 1994 95

strategic information disclosure the case of multi attribute products with heterogeneous consumers we examine the incentives for firms to voluntarily disclose otherwise private information about quality attributes of differentiated products in particular we focus on the case of differentiated products with multiple attributes and consumers that are heterogeneous in their preferences over these attributes we show that there exist certain configurations of consumer preferences under which a firm producing a high quality product even with zero costs of disclosure may choose not to reveal the quality of its product this failure of firms to voluntarily disclose the quality of their products will arise when providing consumers with more information results in more elastic demands for these products which in turn triggers more intensive price competition and leads to lower prices and profits for all firms as a result the equilibrium in which disclosure is voluntary may diverge from that in which disclosure is mandatory

endogenous structures of association in oligopolies the formulation of associations of firms in an oligopoly with linear demand is analyzed as a two stage noncooperative game in the first stage firms form associations in order to decrease their costs and in the second stage they compete on the market examples of associations include r d joint ventures and groups of firms adopting common standards in equilibrium the associations formed exhibit two general features they are asymmetric and inefficient

coarse thinking and persuasion we present a model of uninformative persuasion in which individuals think coarsely they group situations into categories and apply the same model of inference to all situations within a category coarse thinking exhibits two features that persuaders take advantage of i transference whereby individuals transfer the informational content of a given message from situations in a category where it is useful to those where it is not and ii framing whereby objectively useless information influences individuals choice of category the model sheds light on uninformative advertising and product branding as well as on some otherwise anomalous evidence on mutual fund advertising

screening when some agents are nonstrategic does a monopoly need to exclude we characterize the optimal screening mechanism for a monopolist facing consumers with privately known demands some of whom have limited abilities to misrepresent their preferences we show that consumers with better abilities to misrepresent information benefit from the presence of consumers who lack such abilities whenever the fraction of the latter group is positive there is no exclusion the firm supplies a positive quantity of the good to all consumers whose valuations exceed marginal cost of production our analysis is motivated by the evidence indicating that some individuals have limited ability to misrepresent themselves and imitate others

bargaining and sharing innovative knowledge we consider the problem of bargaining over the disclosure of interimresearch knowledge between two participants in an r d race for an ultimate patentable invention licence fee schedules that are functions of the amount of knowledge disclosed by the leading to the laggingagent are examined for their abilities to attain efficient outcomes andvarying shares of the surplus arising from disclosure in hersequential offers bargaining games the uninformed buyer is able to elicitfull disclosures without sharing the incremental surplus with any type ofthe licensor and thus do as well as a perfectly informed and discriminatingknowledge licensee

sequential aggregation of verifiable information we introduce the notion of verifiable information into a model of sequential debate among experts who are motivated by career concerns we show that self censorship may hamper the eciency of information agg regation as experts withhold evidence contradicting the conventional wisdom in this case silence is telling and undermines the prevailing view over time if this view is incorrect as a result withholding arguments about the correct state of the world is only a temporary phenomenon and the probability of the correct state of the world being revealed always converges to one as the group of experts becomes large for small groups a simple mechanism the principal can use to improve decisionmaking is to appoint a devil s advocate

a model of efficient discovery abstract we construct a model of costly pretrial discovery represented as learning the drift rate of a diffusion process by observing its path and settlement negotiations analyzed as a mechanism design problem in which the gains from settling are the avoided costs of a trial whose outcome is correlated with their private information we show that for this particular model the parties expected gains from a joint plan of discovery preceding the settlement negotiations are unaffected by their privately known parameters hence there is no intrinsic impediment to initial agreement on an efficient plan of discovery journal of economic literatureclassification nos c78 d74 d82 k41

competitive intelligence and disclosure competitive intelligence ci activities open new opportunities for firms to acquire and disclose information we show that disclosure depends on the relative usefulness of information to the competing firms and is generally less more likely with cournot bertrand competition and when firms adopt product differentiation strategies when ci costs are independent of information characteristics each firm seeks information solely useful to itself and discloses it unless it is a bertrand competitor with customer information only when the cost advantage is sufficiently great does each firm seek information useful to itself and its rival

voluntary disclosure under imperfect competition experimental evidence abstract this study investigates disclosure behavior when a firm has incentives to influence the actions of a product market rival in a cournot quantity game using an experimental economics method we find that when the firm receives private information about industry wide cost unfavorable favorable information is disclosed withheld and the rival adjusts production accordingly in contrast when the firm receives private information about firm specific cost disclosure behavior is not affected by the favorableness of the information and the rival s production decision is insensitive to the firm s disclosure choice

contracting for technology improvement the effect of asymmetric bargaining power and investment uncertainty abstract investment in technology improvement ti measures that reduce the consumption rate of input commodities like fuel energy water etc yields significant economic and sustainability benefits yet evidence shows that the so called holdup problem leads to inefficient levels of investment in ti the suppliers refrain from investing in ti because they fear that a buyer with greater bargaining power will use ti related cost reductions to push prices down in the purchase bargaining process and thereby further reduce the supplier s profit margin conventional wisdom suggests that higher bargaining power on the buyer s side aggravates this problem in a two tier supplier buyer setting we study the role of relative bargaining power along with technology uncertainty i e the risk associated with investment return on ti investment levels by the supplier we challenge conventional wisdom to show that there is an inverse u shaped relationship between buyer bargaining power and ti investment by the supplier and characterize how technology uncertainty moderates this relationship we study and rank various contracting arrangements commonly used in industry including the price commitment and shared investment contracts to remedy the investment inefficiencies resulting from the bargaining process

the size of government most research on the causes of growth in government expenditure has focused on the demand for government services in this paper we argue that in fact this growth may have occurred because of changes in supply changes in technology leading to increased specialization and thus increased opportunity costs of self production have led to increased market production and increased record keeping also female labor force participation has increased both of these factors serve to reduce the efficiency cost of collecting taxes if the demand for government spending has not changed this increase in supply would lead to a larger public sector we estimate a system of simultaneous equations for the period 1929 1970 incorporating this hypothesis and the results are consistent with the theory we are able to explain virtually all of the growth of government increases in female labor force participation seems to be a very important variable in this explanation

population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility abstract an allocation scheme for a cooperative game specifies how to allocate the worth of every coalition it is population monotonic if each player s payoff increases as the coalition to which he belongs grows larger we show that essentially a game has a population monotonic allocation scheme pmas if and only if it is a positive linear combination of monotonic simple games with veto control a dual characterization is also provided sufficient conditions for the existence of a pmas include convexity and increasing average marginal contributions if the game is convex its extended shapley value is a pmas classification number 026

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

information transparency of business to business electronic markets a game theoretic analysis the abundance of transaction data available on the internet tends to make information more transparent in electronic marketplaces in such a transparent environment it becomes easier for suppliers to obtain information that may allow them to infer their rivals costs is this good news or bad news in this study we focus on theinformational effects of business to business b2b exchanges and explore firms incentives to join a b2b exchange that provides an online platform for information transmission we then study the equilibria by developing a game theoretic model under asymmetric information we examine whether the incentives to join a b2b exchange would be different under different competition modes quantity and price different information structures and by varying the nature of the products substitutes and complements our results challenge the information transparency hypothesis i e open sharing of information in electronic markets is beneficial to all participating firms in contrast to the popular belief we show that information transparency could be a double edged sword the individual rationality of participation in the online exchange reflects the tradeoff between information transparency and data confidentiality this may have important implications for the microstructure design e g data access rules of b2b electronic marketplaces

strategic transmission of costly information it is ofren the case that an individual s decision is at least partly based on information received from another and when the agents payoffs depend on both the former s decision and on the latter s information there is an incentive for the informed individual to attempt to bias the decision maker s decision in his or her favor by strategically manipulating the information transmitted in a seminal paper crawford and sobel 1982 hereafter c s study such strategic information transmission in the context of an abstract sender receiver game variants of the crawford and sobel model have been applied widely and as the application varies so often does the interpretation of type in some cases type refers to a preference parameter given by nature as for example in bargaining theory e g farrell and gibbons 1989 matthews 1989 whereas in other settings for instance legislative decision making or expert testimony type refers to more or less technical information concerning how decisions map into final consequences and as such is acquired information e g gilligan and krehbiel 1987 milgrom and roberts 1986 when the information has to be acquired it is natural to suppose the acquisition is costly for otherwise there is no reason why such information is asymmetrically distributed so long as the receiver can observe surely or at least accurately infer whether the sender is informed and so long as messages are cheap talk there is no issue here for strategic information transmission save whether to become informed at all however there are many circumstances when it is inappropri ate to assume the receiver has such knowledge one possibility is that a receiver may know that a sender has some relevant informa tion but be uncertain of the quality of this information a second perhaps more important possibility is that a receiver is unable to tell whether a potential sender is uninformed inter alia this problem constitutes the rationale for ignorance of the law being inadmissible as a legal defense were it admissible then informed miscreants would mimic uninformed transgressors leads voters to be skeptical of politicians claiming ignorance of illegal arms deals and makes the sec sensitive to problems in distinguishing insider trading from legitimate good judgement so there is an intrinsic asymmetry in that it is generally possible for say senders to verify possession of at least some information but it is typically prohibitively difficult to verify any lack of knowledge

strategic information revelation in fundraising abstract we consider a model of voluntary contributions for a public project with random number of potential contributors the fundraiser who observes this number has to decide whether to reveal or suppress the information before contributions are given the fundraiser s objective is to collect maximal contributions we show that whether the public project is convex or non convex can be the key to the fundraiser s announcement decision in the convex case this number is always revealed in the non convex case the number may not be revealed at all or sometimes revealed only when it is in an intermediate range in the presence of multiple equilibria total contributions increase with the extent of concealment

disclosures and asset returns public information in financial markets often arrives through the disclosures of interested parties who have a material interest in the reactions of the market to the new information when the strategic interaction between the sender and the receiver is formalized as a disclosure game with verifiable reports equilibrium prices can be given a simple characterization in terms of the concatenation of binomial pricing trees there are a number of empirical implications the theory predicts that the return variance following a poor disclosed outcome is higher than it would have been if the disclosed outcome were good also when investors are risk averse this leads to negative serial correlation of asset returns other points of contact with the empirical literature are discussed

information transmission cournot and bertrand equilibria we examine how incentives for two duopolists to honestly share information change depending upon the nature of competition cournot or bertrand and the nature of the information structure while in earlier papers uncertainty is about an unknown common demand intercept in the present paper uncertainty is about unknown private costs the different information structure reverses the incentives to share information while with unknown common demand sharing is a dominant strategy with bertrand competition and concealing is a dominant strategy with cournot competition with unknown private costs sharing is a dominant strategy with cournot competition and concealing is a dominant strategy with bertrand competition

cournot oligopoly with information sharing this paper studies the incentives for information sharing among firms in a cournot oligopoly facing a linear uncertain demand and an affine conditional expectation information structure no information sharing is found to be the unique equilibrium in two cases in which the signals with equal precision are assumed indivisible and infinitely divisible however the nonpooling equilibrium converges to the situation where the pooling strategies are adopted as the amount of information increases hence the efficiency is achieved in the competitive equilibrium as the number of the firm become large

evasive lying in strategic communication abstract information asymmetries in economic transactions are omnipresent and a regular source of fraudulent behavior in a theoretical and an experimental analysis of a sender receiver game we investigate whether sanctions for lying induce more truth telling the novel aspect in our model is that senders may not only choose between truth telling and explicit lying but may also engage in evasive lying by credibly pretending not to know while we find that sanctions promote truth telling when senders cannot engage in evasive lying this is no longer true when evasive lying is possible then explicit lying is largely substituted by evasive lying which completely eliminates the otherwise positive effect of sanctions on the rate of truth telling as outlined in our model the necessary prerequisite for such an erosion effect is that evasive lying is perceived as sufficiently less psychologically costly than direct lying evidence from our experimental data and a survey conducted with additional participants indicate that the shift towards evasion can indeed be attributed to lower psychological costs overall our results clearly demonstrate the limitations of sanctioning lying to counteract the exploitation of informational asymmetries and may explain the empirical evidence from the finance industry that sanctions for financial misconduct eventually appear to be not very effective

did women s suffrage change the size and scope of government this paper examines the growth of government during this century as a result of giving women the right to vote using cross sectional time series data for 1870 1940 we examine state government expenditures and revenue as well as voting by u s house and senate state delegations and the passage of a wide range of different state laws suffrage coincided with immediate increases in state government expenditures and revenue and more liberal voting patterns for federal representatives and these effects continued growing over time as more women took advantage of the franchise contrary to many recent suggestions the gender gap is not something that has arisen since the 1970s and it helps explain why american government started growing when it did

communication in cournot oligopoly abstract this paper studies communication in a static cournot duopoly model under the assumption that the firms have unverifiable private information about their costs we investigate the conditions under which the firms cannot transmit any information through cheap talk and show that when these conditions are violated it may be possible to construct informative cheap talk equilibria if the firms can communicate through a third party communication can be informative even when informative cheap talk is impossible we exhibit a simple mediated mechanism that ensures informative communication and interim pareto dominates the uninformative equilibrium for the firms

risk and revelation changing the value of information a different approach is introduced to determine the value of an information sharing agreement the measure of risk aversion loving this approach reveals the relationship between information sharing models and the risk literature it also allows uncertainty regarding the slope of a firm s own demand function to be examined which previous work eschews the results suggest that the incentive to reveal information is more prevalent than previously thought firms prefer to commit to reveal private valued information in both quantity and price competition this differs from previous work where the incentive to commit depended on the type of competition

testing theories of real government size u s experience 1959 89 in a recent article west 17 argued that the existence of so many strands of analysis attempting to explain the growth of government calls ultimately for one consolidated or generalized theory accordingly he produced a model that integrated four such theories two on the cost side and two on the demand side the purpose of the present paper is to derive empirical measures of all four theories using u s data for the period 1959 1989 the presumption is that each one separately might contribute in its own way to a composite explanation of government growth and that what is currently most needed is a set of jointly determined empirical estimates showing relative importance while all our measures of government size consolidate federal state and local government expenditures two other measurement issues should be emphasized since they distinguish our work from other contributions to this literature the government component of our main dependent variable the real size of government is measured in two different ways the first uses the national accounts definition of government purchases which excludes transfer payments from the measure of size whereas the second includes final purchases plus net government transfer payments since we are interested in the effects of changes in the productivity of supplying government services the first of these definitions is expected to be more relevant and is so used as the basis of our empirical work however since there is a sense in which changes in the productivity of government may affect the output of transfers we also use the second definition to produce a more complete empirical exercise the other distinguishing feature of our analysis is that both definitions of government size are analyzed in real as distinct from the more usual nominal share of government in gross domestic product gdp this distinction becomes immediately more striking when it is pointed out that while most authors hitherto have attempted to explain the phenomenon of positive growth in the ratio of nominals over the past half century the ratio of reals has actually fallen for most of our

coalition formation problem for sourcing contract design in supply networks abstract this article studies a coalition formation problem for cooperative replenishment with a single supplier and multiple firms we consider that a vertical cooperation between the supplier and the set of firms is already set using periodic individual contracts and we investigate the profitability of a horizontal cooperation between firms when designing collaborative contracts given the significant savings that can be realized thanks to horizontal collaboration the main interest of the potential collaborating firms is to figure out how the collaborating group should be formed and how stable alliances and coalitions should be generated in this article the two questions are studied in two business situations focusing either on the collaboration opportunities in the ordering or the transportation process in each collaborative situation a decision making approach is applied to assess the expected profitability of each firm and to determine if firms should form coalitions to maximize their profits an exact solution method based on a game theoretic approach is developed called cooperative replenishment algorithm cra which generates core stable coalitions for cost savings regarding all partner standpoints an analytical study of stability conditions regarding the ordering and transportation cost structures were performed to enhance the cra resolution procedure extensive experiments based on realistic instances are provided to validate the performance of the cra proposed in terms of solution stability and convergence the computational results also confirm the potential benefit of horizontal collaboration between firms in terms of profit maximization compared to the stand alone situation

the value of transparency in multidivisional firms we study internal incentives transparency and firm performance in multidivisional organizations two independent divisions of the same firm design internal incentives and decide whether to publicly disclose their performances in each division a risk neutral principal deals with a risk averse exclusive agent under moral hazard each agent exerts an unverifiable effort that creates a spillover on the effort cost of the other agent we first study the determinants of the optimal principal agent contract with and without performance transparency then we show how effort spillovers affect the equilibrium communication behavior of each division both principals commit to disclose the performance of their agents in equilibrium when efforts are complements while no communication is the only equilibrium outcome when efforts are substitutes

information sharing and oligopoly in agricultural markets the role of the cooperative bargaining association we study incentives for information sharing among agricultural intermediaries in imperfectly competitive markets for farm output information sharing always increases expected grower and total surplus but may reduce expected intermediary profits even when expected profits increase with information sharing intermediary firms face a prisoner s dilemma where it is privately rational to withhold information given that other firms report truthfully this equilibrium can be avoided if firms information reports are verifiable and if firms commit to an ex ante contract that enforces participation in information sharing we show how agricultural bargaining legislation can implement such a contract with the bargained farm price representing a sufficient statistic of all information held by intermediary firms

tax evasion and the marginal cost of public funds tax evasion and deadweight loss have similar implications for the rules of public finance the optimal mix of taxes can be derived from the minimization of the sum of aggregate deadweight loss and aggregate cost of tax evasion similarly the marginal cost of public funds includes allowances for marginal deadweight loss and marginal cost of tax evasion per dollar of public revenue acquired

too much information sharing welfare effects of sharing acquired cost information in oligopoly by using general information structures and precision criteria based on the dispersion of conditional expectations we study how oligopolists information acquisition decisions may change the effects of information sharing on the consumer surplus sharing information about individual cost parameters gives the following trade off in cournot oligopoly on the one hand it decreases the expected consumer surplus for a given information precision as the literature shows on the other hand information sharing increases the firms incentives to acquire information and the consumer surplus increases in the precision of the firms information interestingly the latter effect may dominate the former effect

unraveling in first price auction abstract in a private values first price auction with random number of bidders the auctioneer has to decide whether to announce or not the actual number of bidders if the auctioneer cannot commit to any particular announcement policy then he would like to reveal when the number of bidders is high in order to increase bidding competition by the same logic the auctioneer should like to conceal if the number turns out to be small when bidders types are independent full revelation by the auctioneer is shown to be a unique equilibrium with skeptical belief as the unique equilibrium belief

duopoly information equilibrium cournot and bertrand abstract in a duopoly model where firms have private information about an uncertain linear demand it is shown that if the goods are substitutes not to share information is a dominant strategy for each firm in bertrand cournot competition if the goods are complements the result is reversed furthermore the following welfare results are obtained 1 i with substitutes in cournot competition the market outcome is never optimal with respect to information sharing but it may be optimal in bertrand competition if the products are good substitutes with complements the market outcome is always optimal 2 ii bertrand competition is more efficient than cournot competition 3 iii the private value of information to the firms is always positive but the social value of information is positive in cournot and negative in bertrand competition

duopoly information exchange the case of unknown slope abstract we model information exchange between duopolists facing a common random demand the slope of the common demand curve facing the firms is assumed unknown and firms observe private signals about this slope we show that for sufficiently large variation in the demand slope firms earn strictly higher profit when they share their information rather than keeping it private even with constant marginal costs and homogeneous goods in this case it is a nash equilibrium for the duopolists to share their information in a quid pro quo information exchange consistent with earlier models information exchange raises welfare

game theory and cost allocation problems problems of allocating joint costs in a reasonable way arise in many practical situations where people decide to work together to save costs cost allocation methods based on game theoretical concepts take into account the strategic aspects of cost allocation situations we give a survey of cost allocation methods based on the nucleolus and the shapley value and introduce also a new one the so called cost gap allocation method which is based on the i value it is shown that for some large subclasses of cost allocation problems this new cost allocation method coincides with old separable cost methods proposed in the thirties by the tennessee valley authority and also with the separable costs remaining benefits scrb method properties of this cost gap allocation method are also treated

endogenous information acquisition in bayesian games with strategic complementarities abstract this paper studies covert or hidden information acquisition in common value bayesian games of strategic complementarities using the supermodular stochastic order to arrange the structures of information increasingly in terms of preferences we provide novel easily interpretable and verifiable though restrictive conditions under which the value of information is increasing and convex and study the implications in terms of the equilibrium configuration increasing marginal returns to information leads to extreme behavior in that agents opt either for the highest or the lowest quality signal so that the final analysis of this complex game simplifies greatly into that of a two action game this result can rationalize the complete information game as an endogenous outcome finally we also establish that higher quality information leads players to select more dispersed actions in the bayesian game

the sale of ideas strategic disclosure property rights and contracting ideas are difficult to sell when buyers cannot assess an idea s value before it is revealed and sellers cannot protect a revealed idea these problems exist in a variety of intellectual property sales ranging from pure ideas to poorly protected inventions and reflect the nonverifiability of key elements of an intellectual property sale an expropriable partial disclosure can be used as a signal allowing the seller to obtain payment based on the value of the remaining undisclosed know how we examine contracting after the disclosure and find that seller wealth is pivotal in supporting a partial disclosure equilibrium and in determining the payoff size

financial distress and underemployment a reasonable model of the labour market over the business cycle should predict among other things that a in very low states of product demand there may be too little employment from an efficiency perspective but as the state improves employment will increase until ultimately it is efficiently deployed and b in low states of demand a worker s welfare level will be low and as the state of the world improves so will the worker s welfare except possibly at high levels of demand where the worker s utility may start to fall surprisingly there does not exist a labour contract based model that is consistent with predictions a and b in fact the standard results in the literature are if leisure is a normal good then there will be too much employment in essentially all states of the world and the welfare of the worker declines as the state of the world improves in this paper a labour contracting model is constructed that is consistent with the above mentioned predictions two necessary ingredients in the model are the possibility of financial distress in low demand states and partial provability in contracting financial distress can be viewed as frustrating renegotiation and thus inefficient outcomes are possible in equilibrium partial provability the ability of an informed player to make verifiable claims or statements to an uninformed player eliminates certain kinds of inefficient outcomes in particular it eliminates the possibility that in equilibrium there is too much employment this last result is interesting in itself because it is commonly believed that normality of leisure necessarily implies that labour contracting models will generate employment levels that are too high from an efficiency perspective

the impact of information sharing opportunities on market outcomes an experimental study information regarding uncertain demand conditions or industry costs as well as the opportunity to share this information can have an important impact on firm behavior a series of recent game theoretic models have characterized the incentives for firms to share information regarding uncertain parameters 3 7 8 13 14 16 22 26 20 21 provide a comprehensive survey most of the models assume that behavior in the output market is noncooperative regardless of the firms information sharing decisions this paper reports a series of 15 laboratory sessions that test the noncooperative backward induction approach of these models the results suggest that pricing behavior may be influenced by the information sharing decision under most conditions the noncooperative nash model accurately describes average behavior although in certain conditions information sharing appears to facilitate tacit collusion the paper also estimates a simple behavioral model of learning that describes how experimental subjects learn the optimal information sharing decision as an alternative to the theories backward induction assumption the information sharing models tested here have been interpreted as identifying the incentives for competitive firms to form a trade association that reduces their uncertainty thousands of trade and professional associations are active worldwide and the majority collect information from their members that is aggregated and distributed through association statistical programs the theoretical models demonstrate how three variables influence the information sharing incentives 1 the type of competition bertrand or cournot 2 the nature of the goods substitutes or complements and 3 the source of uncertainty demand or cost the first two variables determine the slope of the firms reaction functions and the uncertainty source along with the information sharing decision determines the degree of correlation among the firms strategies the incentive for noncooperative firms to share information shifts as these three variables change because reduced correlation has a negative or positive effect on profit depending upon the slope of the reaction functions

voluntary disclosure and investment in environmental technology abstract i examine the role of voluntary disclosure programs in creating market incentives for competing firms to invest in environmentally cleaner technology in an industry subject to environmental regulation such as emission taxes such programs may allow firms to credibly disclose their progress in achieving compliance cost reduction through investments in internal rd the outcome of the investment is private information i show that the ex ante incentive to invest is always higher in the presence of the voluntary disclosure program than without it in particular the opportunity to credibly disclose progress in cost reduction allows a successful firm to convey its true position of competitive advantage to the rival firm and realize higher market share and profit thus voluntary disclosure programs increase the efficacy of traditional forms of environmental regulation in creating incentives for green technological change even when buyers have no preference for greener technology i show that such programs generally increase social welfare

differential information monopolistic competition and investment the behavior of investment in a monopolistically competitive industry is investigated under the assumption of imperfect information about the average investment firms profits are affected by productivity shocks these shocks consist of two types of disturbances industry wide and idiosyncratic ones the main results are investment under imperfect information is more volatile than that under perfect information if firms can observe their own productivity conditions but not their components and increased competition always destabilizes investment and raises its volatility the rigidity of rational expectations plays a crucial role copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

on the existence of monotone pure strategy perfect bayesian equilibrium in games with complementarities abstract many important economic situations such as auctions and signaling games can be modeled as dynamic games of incomplete information with strategic complementarities of actions and types in this paper we extend the results of athey 2001 and reny 2011 from static bayesian games to dynamic environments with observable actions providing conditions that guarantee the existence of monotone equilibria in types in such games a feature that distinguishes this environment from those of previous results is the endogeneity of beliefs which can complicate continuity of payoffs needed to find a fixed point to address this we perturb the strategies of the game which pins down beliefs while preserving continuity of payoffs we then provide conditions which guarantee that there will exist monotone best replies to monotone strategies of one s opponents in a dynamic environment enabling verification of existence by merely looking at the primitives of the model