price distortions in agriculture and their effects an international comparison the central thesis of this paper is that agricultural pricing policies pursued by developing countries produce effects which are diametrically opposite to those produced by the pricing policies of many developed countries and that the policies of both are costly in terms of global welfare in general the agricultural sector in developing countries is heavily taxed while that in the developed countries receives substantial price protection the effects of agricultural price distortions on output consumption trade and rural employment are estimated for nine countries in addition the effects of price distortions on the distribution of income between producers and consumers on government revenue and foreign exchange and the net social losses of the policies are calculated the results indicate that there are large income transfers and impacts on migration from the rural to the urban sector in developing countries and from the urban to the rural sector in developed economies

political economy of agricultural policy in this article i focus on the findings from this study on the political economy of agricultural policy as they inform questions about the political economy of agricultural pricing primarily but not exclusively in developing countries to do so first i provide some background data on the comparative study i sketch the various stylized facts that were believed at the time and contrast them with the regularities that emerged from the comparative study finally i indicate some of the systematic empirical regularities and suggest the political economy conclusions which emerge from them

the dual policy in the dual economy the political economy of urban bias in dictatorial regimes in many developing countries public resource allocation is often biased against the rural population since a vast majority of the poor live in rural areas the bias is highlighted as one of the most important institutional factors contributing to poverty this paper develops a political economy model of urban bias in a dictatorial regime a novel result of the model is that urban bias can emerge in predominantly agrarian economies even if there is no bias in political power toward urban residents the empirical evidence from a recently compiled country level panel dataset on agricultural taxes subsidies is consistent with the prediction of the model

why did the elites extend the suffrage democracy and the scope of government with an application to britain s age of reform a new rationale is presented for why an elite may want to expand the franchise even in the absence of threats to the established order expanding the franchise can turn politicians away from particularistic politics based on ad personam redistribution within the elite and foster competition based on programs with diffuse benefits if these programs are valuable a majority of the elite votes in favor of an extension of the franchise despite the absence of a threat from the disenfranchised we argue that the evolution of public spending and of political competition in nineteenth century britain is consistent with our model i introduction at the beginning of the nineteenth century in most countries narrow elites had a disproportionate influence on public affairs even in england where parliament was an influential institution suffrage was mostly the privilege of the wealthy and some members of parliament were elected in boroughs with as few as 100 voters while cities such as manchester did not have any representative a century later most western countries had universal male suffrage with female suffrage to arrive shortly thereafter what brought about this democratic revolution in many cases the elites were forced out of power after violent revolutions however there are important examples such as england where democratization took the form of gradual extensions of the suffrage and these were accompanied by little overt violence it is the peculiar pride of england that the record of social and political reform is to be found on the statute book not in the annals of revolution cheyney 1931 p vii such peaceful democratizations are difficult to rationalize within the benchmark political economic models in those models extending the franchise dilutes the elite s power to influence policy and results

optimal access pricing for natural monopoly networks when costs are sunk and revenues are uncertain this paper studies optimal access pricing for natural monopoly networks with large sunk costs and uncertain revenues using techniques from the option pricing literature we show that the optimal access price corresponds to a risk free form of the efficiency component pricing rule ecpr that is where the opportunity cost is based on the risk free rate of return we also show that at levels of revenue above the optimal level that triggers entry the entrant should pay a premium above risk free ecpr that rewards the incumbent for relinquishing his rights to the risky cash flows at the higher revenue level

real investment options with multiple sources of rare events abstract we value real investment options when the underlying asset follows a mixed jump diffusion process involving various types sources of rare events jumps these jumps are assumed independent of each other with each type having a log normally distributed jump size and a random poisson distributed arrival time they may represent uncertainties about the arrival and impact on the underlying investment of new information concerning technological innovation competition political risk regulatory effects and other sources an analytic solution is presented for european claims call or put options with multiple sources of jumps a discrete time markov chain methodology implemented within a finite difference scheme is proposed for the valuation of american as well as european options the approach is also applicable to financial options with multiple types of rare events the approach is illustrated through valuing complex real options with compound features involving interactions between optimal investment and subsequent operating decisions specifically we value a growth option and an extension option

politics and economics in weak and strong states abstract while much research in political economy points out the benefits of limited government political scientists have long emphasized the problems created in many less developed nations by weak states which lack the power to tax and regulate the economy and to withstand the political and social challenges from non state actors i construct a model in which the state apparatus is controlled by a self interested ruler who tries to divert resources for his own consumption but who can also invest in socially productive public goods both weak and strong states create distortions when the state is excessively strong the ruler imposes such high taxes that economic activity is stifled when the state is excessively weak the ruler anticipates that he will not be able to extract rents in the future and underinvests in public goods i show that the same conclusion applies in the analysis of both the economic power of the state i e its ability to raise taxes and its political power i e its ability to remain entrenched from the citizens i also discuss how under certain circumstances a different type of equilibrium which i refer to as consensually strong state equilibrium can emerge whereby the state is politically weak but is allowed to impose high taxes as long as a sufficient fraction of the proceeds are invested in public goods the consensually strong state might best correspond to the state in oecd countries where taxes are high despite significant control by the society over the government

the impact of investment lags on investment decision abstract this paper suggests a valuation framework for an investment project through the concept of real options generally in real asset world decision time and its payment time are not identical this so called investment lag problem should be considered when valuing real assets when investment lags exist firms accommodation capacities play important roles in this paper the real effect of investment lag on investment value is tested upon various conditions we show the valuation process of real assets under the risk neutral world the closed form formula is also provided for valuing real assets including r d project

the control of politicians in divided societies the politics of fear autocrats in many developing countries have extracted enormous personal rents from power in addition they have imposed inefficient policies including pervasive patronage spending i present a model in which the presence of ethnic identities and the absence of institutionalized succession processes allow the ruler to elicit support from a sizeable share of the population despite large reductions in welfare the fear of falling under an equally inefficient and venal ruler that favours another group is enough to discipline supporters the model predicts extensive use of patronage ethnic bias in taxation and spending patterns and unveils a new mechanism through which economic frictions translate into increased rent extraction by the leader these predictions are consistent with the experiences of bad governance ethnic bias wasteful policies and kleptocracy in post colonial africa

lobbying incentives and the pattern of protection in rich and poor countries in seeking to explain why poor countries tend to choose policies that tax agriculture relative to manufacturing while rich countries do the opposite archetypical parameters for a poor agrarian economy and a rich industrial one are inserted in a computable general equilibrium model to simulate the medium term effects on income distribution of policies that distort the relative prices of tradables the model includes a non tradables sector and intermediate inputs realistic features that ensure even greater skewness in the distributional effects of protection than simpler models suggest the magnitude of the results helps explain the tendency for countries to change gradually from taxing to subsidizing agriculture relative to manufacturing as their economies develop the paper draws out the implications of the analysis for agricultural and trade policy reform in the 1990s this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

state capacity conflict and development the absence of state capacities to raise revenue and to support markets is a key factor in explaining the persistence of weak states this paper reports on an ongoing project to investigate the incentive to invest in such capacities the paper sets out a simple analytical structure in which state capacities are modeled as forward looking investments by government the approach highlights some determinants of state building including the risk of external or internal conflict the degree of political instability and dependence on natural resources throughout we link these state capacity investments to patterns of development and growth

earnouts in mergers and acquisitions a game theoretic option pricing approach abstract this paper presents a valuation approach for merger and acquisition m a deals employing contingent earnouts it is argued that these transactions have option like features and the paper uses a game theoretic option approach to model the value of such claims more specifically the paper examines the impact of uncertainty on the optimal timing of m a using earnouts and it also investigates the impact of uncertainty on the terms of the earnout optimal earnout and initial payment combinations are endogenously derived from the model and testable hypotheses are developed the theoretical contribution of this paper is a dynamic decision making model of the invest to learn option generated upon investment in an acquisition the paper also offers practical implications for the design of acquisitions employing earnouts

lessons from the political economy of the new deal the new deal produced a fundamental change in the structure of american government the national government came to play a much larger role in the financing of social welfare programmes while administration of the programmes was largely located at the states both the purely national and the shared federal parts of the welfare system were characterized by impersonal rules the political economy of how the rules came about and how the new deal experience may have contributed to americans changing their views on the danger of dealing with the national government is the primary focus the paper closes with speculations about the possible effect of changing views on american participation in the second world war after 1939

the survival of the welfare state this paper provides an analytical characterization of markov perfect equilibria in a model with repeated voting where agents vote over distortionary income redistribution a key result is that the future constituency for redistributive policies depends positively on current redistribution since this affects both private investments and the future distribution of voters the model features multiple equilibria in some equilibria positive redistribution persists forever in other equilibria even a majority of beneficiaries of redistribution vote strategically so as to induce the end of the welfare state next period skill biased technical change makes the survival of the welfare state less likely

uncertainty and stepwise investment we analyze the optimal investment strategy of a firm that can complete a project either in one stage at a single freely chosen time point or in incremental steps at distinct time points the presence of economies of scale gives rise to the following trade off lumpy investment has a lower total cost but stepwise investment gives more flexibility by letting the firm choose the timing individually for each stage our main question is how uncertainty in market development affects this trade off the answer is unambiguous and in contrast with a conventional real options intuition higher uncertainty makes the single stage investment more attractive relative to the more flexible stepwise investment strategy

structure of agricultural protection in industrial countries abstract the nominal rates of agricultural protection in ten industrial countries from 1955 to 1980 are estimated with the same commodity coverage and data definitions a regression analysis is conducted to explain variations in the measured level of agricultural protection in terms of political as well as economic factors nearly 80 percent of the variations is accounted for by differences in agriculture s comparative advantage agriculture s share in total economy the international terms of trade between agricultural and manufactured commodities regionalism eec and food security consideration associated with non military alliance

agricultural incentives in developing countries measuring the effect of sectoral and economywide policies the impact of sector specific direct and economywide indirect policies on agricultural incentives for 18 developing countries for the period 1975 84 are estimated the direct effect is measured by the proportional difference between the producer price and the border price adjusting for distribution storage transport and other marketing costs the indirect effect has two components 1 the impact of the unsustainable portion of the current account deficit and of industrial protection policies on the real exchange rate and thus on the price of agricultural commodities relative to nonagricultural nontradables and 2 the impact of industrial protection policies on the relative price of agricultural commodities to that of nonagricultural tradable goods the authors found that a in almost all cases the direct effect is equivalent to a tax on exportable goods and to a subsidy for importables b the indirect effect also taxes agriculture and dominates the direct effect and c the direct policies for both importables and exportables stabilize domestic producer prices

kleptocracy and divide and rule a model of personal rule many developing countries have suffered under the personal rule of kleptocrats who implement highly inefe cient economic policies expropriate the wealth of their citizens and use the proceeds for their own glorie cation or consumption we argue that the success of kleptocrats rests in part on their ability to use a divide and rule strategy made possible by the weakness of institutions in these societies members of society need to cooperate in order to depose a kleptocrat yet such cooperation may be defused by imposing punitive rates of taxation on any citizen who proposes such a move and redistributing the benee ts to those who need to agree to it thus the collective action problem can be intensie ed by threats which remain off the equilibrium path in equilibrium all are exploited and no one challenges the kleptocrat kleptocratic policies are more likely when foreign aid and rents from natural resources provide rulers with substantial resources to buy off opponents when opposition groups are shortsighted when the average productivity in the economy is low and when there is greater inequality between producer groups because more productive groups are more dife cult to buy off jel o12 h00

politics information and the urban bias abstract governments in many ldcs skew public resources towards urban sectors despite a majority of citizens residing in rural areas this paper develops a novel political argument for this urban bias phenomenon in a framework where all voters rural and urban have equal voice but differ in their access to information we argue that this difference is sufficient to give governments an incentive to inefficiently over allocate resources towards urban areas the bias is shown to worsen during adverse economic times leading to increased migration we also examine how voter informativeness affects efficiency of the electoral process in weeding out incompetent governments

the option value of advanced r d existing tools for making r d investment decisions cannot properly capture the option value in r d since many new products are identified as failures during the r d stages the possibility of refraining from market introduction may add a significant value to the npv of the r d project this paper presents new theoretical insight by developing a stochastic jump amplitude model in a real setting the option value of the proposed model depends on the expected number of jumps and the expected size of the jumps in a particular business the model is verified with empirical knowledge of current research in the field of multimedia at philips corporate research this way the gap between real option theory and the practice of decision making with respect to investments in r d is diminished