what drives deregulation economics and politics of the relaxation of bank branching restrictions this paper investigates private interest public interest and political institutional theories of regulatory change to analyze state level deregulation of bank branching restrictions using a hazard model we find that interest group factors related to the relative strength of potential winners large banks and small bank dependent firms and losers small banks and the rival insurance firms can explain the timing of branching deregulation across states during the last quarter century the same factors also explain congressional voting on interstate branching deregulation while we find some support for each theory the private interest approach provides the most compelling overall explanation of our results

the informal sector and the political economy of development this paper takes an initial step in integrating insights from two sets of literature which have focused on central aspects of development with unfortunate independence it highlights politically valuable resources which are identified in the political economy literature and shows that the informal sector literature provides ample evidence that these resources in general are i scarcely available to informal entities ii poorly valued in their possession and iii more often collectively unexploited by them overall there seems to be an important though neglected bias in how the political system in less developed countries formulates crafts and implements policy

divide and rule the economic and legal implications of the proposed ownership unbundling of distribution and supply companies in the dutch electricity sector abstract in machiavelli s theory of power the concept of divide and rule forms the main theme the ruler has absolute power and to maintain and increase such power all means are justified when viewed against the background of this theory the current debate in the netherlands on the unbundling of energy electricity gas companies can be observed as an example of divide and rule in which the dutch minister of economic affairs plays a central role yet contrary to machiavelli in his time the dutch government does in fact aim principally at the greater welfare of the dutch people it is therefore noteworthy that while important steps in the decision to unbundled have been taken there is no evidence that the dutch people will indeed benefit from the envisaged unbundling

the political economy of regulations and trade wine trade 1860 1970 dramatic changes in the 1860 1970 wine trade provide insights on the political economy of regulations and policy instrument choice and trade an invasion of phylloxera in the 1870s turned france from the world s leading exporter to a massive importer of wine and grapes when french production recovered a combination of tariffs safety regulations and quality standards were introduced to protect its french producers causing dramatic changes in global wine and grape production and trade including in spain italy turkey greece algeria tunisia and morocco changes in wine regulations were caused by relative income and loss aversion factors in political economy tariffs were the preferred policy instruments as they directly restrict imports bring in revenues have low transaction costs and are preferred political instruments when there are information imperfections safety regulations and quality standards including labelling and input prohibitions reduce asymmetric information for consumers or undesirable externalities and simultaneously protected domestic producers regulations were often targeted at imported products wine and raisins when tariffs were ineffective or constrained by institutions such as on colonial wine hence tariffs and quality regulations were jointly used in wine policy both as complements and as substitutes in policy design

the impact of group lending in northeast thailand abstract much of the literature on group lending focuses on its high repayment rates rather than its goal of promoting borrower welfare most studies that attempt to measure the impact of group lending neglect the issues of self selection and endogenous program placement thus leading to biased estimates of impact one reason for this neglect is the lack of data that would allow for identification of impact this paper surmounts these problems by using data from a quasi experiment conducted in northeast thailand in 1995 1996 program participants were identified in six control villages 1 year prior to receiving loans surveys were then conducted of these control members treatment members in eight older program villages and nonmembers in both types of village this survey design allows for straightforward estimation of impact the results indicate that program loans are having little impact although naive estimates of impact that fail to account for self selection and endogenous program placement significantly overestimate impact

the lens of contract private ordering james buchanan 2001 p 29 avers that mutuality of advantage from voluntary exchange is the most fundamental of all understandings in economics he further contends that this fundamental understanding is better realized by examining economics through the lens of contract rather than the lens of choice buchanan 1975 because the latter has been the reigning paradigm in economics during the 20th century lionel robbins 1932 melvin w reder 1999 the lens of contract is understandably less fully developed interest in contractual approaches has nevertheless been building up whence the gap between these two has been closing this paper sketches some of these developments with emphasis on private ordering

credit market failure intervention do government sponsored small business credit programs enrich poorer areas using local market employment rates as our measure of economic performance we find a positive and significant correlation between the average annual level of employment in a local market and the level of sba guaranteed lending in that local market furthermore the intensity of this correlation is much larger in low income markets indeed our results suggest that this correlation is positive and significant only in low income markets this result has important implications for public policy in general and sba guaranteed lending in particular

incrementality of sme loan guarantees in many countries loan guarantee programs are important elements of government policy with respect to small and medium sized enterprises smes if loan guarantee schemes are to be effective a majority of firms obtaining assistance through such a scheme ought not to be able to obtain financing from existing sources a property known as incrementality or additionality this paper describes a new approach to measuring incrementality this work uses a two stage process to estimate the incrementality of loans made under the terms of the canada small business financing csbf program first a logistic regression based model of loan outcomes essentially a credit scoring model is estimated based on a large representative sample of smes the resulting model was consistent with prior expectations and exhibited high levels of goodness of fit the model was then employed to classify a sample of firms that had received loans under the terms of the loan guarantee scheme incremental loans ought to be classified as turndowns by the model hence the proportion of loan guarantee recipients that the model classified as turndowns is a direct measure of incrementality for the csbf loan guarantee program incrementality was estimated with 95 confidence as 74 8 9 0

industrial structure change and the widening canada us labor productivity gap in the post 2000 period canada s deterioration in labor productivity performance in the post 2000 period especially relative to the united states has been a major concern for policy makers from an industrial structure perspective this article shows that the faster loss of the manufacturing base in canada than in the united states and the deterioration in the productivity performance of canadian large manufacturing firms relative to their us counterparts were the main factors associated with the widening canada us labor productivity gap in the post 2000 period

effect of credit guarantee policy on survival and performance of smes in republic of korea this study evaluates the effect of credit guarantee on smes at the firm level to estimate the effect of credit guarantee we analyze relations between credit guarantee the survival of guaranteed firms and their productive performance the result indicates that credit guarantee frequency enabled guaranteed firms to achieve good performances in general on the contrary the effect of guarantee amounts is ambiguous in that there is difference between the contemporary effect and the lagged effect therefore we conclude that credit guarantee satisfied partially its goal to alleviate smes difficulty in acquiring finance and to stabilize employment

a transaction cost analysis of the land development process the production of our built environment involves many transaction costs we want to avoid unnecessary transaction costs nevertheless we hardly take account of transaction costs when considering different ways of organising the development process the most important reason is probably the difficulty in identifying them this paper shows why transaction costs are important and offers a method for identifying them with this method it is possible to compare the efficiency of different institutional arrangements

contributions to canadian economic history the last 30 years the cliometric revolution that transformed economic history in the us in the 1960s was soon embraced by canadian economic historians many of the important issues surrounding canadian development remained the same the role of resources the place of international trade immigration capital accumulation and interactions with native americans among others but beginning in the 1960s and certainly over the last 30 years economic historians of canada have addressed them with the tools of modern economics both theoretical and empirical we highlight the recent work emphasizing not just the methods but also the fundamental ways our understanding of canadian history has been changed

the power of the purse and its implications for bureaucratic policy making a dilemma of the power of the purse is thatcutting an agency s budget may make a desired policyinfeasible i examine the implications of thisdilemma with a repeated game in which a bureau choosesunobservable policies after a legislature sets itsbudget the bureau is work averse and has its ownpolicy preferences and therefore may cheat but thelegislature may perform an audit to recover slack funds a main result is that if the legislaturedesires a higher policy level than the agency then itfaces a trade off between good but wasteful policiesand bad but efficient ones

separation of regulators against collusive behavior we show that the separation of powers in regulation may act as a commitment against the threat of regulatory capture splitting regulatory tasks and monitoring technologies among several nonbenevolent regulators may reduce their discretion in engaging in socially wasteful activities when regulators make collusive offers that are accepted by the agent whatever his characteristics competition between regulators relaxes collusion proofness constraints and improves social welfare this result is robust to different specifications of the agent s preferences and to the timing of the game as long as one insists on safe side contracting offers we also discuss how separation affects both allocative efficiency and the distribution of rents in the economy

an analysis of the housing redevelopment process in korea through the lens of the transaction cost framework this paper applies the transaction cost framework to the analysis of the housing redevelopment process in korea the housing redevelopment process involves various identifiable transactions and cos

pay for locally monitored performance a welfare analysis for teacher attendance in ugandan primary schools public sector organizations often rely on reports by local monitors that are costly to verify and that serve twin objectives to incentivize agent performance and to provide information for planning purposes received wisdom has it that pay for locally monitored performance p4lmp will result in collusion and undermine both objectives but simple coasian logic suggests the reverse p4lmp puts transferable money on the table and may enable interested parties to bargain to a more efficient outcome this paper develops a theoretical model that shows why and for which parameters the welfare enhancing coasian scenario exists focusing on education we model how the preferences of a teacher agent and headteacher local monitor affect actual and reported teacher attendance and how these equilibrium outcomes depend on the financial stakes attached to reports to capture the value of information we also consider the welfare of a bureaucracy that makes a costly policy mistake when holding the wrong belief about teacher performance we test the model and estimate the predicted effects using data from a field experiment in ugandan primary schools randomly varying whether head teachers reports of teacher attendance are tied to bonus payments or not consistent with coasian logic p4lmp increased actual and reported teacher attendance by 9 and 15 percentage points respectively and reduced policy mistakes by 7 percentage points relative to unincentivized local monitoring we use these experimental impacts to undertake a detailed cost benefit analysis and conclude even under conservative assumptions that welfare improved when paying for locally monitored performance

the gains from differentiated policies to control stock pollution when producers are heterogeneous we derive optimal input taxes to control stock pollution problems generated by heterogeneous agents the taxes vary over time and in response to differences of asset quality and technology choice we also derive second best policies and compare them to the efficient policy and also among themselves different policies will affect the timing for when and the extent to which conservation technologies are adopted a numerical example based on the california drainage problem shows significant efficiency gains from the optimal policy compared to no intervention but much of the gains are lost with second best interventions the gains from optimal policies do not always increase with the degree of heterogeneity copyright 2008 oxford university press

loan guarantees costs of default and benefits to small firms abstract governments of most countries seek to encourage small and medium sized enterprise sme growth and the job creation that many believe is fostered by such growth substantive growth usually requires expansion capital it is often perceived that compared with larger firms smes face disproportionately less access to the debt capital they need for start up growth and survival consequently governments and trade associations have often intervened in credit markets by taking on the role of guarantor of loans that financial institutions advance to smes for example the small business administration in the united states provides guarantees of loans made by banks to qualifying small firms similar schemes are in effect in among other countries canada japan the u k korea and germany trade associations take on such roles in france spain and other nations loans that support the expansion of small enterprises may convey significant benefits to the borrowing firms and through job creation and retention to the rest of society however to the extent that some borrowers are unable to meet the repayment obligations of their debt guarantors also face material real costs of honoring their guarantee to the lenders loan guarantee programs are designed in a variety of ways often these programs do not appear to reflect guidance from economic theory or experience this paper draws on empirical evidence to compare costs with benefits in addition it uses the results and economic theory to provide some guidance for the design of loan guarantee programs finally the study shows that loan guarantee programs can be an effective means of supporting start up growth and survival of new and risky enterprises the work finds that substantial total and incremental job creation may be attributed to the canadian loan guarantee program the paper reviews previous attempts to conduct cost benefit analyses of loan guarantee programs it finds wide variation internationally in default rates published data suggests default rates vary from less than 5 germany to more than 40 u k the empirical analysis reported here focuses on the canadian implementation of loan guarantees the small business loans act sbla findings include 1 loan guarantees granted under the terms of the sbla provide an extremely efficient means of job creation with very low estimated costs per job 2 default rates are higher for newer firms increase with the amount of funds borrowed and vary widely by sector borrowers in the retail and accommodation and food and beverage sectors were significantly more likely to default than borrowers in other sectors and 3 the widening eligibility to larger firms and to larger loans may not be well advised and is inconsistent with the goals of the program moreover reducing the loan ceiling would arguably discourage fraudulent applications while servicing those smes most in need of early stage capital in addition analysis of the lenders motives suggests that default rates on the portfolio of guaranteed loans and therefore the costs of honoring guarantees are particularly sensitive to the level of the guarantee small reductions in the level of the guarantee for example guaranteeing 80 of principal and accrued interest instead of 85 could lead to substantial reductions in default rates debate persists in economic theory about whether or not government intervention in the credit market is warranted in spite of the findings that loan guarantees seem to make positive contributions further analysis of these issues is advised

contribution to productivity or pork barrel the two faces of infrastructure investment abstract this paper proposes a simultaneous equation approach to the estimation of the contribution of transport infrastructure accumulation to regional growth we model explicitly the political economy process driving infrastructure investments in doing so we eliminate a potential source of bias in production function estimates and generate testable hypotheses on the forces that shape infrastructure policy our empirical findings on a panel of france s regions over 1985 92 suggest that electoral concerns and influence activities were indeed significant determinants of the cross regional allocation of transportation infrastructure investments by contrast we find little evidence of concern for the maximization of economic returns to infrastructure spending even after controlling for pork barrel

the old theory of economic policy and the new institutionalism abstract in economics recent emphasis on institutions suggests new policy dimensions for the traditional theory of economic policy which originated with tinbergen and others at the time of the keynesian revolution the paper presents elements of the traditional view instruments targets and policy models and then considers new aspects of policy especially policy for structural change the discussion emphasizes the implications for institutional design of incomplete knowledge and endogenous politics both public and private actors rely on incomplete policy models and the models themselves can become intermediate targets of policy

budgetary policy with unified and decentralized appropriations authority the divestiture of the house appropriations committee in the1880 s has received considerable attention of an empiricalnature this paper presents a formal model of legislativedecisionmaking using a common agency formulation to representinterest group lobbying of legislators this framework is usedto analyze the effects of decentralizing appropriationsauthority the conditions under which decentralization leadsto higher spending are characterized it is argued that theconventional view that divestiture caused higher levels ofspending only holds if decentralization created barriers tolobbying and political bargaining across different committees in addition the role of specialized committee knowledge isexamined

information asymmetry in small and medium enterprise credit guarantee schemes evidence from japan in this article we investigate whether there is adverse selection and or moral hazard in credit guarantee schemes for small and medium enterprises smes in japan as credit guarantee corporations

paying politicians theory and evidence this paper looks at the theory behind the idea that paying politicians better will improve their performance the paper lays out a political agency model with adverse selection and moral hazard where politicians are subject to two period term limits this model provides a number of predictions about how the pay of politicians affects agency problems we also consider what happens when the pool of politicians is endogenous the main ideas in the model are confronted with data on u s governors jel d72 j33

understanding how land is exchanged co ordination mechanisms and transaction costs this paper seeks to increase our understanding of how land is exchanged between suppliers and demanders most current land price theories and the land use models which are derived from them assume that co ordination between suppliers and demanders is achieved through the price mechanism there are however other possible co ordination mechanisms including imposed rules and mutual trust in order to take account of these the effect of institutions has to be included in the theories transaction cost economics as one strand of institutional economics seeks to explain which co ordination mechanism is chosen in practice in this paper the application of these ideas is illustrated with findings from a detailed survey of how dutch housing associations acquire land it appears that these housing associations choose to acquire land through the mechanism of mutual trust when there is a network in place which they can use and to acquire through the market when that mechanism is not available this applicat

canadian manufacturers relative productivity performance 1907 1990 in this paper i calculate tfp ratios for a sample of canadian manufacturers relative to their american counterparts on an annual basis throughout most of the twentieth century the data used to calculate these ratios are drawn from both industry level and firm level statistical sources i find that in contrast to the relative labour productivity evidence in the literature when tfp is used as the measuring stick there is virtually no evidence of consistent and substantial relative technical inefficiency on behalf of the canadian manufacturers represented in my sample jel classification d24 n60 dans ce memoire l auteur calcule les ratios de la productivite totale des facteurs de production ptf des manufacturiers canadiens par rapport a celle de leurs collegues americains sur une base annuelle pour la plus grande partie du vingtieme siecle les donnees utilisees sont tirees des sources statistiques tant au niveau de l industrie que de l entreprise on montre que contrairement a ce que suggere la litterature specialisee a propos de la productivite relative du travail quand la ptf est utilisee comme etalon de mesure on ne trouve vraiment pas vraiment de resultats qui suggereraient une inefficacite technique relative substantielle et persistante des manufacturiers canadiens de l echantillon

is the small firms loan guarantee scheme hazardous for banks or helpful to small business loan guarantee schemes are an integral part of sme policy in both developed and developing countries yet little has been done to evaluate such programmes particularly in terms of their ability to correct for capital market imperfections this paper uses individual loan data from some 42 000 uk sflgs backed debt contracts to empirically test the default specification outlined in the seminal credit rationing paper of stiglitz and weiss 1981 the results show that default failure does increase with the banks cost of capital but not with the government premium in addition default appears to be determined by a whole host of other factors not typically considered in the credit rationing literature

the economic impact of the canada small business financing program this paper investigates the economic impact of the canada small business financing program csbfp using the 2004 edition of the survey on financing of small and medium enterprises to avoid the usual self selection problem associated with voluntary participation in such programs the financing behavior of the business and its intention to grow are used as control variables based on this analysis participation in the csbfp would have increased growth in salary employment and revenues by 12 12 and 7 percentage points respectively between 2004 and 2006 furthermore csbfp would have induced around 5 000 jobs approximately 3 8 of those created in that time span by small private businesses

partial credit guarantees and firm performance evidence from colombia this paper studies the effect of government backed partial credit guarantees on firms performance in colombia these guarantees are automatically granted by the national guarantee fund ngf to firms without enough collateral to lift their credit constraints we put together a panel of firms covering the period 1997 2007 that allows us to control for observed and unobserved firm characteristics potentially affecting both the selection of firms into the program and firms performance we find that firms that gain access to credit backed by the ngf were able to grow in terms of both output and employment however we do not find any effect on productivity wages or investment

navigating institutional change the accord rogernomics and the politics of adjustment in australia and new zealand this article uses a transactions approach to examine the ability of governments to develop and sustain negotiated solutions to major economic challenges where actors are embedded in long term repeated interaction have long time horizons and invest in monitoring and enforcement technologies effective political exchange is more likely in good transactions environments policy bargains will be more easily renegotiated and therefore more flexible and durable to examine the expectations the author looks to the puzzle posed by events in australia and new zealand 1983 1996 facing similar macroeconomic crises and with historically similar wage bargaining institutions and levels of union density both elect labor governments which then make opposite choices a negotiated solution emerged in australia but not in new zealand relying on the secondary literature and interviews with key actors the author finds support for the transactions approach findings here point to ways in which to broaden the study of

when ideas trump interests preferences world views and policy innovations the contemporary approach to political economy is built around vested interests elites lobbies and rent seeking groups which get their way at the expense of the general public the role of ideas in shaping those interests is typically ignored or downplayed yet each of the three components of the standard optimization problem in political economy preferences constraints and choice variables rely on an implicit set of ideas once the manner in which ideas enter these frameworks is made explicit a much richer and more convincing set of results can be obtained in particular new ideas about policy or policy entrepreneurship can exert an independent effect on equilibrium outcomes even in the absence of changes in the configuration of political power

blockchain and the evolution of institutional technologies implications for innovation policy abstract for the past century economists have proposed a suite of theories relating to industrial dynamics technological change and innovation there has been an implication in these models that the institutional environment is stable however a new class of institutional technologies most notably blockchain technology lower the cost of institutional entrepreneurship along these margins propelling a process of institutional evolution this presents a new type of innovation process applicable to the formation and development of institutions for economic governance and coordination this paper develops a replicator dynamic model of institutional innovation and proposes some implications of this innovation for innovation policy given the influence of public policies on transaction costs and associated institutional choices it is indicated that policy settings conductive to the adoption and use of blockchain technology would elicit entrepreneurial experiments in institutional forms harnessing new coordinative possibilities in economic exchange conceptualisation of blockchain related public policy an innovation policy in its own right has significant implications for the operation and understanding of open innovation systems in a globalised context

revisiting legal realism the law economics and organization perspective the contrast between american legal realism which ran itself into the sand schlegel 1979 p 459 and the law and economics movement which is perhaps the most important development in legal thought in the last quarter century posner 1986 p xix is dramatic that the one foundered while the other flourished is explained in large measure by the absence of an intellectual framework for legal realism and the use by law and economics of the powerful framework of neoclassical economics

comparative politics and public finance we propose a model with micropolitical foundations to contrast different political regimes compared to a parliamentary regime the institutions of a presidential congressional regime produce fewer incentives for legislative cohesion but more separation of powers these differences are reflected in the size and composition of government spending a parliamentary regime has redistribution toward a majority less underprovision of public goods and more rents to politicians a presidential congressional regime has redistribution toward powerful minorities more underprovision of public goods but less rents to politicians the size of government is smaller under a presidential regime this last prediction is consistent with cross country data

spanish smes subsidized and guaranteed credit during economic crisis a regional perspective briozzo a and cardone riportella c spanish smes subsidized and guaranteed credit during economic crisis a regional perspective regional studies this study analyses the effects of two spanish public programmes that provide financial support to small and medium sized enterprises smes 1 subsidized credit by the official credit institute and 2 bank credit guaranteed by a mutual guarantee society the study was conducted from a regional perspective and it compares the effects of the two programmes during normal times with the effects during economic crisis during stable periods these programmes affect the growth of assets sales and the sales to assets ratio however during recession the effects extend to the growth of employment and the sales to employee ratio moreover there are significant regional differences

optimal central banker contracts and common agency this paper considers the contracting approach to centralbanking in a simple common agency model we suggest thatcentral banker contracts that do not consider the possibilityof more than one principal existing are incomplete contracts such incomplete contracts can be a poor form ofmonetary policy delegation under common agency we develop amodel with two principals society government and ageneric interest group whose objective conflicts withsociety s ex ante preferences by incorporating an inflationarybias we determine when the government offered orinterest group offered contract dominates the central banker sdecision the results largely depend on whether theinterest group offered contract is written in terms of outputor inflation

the political economy of inflation labour market distortions and central bank independence using the citizen candidate model we study the government s choice of institutions for the labour market and the central bank and derive the implications for inflation and employment we derive conditions for the existence of equilibria in which the labour market is distorted and the central bank is dependent or independent under a range of conditions affecting central bank dependence the post election cycle in inflation and employment and inflation bias our results imply that average inflation and inflation variability are lower under an independent central bank whereas employment variability can be lower or higher consistent with evidence for oecd countries many democratic societies delegate key tasks to non elected and independent institutions a prominent example being independent central banks the belief in the advantage of central bank independence is nursed by the cross country evi

a theory of misgovernance this paper tries to explain why government bureaucracies are often associated with red tape corruption and lack of incentives the paper identifies two specific ingredients that together can provide an explanation the fact that governments often act precisely in situations where markets fail and the presence of agency problems within the government we show that these problems are exacerbated at low levels of development and in bureaucracies dealing with poor people we also argue that we need to posit the existence of a welfare oriented constituency within the government in order to explain red tape and corruption

constrained discretion in uk monetary and regional policy mcvittie e and swales j k 2007 constrained discretion in uk monetary and regional policy regional studies 41 h m treasury claims that the notion of constrained discretion which directs the effective operation of uk monetary policy applies equally to other delegated and devolved policies such as the use of regional development agencies in the delivery of english regional policy a transaction cost politics perspective is used to argue that the delegation of responsibility for monetary stabilization raises principal agent issues quite different to those encountered in the delegation of the responsibility for regional regeneration in particular the effectiveness and transparency that characterize present day monetary policy cannot be expected in regional policy further the institutional arrangements that accompany the operation of regional development agencies in england should be critically reviewed mcvittie e et swales j k 2007 la notion de discretion entravee dans les poli

meso economic filters along the policy chain understanding the links between policy reforms and rural poverty in latin america abstract the paper clarifies the meso economy concept by defining it as comprising both the market mechanisms and administrative procedures through which policy decisions and market signals trickle down to the household level three main bodies of literature are reviewed the policy oriented literature in which the meso economy was initially considered the transaction cost approach analyzing market and policy failures and the micro economy level of agricultural household models the paper develops a synthesis of macro meso and micro economic perspectives which focuses on the roles played by three levels of filters intervening along the policy chain implications for policy and research are drawn

productivity in manufacturing industries canada japan and the united states 1953 1986 was the productivity slowdown reversed this paper analyzes total factor productivity growth and trends in relative efficiency levels in the national two digit manufacturing industries of japan canada and the united states during the last quarter century the well known slowdown in productivity growth rates in the 1973 80 period was a common phenomenon across the three countries but was felt most strongly in japan and least in canada while the 1980s saw a pick up in productivity growth over the slowdown period growth in productivity has not returned to the pre 1973 level the productivity slowdown and any subsequent increase in productivity growth rates have been correlated across industries in the three countries to a very high degree

local government consolidations the impact of political transaction costs local government in norway comprises a large number of small municipalities cost efficiency can be improved by consolidating local authorities and central government has designed a framework to stimulate voluntary mergers existing theories suggest that political transaction costs will impede consolidations 1 generous grants compensate diseconomies of scale central government has promised small municipalities that grant levels will be maintained but policy promises may not be credible 2 property rights to local revenues are nullified when consolidations have been implemented high revenue municipalities will therefore go against merger with a poorer neighbor 3 a consolidated local council may be composed of different political parties and it may therefore pursue other policies than an existing council expected changes in party strength can lead municipalities to oppose a proposed consolidation 4 senior politicians are less likely to support mergers particularly if they come from small polities

common agency contracting and the emergence of dqopen science dq institutions the cold war s ending has brought mounting pressures to recognize national science and technology research systems yet by comparison with what has been learned already concerning institutional arrangements and business strategies affecting corporate rd investments surprisingly little is known about the economic origins and effects of the corresponding institutional infrastructures shaping the world of academic science and the organization and conduct of publicly supported rd more generally the desirability of closing this particular lacuna in the economics and economic history literatures has been just as evident to economists concerned with extending the analysis of modern institutions as to those who have begun to approach the whole area of science and technology studies from the perspectives and methods of industrial organization economics 1 even before the new economics of science had begun to direct attention to such a program douglass north 1990 p 75 saw a significant challenge and a promising opportunity in explicit exploration of the connecting links between institutional structures and incentives to acquire pure knowledge the research reported here has accepted that challenge see also the other papers in this session timothy lenoir 1998 christophe lecuyer 1998 and marjory s blumenthal 1998 it is focused upon key episodes in the institutional evolution of public science and its complex and changing relationship to the other organizational spheres of contemporaneous scientific activity those in which research was conducted under proprietary rules for industrial profit goals and defense related science and engineering knowledge was sought under conditions of restricted access to information concerning methods findings and their actual and potential applications

credibility and reputation building in the developmental state a model with east asian applications abstract we use a game theoretic model to analyze the role of credibility reputation and investment coordination in a developmental state our model focuses on why a soft state serving narrow social groups so often obtains in less developed countries and under what conditions a hard or developmental state can emerge the model highlights the dilemma that although state and private sector alike may want economic growth both must simultaneously invest to achieve it but the equilibrium outcome analogous to the prisoner s dilemma is investment by neither even when initial conditions are favorable and a state is potentially developmental with the genuine capability to elicit private sector investment this may not materialize and an equilibrium of low or no investment will prevail to avoid this deadlock and foster growth the successful developmental state must demonstrate commitment by promoting its developmental credentials through a process of reputation building a consequent incentive to act tough together with seeming advantages of authoritarianism in implementing the developmental state may help to explain why it is often associated with an authoritarian political system

public infrastructure and the productive performance of canadian manufacturing industries this article examines the effects of public infrastructure on the productive performance of 12 two digit canadian manufacturing industries a flexible cost function incorporating public capital infrastructure is estimated for each industry separately using annual time series data for 1961 1995 the effects of public infrastructure on productivity are measured in terms of both cost saving dual and output augmenting primal measures we also investigate how public capital influences the input demand and cost structure in each industry and calculate the rate of return to public capital the empirical results provide strong evidence of the important role public infrastructure plays in the productivity of manufacturing industries the public capital serves as a substitute for both private capital and labor in most industries the rates of return to public capital are significant and vary over the years

sources of inefficiency in a representative democracy a dynamic analysis this paper studies the efficiency of policy choice in representative democracies it extends the citizen candidate model of democratic policy making to a dynamic environment equilibrium policy choices are shown to be efficient in the sense that in each period conditional on future policies being selected through the democratic process there exists no alternative current policy choices which can raise the expected utilities of all citizens however policies that would be declared efficient by standard economic criteria are not necessarily adopted in political equilibrium the paper argues that these divergencies are legitimately viewed as politicalfailures

competition and incentives with motivated agents a unifying theme in the literature on organizations such as public bureaucracies and private nonprofits is the importance of mission as opposed to profit as an organizational goal such mission oriented organizations are frequently staffed by motivated agents who subscribe to the mission this paper studies incentives in such contexts and emphasizes the role of matching the mission preferences of principals and agents in increasing organizational efficiency matching economizes on the need for high powered incentives it can also however entrench bureaucratic conservatism and resistance to innovations the framework developed in this paper is applied to school competition incentives in the public sector and in private nonprofits and the interdependence of incentives and productivity between the private for profit sector and the mission oriented sector through occupational choice jel d23 d73 h41 l31 the late twentieth century witnessed a historic high in the march of market capitalism with unbridled optimism in the role of the profit motive in promoting welfare in the production of private goods moreover this generated a broad consensus on the optimal organization of private good production through privately owned competitive firms when it comes to the provision of collective goods no such consensus has emerged debates about the relative merits of public and private provision still dominate this paper suggests a contracting approach to the provision of collective goods it focuses on two key issues how to structure incentives and the role of competition between providers at its heart is the idea that organizations that provide collective goods cohere around a mission 2 thus production of collective goods can be viewed as mission oriented

incentive contracts and elections for politicians with multi task problems abstract we consider a model with a politician facing a multi task problem while in office the reelection mechanism distorts the allocation of effort in favor of tasks whose outcomes can be measured more precisely than others we show that a combination of elections and incentive contracts can alleviate this inefficiency the incentive contract does not require direct information about the performance of the politician and is self financing across terms

the theory of the firm as governance structure from choice to contract the propositions that organization matters and that it is susceptible to analysis were long greeted by skepticism by economists one reason why this message took a long time to register is that it is much easier to say that organization matters than it is to show how and why the prevalence of the science of choice approach to economics has also been an obstacle as developed herein the lessons of organization theory for economics are both different and more consequential when examined through the lens of contract this paper examines economic organization from a science of contract perspective with special emphasis on the theory of the firm

an endogenous policy model of hierarchical government endogenous policy models usually neglect that government policies are frequently the result of decisions taken at different tiers by different agents each enjoying some degree of autonomy in this paper policies are the outcome of the choices made by two agents within a hierarchy a legislator decides on the budget to be successively spent by a bureaucrat both agents are lobbied by one or two interest groups the combination of sequential decisionmaking and lobbying implies that the interaction between the agent at one tier and the interest group s depends on the exchange between the same interest group s and the agent at the other tier our results concerning multi tier lobbying and legislatorial oversight substantially qualify the conventional wisdom related to one tier lobbying in particular the reaction of the legislator to lobbying at the bureaucratic tier may make lobbying wasteful even when there is no competition from other lobbies moreover the legislator benefits from lobbying only when there is competition between interest groups at the upper tier it is also shown that competition for influence at the bureaucratic tier may work as a perfect substitute for legislatorial oversight extensions of the model indicate its usefulness for the analysis of decisionmaking in other multilevel governance structures like federations or firms

the making of economic policy a transaction cost politics perspective economic policymaking as a political process the normative approach to policy analysis the positive view of political economy a synthesis the policy process in real time a theme transaction costs the transaction cost politics framework political outcomes and economic efficiency transaction cost analysis in politics mechanisms to cope with transaction costs in politics national differences two case studies to illustrate transaction cost politics tax and expenditure reform in the united states the gatt and national trade politics some reflections and suggestions some lessons for the policy process the role of the economist concluding comments appendix multiprincipal multitask agencies

who is to blame canadian manufacturers and the absence of income per capita convergence no significant convergence between canadian and american income per capita occurred during the first ninety years of the twentieth century this lack of convergence does not appear to have been due to technological dependence input price distortions or diseconomies of scale within the canadian manufacturing sector the evidence presented in this paper is based on total factor productivity measurement statistical testing and counterfactual experimentation using data from national statistical agencies and firm level sources

incentives choice and accountability in the provision of public services this paper discusses a theoretical framework to study the issues of competition and incentives without relying on the standard profitoriented market model in the context of the debates about public service reform in the u k it uses the idea that the production of public services coheres around a mission and discusses how decentralized service provision can raise productivity by matching motivated workers to their preferred missions our focus on competition and incentives cuts across traditional debates about public versus private ownership and allows for the possibility of involving private non profits we also address concerns about the consequences of allowing more flexibility in mission design and competition on inequality

information sharing in common agency when is transparency good when should principals dealing with a common agent share their individual performance measures about the agent s unobservable effort for producing a public good in a model with two principals who offer linear incentive schemes we show that information sharing always increases total expected welfare if the principal who is less informed about the agent s effort also cares more about the agent s output if the less informed principal cares somewhat but not too much less than the other principal about the agent s output information sharing reduces total expected welfare in our model the efficient information regime emerges as an equilibrium outcome

a theory of jurisdictional assignments in bureaucracies 1 what determines the allocation of tasks among government agencies this paper develops a formal model of task allocation that argues that jurisdictions are strategically designed to achieve legislative goals in the model agencies choose unobservable policies and political outcomes are a noisy indicator of these choices the legislature therefore faces a compliance issue when the agencies policy preferences are different from its own the legislature exerts control by defining agency jurisdictions setting ex ante budgets and choosing ex post contractual inducements the principal result is that tasks will be consolidated under a single roof when that agency prefers lower levels of policy than the legislature in other cases separating tasks prevents resources from being allocated in a manner undesirable for the legislature

bigger establishments in thicker markets can we explain early productivity differentials between canada and the united states we use establishment level data describing manufacturers located in 128 border and near border counties in michigan new york ohio pennsylvania and ontario to calculate canadian relative to u s total factor productivity ratios for 25 industries the data have been compiled from the manuscripts for the 1870 u s and 1871 canadian census of manufacturing our results illustrate that the average u s establishment was approximately 7 more efficient than its canadian counterpart in 1870 71 when we control for establishment size and market density the u s productivity advantage shrinks to slightly less than 3 de plus gros etablissements dans des marches plus denses peut on expliquer les differentiels de productivite entre le canada et les etats unis au siecle dernier on utilise les donnees au niveau de l etablissement decrivant des installations manufacturieres localisees dans 128 comtes a la frontiere ou pres de la frontiere dans les etats du michigan de new york de l ohio de la pennsylvanie et dans la province de l ontario pour calculer la productivite totale relative des facteurs de production dans 25 industries les donnees ont ete extraites des manuscrits des recensements des manufactures des etats unis 1870 et du canada 1871 les resultats indiquent que l etablissement americain moyen etait a peu pres 7 plus productif que sa contrepartie au canada quand on normalise pour tenir compte de la taille de l etablissement et de la densite du marche l avantage comparatif des americains tombent a un peu moins de 3

conflict resolution and social protection in an era of globalisation external dimensions to europe s social policy globalisation has marginalised many nations in the south there are systematic mechanisms via which this occurs it has also raised inequality between nations and polarised the world into rich and poor nations accompanying international economic marginalisation a simultaneous growth in violent internal conflict has taken place in developing countries from both the standpoint of common humanity and security considerations the marginalising and unequalising effects of globalisation need to be abated via measures to protect the vulnerable this will also help to stem the tide of internal conflict in the developing world in this connection europe along with its policies and interventions can be of value

modeling opec behavior theories of risk aversion for oil producer decisions abstract theories of opec such as price leadership cartel or game theoretic models suggest an incentive for opec members to expand their production capacity well above current levels in order to maximize revenues yet individual opec members consistently explore for and develop oil fields at a level well below their potential the cause of low oil exploration and development efforts among opec members and even some non opec members may have to do with risk aversion this paper describes an alternative theory for opec behavior based on risk aversion using a two piece non neumann morgenstern utility function similar to fishburn and kochenberger 1979 decision science 10 503 518 and friedman and savage 1948 journal of political economy 56 the model shows possible low oil production behavior

the economics of governance the economics of governance is an effort to implement the study of good order and workable arrangements where good order includes both spontaneous order in the market which is a venerated tradition in economics adam smith 1776 friedrich hayek 1945 kenneth a arrow and gerard debreu 1954 and intentional order of a conscious deliberate purposeful kind chester irving barnard 1938 p 9 also i interpret workable arrangements to mean feasible modes of organization all of which are flawed in comparison with a hypothetical ideal avinash dixit 1996 pp 4 9 the object is to work out the efficiency logic for managing transactions by alternative modes of governance principally spot markets various long term contracts hybrids and hierarchies interest among social scientists economists included in the study and practice of good order and workable arrangements has been steadily growing in contrast with the orthodox lens of choice prices and output supply and demand the economics of governance is a lens of contract construction broadly in the spirit of james buchanan s 2001 p 29 observation that mutuality of advantage from voluntary exchange is the most fundamental of all understandings in economics the economics of governance as herein described is principally an exercise in bilateral private ordering by which i mean that the immediate parties to an exchange are actively involved in the provision of good order and workable arrangements to be sure the need for private ordering varies with the rules of the game as provided by the state distinctions between lawlessness where the state provides limited or unreliable protection for property and contract dixit 2004 and lawfulness where the state undertakes to protect property and enforce contracts in a principled way are pertinent the first of these applies mainly to primitive and transition economies the second is commonly associated with western democracies recourse to private ordering under conditions of lawlessness is altogether understandable given the absence of state support the walter a haas school of business university of california berkeley ca 94720 1900 the paper has benefited from workshop presentations at the university of california berkeley the university of valencia insead fountainebleau and the 2004 annual conference of the international society for new institutional economics an abbreviated version was also given as the horst claus recktenwald lecture at nuremburg on 4 november 2004 comments and suggestions from fred balderston ernesto dalbo avinash dixit robert gibbons witold henisz ian larkin steven tadelis and dean williamson are especially acknowledged 1 lon fuller s 1954 p 477 definition of eunomics as the science theory or study of good order and workable arrangements is very much in the spirit of what i refer to as governance 2 one of the immediate ramifications of insistently comparing feasible alternatives all of which are flawed is that the purported inefficiencies that are ascribed to failures to achieve first best optimality are not dispositive but invite the query as compared with what i return to this issue in section iv 3 excluding corporate governance the numbers of articles that used the word governance during the period 1998 2000 as compared with the period 1977 1979 in selected economics business management sociology organization and political science journals were 60 vs 1 76 vs 4 79 vs 18 and 60 vs 25 where the journals surveyed were the american economic review journal of political economy quarterly journal of economics rand journal of economics and journal of economic perspectives in economics strategic management journal management science academy of management journal and academy of management review in business management administrative science quarterly organization science american journal of sociology american sociological review and annual review of sociology in sociology organization and american political science review political science quarterly journal of politics and political research quarterly in political science combining these four categories articles using the word governance increased from 48 to 275 over this 20 year interval dixit 2004 pp 149 50 reports that the number of web pages that turn up under the search for governance is huge