correlation neglect voting behavior and information aggregation in this paper we analyse elections when voters underestimate the correlation between their information sources correlation neglect we find that this cognitive bias can improve political outcomes we show that the extreme beliefs which result from correlation neglect induce some voters to base their vote on information rather than on political preferences we characterise conditions on the distribution of preferences under which this induces higher vote shares for the optimal policies and better information aggregation

is voter competence good for voters information rationality and democratic performance a long research tradition in behavioral political science evaluates the performance of democracy by examining voter competence this literature got its start arguing that voters lack of information undermines a defense of democracy rooted in electoral accountability a more recent literature deepens the debate with some authors claiming that voters eectively use cues to substitute for information about candidates and policies and other authors claiming that voters are insuciently rational to do so we argue that regardless of its conclusions about voter competence this literature s singleminded focus on voter behavior is misguided we use a sequence of formal models to show that traditional intuitions are incomplete because they ignore the eect that changes in voter behavior have on the equilibrium behavior of politicians when this strategic interaction is taken into account increases in voter information or voter rationality sometimes make democratic performance better and sometimes makes democratic performance worse one simply cannot assess the implications of voter characteristics for democratic performance without also studying how those characteristics aect the

correlation neglect in belief formation many information structures generate correlated rather than mutually independent signals the news media being a prime example this article provides experimental evidence that many people neglect the resulting double counting problem in the updating process in consequence beliefs are too sensitive to the ubiquitous telling and re telling of stories and exhibit excessive swings we identify substantial and systematic heterogeneity in the presence of the bias and investigate the underlying mechanisms the evidence points to the paramount importance of complexity in combination with people s problems in identifying and thinking through the correlation even though most participants in principle have the computational skills that are necessary to develop rational beliefs many approach the problem in a wrong way when the environment is moderately complex thus experimentally nudging people s focus towards the correlation and the underlying independent signals has large effects on beliefs

the problem of market bias in modern capitalist economies modern societies are presently facing a number of challenging and often contentious issues regarding how to organize and govern a variety of activities that employ a substantial and growing fraction of their resources in certain cases to make market organization work satisfactorily will require strong and fine grained regulation and perhaps a number of other supplementary non market elements for other activities it would be best to rely centrally on other basic organizational modes with markets in an ancillary role in these latter cases too strong an adherence to a belief in the general efficacy of simple market organization can hinder the achievement of a satisfactory solution the central purpose of this essay is to call attention to the complexity and variegation of the sectoral or activityspecific governing structures employed by modern capitalist economies and to argue that such structures need to be tailored to the details of the activities involved copyright 2002 oxford university press

micro targeting and polarization abstract this paper connects the rise in polarization to changes in media technology which allow for higher precision in the advertising strategy of candidates candidates place ads in media outlets whose audiences differ in ideology and size we develop the concept of media centrality which takes into account differences in the media network and in ideology media centrality leads to a simple characterization of both the optimal targeting strategy and policy we show that generally a more fragmented media landscape leads to an increase in polarization

accountability with large electorates we show that ignorant voters can succeed in establishing high levels of electoral accountability in our model an incumbent politician is confronted with a large number of voters who receive fuzzy private signals about her performance a sampling effect enables the incumbent to form a precise estimate of the median voter s signal and the resulting level of accountability is as if the incumbent faced a perfectly informed social planner public information or ideological preferences can impair the beneficial impact of the sampling effect on accountability overconfidence of voters can restore the full benefit of the sampling effect

correlation misperception in choice we present a decision theoretic analysis of an agent s understanding of the interdependencies in her choices we provide the foundations for a simple and flexible model that allows the misperception of correlated risks we introduce a framework in which the decision maker chooses a portfolio of assets among which she may misperceive the joint returns and present simple axioms equivalent to a representation in which she attaches a probability to each possible joint distribution over returns and then maximizes subjective expected utility using her possibly misspecified beliefs

uninformed votes information effects in presidential elections theory recent scholarship has emphasized the potential importance of cues information shortcuts and statistical aggregation processes in allowing relatively uninformed citizens to act individually or collectively as if they were fully informed hypotheses uninformed voters successfully use cues and information shortcuts to behave as if they were fully informed failing that individual deviations from fully informed voting cancel out in a mass electorate producing the same aggregate election outcome as if voters were fully informed methods hypothetical fully informed vote choices are imputed to individual voters using the observed relationship between political information and vote choices for voters with similar social and demographic characteristics estimated by probit analysis of data from national election study surveys conducted after the six most recent united states presidential elections results both hypotheses are clearly disconfirmed at the individual level the average deviation of actual vote probabilities from hypothetical fully informed vote probabilities was about ten percentage points in the electorate as a whole these deviations were significantly diluted by aggregation but by no means eliminated incumbent presidents did almost five percentage points better and democratic candidates did almost two percentage points better than they would have if voters had in fact been fully informed

purchasing power parity in the short and long run a reappraisal of the post 1973 evidence in this paper an attempt is made to separate the short run and long run aspects of the purchasing power parity ppp relationship using the techniques of band spectral regression and cointegration for eight industrialized countries the long run ppp is first tested for all the eight countries with reference to their nominal bilateral exchange rates vis a visthe us dollar for five european currencies the analysis is repeated with respect to the deutschmark with a separate consideration of the post ems period in the concluding sections possible reasons for ppp deviations are examined

currency fluctuations in the post bretton woods era the international monetary landscape that has emerged since the felling of bretton woods is characterized by a hybrid exchange rate system that lies somewhere between the textbook polar cases of a gold standard and a pure float this system has relatively flexible exchange rates between major countries active central bank intervention in the market for the major currencies and predominantly fixed exchange rates relative to the dollar or to some basket of currencies for less developed countries and newly industrializing nations the majority of research on currency markets since the early 1970s has focused on the characteristics of flexible exchange rates under this hybrid regime my thesis is that this research has been unsuccessful the proportion of monthly or quarterly exchange rate changes that current models can explain is essentially zero even after the fact forecasts that use actual values instead of forecasted values of the explanatory variables cannot explain major currency movements over the post bretton woods era this result is quite surprising since exchange rate changes would be entirely unpredictable only in very special cases of the theoretical models discussed as the discussion below will argue it is not a general implication of market efficiency that exchange rates follow a random walk process 1

a re assessment of the relationship between real exchange rates and real interest rates 1974 1990 abstract this paper uses cointegration techniques and error correction models to re examine the link between real exchange rates and real interest rate differentials the results show that real exchange rates and real interest rates are nonstationary however they are not cointegrated with each other on the other hand the dynamic models indicate that there might be a long run relationship between these variables but this cannot be verified the final conclusion is that there is little empirical evidence in support of a systematic relationship and this result is robust across exchange rates time periods and measures of expected inflation

was it real the exchange rate interest differential relation over the modern floating rate period in this paper we explore the relationship between real exchange rates and real interest rate differentials in the united states germany japan and the united kingdom contrary to theories based on the joint hypothesis that domestic prices are sticky and monetary disturbances are predominant we find little evidence of a stable relationship between real interest rates and real exchange rates we consider both in sample and out of sample tests one hypothesis that is consistent with our findings is that real disturbances such as productivity shocks may be a major source of exchange rate volatility this paper investigates the empirical relationship between major currency real exchange rates and real interest rates over the modern post march 1973 flexible rate experience the exchange rates examined here include the dollar mark dollar yen and dollar pound rates our two major findings are as follows first the data do not indicate a strong correspondence between real interest rate differentials short term or long term and real exchange rates this finding appears to conflict with the predictions of most monetary and portfolio balance models of exchange rate determination though the conflict can be substantially reconciled if aggregate disturbances are primarily real in nature i e changes in productivity tastes etc it is true that in many cases the sign of the estimated exchange rate interest rate differential relationship is consistent with the possible predominance of financial market disturbances but the relationship is not stable enough to be statistically significant second although one does find some evidence of a unit root in both real exchange rates and long term but not shortterm real interest differentials these two series do not appear to be linearly cointegrated hence the nonstationarity or near nonstationarity in the two series cannot be attributed to the same factor in section i we briefly describe a class of small scale monetary models of exchange rate determination the importance of this class of models for empirical work derives from its strong predictions about how the exchange rate will move

are exchange rates determined by macroeconomic factors in this study we consider 15 countries and examine the relationship between exchange rate volatility and macroeconomic volatility we show that in general empirical support for the existence of a link between exchange rates and macroeconomic fundamentals is very weak and that other factors are more important in casting light on the behaviour of exchange rates in particular we investigate the links between risk premia and exchange rates across our sample of countries using arch and garch techniques we illustrate that despite the targeting policies of the erm risk premia are evident for the majority of countries in our sample

retrospective voting and party polarization we provide a new and favorable perspective on voter naivete and party polarization we contrast sophisticated nash versus retrospective voting in a model where two parties commit to policies retrospective voters do not understand the mapping between states and outcomes induced by a policy instead they simply vote for the party that delivers the highest observed performance as determined in equilibrium we show that parties have an incentive to polarize under retrospective compared to nash voting moreover this polarization often results in higher welfare due to a better match between policies and fundamentals

corruption via media capture the effect of competition in this article we compare a government s optimal choice of whether to engage in corruption by capturing the media outlets through bribery in two alternative media market structures monopoly versus duopoly while there is an extra bribe claimant in a media duopoly relative to monopoly it may also be harder for each firm to individually expose corruption when the rival co opts with the government we find that when the latter effect is stronger than the former media is captured at lower bribes under duopoly relative to monopoly and in such instances media competition facilitates rather than hindering corruption

learning about voter rationality we model the accountability relationship between voters and politicians to clarify what can and can t be learned about voter rationality from existing evidence from the behavior literature we make two key points first we show that evidence on the electoral consequences of natural disasters and economic shocks typically interpreted as evidence for voter irrationality is consistent with a canonical model with rational voters second we show that the evidence on the electoral consequences of disaster response typically interpreted as evidence for voter rationality is consistent with the same model with irrational voters hence neither body of evidence can adjudicate between rational and irrational voting behavior we also derive new hypotheses that can better guide future empirical work attempting to assess voter rationality

negative voters electoral competition with loss aversion this paper studies how voter loss aversion affects electoral competition in a downsian setting assuming that the voters reference point is the status quo we show that loss aversion has a number of effects first for some values of the status quo there is policy rigidity both parties choose platforms equal to the status quo regardless of other parameters second there is a moderation effect when there is policy rigidity the equilibrium policy outcome is closer to the moderate voters ideal point than in the absence of loss aversion in a dynamic extension of the model we consider how parties strategically manipulate the status quo to their advantage and we find that this increases policy rigidity finally we show that with loss aversion incumbents adjust less than challengers to changes in voter preferences the underlying force is that the status quo works to the advantage of the incumbent this prediction of asymmetric adjustment is new and we test it using elections to us state legislatures the results are as predicted incumbent parties respond less to shocks in the preferences of the median voter

cognitive and institutional perspectives of eco efficiency the paper sketches out a theoretical framework for analysing the interplay between eco efficiency cognition and institutions it derives from analytical shortfalls of the prevailing literature which features strongly engineering and business economics by using insights from new institutional economics from cognitive science and partly from evolutionary economics it emphasises the role cognition and institutions play in the adoption of green technologies by firms a cognitive perspective derives from recent research on simple heuristics and context based rationality it is proposed that those findings can serve to analyse decision making of individual actors respectively firms and thus should complement economic analysis a second proposition is that eco efficiency and normative rules such as a factor four strongly rely upon institutions i e the ability of institutions to evolve over time and the development of those institutions that are most appropriate to enhance technological change in this regard business institutions and competition are crucial but regulatory needs remain in order to safeguard continuity of knowledge creation the framework allows for an analysis why overall adoption of eco efficiency still can be considered relatively slow and why some markets and firms are far ahead as a brief case study the article reflects upon german waste law s ability to enhance eco efficiency

expert information and majority decisions this paper shows theoretically and experimentally that hearing expert opinions can be a double edged sword for collective decision making we present a majoritarian voting game of common interest where committee members receive not only private information but also expert information that is more accurate than private information and observed by all members in theory there are bayesian nash equilibria where the committee members voting strategy incorporates both types of information and access to expert information enhances the efficiency of the majority decision however there is also a class of potentially inefficient equilibria where a supermajority always follow expert information and the majority decision does not aggregate private information in the laboratory the majority decisions and the subjects voting behaviour were largely consistent with those in the class of inefficient equilibria we found a large efficiency loss due to t he presence of expert information especially when the committee size was large we suggest that it may be desirable for expert information to be revealed only to a subset of committee members

confirmation bias and signaling in downsian elections how do voters behavioural biases affect political outcomes we study this question in a model of downsian electoral competition in which office motivated candidates have private information about the benefits of policies and voters may infer candidates information from their electoral platforms if voters are bayesian candidates have strategic incentives to anti pander they choose platforms that are more extreme than is justified by their private beliefs however anti pandering incentives are ameliorated if voters inferences are subject to confirmation bias voter confirmation bias can thus counteract distortions due to the strategic interaction between candidates potentially leading to welfare improvements indeed we show that all observers whether biased or bayesian would like the representative voter in our model to exhibit more confirmation bias than they do themselves

overconfidence in political behavior this paper studies theoretically and empirically the role of overconfidence in political behavior our model of overconfidence in beliefs predicts that overconfidence leads to ideological extremeness increased voter turnout and stronger partisan identification the model also makes nuanced predictions about the patterns of ideology in society these predictions are tested using unique data that measure the overconfidence and standard political characteristics of a nationwide sample of over 3 000 adults our numerous predictions find strong support in these data in particular we document that overconfidence is a substantively and statistically important predictor of ideological extremeness voter turnout and partisan identification jel c83 d03 d72 d83

banking on currency forecasts how predictable is change in money abstract the paper examines the predictive performance of four structural exchange rate models using both parametric and nonparametric techniques error correction versions of the models are fit so that plausible long run elasticities can be imposed on the fundamental variables of each model a variety of model evaluation statistics are reported our findings confirm that fundamental exchange rate models forecast no better than a random walk model for short term prediction horizons for longer horizons error correction terms can explain exchange rate movements significantly better than a no change forecast for a subset of the models and currencies we consider

macroeconomic determinants of exchange rates a frequency specific analysis this paper applies a new methodology rolling spectral regression to investigate currency movements at various frequencies this technique generates efficient and frequency band estimates of the regression coefficients between three major exchange rates and their determinants from a generic monetary model empirical results reported in this study suggest that the variations of the yen dollar and pound dollar exchange rates can be explained by changes in monetary policy in the long run and fluctuations in economic growth and long term interest rates in the medium run

social connectivity media bias and correlation neglect we propose a model of political persuasion in which a biased newspaper aims to convince voters to vote for the government each voter receives the newspaper s report as well as an independent private signal voters then exchange this information on social media and form posterior beliefs neglecting correlation among signals an increase in connectivity increases the newspaper s bias if voters are ex ante predisposed to vote against the government and reduces the bias if they are predisposed in favour of the government while more precise independent signals reduce the newspaper s optimal bias the bias remains positive even when connectivity becomes large thus even with a large number of social connections the election produces an inefficient outcome with positive probability implying a failure of the condorcet jury theorem

the monetary model of the exchange rate long run relationships short run dynamics and how to beat a random walk abstract the monetary model is re examined for the sterling dollar exchange rate first it is demonstrated using a multivariate cointegration technique that an unrestricted monetary model is a valid framework for analyzing the long run exchange rate second we find once proper account has been taken of the short run data dynamics that an unrestricted monetary model outperforms the random walk and other models in an out of sample forecasting contest jel f31

sources of bias in retrospective decision making experimental evidence on voters limitations in controlling incumbents are citizens competent to assess the performance of incumbent politicians observational studies cast doubt on voter competence by documenting several biases in retrospective assessments of performance however these studies are open to alternative interpretations because of the complexity of the real world in this article we show that these biases in retrospective evaluations occur even in the simplified setting of experimental games in three experiments our participants 1 overweighted recent relative to overall incumbent performance when made aware of an election closer rather than more distant from that event 2 allowed an unrelated lottery that affected their welfare to influence their choices and 3 were influenced by rhetoric to give more weight to recent rather than overall incumbent performance these biases were apparent even though we informed and incentivized respondents to weight all performance equally our findings point to key limitations in voters ability to use a retrospective decision rule

the neglect of correlation in allocation decisions we study the effect of variation in correlation on investment decision in an experimental two asset application comparison of allocations across problems suggests that subjects neglect probabilistic information on the joint distribution of returns and base their allocations on the observed return levels for the two assets when asked to predict future returns subjects try to replicate the historical distribution thereby falling into the probability matching bias predictions drastically vary when correlations become negative while allocations are not significantly affected by changes in sign of correlation the observed allocation patterns contradict the predictions of standard models of choice the inconsistency is attributed to common behavioral bias in financial decision field implications of the results are discussed

leadership coordination and corporate culture what is the role of leaders in large organizations we propose a model in which a leader helps to overcome a misalignment of followers incentives that inhibits coordination while adapting the organization to a changing environment good leadership requires vision and special personality traits such as conviction or resoluteness to enhance the credibility of mission statements and to eectively rally agents around them resoluteness allows leaders to overcome