spatial competition and vertical integration cement and concrete revisited reply in this review 1983 mark mcbride reconsiders the federal trade commission s ftc enforcement policy toward vertical mergers between cement and ready mix concrete firms in response to a significant increase in acquisitions of ready mix concrete firms by cement manufacturers during the 1960 s the ftc undertook a series of legal actions to block or dissolve the mergers the actions of the ftc constituted one of the most intensive efforts undertaken to date to challenge vertical mergers in a single industry mcbride p 1012 notes that the actions of the ftc provoked considerable debate concerning the motivation for the mergers both in the industry and in academe a significant number of articles were published advancing various reasons for the mergers in addition to the ftc s main contention that the mergers were motivated by a desire for captive markets it has been suggested that there were economies of integration or that the mergers were the outcome of an erroneous view of the potential benefits to foreclosure held by executives in the beleaguered cement industry 2 mcbride s 1983 paper offers another explanation for the mergers his argument is that vertical integration was undertaken to avoid rigid oligopolistic pricing in the cement industry 3 the empirical results presented by mcbride suggest that vertical integration was a significant factor in the decline of cement prices in the 1960 s the purpose of this comment is to point out some of the problems with mcbride s analysis in particular we show that the experimental design of his testing equation is faulty and does not offer a test of his hypothesis as a result mcbride s analysis does not provide convincing evidence on whether cement firms vertically integrated to avoid rigid oligopolistic pricing or if cement firms were merely reacting to prices that had already begun to decline our intent however is not to challenge mcbride s contention that vertical integration can provide lower prices to consumers rather we would argue that the evidence presented at the ftc hearings involving cement and ready mix concrete firms as well as mcbride s and others analyses illustrate the problems in discerning the motives for mergers 4

equilibrium in hotelling s model of spatial competition we study hotelling s two stage model of spatial competition in which two firms first simultaneously choose locations in the unit interval then simultaneously choose prices under hotelling s assumptions uniform distribution of consumers travel cost proportional to distance inelastic demand of one unit by each consumer the price setting subgames possess equilibria in pure strategies for only a limited set of location pairs because of this problem pointed out independently by vickrey 1964 and d aspremont et al 1979 hotelling s claim that there is an equilibrium of the two stage game in which the firms locate close to each other is incorrect a result of dasgupta and maskin 1986 guarantees that each price setting subgame has an equilibrium in mixed strategies we first study these mixed strategy equilibria we are unable to provide a complete characterization of them although we show that for a subset of location pairs all equilibria are of a certain type we reduce the problem of finding an equilibrium of this type to that of solving three or fewer highly nonlinear equations at each of a large number of location pairs we have computed approximate solutions to the system of equations next we use our analytical results and computations to study the equilibrium location choices of the firms there is a unique up to symmetry subgame perfect equilibrium in which the location choices of the firms are pure in it the firms locate 0 27 from the ends of the market at this equilibrium the support of the subgame equilibrium price strategy is the union of two short intervals most of the probability weight is in the upper interval so that this strategy is reminiscent of occasional sales by the firms we also find a subgame perfect equilibrium in which each firm uses a mixed strategy in locations in fact in the class of strategy pairs in which the firms use the same mixed strategy over locations and this strategy is symmetric about 0 5 there is a single equilibrium in this equilibrium most of the probability weight of the common strategy is between 0 2 and 0 4 and between 0 6 and 0 8 there is a wide range of pure nash as opposed to subgame perfect equilibrium location pairs the subgame strategies in which each firm threatens to charge a price of zero in response to a deviation support all but those location pairs in which the firms are very close

spatial competition among multi store firms abstract the paper analyzes spatial cournot competition among multi store firms it demonstrates that the complex problem of determining equilibrium store locations for competing multi store firms can be approximated by a simple one in which each firm behaves as a multi store monopolist in choosing its store locations a firm s equilibrium store locations often coincide with its monopoly locations and in general converge to its monopoly locations as the demand grows larger when the firms have an equal number of stores the stores belonging to competing firms agglomerate at discrete points that coincide with each firm s monopoly store locations

alternative models of spatial competition the concept of a spatial price equilibrium underlies most studies of spatial movement and competition however this concept is based upon a notion of perfectly competitive markets that is often unrealistic for many markets such as the markets for oil and coal and ignores the existence of local spatial monopolies this paper presents alternative economic models of spatial competition and shows how all of these models can be solved with essentially the same solution algorithm specifically after reformulating the classical spatial price equilibrium model and two extensions of takayama and judge s monopoly model we state and analyze a cournot nash model and discuss solution algorithms we then generalize these models and algorithms to multiple commodities and networks with transshipment nodes we conclude with a brief discussion of possible extensions of this class of models and associated algorithms

the principle of minimum differentiation holds under sufficient heterogeneity the so called principle of minimum differentiation stated by hotelling has been challenged by many authors this paper restores the principle by showing that n firms locate at the center of the market and charge prices higher than the marginal cost of production when heterogeneity in consumers tastes is large enough

oligopoly and the polarization of space one remarkable fact in economic geography is that production does not appear everywhere at the same time instead it occurs at a few points with variable intensity more precisely once the spatial distribution of consumption and the transportation infrastructures are given firms seem to be inexorably attracted by some particular places in economic space this results in a distribution of production characterized by a high degree of geographical polarization location theory has provided various explanations of this phenomenon see e g the surveys of fujita 1990 and stahl 1987 they often rely upon the existence of pecuniary externalities of different sorts the purpose of this note is to review some recent contributions that have shed new light on the role of more traditional factors in the agglomeration of industrial or retailing firms more precisely i want to discuss i the impact of the channelization of space created by transportation infrastructures and ii the main forces leading to geographical de concentration in the process of spatial competition in order to account for the polarization of space one must first recognize that increasing returns are essential for explaining the geographical distribution of production activities with nonincreasing returns and a uniform distribution of natural resources it would be desirable for every firm to disperse its activities among the consumption places at each of them a firm s plant would be set up in order to meet the local demand the transportation costs would then be saved and each consumption place would become an autarky put in a different way the distribution of production would mirror exactly the distribution of consumption unless the natural resources are unevenly distributed across locations while indisputably pertinent unequal distribution of resources seems weak as the main explanation for geographical polarization assume that increasing returns are now introduced into the picture their existence makes it profitable for the firms to concentrate their production in

economic uncertainties macroeconomic announcements and sukuk spreads with the large expansion of islamic finance in the recent years sukuks islamic bonds which are the shariah compliant substitute to conventional bonds are now becoming more prominent although

tax incidence in differentiated product oligopoly abstract we analyze the incidence of ad valorem and unit excise taxes in an oligopolistic industry with differentiated products and price setting bertrand firms both taxes may be passed on to consumers by more than 100 percent and an increase in the tax rate can increase short run firm profits and hence the long run number of firms we provide summary conditions for these effects to arise the conditions depend on demand curvatures and are written in elasticity form surprisingly the analysis largely corroborates cournot results with homogeneous demand

institutional forces and organizational culture in china effects on change schemas firm commitment and job satisfaction this paper examines the effects of institutional forces on change schemas of senior managers mid level managers and front line workers of different types of firms in china we postulate that several socio economic forces including regional economic prosperity firm type state owned and foreign invested within firm ranks and organizational cultures are at work the cognitive differences among people in local and foreign firms operating in similar contexts are examined through a survey of 3 960 managers and workers we test hypotheses that relate various institutional forces on how individuals perceive evaluate and infer future changes that challenge them we also examine the effects of individual change schema on firm commitment and job satisfaction two indicators that may mediate future changes in these firms

imperfect competition in the international energy market a computerized nash cournot model this paper describes the conceptual structure properties and solution approach of a computerized model of the international energy market the model treats energy producers as players in a multistage noncooperative game the goal of each player or cartel of players is assumed to be maximization of discounted profit subject to technical political and resource constraints the model calculates that collection of intertemporal extraction and price paths from which a player can unilaterally deviate only at a loss the open loop nash equilibrium the model integrates the theory of exhaustible resources due to hotelling and the theory of oligopoly due to nash and cournot although useful as a teaching device to illustrate theoretical results its main function is to facilitate analysis of real world resource problems the model is flexible allowing the user to specify not only cost demand and reserve information but also assumptions about who belongs to what coalition two shortcomings deserve note t

product selection by quantity setting firms abstract hotelling suggested that competition between oligopolistic sellers would result in consumers with inelastic demands being offered products with an excessive sameness smithies extended the hotelling result to the case of elastic demand while these results are intuitively appealing it has subsequently been shown that both the two stage and simultaneous price location games suffer from fundamental non existence problems when firms do not price discriminate in this paper we investigate the smithies analysis assuming that firms compete in quantities rather than prices we show that a tendency to agglomeration is characteristic of quantity location competition but when locations and quantities are chosen simultaneously problems of non existence of equilibrium do not arise and the principle of minimum differentiation does not hold by contrast when firms play a two stage game choosing locations in the first stage and quantities in the second stage the non existence problems that characterize price location games whether simultaneous or two stage extend to the two stage quantity location game for certain parameter values

a location model with preference for variety we propose a new location model where consumers are allowed to make multiple purchases i e one unit from each firm this model may fit many markets e g newspapers credit cards better than existing models a common feature of these markets is that some consumers are loyal to one brand while others consume more than one product our model yields predictions consistent with this observation if firms are allowed to choose their locations on the interval then spatial differentiation may not be maximal and in some cases it may even be minimal thus under certain conditions we restore hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation

hungarian western partnerships a grounded theoretical model of integration processes and outcomes international cooperative ventures icvs are known to be strongly influenced by the parent firms values practices and systems vpss however less clear is whether and why vpss actually adopted by an icv are those of either parent singly both parents jointly or neither parent this question is especially timely in the transition economies of central and eastern europe where cooperative activity with western multinationals is growing rapidly and where decades old legacies of communism abound in this exploratory study we used a multiple case study methodology to examine 17 hungarian western icvs results show that a majority of the icvs adopted the vpss of the western partner we develop a theoretical model of integration process and outcomes and suggest future research directions

culture meaning and institutions executive rationale in germany and japan this paper contributes rare primary empirical evidence to one of the major research questions in the social sciences today namely the linkage between national cultures and institutional structures of national business systems drawing on the work of redding we explore the thinking or rationale of senior executives of leading german and japanese firms about the ideal structure of the economy we find considerable variation in rationale across the two countries and in comparison with the shape of the business system of the united states our study has implications for our understanding of the meaning of economic activity in different countries and of the evolutionary trajectories of national business systems

spatial competition and spatial price discrimination the analysis of spatial competition under conditions of free entry which derives its major impetus from the seminal work of losch 1954 has been conducted in general on the assumption that the competitive firm will adopt an f o b pricing scheme see for example capozza and van order 1978 and holahan 1978 greenhut 1956 does consider some of the implications of discriminatory pricing within competitive markets but his analysis adopts an essentially short run view and provides little rationale for the choice of such a pricing policy by competitive firms this is in contrast with developments in the analysis of spatial monopoly the early work of singer 1937 and hoover 1937 and subsequent developments by for example greenhut 1956 beckmann 1976 beckmann and ingene 1976 greenhut and greenhut 1977 holahan 1975 and norman 1977 indicate that the spatial monopolist should adopt a discriminatory spatial pricing policy where spatial price discrimination is taken conventionally to mean that delivered prices do not follow an f o b scheme but that all concumers equidistant from a particular supplier pay the same price it is rarely however that the results generated by the analysis of spatial monopoly are reconsidered in the analysis of spatial competition in particular although we know that spatial price discrimination will in general increase a monopolist s profit the assumption that profit maximising spatially competitive firms will adopt f o b pricing schemes has rarely been questioned and has not been questioned within the loschian competitive framework greenhut and ohta 1975a chapter 8 and chapter 8 appendix i are notable exceptions but in both cases they depart from the loschian scheme the first objective of this paper is therefore to show that when loschian competitive firms are allowed the option of discriminatory pricing i e are free of institutional constraints which require f o b pricing they will be forced to exercise that option in order to maintain normal profits secondly we shall show that if competitive conditions change the form of price discrimination will also change and that under certain competitive conditions the degree of discrimination will increase with the degree of competition leading eventually to uniform pricing thirdly we compare two competitive cases with multi plant monopoly and derive the spatial analogue of the conventional spaceless monopoly perfect competition comparison the monopolist s plants will be larger in area and total output than each competitive firm but will supply less per consumer at a higher average price welfare comparisons are less clear cut in that they are dependent upon the type of competition we assume we show however that welfare maximisation requires marginal cost pricing where marginal cost includes transport costs and so requires f o b pricing if there are economies of scale to production it follows that welfare maximisation will require production subsidy

understanding the differences in korean and u s executives strategic orientations competitive positioning in a global market requires an understanding of the decision processes and behavioral attributes of executives from different countries these attributes reflect the executives cultural background the national policies under which they have worked and their home country s level of economic development institutional context the current research compared strategic decision models of u s and korean executives and the results suggest that criteria employed by the executives from the two countries differ differences in institutional context between korea and the u s a were reflected in the weightings of objective criteria used by the executives korean executives emphasized industry attractiveness sales and market share because of policies that encourage growth and u s executives emphasized projected demand discounted cash flow and roi because of policies and institutions that focus on profitability the results suggest the importance of understanding the strategic orientations of international competitors partners in international strategic alliances and managers of international subsidiaries or divisions 1997 by john wiley sons ltd

examining the relationship between default risk and efficiency in islamic and conventional banks we examine the relationship between efficiency and default risk in islamic banks ibs and conventional banks cbs in gulf cooperation countries gcc and three non gcc countries over the period 2002 2010 to the best of our knowledge this is the first study to consider the efficiency default risk paradigm in a comparative setup which includes ibs efficiency and default risk are measured using the stochastic frontier approach and distance to default merton s model respectively the existence of causality reverse causality between the two is addressed via a panel vector auto regression var framework our analysis shows that the relationship between profit efficiency and default risk banks across the sample for cbs and for the gcc is such that a decrease in default risk is associated with lower efficiency levels with the single exception of ibs the causality from profit efficiency to default risk is inversely related for all categories for cbs the trade off between efficiency and risk is evident the absence of a trade off for ibs suggests that efficiency and default risk are plausible early warning indicators of ib instability these findings could be of relevance to regulators in countries where both banking system co exist

the effect of specificity of experience on a firm s perceived importance of institutional knowledge in an ongoing business we study how three types of firm experience ranging from the specific to the general influence the perceived importance of institutional knowledge in the ongoing business of internationalising firms based on a sample of 101 small to medium sized firms the three types of firm experiences are international country and ongoing business the results show that firm experience within the ongoing business and the experience from multiple past business deals in various countries develop institutional knowledge whereas experience from multiple past business deals in a specific country does not the theoretical contribution of this paper is that it establishes a link between different kinds of experience and managerial cognition in terms of institutional knowledge in addition it emphasises that firms develop institutional knowledge from multiple diverse country experiences and experience in the specific ongoing business rather than experiences at the level of the country

discriminating oligopolists and common markets we analyse the properties of a cournot nash equilibrium which arises when two monopolies operating each in a separate market become a duopoly in a common market with two sub markets the formerly separated markets and are allowed to price discriminate across sub markets this equilibrium implies intra industry trade or crosshauling of identical commodities and freight absorption which is an increasing function of the slope of the marginal cost schedule it also leads to price differences such as those observed in the european car market

cournot competition yields spatial agglomeration most theoretical models of spatial competition show a strong tendency toward spatial dispersion of firms yet common observations suggest that firms tend to agglomerate in this paper the authors show that competition between cournot type oligopolists that discriminate over space leads to spatial agglomeration one implication is that firms do not necessarily earn supernormal profits at the free entry equilibrium copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

on the strategic importance of prices versus quantities in this article i investigate three single shot models of differentiated products oligopoly in each model firms choose both output and price the demand cost and spillover demand specifications are quite general and there are three main results first with simultaneous choice there is no pure strategy noncooperative equilibrium second with output chosen first and announced to all firms before the choice of price equilibrium sometimes exists and when it does it is the same as in a quantity only model third with price chosen and announced first equilibrium always exists and is the same as in a price only model

collusion agglomeration and heterogeneity of firms abstract jehiel 1992 and friedman and thisse 1993 show that spatial agglomeration appears in a standard two stage location price model if symmetric firms collude in prices we introduce a cost difference between two firms we show that agglomeration never appears in a collusive equilibrium even when the cost difference between firms is sufficiently small

short run cost inefficiency of commercial banks a flexible stochastic frontier approach we adopt the intermediation approach and use a flexible stochastic frontier to examine the cost efficiency of united states commercial banks with total assets in excess of million we find an average overall inefficiency of just under 10 percent a level somewhat lower than found in previous work our analysis of intra industry variation concludes that inefficiency generally rises with bank size further banks that have branching networks either domestic or foreign have higher inefficiency on average but at the same time inefficiency falls as the number of offices in the branch network expands state level data on the ease of serviceing the market competition from savings institutions and the financial sophistication of depositors significantly affect bank inefficiency generally with the expected signs finally our findings suggest that regulatory changes that increase capital requirements may lead to increased bank efficiency in the short run copyright 1994 by ohio state university press

a generalized production frontier approach for estimating determinants of inefficiency in u s dairy farms this article investigates farm level efficiency of u s dairy farmers by estimating their technical and allocative efficiency technical inefficiency is assumed to be composed of a deterministic component that is a function of some farm specific characteristics and a random component by doing this we extend the stochastic frontier methodology in which determinants of technicial inefficiency are explicitly introduced in the model given the inputs variations in efficiency of farms are then explained by both deterministic and random components of technical inefficiency the empirical results indicate that a levels of education of the farmer are important factors determining technical inefficiency and b large farms are more efficient technically than small and medium sized farms both technical and allocative inefficiency are found to decrease with increase in the level of education of the farmer

spatial price discrimination with heterogeneous products product heterogeneity is introduced into the context of spatial price discrimination many of the strong properties of the standard homogeneous goods case which are attained as a limit case here are shown to be no longer valid in particular the social optimum is no longer sustainable as a market equilibrium unless products are either identical or else very different

spatial cournot competition among multi plant firms in a circular city we characterize equilibrium plant locations for a spatial multi plant cournot oligopoly in a circular city previous work demonstrates that for a two plant duopoly all four plants are equally spaced we establish that the equilibrium location pattern is unique if there are two firms with an equal number of plants in most other scenarios multiple equilibria arise next we endogenously determine both the number of plants per firm and plant locations for a duopoly it is shown that the subgame perfect nash equilibrium may not be unique and for identical set up costs the firms may choose different numbers of plants

local versus international crises and bank stability does bank foreign expansion make a difference abstractwe investigate the impact of global and local crises on bank stability in the mena region and examine the effect of owning bank subsidiaries in other countries we consider banks that experienced both types of crises during our sample period our findings highlight a negative impact of the global financial crisis of 2007 2008 on bank stability but on the whole no negative impact of the local crisis a deeper investigation shows that owning bank subsidiaries outside the home country is a source of increased fragility during normal times yet a source of higher stability during the local crisis but not during the international crisis moreover owning foreign subsidiaries in one or two world regions is insufficient to neutralize both types of crises while being present in three or more regions is more stabilizing during a local crisis but also more destabilizing during an international crisis our findings contribute to the literature examining bank stability and have several policy implications

on 64 majority rule introduction d une definition de consensus social base sur deux restrictions une sur les preferences individuelles et l autre sur la distribution des preferences dans ce cas de consensus une regle de majorite a 64 presente de nombreuses proprietes interessantes par opposition aux regles de super majorite possedant des proprietes paradoxales comme les regles electorales americaines

explaining bank failures deposit insurance regulation and efficiency this paper uses micro level historical data to examine the causes of bank failure for state chartered kansas banks during 1910 28 time to failure is explicitly modeled using a proportional hazards framework in addition to standard financial ratios this study includes membership in the voluntary state deposit insurance system and a measure of technical efficiency to explain bank failure the results indicate that deposit insurance system membership increased the probability of failure and technically inefficient banks were more likely to fail than technically efficient banks copyright 1995 by mit press

mixed oligopoly and spatial agglomeration a comment this paper extends matsushima and matsumura 2003 by incorporating a large production cost difference between public and private firms in a quantity setting spatial mixed oligopoly the public and private firms first choose their locations in a linear market and then compete in quantities it is shown that for a significant inefficiency of the public firm all firms including both public and private firms agglomerate at the market centre ce texte developpe les resultats de matsushima et matsumura 2003 en incorporant la possibilite d une grande difference de couts de production entre l entreprise publique et les entreprises privees dans un oligopole spatial mixte de concurrence par les quantites les entreprises publiques et privees choisissent leur localisation dans un marche lineaire et se concurrencent par les quantites on montre que s il existe une inefficacite significative de l entreprise publique toutes les entreprises publiques et privees tendent a s agglomerer au centre du marche

product differentiation in spatial cournot markets abstract we introduce to the spatial cournot markets model the inverse demand function of deneckere economics letters 11 1983 37 that allows product differentiation the circular model s outcome alters depending on if goods are complements or substitutes while the linear model results in central agglomeration

does cournot competition yield spatial agglomeration abstract locations and quantities are chosen sequentially in spatial markets strikingly different location patterns emerge depending on the shape of the market in a circular city firms locate equidistant from each other in a linear city firms agglomerate at the center

product differentiation with consumer arbitrage abstract we determine the equilibrium to a game where two firms set delivered price schedules and consumers simultaneously declare where they want to take delivery of the product equilibrium pricing policies provide incentives for consumers not to demand their preferred varieties but rather to purchase more standard varieties this behavior may decrease market diversity the demanded varieties tend to agglomerate around the market center we also show that it is efficient for the cost of adapting the product to consumers to be shared through arbitrage but oligopoly gives rise to an inefficient level of personal arbitrage

consumer benefiting exclusive territories i investigate the effect of exclusive territories which are typical vertical controls imposed by upstream firms using shipping spatial models i consider an industry that consists of many independent local markets an upstream monopolist restricts competition between downstream firms using exclusive territories i find that exclusive territories reduce the prices of final products in all local markets in quantity setting competition in price setting competition they raise prices in half the local markets reduce them in other markets and also reduce the total consumer surplus jel classification l42 r32 a propos de territoires exclusifs qui profitent aux consommateurs l auteur analyse les effets de la regle des territoires exclusifs qui est souvent imposee comme controle vertical par les entreprises en amont a l aide de modeles spatiaux de livraison on considere le cas d une industrie composee de plusieurs marches locaux independants un monopoleur en amont reduit la concurrence entre entreprises en aval en imposant la regle des territoires exclusifs on decouvre que cette regle reduit les prix du produit final dans tous les marches locaux s il y a concurrence par les quantites s il y a concurrence par les prix la regle accroit les prix dans la moitie des marches locaux les reduit dans les autres et reduit aussi le surplus au consommateur

where to locate in a circular city abstract we study the location choices by cournot oligopolists in a circular market where consumers are located uniformly along the circumference we analyze the subgame perfect nash equilibria spne of a two stage location quantity game we demonstrate that the equidistant location pattern is only one of the many equilibrium location patterns that arise in a circular market nonequidistant multiple or a continuum of location equilibria may also arise both spatial agglomeration and dispersion or a combination of agglomeration and dispersion may occur in equilibrium in the case of infinitely many location equilibria we establish the welfare equivalence of the equilibrium location patterns

spatial competition and strategic firm relocation firms compete spatially for customers who have some degree of brand loyalty the number and attractiveness of the alternatives available to these customers dictates the level of competition facing firms in this study data on ticket pricing in four professional sports leagues are used to empirically examine the existence of spatial competition in sports and the impact of space on team relocations results allowing for structural breaks over time while using spatial autoregressive techniques suggest that sports franchises spatially compete when pricing their tickets and that spatial characteristics including the level of spatial competition have influenced the relocation of teams jel d40 l11 r30 l83

corporate environmental investments a cross national study on managerial decision making abstract what drives developing country managers to raise their environmental investments using theoretical arguments set forth by the convergence and divergence hypotheses in industrial economics this study develops a series of hypotheses about the effects of country consumer pressure community pressure and resource availability on managers environmental investment decisions using a random assignment factorial survey experiment fse that combines vignettes and questionnaires it compares responses from managers in developing countries 349 managers from brazil china and india and those from developed countries 377 managers from germany and usa results suggest that given the same situation developing country managers raise their investments to a lesser extent in response to consumer pressures when compared to developed country managers when community pressure moderates consumer pressure developing country managers make notably larger investments greater availability of resources does not affect developing country managers investment level contrary to developed country managers

partial agglomeration or dispersion in spatial cournot competition 1 introductionsince the seminal work of hotelling 1929 a rich and diverse literature on spatial competition has emerged location models can be classified into two types one type is shipping or spatial price discrimination model where sellers bear transport costs the other is shopping or mill pricing model where buyers pay for transport for each type one can have either bertrand type price setting or cournot type quantity setting 1most studies on location theory use shopping mill pricing models with bertrand competition although cournot and bertrand types of non spatial models are equally popular the body of literature on spatial competition that uses cournot type models is relatively small economists have recently considered shipping models with cournot competition hamilton thisse and weskamp 1989 and anderson and neven 1991 carry out pioneering works on location models 2 they use linear city models and show that all firms agglomerate at the central point pal 1998 shows that their result is crucially dependent on the assumption of a linear city he investigates a circular city duopoly model3 and finds that an equidistant location pattern appears in equilibrium that is locational dispersion appears 4 matsushima 2001a extends pal s model to an n firm oligopoly and shows another equilibrium where half of the firms locate at one point and the other half locate at the opposite point partial agglomeration these results indicate the multiplicity of equilibria in spatial cournot models with a circular city the multiplicity of equilibria restricts the applicability of the model because the model does not give us a distinct prediction in this article we take a close look at pal 1998 and matsushima 2001a we try to solve this problem by extending their linear transport cost model to one with nonlinear transport cost 5 we consider a simplified model the numbers of firms and markets and so possible locations are four four firms choose location a b c or d see if each of the four firms chooses a different location we call this outcome pal type if two firms locate at a and the other two locate at c we call this outcome matsushima type we find that the pal type equilibrium is much more robust because i pal type equilibrium always exists as long as transport cost is increasing in distance while matsushima type equilibrium fails to exist when the transport cost function is significantly convex or concave proposition 1 ii if firms choose their locations sequentially the unique equilibrium outcome is pal type under nonlinear transport cost functions proposition 2 and iii the profit of each firm in pal type is never smaller than that in matsushima type and the former is strictly larger if the transport cost function is nonlinear proposition 3 we also compare the welfare implications of pal type and matsushima type models if the transport cost function is linear the two outcomes yield exactly the same profits consumer surplus and total social surplus however this equivalence does not hold if the transport cost function is nonlinear either convex or concave in this case pal type yields greater total social surplus and profit of each firm while matsushima type yields greater consumer surplus these results indicate that the welfare implications are sensitive to whether or not the transport cost function is linear anderson and neven 1991 show that in the linear city model a strong concavity in transport cost changes the equilibrium outcome this result is related to our results but we emphasize that our results are different from theirs first we show that both concavity and convexity of the transport cost function affect the results while in anderson and neven 1991 only strong convexity changes the result second in our propositions 2 and 3 even a slight nonlinearity changes the results

cournot competition and spatial agglomeration revisited abstract in a letter previously published in this journal pal economics letters 60 1998 49 show that firms locate equidistant from each other in a circular city however we show that the following location pattern is also an equilibrium outcome firms agglomerate at two points in a circular city

competition of firms discriminatory pricing and location1 two costlessly mobile firms are to be located in a market region a subset of the plane the firms compete by setting locations and delivered price schedules to study this competitive stiuation an appropriate extensive form game is defined along with an appropri ate noncooperative solution concept existence and general properties of the equilibrium are demonstrated among the results are each firm increases its profit by locating so as to decrease total cost to both firms of serving the market firms will never locate coinciden tally if they have identical production costs and transport cost rates or if these are different and the firms are located in a circular market region having a uniform demand distribution this paper studies competition between two profit maximizing firms in space who are costlessly mobile and may discriminate in price we will allow the firms to set locations and delivered price schedules and we will be concerned with the existence and properties of equilibria in location and price starting with hotelling 9 the spatial competition literature has focused on location on bounded linear markets by two or more firms hotelling assumed identical firms that produced a single good with constant cost of production and considered consumers to be uniformly distributed and to have inelastic demand he also assumed that the consumers pay transport cost and purchase the good from the cheapest source hotelling claimed that a nash equilibrium in locations for the two firm market existed and yielded back to back locations at the center of the market many authors most recently d aspremont gabszewicz and thisse 2 have noted that an equilbrium in prices and location does not exist for hotelling s model however if the firms employ identical exogeneously specified prices hotelling s conclusions hold subsequent work by smithies 14 hartwick and hartwick 7 and eaton 3 claimed to show that a nash equi librium in f o b prices and locations can exist in markets with a uniform distribu tion of consumers each of whom have identical elastic demand functions for the two and three firm problems the work of d aspremont et al casts doubt on these conclusions without the adoption of restrictive conditions our work contrasts with these works and related research which has dealt with linear markets with uniform distributions of customers and with identical firms our work will involve markets that are subsets of the plane having nonuniform distributions of customers our firms will be allowed to be different that is have differences in production and transport costs however the fundamental difference in our approach is that our firms will set discriminatory prices and not price f o b in many ways our work will represent the discriminatory pricing

mixed oligopoly and spatial agglomeration abstract we investigate a mixed market where a state owned welfare maximizing public firm competes against profit maximizing private firms we use a circular city model with quantity setting competition in contrast to a pure market case discussed by pal 1998a spatial agglomeration of private firms always appears in equilibrium all private firms locate at the same point and the public firm locates at the opposite side we also find that this equilibrium pattern of the location is second best provided that output of each private firm cannot be controlled by the social planner jel classification h42 l13 oligopole mixte et agglomeration spatiale les auteurs examinent un marche mixte ou une entreprise publique possedee par l etat et cherchant a maximiser le niveau de bien etre est en concurrence avec des entreprises privees qui cherchent a maximiser leurs profits on utilise un modele de cite circulaire ou la concurrence se fait en choisissant la quantite produite en contraste avec le cas du marche parfait discute par pal 1998a l agglomeration spatiale des entreprises privees parait etre en equilibre toutes les entreprises privees se localisent au meme point et l entreprise publique se localise du cote oppose il appert que ce pattern d equilibre de localisation est un equilibre de second ordre compte tenu du fait que la production de chaque entreprise privee ne peut etre controlee par le planificateur social