competition in taxes and performance requirements for foreign direct investment abstract tax incentives offered to attract firms engaged in foreign direct investment are often tied to performance requirements such as domestic content restrictions or adherence to environmental standards the tax competition literature has repeatedly shown that competition between municipalities for mobile firms tends to drive taxes to low levels one would expect a comparable result for burdensome performance requirements despite this the evidence suggests that while taxes have indeed been driven down performance requirements are as popular as ever we explain this seeming conundrum by showing that in the presence of spillovers binding performance requirements can act as a coordination device for firms in equilibrium municipalities choose performance requirements which maximize joint surplus from investment competition between municipalities then transfers this surplus to firms via tax subsidies

human capital and fdi inflow an assessment of the african case summary this study assesses the role of human capital hk on fdi inflows to sub saharan africa it uses panel data for the period 1980 2012 to asses if changing skill needs influence fdi inflows several measures of hk are used to assess whether the quality of labor explains fdi flows over the study period various versions of an fdi model were estimated and the results show that all measures of hk have a significant influence on fdi as are the traditional variables there is no evidence of the increasing importance of hk on fdi over time probably reflecting the type of fdi flowing into ssa

bidding for firms recently toyota sought a plant location in the united states the 800 million plant will employ 3000 workers and numerous states offered toyota generous investment incentives hoping this would induce toyota to select their state the commonwealth of kentucky won this competition but the price was high the present value of the payments exceeds 125 million the payment of investment incentives for the toyota plant is not unique in 1976 pennsylvania paid 75 million to attract a volkswagen plan nissan honda and mazda received generous investment incentives when locating plants in the united states and this bidding is not limited to states to attract the headquarters of the presbyterian church usa with its 1300 jobs and 38 million annual payroll civic leaders in louisville kentucky offered the church a warehouse and 6 2 million for renovation of the structure bidding the church away from kansas city missouri in this paper we contend that this competition may result from the average cost pricing of publicly provided goods and services 2 when the marginal cost of providing a firm and its workers with public services is less than the tax revenue they generate a government may offer the firm subsidies that reduce the distortions the average cost pricing of the public service creates thus this competition for industry is not a zero sum game where the subsidies are only transfers from the government to the firm rather these subsidies may facilitate the efficient location of industry

leaning right and learning from the left diffusion of corporate tax policy across borders there is an increased focus in comparative politics and international relations on how choices of governments are dependent on choices made by other governments the authors argue that although the relationship between policy choices across countries is often labeled as either diffusion or competition in many cases the theoretical mechanisms underpinning these labels are unclear in this article the authors build a model of social learning with a specific application to the diffusion of corporate tax reductions the model yields predictions that are differentiable from existing models of tax competition specifically the authors argue that social learning is most likely in the wake of tax policy cuts by left governments they test the model using an existing data set of corporate tax rate changes and an author created data set of changes in tax legislation covering 20 organisation for economic co operation and development countries the authors empirical findings show that social learning is an important determinant of corporate tax policy making

the impressive contribution of canadian economists to fiscal federalism theory and policy the study of fiscal federalism has been central to the research of canadian economists since the rowell sirois report to mark the 50th anniversary of the founding of the canadian economics association it is fitting to take stock of their contributions we focus on the period since 1982 and emphasize the main scholarly publications of an inclusive array of canadian economists and economists in canadian universities our attention is devoted to applications in the context of federal and provincial governments setting aside related issues in municipal government finance we briefly discuss instances where the fiscal federalism literature has informed policy debates including through policy research institutes government commissions and international organizations la contribution impressionnante des economistes canadiens a la theorie et a la politique du federalisme fiscal l etude du federalisme fiscal a ete un element central de la recherche des economistes canadiens depuis la commission rowell sirois au moment de celebrer le 50eme anniversaire de la fondation de l association canadienne d economique le moment est approprie pour prendre la mesure de leurs contributions on se concentre sur la periode apres 1982 et on souligne les principales publications savantes d un ensemble inclusif d economistes canadiens et d economistes dans les universites canadiennes une attention particuliere est portee aux applications dans le contexte federal et provincial mettant de cote les enjeux relies a la finance municipale on discute brievement des instances ou la litterature sur le federalisme fiscal a eclaire les debats de politiques publiques y compris a travers les instituts de recherche sur les politiques publiques les commissions gouvernementales et les organisations internationales

regional tax coordination and foreign direct investment this paper analyses the effects of a regionally coordinated profit tax or location subsidy in a model with three active countries one of which is not part of the union and a globally mobile firm we show that regional coordination can lead to two types of welfare gain first for investments that would take place in the union in the absence of coordination a coordinated tax increase can transfer location rents from the firm to the union second by internalising all of the union s benefits from foreign direct investment a coordinated tax reduction can attract more welfare enhancing investment than when member states act in isolation depending on which motive dominates tax levels may thus rise or fall under regional coordination

exchange rate pass through and international pricing strategy a conceptual framework and research propositions the extent to which exchange rate fluctuations affect international prices is called exchange rate pass through this paper develops a conceptual model in explaining how exchange rate fluctuations are channeled into international pricing strategy and offers research propositions our model posits that the extent of exchange rate pass through in international pricing is affected by the firm s pricing orientation performance orientation distribution policy and brand equity as well as by exchange rate uncertainty and competitive symmetry

competition for foreign direct investments abstract this paper models international competition for foreign direct investment as a common agency problem using the theory of menu auctions developed by bernheim and whinston in the model national governments act as principals and a multinational corporation as the single agent governments are assumed to maximize the net wage income generated by the corporation s investment it is shown that in the equilibrium of this game a high wage country may be able to attract investment even though all countries use subsidies furthermore it is shown that a country may choose to pay the highest subsidies even if it attracts less investment than in the unsubsidized regime our framework can also be used to study interregional subsidy competition within a country

local fiscal competition an application to sales taxation with multiple federations abstract local sales tax rates influence the location of retail activity this paper develops a theory and empirical identification strategy for studying sales tax competition with multiple federations as exemplified by multiple counties each containing several cities in addition to strategic interactions with nearby cities and a city s own county city tax rates are influenced by the tax rates of neighboring counties cities react heterogeneously to own county sales tax rates depending on distance to the county border using data on the driving time to county borders and a comprehensive cross section of local sales tax rates i exploit variation in proximity to county borders to identify vertical fiscal competition cities located near county borders react more intensely to their county s tax rate in comparison to towns at the interior an increase in the neighboring county tax rate raises city tax rates in nearby counties

wages rents and the quality of life this study focuses on the role of wages and rents in allocating workers to locations with various quantities of amenities the theory demonstrates that if the amenity is also productive then the sign of the wage gradient is unclear while the rent gradient is positive the theory is extended to include the housing market and nontraded goods these extensions require little modification of the conclusion the empirical work on wages shows that the regional wage differences can be explained largely by these local attributes with the use of site price data implicit prices are estimated and quality of life rankings for the cities are computed

politics institutions and welfare spending in industrialized democracies 1960 82 electoral turnout as well as left and center governments increase welfare effort that the welfare efforts of governments led by particular types of parties show significant differences and vary notably with the strength of oppositional and junior coalitional parties and that relatively neocorporatist centralized and traditionalistic polities are high on welfare effort overall our findings suggest that contrary to many claims both partisan and nonpartisan facets of democratic politics and political institutions shape contemporary social welfare effort

politicians decision making with re election concerns abstract we study the impact of elected officials re election concerns on their decisions on whether to undertake new projects the value of a project to a jurisdiction depends in part on its elected official s uncertain ability at providing some public goods our main result is that the elected official s willingness to pay for the project differs from voters willingness to pay if the incumbent official expects to lose win the election then she is willing to pay more less than the project s total value to voters we show how our analysis can be applied to bidding wars among jurisdictions for firms

what makes people think like economists evidence on economic cognition from the survey of americans and economists on the economy abstract the positive economic beliefs of economists and the general public systematically differ what factors make noneconomists think more like economists using the survey of americans and economists on the economy this paper shows people think more like economists 1 if they are well educated 2 if they are male 3 if their real income rose over the last 5 years 4 if they expect their real income to rise over the next 5 years or 5 if they have a high degree of job security however neither high income nor ideological conservatism have this effect my findings for education gender and income have close parallels in political science on tests of objective political knowledge the better educated and males score higher controlling for numerous other variables and the independent effect of income is minor

pathways of representation a causal analysis of public opinion policy linkages theory altemative theories of the linkage process between mass policy preferences and public policies are tested empirically hypotheses opinion policy linkage may arise because mass preferences drive the policy process elite preferences drive the process or because of a shared preferences reciprocal influence process policy linkage may also be facilitated by higher voter mobilization and party competition methods a multiple equation model of the opinion policy process in the united states is tested with two stage least squares regression results the state policy process is best explained by an opinion sharing reciprocal influence model shared partisanship party competition and voter mobilization enhance the linkage process in theoretically anticipated ways

electoral competition in the american states electoral competition is a concept that has played a central role in much of the state politics literature one commonly used indicator of competition in the states is the ranney index we offer an alternative indicator of competition one based on district level outcomes of state legislative elections after evaluating both indicators in terms of validity and reliability the analysis suggests that the district level indicator is both empirically and intuitively superior as a measure of electoral competition the implications of this finding are discussed

american federalism welfare policy and residential choices the relationship between welfare benefit levels and the residential choices of the poor raises two issues for federalism in the united states do state benefit levels affect the residential choices of the poor do residential choices of the poor affect the level at which a state sets its benefit levels empirical studies have seldom studied the interconnection between these two issues this research estimates simultaneously the mutual effects of welfare benefits and poverty rates while controlling for other economic and political variables when benefit levels become high the size of the poverty population increases conversely when poverty rates become high benefit levels are cut the findings are consistent with the claim that state determined benefit levels distort policy and residential choices

a bargaining model of tax competition abstract this paper develops a model in which competing governments offer financial incentives to induce individual firms to locate within their jurisdictions equilibrium is described under three specifications of the supplementary taxes there is no misallocation of capital under two of these specifications and there might or might not be capital misallocation under the third this result contrasts strongly with that of the standard tax competition model which does not allow governments to treat firms individually that model finds that competition among governments almost always leads to capital misallocation

la pleiade and exchange rate pass through abstract we examine the effects of a change in the exchange rate on sales and prices in the framework of a two country two commodity duopoly model with joint production we distinguish two kinds of reaction when the firm located in the country whose currency depreciates appreciates increases decreases sales in both countries we call it the firm specific effect if all sales in the country which appreciates depreciates its currency increase decrease we call it the country specific effect strategic substitutability economies of joint production and or economies of scale lead to the firm specific effect strategic complementarity diseconomies of joint production and or diseconomies of scale lead to the country specific effect

on the optimal structure of government subsidies for enterprise zones and other locational development programs abstract government locational development programs often reward businesses for decisions they would have made or that are going to be quickly reversed this paper presents a model to determine the amount and structure of government locational subsidies that minimize this problem we model the firm s decision to switch locations as an option whose value depends on stochastic operating costs the costs to switch locations and subsidies offered by the government the government maximizes the expected benefit from the operation of the firm within its preferred location by choosing a subsidy package that explicitly and endogenously recognizes the firm s switching option

double tax discrimination to attract fdi and fight profit shifting the role of cfc rules abstract governments worldwide use targeted tax policies to trade off the gains from increased fdi against the cost of excessive profit shifting by multinational firms we show that nationally optimal tax systems generally incorporate both thin capitalization rules which tax discriminate between purely national and multinational firms and controlled foreign company cfc rules which discriminate between home based and foreign based multinationals in the non cooperative policy equilibrium both thin capitalization rules and cfc rules are set more lenient than if tax policies were chosen cooperatively implying an excessive tax discrimination in favor of multinationals we also analyze the effects of reduced transaction costs for fdi and reduced costs for debt shifting on the optimal policy mix our results correspond to the observed developments of anti avoidance rules in oecd countries

eu regional policy and tax competition the european union eu provides coordination and financing of trans european transport infrastructures i e roads and railways which link the eu member states and reduce the cost of transport and mobility this raises the question of whether eu involvement in this area is justified by inefficiencies of national infrastructure policies moreover an often expressed concern is that policies enhancing mobility may boost tax competition we analyze these questions using a model where countries compete for the location of profitable firms we show that a coordination of investment in transport cost reducing infrastructures within union countries enhances welfare and mitigates tax competition in contrast with regard to union periphery infrastructure the union has an interest in a coordinated reduction of investment expenditures here the effects on tax competition are ambiguous our results provide a rationale for eu level regional policy that supports the development of intra union infrastructure

industrial blackmail dynamic tax competition and public investment a dynamic model of intergovernmental competition for a large plant is presented when local productivity is uncertain one firm determines the location of its plant in each period by conducting an auction soliciting bids from local governments equilibrium subsidies from the local governments are derived the author also consider a two stage game where local governments first choose a level of costly infrastructure then participate in the sequential auction even when costs are identical across locations investing in different levels of infrastructure is a nash equilibrium moreover when infrastructure is endogenous in this manner it is chosen efficiently

exchange rates and oligopoly abstract the purpose of this paper is to explain empirical observations concerning the impact of exchange rate changes on industrial prices as exchange rates change the pass through into industrial prices is often incomplete and sometimes it goes into the wrong direction i e the prices in the depreciating country decrease while those in the appreciating country increase the latter is called perverse pass through the usual context for such observations is one of segmented markets and imperfect competition we consider the simplest model with these characteristics two duopolistic firms which both operate in two countries the markets of the two countries are separate and each of the firms produces its good in one of these countries we study the effect of an exchange rate change on the prices in each country and on the level of sales and of profits of each of the firms when strong restrictions such as constant marginal costs are imposed prices move in the right direction in response to an exchange rate change however with general cost and demand structures even in this simple model it is possible for prices in both countries to move in perverse directions