information acquisition and under diversification if an investor wants to form a portfolio of risky assets and can exert effort to collect information on the future value of these assets before he invests which assets should he learn about the best assets to acquire information about are ones the investor expects to hold but the assets the investor holds depend on the information he observes we build a framework to solve jointly for investment and information choices with general preferences and information cost functions although the optimal research strategies depend on preferences and costs the main result is that the investor who can first collect information systematically deviates from holding a diversified portfolio information acquisition can rationalize investing in a diversified fund and a concentrated set of assets an allocation often observed but usually deemed anomalous copyright wiley blackwell

a liquidity based model of security design we consider the problem of the design and sale of a security backed by specified assets given access to higher return investments the issuer has an incentive to raise capital by securitizing part of these assets at the time the security is issued the issuer s or underwriter s private information regarding the payoff of the security may cause illiquidity in the form of a downward sloping demand curve for the security the severity of this illiquidity depends upon the sensitivity of the value of the issued security to the issuer s private information thus the security design problem involves a tradeoff between the retention cost of holding cash flows not included in the security design and the liquidity cost of including the cash flows and making the security design more sensitive to the issuer s private information we characterize the optimal security design in several cases we also demonstrate circumstances under which standard debt is optimal and show that the riskiness of the debt is increasing in the issuer s retention costs for assets

limited liability and incentive contracting with ex ante action choices abstract this article examines a principal agent model of financial contracting in which a risk neutral entrepreneur agent makes an unobservable ex ante effort choice while employing the investment funds of a risk neutral investor principal the key innovation is that the investment contract is subject to statutory liability limits given these liability limits two settings are considered one in which the investor payoff function is also constrained to be monotonically nondecreasing in firm profit and another in which no such monotonic contract constraint is imposed in the former case a standard debt contract is shown to emerge and a first best effort choice is not achieved in the latter setting the optimum is characterized by a live or die payoff function and a first best effort level may or may not be realized

strategic liquidity supply and security design we study how securities and issuance mechanisms can be designed to mitigate the adverse impact of market imperfections on liquidity in our model asset owners seek to obtain liquidity by selling claims contingent on privately observed future cash flows liquidity suppliers can be competitive or strategic in the optimal trading mechanism associated to an arbitrary given security issuers with low cash flows sell their entire holdings of the security while issuers with high cash flows are typically excluded from trade by designing the security optimally issuers can avoid exclusion altogether we show that the optimal security is debt because of its low informational sensitivity debt mitigates the adverse selection problem furthermore by pooling all issuers with high cash flows debt also reduces the ability of a monopolistic liquidity supplier to exclude them from trade in order to better extract rents from issuers with lower cash flows

impacts of instrumental versus relational centered logic on cause related marketing decision making the purpose of cause related marketing is to capitalise on a firm s social engagement initiatives to achieve a positive return on a firm s social investment this article discusses two strategic perspectives of cause related marketing and their impact on a firm s decision making regarding campaign development the instrumental dominant logic of cause related marketing focuses on attracting customers attention in order to generate sales the relational dominant logic of cause related marketing focuses on building relationships with the target stakeholders through the enhancement of a firm s legitimacy the combination of these two types of logic gives rise to four types of cause related marketing altruistic commercial social and integrative this paper uses the qualitative method to explore a firm s marketing decision choices regarding campaign related decision dimensions campaign duration geographical scope cause selection and implementation strategy for each type of cause related marketing the finding provides theoretical managerial and public policy implications

discrete actions in information constrained decision problems individuals are constantly processing external information and translating it into actions this draws on limited resources of attention and requires economizing on attention devoted to signals related to economic behaviour a natural measure of such costs is based on shannon s channel capacity modelling economic agents as constrained by shannon capacity as they process freely available information turns out to imply that discretely distributed actions and thus actions that persist across repetitions of the same decision problem are very likely to emerge in settings that without information costs would imply continuously distributed behaviour we show how these results apply to the behaviour of an investor choosing portfolio allocations as well as to some mathematically simpler tracking problems that illustrate the mechanism trying to use costs of adjustment to explain stickiness of actions when interpreting the behaviour in our economic examples would lead to mistaken conclusions

product market competition and optimal debt contracts the limited liability effect revisited abstract this paper shows that asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers plays a crucial role in the existence of interactions between financial decisions and output market strategies lenders offer an optimal renegotiation proof financial contract which resembles a standard debt contract computing cournot equilibria debt causes firms to compete less aggressively the usual positive limited liability effect on quantities is offset by a negative one due to endogenous financial costs

a trading approach to testing for predictability we propose a market timing test for conditional mean independence of financial returns the new excess predictability ep test statistic has an interpretation of a properly normalized return of a certain trading strategy we discuss similarities of the ep test to the popular directional accuracy da test of pesaran and timmermann power properties of the ep test are advantageous and size properties are comparable to those of the da test we illustrate application of the test using weekly data on the s p500 index

corporate social responsibility theories mapping the territory the corporate social responsibility csr field presents not only a landscape of theories but also a proliferation of approaches which are controversial complex and unclear this article tries to clarify the sit uation mapping the territory by classifying the main csr theories and related approaches in four groups 1 instrumental theories in which the corporation is seen as only an instrument for wealth creation and its social activities are only a means to achieve economic results 2 political theories which concern themselves with the power of corporations in society and a responsible use of this power in the political arena 3 integrative theories in which the corporation is focused on the satisfaction of social demands and 4 ethical theories based on ethical responsibilities of corporations to society in practice each csr theory presents four dimensions related to profits political performance social demands and ethical values the findings suggest the necessity to develop a new theory on the business and society relationship which should integrate these four dimensions

simulation based tests of forward looking models under var learning dynamics in this paper we propose a simulation based technique to investigate the finite sample performance of likelihood ratio lr tests for the nonlinear restrictions that arise when a class of forward looking fl models typically used in monetary policy analysis is evaluated with vector autoregressive var models we consider one shot tests to evaluate the fl model under the rational expectations hypothesis and sequences of tests obtained under the adaptive learning hypothesis the analysis is based on a comparison between the unrestricted and restricted var likelihoods and the p values associated with the lr test statistics are computed by monte carlo simulation we also address the case where the variables of the fl model can be approximated as non stationary cointegrated processes application to the hybrid new keynesian phillips curve nkpc in the euro area shows that i the forward looking component of inflation dynamics is much larger than the backward looking component and ii the sequence of restrictions implied by the cointegrated nkpc under learning dynamics is not rejected over the monitoring period 1984 2005 copyright 2010 john wiley sons ltd

variance ratio tests of random walk an overview this paper reviews the recent developments in the field of the variance ratio vr tests of the random walk and martingale hypothesis in particular we present the conventional individual and multiple vr tests as well as their improved modifications based on power transformed statistics rank and sign tests subsampling and bootstrap methods among others we also re examine the weak form efficiency for five emerging equity markets in latin america

monetary policy and price responsiveness to aggregate shocks under rational inattention this paper presents a general equilibrium model that is consistent with recent empirical evidence showing that the u s price level and inflation are much more responsive to aggregate technology shocks than to monetary policy shocks the model of this paper builds on recent work by mackowiak and wiederholt 2009 who show that models of endogenous attention allocation deliver prices to be more responsive to more volatile shocks as everything else being equal firms pay relatively more attention to more volatile shocks in fact according to the u s data aggregate technology shocks are more volatile than monetary policy shocks inducing in this paper firms to pay more attention to the former than to the latter however most important this work adds to the literature by showing that the ability of the model of this paper to account for observed price dynamics crucially depends on monetary policy in particular this paper shows how interest rate feedback rules affect the incentives faced by firms in allocating attention a policy rate responding more actively to expected inflation and output fluctuations induces firms to pay relatively more attention to more volatile shocks this new mechanism of transmission of monetary policy helps rationalizing the observed behavior of prices in response to technology and monetary policy shocks and implies novel predictions about the impact of changes in taylor rules coefficients on economic fluctuations

a note on efficiency of australian and new zealand stock markets in this article we re examine efficiency of the australia s and new zealand s stock markets extending recent work of narayan 2005 for this purpose we apply the nonlinear unit root test procedure recently developed by kapetanios et al 2003 the nonlinear unit root tests reject the null hypothesis of unit root suggesting that the both stock markets are not weak form efficient contrary to the findings of narayan 2005

testing for market timing ability abstract in this paper we examine the henriksson merton test of market timing and its potential usefulness in evaluating investment advice the paper proposes a natural extension of the test that is valid under more general assumptions about the distribution of asset returns we show that the henriksson merton test and its more general counterpart are special cases of standard tests of market rationality and efficiency both tests are applied to a group of foreign exchange advisory services

portfolio choice attention allocation and price comovement abstract this paper models the attention allocation of portfolio investors investors choose the composition of their information subject to an information flow constraint given their expected investment strategy in the next period which is to hold a diversified portfolio in equilibrium investors choose to observe one linear combination of asset payoffs as a private signal when investors use this private signal to update information about two assets changes in one asset affect both asset prices and may lead to asset price comovement the model also has implications for the transmission of volatility shocks between two assets

are us stock index returns predictable evidence from automatic autocorrelation based tests this article re examines the evidence of return predictability for three major us stock indices using two recently developed data driven tests namely the automatic portmanteau box pierce test and the wild bootstrapped automatic variance ratio test in tracking the time variation of return predictability via rolling estimation window we find that those periods with significant return autocorrelations can largely be associated with major exogenous events theoretically the documented time varying nature of predictable patterns is consistent with the adaptive markets hypothesis

financial intermediaries and liquidity creation trading losses associated with information asymmetries can be mitigated by designing securities which split the cash flows of underlying assets these securities which can arise endogenously have values that do not depend on the information known only to informed agents bank debt deposits is an example of this type of liquid security which protect relatively uninformed agents and we provide a rationale for deposit insurance in this content high grade corporate debt and government bonds are other examples implying that a money market mutual fund based payments system may be an alternative to one based on insured bank deposits

efficient market hypothesis evidence from a small open economy this article studies the efficient market hypothesis for the istanbul stock exchange national 100 isen 100 price index within the lumsdaine and papell two structural breaks unit root test framework the main finding of the article shows that the isen 100 index is characterized by a unit root with two structural breaks which is consistent with the efficient market hypothesis in addition the article applies the augmented dickey fuller test runs test and the variance ratio test to test the weak form efficiency of the isen 100 the analyses are repeated for three sub periods delineated in view of the endogenously determined break points

social enterprises and the performance advantages of a vincentian marketing orientation this study focuses on the managerial issue of should social enterprises ses become more marketing oriented it adapts the kohli et al j mark res 30 467 477 1993 markor marketing orientation scale to measure the adoption of marketing by ses the items capture vincentian based values to leverage business in service to the poor as a measure of a vincentian marketing orientation vmo a vmo is an organisational wide value driven philosophy of management that focuses a se on meeting its objectives by adopting a more marketing orientated approach to serve the needy and poor in a just and sustainable manner ses that exhibit a vmo seek to understand and respond to both the needs of their beneficiaries and stakeholders they are constantly generating disseminating and responding to environmental beneficiary and stakeholder information and develop their business propositions to more effectively and efficiently meet the needs of the poor while guided by a philosophy of leveraging business for social good this study of ses in australia found that a vmo is strongly and positively correlated with social economic and environmental performance these findings suggest that ses may benefit by leveraging marketing capabilities to better serve their beneficiaries and stakeholders

informed lending and security design we examine the role of security design when lenders make inefficient accept or reject decisions after screening projects lenders may be either too conservative in which case they reject positive npv projects or too aggressive in which case they accept negative npv projects in the first case the uniquely optimal security is debt in the second case it is levered equity in equilibrium profitable projects that are relatively likely to break even are financed with debt while less profitable projects are financed with equity highly profitable projects are financed by uninformed arm slength lenders professional lenders have specialized expertise in screening projects unlike the typical entrepreneur to whom they lend they have been exposed to a wide variety of projects in the past professional lenders have experienced loan officers and analysts who know precisely what information is relevant how to treat soft information such as management quality and how to weigh the various pieces of information in making a forecast of the project s cash flows and default risk this paper examines how securities should be optimally designed when lenders make inefficient accept or reject decisions after screening projects in our model screening generates an informative albeit private signal about the project s profitability high signals indicate a positive net present value npv and low signals indicate a negative npv where the project s npv is increasing

information immobility and the home bias puzzle many argue that home bias arises because home investors can predict home asset payoffs more accurately than foreigners can but why does global information access not eliminate this asymmetry we model investors endowed with a small home information advantage who choose what information to learn before they invest surprisingly even when home investors can learn what foreigners know they choose not to investors profit more from knowing information others do not know learning amplifies information asymmetry the model matches patterns of local and industry bias foreign investments portfolio outperformance and asset prices finally we propose new avenues for empirical research

luck versus forecast ability determinants of trader performance in futures markets statistical techniques are used to demonstrate that the fortunes of individual futures traders are determined by luck not forecast ability even though a large number of traders appear to exhibit significantly superior forecast ability the investigation strongly supports three conclusions there are fewer participants with significantly superior skill than expected if participants trade randomly there are more traders exhibiting no skill than expected if participants trade randomly and forecast ability is not correlated over time superior forecasters in the early period are only average forecasters in the later period therefore it is luck that determines trader performance copyright 1991 by university of chicago press

market quality changes in the london stock market this paper examines the impact that the introduction of a closing call auction had on market quality at the london stock exchange using estimates from the partial adjustment with noise model of amihud and mendelson amihud y mendelson h 1987 trading mechanisms and stock returns an empirical investigation journal of finance 42 533 553 we show that opening and closing market quality improved for participating stocks when we stratify our sample securities into five groups based on trading activity we find that the least active securities experience the greatest improvements to market quality a control sample of stocks are not characterized by discernable changes to market quality

measuring financial asset return and volatility spillovers with application to global equity markets we provide a simple and intuitive measure of interdependence of asset returns and or volatilities in particular we formulate and examine precise and separate measures of return spillovers and volatility spillovers our framework facilitates study of both non crisis and crisis episodes including trends and bursts in spillovers and both turn out to be empirically important in particular in an analysis of sixteen global equity markets from the early 1990s to the present we find striking evidence of divergent behavior in the dynamics of return spillovers vs volatility spillovers return spillovers display a gently increasing trend but no bursts whereas volatility spillovers display no trend but clear bursts

examining the first stages of market performance a test for evolving market efficiency abstract a new test of whether markets evolve through detecting changes in weak form efficiency is proposed the test is evaluated through monte carlo simulations empirical examples are provided for both developed and emerging markets

an analysis of cause related marketing implementation strategies through social alliance partnership conditions and strategic objectives cause related marketing crm is an effective marketing tool for promoting corporate social responsibility csr activities and the bulk of campaigns are designed and delivered through collaborative social alliances with non profit organisations npos the authors seek to uncover some of the factors that explain how firms and npos choose their potential partners in the development of their crm strategy the rationales for the observed patterns are investigated through semi structured interviews conducted with managers employed by the uk based firms and npos the authors find that each party has specific preferences when choosing the particular crm implementation strategies in different situations as well as different initial positions when negotiating the formation of the social alliance this article contributes to our understanding of the crm implementation strategies and both the company s and the npo s behaviours toward each of the strategies

monitoring structural change in dynamic econometric models the classical approach to testing for structural change employs retrospective tests using a historical data set of a given length here we consider a wide array of fluctuation type tests in a monitoring situation given a history period for which a regression relationship is known to be stable we test whether incoming data are consistent with the previously established relationship procedures based on estimates of the regression coefficients are extended in three directions we introduce a procedures based on ols residuals b rescaled statistics and c alternative asymptotic boundaries compared to the existing tests our extensions offer better power against certain alternatives improved size in finite samples for dynamic models and ease of computation respectively we apply our methods to two data sets german m1 money demand and u s labor productivity

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

nonparametric retrospection and monitoring of predictability of financial returns we develop and evaluate sequential testing tools for a class of nonparametric tests for predictability of financial returns that include in particular the directional accuracy and excess profitability tests our sequential methods consider in a unified framework both retrospection of a historical sample and monitoring newly arriving data to this end we focus on linear monitoring boundaries that are continuations of horizontal lines corresponding to retrospective critical values elaborating on both two sided and one sided testing we run a simulation study and illustrate the methodology by testing for directional and mean predictability of returns in young stock markets in eastern europe

measuring the degree of time varying market inefficiency abstract we estimate a time varying autocorrelation of stock returns as a degree of market inefficiency the relative inefficiency of the u s stock market varies from 1955 to 2006

rigid pricing and rationally inattentive consumer abstract this paper proposes a mechanism leading to rigid pricing as an optimal strategy it applies a framework of rational inattention to study the pricing strategies of a monopolistic seller facing a consumer with limited information capacity the consumer needs to process information about the realized price while the seller is perfectly attentive the seller chooses to price rigidly i e prices respond to changes in the unit input cost less than if the consumer was perfectly attentive the rigidity is sometimes manifested by discreteness of prices the seller charges a finite set of different prices even for a continuous range of unit input costs the seller does so to provide the consumer with easily observable prices which stimulates her to consume more and increases the seller s profit

a tale of three schools insights on autocorrelations of short horizon stock returns this article reexamines the autocorrelation patterns of short horizon stock returns we document empirical results which imply that these autocorrelations have been overstated in the existing literature based on several new insights we provide support for a market efficiency based explanation of the evidence our analysis suggests that institutional factors are the most likely source of the autocorrelation patterns

bidding with securities auctions and security design we study security bid auctions in which bidders compete for an asset by bidding with securities that is they offer payments that are contingent on the realized value of the asset being sold the value depends on investment by the winner thus creating the possibility of moral hazard such auctions are commonly used both formally and informally in formal auctions the seller generally restricts bids to an ordered set such as an equity share or royalty rate by restricting the bids standard auction formats such as first and second price auctions can be used in informal settings with competing buyers the seller does not commit to a mechanism upfront rather bidders offer securities and the seller chooses the most attractive bid based on his beliefs ex post we characterize equilibrium payoffs and bidding strategies in this setting and show that an informal mechanism yields the lowest possible revenues across all mechanisms we also determine the optimal formal mechanism and show that the security design is more important than the auction format we show that the revenue equivalence principle that expected revenues are independent of the auction format holds if the set of permissible securities is ordered and convex such as equity otherwise it need not hold for example when bidders offer standard debt securities a second price auction is superior on the other hand if bidders compete on the conversion ratio of convertible debt a first price auction yields higher revenues finally we examine how different forms of moral hazard impact our results

learning in crowded markets abstract we present a novel entry game with endogenous information acquisition to study the welfare effects of opacity and competition potential entrants to an opaque market are uncertain about their competitive advantage relative to other investors i e their type they construct optimal costly signals to learn about their types where the marginal cost of learning captures the opacity of the market in general the individually optimal entry and learning decisions are socially suboptimal players over invest in learning and more opaque markets are associated with more crowding nevertheless more opaque markets might still lead to higher welfare by implying a better trade off between the degree of crowding and the total cost of learning similarly decreasing the share of smart investors in the market might also improve welfare however fierce competition is always detrimental to welfare as it leads to more wasteful learning without changing the level of crowding

social alliance and employee voluntary activities a resource based perspective the corporate social responsibility literature devotes relatively little attention to the strategic role played by employee voluntary activities evas in social alliances using the resource based perspective of the organization to frame the data collection and the analyses this article investigates 1 the role of evas in the development of corporate and non profit organizations npos competitive assets and 2 the management approaches to how both parties can develop their own resources by combining them with the shared resources with the purpose of enhancing its competitive advantage in its own sector the database is composed of 70 specifically designed interviews with managers of uk based firms and npos the analyses suggest among other things that the majority of corporate and non profit managers find that evas generate substantial tangible and intangible benefits for their respective organisations creating genuine synergies we also find evidence of a general preference for the management approaches of such programmes in both types of organisation

optimal sticky prices under rational inattention this paper presents a model in which price setting firms decide what to pay attention to subject to a constraint on information flow when idiosyncratic conditions are more variable or more important than aggregate conditions firms pay more attention to idiosyncratic conditions than to aggregate conditions when we calibrate the model to match the large average absolute size of price changes observed in micro data prices react fast and by large amounts to idiosyncratic shocks but only slowly and by small amounts to nominal shocks nominal shocks have strong and persistent real effects we use the model to investigate how the optimal allocation of attention and the dynamics of prices depend on the firms environment jel e 3 e5 d8

implications of rational inattention abstract a constraint that actions can depend on observations only through a communication channel with finite shannon capacity is shown to be able to play a role very similar to that of a signal extraction problem or an adjustment cost in standard control problems the resulting theory looks enough like familiar dynamic rational expectations theories to suggest that it might be useful and practical while the implications for policy are different enough to be interesting

information production dilution costs and optimal security design abstract we investigate the problem of a firm wishing to finance a project by issuing securities under asymmetric information we find that when outside investors can produce noisy information on the firm s quality the degree of information asymmetry resulting in equilibrium is endogenous and depends on the information sensitivity of the security issued thus in contrast to the prediction of the pecking order theory see e g myers and majluf j financial econom 13 1984 187 a security with low sensitivity to private information such as debt does not always dominate one with high information sensitivity such as equity a firm s preference for equity rather than debt depends on the costs of information production the precision of the information production technology and the extent of the information asymmetry we also study the optimal security design problem and find that depending on the cost and precision of the information production technology risky debt or a composite security with a convex payoff emerges as optimal securities

optimality of debt under flexible information acquisition we study the optimality of debt through the interaction between se curity design and information acquisition an impatient seller designs an asset backed security and a buyer decides whether to buy it to provide liquidity facing dierent securities the buyer has incentives to acquire in formation from dierent aspects of the fundamental which in turn aects security design speci cally the buyer bene ts from information acqui sition at the expense of the seller through adverse selection the seller hence deliberately designs the security to induce the buyer to acquire the information least harmful to the seller s interest since securities can be designed in arbitrary ways the resulting incentive to acquire information is very exible thus we introduce exible information acquisition to capture this interaction we show that debt is uniquely optimal com pared with the security design literature we neither assume monotonicity of the feasible securities nor impose various distributional assumptions on the fundamental or information structures fixed aggregate cash ow and homogeneous information cost are two key factors driving the results jel d86 d82 g32

optimal design of securities under asymmetric information a firm must decide what security to sell to raise external capital to finance a profitable investment opportunity there is ex ante asymmetry of information regarding the probability distribution of cash flow generated by the investment in this setting we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a security to be optimal uniquely optimal that is for pooling at this security to be an the unique equilibrium outcome using these conditions we show that the debt contract is uniquely optimal if and only if cash flows are ordered by strict conditional stochastic dominance finally we derive an equivalence relationship between optimal security designs and designs that minimize mispricing