bargaining over reform abstract this paper models the delay in a macroeconomic stabilization as the outcome of a bargaining game between two parties who must reach an agreement over how the stabilization cost is to be shared the paper modifies alesina and drazen s 1991 american economic review 81 1170 1189 war of attrition model by endogenizing the distribution of the stabilization costs through a bargaining game using this bargaining framework the paper analyzes the role of crises and foreign assistance in bringing about a settlement to the distributional conflict in the bargaining game a crisis that increases the welfare loss from not stabilizing the economy will lower the probability of delay in contrast foreign aid that is used to reduce the stabilization costs will further increase the delay in reaching an agreement between the two parties

political and institutional determinants of fiscal policy in the european community in recent theoretical and empirical research the variation in political and institutional arrangements which may affect the process of national policy formation is examined in order to explain cross country differences with respect to fiscal policies pursued in this paper we build upon this literature and examine whether and how cross country differences in debt accumulation and public sector size of member countries of the european community during the 1980s can be explained we conclude that the growth of government debt is positively related to the frequency of government changes and negatively to sound budgetary procedures in countries with left wing governments the growth of the share of government spending in total output generally tends to be higher

two stage residual inclusion estimation addressing endogeneity in health econometric modeling the paper focuses on two estimation methods that have been widely used to address endogeneity in empirical research in health economics and health services research two stage predictor substitution 2sps and two stage residual inclusion 2sri 2sps is the rote extension to nonlinear models of the popular linear two stage least squares estimator the 2sri estimator is similar except that in the second stage regression the endogenous variables are not replaced by first stage predictors instead first stage residuals are included as additional regressors in a generic parametric framework we show that 2sri is consistent and 2sps is not results from a simulation study and an illustrative example also recommend against 2sps and favor 2sri our findings are important given that there are many prominent examples of the application of inconsistent 2sps in the recent literature this study can be used as a guide by future researchers in health economics who are confronted with endogeneity in their empirical work

wars of attrition in italian government coalitions and fiscal performance 1948 1994 we test the war of attrition models of fiscalperformance on the sample of italian governments from1948 to 1994 we control for conditioning phenomena like government stability majority size central bankindependence political budget cycle and externaleconomic constraints as well as for business cycleindicators we improve on the standard specificationsof war of attrition models by considering the role ofthe opposition and by using ex ante measures ofcoalitions fragmentation once these phenomena areaccounted for data support the implications of ourversion of the war of attrition models

nonparametric estimation of the effects of advertising the case of lydia pinkham this article reexamines some of the issues raised subsequent to the classical research by palda 1964 we use a nonparametric estimation method that allows us to incorporate both seasonal and smoothness constraints to estimate the parameters of a demand function using monthly data on lydia pinkham s vegetable compound the analysis indicates that the parameters of the estimated demand equation are not constant throughout the long period of the data which covers the whole life cycle of the product

political fractionalization and delay in fiscal stabilizations a duration analysis this article employs a duration analysis approach to empirically investigate whether political fractionalization leads to delayed fiscal stabilizations using a broad sample of both developed and developing countries for the period 1975 2011 we consistently find strong evidence that political fractionalization is significantly associated with longer delays in stabilizing high deficits in particular political fractionalization has a greater impact on delays in periods of macroeconomic distress we also show that while the fractionalization of government parties delays fiscal stabilization the fractionalization of opposition parties tends to facilitate fiscal stabilization

endogenous regional agricultural production technologies technical relationships between six productive factors for ten agricultural produvction regions in the continental united states are examined the applied methodology provides a departure from conventional production methodologies contained in the literature by allowing aggregate technical relationships to be endogenized within the economic system

constitutional rules and fiscal policy outcomes we investigate the effect of electoral rules and forms of government on fiscal policy outcomes in a large sample of democracies we rely on different estimation methods to address prospective problems of statistical inference due to non random selection of these constitutional rules the findings are consistent with our theoretical priors presidential regimes induce smaller governments than parliamentary democracies while majoritarian elections lead to smaller governments and smaller welfare programs than proportional elections

political determinants of budget deficits coalition effects versus minority effects this paper reexamines some recent empirical evidence on the hypothesis that institutional arrangements in the political process affect budget deficits the results of roubini and sachs 1989b are replicated and sensitivity analysis indicate that their results are robust however the main conclusion of roubini and sachs that coalition governments are less capable of budgetary discipline needs to be modified a reformulation of their variable representing political cohesion reveals that it captures the effects of minority governments rather than majority coalition governments the data support the hypothesis that it is harder to negotiate in parliament than within a government

measurement and interpretation of productivity national research council panel to review productivity statistics national academy of sciences washington 1979 viii 449 pages 18 00 available from office of publications national academy of sciences 2101 constitution avenue n w washington dc 20418 u s a

the weak government thesis some new evidence this paper presents new evidence on the hypothesis that coalition governments will find it more difficult to keep their budgets in line after an adverse economic shock than do one party majoritarian governments the estimates are based on a broad sample of oecd countries for the period 1979 1995 using various specifications as suggested in the literature we do not find evidence that the type of government affects cross country variation in fiscal policy however the number of political parties in government affects central government debt growth

why a stubborn conservative would run a deficit policy with time inconsistent preferences a conservative government in favor of a low level of public consumption knows that it will be replaced by a government in favor of a larger level of public consumption we show that the resulting level of public consumption is in between the levels the two governments would choose if each were in power both in the present and in the future in particular we show that if the conservative government is more stubborn in a particular sense than the succeeding government the conservative government will borrow more than it would had it remained in power in the future

do political variables affect fiscal policy adjustment decisions new empirical evidence we test eight hypotheses on political factors influencing the likelihood that a fiscal policy adjustment occurs we employ a panel discrete choice model for 20 oecd countries for the period 1970 2003 two different definitions of fiscal adjustments are used to capture the differences between rapid and gradual adjustments we find that these types of fiscal adjustment are primarily driven by economic factors and are hardly affected by political variables the likelihood that a rapid adjustment takes place is only influenced by upcoming elections while the likelihood that a gradual adjustment takes place increases in case of broad policy reform

fragmented fiscal policy abstract this paper explores on a panel of 19 oecd countries the role of fragmentation in determining fiscal outcomes over the 1970 95 period we first define the notion of fragmentation of fiscal policy making as the degree to which the costs of a dollar of aggregate expenditure are internalized by individual decision makers empirically this notion has two key logical components the number of decision makers and the rules of the game or the budget process in turn the number of decision makers can refer to the number of parties in a coalition or the number of ministers in the cabinet we test all these determinants against each other and against perhaps the oldest explanation of all ideology we show that cabinet size and to a lesser degree coalition size and ideology are significant and robust determinants of fiscal outcomes in particular transfers are the budget items most affected by these factors

productivity analysis of u s manufacturing using a stochastic coefficients production function in this article we show that the production aggregation and estimation theories that lead to a stochastic coefficients production function are more general than those leading to a fixed coefficients production function estimates of productivity changes implied by these two types of cobb douglas production functions are compared for several u s manufacturing sectors for the period 1955 1982 all of the estimates of the stochastic coefficients cobb douglas function have the right algebraic sign for all industries considered whereas some of the estimates of its fixed coefficients counterpart have the wrong sign

does trade cause capital to flow evidence from historical rainfall abstract we use a historical quasi experiment to estimate the causal effect of trade on capital flows we argue that fluctuations in regional rainfall within the ottoman empire capture the exogenous variation in exports from the empire to germany france and the u k during the period of 1859 1913 the identification is based on the following historical facts first only surplus production was allowed to be exported from the empire provisionistic policy second different products grown in different regions were subject to variation in regional rainfall third different bundles of products were exported to germany france and the u k by the empire using the export bundle weighted regional rainfall as an instrument for ottoman exports to each country our instrumental variable regression suggests the following when a given region of the empire received more rainfall than others the resulting surplus production was exported more to countries that historically imported more of those products and this leads to higher foreign investment by those countries in the empire our findings support theories predicting complementarity between trade and finance in which causality runs from trade to capital flows

the institutional environment for infrastructure investment the empirical evidence that links political institutions to economic outcomes has grown dramatically in recent years however virtually all of this analysis is undertaken using data from the past three decades this paper extends this empirical framework by performing a two century long historical analysis of the determinants of infrastructure investment in a panel of over 100 countries the results demonstrate that political environments that limit the feasibility of policy change are an important determinant of investment in infrastructure copyright 2002 oxford university press

the out of sample forecasting performance of exchange rate models when coefficients are allowed to change abstract this study examines the out of sample forecasting performance of models of exchange rate determination without imposing the restriction that coefficients are fixed over time both fixed and variable coefficient versions of conventional structural models are considered with and without a lagged dependent variable while our results on fixed coefficient models support most of the meese and rogoff conclusions we find that when coefficients are allowed to change an important subset of conventional models of the dollar pound the dollar deutsche mark and the dollar yen exchange rates can outperform forecasts of a random walk model the structural models considered are the flexible price frenkel bilson and sticky price dornbusch frankel monetary models and a sticky price model which includes the current account hooper morton

economic reforms and productive capacity realisation in bangladesh an empirical analysis using firm level data from the bangladesh food manufacturing sector this paper examines the impact of economic reform on productive capacity realisation in the eighties the results suggest that although improvement occurred in the realisation of productive capacities after the implementation of economic reforms there is however room for significant further improvement in increasing output by realising the unrealised capacity

political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries institutions and policies vittorio grilli donato masciandaro and guido tabellini why do countries as similar as the industrialized oecd countries go through such different experience in terms of public deficits and debts or in terms of inflation the answer cannot come from macroeconomic policy responses to different disturbances nor from the principles of optimal taxation but rather from politics this article focuses on the role that particular institutions exert in providing constraints and incentives which shape the actions of policymakers the electoral process and political traditions affect the ability of governments to deal with deficits and mounting debts what seems to matter most it is found is the effect of the durability of governments governments with short horizons act myopically and never quite tackle the hard choices such governments typically exist in countries with an electoral system favouring many small political parties central bank independence promotes low inflation with no apparent costs in terms of real economic performance irrespective of the political institutions in fact there is no link between monetary and fiscal discipline these findings carry powerful implications for countries facing high indebtedness or stubborn inflation but also for the construction of the european economic and monetary union

fiscal adjustments do labor and product market institutions matter this paper investigates the role played by labor and product market institutions in determining the likelihood of initiating and of successfully concluding a fiscal adjustment using data for 16 oecd countries over the period 1970 to 2000 we find that a less generous unemployment benefit system rather than temporary caps on spending e g wage freezes contributes to the success of fiscal consolidation weaker forms of bargaining coordination and centralization facilitate the fiscal adjustment effort on the other hand product market deregulation and more flexible employment protection legislation do not contribute positively to fiscal consolidation