implementing marketable emissions permits the environmental protection agency is introducing bubbles offsets and banks as a way of controlling pollution with market incentives to obtain standards for each source and guide the reallocation of emissions the new method is not a true market because polluters must go through the permitting procedure in order to trade emission allowances this study examines whether an efficient market without source by source review is feasible it considers the importance of enough participants competitiveness sensitivity to geographic emission patterns and trading flexibility to sustain marketable permits the design features that address these problems are permit life market definition market initiation and market operation a stable permit market eliminates some of the uncertainties in decision making because it allows firms to select a preferred level of risk 9 references dck

the ethiopian commodity exchange and spatial price dispersion abstract in this article we study the impact of an institutional intervention on market efficiency in ethiopia more specifically we analyze to what extent the ethiopian commodity exchange ecx in combination with regional warehouses have contributed to a reduction in price spreads between regional markets our hypothesis is that warehouses connected to the ecx reduce the dispersion between export prices and local retail prices in different coffee growing areas as well as the dispersion between export prices and local retail prices in different coffee growing areas by doing so the ecx has the potential to improve the market efficiency to identify the causal effect we combine retail price data with information on the gradual rollout of warehouses connected to the ecx from 2007 to 2012 our results suggest that when two markets both have access to an operating warehouse the average price spread is 0 86 1 78 etb lower than it is for markets where at least one part lacks warehouse access this is a substantial reduction considering that the average price spread over the full period is 3 33 etb the main results are robust to various econometric specifications and our analysis thus suggests that local warehouses connected to the ecx have indeed improved market efficiency

will digital technologies transform agriculture in developing countries mobile phones and the internet have significantly affected practically all sectors of the economy and agriculture is no exception building on a recent world bank flagship report this article introduces a concise framework for describing the main benefits from new information and communication technologies they promote greater inclusion in the broader economy raise efficiency by complementing other production factors and foster innovation by dramatically reducing transaction costs the article reviews the recent literature on corresponding technology impacts in the rural sector in developing countries digital technologies overcome information problems that hinder market access for many small scale farmers increase knowledge through new ways of providing extension services and they provide novel ways for improving agricultural supply chain management while there are many promising examples of positive impacts on rural livelihoods or digital dividends these have often not scaled up to the extent expected the main reason is that technology can always only address some but not all of the barriers faced by farmers in poorer countries

trading for the future signaling in permit markets abstract permit markets are celebrated as a policy instrument since they allow i firms to equalize marginal costs through trade and ii the regulator to distribute the burden in a politically desirable way these two concerns however may conflict in a dynamic setting anticipating the regulator s future desire to give more permits to firms that appear to need them firms purchase permits to signal their need this raises the price above marginal costs and the market becomes inefficient if the social cost of pollution is high and the government intervenes frequently in the market the distortions are greater than the gains from trade and non tradable permits are better the analysis helps to understand permit markets and how they should be designed

planning under incomplete information and the ratchet effect abstract central planning of production is usually performed under asymmetric information the firm in general has more information about its productive possibilities than the central planner from now on for short cp this justifies the use of incentives schemes in which the cp does not directly fix activity levels casual observation of such existing schemes suggests that the time dimensions is crucial for their working typically the cp revises the incentive scheme over time to take into account the information provided by the firm s performance managers of centrally planned economies as well as economists have long recognized that this revision induces firms to underproduce in order to avoid demanding schemes in the future this is the ratchet effect it is purpose of the present paper to study the ratchet effect under the non commitment assumption which we believe to be more realistic the inadequacy of conceptual tools made if difficult in the past to consider such an assumption now basic research on dynamic games with incomplete information recently resulted in new ideas which look particularly relevant for a theoretical analysis of the problem

information gatekeepers on the internet and the competitiveness of homogeneous product markets we examine the equilibrium interaction between a market for price information controlled by a gatekeeper and the homogenous product market it serves the gatekeeper charges fees to firms that advertise prices on its internet site and to consumers who access the list of advertised prices gatekeeper profits are maximized in an equilibrium where a the product market exhibits price dispersion b access fees are sufficiently low that all consumers subscribe c advertising fees exceed socially optimal levels thus inducing partial firm participation and d advertised prices are below unadvertised prices introducing the market for information has ambiguous social welfare effects

composition of household income and child nutrition outcomes evidence from uganda summary this study targets the empirical space between cross country analyses exploring links between income and nutrition without insights on micro level determinants and relevant microeconomic studies hindered by small sample size and or incomplete data we use the rural samples of the three waves of the uganda national panel survey and estimate panel regressions of child height for age z scores haz controlling for time invariant child level heterogeneity on the whole we find no impact of short term changes in total gross income on haz but document small positive correlations for younger children sector differentiated analyses indicate that compared to wage earnings only share of income from non farm self employment correlates positively with haz within agriculture shares of income from consumption of own crop production and from low protein crop production underlie the negative effect of share of income from crop production while we cannot claim causal relationships our findings suggest the possibility of stickiness of crop production to own consumption

ex ante and ex post welfare optimality under uncertainty it is widely believed by economic theorists that if there were no transactions costs and if all information about the economy were perfectly shared by all then arrow debreu contingent commodity markets should bring about an ideal allocation the basis for this belief seems clear we have the two efficiency theorems of welfare economics which assure us that in the absence of external effects any competitive allocation is pareto efficient and that any pareto efficient allocation is competitive provided that appropriate lump sum transfers are made of course there are some reservations that need to be made local satiation and non convexities are well known to cause problems but these are not the problems i wish to discuss here to return to the usual argument the next step involves noticing how with contingent commodity markets the efficiency theorems of welfare economics carry over to an economy with uncertainty as explained for instance in chapter 7 of debreu s theorpj of value the fundamental value judgment that gives these efficiency theorems their normative interest is what may be called consumer sovereignty it is an assumption that the social welfare ordering should respect the preferences that govern consumers market behaviour it is a serious value judgment more serious than most economists have been prepared to concede but its seriousness increases when there is uncertainty we know full well that individuals misperceive the probabilities of certain events assuming that they even perceive any probabilities at all see for example kahneman and tversky 1979 nor are we always willing to accept as appropriate the attitudes to risk of individuals who seem either extremely reckless or extremely cautious societies are often willing to make some gestures towards property owners who have not insured themselves adequately against damage from fire flood or tempest and not just because of imperfect insurance markets or even misperceptions of probabilities in addition the inequalities of income that arise when some individuals take more risks than others are not necessarily seen to be desirable particularly if an individual has undertaken a useful but risky activity and has a very low income as a result of failure such gestures are examples of contingent lump sum transfers it seems clear that if such transfers occur to a sufficient extent they could supplant completely the securities markets which are usually sufficient to bring about pareto efficiency they may even be able to go further and correct the imperfections of an arrow debreu market allocation when individuals do misperceive probabilities or else have wrong attitudes to risk this is the main question i wish to consider here the idea that consumer sovereignty should not always extend to economies with uncertainty is not new it can be found in work by diamond 1967 dr6ze

an interim evaluation of sulfur dioxide emissions trading ide iv of the 1990 clean air act amendments established the first large scale long term environmental program to rely on tradable emissions permitscalled allowances in this program to control pollution this program was designed to cut acid rain by reducing sulfur dioxide so2 emissions from electric generating plants to about half their 1980 level beginning in 1995 it is of interest both as a response to an important environmental issue and as a landmark experiment in environmental policy this experiment comes at a particularly important time since emission trading is under serious consideration with strong u s backing for use to deal with global climate change by curbing emissions of carbon dioxide co2 the economic stakes in climate change surpass those in acid rain by several orders of magnitude intergovernmental panel on climate change 1996 this article summarizes the results to date of our ongoing empirical analysis of compliance costs and allowance market performance under the u s acid rain program

price dispersion in the small and in the large evidence from an internet price comparison site this paper examines four million daily price observations for more than 1 000 consumer electronics products on the price comparison site http shopper com we find little support for the notion that prices on the internet are converging to the law of one price in addition observed levels of price dispersion vary systematically with the number of firms listing prices the difference between the two lowest prices the gap averages 23 per cent when two firms list prices and falls to 3 5 per cent in markets where 17 firms list prices these empirical results are an implication of a general clearinghouse model of equilibrium price dispersion

is knowledge power information and switching costs in agricultural markets this article investigates an important channel through which access to information about market prices could increase the prices that producers receive from middlemen i develop a model of trade between a farmer and a middleman allowing for middlemen to differ in terms of their social preferences and provide an empirical test of the theory using a framed field experiment carried out in india the model predicts a non monotonic relationship between the benefit of information and the cost of switching to a new middleman i find that actual middlemen do differ with regard to their social preferences and that the benefit of information to the farmer varies with the cost of switching while it is not possible to confirm a non monotonic relationship between the benefit of information and the cost of switching based on these data the results are consistent with the predictions of the model

the digital provide information technology market performance and welfare in the south indian fisheries sector when information is limited or costly agents are unable to engage in optimal arbitrage excess price dispersion across markets can arise and goods may not be allocated efficiently in this setting information technologies may improve market performance and increase welfare between 1997 and 2001 mobile phone service was introduced throughout kerala a state in india with a large fishing industry using microlevel survey data we show that the adoption of mobile phones by fishermen and wholesalers was associated with a dramatic reduction in price dispersion the complete elimination of waste and near perfect adherence to the law of one price both consumer and producer welfare increased

lessons about markets from the internet many of us have grown used to tired of and finally downright skeptical of claims of the transformative powers of the internet it was to usher in the new economy but we seem mostly to have the old it would transform retail but toys r us has outlasted etoys frictionless commerce would be the norm but plenty of friction still exists the internet was also claimed to require a whole new economics with all new laws while this too was very far from the truth existing theories have mostly done quite well the internet has had a substantial effect on economic thought in this paper we discuss some ways in which the internet has affected how economists think about markets

farmer bargaining power and market information services in many sub saharan african countries farmers typically have a choice between selling their products to traders who travel between villages and markets and transporting their products to the nearest market themselves because of communities remoteness and poor communications with marketplaces farmers uncertainty about market prices is usually high traders may take advantage of farmers ignorance of the market price and extract a rent from them by offering very low prices for their products in this article we model bargaining interactions between farmers and traders meeting at the farmgate and we study how price information affects the bargain and the balance of power we show the conditions for market information services mis to be profitable for farmers and examine efficiency issues associated with asymmetric information finally we test the model s prediction that information results in positive individual gain for farmers using original survey data collected in the northern region of ghana specifically we estimate the causal effect of a mobile based mis program on farmers marketing performances and find that farmers who have benefited from the mis program received significantly higher prices for maize and groundnuts about 10 more for maize and 7 more for groundnuts than what they would have received had they not participated in the mis program these results suggest that the theoretical conditions for successful farmer use of mis may be met in the field

the optimal distribution of pollution rights in the presence of political distortions a critical issue in designing a system of tradable emission permits concerns the distribution of the initial pollution rights the purpose of this paper is to investigate how the initial rights should be optimally set when the determination of the number of tradable permits is subject to the influence of interest groups according to the coase theorem in the case where there are low transaction costs the assignment of the initial rights does not affect the efficiency of the final resource allocation in the presence of political pressure we show that the distribution of the initial rights has a significant effect on social welfare in contrast to the conventional results we find that grandfathered permits may be more efficient than auctioned permits even after taking into consideration the revenue recycling effect

seller incentive properties of epa s emission trading auction abstract the new clean air act amendments instruct the environmental protection agency epa to conduct annual sealed bid offer auctions of emission allowances the auction pricing rules are discriminative and sellers with the lowest asking prices receive the highest bids this paper assesses the seller incentives of this auction and demonstrates that the auction rules cause sellers to choose asking prices that under reveal their cost of emission control furthermore increasing the number of sellers intensifies this misrepresentation if the number of buyers remains fixed the epa s rules can therefore generate significantly biased price signals and reduce the efficiency of the allowance trading market

economic incentives for environmental protection integrating theory and practice for decades economists have been extolling the virtues of market based or economic incentive approaches to environmental protection some 70 years ago arthur cecil pigou 1920 suggested corrective taxes to discourage activities that generate externalities a half century later j dales 1968 showed how the introduction of transferable property rights could work to promote environmental protection at lower aggregate cost than conventional standards from these two seminal ideas corrective taxes and transferable property rights a substantial body of research has developed both environmental taxes and marketable permits are coming of age in the policy arena examples include the introduction of marketable permits in the united states to control acid rain the use of changes in europe to limit air and water pollution and the employment of deposit refund schemes for products ranging from beverage containers to batteries the introduction of these tools on a large scale provides a unique opportunity to extend the frontiers of knowledge this essay strives to identify prominent issues that merit investigation 8 refs

the political economy of market based environmental policy the u s acid rain program the u s acid rain program enacted in 1990 gave valuable tradable sulfur dioxide emissions permits called allowances to electric utilities we examine the political economy of this allocation though no senate or house votes were ever taken hypothetical votes suggest that the actual allocation would have beaten plausible alternatives while rent seeking behavior is apparent statistical analysis of differences between actual and benchmark allocations indicates that the legislative process was more complex than simple models suggest the coalition of states that produced and burned high sulfur coal both failed to block acid rain legislation in 1990 and received fewer allowances than in plausible benchmark allocations some of these states may have received additional allowances to cover 1995 99 emissions by giving up allowances in later years and some major coal producing states seem to have focused on benefits for miners and on sustaining demand for high sulfur coal

economic prescriptions for environmental problems how the patient followed the doctor s orders o ne of the dangers with ivory tower theorizing is that it is easy to lose sight of the actual set of problems which need to be solved and the range of potential solutions as one who frequently engages in this exercise i can attest to this fact in my view this loss of sight has become increasingly evident in the theoretical structure underlying environmental economics which often emphasizes elegance at the expense of realism in this paper i will argue that both normative and positive theorizing could greatly benefit from a careful examination of the results of recent innovative approaches to environmental management the particular set of policies examined here involves two tools which have received widespread support from the economics community marketable permits and emission charges pigou 1932 dales 1968 kneese and schultze 1975 both tools represent ways to induce businesses to search for lower cost methods of achieving environmental standards they stand in stark contrast to the predominant command and control approach in which a regulator specifies the technology a firm must use to comply with regulations under highly restrictive conditions it can be shown that both of the economic approaches share the desirable feature that any gains in environmental quality will be obtained at the lowest possible cost baumol and oates 1975 until the 1960s these tools only existed on blackboards and in academic journals as products of the fertile imaginations of academics however some countries have recently begun to explore using these tools as part of a broader strategy for managing environmental problems

information efficiency and welfare in agricultural markets information and communications technologies icts have spread rapidly in the developing world there has been considerable interest in the potential role icts particularly mobile phones have begun to play in the marketing of agricultural outputs in these countries in this article we discuss the potential impacts icts may have on welfare both in terms of potential efficiency gains via improved arbitrage and welfare transfers among agents in the supply chain via reduced informational asymmetries and market power we also review the recent empirical evidence for such effects

prices vs quantities the political perspective regulation regimes subject to the influence of interest groups are compared it is shown that the allocation of the regulated commodity varies with the implemented control and that the advantage of prices vs quotas increases with the elasticity of the demand for or the supply of the commodity and decreases with the number of organized producers in the regulated industry control regimes can be ranked for negative but not positive externalities finally a control regime leading to a more efficient commodity allocation also entails using fewer resources in rent seeking activities

how competitive are crop markets in sub saharan africa during the structural adjustment era of the 1980s and 1990s governments across sub saharan africa generally withdrew from crop markets to encourage entry by private traders and foster competition since that time the degree of competition in crop markets has been a central concern of policymakers donors and researchers we review the evidence on that topic by first developing a conceptual framework to guide our analysis then discussing the findings from four categories of literature we have two main findings first there is a paucity of empirical evidence on this question which hinders our ability to draw strong conclusions second that point notwithstanding the evidence that does exist is broadly supportive of the notion that crop markets are competitive the dominant themes in the literature are that trading profits are highly variable trader entry and exit rates are high and price co movements between markets suggest relatively efficient levels of competitive arbitrage it is possible that the high costs of entry foster non competitive conditions at the level of large scale long distance subnational trade but we find no positive evidence to that effect only the satisfaction of certain necessary conditions

international emissions trading with endogenous allowance choices abstract this paper compares endogenous choices of tradable and non tradable emission allowances by non cooperative countries i find that the cost savings of trading do not necessarily lead to less pollution in particular environmentally more concerned countries usually choose less allowances if these are tradable but this may be offset by the choice of more allowances on the side of environmentally less concerned countries moreover if the establishment of a trading system requires the unanimous approval of all countries there may be no agreement on trading even if it were to lead to less pollution overall conversely a trading system may find unanimous approval even if it induces more pollution

the market for sulfur dioxide emissions the 1990 clean air act amendments initiated the first large scale use of the tradable permit approach to pollution control the theoretical case for this approach rests on the assumption of an efficient market for emission rights the authors empirical analysis shows that the emission rights market created by the 1990 amendments had become reasonably efficient by mid 1994 they also show that the auctions specified in the amendments to jump start trading had become a small part of the overall market finally the authors demonstrate that the strategic bidding behavior discussed in the literature has had no effect on market prices copyright 1998 by american economic association

contracting with externalities the paper studies inefficiencies arising in contracting between one principal and n agents when the utility of each agent depends on all agents trades with the principal when the principal commits to a set of publicly observable bilateral contract offers the arising inefficiency is due entirely to the externalities imposed on non signers in contrast when the principal s offers are privately observed the distortion is due to the externalities given agents equilibrium trades comparison of the two externalities determines the relative efficiency of the two contracting regimes in both cases we show that when n is large each agent can be treated as non pivotal provided that appropriate continuity assumptions are satisfied we also study the case in which the principal can condition each agent s trade on other agents messages we characterize the set of such mechanisms in which each agent s participation is voluntary when the principal can commit to any such mechanism she implements the first best outcome while threatening each deviator with the harshest possible punishment however in the presence of noise that goes to zero slower than n goes to infinity in the limit we obtain a generally inefficient outcome in which each agent feels non pivotal

transaction costs and tradeable permits abstract tradeable permit systems are at the center of current interest and activity in market based reforms of environmental policy because these systems can offer significant advantages over conventional approaches to pollution control unfortunately claims made for their relative cost effectiveness have often been exaggerated transaction costs which may be significant in these markets reduce trading levels and increase abatement costs in some cases equilibrium permit allocations and hence aggregate control costs are sensitive to initial permit distributions providing an efficiency justification for politicians typical focus on initial allocations

incentives and prices in an emissions trading scheme with updating abstract emissions trading schemes where allocations are based on updated baseline emissions give firms less incentive to reduce emissions for a given quota or allowance price nevertheless according to bohringer and lange on the design of optimal grandfathering schemes for emission allowances europ econ rev 49 2005 2041 2055 such allocation schemes are cost effective if the system is closed and allocation rules are identical across firms in this paper we show that the cost effective solution may be infeasible if marginal abatement costs grow too fast moreover if a price cap or banking borrowing is introduced the abatement profile is no longer the same as in the case with an auction or lump sum allocation in addition we show that with allocation based on updated emissions the quota price will always exceed marginal abatement costs possibly misguiding policy makers and investors about abatement costs numerical simulations indicate that the quota price most likely will be several times higher than marginal abatement costs unless a significant share of allowances is auctioned

price cap versus rate of return regulation in a stochastic cost model a stochastic cost model is used to show that both price cap and rate of return regulation lead to overinvestment in capital and to excessive managerial slack however they differ in stochastic versus fixed intervals between hearings and in the use of test year costs versus average costs since the previous hearing a numerical example illustrates that fixed intervals between hearings improve welfare if hearings are not held too frequently but most gains go to the firm more significantly the use of average cost data combined with fixed intervals results in dramatic welfare improvements with most gains going to consumers

bilateral trading in networks in many markets goods flow from initial producers to final customers travelling through many layers of intermediaries and information is asymmetric we study a dynamic model of bargaining in networks that captures these features we show that the equilibrium price demanded over time is non monotonic but the sequence of transaction prices declines over time with the possible exception of the last period the price dynamic is therefore reminiscent of fire sales and hot potato trading traders who intermediate the object arise endogenously and make a positive profit the profit earning intermediaries are not necessarily traders with many connections for the case of multilayer networks they belong to the path that reaches the maximum number of potential buyers using the minimal number of intermediaries this is not necessarily the path of the network that maximizes the probability of consumption by traders who value the most the object i e welfare

transaction costs information technologies and the choice of marketplace among farmers in northern ghana using a transactions costs framework we examine the impact of information and communication technologies mobile phones and radios use on market participation in developing country agricultural markets using a novel transaction level data set of ghanaian farmers our analysis of the choice of markets by farmers suggests that market information from a broader range of markets may not always induce farmers to sell in more distant markets instead farmers may use broader market information to enhance their bargaining power in closer markets finally we find weak evidence on the impact of using mobile phones in attracting farm gate buyers

is it enough evidence from a natural experiment in india s agriculture markets access to information and communication technologies icts such as mobile phone networks is widely known to improve market efficiency in this paper we examine whether access to timely and accurate information provided through ict applications has any additional impact using a detailed data set from reuters market light rml a text message service in india that provides daily price information to market participants we find that this information reduces the geographic price dispersion of crops in rural communities by an average of 12 over and above access to mobile phone technology and other means of communication to identify the effect of information on price dispersion we exploit a natural experiment where bulk text messages were banned unexpectedly across india for 12 days in 2010 we find that besides reducing geographic price dispersion rml also increases the rate at which prices converge across india over time we discuss the implications of this for development organizations and informat

market power and transferable property rights the appeal of using markets as a means of allocating scarce resources stems in large part from the assumption that a market will approximate the competitive ideal when competition is not a foregone conclusion the question naturally arises as to how a firm might manipulate the market to its own advantage this paper analyzes the issue of market power in the context of markets for transferable property rights first a model is developed that explains how a single firm with market power might exercise its influence this is followed by an examination of the model in the context of a particular policy problem the control of particulate sulfates in the los angeles region

harmonization and side payments in political cooperation for two districts or countries that try to internalize externalities i analyze a bargaining game under private information i derive conditions for when it is efficient with uniform policies across regions with and without side payments and when it is efficient to prohibit side payments in the negotiations while policy differentiation and side payments allow the policy to better reflect local conditions they create conflicts between the regions and thus delay the results also describe when political centralization outperforms decentralized cooperation and they provide a theoretical foundation for the controversial uniformity assumption traditionally used by the fiscal federalism literature

small pollution markets tradable permits versus revelation mechanisms abstract a simple two period model with two polluters is analyzed they emit a homogeneous hazardous substance and they are given tradable permits to pollute the social planner issues permits and tries to learn the cost of reducing pollution by observing the quantity of permits traded in the first period it is shown that although efficient trade is prevented by strategic considerations by the polluters the planner learns something from observing only quantities comparisons are made between this approach and that of mechanism design and it is concluded that the latter is superior in theory but sensitive to collusion by the firms

getting prices right the impact of the market information service in uganda the market information service project in uganda collected data on prices for the main agricultural commodities in major market centers and disseminated the information through local fmradio stations in various districts exploiting the variation across space between households with and without access to a radio we find evidence suggesting that better informed farmers managed to bargain for higher farm gate prices on their surplus production

a presumptive pigovian tax complementing regulation to mimic an emissions fee if regulations are used to make cars and fuels cleaner should gasoline taxes be used to manage demand for trips that pollute anaysis of a well composed program for mexico city indicates that the emission reductions would cost 24 percent more if a tax on gasoline was not introduced a simple analytical framework is developed to analyze the use of abatement requirements to make cars cleaner and a gasoline tax to economize on the use of cars the two instruments should be combined to mimic the incentives that would have beeen provided by an emissions fee thus cleaner cars and fewer trips are analogous to competing suppliers of emission reductions the planner should buy from both so that marginal costs are equal applying that rule the marginal cost of emission reductions is simply the gasoline tax rate divided by emissions per liter

output based allocation of emissions permits for mitigating tax and trade interactions the allocation of tradable emissions permits has important efficiency as well as distributional effects when tax and trade distortions are taken into account we compare different rules for allocating carbon allowances within sectors lumpsum grandfathering output based allocation oba auctioning and among sectors historical emissions or value added shares the output subsidies implicit in oba mitigate tax interactions unlike grand fathering oba with sectoral distributions based on value added is similar to revenue recycling with auctioning oba based on historical emissions supports heavier polluters more effectively counter acting carbon leakage but at higher welfare costs less energy intensive sectors are also sensitive to allocation rules

a holistic network model for supply chain analysis abstract supply chain researchers are experiencing a conceptual and analytical paradox they are asked to move beyond dyadic analyses and investigate larger network effects with only a limited analytical toolkit this research proposes the use of bilinear mixed modeling to holistically analyze supply chain phenomena through this approach researchers are able to account for multiple supply chain relationships higher order dependencies among member firms and simultaneously evaluate covariates from buyer and seller perspectives the model is validated through the lens of a pervasive supply chain problem commonly referred to as the bullwhip effect a sample of firms from the us apparel industry in 2004 is analyzed and then the findings are confirmed using data from 2005 in addition to validating the model through the presence of the bullwhip effect the bilinear model illuminates variables such as advertising price deals inventory turnover and inventory backlogs that exacerbate or diminish inventory differences between firms in a supply chain the results extend research on supply networks and supply efficiency to a more holistic level and show that higher order dependencies are important drivers of supply chain phenomena