on the option to invest in pollution control under a regime of tradable emissions allowances optimal decisions of a firm facing the option of retrofitting its plant to reduce pollution and thereby eliminate the need to purchase emissions allowances are analysed the decision is treated as a real option with the price of pollution permits following a known stochastic process the model is formulated as a set of one dimensional partial differential equations at discrete points in time the firm owner makes optimal decisions about the retrofit including whether to mothball temporarily the model is used to analyse a firm s decision to instal a scrubber as a result of the 1990 u s clean air act jel classification q25 d81 g31 sur la possibilite d investir dans le controle de la pollution dans un regime de permis d emission de pollution echangeables commercialement ce memoire examine les decisions optimales d une entreprise face a la possibilite d adapter ses installations pour reduire la pollution et ce faisant d eliminer le besoin de se procurer des permis d emission de pollution sur le marche le decision est traitee comme une option reelle ou le prix des permis resulte d un processus stochastique connu le modele est formule sous forme d un ensemble d equations differentielles partielles a une dimension a des points discontinus dans le temps le proprietaire de l entreprise prend des decisions optimales de mise a niveau des installations y compris la possibilite de les fermer temporairement le modele est utilise pour analyser une decision d installer un epurateur suite a la mise en place de la loi americaine de 1990 clean air act

the characteristics of individual analysts forecasts in europe abstract this study investigates the determinants of financial analysts forecasts differential accuracy in 14 different european stock markets using the i b e s detail history database i find that european financial analysts forecast accuracy is positively associated with analyst firm specific experience forecast accuracy is negatively associated with the number of countries followed by analysts and the age of the forecast surprisingly i find no relationship between forecast accuracy and analysts job experience and the size of the bank employing the analyst

investment policy with time to build abstract most capital projects have an implementation lag we examine the effect of implementation lag on a levered firm s investment decision the main finding is that implementation lag can potentially have a substantial effect on a levered company s investment trigger and this effect can be significantly different from that of an unlevered company the exact relationship between lag and investment trigger depends on the level of debt used by the firm for an optimally levered firm a crucial determinant of the lag investment relationship is the fraction of investment cost that has to be incurred upfront if this fraction is small investment trigger is a decreasing function of implementation lag and the effect can be economically significant if this fraction is large investment trigger can be either increasing or decreasing in lag depending on parameter values but the magnitude of the effect is not large optimally levering a firm makes the implementation lag more investment friendly relative to an unlevered firm thus it is possible that the lag has a negative effect on investment if the firm is unlevered but a positive effect if the same firm is optimally levered for an optimally levered firm implementation lag generally has a non negative effect on investment

debt in industry equilibrium this article shows 1 how entry and exit of firms in a competitive industry affect the valuation of securities and optimal capital structure and 2 how given a trade off between tax advantages and agency costs a firm will optimally adjust its leverage level after it is set up we derive simple pricing expressions for corporate debt in which the price elasticity of demand for industry output plays a crucial role when a firm optimally adjusts its leverage over time we show that total firm value comprises the value of discounted cash flows assuming fixed capital structure plus a continuum of options for marginal increases in debt article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

another look at the role of the industrial structure of markets for international diversification strategies abstract this paper re examines the extent to which gains from international diversification are due to differences in industrial structure across countries recent papers by roll 1992 journal of finance 47 3 42 and heston and rouwenhorst 1994 journal of financial economics 36 3 27 investigate this issue and find conflicting evidence using a new database the dow jones world stock index with coverage in 25 countries and over 66 industry classifications we decompose comprehensively both country and industrial sources of variation we confirm that little of the variation in country index returns can be explained by their industrial composition we also uncover differences in the proportion of variation in industry index returns that is captured by country and industry factors and discuss the implications for global diversification strategies

analyzing the analysts career concerns and biased earnings forecasts this paper examines the career concerns of security analysts we relate long histories of their earnings forecasts to job separations we find that relatively accurate past forecasts lead to favorable career outcomes such as remaining at or moving up to a high status large prestigious brokerage house controlling for accuracy optimistic forecasts relative to the consensus increase the chances of favorable job separations job separations depend much less on accuracy for analysts who cover stocks that are underwritten by their brokerage houses such analysts are also much more likely to be rewarded for optimistic forecasts than other analysts furthermore job separations were much less sensitive to accuracy and somewhat more sensitive to optimism during the stock market mania of the late 1990s these findings suggest that the well documented analyst forecast optimism bias is likely due to incentives to promote stocks

optimal timing problems in environmental economics abstract because of the uncertainties and irreversibilities that are often inherent in environmental degradation its prevention and its economic consequences environmental policy design can involve important problems of timing i use a simple two period model to illustrate these optimal timing problems and their implications for environmental policy i then lay out and solve a continuous time model of policy adoption in which the policy itself entails sunk costs and environmental damage is irreversible the model generalizes earlier work in that it includes two stochastic state variables one captures uncertainty over environmental change and the other captures uncertainty over the social costs of environmental damage solutions of the model are used to show the implications of these two types of uncertainty for the timing of policy adoption

an equilibrium model of investment under uncertainty this paper analyzes the optimal investment decisions of heterogeneous rms in a competitive uncertain environment we characterize rms optimal investment strategy explicitly and derive a closed form solution for rm value we show that in the strategic equilibrium real option premia are signi cant as a result rms delay investment choosing optimally not to undertake some positive npv projects the model predicts that rm returns vary over the business cycle with returns negatively skewed during expansions but positively skewed in recessions

information revelation through option exercise in many real world situations agents must formulate option exercise strategies with imperfect information in such a setting agents may infer the private signals of other agents through their observed exercise strategies the building of an office building the drilling of an exploratory oil well and the commitment of a pharmaceutical company toward the research of a new drug all convey private information to other market participants this article develops an equilibrium framework for option exercise games with asymmetric private information many interesting aspects of the patterns of equilibrium exercise are analyzed in particular informational cascades where agents ignore their private information and jump on the exercise bandwagon may arise endogenously article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

bank competition and credit standards this article offers an explanation for the substantial variation of credit standards and price competition among banks over the business cycle as the economic outlook improves the average default probabilities of borrowers decline this affects the profitability of screening and causes bank screening intensity to display an inverse u shape as a function of economic prospects low screening activity in expansions creates intense price competition among lenders and loans are extended to lower quality borrowers as the economic outlook worsens price competition diminishes and credit standards tighten significantly deposit insurance may contribute to the countercyclical variation of credit standards copyright 2004 oxford university press

considering the investment decisions with real options games approach abstract the mix of games theory with the real options has been a dynamic range of exploration in the most recent decade the engaging quality of the specialists for displaying aggressive speculation choices by blending ideas from both hypotheses is on account of a venture choice in a focused business sector can be seen in its substance as a game between firms in this paper we expand a model to consider finite horizon real option games under incomplete information with various parameters in incomplete information games firms actions express significant information about profitability to contestants the encapsulation of this information proposed original blocks in models with strategic interactions this is because of circularity where best exercise decisions are based on previous decisions taken which at a given time are quiet to be mentioned because about the dynamic programming principle we expand an extended version of the least squares monte carlo algorithm to confront these results the model can aid in understanding the relation between strategic optionality and information besides how this influences the best decision policy and its value results we find the informational feature is of great significance for firms best decision policy and optimization of project values

multi stage product development with exploration value enhancing preemptive and innovation options abstract we provide a real options framework for the analysis of product development that incorporates research and exploration actions product attribute value enhancing actions with uncertain outcome as well as preemption and innovation options we derive two stage analytic formulas and propose a general multi period solution using a numerical lattice approach our analysis reveals that exploration actions are more important when the project is out or at the money near zero npv and less important for high project values in a multi stage setting exploration actions are important even for in the money projects when follow on actions exist that can enhance the expected value of the project with path dependency early actions are more valuable since they enhance the impact or reduce the cost of subsequent actions preemptive controls affecting rare event jump frequency and innovations that introduce positive jumps are more valuable for firms with higher frequency of competitive threats involving low volatility

strategic growth options we provide a strategic rationale for growth options under uncertainty and imperfect competition in a market with strategic competition investment confers a greater capability to take advantage of future growth opportunities this strategic advantage leads to the capture of a greater share of the market either by dissuading entry or by inducing competitors to make room for the stronger competitor as a result of this strategic effect payoffs are in a rough sense more convex than in the case of no investment in a growth option when the strategic advantage is strong increased uncertainty encourages investment in growth options higher uncertainty means more opportunity rather than simply larger risk if the strategic effect is weak the reverse is true on the other hand an increase in systematic risk discourages the acquisition of growth options our results contradict the view that volatility is a strong disincentive for investment

real options theory in international business the last quarter century has witnessed substantial growth in applications of real options theory rot to international business ib research in this review we explicate the core rot concepts in the ib context and discuss the contributions of rot based research to three core ib issues timing and scale of market entry or exit entry mode and governance form and the role of multinational networks based on our review we propose a holistic rot view of the multinational enterprise that synthesizes the insights of existing studies finally to move the field forward we highlight key questions and challenges in current rot based work provide a more precise definition of exogenous and endogenous uncertainty suggest empirical designs to test unique rot predictions and explore areas where rot can be combined with other theoretical perspectives to better understand ib phenomena

capital requirements monetary policy and aggregate bank lending theory and empirical evidence capital requirements linked solely to credit risk are shown to increase equilibrium credit rationing and lower aggregate lending the model predicts that the bank s decision to lend will cause an abnormal runup in the borrower s stock price and that this reaction will be greater the more capital constrained the bank i provide empirical support for this prediction the model explains the recent inability of the federal reserve to stimulate bank lending by increasing the money supply i show that increasing the money supply can either raise or lower lending when capital requirements are linked only to credit risk the motivation of this article is first to examine the impact of risk based capital requirements namely those that link mandatory capital to asset ratios for banks to their loans on aggregate bank lending these requirements called the basle capital rules or bis guidelines went into effect in march 1989 for banks in the leading industrialized nations these rules initially required banks to maintain capital equal to 7 25 percent of business and most consumer loans with the requirement increasing to 8 percent by the end of 1992 secondly i wish to understand the link between monetary policy and aggregate bank credit in the presence of risk based capital requirements my curiosity is sparked in part by two recent phenomena one is the experience of the u s economy which displayed sluggish growth during 1989 93 despite a monetary policy that attempted to spur bank lending and economic activity and the other is the striking decline in loans relative to security holdings mostly government bonds in the asset portfolios of u s

does industrial structure explain the benefits of international diversification abstract we examine the influence of industrial structure on the cross sectional volatility and correlation structure of country index returns for 12 european countries between 1978 and 1992 we find that industrial structure explains very little of the cross sectional difference in country return volatility and that the low correlation between country indices is almost completely due to country specific sources of return variation diversification across countries within an industry is a much more effective tool for risk reduction than industry diversification within a country

irreversible investment and r d spillovers in a dynamic duopoly investments in new production processes usually involve a significant amount of rd an increase in uncertainty delaying the equilibrium calls for higher subsidization rates third numerical simulations show that the spillover reduces the difference between the leader s and the follower s maximum value functions accordingly our model can help generate realistic market betas

financial analyst characteristics and herding behavior in forecasting this study classifies analysts earnings forecasts as herding or bold and finds that 1 boldness likelihood increases with the analyst s prior accuracy brokerage size and experience and declines with the number of industries the analyst follows consistent with theory linking boldness with career concerns and ability 2 bold forecasts are more accurate than herding forecasts and 3 herding forecast revisions are more strongly associated with analysts earnings forecast errors actual earnings forecast than are bold forecast revisions thus bold forecasts incorporate analysts private information more completely and provide more relevant information to investors than herding forecasts

debt contracts and financial intermediation with costly screening we develop a credit market model with adverse selection where risk neutral bor rowers self select because lenders make use of a costly screening technology equilibrium contracts are debt contracts and this is robust to randomization in contrast to results for the costly state verification model this framework permits optimal financial intermediary structures in that there is delegated screening in equilibrium if many borrowers are required to fund individual investment projects contrats de dette et internendiation financiere quand le tamisage est couteux les auteurs developpent un modele de marche du credit avec selection adverse otu les emprunteurs qui sont neutres par rapport au risque se selectionnent eux memes parce que les pr6teurs utilisent une technologie de tamisage qui est cohteuse les contrats d equilibre sont des contrats de dette et ces resultats s averent robustes meme quand on utilise des processus au hasard contrairement a ce qui se passe dans le cas du modele cooteux de verification par l etat ce cadre d analyse suggere des structures d intermediation financiere optimales en ce que en equilibre il y a delegation du tamisage si plusieurs emprunteurs sont necessaires pour

a theory of exit in duopoly we develop a duopoly model in which exit occurs because of the existence of fixed costs or opportunity costs each firm enters the market knowing its own cost but not that of its opponent as times goes on each firm becomes increasingly pessimistic about the cost of its remaining rival the time of exit is the only strategic variable so that our model is a war of attrition in contrast to the classic war of attrition however we assume that with positive probability each firm s costs may be low enough that staying in forever is a dominant strategy thus our model unlike the classic one has a unique equilibrium

informed lending and security design we examine the role of security design when lenders make inefficient accept or reject decisions after screening projects lenders may be either too conservative in which case they reject positive npv projects or too aggressive in which case they accept negative npv projects in the first case the uniquely optimal security is debt in the second case it is levered equity in equilibrium profitable projects that are relatively likely to break even are financed with debt while less profitable projects are financed with equity highly profitable projects are financed by uninformed arm slength lenders professional lenders have specialized expertise in screening projects unlike the typical entrepreneur to whom they lend they have been exposed to a wide variety of projects in the past professional lenders have experienced loan officers and analysts who know precisely what information is relevant how to treat soft information such as management quality and how to weigh the various pieces of information in making a forecast of the project s cash flows and default risk this paper examines how securities should be optimally designed when lenders make inefficient accept or reject decisions after screening projects in our model screening generates an informative albeit private signal about the project s profitability high signals indicate a positive net present value npv and low signals indicate a negative npv where the project s npv is increasing

investment in competitive equilibrium the optimality of myopic behavior there is an extensive literature on the optimal irreversible investment strategy of a solitary firm facing an exogenous price process this paper shows that the investment strategies that this literature derives may be optimal in competitive equilibrium even though the price process is now endogenous this provides a simple means for computing equilibrium investment strategies

extreme screening policies abstract we show that a lender often experiences increasing marginal returns to screening in a standard setting where the lender decides how intensively to screen the projects of prospective borrowers the increasing marginal returns imply that even small changes in industry parameters can produce large changes in equilibrium screening intensity in particular a small reduction in the expected return from borrowers projects can produce a pronounced increase in the screening of prospective borrowers with substantial corresponding welfare effects

real options and preemption under incomplete information abstract this paper introduces incomplete information and preemption into an equilibrium model of firms facing real investment decisions the optimal investment strategy may lie anywhere between the zero npv trigger level and the optimal strategy of a monopolist depending on the distribution of competitors costs and the implied fear of preemption our model implies that the equity returns of firms which hold real options and are subject to preemption will contain jumps and positive skewness

on the structure of analyst research portfolios and forecast accuracy this study provides insights into the forces and constraints that shape analyst research coverage along country and sector dimensions and the impact of the structure of an analyst s portfolio on forecast accuracy we find that analyst specialization by country and sector is sensitive to the extent to which firms within a country or sector and firms across country sectors are exposed to common economic forces the potential for revenue generation and broker culture our tests indicate that existing research on the relation between analyst portfolio structure and forecast accuracy may suffer from an endogeneity bias we use our analysis of analyst specialization to develop controls for this bias once we employ these controls we find that country diversification is associated with superior forecast accuracy however the relation between sector diversification and forecast accuracy is context specific specifically sector diversification enhances forecast accuracy in an international context while it detracts from forecast accuracy in a domestic u s context

equilibrium and options on real assets in aggregate options on real and financial assets can have very different properties typically the good or service produced by a real asset has a finite elasticity of demand and developers have finite capacities also the supply of options can be limited and developers can be less than perfectly competitive in a subgame perfect nash equilibrium with these properties the optimal exercise policy and resulting values of developed and undeveloped assets are calculated explicitly the novel comparative statics are discussed in detail article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

credit booms and lending standards evidence from the subprime mortgage market this paper links the u s subprime mortgage crisis to demand side factors that contributed to the rapid expansion of the u s mortgage market we show that denial rates were relatively lower in areas that experienced faster credit demand growth and that lenders in these high growth areas attached less weight to applicants loan to income ratios the results are robust to controlling for supply side factors including house price appreciation mortgage securitization and other economic fundamentals and to several robustness tests controlling for endogeneity the results are consistent with the notion that a relaxation of lending standards triggered by an increased demand for loans contributed to the boom and the ensuing crisis together with other supply side explanations these findings shed new light on the relationship between credit booms and financial instability

investment timing and learning externalities abstract we study a duopoly model of investment in which each player learns about the quality of a common value project by observing some public background information and possibly the experience of his rival investment costs are private information and the background signal takes the form of a poisson process conditional on the quality of the project being low the resulting attrition game has a unique symmetric equilibrium which depends on initial public beliefs we determine the impact of changes in the cost and signal distributions on investment timing and how equilibrium is affected when a first mover advantage is introduced

the impact of public ownership in the lending sector we examine the effects of increased government ownership of suppliers in the lending sector which induces increased concern with total welfare and reduced concern with profit such increased ownership of a lender can have unanticipated effects for instance it can increase lender profit furthermore borrower welfare often declines as government ownership increases in a lender with a relatively limited ability to discern the true quality of borrowers projects in addition there are settings in which increased government ownership of a lender has no impact on either lender profit or borrower welfare resume l impact de la propriete publique sur le secteur des prets les auteurs examinent les effets de la propriete gouvernementale croissante des offreurs dans le secteur des prets un phenomene qui se traduit en un plus grand interet pour le bien etre global et un interet moindre pour le profit un tel accroissement de la propriete publique peut avoir des effets non anticipes par exemple cela peut accroitre les profits des preteurs de plus le bien etre des emprunteurs decline souvent a proportion que la croissance de la propriete gouvernementale d un preteur connote une competence relativement limitee pour discerner la veritable qualite des projets des emprunteurs enfin il existe des circonstances dans lesquelles l accroissement de la propriete gouvernementale d une institution preteuse n a aucun impact soit sur le profit du preteur soit sur le bien etre de l emprunteur

learning preemption and the degree of rivalry we examine a model in which all firms receive common signals as to the uncertain profitability of an investment whose actual payoffs are split only among those who develop the project earliest the benefit from preempting rivals yields an equilibrium reduction in the amount of learning and earlier development as the number or rivals increases the set of equilibria shrinks as the number of rivals gets large and in the limit only the competitive outcome occurs

political measures for strategic environmental policy with external effects this paper investigates an environmental policy designed to reduce the emission of pollutants under uncertainty with the agent problem as an optimal stopping problem we first analyze the two cases in which there are one agent and two competing agents by following ohyama and tsujimura 2005 when we consider a model of strategic agents we need to analyze the external economic effect that is peculiar to an agent s environmental policy implementation then to improve and resolve these external effects we examine three alternative political measures comprising an environmental subsidy an environmental tax and an emission trading system the results of the analysis indicate that the environmental subsidy and environmental tax promote environmental policy however they do not create an incentive to be the leader on the other hand an emissions trading system not only promotes environmental policy but also creates an incentive for leadership

security analysts career concerns and herding of earnings forecasts several theories of reputation and herding see e g scharfstein and stein 1990 suggest that herding among agents should vary with career concerns our goal in this paper is to document whether such a link exists in the labor market for security analysts specifically we look at the relationship between an analyst s job tenure a proxy for career concerns and various measures of stock earnings forecast performance we establish the following key results 1 older analysts are more likely to produce earnings forecasts of firms before younger ones 2 their forecasts also deviate more from the consensus forecast than their younger counterparts we argue that these results are consistent with some reputational models of herding we also establish a number of auxiliary findings regarding the relationship between forecast accuracy and frequency of forecast revisions with job tenure

why bank credit policies fluctuate a theory and some evidence in a rational profit maximizing world banks should msdntain a credit policy of lending if and only if borrowers have positive net present value projects why then are changes in credit policy seemingly correlated with changes in the condition of those demanding credit this paper argues that rational bank managers with short horizons will set credit policies that influence and are influenced by other banks and demand side conditions this leads to a theory of low frequency business cycles driven by bank credit policies evidence from the banking crisis in new england in the early 1990s is consistent with the assumptions and predictions of the theory

information production dilution costs and optimal security design abstract we investigate the problem of a firm wishing to finance a project by issuing securities under asymmetric information we find that when outside investors can produce noisy information on the firm s quality the degree of information asymmetry resulting in equilibrium is endogenous and depends on the information sensitivity of the security issued thus in contrast to the prediction of the pecking order theory see e g myers and majluf j financial econom 13 1984 187 a security with low sensitivity to private information such as debt does not always dominate one with high information sensitivity such as equity a firm s preference for equity rather than debt depends on the costs of information production the precision of the information production technology and the extent of the information asymmetry we also study the optimal security design problem and find that depending on the cost and precision of the information production technology risky debt or a composite security with a convex payoff emerges as optimal securities