power systems expansion planning with time varying co2 tax abstract this article analyzes the effects of implementing a two stage carbon tax on a ten year power expansion planning model the timing effect of the tax is analyzed by studying the costs capacity investments economic dispatch and co 2 emissions in fixed flat and two stage tax schemes results show that under the absence of political economy constraints the most cost effective solution is to have a low co 2 tax in the first stage and an optimal higher tax in the final stage however early actions can be justified depending on how relevant the policy maker considers the beneficial economic and not economic outcomes of a higher first stage tax consequently focusing on a final period goal may not be the best way of facing the global warming problem if emissions saved early have an important value when preventing the consequences of climate change

knowledge spillovers and patent citations evidence from a survey of inventors it is well understood that the non rival nature of knowledge as a productive asset creates the possibility of knowledge spillovers whereby investments in knowledge creation by one party produce external benefits by facilitating innovation by other parties at least since zvi griliches s 1979 seminal paper on measuring the contributions of r d to economic growth economists have been attempting to quantify the extent and impact of knowledge spillovers one line of research of this type has utilized patent citations to identify a paper trail that may be associated with knowledge flows between firms very little of this research has attempted to determine the modes or mechanisms of communication that actually permit knowledge to flow further most of the work has simply assumed that citations or other proxies are sufficiently correlated with knowledge flows to allow statistical analysis of the proxies to be informative regarding the underlying phenomenon of interest this paper reports on a preliminary attempt to improve this situation the idea for this survey came from r d managers whom we were interviewing to test whether the picture of knowledge flows produced by patent citations was consistent with the managers impressions one of these managers commented that he could not let us talk to the scientists who worked for him but that he could not stop uls from contacting them via the postal address that appears on their issued patents the survey results suggest that communication between inventors is reasonably irnportant and that patent citations do provide an indication of communication albeit one that also carries a fair amount of noise

the case for financial laissez faire the argument for financial laissez faire or free banking is essentially very simple if free trade is generally desirable then what is wrong with free trade in the financial services sector if nothing is wrong with it the whole panoply of government intervention into the financial sector the central bank government sponsored deposit insurance and government regulation of the financial system should presumably all be abolished if there is something wrong with laissez faire on the other hand then what exactly is the problem with it why does this problem justify intervention and why does it justify the particular interventions we have such as a central bank most economists take a patently untenable position on these issues for the most part they accept the general principle of free trade but they deny that it applies to financial services yet relatively few could give a coherent defence of this position or have even thought that much about it they oppose free banking more or less instinctively as if its failings are obvious the response of course is that what is obvious is not necessarily true the history of science is full of cases where the obvious turned out to be wrong it therefore behoves us as academic economists to explore these issues more carefully and beware of assuming we already know the answers before we start before getting into detail i would like to make three general points first if free trade is good as most of us agree there must be at least a primafacie case in favour of free banking if the principle of free trade applies in general we must presume it to apply to any specific individual case unless we have clear reason to believe the contrary the onus of proof is on those who oppose free banking to demonstrate its undesirability most professional economists have the wrong priors on this issue secondly while i accept that free banking seems strange at first sight i believe this reaction mainly reflects the way we have been conditioned to think our education leads us to take certain things for granted and the need for central banking is one of them after all why else do we initially react so strongly to what is no more than the application of the generally accepted doctrine of free trade to financial services finally there is a great deal of empirical evidence on the free banking issue and this evidence is supportive of the predictions of free banking theory and in particular of its claim that unregulated banking is stable economists cannot therefore maintain that free banking has never been tried nor that it has been tried and failed the evidence also supports the predictions made by free banking theory that intervention generally weakens the financial system and causes the very problems it is ostensibly meant to cure by contrast the evidence is also inconsistent with opposing theories that have been suggested as providing justifications for central banking

banking panics information and rational expectations equilibrium this paper shows that bank runs can be modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon we demonstrate that some aspects of the intuitive story that bank runs start with fears of insolvency of banks can be rigorously modeled if individuals observe long lines at the bank they correctly infer that there is a possibility that the bank is about to fail and precipitate a bank run however bank runs occur even when no one has any adverse information extra market constraints such as suspension of convertibility can prevent bank runs and result in superior allocations banking panics were a recurrent phenomenon in the united states until the 1930s they have re emerged as a source of public concern and much theoretical research recently in this paper we provide an information theoretic rationale for bank runs the traditional story is that contagion is an important aspect of bank runs the idea seems to be that when the general public observes large withdrawals from the banking system fears of insolvency grow resulting in even larger withdrawals of deposits in our model some individuals withdraw because they get information that future returns are likely to be low uninformed individuals observing this also have an incentive to liquidate their investments in addition some individuals need to withdraw deposits for other than informationally based reasons thus if the random realization of such a group of individuals is unusually large then the uninformed individuals will be misled and will precipitate a run on the bank the technology is such that a large volume of withdrawals involves liquidation costs consequently runs on the bank do impose social costs a mechanism that may reduce these costs in our model is to suspend convertibility if withdrawals are high however those individuals who need to withdraw their assets for liquidity reasons are worse off ex post our model provides a rationalization for restrictions in demand deposits that were widespread prior to 1929 friedman and schwartz 7 suggest that restrictions of payments ensured

trade policy in a super size me world abstract when a foreign monopolist sets a single market clearing price for its product the sign of the optimal tariff is determined by the extent of pass through also known as the terms of trade effect however when a foreign monopolist employs a second degree price discrimination mechanism in the domestic market the calculus of welfare maximization is very different while there are still terms of trade effects from the imposition of a tariff the existence of such effects are neither necessary nor sufficient to determine the sign of the optimal tariff instead the distribution of valuations within the population is the key determinant of the nature of policy intervention this result differs significantly from the uniform price case and is driven by the incentive compatibility constraint which places the distribution of types at the center of the analysis if there is a relatively large fraction of high valuation types in the population then domestic information rents may be increased by subsidizing imports thereby increasing the consumption of the low valuation types and moving the incentive constraint in favor of the high valuation types however if the share of high types in the population is relatively small then the increase in information rents will also be small but the fiscal implications of a subsidy will be large consequently the optimal policy will be to impose a trade tax

alternative forms of deposit insurance pricing and bank incentive issues abstract this paper derives formulas for a deposit insuring agency s liability and hence a fair value deposit insurance premium and the equilibrium value of bank equity considering a wide variety of factors affecting individual bank risk both fixed rate and variable rate risk sensitive insurance systems are analyzed consideration is made as to whether the deposit insuring agency makes direct payments to depositors or arranges mergers following bank closings the effect of these various policy choices on banks incentive for risk taking is also analyzed

optimal bank reorganization and the fair pricing of deposit guarantees abstract when should regulators close a financially ailing bank fdic practice in the us has moved in the direction of early closure in contrast banking regulators in japan continue to follow a more patient approach this paper analyses a series of models in which closure rules and bailout policies arise endogenously through the interaction of i regulators attempts to minimize discounted expected bankruptcy costs and ii equity holders incentives to recapitalise banks we characterize subsidy policies for distressed banks that implement socially optimal closure rules at minimum financial cost to regulators and which reduce moral hazard

pricing risk adjusted deposit insurance an option based model this paper presents a methodology for arriving at empirical estimates of deposit insurance premiums from market data by using isomorphic relationships betweeen equity and a call option and insurance and a put option the data utilizes the market value of equity to solve for the asset value and its volatility market perceptions of fdic bailout policies are explicitly modeled so as to eliminate the bias in inverted values of assets and their volatility sensitivity analyses are performed to show that rank orderings based on premiums are robust to changes in specification thus facilitating allocation of aggregate premium across banks while economists have long argued in favor of risk adjusted deposit insurance as both more equitable and more efficient than the current system of flatrate premiums various recent developments have further contributed to an increasing dissatisfaction with the current system first both the banking industry and the government seem to be tending to the view that deregulation of the banking industry would be necessary in order to meet more sophisticated future demands on the industry as well as desirable as a policy means of stimulating greater competition among banks moreover a sudden rise in the incidence of bank failures 1 and the vulnerability of the u s banks to the socalled international debt crisis have served to bring to the fore concern about the health of the banking industry in the absence of deposit insurance riskier banks will be able to attract deposits only at higher rates and these higher costs of funding serve as built in market regulated incentives to limit excessive risk taking by banks as introduction of deposit insurance makes deposits equally risk free across banks these incentives disappear and regulation and close supervision of the banking industry must necessarily replace them as deterrents to excessive risk taking thus when insurance is offered at a flat premium regulation is designed to ensure that the risk posed to the insurer both asset and financial risk is appropriately uniform

carbon tax or emissions trading an analysis of economic and political feasibility of policy mechanisms for greenhouse gas emissions reduction in the mexican power sector this study provides a comparative assessment of carbon pricing instruments for the mexican electricity sector contrasting a carbon tax with an emissions trading scheme ets the assessment is per

patenting in the shadow of competitors this article empirically examines the patenting behavior of new biotechnology firms that have different litigation costs i show that firms with high litigation costs are less likely to patent in subclasses with many other awards particularly those of firms with low litigation costs this pattern is consistent with the literature on costly litigation which suggests that firms that have high litigation costs will take greater precautions to avoid litigation these results are robust to a variety of control variables and modifications that seek to test alternative explanations

insuring banks against liquidity shocks the role of deposit insurance and lending of last resort it has long been recognized that banks simultaneous provision of monitoring and liquidity services is advantageous but leaves them susceptible to liquidity shocks that may culminate in a system failure because a system failure is costly this provides a rationale for adopting arrangements including a lender of last resort and deposit insurance di to insure banks against liquidity shocks these arrangements have proven themselves very successful but they have also been the source of problems researchers have identified some of the main sources of these problems and have suggested ways to improve the design of these arrangements but there are still many issues that remain unaddressed this paper reviews the literature on the two arrangements that most countries have adopted to insure banks against liquidity shocks a lender of last resort and di and compares the design of these arrangements across countries the paper ends with a brief summary of the key lessons learned about the design of these arrangements and the issues related to them that remain unaddressed copyright blackwell publishers ltd 2006

regulating banks through market discipline a survey of the issues abstract the interest in the application of market discipline to regulate the financial industry has boomed recently due to the proposed new capital accord this paper reviews the potential role market discipline can play in financial regulation we start with a discussion of the rationale for financial regulation and with a brief history of the current regulatory mechanisms next a definition of market discipline as a regulatory mechanism is advanced we evaluate the disciplining power various market participants have finally we argue that more external risk management disclosure is a condition sine qua non in order to enable market discipline as a regulatory mechanism in this respect the basle committee has taken the right approach

supplementing an emissions tax by a feed in tariff for renewable electricity to address learning spillovers abstract in the presence of learning spillovers related to renewable energy technologies an optimal strategy to mitigate climate change should complement an emissions tax by a subsidy for renewables this article addresses the question how such subsidy should be designed it is shown that the widely used approach of a revenue neutral fixed feed in tariff can yield an optimal outcome under restrictive conditions only it has to be adapted continuously as the electricity price changes moreover funding the tariff by a surcharge on the electricity price has important implications for the design of the emission tax the optimal tax rate has to be below the pigovian level differentiated across fossil fuels and adapted over time as the patterns of technological development change these requirements may pose a formidable challenge for practical decision making however it is important to point out that the eventual choices made with respect to the design and funding of a feed in tariff have to be based on a careful and more comprehensive policy assessment including inter alia economic effects beyond the electricity sector and existing institutional constraints

a three level static milp model for generation and transmission expansion planning we present a three level equilibrium model for the expansion of an electric network the lower level model represents the equilibrium of a pool based market the intermediate level represents the nash equilibrium in generation capacity expansion taking into account the outcomes on the spot market and the upper level model represents the anticipation of transmission expansion planning to the investment in generation capacity and the pool based market equilibrium the demand has been considered as exogenous and locational marginal prices are obtained as endogenous variables of the model the three level model is formulated as a mixed integer linear programming milp problem the model is applied to a realistic power system in chile to illustrate the methodology and proper conclusions are reached

the impact of contingent liability on commercial bank risk taking abstract from 1863 1935 regulators imposed contingent liability on bank shareholders to discourage risk taking using data from 1900 to 1915 i find that banks subject to stricter liability rules have lower equity and asset volatility hold a lower proportion of risky assets and are less likely to increase their investment in risky assets when their net worth declines consistent with the hypothesis that stricter liability discourages commercial bank risk taking these findings provide lessons for current bank regulatory policy and show that the shape of the residual claimant s payoff function has a significant impact on managerial incentives and firm performance

foreign direct investment and intellectual property rights evidence from hollywood s global distribution of movies and videos abstract traditional thinking about intellectual property rights ipr suggests that as a country strengthens its ipr standards firms will move their governance structures away from equity based institutions such as foreign direct investment fdi towards more market based relations such as licensing agreements this hypothesis is explored by examining the behavior of hollywood studios in both the feature film and video markets in 40 foreign countries the analysis reveals that the behavior of hollywood studios is more complex than this although moderate iprs are associated with a high degree of licensing both high and low standards of ipr encourage more integrated governance structures

reaping what you sow an empirical analysis of international patent harmonization abstract this paper extends analysis of the gatt uruguay round by quantifying the impact of international patent harmonization as implied by the trips agreement patent harmonization has the capacity to generate large transfers of income between countries the us being the major beneficiary developing countries are major contributors to these transfers but canada the uk and japan also make sizable contributions

information reliability and a theory of financial intermediation this paper is an analysis of when it will be beneficial for agents engaged in the production of information to form coalitions the model is cast in a financial market framework thus leading to an identification of conditions sufficient for the existence of financial intermediaries intermediation is shown to improve welfare if informational asymmetries are present and the information generated to rectify these asymmetries is potentially unreliable the usual appeal to transactions costs to explain intermediation is not needed

an incentive approach to banking regulation we examine the optimal design of a risk adjusted deposit insurance scheme when the regulator has less information than the bank about the inherent risk of the bank s assets adverse selection and when the regulator is unable to monitor the extent to which bank resources are being directed away from normal operations toward activities that lower asset quality moral hazard under a socially optimal insurance scheme 1 asset quality is below the first best level 2 higher quality banks have larger asset bases and face lower capital adequacy requirements than lower quality banks and 3 the probability of failure is equated across banks perihaps t he most troubling aspect of the current deposit insurance system is the distortions caused by the pervasive use of an insurance premium that is independent of risk the undesirable incentives that result when such a system is employed in a world with imperfect information have long been recognized in the literature of particular concern is the incentive banks have to increase the risk of their portfolio in order to maximize the value of the deposit insurance provided in some respects this problem is similar to the incentives generated by corporate debt however the solution to this problem may be different in a banking context because the creditors include the deposit insurer who has the power to regulate the banks conceivably regulation may be able to mitigate the informational problem at hand in this paper we examine some of the tradeoffs that arise in the design of a regulatory system for banks

solutions to the moral hazard problem arising from the lender of last resort facility the provision of liquid funds via a lender of last resort facility has been the chief means by which governments have chosen to prevent or stay bank runs the introduction of such a facility however leads to a moral hazard problem which weakens each financial manager s commitment to sound banking and hence may ultimately make the few bank runs which do occur more dramatic in both size and seriousness in this paper i provide a survey of the various policy measures which have been proposed to mitigate the effects of the moral hazard problem arising from the introduction of a lender of last resort facility

political economy constraints on carbon pricing policies what are the implications for economic efficiency environmental efficacy and climate policy design abstract economists traditionally view a pigouvian fee on carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions either via carbon taxes or emissions caps and permit trading cap and trade as the economically optimal or first best policy to address climate change related externalities yet several political economy factors can severely constrain the implementation of these carbon pricing policies including opposition of industrial sectors with a concentration of assets that would lose considerable value under such policies the collective action nature of climate mitigation efforts principal agent failures and a low willingness to pay for climate mitigation by citizens real world implementations of carbon pricing policies can thus fall short of the economically optimal outcomes envisioned in theory consistent with the general theory of the second best the presence of binding political economy constraints opens a significant opportunity space for the design of creative climate policy instruments with superior political feasibility economic efficiency and environmental efficacy relative to the constrained implementation of carbon pricing policies this paper presents theoretical political economy frameworks relevant to climate policy design and provides corroborating evidence from the united states context it concludes with a series of implications for climate policy making and argues for the creative pursuit of a mix of second best policy instruments

determinants of patent rights a cross national study abstract this paper presents an index of patent rights for 110 countries for the period 1960 1990 the index is used to examine what factors or characteristics of economies determine how strongly patent rights will be protected the evidence does indicate that more developed economies tend to provide stronger protection but the underlying factors which influence patent protection levels are the country s level of research and development r d activity market environment and international integration which are correlated with its level of development the results qualify however that r d activity influences patent protection levels after a nation s research sector reaches a critical size an implication of this is that to raise patent protection levels in weakly protecting countries it is important to foster a significant research base in those countries and thereby create incentives for protecting patent rights

is relationship lending special evidence from credit file data in germany the german financial market is often characterized as a bank based system with strong bank customer relationships the corresponding notion of a housebank is closely related to the theoretical idea of relationship lending it is the objective of this paper to provide a direct comparison between housebanks and normal banks as to their credit policy therefore we analyze a new data set representing a random sample of borrowers drawn from the credit portfolios of five leading german banks over a period of five years we use credit file data rather than industry survey data and thus focus the analysis on information that is directly related to actual credit decisions in particular we use bank internal borrower rating data to evaluate borrower quality and the bank s own assessment of its housebank status to control for information intensive relationships the major results of our study support the view that housebanks are able to establish a distinct behavioral pattern consistent with the idea of long term commitment we find that housebanks do provide liquidity insurance in situations of unexpected deterioration of borrower ratings with respect to loan pricing we find no evidence for intra or intertemporal price differentiation related to housebanking

distinguishing panics and information based bank runs welfare and policy implications in this paper we contrast panics and information based bank runs in an effort to provide a robust and empirically plausible model of how bank runs are triggered the model of information based runs is characterized by two sided asymmetric information the bank cannot observe the true liquidity needs of the depositors while depositors are asymmetrically informed about bank asset quality we also examine the relative degrees of risk sharing provided by bank deposit contracts and traded equity contracts we show that the choice of deposit or equity depends on the attributes of and information about the underlying investment returns

deposit insurance and the discount window pricing under asymmetric information the risk sensitive pricing of deposit insurance and the discount window is determined in an environment where banks have private information concerning their financial conditions the two facilities are managed jointly an incentive compatible policy is designed such that banks choice of terms at which they can obtain insurance and access to discount window credit will reveal their asset quality the function of the discount window is to be a risk neutral lender of last resort to banks in a market dominated by risk averse depositors the need to regulate banks is commonly linked to the risk independent pricing of deposit insurance in that it provides banks with an incentive to increase their risk taking activities 1 critics of the present system have long advocated risk sensitive deposit insurance premiums and a literature is emerging that examines the variety of such pricing schemes 2 this literature typically assumes that the public insuring agency has the same information as the bank concerning the quality of the bank s assets this is both implausible and potentially misleading the bank normally has superior information concerning its assets a pricing policy that ignores this informational asymmetry is likely to provide banks with similar risk taking incentives that is associated with the current riskinsensitive pricing arrangement kane 6 p 275 for example appreciates this aspect of the problem i t is necessary not only to reprice but also to redesign the existing system the fdic and fslic must develop incentive compatible my emphasis insurance contracts and price them fairly contractual incentives must be established that would allow a low risk institution to lower its premiums by communicating to the insurance agency what its own managers know about the institution s own exposure therefore as kane argues a redesigned insurance system is needed that would provide incentives to the banks to truthfully reveal the necessary information and thereby facilitate the efficient pricing of the risk shifted to the public insurer a variety of pricing policies that involve a bank s choice of capital or asset liability composition

does deposit insurance increase banking system stability an empirical investigation based on evidence of 61 countries in 1980 97 the authors find that explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is weak the adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank stability tends to be stronger the more extensive is the coverage offered to depositors and where the scheme is funded and run by the government rather than the private sector

deposit insurance and lender of last resort functions we consider issues concerning the design of a banking system safety net when both a deposit insurer and a lender of last resort are present in our model both entities have a role to play moreover issues related to deposit insurance pricing are relatively unimportant in this context whereas issues related to discount window access and pricing are not we discuss when and why or why not a lender of last resort should lend liberally but charge high rates of interest and we raise the possibility that discount window policy may enhance or reduce the scope for multiplicity of equilibria

optimal carbon taxes for emissions targets in the electricity sector the most dangerous effects of anthropogenic climate change can be mitigated by using emissions taxes or other regulatory interventions to reduce greenhouse gas ghg emissions this paper takes a regulatory viewpoint and describes the weighted sum bisection method to determine the lowest emission tax rate that can reduce the anticipated emissions of the power sector below a prescribed regulatorily defined target this bilevel method accounts for a variety of operating conditions via stochastic programming and remains computationally tractable for realistically large planning test systems even when binary commitment decisions and multiperiod constraints on conventional generators are considered case studies on a modified iso new england test system demonstrate that this method reliably finds the minimum tax rate that meets emissions targets in addition it investigates the relationship between system investments and the tax setting process introducing ghg emissions taxes increases the value proposition for investment in new cleaner generation transmission and energy efficiency conversely investing in these technologies reduces the tax rate required to reach a given emissions target

growth renewables and the optimal carbon tax optimal climate policy is investigated in a ramsey growth model of the global economy with exhaustible oil reserves an infinitely elastic supply of renewables stock dependent oil extraction costs and convex climate damages four regimes can occur depending on the initial social cost of oil being larger or smaller than that of renewables and depending on the initial oil stock being large or small we also offer some policy simulations for the first and second regime which illustrate that with a lower discount rate more oil is left in situ and renewables are phased in more quickly we identify the conditions under which the optimal carbon tax rises or decreases subsidizing renewables without a carbon tax induces more oil to be left in situ and a quicker phasing in of renewables but oil is depleted more rapidly initially the net effect on global warming is ambiguous abstract from author

who enjoys trips abroad an empirical analysis of intellectual property rights in the uruguay round analysis of the uruguay round is extended by quantifying the impact of the trips agreement the static costs of raising the standards of patent protection are captured by the transfers of income between countries with the majority of countries estimated to make net payments abroad the united states being a major beneficiary to offset these transfers the model provides estimates of the dynamic benefits from the greater incentive to innovate revealing that there is potential for all countries to benefit from the trips agreement in the long run however the distribution of these benefits is highly skewed towards developed countries jel classification o34 f43 qui tire profit des adpics a l etranger une analyse empirique des droits de propriete intellectuelle dans la ronde de l uruguay on analyse les decisions de la ronde de l uruguay en vue de quantifier l impact de l accord sur les droits de propriete intellectuelle qui touchent au commerce les couts statiques de normes plus elevees pour la protection des brevets sont mesures par les transferts de revenus entre pays on estime que la majorite des pays effectuent des transferts nets vers l exterieur et que les etats unis sont un beneficiaire important de ces transferts pour compenser ces transferts le modele cherche a determiner les avantages dynamiques qu il y a a encourager ainsi l innovation et montre qu il y a un potentiel de gains pour tous les pays decoulant des accords sur les adpics a plus long terme cependant la repartition de ces avantages est fortement biaisee en faveur des pays developpes

characteristics of patent litigation a window on competition we examine the patenting behavior of firms in an industry characterized by rapid technological change and cumulative innovation recent survey evidence suggests that semiconductor firms do not rely heavily on patents to appropriate returns to r d yet the propensity of semiconductor firms to patent has risen dramatically since the mid 1980s we explore this apparent paradox by conducting interviews with industry representatives and analyzing the patenting behavior of 95 u s semiconductor firms during 1979 1995 the results suggest that the 1980s strengthening of u s patent rights spawned patent portfolio races among capital intensive firms but it also facilitated entry by specialized design firms copyright 2001 by the rand corporation

bank suspension of convertibility abstract a banking panic occurs when depositors at all banks seek a large reduction in their deposit holdings suspension of convertibility of demand deposits into currency was the banking system s response to a banking panic when depositors are incompletely informed about the state of bank investments a panic can occur when depositors expect capital losses conditional on having observed noisy indicators of the state of bank investments banks with superior information about the investments can signal to depositors by suspending convertibility that continuation of the long term investments is mutually beneficial

imperfect competition risk taking and regulation in banking abstract we asses the welfare implications of banking competition under various deposit insurance regimes in a model of imperfect competition with social failure costs and where banks are subject to limited liability we study the links between competition for deposits and risk taking incentives and conclude that the welfare performance of the market and the appropriateness of alternative regulatory measures depend on the degree of rivalry and the deposit insurance regime specifically when competition is intense and the social failure costs high deposit rates are excessive both in a free market and with risk based insurance if insurance premiums are insensitive to risk then the same is true even if there is no social cost of failure we find also that in an uninsured market with nonobservable portfolio risk or with flat premium deposit insurance deposit regulation rate regulation or deposit limits and direct asset restrictions are complementary tools to improve welfare in an uninsured market with observable portfolio risk or with risk based insurance deposit regulation may be a sufficient instrument to improve welfare

moral hazard and information sharing a model of financial information gathering agencies we propose a theory of information gathering agencies in a world of informational asymmetries and moral hazard in a setting in which true firm values are certified by screening agents whose payoffs depend on noisy ex post monitors of information quality the formation of information gathering agencies groups of screening agents is justified on two grounds first it enables screening agents to diversify their risky payoffs second it allows information sharing the first effect itself is insufficient despite the risk aversion of screening agents and the stochastic independence of the monitors used to compensate them this paper develops a model that explains the formation of financial institutions which acquire and process information for the purpose of certifying asset qualities but do not get involved in funding the model makes two basic assumptions the first is that there is an informational asymmetry in the capital market involving insiders possessing more accurate information about the true economic values of their firms than outsiders and the second is that those engaged in the production of information to rectify this asymmetry can gain from sharing their information examples of the information gathering agencies iga s we study are creditrating agencies financial newsletters standard and poor s value line investment counselors credit bureaus etc iga s are distinct from funding financial intermediaries ffi s like banks and credit unions that in addition to acquiring and processing information also issue claims against themselves fund their customers needs and transform asset characteristics from a modeling standpoint a key distinction between iga s and ffi s is that in the case of the latter outsiders depositors for instance do not necessarily have to assess the quality of the intermediary s information since the intermediary can be made accountable for this quality through the positions it takes in the screened assets thus models that explain ffi s focus on how the contracts offered by the intermediary ensure information reliability without reliance on explicit monitoring on the other hand because of the absence of loan and deposit type contracts to dissipate informational problems a model explaining iga s must rely on monitoring related mechanisms

the political economy of an energy tax the united kingdom s climate change levy energy taxes designed to control energy consumption and to assist the achievement of climate change control targets under the kyoto protocol are fairly common in european union countries yet many of these taxes bear little resemblance to the design guidance that is given in economics textbooks political economy analysis in which the interaction of economics and political reality is emphasised explains the gap between theoretical ideals and practical reality a closer look at the factors that influence real world policy design should help policy oriented economists in designing measures that have a greater chance of adoption the end result may well be nth best solutions which simply have to be lived with but there may also be room for design improvements that still honour the political constraints of policy design this paper illustrates these issues in the context of one tax the uk climate change levy

federal deposit insurance regulatory policy and optimal bank capital this paper seeks to explain the combination of explicit and implicit pricing for deposit insurance employed by the fdic essentially the fdic sells two products insurance and regulation to span the product space it must and does set two prices we argue that the need to establish regulatory disincentives to bank risk taking is the heart of the controversy over the adequacy of bank capital and that the ability to close risky banks before exhausting their charter value i e the value of their right to continue in business stands at the center of these disincentives and in front of the fdic s insurance reserves just as a book shouldn t be judged by its cover a government agency shouldn t be judged by the words behind its initials with the fdic federal deposit insurance corporation the agency s name describes only part of its formal operations the fdic is quasi governmental has a regional structure and sells deposit insurance however the initials fail to convey the fdic s critical place in the governmental regulatory structure as the sole federal overseer of the approximately 8900 state chartered commercial banks that have chosen not to belong the federal reserve system reflecting the federal reserve s membership problem the number of these banks is growing year by year besides selling deposit insurance at bargain explicit rates the fdic performs four regulatory functions 1 entry regulation it passes on new banks applications for deposit insurance and on branch and merger proposals as well thereby protecting the value of existing bank charters 2 examination two thirds of fdic employees are concerned with inspecting bank records and supervising managerial activity 3 regulation of deposit rates and conditions for withdrawal by tradition fdic policies on these matters conform entirely with regulations applicable to federal reserve member banks and 4 disposition of failed banks when an insured bank fails the fdic usually chooses not to liquidate it 2

insurance by government or against government overview of public risk management policies in what contexts is it desirable that the government rather than the private sector takes on the role of an insurer and helps people reduce risks our discussion implies that while in a number of areas individuals benefit from well designed insurance provided by their government ill designed public policies for example existing pay as you go pension systems force individuals to insure against their government it is further discussed how governments could improve their risk managing role in many areas by using income contingent loans provided the country has high quality institutions and governance such loans to artists sportspeople flood victims or collapsing financial institutions would replace the existing nonrepayable transfers grants subsidies and bailouts using a simple efficiency equity sustainability framework for comparing income contingent schemes with conventional public and private insurance policies we document that this would enable governments to extend their insurance assistance to a greater number of people and institutions in a way that is not only equitable but also efficient and fiscally sustainable

welfare effects of global patent protection this paper uses a simple model of invention and patent protection to examine the welfare effects of extending patent protection from the country where invention takes place to another country that is only a consumer of invented products it is shown that while the welfare of the inventing country certainly rises with the extension of patent protection that of the other country probably falls and may well fall by more than the increase in welfare of the inventing country in particular as patent protection is extended to a larger and larger portion of the world the effect on the welfare of the world as a whole of extending it to the rest of the world becomes negative

trips trade and growth a two country model of endogenous growth is employed to assess the importance of intellectual property rights to trade growth and technology transfer the paper provides theoretical results linking the intellectual property rights regime to trade patterns aggregate r d worldwide growth and aggregate welfare measures failure to provide patent protection for foreign made innovations forces innovators to employ less than the best practice research technologies reduces aggregate r d activities worldwide effectively eliminates technology transfer across countries and reduces worldwide growth copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

deposit insurance around the world in the past two decades in a series of banking crises around the world banks have become systematically insolvent these crises have occurred in developed and developing economies alike to make such financial system breakdowns less likely and to limit their costs if they occur policymakers feel the need for financial safety nets these include such policies as implicit or explicit deposit insurance a lender of last resort function of the central bank bank insolvency resolution procedures and bank regulation and supervision of these policies explicit deposit insurance has been gaining popularity in recent years since the 1980s the number of countries with explicit deposit insurance schemes almost tripled with most oecd countries and an increasing number of developing economies adopting some form of explicit depositor protection in 1994 deposit insurance became the standard for the newly created single banking market of the european union establishing an explicit deposit insurance scheme became part of the generally accepted best practice advice given to developing economies

international patent protection 1960 2005 abstract this note provides an update to the index of patent protection published in this journal in 1997 the original paper presented the index for 1960 1990 for 110 countries the index has now been updated to 2005 and extended to 122 countries the adoption of stronger patent laws and the composition of patent rights vary across countries by level of economic development

contagious bank failures in a free banking system this paper develops a model of an unregulated banking system based around a private clearing house arrangement whilst such a system may dominate one with a public safety net in reducing moral hazard in lending and therefore the scope for individual bank insolvency it also increases the likelihood of contagious bank failures following a systemic shock or an aggregate liquidity shortage

the role of demandable debt in structuring optimal banking arrangements demandable debt finance by banks warrants explanation because it entails costs of bank suspension liquidation and idle reserve holdings an explanation is developed in which demandable debt provides incentive compatible intermediation where the banker has comparative advantage in allocating investment funds but may act against the interests of uninformed depositors demandable debt attracts funds by giving depositors an option to force liquidation its usefulness in transacting follows from information sharing between monitors and nonmonitors copyright 1991 by american economic association

when an importer s protection of ipr interacts with an exporter s level of technology comparing the impacts on the exports of the north and south using bilateral trade data of countries from 2000 to 2007 this paper contributes to the empirical literature on the role of intellectual property rights iprs in global trade the existing literature has focused on how iprs in the destination country affect exports from a source country in this paper we add an additional dimension the level of technology of the exporting country lt this is quite important for distinguishing the impact of iprs on the exports of developed and developing countries since the technology levels vary across countries at different stages of development and intellectual property rights better protect exports that are technologically advanced than exports that are imitative and potentially infringing by factoring in the level of technology lt our empirical analysis makes the case that iprs can act as a barrier to the exports from the south especially the rapidly catching up economies and thus be a source for the middle income trap phenomenon

bank capital requirements business cycle fluctuations and the basel accords a synthesis abstract in order to survey the mechanisms through which the introduction of basel ii bank capital requirements is likely to accentuate the procyclical tendencies of banking this paper brings together the theoretical literature on the bank capital channel of propagation of exogenous shocks and the literature on the regulatory framework of capital requirements under the basel accords we conclude that the theoretical models that revisit the bank capital channel under the new accord generally support the basel ii procyclicality hypothesis and that the magnitude of the procyclical effects essentially depends on i the composition of banks asset portfolios ii the approach adopted by banks to compute their minimum capital requirements iii the nature of the rating system used by banks iv the view adopted concerning how credit risk evolves through time v the capital buffers over the regulatory minimum held by the banking institutions vi the improvements in credit risk management and vii the supervisor and market intervention under basel ii the recent events and instability in financial markets all over the world have led the procyclicality issue to enter the agendas of several political international fora and some measures to mitigate procyclicality are being put forward the bank capital channel literature should now play an important role in evaluating their effectiveness

the valuation of fdic deposit insurance using option pricing estimates when congress set the premium rate for fdic deposit insurance in the banking act of 1935 which authorized a permanent federal insurance system neither experience nor theory could offer much guidance regarding an appropriate fee structure although rates have since been periodically revised the fdic has yet to attempt to set the insurance rate at a ifair level that is a level equal to administrative costs plus the ex ante value of the insurance such a premium is the rate that would be charged by competitive private insurers however7 the garn st germain act of 1982 directed the fdic to consider the feasibility of a risk based premium structure in response the fdic has suggested a trial system in which each insured bank will be placed in one of three risk classes based on credit and interest rate risk relative to capital and a premium rate will be assigned to each group those rates will be determined in part by the loss experience of the entire banking system fdic 1983 another approach to the determination of the appropriate insurance premium has been offered by merton 1977 who suggested using the analogous relationship between deposit guarantees and put options to value fdic insurance in this paper we follow merton s suggestion and calculate bank specific estimates of the proper premium for deposit insurance for the banks in our sample we find that fdic rates greatly exceed estimates of the fair value of the insurance derived from the blackscholes 1972 option pricing model

modeling the banking firm a survey this paper reports on the status of the literature on micro bank modeling and assesses our understanding of the banking firm s optimal behavior this is no mean task for much has been written on banking broadly defined over the past couple of decades the review is developed in pieces each major subproblem is outlined and the analysis used to deal with the issue explicated this is not the best way to summarize the development of a field it should be immediately recognized one would prefer to have a smooth continuum of development moving the frontier of knowledge evenly through time and across subareas yet this is rarely the way a field develops more likely individual questions attract attention and are the subjects of a substantial number of contributions after a time the field moves on to the new area of interest the banking field is no exception before embarking upon the review however a couple of lines should be devoted to previous attempts there have been essentially three first pyle 1972 analyzes the uncertainty portfolio models at a time when little existed in the literature and hence one finds the review a bit vague and sketchy baltensperger s contributions 1978 1980 are the next serious and rather extensive reviews the quality of these

moral hazard optimal unemployment insurance and experience rating abstract this paper is concerned with evaluating alternative unemployment insurance ui schemes in a dynamic economy with moral hazard we consider changes in the size and duration of ui benefits and the effects of experience rating and use a dynamic contracting approach to determine a benchmark optimal allocation radical changes in the current ui system increase welfare but not by much a move to full experience rating has distributional effects but the aggregate effects are negligible

deregulation and bank financial policy the standard view that banks can value maximize by exploiting non risk rated deposit insurance ignores the potential loss of a valuable bank charter due to insolvency recognition of this effect changes the bank s optimal financial policy and can induce extreme risk averting as well as risk taking behavior however as the value of the bank charter falls the risk taking strategy is more apt to dominate therefore current deregulation of the banking industry by easing entry and devaluing charters holds the potential for increases in the incidence of insolvency unless offsetting policies are instituted

monetary policy in a systemic crisis summary this paper examines the monetary policy followed during the current financial crisis from the perspective of the theory of the lender of last resort it is argued that standard monetary policy measures would have failed because the channels through which monetary policy is implemented depend upon the well functioning of the interbank market as the crisis developed liquidity vanished and the interbank market collapsed central banks had to inject much more liquidity at low interest rates than predicted by standard monetary policy models at the same time as the interbank market did not allow for the redistribution of liquidity among ban ks central banks had to design new channels for liquidity injection

imitation costs and patents an empirical study it has long been recognised that the costs of imitating new products have an important effect on the incentives for innovation in a market economy as arrow i962 and others have pointed out if firms can imitate an innovation at a cost that is substantially below the cost to the innovator of developing the innovation there may be little or no incentive for the innovator to carry out the innovation in their discussions of the innovation process economists frequently have called attention to the major role played by the costs of imitation but there has been little or no attempt to measure these costs to test various hypotheses concerning the factors influencing them or to estimate their effects in this paper we report some findings of what seems to be the first study of this topic in addition we present data regarding the effects of patents on imitation costs and on the rate of innovation

allocating bank regulatory powers lender of last resort deposit insurance and supervision abstract we examine the optimal institutional allocation of bank regulation we find that centralizing the lending of last resort and deposit insurance functions in a regulator leads to excessive forbearance it also leads the bank to invest suboptimally in loans giving this regulator supervision improves on both problems but it still does not lead to the efficient outcome in the multi regulator arrangement we find that it is beneficial to give supervision to the deposit insurer the choice between the unified regulator arrangement and the multi regulator arrangement involves a trade off the multi regulator arrangement reduces the forbearance problem at high levels of liquidity shortage but may exacerbate it at low levels these results assume the absence of information frictions when banks are better informed than regulators we show that regulators may have an incentive not to share private information suggesting it is important to consider regulators informational advantages when deciding on the allocation of regulation

principal agent problems in s l salvage new legislation and traditional fdic insolvency resolution procedures transform and intensify the principal agent problems most responsible for the fslic mess these problems explain counterproductive constraints on the governance and operating policies of the agency responsible for rescuing and salvaging assets in insolvent thrifts the rtc the constraints slow insolvency resolution increase interim financing costs and undermine rtc recovery of asset value operationalizing its task as preserving evanescent and economically misconceived franchise values the rtc allows insolvents to seek financing on an unconsolidated basis initiates bidding for one institution at a time holds back seriously troubled assets and recruits an overly narrow range of bidders although the federal savings and loan insurance corporation fslic is officially defunct its corporate corpse lives on in two successor institutions its deposit insurance business has been taken over by the savings association insurance fund saif while its liquidation or salvage business has been assigned to the resolution trust corporation rtc both saif and rtc have the same stockholder principals federal taxpayers also both are operated by the federal deposit insurance corporation fdic nevertheless their governing structures differ markedly and in a perverse way to maximize net returns from salvage experience suggests the theory that a salvage or value recovery operation requires the aggressive operating flexibility of an automobile junkyard in a junkyard essentially everything in the salvor s inventory is open for inspection stripping and sale to anyone at any time hardto market hulks are compacted into scrap metal i e pooled and shipped out on what can be compared to a bulk sales or auction basis on a strict timetable the yard either owns or transacts with a fleet of tow trucks and has enough operating capital to bring in new wrecks as they appear this paper argues that unlike a private salvor the rtc is saddled with the additional objective of slowing down official recognition of the full size of fslic s losses to this end the financial institutions reform recovery and enforcement act firrea underfunds the rtc requires delayed sales of residential properties ostensibly to promote the availability of affordable housing and creates a superfluous five person rtc oversight board whose incentives are to deprive rtc decisionmakers of desirable operating flexibility the rtc oversight board creates an appearance of improved accountability to taxpayers that runs exactly opposite to its true economic effects three of the

fairly priced deposit insurance and bank charter policy the thrust of current deposit insurance reform risk based insurance premiums and capital requirements is an effort to price deposit insurance more fairly fairly pricing deposit insurance eliminates inequitable wealth transfers but it does not lead to an efficient equilibrium this paper shows that an alternative charter policy results in an efflcient separating equilibrium this article analyzes the effect of alternative charter policies when deposit insurance is fairly priced the thrust of current deposit insurance reformrisk based capital requirements 1988 and risk based insurance premiums 1994 is an effort to price deposit insurance more fairly chan greenbaum and thakor s 1992 seminal paper dramatically illustrated that fairly pricing deposit insurance is not enough to solve the deposit insurance problem in their model when banks hold nontraded private information assets no equilibrium exists with fairly priced deposit insurance unless banks earn rent or are subsidized fairly pricing deposit insurance eliminates inequitable transfers of wealth but it does not lead to an efficient equilibrium this paper shows that an alternative charter policy gives an efficient separating equilibrium the separating equilibrium segregates the market for insured transactions deposits from private information financial intermediation the analysis in this article provides support for the deposit insurance reform proposal in the recent 1993 national commission on financial institution reform recovery and enforcement ncfirre report to the president and congress and for merton and bodie s 1993 proposal both proposals impose a separating equilibrium that isolates insured transactions accounts and the public information traded assets that secure them from private information assets in the bank s portfolio the formal model developed here is designed to demonstrate the effect of charter policy on the efficiency of market equilibrium in an uncomplicated setting but the main result that a separating equilibrium is more efficient is extremely robust with respect to the model specification the model has two types of financial intermediaries intermediaries that hold nontraded private

is fairly priced deposit insurance possible we analyze risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance in the presence of private information and moral hazard without deposit linked subsidies it is impossible to implement risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance pricing in a competitive deregulated environment except when the deposit insurer is the least risk averse agent in the economy we establish this formally in the context of an insurance scheme in which privately informed depository institutions are offered deposit insurance premia contingent on reported capital the result holds for alternative sorting instruments as well this suggests a contradiction between deregulation and fairly priced risk sensitive deposit insurance this paper exposes a conflict between a deregulated competitive financial services industry on the one hand and fairly priced risk sensitive deposit insurance on the other we show that if depository institutions dis are perfectly competitive i e each makes zero profits on average then it is impossible to implement incentive compatible risk sensitive deposit insurance pricing recent distress among dis has fueled debate about reform of the existing deposit insurance system many believe that the prevailing risk insensitive premium structure encourages dis to choose excessively risky assets and that it should be replaced by deposit insurance premia linked to the dis choices of risk 2 risk sensitive deposit insurance pricing however imposes greater informational demands on the deposit insurer and runs afoul of both

optimal bank reorganization policies and the pricing of federal deposit insurance optimal dynamic regulatory policies for closing ailing banks and for deposit insurance premia are derived as functions of the rate of flow of bank deposits and interest rate on deposits the economy s risk free interest rate and the regulators bank audit administration costs under competitive conditions the threshold assets to deposits ratio below which a bank should be optimally closed is shown to be greater than or equal to one optimal deposit insurance premia and probabilities of bank closure are shown to be nondecreasing in the bank s risk on investment and nonincreasing in the bank s current assets to deposits ratio should regulatory agencies close reorganize an ailing federally insured financial institution if so when the recent record rate of failures of savings and loans associations s ls has renewed the urgency of this question the regulatory agencies are empowered but not required to reorganize financial institutions that are statutorily insolvent i e have zero or negative regulatory net worth recently regulators have in many instances permitted insolvent financial institutions to remain in operation 2 also while debating on the increase of the proposed funding of the federal deposit insurers the u s congress argued whether it would be desirable and if so when to close more s ls thus when regulators should close a troubled financial institution has become a major question of bank regulatory policy while the existing academic literature provides powerful insights into the structure and pricing of the insurers liability this literature offers very little guidance regarding the timing of bank reorganizations 3 indeed to the best of our knowledge the value of the federal

estimates of the value of patent rights in european countries during the post 1950 period this paper examines the distribution of the values of patent rights in the united kingdom france and germany during the post 1950 period these values are inferred from the behavior of patentees with respect to payment of renewal fees on their patents a simple economic model of renewal decisions is combined with data on the proportion of patents renewed at alternative ages and the renewal fee schedules to produce estimates of the distribution and the total value of patent rights in these countries moreover the data indicate that there have been changes in the value distribution and we follow these changes over the period the empirical results of particular interest concern the total value of patent rights and the relationship between changes in it and changes in the quantity of patents the skew in the distribution of patent values and the rate of obsolescence on the returns to patents

measuring the progress and impacts of decarbonising british electricity abstract britain s ambitious carbon targets require that electricity be immediately and aggressively decarbonised so it is reassuring to report that electricity sector emissions have fallen 46 in the three years to june 2016 their lowest since 1960 this paper analyses the factors behind this fall and the impacts they are having the main drivers are demand falling 1 3 per year due to efficiency gains and mild winters gas doubling its share to 60 of fossil generation due to the carbon price floor and the dramatic uptake of wind solar and biomass which now supply up to 45 of demand accounting conventions also play their part imported electricity and biomass would add 5 and 2 to emissions if they were included the pace of decarbonisation is impressive but raises both engineering and economic challenges falling peak demand has delayed fears of capacity shortage but minimum net demand is instead becoming a problem the headroom between inflexible nuclear and intermittent renewables is rapidly shrinking with controllable output reaching a minimum of just 5 9 gw as solar output peaked at 7 1 gw 2015 also saw britain s first negative power prices the highest winter peak prices for six years and the highest balancing costs

a reexamination of the over or under pricing of deposit insurance this study shows how fair deposit insurance premia can be calculated using data on bank stock prices interest rate movements and income and balance sheet accounts fair insurance premia are estimat ed under the alternative assumptions that the fdic provides either a limited term variable rate or unlimited term insurance cont ract to banks the paper s results suggest that for nearly all of the large commerical banks in the sample the actual insurance premium c harged by the fdic falls between the bounds of fair limited term and unlimited term insurance premia copyright 1987 by ohio state university press

coordination failures and the lender of last resort was bagehot right after all the classical doctrine of the lender of last resort lolr elaborated by bagehot 1873 asserts that the central bank should lend to illiquid but solvent banks under certain conditions several authors have argued that this view is now obsolete in modern interbank markets a solvent bank cannot be illiquid this paper provides a possible theoretical foundation for rescuing bagehot s view our theory does not rely on the multiplicity of equilibria that arises in classical models of bank runs we built a model of banks liquidity crises that possesses a unique bayesian equilibrium in this equilibrium there is a positive probability that a solvent bank cannot find liquidity assistance in the market we derive policy implications about banking regulation solvency and liquidity ratios and interventions of the lender of last resort furthermore we find that public bailout and private bail in involvement are complementary in implementing the incentive efficient solution and that bagehot s lender of last resort facility must work together with institutions providing prompt corrective action and orderly failure resolution finally we derive similar implications for an international lender of last resort ilolr jel g21 g28

patents as options some estimates of the value of holding european patent stocks in many countries holders of patents must pay an annual renewal fee in order to keep their patents in force this paper uses data on the proportion of patents renewed and the renewal fees faced by post world war ii cohorts of patents in france the united kingdom and germany in conjunction with a model of patent holders renewal decisions to estimate the returns earned from holding patents in these countries since patents are often applied for at a nearly stage in the innovation process the model allows agents to be uncertain about the sequence of returns that will be earned if the patent is kept inforce formally then the paper presents and solves a discrete choice optimal stochastic control model derives the implications of the model on aggregate behaviour and then estimates the parameters of the model from aggregate data the estimates enable a detailed description of the evolution of the distribution of returns earned from holding patents over their life spans and calculations of both the annual returns earned from holding the patents still in force or the patent stocks in the alternative countries and the distribution of the discounted value of returns earned from holding the patents in a cohort this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

deposit insurance and bank failures new evidence from the 1920s this paper examines the contribution of deposit insurance to bank failures during the 1920s using individual bank data from kansas where membership in the state insurance system was voluntary i find that the balance sheets of insured banks reflected greater risk taking and probit model estimates indicate that insured banks were more likely to fail than non insured banks insurance had an especially strong impact the closer a bank was to failure because regulation was comparatively strict in kansas the findings suggest that deposit insurance had an even greater impact in other states and in the recent u s experience

deposit insurance and risk taking behavior in the credit union industry abstract this paper examines the relationship between deposit insurance and risk taking behavior within the credit union industry time series tests employing industry average financial ratios for federal and state credit unions did not support the increased risk taking hypothesis although federal credit union capital declined immediately following the adoption of deposit insurance this was most likely the result of reduced capital requirements not deposit insurance liquidity and loan delinquency ratios had a negative time trend coefficient implying a decline in risk taking behavior during the post insurance period cross sectional test results employing iowa state chartered credit union data indicated that insured credit unions were better capitalized and more liquid than their uninsured counterparts overall there was no evidence that the adoption of deposit insurance increased the risk taking behavior of credit unions

efficient pollution regulation getting the prices right this paper argues for efficient environmental regulations that equate the mar ginal damage of pollution to marginal abatement costs across space the paper estimates the source specific marginal damages of air pollution and calculates the welfare gain from making the current sulfur dioxide allowance trading pro gram for power plants more efficient the savings from using trading ratios based on marginal damages are between 310 and 940 million per year the potential savings from setting aggregate emissions efficiently and from includ ing more sources of air pollution are many times higher jel h23 q53 q58

interbank lending and systemic risk systemic risk refers to the propagation of a bank s economic distress to other economic agents linked to that bank through financial transactions banking authorities often prevent systemic risk through an implicit insurance of interbank claims or by reducing interbank transactions and centralizing banks liquidity management this paper investigates whether the flexability afforded by decentralized bank interactions can be preserved while protecting the central banks from the necessity of conducting undesired rescue operations it develops a model in which decentralized interbank leading is motivated by peer monitoring in this context the paper derives the optimal prudential rules and in particular looks at the impact of interbank monitoring on the solvency and liquidity ratios of borrowing and lending banks last it provides conditions which a too big to fail policy is or is not justified and studies the possibility of propagation of a bank s liquidity shock throughout the financial system copyright 1996 by ohio state university press

the benefits of lending relationships evidence from small business data this paper empirically examines how ties between a firm and its creditors affect the availability and cost of funds to the firm we analyze data collected in a survey of small firms by the small business administration the primary benefit of building close ties with an institutional creditor is that the availability of financing increases we find smaller effects on the price of credit attempts to widen the circle of relationships by borrowing from multiple lenders increases the price and reduces the availability of credit in sum relationships are valuable and appear to operate more through quantities rather than prices

moving toward risk based deposit insurance premiums in the european union the case of spain this article provides a scenario based analysis of how the european union proposal for a new funding model for deposit insurance systems diss would affect the spanish banking sector we examine the risk profiles of commercial banks savings banks and credit cooperatives over the period 2007 to 2011 and compare the contributions to the deposit insurance fund dif under the current flat rate regime with those that would have occurred under the new risk sensitive system we find that a risk based scheme could provide an incentive for sound management by reducing the premiums for credit institutions with better risk profiles we also conclude that the proposed reform may help to mitigate the moral hazard associated with larger credit institutions

a review of the stern review on the economics of climate change how much and how fast should we react to the threat of global warming the stern review argues that the damages from climate change are large and that nations should undertake sharp and immediate reductions in greenhouse gas emissions an examination of the review s radical revision of the economics of climate change finds however that it depends decisively on the assumption of a near zero time discount rate combined with a specific utility function the review s unambiguous conclusions about the need for extreme immediate action will not survive the substitution of assumptions that are consistent with today s marketplace real interest rates and savings rates

financial crises payment system problems and discount window lending in a developed economy financial crises are rapidly conveyed to the payment system which tends to rely on private credit extensions in most countries while many authors recommend that the central bank do no more than provide adequate aggregate liquidity during a crisis this policy requires well functioning private credit markets to channel liquidity to solvent but illiquid firms this paper presents a model of private lending which defines a crisis as a time when lenders become uncertain about how to assess financial risks and therefore rationally withdraw from making new loans in such an environment a government lender of last resort can improve social welfare copyright 1996 by ohio state university press

willingness to pay and policy instrument choice for climate change policy in the united states abstract this paper provides the first willingness to pay wtp estimates in support of a national climate change policy that are comparable with the costs of actual legislative efforts in the u s congress based on a survey of 2034 american adults we find that households are on average willing to pay between 79 and 89 per year in support of reducing domestic greenhouse gas ghg emissions 17 by 2020 even very conservative estimates yield an average wtp at or above 60 per year taking advantage of randomized treatments within the survey valuation question we find that mean wtp does not vary substantially among the policy instruments of a cap and trade program a carbon tax or a ghg regulation but there are differences in the sociodemographic characteristics of those willing to pay across policy instruments greater education always increases wtp older individuals have a lower wtp for a carbon tax and a ghg regulation while greater household income increases wtp for these same two policy instruments republicans along with those indicating no political party affiliation have a significantly lower wtp regardless of the policy instrument but many of these differences are no longer evident after controlling for respondent opinions about whether global warming is actually happening

valuation of flexible transmission investment options under uncertainty significant uncertainty surrounds the future development of electricity systems primarily in terms of size location and type of new renewable generation to be connected in this paper we assess the potential for flexible network technologies such as phase shifting transformers and non network solutions such as energy storage and demand side management to constitute valuable interim measures within a long term planning strategy the benefit of such flexible assets lies not only in the transmission services provided but also in the way they can facilitate and de risk subsequent decisions by deferring commitment to capital intensive projects until more information on generation development becomes available a novel stochastic formulation for transmission expansion planning is presented that includes consideration of investment in these flexible solutions the proposed framework is demonstrated with a case study on the ieee rts where flexible technologies are shown to constitute valuable investment options when facing uncertainties in future renewable generation development

who should act as lender of last resort an incomplete contracts model this paper presents a model of a bank subject to liquidity shocks that require borrowing from a lender of last resort two govern ment agencies may perform this function a central bank and a de posit insurance corporation the agencies share supervisory information which provides a nonverifiable signal of the bank s fi nancial condition and use it to decide whether to support it it is shown that the optimal institutional design involves the two agen cies the central bank dealing with small liquidity shocks and the deposit insurance corporation with large shocks furthermore ex cept for very small shocks they should lend at penalty rates