information and legislative bargaining the political economy of u s tariff suspensions this paper studies the political influence of individual firms on congressional decisions to suspend tariffs on u s imports of intermediate goods we develop a legislative bargaining model in which firms influence legislators by transmitting information about the value of protection using verbal messages and lobbying expenditures model estimation using firm level data on tariff suspension bills and lobbying expenditures reveals that the probability a suspension is granted decreases with each additional firm that expresses opposition this effect is significantly larger than that of either opponent or proponent lobbying due to the greater information content of verbal opposition and legislative bargaining costs jel f13 d7

local government service production the politics of allocative sluggishness a partial adjustment model with endogenous speed of adjustment is developed to analyze how pressure from interest groups and mass media influence the adjustment process of local governments a survey questionnaire to the local politicians is used to measure the pressure indicators based on a combined cross section and time series data base for norwegian local governments the sluggishness of the adjustment process is estimated the dynamics of the adjustment process is shown to reflect the activity of interest groups and media pressure pressure groups related to primary education explain an important part of the sluggishness observed pressure groups promoting kindergartens and health care care for the elderly stimulate reallocations

hormone beef chlorinated chicken and international trade abstract we study international trade in innovative goods subject to uncertain consumer health effects such goods are often at the center of international trade disputes we show that an interesting form of protectionism may arise because of scientific uncertainty a free riding effect is identified implying more conservative behavior by countries we also study the role of producers lobbies in providing valuable information finding that the innovative lobby has an advantage in providing information as compared with the lobby producing the traditional good moreover lobbies disclose more information when the health effects are long lasting

the irrigation demand for electricity this paper examines the regional differences in the irrigation demand for electricity the analysis is based upon the rural electric cooperatives statistics on the sale of power for irrigation a simultaneous equation system is developed to focus on both the short run utilization of electricity in irrigation and the long run determination of the number of irrigators using electricity the structural equations are estimated using pooled state level data for the period 1969 79 in light of the model s results the impacts of changes in relative energy prices on irrigation are examined there are substantial differences in the irrigation practices among regions in the united states farmers choose irrigation systems in response to climate factor prices and relative returns from agriculture irrigation accounted for over 14 of total energy use in crop production in 1974 and it is estimated that over 60 of all irrigation power equipment is electric fea usda and brantwood publications this note shows demand estimates for irrigation electricity in various regions unlike most electric utilities the rural electric cooperatives recs collect and publish information on the use of electricity for irrigation a study of the recs irrigation demand for electricity provides a perspective on regional differences in the irrigation demand for electricity and on the impact of changes in relative energy prices information on the factors that affect irrigation demand growth are needed by the cooperatives to plan for the capacity required to serve irrigation farmers this investigation joins others which deal with energy and irrigation sloggett and clark investigated the differences in irrigation techniques hexem and heady king et al mapp and dobbins and katzman and matlin applied linear programming models to irrigation analysis this study employs econometric modeling to estimate price elasticities and the pattern of interfuel substitution for the irrigation use of electricity the next section presents a simultaneous equation model for regional irrigation demand for electricity the empirical estimation using pooled state level data for the period 1969 79 is then described the final section discusses the potential impact of relative energy price changes on irrigation demand

unilateral disclosure of private information by a regulated firm abstract it is common practice for regulators to depend on regulated firms for self monitoring and self reporting in spite of incentives for misrepresentation our analysis provides some justification for such dependence we study disclosure of information in a game theoretic model of regulation in which both the regulator and the firm are players in the game instead of designing a regulation scheme that compels disclosure we study unilateral disclosure in a given regulatory framework a framework which we believe has counterparts in current regulatory practice the results provide insight to informal relationships between firms and regulators because the game is a single period game the informal relationship in which the disclosures occur cannot be attributed to the existence of reputations and long term relationships

a theory of credibility this paper presents models in which one agent must decide whether to trust another whose motives are uncertain reliability can only be communicated through actions in this context it pays for people to build a reputation based on reliable behaviour someone becomes credible by consistently providing accurate and valuable information or by performing useful services the theory provides a justification for long term arrangements without binding contracts it also describes those situations where it pays an agent to cash in on his reputation many decisions depend on trusting someone consumers must decide whether to believe advertisements banks need to judge the reliability of loan applicants and employers must decide how much responsibility to delegate to their employees this paper attempts to model situations that arise when someone is uncertain about whether to trust the people he deals with in this context reputations for reliability are valuable an agent becomes credible by consistently providing accurate valuable information or by always acting responsibly i analyse a series of simple abstract models of information transmission in the basic model there are two agents the sender s and the receiver r who are to play the game a known finite number of times at each stage both players learn the value of a parameter measuring the importance of that period s play of the game that is the value of making a correct decision and s obtains payoff relevant information s then sends a signal to r who makes a decision that affects the welfare of both players after both players learn the consequences of r s decision the process repeats at each stage r must decide what action to take in order to do that he must assess the credibility of s the difficulty arises because r is uncertain about s s preferences when play begins i model this by assuming that with positive probability s has identical preferences to r s is a friend and with positive probability s has completely opposed preferences to r s is an enemy this uncertainty creates a trade off for enemy senders at each stage providing honest information enhances s s reputation but only at the expense of foregoing an opportunity for immediate gain by duping r the possibility that s is a friend lends credibility to what he says but this credibility may also be exploited by an enemy s the principal equilibrium has the following form in the basic model where s has no control over the importance of a given play s typically conveys accurate information for the first several periods r raises the probability he places on s being friendly after receiving accurate information if he believes that an enemy would have lied to him with positive probability the more important the information the more likely an enemy will attempt to deceive r an enemy will eventually take advantage of r by misleading him when this happens the sender loses all opportunities for deception in the future i

money talks an experimental investigation of cheap talk and burned money we experimentally study the strategic transmission of information in a setting where both cheap talk and money can be used for communication purposes theoretically a large number of equilibria exist side by side in which senders either use costless messages money or a combination of the two we find that senders prefer to communicate through costless messages only when the interest disalignment between sender and receiver increases cheap talk tends to break down and high sender types start burning money to enhance the credibility of their costless messages a behavioral model due to kartik 2009 assuming that sellers bear a cost of lying fits the data best

the impact of carbon taxation on the uk economy abstract the paper explores the likely macroeconomic impact of imposing a carbon tax at levels sufficient to reduce co 2 emissions significantly many studies have indicated the probablity of such a tax entailing substantial economic costs however such studies have not tended to take into account the possible positive effects of using carbon tax revenues to reduce distortionary taxes elsewhere in the economy or to offset competitiveness effects or of the possibility that a carbon tax will stimulate innovation and efficiency in the energy sector with positive economic results the paper concludes that when these factors are given due weight imposing a carbon tax is more likely to entail economic benefit than cost

information access and contributions a signaling model of lobbying interest groups pay monetary contributions to gain access and provide information to a policymaker if their interests are aligned with those of the policymaker s constituency they have costless access and report their private information truthfully if their interests conflict they are forced to pay a strictly positive contribution in order to enhance the credibility of their reports the policymaker bases her policy decision on the competing reports and the size of the contributions accompanying these reports the interest groups contribution decisions are plagued by a free rider problem i derive the implications of this problem for the size and pattern of contributions and for the degree of information aggregation

lobbying and asymmetric information informational lobbying the use by interest groups of their alleged expertise or private information on matters of importance for policymakers in an attempt to persuade them to implement particular policies is often regarded as an important means of influence this paper analyzes this phenomenon in a game setting on the one hand the interest group is assumed to have private information which is relevant to the policymaker whilst on the other hand the policymaker is assumed to be fully aware of the strategic incentives of the interest group to mis report or conceal its private information

communication costs information acquisition and voting decisions in proxy contests this article synthesizes some recent progress in the theories of corporate control and political lobbying to model the proxy campaign as a political campaign the model yields a number of testable implications only some of which have been examined in the literature for example if the loss from voting for a bad dissident exceeds the gain from voting for a good dissident the model predicts that as communication costs fall the number of proxy fights increases announcement day returns decrease and the fraction of dissident wins first increases and then decreases article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

a simple model of the commercial lobbying industry in this paper we present a model of the behavior of commercial lobbying firms such as the so called k street lobbyists of washington d c in contrast to classical special interest groups commercial lobbying firms represent a variety of clients and are not directly affected by policy outcomes they are hired by citizens or groups of citizens to advocate on their behalf to policymakers in our analysis we address two basic questions why do commercial lobbying firms exist and what are the implications of their existence for social welfare we answer the first part of this question by proposing that commercial lobbying firms possess a verification technology that allows them to improve the quality of information concerning the social desirability of policy proposals this gives policymakers the incentive to allocate their scarce time to lobbying firms essentially it is this access to policymakers that lobbying firms sell to their clients to address the question of social welfare we construct a simple general equilibrium model that includes commercial lobbying firms and compare the equilibrium obtained under market provision of lobbying services to the first best optimum we find that the market level of lobbying services can be socially either too large or too small and characterize when each will be the case

are we better off if our politicians have more information the model of public policy studied in this paper has heterogeneous citizens voters and two public goods one roads chosen directly by an elected policy maker and the other pollution stochastically dependent on the amount of roads both a one country and a two country version of the model are analyzed the latter displays externalities across the countries which create incentives for free riding and strategic delegation the welfare effects of providing the policy maker with information about the relationship between roads and pollution are investigated and it is shown that more information hurts some sometimes even all citizens in particular the opportunity not to create an institution for information gathering can serve as a commitment device for a country although with the unfortunate effect of making the overall outcome even worse implications for the welfare effects of informational lobbying are also discussed

communication coordination and nash equilibrium i note a methodological problem in studying the role of pre play communication in ensuring equilibrium to deal with this problem i define a solution concept for the extended game in which talk is followed by play that is intermediate between nash equilibrium and rationalizability in some games our solution concept implies a nash outcome while in others it does not

cheap talk with two audiences these problems have in common a simple structure an informed sender says something to two interested but uninformed receivers who then take actions based on their beliefs these actions affect the sender as well as the receivers in this paper we study how costless nonverifiable claims cheap talk can affect these beliefs and hence the actions and how the incentives for truthful revelation to one receiver are affected by the presence of the other we then ask how welfare is affected by whether claims are made in public or in private as some of the above examples suggest public messages may be more credible than private messages addressed to either audience one possibility is that the presence of one audience can discipline the sender s relationship with the other we call this one sided

potential contributions of political science to environmental economics while political science has much to offer at least some of its contributions might be difficult to incorporate into economic models nevertheless we argue that environmental economics might benefit from supplementing combining or sometimes even replacing the rational choice approach with other approaches commonly used in political science we develop our argument by examining three core components of political science analysis ideas power and institutions for each component we review political science approaches and propositions with a view to determining what s in it for environmental economics

maintaining price stability how long is the medium term using a small estimated forward looking model of the euro area economy this paper analyses the determinants of the optimal monetary policy horizon for maintaining price stability first the optimal policy horizon for a price level objective is generally longer than that for an inflation objective second the policy horizon becomes longer the greater the weight on other objectives like minimising output gap and interest rate variability third the optimal policy horizon is shorter the higher the degree of forward lookingness in the economy and the greater the slope of the phillips curve finally even if society cares only about inflation stabilisation it often pays to give the central bank a price level objective provided the horizon is optimally chosen to be somewhat longer

a bi objective stochastic programming model for a centralized green supply chain with deteriorating products in recent years consumers and legislation have been pushing companies to design their activities in such a way as to reduce negative environmental impacts more and more it is therefore important to examine the optimization of total supply chain costs and environmental impacts together however because of the recycling of deteriorated items the environmental impacts of deteriorating items are more significant than those of non deteriorating ones the objective of this paper is to develop a stochastic mathematical model and to propose a new replenishment policy in a centralized supply chain for deteriorating items in this model we consider inventory and transportation costs as well as the environmental impacts under uncertain demand several transportation vehicles producing various greenhouse gas ghg levels are considered the best transportation vehicles and inventory policy are determined by finding a balance between financial and environmental criteria in this way we develop a linear mathematical model and present a numerical example from the real world to demonstrate its applicability and effectiveness we then perform a sensitivity analysis and provide some managerial insights finally more promising directions are suggested for future research

assessing the role of us agriculture in reducing greenhouse gas emissions and generating additional environmental benefits abstract this study measures the changes in greenhouse gas ghg emissions from us crop production under a scenario where farmers face higher energy prices with the implementation of the kyoto protocol the focus is on predicting the impact on direct and indirect energy resource use and measuring the changes in specific ghgs the study also assesses the potential for additional environmental benefits from the changes in agricultural resource use the analyses rely on the results from a calibrated mathematical programming model of regional us crop production the model accounts for input substitution when farmers are faced with external shocks the results suggest that when energy prices increase there is a relatively small decrease in total harvested acreage but a more significant drop in the use of energy intensive resources overall ghg emissions from us crop production decrease by 20 suggesting agriculture is more effective in abating ghg emissions than the other sectors of us economy there is also a good potential for additional positive environmental externalities from the decreases in resources used in crop production

energy price impacts modelling in the agriculture sector abstract energy price impacts in the agriculture sector are mainly of economic and non economic types however economic impacts are well researched this paper surveys the various types of energy price impacts and different estimation techniques used in the past the study suggests that the energy price impacts estimation from a systems model of the agriculture sector is the best for several reasons for this purpose a price endogenous sectoral programming model of agriculture can be developed in a partial or general equilibrium framework however data requirements for this are enormous

interest groups campaign contributions and probabilistic voting this essay develops a simple model to analyze the impact of campaign contributions on electoral policy decisions of candidates for office interest groups here are firms that select contributions under the assumption that candidates policies and opposing groups donations remain unaltered candidates however recognize that their policy choices affect contributions campaign contributions are used by candidates to affect policy oriented voters perceptions of candidates positions in this framework the introduction of campaign contributions may affect candidates electoral policies and if they do then they benefit surely exactly one of the two interest groups

redistribution and market efficiency an experimental study abstract we study the interaction between competitive markets and income redistribution that reallocates unequal pre tax market incomes away from the rich to the poor majority in one setup participants earn their income by trading in a double auction da with exogenous zero or full redistribution in another setup after trading they vote on redistributive tax policies in a majoritarian election with two competing candidates this results in virtually full redistribution even when participants have the opportunity to influence taxes by transferring money to the candidates we find that the high redistribution reduces trading efficiency but not as much as predicted if market participants trade randomly this is because rather than capitulating to the much lower trading incentives many participants respond to redistribution by asking and bidding more conservatively in the da and in this way help to prevent further efficiency losses

impacts of technological change on factor substitution between energy and other inputs within us agriculture 1950 79 abstract past efforts to estimate elasticities of substitution between inputs both in and out of agriculture have usually made use of a single data set to provide the elasticities between the input pairs and have led to highly conflicting results particularly with respect to the substitution between capital or machinery and energy this study reveals that the elasticity of substitution between a number of input pairs in agriculture can vary by substantial amounts depending on the time period used for the estimation energy in agriculture which was a complement for machinery in the 1950s was a substitute by the 1970s

to what extent are eu steel companies susceptible to competitive loss due to climate policy abstract in recognition of their competitive vulnerability a set of special rules have been devised for managing sectors such as iron and steel within the eu ets under these rules the eu steel sector has received free allocations in excess of their compliance needs to now and will continue to receive some free allowances up to 2020 however perceptions of the sector s competitive vulnerability have been largely based on inherently hypothetical analyses which rely heavily on counterfactual scenarios and abatement cost estimates often provided by firms themselves this paper explores how the three largest steel firms in the eu acerlormittal corus and thyssenkrupp have sought to strategically exaggerate their vulnerability to carbon pricing to the effect of an inefficient policy outcome we conduct a qualitative assessment of two of the key narratives underpinning the competitive vulnerability argument of eu steel companies lack of abatement opportunities and inability to pass through cost increases based on interviews case studies and publicly available data we find that these arguments provide only partial and weak justifications for competitive loss and preferential treatment under the eu ets the strategy however remains successful due to information asymmetry and the peculiar political economy of eu climate regulation

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

is it whom you know or what you know an empirical assessment of the lobbying process abstract do lobbyists provide issue specific information to members of congress or do they provide special interests access to politicians we present evidence to assess the role of issue expertis

interest groups and the size of government the results of the previous section estimates of a three equation model from 23 observations must obviously be regarded as tentative the consistent positive relationship between number of interest groups and size of government observed with changing sets of included independent variables changing samples of nations and treating the number of interest groups as either exogenous or codetermined does imply rather unequivocally that interest groups are able to influence public policies in such a manner as to lead to increased government size beyond helping to reinforce this conclusion the results of the previous section should be regarded as first steps in the development of a model of the polity that can explain participation in the political process by interest groups and citizens as well as the size of government

energy taxation as a policy instrument to reduce co2 emissions a net benefit analysis abstract this study evaluates the costs and benefits of energy taxation as a policy instrument to conserve energy and reduce co2 emissions the study combines economic cost estimates generated with a cge model and monetary estimates of environmental damages in a comprehensive cost benefit framework we find that optimal co2 emissions reductions range from 5 to 38 depending on different assumptions about energy substitution elasticities and environmental damages co2 emissions reductions of between 8 and 64 can be attained at no additional welfare cost relative to a policy of not undertaking any action to control co2 emissions

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem