persuasive advertising and product differentiation in a hotelling type differentiated products duopoly model we distinguish between three alternative ways that persuasive advertising may affect consumer perferences we illustrate the implications of our theory an contrast with results from models of informative advertising by analysing the relationship between the degree of product differentiation and equilibrium levels of advertising the analysis suggests that an positive relationship between equilibrium levels of advertising and inherent product substitutability is consistent only with advertising that increases perceived product differences

estimating dynamic demand for cigarettes using panel data the effects of bootlegging taxation and advertising reconsidered abstracct a dynamic demand for cigarette consumption is estimated using pooled data of 46 states over the period 1963 to 1980 a price elasticity of 0 2 and an insignificant income elasticity is found using pooled estimation techniques the bootlegging effect is modeled explicitly using neighboring price the effect is found to be significant two major policy issues are analyzed in light of these new estimates 1 cigarette taxation is found to be an effective tool for generating revenues even though there may be spillover effects to neighboring states where bootlegging is significant 2 the effects of the fairness doctrine act and the advertising ban on cigarette consumption are re examined we find mild support for the effectiveness of subsidized anti smoking messages in reducing cigarette consumption and no support for the thesis that the ban on advertising helps to increase per capita consumption

advertising and the us market demand for beer the us per capita market demand for beer is empirically estimated to determine the effect of advertising on the demand for beer the empirical results indicate that the most important determinants of demand are the price of beer the price of substitutes demographic factors and a light beer dummy variable the positive effects of income and lagged consumption appear to be small although many have argued that advertising promotes beer consumption the empirical results of this study do not support this hypothesis

campaign finance reform and electoral competition using state senate data from 1984 through the beginning of 2002 this paper finds that campaign donation regulations clearly reduce the competitiveness in political races this is reflected in several dimensions conservative estimates indicate that different donation limits are associated with anywhere from a 4 to over a 23 percentage point increase in win margins the regulations increase the probability that only one candidate will run for office and they increase the probability that incumbents win re election campaign finance regulations also tend to reduce the number of candidates who run for office by an average of about 20 percent

advertising for attention in a consumer search model we model the idea that when consumers search for products they first visit the firm whose advertising is most salient the gains a firm derives from being visited early increase in search costs so equilibrium advertising increases as search costs rise as a result higher search costs may decrease both consumer welfare and firm profits we extend the basic model by allowing for firm heterogeneity in advertising costs firms that raise attention more easily advertise more but also charge lower prices and obtain higher profits as advertising cost asymmetries increase consumer surplus falls and aggregate profits rise

a model of sales with differentiated and homogeneous goods abstract this paper extends the classical model of sales varian 1980 rosenthal 1980 by adding product differentiation instead of uninformed i e loyal customers our setting features variety seekers these consumers regard the products as imperfect substitutes as in the original model the firms also serve bargain seekers who buy the cheapest product the discontinuous demand structure precludes any pure strategy equilibria we characterize the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium of the modified game in contrast to the original model the upper bound on prices and the equilibrium expected profits are decreasing in the mass of bargain seekers

bureaucratic discretion or congressional control regulatory policymaking by the federal trade commission this paper extends stigler and peltzman s approach to regulation by incorporating a legislature the model yields comparative statics results and hence testable implications the paper then tests between two opposing approaches about regulatory agency behavior the first assumes agencies operate independently of the legislature and hence exercise discretion the second assumes that congress controls agency decisions the recent behavior of the federal trade commission provides the empirical setting substantial evidence is found for the specific predictions of the model including the hypothesis of systematic congressional influence over ftc decisions

consumer search with asymmetric price sampling we explore asymmetries in the way consumers sample prices in a simple sequential search framework in equilibrium the price distribution of a firm catering to more local consumers first order stochastically dominates that of its rival prices rise in the degree of asymmetry

it takes two to tango equilibria in a model of sales we show that the varian model of sales with more than two firms has two types of equilibria a unique symmetric equilibrium and a continuum of asymmetric equilibria in contrast the 2 firm game has a unique equilibrium that is symmetric for the n firm case the asymmetric equilibria imply mixed strategies that can be ranked by first order stochastic dominance this enables one to rule out asymmetric equilibria on economic grounds by constructing a metagame in which both firms and consumers are players the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this metagame is symmetric

the new economics of organization over the last ten years or so an important new approach to the study of organizations has emerged within economics it is perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a theoretical focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this paper provides political scientists with an overview of the new economics of organization and explores its implications for the study of public bureaucracy so far positive political theory has not contributed much to our understanding of public bureaucracy in part this is due to the unsympathetic treatment that rational modeling and most other modes of quantitative analysis have long received from students of public administration the other side of the coin however is that positive theorists have not made much of an effort to develop theories of bureaucracy their concerns have centered around two basic mechanisms of social choice voting and markets and they have devoted little systematic attention to a third mechanism that is clearly important for understanding how societies and other aggregates make collective decisions this third and relatively unexplored mechanism is hierarchy movement toward a positive theory of hierarchies would fill a serious gap in the social choice literature while at the same time making a theoretical contribution that strikes to the essence of public bureaucracy indeed of all organizations in fact significant steps toward a positive theory of hierarchies have very recently been taken but by economists not political scientists in small numbers of course economists made contributions to the study of public bureaucracy some time ago with the pioneering works of downs 1967 tullock 1965 and niskanen 1971 but this new wave of theoretical work is different it is already a large complex body of literature that is the focus of innovation and excitement among a growing number of economists and it reflects an unusual degree of theoretical coherence and cumulative effort work in this tradition tends to receive orientation from a distinctive economic approach to the analysis of organizations an approach perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this approach has emerged from recent attempts to move beyond the neoclassical theory of the firm which assumes away all organizational considerations to a theory of economic organizations that can explain why firms corporations and other enterprises behave as they do propo

advertising for consideration abstract we analyze markets where firms competing on price advertise to increase the probability of entering consumers consideration sets we find that moderately costly advertising allows firms to raise prices and possibly profits by reducing the fraction of price conscious consumers and by segmenting the market according to whether or not consumers consider the lower priced firm however when the cost of advertising is sufficiently low advertising leads to a prisoners dilemma that adversely impacts profits without affecting expected prices

oligopolistic pricing with sequential consumer search n identical stores compete by choosing prices for a homogeneous good with constant marginal costs consumers search sequentially with perfect recall for the lowest price one class of consumers called shoppers have zero search costs while all other consumers have a positive search cost c there is a unique symmetric nash equilibrium price distribution with the property that it changes smoothly from marginal cost pricing when all consumers are shoppers and or c 0 and monopoly pricing when no consumers are shoppers remarkably as the number of stores increases the nash equilibrium becomes more monopolistic copyright 1989 by american economic association

electoral cycles and international policy cooperation abstract this paper analyzes the interaction between domestic politics and international policy coope ration as a two level repeated prisoners dilemma at the domestic level two party competition generates an electoral cycle in monetary growth inflation and real output at the international level the policymakers desire to promote domestic expansion by depreciating the currency gives rise to an inflationary bias in monetary growth a move towards international cooperation reduces the inflationary bias but may increase the amplitude of the electoral cycle moreover international cooperation may not be desirable for one of the domestic parties nevertheless domestic and international cooperation may be jointly sustained by the credible threat of a reversion to the regime under which the destabilizing effect of domestic politics is at a maximum

advertising and us alcoholic beverage demand system wide estimates the effects of advertising on consumption of alcoholic beverages in the us are analysed the goal is to obtain evidence on the importance of advertising at the level of beverage demand beer wine spirits and for total consumption of alcohol per capita gallons of ethanol a three equation conditional demand system is estimated that includes own and cros beverage advertising as explanatory variables four models of the differential demand system are estimated including the rotterdam aid cbs and nbr models using annual us data for the period 1964 90 on beverage consumption prices expednitures and real advertising estimates are obtained of the complete matrix of own and cross elascities for each beverage price and advertising at the beverage level the results indicate a positive butr very small effect of advertising on beverage consumption with most of the impact due to wine advertising and non due to beer advertising there is no efect of advertising in the composite demand function for al

advertising and intraindustry brand shift in the u s brewing industry the brewing industry has constituted a focus of interest in industrialorganization economics since world war ii due to its rapidly increasing concentration possibly large plant level scale economies and marked product differentiation accompanied by relatively high firm advertising intensities scherer 19 p 1 10 wrote concerning the dramatic postwar structural change which has characterized this industry

competitive promotional strategies this article analyzes the equilibrium pricing strategies of brands engaged in a pricing game each brand has a monopoly market loyal consumers and competes with others in a common market called brand switchers in the case of a duopoly it is shown that the behavior of the brand switchers characterizes the equilibrium behavior of the duopolists this article focuses on two key comparative statics namely the depth of discounts away from a regular high price and the probability of giving a deal or the frequency of deals how these properties vary with the size of the loyal markets and the behavior of the brand switching population is discussed copyright 1988 by the university of chicago

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games i theory the article presents information about the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games in this paper and its sequel presents study the existence of nash equilibrium in games where agents payoff functions are discontinuous the enquiry is motivated by a number of recent studies that have uncovered serious existence problems in seemingly innocuous economic games in the sequel to this paper authors have explained the utility function in the economic games referred to earlier are neither continuous nor quasi concave however they demonstrate that the payoff functions in mildly modified versions of these constructs exhibit two weaker forms of continuity which together with the requirement of quasi concavity suffice for the existence of an equilibrium from this one may conclude that at least in the modified versions of these models discontinuities in the payoff functions are not the real source of the problem rather it is the failure of the payoff functions to the quasi concave which is responsible for the non existence of equilibrium these observations bear on the existence of nash equilibrium in pure strategies

the kennedy round evidence on the regulation of international trade in the united states the purpose of this paper is to analyze and provide empirical evidence regarding the regulation of international trade flows our goal is to provide an explanation of the changes in the interindustry pattern of trade restrictions which emerged from the kennedy round of tariff negotiations the principal conclusion of the analysis is that the pattern of protection which resulted from the kennedy round was shaped to minimize the domestic political disruption resulting from liberalization industries which faced significant import threats and whose characteristics enhanced their potential political influence were able to maintain tariff protection in the face of overall liberalization the potential impact of the agreed upon tariff reductions was partially undermined by the introduction of offsetting nontariff trade barriers ntbs in addition ntbs were introduced systematically in industries that were becom

informative price advertising in a sequential search model the purpose of this paper is to study the role and implications of price advertising when shopping trips are costly to consumers to do so we introduce advertising into an optimal sequential search model information about prices is both gathered by consumers and disseminated by firms consumers search sequentially and stores advertise with various intensity when it is in their interest to do so our model has a unique equilibrium exhibiting priee dispersion the model generates predictions about the shape of the price distribution and firms advertising behavior we explore the effects of entry and find that when initial advertising costs at zero level of effort are precisely zero entry drives the equilibrium to the perfectly competitive outcome however when initial marginal advertising costs are positive entry drives prices higher and while the informed consumers almost surely locate competitive prices welfare does not necessarily increase finally we compare the effectiveness of the two informational channels when advertising costs shrink prices become competitive however when search costs shrink prices remain bounded above marginal production costs

consumer privacy and marketing avoidance a static model we introduce the concept of marketing avoidance consumer efforts to conceal themselves and to deflect marketing the setting is one in which sellers market some item through solicitations to potential consumers who differ in their benefit from the item and suffer harm from receiving solicitations concealment by one consumer induces sellers to shift solicitations to other consumers whereas deflection does not solicitations cause two externalities direct harm on consumers and the indirect cost of consumer concealment and deflection we find that in markets where the marginal cost of solicitation is sufficiently low efforts by low benefit consumers to conceal themselves will increase the cost effectiveness of solicitations and lead sellers to market more however concealment by high benefit consumers leads sellers to market less furthermore concealment by low benefit consumers increases direct privacy harm and consumer welfare is higher with deflection than concealment finally it is optimal to impose a charge on solicitations

advertising brand loyalty and pricing i consider an oligopoly model where prior to price competition firms invest in persuasive advertising and induce brand loyalty in consumers who would otherwise buy the cheapest alternative on the market this setting in which persuasive advertising is introduced to homogenous product markets provides an alternative explanation for price dispersion phenomena despite ex ante symmetry the equilibrium profile of advertising outlays is asymmetric it follows that endogenously determined brand loyal consumer bases are not symmetric across firms this raises a robustness question regarding varian s model of sales where symmetry is exogenously assumed

consideration sets and competitive marketing we present a model of competitive marketing based on the notion that consumers are boundedly rational and that firms use marketing tactics in an attempt to influence consumers decision process the standard model of consumer behaviour assumes that the consumer applies well defined preferences to a perfectly perceived set of available alternatives we retain the assumption that consumers have stable preferences but relax the assumption that they have a perfect perception of what is relevant for their consumption problem thus allowing firms to manipulate that perception our aim is to explore the market implications of this departure from the standard model especially for the way firms deploy marketing strategies in competitive environments the cornerstone of our model is the observation that in the modern marketplace consumers face an overwhelmingly large variety of products and therefore often use screening criteria deliberate as well as unconscious in order to reduce the number of relevant alternatives as a result consumers apply their preferences not to the set of objectively feasible alternatives but to a potentially smaller set which they construct at an earlier stage of the decision process borrowing a term from the marketing literature we refer to this set as the consideration set the basic idea underlying this term is that consumers may be unaware of some of the feasible products and even when they become aware of a new product they still need to be persuaded to consider it as a potential substitute to their currently consumed product

divided government and u s trade policy theory and evidence if different parties control the u s congress and white house the united states may maintain higher import protection than otherwise this proposition follows from a distributive politics model in which congress can choose to delegate trade policymaking to the president when the congressional majority party faces a president of the other party the former has an incentive to delegate to but to constrain the president by requiring congressional approval of trade proposals by up or down vote this constraint forces the president to provide higher protection in order to assemble a congressional majority evidence confirms that 1 the institutional constraints placed on the president s trade policymaking authority are strengthened in times of divided government and loosened under unified government and 2 u s trade policy was significantly more protectionist under divided than under unified government during the period 1949 90

domestic content legislation house voting and the economic theory of regulation house voting on domestic content legislation provides a rare opportunity to examine the political economy of protectionism with respect to a particular issue rather than by using the traditional interindustry approach the results indicate that a representative s vote in favor of the content legislation and the intensity of the legislator s preferences are positively related to the importance of the auto and steel industries in the representative s district an increasing unemployment rate campaign contributions from labor groups affiliation with democratic party and a liberal ideology despite ideology s statistical significance the results suggest this variable can be disregarded because neither the predictive accuracy nor the explanatory power of the model is improved by its inclusion the estimates also provide insights concerning the impact of changes in the independent variables upon voting patterns

endogenous availability cartels and merger in an equilibrium price dispersion abstract in a generalization of the butters advertising model the equilibrium involves one firm that advertises at least twice as much as the others who all advertise equally a cartel formation game is considered and any equilibrium cartel involves at least two but generally not all firms in one equilibrium only the largest firms join the cartel a merger game is considered and in equilibrium the large firm buys the other firms in sequence with discounting equalizing the expected utility of the targets and prices rising over time journal of economic literature classification numbers d43 d83 l11 l13 l41

information gatekeepers on the internet and the competitiveness of homogeneous product markets we examine the equilibrium interaction between a market for price information controlled by a gatekeeper and the homogenous product market it serves the gatekeeper charges fees to firms that advertise prices on its internet site and to consumers who access the list of advertised prices gatekeeper profits are maximized in an equilibrium where a the product market exhibits price dispersion b access fees are sufficiently low that all consumers subscribe c advertising fees exceed socially optimal levels thus inducing partial firm participation and d advertised prices are below unadvertised prices introducing the market for information has ambiguous social welfare effects

delegation as commitment the case of income tax audits in this article we study the value of delegating authority over income tax audit policy arising from the incompleteness of contracts consider a utilitarian government whose ability to commit is limited to aggregate dimensions of its audit policy as publicly verifiable information about detailed allocations of audit budgets is not available we show that the welfare level associated with the full commitment solution can be attained by delegating authority over audit policy to a manager the latter is offered a simple incentive scheme based only on the aggregate variables which are publicly observable in contrast if the government retains authority direct commitment to these same variables does not allow the full commitment welfare level to be achieved thus despite sharing a common informational basis delegation may perform better than centralized arrangements in the presence of incomplete contracts