can money matter for interest rate policy in this paper it is shown that money can matter for macroeconomic stability under interest rate policy when transactions frictions are non negligible we develop a sticky price model with a shopping time function which induces the marginal utility of consumption to depend on the predetermined stock of money held at the beginning of the period equilibrium stability and uniqueness are then ensured by a passive interest rate policy whereas activeness is associated with an explosive equilibrium by reacting to changes in beginning of period real balances the central bank can restore stability interest rates further depend on lagged real balances even if the central bank acts in an entirely forward looking way as under discretionary optimization if the model is revised such that end of period money provides transaction services money can in principle be neglected for a stabilizing interest rate policy discretionary monetary policy is however likely to be associated with equilibrium indeterminacy which can be avoided if interest rates are set contingent on beginning of period real balances

delegating climate policy to a supranational authority a theoretical assessment abstract this paper studies the delegation of climate policy to a supranational environmental authority we develop a simple model of a world consisting of a large number of countries which derive utility from energy consumption countries suffer from global warming and local air pollution both caused by the combustion of fossil fuels and decide individually on investments in clean technologies for energy production a supranational environmental authority decides for each country on the maximally permitted amount of greenhouse gas emissions we demonstrate that the authority faces a dynamic inconsistency problem that leads to welfare losses but these losses can be kept small if the authority is endowed with an optimally designed mandate the optimal mandate penalizes the cost of local air pollution very heavily relative to the cost of global warming however delegation of climate policy faces a further difficulty as countries have a recurrent incentive to change the authority s mandate over time

determinacy and learnability of monetary policy rules in small open economies this paper evaluates under which conditions different taylor type rules lead to determinacy and expectational stability e stability of rational expectations equilibrium in a simple new keynesian small open economy model developed by gali and monacelli 2005 in particular we extend the bullard and mitra 2002 results of determinacy and e stability in a closed economy to this small open economy framework our results highlight an important link between the taylor principle and both determinacy and learnability of equilibrium in small open economies more importantly the degree of openness coupled with the nature of the policy rule adopted by the monetary authorities might change this link in important ways a key finding is that contrary to bullard and mitra expectations based rules that involve the cpi and or the nominal exchange rate limit the region of e stability and the taylor principle does not guarantee e stability we also show that some forms of managed exchange rate rules can help to alleviate problems of both indeterminacy and expectational instability yet these rules might not be desirable since they promote greater volatility in the economy

household s preferences and monetary policy inertia abstract interest rates set by central banks puzzlingly move with a certain inertia we show that household s preferences can be important determinants of the optimal interest rate inertia due to their impact on the efficiency of the monetary policy transmission mechanism

monetary policy inclinations we examine whether central banks should complement their inflation forecasts with interest rate projections introducing a central bank loss function that accounts for deviations from announcements we incorporate the publication of policy inclinations into a dynamic monetary model we show that in the presence of cost push shocks the publication of interest rate forecasts tends to improve welfare

finn kydland and edward prescott s contribution to the theory of macroeconomic policy finn kydland and ed prescott have transformed the field of macroeconomics with two path breaking contributions one is the idea of time inconsistency of optimal policy rules the second is their analysis of business fluctuations both contributions have profoundly changed the way we think about macroeconomic problems both in academic research and in practical policymaking but while their analysis of business fluctuations is the result of a research effort that lasted more than two decades the idea of time inconsistency of policy stems from a single paper kydland and prescott 1977 after writing that paper kydland and prescott have not returned to this topic except in a methodological paper on capital taxation see kydland and prescott 1980 yet the idea was so important and powerful as to open up a whole new line of research in macroeconomics that changed the way we study and implement economic policy rarely has a single paper had such a profound effect on economic research and the practice of economic policymaking in this paper i discuss the idea of time inconsistency how it was formulated by kydland and prescott and why its implications are so important section ii sets the stage and places the contribution by kydland and prescott in the context of the theory of macroeconomic policy section iii analyses earlier formulations of the notion of time inconsistency section iv summarises kydland and prescott s contribution and its main implications section v briefly considers their impact on subsequent research and section vi concludes

how forward looking is optimal monetary policy we calculate optimal monetary policy rules for several variants of a simple optimizing model of the monetary transmission mechanism with sticky prices and or wages we show that robustly optimal rules can be represented by interest rate feedback rules that generalize the celebrated proposal of taylor 1993 optimal rules however require that the current interest rate operating target depend positively on the recent past level of the operating target and its recent rate of increase in a way that is characteristic of estimated central bank reaction functions but not of taylor s proposal we furthermore find that a robustly optimal policy rule is almost inevitably an implicit rule that requires the central bank to use a structural model to project the economy s evolution under the contemplated policy action however calibrated examples suggest that optimal rules place less weight on projections of inflation or output many quarters in the future than do rules often discussed in the literature on inflation targeting or in the current practice of inflation forecast targeting central banks

when preferences for a stable interest rate become self defeating monetary policymakers often seem to have preferences for a stable interest rate in addition to stable inflation and output in this paper we investigate the implications of having an interest rate level term in the loss function when the policymaker lacks commitment technology we show that such preferences may become self defeating in the sense that they generate a less stable interest rate than in the case without preferences for interest rate stability

optimal interest rate rules and inflation stabilization versus price level stabilization abstract this paper compares the properties of interest rate rules such as simple taylor rules and rules that respond to price level fluctuations called wicksellian rules in a basic forward looking model by introducing appropriate history dependence in policy wicksellian rules perform better than optimal taylor rules in terms of welfare robustness to alternative shock processes and are less prone to equilibrium indeterminacy a simple wicksellian rule augmented with a high degree of interest rate inertia resembles a robustly optimal rule i e a monetary policy rule that implements the optimal plan and that is also completely robust to the specification of exogenous shock processes

the non optimality of proposed monetary policy rules under timeless perspective commitment abstract in a near canonical forward looking model the timeless perspective form of commitment typically provides outcomes that are on average superior to those resulting from discretion the specific condition that appears in the literature is however not optimal from the relevant perspective

chasing after good jobs do they exist and does it matter if they do most people believe that there are such things as good jobs jobs that a worker would consider herself lucky to get but for economists the existence of good jobs is debatable in this paper i provide a definition of a good job based on various theories of the labour market a job that involves a surplus captured partly by the worker i use that definition to guide an empirical investigation of the existence and importance of good jobs i conclude that good jobs do exist that the labour market does not just function according to a roy model with wage differentials reflecting only skill differentials compensating differentials or bond posting and that their impact on the overall wage structure is substantial finally i discuss the implications of the existence of good jobs for policy setting and for assessments of the justice of a society resume la chasse aux bons emplois est ce qu ils existent et est ce que cela importe qu ils existent la plupart des gens croient qu il y a telles choses que de bons emplois des emplois qu un travailleur se trouverait chanceux d avoir mais pour les economistes l existence de bons emplois est discutable dans ce texte l auteur propose une definition de bon emploi fondee sur diverses theories du marche du travail un emploi qui engendre un surplus capture en partie par le travailleur il utilise cette definition pour guider son enquete empirique sur l existence et l importance de bons emplois on conclut que les bons emplois existent que le marche du travail ne fonctionne pas seulement selon le modele de roy avec des differentiels de salaires qui refletent seulement les differentiels d habiletes les differentiels compensatoires ou le depot d une caution et que leur impact sur la structure globale des salaires est substantielle finalement l auteur discute les implications de l existence de bons emplois sur la definition de politiques et sur l evaluation du caractere juste d une societe

testing asymmetries in central bank preferences in a small open economy a study for brazil abstract in this paper we extend surico s 2007a model to an open economy and test if the brazilian central bank s loss function is asymmetric with regard to positive and negative deviations of the output gap and of the inflation rate from its target furthermore we use tests for structural breaks to investigate changes in the conduct of policy and monetary authority s preferences the results revealed that the central bank reacted more strongly to deviations of inflation from the target and the output gap after 2003 with regard to the monetary authority s preferences estimates indicate only an asymmetric preference over an above target inflation rate until mid 2003 after this period the evidence obtained by estimating the reaction function with inflation expectations showed that the central bank has been more averse to positive deviations of inflation from its target

an investigation of the gains from commitment in monetary policy this paper proposes a simple framework for analyzing a continuum of monetary policy rules characterized by differing degrees of credibility in which commitment and discretion become special cases of what we call quasi commitment the monetary policy authority is assumed to formulate optimal commitment plans to be tempted to renege on them and to succumb to this temptation with a constant exogenous probability known to the private sector by interpreting this probability as a continuous measure of the lack of credibility of the monetary policy authority we investigate the welfare effect of a marginal increase in credibility our main finding is that in a simple model of the monetary transmission mechanism most of the gains from commitment accrue at relatively low levels of credibility in our benchmark calibration a commitment expected to last for only 6 quarters is enough to bridge 75 of the welfare gap between discretion and commitment this seems to justify the well known concern of monetary policy makers about their credibility even in a world with limited access to commitment technologies

learning heterogeneity and complexity in the new keynesian model abstract we present a new keynesian model in which a fraction n of agents are fully rational and a fraction 1 n of agents are bounded rational after deriving a simple reduced form we demonstrate that the taylor condition is sufficient for determinacy and stability both when the proportion of fully rational agents is held fixed and when it is allowed to vary according to reinforcement learning however this result relies on the absence of persistence in the monetary policy rule and we demonstrate that the taylor condition is not sufficient for determinacy and stability in the presence of interest rate smoothing for monetary policy rules that imply indeterminacy we demonstrate the existence of limit cycles via hopf bifurcation and explore a rational route to randomness numerically our results support the broader literature on behavioural new keynesian models in which the taylor condition is known to be a useful guide to monetary policy despite not always being sufficient for determinacy and or stability

discretionary policy and multiple equilibria in lq re models we study discretionary equilibria in dynamic linear quadratic rational expectations models in contrast to the assumptions that pervade this literature we show that these models do have multiple equilibria in some situations we demonstrate the existence of multiple discretionary equilibria by example we investigate general properties of discretionary equilibria and discuss implications for numerical algorithms

local robustness analysis theory and application this paper develops a general framework for conducting local robustness analysis by local robustness we refer to the calculation of control solutions that are optimal against the least favorable model among models close to an initial baseline we provide nash and stackelberg equilibrium characterizations of the choice of control we apply this abstract formulation to a class of discrete time control problems this analysis is conducted using frequency domain methods and is shown to involve certain fundamental limits to the efficacy of controls in such environments finally we discuss some implications of our results for monetary policy

optimal interest rate stabilization in a basic sticky price model this paper studies optimal monetary policy with the nominal interest rate as the single policy instrument firms set prices in a staggered way without indexation and real money balances contribute separately to households utility the optimal deterministic steady state under commitment is the friedman rule even if the importance assigned to the utility of money is small relative to consumption and leisure we approximate the model around the optimal steady state as the long run policy target optimal monetary policy is characterized by stabilization of the nominal interest rate instead of inflation stabilization as the predominant principle

regime shifts and the stability of backward looking phillips curves in open economies abstract we assess the stability of open economy backward looking phillips curves estimated over two different exchange rate regimes we calibrate a new keynesian monetary policy model and employ it for producing artificial data a monetary policy break replicating the move from a target zone regime to a free floating regime implemented in sweden in 1992 is modeled we employ two different plausibly calibrated taylor rules to describe the swedish monetary policy conduct and fit a reduced form phillips curve to the artificial data while not rejecting the statistical relevance of the lucas critique we find that its economic importance does not seem to be overwhelming

introduction the global financial crisis there cannot now be a shadow of a doubt that the flaw in his ideology admitted by alan greenspan in response to a question by henry a waxman chairman of the us house of representatives committee on oversight and government reform whether he felt that your ideology pushed you to make decisions that you wish you had not made is both significant and permanent the current financial and economic crisis that has forced the likes of greenspan to question the coherence of dominant conceptual frameworks is unprecedented in global reach and systemic gravity some basic figures speak for themselves according to mckinsey s mapping global financial markets october 2008 global financial assets rose from us 12 trillion in 1980 to us 196 trillion in 2007 the international monetary fund s global financial stability report imf 2009a estimate for the latter figure is considerably higher at us 241 trillion global cross border capital flows more than doubled between 2002 and 2007 with foreign investors holding one in four debt securities and one in five equities while in 2000 only 11 countries had financial assets of more than 350 of gross domestic product gdp 25 countries had deepened their financial markets to the same extent by 2007 as early as 1990 money managers had increased their control of us corporate equities from 8 in 1950 to 60 porter 1992 p 6 whalen 2002 p 402 similarly pension funds had extended their share of total business equities from less than 1 to just short of 39 and their fraction of corporate debt from 13 to 50 ghilarducci 1992 p 117 whalen 2002 p 402 in the period from 1986 to 2006 the us financial sector as a whole increased its share of corporate profits from 10 to 30 while its outstanding debts grew from 20 of gdp in 1980 to 116 in 2007 fed 2009 according to gillian tett from the financial times outstanding credit defaults swaps cds today amount to no less than us 60 trillion with the risk embodied after discounting mutually off setting contracts still as high as us 14 trillion tett 2009 p 264 as we know the curtains have now come down on this dance of the trillions palma 2009 the immediate hang over in the form of a pile of toxic debt is surreal not only in its

robust monetary policy structural breaks and nonlinearities in the reaction function of the central bank of brazil abstract in this work we seek to investigate the existence of nonlinearities in the reaction function of the central bank of brazil arising from this policymaker s uncertainties about the effects of the output gap on inflation theoretically we follow tillmann 2011 to obtain a nonlinear optimal monetary policy rule that is robust to uncertainty about the output inflation trade off of the phillips curve in addition we perform structural break tests to assess possible changes in the conduct of the brazilian monetary policy during the inflation targeting regime the results indicate that i the uncertainties about the slope in the phillips curve implied nonlinearities in the central bank of brazil s reaction function ii we cannot reject the hypothesis of a structural break in the monetary rule parameters occurring in the third quarter of 2003 iii there was an increase in the response of the selic rate to output gap and a weaker response to the current inflation gap in meirelles tombini s administration and iv the central bank of brazil has also reacted to the exchange rate in meirelles tombini s administration

latin america and the global financial crisis the current world economic crisis has hit latin america very hard although financial conditions have deteriorated particularly since september 2008 the financial shock has been less severe than during the two previous crises thanks to improvements in external balance sheets there has been room for counter cyclical credit and monetary policies the decision to absorb large capital inflows during the boom as foreign exchange reserves is one of the major sources of the increased room to manoeuvre however these strengths have been insufficient in the face of a strong trade shock the region s economies should therefore seriously think again in the domestic market with regional integration and active production sector policies as engines of growth copyright the author 2009 published by oxford university press on behalf of the cambridge political economy society all rights reserved oxford university press

changes in uk monetary policy rules and discretion in practice abstract in october 1992 following sterling s departure from the exchange rate mechanism britain adopted a new framework for monetary policy that comprised two components first an explicit target for inflation and second institutional changes designed to give greater influence to the bank of england by increasing the transparency and openness of the process by which interest rates are set this paper analyses those changes from the perspective of the debate on rules versus discretion and argues that an appropriate design of institutional arrangements can provide incentives for central bankers to pursue the first best state contingent monetary policy

speed limit policies the output gap and optimal monetary policy in a standard new keynesian model a myopic central bank concerned with stabilizing inflation and changes in the output gap will implement a policy under discretion that replicates the optimal timeless perspective precommitment policy by stabilizing output gap changes the central bank imparts inertia into output and inflation that is absent under pure discretion even a fully optimizing i e non myopic central bank operating in a discretionary policy environment achieves better social outcomes if it focuses on inflation and changes in the output gap than are achieved under inflation targeting this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

changes in federal reserve preferences abstract using a model of optimizing central bank behavior i estimate the dynamic behavior of preferences which are captured by the relative weight put on stabilizing inflation versus minimizing the output gap unlike previous work i let this parameter vary continuously over time there is a drastic but steady rise in the weight on inflation around the appointment of paul volcker however i find variation in preferences throughout the sample period the results suggest that preference changes have been more complex than typically assumed in the literature the estimated preference series is used to perform counterfactual experiments and to construct a new measure of monetary shocks

pitfalls of forward looking monetary policy a distinctive feature of the procedures recently adopted by inflation targeting central banks is their forward looking character forecasts of the economy s future evolution conditional upon alternative policies play a central role in the banks deliberations to an extent that the procedures adopted are sometimes characterized as forecast targeting this emphasis upon the future consequences of policy is unsurprising in an approach that tries to maintain as transparent as possible a relation between the banks9 decisions and the ultimate goals of monetary policy after all current decisions can still affect the future but not the past nonetheless common descriptions of how inflation targeting is or should be practiced go too far in proposing purely forward looking procedures i shall argue instead that an optimal framework for the conduct of monetary policy must generally be history dependent in ways

inflation persistence and optimal monetary policy in the euro area in this paper we present an optimizing agent model for the euro area to emphasize how the existence of heterogeneity in inflation persistence across regions matters for the design of monetary policy we find supporting evidence of the existence of such a heterogeneity in inflation dynamics across euro area countries in particular based on the estimation of new keynesian phillips curves for five major countries of the euro area we find that inflation in germany has a dominant forward looking component while in the other group of countries inflation show a significant inertial backward looking behavior under this circumstance we study the welfare implications of four monetary policy rules following terms of trade shocks fully optimal optimal inflation targeting hicp targeting and output gap stabilization

inflation targeting and exchange rate pass through this paper analyzes how endogenous imperfect exchange rate pass through affects inflation targeting optimal monetary policies in a new keynesian small open economy the paper shows that an inverse relation exists between the pass through and the insulation of the economy from foreign and monetary policy shocks and that imperfect pass through tends to decrease the variability of the terms of trade furthermore with cpi inflation targeting in the short run delayed pass through constrains monetary policy more than incomplete pass through and interest rate smoothing amplifies this effect when the pass through decreases the variability in economic activity tends to rise and the trade off between the stabilization of cpi inflation and output worsens in direct relation to how strictly the central bank is targeting cpi inflation in contrast with domestic inflation targeting optimal monetary policy is not constrained and opposite results occur consequently imperfect pass through favors the choice of domestic to cpi inflation targeting

the effect of changes in the federal funds rate target on market interest rates in the 1970s abstract this paper examines the influence of monetary policy on interest rates by estimating the effect of changes in the federal funds rate target the federal reserve s policy instrument on market interest rates in the 1970s we find that changes in the target caused large movements in short term rates and smaller but significant movements in intermediate and long term rates we hypothesize that the similarity of the reactions of three six and twelve month rates to changes in the target offers a possible explanation for the lack of support for the expectations theory from studies that have tested the theory using these rates

how the world achieved consensus on monetary policy the worldwide progress in monetary policy is a great achievement and especially considering the situation 30 years ago a remarkable success story i describe how the world achieved a working consensus on the core principles of monetary policy by the late 1990s i survey the muddled state of affairs in the 1970s and then ask what happened in federal reserve policy to produce an understanding of the practical principles of monetary policy how did formal institutional support for targeting low inflation abroad follow from an international acceptance of these ideas and how did a consensus theoretical model develop in academia i explain how the modern theoretical consensus known alternatively as the new neoclassical synthesis or the new keynesian model of monetary policy reinforces key advances the priority for price stability the targeting of core rather than headline inflation the importance of credibility for low inflation and preemptive interest rate policy supported by transparent objectives and procedures of course a working consensus does not constitute complete agreement accordingly the conclusion identifies important monetary policy issues that remain to be explored

inflation forecasts and monetary policy proposals for inflation targeting as a strategy for monetary policy leave open the important operational question of how to determine whether current policies are consistent with the long run inflation target an interesting possibility is that the central bank might target current private sector forecasts of inflation either those made explicitly by professional forecasters or those implicit in asset prices we address the issue of existence and uniqueness of rational expectations equilibria when the central bank uses private sector forecasts as a guide to policy actions in a dynamic model which incorporates both sluggish price adjustment and shocks to aggregate demand and aggregate supply we show that strict targeting of inflation forecasts is typically inconsistent with the existence of rational expectations equilibrium and that policies approximating strict inflation forecast targeting are likely to have undesirable properties we also show that economies with more general forecast based policy rules are particularly susceptible to indeterminacy of rational expectations equilibria we conclude that although private sector forecasts may contain information useful to the central bank ultimately the monetary authorities must rely on an explicit structural model of the economy to guide their policy decisions this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

determinacy stock market dynamics and monetary policy inertia we study equilibrium determinacy in a new keynesian model where the central bank responds to asset prices growth unlike taylor type rules that react to asset prices the proposed alternative does not harm dynamic stability and in certain cases promotes determinacy by inducing interest rate inertia

the learning cost of interest rate reversals abstract many central banks in many time periods have sought to avoid interest rate reversals but at present there is no good explanation of this phenomenon our analysis identifies a new learning cost associated with reversing the interest rate in a standard monetary model with forward looking expectations data uncertainty and parameter uncertainty a policy that frequently reverses the interest rate makes learning the key parameters of the model more difficult optimal monetary policy internalises this learning cost and therefore has a lower number of interest rate reversals

inflation stabilization and welfare the case of a distorted steady state this paper considers the appropriate stabilization objectives for monetary policy in a microfounded model with staggered price setting rotemberg and woodford 1997 and woodford 2002 have shown that under certain conditions a local approximation to the expected utility of the representative household in a model of this kind is related inversely to the expected discounted value of a conventional quadratic loss function in which each period s loss is a weighted average of squared deviations of inflation and an output gap measure from their optimal values zero however those derivations rely on an assumption of the existence of an output or employment subsidy that offsets the distortion due to the market power of monopolistically competitive price setters so that the steady state under a zero inflation policy involves an efficient level of output here we show how to dispense with this unappealing assumption so that a valid linear quadratic approximation to the optimal policy problem is possible even when the steady state is distorted to an arbitrary extent allowing for tax distortions as well as market power and when as a consequence it is necessary to take account of the effects of stabilization policy on the average level of output we again obtain a welfare theoretic loss function that involves both inflation and an appropriately defined output gap though the degree of distortion of the steady state affects both the weights on the two stabilization objectives and the definition of the welfare relevant output gap in the light of these results we reconsider the conditions under which complete price stability is optimal and find that they are more restrictive in the case of a distorted steady state we also consider the conditions under which pure randomization of monetary policy can be welfare improving and find that this is possible in the case of a sufficiently distorted steady state though the parameter values required are probably not empirically realistic

monetary policy under misspecified expectations abstract this paper examines policy rule choices for a central bank that faces uncertainty about the process of expectation formations by economic agents the economy contains both rule of thumb agents who base their expectations on recent observations and agents who have rational expectations the central bank is uncertain about the fraction of the rule of thumb agents i find that when the economy is more forward looking the central bank responds more aggressively to inflation and output but the uncertainty averse central bank evaluates policies by the performance in the worst case in my economy the worst case is when a large fraction of agents are backward looking therefore the best policy for the uncertainty averse central bank involves moderate responses this minimax rule agrees more closely with empirically estimated less responsive taylor rules the paper also uncovers the importance of expectation formations on optimal policy choices

bad luck bad policy and learning a markov switching approach to understanding postwar u s macroeconomic dynamics abstract this paper evaluates the role of monetary policy in understanding the u s post war macroeconomic fluctuations we construct a medium size dsge model in which the central bank through a real time learning process can make mistakes in estimating key elasticities between macroeconomic aggregates and the central banks objectives may change over time the model also features time varying volatilities of non policy shocks we find that misperceptions of the persistence of inflation and the slope of the phillips curve could affect optimal monetary policy decision making therefore their accurate prediction is key for achieving successful monetary policy outcomes in addition we argue that the monetary policy shift geared toward inflation stabilization in the late 1970s changed the composition of output making the marginal efficiency of investment shock that proxies for the functioning of the financial sector the most important contributor to the business cycle

the dynamic in efficiency of monetary policy by committee this paper develops a model where the value of the monetary policy instrument is selected by a heterogenous committee engaged in a dynamic voting game committee members differ in their institutional power and in certain states of nature they also differ in their preferred instrument value preference heterogeneity and concern for the future interact to generate decisions that are dynamically inefficient and inertial around the previously agreed instrument value this model endogenously generates autocorrelation in the policy variable and helps explain the empirical observation that the distribution of actual interest rate changes has a mode of zero

shocks structures or monetary policies the euro area and us after 2001 abstract the us federal reserve cut interest rates more vigorously in the recent recession than the european central bank did by comparison with the fed the ecb followed a more measured course of action we use an estimated dynamic general equilibrium model with financial frictions to show that comparisons based on such simple metrics as the variance of policy rates are misleading we find that because there is greater inertia in the ecb s policy rule the ecb s policy actions actually had a greater stabilizing effect than did those of the fed as a consequence a potentially severe recession turned out to be only a slowdown and inflation never departed from levels consistent with the ecb s quantitative definition of price stability other factors that account for the different economic outcomes in the euro area and us include differences in shocks and differences in the degree of wage and price flexibility

a model of monetary policy shocks for financial crises and normal conditions in their classic 1999 paper monetary policy shocks what have we learned and to what end christiano eichenbaum and evans cee investigate one of the most widely used methods for identifying monetary policy shocks of its time unfortunately their approach is no longer viable at least not in its original form a major problem stems from the recent behavior of two key variables in their model the fed funds rate and non borrowed reserves we develop a new identification scheme that remedies these diculties but maintains the basic cee framework our empirical specification is motivated by a standard new keynesian dsge model augmented by a simple financial structure the model provides theoretical support for variables we use in place of certain variables that were used in the classic var approach outlined in cee one significant innovation is our use of divisia m4 the broadest monetary aggregate currently available for the united states as the policy indicator variable we obtain four major empirical results that support the use of a properly measured broad monetary aggregate as the policy variable first policy shocks have significant eects on output and on the price level even when an interest rate is included in our model contradicting the new keynesian argument that monetary aggregates are redundant second we develop a model that is not subject to the output price or liquidity puzzles common to this literature contradicting the view that using the interest rate as the policy indicator generally yields more reasonable responses than a monetary aggregate third during normal conditions policy shocks from our divisia based model have similar eects on variables to those found in the fed funds model of monetary policy and where there are dierences our model with divisia m4 obtains results that are more consistent with standard economic theory fourth our preferred specification produces plausible responses to a monetary policy shock in samples that include or exclude the recent financial crisis

strategic monetary and fiscal policy interactions an empirical investigation this paper identifies leadership regimes in monetary fiscal policy interactions in three countries the uk the us and sweden we specify a small scale structural general equilibrium model of an open economy and estimate it using bayesian methods we assume that the authorities can act strategically in a non cooperative policy game and compare different leadership regimes we find that the model of fiscal leadership gives the best fit for the uk and sweden while in the us the nash or non strategic regime dominates we assess the extent to which policy maker preferences reflect microfounded social preferences

inflation targeting what inflation rate to target abstract in an economy with nominal rigidities in both an intermediate good sector and a finished good sector and thus with a natural distinction between cpi and ppi inflation rates a benevolent central bank faces a tradeoff between stabilizing the two measures of inflation a final output gap and unique to our model a real marginal cost gap in the intermediate sector so that optimal monetary policy is second best we discuss how to implement the optimal policy with minimal information requirement and evaluate the robustness of these simple rules when the central bank may not know the exact sources of shocks or nominal rigidities a main finding is that a simple hybrid rule under which the short term interest rate responds to cpi inflation and ppi inflation results in a welfare level close to the optimum whereas policy rules that ignore ppi inflation or ppi sector shocks can result in significant welfare losses

estimating central bank preferences under commitment and discretion this paper explains u s macroeconomic outcomes with an empirical new keynesian model in which monetary policy minimizes the central bank s loss function the presence of expectations in the model forms a well known distinction between two modes of optimization termed commitment and discretion the model is estimated separately under each policy using maximum likelihood over the volcker greenspan bernanke period comparisons of fit reveal that the data favor the specification with discretionary policy estimates of the loss function weights point to an excessive concern for interest rate smoothing in the commitment model but a more balanced concern relative to inflation and output stability in the discretionary model

the fed the bond market and gradualism in monetary policy we develop a model of monetary policy with two key features i the central bank has some private information about its long run target for the policy rate and ii the central bank is averse to bond market volatility in this setting discretionary monetary policy is gradualist the central bank only adjusts the policy rate slowly in response to changes in its target such gradualism represents an attempt to not spook the bond market however this effort is unsuccessful in equilibrium as long term rates rationally react more to a given move in short rates when the central bank moves more gradually the same desire to mitigate bond market volatility can lead the central bank to lower short rates sharply when publicly observed term premiums rise in both cases there is a time consistency problem and society would be better off with a central banker who cares less about the bond market

why are the 2000s so different from the 1970s a structural interpretation of changes in the macroeconomic effects of oil prices in the 1970s large increases in the price of oil were associated with sharp decreases in output and large increases in inflation in the 2000s even larger increases in the price of oil were associated with much milder movements in output and inflation using a structural var approach blanchard and gali in j gali and m gertler eds 2009 international dimensions of monetary policy university of chicago press pp 373 428 argued that this reflected a change in the causal relation from the price of oil to output and inflation they then argued that this change could be due to a combination of three factors a smaller share of oil in production and consumption lower real wage rigidity and better monetary policy their argument based on simulations of a simple new keynesian model was informal our purpose in this paper is to take the next step and to estimate the explanatory power and contribution of each of these factors to do so we use a minimum distance estimator that minimizes over the set of structural parameters and for each of two samples pre and post 1984 the distance between the empirical svar based impulse response functions and those implied by a new keynesian model our empirical results point to an important role for all three factors

average inflation targeting and interest rate smoothing abstract we study the welfare implication of average inflation targeting as a simple interest rate rule in which the monetary authority adjusts its short term policy rate in response to the output gap as well as average inflation deviation from its target instead of reacting to the contemporaneous inflation rate as in a taylor type rule we find that the welfare improvement achieved by switching to average inflation targeting from a standard taylor rule is modest with a high degree of interest rate smoothing whereas it is significant without interest rate smoothing we show that average inflation targeting is welfare improving in the same way as interest rate smoothing by making the conduct of monetary policy history dependent thus the high degree of monetary policy inertia in the estimated interest rate rules in many advanced economies implies that the welfare gain from adopting the average inflation targeting rule would be minimal

on targeting frameworks and optimal monetary policy we show that speed limit policy a monetary policy strategy that focuses on stabilizing inflation and the change in the output gap consistently outperforms flexible inflation targeting and flexible price level targeting in empirical medium scale dsge models under discretionary policymaking in contrast to small scale new keynesian models this welfare ranking of the targeting frameworks is not overturned when inflation dynamics are mostly backward looking importantly the performance of the speed limit policy shows less sensitivity to its parameterization than other frameworks that target the inflation rate or the price level

do real balance effects invalidate the taylor principle in closed and open economies this paper examines the determinacy implications of forecast based monetary policy rules that set the interest rate in response to expected future inflation in a neo wicksellian model that incorporates real balance effects we show that the presence of such effects in closed economies restricts the ability of the taylor principle to prevent indeterminacy of the rational expectations equilibrium the problem is exacerbated in open economies particularly if the policy rule reacts to consumer price rather than domestic price inflation however determinacy can be restored in both closed and open economies with the addition of monetary policy inertia

efficient propagation of shocks and the optimal return on money abstract we study optimal allocations in an environment in which money is essential due to lack of commitment and anonymity of individuals because the economy features aggregate preference shocks we apply a notion of implementability that allows for allocations with non trivial business cycle dynamics for the propagation of shocks we show that history dependence is predicted by the theory of second best and becomes necessary for optimality when the degree of patience is neither too low nor too high our analysis concludes with a discussion of whether there is a role for the propagation of shocks in alternative economic environments

monetary policy and exchange rate interactions in a small open economy the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy in a small open economy like norway are analysed through structural vars with special emphasis on the interdependence between monetary policy and exchange rate movements by imposing a long run neutrality restriction on the real exchange rate thereby allowing the interest rate and the exchange rate to react simultaneously to news i find considerable interdependence between monetary policy and the exchange rate in particular following a contractionary monetary policy shock the real exchange rate immediately appreciates after which it gradually depreciates back to the baseline the results are found to be consistent with findings from an event study

euro area money demand and international portfolio allocation a contribution to assessing risks to price stability this chapter argues that a stable broad money demand for the euro area over the period 1980 2011 can be obtained by modelling cross border international portfolio allocation we first observe that in this first decade of the new millennium the breakdown of standard money demand specifications for the euro area and the strong developments in annual m3 growth coincide with large net flows in portfolio invest ment in the euro area we then estimate a new money demand which turns out to be stable by including variables explaining portfolio flows omitted in the traditional specifications

optimal interest rate smoothing this paper considers the desirability of the observed tendency of central banks to adjust interest rates only gradually in response to changes in economic conditions it shows in the context of a simple model of optimizing private sector behaviour that assignment of an interest rate smoothing objective to the central bank may be desirable even when reduction of the magnitude of interest rate changes is not a social objective in itself this is because a response of policy to irrelevant lagged variables may be desirable owing to the way it steers private sector expectations of future policy

an optimizing is lm specification for monetary policy and business cycle analysis we ask whether relations of the is lm type can sensibly be used for the aggregate demand portion of a dynamic optimizing general equilibrium model intended for analysis of issues regarding monetary policy and cyclical fluctuations the main result is that only one change the addition of a term regarding expected future income is needed to make the is function match a fully optimizing model whereas no changes are needed for the lm function this modification leads to a dynamic forward looking model of aggregate demand that is tractable and usable with a wide variety of aggregate supply specifications theoretical applications concerning price level determinacy and gradual price adjustment are included

optimal reputation building in the new keynesian model abstract we study the optimal committed monetary policy when the private sector has imperfect information and has to infer the central banker s ability to commit the optimal policy is designed to influence learning and improve the central banker s reputation of being committed the reputation building implies that when a committed central banker first takes office he should resist the temptation to stimulate output with initially high but declining inflation he should reverse a missed inflation target rather than accommodate it and he should adopt a less accommodative inflation response to a cost push shock than a full commitment solution suggests

monetary policy and exchange rate overshooting dornbusch was right after all abstract dornbusch s exchange rate overshooting hypothesis is a central building block in international macroeconomics yet empirical studies of monetary policy have typically found exchange rate effects that are inconsistent with overshooting this puzzling result has been viewed by some researchers as a stylized fact to be reckoned with in policy modelling however many of these studies in particular those using vector autoregressive vars approaches have disregarded the strong contemporaneous interaction between monetary policy and exchange rate movements by placing zero restrictions on them in contrast we achieve identification by imposing a long run neutrality restriction on the real exchange rate thereby allowing for contemporaneous interaction between the interest rate and the exchange rate in a study of four open economies we find that the puzzles disappear in particular a contractionary monetary policy shock has a strong effect on the exchange rate which appreciates on impact the maximum effect occurs within 1 2 quarters and the exchange rate thereafter gradually depreciates to baseline consistent with the dornbusch overshooting hypothesis and with few exceptions consistent with uncovered interest parity uip

macro factors and the affine term structure of interest rates this paper formulates an affine term structure model of bond yields from a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with observable macro state variables as the term structure factors model implications for the joint macro term structure dynamics are consistent with the empirical patterns from the var estimation model calibration and simulation exercises also provide clear macroeconomic interpretations of the latent term structure factors as found in the finance literature most of the slope factor movement can be explained by exogenous monetary policy shocks and the level factor movement is closely related to the technology shocks

does the fed act gradually a var analysis abstract the tendency for changes in the federal funds rate to be implemented gradually has been considered evidence of an interest rate smoothing objective for the federal reserve this paper investigates whether gradual funds rate movements can be explained by the dynamic structure of the economy and the uncertainty surrounding that structure without recourse to including an ad hoc interest rate smoothing argument in the fed s objective function in the absence of parameter uncertainty the optimal policy involves more aggressive movements in the funds rate than observed parameter uncertainty however limits the responsiveness of the interest rate as a result the optimal policy under parameter uncertainty can account for a considerable portion of the gradualism observed

monetary policy rules in a new keynesian euro area model the first part of this paper is devoted to describe a new keynesian model which after calibration shows a great fit on euro area macroeconomic data then the stabilizing properties of alternative monetary policy rules are evaluated for consideration of the european central bank ecb our main finding is that a simple rule that provides the reaction of the nominal interest rate to price inflation wage inflation and its previous observation can fairly well approximate the optimal monetary policy this result is robust to including an ecb preference on interest rate smoothing

payment system disruptions and the federal reserve following september 11 2001 abstract the monetary and payment system consequences of the september 11 2001 terrorist attacks and the federal reserve s response are reviewed interbank payment disruptions appear to be a central feature of many us banking crises and interbank payment disruptions seem likely to recur federal reserve credit extension following september 11 succeeded in massively increasing the supply of banks balances to satisfy the disruption induced increase in demand and thereby ameliorate the effects of the shock relatively benign banking conditions helped make fed credit policy manageable an interbank payment disruption that coincided with less favorable banking conditions could be more difficult to manage given current daylight credit policies paying interest on reserves would facilitate improvements in daylight credit policy

smoothed interest rate setting by central banks and staggered loan contracts i investigate a new source of economic stickiness namely staggered loan interest rate contracts under monopolistic competition this study introduces this mechanism into a standard new keynesian model simulations show that a response to a financial shock is greatly amplified by the staggered loan contracts although a response to a productivity cost push or monetary policy shock is not much affected i derive an approximated loss function and analyse optimal monetary policy unlike other models the function includes a quadratic loss of the first order difference in loan rates thus central banks have an incentive to smooth the policy rate

the new keynesian monetary model does it show the comovement between gdp and inflation in the u s abstract this paper analyzes the performance of alternative versions of the new keynesian monetary nkm model in replicating the comovement observed between output and inflation following den haan 2000 the comovement between output and prices journal of monetary economics 46 3 30 we analyze comovement by computing the correlations of var forecast errors of the two variables at different forecast horizons the empirical correlation is negative and marginally significant for the one ahead forecast horizon but the correlations are non significant for the other forecast horizons studied in contrast a simple nkm model under a standard parameterization provides a high and significant negative comovement at all forecast horizons however a generalized version including habit formation and a forward looking taylor rule is able to mimic the observed weak comovement at medium and long term forecast horizons

forecast uncertainty and the taylor rule abstract in this paper we derive a modification of a forward looking taylor rule by integrating two variables that measure the uncertainty of inflation and gdp growth forecasts into an otherwise standard new keynesian model we show that certainty equivalence in new keynesian models is a consequence of log linearization and that a second order taylor approximation leads to a reaction function that includes the uncertainty of macroeconomic expectations to test the model empirically we use the standard deviation of individual forecasts around the median consensus forecast as a proxy for forecast uncertainty our sample covers the euro area the united kingdom and the united states for the period 1990q1 2016q4 we find that the bank of england and the european central bank have a significantly negative reaction to inflation forecast uncertainty our findings also reveal that the federal reserve bank of england lowers raises its interest rate in response to higher gdp growth forecast uncertainty we conclude by offering some implications for optimal monetary policy rules and central bank watchers

debt nonneutrality policy interactions and macroeconomic stability we study the consequences of non neutrality of government debt for macroeconomic stabilization policy in an environment where prices are sticky assuming transaction services of government bonds ricardian equivalence fails because public debt has a negative impact on its marginal rate of return and thus on private savings stability of equilibrium sequences requires a stationary evolution of real public debt which steers inflation expectations and rules out endogenous fluctuations under anti inflationary monetary policy regimes macroeconomic fluctuations tend to decrease with the share of tax financing which justifies tight debt constraints in particular a balanced budget policy stabilizes the economy under cost push shocks such that output and inflation variances can be lower than in a corresponding case where debt is neutral

targeting inflation by forecast feedback rules in small open economies abstract we argue that in practice the inflation targeting strategy can be approximated by the interest rate responding to the unchanged interest rate forecast of inflation a method is developed to derive unchanged interest rate forecasts in forward looking models and evaluate the performance of the policy rule in an optimizing new keynesian model due to monacelli european central bank working paper series 227 estimated on uk data we find that the policy rule is less prone to generate a determinate rational expectations equilibrium if based on an unchanged interest rate compared to the rule consistent forecast both rules approximate the optimal commitment policy if the central bank attaches sufficient weight to inflation as opposed to output gap stabilization the optimal forecast feedback horizon is close to a year and a half and is largely independent of how much the central bank prefers inflation to output gap stability

delegating optimal monetary policy inertia abstract in a forward looking business cycle model central banks can achieve the timeless optimal commitment equilibrium even in the absence of a commitment technology if they are delegated with an objective function that is different from the societal one the paper develops a general linear quadratic method to solve for the optimal delegation parameters that generate the optimal amount of inertia in a markov perfect equilibrium and studies the optimal design of some policy regimes that are nested within this framework the squared optimal targeting rule inflation output gap growth and nominal income growth targeting and inflation and output gap contracts

monetary policy by committee consensus chairman dominance or simple majority this paper studies the theoretical and empirical implications of monetary policy making by committee under four different voting protocols the protocols are a consensus model where a supermajority is required for a policy change an agenda setting model where the chairman controls the agenda a dictator model where the chairman has absolute power over the committee and a simple majority model where policy is determined by the median member these protocols give preeminence to different aspects of the actual decision making process and capture the observed heterogeneity in formal procedures across central banks the models are estimated by maximum likelihood using interest rate decisions by the committees of five central banks namely the bank of canada the bank of england the european central bank the swedish riksbank and the u s federal reserve for all central banks results indicate that the consensus model fits actual policy decisions better than the alternative models this suggests that despite institutional differences committees share unwritten rules and informal procedures that deliver observationally equivalent policy decisions

posterior predictive evidence on us inflation using extended new keynesian phillips curve models with non filtered data changing time series properties of us inflation and economic activity measured as marginal costs are modeled within a set of extended new keynesian phillips curve nkpc models it is shown that mechanical removal or modeling of simple low frequency movements in the data may yield poor predictive results which depend on the model specification used basic nkpc models are extended to include structural time series models that describe typical time varying patterns in levels and volatilities forward and backward looking expectation components for inflation are incorporated and their relative importance is evaluated survey data on expected inflation are introduced to strengthen the information in the likelihood use is made of simulation based bayesian techniques for the empirical analysis no credible evidence is found on endogeneity and long run stability between inflation and marginal costs backward looking inflation appears stronger than forward looking inflation levels and volatilities of inflation are estimated more precisely using rich nkpc models the extended nkpc structures compare favorably with existing basic bayesian vector autoregressive and stochastic volatility models in terms of fit and prediction tails of the complete predictive distributions indicate an increase in the probability of deflation in recent years

inflation forecast contracts we introduce a new type of incentive contract for central bankers inflation forecast contracts which make central bankers remunerations contingent on the precision of their inflation forecasts we show that such contracts enable central bankers to influence inflation expectations more eectively thus facilitating more successful stabilization of current inflation inflation forecast contracts improve the accuracy of inflation forecasts but have adverse consequences for output on balance paying central bankers according to their forecasting performance improves welfare

from global imbalances to global reorganisations the world feels itself to be in transition but to what is unclear will the liberal market model retain its normative primacy once some semblance of normality is restored or will other varieties of capitalism with a bigger role of the state acquire more legitimacy the answer depends partly on one s explanation for the current crisis this essay argues first that global imbalances had too important a role to ignore in contrast to a mainstream view that focuses on mistakes in monetary policy and financial regulation it argues second that in light of global dynamics the crisis is likely to become worse by early 2010 which on the face of it makes significant reorganisations of capitalism more likely the third section lays out what should be done to reconfigure capitalism at national and international levels the final section discusses the political economy of policy reforms in terms of the difficult translation from what should be done to what can be done the broad conclusion is that in five years from now the liberal market model will have been restored to normative primacy and we must have more globalization will again be the elite rallying cry but the crisis will have left behind sufficient doubts about factual propositions and value priorities that political parties and economists advocating alternatives will have more scope than they have had for the past three decades

central bank reputation in a forward looking model this paper examines whether reputation concerns can induce the central bank to implement the time inconsistent optimal monetary policy in the standard new keynesian model interestingly the forward looking nature of this model enables us to account for the coordination of the private agents on the punishment length of their trigger strategy our results suggest that both the inflation bias and the stabilization bias can be overcome by a reputation concerned central bank for the calibrations used in the literature these results enable us to endogenize woodford s timeless perspective and tend to weaken the case for recent monetary policy delegation proposals

why inflation rose and fell policy makers beliefs and u s postwar stabilization policy this paper provides an explanation for the run up of u s inflation in the 1960s and 1970s and the sharp disinflation in the early 1980s which standard macroeconomic models have difficulties in addressing i present a model in which rational policymakers learn about the behavior of the economy in real time and set stabilization policy optimally conditional on their current beliefs the steady state associated with the self confirming equilibrium of the model is characterized by low inflation however prolonged episodes of high inflation ending with rapid disinflations can occur when policymakers underestimate both the natural rate of unemployment and the persistence of inflation in the phillips curve i estimate the model using likelihood methods the estimation results show that the model accounts remarkably well for the evolution of policymakers beliefs stabilization policy and the postwar behavior of inflation and unemployment in the united states

investment and monetary policy learning and determinacy of equilibrium we explore determinacy and expectational stability learnability of rational expectations equilibrium ree in new keynesian nk models that include capital using a consistent calibration across three different models labor only firm specific capital or an economy wide rental market for capital we provide a clear picture of when ree is determinate and learnable and when it is not under a variety of monetary policy rules our findings make a case for greater optimism concerning the use of such rules in nk models with capital while bullard and mitra s 2002 2007 findings for the labor only nk model do not always extend to models with capital we show that determinate and learnable ree can be achieved in nk models with capital if there is i plausible capital adjustment costs ii some weight given to output in the policy rule and or iii a policy of interest rate smoothing

house prices and stock prices different roles in the us monetary transmission mechanism we analyze the role of house prices and stock prices in the monetary policy transmission mechanism in the us using a structural vector autoregressive model if we allow the interest rate and asset prices to react simultaneously to news we find different roles for house prices and stock prices in the monetary transmission mechanism following a contractionary monetary policy shock stock prices fall immediately while the response in house prices is more gradual regarding the systematic response in monetary policy stock prices play a more important role than house prices as a consequence house prices contribute more than stock prices to fluctuations in gross domestic product and inflation

monetary policy rules under heterogeneous inflation expectations this paper evaluates the role of inflation forecast heterogeneity in u s monetary policymaking the deviation between private and central bank inflation forecasts is identified as a significant explanatory factor behind the fed s monetary policy decisions a discretionary policy rule that includes the forecast deviation as an additional argument is estimated empirically for the period 1975 2009 covering the chairmanships of arthur burns george miller paul volcker alan greenspan and the beginning of ben bernanke s term by using inflation forecasts obtained from the federal open market committee s greenbook and the survey of professional forecasters and real time estimates of the output gap the estimated rule appears to provide a consistent description of the fed s policy during the sample period presenting an alternative perspective regarding the key drivers of the high inflation phase in the 1970s as well as of the successful volcker disinflation in the early 1980s and the gradual transition to a regime of lower inflation and high policy credibility that has increasingly characterized monetary policy over the past two decades jel e50 e52 e58

a note on timeless perspective policy design working with a typical macroeconomic model we investigate the potential superiority or otherwise of timeless perspective tp policy design we show that when fiscal policy matters the timeless perspective policy design can cause instability

asymmetric monetary policy rules in australia abstractin this study the hypothesis that the reserve bank of australia rba implements an asymmetric monetary policy rule is tested we estimate both linear and asymmetric monetary policy reaction functions for the period before inflation targeting was adopted for the period when inflation targeting was explicitly adopted and for the full sample period the results of the linear monetary policy rules are consistent with the estimates reported from other studies that estimate linear monetary policy rules for australia on the other hand the results of estimating the asymmetric monetary policy rules for the pre inflation targeting period shows that the rba had reacted symmetrically suggesting that it had acted with the same aggressiveness towards both inflation and output gaps of the same magnitude over both phases of the business cycle however for the inflation targeting period the results show that the rba had reacted asymmetrically in its policy response to the inflation gap output gap or both

instability imprecision and inconsistent use of equilibrium real interest rate estimates abstract the debate on monetary and fiscal policy is heavily influenced by estimates of the equilibrium real interest rate in particular this concerns estimates derived from a simple aggregate demand and phillips curve model with time varying components as proposed by laubach and williams 2003 for example summers 2014a refers to these estimates as important evidence for a secular stagnation and the need for fiscal stimulus yellen 2015 2017 has made use of such estimates in order to explain and justify why the federal reserve has held interest rates so low for so long first we re estimate the united states equilibrium rate with the methodology of laubach and williams 2003 then we build on their approach and an alternative specification to provide new estimates for the united states germany the euro area and japan third we subject these estimates to a battery of sensitivity tests due to the great uncertainty and sensitivity that accompany these equilibrium rate estimates the observed decline in the estimates is not a reliable indicator of a need for expansionary monetary and fiscal policy yet if these estimates are employed to determine the appropriate monetary policy stance such estimates are better used together with the consistent estimate of the level of potential output

simple monetary policymaking without the output gap several research contributions have argued that information about the output gap is essential for a good monetary policy rule however as pointed out by orphanides 2001 there is considerable real time uncertainty about the size of the output gap the paper argues that simple monetary policy rules that rely exclusively on survey based information about future and past inflation rates may be more efficient than optimized taylor rules once realtime output gap uncertainty is accounted for even when only information about historical inflation rates is available a very simple policy rule may be constructed that improves on the taylor rule