involuntary unemployment and implicit contracts this paper provides an explanation of involuntary umemployment arising as a consequence of asymmetric information between firms and workers involuntary unemployment is defined as a situation where ex post gains to trade exist a model of labor contracts is developed where the allocations are not ex post optimal it is shown that inferiority of leisure is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of involuntary unemployment

a simple framework for international monetary policy analysis abstract we study the international monetary policy design problem within an optimizing two country sticky price model where each country faces a short run tradeoff between output and inflation the model is sufficiently tractable to solve analytically we find that in the nash equilibrium the policy problem for each central bank is isomorphic to the one it would face if it were a closed economy gains from cooperation arise however that stem from the impact of foreign economic activity on the domestic marginal cost of production while under nash central banks need only adjust the interest rate in response to domestic inflation under cooperation they should respond to foreign inflation as well in either scenario flexible exchange rates are desirable

optimal policy in markov switching rational expectations models abstract in this paper we consider the optimal quadratic control problem of markov switching linear rational expectation models these models are general and flexible tools for modelling not only regime but also model or parameter uncertainty we show first how to find the solution of a markov switching linear rational expectation model based on this solution we then show how to apply dynamic programming to find the optimal time consistent policy and the resulting nash stackelberg equilibrium suitable modifications of the algorithm allow to deal with the non re case in which the policymaker and the private sector hold different beliefs or probabilities over regime change we also show how the optimisation procedure can be employed to obtain the optimal policy under commitment as an illustration we compute the optimal policy in a small open economy subject to stochastic structural breaks in some of its key parameters

monetary policy and uncertainty in an empirical small open economy model this paper explores optimal policy design in an estimated model of three small open economies australia canada and new zealand within a class of generalized taylor rules we show that to stabilize a weighted objective of output consumer price in ation and nominal interest variation optimal policy does not respond to the nominal exchange this is despite the presence of local currency pricing and due in large part to observed exchange rate disconnect in these economies optimal policies that account for the uncertainty of model estimates as captured by the parameters posterior distrbution similarly exhibit a lack of exchange rate response in contrast to brainard 1967 the presence of parameter uncertainty can lead to more or less aggressive policy responses depending on the model at hand

the value relevance of reputation for sustainability leadership this study investigates whether the market valuation of the two summary accounting measures book value of equity and net income is higher for firms with reputation for sustainability leadership when compared to firms that do not enjoy such reputation the results are interpreted through the lens of a framework combining signalling theory and resource based theory according to which firms signal their commitment to sustainability to influence the external perception of reputation a firm s reputation for being committed to sustainability is an intangible resource that can increase the value of a firm s expected cash flows and or reduce the variability of its cash flows our findings are according to expectations and show that the net income of firms with good sustainability reputation has a higher valuation by the market when compared to their counterparts

wage employment contracts this paper studies the efficient agreements about the dependence of workers earnings on employment when the employment level is controlled by firms the firms superior information about profitability conditions is responsible for this form of contract governance under plausible assumptions such agreements will cause employment to diverge from efficiency as a byproduct of their attempt to mitigate risk it is shown that if leisure is a normal good and firms are risk neutral employment is always above the efficient level such a one period implicit contracting model cannot therefore be used to explain unemployment as a rational byproduct of risk sharing between workers and a risk neutral firm under conditions of asymmetric information

career concerns incentives and endogenous learning in labour markets models of career concerns provide a framework for analyzing the actions that may be taken by a manager in an attempt to influence performance signals that the market uses to update its beliefs on her productivity and the incentive problem that arises if such actions do not coincide with those that maximize the financial return to a firm s owner this survey provides a formal introduction to the main types of models of career concerns hidden action and hidden information and discusses some extensions of these models applications of the career concerns framework to explain aspects of managerial behavior and the form of labor market institutions are emphasized copyright 1992 by blackwell publishers ltd

the peter principle a theory of decline some have observed that individuals perform worse after being promoted the peter principle which states that people are promoted to their level of incompetence suggests that something is fundamentally misaligned in the promotion process this view is unnecessary and inconsistent with the data below it is argued that ability appears lower after promotion purely as a statistical matter being promoted is evidence that a standard has been met regression to the mean implies that future ability will be lower on average firms optimally account for the regression bias in making promotion decisions but the effect is never eliminated rather than evidence of a mistake the peter principle is a necessary consequence of any promotion rule furthermore firms that take it into account appropriately adopt an optimal strategy usually firms inflate the promotion criterion to offset the peter principle effect and the more important the transitory component is relative to total variation in ability the larger

optimal labour contracts when workers have a variety of privately observed reservation wages if a firm does not know the individual ex post outside opportunities of its contracted workforce then it can use hours wages and redundancy payments to screen them will a second best contract have underemployment inefficiency or overemployment and with a stochastic contract are those workers randomly selected for layoff worse off than their retained colleagues involuntary layoff or vice versa involuntary retention the answers depend on the nature of the workers preferences two polar cases are looked at corresponding to permanent and temporary layoff the former is characterized by overemployment and involuntary retention the latter by underemployment and involuntary layoff also examined are simple contracts where all retained workers are paid a common wage and all laid off workers receive a common redundancy payment handling asymmetric information in stochastic contracts has led to two technical innovations first a number of results are proved even though all the truth telling constraints are explicitly included second a new regularity condition is found under which the local constraints are sufficient to ensure global incentive compatibility at an optimum

what will consumers pay for social product features the importance of ethical consumerism to many companies worldwide has increased dramatically in recent years ethical consumerism encompasses the importance of non traditional and social components of a company s products and business process to strategic success such as environmental protectionism child labor practices and so on the present paper utilizes a random utility theoretic experimental design to provide estimates of the relative value selected consumers place on the social features of products

standard promotion practices versus up or out contracts this article develops a theory concerning the choice between standard promotion practices and up or out contracts our theory is based on asymmetric learning and promotion incentives we find that firms employ up or out contracts when firm specific human capital is low and standard promotion practices when it is high we also find that if commitment to a wage floor is feasible and effort provision is important up or out is employed when low and high level jobs are similar these results are consistent with many of the settings in which up or out is typically observed such as law firms and academia

two sided uncertainty and up or out contracts a bilateral moral hazard problem provides a rationale for up or out employment contracts the employer sets a wage higher than opportunity cost to induce the worker to invest in firm specific capital if the individual does not make the grade it is in the firm s interest ex post to fire him had the initial arrangement not included provisions for firing individuals the firm would underreport the value of the employee wrecking the incentive scheme the basic model permits both firm and worker to be risk neutral therefore it admits a straightforward multiperiod extension which we also investigate

price setting power vs private information an experimental evaluation of their impact on holdup abstract this paper investigates the extent of the holdup problem in a buyer seller relationship in which the seller has private information about his alternative opportunities theory predicts that compared to a situation in which outside options are publicly observed the seller obtains an informational rent whereas the buyer bears an informational loss as a result the seller is predicted to invest more while the buyer is expected to invest less in contrast to this private information has no impact on the investment levels observed in the experiment but actual investments do increase with the price setting power of the investor these findings are roughly consistent with a model in which agents are inequality averse overall the results question some recent theoretical suggestions that private information rents might substitute for price setting power in mitigating holdup

a new framework integrating environmental effects into technology evaluation this study aims to propose a framework considering both economic issues and environmental effects in technology evaluation in order to provide firms decision makers a useful reference in adopting technologies that will enable them to fulfill corporate social responsibilities and get competitive advantages at the same time recently the demands for technology evaluation have increased with the flourishing development of technology licensing technology transaction or joint venture on the one hand and with the pressing needs of environmental protection for human beings sustainable development on the other hand under such conditions it thus goes without saying that firms decision makers are propelled to take into account both economic benefits and environmental effects in evaluating technologies by choosing low or nonpolluting technologies for manufacturing products although technology evaluation is not a new and emerging subject currently besetting scholars in the field of management previous research on this topic has unwittingly left behind the pressing issue of environmental effects based on this observation this study purports to develop a new framework for technology evaluation by taking both economic benefits and environmental perspectives into consideration in it we seek to demonstrate that our proposed framework will not only be a workable model but also can serve as a useful point of reference for technology appraisers and firms decision makers

do central banks respond to exchange rate movements a structural investigation abstract we estimate a small scale structural general equilibrium model of a small open economy using bayesian methods our main focus is the conduct of monetary policy in australia canada new zealand and the uk we consider generic taylor type rules where the monetary authority reacts in response to output inflation and exchange rate movements we perform posterior odds tests to investigate the hypothesis whether central banks do target exchange rates the main result of this paper is that the central banks of australia and new zealand do not whereas the bank of canada and the bank of england do include the nominal exchange rate in its policy rule this result is robust for various specification of the policy rule we also find that terms of trade movements do not contribute significantly to domestic business cycles

toward a theoretical model of voluntary overcompliance abstract we explain why some firms voluntarily overcomply with environmental regulation in our model all consumers value environmental quality but differ in their willingness to pay which depends on their income levels publicly available information on environmental performance of firms enables consumers to identify clean firms firms participate in a two stage duopoly game where they first choose their levels of cleaning technology and next engage in price competition the market gets segmented by income levels a minimum standard binding on the dirty firm has the effect of improving the performance of the cleaner firm a subsidy obtains the same competitive outcome

evolving monetary fiscal policy mix in the united states a micro founded model that allows for changes in the monetary fiscal policy mix and in the volatility of structural shocks is fit to us post wwii data agents are aware of the possibility of regime changes and their beliefs have an impact on the law of motion of the macroeconomy the results show that the 60s and the 70s were characterized by a prolonged period of active fiscal policy and passive monetary policy the appointment of volcker marked a change in the conduct of monetary policy but it took almost ten years for the fiscal authority to start accommodating this regime change

worker mobility in a search model with adverse selection we analyze the effects of adverse selection on worker turnover and wage dynamics in a frictional labor market we consider a model of on the job search where firms offer promotion wage contracts to workers of different abilities which is unknown to firms at the hiring stage with sufficiently strong information frictions low wage firms offer separating contracts and hire all types of workers in equilibrium whereas high wage firms offer pooling contracts promoting high ability workers only low ability workers have higher turnover rates and are more often employed in low wage firms the model replicates the negative relationship between job to job transitions and wages observed in the u s labor market

incentives in organizations n 1975 steven kerr published on the folly of rewarding a while hoping for b the argument was simple you get what you pay for kerr distilled this unifying theme from a disparate set of examples involving politicians soldiers doctors orphanage directors professors and students as well as manufacturing and clerical employees and even human resource managers from these examples kerr pp 77980 concluded that two main causes of distorted incentives are fascination with an objective criterion where individuals seek to establish simple quantifiable standards against which to measure and reward performance and overemphasis on highly visible behaviors when some parts of the task are highly visible while others are not it took agency theory 15 years to express kerr s title not to mention to evaluate or extend his conclusions during this period agency theory was obsessed with the tradeoff between incentives and insurance even though clear eyed observations like kerr s about the design and performance of real incentive contracts suggested that several other issues are at least as important fortunately recent work has brought agency theory not only to kerr s position but beyond in this paper i summarize four new strands in agency theory that help me think about incentives in real organizations as a point of departure i begin with a quick sketch of the classic agency model i then discuss static models of objective performance measurement that sharpen kerr s argument repeated game models of subjective performance assessments incentives for skill development rather than simply for effort and incentive contracts between versus within organizations i con

customer regulatory and competitive pressure as drivers of environmental innovation we develop an economic analysis in order to examine the effects of consumer regulatory and competitive pressure on firm investments in environmentally friendly production specifically we ask why do firms vary in their levels of environmental innovation under what conditions are such pressures effective in bringing about environmental innovation we first consider a monopolist who faces the twin pressures of reduced customer demand and regulatory penalties as a result of its emissions in response to these pressures the firm has the opportunity to make a costly investment in reduction of emissions secondly we consider a competitive scenario in which two firms compete for environmentally sensitive customers solving our model we find that pressure has the intended effect as long as the firm s initial level of emissions is below a certain threshold if the emissions are above this threshold we find that pressure might have an adverse effect on the firm s environmental investment and that subsidies that support environmental innovation can be a better alternative we also show that competition over environmentally sensitive customers can improve the effectiveness of environmental pressures

the excess sensitivity of layoffs and quits to demand excessive layoffs in bad times and excessive quits in good times both stem from the same weakness in practical employment arrangements the specific nature of worker firm relations creates a situat

u s monetary regimes and optimal monetary policy in the euro area monetary policy in the united states has been documented to have switched from reacting weakly to inflation fluctuations during the 1970s to fighting inflation aggressively from the early 1980s onward in this paper i analyze the impact of the u s monetary policy regime switches on the eurozone i construct a new keynesian two country model where foreign u s monetary policy switches regimes over time i estimate the model for the u s and the euro area using quarterly data and find that the united states has switched between those two regimes in line with existing evidence i show that foreign regime switches affect home eurozone inflation and output volatility and their responses to shocks substantially as long as the home central bank commits to a time invariant interest rate rule reacting to domestic conditions only optimal policy in the home country instead requires that the home central bank reacts strongly to domestic producer price inflation and to international variables such as imported goods relative prices in fact i show that currency misalignments and relative prices play a crucial role in the transmission of foreign monetary policy regime switches internationally interestingly i show that only marginal gains arise for the euro area when the european central bank ecb adjusts its policy according to the monetary regime in the united states thus a simple time invariant monetary policy rule with a strong reaction to producer price index ppi inflation and relative prices is enough to counteract the effects of monetary policy switches in the united states

the firm as a dedicated hierarchy a theory of the origins and growth of firms in the formative stages of their businesses entrepreneurs have to provide incentives for employees to protect rather than steal the source of organizational rents we study how the entrepreneur s response to this problem determines the organization s internal structure growth and its eventual size large steep hierarchies will predominate in physical capital intensive industries and will have seniority based promotion policies by contrast e at hierarchies will prevail in human capital intensive industries and will have up or out promotion systems furthermore e at hierarchies will have more distinctive technologies or cultures than steep hierarchies the model points to some essential differences between organized hierarchies and markets at the root of most enterprises generating economic surplus is an entrepreneur with a unique critical resource such as an idea good customer relationships a new tool or superior management technique a fundamental problem of entrepreneurship is how to enlist the cooperation of the many agents necessary for production without ceding to them too much of the surplus generated by the enterprise the risk of being expropriated however is always inherent in production in particular the entrepreneur has to give her employees whom we call managers close proximity or access to the critical resource for them to learn to produce effectively for example a manager has to understand the idea be in contact with the key customers and suppliers or even learn the entrepreneur s unique managerial techniques in order to work effectively but access also gives the manager the opportunity to expropriate this critical resource and compete against the entrepreneur managers may steal the idea walk away with clients or mimic the entrepreneur s management style and start up a rival concern the greater the access a manager has the more he can appropriate and the more effectively he can compete this paper explores the role of organizational design in

reexamining the expected effect of available resources and firm size on firm environmental orientation an empirical study of uk firms an emergent body of literature examined why some firms apply some environmental initiatives while other firms do not take responsibility for their natural environment thus firm environmental orientation responsiveness and performance are linked in the literature to several variables unfortunately the relationship between firm environmental orientation and either available resources or firm size showed mixed results and inconclusive evidence therefore the aim of this paper is to show empirically how available resources and firm size can explain differences in firm environmental responsiveness and environmental performance econometric results of environmental responsiveness using the logistic regression model demonstrated that firm size does appear to add something unique in explaining differences in environmental responsiveness while available resource can be safely dropped from the model however econometric analysis of environmental performance using the maximum likelihood random effects model showed strong evidence that available resources and firm size are significant predictors of firm environmental performance

solution and estimation of re macromodels with optimal policy macro models of monetary policy typically involve forward looking behavior except in rare circumstances we have to apply some numerical method to find the optimal policy and the rational expectations equilibrium this paper summarizes a few useful methods and shows how they can be combined with a kalman filter to estimate the deep model parameters with maximum likelihood simulations of a macro model with staggered price setting interest rate elastic output and optimal monetary policy illustrate the properties of this estimation approach

do the ecb and the fed really need to cooperate optimal monetary policy in a two country world abstract a two country model with monopolistic competition and price stickiness is employed to investigate the implications for macroeconomic stability and the welfare properties of three international policy arrangements a cooperative b non cooperative and c monetary union i characterize the conditions under which there is scope for policy cooperation and quantify the costs of non cooperation and monetary union the non cooperative equilibrium may be suboptimal because of terms of trade spillover effects while monetary union may be suboptimal because of the sluggishness of relative prices both the costs of policy competition and of a monetary union are sensitive to the values assumed for the intertemporal and international demand elasticity and the degree of openness of the economy independently of the calibration scenario adopted the ecb has little to gain by coordinating with the fed

discretion and bias in performance evaluation most of the economics literature on compensation and organizations builds from the theory of agency for the most part the literature analyzes situations in which agents performance can be controlled by tying compensation to objective performance measures such as output or sales it ignores the fact that most compensation arrangements involve superiors subjectire and hence non contractible judgements about employee performance in our view much of what is interesting about actual employment relations follows from the observation that performance appraisal is a process by which humans judge other humans milkovich and wigdor 1991 this paper studies the implications of subjective performance evaluation for compensation policies and for the efficiency of employment relations our objectives are two fold first we propose the importance of subjectivity of evaluations to better understand organizatlonal practices such as politicking favoritism and compression of wage scales second we hope to orient the study of subjective performance evaluation in ways that are consistent with empirical evidence on what organizations actually do

incentives between firms and within this paper reviews the significant progress in agency theory i e the economic theory of incentives during the 1990s with an eye toward applications to supply transactions i emphasize six recent models in three pairs 1 new foundations for the theory of incentive contracts 2 new directions in incentive theory and 3 new applications to supply transactions by reviewing these six models i hope to establish three things first the theory of incentive contracts needed and received new foundations second new directions in incentive theory teach us that incentive contracts are not the only source of incentives finally and especially relevant to supply transactions the integration decision is an instrument in the incentive problem

worker reciprocity and employer investment in training standard economic theory predicts that firms will not invest in general training and will underinvest in specific training empirical evidence however indicates that firms do invest in general training of their workers evidence from laboratory experiments points to less underinvestment in specific training than theory predicts we propose a simple model in which a firm invests the socially optimal amounts in general and specific training if the worker is sufficiently motivated by reciprocity a reciprocal worker may be willing to give the firm a full return on its investment we present empirical evidence that supports the proposed mechanism workers with a high sensitivity to reciprocity have 15 higher training rates than workers with a low sensitivity to reciprocity

promotion rules and skill acquisition an experimental study standard economic theory identifies a trade off between up or stay and up or out promotion rules up or stay never wastes the skills of those not promoted but may provide insufficient incentives to invest in skills up or out can always induce investment in skill acquisition but may waste the skills of those not promoted the paper reports an experiment designed to study this trade off under up or out parties behave almost exactly as theory predicts but under up or stay and stay or stay results differ markedly from theoretical predictions in that case workers invest rather frequently although the prediction is that they would not these deviations can be explained by various reciprocity mechanisms

designing targeting rules for international monetary policy cooperation this study analyzes a two country dynamic general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities monopolistic competition and producer currency pricing a quadratic approximation to the utility of the consumers is derived and assumed as the policy objective function of the policymakers it is shown that only under special conditions there are no gains from cooperation and moreover that the paths of the exchange rate and prices in the constrained efficient solution depend on the kind of disturbance that affects the economy it might be the case either for fixed or floating exchange rates despite this result simple targeting rules that involve only targets for the growth of output and for both domestic gdp and cpi inflation rates can replicate the cooperative allocation

do efficiency wages explain dismissals this study modifies rebitzer s 1987 model of efficiency wages to predict dismissal from employment using a sample selection method and data from australian workplaces the analysis supports the predictions that both very high and very low levels of required effort loose labour markets and high dismissals costs are associated with fewer dismissals among other results we find extensive internal labour markets and active unions reduce dismissals the evidence suggests that large employers rely more heavily on dismissals to motivate employees although such employers screen more effectively and so exhibit lower dismissal rates jel j24 j41 j42

involuntary unemployment and worker moral hazard this paper critically examines the hypothesis that layoffs are involuntary in implicit labour contracts because they are used by employers to punish inferior worker performance in repeated moral hazard situations workers typically bear risk associated with whether they are chosen to be laid off even though the latter is uninformative about previous effort choices and wages are performance contingent however the hypothesis is unsatisfactory as optimal contracts involve involuntary retentions rather than involuntary layoffs in a wide variety of circumstances the theory of implicit labour contracts as developed over the past decade has thrown considerable light on the nature of long term employment relationships by emphasizing that firm owners are usually less risk averse than workers and thus have an incentive to insure workers against fluctuations in the demand for the firm s product the theory manages to explain the emergence of long term contracts characterized by downward real wage rigidity see holmstrom 1983 however the theory also typically implies that workers will be indifferent about whether they are to be retained or laid off this runs contrary to the common observation that there is an element of involuntariness in layoff decisions i e within any job category with given skill and performance history if a proportion of randomly chosen workers are to be laid off in a recession the laid off workers would strictly prefer to be retained not only is this phenomenon of involuntary layoffs interesting to explain per se it also seems relevant to the keynesian notion of involuntary unemployment interpreted as unequal treatment of similar workers where some are employed while others are not and unemployed workers would strictly prefer to be employed it thus seems worthwhile to examine if the theory of implicit contracts can be extended to explain this phenomenon satisfactorily as a test of its plausibility and as a possible source of a consistent microfoundation for keynesian propositions to explain why the firm does not insure workers against the risk associated with selection of those to be laid off it is natural to think of possible informational asymmetries this has been attempted by geanakoplos and ito 1981 and moore 1985 geanakoplos and ito introduce the realistic feature that a firm does not observe spot market opportunities available ex post to a laid off worker this permits only incomplete insurance against the risk of layoff however their model produces the paradoxical conclusion that with decreasing absolute risk aversion workers strictly prefer ex ante being laid off moore allows workers to have better ex ante information about their spot market opportunities but finds a similar tendency toward involuntary retentions rather than involuntary layoffs in this paper we explore the alternative hypothesis that firms cannot perfectly observe effort decisions of employed workers and use the threat of involuntary layoff as a discipline device the analysis of stiglitz and weiss 1983 shapiro and stiglitz 1984 and singh 1982 of principal agent relations in the absence of demand fluctuations suggests that the threat of contract termination may be used as an incentive device in their models

strategic formulation and communication of corporate environmental policy statements uk firms perspective this paper suggests that most of the ftse listed firms in the united kingdom use corporate environmental policy statements ceps to communicate their strategic intent of what environmental and social targets to attain and broad guidelines of how they will progressively achieve all the required changes and new developments in this paper we link the contents of ceps of a sample of ftse listed firms from the chemical pharmaceutical and food industry that are committed to develop business excellence to the voluntary participation in the environmental benchmarking exercise and the various levels of environmental performance therein the findings suggest that in contrast to their non participating counterparts the strategic focus of the participating firms transcends from simply mitigating any potential damages that their operations might have on the environment to business process reengineering and building new implementation capabilities however not all of the participating firms achieved excellence in their environmental performance the high performing firms outweighed their counterparts on their emphasis on technological competence and competitiveness and interestingly the average performing firms would use the strategic emphasis on social responsibility to compensate for their mediocre technological competence

the role of promotion in inducing specific human capital acquisition workers routinely carry out activities that increase their productivity with their current employer for which they are not directly compensated for example a worker may be asked to develop relationships with clients or shop floor staff or he may develop a better understanding of how his firm operates firmspecific human capital of this type is difficult to quantify so that it is likely to be difficult to directly compensate the worker for its acquisition this paper is concerned with designing compensation schemes for employees to induce them to collect nonverifiable firm specific human capital if firms develop reputations for fairly compensating workers for skill collection the vagueness of these skills may not provide a significant incentive problem i consider the case where firms do not have the opportunity to develop reputations as a result the acquisition of human capital is subject to a dual moral hazard problem first noted in kahn and huberman 1988 first a worker only collects skills if there is a promise of a higher wage if he does so second the employer has an incentive to claim that the worker has not collected these skills even when he in fact has in order to save on wage costs so on the one hand it is difficult to repay the worker after skills are collected as the firm has an incentive to renege however the worker cannot be repaid before collecting skills as he has no subsequent incentive to collect them following the institutional literature i assume that the firm can commit to a labor contract which attaches wages to different tasks the principal purpose of the paper is to show that the firm can use this ability to commit to a wage scale for different tasks to induce a worker to collect firm specific human capital in the presence of this dual moral hazard problem where the worker is rewarded for skill acquisition by promotion to another job assume that a worker can be assigned to one of two jobs d and

work incentives hierarchy and internal labor markets this paper argues that contracts with payment based on a ranking of employee performance can provide performance incentives even under asymmetric information that prevents payment based on individual performance only being enforceable such contracts also fit with five features of labor markets that have aroused considerable interest 1 hierarchical wage structures 2 internal promotion 3 wage rates that rise with seniority and experience more than productivity 4 the variance of earnings increasing with experience and 5 wage rates attached to jobs rather than individuals with differentials set by administrative procedures rather than by reference to external market wages

classic promotion tournaments versus market based tournaments as initially formulated in the seminal analysis of lazear and rosen 1981 an important perspective for understanding the role of promotions in firms is the tournament perspective that is a promotion and in particular the wage increase associated with a promotion is a prize that serves as an incentive for workers to exert effort and take other actions beneficial to the firm such as the accumulation of human capital in this paper i consider whether the best way to model promotion tournaments is by having firms commit to prizes ex ante as in lazear and rosen s initial formulation or whether promotion prizes should be modeled as arising from the signaling role of promotions and the competition between firms for promoted workers

welfare and macroeconomic interdependence we develop a baseline model of monetary and fiscal transmission in interdependent economies the welfare effects of expansionary policies are related to monopolistic supply in production and monopoly power of a country in trade an unanticipated exchange rate depreciation can be beggar thyself rather than beggar thy neighbor as gains in domestic output are offset by deteriorating terms of trade smaller and more open economies are more prone to suffer from inflationary shocks larger economies benefit from moderate demand led expansions but may be worse off if policy makers attempt to close the output gap fiscal shocks are generally beggar thy neighbor in the long run in the short run they raise domestic demand at given terms of trade thus reducing the welfare benefits from monetary expansions analytical tractability makes our model uniquely suitable as a starting point to approach the recent new open economy macroeconomic literature

optimal simple and implementable monetary and fiscal rules welfare maximizing monetary and fiscal policy rules are studied in a model with sticky prices money and distortionary taxation the ramsey optimal policy is used as a point of comparison the main findings are the size of the inflation coefficient in the interest rate rule plays a minor role for welfare it matters only insofar as it affects the determinacy of equilibrium optimal monetary policy features a muted response to output interest rate rules that feature a positive response to output can lead to significant welfare losses the welfare gains from interest rate smoothing are negligible optimal fiscal policy is passive the optimal monetary and fiscal rule combination attains virtually the same level of welfare as the ramsey optimal policy

the manufacturing sector s environmental motives a game theoretic analysis what motivates manufacturing companies to make costly investments in producing in an environmentally clean manner the traditional argument is that such behaviour is value reducing and that therefore firms must be forced by regulation to invest in green production processes a counter argument is that firms have an incentive to make environmental investments in an attempt to attract green consumers and investors hence gaining competitive advantage over their rivals in this paper we employ a game theoretic approach that demonstrates that competing firms incentives to make voluntary investments in environmental clean up are affected by the size of the investment costs and the extent of consumer and investor green awareness we argue that an increase in green behaviour can be induced by a combination of governmental subsidies for firms that invest in environmentally clean production processes together with an education program that promotes green awareness amongst consumers investors and the managers themselves

optimal retention in agency problems this paper studies the interaction between a single long lived principal and a series of short lived agents in the presence of both moral hazard and adverse selection we assume that the principal can influence the agents behavior only through her choice of a retention rule this rule is further required to be sequentially rational i e no precommitment is allowed we provide general conditions under which equilibria exist where a the principal adopts a cut off rule under which agents are retained only when the reward they generate exceeds a critical bound and b agents separate according to type with better agents taking superior actions we show that in equilibrium a retained agent s productivity is necessarily declining over time but that retained agents are also more productive on average than untried agents due to selection effects finally we show that for each given type agents of that type are more productive in the presence of adverse selection than when there is pure moral hazard i e when that type is the sole type of agent in the model nonetheless adding uncertainty about agent types cannot benefit the principal except in uninteresting cases

regime switches agents beliefs and post world war ii u s macroeconomic dynamics the evolution of inflation and output over the last 50 years is examined through the lens of a micro founded model that allows for changes in the behavior of the federal reserve and in the volatility of structural shocks agents are aware of the possibility of regime changes and their beliefs have an impact on the law of motion underlying the macroeconomy the results support the view that there were regime switches in the conduct of monetary policy however the behavior of the federal reserve is identified by repeated fluctuations between a hawk and a dove regime instead of by the traditional pre and post volcker structure counterfactual simulations show that if agents had anticipated the appointment of an extremely conservative chairman inflation would not have reached the peaks of the late 70s and the inflation output trade off would have been less severe these beliefs counterfactuals are new in the literature finally the paper provides a bayesian algorithm to handle the technical difficulties that arise in a rational expectations model with markov switching regimes

optimal monetary policy in a regime switching economy the response to abrupt shifts in exchange rate dynamics abstract this paper examines the trade offs that a central bank faces when the exchange rate can experience sustained deviations from fundamentals and occasionally collapse the economy is modelled as switching randomly between different regimes according to time invariant transition probabilities we compute both the optimal regime switching control rule for this economy and optimised linear taylor rules in the two cases where the transition probabilities are known with certainty and where they are uncertain the simple algorithms used in the computation are also of independent interest as tools for the study of monetary policy under general forms of asymmetric additive and multiplicative uncertainty an interesting finding is that policies based on robust minmax values of the transition probabilities are usually more conservative

strategic shirking a theoretical analysis of multitasking and specialization we provide a new theory to explain why firms multitask workers instead of specializing them workers overperform in tasks they like and underperform in tasks they dislike to favorably influence future job assignments anticipating this firms may find it optimal to commit to future multitasking to induce workers to appropriately allocate effort early in the employment relationship we show that when the product market is volatile so that future product prices are uncertain the firm s ability to credibly commit to a multitasking strategy diminishes this generates a negative relationship between multitasking and product market volatility consistent with recent empirical evidence

the firm as the locus of social comparisons standard promotion practices versus up or out we suggest a parsimonious dynamic agency model in which workers have status concerns a firm is a promotion hierarchy in which a worker s status depends on past performance we investigate the optimality of two types of promotion hierarchies i standard promotion practices where agents have a job guarantee and ii up or out in which agents are fired when unsuccessful we show that up or out is optimal if success is difficult to achieve when success is less hard to achieve standard promotion practices are optimal provided the payoffs associated with success are moderate otherwise up or out is again optimal

limited contract enforcement and strategic renegotiation this paper presents a strategic theory of contract renegotiation in this theory suboptimal contracts are put in place initially to protect one party against undesirable a ctions by another party and are renegotiated once the danger is past the authors develop a model to establish the cases in which simple contracts cannot achieve desirable outcomes so that only a complicated contract or renegotiation will serve unlike most previous accounts of contract renegotiation this theory does not rely on exogenous uncertainty to motivate renegotiation copyright 1988 by american economic association

trading uncertainty enforcement and labor unions it is shown that when contracts can be perfectly enforced trading uncertainty leads to discrimination among workers with the same skills and experience in this case anti discrimination laws lead to inefficiencies in the absence of perfect enforcement anti discrimination practices may be used as enforcement devices and need not lead to inefficiencies in particular firms may wish to precommit to an anti discrimination policy say by inviting in a labor union in order to offer credible insurance to its workers this leads to an equilibrium in which union workers get a higher wage than non union workers but unions do not have monopoly power

profit sharing and the role of professional partnerships when it is hard to assess service quality firms will suboptimally hire low ability workers we show that organizing as a profit sharing partnership can alleviate these problems our theory explains the relative scarcity of partnerships outside of professional service industries such as law accounting medicine investment banking architecture advertising and consulting it also sheds light on features of partnerships such as up or out promotion systems the use of noncompete clauses and recent trends in professional service industries

the layoff rat race we investigate how discretionary investments in general and specific human capital are affected by the possibility of layoffs after investments are made firms may have to lay off workers and will do so in inverse order of the profit that each worker generates greater skill investments especially in specific human capital contribute more to a firm s bottom line so that workers who make those investments will be laid off last we show that as long as workers bargaining positions are not too weak workers invest in specific human capital in order to reduce layoff probabilities indeed workers over invest in skill acquisition from a social perspective whenever their bargaining power is strong enough even though they only receive a share of any investment more generally we characterize how equilibrium skill investments are affected by the distribution of worker abilities within firms the probability that a firm will downsize and the distribution of employment opportunities in the economy

monetary policy regime shifts and inflation persistence abstract using bayesian methods we estimate a markov switching new keynesian msnk model that allows shifts in the monetary policy reaction coefficients and shock volatilities with u s data we find that a more aggressive monetary policy regime was in place after the volcker disinflation and before 1970 than during the great inflation of the 1970s our estimates also indicate that a low volatility regime has been in place during most of the sample period after 1984 we connect the timing of the different regimes to a measure of inflation persistence

has monetary policy become more effective we investigate the implications of changes in the structure of the u s economy for monetary policy effectiveness estimating a vector autoregression over the pre and post 1980 periods we provide evidence of a reduced effect of monetary policy shocks in the latter period we estimate a structural model that replicates well the economy s response in both periods and perform counterfactual experiments to determine the source of the change in the monetary transmission mechanism and in the economy s volatility we find that by responding more strongly to inflation expectations monetary policy has stabilized the economy more effectively in the post 1980 period

general training by firms apprentice contracts and public policy workers will not pay for general on the job training if contracts are not enforceable firms may if there are mobility frictions private information about worker productivities however prevents workers who quit receiving their marginal products elsewhere their new employers then receive external benefits from their training in this paper training firms increase profits by offering apprenticeships which commit firms to high wages for those trainees retained on completion at these high wages only good workers are retained this signals their productivity and reduces the external benefits if they subsequently quit regulation of apprenticeship length a historically important feature enhances efficiency appropriate subsidies enhance it further

do formal salary systems really matter drawing on a single large u s corporation s personnel records for the years 1989 93 the authors analyze an example of the kind of formal salary system used by most large firms they find that this firm s practices were consistent with most of the important conclusions of prior empirical research on internal labor markets the system was highly centralized covering salary levels salary ranges raises and bonuses supervisors had little discretion over pay other than through subjective performance ratings the firm held fairly strictly to the salary rules leading to observable constraints on pay for employees near the top of the salary range these constraints however apparently did not impose important costs on the firm in the form of increased turnover although the system operated without any apparent connection to external factors the authors conclude that it transmitted external labor market forces with little distortion

term structure evidence on interest rate smoothing and monetary policy inertia abstract numerous studies have used quarterly data to estimate monetary policy rules or reaction functions that appear to exhibit a very slow partial adjustment of the policy interest rate the conventional wisdom asserts that this gradual adjustment reflects a policy inertia or interest rate smoothing behavior by central banks however such quarterly monetary policy inertia would imply a large amount of forecastable variation in interest rates at horizons of more than 3 months which is contradicted by evidence from the term structure of interest rates the illusion of monetary policy inertia evident in the estimated policy rules likely reflects the persistent shocks that central banks face

has u s monetary policy changed evidence from drifting coefficients and real time data despite the large amount of empirical research on monetary policy rules there is surprisingly little consensus on the nature or even the existence of changes in the conduct of u s monetary policy three issues appear central to this disagreement 1 the specific type of changes in the policy coefficients 2 the treatment of heteroskedasticity and 3 the real time nature of the data used this paper addresses these issues in the context of forwardlooking taylor rules with drifting coefficients the estimation is based on real time data and accounts for the presence of heteroskedasticity in the policy shock the findings suggest important but gradual changes in the rule coefficients not adequately captured by the usual split sample estimation in contrast to orphanides 2002 2003 i find that the fed s response to the real time forecast of inflation was weak in the second half of the 1970s perhaps not satisfying taylor s principle as suggested by clarida gali and gertler 2000 however the response to inflation was strong before 1973 and gradually regained strength from the early 1980s onward moreover as in orphanides 2003 the fed s response to real activity fell substantially and lastingly during the 1970s

evolving macroeconomic dynamics in a small open economy an estimated markov switching dsge model for the uk this paper investigates the possibility of shifts in the uk economy using a markov switching open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model we find overwhelming evidence to reject the hypothesis that the deep structural parameters of the underlying structural model had stayed constant throughout the sample period and there is significant changes to the volatility of the structural shocks counterfactual experiments based on the model with the best empirical fit indicate that the change in the policy rule as well as changes to the volatility of the structural shocks over the sample period are crucial features in explaining uk s macroeconomic performance

international dimensions of optimal monetary policy abstract this paper provides a baseline general equilibrium model of optimal monetary policy among interdependent economies with monopolistic firms and nominal rigidities an inward looking policy of domestic price stabilization is not optimal when firms markups are exposed to currency fluctuations such a policy raises exchange rate volatility leading foreign exporters to charge higher prices vis a vis increased uncertainty in the export market as higher import prices reduce the purchasing power of domestic consumers optimal monetary rules trade off a larger domestic output gap against lower consumer prices optimal rules in a world nash equilibrium lead to less exchange rate volatility relative to both inward looking rules and discretionary policies even when the latter do not suffer from any inflationary or deflationary bias gains from international monetary cooperation are related in a non monotonic way to the degree of exchange rate pass through

on the international transmission of technology shocks abstract using vector autoregressions on u s time series and an aggregate of industrialized countries we find that technology shocks appreciate the terms of trade and lower the trade balance they induce an s shaped cross correlation function for both variables the s curve in calibrating a prototypical international business cycle model under complete and incomplete financial markets we find two distinct sets of parameter values while both model specifications deliver the s curve the underlying transmission mechanism of technology shocks is fundamentally different most importantly only in the incomplete markets economy the terms of trade appreciate and thus amplify the relative wealth effects of technology shocks as suggested by the evidence

policy instrument choice and non coordinated monetary policy in interdependent economies abstract non coordinated monetary policy is analyzed in a stochastic two country general equilibrium model non coordinated equilibria are compared in two cases one where policy is set in terms of state contingent money supply rules and one where policy is set in terms of state contingent nominal interest rate rules in general the non coordinated equilibrium differs between the two types of policy rule but a number of special cases are identified where the equilibria are identical the endogenous choice of policy instrument is analyzed and the nash equilibrium in the choice of policy instrument is shown to depend on the interest elasticity of money demand

were there regime switches in u s monetary policy working paper 2004 14 june 2004 abstract a multivariate model identifying monetary policy and allowing for simultaneity and regime switching in coefficients and variances is confronted with u s data since 1959 the best fit is with a model that allows time variation in structural disturbance variances only among models that also allow for changes in equation coefficients the best fit is for a model that allows coefficients to change only in the monetary policy rule that model allows switching among three main regimes and one rarely and briefly occurring regime the three main regimes correspond roughly to periods when most observers believe that monetary policy actually differed and the differences in policy behavior are substantively interesting though statistically ill determined the estimates imply monetary targeting was central in the early 80s but was also important sporadically in the 70s the changes in regime were essential neither to the rise in inflation in the 70s nor to its decline in the 80s jel classification e52 e47 c53 key words counterfactuals lucas critique policy rule monetary targeting simultaneity volatility model comparison i the debate over monetary policy change in an influential paper clarida gali and gertler 2000 cgg presented evidence that us monetary policy changed between the 1970 s and the 1980 s indeed that in the 70 s it was drastically worse they found that the policy rule apparently followed in the 70 s was one that when embedded in most stochastic general equilibrium models would imply non uniqueness of the equilibrium and hence vulnerability of the economy to sunspot fluctuations of arbitrarily large size their estimated policy rule for the later period on the other hand eliminated this indeterminacy these results are a possible explanation of the volatile and rising inflation of the 70 s and of its subsequent decline the cgg analysis has two important weaknesses one is that it fails to account for stochastic volatility us macroeconomic variables and particularly the federal funds rate have gone through periods of tranquility and of agitation with forecast error variances varying greatly from period to period ignoring such variation does not lead to inconsistent estimates of model parameters when the forecasting equations themselves are constant but it strongly biases toward a finding of changed parameters tests of the stability of the forecasting equations the other weakness is that the cgg analysis rests on powerful and implausible identifying assumptions they require that we accept that the response of the monetary authority to expected future inflation and output does not depend on the recent history of inflation money growth or output it is hard to understand why this should be so especially in the 70 s when monetarism was a prominent theme in policy debates congress was requiring reports from the fed of projected time paths of monetary aggregates and financial markets were reacting sensitively to weekly money supply numbers the requirement for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in dynamic models is that the monetary policy rule show a more than unit response of interest rates to the sum of the logs of all nominal variables that appear on the right hand side of the reaction function if we force a particular measure of expected future inflation to proxy for all the nominal variables that actually appear independently in the reaction function we are bound to get distorted conclusions on the one hand because expected future inflation will be a noisy measure of the full set of nominal influences on policy we might get downward bias in our estimates from the usual errorsin variables effect on the other hand to the extent that expected future inflation like most expected future values shows less variation than current nominal variables we could find a mistaken scaling up of coefficients

a model of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for new issues this paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for the case in which the investment banker is better informed about the capital market than is the issuer and the issuer cannot observe the distribution effort expended by the banker the optimal contract under which the offer price decision is delegated to the better informed banker in order to deal with the adverse selection and moral hazard problems resulting from the informational asymmetry and the observability problem is characterized the model demonstrates a positive demand for investment banking advising and distribution services and provides an explanation of the underpricing of new issues an investment banker performs three functions which may be of value to an issuer of new securities underwriting advising and distribution this paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services based on an informational asymmetry between an issuer of new securities and an investment banker ultimately a theory of the organization of the financial intermediary industry is required that would predict which firms would use which types of financial intermediaries for which purposes and which firms would raise capital without engaging the services of a financial intermediary only a limited set of such predictions are developed here in the context of a model of a fixedprice offering under a negotiated contract in which the investment banker is

performance promotion and the peter principle this paper considers why organizations use promotions rather than just monetary bonuses to motivate employees even though this may conflict with efficient assignment of employees to jobs when performance is unverifiable use of promotion reduces the incentive for managers to be affected by influence activities that would blunt the effectiveness of monetary bonuses when employees are risk neutral use of promotion for incentives need not distort assignments when they are risk averse it may sufficient conditions for this are given the distortion may be either to promote more employees than is efficient the peter principle effect or fewer

employment wage and accommodation patterns of permanently impaired workers this article offers an explanation of the postinjury employment wage and accommodation patterns of permanently impaired workers in particular it argues that the observed tendency of time ofaccident employers to rehire at the preinjury wage accommodate and then perhaps quickly terminate the impaired worker is a manifestation of the worker s preferred contract that contract is characterized by wage inflexibility by removing the opportunity for the postinjury employer to underreport productivity this contract creates an incentive for the worker to attempt to functionally adapt to the impairment thereby increasing expected lifetime utility

turnover and promotion of lawyers an inquiry into gender differences this paper analyzes the turnover and promotion of male and female lawyers using data on two cohorts of lawyers one which entered law firms between 1969 and 1973 and the other entering between 1980 and 1983 this study considers whether law firm promotion decisions have differed for women and if so whether these differences have declined over time a competing risks duration model is employed to capture the link between the lawyer s decision to stay or leave and the firm s decision to grant or deny promotion we find that over the entire sample period women are considerably less likely to be promoted and slightly more likely to leave the firm without being promoted however we also find that the parametric differential between men and women in partnership hazards has been reduced substantially and in the most general of our specifications eliminated across the two cohorts in contrast the gap between male and female job turnover rates does not appear to change over time we find that the gap between males and females in the cumulative partnership rate at seven years of experience falls from 32 to 14 percent the turnover gap increases about 0 2 percent with females slightly more likely to exit from the firm in the later period

why inflation rose and fell policy makers beliefs and u s postwar stabilization policy this paper provides an explanation for the run up of u s inflation in the 1960s and 1970s and the sharp disinflation in the early 1980s which standard macroeconomic models have difficulties in addressing i present a model in which rational policymakers learn about the behavior of the economy in real time and set stabilization policy optimally conditional on their current beliefs the steady state associated with the self confirming equilibrium of the model is characterized by low inflation however prolonged episodes of high inflation ending with rapid disinflations can occur when policymakers underestimate both the natural rate of unemployment and the persistence of inflation in the phillips curve i estimate the model using likelihood methods the estimation results show that the model accounts remarkably well for the evolution of policymakers beliefs stabilization policy and the postwar behavior of inflation and unemployment in the united states

a simple approach to international monetary policy coordination this paper analyzes the strategic interaction between the monetary policies of two countries in an intertemporal general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities and imperfect competition it offers an excursus on non cooperative towards cooperative solutions all the results can be read by comparing the strength of the two biases the monopolistic distortions and the terms of trade externalities in the best feasible allocation the larger country retains some monopolistic distortions while the smaller country reaches the competitive level

environmental marketing a source of reputational competitive and financial advantage corporate reputation is an intangible asset that is related to marketing and financial performance the social economic and global environment of the 1990 shas resulted in environmental performance becoming an increasingly important component of a company sreputation this paper explores the relationship between reputation environmental performance and financial performance and looks at the contingencies that impact environmental policy making

uncertainty asymmetric information and bilateral contracts on considere un monopole bilateral avec incertitude et information asymetrique on donne les conditions necessaires et suffisantes a l existence de contrats qui soient efficaces et a la fois stimulants

implementing high powered contracts to motivate intertemporal effort supply we characterize the optimal contract between a principal and a risk neutral wealth constrained agent when an adverse selection problem follows a moral hazard problem the optimal contract in this setting often is more steeply sloped for the largest output levels than is the optimal contract in either the standard moral hazard setting or the standard adverse selection setting the large incremental rewards for exceptional performance motivate the agent to deliver substantial effort both before and after he acquires privileged information about the production environment

shocks and government beliefs the rise and fall of american inflation working paper 2004 22 september 2004 abstract the authors use a bayesian markov chain monte carlo algorithm to estimate a model that allows temporary gaps between a true expectational phillips curve and the monetary authority s approximating nonexpectational phillips curve a dynamic programming problem implies that the monetary authority s inflation target evolves as its estimated phillips curve moves the authors estimates attribute the rise and fall of post world war ii inflation in the united states to an intricate interaction between the monetary authority s beliefs and economic shocks shocks in the 1970s altered the monetary authority s estimates and made it misperceive the tradeoff between inflation and unemployment that misperception caused sharp rise in inflation in the 1970s the authors estimates indicate that policy makers updated their beliefs continuously by the 1980s policy makers beliefs about the phillips curve had changed enough to account for fed chairman paul volcker s conquest of u s inflation in the early 1980s jel classification e3 e5 key words updating beliefs policy evaluation self confirming equilibrium nash inflation ramsey outcomes i introduction today many statesmen and macroeconomists believe that inflation can largely be determined by a government monetary authority then why did the federal reserve board preside over high us inflation during the late 1960s and the 1970s and why under paul volcker did it rapidly bring inflation down during the early 1980s this paper answers these questions by estimating a model that features a particular process that makes a procession of economic shocks induce the monetary authority to alter its model of inflation unemployment dynamics the phillips curve at each date t the monetary authority updates its beliefs about the phillips curve and then recomputes a first period action recommended by a phelps problem a discounted dynamic programming problem that minimizes the expected value of a discounted quadratic loss function of inflation and unemployment 1 the monetary authority pursues the same objectives at each date using the same structural model with only its estimates of that model changing over time 2 this model of the systematic part of inflation puts the monetary authority s beliefs about the phillips curve front and center 3 we assume that the monetary authority s model of the phillips curve deviates in two subtle but important ways from what it would be in a rational expectations model e g kydland and prescott 1977 the first deviation is that while the true phillips curve is like kydland and prescott s we assume that the monetary authority omits the public s expected rate of inflation from its phillips curve by itself this omission need not prevent the outcomes of our model from coinciding with those of kydland and prescott s nor need it imply that the government s model is wrong in a way that could be detected from even an infinite sample whether the monetary authority s model is wrong in a statistically detectable way depends on how we allow the monetary authority to reestimate the parameters of its model in particular if the monetary authority were to believe that the coefficients of its phillips curve are constant over time then its estimates would converge to ones that support a self confirming equilibrium sce after convergence its estimated phillips curve would correctly describe occurrences along the sce path for inflation and unemployment such an after convergence version of our model has little hope of explaining the rise and fall of us inflation that model would have inflation fluctuating randomly around a constant sce level that coincides with kydland and prescott s time consistent suboptimal i e excessive level 4 this outcome motivates our second subtle deviation from a rational expectations equilibrium

the effect of individual uncertainty on the specificity of human capital empirical evidence from career developments in professional soccer this study looks at careers in professional soccer to investigate the determinants of human capital hc specificity inspired by labour market research we formulate three hypotheses on how uncertainty about the usefulness of individuals more productive specific skills affects their investment in more flexible general skills the empirical analysis is based on unique panel data on school grades soccer evaluations and sociodemographic characteristics of 90 elite players from the youth academy of a german bundesliga club we find that senior and long serving players who are comparably certain that their soccer specific capital will be sufficient to pursue a lucrative professional career invest less in general hc at school expected soccer performance in contrast has a counterintuitive positive effect our results expand knowledge on the factors influencing hc specificity from the macro to the subject level and highlight practical implications for institutions that train gifted individuals