hitting the jackpot product proliferation by multiproduct firms under uncertainty this paper presents a model of product proliferation by multiproduct firms under uncertainty firms introduce new differentiated products because they want to hit as many jackpots as possible products with high profits and long lives there is uncertainty about the success of new products as the probability of hitting a jackpot increases product proliferation increases more products are introduced and expected in equilibrium the expected number of products in equilibrium is always less than at the optimum but in industries with multiple firms as the probability of hitting a jackpot increases rivalry intensifies and that gap shrinks

analysis of deterministic lp based booking limit and bid price controls for revenue management we study the performance of two popular and widely used heuristics for revenue management known as the booking limit and bid price controls in contrast to a recent result in the literature where frequent re solvings of a certain heuristic are shown to significantly reduce revenue loss we show that the asymptotic revenue loss of either booking limit or bid price control cannot be reduced regardless of the choice of re solving times and the frequency of re solving moreover we also show that further variations within the policy classes such as nested instead of partition booking limit or certainty equivalent instead of additive bid price are simply indistinguishable in terms of their order of revenue loss under frequent re solvings this negative result highlights the limitation of re solving deterministic linear programs when the solution is interpreted as either a booking limit or a bid price finally we briefly discuss how to modify the traditional booking limit control to make it more responsive

sources procedures and microeconomic effects of innovation fabio arcangeli paul david frank engelman christopher freeman massimo moggi richard nelson luigi orsenigo nathan rosenberg michele salvati g n von tunzelman two anonymous referees and the participants at the meeting of the committee on distribution growth and technical progress of the italian national research council cnr rome november 16 1985 have helped with various redraftings a particularly grateful acknowledgment is for the insightful and patient help of moses abramovitz this work has been undertaken at the science policy research unit spru university of sussex as part of the research program of the designated research centre sponsored by the economic and social research council esrc earlier support to the research that led to this paper by the italian national research council cnr is also gratefully acknowledged the statistical research has been undertaken with the assistance of stephano brioschi ilaria fornari and giovannu prennushi

modeling multiattribute utility risk and belief dynamics for new consumer durable brand choice this paper proposes a brand choice model to aid in the prelaunch management of a new consumer durable entry in an existing category the model contributes to theory by integrating the critical phenomena of multiattribute preference risk and dynamics in an individual level expected utility framework the integration is based on established theoretical constructs in utility bayesian decision analysis and discrete choice theory measurement and estimation procedures are presented an application is described and the managerial relevance of this work as a planning and forecasting tool is examined

motives to adopt renewable electricity technologies evidence from sweden the diffusion of renewable electricity technologies rets has to speed up for countries to reach their often ambitious targets for renewable energy generation this requires a large number of actors including individuals companies and other organizations to adopt rets policies will most likely be needed to induce adoption but there is limited knowledge about what motivates ret adoption the purpose of this paper is to complement and expand the available empirical evidence regarding motives to adopt rets through a survey to over 600 ret adopters in sweden the main finding of the study is that there are many different motives to adopt rets and that ret adopters are a heterogeneous group with regard to motives although environmental concerns interest in the technology access to an re resource and prospects to generate economic revenues are important motives in general adopters differ with regard to how large importance they attach to the same motive and each adopter can also have several different motives to adopt there are also differences in motives between adopter categories especially independent power producers vs individuals and diversified companies and between rets especially wind power vs solar power this implies that a variety of policy instruments might be needed to induce further adoption of a variety of rets by a variety of adopter categories

the demand for information and the diffusion of a new product abstract the paper examines the implications of the ability of a consumer to learn about the characteristics of a new product on the diffusion of the product over time the demand for information by the consumer is shown to generate a sigmoid diffusion curve for total sales of the product further it is shown that over time the elasticity of demand along the diffusion curve increases

information capacity and innovation adoption researchers of innovation adoption and diffusion often have tested the hypothesis that firms with greater capacities to gather and evaluate information should adopt sooner however the data generally do not support this hypothesis a theoretical model of innovation adoption under uncertainty is developed to show that greater information capacity implies not only faster learning which tends to reduce the expected delay until adoption but also a more stringent adoption criterion which tends to increase the expected delay the resulting ambiguity provides an explanation for the lack of empirical support for this hypothesis

an amplification mechanism in a model of energy this paper investigates a propagation mechanism of the energy price shock in a model where capital utilization is associated with costly energy consumption endogenous depreciation is an important element of the model as it has been shown to produce a significant negative effect of energy prices on output i show that the amplifying effect of endogenous depreciation is determined by the choice of the functional form and calibration strategy for the energy cost function my estimates of the energy cost function allow to conclude that the energy price shock has only a moderate effect on output in this model while endogenous depreciation mitigates rather than amplifies the effect of the energy price shock

adoption and diffusion of an innovation of uncertain profitability the argument has frequently been made that the pattern of diffusion associated with most new innovations will typically have certain characteristics a diffusion curve for an innovation is usually defined as the proportion of its potential users who have already adopted as a function of time measured from the first adoption many empirical studies by both economists and other social scientists have shown that diffusion curves nearly always have two distinct characteristics i they are s shaped the proportion adopted is an increasing function of time which is initially convex but eventually becomes concave and ii they tend to be right hand skewed the inflection point occurs at a time corresponding to a proportion adopted which is less than one half so that the function is concave over the greatest amount of time in fact this skewing is occasionally severe enough to make the diffusion curve appear concave everywhere the focus of most empirical studies of innovation diffusion has centered on identification of either the major determinants of the speed of diffusion or the characteristics of firms which determine how long they delay adoption the seminal contributions are griliches 6 study of hybrid corn and mansfield s 121 study of 12 industrial innovations these studies and most of the similar ones following conclude that diffusion is faster for innovations with higher profitability and that large firms tend to be the earliest adopters some studies e g mansfield 121 herregat 71 have attempted to ascertain

innovation adoption and diffusion when there are competing innovations abstract firms face a choice between two innovations without knowing which of the two is better each firm has a prior that one of the innovations is better which is updated by bayes rule as trials with the innovations are made a simple decision rule indicating which innovation should be tried given any posterior is derived and used to define an expected diffusion curve for the better innovation this curve has the commonly observed ogive shape even in the absence of any external demonstration effect when the distribution of firm priors belongs to a general class

boom and bust patterns in the adoption of financial innovations we develop a dynamic model of the adoption of financial innovations each period firms decide whether or not to adopt an innovation of uncertain value and the profitability of each period s adoptions reveals information about the innovation s value we show that characteristics of financial innovation waves cited by critics as evidence of irrational excess are in fact consistent with fully rational behavior we also show that social welfare is enhanced when more firms adopt innovations of questionable value and that financial intermediaries base an incentive to encourage such adoption article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

uncertain search a model of search among technologies of uncertain values in the standard search problem there is an infinite pool of items whose distribution of values is known a decision maker draws an item from the pool observes its value and decides whether to keep it or to draw another item he can keep only one item and he seeks the item with the largest value in the standard uncertainty resolution problem there is only one item and the value of that item remains uncertain even after it is drawn the decision maker sequentially collects observations on the value of the item and decides whether to keep the item discard the item or take another observation uncertain search marries the sequential drawing from a pool of items from the search literature with the unknown value of a drawn item from the uncertainty resolution literature presented in the context of technology adoption it considers drawing from a pool of new technologies whose values remain unknown even after being drawn the decision maker sequentially purchases information in order to bayesianly update

technology adoption with uncertain future costs and quality in this paper we study the impact of uncertainty about future innovations in quality and costs on consumers technology adoption decisions we model the uncertainty in the technology s quality and costs as a markov process and consider three models of the adoption decision the first model assumes that consumers do a simple net present value npv analysis that compares the npv of adopting to that of not adopting without considering the possibility of waiting the second model is a stochastic dynamic program that considers the possibility of waiting and views the adoption decision as a one time event i e the consumer will only make a single purchase the only question is when the third model allows repeat purchases so the consumer may upgrade by purchasing new versions of the technology whenever it suits her we study structural properties of these models e g the following what changes in qualities and costs will make the consumer better off what changes will encourage adoption we will see that the simple npv and single purchase model have many intuitive properties with the right notion of improvements and reasonable assumptions about the technology changes we find that improvements in the technology make the consumer better off and encourage adoption here improvements are defined using a partial order on quality and cost pairs the results are more complicated in the repeat purchase model under the same conditions on technology changes technology improvements will make the consumer better off however except for special cases of transitions these improvements may make the consumer better off and discourage adoption

innovation firm size and growth in a centralized organization the optimal innovation firm size and growth are derived for a centrally controlled firm in which only the entrepreneur evaluates and restores current projects or evaluates and adopts new projects current projects are subject to failure due to entry and possible obsolescence while new projects may not be successful the optimal allocation of attention implies bounds on firm size and that the rate of innovation depends not only on monopoly profits firm size and technological opportunity but also on the probability of obsolescence the effects of monopoly power and firm size on innovation also depend on the degree of obsolescence

something to talk about social spillovers in movie consumption we exploit the randomness of weather and the relationship between weather and moviegoing to quantify social spillovers in movie consumption instrumenting for early viewership with plausibly exogenous weather shocks captured in lasso chosen instruments we find that shocks to opening weekend viewership are doubled over the following five weekends our estimated momentum arises almost exclusively at the local level and we find no evidence that it varies with either ex post movie quality or the precision of ex ante information about movie quality suggesting that the observed momentum is driven in part by a preference for shared experience and not only by social learning

information acquisition and the adoption of new technology the profitability of a new technology is rarely known with certainty at its announcement date consequently prior to making an adoption decision it behooves the firm considering the adoption of this innovation to reduce the level of uncertainty associated with its profitability the firm accomplishes this by sequentially gathering information updating its prior estimate of profitability in a bayesian manner quantifying the uncertainty regarding the innovation permits application of dynamic programming techniques criteria are derived which tell the firm when to stop collecting information and make the adoption decision it will be shown that it is optimal for the firm to continue to collect information until its estimate of profitability crosses one of two thresholds upon crossing the upper threshold the firm adopts the technology whereas the firm rejects the technology if the lower threshold is crossed the model predicts that even the manager who behaves optimally will occasionally adopt unprofitable technologies and reject profitable ones

second mover advantages in the strategic adoption of new technology under uncertainty abstract this paper introduces technological uncertainty into a timing game of new technology adoption it is shown that the timing neither necessarily involves first mover advantages in precommitment equilibria reinganum review of economic studies xlviii 1981 395 405 nor rent equalization due to the threat of preemption fudenberg and tirole review of economic studies lii 1985 383 401 rather there may be second mover advantages because of informational spillovers furthermore the model predicts that the equilibrium payoffs will typically be discontinuous and non monotonic in the probability that the new technology is profitable a welfare analysis reveals several market failures and suggests that policy intervention should adequately depend on the nature of uncertainty and the rate of technological progress

technology choice and timing with positive network effects abstract when two competing and incompatible products coexist in a market potential users face a choice between the two products and the alternative of deferring the decision this paper examines the choice between the two substitutes where each one is subject to a positive network effect that is a user of one of the products experiences an increase in the value for each additional person using the same product we examine this buy or wait problem either for an individual or a manager making the investment on behalf of a firm by formulating and analyzing a decision theoretic model to model the stochastic evolution of market share we build on the generalized polya urn of arthur et al arthur w b ermoliev y m kaniovski y m 1987 path dependent processes and the emergence of macro structure european journal of operational research 30 3 294 303 allowing for composition of the market to affect not just the relative market shares but also the absolute growth rate of the market we show that the optimal strategy is defined by a pair of market penetration thresholds that depend on the market composition looking at the effect of the network effects on the optimal strategy we find that more pronounced network effects can either raise or lower the penetration thresholds

on the diffusion of new technology a game theoretic approach this paper is an attempt at a rigorous albeit not exceedingly general analysis of the diffusion of new technology in particular consider an industry composed of two firms each using the current best practice technology the firms are assumed to be operating at nash equilibrium output levels generating a market price given demand and profit allocations when a cost reducing innovation is announced each firm must determine when if ever to adopt it based in part upon the discounted cost of implementing the new technology and in part upon the behavior of the rival firm if either firm adopts before the other it can expect to make substantial profits at the expense of the other firm on the other hand the discounted sum of purchase price and adjustment costs may decline with the lengthening of the adjustment period as various quasi fixed factors become more easily variable therefore although waiting costs the firm more in terms of foregone profits it may save money on the cost of purchasing the new technology thus the firm must weigh the costs and benefits of delaying adoption as well as take account of its rival s strategic behavior

impact of bayesian learning and externalities on strategic investment we investigate the interplay between learning effects and externalities in the problem of competitive investments with uncertain returns we examine a game theoretic duopoly investment model in which i a firm can learn about the profitability of the investment by observing the performance of the first mover and ii externalities exist between the investments of two firms we find a region of a war of attrition between the two firms in which the interplay between externalities and learning gives rise to counterintuitive effects on investment strategies and payoffs in particular we find that contrary to the conventional war of attrition where an increase in benefits for the follower generally delays the first move an increase in the rate of learning which tends to benefit the follower can hasten the first investment this paper was accepted by james smith decision analysis

endogenous diffusion of technology abstract this paper presents a positive theory of diffusion of technology it examines a two period model strategic firms are confronted by a process technology with an uncertain reduction in marginal costs the uncertainty is automatically resolved between the two periods adoption in the first period yields a leadership advantage relative to firms that do not adopt while simultaneous adoption by firms results in a cournot equilibrium the firms strategies are both production quantities and adoption timings these decisions are made at the same time thus firms face a trade off between early adoption and possibly reaping first mover advantages on one hand and deferring the adoption decision until after all the uncertainty is resolved but face the possibiity of being a follower in the market interestingly an endogenously determined diffusion rate is obtained as a pure strategy nash equilibrium of this game this means that while adoption and diffusion of technology results with probability one diffusion of a bad innovation is also possible it is also shown that in a market with one large firm and a nonatomic continuum of small firms there is a unique nash equilibrium in which the large firm adopts first and is a stackelberg leader and all the small firms decide whether or not to adopt after the uncertainty is resolved the implication of this result is simply that the diffusion of technology is to some extent determined by the relative size of firms in the industry

bad eggs learning by doing and the choice of technology we model long run economic development through technology adoption under scientific uncertainty about environmental effects there are four possible long run equilibria in a socially planned economy high growth adopt rapidly but abandon damaging technologies once revealed ddt cfcs cautious brake the introduction of new technologies to avoid mistakes genetically modified organisms no growth halt technological progress to preserve secondary knowledge and collapse adopt rapidly without ever abandoning damaging technologies in the base parameterization a short sighted social planner chooses the cautious strategy a far sighted planner chooses the high growth strategy unless damages are irreversible in which case the cautious strategy again dominates regulatory options in the market economy are investigated pollution taxes do not affect the firm s level of precaution if they can only be applied after the adopting firm has reaped the benefits however they do encourage the abandonment of damaging technologies liability rules do affect precaution but may lead to excessive caution or even a no growth trap