compatibility and bundling of complementary goods in a duopoly this paper presents a simple model of compatibility and bundling in industries where consumers assemble several necessary components into a system that is close to their ideal the authors show that for a wide range of parameters firms will choose to produce compatible components but will offer discounts to consumers who purchase all components from the same firm however firms would be better off if they could commit not to provide such discounts furthermore the equilibrium tends to involve socially excessive bundling finally mixed bundling strategies tend to increase the range of parameters over which socially excessive standardization occurs copyright 1992 by blackwell publishing ltd

consumer skepticism of advertising claims testing hypotheses from economics of information propositions regarding consumers differential skepticism for search experience and credence claims are tested in an experiment using adult consumers the results provide clear support for nelson s 1970 hypotheses that consumers are more skeptical of experience than search attribute claims and more skeptical of subjective than of objective claims no support is found however for the darby and kami 1973 hypothesis that consumers will be more skeptical of credence than of experience attribute claims or for the hypothesis that consumers will not be less skeptical of experience claims for low priced goods

consumer preference for a no choice option the traditional focus in the decision making literature has been on understanding how consumers choose among a given set of alternatives the notion that preference uncertainty may lead to choice deferral when no single alternative has a decisive advantage is tested in seven studies building on recent research the article shows that the decision to defer choice is influenced by the absolute difference in attractiveness among the alternatives provided and is not consistent with trade off difficulty or the theory of search these findings are then extended to show that choice deferral can also be modified for the same alternatives by manipulations that make them appear more similar in attractiveness or that decrease the need to differentiate among them the results are consistent with the notion that preference uncertainty results in a hesitation to commit to any single action since small differences in attractiveness among the alternatives are potentially reversible consistent with this premise the effect of attractiveness difference on choice deferral decreased significantly when subjects were first allowed to practice making monetary trade offs among the available alternatives

desirability of compatibility in the absence of network externalities i compare the incentives firms have to produce individual components compatible with components of other manufacturers instead of systems composed of components that are incompatible with components of competing manufacturers i show that even in the absence of positive consumption externalities network externalities prices and profits will be higher in the regime of compatibility equilibrium total surplus could be higher in either regime both regimes overprovide variety compared to the surplus maximizing solution in today s environment many products are complex specified by a long array of characteristics part of the decision of the firm is to choose if it should break this long array of features into two or more smaller parts and produce the products corresponding to the smaller arrays instead of the product that embodies the full array we will call the products that correspond to these smaller arrays components and the product that corresponds to the full array a system note that components are by their definition complements components produced by different manufacturers are compatible if it is feasible for the consumers to combine them costlessly into a working system in this paper we will assume that there are two components which make up a system we will discuss competition under full compatibility when components produced by all firms are compatible with each other and under incompatibility when no components produced by different firms are compatible and no hybrid systems can exist 2 assuming availability of the same

search and consumer theory a consumer faces list prices for commodities but can buy one at a discount discounts vary randomly between sellers the number of quotations sought depends on list prices search costs and wealth this function is homogeneous of degree zero and provided some sufficient conditions are satisfied is increasing in wealth decreasing in search cost independent of the list price of the discounted commodity if indirect utility is multiplicatively separable increasing in the list price if the commodity is a necessity increasing in the list price of substitutes slutsky s equation is generalized to include search

a new perspective on planned obsolescence automobile manufacturers have long had a policy of introducing annual style changes into their new model cars textbook publishers have a policy of periodically bringing out revised editions of their popular books recently ibm changed the operating system used in its personal computers causing a reduction in the compatibility between its old and new machines if one were to ask the typical man in the street to explain what is happening in these markets he would not hesitate before giving the following answer in economists terminology he would say that for the above firms the incentive to introduce new products that make old units obsolete is too high i e the firms have an incentive to practice planned obsolescence of course just as is true for the man in the street economists have also long observed and commented on the speed with which new products are introduced for example galbraith 1958 suggests that the annual model changes of automobile manufacturers are socially wasteful while fisher griliches and kaysen 1962 provide empirical estimates of the costs of these changes there have also been numerous theoretical attempts to model the idea of planned obsolescence or the related idea of killing off the market for secondhand goods but most of these models have in fact considered the choice a monopolist faces concerning how much durability to build initially into his product rather than the monopolist s incentive to introduce new versions of his product over time 1 in this paper i consider planned obsolescence from the standpoint of a firm that can change the nature of what it sells and show that the man in the street is in fact correct in many settings the incentive for a durable goods monopolist to introduce new products that make old units obsolete will be above that which is socially optimal

search costs and adaptive consumers short time delays do not affect choice quality using online price comparison and shopping platforms makes experiencing slow connections lags and waiting times for information an unfortunate reality however little attention has been paid to analyzing the effects of such delayed display of information on product choice behavior this article explores the effect of time delays in a multi attribute choice laboratory experiment by not providing information immediately when requested but after short time delays increasing these waiting times reduced the amount of information looked up but did not affect choice quality higher time delays made decision makers use more deliberate search processes whereas low time delays induced inefficient over searching

consumer myopia standardization and aftermarket monopolization abstract in this paper i show that the standard bertrand competition argument does not apply when firms compete for myopic consumers who optimize period by period i develop the model in the context of aftermarket with overlapping generations of consumers simultaneous product offerings in the primary market and aftermarket establishes a price floor for the primary good this constraint prevents aftermarket rents from being dissipated by the primary market competition duopoly firms earn positive profits despite price competition with undifferentiated products nonetheless government interventions to reinforce aftermarket competition such as a standardization requirement may lead to the partial collapse of the primary market

planned obsolescence and the r d decision by investing in rd i e the r d choice that maximizes current profitability does not maximize overall profitability the result is that if output is sold rather than rented then in its r d decision the monopolist has an incentive to practice a type of planned obsolescence that lowers its own profitability

some legacies of robbins an essay on the nature and significance of economic science this paper criticizes three robbinsian positions still often found in modern economics 1 the methodology of intuitively obvious assumptions 2 treating facts as illustrations rather than as tests of theoretical propositions 3 assuming that theory provides universally applicable generalizations independent of the characteristics of individual economies and so are independent of specific historical processes two corollaries of point 3 are that theory cannot assist in explaining unique historical events such as the emergence of sustained growth in the west and that economists need not interest themselves in the details of the technologies that produce the nation s wealth

network externality compatibility choice and planned obsolescence this paper attempts to provide a formal theory of planned obsolescence based on incompatible technologies in the presence of network externalities the author explores how a monopolist s ability to make the new product incompatible with the old version of a product constrains the optimal dynamic behavior of the monopolist the social optimum and the market equilibrium are compared finally the possibility of quality distortion is considered as a commitment mechanism to the future compatibility choice copyright 1994 by blackwell publishing ltd

price search in a product market regressions using panel data on grocery purchases show lower purchase costs are significantly associated with a larger number of stores visited per week there is also evidence but somewhat weaker of diminishing gains from such search an economic model of the determinants of search suggests that prices paid quantities purchased and number of store visits are interrelated a view supported by results of estimating a proposed simultaneous equations model

competitive promotional strategies this article analyzes the equilibrium pricing strategies of brands engaged in a pricing game each brand has a monopoly market loyal consumers and competes with others in a common market called brand switchers in the case of a duopoly it is shown that the behavior of the brand switchers characterizes the equilibrium behavior of the duopolists this article focuses on two key comparative statics namely the depth of discounts away from a regular high price and the probability of giving a deal or the frequency of deals how these properties vary with the size of the loyal markets and the behavior of the brand switching population is discussed copyright 1988 by the university of chicago

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games i theory the article presents information about the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games in this paper and its sequel presents study the existence of nash equilibrium in games where agents payoff functions are discontinuous the enquiry is motivated by a number of recent studies that have uncovered serious existence problems in seemingly innocuous economic games in the sequel to this paper authors have explained the utility function in the economic games referred to earlier are neither continuous nor quasi concave however they demonstrate that the payoff functions in mildly modified versions of these constructs exhibit two weaker forms of continuity which together with the requirement of quasi concavity suffice for the existence of an equilibrium from this one may conclude that at least in the modified versions of these models discontinuities in the payoff functions are not the real source of the problem rather it is the failure of the payoff functions to the quasi concave which is responsible for the non existence of equilibrium these observations bear on the existence of nash equilibrium in pure strategies

economic search an experimental study this paper presents results of experiments designed to test several of the hypotheses present in the theoretical literature on optimal economic search first we test whether the subjects searchers actually search for wages in ways that are consistent with setting an optimal reservation wage we then proceed to determine experimentally the effects of risk aversion increased search costs changes in risk brought about by a mean preserving transformation of the distribution of wage offers the presence or absence of recall the existence of a finite horizon and the searcher s state of knowledge about the underlying distribution of wages in general we find that the searchers exhibit behavior that is consistent with that predicted by theory differences between risk neutral and risk averse searchers are found and the responses of both groups to changes in search costs in the degree of risk or in the state of knowledge are consistent with theoretical predictions

an experimental examination of the economics of information this article presents an experimental test of propositions that come from stigler s classic economics of information theory it reviews previous empirical evidence for the propositions and discusses the mixed support provided for the theory it also discusses a major assumption of the theory and presents hypotheses that suggest that the propositions are not as universal as has been thought the results indicate that buyers with more certain beliefs about retailer price images search less and are less responsive to changes in the costs and benefits of search than buyers with less certain beliefs finally the article discusses the implications of the results for both economics and marketing

refusals to deal and orders to supply in competitive markets abstract a number of recent antitrust cases in north america and europe have involved allegations that manufacturers of durable products have refused to supply parts to independent service organizations apparently to monopolize the market for repairs of their products this paper analyzes such refusals in a competitive market and connected aftermarket in this model the refusals help to support higher prices for high intensity high value users however these higher charges permit the recovery of higher costs incurred during an initial warranty period since full prices equal full marginal costs in equilibrium the refusals permit the attainment of a first best outcome and an attempt by antitrust authorities to force supply will be welfare reducing

can entrepreneurial firms benefit from product piracy abstract we examine the potential benefits of product piracy to entrepreneurial firms specifically we use a resource based perspective to show that a decrease in the inimitability of an entrepreneurial firm s intellectual property does not necessarily diminish performance when piracy increases the value of this resource and an information economics perspective to explain why and when imitation can increase the value of an intellectual property resource this explanation reconciles empirical studies that indicate mixed results it also expands the resource based view by suggesting that reducing the value of one resource can directly increase the value of another

mixed pricing in oligopoly with consumer switching costs abstract in this paper we develop an alternative and more natural two period model of duopolistic competition with switching costs we find that overall competition is always less severe when consumers find switching suppliers expensive however the relationship between the strength of competition and the importance of switching costs is not monotonic interestingly competition between ex ante identical firms naturally results in firms having asymmetric market shares in equilibrium

chapter 11 pricing models in marketing publisher summary this chapter brings together a set of diverse efforts in the recent literature on the modeling of price decisions and related questions in marketing there has been an impressive growth in the array of topics investigated in the literature various trends in the development of pricing models are evident from the foregoing review first one trend has been to develop theoretical models to describe observed pricing strategies in the marketplace and to derive conditions under which certain strategies are optimal this trend is clearly evident when one considers the area of dynamic pricing models another trend is an attempt to develop pricing models in which certain aspects of consumer behavior e g asymmetric response to price increases versus price decreases are incorporated this development is quite recent and does offer a large potential a third dominant direction is the use of game theoretic models for developing equilibrium pricing strategies

a model of add on pricing this paper examines competitive price discrimination with horizontal and vertical taste differences consumers with higher valuations for quality are assumed to have stronger brand preferences two models are considered a standard competitive price discrimination model in which consumers observe all prices and an add on pricing game in which add on prices are naturally unobserved and firms may advertise a base good at a low price in hopes of selling add ons at high unadvertised prices in the standard game price discrimination is self reinforcing the model sometimes has both equilibria in which the firms practice price discrimination and equilibria in which they do not the analysis of the add on pricing game focuses on the chicago school argument that profits earned on add ons will be competed away via lower prices for advertised goods a conclusion is that add on practices can raise equilibrium profits by creating an adverse selection problem that makes price cutting unappealing although profitable when jointly adopted using add on pricing is not individually rational in a simple extension with endogenous advertising practices and costless advertising several models that could account for add on pricing are discussed

independent service organizations and economic efficiency david e mills i introduction many manufacturers of capital equipment provide maintenance service to their equipment users sometimes equipment and service are sold separately and at other times they are bundled for example through leases and rental agreements numerous recent antitrust cases revolve around allegedly anti competitive practices used by some manufacturers to deter independent service organizations isos from servicing the manufacturer s equipment indeed the volume of cases brought by isos in the past decade exceeds litigation in more conventional antitrust areas like antimerger disputes and cases under the robinson patman act 1 the controversial practices in these cases include tying sales of equipment and service tying sales of service and other aftermerket products refusals to sell replacement parts to isos and refusals to license operating or diagnostic software to isos the pivotal issue in these cases is whether practices that deter isos injure competition in the service aftermarket 2 manufacturers claim their customers shop for equipment and service simultaneously that is customers choose a proprietary system comprised of equipment service and other components instead of merely choosing a brand of equipment this line of reasoning holds that interbrand competition for systems disciplines the pricing of every component in tile system and therefore is sufficient to protect equipment users welfare if one manufacturer s equipment is priced above rivals the high priced equipment manufacturer must supply service at a lower price than its rivals to remain competitive on a total cost of ownership tco basis 3 brand specific intrabrand competition in the service aftermarket is not necessary to maximize equipment users welfare because systems competition is sufficient manufacturer practices that deter isos or discourage intrabrand service competition canno t injure competition isos claim that systems competition does not adequately discipline manufacturers service pricing once customers acquire a piece of durable equipment they cannot replace it with another brand without incurring switching costs thus as salop argues such customers become locked in to the manufacturer for maintenance service and are left vulnerable to opportunistic service pricing throughout the useful life of the equipment 1993 the only protection customers enjoy from exploitation by manufacturers in the service aftermarket is the protection afforded by isos in the much cited kodak decision 4 the supreme court rejected the notion that inter brand competition in systems or equipment is always sufficient to prevent the exercise of monopoly power in the service aftermarket the court was influenced by recent economic research that highlights theoretical opportunities for equipment manufacturers to exploit their locked in customers these theoretical opportunities stem from information costs faced by customers and incomplete contracts between manufacturers and their customers 5 carl shapiro recounted the available theories of antitrust injury 1995 485 that apply to these circumstances these theories include i incomplete information where customers who are poorly informed about the tco of competing brands of equipment are exploited by manufacturers once they become locked in ii opportunistic pricing where manufacturers break trust with their locked in customers and sacrifice their reputations by implementing unanticipated increases in service pricing iii inability to commit where higher than competitive service pricing and lower than competitive equipment pricing arise because manufacturers cannot provide contractual assurances about future service prices 6 and iv better opportunities for price discrimination afforded by the absence of independent maintenance providers the price discrimination theory of lock in exploitation differs from the previous three in that price discrimination often improves rather than impairs market performance

eliminating the market for secondhand goods an alternative explanation for leasing there are a number of prominent specific instances in which a durable goods manufacturer with significant market power employed a lease only policy i united shoe in the market for shoe machinery ii ibm in the market for computers and iii xerox in the market for copiers the obvious question that arises is why would such a firm prefer leasing over selling in this article i argue that one role of the lease only policy was to eliminate the market for secondhand goods the article formally demonstrates the argument discusses the relationship between this article and earlier literature on secondhand markets and discusses the implications for antitrust policy

the value of time spent in price comparison shopping survey and experimental evidence the value that consumers place on time spent in price comparison shopping is central to the economics of information theory and models of consumers search behavior yet few empirical studies have examined consumers subjective value of time building on gary becker s work this article presents two tests of a model of the subjective value of time in an effort to explain consumers subjective value of time while they are price comparison shopping the model introduces perceived enjoyment of shopping as a new explanatory variable the findings reveal that respondents incorporate both wage rates and perceived enjoyment of price comparison shopping into their subjective value of time

a consumer perspective on price matching refund policies effect on price perceptions and search behavior although price matching refund policies are common in many retail environments the impact of such policies on consumers has largely been ignored this article reports the results of three studies that examine price matching policies from a consumer perspective study 1 shows that consumers perceive price matching policies as signals of low store prices and that the presence of a refund increases the likelihood of discontinuing price search contrary to the predictions based on signaling theory in information economics studies 2 and 3 show that when search costs are low the number of stores searched increases in the presence versus absence of a price matching policy when search costs are high consumers appear to accept the price matching signal at face value and search less in the presence of a refund the article concludes by discussing the theoretical implications of the findings and suggesting directions for future research