improving supply chain performance and managing risk under weather related demand uncertainty we consider a manufacturer retailer supply chain for a seasonal product whose demand is weather sensitive the retailer orders from the manufacturer supplier prior to the selling season and then sells to the market we examine how a manufacturer can structure a weather linked rebate to improve his expected profit the proposed class of rebate contracts offers several advantages over many other contract structures including no required verification of leftover inventory and or markdown amounts and no adverse effect on sales effort by the retailer we provide a thorough analysis of the manufacturer s and retailer s decisions in this context we show that the weather linked rebate can take many different forms and this flexibility allows the supplier to design contracts that are pareto improving and or limit his risk in offering the contract and the retailer s risk in accepting it for weather rebates with certain characteristics the manufacturer can fully hedge his risks of offering a weather rebate by paying a risk premium we show how this can be accomplished we also show that the basic structural results extend to settings in which the two parties would like to limit their risk

on the integration of production and financial hedging decisions in global markets we study the integrated operational and financial hedging decisions faced by a global firm who sells to both home and foreign markets production occurs either at a single facility located in one of the markets or at two facilities one in each market the company has to invest in capacity before the selling season starts when the demand in both markets and the currency exchange rate are uncertain the currency exchange rate risk can be hedged by delaying allocation of the capacity to specific markets until both the currency and demand uncertainties are resolved and or by buying financial option contracts on the currency exchange rate when capacity commitment is made a mean variance utility function is used to model the firm s risk aversion in decision making we derive the joint optimal capacity and financial option decision and analyze the impact of the delayed allocation option and the financial options on capacity commitment and the firm s performance we show that the firm s financial hedging strategy ties closely to and can have both quantitative and qualitative impact on the firm s operational strategy the use or lack of use of financial hedges can go beyond affecting the magnitude of capacity levels by altering global supply chain structural choices such as the desired location and number of production facilities to be employed to meet global demand

buy now and price later supply contracts with time consistent mean variance financial hedging abstract we consider a two stage supply chain comprising one risk neutral manufacturer he and one risk averse retailer she where the manufacturer procures consumption commodities in spot market as major inputs for production and sells the final products to the retailer the retailer then sells the final products to the market at a stochastic clearance price we investigate a flexible price contract that allows the manufacturer to determine the product wholesale price and the retailer to determine the order quantity based on the future spot price of consumption commodities compared with the simple wholesale price contract a win win situation can be achieved under the flexible price contract when the manufacturer s postponed processing cost is lower than a threshold however under this flexible price contract the retailer may suffer from the commodity price volatility even if she does not procure the commodities directly we further investigate how the risk averse retailer conducts mean variance financial hedging by purchasing consumption commodity futures contracts we formulate the problem using a dynamic programming model and derive a closed form time consistent financial hedging policy through numerical experiments we show that the commodity price risk from the manufacturer to the retailer is effectively mitigated with the hedging and the benefits of the flexible price contract are maintained

caps on political lobbying the cost of political campaigns in the u s has risen substantially in recent years for example real spending on congressional election campaigns doubled between 1976 and 1992 steven d levitt 1995 there are many reasons why increased campaign spending might be socially harmful first increased spending means increased fund raising which may keep politicians from their legislative duties 1 second a lobbyist who makes a large campaign contribution may have undue influence on electoral outcomes on the shaping of legislation or on the outcome of regulatory proceedings 2 that is the socially preferred candidate or legislation may not prevail likewise a lobbyist involved in a regulatory matter or a competition for a government contract may benefit unduly from a legislator s intervention 3 third a perception that campaign contributions purchase influence may lead to increased tolerance of corruption in the private sector a desire to control campaign spending has spawned many initiatives to limit both campaign contributions and spending beginning with the passage of the federal election campaign act feca political action committees pacs can contribute at most 5 000 per election to a candidate while individuals can contribute at most 1 000 restrictions have also been put on in kind contributions making it more difficult to circumvent these limits 4 while direct restrictions on campaign spending have proven difficult to implement recent initiatives aim to impose voluntary spending limits and stricter limits on contributions 5 despite the existing legislation and the proposals to limit contributions little is known about the impact of contribution limits on aggregate expenditures while it is intuitively appealing that aggregate expenditures would drop we challenge that intuition here we study a lobbying game and show that a cap on individual lobbyists expenditures may have the perverse effect of increasing aggregate expenditures and loweri this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

evaluating income streams a decision analysis approach most important decision problems virtually all capital investiments and planning situations involve risky cash flows with uncertainties that are resolved over time in most of these problems the decision maker has access to financial markets and may borrow and lend to smooth consumption over time yet because of the difficulty of incorporating these borrowing and lending decisions into the evaluation models these opportunities are rarely explicitly modeled in decision and risk analyses of these investments in this paper we study the errors induced by failing to account for these borrowing and lending decisions and we develop extensions to the standard decision and risk analysis procedures that given certain market and preference assumptions take these borrowing and lending opportunities into account without overburdening the evaluation models

the value of operational flexibility in the presence of input and output price uncertainties with oil refining applications refining is indispensable to almost every natural resource based commodity industry it involves a series of complex processes that transform inputs with a wide range of quality characteristics into refined finished products sold to end markets in this paper we take the perspective of a profit maximizing refiner that considers upgrading its existing simple refinery to include intermediate conversion flexibility i e the capability of converting heavy intermediate components to light ones we present a stylized two stage stochastic programming model of a petroleum refinery to investigate the value drivers of conversion flexibility and the impact of input and output market conditions on its economic potential conversion flexibility adds value to refineries by either transforming a nonprofitable situation into a profitable one referred to as purchase benefit or improving profitability of an already profitable situation referred to as unit revenue benefit in a real data calibrated numerical study w

primaries and the new hampshire effect candidates for u s presidential elections are determined through sequential elections in single states the primaries we develop a model in which candidates can influence their winning probability in electoral districts by spending money on campaigning the equilibrium replicates several stylized facts very well campaigning is very intensive in the first district the outcome of the first election then creates an asymmetry in the candidates incentives to campaign in the next district which endogenously increases the equilibrium probability that the first winner wins in further districts on the normative side our model oers a possible explanation for the sequential organization it leads in expectation to a lower level of advertising expenditures than simultaneous elections moreover if one of the candidates is the more eective campaigner sequential elections also perform better with regard to the selection of the best candidate

how firms should hedge substantial academic research explains why firms should hedge but little work has addressed how firms should hedge we assume that firms can experience costly states of nature and derive optimal hedging strategies using vanilla derivatives e g forwards and options and custom exotic derivative contracts for a value maximizing firm facing both hedgable price and unhedgable quantity risks customized exotic derivatives are typically better than vanilla contracts when correlations between prices and quantities are large in magnitude and when quantity risks are substantially greater than price risks finally we discuss how our model may be applied in practice copyright 2002 oxford university press

integrated operational and financial hedging with capacity reshoring abstract we consider a multinational corporation that employs capacity reshoring production switching and financial hedging to manage supply demand mismatches and currency risk we optimize mean conditional value at risk cvar by decomposing operations and finance operational flexibility maximizes expected profit subject to a cvar constraint whereas financial hedging minimizes cvar subject to a minimum expected profit we report three main findings first operational flexibility and financial hedging can be complements operational flexibility enhances profitability and reduces downside risk while financial hedging minimizes downside risk and can affect the feasible set of capacity portfolios albeit indirectly by relaxing a cvar constraint second operational flexibility and financial hedging are substitutes in risk reduction though the latter has greater risk reduction effects in cvar when used alone third coordinating operations and finance is crucial for minimizing substitution effects efficient financial hedging depends on rigorous estimation of cash flow distribution as shaped by operational flexibility and a capacity portfolio s feasibility relies on financial hedging because of the cvar constraint

the risk averse and prudent newsboy the effects of risk and risk aversion in the single period inventory newsboy problem are examined comparative static effects of changes in the various price and cost parameters are determined and related to the newsboy s risk aversion the addition of a random background wealth and of an increase in the riskiness of newspaper demand are also examined although many of the comparative effects generally are ambiguous some fairly simple restrictions on preferences and or risk increases are shown to lead to qualitatively deterministic results

shortfall as a risk measure properties optimization and applications motivated from second order stochastic dominance we introduce a risk measure that we call shortfall we examine shortfall s properties and discuss its relation to such commonly used risk measures as standard deviation var lower partial moments and coherent risk measures we show that the mean shortfall optimization problem unlike mean var can be solved e7ciently as a convex optimization problem while the sample mean shortfall portfolio optimization problem can be solved very e7ciently as a linear optimization problem we provide empirical evidence a in asset allocation and b in a problem of tracking an index using only a limited number of assets that the mean shortfall approach might have advantages over mean variance 2003 elsevier b v all rights reserved

terrorist group survival ideology tactics and base of operations the paper applies survival analysis to identify the determinants of terrorist group duration our sample includes 367 terrorist organizations that operated during 1970 2007 consistent with the theory determinants of these groups survival include their tactics sizes ideological basis regions of operation and base country characteristics cross sectional and panel estimates are reported terrorist organizations fare better if they are larger in size diversify their attack modes are animated by religiosity rather than secular political goals and base their operations in the middle east or africa groups longevity is bolstered by democratic institutions and an intermediate level of ethnic fractionalization at home

capacity decisions with debt financing the effects of agency problem abstract this paper studies the capacity management problem for a firm that uses debt financing this is done by analyzing the effect of the associated agency problem when making capacity decisions the agency problem arises when there are potential conflicts of interest between the firm owner and the lender we show that this agency problem can constrain the firm s optimal capacity decision because the borrowing rate will increase as the risk of default increases with capacity level chosen the firm will therefore try to optimally choose the level so as to reduce the risk of bankruptcy which the lender will take into account and as a consequence the firm will try to control the risk associated with potentially high borrowing costs however even when the expected bankruptcy cost is carefully controlled the optimal capacity decision is still made at the risk of incurring considerable agency costs in addition the corporate tax level can also play a significant role in capacity choice we show that although a higher tax rate leads to bigger tax benefit of debt and lower agency cost it also gives rise to a higher tax liability after balancing the tax benefit of debt with the agency cost the firm can make an optimal decision on the capacity level required the efficacy of financial hedging for mitigating the agency cost is also analyzed finally we compare and contrast our analysis with existing studies and it appears that we have been able to obtain a deeper insight into the problem

poverty political freedom and the roots of terrorism this article provides an empirical investigation of the determinants of terrorism at the country level in contrast with the previous literature on this subject which focuses on transnational terrorism only i use a new measure of terrorism that encompasses both domestic and transnational terrorism in line with the results of some recent studies this article shows that terrorist risk is not significantly higher for poorer countries once the effects of other country specific characteristics such as the level of political freedom are taken into account political freedom is shown to explain terrorism but it does so in a non monotonic way countries in some intermediate range of political freedom are shown to be more prone to terrorism than countries with high levels of political freedom or countries with highly authoritarian regimes this result suggests that as experienced recently in iraq and previously in spain and russia transitions from an authoritarian regime to a democracy may be accompanied by temporary increases in terrorism finally the results suggest that geographic factors are important to sustain terrorist activities this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

human capital and the productivity of suicide bombers the authors empirical analysis suggests that older and more educated suicide bombers are being assigned by their terror organization to more important targets they find that more educated and older suicide bombers are less likely to fail in their mission and are more likely to cause increased casualties when they attack

inventory control in a fluctuating demand environment we present an inventory model where the demand rate varies with an underlying state of the world variable this variable can represent economic fluctuations or stages in the product life cycle for example we derive some basic characteristics of optimal policies and develop algorithms for computing them in addition we show that certain monotonicity patterns in the problem data are reflected in the optimal policies

risk aversion and expected utility theory a calibration theorem within the expected utility framework the only explanation for risk aversion is that the utility function for wealth is concave a person has lower marginal utility for additional wealth when she is wealthy than when she is poor this paper provides a theorem showing that expected utility theory is an utterly implausible explanation for appreciable risk aversion over modest stakes within expected utility theory for any concave utility function even very little risk aversion over modest stakes implies an absurd degree of risk aversion over large stakes illustrative calibrations are provided

role of risk aversion in price postponement under supply random yield price postponement is an effective mechanism to hedge against the adverse effect of supply random yield however its effectiveness and the resulting production decisions have not been studied for

risk aversion in inventory management traditional inventory models focus on risk neutral decision makers i e characterizing replenishment strategies that maximize expected total profit or equivalently minimize expected total cost over a planning horizon in this paper we propose a framework for incorporating risk aversion in multiperiod inventory models as well as multiperiod models that coordinate inventory and pricing strategies we show that the structure of the optimal policy for a decision maker with exponential utility functions is almost identical to the structure of the optimal risk neutral inventory and pricing policies these structural results are extended to models in which the decision maker has access to a partially complete financial market and can hedge its operational risk through trading financial securities computational results demonstrate that the optimal policy is relatively insensitive to small changes in the decision maker s level of risk aversion

the optimal allocation of prizes in contests we study a contest with multiple not necessarily equal prizes contestants have private information about an ability parameter that affects their costs of bidding the contestant with the highest bid wins the first prize the contestant with the second highest bid wins the second prize and so on until all the prizes are allocated all contestants incur their respective costs of bidding the contest s designer maximizes the expected sum of bids our main results are 1 we display bidding equlibria for any number of contestants having linear convex or concave cost functions and for any distribution of abilities 2 if the cost functions are linear or concave then no matter what the distribution of abilities is it is optimal for the designer to allocate the entire prize sum to a single first prize 3 we give a necessary and sufficient conditions ensuring that several prizes are optimal if contestants have a convex cost function

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

the economic design of sporting contests what is the optimal number of entrants in a race or the optimal number of teams in a baseball league what is the optimal structure of prizes for a golf tournament or degree of revenue sharing for a football championship how evenly balanced should the competing teams be in the nascar or formula one championships what is the maximum number of entrants per nation to the olympic games that should be permitted what quota of qualifying teams to the soccer world cup should be allocated to the developing nations

an integrated model of multinational flexibility and financial hedging abstract we construct a model of a multinational firm with flexibility in sourcing its production and with the ability to use financial markets to hedge exchange rate risk agency costs generated by the firm s capital structure create a link between the firm s financial policy and its production decisions the firm s need for hedging is directly related to the degree of flexibility and the production plan it chooses is a function of the hedging strategy it employs consequently the firm s ability to exploit its competitive position depends upon the degree to which its flexibility is matched by the construction of an appropriate hedging strategy

supply chain network equilibrium with strategic financial hedging using futures abstract in this paper we develop a network equilibrium model for supply chain networks with strategic financial hedging we consider multiple competing firms that purchase multiple materials and parts to manufacture their products the supply chain firms procurement activities are exposed to commodity price risk and exchange rate risk the firms can use futures contracts to hedge the risks our research studies the equilibrium of the entire network where each firm optimizes its own operation and hedging decisions we use variational inequality theory to formulate the equilibrium model and provide qualitative properties we provide analytical results for a special case with duopolistic competition and use simulations to study an oligopolistic case the analytical and simulation studies reveals interesting managerial insights

transfer of newsvendor inventory and supply risks to sub industry and the public by financial instruments abstract we consider a two stage newsvendor model of a sub industry in which suppliers have short lead time capacity to produce goods for retailers that are selling non identical products we argue that the inventory and supply risks of the newsvendors due to demand uncertainty can be pooled and shared among different supply chains by treating reserved capacity as commodities and trading them as futures and options on futures to hedge the risks the risks will be further shared with and transferred to the public if speculators are allowed to play the game we show that this new mechanism of combining operational and financial risk hedging strategies offers industries a new way to more efficiently meet demand and improve profit

valuing risky projects option pricing theory and decision analysis in the academic literature and professional practice there are a number of alternative and apparently competing methods for valuing risky projects in this paper we compare and contrast three different approaches risk adjusted discount rate analysis option pricing analysis and decision analysis focusing on the last two we show that in contrast to some of the claims made in the real options literature when both option pricing and decision analysis methods are correctly applied they must give consistent results we also explore ways in which option pricing and decision analysis methods can be profitably integrated in particular we show how option pricing techniques can be used to simplify decision analysis when some risks can be hedged by trading and conversely how decision analysis techniques can be used to extend option pricing techniques to problems with incomplete securities markets

round robin tournaments with a dominant player we analyze the subgame perfect equilibrium of the round robin tournament with one strong dominant and two weak players and we compare this tournament and the one stage contest with respect to the players expected payoffs expected total effort and their probabilities of winning we find that if the contest designer s goal is to maximize the players expected total effort then if the asymmetry between the players is relatively low the one stage contest should be used however if the asymmetry is relatively high then the round robin tournament should be used

early round upsets and championship blowouts i introduction popular discussions of tournament play often celebrate the success of underdogs in early rounds and decry the prevalence of unexciting finals such a pattern might be just a statistical illusion there are many early round matches so some upsets are inevitable and there is only one final so it is unlikely to be the most exciting match of the tournament in this article we consider instead whether the pattern might have a real foundation in the strategic allocation of effort by tournament participants we analyze a two round tournament in which a favorite and underdog play in each of the two semifinals and then one player from each match advances to the final victory in a match is probabilistic in that the chance of winning is increasing in each player s relative quality and in his relative effort expenditure 1 each player has a fixed amount of effort to exert over the two rounds unused effort is of no value and the only payoff is from winning the tournament to maximize the chance of winning each player must balance out the benefits of expending more effort in the semifinal against the opportunity cost of having less effort available for the final favorites and underdogs both have an incentive to conserve resources for the final but the trade offs they face are different a favorite plays a weak opponent in the semifinal but is likely to face a tough opponent in the final so it has a strong incentive to hold back conversely an underdog already plays a tough opponent in the semifinal so it has less incentive to conserve effort for the final 2 because of these different incentives we find that in any symmetric nash equilibrium underdogs exert more effort than favorites do in the semifinal the extra effort does not fully compensate for lower ability and underdogs are still likely to lose but the chance of an upset rises in the final round each player expends all its remaining resources so differences in abilities are no longer compressed by strategic considerations instead an underdog who makes it to the final has fewer resources left to spend than the favorite so differences in abilities are amplified and the chance of a blowout by the favorite rises if a favorite loses to an underdog in the early rounds it is often accused of looking past the underdog to its next match even if a player s strategy is optimal ex ante it might turn out to be unsuccessful ex post so such criticism is often unfair our results imply that it is rational for the favorite to hold back on resources in the semifinal even if it correctly anticipates that in equilibrium the underdog will be playing harder sometimes the strategy will backfire but on average the favorite benefits from being in a better position for the final these results are derived using a standard contest model in which each player s probability of victory in a match is a strictly increasing function of his ability and effort 3 such models were first developed to analyze rent seeking tullock 1967 1980 and similar models appear in a wide variety of areas including patent races loury 1979 election campaigns snyder 1989 compensation schemes nalebuff and stiglitz 1983 career ladders lazear and rosen 1981 lobbying baye et al 1993 and sports contests szymanski 2003 4 more specifically we model the contest as a sequential elimination ladder tournament in which players first compete in separate groups and the winners then compete against each other rosen 1986 our result that underdogs do indeed try harder than favorites in the semifinals contrasts with that of rosen 1986 p 707 8 because the favorite has a better chance of victory in the final rosen finds that winning a semifinal match is more valuable to the favorite so the favorite tries harder than the underdog we reach the opposite conclusion because we assume that there is a fixed supply of effort to be used across rounds and unused effort in the tournament has no value

combined pricing and inventory control under uncertainty this paper addresses the simultaneous determination of pricing and inventory replenishment strategies in the face of demand uncertainty more specifically we analyze the following single item periodic review model demands in consecutive periods are independent but their distributions depend on the item s price in accordance with general stochastic demand functions the price charged in any given period can be specified dynamically as a function of the state of the system a replenishment order may be placed at the beginning of some or all of the periods stockouts are fully backlogged we address both finite and infinite horizon models with the objective of maximizing total expected discounted profit or its time average value assuming that prices can either be adjusted arbitrarily upward or downward or that they can only be decreased we characterize the structure of an optimal combined pricing and inventory strategy for all of the above types of models we also develop an efficient value iteration method to compute these optimal strategies finally we report on an extensive numerical study that characterizes various qualitative properties of the optimal strategies and corresponding optimal profit values

inventory control with an exponential utility criterion a base stock policy is shown to be optimal when a dynamic version of the news vendor model is optimized with respect to an exponential utility criterion

integrating long term and short term contracting in beef supply chains this paper analyzes the optimal procurement processing and production decisions of a meat processing company hereafter a packer in a beef supply chain the packer processes fed cattle to produce two beef products program premium boxed beef and commodity boxed beef in fixed proportions but with downward substitution of the premium product for the commodity product the packer can source input fed cattle from a contract market where long term contracts are signed in advance of the required delivery time and from a spot market on the spot day contract prices are taken to be of a general window form linear in the spot price but capped by upper and lower limits on realized contract price our analysis provides managerial insights on the interaction of window contract terms with processing options we show that the packer benefits from a low correlation between the spot price and product market uncertainties and this is independent of the form of the window contract although the expected revenues from processing increase in spot price variability the overall impact on profitability depends on the parameters of the window contract using a calibration based on the report by the gipsa grain inspection packers and stockyards administration 2007 gipsa livestock and meat marketing study vol 3 fed cattle and beef industries report u s department of agriculture washington dc this paper elucidates for the first time the value of long term contracting as a complement to spot sourcing in the beef supply chain our comparative statics results provide some rules of thumb for the packer for the strategic management of the procurement portfolio in particular we show that higher variability higher spot price variability product market variability and correlation increases the profits of the packer but decreases the reliance on the contract market relative to the spot market this paper was accepted by yossi aviv operations management

discouragement effect and intermediate prizes in multi stage contests evidence from davis cup abstract the discouragement effect of being the lagging player in multi stage contests is a well documented phenomenon in this study we utilize data from 2447 davis cup matches in team tennis tournaments to test the effect of being behind or ahead on individuals performance with and without intermediate prizes using several different strategies to disentangle the effect of being ahead in the interim score from the effect of selection we find the usual discouragement effect however the discouragement effect disappears after the introduction of intermediate prizes in the form of ranking points the lagging favorite had close to a 20 percentage point greater probability of winning compared to matches without such a prize we show that this result is not driven by the selection of better players into tournaments with intermediate prizes as predicted by previous theoretical studies our empirical findings suggest that intermediate prizes may mitigate or even eliminate the ahead behind effects that arise in multi stage contests

racing with uncertainty a patent race experiment this paper presents an experimental test of the multi stage patent race model of harris and vickers rev econ stud 54 1987 1 tied competitors invested more when nearer the end of the race but this may have followed from a more general and unexplained pattern of a positive correlation between investment and progress in the race the relationship between investment and gap between competitors was mostly not as predicted also leaders did not invest more than not heavily lagging followers and the race did not approach monopoly as the gap between competitors widened overall the evidence brings only limited support to the theory

orchestrating rent seeking contests contests have different sometimes quite complex organisational structures in particular while most of the existing literature focusses on simultaneous contests multistage contests are also quite frequently encountered this paper seeks to provide a rationale for the latter by endogenising the choice of a contest structure which is made by an organiser of a contest interested in maximising the efforts expended by the contenders

production with risk hedging optimal policy and efficient frontier demand for many products may depend on the price of a tradable asset or on the economy in general for example demand for equipment that plants or harvests corn correlates with the corn price on the commodity market and discount stores experienced increased sales revenue during the last recession thus we model demand as a stochastic process with two components in addition to the usual gaussian component reflecting demand volatility there is a drift component taking the form of a function of a tradable asset price in the case of dependence on the general economy the asset price can be a broad market index such as the s p 500 index with this demand model we study the one time production quantity decision along with a real time risk hedging strategy over a given planning horizon the production cycle pursuing a mean variance formulation we derive the optimal solution to both production and hedging decisions we give a complete characterization of the efficient frontier and quantify the improv

optimal investment in product flexible manufacturing capacity this paper presents a model and an analysis of the cost flexibility tradeoffs involved in investing in product flexible manufacturing capacity flexible capacity provides a firm with the ability to respond to a wide variety of future demand outcomes but at the expense of the increased cost of acquiring flexible manufacturing capacity as compared with dedicated or nonflexible capacity we formulate the product flexible manufacturing capacity investment decision as a two stage stochastic program in the first stage the firm must make its investment decision in manufacturing capacity before the resolution of uncertainty in product demand in the second stage after demand for products are known the firm implements its production decisions constrained by the first stage investments the main contributions of this paper are threefold first we develop a model of the firm s flexible manufacturing investment decision that conceptually captures some of the key characteristics of this complex decision probl

determinants of the demise of terrorist organizations this article investigates the determinants of terrorist groups failure by applying survival analysis in a discrete time specification our sample consists of a diverse set of 586 terrorist groups in which just over 63 end operations demise during 1970 2007 we use rand event data and jones and libicki terrorist group data findings show that the survival of terrorist groups is bolstered by diversifying attacks having multiple home bases locating in the middle east locating in a democratic country and limiting reliance on transnational terrorist attacks moreover larger groups have better survival prospects religious fundamentalist terrorist groups face better survival prospects than other terrorist groups terrorist groups located in a country with larger tropical territory are less likely to end operations however groups based in a landlocked country are more likely to fail

coordinating inventory control and pricing strategies with random demand and fixed ordering cost the finite horizon case we analyze a finite horizon single product periodic review model in which pricing and production inventory decisions are made simultaneously demands in different periods are random variables that are independent of each other and their distributions depend on the product price pricing and ordering decisions are made at the beginning of each period and all shortages are backlogged ordering cost includes both a fixed cost and a variable cost proportional to the amount ordered the objective is to find an inventory policy and a pricing strategy maximizing expected profit over the finite horizon we show that when the demand model is additive the profit to go functions arek concave and hence an s s p policy is optimal in such a policy the period inventory is managed based on the classical s s policy and price is determined based on the inventory position at the beginning of each period for more general demand functions i e multiplicative plus additive functions we demonstrate that the profit to go function is not necessarilyk concave and an s s p policy is not necessarily optimal we introduce a new concept the symmetrick concave functions and apply it to provide a characterization of the optimal policy

newsvendor model with random supply and financial hedging utility based approach abstract this paper takes a utility based approach to the single period and single item newsvendor model unlike most models in the literature the newsvendor is not necessarily risk neutral and chooses the order quantity that maximizes the expected utility of the cash flow at the end of the period we suppose that there is uncertainty in demand as well as supply furthermore random demand and supply may be correlated with the financial markets the newsvendor exploits this correlation and manages his risks by investing in a portfolio of financial instruments the decision problem therefore includes not only the determination of the optimal ordering policy but also the selection of the optimal portfolio at the same time we first use a minimum variance approach to select the portfolio the analysis results in some interesting and explicit characterizations on the structure of the optimal policy we also present numerical examples to illustrate the effects of the parameters on the optimal order quantity and the importance of financial hedging on risk reduction

price versus production postponement capacity and competition this article presents a comparative analysis of possible postponement strategies in a two stage decision model where firms make three decisions capacity investment production inventory quantity and price typically investments are made while the demand curve is uncertain the strategies differ in the timing of the operational decisions relative to the realization of uncertainty we show how competition uncertainty and the timing of operational decisions influence the strategic investment decision of the firm and its value in contrast to production postponement price postponement makes the investment and production inventory decisions relatively insensitive to uncertainty this suggests that managers can make optimal capacity decisions by deterministic reasoning if they have some price flexibility under price postponement additional postponement of production has relatively small incremental value therefore it may be worthwhile to consider flexible ex post pricing before production postponement reengineering while more postponement increases firm value it is counterintuitive that this also makes the optimal capacity decision more sensitive to uncertainty we highlight the different impact of more timely information which leads to higher investment and inventories and of reduced demand uncertainty which decreases investment and inventories our analysis suggests appropriateness conditions for simple make to stock and make to order strategies we also present technical sufficiency and uniqueness conditions under price postponement these results extend to oligopolistic and perfect competition for which pure equilibria are derived interestingly the relative value of operational postponement techniques seems to increase as the industry becomes more competitive

decision bias in the newsvendor problem with a known demand distribution experimental evidence in the newsvendor problem a decision maker orders inventory before a one period selling season with stochastic demand if too much is ordered stock is left over at the end of the period whereas if too little is ordered sales are lost the expected profit maximizing order quantity is well known but little is known about how managers actually make these decisions we describe two experiments that investigate newsvendor decisions across different profit conditions results from these studies demonstrate that choices systematically deviate from those that maximize expected profit subjects order too few of high profit products and too many of low profit products these results are not consistent with risk aversion risk seeking preferences prospect theory preferences waste aversion stockout aversion or the consequences of underestimating opportunity costs two explanations are consistent with the data one subjects behave as if their utility function incorporates a preference to reduce ex post inventory error the absolute difference between the chosen quantity and realized demand two subjects suffer from the anchoring and insufficient adjustment bias feedback and training did not mitigate inventory order errors we suggest techniques to improve decision making

valuing operational flexibility under exchange rate risk in this paper we develop a stochastic dynamic programming formulation for the valuation of global manufacturing strategy options with switching costs overall we adopt a hierarchical approach first exchange rates are modeled as stochastic diffusion processes that exhibit intercountry correlation second the firm s global manufacturing strategy determines options for alternative product designs as well as supply chain network designs product options introduce international supply flexibility supply chain network options determine the firm s manufacturing flexibility through production capacity and supply chain network linkages third switching costs determine the cost of operational hedging i e the costs associated with reducing downside risks overall the firm maximizes its expected discounted global after tax value through the exercise of product and supply chain network options and or through exploitation of operational flexibility contingent on exchange rate realizations in this environment the firm must trade off fixed operating costs switching costs and the economic benefits derived from exploiting differentials in factor costs and corporate tax rates a multinomial approximation of correlated exchange rate processes is proposed that leads to a consistent and tractable lattice model for this compound option valuation problem we then demonstrate how the global manufacturing strategy planning model framework can be utilized to analyze financial and operational hedging strategies

first in first win evidence on schedule effects in round robin tournaments in mega events the order of actions in contests may have a significant effect on performance in this study we examine the role of the schedule in round robin tournaments with sequential games between three and four contestants our empirical analysis based on soccer fifa world cups and uefa european championships and on two olympic wrestling events reveals that there is a substantial advantage to the contestant who competes in the first and third matches our findings are in line with the hypothesis that winning probabilities in multi stage contests with sequential games are endogenously depending on the schedule of contests as predicted by game theoretical models we also discuss possible ways to reduce the effect of the schedule

operational flexibility and financial hedging complements or substitutes we consider a firm that invests in capacity under demand uncertainty and thus faces two related but distinct types of risk mismatch between capacity and demand and profit variability whereas mismatch risk can be mitigated with greater operational flexibility profit variability can be reduced through financial hedging we show that the relationship between these two risk mitigating strategies depends on the type of flexibility product flexibility and financial hedging tend to be complements substitutes i e product flexibility tends to increase decrease the value of financial hedging and vice versa financial hedging tends to increase decrease the value of product flexibility when product demands are positively negatively correlated in contrast to product flexibility postponement flexibility is a substitute to financial hedging as intuitively expected although our analytical results assume perfect flexibility and perfect hedging and rely on a linear approximation of the value of hedging we validate their robustness in an extensive numerical study

on the determinants of corporate hedging finance theory indicates that hedging increases firm value by reducing expected taxes expected costs of financial distress or other agency costs this paper provides evidence on these hypotheses using survey data on firm s use of forwards futures swaps and options combined with computstat data on firm characteristics of 169 firms in the sample 104 firms use hedging instruments in 1986 the data suggest that firms which hedge face more convex tax functions have less coverage of fixed claims are larger have more growth options in their investment opportunity set and employ fewer hedging substitutes