product and price competition in a duopoly this paper examines the role of consumer preferences costs and price competition in determining the competitive product strategy of a firm in the model studied here there are two identical firms competing on product quality and price they face consumers who prefer a higher quality product to a lower quality product but differ in how much they are willing to pay for quality the consumers can also choose a substitute if they don t like the product price offerings of the two firms for the firms a higher quality product costs more to produce than a lower quality product the paper shows that the equilibrium strategy for each firm should be to differentiate its product from its competitor with the firm choosing the higher quality choosing the higher margin as well this differentiation however is not efficient that is it is possible to choose two other products and offer them at prices that cover their marginal cost and still satisfy consumers needs better in the aggregate a monopolist by contrast would differentiate his product line efficiently this suggests that cannibalization has different effects on product strategy than competition the paper also shows that if one firm enters the market first then it can defend itself from later entrants and gain a first mover advantage by preempting the most desirable product position

social absorption capability systems of innovation and manufactured export response to preferential trade incentives abstract in many extant analyses of the impact of non reciprocal system of trade preferences it is typical to focus on the details of market access value of tariff concessions as explanation for why export of beneficiaries may or may not respond to incentives very often the role that supply related factors can and do play in the process is relegated to the background this paper argues that the social absorption capability of a beneficiary s economy as expressed in her incumbent systems of innovation is a crucial determinant of export performance response the experience of sub sahara african countries under the us african growth and opportunity act apparel trade incentive is used as a classical illustration of this proposition it is shown that the comparative efficiency of lesotho despite emerging from a relatively weak trade performance potential background in recording the highest level of export success among beneficiaries of the scheme is a function of the relative efficiency of her systems of innovation

choosy search and the mismatch of talents this article proposes a multi sector matching model where workers have symmetric sector specific skills and the search market is segmented by sector workers choose the range of markets they are willing to participate in i identify a composition externality workers do not take into account the impact of their choice on sector specific mean productivity among the pools of job seekers consequently workers prospect too many market segments and there is room for public policy even when the so called hosios condition holds

sustainable innovation business models and economic performance an overview sustainable development requires radical and systemic innovations such innovations can be more effectively created and studied when building on the concept of business models this concept provides firms with a holistic framework to envision and implement sustainable innovations for researchers the concept provides an analytical tool that allows them to assess the interplay between the different aspects that firms combine to create ecological economic and social value in addition the business model concept provides a link between the individual firm and the larger production and consumption system in which it operates this paper provides an introduction to the special issue which emerged from selected papers presented at the erscp emsu 2010 conference held in delft the netherlands papers in the special issue cover a broad range from a conceptual discussion resulting in a research agenda the assessment of diffusion of specific business models such as product service systems the introduction of new management tools for business transition management to case studies on how specific business models evolved in specific communities together these papers provide insight into the promise of the business model concept for understanding and advancing sustainable innovation

the sullying effect of recessions previous work has established that recessions involve a cleansing effect so that in downturns only high productivity jobs remain but empirical evidence suggests job quality is procyclical jobs created in recessions are likely to be low paying and temporary this paper modifies previous models by adding on the job search which leads to an additional sullying effect calibration of the model suggests this offsetting sullying effect is likely to be much larger than the cleansing effect and can account for the procyclical match quality we observe in the data

controlling measurement errors in models of advertising competition abstract commercial market research firms provide information on advertising variables of interest such as brand awareness or gross rating points that are likely to contain measurement errors this unreliability of measured variables induces bias in the estimated parameters of dynamic models of advertising consequently advertisers either under or overspend on advertising to maintain a desired level of brand awareness monte carlo studies show that the magnitude of bias can be serious when conventional estimation methods such as ordinary least squares and errors in variables are employed to obtain parameter estimates therefore the authors have developed two new approaches that either reduce or eliminate parameter bias using these methods advertisers can determine an unbiased optimal advertising budget even if advertising variables are measured with error the application of these methods to estimate the extent of measurement noise in empirical advertising data is illustrated

competitive search equilibrium in this paper i construct an equilibrium for markets with frictions which is competitive in the sense that all agents are price takers and maximize utility subject to a set of market parameters i show that the equilibrium allocation is socially optimal i also show how the competitive search equilibrium can be achieved if employers with vacancies can advertise publicly the wages they pay

trade unions and the efficiency of the natural rate of unemployment decentralized wage setting in search equilibrium models is inefficient because the meeting firm and worker ignore the dependence of job matching probabilities on the number of firms and workers engaged in search this paper investigates whether risk neutral monopolistic unions will have an incentive to internalize this externality i find that the externality will be internalized only if the union s policy is chosen by unemployed persons if employed persons influence union policy both the union wage and unemployment will be too high a tax on the union wage combined with an employment subsidy to firms can correct this inefficiency

desirability of compatibility in the absence of network externalities i compare the incentives firms have to produce individual components compatible with components of other manufacturers instead of systems composed of components that are incompatible with components of competing manufacturers i show that even in the absence of positive consumption externalities network externalities prices and profits will be higher in the regime of compatibility equilibrium total surplus could be higher in either regime both regimes overprovide variety compared to the surplus maximizing solution in today s environment many products are complex specified by a long array of characteristics part of the decision of the firm is to choose if it should break this long array of features into two or more smaller parts and produce the products corresponding to the smaller arrays instead of the product that embodies the full array we will call the products that correspond to these smaller arrays components and the product that corresponds to the full array a system note that components are by their definition complements components produced by different manufacturers are compatible if it is feasible for the consumers to combine them costlessly into a working system in this paper we will assume that there are two components which make up a system we will discuss competition under full compatibility when components produced by all firms are compatible with each other and under incompatibility when no components produced by different firms are compatible and no hybrid systems can exist 2 assuming availability of the same

help wanted job needed estimates of a matching function from employment service data i estimate a function that matches vacant jobs and unemployed workers to produce new hires israeli law requiring vacancy registration yields unique data quality the literature underestimates matching function coefficients because of a simultaneity bias as the outflow of hires depletes stocks of unemployed and vacancies instruments and a new simulation method address this bias a new test reveals strong evidence of heterogeneity in unemployed and vacancies estimates imply labor market dynamics that absorb shocks completely within only 2 months reductions in the hire rate of referrals can explain a 2 1 percentage point increase in unemployment between 1978 and 1990

a search theoretic approach to monetary economics the essential function of money is its role as a medium of exchange the authors formalize this idea using a search theoretic equilibrium model of the exchange process that captures the double coincidence of wants problem with pure barter one advantage of the framework described here is that it is very tractable the authors also show that the model can be used to addre ss some substantive issues in monetary economics including the potenti al welfare enhancing role of money the interaction between specializat ion and monetary exchange and the possibility of equilibria with multip le fiat currencies copyright 1993 by american economic association

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

forecaster diversity and the benefits of combining forecasts the expected error variance of a combined forecast is necessarily lower than that of an individual forecast but in practice there may be considerable variation around these expected values this paper introduces a measure of the benefit from combining the probability of a reduction in error variance which recognizes this problem the measure is applied to data on the forecasts and forecasting methods of a panel of u s economists to determine how the benefits of combining vary with the number of forecasts combined and with the diversity in theories and techniques among the component forecasts

marketing information a competitive analysis selling information that is later used in decision making constitutes an increasingly important business in modern economies jensen jensen fred o 1991 information services congram friedman eds the ama handbook of marketing for the service industries chapter 22 ama com new york 423 443 information is sold under a large variety of forms industry reports consulting services database access and or professional opinions given by medical engineering accounting financial and legal professionals among others this paper is the first attempt in marketing to study competition in the rapidly emerging information sector specifically we are interested in answering the following questions 1 is competition fundamentally different when competing firms sell information rather than traditional goods and services and if yes why 2 what are the implications of such differences for decision makers marketers and regulators 3 can we explain some of the observed marketing strategies in the information industry as such the audience of the paper includes academics as well as professionals who are interested in understanding what is specific about competition in information markets familiarity with the practical implications of such differences and understanding of the mechanisms that drive them is essential for those who are faced with the problem of marketing information to answer the above research questions we build a simple game theoretic model that consists of two firms selling information to a population of consumers who are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for the quality of information the most important features of the model are the following information products sold by the two firms are modeled as random draws from two normal distributions having equal mean the variances of these distributions and their correlatedness constitute the product attribute space which is assumed to be common knowledge consumers are interested in assessing the mean of the distributions and to do so they can buy the sample from any of the firms or they can buy both samples and combine them to obtain a more accurate estimate quality of information is linked to the accuracy of consumers estimate of the mean which in turn is influenced by the accuracy of each sample as well as by their correlatedness consumers utility depends on the quality of information they purchased on their inherent utility for quality taste and on the total price they paid to acquire information knowing consumer preferences firms simultaneously price their information products the main finding of the paper is that information markets face unique competitive structures in particular the qualitative nature of competition changes depending on basic product characteristics while traditional products and services compete either as substitutes or as complements in the relevant product attribute space information may be one or the other depending on its position within the same product attribute space said differently the nature of competition changes qualitatively with a continuous change in basic product attribute levels the intuition behind this finding is the following when purchasing information consumers facing important decisions may find it beneficial to purchase from several information sellers this is more likely to happen when the reliability of information is low and the sources of information are independent under such conditions information products tend to be complements and as a result competition between sellers is relatively mild in the opposite case when information is reliable and or sellers sources are highly correlated consumers are satisfied after consulting a single source in this case information products are substitutes and sellers tend to undercut one another s prices to induce consumers to choose their brand understanding this discontinuity in competitive structures has important implications for decision makers as very different strategies are optimal under different product characteristics under substitution traditional strategies to avoid competition e g differentiation are recommended when the competing products reliability is generally low they are complements firms are better off accommodating competition in fact we find that a firm may benefit from inviting a competitor finally our findings are also important for regulators of information markets as the literature on complementarity suggests price fixing agreements between firms offering complementary products may benefit firms as well as consumers

market for information experimental evidence predictions of the noisy rational expectations equilibrium ree model are found to be relatively accurate for both asset and information markets in the laboratory when information about an asset s uncertain dividend is sold to a fixed number of highest bidders prices allocations efficiency and distribution of profit predictions of the full revelation ree model in the asset market dominate the predictions of the walrasian model demand for information shifts to the left and its price declines close to zero when the price of information is fixed at a relatively high level the number of informed agents and the informativeness of the asset market tends to adjust to permit the informed agents to recover their investment in information

research note cost uncertainty is bliss the effect of competition on the acquisition of cost information for pricing new products we examine the optimal acquisition of information about a common uncertain cost factor by two competing firms seeking to price a new product we show that existing findings regarding the acquisition of demand information or the acquisition of either cost or demand information related to quantity decisions do not extend to this case for cost information with price competition the information acquisition strategies are strategic substitutes even though the price decisions that are based on the information are strategic complements competition decreases the expected value of cost information moreover when competition is intense and the cost of information low identical firms do not acquire the same amount of cost information even when information is free cost uncertainty acts like a fog that lessens the destructive effect of price competition when products are close substitutes and thus increases expected profits buyers on the other hand are better off when competing firms are informed about cost even though the expected value of cost information strictly decreases with competition the optimal price for industry specific cost information set by an information vendor increases with competition when the firms products are sufficiently substitutable

research note consumer addressability and customized pricing the increasing availability of customer information is giving many firms the ability to reach and customize price and other marketing efforts to the tastes of the individual consumer this ability is labeled as consumer addressability consumer addressability through sophisticated databases is particularly important for direct marketing firms catalog retailers such as l l bean and land s end credit card issuing banks and firms in the long distance telephone market we examine the strategic implications of consumer addressability on competition between database direct marketing firms we address questions such as in a competitive environment how should firms invest in addressability will future improvements in the degree of addressability increase or mitigate the intensity of competition between the firms will greater addressability always be beneficial for firms we model competition between two firms in a market where consumers differ on a horizontal attribute of product differentiation the market comprises consumers located on a linear attribute space and firms located at the ends of the line we represent the degree of addressability or the reach of a firm s database as the proportion of consumers at each point in the market who are in the firm s database consequently the firm can offer these consumers customized prices consumer addressability creates two effects that govern the competition between firms a surplus extraction effect because a firm might address a consumer who is not reached by its competitor and a competitive effect that is created by the set of consumers who can be addressed by both firms the key results of the paper pertain to when the addressability decision is endogenous when the extent of market differentiation or consumer heterogeneity in preferences for a product brand attribute as well as the incremental cost of addressability are sufficiently large firms make symmetric investments in equilibrium given high costs firms choose sufficiently low levels of addressability low addressability and high levels of market differentiation both help reduce price competition which facilitates symmetric choice of addressability by the firms in equilibrium however when market differentiation and the cost of incremental addressability become small firms face the prospect of destructive competition as a result they strategically differentiate in their choice of addressability to mitigate this competition interestingly even in the extreme case when incremental addressability is costless not every firm chooses full addressability in equilibrium this has useful implications for direct marketing given that the advances in information technology should improve the ability of firms to address their consumers it might indeed not be desirable for all direct marketing firms to indefinitely pursue greater addressability as costs of doing so decline the analysis also shows an interesting effect of market differentiation in addressable markets equilibrium profits can decrease with an increase in market differentiation when the marginal cost of addressability is sufficiently high finally we discuss the competitive outcome that would result when firms compete with addressable as well as uniform posted prices

technological infrastructure and international competitiveness the paper is probably the first written paper using the concept of the national innovation system and it analyses how technological infrastructure differs between countries and how such differences are reflected in international competitiveness it makes a critical review of new in the 1980s developments in the theory of international trade and confronts them with recent empirical results it shows how competitiveness cannot be explained by wage rates prices currency rates technological leadership gives absolute rather than comparative advantage and technological leadership will reflect institutions supporting coupling creating clustering comprehending and coping in connection with technology the analysis is rooted in historical context through references to friedrich list and his criticism of adam smith and laissez faire special emphasis is put on list s concept of mental capital finally the analytical arguments are illustrated by the catching up and forging ahead of first germany and later japan the paper concludes that disequilibria in international trade will be persistent and that for laggard economy the free trade doctrine may be unduly restrictive another conclusion is that public investment in technological infrastructure and intellectual capital is crucial for successful economic development it is pointed out that there is a need to couple education science trade and industry policy in order to build competitiveness

competition and integration among complements and network market structure this article analyzes the competition and integration among complementary products that can be combined to create composite goods or systems the model generalizes the cournot duopoly complements model to the case in which there are multiple brands of compatible components it analyzes equilibrium prices for a variety of organizational and market structures that differ in their degree of competition and integration the model applies to a variety of product networks including automatic teller machines real estate multiple listing services and airlines crs as well as to nonnetwork markets of compatible components such as computer cpus and peripherals hardware and software and long distance and local telephone services copyright 1992 by blackwell publishing ltd

improving channel coordination through franchising in this paper we explore the role of franchising arrangements in improving coordination between channel members in particular we focus on two elements of the franchising contract namely the royalty structure and the monitoring technology we begin with a simple analysis where a manufacturer distributes its product through a retailer and the retail demand is affected by the retail price and the service provided by the retailer in this context we show that neither royalty payments nor monitoring are needed for full coordination we then extend the model to allow for free riding by franchisees and show that although monitoring helps affect the behavior of the franchisees royalty payments are still unnecessary to coordinate the activities of the franchisor and the franchisees finally we show that in environments where factors affecting retail sales are controlled by both the franchisor and the franchisee royalty payments provide the necessary incentives for the franchisor while monitoring systems are used to ensure that franchisees also behave in the best interest of the channel our general results are found to be consistent with those in brickley and dark 1987 and norton 1988 who conclude that franchising is affected by principal agent problems our theory finds special support in the work of lafontaine 1988 where it is concluded that the incidence of franchising is related to cost of monitoring and the importance of franchisor investments

voluntary quality disclosure and market interaction marketers disclose quality information directly to potential consumers using a variety of communication channels this study investigates how competition may influence duopoly firms incentive to voluntarily reveal quality information we show that firms in competitive markets reveal less information than a monopoly firm in addition sequential disclosure leads to asymmetric equilibrium disclosure behavior the disclosure leader reveals unambiguously less information than in the simultaneous disclosure case whereas the follower ex ante reveals less more private information than that released by the leader or by the firms in the simultaneous case when the disclosure cost is sufficiently low high we also examine the equilibrium firm profits and social welfare we demonstrate that there may be a u shaped relationship between equilibrium monopoly profits or social welfare under both monopoly and duopoly and the disclosure cost moreover in comparison to the simultaneous disclosure case sequential disclosure can lead to increasingly softened competition improving both firm profitability and social welfare

a monopolistic market for information abstract we analyze a model where traders buy information from a monopolistic seller which is subsequently used in a speculative market in order to overcome the dilution in the value of information due to its leakage through informative prices the seller of information may prefer to sell noisier versions of the information he actually has moreover to obtain higher profits it is desirable for the seller to sell different signals to different traders so that the added noise realizations do not affect equilibrium prices one way of doing so which does not require discrimination is to sell identically distributed personalized signals to each of a large number of traders

averages of forecasts some empirical results an alternative to using a single forecasting method is to average the forecasts obtained from several methods in this paper we investigate empirically the impact of the number and choice of forecasting methods on the accuracy of simple averages it is concluded that the forecasting accuracy improves and that the variability of accuracy among different combinations decreases as the number of methods in the average increases thus combining forecasts seems to be a reasonable practical alternative when as is often the case a true model of the data generating process or a single best forecasting method cannot be or is not for whatever reasons identified

demand signalling and screening in channels of distribution this paper examines two ways channel members at the manufacturing and retail ends deal with asymmetric information in the context of new product introduction a manufacturer who has private information that demand for a new product will be high can differentiate itself from a manufacturer less confident of demand by undertaking high levels of pre launch advertising and offering a high wholesale price a retailer for its part can screen potentially high demand from potentially low demand products by stipulating a take it or leave it slotting allowance the assumption being that the offer will be accepted only by manufacturers confident of sufficient demand to recover the high initial cost of slotting allowances it is shown that manufacturers prefer to signal demand through advance advertising and wholesale price retailers to screen demand through slotting allowances it is shown that unless advance advertising is sufficiently effective slotting allowances yield higher total channel profits and higher social welfare

frictional assignment i efficiency abstract this paper examines the two sided matching problem where the agents on each side of the market are heterogeneous and the matching process is time consuming this is cast in a labor market setting where workers of different skills match with different machine qualities i characterize the efficient allocation and then show that it can be decentralized by a market mechanism the efficient assignment is not always positively assortative despite the fact that machine qualities and skills are complementary in production to decentralize the efficient allocation the market mechanism requires the firms to post wages and commit each machine quality to a particular skill implications on wage inequality are briefly examined journal of economic literature classification numbers j31 e24 j64

direct and indirect sale of information the authors compare two methods for a monopolist to sell information to traders in a financial market in a direct sale information buyers observe versions of the seller s signal while in an indirect sale the seller sells shares in a portfolio based on his private information it is shown that when traders are identical and pricing is linear there is a trade off between optimal surplus extraction that is possible under direct sale and more effective control of the usage of information that is possible under indirect sale the optimal selling method depends on how much information is revealed by equilibrium prices copyright 1990 by the econometric society

the determinants of information value synthesizing some general results this paper identifies the determinants of information value and synthesizes some general results concerning their effects while some attributes of an information system exhibit a consistent directional effect on information value attributes of the decision setting and decision maker do not

evolution roots and influence of the literature on national systems of innovation a bibliometric account the literature on the national systems of innovation nsi is a relatively new field of research that has spread remarkably in the past 20 years this article offers a complementary quantitative description of the state of the art of the literature based on bibliometric methods by explicitly addressing the roots evolution and influence of nsi literature the exercise shows that over time the rate of published articles was quite irregular and that contributions on nsi have not yet converged to an integrated analytical framework although historically detailed descriptions on nsi showed a noticeable increase in the more recent period 2006 2010 analyses using more formal and diversified quantitative methodologies for assessing the performance of nsi remained lacking reflecting its persisting methodological weaknesses the roots of the nsi literature can be found at the core of innovation studies by certain well known scholars in the area of economics of innovation and science policy research even though publications on nsi are falling in relative importance and are highly concentrated on a small set of countries united kingdom denmark and the united states their influence is global they are cited by authors affiliated in organisations around the world notably in latin america and asia such an influence goes far beyond the area of innovation studies and has resonated in fields such as economic geography environmental studies international business and managerial sciences this demonstrates that the nsi literature is not self referential

market information and firm performance the value of new information depends on how accurate the information is but it may also depend on the characteristics of the firm and the nature of the industry it operates in we develop a game theoretic model to understand how firm and industry characteristics moderate the effect of market information on firm profits our results suggest that information is more valuable when product substitutability is higher suggesting that information is of greater value in more competitive industries our results also suggest that although industry size does not affect the value of information information is more valuable for larger firms we find that except under some conditions more precise market information has a greater impact on profits in a stackelberg mode of conduct than in a bertrand nash mode

catching up and academic institutions a comparative study of past national experiences abstract the universities role in economic development is again today an important focus of debate while policy in developing countries often aims at reproducing advanced economies institutions recent research on national systems of innovation frames the hypothesis that the catching up process is marked by changes in the contribution of academic institutions to the development of firm level capabilities this paper argues in favour of this hypothesis drawing from the history of successful national catching up processes it identifies important similarities across countries despite variations in historical context and local conditions each country struggled to achieve an effective integration of academic institutions into the industrial development process this task was particularly difficult when industry needs were poorly articulated or neglected by the evolution of educational curricula

individual marketing with imperfect targetability our research investigates the competitive ramifications of individual marketing and information management in today s information intensive marketing environments the specific managerial issues we address are as follows first what kinds of incentive environments do competing firms face when they can only target individual customers imperfectly second does the improvement in an industry s targetability intensify price competition in the industry such that all competing firms become worse off third should a firm share its customer knowledge so as to improve its rival s targetability fourth how should an information vendor sell its information that can improve a firm s targetability finally do competing firms have the same incentives to invest in their own targetability to answer those questions we develop a simple model a la narasimhan 1988 in which each of the two competing firms have their own loyal customers and compete for common switchers we assume that each firm can classify its own loyal customers and switchers correctly only with a less than perfect probability this means that each firm s perceived customer segmentation differs from the actual customer segmentation based on their perceived reality these two competing firms engage in price competition as an extension we also allow the competing firms to make their investment decisions to acquire targetability we show that when individual marketing is feasible but imperfect improvements in targetability by either or both competing firms can lead to win win competition for both even if both players behave noncooperatively and the market does not expand win win competition results from the fact that as a firm becomes better at distinguishing its price insensitive loyal customers from the switchers it is motivated to charge a higher price to the former however due to imperfect targetability each firm mistakenly perceives some price sensitive switchers as price insensitive loyal customers and charges them all a higher price these misperceptions thus allow its competitors to acquire those mistargeted customers without lowering their prices and hence reduce the rival firm s incentive to cut prices this effect softens price competition in the market and qualitatively changes the incentive environment for competing firms engaged in individual marketing a prisoner s dilemma occurs only when targetability in a market reaches a sufficiently high level this win win perspective on individual marketing has many managerial implications first we show that superior knowledge of individual customers can be a competitive advantage however this does not mean that a firm should always protect its customer information from its competitors to the contrary we find that competing firms can all benefit from exchanging individual customer information with each other at the nascent stage of individual marketing when firms targetability is low indeed under certain circumstances a firm may even find it profitable to give away this information unilaterally however as individual marketing matures as firms targetability becomes sufficiently high further improvements in targetability will intensify price competition and lead to prisoner s dilemma therefore it is not only prudent politics but also a business imperative for an industry to seize the initiative on the issue of protecting customer privacy so as to ensure win win competition in the industry second we show that the firm with a larger number of loyal customers tends to invest more in targetability when the cost of acquiring targetability is high however the firm with a smaller loyal base can through information investment acquire a higher level of targetability than the firm with a larger loyal base as long as the cost of acquiring targetability is not too high as the cost further decreases competing firms will all have more incentives to increase their investments in targetability until they achieve the highest feasible level third an information vendor should make its information available nonexclusively exclusively when its information is associated with a low high level of targetability when the vendor does sell its information exclusively it should target a firm with a small loyal following if it can impart a high level of targetability to that firm finally our analysis shows that an information intensive environment does not doom small firms in fact individual marketing may provide a good opportunity for a small firm to leapfrog a large firm the key to leapfrogging is a high level of targetability or customer knowledge

national innovation systems and the intermediary role of industry associations in building institutional capacities for innovation in developing countries a critical review of the literature abstract developed over the past three decades the national innovation system concept nis has been widely used by both scholars and policy makers to explain how interactions between a set of distinct nationally bounded institutions supports and facilitates technological change and the emergence and diffusion of new innovations this concept provides a framework by which developing countries can adopt for purposes of catching up initially conceived on structures and interactions identified in economically advanced countries the application of the nis concept to developing countries has been gradual and has coincided in the nis literature with a move away from overly macro interpretations to an emphasis on micro level interactions and processes with much of this work questioning the nation state as the most appropriate level of analysis as well as the emergence of certain intermediary actors thought to facilitate knowledge exchange between actors and institutions this paper reviews the nis literature chronologically showing how this shift in emphasis has diminished somewhat the importance of both institutions particularly governments and the political processes of institutional capacity building in doing so the paper suggests that more recent literature on intermediaries such as industry associations may offer valuable insights to how institutional capacity building occurs and how it might be directed particularly in the context of developing countries where governance capacities are often lacking contributing to less effective innovation systems stagnant economies and unequal development

vaporware suddenware and trueware new product preannouncements under market uncertainty a firm may want to preannounce its plans to develop a new product in order to stimulate future demand but given that such communications can affect rivals incentives to develop the same new product a firm may decide to preannounce untruthfully in order to deter competitors we examine an incumbent s preannouncement strategy when there is uncertainty regarding the commercial viability of a new product opportunity and a threat of rival entry each firm has a private assessment of the market potential for the new product two competitive incentives arise for the incumbent in terms of discouraging rival entry it can use preemptive communication or it can remain silent and instill a pessimistic market potential outlook we find that an incumbent prefers to follow a vaporware strategy i e declares plans to pursue a new product opportunity even when it may have no development intentions when its market forecasting capabilities are weak and the demand side benefits from preannouncing are small by contrast when the incumbent has strong market forecasting capabilities and the demand side benefits are small the incumbent adopts a suddenware strategy i e remains silent about its new product plans even when it actually plans to develop the new product finally when its market forecasting capabilities are strong and the demand side benefits are large the incumbent prefers to engage in a trueware strategy i e truthfully preannounces development plans we show that an interplay between competition related and demand related considerations is what allows trueware to emerge as an equilibrium in the absence of any ex post cost to engaging in vaporware in an extension we let the incumbent s actual development plans leak out and allow the entrant to wait and learn those plans prior to setting a research and development level we identify conditions for the entrant to postpone development despite the risk of being late to market as well as conditions for the entrant to commence development immediately despite not knowing the incumbent s plans based on the observed preannouncement strategy

pricing diagnostic information diagnostic information allows an agent to predict the state of nature about the success of an investment project better than the prior we analyze the optimal pricing scheme for selling diagnostic information to buyers with different privately known ex ante success probability investment costs and returns of successful projects are assumed to be the same for all buyers the value of diagnostic information is the difference in expected payoffs with and without it and we show that the willingness to pay for diagnostic information is nonmonotonic in the ex ante success probability when the information seller can offer only one quality level and negative payments are not allowed we find that the optimal menu of linear contracts is remarkably simple a pure royalty is offered to buyers with low ex ante success probability and a pure fixed fee is offered to buyers with high ex ante success probability

sweet lemons illusory quality self deceivers advertising and price the author s study suggests that competition can lead to low quality advertisers competing against and gaining market shares from lower priced high quality non advertisers evidence in support of

regulating complementary products a comparative institutional analysis optimal regulation subject to informational constraints is analyzed for industries for which production requires complementary inputs an issue for regulatory policy is whether supply in these industries should be bundled or unbundled bundled supply calls for regulation of an integrated industry unbundled supply has each component regulated separately a main result is that unbundling introduces into regulation an additional component of information cost that is similar to double marginalization in the monopoly pricing of complementary products unbundling may be advantageous if it allows sufficient competition in nonmonopoly services but the information cost can exceed the benefits of competition

demand forecast sharing in a dual channel supply chain abstract we assess the benefits of sharing demand forecast information in a manufacturer retailer supply chain consisting of a traditional retail channel and a direct channel the demand is a linear function of price with a gaussian primary demand i e zero price market potential both the manufacturer and the retailer set their price based on their forecast of the primary demand in this setting we investigate the value of sharing demand forecasts we analyze the make to order scenario in which prices are set before and production takes place after the primary demand is known and the make to stock scenario in which production takes place and prices are set before the primary demand is known we also compare the supply chain performance with and without the direct channel under some assumptions production cost is zero and each demand function has the same slope of price we find that the direct channel has a negative impact on the retailer s performance and under some conditions the manufacturer and the whole supply chain are better off our research extends and complements prior research that has investigated only the inventory and replenishment related benefits of information sharing

a stackelberg model of pricing of complementary goods under information asymmetry abstract we consider a duopoly market where two separate firms offer complementary goods in a leader follower type move each firm has private forecast information about the uncertain market demand and decides whether to share it with the other firm we show that information sharing would benefit the leader firm but hurt the follower firm as well as the total system if the follower firm shares information unconditionally we then devise a simple to implement information sharing scheme under which both firms and the total system are better off we also provide several interesting managerial insights and establish the robustness of the model in managing a supply chain through our analytical and simulation results

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem