local government structure and public expenditures the law of 1 n postulates a positive relationship betweenthe number of democratically electedrepresentative districts and governmentspending strong support for thisrelationship exists in legislatures in theunited states at both the state andnational level and across countries fewstudies have examined this relationship atthe local level despite the fact that localgovernments operate under constraintssimilar to those faced by representativelegislatures using a sample of georgiacounties we find the number of countycommissioners to be positively correlatedwith county government expenditures indicating support for the law of 1 nat the local level

budget processes and commitment to fiscal discipline abstract we present a framework of investigation into the political economy of the budget process our model suggests that institutional rules governing the budget process can be found to limit the importance of fiscal illusion empirical evidence supports that proposition the choice of rules depends on the political environment as well as the dominant source of uncertainty in the budget process

strategic restraint in contests abstract economic policy is modelled as the outcome of a political game between two interest groups the possible ex post realized outcomes in the game correspond to the proposed policies in the literature policy proposals are exogenous we extend such games by allowing the endogenous determination of the proposed policies in a first stage the groups decide which policy to lobby for and then in a second stage engage in a contest over the proposed policies our main result is that competition over endogenously determined policies induces strategic restraint that reduces polarization and in turn wasteful lobbying activities

pricing and green level decisions of a green supply chain with governmental interventions under fuzzy uncertainties abstract environmental issues make green manufacturing become inevitable and fuzzy uncertainty prevails in supply chain management in order to further promote the development of green supply chain according to channel leadership scenario we develop three game models of a green supply chain with governmental interventions under fuzzy uncertainties of both manufacturing cost and consumer demand we study how prices green levels and expected profits are influenced by channel leadership and governmental interventions green level sensitivity and fuzzy degree of parameters are considered analytical results indicate that manufacturer stackelberg scenario is the inferior structure than other scenarios and retailer stackelberg scenario is superior to other scenarios for all players under the strong governmental interventions then when governmental interventions increase the green level will increase but the tendency of retail price depends on channel leadership governmental interventions are not always beneficial to the green supply chain and the manufacturer further although the government s subsidy is offered to the manufacturer the retailer benefits from it ultimately and further becomes the main puller of the development of green products in addition a relatively high green level floor for subsidy results in the manufacturer s first mover disadvantage

industry self regulation without sanctions the chemical industry s responsible care program industry self regulation the voluntary association of firms to control their collective action has been proposed as a complement to government regulation proponents argue that the establishment of

majority rules and incentives a club s majority rule defines the number of members that must approve a policy proposed to replace the status quo since the majority rule thus dictates the extent to which winners must compensate losers it also determines the incentives to invest in order to become a winner of anticipated projects if the required majority is large members invest too little because of a holdup problem if it is small members invest too much in order to become a member of the majority coalition to balance these opposing forces the majority rule should increase in the project s value and the club s enforcement capacity but decrease in the heterogeneity in preferences externalities can be internalized by adjusting the rule with heterogeneity in size or initial conditions votes should be appropriately weighted or double majorities required

retailing public goods the economics of corporate social responsibility abstract this paper explores the feasibility and desirability of corporate social responsibility csr we identify csr with creation of public goods or curtailment of public bads using a model with profit maximizing firms the paper shows that there is a direct parallel between csr and traditional models of private provision of public goods indeed firms that use csr will produce public goods at exactly the same level as predicted by the standard voluntary contribution equilibrium for public goods we compare csr with government provision and charitable provision discussing when csr by private for profit firms could have a comparative advantage in dealing with public goods provision

deeds not words a cosmopolitan perspective on the influences of corporate sustainability and ngo engagement on the adoption of sustainable products in china to make a business case for corporate sustainability firms must be able to sell their sustainable products the influence that firm engagement with non governmental organizations ngos may have on consumer adoption of sustainable products has been neglected in previous research we address this by embedding corporate sustainability in a cosmopolitan framework that connects firms consumers and civil society organizations based on the understanding of responsibility for global humanity that underlies both the sustainability and cosmopolitanism concepts we hypothesize that firms sustainability engagement and their ngo engagement influence consumer adoption of sustainable products empirically we investigate the adoption of sustainable eco circle products made from recycled fibers marketed by li ning a china based global sportswear brand we apply a stepwise regression approach to test our hypotheses with paper and pencil survey data from 217 chinese consumers we find adoption to be positively associated with consumers sustainability attitude but not with firms sustainability engagement for firm ngo engagement these relationships are reversed adoption is positively associated with firm ngo engagement but not with consumers related attitude our results present a picture of the chinese context in which there is a business case for corporate sustainability if firms words about sustainable product strategies are supported by signals from civil society about firm deeds the results imply that in a chinese context firms need to be particularly aware of the role of ngos when hoping to be rewarded for sustainability

certification under oligopolistic competition in a symmetric duopolistic market where each firm s choice regarding certain quality attributes such as the environmental friendliness of its product is its own private information the extent of horizontal differentiation between firms plays a crucial role in a certifier s optimal certification policy under a non profit certifier it is always the case that both firms produce the highest quality and opt for certification this is also the case under a for profit certifier but only when the degree of horizontal differentiation is sufficiently high when horizontal differentiation is low the for profit certifier by charging a very high certification fee creates maximum vertical differentiation between firms as a result only one firm produces the highest quality and opts for certification whereas the other firm produces the lowest quality and does not opt for certification this asymmetry under a for profit certifier makes the market inefficient which provides one possible explanation for the existence of mostly non profit certifiers in such markets

government spending and budget deficits in the industrial economies fiscal policy nouriel roubini and jeffrey sachs this paper examines the evolution of the size of government and of budget deficits in oecd economies we highlight the rapid increase in government spending in the 1970s the sharp rise in budget deficits and public debt after 1973 and the reversal in these trends in the 1980s the increase in the size of government was associated in part with the slowdown in growth after 1973 but also reflected gradual adjustment of the ratio of spending to output towards a long run target which depends on political and institutional characteristics of the economy the political orientation of the government the degree of wage indexation and the degree of stability of the political system such factors also explain the size of budget deficits when faced with an adverse shock subsequent deficit reduction requires a measure of political consensus we note that such consensus is hard to achieve in multi party coalitions in consequence countries with such a political structure tended in consequence countries with such a political structure tended toin consequence countries with such a political structure tended to experience much more rapid increases in their debt gnp ratios

elections coalitions and legislative outcomes predictions of electoral behavior in a multiparty setting should be a function of the voters beliefs about how parties will perform following an election similarly party behavior in a legislature should be a function of electoral promises and rewards we develop a multistage game theoretic model of three party competition under proportional representation the final policy outcome of the game is generated by a noncooperative bargaining game between the parties in the elected legislature this game is essentially defined by the vote shares each party receives in the general election and the parties electoral policy positions at the electoral stage parties and voters are strategic in that they take account of the legislative implications of any electoral outcome we solve for equilibrium electoral positions by the parties and final policy outcomes

credence attributes voluntary organizations and social pressure abstract credence attributes of products are unobservable through search or experience some consumers are willing to pay a premium for their provision and in addition citizens can apply social pressure on firms to supply credence attributes firms have formed voluntary organizations to assure the provision of credence attributes and the credible provision provides product differentiation this paper provides a theory of the voluntary provision of credence attributes in the presence of demand pull from consumers and social pressure from ngos where an organization chooses a credence standard and firms compete given the standard the credence standard is lower the larger the organization and social pressure results in a higher standard

quality leadership when regulatory standards are forthcoming in many markets governments set minimum quality standards while some sellers compete on the basis of quality by exceeding them such quality leadership strategies often win public acclaim especially when they involve environmental attributes using a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation we show that if the high quality firm can commit to a quality level before regulations are promulgated it induces the regulator to weaken standards and welfare falls our results raise doubts about the social benefits of corporate self regulation and highlight the dangers of lengthy delays between legislative mandates for new regulations and their implementation

fragmented government effects on fiscal policy new evidence most industrialized countries entered the 1980s with their public finances in disarray at the time persistent deficits pushed up public debt to gdpratios despite such similarities deficit spending varies substantially between countries and within countries over time recent theoretical and empirical research has considered how differences in political arrangements affecting national policy formation might explain variation in fiscal policies pursued using a panel of 22 oecd countries over the 1971 1996 period this paper extends previous literature on the effects of fragmented government on fiscal policy outcomes in various directions first we focus on data relating to central government instead of general government as all theories refer to central government second not only do we analyze the effect of size fragmentation of government we also examine government s position vis a vis parliament and government s political fragmentation we find evidence that more fragmented government defined in terms of the number of political parties in a coalition or the number of spending ministers have higher deficits there is also some evidence that governments that dispose of excess seats in parliament have lower deficits right wing governments appear to have been fiscally more responsible in the seventies political fragmentation does not affect government s budget deficit

multiparty government and economic policy making multiparty government has often been associated with poor economic policy making with distortions like lower growth rates and high budget deficits one proposed reason for such distortions is that coalition governments face more severe common pool problems since parties use their control over specific ministries to advance their specific spending priorities rather than practice budgetary discipline we suggest that this view of multiparty government is incomplete and that we need to take into account that coalitions may have established certain control mechanisms to deal with such problems one such mechanism is the drafting of a coalition agreement our results when focusing on the spending behavior of cabinets formed in 17 western european countries 1970 1998 support our claim that coalition agreements matter for the performance of multiparty cabinets in economic policy making more specifically we find clear support for an original conditional hypothesis suggesting that coalition agreements significantly reduce the negative effect of government fragmentation on government spending in those institutional contexts where prime ministerial power is low

the winds of change how wind firms assess germany s energy transition abstract in september 2010 the german government initiated a plan to shift from fossil fuels to renewable energies with nuclear power as a bridging fuel following the fukushima nuclear disaster however the government decided to immediately shut down almost half of germany s reactors and phase out the rest by 2022 the outcome of germany s energy transition energiewende from high carbon and nuclear sources of power to renewable energies has implications for germany s prosperity and may serve as either a positive or negative model for other countries achieving the energiewende will require the commitment of germany s renewable energy companies whose opinions on the transition have not yet been reported this article seeks to help fill this gap by relating the views of over 80 percent of germany s wind industry per market share the firms in our study are mostly optimistic about the government s ambitious targets but express concern over the prospects for offshore wind lagging network expansion and the efficacy of extant legislation to support the transition from the government s side cost concerns have already led to discussions of slowing the transition leading to a push pullback policy approach for the transition to proceed smoothly fundamental issues such as market design must be resolved

credence goods costly diagnosis and subjective evaluation we study contracting between a consumer and an expert the expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low cost service is sufficient or whether a high cost treatment is required to solve the consumer s problem this involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and signals are not observable treatments are contractible but success or failure of the low cost treatment is observed only by the consumer payments can therefore not depend on the objective outcome but only the consumer s report or subjective evaluation a failure of the low cost treatment delays the solution of the consumer s problem by the high cost treatment to a second period we show that the first best solution can always be implemented if the parties discount rate is zero an increase in the discount rate reduces the range of parameter combinations for which the first best can be obtained in an extension we show that the first best is also always implementable if diagnosis and treatment can be separated by contracting with two different agents

political determinants of budget deficits coalition effects versus minority effects this paper reexamines some recent empirical evidence on the hypothesis that institutional arrangements in the political process affect budget deficits the results of roubini and sachs 1989b are replicated and sensitivity analysis indicate that their results are robust however the main conclusion of roubini and sachs that coalition governments are less capable of budgetary discipline needs to be modified a reformulation of their variable representing political cohesion reveals that it captures the effects of minority governments rather than majority coalition governments the data support the hypothesis that it is harder to negotiate in parliament than within a government

what can be learned from practical cases of green economy studies from five european countries the transition to green economies has been mediated by concrete cases and experiments in a variety of different industrial and social sectors what is lacking is research that would synthesize key findings and lessons learned across a variety of cases in this study we explore ten cases of green economy of different sectors and approaches from five european countries and identify factors that have had critical importance for the success or failure of the cases our paper reveals similarities across small and large scale cases and different approaches for implementing green economy we identified critical factors related to economic viability public funding technological development impact assessments public policies and regulation social capital leadership and coordination as well as public acceptability and image according to our results transition to green economies requires negotiation between potential trade offs among multiple goals and interests of various stakeholders the mutual benefits can be communicated through valid impact assessments and the integration of r d into the practical implementation securing the continuity of funding and leadership is crucial in successful experiments and attention should be paid to fostering social capital among stakeholders instead of any single critical factor the practical implementation of green economy is related to a multiplicity of factors and causalities depending on the context the challenges with the practical implementation of green economy can only be met with patient careful and far sighted planning of green economy initiatives as well as continuous learning from past experiences

not in my community social pressure and the geography of dismissals we investigate the impact of local social pressure on firms firing decisions using linked employer employee data we show that secondary establishments located further away from headquarters have higher dismissal rates than those located closer the effect of distance on dismissals is stronger the greater the visibility of the firm in the local community of its headquarters and the larger the degree of selfishness of that community we show that these findings can be explained by the social pressure exerted by the communities where firms headquarters are located which induces ceos to refrain from dismissing at short distance from their headquarters

flexible integration mandatory and minimum participation rules should a subset of the eu members be allowed to form inner clubs and enhance cooperation or should integration proceed at the same speed for all while flexible cooperation allows members to participate if and only if they benefit it also generates a free rider problem if potential members choose to opt out the analysis shows that flexible cooperation is better only if the heterogeneity is large and the externality small but rigid cooperation will be the political equilibrium too often flexibility and rigidity can be combined by i mandatory participation rules where participation is voluntary unless a super majority requires everyone to participate and ii minimum participation rules where inner clubs must be sufficiently large the combination of mandatory and minimum participation rules may implement the best possible mechanism

steering innovations towards a green economy understanding government intervention in this paper we analyse institutional conditions facilitating the transition towards a green economy by encouraging investment in the enhancement of natural capital and social equity focussing especially on government interventions presenting a conceptual institutional model how innovation generally occurs we depict system levels that can be influenced by government interventions to facilitate societal innovations towards a green economy we hypothesize that the transition to a green economy is about extending the possibility frontier outwards towards a greener economy while at the same time limiting the action space at the brown economy end a normative evaluation framework is presented to assess transitions correspondingly we elaborate on the emerging lessons for governance by examining evidence from five selected european case studies and provide a non exhaustive list of impacts that government intervention may have on the action spaces available at different system levels

morally motivated self regulation 2 this paper focuses on self regulation motivated by altruistic moral concerns the context is one in which individuals can voluntarily self regulate in the presence of opportunities to free ride on the self regulation of their trading partners moral preferences can mitigate free riding but moral preferences can be limited in the sense that they may be weaker the greater the socioeconomic distance from a trading partner and can depend on whether others are expected to reciprocate the scope of self regulation can be increased by moral suasion but individuals can also form organizations to reduce free riding this paper characterizes the scope of self regulation as a function of the form and strength of moral preferences and explains the effectiveness of organizations in expanding that scope moral preferences can be conditional on the actions of others or limited by socioeconomic distance a citizen thus may self regulate when interacting with someone close but not with someone far away moral preferences can also be conditional or unconditional unconditional moral preferences are independent of the action of others whereas with conditional preferences a citizen is more willing to self regulate if other citizens are expected to reciprocate 3

the german energy transition as a regime shift abstract in this paper i use the resilience framework to interpret the project of transforming the german energy system into a renewable energy sources res based system the so called energiewende as a regime shift this regime shift comprises several transformations which are currently altering the technological political and economic system structure to build my argument i first sketch how technological political and economic developments reduced the resilience of the conventional fossil nuclear energy regime and created a new res regime second i depict recent changes in german public discourse and energy policy as the shift to the res regime third i highlight the challenges involved with increasing the resilience of the res regime in particular sufficient resilience of the electricity transmission grid appears to be crucial for facilitating the transformation of the whole energy system

a theory of consumer boycotts under symmetric information and imperfect competition this article models strategic interactions between non identical duopolistic firms and a public interest environmental organisation eo that promotes green production practices by threatening consumer boycotts against brown producers the article describes when boycotts are deterred by prior firm commitments to be green and also when a boycott arises in equilibrium despite symmetric information when a boycott arises it is either a small persistent boycott against the small firm in the industry or a large transitory boycott against the large firm in the industry that prompts the target firm to accede to the boycott demands quickly

reconceptualising the policy mix for innovation abstract recent years have seen the emergence take up and use of the term policy mix by innovation policy makers and by policy analysts and scholars alike imported from economic policy debates the term implies a focus on the interactions and interdependencies between different policies as they affect the extent to which intended policy outcomes are achieved however the meaning of the term remains ambiguous nonetheless we argue that the emergence of the policy mix concept into common use in the field of innovation policy studies provides us with a window of opportunity to reconsider some basic and often hidden assumptions in order to better deal with a messy and complex multi level multi actor reality we draw upon a range of literatures to re conceptualise the basic building blocks of innovation policy studies in order to arrive at a useful definition of policy mix tensions and interactions of different kinds across a series of dimensions we suggest that this reconceptualisation has important implications for the future scope and focus of prescriptive and analytical innovation policy studies

on the economics of labels how their introduction affects the functioning of markets and the welfare of all participants are labels good or bad for consumers and firms the answer may seem straightforward since labels improve information yet economic theory reveals situations where their introduction reduces the welfare of at least some market participants this essay reviews the theoretical literature on labels in order to identify and explain the main reasons that may cause labeling to produce undesirable side effects in contrast to earlier reviews that either concentrate on narrow topics or treat the subject in a more or less informal way we bring together the main results from all the relevant topics by presenting and discussing the assumptions and model building techniques that underpin them the advantage of this approach is that it identifies the origin of the differences between results thus allowing the synthesis of results that sometimes appear even to be contradictory we focus on quality labels and examine the impact of labeling on market structure the side effects of costly certification issues related to the label s trustworthiness the rationale for mandatory vs voluntary labeling the level at which the label s standard is set according to the agency that selects it the political economy of labels that is pro or anti label lobbying lobbying to affect the label s standard and lobbying in favor or against the label s mandatory imposition these topics cover a wide range of applications including genetically modified organism gmos organic produce geographic indicators controlled origin eco labels etc we conclude by identifying topics that require further research

the national system of innovation in historical perspective contrary to some recent work on so called globalisation this paper argues that national and regional systems of innovation remain an essential domain of economic analysis their importance derives from the networks of relationships which are necessary for any firm to innovate whilst external international connections are certainly of growing importance the influence of the national education system industrial relations technical and scientific institutions government policies cul tural traditions and many other national institutions is fundamental the historical examples of germany japan and the former ussr illustrate this point as well as the more recent contrast between east asian and latin american countries introduction the national system of friedrich list according to this author s recollections the first person to use the expression national system of innovation was bengt ake lundvall and he is also the editor of a highly original and thought provoking book 1992 on this subject however as he and his colleagues would be the first to agree and as lundvall himself points out the idea actually goes back at least to friedrich list s conception of the national system of political economy 1841 which might just as well have been called the national system of innovation the main concern of list was with the problem of germany overtaking england and for underdeveloped countries as germany then was in relation to england he advocated not only protection of infant industries but a broad range of policies designed to accelerate or to make possible industrialisation and economic growth most of these policies were concerned with learning about new technology and applying it the racialist and colonialist overtones of the book were in strong contrast to the inter nationalist cosmopolitan approach of the classical free trade economists and list s belief that holland and denmark should join the german bund and acquire german nationality because of their descent and whole character reads somewhat strangely in the european community of today nevertheless despite these unattractive features of his outlook he clearly anticipated many contemporary theories after reviewing the changing ideas of economists about development in the years since the second world war the world bank 1991 concludes that it is intangible investment in knowledge accumulation which is decisive rather than physical capital investment as was at one time believed pages 33 35 the report cites the new growth theory

internationalization and changes in tax policy in oecd countries the importance of domestic veto players this article examines the role that economic and political factors played in tax reform in organization for economic cooperation and development oecd countries from 1986 to 1990 some writers argue that economic integration forced states to reform their tax systems the authors findings indicate that economic openness had an indirect effect on the level of change in marginal tax rates the institutional structure of a country was most important countries that had only one veto player or only one institution or party whose approval was necessary for a bill to become law enacted more sweeping reform than states that had more than one veto player these results suggest that even when international or domestic economic factors might dictate a change in policy reform will not be as sweeping in countries in which agreement among several institutions and or parties is necessary

endogenous quality choice price vs quantity competition two versions of a vertical product differentiation model one with fixed and the other with variable costs of quality are analyzed to study how the hypotheses of price versus quantity competition affect equilibrium solutions product differentiation arises under all the scenarios considered contrasting previous findings of symmetric quality choices under cournot behavior however to relax harsher market competition firms differentiate more under bertrand than under cournot a simple welfare measure also indicates that the economy is better off when firms compete on prices with fixed costs of quality not only consumer but also producer surplus is higher under price competition copyright 1993 by blackwell publishing ltd

politics and social costs estimating the impact of collective action on hazardous waste facilities firms that generate negative externalities may consider the effects of their location on the surrounding environment because of the right of their prospective neighbors to demand compensation for pollution and raise the transaction costs of location since communities vary both in the value individuals place on the environment and in the ability of residents to organize politically locations that generate the least political opposition may not be the locations that result in the lowest externalities this article tests whether the degree to which firms internalize their externalities depends on the ability of affected communities to engage in collective action the results indicate that firms processing hazardous waste when deciding where to expand capacity do take into account variations in the potential for collective action to raise their costs

managerial contracting and corporate social responsibility abstract this paper presents a theory of corporate social responsibility in the form of the private provision of public goods and private redistribution by a firm these social expenditures are determined by a manager operating under a compensation contract chosen by shareholders in a capital market that prices social expenditures the theory incorporates three explanations for compensation systems that encompass social performance first consumers may reward the firm for its social expenditures second managers may have personal preferences for contributing to social causes and third the shareholder clientele a firm attracts may prefer social expenditures social incentives are higher powered the more consumers reward the firm and the stronger are shareholders warm glow preferences for social expenditures profit incentives are higher powered the more consumers reward the firm but are independent of shareholder preferences when consumers reward the firm for its social expenditures firms with higher ability managers have both higher operating profits and higher social expenditures when times are good so a positive correlation is predicted in bad times however the correlation is negative except for firms with very low ability managers in very bad times where the correlation is zero

short versus long coalitions electoral accountability and the size of the public sector this article examines the policy consequences of the number of parties in government we argue that parties externalize costs not borne by their support groups larger parties thus internalize more costs than small parties because they represent more groups this argument implies that the public sector should be larger the more parties there are in the government coalition we test this prediction using yearly time series cross sectional data from 1970 to 1998 in 17 european countries we find that increasing the number of parties in government increases the fraction of gdp accounted for by government spending by close to half a percentage point or more than one billion current dollars in the typical year we find little support for the alternative claim that the number of legislative parties affects the size of the public sector except via the number of parties in government

a coalition formation approach to equilibrium federations the authors develop a model in which states may choose to form coalitions to capture efficiency gains from policy coordination joining a coalition entails setting the policy variable to maximize the coalition s aggregate payoff at a nash equilibrium against nonmembers and to commit to a transfer scheme to share the gains with two states the unique equilibrium structure is complete federation with more than two states incomplete federation can be the unique equilibrium interpreting this result in terms of custom unions the trend to trading bloc formation may be equilibrium behavior even with cooperation and transfers within customs unions copyright 1997 by american economic association

environmental pressure group strength and air pollution an empirical analysis there is an established theoretical and empirical case study literature arguing that environmental pressure groups have a real impact on pollution levels our original contribution to this literature is to provide the first systematic quantitative test of the strength of environmental non governmental organizations engos on air pollution levels we find that engo strength exerts a statistically significant impact on sulfur dioxide smoke and heavy particulates concentration levels in a cross country time series regression analysis this result holds true both for ordinary least squares and random effects estimation it is robust to controlling for the potential endogeneity of engo strength with the help of instrumental variables the effect is also substantively important strengthening engos represents an important strategy by which aid donors foundations international organizations and other stakeholders can try to achieve lower pollution levels around the world

green economy and related concepts an overview for the last ten years the notion of a green economy has become increasingly attractive to policy makers however green economy covers a lot of diverse concepts and its links with sustainability are not always clear in this article we focus on definitions of green economy and related concepts and an evaluation of these concepts against the criterion of strong and weak sustainability the article serves three purposes firstly we identify and describe diverse theories concepts approaches and tools related to a green economy among these are the theories of environmental economics and ecological economics the concepts and approaches of cleaner production waste hierarchy bio economy industrial ecology circular economy nature based solutions and dematerialization through product servicizing and tools like life cycle assessment and cost benefit analysis secondly we develop a framework that shows the capacity of the green economy concepts approaches and tools to support the transition towards sustainability such a framework can serve as a heuristic to embed diverse concepts and approaches into a green economy framework thirdly we briefly discuss green economy concepts with respect to their impact on strong and weak sustainability depending on the different concepts approaches and tools identified in the green economy framework different degrees of substitutability and trade offs between environmental and economic benefits are allowed and more or less structural changes of our modes of living are required by discussing the notion of green economy and related concepts approaches and tools we seek to make a contribution to their definitions and relationships as a prerequisite for operationalizing green economy