banking panics information and rational expectations equilibrium this paper shows that bank runs can be modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon we demonstrate that some aspects of the intuitive story that bank runs start with fears of insolvency of banks can be rigorously modeled if individuals observe long lines at the bank they correctly infer that there is a possibility that the bank is about to fail and precipitate a bank run however bank runs occur even when no one has any adverse information extra market constraints such as suspension of convertibility can prevent bank runs and result in superior allocations banking panics were a recurrent phenomenon in the united states until the 1930s they have re emerged as a source of public concern and much theoretical research recently in this paper we provide an information theoretic rationale for bank runs the traditional story is that contagion is an important aspect of bank runs the idea seems to be that when the general public observes large withdrawals from the banking system fears of insolvency grow resulting in even larger withdrawals of deposits in our model some individuals withdraw because they get information that future returns are likely to be low uninformed individuals observing this also have an incentive to liquidate their investments in addition some individuals need to withdraw deposits for other than informationally based reasons thus if the random realization of such a group of individuals is unusually large then the uninformed individuals will be misled and will precipitate a run on the bank the technology is such that a large volume of withdrawals involves liquidation costs consequently runs on the bank do impose social costs a mechanism that may reduce these costs in our model is to suspend convertibility if withdrawals are high however those individuals who need to withdraw their assets for liquidity reasons are worse off ex post our model provides a rationalization for restrictions in demand deposits that were widespread prior to 1929 friedman and schwartz 7 suggest that restrictions of payments ensured

understanding bank runs the importance of depositor bank relationships and networks we use a unique new database to examine micro depositor level data for a bank that faced a run we use minute by minute depositor withdrawal data to understand the effectiveness of deposit insurance the role of social networks and the importance of bank depositor relationships in influencing depositor propensity to run we employ methods from the epidemiology literature which examine how diseases spread to estimate transmission probabilities of depositors running and the significant underlying factors we find that deposit insurance is only partially effective in preventing bank runs further our results suggest that social network effects are important but are mitigated by other factors in particular the length and depth of the bank depositor relationship depositors with longer relationships and those who have availed of loans from a bank are less likely to run during a crisis suggesting that cross selling acts not just as a revenue generator but also as a complementary insurance mechanism for the bank finally we find there are long term effects of a solvent bank run in that depositors who run do not return back to the bank our results help understand the underlying dynamics of bank runs and hold important policy implications

nonmonetary effects of the financial crisis in propagation of the great depression this paper examines the effects of the financial crisis of the 1930s onthe path of aggregate output during that period our approach is complementary to that of friedman and schwartz who emphasized the monetary impact of the bank failures we focus on non monetary primarily credit related aspects of the financial sector output link and consider the problems of debtors as well as those of the banking system we argue that the financial disruptions of 1930 33 reduced the efficiency of the credit allocation process and that the resulting higher cost and reduced availability of credit acted to depress aggregate demand evidence suggests that effects of this type can help explain the unusual length and depth of the great depression this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

consequences of bank distress during the great depression the consequences of bank distress for the economy during the depression remain an area of unresolved controversy since john m keynes 1931 and irving fisher 1933 macroeconomists have argued that bank distress magnified the extent of the economic decline during the depression as the intermediaries controlling money and credit banks were in a special position to transmit their distress to other sectors but the mechanism through which banking distress mattered for the economy has been hotly contested milton friedman and anna j schwartz 1963 saw the contraction in the money multiplier driven in their view by panicked depositors withdrawals of deposits as the primary mechanism through which banking distress affected the real economy they described the mechanism transmitting banking distress to the real sector as operating at the national level through changes in the aggregate supply of money and interest rates bank distress reduced the money supply available to the public either through the closure of banks and the consequent freezing of bank deposits or the withdrawals of deposits by depositors that feared bank failure ben s bernanke 1983 building on fisher 1933 emphasized the transmission of monetary shocks via their effects on the balance sheets of borrowers and on the supply of credit by banks borrowers balance sheets were worsened by debt deflation as the result of fixed dollar debt obligations borrowers net worth and cash flow declined with the rising value of debt service costs relative to income borrowers with positive net present value projects but weak balance sheets had less internally generated retained earnings to invest and could not qualify for credit furthermore bernanke argued that the contraction of the money supply produced contraction of nominal income and prices relative to fixed debt service which weakened borrowers balance sheets and in turn weakened banks not only did firms financial distress reduce the number of qualified borrowers the contraction in banks net worth forced a reduction in the supply of bank loans to qualified borrowers many firms and individuals relied on banks for credit and as those banks suffered losses of capital due to asset value declines and contractions in deposits as depositors reacted to bank weakness by withdrawing their funds even borrowers with viable projects and strong balance sheets experienced a decrease in the effective supply of loanable funds bernanke termed the combined weakening of borrowers balance sheets and the contraction in bank credit supply a rise in the cost of credit intermediation the scarcity of perfect substitutes for the positive net present value investments of firms with weak balance sheets and for the credit supplied by existing banks implies that the weakening of firms and banks balance sheets the disappearance of banks and the contraction in surviving banks lending made it more difficult for the economy to channel funds to their best use thus what began as a contraction in aggregate demand became a contraction in aggregate supply which magnified adverse economic shocks and prolonged and deepened the depression the financial distress of firms and banks and the decline in bank lending were not only symptoms of the depression but means for magnifying the shocks that caused the depression bernanke s statistical evidence in support of this story is derived from time series analysis at the national level in calomiris graduate school of business 601 uris hall columbia university 3022 broadway new york ny 10027 and national bureau of economic research e mail cc374 columbia edu mason department of finance drexel university 3141 chestnut street philadelphia pa 19104 e mail joe mason drexel edu we thank valerie ramey david wheelock charles himmelberg steve zeldes gary gorton two referees and seminar participants at columbia university wharton northwestern university and the 2001 economic history association meetings for helpful comments on an earlier draft we gratefully acknowledge support from the national science foundation the university of illinois and the federal reserve bank of st louis

bank runs and institutions the perils of intervention we study ex post efficient policy responses to a run on the banking system and the ex ante incentives these responses create we show that the efficient response to a run is typically not to freeze all remaining deposits since doing so imposes heavy costs on some individuals instead once a run is underway benevolent government institutions would allow additional deposit withdrawals placing further strain on the banking system when depositors anticipate these extra withdrawals their incentive to participate in the run increases in fact ex post efficient interventions can generate the conditions necessary for a self fulfilling run to occur jel g21 g8

in which context is the option clause desirable the option clause is a contractual device from free banking experiences meant to prevent banknote redemption duels it has been used within the diamond and dybvig j pol econ 91 401 419 1983 framework to suggest that very simple contractual solutions can act as an alternative to deposit insurance this literature has however been ambiguous on whether the option clause can replace deposit insurance outside of those two contexts it will be argued that the theoretical clause does not generally affect the likelihood that a solvent bank goes bankrupt because of a bank run as empirical evidence suggests it is already near null and that the exercise of the clause will have the effect of diminishing the size of creditor claims on bank assets because it exacerbates the agency problem of bank debt it will therefore be argued that the clause is only desirable in a free banking systems that are historically devoid of bank runs in the first place and have other means of managing debt related agency problems and b under the unrealistic assumption that bank runs are self fulfilling prophecies it will be argued that the agency problem of bank debt makes the option clause undesirable outside of free banking systems

models of banking instability a partial review of the literature abstract this paper critically examines the theoretical literature on banking instability that has followed diamond and dybvig 1983 it explores the extent to which it a explains banking instability within a theoretical context in which financial intermediaries improve on unintermediated markets and b justifies government involvement in the financial intermediation industry it suggests that the literature has yet to provide a satisfactory theoretical basis for banking instability as such since the intermediaries which arise from it are peculiar mutual funds that bear little resemblance to real world banks in addition the paper challenges the widespread belief that this literature provides a sound foundation for government involvement in the industry it suggests that arguments for government intervention are open to objection on various grounds the most important one being that they are inconsistent with the existence of properly motivated financial intermediation in these models

a serial inventory system with supplier selection and order quantity allocation given the prevalence of both supplier selection and inventory control problems in supply chain management this article addresses these problems simultaneously by developing a mathematical model for a serial system this model determines an optimal inventory policy that coordinates the transfer of items between consecutive stages of the system while properly allocating orders to selected suppliers in stage 1 in addition a lower bound on the minimum total cost per time unit is obtained and a 98 effective power of two pot inventory policy is derived for the system under consideration this pot algorithm is advantageous since it is simple to compute and yields near optimal solutions

housing finance and monetary policy we document three facts concerning how the structure of housing finance affects the monetary transmission mechanism first the characteristics of residential mortgage markets differ markedly across industrialized countries second the impact of monetary policy shocks to residential investment and house prices is significantly stronger in those countries with larger flexibility development of mortgage markets third the transmission to consumption is stronger only in those countries where mortgage equity release is common and mortgage contracts are predominantly of the variable rate type we then build a two sector dsge model with financial constraints to rationalize those facts

spillovers among sovereign debt markets identification through absolute magnitude restrictions this paper studies spillovers among us and european sovereign yields we employ absolute magnitude restrictions on the impact matrix to identify the countries that were the main sources of spillovers despite the large size of shocks from euro area stressed countries connectedness among sovereign yields declined between 2008 and 2012 due to financial fragmentation particularly between countries with more divergent business and fiscal cycles we show that none of the sovereign yields were insulated from foreign shocks and that shocks to the greek bond market in 2010 explained 20 30 of the variance of sovereign yields in stressed countries while in 2011 2012 italy not spain was the source of systemic risk

do depositors punish banks for bad behavior market discipline deposit insurance and banking crises this paper empirically investigates two issues largely unexplored by the literature on market discipline we evaluate the interaction between market discipline and deposit insurance and the impact of banking crises on market discipline we focus on the experiences of argentina chile and mexico during the 1980s and 1990s we find that depositors discipline banks by withdrawing deposits and by requiring higher interest rates deposit insurance does not appear to diminish the extent of market discipline aggregate shocks affect deposits and interest rates during crises regardless of bank fundamentals and investors responsiveness to bank risk taking increases in the aftermath of crises

unique equilibrium in a model of self fulfilling currency attacks even though self fulfilling currency attacks lead to multiple equilibria when fundamentals are common knowledge we demonstrate the uniqueness of equilibrium when speculators face a small amount of noise in their signals about the fundamentals this unique equilibrium depends not only on the fundamentals but also on financial variables such as the quantity of hot money in circulation and the costs of speculative trading in contrast to multiple equilibrium models our model allows analysis of policy proposals directed at curtailing currency attacks

an evaluation of vendor selection models from a total cost of ownership perspective abstract many different vendor selection models have been published in the purchasing literature however there has been no systematic approach to compare the relative efficiency of the systems in this paper we propose to use the concept of total cost of ownership as a basis for comparing vendor selection models we illustrate the comparison with a real life data set of the purchasing problem of ball bearings at cockerill sambre a belgian multinational company in the steel industry from a total cost of ownership perspective mathematical programming models outperform rating models and multiple item models generate better results than single item models for this specific case study

evaluating theories of bank runs with heterogeneity restrictions this paper empirically tests theories of bank runs we use a structural panel var to extract runs from deposit market data identification exploits cross sectional heterogeneity in deposit insurance we identify bank runs as adverse deposit market supply shocks hitting uninsured banks harder compared to insured conditional on a run we study the behavior of uninsured banks with bad and good fundamentals we find that both experience runs but deposit outflows at the former are more severe panic effects which affect all uninsured deposits alike irrespective of fundamentals dominate in the aggregate insured banks partially absorb the outflow of uninsured deposits

fundamentals panics and bank distress during the depression we assemble bank level and other data for fed member banks to model determinants of bank failure fundamentals explain bank failure risk well the first two friedman schwartz crises are not associated with positive unexplained residual failure risk or increased importance of bank illiquidity for forecasting failure the third friedman schwartz crisis is more ambiguous but increased residual failure risk is small in the aggregate the final crisis early 1933 saw a large unexplained increase in bank failure risk local contagion and illiquidity may have played a role in pre 1933 bank failures even though those effects were not large in their aggregate impact

the option clause in scottish banking 1730 65 a reappraisal many writers from adam smith s time on have held that the option clause encouraged overissue of notes and was therefore a source of instability recently proponents of the legal restrictions theory of money and some proponents of free banking have argued that the clause produced a number of desirable effects neither position is consistent with the historical facts these facts indicate that the impact of the clause on the stability of the banking system was limited to discouraging note wars and providing a means by which to deal with specie drains caused by external shocks copyright 1995 by ohio state university press

sources of panics evidence from the weekly data abstract we use weekly data 1867 1933 to investigate the sources of banking and financial panics we find that while a panic s exact starting date is unpredictable one can identify environments conducive to panics a lack of liquidity in financial markets seems to be a key source results also reveal the effectiveness of the aldrich vreeland act inelastizing the money supply and shortening the panic of 1914 and suggest that the panic of 1933 may have been caused by a speculative attack on the gold backed us dollar via the banks as opposed to a run on the banks directly

distinguishing panics and information based bank runs welfare and policy implications in this paper we contrast panics and information based bank runs in an effort to provide a robust and empirically plausible model of how bank runs are triggered the model of information based runs is characterized by two sided asymmetric information the bank cannot observe the true liquidity needs of the depositors while depositors are asymmetrically informed about bank asset quality we also examine the relative degrees of risk sharing provided by bank deposit contracts and traded equity contracts we show that the choice of deposit or equity depends on the attributes of and information about the underlying investment returns

note an acquisition policy for a single item multi supplier system in this paper we consider the problem of developing an acquisition policy specifically given a set of potential qualified suppliers from whom should the firm buy the product in what quantities and how often we provide properties of the optimal solution and relate them to the approach of using a single source as advocated by jit the solution procedure provides the periodic order quantity from each supplier the order size and the firm cycle time as well as how many times per cycle we should order from each supplier we show that the maximum error of our solution can be made as small as desired

optimal financial crises empirical evidence suggests that banking panics are related to the business cycle and are not simply the result of sunspots panics occur when depositors perceive that the returns on bank assets are going to be unusually low we develop a simple model of this in this setting bank runs can be first best efficient they allow efficient risk sharing between early and late withdrawing depositors and they allow banks to hold efficient portfolios however if costly runs or markets for risky assets are introduced central bank intervention of the right kind can lead to a pareto improvement in welfare from the earliest times banks have been plagued by the problem of bank runs in which many or all of the bank s depositors attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously because banks issue liquid liabilities in the form of deposit contracts but invest in illiquid assets in the form of loans they are vulnerable to runs that can lead to closure and liquidation a financial crisis or banking panic occurs when depositors at many or all of the banks in a region or a country attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously prior to the twentieth century banking panics occurred frequently in europe and the united states panics were generally regarded as a bad thing and the development of central banks to eliminate panics and ensure financial stability has been an important feature of the history of financial systems it has been a long and involved process the first cerntral bank the bank of sweden was established more than 300 years ago the bank of england played an especially important role in the development of effective stabilization policies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by the end of the nineteenth century banking panics had been eliminated in europe the last true panic in england was the overend gurney company crisis of 1866

bank run psychology abstract banks are inherently susceptible to panics and bank runs due to the problem of maturity mismatch resulting in both a stable equilibrium in which the bank survives and an unstable equilibrium in which a bank run occurs understanding equilibrium selection in this setting is extremely important for safeguarding financial stability in this paper one new potential factor that determines whether a bank runs gets triggered or not is experimentally studied namely the psychological state of the depositor prior to participating in an experimental bank run game subjects are either induced with fear sadness or happiness using an autobiographical emotion induction task the findings suggest that the presence of background fear significantly increases the likelihood of withdrawal and a subsequent bank run in addition women are shown to be significantly more likely to withdraw then men but only in the fear induction treatment

bank suspension of convertibility abstract a banking panic occurs when depositors at all banks seek a large reduction in their deposit holdings suspension of convertibility of demand deposits into currency was the banking system s response to a banking panic when depositors are incompletely informed about the state of bank investments a panic can occur when depositors expect capital losses conditional on having observed noisy indicators of the state of bank investments banks with superior information about the investments can signal to depositors by suspending convertibility that continuation of the long term investments is mutually beneficial

how do us credit supply shocks propagate internationally a gvar approach abstract we study how us credit supply shocks are transmitted to other economies we use the recently developed gvar approach to model financial variables jointly with macroeconomic variables in 33 countries for the period 1983 2009 we experiment with inter country links based on bilateral trade portfolio investment foreign direct investment and banking exposures capturing both bilateral trade and financial exposures in a gvar fits the data better than using trade weights only we use sign restrictions on the short run impulse responses in the us model to identify the credit supply shocks we find that negative credit supply shocks have strong negative effects on us and foreign gdp credit and equity markets in several countries respond clearly to the shocks exchange rate responses are consistent with a flight to quality to the us dollar the credit supply shocks explain about a fifth of one year ahead output forecast error variance in the us and about a tenth in the euro area and the uk but considerably less elsewhere

98 effective integer ratio lot sizing for one warehouse multi retailer systems a warehouse supplies n retailers constant external demand occurs at each retailer and shortages are not allowed there are linear holding costs and fixed costs for ordering at the warehouse and at each retailer the goal is to minimize the long run average cost over an infinite time horizon we define a new class of policies for this problem whose simple structure facilitates both computation and implementation the cost of a policy that is optimal within this class is shown to be within 2 of the cost of an optimal policy for the original problem in the worst case such a policy can be computed in on log n time

in defence of demand deposits contractual solutions to the barnett and block and bagus and howden debate this article contributes to a recent debate between barnett and block j bus ethics 88 4 711 716 2009 bagus and howden j bus ethics 90 3 399 406 2009 barnett and block j bus ethics 100 299 238 2011 cachanosky j bus ethics 104 219 221 2011 and bagus and howden j bus ethics 106 295 300 2012a regarding the conceptual distinction between demand deposits and time deposits it is argued that from an economic perspective there is nothing inherently fraudulent or illegitimate about deposit accounts that are available on demand but that this relies on certain contractual provisions particular attention is drawn to option clauses and withdrawal clauses which solve the problems raised by barnett and block and bagus and howden previous authors have also neglected the asset side of banks balance sheets and this is shown to further justify the legitimacy of fractional reserve banking

the total cost of logistics in supplier selection under conditions of multiple sourcing multiple criteria and capacity constraint abstract little attention is given in the literature to decisions on the appropriate selection of suppliers and on assigning order quantities to these suppliers in the case of multiple sourcing with multiple criteria and with suppliers capacity constraints only a few mathematical programming models to analyse such decisions have been published to date and these have tended to consider only net price as the cost of purchasing although the costs of transportation ordering and storage may be significantly important to the decision in this paper a mixed integer non linear programming model is presented to solve the multiple sourcing problem which takes into account the total cost of logistics including net price storage transportation and ordering costs buyer limitations on budget quality service etc can also be considered in the model an algorithm is proposed to solve the model and the model is illustrated using a numerical example

bank runs and currency run in a system without a safety net argentina and the tequila shock abstract this paper tests the random withdrawals vs informed based theories of bank runs in the context of the bank panic that took place in argentina as a consequence of the mexican devaluation of december 20 1994 this evidence is unique in several ways it is the case of a contemporary banking system with virtually no explicit safety net a currency board with no deposit insurance scheme and a case in which the bank runs were triggered by a currency run the findings of the paper provide support to the informed based theories and show that depositors are concerned with the impact of a currency run on bank solvency

the role of demandable debt in structuring optimal banking arrangements demandable debt finance by banks warrants explanation because it entails costs of bank suspension liquidation and idle reserve holdings an explanation is developed in which demandable debt provides incentive compatible intermediation where the banker has comparative advantage in allocating investment funds but may act against the interests of uninformed depositors demandable debt attracts funds by giving depositors an option to force liquidation its usefulness in transacting follows from information sharing between monitors and nonmonitors copyright 1991 by american economic association

market discipline by thrift depositors this paper tests for the presence of depositor discipline by examining the effect of depository institutions risk on the pricing and growth of uninsured deposits the study analyzes a large panel of thrifts that includes detailed information on interest rate schedules this information allows the authors to develop a time consistent risk profile for thrifts their empirical findings support the presence of market discipline riskier banks are found to pay higher interest rates but attract smaller amounts of uninsured deposits the authors also find that qualitative results are similar for fully insured deposits although statistical significance is substantially lower

the option clause in scottish banking a key question raised by the modern literature on laissez faire money and banking is whether unregulated fractional reserve banks could protect themselves from bank runs by purely contractual means if so banking stability would not require government to provide deposit insurance or to act as a lender of last resort one possible run proofing device discussed in the literature is an option clause or notice of withdrawal clause allowing a bank temporarily to suspend the redeemability of some or all of its liabilities notes or demand deposits provided the bank pays a prespecified penalty rate of interest on the suspended liabilities before the practice was outlawed in 1765 many scottish banks issued notes bearing option clauses in an informative reappraisal of the option clause in scottish banking james a gherity 1995 suggests that his findings contradict other recent discussions in particular gherity disputes three propositions that he attributes to us and others 1 that option clauses were vital to preventing runs in scotland 2 that run proofing was the purpose that motivated scottish banks to employ option clauses and 3 that option clause notes were accepted by the public without prejudice to set the record straight we note here that we and several other authors gherity cites have in fact avoided making claims 1 and 2 the conflict between gherity s view and ours is thus much smaller than he suggests we would defend claim 3 however and argue that the evidence gherity offers against it does not suffice to refute that claim 1 the potential and historical roles of the option clause an option clause can keep a solvent bank from being run upon by providing a contractual circuit breaker by allowing an illiquid bank to suspend for enough time to liquidate assets without fire sale losses it prevents a run from forcing a sol

equilibrium bank runs we analyze a banking system in which the class of feasible deposit contracts or mechanisms is broad the mechanisms must satisfy a sequential service constraint but partial or full suspension of convertibility is allowed consumers must be willing to deposit ex ante we show by examples that under the so called optimal contract the postdeposit game can have a run equilibrium given a propensity to run triggered by sunspots the optimal contract for the full predeposit game can be consistent with runs that occur with positive probability thus the diamond dybvig framework can explain bank runs as emerging in equilibrium under the optimal deposit contract

were financial crises predictable this paper empirically investigates the nature of financial crises in the united states before 1914 it attempts to determine whether crises were statistically similar predictable and had a common generating mechanism using probit and hazard models and out of sample criteria it is shown there are variables that explain movements in the probability of crises and that the probability of crises is seasonal two crises were predictable but in the other six episodes every forecasting model examined failed these results suggest that financial crises were not all statistically alike and that their generation mechanisms differed copyright 1994 by ohio state university press

testing for convergence clubs in income per capita a predictive density approach the article proposes a technique based on the predictive density of the data conditional on the parameters of the model to jointly tests for groups of unknown size in a panel and to estimate the parameters of each group the procedure is applied to the problem of identifying convergence clubs in scaled income per capita data the steady state distribution of european regional data clusters around four poles of attraction with different economic features the distribution of income per capita of oecd countries has two poles of attraction and each group clearly identifiable economic characteristics we share the uncommonness of being different j p roche

interbank contagion at work evidence from a natural experiment this article tests financial contagion due to interbank linkages for identification we exploit an idiosyncratic sudden shock caused by a large bank failure in conjunction with detailed data on interbank exposures first we find robust evidence that higher interbank exposure to the failed bank leads to large deposit withdrawals second the magnitude of contagion is higher for banks with weaker fundamentals third interbank linkages among surviving banks further propagate the shock finally we find results suggesting that there are real economic effects these results suggest that interbank linkages act as an important channel of contagion and hold important policy implications jel g01 g21 g28 e58 since the onset of the financial turmoil increased uncertainty reflected particularly in counterparty risk has led banks to hoard liquidity this has resulted in a significant decline of trading in the interbank money markets jean claude trichet president of the european central bank december 2008