monotone equilibrium of two bidder all pay auctions redux abstract in this paper we revisit the two bidder asymmetric all pay auction of amann and leininger 1996 by allowing interdependent values and correlated signals both values and signals are distributed on continuous supports we provide conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a monotone pure strategy equilibrium mpse and constructively characterize the mpse when it exists we find that given the marginal distributions of the signals the equilibrium allocation is solely determined by how bidders values depend on their signals in particular the equilibrium allocation does not depend on how bidders signals are correlated

incomplete information and rent dissipation in deterministic contests abstract in a deterministic contest or all pay auction all rents are dissipated when information is complete and contestants are identical as one contestant becomes stronger that is values the prize more total expenditures are known to decrease monotonically thus asymmetry among contestants reduces competition and rent dissipation recently this result has been shown to hold for other non deterministic contest success functions as well thereby suggesting a certain robustness in this paper however the complete information assumption is shown to be crucial i examine a tractable incomplete information model for which the complete information model is a special case with incomplete information regardless of how little total expenditures in a deterministic two player contest increase when one contestant becomes marginally stronger starting from a symmetric contest in fact both contestants expend resources more aggressively with complete information neither of them do so thus there is a discontinuity in the information structure

modeling exchange rate passthrough after large devaluations large devaluations are generally associated with large declines in real exchange rates burstein eichenbaum and rebelo 2005 argue that the primary force causing these declines is often the slow adjustment in the price of nontradable goods and services we develop a model which embodies two complementary forces that account for the large declines in the real exchange rate that occur in the aftermath of large devaluations the first force is sticky nontradable goods prices instead of simply assuming that nontradable goods prices are sticky we develop conditions under which this phenomenon can emerge as an equilibrium outcome the second force is the impact of real shocks that often accompany large devaluations these real shocks lead to a decline in the price of nontradable goods relative to traded goods we argue that sticky nontradable goods prices generally play an important role in explaining post devaluation movements in real exchange rates however there are cases in which sticky nontradable goods prices are not sustainable as an equilibrium phenomenon in these cases real shocks are the primary driver of real exchange rate movements j e l classification f31

optimal monetary policy in a small open economy with home bias we analyze optimal monetary policy in a small open economy characterized by home bias in consumption peculiar to our framework is the application of a ramseytype analysis to a model of the recent open economy new keynesian literature we show that home bias in consumption is a su cient condition for inducing the monetary policy maker of an open economy to deviate from a strategy of strict markup stabilization and contemplate some optimal degree of exchange rate stabilization we focus on the optimal setting of policy both in the case of rms setting prices one period in advance and in a gradual fashion subject to adjustment costs while the rst setup allows us to analytically highlight home bias as an independent source of equilibrium

heterogeneous risk loss aversion in complete information all pay auctions we extend previous theoretical work on n player complete information all pay auctions to incorporate heterogeneous risk and loss averse utility functions we provide sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of equilibria with a given set of active players with any strictly increasing utility functions and characterize the players equilibrium mixed strategies assuming that players can be ordered by their risk aversion player a is more risk averse than player b if whenever player b prefers a certain payment over a given lottery so does player a we find that in equilibrium the more risk averse players either bid higher than the less risk averse players and win with higher ex ante probability or they drop out furthermore while each player s expected bid decreases with the other players risk aversion her expected bid increases with her own risk aversion thus increasing a player s risk aversion creates two opposing effects on total expected bid a sufficient condition for the total expected bid to decrease with a player s risk aversion is that this player is relatively more risk averse compared to the rest of the players our findings have important implications for the literature on gender differences in competitiveness and for gender diversity in firms that use personnel contests for promotions

optimal monetary policy responses to relative price changes abstract an optimizing model with a flexible price sector and a sticky price sector is presented to analyze the effects of relative price changes on inflation fluctuations the relative price of the flexible price good represents a shift parameter of the new keynesian phillips curve the optimal monetary policy is to target sticky price inflation rather than a broad inflation measure although stabilizing the relative price around its efficient value is one of the appropriate goals of the central bank stabilizing sticky price inflation is sufficient for achieving this goal an optimal monetary policy for a small open economy is also discussed

openness and optimal monetary policy abstract we show that the composition of international trade has important implications for the optimal volatility of the exchange rate above and beyond the size of trade flows using an analytically tractable small open economy model we characterize the impact of the trade composition on the policy trade off and on the role played by the exchange rate in correcting for price misalignments contrary to models where openness can be summarized by the degree of home bias we find that openness can be a poor proxy of the welfare impact of alternative monetary policies using input output data for 25 countries we document substantial differences in the import and non tradable content of final demand components and in the role played by imported inputs in domestic production the estimates are used in a richer small open economy dsge model to quantify the loss from an exchange rate peg relative to the ramsey policy conditional on the composition of imports we find that the main determinant of the losses is the share of non traded goods in final demand

handicaps in incomplete information all pay auctions with a diverse set of bidders abstract in many contests a subset of contestants is granted preferential treatment which is presumably intended to be advantageous examples include affirmative action and biased procurement policies in this paper however i show that some of the supposed beneficiaries may in fact become worse off when the favored group is diverse the reason is that the other favored contestants become more aggressive which may outweigh the advantage that is gained over contestants who are handicapped the contest is modeled as an incomplete information all pay auction in which contestants have heterogenous and possibly non linear cost functions

expenditure switching vs real exchange rate stabilization competing objectives for exchange rate policy this paper develops a view of exchange rate policy as a trade off between the desire to smooth fluctuations in real exchange rates so as to reduce distortions in consumption allocations and the need to allow flexibility in the nominal exchange rate so as to facilitate terms of trade adjustment we show that optimal nominal exchange rate volatility will reflect these competing objectives the key determinants of how much the exchange rate should respond to shocks will depend on the extent and source of price stickiness the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods and the amount of home bias in production quantitatively we find the optimal exchange rate volatility should be significantly less than would be inferred based solely on terms of trade considerations moreover we find that the relationship between price stickiness and optimal exchange rate volatility may be non monotonic

the changing technology of technological change general and abstract knowledge and the division of innovative labour abstract in the past most innovations have resulted from empiricist procedures the outcome of each trial yielding knowledge that could not be readily extended to other contexts while trial and error may remain the primary engine of innovation developments in many scientific disciplines along with progress in computational capabilities and instrumentation are encouraging a new approach to industrial research instead of relying purely on trial and error the attempt is also to understand the principles governing the behaviour of objects and structures the result is that relevant information whatever its source can now be cast in frameworks and categories that are more universal the greater universality makes it possible for the innovation process to be organised in new ways firms can specialise and focus upon producing new knowledge and the locus of innovation may be spread across both users and producers more generally the use of general and abstract knowledge in innovation opens up the possibility for a division of labour in inventive activity the division of innovative labour the implications for public policy especially that on intellectual property rights are discussed

asymmetric all pay auctions with incomplete information the two player case abstract we prove existence and uniqueness of bayesian equilibrium for a class of generally asymmetric all pay auctions with incomplete information due to its importance in applications some prominence is given to the first price all pay auction for which a detailed characterization of equilibrium and an approximation to equilibrium of its well studied complete information version are supplied furthermore we relate our uniqueness result to the well known multiplicity of equilibria in the war of attrition second price all pay auction which emerges as a limit point of the class of two player auction games considered journalof economic literature classification numbers d44 c62 c72

asymmetric contests with conditional investments rent seeking scenarios competitions for promotions and research and development r d races are examples of competitions in which participants expend resources regardless of whether they win or lose although similar in their all pay feature such competitions often differ in important dimensions these include the type of technologies employed in competition the type of asymmetries among competitors the degree to which expenditures are sunk and the number of prizes consider lobbying settings in which firms expend resources in order to influence a policymaker if expenditures take the form of monetary outlays and all firms have the same cost of capital then it is reasonable to think of firms marginal cost of influence as linear but if a firm has a reputational advantage and high costs of capital its lobbying technology may be more reasonably thought of as having convex costs relatively low marginal costs up to a moderate level of influence due to the reputational advantage and relatively high marginal costs at higher levels of influence due to the high costs of capital similarly the lobbying technology of a firm that is relatively unknown and has low costs of capital may be characterized by concave costs lobbying restrictions geographic location or preferential treatment by the policymaker further impact firms lobbying technologies inducing additional nonlinearities and asymmetries among firms in some lobbying settings firms also commit to expenditures conditional on a favorable outcome for example a firm may commit to building factories and creating new jobs if it is granted one of a limited number of manufacturing licenses thus the specification of firms lobbying technologies the type of asymmetries among firms the combination of unconditional and conditional investments and the number of eventual winners may change according to the lobbying setting studied the same is true for other competitions with an all pay feature in a competition for promotions workers often differ in their abilities experience and social skills more than one prize

bid costs and endogenous bid caps we study contests where several privately informed agents bid for a price all bidders bear a cost of bidding that is an increasing function of their bids and moreover bids may be capped we show that regardless of the number of bidders if agents have linear or concave cost functions then setting a bid cap is not profitable for a designer who wishes to maximize the average bid on the other hand if agents have convex cost functions i e an increasing marginal cost then affectively capping the bids is profitable for a designer facing a sufficiently large number of bidders

monetary policy and exchange rate volatility in a small open economy we lay out a small open economy version of the calvo sticky price model and show how the equilibrium dynamics can be reduced to a simple representation in domestic inflation and the output gap we use the resulting framework to analyse the macroeconomic implications of three alternative rulebased policy regimes for the small open economy domestic inflation and cpi based taylor rules and an exchange rate peg we show that a key difference among these regimes lies in the relative amount of exchange rate volatility that they entail we also discuss a special case for which domestic inflation targeting constitutes the optimal policy and where a simple second order approximation to the utility of the representative consumer can be derived and used to evaluate the welfare losses associated with the suboptimal rules

do central banks respond to exchange rate movements a structural investigation abstract we estimate a small scale structural general equilibrium model of a small open economy using bayesian methods our main focus is the conduct of monetary policy in australia canada new zealand and the uk we consider generic taylor type rules where the monetary authority reacts in response to output inflation and exchange rate movements we perform posterior odds tests to investigate the hypothesis whether central banks do target exchange rates the main result of this paper is that the central banks of australia and new zealand do not whereas the bank of canada and the bank of england do include the nominal exchange rate in its policy rule this result is robust for various specification of the policy rule we also find that terms of trade movements do not contribute significantly to domestic business cycles

price stability in open economies this paper studies the conditions under which price stability is the optimal policy in a two country open economy model with imperfect competition and price stickiness special conditions on the levels of country specific distortionary taxation and the intratemporal and intertemporal elasticities of substitution need to be satisfied these restrictions apply to both cooperative and non cooperative settings most importantly we show that cooperative and non cooperative solutions do not coincide despite market completeness and producer currency pricing in this framework our analysis suggests a role for international policy coordination

the federal reserve the emerging markets and capital controls a high frequency empirical investigation in this paper i use weekly data from seven emerging nations four in latin america and three in asia to investigate the extent to which changes in fed policy interest rates have been transmitted into domestic short term interest rates during the 2000s the results suggest that there is indeed an interest rates pass through from the fed to emerging markets however the extent of transmission of interest rate shocks is different in terms of impact steady state effect and dynamics in latin america and asia the results also indicate that capital controls are not an effective tool for isolating emerging countries from global interest rate disturbances changes in the slope of the u s yield curve including changes generated by a twist policy affect domestic interest rates in emerging countries i also provide a detailed case study for chile

macroeconomic interdependence under incomplete markets this paper uses a two country flexible price model with overlapping generations of infinitely lived households to study the role of net foreign asset dynamics in the propagation of productivity shocks absence of ricardian equivalence ensures existence of a unique steady state level of net foreign assets to which the economy returns following temporary shocks model dynamics are significantly different from those of a setup in which terms of trade movements perform all the international adjustment and net foreign assets do not move the difference relative to a complete markets economy in which net foreign asset movements play no role in shock transmission is smaller it is amplified if the substitutability across goods rises and if shocks are permanent

international research networks in pharmaceuticals structure and dynamics abstract knowledge production and scientific research have become increasingly more collaborative and international particularly in pharmaceuticals we analyze this tendency in general and tie formation in international research networks on the country level in particular based on a unique dataset of scientific publications related to pharmaceutical research and applying social network analysis we find that both the number of countries and their connectivity increase in almost all disease group specific networks the cores of the networks consist of high income oecd countries and remain rather stable over time using network regression techniques to analyze the network dynamics our results indicate that accumulative advantages based on connectedness and multi connectivity are positively related to changes in the countries collaboration intensity whereas various indicators on similarity between countries do not allow for unambiguous conclusions

a welfare based analysis of international monetary policy spillovers at the zero lower bound we study the welfare effects of international monetary policy spillovers at the zero lower bound focusing on the effects of forward guidance in a large economy foreign on its smaller trading partner home in scenarios motivated by the global financial crisis we find that foreign forward guidance has an overall prosper thy neighbor effect on the home economy as long as it increases foreign welfare this finding holds under alternative assumptions about exchange rate pass through or the degree of international financial integration however foreign forward guidance may worsen the trade off between the stabilization objectives of home monetary policy

national systems of biotechnology innovation complex interdependence in the global system this paper explores the relationship between national institutional context and the development of biotechnology in the united states united kingdom japan and germany national patterns in biotechnology r d are linked to the configuration of county specific institutional features into a system of innovation which supports or impedes the accumulation and diffusion of knowledge between the scientific and industrial communities building on this comparative analysis it is argued that the particular characteristics of national systems of biotechnology innovation form the basis for complex interdependence within the global system through international technological cooperation and the cross border adoption and adaptation of institutional forms and practices implications for national technological advantage and the stability of national institutional systems are discussed

the origins and dynamics of production networks in silicon valley abstract computer systems firms in silicon valley are responding to rising costs of product development shorter product cycles and rapid technological change by focusing and building partnerships with suppliers both within and outside of the region well known firms like hewlett packard and apple computers and lesser known ones like silicon graphics and pyramid technology are organized to combine the components and sub systems made by specialist suppliers into new computer systems as these firms collaborate to both define and manufacture new systems they are institutionalizing their capacity to learn from one another three cases a contract manufacturer a silicon foundry and the joint development of a microprocessor illustrate how inter firm networks help account for the sustained technological dynamism of the regional economy

optimal monetary policy in open versus closed economies an integrated approach in clarida et al 1999 hereafter cgg we presented a normative analysis of monetary policy within a simple optimization based closedeconomy framework we derived the optimal policy rule and among other things characterized the gains from commitment also we made precise the implications for the kind of instrument feedback rule that a central bank should follow in practice in this paper we show how our analysis extends to the case of a small open economy openness complicates the problem of monetary management to the extent the central bank must take into account the impact of the exchange rate on real activity and inflation how to factor the exchange rate into the overall design of monetary policy accordingly becomes a central consideration here we show that under certain conditions the monetary policy design problem for the small open economy is isomorphic to the problem of the closed economy that we considered earlier hence all our qualitative results for the closed economy carry over to this case openness does affect the parameters of the model suggesting quantitative implications though the general form of the optimal interest rate feedback rule remains the same as in the closedeconomy case for example how aggressively a central bank should adjust the interest rate in response to inflationary pressures depends on the degree of openness in addition openness gives rise to an important distinction between domestic inflation and consumer price inflation as defined by the cpi to the extent that there is perfect exchange rate pass through we find that the central bank should target domestic inflation and allow the exchange rate to float despite the impact of the resulting exchangerate variability on the cpi kosuki aoki 1999 gali and tommaso monacelli 2000

price stability with imperfect financial integration this paper studies whether the international monetary system can be affected by asymmetries in the cross country positions in the international financial markets i e the fact that some countries are large debtors while others are creditors an important channel that is explored is the interaction between international risk sharing and the stabilization role of monetary policy in each country the main finding is that the welfare costs of incomplete markets and the gains of deviating from a policy of price stability are increasing with the cross country asymmetries in the initial net international positions and in particular they become nonnegligible when the persistence of the shocks increases 1 of a permanent shift in steady state consumption for the welfare costs of incomplete markets and 0 2 for the gains of deviating from a policy of price stability when global imbalances become larger optimal monetary policy requires an increase in the volatilities of the real returns on assets and in particular of the nominal interest rates which should happen to be more correlated across countries

new directions for stochastic open economy models the paper develops a simple stochastic new open economy macroeconomic model based on sticky nominal wages explicit solution of the wage setting problem under uncertainty allows one to analyze the effects of the monetary regime on welfare expected output and the expected terms of trade despite the potential interplay between imperfections due to sticky wages and monopoly the optimal monetary policy rule has a closed form solution to motivate our model we show that observed correlations between terms of trade and exchange rates are more consistent with our traditional assumptions about nominal rigidities than with a popular alternative based on local currency pricing 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

optimal monetary policy with international trade in intermediate inputs abstract this paper examines optimal monetary policy in a two country new keynesian model with international trade in intermediate inputs we derive the loss function of a cooperative monetary policymaker and find that the optimal monetary policy must target intermediate goods price inflation rates final goods price inflation rates final goods output gaps and relative price gaps we use the welfare loss under the optimal monetary policy as a benchmark to evaluate the welfare implications of three taylor type monetary policy rules a main finding is that the degree of price stickiness at the stage of intermediate goods production is a key factor to determine which policy rule should be followed specifically when the degree of price stickiness at the stage of intermediate goods production is high the policymaker should follow intermediate goods ppi based taylor rule whereas cpi based taylor rule should be followed when the degree of price stickiness at the stage of intermediate goods production is intermediate or low

the role of consumption substitutability in the international transmission of monetary shocks abstract this paper develops a general framework to analyze the impact of monetary shocks in an open economy focusing on the role of the degree of substitutability between goods produced in different countries we extend the contributions by obstfeld and rogoff obstfeld m rogoff k 1995 exchange rate dynamics redux journal of political economy 103 624 659 and corsetti and pesenti corsetti g pesenti p 1997 welfare and macroeconomic interdependence nber working paper 6307 to show that the welfare impact differs across countries when the degree of substitutability between goods produced in different countries is different from the degree of substitutability between goods produced in the same country a shock that would be beneficial in a closed economy can have an adverse beggar thyself effect in the country where it takes place or an adverse beggar thy neighbor effect on its neighbor

international spillover effects and monetary policy activism this paper examines how the preferences of a large economy s central bank affect the trade off between output and inflation volatility faced by the central bank of a small open economy by analyzing the impact of a global cost push shock we demonstrate that under the assumption of producer currency pricing the trade off faced by the small open economy is likely to worsen as the foreign central bank becomes more focused on output stabilization relative to inflation stabilization but the opposite is true in the case of local currency pricing

favoritism in asymmetric contests head starts and handicaps abstract i examine a contest with identity dependent rules in which contestants are privately informed and ex ante heterogeneous a contestant may suffer from a handicap or benefit from a head start the former reduces the contestant s score by a fixed percentage the latter is an additive bonus although total effort increases if the weak contestant is favored with a head start the optimal use of handicaps is not as clear cut depending on the nature of the asymmetry it may or may not be optimal to handicap the strong contestant moreover it is generally optimal to combine the two instruments for instance when contestants are sufficiently heterogeneous the weak contestant should be given both a head start and a handicap it may also be possible to induce higher effort and at the same time make both contestants better off ex ante

gaps and triangles we derive principles of optimal short run monetary policy in a real business cycles model with money and prices set in advance the optimal allocation is achieved under the friedman rule however given that policy the allocation is indeterminate we move away from the friedman rule take the interest rate path as exogenous and characterize the optimal money supply policy we identify the conditions under which it is optimal to replicate the allocation under exible prices in general sticky prices provide the planner with tools to improve upon a distorted exible prices allocation

an elementary proof of the common maximal bid in asymmetric first price and all pay auctions we prove that the maximal bid in asymmetric first price and all pay auctions is the same for all bidders our proof is elementary and does not require that bidders are risk neutral or that the distribution functions of their valuations are independent or smooth

do the ecb and the fed really need to cooperate optimal monetary policy in a two country world abstract a two country model with monopolistic competition and price stickiness is employed to investigate the implications for macroeconomic stability and the welfare properties of three international policy arrangements a cooperative b non cooperative and c monetary union i characterize the conditions under which there is scope for policy cooperation and quantify the costs of non cooperation and monetary union the non cooperative equilibrium may be suboptimal because of terms of trade spillover effects while monetary union may be suboptimal because of the sluggishness of relative prices both the costs of policy competition and of a monetary union are sensitive to the values assumed for the intertemporal and international demand elasticity and the degree of openness of the economy independently of the calibration scenario adopted the ecb has little to gain by coordinating with the fed

asymmetric tournaments equal opportunity laws and affirmative action some experimental results this paper assesses whether affirmative action programs and equal opportunity laws affect the output of economic agents more precisely we find that equal opportunity laws and affirmative action programs always benefit disadvantaged groups equal opportunity laws also increase the effort levels of all subjects and hence the profits of the tournament administrator usually the firm the effects of affirmative action programs depend on the severity of a group s cost disadvantage when the cost disadvantage is severe these programs significantly increase effort levels and hence profits the opposite is true when the disadvantage is slight

do women shy away from competition do men compete too much we examine whether men and women of the same ability differ in their selection into a competitive environment participants in a laboratory experiment solve a real task first under a noncompetitive piece rate and then a competitive tournament incentive scheme although there are no gender differences in performance men select the tournament twice as much as women when choosing their compensation scheme for the next performance while 73 percent of the men select the tournament only 35 percent of the women make this choice this gender gap in tournament entry is not explained by performance and factors such as risk and feedback aversion only playa negligible role instead the tournament entry gap is driven by men being more overconfident and by gender differences in preferences for performing in a competition the result is that women shy away from competition and men embrace it

on the benefits of a monetary union does it pay to be bigger this paper revisits the question of the appropriate domain of a currency area using a new keynesian open economy model in which the world is split into two areas each framed as a continuum of small open regions we show that the adoption of a common currency like the euro can be beneficial for the members of the monetary union since the spill over effects generated by the inflationary policies of the small open economies are likely to outweigh the costs of not tailoring monetary policy to country specific shocks we also show that while the enlargement of the monetary union to another group of small open economies can bring about welfare gains for all countries involved monetary integration of two large economies such as the euro area and the u s will not these findings can help to rationalize the process of the creation and enlargement of multi country currency areas like the eurozone

social capital structural holes and the formation of an industry network the formation of a network is determined by the opposition of two forces the first is the reproduction of network structure as a general social resource for network members the second is the alteration of network structure by entrepreneurs for their own benefit the idea of reproduction is a conventional one in organizational sociology but has taken on increased importance due to the work of bourdieu and coleman in contrast burt stresses the entrepreneurship of individual agents in exploiting structural holes that lie between constrained positions though complementary the theories of social capital and structural holes have fundamentally different implications for network formation this paper investigates these theories by examining empirically the formation of the interorganizational network among biotechnology firms we propose that network structure determines the frequency with which a new biotechnology firm or startup establishes new relationships network structure indicates both where soci

international business cycles with endogenous incomplete markets backus kehoe and kydland 1992 baxter and crucini 1995 and stockman and tesar 1995 find two major discrepancies between standard international business cycle models with complete markets and the data in the models cross country correlations are much higher for consumption than for output while in the data the opposite is true and cross country correlations of employment and investment are negative while in the data they are positive this paper introduces a friction into a standard model that helps resolve these anomalies the friction is that international loans are imperfectly enforceable any country can renege on its debts and suffer the consequences for future borrowing to solve for equilibrium in this economy with endogenous incomplete markets the methods of marcet and marimon 1999 are extended incorporating the friction helps resolve the anomalies more than does exogenously restricting the assets that can be traded

monetary policy and welfare in a small open economy this paper analyzes optimal monetary policy in a small open economy featuring monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities it shows that the utility based loss function for this economy can be written as a quadratic expression of domestic inflation output gap and real exchange rate the presence of an internal monopolistic distortion and a terms of trade externality drives optimal policy away from domestic inflation targeting and affects the optimal level of exchange rate volatility when domestic and foreign goods are close substitutes for each other the optimal policy rule implies lower real exchange rate volatility than a domestic inflation targeting regime the reverse is true when the elasticity of substitution between goods is low

less fighting than expected experiments with wars of attrition and all pay auctions while all pay auctions are well researched experimentally we do not have much laboratory evidence on wars of attrition this paper tries to fill this gap technically there are only a few differences between wars of attrition and all pay auctions behaviorally however we find striking differences as many studies our experiment finds overbidding in all pay auctions in contrast in wars of attrition we observe systematic underbidding

inflation stabilization and welfare the case of a distorted steady state this paper considers the appropriate stabilization objectives for monetary policy in a microfounded model with staggered price setting rotemberg and woodford 1997 and woodford 2002 have shown that under certain conditions a local approximation to the expected utility of the representative household in a model of this kind is related inversely to the expected discounted value of a conventional quadratic loss function in which each period s loss is a weighted average of squared deviations of inflation and an output gap measure from their optimal values zero however those derivations rely on an assumption of the existence of an output or employment subsidy that offsets the distortion due to the market power of monopolistically competitive price setters so that the steady state under a zero inflation policy involves an efficient level of output here we show how to dispense with this unappealing assumption so that a valid linear quadratic approximation to the optimal policy problem is possible even when the steady state is distorted to an arbitrary extent allowing for tax distortions as well as market power and when as a consequence it is necessary to take account of the effects of stabilization policy on the average level of output we again obtain a welfare theoretic loss function that involves both inflation and an appropriately defined output gap though the degree of distortion of the steady state affects both the weights on the two stabilization objectives and the definition of the welfare relevant output gap in the light of these results we reconsider the conditions under which complete price stability is optimal and find that they are more restrictive in the case of a distorted steady state we also consider the conditions under which pure randomization of monetary policy can be welfare improving and find that this is possible in the case of a sufficiently distorted steady state though the parameter values required are probably not empirically realistic

uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price abstract we prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium for a general class of two player bidding games we apply our results to the first price auction the combination of first and second price auctions the war of attrition the all pay auction as well as combinations of the latter two auction forms we also treat the first price auction without risk neutrality our results deal with the asymmetric affiliated common values environment in the case where signals are independent our results apply to all equilibria when signals are not independent our uniqueness results hold in the class of nondecreasing strategy equilibria journal of economic literature classification number d44

designing targeting rules for international monetary policy cooperation this study analyzes a two country dynamic general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities monopolistic competition and producer currency pricing a quadratic approximation to the utility of the consumers is derived and assumed as the policy objective function of the policymakers it is shown that only under special conditions there are no gains from cooperation and moreover that the paths of the exchange rate and prices in the constrained efficient solution depend on the kind of disturbance that affects the economy it might be the case either for fixed or floating exchange rates despite this result simple targeting rules that involve only targets for the growth of output and for both domestic gdp and cpi inflation rates can replicate the cooperative allocation

welfare and macroeconomic interdependence we develop a baseline model of monetary and fiscal transmission in interdependent economies the welfare effects of expansionary policies are related to monopolistic supply in production and monopoly power of a country in trade an unanticipated exchange rate depreciation can be beggar thyself rather than beggar thy neighbor as gains in domestic output are offset by deteriorating terms of trade smaller and more open economies are more prone to suffer from inflationary shocks larger economies benefit from moderate demand led expansions but may be worse off if policy makers attempt to close the output gap fiscal shocks are generally beggar thy neighbor in the long run in the short run they raise domestic demand at given terms of trade thus reducing the welfare benefits from monetary expansions analytical tractability makes our model uniquely suitable as a starting point to approach the recent new open economy macroeconomic literature

endogenous network formation in patent contests and its role as a barrier to entry in a setting of r d co opetition we study by using an all pay auction approach how collaboration affects strategic decisions during a patent contest and how the latter influences the possible collaboration network structures the firms can hope to form the all pay auction approach allows us to 1 endogenize both network formation and r d intensities and 2 take heterogeneous and private valuations for patents into account we find that different from previous literature the complete network is not always the only pairwise stable network even and especially if the benefits from cooperating are important interestingly the other possible stable networks all have the realistic property that some firms decide not to participate in the contest thus weak cooperation through network formation can serve as a barrier to entry on the market for innovation we further show that there need not be any network that survives a well known refinement of pairwise stability strong stability which imposes networks to be immune to coalitional deviations

optimal fiscal and monetary policy equivalence results in this article we analyze the implications of price setting restrictions for the conduct of cyclical fiscal and monetary policy we consider standard monetary economies that differ in the price setting restrictions imposed on the firms we show that independently of the degree or type of price stickiness it is possible to implement the same efficient set of allocations and that each allocation in that set is implemented with policies that are also independent of the price stickiness in this sense environments with different price setting restrictions are equivalent

equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions there is a voluminous theoretical literature on sealed high bid auctions auctions in which bids are sealed and the high bidder pays his bid see for example vickrey 1961 myerson 1981 riley and samuelson 1981 milgrom and weber 1982 matthews 1983 maskin and riley 1984 holt 1980 cox smith and walker 1988 a critical property on which this literature relies is the existence of equilibrium in which buyers bidding strategies are monotonic in their types this enables the analyst to perform comparative statics as the distribution of types changes and to compare the welfare properties of the high bid auction with those of other auction institutions one case in which the existence of monotonic equilibrium is readily established is that in which buyers types are distributed smoothly independently and symmetrically in this case there exists a symmetric equilibrium one in which all bidders share the same bidding behaviour as a function of their valuations and this bid function is the solution to a first order differential equation

does exchange rate variability matter for welfare a quantitative investigation of stabilization policies abstract this paper studies what degree of exchange rate stabilization is optimal for several types of open economies this is accomplished through a quantitative evaluation of optimal monetary policy rules in a two country sticky price model first a calibrated benchmark model with incomplete asset markets supports past conclusions from simpler models emphasizing inflation stabilization rather than exchange rate stabilization it also highlights that the utility gains from optimal stabilization policy are small second while an economy extended to include consumer habits implies greater sensitivity by households to consumption variability it has only minor effects on the benchmark conclusions and benefits finally these conclusions are altered under an alternative environment where international asset markets exhibit asymmetry in the form of original sin such countries can benefit from policies that aggressively stabilize the exchange rate with utility gains larger than the previous cases

rigging the lobbying process an application of the all pay auction textabstractin a world where a politician can explicitly auction off a prize to the high bidder the standard auction literature can be used to analyse political behavior the justice system however precludes politicians from explicitly selling the prize to the highest bidder thus politicians cannot let it become public knowledge that they are in the business of selling political favors an institution has emerged in political markets to overcome this constraint which are termed as lobbying lobbyists make implicit payments to the politician through campaign contributions if these up front payments were rebated to those failing to receive the prize it would be clear that the politician was selling favors this article has examined an interesting principle arising in all pay auctions this principle states that a politician wishing to maximize political rents may find it in his best interest to exclude certain lobbyists from participating in the lobbying process particularly lobbyists valuing most the political prize

asymmetric all pay auctions with interdependent valuations abstract i show that a unique equilibrium exists in an asymmetric two player all pay auction with a discrete signal structure correlated signals and interdependent valuations the proof is constructive and the construction can be implemented as a computer program and be used to derive comparative statics i also characterize the set of equilibria when a reserve price is introduced

new concepts and trends in international r d organization abstract the globalization of markets the regionalization of technical and scientific expertise and the rapid change in technologies are forcing technology based companies to continuously adjust their r d organization our study of 33 companies reveals five different types of r d organization in multinational companies mnc we classified r d organizations according to the dispersion of r d activities and the degree of cooperation between individual r d units and identified the ethnocentric centralized the geocentric centralized the polycentric decentralized the r d hub and the integrated r d network organization five trends of organizational change among these forms of international r d organization were identified 1 stronger orientation of r d activities towards international markets and knowledge centers 2 establishment of tightly coordinated listening posts 3 strengthening and reinforcement of foreign r d sites 4 increased integration of decentralized r d units and 5 tighter coordination and recentralization of r d activities at fewer know how centers the search for the optimal balance between coordination and control is reflected by hybrid structures and intermediary configurations detected in some of the investigated companies since effective changes in behavioral orientation require considerable time successful quantum leaps in multinational r d organization are next to impossible

a tug of war team contest this paper analyzes a tug of war contest between two teams in each round of the tug of war a pair of agents from the opposing teams competes in a private value all pay auction with asymmetric value distributions and effort effectiveness whichever team arrives first at a given lead in terms of battle victories over the opponent wins the tug of war there exists a unique markov perfect equilibrium in bidding strategies which depend on the respective player s valuation and the current state of the tug of war we derive rich comparative statics for this equilibrium by using the fact that the state of the tug of war evolves according to a time homogeneous absorbing markov chain

patience persistence and welfare costs of incomplete markets in open economies abstract we investigate the welfare implications of alternative financial market structures in a two country endowment economy model we obtain an analytic expression for the expected lifetime utility of the representative household when sovereign bonds are the only internationally traded asset and we compare this welfare level with that obtained under complete asset markets the welfare cost of incomplete markets is negligible if agents are very patient and shocks are not very persistent but this cost is dramatically larger if agents are relatively impatient and shocks are highly persistent for realistic cases in which agents are very patient and shocks are highly persistent the welfare cost of incomplete markets is highly sensitive to the specific values of these parameters

monetary policy in the open economy revisited the case for exchange rate flexibility restored abstract this paper revisits the sticky price pricing to market model of devereux and engel devereux m b engel c 2003 monetary policy in the open economy revisited price setting and exchange rate flexibility review of economic studies 70 4 765 783 in which fixed exchange rates are optimal even in the face of country specific nonmonetary shocks we show that this result hinges critically on the devereux engel model s prediction that international consumption levels are perfectly synchronized under flexible prices realistic modifications of the model that produce nonsynchronous consumption movements such as the presence of nontraded goods upset the fixed exchange rate prescription even in the absence of an expenditure switching role of exchange rate changes

multi stage sequential all pay auctions abstract we study multi stage sequential all pay contests auctions where heterogeneous contestants are privately informed about a parameter ability that affects their cost of effort we characterize the perfect bayesian equilibrium of these contests and analyze the effect of the number of contestants and their types on the contestants expected highest effort

inflation targeting should it be modeled as an instrument rule or a targeting rule abstract the paper discusses how current inflation targeting should be modeled and argues that it is better represented as a commitment to a targeting rule a rule specifying operational objectives for monetary policy or a condition for the target variables than as a commitment to a simple instrument rule like a taylor rule

all pay contests this paper studies a class of games all pay contests which capture general asymmetries and sunk investments inherent in scenarios such as lobbying competition for market power labor market tournaments and r d races players compete for one of several identical prizes by choosing a score conditional on winning or losing it is weakly better to do so with a lower score this formulation allows for differing production technologies costs of capital prior investments attitudes toward risk and conditional and unconditional investments among others i provide a closed form formula for players equilibrium payoffs and analyze player participation a special case of contests is multiprize complete information all pay auctions

optimal prize structures in elimination contests abstract we consider multi stage elimination contests where agents efforts at different stages generate some output for the principal depending on the output function various prize structures can be optimal if the output function depends much more on efforts applied at later stages than on those applied at the earlier ones the optimal prize structure can be non monotone that is at some stages prizes fall and the agents who are more successful may earn less necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimality of such structures are provided we also show that for any increasing prize shape there exists an output function such that this prize shape is optimal further we consider the case of limited liability where the principal is not allowed to use negative prizes but can choose a contest success function csf there is always an efficient equilibrium under which the principal is able to extract the full surplus from the agents and the corresponding optimal prize structure is always increasing moreover under some plausible assumptions the optimal csf is necessary convex which corresponds to the most frequently used prize schemes in practice

incomplete pass through and the welfare effects of exchange rate variability abstract this paper considers the implications of incomplete exchange rate pass through for optimal monetary and exchange rate policy a two country model is presented which allows an explicit derivation of welfare functions in terms of a weighted sum of the second moments of producer prices and the nominal exchange rate from a single country perspective the optimal exchange rate variance depends on the degree of pass through the size and openness of the economy the elasticity of labour supply and the volatility of foreign producer prices welfare may be decreasing or increasing in the volatility of the exchange rate

the new open economy macroeconomics a survey since the 1995 publication of obsteld and rogoff s redux model there has been an outpouring of research on open economy dynamic general equilibrium models that incorporate imperfect competition and nominal rigidities this paper offers an interim survey of this recent literature 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

international dimensions of optimal monetary policy abstract this paper provides a baseline general equilibrium model of optimal monetary policy among interdependent economies with monopolistic firms and nominal rigidities an inward looking policy of domestic price stabilization is not optimal when firms markups are exposed to currency fluctuations such a policy raises exchange rate volatility leading foreign exporters to charge higher prices vis a vis increased uncertainty in the export market as higher import prices reduce the purchasing power of domestic consumers optimal monetary rules trade off a larger domestic output gap against lower consumer prices optimal rules in a world nash equilibrium lead to less exchange rate volatility relative to both inward looking rules and discretionary policies even when the latter do not suffer from any inflationary or deflationary bias gains from international monetary cooperation are related in a non monotonic way to the degree of exchange rate pass through

first price auctions in the asymmetric n bidder case i consider the first price auction when the bidders valuations may be differently distributed i show that every bayesian equilibrium is an essentially pure equilibrium formed by bid functions whose inverses are solutions of a system of differential equations with boundary conditions i then prove the existence of an equilibrium i prove its uniqueness when the valuation distributions have a mass point at the lower extremity of the support i give sufficient conditions for uniqueness when every valuation distribution is one of two atomless distributions i establish inequalities between equilibrium strategies when relations of stochastic dominance exist between valuation distributions

optimal monetary policy optimal monetary policy maximizes the welfare of a representative agent given frictions in the economic environment constructing a model with two sets of frictions costly price adjustment by imperfectly competitive firms and costly exchange of wealth for goods we find optimal monetary policy is governed by two familiar principles first the average level of the nominal interest rate should be sufficiently low as suggested by milton friedman that there should be deflation on average yet the keynesian frictions imply that the optimal nominal interest rate is positive second as various shocks occur to the real and monetary sectors the price level should be largely stabilized as suggested by irving fisher albeit around a deflationary trend path since expected inflation is roughly constant through time the nominal interest rate must therefore vary with the fisherian determinants of the real interest rate although the monetary authority has substantial leverage over real activity in our model economy it chooses real allocations that closely resemble those which would occur if prices were flexible in our benchmark model there is some tendency for the monetary authority to smooth nominal and real interest rates

what is wrong with taylor rules using judgment in monetary policy through targeting rules it is argued that inflation targeting is best understood as a commitment to a targeting rule rather than an instrument rule e ither ageneral targeting rule explicit objectives for monetary policy or a specific targeting rule a criterion for the forecasts of the target variables to be fulfilled essentially the equality of the marginal rates of transformation and substitution between the target variables targeting rules allow the use of judgment and extramodel information are more robust and easier to verify than optimal instrument rules and they can nevertheless bring the economy close to the socially optimal equilibrium

all pay auctions and group size grading on a curve and other applications we model contests with a fixed proportion of prizes such as a grading curve as all pay auctions where higher effort weakly increases the likelihood of a prize we find theoretical predictions for the heterogeneous effect auction size has on effort from high and low types we test our predictions in a laboratory experiment that compares behavior in two bidder one prize auctions with behavior in 20 bidder 10 prize auctions we find a statistically significant 11 8 increase in aggregate bidding when moving from the small to large auction the impact is heterogeneous as the auction size increases low types decrease effort but high types increase effort additionally the larger auction provides a stronger rank correlation between effort and ability awarding more prizes to the higher skilled and improving the efficiency of prize allocation

contests with three or more heterogeneous agents abstract we study monotone equilibrium behavior in contests with observable effort bid where three or more participants have distinct risk attitudes and the monetary value for the prize of each is drawn independently from a distinct distribution these differences can either cause a player to drop out that is always choose zero effort regardless of his valuation or use all or nothing strategies with discontinuous effort choice neither complete drop out nor discontinuous bidding with finitely many gaps is consistent with pure strategy monotone bayesian nash equilibrium in a contest with either ex ante identical players or only two distinct participants

behavior in all pay auctions with incomplete information abstract this paper analyzes the behavior of single unit all pay auctions within the independent private values environment in the laboratory we study revenue individual bidding behavior and efficiency in relation to theoretical benchmarks and to a similar study of winner pay first price sealed bid auctions we conclude that the all pay auction yields significantly higher revenue than both the risk neutral bayesian equilibrium and the winner pay auction bidders decisions move closer to equilibrium levels over time in the auction

performance in competitive environments gender differences even though the provision of equal opportunities for men and women has been a priority in many countries large gender differences prevail in competitive high ranking positions suggested explanations include discrimination and differences in preferences and human capital in this paper we present experimental evidence in support of an additional factor women may be less effective than men in competitive environments even if they are able to perform similarly in non competitive environments in a laboratory experiment we observe as we increase the competitiveness of the environment a significant increase in performance for men but not for women this results in a significant gender gap in performance in tournaments while there is no gap when participants are paid according to piece rate this effect is stronger when women have to compete against men than in single sex competitive environments this suggests that women may be able to perform in competitive environments per se

an analysis of the war of attrition and the all pay auction we study the war of attrition and the all pay auction when players signals are affiliated and symmetrically distributed we a find sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric monotonic equilibrium bidding strategies and b examine the performance of these auction forms in terms of the expected revenue accruing to the seller under our conditions the war of attrition raises greater expected revenue than all other known sealed bid auction forms journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 d82 1997 academic press

ex post unbalanced tournaments tournaments create strong incentives under the assumption that the competition between the agents is balanced if at the outset one agent is stronger than the other the tournament is ex ante unbalanced and incentives break down handicaps can in this case restore incentives in practice competing agents are often overall equally strong but have different sorts of strengths then competition will typically be unbalanced ex post and incentives break down but handicaps cannot be used we show how a simple means introducing the possibility of a tie can often resolve the problem we examine under what conditions incentives are maximized by ties