an r d race with knowledge accumulation i develop a model of an r d race with knowledge accumulation my model does not inherit the memorylessness property of the exponential distribution that troubles existing models of r d races hence firms knowledge stocks are no longer irrelevant to their behavior during the r d race and knowledge accumulation has strategic implications in this more general setting i obtain results that stand in marked contrast to the previous literature in particular under some conditions the firm that is behind in the race engages in catch up behavior this pattern of strategic interactions action reaction is consistent with empirical research copyright 2003 by the rand corporation

industry and firm specific factors of innovation novelty this article investigates the underlying factors that might shape the firm s choices with respect to degrees of innovation novelty using a sample of 2983 firms observed under the portuguese community innovation survey we assess the relative relevance of a set of firm and industry specific factors in explaining firms choices about incremental or radical innovation the results indicate that both the firm s idiosyncratic historical factors giving rise to heterogeneous r d capabilities and the industry context have power to shape the firm s innovation choices even though firm specific factors appear to be more powerful the estimated impacts on firm s innovation novelty are nonetheless significantly moderated by the type of firm and industry

reputation and entry deterrence under short run ownership of a firm abstract this paper discusses the role of the changing ownership of a long run firm facing a sequence of potential entrants to its market when there is uncertainty about the firm s type about its cost of taking an aggressive action that is observed only by the current owner it is shown that there exists an equilibrium in which each generation of owners takes the same aggressive action to deter entry regardless of the type under a natural refinement of equilibrium beliefs the path induced by this pooling equilibrium is shown to be unique the results sharply contrast with the case of long run ownership where for the same discount factor the firm s owner separates his actions depending on the type of the firm so that the high coat firm allows entry every period while the low cost firm plays aggressively every period consequently the value of the high cost firm is shown to be strictly higher under short run ownership than under long run ownership journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 l13

innovation threats and strategic responses in oligopoly markets this paper deals with the strategic reaction of firms to competitive threats stemming from newly developed products of actual competitors product innovation projects go through multiple time consuming stages with several continuation termination decisions hence competitors can react to the threat before the new product is introduced and thereby may prevent or facilitate the product s introduction we consider a duopoly model where firm 1 can start a two stage product innovation project for obtaining a horizontally and vertically differentiated product in between the two stages firm 2 can react by making an investment that improves the competitive position of the current product we find that under weak vertical differentiation firm 2 wants firm 1 to innovate horizontal differentiation softens competition and firm 2 over invests to induce firm 1 to launch the new product second under strong vertical differentiation firm 1 starts the product innovation project triggering under investment by firm 2 but never finishes it the under investment makes firm 2 a weaker competitor which induces firm 1 not to innovate third under very strong vertical differentiation firm 2 prevents a launch of the new product by over investing this results in a strong competitive position of firm 2 it therefore captures such a big market share that firm 1 will not introduce the new product the situation of firm 1 in the old market has worsened the option to complete the innovation created by initiating the first stage of the innovation project has a negative value for firm 1

demand signalling and screening in channels of distribution this paper examines two ways channel members at the manufacturing and retail ends deal with asymmetric information in the context of new product introduction a manufacturer who has private information that demand for a new product will be high can differentiate itself from a manufacturer less confident of demand by undertaking high levels of pre launch advertising and offering a high wholesale price a retailer for its part can screen potentially high demand from potentially low demand products by stipulating a take it or leave it slotting allowance the assumption being that the offer will be accepted only by manufacturers confident of sufficient demand to recover the high initial cost of slotting allowances it is shown that manufacturers prefer to signal demand through advance advertising and wholesale price retailers to screen demand through slotting allowances it is shown that unless advance advertising is sufficiently effective slotting allowances yield higher total channel profits and higher social welfare

a postponement model for demand management in this paper we analyze demand postponement as a strategy to handle potential demand surges under demand postponement a fraction of the demands from the regular period are postponed and satisfied during a postponement period this permits capacity to be procured to satisfy the postponed demands a reimbursement per unit is paid to customers whose demands are postponed the basic idea is that by preempting stockouts through demand postponement we can reduce overall stockout costs we formulate and solve a two stage capacity planning problem under demand postponement we propose a power range class of distributions to capture the nature of demand surges we establish the scalability and conjugate properties of the power range distributions under demand postponement which leads to a tractable analysis of the problem we analytically solve the problem of determining the optimal regular and postponement period capacities and the demand splitting rule to minimize the supplier s expected cost we show that a the value of postponement may be significant depending on cost and demand parameters b a postponement strategy may lead to reduced investment in initial capacity and c it may be optimal to do no demand postponement over a range of demands even after observing a higher demand signal we then relax several model assumptions and provide results for these extensions we conclude with managerial insights

weak entrants are welcome abstract this paper investigates the decision problem of an incumbent firm confronted by both a weak and strong entrant in a differentiated market suppose that the incumbent can deter entry of the weak firm but cannot deter entry of the strong firm by itself then the incumbent may allow entry of the weak firm and use it to alter the strong firm s entry decision the present paper formalizes this idea and it sheds new light on the fact that domestic firms are sometimes able to block strong foreign firms after trade liberalization the idea also explains why a dominant firm lets fringe firms be in the market

a bargaining model for a first time interaction under asymmetric beliefs of supply reliability we consider the case of a first time interaction between a buyer and a supplier who is unreliable in delivery the supplier declares her estimate of the ability to meet the order obligations but the buyer may have a different estimate which may be higher or lower than the suppliers estimate we derive the nash bargaining solution and discuss the role of using a down payment or nondelivery penalty in the contract for the case of buyer overtrust the down payment contract maximizes channel profits when the suppliers estimate is public information if the suppliers estimate is private information a nonsymmetric contract is shown to be efficient and incentive compatible for the case of buyer undertrust the contract structure is quite different as both players choose not to include down payments in the contract when delivery estimates are public information a nondelivery penalty contract is able to maximize channel profits if the buyer uses the suppliers estimate in making the ordering decision if estimates are private information channel profits are maximized only if the true estimates of both players are not far part we also discuss the effect of different risk profiles on the nature of the bargaining solution in three extensions of the model we consider the following variants of the basic problem first we analyze the effect of early versus late negotiation on the bargaining solution then we study the case of endogenous supply reliability and finally for the case of repeated interactions we discuss the impact of updating delivery estimates on the order quantity and negotiated prices of future orders

securitization and lending competition we study the eects of securitization on interbank lending competition when banks see private signals of local applicants repayment chances if banks cannot securitize the outcome is e cient they lend to their most creditworthy local applicants with securitization banks lend also to remote applicants with strong observables in order to lessen the lemons problem they face in selling their securities this reliance on observables is ine cient raises the mean default risk and may lead to a deceptive rise in credit scores

target market selection and marketing effort under uncertainty the selective newsvendor abstract we consider a firm that markets procures and delivers a good with a single selling season in a number of different markets the price for the good is market dependent and each market has an associated demand distribution with parameters that depend on the amount of marketing effort applied given long procurement lead times the firm must decide which markets it will serve prior to procuring the good we develop a profit maximizing model to address the firm s integrated market selection marketing effort and procurement decisions the model implicitly accounts for inventory pooling across markets which reduces safety stock costs but increases model complexity the resulting model is a nonlinear integer optimization problem for which we develop specialized solution methods for the case in which budget constraints exist we provide a novel solution approach that uses a tailored branch and bound algorithm our approach solves a broad range of 3000 test instances in an average of less than 2 seconds significantly outperforming a leading commercial global optimization solver

informative advertising and entry deterrence a bertrand model abstract this paper shows that strategic entry deterrence via informative advertising is impossible in a game of sequential advertising followed by simultaneous price setting in a homogenous product market it contrasts schmalensee s journal of political economy 91 1983 636 653 result that when the strategic variables at the post advertising stage are quantities not prices optimal entry deterrence is possible and involves underinvestment in advertising

entry deterrence and innovation in durable goods monopoly this paper investigates the efficiency of innovation investments in a durable goods monopoly when a potential entrant threatens to innovate as well we show that the durability of the good endows the monopolist with the power to discourage rival innovation since current sales alter the demand for a new generation of the good the equilibrium is therefore determined not only by competitive pressure due to time inconsistency but also by the incumbent s concern for maintaining the technological leadership we demonstrate that entry deterrence followed by no innovation always implies underinvestment in innovation

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

a multiproduct dynamic pricing problem and its applications to network yield management a firm has inventories of a set of components that are used to produce a set of products there is a finite horizon over which the firm can sell its products demand for each product is a stochastic point process with an intensity that is a function of the vector of prices for the products and the time at which these prices are offered the problem is to price the finished products so as to maximize total expected revenue over the finite sales horizon an upper bound on the optimal expected revenue is established by analyzing a deterministic version of the problem the solution to the deterministic problem suggests two heuristics for the stochastic problem that are shown to be asymptotically optimal as the expected sales volume tends to infinity several applications of the model to network yield management are given numerical examples illustrate both the range of problems that can be modeled under this framework and the effectiveness of the proposed heuristics the results provide several fundamental insights into the performance of yield management systems

industry structure with sequential technology choice abstract noncooperative entry deterrence arises in a market where firms enter sequentially and irreversibly choose a technology in the case of delegated entry deterrence the earliest firms enter with a normal technology and pass on entry deterrence responsibilities to subsequent entrants in the case of partial entry deterrence the earlliest firms choose an inferior technology that allows some but not full entry of later firms with a normal technology in both cases entry is deterred in that the equilibrium number of firms is smaller than would prevail if all firms were to choose a normal technology

optimal r d investment strategies under the threat of new technology entry abstract this paper studies the r d investment decisions of a firm facing the threat of new technology entry the r d project is subject to technical uncertainty the incumbent can successfully prevent entry by innovating however in an entry deterrence situation the resulting monopoly is different from a monopoly without an entry threat because potential competition means that the monopolist completes the r d project which it otherwise would not have done greater technical uncertainty stimulates initiating exploratory r d and can result in implementation of more expensive research projects this is a result of the limited downside risk of the project it does not matter whether the outcome of an initial r d stage is disappointing or very disappointing since in both cases the firm will simply abandon the project the welfare analysis shows that the threat of entry may reduce welfare in case of entry deterrence

advertising and limit pricing we enrich milgrom and roberts 1982 limit pricing model to allow an incumbent to signal his costs with both price and advertisements our fundamental result is that a cost reducing distortion occurs in that the incumbent behaves as if there were complete information but his costs were lower than they are preentry price is therefore distorted downward and demand enhancing advertising is distorted upward as a consequence of signalling if advertising is a purely dissipative signal it is not used nor therefore distorted recent refinements of the sequential equilibrium concept are featured

advertising and prices as signals of quality in a regime of price rivalry abstract this paper addresses the issue of whether firms use price or advertising to signal quality and whether advertising has pro or anti competitive effects we show that when there is price rivalry advertising may be necessary to signal quality in contrast to single firm models signaling through price alone prevails for sufficient inter brand quality differentials joint price advertising signals prevail when the quality differential is small finally advertising in the form of variable rather than fixed costs is shown to increase the feasibility of signaling quality

can poorly informed regulators hinder competition this paper considers an entry deterrence game in which environmental policy is set without perfectly observing the incumbent firm s costs we investigate if regulators who can have an informational advantage relative to the potential entrant support entry deterring practices the paper demonstrates that while entry deterring equilibria only emerge under restrictive conditions when the regulator is perfectly informed these equilibria arise under larger settings as he becomes uninformed furthermore we show that the regulator is willing to support the incumbent s entry deterring practices regardless of his degree of information if entry costs are sufficiently high however when entry costs are lower the regulator only sustains this type of practices if he is poorly informed

a patent race in a real options setting investment strategy valuation capm beta and return volatility abstract in this paper we study financial properties of r d intensive firms through a continuous time real options patent race model numerical analysis in this study shows that intense competition drives a firm to invest more aggressively which then pushes up its cost of capital and return volatility while introducing negative return correlation with its competitor furthermore we find that a firm s position in competition has important impacts on its financial properties for instance a firm s cost of capital is a non monotonic function of its relative position in the race in addition the relationship between cash flow uncertainty and investment can be negative when a firm is far ahead or far behind or positive when firms are close in the race

revenue management approach to stochastic capacity allocation problem abstract to formulate stochastic capacity allocation problems in a manufacturing system the concept and techniques of revenue management is applied in this research it is assumed the production capacity is stochastic and hence its exact size cannot be forecasted in advance at the time of planning there are two classes of frequent and occasional customers demanding this capacity the price rate as well as the penalty for order cancellation caused by overbooking is different for each class the model is developed mathematically and we propose an analytical solution method the properties of the optimal solution as well as the behavior of objective function are also analyzed the objective function is not concave in general however we prove it is a unimodal function and by taking advantage of this property the optimal solution is determined

dynamic capacity allocation to customers who remember past service we study the problem faced by a supplier deciding how to dynamically allocate limited capacity among a portfolio of customers who remember the fill rates provided to them in the past a customer s order quantity is positively correlated with past fill rates customers differ from one another in their contribution margins their sensitivities to the past and in their demand volatilities by analyzing and comparing policies that ignore goodwill with ones that account for it we investigate when and how customer memory effects impact supplier profits we develop an approximate dynamic programming policy that dynamically rationalizes the fill rates the firm provides to each customer this policy achieves higher rewards than margin greedy and lagrangian policies and yields insights into how a supplier can effectively manage customer memories to its advantage this paper was accepted by martin lariviere operations management

monetary policy delegation and polarisation there is by now a comprehensive literature beginning with rogoff 1985 arguing that a government should delegate monetary policy to a central banker who is independent and more conservative than the government itself this will reduce the inflationary bias typically at the cost of stabilisation for a democratic society this result would suggest that the median voter should prefer that monetary policy is delegated to an independent central banker who is more conservative than herself typically the central banker is chosen by the government and the government is chosen by the electorate thus there is some albeit perhaps a weak link between the preferences of the electorate and the central banker although the central banker presumably should be chosen for a long period of time waller and walsh 1996 he has to be chosen at some point in time this paper contains a political economy model where the central issue in politics is the choice of central banker and

oligopoly limit pricing strategic substitutes strategic complements abstract conditions are outlined under which it is a sequential equilibrium for firms to forgo current profit to reduce the likelihood of entry if firms are uncertain about rivals costs the assumptions about out of equilibrium beliefs that sustain such equilibria are more plausible if firms produce strategic substitutes than if firms produce strategic complements

optimal export policy in the presence of informational barriers to entry and imperfect competition abstract this paper examines government intervention to help exporters overcome informational barriers to entry into foreign markets foreign consumers know the quality of a local good but not that of the imported substitute an exporter who chooses high quality needs to signal this choice to foreign consumers via a high introductory price export policy affects both the signaling distortion and competition between exporter and incumbent the signaling distortion may call for an export subsidy competition for an export tax which policy is adopted in equilibrium depends on industry characteristics over time the export tax tends to rise as the signaling distortion disappears

impact of product pricing and timing of investment decisions on supply chain co opetition abstract in supply chain co opetition firms simultaneously compete and co operate in order to maximize their profits we consider the nature of co opetition between two firms the product supplier invests in the technology to improve quality and the purchasing firm buyer invests in selling effort to develop the market for the product before uncertainty in demand is resolved we consider three different decision making structures and discuss the optimal configuration from each firm s perspective in case 1 the supplier invests in product quality and sets the wholesale price for the product the buyer then exerts selling effort to develop the market and following demand potential realization sets the resale price in case 2 the supplier invests in product quality followed by the buyer s investment in selling effort then after demand potential is observed the supplier sets the wholesale price and the buyer sets the resale price finally in case 3 both firms simultaneously invest in product quality and selling effort respectively subsequently observing the demand potential the supplier sets the wholesale price and the buyer sets the resale price we compare all configuration options from both the perspective of the supplier and the buyer and show that the level of investment by the firms depends on the nature of competition between them and the level of uncertainty in demand our analysis reveals that although configuration 1 results in the highest profits for the integrated channel there is no clear dominating preference on system configuration from the perspective of both parties the incentives of the co opetition partners and the investment levels are mainly governed by the cost structure and the level of uncertainty in demand we examine and discuss the relation between system parameters and the incentives in desiging the supply contract structure

preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly this article takes a different tack and inquires whether institutions such as the patent system create opportunities for firms with monopoly power to maintain their monopoly power the results apply to other situations such as brand identification spatial location and capacity expansion which share the characteristic that early or preemptive actions may lower the returns to potential competitors

price and lead time quotation for contract and spot customers we study price and lead time quotation decisions in a make to order system with two customer classes 1 contract customers whose orders are practically always accepted and fulfilled based on a contract price and lead time agreed on at the beginning of the time horizon and 2 spot purchasers who arrive over time and are quoted a price and lead time pair dynamically the objective is to maximize the long run expected average profit per unit time where profit from a customer is defined as revenues minus lateness penalties incurred because of lead time violations we model the dynamic quotation problem of the spot purchasers as an infinite horizon markov decision process given a fixed price and lead time for contract customers we analyze the impact of customer preferences e g price and lead time sensitivity on the optimal price and lead time decisions for spot purchasers and characterize the optimal policy we explore the benefits of dynamic quotation compared to the use of fixed price and lead tim

competition and confidentiality signaling quality in a duopoly when there is universal private information abstract we model non cooperative signaling by two firms that compete over a continuum of consumers assuming each consumer has private information about the intensity of her preferences for the firms respective products and each firm has private information about its own product s quality we characterize a symmetric separating equilibrium in which each firm s price reveals its respective product quality we show that the equilibrium prices the difference between those prices the associated outputs and profits are all increasing functions of the ex ante probability of high safety if horizontal product differentiation is sufficiently great then equilibrium prices and profits are higher under incomplete information about quality than if quality were commonly known thus while signaling imposes a distortionary loss on a monopolist using price to signal quality duopolists may benefit from the distortion as it can reduce competition finally average quality is lower since signaling quality redistributes demand towards low quality firms

a taxonomy and research overview of perishable asset revenue management yield management overbooking and pricing this paper proposes the term perishable asset revenue management to denote the field that combines the areas of yield management overbooking and pricing for perishable assets after summarizing the characteristics common to problems in this field the paper discusses the objectives and constraints faced by decision makers then it offers a comprehensive taxonomy with 14 different elements and reviews the research that has been done related to each element finally it suggests some important areas of future research that can help bridge the gap between theory and application

strategic wholesale pricing in a supply chain with a potential entrant this paper develops an adverse selection model for a two stage supply chain with one supplier one retailer and a potential outside entrant supplier who makes a partially substitutable product the work is different from most research on entry deterrence that only considers a single stage model our main interest is to investigate how the incumbent supplier can strategically maximize her profit by a wholesale pricing policy when facing the potential entrant we focus on a model where the entrant supplier will sell her product through the same incumbent retailer we derive the optimal decisions for each player and study the comparative statics of the equilibrium to investigate how the supply chain structure may affect the deterrence strategy of the incumbent supplier we also consider three alternative models with different channel structures when both suppliers sell their products directly when the entrant has another independent retailer and when the entrant sells her product directly through the comparison we find that the existence of the common downstream retailer often enhances the deterring motivation of the incumbent supplier

risk sharing and information revelation mechanism of a one manufacturer and one retailer supply chain facing an integrated competitor this paper develops an information revelation mechanism model of a one manufacturer and one retailer supply chain facing an outside integrated competitor under demand uncertainty we investigate how the manufacturer designs a wholesale price order quantity contract to induce the retailer to report his risk sensitivity information truthfully we try to explore the effects of the outside competitor and the risk sharing rule on the optimal price service level decisions of the retailer and the optimal wholesale prices of the manufacturer we find that the strategic interaction plays an important role in the effect of risk sensitivity on the order quantity for the retailer when the fraction of the risk cost shared by the manufacturer is sufficiently large small the optimal wholesale price for the high risk averse retailer is higher lower than that for the low risk averse retailer

not just the great contraction friedman and schwartz s a monetary history of the united states 1867 to 1960 milton friedman and anna j schwartz published a monetary history of the united states 1867 to 1960 with princeton university press in 1963 to critical acclaim since then the book s reputation has grown and it clearly has become one of the most influential volumes in economics in the twentieth century in this paper we document the extraordinary impact of a monetary history and argue that the key to this success was the use of the narrative approach to the problem of identifying the effects of monetary policy on economic activity

the cost and technological structure of aluminium smelters worldwide a cost model is developed for the estimation of several technological parameters describing the production process of aluminium smelters worldwide the model is similar to baltagi and griffin s 1988 but instead of estimating technological change using a panel data set of firms we estimate among other things the vintage effect using a cross section of aluminium smelters in operation throughout 1994 the vintage effect is defined as the variable cost differential that may be attributed to the utilization of a specific technical vintage in the production of aluminium in relation to another other technological measurements are also discussed the scale effect or returns to scale and technological characteristic effects i e the variable cost elasticities with respect to pot size and current intensity the results show that considerable cost reductions may be expected from the change of old technical vintages to more recent ones also results show that for a majority of smelters in the sample returns to scale seem to be exhausted finally variable costs are very sensitive to pot size in the sense that large cost reductions can be expected from the increase in pot size an important characteristic of the technology used by smelters copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

sunk costs entry deterrence and financial constraints this paper studies how sunk costs affect a financially constrained incumbent s ability to deter entry into its market sunk costs make it less attractive to the incumbent to accommodate entry by liquidating assets in place and exiting the market this may render entry by a prospective rival unprofitable and thereby facilitate entry deterrence however sunk costs also make it harder for the incumbent to pledge valuable collateral to outside investors to make up for the poor collateral value the incumbent will have to give stronger liquidation rights to its lenders consequently a larger fraction of the incumbent s assets will be liquidated in the event of a liquidity default this potentially creates room for profitable entry the overall effect of sunk costs on the incumbent s ability to deter entry into its market is thus ambiguous

location choice product proliferation and entry deterrence within a slightly modified version of hotelling s model we reconsider the claim that the threat of entry induces existing firms to produce a larger number of products than they would otherwise we show that entry deterrence although optimal need not be achieved through product proliferation in some cases the incumbent monopolist resorts to an entry deterring strategy based on location choice rather than product proliferation we also show that in some cases the number of products chosen by the incumbent facing the threat of entry is strictly greater than the minimum number required to deter entry

oligopoly limit pricing we expand milgrom and roberts 1982 limit pricing model to allow for multiple incumbents each incumbent is informed as to the level of an industry cost parameter and selects a preentry price while a single entrant observes each incumbent s preentry price we find that incumbents are unable to coordinate deception which results in a separating equilibrium in which preentry prices are not distorted further introducing the refinement of unprejudiced beliefs we show that the no distortion equilibrium is the only refined separating equilibrium plausible pooling equilibria fail to exist or involve downward distortions in preentry prices

the insurance is the lemon failing to index contracts we model the widespread failure of contracts to share risk using available indices a borrower and lender can share risk by conditioning repayments on an index the lender has private information about the ability of this index to measure the true state that the borrower would like to hedge the lender is risk averse and thus requires a premium to insure the borrower the borrower however might be paying something for nothing if the index is a poor measure of the true state we provide sufficient conditions for this effect to cause the borrower to choose a nonindexed contract instead

public technology transfer commercialization and business growth abstract this study analyzes the conditions for the commercialization of public technologies transferred to the private sector and the subsequent effect on business growth we focus on the commercial exploitation of technologies transferred by universities and public research institutes u pris to companies the empirical analysis uses detailed information regarding an extensive set of actual instances of public private technology transfer in korea 514 cases of technologies transferred by 43 major u pris to highlight the role of company absorptive capacity and internal innovation capabilities cooperation with u pris and the intensity of market competition in determining commercialization success and business growth we find that the intensity of market competition significantly influenced the paths along which absorptive capacity and internal innovation capacity affected successful commercialization and successful commercialization in turn affected business growth effective partnership is a key factor of the successful commercialization of transferred technologies irrespective of market situations absorptive capacity contributes to their short term success and long term growth when market competition is strong

signalling and entry deterrence a multidimensional analysis i consider whether a privately informed incumbent can use limit pricing and upward distortions in advertising to deter profitable entry profitable entry is not deterred when the incumbent is privately informed only about its cost type profitable entry may be deterred however if the incumbent is privately informed about its cost type and its patience level an equilibrium foundation is thus provided for the traditional hypothesis that limit pricing and aggressive advertising by an incumbent may deter profitable entry at a methodological level the article contributes by characterizing the refined equilibria of a signalling model with multiple dimensions of private information and multiple signals

dynamic entry deterrence in the uk pathology services market this paper describes work on a dynamic model of entry deterrence applied to the uk national health service nhs market for pathology services the model based on a game theoretical framework is concerned with decision support applications presented in this paper is a case study analysis of a geographical region in which a provider of pathology services is concerned at the prospect of being exposed to competition from a new entrant the incumbent provider may undertake strategic investments to create a stock of knowledge and goodwill with the intention of dissuading others from entering the market the effect of a new entrant is modelled as perturbation of a pre existing stable nash cournot equilibrium in an oligopolistic market and is influenced by market forces subject to government regulation the original contribution of this study is to identify the nature of these potential strategic investments and their interaction with cash flows recent historical data and managerial analysis are used to characterise market growth an estimate of the incumbent provider s market share which is at risk can be found by examining the local geographical distribution of providers and purchasers of pathology services on the basis of this analysis we propose a method for obtaining the strategic investment profile which minimises the total investment required to deter entry

cross market network effect with asymmetric customer loyalty implications for competitive advantage a cross market network effect exists in many industries e g newspaper publishing media software in which a seller sells both a primary and a secondary product e g a newspaper publisher sells newspapers to readers and advertising space to advertisers and the value of the secondary product depends on the size of the user base of the primary product this paper examines the competitive implications of asymmetric customer loyalty in such markets in traditional markets an advantage in customer loyalty generates a profit advantage we show here however that in the presence of a cross market network effect a midlevel of loyalty advantage in the primary product market can lead to an overall profit disadvantage this surprising result is derived from the interdependence of the two markets whereby a profit in one market may be gained at the cost of the other and by the positive relationship between a larger loyalty segment and a higher opportunity cost of price competition in the product of the primary market extending our model to a two period entry game also shows that under certain conditions the entrant with disadvantage in customer loyalty can outperform the incumbent in profit and market share this result suggests that asymmetry in customer loyalty can be a source of first mover advantage or disadvantage

flexible supply contracts under price uncertainty abstract this article develops supply contracts covering environments with changing prices we investigate characterization properties of the price processes while considering costs and discount factors we determine expressions of the contract s expected low price and its second moment for a given horizon we then employ these expected price and second moment values to identify an expected optimum time before the contract expires at which the lowest price occurs simulation experiments verify our analysis and they illustrate how the optimum purchase time decreases as the drift term increases

heterogeneous or homogeneous quantity competition abstract every homogeneous goods cournot model is payoff equivalent to a heterogeneous goods model we characterize when the converse is true for linearly separable and multiplicatively separable models these results have implications that blur the distinction between process and product innovations

pricing strategy quality signaling and entry deterrence abstract i investigate a pricing strategy that is aimed at deterring entry by applying a two period model of a durable goods monopolist there exists an incumbent that is of two types that is high and low quality types they differ in terms of their r d capabilities and the incumbent s type is assumed to be unknown to an entrant if the entrant decided to enter the market nash bertrand price competition ensues between the incumbent and the entrant i show that not only limit pricing but also prestige pricing signals the incumbent s quality type which serves to discourage entry in the prestige pricing the high quality type sells the products at an intentionally higher price i also show that although limit pricing is more desirable than prestige pricing from a social welfare viewpoint the incumbent can still choose prestige pricing

review of a history of the federal reserve volume i 2003 by allan h meltzer abstract this is a book review of a history of the federal reserve volume i 2003 by allan h meltzer

when does environmental regulation facilitate entry deterring practices abstract this paper evaluates the welfare benefits of introducing environmental regulation in a market that is subject to the threat of entry we consider complete and incomplete information settings where potential entrants use the regulator s tax policy and the incumbent s output decisions in order to infer the incumbent s cost structure when the regulator is absent we show that firms entry deterring practices increase pollution relative to complete information hence under certain conditions environmental regulation becomes more beneficial in incomplete than in complete information contexts our results therefore identify under which cases an under or over estimation of the welfare benefits of environmental regulation arises from ignoring the information setting in which firms interact we also examine how this estimation error increases as firms become more symmetric in their production costs

entry deterrence and signaling in markets for search goods abstract this paper studies entry in markets for search goods signaling through prices is studied both when an entrant s quality is private information and when it is common knowledge to the entrant and incumbent when consumers visit a store they are assumed to observe quality and have the option of continuing to search but at a cost when search costs are low an entrant can signal high quality by setting a sufficiently high price so that consumers who find out that its quality is low visit the incumbent entry may be facilitated when search costs are sufficiently low or when the incumbent knows the quality of the entrant s product

stocking and pricing decisions under endogenous demand and reference point effects abstract in this paper we study the newsvendor s pricing and stocking decisions under reference point effects the demand faced by the newsvendor is endogenous and the customers may also decide to procure the product from an outside option we characterize the firm s optimal pricing and stocking decisions our analysis reveals a threshold policy on the firm s ordering and pricing decisions while considering the impact of reference point effects we also find that as the level of optimism increases the firm s optimal ordering level decreases and optimal price increases we further study the impact of loss aversion on the firm s ordering and pricing decisions

towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm this paper outlines a theory of the multiproduct firm important building blocks include excess capacity and its creation market imperfections and the peculiarities of organizational knowledge including its fungible and taut character a framework is adopted in which profit seeking firms are seen to diversify in order to avoid the high transactions costs associated with using various markets to trade the services of various specialized assets neoclassical explanations of the multiproduct firm are shown to be seriously deficient

search bargaining and signalling in the market for legal services over the last eight centuries lawyers in common law countries have generally been precluded from buying their clients cases recently a number of economists and lawyers have argued that sale should be allowed so as to eliminate moral hazard particularly when contingent fees are used this argument is based on full information reasoning however if the lawyer has private information about the case value then compensation demands potentially signal this value when the client can search over lawyers we provide a formal model and a family of computational examples that show that allowing possibly partial purchase can reduce expected social efficiency

what do we know about investment under uncertainty recent theoretical developments relating to investment under uncertainty have highlighted the importance of irreversibility for the timing of investment expenditures and their expected returns this has subsequently stimulated a growing empirical literature which examines uncertainty and threshold effects on investment behaviour this paper presents a review of this literature a variety of methods have been used to investigate the empirical implication of irreversibility in investment the majority focusing on the relationship between investment flows and proxy measures of uncertainty a general conclusion is that increased uncertainty at both aggregate and disaggregate levels leads to lower investment rates this suggests that there is an irreversibility effect under which greater uncertainty raises the value of the call option to delay a commitment to investment this effect appears to dominate any positive impact on investment arising from the fact that greater uncertability under certain circumstances increases the marginal profitability of capital the methods used raise a number of issues which call into question the reliability of the findings and these are addressed in the paper however if such irreversibility effects are present then their omission from traditional investment models casts doubt on the efficacy of such specifications jel classification d81 d92 e22

credible spatial preemption it is often argued that incumbent firms may deter entry by preemptive investment in new goods we show that these conclusions are reversed when multiproduct incumbentfirms may exit in response to entry once entrants are in an industry an incumbent will often want to withdraw some goods to prevent competition with the entrant from reducing profits on other goods such a reaction makes entry more attractive to a potential entrant the equilibrium industry structure is less likely to be monopolistic as the goods are better substitutes as exit costs are low and as the competition between producers of the same good is more intense

empirical methodology in macroeconomics explaining the success of friedman and schwartz s a monetary history of the united states 1867 1960

advertising and pricing to deter or accommodate entry when demand is unknown abstract we consider the advertising and pricing strategies of an incumbent firm who is concerned with deterring or accommodating entry and privately informed as to the level of market demand our fundamental result is that a demand exaggerating distortion occurs if the incumbent seeks to signal a low high demand then he behaves as if there were complete information but demand were lower higher than it is pre entry pricing and demand enhancing advertising are therefore distorted downward upward as a consequence of signaling purely dissipative advertising is thus not employed as a signal refinements of sequential equilibrium are featured

the effect of exit on entry deterrence strategies abstract recent analyses of entry deterrence strategies have required an incumbent s post entry output or pricing strategy to be profit maximizing however most papers have continued to assume that either an incumbent can commit not to exit after entry or that exit is never optimal when there are avoidable fixed costs of operating in any period however exit can be the optimal strategy in this situation entry deterrence strategies operate very differently than when exit is never optimal in fact the possibility of exit can make some previously effective strategies completely ineffective while improving the effectiveness of others

limit pricing when incumbents have conflicting interests abstract this paper considers entry into a market with two incumbents where one prefers entry and one dislikes it unlike the entrant incumbents know market demand in separating equilibria incumbents play full information nash equilibrium strategies when beliefs are unprejudiced separating equilibria only exist if entry is relatively unimportant for an incumbent in growing markets this condition will tend to be violated so that only pooling equilibria may exist

capacity and entry issues in online exchanges abstract with the advent of open standards and internet technologies the number of sellers who can participate in online exchanges is greatly increased we model the competition between identical sellers vying for the same business and find that there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium in prices the results help us understand the dynamics between a seller s capacity and his motivation to participate in an auction

entry deterrence and the free rider problem the public good aspect of entry prevention is examined in an industry characterized by an established oligopoly facing a potential entrant although incumbent firms act noncooperatively underinvestment in entry deterrence does not occur and in fact incumbents may find themselves in a pareto dominated arrangement in terms of profits by preventing entry

airline deregulation the cost pieces of the puzzle this paper analyzes cost changes in the u s airline industry in the pre and postderegulation era using a panel data set of airlines specifically it seeks to disentangle cost changes attributable to technical change economies of scale and density and input prices the authors estimate a purely general index of industry technical change and in turn analyze its determinants despite the slowing of productivity growth in the 1980s deregulation does appear to have stimulated technical change due to more efficient route structures copyright 1995 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

strategic growth options we provide a strategic rationale for growth options under uncertainty and imperfect competition in a market with strategic competition investment confers a greater capability to take advantage of future growth opportunities this strategic advantage leads to the capture of a greater share of the market either by dissuading entry or by inducing competitors to make room for the stronger competitor as a result of this strategic effect payoffs are in a rough sense more convex than in the case of no investment in a growth option when the strategic advantage is strong increased uncertainty encourages investment in growth options higher uncertainty means more opportunity rather than simply larger risk if the strategic effect is weak the reverse is true on the other hand an increase in systematic risk discourages the acquisition of growth options our results contradict the view that volatility is a strong disincentive for investment

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

capital as a commitment strategic investment to deter mobility abstract this paper analyzes how an early entrant in a market can exploit its head start by strategic investment the analysis is based on spence s paper investment strategy and growth in a new market bell j econ 10 1979 1 19 we frist study the investment game in the no discounting case which embodies the key features of mobility deterrence we establish the existence of a set of perfect equilibria and suggest that one particular equilibrium is most reasonable this equilibrium also valid with discounting involves the follower firm being forever deterred from investing to its steady state reaction curve in contrast to spence s proposed solution

almost efficient information transmission in elections abstract we study a model in which two parties compete by announcing their policies after receiving conditionally independent private signals about the true state of the world parties are both office and policy motivated our model can explain radically different policy positions even when parties receive identical signals and have unbiased preferences this holds in an asymmetric equilibrium in which both parties reveal their private information to the voters and the implemented policy is almost first best for all possible realizations of parties signals in this equilibrium one party adopts extreme and the other one moderate policy positions

a theory of market structure with sequential entry this article sets out a theory of market structure with sequential entry we characterize the perfect nash equilibrium to the entry game in several propositions first equilibria never involve excess capacity second a sufficient statistic for the entry of any firm is that its profits are positive when computed myopically i e with no further entry third the equilibrium number of firms is the smallest number that can deter entry fourth aggregate output in equilibrium is no smaller than the limit output we calculate some explicit solutions to the model and examine comparative static properties

noncooperative entry deterrence uncertainty and the free rider problem previous authors who have considered the issue of noncooperative entry deterrence have not found the free rider problem to be a significant factor these authors however have only considered models in which the exact investment needed to deter entry is known with certainty in this paper i add uncertainty to the models investigated by these previous authors and demonstrate that the free rider problem can be significant but is not so in all cases that is for certain types of entry deterring investments the introduction of uncertainty causes the oligopoly to underinvest in entry deterrence however for other types no underinvestment result arises

can low price guarantees deter entry abstract this paper examines the strategic use of low price guarantees lpgs as an entry deterrent the entire space of contemporaneous lpg messages is partitioned according to their ability to deter entry and or increase the incumbent s profits while most price matching and price beating guarantees cannot deter entry into a perfectly contestable market there do exist special classes of price beating guarantees that enable the incumbent to prevent entry interestingly both price matching and price beating can be a part of the incumbent s strategy in subgame perfect equilibria of the game where the firms choose lpgs from 14 classes defined in the paper

sequential entry industry structure and welfare in this paper we reexamine the relationship between potential competition industry structure and welfare in a market subject to a sequential entry threat where firms can make quantity commitments and have access to a constant returns technology it is shown that provided entry is not blockaded the incumbent s will either prevent entry or allow all the potential entrants in furthermore actual entry may decrease but social welfare never goes down with more potential entrants nevertheless with a finite number of potential entrants policies which lower the cost of entry need not be beneficial in welfare terms

elections with privately informed parties and voters this paper studies a situation in which parties are betterinformed than voters about the optimal policies for voters weshow that voters are able to infer the parties information byobserving their electoral positions even if parties have policypreferences which differ substantially from the median voter s unlike previous work that reach opposite conclusions we assumethat voters have some private information of their own if theinformation available to voters is biased parties attempts toinfluence voters beliefs will result in less than fullconvergence even if parties know with certainty the optimalpolicy for the median voter

the inverse newsvendor problem choosing an optimal demand portfolio for capacitated resources the classical newsvendor problem is one of optimally choosing a level of capacity to respond to a known demand distribution the inverse newsvendor problem is one of optimally choosing a demand distribution with fixed capacity the applications of the inverse problem include industrial settings where demand management is relatively less costly than capacity adjustments demand distributions are chosen from an opportunity set which reflects the set of market opportunities for the firm we analyze the firm s profit as a function of these demand alternatives provide solution methods and insights and identify inefficient and dominated distributions we provide results when the opportunity set is known or only partially known we extend the results to cases in which there are multiple prioritized customer classes that share the firm s productive capacity this paper was motivated by an industrial application in a firm selling a semicommodity product into three prioritized industrial sectors we review the application of our methods to this setting

strategic deterrence of sequential entry into an industry industrial entry deterrence is typically studied in a setting where an established firm or firms confront and attempt to deter a single potential competitor during the evolution of most industries however a sequence of firms enters or attempts to enter at distinct points in time consideration of issues arising from sequential entry fundamentally alters the qualitative nature of the deterrence decision undertaken by incumbent firms within a sequential setting counterintuitive behavior may be observed specifically numerous government policies designed to decrease industrial concentration penalties for anticompetitive practices subsidization of entry consent decrees restructuring industries may have the opposite effect

the entry deterring effects of inflexible regulation this paper investigates the signalling role of tax policy in promoting or hindering the ability of a monopolist to practise entry deterrence we show that environmental policy can facilitate the incumbent firm s concealment of information from potential entrants thus deterring entry and yet entail welfare improvements furthermore we demonstrate that entry deterrence is more likely to arise when environmental regulation cannot be rapidly revised across time if market conditions change inflexible regimes than when regulatory agencies can adjust environmental policy over time les effets de dissuasion de l entree d une reglementation inflexible ce texte examine le role de signalisation d une politique fiscale qui promeut ou reduit l habilete d un monopole a pratiquer la dissuasion de l entree de concurrents on montre qu une politique environnementale peut faciliter la dissimulation d information par la firme en place vis a vis les concurrents potentiels et donc les dissuader d entrer et pourtant engendrer des ameliorations de bien etre de plus on montre que la dissuasion de l entree est davantage susceptible d emerger quand la reglementation environnementale ne peut pas etre revisee rapidement dans le temps si les conditions de marche se modifient regimes inflexibles que quand les agences de reglementation environnementales peuvent ajuster la politiques dans le temps

a general index of technical change this paper outlines a procedure for estimating a general index of technical change within the context of a quite general production technology specifically when panel data are available for firms in an industry time specific dummies can be combined in a nonlinear estimation procedure to yield a general index of technical change that may be both nonneutral and scale augmenting this approach offers numerous advantages over the traditional time trend representation of technical change for example the general index can serve as the basis for analysis of the determinants of technical change results for a sample of 30 electric utilities over the period 1951 78 show that the productivity decline of the 1970s can be attributed primarily to sulphur oxide restrictions and secularly declining capacity utilization due to rapidly increasing peak load demands

information acquisition for capacity planning via pricing and advance selling when to stop and act this paper investigates a capacity planning strategy that collects commitments to purchase before the capacity decision and uses the acquired advance sales information to decide on the capacity in particular we study a profit maximization model in which a manufacturer collects advance sales information periodically prior to the regular sales season for a capacity decision customer demand is stochastic and price sensitive once the capacity is set the manufacturer produces and satisfies customer demand to the extent possible from the installed capacity during the regular sales period we study scenarios in which the advance sales and regular sales season prices are set exogenously and optimally for both scenarios we establish the optimality of a control band or a threshold policy that determines when to stop acquiring advance sales information and how much capacity to build we show that advance selling can improve the manufacturer s profit significantly we generate insights into how operating conditions such as the capacity building cost and market characteristics such as demand variability affect the value of information acquired through advance selling from this analysis we identify the conditions under which advance selling for capacity planning is most valuable finally we study the joint benefits of acquiring information for capacity planning through advance selling and revenue management of installed capacity through dynamic pricing

competition between insurers with superior information abstract we analyze markets where insurers are better informed about risk than consumers we show that even competitive markets may result in insufficient information revelation and inefficient insurance coverage this explains why certain risky consumers remain uninsured and why certain market segments are persistently profitable we also show robustness to competition in menus or mechanisms our analysis of the contrary of adverse selection competition between principals with common value and exclusivity is suitable for other markets lawyers doctors mechanics etc

the newsvendor problem review and directions for future research in this paper we review the contributions to date for analyzing the newsvendor problem our focus is on examining the specific extensions for analyzing this problem in the context of modeling customer demand supplier costs and the buyer risk profile more specifically we analyze the impact of market price marketing effort and stocking quantity on customer demand how supplier prices can serve as a coordination mechanism in a supply chain setting integrating alternative supplier pricing policies within the newsvendor framework and how the buyer s risk profile moderates the newsvendor order quantity decision for each of these areas we summarize the current literature and develop extensions finally we also propose directions for future research

oligopoly limit pricing in the lab we examine the behavior of senders and receivers in the context of oligopoly limit pricing experiments in which high prices chosen by two privately informed incumbents may signal to a potential entrant that the industry wide costs are high and that entry is unprofitable the results provide strong support for the theoretical prediction that the incumbents can credibly deter unprofitable entry without having to distort their prices away from their full information levels yet in a large number of cases asymmetric information induces incumbents to raise prices when costs are low the results also show that the entrants behavior is by and large bi polar entrants tend to enter when the incumbents prices are low but tend to stay out when the incumbents prices are high