land tenure investment incentives and the choice of techniques evidence from nicaragua the choice of cultivation techniques is a key determinant of agricultural productivity and has important consequences for income growth and poverty reduction in developing countries household data from nicaragua are used to show that the choice of cultivation technique depends on farmers tenure status even when techniques are observable and contractible in particular tree crops are less likely to be grown on rented than on owner cultivated plots further evidence indicates that the result follows from landlords inability or unwillingness to commit to long term tenancy contracts rather than from agency costs due to risk aversion or limited liability

anatomy of a contract change we study the productivity impact of a contract change the setting is a tea plantation in india the activity in question is tea plucking the output of which is measurable and contractible payments to pluckers consist of a baseline wage along with piece rates per kilogram kg of output that vary over different production intervals in 2008 a contract change was instituted as part of a customary practice of renegotiation once every three years this plantation represented only a fraction of the negotiating parties which involved representatives from some 20 unions and large plantations operating in the tea growing region with no dominant players on either side of the table negotiations commenced a few months prior to the expiration of the going contract and went through several rounds the new contract increased the baseline wage by approximately 30 percent almost all of this increase was mandated by state government legislation in june 2008 the government announced a preliminary notification under the minimum wages act 1948 setting the minimum daily wage payable to plantation workers in the state at rs 102 us 2 25 the baseline in force in our plantation was at

nonrenewable resource scarcity nonrenewable resource theory often is summarized by hotelling s rule this paper reviews theoretical extensions and empirical investigations of resource extraction models observed data are often inconsistent with the hotelling rule suggesting that other characteristics of nonrenewable resource supply including exploration heterogeneous ore quality technological progress and capital investment are important determinants of the dynamic behavior of resource prices given the persistent recurrence of concern about nonrenewable resource scarcity measures of nonrenewable resource scarcity and the empirical evidence for the time trends of those measures are reviewed finally the implications of nonrenewable resource scarcity for economic growth are examined

tenure land rights and farmer investment incentives in china the goal of this paper is to understand the nature of the property rights associated with china s land tenure systems and to study the impact of these property rights on agricultural production efficiency the results show that land tenure and associated property rights in rural china affect the production behavior of farmers the most robust finding is that the right to use land for long periods of time encourages the use of land saving investments while the results show that land tenure affects agricultural production decisions the difference between collective and private plots however is small compared to the private plotcommunal productivity gap that existed in the pre reform period 1998 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

quality and accountability in health care delivery audit study evidence from primary care in india we present unique audit study evidence on health care quality in rural india and find that most private providers lacked medical qualifications but completed more checklist items than public providers and recommended correct treatments equally often among doctors with public and private practices all quality metrics were higher in their private clinics market prices are positively correlated with checklist completion and correct treatment but also with unnecessary treatments however public sector salaries are uncorrelated with quality a simple model helps interpret our findings where public sector effort is low the benefits of higher diagnostic effort among private providers may outweigh costs of potential overtreatment

assessing the functioning of land rental markets in ethiopia although a large theoretical literature discusses the possible inefficiency of sharecropping contracts the empirical evidence on this phenomenon has been ambiguous at best household level fixed effect estimates from about 8 500 plots operated by households that own and sharecrop land in the ethiopian highlands provide support for the hypothesis of marshallian inefficiency at the same time a factor adjustment model suggests that the extent to which rental markets allow households to attain their desired operational holding size is extremely limited our analysis points towards factor market imperfections no rental for oxen lack of alternative employment opportunities and tenure insecurity as possible reasons underlying such behavior suggesting that rather than worrying almost exclusively about marshallian inefficiency it is equally warranted to give due attention to the policy framework within which land rental markets operate

l etranger status property rights and investment incentives in cote d ivoire this study uses data from cote d ivoire to show that outsider households have relatively small land holdings and less complete rights over land than locals it then demonstrates a link between property rights and investment incentives by looking at the decision to leave land fallow outsiders fallow a smaller proportion of their land indicating that their farms are left uncultivated for shorter periods this is only partly explained by their incomplete property rights and relative land poverty these differences in investment patterns lead to lower yields per hectare jel o12 q15

rural infrastructure transactions costs and market participation in kenya abstract we develop a conceptual framework for quantifying fixed transactions costs facing semisubsistence households using household survey data from a sample of 324 kenyan maize farmers we jointly estimate household supply and demand schedules and transactions costs econometric results indicate that on average the ad valorem tax equivalent of fixed transactions costs for households in our sample is 15 additional analysis indicates that economic isolation is positively associated with the size of transactions costs to the best of our knowledge ours are the first empirical estimates of the magnitude of fixed transactions costs for agricultural households in developing countries

the economics of development a survey i the subject our definition of the subject will be the use of economic analysis to understand the economies of poor or developing countries this includes in particular how standards of living in the population are determined and how they change over time and further how policy can or should be used in the influence of these processes the definition contains in principle much or most of analytical methods in economics insofar as they can be put to use in the examination of the issues of interest this is as it should be but it poses a problem for a survey in a journal a comprehensive treatment is infeasible so we shall follow a different route the survey will focus on what i take to be the major themes and approaches which characterise the productive aspects of the subject there is therefore no pretence at being exhaustive the purpose is rather to highlight some of the advances many of these have been of real substance there are a number of possible purposes for a survey and it is important to be clear at the outset for whom it is intended what it is and what it is not this survey is addressed to economists and students of economics who know the tools of their trade but not necessarily how they have been applied to and fashioned for the analysis of the economics of developing countries it is a description of the ways in which problems can be productively formulated and approached in terms of examples chosen for their intrinsic importance and interest the vastness of the subject means that we have to be highly selective it does not seek to provide a summary evaluation of the current view of the appropriate response to immediate policy questions it is not a history of thought nor a research manifesto nor an attempt to adjudicate or settle the major debates where they arise naturally from the major purpose some judgements on these subjects will be offered but they do not themselves constitute the primary intent of this survey there are three lines of enquiry or sets of questions which have i suggest been distinctive of the most fruitful work in development economics they will

state led or market led green revolution role of private irrigation investment vis a vis local government programs in west bengal s farm productivity growth this paper estimates respective roles of private investments in irrigation and local government programs land reforms extension services and infrastructure investments in the growth of farm productivity in west bengal india between 1981 95 using a farm panel from a stratified random sample of farms from major agricultural districts of west bengal we find evidence that private investment in irrigation which reduced irrigation costs for farms played an important role in the growth process however the growth in private investment was itself stimulated by tenancy registration and minikit distribution programs implemented by local governments this channel helps account for the substantial spillover effects of the tenancy reform on non tenant farms noted in an earlier study hence the observed productivity growth was a result of complementarity between private investment incentives and state led institutional reforms

agricultural land relations in the developing world in this paper we draw on a number of methodological approaches which have been used to explain land relations tenancy sharecropping and interlinking distress sales dualistic land ownership distributions classes and land reform and their variations over space and time we indicate that the explanatory power of theories on land relations hinges on the complexity market imperfections and distortions admitted in the analysis

do overlapping property rights reduce agricultural investment evidence from uganda the need for land related investment to ensure sustainable land management and increase productivity of land use is widely recognized however there is little rigorous evidence on the effects of property rights for increasing agricultural productivity and contributing toward poverty reduction in africa whether and by how much overlapping property rights reduce investment incentives and the scope for policies to counter such disincentives are thus important policy issues using information on parcels under ownership and usufruct by the same household from a nationally representative survey in uganda the authors find significant disincentives associated with overlapping property rights on short and long term investments the paper combines this result with information on crop productivity to obtain a rough estimate of the magnitudes involved the authors make suggestions on ways to eliminate such inefficiencies

contract farming and smallholder incentives to produce high quality experimental evidence from the vietnamese dairy sector in emerging markets for high value food products in developing countries processing companies search for efficient ways to source raw material of high quality one widely embraced approach is contract farming but relatively little is known about the appropriate design of financial incentives in a small farm context we use the example of the vietnamese dairy sector to analyze the effectiveness of existing contracts between a processor and smallholder farmers in terms of incentivizing the production of high quality milk a framed field experiment is conducted to evaluate the impact of two incentive instruments a price penalty for low quality and a bonus for consistent high quality milk on farmers investment in quality improving inputs statistical analysis suggests that the penalty drives farmers into higher input use resulting in better output quality the bonus payment generates even higher quality milk we also find that input choice levels depend on farmers socio economic characteristics such as wealth while individual risk preferences seem to be less important implications for the design of contracts with smallholders are discussed

a theory of sharecropping the role of price behavior and imperfect competition this paper proposes a theory of sharecropping on the basis of price behavior in agriculture and imperfectly competitive nature of rural product markets we consider a contractual setting between one landlord and one tenant with seasonal variation of price where the tenant receives a low price for his output while the landlord can sell his output at a higher price by incurring a cost of storage we consider two different classes of contracts i tenancy contracts and ii crop buying contracts it is shown that sharecropping is the optimal form within tenancy contracts and it also dominates crop buying contracts provided the price variation is not too large then we consider interlinked contracts that have both tenancy and crop buying elements and show that there are multiple optimal interlinked contracts finally proposing an equilibrium refinement that incorporates imperfect competition in the rural product market it is shown that the unique contract that is robust to this refinement results in sharecropping

formal and informal risk sharing in ldcs theory and empirical evidence in village economies limited commitment models have been proposed as theoretical alternatives to the complete markets hypothesis and have been shown to be empirically relevant yet village institutions might be able to enforce some contracts we construct a theoretical model which shows how households can insure through both formal and informal contracts when some verifiable production takes place in an environment of incomplete markets this theoretical setting nests the case of complete markets when all risks can be insured by formal contracts because all states of nature would be verifiable and the case where only informal agreements are available agreements specifying informal transfers that needs to be self enforceable we derive two equations of interest the income equation which is partially determined by the formal contract and an euler type equation where consumption growth is affected by lagged consumption instead of being a martingale using semi parametric specifications we derive testable restrictions of our model we estimate both equations using data of village economies in pakistan empirical results are consistent with the model the estimation and allows to show that the incentive constraints due to selfenforcement bind and that formal contracts are used to reduce the probability of binding the constraint

tenure security human capital and soil conservation in an overlapping generation rural economy we develop an overlapping generation model of rural agricultural households to examine whether tenure security and subsistence needs influence the choice between unexploited topsoil and investment in children s human capital as the mode of transfer of wealth a unique dataset from bangladesh finds that tenure security is associated with greater topsoil conservation and lower human capital investment therefore there exists a tradeoff between these two modes of transfer we suggest that increased public expenditure on schooling which substitutes private expenditure may lower the pressure on land and soil resources

transactional framework of sharecropping empirical evidence abstract chew chew tek ann 1991 share contracts in malaysian rubber smallholdings land econ 67 85 98 chew tek ann 1993 the transactional framework of sharecropping further implications can j agric econ 41 209 221 proposed a transactional framework of sharecropping that accommodates both the marshallian and the cheungian equilibria an important conclusion arising thereof is the hypothesis that cheung s sharecropping equilibrium is the rarity while the marshallian equilibrium is the norm in this paper we collated some recent evidences to verify this hypothesis the evidences support the marshallian equilibrium thereby providing indirect support for the transactional framework of sharecropping

the efficiency of sharecropping evidence from the postbellum south in this article we investigate why sharecropping rose sharply in the postbellum south our hypothesis is that sharecropping was desirable because sharecropped farms could be more productive than owner operated farms and perhaps more productive than rented farms using the data from the postbellum south we find strong empirical support for this hypothesis our results show that the output elasticity of sharecropped farms is higher than that of owner operated farms on all occasions and that of rented farms on some occasions the differences in productivity are statistically significant and the results are very robust these empirical results refute the long held notion that sharecropping is inefficient contrary to the view that like a tax sharecropping produces disincentives to work the results in this article suggest that sharecropping might have created an incentive among farmers for its rapid and widespread use in the postbellum south

the economic lives of the poor in what turned out to be a rhetorical master move the 1990 world development report from the world bank defined the extremely poor people of the world as those who are currently living on no more than 1 per day per person measured at the 1985 purchasing power parity ppp exchange rate in 1993 the poverty line was updated to 1 08 per person per day at the 1993 ppp exchange rate which is the line we use in this paper poverty lines have always existed indeed 1 per day was chosen in part because of its proximity to the poverty lines used by many poor countries 1 however the 1 a day poverty line has come to dominate the conversations about poverty to a remarkable extent

endogenous matching and the empirical determinants of contract form empirical work on contracts typically regresses contract choice on observed principal and agent characteristics if i some of these characteristics are unobserved or partially observed and ii there are incentives whereby particular types of agents end up contracting with particular types of principals estimated coefficients on the observed characteristics may be misleading we address this endogenous matching problem using a data set on agricultural contracts between landlords and tenants in early renaissance tuscany controlling for endogenous matching has an impact on parameters of interest and tenants risk aversion appears to have influenced contract choice

land acquisition for industrialization and compensation of displaced farmers this paper addresses the question of how farmers displaced by acquisition of agricultural land for the purpose of industrialization ought to be compensated prior to acquisition the farmers are leasing in land from a private owner or local government with a legally mandated sharecropping contract compensation rules affect the decision of the landlord to sell the land ex post to an industrial developer and ex ante incentives of tenants and landlord to make specific investments in agricultural productivity efficiency considerations are shown to require farmers be over compensated in the event of conversion

does supervision matter some hypothesis tests using indian farm level data abstract a model is developed and estimated to test for heterogeneity of family and hired labor in agricultural production and to estimate the impact of employer supervision on the productivity of hired labor plot level data are used from a rice growing village in semi arid tropical india the hypothesis that family and hired labor are homogeneous inputs was rejected results indicate that family member supervision is required to increase hired labor productivity output loss attributable to operating at reduced supervision intensity was greater than 10 on over 40 of the plots

steady state growth in a hotelling model of resource extraction this paper re examines the hotelling model of optimal nonrenewable resource extraction in light of stock effects and technological progress we assume functional forms for cost and demand so that the solution to the hotelling problem is a steady state consistent with the empirical observation that the growth rates of market prices have remained zero over a long period of time we use data on 14 minerals from 1970 to 2004 to estimate the supply and demand functions using sur and 3sls and to test the model we validate the model for 8 of 14 minerals c 2007 elsevier inc all rights reserved

testing between competing models of sharecropping the marshallian approach assumes a prohibitively high cost of monitoring the sharecropper s activities while the monitoring approach argues that landlords stipulate and effectively monitor sharecroppers activities i present new evidence using detailed data collected from eight indian villages most tenants own some land of their own this provides a controlled environment in studying the impact of contractual arrangements the differences in input and output intensities on owned minus sharecropped land of the same household are found to be sizable and significant suggesting a rejection of the monitoring approach and supporting the notion of the marshallian productive inefficiency of sharecropping

monopoly power and distribution in fragmented markets the case of groundwater using data from pakistan s punjab the authors examine monopoly power in the market for groundwater irrigation water extracted using private tubewells a market characterized by barriers to entry and spatial fragmentation simple theory predicts that tubewell owners should price discriminate in favor of their own share tenants and this analysis of individual groundwater transactions over an 18 month period confirms such price discrimination and among those studied tubewell owners and their tenants use considerably more groundwater on their plots than do other farmers the authors also provide evidence that monopoly pricing of groundwater leads to compensating albeit small reallocations of canal water which farmers exchange in a separate informal market despite the substantial misallocation of groundwater a welfare analysis show that monopoly pricing has limited effects on equity and efficiency in the long run a policy aimed at eliminating monopoly pricing would do little to help the poorest farmers

the contributions of the economics of information to twentieth century economics in the e eld of economics perhaps the most important break with the past one that leaves open huge areas for future work lies in the economics of information it is now recognized that information is imperfect obtaining information can be costly there are important asymmetries of information and the extent of information asymmetries is affected by actions of e rms and individuals this recognition deeply affects the understanding of wisdom inherited from the past such as the fundamental welfare theorem and some of the basic characterization of a market economy and provides explanations of economic and social phenomena that otherwise would be hard to understand i introduction the century coming to a close has seen vast changes in economics in both ideas and methodology upon ree ection it is remarkable however how many of the seeds of advances in this century were sowed in the previous i would argue that perhaps the most important break with the past one that leaves open huge areas for future work lies in the economics of information the recognition that information is imperfect that obtaining information can be costly that there are important asymmetries of information and that the extent of information asymmetries is affected by actions of e rms and individuals has had profound implications for the wisdom inherited from the past and has provided explanations of economic and social phenomena that otherwise would be hard to understand in this essay i wish to argue that information economics has had directly and indirectly a profound effect on how we think about economics today eighteenth and nineteenth century antecedents to be sure marshall and other nineteenth century economists talked about problems of imperfect information but with one exception discussions of information were obiter dicta caveats at the end of the analysis they were never at the center

productivity effects of land rental market operation in ethiopia evidence from a matched tenant landlord sample as countries increasingly strive to transform their economies from agriculture based into a diversified one land rental will become of greater importance it will thus be critical to complement research on the efficiency of specific land rental arrangements such as sharecropping with an inquiry into the broader productivity impacts of the land rental market plot level data for a matched landlord tenant sample in an environment where sharecropping dominates allow us to explore both issues the author fined that pure output sharing leads to significantly lower levels of efficiency that can be attenuated by monitoring while the inefficiency disappears if inputs are shared as well rentals transfer land to more productive producers but realization of this productivity advantage is prevented by the inefficiency of contractual arrangements suggesting changes that would prompt adoption of different contractual arrangements could have significant benefits

land reform and agricultural productivity in india a review of the evidence in this paper we review as well as contribute to the empirical literature on the impact of land reform on agricultural productivity in india we find that overall for all states land reform legislation had a negative and significant effect on agricultural productivity however this hides considerable variation across types of land reform as well as variation across states decomposing by type of land reform the main driver for this negative effect seems to be land ceiling legislation in contrast the effect of tenancy reform averaged across all states is insignificant there seems to be a wide range of state specific effects which suggests that focusing on average treatment effects can hide a considerable amount of heterogeneity in particular allowing a separate slope for west bengal one of the few states that implemented tenancy laws rigorously we find that land reform had a marginal positive effect relative to the rest of india

transaction costs and the design of cropshare contracts modern cropshare contracts are explained using a model in which agents are risk neutral and contract rules are chosen to maximize expected joint wealth it is shown that the farmer either bears the entire cost of inputs or shares the costs with the landowner in the same proportion as the output the incentives of altering the cropshare percentage are examined and are used to derive implications about the portion of the crop that will be owned by the farmer the model is tested and supported using data from a 1986 survey offarmers and landowners in nebraska and south dakota

impacts of tenancy arrangements on investment and efficiency evidence from pakistan in this article we use farm level data from the punjab province in pakistan to analyze the impact of three tenancy contracts on investment in soil improving and productivity enhancing measures and farm productivity a multivariate tobit model that accounts for potential substitutability and complementarity of investment options as well as endogeneity of tenure arrangements was employed in the empirical analysis our empirical results indicate that land tenure arrangements influence farmers decisions to invest in soil improving and productivity enhancing measures in particular owner cultivators with secured tenancy arrangements were found to be more likely to invest in soil improving and productivity enhancing measures compared to those on leased contracts we also find that output per hectare was highest on land cultivated by owners and lowest on land under sharecropping tenancy lending support to the marshallian inefficiency hypothesis

evidence on the incentive properties of share contracts abstract ever since adam smith share contracts have been condemned for their lack of incentives sharecropping tenants face incentives to undersupply productive inputs since they receive only a fraction of the marginal revenue the empirical literature reports that lands under sharecropping are indeed less productive and employ inputs less intensively than those operated by owners this paper shows that 1 sharecropping and fixed rent tenancy are both associated with low quality lands 2 plots under sharecropping and fixed rent present on average the same unconditional productivity 3 controlling for observed land quality and input use their average productivities are also identical to those of owner operated plots and 4 the input choices satisfy the same profit maximization conditions for all land contracts these results challenge the conventional wisdom connecting sharecropping to incentive distortions they support an alternative view that farmers optimally employ more input resources into

land tenure climate and risk management abstract we analyze to what extent climate conditions affect the prevalence of sharecropping as a form of traditional land tenure we investigate how sharecropping tenure is related to climate risk and how it interacts with fertilizer use and livestock ownership that both influence production risk we first develop a stylized theoretical model to illustrate the role of climate for land tenure and production our empirical analysis is based on more than 9000 households with considerable heterogeneity in climate conditions across several african countries we find that farmers in areas with low precipitation are more likely to be sharecroppers we further find evidence for risk management interaction effects as sharecropping farmers are less likely to own livestock and more likely to use fertilizer in economies where formal kinds of insurance are unavailable sharecropping thus functions as a form of insurance and reduces the need for potentially costly risk management strategies

moral hazard experimental evidence from tenancy contracts agricultural productivity is particularly low in developing countries output sharing rules that make farmers less than full residual claimants are seen as a potentially important driver of low agr

tenancy and family resources a model and some empirical analysis abstract in this paper we discuss with the help of a simple model the role of family resource endowments in determining the extent of land leased in or leased out by a household this becomes important when the market for some of these resources is either not functioning at all or is functioning imperfectly we focus on three such resources which have some relevance in indian agriculture these are 1 the family s managerial skill 2 its endowment of human labour and 3 its endowment of draft animal labour household level data from six villages of maharashtra and andhra pradesh are also utilized to test some of the hypotheses

labor markets and poverty in village economies we study how women s choices over labor activities in village economies correlate with poverty and whether enabling the poorest women to take on the activities of their richer counterparts can set them on a sustainable trajectory out of poverty to do this we conduct a large scale randomized control trial covering over 21 000 households in 1 309 villages surveyed four times over a seven year period to evaluate a nationwide program in bangladesh that transfers livestock assets and skills to the poorest women at baseline the poorest women mostly engage in low return and seasonal casual wage labor while wealthier women solely engage in livestock rearing the program enables poor women to start engaging in livestock rearing increasing their aggregate labor supply and earnings this leads to asset accumulation livestock land and business assets and poverty reduction both accelerating after four and seven years these gains do not come at the expense of others non eligibles livestock rearing businesses are not crowded out and wages received for casual jobs increase as the poor reduce their labor supply in such labor activities our results show that i the poor are able to take on the work activities of the non poor but face barriers to doing so and ii one o interventions that remove these barriers lead to sustainable poverty reduction

information and the operation of markets tests based on a general equilibrium model of land leasing in india abstract this paper develops an estimable general equilibrium model of land leasing to test the extent to which information is commonly held in a village and whether village markets are efficient information regarding the relative farming skill of households is found to be widespread but the assumption of perfectly efficient markets within the village is rejected these results have ramifications for the estimation of agricultural household models and for our understanding of rural institutions the model is derived from the primitives of the production technology the extent of information and the distributions of assets and several household unobservables simultaneity and selection issues are dealt with explicitly in a two stage maximum likelihood estimation procedure using panel data from india

contracts resource use and productivity in sharecropping this article identifies the contractual terms in sharecropping that result in efficient use of resources evidence is then presented from pakistan to comment on the manner in which landlords ensure that sharecroppers fulfil the terms it is shown that landlords in general specify contract terms that encourage sharecroppers to adopt new techniques of production productivity comparisons are also made for farms under different tenancy contracts to conclude that share cropping tenancies do not appear to result in output loss even when technology is changing

credit and sharecropping in agrarian societies this paper considers a model of linkage between land labor and credit transactions in the context of sharecropping the paper s objectives are a to derive and characterize the equilibrium in a model of a land scarce labour abundant economy under sharecropping given an infinitely elastic supply of identical sharecroppers at a reservation utility and b to demonstrate that in an imperfect market a landlord may offer credit to his tenant sometimes even at a subsidized rate of interest without necessarily insisting that the sharecropper borrow only from him precluding an involuntary linkage between credit and land transations it has been demonstrated that regardless of the presence or absence of linkage or any other control by the landlord as long as he can vary the size of the plot given to a tenant and there are enough potential tenants in equilibrium contracts a tenants utility under sharecropping will be the same as that which he could have obtained as a full time wage laborer this result implies that policies other than land reform will not affect the welfare of tenants

moral hazard and marshallian inefficiency evidence from tunisia abstract we formalize the link between optimal cost sharing contracts and the production technology in the presence of moral hazard by appealing to several well known results from duality theory building on intuitions from the interlinkage literature we show that optimal contractual structure is determined by the i substitution possibilities that exist between different observable factor inputs as well as ii between these inputs and unobservable effort we endogenize contractual choice using landlord characteristics as instruments exploiting the fact that in our dataset landlords interact with several tenants and vice versa the approach is applied to an unbalanced plot level panel of cost sharing contracts in a tunisian village using a translog representation of the restricted profit function contractual terms are found to be a significant determinant of input use and therefore lead to marshallian inefficiency while the optimality of the underlying contractual structure is rejected

on the economics of state lotteries s tate lotteries can be evaluated from either of two perspectives familiar to economists as a consumer commodity or as a source of public revenue l as a commodity the lottery is notable for its broad market penetration and rapid growth sixty percent of the adults in lottery states play at least once in a year the annual growth in real per capita sales in lottery states has averaged 12 percent rising in 1989 dollars from 22 in 1975 to 108 in 1989 as a source of public revenue lotteries account for a rather modest fraction of revenue in states that run them 3 3 percent in 1986 but they are nonetheless one of the most visible state government activities lottery sales exceed those of all other products sold directly by state governments to the public and are larger than all but three major activities of state government education public welfare and highways clotfelter and cook 1989 table 2 5 moreover lotteries are a qualitatively new activity for state governments in that they are a business operated in effect for profit state liquor stores are perhaps the closest analog but they were created to encourage temperate drinking practices and do not engage in the sales promotion and marketing activities that are characteristic of the lotteries lotteries enjoy an honored place in american history as a device for raising funds for public purposes funding for such institutions as the jamestown settlement harvard college and the continental army as well as hundreds of bridges fire houses and schools came from lotteries but after the

does sharecropping affect long term investment evidence from west bengal s tenancy reforms in india land reform has been high on the political agenda since independence in 1947 and early efforts at abolishing intermediaries are widely credited with having brought about significant social benefits the most prominent type is tenancy reform as it does not extinguish landlords ownership rights tenants who may have benefited from rent ceilings and cannot be evicted still have to pay annual share rent this weakness of rights may fail to create the incentives for effort supply and long term investment that have underpinned the success of land reforms elsewhere effectively adding a dynamic inefficiency to the disincentives created by the marshallian inefficiency of sharecropping this could imply that despite the high political price of implementing land reform in india the schemes so far have failed to reach their productivity and poverty reduction potential

contract choice in modern agriculture cash rent versus cropshare e conomists have expended enormous effort examining the rationale for various contractual arrangements in agriculture particularly sharecropping while economists have made considerable theoretical efforts to understand agricultural contracts few empirical studies have been undertaken the dearth of empirical analyses of agricultural contracts is particularly striking for modern western agriculture this is an important omission not only because the existing empirical work tends to focus on the question of efficiency but also because the theoretical models tend to examine contracts that bear little resemblance to those found in the united states today

a critical review of iran s buyback contracts abstract iran s oil and gas industry requires investments of us 15 billion in the short term and over us 70 billion in the medium term iran tries to interest international oil companies ioc in investing in iran s oil and gas business by offering buyback contracts under a buyback contract an ioc invests and when production starts the field is handed over to the national iranian oil company nioc or one of its representatives the ioc gets its costs and an agreed upon profit paid out of the oil and or gas gross profits assuming the field produces as agreed upon and the international energy prices are high enough according to the iranian government the buyback contract contains sufficient incentives for an ioc to invest in iran the iocs however disagree they claim that they solely bare the risks in a buyback contract whereas the iranian counterpart receives all windfall profits furthermore the iocs claim that the utilisation of iran s oil and gas reserves will be sub optimal if they are not involved in optimising long term recovery in this paper we investigate these claims and show that they are partly correct given iran s need for investment capital iran might have to change its policy

the economics of casino taxation in this article a model of the costs of a casino is developed that focuses on the implications for economic welfare of different taxation schemes for casinos the situation being considered is in a country where casinos cater exclusively to foreign tourists the goal of the country is to determine the maximum amount of taxes that can be extracted from the activities of this sector under different systems of taxation when the price of gambling is set by regulation above its competitive level the economic losses created by excessive investment in the sector can be reduced by taxation a turnover tax on the amount gambled can maximize both tax revenue and the economic welfare of the country due to administrative constraints a number of countries rely on the taxation of the casinos fixed assets or a combination of a turnover tax and a tax on fixed costs the model is applied to the situation in north cyprus the annual economic efficiency loss from its poorly designed tax policies on casino gambling is

gender agricultural production and the theory of the household virtually all models of the household assume that the allocation of resources is pareto efficient within many african households agricultural production occurs on many plots controlled by different members of the household pareto efficiency implies that factors should be allocated efficiently across these plots i find in contrast that plots controlled by women are farmed much less intensively than similar plots within the household controlled by men the estimates imply that about 6 percent of output is lost because of inefficient factor allocation within the household the paper suggests a new approach to modeling intrahousehold allocation consistent with the empirical results

mixed and pure sharecropping in nepal empirical evidence supporting the traditional hypothesis we analyse differences in input and output intensities across three comparative tenure regimes in nepal using two test methods an f test based on hotelling s t2 statistic and a test which adapts shaban s 1987 methodology to include plot size and crop type our results reveal statistically significant differences in the three alternative systems of property rights assignments which have implications for economic theory and policy relating to tenure systems

oil production responses to price changes an empirical application of the competitive model to opec and non opec countries abstract falling oil prices over the last decade accompanied by over production by some opec members and the growth of non opec supply warrant further empirical investigation of the competitive model to ascertain production behavior a supply function based on a modification of griffin s model is estimated using data from 1973 1997 the sample period unlike griffin s however includes phases of price increase 1970s and price decrease 1980s 1990s thus providing a better framework for examining production behavior using the competitive model the opec results do not support the competitive hypothesis instead a negative and significant price elasticity of supply is obtained this result offers partial support for the target revenue theory for most of the non opec members the estimates support the competitive model opec s loss of market share and the drop in the share of oil based energy should signal adjustments in price and quantity based on a competitive world market for crude oil

effects of technology on incentive design of share contracts do observed contracts have the properties predicted by the principal agent model with moral hazard in contract theory this paper tests the predictions of such an agency model in the context of sharecropping in north india the most well known explanation for sharecropping is based on the principal agent model with a trade off between risk and incentives even though sharecropping contracts are quite prevalent in rural areas of developing countries there is very little evidence on factors determining the instruments used to provide incentives in such contracts using information in the data giving rise to exogenous variation in technology across regions this paper tests for the effect of cultivation technology on the incentive structure of share contracts as predicted by the agency model existing empirical evidence on sharecropping seems to indicate that yield on sharecropped plots is lower than on owner operated plots i e there is an incentive problem or moral hazard radwan a shaban 1987 jean jacques laffont and mohamed s matoussi 1995 there is some informal evidence that landowners use various mechanisms to improve efficiency in sharecropping by participating in cost sharing and by repeating contracts robert m townsend and rolf a mueller 1994 examine the nature of these mechanisms in detail but their data do not permit econometric tests more generally though the principal agent model has been widely studied there is little existing empirical evidence for it michael c jensen and kevin j murphy 1990 find that executive compensation is only weakly sensitive to firm performance in recent work rajesh k aggarwal and andrew a samwick 1999 find that executive s pay performance sensitivity is decreasing in the volatility of firm s performance however their results are sensitive to the inclusion of other characteristics of the firms in the regressions as pierre a chiappori and bernard salanie 2003 note in a recent survey empirical work on contract theory using nonexperimental data needs to be careful in adequately correcting for underlying heterogeneity across agents otherwise the parameters of interest would be hard to interpret if such heterogeneity affects contract choice for example douglas w allen and dean lueck 1995 find no role for risk in the choice between share contract and fixed rent contracts but they do not take the heterogeneity across agents into account in a recent paper addressing the issue of heterogeneity across agents ackerberg and botticini 2002 find a significant role for risk in the choice between share contract and fixed rent contract after correcting for endogenous matching between landowners and tenants they find that wealthier tenants are more likely to be in fixed rent contracts in this paper we are able to address such estimation issues and check for the robustness of our results regarding the relationship between technology and the design of share contracts department of economics pennsylvania state university university park pa 16801 e mail pxp22 psu edu this paper derives from related work done earlier in my dissertation i am grateful to two anonymous referees for very helpful suggestions i thank james heckman lars stole robert townsend kala krishna and seminar participants for useful comments financial support from the andrew mellon foundation for both rounds of fieldwork is gratefully acknowledged any errors remain my own 1 see nirvikar singh 1991 for a survey of various theories of sharecropping including steven n cheung 1969 c h hanumantha rao 1971 joseph e stiglitz 1974 david newbery and stiglitz 1979 avishay braverman and stiglitz 1982 mukesh eswaran and ashok kotwal 1985 and sudhir shetty 1988 a common feature of the different theories is an emphasis on uncertainty and asymmetric information 2 an exception is daniel a ackerberg and maristella botticini 2002 ackerberg and botticini differ from our paper in that they examine the role of tenant s risk aversion in the choice between fixed rental contract and share contract they do not examine share contracts per se 3 see john e core and wayne guay 2000

moral hazard land fertility and sharecropping in a rural area of the philippines abstract introducing concerns about land fertility for landlords in a principal agent model of sharecropping with moral hazard we show that the optimal contract under limited commitment reflects a trade off between production and land quality maintenance using data from the philippines a model where the leasing out and contract choices are simultaneous is estimated and avoids the selectivity bias of observed contracts landlords prefer to use more incentive contracts for more fertile plots and less incentive ones when crop choices induce land overuse empirical tests reject the model of pure risk sharing in production and show the interest of taking land quality maintenance into account

rental markets for cultivated land and agricultural investments in china the purpose of this paper is to empirically track the progress and consequences of the emergence of cultivated land markets in china since 2000 we draw on a set of nationwide household level panel data for 2000 and 2008 and find that the markets for cultivated land rental have emerged robustly according to our data 19 of china s cultivated land was rented in farm operators in 2008 we also find that the nature of china s cultivated land rental contracts has become more formal and lengthened the period of time that the tenant is able to cultivate the rented in plots while there may be benefits for lessors and tenants our data show that there are falling rates of investment in organic manure the farmers in our sample have reduced organic manure use from 13 tons ha in 2000 to 5 tons ha in 2008 part of this fall is due to the rise of cultivated land rental markets the analysis however does not find that improved property rights in cultivated land rental affect investment largely because property rights have largely been established by 2000 the first year of our sample our results however also show that there are forces that appear to be mitigating the negative consequences of rising cultivated land rental after holding constant initial rental rates and other factors we find that the gap between investment in organic manure in own land and rented in land is narrowing one interpretation of our findings is that if policymakers can find ways to even further strengthen the rights of lessors and tenants as well as lengthen contract periods farmerseven those that rentwill invest more in their land because they will be able to capture the returns to their investments

on minimum rents part 2 a modern interpretation summary the idea that there might be some minimum rent below which a land owner would not let to any tenant was put forward by marx but with little supporting argument in this paper it is shown that the modern concepts and analysis of transaction costs and monitoring costs can explain why such a minimum rent might exist further that risk and uncertainty coupled with the fact that tenancies are usually for some years also provide an explanation for the reluctance of land and property owners to let at minimal rents some empirical evidence is cited particularly the substantial rents which have to be paid to lay telecommunication cables across private land

poverty and land redistribution abstract despite a theoretical literature that promises that land transfers will have large impacts on the well being of poor households well identified empirical evidence on the efficacy of land redistribution is scarce in an effort to fill this gap this paper examines south africa s land redistribution for agricultural development lrad program we exploit features of lrad program implementation to extract exogenous variation in whether and for how long applicant households enjoyed land transfers binary treatment estimates which compare treated with untreated households show that beneficiary households on average experienced a 25 increase in per capita consumption our preferred continuous treatment estimates which analyze only the subset of treated households identify the impact time path of land transfers on consumption these estimates show that living standards initially drop and then after 3 4 years rise to 150 of their pre transfer level these results are statistically significant and robust to a statistically more conservative identification strategy

the time path of scarcity rent in the theory of exhaustible resources there is now a consensus in the literature on resource economics that a depletable resource should command a price in excess of its marginal extraction cost simply to reflect the opportunity cost of using a unit of it today rather that conserving it for the future but how this excess is to change along an optimal or competitive equilibrium path of resource use is still an unresolved question this might at first seem puzzling since according to the fundamental theorem of economics of exhaustible resources or hotelling i 93 i rule on an optimal path price minus marginal extraction cost also termed interchangeably as scarcity rent user cost or royalty should steadily grow over time at the social rate of discount however the literature contains sharply contrasting views on the subject for example kay and mirrlees 1975 have argued that since along an optimal path the scarcity rent grows exponentially as a finite stock of a resourcexnears exhaustion then situations in which the resource stock is still very large and yet the price greatly exceeds the marginal extraction cost should indicate that the price is significantly above its optimal level and that the resource is overconserved in stark contrast to this view heal i976 has argued that as the resource stock nears exhaustion the difference between price and marginal cost or what he termed social cost of extraction falls monotonically to zero hanson i980 analyses the same model as heal s but unlike heal who assumes the unit extraction cost to be convex he postulates it to be concave and yet like heal concludes that the scarcity rent will be monotonically declining over time solow and wan i976 analyse a still different situation where resource deposits differ in quality and the unit extraction cost increases as higher grade deposits are exhausted and extraction proceeds to lower grades they show that along an optimal path the shadow price of a resource must rise at the real rate of interest despite differential extraction costs but that the difference between price and the marginal extraction cost or what they call degradation charge declines monotonically over time to zero these sharply differing conclusions suggest that far from being resolved the question of how scarcity rent changes over time is much in want of a close scrutiny the need for such a scrutiny becomes even stronger once it is noted

does risk matter the case of wage labour allocation by owner cultivators this study analyses the impact of revenue risk on the hiring out behaviour of owner cultivators since hiring out is not certain labour market risk is also allowed for a large sample of owner cultivators residing in semi arid regions in india and hence subject to high production and labour market risks is used for this purpose it is found that possibly because production risks carry forward into the local labour market households are unable to use the labour market as a hedge against production risk we also find that labour force participation is positively affected by increases in the real wage rate a result that is contrary to the findings of earlier studies using data from less developed agriculture several other insights also result

do iran s buy back service contracts lead to optimal production the case of soroosh and nowrooz abstract we model the dynamically optimal oil production on iran s offshore soroosh and nowrooz fields which have been developed by shell exploration through a buy back service contract in particular we examine the national iranian oil company s nioc actual and contractual oil production behavior and compare it to the production profile that would have been optimal under the conditions of the contract we find that the contract s production profile is different from optimal production profile for most discount rates and that the nioc s actual behavior is inefficient its production rates have not maximized profits because the nioc s objective is purported to be maximizing cumulative production instead of the present discounted value of the entire stream of profits we also compare the nioc s behavior to the production profile that would maximize cumulative production we find that even though what the contract dictates comes close to maximizing cumulative production the nioc has not been achieving its own objective of maximizing cumulative production

trends in natural resource commodity prices an analysis of the time domain abstract this paper attempts to reconcile the theoretical predictions of increasing real prices for nonrenewable natural resource commodities obtained from hotelling style models with the empirical findings of falling prices for these commodities a theoretical model for relative price movements is derived for the case of exogenous technical change and endogenous change in the grade of ores mined the model suggests a u shaped time path for relative prices the implied price movements are tested for all the major metals and fuels and the model parameters are found to be statistically significant for 11 out of the 12 commodities tested

efficient share tenancy contracts under risk the case of two rice growing villages in thailand abstract two categories of thai sharecroppers are observed to be efficient those under high poverty and high risk and those in a long term relation of gift exchange with their landlord econometric estimates show that use of variable factors by these sharecroppers is insignificantly different from that by owner operators and significantly higher than that by generic sharecroppers interpretations for this behavior are provided by models of sharecropping under safety first and of repeated contracts with gift exchange

sharecropping and the interlinking of agrarian markets one of the often noted features of less developed agrarian economies is the existence of interlinkages among the land labor credit and product markets the landlord is often the supplier of credit he frequently purchases and markets the output of the tenant farmers and often sells raw materials and even consumption goods to his tenant farmers how can this phenomenon be explained what are the welfare consequences of attempts to restrict these practices which often seem to constitute restraints on free trade these are the questions to which this paper is addressed a general set of arguments applicable to both competitive and noncompetitive environments are presented to situations where all the terms of the contract are determined in an optimal way as well as to situations where many of the terms are specified institutionally section i examines interlinked credit and tenancy contracts section ii examines interlinked marketing and tenancy contracts section iii points out the possible interlinking between labor contracts and consumption goods markets and section iv presents the different equilibrium frameworks discussed in the paper such as monopoly monopsony competition and equilibria with surplus labor

credit and land contracting a test of the theory of sharecropping author s das n de janvry a sadoulet e abstract 2019 the author s 2019 published by oxford university press on behalf of the agricultural and applied economics association all rights reserved for permissions please email journals permissions oup com choice of a share vs fixed rent land rental contract has figured prominently in the theory of industrial organization this theory tells us that while a share contract is inefficient in a first best world it may be the preferred option under second best conditions it has thus predicted the existence of sharecropping as the potentially preferred contract under conditions of liquidity constraint rigorous empirical evidence is however still lacking on this basic contribution of theory we use a randomized experiment in a credit program for landless workers and marginal farmers organized by brac in bangladesh to show that increased access to credit has a large positive effect on the choice of fixed rent over share rent contracts both in terms of number of contracts and area contracted as predicted by theory the magnitude of this shift away from sharecropping is enhanced when the tenant is less exposed to risk development programs that facilitate access to credit to potential tenants can thus help them take more efficient land rental contracts

limited liability wealth differences and tenancy contracts in agrarian economies abstract an explanation is provided for two observations concerning variations in the choice of tenants and their welfare differences in tenants wealth imply corresponding differences in liability when default is possible on fixed rental commitments in this context the inability of landlords to specify their tenants effort lead to effort choices that vary with the type of contract offered the selection of tenants and the contract terms they receive thus depend on wealth with wealthier tenants being preferred and receiving fixed rent contracts these results also predict that wealthier tenants earn higher profits on their leased plots

uncertainty entrepreneurship and sharecropping in india this study attempts to explain the coexistence of different farm lease arrangements in terms of the varying significance of entrepreneurial functions in india crop sharing arrangements are common in areas of relative economic certainty with very little scope for decision making for example for product and factor substitution and where the entrepreneurial profit is low fixed cash rents are common in situations of high uncertainty where the scope for decision making is significant or where the crops are highly profitable efficiency considerations predominate in areas of sharecropping favoring a smaller farm size whereas under high uncertainty large size is favored for reducing risk

empowerment and efficiency tenancy reform in west bengal the paper analyzes the effect of agricultural tenancy laws offering security of tenure to tenants and regulating the share of output that is paid as rent on farm productivity theoretically the net impact of tenancy reform is shown to be a combination of two effects a bargaining power effect and a security of tenure effect analysis of evidence on how contracts and productivity changed after a tenancy reform program was implemented in the indian state of west bengal in the late 1970s suggests that tenancy reform had a positive effect on agricultural productivity there

the efficiency of share contracts in ghana s cocoa industry social anthropologists have contributed significantly to our understanding of the consistency between observed labour contracts in the ghana cocoa industry and the cultural historical development of the country this article contributes to the ongoing research efforts in this area by demonstrating that the observed labour contracts are also efficient and consistent with the predictions of economic theory it concludes that joint efforts by anthropologists and economists may be one effective way to proceed in seeking insights into a labour market that is so deeply rooted in the culture of a people

rural market imperfections and the farm size productivity relationship evidence from pakistan the subject of this article is the relationships between farm size and productivity and between farm size and profitability in the developing countries the recent controversies over the inverse size output relationship are reviewed and a framework is provided that explains the inverse relationship based on plausible assumptions about imperfections in the markets for labor land credit and risk from this framework a set of testable hypotheses are derived the hypotheses are tested on recent farm level panel data from pakistan a strong inverse relationship between farm size and yield is present in the sample even when household fixed effects are used to account for unobserved heterogeneity moreover the suggested market imperfections framework is consistent with the data

insecure land rights and share tenancy evidence from madagascar most studies of tenurial insecurity focus on its effects on investment this paper studies the hitherto unexplored relationship between tenurial insecurity and land tenancy contracts based on distinct features of formal law and customary rights in madagascar this paper augments the canonical model of sharecropping by making the strength of the landlord s property right increasing in the amount of risk she bears within the contract using data on landlords subjective perceptions in rural madagascar empirical tests support the hypothesis that insecure property rights drive contract choice but offer little support in favor of the canonical risk sharing hypothesis

inverse productivity land quality labor markets and measurement error abstract this paper examines the role that land quality and imperfect markets play in generating the inverse productivity relationship in the international crop research institute for the semi arid tropics icrisat data differences in land quality largely explain the inverse productivity ip relationship in the random effects profit regression but not in labor demand regressions controlling for labor and land market failures and differences in soil quality eliminates the ip relationship for male labor but not female labor in the random effects estimates the inverse relationship is much stronger in fixed effects than random effects estimates suggesting that the farm size variable may be subject to measurement error a view supported by the results of instrumental variables estimation