aggregate scale economies market integration and optimal welfare state policy abstract using a two sector two country model with aggregate scale economies and unionisation we show that optimal welfare state policy entails positive levels of unemployment benefits under free trade and capital mobility in this setting economic integration does not reduce the revenue raising capacity of governments and thus does not lead to a race to the bottom in social standards instead trade and capital flows interact with welfare state policies in increasing welfare even when each government acts independently non cooperatively in determining its optimal welfare payment cooperation is shown to improve upon non cooperative outcomes by raising both the generosity of the welfare state and aggregate welfare

imperfect competition and the keynesian cross abstract this paper presents a simple general equilibrium model in which the only non walrasian feature is imperfect competition in the goods market the model is shown to exhibit various keynesian characteristics in particular as competition in the goods market becomes less perfect the fiscal policy multipliers approach the values implied by the textbook keynesian cross

the impact of fiscal policy on profits i introduction a large number of policy making decisions rely on the key issue of the impact of fiscal policy on the economy therefore it is not surprising that the effect of fiscal policy on macroeconomic aggregates has been extensively studied in the empirical literature 1 several authors starting with blanchard and perotti 2002 have attempted to estimate the effect of government spending shocks on output and other variables in the context of structural var models see perotti 2008 for a survey this interest has been renewed since the 2008 2009 recession given the unprecedented size of fiscal packages worldwide barro and redlick 2009 hall 2009 an important part of this literature focuses on the theoretical and empirical investigation of the fiscal policy transmission channels theories of fiscal policy transmission differ in their implications regarding the response of different macroeconomic variables to government spending shocks for example the neoclassical model predicts a negative impact of government spending on real wages and consumption while this prediction is challenged by new keynesian models to that end an important branch of empirical literature on fiscal multipliers has investigated the transmission channels of fiscal policy by looking mainly at the response of private consumption and real wages 2 this paper deals with an important but relatively under investigated channel of fiscal policy transmission which is the effect of fiscal policy on profits as pointed out by hall 2009 the impact of fiscal shocks on the markup of price over marginal cost is important for understanding the functioning of the fiscal multiplier in the purely neoclassical general equilibrium model a rise in government spending produces a negative wealth effect the labor supply curve shifts outward and real wages and consumption fall this implies that the output multiplier will be well below unity a keynesian type fiscal multiplier implying a large positive output effect and positive responses of private consumption and real wages to increased government spending relies on a negative response of the markup of price over marginal cost to an increase in economic activity the intuition is that a decrease in the price marginal cost markup in response to higher government spending allows a rise in wages or at least a smaller reduction in wages compared with the case when the markup is constant a rise in wages would then imply that households will substitute away from leisure and into consumption therefore if the markup is countercyclical conditional on government spending shocks sizeable output multipliers of fiscal spending are consistent with existing empirical evidence that fiscal shocks are not related to strong decreases in real wages or consumption blanchard and perotti 2002 fatas and mihov 2001 gall david lopez salid and valles 2007 perotti 2005 2008 in general a new keynesian model with sticky prices implies a countercyclical markup ratio as input prices rise in a boom while output prices stay constant however for understanding the fiscal policy transmission the key factor is markup and not price stickiness itself as a countercyclical markup could also be implied by models with flexible prices when the desired markup changes in response to a shock 3 a model which assigns a central role to markups for fiscal policy transmission has been presented by ravn schmitt grohe and uribe 2007 assuming that demand has a price inelastic component that is a function of deep habits a government spending shock that leads to a positive output response increases the share of the price elastic component of demand causing a rise in the overall demand elasticity and a corresponding decline in the optimal markup 4 thus for a sufficient decline in the markup the resulting rise in wages induces households to substitute away from leisure and into consumption thereby more than offsetting the negative wealth effect of government spending predicted by the neoclassical model

allowance price and distributional effects under a personal carbon trading scheme abstract personal carbon trading pct is a downstream cap and trade scheme to reduce carbon emissions from the household sector in comparison to an upstream carbon trading scheme pct is a progressive scheme in which the poorer consumers are mostly winners as their levels of emissions are generally lower this paper investigates the equilibrium price for allowances and distributional effects under a pct scheme first we propose an equilibrium model for pct from which we derive an equilibrium price for allowances second a consumer surplus analysis is conducted to examine the welfare changes caused by the pct scheme generally we find that the pct scheme is progressive and can provide a buffer between the energy and allowance price based on these results the implications are discussed and suggestions for a future study are provided

market structure and fiscal policy effectiveness in a monopolistic competition macromodel with endogenous market structure the fiscal multiplier is shown to consist of two components the first depicts the response of output to a fiscal expansion through the conventional channels that disregard the role of market imperfections the second component captures the effects of firms market power as well as the policy induced change in market structure the latter effect which has not been taken into account in existing studies is shown to be quite significant in raising the fiscal multiplier even above unity and in improving consumers welfare when the labour market is competitive

unions and profitability over the 1980s some evidence on union firm bargaining in the united kingdom in this paper an attempt is made to assess the behaviour of the rate of return on sales of unionised firms as compared to the non unionised ones in the late 1980s in the united kingdom the main aim is to examine what has happened to the relationship between unionisation and profitability after the changes in the union legislation competition environment and cyclical variations that took place over this period the impact of different forms of union firm bargaining on the union profitability effect is also examined the data reveal that the negative union effect on profitability exists even after controlling for firm specific fixed effects but that it has been sharply reduced over the 1980s

education and economic declin 1890 1980s over the last hundred years or so there has been a persistent belief that the relative decline of the british economy has been underlain by defects in our education the argument that i wish to put forward here is that whatever the defects of technical and scientific education in the 1870s and 1880s the situation radically improved in the 1890s and 1900s and it is fallacious to regard the whole period 18701914asoneinwhichdefectsofprovisionhinderedindustrialperformance the more lasting problem was not so much the provision of technical education as the willingness of employers to receive its products this was compounded by the liberal education values entrenched in the education of the upper classes at the public schools and oxford the focussing by historians on the defects of the pre 1914 period has also diverted attention from perhaps the most serious issue of all namely the failure in the twentieth century to develop a technical education for teenagers of school age

make and buy balancing bargaining power abstract we analyze the optimal procurement of labor which can be supplied either internally based on wage negotiations or acquired at terms negotiated with an external subcontractor the novel feature of our model is that the subcontractor s bargaining power is a function of the proportion of output outsourced we demonstrate analytically how multiple sourcing emerges as an organizational mechanism to balance cost advantages associated with outsourcing against a subcontractor s increased bargaining power we find that the optimal proportion of outsourcing is lower with sequential negotiations than with simultaneous negotiations if the supplier to first negotiate can foreclose subsequent negotiations

representative agent meets class structure imperfect competition and the balanced budget multiplier recently new keynesian economists nke have been concerned with the effect of imperfect competition on the sign and size of the balanced budget fiscal multiplier this literature all came up with models based on a profit income relationship in which imperfect competition increases the tax financed fiscal multiplier accordingly the higher the exercise of market power by firms the greater the effectiveness of fiscal policy in this paper we argue that the new keynesian results are very sensitive to a heroic simplification on which they rest the representative agent we show that in terms of the budget balanced multiplier a kaleckian approach where class structure matters offers a richer set of results moreover we develop a simple short run rational agent optimisation model of the type used by nke and introduce class structure into it we demonstrate in support of the kaleckian approach that even in a general equilibrium optimising framework the balanced budget multiplier is strictly decreasing in the degree of monopoly copyright 2006 oxford university press

multifirm unions and the incentive to adopt pattern bargaining in oligopoly abstract this paper develops a model of wage bargaining between an industry wide trade union and firms in an oligopoly and considers the circumstances under which the union prefers pattern bargaining that is negotiating contracts in a sequential manner to simultaneous bargaining with the firms the paper goes on to consider the importance of the bargaining order in pattern bargaining when the firms are asymmetric the analysis shows that the union gains by first targeting a firm which is in a relatively weak bargaining position i e impatient to settle or a firm with relatively large profits

endogenous markups and the effects of income taxation theory and evidence from oecd countries abstract existing studies on the effects of fiscal policy under imperfect competition typically treat each firm s price cost markup as fixed this paper examines the implications of endogenising the markup in a simple model of income taxation under monopolistic competition it is demonstrated that an increase in income tax reduces the number of firms lessens competition among surviving firms and raises the optimal markups in the new steady state through this channel the effects of income taxation on the key macroeconomic variables as well as on consumer welfare are unambiguously enlarged the simple model prediction is largely supported by cross section regressions with data from oecd countries

environmental taxation and unemployment some evidence on the double dividend hypothesis in europe abstract the employment double dividend hypothesis suggests that an appropriately designed fiscal reform in which emission charges are used to subsidize employers social security contributions may realize at least two relevant policy goals a better quality of the environment and at the same time an increase in employment levels this paper uses a newly developed econometric general equilibrium model for the european union as well as for each member country and presents simulation results up to the year 2010 of the effects of a european carbon tax the revenues from which are recycled to reduce employers social security contributions the results show that recycling carbon tax revenues may provide an employment double dividend only in the short run

how are product demand changes transmitted to the labour market in the traditional keynesian and classical models the transmission of product demand changes to the labor market generally involves wage price sluggishness or countercyclical real wage movements in practice however real wages are often acyclical or procyclical and wages and prices are flexible over periods of several years this paper examines the main channels whereby product demand can affect employment under these conditions the analysis suggests that the effectiveness of demand management policies under wage price flexibility depends significantly on the availability of a limited number of supply side transmission channels copyright 1994 by royal economic society

can personal gasoline permit trading be effective an investigation into permit demand this study proposes a personal gasoline permit trading scheme to limit the total gasoline consumption thus reducing its environmental impact we studied the effectiveness of this scheme by analyzing the permit demand of a gasoline driven vehicle in transportation sector a general utility optimization model is formulated and a cobb douglas utility function is further assumed to analyze the response of permit demand to its price changes with the slutsky decomposition of price effects the results when defined in economic terms indicate that the permit demand of consumers in higher income groups are negatively related to permit price permit demand are also negatively related to permit price for consumers in medium income groups but with positive income effect and the direct relationship between permit demand of lower income groups and the price is defined as a giffen good effect that is for those low income groups when the permit price rises their demand for permits would also increase then us and singapore household expenditure data are used to show comparable results of a pilot personal gasoline permit trading scheme further some regulations on critical parameters such as permit allocation and permit prices in the policy design are proposed to make the scheme feasible in different income groups based on these results implications limitation and suggestions for future study are discussed

public capital and imperfect competition abstract in this paper we consider a macroeconomic model in which public capital is a productive input and there is monopolistic competition in the product market we analyze the effects of a permanent variation in public capital investment both in the short and in the long run finally we show that the optimal provision of public capital under imperfect competition is higher than that associated with the first best policy

an alternative to steady state comparisons in perfect foresight models abstract this note examines a technique for the computation of the welfare impact of a pertubation of the steady state in a typical perfect foresight model the major innovation is the ability to analyze non stationary perturbations

productivity and long term growth potential in the uk economy 1924 1968 this paper examines the long term structural determinants of labour productivity for the uk economy using a panel data set from 1924 to 1968 trade union product market competition and human capital explanations are embedded within the model and compared labour quality or human capital is found to be the most important of the explanations considered

an integration of trade union models in a sequential bargaining framework this paper aims to embed two popular models of trade union behavior the monopoly model and the efficient bargaining model in a more general framework it does this by analyzing sequential bargaining models where wages are determined before employment and the power of the union in the two stages of the bargain differs as well as finding that the monopoly and efficient bargain models are special cases of this model a new class of models is also discovered this framework is used to analyze the relationship between union pow er and efficiency the empirical analysis of trade unions and the effects of trade union legislation copyright 1987 by royal economic society

green trade unions structure wages and environmental technology this paper investigates the effect of trade union structure on firms technological choices when unions care about environmental protection we compare a decentralized with a centralized union structure in a cournot duopoly our results suggest that a decentralized structure provides higher incentives for the investment in cleaner technologies although emissions may be lower under a centralized structure the effect of the environmental damage parameter on wages and output may be non monotonic

the assessment productivity and competitiveness in british manufacturing this issue of the oxford review examines productivity and competitiveness in british manufac turing the simplest and most widely used measure of productivity is output per head from this definition sprout at once the horns of a dilemma for an economy facing unemployment on the present scale for a given rate of expansion of output the higher the rate of productivity growth the greater the decline in employment or at least the smaller its growth on the other hand in an economy open to international competition a high rate of productivity growth relative to that of other countries is the long term key to achieving the favourable international competitive po sition necessary to sustain growth and a low level of unemployment

infrastructure investment a review essay economists try not to be faddists but they often cannot help themselves while work on a topic should mirror the prospective importance of the topic that situation seems to occur with disappointing frequency instead the usual pattern is that some reasonably important topic will be totally ignored for the longest time then recognized and then the subject of a flurry of work all out of proportion to its likely long run importance nowhere has this speculative bubble of economic research been more clearly illustrated than with infrastructure investment macroeconomists havelong felt that the stock of public capital is an important factor input in the production of total output macroeconomists have known that u s productivity growth slowed dramatically in about 1973 and macroeconomists should have known that united states investment in public capital has been down since the late 1960s yet analysis of the u s productivity slowdown completely ignored infrastructure investment for the first fifteen years of this slowdown concentrating instead on energy prices social regulation the composition of the work force research and development different rates of obsolescence of the private capital stock and any number of other matters the public capital stock was hardly ever even mentioned as a potential factor in the productivity slowdown aschauer changed all that he wrote a series of papers 1989a 1989b 1989c that put these two movements together econometrically infrastructure investment turned down and aggregate productivity turned down slightly later both in the united states and in some other developed countries his work hit the magic button those who had worried about the productivity puzzle for fifteen years welcomed a new suspect those who were worried about low rates of u s national saving welcomed a new way to make their argument even more forcefully than with official figures on saving and investment which do not count infrastructure investment as investment political liberals and liberal politicians saw a way to rescue government spending and projects from the assaults of reaganism and even a way to avoid oth

rent shifting and the order of negotiations abstract when two sellers negotiate terms of trade with a common buyer the order in which the negotiations occur can affect the buyer s payoff this suggests that the buyer may have preferences over which seller to negotiate with first we find that when the efficient outcome calls for the buyer to purchase from only one seller the buyer weakly prefers to negotiate first with the inefficient seller and when the efficient outcome calls for the buyer to purchase from both sellers the buyer prefers to negotiate first with the seller that has less bargaining power or offers a smaller stand alone surplus all else being equal these conclusions hold whether or not penalty clauses are feasible

monopolistic competition as a foundation for keynesian macroeconomic models a general equilibrium macroeconomic model based on monopolistic competition is presented the model exhibits a traditional multiplier in the short run but due to free entry the multiplier disappears in the long run by construction all agents are fully rational the keynesian results are a consequence of the assumption of monopolistic competition which creates a divergence between optimal private behavior and optimal social behavior

productive government expenditures and long run growth the purpose of this paper is to review some of the recent developments in endogenous growth models specifically our focus is on the growth effects of productive government spending in dynamic general equilibrium models we use a simple overlapping generations model as our basic framework and illustrate the role of taxes and spending we then examine several related issues nonrivalry in publicly provided goods existence and uniqueness of competitive equilibrium endogenous public policy ways of financing public expenditures composition of publicly provided goods and services and private alternatives finally we review some empirical results related to output elasticity of public capital and educational expenditures

labour productivity in spain 1977 2002 this study examines the evolution of labour productivity across spanish regions during the period from 1977 to 2002 applying the kernel technique we estimate the effects of the transition process on labour productivity and its main sources we find that spanish regions experienced a major convergence process in labour productivity mostly driven by human capital in the 1977 1993 period conversely the dynamics of investment in physical capital appear to be neutral with respect to the transition dynamics of labour productivity finally from 1995 to 2002 no dynamic processes seemed to have taken place spanish regions exhibit a persistent relative position with established convergence clubs the human capital effect is less important and the investment in physical capital seems not to have a triggering effect on labour productivity growth

the failure of training in britain analysis and prescription in the last decade education and training et reform has become a major issue in many of the world s industrial powers one theme which runs throughout these reform initiatives is the need to adapt et systems to the changing economic environment these changes include the increasing integration of world markets the shift in mass manufacturing towards newly developed nations and the rapid development of new technologies most notably information technologies education and training are seen to play a crucial role in restoring or maintaining international competitiveness both on the macro level by easing the transition of the workforce into new industries and at the micro level where firms producing high quality specialized goods and services require a well qualified workforce capable of rapid adjustment in the work process and continual product innovation this paper will highlight the need for policy makers and academics to take account of the two way nature of the relationship between et and the economy

to be unionized or not to be a case for cost raising strategies under cournot oligopoly abstract this paper analyses the decision by firms under cournot oligopoly as to recognize unions in order to gain market power despite higher costs considering classical models of union firm bargaining namely right to manage rtm and efficient bargaining eb we show that for a sufficiently low level of union power eb firms might adopt cost raising strategies this theoretical prediction is compatible with some empirical evidence in favour of eb and adds to the theoretical finding that eb might dominate rtm under unionized cournot nash oligopoly it also suggests closer antitrust scrutiny as whether unions can provide cartel like services to oligopoly firms allowing them to distort product market competition at the expense of consumers

worker substitutability and patterns of unionisation a strategic three party bargaining model is developed in which one distinguished party the firm has to reac h agreements with the other two each of which is a group of workers in the prebargaining stage the two worker groups decide whether to organize jointly or separately the main observation relates the equi librium pattern of unionization to the substitutability in production between the two groups the outcome is joint or separate unions acco rding to whether the two groups are substitute or complementary facto rs of production the analysis also considers possibilities for firm s strategic intervention in the unionization process copyright 1988 by royal economic society

on the monotonicity of balanced budget multiplier under imperfect competition abstract this paper presents a counterexample to the wellknown monotonicity result of mankiw 1988 mankiw n g 1988 imperfect competition and the keynesian cross economics letters 26 7 13 in particular by considering taxes on labor income rather than lumpsum taxes it obtains a negative relation between the magnitude of the balanced budget multiplier and marketpower

economic growth international competitiveness and environmental protection r d and innovation strategies with the warm model abstract it is often argued that policies designed to protect the environment may harm economic growth moreover if introduced unilaterally by a given country they may reduce the competitiveness of domestic firms these arguments are generally based on the assumption that environmental protection has to be achieved through the introduction of emission charges e g a carbon tax however three issues need to be raised first the tax is not the only policy instrument and is not the most efficient one that can be used to reduce polluting emissions secondly even when a tax policy is implemented it is important to assess the feedback effects induced by recycling the tax revenue thirdly and most importantly the role of technical progress cannot be neglected therefore there may exist a policy mix that provides firms with the correct incentives to adopt energy saving technologies and to invest in environment friendly r d the first two issues have partly been explored both in the theoretical and empirical literature the third issue i e the role of incentives to technical progress still lacks adequate quantitative assessment this is why a new model has been developed which endogenizes technical progress and its effects and feedbacks on economic energy and environmental variables using warm an econometric general equilibrium model for the european union and for each member country this paper presents simulation results up to 2015 of the effects of some industrial environmental policies which are aimed at protecting the environment without necessarily damaging competitiveness and economic growth the results show that policies that stimulate environmental r d technological innovation and diffusion may provide firms with the correct incentives to avoid damaging the environment while preserving their competitiveness in the market moreover such a policy based both on r d subsidies and on innovation incentives may not worsen the public sector budget balance as a result of the positive effects on economic growth

profits markups and entry fiscal policy in an open economy in this paper we develop a general model of an imperfectly competitive small open economy there is a traded and non traded sector whose outputs are combined in order to produce a single final good that can be either consumed or invested we make general assumptions about preferences and technology and analyze the impact of fiscal policy on the economy we find that the fiscal multiplier is between zero and one and provide sufficient conditions for it to be increasing in the degree of imperfect competition we also are able to compare the multiplier under free entry and with a fixed number of firms and welfare a simple graphical representation of the model is developed

optimal labour contracts and imperfect competition a framework for analysis this paper examines the macroeconomic properties of imperfectly competitive economies by modeling the labor market from the perspective of optimal contract theory the point is to demonstrate that important properties of imperfectly competitive economies such as underemployment equilibria multipliers and the prospect of coordination failures are not the consequence of arbitrary labor relations but can emerge with privately optimal labor contracts

market structure cost asymmetries and fiscal policy effectiveness abstract imperfectly competitive macroeconomic models typically assume a symmetric equilibrium with identical firms despite the fact that most industries are characterised by substantial degrees of firm heterogeneity we examine how inter firm efficiency gaps affect fiscal policy effectiveness under monopolistic competition

bilateral monopolies and incentives for merger the paper presents a model of duopoly in which firms acquire inputs through bilateral monopoly relations with suppliers it combines a bargaining model with a duopoly model to examine how input pri

the equilibrium approach to fiscal policy this paper lays out a simple model for the purpose of bringing together the various strands of the analysis of fiscal policy in an optimizing competitive equilibrium model the discussion centers on the critic al assumptions lying behind the ricardian equivalence proposition th e role of the time profile and composition of public expenditure and the timing of distortional taxation copyright 1988 by ohio state university press

the assessment british economic cgowth over the long run it is now conventional wisdom that for some hundred years or so british growth and especially productivity performance have been deeply disappointing when compared with that of other advanced countries more contentious but nevertheless widely held is the belief that the failures of the post war economy are deeply rooted in the past presenting successive governments both with an unenviable legacy and a most daunting task in their aspiration to remedy britain s relative economic decline thus eatwell 1982 claims that the weakness of the british economy is the cumulative product of the entire history of britain since the end of the nineteenth century when it first became evident that b ritain was unable or unwilling to adapt to a competitive world in which her pre eminence could no longer be taken for granted certainly complaints about the poor quality of industrial management trade union obstacles to productivity advance the inappropriate and inadequate education system in the uk and slowness to develop and apply advanced technology were commonplace at the turn of the century as they have been in recent decades furthermore the twentieth century has seen a constant and often painful need to restructure economic activity in the face of a declining share of world trade and changing comparative advantage whilst in terms of olson s thesis 1982 suffering the sclerotic effect of special interest groups undisrupted by war foreign occupation or totalitarian government

break up fees and bargaining power in sequential contracting abstract when a buyer negotiates in sequence with two potential sellers of a good the outcome of each negotiation depends on all three players bargaining powers assuming all parties are symmetrically informed we find that the first seller s payoff is increasing in his own and the second seller s bargaining power on the other hand the second seller s payoff is decreasing in the first seller s bargaining power and in some cases also in his own bargaining power we characterize when contracts will contain break up fees all results extend to the case of a seller negotiating in sequence with two buyers

is pattern bargaining dead this paper challenges the common belief that pattern bargaining largely ended in the 1980s applying a measure of pattern bargaining the dispersion of log wages to wage data drawn from the same data set that audrey freedman used in her widely quoted studies of this subject the author shows that the extent of pattern bargaining was actually greater in 1983 than in 1977 the evidence suggests that managers perceptions of changes in the bargaining process which are the basis for freedman s claim that pattern bargaining has eroded are inconsistent with actual changes in wage patterns

imperfect competition the marginal cost of public funds and public goods supply abstract this paper analyses the impact of changes in product market competition on the marginal cost of public funds mcpf and public goods supply when distortionary commodity taxes are used to raise revenue first less competition measured by a switch from bertrand to cournot conduct or a decrease in the elasticity of demand does not necessarily raise the mpcf second even if it does optimal public good supply does not necessarily fall the paper also presents a method for modelling bertrand and cournot competition in general equilibrium that may be of independent interest

tiered gasoline pricing a personal carbon trading perspective abstract this paper proffers a tiered gasoline pricing method from a personal carbon trading perspective an optimization model of personal carbon trading is proposed and then an equilibrium carbon price is derived according to the market clearing condition based on the derived equilibrium carbon price this paper proposes a calculation method of tiered gasoline pricing then sensitivity analyses and consumers surplus analyses are conducted it can be shown that a rise in gasoline price or a more generous allowance allocation would incur a decrease in the equilibrium carbon price making the first tiered price higher but the second tiered price lower it is further verified that the proposed tiered pricing method is progressive because it would relieve the pressure of the low income groups who consume less gasoline while imposing a greater burden on the high income groups who consume more gasoline based on these results implications limitations and suggestions for future studies are provided

the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination in intermediate good markets the case of bargaining this article examines the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination by a monopolist selling to downstream firms with bargaining power one of the downstream firms the chain store can integrate backward at lower cost than rivals bargaining powers also depend on disagreement profits bargaining weights and concession costs if the chain s integration threat is not credible price discrimination reduces the input price charged symmetric downstream firms and often reduces the average input price charged asymmetric downstream firms

monopolistic competition and the effects of aggregate demand how important is monopolistic competition to an understanding of the effects of aggregate demand on output we ask the question at three levels can monopolistic competition by itself explain why aggregate demand movements affect output can it together with other imperfections generate effects of aggregate demand in a way that perfect competition cannot if so can it give an accurate account of the response of the economy to aggregate demand movements the answers are no yes and yes

imperfectly competitive cycles with keynesian and walrasian features abstract we consider a multi sector overlapping generations model with oligopolistic firms in the output markets and wage setting trade unions in the labour markets a coordination problem between firms creates multiple temporary equilibria which are either walrasian or of the keynesian unemployment type there exist many deterministic and stochastic equilibrium cycles fluctuating between keynesian recession and walrasian boom periods with arbitrarily long phases in each regime the cycles are in accordance with certain empirical regularities money is neutral and superneutral but appropriate countercyclical fiscal policies stabilize the cycles in a textbook keynesian way

bargaining power fear of disagreement and wage settlements theory and evidence from u s industry the paper develops and estimates a theoretical model of wage determination and union nonunion wage differentials in order to overcome the institutional ctiticisms of the formal bargaining literature the paper generalizes the nash zeuthen harsanyi model by linking the solution to the institutional concepts of bargaining power and fear or cost of disagreement and by making the outcome depend not only on endogenous but also on exogenous factors an operational specification of bargaining power and fear of disagreement allows the model to be estimated with data covering twelve companies and trade unions during the period from mid 1950 s to the late 1970 s while giving limited support to the nashzeuthen harsanyi solution the empirical analysis indicates that the bargaining outcome usually deviates from the nash zeuthen harsanyi point and in accordance with the institutionalist claim that it varies significantly with exogenous factors contrary to the traditional labor economics view the results do not support the general conclusion that the bargaining solution lies on the marginal revenue product curve of labor instead the relevant coefficients suggest that for many firms and unions the outcome might be better characterized by the efficient contract vertical contract curve

fiscal policy multipliers the role of monopolistic competition scale economies and intertemporal substitution in labour supply a dynamic macroeconomic model of monopolistic competition is developed for the closed economy forward looking consumers demand differentiated goods supply labour and save part of their income in the form of shares producers manufacture the differentiated goods by using labour and capital we study the short run transition and long run effects of fiscal policy comparisons with the new classical case of perfect competition are made simple expressions far multipliers are derived the sensitivity of the multipliers for diversity preference and ethier productivity effects intratemporal and intertemporal substitution effects and markup effects under free and restricted entry are also studied

imperfect competition and the fiscal multiplier the impact of fiscal policy in an economy with a monopolistic output market but a perfectly competitive labor market is examined both in the short run with a fixed number of firms and in the long run with free entry the main innovation of the paper is the generality of the assumptions about preferences and technology which enable the authors to examine the robustness of the relationship between the degree of monopoly and the fiscal multiplier found by r startz 1989 n g mankiw 1988 and h d dixon 1987 the specific results of these papers are found to rest on two assumptions constant returns and cobb douglas preferences copyright 1996 by the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

countervailing power and consumer prices this paper considers the importance of countervailing power manifested as the effects of increased retail concentration on consumer prices and welfare within a market setting where imperfectly competitive retailers negotiate intermediate prices with a monopoly supplier only when retailer services are regarded as very close substitutes do final prices fall following a reduction in the number of retailers even in these circumstances the social benefits of countervailing power may not be realised as the supplier may seek to protect its profits by using a refusal to supply restraint to engage in exclusive trading

optimal fiscal policy in open economies with labour market distortions abstract we set up a general equilibrium model with unemployment owing to distortions in the labour market it is shown that a public expansion financed by a distortionary income tax may give rise to a decrease in unemployment even if public goods are pure waste such an expansion may give rise to an increase in welfare if it is associated with a decrease in unemployment since part of the gain from a fiscal expansion is achieved at the expense of welfare in other countries non cooperative policies tend to be too expansionary

multiunit bargaining in oligopolistic industries a model of wage determination in unionized oligopolistic industries is developed and used to compare the outcome of collective bargaining under two different bargaining structures one in which the workers of each firm are represented by separate and independent unions local bargaining and one in which a national union represents all workers in the industry in both cases the bargaining problem has a unique outcome with industrywide bargaining resulting in higher wages in addition industrywide unions are inherently stable in that there are no incentives for independent unions to attempt to cheat on the collusive agreement

optimal government spending in an economy with imperfectly competitive goods and labor markets this article examines the growth and welfare maximizing government spending in an economy that is characterized by market imperfections namely unionization in the labor market and monopolistic competition in the goods market to thoughtfully explore the optimal spending two distinct scenarios where the government spending is financed by labor capital income taxes are considered our analysis shows that the optimal growth maximizing government spending is inconsistent with the welfare maximizing government spending moreover the growth maximizing welfare maximizing government spending have quite different responses to distinctive market imperfections markups in the goods and labor markets particularly in the scenarios with distinctive financing modes our numerical study indicates that the growth maximizing and welfare maximizing government expenditures in general are more responsive to the change in the labor market friction than that in the product market friction and the growth maximizing government spending is more likely to be lower than the welfare maximizing government spending

is public expenditure productive abstract this paper considers the relationship between aggregate productivity and stock and flow government spending variables the empirical results indicate that i the nonmilitary public capital stock is dramatically more important in determining productivity than is either the flow of nonmilitary or military spending ii military capital bears little relation to productivity and iii a core infrastructure of streets highways airports mass transit sewers water systems etc has most explanatory power for productivity the paper also suggests an important role for the net public capital stock in the productivity slowdown of the last fifteen years

the thatcher miracle since 1979 productivity growth in britain has improved markedly compared with europe the turnaround in productivity growth has two main causes the british economy was subjected to a far more severe contraction of demand in 1980 81 than any other country this led to a new realism which was sustained by the legal changes in trade union power since 1979 there has been a worsening in the trade off between unemployment and inflation the poor unemployment inflation trade off is due to the neglect of skill training and education causing skill shortages and to the build up of long term unemployment which does little to restrain inflation this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed f this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

unions in oligopolistic vertically connected industries a model of two unionized vertically connected oligopolistic industries is analyzed economic performance measured by consumer prices depends on the institutional setting of wage bargaining two externalities may occur namely an integration and a competition externality which have contrary effects with decentralized bargaining no externalities can be internalized resulting in low consumer prices with bargaining at the industry level only the competition externality is internalized resulting in high prices with centralized bargaining both externalities can be internalized resulting again in low prices with at least two firms in each industry the decentralized setting performs best performance improves with an increase in the competition of the product markets author s abstract

the strategic choice of union oligopoly bargaining agenda abstract this article analyzes the optimal choice of union oligopoly bargaining agenda i e right to manage versus efficient bargaining under possible market entry it is shown that agreement by both the union and the incumbent firm about efficient bargaining emerges as equilibrium in nash strategies even more so under non blockaded entry for deterrence motives this is consistent with the common empirical findings that unionized firms do not behave according to the prediction of the right to manage model that employment will be on the labor demand curve the entry deterrence effect highlighted in this paper also suggests that labor market organization should not be overlooked as a component of the welfare analysis of product market competition

fiscal policy in general equilibrium this paper studies four classic fiscal policy experiments within a quantitatively restricted neoclassical model the authors main findings are as follows 1 permanent changes in government purchases can lead to short run and long run output multipliers that exceed one 2 permanent changes in government purchases induce larger effects than temporary changes 3 the financing decision is quantitatively more important than the resource cost of changes in government purchases and 4 public investment has dramatic effects on private output and investment these findings stem from important dynamic interactions of capital and labor absent in earlier equilibrium analyses of fiscal policy copyright 1993 by american economic association

the competition effects of industry wide vertical price fixing in bilateral oligopoly this paper examines the competition and welfare effects of vertical price fixing through industry wide resale price maintenance rpm arrangements such as those benefiting from exemption from a general prohibition against rpm a bilateral oligopoly framework is employed incorporating differentiation between manufacturer products and between retailer services transactions between the stages involve prices being determined through bargaining we do not find rpm to be universally undesirable however where retailer power is strong the social effects of rpm are likely to be adverse since the practice can assist in coordinating final price levels and prevent socially desirable countervailing power arising

a model of imperfect competition with keynesian features the recent literature on the reappraisal of keynes has viewed keynesian equilibria as arising when prices are fixed and effective demands and supplies are equilibrated through the adjustment of quantities one problem with this approach is that it lacks a theory of price determination in particular of why prices are fixed in the present paper we show that a number of keynesian features arise in a model in which prices are fully flexible but where agents have some monopoly power one advantage of this approach is that it provides a theory of the determination of both prices and quantities

imperfect competition and crowding out abstract this paper applies the central feature of imperfect competition in the goods market to examine the validity of the standard belief in international macroeconomics namely that policy effects in a small open economy are less effective than in a closed economy it is shown that the profit margin in imperfect competition and marginal propensity to leisure are the key factors in determining whether this standard belief is valid

increasing returns and the foundations of unemployment theory current approaches to macroeconomic theory divide roughly into two basic schools of thought one approach typically associated with rational expectations views the economy as basically at or near walrasian market clearing equilibrium in which case it becomes very difficult to explain away convincingly the undeniable persistence at times of involuntary unemployment another approach views the underemployed economy as being in a state of temporary fixed price disequilibrium in which case aside from having to repress suspicions that the essence of effective demand failure might not have to do with prices fixed at wrong values there is a lot of rationalising to be done about why profitable adjustments are so slow this paper argues that something like an internally consistent theory of steady state involuntary unemployment is possible and even plausible the cornerstone of this third approach is increasing returns to scale which blocks unemployed agents from breaking out of a low level equilibrium trap unless there is overall coordination or stimulation a simple model is presented which contains the basic ideas

the dynamically extended keynesian cross and the welfare improving fiscal policy abstract we construct a dynamic keynesian cross the dynamic extension allows for seigniorage on government financing in lieu of lump sum taxation because seigniorage imposes no tax burden expansionary fiscal policy improves welfare even if wasteful

is pattern bargaining dead a discussion in her article is pattern bargaining dead kathryn j ready suggests that pattern bargaining actually strengthened during the period 1977 83 a period commonly thought to mark a sharp decline in union bargaining power and settlements ready s conclusion that hourly wages were more similar across a sample of union firms in 1983 than in 1977 is used to suggest that perhaps unions are still able to enforce pattern bargaining and therefore that their bargaining power did not in fact collapse as is commonly assumed indeed if they are more able to enforce patterns perhaps their power has actually increased this conclusion bears closer scrutiny because it runs counter to a considerable body of evidence on contemporary collective bargaining pattern bargaining refers to relationships between sets of negotiations for example an agreement with one employer may form the basis for bargaining with other firms in the same industry or in some cases across industries unions and their bargaining power have generally

imperfect competition the keynesian cross and optimal fiscal policy abstract this note analyzes a simple keynesian macro model with imperfect competition and demonstrates that the optimal fiscal policy is a complete shutdown taxes and government purchases should both be zero if the model is extended slightly then welfare improving policies may exist however the benefits are generated in part by the public goods nature of government purchases and not just by the multiplier process it appears that the multiplier alone is not sufficient to justify the use of fiscal policy

the composition of government expenditure and its consequences for macroeconomic performance abstract this paper employs the intertemporal optimizing market clearing framework to compare the effects of government consumption expenditure and government infrastructure expenditure on macroeconomic adjustment and performance particular attention is focused on the time path of the capital stock and its adjustment to both permanent and temporary changes in government expenditure are considered we show how the effects of both forms of government expenditure on economic welfare can be broken down into 1 i a direct crowding out effect and 2 ii a second component which describes the intertemporal tradeoffs between the short run rate of capital accumulation and the resulting change in the capital stock

optimal tax debt and expenditure policies in a growing economy abstract this paper employs an endogenous growth model to analyze the role of a consumption tax in enhancing growth and welfare provided government expenditure impacts directly on the decisions of private agents two fiscal instruments are necessary to replicate the first best optimum the tradeoff between consumption and income taxes to achieve this outcome is discussed and shown to depend upon the degree of congestion associated with the public good and the level of government expenditure relative to its social optimum in general the analysis suggests a potentially important role for a consumption tax as part of an overall optimal fiscal package

on the effectiveness of economic policy when competition is imperfect and expectations are rational abstract we study the consequences of imperfect competition in a macro model with only one imperfection that of labor market competition otherwise the model is clean agents are optimizers prices are endogenous and expectations are rational we show that although imperfect competition in itself can explain unemployment as is well known it does not in itself give strong support to the use of traditional fiscal policy in fighting unemployment fiscal policy will almost inevitably have real effects but only through a special effect that may be difficult to control in many cases fiscal policy cannot create full employment and it may very well have perverse effects

unionization structure licensing and innovation we show the effects of the unionization structure viz decentralized and centralized unions on a firm s incentive for technology licensing and innovation the incentive for technology licensing is stronger under decentralized unions we identify circumstances under which the benefit from licensing creates a stronger incentive for innovation under decentralized unions if the union s preference for employment is high the benefit from licensing may create higher incentive for innovation under decentralized unions however if the union s preference for wage is high enough the incentive for innovation is higher under a centralized union irrespective of licensing ex post innovation if the centralized union decides whether or not to supply workers to all firms the possibility of higher innovation under decentralized unions increases we further show that perfectly substitutable workers can be better off under decentralized unions if the labor productivity depends on the unionization structure which occurs in our analysis when e g licensing after innovation occurs only under decentralized unions or innovation with no licensing occurs only under a centralized union