wheat from chaff meta analysis as quantitative literature review abstract this paper presents and develops a quantitative method of literature reviewing and evaluating empirical research meta regression analysis or mra economics is theory driven yet we must learn empirically if economics is to advance mra offers a more objective statistical method to summarize our empirical knowledge and to explain the wide study to study variation in economic research mra is used to assess the evidence for ricardian equivalence and its findings are contrasted to those of conventional narrative review furthermore mra establishes a platform from which to distinguish genuine empirical effect from the exploitable specification error that infests applied econometrics

fdi and taxation a meta study despite the continuing political interest in the usefulness of tax competition and tax coordination as well as the wealth of theoretical analyses it still remains open whether or when tax competition is harmful moreover the influence of tax differentials on multinationals decisions is still insufficiently analyzed thus economists have increasingly resorted to empirical analysis in order to gain insights on the elasticity of fdi with respect to company taxation as a result the empirical literature on taxation and international capital flows has grown to a similar abundance during the last 25 years as the respective theoretical literature its heterogeneity leads to a rising need for concise reviews on the existing empirical evidence in this paper we extend former meta analyses on fdi and taxation in three ways first we add the most recent publications unconsidered in meta analyses up to date second we apply a different methodology by using a broad set of meta regression estimators and explicitly discuss which one is most suitable for application to our meta data third we address some important issues in research on fdi and taxation to the clarification of which meta analysis can make valuable contributions these issues are mainly the influence of variables which might moderate effects of tax differentials e g public spending the implications of using aggregate fdi data as opposed to firm level information on measured tax effects the implications of bilateral effective tax rates and the possible presence of publication bias in primary research

centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods a political economy approach abstract this paper takes a fresh look at the trade off between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods it argues that the sharing of the costs of local public spending in a centralized system will create a conflict of interest between citizens in different jurisdictions when spending decisions are made by a legislature of locally elected representatives this conflict of interest will play out in the legislature depending on precisely how the legislature behaves the result may be excessive public spending or allocations of public goods characterized by uncertainty and misallocation across districts the extent of the conflict of interest between districts is affected by spillovers and differences in tastes for public spending thus the relative performance of centralized and decentralized systems depends upon spillovers and differences in tastes for public spending but for different reasons than suggested in the existing literature

depressing dependence transfers and economic growth in the german states 1975 2005 abstractdepressing dependence transfers and economic growth in the german states 1975 2005 regional studies most countries pay substantial intergovernmental transfers to poor regions with the aim of achieving regional convergence consequently transfers should have a positive effect on economic growth however it is equally possible that transfers perpetuate underdevelopment this paper studies empirically the effect of intergovernmental transfers on economic growth with a panel of west german states over the period 1975 2005 the findings suggest that transfers do not foster economic growth presumably because the recipients use them to subsidize declining industries

capital structure choice and company taxation a meta study this paper provides a quantitative review of the empirical literature on the tax impact on corporate debt financing synthesizing the evidence from 46 previous studies we find that this impact is substantial in particular the tax rate proxy determines the outcome of primary analyses measures like the simulated marginal tax rate graham 1996a avoid a downward bias in estimates for the debt response to tax moreover debt characteristics econometric specifications and the set of control variables affect tax effects accounting for misspecification biases by means of meta regressions we predict a marginal tax effect on the debt ratio of 0 3

decentralization and macroeconomic performance in china regional autonomy has its costs abstract we give an empirical examination of the impact of fiscal and economic decentralization in china on the country s economic growth and inflation using a vector autoregressive var model with latent variables our econometric investigation offers strong evidence that there is a connection between decentralization and macroeconomic performance in china economic decentralization appears to be positively related to growth in real output for the entire postwar period in china fiscal decentralization seems to have adverse implications for the rate of inflation especially after the late 1970s decentralization would therefore seem to be good for growth and bad for price stability

capture and governance at local and national levels 135 despite the importance of this issue not much systematic research appears to have been devoted to assessing the relative susceptibility of national and local governments to interestgroup capture here we describe a model of two party electoral competition with probabilistic voting behavior and lobbying by specialinterest groups based on david baron 1994 and gene grossman and elhanan helpman 1996 that helps identify determinants of relative capture at different levels of government these include relative levels of voter awareness and interest group cohesiveness electoral uncertainty electoral competition heterogeneity of districts with respect to inequality and the electoral system while some of these uphold the traditional madisonian presumption others are likely to create a tendency for lower capture at the local level so the net effect is theoretically ambiguous this suggests that the extent of relative capture may be context specific and needs to be assessed empirically

the comparison between destination and origin principles under imperfect competition abstract especially but not only in the european union closer economic integration is putting increasing pressure on the destination principle under which goods entering international trade are normally taxed this has raised the possibility of switching to the origin principle which dispenses with problematic border tax adjustments this paper compares destination and origin principles under conditions of imperfect competition previous analyses which have considered only the competitive case have led to a qualified presumption in favour of the destination principle a series of results are established here for both cooperative and non cooperative tax setting which challenge that presumption under imperfect competition

taxes federal grants local public spending and growth abstract in a dynamic model with both private and local public capital accumulation this paper examines how federal and local income taxes local consumption tax and federal matching grants for local public consumption and local public investment affect the long run equilibrium equilibria of private consumption private capital accumulation local public consumption and local public capital stock

the incentive effect of fiscal equalization transfers on tax policy abstract a theoretical analysis considers the impact of a typical system of redistributive fiscal equalization transfers on the tax effort of local jurisdictions more specifically it shows that the marginal contribution rate i e the rate at which an increase in the tax base reduces those transfers might be positively associated with the local tax rate while the volume of grants received is likely to be inversely related to the tax rate these predictions are tested in an empirical analysis of the tax policy of german municipalities in order to identify the incentive effect the analysis exploits discontinuities in the rules of the fiscal equalization system as well as policy changes the empirical results support the existence of an incentive effect suggesting that the high marginal contribution rates induce the municipalities to set significantly higher business tax rates compared with a situation without fiscal equalization

fiscal federalism and economic growth this paper uses an endogenous growth model with overlapping generations to explore the connection between fiscal federalism and economic growth the analysis shows that federalism which allows public good levels to be tailored to suit the differing demands of young and old consumers who live in different jurisdictions increases the incentive to save this stronger incentive in turn leads to an increase in investment in human capital and a byproduct of this higher investment is faster economic growth

state corroding federalism competition among local governments in a decentralized political system is often thought to discipline lazy or corrupt officials improving public good provision and increasing welfare some scholars note possible distortions due to spillovers or a race to the bottom but suggest that central transfers or regulations can remedy these both arguments take for granted a framework of constitutional order in which the central government can collect taxes allocate transfers and enforce regulations autonomously but what if it can t we show that if central enforcement capacity is endogenous interjurisdictional competition may itself erode the center s ability to channel competition in welfare enhancing directions regional governments may compete for capital by shielding firms from central tax collectors bankruptcy courts or regulators the equilibrium result is weaker central law enforcement and usually lower welfare interjurisdictional competition corrodes the state we illustrate with three examples from russia china and the us of cases in which such competition apparently encouraged subnational politicians to help firms evade central taxes or regulations

regional decentralization and fiscal incentives federalism chinese style abstract aligning the interests of local governments with market development is an important issue for developing and transition economies using a panel data set from china we investigate the relationship between provincial government s fiscal incentives and provincial market development we report three empirical findings first we find that during the period of fiscal contracting system the discrepancy between ex ante contracts and ex post implementation was relatively small suggesting that the fiscal contracts were credible second we find a much higher correlation about four times between the provincial government s budgetary revenue and its expenditure during 1980s and 1990s as compared to 1970s demonstrating that provincial governments faced much stronger ex post fiscal incentives after reform third we find that stronger ex ante fiscal incentives measured by the contractual marginal retention rate of the provincial government in its budgetary revenue are associated with faster development of the non state sector as well as more reforms in the state sector in the provincial economy this holds even when we control for the conventional measure of fiscal decentralization finally we compare federalism chinese style to federalism russian style

beyond publication bias abstract this review considers several meta regression and graphical methods that can differentiate genuine empirical effect from publication bias publication selection exists when editors reviewers or researchers have a preference for statistically significant results because all areas of empirical research are susceptible to publication selection any average or tally of significant insignificant studies is likely to be biased and potentially misleading meta regression analysis can see through the murk of random sampling error and selected misspecification bias to identify the underlying statistical structures that characterize genuine empirical effect meta significance testing and precision effect testing pet are offered as a means to identify empirical effect beyond publication bias and are applied to four areas of empirical economics research minimum wage effects union productivity effects price elasticities and tests of the natural rate hypothesis

optimal fiscal federalism in the presence of tax competition abstract this paper models the optimal division of public goods provision between central and regional governments in an economy with interregional tax competition regional provision is inefficient because governments compete for scarce capital by lowering their capital taxes and public good levels to inefficiently low levels on the other hand central provision is inefficient because it is determined by the minimum winning coalition within a legislature the optimal degree to which public good provision should be decentralized depends on a tradeoff between these inefficiencies in our main model complete centralization is never optimal regional governments should supply some public goods

non binding minimum taxes may foster tax competition abstract in a stackelberg framework of capital income taxation it is shown that imposing a minimum tax rate that is lower than all countries equilibrium tax rates in the unconstrained non cooperative equilibrium may reduce equilibrium tax rates in all countries

does tax competition really promote growth abstract this paper considers the relationship between tax competition and growth in an endogenous growth model where there are stochastic shocks to productivity and capital taxes fund a public good which may be for final consumption or an infrastructure input absent stochastic shocks decentralized tax setting two or more jurisdictions maximizes the rate of growth as the constant returns to scale present with endogenous growth implies extreme tax competition stochastic shocks imply that households face a portfolio choice problem which dampens down tax competition and may raise taxes above the centralized level growth can be lower with decentralization our results also predict a negative relationship between output volatility and growth with decentralization

does federalism lead to excessively high taxes the relative strengths of vertical and horizontal tax externalities turn on the balance between the interest responsiveness of the supply of savings and demand for capital the extent to which immobile factors are taxed by the states and the strength of preferences between federal and state expenditures the vertical externality will dominate if the aggregate tax base of the federation is responsible to the state tax instrument tax interactions in federations are more complex than has often been supposed

regional tax coordination and foreign direct investment this paper analyses the effects of a regionally coordinated profit tax or location subsidy in a model with three active countries one of which is not part of the union and a globally mobile firm we show that regional coordination can lead to two types of welfare gain first for investments that would take place in the union in the absence of coordination a coordinated tax increase can transfer location rents from the firm to the union second by internalising all of the union s benefits from foreign direct investment a coordinated tax reduction can attract more welfare enhancing investment than when member states act in isolation depending on which motive dominates tax levels may thus rise or fall under regional coordination

declining bias and gender wage discrimination a meta regression analysis this paper extends tests and revises a previous meta regression analysis of the gender wage gap stanley and jarrell 1998 we find that there remains a strong though dampened tendency for discrimination estimates to fall and male researchers still report significantly larger amounts of wage discrimination against women this extensive research base containing 104 estimates suggests that there is less need to correct for selection bias an indirect sign of lessened discrimination there is evidence that gender research is changing and improving although gender wage discrimination has lessened the research base still finds a significant gender wage inequality

local decentralization and local economic growth a cross sectional examination of us metropolitan areas this paper builds on the growing empirical literature that explores the relationship between government structure and economic growth it uses a new data set of 314 us metropolitan areas to examine the relationship between local decentralization and local economic growth the results indicate a negative relationship between the central city share of metro area population and economic growth and a positive relationship between both the number of municipalities per 100 000 residents and the number of counties per 100 000 residents and economic growth those findings provide support for the hypothesis that decentralization enhances economic growth

competing in taxes and investment under fiscal equalization the paper considers a model of federation with two heterogeneous regions that try to attract the capital by competing in capital income taxes and public investment that enhance the productivity of capital regions choices determine allocation of capital across the regions and their revenues under a tax sharing scheme this framework allows for the examination of different approaches to fiscal equalization schemes boadway r flatters f 1982 efficiency and equalization payments in a federal system of government a synthesis and extension of recent results canadian journal of economics 15 613 633 weingast b r 2006 second generation fiscal federalism implication for decentralized democratic governance and economic development working paper hoover institution stanford university we show that tax competition distorts downwards public investments and that the equalization grants discourage public investments with a little effect on equilibrium taxes however the equalization schemes remain beneficial not only for the federation and under a low degree of regional asymmetry also for each region c 2008 elsevier b v all rights reserved

fiscal decentralization and economic growth abstract fiscal decentralization may indeed have a direct impact on economic growth but the theoretical underpinnings for this relationship remain largely undeveloped a fair summary of the empirical search for a direct relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth is that it remains an open question much less attention has been devoted in the literature to the indirect channels through which fiscal decentralization may affect economic growth we argue that much work remains to be done before policy advisors and decision makers can formulate and implement decentralization programs on the basis of improving the rate of economic growth

fiscal decentralization and economic growth reconsidered recent studies examining the relation between fiscal decentralization and economic growth have failed to take account of the extent of the independent taxing powers available to sub national governments and thus have substantially overstated the degree of effective decentralization results from a cross section study of 19 oecd member countries suggest that when the measure of fiscal decentralization is limited to the revenues over which sub national governments have full autonomy its impact on economic growth is not statistically significant

tax competition and leviathan abstract attitudes towards downward pressure on tax rates from international tax competition depend on attitudes towards government this paper synthesises the two extremes which as in other areas of public finance have dominated the debate typically being presented as stark alternatives the view of government as a leviathan from which tax competition emerges as a useful constraint on policy makers and the view of government as a benevolent maximiser of their citizens welfare from which it emerges as a source of inefficiency conditions are derived under which when policy makers are neither entirely benevolent nor wholly self serving tax coordination benefits the representative citizen

tax evasion fiscal competition and economic integration abstract this paper examines the implications of tax evasion for fiscal competition and tax harmonization policies in an economic union first for symmetric countries it proves that the equilibrium values of the tax and audit rates are less than optimal tax harmonization alone will also lead to a less than optimal audit rate second for asymmetric countries the paper shows that integration may turn an honest country into an evading one it argues that tax harmonization alone may be a bad policy in that it can make both countries worse off it may also cause an otherwise honest country to turn to evasion

reforming an asymmetric union on the virtues of dual tier capital taxation the tax competition for mobile capital in particular the reluctance of small countries to agree on measures of tax coordination has ongoing political and economic fallouts within europe we analyse the effects of introducing a two tier structure of capital taxation where the asymmetric member states of a union choose a common federal tax rate in the first stage and then non cooperatively set local tax rates in the second stage we show that this mechanism effectively reduces competition for mobile capital between the members of the union moreover it distributes the gains across the heterogeneous states in a way that yields a strict pareto improvement over a one tier system of purely local tax choices we also discuss the effects of diverging capital endowments within the union and capital flows to third countries

dynamic effects of federal grants on local spending abstract in a dynamic model of local government spending this paper examines both long run and short run effects of permanent federal grant changes on local public investment and recurrent expenditures it also utilizes the judd approach to quantify the short run effects of temporary current and future policy shocks the interesting perhaps surprising findings are 1 a permanent increase in the matching grants for investment and recurrent expenditures may accelerate or slow down public investment and 2 a current temporary grant increase stimulates current public investment but a temporary future increase in the nonmatching grant reduces current investment and raises current recurrent expenditures

international tax coordination regionalism versus globalism tax competition for mobile capital can undermine the attempts of governments to redistribute income from rich to poor i study whether international tax coordination can alleviate this problem using a general equilibrium model synthesizing recent contributions to the tax competition literature the model highlights the crucial distinction between global tax coordination and regional coordination with high capital mobility between the tax union and the rest of the world the welfare gain from regional capital income tax coordination is only a small fraction of the gain from global coordination even if the tax union is large relative to the world economy

federal competition and economic growth abstract this paper exploits exogenous variation in the natural topography of the united states to estimate the causal impact of inter jurisdictional competition on income growth we find that doubling the number of county governments in a metropolitan area leads to a 17 increase in the average annual growth rate of earnings per employee over 1969 2006 and a 10 increase in 2006 income per employee decomposing income effects using 2000 census worker level data we find that approximately half of the effect stems from making workers more productive while the other half comes from changing the composition of the workforce and inducing workers to work more hours we also present evidence that inter jurisdictional competition leads local governments to raise more in taxes spend more and issue more debt per capita but does not help them obtain more inter governmental transfers however the additional cost from this increase in expenditures to a median wage employee is much smaller than the increase in that employee s wages due to greater inter jurisdictional competition

corporate tax elasticities a reader s guide to empirical findings corporate taxes exert a variety of effects on business behaviour a wealth of empirical evidence assesses the magnitude of these behavioural margins of taxation this article offers an up to date review and aims to provide common ground by computing for each distortion the semi elasticity of the corporate tax base we pay particular attention to international investment where it is not a priory clear whether marginal investment decisions or discrete locations are most important using anextension of the meta analysis of de mooij and ederveen 2003 we explore the extent to which existing studies reveal differences in effect size between the intensive and extensive margins of international investment

the future of value added tax in the european union the current vat regime in the eu introduced with the removal of fiscal frontiers in 1993 is explicitly transitional we consider the issues that arise in designing a definitive regime the two most widely canvassed options adoption of a clearing house or a shift to origin taxation are found wanting the paper develops an alternative strategy combining a harmonized rate of vat on transactions between firms both between and within member states with national discretion over rates applied to final sales this offers the prospect of a real improvement on current arrangements

asymmetric tax competition abstract the paper analyzes nash equilibrium when two jurisdictions set tax rates on a tax base which is mobile between them population differences imply tax differences the smaller jurisdiction levies a lower tax rate in equilibrium and its residents are better off than those in the larger jurisdiction the nash equilibrium is inefficient if the two jurisdictions merged the resulting allocation would be efficient however if differences in population are great enough residents of the small jurisdiction would be made worse off by such a merger

multimarket contact and collusive behavior traditional analyses of industrial behavior typically link the exercise of market power in an industry to internalfeatures such as demand conditions concentration and barriers to entry nevertheless some economists have remained concerned that external factors such as contact across markets may also play a significant role in determining the level of competitiveness in any particular industry in this article we examine the effect of multimarket contact on the degree of cooperation that firms can sustain in settings of repeated competition we isolate conditions under which multimarket contact facilitates collusion and show that these collusive gains are achieved through modes of behavior that have been identified in previous empirical studies of multimarketfirms

the economic consequences of corporate tax rates reductions in the eu evidence using a computable general equilibrium model in a globalised world governments are eager to attract foreign investors by lowering corporate tax rates recent trends point towards a revival of a race to the bottom in corporate income tax cit rates in developed economies eu countries have been active in this respect a generalised fall in cit rate could prove detrimental to tax revenues and trigger increase in other taxes to meet fiscal policy objectives however it could also spur investment and growth and prove to be a good fiscal policy strategy if as a result the corporate tax base increases the final economic and fiscal impact of a reduction in cit rates is therefore unclear using a cge model we find that uncoordinated tax reforms significantly impact national economies and third country effects can be significant when large countries implement cit rate cuts small countries are better off unilaterally reducing their cit rate at the expense of other eu countries we find that negative spillovers are mitigated when the country reducing its cit rate restores its budget balance by cutting either public expenditures or social transfers a larger degree of non eu capital mobility also tends to reduce the negative spillover effects of unilateral cit rate reductions

decentralisation as an incentive scheme recent changes have introduced more decentralization in a number of traditionally centralized countries 1 in the case of france it is sometimes claimed that the 1982 1983 reform of subcentral government is of historical importance although the principles of that reform are not contested any more by the new majority elected in 1986 opinions still differ on a number of policy issues some of the issues are presented in this introductory section but the main purpose of this paper is not to expose or discuss in detail the problems of decentralization in france as argued in the second part of the introductory section the theoretical framework in which the policy issues of decentralization are usually discussed by economists is somewhat unsatisfactory in particular when applied to unitary states such as britain or france the bulk of the paper is devoted to the exploration of a different approach to decentralization it is not purported however that this approach could completely replace the more traditional one consequently when in the concluding section we return briefly to the policy issues identified here this is to be read as a preliminary attempt to evaluate the relevance of the reasoning developed in the paper

federal mandates by popular demand this paper proposes a new framework for studying federal mandates regarding public policies in areas such as environmental quality public health highway safety and the provision of local public goods voters have single peaked preferences along a single policy dimension there are two levels of government federal and local the federal level can constrain local policy by mandating a minimum or maximum policy localities are free to adopt any policy satisfying the constraint imposed by the federal mandate we show that voters choose federal mandates that are too strict which leads to excessively severe mandates we show that similar results can obtain when federal provision of the public provided good is more efficient than local provision

decentralization and economic growth revisited an empirical note abstract although it is theoretically expected that decentralization leads to efficient provision of local public services and stimulates economic development there is a mixed picture of the decentralization effect on economic growth across earlier empirical studies using the instrument variables iv technique with the latest cross country data for the period from 1997 to 2001 this paper found that fiscal decentralization has a significant positive impact on per capita gdp growth therefore when the focus is placed on the latest information on the economic situation in the latter 1990s decentralization particularly on the fiscal expenditure side is instrumental in economic growth

fiscal decentralisation and idc economic growth an empirical investigation the impact of fiscal decentralisation on ldc economic growth and development is widely debated in the development literature notwithstanding this there has been little attempt to test systematically this relationship accordingly in this note we present an empirical examination of the relationship between the level of fiscal decentralisation and economic growth rates across a sample of twenty three ldcsfrom 1974 to 1991 we fail to find however any strong systematic relationship between the two among our sample of ldcs

taxation and growth with overlapping generations abstract this paper examines the growth effects of wage and interest income taxation in an endogenous growth model which is characterized by diminishing point in time returns in human capital producing technology and overlapping generations of two period lived individuals we show that the greater the long term learning time of individuals the more individuals inherit human capital from the previous generation we demonstrate that a flat rate wage tax stimulates economic growth while interest income taxation does not necessarily foster such growth intergenerational redistribution induces individuals to change both physical and human capital accumulation affecting the growth rate through changes in factor prices

do countries compete over corporate tax rates this paper tests whether oecd countries compete with each other over corporate taxes in order to attract investment we develop two models with firm mobility countries compete only over the statutory tax rate or the effective average tax rate while with capital mobility countries compete only over the effective marginal tax rate we estimate the parameters of reaction functions using data from 21 countries between 1983 99 we find evidence that countries compete over all three measures but particularly over the statutory tax rate and the effective average tax rate this is consistent with a belief amongst governments that location choices by multinational firms are discrete we also find evidence of concave reaction functions consistent with the model outlined in the paper

taking the bite out of fiscal competition regions can benefit by offering infrastructure services that are differentiated by quality thus segmenting the market for industrial location regions that compete on infrastructure quality have an incentive to increase the degree of differentiation between them this places an upper bound on the number of regions successfully able to participate in the location market and limits the dissipation of regional surplus through tiebout competition it indicates a process of fiscal agglomeration through which regional concentrations arise which does not depend on the circular causation underlying much of the recent literature on economic geography

redistribution fiscal competition and the politics of economic integration the paper examines the consequences of the economic integration of factor markets in a model with two countries that redistribute income among their residents the social benefits in each country are financed by a source based tax on capital which is democratically chosen by its inhabitants if either capital or labour is internationally mobile the countries engage in fiscal competition and the partial integration of capital or labour markets is detrimental to the countries redistributive ability a move from partial to full integration however may alleviate rather than intensify fiscal competition particularly if the two countries face sufficiently similar economic and political conditions in such a situation for example tax competition for mobile capital is softened as the labour market becomes more integrated and even vanishes if both factors are fully mobile as a result there is more redistribution in equilibrium and a majority of the population in each country is strictly better off copyright 2002 wiley blackwell

incumbent behavior vote seeking tax setting and yardstick competition this paper develops a model of the political economy of tax setting in a multijurisdictional world where voters choices and incumbent behavior are determined simultaneously voters are assumed to make comparisons between jurisdictions to overcome political agency problems this forces incumbents into a yardstick competition in which they care about what other incumbents are doing we provide a theoretical framework and empirical evidence using u s state data from 1960 to 1988 the results are encouraging to the view that vote seeking and tax setting are tied together through the nexus of yardstick competition

is partial tax harmonization desirable we consider a setting in which capital taxation is characterized by two distortions working in opposite directions on one hand governments engage in tax competition and are tempted to lower capital tax rates on the other hand they are unable to commit to future policies and once capital has been installed have incentives to increase taxes in this setting there exists a tax that optimally trades off the two distortions we compare three possible tax harmonization scenarios no tax harmonization all countries set taxes unilaterally global tax harmonization all countries coordinate their capital taxes and partial tax harmonization only a subset of all countries coordinate capital taxes we show that if capital is sufficiently mobile partial tax harmonization benefits all countries compared to both global and no harmonization

public provision of private goods government may provide a good that can if legally permitted be supplemented by private purchases policy is determined by majority rule under standard assumptions on preferences a majority voting equilibrium exists a regime of positive government provision with no restriction on private supplements is shown to be majority preferred to a regime of either only market provision or only government provision combined public and private expenditure on the good is higher under this dual provision regime than under either of the alternatives under some preference configurations the median income voter is pivotal under others a voter with income below the median is pivotal

fiscal federalism decentralization and economic growth a meta analysis the theoretical literature on fiscal federalism has identified several channels through which government decentralization could affect economic growth much of the literature focuses on the efficiency aspects of a decentralized provision of public services but decentralization may also increase growth by raising the ability of the political system to innovate and carry out reforms in contrast some authors argue that decentralization increases corruption and government inefficiency and thus may diminish growth given this theoretical ambiguity several studies have attempted to identify the effect of decentralization on economic growth empirically over the last two decades we review and conduct a meta analysis of this empirical literature based on our analysis we point out open questions and discuss possible ways to answer them jel h77 043 c52 i introduction building on various theoretical contributions an empirical literature analyzing the effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth has emerged since the 1990s the relevant studies vary as to whether they use cross sectional time series or panel data as to whether they rely on cross country or single country samples and they vary in estimation methods decentralization measures and sample composition given the size and heterogeneity of the empirical literature it is useful to review the individual studies and summarize their main findings conducting a comprehensive search we identify 31 published and unpublished studies on the effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth each of these studies estimates several models resulting in over 400 individual estimates while we first review these studies in a traditional manner our main aim is to analyze these estimates quantitatively specifically the main contribution of this article is to offer a meta analysis of the empirical findings on fiscal decentralization and economic growth a meta analysis is a useful methodology in our context as it is difficult to obtain clear cut conclusions with only a traditional survey of empirical literature the individual studies vary substantially in their characteristics and correspondingly in the findings they report by conducting a meta analysis however we can identify how the idiosyncratic characteristics of a particular study relate to its findings the meta analysis approach thus addresses model uncertainty with regard to each individual estimate in addition it can also serve as a partial response to the methodological critique of empirical research on fiscal decentralization by rodden 2004 as it helps to clarify the quantitative effects of different decentralization measures and estimation techniques finally as meta analytical techniques are rarely used in economics we also aim at contributing to the further establishment of this methodology stanley 2001 2008 the next section briefly discusses the various theoretical arguments as to why fiscal decentralization may affect economic growth we then provide a short traditional survey of the empirical studies in section iii we review this literature more systematically and quantitatively in section iv in section v we report the results of meta regressions and discuss how the idiosyncratic characteristics of a given study are related to its specific findings finally section vi provides a discussion of the results and some conclusions ii how could fiscal federalism affect economic growth theoretical approaches within the framework of the solow swan model solow 1956 swan 1956 fiscal federalism may be associated with a different level of efficiency in governance than unitary systems leading to a different value of solow s a the level of technology a regime change toward federalism would then be associated with temporarily different growth rates and eventually different levels of income but not with persistent growth differences

harmonization and side payments in political cooperation for two districts or countries that try to internalize externalities i analyze a bargaining game under private information i derive conditions for when it is efficient with uniform policies across regions with and without side payments and when it is efficient to prohibit side payments in the negotiations while policy differentiation and side payments allow the policy to better reflect local conditions they create conflicts between the regions and thus delay the results also describe when political centralization outperforms decentralized cooperation and they provide a theoretical foundation for the controversial uniformity assumption traditionally used by the fiscal federalism literature

fiscal decentralization and economic growth a cross country study abstract we use a panel data set of 46 countries over the 1970 1989 period to investigate the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth we find a negative relationship between fiscal decentralization and growth in developing countries but none in developed countries several explanations are offered for our findings

trust in triads effects of exit control and learning this paper provides theoretical background for some effects of social networks on trust we study the implications of a model with rational actors in two settings with three actors in the first setting there are two trustees who are involved in transactions with one truster implying that the truster has an exit option in the second setting two trusters play with one trustee which gives the trusters options for voice i e complaining and informing each other about the trustee s behavior we compare these models with a baseline model in which there is only one truster and one trustee it turns out that the opportunities for placing and honoring trust do not change for the exit model compared to the baseline model the opportunities for trust in the voice model differ from the baseline model only if both trusters inform each other at a rate that is high enough only if the possibilities for receiving information and transmitting information are large enough for both trusters trust will increase due to the information exchange possibilities in the voice model

international fiscal policy coordination and economic growth this paper examines the effects of policy coordination in a two country model of endogenous growth governments choose taxes to provide public inputs and public consumption goods tax rates affect the rewards to investment and rates of economic growth two regimes are examined one with independent policy making and one with policy coordination whatever the regime the choice of public inputs is always efficient without coordination however governments choose inefficient tax rates but taxes may be either higher or lower than under policy coordination as a consequence growth rates may be lower or higher than those under policy coordination copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

fiscal decentralization and economic growth in the oecd what impact if any does fiscal decentralization fd have on economic growth further investigations of the inter relationships between fd and economic growth are timely given that government decentralization remains at the forefront of many organization for economic cooperation and development oecd policy agendas this study incorporates a range of measures of fd to better account for the direct impact of different levels of subnational fiscal autonomy on economic growth the analysis also considers the impact of previously omitted public sector decentralization variables that provide further indication of the extent to which subnational governments sng are closer to the people and potentially better able to account for local preferences in fiscal decision making whilst little evidence of a direct relationship between fd and output growth is found some evidence is found to suggest that federal systems tend to have lower growth rates than do unitary states independent of their degree of decentr

distributive politics and the costs of centralization this paper studies the choice between centralization and decentralization of fiscal policy in a political economy setting with centralization regional delegates vote over agendas comprising sets of region specific projects the outcome is inefficient because the choice of projects is insufficiently sensitive to within region benefits the number of projects funded may be non monotonic in the strength of project externalities the efficiency gains from decentralization and the performance of constitutional rules such as majority voting which may be used to choose between decentralization and centralization are then discussed in this framework weaker externalities and more heterogeneity between regions need not increase the efficiency gain from decentralization

jeux sans frontieres tax competition and tax coordination when countries differ in size closer international integration is putting increasing pressure on existing national tax structures this paper uses a simple two country model to address a range of consequent policy concerns focusing particularly on the role of country size differences in size exacerbate the inefficiency from noncooperative behavior harming both countries the smaller country loses from harmonization to any tax rate between those set in the noncooperative equilibrium but both countries gain from the imposition of a minimum tax anywhere in that range the fully optimal response to freer cross border trade however may be to do nothing jel h20 h77

firm location decisions regional grants and agglomeration externalities we examine whether discretionary government grants influence where domestic and multinational firms locate new plants and how the presence of agglomeration externalities interacts with these policy instruments we find that a region s existing industrial structure has an effect on the location of new entrants grants do have a small effect in attracting plants to specific geographic areas but importantly we find that firms are less responsive to government subsidies in areas where there are fewer existing plants in their industry this suggests that these subsidies are less effective in influencing firms location decisions in the face of countervailing co location benefits