the value added of laboratory experiments for the study of institutions and common pool resources abstract this article provides an overview of the effects of communication on experimental studies of behavior and outcomes in common pool resource cpr dilemmas aggregate outcomes in cpr dilemmas without communication approximate predictions of non cooperative game theory but allowing cheap talk results in higher outcomes when exogenous rules are monitored at realistic levels subjects cheat even though following the rule would generate optimal outcomes if given the opportunity experimental subjects will devise their own rule systems and impose sanctions on each other these findings complement field research on more complex resources and communities by confirming the critical importance of communication and endogenous rule formation

was the sarbanes oxley act of 2002 really this costly a discussion of evidence from event returns and going private decisions abstract this paper discusses evidence on the costs of the sarbanes oxley act sox from stock returns and going private decisions zhang 2007 economic consequences of the sarbanes oxley act of 2002 journal of accounting and economics doi 10 1016 j jacceco 2006 07 002 analyzes returns around legislative events and concludes that sox imposes significant costs on firms engel et al 2007 the sarbanes oxley act and firms going private decisions journal of accounting and economics doi 10 1016 j jacceco 2007 02 002 examine going private decisions and point to unintended consequences both studies are carefully conducted and deserve praise for tackling an important issue however as my discussion highlights several key findings may not be attributable to sox and we should exercise caution in interpreting the evidence while it is not implausible that one size fits all regulation imposes substantial costs on firms we presently do not have much sox related evidence to support this conclusion

betting on hitler the value of political connections in nazi germany this paper examines the value of connections between german industry and the nazi movement in early 1933 drawing on previously unused contemporary sources about management and supervisory board composition and stock returns we find that one out of seven firms and a large proportion of the biggest companies had substantive links with the national socialist german workers party firms supporting the nazi movement experienced unusually high returns outperforming unconnected ones by 5 to 8 between january and march 1933 these results are not driven by sectoral composition and are robust to alternative estimators and definitions of affiliation

the role of wages and auditing during a crackdown on corruption in the city of buenos aires abstract we study the prices paid for basic inputs during a crackdown on corruption in the public hospitals of the city of buenos aires argentina during 1996 97 we find a well defined negative effect on the measures used to capture corruption prices paid by hospitals for basic homogeneous inputs decrease by 15 percent during the first 9 months of the crackdown after this period prices increase but they are still 10 percent lower than those prevailing before the crackdown relative to the precrackdown period higher wages play no role in inducing lower input prices when audit intensity can be expected to be maximal during the first phase of the crackdown but have a negative and well defined effect when audit intensity takes intermediate levels the last phase of the crackdown controlling for fixed effects we find that the wage elasticity of input prices exceeds 20 these results are consistent with the standard model of bribes of gary becker and george stigler

the development of securities law in the united states given the existence of contract property fraud and company law what is the purpose of securities laws broadly speaking they can serve either of two functions or some mix of both the first is to facilitate contracting among entrepreneurs managers shareholders and financial intermediaries by providing a standardized set of rights and obligations la porta et al 2005 such laws are motivated by the desire to reduce transaction costs where contracting parties are widely dispersed and both writing complete contracts ex ante and renegotiating ex post are difficult a second possible function is to restrict contracting by limiting the set of legally available terms such laws reflect the view that securities markets are beset by market failures stemming from externalities or investor irrationality coffee 1984 fox 1999 langevoort 2002 for the sake of simplicity we can call the first a contracting paradigm and the second a regulatory paradigm

detecting earnings management a new approach this paper provides a new approach to test for accrual based earnings management our approach exploits the inherent property of accrual accounting that any accrual based earnings management in one period must reverse in another period if the researcher has priors concerning the timing of the reversal incorporating these priors can significantly improve the power and specification of tests for earnings management our results indicate that tests incorporating reversals increase test power by around 40 and provide a robust solution for mitigating model misspecification arising from correlated omitted variables

the changing landscape of accrual accounting a fundamental property of accrual accounting is to smooth temporary timing fluctuations in operating cash flows indicating an inherent negative correlation between accruals and cash flows we show that the overall correlation between accruals and cash flows has dramatically declined in magnitude over the past half century and has largely disappeared in more recent years the adjusted r 2 from regressing changes in accruals on changes in cash flows drops from about 70 90 in the 1960s to near zero under 20 in more recent years in exploring potential reasons for the observed attenuation we find that increases in non timing related accrual recognition as proxied by one time and nonoperating items and the frequency of loss firm years explain the majority of the overall decline on the other hand temporal changes in the matching between revenues and expenses and the growth of intangible intensive industries play only a limited role in explaining the observed attenuation finally the relative decline of the timing role of accruals does not appear to be associated with an increase in the asymmetrically timely loss recognition role

show me the money interjurisdiction political competition and fiscal extraction in china we argue that interjurisdiction competition in authoritarian regimes engenders a specific logic for taxation promotion seeking local officials are incentivized to signal loyalty and competence to their principals through tangible fiscal revenues the greater the number of officials accountable to the same principal the more intense political competition is resulting in higher taxation however too many officials accountable to the same principal leads to lower taxation due to shirking by uncompetitive officials and the fear of political instability using a panel dataset of all chinese county level jurisdictions from 1999 2006 we find strong evidence for an inverse u shaped relationship between the number of county level jurisdictions within a prefecture our proxy for the intensity of political competition and fiscal revenues in most provinces but not so in politically unstable ethnic minority regions the results are robust to various alternative specifications including models that account for heterogeneous county characteristics and spatial interdependence

an analysis of glass ceiling perceptions in the accounting profession access to a deep pool of talent is essential to the success of every professional services firm the supply of that talent is contingent upon the available rewards for the exercise of that talent and both the existence of the potential rewards and the beliefs that individuals hold about the existence of the rewards affect the decision to remain in the field one structural factor that may affect the judgment about whether to remain in a profession concerns promotions based on the gender of the employee i e the glass ceiling in this study we examine the glass ceiling within the context of the accounting profession while advances have been made within the accounting profession to address the glass ceiling the continued existence and perceptions about the continued existence of the issue exert adverse effects upon the available talent pool and may create long term problems for the profession in this study we investigate glass ceiling perceptions among a large sample of female accounting professionals employed in accounting the sample includes both public accountants and those employed in industry accounting our study yields the finding of beliefs in bias driven effects e g a bias against female promotions to the top level structural effects e g a lack of mentoring opportunities networking opportunities and high profile job assignments and cultural effects e g a lack of social support from the male leaders within the organization among these accounting professionals glass ceiling perceptions are also influenced by several demographic factors furthermore accounting professionals employed by industry are more likely to report a glass ceiling within their firms than accounting professionals employed by public accounting firms the findings are of interest to researchers who explore gender related issues in professional service firms such as the field of accounting and to senior members of practice who are tasked with ensuring the integrity and quality of the talent pool and the equitable distribution of rewards to employees

earnings quality in uk private firms comparative loss recognition timeliness abstract uk private and public companies face substantially equivalent regulation on auditing accounting standards and taxes we hypothesize that private company financial reporting nevertheless is of lower quality due to different market demand regulation notwithstanding a large uk sample supports this hypothesis quality is operationalized using basu s 1997 time series measure of timely loss recognition and a new accruals based method the result is not affected by controls for size leverage industry membership and auditor size or by allowing endogenous listing choice the result enhances understanding of private companies which are predominant in the economy it also provides insight into the economics of accounting standards

the effects of hedge fund interventions on strategic firm behavior we examine the impact of hedge fund interventions on target firms strategic behavior specifically their voluntary disclosure and earnings management strategies we find a decrease in both the likelihood and the frequency of management earnings forecasts conveying bad news and an increase in the level of real earnings management following interventions by hedge fund activists additional evidence suggests that managers substitute between voluntary disclosure and earnings management strategies in resisting hedge fund attacks we also find that withholding of bad news is more pronounced when hedge fund activists pose greater threats to the target firm s management and when the intervention lasts for a relatively short time period our results are consistent with firms behaving strategically in response to heightened career reputation concerns and endangered corporate control arising from hedge fund activism the online appendix is available at https doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2017 2816 this paper was accepted

do land revenue windfalls create a political resource curse evidence from china abstract by analyzing a panel on the political turnovers of 4390 county leaders in china during 1999 2008 we find that the revenue windfalls accrued to these officials from land sales have undermined the effectiveness of the promotion system for government officials instead of rewarding efforts made to boost gdp growth promotion is positively correlated with signaling efforts and with corruption the robust positive relationship between land revenue windfalls and political turnover or specifically promotion suggests that those who are politically connected to their superiors and those beyond the prime age for promotion are the primary beneficiaries the case for corruption is substantiated by the evidence inferred from anti corruption crackdowns which reveals that the additional effect of land revenue on political turnover and size of bureaucracy a proxy for corruption decreases significantly in crackdowns but that land revenue has no effect on city construction expenditure a proxy for signaling

cooperation in and out of markets an experimental comparison of public good games and markets with externalities experimental studies have compared cooperation across different nonmarket social dilemma settings but the experimental literature has largely overlooked comparing cooperation across market and nonmarket settings this paper reports the results from an experiment that compares behavior in theoretically equivalent public good games and market games with externalities both positive and negative external effects are considered results indicate that people tend to be less cooperative in the marketplace relative to the nonmarket setting whether the external effect is positive or negative most striking is the finding that the combination of a positive external effect in a nonmarket setting i e the standard public good game stands apart from the other market and nonmarket settings

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

implications of power when the ceo can pressure the cfo to bias reports abstract building on archival anecdotal and survey evidence on managers roles in accounting manipulations i develop an agency model to examine the effects of a ceo s power to pressure a cfo to bias a performance measure like earnings this power has implications for incentive compensation reporting quality firm value and information rents predictions from the model provide potential explanations for the differing results from recent empirical studies on the impact of regulatory interventions like sox and the extent to which the ceo s or cfo s incentives significantly impact on earnings management the model also identifies conditions under which either a powerful or a non powerful ceo can extract rents which can help explain mixed empirical results on the association between ceo power and excessive compensation

mps for sale returns to office in postwar british politics many recent studies show that firms profit from connections to influential politicians but less is known about how much politicians financially benefit from wielding political influence we estimate the returns to serving in parliament using original data on the estates of recently deceased british politicians applying both matching and a regression discontinuity design to compare members of parliament mps with parliamentary candidates who narrowly lost we find that serving in office almost doubled the wealth of conservative mps but had no discernible financial benefits for labour mps conservative mps profited from office largely through lucrative outside employment they acquired as a result of their political positions we show that gaining a seat in parliament more than tripled the probability that a conservative politician would later serve as a director of a publicly traded firm enough to account for a sizable portion of the wealth differential we suggest that labour mps did not profit from office largely because trade unions collectively exerted sufficient control over the party and its mps to prevent members from selling their services to other clients

agency problems auditing and the theory of the firm some evidence agency problems auditing and the theory of the firm some evidenceauthor s ross l watts and jerold l zimmermansource journal of law and economics vol 26 no 3 oct 1983 pp 613 633published by the university of chicago pressstable url http www jstor org stable 725039accessed 29 06 2008 23 14

implications for gaap from an analysis of positive research in accounting based on extant literature we review the positive theory of gaap the theory predicts that gaap s principal focus is on control performance measurement and stewardship and that verifiability and conservatism are critical features of a gaap shaped by market forces we recognize the advantage of using fair values in circumstances where these are based on observable prices in liquid secondary markets but caution against expanding fair values to financial reporting more generally we conclude that rather than converging u s gaap with ifrs competition between the fasb and the iasb would allow gaap to better respond to market forces

the goals and promise of the sarbanes oxley act the primary goal of the sarbanes oxley act was to fix auditing of u s public companies consistent with its full official name the public company accounting reform and investor protection act of 2002 by consensus auditing had been working poorly and increasingly so the most important and most promising part of sarbanes oxley was the creation of a unique quasi public institution to oversee and regulate auditing the public company accounting oversight board pcaob in controversial section 404 the law also created new disclosure based incentives for firms to spend money on internal controls above increases that would have occurred after the corporate scandals of the early 2000s in exchange for these higher costs which have already fallen substantially sarbanes oxley promises a variety of long term benefits investors will face a lower risk of losses from fraud and theft and benefit from more reliable financial reporting greater transparency and accountability public companies will pay a lower cost of capital and the economy will benefit because of a better allocation of resources and faster growth sarbanes oxley remains a work in progress section 404 in particular was implemented too aggressively but reformers should push for continued improvements in its implementation by pcaob rather than for repeal of the legislation itself

chief executive officer equity incentives and accounting irregularities this study examines whether chief executive officer ceo equity based holdings and compensation provide incentives to manipulate accounting reports while several prior studies have examined this important question the empirical evidence is mixed and the existence of a link between ceo equity incentives and accounting irregularities remains an open question because inferences from prior studies may be confounded by assumptions inherent in research design choices we use propensity score matching and assess hidden omitted variable bias within a broader sample in contrast to most prior research we do not find evidence of a positive association between ceo equity incentives and accounting irregularities after matching ceos on the observable characteristics of their contracting environments instead we find some evidence that accounting irregularities occur less frequently at firms where ceos have relatively higher levels of equity incentives

two sided learning and the ratchet principle i study a class of continuous time games of learning and imperfect monitoring a long run player and a market share a common prior about the initial value of a gaussian hidden state and learn about its subsequent values by observing a noisy public signal the long run player can nevertheless control the evolution of this signal and thus affect the market s belief the public signal has an additive structure and noise is brownian i derive conditions for an ordinary differential equation to characterize equilibrium behavior in which the long run player s actions depend on the history of the game only through the market s correct belief using these conditions i demonstrate the existence of pure strategy equilibria in markov strategies for settings in which the long run player s flow utility is nonlinear the central finding is a learning driven ratchet principle affecting incentives i illustrate the economic implications of this principle in applications to monetary policy earnings management and career concerns

accounting activities security prices and class action lawsuits abstract provisions in the securities acts provide incentives to purchasers of common stocks to initiate class action lawsuits when stock prices decline at and preceding announcements that directly reduce or imply a reduction in previously reported accounting book values reported common stock returns associated with alleged misrepresentations in financial statements are consistent with incentives provided by the law classification of misrepresentations based on hypothesized relations between announcements and security returns results in observed differences in the association between litigated accounting announcements and common stock returns

on the optimal relation between the properties of managerial and financial reporting systems we develop a theoretical model of the firm that links properties stewardship vs valuation focus of financial reporting regimes with the informational properties of optimal managerial accounting systems we show that contrary to the standard textbook proposition properties of management and financial accounting systems are not independent significantly we provide an explicit connection between exogenous and observable properties of a firm s financial reporting system and the quality of the managerial accounting system on which manager s base real economic decisions as the quality of those economic decisions can also be inferred from publicly available data our theory generates new opportunities for empirical managerial accounting research on large nonproprietary samples further by being able to identify enhanced performance due to improved managerial accounting information our theory provides opportunities to gain a better understanding of the link between particular managerial accounting practices and the quality of the information produced

politician family networks and electoral outcomes evidence from the philippines we demonstrate the electoral importance of politician family networks and provide evidence of the mechanisms behind the relationship we use a 20 million person dataset allowing us to reconstruct intermarriage networks for over 15 000 villages in 709 municipalities in the philippines we show that politicians are disproportionately drawn from more central families and that controlling for candidate fixed e ects candidates receive a higher vote share in villages where their families are more central we present evidence that centrality confers organizational and logistical advantages that facilitate clientelistic transactions such as vote buying and do not operate through popularity name recognition or through the choice of policies more aligned with their constituents preferences

religion and the method of earnings management evidence from china previous studies argue that religious firms are more ethical and thus engage less in accrual earnings management at odds with the ethical view we use a sample of chinese listed firms and show that firms in religious regions use more real earnings management we postulate that besides ethics religion also proxies for risk aversion which motivates firms to substitute accrual earnings management with real earnings management consistent with this view we show that the positive negative association between religiosity and real accrual earnings management is more pronounced for firms with lower litigation risk and for firms with less reputable auditors in addition we use a mediation model introduced by baron and kenny j pers soc psychol 51 6 1173 1182 1986 to show that religiosity affects earnings management through the channel of risk aversion we conclude that firms choose real earnings management over accrual based earnings management because of risk aversion rather than ethical reasons

do investors see through mistakes in reported earnings this study investigates whether investors see through materially misstated earnings and whether they anticipate earnings restatements for firms that restate at least one annual report we find that investors are misled by mistakes in reported earnings at the time of initial earnings announcements investors react positively to the component of the favorable earnings surprise that will subsequently be restated and they attach the same valuation to it as to the true earnings surprise we also find that investors anticipate the subsequent downward restatements and start marking stock prices down several months before a restatement announcement so that the full impact of a restatement is about three times as large as the restatement announcement effect indeed we show that investors punish restating firms because the stock price gains that shareholders enjoy when firms initially announce overstated earnings are more than reversed by the time of the restatement announcement

the private returns to public office we study the wealth accumulation of indian state politicians using public disclosures required of all candidates the annual asset growth of winners is 3 5 percent higher than that of runners up a difference that holds also in a set of close elections the relative asset growth of winners is greater in more corrupt states and for those holding ministerial positions these results are consistent with a rent seeking explanation for the relatively high rate of growth in winners assets

earnings volatility and earnings predictability abstract survey evidence indicates widely held managerial beliefs that earnings volatility is negatively related to earnings predictability in addition existing research suggests that earnings volatility is determined by economic and accounting factors and both of these factors reduce earnings predictability we find that the consideration of earnings volatility brings substantial improvements in the prediction of both short and long term earnings conditioning on volatility information also allows one to identify systematic errors in analyst forecasts which implies that analysts do not fully understand the implications of earnings volatility for earnings predictability

value destruction and financial reporting decisions the comprehensive survey reported here allowed analysis of how senior u s financial executives make decisions related to performance measurement and voluntary disclosure chief financial officers were asked what earnings benchmarks they cared about and which factors motivated executives to exercise discretion even sacrifice economic value to deliver earnings these issues are crucially linked to stock market performance the results show that the destruction of shareholder value through legal means is pervasive perhaps even a routine way of doing business indeed the amount of value destroyed by companies striving to hit earnings targets exceeds the value lost in recent high profile fraud cases

capital market consequences of asymmetric output price rigidities abstract firms adjust output prices to cost decreases with a delay relative to cost increases i document firms operating income becomes less persistent when their input costs decrease than when their costs increase the stocks of firms slowly cutting output prices due to asymmetric output price rigidities also experience high stock return volatility and their ceos more frequently manage expectations of financial analysts i show these results are consistent with a new keynesian model with trend inflation

market and political regulatory perspectives on the recent accounting scandals not surprisingly the recent accounting scandals look different when viewed from the perspectives of the political regulatory process and of the market for corporate governance and financial reporting we do not have the opportunity to observe a world in which either market or political regulatory processes operate independently and the events are recent and not well researched so untangling their separate effects is somewhat conjectural this paper offers conjectures on issues such as what caused the scandalous behavior why was there such a rash of accounting scandals at one time who killed arthur andersen the securities and exchange commission or the market did fraudulent accounting kill enron or just keep it alive for too long what is the social cost of financial reporting fraud does the united states in fact operate a principles based or a rules based accounting system was there market failure or was there regulatory failure or both was the sarbanes oxley act a political and regulatory overreaction does the united states follow an ineffective regulatory model

exposing corrupt politicians the effects of brazil s publicly released audits on electoral outcomes author s finan frederico ferraz claudio abstract this paper examines the extent to which access to information enhances political accountability based upon the results of brazil s recent anti corruption program that randomly audits municipal expenditures of federally transferred funds it estimates the effect of the disclosure of local government corruption practices upon the re election success of incumbent mayors in municipal elections comparing municipalities which were randomly audited before the elections with those audited after the analysis shows that the disclosure of audit results had a significant impact on the re election rates of mayors found to be corrupt for a one standard deviation increase in reported corruption the audit policy reduced the incumbent s likelihood of re election by 25 percent this effect is more pronounced in municipalities where radio stations are present and higher levels of corruption are identified these findings highlight the value of information and the role of the media in reducing informational asymmetries in the political process thus enabling voters to not only hold corrupt politicians accountable but also to reward non corrupt politicians

china s land market auctions evidence of corruption this paper studies the urban land market in china in 2003 2007 in china all urban land is owned by the state leasehold use rights for land for re development are sold by city governments and are a key source of city revenue leasehold sales are viewed as a major venue for corruption prompting a number of reforms over the years reforms now require all leasehold rights be sold at public auction there are two main types of auction regular english auction and an unusual type which we call a two stage auction the latter type of auction seems more subject to corruption and to side deals between potential bidders and the auctioneer absent corruption theory suggests that two stage auctions would most likely maximize sales revenue for properties which are likely to have relatively few bidders or are cold which would suggest negative selection on property unobservables into such auctions however if such auctions are more corruptible that could involve positive selection as city officials divert hotter properties to a more corruptible auction form the paper finds that overall sales prices are lower for two stage auctions and there is strong evidence of positive selection the price difference is explained primarily by the fact that two stage auctions typically have just one bidder or no competition despite the vibrant land market in chinese cities

debt covenant violations and managers accounting responses abstract this paper examines accounting changes costs of default and accounting based covenants violated by 130 firms reporting violations in annual reports i find that managers of firms approaching default respond with income increasing accounting changes and that the default costs imposed by lenders and the accounting flexibility available to managers are important determinants of managers accounting responses i also document that private lending agreements are the first violated that net worth and working capital restrictions are the most frequently violated restrictions and that in 52 percent of the cases lenders require concessions from borrowers to resolve default

auditor reputation the impact of critical reports issued by government inspectors in recent years u k department of trade investigations into the affairs of a specific company have sometimes been critical of the work done by its auditors and reporting accountants this article assesses the impact of this criticism on the auditor s reputation in particular it examines the stock price performance of the auditor s listed clients the results show a small wealth loss for the audit clients the article also examines the impact of the department of trade criticism on an audit firm s number of listed clients and its future audit fees compared to a control group the criticized auditors appear to suffer a small loss in market share based on number of listed clients and on audit fees the evidence suggests that criticized auditors incurred economic losses from the damage to their reputations this is consistent with models of reputation advanced in the industrial organization literature

friends with benefits patronage networks and distributive politics in china abstract existing research on distributive politics mainly focuses on the influence of electoral competition between political parties but less is known about non electoral mechanisms of resource allocation inside a dominant party this study examines how informal patron client networks within the ruling communist party shape the distribution of intergovernmental transfers in china a major one party regime using a new dataset on city level fiscal transfers and a novel method to infer informal political connections through past promotions we show that provincial leaders allocate significantly more transfers to localities governed by officials who are part of their networks this bias persists even when we use a specification that only exploits variations in connection caused by exogenous turnovers of higher level leadership we evaluate two plausible motivations behind this bias network based policy coordination and collective corruption and find evidence in stronger support of the former our findings suggest that private networks may function as an important albeit costly tool of mobilization in one party systems

the economics of short term performance obsession in theory discounted cash flows dcfs set prices in well functioning capital markets in practice investment managers attach substantial weight in stock selection to short term performance particularly earnings and tracking error corporate executives blame this behavior for their own obsession with short term earnings are stock prices likely to allocate financial resources efficiently when short term earnings dominate investment decisions can investment managers who identify stocks as mispriced on a dcf basis earn excess returns this article explains why maximizing long term cash flow is the most effective way to create value for shareholders and charts a course for alleviating the obsession with short term performance

why do accruals predict earnings abstract higher accruals are associated with lower subsequent earnings we show this phenomenon can be explained by the way sales profits and working capital respond to changes in a firm s product markets empirically high accruals predict high subsequent sales growth but a long lasting drop in both profits and profitability accruals also predict an increase in future competition suggesting that accruals are correlated with abnormally high and in equilibrium transitory true profitability that attracts new entrants to the industry overall the predictive power of accruals is better explained by product market effects than by measurement error in accruals or diminishing returns from investment

the relevance of the value relevance literature for financial accounting standard setting another view this paper explains that value relevance research assesses how well accounting amounts reflect information used by equity investors and provides insights into questions of interest to standard setters a primary focus of financial statements is equity investment other uses of financial statement information such as contracting do not diminish the importance of value relevance research value relevance questions can be addressed using extant valuation models value relevance studies address econometric issues that otherwise could limit inferences and can accommodate and be used to study the implications of accounting conservatism r 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved jel classification m41 m44 g12

regulatory sanctions on independent directors and their consequences to the director labor market evidence from china we investigate the regulatory sanctions imposed on independent directors for their firms financial frauds in china these regulatory sanctions are prima facie evidence of significant lapses in business ethics during the period 2003 2010 302 person time independent directors were penalized by the regulator the china securities regulatory commission the csrc and the two stock exchanges we find that the independent directors with accounting experiences are more likely to be penalized by the csrc though they do not suffer more severe penalties than do the other sanctioned independent directors we also find that independent directors suffer less severe penalties than do the insider directors these results are consistent with the hypothesis that the sanctions on independent directors are tied to their assumed ethical and legal responsibilities following a regulatory sanction penalized independent directors experience a significant decline in the number of other board seats held however they can gain board seats in better quality firms we find that interlocked firms that share penalized independent directors with the fraud firm do not suffer from a valuation decline overall our results suggest that regulatory sanctions have not triggered further sanctions on the penalized directors in the labor market but they have instead created a disincentive for these directors to serve on the company boards of high risk firms

recognizing ethical issues an examination of practicing industry accountants and accounting students it has long been recognized that accountants practicing in business settings have a dual role 1 as employees they are bound to the organization and 2 as professionals they are bound by the profession s code of ethical conduct westra journal of business ethics 5 2 119 128 1986 these two roles highlight the need to recognize and consider both the ethical and economic implications of their decisions practicing industry accountants are commonly involved in a broad range of their firm s business practices and decision making and are increasingly exposed to the commercial aspects of their companies also during their education they were trained on their professional responsibilities however in general this education was not recent and may not have been reinforced by contrast accounting students have been recently and repeatedly exposed to and have knowledge about their professional responsibilities as an accountant but limited if any exposure to the commercial aspects of business consequently our first hypothesis predicts that the ethical sensitivity of practicing industry accountants will be lower than that of accounting students we find limited support for this hypothesis second we also examine company reward structure and predict that ethical sensitivity will be lower for those in a company with a reward structure narrowly focused only on financial goals as compared to those in a company with a broad reward structure e g including rewards for both financial and non financial goals third we predict that the difference in ethical sensitivity levels between those in a company with a narrow reward structure as compared to those in a company with a broad financial reward structure will be higher for practicing industry accountants compared to accounting students results from our study generally support these last two predictions ethical sensitivity is lower for those in a company with a reward structure narrowly focused only on financial goals as compared to those in a company with a broad reward structure suggesting that companies may be able to increase ethical awareness in their organizations by including non financial goals in their reward structures

the economics of fraudulent accounting we argue that earnings management and fraudulent accounting have important economic consequences in a model where the costs of earnings management are endogenous we show that in equilibrium low productivity firms hire and invest too much in order to pool with high productivity firms this behavior distorts the allocation of economic resources in the economy we test the predictions of the model using firmlevel data we show that during periods of suspicious accounting firms hire and invest excessively while managers exercise options when the misreporting is detected firms shed labor and capital and productivity improves our firm level results hold both before and after the market crash of 2000 in the aggregate our model provides a novel explanation for periods of jobless and investment less growth

dilemmas coordination and defection how uncertain tipping points induce common pool resource destruction abstract many common pool resources cprs have tipping points stock levels below which the resource is permanently damaged or destroyed but the specific levels at which these thresholds are crossed are rarely known with certainty we model a cpr in which uncertainty simultaneously creates a prisoner s dilemma and a coordination game this model highlights a novel mechanism through which uncertainty incentivizes the overuse of a cpr in the model two nash equilibria exist both of which lead to a tragedy of the commons but one is an inferior solution because it leads to assured resource destruction we use a single period laboratory experiment to investigate the effects of uncertain tipping points on constituents resource extraction decisions experimental results suggest that uncertainty reduces coordination in this type of cpr setting and increases the likelihood of resource destruction we also find that tax and fine policies reduce consumption rates and prevent resource destruction

a theory of corporate scandals why the usa and europe differ a wave of financial irregularity in the usa in 2001 2 culminated in the sarbanes oxley act a worldwide stockmarket bubble burst over this same period with the actual market decline being proportionately more severe in europe yet no corresponding wave of financial scandals involving a similar level of companies occurred in europe given the higher level of public and private enforcement in the usa for securities fraud this contrast seems perplexing this paper submits that different kinds of scandals characterize different systems of corporate governance in particular dispersed ownership systems of governance are prone to the forms of earnings management that erupted in the usa but concentrated ownership systems are much less vulnerable instead the characteristic scandal in such systems is the appropriation of private benefits of control this paper suggests that this difference in the likely source of and motive for financial misconduct has implications both for the utility of gatekeepers as reputational intermediaries and for design of legal controls to protect public shareholders the difficulty in achieving auditor independence in a corporation with a controlling shareholder may also imply that minority shareholders in concentrated ownership economies should directly select their own gatekeepers copyright 2005 oxford university press

executive overconfidence and the slippery slope to financial misreporting abstract a detailed analysis of 49 firms subject to aaers suggests that approximately one quarter of the misstatements meet the legal standards of intent in the remaining three quarters the initial misstatement reflects an optimistic bias that is not necessarily intentional because of the bias however in subsequent periods these firms are more likely to be in a position in which they are compelled to intentionally misstate earnings overconfident executives are more likely to exhibit an optimistic bias and thus are more likely to start down a slippery slope of growing intentional misstatements evidence from a high tech sample and a larger and more general sample support the overconfidence explanation for this path to misstatements and aaers

busting the princelings the campaign against corruption in china s primary land market using data on over a million land transactions during 2004 2016 where local governments are the sole seller we find that firms linked to members of china s supreme political elites the politburo obtained a price discount ranging from 55 4 to 59 9 compared with those without the same connections these firms also purchased slightly more land in return the provincial party secretaries who provided the discount to these princeling firms are 23 4 more likely to be promoted to positions of national leadership to curb corruption president xi jinping stepped up investigations and strengthened personnel control at the province level using a spatially matched sample e g within a 500 meter radius we find a reduction in corruption of between 42 6 and 31 5 in the provinces either targeted by the central inspection teams or whose party secretary was replaced by one appointed by xi accordingly this crackdown on corruption has also significantly reduced the promotional prospects of those local officials who rely on supplying a discount to get ahead

earnings quality evidence from the field abstract we provide insights into earnings quality from a survey of 169 cfos of public companies and in depth interviews of 12 cfos and two standard setters cfos believe that i above all high quality earnings are sustainable and repeatable specific characteristics include consistent reporting choices backing by actual cash flows and absence of one time items and long term estimates ii about 50 of earnings quality is driven by non discretionary factors such as industry and macro economic conditions iii in any given period about 20 of firms manage earnings to misrepresent economic performance and for such firms 10 of eps is typically managed iv earnings manipulation is hard to unravel from the outside but peer comparisons and lack of correspondence between earnings and cash flows provide helpful red flags in addition cfos disagree with current standard setting on a number of issues including the sheer number of promulgated rules the top down approach to rule making the neglect of the matching principle and the emphasis on fair value accounting they indicate that a rules based culture makes the audit function centralized and mechanical and hinders the development of audit professionals a summary impression from our work is that cfos view earnings quality as more of a single and unconditional characteristic in contrast to current research where measures of earnings quality are strongly conditional on the decision setting this cfo view is related to their idea of one number a single earnings metric that shapes both their interactions with external stakeholders and internal decision making

do lenders favor politically connected firms rent provision in an emerging financial market corruption by the politically connected is often blamed for economic ills particularly in less developed economies using a loan level data set of more than 90 000 rms that represents the universe of corporate lending in pakistan between 1996 and 2002 we investigate rents to politically connected rms in banking classifying a rm as political if its director participates in an election we examine the extent nature and economic costs of political rent provision we nd that political rms borrow 45 percent more and have 50 percent higher default rates such preferential treatment occurs exclusively in government banks private banks provide no

behind the scenes the corporate governance preferences of institutional investors we survey institutional investors to better understand their role in the corporate governance of firms consistent with a number of theories we document widespread behind the scenes intervention as well as governance motivated exit these governance mechanisms are viewed as complementary devices with intervention typically occurring prior to a potential exit we further find that long term investors and investors that are less concerned about stock liquidity intervene more intensively finally we find that most investors use proxy advisors and believe that the information provided by such advisors improves their own voting decisions

the impact of performance based compensation on misreporting abstract this paper examines the effect of ceo compensation contracts on misreporting we find that the sensitivity of the ceo s option portfolio to stock price is significantly positively related to the propensity to misreport we do not find that the sensitivity of other components of ceo compensation i e equity restricted stock long term incentive payouts and salary plus bonus have any significant impact on the propensity to misreport relative to other components of compensation stock options are associated with stronger incentives to misreport because convexity in ceo wealth introduced by stock options limits the downside risk on detection of the misreporting

do scaling and selection explain earnings discontinuities abstract earnings distributions commonly exhibit statistically significant discontinuities at zero earnings which are widely interpreted as evidence of earnings management to avoid a loss in contrast durtschi and easton 2005 durtschi and easton 2009 assert that discontinuities are instead explained by some combination of prior researchers choice s of scaling and sample selection as well as a scaling related effect due to a systematic relation between the sign of earnings and market prices resolution of the conflicting interpretations of discontinuities is important because 1 it affects how investors regulators and scholars view earnings management and 2 it demonstrates the importance of a close linkage between theory and research design choices we point out that de provide no evidence that scaling or selection create discontinuities but only evidence showing that changes in scaling or selection eliminate discontinuities we demonstrate why the research designs used by de eliminate discontinuities and why alternative designs using the same data yield statistically significant discontinuities that cannot be attributed to either scaling or selection

varieties of clientelism machine politics during elections although many studies of clientelism focus exclusively on vote buying political machines often employ diverse portfolios of strategies we provide a theoretical framework and formal model to explain how and why machines mix four clientelist strategies during elections vote buying turnout buying abstention buying and double persuasion machines tailor their portfolios to the political preferences and voting costs of the electorate they also adapt their mix to at least five contextual factors compulsory voting ballot secrecy political salience machine support and political polarization our analysis yields numerous insights such as why the introduction of compulsory voting may increase vote buying and why enhanced ballot secrecy may increase turnout buying and abstention buying evidence from various countries is consistent with our predictions and suggests the need for empirical studies to pay closer attention to the ways in which machines combine clientelist strategies

the effect of environmental uncertainty on the tragedy of the commons abstract we model a common pool resource game under environmental uncertainty where individuals in a symmetric group face the dilemma of sharing a common resource each player chooses a consumption level and obtains a corresponding share of that resource but if total consumption exceeds a sustainable level then the resource deteriorates and all players are worse off we consider the effect of uncertainty about the sustainable resource size on the outcome of this game assuming a general dynamic for resource deterioration we study the effect of increased ambiguity i e uncertain probabilities pertaining to the common resource s sustainable size we show that whereas increased risk may lead to more selfish behavior i e to more consumption increased ambiguity may have the opposite effect

competition for talent under performance manipulation abstract we study the effects of introducing competition for ceos assuming that the talent of ceos is not observable and that they can misreport their performance without competition for talent firms maximize their profits by offering inefficiently low powered incentive contracts competition for talent removes those inefficiencies but it leads to excessively high powered incentive contracts causing efficiency losses that can be more severe than the inefficiencies that competition mitigates if misreporting is not a concern however then competition for talent has unambiguously positive effects on efficiency

earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses this paper provides evidence that firms manage reported earnings to avoid earnings decreases and losses specifically in cross sectional distributions of earnings changes and earnings we lind unusually low frequencies of small decreases in earnings and small losscs and unusually high frequencies of small increases in earnings and small positive income we find evidence that two components of earnings cash flow from operations and changes in working capital are used to achieve increases in earnings we present two theories based on stakeholder use of information processing heuristics and prospect theory about the motivation for avoidance of earnings decreases and losses

decision making approaches and the propensity to default evidence and implications abstract this paper examines heterogeneity in the responsiveness to default options in a large state retirement plan focusing on individuals decision making approaches as well as their economic and demographic characteristics analyses of a survey of plan participants show that procrastination and the need for cognitive closure are important determinants of the likelihood of default this paper also explores an important implication of defaulting individuals who default are significantly more likely to subsequently express a desire to enroll in a different plan the desire to change plans is also correlated with numerous economic and decision making characteristics including procrastination

dynastic political rents economic benefits to relatives of top politicians we exploit close elections in swedish municipalities to test whether relatives of politicians who become mayors obtain economic benefits we find no benefits for the siblings of new mayors but the

a contracting perspective on earnings quality abstract this paper analyzes the impact of signal to noise ratios and the autocorrelation of a performance measure on the principal s welfare in dynamic agencies with renegotiation we consider the impact of changes in the persistent transitory and reversible components of accounting earnings on its usefulness in valuation versus contracting increasing the persistent components and reducing the reversible components are generally desirable for valuation but not for contracting eliminating transitory components of earnings is generally desirable for valuation but not necessarily for contracting we discuss the contracting implications of differences in the autocorrelations of accounting earnings versus stock returns

does auditor reputation matter the case of kpmg germany and comroad ag we study the stock and audit market effects associated with a widely publicized accounting scandal involving a public company comroad ag and a large reputable audit firm kpmg in a country germany that has long provided auditors with substantial protection from shareholder legal liability we use this event to study whether an auditor s reputation helps to ensure audit quality a rationale for which recent literature and events provide scant support given the absence of a strong insurance rationale for audit quality germany permits a relatively clean test of whether auditor reputation matters we find that kpmg s clients sustain negative abnormal returns of 3 at events pertaining to comroad and that these returns are more negative for companies that are likely to have higher demands for audit quality we also find an increase in the number of clients that drop kpmg in the year of the comroad scandal mostly smaller recently public companies that are similar to comroad overall our results provide support for the reputation rationale for audit quality

monitoring corruptible politicians does monitoring politicians corrupt activities induce a sustained reduction in corruption we use longitudinal data on publicly released audits of municipal governments in puerto rico to answer this question we find that corruption is considerably lower in municipalities with timely audits before an election however these municipalities do not exhibit decreased levels of corruption in subsequent audits in spite of this mayors in municipalities audited preceding the previous election have higher re election rates suggesting that audits enable voters to select more competent politicians we conclude that audit programs must be timely sustained and long term commitments in order to be effective

chronic bias in earnings forecasts whatever the source or explanation of bias in forecasts of company earnings if such bias persists it is potentially discoverable and exploitable by investors this research addresses 1 whether characterizing forecasts as if they were a homogeneous group with respect to bias is accurate or useful and 2 whether a long term record of forecast errors contains information useful in predicting subsequent errors we found that earnings forecasts are heterogeneous with respect to direction and degree of bias we also found evidence of extremes in optimism and pessimism and that extreme errors tend to persist in the same direction which suggests certain potentially profitable trading strategies

real earnings management in sales abstract we surveyed 1 638 sales executives across 40 countries regarding their companies likelihood of asking sales to perform real earnings management rem actions when earnings pressure exists using this information which we refer to as companies rem propensities we study how company characteristics and environmental conditions relate to the responses received the use of cash flow incentives for sales personnel and the distribution of interfunctional power in favor of finance rather than sales are both associated with companies rem propensities in addition we show that sales executives preemptively change their behaviors in anticipation of top management s rem requests sales executives working for public companies and companies in the united states reported higher levels of rem propensity the data also support an association between rem propensity and finance sales conflict these findings and others are compared and contrasted with existing empirical and survey based research on rem throughout the paper abstract from author

fiscal incentives and policy choices of local governments evidence from china abstract this paper examines how fiscal incentives affect the policy choices of local governments in the context of china based on exogenous changes in the intergovernmental revenue sharing scheme we construct a simulated instrumental variable to resolve the endogeneity problem we find evidence that local governments shifted their efforts from fostering industrial growth to urbanizing china i e to developing the real estate and construction sectors when their retention rate of enterprise tax revenue was reduced the increase from the new revenue source compensated for half of the losses in revenue that resulted from the reassignment of fiscal rights the reassignment had also the effect of retarding the industrial growth of domestically owned firms in particular

on the persistence and pricing of industry wide and firm specific earnings cash flows and accruals economic theory suggests that the industry wide component of firm performance is more persistent than the firm specific component this paper tests whether investors fail to fully appreciate the relatively higher lower persistence of industry wide firm specific earnings consistent with predictions we find that the industry wide component of earnings is a significant predictor of future stock returns we show that this form of mispricing is distinct from the accrual anomaly sloan 1996 a hedge portfolio trading strategy that exploits signals from both industry fundamentals and accounting accruals generates abnormal returns in excess of either strategy alone additional evidence suggests that the market underreacts overreacts to industry wide cash flows firm specific accruals but correctly prices both industry wide accruals and firm specific cash flows

the role of accounting quality in the m a market we examine the role of target firms accounting quality in the merger and acquisition process we predict that target firm accounting quality will be positively associated with 1 the likelihood that the deal will be structured as a negotiation rather than as an auction 2 the speed with which the deal reaches final resolution and 3 the likelihood that the proposed deal is ultimately completed our empirical evidence is consistent with these predictions these results complement and extend existing findings on target firm accounting quality and provide new evidence that financial accounting quality relates positively to the efficient allocation of the economy s capital resources this paper was accepted by mary barth accounting

incentives information and organizational form we model an organization as a hierarchy of managers erected on top of a technology here consisting of a collection of plants in our framework the role of a manager is to take steps to reduce the adverse consequences of shocks that affect the plants beneath him we argue that different organizational forms give rise to different information about managers performance and therefore differ according to how effective incentives can be in encouraging a good performance in particular we show that under certain assumptions the m form multi divisional form is likely to provide better incentives than the u form unitary form because it promotes yardstick competition i e relative performance evaluation more effectively we conclude by presenting evidence that the assumptions on which this comparison rests are satisfied for chinese data

is there a link between executive equity incentives and accounting fraud we compare executive equity incentives of firms accused of accounting fraud by the securities and exchange commission sec during the period 1996 2003 with two samples of firms not accused of fraud we measure equity incentives in a variety of ways and employ a battery of empirical tests we find no consistent evidence that executive equity incentives are associated with fraud these results stand in contrast to assertions by policy makers that incentives from stock based compensation and the resulting equity holdings increase the likelihood of accounting fraud

environmental variability and collective action experimental insights from an irrigation game abstract studies of collective action in commons dilemmas in social ecological systems typically focus on scenarios in which actors all share symmetric or similar positions in relation to the common pool resource many common social ecological systems do not meet these criteria most notably irrigation systems participants in irrigation systems must solve two related collective action problems 1 the provisioning of physical infrastructure necessary to utilize the resource water and 2 the asymmetric common pool resource dilemma where the relative positions of head enders and tail enders generate asymmetric access to the resource itself water in times of scarcity head enders have an incentive to not share water with tail enders likewise tail enders have an incentive to not provide labor to maintain the system if they do not receive water these interdependent incentives may induce a cooperative outcome under favorable conditions however how robust is this system of interdependent incentives in the presence of environmental variability that generates uncertainty about water availability either through variation in the water supply itself or through shocks to infrastructure this paper reports on results from laboratory experiments designed to address this question

how should we think about earnings quality a discussion of earnings quality evidence from the field abstract dichev graham harvey and rajgopal dghr in this issue survey chief financial officers cfos to elicit their views on earnings quality broader trends in financial reporting and the prevalence of earnings management they provide some interesting insights on these issues we discuss how cfos incentives in the financial reporting process are likely to affect what we can learn from them about earnings quality we also discuss how dghr s methodological choices regarding survey sample and question design affect their inferences including what we can infer about the prevalence and magnitude of earnings management

real effects of accounting rules evidence from multinational firms investment location and profit repatriation decisions we analyze survey responses from nearly 600 tax executives to better understand corporate decisions about real investment location and profit repatriation our evidence indicates that avoiding financial accounting income tax expense is as important as avoiding cash income taxes when corporations decide where to locate operations and whether to repatriate foreign earnings this result is important in light of the recent research about whether financial accounting affects investment and in light of the decades of research on foreign investment that examines the role of cash income taxes but heretofore has not investigated the importance of financial reporting effects our analysis suggests that financial reporting is an important factor to be considered in the policy debates focused on bringing investment to the united states

earnings management the shapes of the frequency distributions of earnings metrics are not evidence ipso facto we provide evidence that the shapes particularly around zero of the frequency distributions of earnings metrics examined in the extant earnings management literature are affected by 1 deflation using for example price or market capitalization 2 sample selection criteria that lead to differential inclusion exclusion of observations to the left of zero versus observations to the right of zero implicit in studies focusing on firms followed by i b e s and explicit in studies partitioning on a variable differing between loss observations and profit observations 3 differences between the characteristics of observations to the left of zero and observations to the right of zero such as market pricing and analyst optimism pessimism or 4 a combination of these factors since the shapes of the frequency distributions of earnings metrics at zero are likely due to one of the above effects we conclude that the shapes cannot be used as ipso facto evidence of earnings management

a behavioral understanding of investment horizon and firm performance observers have argued that firms overly emphasize short term results at the expense of long run value using a behavioral perspective we analyze three hypotheses related to this general argument first we examine the association of investment time horizons with firm performance contributing new theory that argues for a quadratic rather than linear association second because the tendency toward immediate results could reflect stock market pressures we consider how the interaction of investor patience and firm horizon relates to firm performance third we examine the argument s implication that most firms have investment horizons at a level where marginal increases in horizon associate positively with firm performance measuring horizon as the expected useful lives of capital expenditures we find empirical support for the hypothesized quadratic relation in a large scale multiyear sample of u s publicly held manufacturing firms and confirm that a majority of firms have horizons in the region where our models predict increases in horizon positively influence performance we also find that the most positive returns occur when long horizon investments are aligned with investor patience

does managerial sentiment affect accrual estimates evidence from the banking industry abstract we examine whether managerial sentiment is associated with errors in accrual estimates using public banks we find 1 managerial sentiment is negatively associated with loan loss provision estimates 2 future charge offs per dollar of provision are positively associated with sentiment when the provision is estimated and 3 the effects of sentiment are greater for firms with more uncertain charge offs results are similar for private banks suggesting accrual manipulation related to capital market incentives is unlikely to explain the results although economic fundamentals explain most of the variation in the provision we find sentiment has an incremental and economically meaningful effect