optimal incentive schemes with many agents the grossman hart principal agent model of moral hazard is extended to the multiple agent case to explore the use of relative performance in optimal incentive contracting under the assumption that the principal chooses incentive schemes to implement agent actions as nash equilibria necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for the optimality of independent contracts of rank order tournaments and for attainability of the first best in this context the relation of the principal s welfare to the correlation between the underlying randomness in outputs of different agents is also investigated finally some problems with the nash equilibrium implementation assumption are discussed in this paper we extend the grossman hart analysis of the principal agent problem to a multiple agent setting in this version of the problem a risk neutral principal is assumed to observe the output or a performance index for each risk averse agent the output of any agent depends on a privately observable action chosen by the agent and an exogenous random variable the realization of which is not observed either by the principal or by the agent before choosing its action we especially focus attention on the role of relative performance evaluation in optimal incentive contracts and the way this depends on properties of the underlying production technology and the joint distribution of the random variables affecting the outputs of different agents in section 2 of the paper we consider the principal s problem of finding an optimal incentive scheme and an action tuple for agents subject to the constraint that the latter be implemented as a nash equilibrium between agents by the chosen incentive scheme where agents must attain at least their reservation utilities a characterization of optimal incentive schemes is derived analogous to the grossman hart characterization for the single agent problem this characterization is then utilized to find sufficient and generically necessary conditions for a optimal contracts for any agent to be independent of the performance of other agents and b optimality of rank order tournaments where payments depend solely on ordinal comparisons of output across agents we then describe a necessary and sufficient condition for the principal to extract maximum advantage from relative performance clauses i e achieve the first best level of expected utility in the multiagent situation an implication of this result is that under fairly weak conditions perfect correlation in the underlying production uncertainties for different agents enables the principal to attain the first best if and only if sufficiently heavy penalties can be inflicted on agents we then enquire what happens in intermediate cases of non perfect correlation it turns out that while in general the principal s welfare is a continuous function of the correlation coefficient it is not always nondecreasing in the latter because the correlation coefficient is not a general measure of association between two random variables but rather a measure of linear association between them

wall street occupations many finance jobs entail the risk of large losses and hard to monitor effort we analyze the equilibrium consequences of these features in a model with optimal dynamic contracting we show that finance jobs feature high compensation up or out promotion and long work hours and are more attractive than other jobs moral hazard problems are exacerbated in booms even though pay increases employees whose talent would be more valuable elsewhere can be lured into finance jobs while the most talented employees might be unable to land these jobs because they are too hard to manage

testing the morale theory of nominal wage rigidity this paper tests the morale theory of nominal wage rigidity according to which firms resist making nominal cuts to workers pay even in adverse economic conditions because such cuts hurt worker morale and productivity the authors analyze data from an employer employee survey they conducted in japan in 2000 that year coincided with a rare spell of deflationary recession which the authors argue is a good setting in which to study how nominal pay cuts affect morale they find that a nominal annual pay freeze experienced by 21 of the sampled workers demoralized workers by reducing their trust in the firm and that even greater demoralization not wholly attributable to reduced trust was associated with a nominal pay cut which affected 17 of the workers the observed negative relationship between nominal pay cuts and morale persists even when the estimation includes controls and firm fixed effects

labour force substitution and the effects of an ageing population 1986 labour force substitution and the effects of an ageing population applied economics vol 18 no 8 pp 901 913

gender differences in training capital and wages this paper constructs an equilibrium job matching model where workers differ in their attachment to the labor force the model predicts that workers with weaker attachment to the labor market will receive lower starting wages and lower post training wages and will be placed in jobs that offer less training and use less capital the implications of the model for gender differences in pay and job assignment are tested with the eopp data set ourfindings suggest that while training intensity during the first three months of employment is similar in positions filled by males and females females are employed in positions that have a shorter duration of on the job training and that use less capital these differences in on the job training and capital in positions filled by men and women as well as a lower market value for women s prior labor market experience account for a substantial part of the gap in wages between males and females

futures pricing in electricity markets based on stable carma spot models we present a new model for the electricity spot price dynamics which is able to capture seasonality low frequency dynamics and the extreme spikes in the market instead of the usual purely deterministic trend we introduce a non stationary independent increments process for the low frequency dynamics and model the large uctuations by a non gaussian stable carma process the model allows for analytic futures prices and we apply these to model and estimate the whole market consistently besides standard parameter estimation an estimation procedure is suggested where we t the non stationary trend using futures data with long time until delivery and a robust l 1 lter to nd the states of the carma process the procedure also involves the empirical and theoretical risk premiums which as a by product are also estimated we apply this procedure to data from the german electricity exchange eex where we split the empirical analysis into base load and peak load prices we nd an overall negative risk premium for the base load futures contracts except for contracts close to delivery where a small positive risk premium is detected the peak load contracts on the other hand show a clear positive risk premium when they are close to delivery while the contracts in the longer end also have a negative premium ams 2000 subject classications primary 60g52 62m10 91b84 secondary 60g10 60g51 91b70

coordination of internal supply chains in vertically integrated high tech manufacturing organizations htmos abstract this paper uses economic mechanisms to coordinate supply chains within high tech manufacturing organizations htmos it models the one shot initial production and allocation decisions involved in the production and marketing of new technologies these decisions are driven by the economic objectives of the firm and of the employees with private information the experts it analyzes and compares the efficiency of three coordination policies centralized command and control centralized revelation and decentralized revelation it shows that decentralized policies introduce an additional cost and it proposes rules of thumb for coordinating supply chains within firms that use many experts

dynamic contracts with worker mobility via directed on the job search this article proposes a model with dynamic incentive contracts and on the job search in a frictional labor market the optimal long term contract exhibits an increasing wage tenure profile with increasing wages worker effort also increases with tenure these two features imply that the probabilities of both voluntary and involuntary job separation decrease with both job tenure and the duration of employment given these results workers experience differing labor market transitions between employment unemployment and across different employers and the equilibrium generates endogenous heterogeneity among ex ante homogeneous workers abstract from author

the british low wage sector and the employment prospects of the unemployed abstractare low wages a way for the unemployed to switch to higher paying jobs using data from the british household panel survey the labour market dynamics of unemployed low paid and higher paid employed men are analysed moreover the respective un employment duration and occupational skill level are accounted for results show that in general low wages significantly reduce the risk of future unemployment and increase the chances of ascending the salary ladder especially in the case of long term unemployment 360 days furthermore the occupational skill level has a substantial influence on the upward mobility of low paid jobs individuals working in the initial period in a low paid and higher skilled occupation have on average an 11 percentage points higher probability of entering higher pay compared to when working in a low paid and low skilled occupation

the overnight risk premium in electricity forward contracts abstract we analyze the risk premium on electricity forward contracts traded for the nordic and german austrian electricity markets we argue that finding risk premiums by analyzing overnight returns is more relevant than the frequently used ex post approach the derivatives in these markets can be characterized as trading products and hedging products each contract shows a clear increase in trading volume and liquidity when approaching maturity we link this to a testable hypothesis where financial traders are compensated for holding price risk and where the sign and magnitude of the risk premium changes depending on the hedging pattern of producers and retailers incorporating this in regressions we find that there are higher risk premiums in the period before the forwards become front products compared to the risk premiums in the front period quarterly and monthly contracts show the most significant results

pricing forward contracts in power markets by the certainty equivalence principle explaining the sign of the market risk premium in this paper we provide a framework that explains how the market risk premium defined as the difference between forward prices and spot forecasts depends on the risk preferences of market players and the interaction between buyers and sellers in commodities markets this premium is an important indicator of the behavior of buyers and sellers and their views on the market spanning between short term and long term horizons we show that under certain assumptions it is possible to derive explicit solutions that link levels of risk aversion and market power with market prices of risk and the market risk premium we apply our model to the german electricity market and show that the market risk premium exhibits a term structure which can be explained by the combination of two factors firstly the levels of risk aversion of buyers and sellers and secondly how the market power of producers relative to that of buyers affects forward prices with different delivery periods

carbon pricing and electricity markets the case of the australian clean energy bill abstract we examine the impact of the clean energy bill on the price behavior of electricity futures contracts in the australian national electricity market first we compute ex ante forward risk premiums in the pre tax period until june 2012 then derive market implied expectations about additional costs of the carbon pricing mechanism cpm on generators as well as pass through rates during the carbon tax july 2012 june 2014 and post tax after july 2014 periods our results suggest that the observed carbon premiums became increasingly higher once the carbon tax had been proposed and subsequently legislated in 2011 during periods where market participants could be relatively certain that the tax would be effective we find expected carbon pass through rates between 67 and 150 which seem to be inversely related to emission intensities in the regional markets our results are also a clear indication of strong policy uncertainty with regards to the cpm and suggest that in the future a stable and long term policy framework would be required for a carbon pricing mechanism to have its full effect

economic contests comparative reward schemes contests are situations in which an individual s reward depends on his performance relative to others students are graded on a curve the candidate with the most votes gets the political office the underling who performs best is promoted to the executive position contests are useful in dealing with indivisible rewards reducing monitoring costs and minimizing risks from common uncertainties they are employed to sort potential participants and once they have entered to induce appropriate effort from them with monitoring precision and prize spreads as potential choice variables optimal contest structures are derived for fair and unfair contests among equal and unequal participants the converse problems of climbing low ability individuals enter the contest designed for high ability candidates and slumming are shown to be manageable

the firm as a dedicated hierarchy a theory of the origins and growth of firms in the formative stages of their businesses entrepreneurs have to provide incentives for employees to protect rather than steal the source of organizational rents we study how the entrepreneur s response to this problem determines the organization s internal structure growth and its eventual size large steep hierarchies will predominate in physical capital intensive industries and will have seniority based promotion policies by contrast e at hierarchies will prevail in human capital intensive industries and will have up or out promotion systems furthermore e at hierarchies will have more distinctive technologies or cultures than steep hierarchies the model points to some essential differences between organized hierarchies and markets at the root of most enterprises generating economic surplus is an entrepreneur with a unique critical resource such as an idea good customer relationships a new tool or superior management technique a fundamental problem of entrepreneurship is how to enlist the cooperation of the many agents necessary for production without ceding to them too much of the surplus generated by the enterprise the risk of being expropriated however is always inherent in production in particular the entrepreneur has to give her employees whom we call managers close proximity or access to the critical resource for them to learn to produce effectively for example a manager has to understand the idea be in contact with the key customers and suppliers or even learn the entrepreneur s unique managerial techniques in order to work effectively but access also gives the manager the opportunity to expropriate this critical resource and compete against the entrepreneur managers may steal the idea walk away with clients or mimic the entrepreneur s management style and start up a rival concern the greater the access a manager has the more he can appropriate and the more effectively he can compete this paper explores the role of organizational design in

why are capitalists the bosses this paper addresses the question why does capital typically hire labor rather than the other way around it models a situation in which a capitalist owner of money capital can choose between lending out his capital for production and using it to set up production under his own supervision it is demonstrated that the moral hazard of potential borrowers on account of limited liability provides the capitalist with the incentive to become a firm owner supervising hired labor the capitalist s choice is endogenized in terms of his opportunity cost of time it is argued that moral hazard with respect to the use of borrowed capital is an important determinant of the social hierarchy in the workplace copyright 1989 by royal economic society

electricity futures prices indirect storability expectations and risk premiums the goal of this paper is to examine to what extent electricity futures prices contain expected risk premiums or have power to forecast spot prices and whether this might be dependent on the type of electricity supply we analyse futures prices from the dutch market a market in which power is produced with storable fossil fuels and futures prices from the nordpool market where electricity is mostly produced by hydropower we show that futures prices from markets in which electricity is predominantly produced by imperfectly storable fuels such as hydro wind and solar contain information about expected changes in the spot price of electricity whereas futures prices from markets in which electricity is predominantly produced with perfectly storable fuels contain information about both expected price changes and time varying risk premiums these findings provide insight in the applicability of forward price models one cannot apply the same model to all electricity markets forward models for markets with imperfect indirect storability should depend heavily on price expectations and models should include time varying risk premiums for markets with perfect indirect storability

major oecd country industrial sector interfuel substitution estimates 1960 1979 abstract a range of static and dynamic translog based expenditure shares models are estimated for non energy producing industrial sectors of the major seven countries of the oecd area sectoral energy volume and fuel efficiency bias variables are shown to be significant over and above individual prices in explaining individual fuel expenditure shares statistically significant own price and cross price elasticities of demand are presented for individual countries with some magnitudes varying considerably across alternative model specifications

should i stay or should i go career choices for young workers in latin america labor market institutions shape the return to workers skills they define the incentives of firms and workers to invest in general and specific skills affecting the returns to experience and tenure this paper presents an empirical assessment of this hypothesis we take advantage of rich administrative data from brazil and chile two countries with different regulatory frameworks we focus on young workers as they face to a greater extent the trade off between accumulating general or specific skills the analysis is motivated by a simple conceptual framework from which we derive empirical predictions it takes into account the potential endogeneity of occupational choices while allowing for heterogenous returns to tenure and experience we find positive average returns to both dimensions in both countries with larger returns to tenure in brazil and larger returns to experience in chile this is consistent with the original conjecture as the more rigid labor market legislation in brazil encourages firms to carry out additional investments in young workers s specific skills chile s institutions on the contrary promote the acquisition of general skills we further examine how these returns differ by educational attainment an important policy consideration in the region and find that more educated workers in both countries face larger returns to experience and tenure relative to their less educated counterparts

moral hazard in high office and the dynamics of aristocracy both aristocratic privileges and constitutional constraints in traditional monarchies can be derived from a ruler s incentive to minimize expected costs of moral hazard rents for high officials we consider a dynamic moral hazard model of governors serving a sovereign prince who must deter them from rebellion and hidden corruption which could cause costly crises to minimize costs a governor s rewards for good performance should be deferred up to the maximal credit that the prince can be trusted to pay in the long run we find that high officials can become an entrenched aristocracy with low turnover and large claims on the ruler dismissals for bad performance should be randomized to avoid inciting rebellions but the prince can profit from reselling vacant offices and so his decisions to dismiss high officials require institutionalized monitoring a soft budget constraint that forgives losses for low credit governors can become efficient when costs of corruption are low

immigrant earnings differentials and birth year effects for men in canada post war 1972 this paper investigates immigrant earnings differentials for males in canada and how these earnings have changed over time leading up to 1972 with workers year of birth the paper uses the 1973 job mobility survey which contains a direct measure of work experience reported independent of age thus using age as a birth year index it is found that cross sectional earnings differentials of immigrant men have widened since the later 1960s relative to those of native born workers summary in fre excerpt

short term variations and long term dynamics in commodity prices in this article we develop a two factor model of commodity prices that allows meanreversion in short term prices and uncertainty in the equilibrium level to which prices revert although these two factors are not directly observable they may be estimated from spot and futures prices intuitively movements in prices for long maturity futures contracts provide information about the equilibrium price level and differences between the prices for the short and long term contracts provide information about short term variations in prices we show that although this model does not explicitly consider changes in convenience yields over time this short term long term model is equivalent to the stochastic convenience yield model developed in gibson and schwartz 1990 we estimate the parameters of the model using prices for oil futures contracts and apply the model to some hypothetical oil linked assets to demonstrate its use and some of its advantages over the gibson schwartz model

an empirical study of the information premium on electricity markets abstract due to the non storability of electricity and the resulting lack of arbitrage based arguments to price electricity forward contracts a significant time varying risk premium is exhibited using eex data during the introduction of emission certificates and the german atom moratorium we show that a significant part of the risk premium in electricity forwards is due to different information sets in spot and forward markets in order to show the existence of the resulting information premium and to analyse its size we design an empirical method based on techniques relating to enlargement of filtrations and the structure of hilbert spaces

revisiting the relationship between spot and futures prices in the nord pool electricity market abstract this work discusses potential pitfalls of applying linear regression models for explaining the relationship between spot and futures prices in electricity markets in particular the bias coming from the simultaneity problem the effect of correlated measurement errors and the impact of seasonality on the regression results studying a 13 year long 1998 2010 price series of spot and futures prices at nord pool and employing regression models with garch residuals we show that the impact of the water reservoir level on the risk premium is positive which is to be expected but contradicts the results of botterud et al 2010 we also show that after taking into account the seasonality of the water level the storage cost theory proposed by botterud et al 2010 to explain the behavior of convenience yield has only limited support in the data

job assignments signalling and efficiency this article analyzes a model in which information about a worker s ability is only directly revealed to the firm employing the worker other firms however use the worker s job assignment as a signal of ability three results recur throughout the analysis first wage rates tend to be more closely associated with jobs than with ability levels second there is frequently an inefficient assignment of workers to jobs i e even when a firm has complete information about a worker s output third the severity of this inefficiency tends to be negatively correlated with the level of firm specific human capital in the economy

are electricity risk premia affected by emission allowance prices evidence from the eex nord pool and powernext the links between emission and energy markets are of great interest to practitioners academics and policy makers in this paper it is conjectured that a positive relationship exists between emission allowance spot returns and electricity risk premia within the european union emissions trading scheme eu ets we discuss how this can be justified on the basis of the substantial uncertainties in the carbon markets we also argue that this link could be due to trading strategies followed by electricity producers who attempt to exploit their initial allocation of free allowances analysis of data from three major markets the eex nord pool and powernext offers empirical support to our conjecture these findings have significant policy implications since they imply that efforts should be made in order to reduce the uncertainty in the carbon markets by clearly defining the eu ets regulative framework and design over the next years moreover our results suggest that the allocation of free allowances and their unrestricted trading enable electricity producers to accomplish windfall profits in the derivatives market at the expense of other market participants

are wages habit forming evidence from micro data although utility functions play a central role in economics the axiom that utility depends only on the absolute levels of its arguments is rarely tested this paper uses panel data on 2000 british employees who remain with the same employer and who are not promoted from one wave to the next it is shown that one important measure of well being overall job satisfaction is strongly positively correlated with the change in the worker s pay between waves but is unrelated to the current level of pay empirical tests suggest that a reference dependent satisfaction function where individual well being depends on current pay relative to past pay is more consistent with these regression results than are productivity or agency explanations of increasing wage profiles some evidence is presented of greater job satisfaction effects of pay rises for lower paid less well educated and younger workers these results provide some micro evidence consistent with the theory widespread in social science of habituation individuals may become used to any given level of consumption or income as such they tie in with the finding that a country s well being as measured by the average happiness of its citizens is only weakly correlated with its per capita gnp

locational price spreads and the pricing of contracts for difference evidence from the nordic market in electricity markets not only does the risk of substantial price variations over time exist but so does the risk of price variations over space as prices between locations can differ due to transmission congestion to manage this risk contracts for difference cfds i e forwards on the spread between a particular area price and the unconstrained system price were introduced at the scandinavian electricity exchange nord pool at the end of 2000 we empirically investigate the pricing of these cfds over the period 2001 through 2006 and find that cfd prices contain significant risk premia their sign and magnitude however differ substantially between areas and delivery periods because areas are subject to transmission congestion to a varying extent while the relation between risk premia and time to maturity is not uniform for cfds there is a negative relation for implied area and system forwards which can be explained by the relative hedging demand of market participants in addition we find that risk premia of cfds and implied area forwards vary systematically with the variance and skewness of the underlying spot prices this confirms both implications of the bessembinder and lemmon bessembinder h lemmon m l 2002 equilibrium pricing and optimal hedging in electricity forward markets journal of finance 57 1347 1382 model

risk management in use of system tariffs for network users network use of system uos tariffs play an essential role in the deregulated power markets to recover network investment and maintenance costs from network users and send economic signals to influence the users behaviors in using systems the tariffs are essential to the business operation of both network operators and users they however could have great volatility due to the uncertainties from both external and internal factors such uncertain tariffs could bring severe adverse impacts to network users which justifies that there is an urgent need to reduce the tariff volatility and improve its predictability this paper for the first time investigates the variations in network tariffs that cause great risks to network users and then designs financial tools to reduce the volatility the causing factors of the variations are categorized into global and local groups according to their different features after introducing the process from network planning charging to revenue reconciliation the paper discusses the benefits of hedging for network users in order to reduce tariff volatility it proposes a novel risk management strategy to maintain the consistency of tariffs it is achieved by designing long term contracts using financial hedging the value of hedge contracts is decided by three key factors hedged load generation percentage hedged price and risk premium the hedged part is charged at hedged prices and the non hedged part is charged at actual prices on top of which customers needs to pay extra for the risk premium the paper also designs an optimal decision making tool to assist network users to manage long term contracts in order to reduce total tariff costs as demonstrated in the case study the proposed long term products can effectively reduce tariff volatility for network users and create a safe environment for their business operation

salaries and piece rates compensation can take many forms remuneration can come as pecuniary payments as fringes such as health and pension benefits or as a nonpecuniary reward such as plush office furniture that costs the firm less than it benefits the worker a significant literature has examined the trade offs between pecuniary and nonpecuniary compensation the modern work having been pioneered by rosen 1974 more recently another body of literature has examined the selection of method of total compensation ignoring the distinction between pecuniary and nonpecuniary payment this work has focused on risk and incentive factors it has resulted in comparisons of compensation based on absolute output levels to that based on relative performance it has also led to explorations of the relation of compensation to experience over the work life 2 little attention has been paid to what may be among the most important and obvious distinction in methods of compensation namely the choice between a fixed salary for some period of time that is paying on the basis of input and some workers receive compensation that is specified in advance and not directly contingent on performance instead it depends on an input measure such as hours worked for others compensation is directly related to output this essay is an attempt to predict a firm s choice of compensation method piece rates are defined more rigorously among the more important factors discussed are worker heterogeneity incentives sorting considerations monitoring costs and asymmetric information one result is that salary workers tend to be of lower quality and more homogeneous than are their piece rate counterparts numerous additional results are provided helpful comments by victoria lazear and yoram weiss are gratefully acknowledged support was provided by the department of labor and the national science foundation 1 see lazear and rosen 1981 stiglitz 1981 holmstrom 1982 green and stokey 1983 2 see lazear 1979 1981 and harris and holmstrom in press

work incentives hierarchy and internal labor markets this paper argues that contracts with payment based on a ranking of employee performance can provide performance incentives even under asymmetric information that prevents payment based on individual performance only being enforceable such contracts also fit with five features of labor markets that have aroused considerable interest 1 hierarchical wage structures 2 internal promotion 3 wage rates that rise with seniority and experience more than productivity 4 the variance of earnings increasing with experience and 5 wage rates attached to jobs rather than individuals with differentials set by administrative procedures rather than by reference to external market wages

implicit contracts explicit contracts and wages over the past decade the search for an explanation of aggregate money wage stickiness in the face of substantial shifts in the marginal revenue product of labor of the kind that was associated with an increase in real wages in the depression of the 1930 shas led to an extensive examination of explicit union and implicit nonunion employment contracting arrangements this distinction can be exaggerated long term union contracts have an implicit element in the sense that they specify only a limited number of contingencies to which wages will be adjusted moreover the implicit contracting branch of the literature has pushed in the direction of implying that the explicit contracts observed in the union sector may be formalizations of common informal arrangements in the nonunion sector so that differences between the sectors in the behavior of wages and employment may be more apparent than real the purpose of this paper is to examine the empirical basis for some of the key propositions of implicit contract theories and to note some important differences in the outcome of implicit and explicit contracting

limited liability contracts between principal and agent abstract the optimal strategy of the principal is examined in an environment where there are ex post limitations on the maximum penalty that can be imposed on a riskneutral agent contrary to the case in which such limitations are not imposed it is in the principal s interest to deliberately forego the opportunity to induce socially efficient behavior and to instead design a contract that induces the agent to realize an efficient outcome only in the most productive state of nature and perhaps in certain very unproductive states the properties of the contract are examined in detail

optimal forward trading and battery control under renewable electricity generation abstract the increased market penetration of renewable energy sources and the rapid development of electric battery storage technologies yield a potential for reducing electricity price volatility while maintaining stability of the power grid this work presents an algorithmic approach to control battery levels and forward positions to optimally manage power output fluctuations caused by intermittent renewable energy generation this paper will also explore the effect of battery technology on the firm s optimal trading behaviour in the electricity spot market

an empirical study of labor market equilibrium under working hours constraints predictions of economic theory for the equilibrium condition of workers in three labor markets with differing working hours constraints are tested original data allow the marginal rate of substitution of income for leisure to be estimated directly in two markets working hours constraints resulting from high fixed employment costs and the overtime premium respectively cause workers to desire fewer and more hours in the third market agricultural labor constraint factors are absent the predicted relationship between the wage and the marginal rate of substitution of income for leisure holds in each case implications for agency and human capital models are investigated additionally in the agricultural case preferences and equilibria are indistinguishable for legal and illegal workers copyright 1990 by mit press

unionization and plant closure in canada this paper examines for the first time the role of unionization as a determinant of plant closings in canada using the 1999 to 2001 canadian workplace and employee survey the paper contributes to the north american evidence by showing that the share of a plant s workers covered by collective bargaining has a robust positive partial correlation with the probability of larger plants closing for smaller plants the extent of unionization tends to be much lower and its variation plays no role in plant closure the study highlights the theoretical and statistical importance of examining closure separately for large and small plants ce memoire examine pour la premiere fois le role de la syndicalisation en tant que determinant de la fermeture d usines au canada a l aide des resultats de l enquete sur le milieu de travail et les employes de 1999 et de 2001 emte le texte contribue a enrichir le dossier qui montre qu il y a correlation positive partielle robuste entre la portion des travailleurs d usines couverts par une convention collective et la probabilite de fermeture des grandes usines pour les plus petites usines le degre de syndicalisation tend aetre plus faible et sa variation ne joue pas de role dans le processus de fermeture d usines cette etude montre l importance theorique et pratique qu il y a aetudier separement les fermetures des grandes et des petites usines

the plunge in german electricity futures prices analysis using a parsimonious fundamental model abstract the german market has seen a plunge in wholesale electricity prices from 2007 until 2014 with base futures prices dropping by more than 40 this is frequently attributed to the unexpected high increase in renewable power generation using a parsimonious fundamental model we determine the respective impact of supply and demand shocks on electricity futures prices the used methodology is based on a piecewise linear approximation of the supply stack and time varying price inelastic demand this parsimonious model is able to replicate electricity futures prices and discover non linear dependencies in futures price formation we show that emission prices have a higher impact on power prices than renewable penetration changes in renewables demand and installed capacities turn out to be similarly important for explaining the decrease in operation margins of conventional power plants we thus argue for the establishment of an independent authority to stabilize emission prices

an empirical look at franchising as an organizational form franchise contracts are identified as a hybrid form of economic organization motives for the dominance of franchise arrangements are identified by examining the theoretical literature on franchising and related literatures on the theory of the firm firm growth managerial and employee selection a nd brand name capital empirical tests are performed on the incidence of franchise contracts across states for three industries in which f ranchising is prominent and data are readily available the results s uggest that both principal agent incentives and informational incenti ves favor the use of franchise arrangements copyright 1988 by the university of chicago

employer seniority discrimination evidence from enterpreneurial occupational choice abstract this research examines the theories presented in the human capital literature by becker 1975 lazear 1979 1981 and others that the relative paths of earnings and value of marginal product henceforth vmp diverge over the worklife the findings support lazear s work incentive theory for professionals but reject its application to non professionals as predicted by orthodox human capital theory documentation is also developed that earnings for non professionals equal their vmp over the job life cycle on the other hand the analysis provides no support to becker s specific training model

dynamic labor market competition and wage seniority abstract we design an overlapping generations model of the labor market experienced workers bear costs of switching employers whereas the segment for junior workers is horizontally differentiated the literature typically explains wage seniority premia with reference to productivity gains generated by the accumulation of worker experience or mechanisms associated with incomplete information in contrast this paper characterizes how the wage seniority premium depends on the relative intensities of competition in the markets for junior and senior workers in particular we show that a wage seniority premium may prevail even under circumstances where senior workers are less productive than junior workers

seniority rules and productivity an empirical test the primary purpose of this paper is to test empirically the effect of labor quality on short run manufacturing productivity in doing so the study makes major advances in two areas for the first time a job tenure function is estimated and a time series of job tenure in manufacturing is developed this estimated tenure series empirically verifies the use of seniority rules in the firm worker employment relationship having generated a tenure series the authors then test whether tenure enhances productivity in manufacturing the results clearly indicate that seniority rules have a statistically significant positive impact on productivity and the pattern of the seniority rules is reminiscent of a model where human capital has a specific component copyright 1989 by the london school of economics and political science

does rising productivity explain seniority rules for layoffs seniority rules for layoffs are a widespread feature of the union and nonunion workplace many explanations have been offered for their existence some emphasize the role of unions but others argue that seniority rules can promote economic efficiency in this context the rules are simple easy to implement and widely regarded as fair they may help control turnover and conserve valuable investments in specific capital they may also be a response to the higher reliability of more experienced workers or they may reflect the higher value young workers place on their time at home or at search in this company a new explanation is hardly needed and this note will not provide one rather i will show that one of the most commonly accepted explanations is based on an assumption that is quite unrealistic one of the most plausible explanations for seniority rules seems to follow directly from human capital theory 2 senior workers having had more time to invest in on the job training are likely to be more productive the seniority rule may therefore be a convenient rule of thumb which ensures that on average it is the less productive workers who are let go while the more productive ones are hoarded until business picks up this argument has been given added weight by some results from implicit contract theory when workers differ in skill levels but share the same value of time at home efficient contracts will always lay off the unskilled workers before the skilled ones the natural corollary again seems to be that where senior workers are more skilled they should be last to go 3 i show in this paper however that when skill grows with experience as human capital models predict this corollary is false in fact human capital growth by itself predicts that it is the most senior workers who should be laid off first previous writers have missed this result because they have implicitly and unrealistically assumed that workers continue to gain productive skills while sitting at home on layoff my analysis will also shed light on some aspects of collective bargaining contracts and on the phenomenon of early retirement the results are first derived in the context of an implicit contract model which is stripped of all but the barest essentials subsequently the robustness of the conclusions is examined in a series of extensions finally some implications of the analysis are discussed

towards definition of the risk premium function successful trading in electricity markets relies on the market actor s ability to accurately forecast the electricity price the fundamental electricity price models use market information provided by various price drivers including the residual that contains a risk premium in the past researchers investigating risk premium focused primarily on daily spot price levels ignoring the intraday information hindering the accurate risk premium determination this paper presents a new kgb method for modelling of risk premium based on ex ante approach focused on a yearly product the method involves a novel kgb model and its linearized formulation the kgb linear model which enables capturing the influence of renewable energy sources on risk premium the four key drivers of the kgb linear model were used providing an insight into the influence of res generation on risk premium evolution the method was tested on historical data from the german electricity market the results for the 2010 2014 period reveal overall influence of pv production share on risk premium is greater than that of wind production share both increasing the risk premium due to their variability and uncertainty using the kgb method market actors can forecast risk premium using information readily available to them

a consistent two factor model for pricing temperature derivatives in the past decade the chicago mercantile exchange began to trade weather derivatives to hedge weather risk the pricing of weather derivatives is challenging since the underlying is not tradable and thus classical arbitrage approaches have to be used with caution in typical pricing approaches all information available to the market is assumed to be incorporated in the underlying and thus forward looking information about non tradable assets such as meteorological forecasts is often ignored in this article we analyze a new pricing methodology for temperature derivatives that accounts for forward looking information more precisely we provide an empirical back up for the theoretical framework of so called consistent factor models for temperature forecast curves introduced previously in the literature and put this pricing approach into practice first we perform a thorough statistical analysis of meteorological forecast curve data second based on this analysis we propose a specific consistent two factor model derive explicit temperature derivative prices and calibrate the market price of risk mpr the power of the model is demonstrated against alternative pricing models this confirms that at least parts of the irregularity of the mpr observed in earlier studies are not due to irregular risk perception but rather due to information misspecification

risk premiums in the german day ahead electricity market this paper conducts an empirical analysis of risk premiums in the german day ahead electricity wholesale market we compare hourly price data of the european energy exchange eex auction and of the continuous over the counter otc market which takes place prior to the eex auction data provided by the energy exchange austria exaa has been used as a snapshot of the otc market two hours prior to the eex auction ex post analysis found market participants are willing to pay both significant positive and negative premiums for hourly contracts the largest positive premiums were paid for high demand evening peak hours on weekdays during winter months by contrast night hours on weekends featuring lowest demand levels display negative premiums additionally ex ante analysis found a strong positive correlation between the expected tightness of the system and positive premiums for this purpose a tightness factor has been introduced that includes expectations of fundamental factors such as power plant availability wind power production and demand hence findings by longstaff and wang 2004 can be supported that power traders in liberalised markets behave like risk averse rational economic agents

performance responses to competition across skill levels in rank order tournaments field evidence and implications for tournament design tournaments are widely used in the economy to organize production and innovation we study individual data on 2775 contestants in 755 software algorithm development contests with random assignment the performance response to added contestants varies nonmonotonically across contestants of different abilities precisely conforming to theoretical predictions most participants respond negatively whereas the highest skilled contestants respond positively in counterfactual simulations we interpret a number of tournament design policies number of competitors prize allocation and structure number of divisions open entry and assess their effectiveness in shaping optimal tournament outcomes for a designer

time zero efficiency of european power derivatives markets abstract we study time zero efficiency of electricity derivatives markets by time zero efficiency is meant a sequence of prices of derivatives contracts having the same underlying asset but different times to maturity which implies that prices comply with a set of efficiency conditions that prevent profitable time zero arbitrage opportunities we investigate whether statistical tests based on the law of one price and trading rules based on price differentials and no arbitrage violations are useful for assessing time zero efficiency we apply tests and trading rules to daily data of three european power markets germany france and spain in the case of the german market after considering liquidity availability and transaction costs results are not inconsistent with time zero efficiency however in the case of the french and spanish markets limitations in liquidity and representativeness are challenges that prevent definite conclusions liquidity in french and spanish markets should improve by using pricing and marketing incentives these incentives should attract more participants into the electricity derivatives exchanges and should encourage them to settle otc trades in clearinghouses publication of statistics on prices volumes and open interest per type of participant should be promoted

do workers prefer increasing wage profiles we present survey data challenging the assumption implicit in analyses of labor supply that all else being equal workers prefer declining over increasing wage profiles we test several explanations for our results including that a there is something special about wages e g their association with productivity as opposed to other types of payments that induces the preference for increasing wages b utility depends not only on absolute levels of consumption but also on changes in consumption over time and c respondents who prefer increasing wage profiles are irrational and would change their behavior if the rationale for preferring declining wages were explained

human capital vs signalling explanations of wages increases wages by directly increasing the worker s productivity this learning explanation is usually associated with human capital theory however it seems unlikely that learning explains all the wage differences associated with schooling and work history better educated workers are not a random sample of workers they have lower propensities to quit or to be absent are less likely to smoke drink or use illicit drugs and are generally healthier it is unlikely that employers make full use of differences in propensities to quit or to be absent or sick when hiring workers these characteristics are often not directly observed and the americans with disabilities act precludes firms from using either poor health or the likelihood of future sickness as a hiring criterion unless it is directly related to job performance however if low levels of education are associated with these unfavorable employee characteristics and employers are allowed to take education into account when hiring workers we would expect employers to favor better educated workers as a means of reducing their costs of sickness and job turnover in turn students will take these hiring criteria into account when deciding how long to stay in school students will choose a length of schooling to signal their ability to employers and employers will demand a minimum level of schooling

tenure unions and the relationship between employer size and wages the unionization rate in a worker s industry and the worker s tenure are interacted with employer size in wage regressions using current population survey data the results provide insight into the relatively small size wage relationship in the union sector nonunion tenure profiles steepen sharply with establishment size while union profiles flatten also the effect of industry unionization increases with firm size in the nonunion sector a pattern indicative of threat effects a separate analysis of nonunion wages indicates that size wage relationships are stronger in occupations associated with high monitoring costs

minimum wage legislation in a dual labor market the paper studies the equilibrium effects of minimum wage legislation in an economy with coexisting primary and secondary labor markets owing to difficulties in monitoring relative wages and the threat of job loss play a functional role in eliciting effort from primary sector workers minimum wage laws hence affect the primary wage and employment level even if the law only binds in the secondary labor market furthermore interaction between the two sectors can also alter the secondary outcome relative to the standard analysis and has implications for participation decisions and for the level of unemployment

promotions as work incentives i introduction why do professional partnerships like law firms accounting practices and management consulting groups to name a few rely almost exclusively on promotions for incentives and do not typically use incentive pay to motivate their associates we offer a possible explanation for this observation that is based upon the fact that these firms face similar capital constraints that is when capital is required in professional partnerships the funds are usually obtained internally from the firm s partners since partnerships are legally prohibited from incorporating and selling shares to the public it is this common capital restriction which may explain the widespread use of promotion based contests in this class of firms 1 we argue that principals cannot effectively set compensation rules without at least some knowledge of the production environment while such knowledge is costly to acquire it is jointly produced while performing supervisory services supervision may also provide information on the states of the world knowledge which is important for the design of compensation mechanisms it appears therefore that principals are likely to be active participants in supervision rather than passive bystanders who delegate all production responsibilities this improves the efficiency of owner managed firms relative to that of firms owned by passive shareholders most papers in the literature such as lazear and rosen 1981 nalebuff and stiglitz 1983 and holmstrom 1982 concentrate on the moral hazard arising from the inability of the passive principal to observe workers effort we allow for a similar moral hazard on the part of the supervising principal generally within the type of organization considered here it is at least as difficult for workers to observe supervisory effort as it is for the supervisor to observe worker s effort hence both workers and their supervisor are subject to moral hazard which must be resolved by the appropriate choice of compensation scheme lazear and rosen 1981 green and stokey 1983 and nalebuff and stiglitz 1983 have shown that where the agents and principal are risk neutral both piece rates which are related to an individual s measured output and tournaments which pay a monetary prize to the highest producers yield first best results in contrast when workers are risk averse neither mechanism is efficient the relative efficiency of each compensation mechanism has been shown to depend upon the relative magnitude of the common errors in the measurement of total group output and the individual errors associated with the measurement of the individual s effort on the one hand and the degree of workers risk aversion on the other hand we believe such comparisons between economic contests and piece rates are unduly restrictive and may obscure some important elements in the theory of compensation both tournaments and individualistic piece rates are imperfect instruments which omit different pieces of relevant information tournaments ignore information on quantitative differences among participants while individualistic piece rates ignore information about the group it is quite straightforward to show that the existence of common error and risk aversion cannot explain the prevalence of tournaments in these firms relative piece rates for example will reduce the variance in compensation due to errors in the measurement of effort associated with group output without the additional variance associated with the discrete nature of the tournament reward risk averse employees would therefore prefer relative piece rate schemes to tournaments what we see however is the widespread use of contests as compensation mechanisms in the type of firms examined in this paper to explain this phenomenon it is necessary to focus on the often ignored fact that most contests in these firms take the form of promotions to partnership which in turn entails supervisory responsibilities

the agent agents problem payment by relative output this paper begins an investigation into the incentive problems at a firm when the effort of the employer and the employees combines to determine final output the major conclusion is that optimal reward functions in this circumstance will in general value the performance of a worker relative to that of his peers the paper thus joins a growing literature associated with the work of lazear and rosen on rank order tournaments

spot price modeling and the valuation of electricity forward contracts the role of demand and capacity we propose a model where wholesale electricity prices are explained by two state variables demand and capacity we derive analytical expressions to price forward contracts and to calculate the forward premium we apply our model to the pjm england and wales and nord pool markets our empirical findings indicate that volatility of demand is seasonal and that the market price of demand risk is also seasonal and positive both of which exert an upward seasonal pressure on the price of forward contracts we assume that both volatility of capacity and the market price of capacity risk are constant and find that depending on the market and period under study it could either exert an upward or downward pressure on forward prices in all markets we find that the forward premium exhibits a seasonal pattern during the months of high volatility of demand forward contracts trade at a premium during months of low volatility of demand forwards can either trade at a relatively small premium or even in some cases at a discount i e they exhibit a negative forward premium

intergenerational conflicts of interest and seniority systems in organizations this paper studies the role of a proposed seniority system in an organization the organization consists of at least three overlapping generations of short lived members and chooses either a shortsighted or a farsighted action in each period this results in intergenerational conflicts of interest the old generation desires to obtain an immediate profit while the middle and young generations have incentives to invest for future profits we use a model of infinitely repeated games and demonstrate that the seniority system solves these conflicts in the sense that the farsighted action profile is sustainable in equilibrium

estimating elasticities of substitution by the cde production function an application to japanese manufacturing industries using time series data from japanese manufacturing industries the capital skill complementarity hypothesis is tested by estimating eslasticities from a cde production function the first component

political economy of mechanisms we study the optimal mirrlees taxation problem in a dynamic economy in contrast to the standard approach where the taxation mechanism is operated by a benevolent planner with full commitment power we focus on economies in which policy decisions are made by self interested politicians who cannot commit to policies the society controls politicians using elections we show that the provision of incentives to politicians can be partly separated from redistribution across agents and that political economy constraints can be modeled as introducing additional aggregate distortions in the dynamic mirrlees problem we provide conditions under which the political economy distortions persist or disappear in the long run if the politicians are as patient as the agents the best sustainable mechanism leads to an asymptotic allocation where the aggregate distortions arising from political economy disappear in contrast when politicians are less patient than the citizens positive aggregate labor and capital taxes remain even asymptotically we conclude by providing a brief comparison of centralized

health insurance market reform and employee compensation the case of pure community rating in new york abstract pure community rating which was enacted to improve access to health insurance in new york s small group market in 1993 prevents carriers from charging different premiums based on the ages of a firm s workers if small firms were adjusting compensation packages prior to reform to offset higher health care costs of older workers then community rating could lead to greater relative wages for older workers post reform and not necessarily induce adverse selection that results in changes in who is insured i present evidence showing that relative wages of older workers in small firms increased in comparison with other states and with large firms within new york following reform

some evidence on the relationship between performance related pay and the shape of the experience earnings profile we investigate the relationship between performance related pay prp and the shape of workers experience earnings profiles in particular we argue that the slope of the profile depends critically upon the degree of equity held by workers in their enterprise as measured by the extent of prp the implication is that the slope of the profile for prp workers falls between those of their zero equity fixed wage and one hundred per cent equity self employed counterparts our empirical analysis of three british data sets namely the british social attitudes survey the british household panel survey and the british family expenditure survey supports this prior in this paper we explore the shape of the experience earnings profile for individuals employed under different types of contracts fixed wage performance related pay prp and self employment contracts we follow lazear 1979 1981 and lazear and moore 1984 in hypothesizing that the slope of the experience earnings profile reflects agency costs and the reduction thereof with increased agency costs inducing steeper profiles if monitoring costs are high firms may implement compensation schemes designed to encourage employees to self select behavior in the firms interests one such scheme defers a substantial amount of compensation until the later years of tenure the resulting experience earnings profile provides a penalty for shirking lazear and moore 1984 we therefore presume that the profiles of workers employed under fixed wage contracts are steeper than those of self employees for whom the issue of agency does not arise because of the duality of principal and owner lazear and moore 1984 the interesting case is that of workers employed under prp if such contracts represent a hybrid between fixed wage and self employment then one would expect their experience earnings profiles to lie somewhere between these two extreme