existence of free entry equilibrium in aggregative games with asymmetric agents in this paper we examine a free entry aggregative game where agents can be asymmetric we show the existence of a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium of this game the proof is a constructive one and therefore we provide a method to derive a subgame perfect equilibrium within a reasonable time

post reform forestland markets in china land markets developed rapidly in china after agricultural land tenure reforms but not after forest reforms we surveyed farmers in three provinces to examine the post reform forestland markets and options to strengthen them using household choice experiments we estimate land market demand and supply under alternative contractual arrangements our findings are consistent with the currently thin markets but also suggest that alternative institutional and contractual conditions could support broader participation in land markets strengthening property rights on forestland emerges as an especially effective possible policy instrument we illustrate its predicted effects on equilibrium rental rates and market participation

monotone comparative statics in games with non monotonic best replies contests and cournot oligopoly abstract in this paper we employ lattice theoretic techniques to derive a number of comparative statics in a logit contest a class of games for which best replies are generically non monotonic using the same approach we obtain several comparative statics in a cournot oligopoly model without imposing the usual assumptions that ensure the game is one of strategic substitutes our analysis illustrates how lattice theoretic techniques can deliver powerful insights in games with non monotonic best replies

forest loss monetary compensation and delayed re planting the effects of unpredictable land tenure in china abstract over the past 65 years forest tenure in china has oscillated unpredictably between private and village property regimes this policy induced uncertainty has distorted the harvesting decisions of individuals granted rights to grow trees and has lowered the value of china s forest output we provide an analytical framework for assessing these effects quantitatively understanding the consequences of this policy induced uncertainty is particularly important since china is currently engaged in an ambitious plan to increase its domestic supply of timber to conduct this analysis we extend the literature on forestry economics when there is a risk of loss due to forest fire or pests we 1 take account of the possibility that replanting can only resume after an interval of uncertain length with immediate replanting as a special case 2 investigate the effects of compensation for such losses based only on the net value of the stand of trees at the time of the loss and 3 compare it to compensation that would leave the wealth and rotation decisions of the farmer unaffected by the presence of uncertainty

equilibrium existence and uniqueness in impure public good models abstract despite widespread application of the impure public good model surprisingly little attention has been given to the model s equilibrium properties this paper presents a proof that clearly shows sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of a nash equilibrium

cournot oligopoly and the theory of supermodular games abstract we reconsider the cournot oligopoly problem in light of the theory of supermodular games invoking the recent ordinal version of this theory proposed by milgrom and shannon we generalize novshek s existence result derive the associated uniqueness result give an extension of a classical existence result under symmetry and provide conditions making a cournot oligopoly into a log supermodular game with the natural order on the action sets we also provide extensive and precise insight as to why decreasing best responses are widely regarded as being typical for the cournot model with production costs several illustrative examples are provided journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c72 l10 l13

nash equilibrium existence and uniqueness in a club model abstract we model a single club heterogeneous consumer exogeneous income economy as an aggregative public good game under common assumptions if club quality functions are homogeneous of positive degree in the club facility investment and use an unique nash equilibrium exists

dimensions and diversity of property rights in rural china dilemmas on the road to further reform abstract this paper contributes to the debate over land tenure in rural china by conceptualizing and measuring multiple dimensions of property rights in a way that elucidates the competing interests that are affected by the property rights regime utilizing a unique village level data set this paper argues that the regional and temporal variation in rural property rights signals a pattern in which decentralized institutional innovation occurs in response to the competing interests of the national state of local authorities and of present and possible future individual land users unlike the earlier debate concerning the household responsibility system the current property rights dilemma is intrinsically more complex because the potential conflicts of interest between individuals local collectives and the state are greater resolution of that debate will ultimately require careful exploration of the reality and substance of the tradeoffs and competing interests that make further reform of rural property rights so difficult

understanding the emergence of open science institutions functionalist economics in historical context this essay exposes the limitations of the logical origins approach that has found favour among economists who seek to understand the workings of institutions in the past present it pursues a different approach applying functionalism in historical context to explain the emergence of the characteristic ethos and institutions of open science the emergence during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries of the idea and practice of open science represented a break from the previously dominant ethos of secrecy in the pursuit of nature s secrets it was a distinctive and vital organizational aspect of the scientific revolution from which crystallized a new set of norms incentives and organizational structures that reinforced scientific researchers commitments to rapid disclosure of new knowledge to understand how this came about it is necessary to examine the economics of patronage and the roles of asymmetric information and reputation in the early modern reorganization of scientific activities the rise of cooperative rivalries in the revelation of new knowledge is seen as a functional response to heightened asymmetric information problems posed for the renaissance system of court patronage of the arts and sciences pre existing informational asymmetries had been exacerbated by increased importance of mathematics and the greater reliance upon sophisticated mathematical techniques in a variety of practical contexts of application analysis of the court patronage system of late renaissance europe within which the new natural philosophers found their support points to the significance of the feudal legacy of fragmented political authority in creating conditions of common agency contracting in substitutes these conditions are shown to have been conducive to more favorable contract terms especially with regard to autonomy and financial support for the agent client members of western europe s nascent scientific communities some lessons may be drawn for contemporary science and technology policy debates in which the open science mode of pursuing knowledge often seems to be viewed a robust concomitant of the power of scientific research techniques whereas it is a fragile cultural legacy of western europe s history upon which rests the ascendancy of modern science as a driver of long term economic growth copyright 2004 oxford university press

aggregate comparative statics abstract in aggregative games each player s payoff depends on her own actions and an aggregate of the actions of all the players many common games in industrial organization political economy public economics and macroeconomics can be cast as aggregative games this paper provides a general and tractable framework for comparative static results in aggregative games we focus on two classes of games 1 aggregative games with strategic substitutes and 2 nice aggregative games where payoff functions are continuous and concave in own strategies we provide simple sufficient conditions under which positive shocks to individual players increase their own actions and have monotone effects on the aggregate the results are illustrated with applications to public good provision contests cournot competition and technology choices in oligopoly

land ownership security and farm productivity evidence from thailand the article discusses the impact of land ownership security on farmers input use and output value economic theory suggests that farmers with secure legal ownership will have more incentives and better ability to invest due to a lower perceived risk and a favourable access to institutional credit this leads to higher variable inputs use and higher output per unit of land the article uses farm level data from three provinces in thailand to test the above propositions the data pertain to samples of squatters who lack secure legal ownership as contrasted with legally titled farmers the results confirm that the provision of secure ownership in ldcs can increase productivity significantly

are choice experiments incentive compatible a test with quality differentiated beef steaks this study compares hypothetical and nonhypothetical responses to choice experiment questions we test for hypothetical bias in a choice experiment involving beef ribeye steaks with differing quality attributes in general hypothetical responses predicted higher probabilities of purchasing beef steaks than nonhypothetical responses thus hypothetical choices overestimate total willingness to pay for beef steaks however marginal willingness to pay for a change in steak quality is in general not statistically different across hypothetical and actual payment settings

strategic complements and substitutes and potential games abstract we show that games of strategic complements or substitutes with aggregation are pseudo potential games the upshot is that they possess nash equilibria in pure strategies ne even if the strategy sets are not convex and that various dynamic processes converge to ne in particular ne exist in cournot oligopoly with indivisibilities in production our notion of aggregation is quite general and enables us to take a unified view of several disparate models

intertemporal population ethics critical level utilitarian principles this paper considers the problem of social evaluation in a model where population size individual lifetime utilities lengths of life and birth dates vary across states in an intertemporal framework we investigate principles for social evaluation that allow history to matter to some extent using an axiom called independence of the utilities of the dead we provide a characterization of critical level generalized utilitarian rules as a by product of our analysis we show that social discounting is ruled out in an intertemporal welfarist environment a simple population planning example is also discussed

forest tenure reform in china a choice experiment on farmers property rights preferences decentralization experiments are currently underway in the chinese forestry sector however researchers and policy makers tend to ignore a key question what do forest farmers really want from reform this paper addresses this question using a survey based choice experiment to investigate farmers preferences for various property rights attributes of a forestland contract we found that farmers are highly concerned with the types of rights provided by a contract reducing perceived risks of contract termination and introducing a priority right for the renewal of an existing contract significantly increases farmers marginal willingness to pay for a forest contract

the power of money wealth effects in contests abstract the relationship between wealth and power has long been debated nevertheless this relationship has been rarely studied in a strategic game in this paper we study wealth effects in a strategic contest game two opposing effects arise wealth reduces the marginal cost of effort but it also reduces the marginal benefit of winning the contest we consider three types of contests which vary depending on whether rents and efforts are commensurable with wealth our theoretical analysis shows that the effects of wealth are strongly contest dependent it thus does not support general claims that the rich lobby more or that low economic growth and wealth inequality spur conflicts

rawlsian intergenerational justice as a markov perfect equilibrium in a resource technology the rawlsian maximin criterion is combined with nonpaternalistic altruistic preferences in a nonrenewable resource technology the maximin programme is shown to be time inconsistent for a subset of initial conditions a solution to this intergenerational conflict is found under a given assumption as a generically unique subgame perfect equilibrium

do hypothetical and actual marginal willingness to pay differ in choice experiments application to the valuation of the environment abstract in this paper we test the validity of choice experiments with donations for environmental projects in particular we test whether or not there are differences in preferences between a hypothetical and an actual choice experiment our experiments indicate no differences in addition internal tests of validity indicate transitive and stable preferences in both experiments although there are some indications of possible learning effects during the experiment

mean field equilibrium in dynamic games with strategic complementarities we study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players formally in the games we consider the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical distribution of the states of other players such games can be used to model a diverse set of applications including network security models recommender systems and dynamic search in markets stochastic games are generally difficult to analyze and these difficulties are only exacerbated when the number of players is large as might be the case in the preceding examples we consider an approximation methodology called mean field equilibrium to study these games in such an equilibrium each player reacts to only the long run average state of other players we find necessary conditions for the existence of a mean field equilibrium in such games furthermore as a simple consequence of this existence theorem we obtain several natural monotonicity properties we show that there exist a largest and a smallest equilibrium among all those where the equilibrium strategy used by a player is nondecreasing and we also show that players converge to each of these equilibria via natural myopic learning dynamics as we argue these dynamics are more reasonable than the standard best response dynamics we also provide sensitivity results where we quantify how the equilibria of such games move in response to changes in parameters of the game for example the introduction of incentives to players

equilibrium bias of technology this paper presents three sets of results about equilibrium bias of technology first i show that when the menu of technological possibilities only allows for factor augmenting technologies the increase in the supply of a factor induces technological change relatively biased toward that factor meaning that the induced technological change increases the relative marginal product of the factor becoming more abundant moreover this induced bias can be strong enough to make the relative marginal product of a factor increasing in response to an increase in its supply thus leading to an upward sloping relative demand curve i also show that these results about relative bias do not generalize when more general menus of technological possibilities are considered second i prove that under mild assumptions the increase in the supply of a factor induces technological change that is absolutely biased toward that factor meaning that it increases its marginal product at given factor proportions the third and most important result in the paper establishes the possibility of and conditions for strong absolute equilibrium bias whereby the price marginal product of a factor increases in response to an increase in its supply i prove that under some regularity conditions there will be strong absolute equilibrium bias if and only if the aggregate production function of the economy fails to be jointly concave in factors and technology this type of failure of joint concavity is possible in economies where equilibrium factor demands and technologies result from the decisions of different agents

aggregating infinite utility streams with intergenerational equity the impossibility of being paretian it has been known that in aggregating infinite utility streams there does not exist any social welfare function which satisfies the axioms of pareto intergenerational equity and continuity we show that the impossibility result persists even without imposing the continuity axiom and in frameworks allowing for more general domains of utilities than those used in the existing literature

the evolution of walrasian behavior consider an evolutionary context where a given number of quantity setting oligopolists tend to mimic successful behavior occasionally experimenting with some small probability in this context it is shown that the unique long run outcome of the process has all firms playing walrasian i e choosing an output that maximizes profits when taking the market clearing price as given

successful leadership in global public good provision incorporating behavioural approaches in the standard model of voluntary public good provision and other game theoretic models climate friendly leadership of a country is not successful a unilateral increase of this country s greenhouse gas abatement measures i e contributions to the global public good of climate protection will not lead to a positive reaction by the other countries but instead trigger a reduction of their abatement efforts and thus a crowding out effect in this paper it is shown how this undesired consequence need no longer occur when elements of behavioral economics are incorporated in the otherwise standard model of public good provision in particular strategic complementarities between the public good contribution of the leading country and those of the follower may result either if the follower has specific non egoistic or other regarding preferences or if the leader s contribution positively affects the follower s beliefs i e his conjectural variations about the leader s behaviour

rent seeking incentives in share contests abstract this article investigates share contests in our framework we allow contestants to have more general preferences than have been used in the literature previous approaches have the unfortunate characteristic that contestants marginal rates of substitution between the rent share allocated by the contest and their effort is constant regardless of the size of the rent share this results in a conventional wisdom larger rents command more effort by providing a more general framework we show the reverse may also be true and we derive the conditions under which this is the case our approach then allows us to rationalize within a standard contest framework observations that rents might be more hotly contested when they become scarcer as has evidently been the case with the recent global contraction of public funds available for public policy

conflict and rent seeking success functions ratio vs difference models of relative success the rent seeking competitions studied by economists fall within a much broader category of conflict interactions that also includes military combats election campaigns industrial disputes lawsuits and sibling rivalries in the rent seeking literature each party s success pi which can be interpreted either as the probability of victory or as the proportion of the prize won has usually been taken to be a function of the ratio of the respective resource commitments alternatively however pi may instead be a function of the difference between the parties commitments to the contest the contest success function csf for the difference from is a logistic curve in which as is consistent with military experience increasing returns apply up to an inflection point at equal resource commitments a crucial flaw of the traditional ratio model is that neither onesided submission nor two sided peace between the parties can ever occur as a cournot equilibrium in contrast both of these outcomes are entirely consistent with a model in which success is a function of the difference between the parties resource commitments

theory general equilibrium and political economy in development economics i discuss the role of economic theory in empirical work in development economics with special emphasis on general equilibrium and political economy considerations i argue that economic theory plays should play a central role in formulating models estimates of which can be used for counterfactual and policy analysis i discuss why counterfactual analysis based on microdata that ignores general equilibrium and political economy issues may lead to misleading conclusions i illustrate the main arguments using examples from recent work in development economics and political economy

evolution and kantian morality what kind of preferences should one expect evolution to favor we propose a definition of evolutionary stability of preferences in interactions in groups of arbitrary finite size groups are formed under random matching that may be assortative individuals preferences are their private information the set of potential preferences are all those that can be represented by continuous functions we show that a certain class of such preferences that combine self interest with morality of a kantian flavor are evolutionarily stable and that preferences resulting in other behaviors are evolutionarily unstable we also establish a connection between evolutionary stability of preferences and a generalized version of maynard smith s and price s 1973 notion of evolutionary stability of strategies

pigou s wealth and welfare a centenary assessment pigou s wealth and welfare offered a programme of action that was potentially very interventionist any economic policy should be assessed he proposed by its expected effect on the size distribution and variability of the national dividend his programme though rough and ready has proved to be more useful than the new welfare economics which tended to leave distributional questions for others and efficiency questions to competitive markets pigou himself however took a conservative view of what might be done in practice the impact of policies on the size distribution and variability of income is still a central focus of both popular and technical interest some of the issues now recognised as important to well being such as welfare in unequal societies and the experience of unemployment may be subsumed into pigou s three criteria

land tenure security and investment incentives puzzling evidence from burkina faso abstract the commonsense logic associating higher land security and higher incentives to invest has been recently called into question in the case of african agriculture to be meaningful empirical tests have to be carefully designed so as to take account of the possible endogeneity of the land rights variable this is done in this paper by applying suitable econometric methods to the original data collected in burkina faso the results obtained cast doubt on the existence of a systematic influence of land tenure security on investment by reviewing the justifications for scepticism in the recent literature we are able to conclude that the traditional village order where it exists provides the basic land rights required to stimulate small scale investment

trade and insecure resources we construct a model of conflict and trade to study the consequences of interstate disputes over contested resources land oil water or other resources for arming welfare and trade flows different trade regimes imply different costs of such disputes in terms of arming depending on world prices free trade can intensify arming to such an extent that the additional security costs it brings swamp the traditional gains from trade and thus render autarky more desirable for one or all rival states free trade though is always an equilibrium and sometimes is a dominant one with features of a prisoner s dilemma outcome furthermore contestation of resources can reverse a country s apparent comparative advantage relative to its comparative advantage in the absence of conflict and where such conflict is present comparisons of autarkic prices to world prices could be inaccurate predictors of trade patterns

egalitarianism subsistence provision and work incentives in china s agricultural collectives abstract collective agriculture in china failed because its reward system was too egalitarian to provide sufficient work incentives to the peasants a popular view attributes egalitarianism to the difficulties of monitoring work effort in a team an alternative view presented here argues that a the egalitarian provision of basic foodgrains to peasant households reflected more generally the consumption problem of the peasantry who were impoverished by the state s policy of extracting agriculture and b as a remuneration system time rates better served the work and income sharing purpose than piece rates and therefore better protected households with high dependency ratios egalitarianism survives under the household farming system

unjust intergenerational allocations abstract an intergenerational allocation is defined to be unjust if there is a feasible allocation with more total consumption and less relative inequality unjust allocations are characterized in technologies satisfying certain regularity conditions after ruling out unjust allocations the consequences of letting generations choose according to a standard form of altruistic preferences are explored in to particular classes of technologies a connection between excluding unjust allocations and maximizing the welfare of the worst off generation is established in these technologies

investigating fishers preferences for the design of marine payments for environmental services schemes we determine the effects of various management restrictions on adoption rates of marine payments for environmental services pes schemes choice experiments are used in order to determine how fisher participation rates change under different marine pes programme designs various designs with differing restriction rates show different rates of adoption however fishers show a high utility loss associated with any move away from the current management situation irrespective of restriction levels this indicates that pes scheme costs may be high and creating an enabling environment could be important to reducing perceived losses as could investment into conditional in kind compensation mechanisms the paper also shows choice experiments to be a useful tool in marine pes design

fully aggregative games abstract a game is fully aggregative if payoffs and marginal payoffs depend only on a player s own strategy and a function of the strategy profile which is common to all players we characterize the form which this function must take in such a game and show that the game will be strategically equivalent to another game in which the function is the simple sum of strategies

political economy of dynamic resource wars abstract the political economy of exhaustible resource extraction is analysed in three contexts first if an incumbent faces a threat of being removed once and for all by a rival faction extraction becomes more voracious if the factions do not share rents equally second perennial political conflict cycles are more inefficient if constitutional cohesiveness or the partisan in office bias is large and political instability is high third resource wars are more intense if constitutional cohesiveness is weak the incumbent has a partisan in office bias reserves of resources are high the wage is low governments can be less frequently removed from office and fighting technology has less decreasing returns to scale resource depletion in such wars is more rapacious if there is more government instability the political system is less cohesive and the partisan in office bias is smaller

strategic interactions among private and public efforts when preventing and stamping out a highly infectious animal disease upon the outbreak of a contagious animal disease a primary motive for restoring disease free status is often to regain access to international product markets efforts applied toward continuing or regaining such access generate a public good all growers benefit regardless of the extent of private effort taken while exclusion is impractical private incentives to take preventive measures and stamp out effort interact in complex ways there are intra farm temporal interactions and also inter farm contemporaneous interactions public effort also takes place and interacts with private effort this paper provides a succinct multi agent model to explore these interactions in social optimum and in nash equilibrium and also to explore how socially optimal and nash behavior differ comparative statics under social optimality are more straightforward than under nash equilibrium whether it is in social optimum or nash equilibrium public prevention effort complements both private prevention and private stamp out efforts however public stamp out effort substitutes for both private stamp out and private prevention efforts reasonable conditions are identified under which nash levels of private prevention and stamp out efforts are both below socially optimal levels concerning policy prescriptions secure property rights and low property transfer costs should promote prevention and eradication efforts other things being equal public prevention effort should be more effective at improving welfare than comparable public stamp out effort subsidies on private effort should favor prevention because subsidies on eradication effort may discourage prevention effort even if products from diseased animals are safe to consume and acceptable to consumers it may be optimal to destroy them

pigou and future generations a cambridge tradition in the economics of welfare and elsewhere a c pigou took the view that future people should be treated equally with present people he stressed our defective telescopic faculty mortality and weak linkages over time and argued that the present generation would consequently devote too few resources to investment particularly in human capital pigou linked his argument with the then contemporary controversies about natural resource conservation and about eugenics this cambridge tradition holds that issues of generational justice leave an important role for the state and cannot be resolved simply at the level of the individual or the family c 1996 academic press limited copyright 1996 by oxford university press

robust comparative statics for non monotone shocks in large aggregative games a policy change that involves a redistribution of income or wealth is typically controversial affecting some people positively but others negatively in this paper we extend the robust comparative statics result for large aggregative games established by acemoglu and jensen 2010 49th ieee conference on decision and control 3133 3139 to possibly controversial policy changes in particular we show that both the smallest and the largest equilibrium values of an aggregate variable increase in response to a policy change to which individuals reactions may be mixed but the overall aggregate response is positive we provide sufficient conditions for such a policy change in terms of distributional changes in parameters

rationalizability learning and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities we study a rich class of noncooperative games that includes models of oligopoly competition macroeconomic coordination failures arms races bank runs technology adoption and diffusion r d competition pretrial bargaining coordination in teams and many others for all these games the sets of pure strategy nash equilibria correlated equilibria and rationalizable strategies have identical bounds also for a class of models of dynamic adaptive choice behavior that encompasses both best response dynamics and bayesian learning the players choices lie eventually within the same bounds these bounds are shown to vary monotonically with certain exogenous parameters we study the class of noncooperative supermodular games introduced by topkis 1979 and further analyzed by vives 1985 1989 who also pointed out the importance of these games in industrial economics supermodular games are games in which each player s strategy set is partially ordered the marginal returns to increasing one s strategy rise with increases in the competitors strategies so that the game exhibits strategic complementarity 2 and if a player s strategies are multidimensional marginal returns to any one com ponent of the player s strategy rise with increases in the other components this class turns out to encompass many of the most important economic applications of noncooperative game theory in macroeconomics diamond s 1982 search model and bryant s 1983 1984 rational expectations models can be represented as supermodular games in each of these models more activity by some members of the economy raises the returns to increased levels of activity by others in oligopoly theory some models of bertrand oligopoly with differentiated products qualify as supermodu lar games in these games when a firm s competitors raise their prices the marginal profitability of the firm s own price increase rises a similar structure is present in games of new technology adoption such as those of dybvig and spatt 1983 farrell and saloner 1986 and katz and shapiro 1986 when more users hook into a communication system or more manufacturers adopt an interface standard the marginal return to others of doing the same often rises similarly in some specifications of the bank runs model introduced by diamond and dybvig 1983 when more depositors withdraw their funds from a bank it is more worthwhile for other depositors to do the same in the warrant exercise

when does aggregation reduce risk aversion we study the problem of risk sharing within a household or syndicate a household shares risky prospects using a social welfare functional we characterize the social welfare functionals such that the household is collectively less risk averse than each member and satisfies the pareto principle and an invariance axiom we single out the sum of certainty equivalents as the unique member of this family which is quasiconcave over riskless allocations

planning for the long run programming with patient pareto responsive preferences ethical social welfare functions treat generations equally and respect pareto improvements to non null sets of generations there are perfect optima for such preferences generations facing the same circumstances choose the same actions and all circumstances are treated as possible if each stationary policy determines a unique long run distribution that is independent of the starting point then there is a recursive formulation of policies that are simultaneously optimal for all of the preferences studied here when the ergodic distribution can depend on early events hysteresis the curvature of the social welfare function determines the risks that society is willing to undertake and leads to a variant of the precautionary principle

time discounting in harold hotelling s approach to natural resource economics the unsolved ethical question the paper focuses on harold hotelling s approach to time discounting in the context of the intertemporal allocation of exhaustible natural resources in 1931 hotelling introduces a positive discount rate when dealing with the social value or total utility derived from a resource his position was in contrast with early economic literature on conservation as well as with the point of view of frank ramsey according to whom time discounting expressed an unjustified preference for the welfare of present generations over that of future ones hence it has been argued that hotelling dismissed ethical concerns using archival material we find that for hotelling economic questions should not be restricted to issues of economic efficiency that his choice to discount utility which he considered as analogous to a concrete benefit at the interest rate is compatible with ramsey s position and more broadly that this choice does not preclude an ethical position on the desirable distribution of exhaustible resources through time to hotelling ethics is implemented by politics through fiscal corrections of the interest rate revisiting hotelling on the articulation between ethics allocative efficiency and policies allows us to rethink the way we do that in current models using time discounting

inequality aversion and risk aversion this note shows that for two social welfare functions which are inequality averse and anonymous if one is more inequality averse than the other it induces a more risk averse household through optimal sharing than the other we present examples showing that this comparative static can be reversed if either the property of inequality aversion or anonymity is dropped

comparative statics of contests and rent seeking games this paper develops the comparative statics properties of a contest encountered in patent races and rent seeking games the author shows that symmetric equilibrium expenditure and profit per player decrease with the number of competitors and the discount rate but increase with the value of the prize a fundamental lemma established in the paper shows that a stability condition usually imposed on the model is automatically satisfied the author identifies a class of likelihood or hazard rate functions for which aggregate expenditure increases with the number of competitors and total profits converge to zero copyright 1997 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

on the existence of cournot equilibrium this paper examines the existence of n firm cournot equilibrium in a market for a single homogeneous commodity it proves that if each firm s marginal revenue declines as the aggregate output of other firms increases which is implied by concave inverse demand then a cournot equilibrium exists without assuming that firms have nondecreasing marginal cost or identical technologies also if the marginal revenue condition fails at a potential optimal point there is a set of firms such that no cournot equilibrium exists the paper also contains an example of nonexistence with two nonidentical firms each with constant returns to scale production