the link between response time and preference variance and processing heterogeneity in stated choice experiments abstract in this article we utilize the time respondents require to answer a self administered online stated preference survey while the effects of response time have been previously explored this article proposes a different approach that explicitly recognizes the highly equivocal relationship between response time and respondents choices in particular we attempt to disentangle preference variance and processing heterogeneity and explore whether response time helps to explain these three types of heterogeneity for this we divide the data ordered by response time into approximately equal sized subsets and then derive different class membership probabilities for each subset we estimate a large number of candidate models and subsequently conduct a frequentist based model averaging approach using information criteria to derive weights of evidence for each model our findings show a clear link between response time and utility coefficients error variance and processing strategies our results thus emphasize the importance of considering response time when modeling stated choice data

lottery choice incentives complexity and decision time this paper reports the results of an experiment on lottery choice in which decision cost is measured as decision making time a simple decision cost model motivates this measurement and the experiment and predicts relationships between incentive mechanism manipulations and decision making time which are borne out in the experiment the decision cost model also suggests that decisions will change in the face of the incentive manipulations in the experiment this suggestion is borne out in a complex decision making environment but not in a simple one specification tests demonstrate that observed changes in subjects behavior are not merely due to changes in subject specific error variance one may conclude from this that the payoff dominance problem is a real issue in complex decision making experiments copyright 1993 by royal economic society

unanimous rules in the laboratory we study the information aggregation properties of unanimous voting rules in the laboratory in line with theoretical predictions we find that majority rule with veto power dominates unanimity rule we also find that the strategic voting model is a fairly good predictor of subject behavior finally we exploit a framing effect to study how the presence of less sophisticated agents affects veto s welfare properties

evaluation of the influence of agricultural price policy on cotton production in cote d ivoire abstract in this paper the impact of the cotton pricing policy of the marketing board of cote d ivoire is investigated a theoretical model is developed to derive the price level which maximizes revenue generated from the marketing board s cotton transactions a dynamic cotton supply function was estimated and used to compute elasticities the estimates indicate that farmers in the country response to price changes and that the pricing policy of the marketing board has been consistent with an objective of generating revenue for the government

value learning and the willingness to accept willingness to pay disparity the assumption that individual preferences are rational and consistent with standard economic theory is often appropriate but may be optimistic if consumers are uncertain about either their preferences or how the market operates both sources of uncertainty may present themselves in lab experiments exploring the well known disparity between individuals willingness to accept and willingness to pay this paper explores the role of value uncertainty in the observed disparity and finds that providing subjects with a value learning opportunity can reduce the value disparity to insignificance

estimating recreation demand using the properties of the implied consumer surplus consumer surplus estimates are random variables while they are generally recognized as stochastic little attention was given to their properties prior to bockstael and strand s 1987 evaluation of conventional practices for using recreation demand models in benefit measurement their paper as well as all the research it stimulated adopted a similar strategy namely to judge the methods for estimating demand or random utility models based on the properties of their respective consumer surplus estimates this paper proposes a different strategy to define estimators based on the properties of their implied consumer surplus estimates this type of argument is not new and usually is associated with the rationale offered for bayesian estimators 2 however the motivation for the estimator proposed here can be based on minimizing the mean squared error of the consumer surplus estimates moreover it can be constructed from the statistics usually reported with ordinary least squares ols estimates

preference anomalies preference elicitation and the discovered preference hypothesis there is wide ranging evidence much of it deriving from economics experiments of anomalies in behaviour that challenge standard preference theories this paper explores the implications of these anomalies for preference elicitation methods because methods that are used to inform public policy such as contingent valuation are based on standard preference theories their validity may be called into question by the anomaly data however on a new interpretation these anomalies do not contradict standard theory but are errors in stated preference that can be expected to disappear as people become more experienced in relevant decision environments we explore the evidence for this interpretation and what implications follow for preference elicitation methodology

information aggregation and turnout in proportional representation a laboratory experiment abstract this paper documents a laboratory experiment that analyzes voter participation in common interest proportional representation pr elections comparing this with majority rule consistent with theoretical predictions poorly informed voters in either system abstain from voting thereby shifting weight to those who are better informed a dilution problem makes mistakes especially costly under pr so abstention is higher in pr in contrast with private interest environments and welfare is lower deviations from nash equilibrium predictions can be accommodated by a logit version of quantal response equilibrium qre which allows for voter mistakes

measuring the cost of time in recreation demand analysis comment in the february 1981 issue of the journal mcconnell and strand present a model of recreation demand in which the opportunity cost of an hour of travel to a recreation site is assumed not to equal the average hourly income of the recreating family they test the model with data from a 1978 survey of sportfishermen in the chesapeake bay region simply stated the model hypothesizes that the sportfishermen will behave as if the price of a recreational trip is the sum of cash costs and the opportunity cost of travel time this opportunity cost is hypothesized to be some ratio k of average family income per hour times the travel time mcconnell and strand estimate the value of k by regressing recreation days against cash costs and opportunity cost of time as separate variables the ratio of regression coefficients then is an estimate of k they go on to estimate the ratio k of the opportunity cost of travel to the average income for sportfishermen in the chesapeake bay region the authors hypothesize that the ratio k falls between 0 and 1 implying that sportfishermen value the time in transit lower than their average income when working sufficient conditions for k to equal one include a the tax rate is zero b marginal earnings are constant and c nonwork income equals zero this comment is written to point out certain aspects of the study which may have led to an underestimation of the value of k it is argued that mcconnell and strand have misspecified their demand equation in such a way that their estimate for k 612 is biased downward mcconnell and strand hypothesize the demand relation

reliability of individual valuations of public and private goods choice consistency response time and preference refinement we examined the reliability of a large set of paired comparison value judgments involving public goods private goods and sums of money as respondents progressed through a random sequence of paired choices they were each given their response time decreased and they became more consistent apparently fine tuning their responses suggesting that respondents tend to begin a hypothetical value exercise with relatively imprecise preferences and that experience in expressing preference helps reduce that imprecision reliability was greater for private than for public good choices and greater for choices between a good and a monetary amount than for choices between two goods however the reliability for public good choices was only slightly lower than for the private goods published by elsevier b v

voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice abstract the efficiency of committee voting and referenda with common interest issues critically depends on voter motivation i e on voters willingness to cast an informed vote if voters are motivated voting may result in smart choices because of information aggregation but if voters remain ignorant delegating decision making to an expert may yield better outcomes we experimentally study a common interest situation in which we vary voters information cost and the competence of the expert we find that voters are more motivated to collect information than predicted by standard theory and that voter motivation is higher when subjects demand to make choices by voting than when voting is imposed on subjects

the value of familiarity effects of knowledge and objective signals on willingness to pay for a public good we design and conduct a field experiment in which treated subjects receive a precise and objective signal regarding their knowledge about a public good before estimating their wtp for it we find that the causal effect of objective signals about the accuracy of a subject s knowledge for a public good can dramatically affect their valuation for it treatment caused a significant increase of 85 129 in wtp for well informed individuals we find no such effect for less informed subjects our results imply that wtp estimates for public goods are not only a function of true information states of the respondents but beliefs about those information states

characterizing the effects of valuation methodology in function based benefits transfer abstract meta analyses have demonstrated that willingness to pay wtp estimates vary systematically according to methodological factors the benefits transfer literature provides little guidance with regard to the treatment of such effects transfers are typically conducted by ignoring such effects using ad hoc adjustments or otherwise suppressing information regarding the sensitivity of wtp to methodological attributes this paper illustrates a means to characterize methodological effects within benefits transfer based on an application of the common bootstrap drawing from meta analysis the approach characterizes the sampling distribution of wtp with respect to patterns of methodological variation present in underlying studies results provide a means to characterize the extent of variation associated with predefined groups of methodological attributes providing transparent information on the sensitivity of wtp not typically available in benefits transfer

information aggregation rationality and the condorcet jury theorem the condorcet jury theorem states that majorities are more likely than any single individual to select the better of two alternatives when there exists uncertainty about which of the two alternatives is in fact preferred most extant proofs of this theorem implicitly make the behavioral assumption that individuals vote sincerely in the collective decision making a seemingly innocuous assumption given that individuals are taken to possess a common preference for selecting the better alternative however in the model analyzed here we find that sincere behavior by all individuals is not rational even when individuals have such a common preference in particular sincere voting does not constitute a nash equilibrium a satisfactory rational choice foundation for the claim that majorities invariably do better than individuals therefore has yet to be derived

marginal welfare measures for discrete choice models abstract this letter deals with the use of discrete choice models for applied welfare analysis an approximate formula is presented for the marginal willingness to pay for a change in the attributes of any of the discrete alternatives which is simple to calculate and has an intuitive interpretation

consumption benefits of national hockey league game trips estimated from revealed and stated preference demand data this paper examines the demand for hockey game trips among metropolitan and nonmetropolitan residents of alberta canada using data on both revealed and stated preference game trip behavior from a telephone survey conducted throughout alberta we estimate the effect of ticket prices team quality arena amenities and capacity on the latent demand for national hockey league hockey games we nd that lower ticket prices higher team quality and additional capacity encourage attendance in the status quo scenario consumer surplus per game is 50 for those who had attended hockey games and about 50 less for those who had not attended games exploiting the stated preference data we develop a number of other consumer surplus estimates we also include travel costs in the estimation of the demand function and estimate the full value of the game trip considering both ticket prices and travel costs sold out arenas in calgary and edmonton generate annual consumption bene ts of 40 and 35 million when only ticket prices are used to calculate consumer surplus i e excluding travel costs considering the full price consumer surplus for the calgary flames of 103 per game trip the annual consumption bene ts may be as high as 82 million jel r22 l83 d61

divided majority and information aggregation theory and experiment this paper studies theoretically and experimentally the properties of plurality and approval voting when a majority gets divided by information imperfections the majority faces two challenges aggregating information to select the best majority candidate and coordinating to defeat the minority candidate under plurality the majority cannot achieve both goals at once under approval voting it can welfare is strictly higher because some voters approve of both majority alternatives in the laboratory we find i strong evidence of strategic voting and ii superiority of approval voting over plurality finally subject behavior suggests the need to study equilibria in asymmetric strategies

reducing barriers in future benefit transfers needed improvements in primary study design and reporting abstract original research provides many social benefits including additions to our stock of knowledge benefit transfer is a formal process whereby our stock of knowledge rather than original research is used to inform decisions any shortcoming in this stock directly affects our ability to conduct valid and reliable benefit transfers this paper discusses three general criteria that are necessary for valid benefit transfers and how original research designs and reporting of results unnecessarily constrain the potential of benefit transfers we make several suggestions regarding how original research through improved design and reporting might increase the validity and reliability of benefit transfers we also recommend that repositories for original research surveys and data be developed to insure long term availability of study information

reliability and predictive validity of contingent values does the nature of the good matter abstract because the contingent valuation mechanism cvm elicits verbal reports of maximum willingness to pay and not actual willingness to pay analysts have expressed doubts about the reliability and validity of contingent values for commodities such as environmental amenities this skepticism is usually attributed to the amorphous nature of the commodity and to peoples lack of familiarity or experience however our comparison of two commodities which lie at polar extremes of the private good public good continuum suggests that the nature of the good may have little influence on the reliability and predictive validity of the cvm instead aspects of the cvm itself e g explicit payment obligation may be more important for high intention behavior consistency

multicandidate elections aggregate uncertainty in the laboratory the rational voter model is often criticized on the grounds that two of its central predictions the paradox of voting and duverger s law are at odds with reality recent theoretical advances suggest that these empirically unsound predictions might be an artifact of an arguably unrealistic assumption the absence of aggregate uncertainty about the distribution of preferences in the electorate in this paper we propose direct empirical evidence of the effects of aggregate uncertainty in multicandidate elections adopting a theory based experimental approach we explore whether aggregate uncertainty indeed favors the emergence of non duverger s law equilibria in plurality elections our experimental results support the main theoretical predictions

the paradox of voter participation a laboratory study it is widely believed that rational choice theory is grossly inconsistent with empirical observations about voter turnout we report the results of an experiment designed to test the voter turnout predictions of the rational choice palfrey rosenthal model of participation with asymmetric information we find that the three main comparative statics predictions are observed in the data the size effect whereby turnout goes down in larger electorates the competition effect whereby turnout is higher in elections that are expected to be close and the underdog effect whereby voters supporting the less popular alternative have higher turnout rates we also compare the quantitative magnitudes of turnout to the predictions of nash equilibrium we find that there is undervoting for small electorates and overvoting for large electorates relative to nash equilibrium these deviations from nash equilibrium are consistent with the logit version of quantal response equilibrium which provides a good fit to the data and can also account for significant voter turnout in very large elections

confidence intervals for evaluating benefits estimates from dichotomous choice contingent valuation studies i evaluate the potential usefulness of nonmarket valuation concepts and techniques from environmental economics for improving wildlife conservation the concepts include distinguishing between on site recreation use value and off site passive use or

choice certainty and consistency in repeated choice experiments the main objective of this study is to examine how repeated choice affects preference learning in stated preference experiments we test different hypotheses related to preference learning by analyzing response patterns and asking respondents in a choice experiment to report their experienced certainty when going through the choice tasks in a split sample test we show that follow up choice certainty questions are procedural invariant the self reported certainty results indicate that learning occurs but econometric testing procedures do not identify any significant impact of learning effects on parameter estimates or variance across choice tasks additional tests of choice consistency suggest that preferences in the choice experiment are stable and coherent

exchange asymmetry in experimental settings abstract we review past trading experiments and present 11 new experiments designed to show how the trading rate responds to alterations of the experimental procedure in agreement with earlier studies results show that if the trade decision is converted to one resembling a choice between goods the exchange asymmetry disappears but otherwise the asymmetry is remarkably robust results also indicate that when trading is public herding can occur which may have caused some of the more extreme examples of the exchange asymmetry and that some of the lack of trade may result from preference indifference nevertheless some form of status quo bias which may consist of a combination of loss aversion gain attraction regret avoidance and dislike of trading and which may be enhanced by indifference between the goods offered probably remains as an important influence on the trading rate

explaining voter turnout patterns an information theory voting research is rich in empirical regularities yet a parsimonious theory of voter turnout that can match the facts has proven to be elusive this paper argues that voter turnout patterns can be explained by extending the traditional rational voter model to include limited information a model is presented in which utility maximizing consumers receive higher payoffs from voting the more confident they are of their vote choice the model provides an explanation for the most important cross sectional voter turnout patterns in addition it suggests a novel explanation for the post 1960 decline in u s participation

let the experts decide asymmetric information abstention and coordination in standing committees abstract we examine abstention when voters in standing committees are asymmetrically informed and there are multiple pure strategy equilibria swing voter s curse svc equilibria where voters with low quality information abstain and equilibria when all participants vote their information when the asymmetry in information quality is large we find that voting groups largely coordinate on the svc equilibrium which is also pareto optimal however we find that when the asymmetry in information quality is not large and the pareto optimal equilibrium is for all to participate significant numbers of voters with low quality information abstain furthermore we find that information asymmetry induces voters with low quality information to coordinate on a non equilibrium outcome this suggests that coordination on letting the experts decide is a likely voting norm that sometimes validates svc equilibrium predictions but other times does not

choice consistency and preference stability in test retests of discrete choice experiment and open ended willingness to pay elicitation formats this study tests the temporal stability of preferences choices and willingness to pay wtp values using both discrete choice experiment dce and open ended oe wtp elicitation formats the same sample is surveyed three times over the course of two years using each time the same choice sets choice consistency is positively correlated with choice certainty and choice complexity the impact of choice complexity fades away in time most likely as a result of learning and preference refinement although the oe wtp values remain stable over a time period of 2 years as in previous stated preference studies dce based wtp measures differ significantly suggesting their use in benefits transfer may be limited

information aggregation and strategic abstention in large laboratory elections this paper compares strategic abstention in ad hoc committees versus standing committees ad hoc committees meet only once and then dissolve while standing committees the central finding from this study is that most of the predictions of swing voter curse theory hold up in large elections conducted under controlled laboratory conditions there is significant abstention and significant balancing of partisans by uniformed voters and vote balancing increases with the partisan imbalance elections with no partisan imbalance successfully aggregate information and lead to efficient outcomes consistent with swing voter curse theory this efficiency falls off as partisan imbalance increases but to a significantly greater extent than is predicted in equilibrium it is instructive to compare these findings in large elections with results from the elections reported in battaglini et al 2007 all of the qualitative results are the same concerning the comparative statics balancing and abstention one slight difference is that there was less irrational voting for in the small elections than in the large elections except for the 5 9 m 0 treatment where we observed 20 voting for in the small elections compared with 10 voting for in the large elections these differences were reflected in slightly different efficiency results between small and large elections with the comparisons mirroring the differences in voting for more irrational voting results in lower e ciency we conclude that this scaled up study successfully replicates the initial swing voter s curse experiment reported in battaglini et al 2007 obtaining very similar findings in laboratory committees that are three times the size of those in the original study the one caveat is that we found evidence of a slight increase in irrational nonequilibrium behavior voting for in the larger elections whether this trend would continue as election size is further scaled up is an open question a swing voter s curse environment

sad or happy the effects of emotions on stated preferences for environmental goods a substantial literature in behavioural science and psychology shows that emotions affect human choices and values this paper investigates whether such emotional impacts are also present in stated choice experiments for environmental goods if this were so it would introduce an additional element of context dependence to the welfare measures derived from such methods and would be at odds with the rational choice model underlying welfare economics a laboratory experiment using three different emotion treatments was combined with a stated preference choice experiment concerned with changes in coastal water quality and fish populations in new zealand no statistically significant effects of changes in emotional state on estimated preference parameters willingness to pay or the randomness of choices were found the paper concludes by questioning why such a contrast exists with empirical findings in behavioural science

bootstrapping in applied welfare analysis bootstrapping procedures are used to estimate the statistical properties of common empirical welfare measures results from a monte carlo experiment indicate that welfare estimates such as marshallian consumer surplus often exhibit significant bias standard errors of welfare estimates are found to often exceed the magnitude of the point estimate for typical cross section data sets and are generally larger than the difference between comparable hicksian and marshallian measures precision of welfare estimates can be markedly enhanced through generating larger data sets obtaining better model fits and through imposition of innocuous inequality restrictions on the demand function parameters

count data models and the problem of zeros in recreation demand analysis in this paper we develop a count data model for consumer demand which explicitly allows for a large number of zero observations for the dependent variable and separation of the participation versus quantity decisions the advantages of the model over traditional censored and count demand models are brought out and the appropriate consumer surplus measures are derived by introducing a random error term into the traditional count model demand function the appropriate measure of expected consumer surplus for count models is derived the model is illustrated using a recreational survey of the general population

actual averting expenditure versus stated willingness to pay the purpose of this study is to perform a complete comparison of actual averting expenditure and stated willingness to pay measures and to determine if the averting expenditure is a lower bound of the willingness to pay measured from contingent valuation experiment as suggested by literature in addition to the single value comparison bootstrap krinsky and robb jackknife and cameron are four simulation methods used to calculate confidence intervals for response function sample sizes of 100 200 and 1000 are simulated 100 and 200 times respectively a set of data with 540 households from a contingent policy referendum survey is employed for our purpose under a specific level of bod improvement a one to one single mean value comparison of the actual averting expenditure is greater than the mean willingness to pay from utility difference model the empirical results are consistent with the theoretical expectation for expenditure difference that averting expenditure is a lower bound of willingness to

public protests and policy making technological advances and the development of social media have made petitions public protests and other form of spontaneous activism increasingly common tools for individuals to influence decision makers to study these phenomena in this article i present a theory of petitions and public protests that explores their limits as mechanisms to aggregate information the key assumption is that valuable information is dispersed among citizens through petitions and protests citizens can signal their private information to the policy maker who can then choose to use it or not i first show that if citizens individual signals are not sufficiently precise information aggregation is impossible no matter how large is the population of informed citizens even if the conflict with the policy maker is small i then characterize the conditions on conflict and the signal structure that guarantee information aggregation when these conditions are satisfied i show that full information aggregation is possible as the population grows to infinity when they are not satisfied i show that information aggregation may still be possible if social media are available

economic evaluation of environmental externalities in china s coal fired power generation abstract serious environmental externalities exist in china s power industry environmental economics theory suggests that the evaluation of environmental externality is the basis of designing an efficient regulation the purposes of this study are 1 to identify chinese respondents preferences for green development of electric power industry and the socio economic characteristics behind them 2 to investigate the different attitudes of the respondents towards pollution and co2 reduction 3 to quantitatively evaluate the environmental cost of china s coal fired power generation based on the method of choice experiments ce and the 411 questionnaires with 2466 data points we found that chinese respondents prefer pm2 5 so2 and nox reduction to co2 reduction and that the environment cost of coal fired power plants in china is 0 30 yuan per kwh in addition we found that the socio economic characteristics of income education gender and environmental awareness have significant impacts on respondents choices these findings indicate that the environmental cost of coal fired power generation is a significant factor that requires great consideration in the formulation of electric power development policies in addition importance should also be attached to the implementation of green power price policy and enhancement of environmental protection awareness

a passion for voting we model expressive voting as a dynamic game with informed and ignorant voters a voter has selective memory for actions and he is aware of it we find a unique symmetric equilibrium with ignorant voting public signal in favor of one particular alternative creates the bandwagon and underdog effects when the signal is sufficiently strong the majority outcome is biased this is a possible reason for persistence of public policies

do parents benefit it from school health risk reduction the choice experiment method was applied to determine parent s preferences and monetaryvalues of risk reductions on three related health issues in school lead contamination inschool drinking water diarrhea from food contamination and accident from outdoor playground data were obtained from face to face interview of 672 respondents in three regions ofthailand lead contamination is the greatest concern among parents as reflected by thelargest coefficients of risk reduction levels and the highest amount of monetary values elicitedfrom parent s preferences the other two issues are considered of equal importance however parents seem insensitive to the changes of risk reductions of these two issues revealingthe scope insensitivity given the scope insensitivity choice experiment may be seen as apromising method to determine preferences and monetary values of health related issuesthat have no appropriate or precise financial proxy available keywords non market valuation safety in school health risk reduction jel classification d61 i10 i31

adopt a hypothetical pup a count data approach to the valuation of wildlife the willingness to pay wtp for a coyote conservation program is estimated using a novel payment vehicle based on how many problem coyotes respondents would be willing to sponsor for a year this hypothetical scenario mimics an increasingly popular type of actual market data from a phone survey conducted in prince edward island are analyzed using count data models that consider different processes explaining zero responses and the level of positive responses this is particularly important in the case of coyotes often regarded as an economic bad estimates of wtp per coyote per year around 18 22 and annual wtp per contributor of about 46 57 are obtained

efficiency equity and timing of voting mechanisms we compare the behavior of voters under simultaneous and sequential voting rules when voting is costly and information is incomplete in many political institutions ranging from small committees to mass elections voting is sequential which allows some voters to know the choices of earlier voters for a stylized model we generate a variety of predictions about the relative efficiency and participation equity of these two systems which we test using controlled laboratory experiments most of the qualitative predictions are supported by the data but there are significant departures from the predicted equilibrium strategies in both the sequential and the simultaneous voting games we find a tradeoff between information aggregation efficiency and equity in sequential voting a sequential voting rule aggregates information better than simultaneous voting and is more efficient in some information environments but sequential voting is inequitable because early voters bear more participation costs

abstention in elections with asymmetric information and diverse preferences we analyze a model of a two candidate election with costless voting in which voters have asymmetric information and diverse preferences we demonstrate that a strictly positive fraction of the electorate will abstain and that nevertheless elections effectively aggregate voters private information using examples we show that more informed voters are more likely to vote than their less informed counterparts increasing the fraction of the electorate that is informed however may lead to higher levels of abstention we conclude by showing that a biased distribution of information can lead to a biased voting population but does not lead to biased outcomes

estimation of the public benefits of urban water supply improvements in ethiopia a choice experiment improving existing drinking water supply services in developing countries depends crucially on available financial resources cost recovery rates of these services are typically low while demand for more reliable services is high and rapidly growing most stated preference based demand studies in the developing world apply the contingent valuation method and focus on rural areas this study examines household willingness to pay wtp for improved water supply services in a choice experiment in an urban area in ethiopia a country with the lowest water supply coverage in sub saharan africa the design of the choice experiment allows estimation of the value of both drinking water supply reliability and safety the estimated economic values can be used in policy appraisals of improved supply investment decisions despite significant income constraints households are willing to pay up to 80 extra for improved levels of water supply over and above their current water bill women and households living in the

the swing voter s curse in the laboratory this paper reports the first laboratory study of the swing voter s curse and provides insights on the larger theoretical and empirical literature on pivotal voter models our experiment controls for different information levels of voters as well as the size of the electorate the distribution of preferences and other theoretically relevant parameters the design varies the share of partisan voters and the prior belief about a payoff relevant state of the world our results support the equilibrium predictions of the feddersen pesendorfer model and clearly reject the notion that voters in the laboratory use naive decision theoretic strategies the voters act as if they are aware of the swing voter s curse and adjust their behavior to compensate while the compensation is not complete and there is some heterogeneity in individual behavior we find that aggregate outcomes such as efficiency turnout and margin of victory closely track the theoretical predictions

television and voter turnout i use variation across markets in the timing of television s introduction to identify its impact on voter turnout the estimated effect is significantly negative accounting for between a quarter and a half of the total decline in turnout since the 1950s i argue that substitution away from other media with more political coverage provides a plausible mechanism linking television to voting as evidence for this i show that the entry of television in a market coincided with sharp drops in consumption of newspapers and radio and in political knowledge as measured by election surveys i also show that both the information and turnout effects were largest in off year congressional elections which receive extensive coverage in newspapers but little or no coverage on television

tough and easy choices testing the influence of utility difference on stated certainty in choice in choice experiments respondents in stated preference studies may be uncertain about their preferences for the good presented to them inspired by wang j environ econ manag 32 219 232 1997 we hypothesize that respondents stated certainty in choice increases with the utility difference between the alternative chosen and the best alternative to that we test this hypothesis using data from two independent choice experiments both focusing on nature values in modelling respondents self reported certainty in choice we find evidence that the stated level of certainty increases significantly as utility difference in choice sets increases in addition stated certainty increases with income furthermore there is some evidence that male respondents are inherently more certain in their choices than females and a learning effect may increase stated certainty we find evidence of this in the first study where the good is described in rather broad and generic terms but not in the second study where a more specific description of the good is used

an experimental study of jury decision rules we present experimental results on groups facing a decision problem analogous to that faced by a jury we consider three treatment variables group size three or six number of votes needed for conviction majority or unanimity and pre vote deliberation we find evidence of strategic voting under the unanimity rule a large fraction of our subjects vote for a decision analogous to conviction even when their private information indicates a state analogous to innocence this is roughly consistent with the game theoretic predictions of feddersen and pesendorfer although individual behavior is explained well by the game theoretic model there are discrepancies at the level of the group decision contrary to feddersen and pesendorfer in our experiments there are fewer outcomes analogous to incorrect convictions under unanimity rule than under majority rule in the case of no deliberation we simultaneously account for the individual and group data using quantal response equilibrium

the effects of experience on preferences theory and empirics for environmental public goods this article develops a choice model for environmental public goods which allows for consumers to learn about their preferences through consumption experiences we develop a theoretical model of bayesian updating perform comparative statics over the model and show how the theoretical model can be consistently incorporated into a reduced form econometric model our main findings are that in a random utility model rum discrete choice model a subject s scale should increase and the variability of scale should decrease with experience if subjects are bayesians we then estimate the model using field data regarding preferences for one particular public good water quality we find strong evidence that additional experience increases scale thereby making consumer preferences more predictable from the econometrician s perspective we find supportive but less convincing evidence that experience decreases the variability of scale across subjects

discrete choice under preference uncertainty an improved structural model for contingent valuation abstract this paper is concerned with discrete choice contingent value estimation in the presence of response errors we attempt to extend the theoretical frameworks developed by hanemann 1984 amer j agric econom 66 332 341 and cameron 1988 j environ econom management 15 355 379 by introducing preference uncertainty with individual respondents we assume that respondents have incomplete knowledge about their true valuation of a nonmarket resource and thus may give wrong yes no answers on whether or not to pay a given bid amount for the resource a post decisional confidence measure for each observed yes no answer is elicited for characterizing the degree of preference uncertainty with the help of this confidence measure we develop an improved structural model for deriving value estimates data from a forest environment valuation survey are used for the empirical estimations

the effect of common sources of regression error on benefit estimates discussions of the sources of error in recreation demand analysis are common in the existing literature the most traditional line of thought e g gum and martin considers the error component in predicting the individual s recreation behavior to arise from unmeasured socioeconomic factors others e g hanemann attribute at least some of this error to fundamental randomness in human behavior applied statisticians e g hiett and worrall on the other hand suggest that recall of annual number of recreational trips i e the quantity demanded is subject to substantial error still others e g brown et al have argued that recall of explanatory variables such as travel expenses contains error despite the discussion of potential error sources there is no work which relates the sources of error in the demand relationship with benefit measurement 1 of practical importance in recreational demand estimation is whether error assumptions have an influence on welfare measures since it is for public policy decision purposes that recreational demand estimation is usually undertaken will the estimated consumer surplus derived from demand analysis be independent of the assumed source of the error in the regression the purpose of this paper is to explore how the assumptions about sources of error influence estimates of recreation benefits a discussion of the various sources of error in de

dynamic learning and context dependence in sequential attribute based stated preference valuation questions a hybrid stated preference model is presented that combines the referendum contingent valuation response format with an experimentally designed set of attributes a sequence of valuation questions is asked to a random sample in a mailout mail back format econometric analysis shows greater discrimination between alternatives in the final choice in the sequence and the vector of preference parameters shifts lead and lag choice sets have a structural influence on current choices and unobserved factors induce positive correlation across the responses these results indicate that people learn about their preferences for attributebased environmental goods by comparing attribute levels across choice sets

the marginal voter s curse an intuitive explanation for voter abstention is that a voter is uncertain which policy or candidate to vote for and so defers to the rest of the electorate to make the decision in majoritarian elections this has been formally modelled as a strategic response to the swing voter s curse which arises because the rare event of a pivotal vote conveys substantial information in electoral systems other than majority rule however the standard pivotal voting calculus may not apply this paper analyzes one such system namely proportional representation where additional votes continue to push the policy outcome in one direction or the other a new strategic incentive for abstention arises in that case to avoid the marginal voter s curse of pushing the policy outcome in the wrong direction intuitively conditioning on the rare event of a pivotal vote might seem to have a greater impact on behavior but the marginal voter s curse actually presents a larger disincentive for voting than the swing voter s curse this and other predictions of the model are con rmed empirically by a series of laboratory experiments

common value elections with private information and informative priors theory and experiments abstract we study efficiency and information aggregation in common value elections with contin uous private signals and informative priors we show that small elections are not generally efficient and that there are equilibria where some voters vote against their private signal even if it provides useful information and abstention is allowed this is not the case in large elections where the fraction of voters who vote against their private signal tends to zero in an experiment we then study how informativeness of priors and private signals impact efficiency and information aggregation in small elections we find that there is a substantial amount of voting against the private signal moreover while most experimental elections are efficient we find that it is not generally the case that better private information leads to better decisions

the influence of task complexity on consumer choice a latent class model of decision strategy switching the literature indicating that person context and task specific factors cause consumers to utilize different decision strategies has generally failed to affect the specification of choice models used by practitioners and academics alike who still tend to assume an utility maximizing omniscient indefatigable consumer this article 1 introduces decision strategy selection within a maintained compensatory framework into aggregate choice models via latent classes which arise because of task complexity 2 it demonstrates that within an experimental choice task the model reflects changing aggregate preferences as choice complexity changes and as the task progresses the import of these findings for current practice model interpretation and future research needs is examined

choosing not to choose on the link between information and abstention abstract we use a dataset that allows us to circumvent a number of estimation difficulties that have plagued previous studies of the relationship between information and abstention our results show that information is a major determinant of abstention

designing choice sets for stated preference methods the effects of complexity on choice consistency abstract we vary the complexity of choice sets used in stated preference methods to evaluate the impact on choice consistency we define five measures of complexity that capture either the amount of information or the correlational structure of information in a choice set using these measures as randomly assigned treatments in a large experiment we analyze the consistency of respondents choices using a heteroskedastic multinomial logit model we find that i all of our measures of choice set complexity affect choice consistency ii changes in the correlational structure of information have the largest impact on choice consistency and iii choice complexity significantly distorts welfare estimates our results confirm economists initial worry that moving from contingent valuation to conjoint methods will increase complexity induced choice inconsistency however our analysis also shows that these negative impacts may be mitigated if precautions are taken at the design and estimation stages of stated preference methods

rational choice theory and the paradox of not voting at least since downs s 1957 seminal work an economic theory of democracy rational choice theorists have appreciated the paradox of not voting in a large election the probability that an individual vote might change the election outcome is vanishingly small if each person only votes for the purpose of influencing the election outcome then even a small cost to vote like a minor schedule conflict or mildly bad weather should dissuade anyone from voting yet it seems that many people will put up with long lines daunting registration requirements and even the threat of physical violence or arrest in order to vote given the central place of voting within political economy the lack of an adequate rational choice model of large elections with costly voting presents an obvious problem for the most part theorists have bypassed the turnout problem either by eliminating voters as strategic actors or by assuming that the decision to vote is independent of other strategic choices the problem with the first approach is that the empirical literature on voting behavior provides considerable evidence of apparently strategic behavior in primary elections there is evidence that voters condition their vote choice on the viability of candidates abramson aldrich paolino and rohde 1992 in a seminal and comprehensive study cox 1997 shows that voting patterns and election outcomes are broadly consistent with patterns of behavior predicted by strategic voting models for example under plurality rule in which the candidate with the most votes wins the election

a semiparametric smooth coefficient estimator for recreation demand we introduce a semiparametric smooth coefficient estimator for recreation demand data that allows more flexible modeling of preference heterogeneity we show that our sample of visitors each has an individual statistically significant price coefficient estimate leading to clearly nonparametric consumer surplus and willingness to pay wtp distributions we also show mean wtp estimates that are different in economically meaningful ways for every demographic variable we have for our sample of beach visitors this flexibility is valuable for future researchers who can include any variables of interest beyond the standard demographic variables we have included here and the richer results price elasticities consumer surplus and wtp estimates are valuable to planners and policymakers who can easily see how all these estimates vary with characteristics of the population of interest

changing with the tide semiparametric estimation of preference dynamics we contrast the discovered preference hypothesis against the theory of coherent arbitrariness in a split sample stated choice experiment on flood risk exposure a semiparametric local multinomial logit model is developed as an alternative to the swait and louviere 1993 test procedure controlling for preference dynamics within and between samples the proposed model supports the discovered preference hypothesis by means of a decaying starting point bias the swait and louviere 1993 test procedure reaches a different conclusion it rejects the assumption of stable preferences but most preference dynamics tend to be smoothed out causing a more erratic pattern of preference dynamics

the swing voter s curse the authors analyze two candidate elections in which some voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters they demonstrate the existence of a swing voter s curse less informed indifferent voters strictly prefer to abstain rather than vote for either candidate even when voting is costless the swing voter s curse leads to the equilibrium result that a substantial fraction of the electorate will abstain even though all abstainers strictly prefer voting for one candidate over voting for another copyright 1996 by american economic association

ignorance and bias in collective decisions we study theoretically and experimentally a committee with common interests committee members do not know which of two alternatives is the best but each member can acquire privately a costly signal before casting a vote under either majority or unanimity rule in the experiment as predicted by bayesian equilibrium voters are more likely to acquire information under majority rule and attempt to counter the bias in favor of one alternative under unanimity rule as opposed to bayesian equilibrium predictions however many committee members vote when uninformed moreover uninformed voting is strongly associated with a lower propensity to acquire information we show that an equilibrium model of subjective prior beliefs can account for both these phenomena and provides a good overall fit to the observed patterns of behavior both in terms of rational ignorance and biases

economic valuation by the method of paired comparison with emphasis on evaluation of the transitivity axiom the paired comparison pc method is used to investigate reliability transitiv ity and decision time for binary choices among goods and sums of money the pc method reveals inconsistent choices and yields individual prefer ence order over the set of items being compared the data reported support the transitivity as sumption and demonstrate high reliability for individual preference order the paper also discusses using the pc method to obtain conser vative median and mean estimates of willingness to accept compensation for public and private goods the pc method may prove useful for valu ing public goods and warrants further study jel 426

are fast responses more random testing the effect of response time on scale in an online choice experiment scepticism over stated preference surveys conducted online revolves around the concerns over professional respondents who might rush through the questionnaire without sufficiently considering the information provided to gain insight on the validity of this phenomenon and test the effect of response time on choice randomness this study makes use of a recently conducted choice experiment survey on ecological and amenity effects of an offshore windfarm in the uk the positive relationship between self rated and inferred attribute attendance and response time is taken as evidence for a link between response time and cognitive effort subsequently the generalised multinomial logit model is employed to test the effect of response time on scale which indicates the weight of the deterministic relative to the error component in the random utility model results show that longer response time increases scale i e decreases choice randomness this positive scale effect of response time is further found to be non linear and wear off at some point beyond which extreme response time decreases scale while response time does not systematically affect welfare estimates higher response time increases the precision of such estimates these effects persist when self reported choice certainty is controlled for implications of the results for online stated preference surveys and further research are discussed

aggregating information by voting the wisdom of the experts versus the wisdom of the masses this article analyzes participation and information aggregation in a common value election with continuous private signals in equilibrium some citizens ignore their private information and abstain from voting in deference to those with higher quality signals even as the number of highly informed peers grows large however citizens with only moderate expertise continue voting so that voter participation remains at realistic levels e g 50 to 60 percent for simple examples the precise level of voter turnout along with the margin of victory are determined by the distribution of expertise improving a voter s information makes her more willing to vote consistent with a growing body of empirical evidence but makes her peers more willing to abstain providing a new explanation for various empirical patterns of voting equilibrium participation is optimal even though the marginal voter may have very little e g below average expertise and even though nonvoters information is not utilized copyright oxford university press

maize acreage response under differential prices in the republic of benin west africa price response of maize acreage in benin was estimated with a particular emphasis on whether the prices were producer prices in rural markets or retail prices in urban markets a second difference between prices was examined through a price adjustment model which takes into account the distortions caused by local units on maize price when one is concerned with the pricing system in the private marketing network relating rural and urban areas urban market price specification appeared to be the most relevant statistically in explaining acreage decisions in mono province price elasticity of acreage was 0 445 in this area while its value around 0 10 was not significant for benin as a whole the use of adjusted urban prices enabled an increase of 5 6 of the elasticity in mono province the urban vs rural difference was apparent but the coefficients of the price variable were not significant in equations with rural prices the latter were not as reliable as those of the urban market of dantokpa in cotonou city collected by the institute of statistics insae and the gtz project