on the existence of markov consistent plans under production uncertainty strotz 1956 and pollak 1968 were among the first to study the behaviour of an economic agent whose preferences change over time they suggested that such an agent would choose a consistent plan which they described as the best plan that he would actually follow a markov consistent plan has a particularly simple structure current decisions are independent of past decisions except insofar as past decisions affect the current values of state variables unfortunately markov consistent plans do not generally exist in this paper we demonstrate that the existence problem dissappears for finite horizon problems when one introduces even a small amount of smooth uncertainty into production

estimation of the tenants benefits residing in public rental housing with unit size constraint in korea summary hicksian income equivalent variation ev has often been used to measure tenants benefits in evaluating public housing programmes a number of papers have so far attempted to apply hicksian ev under the implicit assumption of no constraint on unit size of public housing as a result overestimation of tenants benefits probably occurs where unit size constraints exist as in korea s public housing programme thus the purpose of the paper is to measure hicksian ev with the constraint in unit size of public housing by formulating a revised hicksian ev equation and comparing the result with constraint free cases it is found that hicksian ev with constraint in unit size decreases relative to that of the constraint free cases the extent of ev decrease depends on the income elasticity of demand for housing and the difference between the optimum consumption of public housing under rent support demand wanted and the actual constraint of unit size demand fulfilled

permanent income hedonic prices and demand for housing new evidence abstract housing demand is examined by looking quite specifically at the income and price variables based on individual household data permanent and transitory incomes are computed through instrumental variables related to human and nonhuman wealth a price is constructed by spatially varying hedonic techniques separation of measured income into permanent and transitory components substantially improves the predictive power of the housing demand estimation and leads to demand elasticities of 1 and 1 with respect to permanent income and price the permanent income elasticity is roughly twice the measured income elasticity

banking panics information and rational expectations equilibrium this paper shows that bank runs can be modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon we demonstrate that some aspects of the intuitive story that bank runs start with fears of insolvency of banks can be rigorously modeled if individuals observe long lines at the bank they correctly infer that there is a possibility that the bank is about to fail and precipitate a bank run however bank runs occur even when no one has any adverse information extra market constraints such as suspension of convertibility can prevent bank runs and result in superior allocations banking panics were a recurrent phenomenon in the united states until the 1930s they have re emerged as a source of public concern and much theoretical research recently in this paper we provide an information theoretic rationale for bank runs the traditional story is that contagion is an important aspect of bank runs the idea seems to be that when the general public observes large withdrawals from the banking system fears of insolvency grow resulting in even larger withdrawals of deposits in our model some individuals withdraw because they get information that future returns are likely to be low uninformed individuals observing this also have an incentive to liquidate their investments in addition some individuals need to withdraw deposits for other than informationally based reasons thus if the random realization of such a group of individuals is unusually large then the uninformed individuals will be misled and will precipitate a run on the bank the technology is such that a large volume of withdrawals involves liquidation costs consequently runs on the bank do impose social costs a mechanism that may reduce these costs in our model is to suspend convertibility if withdrawals are high however those individuals who need to withdraw their assets for liquidity reasons are worse off ex post our model provides a rationalization for restrictions in demand deposits that were widespread prior to 1929 friedman and schwartz 7 suggest that restrictions of payments ensured

the possibility of informationally efficient markets abstract a rational expectations equilibrium with positive demand for financial information does exist under fully revealing asset price contrary to a wide held conjecture whereas a continuum of investors is inconsistent with fully revealing equilibrium finitely many investors with average portfolios demand information in equilibrium if they can adjust portfolio size in an additive signal return model more information diminishes the expected excess return of a risky asset so that investors who only have a choice of portfolio composition or whose asset endowments strongly differ from the average portfolio are worse off under fully revealing price information market equilibria both with and without information acquisition are pareto efficient

growth and income distribution in a credit money economy introducing the banking sector into the linear production model this paper attempts to incorporate the post keynesian view of the endogenous money supply into the sraffian linear production model the framework presented here unifies some key contributions made by sraffa the price equations kaldor and kalecki the endogenous nature of money in the industrial economy and the framework of the institutional theory of income distribution and keynes liquidity preference and the concept of the own rates of interest with its implication for the long period position two different positions in the endogeneity view the accommodationist and the structuralist are classified in terms of method of selecting exogenous and endogenous variables in this way we hope to show that credit and money can play an essential role from the demand and or the supply side by having a permanent impact on the growth path and the state of income distribution of an economy copyright 2002 oxford university press

rational expectations in microeconomic models an overview abstract this paper is an expository introduction to several topics of current research in the general equilibrium theory of rational expectations more specifically we discuss the existence of exact and approximate rational expectations equilibria the implementation of equilibria the behavior of learning and smoothing processes by which traders construct expectations from repeated observations of the market and the lagged use of the information revealed by prices in an intertemporal sequence of markets the purpose of this discussion is to introduce papers on these topics appearing in the journal of economic theory symposium on rational expectations in microeconomic models

strict rational expectations equilibria with diffuseness abstract for smooth static pure exchange economies under uncertainty it is shown that a diffuseness condition on the distribution of traders characteristics as the state of the world varies permits one to use only a weak dimensionality restriction in the proof of the genericity of existence of strict rational expectations equilibria a generic result on the amount of information conveyed by equilibrium price functions and comparisons with some examples of nonexistence are given

on the possibility of informationally efficient markets this paper presents conditions for a resolution of the grossman stiglitz paradox of informationally efficient markets we display a market with asymmetric information where a privately revealing equilibrium obtains in a competitive framework and where incentives to acquire information are preserved as long as the correlation in traders valuations is not too large the equilibrium is efficient and the problems associated with fully revealing rational expectations equilibria are precluded without resorting necessarily to noise traders the robustness of the results to general information structures is established and the effect of market power is examined in a large market approximation to the competitive economy the model is applied to explain changes in bidding behavior in central bank liquidity auctions in the crisis period jel d82 d84 g14 e59

the redistributive effect of public housing in hong kong public housing programmes in hong kong affect half of the population directly and the other half indirectly this paper assesses the redistributive effect of public rental housing on income distribution it uses a subsidised to market rent ratio method and an imputed rent method to convert transfer in kind of public rental housing into equivalent monetary value empirical results show that the provision of public housing alleviates the income inequality problem however the amount of public expenditure required achieving the same improvements in gini coefficient and other inequality measures is small relative to the actual public expenditure on housing policy makers should thoroughly review the existing public housing programmes

measuring welfare changes in settings with imposed quantities abstract an intuitively attractive money metric utility measure is developed which is applicable in settings where individuals receive fixed quantities of one or more goods one use of this measure is in cost benefit analyses of imposed quantity changes the approximate measures typically used are shown to be subject to relatively large approximation errors however techniques are presented which can always be used to numerically evaluate the exact welfare measure provided that one knows the uncompensated demand function s or marginal willingness to pay function s of individuals

equilibrium price formation and the value of private information an economy is analyzed in which agents first choose whether to acquire costly information about the return to a risky asset and then choose demand functions that determine the allocation of assets it is a well known paradox that if agents are price takers and prices are fully revealing then an equilibrium with costly information acquisition does not exist it is shown that if the price formation process is modeled explicitly and agnets are not price takers then it is possible to have an equilibrium with fully revealing prices and costly information acquisition article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

markov perfect equilibria in altruistic growth economies with production uncertainty this paper concerns the existence of markov perfect equilibria in altruistic growth economies previous work on deterministic models has established existence only under extremely restrictive conditions we show that the introduction of production uncertainly yields an existence theorem for aggregative infinite horizon models with very general forms of altruism journal of economic literature classification numbers

aggregation determinacy and informational efficiency for a class of economies with asymmetric information abstract we identify and analyze a class of economies with asymmetric information that we call quasi complete for quasi complete economies we determine equilibrium trades show that the set of fully informative equilibria is a singleton and give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partially informative equilibria besides unifying some familiar settings such as those of grossman 1976 and milgrom and stokey 1982 the following new results are proved a the same restrictions that deliver gorman aggregation under symmetric information are sufficient for gorman aggregation under asymmetric information even under partially informative prices b the traditional assumptions of quadratic utilities and endowment spanning that result in the capm under symmetric information deliver a conditional capm under asymmetric information with prices that need not be fully informative c the linear equilibrium in grossman s 1976 model is the only equilibrium linear or not while minor changes in the normality assumptions result in indeterminacy and partially informative equilibria and d if there is no aggregate endowment risk asymmetrically informed agents with common priors sell the risky part of their endowment in every equilibrium journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 g14 c62

measurement problems in quantifying the distributional effects of subsidy programs abstract use of estimated compensating or equivalent variation benefit measures to analyze the distributional effects of subsidy programs can lead to biased results the vast majority of previous studies have used average elasticity parameters to calculate individual compensating or equivalent variations this can lead to measurement errors which are systematically related to program targeting criteria and result in biased distributional impacts being identified from analysis of cross sectional estimated program benefits the seriousness of this problem is illustrated in a case study with simulated data the results suggest that much greater effort and care are warranted in ascertaining the robustness of estimates of the cross sectional variation in the benefits of many subsidy programs

the financial system and the pasinetti theorem palley inside debt aggregate demand and the cambridge theory of distribution cambridge journal of economics vol 20 no 4 465 74 1996 financial institutions and the cambridge theory of distribution cambridge journal of economics vol 26 no 2 275 7 2002 considers the pasinetti theorem in the context of the credit money system where banks generate debts endogenously and claims that the theorem ceases to hold in such a system being valid only in the loanable funds system this paper traces the root of palley s claim to his assumption regarding the ownership of banks sets out an alternative more realistic ownership arrangement and thereby restores the pasinetti theorem unscathed in the credit money system at least in the kind palley must have considered the paper however uncovers the case where the theorem indeed collapses and discusses the reason for it the hoarding of a non interest bearing asset copyright 2006 oxford university press

foreign direct investment with unemployment and endogenous taxes and tariffs it is well known that high tariffs can induce foreign direct investment or tariff jumping this paper analyzes tariff jumping in the context of a host government which can set specific tariffs and taxes subject to the credibility constraint that the chosen levels be optimal once capital is irreversibly in place the foreign multinational is assumed to choose its location and level of investment strategically taking into account the induced tax and tariff levels in the presence of unemployment the optimal tariff exceeds the optimal tax for any given level of capital investment leading to foreign direct investment

what affects the market s ability to adjust for optimistic forecast bias evidence from experimental asset markets abstract this study uses experimental asset markets to investigate the effects of experience and common knowledge on a market s ability to adjust for optimistic forecast bias as a baseline we find that period end prices reflect unbiased forecasts in markets with private information and inexperienced traders with low bias forecasts traders need experience before price adjusts for the bias with high bias forecasts traders need experience and public forecast releases before price adjusts for the bias overall our findings provide insight into identifying conditions that are critical for the full revelation of biased imperfect forecasts and provide direction for future theoretical work

cash welfare as a consumption smoothing mechanism for divorced mothers abstract while there has been considerable research on the disincentive effects of cash welfare under the aid to families with dependent children afdc program there is little evidence on the benefits of the program for single mothers and their children one potential benefit of this program is that it provides short run consumption insurance for women at the point that they become single mothers this is only true however to the extent that the program is not crowding out other sources of support such as own savings labor supply or transfers from others i assess the importance of this insurance mechanism by measuring the extent to which afdc smooths the consumption of women who transition to single motherhood through marital dissolution i use longitudinal data on family structure and consumption expenditures on food and housing from the panel study of income dynamics psid matched to information on the welfare benefits available in each state and year over the 1968 1985 period i find that raising potential benefits by one dollar raises the food and housing consumption of women who get divorced and their families by 28 cents this estimate implies that for each dollar of afdc received by this population their consumption of these categories of goods rises by up to 51 cents this is roughly the share of food and housing in the consumption bundle of divorced mothers and their families suggesting little crowdout of other sources of support

the welfare cost of free public schools the welfare cost of free public schools is the difference between the cost of those schools and the maximum parents would be willing to pay to send their children to those schools estimates based on data from california school districts in 1970 indicate that this welfare cost is substantial mostly because private schools are cheaper per unit of quality than public schools

exact consumer s surplus and deadweight loss consumer s surplus is a widely used tool in applied welfare economics both economic theorists and cost benefit analysis often use consumer s surplus despite its somewhat dubious reputation the basic idea is to evaluate the value to a consumer or his willingness to pay for a change in price of a good from say pricep to pricep because price changes affect consumer welfare an evaluation of this effect is often a key input to public policy decisions yet consumer s surplus is probably the most controversial of widely used economic concepts both paul samuelson and ian little conclude that the economics profession would be better off without it it is my feeling of the situation that substantial agreement exists on the correct quantities to be measured the amount the consumer would pay or would need to be paid to be just as well off after the price change as he was before the price change the quantities correspond to john hicks compensating variation measures an alternative measure which takes ex post price change utility as the basis of comparison is hicks equivalent variation the controversy arises in the measurement of these quantities the usual measurement procedure is to use the area to the left of the marshallian market demand curve between two price levels jules dupuit originated this measure of welfare change and alfred marshall and hicks derived appropriate conditions for its use the primary condition for the area to the left of the demand curve to correspond to the compensating variation is to have constant marginal utility of income marshall gave this condition and if it holds the same quantity will be derived as the area to the left of the compensated hicksian demand curve this area to the left of the compensated demand curve is exactly what the compensating variation and equivalent variation measure thus the constant marginal utility of income is a sufficient condition for marshallian consumer s surplus to be equal to hicks consumer s surplus in this case arnold harberger s plea to use the welfare triangle as one half times the product of the price change times the quantity change to measure deadweight loss corresponds to the correct theoretical amount of welfare change in a recent paper robert willig derives bounds for the percentage difference between the correct measure of either the compensating or equivalent variation and the marshallian measure derived form the market demand curve his bounds which depend on the income elasticity of demand for the single good in the region of price change being considered as well as the proportion of the consumer s income spent on the good demonstrate that the marshallian consumer s surplus is often a good approximation to hicks consumer s surplus the fact that the proportion of the consumer s income spent matters as well as the income elasticity was first pointed out by harold hotelling willig contends that the approximation error will be less than the errors involved in estimating the demand curve thus he hopes to remove the need for apology that applied economists often need to give to theorists who remark on the inappropriateness of using marshallian consumer s surplus to measure welfare change however in this paper i show that for the case primarily considered by willig of a single price change which is also the situation in which consumer s surplus is often used in applied work no approximation is necessary professor of economics massachusetts institute of technology and research associate national bureau of economic research i would like to thank peter diamond erwin diewert daniel mcfadden robert merton robert solow hal varian joel yellin and the referees for help and comments research support from the national science foundation is acknowledged the reason that we still have two rather than one of samuelson s six measures of consumer s surplus arises from an index number problem of the correct basis for the welfare comparison i will give both measures but plan to concentrate on the compensating variation

a monopolistic market for information abstract we analyze a model where traders buy information from a monopolistic seller which is subsequently used in a speculative market in order to overcome the dilution in the value of information due to its leakage through informative prices the seller of information may prefer to sell noisier versions of the information he actually has moreover to obtain higher profits it is desirable for the seller to sell different signals to different traders so that the added noise realizations do not affect equilibrium prices one way of doing so which does not require discrimination is to sell identically distributed personalized signals to each of a large number of traders

corporate financial hedging with proprietary information abstract if a firm has information pertinent to its own dividend stream that is not made available to its shareholders it may be in the interests of the firm and its shareholders to adopt a financial hedging policy this is in contrast with the modigliani miller theorem which implies that with informational symmetry such financial hedging is irrelevant in certain cases hedging policies are identified that are unanimously supported by shareholders

self fulfilling mechanisms in bayesian games abstract amechanismfor a bayesian gamegis a mapping from the set of states of nature to the set of players actions isself fulfillingif players are truthful at the communication stage and given the information revealed by no player can gain in unilaterally deviating from the action prescribed by the mechanism we investigate the properties of self fulfilling mechanisms and we show in particular that they correspond to inert solutions of the infinitely repeated game generated byg we also discuss applications to market games regulation and r d games journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d82 c72

measuring investment performance in a rational expectations equilibrium model much research has been concerned with evaluating the performance of managed portfolios e g mutual funds and examining whether portfolio managers display in some sense superior performance superior performance would seemingly turn on the possession of superior information that is utilized in managing portfolios in general a fund s asset holdings or portfolio weights might not be observable to an outsider whether they are or not however they are likely to change over time this happens especially when better performance is a result of superior information since managers will change their portfolio composition on obtaining private information since such changes must be taken into account the problem of measuring performance of managed portfolios is inherently different from that of evaluating the performance of individual assets groups of assets or generally portfolios with constant and known composition

rational behavior and rational expectations abstract this paper presents a new definition of rational expectations equilibrium in security markets characterized by a rigorous treatment of the decision problem facing each agent a rational expectations equilibrium is one in which it is common knowledge among the agents that all of them are rational and that the price observed is the market clearing price the paper shows that such equilibria always exist and that they need not have the property that for generic economies the equilibrium price reveals all economically relevant information the paper also shows that the new definition generalizes existing definitions of rational expectations equilibrium

hamlet without the prince cambridge macroeconomics without money keynes general theory was exclusively concerned with a monetary economy in which changing beliefs about the future influence the quantity of employment yet money plays no more than a perfunctory role in the cambridge theories of growth capital and distribution developed after keynes this essay attempts to explain this paradox with reference to the relation between keynes monetary revolution and the value theory revolution which simultaneously occurred in cambridge in the 1930 s

the benefits of in kind government programs abstract in this paper i present a methodology to calculate the benefits of in kind programs such as public housing which restrict consumption of some goods to the levels offered by the government most previous studies begin with an a priori specification of the direct utility function i begin with the ordinary demand function and then integrate demand to recover the indirect utility function and the expenditure function i argue that this approach gives additional flexibility in choosing a functional form which best describes the data i then use this methodology to estimate the benefits of the u s government s section 8 housing program

rational expectations information acquisition and competitive bidding most rational expectations market equilibrium models are not models of price formation and naive mechanisms leading to such equilibria can be severely manipulable in this paper a bidding model is developed which has the market like features that bidders act as price takers and that prices convey information higher equilibrium prices convey more favorable information about the quality of the objects being sold than do lower prices bidders can benefit from trading only if they have a transactions motive or if they have access to inside information apart from exceptional cases prices are not fully revealing a two stage model is developed in which bidders may acquire information at a cost before bidding and for which the equilibrium price is fully revealing resolving a well known paradox

market vs rationing the case of soviet housing economists devote considerable effort to the analysis of various forms of nonprice rationing these analyses generally disregard forces that act to foil rationing schemes even with a commodity that seems to be easy to control however in a system with extensive rationing experience nonprice rationing schemes can be circumvented this thesis is examined for the case of housing distribution in the u s s r utilizing the data from a survey of recent soviet emigres it is shown that administrative rationing of soviet urban housing is partially replaced by market forces acting usually through the second economy copyright 1988 by mit press

the revelation of information and self fulfilling beliefs abstract at a rational expectations equilibrium ree individuals are assumed to know the map from states to prices this hypothesis has two components that agents agree consensus and that they have point expectations degeneracy we consider economies where agents beliefs are described by a joint distribution on states and prices and these beliefs are fulfilled at equilibrium beliefs are self fulfilling if every price in the support of the distribution is an equilibrium price the corresponding equilibria are beliefs equilibria be the further restriction that agents have the same beliefs results in common beliefs equilibria cbe we study the relationship between be cbe and ree thus isolating the role of consensus and of degeneracy in achieving rational expectations journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d51 d82

self selection and the redistributive impact of in kind transfers an econometric analysis self targeting welfare programs have received increasing attention from economists and policymakers alike this paper provides evidence on the redistributive impact of transferring low quality goods in kind i study a school feeding program in jamaica which distributes a bland snack to all students poorer households and those with a greater number of eligible children are found significantly more likely to self select into the program but against these targeting benefits is a large estimated dead weight loss

the existence of fully rational expectations approximate equilibria with noisy price observations abstract nonrevealing fully rational expectations approximate equilibria exist in microeconomic pure exchange economies in which uninformed agents have suitably dispersed noisy price observations such traders maximize a state dependent expected utility conditional on the price vector they observe the distributions of noisy price observations and the correct equilibrium relationship between states of the world and prices in equilibrium aggregate excess demand is small with high probability in every state of the world and its expectation is also small this magnitude diminishes as the noisy price observations become more accurate equilibria are obtained by applying a fixed point argument to state dependent excess demand functions which are smooth because of the noisy price observations

on the existence of rational expectations equilibrium abstract we prove a theorem on the existence of rational expectations general economic equilibrium when agents condition on prices as well as on private information and maximize the expectation of a state dependent utility function the key to the result is a new idealization of what it means for a set of empirical distributions to support agents expectations this idealization depends on the notion that agents compare their expectations with continuous versions of the random empirical distributions that are generated by the workings of the economy the existence theorem covers all strictly concave utility functions arbitrary distributions of the state variable and situations in which the dimension of the state variable is large relative to the number of commodities

information aggregation in debate who should speak first abstract privately informed individuals speak openly in front of other members of a committee about the desirability of a public decision each individual wishes to appear well informed for any given order of speech committee members may herd by suppressing their true information with individuals of heterogeneous expertise optimizing over the order of speech can improve the extraction of information but not perfectly so it is not always optimal to use the common anti seniority rule whereby experts speak in order of increasing expertise a committee with more able experts may be afflicted by greater herding problems yielding a worse outcome

ex post regret and the decentralized sharing of information abstract firms reveal private information about the value of investment through their investment decisions as a consequence they may have ex post regret once they see other firms investments we define a notion of rational expectations equilibrium for games which imposes a no regret property in this equilibrium all firms make the same investment decision but despite the absence of ex post regret the investment herd can be inefficient in addition equilibrium might not exist we introduce a notion of probabilistic existence and identify conditions under which if the number of firms is large enough information comes out so that investment herds are first best efficient with high probability and equilibrium exists with high probability journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c7 d8

an econometric and cultural analysis of rent control in kumasi ghana an empirical analysis of rent control in kumasi ghana is presented based upon a consumer demand model for housing controlled rent to income ratios are exceptionally low for a developing country moreover the asante housing market exhibits unusual cultural attributes and problems in estimating the without rent control situation benefits and costs of rent control are presented by housing types and income levels and distributional impacts assessed

on the optimality of the patent renewal system the patent system is mainly a renewal system the patent life is chosen by the patentee in return for fees i ask whether such a system can be justified by asymmetric information on costs and benefits of research in such a model i show that renewal mechanisms possibly with subsidies are equivalent to direct revelation mechanisms and therefore cannot be improved on regardless of the objective function under plausible circumstances patents should have a uniform life rather than varying in length as typically occurs under a renewal system

measuring welfare changes when quantity is constrained in this article we propose a simple and efficient method of estimating welfare measures in an n equation consumer demand system when some quantities are constrained or rationed we also estimate the variance of these measures the method is evaluated using monte carlo studies of two demand systems we also use the method to analyze the welfare costs of constraining the hours worked by married women in canada the gauss code for implementing the method is included

bayesian learning in an infant industry model abstract most analyses of the infant industry argument assume that production early on benefits subsequent production in deterministic fashion this paper presents an alternative framework for evaluating the infant industry argument that focuses on imperfect information as a barrier to entry initial entrants provide information of social value by reducing uncertainty for potential followers about the suitability of local conditions in contrast to earlier work i show that factors that increase the informational barrier to entry may lower the optimal subsidy to the infant industry and that the standard test of the success of infant industry policy is not always valid 1997 elsevier science b v

net trade and market efficiency in grossman and stiglitz 1980 abstract in this paper we correct part b of theorem 6 of grossman and stiglitz gs 1980 we demonstrate that when the private signal tends to be perfect the market converges to strong form efficiency and thus informed and uninformed traders have almost homogeneous beliefs about the stock payoff but there is still significant net trade rather than no trade as erroneously shown by gs we further show that when the stock price becomes more informative and thus traders beliefs about the stock payoff become closer the net trade may increase

informed traders and limit order markets abstract we consider a dynamic limit order market in which traders optimally choose whether to acquire information about the asset and the type of order to submit we numerically solve for the equilibrium and demonstrate that the market is a volatility multiplier prices are more volatile than the fundamental value of the asset this effect increases when the fundamental value has high volatility and with asymmetric information across traders changes in the microstructure noise are negatively correlated with changes in the estimated fundamental value implying that asset betas estimated from high frequency data will be incorrect

theory and estimation in the economics of housing demand the main purpose of this paper is to review recent theoretical and empirical developments in the economics of housing demand in particular we ask what is known concerning the permanent income elasticity of housing demand vis a vis the current or measured income elasticity what is known concerning price elasticities what is the appropriate functional form for housing demand equations what is the role of demographic variables what is known concerning dynamic aspects of housing demand what appear to be the major sources of bias in existing estimates of demand equations

rational expectations equilibrium with econometric models we prove the existence of general economic equilibrium under uncertainty when agents form econometric models of the relationship among their private information prices and the state of the environment the functional form of each agent s model is specified in advance with a finite number of parameters to be determined agents are then thought of as performing linear least squares estimation of the parameters equilibrium requires not only that markets clear but also that each agent be using the vector of parameter values which within a compact convex set of parameters gives the least squares best fit to the data that is generated by the working of the economy when agents adhere to their models

rational expectations equilibrium with conditioning on past prices a mean variance example abstract the paper uses an intertemporal mean variance model of the market for a dividend paying risky asset to analyse rational expectations equilibria when all agents condition their expectations on past rather than current prices the main result shows that if the time span between successive market periods is short the market will approximate full informational efficiency arbitrarily closely yet the returns to being informed are bounded away from zero this contrasts with the grossman stiglitz proposition that markets cannot come close to informational efficiency if the acquisition of information is costly

do prices transmit rationally expected information a simple model with asymmetric information in which inventory holders or traders submit demand curves to an auctioneer has a unique partially revealing equilibrium we wonder whether the agents can plausibly coordinate on this equilibrium through eductive reasoning relying on common knowledge the analysis stresses the role of two effects sensitivity and amplification whose product should be small enough the property is obtained whenever the equilibrium excess demand is steep enough i e when the search for information does not distort demand too much neither the influence of the number of informed agents nor that of noise trading are monotonic real time learning has strikingly different features jel d82 d84

consumption and poverty how effective are in kind transfers the ability of in kind transfers to alleviate poverty depends on accurate targeting as well as recipients valuations of the benefits using data from the consumer expenditure surveys the efficiency of in kind transfers is examined in a microsimulation framework in which recipients are identified as those who have the lowest consumption in this framework in kind transfers of food capital services which includes housing and consumer services are an effective means of providing support to the poor even at high levels of subsidization the multiple good transfers that are considered are essentially equivalent to cash grants copyright 1996 by royal economic society

an introduction to the theory of rational expectations under asymmetric information every good economics textbook contains the cliche that market prices provide signals which facilitate the allocation of resources to their best use in a world not subject to random shocks consumers and producers when faced with competitive prices need look no further than their own preferences or production technology to be able to make a decision they need give no thought to the tastes endowments or technology of other agents however in a world subject to random shocks this is no longer the case agents are faced with the problem of forecasting future states of nature and more importantly of forecasting the impact of these states on the actions of other agents rational expectations theories provide a model of how agents make those forecasts in a world subject to random shocks it will be the case that agents acquire or at least attempt to acquire information about the future realization of the shocks it will in general be the case that different agents have access to different information the fact that information is dispersed throughout the economy has the potential to cause a misallocation of resources relative to what would be the case if all agents knew everything an efficient allocation of resources will in general require the transfer of information from consumers who have some information about their future demands to producers who can take current actions to mitigate avoidable scarcities or surpluses though many classical and neo classical writers emphasize the informational role of prices the standard marshallian or walrasian model of competitive equilibrium does not involve prices transferring information across traders the purpose of this paper is to show that rational expectations models are radically different from walrasian models in an economy where traders have diverse information this is demonstrated by showing that unlike what occurs in a walrasian equilibrium of an economy with heterogeneous information if there is a complete set of insurance markets and utility is additively separable over time then there exists a rational expectations equilibrium which gives consumers the same allocation as if each consumer has access to all of the economy s information this implies that under the above assumptions a central planner with all the economy s information could not pareto dominate the competitive allocation achieved when traders have diverse information and rational expectations this paper makes no attempt to survey the literature on rational expectations the reader is referred to shiller 1978 barro 1981 for a survey of macroeconomics and rational expectations and radner 1980 for a survey of the microeconomics and mathematical theory of rational expectations this paper will however try to outline the evolution of the rational expectations concept from a notion of optimal forecasting to a virtually complete departure from the walrasian model of equilibrium the rest of this section is devoted to a discussion of pre rational expectations ideas

the household s decision to accept or reject a conditional transfer offer households deemed by society to have insufficient resources to purchase an adequate commodity bundle are often offered aid i e additional resources conditional upon the households purchasing a given level of some commodity e g food fuel or housing such conditional transfers attempt to modify the households normal behavior i e if the households would normally purchase the required level of the designated commodity upon receipt of the transfer the constraint would not be necessary how these incentives and constraints interact to affect the households behavior determines in large part the number and type of eligibles aided by the program aggregate program costs given payment levels and the types of commodity bundles purchased by the recipient households clearly understanding the decision to accept or reject a conditional transfer offer has widespread implications for the costs of the transfer program the impact on eligible households and the attainment of society s objectives numerous studies have investigated the size and distribution of recipient benefits in conditional transfer programs 1 3 6 8 9 14 16 21 to this author s knowledge however no analysis has estimated a model of the household s decision to participate in a conditional transfer program using household data and a theoretically appropriate measure for the household s net gain to overcome this gap in our understanding of the household s

information revelation and strategic delay in a model of investment we model investment as an n player game with a pure informational externality each player s payoff depends only on his own action and the state of nature however because a player s action reveals his private information players wait to see what other players will do equilibrium is inefficient because delay is costly and information is imperfectly revealed we characterize the unique symmetric perfect bayesian equilibrium and study the robustness of delay which turns out to be sensitive to the reaction speed and the number of players we establish the following results i when the period length is very short the game ends very quickly and there is a form of herding or informational cascade which results in a collapse of investment ii as the period length increases the possibility of herding disappears iii as the number of players increases the rate of investment and the information flow are eventually independent of the number of players adding more players simply increases the number who delay iv in the limit the time profile of investment is extreme a period of low investment followed either by an investment surge or a collapse

implementation of walrasian expectations equilibria in an exchange economy with differentially informed traders non exclusivity of information nei is the condition that each trader s private information be perfectly predictable by an outside observer who has observed the private information of all other traders nei is one of a set of conditions which taken together are sufficient for the implementability of fully revealing expectations equilibria here we show that this condition is in fact necessary for the weak implementation of a much broader class of walrasian equilibria herein called expectations equilibria

industrial targeting experimentation and long run specialization abstract this paper emphasizes the experimental nature of industrial targeting policies under uncertainty in a small open economy a government promotes entry of new firms in selected industries and updates its beliefs about the country s comparative advantage in a bayesian way this selective targeting policy is analyzed in the framework of a special type of statistical decision problem known as the multi armed bandit the paper analyzes how the costs and benefits of learning about a country s comparative advantage depend on the characteristics of the targeted industries the framework suggests that even an optimally designed industrial targeting policy may eventually steer the country away from specializing according to its true comparative advantage

estimating the welfare implications of in kind government programs a general numerical approach abstract the purpose of this paper is to present and apply a general methodology to estimate the welfare implications of in kind government programs on the basis of arbitrary systems of demand equations the method provides a useful alternative to more restrictive procedures that previously have been used in the literature as it allows complete flexibility with respect to the specification of demand functions the proposed procedures are applied to estimate the benefits and welfare costs of a belgian public housing program the results suggest that the estimated efficiency and equity implications of in kind programs may be quite sensitive to the specification of demand which provides additional justification for the use of the proposed methodology

informed speculation with imperfect competition competitive rational expectations models have the unsatisfactory property dubbed the schizophrenia problem by hellwig that each trader takes the equilibrium price as given despite the fact that he influences that price an examination of information aggregation in a non competitive rational expectations model using a nash equilibrium in demand functions shows that the schizophrenia problem is avoided by having each trader take into account the effect his demand has on the equilibrium price given a distribution of private information across traders prices reveal less information than in the competition equilibrium and prices no longer become fully informative in the limit as noise trading vanishes or as traders become risk neutral with small traders the model may become one of monopolistic competition not perfect competition in contrast to the competitive model a reasonable model of endogenous acquisition of costly private information is obtained even when traders are risk neutral

partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium in a competitive economy abstract a class of pure exchange economies is considered in which some agents are informed of private information and others are uninformed existence of a partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium ree is proved without restricting attention to particular functional forms for utility functions and probability distributions without introducing noise into the model and without departing from the standard definition of ree the equilibrium is robust in the sense that if the primitives of the economy are slightly perturbed the economy continues to have a qualitatively similar ree with somewhat stronger assumptions placed on the economy the equilibrium is also the unique measurable ree

information aggregation in a noisy rational expectations economy abstract this paper analyzes a general equilibrium model of a competitive security market in which traders possess independent pieces of information about the return of a risky asset each trader conditions his estimate of the return both on his own private source of information and price which in equilibrium serves as a noisy aggregator of the total information observed by all traders a closed form characterization of the rational expectations equilibrium is presented a counter example to the existence of fully revealing equilibrium is developed