pollution as a source of endogenous fluctuations and periodic welfare inequality in olg economies this article examines the conditions under which endogenous fluctuations and periodic welfare inequality can emerge in olg economies having an environmental dimension

a solution concept for majority rule in dynamic settings we define and explore the notion of a dynamic condorcet winner dcw which extends the notion of a condorcet winner to dynamic settings we show that for every dcw every member of a large class of dynamic majoritarian games has an equivalent equilibrium and that other equilibria are not similarly portable across this class of games existence of dcws is guaranteed when members of the community are sufficiently patient we characterize sustainable and unsustainable outcomes study the effects of changes in the discount factor investigate efficiency properties and explore the potential for achieving renegotiation proof outcomes we apply this solution concept to a standard one dimensional choice problem wherein agents have single peaked preferences as well as to one involving the division of a fixed aggregate payoff

informational constraints and the overlapping generations model folk and anti folk theorems this paper analyses the sustainability of inter generational transfers in samuelson s consumption loan model when agents are imperfectly informed about past events we find that with mild informational constraints transfers cannot be supported by pure strategy equilibria mixed strategies allow transfers to be sustained even if agents have little information so that a version of the folk theorem holds however these equilibria are not robust if each agent s utility function is subjected to a small random perturbation as in harsanyi 1973 these mixed strategy equilibria unravel and only the zero transfer allocation survives as the unique rationalizable outcome this result is an example of mixed strategy equilibrium of an extensive form game which cannot be purified

a positive theory of social security based on reputation we construct a general equilibrium model in which a pay as you go social security system can be adopted and sustained as a political and economic equilibrium we alalyze the welfare implictions of this system and compare general equilibrium welfare measure to the commonly used notion of actuarial fairness

politics and efficiency of separating capital and ordinary government budgets we analyze a golden rule that separates capital and ordinary account budgets and allows a government to finance only capital items with debt many national governments followed this rule in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and most u s states do today we study an overlapping generations economy where majorities choose durable and nondurable public goods in each period when demographics imply even moderate departures from ricardian equivalence the golden rule substantially improves efficiency examples calibrated to u s demographics show greater improvements at the state level or with nineteenth century demographics than under current national demographics

do pensions foster education an empirical perspective the paper examines the effect of population ageing on public education spending on the one hand ageing is expected to have a negative effect on education as an increasing number of retirees resu

a dynamic efficiency rationale for public investment in the health of the young in this paper we assume away standard distributional and static efficiency arguments for public health and instead seek a dynamic efficiency rationale we study a lifecycle model wherein young agents make health investments to reduce mortality risk we identify a welfare rationale for public health under dynamic efficiency and exogenous mortality even when private and public investments are perfect substitutes if health investment reduces mortality risk but individuals do not internalize its effect on the life annuity interest rate the philipson becker effect emerges when the young are net borrowers this works together with dynamic efficiency to support a role for public health resume raisons fondees sur l efficience dynamique pour l investissement public dans la sante des jeunes dans ce memoire on met de cote les arguments conventionnels de sante publique fondes sur la repartition des revenus et l efficience statique pour s interesser a explorer les raisons d efficience dynamique pour ce genre d investissement on etudie un modele de cycle de vie ou les jeunes agents font des investissements en soins de sante pour reduire le risque de mortalite on identifie un raisonnement en termes de bien etre en faveur de depenses en sante publique quand il y a efficience dynamique et mortalite exogene meme quand les investissements prives et publics sont de parfaits substituts si l investissement en soins de sante reduit le risque de mortalite mais que les individus n internalisent pas ses effets sur le taux d interet sur les rentes viageres l effet philipson becker emerge quand les jeunes sont des emprunteurs nets cet effet joue dans le meme sens que l efficience dynamique en faveur d un role pour la sante publique

price competition and market structure the impact of cartel policy on concentration in the uk this paper examines the impact of firms conduct on market structure it studies the evolution of concentration in uk manufacturing following the abolition of cartels using a theoretical framework based on sutton s theory of market structure and a panel data set of four digit industries over 1958 1977 the econometric results suggest that the intensity of price competition has a positive impact on concentration in exogenous sunk cost industries as well as in advertising intensive and r d intensive industries the concentration market size relationship while negative in exogenous sunk cost industries breaks down in industries with high advertising or r d intensity

the family and the state the immaturity of children sometimes precludes efficient arrangements between children and parents or others responsible for child care the difficulty in establishing efficient relations within families provides the point of departure for our interpretation of the heavy state involvement in the family the authors believe that a surprising number of state interventions mimic the agreements that would occur if children were capable of arranging for their care many regulations of the family improve the efficiency of family activities these interventions include subsidies to education and training social security and other old age support subsidies to births laws that limit access to divorce and the sale of children and laws that require parents permission for early marriage and other choices of children families that leave bequests can force children to repay parents for investments in human capital by reducing bequests therefore these families do not underinvest in childrens human capital by contrast families that do not leave bequests often poorer families do underinvest in children the state may subsidize schools and other training facilities to raise investments in children by poorer families to efficient levels authors modified

cooperation in ongoing organizations this paper argues that overlapping games can provide a natural theory of long lived organizations it shows that participation in organizations of infinite duration changes the incentives of agents with finite lives and will induce more cooperation than a static model would predict after developing the general theory we apply it to the description of career paths in organizations and show that it can be optimal to give the youngest workers the most arduous tasks

the political intergenerational welfare state abstract using a three period overlapping generations economy framework we characterize an intergenerational welfare state with endogenous education and pension under voting we show that although politically establishing pay as you go payg social security in isolation in a dynamically efficient economy will always reduce the capital investment and therefore the social welfare as expected in contrast politically implementing education pension policy package instead can improve both human and physical capital accumulation and social welfare over laissez faire however for this the political influence of the old has to be small thus limiting the size of the payg social security program

competition and the relative productivity of large and small firms using a comprehensive dataset on the incidence of price fixing across british manufacturing industries in the 1950s i compare collusive and competitive industries and find evidence of a negative relationship between collusion and the labour productivity of larger firms relative to smaller firms in particular collusion is associated with a reduction or even a reversal of the productivity gap between larger and smaller firms this result is robust to controlling for the potential endogeneity of collusion

religion and income heterogeneity between countries this paper tests whether the behaviour of households in different countries is homogeneous with respect to the influence of religion on income the violation of the homogeneity assumption would have two consequences first results based on country studies might not be applicable to other countries second one should be careful when pooling cross country data in this type of research data at household level from the european and world values survey are pooled for 25 western countries we estimate simultaneously an income and a religion equation to correct for the endogeneity of religiousness we find that estimation outcomes are different for low and high income countries whereas church membership is found to have a positive effect on income for high income countries this effect is negative for low income countries this result is robust to denominational distribution participation effects and alternative measures of religiousness

playing the fertility game at work an equilibrium model of peer effects we study workplace peer effects in fertility decisions using a game theory model of strategic interactions among coworkers that allows for multiple equilibria using register based data on fertile aged women working in medium sized establishments in denmark we uncover negative average peer effects allowing for heterogeneous effects by worker type we find that positive effects dominate across worker types defined by age or education negative effects dominate within age groups and among low education types policy simulations show that these estimated effects make the distribution of where women work an important consideration beyond simply if they work in predicting population fertility

the price of anarchy in supply chains quantifying the efficiency of price only contracts in this paper we quantify the efficiency of decentralized supply chains that use price only contracts with a price only contract a buyer and a seller agree only on a constant transaction price without specifying the amount that will be transferred it is well known that these contracts do not provide incentives to the parties to coordinate their inventory capacity decisions we measure efficiency with the price of anarchy poa defined as the largest ratio of profits between the integrated supply chain that is fully coordinated and the decentralized supply chain we characterize the efficiency of various supply chain configurations push or pull inventory positioning two or more stages serial or assembly systems single or multiple competing suppliers and single or multiple competing retailers

a note on closure properties of failure rate distributions increasing generalized failure rate igfr distributions were introduced as a tool in the study of contracting mechanisms in supply chains in this note we compare and contrast the closure and the lack thereof of igfr and increasing failure rate ifr distributions with respect to standard operations on random variables some implications of these results for the use of igfr distributions in supply chain models are noted

social contracts as assets a possible solution to the time consistency problem this paper presents a new solution to the time consistency problem that appears capable of enforcing ex ante policy in a variety of settings in which other enforcement mechanisms do not work the solution involves formulating a social contract institution or agreement that specifies the optimal ex ante policy the social contract is effectively sold by succesive old generations to successive young generations who pay for the social contract through the payment of taxes both old and young generations have an economic incentive to fulfill the social contract for the old generation breaking the social contract makes the social contract valueless and the generation suffers a capital loss by not being able to sell it for the young generation the economic advantage of purchasing the existing social contract exceeds its price as well as the economic gain from setting up the a new social contract

the family as an incomplete annuities market families can self insure against uncertain dates of death through implicit or explicit agreements with respect to consumption and interfamily transfers interfamily transfers need have nothing to do with altruistic feelings they may simply reflect risk sharing behavior of completely selfish family members although family annuity markets are incomplete even small families can substitute by more than 70 percent for perfect market annuities given adverse selection and transaction costs family risk pooling may be preferred to public market annuities in the absence of public annuities these risk sharing arrangements provide powerful incentives for marriage and family formation

a note on pricing with risk aversion abstract we consider the pricing problem of a risk averse seller facing uncertain demand demand uncertainty stems from buyers valuations being privately observed by imposing very mild restrictions on the distribution of buyers valuations an increasing generalized failure rate distribution and the bernoulli utility function we show that a risk averse seller will unambiguously post a lower price than a risk neutral counterpart

market power productivity and the eu single market program evidence from a panel of italian firms abstract this paper provides empirical evidence on the impact the eu single market program has exerted on market power and total factor productivity in a large sample of italian firms both market power and total factor productivity are estimated by applying several extensions of the methodology developed by hall main findings can be summarised as follows firstly for the sample of 1992 most sensitive firms market power decreases by 50 in the smp implementation period compared to previous years whereas no clear pattern emerges for the other sub samples of firms secondly and less conclusively only for the sub sample of 1992 most sensitive firms a positive transitory shock to productivity growth rates is observed immediately after the announcement of the reform project overall these results are consistent with the long standing view that economic integration reduces firms market power and increases productivity via the removal of non tariff barriers

the intergenerational state education and pensions allocation is inefficient when generations overlap this failure can be mitigated by properly designed social arrangements we show that public financing of education and public pensions can be designed to implement an intergenerational transfer scheme supporting the complete market allocation neither the public financing of education nor the pension scheme we consider resemble standard ones in our mechanism via the public education system the young borrow from the middle aged to invest in human capital they pay back the debt via a social security tax the proceedings of which finance pension payments when the complete market allocation is achieved the rate of return implicit in this borrowinglending scheme should equal the market rate of return

impact of plant size and focus on productivity an empirical study recent popular business literature has suggested that there is a significant trend in the united states for firms to decrease the size and increase the focus of manufacturing plants they operate and that this leads to higher productivity this paper tests empirically the validity of these claims we analyze data on virtually the entire population of manufacturing plants in the united states and find that contrary to the popular business literature the average size of plants increased during the period 1972 1984 however consistent with the popular notion the rate of growth in plant size slowed considerably and even turned negative for a category of large plants plant focus did increase during this period we then investigate the relationship between productivity and plant characteristics including plant size and plant focus overall our results do not support the popular argument that reduction in plant size results in productivity gains however we do find support for this argument in some two digit sic industries also scale economies in the entire population decreased over the period 1972 1982 we also find only limited support for the popular argument that plant focus increases productivity

how income transfer programs affect work savings and the income distribution a critical review for helpful comments on earlier drafts we thank without implicating moses abramovitz yves balcer john bishop alan blinder richard burkhauser michael darby irwin garfinkel alan gustman daniel hamermesh martin holmer george jakubson robert lampman paul menchik robert moffitt michael murray joseph quinn timothy smeeding eugene smolensky barbara wolfe and two anonymous referees

relationships among three assumptions in revenue management this note discusses the relationships among three assumptions that appear frequently in the pricing revenue management literature these assumptions are mostly needed for analytical tractability and they have the common property of ensuring a well behaved revenue function the three assumptions are decreasing marginal revenue with respect to demand decreasing marginal revenue with respect to price and increasing price elasticity of demand we provide proofs and examples to show that none of these conditions implies any other however they can be ordered from strongest to weakest over restricted regions and the ordering depends upon the region

the intergenerational case of missing markets and missing voters a simple game formulation is used to examine the possibility of linking generations when a future generation will confront a risk that can be alleviated by an earlier generation s investment an insurance market will function provided that the overlapping generations are sufficiently near in time and share risks without propinquity or shared risks there is a need for intervention to overcome the problems of missing markets and missing voters this intervention should take the form of minimum environmental standards based on a notion of sustainability that is constitutionally enforced

public education and pensions in democracy a political economy theory a dynamic political economy theory of scal policy is presented to explain the simultaneous existence of public education and pensions in modern democracies the driving force of the model is the intergenerational conict over the allocation of the public budget successive generations of voters choose scal policies through repeated elections the political power of elderly voters creates the motive for adults to support public investment in the human capital of future generations since it expands future pension possibilities we characterize the markov perfect equilibrium of the voting game in a small open economy the equilibrium reproduces salient features of intergenerational

ageing government budgets retirement and growth we analyze the short and long run effects of demographic ageing increased longevity and reduced fertility on per capita growth the olg model captures direct effects working through adjustments in the savings rate labor supply and capital deepening and indirect effects working through changes of taxes government spending components and the retirement age in politico economic equilibrium growth is driven by capital accumulation and productivity increases fueled by public investment the closed form solutions of the model predict taxation and the retirement age in oecd economies to increase in response to demographic ageing and per capita growth to accelerate if the retirement age were held constant the growth rate in politico economic equilibrium would essentially remain unchanged due to a surge of social security transfers and crowding out of public investment

toward a new welfare economics for sustainability the debate over various definitions of sustainability has for the most part been conducted within the framework of traditional welfare economics discussion has centered on technical issues imbedded within the functional forms of various optimization models especially the coefficient of the elasticity of substitution and the social discount rate two more basic problems are 1 intractable theoretical difficulties within welfare economics call into question the results of traditional models of sustainability regarding intergenerational welfare and 2 equating per capita consumption with welfare contradicts empirical evidence suggesting that the link between happiness and wealth income is relatively weak alternative approaches to measuring well being are being developed and these have great potential to move the sustainability debate forward

what determines cartel success following george stigler 1964 many economists assume that incentive problems undermine attempts by firms to collude to raise prices and restrict output but the potential profits from collusion can create a powerful incentive as well theory cannot tell us a priori which effect will dominate whether or when cartels succeed is thus an empirical question we examine a wide variety of empirical studies of cartels to answer the following questions 1 can cartels succeed 2 if so for how long 3 what impact do cartels have 4 what causes cartels to break up we conclude that many cartels do survive and that the distribution of duration is bimodal while the average duration of cartels across a range of studies is about five years many cartels break up very quickly i e in less than a year but there are many others that last between five and ten years and some that last decades limited evidence suggests that cartels are able to increase prices and profits to varying degrees cartels can also affect other non price variables including advertising innovation investment barriers to entry and concentration cartels break up occasionally because of cheating or lack of effective monitoring but the biggest challenges cartels face are entry and adjustment of the collusive agreement in response to changing economic conditions cartels that develop organizational structures that allow them the flexibility to respond to these changing conditions are more likely to survive price wars that erupt are often the result of bargaining issues that arise in such circumstances sophisticated cartel organizations are also able to develop multipronged strategies to monitor one another to deter cheating and a variety of interventions to increase barriers to entry

millian efficiency with endogenous fertility should governments implement policies that affect fertility decisions on efficiency grounds what is the correct notion of efficiency to use to address these issues this paper develops an extension of the notion of pareto efficiency referred to as millian efficiency to evaluate symmetric allocations in an overlapping generations setting with endogenous fertility this extension is based on preferences of those agents who are actually alive and exclusively allows for welfare comparisons of symmetric allocations first we provide necessary and sufficient conditions to determine whether an allocation is millian efficient or not and we show that the sufficient conditions for dynamic efficiency offered by cass 1972 and balasko and shell 1980 cannot be directly applied when fertility decisions are endogenous second we characterize millian efficient allocations as the equilibria of a decentralized price mechanism and we present a sufficient condition for dynamic efficiency that uses the sequence of prices associated to such decentralized equilibria finally we analyse how intergenerational policies should be designed to restore efficiency and achieve net welfare gains in two different settings in which markets yield inefficient allocations dynamic inefficiencies and financial market incompleteness regarding human capital in the former a pay as you go social security system eliminates dynamic inefficiencies provided pensions are explicitly linked with fertility decisions in the latter a specific link between social security and public education becomes a necessary condition for millian efficiency copyright wiley blackwell

efficiency enhancing signalling in the samaritan s dilemma suppose an altruistic person a is willing to transfer resources to a second person b if b comes upon hard times if b anticipates that a will act in this manner b will save too little from both agents point of view this is the samaritan s dilemma this paper shows that the undersaving result is mitigated if we relax the standard assumption of complete information because if a is uncertain about how big b s need for support is b will have an incentive to signal that he is in great need by saving more than he otherwise would have done

the fiscal effects of immigration to the uk we investigate the fiscal impact of immigration on the uk economy with a focus on the period since 1995 our findings indicate that when considering the resident immigrant population in each year from 1995 to 2011 immigrants from the european economic area eea have made a positive fiscal contribution even during periods when the uk was running budget deficits while non eea immigrants not dissimilar to natives have made a negative contribution for immigrants that arrived since 2000 contributions have been positive throughout and particularly so for immigrants from eea countries notable is the strong positive contribution made by immigrants from countries that joined the eu in 2004

the effect of competition on wages and productivity evidence from the united kingdom abstract i examine the impact of competition on wages and productivity using a panel data set of u k manufacturing industries over 1954 1973 the introduction of cartel law in the united kingdom in the late 1950s caused an intensification of price competition in previously cartelized manufacturing industries but it did not affect those industries that were not cartelized the econometric results from a comparison of the two groups of industries before and after the introduction of cartel law provide strong evidence of a negative effect of collusion on labor productivity growth there is no evidence of any effect of collusion on wages these results are robust to controlling for the potential endogeneity of collusion and are further strengthened by a comparison with u s data

multimarket contact and collusive behavior traditional analyses of industrial behavior typically link the exercise of market power in an industry to internalfeatures such as demand conditions concentration and barriers to entry nevertheless some economists have remained concerned that external factors such as contact across markets may also play a significant role in determining the level of competitiveness in any particular industry in this article we examine the effect of multimarket contact on the degree of cooperation that firms can sustain in settings of repeated competition we isolate conditions under which multimarket contact facilitates collusion and show that these collusive gains are achieved through modes of behavior that have been identified in previous empirical studies of multimarketfirms

what determines productivity lessons from the dramatic recovery of the u s and canadian iron ore industries following their early 1980s crisis great lakes iron ore producers had faced no competition from foreign iron ore in the great lakes steel market for nearly a century as the 1970s closed in the early 1980s as a result of unprecedented developments in the world steel market brazilian producers were offering to deliver iron ore to chicago the heart of the great lakes market at prices substantially below prices of local iron ore the u s and canadian iron ore industries faced a major crisis that cast doubt on their future in response to the crisis these industries dramatically increased productivity labor productivity doubled in a few years whereas it had changed little in the preceding decade materials productivity increased by more than half capital productivity increased as well i show that most of the productivity gains were due to changes in work practices work practice changes reduced overstaffing and hence increased labor productivity by increasing the fraction of time equipment was in operating mode changes in work pra

a repeated game with finitely lived overlapping generations of players abstract this paper analyzes infinitely repeated noncooperative games where the players have finite but overlapping terms thus the nature of the game remains constant but the identity of the players changes over time this type of scenario depicts the situation facing firm managers in regulated or oligopolistic environments despite finite lives which lead players to always choose opportunistic actions at the end of their careers it is shown that there are equilibria where cooperative behavior emerges in this noncooperative setting further a folk theorem result is obtained any individually rational payoffs can be realized as a subgame perfect equilibrium journal of economic literature classification numbers 022 026

the future of social security we analyze the effect of the projected demographic transition on the political support for social security and equilibrium outcomes embedding a probabilistic voting setup of electoral competition in the standard olg model with capital accumulation we find that intergenerational transfers arise in the absence of altruism commitment or trigger strategies closed form solutions predict population ageing to lead to higher social security tax rates a rising share of pensions in gdp but eventually lower social security benefits per retiree the response of equilibrium tax rates to demographic shocks reduces old age consumption risk calibrated to match features of the u s economy the model suggests that in response to the projected demographic transition social security tax rates will gradually increase to 16 other policies that distort labor supply will become less important labor supply therefore will rise in contrast with frequently voiced fears

two sided intergenerational transfer policy and economic development a politico economic approach we consider an overlapping generations model with public education and social security where the overall size of these policies is determined in a repeated voting game we investigate the interaction between the politically determined policies and economic development in a markov perfect equilibrium the following results are obtained first the level of human capital determines whether these policies are sustained in the markov perfect equilibrium second if the level of initial human capital is sufficiently high human capital grows forever in contrast if the level of initial human capital is low the economy might be caught in a poverty trap

forward and backward intergenerational goods why is social security good for the environment this paper studies the ability of nonmarket institutions to invest optimally in forward intergenerational goods figs such as education and the environment when agents are selfish or exhibit paternalistic altruism we show that backward intergenerational goods bigs such as social security play a crucial role in sustaining investment in figs without them investment is inefficiently low but with them optimal investment is possible we also show that making the provision of bigs mandatory crowds out the voluntary provision of figs and that population aging can increase investment in figs

repeated games played by overlapping generations of players the present paper tries to explain cooperative behaviour in an organization run by a sequence of long but finitely lived agents we show that the folk theorem holds for infinitely repeated games with overlapping generations of finitely lived players any mutually beneficial outcome can approximately be sustained if the player s life span and the overlapping periods are long enough the result is stronger than the usual folk theorems in that it employs no assumption on the stage game such as the full dimensionality of payoff set or multiplicity of equilibria

public pensions as optimal social contracts abstract a simple overlapping generations model is modified to allow for an externality experienced by the young from consumption by the elderly this sets up a game between generations in which one generation s strategy may be to save too little and rely on gifts from the young e g public assistance for retirement income social security can therefore be viewed as a pareto optimal contract to restore efficient intertemporal allocation a funded public pension plan corresponds to forced saving but is vulnerable in that the next young generation may stop contributing rely on its children for retirement assistance and meanwhile reap the consumption externality from the current elderly s social security benefits this suggests a forced giving or pay as you go type of compulsory pension plan such as exists in most nations which also has the advantage of aiding the initial old generation and therefore generating an immediate consumption externality for the initial young the approach can also be used to explain other aspects of existing social security

price competition non price competition and market structure theory and evidence from the uk this paper examines the impact of price competition on advertising r and d expenditure and market structure a general theoretical result is derived which restricts the space of possible outcomes regarding the behaviour of concentration and advertising r and d expenditure following an intensification of price competition the theory is tested using uk data on the evolution of competition concentration and advertising over 1954 77 the econometric results suggest that the introduction of restrictive practices legislation in the uk caused a rise in concentration in previously cartelized high advertising manufacturing industries and probably also a fall in advertising intensity

parental altruism and inter vivos transfers theory and evidence this paper uses psid data on the extended family to test whether inter vivos transfers from parents to children are motivated by altruism specifically the paper tests whether an increase by one dollar in the income of parents actively making transfers to a child coupled with a one dollar reduction in that child s income results in the parents increasing their transfer to the child by one dollar this restriction on parental and child transfer income derivatives is derived for the standard altruism model augmented to include uncertainty and liquidity constraints these additional elements pin down the timing of inter vivos transfers the method used to estimate income transfer derivatives takes into account unobserved heterogeneity across families in the degree of altruism the findings strongly reject the altruism hypothesis redistributing one dollar from a recipient child to donor parents leads to less than a 13 cent increase in the parents transfer to the child far less than the one dollar increas

partnership firms reputation and human capital in human capital intensive industries where it is difficult to contract upon the training effort of skilled agents a socially suboptimal level of training may occur we show how partnership organisations can overcome this problem by tying human and financial capital partnerships are opaque so that the willingness of clients to pay depends upon reputation partnerships are illiquid and partners must stay with the firm until clients discover their type and update the firm s reputation this renders unskilled agents who will aversely affect reputation unwilling to accept partnerships skilled agents therefore train the next generation so as to ensure that there is an adequate market for their own shares we comment upon the salient differences between partnerships and joint stock firms

opportunity inequality and the intergenerational transmission of child labour this paper presents a model in which opportunity differences within society result in child labour where opportunity is broadly defined but can include school quality access to higher paying jobs access to information about the returns to education and actual discrimination if opportunity differences exist child labour and poverty are shown to be symptomatic of this underlying socioeconomic condition it is then shown that policies that ban child labour and or introduce compulsory education laws can actually reduce dynastic welfare increase poverty and further exacerbate income inequality within society because they treat the symptom rather than the disease the lack of opportunity

the intergenerational welfare state and the rise and fall of pay as you go pensions this article develops a theory of the two armed intergenerational welfare state consistent with key features of modern welfare arrangements and uses it to rationalise the rise and fall in generosity of pay as you go pensions solely on efficiency grounds by using the education arm a dynamically efficient welfare state is shown to improve upon long run laissez faire even when market failures are absent to release these downstream welfare gains without hurting any transitional generation help from the pension arm is needed in the presence of an intergenerational education externality pensions initially rise in generosity but can be replaced by fully funded pensions eventually

perspectives on positive political economy this volume serves as an introduction to the field of positive political economy and the economic and political processes with which it is concerned this new research tradition is distinct from both normative and historical approaches to political economy grounded in the rational actor methodology of microeconomics positive political economy is the study of rational decisions in a context of political and economic institutions more analytical than traditional approaches it is concerned with the derivation of principles and propositions against which real world experience may be compared its focus is on empirical regularities and its goal is theoretical explanation the field has focused on three main areas of research models of collective action constraints on competitive market processes and the analysis of transaction costs developments in all of these areas are covered in the book the first part of the volume surveys the field while the second part displays positive political economy at work examining a variety of subjects the final part contains essays by leading political economists on the theoretical foundations of the field

how to protect future generations using tax base restrictions this paper studies how to protect future generations from expropriation and to induce optimal investment in intergenerational public goods ipgs by introducing constitutional restrictions on the tax base the type of tax base restrictions that we consider places limits on the tax instruments that the government can use to raise revenue but not on the level of expenditures or debt we show that the introduction of a constitutional amendment requiring that ipgs and debt be financed with land taxes makes intergenerational expropriation impossible and for many cases of interest induces optimal investment in ipgs we also show that a weaker constitutional amendment requiring that ipgs be financed with land taxes but imposing no restrictions on how to finance the debt has a positive impact on ipgs but not on expropriation the paper also studies the political feasibility of these reforms we show that the first reform is not politically feasible since it hurts current generations but the weaker reform can induce a pareto improvement jel d1 d7

climate change population ageing and public spending evidence on individual preferences abstract economic theory as well as empirical research suggest that elderly people prefer public spending on policies yielding short term benefits this might be bad news for policies aimed at combating climate change while the unavoidable costs of these policies arise today the expected benefits occur in the distant future drawing on data from over 12 000 households and using the ordered logit and the generalized ordered logit model we analyze whether attitudes towards climate change and climate policies as well as public spending preferences differ with respect to age our estimates show that elderly people are less concerned about climate change but more concerned about other global challenges furthermore they are less likely to support climate friendly policies such as the subsidization of renewables allocate less public resources to and have lower willingness to pay for environmental policies thus our results suggest that the ongoing demographic change in industrialized countries may undermine climate policies

pension design when fertility fluctuates the role of education and capital mobility this study compares alternative designs of an unfunded pension system convex combinations between a fixed contribution rate and a fixed benefit rate are considered the objective is to maximize the expected ex ante welfare under stochastic fertility the model is a three period cge framework where the financing of education and effects on factor prices are accounted for factor prices depend on the degree of capital mobility for low degrees of capital mobility it is optimal to have a fixed benefit rate in the pension system but for the small open economy a fixed contribution rate is optimal if the education system has a fixed benefit rate in this case individuals in the small open economy are unaffected by fertility fluctuations

money is memory abstract this paper examines the sets of feasible allocations in a large class of economic environments in which commitment is impossible following myerson 8 the standard definition of feasibility is adapted to take account of the lack of commitment the environments feature either memory or money memory is defined as knowledge on the part of an agent of the full histories of all agents with whom he has had direct or indirect contact in the past money is defined as an object that does not enter utility or production functions and is available in fixed supply the main proposition is that any allocation that is feasible in an environment with money is also feasible in the same environment with memory depending on the environment the converse may or may not be true hence from a technological point of view money is equivalent to a primitive form of memory journal of economic literature classification numbers e40 c73 d82

a note on probability distributions with increasing generalized failure rates distributions with an increasing generalized failure rate igfr have useful applications in pricing and supply chain contracting problems we provide alternative characterizations of the igfr property that lead to simplify verifying whether the igfr condition holds we also relate the limit of the generalized failure rate and the moments of a distribution

social security as trade among living generations we model u s social security that is legislated endogeneously by living generations specifically we consider the effects of social security on resource allocation and pareto optimality examining which generations gain from social security and whether some generations lose because saving and transfer decisions are made sequentially in the real world we use an infinite horizon overlapping generations framework in which life cycle saving and transfers to the old are determined by living agents we focus on the case in which agents are altruistic but place sufficiently greater weight on own comsumption than on the consumption of agents in other generations so that starting from a steady state without social security living agents would gain utility if consumption were shifted marginally to them from later generations excerpt

government debt in an overlapping generations model with bequests and gifts in 1974 robert barro argued that if individuals in successive generations were linked by bequests changes in the stock of government debt or in social security programs would have no effect on the steady state capital stock barro assumed that individuals held static expectations and that the size of the population was constant martin feldstein 1974 1977 had concluded that social security would reduce the capital labor ratio in models that did not admit a bequest motive and in his 1976 comment on barro argued that the introduction of government debt or social security into a perfect foresight dynamic growth model with bequests would still reduce the capital labor ratio barro replied that feldstein s criticisms were invalid if the steady state capital labor ratio were smaller than the golden rule level but would be correct if the opposite were true barro did suggest however that the latter possibility with overaccumulation of capital might be ruled out in his model as it was in miguel sidrauski 1967 but he was unable to demonstrate that the required behavior would be consistent with utility maximization by finite lived individuals 1976 p 345 although recent work by willem buiter 1979 jeffrey carmichael 1979 1982 truman bewley 1981 a b and others has helped to elucidate the nature of overlapping generations models with bequests and gifts and the issues in the barro feldstein debate they remain far from clear the purpose of this paper is to shed a little more light on the subject in what follows i contend that some of the authors cited above either have specified the individual s optimization problem in an asymmetric way or have failed to impose necessary conditions for a sensible optimization problem or both there is a natural specification of the barro model 1 that emphasizes the similarity between this model and optimal growth models see for example david cass 1965 peter diamond 1973 here in steady state equilibrium the aftertax interest rate r must equal the rate at which individuals discount the utility of their heirs p r p has become known as the modified golden rule and a meaningful individual optimization problem requires that p exceed n the natural growth rate of the economy my results confirm barro s hunch about his model in a barro model r must exceed n much of the barro feldstein 1976 interchange which assumed that r could have any relation to n is wrong headed barro and feldstein reach different conclusions about the effects of government debt and social security because they assume different individual utility functions also my results contrast sharply with those of buiter and carmichael for example carmichael concluded that with intergenerational transfers from parents to children bequests r must exceed n but with transfers in the opposite direction n must exceed r 1982 pp 205 06 indeed i believe that the buiter carmichael representation of the barro model is logically faulty see section ii in section i i outline an overlapping generations model with gifts and bequests and derive its steady state properties in the next section i discuss the shortand long run effects of introducing government debt into the model and contrast my results with those

in which industries is collusion more likely evidence from the uk i examine the factors facilitating or hindering collusion using a comprehensive data set on the incidence of price fixing across uk manufacturing industries in the 1950s the econometric results suggest that collusion is more likely the higher the degree of capital intensity and less likely in advertising intensive than in low advertising industries there is also some evidence of a non monotonic relationship between market growth and the likelihood of collusion there is no clear link between concentration and the incidence of collusion

is the extended family altruistically linked direct tests using micro data this paper uses panel study of income dynamics data on parents and their adult children to test the standard altruism model this model predicts that within the extended family the distribution of consumption is independent of the distribution of resources the authors findings strongly reject this prediction copyright 1992 by american economic association

self enforcing intergenerational social contracts for pareto improving pollution mitigation we consider in an overlapping generations model with an environmental externality a scheme of contracts between any two successive generations under each contract agents of the young generation invest a share of their labor income in pollution mitigation in exchange for a transfer in the second period of their lives the transfer is financed in a pay as you go manner by the next young generation different from previous work we assume that the transfer is granted as a subsidy to capital income rather than lump sum we show that the existence of a contract which is pareto improving over the situation without contract for any two generations requires a sufficiently high level of income in a steady state with social contracts in each period the pollution stock is lower compared to a steady state without contracts analytical and numerical analysis of the dynamics under nash bargaining suggests that under reasonable conditions also steady state income and welfare are higher delaying the implementation of a social contract for too long or imposing a contract with too low mitigation can be costly net income may inevitably fall below the threshold in finite time so that pareto improving mitigation is no longer possible and the economy converges to a steady state with high pollution stock and low income and welfare in the second part of the paper we study a game theoretic setup taking into account that credibly committing to a contract might not be possible we show that with transfers granted as a subsidy to capital income there exist mitigation transfer schemes which are both pareto improving and give no generation an incentive to deviate from any of its contracts even in a dynamically efficient economy social contracts coexist with private savings

cartel overcharges survey and meta analysis abstract the article presents a novel meta regression analysis of the size of cartel overcharges from a sample of more than 800 observations collected from a wide variety of published sources the analysis of a subsample of 395 cartel episodes finds that duration legal environment and organizational characteristics of cartels explain variation in overcharge rates to a greater extent than the type of publication or the method of calculation overcharges tend to be significantly higher for durable international cartels secular decline is observed as antitrust enforcement regimes have stiffened