information transmission cournot and bertrand equilibria we examine how incentives for two duopolists to honestly share information change depending upon the nature of competition cournot or bertrand and the nature of the information structure while in earlier papers uncertainty is about an unknown common demand intercept in the present paper uncertainty is about unknown private costs the different information structure reverses the incentives to share information while with unknown common demand sharing is a dominant strategy with bertrand competition and concealing is a dominant strategy with cournot competition with unknown private costs sharing is a dominant strategy with cournot competition and concealing is a dominant strategy with bertrand competition

cournot oligopoly with information sharing this paper studies the incentives for information sharing among firms in a cournot oligopoly facing a linear uncertain demand and an affine conditional expectation information structure no information sharing is found to be the unique equilibrium in two cases in which the signals with equal precision are assumed indivisible and infinitely divisible however the nonpooling equilibrium converges to the situation where the pooling strategies are adopted as the amount of information increases hence the efficiency is achieved in the competitive equilibrium as the number of the firm become large

cooperative and noncooperative r d in duopoly with spillovers contrary to the usual assumption made in most oligopoly models relations among firms are seldom of a wholly cooperative or noncooperative type in many situations they compete in some fields while they cooperate in others an important example is the case of cooperative research efforts bringing fierce competitors together two types of agreement are observed first r d cooperation can take place at the so called precompetitive stage companies share basic information and efforts in the r d stage but remain rivals in the market place 1 a second type of agreement involves an extended collusion between partners creating common policies at the product level the usual justifications of this extension are the difficulties of protecting intellectual property the idea is then to allow partners who have achieved inventions together to also control together the processes and products which embody the results of their collaboration in order to recuperate jointly their r d investments 2 what could be expected from these types of agreement is a reduction in r d expenditures because of less wasteful duplication and a reduction of total production because of more reprinted from the american economic review 78 5 1133 1137 1988 center for operations research econometrics 1348 louvain la neuve belgium we are grateful to jean

cost reduction competition and industry performance in many markets firms compete over time by expending resources with the purpose of reducing their costs sometimes the cost reducing investments operate directly on costs in many instances they take the form of developing new products that deliver what customers need more cheaply therefore product development can have the same ultimate effect as direct cost reduction in fact if one thinks of the product as the services it delivers to the customer in the way that lancaster pioneered then product development often is just cost reduction

aggregation and aggregation we discuss economic aggregation and political aggregation in the context of a simple dynamic version of the canonical political economy model the meltzer richard model consumers differ both in labor productivity and initial asset wealth and there is no physical capital under commitment over future tax policy and for economic preferences that imply aggregation in assets and productivity the induced policy preferences for individuals do not depend on any distributional characteristics other than means they imply time inconsistency with taxes changing between the first and the second periods and staying constant thereafter political aggregation in the form of a median voter theorem applies only in special cases jel d72 d78 e61 h23

carbon emission performance evaluation and allocation in chinese cities abstract this paper presents a dea approach with multiple abatement factors to evaluate co2 emission performance and allocate co2 emission quotas in chinese cities we first consider the difference of marginal abatement costs among cities and construct the non radial directional distance function with multiple abatement factors the total factor co2 emission performance index and its dynamic change index are then proposed to measure co2 emission performance considering equity and efficiency we develop a composite index by the hybrid method to allocate emissions quota which considers co2 emissions as well as co2 emission performance then we conduct an empirical study using inputs and outputs dataset of 71 chinese cities in 2005 2012 chinese cities have poor energy efficiency and still have high co2 emissions the eastern region outperforms the central region and the western region performs worst whereas the dynamic co2 emission performance of the central region has the largest increase the change of co2 emission performance is driven mainly by technological advances as for the co2 emission allocation the composite index method encourages cities to reduce emissions and enhance emission performance through carbon trading market it also motivates cities with high historical emissions to reduce their emissions by improving technology when they have poor co2 emission performance

first mover disadvantages with private information we consider a leader follower game with output quantities as strategies so as to demonstrate the reduced advantages of the stackleberg leader in a stochastic environment with private information at the equilibrium the strategy of the leader reveals to the follower information about the demand in an attempt to signal low demand the leader contracts his output nevertheless unless the leader s information is infinitely noisy the follower can always correctly infer his signal we find a wide range of parameter values over which the follower is better off compared to the leader

exchange of cost information in oligopoly when do oligopolists gain by sharing their private information about their costs with one another what are the social welfare effects of such information exchange i study these questions by comparing the oligopolists expected profits under a cost sharing agreement with their expected profits in the bayesian equilibrium that would arise without cost sharing i also analyse the firms decisions to form a trade association to share their cost data under conditions of linear demand and cournot behaviour industrywide information exchange is the unique point in the core of the trade association membership game the exchange of cost data increases expected profits and welfare but reduces expected consumer surplus cost sharing increases efficiency by raising the market shares of lower cost firms and reducing the variability of aggregate output consumer surplus is diminished however because the variance of output is reduced and consumer surplus is a convex function of output

mergers and investments in cost reduction with private information abstract we present a model of cost reducing r d investments where the marginal cost realization is private information of the innovating firm the main contribution is the conclusion according to which with merger anticipations the innovating firm does not have ex ante incentives to reveal its cost realization prior to the takeover interestingly we also find the expected consumer surplus to be higher for the regime characterized by incomplete information as compared to a regime based on information sharing

voting for income immiserizing redistribution in the meltzer richard model this paper argues that income received via redistributive transfers unlike labor income requires no direct sacrifice of leisure this makes it attractive to many voters even if it leaves them poorer this point is made within the classic meltzer and richard 1981 model wherein heterogeneous voters evaluate an income redistribution program that finances a lump sum transfer to all via a distorting income tax the politicalequilibrium policy under majority rule is the tax most preferred utility wise by the median voter she and many poorer voters may support income redistribution that ironically leaves them poorer in income terms but with higher utility jel h2 e6 d

production subsidies and redistribution abstract who gains from stimulating output we explore a dynamic model with production subsidies where the population is heterogeneous in one dimension wealth there are two channels through which production subsidies redistribute resources across the population first poorer agents gain from a rise in wages since to the extent there is an operative wealth effect in labor supply they work harder second because a current output boost will raise consumption today relative to the future thus lowering real interest rates poor agents gain in relative terms since their income is based less on interest income we examine optimal redistribution from the perspective of an arbitrary consumer in the population we show that if this consumer has commitment at time zero to set all present and future subsidy rates and for a class of preferences that admits aggregation in wealth then output stimulation and hence redistribution will only occur at time zero after that subsidies are zero a byproduct of our analysis of this environment is a median voter theorem with direct voting over subsidy sequences at time zero the sequence preferred by the median wealth consumer is the unique outcome we also study lack of commitment since interest rate manipulation is associated with time inconsistency we analyze this case formally by looking at the markov perfect time consistent equilibrium in a game between successive identical decision makers e g the median agent here subsidies persist they are constant over time and are more distortionary than under commitment moreover whereas under commitment asset inequality changes initially in favor of the consumer who decides on policy it does not under lack of commitment

predation mergers and incomplete information this article examines the strategic pricing of duopolists in anticipation of a takeover of one by the other in equilibrium the acquiring firm may expand its output to signal that it is a low cost rival and thereby improve the takeover terms if the merged firm willface potential entry a premerger expansion of output may be necessary to deter entry and to make the merger profitable in that case the acquiringjirm s output expansion increases industry concentration by facilitating the takeover and by deterring entry this establishes the rationality of predatory output expansions even when a merger or a takeover is possible and indeed anticipated a voluminous literature is devoted to exploring the role of pricing in altering industry structure to achieve monopoly power that literature discusses both price cutting to drive existing rivals from the industry predatory pricing and setting low prices to deter potential entrants limit pricing the former has received the lion s share of the attention of antitrust commentators and enforcers but the rationality of predatory pricing has been seriously questioned the major criticism has two parts i takeovers are a superior means of achieving monopoly power and where legal should therefore be used instead of price cutting and ii if a takeover is anticipated premerger price cutting merely dissipates some of the value of the merging parties and would thus be irrational the first argument was originally advanced by mcgee 1958 and later by telser 1965 and bork 1978 the essential idea is that since predation is costly firms should realize that a more profitable arrangement in the form of a merger exists and ought to be negotiated the second argument is a natural extension of the first in response to this criticism yamey 1972 provides two arguments first the aggressor knows that he may face other rivals in the future entrants into this or other markets those potential rivals may draw inferences from his current behavior about the response they will face if they enter in that case the aggressor may wish to develop a reputation for aggressive behavior second even if a takeover is anticipated the terms of the takeover may be affected by the pretakeover pricing

public debt in economies with heterogeneous agents abstract we study public debt in competitive equilibria in which a government chooses transfers and taxes optimally and in addition decides how thoroughly to enforce debt contracts if the government enforces perfectly asset inequality is determined in an optimum competitive equilibrium but the level of government debt is not welfare increases if private debt contracts are not enforced borrowing frictions let the government gather monopoly rents that come from issuing public debt without facing competing private borrowers regardless of whether the government chooses to enforce private debt contracts the level of initial government debt does not affect an optimal allocation

on the size of u s government political economy in the neoclassical growth model we study a dynamic version of meltzer and richard s median voter model of the size of government taxes are proportional to total income and they are redistributed as equal lump sum transfers voting takes place periodically over time and each consumer votes for the tax rate that maximizes his equilibrium utility we calibrate the model to u s data key elements in the calibration are the income and wealth distribution and the parameters governing the leisure and consumption choices the total size of transfers predicted by our political economy model is quite close to the size of transfers in the data

median voter equilibria in the neoclassical growth model under aggregation we study a dynamic version of meltzer and richard s median voter model where agents differ in wealth taxes are proportional to income and are redistributed as equal lump sum transfers voting occurs every period and each consumer votes for the tax that maximizes his welfare we characterize time consistent markov perfect equilibria twofold first restricting utility classes we show that the economy s aggregate state is mean and median wealth second we derive the median voter s first order condition interpreting it as a tradeoff between distortions and net wealth transfers our method for solving the steady state relies on a polynomial expansion around the steady state

politico economic consequences of rising wage inequality abstract this paper uses a dynamic political economy model to evaluate whether the observed rise in wage inequality and decrease in median to mean wages can explain some portion of the relative increase in transfers to low earnings quintiles and relative increase in effective tax rates for high earnings quintiles in the u s over the past several decades specifically we assume that households have uninsurable idiosyncratic labor efficiency shocks and consider policy choices by a median voter which are required to be consistent with a sequential equilibrium we choose the transition matrix to match observed mobility in wages between 1978 and 1979 in the panel study of income dynamics psid data set and then evaluate the response of social insurance policies to a new transition matrix that matches the observed mobility in wages between 1995 and 1996 and is consistent with the rise in wage inequality and the decrease in median to mean wages between 1979 and 1996 we deal with the problem that policy outcomes affect the evolution of the wealth distribution and hence prices by approximating the distribution by a small set of moments we contrast these numbers with those from a sequential utilitarian mechanism as well as mechanisms with commitment

technological competition uncertainty and oligopoly abstract in an oligopoly context the present technological choice of a firm which expects to receive private revelant information just prior to the uncertain market stage has both a flexibility value and a strategic commitment value in contrast to some common wisdom ideas we provide a natural two stage competition framework in which an increase in uncertainty always raises the commitment value of the technological choice of the firm and may decrease its flexibility value when the increased uncertainty takes the form of more variable beliefs the first result tends to reinforce therefore the findings of the strategic commitment literature under certainty

evaluating the interplays among economic growth and energy consumption and co2 emission of china during 1990 2007 the interplays among economy and energy and environment have been widely concerned this paper put forward several indicators to quantify the relationships among economic growth and energy consumption and co2 emission as an example these indicators were applied to evaluate the comprehensive performances of china during 1990 2007 the results show that chinese people has been living a better life with chinese rapid economic growth but not synchronously in urban and rural areas non carbon energy resources share has increased however fossil energy resources have still acted as the main driver for chinese economic growth during this period technical progress has improved the fossil energy efficiency of chinese economic activity which leads to co2 emission per unit gdp and co2 emission per capita unit gdp dropping simultaneously however the two indicators annual decline rates become smaller and smaller which reflects that technical progress role is dropping and economic scale s effect is climbing people s survival has a rising contribution to co2 emission co2 emission per capita has increased which shows that economic scale has greater impact on co2 emission than technical progress does relatively speaking chinese development patterns have become more and more sustainable during this period finally based on the related issues being discussed some corresponding suggestions are put forward for chinese government to further coordinate the relationship among economic development and energy consumption and co2 emission the proposed indicators can form a set of useful tool for policy makers to promote the harmonious development of economy and energy and environment in different regions and countries

total factor carbon emission performance of fossil fuel power plants in china a metafrontier non radial malmquist index analysis article i nfo this paper proposes the metafrontier non radial malmquist co2 emission performance index mnmcpi for measuring dynamic changes in total factor co2 emission performance over time the mnmcpi method allows for the incorporation of group heterogeneity and non radial slack into the previously introduced malmquist co2 emission performance index mcpi we derive the mnmcpi by solving several non radial data envelop ment analysis dea models we decompose the mnmcpi into an efficiency change ec index a best practice gap change bpc index and a technology gap change tgc index and based on the proposed indices we examine the dynamic changes in co2 emission performance and its decomposition of fossil fuel power plants in china for the 2005 2010 period the empirical results show a 0 38 increase in total factor co2 emission performance as a whole and a u shaped mnmcpi curve for the sample period because companies owned by the central government lack innovation and technological leadership the results suggest a missing link in the role of the central government in promoting co2 emission performance

the decrease of co2 emission intensity is decarbonization at national and global levels abstract this viewpoint proposes the definition decarbonization refers to a decrease of co2 emission intensity in a trend this viewpoint then argues that an analysis of decarbonization at national and global levels based on that definition would lead to the correct calculation of decarbonization