signalling commitment with monetary and inflation targets abstract this article studies a two period game between the public and a central bank about whose ability to commit to an announced target the public is uncertain the central bank chooses between announcing a target for an intermediate variable money growth and its goal variable inflation prior to setting its instrument the central bank receives private noisy information about the link between money growth and inflation monetary targeting facilitates communication of the central bank s type in that the probability of separation is always higher than under inflation targeting this advantage of monetary targets from a dependable central bank s perspective is outweighed for most parameter values by the advantage of inflation targeting in terms of inflation control if the regime choice is treated as a strategic decision over a large range of parameter values both central banks choose the regime that a dependable central bank would prefer

signaling fiscal regime sustainability abstract this paper proposes a signaling model that offers a new perspective on why governments deviate from optimal tax smoothing and delay debt stabilization in our model dependable but not fully credible governments have an incentive to tighten the fiscal regime when the signaling effect on credit ratings is larger that is when a sufficiently large stock of debt has been accumulated at this point they may deviate from tax smoothing not to be mimicked by weak governments we show that a testable prediction of our model is that primary balances and debt stocks are complementary inputs in the credit rating function and we successfully test it on italian irish belgian and danish data

inflation and reputation in many macroeconomic models with rational expectations optimal policy is time inconsistent and therefore announced policy may not be credible this paper models the government s credibility explicitly using kreps and wilson s analysis time consistent optimal government policy emerges as a sequential equilibrium in a repeated game this policy is at least as good as the inconsistent optimal policy and dominates the consistent policy when reputational effects are ignored thus the analysis resolves the problem of specifying a credible optimal policy in such models the results show why attempts to disinflate may lead to recession even with perfectly flexible prices this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the mirage of floating exchange rates this note summarizes some of the highlights of my longer paper with guillermo calvo fear of floating many emerging market countries have suffered financial crises one view blames soft pegs for these crises adherents to that view suggest that countries move to corner solutions hard pegs or floating exchange rates we analyze the behavior of exchange rates reserves and interest rates to assess whether there is evidence that country practice is moving toward corner solutions we focus on whether countries that claim they are floating are indeed doing so we find that countries that say they allow their exchange rate to float mostly do not there seems to be an epidemic case of fear of floating

monetary policy inclinations we examine whether central banks should complement their inflation forecasts with interest rate projections introducing a central bank loss function that accounts for deviations from announcements we incorporate the publication of policy inclinations into a dynamic monetary model we show that in the presence of cost push shocks the publication of interest rate forecasts tends to improve welfare

ceo compensation and bank efficiency an application of conditional nonparametric frontiers the paper investigates in a dynamic context the effect of chief executive officer ceo bonus and salary payments on banks technical efficiency levels our methodological framework incorporates the latest developments on the probabilistic approach of efficiency measurement as introduced by b din et al 2012 we apply time dependent conditional efficiency estimates to analyse a sample of 37 us banks for the period from 2003 to 2012 the empirical evidence reveals a non linear relationship between ceo bonus and salary payments and banks efficiency levels more specifically it is reported that salary and bonus payments affect differently banks technological change and technological catch up levels finally the empirical evidence suggests that higher salary and bonus payments are not always aligned with higher technical efficiency levels

the choice of exchange rate bands balancing credibility and flexibility abstract this paper develops a framework for the optimal choice of exchange rate bands within an environment in which policymakers dislike nominal exchange rate variability but value the flexibility to adjust the nominal exchange rate in response to shocks in order to attain real exchange rate objectives the paper provides an endogenous characterization of the optimal exchange rate band in terms of the underlying distribution of shocks to the current and capital accounts of the balance of payments and in terms of the commitment reputation of policymakers

pegged exchange rate regimes a trap this paper studies the empirical and theoretical association between the duration of a pegged exchange rate and the cost experienced upon exiting the regime we confirm empirically that exits from pegged exchange rate regimes during the past two decades have often been accompanied by crises the cost of which increases with the duration of the peg before the crisis we explain these observations in a framework in which the exchange rate peg is used as a commitment mechanism to achieve inflation stability but multiple equilibria are possible we show that there are ex ante large gains from choosing a more conservative not only in order to mitigate the inflation bias from the well known time inconsistency problem but also to steer the economy away from the high inflation equilibria these gains however come at a cost in the form of the monetary authority s lesser responsiveness to output shocks in these circumstances using a pegged exchange rate as an anti inflation commitment device can create a trap whereby the regime initially confers gains in anti inflation credibility but ultimately results in an exit occasioned by a big enough adverse real shock that creates large welfare losses to the economy we also show that the more conservative is the regime in place and the larger is the cost of regime change the longer will be the average spell of the fixed exchange rate regime and the greater the output contraction at the time of a regime change

credibility of policies versus credibility of policymakers standard models of policy credibility defined as the expectation that an announced policy will be carried out emphasize the preferences of the policymaker and the role of tough policies in signaling toughness and raising credibility whether a policy is carried out however will also reflect the state of the economy we present a model in which a policymaker maintains a fixed parity in good times but devalues if the unemployment rate gets too high our main conclusion is that if there is persistence in unemployment observing a tough policy in a given period may lower rather than raise the credibility of a no devaluation pledge in subsequent periods we test this implication on ems interest rates and find support for our hypothesis

inflation expectations in latin america this paper tests the rationality of inflation forecasts surveyed in mexico brazil and chile and identifies their recent formation rule there is strong evidence that forecasts are unbiased but forecasters have not been fully efficient in the use of available information the paper assesses the importance of inflation targets to anchor inflation expectations in these countries and finds that in most cases there is room for improvement in credibility

signalling wage controls and monetary disinflation policy focuses on wage control and monetary disinflation policy how the crucial variable to control is the money supply and wage and price controls should be avoided because of their macroeconomic costs the two types of government as being low inflation governments and high inflation governments how wage controls have microeconomic costs

time consistent collection of optimal seigniorage a unifying framework this paper reviews the existing literature on the time consistency problem of seigniorage collection when monetary policy is determined by optimal taxation considerations it develops a unifying accounting framework and suggests a general measure for seigniorage which encompasses the standard measures employed in the literature in addition the ex ante optimal solution to the optimal taxation problem is derived and interpreted in relation to the ramsey principle we show that the different recommendations of the public finance literature i e the friedman rule of optimal deflation moderately positive inflation and seigniorage maximizing inflation are specific solutions to the optimal taxation problem the paper continues with a formal illustration of the time consistency problem of the ex ante optimal policy and the characterization of the time consistent solution under discretion as possible solutions to the time consistency problem we consider reputational forces institutional reforms that establish central bank independence and specific ways of asset and debt management in particular it is formally shown that a modified version of the asset and debt management scheme suggested by persson persson and svensson is not only necessary but also sufficient for optimality although this did not hold in their model

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

when and how much to talk credibility and flexibility in monetary policy with private information abstract this paper analyzes the role of noisy or imprecise announcements in mitigating the basic credibility problem in monetary policy based on a model where the monetary authority s private information gives rise to an unavoidable trade off between flexibility and credibility the analysis finds that noisy announcements can serve as a meaningful form of communication to make that trade off more favorable however such talk is not cheap the analysis predicts that those central banks who can speak more precisely are those who are less likely to speak at all

natural oligopoly and customer networks in intermediated markets abstract the industrial structure of an intermediation industry is analyzed in brokerage markets where intermediaries help to reduce search frictions the aspect of competition in intermediated markets is analyzed in an island economy in which intermediaries invest in information networks which allow them to inform the market about their price offers larger networks allow them to reach more markets and potential customers this enhances trading probabilities thus the size of the information network may be viewed as a quality attribute by market participants price competition among intermediaries therefore exhibits features of imperfect price competition in markets of vertically differentiated products it is shown that the number of intermediaries active in a symmetric equilibrium is bounded independently of the size of the market as long as investments are costly thus the market constitutes a natural oligopoly in the sense of shaked and sutton econometrica 1983 51 1469 1483 and convergence to a fragmented industrial structure does not obtain as the economy grows large in particular we find a natural oligopoly consisting of generally three larger intermediaries of similar size and smaller intermediaries occupying niche markets nevertheless as the number of islands increases spreads shrink to zero and almost competitive allocations arise

rational expectations and policy credibility following a change in regime we examine the dynamic path of an economy after a change in regime when neither the policy to be followed nor the reactions of the public are known the model is an application of kreps and wilson s reputation model to barro and gordon s macroeconomic policy game equilibrium is defined to be the dynamically consistent solution to a game between the government and the private sector it involves mixed strategies and bayesian learning by both sides until the uncertainty about government and public behaviour is resolved the absence of complete credibility of government policy and intransigence of private sector wage demands increase the output loss of disinflation the analysis also sheds light on the strategic nature of economic policymaking and the role of information in macroeconomics

balance of payments crises in a cash in advance economy the author shows that a flexible prices sidrauski type model with a cash in advance constraint is capable of depicting some of the phenomena associated with a balance of payments crisis like the onesrecently observed in argentina and mexico current accounts deficits and appreciation of the real exchange rat e it is also shown that these phenomena become exacerbated as the rate of devaluation before the crisis occurs becomes smaller copyright 1987 by ohio state university press

openness imperfect exchange rate pass through and monetary policy abstract this paper analyses the implications of imperfect exchange rate pass through for optimal monetary policy in a linearised open economy dynamic general equilibrium model calibrated to euro area data imperfect exchange rate pass through is modelled by assuming sticky import price behaviour the degree of domestic and import price stickiness is estimated by reproducing the empirical identified impulse response of a monetary policy and exchange rate shock conditional on the response of output net trade and the exchange rate it is shown that a central bank that wants to minimise the resource costs of staggered price setting will aim at minimising a weighted average of domestic and import price inflation

who chooses to inflation target abstract in this article we seek what are the factors behind a country s decision to move to inflation targeting we find that high past inflation low debt levels and the absence of a nominal exchange rate anchor increase the probability that a country will end up opting for it

unique equilibrium in a model of self fulfilling currency attacks even though self fulfilling currency attacks lead to multiple equilibria when fundamentals are common knowledge we demonstrate the uniqueness of equilibrium when speculators face a small amount of noise in their signals about the fundamentals this unique equilibrium depends not only on the fundamentals but also on financial variables such as the quantity of hot money in circulation and the costs of speculative trading in contrast to multiple equilibrium models our model allows analysis of policy proposals directed at curtailing currency attacks

balance of payments crises under inflation targeting abstract this paper analyzes a small open economy model under inflation targeting it shows why such a monetary regime is vulnerable to speculative attacks that take place over a short period rather than instantaneously the speed at which the regime collapses and the extent of reserve losses are increasing in the central bank s explicit or implicit commitment to intervene in the foreign exchange market attacks are therefore ranked from most to least severe as follows exchange rate targeting cpi inflation targeting domestic nontradables inflation targeting and money targeting under inflation targeting the size of the attack is increasing in the tradables consumption share

announcements inflation targeting and central bank incentives this paper studies the incentives a central bank faces in announcing inflation targets when the central bank has private information about the economy and the public is uncertain about the central bank s preferences targeting rules in the absence of announcements reduce the inflationary bias of discretionary policy but they distort the central bank s response to private information about the economy this distortion is eliminated when the central bank is allowed to announce the inflation target announcements also affect credibility although the way they do so depends on the exact definition of credibility that is employed in standard models of monetary policy in which dynamic inconsistency plays a prominent role announcements from the central bank about its policy inten tions are not believable the central bank has an incentive to lie yet central banks often do make announcements and they are legally required to do so in some cases the bank of england for example must issue periodic inflation reports the chairman of the federal reserve is required by the humphrey hawkins act to testify before congress twice each year to explain the fed s policy actions and to detail the fed s outlook for future economic develop ments similarly the reserve bank of new zealand is required under the reserve bank act of 1989 to publish policy statements that spell out its plans the january 1994 legislation governing the banque de france requires its gov ernor to appear before parliament and the european central bank must under the maastricht treaty report at least annually to the european parlia ment if public statements about policy intentions are not credible the question naturally arises as to why central banks are frequently required to make them the answer of course is that announcements do provide the public with some information given the growing interest in policy transparency particu larly among those central banks that have adopted some form of inflation targeting it is perhaps surprising that there has been relatively little explicit analysis of how inflation targeting requirements might combine with reporting requirements to influence the informational content of announcements the conduct of stabilization policies and the central bank s credibility the purpose of this paper is to analyse the way inflation targeting affects the incentives the central bank faces in announcing targets when the central bank has private information about the economy and the public is uncertain about the central bank s preferences inflation targeting has seen increased popularity in recent years but a fixed target for inflation is generally suboptimal in the face of supply shocks while state contingent targets are viewed as not feasible an important result of this paper is that allowing the central bank to announce its own inflation target

international evidence on tradables and nontradables inflation abstract using 1970 1985 sectoral data for the oecd we find that inflation in nontradable goods exceeds inflation in tradables we identify a demand shift towards nontradables and faster growth of total factor productivity in the tradable goods sector as the prime causes of the differential inflation in addition disinflation attempts and the exchange rate regime appear to have exerted significant influence on the relative inflation rate

taxation and executive compensation evidence from stock options abstract understanding the effects of taxes on executive compensation provides insight into the process determining this compensation and is a key input to top income tax rate policy a 2010 tax reform in canada which greatly increased the effective tax rate on stock option compensation for a subset of firms provides a natural experiment with which to address this issue difference in differences estimates suggest that this tax increase resulted in an immediate reduction in both stock option grants and the fraction of total compensation made up of stock options with limited if any substitution towards other components of compensation

political influence on the central bank international evidence political influence on the central bank is measured bere by looking at the probability that a central bank governor will be replaced shortly after a political change of government the governor changes about half the time witbin six months of a nonconstitutional or other radical change of government a military coup or a restoration of democracy the governor is much less likely to change within six months following a routine change in the head of government about one fourth of the time in developing countries and one tenth in industrial countries these indicators vary across countries and correlate statistically with inflation and its variability and with real growth and real interest rates differences in the vulnerability of the central bank to political instability in political instability itself and in central bank turnover in nonpolitical periods seem to be a major part of the explanation for why developing countries have on average higher and more variable inflation than industrial countries do

flexible inflation targets forex interventions and exchange rate volatility in emerging countries abstract emerging economies with inflation targets it face a dilemma between fulfilling the theoretical conditions of strict it which imply a fully flexible exchange rate or applying a flexible it which entails a de facto managed floating exchange rate with foreign exchange forex interventions to moderate exchange rate volatility using a panel data model for 37 countries we find that although it lead to higher exchange rate instability than alternative regimes forex interventions in some it countries have been more effective to lower volatility than in non it countries which may justify the use of flexible it by policymakers

bank runs as an equilibrium phenomenon a standard demand deposit contract in which individuals are entitled to their full deposit at any time provided the bank is solvent is analyzed in a context in which there are no exogenous events on which agents condition their behavior and a unique equilibrium involving a bank run with positive probability is shown to exist

bonuses and managerial misbehaviour abstract profit based bonus payments have been criticised for encouraging managers to take excessively risky actions or to engage in other activities that are not in the firm s best interest we show however that large bonuses may discourage managers from such misbehaviour because they have more to lose in the event that misbehaviour is detected thus large bonuses may be an optimal way for firms to control misbehaviour our finding sheds new light on recent proposals to regulate bonuses

optimal policy with credibility concerns abstract this paper considers a reputation model of optimal taxation in which the public is unsure about the government type a long lived government can be trustworthy meaning that it commits to its announced tax rate or opportunistic meaning that it retains the ability to change its tax rate after announcing it unlike in most prior studies the committed strategy in this model is optimally chosen by the trustworthy type we show that this change has significant consequences for the equilibrium dynamics the optimal committed strategy is found to vary with the time preferences of the two government types the initial reputation of the government and the elasticity of household production this formulation explains differences in policy responses across governments in the face of similar credibility problems

the credit channel transmission mechanism and the nonlinear growth and welfare effects of inflation and taxes with the credit channel effect driven by the central bank s open market operations this paper s model easily gives rise to the nonlinear inflation growth nexus which is evidenced by a number of cross country empirical studies the threshold level of the inflation rate is found to be lower when tax rates are higher the presence of the credit channel effect also provides the rationale for setting positive and smaller than 1 tax rates on consumption labor income and capital income the optimal tax rates rise as the inflation target declines under a fiscal policy rule where labor and capital income taxes move proportionally to each other the optimal capital income tax rate could be higher than the optimal labor income tax rate under a sufficiently large central bank balance sheet the credit channel effect will be so weak that inflation and all kinds of taxes are growth and welfare repressing this provides a rationale for central banks that have implemented quantitative easing policies to shrink their balance sheets jel e58 e62 o42

the dynamics of optimal gradual stabilizations inflation inertia may be quite tenacious because of the simultaneous interaction between policy actions and inflationary expectations under imperfect credibility this result is particularly relevant for understanding some of the failed efforts to stabilize inflation in south america this article deals with the issue of inertia in the framework of imperfect information about the type of the policymaker and extends the existing models to an infinite horizon because policymakers do not have perfect control of inflation a frivolous stabilizer may deviate from the policies of a serious stabilizer without necessarily being unmasked immediately when the difference in the ability of strong and weak policymakers to control inflation is large unexpected inflation may be persistently negative for quite a while thus causing reduced economic activity and giving the indication that credibility is low if the policymaker persists with the stabilization this pattern gradually disappears as his reputation rises but before this final stage the serious policymaker has to compromise his inflation objective in view of adverse expectation about this type and pay the cost of imperfect credibility

variation in central bank independence across countries some provisional empirical evidence in this paper seven hypotheses to explain variation in central bank independence across countries are tested the predictions based upon the theory that delegation of authority by politicians to the central bank is used as a commitment device are not supported central bank independence is not higher the larger the employment motivated inflationary bias the higher political instability or the larger the government debt central bank independence is positively related to historical inflation experience and negatively with political instability we do only find limited support for the view that countries with a universal banking system and countries whose central banks do not regulate financial institutions have more independent central banks

platform selection in the lab abstract emerging literature explores experimental platform selection games these games converge rapidly on the superior platform under a wide range of conditions we replicate the remarkable results of hossain and morgan 2009 in which such a game tips almost perfectly to the superior platform next we show that platform coordination fails when seemingly innocent increases in out of equilibrium payoffs are introduced the inflated payoffs keep the best reply structure unchanged and do not influence players security levels our design allows control for the explanatory force of risk dominance we find that equilibrium selection theory is unable to account for coordination failure while observed behavior is consistent with non rational learning furthermore and contrary to the literature we find that efficiency suffers when an inferior platform is granted initial monopoly

gaining and losing erm credibility the case of the united kingdom the model of this paper highlights two aspects of credibility signaling the type of government which is assumed not to be known and for any type the likelihood that if circumstances are sufficiently unfavorable a devaluation will be impossible to avoid since not to do so would go against the government s interests these two factors have opposite implications for the link between unemployment and interest differentials high unemployment signals a tough government but also makes it less likely that even a tough government will maintain an existing parity copyright 1995 by royal economic society

payoff complementarities and financial fragility evidence from mutual fund outflows the paper provides empirical evidence that strategic complementarities among investors generate fragility in financial markets analyzing mutual fund data we find that consistent with a theoretical model funds with illiquid assets where complementarities are stronger exhibit stronger sensitivity of outflows to bad past performance than funds with liquid assets we also find that this pattern disappears in funds where the shareholder base is composed mostly of large investors we present further evidence that these results are not attributable to alternative explanations based on the informativeness of past performance or on clientele effects we analyze the implications for funds performance and policies

learning large deviations and recurrent currency crises this article studies a version of obstfeld s journal of international economics 43 1997 61 77 escape clause model the model is calibrated to produce three rational expectations equilibria two of these equilibria are e stable and one is unstable dynamics are introduced by assuming that agents must learn about the government s decision rule it is assumed they do this using a stochastic approximation algorithm it turns out that as a certain parameter describing the sensitivity of beliefs to new information gets small the algorithm converges to a small noise diffusion process the dynamics of exchange rate changes are then characterized using large deviation techniques from freidlin and wentzell random perturbations of dynamical systems second edition berlin springer verlag 1998 these methods describe the sense in which the limiting distribution of exchange rate changes is approximated by a two state markov switching process where the two states correspond to the two e stable equilibria the model is calibrated to the exchange rate histories of argentina brazil and mexico currency crises in these countries resemble the predicted escape routes of the model a key feature of these escape routes is that expectations of a devaluation erupt suddenly without large contemporaneous shocks this is consistent with evidence showing that crises are often poorly anticipated by financial markets

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

inflationary finance under discrepion and rules inflationary finance involves first the tax on cash balances from expected inflation and second a capital levy from unexpected inflation from the standpoint of minimizing distortions these capital levies are attractive ex post to the policymaker in a full equilibrium two conditions hold 1 the monetary authority optimizes subject to people s expectations mechanisms and 2 people form expectations rationally given their knowledge of the policymaker s objectives the outcomes under discretionary policy are contrasted with those generated under rules in a purely discretionary regime the monetary authority can make no meaningful commitments about the future behavior of money and prices under an enforced rule it becomes possible to make some guarantees hence the links between monetary actions and inflationary expectations can be internalized there is a distinction between fully contingent rules and rules of simple form a simple rule allows the internalization of some connections between policy act ion and inflationary expectations but discretion permits some desirable flexibility of monetary growth this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

deposit competition and financial fragility evidence from the us banking sector preliminary and incomplete please do not cite without permission we develop and estimate an empirical model of the u s banking sector using a new data set covering the largest u s banks over the period 2002 2013 our model incorporates insured depositors and run prone uninsured depositors who have rich preferences over dierentiated banks banks compete for deposits in the spirit of matutes and vives 1996 and can endogenously default we estimate demand for uninsured

coordinated bubbles and crashes abstract in a market with information friction investors strategically consider the actions of others and evolutionarily switch between fundamental and technical strategies to maximize their payoffs the collective actions of all investors exert feedback on asset price which affects investors subsequent actions we find that investors have the incentive to adopt fundamental strategy to restore market efficiency only if the mispricing is sufficiently large when investors fail to coordinate on the fundamental strategy market inefficiency increases which blows the bubble as market inefficiency grows the coordination on fundamental strategy strengthens which eventually bursts the bubble

cheap talk and the fed a theory of imprecise policy announcments this paper examines the problem faced by the federal reserve in announcing its private information about its future policies because it would like to manipulate expectations and pursue a time inconsistent policy the fed cannot reveal its policy objectives precisely and credibly it can however communicate some information about its goals through the cheap talk mechanism of vincent crawford and joel sobel making announcements that are imprecise and only giving ranges within which these goals may lie copyright 1989 by american economic association

imperfect credibility and the zero lower bound as the nominal interest rate cannot fall below zero a central bank with imperfect credibility faces a significant challenge to stabilize the economy in a new keynesian model during a large recession we characterize the optimal monetary policy at the zero lower bound for the nominal interest rate if credibility is imperfect confronting monetary policy communication of the u s federal reserve and the swedish riksbank with such a framework the credibility of both institutions is shown to have been low in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis

gold monetization and gold discipline gold and its price have emerged as frequent topics of both academic and government debate 2 public attention focused on the gold market since gold s price began fluctuating violently in 1980 and 1981 has turned to gold as a possible means of removing some discretion inherent in the current fiat money system since lack of adherence to monetary rules can lead to problems of dynamic policy inconsistency academic economists have begun seriously to reconsider monetary standards based either on gold or on some other commodity as politically feasible methods of establishing rules 3

optimal accommodation by strong policymakers under incomplete information abstract this paper examines the optimal behavior of a policymaker who is able to precommit labelled strong when the public entertains the possibility that he is either strong or weak unable to precommit the main result is that in the presence of doubts about their type it is optimal even for strong policymakers to partially accommodate inflationary expectations this contrasts with vickers 1986 who finds that when strength is conceived in terms of the relative concern for employment the strong policymaker inflates less under incomplete than under full information the paper also provides a theory of endogenous announcements

dynamic government performance honeymoons and crises of confidence we use a formal theoretical framework to explore the interplay between a government s longevity and its performance ministers perform well when their careers are valuable this is so when the government s duration is expected to be long the government s survival depends on its popularity and finally that popularity depends on its ministers performance the feedback loop between performance and longevity means that multiple rational expectations equilibria can arise ministers work hard for a popular government but divert efforts elsewhere if they believe the government is doomed these alternatives are both self fulfilling prophecies however the presence of perhaps small random events that buffet the performance and popularity of a government is sufficient to pin down a unique equilibrium we explore the dynamics that arise a crisis of confidence involving the rapid collapse of a government s performance is sparked when a sequence of negative shocks push the popularity of the government below a unique critical threshold

implicit asymmetric exchange rate peg under inflation targeting regimes the case of turkey especially after the 2000s many developing countries let exchange rates float and began implementing inflation targeting regimes based on mainly manipulation of expectations and aggregate demand however most developing countries implementing inflation targeting regimes experienced considerable appreciation trends in their currencies might have exchange rates been utilized as implicit tools even under inflation targeting regimes in developing countries to answer this question and investigate the determinants of inflation under an inflation targeting regime as a case study this paper analyzes the turkish experience with the inflation targeting regime between 2002 and 2008 there are two main findings of this paper first the evidence from a vector autoregressive var model suggests that the main determinants of inflation in turkey during this period are supply side factors such as international commodity prices and the variation in exchange rate rather than demand side factors since the turkish lira tl was considerably over appreciated during this period it is apparent that the turkish central bank benefited from the appreciation of the tl in its fight against inflation during this period second our findings suggest that the appreciation of the tl is related to the deliberate asymmetric policy stance of the bank with respect to the exchange rate both the econometric analysis from a var model and descriptive statistics indicate that appreciation of the turkish lira was tolerated during the period under investigation whereas depreciation was responded aggressively by the bank we call this policy stance under the inflation targeting regimes as implicit asymmetric exchange rate peg the turkish experience indicates that as opposed to rhetoric of central banks in developing countries inflation targeting developing countries may have an asymeyric stance toward exchange rates and favour appreciation of their currencies to hit their inflation targets in this sense it seems to contribute to the ignorance of dangers regarding to over appreciation of currencies in developing countries

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

multiple equilibria and currency crisis evidence for korea abstract this paper estimates a non linear model that allows for multiple equilibria using data on korea during the currency crisis in 1997 results suggest that korea may have been vulnerable to self fulfilling speculation as early as january 1997 an extended phase of multiple equilibria started in october 1997 the fundamentals for korea remained in this crisis zone until march 1998 korea briefly entered a multiple equilibria zone again in may and june 1998 before stabilizing in july 1998 results are supportive of roles for weakness in fundamentals and for self fulfilling beliefs in explaining currency crises

management economics in a large retail company we use unique data from 245 stores of a uk retailer to study links among middle store manager skills sales and manager pay we find that of the six management practice areas surveyed the most important is commercial awareness where abler managers achieve up to 13 9 higher sales per worker we find that many stores have poor managers on this indicator however the company is careful to incentivize managers operating a scheme giving shares approximately 20 in both positive and negative deviations of actual sales from expected abler managers do not receive higher pay implying that their skills are company specific

inflation targeting with imperfect information in a global games setup with imperfect commitment technology we show that low targets the ones close to the optimal inflation under perfect commitment are unattainable leading to a trade off between low and credible targets moreover since noisy public information helps to coordinate expectations around the announced target our article supports unconventional policy prescriptions first weaker countries need to impose higher targets second less transparency helps to make the announced target credible and then reduces the optimally announced target results are based on a general central bank loss function encompassing models traditionally used to discuss central bank decisions

transparency reputation and credibility under floating and pegged exchange rates this paper shows that if the cost of importing foreign inflation and real exchange rate shocks are not too high then the equilibrium nominal exchange rate regime for a country with a credibility problem is a peg under which credibility is higher and inflation is lower than under a float this holds true although devaluations of the pegged rate are assumed to be costless the reason is that as realized inflation is not perfectly controllable planned inflation under a float is private information in contrast since the exchange rate can be perfectly controlled pegging resolves the private information problem is more transparent and makes reputation more effective

inflation targeting a new framework for monetary policy he world s central bankers and their staffs meet regularly in venues from basle to washington to share ideas and discuss common problems perhaps these frequent meetings help explain why changes in the tactics and strategy of monetary policymaking such as the adoption of money growth targets in the 1970s the intensification of efforts to reduce inflation in the 1980s and the recent push for increased institutional independence for central banks tend to occur in many countries more or less simultaneously whatever their source major changes in the theory and practice of central banking are of great importance for both individual countries and the international economy in this article we discuss a new strategy for monetary policy known as inflation targeting which has sparked much interest and debate among central bankers and monetary economists in recent years this approach is characterized as the name suggests by the announcement of official target ranges for the inflation rate at one or more horizons and by explicit acknowledgment that low and stable inflation is the overriding goal of monetary policy other important features of inflation targeting include increased communication with the public about the plans and objectives of the monetary policymakers and in many cases increased accountability of the central bank

the electronic mail game strategic behavior under almost common knowledge the paper addresses a paradoxical game theoretic example which is closely related to the coordinated attack problem two players have to play one of two possible coordination games only one of them receives information about the coordination game to be played it is shown that the situation with almost common knowledge is very different from when the coordination game played is common knowledge

optimal reputation building in the new keynesian model abstract we study the optimal committed monetary policy when the private sector has imperfect information and has to infer the central banker s ability to commit the optimal policy is designed to influence learning and improve the central banker s reputation of being committed the reputation building implies that when a committed central banker first takes office he should resist the temptation to stimulate output with initially high but declining inflation he should reverse a missed inflation target rather than accommodate it and he should adopt a less accommodative inflation response to a cost push shock than a full commitment solution suggests

on the credibility of alternative exchange rate regimes abstract most anti inflation plans have used a nominal exchange rate anchor even though many other variables can serve this role the conventional wisdom is that an exchange rate anchor imposes more macroeconomic discipline than other anchors though theory does not yet provide any clear reason why this is so we explain the link between an exchange rate anchor and discipline with a model that assumes that the public can monitor the nominal exchange rate more easily that it can the other variables in our model a barro gordon game of incomplete information with imperfect monitoring we show that serious stabilizers prefer more visible anchors such as the nominal exchange rate we also show that in some circumstances serious stabilizers will choose to fix the exchange rate even when fixed exchange rates have some costs such as diminished capabilities to respond to external shocks

exchange rate pass through when market share matters the authors investigate the pass through from exchange rates to import prices when firms future demands depend on their current market shares they show that profit maximizing foreign firms may either raise or lower their dollar export prices when the dollar appreciates temporarily i e the pass through may be perverse and that current import prices may be more sensitive to expected future exchange rates than to current exchange rates they present evidence that suggests the behavior of expected future exchange rates may provide a clue to the puzzling recent behavior of u s import prices copyright 1989 by american economic association

reputation in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information abstract previous models of rules versus discretion are extended to include uncertainty about the policymaker s type when people observe low inflation they raise the possibility that the policymaker is committed to low inflation type 1 this enhancement of reputation gives the uncommitted policymaker type 2 an incentive to masquerade as the committed type in the equilibrium the policymaker of type 1 delivers surprisingly low inflation with corresponding costs to the economy over an extended interval the type 2 person mimics this outcome for awhile but shifts eventually to high inflation this high inflation is surprising initially but subsequently becomes anticipated

speculative attack and the external constraint in a maximizing model of the balance of payments balance of payments models of speculative attack differ from non renewable resource models in that foreign exchange reserves may be borrowed from abroad this paper shows that in an idealized world where all private income is subject to lump sum taxation central bank reserves can become infinitely negative without violating the government s intertemporal budget constraint none the less a growth rate of domestic credit exceeding the world interest rate if maintained indefinitely leads to violation of the constraint in the paper s model given an assumed limit to official external borrowing the paper next analyses inevitable transitions between fixed and floating exchange rate regimes when individual preferences are explicitly specified in a discrete time deterministic model the collapse of a fixed rate may be characterized by two successive speculative attacks

inflation targeting and exchange rate management in less developed countries abstract we analyze coordination of monetary and exchange rate policy in a two sector model of a small open economy featuring imperfect substitution between domestic and foreign financial assets our central finding is that tight management of the exchange rate greatly enhances the efficacy of inflation targeting in a flexible exchange rate system inflation targeting incurs a high risk of indeterminacy moreover small inflation shocks may escalate into much larger increases in inflation ex post both problems disappear when the central bank fixes the path of the nominal exchange rate or leans heavily against the wind in a managed float

the impact of market competition on ceo salary in the us energy sector1 abstract in this work we examine the impact of market competition on ceos salaries by analyzing a sample of alls p american firms in the energy sector in the 1992 2015 time span and measuring market competition by means of the so called herfindhal hirschman index we divide industries into three sub groups based on small medium and high market concentration and try to expand our research by exploring the impact of the recent financial crisis the paper investigates how ceos salaries are affected by firm level determinants e g firm size returns on assets returns on equity capital expenditure market concentration tobin s q etc as well as by the individual characteristics of each ceo e g ceos age gender based on our findings the market concentration index in the us energy sector has a negative and statistically significant impact on ceo salary for all firms that operate in either a highly monopolistic or a purely competitive environment the results of this empirical work are robust after examining for different alternative high order fixed effects specifications

two cases for sand in the wheels of international finance the incompatibility of pegged exchange rates international capital mobility and national monetary autonomy is a basic postulate of open economy macroeconomies in the present environment of high capital mobility and political uncertainty even the possibility that governments may utilize their policy autonomy can defeat efforts to peg the exchange rate this leaves two possibilities one is to fix the exchange rate irrevocably through monetary unification the other is to live with floating rates either way a case can be made for throwing sand in the wheels of international finance where monetary unification is not an option this is a may to make distinct national currencies tolerable and international money and capital markets compatible with modest national autonomy in monetary and macroeconomic policy for eu counties striving to create a monetary union it is the only politically and economically feasible way of completing the transition to stage iii of the maastricht process

currency crises with the threat of an interest rate defence while virtually all currency crisis models recognise that the decision to abandon a peg depends on how tenaciously policy makers defend it this is seldom modelled explicitly we add the threat of an interest rate defence to the global game model of morris and shin american economic review 88 1998 with an endogenous defence actions of speculators may become strategic substitutes instead of the usual complements nevertheless our generalised model remains tractable and has a unique threshold equilibrium it provides additional insights for instance the threat of an interest rate defence makes speculation riskier and this may be sufficient to keep speculators out when fundamentals are still relatively strong

managing beliefs about monetary policy under discretion in models of monetary policy discretionary policymaking is typically constrained in its ability to manage public beliefs however when a policymaker possesses private information policy actions serve as signals to the public about unobserved economic conditions and belief management becomes an integral part of optimal discretion policies this article derives the optimal time consistent policy for a general linear quadratic setting the optimal policy is illustrated in a simple new keynesian model where analytical solutions can be derived as well in this model imperfect information about the policymaker s output target leads to lower policy losses

the more we know about the fundamental the less we agree on the price i allow trading horizon heterogeneity across groups in a standard differential information model of a financial market this approach can explain the well established phenomenon that after a public announcement trading volume increases more private information is incorporated into prices and volatility increases in such environments public information has the important secondary role of helping agents learn about the information of other agents therefore whenever the correlation between the private information of different groups is sufficiently low a public announcement increases disagreement among short horizon traders regarding the expected selling price even as it decreases disagreement about the fundamental value of the asset additional testable implications are also suggested

ceo pay firm size and corporate performance evidence from canada executive compensation of 755 canadian firms is examined over the period 1991 95 and evidence is obtained consistent with previous studies ceo pay rises with firm size and compensation is tied to company performance in addition executives in utilities earn lower pay and their compensation is less responsive to performance than is true for their counterparts in other industries some novel findings are also documented first the sales elasticity of ceo compensation is greater in larger firms second while ceo turnover probability is generally negatively related to the firm s stock performance the threat of dismissal appear to be less pronounced in small firms jel classification g35 j33 salaire des pdg taille de l entreprise et performance des societes resultats pour le canada en etudiant le salaire des pdg de 755 entreprises canadiennes au cours de la periode 1991 95 l auteur confirme certains resultats d etudes anterieures le salaire du pdg croit avec la taille de l entreprise et il est liea la performance de l entreprise il appert aussi que les cadres dans les entreprises de service public gagnent moins relativement parlant et que leur salaire est moins sensible aux ecarts de performance que dans les autres secteurs on met aussi a jour certains resultats inedits d abord il semble que l elasticite du salaire du pdg par rapport au niveau des ventes est plus forte dans les plus grandes entreprises ensuite alors que la probabilite de roulement est en general co reliee negativement a la performance des actions en bourse de l entreprise la menace de renvoi semble moins prononcee dans les petites entreprises

central banker contracts incomplete information and monetary policy surprises in search of a selfish central banker approaching monetary policy as a principal agent problemprovides a useful framework for interpreting alternativedelegation schemes in this paper we consider theeffectiveness of central banker incentive schemes when theprincipal delegates monetary policy through contracts butremains uncertain about the central banker s responsiveness tosuch schemes we adopt a simple principal agent model andassume that the central banker s trade off between socialwelfare and the incentive scheme is private information weconsider two types of central bankers one who responds to theincentive scheme selfish and one who does not and onlycares about social welfare benevolent we demonstratethat when a benevolent central banker accepts a contractdesigned for a selfish central banker positive inflationsurprises occur and output exceeds its natural rate wefurther show that a benevolent central banker with aninflation bias has an incentive to masquerade as selfish mechanisms exist that solve that problem by achievingpreference revelation we consider a simple mechanism indominant strategies that induces the benevolent type eithernot to breach or not to accept the appointment contract inthe first place this multi period mechanism works with eitherinflation targets or the appointment of a conservativecentral banker our results suggest that more complicatedincentive schemes embedded within broader constitutionalarrangements are required in the presence of privateinformation for them to work effectively

social value of public information comment morris and shin 2002 is actually pro transparency not con the main result of morris and shin 2002 restated in papers by amato morris and shin 2002 and amato and shin 2003 and commented upon by the economist 2004 has been presented and interpreted as an anti transparency result more public information can be bad however some scrutiny of the result shows that it is actually pro transparency except in very special circumstances more public information is good furthermore for a conservative benchmark of equal precision in public and privateinformation social welfare is higher than in as ituation without public information

inflation targeting in brazil constructing credibility under exchange rate volatility abstract this paper assesses the challenges faced by the inflation targeting regime in brazil the inflation targeting framework has played a critical role in macroeconomic stabilization we stress two important challenges construction of credibility and exchange rate volatility the estimations indicate the following results i the inflation targets have worked as an important coordinator of expectations ii the central bank has reacted strongly to inflation expectations iii there has been a reduction in the degree of inflation persistence and iv the exchange rate pass through for administered or monitored prices is two times higher than for market prices

the choice of exchange rate regime and speculative attacks we develop a framework for studying the choice of exchange rate regime in an open economy where the local currency is vulnerable to speculative attacks the optimal regime is determined by a policymaker who trades off the loss from nominal exchange rate uncertainty against the cost of maintaining a given regime this cost is affected in turn by the likelihood of a speculative attack searching for the optimal regime within the class of exchange rate bands we show that the optimal regime is either a peg a zero width band a free float an infinite width band or a non degenerate finite width band the paper shows that lower costs of moving across currencies induce policymakers to set more flexible exchange rate systems this lowers ceteris paribus the likelihood of financial crises one implication is that a tobin tax does not necessarily reduce the likelihood of currency crises the paper also investigates the effects of country size openess variability in fundamentals and reputation on the choice of exchange rate regime the role of abrupt changes in reputation in triggerering crises even with unchanged fundamentals as an alternative to sunspots is discussed and illustrated

the modern history of exchange rate arrangements a reinterpretation we develop a novel system of reclassifying historical exchange rate regimes one key difference between our study and previous classifications is that we employ monthly data on market determined parallel exchange rates going back to 1946 for 153 countries our approach differs from the imf official classification which we show to be only a little better than random it also differs radically from all previous attempts at historical reclassification our classification points to a rethinking of economic performance under alternative exchange rate regimes indeed the breakup of bretton woods had less impact on exchange rate regimes than is popularly believed

crises and prices information aggregation multiplicity and volatility crises are volatile times when endogenous sources of information are closely monitored we study the role of information in crises by introducing a financial market in a coordination game with imperfect information the asset price aggregates dispersed private information acting as a public noisy signal in contrast to the case with exogenous information our main result is that uniqueness may not obtain as a perturbation from perfect information multiplicity is ensured with small noise in addition we show that a multiplicity may emerge in the financial price itself b less noise may contribute toward nonfundamental volatility even when the equilibrium is unique and c similar results obtain for a model where individuals observe one another s actions highlighting the importance of endogenous information more generally