political competition and the politicization of the state in east central europe the expansion and politicization of the postcommunist state even among the reform leaders of czech republic hungary poland and slovakia has confounded early expectations that the state would s

reducing bureaucratic corruption interdisciplinary perspectives on what works abstract this article offers the first comprehensive review of the interdisciplinary state of knowledge regarding anti corruption policies with a particular focus on reducing corruption among civil servants drawing on the work of economists political scientists sociologists and anthropologists we examine seven policy categories 1 rewards and penalties 2 monitoring 3 restructuring bureaucracies 4 screening and recruiting 5 anti corruption agencies 6 educational campaigns and 7 international agreements notably rigorous empirical evaluation is lacking for the majority of commonly prescribed anti corruption policies nevertheless we find growing evidence of the effectiveness of policies based on monitoring including anti corruption audits and e governance in addition adequate civil service wages seem to be a necessary but insufficient condition for control of corruption an emerging skepticism regarding the effectiveness of anti corruption agencies also is apparent in the literature we conclude with broader lessons drawn from our review such as the recognition that when corruption is a systemic problem it cannot be treated in the long term with individual level solutions

bureaucracy infrastructure and economic growth evidence from u s cities during the progressive era recent work in the sociology of economic development has emphasized the establishment of a professional bureaucracy in place of political appointees as an important component of the institutional environment in which private enterprise can flourish i hypothesize that establishment of such a bureaucracy will lengthen the period that public decision makers are willing to wait to realize the benefits of expenditures leading to allocation of a greater proportion of government resources to long gestation period projects such as infrastructure this hypothesis can be tested using data generated by a natural experiment in the early part of this century when a wave of municipal reform transformed the governments of many u s cities controlling for city and time effects adoption of civil service is found to increase the share of total municipal expenditure allocated to road and sewer investment other estimates imply that this increased share raises the growth rate of city manufacturing employment by one half percent per year this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the hidden persuaders institutions and individuals in economic theory in his classic book the hidden persuaders vance packard claimed that large corporations manipulated consumers using advertising techniques john kenneth galbraith and others have repeated a similar view against this gary becker and george stigler have claimed that advertising is essentially informative rather than manipulative in contrast it is argued here that both of these opposed accounts of human agency neglect the more subtle and undesigned processes by which institutions bear upon and mould individuals this paper proposes a concept of reconstitutive downward causation in which institutions act upon individual habits and dispositions the mechanisms involved do not fall foul of past critiques of holism or methodological collectivism this argument involves a rehabilitation of the concept of habit in social science with far reaching implications

public sector wages and bureaucratic quality evidence from latin america the purpose of this paper is to present evidence on public private wage differential for a sample of latin american countries and to discuss the relationship between public private wage differentials and bureaucratic quality in the region the paper starts by estimating public private wage differentials for a sample of 17 latin american countries covering 88 percent of the population of the region next the paper looks at the relationship between bureaucratic quality and public private wage differentials and finds that while there is no correlation between average public sector wages and bureaucratic quality there is a positive correlation between bureaucratic quality and the degree

the role of wages and auditing during a crackdown on corruption in the city of buenos aires abstract we study the prices paid for basic inputs during a crackdown on corruption in the public hospitals of the city of buenos aires argentina during 1996 97 we find a well defined negative effect on the measures used to capture corruption prices paid by hospitals for basic homogeneous inputs decrease by 15 percent during the first 9 months of the crackdown after this period prices increase but they are still 10 percent lower than those prevailing before the crackdown relative to the precrackdown period higher wages play no role in inducing lower input prices when audit intensity can be expected to be maximal during the first phase of the crackdown but have a negative and well defined effect when audit intensity takes intermediate levels the last phase of the crackdown controlling for fixed effects we find that the wage elasticity of input prices exceeds 20 these results are consistent with the standard model of bribes of gary becker and george stigler

alternative health insurance schemes a welfare comparison in this paper we present a simple model of health insurance with asymmetric information where we compare two alternative ways of organizing the insurance market either as a competitive insurance market where some risks remain uninsured or as a compulsory scheme where however the level of reimbursement of loss is to be determined by majority decision in a simple welfare comparison the compulsory scheme may in certain environments yield a solution which is inferior to that obtained in the market we further consider the situation where the compulsory scheme may be supplemented by voluntary competitive insurance this situation turns out to be at least as good as either of the alternatives

bureaucratic capacity delegation and political reform thecentraltensionmotivatingcontemporarytheories of delegation from politicians to bureaucrats lies in the potential conflict between the value of bureaucratic expertise on one hand and the desire for political control on the other this tension is well known and has been debated at least since weber s classic work on bureaucracy modern bureaucracies are staffed with individuals who by virtue of rational bureaucratic organization are highly skilled policy experts who in principle should be able to help less knowledgeable politicians achieve their goals however the very skills and expertise that bureaucrats enjoy create the possibility that bureaucrats will usurp the rightful role of politicians in policymaking processes because the way this tension is resolved determines the ultimate compatibility of democracy and bureaucracy existing theories of delegation typically focus on understanding how and to what extent politicians can resolve it 1 in many contexts particularly developing democracies bureaucracy does not fit the weberian characteristics that are assumed in the existing delegation literature the bureaucracies may be staffed with individuals who lack the personal capacity to execute orders effectively the organizational structure may lead to breakdowns within bureaucratic hierarchies making it difficult for senior administrators to control their subordinates departments and ministries may lack basic budgets and resources to undertake implementation actions they may suffer from incentives for

why don t poor countries catch up a cross national test of an institutional explanation early neoclassical analyses predicted that poor countries would grow faster than wealthy countries because of technological advances and diminishing returns to capital in the latter the reverse has occurred poor countries are falling back rather than catching up we suggest here that deficient institutions underlie this divergence employing various indicators of institutional quality including the rule of law the pervasiveness of corruption and the risk of expropriation and contract repudiation we show that the ability of poor countries to catch up is determined in large part by the institutional environment in which economic activity in these countries takes place jel o00 o10

bureaucracy and growth a cross national analysis of the effects of weberian state structures on economic growth the role of bureaucratic authority structures in facilitating economic growth has been a sociological concern since max weber s classic contributions almost 100 years ago using a recent and original data set we examine the characteristics of core state economic agencies and the growth records of a sample of 35 developing countries for the 1970 1990 period our weberianness scale offers a simple measure of the degree to which these agencies employ meritocratic recruitment and offer predictable rewarding long term careers we find that these weberian characteristics significantly enhance prospects for economic growth even when we control for initial levels of gdp per capita and human capital our results imply that weberianness should be included as a factor in general models of economic growth they also suggest the need for more attention by policymakers to building better bureaucracies and more research by social scientists on variations in how state bureaucracies are organized

political parties clientelism and bureaucratic reform the challenge of public administration reform is well known politicians often have little interest in the efficient implementation of government policy using new data from 439 world bank public sector reform loans in 109 countries we demonstrate that such reforms are significantly less likely to succeed in the presence of non programmatic political parties earlier research uses evidence from a small group of countries to conclude that clientelistic politicians resist reforms that restrict their patronage powers we support this conclusion with new evidence from many countries allowing us to rule out alternative explanations including the effect of electoral and political institutions we also examine reforms that have not been the subject of prior research those that make public sector financial management more transparent here we identify a second mechanism through which non programmatic parties undermine public sector reform clientelistic politicians have weaker incentives to exercise oversight of policy implementation by the executive branch

the neoclassical maximization hypothesis reply bruce caldwell has chided me for ignoring the contributions of modem philosophers in my 1981 article supposedly if i were to appreciate the contributions of the logical empiricists since the mid 1930 s i would see the error of my ways caldwell chooses to focus on my view of criticism namely that for any criticism to be successful it must be decisive or as he says logically compelling he feels this concept is overly narrow i understand him to be saying that there are other concepts which are less narrow and thus my concept is only a special case he recommends a more liberal concept of criticism which he calls appraisal my reply is that he is exactly wrong the idea that criticism must be logically compelling is not narrow but instead the broadest possible and worse his concept of criticism is completely inadequate the implication that we should avoid logically compelling criticism in favor of a weaker line of argument which he calls appraisal is merely an expression of caldwell s advocacy of the commonly promoted but logically inadequate methodology which philosophers today call conventionalism

alternative models of individual behaviour and implications for environmental policy abstract most insights of environmental economics are in line with the standard neoclassical economic model of rational behaviour formulated in terms of maximization of utility in general or of profits in particular the standard theory of environmental policy is a case in point however the maximization hypothesis and its methodological foundation have been criticized on many grounds related to a lack of either logical or empirical content moreover over the years a great many alternative models of behaviour have been proposed both criticism and alternatives are surveyed here attention is devoted to relevant insights from the philosophy of science the notion of methodological individualism and other criticism the alternative behavioural models include bounded rationality and satisficing lexicographic preferences habitual behaviour incommensurability and multicriteria evaluation and various models of behaviour under uncertainty major implications of the criticism and alternative models of individual behaviour for environmental policy theory are outlined

lock in institutions and efficiency abstract economists who emphasize path dependence generally dispute at first approximation the effectiveness of rational choice in understanding institutions such economists belonging to the original old institutional economics and the historical school maintain that the constraint function is riddled with inefficient technologies and institutions which agents fail to replace with superior ones even when the switching cost is clearly lower than expected benefit the argument ultimately rests on a theory of action a la herbert simon where agents become habituated for whatever is the default institution such a theory recognizes that agents are ready to replace habits with more viable ones but only when agents face shocks or crises such recognition though necessarily allows rational choice in the sense of responsiveness to incentives to enter from the rear window after all shocks and crises are merely severe incentives

transferable lessons re examining the institutional prerequisites of east asian economic policies competing theories of east asian economic policy share the assumption that a highly capable coherent economic bureaucracy closely connected to but still independent of the business community has been an essential institutional prerequisite for successful policy formation and implementation in east asia these institutional prerequisites were constructed in a variety of concrete forms with great difficulty and imperfect results as long as the idea of transferable lessons is understood as an invitation to indigenous innovation that takes advantage of the underlying analytical logic of east asian institutions other countries can reap important benefits from east asia s experience

corruption in russia abstractwe analyze the determinants of corruption in russia using law enforcement data on corruption incidents for a panel of 79 russian regions for the period 2004 13 we find that the relative salaries of bureaucrats determine corruption levels corruption declines as relative salaries rise yet at strongly diminishing rates furthermore we show that even very limited media freedom helps to curtail corruption other important determinants are the strength of law enforcement education levels and unemployment rates

comment defining health insurance affordability unobserved heterogeneity matters affordability is a vague concept bundorf and pauly bundorf m k pauly m v 2006 is health insurance affordable for the uninsured journal of health economics 25 4 650 673 address this problem by establishing clear working definitions of affordability and they use these definitions to estimate the percent of the uninsured who can afford insurance when they establish their definitions of affordability they use a microeconomic model that omits essential characteristics of the health insurance market this comment suggests alternative definitions that better incorporate the structure of the health insurance market discusses both endogeneity and specification problems that might occur when implementing their econometric model to estimate the fraction of uninsured afforders and then recommends ways to reduce omitted variable bias and endogeneity bias

the incidence and persistence of corruption in economic development abstract economic development and bureaucratic corruption are determined jointly in a dynamic general equilibrium model of growth bribery and tax evasion corruption arises from the incentives of public and private agents to conspire in the concealment of information from the government these incentives depend on aggregate economic activity which in turn depends on the incidence of corruption the model produces multiple development regimes transition between which may or may not occur in accordance with recent empirical evidence the relationship between corruption and development is predicted to be negative

colonisation institutions and development new evidence abstract this article analyses current attempts to identify the factors underlying long term economic growth the author criticises some of the arguments and historical evidence on which the two main explanations that dominate recent literature are based the institutional approach and the approach focusing on the importance of geographical factors using an approach which is deliberately eclectic the author considers the role of geography international trade human capital and institutional quality in explaining development a new estimation is carried out through two stages least squares tsls with instrumental variables the results of the empirical model confirm the central role of institutions in long term economic growth however certain geographical conditions also seem to have influenced countries chances of progress the human capital is a less robust factor in explaining economic growth and trade openness does not seem significant in any estimation nevertheless several questions remain to

aggregate structural macroeconomic analysis a reconsideration and defence aggregate structural macroeconomic analysis asma is frequently criticised for being ad hoc and justified if at all only as a pragmatic expedient this paper argues instead that asma is consistent with the principles of well established bodies of social theory appeal to these principles reveals that asma is adequate and likely even necessary for the successful prosecution of macroeconomic inquiry

two conceptions of economics and maximisation fil crespo ricardo fernando consejo nacional de investigaciones cientificas y tecnicas argentina universidad austral instituto de altos estudios argentina

bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries abstract we argue that several easily identifiable structural features constitute the key ingredients of effective state bureaucracies and should help to predict ratings of bureaucratic performance competitive salaries internal promotion and career stability and meritocratic recruitment we collect a new dataset on these features for bureaucracies of 35 less developed countries controlling for country income level of education and ethnolinguistic diversity we find that our measure of meritocratic recruitment is a statistically significant determinant of ratings supplied by two of three country risk agencies the importance of competitive salaries and internal promotion and career stability could not be clearly established

cost function estimation and quality bias the regulated automobile insurance industry this article explores the implications of endogenous product quality and therefore endogenous output in the empirical estimation of cost functions for regulated automobile collision insurance firms it contains a structural model of such a firm and provides an illustration of the types of biases that can result if data on quality of service are unavailable or otherwise omitted the analysis shows how the directions of biases depend on the nature of the variations in the observed nonquality data a new test suggests that such bias is present in insurance cost functions

civil service and the growth of government abstract i study a model of elections which links the scale of government activity to civil service rules without tenure protections bureaucrats career prospects are tied to the electoral prospects of the party that hires them to avoid wasteful partisan spending voters only consent to minimal taxation if bureaucrats are protected by tenure they have no incentive to favour one party over another and governments only produce public goods in turn voters consent to high taxes however because higher tax revenues increase the ability of governing parties to co opt the bureaucracy through favourable compensation large scale government activity is accompanied by inefficiently high public sector wages

press freedom externally generated transparency and stock price informativeness international evidence abstract this paper examines the impact of press freedom on stock price informativeness in a sample of firms from 50 countries we find a significant relation between more press freedom and lower stock price synchronicity our results suggest that the freedom of the press can enhance the information environment of stock markets

polarization politics and property rights links between inequality and growth most efforts to trace the effects of income inequality on growth have focused on redistribution however empirical investigation has not substantiated either the positive association of income inequality with redistribution or the negative association of redistribution with economic growth the authors analyze the effects of inequality in the broader context of social polarization they argue that social polarization whether rooted in income inequality or in ethnic tension makes large changes in current policies including those guaranteeing the security of contract and property rights more likely under a wide range of institutional arrangements the resulting uncertainties in the policy and contractual environment hinder growth they find strong empirical support for both parts of this argument the policy implications of their argument are quite distinct from those of arguments that inequality reduces growth by increasing pressures for redistribution if redistributive policies per se were to blame for the low growth resulting from inequality governments that seek to mitigate income inequality must inevitably confront a tradeoff between equity and growth if on the other hand the insecurity of property rights slows growth in unequal or otherwise polarized societies governments that commit over the long run to particular redistributive policies incur less risk of slowing economic growth fiscal redistribution that reduces inequality may actually increase growth by reducing the risks of political uncertainty

fractionalization entrepreneurship and the institutional environment for entrepreneurship the vast majority of the literature on ethnicity and entrepreneurship focuses on the construct of ethnic entrepreneurship however very little is known about how ethnic heterogeneity affects entrepreneurship and the institutional arrangements affecting entrepreneurship this study attempts to fill the gap and thus examines the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on various outcomes associated with entrepreneurship and the institutional environment for entrepreneurship using indices of ethnic and linguistic fractionalization we show that ethnic heterogeneity negatively influences entrepreneurship we argue that potential channels that can explain the negative effect of fractionalization on entrepreneurship include trust social network and innovation among others this study provides a new perspective on the existing debate that seeks to understand why the levels of entrepreneurial success vary across countries

public goods institutions human capital and growth evidence from german history what are the origins and consequences of the state as a provider of public goods we study public goods provision established through new laws in german cities during the 1500s cities that adopted the laws subsequently began to differentially produce and attract human capital and to grow faster legal change occurred where ideological competition introduced by the protestant reformation interacted with local politics we study plagues that shifted local politics in a narrow period as sources of exogenous variation in public goods institutions and find support for a causal interpretation of the relationship between legal change human capital and growth

why resource poor dictators allow freer media a theory and evidence from panel data every dictator dislikes free media yet many nondemocratic countries have partially free or almost free media in this article we develop a theory of media freedom in dictatorships and provide systematic statistical evidence in support of this theory in our model free media allow a dictator to provide incentives to bureaucrats and therefore to improve the quality of government the importance of this benefit varies with the natural resource endowment in resource rich countries bureaucratic incentives are less important for the dictator hence media freedom is less likely to emerge using panel data we show that controlling for country fixed effects media are less free in oil rich economies with the effect especially pronounced in nondemocratic regimes these results are robust to model specification and the inclusion of various controls including the level of economic development democracy country size size of government and others

the source of optimality in action it is well known that the nature of the information set and the axioms of rational choice are critical in determining the type of ranking on which agents are held to act in economic theory this paper argues that the concept of the optimising agent is also sensitive to the conception of the relation between a ranking of options facing an agent and concrete action what is termed the realisation process three conceptions of the realisation process are examined which are seen to lead to three quite distinct views on the role of agency the enabling conditions under which the concept of the optimising agent may be legitimately applied and the resulting domain of application of optimisation

the institutional foundations of public policy documento de trabajo 90 presidential address to the latin american and caribbean economic association lacea paris november 2005 titulo tomado de la pantalla de presentacion visto 12 de septiembre de 2011 noviembre 2005 incluye referencias bibliograficas

the costs of patronage evidence from the british empire i combine newly digitized personnel and public finance data from the british colonial administration for the period 1854 1966 to study how patronage affects the promotion and incentives of governors governors are more likely to be promoted to higher salaried colonies when connected to their superior during the period of patronage once allocated they provide more tax exemptions raise less revenue and invest less the promotion and performance gaps disappear after the abolition of patronage appointments patronage therefore distorts the allocation of public sector positions and reduces the incentives of favored bureaucrats to perform

bureaucracy and growth we revisit the hypothesis that a weberian bureaucracy enhances economic growth theoretically we develop arguments for why such a bureaucracy may enhance growth and discuss plausible counterargume

truth telling by third party auditors and the response of polluting firms experimental evidence from india in many regulated markets private third party auditors are chosen and paid by the firms that they audit potentially creating a conflict of interest this article reports on a two year field experiment in the indian state of gujarat that sought to curb such a conflict by altering the market structure for environmental audits of industrial plants to incentivize accurate reporting there are three main results first the status quo system was largely corrupted with auditors systematically reporting plant emissions just below the standard although true emissions were typically higher second the treatment caused auditors to report more truthfully and very significantly lowered the fraction of plants that were falsely reported as compliant with pollution standards third treatment plants in turn reduced their pollution emissions the results suggest reformed incentives for third party auditors can improve their reporting and make regulation more effective jel codes q56 m42 d22 copyright 2013 oxford university press

modern theories of entrepreneurial behavior a comparison and appraisal this paper compares and appraises three principal contemporary theories of entrepreneurial decision making neoclassical austrian and behavioral we employ theory appraisal criteria made available in fritz machlup s 1967 celebrated article on alternative theories of the firm the paper considers theories that treat sequences of behavior by which individual entrepreneurs reach decisions on two levels the discovery of profit opportunities and their exploitation we also consider how each theory characterizes the entrepreneur s decision making process by contrast with the posited behavior of other economic agents austrian theory is suited to explaining novel adventurous behavior at the discovery stage the algorithm for opportunity exploitation in both the neoclassical and austrian approaches is a single repertoire optimization rule neoclassical theory is situated in frictionless atomistic walrasian markets and emphasizes mathematical tractability austrian and behavioral theories conceive entrepreneurial acts taking place in market processes understood as complex institutional phenomena there are strong theoretical complementarities between austrian and behavioral approaches both approaches value descriptive accuracy though the behavioralists place more weight on operational tractability austrians and behavioralists share an interest in heuristics they emphasize the role of prior micro level knowledge at the discovery stage therefore more collaborative research in future between austrians and behavioralists should prove fruitful

disagreement and learning about reforms when it comes to economic reforms in developing countries many economists agree on broad objectives broad objectives however can be pursued in different ways and policy experimentation is often indispensable for learning which alternative works locally we propose a theoretical model to study this societal learning process the model explores the role of disagreeing beliefs about what works it suggests that such disagreement can stall the societal learning process and cause economic stagnation although everyone knows that growth promoting reforms do exist our analysis is motivated by the observation of a negative relationship between disagreement and economic growth among poorer countries

the impact of an unexpected wage cut on corruption evidence from a xeroxed exam this paper aims to understand how corruption responds to an income loss we exploit an unexpected 25 wage cut incurred in 2010 by all romanian public sector employees including the public education staff we investigate a corruptible high stake exam taking place shortly after the wage announcement to measure corruption we compare changes in exam outcomes from 2007 to 2010 between public and private schools as the latter were not affected by the policy we find that the wage loss induced better exam outcomes in public than in private schools and we attribute this difference to increased corruption by public educators

the robot the party animal and the philosopher an evolutionary perspective on deliberation and preference this paper examines the evolutionary fitness of a variety of ways of reaching decisions in early hunter gatherer societies in order to derive insights about how economists should view modern consumers it challenges conclusions reached by mainstream economists robson rayo and becker about why hunter gatherers needed sensory rewards and about the kinds of preference systems that would have conferred evolutionary fitness it argues that evolution favours those with a variety of ways of reaching decisions programmed deliberative intuitive and go with the flow and that the prospect of sensory rewards serves an evolutionary role by diverting people from thinking too much about what they are doing in situations in which deliberation might interfere with survival or reproduction the evolutionary role of a reluctance or failure to make trade offs is also considered along with the benefits of developing a relatively fixed identity rather than being all things to all men

a controlled field experiment on corruption abstract this paper reports on a controlled field experiment on corruption designed to address two important issues the experimenter s scrutiny and the unobservability of corruption in the experiment a grader is offered a bribe along with a demand for a better grade we find that graders respond more favorably to bigger bribes while the effect of higher wages is ambiguous it lowers the bribe s acceptance but it fosters reciprocation monitoring and punishment can deter corruption but we cannot reject that it may also crowd out intrinsic motivations for honesty when intensified finally our results suggest several micro determinants of corruption including age ability religiosity but not gender

time consistent health insurance currently available health insurance contracts often fail to insure long term illnesses sick people can suffer large increases in premiums or denial of coverage i describe insurance contracts that solve this problem their key feature is a severance payment a person who is diagnosed with a long term illness and whose premiums are increased receives a lump sum equal to the increased present value of premiums this lump sum allows him or her to pay the higher premiums required by any insurer people are not tied to a particular insurer or a group and the improvement is free insurance companies can operate at zero economic profits and consumers can pay exactly the same premium they do with standard contracts

the neoclassical maximization hypothesis comment in a recent paper in this review lawrence boland argues it is futile to criticize the neoclassical maximization hypothesis his argument is summarized as follows 1 there are only two types of criticism of any behavioral hypothesis once one has established its logical validity one can argue against the possibility of the hypothesized behavior or one can argue against the empirical truth of the premise of the hypothesis p 1031 boland hopes to show that neither of the two forms of criticism works against the maximization hypothesis 2 one cannot prove the logical impossibility of the maximization hypothesis attempts to do so fail for one of two reasons either one must assume that inductive proofs are necessary for true knowledge or one must assume that true knowledge is necessary for maximization see pp 1032 33 boland argues that neither assumption can be maintained 3 regarding empirical criticism the methodological problems of empirical refutations of economic theories are widely accepted p 1033 4 even were this not true the logical form of the maximization hypothesis an all and some statement makes it neither verifiable nor refutable e ven if one could prove that a consumer is not maximizing utility this would not constitute a refutation of the neoclassical hypothesis p 1034 because one can always claim that the consumer was maximizing something that is something other than utility 5 finally this does not imply that the hypothesis is necessarily a tautology the hypothesis is best considered an untestable metaphysical statement which is an essential component of the neoclassical research program points 3 and 5 above attributed to boland are acceptable as stated they are related points the empirical problems mentioned in point 3 are sufficient to establish the untestability of the maximization hypothesis which supports the conclusion in point 5 the purpose of this comment is to criticize points 1 2 and 4 specifically it is shown that though there are only two forms of logically compelling criticism many other forms of criticism that are useful exist and that given a broader interpretation of the term criticism boland s remarks about proofs of logical impossibility though correct miss the point of what critics of the maximization hypothesis tried to do an alternative to boland s characterization of the maximization hypothesis as an all and some statement one more consistent with well known developments in philosophy of science is also presented in the final section it is shown that boland s approach of necessity neglects some widely known and relevant developments in the methodological literature

distribution and development in a model of misgovernance abstract this paper presents an analysis of bureaucratic corruption income inequality and economic development the analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which bureaucrats are appointed by the government to implement a redistributive programme of taxes and subsidies designed to benefit the poor corruption is reflected in bribery and tax evasion as bureaucrats conspire with the rich in providing false information to the government in accordance with empirical evidence the model predicts a positive relationship between corruption and inequality and a negative relationship between corruption and development

politics and administration this paper develops a theory of the eectiveness of government programs in the model a bureaucrat chooses a mechanism for assigning a good such as a license or a benet payment to a client of uncertain qualications the mechanism uses a means test to verify the client s eligibility a politician who values the payos of a subset of client types exercises oversight by designating the resources available for means testing and the population of clients that can be served the model makes predictions about common administrative pathologies including inecient and politicized distribution of resources program errors and backlogs when the politician favors marginally qualied clients programs will tend to be universal with low per capita spending and high error rates when the politician favors highly qualied clients programs have smaller client populations higher per capita spending and lower error rates notably the bureaucrat can only use discriminatory testing in the latter case and programs with larger budgets do not spend more per client

the glittering prizes career incentives and bureaucrat performance bureaucracies are configured differently to private sector and political organizations across a wide range of civil services entry is competitive promotion is constrained by seniority jobs are for life and retirement occurs at a fixed age this implies that older entering officers who are less likely to attain the glittering prize of reaching the top of the bureaucracy before they retire may be less motivated to exert effort using a nationwide stakeholder survey and rich administrative data on elite civil servants in india we provide evidence that i officers who cannot reach the senior most positions before they retire are perceived to be less effective and are more likely to be suspended and ii this effect is weakened by a reform that extends the retirement age together these results suggest that the career incentive of reaching the top of a public organization is a powerful determinant of bureaucrat performance

economics and underdetermination a case study of urban land and housing economics underdetermination associated with the duhem quine thesis is a familiar if under researched theme in economics in the light of this we examine the development of urban land and housing economics through its cartesian dualistic delineation of theory and data the contemporary mainstream approach appears unable to circumvent the problem of underdetermination in effect it employs the strong version of duhem quine in its retention of the assumption of a single unitary competitive market and associated access space trade off conversely we highlight the affinity of ely s and the later columbia school s approach to pragmatists dewey and peirce which provides a more fruitful basis for explanation

traveling agents political change and bureaucratic turnover in india abstract we develop a framework to empirically examine how politicians with electoral pressures control bureaucrats with career concerns and the consequent implications for bureaucrats career investments unique microlevel data on indian bureaucrats support our key predictions politicians use frequent reassignments transfers across posts of varying importance to control bureaucrats high skilled bureaucrats face less frequent political transfers and lower variability in the importance of their posts we find evidence of two alternative paths to career success officers of higher initial ability are more likely to invest in skill but caste affinity to the politician s party base also helps secure important positions

merit tenure and bureaucratic behavior evidence from a conjoint experiment in the dominican republic bureaucratic behavior in developing countries remains poorly understood why do some public servants yet not others work hard to deliver public services misuse state resources and or participate in electoral mobilization a classic answer comes from weber bureaucratic structures shift behavior toward integrity neutrality and commitment to public service our study conducts the first survey experimental test of the effects of bureaucratic structures it does so through a conjoint experiment with public servants in the dominican republic looking at merit examinations and job stability we find that weber was right but only partially recruitment by examination curbs corruption and political services by bureaucrats while enhancing work motivation job stability by contrast only decreases political services tenured bureaucrats are less likely to participate in electoral mobilization examinations thus enhance the quality of bureaucracy motivation and lower corruption and democracy electoral compe

political foundations of the resource curse in this paper we argue that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse we show 1 politicians tend to over extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they discount the future too much and 2 resource booms improve the efficiency of the extraction path however 3 resource booms by raising the value of being in power and by providing politicians with more resources which they can use to influence the outcome of elections increase resource misallocation in the rest of the economy 4 the overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends critically on institutions since these determine the extent to which political incentives map into policy outcomes countries with institutions that promote accountability and state competence will tend to benefit from resource booms since these institutions ameliorate the perverse political incentives that such booms create countries without such institutions however may suffer from a resource curse

political budget cycles and the civil service evidence from highway spending in us states abstract we study political budget cycles in infrastructure spending that are conditional on bureaucratic organization bureaucrats can facilitate or hinder politicians ability to engage in voter friendly spending around elections to test this idea we use civil service reforms undertaken by us states in the second half of the 20th century to study political budget cycles in highway spending under civil service and patronage we find that under patronage highway spending is 12 higher in election years and 9 higher in the year before an election by contrast under civil service highway spending is essentially smooth over the electoral cycle these findings provide a novel way through which civil service rules can stabilize government activity

optimal risk adjustment in markets with adverse selection an application to managed care it is well known that adverse selection causes distortions in contracts in markets with asymmetric information taxing inefficient contracts and subsidizing the efficient ones can improve market outcomes bruce c greenwald and joseph e stiglitz 1986 although regulators rarely seem to implement tax and subsidy schemes with adverse selection motives in mind contracts are often complex and incomplete and it is the inefficient elements of the contract that are difficult to verify and hence tax or subsidize this is precisely the reason that in health insurance markets rather than subsidizing contracts regulators and payers contend with adverse selection by taxing and subsidizing the price paid to insuring health plans on the basis of observable characteristics of the persons joining the plan a practice known as risk adjustment risk adjusted premiums are paid to managed care plans plans that ration care by management rather than by conventional approaches like coinsurance and deductibles and offer a bundle of characteristics quality access for many services that is fundamentally outside the scope of direct regulation selection related incentives threaten the efficiency and fairness of this organization of health insurance markets by inducing plans to distort the quality of the services they offer to discourage high cost persons from joining the plan as managed care becomes the predominant source of health care for residents of the united states and many other countries payers attempt to address this incentive by setting a risk adjusted price that pays more for more expensive enrollees as it is conventionally practiced risk adjustment sets prices for people proportional to their expected cost based on observable characteristics the federal medicare program for example has used age sex welfare status and county of residence adjusters to set prices to managed care plans to convey how what we term conventional risk adjustment works suppose age is the risk adjuster for a medicare population over 65 if it is determined that the 75to 84 year old population costs 20 percent more than the overall average in medicare the assumption in conventional risk adjustment is that the premium paid to plans for someone in this group should be 20 percent above the average we fundamentally disagree that this is the right way to think about and do risk adjustment

a branch of economics is missing micro micro theory jn the life history of most sciences there are movements toward the study of larger aggregates or toward the detailed study of smaller and more fundamental units my impression is that in most fields the movement toward the study of more micro units has predominated yet in economics in the 1930 s the movement was in the macro direction both physics and biology in the last three decades have made great strides by studying smaller and smaller entitiesphysics by studying more minute fundamental particles and biology by studying the fundamental elements determining genetics in a general sense economics has not been moving in this direction although some work of this nature exists the purpose of this paper is to review some samples of the work that exists and to argue that this area must become a major field of economic research and study the question of how individuals in multiperson firms influence firm decisions seems like such a natural question to ask that it is amazing that it is not part of the formal agenda of economists as a profession of course it has been asked but not by present day economists in their professional capacity in other words micromicroeconomics has never become an established field for the most part theorists have not only not raised this question but they have continued to develop micro theory in such a way as to discourage economists from raising this question part of the reason for this lies in the maximizing and optimizing biases of conventional micro theory and part can be ascribed to the consequences of the long period required to refine the theory so that elements that did not fit the basic model were discarded

runaway state building how political parties shape states in postcommunist eastern europe why has the rate of expansion of postcommunist state administrations varied so widely among countries that are at comparable stages of economic transition have similar formal institutions and have been equally exposed to the dynamics of eu integration based on a close comparison of poland the czech republic and slovakia the author argues that the critical factor in postcommunist state building is the robustness of party competition the legacy of communism creates strong pressures for patronage politics which swells the administration but it is party competition that determines whether the predisposition to patronage politics in fact becomes the practice of patronage politics the number of state administrative personnel has expanded significantly more in countries where party system development has stalled and party competition has failed to constrain the party ies of government

a free press is bad news for corruption abstract this paper tests the proposition that a free press may be a powerful control on corruption we find evidence of a significant relationship between more press freedom and less corruption in a large cross section of countries this result is robust to specification and sample and the relationship is not sensitive to the choice of a particular measure of corruption or of press freedom furthermore we present evidence which suggests that the direction of causation runs from higher press freedom to lower corruption

emergence and persistence of inefficient states we present a theory of the emergence and persistence of inefficient states based on patronage politics the society consists of rich and poor the rich are initially in power but expect to transition to democracy which will choose redistributive policies taxation requires the employment of bureaucrats by choosing an inefficient state structure the rich may be able to use patronage and capture democratic politics so reducing the amount of redistribution in democracy moreover the inefficient state creates its own constituency and tends to persist over time intuitively an inefficient state structure creates more rents for bureaucrats than would an efficient one when the poor come to power in democracy they will reform the structure of the state to make it more efficient so that higher taxes can be collected at lower cost and with lower rents for bureaucrats anticipating this when the society starts out with an inefficient organization of the state bureaucrats support the rich who set lower taxes but also provide rents to bureaucrats we obtain that the rich bureaucrats coalition may also expand the size of bureaucracy excessively so as to generate enough political support the model shows that an equilibrium with an inefficient state is more likely to arise when there is greater income inequality when bureaucratic rents take intermediate values and when individuals are sufficiently forward looking jel p16 h11 h26 h41

governance and the effectiveness of public health subsidies evidence from ghana kenya and uganda abstract distributing subsidized health products through existing health infrastructure could substantially and cost effectively improve health in sub saharan africa there is however widespread concern that poor governance in particular limited health worker accountability seriously undermines the effectiveness of subsidy programs we audit targeted bed net distribution programs to quantify the extent of agency problems we find that around 80 of the eligible receive the subsidy as intended and up to 15 of subsidies are leaked to ineligible people supplementing the program with simple financial or monitoring incentives for health workers does not improve performance further and is thus not cost effective in this context

state capacity and health outcomes comparing argentina s and chile s reduction of infant and maternal mortality 1960 2013 summary there is substantial quantitative evidence linking higher state capacity to better health outcomes but scant attention has been paid to the specific mechanisms through which this causal influence operates the problem is compounded by the considerable diversity of ways in which the influence of the state on development outcomes has been conceptualized making it hard for practitioners to extract policy lessons from this literature in this study i seek to help to address both of these problems through a historical comparative examination of the ways in which state capacity affected infant and maternal mortality reduction in argentina and chile over the last half century i show that chile s greater investment in health specific state capacities was behind the remarkable historical reversal of fortune between these two countries in terms of infant and maternal mortality levels from 1960 to the present as well as behind chile s notorious reduction in the territorial inequality of these outcomes i show the key difference between the two countries was the quality reach and homogeneity of their respective public health systems from a theoretical standpoint i argue that the notions of bureaucratic quality and infrastructural power are both necessary and complementary perspectives through which to conceptualize state capacity and understand its causal influence over health and other desirable developmental outcomes in turn this suggests that a useful way to specify calls for better governance and to achieve better long run health performance may be to invest in the public health system s technical bureaucratic autonomy and in its system wide planning and coordination capacities