multimarket optimal bidding for a power producer this paper considers a profit maximizing thermal producer that participates in a sequence of spot markets namely day ahead automatic generation control agc and balancing markets the producer behaves as a price taker in both the day ahead market and the agc market but as a potential price maker in the volatile balancing market the paper provides a stochastic programming methodology to determine the optimal bidding strategies for the day ahead market uncertainty sources include prices for the day ahead and agc markets and balancing market linear price variations with the production of the thermal producer results from a realistic case study are reported and analyzed conclusions are duly drawn

efficient and durable decision rules with incomplete information we compare six concepts of efficiency for economies with incomplete information depending on the stage at which individuals welfare is evaluated and on whether incentive constraints are recognized an example is shown in which an incentive efficient decision rule may be unanimously rejected by the individuals in the economy we define durable decision rules which can resist such unanimous rejection and show that efficient durable decision rules exist

efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

optimal bidding scheduling and deployment of battery systems in california day ahead energy market an optimal supply and demand bidding scheduling and deployment design framework is proposed for battery systems it takes into account various design factors such as the day ahead and real time market prices and their statistical dependency as well as the location size efficiency lifetime and charge and discharge rates of the batteries utilizing second life used batteries is also considered without loss of generality our focus is on the california independent system operator iso energy market and its two available bidding options namely self schedule bidding and economic bidding while the formulated stochastic optimization problems are originally nonlinear and difficult to solve we propose a methodology to decompose them into inner and outer subproblems accordingly we find the global optimal solutions within a short amount of computational time all case studies in this paper are based on real market data

a new transmission tariff allocation model based on bilevel programming this paper proposes a flow based approach for the transmission tariff allocation problem based on the notions of long run marginal cost lrmc and nodal exchange factors nefs a worst case power flow expressed in terms of nefs is formulated to characterize the system state additionally the nefs optimal values are determined considering a specific criterion to compute tariffs the resulting problem is formulated as a bilevel program the upper level is a worst case power flow that maximizes line flows taking into account the transmission tariffs computed in the lower level the criterion considered in the lower level aims to minimize the variation range of transmission tariffs which is particularly desirable to provide incentives for renewable sources installed far away from load centers the resulting bilevel problem may have multiple solutions here the uniqueness in tariffs is preserved by solving an alternative problem once both the generation dispatch and the variation range of transmission tariffs are known numerical results are provided for a 6 bus system and the ieee 118 bus system

bilateral trading with naive traders we introduce naive traders in bilateral trading these traders report their true types in direct mechanisms and bid ask their values costs in auctions we show that by expropriating naive traders in direct mechanisms the mechanism designer can subsidize additional trades by strategic traders and improve efficiency in fact complete expropriation of naive traders is a necessary condition for constrained efficiency a significant implication is that in the presence of naive traders ex post individually rational mechanisms are not constrained efficient in contrast if the traders must use a given mechanism then the introduction of naive traders has an ambiguous effect on efficiency

tax limited reaction functions summary this paper models for the first time a spatial process in local tax policies in the presence of centrally imposed fiscal limitations focusing on the frequently encountered case of a tax rate cap we evaluate three empirical approaches to the analysis of spatially dependent limited tax policies i a bayesian spatial approach for censored dependent variables ii a tobit corner solution model augmented with a spatial lag iii a spatial discrete hazard model the evidence arising from an investigation of severely state constrained local vehicle taxes in italy suggests that ignoring tax limitations can lead to substantial underestimation of inter jurisdictional fiscal interaction copyright 2011 john wiley sons ltd

market power assessment and mitigation in hydrothermal systems the objective of this paper is to investigate market power issues in bid based hydrothermal scheduling initially market power is simulated with a single stage nash cournot equilibrium model market power assessment for multiple stages is then carried through a stochastic dynamic programming scheme the decision in each stage and state is the equilibrium of a multi agent game thereafter mitigation measures specially bilateral contracts are investigated case studies with data taken from the brazilian system are presented and discussed

individually rational budget balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus abstract we investigate the issue of implementation via individually rational ex post budget balanced bayesian mechanisms we show that all decision rules generating a nonnegative expected social surplus are implementable via such mechanisms if and only if the probability distribution of the agents type profiles satisfies two conditions the well known condition of cremer and mclean 1988 full extraction of the surplus in bayesian and dominant strategy auctions econometrica 56 1247 1257 and the identifiability condition introduced in this paper we also show that these conditions are necessary for ex post efficiency to be attainable with budget balance and individual rationality and that the expected social surplus in these mechanisms can be distributed in any desirable way lastly we demonstrate that like cremer mclean condition the identifiability condition is generic if there are at least three agents

nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition abstract this paper analyzes nash equilibria in a simple model of an economy with jurisdictions engaging in fiscal competition small number nash equilibria in which tax rates are the strategic variables are shown not to coincide with nash equilibria in which public expenditure levels are the strategic variables

efficient bilateral trade with statistically dependent beliefs abstract this paper derives a necessary and sufficient condition for ex post efficient trade to be feasible when trader beliefs can be statistically dependent allowing for dependent beliefs produces equilibrium and comparative statics behavior that differs qualitatively from that observed in bilateral trade models in which traders have independent beliefs

on the solution of revenue and network constrained day ahead market clearing under marginal pricing part ii case studies this paper presents the numerical analysis of the bilevel programming approach for revenue and network constrained market clearing developed in its companion paper the impact of minimum revenue conditions and minimum declared profits on generation and consumption levels as well as on locational marginal prices for energy is examined in detail through three case studies first the results from an illustrative example including minimum revenue conditions are comprehensively analyzed the second case study is based on the ieee reliability test system and considers minimum declared profits in the third case study a modified version of the ieee 118 bus system is tested while accounting for minimum revenue conditions in addition the computational behavior of the proposed approach is illustrated with several case studies including the ieee 300 bus system numerical results show the effectiveness of the proposed approach to handle revenue constraints as well as its superiority over the heuristic currently implemented in the iberian electricity market moreover simulations reveal that unlike previous works in the literature generation revenue constraints can be precisely incorporated in day ahead market clearing while explicitly considering the standard economic dispatch based marginal pricing scheme and without requiring price uplifts

a theory of interregional tax competition a general equilibrium model is constructed to study tax competition where local governments compete for capital by holding down property tax rates and public expenditure levels an exact definition of tax competition is provided and both the existence and nonexistence of tax competition are shown to be theoretically possible it is argued however that tax competition must occur under empirically reasonable conditions inefficiency in public production is also explicitly modeled the amount of capital used to produce a given level of public service output is shown to be greater than that which is required to minimize costs evaluated at the prices facing private firms

a three level static milp model for generation and transmission expansion planning we present a three level equilibrium model for the expansion of an electric network the lower level model represents the equilibrium of a pool based market the intermediate level represents the nash equilibrium in generation capacity expansion taking into account the outcomes on the spot market and the upper level model represents the anticipation of transmission expansion planning to the investment in generation capacity and the pool based market equilibrium the demand has been considered as exogenous and locational marginal prices are obtained as endogenous variables of the model the three level model is formulated as a mixed integer linear programming milp problem the model is applied to a realistic power system in chile to illustrate the methodology and proper conclusions are reached

an optimization model for the electricity market clearing problem with uniform purchase price and zonal selling prices electricity markets can be designed in different ways one rule that is sometimes enforced is the uniform purchase price under this pricing method all the consumers pay the same price regardless of the zone they belong to by contrast each producer receives its zonal price this asymmetry in the price paid and received makes the clearing process not easily treatable through standard optimization techniques within the framework of marginal pricing this paper shows how it is possible to formulate the market clearing problem with uniform purchase price and zonal selling prices as a computationally tractable mixed integer linear programming problem the proposed approach is tested using real data from the italian day ahead market which is actually based on the aforementioned rule

impact of forecast errors on expansion planning of power systems with a renewables target abstract this paper analyzes the impact of production forecast errors on the expansion planning of a power system and investigates the influence of market design to facilitate the integration of renewable generation for this purpose we propose a programming modeling framework to determine the generation and transmission expansion plan that minimizes system wide investment and operating costs while ensuring a given share of renewable generation in the electricity supply unlike existing ones this framework includes both a day ahead and a balancing market so as to capture the impact of both production forecasts and the associated prediction errors within this framework we consider two paradigmatic market designs that essentially differ in whether the day ahead generation schedule and the subsequent balancing re dispatch are co optimized or not the main features and results of the model set ups are discussed using an illustrative four node example and a more realistic 24 node case study

offering strategies and simulation of multi item iterative auctions of energy contracts the objective of this work is threefold we firstly present an optimization model for a price taker hydrothermal generation company genco to devise bidding strategies in multi item iterative auctions of long term contracts the bidding model calculates a bidder s best response function which takes into account the key issues on the auctioned contracts such as its time horizon the risk factors that affect the future contract outcomes interdependence between auctioned products and the agents risk profile the risk profile of the gencos are represented as piecewise linear utility functions and a practical specification approach is proposed we finally present a simulator of a uniform pricing and iterative multi item contract auction where the set of auction rules is implemented and the optimization model developed is used to determine the gencos s best responses at each auction round the simulator enables auctioneers and generators to estimate the auction s competitive equilibrium price and to study the auction dynamics a real multiproduct descending clock auction is simulated for the brazilian power system under the proposed bidding scheme

computation of extremal nash equilibria in a wholesale power market using a single stage milp this letter proposes a new approach to the computation of extremal nash equilibria in a wholesale power market with transmission constraints the approach uses linearization techniques to formulate the extremal nash equilibrium problem as a single stage mixed integer linear programming problem which can be solved with standard software through the introduced concept of extremal nash equilibria the derived structure can efficiently locate all nash equilibria of the game we show that this approach offers significant performance improvements over existing approaches to computing nash equilibria

risk constrained generation asset arbitrage in power systems a competitive generating company genco can maximize its payoff by optimizing its generation assets this paper considers the genco s arbitrage problem using stochastic price based unit commitment while considering the associated risks the genco may consider arbitrage opportunities in purchases from qualifying facilities qfs as well as simultaneous trades with spot markets for energy ancillary services fuel and emission allowance the tradeoff between maximizing expected payoffs and minimizing risks due to market price uncertainties is modeled explicitly by including the expected downside risk as a constraint the downside risk is defined as the unfulfilled profit the monte carlo simulation is applied to generate scenarios and scenario reduction techniques are applied to reduce the number of scenarios while maintaining a good approximation of the exact solution the proposed case studies illustrate the significance of arbitrage in multi commodity markets and the importance of considering the uncertainty of market prices

demand and distance evidence on cross border shopping while many studies have documented deviations from the law of one price in international settings evidence is scarce on the extent to which consumers take advantage of price differentials and engage in cross border shopping we use data from 287 swedish municipalities to estimate how responsive alcohol sales are to foreign prices and relate the sensitivity to the location s distance to the border typical results suggest that the elasticity with respect to the foreign price is around 0 4 in the border region moving 200 400 kilometers inland reduces it to 0 2 0 1 given that cross country price differences for alcohol and other products are often caused by taxes our evidence has implications for the debate on tax competition harmonization

the role of commitment in bilateral trade abstract this paper characterizes the set of equilibrium payoffs in bargaining with interdependent values when the informed party makes all offers as discounting vanishes the seller of a good is informed of its quality which affects both his cost and the buyer s valuation but the buyer is not to characterize this payoff set we derive an upper bound using mechanism design with limited commitment we then prove that this upper bound is tight by showing that all its extreme points are equilibrium payoffs our results shed light on the role of different forms of commitment in bargaining in particular they imply that the buyer s inability to commit before observing the terms of trade is what precludes efficiency

patient mobility and health care quality when regions and patients differ in income we study the effects of cross border patient mobility on health care quality and welfare when income varies across and within regions we use a salop model with a high middle and low income region in each region a policy maker chooses health care quality to maximise the utility of its residents when health care costs are financed by general income taxation in equilibrium regions with higher income offer better quality which creates an incentive for patient mobility from lower to higher income regions assuming a prospective payment scheme based on drg pricing we find that lower non monetary administrative mobility costs have i no effect on quality or welfare in the high income region ii a negative effect on quality but a positive effect on welfare for the middle income region and iii ambiguous effects on quality and welfare for the low income region lower monetary mobility costs copayments might reduce welfare in both the middle and low income region thus health policies that stimulate cross border patient mobility can be counterproductive when regions differ in income

non binding minimum taxes may foster tax competition abstract in a stackelberg framework of capital income taxation it is shown that imposing a minimum tax rate that is lower than all countries equilibrium tax rates in the unconstrained non cooperative equilibrium may reduce equilibrium tax rates in all countries

nash equilibrium in strategic bidding a binary expansion approach this paper presents a mixed integer linear programming solution approach for the equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints epec problem of finding the nash equilibrium ne in strategic bidding in short term electricity markets a binary expansion be scheme is used to transform the nonlinear nonconvex ne problem into a mixed integer linear problem milp which can be solved by commercially available computational systems the be scheme can be applicable to cournot bertrand or joint price quantity bidding models the approach is illustrated in case studies with configurations derived from the 95 gw brazilian system including unit commitment decisions to the price maker agents

bargaining under incomplete information this paper presents and analyzes a bargaining model of bilateral monopoly under uncertainty under the bargaining rule proposed the buyer and the seller each submit sealed offers that determine whether the good in question is sold and the transfer price the nash equilibrium solution of this bargaining game implies an offer strategy of each party that is monotonic in its own reservation price and depends on its assessment of the opponent s reservation price issues of relative bargaining advantage and efficiency are examined for a number of special cases finally we discuss the appropriateness of the nash solution concept

capacity expansion equilibria in liberalized electricity markets an epec approach this paper presents a novel way to model the generation capacity expansion problem in a liberalized framework via a multi year bilevel equilibrium model in the upper level the competing generation companies maximize their individual profits while the lower level represents the market using a conjectured price response approach which allows us to vary the strategic spot market behavior to see how much the reigning competitive behavior impacts investment decisions the bilevel equilibrium model is formulated as an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints transformed into a mixed integer linear program and solved as such using diagonalization in order to verify equilibria we present a case study to apply this new modeling approach and to demonstrate that the proposed equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints can have multiple solutions whose respective investments can vary

endogenizing leadership in tax competition abstract in this paper we extend the standard approach of horizontal tax competition by endogenizing the timing of decisions made by the competing jurisdictions following the literature on the endogenous timing in duopoly games we consider a pre play stage where jurisdictions commit themselves to move early or late i e to fix their tax rate at a first or second stage we highlight that at least one jurisdiction experiments a second mover advantage we show that the subgame perfect equilibria spes correspond to the two stackelberg situations yielding to a coordination problem in order to solve this issue we consider a quadratic specification of the production function and we use two criteria of selection pareto dominance and risk dominance we emphasize that at the risk dominant equilibrium the less productive or smaller jurisdiction leads and hence loses the second mover advantage if asymmetry among jurisdictions is sufficient pareto dominance reinforces risk dominance in selecting the same spe three results may be deduced from our analysis i the downward pressure on tax rates is less severe than predicted ii the smaller jurisdiction leads iii the big country higher tax rate rule does not always hold

on pareto improving commodity tax changes under fiscal competition this paper shows that when a noncooperative fiscal equilibrium of the mintz tulkens 1986 model of tax competition is inefficient pareto improving changes are positive for the taxes of both regions under concavity of the regions welfare functions it also identifies a class of such equilibria that are always efficient

price elasticity of gasoline smuggling a semi structural estimation approach abstract we estimate the price elasticity of the demand for gasoline smuggling in iran for this purpose we employ a detailed panel of monthly gasoline consumption data from 160 distribution hubs during the period 2005 2014 we apply two different approaches which are diff in diff and panel data estimations the results suggest that the foreign to home gasoline price ratios have a significant impact on the time varying elasticity of demand this finding supports the hypothesis that an increase in domestic gasoline prices will significantly reduce the demand for smuggling in addition as the distance of a region from its closest higher price neighboring country diminishes the price elasticity of demand for gasoline smuggling for that region declines as well finally we find that when the ratio of foreign to domestic prices is higher the gasoline demand sensitivities to price in neighboring countries go up our work offers new insights regarding the welfare impact of removing fuel subsidies and modifying fuel pricing policies

ex ante efficient ex post individually rational trade abstract consider a bilateral trade model with two sided incomplete information for a general set of independent beliefs an ex post individually rational mechanism generating the same level of ex ante expected gains from trade as an ex ante efficient interim individually rational mechanism is constructed thus imposing the stronger notion of ex post individual rationality on this mechanism design problem generates no loss of efficiency

on the solution of revenue and network constrained day ahead market clearing under marginal pricing part i an exact bilevel programming approach the first of this two paper series addresses a practical day ahead auction model where generation revenue constraints are explicitly incorporated in the problem formulation as routinely done in several national electricity markets across europe the revenue constrained market clearing procedure includes the effect of the transmission network inter temporal constraints associated with generation scheduling demand side bidding and marginal pricing this auction design is an instance of price based market clearing which features two major complicating factors first locational marginal prices become decision variables of the optimization process in addition producer revenues are formulated as bilinear and highly nonconvex products of power outputs and market clearing prices the resulting problem is formulated as a mixed integer nonlinear bilevel program with bilinear terms for which available solution techniques rely on heuristics approximations or modeling simplifications this paper presents a novel and exact methodology whereby the original problem is recast as an equivalent single level mixed integer linear program as a consequence finite convergence to optimality is guaranteed and the use of standard commercial software is allowed the proposed transformation is based on duality theory of linear programming karush kuhn tucker optimality conditions and integer algebra results in the second part of this two paper series numerical results from several case studies illustrate the effective performance of the proposed solution approach

irrigation technology adoption and gains from water trading under asymmetric information we develop a water allocation and irrigation technology adoption model under the prior appropriation doctrine with asymmetric information among heterogeneous farmers and between farmers and water authorities we find that adverse selection reduces the adoption of modern irrigation technology we also show that even with asymmetric information incentives for water trade exist and lead to additional technology adoption with gains to all parties this suggests that under asymmetric information a thin secondary market improves the allocation of water resources and induces additional adoption of modern irrigation technologies

reforming an asymmetric union on the virtues of dual tier capital taxation the tax competition for mobile capital in particular the reluctance of small countries to agree on measures of tax coordination has ongoing political and economic fallouts within europe we analyse the effects of introducing a two tier structure of capital taxation where the asymmetric member states of a union choose a common federal tax rate in the first stage and then non cooperatively set local tax rates in the second stage we show that this mechanism effectively reduces competition for mobile capital between the members of the union moreover it distributes the gains across the heterogeneous states in a way that yields a strict pareto improvement over a one tier system of purely local tax choices we also discuss the effects of diverging capital endowments within the union and capital flows to third countries

modeling strategic investment decisions in spatial markets abstract markets for natural resources and commodities are often oligopolistic in these markets production capacities are key for strategic interaction between the oligopolists we analyze how different market structures influence oligopolistic capacity investments and thereby affect supply prices and rents in spatial natural resource markets using mathematical programming models the models comprise an investment stage and a supply stage in which players compete in quantities we compare three models a perfect competition and two cournot models in which the product is either traded through long term contracts or on spot markets in the supply stage tractability and practicality of the approach are demonstrated in an application to the international metallurgical coal market results may vary substantially between the different models the metallurgical coal market has recently made progress in moving away from long term contracts and more towards spot market based trade based on our results we conclude that this regime switch is likely to raise consumer rents but lower producer rents while the effect on total welfare is negligible

assessing market structures in resource markets an empirical analysis of the market for metallurgical coal using various equilibrium models abstract the prevalent market structures found in many resource markets consist of high concentration on the supply side and low demand elasticity market results are therefore frequently assumed to be an outcome of strategic interaction between producers common models to investigate the market outcomes and underlying market structures are games representing competitive markets strategic cournot competition and stackelberg structures that take into account a dominant player acting first followed by one or more players we add to the literature by expanding the application of mathematical models and applying an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints epec which is used to model multi leader follower games to a spatial market using our model we investigate the prevalent market setting in the international market for metallurgical coal between 2008 and 2010 whose market characteristics provide arguments for a wide variety of market structures using different statistical measures to compare model results with actual market outcomes we find that two previously neglected settings perform best first a setting in which the four largest metallurgical coal exporting firms compete against each other as stackelberg leaders while the remainders act as cournot followers second a setting with bhpb acting as sole stackelberg leader

the impact of fuel tourism on retailers diesel price in spanish neighbouring regions since 1986 car fuel consumption in spain has been subject to the special hydrocarbons tax and the value added tax in addition since 2002 regional governments have been able to apply a regional excise duty on hydrocarbons this article analyses the impact that such a regional tax has on the retailer s diesel price at the border of the province of lugo in the region of galicia and the province of leon in the region of castile leon only the former region has the regional tax evidence shows that variations in the price of diesel at the border of lugo are of the same sign but of lower intensity than at the border of leon the price price elasticity is 0 8060 these results suggest that service stations located in regions with higher excise duties use their price policy to lessen the negative effects generated for fuel tourism

can capital income taxes survive in open economies optimal tax theory forecasts that small open economies should not tax capital income yet countries do tax capital income why the inconsistency this paper shows that use of the double taxation convention whereby governments credit taxes paid abroad against domestic taxes helps explain this inconsistency in particular capital income will be taxed if a dominant capital exporter acts as a stackelberg leader when setting its tax policy due to the convention other countries will then tax capital imports making it attractive for the dominant capital exporter to tax capital income without a dominant capital exporter however the model still forecasts no capital income taxes can taxation of capital income survive the increasing integration of world capital markets a number of recent papers suggest not diamond and mirrlees 1971 for example showed that a small open economy would not choose to tax the income generated by the physical capital located within the country this is because production would occur efficiently under an optimal tax system which requires that domestic investments earn the rate of return available on the world capital market in principle a country might still attempt to tax income earned on the savings of its residents however in practice income from savings invested outside the country is virtually impossible for a government to monitor individuals therefore can evade tax on such savings with very little risk as razin and sadka 1989 show such capital flight in theory eliminates any possibility of a tax on savings investors will simply transfer their funds abroad to avoid taxation yet virtually all countries do in fact tax the capital income earned by corporations and individuals located within their borders how can the theoretical forecast of no capital income taxation be reconciled with this simple observation it is difficult to use existing models with any confidence to analyze the implications of changes in capital income tax rates if these same models forecast that countries should never tax capital income

an individual welfare maximization algorithm for electricity markets an algorithm that allows a market participant to maximize its individual welfare in electricity spot markets is presented the use of the algorithm in determining market equilibrium points called nash equilibria is demonstrated the start of the algorithm is a spot market model that uses the optimal power flow opf with a full representation of the transmission system and inclusion of consumer bidding the algorithm utilizes price and dispatch sensitivities available from the hessian matrix and gradient of the opf to help determine an optimal change in an individual s bid the algorithm is shown to be successful in determining local welfare maxima and the prospects for scaling the algorithm up to realistically sized systems are very good nash equilibria are investigated assuming all participants attempt to maximize their individual welfare this is done by iteratively solving the individual welfare maximization algorithm until all individuals stop modifying their bids

commodity tax competition between member states of a federation equilibrium and efficiency we first describe regional market equilibria whereupon consumers of each region allocate their purchases of private goods between domestic and nondomestic ones according to the structure of relative prices taxes and transportation costs next regional optimal tax levels and public good quantities are derived the tax of the other region being held constant fiscal competition arises from the ability of one region in choosing its tax to alter the tax base of the other

a bilevel model for electricity retailers participation in a demand response market environment abstract demand response programmes are seen as one of the contributing solutions to the challenges posed to power systems by the large scale integration of renewable power sources mostly due to their intermittent and stochastic nature among demand response programmes real time pricing schemes for small consumers are believed to have significant potential for peak shaving and load shifting thus relieving the power system while reducing costs and risk for energy retailers this paper proposes a game theoretical model accounting for the stackelberg relationship between retailers leaders and consumers followers in a dynamic price environment both players in the game solve an economic optimisation problem subject to stochasticity in prices weather related variables and must serve load the model allows the determination of the dynamic price signal delivering maximum retailer profit and the optimal load pattern for consumers under this pricing the bilevel programme is reformulated as a single level milp which can be solved using commercial off the shelf optimisation software in an illustrative example we simulate and compare the dynamic pricing scheme with fixed and time of use pricing we find that the dynamic pricing scheme is the most effective in achieving load shifting thus reducing retailer costs for energy procurement and regulation in the wholesale market additionally the redistribution of the saved costs between retailers and consumers is investigated showing that real time pricing is less convenient than fixed and time of use price for consumers this implies that careful design of the retail market is needed finally we carry out a sensitivity analysis to analyse the effect of different levels of consumer flexibility

the efficiency of linear equilibria of sealed bid double auctions abstract this paper modifies myerson and satterthwaite s j econ theory 29 1983 265 281 analysis of direct bilateral trade mechanisms with two sided incomplete information by developing a new technique for analyzing their payment rule restrictions for each member of a narrow class of beliefs this new technique defines a mechanism that is both ex ante efficient and ex post individually rational moreover the resulting allocation is shown to be equivalent to that generated by the linear equilibrium of a k double auction

tax and the city a theory of local tax competition abstract in this paper we propose a novel theoretical model of tax competition at the local level large jurisdictions cities compete both locally with smaller neighbouring communities and interregionally with more distant cities while small jurisdictions hinterlands compete only with other jurisdictions in their neighbourhood the model structure is motivated by recent empirical findings as well as survey results among german mayors the perceived intensity of competition for firms varies considerably between jurisdictions and can mainly be explained by the size and location of the jurisdiction our model predicts contrary to earlier findings for competition between countries or regions that capital taxes of large jurisdictions fall more strongly with increasing interregional competition and may eventually lead to smaller taxes than in small jurisdictions hinterlands are therefore less affected from globalisation than cities we contrast our results with a standard tax competition model in which all jurisdictions compete with all other jurisdictions

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

unit tax versus ad valorem tax a tax competition model with cross border shopping abstract within the framework of spatial tax competition with cross border shopping we examine the choice of tax method between ad valorem tax and unit specific tax this study shows that governments endogenously choose the ad valorem tax method not because of a classic welfare reason but because it is a good strategy to compete for mobile consumers another key finding is that while governments are committed to the ad valorem tax method the choice leads to inferior outcome tax cutting competition becomes more serious when countries adopt ad valorem tax and competition in ad valorem tax results in smaller tax revenue than competition in unit tax

interstate commodity tax differentials and the distribution of residents abstract this paper considers the manner in which an unequal distribution of consumers affects the commodity tax policies of neighboring jurisdictions the paper uses a spatial model in which the residents of two states are distributed non uniformly and employs a variety of assumptions about the behavior of governments and firms throughout the paper shows that at a nash equilibrium in tax levels the sparsely populated state imposes a lower tax than does its densely populated neighbor the paper also demonstrates how equilibrium state taxes differ depending on whether firms employ marginal cost or profit maximizing pricing

equilibria of the sealed bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information we study the nash equilibria of the sealed bid bargaining mechanism with incomplete information a nonzero sum game for the case of uniform priors we describe two uncountably numerous families of equilibria the first has differentiable strategies in the second the strategies are step functions the efficiencies of these equilibria range from second best to zero for independent nonuniform priors we show that a similar situation obtains these results seem discouraging with regard to using the sealed bid mechanism in practice the mechanism might be salvaged however if bargainers turn out to confine themselves to linear strategy equilibria

status quo bias in bargaining an extension of the myerson satterthwaite theorem with an application to the coase theorem we use a generalized version of the myerson satterthwaite theorem to study inefficiencies in bilateral bargaining over trade of an indivisible good where there is two sided private information on the valuations we show that when preferences are convex and quasi linear and when the private information represents the magnitude of the utility gain or loss and follows a uniform distribution that the most efficient mechanism always exhibits a bias towards the status quo in the case that utility functions are quadratic in the amount traded we prove that for any incentive compatible direct mechanism there is an expected bias towards the disagreement point in other words for the class of preferences we study there is a strategic advantage to property rights in the coase bargaining setup in the presence of incomplete information

nash equilibrium tariffs for the united states and canada the roles of country size scale economies and capital mobility a theoretical analysis of optimal nash equilibrium tariff rates is presented a numerical general equilibrium model is then used to find nash equilibrium tariff rates for the united states and canada the nash equilibrium tariffs are small relative to partial equilibrium estimates 18 percent for the united states and 6 percent for canada the united states is essentially indifferent between the nash equilibrium and free trade while canada is better off at the latter by 4 billion empirical results support theoretical predictions that the optimal tariff is smaller when the country is smaller there are scale economies and free entry and capital is internationally mobile

agent based modeling in electrical energy markets using dynamic bayesian networks due to uncertainties in generation and load optimal decision making in electrical energy markets is a complicated and challenging task participating agents in the market have to estimate optimal bidding strategies based on incomplete public information and private assessment of the future state of the market to maximize their expected profit at different time scales in this paper we present an agent based model to address the problem of short term strategic bidding of conventional generation companies gencos in a power pool based on the proposed model each genco agent develops a private probabilistic model of the market using dynamic bayesian networks employs an online learning algorithm to train the model sparse bayesian learning and infers the future state of the market to estimate the optimal bidding function we show that by using this multiagent framework the agents will be able to predict and adapt to approximate nash equilibrium of the market through time using local reasoning and incomplete publicly available data the model is implemented in matlab and is tested on four test case systems two generic systems with 5 and 15 genco agents and two ieee benchmarks 9 bus and 30 bus systems both the day ahead da and hour ahead ha bidding schemes are implemented the results show a drop in market power in the 15 agent system compared to 5 agent system along with a pareto superior equilibrium in the ha scheme compared to the da scheme which corroborates the validity of the proposed decision making model also the simulations show that introduction of an ha decision making stage as an uncertainty containment tool leads to a more stable and less volatile price signal in the market which consequently results in flatter and improved profit curves for the gencos

endogenous timing in the presence of non monotonicities the aim of this paper is to generalize the endogenous timing game proposed by hamilton and slutsky games and economic behavior 1990 2 pp 29 46 by allowing the payoff or the marginal payoff of a player to become non monotonic with respect to the strategy of the opponent we propose a taxonomy of the subgame perfect nash equilibria based on the characteristics of the payoff functions proposed by eaton canadian journal of economics 2004 37 pp 805 29 we determine under which conditions of the initial payoff functions commitment has a social value and when the simultaneous move nash equilibrium is commitment robust and discuss its pareto efficiency

generation capacity expansion in liberalized electricity markets a stochastic mpec approach this paper proposes a bilevel model to assist a generation company in making its long term generation capacity investment decisions considering uncertainty regarding the investments of the other generation companies the bilevel formulation allows for the uncoupling of investment and generation decisions as investment decisions of the single investing generation company are taken in the upper level with the objective to maximize expected profits and generation decisions by all companies are considered in the lower level the lower level represents the oligopolistic market equilibrium via a conjectured price response formulation which can capture various degrees of strategic market behavior like perfect competition the cournot oligopoly and intermediate cases

commodity tax competition under destination and origin principles abstract this paper studies the effect of switching from the destination to the origin principle of taxation on non cooperative commodity tax equilibrium when taxes are constrained to be uniform across commodities the switch has no effect when differentiated taxes are allowed the effects of the switch depend on whether countries are small or large in both cases the switch imposes the requirement that taxes must be uniform across commodities within each country in the second case there are two further effects of the switch i negative spillover effects from tax policy are introduced ii incentives to manipulate the terms of trade are changed the switch does not necessarily lead to a fall in all tax rates

risk constrained scheduling and offering strategies of a price maker hydro producer under uncertainty this paper presents a stochastic mixed integer linear programming smilp approach to maximize total expected profit of one price maker hydro producer in a pool based electricity market head dependence commitment decisions discharge ramping startup costs and forbidden zones are all effectively handled in our approach uncertainty about the competitors offers is adequately represented by residual demand curves rdcs scenarios the management of risk is suitably addressed by conditional value at risk cvar to provide the efficient frontier i e the solutions set for which the expected profit may not be augmented without enlarging the variance of profit appropriate offering strategies to the pool are also developed consisting of supply functions built for different risk levels a representative cascaded hydro system with 7 reservoirs is considered to analyze and compare risk neutral versus risk averse results

prices taxes and automotive fuel cross border shopping abstract the aim of the present paper is to determine whether differences in automotive fuel prices among neighboring autonomous communities i e spanish political administrative regions affect the decisions taken by individuals regarding the region in which to purchase fuel in particular the intention is to discover if price increases in certain autonomous communities as a result of the application of the regional tranche of the hydrocarbon retail sales tax hrst has affected fuel purchases in neighboring communities in order to achieve the above mentioned objectives the monthly purchases of automotive diesel in aragon between january 2001 and march 2007 is estimated from the fuel price in aragon the relation between prices in each of the bordering communities and aragon weighted by density of traffic the number of vehicles registered in that community and three dummy variables representative of the implementation of the regional tranche of the hrst in madrid catalonia and valencia the paper finds empirical evidence to demonstrate a positive effect of the relative prices in the neighboring communities and vehicle registrations and also a negative effect of prices in aragon upon the acquisition of diesel in this region in the case of catalonia some evidence suggests that the price effect may have been strengthened following the introduction of the regional tranche of the hrst in august 2004

strategic bidding under uncertainty a binary expansion approach this work presents a binary expansion be solution approach to the problem of strategic bidding under uncertainty in short term electricity markets the be scheme is used to transform the products of variables in the nonlinear bidding problem into a mixed integer linear programming formulation which can be solved by commercially available computational systems the be scheme is applicable to pure price pure quantity or joint price quantity bidding models it is also possible to represent transmission networks uncertainties scenarios for price quantity plant availability and load financial instruments capacity reinforcement decisions and unit commitment the application of the methodology is illustrated in case studies with configurations derived from the 80 gw brazilian system

cross border shopping from small to large countries abstract contrary to predictions of theoretical models there are many examples in the real world of cross border shopping from small to large countries we demonstrate that a sufficient wedge between marginal costs of public funds in small and large countries can explain this phenomenon

price maker self scheduling in a pool based electricity market a mixed integer lp approach this paper addresses the self scheduling problem faced by a price maker to achieve maximum profit in a pool based electricity market an exact and computationally efficient mixed integer linear programming milp formulation of this problem is presented this formulation models precisely the price maker capability of altering market clearing prices to its own benefits through price quota curves no assumptions are made on the characteristics of the pool and its agents a realistic case study is presented and the results obtained are analyzed in detail

strategic bidding for price taker hydroelectricity producers this paper introduces a stochastic programming model that integrates strategic bids or offers for electricity in quantities and prices in a deregulated electricity market the model is designed to maximize the profits of a producer of electricity who manages a series of power plants along a river the model is compared with a previously reported stochastic model where the bidding process is disregarded the superiority of the new model is empirically demonstrated on historical data

bilateral trade with the sealed bid k double auction existence and efficiency for k in the unit interval the k double auction determines the terms of trade when a buyer and a seller negotiate transfer of an item the buyer submits a bid b and the seller submits an offer s trade occurs if b exceeds s at price kb 1 k s we model trade as a bayesian game in which each trader privately knows his reservation value but only has beliefs about the other trader s value existence of a multiplicity of equilibria is proven for a class of trader s beliefs for generic beliefs however these equilibria are shown to be ex ante inefficient

a robust linear approach for offering strategy of a hybrid electric energy company this paper presents a new approach for determining the day ahead bidding strategies of a large scale hybrid electric energy company the company has both energy generation and energy retailing businesses in a competitive electricity market demand response programs are also considered in the retail side of the company in order to hedge the risk of participation in wholesale market this paper introduces a max min bilevel mathematical programming with equilibrium constraint model for offering a strategy that manages the risk of uncertain forecasted rivals bids by robust optimization the max min bilevel model is converted to its equivalent single level optimization using karush kuhn tucker optimality conditions the duality theory is utilized to find the equivalent ordinary maximization model of the max min problem strong duality theory and big m method are also used to linearize the final model of offering strategy applicability of the proposed approach is shown by implementing it on the ieee 118 bus test system

a note on equilibrium leadership in tax competition models this paper reexamines the work of kempf and rota graziosi j pub econ 94 768 776 2010 which shows that leadership by the small region is the risk dominant equilibrium under the endogenous timing game they obtained this result in a model where the asymmetry among regions translates into different gradients of the demand for capital but identical vertical intercepts in this paper we simply reverse the form of asymmetry by considering different vertical intercepts but identical gradients the reason is that market power is typically related to the intercept and not to the slope of the demand function we then show that leadership by the large region becomes the risk dominant equilibrium and can even become pareto superior

jeux sans frontieres tax competition and tax coordination when countries differ in size closer international integration is putting increasing pressure on existing national tax structures this paper uses a simple two country model to address a range of consequent policy concerns focusing particularly on the role of country size differences in size exacerbate the inefficiency from noncooperative behavior harming both countries the smaller country loses from harmonization to any tax rate between those set in the noncooperative equilibrium but both countries gain from the imposition of a minimum tax anywhere in that range the fully optimal response to freer cross border trade however may be to do nothing jel h20 h77

risk constrained bidding strategy with stochastic unit commitment this paper develops optimal bidding strategies based on hourly unit commitment in a generation company genco that participates in energy and ancillary services markets the price based unit commitment problem with uncertain market prices is modeled as a stochastic mixed integer linear program the market price uncertainty is modeled using the scenario approach monte carlo simulation is applied to generate scenarios scenario reduction techniques are applied to reduce the size of the stochastic price based unit commitment problem and postprocessing is applied based on marginal cost of committed units to refine bidding curves the financial risk associated with market price uncertainty is modeled using expected downside risk which is incorporated explicitly as a constraint in the problem accordingly the proposed method provides a closed loop solution to devising specific strategies for risk based bidding in a genco illustrative examples show the impact of market price uncertainty on genco s hourly commitment schedule and discuss the way gencos could decrease financial risks by managing expected payoffs

the rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases an asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms private information in an independent private values market provides incentives to traders to manipulate equilibrium prices strategically this strategic behavior precludes ex post efficient market performance increasing the number of traders improves the efficiency of some trading mechanisms by enabling them to better utilize the private information traders bids and offers reveal this paper shows that the expected inefficiency of optimally designed mechanisms relative to ex post efficient allocations decreases almost quadratically as the number of traders increases

finding multiple nash equilibria in pool based markets a stochastic epec approach we present a compact formulation to find all pure nash equilibria in a pool based electricity market with stochastic demands the equilibrium model is formulated as a stochastic equilibrium problem subject to equilibrium constraints epec the problem is based on a stackelberg game where the generating companies gencos optimize their strategic bids anticipating the solution of the independent system operator iso market clearing a finite strategy approach both in prices and quantities is applied to transform the nonlinear and nonconvex set of nash inequalities into a mixed integer linear problem milp a procedure to find all nash equilibria is developed by generating holes that are added as linear constraints to the feasibility region the result of the problem is the set of all pure nash equilibria and the market clearing prices and assigned energies by the iso a case study illustrates the methodology and proper conclusions are reached

optimal bidding strategies for hydro electric producers a literature survey in a competitive environment with bid based markets power generation companies desire to develop bidding strategies that maximize their revenue in this paper we ask what approaches and methodologies have been used to model the bidding problem for hydro electric producers we present the problem s developments over time and through reviewing different variants of the problem progressively build to the case in which the agent is a price maker hydro electric producer in each variant of the bidding problem we examine how the approaches used to solve it may or may not be applicable to other variants last for the price maker hydro electric producer s bidding problem we recognize the most recent developments and illuminate a path for future efforts