pricing free bank notes abstract during the pre civil war period us banks issued distinct private monies called bank notes a bank note is a perpetual risky non interest bearing debt claim with the right to redeem on demand at par in specie this paper investigates the pricing of this private money taking into account the enormous changes in technology during the period namely the introduction and rapid diffusion of the railroad a contingent claims pricing model for bank notes is proposed and tested using monthly bank note prices for all banks in north america together with indices of the durations and costs of trips back to issuing banks constructed from pre civil war travelers guides evidence is produced that market participants properly priced the risks inherent in these securities suggesting that wildcat banking was not common because of market discipline

sorting equilibrium in a multi jurisdiction model abstract this paper analyzes a general model of an economy with heterogeneous individuals choosing among two jurisdictions such as towns or political parties each jurisdiction is described by its constitution where a constitution is defined as a mapping from all possible population partitions into the possibly multidimensional policy space this study is the first to establish sufficient conditions for existence of sorting equilibria in a two jurisdiction model for a policy space of an arbitrary dimension

decentralization and intra country transfers in the great recession the case of the european union empirical evidence is found supporting the assignment of the redistribution function to the central government viewing the great recession or recessions in general as a shock it is found that a

factor mobility and income redistribution in a federation abstract jurisdictions in a federation redistribute income by taxing capital and providing transfers to labor capital and labor move to earn higher returns net of taxes or gross of transfer benefits between jurisdictions in determining its redistributive policy the government for each jurisdiction thus takes into account the effects of its policy on the movement of factors from and to the jurisdiction hence the extent of redistribution depends on the mobility of factors the mobility of capital or labor leads to less redistribution than under autarky however mobility of both capital and labor may lead to more redistribution than if only capital moves as a consequence increased mobility of factors is not necessarily harmful to redistribution

nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition abstract this paper analyzes nash equilibria in a simple model of an economy with jurisdictions engaging in fiscal competition small number nash equilibria in which tax rates are the strategic variables are shown not to coincide with nash equilibria in which public expenditure levels are the strategic variables

the implications of competition among jurisdictions does tiebout need politics the paper investigates whether compensation among local jurisdiction is by itself sufficient to ensure efficient provision of local public goods jurisdictions have fixed boundaries and each has an entrenched government with the power to tax and supply the public good residents can move costlessly among jurisdictions it is shown that competition among numerous jurisdictions is not sificient to guarantee public sector efficiency though residents can vote with their feet land is immobile hence governments can unsurp some land rents for their own ends increasing the number of jurisdictions limits but cannot completely eliminate the ability to exercise discretionary governmental power

mexico s experiments with bank privatization and liberalization 1991 2003 during the 1990s mexico conducted two experiments with its banking system in the first experiment 1991 96 it privatized the banks this experiment took place with weak institutions to enforce contract rights it also took place without institutions that encourage prudent behavior by bankers the result was reckless behavior by banks and a collapse of the banking system in the second experiment 1997 2003 mexico reformed many of the institutions that promoted bank monitoring and it opened up the industry to foreign investment it was less successful however in reforming the institutions that promote the enforcement of contract rights the result was that bankers behaved prudently but prudent behavior in the context of weak contract rights implies that banks are reluctant to extend credit to firms and households

monopoly provision of product quality and warranties an exploration in the theory of multi dimensional screening we address the monopoly problem of designing and pricing a product line of goods distinguished by different quality and warranty levels consumers vary in their evaluations of these attributes so that the problem is one of screening it is sufficiently complex that the local approach commonly used does not work instead we use new techniques for dealing with incentive constraints between nonadjacent consumer types these techniques allow us to characterize optimal allocations that may not be monotonic in particular although the more eager types of buyer do pay higher prices and yield the monopoly higher profit they may receive lower quality or lower warranty coverage we find preference restrictions that restore monotonicity concave risk tolerance implies that warranty coverage increases in type and constant absolute risk aversion implies that quality increases in type

capitalization and the theory of local public finance the tiebout literature is incomplete this paper argues because it has not fully accounted for the capitalization of local fiscal variables into house values the paper explains why capitalization arises why it persists in long run equilibrium how it affects both residential location and the outcome of local voting and why it interferes with the efficiency of a system of local governments the analysis which is based on the main tiebout assumptions plus a property tax combines a model of household bids in a housing market with a median voter model of local public service determination

the rise of the states u s fiscal decentralization in the postwar period article i nfo article history one of the most dramatic changes in the fiscal federalism landscape during the postwar period has been the rapid growth in state budgets which almost tripled as a share of gdp and doubled as a share of government spending between 1952 and 2006 we argue that the greater role of states cannot be easily explained by changes in tiebout forces of fiscal competition such as mobility and voting patterns and are not accounted for by demographic or income trends rather we demonstrate that much of the growth in state budgets has been driven by changes in intergovernmental interactions restricted federal grants to states have increased and federal policy and legal constraints have also mandated or heavily incentivized state own source spending particularly in the areas of education health and public welfare these outside pressures moderate the forces of fiscal competition and must be taken into account when assessing the implications of observed revenue and spending patterns

income taxation and the diversity of consumer goods a political economy approach after tax income inequality has risen since the mid 1990s as increases in market income inequality have not been offset by greater fiscal redistribution we argue that the substantial increase in the diversity of consumer goods has mitigated mounting political pressures for redistribution within a probabilistic voting framework we demonstrate that if the share of diversified goods in the consumption bundle increases sufficiently with income then an increase in goods diversity can reduce the political equilibrium tax rate focusing on oecd countries we find empirical support for both the model s micro political foundations and the implied relation between goods diversity and fiscal policy outcomes

the political economy of urban transport system choice this paper analyzes the political economy of transport system choice with the goal of gaining an understanding of the forces involved in this important urban public policy decision transport systems pose a continuous trade off between time and money cost so that a city can choose a fast system with a high money cost per mile or a slower cheaper system the paper compares the socially optimal transport system to the one chosen under the voting process focusing on both homogeneous and heterogeneous cities while considering different landownership arrangements the analysis identifies a bias toward underinvestment in transport quality in heterogeneous cities

are the rich too rich to be expropriated economic power and the feasibility of constitutional limits to redistribution why is it that in democracies the poor do not expropriate the rich even though they outnumber them in this paper we analyze the commonly held belief that the rich escape expropriation because they are economically powerful we demonstrate that the economically powerful i e the above average income earners are indeed in a position to bribe the small segment of the voters with incomes between the median and the mean to resist the temptation of supporting confiscatory taxation this is true even if compensation payments in cash are politically unfeasible and therefore need to be made in terms of an evenly distributed private good and it may even be true if only pure public goods are available to swing the middle class

inequality in the local public sector effects on renters welfare of changes in local government spending are examined in a multijurisdiction model in equilibrium each income class chooses the jurisdiction whose combination of local public output and housing price maximizes utility comparative static analysis of this equilibrium is used to show how inequality in local public expenditure benefits low income residents if low income residents are observed to choose jurisdictions with low levels of per capita public expenditure then they may be worse off by outside aid which increases local public expenditure in their jurisdictions the advantages of inequality in the local public sector also exist when a program of tax base equalization is introduced

the income elasticity of demand for single family owner occupied housing an empirical reconciliation abstract past studies estimate the permanent income elasticity of demand for single family owner occupied housing to range from 0 14 to 1 5 a range much too broad to be of any use for solving policy questions data from the panel study of income dynamics are used herein to test the sensitivity of this income elasticity to several factors the results suggest that differences in sample population with respect to duration of housing tenure explain a large portion of the variation in the estimates of this elasticity the paper concludes that for short run applications the probable value of this elasticity is approximately 0 70 and for long run applications the probable value of this elasticity might best be taken as approximately 1 00

productive government expenditures and long run growth the purpose of this paper is to review some of the recent developments in endogenous growth models specifically our focus is on the growth effects of productive government spending in dynamic general equilibrium models we use a simple overlapping generations model as our basic framework and illustrate the role of taxes and spending we then examine several related issues nonrivalry in publicly provided goods existence and uniqueness of competitive equilibrium endogenous public policy ways of financing public expenditures composition of publicly provided goods and services and private alternatives finally we review some empirical results related to output elasticity of public capital and educational expenditures

taxation and the tiebout model the differential effects of head taxes taxes on land rents and property taxes on the theory of state and local public finance is the seminal paper by charles tiebout 1956 tiebout constructed a multijurisdictional model in which independent local governments offer a wide variety of expenditure and tax policies and perfectly mobile consumers reveal their preferences for local public goods through their choice of residential community he argued that under such circumstances local public service provision would be efficient the tiebout model has formed the basis of a vast number of subsequent articles in the state and local public finance literature and has also been very influential in urban and regional economics the efficiency properties of various tiebout type models of local public good provision have been examined and the role of politics in these models has been debated at length in this literature of more direct relevance to this paper however is the fact that although tiebout had little to say directly about taxation simply assuming the existence of head taxes subsequent analyses have used adaptations of this model to examine the effects of local head taxes land taxes and property taxes it is the literature on the efficiency and distributional effects of alternative local taxes that is the subject of this survey 1

are current syndicated loan alliances related to past alliances abstract the odds of a current syndicate relationship between two lenders depend upon their previous alliances the odds are significantly higher lower and strongest for a current lead participant relationship with a continuation reversal of their previous roles to illustrate the odds are nearly four times higher when two lenders have allied in the previous 5 years the strength of lead participant syndicate relationships between two lenders with same ordered roles is most sensitive to the lead bank s reputation and informationally opaque participants tend to have stronger relationships with lead banks lenders exhibit home bias in their syndicate alliances since ongoing relationships are stronger with domestic counterparts

assistance to the poor in a federal system abstract this paper explores the roles of different levels of government in assisting the poor using a model incorporating utility interdependence the paper first presents some theoretical results indicating how levels of poor relief vary with the extent of mobility of the poor under both centralized and decentralized systems of support it then provides a survey of the empirical work on migration of the poor along with a brief historical discussion of the experience under the english poor laws the concluding section turns to normative issues and contends that mobility of the poor is a basic source of inefficiency in wholly decentralized systems of support this inefficiency along with certain other equity considerations establishes a role for the central government in assistance to the poor

income redistribution in a federal system the question of the appropriate level of government to undertake income redistribution is receiving renewed attention from economists the standard argument about the issue might be summarized as follows 1 interstate migration of taxpayers and transfer recipients raises the cost to voters of income redistribution at the state level above the cost at the federal level 2 statewide redistribution confers spillover benefits to residents of other states 3 therefore as compared with a national system decentralized responsibility for income redistribution yields both less redistribution and less than the socially optimal amount of income redistribution the purpose of this paper is only to question step 1 of the above argument of course readers who accept the assumptions of the standard argument may conclude that the possible weakening of step 1 of that argument reduces the likelihood that its conclusion holds the paper argues that the cost of redistribution faced by state residents may in fact be lower at the state level than at the national level because their federal tax obligations fall as the state redistributes more income thus part of the cost of redistribution at the state level can be exported to residents of other states the state s federal tax bill falls when taxable incomes in the state are reduced by increased redistribution deductibility of state taxes enhances this result but is not necessary for it to demonstrate the proposition without adding unnecessary complication a simple model of income redistribution is described in which governments at all levels use linear tax transfer schedules to redistribute income the single government case is considered first then two levels of government are introduced and finally migration is allowed it is shown that without migration state costs are never greater than national costs of redistribution as long as redistribution reduces total money income when migration is allowed the result depends on the elasticity of migration responses compared with the elasticity of labor supply responses

non existence of equilibria in multicommunity models abstract this paper reconsiders equilibrium existence in models with migration and voting over local public goods we show that under some straightforward assumptions on preferences and income distributions the basic structure of multicommunity models i e perfect mobility majority rule single crossing property implies that no equilibrium with jurisdictions conducting different policies can exist stratification equilibria with sorting of the population according to income classes are therefore not as natural as is sometimes suggested mechanisms that can serve to support stratification i e tight housing markets returns to scale in the provision of publicly consumed goods are discussed

how property markets determine welfare outcomes an equilibrium sorting model analysis of local environmental interventions this paper examines the pivotal role played by property markets in determining the magnitude and distribution of welfare changes resulting from localised environmental change we address that issue using an equilibrium sorting model esm calibrated by way of example to the circumstances of a road infrastructure project in the english town of polegate previous esm research has tended to assume that all households rent property from a fixed property stock the narrative that arises from those models concerns environmental gentrification wherein access to environmentally improved locations is appropriated by the relatively wealthy through their ability to out compete the less wealthy in the rental property market our research shows that to be only part of a much more complex story we develop a model that extends the sophistication with which esms replicate property market dynamics allowing for households to choose whether to rent or purchase their home and introducing greater realism into housing supply responses to changing market conditions our research shows that property markets redistribute welfare gains across the population in complex ways in which tenure choice and housing supply constraints play central roles

on the political economy of zoning abstract households choose a community in a metropolitan area and collectively set a minimum housing quality and a property tax to finance a local public good the collective imposition of a lower bound on housing consumption induces an income stratified equilibrium in a specification where meaningful community differentiation would not arise without zoning we show computationally that zoning restrictions are likely to be stringent with a majority facing a binding constraint in communities that permit it by inducing a stratified equilibrium zoning causes tiebout welfare gains in aggregate but with large welfare transfers relative to stratified equilibrium without zoning the zoning equilibrium is significantly more efficient as it reduces housing market distortions

why do rich countries prefer free trade over free migration the role of the modern welfare state abstract according to traditional trade theory heckscher ohlin free trade and free migration are equivalent measures of economic integration leading both to an equalization of factor prices this prediction is in sharp opposition to the observed preference of rich countries for free trade over free migration we provide an explanation for this inconsistency the redistribution policies in the countries social welfare in countries with a relatively small number of low skilled native workers is higher with free trade than with free migration due to redistribution of income towards immigrating workers

mobility and redistribution the ability of individuals to move freely from one jurisdiction to another is generally seen as a constraint on the amount of redistribution that each jurisdiction within a system of governments can undertake in this paper we look at this proposition by developing a positive analysis of income redistribution by local governments in a federal system we ask how much redistribution occurs when only local governments can have tax transfer instruments individuals can move freely among jurisdictions and voters in each jurisdiction are fully aware of the migration effects of redistributive policies local redistribution is shown to induce sorting of the population with the poorest households located in the communities that provide the most redistribution while the threat of out migration affects the potential for redistribution our results suggest that significant local redistribution is nonetheless feasible numerical computations indicate that the proportion of residents who are renters is a major factor affecting the local choice of level of redistribution

ends against the middle determining public service provision when there are private alternatives abstract public provision of a service coexists with private market provision the quality of public provision is determined by majority vote preferences are not single peaked owing to the presence of private alternatives we identify two cases in one majority voting equilibrium always exists and the median income voter is pivotal in the other a necessary condition for equilibrium indentifies the pivotal voter who must have income below the median when equilibrium exists a coalition of middle income households who consume the public alternative will be opposed by a coalition of rich and poor households with the rich choosing private consumption

how does war shock the economy abstract wartime periods have frequently been treated as natural macroeconomic experiments but the international pooled time series evidence presented here shows that the literature has over emphasized the experience of the united states and the united kingdom wars fought exclusively on foreign soil do have marginally higher real output growth than peacetime periods but real growth during all other wars is sharply below peacetime levels evidence for foreign and domestic wars is consistent with monetarist fiscalist and mixed theories of wartime booms

demandable debts as a means of payment banknotes versus checks we examine whether transactable forms of privately issued demandable debt are better used as banknotes or checks the distinction between the two is that a check must be redeemed by the issuing bank with each use whereas a banknote can circulate we find that the answer to the question depends on the cost of early redemption if this cost is small banknotes will not circulate so the question is moot if this cost is large incentive problems may prevent the circulation of banknotes for intermediate values of the early redemption cost banknotes will be preferred over checks

social limits to redistribution in many countries equality of political rights including the right to vote over taxes and transfers goes along with substantial inequality of economic conditions this observation lies at the root of one fundamental issue in political economy one about the factors that limit the extent of redistribution in democracies the conventional economic wisdom on this issue can roughly be summarized by two arguments firstly redistributive taxation may be limited by various kinds of incentive costs of taxation as e g in james a mirrlees 1971 kevin w s roberts 1977 dennis n epple and thomas romer 1991 and thomas piketty 1995 secondly redistribution may be dampened by the lobbying activity of high income groups and by various imperfections inherent to the political process that determines the tax system as e g in gary s becker 1983 and john e roemer 1995 while both arguments offer illuminating insights into the phenomenon of redistribution they are also based on a very crude description of human behavior one which ignores social motivations of action both in the economic and the political sphere the present paper develops an explanation that takes such motivations into account specifically it shows that limits to redistribution may arise when economic inequality has an informational value for social decisions our approach is based upon the following observation many goods and decisions that heavily affect an individual s quality of life are not allocated or made through markets but through social interactions thomas scitovsky 1976 for instance although people have strong preferences over how they are treated by others and over whom they mate with these things are not the object of market transactions a number of sources of satisfaction like conversation dinners and parties playing with others and being observed and admired are nonmarket goods for which a keen social competition between individuals often develops as shown by harold cole et al 1992 the existence of social rather than market competition for some goods can endogenously generate a concern for relative position in the income distribution when information about relative income is private individuals become interested in the observable consumption differentials between them and their social competitors since consumption differentials are influenced by redistributive taxation the political attitudes of people toward redistribution will be shaped by its expected impact on social competition in some identifiable environments this concern for social success may be the crucial factor that limits the extent of redistribution desired by a majority of voters specifically while the middle class may obtain economic benefits from a large amount of redistributive taxation it may oppose an equalization of living standards since this would harm its social success the fear of losing social status in favor of the poor induces the middle class to enter a political alliance with the rich which supports conservative taxation programs in the sociological literature scholars of voting behavior have often suggested that the need for social recognition plays a crucial role in shaping political attitudes seymour m lipset 1967 pointed out that white collar workers tend to be socially valued similarly as those higher in the system and although their income may be only slightly larger than that of manual workers white collars are much more likely to corneo department of economics university of osnabruck rolandstrasse 8 d 49069 osnabruck germany cesifo munich and cepr london gruner department of economics university of mannheim d 68131 mannheim germany iza bonn and cepr london we would like to thank emmanuelle auriol dieter bos peter funk mike hout olivier jeanne peter jonas georg noldeke thomas piketty regis renault john roemer jens weidmann and three anonymous referees for insightful comments and suggestions we have also benefited from the comments of participants at workshops and conferences in barcelona bonn davis jena maastricht magdeburg mannheim montreal munich rotterdam silvaplana tel aviv tilburg toulouse and warwick at which we presented earlier versions of this work financial support from the deutsche forschungsgemeinschaft sfb 303 at the university of bonn is gratefully acknowledged

divided we stand united we fall the hume north jones mechanism for the rise of europe the great divergence in incomes between europe and the rest of the world occurred relatively recently why was it that western europe once a backward outpost on the fringes of the eurasian continent able to dominate in terms of income and technology the previously successful eastern economies several mechanisms have been identi ed to account for the rise of europe this paper formalizes one important mechanism the intellectual origins of which can be traced back to hume and weber and which was fully though informally articulated by e l jones this mechanism emphasizes the contrast between the european states system and the eastern empires political competition for a mobile tax base in a states system forces rulers to expropriate less from their subjects and to supply relatively more public services by effectively limiting the exit options of the ruled an empire rewards its ruler with a captive tax base that can be subjected to relatively higher levels of expropriation without a similar rise in public services provided the states system thus encourages higher levels of capital accumulation while the empire stises it the successes of the eastern empires in their consolidation phase are due to the competition they initially faced from neighboring states since europe escaped such consolidation the process of accumulation there never faced the impediments its eastern counterparts did the paper thus also provides a structural explanation for the emergence of institutions in europe that led to relatively secure property rights

labor market integration investment in risky human capital and fiscal competition this paper presents a general equilibrium model where human capital investment increases specialization and exposes skilled workers to region specific earnings risk interjurisdictional mobility of skilled labor mitigates these risks state contingent migration of skilled labor also improves efficiency with perfect capital markets labor market integration raises welfare and reduces ex post earnings inequality if instead human capital investment can only be financed through local taxes labor market integration leads to interjurisdictional fiscal competition shifting the burden of taxation to low skilled immobile workers decentralized public provision of human capital investment creates earnings inequalities and is inefficient

does nation building spur economic growth nation building the allocation of economic aid conditional on military assistance in conflict and post conflict environments has cost the world trillions of dollars over the last half century yet few attempts have been made to quantify the potential economic growth effects for the recipient country from the provision of this aid using a 45 year panel dataset we construct a measure of nation building using a three way interaction term between military assistance economic aid and conflict regime considering that slow growing and problem prone countries may be less likely to receive aid we instrument for economic aid by estimating donor to donee aid flows in a first stage procedure using this approach we find that spending on nation building has positive growth effects during conflict periods but that these effects disappear after conflict jel f3 f4 o5

the limits of equality insights from the israeli kibbutz what limits the capacity of society to redistribute what determines the structure of compensation in organizations striving for income equality this paper addresses these questions by investigating the economic and sociological forces underlying the persistence of the israeli kibbutzim communities based on the principle of income equality to do this i exploit newly assembled data on kibbutzim and a financial crisis in the late 1980s that affected them differentially the main findings are that 1 productive individuals are the most likely to exit and a kibbutz s wealth serves as a lock in device that increases the value of staying 2 higher wealth reduces exit and supports a high degree of income equality and 3 ideology facilitates income equality using a simple model i show that these findings are consistent with a view of the kibbutz as providing optimal insurance when members have the option of leaving more generally these findings contribute to an understanding of how mobility limits redistribution and to an understanding of the determinants of the sharing rule in other types of organizations such as professional partnerships cooperatives and labor managed firms

nation building and economic growth nation building the joint provision of economic and military aid in conflict or postconflict areas has been used as an important and expensive foreign policy tool yet despite the huge costs of these investments the growth effects of nation building operations for recipient nations remain underexplored while recent literature documents the negative growth effects of conflict yamarik johnson and compton 2010 and the positive effects of economic aid after conflict collier and hoeffler 2002 very little has been done on the confluence of different kinds of aid and the effectiveness of such joint efforts during times of turmoil this paper attempts to answer the following three questions regarding the growth effects of nation building operations does the joint provision of economic and military assistance help a country grow when it is embroiled in conflict does such joint provision

redistribution and market efficiency an experimental study abstract we study the interaction between competitive markets and income redistribution that reallocates unequal pre tax market incomes away from the rich to the poor majority in one setup participants earn their income by trading in a double auction da with exogenous zero or full redistribution in another setup after trading they vote on redistributive tax policies in a majoritarian election with two competing candidates this results in virtually full redistribution even when participants have the opportunity to influence taxes by transferring money to the candidates we find that the high redistribution reduces trading efficiency but not as much as predicted if market participants trade randomly this is because rather than capitulating to the much lower trading incentives many participants respond to redistribution by asking and bidding more conservatively in the da and in this way help to prevent further efficiency losses

american federalism welfare policy and residential choices the relationship between welfare benefit levels and the residential choices of the poor raises two issues for federalism in the united states do state benefit levels affect the residential choices of the poor do residential choices of the poor affect the level at which a state sets its benefit levels empirical studies have seldom studied the interconnection between these two issues this research estimates simultaneously the mutual effects of welfare benefits and poverty rates while controlling for other economic and political variables when benefit levels become high the size of the poverty population increases conversely when poverty rates become high benefit levels are cut the findings are consistent with the claim that state determined benefit levels distort policy and residential choices

a model of redistribution under social identification in heterogeneous federations abstract redistribution of resources to accommodate income heterogeneity within a federation is often fiercely debated e g belgium germany or the european union to help elucidate potential drivers behind such debates this article builds on social identity theory to develop a theoretical framework linking jurisdictional identification and preferences towards intra federation redistributive financial flows we show that federal rather than local identification can lead individuals to shift their redistribution preferences against their narrowly defined personal economic interest in contrast to predictions of standard models the sign and strength of this effect depends crucially not only upon individuals characteristics but also upon the social groups i e regions to which they belong we furthermore illustrate that federal rather than regional identification should be more widespread in poorer and or more populous regions within a federation but less common in regions which are very homogeneous internally or very dissimilar from the rest of the federation

majority choice of tax systems in single and multi jurisdictional economies abstract we examine majority choice of tax instruments in an economy with heterogeneous households in our framework majority voting equilibrium exists despite the multidimensional policy choice set we examine single and multi jurisdictional economies we identify five competing incentives that influence choice of tax instruments equilibria generally entail a mixture of tax types with multiple jurisdictions strong reliance on head taxation in rich communities arises to deter poorer households from immigrating in spite of local incentives to use alternative tax instruments to redistribute wealth if relocation costs preclude inter community mobility the equilibrium tax system is fundamentally affected with redistribution incentives then dominating choice of instruments and tax rates limiting or eliminating head taxation fundamentally alters stratification public good provision levels and tax systems

efficiency equilibrium and exclusion when the poor chase the rich using a simple adverse selection model we characterize equilibrium when the rich chase the poor if communities are established by competitive entrepreneurs the equilibrium exists is unique and is efficient it involves either complete separation or complete pooling different income groups may rank these qualitative outcomes differently we show how restrictions imposed by a central government may alter the nature of equilibrium such restrictions may be explained as the choice of a low income majority altering the equilibrium to the pooling outcome which they prefer

relocation of the rich migration in response to top tax rate changes from spanish reforms a spanish reform granted regions the authority to set income tax rates resulting in substantial tax differentials using administrative data we find that conditional on moving taxes have a signi

migration selectivity and the effects of public programs abstract a model of the spatial distribution of mobile heterogeneous agents is formulated to assess how a price change or program subsidy that is location specific affects the composition of local residents via selective migration and thus biases evaluations of the effectiveness of the program based on its local consequences longitudinal data from colombia are used to test the implications of migration selectivity the findings confirm the existence of selective migration suggesting that local subsidies to human capital attract high income but within income groups low fertility households and those with low human capital endowments these migration patterns are shown to be consistent with the dominance of endowment over tastes heterogeneity in the population under plausible behavioral assumptions

exploring mortgage interest deduction reforms an equilibrium sorting model with endogenous tenure choice in most equilibrium sorting models esms of residential choice across neighborhoods the question of whether households rent or buy their home is either ignored or else tenure status is treated as exogenous of course tenure status is not exogenous and households tenure choices may have important public policy implications particularly since higher levels of homeownership have been shown to correlate strongly with various indicators of improved neighborhood quality indeed numerous policies including that of mortgage interest deduction mid have been implemented with the express purpose of promoting homeownership this paper presents an esm with simultaneous rental and purchase markets in which tenure choice is endogenized and neighborhood quality is partly determined by neighborhood composition the public policy relevance of the model is shown through a calibration exercise for boston massachusetts which explores the impacts of various reforms to the mid policy the simulations confirm some of the arguments made about reforming mid but also demonstrate how the complex patterns of behavioral change induced by policy reform can lead to unanticipated effects the results suggest that it may be possible to reform mid while maintaining the prevailing rates of homeownership and reducing the federal budget deficit

trade capital mobility and tax competition this paper examines a system of governments national state or local that finance public expenditures with taxes on mobile capital e g a property tax unlike previous research on tax competition explicit consideration is given to the general equilibrium determination of the prices at which goods are traded between regions the analysis identifies inefficiencies in government behavior that are not apparent in models in which the terms of trade are exogenously given capital taxation is shown to create an inefficient distribution of public good outputs across regions accompanied by an inefficient pattern of trade a model is presented in which the chosen levels of public good outputs differ across regions containing identical residents and production possibilities there is a wasteful diversity of public good supplies

the intergenerational conflict over the provision of public education abstract we study the intergenerational conflict over the provision of public education this conflict arises because older households without children have weaker incentives to support the provision of high quality educational services in a community than younger households with school age children we develop an overlapping generations model for households in a system of multiple jurisdictions this model captures the differences in preferred policies over the life cycle we show that the observed inequality in educational policies across communities is not only the outcome of stratification by income but is also determined by the stratification by age and a political process that is dominated by older voters in many urban communities with low quality of educational services the mobility of older households creates a positive fiscal externality since it creates a larger tax base per student this positive tax externality can dominate the negative effects that arise because older households tend to vote for lower educational expenditures as a consequence sorting by age can reduce the inequality in educational outcomes that is driven by income sorting

incentives for secession in the presence of mobile ethnic groups abstract this paper presents a model on secessions and nationalism with special emphasis on the role of imperfectly mobile ethnic minorities individuals trade off political benefits of homogeneity against economic costs from increasing returns to scale in production the main findings are i mobility decreases the political motivation for independence because increased competition for labour forces the ethnic majorities in the separating countries to accommodate their policy ii the impact of mobility depends on whether separation is politically or economically motivated iii increased mobility leads to a less accommodated policy in case of no separation

bank panics government guarantees and the long run size of the financial sector evidence from free banking america governments attempt to increase the confidence of financial market participants by making implicit or explicit guarantees of uncertain credibility confidence in these guarantees presumably alters the size of the financial sector but observing the long run consequences of failed guarantees is difficult we look to america s free banking era and compare the consequences of a broken guarantee during the indiana centered panic of 1854 to the panic of 1857 in which guarantees were honored our estimates of a model of endogenous market structure indicate substantial negative long run consequences to financial depth when panics cast doubt upon a government s ability to honor its guarantees

aid and growth what does the cross country evidence really show abstract we examine the effects of aid on growth in cross sectional and panel data after correcting for the possible bias that poorer or stronger growth may draw aid contributions to recipient co

tiebout and redistribution in a model of residential and political choice abstract the paper considers a two community model with freely mobile individuals individuals differ not only in their incomes but also in their tastes for a local public good in each jurisdiction the amount of public services is determined by majority vote of the inhabitants and local spending is financed by a residence based linear income tax when making their residential and political choices individuals thus face a trade off between the provisionary and redistributive effects of policies we analyze this trade off and show that tiebout like sorting equilibria often exist if the spread in tastes among individuals is very large an almost perfect sorting according to preferences emerges otherwise a partial sorting prevails and stratification into rich and poor communities is more pronounced importantly we demonstrate that all these sorting equilibria exist whether or not individuals are allowed to relocate after voting

aid and growth regressions this paper examines the relationship between foreign aid and growth in real gdp per capita as it emerges from simple augmentations of popular cross country growth specifications it is shown that aid in all likelihood increases the growth rate and this result is not conditional on good policy there are however decreasing returns to aid and the estimated effectiveness of aid is highly sensitive to the choice of estimator and the set of control variables when investment and human capital are controlled for no positive effect of aid is found yet aid continues to impact on growth via investment we conclude by stressing the need for more theoretical work before this kind of cross country regressions are used for policy purposes

interregional redistribution and mobility in federations a positive approach the paper studies the effects and the determinants of interregional redistribution in a model of residential and political choice we find that paradoxical consequences of inter jurisdictional transfers arise if people are mobile while self sufficient regions are nec essarily identical with respect to policies and average incomes in our model interregional redistribution always leads to the divergence of regional policies and per capita incomes thus interregional redistribution prevents interregional equality at the same time however transfers may allow for more interpersonal equality among the inhabitants of each region the voting population may therefore in a decision over the fiscal constitution deliberately implement such a transfer scheme to foster regional divergence empirical evidence from panel data from oecd countries and candian provinces is consistent with the theory