imperfect competition information heterogeneity and financial contagion this study examines how heterogeneity of private information may induce financial contagion using a model of multi asset trading in which the three main channels of contagion through financial linkages in the literature correlated information correlated liquidity and portfolio rebalancing are ruled out by construction i show that financial contagion can still be an equilibrium outcome when speculators receive heterogeneous fundamental information risk neutral speculators trade strategically across many assets to mask their information advantage about one asset asymmetric sharing of information among them prevents rational market makers from learning about their individual signals and trades with sufficient accuracy incorrect cross inference about terminal payoffs and contagion ensue when used to analyze the transmission of shocks across countries my model suggests that the process of generation and disclosure of information in emerging markets may explain their vulnerability to financial contagion jel d82 g14 g15

tariff jumping antidumping duties abstract this paper examines the tariff jumping response of all firm and product combinations subject to us antidumping investigations from 1980 to 1990 using a newly constructed database previous studies have focused only on japanese fdi responses to antidumping protection and found large tariff jumping responses in contrast this paper finds quite modest tariff jumping responses and the evidence suggests that tariff jumping is only a realistic option for multinational firms from industrialized countries this may partially explain developing countries concerns about addressing ad protection in the wto despite high tariff jumping responses there is no evidence of a japanese specific propensity to tariff jump holding other economic factors constant

some defaults are deeper than others understanding long term mortgage arrears abstract the 2007 2008 financial crisis yielded a significant number of delinquent mortgage loans which ordinarily would have faced foreclosure and repossession however given the negative externalities of repossession policy response has shifted towards forbearance and mortgage modification which has led to longer spells in default for delinquent mortgage holders it is therefore imperative to move beyond binary models of default towards an understanding of the factors that drive the depth of default spells exploiting a highly detailed dataset on financially distressed households in ireland in 2012 and 2013 we are able to identify the impact of a range of current household level factors generally not available in loan level studies of mortgage default on the probability of entering early and deep states of mortgage default our results suggest that high loan to value ratios consumer credit growth shocks to mortgage affordability and unemployment should all trigger serious concerns among policy makers regarding subsequent stability in the mortgage market with these measures all shown to have differentially large impacts on entry to deep relative to early stage arrears

an economic approach to influence activities in organizations members of organizations spend considerable time effort and ingenuity attempting to influence decision makers such influence activities may bring benefits to the organization but they also involve real costs this essay offers an economic rationale for such influence activity as representing rational self interested behavior in the presence of informational asymmetries and an analysis of how the design of the organization s structure and policies should respond to the incentives for attempting influence it is posited that information valuable for the organization s decision making is directly available only to members of the organization who have some personal stake in the decisions these individuals may then have an incentive to try to manipulate the information they develop and provide in order to influence the resulting decisions to their benefits this can be costly both in degrading the quality of decision making and in diverting the attention and effort of the organization s members from more productive activities the organization has three different methods it can employ to discourage excessive influence activities and to encourage more directly productive uses of time and effort it can limit access to decision makers and participation in decision making it can alter its decision making criteria to favor those performing well in productive activities and it can provide direct financial incentives to encourage the desired allocation of effort it is shown that an efficiently designed organization will use such financial incentives only as a last resort instead it will always first alter its decision participation policies and decisionmaking criteria

foreign direct investment local content requirement and profit taxation we develop a partial equilibrium model of foreign direct investment fdi in which identical foreign firms locate themselves in a host country to compete in an oligopolistic market for a non tradeable commodity the host country assumed to be small in the market for fdi makes use of two instruments viz a profit tax and a local content requirement to compete for fdi in the international market we assume the existence of unemployment in the host country the structure of optimal instruments and their relationship to the number and the relative efficiency levels of the domestic firms are established

an analysis of the use of accounting and market measures of performance in executive compensation contracts prior research has provided useful insights into the structure of compensation plans and their incentive effects however one important limitation of these studies is the virtual absence of any cross sectional analyses of the attributes of compensation contracts 2 this absence is related in part to the problems associated with controlling for other factors that affect compensation that is compensation contracts are

agency theory and franchising some empirical results this article provides an empirical assessment of various agency theoretic explanations for franchising including risk sharing one sided moral hazard and two sided moral hazard the empirical models use proxies for factors such as risk moral hazard and franchisors need for capital to explain both franchisors decisions about the terms of their contracts royalty rates and up front franchise fees and the extent to which they use franchising in this article i exploit several new sources of data on franchising to construct a cross section of 548 franchisors involved in various business activities in the united states in 1986 the data are most consistent with a model based on two sided moral hazard the empirical models are also more successful at explaining the extent to which franchisors choose to franchise stores than at explaining the terms of franchise contracts finally contrary to the predictions of several theoretical models i find that royalty rates and franchise fees are not negatively related

security design for a non standard ipo the case of spacs abstract a special purpose acquisition company spac is a public entity set up by a founder for the specific purpose of acquiring another firm typically a private firm the acquired firm is publicly traded after the acquisition and the acquisition in effect represents a non standard approach for the private firm to go public in this paper we develop a theoretical framework to explain several unique features of the spac design such as the prevalence of unit offerings and the use of equity and warrants in the founder s contract the founder in our model undertakes costly effort to learn about the characteristics of the acquisition target and delivers a good quality firm to the spac shareholders we show that the warrants play a unique role in limiting the level of risk of firms that the founder selects for acquisition we also show that the equity grant given to the spac founder pre commits the spac shareholders and firms to a pre determined level of underpricing for the non standard spac ipo process

the power of incentives variable pay is usually defined as pay that is tied to some measure of worker output the most typical form of variable pay historically was the piece rate which was more prevalent during the early part of the 20th century than it is at the beginning of the 21st there is a resurgence in variable pay particularly as it relates to executives whose pay is tied to output through some mechanism like stock options or bonuses that depend on individual or firm performance why use variable pay the typical reaction is that variable pay provides incentives to put forth effort although true discrete pay schemes also generate incentives much of the confusion in the literature results from the use of the terms high powered and low powered incentives which connote difference in ability to elicit worker effort it is more informative to make distinctions between discrete and continuous pay and between inputbased and output based pay 2 pay structures can be summarized by the following equation

fee speech signaling risk sharing and the impact of fee structures on investor welfare the fee structure used to compensate investment advisers is central to the study of fund design and affects investor welfare in at least three ways i by influencing the portfolioselection incentives of the adviser ii by affecting risk sharing between adviser and investor and iii through its use as a signal of quality by superior investment advisers in this paper we describe a model in which all of these features are present and use it to compare two popular and contrasting forms of fee contracts the fulcrum and the incentive types from the standpoint of investor welfare while the former has some undeniably attractive features that have in particular been used by regulators to justify its mandatory use in a mutual fund context we find surprisingly that it is the latter that is often more attractive from the standpoint of investor welfare our model is a flexible one our conclusions are shown to be robust to many extensions of interest the results are also extended to consider unrestricted fee structures and competitive markets for fund managers

a generalized valuation model for fixed rate residential mortgages this paper uses option pricing techniques to rationally price mortgage instruments subject to both default and prepayment risk attention is given to terminations due to purely financial consideration of the mortgage contract itself as well as to personally induced terminations explicit inclusion of default in the mortgage valuation procedure also permits the valuation of insurance against such default qualitatively it is found that default differs significantly in the behavior from either prepayment or nonfinancial termination quantitatively however there is significant substitution between prepayment and default so that the addition of a default feature to the contract has only a modest impact on mortgage values unless there is substantial price volatility in the housing market or a high loan to value ratio copyright 1992 by ohio state university press

the contagion effect of foreclosed properties although previous research shows that prices of homes in neighborhoods with foreclosures are lower than those in neighborhoods without foreclosures it remains unclear whether the lower prices are the result of a general decline in neighborhood values or whether foreclosures reduce the prices of nearby non distressed sales through a contagion effect we provide robust evidence of a contagion discount by simultaneously estimating the local price trend and the incremental price impact of nearby foreclosures at its peak the discount is roughly 1 per nearby foreclosed property the discount diminishes rapidly as the distance to the distressed property increases the contagion discount grows from the onset of distress through the foreclosure sale and then stabilizes this pattern is consistent with the contagion effect being the visual externality associated with deferred maintenance and neglect

bidding for firms recently toyota sought a plant location in the united states the 800 million plant will employ 3000 workers and numerous states offered toyota generous investment incentives hoping this would induce toyota to select their state the commonwealth of kentucky won this competition but the price was high the present value of the payments exceeds 125 million the payment of investment incentives for the toyota plant is not unique in 1976 pennsylvania paid 75 million to attract a volkswagen plan nissan honda and mazda received generous investment incentives when locating plants in the united states and this bidding is not limited to states to attract the headquarters of the presbyterian church usa with its 1300 jobs and 38 million annual payroll civic leaders in louisville kentucky offered the church a warehouse and 6 2 million for renovation of the structure bidding the church away from kansas city missouri in this paper we contend that this competition may result from the average cost pricing of publicly provided goods and services 2 when the marginal cost of providing a firm and its workers with public services is less than the tax revenue they generate a government may offer the firm subsidies that reduce the distortions the average cost pricing of the public service creates thus this competition for industry is not a zero sum game where the subsidies are only transfers from the government to the firm rather these subsidies may facilitate the efficient location of industry

on the incentives for money managers abstract money managers select weights of managed portfolios to enhance their reputation in the spot market for their services inevitably using their actions to signal their quality we develop a two asset signalling model of money managers a unique screening equilibrium and under certain parameter configurations a host of pooling equilibria survive the cho kreps intuitive criterion in all the equilibria managers behave more aggressively than they would in the absence of the signalling motive exaggerating their position in the risky asset

the inefficiency of refinancing why prepayment penalties are good for risky borrowers abstract this paper provides a theoretical analysis of the efficiency of prepayment penalties in a dynamic competitive lending model with risky borrowers and costly default when considering improvements in the borrower s creditworthiness as one of the reasons for refinancing mortgages we show that refinancing penalties can be welfare improving and that they can be particularly beneficial to riskier borrowers in the form of lower mortgage rates reduced defaults and increased availability of credit thus a high concentration of prepayment penalties among the riskiest borrowers can be an outcome of efficient equilibrium in a mortgage market we also provide empirical evidence that is consistent with the key predictions of our model

incentive fees who wins who loses 1987 incentive fees who wins who loses financial analysts journal vol 43 no 1 pp 27 38

gradualism in tax treaties with irreversible foreign direct investment bilateral international tax treaties govern the host country taxation for the vast majority of the world s foreign direct investment fdi of particular interest is the fact that the tax rates used under these treaties are gradually falling although the treaties themselves do not specify any such reductions since there is no outside governing agency to redress treaty violations such reductions must be both mutually beneficial and self enforcing furthermore the optimal tax rates must be less than those initially set otherwise no reductions would be necessary to explain such behavior we model a two country setting with two way capital flows in particular only part of fdi is immediately reversible as the extent of irreversibility increases the likelihood of pareto optimal tax rates obtaining as a self enforcing outcome in the initial period is reduced more modest tax reductions from the non treaty levels are still possible these limited tax reductions generate an increase in bilateral fdi as countries increase the stock of capital in one another further reductions in taxes become self enforcing depending on the extent of irreversibility and asymmetry pareto optimal tax rates may be obtainable in the long run thus the amount of inbound investment a country can attract may be related to the commitment to which its outbound investment binds it this final insight provides an additional rationale for the observed pattern of capital flows in which those countries with the greatest outbound capital flows are also those with the highest inbound flows

securitization and distressed loan renegotiation evidence from the subprime mortgage crisis abstract we examine whether securitization impacts renegotiation decisions of loan servicers focusing on their decision to foreclose a delinquent loan conditional on a loan becoming seriously delinquent we find a significantly lower foreclosure rate associated with bank held loans when compared to similar securitized loans across various specifications and origination vintages the foreclosure rate of delinquent bank held loans is 3 to 7 lower in absolute terms 13 to 32 in relative terms there is a substantial heterogeneity in these effects with large effects among borrowers with better credit quality and small effects among lower quality borrowers a quasi experiment that exploits a plausibly exogenous variation in securitization status of a delinquent loan confirms these results

regional tax coordination and foreign direct investment this paper analyses the effects of a regionally coordinated profit tax or location subsidy in a model with three active countries one of which is not part of the union and a globally mobile firm we show that regional coordination can lead to two types of welfare gain first for investments that would take place in the union in the absence of coordination a coordinated tax increase can transfer location rents from the firm to the union second by internalising all of the union s benefits from foreign direct investment a coordinated tax reduction can attract more welfare enhancing investment than when member states act in isolation depending on which motive dominates tax levels may thus rise or fall under regional coordination

integration of the sales force an empirical examination this article develops and tests a model of integration of a marketing function personal selling the model derived from transaction cost analysis as developed principally by williamson is formulated as a logistic function which is estimated with data from the electronic components industry as expected integration is associated with increasing levels of asset specificity difficulty of performance evaluation and the combination of these two factors contrary to the transaction cost model neither frequency of transactions nor interaction of specificity and environmental uncertainty is significantly related to integration the transaction cost model improves significantly upon the fit of a simple model relating integration to company size alone these results suggest that for studying transactions of this kind it is fruitful to view the firm as a governance structure

competition for foreign direct investments abstract this paper models international competition for foreign direct investment as a common agency problem using the theory of menu auctions developed by bernheim and whinston in the model national governments act as principals and a multinational corporation as the single agent governments are assumed to maximize the net wage income generated by the corporation s investment it is shown that in the equilibrium of this game a high wage country may be able to attract investment even though all countries use subsidies furthermore it is shown that a country may choose to pay the highest subsidies even if it attracts less investment than in the unsubsidized regime our framework can also be used to study interregional subsidy competition within a country

franchising and risk management franchising is an important and controversial form of vertical integration allegations of opportunistic behavior by franchisors have led to calls for public regulation and in some states fairness in franchising laws the advisability of such regulation depends on the long run incentives to franchise if franchising is a temporary step on the path to complete ownership integration regulation may be called for alternatively if complete or partial franchising is a permanen t market solution regulation is at least contestable this paper offer s new evidence on the incentives to franchise copyright 1988 by american economic association

franchising agency problems and the cost of capital explanations for franchising are examined in the context of the us hotel industry the study is distinct from previous research on franchising because it explicitly recognizes the existence of three organizational forms whereas previous research has focused exclusively on two of these three forms the two organizational forms examined in previous work are franchising and company ownership the additional organizational form is company management investor ownership which involves management by the franchisor and ownership by outside investor groups a plausible explanation for the existence of the last organizational form is based on the availability of low cost capital from non chain sources

multinationals multi plant economies and the gains from trade a general equilibrium model of a multinational enterprise based on economies of multi plant operation is developed these economies are modelled as arising from the existence of a joint input whose productivity in each production facility is independent of the number of facilities maintained by a firm the multinational thus offers the world increased technical efficiency by eliminating the duplication of the joint input that would occur with independent national firms since this technical efficiency may come at the expense of increased market power the full determinants of home country host country and world welfare are considered

tax competition and leviathan abstract attitudes towards downward pressure on tax rates from international tax competition depend on attitudes towards government this paper synthesises the two extremes which as in other areas of public finance have dominated the debate typically being presented as stark alternatives the view of government as a leviathan from which tax competition emerges as a useful constraint on policy makers and the view of government as a benevolent maximiser of their citizens welfare from which it emerges as a source of inefficiency conditions are derived under which when policy makers are neither entirely benevolent nor wholly self serving tax coordination benefits the representative citizen

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

the dynamics of portfolio management contracts we consider the multiperiod relationship between a client and a portfolio manager and the resulting problem of motivating a manager of unknown ability to acquire valuable information we explore the contractual forms and the optimal retention policy of the client and find that the optimal initial set of contracts features a smaller performance based fee component paid to the manager than in a first best contract and the contract choice elicits only partial information about the manager as a result ex post performance measurement is critical to future recontracting in general managers are retained only if the returns on their portfolio exceed the benchmark by an appropriate amount article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

the expectations hypothesis of the term structure when interest rates are close to zero abstract in an economy where cash can be stored costlessly in nominal terms the nominal interest rate is bounded below by zero this paper derives the implications of this non negativity constraint for the term structure and shows that it induces a nonlinear and convex relation between short and long term interest rates the long term rate responds asymmetrically to changes in the short term rate and by less than that is predicted by the benchmark linear model in particular a decrease in the short term rate produces a smaller response in the long term rate than an increase of the same magnitude the empirical predictions of the model are examined using data from japan

when cheaper is better fee determination in the market for equity mutual funds abstract in this paper we develop a model of the market for equity mutual funds that captures three key characteristics of this market first there is competition among funds second fund managers ability is not observed by investors before making their investment decisions third some investors do not make optimal use of all available information the main results of the paper are that 1 price competition is compatible with positive mark ups in equilibrium and 2 worse performing funds set fees that are greater or equal to those set by better performing funds these predictions are supported by available empirical evidence

management compensation and market timing under portfolio constraints abstract this paper shows that portfolio constraints have important implications for management compensation and performance evaluation in particular in the presence of portfolio constraints allowing for benchmarking can be beneficial benchmark design arises as an alternative effort inducement mechanism vis a vis relaxing portfolio constraints numerically we solve jointly for the manager s linear incentive fee and the optimal benchmark the size of the incentive fee and the risk adjustment in the benchmark composition are increasing in the investor s risk tolerance and the manager s ability to acquire and process private information

the tenuous trade off between risk and incentives empirical work testing for a negative trade off between risk and incentives has not had much success the data suggest a positive relationship between measures of uncertainty and incentives rather than the posited negative trade off i argue that the existing literature fails to account for an important effect of uncertainty on incentives through the allocation of responsibility to employees when workers operate in certain settings firms are content to assign tasks to workers and monitor their inputs by contrast when the situation is more uncertain they delegate responsibility to workers but to constrain their discretion base compensation on observed output

executive compensation and principal agent theory the empirical literature on executive compensation generally fails to specify a model of executive pay on which to base and test hypotheses regarding its determinants in contrast this paper analy

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

policy competition for foreign direct investment between asymmetric countries the present paper analyses policy competition for foreign direct investment between countries of different size and different market structure we demonstrate how policy competition affects the location decision of the foreign investor and derive welfare implications the key variables in our analysis are intra regional trade costs differences in market size and minimum wages

adverse risk incentives and the design of performance bases contracts this paper uses option pricing theory to value and analyze many performance based fee contracts that are currently in use a potential problem with some of these contracts is that they may induce portfolio managers to adversely alter the risk of the portfolios they manage the paper is prescriptive in that it presents conditions for contract parameters that provide proper risk incentives for classes of investment strategies for buy and hold and rebalancing strategies adverse risk incentives are avoided when the penalties for poor performance outweigh the rewards for good performance

firms choice of method of pay using data from the bls industry wage survey the author tests the theory that firms choose their methods of pay by balancing the gains from more precise links between performance and pay against m

an empirical analysis of sales force compensation plans among the array of direct and indirect methods of motivation and control available to the sales manager is sales force compensation in this article the authors summarize theoretical predictions from the economics marketing finance and accounting literatures on the structure of optimal sales force compensation plans guided by these insights they then construct empirical models to quantify the effect of various sales force factors firm and product factors and market factors on compensation using data from 286 firms in 39 industries the authors examine determinants of incentive components and total pay and the optimal horizon for incentive pay copyright 1992 by university of chicago press

profit taxation and the mode of foreign market entry abstract this paper studies the role of profit taxation for an international firm s decision upon how to penetrate a foreign market through exports or through foreign direct investment fdi and local supply we show that with harmonized taxes the international firm may choose fdi even though this has welfare costs from a global point of view with tax competition the host country can enforce exporting instead of fdi this leads to a nash equilibrium associated with higher world welfare than harmonized taxes thus because of the effect on entry mode tax competition provides heretofore unexplored benefits as compared to tax harmonization

an empirical look at franchising as an organizational form franchise contracts are identified as a hybrid form of economic organization motives for the dominance of franchise arrangements are identified by examining the theoretical literature on franchising and related literatures on the theory of the firm firm growth managerial and employee selection a nd brand name capital empirical tests are performed on the incidence of franchise contracts across states for three industries in which f ranchising is prominent and data are readily available the results s uggest that both principal agent incentives and informational incenti ves favor the use of franchise arrangements copyright 1988 by the university of chicago

equilibrium prices in the presence of delegated portfolio management abstract this paper analyzes the asset pricing implications of commonly used portfolio management contracts linking the compensation of fund managers to the excess return of the managed portfolio over a benchmark portfolio the contract parameters the extent of delegation and equilibrium prices are all determined endogenously within the model we consider symmetric fulcrum performance fees distort the allocation of managed portfolios in a way that induces a significant and unambiguous positive effect on the prices of the assets included in the benchmark and a negative effect on the sharpe ratios asymmetric performance fees have more complex effects on equilibrium prices and sharpe ratios with the signs of these effects fluctuating stochastically over time in response to variations in the funds excess performance

the oecd model tax treaty tax competition and two way capital flows model tax treaties do not require tax rate coordination but do require that either credits or exemptions be applied to repatriated earnings this contradicts recent models with a single capital exporter where deductions are most efficient i incorporate the fact that capital flows are typically bilateral with symmetric countries credits by both is the unique and efficient treaty equilibrium this equilibrium weakly dominates the nontreaty equilibrium with asymmetric countries the treaty need not offer improvements without tax harmonization with harmonization it is always possible to reach efficient capital allocations while increasing both countries welfares only if neither uses deductions

fund families as delegated monitors of money managers because a money manager learns more about her skill from her management experience than outsiders can learn from her realized returns she expects inefficiency in future contracts that condition exclusively on realized returns a fund family that learns what the manager learns can reduce this inefficiency cost if the family is large enough the family s incentive is to retain any given manager regardless of her skill but when the family has enough managers it adds value by boosting the credibility of its retentions through the firing of others as the number of managers grows the efficiency loss goes to zero

is the market for mortgage backed securities a market for lemons this paper models and provides empirical evidence for the quality of assets that are securitized through bankruptcy remote special purpose vehicles spvs the model predicts that assets sold to spvs will be of lower quality lemons compared to assets that are not sold to spvs we find strong empirical support for this prediction using a comprehensive data set of sales of mortgage backed securities freddie mac participation certificates or pcs to spvs over the period 1991 through 2002 valuation estimates based on a structural two factor model indicate that pcs sold to spvs are on average valued 0 39 lower per 100 of face value relative to pcs not so sold for the four largest coupon groups in our full sample of freddie mac pcs we find a lemons spread of 4 6 basis points in terms of yield to maturity and this spread accounts for 13 45 of the overall prepayment spread of these securities jel d82 g13 g14 g21

tax evasion tax competition and the gains from nondiscrimination the case of interest taxation in europe this paper uses a game tlieoredc approach to analyse the taxadon of interest income in europe in the presence of tax evasion the model allows tis to assess the success of various reform proposals we argue tbat the tax treatment of nonresidents interest income plays a crucial role when decisions on discriminatio n and on withholding tax rates are made noncooperadvely the outcome is similar to a prisoners dilemma all countries discriminate but in equilihrium internationally mobile portfolio capital evades taxation successfully in contrast if all governments did not discriminate tax competition leads to less tax evasion the integration of capital markets in europe has hrought various benefits at the same time however governments struggle to contain tax evasion international capital flight as an attempt to evade taxes is particularly relevant in the area of taxation of interest income banking secrecy laws in some eu countries and low tax rates in small countries like luxembourg which hoost its role as financial centre have led to the effective elimination ofthe taxation of interest income for some investors the economist speaks not surprisingly about the disappearing taxpayer may 31 1997 several proposals have been made in order to overcome this situation the european commission supports the introduction of a minimum tax rate and or the status of a community resident under the concept of a community resident a country s tax on interest income is independent of the residence of the investor practically realising the source principle by contrast a proposal of the oecd 1977 argues in favour of a maximum withholding tax rate on interest income none of these proposals has been unanimously accepted since gains and losses from non coordinated policies differ greatly across member states the main beneficiary of the present situation is luxembourg which attracts large amounts of foreign capital in particular from germany the united kingdom opposes any coordination for political reasons and because tax coordination may also threaten london s role as the leading financial centre in europe in contrast germany sticks to its traditional bank secrecy law which enables resident investors to evade german taxation by investing abroad

the choice of organizational form the case of franchising abstract we examine companies that franchise some units and centrally operate own others the agency problems confronting these two organizational forms are analyzed testable hypotheses are developed the empirical results support the notion that owning versus franchising reflects a trade off among agency related problems the cost of monitoring store managers appears to be especially important in the own franchise decision the level of repeat business and initial investment requirements per unit also appear to be important

juvenile delinquent mortgages bad credit or bad economy abstract we study early default defined as serious delinquency or foreclosure in the first year among nonprime mortgages from the 2001 to 2007 vintages after documenting a dramatic rise in such defaults and discussing their correlates we examine two primary explanations changes in underwriting standards that took place over this period and changes in the economic environment we find that while credit standards were important in determining the probability of an early default changes in the economy especially a sharp reversal in house price appreciation after 2004 were the more critical factor in the increases in default rates that we observe an important additional result is that in spite of our rich set of covariates much of the increase remains unexplained even in retrospect thus the fact that the credit markets seemed surprised by the rate of early defaults in the 2006 and 2007 nonprime vintages becomes more understandable

an empirical analysis of a firm s decision to franchise abstract hypotheses from monitoring and search cost explanations for the existence of franchising are discussed and tested the evidence offers strong support for the search theory somewhat weaker support for the monitoring shirking theory and no support for the monitoring cheating hypothesis

welfare home market effects and horizontal foreign direct investment we investigate the spatial distribution and organization of an imperfectly competitive industry when firms may choose to operate more than a single production unit focusing on a short run setting with a fixed mass of firms we fully characterize the spatial equilibria analytically comparing the equilibrium and the first best we show that both organizational and spatial inefficiencies may arise in particular when fixed costs are low enough the market outcome may well lead to overinvestment and therefore to too many multinationals operating from a social point of view furthermore once multinationals are taken into account the market outcome may well lead too little agglomeration

does it all add up benchmarks and the compensation of active portfolio managers in this article the authors examine theoretically the use of benchmark portfolios in the compensation of privately informed portfolio managers they find that the use of a benchmark and particularly the types of benchmarks often observed in practice cannot be easily rationalized specifically commonly used benchmark adjusted compensation schemes are generally inconsistent with optimal risk sharing and do not lead to the choice of an optimal portfolio for the investor moreover benchmarks do not help in solving potential contracting problems such as inducing the manager to expend effort or trying to screen out uninformed managers copyright 1997 by university of chicago press

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

preferential trade agreements and tax competition for foreign direct investment abstract this paper examines how free trade agreements and customs unions affect the location of foreign direct investment fdi and social welfare taking into account that governments may adjust taxes and external tariffs to compete for fdi conditions are identified under which a free trade agreement leads to fdi and under which this improves welfare the welfare effect is shown to depend on the relative size of efficiency gains in production and government revenue losses due to tax competition a free trade agreement may fail to induce welfare improving fdi creating a role for a customs union

transactions costs and the efficient organization of production a study of timber harvesting contracts a transaction costs framework is developed to explain the choice between lump sum and per unit payment provisions in private timber harvesting contracts predictions about which contract type minimizes the transaction costs of presale measurement and contract enforcement and monitoring are derived and tested using private timber sales contracts from north carolina the empirical results provide strong support for the transaction costs approach and also reject several predictions from a risk based model the transaction costs framework also provides insights into the choice between negotiated and competitive sales procedures

subprime mortgage default abstract this paper constructs a reduced form credit risk model of mortgage default the data used is of privately securitized subprime arms adjustable rate mortgages originated between 1997 and 2008 and observed between 2000 and 2009 the period studied thus encompasses the beginning of the subprime crisis given the estimated model contractual properties of the loans are then used to infer the market price of default risk for the various quarters of origination it is empirically determined that a change in the inherent nature of borrowers led to a deterioration in their default performance a change which can be first detected in late 2004 on the other hand the evidence also indicates that the secondary mortgage market became aware of this change at about this same time the large rise in defaults in 2007 cannot therefore be attributed to any surprise other than the unexpectedly large fall in housing prices

on the welfare effects of competition for foreign direct investments abstract this paper investigates welfare effects of subsidy competition for the location of a multinational enterprise one of the competing regions benefits more from the inward investment but in the absence of incentives the multinational s preferred location is the other more advanced region the paper shows that subsidies by making the multinational switch location may increase aggregate welfare if the multinational exports in the absence of incentives the welfare effects of subsidy competition may look very different allowing subsidies attracts the direct investment which otherwise would not take place in one of the two regions further it intensifies competition in the market the paper shows that the welfare increasing role of incentives may be amplified but also that the competition effect by hurting domestic firms may cancel out any other positive role of incentives

negative equity and foreclosure theory and evidence abstract recent declines in housing prices have focused attention on the relationship between negative housing equity and mortgage default theory implies that negative equity is a necessary condition for default but not a sufficient one this often misunderstood result is clearly illustrated in a dataset of massachusetts homeowners during the early 1990s fewer than 10 percent of borrowers likely to have had negative equity at the end of 1991 experienced a foreclosure during the following three years an econometric model of default estimated on two decades of massachusetts housing data also predicts low default rates for current negative equity borrowers we develop a simple theoretical model to interpret these empirical findings and to assess potential foreclosure reduction policies our results imply that lenders and policymakers face an information problem in trying to help borrowers with negative equity because it is hard to determine which owners really need help in order to stay in their homes

uncertainty entrepreneurship and sharecropping in india this study attempts to explain the coexistence of different farm lease arrangements in terms of the varying significance of entrepreneurial functions in india crop sharing arrangements are common in areas of relative economic certainty with very little scope for decision making for example for product and factor substitution and where the entrepreneurial profit is low fixed cash rents are common in situations of high uncertainty where the scope for decision making is significant or where the crops are highly profitable efficiency considerations predominate in areas of sharecropping favoring a smaller farm size whereas under high uncertainty large size is favored for reducing risk

tax competition in imperfectly competitive markets abstract the literature on strategic trade policy has shown that in imperfectly competitive markets governments have an incentive to subsidize exports of their own firms yet the consequence of the departure from laissez faire is a wasteful subsidy race in contrast this paper shows that even in imperfectly competitive markets there is a strong tendency for laissez faire to prevail the driving force is the firms willingness to exploit tax or subsidy differentials by relocating production a small tax differential induces firms to change their place of production the change in market structure has a negligible effect on the oligopoly equilibrium but a non negligible impact on government revenues when tax policy is non discriminatory governments gain lose by attracting all firms when production is taxed subsidized hence laissez faire is the only equilibrium since from the point of view of the two producing countries laissez faire nondiscrimination pareto dominates the intervention equilibrium discrimination nondiscrimination is a simple device to result in a mutual beneficial outcome

incentive fees some problems and some solutions 1987 incentive fees some problems and some solutions financial analysts journal vol 43 no 1 pp 21 26

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

a knowledge and physical capital model of international trade flows foreign direct investment and multinational enterprises abstract this paper addresses two important issues at the nexus of the literatures on international trade foreign direct investment fdi foreign affiliate sales fas and multinational enterprises mnes first the introduction of a third internationally mobile factor physical capital to the standard 2 2 2 knowledge capital model of mnes with skilled and unskilled labor allows us to resolve fairly readily the puzzle in the modern mne literature that foreign affiliate sales among two identical economies completely displace their international trade intra industry trade and intra industry fdi and fas can coexist for national and multinational firms with identical productivities in identical countries second the introduction also of a third country to the model suggests a formal n country theoretical rationale for estimating gravity equations of bilateral fdi flows and fas in a manner consistent with estimating gravity equations for bilateral trade flows

what triggers mortgage default this paper assesses the relative importance of two key drivers of mortgage default negative equity and illiquidity to do so the authors combine loan level mortgage data with detailed credit bureau information about the borrower s broader balance sheet this gives them a direct way to measure illiquid borrowers those with high credit card utilization rates the authors find that both negative equity and illiquidity are significantly associated with mortgage default with comparably sized marginal effects moreover these two factors interact with each other the effect of illiquidity on default generally increases with high combined loan to value ratios cltv though it is significant even for low cltv county level unemployment shocks are also associated with higher default risk though less so than high utilization and strongly interact with cltv in addition having a second mortgage implies significantly higher default risk particularly for borrowers who have a first mortgage ltv approaching 100 percent this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

firm location decisions regional grants and agglomeration externalities we examine whether discretionary government grants influence where domestic and multinational firms locate new plants and how the presence of agglomeration externalities interacts with these policy instruments we find that a region s existing industrial structure has an effect on the location of new entrants grants do have a small effect in attracting plants to specific geographic areas but importantly we find that firms are less responsive to government subsidies in areas where there are fewer existing plants in their industry this suggests that these subsidies are less effective in influencing firms location decisions in the face of countervailing co location benefits