regression discontinuity analysis of gavi s impact on vaccination rates abstract since 2001 an aid consortium known as gavi has accounted for over half of vaccines purchased in the 75 eligible countries with an initial gni below 1 000 per capita regression discontinuity estimates suggest most aid for cheap existing vaccines like hepatitis b and dpt was inframarginal for instance hepatitis b doses sufficient to vaccinate roughly 75 of infants raised vaccination rates by single digit margins these results are driven by middle income countries near the eligibility threshold and do not preclude larger gains for the poorest countries global externalities via vaccine markets or impacts on newer vaccines such as pneumococcal or rotavirus for which income eligibility rules were relaxed

fungibility and the impact of development assistance evidence from vietnam s health sector how can the impact of aid be estimated in the presence of fungibility and how far does fungibility reduce its benefits these questions are analyzed in a context where a donor wants to target its efforts on a specific sector and specific geographic areas a traditional differences in differences method comparing the change in outcomes between the target and nontarget areas before and after the project risks misestimating the project s benefits the paper develops an alternative estimation method in which intersectoral fungibility reduces project benefits insofar as government spending has a smaller impact in the sector to which the funds leak than in the target sector while intrasectoral fungibility reduces benefits insofar as the donor is able to leverage productivity increases in government spending in the target areas the methods are applied to two contemporaneous world bank health projects that set out to target assistance on approximately one half of vietnam s provinces aid is not apparently fungible between vietnam s health sector and other sectors but is fungible across provinces within the health sector differences in differences yield an insignificant impact on infant mortality while the use of the new method yields a statistically significant impact of around 4 per 1000 live births the results however are ambiguous on the costs associated with intrasectoral fungibility

competition risk and managerial incentives this paper examines how the degree of competition among firms in an industry affects the optimal incentives that firms provide to their managers a central assumption is that there is free entry and exit in the industry which implies that changes in the nature of competition lead to changes in the equilibrium market structure the main result is that as the intensity of product market competition increases as a result of greater product substitutability or greater market size principals unambiguously provide stronger incentives to their agents to reduce costs at the same time more intense competition also leads to more volatile firm level profits consequently managers incentives are positively correlated with firm level risk consistent with empirical evidence a decrease in the cost of entering the market has the opposite effect on incentives but still induces a positive correlation between risk and incentives

underwater options and the dynamics of executive pay to performance sensitivities we empirically analyze the dynamics of executives pay to performance sensitivities option pay to performance sensitivities become weaker as options fall underwater often leading to pressures to reprice options or restore pay to performance sensitivity in other ways building a detailed data set on executives portfolios of stock and options we find that the responsiveness of pay to performance sensitivities created by all executive holdings of stock and options to changes in stock price is large the elasticity of pay to performance sensitivities with respect to stock price decreases is about 0 7 and is larger for high option executives and for executives with high percentages of options already underwater the dominant mechanism through which companies offset declines in option pay to performance sensitivities is larger option grants following stock price declines on average these larger grants restore approximately 40 of the stock price induced pay to performance sensitivity declines option repricings are inconsequential in this regard despite the attention they have attracted in looking at positive returns we find the reverse higher returns both directly increase pay to performance sensitivities and lead to larger option grants which raise pay to performance sensitivities further thus option grants to executives tend to be largest following large stock price increases or large stock price decreases

the impact of foreign aid on the fiscal behavior of asian ldc governments a comment on khan and hoshino 1992 abstract khan and hoshino 1992 analyze public sector fiscal behavior in the presence of foreign aid using data for five south and southeast asian countries this paper first questions a critical hypothesis test on which khan and hoshino s conclusions depend it then extends khan and hoshino s analysis making explicit both the direct and indirect effects of aid contained within their fiscal response model it argues that a number of khan and hoshino s conclusions do not hold in the context of this representation

the growth of executive pay this paper examines both empirically and theoretically the growth of us executive pay during the period 1993 2003 during this period pay has grown much beyond the increase that could be explained by changes in firm size performance and industry classification had the relationship of compensation to size performance and industry classification remained the same in 2003 as it was in 1993 mean compensation in 2003 would have been only about half of its actual size during the 1993 2003 period equity based compensation has increased considerably in both new economy and old economy firms but this growth has not been accompanied by a substitution effect i e a reduction in non equity compensation the aggregate compensation paid by public companies to their top five executives during the considered period added up to about 350 billion and the ratio of this aggregate top five compensation to the aggregate earnings of these firms increased from 5 per cent in 1993 5 to about 10 per cent in 2001 3 after presenting evidence about the growth of pay we discuss alternative explanations for it we examine how this growth could be explained under either the arm s length bargaining model of executive compensation or the managerial power model among other things we discuss the relevance of the parallel rise in market capitalizations and in the use of equity based compensation copyright 2005 oxford university press

capital grants and regional public investment in spain fungibility of aid or crowding in effect the aim of capital grants to subcentral governments is to increase their investment however recipients may try to allocate additional resources to cut saving or deficit generating a crowding out effect on self financed investment using data from the spanish autonomous communities during the period 1984 to 1999 the effect of capital transfers on regional public investment saving and deficit are estimated econometric results demonstrate that capital grants have no relevance when explaining the dynamics of saving however in deficit regressions they are shown to be both significant and negative both results lead us to a partial long run crowding out effect of grants on self financed investment

does foreign aid promote the expansion of government building on the literature on public finance i seek to advance our understanding of variations in government size by exploring the impact of official development assistance on fiscal policy i hypothesize that foreign aid operates in accordance with the flypaper effect systematically generating incentives and opportunities for the expansion of government spending results from a time series cross sectional regression analysis of growth in government spending over the 1970 99 time period are consistent with the hypothesis for middle and lower income nations aid represents an important determinant of government expansion looking at the tax and revenue side of the equation however reveals a more perverse pattern of response aid promotes not only increased spending but also reduced revenue generation the results have important implications from both a theoretical and policy perspective inter alia they point to the potentially self defeating nature of efforts to promote market oriented programs of state retrenchment via development assistance as well as to the importance of incorporating international transfers into future research on government spending

skill development and regional mobility lessons from the australia pacific technical college abstractdeveloping countries can lose part of their investment in training skilled workers who later emigrate one innovative response is for migrants destination countries to help finance skilled emigrants training ex ante linking skill creation and skill mobility we describe one such project the australia pacific technical college aptc which has financed vocational training in five pacific island developing countries for employment both at home and abroad including employment in australia the aptc has attained its goal of skill creation but not its goal of skill mobility we offer explanations for this result and lessons for future policy innovation

budget support versus project aid a theoretical appraisal should donors interested in the effectiveness of developmental programmes rely on conditional budget support or on project aid to answer this question we present a model in which only a subset of developmental expenditures can be subject to conditionality we show that budget support is preferable to project aid when the preferences of donors and recipients are aligned and when assistance is small relative to the recipients own resources furthermore when donors cannot observe the recipient s type they may impose higher levels of conditionality to separate committed governments from uncommitted ones

the fungibility of aid earmarked for hiv aids control programs summary this paper investigates fungibility of official development assistance oda for hiv aids control adding to the debate regarding consequences of scaling up this type of oda a theoretical model yields two estimable equations in public health spending and non health spending with oda for hiv aids as the key regressor the equations are estimated using data for 52 countries from 2003 to 2009 results suggest oda for hiv aids is not fungible across the 52 countries fungibility and other constraints to effective use of increased oda in health sectors are country specific issues oda for hiv aids must be delivered via mechanisms specific to country contexts

debt relief for poor countries conditionality and effectiveness this paper studies the effectiveness of debt relief to stimulate economic growth in the most heavily indebted poor countries we develop a neoclassical framework with a conflict of interest between the altruistic donor and the recipient government and model conditionality as an imperfectly enforceable dynamic contract in contrast to the recent practice of fully cancelling debt optimal incentive compatible conditionality is accompanied by a concessionality level that implies a combination of subsidized loans and outright grants the optimal concessionality level depends on the recipient s access to international financial markets and on the strength of the conflict of interest incentive compatible transfers with optimal concessionality levels generate substantial welfare gains if the donor does not implement the optimal concessionality level and provides subsidized loans only then the effectiveness of transfers decreases in the long run with severe welfare implications in contrast transfers are less effective in the short run if the donor offers outright grants only

can the world cut poverty in half how policy reform and effective aid can meet international development goals abstract poverty in the developing world will decline by about one half by 2015 if the trends of the 1990s persist most of this poverty reduction will occur in asia however while poverty will decline only slightly in africa effective aid could make a contribution to greater poverty reduction in lagging regions even more potent would be significant policy reform in these countries we develop a model of efficient aid in which flows respond to policy improvements that create a better environment for poverty reduction and effective aid we investigate scenarios of policy reform and efficient aid that point the way to how the world can cut poverty in half in every major region

the other side of the trade off the impact of risk on executive compensation the principal agent model of executive compensation is of central importance to the modern theory of the firm and corporate governance yet the exiting empirical evidence supporting it is quite wea

executive compensation and principal agent theory the empirical literature on executive compensation generally fails to specify a model of executive pay on which to base and test hypotheses regarding its determinants in contrast this paper analy

aid the public sector and the market in less developed countries a reply the article in this journal by mosley et al i987 concludes its analysis of aid effectiveness as demonstrating inability of development aid over more than twenty years to provide a net increment to overall growth in the third world p 636 this note purports to show that this conclusion which is ostensibly distressing as the authors claim is not warranted the section of the study which is the basis of the conclusion cited and the subject of this note is a cross section regression analysis full details of which are shown in mosley et al table 3 the note is concerned with the relation between the dependent variable specified as the growth rate of real gdp per cent per annum hereafter gdp and aid specified as a percentage of gdp hereafter aid the aid results with only two significant positive coefficients in one subsample certainly give no basis for claiming aid effectiveness in terms of gdp growth the intention in this note is to interpret the results which are assumed to be valid this is made possible by the fact that the authors have helpfully provided the full input set of mean values derived from the raw data from this it is possible to calculate the gdp aid relationship for each country for the second and third period the procedure for deriving these relationships is as follows for each country the mean values of the time series of gdp and aid are extracted from the data for i 960 70 and for i 970 80 using i 960 70 as the base the signs of the change in the levels of the gdp and aid mean values between periods are recorded this is repeated for i980 4 with i970 80 mean values as the base the relationship between the two signs is an indication of the effect of aid on gdp in the period in which the change in levels is effected thus in the case of an increase in aid being combined with a decrease in gdp the latter must have fallen relatively to the former and aid effectiveness is negative mutatis mutandis for the other three sign combinations thus generating the appropriate gdp aid relationship for each country in each period a frequency distribution of the four sign combinations relating to the full sample is presented in table i since the signs of the changes in the levels of gdp and aid are derived by making explicit the arithmetic relationship implicit in the data they form a valid base from which to draw conclusions without requiring any test of

the tenuous trade off between risk and incentives empirical work testing for a negative trade off between risk and incentives has not had much success the data suggest a positive relationship between measures of uncertainty and incentives rather than the posited negative trade off i argue that the existing literature fails to account for an important effect of uncertainty on incentives through the allocation of responsibility to employees when workers operate in certain settings firms are content to assign tasks to workers and monitor their inputs by contrast when the situation is more uncertain they delegate responsibility to workers but to constrain their discretion base compensation on observed output

the effectiveness of aid on savings and investment in sub saharan africa do volatility and institutional quality matter abstractthe effectiveness of aid is somewhat subject to its volatility this study investigates the impact of aid volatility especially on savings and investment with a particular focus on the role of institutional quality in 45 sub saharan african ssa countries over the period from 1990 to 2013 we used the generalized method of moments gmm technique combined with a measure of volatility namely an averaged data method involving six 4 year sub periods our results suggest that while aid is positively associated with savings and investment its volatility is harmful to savings and investment however when higher quality institutions exist the volatility of aid has a less negative impact on savings and investment the policy implications are diverse first donors and ssa aid dependent countries need to take into account the diversity of shocks to which aid can respond in mitigating its unpredictability secondly ssa countries should be encouraged to establish the conditions for better quality inst

earnings and price based compensation contracts in the presence of discretionary trading and incomplete contracting abstract the paper analyzes the use of reported accounting earnings and price as a basis for compensating a manager when he trades on private information and share price is set rationally based on privately held information publicly available and contractible information and publicly available but noncontractible information in addition we analyze the comparative statics of the compensation on reported earnings and price with respect to changes in the economy

are ceos really paid like bureaucrats a common view is that there is little correlation between firm performance and ceo pay using a new fifteen year panel data set of ceos in the largest publicly traded u s companies we document a strong relationship between firm performance and ceo compensation this relationship is generated almost entirely by changes in the value of ceo holdings of stock and stock options in addition we show that both the level of ceo compensation and the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance have risen dramatically since 1980 largely because of increases in stock option grants

does economic analysis improve the quality of foreign assistance the world bank undertakes an annual expenditure of around 60 million on country specific economic analysis and advice for its member developing countries what is the impact of this economic and sector work on the quality of world bank lending it will be useful to know whether past analytical work has generated measurable economic benefits that will justify its continued provision in an environment of increasingly scarce resources this article sets out an idealized model of decision making in which a country manager makes a broad allocation of resources between lending services and economic and sector work given that decision the task manager for each project makes project specific decisions with respect to the allocation of resources between preparation and supervision the analysis indicates that economic and sector work has a significant positive impact on the quality of world bank loans the results provide clear evidence of underinvestment in economic and sector work and the analysis shows that resources can be switched from preparation and supervision to economic and sector work to the benefit of both the quality of programs and level of disbursements

animal spirits investment and international capital movements abstract in the aftermath of the debt crisis developing countries are endeavoring to repatriate flight capital and to resume domestic private investment yet investment and the associated capital inflows continue to be disappointing and highly uneven over time in many cases this paper provides a model of investment and capital movements in and out of such countries central to the paper is the introduction of fiscal increasing returns to domestic capital into a standard dynamic optimizing model the resulting system may display multiple steady states and surprising dynamic behavior initial conditions and expectations both matter in selecting the equilibrium on which the economy converges for some initial conditions animal spirits can determine the course of investment and capital flows a limit cycle may occur around one of the welfare inferior equilibria along that cycle capital stocks and relative prices display endogenous fluctuations

donor preferences and recipient fiscal behavior a simultaneous analysis of foreign aid we theoretically develop and empirically estimate a preference model determining foreign aid donor behavior aid access and levels are separately determined by endogenous budgetary allocations the international economic environment the distribution of income between countries basic human needs the small country effect and regional bias we find fungibility of aid in recipient budgets is due to donor and recipient preferences despite the importance of other economic influences we find a significant pro poor country bias in aid allocations although little aggregate influence of basic human needs or regional bias the small country effect is significant for two of six donors jel f35 o19 h 77

the going public decision and the development of financial markets this paper explores the linkages between stock price efficiency the choice between private and public financing and the development of capital markets in emerging economies generally the advantage of public financing is high if costly information is diverse and cheap to acquire and if investors receive valuable information without cost the value of public firms generally depends on public market size which implies that there can be a positive externality associated with going public so that an inferior equilibrium can exist where too few firms go public the model is consistent with empirical observations on financial market development

fiscal illusion and the grantor government empirical studies indicate that unconditional intergovernmental grants have a flypaper effect several authors have modeled recipient government spending under fiscal illusion to explain this phenomenon in short grants reduce the perceived marginal cost of recipient government output this paper develops a more general model of illusion that incorporates the grantor government thereby eliminating inconsistencies encountered in previous models the more general model implies that grant finance increases the perceived marginal cost of grantor government output thus grant induced illusion should have two effects an increase in recipient output and a decrease in grantor output the empirical work supports this hypothesis

assessing foreign aid s long run contribution to growth in development this paper confirms recent evidence of a positive impact of aid on growth and widens the scope of evaluation to a range of outcomes including proximate sources of growth e g physical and human capital indicators of social welfare e g poverty and infant mortality and measures of economic transformation e g share of agriculture and industry in value added focusing on long run cumulative effects of aid in developing countries and taking due account of potential endogeneity a coherent and favorable pattern of results emerges aid has over the past forty years stimulated growth promoted structural change improved social indicators and reduced poverty

nigeria during and after the oil boom a policy comparison with indonesia nigeria and indonesia provide an interesting contrast with regard to performance and policy during and after the oil boom roughly a decade after the first oil shock nigeria is faced with several economic problems including a serious decline in its agricultural sector and a deteriorating external debt situation while some decline in the nonoil traded goods sector reflects efficient adjustment to the oil boom policy with regard to public expenditure exchange rates pricing and the trade regime could exacerbate such decline and impede readjustment as the boom subsides the links between oil prices deficits inflation and real exchange rate appreciation are analyzed and nigerian and indonesian fiscal and exchange rate and agricultural and foreign borrowing strategies are compared it is concluded that with the exception of cuts in the deficit since 1984 nigerian policy following the boom has not been conducive to adjustment to the current period of low oil prices and high real interest rates corrective measures and policy options are discussed

to invest or insure how authoritarian time horizons impact foreign aid effectiveness in this article the author argues that the time horizon a dictator faces affects his incentives over the use of aid in three ways first dictators have a greater incentive to invest in public goods when they have a long time horizon second dictators with short time horizons often face the threat of challengers to the regime this leads them to forgo investment and instead consume state resources in two forms that harm growth repression and private pay offs to political opponents third dictators with short time horizons have a strong incentive to secure personal wealth as a form of insurance in case the regime falls using panel data on dictatorships in 71 developing countries from 1961 to 2001 the author finds that time horizons have a positive impact on aid effectiveness foreign aid is associated with positive growth when dictators face long time horizons and negative growth when time horizons are short

risk aversion performance pay and the principal agent problem this paper calculates numerical solutions to the principal agent problem and compares the results to the stylized facts of ceo compensation the numerical predictions come from parameterizing the models of grossman and hart and of holmstrom and milgrom while the correct incentives for a ceo can greatly enhance a firm s performance providing such incentives need not be expensive for many parameter values ceo compensation need increase only by about 10 for every 1 000 of additional shareholder value for some values the amount is 0 003 cents

lower salaries and no options on the optimal structure of executive pay we estimate a standard principal agent model with constant relative risk aversion and lognormal stock prices for a sample of 598 us ceos the model is widely used in the compensation literature but it predicts that almost all of the ceos in our sample should hold no stock options instead ceos should have lower base salaries and receive additional shares in their companies for a typical value of relative risk aversion almost half of the ceos in our sample would be required to purchase additional stock in their companies from their private savings the model predicts contracts that would reduce average compensation costs by 20 while providing the same incentives and the same utility to ceos we investigate a number of extensions and modi cations of the standard model but nd none of them to be satisfactory we conclude that the standard principal agent model typically used in the literature cannot rationalize observed contracts one reason may be that executive pay contracts are suboptimal

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

information based stock trading executive incentives and the principal agent problem we examine the role of information based stock trading in affecting the risk incentive relation by incorporating an endogenous informed trading into an optimal incentive contracting model we analytically show that apart from reducing incentives a greater risk increases the level of information based trading which consequently enhances executive incentives and offsets the negative risk incentive relation we calibrate the model and find that the economic magnitude of this incentive enhancement effect is significant our empirical test using real world executive compensation data lends strong support to the model prediction our results suggest that principals boards of directors should consider underlying stock trading characteristics when structuring executive incentives

the dependence of pay performance sensitivity on the size of the firm i analyze the relationship between firm size and the extent to which executive compensation depends on the wealth of the firm s shareholders i use a simple agency model to motivate an econometric model of this relationship estimating this model on chief executive officer ceo compensation data using nonlinear least squares i determine that pay performance sensitivity as defined by jensen and murphy 1990b appears to be approximately inversely proportional to the square root of firm size however measured i also analyze the properties of pay performance sensitivity for teams of executives working for the same firm and show it to have similar properties as ceo pay performance sensitivity

politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid abstract critics of foreign aid programs have long argued that poverty reflects government failure in this paper i test predictions for aid effectiveness based on an analytical framework that relates aid effectiveness to political regimes i find that aid does not significantly increase investment nor benefit the poor as measured by improvements in human development indicators but it does increase the size of government the impact of aid does not vary according to whether recipient governments are liberal democratic or highly repressive but liberal political regimes and democracies ceteris paribus have on average 30 lower infant mortality than the least free regimes this may be due to greater empowerment of the poor under liberal regimes even though the political elite continues to receive the benefits of aid programs an implication is that short term aid targeted to support new liberal regimes may be a more successful means of reducing poverty than current programs

public trading and private incentives this article studies the link between public trading and the activity of a firm s large shareholder who can affect firm value public trading results in the formation of a stock price that is informative about the large shareholder s activity this increases the latter s incentives to engage in value increasing activities indeed if he has to liquidate part of his stake before the effect of his activity is publicly observed a more informative price rewards him for his activity implications are derived for the decision to go public capital structure and security design we consider a firm with a large shareholder and otherwise dispersed shares which are publicly traded the block holder is an insider in the sense that he can undertake actions that directly affect the firm s value moreover the insider might not take all value increasing actions as at least some of them involve a private cost for him in other words there is an incentive problem the article s main premise is that public trading as part of the price formation process generates information not only about exogenous factors affecting firm value but also about the insider s activity for instance as a result of public trading a firm s stock price will incorporate the market s evaluation of how a controlling shareholder allocates corporate resources we identify two sources of incentives for the insider to engage in activities that will increase firm value the first one is his stake in the firm since the insider participates in a value increase in proportion to his equity stake a larger stake increases the benefit to him from the firm value being high the view that large shareholders affect firm value is indeed widespread shleifer and vishny 1997 they alleviate the free rider problem pervasive in firms with passive dispersed investors unable or unwilling to affect the firm s operations that is outsiders

is foreign aid fungible the case of indonesia this paper considers whether foreign aid given for specific categories of expenditure is fungible among them and whether aid reduces tax effort by the recipient government models developed to analyze the fiscal relations among different levels of government in the united states are applied to analysis of the impact of foreign aid econometric analysis of data for indonesia reveals that aid is largely spent as the donors intended that aid does not lead to a reduction in tax effort and that aid is not diverted to nondevelopment current expenditures copyright 1990 by royal economic society

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

foreign aid and the question of fungibility this paper analyzes whether the foreign assistance provided for specific categories of expenditure is shifted among them contrary to the wishes of donors it also considers whether aid reduces the tax effort of recipient governments econometric results are presented for the dominican republic that show that the fungibility of aid has resulted in a thwarting of the intentions of donors an attempt is made to account for the observed differences in behavior of individual countries in altering expenditures copyright 1993 by mit press

noise trading and takeovers a model of takeovers is investigated in which noise trading provides camouflage that makes it possible for a large corporate outsider to purchase enough shares at favorable prices so that takeovers become profitable although the model accommodates the possibility of dilution grossman and hart 1980 and a large incumbent shareholder shleifer and vishny 1986 neither dilution nor a large incumbent shareholder is necessary for costly takeovers to be profitable noise trading tends to encourage costly takeovers that otherwise would not occur and to discourage beneficial takeovers that otherwise would occur

aid and performance a reassessment two visions of aid effectiveness and allocation are compared the first corresponding to the new aid paradigm argues that aid is only effective if domestic policies are appropriate the second in contrast argues that aid effectiveness depends on the external and climatic environment the worse this environment or the more vulnerable the recipient countries the greater the effectiveness of aid cross sectional econometric tests related to gdp growth on two 12 year pooled periods clearly favour the second view the two views can be reconciled through the principle of performance based aid allocation where performance is defined as outcomes adjusted for the impact of environmental factors performance can then be measured in several manners which are subject to comparison one approach would lead one to allocate more aid the worse the external environment is for a given policy and the better the policy is for a given environment

informed trading investment and welfare this article studies the welfare economics of informed stock market trading we analyze the effect of more informative prices on investment given that this dependence will itself be reflected in equilibrium prices while a higher incidence of informed speculation always increases firm value through a more informative trading process the effect on agents welfare depends on how revelation of information changes risk sharing opportunities in the market greater revelation of information that agents wish to insure against reduces their hedging opportunities on the other hand early revelation of information that is uncorrelated with hedging needs allows agents to construct better hedges