inducing liquidity in thin financial markets through combined value trading mechanisms asset pricing theory hypothesizes that investors are only interested in portfolios individual securities are evaluated only in terms of their contribution to portfolio risk and return yet standard financial market design is that of parallel unconnected markets whereby investors cannot submit orders in one market conditional on events in others when markets are thin this exposes them to substantial execution risk fear of ending up with unbalanced portfolios after trading may even keep investors from submitting orders further eroding liquidity and the ability of markets to equilibrate the suggested solution is a portfolio trading mechanism referred to as combined value trading cvt investors are allowed to submit orders for packages of securities and the system matches trades and computes prices by optimally combining portfolio orders in an open book we study the performance of the cvt mechanism experimentally and compare it to the performance of parallel unconnected double auctions in experiments with similar parametrization and either a similar number of subjects or substantially thicker markets we present evidence that our portfolio trading mechanism facilitates equilibration to the extent that the thicker markets do inspection of order submission and trade activity reveals that subjects manage to exploit the direct linkages between markets enabled by the cvt system

the effect of payoff feedback and information pooling on reasoning errors evidence from experimental markets avast literature shows that individuals frequently violate normative principles in reasoning in this paper we report the results of four studies designed to determine if information dissemination in competitive auctions can reduce or even eliminate logical errors in the wason selection task our results show that payoff feedback and exposure to the information flow drive the aggregate behavior toward the normative solution we also found evidence of spillover effects from informed to uninformed traders in one sided combinatorial auctions as well as positive transfer effects from competitive to individual settings

a unified framework for dynamic prediction market design recently coinciding with and perhaps driving the increased popularity of prediction markets several novel pari mutuel mechanisms have been developed such as the logarithmic market scoring rule lmsr the cost function formulation of market makers utility based markets and the sequential convex pari mutuel mechanism scpm in this work we present a convex optimization framework that unifies these seemingly unrelated models for centrally organizing contingent claims markets the existing mechanisms can be expressed in our unified framework by varying the choice of a concave value function we show that this framework is equivalent to a convex risk minimization model for the market maker this facilitates a better understanding of the risk attitudes adopted by various mechanisms the unified framework also leads to easy implementation because we can now find the cost function of a market maker in polynomial time by solving a simple convex optimization problem in addition to unifying and explaining the existing mechanisms we use the generalized framework to derive necessary and sufficient conditions for many desirable properties of a prediction market mechanism such as proper scoring truthful bidding in a myopic sense efficient computation controllable risk measure and guarantees on the worst case loss as a result we develop the first proper truthful risk controlled loss bounded independent of the number of states mechanism none of the previously proposed mechanisms possessed all these properties simultaneously thus our work provides an effective tool for designing new prediction market mechanisms we also discuss possible applications of our framework to dynamic resource pricing and allocation in general trading markets

can a liberalization of capital outflows increase net capital inflows abstract facing massive capital inflows that put downward pressure on the real exchange rate some policymakers and analysts have recommended a liberalization of capital outflows empirically however the removal of capital outflow controls has apparently stimulated a net inflow of capital in several experiences such as britain since 1979 italy new zealand and spain in the mid to late 1980s and colombia egypt and mexico in the 1990s numerous measures to liberalize capital outflows in chile during the 1990s have not had a noticeable effect in offseting a surge of net capital inflows how can we explain the apparent paradox that reducing controls on capital outflows can actually increase net capital inflows our theoretical model provides one such explanation a liberalization of capital outflows understood here as a reduction in the minimum capital repatriation period for foreign investment reduces the degree of irreversibility of the decision to invest in a given country this in turn lowers the option value of waiting until uncertainty about a possible change in the rules of the game that affect investment in domestic assets is resolved because in this event foreigners investing at home will be stuck with the low return asset for a shorter period of time thus a reduction in the minimum repatriation period is likely to increase not decrease net capital inflows this result has an important policy implication liberalizing capital outflows may have significant benefits on its own but it may not be the appropriate policy to defend the real exchange rate in the presence of massive capital inflows because it is likely to strengthen those very capital inflows

an experimental test of combinatorial information markets while a simple information market lets one trade on the probability of each value of a single variable a full combinatorial information market lets one trade on any combination of values of a set of variables including any conditional or joint probability in laboratory experiments we compare the accuracy of simple markets two kinds of combinatorial markets a call market and a market maker isolated individuals who report to a scoring rule and two ways to combine those individual reports into a group prediction we consider two environments with asymmetric information on sparsely correlated binary variables one with three subjects and three variables and the other with six subjects and eight variables thus 256 states

trading mechanisms and stock returns an empirical investigation this paper examines the effects of the mechanism by which securities are traded on their price behavior we compare the behavior of open to open and close to close returns on nyse stocks given the differences in execution methods applied in the opening and closing transactions opening returns are found to exhibit greater dispersion greater deviations from normality and a more negative and significant autocorrelation pattern than closing returns we study the effects of the bid ask spread and the price adjustment process on the estimated return variances and covariances and discuss the associated biases we conclude that the trading mechanism has a significant effect on stock price behavior

are unemployment and out of the labor force behaviorally distinct labor force states this paper tests the hypothesis that the classifications unemployed and out of the labor force are behaviorally meaningless distinctions this hypothesis is rejected distinct behavioral equations govern transitions from out of the labor force to employment and from unemployment to employment the evidence reported in this paper is broadly consistent with versions of search theory in which unemployment is a state that facilitates the job search process in an appendix we demonstrate that log concavity of the wage offer distribution implies that the exit rate from unemployment is an increasing function of the rate of arrival of job offers

a limit of bilateral contracting institutions i introduction the double auction da institution has a solid and deserved reputation as the archetypal efficient market institution beginning with smith 1962 30 years of experimental research shows that the da achieves very high and stable efficiency for a wide variety of underlying market structures davis and holt 1993 the da resembles many naturally occurring market institutions including some of the world s largest financial exchanges in the da any agent may at any time unilaterally make a price quantity quote to other agents revise his or her quote or accept an outstanding quote made by another agent these actions occur publicly at some central location whether spatial or electronic so all traders may continuously view quote and contract activity in both the field and the laboratory these basic rules are often augmented with bid ask improvement rules variations on the display of bid ask queues or books limit orders and so on many of these augmentations improve the da s price stability and trading efficiency smith and williams 1982 but more recent studies e g banks et al 1989 van boening and wilcox 1996 show that the da has its limits in particular it fails to produce stable and efficient allocations when market structures contain nonstandard preferences and or technological features particularly when markets are relatively thin in our own previous work the nonconvexity of batch production was the source of the difficulty walrasian equilibria do not always exist in this case and the da is inefficient in those situations this article describes our attempt to generalize the da institution so that it might encourage efficient nonuniform pricing in such situations taken at face value this attempt must be judged a failure and other past attempts to solve this problem durham et al 1996 archibald et al 2002 have not been wholly satisfying either yet examination of these results and the process of elimination strongly suggest that an implicit restriction to bilateral contracting is an essential part of the received da s limitations as we have briefly described it the da may initially appear to be the very essence of free contracting but it does not provide a mechanism whereby three or more agents may simultaneously negotiate and then enter into a mutually agreeable multiagent contract all contracts are necessarily bilateral ones under the da and in fact under almost all conventional marketlike institutions in market structures where preferences and technologies are convex the restriction to bilateral contracts is generally unimportant but when nonconvexities are severe it may be impossible to reliably achieve efficiency under the constraint of bilateral contracting telser 1987 in this article we show this is true even if the da is modified so that bilateral negotiation and contracting possibilities are made particularly rich we believe these results have important policy implications privatization and deregulation initiatives have gained momentum around the globe over the past 20 years and many economists including us have little doubt of their potential for good nonetheless poorly articulated calls for regulation by the market carry an unnecessary potential for harm although the possible institutional rules governing negotiation and contracting under private property come in nearly infinite varieties regulation by the market typically means the adoption of traditional bilateral contracting institutions like the da yet there are good theoretical reasons to doubt that these are always the best choice telser 1987 and accumulating experimental evidence supports these doubts moreover there are now promising alternatives to traditional bilateral contracting institutions that outperform the da in several nonstandard structural situations bossaerts et al 2002 bykowski et al 2000 ishikida et al 2001 we conclude that calls for regulation by the market are sometimes too vague to unambiguously serve the public interest

the significance of the market portfolio the market portfolio is in one sense the least important portfolio to provide to investors in an j agent one period stochastic endowment economy where preferences are quadratic a social welfare minded contract designer would never create a contract that would allow trading the market portfolio even the complete set of contracts all j 1 of them which achieve a first best solution never span the market portfolio these conclusions rely on the assumption that the contract designer has perfect information about agents utilities we also show that as the contract designer s information about agents utilities becomes more imperfect the optimal contracts approach contracts that weight individual endowments in proportion to elements of eigenvectors of the variance matrix of endowments then if there is a strong enough market component to endowments a portfolio approximating the market portfolio may be the most important portfolio

large scale privatization in transition economies to explain the slow progress of mass privatization programs in eastern europe the authors present a model based on a positive spillover between aggregate privatization and the individual expected return to privatization derived from a potential populist backlash if costly reforms do not bring forth sufficient aggregate privatization the model allows for the simultaneous existence of a pessimistic zero privatization trap and an optimistic full privatization equilibrium defined by a critical mass of expected privatization while both privatization subsidies and minimum income guarantees can by themselves secure coordination on the optimistic equilibrium the financing constraint may offset the direct effect copyright 1993 by american economic association

privatization market liberalization and learning in transition economies privatization and market liberalization are widely considered to be complementary reforms in transition economies this article challenges this view and the closely related big bang approach when pursued too vigorously privatization may impede the transition process following liberalization our result is based on an explicit model of market learning compared to a mature market a market in transition is characterized by greater uncertainty regarding market conditions including equilibrium prices and quanti ties economic actors must learn about these conditions through their participation in the market process less than full privatization is optimal if the costs of learning are sufficiently important

privatization technology choice and aggregate outcomes abstract we analyze the macroeconomic consequences of privatization policies in transition economies due to the particular market structure in those economies strategic completnentarities in restructuring of privatized firms occur giving rise to multiple macroeconomic equilibria restructuring and the resulting macroeconomic outcomes crucially depend on how property rights are distributed and which method of privatization is chesen firm sales to single or core investors may easily lead to bad equilibria without restructuring if employees are given profit claims this is so even if the workers give up parts of their wages as a compensation for stocks wage equity swaps contrary to conventional wisdom mass privatization can have favourable influence on micro economic efficiency and may therefore lead to a good aggregate outcome as an additional feature favouring mass privatization we argue that a big bang approach to privatization might lead to a favourable equilibrium

implications of an index contingent trading mechanism this article analyzes a call market that enables conditioning not only on an asset price but also on an index a weighted average of stock prices that is determined simultaneously with the prices of all assets the authors compare two trading systems with and without index conditioning and find that in the system with index conditioning traders indeed use the facility of index conditioning there is more depth liquidity in the market price fluctuations around true values are lower expected trading costs of liquidity traders are lower and the expected utility of informed traders is lower than in a system without index conditioning copyright 1997 by university of chicago press

stock market microstructure and return volatility evidence from italy abstract this paper studies the impact of the stock market microstructure on return volatility and on the value discovery process in the milan stock exchange the primary trading mechanism employed by this exchange is a call market which is usually preceded and followed by trading in a continuous market we find that the opening transaction in the continuous market has the highest volatility and that opening the market with the call transaction seems to produce relatively lower volatility in the closing transaction investors correct perceived errors or noise in the prices set at the call the implications of the results for market design are examined

privatization under political interference evidence from eastern germany abstract can privatization authority be successfully delegated to a privatization agency to address this question we examine the liquidation policy of the german privatization agency the theoretical part develops a dynamic model of optimal liquidation under incomplete political insulation of the privatization agency we explore how external political interference affects its liquidation policy and derive testable implications for the distribution of liquidation decisions and privatization prices the empirical part uses micro data on 1804 privatization contracts and 1097 liquidation decisions to verify the model predictions the data confirm the view that political liquidation constraints are an important determinant of privatization outcomes

allocating uncertain and unresponsive resources an experimental approach we identify an important class of economic problems that arise naturally in several applications the allocation of multiple resources when there are uncertainties in demand or supply unresponsive supplies no inventories and fixed capacities and significant demand indivisibilities rigidities examples of such problems include scheduling job shops airports or supercomputers zero inventory planning and the allocation and pricing of nasa s planned space station using experimental methods we show that the two most common organizations used to deal with this problem markets and administrative procedures can perform at very low efficiencies 60 65 efficiency in a seemingly robust example thus there is a need to design new mechanisms that more efficiently allocate resources in these environments we develop and analyze two mechanisms that arise naturally from auctions used to allocate single dimensional goods these new mechanisms involve computer assisted coordination made possible by the existence of networked computers both mechanisms significantly improve on the performance of administrative and market procedures

models for bundle trading in financial markets abstract bundle trading is a new trend in financial markets that allows traders to submit consolidated orders to sell and buy packages of assets we propose a new bundle based market clearing formulation for portfolio balancing that extends the previous models in the literature through a more detailed representation of portfolios and the formulation of new bidding requirements we also present post optimality tie breaking procedures intended to discriminate between equivalent orders on the basis of submission times numerical results evaluate the bundle effect as well as the bidding flexibility and the computational complexity of the formulation

trade reform aggregate investment and capital flight on credibility and the value of information abstract in this paper we demonstrate that uncertainty about future policy reversals coupled with irreversible investment confers an option value to foreign exchange and may lead to capital flight and a fall in aggregate investment after a trade reform the analysis focuses on the value of information and the credibility of the policy reform the conclusion points to a potential role for international institutions to prevent such problems

distributional constraints on the speed of privatization abstract this paper argues that adverse distributional effects may prevent speedy privatization in former command economies an imbalanced structure of the work force combined with a politically motivated subsistence consumption constraint may necessitate gradual privatization this possibility is illustrated by a numerical example and a model of gradual privatization is suggested

a trading mechanism contingent on several indices we introduce a trading mechanism where the execution of an order on a security can be made contingent on the relation between the clearing price of the security and the clearing price of one or several indices a mechanism similar to ours but limited to only one index was implemented on the tel aviv stock exchange we argue that it is in some cases crucial to make the execution of an order contingent on several indices our mechanism consists of a particular implementation of a double sided multi unit combinatorial auction with substitutes or dmcs auction which we introduced in an earlier article

characteristics of privatization evidence from developed less developed and former communist countries a privatization wave has swept the world starting in the u k in the early 1980s and then progressing to other developed and less developed nations this study examines how the country characteristics for the formerly state owned enterprises relate to the nature of the privatization deal and the strategy of the acquiring firm in particular this paper examines how country characteristics affect government privatization policies and in turn firm strategy results indicate that there are differences with respect to the characteristics of privatization and government policies that translate into differences in firm strategy in former communist less developed and developed countries

the exposure problem and market design markets have an exposure problem when getting to the optimal allocation requires a sequence of transactions which if started but not completed leaves at least one trader with losses we use laboratory experiments to evaluate the effect of the exposure problem on alternative market mechanisms the continuous double auction performs poorly efficiency is only 20 when exposure is high and 55 when it is low a package market effectively eliminates the exposure problem in low and high exposure treatments efficiency is 82 and 89 respectively building on stability notions from matching theory we introduce the concept of mechanism stability a model of trade that combines mechanism stability with noisy best responses and imperfect foresight explains the difference in market performance finally decentralized bargaining with contingent contracts performs well with perfect information and communication but not in the more realistic case when traders preferences are privately known

is unemployment insurance addictive evidence from the benefit durations of repeat users the author finds evidence that the past occurrence of a spell of insured unemployment lengthens the duration of future spells descriptive statistics from canadian administrative data covering mid 1971 to early 1990 suggest that unemployment insurance ui claimants tend to spend a longer and longer time collecting benefits with each additional claim they make this finding contradicts the implication of static neoclassical models that successive ui spells should be of the same length the author hypothesizes that the stigma attached to receiving unemployment benefits erodes with each new ui claim an individual files

the design of decentralized auction mechanisms that coordinate continuous trade in synthetic securities abstract this paper explores smart market mechanisms that link auction markets together in order to support trade in synthetic securities that are derived from a well defined bundle of underlying component securities these mechanisms coordinate the auctions of the component securities without interrupting the normal order flow of these markets by selectively locking individual orders using techniques from concurrency control theory a decentralized market mechanism that automatically performs cross market arbitrage is developed this mechanism requires only that the markets for the component securities be loosely coupled i e intermarket communications are not instantaneous a mechanism that does not require orders to be locked but is subject to arbitrage is also examined

equilibrium discovery and preopening mechanisms in an experimental market we experimentally analyze how to design preopening mechanisms facilitating coordination on high equilibrium liquidity and gains from trade we allow a call auction to be preceded by a preopening or not preopening orders to be binding or not and the opening time to be deterministic or random when the preopening is nonbinding traders place manipulative orders reducing the credibility of preplay communication random market opening deters manipulation but also hinders communication by making it costly gains from trade are maximized when preopening orders are binding this enables some traders to place early limit orders attracting further liquidity data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2013 1787 this paper was accepted by wei xiong finance

do past unemployment spells affect the duration of current unemployment abstract on the basis of monthly labor force histories of respondents constructed from the panel study of income dynamics this paper finds no occurrence dependence in unemployment spells positive occurrence dependence in unemployment insurance spells and substantial heterogeneity in occurrence dependence

the feasibility of an index contingent trading mechanism auction or call trading systems are used in many stock exchanges an essential problem in the application of these systems is that orders in one security cannot be conditioned on prices of other securities this paper proposes and analyzes the feasibility of an index contingent trading system in this system limit orders may be conditioned on an index any weighted average of the security prices that is determined simultaneously with the prices in addition to the asset price without any assumptions about traders behavior it is shown that under a reasonable restriction on the structure of the limit orders there is a unique solution vector of prices to any set of orders in all securities moreover the paper presents a quick and simple algorithm that converges to the solution this algorithm is based on an extension of the current mechanisms therefore it can be implemented easily in any computerized auction system

global corporations and local politics income redistribution vs fdi subsidies abstract income inequality has been used empirically to explain the mixed performance of developing countries in attracting fdi this paper sets up a theoretical model that links the skewness of the income distribution to a host government s willingness to subsidize fdi large skewness makes government subsidies less likely because the median income person prefers redistribution little skewness however does not guarantee fdi in addition host governments may switch from positive to no subsidies if a shift in economic variables changes how the policymaker trades off the fdi benefits and income redistribution thereby offering an alternative to the conventional hold up story

a comparison of stock market mechanisms i analyze a multi asset market under two trading mechanisms in the first the unrestricted system traders demand for each asset depends on all equilibrium prices and prices reflect the information contained in all order flows in the second the restricted system traders demand depends on the traded asset price and prices reflect single order flow information i show that informed traders use of multidimensional private information depends on the number of prices they observe and on the price formation process i then give conditions rendering the restricted system more efficient than the unrestricted system

capital repartriation and the waiting game abstract a stylized fact on post stabilization economies is that getting the fundamentals right even though necessary is not sufficient to ensure a prompt and costless resumption of growth uncertainty whether stabilization can in fact be sustained confers an option value to postponing investment in domestic real assets

are workers permanently scarred by job displacements this paper investigates whether workers suffer lasting scars following job displacements using david t ellwood s 1982 terminology scars represent persistent effects whereas blemishes are transitory adjustments which dissipate over time more precisely dislocated individuals are defined as scarred if they continue to earn less or to be unemployed more than their nondisplaced counterparts even after the conclusion of a several year adjustment period