growth miracles and failures in a markov switching classification model of growth abstract in this paper economic growth is interpreted as a sequence of transitions between distinct growth regimes that countries visit with different frequencies countries featuring similar growth dynamics are endogenously grouped into three different clusters the first cluster comprises successful countries that are characterized by lengthy periods of high or very high growth moderately successful countries in the second cluster experience both periods of reasonable growth and periods of stagnation whereas failing countries in the third cluster suffer from highly volatile growth rates with frequent episodes of crisis successful countries are characterized by better initial conditions policies and institutions compared to the other countries neither initial conditions nor institutions distinguish moderately successful from failing countries what makes them different is policy in the form of investments into infrastructure and human capital trade liberalization and limited policy volatility

estimating the foreclosure effect of exclusive dealing evidence from the entry of specialty beer producers this paper estimates an entry model to study the effect of exclusive dealing between anheuser busch and its distributors on rival brewers entry decisions and consumer surplus the entry model accounts for post entry demand conditions and strategic spillover effects i recover a brewer s fixed costs using a two step estimator and find spillover effects on brewers entry decisions i find that a brewer has higher fixed costs at locations where anheuser busch employ exclusive distributors but the effect is only statistically significant in certain local areas the estimates also show that a brewer is less likely to enter a location that is farther from its brewery has lower expected demand or is smaller in store size i implement counterfactual experiments to study the effect of banning exclusive contracts between anheuser busch and its distributors the results show that the welfare improvement associated with banning such contracts is very small

the political dynamics of economic growth summary we argue that an understanding of the political drivers of economic growth needs an explanation of the political dynamics around the transition from one growth phase to another and that the political drivers of early stage growth accelerations are different from that of growth maintenance informal institutions are likely to play a role in growth acceleration while formal institutions of credible commitment the provisioning of public goods and the overcoming of co ordination failures will be more important in growth maintenance we present empirical evidence drawn from country case studies and cross country econometric analysis that provides support to our theoretical propositions

the competitive effects of vertical agreements for many years there were few distinctions drawn between horizontal and vertical agreements both were considered anticompetitive and subject to per se condemnation under the antitrust laws recently however this approach has come under attack and what was once the conventional wisdom is no longer so indeed there is growing acceptance of the view that vertical agreements can rarely have anticompetitive consequences per se legality would then be the appropriate standard in this paper we investigate the competitive implications of a particular vertical agreement the imposition of exclusive dealing requirements by a manufacturer on his distributors however to maintain the focus of the analysis we do not consider ultimate welfare gains or losses in an early application of economic analysis to this practice aaron director and edward levi 1956 suggest that exclusive dealing would be anticompetitive if it raised entry costs for rivals our object following this conjecture see their p 293 is to examine the market conditions under which exclusive dealing impedes entry howard marvel 1982 dealt with the practice of exclusive dealing he provides an efficiency rationale for exclusive dealing ignores the prospect that anticompetitive effects may follow and concludes that exclusive dealing ought therefore to be treated as legal per se p 25 this paper examines the possible anticompetitive effects neglected by marvel i market conditions for exclusive dealing

women as policy makers evidence from a randomized policy experiment in india this paper uses political reservations for women in india to study the impact of women s leadership on policy decisions since the mid 1990 s one third of village council head positions in india have been randomly reserved for a woman in these councils only women could be elected to the position of head village councils are responsible for the provision of many local public goods in rural areas using a dataset we collected on 265 village councils in west bengal and rajasthan we compare the type of public goods provided in reserved and unreserved village councils we show that the reservation of a council seat affects the types of public goods provided specifically leaders invest more in infrastructure that is directly relevant to the needs of their own genders

universal service obligations in ldcs the effect of uniform pricing on infrastructure access abstract this paper develops a model to analyze the impacts of asymmetric information on optimal universal service policy in the public utilities of developing countries optimal universal service policy is implemented using two regulatory instruments pricing and network investment under discriminatory pricing asymmetric information leads to a higher price and smaller network in the rural area than under full information under uniform pricing the price is also lower but the network is even smaller in addition under both pricing regimes not only the firm but also taxpayers have incentives to collude with the regulator

why political reservations many countries are amending their political systems to set aside positions to groups such as women and racial or religious minorities that are perceived as being disadvantaged using evidence from india this article assesses the case for these reservations jel h4 o15 several countries have introduced procedures either explicit quotas or forms of gerrymandering to ensure political representation of disadvantaged groups such as women or ethnic minorities in 2001 quotas for women in parliaments were in force in more than 30 countries in india seats are reserved for historically disadvantaged groups scheduled castes or sc and scheduled tribes or st in federal or state legislative assemblies and for both historically disadvantaged groups and women at all levels of the panchayat system the system of decentralized decision making on the basis of evidence accumulated about the indian experience this paper reviews the case for reservation

centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods a political economy approach abstract this paper takes a fresh look at the trade off between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods it argues that the sharing of the costs of local public spending in a centralized system will create a conflict of interest between citizens in different jurisdictions when spending decisions are made by a legislature of locally elected representatives this conflict of interest will play out in the legislature depending on precisely how the legislature behaves the result may be excessive public spending or allocations of public goods characterized by uncertainty and misallocation across districts the extent of the conflict of interest between districts is affected by spillovers and differences in tastes for public spending thus the relative performance of centralized and decentralized systems depends upon spillovers and differences in tastes for public spending but for different reasons than suggested in the existing literature

government impartiality and sustained growth in sub saharan africa many studies suggest that one of the main reasons for africa s dismal growth performance over most of the 20th century is its degree of ethnic fragmentation yet there is still insufficient knowledge about whether ethnic diversity necessarily entails large economic costs or whether the implications of diversity depend inter alia on the government s approach toward the ethnic question we note that economic growth tends to increase average incomes but it also affects the income distribution then if growth is accompanied by growing economic inequality the perception of the impartiality of the government toward different ethnic groups is likely to be important for whether growth can be sustained or whether sparks of growth will evaporate because of rising political divisions and internal conflicts in this paper we study whether the degree of ethnic impartiality in the government s policies is related to the emergence of sustained growth in sub saharan africa irrespective of the actual content of the policies we measure perceptions about the impartiality of the government with survey data from the afrobarometer covering 20 countries starting in the late 1990 s our main definition of sustained growth is when there is a gdp per capita growth rate of at least 2 for at least five consecutive years our empirical results suggest that countries whose governments are perceived as impartial are more likely to experience sustained growth we conclude that in order to ensure economic development it is not only important to choose the right policies but also to implement these policies in a fair manner

bureaucracy and growth a cross national analysis of the effects of weberian state structures on economic growth the role of bureaucratic authority structures in facilitating economic growth has been a sociological concern since max weber s classic contributions almost 100 years ago using a recent and original data set we examine the characteristics of core state economic agencies and the growth records of a sample of 35 developing countries for the 1970 1990 period our weberianness scale offers a simple measure of the degree to which these agencies employ meritocratic recruitment and offer predictable rewarding long term careers we find that these weberian characteristics significantly enhance prospects for economic growth even when we control for initial levels of gdp per capita and human capital our results imply that weberianness should be included as a factor in general models of economic growth they also suggest the need for more attention by policymakers to building better bureaucracies and more research by social scientists on variations in how state bureaucracies are organized

does affirmative action reduce productivity a case study of the indian railways summary our objective is to shed empirical light on a claim often made by critics of affirmative action policies that increasing the representation of members of marginalized communities in jobs comes at the cost of reduced productive efficiency we undertake a systematic empirical analysis of productivity in the indian railways the world s largest employer subject to affirmative action in order to assess whether higher proportions of affirmative action beneficiaries in employment have reduced efficiency in the railway system we find no evidence for such an effect indeed some of our results suggest that the opposite is true

vertical contracts in the video rental industry a large body of theoretical work has explored the channels through which vertical contracts can induce efficiency improvements however it is also important to study vertical contracts empirically in order to gain insight into the relative size of different types of efficiency gains in this paper i empirically analyse a contractual innovation in the vertically separated video rental industry prior to 1998 video stores obtained inventory from movie distributors using simple linear pricing contracts in 1998 revenuesharing contracts were widely adopted i investigate the effect of the introduction of revenue sharing contracts on firms profits and consumer welfare i analyse a new panel data set of home video retailers that includes information on individual retailers contract and inventory choices as well as rentals and contract terms for 246 movie titles and 6137 retailers in the u s during each week of 1998 and 1999 and the first half of 2000 a structural econometric model of firms behaviour is developed that describes the nature of firms contract choices estimates from this model indicate that both upstream and downstream profits increase by 10 under the revenue sharing contract for popular titles for less popular titles the effects can be even larger i also estimate that consumers benefit when revenue sharing contracts are adopted

capture and governance at local and national levels 135 despite the importance of this issue not much systematic research appears to have been devoted to assessing the relative susceptibility of national and local governments to interestgroup capture here we describe a model of two party electoral competition with probabilistic voting behavior and lobbying by specialinterest groups based on david baron 1994 and gene grossman and elhanan helpman 1996 that helps identify determinants of relative capture at different levels of government these include relative levels of voter awareness and interest group cohesiveness electoral uncertainty electoral competition heterogeneity of districts with respect to inequality and the electoral system while some of these uphold the traditional madisonian presumption others are likely to create a tendency for lower capture at the local level so the net effect is theoretically ambiguous this suggests that the extent of relative capture may be context specific and needs to be assessed empirically

bad loans to good friends money politics and the developmental state in south korea why has the literature on asian development not addressed the issue of money politics in south korea how can we reconcile the view of an efficient developmental state in south korea before 1997 with reports of massive corruption and inefficiency in that same country in 1998 and 1999 politics is central to the answer in this study i make two arguments first money politics was extensive in south korea both during and after the high growth era second political not economic considerations dominated policymaking this study explains both past and present and compares the patterns of money politics in the early post independence era with those that arose after the democratic transition in 1987 while during the park era a balance of power between businessmen and politicians kept corruption from spinning out of control the transition to democracy altered the basic business state relationship allowing business to exert greater influence over policy decisions the political hypothesis advanced in this study suggests a new direction for our research about the developmental state

decentralisation and accountability in infrastructure delivery in developing countries many developing countries are experimenting with decentralisation of public service delivery to elected local governments instead of bureaucrats appointed by a central government we study the resulting implications in a theoretical model in which the central government is uninformed about local need and unable to monitor service allocations bureaucrats charge bribes for services as monopoly providers resulting in underprovision of services especially for the poor local governments are directly responsive to their citizens needs but may be subject to capture by elites effects of decentralisation on service volumes efficiency and equity are analysed under different financing arrangements for local governments the theme of the 2004 world development report is summarised by its opening paragraph too often services fail poor people in access in quantity in quality but the fact that there are strong examples where services do work means governments and citizens can do better how by putting poor people at the center of service provision by enabling them to monitor and discipline service providers by amplifying their voice in policymaking and by strengthening the incentives for providers to serve the poor problems of accountability associated with traditional modes of delivery involving centralised bureaucracies include cost padding service diversion limited responsiveness to local needs limited access and high prices charged especially to the poor 1 many developing countries have thus begun to experiment with initiatives to increase accountability of service providers by providing greater control rights to citizen groups these include decentralisation of service delivery to local governments community participation direct transfers to households and contracting out delivery to private providers and ngos the programmes include a wide range of infrastructure services water sanitation electricity telecommunications roads and social services education health and welfare programmes countries where such trends have gathered

what makes growth sustained abstract we identify structural breaks in economic growth in 140 countries and use these to define growth spells periods of high growth preceded by an upbreak and ending either with a downbreak or with the end of the sample growth spells tend to be shorter in african and latin american countries than elsewhere we find evidence that growth duration is positively related to the degree of equality of the income distribution democratic institutions export orientation with higher propensities to export manufactures greater openness to fdi and avoidance of exchange rate overvaluation favorable for duration and macroeconomic stability

endogenous federal grants and crowd out of state government spending theory and evidence from the federal highway aid program contrary to simple theoretical predictions existing evidence suggests that federal grants do not crowd out state government spending a legislative bargaining model with endogenous grants documents a positive correlation between grant receipts and preferences for public goods this correlation has likely biased existing work against measuring crowd out to correct for such endogeneity the model motivates instruments based on the political power of state congressional delegations exploiting this exogenous variation in grants the instrumental variables estimator reports crowd out that is statistically and economically significant this endogeneity may explain the flypaper effect a nonequivalence between grant receipts and private income jel d70 h40 h77

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

rational expectations and policy credibility following a change in regime we examine the dynamic path of an economy after a change in regime when neither the policy to be followed nor the reactions of the public are known the model is an application of kreps and wilson s reputation model to barro and gordon s macroeconomic policy game equilibrium is defined to be the dynamically consistent solution to a game between the government and the private sector it involves mixed strategies and bayesian learning by both sides until the uncertainty about government and public behaviour is resolved the absence of complete credibility of government policy and intransigence of private sector wage demands increase the output loss of disinflation the analysis also sheds light on the strategic nature of economic policymaking and the role of information in macroeconomics

from riches to rags and back institutional change financial development and economic growth in argentina since 1890 abstractargentina is the only country in the world that in 1900 was developed and in 2000 was developing although economic historians have identified and explored various possible explanations chiefly institutions political instability financial development inflation trade openness and international financial integration no study so far has attempted a comprehensive quantitative assessment of their relative importance this article tries to fill this gap using the power arch framework and annual data since 1896 to study the effects of these factors in terms of both growth and growth volatility the results highlight two main factors to understand the remarkable growth trajectory of argentina over the very long run financial development and institutions formal and informal political instability and stress the importance of differences in their short vis a vis long run behaviour

does political reservation for minorities affect child labor evidence from india summary this paper examines the impact of state level political reservation for two minority groups scheduled castes and scheduled tribes on the incidence of child labor in india we estimate the effect of political reservation on the incidence of child labor by exploiting the state variation in the share of seats reserved for the two minority groups in state legislative assemblies mandated by the constitution of india using data from state and household level surveys on fifteen major indian states we find that at the household level schedule tribe reservation decreases the incidence of child labor while scheduled caste reservation increases the total number of children working we examine these impacts on the general as well as the disadvantaged group population independently and across the gender of children we also explore potential explanations for the differential impact of sc and st political reservation including geographic isolation caste fragmentation support for the congress party and decentralization of power our results survive a variety of robustness checks

the competitive effects of vertical agreements comment recent economic analyses of vertical restraints and integration emphasize the circumstances under which these arrangements are socially efficient efficiency claims have proven contentious however for exclusive dealing a vertical restraint that prohibits any outlet carrying a manufacturer s product from stocking substitute brands this paper analyzes the impact of exclusive dealing on competition and allocative efficiency opinions expressed on the impact of exclusive dealing range from the extreme view that it is invariably anticompetitive to the view that it is always procompetitive the u s supreme court has concluded that in hundreds if not thousands of communities where there is a single retailer for a product

stepping into formal politics women s engagement in formal political processes in irrigation in rural india summary gender quotas decentralization of irrigation management and reliance on mgnrega for labor provision challenge the traditional patriarchal canal management system by institutionalizing women as formal decision makers and members of the irrigation labor force in northern india based on a survey of 592 women in rural himachal pradesh this paper quantitatively analyses how these policies affect women s engagement in formal political processes results indicate that factors from the private and individual domains influence female participation in formal political processes most importantly india s gender inclusive policies provide women with the opportunity to legitimately engage in formal political processes governing resource management

beer and the tie did divestiture of brewer owned public houses lead to higher beer prices in 1989 the united kingdom monopolies and mergers commission mmc recommended measures that eventually led brewers to divest themselves of 14 000 public houses the mmc claimed that their recommendations would lower retail prices and increase consumer choice since that time however retail prices have risen this paper contains an econometric analysis of the transition period the analysis is based on a model of the relationship between retail price and retail organisational form that emphasises how exclusive dealing clauses and strategic factors interact in 1989 in an important decision the united kingdom monopolies and mergers commission mmc recommended measures that eventually led brewers to divest themselves of 14 000 public houses the mmc claimed that their recommendations would lower retail prices and increase consumer choice there is considerable doubt however that their objectives were achieved indeed since the time that the recommendations were implemented retail prices have risen it is not clear however if prices would have increased in the absence of divestiture one goal of my research is to provide an answer to this question the mmc s recommendations created an exceptional opportunity to assess the effects that different contractual arrangements have on retail prices indeed one would like to investigate this relationship ceteris paribus unfortunately however the choice of vertical market structure is normally endogenous and it is impossible to condition on all of the factors that affect the contracting decision in the uk beer industry in contrast the government ordered changes in the type and terms of the contracts under which national brewers could operate their licensed premises increased separation between brewer and publican therefore was not due to changes in economic conditions moreover some premises the free houses that were not owned by a brewer were not affected by the beer orders the existence of a control group facilitates the analysis by strengthening the conclusions that one can draw in recent years economists have moved away from simple theories of vertical

the competitive effects of vertical agreements comment in a recent paper comanor and frech 1985 cf claim that a manufacturer enjoying a product differentiation advantage could impose exclusive dealing on distributors while also raising its wholesale price the two consumer groups in the model would then pay higher prices than under nonexclusive dealing cf also suggest that exclusive dealing is more likely to emerge when product differentiation is relatively strong cf s analysis does not carefully incorporate the constraints imposed by dealer rationality doing so within cf s model i reach opposite conclusions exclusive dealing will be accepted only if the manufacturer reduces its wholesale price to dealers relative to nonexclusive dealing price rises to one group of consumers but falls to the other moreover exclusive dealing is more likely to emerge when product differentiation is relatively weak

exclusive dealing investment promotion may facilitate inefficient foreclosure this paper studies a model whereby exclusive dealing ed can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier since ed promotes the incumbent seller s investment the seller and the buyer realize a greater surplus from bilateral trade under exclusivity hence the parties involved may sign an ed contract that excludes a more efficient entrant in circumstances where ed would not arise absent investment the paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards accepting possible investment promotion arguments as a defense for ed

local politics political institutions and public resource allocation abstractthis article examines how political institutions and local power structures interact with and influence local public resource allocation in the indian state of karnataka we use data from 80 village councils and 225 villages to examine how this local political economy influences the allocation of public resources our empirical strategy exploits a unique policy of political representation in karnataka that mandates representation or reserves seats in local governments for both historically disadvantaged groups and politically dominant groups these policy induced differences in the caste composition of these village councils therefore allow us to examine whether and how the form of such local politics distorts local public resource allocation representation in village councils is a nonlinear function of the demographic shares of these groups controlling for the latter allows us to identify the role of local power structures through the effect of social identities and the associated relative ba

exclusive dealing and common agency in international markets abstract this paper investigates the contractual choice between exclusive dealing and common agency in a simple international oligopoly model where products are sold through intermediaries we find that when trade barriers are high domestic firms tend to adopt exclusive dealing contracts whereas trade liberalization may lead firms to choose common agency social welfare can be raised be prohibiting exclusive dealing common agency when trade barriers are high low and products are close substitutes

the competitive effects of exclusive dealing evidence from the u s beer industry abstract several recent theoretical articles have modeled the effects of exclusive dealing contracts that restrict dealers to selling a single brand yet detailed empirical analysis of the impact of exclusivity on actual market outcomes has been lacking i analyze a unique set of firm level data on nearly 400 beer distributors in the united states the impacts of economies of scale and restrictions on distributor promotional activities on the use of exclusive dealing are measured as well as the effects of exclusivity on costs prices and output the results support the view that exclusive dealing serves to minimize manufacturer dealer incentive conflicts and enhances social welfare

the politics of public good provision evidence from indian local governments this paper uses village and household survey data from south india to examine how political geography and politician identity impacts on public good provision we provide evidence that the nature of this relationship varies by type of public good for high spillover public goods residential proximity to elected representative matters in contrast for low spillover public goods sharing the politician s group identity is what matters jel d78 h40

votes and regional economic growth evidence from turkey in countries where governments disproportionate power over the bureaucracy is coupled with a strong political polarization can votes for the national incumbent party buy preferential policy treatment and faster regional economic growth the article tests such question on turkey s 81 provinces over 2004 12 results uncover a link between votes and faster regional growth as well as a small influence of preferential allocations in explaining it yet after addressing potential endogeneity economic performance is almost entirely explained by standard drivers primarily human capital endowment results suggest that the impact of electorally motivated distributive politics on regions economic performance is extremely limited

ethnic diversity social sanctions and public goods in kenya abstract this paper examines ethnic diversity and local public goods in rural western kenya the identification strategy relies on the stable historically determined patterns of ethnic land settlement ethnic diversity is associated with lower primary school funding and worse school facilities and there is suggestive evidence that it leads to poor water well maintenance the theoretical model illustrates how inability to impose social sanctions in diverse communities leads to collective action failures and we find that school committees in diverse areas do impose fewer sanctions on defaulting parents we relate these results to the literature on social capital and economic development and discuss implications for decentralization in less developed countries

welfare effects of criminal politicians a discontinuity based approach abstract this paper uses unique data on the criminal records of indian bureaucrats to examine the relationship between politicians criminality and consumption crime and corruption the identification relies on a regression discontinuity design by which individuals living in districts where a criminal politician was barely elected are compared with individuals living in districts where a criminal politician barely lost the results show that criminal politicians decrease consumption by vulnerable sections of society the monthly per capita expenditure of scheduled castes scheduled tribes or other backward classes decreases by 19 percent this paper suggests that the effect of criminal politicians on criminality and corruption may explain this result

can the west save africa in the new millennium the western aid effort toward africa has surged due to writ ings by well known economists a celebrity mass advocacy campaign and decisions by western leaders to make africa a major foreign policy priority this survey contrasts the predominant transformational approach west comprehensively saves africa to occasional swings to a marginal approach west takes one small step at a time to help individual africans evaluation of one step at a time initiatives is generally easier than that of transformational ones either through controlled experiments although these have been oversold or simple case studies where it is easier to attribute outcomes to actions we see two themes emerge from the literature survey 1 escalation as each successive western transformational effort has yielded disappointing results as judged at least by stylized facts since again the econometrics are shaky the response has been to try an even more ambitious effort and 2 the cycle of ideas rather than a progressive testing and discarding of failed ideas we see a cycle in aid ideas in many areas in africa with ideas going out of fashion only to come back again later after some lapse long enough to forget the previous disappointing experience both escalation and cyclicality of ideas are symptomatic of the lack of learning that seems to be characteristic of the transfor mational approach in contrast the marginal approach has had some successes in improving the well being of individual africans such as the dramatic fall in mortality

over confidence may reduce negotiation delay abstract when a seller negotiates with multiple buyers how does over confidence affect the timing of trade in this paper we distinguish between over confidence about trade opportunities and over confidence about the terms of trade in bargaining environments without externalities both types of over confidence can cause delays in agreement if externalities are present the two forms of subjective bias have very different impacts on delay in particular over confidence about trade opportunities may reduce bargaining delay

empirics of hills plateaus mountains and plains a markov switching approach to growth abstract most economic growth research has been aimed at explaining cross country differences in average growth rates however it is well known that growth experiences differ over time within a country almost as much as they differ among countries this paper builds on pritchett s 2000 pritchett lant understanding patterns of economic growth searching for hills among plateaus mountains and plains world bank economic review may 2000 14 2 221 250 observation that the growth process can be thought of as transitions between different growth regimes and proposes a framework for systematic analysis of such regimes and the dynamics of the transitions i estimate a markov switching regression to characterize four distinct growth regimes and transitions between them the results show that countries switch among regimes of stable growth miracle catch up stagnation and crisis with the transition probabilities determined by the quality of institutions better institutions appear to improve long run growth by making episodes of fast growth more persistent low average growth rates in countries with weak institutions are a result of these countries spending more time in stagnation regimes rather then being incapable of fast growth at all weak institutions do not rule out growth takeoffs but limit their sustainability the approach directs attention to shifts in growth performance and highlights the fact that identical average growth rates can mask very distinct growth paths

public good provision in indian rural areas the returns to collective action by microfinance groups self help groups shgs are the most common form of microfinance in india the authors provide evidence that shgs composed of women only undertake collective actions for the provision of public goods within village communities using a theoretical model this paper shows that an elected official whose aim is to maximize re election chances exerts higher effort in providing public goods when private citizens undertake collective action and coordinate their voluntary contributions towards the same goods this effect occurs although government and private contributions are assumed to be substitutes in the technology of providing public goods using first hand data on shgs in india the paper tests the prediction of the model and shows that in response to collective action by shgs local authorities tackle a larger variety of public issues and are more likely to tackle issues of interest to shgs the findings highlight how the social behavior of shgs can influence the governance of rural indian communities

can resale price maintenance and franchise fees correct sub optimal levels of retail service abstract this paper examines resale price maintenance by a monopoly manufacturer who sells its product through monopolistically competitive retailers the retailers also provide service but there is an externality in its provision if the manufacturer sets only a wholesale price the externality results in too little service and the addition of rpm will not correct this maximum rpm is used only to correct the successive monopoly problem with no effect on service however if the manufacturer can also set a franchise fee too little service arises when the externality is large minimum rpm will correct this increasing both profits and consumer surplus this partially confirms the telser 1960 argument for rpm when the externality is small retailers provide too much service and the vertical externality argument is invalid these results suggest that the insights from simple vertical models may not generalize to models which allow other dimensions of non price competition among retailers

community based development and poverty alleviation an evaluation of china s poor village investment program we conduct the first systematic evaluation of the world s largest community based development program china s flagship poverty alleviation program began in 2001 which finances public investments in designated poor villages based on participatory village planning we use matching methods and a panel household and village data set with national coverage to compare changes from 2001 to 2004 in designated poor villages that began plan investments and in designated poor villages that had yet to begin plan investments we find that the program significantly increased both government and village financed investments while the program did not increase the income or consumption of poorer households it did increase the income and consumption of richer households by 6 1 to 9 2 we also find suggestive evidence that governance matters in the distribution of program benefits relative gains were greater for richer households in villages with more educated leaders and higher quality village committees delivered greater benefits to both richer and poorer households

can mandated political representation increase policy influence for disadvantaged minorities theory and evidence from india accountable governments often fail to reflect the interests of disadvantaged minorities this paper exploits the institutional features of political reservation as practiced in indian states to examine the role of mandated political representation in providing disadvantaged groups influence over policy making ifind that political reservation has increased transfers to groups which benefit from the mandate this finding also suggests that complete policy commitment may be absent in democracies as is found in this case jel d72 d78 hl 1 h50

low level versus high level equilibrium in public utility services abstract heterogeneity of public utility services is common in developing countries in a high level equilibrium the quality of utility services is high consumer willingness to pay for services is high the utility is well funded and staff well paid in order to induce high quality of performance in a low level equilibrium the opposite is the case which alternative occurs depends on both the quality of utility management and public perceptions about service quality if a utility administration has the potential to offer high quality service and the public is aware of this high quality equilibrium also requires the public s service payments to be high enough to fund the needed pay incentives for the utility staff when the public lacks knowledge about the utility administration s quality the public s initial beliefs about the utility administration s quality will also influence their willingness to pay sufficiently for a high quality equilibrium to be realized this paper shows that with low confidence only a low level equilibrium may exist while with higher initial confidence a high level equilibrium becomes possible intermediate in between the low and high level outcomes can also occur in early periods with high level outcomes later on

don t touch my road evidence from india on affirmative action and everyday discrimination summary this article investigates whether affirmative action in the form of electoral quotas affects group based discrimination the redistributive effect of quotas is subject to debate and their ultimate target is discrimination to identify the effect of electoral quotas i take advantage of their rotation across space and over time in india to proxy discrimination i use a measure of caste based exclusion from a public infrastructure namely streets in 2006 44 5 household members of the marginalized castes labeled scheduled castes sc still suffered from caste based exclusions i document that ongoing sc quotas reduce the likelihood of caste based exclusion for members of the scs by about one fifth the results also imply that the effect is not persistent it disappears with the end of the sc quota from a policy maker s perspective these results are mixed since electoral quotas do affect everyday discrimination even if the effect does not last these results are consistent with a temporary change in the behavior of members of the dominant castes after a one shot electoral quota these results are inconsistent with either a change in the stereotypes held by members of the dominant castes or a change in the aspirations of members of the lower castes

to lobby or to partner investigating the shifting political strategies of biopharmaceutical industry associations in innovation systems of south africa and india the role of industry associations in shaping policy through various lobbying activities is well established in most cases while such activities are deemed essential from an industry perspective they also carry negative connotations connected to narrow rent seeking and the pursuit of elites interests which run counter to the public good and discourage competition and subsequent innovation as such industry associations have long been excluded from discussions regarding the relational dynamics and evolution of innovation systems in contrast this paper builds upon more recent work that places industry associations as key intermediary actors that facilitate knowledge exchange and institutional capacity building particularly in the context of developing countries where limited institutional capacities and substantial knowledge gaps can limit both innovation and development employing a qualitative cross national comparison this paper examines the changing roles and activities of biopharmaceutical industry associations in the development of the south african and indian pharmaceutical industries with a particular focus on government industry relations for doing so the paper captures developments during three main periods through which both the south african and indian biopharmaceutical industries have similarly evolved although within different national contexts 1 pre liberalization 2 expanding pluralism and 3 increasing partnership we argue that in south africa and india particular historical trajectories and lack of institutional capacities are shifting industry associations away from ineffective lobbying to a new political approach that emphasizes partnering with government in the pursuit of not only narrow industry objectives but also broader development aims

the political economy of benefits and costs a neoclassical approach to distributive politics this essay offers a rational political explanation for the notorious inefficiency of pork barrel projects with an optimization model of legislative behavior and legislative institutions the model emphasizes the economically arbitrary from a welfare point of view importance of the geographic incidence of benefits and costs owing to the geographic basis for political representation we explore the implications of a legislator s objective function and derive conditions under which a representative legislature will select an omnibus of projects each of which exceeds the efficient scale

the spillover effects of affirmative action on competitiveness and unethical behavior we conduct an artefactual field experiment to examine various spillover effects of affirmative action policies in the context of castes in india we test a if individuals who enter tournaments in the presence of affirmative action policies remain competitive after the policy has been removed and b whether having been exposed to the policy generates unethical behavior and spite against subjects from the category who has benefited from the policy we find that these policies substantially increase the confidence and the competitiveness of the backward caste members however we find no spillover effect on confidence and competitiveness once affirmative action is withdrawn any gain in competitiveness due to the policy is then entirely wiped out furthermore the strong existing bias of the dominant category against the backward category is not significantly aggravated by affirmative action except when individuals learn that they have lost the previous competition

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

can gender quotas break down negative stereotypes evidence from changes in electoral rules abstract in this paper we analyze the effect of gender quotas on women s involvement in political activity by using a rich data set providing information on all italian local administrators who were elected from 1985 to 2007 gender quotas were introduced by law in italy in 1993 and were in force until 1995 because of the short period covered by the reform some municipalities never voted under the gender quota regime this allows us to identify a treatment and a control group and to estimate the effects of gender quotas by using a difference in differences estimation strategy our estimates show that women s representation in politics after the reform increased significantly more in municipalities that were affected by the reform than in municipalities that were not affected this result also holds true if we exclude from our analysis elections which took place during the period in which the reform was in force moreover the higher women s representation in gender quota municipalities is not related to the advantages that women who were elected during the reform have obtained from incumbency and does not seem to be driven by differences in temporal trends between southern and northern regions these findings suggest that affirmative actions can be of use in breaking down stereotypes against women

health nutrition and economic development the relationship between health and economic development is explored focusing on nutrition based health indicators the spotlight is placed on the inter related feedbacks between the influence of health on productivity on one hand and the influence of income on health status on the other disentangling causality in these relationships has preoccupied much of the literature we evaluate different empirical strategies that have been adopted and assess the results there is now a body of evidence based on careful empirical studies that demonstrates a causal relationship between health and labor productivity there is also evidence that at least among the very poor additional income is spent on improved nutrition there are two issues that have received little attention although we argue they are likely to be very important first measurement of health is discussed in detail evidence is presented on how taking into account differences in the extent of measurement error is critical for interpreting the impact of health on wages the same theme emerges in studies of the effect of income on health specifically calorie intake the key role of non linearities in these relationships is highlighted and we demonstrate that a good deal of the variation in estimates of income elasticities of demand for calories can be ascribed to the role of measurement and functional form authors

the effect of health on economic growth a production function approach abstract we estimate a production function model of aggregate economic growth including two variables that microeconomists have identified as fundamental components of human capital work experience and health our main result is that good health has a positive sizable and statistically significant effect on aggregate output even when we control for experience of the workforce we argue that the life expectancy effect in growth regressions appears to be a real labor productivity effect and is not the result of life expectancy acting as a proxy for worker experience

an economic theory of vertical restraints vertical restraints imposed by manufacturers on the prices locations and sales of retail firms represent a puzzling departure from the simple price mediated exchange of conventional markets in this article we analyze the theoretical basis for these restraints in a setting where retailers inform consumers and are imperfectly competitive and where a manufacturer has some monopoly power we identify three potential externalities affecting retailers decisions these externalities lead to the failure of simple uniform price contracts to coordinate the incentives of retailers with the objective of maximizing combined manufacturer and retailer profits we identify the packages of vertical restraints that are minimally sufficient under various conditions to neutralize the externalities and to achieve the joint profit maximum

the cost of segregation in social networks abstract this paper investigates the welfare effect of income redistribution in the private provision of public goods on networks we first show that the welfare effect of income redistribution is determined by bonacich centrality then we develop an index based on the network structure of interactions which roughly speaking measures the welfare effect of income redistribution confined to a component of contributors the proposed index vanishes when applied to large components of contributors that display special segregated interactions which suggests an asymptotic neutrality of redistributive policies

democracy and demography societal effects of fertility limits on local leaders we investigate whether restricting elected leadership positions to candidates with desirable characteristics leads to society wide adoption of those characteristics in a low income democracy with high political participation exploiting quasi experimental variation in fertility limits imposed on village council members in india to curb population growth we find that rural couples significantly decreased fertility in response socially disadvantaged families exhibit the greatest reduction in marginal fertility immediately following the passage of these limits but the decline in the long run stock of children is more evenly spread across socioeconomic groups the limits however also increased the already male biased sex ratio at birth in castes with strong son preference therefore while restricting access to elected office may aid in achieving social objectives it can also worsen inequality

upfront payments and exclusion in downstream markets although upfront payments are often observed in contracts between manufacturers and retailers little is known about their competitive effects or the role retailers play in securing them in this article we consider a model in which two competing retailers make take it or leave it offers to a common manufacturer we find that upfront payments are a feature of equilibrium contracts and in all equilibria only one retailer buys from the manufacturer these findings support the claims of small manufacturers who argue that they are often unable to obtain widespread distribution for their products because of upfront payments copyright 2007 rand

exclusive contracts foster relationship specific investment exclusive contracts prohibit one or both parties from trading with anyone else contrary to earlier findings we show that investments that are specific to the contracting parties may be encouraged by exclusivity results depend on the nature of investments and the bargaining solution the major part of the analysis shows that exclusivity deals designed to assure the supply of essential inputs promote investment infinite penalties for breach even if ex post renegotiable may result in excessive investment in which case a positive but finite damage payment yields the first best outcome

discount chains and brand policy retail chains are observed in many industries the question addressed here is whether retail chains can exploit buyer power by excluding some brands in a theoretical model with two differentiated producers and a single retailer we show that a retailer will require exclusivity exclude a brand if the brands are sufficiently symmetric in demand potential exclusivity will increase welfare if the excluded brand is a close substitute for the brand carried by the retailer our theoretical results are also set in relation to some findings from the norwegian grocery industry jel classification l12 l42

equilibrium incentives for exclusive dealing in a differentiated products oligopoly we consider the incentives for oligopolistic manufacturers to adopt exclusive dealing manufacturers producing differentiated brands can choose to distribute through exclusive retail dealerships or nonexclusive dealerships with nonexclusive dealing manufacturers face an interbrand externality because brand enhancing investments made by one manufacturer may benefit the brands of other manufacturers although exclusive dealing eliminates this externality oligopolistic manufacturers may not choose exclusive dealing exclusive dealing enhances the incentive to invest but the promotional investments are a form of competition between manufacturers thus manufacturers might earn higher profits with nonexclusive dealing making lower promotional investments we find cases in which nonexclusive dealing is a dominant strategy we also find cases in which some but not all manufacturers adopt exclusive dealing moreover even if adoption of exclusive dealing by all manufacturers is the equilibrium it can arise from a prisoner s dilemma in that each manufacturer would prefer nonexclusive dealing

are we witnessing a paradigm shift in the analysis of political competition this presidential address assesses the crisis of the downsian model of political competition in light of the mounting evidence on policy divergence and evaluates the possibility that the new theories of politicians quality and political selection provide an alternative theoretical conceptualization of political competition based on a critical review of the literature and on the author s works on content analysis of policy speeches income redistribution politicians quality and political legislation cycles this address concludes that multidimensional downsian models of political competition are adequate to explain policy divergence and points out the serious theoretical and empirical problems that models of political selection have to solve

seeking the local state gender caste and the pursuit of public services in post tsunami india summary how do ordinary citizens access the state in the world s largest democracy this paper examines a critical case from india exploring the channels formal and informal through which residents of two tsunami affected villages pursued public services following the 2004 disaster external shocks such as the proliferation of aid and ngos created moments in which individuals interacted differently with public agencies different village level groups attempted to access state resources through distinct sets of intermediaries marginalized groups women and caste minorities appeared most willing and likely to utilize formal government channels while men from the locally dominant caste turned to informal non state channels

the economic theory of vertical restraints the types of contracts arising in a typical vertical manufacturer retailer relationship are more sophisticated than a simple uniform price in addition to setting per unit prices manufacturers and retailers also revert to non linear pricing and non price instruments these instruments or contracts are referred to as vertical restraints and can take the form of franchise fees resale price maintenance exclusive dealing exclusive territories and slotting allowances the use and the effects of one type of instrument versus another depend crucially on specific market assumptions upstream and downstream and on the division of bargaining power between manufacturers and retailers this paper surveys the industrial organization literature on retail pricing and shows that vertical restraint instruments have important effects on producer and consumer prices market structure efficiency and welfare

income and democracy existing studies establish a strong cross country correlation between income and democracy but do not control for factors that simultaneously affect both variables we show that controlling for such factors by including country fixed effects removes the statistical association between income per capita and vari ous measures of democracy we present instrumental variables estimates that also show no causal effect of income on democracy the cross country corre lation between income and democracy reflects a positive correlation between changes in income and democracy over the past 500 years this pattern is con sistent with the idea that societies embarked on divergent political economic development paths at certain critical junctures jel d7 e 1

mandated political representation and redistribution mandated political representation for minorities involves earmarking certain electoral districts where only minority group candidates are permitted to contest such quotas have been implemented in india for certain social groups and for women although gender quotas in the legislature are popular in several other countries this paper builds a political economy model to analyze the effect of such affirmative action on redistribution in equilibrium our model predicts that in situations where the minority group is economically disadvantaged and where voters favor candidates from their own group such a quota actually reduces transfers to poorer groups moreover redistribution in reserved districts leads to a rise in within minority group inequality

power it up strengthening the electricity sector to improve efficiency and support economic activity poor performance of the electricity sector remains a drag to economic efficiency and a bottleneck to economic activity in many low income countries this paper proposes a number of models that account for different equilibria some better some worse of the electricity sector they show how policy choices affecting insolvency prospects or related to rules for electricity dispatching or tariff setting stochastic generation costs and initial conditions affect investment in generation and electricity supply they also show how credible non credible promises of stronger enforcement to reduce theft result in larger smaller electricity supply lower higher government subsidies and lower higher tariffs and distribution losses which in turn affect economic activity to illustrate these findings the paper reviews the experience of haiti a country stuck in a bad equilibrium of insufficient supply high prices and electricity theft and that of nicaragua which is gradually transitioning to a better equilibrium

naked exclusion in the lab the case of sequential contracting in the context of the naked exclusion model of rasmusen ramseyer and wiley 1991 and segal and whinston 2000b we examine whether sequential contracting is more conducive to exclusion in the lab and whether it leads to lower exclusion costs for the incumbent than simultaneous contracting we find that an incumbent who proposes exclusive contracts to buyers sequentially is better able to deter entry than an incumbent who proposes contracts simultaneously in contrast to theory this comes at a substantial cost for the incumbent