median voters or budget maximizers evidence from school expenditure referenda some readers may have found these results of greater interest were we able to confirm the directional hypotheses of the certainty setter model in addition to finding that spending is related to the reversion the much weaker prediction of the uncertainty model yet the failure of the certainty when base elections were optional their infrequent occurrence might be expected under either a median voter or a setter model for those districts that did hold base elections the observations appear consistent with a setter model but are either inexplicable by or inconsistent with a median voter model finally both a the relationship between the number of budget elections and the presence of base elections and b the outcome of mandatory base elections in 1978 provide a set of observations that are challenging to either model a similar challenge was posed by our investigation of budget elections when we called attention to the inadequacy of static full information models rather than resolving the question of the simple setter model against the simple median voter model our results indicate that both may be inappropriate and that endeavors dealing with complexities omitted here are warranted

governmental behavior in representative democracy a synthesis of the theoretical literature what is the impact of bureaucratic behaviors on tax rates what is preferable a bureaucrat or a partisan politician does a flypaper effect occur when lobby groups influence public policies this article tries to answer these questions by analyzing and comparing six different models of public choice 1 the median voter model 2 the leviathan model 3 the slack maximizing model 4 a general model of bureaucracy 5 the partisan politicians model and 6 a general model of lobbying among several results it is shown that the median voter s income and tax share almost always play a significant role in the design of the public good tax package even if the government does not explicitly try to maximize the median voter s utility the article also provides a synthesis of the positive analysis of the flypaper effect

biased tax price or grant expenditure elasticities abstract minor differences in logarithmic government expenditure function specifications lead to wide swings in elasticity estimates the median voter model is use to identify the biases as well as the appropriate adjustments to bring the elasticities into conformity across model specifications

the median voter according to garp this paper adapts the generalized axiom of revealed preference garp empirical method to the public goods problem to test whether observed municipal public spending can be explained as if the city governments maximize the utility of the median income voter it applies the test procedure for medium size municipal governments in five midwest states the data are consistent with garp and reveal that the local governments in the sample behave as if they maximize median voter utility once we control for the state specific effects government management structure and population density the median voter hypothesis is the proposition that local governments behave as if they maximize the utility of the median income voter in the jurisdiction although an important tool in public economic analysis there has been no conclusive direct test of the maximization hypothesis to date revealed preference theory shows that any finite set of price and quantity observations satisfying the generalized axiom of revealed preference garp can be rationalized by the constrained maximization of an increasing continuous concave utility function afriat 1967 1973 varian 1982 this paper adapts the revealed preference method to the public goods problem in order to test municipal spending data for consistency under garp thereby providing the first direct test of whether or not the local governments behave as if they maximize median voter utility the median voter hypothesis represents a simple tool that is the most widely used characterization of local government behavior given its prominence in the literature it is not surprising that the hypothesis itself has become the subject of scrutiny the framework assumes direct or representative democracy without strategic behavior in which competition among politicians ensures that the public sector bureaucracy responds efficiently to voters desires public sector decision making reduces to an as if constrained maximization problem a simplified picture of the outcome of collective action still much of the empirical testing literature is motivated by concerns over whether the model is too simplistic nonetheless it can be argued that given its depiction as an as if outcome the median voter hypothesis should be judged not by its descriptive accuracy of the public sector decision process but instead by how well it explains observed local fiscal choices on this basis the existing empirical evidence although mixed reveals a surprising amount of indirect support for the framework one approach taken in the literature is to evaluate the median voter hypothesis by testing the predictive power of regression equations with median income and tax price terms for explaining state or local fiscal behavior in this line of the

the wage gap between francophones and anglophones a canadian perspective 1970 2000 the wage gap between francophone and anglophone men from 1970 and 2000 fell by 25 percentage points within quebec but only by 10 points canada wide largely because the wages of quebec anglophones fell by 15 points relative to other canadian anglophones accordingly the canadian measure of the francophone gap better reflects the changing welfare of francophones than the quebec measure over half of the reduction in the canadian francophone wage gap is explained by rising francophone education levels in quebec the declining number and relative wages of anglophone workers is best explained by a falling demand for english speaking labour l ecart de salaires entre les hommes francophones et anglophones est tombe de 25 points de pourcentage au quebec entre 1970 et 2000 mais seulement de 10 points a l echelle canadienne largement parce que les salaires des anglophones au quebec sont tombes de 15 points par rapport aux autres canadiens anglophones en consequence la mesure canadienne de l ecart prend mieux la mesure du changement de bien etre des francophones que la mesure quebecoise plus de la moitie de la reduction dans l ecart au niveau canadien s explique par l accroissement des niveaux d education des francophones au quebec le nombre en declin des travailleurs anglophones et la chute de leurs salaires relatifs s expliquent par un declin dans la demande de travailleurs parlant anglais

perfection the infinite horizon and dominance abstract consideration of time and independence brought into focus by the example of perfection in the infinite horizon leads the author to a modified contraction by dominance solution for game theory

rational behaviour in extensive form games it is argued that subgame perfect equilibrium behavior is not an inevitable consequence of common belief of rationality among players in noncooperative extensive form games the argument centers around a particular extensive form game with perfect information in the context of this game it is argued that if rationality is not common belief throughout play of the game then it can be perfectly rational to play contrary to subgame perfection even if rationality is common belief at the beginning of the game it is then shown that it is impossible for rationality to be common belief throughout every play of the game

local government internal structure external constraints and the median voter this paper examines how internal structure and external constraints affect local government ability to meet voters demands it applies the revealed preference method to us counties to identify those that fail to satisfy the pure democracy outcome of the median voter hypothesis mvh probit analysis identifies the factors associated with counties that satisfy the mvh internal government structure does not matter but restricting home rule increases the likelihood of satisfying the mvh equilibrium the latter result consistent with the leviathan model the systematic differences found for urban and rural county governments reinforce this conclusion

price and income distortions under separate spending and taxing decisions abstract this paper analyzes the extent to which intergovernmental grants create a discrepancy between the local voter s actual and perceived budget constraints the model is innovative in that it introduces grant illusion due to income misperceptions theoretically distinguishes illusion caused by income distortions from illusion caused by price distortions and separately tests for the magnitude of each empirical analysis identifies both price and income misperceptions as significant determinants of voter behavior these unbiased estimates reveal that previous research has misspecified the budget constraint resulting in overestimation of the stimulative effects of intergovernmental grants on local expenditure

fiscal illusion uncertainty and the flypaper effect abstract the flypaper effect is the empirical observation that increases in intergovernmental aid stimulate greater local government expenditure than do increases in voter income fiscal illusion provides a widely accepted explanation for this asymmetry models of voter behavior under fiscal illusion typically assume that taxpayers consistently misperceive nonstochastic average for marginal tax prices this paper develops an alternative framework in which rational voters recognize marginal tax prices but must make tax and expenditure plans under imperfect information or uncertainty various sources of uncertainty are analyzed and related to the flypaper effect and implications for public expenditure demand theory are discussed

is the median voter decisive evidence from referenda voting patterns abstract this paper examines whether the voter with the median income is decisive in local spending decisions previous tests have relied on cross sectional data while we make use of a pair of california referenda to estimate a first difference specification the referenda proposed to lower the required vote share for passing local educational bonding initiatives from 67 to 50 and 67 to 55 respectively we find that voters rationally consider future public service decisions when deciding how to vote on voting rules however the empirical evidence strongly suggests that an income percentile below the median is decisive for majority voting rules especially in communities that have a large share of high income voters with attributes that suggest low demand for public services based on a model that explicitly recognizes that each community contains voters with both high and low demand for public school spending we also find that an increase in the share of low demand voters is associated with a lower decisive voter income percentile for the high demand group this two type model implies that our low demand types individuals over age 45 with no children have demands that are 45 lower than other voters collectively these findings are consistent with high income voters with weak preferences for public educational services voting with the poor against increases in public spending on education

the learning curve predation antitrust and welfare an economic definition of predation is applied to a dynamic model of duopoly competition with learning curves it is shown that rational predation occurs in equilibrium although below cost pricing is neither a necessary nor a sufficient indicator of predation a conceptual framework for antitrust analysis of predation shows that a prohibition of predation might help or harm consumer welfare depending on details of market structure although the informational requirements of fashioning an effective legal rule against harmful predation are formidable

equilibria and efficiency in bilingual labour markets abstract we consider a labour market where two languages are commonly in use and each individual may make a costly investment to learn the language which is not his or her mother tongue language skills are productive in a human capital sense and can also be used to signal unobservable traits to employers due to the informational asymmetry between workers and employees the equilibrium rate of bilingualism in the economy may exceed the socially efficient level on the other hand the spillovers associated with second language acquisition may imply there is not enough bilingualism relative to the social optimum we consider the circumstances under which either the signalling or the network welfare effects dominate in equilibrium depending on the parameter values of the model policies of either encouraging or discouraging the investment in language skills may be welfare enhancing

bilingualism and network externalities the authors develop a model in which the benefit of language acquisition is increasing in the number of individuals who speak the language this gives rise to a network externality and if language acquisition is costly the language acquisition decisions by individuals may be inefficient if the available policy instruments affect all members of a language group homogeneously then policies that effectively subsidize language acquisition are warranted only for the majority language

eductive learning and the rationalizability of oligopoly games abstract this paper extends the eductive learning approach in settings with non atomistic agents it shows the connection between the characterization of rationalizable sets by basu 1991 and the seminal result by guesnerie 1992 in the context of cournot oligopoly models

two sided uncertainty in the monopoly agenda setter model we extend the romer rosenthal model of representative democracy to a signaling environment in which i only the representatives knows the status quo outcome resulting if her take it or leave it policy proposal is rejected by the voters while ii only the voters know their true preferences over policies a separating sequential equilibrium is shown to exist and to uniquely satisfy a common equilibrium refinement furthermore this equilibrium has the property that relative to the environment where the status quo is known to the voter there is a downward bias in the setter s proposal and an associated upward bias in the probability of the proposal s acceptance by the voter

recent advances in oligopoly theory from a game theory perspective abstract this paper surveys the contribution that recent developments in game theory have made to the understanding of oligopoly theory it is argued that conventional models suffer from the problem that there are a number of solution concepts offered with little guidance as to which should be selected and this is related to the static nature of the models employed one important development in game theory has been the analysis of repeated games and when applied to oligopoly theory this suggests that outcomes may be more cooperative than conventional theory suggests related to this is the requirement that firms employ credible threats to punish cheating from cooperative outcomes and the paper examines the extent to which imperfect information may restrict the scope of firms to employ such punishments one way in which firms may seek to make threats credible is through strategic investments for example in production capacity and the paper explores how competition over price or output is integrated with competition over instruments for strategic investment

rationalizable strategic behavior the notion of equilibrium proposed by nash 19 has come to play a dominant role in economic applications of noncooperative games while analyses of nash equilibria have unquestionably contributed to our understanding of economic behavior it would be unreasonably optimistic to maintain that nash solved the problem of noncooperative strategic choice there is a small literature beginning with ellsberg 6 and a much larger oral tradition which argues that nash behavior is neither a necessary consequence of rationality nor a reasonable empirical proposition in this paper i take the view that although there may be various reasons why an agent might select a nash strategy the notion of an equilibrium has little intrinsic appeal within a strategic context when an agent reaches a decision in ignorance of the strategies adopted by other players rationality consists of making a choice which is justifiable by an internally consistent system of beliefs rather than one which is optimal post hoc this point of view is not original indeed most serious justifications of the nash hypothesis embrace such an approach arguing that agents will expect the game to yield a nash outcome and consequently will choose their equilibrium strategies nevertheless when we think in terms of maximizing utility subject to expectations rather than realizations it becomes clear that the nash hypothesis far from being a consequence of rationality arises from certain restrictions on agents expectations which may or may not be plausible depending upon the game being played we are then quite naturally led to ask are there any restrictions of individuals expectations and hence choices which are required by rationality alone rather than by subjective plausibility this paper is concerned with defining justifying characterizing and refining a criterion for rational strategic choice which i label rationalizability

the median voter model across levels of government the median voter model provides a method of aggregating individual voter s demands to obtain community demand although higher level governments are often assumed to be less responsive to voters than lower level governments it remains an open question whether or not the median voter model which has been found to apply to the lowest tier of the federalist system extends to higher level governments we use the cox specification test to find that the ad hoc model dominates the median model for counties and states the county results are sensitive to the time periods budgetary structure and degree of urbanization

testable implications of subjective expected utility theory abstract i show that the predictive content of the hypothesis of subjective expected utility maximization critically depends on what the analyst knows about the details of the problem a particular decision maker faces when the analyst does not know anything about the agent s payoffs or beliefs and can only observe the sequence of actions taken by the decision maker any arbitrary sequence of actions can be implemented as the choice of an agent that solves some intertemporal utility maximization problem under uncertainty

male female earnings differentials and the role of language in canada ontario and quebec 1970 recent studies by robb 1978 and gunderson 1979a have analysed malefemale earnings differentials in ontario and canada respectively both authors first estimated sex specific earnings functions and then employed the estimated coefficients to decompose the observed or gross earnings differential into a portion attributable to differences in mean characteristics or endowments and a portion attributable to discrimination i discrimination is measured both by differential returns to the same productivity generating characteristics the estimated coefficients of the characteristics and by other forms of discrimination which do not appear explicitly in the earnings equation the estimated intercepts the purpose of this note is to report the results obtained from performing a similar decomposition analysis for quebec and to compare our results with those of robb and gunderson given the comparative nature of our study we have chosen to use the same data base sample characteristics model specifications and control variables as did robb and gunderson 2 the major difference between our study and those of robb and gunderson is the treatment of language robb did not include language variables in her earnings functions for ontario while gunderson employed what we term a narrow definition of language for canada in his earnings equations gunderson measured language skills by the ability to communicate in canada s official

rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection this paper explores the fundamental problem of what can be inferred about the outcome of a noncooperative game from the rationality of the players and from the information they possess the answer is summarized in a solution concept called rationalizability strategy profiles that are rationalizable are not always nash equilibria conversely the information in an extensive form game often allows certain unreasonable nash equilibria to be excluded from the set of rationalizable profiles a stronger form of rationalizability is appropriate if players are known to be not merely rational but also cautious what constitutes rational behavior in a noncooperative strategic situation this paper explores the issue in the context of a wide class of finite noncooperative games in extensive form the traditional answer relies heavily upon the idea of nash equilibrium nash 17 the position developed here however is that as a criterion for judging a profile of strategies to be reasonable choices for players in a game the nash equilibrium property is neither necessary nor sufficient some nash equilibria are intuitively unreasonable and not all reasonable strategy profiles are nash equilibria the fact that a nash equilibrium can be intuitively unattractive is well known the equilibrium may be imperfect introduced into the literature by selten 20 the idea of imperfect equilibria has prompted game theorists to search for a narrower definition of equilibrium while this research some of which will be discussed here has been extremely instructive it remains inconclusive theorists often agree about what should happen in particular games but to capture this intuition in a general solution concept has proved to be very difficult if this paper is successful it should make some progress in that direction the other side of the coin has received less scrutiny can all non nash profiles really be excluded on logical grounds i believe not the standard justifications for considering only nash profiles are circular in nature or make gratuitous assumptions about players decision criteria or beliefs the following discussion of these points is extremely brief due to space constraints more detailed arguments may be found in pearce 18

a direct test of direct democracy new england town meetings representative democracies govern most locales in the us making it difficult to compare performance relative to direct democracy new england states however provide an opportunity to test both direct and representative democracy at the local level this article uses revealed preference axioms to compare spending patterns in new england towns and cities against median voter hypothesis benchmarks contrary to previous evidence we find no differences between direct and representative democracy the results suggest that horizontal competition arising from local fragmentation minimize differences between direct and representative local government providing support for wider applicability of median voter based empirical models of local government behaviour in the us

asymmetric information and agenda control the bases of monopoly power in public spending abstract a pervasive empirical finding widely known as the flypaper effect is that lump sum intergovernmental grants generate considerably greater public spending by the recipient jurisdiction than would be predicted by equivalent shifts in personal income in that jurisdiction moreover such observations are inconsistent with standard median voter models of the political process we posit a model in which it is in the interest of suppliers of a collectively provided good not to generate full information to voters about outside aid the empirical results are consistent with flypaper and suggest that voters are very poorly informed about outside grants

the median voter model in public choice theory the changing perception by public choice theorists about the relevance of the median voter model is a result of excessive extrapolation of the conclusions of theoretical models to the real world early in the 1970s the median voter model was often accepted as implying that the output produced in the public sector was what was most preferred by the median voter this claim is excessive because the median voter model is only a model of demand aggregation under majority rule and has little to say about the supply side of the public sector in the late 1970s many scholars identified several circumstances under which the model would not apply in theory but these critiques of the model were often viewed as reasons to abandon the median voter model altogether the model went from having excessive claims that made the model appear to be more powerful than it really is to excessive claims that made the model appear to be less powerful than it really is these latter claims were often in response to the earlier claims rather than to the model appropriately applied

earnings by language group in quebec in 1980 and emigration from quebec between 1976 and 1981 between 1976 and 1981 many pople moved out of quebec especially anglophones to the extent that a persons decision to stay or to move may be related to earnings prospects earnings comparisons with individuals who lived in quebec in 1981 may suffer from a selection bias this paper analyses emigration from quebec and earnings with a two equation model using a sample of men drawn from the from the 1981 canadian census it is found that a selection bias is indeed present for anglophones and that the returns to learning french may be underestimated when that bias is ignored excerpt

overlapping jurisdictions substitutes or complements this paper presents a simple model of the demand relationship between the activities undertaken by overlapping governments and uses the framework to estimate the relationship between municipal and county expenditures the empirical results reveal a complementary relationship between county and city general expenditures any public sector expansion effects of monopoly power at the county level will therefore be reinforced by greater municipal spending further expanding the total size of the local public sector on the other hand changes in county police and roads expenditures appear to have no strong stable impact on municipal police and roads expenditures respectively providing no reinforcing or offsetting municipal spending responses to decisions at the county level

a language theory of discrimination any advanced industrial society is composed of a number of speech communities with different verbal and nonverbal languages in particular in the united states blacks and whites and men and women have sharply differing methods of speaking and listening this paper develops a model in which people can only work together if they speak the same language and in which it is costly to learn a second language the competitive market will tend to minimize communication through segregation but if interaction is required the cost will be borne by the minority a number of nontrivial predictions are derived from the model

fiscal illusion and the grantor government empirical studies indicate that unconditional intergovernmental grants have a flypaper effect several authors have modeled recipient government spending under fiscal illusion to explain this phenomenon in short grants reduce the perceived marginal cost of recipient government output this paper develops a more general model of illusion that incorporates the grantor government thereby eliminating inconsistencies encountered in previous models the more general model implies that grant finance increases the perceived marginal cost of grantor government output thus grant induced illusion should have two effects an increase in recipient output and a decrease in grantor output the empirical work supports this hypothesis

the flypaper effect and other anomalies abstract i develop a model in which income both in its own right and as a proxy for other socioeconomic characteristics is an input in the production function for local public services the most obvious example is education though there are other applications as well the comparative statics results from this model yield the following results 1 the observed flypaper effect the tendency for local government to spend a higher fraction of unrestricted grants than income of residents may be due at least in part to the fact that own income but not grants is a substitute for purchased inputs in the technology hence the propensity to spend on purchased inputs out of own income is lower than out of grants 2 the income elasticity of demand for public sector output may be higher than the observed income elasticity of demand for purchased inputs 3 equalization of educational opportunity via wealth neutrality as suggested by feldstein requires major changes in education finance once we recognice the distinction between purchased inputs and output

the current state of the law and economics of predatory pricing it has been almost 20 years since phillip areeda and donald f turner introduced their proposals for antitrust policy toward predatory pricing their 1975 harvard law review article predatory pricing and related practices under section 2 of the sherman act sparked a lively debate among legal scholars and economists that continued mostly in law reviews for several years the controversy focused on the core areeda turner at test which put forward short run marginal cost as the appropriate but difficult to measure standard of a lawful price and recommended reasonably anticipated average variable cost as a surrogate the discussion included consideration of other cost based measures as well as alternative rules restricting dominant firm pricing and output policies and both structured and open textured rule of reason analyses the controversy also helped to illuminate the qualifications that areeda and turner imposed on their proposal one of the central issues in the debate concerning the at test was whether or not it gave sufficient weight to the dynamic and strategic character of predatory pricing all the participants in the discussion including areeda and turner themselves recognized that since the essence of predatory pricing is the predator s sacrifice of short run gains for longer run gains and consequent harm to the public the problem being addressed is inherently strategic the lawyers and economists engaged in the debate differed however about whether anything practical could be done to cope with the intertemporal strategic issues areeda and turner s reliance on a static model of dominant firm behavior to derive their test reflected their doubt that a sound legal rule could be fashioned to cope with the inherently speculative and indeterminate assessment of longrun considerations curiously enough just as the debate in the law reviews was winding down the market organization literature was beginning to see an infusion of contributions that used modern game theoretic concepts and techniques to analyze well specified models of strategic firm behavior in oligopolistic markets in particular several important contributions analyzed models of markets in which predatory pricing emerged as part of a set of equilibrium strategies these contributions effectively undermined the view that because of its costs to the would be predator predation is irrational and hence not likely to occur this work is well categorized and well surveyed in the chapter that janusz ordover and garth saloner 1989 contributed to the handbook of industrial organization a central feature of this class of models is some asymmetry of information between market actors the dominant incumbent firm is better informed than its smaller rival in models where the predator induces exit of competitors the incumbent is better informed than potential entrants in models where predation takes the form of entry deterrence and firms in general are better informed about their prospects than are their sources of financing the new market organization literature on predation offered three major types of models first there were well developed game theoretic analyses of the long purse or deep pocket theories of predation theories which lester g telser 1966 had analyzed earlier in a perfect information tdiscussants paul joskow massachusetts institute of technology joseph stiglitz stanford university

on government structure and spending the effects of management form and separation of powers summary this paper contributes to the on going debate over how government form affects spending it broadens the previous focus on elected versus professional management to address the separation of legislative and executive powers the empirical results reveal spending differences between governments with separation of powers and those with unified powers only for southern counties of the us in addition for all regions and time periods professional or elected executive management does not significantly affect either municipal or county spending

a bureaucratic theory of flypaper effects abstract one well documented pattern in local public finance is that in comparison with what is spent out of residents private income a disproportionate amount of lump sum intergovernmental aid is used to increase expenditures rather than to reduce local taxes this paper shows how a bureaucratic model of the type suggested by niskanen bureaucracy and representative government aldine atherton chicago 1971 can be used to explain this behavior an empirical test of the model using 115 small governments in michigan suggests that this bureaucratic model explains capital expenditures well while operating expenditures appear to be better explained by the standard median voter model

the median voter hypothesis evidence from general purpose local governments the median voter hypothesis mvh represents a much used as well as much criticized tool in the hands of public finance economists to evaluate the mvh this paper applies the cox specification test using data from general purpose municipal governments the cox test allows for possible simultaneous rejection of the mvh and all tested models thus providing stricter criteria than applied to date in empirical mvh analyses the test results reveal that the mvh is appropriate for explaining the aggregate behavior of municipal governments but not specific services further the single service and single tax base assumptions are not critical to the empirical mvh performance

cournot and the oligopoly problem cournot s recherches sw les principes mathpmatiques de la thiorie des richesses 1838 contribution to economic theory ranges from the formulation of the concept of demand function to the analysis of price determination in different market structures from monopoly to perfect competition he is credited for being the pioneer in the use of mathematics in economic analysis nevertheless cournot is most known for his theory of oligopoly cournot claimed that prices would also be determined under oligopolistic rivalry he envisioned firms the celebrated mineral water producers competing independently deciding about their production levels and bringing to the market the output where a price emerges from the interaction of supply and demand an equilibrium is reached when the output of any firm is a best response to the other firms outputs that is when each firm chooses an output level that maximizes profits given the outputs chosen by the rivals the equilibrium involves a price above the marginal cost of production cournot thought furthermore that this equilibrium would be stable in the sense that a departure from it would be self correcting through a series of reactions of the firms the disequilibrium dynamics would be governed by the best response functions of the firms that is by the functions that give the optimal output of a firm in terms of the outputs of the rivals cournot also evoked the question of why is it that firms do not come to an understanding and agree on sharing the market at the monopoly price the answer is that from the point of view of a firm if the rivals follow the agreement it is in the interest of the firm to depart from it since this way it can increase its profits in other words there is an incentive to cheat cournot thought that monopoly or cartel type agreements could only be maintained by means of a formal engagement p 83 our author also considered competition of

political fragmentation party ideology and public expenditures in this paper we propose an original model of competition for effective political power between majority and opposition coalitions the model indicates that the electoral margin of the majority and the fragmentation of both coalitions are key variables that determine their effective political power we estimate the model in the case of the french departements our econometric results support the model and show that the per capita social expenditures in the french departements depend on the effective political power of the majority

searching for leviathan an empirical study in several papers and a recent book geoffrey brennan and james buchanan 1977 1978 1980 have put forth a striking and controversial view of the public sector drawing by analogy on the conventional theory of monopoly in the private sector they envision a monolithic government that systematically seeks to exploit its citizenry through the maximization of the tax revenues that it extracts from the economy from this perspective they develop a fiscal constitution whose central purpose is to constrain leviathan by limiting in various ways its access to tax and other fiscal instruments while the leviathan hypothesis has been the source of lively debate and a wide range of policy proposals it has not been the subject of much systematic empirical work or testing this is a matter of some importance since the policy implications of the leviathan view are disturbing to put it mildly in particular brennan and buchanan virtually stand on their heads many of the basic theorems in public finance for an efficient and equitable tax system if in fact the leviathan view is an inaccurate depiction of the functioning of the public sector the introduction of their policy proposals is likely to make a sorry mess of the fiscal system the leviathan model does however have some straightforward implications for observable fiscal behavior it is the purpose of this paper to examine one of these testable implications brennan and buchanan stress that fiscal decentralization is itself a powerful constraint on leviathan competition among governments in the context of the interjurisdictional mobility of persons in pursuit of fiscal gains can offer partial or possibly complete substitutes for explicit fiscal constraints on the taxing power 1980 p 184 such competition among governments in a federal system that places heavy reliance on local fiscal decisions will greatly limit the capacity of leviathan to channel resources into the public sector in short as indicated by the epigraph to this paper the leviathan model implies that other things equal the size of the public sector should vary inversely with the extent of fiscal decentralization 2

per capita public expenditures and population size a non parametric analysis using french data based on the median voter model we specify a flexible general framework of the effect of municipality size on per capita public expenditures previous literature has recognized that municipality size should have a non linear effect on the quality of public goods provision and to this end different papers have applied a range of alternative parametric specifications using a very large sample of french communes we are able to estimate the effect of municipality size semi parametrically in contrast with the parametric specifications we find evidence of the u shaped relationship between per capita public expenditures and population which is predicted by theory