strategic behavior in contests comment almost by definition contests involve strategy this is especially true in contests between unevenly matched contenders in a recent article avinash dixit 1987 explored strategic commitment in contests between a favorite and an underdog the favorite is defined as the player whose chance of victory exceeds one half at the nash equilibrium an underdog s chance is less than one half dixit concludes that if the favorite has the opportunity to move first then he will overcommit effort compared with the nash equilibrium an important implication of the favorite overcommitting effort is that strategic behavior leads to greater social costs see gordon tullock 1980 the opposite holds if the underdog has the opportunity to move first this paper demonstrates that the favorite will never overcommit effort given endogenous order of moves the favorite finds it advantageous to wait until the underdog moves surprisingly the underdog s best strategy is not to wait but to make the first move throwing the first punch the equilibrium order of play is for the underdog to move before the favorite in this equilibrium one never observes overcommitment of effort consequently extending dixit s model to allow for endogenous order of moves suggests that strategic behavior in contests will lead to undercommitment compared with nash behavior

the solution to the tullock rent seeking game when r 2 mixed strategy equilibria and mean dissipation rates in tullock s rent seeking model the probability a player wins the game depends on expenditures raised to the power r we show that a symmetric mixed strategy nash equilibrium exists when r 2 and that overdissipation of rents does not arise in any nash equilibrium we derive a tight lower bound on the level of rent dissipation that arises in a symmetric equilibrium when the strategy space is discrete and show that full rent dissipation occurs when the strategy space is continuous our results are shown to be consistent with recent experimental evidence on the dissipation of rents

rent seeking contests with private values and resale this paper studies rent seeking contests with private values and resale possibilities with a stochastic success function the resulting possible inefficiency creates a motive for aftermarket trade players valuations are determined endogenously when there is an opportunity of resale we characterize symmetric equilibria we assume that the winner has full bargaining power but the results extend to other resale mechanisms we show that resale enhances allocative efficiency ex post at the expense of more social resource waste since players compete more aggressively with resale possibilities

effort levels in contests with two asymmetric players a contest is a situation in which players compete with one another by expending effort to win a prize examples abound firms compete by spending rd 26 krueger 14 posner 20 rogerson 23 appelbaum and katz 1 hillman and riley 12 hirshleifer 13 ellingsen 8 nitzan 18 and baik 2 3 have studied rent seeking contests lazear and rosen 15 o keeffe viscusi and zeckhauser 19 and rosen 24 have examined performance incentives associated with reward schemes riley 22 has analyzed the war of attrition and auctions dixit 7 has considered strategic commitments in contests with different applications these are only a part of the literature on the theory of contests despite the vast literature however the effects of asymmetries between players have not been clarified except by harris and vickers 11 who analyze in a patent race model the strategic consequences of asymmetries the purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of asymmetries between two players on individual and total effort levels in a model with a logit form probability of winning function effort levels expended by the players deserve attention effort in a rent seeking contest is interpreted as social costs and thus total effort level is a measure of economic efficiency effort in an r d contest is interpreted as r d expenditures and thus effort levels determine the expected date of invention we focus on asymmetries between the players resulting from their different valuations of the prize their different abilities to convert effort into probability of winning or both such asymmetries are common in contests for example people in different locations may receive different

rent seeking and rent dissipation a neutrality result abstract we consider rent seeking contests between at least two agents who might value the prize differently we capture a wide range of institutional aspects of contests by analyzing a class of contest success functions fulfilling several properties the main properties are anonymity and a condition on the elasticity of a rent seeker s win probability with respect to her effort we show the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium and establish equilibrium payoffs in this equilibrium complete rent dissipation holds our results imply a partial robustness result for the all pay auction

channel coordination and quantity discounts this paper presents a model for analyzing the impact of joint decision policies on channel coordination in a system consisting of a supplier and a group of homogeneous buyers the joint decision policy characterized by the unit selling price and the order quantity is coordinated through quantity discounts and franchise fees both the annual demand rate and the operating cost including the purchase ordering and inventory holding costs depend on the joint decision policy employed this paper contributes by integrating work addressing quantity discounts on inventory and ordering policies and work focusing on the control mechanism provided by quantity discounts in channel coordination it is shown that the optimal all unit quantity discount policy is equivalent to the optimal incremental quantity discount policy in achieving channel coordination furthermore it is shown that quantity discounts alone are not sufficient to guarantee joint profit maximization the analyses of the general models are illustrated by specific analytical results obtained for a given demand function

incomplete information and rent dissipation in deterministic contests abstract in a deterministic contest or all pay auction all rents are dissipated when information is complete and contestants are identical as one contestant becomes stronger that is values the prize more total expenditures are known to decrease monotonically thus asymmetry among contestants reduces competition and rent dissipation recently this result has been shown to hold for other non deterministic contest success functions as well thereby suggesting a certain robustness in this paper however the complete information assumption is shown to be crucial i examine a tractable incomplete information model for which the complete information model is a special case with incomplete information regardless of how little total expenditures in a deterministic two player contest increase when one contestant becomes marginally stronger starting from a symmetric contest in fact both contestants expend resources more aggressively with complete information neither of them do so thus there is a discontinuity in the information structure

how to win the political contest a monopolist vs environmentalists this paper sheds light on the political economy of local energypolitics both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective first a case study of a small town in southern germany schonau is presented where environmentalists have won thepolitical contest against the regional energy monopolist and havefounded an energy supply firm themselves the different stagesof the political process are explained and analysed second apolitical economy model is developed where environmentalists anda monopolistic utility firm confront each other both on thepolitical and on the energy market in the lobbying equilibriumthe probability of the environmentalists winning the gamedepends on the monopoly rent and the perceived social costs ofenergy production it is shown that it is optimal for themonopolist to reduce his output below the monopolistic output finally the winning strategy in the schonau case is discussedin the light of the theoretical results of the paper

contests with multiple rounds this paper studies contests where players have the flexibility to add to their previous efforts after observing their rivals most recent effort in an intermediate stage it is found that 1 contrary to previous findings the stackelberg outcome where the underdog leads and the favorite follows cannot be an equilibrium 2 there are multiple subgame perfect equilibria all occurring on the underdog s usual one shot reaction function in between and including the one shot cournot nash and stackelberg outcome with the favorite leading 3 the total equilibrium effort is typically greater than or equal to what a one shot cournot nash play would predict and 4 in settings where players can choose whether or not to disclose their early actions to the rival both the favorite and the underdog disclose in equilibrium applications in sports lobbying and r d races are discussed

efficient rents 2 free entry and efficient rent seeking in the competition for a monopoly right in which the number of bidders is fixed tullock and others have found the value of the resources spent in the aggregate to capture the transfer to be sometimes less than and sometimes greater than the value of the monopoly we think this approach to be incomplete since it leaves unanswered the question of what determines the number of individuals who will vie for the right to be the monopolist it is unsatisfactory to imagine for example that the franchisor sets the number of contestants one could then foresee that rent seeking would arise to influence the permissible number of bidders and this merely moves the rent seeking dissipation question one step back

supply chain coordination for the joint determination of order quantity and reorder point using credit option abstract decisions regarding order quantity and reorder point are two major challenges in supply chain inventory management in this paper a coordination model of the joint determination of these two decision variables is proposed a decentralized supply chain consisting of one buyer and one supplier in a multi period setting is investigated demand and lead times are uncertain in our model an incentive scheme based on credit option has been developed to encourage the buyer to participate in the coordination model in this model the downstream member has the option of using credit to purchase goods during the credit time subject to its commitment to a jointly agreed order quantity and reorder point the credit time is determined in such a way that the two parties have incentives to participate the proposed incentive scheme can share the benefits of coordination between the two members based on their bargaining power the proposed model shows that the coordination of the reorder point together with order quantity can increase the overall chain profitability as well as each member s profitability

how to split the pie optimal rewards in dynamic multi battle competitions abstract multi battle competitions are ubiquitous in real life in this paper we examine the effort maximizing reward design in sequentially played multi battle competitions between two players the organizer has a fixed prize budget and rewards players contingent on the number of battles they win in a three battle contest a full spectrum of contest technologies in the tullock family is accommodated we find that the optimal design varies with the discriminatory power of the contest technology in particular when it is in the low range winner take all is optimal for the intermediate range as discriminatory power increases the optimal prize structure evolves continuously from winner take all to the proportional division rule due to the need to mitigate the growing momentum discouragement effect for the high range a wide span of prize structures extracts full surplus and is thus optimal several robustness checks confirm that mitigating the momentum discouragement effect is essential for effort maximizing prize design in dynamic multi battle contests

a review of trade credit literature opportunities for research in operations abstract trade credit arises when a buyer delays payment for purchased goods or services its nature has predominantly been an area of inquiry for researchers from the disciplines of finance marketing and economics but it has received relatively little attention in other domains in our article we provide an integrative review of the existing literature and discuss conflicting study outcomes we organize the relevant literature into seven areas of inquiry and analyze four in detail trade credit motives order quantity decisions credit term decisions and settlement period decisions additionally we derive a detailed agenda for future research in these areas

efficiency out of disorder contested ownership in incomplete contracts in many situations irreconcilable disagreements between players lead to costly ownership disputes over assets for example in case of joint ownership this article studies the role of such disputes in a situation where two players have to make a transaction specific investment and when contracts are incomplete i show that potentially contested ownership may mitigate the inefficiency of investments due to the incompleteness of contracts generating an exchange surplus that comes closer to the first best surplus as compared to any other ex ante distribution of ownership typically discussed in the literature following the influential work by grossman hart and moore if the contest is an all pay auction each player makes a transaction specific investment as if he or she owns the asset this article can explain why shared ownership as for example in equity joint ventures family firms start up partnerships and so on is an important part of today s corporate landscape

primaries and the new hampshire effect candidates for u s presidential elections are determined through sequential elections in single states the primaries we develop a model in which candidates can influence their winning probability in electoral districts by spending money on campaigning the equilibrium replicates several stylized facts very well campaigning is very intensive in the first district the outcome of the first election then creates an asymmetry in the candidates incentives to campaign in the next district which endogenously increases the equilibrium probability that the first winner wins in further districts on the normative side our model oers a possible explanation for the sequential organization it leads in expectation to a lower level of advertising expenditures than simultaneous elections moreover if one of the candidates is the more eective campaigner sequential elections also perform better with regard to the selection of the best candidate

managing channel profits a channel of distribution consists of different channel members each having his own decision variables however each channel member s decisions do affect the other channel members profits and as a consequence actions a lack of coordination of these decisions can lead to undesirable consequences for example in the simple manufacturer retailer consumer channel uncoordinated and independent channel members decisions over margins result in a higher price paid by the consumer than if those decisions were coordinated in addition the ensuing suboptimal volume leads to lower profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer this paper explores the problems inherent in channel coordination we address the following questions what is the effect of channel coordination what causes a lack of coordination in the channel how difficult is it to achieve channel coordination what mechanisms exist which can achieve channel coordination what are the strengths and weaknesses of these mechanism what is the role of nonprice variables e g manufacturer advertising retailer shelf space in coordination does the lack of coordination affect normative implications from in store experimentation can quantity discounts be a coordination mechanism are some marketing practices actually disguised quantity discounts we review the literature and present a simple formulation illustrating the roots of the coordination problem we then derive the form of the quantity discount schedule that results in optimum channel profits this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 3 pages 239 272 in 1983

dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders the theory of rent seeking with its origins in the observations of gordon tullock 1967 or to use jagdish bhagwati s 1982 proposed term the theory of directly unproductive profit seeking activities is concerned with the potentially adverse effects on resource allocation of incentives to cap ture and defend artificially contrived rents and transfers the scope for so cial loss proposed by the theory derives from the relation between the value of a contestable prize and the value of the resources attracted into the con test to determine the beneficiary of the prize underlying this social loss is a specification of how rational behavior by optimizing agents links the value of the prize sought to the resources expended it has been traditional to assume competitive behavior in describing the activities of lobbying and influence seeking then if some further condi tions are satisfied l the total value of the resources expended precisely equals the value of the prize sought so dissipation is complete 2 conse quently the social cost associated with contestability of a rent can be in ferred from the value of the rent itself and the detailed and hard to come by information on individual outlays made in the course of the contest be comes unnecessary by basing their analyses on competitive dissipation contributors to the rent seeking literature see the review by robert tollison 1982 have been able to presume that the observed value of a contested rent is an exact measure of the associated social cost of monopoly power or regu lation similarly in the trade theoretic literature where the rights contested are to quota premia or revenues from trade taxes krueger 1974 bhagwati

free entry and efficient rent seeking this paper concerns rent seeking and the extent to which rents are dissipated under various circumstances gordon tullock s 1967 insight that expenditures made to capture an artificially created transfer represent a social waste suggested that the cost to the economy of monopoly and regulation is greater than the simple harberger 1954 deadweight loss indeed under tullock s original formulation and in the extensions of his work by krueger 1974 and posner 1975 rents are exactly dissipated at the social level 1 is spent to capture 1 so that the total welfare loss from such activities is equal to the harberger triangle plus the rectangle of monopoly profits

accurate lead time demand modeling and optimal inventory policies in continuous review systems abstract to construct an accurate probability density function for lead time demand in inventory management models a mixture of polynomials mops distributions is estimated using b spline functions from empirical data on demand per unit time this is accomplished by summarizing the empirical observations into separate datasets for each lead time value a mixture distribution approach is then applied to model lead time demand in a continuous review inventory system inventory policies can be determined without knowledge of the underlying demand and or lead time distributions an improvement to a mixture distribution approach that models the lead time demand distribution with a mixture of truncated exponentials mtes distribution is also presented and the mop and mte techniques are compared both methods provide reasonable accuracy but the mop approach requires lower computational time to determine optimal inventory policies the mixture distribution approach is also compared with solutions calculated using optimization through simulation and by compiling a discrete empirical lead time demand distribution

three sides of harberger triangles prevailing economic wisdom is highly critical of injudicious tax policies or government regulations uncorrected externalities unchecked monopolistic practices and various other market failures when economists are challenged to quantify the economic costs of associated price distortions it is standard practice and has been since the 1960s to use a small number of assumptions and selected elasticities to estimate areas of the relevant harberger triangles this simple and straightforward exercise has numerous applications and the virtue of producing answers rather than conjectures harberger triangles come in many shapes and sizes figure 1 offers an illustration of such a triangle for the simple case of an excise tax point a of figure 1 at which the demand and supply schedules intersect denotes market equilibrium in the absence of the tax with quantity q1 transacted at price p1 introduction of an excise tax at rate t payable by firms selling the commodity shifts the supply schedule upward by t at the new market equilibrium firms sell q2 units of the commodity at a market price of p2 receiving after tax p3 a p2 0 t market equilibrium at point a in figure 1 has the feature that marginal consumption benefits equal marginal production costs the excise tax drives a wedge between marginal benefits and marginal costs at consumption level q2 consumers are willing to pay any amount up to p2 for additional units of the good and suppliers would readily provide additional units of the good for any price of p3 or greater but these additional transactions do not take place due to the effect of the tax wedge the loss associated

uniqueness of equilibrium in two player asymmetric tullock contests with intermediate discriminatory power abstract this paper provides a different approach to establish the uniqueness of equilibrium in tullock contests between two players with asymmetric valuations when the discriminatory power r is between 1 and 2 our result complements that of ewerhart 2017 in filling up the remaining gap in the literature on the uniqueness of equilibrium in two player asymmetric tullock contests

the impact of managerial change on performance the role of team heterogeneity when a key responsibility of a manager is to allocate more or less attractive tasks to subordinates these subordinates have an incentive to work hard and demonstrate their talents as a new manager is less well acquainted with these talents this incentive mechanism is reinvigorated after a management change but only when the team is suciently homogenous otherwise a new manager quickly makes similar choices as the old one did we investigate this hypothesis using a large data set on coach dismissals in the german football league where the selection of players is indeed a key task of the coach indeed we nd substantial evidence that coach replacements enhance team performance only in homogenous teams moreover from a methodological point of view we argue that there is typically a negative selection bias when evaluating succession eects which might reconcile previous ndings of no or even negative eects with the vast number of dismissals

the stabilizing effect of inventory in supply chains this paper presents a hierarchical model framework for the analysis of the stabilizing effect of inventories in multiechelon manufacturing distribution supply chains this framework is used to compare the variance of demand to the variance of replenishment orders at different echelons of the system e g retailer wholesaler empirical data and experience with management games suggest that in most industries inventory management policies can have a destabilizing effect by increasing the volatility of demand as it passes up through the chain the bullwhip effect our model helps to explain these observations and indicates mechanisms that can promote stabilization the analysis results also define sufficient conditions for the existence of stabilization and relate these conditions to the optimality of myopic control policies

analysis of the impact of price sensitivity factors on the returns policy in coordinating supply chain this paper analyzes the impact of price sensitivity factors on characteristics of returns policy contracts in a single period product supply chain the contract considers stochastic and price dependent demand we present an analytical model and then use numerical methods with the stackelberg game to identify the contract properties we numerically show that a returns policy indeed improves supply chain performance however the benefits earned from the returns policy under price sensitive and variable demand are different for different supply chain partners first when price sensitivity is high profit of the manufacturer decreases with increase in demand variability second when price sensitivity is sufficiently high and demand variability increases the manufacturer has to surrender part of the profits to the retailer in order to continue sales however even after surrendering part of the profits to the retailer the manufacturer still earns profits that are higher than those available in a wholesale price contract last from the perspective of division of channel profits the retailer is always worse off in case of returns policies than in a wholesale price contract therefore to apply this form of incentive in practice managements should consider the impact of price sensitivity on the returns policy and its performance

stock wars inventory competition in a two echelon supply chain with multiple retailers this paper studies the competitive and cooperative selection of inventory policies in a two echelon supply chain with one supplier andn retailers stochastic demand is monitored continuously retailers incur inventory holding and backorder penalty costs the supplier incurs holding costs for its inventory and backorder penalty costs for backorders at the retailers the latter cost reflects the supplier s desire to maintain adequate availability of its product to consumers previous research finds the supply chain cost minimizing reorder point policies the cooperative solution the competitive solution is a nash equilibrium a set of reorder points such that no firm can deviate from the equilibrium and lower its cost it is shown that nash equilibria exist and a method is presented to find all of them in some settings the cooperative solution is a nash equilibrium competition does not necessarily lead to supply chain inefficiency in other settings competition leads to costs that are substantially higher than optimal usually but not always the competitive supply chain carries too little inventory three cooperation strategies are discussed change incentives change equilibrium and change control a set of contracts is provided that changes the firms incentives so that the optimal policy is a nash equilibrium an equilibrium change can improve performance but does not guarantee optimal performance to change control the firms let the supplier choose all reorder points a key component in vendor managed inventory that change leads to optimal supply chain performance

on the efficient provision of public goods by means of biased lotteries the two player case in this paper we analyze how biased lotteries can be used to overcome the free riding problem in voluntary public good provision we characterize the optimal combinations of bias and lottery prize and the conditions that guarantee efficient public good provision in equilibrium

a quantity discount approach to supply chain coordination abstract quantity discounts provide a practical foundation for inventory coordination in supply chains however typical supply chain participants may encounter difficulties in implementing the coordination policy simply because 1 specified lot size adjustments may deviate from the economic lot sizes and 2 the buying firm may face amplified overstocking risks related to increased order quantities the main objective of this study is to develop a quantity discount model that resolves the practical challenges associated with implementing quantity discount policies for supply chain coordination between a supplier and a buyer the proposed buyer s risk adjustment b ra model allows the supplier to offer discounts that capitalize on the original economic lot sizes and share the buyer s risk of temporary overstocking under uncertain demand the analytical results suggest that the proposed b ra discount approach is a feasible alternative for supply chain coordination under uncertain demand conditions

quitters never win the adverse incentive effects of competing with superstars internal competition may motivate worker effort yet the benefits of competition may depend critically on workers relative abilities large skill differences may reduce efforts i use panel data from professional golf tournaments and find that the presence of a superstar is associated with lower performance on average golfers first round scores are approximately 0 2 strokes worse when tiger woods participates relative to when woods is absent the overall tournament effect is 0 8 strokes the adverse superstar effect varies with the quality of woods s play there is no evidence that reduced performance is attributable to media attention intensity or risky strategy adoption

rent seeking contest when the prize increases with aggregate efforts the objective of this article is to investigate contests in which efforts are productive tullock s standard rent seeking model is extended by making the rent itself increase with the aggregate efforts a positive externality is thereby introduced into the contest because a contender s private effort in quest of the rent generates a benefit for other contenders coupled with a negative externality presented in the standard rent seeking model the net effect on the social efficiency of the contest is a priori ambiguous it is shown that the extended contest generates socially wasteful excessive aggregate efforts

should lotteries offer discounts on multiple tickets in a complete information setting we show that the standard lottery in which each lottery ticket is offered for the same price is an optimal fundraising mechanism in the presence of strong asymmetries in the way bettors value the prize and the public good provided with the lottery proceeds when participants are more homogeneous it is optimal to offer discounts for the purchase of multiple tickets

disclosure policy in tullock contests with asymmetric stochastic entry we examine how disclosure policy can be optimally designed to incentivize contestants when their participation is exogenously stochastic in a generalized tullock contest setting with two players who are asymmetric in both their values and entry probabilities we fully characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions under which no disclosure dominates full disclosure we find that the comparison depends solely on a balance effect exercised by entry probabilities on the expected total effort the optimal disclosure policy must better balance the competition these conditions continue to hold when the precision r of tullock contests is endogenously chosen by the designer

asymmetric rent seeking with more than two contestants this article considers a rent seeking model with n asymmetriccontestants each contestant may have a different valuation ofthe rent or a different relative ability to win the rent oneof the n contestants is selected as the winner based ontullock s probabilistic contest rule with constant returns toscale a pure strategy nash equilibrium solution is obtainedand its consequences are investigated

coordination mechanisms of supply chain systems supply chain management scm has become an important management paradigm as supply chain members are often separate and independent economic entities a key issue in scm is to develop mechanisms that can align their objectives and coordinate their activities so as to optimize system performance in this paper we provide a review of coordination mechanisms of supply chain systems in a framework that is based on supply chain decision structure and nature of demand this framework highlights the behavioral aspects and information need in the coordination of a supply chain the identification of these issues points out several directions of future research in this area

coordination and profit sharing between a manufacturer and a buyer with target profit under credit option several studies have focused on buyer vendor coordination through quantity discount credit option mechanism but few quantitative models and investigations are available that have explored the mechanism for transfer of surplus generated due to coordination in this paper we develop a coordination mechanism through credit option such that both the parties can divide the surplus equitably after satisfying their own profit targets two situations are explored here in the first situation both the parties have no individual profit target from the business whereas in the second situation there are individual profit target for both the parties the proposed mechanism for division of surplus is studied through a numerical study and the impact of different parameter values on the results are examined

team contests with multiple pairwise battles abstract we consider a multi battle team contest in which players from two rival teams form pairwise matches to fight in distinct component battles which are carried out sequentially or partially

competitive and cooperative inventory policies in a two stage supply chain we investigate a two stage serial supply chain with stationary stochastic demand and fixed transportation times inventory holding costs are charged at each stage and each stage may incur a consumer backorder penalty cost e g the upper stage the supplier may dislike backorders at the lower stage the retailer we consider two games in both the stages independently choose base stock policies to minimize their costs the games differ in how the firms track their inventory levels in one the firms are committed to tracking echelon inventory in the other they track local inventory we compare the policies chosen under this competitive regime to those selected to minimize total supply chain costs i e the optimal solution we show that the games nearly always have a unique nash equilibrium and it differs from the optimal solution hence competition reduces efficiency furthermore the two games equilibria are different so the tracking method influences strategic behavior we show that the system optimal solution can be achieved as a nash equilibrium using simple linear transfer payments the value of cooperation is context specific in some settings competition increases total cost by only a fraction of a percent whereas in other settings the cost increase is enormous we also discuss stackelberg equilibria

collective rent dissipation the theory of rent seeking was initiated by tullock 1967 1980 followed by krueger 1974 and posner 1975 and more recently extended in various directions by allard 1988 appelbaum and katz 1986a b c gradstein and nitzan 1989 hillman and katz 1984 1987 hillman and samet 1987 hillman and riley 1989 katz et al 1990 long and vousden 1987 ursprung 1990 and varian 1989 the purpose of this paper is to extend this theory by introducing the possibility of collective group rent seeking with voluntary individual decisions regarding their extent of participation in the collective rent seeking efforts

the power of money wealth effects in contests abstract the relationship between wealth and power has long been debated nevertheless this relationship has been rarely studied in a strategic game in this paper we study wealth effects in a strategic contest game two opposing effects arise wealth reduces the marginal cost of effort but it also reduces the marginal benefit of winning the contest we consider three types of contests which vary depending on whether rents and efforts are commensurable with wealth our theoretical analysis shows that the effects of wealth are strongly contest dependent it thus does not support general claims that the rich lobby more or that low economic growth and wealth inequality spur conflicts

measuring consumer surplus with unknown hicksian demands the objective of this paper to introduce the slutsky demand curve as a tool in welfare analysis it is shown that the compensating or equivalent variation can in most cases be measured to within a fraction of a percent of their true value without any numerical integration techniques two well known examples in the literature are explored a theoretical measure of the accuracy of the slutsky based measure relative to the marshallian measure is developed the approach is locally path independent and can be used to measure the money value of a ration finally it application to models of labour supply is explored an an error in the literature is corrected this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

integrated vendor buyer cooperative inventory models with variant permissible delay in payments abstract the integrated inventory models usually have the advantage of reducing total cost however the way to allocate the cost savings from the integration to the buyer and vendor is critical to the success of the joint relationship between both sides to deal with this problem this paper develops the integrated models with the permissible delay in payments for determining the optimal replenishment time interval and replenishment frequency applying the models and considering the coefficient of negotiation and the maximum delay payment period a simple solution algorithm is presented to resolve the allocation of cost savings in the integration model the coefficient of negotiation is adopted to determine the compromise between the buyer s and vendor s cost savings a numerical example is used to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed integration models a sensitivity analysis is also conducted to demonstrate some properties using the information from the proposed models the buyer and vendor can achieve an acceptable compromise solution for both sides in the supply chain management

an optimal vendor buyer cooperative policy under generalized lead time distribution with penalty cost for delivery lateness abstract this paper presents an integrated inventory model for a single vendor and single buyer where lead time is a stochastic variable with general distribution function the vendor delivers goods at a fixed lot size to the buyer who has a constant demand rate storage is permitted on both parties but a penalty cost is assessed when the vendor delivers the shipment late beyond a threshold time the problem is formulated as a nonlinear cost model which needs to be minimized to arrive at an optimal policy for reorder point order quantity and number of shipments from the vendor to buyer to cooperatively operate the joint contract the solution procedure involves both closed form solution and iterative search procedure for this multi dimensional problem numerical examples are presented for uniform exponential and normally distributed lead time s to demonstrate the solution methodology as well as a precursor test for special cases the model presented here are applicable for numerous two stage supply chain systems including retail businesses assembly and production houses where two parties of the supply chain are tied to their common goal of achieving minimum total cost of inventory operation

an approximate solution to rent seeking contests with private information abstract we propose an approximate solution to rent seeking contests in which participants have heterogeneous and private valuations the procedure only requires common knowledge about the mean of the distribution of valuations we obtain a closed form expression for an agent s level of investment and subject it to comparative statics analysis we then assess the performance of the model and find that the proposed solution provides a remarkably effective approximation of the optimal solution for a wide range of parameter specifications

on the evolution of prize perceptions in contests abstract we apply an indirect evolutionary approach to players perceived prize valuations in contests evolution in finite populations leads to preferences that overstate the prize s material value and induce overexpenditure we establish an equivalence between evolutionarily stable strategies and the behavior induced by evolutionarily stable preferences

information disclosure in contests a bayesian persuasion approach we examine optimal information disclosure through bayesian persuasion in a two player contest one contestant s valuation is commonly known and the other s is his private information the contest organiser can precommit to a signal to influence the uninformed contestant s belief about the informed contestant we show that to search for the optimal signal when the informed contestant s valuation follows a binary distribution it is without loss of generality to compare no disclosure with full disclosure otherwise such a restriction causes loss of generality we propose a simple method to compute the optimal signal which yields explicit solutions in some situations

coordination of social responsibility and order quantity in a two echelon supply chain a collaborative decision making perspective abstract regarding globalization growing trend and sustainability concerns the need for paying attention to the issues of corporate social responsibility csr not only applies to individual firms but also extends to the whole supply chain sc networks assisting csr issues in one individual firm will thoroughly influence other supply chain members in this paper a supplier retailer sc is considered in a newsvendor setting it is possible for the supplier to invest in csr activities which could improve the popularity of products and subsequently market demand firstly both members decisions under decentralized and centralized decision making models are investigated afterwards a novel collaborative model is proposed to determine optimal order quantity and csr investment thus maximizing the whole sc profits and also motivating members to participate finally the results of decentralized centralized and collaborative models are compared and some managerial insights are provided numerical experiments indicate that under some circumstances alongside the increment of sc profits more csr investment and better csr performance level will be achieved through the collaborative model than other decision making structures

reexamining efficient rent seeking in laboratory markets given millner and pratt s 1989 finding of behavior inconsistent with theory we reexamine efficient rent seeking in experimental markets we show that a when r 3 no nash equilibrium exists and therefore behavior has no theoretical benchmark to judge consistency and b when r 1 with a new experimental design utilizing an explicit expected payoff matrix rent seeking behavior is consistent with both nash equilibrium and dissipation hypotheses

would you trust lobbies we consider the regulatory problem to approve or to ban a new product technology in the context of scientific controversy about its detrimental environmental and or health effects we formalize the regulator s decision making process as a tullock contest towards a theory of the rent seeking society texas a m university press texas 1980 the contestants being an industrial lobby representing the economic agents who have developed the new product technology and an environmental lobby representing the economic agents who will be harmed by the product or technology assuming that the industrial lobby has private information about the unfavorable environmental and or health effects but can be held liable for damage ex post we derive the equilibrium properties of the contest in particular we derive conditions under which it is socially preferable for the regulator to decide according to the contest s outcome rather than according to an ex ante cost benefit analysis using his prior beliefs we find that the contest outperforms the ex ante cost benefit analysis only if the risk of judgment proofness is not too high

rigging the lobbying process an application of the all pay auction textabstractin a world where a politician can explicitly auction off a prize to the high bidder the standard auction literature can be used to analyse political behavior the justice system however precludes politicians from explicitly selling the prize to the highest bidder thus politicians cannot let it become public knowledge that they are in the business of selling political favors an institution has emerged in political markets to overcome this constraint which are termed as lobbying lobbyists make implicit payments to the politician through campaign contributions if these up front payments were rebated to those failing to receive the prize it would be clear that the politician was selling favors this article has examined an interesting principle arising in all pay auctions this principle states that a politician wishing to maximize political rents may find it in his best interest to exclude certain lobbyists from participating in the lobbying process particularly lobbyists valuing most the political prize

revenue ranking of optimally biased contests the case of two players it is shown that the equilibrium in the asymmetric two player tullock contest is unique for parameter values r 2 this allows proving a revenue ranking result saying that a revenue maximizing designer capable of biasing the contest always prefers a technology with higher r

a general analysis of rent seeking games in this paper we reconsider the basic model of efficient rent seeking we stress the importance of the shape of the players reaction curve in order to understand the impact of the technology of rent seeking on the structure of the outcome of the game we give a complete characterization of the pure strategy equilibria moreover the possibility of preemption by a stakelberg leader is discussed according to the nature of the technology of rent seeking available to the agents

efficient rents 1 rent seeking behavior in the long run we have analyzed long run behavior in rent seeking under several conditions and behavioral hypotheses the question of interest is whether or not the long run expenditures will exactly equal the value of the rents our results depend on the type of competitive response which is assumed to exist in the long run and on the r value governing the probability of winning

on optimal payment time for a retailer under permitted delay of payment by the wholesaler abstract jamal et al 2000 optimal payment time for a retailer under permitted delay of payment by the wholesaler international journal of production economics 66 59 66 study a wholesaler retailer supply chain where the retailer is given a permissible credit period to pay back the dues without paying any interest to the wholesaler the problem is modeled as a cost minimization problem with two decision variables the payment time p of the retailer and the length of the inventory cycle t while the model represents in general an interesting problem we show in this note that there are a number of nontrivial flaws contained in the development of their model and therefore the solution they derived is not correct we give the correct model and derive the corresponding optimal solution

rent seeking for pure public goods in this paper we present a formal analysis of rent seeking for public goods by two or more groups with different numbers of individuals we begin by considering equally wealthy groups under risk neutrality a case which constitutes our basic model several surprising and interesting results emerge from the analysis of this basic case the problem is then extended to deal with a groups with different wealth levels and b risk aversion this last extension brings about a further crop of interesting and useful results

proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition this paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which agents expend efforts to be the proposer in equilibrium agents effort choices are influenced by the prize and cost effects the endogenous prize is 9

give peace a chance the effect of ownership and asymmetric information on peace abstract we study the possibility of peace when two countries fight a war over the ownership of a resource war is always the outcome of the game played by rational countries under complete or asymmetric information when there is no pre established distribution of the resource among countries when there is such a distribution of the resource under complete information peace is feasible for some initial distributions of the resource whereas under asymmetric information there are two classes of equilibria peaceful equilibria in which peace has a positive probability and aggressive equilibria which assign probability one to war surprisingly a little asymmetric information may yield war

single supplier multiple buyer supply chain coordination incorporating buyers expectations under vertical information sharing abstract we address the coordination problem in a single supplier multiple buyer supply chain the supplier wishes to coordinate the supply chain by offering quantity discounts to obtain their complete cost information the supplier exchanges his own cost parameters with buyers leading to vertical information sharing the supplier thinks that the buyers as they have access to supplier s setup and holding cost information may demand a portion of the anticipated coordination savings based on the partial information they hold about the cost structure of the entire supply chain we model each buyer s expectations based on her limited view of the entire supply chain which consists of herself and the supplier only these expectations are then incorporated into the modeling of the supply chain which results in a generalization of the traditional stackelberg type models we discuss alternative efficiency sharing mechanisms and propose methods to design the associated discount schemes that take buyers expectations into account in designing the discount schemes we consider both price discriminatory and non price discriminatory approaches the study adds to the existing body of work by incorporating buyers expectations into a constrained stackelberg structure and by achieving coordination without forcing buyers to explicitly comply with the supplier s replenishment period in choosing their order quantities the numerical analysis of the coordination efficiency and allocation of the net savings of the proposed discount schemes shows that the supplier is still able to coordinate the supply chain with high efficiency levels and retain a significant portion of the net savings

are smallholder farmers better or worse off from an increase in the international price of cereals citation nakelse t dalton t j hendricks n p hodjo m 2018 are smallholder farmers better or worse off from an increase in the international price of cereals food policy 79 213 223 https doi org 10 1016 j foodpol 2018 07 006

contest design and heterogeneity i show that the effect of heterogeneity on contest investments depends on the structure of the competition which implies that heterogeneity matters for optimal contest design this insight helps to explain empirical evidence on the comparison of different contest structures

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

favoring the winner or loser in repeated contests should a firm favor a weaker or stronger employee in a contest despite a widespread emphasis on rewarding the best employees managers continue to tolerate and even favor poor performers contest theory reveals that evenly matched contests are the most intense which implies that a contest designer can maximize each player s effort by artificially boosting the underdog s chances we apply this type of handicapping to a two period repeated contest between employees in which the only information available about their abilities is their performance in the first period in this setting employees are strategic and forward looking such that they fully anticipate the potential impact of the first period contest result on the second period contest and thus adjust their behaviors accordingly the manager also incorporates these strategic behaviors of employees when determining an optimal handicapping policy if employees abilities are sufficiently different favoring the first period loser in the second period increases the total effort over both periods however if abilities are sufficiently similar we find the opposite result occurs total effort increases the most in response to a handicapping strategy of favoring the first period winner

lottery versus all pay auction models of lobbying i first provide a complete characterization of the unique equilibrium of the lottery game by n lobbyists with asymmetric valuations and then compare the lottery and the all pay auction models of lobbying i show that the exclusion principle discovered by baye kovenock and de vries 1993 for all pay auction does not apply to lottery i also show that the perverse effect that an exogenous cap may increase the total lobbying expenditure in a two bidder all pay auction discovered by che and gale 1998 does not apply to lottery

stakes and welfare in rent seeking contests using a public policy application oftullock s two player rent seeking contest this paper focuses on the relationshipbetween the aggregate expected utility ofthe players and their asymmetricvaluations in our game these valuationsare the players payoffs in the twopossible states of nature namely theapproval and rejection of the proposedpublic policy our main result provides thecondition that ensures that the aggregateexpected payoff of the two contestants theinterest groups that compete on theapproval of the proposed policy is positively related to the valuationparameters

rent seeking with asymmetric valuations this paper analyzes tullock s rent seeking game with asymmetric valuations for a variable range of the returns to scale parameter a necessary and sufficient condition for a unique pure strategy nash equilibrium is established equilibrium effort and expected profits are determined and subjected to comparative statics analysis increasing the underdog s valuation induces both players to increase their efforts increasing the favorite s valuation increases his effort but decreases the effort of the underdog expected profits increase with a player s valuation but decreases with the valuation of the competitor the impact of the returns to scale parameter is also analyzed

linking individual and collective contests through noise level and sharing rules we propose the use of nitzan s 1991 sharing rule in collective contests as a tractable way of modelling individual contests this proposal i tractably introduces noise in tullock contests when no closed form solution in pure strategies exists ii satisfies the important property of homogeneity of degree zero iii can be effort or noise equivalent to a standard tullock contest

endogenous timing in general rent seeking and conflict models we examine simultaneous versus sequential choice of effort in a two player contest the timing of moves determined in a preplay stage prior to the contest subgame as well as the value of the prize is allowed to be endogenous contrary to endogenous timing models with an exogenously fixed prize the present paper finds the following 1 players may decide to choose their effort simultaneously in the subgame perfect equilibrium spe of the extended game 2 the spe does not need to be unique in particular there is no unique spe with sequential moves if the direct costs of effort are zero 3 symmetry among players does not rule out incentives for precommitment to effort locally away from the cournot nash level 4 finally there may be no correlation between win probability and strategic incentives in our framework a finding most central in the analysis of fixed prize contests

comparative statics of contests and rent seeking games this paper develops the comparative statics properties of a contest encountered in patent races and rent seeking games the author shows that symmetric equilibrium expenditure and profit per player decrease with the number of competitors and the discount rate but increase with the value of the prize a fundamental lemma established in the paper shows that a stability condition usually imposed on the model is automatically satisfied the author identifies a class of likelihood or hazard rate functions for which aggregate expenditure increases with the number of competitors and total profits converge to zero copyright 1997 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

ambiguous political power and contest efforts when there is incomplete information on the source of power in a contest the contestants may divide their lobbying efforts between the potential centers of power only one of which determines the contests winning probabilities our analysis focuses on the effect of ambiguity regarding the source of power on the contestants aggregate effort in a symmetric simple lottery contest with two potential centers of power specifically we examine the effects of varying the informativeness of the contestants private signals i e the probability that a signal is correct and the degree of correlation between them our benchmark case is the standard tullock s model in which the source of power is known i e the contestants signals are perfectly informative we show that the level of aggregate effort in this case is reached also when the signals are perfectly uninformative however in any intermediate case the contestants aggregate effort is lower provided that the signals are not perfectly correlated in other words there is a u shape relationship between the informativeness of the signals and the aggregate effort in the contest the lowest level of effort is spent when the signals are independent and the probability that a signal is true is about 0 85 in this case efforts are reduced by about one fifth in comparison with the benchmark case from a rent dissipation of 50 to slightly over 40