behavioral contract theory abstract this review provides a critical survey of psychology and economics behavioral economics research in contract theory first i introduce the theories of individual decision making most

speculation under unawareness no trade theorems establish that in various trading environments investors who share a common prior will not engage in speculation as long as expected utility bayesian updating and full awareness are imposed we relax the last assumption by allowing for asymmetric unawareness and examine under which conditions speculative behaviour emerges we find that if common knowledge is assumed as in the settings of aumann 1976 and milgrom and stokey 1982 unawareness cannot generate speculation this is not true however in settings where no common knowledge is assumed such as speculation in equilibrium geanakoplos 1989 and betting that is always beneficial morris 1994 unless stronger conditions on awareness are imposed

contracts as a barrier to entry it is shown that an incumbent seller who faces a threat of entry into his or her market will sign long term contracts that prevent the entry of some lower cost producers even though they do not preclude entry completely moreover when a seller possesses superior information about the likelihood of entry it is shown that the length of the contract may act as a signal of the true probability of entry

do cigarette producers price discriminate by state an empirical analysis of local cigarette pricing and taxation abstract this study analyzes the interactive effects of oligopoly pricing state taxation and anti smoking regulations on retail cigarette prices by state using panel data for the 50 us states between 1960 and 1990 the results indicate that cigarette producers do price discriminate by state though the effect is not large relative to the final retail price there are two further results 1 state taxes are more than passed on a 1 cent state tax increase results in a price increase of 1 11 cents and 2 sellers offset state and local anti smoking laws with lower prices thereby blunting effects of the regulations

two remarks on the property rights literature we first point out that the recent property rights literature is based on three assumptions 1 that contracts are always subject to renegotiation 2 that the exercise of a property right confers a private benefit and 3 that parties are risk neutral building on hart moore 1999 we provide conditions under which an optimal contract consists of nothing more than an assignment of property rights we also examine the robustness of some of the literature s standard predictions about asset ownership to the introduction of mechanisms for eliciting parties ex post willingness to pay for the assets such as options or financial markets to illustrate the issue we revisit the hart moore 1990 proposition that joint ownership is suboptimal and argue that ownership by a single party is dominated by joint ownership with put options

impact of cost shocks on consumer prices in vertically related markets the case of the french soft drink market we develop a structural econometric model of the vertical contracts between soft drink manufacturers and retailers to assess the impact of taxes or changes in production costs on consumer prices using individual data on food purchases from a representative survey of 19 000 french households in 2005 we estimate consumer demand using a random utility approach among a set of possible vertical relationships we select the model that best fits the data we evaluate the pass through rate of changes in input costs sugar or of taxes and show that the industry over shifts cost changes or excise taxes to the consumers this result challenges the belief that firms do not pass on the full extent of cost changes or excise taxes to consumers

contracting in the shadow of the law economic models of contract typically assume that courts enforce obligations based on verifiable events corresponding to the legal rule of specific performance as a matter of law this is not the case this leaves open the question of optimal contract design given the available remedies used by the courts this article shows that american standard form construction contracts can be viewed as an efficient mechanism for implementing building projects given existing legal rules it is shown that a central feature of these contracts is the inclusion of governance covenants that shape the scope of authority and regulate the ex post bargaining power of parties our model also implies that the legal remedies of mistake impossibility and the doctrine limiting damages for unforeseen events developed in the case of hadley v baxendale are efficient solutions to the problem of implementing complex exchange

the demand for smokeless tobacco among male high school students in the united states the impact of taxes prices and policies despite the deleterious effects of smokeless tobacco use very little is known about the effects of tobacco control policies on smokeless tobacco demand this paper uses data extracted from the 1995 2001 national youth risk behavior surveys yrbs augmented with tobacco taxes prices and policies to estimate smokeless tobacco demand equations among male high school students the estimates indicate that higher smokeless tobacco taxes would significantly reduce the number of male students who use smokeless tobacco and the number of days smokeless tobacco users use smokeless tobacco moreover smokeless tobacco products and cigarettes were found to be economic complements in consumption

unforeseen contingencies and incomplete contracts we scrutinize the conceptual framework commonly used in the incomplete contract literature this literature usually assumes that contractual incompleteness is due to the transaction costs of describing or of even foreseeing the possible states of nature in advance we argue however that such transaction costs need not interfere with optimal contracting i e transaction costs need not be relevant provided that agents can probabilistically forecast their possible future payoffs even if other aspects of the state of the nature cannot be forecast in other words all that is required for optimality is that agents be able to perform dynamic programming an assumption always invoked by the incomplete contract literature the foregoing optimality result holds very generally provided that parties can commit themselves not to renegotiate moreover we point out that renegotiation may be hard to reconcile with a framework that otherwise presumes perfect rationality however even if renegotiation is allowed the result still remains valid provided that parties are risk averse

investments holdup and the form of market contracts the authors analyze incomplete contracts to induce efficient investment with exogenous switching costs fixed price contracts are efficient generate some rigidity in prices are renegotiated intermittently by possibly small amounts and when inflation is positive generate asymmetric responses to shocks all consistent with evidence on prices and wages with two sided specific investments efficiency requires prices to have sufficient escalator clauses to avoid renegotiation as observed in many long term contracts a third case with one sided specific investments can generate take or pay contracts and explain why firms sometimes pay for specific investments that appear to benefit employees directly

incomplete contracts and strategic ambiguity why are observed contracts so often incomplete in the sense that they leave contracting parties obligations vague or unspecified traditional answers to this question invoke transaction costs or bounded rationality in contrast the authors argue that such incompleteness is often an essential feature of a well designed contract specifically once some aspects of performance are unverifiable it is often optimal to leave other verifiable aspects of performance unspecified the authors explore the conditions under which this occurs and investigate the structure of optimal contracts when these conditions are satisfied copyright 1998 by american economic association

state responses to fiscal crises the effects of budgetary institutions and politics this paper explores the dynamics of state taxes and spending during the late 1980s when regional economic downturns and increased expenditure demands led to substantial state budget deficits more restrictive state fiscal institutions such as no deficit carryover rules and tax and expenditure limitations are correlated with more rapid fiscal adjustment to unexpected deficits political factors are also important when a single party controls the state house and the governorship deficit adjustment is much faster than when party control is divided in gubernatorial election years tax increases and spending cuts are both significantly smaller than at other times

market transition industrialization and social mobility trends in postrevolution china1 this study examines trends in intergenerational class mobility in china by analyzing six comparable nationally representative surveys between 1996 and 2012 defying a simplistic unidirectional ac

incentives for unaware agents the paper introduces the problem of unawareness into principalagent theory and discusses optimal incentive contracts when the agent may be unaware of her action space depending on the agent s default behavior it can be optimal for the principal to propose an incomplete contract that keeps the agent unaware or a complete contract the key tradeoff is that of enlarging the agent s choice set versus adding costly incentive constraints if agents differ in their unawareness optimal contracts show a self reinforcing pattern if there are few unaware agents in the economy optimal contracts promote awareness if unawareness is wide spread optimal contracts shroud the contracting environment thus keeping the agent unaware

thinking ahead the decision problem we propose a model of costly decision making based on time costs of deliberating current and future decisions we model an individual decision maker s thinking process as a thought experiment that takes time and let the decision maker think ahead about future decision problems in yet unrealized states of nature by formulating an intertemporal state contingent planning problem which may involve costly deliberation in every state of nature and by letting the decision maker deliberate ahead of the realization of a state we attempt to capture the basic observation that individuals generally do not think through a complete action plan instead individuals prioritize their thinking and leave deliberations on less important decisions to the time or event when they arise

toward a theory of regulation for developing countries following jean jacques laffont s lead the efficient operation and expansion of infrastructures in developing countries is crucial for growth and poverty reduction however recent reforms aimed at improving the performance of these sectors have had limited success evidence suggests that in many instances this was because the traditional regulatory theory relied on by policymakers was not suitable for the institutional context in developing countries this article surveys more recent theoretical work focusing on problems with regulation in these countries at the heart of the survey is the work of jean jacques laffont who in the last decade of his life set about developing a theoretical framework for regulation in developing countries we consider the implications of his work which focused on the key institutional limitations faced in developing countries we then discuss where experience suggests that there are important omissions from this modeling bringing in extensions and alternative approaches pursued by other authors we conclude by summarizing the key ways in which regulatory policy will be different when institutions are weak overall we find that an understanding of the institutional context and its implications are crucial when designing a regulatory framework for developing countries

testing hypotheses about firm behavior in the cigarette industry data on the effects of excise taxes are used to investigate the level of competition in the cigarette industry a lower bound on the numbers equivalent of firms in the context of the conjectural variations model is derived and estimated results point to at least a moderately high level of competition and in particular allow for the rejection of the perfect cartel model this paper relies on comparative statics results and hence circumvents recent criticisms of a study of monopoly behavior in the cigarette industry

incomplete contracts and the theory of the firm what have we learned over the past 25 years incomplete contracts and the theory of the firm what have we learned over the past 25 years

the effectiveness of anti smoking legislation a review abstract this survey focuses on government efforts to curb the use of undesirable goods notably tobacco products we synthesize the economics literature and examine the effectiveness of government curbs on tobacco consumption through non price controls such as bans on cigarette advertising health warnings and workplace smoking bans and price measures or higher prices through higher taxes this literature review is unique in that we do not merely aim to provide a summary of the literature rather our main focus is to draw conclusions from the literature regarding the effectiveness of alternate policy measures across countries in checking smoking and to provide directions suggestions for extending the scope of government intervention to other tobacco products

litigation and the value of tobacco companies this study determines how the recent wave of litigation affected returns and systematic risk in the tobacco industry we test for changes in stock prices coinciding with litigation announcements using a difference in difference event study methodology unfavorable information concerning litigation reduced tobacco returns we find a decline in systematic risk as traditionally measured by the covariance between industry returns and returns to a diversified efficient portfolio this decline may imply a substantial decline in the cost of equity capital of at least 2 2 after the period of litigation which we attribute to common cost shocks experienced by the companies participating in the master settlement agreement combined with the oligopolistic structure of the industry

measurement of monopoly behavior an application to the cigarette industry a simple scheme is proposed to measure monopoly pricing behavior the coefficient of the tax rate term in a price equation identifies the ratio of price to marginal cost no direct measurement of costs is required so a major problem for other empirical studies of monopoly is avoided empirical results for cross section time series data support rejection of atomistic competition but also provide evidence against the operation of an effective cartel in the cigarette industry the model represents an alternative interpretation of related results in a recent paper by barzel application of the methodology to other markets is feasible

contract duration and relationship specific investments empirical evidence from coal markets this paper examines the importance of specific relationship investments in determining the duration of coal contracts negotiated between coal suppliers and electric utilities data for 277 coal contracts are used to perform the analysis the results provide strong support for the view that buyers and sellers make longer commitments to the terms of future trade at the contract execution stage and rely less on repeated bargaining when relationship specific investments are more important

cooperative investments and the value of contracting recent articles have shown that contracts can support the efficient outcome for bilateral trade even in the face of specific investments and incomplete contracting these studies typically considered selfish investments that benefit the investor e g the seller s investment reduces her production costs the authors find very different results for cooperative investments that directly benefit the investor s partner e g the seller s investment improves the buyer s value of the good most importantly if committing not to renegotiate the contract is impossible then contracting has no value i e the parties cannot do better than to abandon contracting altogether in favor of ex post negotiation

managerial incentive problems a dynamic perspective the paper studies how a person s concern for a future career may influence his or her incentives to put in effort or make decisions on the job in the model the person s productive abilities are revealed over time through observations of performance there are no explicit output contingent contracts but since the wage in each period is based on expected output and expected output depends on assessed ability an implicit contract links today s performance to future wages an incentive problem arises from the person s ability and desire to influence the learning process and therefore the wage process by taking unobserved actions that affect today s performance the fundamental incongruity in preferences is between the individual s concern for human capital returns and the firm s concern for financial returns the two need be only weakly related it is shown that career motives can be beneficial as well as detrimental depending on how well the two kinds of capital returns are aligned it is well understood by now that informational externalities may place special demands on the organization of economic exchange simple price mediated markets will frequently fail in the presence of asymmetric information in that case more elaborate contractual arrangements have to be used as substitutes for the price system lately considerable effort has been devoted to the analysis of contracting under incomplete information with the objective to understand the range of economic institutions that emerge in response to the failure of the price system the analysis of moral hazard has played a prominent role in this development moral hazard problems arise when for some reason or another transacting parties cannot contract contingent on the delivery of the good for instance in buying labour services it may be that the amount of labour supplied is not directly observable precluding a simple exchange of wage for labour as a partial remedy to this problem an imperfect mutually observed signal about the supply of labour can be used as a proxy in the contract frequently output is taken as such a proxy the drawback is that output is often influenced by other factors than labour input which induce undesirable risk into the contract one is therefore faced with a tradeoff between allocating risk associated with incomplete observability and providing incentives for a proper supply of labour gaining insight into this tradeoff is important not only for understanding contracting in the small e g managerial incentive schemes but also because it is closely related to the fundamental tension between equity and efficiency in the society as a whole while our understanding of moral hazard has advanced a lot in past years it is clear that much work remains an important question that has received little attention until

testing static oligopoly models conduct and cost in the sugar industry 1890 1914 we explore the widespread methodology of using demand information to infer market conduct and unobserved cost components under the hypothesis of static oligopoly behavior direct measures of marginal cost and conduct indicating small market power serve as benchmarks the more competitive models yield better cost estimates the best cost estimates occur when conduct is estimated as a free parameter which in turn only slightly underestimates our direct measure it also tracks the decline in market power accompanying the industry s structural changes the methodology is largely validated although partial cost information can improve its predictive power conclusions are robust to demand function

the insurance is the lemon failing to index contracts we model the widespread failure of contracts to share risk using available indices a borrower and lender can share risk by conditioning repayments on an index the lender has private information about the ability of this index to measure the true state that the borrower would like to hedge the lender is risk averse and thus requires a premium to insure the borrower the borrower however might be paying something for nothing if the index is a poor measure of the true state we provide sufficient conditions for this effect to cause the borrower to choose a nonindexed contract instead

returns to education in china a meta analysis within labour economics returns to education is an area of focused research moreover amongst studies looking at emerging economies china is the most widely studied economy while there is a gen

cigarette tax avoidance and evasion variation in state cigarette taxes provides incentives for tax avoidance through smuggling legal border crossing to low tax jurisdictions or internet purchasing when taxes rise tax paid sales of cigarettes will decline both because consumption will decrease and because tax avoidance will increase the key innovation of this paper is to compare cigarette sales data to cigarette consumption data from the behavioral risk factor surveillance system brfss i show that after subtracting percent changes in consumption residual percent changes in sales are associated with state cigarette tax changes implying the existence of tax avoidance i estimate that the tax avoidance response to tax changes is at least twice the consumption response and that tax avoidance accounted for up to 9 6 of sales between 1985 and 2001 because of the increase in tax avoidance tax paid sales data understate the level of smoking and overstate the drop in smoking i also find that the level of legal border crossing was very low relative to other forms of tax avoidance if states have strong preferences for smoking control they must pair high cigarette taxes with effective policies to curb smuggling and other forms of tax avoidance or employ alternative policies such as counter advertising and smoking restrictions

incomplete written contracts undescribable states of nature this paper extends the classic two armed bandit problem to a many agent setting in which n players each face the same experimentation problem the difference with the single agent problem is that agents can now learn from the experiments of others thus experiementation produces a public good and a free rider problem in experimentation naturally arises more interestingly future experimentation by others encourages current individual experimentation the paper provides an analysis of the set of markov equilibria in terms of the free rider effect and the encouragement effect

can higher cigarette taxes improve birth outcomes abstract this study examines whether higher state cigarette taxes can be used to improve birth outcomes data on the outcomes of interest are taken from the 1989 1992 natality detail files generating a sample of roughly 10 5 million births the results suggest that smoking participation among pregnant women declines and average birth weights rise when excise taxes are increased these results can be used to form an instrumental variables estimate of the impact of smoking on birth weight this estimate is remarkably close to numbers from a random assignment clinical trial the smoking participation price elasticity is estimated to be 0 5

the paradox of pledgeability abstract we develop a model in which collateral serves to protect creditors from the claims of other creditors we find that paradoxically borrowers rely most on collateral when pledgeability is high this is when taking on new debt is easy which dilutes existing creditors creditors thus require collateral for protection against possible dilution by collateralized debt there is a collateral rat race but collateralized borrowing has a cost it encumbers assets constraining future borrowing and investment there is a collateral overhang our results suggest that policies aimed at increasing the supply of collateral can backfire triggering an inefficient collateral rat race likewise upholding the absolute priority of secured debt can exacerbate the rat race

a critical assessment of the incomplete contracts theory for private participation in public services the case of the water sector in ghana this paper provides a critical analysis of the recent developments in the incomplete contracts theory and its conclusions for privatisation of public services drawing on a case study of management contract for urban water services in ghana and highlighting the flaws in the theory the article argues that contractual incompleteness does not provide a uniform guidance on efficient forms of ownership we argue that methodological individualism utilised in the theory is particularly ineffective for its application to public services where direct or indirect contractual role of the state cannot be eliminated the sterility of the theory with respect to political institutional and distributional context of public service delivery is identified as an important weakness copyright oxford university press

ownership organization and income inequality market transition in rural vietnam in transitional economies the scale of economic enterprise and the allocation of property rights shape social structures and influence income distribution in agrarian economies where labor intensive family enterprises dominate political officials income advantages decline rapidly relative to those of private entrepreneurs larger enterprises however provide greater income opportunities for officials especially when a government retains an ownership stake in the initial phases of reform this article replicates the findings from an earlier study of rural china using comparable survey data from vietnam we find that during the first two decades of rural market reform in vietnam and china the scale and ownership of firms differed radically small family enterprises dominated rural development in vietnam whereas china s development was dominated by larger firms initially established by rural governments consequently while cadre income advantages have kept pace with those of private entrepreneurs

holdups standard breach remedies and optimal investment in bilateral trading problems the parties may be hesitant to make relationship specific investments without adequate contractual protection we postulate that the parties can sign noncontingent contracts prior to investing and can freely renegotiate them after information about the desirability of trade is revealed we find that such contracts can induce one party to invest efficiently when courts impose either a breach remedy of specific performance or expectation damages moreover specific performance can induce both parties to invest efficiently if a separability condition holds expectation damages on the other hand is poorly suited to solve bilateral investment problems forthcoming the american economic review please contact the program in law and economics at boalt hall school of law uc berkeley berkeley ca 94720 for a copy of this paper

are alcohol tax hikes fully passed through to prices evidence from alaska on 1 october 2002 the state of alaska increased taxes on malt beverages from 0 35 per gallon to 1 07 per gallon increased taxes on wine from 0 85 per gallon to 2 50 per gallon and increased taxes on distilled spirits from 5 60 per gallon to 12 80 per gallon the net effect is that the tax on a standard serving rose from about 3 cents for beer 2 cents for wine and 4 cents for spirits to a uniform tax of 10 cents per standard serving of each type of alcohol beverage this paper uses primary data on alcoholic beverage prices in alaska to study a very basic question what was the impact of the tax hikes on prices an alcohol tax hike is often viewed as a public health policy tool to discourage excessive alcohol consumption and alcohol related problems such as drunk driving the impact of a tax hike on alcoholic beverage prices is a key link in the chain of the causality from the tax to public health economic theory and previous empirical studies mainly of taxes on goods other than alcoholic beverages do not provide very much guidance on what to expect following a tax hike it is an empirical question to answer the question i conducted telephone surveys just before and a year after the tax hike of on premise and off premise alcohol retail establishments across alaska

rising cigarette prices and rising obesity coincidence or unintended consequence economists have begun to debate if the rise in cigarette prices in the u s in recent decades has contributed to the nation s rise in obesity reaching conclusions that are surprisingly sensitive to specification i show that allowing for the effect to occur gradually over several years leads to the conclusion that a rise in cigarette prices is actually associated with a long run reduction in body mass index and obesity this result is robust to the different methodologies used in the literature i also provide evidence that indirect effects on exercise and food consumption may explain the counterintuitive result

getting paid wage arrears and stratification in russia1 wage arrears have played an important yet unappreciated role in the stratification of contemporary russian society delays in wage payments became rampant and persistent during the 1990s because of the particular structural institutional and policy context that accompanied russia s market reforms recent improvements in russia s economy have reduced but not eliminated wage arrears an innovative practice that has become institutionalized in some but not all postsocialist societies analyses of survey data collected in early 1998 confirm the independent stratifying role of arrears inequality in getting paid is socially structured in a different manner than inequality in contracted wages and the former proves equally or more decisive in shaping inequality in actual wages arrears occur with some regularity in other national and historical contexts this study of russia shows that where arrears are rampant researchers should incorporate them into conceptual and empirical models of earnings inequalit

the new patent intermediaries platforms defensive aggregators and super aggregators some assets are traded in liquid markets at transparent prices with the help ome assets are traded in liquid markets at transparent prices with the help of many thriving intermediaries houses and apartments stocks and other of many thriving intermediaries houses and apartments stocks and other fi nancial products books dvds electronics and all sorts of collectibles fi nancial products books dvds electronics and all sorts of collectibles

shrouded attributes consumer myopia and information suppression in competitive markets bayesian consumers infer that hidden add on prices e g the cost of ink for a printer are likely to be high prices if consumers are bayesian firms will not shroud information in equilibrium however shrouding may occur in an economy with some myopic or unaware consumers such shrouding creates an inefficiency which firms may have an incentive to eliminate by educating their competitors customers however if add ons have close substitutes a curse of debiasing arises and firms will not be able to profitably debias consumers by unshrouding add ons in equilibrium two kinds of exploitation coexist optimizing firms exploit myopic consumers through marketing schemes that shroud high priced add ons in turn sophisticated consumers exploit these marketing schemes it is not possible to profitably drive away the business of sophisticates it is also not possible to profitably lure either myopes or sophisticates to nonexploitative firms we show that informational shrouding flourishes even in highly competitive markets even in markets with costless advertising and even when the shrouding generates allocational inefficiencies

complexity and renegotiation a foundation for incomplete contracts the paper considers a hold up model where only one of n future trading opportunities will prove to be efficient and where ex post renegotiation of the ex ante contract cannot be prevented as the environment becomes more complex n the outcome under any message contingent long term contract converges to that of the incomplete contracting model where trade is contractible ex post but not ex ante when trades are costly to describe both ex ante and ex post the incomplete contracting result is extended to a broader class of environments

endogenous verifiability and relational contracting for contracting parties it will often be uncertain whether a legal court is able to enforce the real intents of their contract the strict requirements of verifiability make it costly if not impos sible for parties to arrange their transactions and design their contract in a way that makes it completely protected by the court a way out is then to rely on self enforcing relational con tracts through repeated transactions the parties can make it costly for each other to breach the contract by letting breach ruin future trade but the self enforcing range of contracts is limited so the court s ability to enforce a contract is not without consequence for the contracting parties if possible the parties may thus have incentives to take costly actions that affect the ability of the court both ex ante preparations in terms of detailed contracting and ex post revelation of informa tion can increase the probability of fair court enforcement in this paper we focus on the former assuming that the parties are able to improve the verifiability of the contracted actions by care ful ex ante contract specifications we assume that careful contracting can improve the court s ability to verify whether an action conforms to the one described in the contract then we ask what happens to the self enforcing contract equilibrium if a party takes actions ex ante that affect the probability of verification in order to provide some answers we analyze a simple repeated principal agent game where the verifiability of the agent s actions is endogenously determined by the principal s investments in drafting an explicit contract pertaining to the quality of the agent s output the model makes it possible to identify some subtle effects of two key enforcement devices legal courts and repeated interaction note that by endogenizing verifiability we also endog enize the degree of contractual incompleteness and the equilibrium level of incompleteness will depend on the verification technology i e the resource costs that are necessary to achieve various verifiability levels this verification technology will be influenced in an essential way by the quality of courts in fact we can use the model to study relationships between two distinct aspects of courts namely their ability which influences the verification technology and their predictability which manifests itself in the equilibrium level of verifiability i e the probability with which the court in fact will verify the relevant action the repeated game approach formalizes an economic concept of trust and trustworthiness since a party honors trust if the present value of honoring exceeds the present value of abusing it the discount factor is then a proxy for the trust level in the relationship by studying the effect of variations in verification technology and the discount factor we can gain insight into the rela tionship between court ability explicit contracting trust and relational contracting below we summarize the results

schumpeter and georgescu roegen on the foundations of an evolutionary analysis qualitative change is widely recognised as a defining feature of evolution schumpeter and georgescu roegen put it at the centre of their methodological reasoning i revisit important contributions of these two authors paying attention to the immediate relationship of the major traits and treated issues between their works with reference to qualitative change their joint approach provides answers as to i why an evolutionary analysis has to necessarily apply a varied less formal set of methods as compared with modern static and dynamic analysis ii why an evolutionary analysis is a necessary component of economic analysis and iii how it can be seen as complementary to modern statics and dynamics they argued for methodological pluralism where the choice of methods shall derive from close observation of the subject matter under scrutiny georgescu roegen s reasoning shows the necessity of interdisciplinary contributions and the interrelation of economic activity and environmental impact and constraints putting environmental issues immediately on the evolutionary economics agenda the paper provides a new ground for evaluating georgescu roegen s own and their joint contribution to modern research

excise tax avoidance the case of state cigarette taxes we conduct an applied welfare economics analysis of cigarette tax avoidance we develop an extension of the standard formula for the optimal pigouvian corrective tax to incorporate the possibility that consumers avoid the tax by making purchases in nearby lower tax jurisdictions to provide a key parameter for our formula we estimate a structural endogenous switching regression model of border crossing and cigarette prices in illustrative calculations we find that for many states after taking into account tax avoidance the optimal tax is at least 20 smaller than the standard pigouvian tax that simply internalizes external costs our empirical estimate that tax avoidance strongly responds to the price differential is the main reason for this result we also use our results to examine the benefits of replacing avoidable state excise taxes with a harder to avoid federal excise tax on cigarettes

contracting with private knowledge of signal quality we characterize the optimal procurement contract in a setting where a supplier has privileged knowledge of the quality of a public signal about his production costs the optimal contract exhibits important differences with standard contracts in adverse selection settings for instance the contract induces output both above and below first best levels furthermore the induced output may not vary with the realized public signal unless the signal quality is sufficiently pronounced in addition output may increase as expected costs increase

a nearly global look at the dynamics of youth smoking initiation and cessation the role of cigarette prices this study investigates the role of cigarette prices on smoking initiation and cessation among youth in a sample of eight primarily non western low middle and high income countries with a particular focus on a subsample of 40 low and middle income countries lmics using split population duration models on longitudinally transformed individual data from the global youth tobacco survey gyts the average impact of cigarette prices in the presence of unobserved country heterogeneity and shifting cultural norms within countries is identified by the variation of cigarette prices within countries over time price increases are found to effectively reduce initiation in early youth and girls are considerably more responsive than boys the price elasticity of initiation in lmics is 0 82 for the combined gender analysis 0 46 for boys only and 1 5 for girls only there is some indication that youths in developing countries may be slightly less responsive to price changes than in high income countries no

does the market pay off earnings returns to education in urban china previous work on the market transition in reform era china has missed the direct link between individuals labour market history and individuals labour market outcome a typology of workers is developed based on individuals labour market histories and a model of selective mobility of workers from the state sector to the market sector is offered as an explanation for higher earnings returns to education in the market sector analysis of data from an urban survey in china reveals that commonly observed higher earnings returns to education in the market sector are limited only to recent market entrants and that early market entrants resemble state workers in both their level of earnings and returns to education these results challenge the prevailing wisdom that education is necessarily more highly rewarded in the market sector thus it is concluded that higher returns to education in the market sector should not be construed as being caused by marketization per se and instead that the sorting process of workers in labour markets helps explain the sectoral differentials

the effects of excise taxes and regulations on cigarette smoking abstract we estimate a generalized linear model to examine adult and teenage cigarette demand our analysis focuses on the extent to which exice taxes and regulations restricting smoking in public places affect cigarette consumption the adult results indicate that the price elasticity of demand is unstable over time ranging from 0 06 in 1970 to 0 23 in 1985 these estimates are lower than most found in previous studies the teenage price elasticity does not differ statistically from the estimates for adults additionally regulations restricting smoking in public places have a significant effect on both adult and teenage cigarette demand

cutting through the smoke separating the effect of price on smoking initiation relapse and cessation i employ a large national representative dataset current population survey tobacco use supplements to investigate how cigarette prices affect smoking decisions a standard econometric approach is to estimate the relationship between cigarette prices and smoking participation at a point in time i extend this approach to model past year decisions to start resume or quit smoking considering reverse causality i apply an instrumental variable excise taxes for cigarette prices i include an index of state level anti smoking sentiment to control for omitted variable bias after estimating separate models for smoking initiation relapse and cessation and for different age groups i find no evidence that increasing taxes on cigarettes can prevent the onset of youth smoking neither does it effectively induce young smokers to quit however cigarette prices do play an important role to prevent relapse and encourage quitting at older ages

executive compensation a modern primer this article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation bringing them together under a simple unifying framework accessible to the general interest reader we analyze assignment models of the level of pay and static and dynamic moral hazard models of incentives and compare their predictions to empirical findings we make two broad points first traditional theories find it difficult to explain the data suggesting that compensation results from rent extraction by ceos however more modern shareholder value theories that arguably better capture the ceo setting do deliver predictions consistent with observed practices suggesting that these practices need not be inefficient second seemingly innocuous features of the modeling setup often made for tractability or convenience can lead to significant differences in the model s implications and conclusions on the efficiency of observed practices we close by highlighting apparent inefficiencies in executive compensation and additional directions for future research

imperfect memory and choice under risk this paper presents a model of choice based on imperfect memory and self deception i assume that people have preferences over their own attributes e g skill knowledge or competence and can manipulate their memories the model provides a prior dependent theory of regret aversion and allows for prior dependent information attitudes it implies that behavior will converge to the one predicted by expected utility theory after a choice has been faced a sufficiently large number of times

on the value of commitment with asymmetric information several recent papers have emphasized that long term relationships can be efficiently governed by short term contracts provided that there is no asymmetric information at the contracting dates this excludes not only adverse selection problems but also moral hazards problems in which hidden actions generate private information over the future in this paper we show in the context of a multiperiod principal agent relationship with adverse selection that renegotiable short term contracts can be as efficient as long term renegotiation proof contracts on the other hand spot contracting may fail to achieve long run efficiency not only because of intertemporal smoothing as with symmetric information but also because of ratchet effects and time inconsistency in the optimal structure of informational rents thus some limited commitment seems to be a necessary and sufficient condition to achieve long run efficiency

an empirical analysis of dynamic nonprice competition in an oligopolistic industry this article develops a dynamic model of nonprice competition in an oligopolistic industry and uses it to analyze advertising competition in the u s cigarette industry the model generalizes existing studies by allowing advertising to affect both firm market shares and the total size of the market the model also allows dynamic conjectural variations to arise from the intertemporal links created by the durability of advertising we use these dynamic conjectural variations to distinguish alternative models of competitive interaction we estimate the complete model of firm production demand and advertising choice by using data for u s cigarette producers the results indicate that firm advertising primarily affects the level of market demand with a firm s effect on rival firms market shares arising through variations in the number of brands sold empirical results on firm behavior suggest that firms act as if their advertising choices will alter the future advertising choices of rival firms in both the high tar and low tar cigarette markets

does increasing the beer tax reduce marijuana consumption previous studies suggest that alcohol and marijuana are economic substitutes so recent policies restricting the availability of alcohol have led to an increase in the amount of marijuana consumed using micro level data from the national longitudinal survey of youth nlsy to estimate individual demand equations for alcohol and marijuana this research finds that alcohol and marijuana are economic complements not substitutes further this research finds that increases in the federal tax on beer will generate a larger reduction in the unconditional demand for marijuana than for alcohol in percentage terms

long term short term and renegotiation on the value of commitment in contracting spot contracting generally involves efficiency losses relative to long term contracting it is proved here that short term contracting and renegotiation allow to achieve long run efficiency when transfers are not limited objectives are conflicting and no relevant asymmetric information appears at recontracting dates this last assumption excludes adverse selection but not moral hazard when technologies and preferences are time separable copyright 1990 by the econometric society

who pays cigarette taxes the impact of consumer price search abstract we conduct an empirical study of the impact of consumer price search on the shifting of cigarette excise taxes to consumer prices we use novel data on the prices that smokers report paying and document substantial price dispersion we find that cigarette taxes are shifted at lower rates to carton buyers and especially smokers who buy cartons of cigarettes in a state other than their state of residence we also find evidence that taxes are shifted at somewhat lower rates to the prices paid by heavier smokers and at somewhat higher rates to the prices paid by smokers of light cigarettes

cognition and incomplete contracts thinking about contingencies designing covenants and seeing through their implications is costly parties to a contract accordingly use heuristics and leave it incomplete the paper develops a model of limited cognition and examines its consequences for contractual design

signaling with costly acquisition of signals in this paper we investigate the consequences of introducing a cost to observe the signal in an otherwise standard signaling game beyond identifying equilibria which we contrast with those of a standard signaling game we study their robustness to two important classes of refinements acting through restrictions on out of equilibrium beliefs and through trembles our results suggest that more prominence should be given to the pooling outcome on the minimum signal

cigarette taxes and illicit trade in europe cigarettes are highly taxed in europe but at higher prices some consumers substitute more toward illicit cigarettes the illicit retail trade in cigarettes irtc includes counterfeit untaxed and smuggled cigarettes some existing literature includes claims that taxes are not an important determinant of irtc using data from the european union we find the opposite raising prices leads to substantial increases in irtc a 1 increase in tax pack is expected to increase illicit market share by 5 to 12 percentage points and increase illicit cigarette sales by 29 to 95 the results are robust to alternative specifications and data jel i18 h26 k42

revolution reform and status inheritance urban china 1949 1996 do regime change and market reform disrupt patterns of intergenerational mobility china s political trajectory is distinctive from that of other communist regimes in two ways during its first three decades the regime enforced unusually restrictive barriers to elite status inheritance and during the subsequent market transition unlike most of its counterparts the communist party survived intact data from a multigeneration survey suggest that despite their obvious exclusion from the party and related administrative careers in the mao era certain prerevolution elites transmitted one type of elite status to their offspring to a surprising degree party elites in contrast were hit hard by radical maoism but recovered quickly afterward and their offspring inherited elite status at much higher rates

the mirrlees approach to mechanism design with renegotiation with applications to hold up and risk sharing the paper studies the implementation problem first analyzed by maskin and moore 1999 in which two agents observe an unverifiable state of nature and may renegotiate inefficient outcomes following play of the mechanism we develop a first order approach to characterizing the set of implementable utility mappings in this problem paralleling mirrlees s 1971 first order analysis of standard mechanism design problems we use this characterization to study optimal contracting in hold up and risk sharing models in particular we examine when the contracting parties can optimally restrict attention to simple contracts such as noncontingent contracts and option contracts where only one agent sends a message

an anatomy of cartel contracts we study cartel contracts using data on 18 contract clauses of 109 legal finnish manufacturing cartels one third of the clauses relate to raising profits the others deal with instability through incentive compatibility cartel organization or external threats cartels use three main approaches to raise profits price market allocation and specialization these appear to be substitutes choosing one has implications on how cartels deal with instability simplifying we find that large cartels agree on prices cartels in homogenous goods industries allocate markets and small cartels avoid competition through specialization

lawyers in venture capital contracting theory and evidence real world financial contracts are sometimes so complex that it can be difficult to understand their exact payoff consequences we develop and test a theoretical model of a venture capitalist vc negotiating with an entrepreneur who may overweigh or underweigh the payoff consequences of contractual downside protection dp a lawyer with expertise in venture capital can inform the entrepreneur about these consequences but less expert but otherwise high quality lawyers cannot we determine how a vc s decision to include dp is affected by the expected quality of the entrepreneur s project the entrepreneur s experience and the vc expertise of his her legal counsel we show that the vc s incentive to include unnecessary dp declines in expected project quality indeed for inexperienced entrepreneurs involved with high quality projects vcs prefer that the entrepreneur s counsel has vc expertise this implies that when negotiating with inexperienced entrepreneurs vcs who invest in high quality companies should be more likely to negotiate with entrepreneurs who employ lawyers with vc expertise we document broad empirical support for the model and provide evidence against competing explanations jel l24 g24 k12 l14 l24

health scare excise taxes and advertising ban in the cigarette demand and supply the cigarette industry is a fascinating laboratory for industrial economists because of its concentrated market structure and history of conflicts over health and tax issues the industry has been the focal point of many economic studies most of the recent studies have concentrated on the demand side of the market for example bass schmalensee hamilton and fujii deal with the impact of advertising and the health scare on cigarette demand 4 15 10 8 barzel johnson and sumner ward assessed the importance of the excise tax or ad valorem tax on consumers cigarette demand 3 12 16 on the supply side vernon rives naylor developed an econometric model of the tobacco industry 20 which however is more concerned with the agricultural aspects of the product than the industry s market organization a careful review of the above studies suggests serious shortcomings which appear to limit their application to policy formulation or market analysis first the variables are introduced in an ad hoc fashion without reference to existing demand or supply theories second none of the above studies recognizes explicitly the interactions among the variables in the demand and the supply equations in the context of the determination of market equilibrium this paper has three objectives 1 to apply the standard neoclassical market theory to the cigarette industry 2 to identify the interactions between cigarette demand and supply using a simultaneous equations approach the first such attempt in a cigarette industry study and 3 to evaluate the effects of cigarette taxes advertising and health scare issues on the industry s output based on the empirical results obtained from the simultaneous equations analysis the judicious selection of explanatory variables careful data

the us national tobacco settlement the effects of advertising and price changes on cigarette consumption this paper provides an econometric analysis of the effects of cigarette price and advertising changes stemming from the united states tobacco settlement of 1998 this is done by estimation of a demand function for cigarettes based on data from both before and after the settlement the model is estimated using monthly time series data for the period 1990 2000 results show that the increase in cigarette prices stemming from the settlement reduced per capita cigarette consumption in the usa by 8 3 however the cigarette companies also increased advertising in the years immediately preceding and following the settlement this study estimates that this increased advertising partially offsets the effects of the higher prices increasing cigarette consumption by 2 7 to 4 7 and hence blunting the effects of the price increase by 33 57

market premium social process and statisticism statistics is a powerful yet potentially dangerous tool more than two decades ago the late otis dudley duncan 1984 226 warned us concerning the danger of statisticism the notion that computing is synonymous with doing research the naive faith that statistics is a complete or sufficient basis for scientific methodology the superstition that statistical formulas exist for evaluating such things as the relative merits of different substantive theo

tax incidence with strategic firms in the soft drink market abstract because soft drink sd consumption is considered to be a contributor to the epidemic of obesity there is a growing interest in evaluating the impact on sd consumption of alternative tax policies in this paper we propose a methodology to evaluate the impact of taxation of a food market taking into account the strategic price response of both manufacturers and retailers we apply this methodology to the french sd market and simulate the impacts of ad valorem and excise taxes we find that firms behave differently when facing an ad valorem tax or an excise tax an excise tax is overshifted to consumer prices while an ad valorem tax is undershifted to consumer prices we find that an excise tax based on the sugar content of sd is the most effective at reducing sd consumption our results also indicate that ignoring strategic pricing by firms leads to misestimations of the impact of taxation by between 15 and 40 depending on the products and the tax implemented in the short term that is ignoring positive long term health effects a 9 cents l excise tax has a small negative welfare effect about 1 person year

oligopoly structure and the incidence of cigarette excise taxes abstract a model of oligopoly price behavior and tax incidence for the u s cigarette industry for the period 1955 1990 is presented a cost function is estimated and shows manufacture to be subject to increasing returns to scale the mean price elasticity of demand is 0 71 the model indicates that competition among manufacturers has been decreasing since 1980 a simulation shows that an increase in the federal excise tax causes a greater increase in price and a greater decrease in consumption than does the same increase in the average of state and local tax rates

incomplete contracts and signaling this article presents a principal agent model in which asymmetric information leads to contractual incompleteness i show that in the presence of transactions costs incompleteness may act as a signal of the principal s type two types of transactions costs are considered those incurred ex ante drafting costs and those incurred ex post enforcement or verification costs i prove that in the presence of either of these costs asymmetric information leads to more contractual incompleteness than full information does

a model of add on pricing this paper examines competitive price discrimination with horizontal and vertical taste differences consumers with higher valuations for quality are assumed to have stronger brand preferences two models are considered a standard competitive price discrimination model in which consumers observe all prices and an add on pricing game in which add on prices are naturally unobserved and firms may advertise a base good at a low price in hopes of selling add ons at high unadvertised prices in the standard game price discrimination is self reinforcing the model sometimes has both equilibria in which the firms practice price discrimination and equilibria in which they do not the analysis of the add on pricing game focuses on the chicago school argument that profits earned on add ons will be competed away via lower prices for advertised goods a conclusion is that add on practices can raise equilibrium profits by creating an adverse selection problem that makes price cutting unappealing although profitable when jointly adopted using add on pricing is not individually rational in a simple extension with endogenous advertising practices and costless advertising several models that could account for add on pricing are discussed

elite opportunity in transitional economies command economies gave communist era elites administrative control and material privilege but severely restricted money income and private wealth markets and privatization have injected new value into public assets and create unprecedented opportunities for elite insiders these opportunities depend on the extent of regime change and barriers to asset appropriation regime change varies from the survival of the entire party hierarchy to its rapid collapse and defeat in competitive elections barriers to asset appropriation vary with the extent pace and form of privatization and the concentration and liquidity of assets different combinations of such circumstances jointly affect the extent to which prior elites obtain ownership or control of privatized assets use political office to extract larger incomes move into salaried elite occupations or fall out of the elite altogether regime change and barriers to asset appropriation affect change at the national level but outcomes vary across economic sectors because of characteristics of organizations elite positions and assets this elementary theory serves to integrate varied findings from recent research on central europe china and russia and yields predictions for other regions

impact of domestic content requirement on the us tobacco and cigarette industries abstract using a log linear equilibrium displacement model we quantify the impact of the recent domestic tobacco content requirement on us cigarette manufacturing we investigate effects on us growers and manufacturers and competing tobacco imports the policy increased domestic use of us grown tobacco but induced a small negative output effect tobacco imports decreased substantially the paper also discusses the political economic incentives for us manufacturers to comply with such policies the political cooperation between us growers and manufacturers decreases the opposition of the latter to protectionist policies championed by the former

arm s length relationships we show that lowering the cost of acquisition of information that a principal obtains about the performance of an agent may make it more difficult for the principal to commit to threats hence it will weaken incentives and can therefore be counterproductive this phenomenon is explored in a framework where improving the quality of information makes a commitment not to renegotiate less credible applications to the theory of the firm are briefly explored

the failure of models that predict failure distance incentives and defaults statistical default models widely used to assess default risk fail to account for a change in the relations between different variables resulting from an underlying change in agent behavior we demonstrate this phenomenon using data on securitized subprime mortgages issued in the period 1997 2006 as the level of securitization increases lenders have an incentive to originate loans that rate high based on characteristics that are reported to investors even if other unreported variables imply a lower borrower quality consistent with this behavior we find that over time lenders set interest rates only on the basis of variables that are reported to investors ignoring other credit relevant information as a result among borrowers with similar reported characteristics over time the set that receives loans becomes worse along the unreported information dimension this change in lender behavior alters the data generating process by transforming the mapping from observables to loan defaults to illustrate this effect we show that the interest rate on a loan becomes a worse predictor of default as securitization increases moreover a statistical default model estimated in a low securitization period breaks down in a high securitization period in a systematic manner it underpredicts defaults among borrowers for whom soft information is more valuable regulations that rely on such models to assess default risk could therefore be undermined by the actions of market participants

nash equilibrium and welfare optimality if is a set of social alternatives a social choice rule scr assigns a subset of a to each potential profile of individuals preferences over a where the subset is interpreted as the set of welfare optima a game form or mechanism implements the social choice rule if for any potential profile of preferences 1 any welfare optimum can arise as a nash equilibrium of the game form implying in particular that a nash equilibrium exists and 2 all nash equilibria are welfare optimal the main result of this paper establishes that any scr that satisfies two properties monotonicity and no veto power can be implemented by a game form if there are three or more individuals the proof is constructive

taxation regulation and addiction a demand function for cigarettes based on time series evidence this work analyzes the effects of prices taxes income and anti smoking regulations on the consumption of cigarettes in california a 25 cent per pack state tax increase in 1989 enhances the usefulness of this exercise analysis is based on monthly time series data for 1980 through 1990 results show a price elasticity of demand for cigarettes in the short run of 0 3 to 0 5 at mean data values and 0 5 to 0 6 in the long run we find at least some support for two further hypotheses that antismoking regulations reduce cigarette consumption and that consumers behave consistently with the model of rational addiction

excise gap and price in the italian cigarette industry we provide evidence that tax shifts in the italian cigarette industry are not homogeneous across price categories and are associated with differences in the excise structure we take the gap betwee