contracting with wealth constrained agents we examine how a project owner optimally selects a project operator and motivates him to deliver an essential noncontractible input e g effort when potential operators are privately informed about their limited wealth truthful revelation of wealth is induced by promising a higher probability of operation and if necessary a greater share of realized profit the larger the nonrefundable bond that a potential operator posts the project owner benefits when total wealth is widely dispersed among potential operators under plausible conditions limited knowledge of wealth is not constraining for the project owner

effort levels in contests with two asymmetric players a contest is a situation in which players compete with one another by expending effort to win a prize examples abound firms compete by spending rd 26 krueger 14 posner 20 rogerson 23 appelbaum and katz 1 hillman and riley 12 hirshleifer 13 ellingsen 8 nitzan 18 and baik 2 3 have studied rent seeking contests lazear and rosen 15 o keeffe viscusi and zeckhauser 19 and rosen 24 have examined performance incentives associated with reward schemes riley 22 has analyzed the war of attrition and auctions dixit 7 has considered strategic commitments in contests with different applications these are only a part of the literature on the theory of contests despite the vast literature however the effects of asymmetries between players have not been clarified except by harris and vickers 11 who analyze in a patent race model the strategic consequences of asymmetries the purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of asymmetries between two players on individual and total effort levels in a model with a logit form probability of winning function effort levels expended by the players deserve attention effort in a rent seeking contest is interpreted as social costs and thus total effort level is a measure of economic efficiency effort in an r d contest is interpreted as r d expenditures and thus effort levels determine the expected date of invention we focus on asymmetries between the players resulting from their different valuations of the prize their different abilities to convert effort into probability of winning or both such asymmetries are common in contests for example people in different locations may receive different

hospital transaction prices and managed care discounting for selected medical technologies it is generally assumed that managed care has been successful at capturing discounts from medical providers but the implications have been a matter of debate critics argue that managed care organizations attain savings by reducing intensity of services while others have argued that savings are real and are a consequence of discounts per unit of care rather than reduced intensity because medical services tend to be bundled together into episodes of care separating out prices and quantities can be difficult given available data past studies focused on an average price for the aggregate hospital calculated from total revenue divided by the number of inpatient days or cases e g glenn a melnick et al 1992 emmett b keeler and melnick 1999 david dranove and richard ludwick 1999 caution that these methods provide approximations of actual prices and are subject to measurement error due to unobservable differences in service mix examining treatment episode for acute myocardial infarctions heart attacks david cutler et al 2000 infer that discounts attained by managedcare plans are only partly due to reductions in intensity here we employ data that enable us to observe transaction prices i e actual payments borne by the payer and received by the hospital for major procedures on an unbundled basis our analysis differs from previous studies in several important dimensions among these is the focus on pricing differences between various insurers and employers rather than differences within a single large insurer as a consequence we derive an empirical specification based on the bargaining framework due to john m brooks et al 1997 rather than their insurerbased model moreover to identify pure unit discounts we focus on the narrowly defined procedure like cutler et al we focus on coronary heart disease a leading cause of death we examine a major procedure used to treat this disease one that is costly and relatively common in bypass surgery more fully coronary arterial bypass graft or cabg healthy segments of artery are surgically inserted around the diseased arteries in 2002 about 344 000 cabg s were performed in the united states with expenditures exceeding 21 billion other economists have focused on these procedures to examine market phenomena such as the hospital s entry decision michael chernew et al 2002 or information diffusion dranove et al 2003 yet the pricing decision was not treated fully

the role of firm size in bilateral bargaining a study of the cable television industry we examine the effect of buyer merger on bilateral negotiations between a supplier and n buyers merger may have bargaining effects in addition to the usual efficiency effects the effect of merger on the buyers bargaining position depends on the curvature of the supplier s gross surplus function merger enhances worsens the buyers bargaining position if the function is concave convex based on a panel of advertising revenue in the cable television industry our estimates indicate that the gross surplus function for suppliers of program services is convex this result suggests that cable operators integrate horizontally to realize efficiency gains rather than to enhance their bargaining position vis a vis program suppliers

caps on political lobbying the cost of political campaigns in the u s has risen substantially in recent years for example real spending on congressional election campaigns doubled between 1976 and 1992 steven d levitt 1995 there are many reasons why increased campaign spending might be socially harmful first increased spending means increased fund raising which may keep politicians from their legislative duties 1 second a lobbyist who makes a large campaign contribution may have undue influence on electoral outcomes on the shaping of legislation or on the outcome of regulatory proceedings 2 that is the socially preferred candidate or legislation may not prevail likewise a lobbyist involved in a regulatory matter or a competition for a government contract may benefit unduly from a legislator s intervention 3 third a perception that campaign contributions purchase influence may lead to increased tolerance of corruption in the private sector a desire to control campaign spending has spawned many initiatives to limit both campaign contributions and spending beginning with the passage of the federal election campaign act feca political action committees pacs can contribute at most 5 000 per election to a candidate while individuals can contribute at most 1 000 restrictions have also been put on in kind contributions making it more difficult to circumvent these limits 4 while direct restrictions on campaign spending have proven difficult to implement recent initiatives aim to impose voluntary spending limits and stricter limits on contributions 5 despite the existing legislation and the proposals to limit contributions little is known about the impact of contribution limits on aggregate expenditures while it is intuitively appealing that aggregate expenditures would drop we challenge that intuition here we study a lobbying game and show that a cap on individual lobbyists expenditures may have the perverse effect of increasing aggregate expenditures and loweri this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

hospital systems and bargaining power evidence from out of market acquisitions competition analyses generally restrict their attention to how mergers alter concentration in the relevant consumer market studying hospital competition by focusing on the local patient market may be misleading however as multi market hospital systems often play an important role in the price negotiations of their members with managed care organizations we focus on out of market hospital mergers to investigate the cross market effects of system membership on member hospital reimbursement rates based on acquisitions occurring across the united states during 2000 2008 we find that hospitals exhibit significant increases of around 14 in their net reimbursement rates after becoming affiliated with an out of market system compared to independent stand alone hospitals we find no evidence that the price effect results from changes in patient case mix the cost of providing care generally or hospital quality the findings reveal that systems can impact the market power of hospitals in ways that have not been considered in recent antitrust analysis

insurer hospital bargaining negotiated discounts in post deregulation connecticut this paper uses unique data from the state of connecticut to examine discounting patterns in the state s hospital industry for the years following deregulation 1995 1998 the data provide a rare opportunity to study payer level differences in negotiated discounts for hospital services in addition to presenting descriptive evidence on how discounts vary across payers payer types and hospital types this study uses matched revenue data to analyze the economic determinants of discount magnitudes payer size appears to affect bargaining power but the economic significance of the effect is small the data exhibit patterns consistent with a bargaining explanation in which discount magnitudes depend critically on payers abilities to channel patients to hospitals with which favorable discounts have been negotiated

endogenous timing in contests with delegation i introduction contests with delegation where each player hires a delegate to expend effort or resources on the player s behalf to win a prize are common 1 an example is litigation between a plaintiff and a defendant in which each litigant hires an attorney who expends his effort to win the lawsuit on behalf of his client another example is a rent seeking contest in which each firm hires a lobbyist who expends his effort to acquire a monopoly or a procurement contract from the government on behalf of his client yet another example is a patent contest in which each firm hires a group of independent researchers or university professors who conduct research to obtain a patent on behalf of their employer delegation is attractive to players because they each can use superior ability by hiring a delegate with more ability than herself and achieve strategic commitments through delegation in such contests with delegation we believe delegates decide endogenously when to expend their effort after signing delegation contracts indeed pursuing their self interest the delegates may well endogenize the order of their moves and communicate it with each other before they expend their effort we believe also that players take it into account when designing their contracts for the delegates that the delegates will endogenize the order of their moves it is these ideas that motivate this paper accordingly the purpose of this paper is to systematically study contests with delegation in which delegates decide endogenously when to expend their effort after signing delegation contracts and before they expend their effort we study two player contests with delegation focusing on not only the equilibrium delegation contracts between players and their delegates but also the equilibrium orders of the delegates moves specifically we set up and analyze the following three stage game in the first stage two players each hire a delegate and they simultaneously announce their contracts written with their delegates each player s contract specifies how much her delegate will be paid if he wins the contest and how much if he loses it in the second stage each delegate decides when to expend his effort and the delegates announce their decisions simultaneously in the third stage the delegates expend their effort according to their decisions in the second stage to win the prize on behalf of their employers we show that in equilibrium the delegate hired by the higher valuation player chooses his effort level after observing his counterpart s and his expected payoff is greater than that of his counterpart this advantage of the delegate of the higher valuation player can be explained by the fact that his employer the higher valuation player offers better contingent compensation as it will be defined in section ii to him than the lower valuation player does to her delegate we compare the outcomes of the endogenous timing framework the three stage game presented above with those of the simultaneous move framework the game which is the same as the three stage game with the exception that the delegates choose their effort levels simultaneously and this order of their moves is given exogenously an interesting result is that each player offers her delegate a better contract in the endogenous timing framework than in the simultaneous move framework another interesting result is that unless the valuation for the prize of the higher valuation player is significantly greater than that of the lower valuation player then each delegate s expected payoff is greater in the endogenous timing framework than in the simultaneous move framework whereas each player s expected payoff is less in the endogenous timing framework than in the simultaneous move framework in summary pursuing their self interest the delegates decide endogenously when to expend their effort given contracts between the players and the delegates

two player asymmetric contests with ratio form contest success functions i examine players equilibrium effort levels in two player asymmetric contests with ratio form contest success functions i first characterize the nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move game i show that the equilibrium effort ratio is equal to the valuation ratio and that the prize dissipation ratios for the players are the same i also show that the prize dissipation ratio for each player is less than or equal to the minimum of the players probabilities of winning at the nash equilibrium and thus never exceeds a half then i examine how the equilibrium effort ratio the prize dissipation ratios and the players equilibrium effort levels respond when the players valuations for the prize or their abilities change jel d72 c72 i introduction a contest is a situation in which players compete with one another by expending irreversible effort to win a prize typical examples are various types of rent seeking contests competition among firms to win a monopoly rent secured under government protection or by a government procurement contract competition between domestic and foreign firms to obtain governmental trade policies favorable to them competition among firms to acquire a rent generated by rights of ownership to an import quota and competition among firms to capture rents created by governmental decisions to establish tariffs or other trade barriers other examples of contests include auctions patent races research and development r d competition among firms litigation competition for jobs among job candidates competition among candidates to win promotion to higher ranks election campaigns between political candidates and competition between local governments to invite business firms government institutions or government owned corporations into their districts naturally due to their prevalence and importance in economies such contests have been studied by many economists loury 1979 lee and wilde 1980 tullock 1980 rogerson 1982 rosen 1986 appelbaum and katz 1987 dixit 1987 hillman and riley 1989 hirshleifer 1989 ellingsen 1991 nitzan 1991 1994 krishna and morgan 1997 che and gale 1998 hurley and shogren 1998 and konrad 2000 to name a few in this vast literature on the theory of contests one of the main issues is how much effort do the players exert in pursuit of the prize indeed it is of great interest because the players effort levels determine the profitability of the players engaging in the contest and in some cases they are revenues collected by the contest organizer or bribes given to government officials furthermore they account for other important outcomes of the contest for example in a rent seeking contest efforts expended by the players are viewed as social costs due to rent seeking activities so that total effort level is a measure of economic efficiency in an r d contest effort levels expended by the players these are r d expenditures of the firms determine the expected date of invention this article also addresses the issue how much effort do the players exert in pursuit of the prize but it differs from previous research by dealing with contests with ratio form contest success functions 1 specifically the novelty of this article is to consider two player asymmetric contests in which each player s probability of winning is a function of the ratio of the two players effort levels two player contests with ratio form contest success functions or two player contests that can be best modeled with ratio form contest success functions are easily observed in the real world examples include various types of two player rent seeking contests litigation between a plaintiff and a defendant election campaigns between two parties or candidates and r d competition between two firms consider for example a rent seeking contest in which two firms potential monopolists compete with each other to win a government monopoly franchise contract

delegation and threat in bargaining abstract two principals nations appoint one agent each to bargain over the provision of a public good two institutional set ups are studied each with a different level of authority given to the agents here authority means the right to decide the own side s provision if negotiations break down in equilibrium the principals choose agents with preferences differing from their own the low authority equilibrium pareto dominates with regard to the principals the case of the principals deciding on the provisions simultaneously autarchy the high authority equilibrium is pareto dominated by the low authority equilibrium and it may even be dominated by autarchy journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c71 and c72

job design delegation and cooperation a principal agent analysis abstract this paper analyzes how tasks are assigned in organizations tasks can be allocated vertically between a principal and an agent or laterally among agents the resulting organizational job design determines how many tasks are delegated to agents and how the agents tasks are divided among them in the framework of the standard principal agent relationship with moral hazard it is shown that i an incentive consideration causes the principal to group a broad range of tasks into an agent s job rather than hire multiple agents and make each of them specialize in just one task and ii the principal may choose to delegate all the tasks in order to mitigate a conflicting incentive problem with agents

a dynamic theory of countervailing power in this article i develop a model of an infinitely repeated procurement auction with one buyer and several sellers the buyer can accumulate a backlog of unfilled orders which similar to a boom in demand forces the sellers to collude on a low price to prevent undercutting if the buyer s cost of shifiing its consumption over time is low enough then the extent of collusion is bounded away from the joint profit maximizing level even for discount factors approaching one the model is extended to allow for multiple buyers large buyers are shown to obtain lower prices from the sellers buyer mergers increase pro t for all buyers not just the merging pair at the expense of the sellers in contrast buyer growth through addition harms buyers that do not grow and benefits sellers

share tenancy as strategic delegation abstract the paper develops a new explanation of sharecropping based on the idea of an incentive equilibrium it considers a set up in which a few landlords in a village confront the choice of cultivating their farms by adopting different tenurial arrangements ranging from owner operation through the fixed rental system to sharecropping these landlords are the only sources of employment in the village and compete in the wages they pay to their workers in such an environment sharecropping is explained as a form of strategic delegation where a landlord gets extra benefit by having a share tenant and giving him suitable incentives

asymmetric two stage group rent seeking comparison of two contest structures two variations of a two stage rent seeking contest areconsidered in the first stage of the between groupmodel groups compete through the expenditure of resources bytheir members based on group expenditures one winning groupis probabilistically determined on the second stage membersof the winning group compete with one another for an exogenousprize in the semi finals model a player is chosen fromeach group and then these players compete for the prize groups differ in size or in their valuation of the prize subgame perfect equilibrium solutions are constructed forthese two contest structures

legal fee restrictions moral hazard and attorney rents abstract when attorney effort is unobservable and certain other simplifying assumptions such as risk neutrality hold it is efficient for an attorney to purchase the rights to a client s legal claim however the american bar association model rules of professional conduct prohibit this arrangement we show that this ethical restriction which is formally equivalent to requiring a minimum fixed fee of zero can create economic rents for attorneys even though they continue to compete along the contingent fee dimension the contingent fee is not bid down to the zero profit level because such a fee does not induce sufficient attorney effort we thereby provide a political economy explanation for these restrictions

observable contracts strategic delegation and cooperation the role of commitments in noncooperative games is well acknowledged and documented one way to achieve commitments is by letting delegates represent the players of a game in this paper the authors study a delegation game in which the players can use agents strategically to play on their behalf and the contracts they sign with them are common knowledge they show that in such cases every pareto optimal outcome of the game can become the unique subgame perfect nash equilibrium of the delegation game the authors demonstrate this result by discussing the cournot type duopolistic game copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

price and concentration in hospital markets the switch from patient driven to payer driven competition perhaps the most widely accepted paradigm of industrial organization i o is that competition lowers prices or alternatively that price cost margins are lower in less concentrated markets 1 the applicability of this paradigm for hospital markets has been questioned for example in united states vs carilion health system and roanoke valley hospital the district and appellate courts accepted evidence that hospital prices are lower in more concentrated markets and thereby approved a merger between the two largest hospitals in a three hospital market 2 the view that competition has a weak or perverse effect on hospital prices is shared by a number of researchers 3 is a common theme in newspaper stories

worker substitutability and patterns of unionisation a strategic three party bargaining model is developed in which one distinguished party the firm has to reac h agreements with the other two each of which is a group of workers in the prebargaining stage the two worker groups decide whether to organize jointly or separately the main observation relates the equi librium pattern of unionization to the substitutability in production between the two groups the outcome is joint or separate unions acco rding to whether the two groups are substitute or complementary facto rs of production the analysis also considers possibilities for firm s strategic intervention in the unionization process copyright 1988 by royal economic society

collective rent dissipation the theory of rent seeking was initiated by tullock 1967 1980 followed by krueger 1974 and posner 1975 and more recently extended in various directions by allard 1988 appelbaum and katz 1986a b c gradstein and nitzan 1989 hillman and katz 1984 1987 hillman and samet 1987 hillman and riley 1989 katz et al 1990 long and vousden 1987 ursprung 1990 and varian 1989 the purpose of this paper is to extend this theory by introducing the possibility of collective group rent seeking with voluntary individual decisions regarding their extent of participation in the collective rent seeking efforts

information and endogenous delegation in a rent seeking contest we offer a new explanation for the occurrence of delegation in rent seeking contests we consider a two player contest for a prize of common value the players only know that the prize is high or low with given probabilities each player can hire a delegate to act on his behalf after a delegate is hired she privately observes the true value of the prize we derive the conditions under which respectively no player only one player or both players delegate in equilibrium jel d7

health care costs on the rise again since 1999 health care costs have been growing faster than national income this rapid growth has occurred as the ability of private and public purchasers to reduce service utilization and bargain for lower prices has fallen insurers have recouped lost profits through higher premiums and new technologies have driven up costs throughout the sector private insurance market responses to these rising costs may lead to reductions in the number of people with insurance and to increased fragmentation of the insurance market over time technological change in medicine both increases costs and improves the quality of care the challenge for public policy is to maintain insurance and some degree of equity in the face of these rising costs

the welfare effects of restricted hospital choice in the us medical care market summary managed care health insurers in the usa restrict their enrollees choice of hospitals to within specific networks this paper considers the implications of these restrictions a three step econometric model is used to predict consumer preferences over health plans conditional on the hospitals they offer the results indicate that consumers place a positive and significant weight on their expected utility from the hospital network when choosing plans a welfare analysis assuming fixed prices implies that restricting consumers choice of hospitals leads to a loss to society of approximately 1 billion per year across the 43 us markets considered this figure may be outweighed by the price reductions generated by the restriction copyright 2006 john wiley sons ltd

managed care s price bargaining with hospitals research has shown that managed care mc slowed the rate of growth in health care spending in the 1990s primarily via lower unit prices paid however the mechanism of mc s price bargaining has not been well studied this article uses a unique panel dataset with actual hospital prices in massachusetts between 1994 and 2000 to examine the sources of mc s bargaining power i find two significant determinants of price discounts first plans with large memberships are able to extract volume discounts across hospitals second health plans that are more successful at channeling patients can extract greater discounts patient channeling can add to the volume discount that plans negotiate

the economic design of sporting contests what is the optimal number of entrants in a race or the optimal number of teams in a baseball league what is the optimal structure of prizes for a golf tournament or degree of revenue sharing for a football championship how evenly balanced should the competing teams be in the nascar or formula one championships what is the maximum number of entrants per nation to the olympic games that should be permitted what quota of qualifying teams to the soccer world cup should be allocated to the developing nations

bilateral monopolies and incentives for merger the paper presents a model of duopoly in which firms acquire inputs through bilateral monopoly relations with suppliers it combines a bargaining model with a duopoly model to examine how input pri

the effect of network arrangements on hospital pricing behavior the department of justice doj and the federal trade commission ftc have taken a recent interest in collaborations among hospitals that do not entail common ownership despite the lack of scientific evidence regarding effects of these hospital networks on market competition this paper explores the relationship between hospital networks and pricing behavior in california during a period of dynamic increase in hospital network activity there using herfindahl hirschman indexes hhi market definitions based on patient origin and accounting for network relationships we find a positive network effect on hospital pricing however this result appears to be generated primarily by system owned hospitals that form networks to provide particular services jointly

delegation with multiple instruments in a rent seeking contest we consider delegation in a rent seeking contest with two players where delegates have more instruments at their disposal than the main players we endogenize both the decision to hire a delegate and the contingent fee offered to the delegates we characterize the situations when either no one or two players hire a delegate in equilibrium we show that the decision to hire a delegate depends in a non monotonic way on the size of the contested prize

limited liability contracts between principal and agent abstract the optimal strategy of the principal is examined in an environment where there are ex post limitations on the maximum penalty that can be imposed on a riskneutral agent contrary to the case in which such limitations are not imposed it is in the principal s interest to deliberately forego the opportunity to induce socially efficient behavior and to instead design a contract that induces the agent to realize an efficient outcome only in the most productive state of nature and perhaps in certain very unproductive states the properties of the contract are examined in detail

rigging the lobbying process an application of the all pay auction textabstractin a world where a politician can explicitly auction off a prize to the high bidder the standard auction literature can be used to analyse political behavior the justice system however precludes politicians from explicitly selling the prize to the highest bidder thus politicians cannot let it become public knowledge that they are in the business of selling political favors an institution has emerged in political markets to overcome this constraint which are termed as lobbying lobbyists make implicit payments to the politician through campaign contributions if these up front payments were rebated to those failing to receive the prize it would be clear that the politician was selling favors this article has examined an interesting principle arising in all pay auctions this principle states that a politician wishing to maximize political rents may find it in his best interest to exclude certain lobbyists from participating in the lobbying process particularly lobbyists valuing most the political prize

hospital insurer bargaining an empirical investigation of appendectomy pricing employers increased sensitivity to health care costs has forced insurers to seek ways to lower costs through effective bargaining with providers what factors determine the prices negotiated between hospitals and insurers the hospital insurer interaction is captured in the context of a bargaining model in which the gains from bargaining are explicitly defined appendectomy was chosen because it is a well defined procedure with little clinical variation our results show that certain hospital institutional arrangements e g hospital affiliations hmo penetration and greater hospital concentration improve hospitals bargaining position furthermore hospitals bargaining effectiveness has diminished over time and varies across states

the strategic choice of managerial incentives do firms with separate owners and managers maximize profits we address this question for an oligopoly where managers compete in quantities or prices as in the cournot or bertrand models and owners choose their managers incentives we find that there is a strategic aspect in the problem of selecting incentives and that profit maximizing behavior does not result in particular in the oligopoly we study the behavior of firms competing in quantity price more closely resembles perfectly competitive collusive behavior than cournot bertrand behavior

the value of consumer choice and the decline in hmo enrollments i introduction and overview health insurance contracts may restrict consumers choice of medical provider in order to minimize moral hazard for example consumers who are insured for their marginal healthcare expenses have no incentive to enforce price discipline on their own in this case insurers may impose this discipline by restricting consumers choice of medical provider to those who offer competitive prices 1 this practice known as selective contracting sc may have other benefits as well including channeling consumers to efficient providers and achieving other efficiencies associated with partial vertical integration sc has been utilized by insurers both in the united states and abroad 2 however it is not a universal feature of health insurance contracts in part this is because reducing the choice set of medical providers imposes costs on consumers to the extent that consumers assign option value to choice capps dranove and satterthwaite 2003 for example sc was widely employed in the united states by health maintenance organizations hmos and other insurers in the 1990s and appears to have been an important cost control mechanism cutler mcclellan and newhouse 2000 robinson and phibbs 1989 however most private u s health insurers moderated their use of sc during the past decade at the same time that healthcare costs accelerated anecdotally a consumer and regulatory backlash against provider choice restrictions forced insurers to expand choice and largely abandon the practice blendon et al 1998 vita 2001 simultaneously hmo enrollments declined the purpose of this article is to explore the economic tradeoffs of sc with a particular focus on directly measuring the value that consumers assign to choice in medical markets i am interested in assessing whether the magnitude of any utility loss from choice restrictions can be offset by volume based price discounts that insurers may receive from hospitals my results bear on the larger question of whether an economic linkage can be drawn between consumers demand for choice and their apparent rejection of what is called tightly managed care they also have implications for many healthcare reform proposals that necessarily imply restrictions on the consumers choice sets i analyze health plan s sc of hospitals in the state of florida between 1999 and 2003 hospital sc restricts consumer choice in multiple ways including their choice of hospital in addition hospital choice restrictions imply restrictions over the use of specific physicians 3 i start by constructing hospital networks for each of a set of plan choices and then estimate a discrete choice model of health insurance demand conditional on each plan s restricted network for these purposes i use the capps dranove and satterthwaite 2003 measure of sc disutility that focuses on the option value of choice i employ several different discrete choice estimators to estimate the model including models with plan metropolitan statistical area msa fixed effects designed to control for unobserved plan attributes this provides me with estimates of disutility resulting from choice restrictions subsequently i project the estimated plan effects onto an instrumented value of plan price in order to estimate the price elasticity and also convert my disutility estimates into dollars my results show that consumers associated restrictive hospital networks with plan disutility during each of the years of the study period with choice elasticities that range from 0 10 to 0 32 in pooled estimates greater effects are obtained in 2003 using models where i allow the estimates to vary by year using my instrumental variables methodology to recover unbiased price coefficients i show that consumers associated a one standard deviation reduction in the size of a plan s hospital network with a reduction in plan value of between 62 and 118

equilibrium contingent compensation in contests with delegation we consider two player contests in which each player hires a delegate who expends his effort to win a prize on the player s behalf endogenizing delegation contracts we focus on the equilibrium contracts between the players and their delegates we first show that each player s equilibrium contract is a no win no pay contract then we examine the delegates equilibrium compensation spreads effort levels probabilities of winning expected payoffs and the players equilibrium expected payoffs we show that economic rents for the delegates may exist

limited liability and incentive contracting with multiple projects i examine a principal agent model with multiple projects where a risk neutral manager is protected by limited liability the analysis has several interesting implications i incentive problems are shown to be a natural source of economies of scope as combining multiple projects under the management of a single manager relaxes the limited liability constraint ii as a result managers may be overloaded with work and exert inefficiently high effort and iii the analysis has implications for the optimal allocation of projects to different managers copyright 2001 by the rand corporation

hospital competition in hmo networks abstract we develop a framework for analyzing bargaining relationships between hospitals and hmos under selective contracting using a unique dataset on hospitals in the los angeles area from 1990 to 1993 we estimate the determinants of actual negotiated prices paid to hospitals by two major hmos we find that a hospital s bargaining power and thus its price decrease when the hmo can readily turn to alternative networks that exclude the hospital we simulate the effect of hypothetical hospital mergers on bargaining power and find that some hospital mergers even in urban areas with many nearby hospitals can lead to significant price increases

insurer provider networks in the medical care market i use data on the hospital networks offered by managed care health insurers to estimate the expected division of profits between insurers and providers i include a simple profit maximization framework and an additional effect hospitals that can secure demand without contracting with all insurers e g those most attractive to consumers and those that are capacity constrained may demand high prices that some insurers refuse to pay hospital mergers may also affect price bargaining i estimate that all three types of hospitals capture higher markups than other providers these results provide information on the hospital investment incentives generated by bargaining

the effects of market structure and bargaining position on hospital prices ppos and hmos have gained widespread acceptance due in part to the belief that excess capacity and competitive market conditions can be leveraged to negotiate lower prices with health care providers we investigated prices obtained in different types of markets by the largest ppo in california our findings indicate that greater hospital competition leads to lower prices furthermore as the importance of a hospital to the ppo in an area increases the price rises substantially our testing of alternative methods for defining hospital geographic markets reveals that the common practice of using counties to define the market leads to an underestimate of the price increasing effects of a merger

enrollee mix treatment intensity and cost in competing indemnity and hmo plans abstract why do indemnity insurance plans cost substantially more per capita 77 more in our study than hmos we answer this question using data from a large organization s insurance pool covering 215 000 lives we decompose cost differences for eight major medical conditions into four sources demographics incidence within demographic groups treatment intensity and prices per service greater incidence of disease in the indemnity plan both from demographics themselves and within demographic groups and higher prices each explain nearly 50 of the difference contrary to conventional wisdom indemnity plans do not have greater treatment intensity

in defense of lawyers moral hazard as an aid to cooperation abstract this paper studies strategic delegation in two player contests for an indivisible prize as in e g litigation where one party s probability of winning is determined by the relative investments of both even though neither player stands to gain anything from precommitment both players ex ante prefer compulsory representation by agents e g lawyers whose efforts are unobservable this delegation equilibrium is unaffected by secret renegotiation opportunities equivalently it does not matter whether contracts are observable or not hence the paper points out a role for delegation with moral hazard in facilitating cooperation an effect quite separate from precommitment journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d72 d82 k41

bargaining with noisy delegation principals delegate to an agent in the context of the nash bargaining model but communicate instructions to their agents imperfectly numerical methods are used to find a unique equilibrium in the principals strategies agents fail to agree with a positive probability invoking a secondary mechanism for the resolution of disputes such as arbitration comparative statics are informative the risk sensitivity of the nash bargaining solution is mitigated but not eliminated as uncertainty goes to zero a stable unique limiting equilibrium is identified from the set of multiple equilibria identified in a model in which principals delegate without trembles

why do larger buyers pay lower prices intense supplier competition abstract the paper provides a theoretical explanation of the common claim that larger buyers pay lower prices in the model suppliers compete more aggressively for the business of larger buyers much as they do in boom periods of rotemberg and saloner

effort levels in a cournot nash contest with asymmetric information abstract many contests exist where one player does not know his opponent s value of a fixed prize e g unobservable non market preferences for preservation this paper explores how changes in the nature of a one sided information asymmetry affect effort levels in a cournot nash contest the results indicate that the uninformed player s effort is an uncertain input such that his effort is inversely related to risk this reduces his average odds of success comparative static results are driven by the perceived odds of success and risk for the uninformed player and the actual odds of success for the informed player

ability moral hazard firm size and diversification agency problem between the firm s managers and owners the agency relationship together with a span of control managerial technology determines an optimalfirm size and degree of diversification that are increasing in the manager s ability and therefore positively correlated cross sectionally i compare the benefits of merger with those achieved by using compensation contracts based on relative performance and show that for a particular parameterization the relative value of merger is a nonmonotonic function of the correlation between the productivity signals of the two firms neoclassical microeconomic theory has generally treated the firm as being identical to a technologically determined production function nevertheless it is widely recognized that this cost curve approach is more appropriately applied to plants within a firm than to the determination of firm size or structure itself one aspect of firm structure that has received especially little attention in the economic literature is diversification in particular the literature has not succeeded in distinguishing the benefits of efficiently using capital in production from the benefits to common ownership of the capital if joint use of capital creates efficiencies in the production of two or more goods the joint use could in principle be achieved by contracting over the use of the separately owned factors this ownership structure does not preclude the efficient use of factors further even if technological scope economies create incentives to diversify they cannot explain all diversification because much that we observe is between products that are apparently unrelated in production technology or demand the purpose of this article is to analyze the incentives of firms to diversify in an economy comprising managers and capital owners whose interests do not necessarily coincide and in which information is generally not perfect i derive the implications of the principalagent relationship between owners and managers of firms for the optimal structure of the firm in a competitive environment diversification is shown to be an optimal response to

comparative statics of contests and rent seeking games this paper develops the comparative statics properties of a contest encountered in patent races and rent seeking games the author shows that symmetric equilibrium expenditure and profit per player decrease with the number of competitors and the discount rate but increase with the value of the prize a fundamental lemma established in the paper shows that a stability condition usually imposed on the model is automatically satisfied the author identifies a class of likelihood or hazard rate functions for which aggregate expenditure increases with the number of competitors and total profits converge to zero copyright 1997 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

market share and the illusion of power can blue cross force hospitals to discount researchers in health care financing have claimed that large private insurers like blue cross frequently exercise monopsony power to obtain discounts from normal hospital charges they claim that the monopsony power derives from a large blue cross share of a given hospital cost shifting whereby hospitals offset the discount by raising charges to less powerful customers this paper re examines both theoretically and empirically the conditions necessary for a private insurer to extract discounts from a hospital we demonstrate that the theoretical conditions necessary for blue cross to force a discount do not exist in the indiana market using revenue data from 110 indiana hospitals we reject the traditional claim that blue cross pays less than other insurers as a function of market share