distributional coalitions and the politics of economic reform in latin america for much of the discipline of economics a closed economy is seen as the result of efforts of distributional coalitions and rent seekers to maintain sector specific protections accordingly economic liberalization is explained by the policy consistency of uncompromising reform elites students of the politics of economic adjustment in the developing world in turn have argued that reform programs concentrate costs in the present and disperse benefits in the future hence losers are prepared to engage in collective action whereas prospective winners facing uncertainty about payoffs remain disorganized they thus posit the cohesiveness and insularity of policymakers as the main variable for explaining successful reform both economists and political scientists therefore adopt a collective action approach that overlooks how groups organize in support of liberalization in the recent latin american experience however these reforms have preserved market reserves for firms that provided vital political support to and often colluded with policymaking elites this setting has thus reproduced incentives for rent seeking behavior even in the presence of comprehensive liberalization this evidence supports two interrelated theoretical claims first distributional coalitions may proliferate when the state withdraws from the economy not only when it intervenes second interest based variables retain explanatory power in political economy which state autonomy arguments disregard irrespective of whether the economy is closed or open which neoclassical perspectives overlook to highlight the centrality of interest groups favoring marketization therefore the article suggests modifications to the dominant theories of collective action and the literature on the politics of economic adjustment

the rule of law and economic growth where are we summary it is widely assumed that the rule of law is essential for economic growth however the rule of law is clearly a multidimensional concept encompassing a variety of discrete components from security of person and property rights to checks on government and control of corruption we review the theory underlying these different causal mechanisms linking the rule of law to economic growth and provide an introduction to some outstanding measurement issues we find that the correlation among different components of the rule of law concept are not tight among developing countries and that some inferences about the effects of property rights protection may not be warranted

political economic markets perts and pests in food and agriculture j i lyniversity of california berkeley jjept of agricultural and resource economic l working paper al cljdare i lorking paper 0 231 politic eco lic l rxets a d pests i j food l ti achiculture by per ts cordon c rausser ja nlnl tt junot tlon a riii ent st ticn giannini fou 1cl itiol1of ar ricultllrnj econo ll i cs july 11 w

smuggling and price disparity abstract this paper proposes a model of smuggling consistent with the coexistence of smuggling legal trade and price disparity defined as a domestic price which exceeds is less than the return from legal export import these phenomena have been found to characterize indonesian smuggling a framework is presented in which legal trade is used to cloak smuggling activity with the implication that the greater the volume of legal trade the less the costs of smuggling this model is then used to explain the observation noted above and to show that smuggling may be welfare increasing vis a vis the non smuggling situation and that even if the suppression of smuggling is costless tax revenue maximization may require a positive level of smuggling in addition the model is applied to coffee and rubber exports from indonesia

the efficiency of equity in organizational decision processes it is now widely accepted that rent seeking anne krueger 1974 or directly unproductive profit seeking jagdish bhagwati 1982 may cause inefficiencies in the context of public sector decisions the possibility that government decisions for example about taxes quotas franchises or standards may create or redistribute rents induces private parties to spend valuable resources to influence that distribution even when such expenditures carry no social benefit moreover the social cost of rent seeking can exceed the value of the resources spent trying to gain and protect rents for example because the fear of losing wealth through redistribution reduces the incentives for wealth creation treating rent seeking activities as characteristic of public sector decision processes ignores the fact that similar phenomena are to be found in firms unions and other private sector organizations our recent work milgrom 1988 our 1988 1990 papers attempts to identify the advantages of decision processes private or public that permit rent seeking and to incorporate these into a cost benefit analysis of optimal decision processes our work begins with an analysis of why rents and quasi rents arise in organizations and of the forms that the rent seeking they engender may take some measures to insulate the decision process from rent seeking such as limits on the provision of information by interested parties or restrictions on the range of options considered may degrade the quality of decisions especially by blocking the flow of valuable information optimal decision processes balance the costs of rent seeking against the value of information obtained several aspects of the rules affect the opportunities that members have to spend resources trying to alter the distribution of rents to ascertain the possibilities for rent seeking the analyst must ask questions like can the parties propose new initiatives at any time can they give volumes of testimony in a form of their own choosing can they appeal adverse decisions are decision makers obliged to respond to the parties initiatives is the range of actions that they can take in response relatively broad rather than being tightly constrained by property rights or other formal rules more affirmative answers to these questions lead to more opportunities or greater incentives for costly rent seeking as a kind of shorthand we call decision processes that have more of these elements more open processes the very elements that make a process open to rent seeking may also add flexibility and responsiveness helping to ensure that important ideas and proposals are fully considered from this perspective the benefits of openness can in principle be measured by a value of information calculation in the usual manner of statistical decision theory weighing the costs and benefits it follows that a more open process is more desirable when the rents available for redistribution are low and the value of the information that might be acquired is high conversely when the potential for redistribution is high and the value of information is low the optimal decision process is less open this kind of reasoning helps to illuminate the variations in the decision processes that are found in many organizations we have discussed a number of examples in our earlier work including the characteristics of personnel departments the contrasting patterns of decision making employment and compensation in u s and japanese firms professor of economics stanford university and jonathan b lovelace professor of economics graduate school of business stanford university stanford ca 94305 respectively this work was supported by the national science foundation

foreign competition immigration and structural adjustment abstract the paper uses the ricardo viner r v model to investigate the relationship in a capital abundant economy between trade competition and immigration in doing so it derives new results for the r v model especially on the welfare implications of migration with and without an initial tariff

predatory versus productive government the case of u s agricultural policies this essay will argue that agricultural policy in the united states has led to both the enhancement of efficiency through productive policies and the transfer of wealth and income to special interests through redistributive or predatory policies these two activities can be labeled as pests and perts pest policies or political economic seeking transfers are meant to redistribute wealth from one social group to another and are not explicitly concerned with efficiency in contrast perts or political economic resource transactions are intended to correct market failures or to provide public goods these policies have neutral distributional effects at least in design a review of the history of public policy in agriculture reveals not only tension between the pert and pest roles of the public sector but also some coordination between these two types of activities as different interest groups pressure the political process the government trades off pests and perts in its attempts to acquire balance and secure political power at times this has led to combinations of programs that appear incoherent in such a world the challenge for economists is to design and advocate policies that are both economically productive and politically sustainable

endogenous insecurity and economic development abstract we explore the implications of endogenous credit market imperfections for the endogenous relationship between investment insecurity and the process of economic development in the initial stages of development the fraction of agents engaged in nonproductive diversionary activities e g rent seeking grows as the opportunities to gain from diversionary activities expand in later stages however diversion falls as capital market imperfections are overcome and productive activities become more secure and more profitable we detail the forces that determine whether the insecurity generated by an economy s early development will choke off the growth process we also compare the cost effectiveness of alternative policies designed to prevent diversion

interest profits and suboptimality in a demand constrained macro model keynes argues that under pessimistic expectations investment demand falls short of full employment savings consequently income adjusts to bring savings into line with investment resulting in unemployment and or excess capacity classical theory as reconstituted in postwar textbooks counters that investment and full employment savings are equilibrated by adjustment of the interest rate thus current output will obtain its optimal level at full employment and full capacity despite pessimistic expectations of future demand the only way this can fail is if some type of wage or price rigidity prevents the stock of real money balances from accommodating the demand for them at the fullemployment interest rate fig i illustrates the keynesian and classical views in a traditional loanable funds diagram here the full employment supply of savingsis given by s investment demand under optimistic expectations is i and the full employment interest factor unity plus the interest rate is r pessimistic expectations shift investment demand to it reducing the full employment interest factor to r in the classical model or reducing employment income and hence savings to s in the simplest keynesian model general equilibrium theory provides a third view on interest rate determination here competition over prospective profits leads the interest rate to adjust to the return on capital adjusted for risk so prospective profits are eliminated provided capital is mobile to reconcile this view with either the keynesian or classical view depicted in fig i it should first be noted that the general equilibrium model of interest rates is a multi period model while the textbook models of fig i are not they are one period models with views of the future imprecisely summarised in the investment demand function furthermore in those models views of the future are not analysed for prospective profits or their consequences graphically the inframarginal triangle between the investment demand curve and the interest rate line is not analysed or explained how can such prospective profits survive competitive activities the present paper proposes to examine this issue in as simple a model as possible the key simplifications are as follows first the simplest multi period

natural monopoly in portuguese telecommunications the purpose of this paper is to show an empirical test of subadditivity based on a sufficient condition namely transray convexity coupled with global economies of scale which has not been commonly used in the literature we use this sufficient condition to test the hypothesis of subadditivity of the cost function in the largest portuguese telecommunications firm ctt and find that the market for telecommunications services in portugal was a natural monopoly in the period analysed

on trust as a commodity and on the grammar of trust abstract i look at trust in the light of two constructions taken from economic science general competitive analysis and the theory of games i draw on baier s anti contractarian perspective as well as on one informed by wittgenstein s writings the former focuses on relations between inherently unequal and asymmetrical individuals while the latter draws on and revolves around the imperative in the philosophical investigations let the use teach you the meaning p 212 also p 220 i try to spell out how the choice of language has epistemological implications for an analysis of trust for the trustworthiness of the scientific constructions i use for analyzing trust and thereby more generally for defining ourselves and our form of life

exports inflation and growth abstract this article seeks to identify some of the main determinants of exports and economic growth in cross sectional data from the world bank covering 160 countries for 1985 94 first the linkages between the propensity to export and population per capita income agriculture primary exports and inflation are studied by statistical methods then the relationship between economic growth and some of the above mentioned determinants of exports as well as investment are scrutinized the same way the main conclusion is that in the period under review high inflation and an abundance of natural resources tended to be associated with low exports and slow growth

social welfare loss due to second best pricing an application to the portuguese telecommunications the telecommunications industry is usually characterized by low marginal costs and significant fixed costs which are the conditions for the inefficiency of marginal cost pricing in such cases theory postulates that optimal pricing is obtained by maximizing welfare subject to a restriction of viability of the firm the second best pricing scheme the possible welfare losses due to second best pricing varies according to the values of marginal costs prices and demand elasticities this paper analyses to what extent the second best pricing has been achieved in the portuguese telecommunications firm ctt over the period 1950 150 1984 as well as the magnitude of the price cost margins and welfare losses created we obtained empirical evidence of the presence of economies of scale a welfare loss estimate of 1 of the telecommunications receipts and a result that price was 40 greater than marginal cost we concluded that price regulation and public ownership of the firm did not seriously affect social welfar

the effects of increased copyright protection an analytic approach previous authors who have considered partially nonexcludable goods have claimed that an increase in copyright protection will have the following two effects on social welfare first it will decrease the social welfare loss due to underproduction second it will increase the social welfare loss due to underutilization in this paper we investigate these claims in a formal setting by analyzing a model in which consumers vary only in terms of their costs of obtaining a reproduction our analysis provides partial support to the first claim of these previous authors while giving little or no support to the second claim

fiscal faux pas an analysis of the revenue implications of trade liberalization abstract this paper examines the argument that trade liberalization depresses tax revenue gdp ratios in developing countries this occurs because the structural characteristics associated with developing countries limit their ability to make the transition from trade to domestic taxes using a panel of 80 developing and industrialized countries over 1970 98 the econometric analysis carried out employs a fixed effects regression framework to examine the evidence the results indicate that low income and upper middle income countries have experienced declining tax revenues as a result of falling income and trade tax revenues and that structural characteristics have been significant in explaining the decline

the impact of corruption on investment predictability matters abstract this paper argues that it is not only level of corruption that affects investment but also the nature of corruption corruption regimes that are more predictable in the sense that those seeking favors from government do obtain those favors have less negative impact on investment than those that are less predictable using the data collected by world bank in preparing the world development report of 1997 we provide empirical support for the conjecture

determinants of the u s wheat producer support price do presidential elections matter the paper s focus is on the determinants of the u s wheat producer support price the results of the time series analysis suggest that this price is largely determined by the previous price the expected u s share in world exports and expected program costs presidential elections also influence u s wheat price policies all other things being equal the support price tends to be lower in election years than in other years this suggests that small interest groups relative political economic power may be less pronounced in election years if they do not succeed in positioning themselves on the political economic market such that they contain the potentially decisive voter

how to avoid transferring a valuable asset many mechanisms such as auctions efficiently allocate an asset to the firm which values it most highly but sometimes the asset s owner may benefit from the transfer only if the asset is not too valuable to potential buyers in this setting we examine the efficiency of mechanisms when the potential buyers have private information about the asset s value we show that rent seeking and lobbying rather than merely wasting resources can lead to allocations which are close to efficient

optimal pricing of the portuguese telephone service a first attempt is made at finding the optimal two part tariff for portugese telephone service a theoretical model of consumer demand is presented and the two part tariff which maximizes social welfare is derived the model is then calibrated using portugese data and previous econometric studies the optimal long run two part tariff consists of an access charge that is close to twice the marginal cost of access and a usage charge 25 above the marginal cost of use the level of the optimal two part tariff depends mainly on the marginal cost of taxation and on an index of aversion to inequality the structure of the optimal two part tariff depends mainly on the ratio between the marginal consumer s usage level and the average usage level although the cost estimates are very tentative the results suggest that the 1986 usage charge was greater than optimum no similar conclusion can be drawn with respect to the acces charge

rent seeking in a market with morality solving a puzzle about corporate social responsibility rent seeking by lobbying for government favors is generally thought to be wasteful in view of this wastefulness it is puzzling that rent seeking by corporations has not been criticized as a failure to be socially responsible or even as an unethical business practice this article examines the compatibility of rent seeking with corporate social responsibility by utilizing thomas dunfee s idea of a marketplace with morality this idea is useful for solving this puzzle because in considering whether rent seeking is compatible with corporate social responsibility it is necessary first to define rent seeking which this article argues is a normative concept and second to find some principled way of identifying rent seeking behavior it also solves the puzzle about rent seeking by revealing that the concept of rent seeking itself is of little use in determining whether certain conduct is or is not socially responsible since rent seeking activity cannot be identified without first evaluating which activity is rent seeking

looking at the cost side of monopoly welfare loss under oligopoly is defined as that part of consumer surplus which is lost and not regained by higher profits in a model with asymmetric firms this implies that the total welfare loss consists of the deadweight loss triangle plus a cost side inefficiency effect due to the fact that in imperfect markets not all firms utilize the lowest cost technique using a flexible cv model we calculate these effects empirically for two relatively homogeneous industries pulp paper and cement the deadweight loss triangles are shown to be smaller than the cost difference effect the staircase for these industries

historical legacies a model linking africa s past to its current underdevelopment abstract recent studies have found evidence linking africa s current under development to colonial rule and the slave trade given that these events ended long ago why do they continue to matter today i develop a model exhibiting path dependence which provides one explanation for why these past events may have lasting impacts the model has multiple equilibria one equilibrium with secure property rights and a high level of production and others with insecure property rights and low levels of production i show that external extraction when severe enough causes a society initially in the high production equilibrium to move to a low production equilibrium because of the stability of low production equilibria the society remains trapped in this suboptimal equilibrium even after the period of external extraction ends the model provides one explanation why africa s past events continue to matter today

do neoliberal policies deter political corruption this article probes the relationship between neoliberal economic poli cies and political corruption focusing in particular on the impact of trade and invest ment policies regulatory policy and the overall size of the public sector on corruption using a large cross national data set from the mid to late 1990s we test the neolib eral hypotheses that market oriented economic policies are associated with lower lev els of political corruption and state intervention in the economy with higher levels consistent with the neoliberal argument we find that open trade and investment pol icies and low effective regulatory burdens do correlate with lower levels of political corruption however we find no consistent relationship between the aggregate size of the public sector and political corruption while the neoliberal hypothesis on polit ical corruption has initial empirical support its lessons cannot be applied wholesale market oriented states may be less corrupt but interventionist states as measured by public spending are not necessarily more corrupt

does foreign aid promote the expansion of government building on the literature on public finance i seek to advance our understanding of variations in government size by exploring the impact of official development assistance on fiscal policy i hypothesize that foreign aid operates in accordance with the flypaper effect systematically generating incentives and opportunities for the expansion of government spending results from a time series cross sectional regression analysis of growth in government spending over the 1970 99 time period are consistent with the hypothesis for middle and lower income nations aid represents an important determinant of government expansion looking at the tax and revenue side of the equation however reveals a more perverse pattern of response aid promotes not only increased spending but also reduced revenue generation the results have important implications from both a theoretical and policy perspective inter alia they point to the potentially self defeating nature of efforts to promote market oriented programs of state retrenchment via development assistance as well as to the importance of incorporating international transfers into future research on government spending

dynamics of pro market institutions and firm performance we analyze how pro market institutions affect firm performance in emerging markets integrating transaction costs and signaling theory we advance three arguments first we separate four dynamic components of pro market institutions intensifying and fading pro market reforms and intensifying and fading pro market reversals second we propose an asymmetric dynamic view whereby not only intensifying reforms but also fading reversals improve firm performance while not only fading reforms but also intensifying reversals reduce performance finally we argue that more efficient firms perform better under each of the dynamics we test these arguments on a sample of 1092 firms from 34 emerging markets during 1998 2011

directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities this paper propses directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities as a general concept that embraces a wide range of recently analyzed economic activities including the subset of rent seeking activities considered by krueger it then proceeds to provide a synthesis and generalization of the welfare theoretic analysis of such activities by developing a fourfold categorization of cases depending on the levels of distortions before and after the dup activity thus a unification and overview of the subject are achieved

does foreign aid distort incentives and hurt growth theory and evidence from 75 aid recipient countries foreign aid transfers can distort individual incentives and hence hurt growth by encouraging rent seeking as opposed to productive activities we construct a model of a growing small open economy that distinguishes two effects from foreign transfers i a direct positive effect as higher transfers allow the financing of infrastructure ii an indirect negative effect as higher transfers induce rent seeking competition by self interested individuals in this framework the growth impact of aid is examined jointly with the determination of rent seeking behavior we test the main predictions of the model for a cross section of 75 aid recipient countries there is evidence that aid has a direct positive effect on growth which is however significantly mitigated by the adverse indirect effects of associated rent seeking activities this is especially the case in recipient countries with relatively large public sectors

rural urban wage differential rent seeking and a justification for free trade abstract in the well known model of rural urban wage differentials analyzed by e e hagen quart j econom 72 496 514 1958 among others free trade was shown to be inferior to autarky the present paper demonstrates that if rents implicit in the wage differential are dissipated via rent seeking activities the case for free trade can be fully restored the reason for the reversal of the orthodox policy intuition is that when rents are dissipated market prices adequately reflect social opportunity costs of production despite the presence of a wage distortion

university admission requirements as rent seeking the paper argues that admission requirements into public universities are best viewed as rent seeking by several groups in contrast to the conventional rationing rationale the rents are principally nonfinancial for some of the groups the paper concludes by showing why admission requirements are not set too high

learning adjustment and economic development transforming firms the state and associations in chile abstract this article views learning processes as key to successful economic adjustment it discusses results of research conducted in chile focused on the agroindustry and footwear sectors it identifies specific problems that large and small firms face to upgrade production and stresses the limits of focusing exclusively on market reforms for achieving growth the article discusses how institutions reshape to facilitate learning and improve performance in chile particularly the relations between firms the reorientation of trade associations and the state s role as facilitator of collective learning processes

the competition for rationed resources abstract the paper considers a model in which firms face an output target and can purchase the input on two dates on the first date unlimited purchases are possible but a carrying cost has to be paid on the second date the input is rationed but by spending specialized managerial resources the firm can influence the rationing density to its own advantage it also faces a quadratic penalty for missing the target and is assumed to minimize expected net costs in an n firm industry a cournot nash equilibrium in expenditures on the specialized managerial labor is defined and the comparative statics of the model are analyzed we also find that under collusion the firms expected costs the total expenditure on the otherwise unproductive managerial labor and the variance of the output are smaller than in the cournot nash equilibrium this provides an insight into why economic planners have tended to prefer to deal with a few very large firms rather than many small ones

estimating the performance effects of business groups in emerging markets business groups confederations of legally independent firms are ubiquitous in emerging economies yet very little is known about their effects on the performance of affiliated firms we conceive of business groups as responses to market failures and high transaction costs in doing so we develop hypotheses about the effects of group affiliation on firm profitability affiliation could either boost or depress firm profitability and members of a group are likely to earn rates of return similar to other members of the same group using a unique data set compiled largely from local sources we test for these effects in 14 emerging markets argentina brazil chile india indonesia israel mexico peru the philippines south africa south korea taiwan thailand and turkey we find evidence that business groups indeed affect the broad patterns of economic performance in 12 of the markets we examine group affiliation appears to have as profound an effect on profitability as does industry membership yet strategy scholars have a much clearer grasp of industries than of groups moreover membership in a group raises the profitability of the average group member in several of the markets we examine this runs contrary to the wisdom conventional in advanced economies that unrelated diversification depresses profitability overall our findings suggest that the roots of sustained differences in profitability may vary across institutional contexts conclusions drawn in one context may well not apply to another copyright 2001 john wiley sons ltd

a new paradigm for policy reform and economic development throughout much of the world significant institutional changes are in the air wind and water evidence is accumulating that democracy has won the political battle and that markets have won the economic battle some serious scholars have even argued that the history of thought about first principles including those governing political and social organizations has come to an end fukuyama for those who hold this view hegel was simply too early in forecasting the end of the evolution of thought about such first principles nearly two centuries ago the entire marxian experiment was nothing more than a 150 year detour which corroborated hegel s view that the end of history coincided with the emergence of liberal democratic states following the french and american revolutions regardless of whether the history of ideology is over a new consensus on economic political and civil freedoms has emerged this consensus means more than simply adjusting macroeconomic policy achieving stability and selling off a few government owned enterprises in an attempt to set developing countries on a path toward broad based economic growth instead it means creating a vision of an open economy underpinned by an open polity identifying and removing the obstacles to economic participation obstacles that lock the ordinary citizen out of the game enhancing the availability and utility of information resources by shaping incentives and helping to establish the basic rules of social transactions encouraging more efficient organization of economic activity whether by market hierarchy or hybrid modes williamson in ways that may lead to fundamental restructuring of an economy and fostering institutional frameworks that expand the role of human choice and promote the full panoply of entrepreneurial energies

cooperative lobbying and endogenous trade policy this paper considers trade policies in a small open economy in which two influential interest groups lobby the government since competitive lobbying leads to excessive rent seeking expenditures the lobbies have an incentive to cooperate the outcome of cooperative lobbying is characterized in terms of lobbying and bargaining power of the two groups two important results are derived first if the power of competing interest groups is balanced then cooperation leads to free trade second if it is unbalanced cooperation may on the contrary increase protection

rent seeking market structure and growth we study the role of productive and unproductive entrepreneurship in economic growth in a setting where firms compete in both economic and political markets specifically firms compete for market share through cost reducing technological innovation and they vie for influence over government transfer policy through rent seeking activities we find that rent seeking affects growth in two ways it allows firms to ignore economic competition leading to less innovation and it alters the number of firms that are supported in equilibrium the former effect is negative while the latter is ambiguous we show how these effects depend on various characteristics of economic and political markets

controls and the intersectoral terms of trade the indian case sectors the indian economy is substantially insulated from outside market forces and the direction of movement of the intersectoral terms of trade has therefore been regarded as having special policy importance industry is equated with the urban modern sector agriculture with the rural traditional sector while the debate on the north south terms of trade following singer i 950 and prebisch i 964 has prompted discussion of international trade arrangements between developing and developed economies the debate on the intersectoral trade seems to have played a comparable role in india 2 if growth as with singerprebisch causes a deterioration in the terms of trade of the traditional sector then policy measures to offset the associated redistributive effects are seen in india as justified these can take the form of subsidies to agriculture maintenance of the current tax free status of agriculture and other measures equally since extensive redistribution through tax transfer schemes is administratively infeasible an improvement in the agricultural industrial terms of trade in favour of agriculture is often seen as a substitute for other redistributive measures poverty is concentrated in rural areas and manipulating the terms of trade in favour of agriculture through price controls subsidies and the like is a widely supported policy stance in this paper we argue that existing statistical studies of the intersectoral terms of trade in india are misleading since they typically focus on the terms of trade at controlled prices price and other controls in india are so extensive that black market rather than controlled prices should clearly enter any assessment of changes in the intersectoral terms of trade we also argue that the problem with these studies is analytically deeper than simply whether black market or controlled drices should be used because of

contestable markets an uprising in the theory of industry structure presents a transcript of the presidential address delivered at the 94th meeting of the american economic association on december 29 1981 discussion of developments in the theory of industry structure welfare attributes of contestable markets behavior characteristics of oligopoly equilibrium intertemporal vulnerability to inefficient entry ebsco

import competition international factor mobility and lobbying responses the schumpeterian industry case abstract this paper analyzes the different responses of economic agents to import competition in seeking policy intervention economic agents are divided into three groups capitalists workers and the government the following output restoring policies are considered protection capital importation labour importation and technology importation the paper concentrates on capital intensive technologically progressive industries using both the heckscher ohlin samuelson and the jones neary factor specific models

the empirical measurement of rent seeking costs this survey focuses on the efforts carried out mainly by public choice scholars to measure the social cost of rent seeking the concept introduced by gordon tullock in 1967 and coined by anne krueger in 1974 is well known and accepted by the profession but its empirical measurement has fallen behind with respect to its theoretical formulation an often criticized lack in the literature although there are good general surveys none has specifically focused on reviewing the empirical efforts made to measure the phenomenon the purpose of this paper is to provide such a survey it could be said that the rent seeking concept has been fully integrated into economic jargon it is commonly used when some agent seeks to obtain an artificial transfer usually from government and covers all the actions efforts or expenses that the agent has to carry out to obtain the prize the key issue however is the possible social waste that arises in these situations the empirical efforts to measure such waste constitute the main purpose of this survey the concept of rent seeking was introduced by tullock 1967 although the term was first coined by krueger 1974 in a paper not related to the former in a recent paper tullock himself wrote of the history of the concept and the intellectual context within which it arose tullock 2003 starting with the pioneering work by harberger 1954 several studies were conducted during the 1950s in which the calculation of the social cost of monopolies and tariffs always gave the result of very modest figures the first response to these results was made by leibenstein 1966 and his x efficiency which refers to a hypothetical loss in efficiency due to the absence of competition shortly after leibenstein s paper appeared tullock argued that the deadweight costs of monopoly and tariffs understate the true social cost because the expenditures made to capture related rents have to be included so rectangles as well as harberger s triangles have to be included in the calculations let us see this argument once more figure 1 depicts the iconic tullock graphic analysis of rent seeking it represents the demand schedule d for a monopolized good where pm is the monopoly

externalities in economies with imperfect information and incomplete markets this paper presents a simple general framework for analyzing externalities in economies with incomplete markets and imperfect infonnation by identifying the pecuniary effects of these externalities that net out the paper simplifies the problem of determining when tax interventions are pareto improving the approach indicates that such tax interventions almost always exist and that equilibria in situations of imperfect information are rarely constrained pareto optima it can also lead to simple tests based on readily observable indicators of the efficacy of particular tax policies in situations involving adverse selection signaling moral hazard incomplete contingent claims markets and queue rationing equilibria traditional discussions of externalities have emphasized the distinction between technological externalities in which the action of one individual or firm directly affects the utility or profit ofanother and pecuniary externalities in which one individual s or firm s actions affect another only through effects on prices while the presence of technological externalities imply in general that a competitive equilibrium may not be pareto efficient pecuniary externalities hy themselves are not a source of inefficiency the fact that prices change has of course important consequences there are both distributional and allocational effects but the distribution effects net out gains for example hy firms whose prices increase are precisely offset by losses e g to individuals who must pay higher prices and there are no welfare losses from the allocation effects as long as the price changes involved are small if firms are maximizing profits and individuals are maximizing utility both facing prices that correctly refiect opportunity costs then standard envelope theorem arguments imply that changes in profits or utility induced by changes in allocations resulting from any small change in prices are negligible

distributive justice corruption and entrepreneurial behavior this article introduces equity theory to the economic growth literature to examine whether a relationship exists between perceptions of distributive justice and the productivity of entrepreneurial behavior using survey responses from 317 entrepreneurs in india we find that productive entrepreneurship is positively related to distributive justice perceptions but negatively related to perceptions that corruption is pervasive in contrast nonproductive forms of entrepreneurship are negatively related to distributive justice but positively related to corruption unexpectedly the findings also show that corruption mediates the relationship between distributive justice and legal entrepreneurial behavior while distributive justice mediates the relationship between corruption and illegal entrepreneurial behavior we conclude with a discussion of the study s findings and their implications for entrepreneurship and economic growth

the economics of special interest politics the case of the tariff this paper investigates the interaction of politicians and special interest lobbies the goal is to model the equilibrium levels of redistributive policies such as taxes subsidies tariffs and regulatory decisions the model is applied throughout to the setting of tariffs by contributing to political campaigns special interest lobbies generate economic returns higher tariffs generate revenue for import competing industries through higher product prices higher milk support prices raise dairy farm income and so forth the lobby invests to maximize these net economic returns in evaluating their chances of election politicians weigh the favorable effects of special interest money against the unfavorable association with the lobby and the social cost of the redistributive policy section i explores the lobby s problem it describes a formalization of mancur olson s discussion of the voluntary provision of public goods and optimal contributions by lobbies to political campaigns section ii describes determination of the equilibrium tariff positions of each politician in a political campaign

a policy preference function for government intervention in the u s wheat market this paper estimates a policy preference function that explains the government s choices of target prices government held wheat stocks and public wheat research funding the policy preference function depends on producers surplus consumers surplus and budget expenditures an important innovation in this paper is the inclusion of interactions between public research expenditures and other public policy variables results indicate that the government places a premium of 25 to 45 on the welfare of wheat producers of relative to budget expenditures while wheat consumers welfare is discounted as much as 50 relative to budget expenditures the purpose of this paper is to provide an explanation of government commodity programs stock accumulations and research expenditures in the u s wheat sector the explanation is based on a policy preference function ppf that depends on producers surplus consumers surplus and budget expenditures it is assumed that target prices reductions in or additions to government stocks and public research expenditures are chosen to maximize the policy preference function the central contribution of the paper is the estimation of a function that is consistent with the observed government interventions in the u s wheat market that is the paper explains the observed target prices government sales and public research expenditures as rational behavior by a government which seeks to maximize the estimated policy preference function the approach in this paper is based on the political interest group theories of peltzman and becker applications of these ideas to agriculture include rausser and freebairn s description of the beef industry gardner s 1985 analysis

corruption and microenterprises in russia abstract in russia compliance with the rules and regulations that govern almost all aspects of economic life has created a hostile environment for microenterprises more serious than the regulations per se however is the potential niche they create for opportunistic behavior by regulatory authorities in russia the regulatory state has created a corrupt cadre of government bureaucrats who frequently engage in rent seeking behavior while enforcing regulations firms are not uniformly affected by corruption however this paper shows empirical evidence of differential incidence of extortion based on firm and entrepreneurial characteristics corruption in russia is similar to a regressive tax and acts as a disincentive to innovation and growth it may induce technologically inefficient production decisions and can dilute economies of scale and scope

free trade and laissez faire has the wheel come full circle this paper notes that there is a need to get to a fourth stage in the evolution of the relationship of free trade to laissez faire going beyond the three stages identified in max cordon s magisterial book trade policy and economic welfare in the first stage free trade was a special case of the argument for laissez faire in the second stage many arguments for protection arose with various qualifications to the case of free trade and laissez faire in the third stage the link between free trade and laissez faire was broken and in the theory of domestic distortions it was noted that all arguments for protection except in the case of monopoly power in trade were second best arguments moreover it was possible to devise measures such as taxes and subsidies that reduced the distortion through government intervention but noting that government intervention itself carries with it problems of rent seeking and directly unproductive activities as well as the taking into the proper role of government laissez faire seems the best policy hence the need for a fourth stage in the evolution of free trade and laissez faire to link them together again

consumer s surplus without apology the purpose of this paper is to settle the controversy surrounding consumer s surplus and by so doing to validate its use as a tool of welfare economics i will show that observed consumer s surplus can be rigorously utilized to estimate the unobservable compensating and equivalent variations the correct theoretical measures of the welfare impact of changes in prices and income on an individual i derive precise upper and lower bounds on the percentage errors of approximating the compensating and equivalent variations with consumer s surplus these bounds can be explicitly calculated from observable demand data and it is clear that in most applications the error of approximation will be very small in fact the error will often be overshadowed by the errors involved in estimating the demand curve the results in no way depend upon arguments about the constancy of the marginal utility of income consequently this paper supplies specific empirical criteria which can replace the apologetic caveats frequently employed by those who presently apply consumer s surplus moreover the results imply that consumer s surplus is usually a very good approximation to the appropriate welfare measures to preview below i establish the validity of these rules of thumb for a

the design of rent seeking competitions committees preliminary and final contests the paper examines the common practice in multi contest rent seeking competitions where finalists are selected based on rent seekers efforts in a preliminary contest we find that for any single contest design rent seeking expenditures could be reduced by introducing a preliminary contest if the marginal returns to rent seeking effort in the preliminary contest is sufficiently low in addition to other reasons the paper argues that this may explain why such multi contest designs are common we argue that rent seeking expenditure in the preliminary stage represents the cost of reducing the number of contestants we also find that the practice of setting a higher quality standard in the final contest than the quality standard in the preliminary contest reduces rent seeking waste we derive an expression for the optimal number of finalists under certain conditions we find that the optimal number of finalists is directly proportional or equal to the square root of the number of potential contestants finally we show that whether rent seeking expenditures rise or fall when the rent is awarded by a committee instead of a single administrator depends on the sensitivity of the committee relative to that of the single administrator

stackelberg rent seeking in this paper i present a formal analysis of rent seeking games in which the players do not move simultaneously i consider rent seeking situations where the players are risk neutral and may value the prize differently the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in this stackelberg game provides several surprising and interesting results i extend the problem to deal with cases of in complete information concerning the value a player has for the politically contestable rent

x efficiency and technical efficiency efficiency measurement has become a very popular field in applied economics in recent years and with this interest there has been a large intellectual investment in refining the empirical methods available to researchers in the area in this paper we relate these developments to harvey leibenstein s original 1966 insight into the psychological ideas underlying the notion that economic agents may not achieve maximal efficiency in their productive decisions and behaviour of course it is always possible to argue that apparent inefficiency only arises from a failure of the observer to realise what it is that is being maximized however we evade this easy escape route into non falsifiable hypothesizing and instead take at face value the fact that too many empirical studies have come up with substantial measures of inefficiency for us to ignore its importance for normative economics

structure of public support for national agricultural research systems a political economy perspective abstract this paper initiates development of a set of stylized facts concerning the structure of public support for national agricultural research systems nars within a neoclassical political economy framework the aim is to place public funding of nars in the broader context of the overall level of direct government assistance to agriculture using a newly constructed data set on nars expenditures over the 1970 1985 period we observe a growing disparity in agricultural research intensity ratios which measure the level of public support for nars in relation to agricultural gross domestic production aggdp between low and high income countries this growing disparity appears to be driven by much larger increases in support for agricultural research by high income countries coupled with a significantly slower growth in the size of their agricultural sector despite the propensity of low and middle income countries to increase real support to agricultural research as per capita incomes rise the public agricultural expenditure ratio which measures public expenditures on agriculture relative to the size of the agricultural sector aggdp increases substantially public expenditures on agriculture were indexed on agricultural and non agricultural populations to give a rough indication of the increasing incentives for rural distributional coalitions to seek a redistribution of public expenditures in their favor a relative research expenditure rre ratio is developed which measures the proportion of total public expenditure on agriculture spent on agricultural research it provides an indication of the relative importance given to research on agriculture within the constraints imposed by overall public spending on agriculture in contrast to the agricultural research intensity ratios the rre ratios suggest that agricultural research appears to command as large a share of the public purse devoted to agriculture in low and middle income countries as it does in high income countries expectations derived from the neoclassical political economy literature that research may have fared relatively better in high compared with low income countries were not supported by the data

synchronizing export orientation with import substitution creating competitive indigenous high tech companies in china summary this paper examines how the synergy between china s domestic and the international market has affected its most competitive indigenous companies through case study in china s ict sectors in the 1990s the paper shows that when export upgrades and domestic market growth intersect in timing and sectors that is when they synchronize chinese companies found conditions most favorable to compete with foreign companies within the domestic market the synchronization has significant impact on sectors for both mature products and technologically advanced products it is thus necessary to reexamine the role of import substitution practices under the new context of globalization and in conjunction with exports

the welfare consequences of directly unproductive profit seeking dup lobbying activities price versus quantity distortions abstract this paper is a contribution to the growing literature on the theory of what bhagwati 1982 has christened the theory of dup activities these are activities that use up real resources in making profits i e income without producing directly or indirectly a good they result therefore in the contraction of the availability set defined on goods for one generic subset of such dup activities namely distortion triggered lobbying activities the paper establishes asymmetrical propositions on the possibility of such dup lobbying resulting in a paradoxical improvement of welfare

endangering the war on terror by the war on drugs the united states is currently engaged in two wars one of which is less than a decade old the other has lasted over a century the first the war on terror against islamist fundamentalists began with al qaeda s destruction of the world trade centre s twin towers on sept 11 2001 this led to the us invasion of afghanistan the defeat of the taliban and the dislocation of al qaeda s terrorist infrastructure with osama bin laden and his deputy al zawahari having to flee to the lawless badlands between pakistan and afghanistan with the creation of a democratically elected government under ahmad karzai it might have been thought that the war on terror in afghanistan had been won but as the taliban cum al qaeda scorpion had been squashed but not killed it is now remerging with the resurgence of the taliban and its continuing support for the refurbished al qaeda terrorist network in the southern provinces particularly in helmand of afghanistan this area also happens to be the major poppy growing area in afghanistan for conversion into opium and heroin in 2007 it provided 92 of the world s opium supply whose farm gate value was us 1 billion 1 it is this opium economy which is now as in the past providing the taliban with the money for arms and growing control over the southern opium growing provinces by offering farmers protection from the opium eradication programs spearheaded by the us as part of its war on drugs the first part of this paper

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

economic liberalization and the computer industry comparing outcomes in brazil and mexico abstract market liberalization has been carried out by many developing countries in the hopes of stimulating trade investment and technology transfer in order to analyze the impacts of liberalization on a specific industry sector this paper compares the experiences of brazil and mexico in liberalizing the computer industry in the 1990s the authors conclude that liberalization leads to lower prices and more rapid diffusion of computer use throughout the economy but at a cost to domestic computer firms who were harmed by foreign competition both countries saw an increase in computer production but mexico s production was mainly for export to the united states while brazil was producing for the domestic market the differences between outcomes in the two countries have been determined more by environmental factors than by the nature and pace of liberalization

optimal pricing of local telephone service although payment for nearly all other goods and services including toll long distance telephone calls increases with greater consumption nearly 90 percent of the residential telephone subscribers and more than half the business subscribers in the united states now pay a flat monthly rate for local calls see larry garfinkel recently however the telephone companies and regulatory commissions have been moving cautiously toward imposing usage charges for local telephone calls there is renewed interest in what is currently termed usage sensitive pricing t usp it is due to the combined forces of inflation increased local usage and competition from independent firms that sell telephone terminal equipment and supply private toll lines to business customers under usp the pricing of such services as telephone installation directory assistance and minutes of calling is based on incremental rather than average costs since world war ii technological advances have benefited long distance far more than local telephone calling development in microwave communications coaxial cable satellites and waveguides have dramatically lowered the costs of long distance transmission in contrast the costs of local service have moved upward since the late 1960 s at a rate not far below the general price index see at t 1975 faced with a continuing stream of requests for local telephone rate increases state regulatory commissions are finding the concept of tying prices to usage increasingly attractive at t and some of the independent telephone carriers are beginning to test usp plans in several cities with flat rate tariffs increases in local calling add to carrier costs but not to their revenues the local calling rate per subscriber has increased by an average of 2 percent for the past seven years at t s chairman has stated we are moving more and more in the direction of usage sensitive pricing see washington star news p a12 and according to newspaper accounts of at t management documents the bell system plans to phase out flat rate telephone service and begin charging for each local call in major metropolitan areas in 1978 80 see seattle postintelligencer pp 1 10 still regulatory commissions consumer groups and the carriers themselves remain cautious about requiring usage sensitive tariffs for all subscribers the prospective gains from prices more closely related to costs are at least partially offset by the added costs of metering equipment and billing most telephone subscribers prefer flat rates according to bell system marketing surveys see garfinkel p 28 and it is by no means clear which groups of subscribers will be helped and which harmed by such revisions in local tariff structures will the poor end up paying more because they use their phones more should different prices be charged for calls at different times of day on what bases should the monthly and per call rates be determined the purpose of this paper is to sort out some of the questions of economic efficiency and equity that arise when changes are considered in the methods of pricing local telephone services in section i i construct a department of economics the rand corporation and the international institute of management berlin this study was supported under a grant from the john and mary r markle foundation i am indebted to walter s baer for numerous contributions to this paper to s c littlechild and patricia munch and to the managing editor and a referee of this review for critical and constructive review of a draft i have benefited as well from the comments and suggestions of james h alleman stanley m besen william s comanor john m drew leland l johnson john a kay edward d lowry carl pavarini john rolph ralph turvey and chris witze bryant mori assisted with the computer programming see my 1976 paper for a more extensive version of this paper which also discusses optimal flat rate and optimal peak load tariffs

international capital markets and interest groups capital market integration has increased the scale and mobility of capital movements within and among nations to unprecedented levels integration is fairly recent frankel concludes from his review of the literature that barriers in the major world financial markets were sufficiently low that by 1989 financial markets could be viewed as being fully integrated the scale and mobility of capital flows among nations has numerous implications to currency values interest rates wealth and through current capital account linkages to relative product and factor prices capital flows that have real economic effects also affect the functioning of policy instruments and how effective they are in remunerating an interest group at the expense if any of others this paper provides insights into the process and linkages by which the integration of capital markets has altered economic policy through interest group pressures on government if economic policy is viewed as the outcome of interest groups seeking through the power of the state that which cannot be provided by the market alone then capital market adjustments that affect the return to policy instruments can also affect the returns to lobbying resources and hence the balance of political influence among the various groups 2 this type of explanation for economic policy has been forwarded under the rubric of models of rent seeking krueger 1974 3 the paper is organized as follows 4 selected historical evidence linking capital markets to pressures for legislation in the united states and other countries is briefly reviewed in some cases capital market adjustments have eased pressures for protection while in other cases adjustments either forced policy change because of a liquidity constraint or made unprofitable the lobbying for sustaining policy in face of these adjustments the discussion in the next section provides deeper insight into capital market lobbying linkages discussion focuses on the results from a simple model of rent seeking where government intervenes in markets and provides sector specific public goods

anti lobbying gains from international agreements abstract i argue that an important potential benefit of international agreements is to reduce wasteful rent seeking activities by domestic and foreign special interest groups through a reduction in policy discretion the presence of foreign lobbying generates a novel type of international externality by inviting wasteful rent seeking by foreign lobbies the presence of policy discretion itself generates a negative international externality i examine the potential anti lobbying effects of three salient types of international rules exact policy commitments policy bounds and non discrimination rules unlike exact policy commitments which remove policy discretion and hence shut down ex post lobbying policy bounds may invite ex post lobbying and hence may forego part or all of the potential anti lobbying gains i also find that policy bounds may lead to mixed strategy equilibria of the rent seeking game a non discrimination rule can reduce rent seeking by foreign lobbies by injecting a free rider problem in the strategic interaction between these lobbies and under some conditions can achieve all the potential anti foreign lobbying gains

optimal departures from marginal cost pricing focuses on departures from marginal cost pricing optimal allocation or resources level of tax revenue that will be collected by the government theorems developed for resource allocation ebsco

privatization and economic growth an empirical investigation from a sample of developing market economies this paper explores the economic determinants of privatization programmes and the macroeconomic impact of this institutional reform on the growth rate of the gdp a sample of thirty five developing market economies is considered over the 1988 92 period probit and tobit models are used to identify the determinants of successful privatization programmes then regressions are run where probabilities probit and expected values tobit are successively included as additional regressors beside the potential influence of other economic policy variables a significant positive effect is highlighted giving evidence of the importance of divestiture the economic effect is found to be stronger when this institutional reform took place in industry or infrastructure

unproductive accumulation in the usa a new analytical framework in this paper i offer an innovative analysis of unproductive accumulation in the united states economy from 1947 to 2011 i develop a new theoretical and empirical framework to analyze the accumulation of capital in its productive and unproductive forms i also develop a methodology to compute marxist categories predicated on the idea that the production of knowledge and information is an unproductive activity that relies on the creation of knowledge rents in particular i provide new empirical estimates to uncover the shifting balance between productive and unproductive forms of accumulation the accumulation pattern observed during the 1947 1979 phase that prioritized productive accumulation gave way after the 1980s to a contrasting pattern prioritizing unproductive accumulation unproductive activity has been growing at a fast pace in terms of incomes fixed assets and employment among all forms of unproductive activity my approach places special attention on how the production of knowledge and information has constituted a rising share of total unproductive income and capital stock additionally productive stagnation and rapid unproductive accumulation have been related to greater exploitation of productive workers and to widening income inequality

distortion triggered lobbying and welfare a contribution to the theory of directly unproductive profit seeking activities abstract the paper considers the normative implications of lobbying for non exclusive income generated by an exogenously specified policy intervention such lobbying activities are a subset of what bhagwati has termed directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities it is demonstrated that the welfare effects of lobbying triggered by a policy distortion depend critically on whether the direct impact of the policy constraint is on price or an quantity it is also shown that several standard comparative static welfare analyses of alternative policy distorted states are significantly affected once the policy intervention is assumed to be continuously accompanied by lobbying for the associated non exclusive income

habitual and occasional lobbyers in the u s steel industry an em algorithm pooling approach bernard yeung using u s steel firm data we find that lobbying for import protection appears to be habit forming to identify heterogeneity in lobbying behavior among firms we use an expectation maximization algorithm to sort our firms into groups with different propensities to lobby and estimate the determinants of lobbying in each group a two pool model emerges occasional lobbyers lobbying depends on their market performance and habitual lobbyers lobbying only depends on past lobbying the latter tends to be larger steel firms whose business is more focused in steel our evidence is consistent with dynamic economies of scale in protection seeking breeding protection dependent firms jel f13 1 introduction rent seeking activities plausibly have dynamic economies to scale past rent seeking experience should reduce the cost of further rent seeking and increase its return thus rent seekers may over time become more prone to further rent seeking and even become dependent on it given the large welfare losses theoretically associated with rent seeking e g bhagwati 1982 1988 and magee et al 1989 a better understanding of actual rent seeking behavior is required in particular empirical verification of the self sustaining nature of rent seeking is of fundamental importance lobbying for protection from import competition is a form of rent seeking this article uses data on lobbying for protection by firms in the steel industry in the 1970s and 1980s to show that a habit forming effect does exist in a preliminary investigation we pool all firm level data and find that past lobbying increases the current tendency to lobby however not all firms have the same propensity to lobby to allow heterogeneity among firms dependence on past lobbying we apply an expectation maximization em algorithm approach dempster et al 1977 to a lagged dummy model heckman 1982a 1982b this lets our firms sort themselves into groups according to the determinants of their lobbying activity our statistical results suggest that an acceptable division of our data is a division into two groups occasional lobbyers whose lobbying depends on the firm s market performance and habitual lobbyers whose lobbying is essentially unrelated to the firm s business situation and depends mainly on past lobbying firms that never lobby for protection end up in the first group greater firm size and greater focus in steel production are associated with increased lobbying in both groups but the influence is stronger for occasional lobbyers past sales growth and spending on modern equipment are associated with curtailed lobbying by occasional rent seekers but are unrelated to lobbying by habitual rent seekers changes in cash flow have no influence in either generally habitual lobbyers are larger firms whose business is more concentrated on steel they are naturally more inclined than occasional lobbyers to initiate lobbying however their lobbying appears to have become a habit divorced from their market pe rformance these results are consistent with the presence of economies of scale in rent seeking and with rent seeking being habit forming e g magee et al 1989 in the next section we describe the intensive lobbying for protection in the u s steel industry in the 1970s and 1980s we justify our contentions that lobbying for protection by steel firms in the sample period may be habit forming and that different groups of firms should have dissimilar propensities to lobby for protection in section iii we explain the em algorithm approach we explain the data in the fourth section and report our results in section v section vi concludes ii habitual and occasional lobbying in the u s steel industry in the united states domestic firms under import competition pressure often complain to the government about unfair foreign practice