rational heuristics expectations and behaviors in evolving economies with heterogeneous interacting agents we analyze the individual and macroeconomic impacts of heterogeneous expectations and action rules within an agent based model populated by heterogeneous interacting firms agents have to cope with a complex evolving economy characterized by deep uncertainty resulting from technical change imperfect information coordination hurdles and structural breaks in these circumstances we find that neither individual nor macroeconomic dynamics improve when agents replace myopic expectations with less naive learning rules our results suggest that fast and frugal robust heuristics may not be a second best option but rather rational responses in complex and changing macroeconomic environments jel c63 d8 e32 e6 o4

the real effects of liquidity during the financial crisis evidence from automobiles illiquidity in short term credit markets during the financial crisis might have severely curtailed the supply of nonbank consumer credit using a new data set linking every car sold in the united states to the credit supplier involved in each transaction we find that the collapse of the asset backed commercial paper market reduced the financing capacity of such nonbank lenders as captive leasing companies in the automobile industry as a result car sales in counties that traditionally depended on nonbank lenders declined sharply although other lenders increased their supply of credit the net aggregate effect of illiquidity on car sales is large and negative we conclude that the decline in auto sales during the financial crisis was caused in part by a credit supply shock driven by the illiquidity of the most important providers of consumer finance in the auto loan market these results also imply that interventions aimed at arresting illiquidity in short term credit markets might have helped contain the real effects of the crisis

a limited sample benchmark approach to assess and improve the performance of risk equalization models abstract a new method is proposed to assess and improve the performance of risk equalization models in competitive markets for individual health insurance where compensation is intended for variation in observed expenditures due to so called s ubsidy type risk factors but not for variation due to other so called n on subsidy type risk factors given the availability of a rich subsample of individuals for which normative expenditures ynorm can be accurately determined we make two contributions a any risk equalization scheme applied to the entire population yref should be evaluated through its performance in the subsample by comparing yref with ynorm not by comparing yref with observed expenditures y in the entire population as commonly done b conventional risk equalization schemes can be improved by the subsample regression of ynorm rather than y on the risk adjusters that are observable in the entire population this new method is illustrated by an application to the 2004 dutch risk equalization model

risk adjustment and prevention widespread integration of market based incentives into healthcare systems calls for and has elicited increasing adoption of risk adjustment by deterring selection risk adjustment helps to assure fair and efficient payments among health insurers or capitated provider groups however since conventional risk adjustment allocates funds among regions or insurers according to current population health status it does not reward indeed it penalizes preventive efforts that improve population health this prevention penalty of risk adjustment represents a hidden cost of unclear magnitude undermining provider incentives for health promotion we develop a theoretical model of selection and prevention demonstrating this problem with conventional risk adjustment and suggesting a simple alternative risk adjustment should be linked to pay for performance for prevention l integration generalisee d incitatifs mercantiles dans les systemes de soins de sante appelle et a engendre l adoption croissante d ajustements au risque en decourageant la selection l ajustement au risque aide a assurer des paiements justes et equitables entre les assureurs ou les groupes de fournisseurs finances par capitation cependant comme les ajustements conventionnels au risque allouent des fonds entre les regions ou les assureurs selon le statut sanitaire present de la population ils ne recompensent pas et meme penalisent les efforts de prevention qui ameliorent la sante des populations cette penalisation de la prevention dans les ajustements au risque represente un cout cache d une magnitude mal etablie qui mine l incitation des fournisseurs a s occuper de promotion de la sante on developpe un modele theorique de selection et de prevention mettant en lumiere ce probleme dans l utilisation de l ajustement au risque conventionnel et on suggere une solution de rechange ou l ajustement au risque est reliea une remuneration a la performance pour la prevention

bad times good credit banks limited knowledge about borrowers creditworthiness constitutes an important friction in credit markets is this friction deeper in recessions thereby contributing to cyclical swings in credit or is the friction reduced as bad times reveal information about firm quality we test these alternative hypotheses using internal ratings data from a large swedish cross border bank and credit scores from a credit bureau the ability to classify corporate borrowers by credit quality is greater during bad times and worse during good times soft and hard information measures both display countercyclical patterns our results suggest that information frictions in corporate credit markets are intrinsically countercyclical and not due to cyclical variation in monitoring effort the presence of countercyclical information frictions provides a rationale for countercyclical provisions or capital in banks to smooth credit cycles

competition between private and public schools vouchers and peer group effects a theoretical and computational model with tax financed tuition free public schools and competitive tuition financed private schools is developed students differ by ability and income achievement depends on own ability and on peers abilities equilibrium has a strict hierarchy of school qualities and two dimensional student sorting with stratification by ability and income in private schools high ability low income students receive tuition discounts while low ability high income students pay tuition premia tuition vouchers increase the relative size of the private sector and the extent of student sorting and benefit high ability students relative to low ability students

price and quality competition under adverse selection market organization and efficiency firms compete with prices and qualities in markets where consumers have heterogeneous preferences and cost characteristics consumers demand two goods which can be supplied jointly or separately by firms we consider two strategy regimes for firms uniform price quality pairs and screening price quality menus for each regime we compare the equilibria under integration each firm supplying both goods and separation each firm supplying one good integrating and separating markets change quality efficiency and welfare the theory illustrates phenomena such as the carveout of mental health and substance abuse coverage from general health insurance and creaming for low cost students in locales with school choices copyright 2003 by the rand corporation

credit market frictions and capital structure dynamics we study the implications of credit market frictions for the dynamics of corporate capital structure and the risk of default of corporations to do so we develop a dynamic capital structure model in which firms face uncertainty regarding their ability to raise funds in credit markets and have to search for investors when seeking to adjust their capital structure we provide a general analysis of shareholders dynamic financing and default decisions show when markov perfect equilibria in financing and default barrier strategies exist and when uniqueness can be achieved we then use the model to generate a number of novel testable implications relating credit market frictions to target leverage the pace and size of capital structure changes creditor turnover and the likelihood of default c 2014 elsevier inc all rights reserved

fiscal and monetary policies in complex evolving economies what is the most appropriate combination of fiscal and monetary policies in economies subject to banking crises and deep recessions we study this issue using an agent based model that is able to reproduce a wide array of macro and micro empirical regularities simulation results suggest that policy mixes associating unconstrained counter cyclical fiscal policy and monetary policy targeting employment is required to stabilise the economy we also show that discipline guided fiscal rules can be self defeating as they depress the economy without improving public finances finally we find that the effects of monetary and fiscal policies become sharper as the level of income inequality increases

monetary policy and regional availability of debt financing the relative availability of bond and bank financing should affect the firm s external financing and investment decisions we define a measure that proxies for the regional borrowing inflexibility to substitute between bank and bond financing debt inflexibility debt inflexibility tilts the firm s financial structure towards equity and reduces investment the impact is stronger during the period of tight monetary policy particularly for smaller firms and firms without banking relationships debt inflexibility increases the sensitivity of cash holdings to cash flows reduces the likelihood of dividend payment and makes the firm more likely to pay equity in mergers and acquisitions

sovereign stress and smes access to finance evidence from the ecb s safe survey abstract we study the effect of sovereign stress on smes capital structure using restricted access data from the european central bank we find that during the sovereign debt crisis and controlling for borrowers quality firms in stressed countries became more likely to be denied credit to be credit rationed and to face higher loan rates less creditworthy firms were not more likely to become credit constrained suggesting no flight to quality in lending we also find that in order to make up for the decline in bank credit firms in stressed countries began relying considerably more on retained earnings and government subsidies

what happened financial factors in the great recession abstract at the onset of the recent global financial crisis the workhorse macroeconomic models assumed frictionless financial markets these frameworks were thus not able to anticipate the crisis nor to analyze how the disruption of credit markets changed what initially appeared like a mild downturn into the great recession since that time an explosion of both theoretical and empirical research has investigated how the financial crisis emerged and how it was transmitted to the real sector the goal of this paper is to describe what we have learned from this new research and how it can be used to understand what happened during the great recession in the process we also present some new empirical work we argue that a complete description of the great recession must take account of the financial distress facing both households and banks and as the crisis unfolded nonfinancial firms as well exploiting both panel data and time series methods we analyze the contribution of the house price decline v

can chinese state enterprises perform like market entities productive efficiency in the chinese iron and steel industry as a consequence of economic reforms in china firms have ben affected by three essential changes first instead of surrendering all profits to the government firms now pay tax on their profits according to a contract between them and the government and retain the balance as their own controllable surplus second the central economic plan determines only part of firms production after fulfilling the command plan firms are allowed to adjust their production scale by the availability of inputs and the profitability of production third most consumer and investment goods have two prices a plan price and a market price as most of the plan prices are always lower than the market prices the latter play a basic role in determining firms profits after a decade of economic reforms the important question is can chinese state enterprises perform like market entities the analysis shows that chinese firms in transition domimic the production behaviour of market based efficiency oriented firms

much ado about two reconsidering retransformation and the two part model in health econometrics in health economics applications involving outcomes y and covariates x it is often the case that the central inferential problems of interest involve e y x and its associated partial effects or elasticities many such outcomes have two fundamental statistical properties y 0 and the outcome y 0 is observed with sufficient frequency that the zeros cannot be ignored econometrically this paper 1 describes circumstances where the standard two part model with homoskedastic retransformation will fail to provide consistent inferences about important policy parameters and 2 demonstrates some alternative approaches that are likely to prove helpful in applications

unfair inequalities in health and health care inequalities in health and health care are caused by different factors measuring unfair inequalities implies that a distinction is introduced between causal variables leading to ethically legitimate inequalities and causal variables leading to ethically illegitimate inequalities an example of the former could be life style choices an example of the latter is social background we show how to derive measures of unfair inequalities in health and in health care delivery from a structural model of health care and health production direct unfairness linked to the variations in medical expenditures and health in the hypothetical distribution in which all legitimate sources of variation are kept constant fairness gap linked to the differences between the actual distribution and the hypothetical distribution in which all illegitimate sources of variation have been removed these two approaches are related to the theory of fair allocation in general they lead to different results we propose to analyse the resulting distributions with the traditional apparatus of lorenz curves and inequality measures we compare our proposal to the more common approach using concentration curves and analyse the relationship with the methods of direct and indirect standardization we discuss how inequalities in health care can be integrated in an overall evaluation of social inequality

small and medium sized enterprise financing and securitization firm level evidence from the euro area this paper analyzes the impact of securitization on access to finance for small and medium sized enterprises smes in the euro area using firm level survey data on sme financing conditions we show that an increase in securitization issuance reduces the probability of smes facing credit constraints and decreases the costs of bank financing for nonconstrained firms our results reveal that in addition to the volume of securitization its type and quality matter for credit extension to smes the paper thus provides empirical support for recent initiatives to revive securitization in europe and for effective monetary policy transmission in the euro area jel d22 e44 e51 e58 g21

risk selection and the specification of the conventional risk adjustment formula we argue that a sharp distinction must be made between the empirical problem of finding the best equation for explaining medical expenditures and the normative question of deriving capitations which give health plans the appropriate incentives we propose a procedure taken from the social choice literature to go from the estimated equations to the capitations if the estimated equations are not additively separable in legitimate and illegitimate risk adjusters it is impossible to remove all incentives for risk selection while respecting at the same time a straightforward requirement of horizontal equity this has immediate implications for the choice of the functional form moreover in so far as the conventional risk adjustment literature only includes so called legitimate risk adjusters in the estimations its results may suffer from omitted variables bias we illustrate our general methodological points with empirical results obtained from a cross section of 321 111 belgian patients

direct versus indirect standardization in risk adjustment direct and indirect standardization procedures aim at comparing differences in health or in health care expenditures between subgroups of the population after controlling for observable morbidity differences there is a close analogy between this problem and the issue of risk adjustment in health insurance traditional methods of risk adjustment are analogous to indirect standardization they are equivalent to the so called conditional egalitarian mechanism in social choice in general they do not remove incentives for risk selection even if the effect of non morbidity variables is correctly taken into account a method of risk adjustment based on direct standardization does remove the incentives for risk selection but at the cost of violating a neutrality condition stating that insurers should receive the same premium subsidy for all members of the same risk group direct standardization is equivalent to the egalitarian equivalent or proportional mechanism in social choice the conflict between removing incentives for risk selection and neutrality is unavoidable if the health expenditure function is not additively separable in the morbidity and efficiency variables

the interaction between forms of insurance contract and types of technical change in medical care a simple three parameter description of medical technology is introduced to investigate the relationships between technical change welfare and type of insurance contract the value of a particular change in technology depends on the existing form of contract the marginal equilibrium expected utility to consumers of different types of technical change hinges on the manner in which the insurance arrangement is designed to mitigate moral hazard these results open the way for a positive model of the effects of insurance arrangements on the types of technology that are adopted and the effects of technical changes on the prevalent forms of insurance contract

why european banks are less profitable than u s banks a decomposition approach abstract the low profitability of european banks relative to their u s counterparts has recently raised concerns among policy makers and researchers this paper attempts to shed light on this issue by using the o donnell 2012 decomposition approach this approach enables us to decompose the relative profitability of european banks into an output input price index and a total factor productivity index with the former further decomposed into two price indexes and the latter further into four productivity and efficiency measures our results show that european banks profitability was not only weak but also deteriorated over time our further analysis shows that the decline in the output input price index was due to declines in relative lending rate and relative return on securities and an increase in funding costs while the decline in the productivity index was driven by declines in technical efficiency scale efficiency and residual mix efficiency

corporate debt structure and economic recoveries abstract this paper analyzes the business cycle behavior of the corporate debt structure and its interaction with economic recovery the debt structure is measured as the share of bonds in the total credit to non financial corporations for a quarterly panel of countries over the period 1989 2013 we first show that the substitution of loans for bonds in recoveries is a regular property of business cycles secondly we provide evidence that economies with high bond share and important bond loan substitution recover from the recessions faster this identified link between corporate debt structure and business cycles is robust to the inclusion of traditional factors which shape recessions and recovery such as the size and the quality of financial markets the occurrence of bank crisis the dynamics of credit and the distribution of firm size

reimbursing health plans and health providers efficiency in production versus selection the tradeoff between an insurer s or medical provider s incentives to select good risks and to produce efficiently is governed by the supply price analog to the demand price tradeoff between moral hazard and risk aversion under a variety of models the optimum supply price is a mixture of capitation and fee for service payments empirical literature shows that pure capitation payment leaves strong incentives for selection that are acted upon the presence of contracting costs in a rothschild stiglitz model means a limited pooling equilibrium can exist and that poor risks will not be at their preferred outcome

an empirical analysis of the determinants of corporate debt ownership structure i examine the relation between corporate debt ownership structure and several firm characteristics suggested by recent theory the results demonstrate the importance of monitoring and information costs the likelihood and costs of inefficient liquidation and borrowers incentives in affecting firms debt source preferences several theoretical predictions receive support while others do not the results also suggest important differences between bank and private non bank debt which contrasts with most theoretical models additionally i find evidence of systematic use of bank debt by firms with access to public debt suggesting the benefits attributed to bank debt in theoretical models remain important after firms gain access to public debt markets although different lenders appear to have different maturity preferences the results also suggest debt maturity and debt ownership decisions may be separable

can equity volatility explain the global loan pricing puzzle we examine whether equity volatility can explain the difference in syndicated corporate loan spreads paid by u s and european borrowers first documented by carey and nini 2007 we argue that ols estimates of the association between equity volatility and loan spreads are biased and inconsistent we suggest instrumental variables that potentially identify consistent estimates our instrumental variable results indicate that there is no statistically significant difference in loan spreads paid by u s and european borrowers and that ols estimates of the association between idiosyncratic equity volatility and corporate loan spreads are biased downward by about a factor of 5

the complementarity between risk adjustment and community rating distorting market outcomes to facilitate redistribution abstract we analyze optimal risk adjustment in competitive health insurance markets when insurers have better information on their customers risk profiles than the sponsor of health insurance in the optimal scheme the sponsor uses reinsurance to screen insurers with bad and good risks in order to lower premiums for enrollees with high expected healthcare costs we then explore the effects of adding a community rating requirement to complement this risk adjustment scheme with community rating insurers have incentives to distort contract generosities to cherry pick low cost consumers however the reduced generosity for low cost types makes screening through reinsurance easier allowing the sponsor to redistribute more when costs for reinsurance are low or the sponsor s bias towards high cost consumers is high community rating dominates risk rating

growth efficiency and convergence in china s state and collective industry in china as in the soviet union and eastern europe economic reform initiatives seek to increase productivity by introducing elements of market oriented policies and institutions into an economy formerly dominated by state planning efforts to evaluate the impact of reform of chinese industry have focused on the measurement of productivity change in state enterprises this study expands the prior framework of analysis in several directions our investigation of productivity trends is not limited to state enterprises but includes quantitative comparisons with china s fast growing collective industries which contributed 36 of overall industrial output in 1988 1 unlike previous studies our analysis works with gross rather than net output this permits us to investigate changes in the productivity of intermediate inputs which occupy a large portion of total costs in chinese industry as well as labor and capital to do this we develop a quasi frontier estimation procedure which seems appropriate for comparisons of total factor productivity based on chinese industrial data finally we offer a quantitative perspective on the extent to which reform efforts have moved industrial resource allocation toward patterns expected of a market system the analysis confirms our previous finding based on a restricted framework employing only labor fixed capital and net output that multifactor productivity in state industry has risen substantially during

financial frictions and employment during the great depression abstract we provide new evidence that a disruption in credit supply played a quantitatively significant role in the unprecedented contraction of employment during the great depression using a novel hand collected dataset of large industrial firms our identification strategy exploits preexisting variation in the need to raise external funds at a time when public bond markets essentially froze local bank failures inhibited firms ability to substitute public debt for private debt which exacerbated financial constraints we estimate a large and negative causal effect of financing frictions on firm employment we find that the lack of access to credit likely accounted for a substantial fraction of the aggregate decline in employment of large firms between 1928 and 1933

got rejected real effects of not getting a loan using a lender cutoff rule that generates plausibly exogenous variation in credit supply i investigate a new channel through which funding shocks are transmitted to the real economy based on a sample of more than 15 000 loan applications from small and medium sized enterprises i find that precautionary savings motives can aggravate real effects low liquidity firms whose loan applications were rejected increase cash holdings and cut noncash assets in excess of the requested loan amount these results point to the amplifying effect of precautionary savings motives in the transmission of credit supply shocks received december 11 2016 editorial decision february 22 2018 by editor philip strahan

cyclicality of credit supply firm level evidence abstract we quantify fluctuations in bank loan supply in the time series by studying firms substitution between loans and bonds using firm level data any firm that raises new debt must have a positive demand for external funds conditional on the issuance of new debt we interpret firms switching from loans to bonds as a contraction in bank credit supply we find strong evidence of this substitution at times that are characterized by tight lending standards depressed aggregate lending poor bank performance and tight monetary policy we show that this substitution behavior has strong predictive power for bank borrowing and investments by small firms

did financial frictions stifle r d investment in europe during the great recession abstract we investigate the role of financial frictions in r d spending in a large sample of european firms our identification strategy exploits the contraction in credit supply that followed the 2008 09 global financial crisis and 2012 euro area sovereign debt crisis together with differences in financial frictions across firms and industries to identify a causal effect of financial constraints on investment in innovation we show that firms that are more likely financially constrained in industries more dependent on external finance invest disproportionally less in r d during periods of tight credit supply smaller private firms with weaker balance sheets also have a lower share of r d in total investment suggesting r d drops more than total investment during these crisis episodes these results are robust to different proxies of financial constraints and fixed effects identification strategies

bank capital and lending relationships this paper investigates the mechanisms behind the matching of banks and firms in the loan market and the implications of this matching for lending relationships bank capital and the provision of credit i find that bank dependent firms borrow from well capitalized banks while firms with access to the bond market borrow from banks with less capital this matching of bank dependent firms with stable banks smooths cyclicality in aggregate credit provision and mitigates the effects of bank shocks on the real economy

do smes benefit from unconventional monetary policy and how microevidence from the eurozone we study the impact of the announcement of the european central bank s ecb s outright monetary transactions program on small firms access to finance using a matched firm bank data set from eight eurozone countries we find that following the announcement credit access improved relatively more for firms borrowing from banks with high balance sheet exposures to impaired sovereign debt with such firms less likely to be refused a loan or to be price rationed loan terms also improved as manifested by lengthening of loan maturities unconventional monetary policy has a positive impact on firms investment and profitability while its effect on firm innovation is weaker

externalities in economies with imperfect information and incomplete markets this paper presents a simple general framework for analyzing externalities in economies with incomplete markets and imperfect infonnation by identifying the pecuniary effects of these externalities that net out the paper simplifies the problem of determining when tax interventions are pareto improving the approach indicates that such tax interventions almost always exist and that equilibria in situations of imperfect information are rarely constrained pareto optima it can also lead to simple tests based on readily observable indicators of the efficacy of particular tax policies in situations involving adverse selection signaling moral hazard incomplete contingent claims markets and queue rationing equilibria traditional discussions of externalities have emphasized the distinction between technological externalities in which the action of one individual or firm directly affects the utility or profit ofanother and pecuniary externalities in which one individual s or firm s actions affect another only through effects on prices while the presence of technological externalities imply in general that a competitive equilibrium may not be pareto efficient pecuniary externalities hy themselves are not a source of inefficiency the fact that prices change has of course important consequences there are both distributional and allocational effects but the distribution effects net out gains for example hy firms whose prices increase are precisely offset by losses e g to individuals who must pay higher prices and there are no welfare losses from the allocation effects as long as the price changes involved are small if firms are maximizing profits and individuals are maximizing utility both facing prices that correctly refiect opportunity costs then standard envelope theorem arguments imply that changes in profits or utility induced by changes in allocations resulting from any small change in prices are negligible

business loans and the transmission of monetary policy we study the transmission mechanism of monetary policy through business loans and illustrate subtle aspects of its functioning that relate to the contractual characteristics and the borrower lender types of loans we show that the puzzling increase in business loans in response to monetary tightening documented before the great recession is largely driven by drawdowns from existing commitments at large banks spot loans also rise and take a considerable amount of time to adjust banks nonetheless do curtail credit supply by shortening maturities of new loans following the great recession the mechanism has worked differently with loan responses to monetary tightening displaying a significant downward shift

risk sharing as a supplement to imperfect capitation a tradeoff between selection and efficiency this paper describes forms of risk sharing between insurers and the regulator in a competitive individual health insurance market with imperfectly risk adjusted capitation payments risk sharing implies a reduction of an insurer s incentives for selection as well as for efficiency in a theoretical analysis we show how the optimal extent of risk sharing may depend on the weights the regulator assigns to these effects some countries employ outlier or proportional risk sharing as a supplement to demographic capitation payments our empirical results strongly suggest that other forms of risk sharing yield better tradeoffs between selection and efficiency

economic reform and allocative efficiency in china s state owned industry beginning in late 1978 the people s republic of china introduced sweeping reforms into its management of state owned industry before reform the allocation of labor capital and materials to industrial enterprises was carried out administratively at the central or regional level and output was typically sold to the state at controlled prices this planned system succeeded in channeling capital and labor into industry and raising industrial output but there is considerable evidence that allocative efficiency has been poor in this planned sector total factor productivity tfp was at best stagnant in chinese industry from 1957 to 1978 and may have actually declined over that period decisions made by the central committee of the chinese communist party at its third plenum in december 1978 led to the development of a reform program for the chinese economic system concrete plans for reform started to be announced by the state council in mid1979 the centerpiece of reform has been the devolution of economic control to the enterprise level in the agricultural sector this meant breaking up the communes and introducing the family responsibility system providing individual peasant families considerable freedom to choose inputs and outputs sell a large share of output on free markets and retain the profits agricultural output grew rapidly in the years following reform and there is a growing body of evidence that resource use has become more efficient in chinese agriculture 2 there have been analogous attempts to reform state owned industry in china which consists of 87 000 enterprises and accounts for three quarters of the country s industrial output the reforms have provided enterprises with more freedom in hiring or purchasing inputs including capital materials and to a lesser extent labor enterprises now have limited ability to alter their product line and introduce new

optimal debt structure and the number of creditors within an optimal contracting framework we analyze the optimal number of creditors a company borrows from we also analyze the optimal allocation of security interests among creditors and intercreditor voting rules that govern renegotiation of debt contracts the key to our analysis is the idea that these aspects of the debt structure affect the outcome of debt renegotiation following a default debt structures that lead to inefficient renegotiation are beneficial in that they deter default but they are also costly if default is beyond a manager s control the optimal debt structure balances these effects we characterize how the optimal debt structure depends on firm characteristics such as its technology its credit rating and the market for its assets

setting health plan premiums to ensure efficient quality in health care minimum variance optimal risk adjustment abstract risk adjustment refers to the practice of paying health plans a premium per person or per family based on a formula using risk adjusters such as age or gender and weights on those adjusters one role of risk adjustment is to make sure plans have an incentive to accept all potential enrollees another role at least as important in our view is to lead health plans to choose the efficient level of quality of care for the various services they offer most of the research and policy literature on risk adjustment focuses on the first problem this paper proposes a new way to calculate weights in a risk adjustment formula that contends with both problems for a given set of adjusters we identify the weights that minimize the variance in plan predictable health care costs that are not explained by risk adjustment addressing the access problem subject to the payments satisfying conditions for an optimal risk adjuster making sure plans provide the efficient quality we call the formula minimum variance optimal risk adjustment mvora

bank bias in europe effects on systemic risk and growth europe s financial structure has become strongly bank based far more so than in other economies we document that an increase in the size of the banking system relative to equity and private bond markets is associated with more systemic risk and lower economic growth particularly during housing market crises we argue that these two phenomena arise owing to an amplification mechanism by which banks overextend and misallocate credit when asset prices rise and ration it when they drop the paper concludes by discussing policy solutions to europe s bank bias which include reducing regulatory favouritism towards banks while simultaneously supporting the development of securities markets

did the technical efficiency of state enterprises improve with the same speed in all provinces in china the objectives of this study are to examine whether technical efficiency of china s state enterprises improved over time due to the impact of economic reforms and to examine whether the response rates varied significantly across provinces the results carry strong policy implications for future reforms the empirical results show that technical efficiency improved significantly due to economic reforms from 1986 to 1989 shanghai appears to have responded more quickly and consistently to economic reforms than other provinces over the period

the employment effects of credit market disruptions firm level evidence from the 2008 9 financial crisis this article investigates the effect of bank lending frictions on employment outcomes i construct a new data set that combines information on banking relationships and employment at 2 000 nonfinancial firms during the 2008 9 crisis the article first verifies empirically the importance of banking relationships which imply a cost to borrowers who switch lenders i then use the dispersion in lender health following the lehman crisis as a source of exogenous variation in the availability of credit to borrowers i find that credit matters firms that had precrisis relationships with less healthy lenders had a lower likelihood of obtaining a loan following the lehman bankruptcy paid a higher interest rate if they did borrow and reduced employment by more compared to precrisis clients of healthier lenders consistent with frictions deriving from asymmetric information the effects vary by firm type lender health has an economically and statistically significant effect on employment at small and medium firms but the data cannot reject the hypothesis of no effect at the largest or most transparent firms abstracting from general equilibrium effects i find that the withdrawal of credit accounts for between one third and one half of the employment decline at small and medium firms in the sample in the year

are banks really special new evidence from the fdic induced failure of healthy banks the fdic used cross guarantees in order to close 38 subsidiaries of first republicbank corporation in 1988 and 18 subsidiaries of first city bankcorporation in 1992 when lead banks from each of these texas based bank holding companies were declared insolvent i use this plausibly exogenous failure of otherwise healthy subsidiary banks as a natural experiment in order to study the impact of bank failure on local area real economic activity the resolution of these institutions was associated with a significant decline in failed bank lending that led to a permanent reduction in real county income of about 3 percent jel codes e5 g18 g33 keywords bank failures cross guarantee uniqueness of banks

paying for health insurance the trade off between competition and adverse selection we use data on health plan choices by employees of harvard university to compare the benefits of insurance competition with the costs of adverse selection moving to a voucher type system induced significant adverse selection with a welfare loss of 2 to 4 percent of baseline spending but increased competition reduced harvard s premiums by 5 to 8 percent the premium reductions came from insurer profits so while harvard was better off the net effect for society was only the adverse selection loss adverse selection can be minimized by adjusting voucher amounts for individual risk we discuss how such a system would work governments are increasingly turning to market forces as a way to limit the cost of social insurance traditionally social insurance programs were operated as nonmarket goods governments mandated participation in a central program collected revenues to finance the program and ran the insurance system there was no role for competition among suppliers in providing the basic benefit as the costs of social insurance have increased however the centralized model of social insurance is coming under increasing strain in the united states for example recent proposals have called for replacing the medicare program with a health care voucher for the elderly aaron and reischauer 1995 cutler 1996 the voucher would guarantee people a basic insurance plan but the plans would be privately run competition among plans would generate plan premiums and enrollments similarly longstanding proposals for social security reform have called for replacing the current system with a system of individual accounts where people would make saving investment and annuitization decisions on their own advisory council on social security 1996 feldstein 1996 the trend is not just domestic in the united kingdom the national health service has moved to encourage more competition in recent years with the establishment of hospital trusts that bid for patients and partially fixed payments to physicians

seniority and monopsony in the academic labor market workers with high seniority usually have higher wages than workers with low seniority and the same total labor marke t experience in contrast the results of this paper indicate that higher seniority is associated with lower salaries for university professors the author documents this finding for national surveys a nd individual institutions and explains it as due to monopsonistic discrimination by employers copyright 1993 by american economic association

the source of fluctuations in money evidence from trade credit abstract this paper tests the relative importance of technology shocks and financial shocks as sources of fluctuations in money the model extends the theory of king and plosser 1984 by recognizing that both money and trade credit provide transactions services under certain conditions the co movements between money and trade credit can reveal the nature of the underlying shocks the empirical results strongly suggest that shocks to the financial system account for most of the fluctuations in money in the long run and at business cycle frequencies on the other hand technology shocks appear to be more important at seasonal frequencies

optimal risk adjustment in markets with adverse selection an application to managed care it is well known that adverse selection causes distortions in contracts in markets with asymmetric information taxing inefficient contracts and subsidizing the efficient ones can improve market outcomes bruce c greenwald and joseph e stiglitz 1986 although regulators rarely seem to implement tax and subsidy schemes with adverse selection motives in mind contracts are often complex and incomplete and it is the inefficient elements of the contract that are difficult to verify and hence tax or subsidize this is precisely the reason that in health insurance markets rather than subsidizing contracts regulators and payers contend with adverse selection by taxing and subsidizing the price paid to insuring health plans on the basis of observable characteristics of the persons joining the plan a practice known as risk adjustment risk adjusted premiums are paid to managed care plans plans that ration care by management rather than by conventional approaches like coinsurance and deductibles and offer a bundle of characteristics quality access for many services that is fundamentally outside the scope of direct regulation selection related incentives threaten the efficiency and fairness of this organization of health insurance markets by inducing plans to distort the quality of the services they offer to discourage high cost persons from joining the plan as managed care becomes the predominant source of health care for residents of the united states and many other countries payers attempt to address this incentive by setting a risk adjusted price that pays more for more expensive enrollees as it is conventionally practiced risk adjustment sets prices for people proportional to their expected cost based on observable characteristics the federal medicare program for example has used age sex welfare status and county of residence adjusters to set prices to managed care plans to convey how what we term conventional risk adjustment works suppose age is the risk adjuster for a medicare population over 65 if it is determined that the 75to 84 year old population costs 20 percent more than the overall average in medicare the assumption in conventional risk adjustment is that the premium paid to plans for someone in this group should be 20 percent above the average we fundamentally disagree that this is the right way to think about and do risk adjustment

equity bonds and bank debt capital structure and financial market equilibrium under asymmetric information this paper proposes a model of financial markets and corporate finance with asymmetric information and no taxes where equity issues bank debt and bond financing coexist in equilibrium the relationship banking aspect of financial intermediation is emphasized firms turn to banks as a source of investment mainly because banks are good at helping them through times of financial distress this financial flexibility is costly since banks face costs of capital themselves which they attempt to minimize through securitization to avoid this intermediation cost firms may turn to bond or equity financing but bonds imply an inefficient liquidation cost and equity an informational dilution cost we show that in equilib rium the riskier firms prefer bank loans the safer ones tap the bond markets and the ones in between prefer to issue both equity and bonds this segmentation is broadly consistent with stylized facts

explaining and forecasting bank loans good times and crisis abstractthis article aims to develop a parsimonious model to explain and forecast bank loans to nonfinancial companies during calm periods as well as in situations of financial turmoil it focuses on the french context over a period including financial banking and sovereign debt crises theoretical views and intuitions led us to gauge the marginal informational content of a large set of leading indicators in var and vecm models and to investigate potential nonlinearity in credit dynamics in accordance with firms and banks balance sheet effects the growth rate of equity prices appears to be one of the most interesting leading indicator as well as a significant threshold variable for explaining regime switching however it appears difficult to accurately predict the right credit dynamics regimes a simple var model finally performs better

credit reallocation deleveraging and financial crises this paper studies how the process of reallocation of credit across firms behaves before and after financial crises applying the methodology typically used for measuring job reallocation we track credit reallocation across korean firms for over three decades 1980 2012 the credit boom preceding the 1997 crisis featured a slowdown of credit reallocation after the crisis and the associated reforms the creditless recovery deleveraging masked a dramatic intensification and increased procyclicality of credit reallocation the findings suggest that the intensification of reallocation was efficiency enhancing

the macroeconomics of shadow banking we propose a dynamic macroeconomic model of nancial intermediation in an environment where households demand liquid assets in contrast to the literature intermediaries can issue equity without any friction in normal times intermediaries maximize liquidity creation by levering up the collateral value of their assets a process we call shadow banking a rise in uncertainty causes investors to demand liquidity in bad states intermediaries respond by simultaneously deleveraging and substituting toward safe liabilities shadow banking eectively shuts down prices fall and investment plummets the model generates amplication via endogenous collateral runs as well as ight to quality eects the model s macroeconomic eects are consistent with a slow economic recovery even when and especially when intermediary capital is high we analyze the impact of several policy interventions in the areas of unconventional monetary policy and regulatory reform

identifying the risk taking channel of monetary transmission and the connection to economic activity abstract i use loan level data from the syndicated loan market in the u s to investigate how monetary policy affects banks sensitivity to risk using loan level data and banks sensitivity to risk enables me to identify the risk taking channel and disentangle it from other monetary channels i show that banks change their behavior toward risk following changes in monetary policy where loose monetary policy reduces banks sensitivity to risk i then provide evidence for the significant contribution of risk taking shocks and changes in banks risk taking behavior to economic outcomes and business cycle fluctuations the paper s primary contribution is in providing new loan level evidence for the existence of the risk taking channel in the u s as well as a possible link between the risk taking channel and business cycle fluctuations

collateral and the choice between bank debt and public debt this paper tests how collateral value affects a firm s choice between bank debt and public debt by considering the exogenous variation in the market value of a firm s real estate assets caused by fluctuations in local real estate prices using local land supply elasticities as an instrument for local real estate prices i estimate that a one standard deviation increase in collateral value causes bank debt as a fraction of total debt to increase by six percentage points this paper was accepted by wei jiang finance

the measurement and sources of technical inefficiency in the indonesian weaving industry production function models are estimated with a time series of cross section data on indonesian weaving establishments the sources of technical inefficiency are investigated three firm attributes are identified as being potentially related to firm efhciency tbey are firm ownership age and size the importance of these attributes as sources of inefficiency in the indonesian weaving industry is investigated and the implications of the find ings discussed

does the source of capital affect capital structure prior work on leverage implicitly assumes capital availability depends solely on firm characteristics however market frictions that make capital structure relevant may also be associated with a firm s source of capital examining this intuition we find firms that have access to the public bond markets as measured by having a debt rating have significantly more leverage although firms with a rating are fundamentally different these differences do not explain our findings even after controlling for firm characteristics that determine observed capital structure and instrumenting for the possible endogeneity of having a rating firms with access have 35 more debt copyright 2006 oxford university press

corporate debt structure and the financial crisis we present a dsge model where rms optimally choose among alternative instruments of external nance the model is used to explain the evolving composition of corporate debt during the nancial crisis of 2007 09 namely the observed shift from bank nance to bond nance despite the increasing cost of debt securities relative to bank loans we show that substitutability among instruments of external nance is important to shield the

a discrete choice model for large heterogeneous panels with interactive fixed effects with an application to the determinants of corporate bond issuance a discrete choice model for large heterogeneous panels with interactive fixed effects with an application to the determinants of corporate bond issuan

a model of the impact of reimbursement schemes on health plan choice flat capitation uniform prospective payments makes enrolling healthy enrollees profitable to health plans plans with relatively generous benefits may attract the sick and fail through a premium spiral we simulate a model of idealized managed competition to explore the effect on market performance of alternatives to flat capitation such as severity adjusted capitation and reduced supply side cost sharing in our model flat capitation causes severe market problems severity adjustment and to a lesser extent reduced supply side cost sharing improve market performance but outcomes are efficient only in cases in which people bear the marginal costs of their choices