should renewable energy policy be renewable political flexibility brings about trade offs for policy makers aiming to support the deployment of renewable energy sources res on the one hand it allows incorporating new information on ex ante uncertain benefits and costs of res policy on the other hand it may deter res investments this paper scrutinizes how these trade offs play out economically and politically when res policy makers choose the degree of flexibility as well as the instruments to implement flexibility the analysis builds on a theoretical framework distinguishing between flexibility by design and by adjustment it is complemented by a discussion of three case studies res support schemes in germany and the united kingdom and the eu emissions trading scheme theoretical as well as empirical results suggest that the politically chosen degree of flexibility by policy design may be sub optimally low in contrast flexibility by policy adjustment is often excessively high

a revelation scheme for allocating organizational resources abstract efficient resource allocation in a hierarchical organization frequently requires top management to obtain information from division managers but division managers may place personal interests above those of the organization and communicate distorted information designing simple and robust optimal game theoretic revelation schemes is difficult instead of making another attempt at this we analyze a project valuation scheme actually used by several us government agencies under certain environments the scheme encourages managers to truthfully reveal the relative benefits of alternative projects while some aspects of these environments do not have nice mathematical properties we argue that they may well represent better characterizations of the way managers actually view their situation

has consumption inequality mirrored income inequality we revisit to what extent the increase in income inequality since 1980 was mirrored by consumption inequality we do so by constructing an alternative measure of consumption expenditure using a demand system to correct for systematic measurement error in the consumer expenditure survey our estimation exploits the relative expenditure of high and low income households on luxuries versus necessities this double differencing corrects for measurement error that can vary over time by good and income we find consumption inequality tracked income inequality much more closely than estimated by direct responses on expenditures jel d31 d63 e21

house prices home equity based borrowing and the u s household leverage crisis us household leverage sharply increased in the years preceding the 2007 eco nomic recession the top panel of figure 1 shows the steady rise in household debt since 1975 which accelerated beginning in 2002 in just five years the household sector doubled its debt balance in comparison the contemporaneous increase in corporate debt was modest the middle panel shows that the increase in household debt from 2002 to 2007 translated into a striking rise in household leverage as mea sured by the debt to income ratio during the same time period corporate leverage declined the dramatic absolute and relative rise in us household leverage from 2002 to 2007 is unprecedented compared to the last 25 years one reason for the rapid expansion in household leverage during this period is that mortgage credit became more easily available to new home buyers mian and sufi 2009 strong house price appreciation from 2002 to 2006 however which may have been fueled by the availability of mortgage credit to a riskier set of new home buyers could also have had an important feedback effect on household lever age through existing homeowners given that 65 percent of us households already owned their primary residence before the acceleration in house prices the feedback from house prices to borrowing may be an important source of the rapid rise in household leverage that preceded the economic downturn our central goals in this study are to estimate how homeowner borrowing responded to the increase in house prices and to identify which homeowners responded most aggressively we examine this home equity based borrowing channel using a dataset consisting of anonymous individual credit files of a national consumer credit bureau agency we follow a random sample of over 74 000 us homeowners who owned their homes as of 1997 at an annual frequency from the end of 1997 until the end of 2008 the bottom panel of figure 1 plots the growth in debt of 1997 homeowners over time and shows that existing homeowners borrow significantly more debt as their house prices appreciate from 2002 to 2006 while the aggregate trend is suggestive

second best taxation as a game second best theory usually lies in the realm of normative analysis it focuses attention on the best solutions which still can be obtained in problems where constraints of various natures forbid the attainment of first best pareto optimal situations its central concern is the characterization of such second best solutions and a large part of the literature concentrates on the optimal design of taxes or of policies of public firms taking a second best problem we try in this paper to shift the emphasis from normative to positive considerations the solution we are interested in is not optimal with respect to some a priori given social welfare function embodying justice objectives but it is supposed to reflect the power of the different agents in a negotiation process clearly the conceptual tools required for such an analysis are to be found in game theory and it is actually a game theoretical approach that we follow here the model we are looking at is presented in section ii it formalizes one of the simplest second best problems that can be imagined we have a twogood economy with one private good and one public good agents have different wealth in private good and the public good is financed through a wealth tax this latter fiscal system is clearly not flexible enough to adjust contributions with marginal willingnesses to pay so that we actually face a second best situation there is one decision variable in the society the tax rate which determines the public good production about which the agents have conflicting desires to this problem we associate a game which provides a precise framework for the analysis of the power of the agents the positive outcomes of the negotiation process are supposed to belong to the core of this game sections iii and iv concentrate on the analysis of the core the results strongly contrast with those obtained in the classical studies of the core of 67 0022 053 l 81 040067 25 02 00 o

market shares financial constraints and pricing behaviour in the export market a structural dynamic model of price and quantity adjustment is estimated on time series data for exports and export prices two sources of dynamics are considered customer markets and preset prices as predicted by the customer market model the market share adjusts slowly after a change in the relative price and financial conditions affect prices prices are found to be sticky in the sense that they do not reflect the most recent information about costs and exchange rates a parsimoniously parameterized structural model explains about 90 of the variation in market share and the relative price

signalling with many signals this paper examines a market with asymmetric information where there are many signals available and where both the costs of signaling and the product value may depend on many privately known characteristics under a weak condition on the relationship between the marginal cost of increasing the signals and the product value a separating set exists whereby the value of every seller s product is inferred from the seller s optimal choice of signals the separating set constructed is pareto dominant and corresponds to recently proposed equilibrium notions in signaling and screening models copyright 1987 by the econometric society

essential facility financing and market structure abstract the paper analyzes the funding of an infrastructure project when an incumbent operator has private information about market profitability and the regulator does not have access to taxpayers money an open access policy raises welfare but may make the project non viable since funding must be provided by operators capital contributions we characterize the optimal market structure the regulator can ask the incumbent to bear a higher share of investment cost if the latter insists on an exclusive use yet the incumbent is willing to pay more for exclusivity the higher the demand that is precisely when competition yields the highest benefits at the optimum the incumbent s information is not used to determine market structure we further investigate the implications of this basic result in a dynamic context we show that the monopoly franchise policy is time consistent while an open access policy is not we also demonstrate that a threat of regulatory capture creates an open access presumption last we show that when the decision involves multiple projects monopoly segments should cross subsidize open access ones

why the subprime crisis is different a minskyian approach minsky s financial instability model suggests that financial crises can be resolved efficiently with lender of last resort and big government interventions the crisis that began in 2007 hereafter the 2007 crisis has been different it has been more profound and resistant to policy interventions this paper examines why our approach is to expand minsky s balance sheet approach in several ways first we incorporate two factors minsky missed because he built his model in the 1970s the impact of racial exclusion and u s cross border imbalances on u s financial dynamics in addition we draw out the analytical implications of the systematic differences between banks and non banks balance sheets minsky didn t do this but because of the transformation of banking after 1980 these differences have become deeply significant one key effect of so doing is to see that asset liability balances as well as cash flows are crucial in financial dynamics this paper concludes that the 2007 crisis has been so profound and unresponsive to policy intervention for several reasons banks no longer bear as well as originate credit risk banks made exploitative loans to minority borrowers and then generalized these loans as housing prices rose and subprime homeowners and structured investment vehicles became more leveraged than banks copyright the author 2009 published by oxford university press on behalf of the cambridge political economy society all rights reserved oxford university press

permanent versus interim regulations a game theoretic analysis abstract when a regulator anticipates learning about the benefits or costs of regulations over time questions can be raised about the appropriate regulatory policy this paper compares permanent and interim regulations in a setting with initially uncertain pollution damages a fixed capital input and costly enforcement the analysis shows that neither policy is first best conditions under which one policy dominates the other are identified with the help of a simulation the results indicate that permanent regulations may be preferable to interim regulations even when there is substantial uncertainty about damages

public versus regulated private enterprise a comparison of public enterprise with regulated private enterprise shows that the efficiencies of privatization stem from the insulation it brings from arbitrary political and self serving influences the critical insulation springs from the costliness of interventions when there is a regulatory compact in place that protects private property from expropriation while it also corrects for market failures that same insulation means that public enteprise is a better form of organization for activities that call for a response to public interest exigencies which cannot be specified in advance or reliably adjudicated after the fact the analysis emphasizes that an appropriate regulatory compact requires institutional support international organizations that seek to implement privatization should consider promoting credible regulatory commitment by requiring countries to execute explicit regulatory compacts and by bringing to bear the weight of their continuing relationship as a means of motivating the countries to conform to such strictures

a macroprudential approach to financial regulation many observers have argued that the regulatory framework in place prior to the global financial crisis was deficient because it was largely microprudential in nature a microprudential approach is one in which regulation is partial equilibrium in its conception and aimed at preventing the costly failure of individual financial institutions by contrast a macroprudential approach recognizes the importance of general equilibrium effects and seeks to safeguard the financial system as a whole in the aftermath of the crisis there seems to be agreement among both academics and policymakers that financial regulation needs to move in a macroprudential direction in this paper we offer a detailed vision for how a macroprudential regime might be designed our prescriptions follow from a specific theory of how modern financial crises unfold and why both an unregulated financial system as well as one based on capital rules that only apply to traditional banks is likely to be fragile we begin by identifying the key market failures at work why individual financial firms acting in their own interests deviate from what a social planner would have them do next we discuss a number of concrete steps to remedy these market failures we conclude the paper by comparing our proposals to recent regulatory reforms in the united states and to proposed global banking reforms

optimal strategic trade policy under asymmetric information abstract when cost is private information in the brander spencer model the home government is confronted by a decision of choosing between two policy options a menu of policies and a uniform policy the former induces separation and so reveals the cost information to the foreign competitors the latter helps the weak firm by concealing the cost information the main result from this study is that policy menu is preferred to uniform policy under cournot competition while the opposite occurs under bertrand competition

incentive regulatory policies the case of public transit systems in france we assess the empirical relevance of the new theory of regulation using a principal agent framework to study the regulatory schemes used in the french urban transport industry taking the current regulatory schemes as given the model of supply and demand provides estimates for the firms inefficiency the effort of managers and the cost of public funds it allows us to derive the first best and second best regulatory policies for each network and compare them with the actual situation in terms of welfare loss or gain fixed price policies lie between fully informed and uninformed second best schemes cost plus contracts are dominated by any type of second best contract from these results we may conjecture that fixed price contracts call for better informed regulators

regulation competition and asymmetric information abstract this article studies a model of regulation under asymmetric information when there exists a competitive fringe of unregulated alternative producers the correlation between the unknown cost parameters of the fringe and of the regulated firm allows the regulator to use the threat of entry by the fringe to reduce the informational cost of regulation the presence of the fringe is welfare enhancing the allocative distortions can be larger or smaller than those in the no fringe case and the optimal contract sometimes allows inefficient entry the optimal contract can exhibit non standard bunching phenomena and discontinuities

incentives and optimal size of local jurisdictions abstract a model of optimal territorial decentralization is presented in which smaller local governments have an informational advantage concerning public goods production costs and the central government has imperfect information on spillover effects induced by local projects the attention is focused on the optimal size of local entities and on the shape of transfer schedules from the central government to local jurisdictions the optimal territorial organization is a compromise between small jurisdictions so as to benefit from the geographical proximity effect on information and large entities in which spillover effects are more easily internalized by means of linear or non linear taxation schemes implemented by the centre

national vs european incentive policies bargaining information and coordination abstract we build a hierarchical model of contractual relationships under moral hazard to address issues about subsidiarity i e optimal de centralization of incentive industrial policies at the national level or at the european community level incentive policy is viewed as an incentive contract for producers who take unobservable decisions that have spillover effects across member states a community agency designs contracts for producers and contractual compensatory transfers between states on the basis of its observations then national regulators and their home producers negotiate according to a generalized nash bargaining a national contract that complements the community contracts given that national regulators will have access to more observations on the producers activities in this setting we show that full centralization is never optimal we give sufficient conditions for complete decentralization to be optimal and when both policies are present we characterize how they interact to provide incentives to producers

between scylla and charybdis income distribution consumer credit and business cycles we introduce a macroeconomic model with heterogeneous households and an aggregate banking sector in order to analyze the impact of rising income inequality under different credit scenarios growing inequality produces debt led consumption boom dynamics when the banking sector is characterized by a lower capital requirement and a higher willingness to lend instead when inequality rises but the banking sector is highly regulated aggregate demand and output fall our results also yield new insights on the appropriate fiscal policy reaction to stabilize the economy acting on the progressivity of the tax system seems more effective than a proactive countercyclical fiscal policy jel c63 d31 e62 g01

catching the agent on the wrong foot ex post choice of monitoring abstract in a principal agent model with multiple performance measures we show that the principal benefits by choosing ex post which variables will be monitored if it is too costly for one type of agent to mimic all performance measures expected from another type the principal can hope to catch the agent on the wrong foot if the agent tries to misrepresent his type for cases of small asymmetry of information the principal can implement the first best contract for more serious asymmetries of information the first best is not implementable then the low type may be required to overproduce which is in contrast to the traditional result of second best contracting we also obtain a ranking of monitoring instruments according to the frequency of their use

inequality leverage and crises the paper studies how high leverage and crises can arise as a result of changes in the income distribution empirically the periods 1920 1929 and 1983 2007 both exhibited a large increase in the income share of the rich a large increase in leverage for the remainder and an eventual financial and real crisis the paper presents a theoretical model where these features arise endogenously as a result of a shift in bargaining powers over incomes a financial crisis can reduce leverage if it is very large and not accompanied by a real contraction but restoration of the lower income group s bargaining power is more effective

export subsidies as an outcome of the management labor conspiracy a mercantilistic trade policy is often introduced as a tool to generate more jobs in some key industries when employment in an export import industry is perceived to be low the government would be tempted to adopt measures of export promotion import protection to increase it by effectively guaranteeing employment however these policies would reduce incentives for the private sector to reach efficient labor contracts for example the labor union might refuse to sign a profit sharing contract with management and unilaterally demand high wages believing that the resulting loss in competitiveness would not affect the well being of its members since the government would protect the industry it is also conceivable that management and the labor union conspire to reach inefficient contracts so as to invite government intervention in certain cases trade policies only transfer income without any allocative effect this is not merely a theoretical curiosum free trade advocates have often pointed out that protectionist policies would have deleterious effects on the pattern of collective bargaining in the trade sensitive sectors this paper constructs simple models to illustrate this point for export subsidies and so it can be viewed as an addition to the literature that aims to bring attention to the pitfalls of the new mercantilism such as eaton and grossman 1986 dixit and grossman 1986 and horstman and markusen 1986 unlike these studies however the government policies considered here are reactive in the sense that the private sector moves first anticipating the government s response dixit and kyle 1985 carmichael

government intervention in production and incentives theory a review of recent contributions national science foundation the commissariat general du plan and the center for energy policy research at m i t

enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted in the united states empirical studies of the enforcement of continuous compliance with environmental regulations especially air and water pollution regulations have repeatedly demonstrated the following i for most sources the frequency of surveillance is quite low ii even when violations are discovered fines or other penalties are rarely assessed in most states iii sources are nonetheless thought to be in compliance a large part of the time the evidence for the apparently low level of enforcement activity is found in a number of case studies of state and local enforcement of air and water quality regulations conducted jointly by the environmental protection agency epa and council on environmental quality ceg together with periodic surveys of implementation of air and water quality legislation conducted by the general accounting office gao these surveys show

the economics and politics of regulation this article provides a critical survey of the literature on the economics and politics of regulation after some conceptual clarifications the article surveys the evolution of perspectives on regulation during the post second world war period emphasizing especially the interactions between intellectual changes and real world economic and political developments it then looks at some themes that are neglected in the current literature the inevitability of regulation the need to create and not simply regulate markets distributional issues dynamic considerations and the politics of regulation and suggests that incorporating these themes more closely into the discussion will improve our understanding in this area copyright 1997 by oxford university press

optimal linear income tax with random revenue abstract this paper introduces the concept of risk attitudes a government may take toward random revenue in the design of a linear income tax it shows that the familiar trade off formula between equity and efficiency can be derived either by assuming a risk neutral government attitude toward random revenue or by assuming no randomness of revenue we provide numerical analysis to demonstrate that optimum tax schedules for a non risk neutral government can significantly deviate from those for a risk neutral government

the dynamics of incentive contracts the paper studies a simple two period principal agent model in which the principal updates the incentive scheme after observing the agent s first period performance the agent has superior information about his ability the principal offers a first period incentive scheme and observes some measure of the agent s first period performance cost or profit which depends on the agent s ability and unobservable first period effort the relationship is entirely run by short term contracts in the second period the principal updates the incentive scheme and the agent is free to accept the new incentive scheme or to quit the strategies are required to be perfect and updating of the principal s beliefs about the agent s ability follows bayes rule the central theme of the paper is that the ratchet effect leads to much pooling in the first period first for any first period incentive scheme there exists no separating equilibrium second when the uncertainty about the agent s ability is small the optimal scheme must involve a large amount of pooling the paper also gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partition equilibria and looks at the effect of cost uncertainty

irreversible environmental investments with uncertain benefit levels abstract the principal property of irreversibilities is that they generate incentives for policies that are smaller in scale than a myopic policy the circumstances in which this irreversibility effect occurs are first considered for a model with unit benefit uncertainty and time invariant cost functions with changes in cost relationships over time such as fixed costs for augmenting investment it may be desirable to adopt policies with scales that are larger than smaller than or the same as the scale of a myopic policy with rising unit benefits over time one adopts a policy scale larger than or the same as that in the myopic case and with declining unit benefits the opposite result holds irreversibilities will however lead to underinvestments in comparison with incompletely reversible investments with similar adjustment costs for increasing policy investments

on the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection abstract this paper characterizes a class of optimal incentive schemes in a simple principal agent model which allows for moral hazard and adverse selection we show that incentive compatible allocation can always be approximately implemented through a menu of quadratic incentive schemes it is also proved that the set of incentive compatible allocations is independent of the distribution of the additive uncertainty which affects the outcome informational requirements and economic interpretation of quadratic and linear schemes are discussed

on the design of incentive mechanisms in environmental policy the theory of incentives in environmental policy is concerned with the problem an environmental authority faces when its own objectives do not coincide with those of the polluters negative externalities in production and consumption degrade the quality of the environment in an excessive way the public goods property of natural resources like air and water is a standard example of the failure of markets and hence for the need of public regulation it is the task of the environmental authority the principal to invent instruments for environmental policy in order to internalize the social cost of production and consumption caused by the polluters the agents

errors in import demand estimates based upon unit value indexes disaggregated import demand elasticity estimates based on import unit value indexes are used in virtually all trade policy simulation models however unit value indexes have been criticized especially by kravis and lipsey 1974 to examine the effect of using unit value indexes on estimates of disaggregated import demand elasticities this paper compares regression results using unit value indexes with results using u s bureau of labor statistics import price indexes for several detailed trade categories based on quarterly data for 1978 88 results show that using unit value indexes does not greatly affect estimated import demand elasticities

economic reform and dynamic political constraints in this paper we examine the impact of political constraints on economic reform plans with special reference to the transition from centrally planned to market economies we analyse the problem of an agenda setting reform minded government facing a bureaucracy or industrial sector for which allocative efficiency requires redundancies and an increase in work intensity the government also tries to minimize the rents conceded to its heterogeneous workforce we examine two types of political constraints unanimity rule and majority rule both in a one period and a two period horizon the main results are the following first of all we show how adverse selection and time consistency may generate the widely observed feature of gradualism as an ingredient of an optimal reform second under a majority rule it is shown to be possible for the government to obtain a majority vote for a reform scheme that intertemporally hurts majority interests indeed the government can improve rent extraction through the strategic use of the threat of future proposals the group which expects to be in the minority tomorrow may accept concessions while its votes can be used to extract rents from another group these results suggest that in a dynamic context democratic constraints should not be overestimated as an obstacle against efficiency enhancing economic reforms the results of this paper may throw some light on the political economy of current reforms in eastern europe governments and political decision makers in general always face political constraints when elaborating reform proposals they know that the need to overcome potential opposition from various groups of the population constrains proposals for change political constraints vary depending on the specific institutional structure of society and are clearly different under a military dictatorship than under a parliamentary democracy the role of political constraints seems particularly important in eastern europe today where new democratic governments face the huge task of achieving the transition to a market economy while the introduction of democracy may have removed some important obstacles to economic change namely the veto power of a powerful nomenclatura under communist one party rule fears are expressed that it could potentially jeopardize economic reforms which may during the transition period hurt a majority of the population what can economic theory tell us about optimal economic reform under political constraints this paper starts addressing this ambitious question by looking at structural reform focusing on a restructuring of economic sectors which requires massive redundancies and a significant rise in labour productivity our model illustrates the case of planning

the evidence of strategic pricing policies of turkish textile exports this paper examines the strategic pricing behaviour pricing to market ptm policies of textile exports in the 1990s for a hyperinflation country turkey whose currency has been depreciating continually for the last two decades the findings show that turkish textile export categories exhibit evidence of strategic pricing behaviour when the turkish textiles export data is analysed for different frequencies the results show that evidence of strategic pricing behaviour is observed in response to changes in real exchange rates for textile exports for closer lagging periods and strategic pricing behaviour diminishes with further lagging periods also evidence of strategic pricing behaviour is observed in a more recurrent fashion with higher frequency data three month periods than with relatively lower frequency data six month and 12 month periods another interesting finding is that turkish textile exporters prefer to increase their prices as a reaction if they had adjusted their prices in an overshoot

export price responses to exogenous exchange rate movements the export price responses to three different exogenous exchange rate movements are investigated using data on swedish exports of automobiles and kraft paper to three destination countries a pric

competing vertical structures precommitment and renegotiation we consider a model where two agents privately informed about their own characteristics play a normal form game on behalf of two uninformed principals we analyze the existence of precommitment effects through public announcements of contracts in a model where agency contracts designed ex ante can always be secretly renegotiated at the ex ante and interim stages we show that the existence of precommitment effects depends both on the strategic complementarity of the agents actions and on the direct effect of the opponents actions on each principal s welfare in our model the possibility of renegotiation is crucial for the existence of precommitment effects the results are introduced through an example of cournot and bertrand competition between firms viewed as vertical structures

strategic responses to automobile emissions control a game theoretic analysis abstract this paper examines the dynamics of standard setting regulation under technological uncertainty and asymmetric information about technological capability a two period model which allows fully strategic action is developed and applied to the regulation of automobile emissions a situation in which standards have been used to force innovation it is found that the initial level of r d activity caused by regulation increases with the intrinsic technical capability of industry this result done not depend on marginal productivities of research that favor high capability types and implies that a poor capability industry will not attempt to compensate for its inability to innovate with increased research activity it is also found that the regulator s ability to induce investment is greater when r d is likely to be unsuccessful

simple monetary policy rules and exchange rate uncertainty abstract we analyze the performance and robustness of some common simple rules for monetary policy in a new keynesian open economy model under different assumptions about the exchange rate model adding the exchange rate to an optimized taylor rule that responds to cpi inflation gives only small improvements in terms of economic stability in most model configurations the taylor rule is also slightly more robust to uncertainty about the exchange rate model than are rules that respond to the rate of exchange rate depreciation our results thus indicate that the taylor rule is sufficient to stabilize a small open economy also under exchange rate model uncertainty

pollution taxes when firms choose technologies we consider the properties of a pollution tax when the regulated firm has a discrete choice of technologies with which to reduce pollution the firm s technology choice makes possible two sequences of play the traditional one in which the regulator moves first committing to a tax rate before the firm adopts a technology and an alternative one in which the firm moves first by adopting a technology we find that a range of pollution levels including possibly the first best one are unattainable when the regulator moves first the regulator may be better able to achieve the first best outcome when the firm moves first

incentives in principal agent relationships this article identifies some of the major issues that have been examined in the literature on incentives the article begins by discussing the frictions that lie at the heart of incentive problems next the principal s optimal response to these frictions is explored taking as given the characteristics of the agents with whom the principal interacts in a nonrepeated setting the design of individualized contracts contests and tournaments is analyzed then the principal s task of selecting the best agent is addressed and repeated agency relationships are considered

pricing to market in swedish exports fluctuations in prices of swedish exports to five countries are investigated in this paper we test whether there are systematic differences between prices to different markets and whether relative export prices are affected by macroeconomic conditions in destination countries the test results indicate that deviations from no pricing to market and neutrality of money are quite common and persistent over a sample of 15 years long run monetary neutrality is rejected in almost half of the cases in most cases the degree of pricing to market is also affected by aggregate demand in export markets

price discrimination by u s and german exporters the insensitivity of the u s trade balance to the sharp depreciation of the dollar in the past three years has revived interest in the relationship between exchange rates and the trade balance a central issue in most analyses of the relation between the current account and the exchange rate concerns the price adjustment process the simple integrated competitive market model predicts that local currency prices should change in proportion to the nominal exchange rate for a country too small to influence world prices the relationship between local currency import prices and exchange rates has been referred to as the pass through relationship in the empirical literature in international economics if the proportional relationship between import prices and exchange rates holds pass through is said to be complete accounts of recent u s experience cite the failure of dollar prices of imported goods to rise in proportion to exchange rates i e incomplete pass through as an important factor in explaining the persistence of the trade deficit unfortunately observations on pass through alone provide limited insight into the behavior of markets since incomplete pass through is consistent with at least two fundamentally different paradigms one is the standard competitive model of trade in which the law of one price holds but exchange rate fluctuations are associated with large changes in import demand due to other factors for example if dollar appreciation is correlated with increases in world demand and industry marginal cost is increasing then pass through will be less than complete the other is an imperfectly competitive model in which exporters are capable of price discriminating across destination markets a phenomenon paul krugman 1987 has labeled pricing to market in this model incomplete pass through is typically associated with fluctuations in the markup of price over marginal cost on exports 2 these fluctuations in markups are believed to be countryspecific they do not reflect the behavior of prices to other export destinations both models are plausible explanations of recent u s experience unfortunately it is impossible to distinguish between these competing models using only information on import prices and exchange rates for a single country in order to distinguish between the competing models an empirical analysis of goods prices and exchange rates must be capable of measuring either marginal cost or the markup over marginal cost either of these tasks poses formidable empirical problems much of the empirical literature in industrial organization has been concerned with precisely these issues since markups are an important measure of the competitiveness of industries

the ratchet effect and the coordination of production in the absence of rent extraction valuable to offset the cost these net gains may help explain why the ratchet has been observed in situations as diverse as managerial reward systems in the soviet union and salesman bonus arrangements in capitalist countries

did inequality cause the u s financial crisis in his widely discussed book fault lines 2010 raghuram rajan argues that many low and middle income consumers have reduced their saving and increased debt since income inequality started to soar in the united states in the early 1980s this has temporarily kept private consumption and employment high but it also contributed to the creation of a credit bubble this surge in household indebtedness turned out to be unsustainable in the financial crisis starting in 2007 although rajan and others emphasize the role of government in promoting credit to those households with declining relative permanent incomes other strands of the literature have focused more explicitly on the implications of rising inequality for aggregate demand and households demand for credit these differences in emphasis may explain why the literature on the inequality crisis nexus appears somewhat disparate even though the various strands are far from mutually exclusive but rather complement each other we therefore place the rajan hypothesis in the context of competing theories of consumption and survey the empirical literature on the effects of inequality on household behaviour we conclude that the empirical evidence calls for a renaissance of the relative income hypothesis of consumption

house prices and credit constraints making sense of the us experience most us house price models break down in the mid 2000s due to the omission of exogenous changes in mortgage credit supply associated with the sub prime mortgage boom from house price to rent ratio and inverted housing demand models previous models lack data on credit constraints facing first time home buyers incorporating a measure of credit conditions the cyclically adjusted loan to value ratio for first time buyers into house price to rent ratio models yields stable long run relationships more precisely estimated effects reasonable speeds of adjustment and improved model fits

productive efficiency in public and private firms abstract this paper compares the degree of x inefficiency which emerges as a consequence of the imposition of the optimal incentive contracts in public and private firms using a straightforward principal agent model with two possible states of the world it establishes the rather surprising result that in the good state of the world public ownership always results in a higher degree of productive efficiency

regulation and legislative choice regulation has economic and political dimensions both of which i endogenize in this hierarchical model in which a legislature chooses by majority rule the mandate of an agency that faithfully regulates a firm with private information about its costs sufficient conditions are given for an equilibrium to exist if there is a strong electoral connection between the benefits delivered to constituents and their electoral support the legislature will choose a regulatory mandate that favors consumer over producer interests and results in regulation that does not maximize expected total surplus political interest in delivering benefits to constituents through factor employment results in a regulatory mandate that yields greater expected total surplus

guilty until proven innocent regulation with costly and limited enforcement abstract we consider optimal regulations for a polluting firm when regulators cannot observe emission control costs and can only observe emissions via costly monitoring fines or subsidies for enforcing compliance are also limited the optimal regulations resemble a deposit refund system the firm reports its emissions and pays an initial tax based on this report if the firm is monitored it receives a rebate when actual and reported emissions coincide the enforcement constraints and the firm s rights determine whether the incentives to reduce emissions are optimally provided by varying the rebate for compliance the monitoring probability or the initial tax

getting at systemic risk via an agent based model of the housing market systemic risk must include the housing market though economists have not generally focused on it we begin construction of an agent based model of the housing market with individual data from washington dc twenty years of success with agent based models of mortgage prepayments give us hope that such a model could be useful preliminary analysis suggests that the housing boom and bust of 1997 2007 was due in large part to changes in leverage rather than interest rates

participation constraints in adverse selection models abstract this paper characterizes the optimal contract offered by an uninformed principal to an informed agent when the latter s reservation utility depends on his type the informational rent is nonmonotonic so that interior types may have a vanishing rent or be excluded from trade the paper identifies conditions for the optimal contract to be separating to be nonstochastic and to induce full participation it also discusses the nature of the solution when bunching occurs the results are applied to nonlinear pricing under price cap regulation and bypass competition and to competition in nonlinear pricing journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 d42 d23 d78 l51 l15

pricing to market in a small open economy the determinants of norwegian import prices of manufactures are investigated over the period 1970 1 1991 4 multivariate cointegration analysis establishes a long run relationship between import prices foreign prices the exchange rate and domestic unit labour costs normalized on import prices the long run elasticities are 0 63 foreign prices and the exchange rate and 0 37 domestic costs deviations from this relationship are highly significant in a structural import price equation which also contains positive effects of growth in domestic demand and inflation as well as a negative effect from the norwegian unemployment rate the estimated parameters appear reasonably stable within the sample

on efficiency inducing taxation for a non renewable resource monopolist the problem of using taxes to induce a monopolist supplier of a non renewable resource to extract efficiently has been solved under the assumption that the government has perfect information about the monopolist s cost function and reserves and is able to precommit to an entire sequence of taxes over time we extend this literature by constructing an efficiency inducing tax mechanism that does not require the government to have any information about the cost function or reserves and which does not require it to precommit to a sequence of taxes over time

regulation competition and liberalization in many countries throughout the world regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries this essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process while stressing the importance of case specific analyses this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are procompetitive from corresponding anticompetitive liberalization policies

goods prices and exchange rates what have we learned import prices typically change by a smaller proportion than the exchange rate between the exporting and importing country recent research indicates that common currency relative prices for similar goods exported to different markets are highly correlated with exchange rates between those markets this evidence suggests that incomplete pass through is a consequence of third degree price discrimination while distance matters for market segmentation borders have independent effects the source of the border effect has not been clearly identified furthermore there is little evidence yet to suggest substantial market power is implied by the observed price discrimination

state regulation and university behavior abstract the impact of state regulation on the economic behavior of american public research universities is studied using a unique sample of data on costs outputs and regulation measures for 98 institutions the university cost structure is modeled by a multiple output translog cost function explicitly allowing for the impact of state regulation regulating non faculty salary expenditures and the spending of non state revenues decreases costs while regulating faculty salary expenditures increases costs given the same output levels the results are interpreted in terms of the principal agent relationship of state regulators and universities efficiency gains and losses depend on the relative accuracy of state information on the production process

income inequality consumption credit and credit risk in a data driven agent based model abstract the issue of income inequality occupies a prominent position in the research agenda of academic and policy circles alike especially after the crisis of 2008 due to its potential causal link with the development of credit bubbles and therefore the emergence of financial crises this paper examines the long run effect of income inequality on consumption consumer credit and non performing loans through the means of a data driven agent based model the data driven nature of the model enhances its ability to match historical series and thus makes it suitable for policy simulations tailored for specific economies the analysis indicates that higher income inequality has a detrimental impact on consumption and is associated with lower volumes of consumer credit however the ratio of non performing loans as a share of total loans seems to be independent of income inequality

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

exchange rates and prices the adjustment of relative prices to exchange rate movements is explained in an industrial organization approach given labor costs in the respective currencies exchange rate movements change costs for firms selling in the home market and thus disturb the industry equilibrium the extent of absolute and relative price adjustment is shown to depend on market integration product substitutability the relative number of domestic and foreign firms and the market structure the impact of exchange rates on prices is illustrated in a variety of approaches including the cournot a dixit and j stiglitz 1977 and s salop 1979 models some empirical evidence is offered in support of the theory copyright 1987 by american economic association

rising inequality as a cause of the present crisis the article argues that the economic imbalances that caused the present crisis should be thought of as the outcome of the interaction of the effects of financial deregulation with the macroeconomic effects of rising inequality in this sense rising inequality should be regarded as a root cause of the present crisis i identify four channels by which it has contributed to the crisis first rising inequality creates a downwards pressure on aggregate demand since poorer income groups have high marginal propensities to consume second international financial deregulation has allowed countries to run larger current account deficits and for longer time periods thus in reaction to potentially stagnant demand two growth models have emerged a debt led model and an export led model third in the debt led growth models higher inequality has led to higher household debt as working class families have tried to keep up with social consumption norms despite stagnating or falling real wages fourth rising inequality has increased the propensity to speculate as richer households tend to hold riskier financial assets than other groups the rise of hedge funds and of subprime derivatives in particular has been linked to rise of the super rich

financialisation income distribution and aggregate demand in the usa this paper investigates the effects of financialisation and functional income distribution on aggregate demand in the usa by estimating the effects of the increase in rentier income dividends and interest payments and housing and financial wealth on consumption and investment the redistribution of income in favour of profits suppresses consumption whereas the increase in the rentier income and wealth has positive effects a higher rentier income decreases investment without the wealth effects the overall effect of the changes in distribution on aggregate demand would have been negative thus a pro capital income distribution leads to a slightly negative effect on growth i e the usa economy is moderately wage led

managerial overconfidence in initial public offering decisions and its impact on macrodynamics and financial stability analysis using an agent based model abstract in this study we build a macroeconomic agent based model that is calibrated for the specific case of poland to explore whether the overconfidence of top corporate managers in the context of their initial public offering ipo decisions is detrimental for the firms being managed in this way the financial market dynamics and the selected macroeconomic indicators we found a contradiction between the micro and macro impacts of overconfidence overconfident firms showed better performance in terms of output than other firms but were also more exposed to stock market volatility thereby making them more likely to default the higher default rates of overoptimistic firms negatively impacted the banking sector and increased financial instability finally we ran policy shocks and showed that increased financial instability can be offset by strengthening the regulation of the banking sector

ex post participation constraint in a principal agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard abstract this paper analyzes optimal contracting when an agent has private information before contracting and exerts hidden effort that stochastically affects the output additionally the contract is constrained to satisfy the agent s ex post participation we highlight three features of this model first the agent faces countervailing incentives second the separation of types is never optimal third the optimal constant bonus rewarding success is distorted downward below its efficient level

unemployed but optimistic optimal insurance design with biased beliefs biased perceptions of risks change the perceived value of insurance and the per ceived returns to avoiding these risks i show empirically that unemployed workers overestimate how quickly they will nd work but underestimate the return to their search eorts i analyze the consequences for the optimal design of unemployment insurance with biased beliefs contracts equalizing the marginal smoothing ben e t and the moral hazard cost of insurance are suboptimal social and private insurance diverge a paternalistic social planner corrects the moral hazard cost for the distortion in the insured s eort choice while private insurers focus on the perceived rather than the true smoothing bene ts when unemployed workers are optimistic privatizing unemployment insurance may result in ine ciently low or rapidly decreasing unemployment bene ts

decentralization duplication and delay we argue that although decentralization has advantages in finding low cost solutions these advantages are accompanied by coordination problems which lead to delay or duplication of effort or both consequently decentralization is desirable when there is little urgency or a great deal of private information but it is strictly undesirable in urgent problems when private information is less important we also examine the effect of large numbers and find that coordination problems disappear in the limit if distributions are common knowledge

commitment versus discretion in climate and energy policy to decarbonize the power sector policy makers need to commit to long term credible rules for climate and energy policy otherwise risk of opportunistic policy making will impair investments into low carbon technologies however the future benefits and costs of decarbonization are subject to substantial uncertainties thus there may also be societal gains from allowing policy makers the discretion to adjust the policies as new information becomes available we examine how this trade off between policy commitment either unconditional or state contingent and discretion affects the optimal intertemporal design of market based instruments in the power sector using a dynamic partial equilibrium model we show that commitment to a state contingent level of ambition for the market based instrument leads to higher welfare than both unconditional commitment and discretion with benefit uncertainty the choice between the practically more feasible approaches of unconditional commitment and discretion is analytically ambiguous a basic numerical illustration suggests that policy discretion may outperform unconditional commitment in terms of welfare however this result is reversed when only a limited fraction of benefit uncertainty resolves in reasonable time when future policy makers have own agendas or when investors are risk averse with cost uncertainty policy discretion is welfare superior if the government can commit to a technology deployment target

income distribution credit and fiscal policies in an agent based keynesian model this work studies the interactions between income distribution and monetary and fiscal policies in terms of ensuing dynamics of macro variables gdp growth unemployment etc on the grounds of an agent based keynesian model the direct ancestor of this work is the keynes meeting schumpeter formalism presented in dosi et al 2010 to that model we add a banking sector and a monetary authority setting interest rates and credit lending conditions the model combines keynesian mechanisms of demand generation a schumpeterian innovation fueled process of growth and minskian credit dynamics the robustness of the model is checked against its capability to jointly account for a large set of empirical regularities both at the micro level and at the macro one the model is able to catch salient features underlying the current as well as previous recessions the impact of financial factors and the role in them of income distribution we find that different income distribution regimes heavily affect macroeconomic performance more unequal economies are exposed to more severe business cycles fluctuations higher unemployment rates and higher probability of crises on the policy side fiscal policies do not only dampen business cycles reduce unemployment and the likelihood of experiencing a huge crisis in some circumstances they also affect positively long term growth further the more income distribution is skewed toward profits the greater the effects of fiscal policies about monetary policy we find a strong non linearity in the way interest rates affect macroeconomic dynamics in one regime with low rates changes in interest rates are ineffective up to a threshold beyond which increasing the interest rate implies smaller output growth rates and larger output volatility unemployment and likelihood of crises

inequality household debt and financial instability an agent based perspective abstract our paper contributes to the literature on the causes of the 2007 2008 financial crisis in the united states by means of an agent based model we replicate an artificial credit network economy in order to assess the impact of growing income inequality in the presence of peer effects and home equity borrowing we show that the resulting debt financed consumption boom jeopardises the stability of the economic system thus paving the way for a financial crisis our model includes a behavioural rule for consumption based on expenditure cascades a hierarchical structure of household finance an articulated credit market with collateralised consumption loans and mortgages and a simple housing market results show that the model is able to capture the economic and social pressure of inequality on low and middle income households that pushes them to increase their consumption via home equity extraction rising non performing loans lead to higher bad debt on the banks balance sheets and consequently to the emergence of a crisis as an endogenous dynamic

ends against the middle determining public service provision when there are private alternatives abstract public provision of a service coexists with private market provision the quality of public provision is determined by majority vote preferences are not single peaked owing to the presence of private alternatives we identify two cases in one majority voting equilibrium always exists and the median income voter is pivotal in the other a necessary condition for equilibrium indentifies the pivotal voter who must have income below the median when equilibrium exists a coalition of middle income households who consume the public alternative will be opposed by a coalition of rich and poor households with the rich choosing private consumption

emission taxes and optimal refunding schemes abstract we examine how refunding emission taxes to firms dependent on market shares should be designed while refunding is harmful under perfect competition a first best self financing tax tax refunding scheme exists if the marginal damage from pollution exceeds the marginal distortion in an imperfectly competitive output market with symmetric firms under pre investment in cleaner technology with short term abatement opportunities a first best refunding scheme exists if pollution refunding can be made dependent on both market and investment shares

optimal capital structure in agency relationships we analyze the optimal design of capital structure in agency relationships when a risk averse principal controls the agent s capital structure she awards a larger equity stake to outsiders the smaller the agent s productivity when she controls both the timing and the terms of the agent s financing the principal shifts to equityholders all risk associated with stochastic production and with the agent s unknown productivity when the principal dictates only the terms of financing only the former risk is borne by equityholders when the principal is sufficiently averse to risk she affords the agent no choice among incentive schemes

the financial accelerator in an evolving credit network we model a credit network characterized by credit relationships connecting i downstream d and upstream u firms and ii firms and banks the net worth of d firms is the driver of fluctuations the production of d firms and of their suppliers u firms in fact is constrained by the availability of internal finance proxied by net worth to the d firms the structure of credit interlinkages changes over time due to an endogeneous process of partner selection which leads to the polarization of the network at the aggregate level the distribution of growth rates exhibits negative skewness and excess kurtosis when a shock hits the macroeconomy or a significant group of agents in the credit network a bankruptcy avalanche can follow if agents leverage is critically high in a nutshell we want to explore the properties of a network based financial accelerator

a complete solution to a class of principal agent problems with an application to the control of a self managed firm this paper considers a class of principal agent problems which have the following features 1 there is adverse selection because the principal ignores the value of one parameter of the agent s true characteristics 2 leaving aside the information parameter the principal s welfare as well as the agent s welfare depend on two types of variables observable to both of them the first ones possibly multidimensional are called action variable s and the second one which is one dimensional has in general the meaning of a money transfer 3 the principal is a stackelberg leader of the two person game he can commit himself to decision rules which are admissible on informational grounds he optimizes within the adequate class taking into account besides the agent s reaction one constraint which has generally the meaning of an individual rationality constraint and sometimes of a feasibility constraint the optimization is limited to the class of non stochastic mechanisms 4 the problem can also receive an alternative interpretation the principal faces a continuum of agents of unknown characteristics the distribution being known however stylized principal agent problems of this type have often been considered in the economic literature in particular the reader will later be able to recognize that the standard income tax model a la mirrlees 1971 the quality or quantity choice model of the monopolist a la mussa and rosen 1978 or maskin and riley 1982 and the model of government regulation of the private monopolist of baron and myerson 1982 all belong to

exchange rates and traded goods prices abstract this paper presents a partial equilibrium model of the determination of domestic and export prices by a monopolistic competitive firm the model stresses the role of exchange rate uncertainty and expectations the most important result of the analysis is that the stochastic properties of deviations from the law of one price are crucially affected by the currency of denomination of export prices using data on domestic and dollar export prices of japanese goods i find that deviations from the law of one price are due to exchange rate surprises but also to price staggering and ex ante price discrimination

environmental policy choice with an uncertain chance of irreversibility abstract an uncertain chance of irreversibility leads to lower levels of investment than in the reversible case if there is downward irreversibility higher levels of investment if there is upward irreversibility and a possible effect in either direction in the case of complete irreversibility in all of these situations there will be an effect on initial policy investments whenever there is a nonzero probability that the irreversibility constraint is binding the policy design is based on equating initial marginal costs to conditional marginal benefits over the states in which the initial policy scale decision will be the policy choice the maximum attainable policy value is convex with respect to the probability of irreversibility

optimal resource royalties with unknown and temporally independent extraction cost structures the authors study optimal nonrenewable resource royalty contracts when the extracting agent has private information on costs this is a dynamic incentive problem in which the repeated relationship between the principal and the agent is constrained by initial reserves commitment is limited to one period and costs are intertemporally independent compared with full information extraction information asymmetry shifts production to the future when the optimal contract requires exhaustion in two periods when exhaustion by all types in two periods is not warranted the effect on the terminal period is ambiguous and the output of even the lowest cost firm is always distorted copyright 1995 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

adjustment costs and pricing to market theory and evidence abstract this paper develops an adjustment cost model of pricing to market the model consists of a monopolist who supplies an identical nondurable good to two foreign markets it is shown that the degree of pricing to market increases with the relative importance of the transitory component in exchange rates customs data from 1978 through 1987 on u s and canadian imports of seven german commodities are used to estimate the model s parameters and test its over identifying restrictions

markets and regulatory hold up problems abstract many regulatory programs such as environmental regulation are effective only if firms make irreversible investments that reduce the cost of compliance a firm potentially subject to regulation may therefore behave strategically by not investing thereby forcing the regulator to void the proposed regulation we show that such incentives which resemble a hold up problem may not be overcome when government s only tool is the imposition of an emissions tax the hold up problem can be overcome by the issuance of tradeable permits a time consistent equilibrium exists with all firms investing and the government imposing regulations even if no permits are traded and their market price is low indeed an observation of no trade may indicate that pollution abatement is great

small pollution markets tradable permits versus revelation mechanisms abstract a simple two period model with two polluters is analyzed they emit a homogeneous hazardous substance and they are given tradable permits to pollute the social planner issues permits and tries to learn the cost of reducing pollution by observing the quantity of permits traded in the first period it is shown that although efficient trade is prevented by strategic considerations by the polluters the planner learns something from observing only quantities comparisons are made between this approach and that of mechanism design and it is concluded that the latter is superior in theory but sensitive to collusion by the firms

oligopoly extraction of a common property natural resource the importance of the period of commitment in dynamic games the theory of noncooperative dynamic games has provided an extremely powerful framework for studying many of the classic questions in industrial organization for example questions about resource extraction advertising research and development investment in new capacity and barriers to entry where interactions over time among few firms are involved however an important methodological issue arises when economic competition over time is modeled as a dynamic game the issue is the appropriate formulation of the players strategy spaces