bank monitoring and the pricing of corporate public debt1 we examine whether the existence of a bank firm relationship lowers the cost of public debt financing using a sample of first public straight debt o ers we test the crossmonitoring e ect of bank debt and diamond s 1991 journal of political economy 99 689 721 reputation building argument we find that the existence of bank debt lowers the at issue yield spreads for first public straight bond o ers by about 68 basis points on average consistent with diamond s reputation building argument we document that firm reputation is negatively related to the at issue yield spread for initial public debt o ers 1999 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

trading in networks theory and experiments intermediation is a prominent feature of economic production and exchange two features of intermediation are salient coordination among traders between the source and the destination and competition between alternative combinations of intermediaries we develop a simple model to study these forces and we test the theoretical predictions in experiments our theoretical analysis yields a complete characterization of pricing equilibrium in networks there exist both ecient and inecient equilibria suggesting a key role of coordination among intermediaries strategic interaction leads to either buyer and seller retaining all surplus or intermediaries extracting all surplus we develop conditions on network structure under which these di erent extremal outcomes arise respectively laboratory experiments show that eciency prevails in almost all cases so traders are successful in coordination subjects coordinate on extreme surplus division finally experiments highlight the role of network structure in determining pricing and the

bank underwriting of debt securities modern evidence this article examines debt securities underwritten by section 20 subsidiaries of bank holding companies relative to those underwritten by investment houses consistent with a net certification effects for banks bank underwriting of lower credit rated firms to whom the bank lends results in relatively higher prices lower yields we find no evidence of conflicts of interest even when an issue is used to repay bank debt further banks bring a relatively larger proportion of small issues to the market contrary to the contention that universal banking stunts availability of finance to small firms bank underwritings appear to benefit small firms article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

what s different about banks abstract negotiable certificates of deposit cd s trade in the capital market in competition with other securities like commercial paper and bankers acceptances if cd s must pay lenders competitive monetary interest the reserve tax on cd s is borne by bank borrowers viability of the tax means there must be something special about bank loans that makes some borrowers willing to pay higher interest rates than those on other securities of equivalent risk moreover there must be something special about banks that prevents other intermediaries from competing to assure that it never pays to finance loans with cd s

a theory of buyer seller networks this paper introduces a new model of exchange networks rather than markets of buyers and sellers it begins with the empirically motivated premise that a buyer and seller must have a relationship a link to exchange goods networks buyers sellers and the pattern of links connecting them are common exchange environments this paper develops a methodology to study network structures and explains why agents may form networks in a model that captures characteristics of a variety of industries the paper shows that buyers and sellers acting strategically in their own self interests can form the network structures that maximize overall welfare

how should public pension plans invest how public pension plan assets should be invested is an important but unsettled question alicia h munnell and mauricio soto 2007 find that the share of state and local s l plan assets held in equities has grown over time largely in parallel with private sector practices from an average of about 40 percent in the late 1980s to about 70 percent in 2007 this exposure led to a loss of an estimated 1 trillion dollars following the decline of the stock market from october 2007 to october 2008 munnell kelly haverstick and jean pierre aubry 2008 nevertheless some observers endorse the standard practice of investing heavily in higher yielding but riskier equities reasoning that the higher average returns will reduce future required tax receipts and also help to reduce underfunding over time others advocate a more conservative approach that reduces the volatility of funding levels and the likelihood of severe shortfalls during economic downturns when government resources are already constrained e g lawrence n bader and jeremy gold 2007 the accounting rules for public pensions create a perverse incentive to invest in stocks since projected liabilities are discounted at the expected return on assets rather than at a rate that reflects the generally lower risk of liabilities investing the assets in the stock market leads to

the effect of lender identity on a borrowing firm s equity return previous research demonstrates that a firm s common stock price tends to fall when it issues new public securities by contrast commercial bank loans elicit significantly positive borrower returns this article investigates whether the lender s identity influences the market s reaction to a loan announcement although we find no significant difference between the market s response to bank and nonbank loans we do find that lenders with a higher credit rating are associated with larger abnormal borrower returns this evidence complements earlier findings that an auditor s or investment banker s perceived quality signals valuable information about firm value to uninformed market investors previous studies show that certain types of loan announcements generate significantly positive abnormal returns to the average borrower s equity 1 this finding contrasts with the negative equity returns generally associated with a corporation s issuance of public securities smith 1986 this difference in market reactions indicates that private and public securities are not perfect substitutes for the average firm in this sense lender identity defined as public versus private lender significantly impacts the borrower s abnormal equity return the standard theoretical explanation for this difference is that private lenders either obtain private information about the firm s value or they have the incentive and ability to monitor firm behavior more effectively than other outside monitors can although the empirical literature on private lending has evaluated primarily commercial bank loans and lines of credit these theoretical arguments apply equally to any type of private

the effects of price deregulation on maize marketing margins in south africa abstract there has been continuous controversy over the impact of food market reforms on food security in africa in south africa the government and media have often questioned the effects of price deregulation of maize meal the major staple food on consumers this article determines the effect of retail price deregulation on the size of maize milling retail margins in south africa regression models of monthly milling retail margins are run from the period may 1976 to december 2004 to assess the robustness of our findings we estimate several different models of structural change vary the sample period to examine the sensitivity of findings to unusual weather and market conditions in the region during episodes between 2001 and 2004 and run the models using different estimation techniques ols with newey west robust estimators and feasible general least squares in virtually all models the results indicate that real maize milling retailing margins in south africa have increased by at least 20 since the deregulation of retail prices in 1991 moreover there is evidence of trend growth in the size of the milling margin over time simulations indicate that the deregulation of maize meal prices has entailed a transfer of at least us 179 million year from consumers to agents in the marketing system further study is needed to understand why this outcome in south africa differs from findings in other countries in the region concerning the effects of reform on food marketing margins

the case against stock in public pension funds the case against equity investment by u s corporate pension funds has been well documented for a quarter century the public sector has ignored or dismissed that case because of differences between taxation and accounting between the private and public sectors the differing interests of shareholders and taxpayers and the presumption that public plans last forever despite these differences shifting public pension fund investments from equities to bonds adds value for local taxpayers it also minimizes the risks of intergenerational taxpayer conflicts undercharges to employees compensation packages for the value of the pensions employee claims on pension surplus and higher governmental borrowing costs

competition through commissions and kickbacks in markets for retail financial products and health services consumers often rely on the advice of intermediaries to decide which specialized offering best fits their needs product providers in turn compete to influence the intermediaries advice through hidden kickbacks or disclosed commissions motivated by the controversial role of these widespread practices we formulate a model to analyze competition through commissions from a positive and normative standpoint the model highlights the role of commissions in making the advisor responsive to supply side incentives we characterize situations when commonly adopted policies such as mandatory disclosure and caps on commissions have unintended welfare consequences jel d21 d82 d83 g21 l15 l25

commercial bank underwriting of credit enhanced bonds are there certification benefits to the issuer recent studies have expanded the commercial bank certification hypothesis to include banks acting in an underwriting capacity this paper further develops that research by focusing on the industrial revenue bond market in which banks have the unique opportunity to simultaneously act as both credit guarantor and underwriter when explicitly allowing for bank issued standby letters of credit guarantees we find significantly greater yield spreads for those bonds underwritten by commercial banks compared to bonds underwritten by investment banks overall no net benefit appears to accrue to the bond issuer when attempting to achieve joint or double certification benefits by employing commercial banks as both credit guarantor and underwriters except in the special case where the same bank acts as both guarantor and underwriter this limited certification effect is further validated when the credit quality of participating banks is accounted for this result is consistent with an economy of scope in monitoring and reusing information

estimating the signaling benefits of debt insurance the case of municipal bonds this paper examines the demand for municipal bond insurance in the context of a competitive signaling equilibrium model the study compares the pricing of new bond issues that are insured to similar issues that are not insured the results indicate that issuers who purchase bond insurance on average are able to reduce their new issue borrowing cost more than enough to offset the cost of the insurance premium furthermore the net benefit to the issuer increases as the underlying credit quality of the bond declines

investment bank reputation information production and financial intermediation we model reputation acquisition by investment banks in the equity market entrepreneurs sell shares in an asymmetrically informed equity market either directly or using an investment bank investment banks who interact repeatedly with the equity market evaluate entrepreneurs projects and report to investors in return for a fee setting strict evaluation standards unobservable to investors is costly for investment banks inducing moral hazard investment banks credibility therefore depends on their equity marketing history investment banks evaluation standards their reputations underwriter compensation the market value of equity sold and entrepreneurs choice between underwritten and nonunderwritten equity issues emerge endogenously

bargaining in stationary networks we study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players con nected in a network are randomly matched to bargain players who reach agreement are replaced by new players at the same positions in the network we show that all equilibria are payoff equivalent the payoffs and the set of agreement links converge as players become patient several new concepts mutually estranged sets partners and shortage ratios provide insights into the relative strengths of the positions in the network we develop a procedure to deter mine the limit equilibrium payoffs for all players characterizations of equitable and nondiscriminatory networks are also obtained jel c78 d85 competitive equilibrium theory assumes large and anonymous markets in which every buyer can trade with every seller underlying these assumptions are standard goods and services that may be traded at low transaction costs by agents who are not in specific relationships with one another however in many markets goods and services are heterogeneous e g cars apartments or need to be tailored to particular needs e g manufacturing inputs technical support furthermore trad ing opportunities may depend on transportation costs social relationships infor mation advertising trust technological compatibility joint business opportunities free trade agreements etc in such cases it is natural to model the market using a network where only pairs of connected agents may engage in exchange new theories are needed to explore the influence of the network structure on market outcomes many questions arise how does an agent s position in the net work determine his bargaining power and the local prices he faces who trades with whom and on what terms when are prices uniform in the network one possible conjecture is that an agent s bargaining power is determined by his relative number of connections in the network however this simple theory is implausible consider the network of four sellers located at the top nodes and nine buyers located at the bottom nodes depicted in figure 1 assume that each seller supplies one unit of a homogeneous indivisible good each buyer demands one unit of the good and all buyers have identical values for the good the buyer located in the middle has the largest number of links in the network as he is connected to each

structural holes in social networks we consider a setting where every pair of players that undertake a transaction e g exchange goods or information creates a unit surplus a transaction can take place only if the players involved have a connection if the connection is direct the two players split the surplus equally while if it is indirect then intermediate players also get an equal share of the surplus thus individuals form links with others to create surplus to gain intermediation rents and to circumvent others who are trying to become intermediary our analysis clarifies the interplay between these forces in the process of strategic network formation first we show that in the absence of capacity constraints on links it leads to the emergence of a star network where a single agent acts as an intermediary for all transactions and enjoys significantly higher payoffs second we study the implications of capacity constraints in the ability of agents to form links in this case distances between players must be long which induces players who are far off to connect in order to avoid paying large intermediation rents a cycle network then emerges payoffs being equal across all players

borrowing relationships intermediation and the cost of issuing public securities abstract this paper investigates how an established borrowing relationship affects the costs associated with initial public offerings of equity our model illustrates how the existence of a borrowing relationship reduces the ex ante uncertainty about the value of the issuing firm s equity in the secondary market if underpricing is related to uncertainty a borrowing relationship can reduce underpricing empirically we find that other things equal ipos of firms with previously established borrowing relationships are underpriced substantially less than other ipos

assessing the effects of unconventional monetary policy and low interest rates on pension fund risk incentives this study quantifies the effects of persistently low interest rates near to the zero lower bound and unconventional monetary policy on pension fund risk incentives in the united states using two structural vector autoregressive var models and a counterfactual scenario analysis the results show that monetary policy shocks as identified by changes in treasury yields following changes in the central bank s target interest rates lead to a substantial increase in pension funds allocation to equity assets notably the shift from bonds to equity securities is greater during the period where the us federal reserve launched unconventional monetary policy measures additional findings show a positive correlation between pension fund risk taking low interest rates and the decline in treasury yields across both well funded and underfunded public pension plans which is thus consistent with a structural risk shifting incentive

trading networks with price setting agents abstract in a wide range of markets individual buyers and sellers trade through intermediaries who determine prices via strategic considerations typically not all buyers and sellers have access to the same intermediaries and they trade at correspondingly different prices that reflect their relative amounts of power in the market we model this phenomenon using a game in which buyers sellers and traders engage in trade on a graph that represents the access each buyer and seller has to the traders we show that the resulting game always has a subgame perfect nash equilibrium and that all equilibria lead to an efficient allocation of goods finally we analyze trader profits in terms of the graph structure roughly a trader can command a positive profit if and only if it has an essential connection in the network thus providing a graph theoretic basis for quantifying the amount of competition among traders

the benefits of lending relationships evidence from small business data this paper empirically examines how ties between a firm and its creditors affect the availability and cost of funds to the firm we analyze data collected in a survey of small firms by the small business administration the primary benefit of building close ties with an institutional creditor is that the availability of financing increases we find smaller effects on the price of credit attempts to widen the circle of relationships by borrowing from multiple lenders increases the price and reduces the availability of credit in sum relationships are valuable and appear to operate more through quantities rather than prices

bertrand competition when rivals costs are unknown the conclusions of the bertrand model of competition are substantially altered by the presence of asymmetric information about rivals costs asymmetric information eliminates the discontinuity in the bertrand model and significantly alters the properties of the market equilibrium in the bertrand nash equilibrium when rivals costs are unknown firms price above marginal cost and have positive expected profit the analysis is extended to franchise competition the market equilibrium is sensitive to market structure and yields incentives for entry copyright 1995 by blackwell publishing ltd

the maturity structure of corporate debt we provide an empirical examination of the determinants of corporate debt maturity our evidence offers strong support for the contracting cost hypothesis firms that have few growth options are large or are regulated have more long term debt in their capital structure we find little evidence that firms use the maturity structure of their debt to signal information to the market the evidence is consistent however with the hypothesis that firms with larger information asymmetries issue more short term debt we find no evidence that taxes affect debt maturity

venture capitalist certification in initial public offerings this paper provides support for the certification role of venture capitalists in initial public offerings consistent with the certification hypothesis a comparison of venture capital backed ipos with a control sample of nonventure capital backed ipos from 1983 through 1987 matched as closely as possible by industry and offering size indicates that venture capital backing results in significantly lower initial returns and gross spreads in effect the presence of venture capitalists in the issuing firms serves to lower the total costs of going public and to maximize the net proceeds to the offering firm in addition we document that venture capitalists retain a significant portion of their holdings in the firm after the ipo the ability of third party specialists to certify the value of securities issued by relatively unknown firms in capital markets that are characterized by asymmetric information between corporate insiders and public investors has attracted much academic interest in recent years several authors including james 1990 blackwell marr and spivey 1990 and barry muscarella peavy and vetsuypens 1991 have developed and tested models based at least in part on the formal certification hypothesis presented in booth and smith 1986 a related body of work represented by deangelo 1981 beatty and ritter 1986 titman and trueman 1986 johnson and miller 1988 carter 1990 simon 1990 and carter and manaster 1990 has examined how investment bankers and auditors help resolve the asymmetric information inherent in the initial public offering ipo process in this paper we examine whether the presence of venture capitalists as investors in a firm going public can certify that the offering price of the issue reflects all available and relevant inside information we hypothesize that venture capitalists can perform this function that it will be an economically

efficiency in decentralized oligopolistic markets the paper analyzes quantity competition in economies in which a network describes the set of feasible trades a model is presented in which the identity of buyers of sellers and of intermediaries is endogenously determined by the trade flows in the economy the analysis first considers small economies and provides sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence a characterization of prices and flows and some negative results relating welfare to network structure the second and central part of the analysis considers behavior in large markets and presents necessary and sufficient conditions on the network structure for equilibria to be approximately efficient when the number of players is large