efficiency considerations and the exemption of food from sales and value added taxes we evaluate efficiency considerations underlying the widespread exemption of food from sales and value added taxes and the implications for tax policy household and restau rant meals and both constant and increasing returns cases are examined higher taxes on food offset the non taxation of time inputs into household production even under constant returns to scale with increasing returns gains from taxing food are higher and amplified by subsidizing restaurant food and all marginal cost components of restaurant meals on effi ciency grounds exemption of food from sales and value added taxes emerges as socially costly policy especially under increasing returns

the effects of taxation price control and government contracts in oligopoly and monopolistic competition abstract many government contracts with or policies towards oligopolistic sectors essentially involve private firms selling a given proportion or quantity of output to the government at a fixed price p r with the remainder being sold on the open market often this is combined with consumer rationing examples include cement and sugar in india and health housing and defence in many countries the paper investigates the effects of these schemes including sales and excise taxation on prices output and household welfare under oligopoly and monopolistic competition less government control reduced may raise prices and tax shifting can be above or below 100 percent

non nested models of australia s overseas aid program after briefly surveying the existing on overseas aid motivations some empirical results are presented for australian bilateral aid in terms of the two competing theories in the aid literature namely the recipient need model and the donor interest model the empirical results for austrlia are atypical in that there is support for both hypotheses this is contrast to the results of previous studies of large nation states the united states britain germany france and japan which have found support for the donor interst model but not the recipient need model given that the empirical results reported here are consistent with both models this paper then proceeds to apply the relatively new tests of non nested hypotheses to the models the results indicate that australia s aid program has both recipient need and donor interest concerns i some years the recipient need motive dominates and in other years donor interest dominates

cross border shopping and the optimum commodity tax in a competitive and a monopoly market using a partial equilibrium model optimality rules for a commodity tax are derived for an economy that is exposed to cross border shopping in a competitive market the conventional inverse elasticity rule is shown to be valid with the qualification that it is the elasticity of domestic rather than total demand that matters with a foreign monopoly the inverse elasticity is modified by a tax shifting effect when the supplier is a multinational firm price repercussions abroad should be taken into account the implications for domestic taxation of the prices and taxes set abroad are also examined

foreign aid an instrument for fighting communism abstract in this paper we test the argument that the sizeable reduction in aggregate aid levels in the 1990s was due to the end of the cold war we test two different models using a dynamic econometric specification on a panel of 17 donor countries spanning the years 1970 97 we find aid to be positively related to military expenditures in the former eastern bloc during the cold war but not in the 1990s suggesting that the reductions in aid disbursements are driven by the disappearance of an important motive for aid we also study the effect on aid allocation but here we do not find any robust effects of the end of the cold war

motivations for aid to developing countries abstract this paper attempts to identify the underlying principles of aid allocation and particularly the balance of motivations as between the needs of recipient countries and the interests of donor countries two alternative models are fitted by cross country regressions to bilateral and multilateral aid flows to some 80 developing countries in 1969 1970 and 1978 1980 the first recipient need model assumes that all aid is given to compensate for shortfalls in domestic resources this model provides a reasonable explanation for the distribution of multilateral aid but it is clearly not applicable for bilateral aid flows the second donor interest model assumes that all aid serves only donor interests defined to cover political security investment and trade interests this model gives generally good explanations of bilateral aid but is a poor fit for multilateral aid the relative importance of the various donor interests differs sharply among donors the paper ends with an analysis of the shift in the balance of aid over the 1970s towards the recipient need element and with a reference to the sharp change in policy in the 1980s towards increasing emphasis on donor interest aid

second best subsidies in monopolistic competition abstract in the spence dixit stiglitz model of monopolistic competition an output or input subsidy is welfare improving under competitive conjecture the significance of this result is that it holds even when the subsidy exacerbates the potential problem of excess product diversity

coding error or statistical embellishment the political economy of reporting climate aid to benefit from a wide spread public support for climate policy aid agencies strive to show the climate relevance of their development activities using project level aid data and country level political data for 21 dac donors from 1995 to 2007 we test whether this may lead to politically motivated misreporting through keyword search in individual project descriptions and complementary hand coding we assess all aid activities for their actual climate change related content and thereby construct our most relevant control variables econometric results reveal that indeed project coding is influenced systematically by the donor governments ideological orientation as well as by national voters environmental preferences

migration and foreign aid when it comes to linkages between migration and the global allocation of foreign development assistance the size of the immigrant population from a recipient country residing in a donor country is an important determinant of dyadic aid commitments two complementary hypotheses probe this relationship first donors use foreign aid to achieve their broader immigration goals targeting migrant sending areas to increase development and decrease the demand for entry into the donor country second migrants already residing in the donor country mobilize to lobby for additional aid for their homeland empirical tests on a large sample of country pairs made up of twenty two donors and more than 150 recipients over the period 1993 to 2008 show robust support for these hypotheses

choosing to target what types of countries get different types of world bank projects well governed countries are more likely to make use of foreign aid for the purposes of economic development and poverty alleviation therefore if aid agencies are providing funds for the sake of development these countries should receive more aid and categorically different types of aid as compared with poorly governed countries in poorly governed countries aid should be given in forms that allow for less discretion using an original data set of all world bank projects from 1996 to 2002 the author distinguishes programmatic projects from investment projects and national from subnational investment projects if the world bank allows more discretion in well governed countries then it will choose to provide programmatic and national aid for these recipients the author presents evidence that the world bank provides a larger proportion of national investment lending in better governed countries with regard to programmatic lending he finds mixed evidence among counties eligible for international development association ida aid good governance surprisingly is associated with a lower proportion of programmatic aid whereas for international bank for reconstruction and development ibrd borrowers good governance is associated with a higher proportion the author subjects these results to a number of robustness checks although he confirms the existing result in the literature that the world bank provides larger overall amounts of aid to better governed countries his examination of the disaggregated data leads to questioning whether both lending wings of the world bank are designing aid programs in the most prodevelopment way possible

are bilateral and multilateral aid for trade complementary using the first comprehensive estimates of ad valorem tariff equivalent bilateral trade costs spanning the time period 2002 10 we examine whether the aid for trade aft inflows reduce bilateral trade costs facing aid recipients if so we ask whether the trade costs reduction effects of aft from bilateral and multilateral sources are complementary by showing the extent to which the observed trade cost reduction effects of aft from bilateral multilateral sources correlate with the magnitudes of aft disbursements from multilateral bilateral sources we present plausible explanation for the cross country variations in the extent to which aft promotes trade flows our findings have thus important policy implications for shaping future discourses on the coordination of disbursements for enhancing the effectiveness of aft

rents and the cost and optimal design of commodity taxes this paper numerically investigates the significance of rents for both the welfare costs and the optimal design of commodity taxes using a general equilibrium model calibrated to 1986 canadian data in the data we use ricardian rents are concentrated in agriculture and utilities with market structure rents concentrated in manufacturing different types of rents have different implications for the welfare cost of taxes and hence also for appropriate tax design ricardian rents lower the cost of taxes rents supported by imperfect competition with no free entry raise the cost of taxes rents supported by regulation generate rent seeking costs and if taxed improve resource allocation model results show a markedly nonuniform optimal tax structure and a substantial influence of the treatment of rents on the pattern of optimal tax rates by commodity

samaritan agents on the strategic delegation of aid policy abstract should a donor delegate the responsibility for allocating its aid budget to a less inequality averse agent to alleviate the consequences of the samaritan s dilemma it is facing i show that when aid impact differs across recipients the optimal type of agent depends on whether or not committing to a greater share for countries where the productivity of aid is low raises the combined domestic incomes of recipients this is the case for donors too concerned with efficiency ex post they therefore delegate the decision on the discretionary aid allocation rule to agents more sensitive to distributional issues than themselves

estimating aid allocation criteria with panel data in 1990 the net amount of economic aid or official development assistance to all recipients from all multilateral and bilateral sources was about 62 billion an amount that exceeded the gdps of greece and portugal despite the size of this yearly transfer there has been no rigors modeling and estimation of the criteria by which it occurs as a result there is little agreement about the extent to which oda is allocated according to the needs of the recipient countries the purpose of this paper is to develop a rigorous theoretical model of oda allocation that can be used to provide consistent estimates of the importance of recipient needs copyright 1994 by royal economic society

competition for aid and trade policy this paper considers the optimal allocation of a given amount of foreign aid between two recipient countries it is shown that given consumer preferences a country following a more restrictive trade policy would receive a smaller share of the aid if the donor country maximises its own welfare in allocating aid if on the other hand the donor country allocates aid in order to maximize the sum of the welfare of the two recipient countries the result is just the opposite finally we analyze the situation where the recipient countries compete with each other for the given amount of aid it is shown that this competition tends to lower the level of optimal tariffs in the recipient countries

aid and debt relief in africa have they been substitutes or complements summary much attention has been paid to helping economies in sub saharan africa ssa to achieve the millennium development goals mdgs the conventional instruments for providing assistance have been foreign aid disbursements and debt relief but have debt relief initiatives complemented or substituted for other aid has debt relief been additional this paper examines the evolving relationship between debt relief and other foreign aid in ssa using recently constructed and improved data estimating a model of aid allocation for 42 ssa countries using panel data for 1988 2006 it finds that the relationships between debt debt relief aid and resource transfers have changed over time this paper interprets how policy changes may have modified the underlying relationship between aid and debt relief

endogenous market structures and optimal taxation this article provides optimal labour and dividend income taxation in a general equilibrium model with oligopolistic competition and endogenous firms entry in the long run the optimal dividend income tax corrects for inefficient entry the dividend income tax depends on the form of competition and the nature of the sunk entry costs in particular it is higher in market structures characterised by competition in quantities rather than those characterised by price competition oligopolistic competition leads to an endogenous countercyclical price markup as a result offsetting the distortions over the business cycle requires deviations from full tax smoothing

does foreign aid mitigate the adverse effect of expropriation risk on foreign direct investment abstract we construct a model of fdi risk and aid where a country loses access to fdi and aid if the country expropriates fdi we show that i the threat of expropriation leads to under investment ii the optimal level of fdi decreases as the risk of expropriation rises and iii aid mitigates the adverse effect of expropriation risk on fdi the empirical analysis employs data for 35 low income countries and 28 countries in sub saharan africa over the period 1983 2004 we find that risk has a negative effect on fdi and that aid mitigates but cannot eliminate the adverse effect of risk

the allocation of aid among developing countries a multi donor analysis using a per capita aid index abstract this paper seeks to measure the relative aid giving performance of aid donors in terms of the inter recipient distribution of their aid performance is taken to be the extent to which a donor bases its aid allocation on the relative needs of recipient countries donor performance is measured by an income weighted per capita aid index formulated in this paper this index was calculated using the per capita allocations to a sample of 85 recipient countries in the years 1969 84 the performance of 17 dac members plus that of a number of multilateral agencies and that of the dac and these agencies combined is identified results indicate that the performance of four countries belgium finland denmark and norway was generally superior to that of other donors

foreign aid and domestic savings in less developed countries some tests for causality abstract the negative correlation between foreign aid and domestic savings rates in less developed countries is an accepted fact in the existing literature the direction of causality however remains a subject of dispute in this paper we use time series data to investigate causal relationships we conclude that causal relationships are not universal and it is suggested that in those countries where they do hold the direction of causality may depend upon the proportions of aid from bilateral and multilateral sources

tax design in the presence of imperfect competition an example abstract this paper studies the effects upon price output and entry in an oligopolistic market induced by tax policy elsewhere in the economy the results derived are applied to a model of copying to find conditions for which subsidisation of the manufacturers of originals is welfare improving the critical factor is found to be the distribution of consumers tastes

the economic and political determinants of imf and world bank lending in the middle east and north africa mena assumes both political and economic significance politically it is arguably the epicentre of world crisis chronically war prone and the site of the world s most protracted conflicts hinnebusch 2003 p 1 economically it owns the bulk of the world s oil reserves driving in particular the usa economic engine in light of the region s geopolitically and economically strategic position in the world economy it is clear that economic and political factors are inextricably linked when it comes to the manner in which the west particularly the usa responds to the region s needs

funding self sustaining development the role of aid fdi and government in economic success this article challenges a long held development policy assumption that aid and foreign direct investment fdi serve as substitutes or complements in accelerating the development of the world s poorer countries we show both theoretically and empirically that aid and fdi affect development differently aid contributes powerfully to both economic growth and human development and the higher the level of human capital in a country the more aid contributes by contrast fdi at best has no effect on economic growth and actually slows the rate of human development in less developed countries we find no evidence that the degree of democratic responsiveness in government conditions the effectiveness of either aid or fdi although we do find that democracy independently increases human development in all but the most developed countries our results demonstrate that fdi and aid are not and cannot be substitutes in the development of the world s poorer countries nor even can they be thought of as complements certainly not at mid to low levels of development in the end poor countries need democracy and aid not fdi we are extremely grateful to susan rose ackerman gustav ranis frances rosenbluth kenneth scheve and participants at the leitner political economy seminar at yale university in december 2003 for very helpful comments we also received valuable suggestions from two anonymous reviewers stephen kosack would like to thank the national science foundation for the support of a graduate research fellowship

some determinants of foreign aid to india 1960 1985 abstract using a unique data set of aid to india from all sources 1960 1985 we discuss the magnitude and composition of aid and present a principal components analysis of aid giving we then attempt to get at the underlying patterns and causes of aid giving using factor analytic techniques and explain the level of foreign aid by employing a partial adjustment model we find that latent motivations to classify the donor countries into four convenient groups each with different political and economic motivations we also find that the latent variables capturing the motivations of the united states western european countries eastern european countries as well as last year s aid and the balance of trade but not gdp growth are significant determinants of the level of aid

oligopolistic competition and economic welfare a general equilibrium analysis of entry regulation and tax subsidy schemes abstract two contributions to the general equilibrium analysis of an oligopolistic economy with free entry are intended first we generalize the excess entry theorem to the effect that a marginal decrease in the number of oligopolistic firms from the free entry equilibrium level improves economic welfare second we explore the pareto improving tax subsidy schemes in an oligopolistic economy several self financing and pareto improving tax subsidy schemes will be identified in contrast with the preceding analysis by atkinson and stiglitz which focused on the long run incidence of corporate taxation we analyse the short run as well as long run welfare implications of various policies under generalized conditions

can the world cut poverty in half how policy reform and effective aid can meet international development goals abstract poverty in the developing world will decline by about one half by 2015 if the trends of the 1990s persist most of this poverty reduction will occur in asia however while poverty will decline only slightly in africa effective aid could make a contribution to greater poverty reduction in lagging regions even more potent would be significant policy reform in these countries we develop a model of efficient aid in which flows respond to policy improvements that create a better environment for poverty reduction and effective aid we investigate scenarios of policy reform and efficient aid that point the way to how the world can cut poverty in half in every major region

aid policies and growth the authors of this paper use a new database on foreign aid to examine the relationships among foreign aid economic policies and growth of per capita gdp in panel growth regressions for 56 developing countries and 6 four year periods 1970 93 they find that the policies that have a great effect on growth are those related to fiscal surplus inflation and trade openness they construct an index for those three policies and have that index interact with foreign aid they have instruments for both aid and aid interacting with policies they find that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal monetary and trade policies in the presence of poor policies aid has no positive effect on growth this result is robust in a variety of specifications which include or exclude middle income countries include or exclude outliers and treat policies as exogenous or endogenous they examine the determinants of policy and find no evidence that aid has systematically affected policies either for good or for ill they estimate an aid allocation equation and show that any tendency for aid to reward good policies has been overwhelmed by donors pursuit of their own strategic interests in a counterfactual they reallocate aid reduce the role of donor interests and increasing the importance of policy such a reallocation would have a large positive effect on developing countries growth rates

do developing country wto members receive more aid for trade aft since the world trade organization wto doha development agenda dda negotiations started in 2001 the importance of aid for trade aft has been well recognised as a useful tool for facilitating trade economic growth and social development in developing countries at the wto hong kong ministerial conference in december 2005 the aft initiative was launched and many high income member countries pledged to increase their aft contributions particularly for the least developed member countries ldc this paper aims to assess whether and to what extent the wto s developing member countries have received more aft for this purpose a system generalised method of moments is applied to a sample of 118 recipient countries for the period 2001 10 we find evidence that while ldc wto members on average receive relatively more aft than other developing countries the difference has not increased since launch of the aft initiative among the three categories of aft the positive wto membership effect for ldc members increased for building productive capacity and for trade policy and regulation but declined for infrastructure

optimal labour taxation and search abstract this paper explores the optimal role of the tax system in alleviating labour market imperfections and raising revenue for this purpose the standard search model of the labour market is extended by introducing scarce entrepreneurial talent and arbitrage between the supply and demand sides of the labour market we study how these extensions affect the following two major implications of the standard model 1 only the ad valorem component of the wage tax should be employed to raise revenue 2 the optimal tax system should not distort labour market tightness

impact of vat reform on swedish restaurants a synthetic control group approach var analys av den sankta restaurangmomsen visar pa positiva effekter pa lonesumma omsattning anstallningar rorelsemarginaler och foretagsstocken resultaten visar tydligt att foretagen har valt

determinants of canadian bilateral aid allocations humanitarian commercial or political in this paper we examine the determinants of the allocation of canadian bilateral aid over the period 1984 2000 we draw on models of donor behaviour that allow us to incorporate humanitarian commercial and political considerations the trinity of mixed motives that affect canadian aid we find that allocations are moderately altruistic recipient country human rights and membership in the commonwealth and la francophonie also affect aid flows most strikingly our results suggest that canadian aid flows became less altruistic over this period and commercial motives became increasingly important jel classification h50 o10 les determinants des allocations de l aide humanitaire canadienne humanitaires commerciaux ou politiques ce memoire etudie les determinants de l allocation de l aide bilaterale canadienne dans la periode 1984 2000 on utilise des modeles de comportement de donateur qui permettent de prendre en considerations les motivations humanitaires commerciales et politiques la trinite de motifs mixtes qui affectent l aide canadienne on decouvre que les allocations sont moderement altruistes le fait pour un pays de defendre bien les droits de la personne et d etre membre du commonwealth et de la francophonie affecte les flux d aide plus important peut etre les resultats suggerent qu au cours de cette periode les flux d aide canadienne deviennent moins altruistes et les motifs commerciaux de plus en plus importants

explaining global patterns of international aid for linked biodiversity conservation and development summary there is little systematic knowledge about the nature extent and trends of international aid for projects that link biodiversity conservation and development goals this study uses a new dataset to analyze spatial and temporal patterns of such aid globally over the past three decades results reveal significant donor selectivity in aid allocation though linked conservation and development aid comprised more than two thirds of all biodiversity related assistance biodiversity aid generally was directed to biodiversity rich well governed countries but countries able to exert greater political leverage secured more linked aid than aid targeted to conservation without a stated development objective

does foreign aid target the poorest to examine the extent to which foreign aid reaches people at different levels of wealth in africa i use household surveys to measure the subnational distribution of a country s population by wealth quintiles and match this information to data on the location of aid projects from two multilateral donors within countries aid disproportionately flows to regions with more of the richest people aid does not favor regions with more of the poorest people these findings violate the stated preferences of the multilateral donors under study suggesting that the donors either cannot or are not willing to exercise control over the location of aid projects within countries the results also suggest that aid is not being allocated effectively to alleviate extreme poverty

imperfect competition the marginal cost of public funds and public goods supply abstract this paper analyses the impact of changes in product market competition on the marginal cost of public funds mcpf and public goods supply when distortionary commodity taxes are used to raise revenue first less competition measured by a switch from bertrand to cournot conduct or a decrease in the elasticity of demand does not necessarily raise the mpcf second even if it does optimal public good supply does not necessarily fall the paper also presents a method for modelling bertrand and cournot competition in general equilibrium that may be of independent interest

firm types price setting strategies and consumption tax incidence abstract we analyze price responses to large restaurant vat rate reductions in two different european countries our results show that responses in the short and medium run were clustered around two focal points of zero pass through and full pass through differences between independent restaurants and chains is the key explanation for this pattern while nearly all independent restaurants effectively ignored the tax reductions and left consumer prices unchanged a substantial fraction of restaurants belonging to chains chose a rapid and complete pass through in the longer run prices converged but primarily through a price reversion among chain restaurants the stark difference in price responses does not appear to arise because of different market characteristics such as location initial price levels meal types and restaurant segment

empirical results of aid motivations australia s bilateral aid program abstract this paper briefly surveys the existing literature on the motivations of overseas aid the emphasis is on the two competing models of recipient need and donor interest and the paper estimates these two models using data for australian bilateral aid both the recipient need model and the donor interest model are supported by the econometric analysis this is in stark contrast to the results of other studies for large states such as the united states and the united kingdom these prior studies show no support for the recipient need model whereas the donor interest model is supported the atypical result for the australian bilateral aid program requires further analysis in terms of non nested hypotheses

donor preferences and recipient fiscal behavior a simultaneous analysis of foreign aid we theoretically develop and empirically estimate a preference model determining foreign aid donor behavior aid access and levels are separately determined by endogenous budgetary allocations the international economic environment the distribution of income between countries basic human needs the small country effect and regional bias we find fungibility of aid in recipient budgets is due to donor and recipient preferences despite the importance of other economic influences we find a significant pro poor country bias in aid allocations although little aggregate influence of basic human needs or regional bias the small country effect is significant for two of six donors jel f35 o19 h 77

bilateral donors and the age of the national interest what prospects for challenge by development agencies summary foreign aid agencies represent and champion global development priorities within a donor nation increasingly however these agencies sit within donor governments that are strongly committed to upholding the national interest through their development commitments this paper is concerned with how bilateral aid agencies manage this tension and how they might continue to serve the altruistic aims of development the main research question asks if autonomy or a combination of autonomies can improve a development agency s ability to defend the humanitarian imperative of development against normative pressures privileging the national interest by drawing on theories of autonomy within public management literatures it is possible to identify points of leverage for development agencies where spaces for autonomous preferences and actions remain as well as sources of limitation where such opportunities are considerably reduced six types of autonomy are examined across three nations widely perceived as strong performers as donors norway the uk and sweden the paper suggests that while structural autonomy is critical for preserving humanitarian motivations there are also unexplored opportunities within other autonomous spheres a multi dimensional examination of autonomy highlights the varying capacity that development agencies have to resist pressures to strongly nationalize the global development project

effective aid how democracy allows development aid to improve the quality of life abstract research into foreign aid has mostly focused on its ability to affect economic i e gdp per capita growth conclusions have been mixed i consider aid s effectiveness differently by its ability to improve quality of life i find that though aid does not affect quality of life in the aggregate it is effective when combined with democracy and ineffective and possibly harmful in autocracies the results suggest that aid would be more effective if it were combined with efforts to encourage democratization

optimal taxes and the structure of preferences if optimal tax theory is to be the basis for calculating tax rates a close understanding is required of the relationship between the structure of preferences and the configuration of optimal tax rates otherwise hypotheses chosen by the econometrician for practical convenience may completely determine the results independently of measurement this paper explores the relationship between various types of separability particularly weak and implicit separability and optimal tax rates in the various models discussed in the literature the use of distance functions and the antonelli matrix provides a significant unification of previously disparate results in the final analysis optimal tax theory should be the basis for actual calculation of tax rates although recently there have been great advances in theoretical results and in our understanding of their meaning we are still some way from a working knowledge of whether uniform commodity taxes are in practice optimal or if not which commodities should be discriminated against present theoretical formulae do not yield clear cut results except in special cases and it has recently become clear that optimal rates depend crucially on the detailed structure of consumer preferences for example atkinson and stiglitz 3 show that with an optimal nonlinear income tax discriminatory commodity taxes are only necessary to the extent that individual commodities are not weakly separable from leisure more recently deaton 6 has shown that a similar result holds for what is perhaps the most interesting of the standard models that where there are many consumers and only a linear income tax and proportional commodity taxes are allowed in this case separability between goods and leisure together with linear engel curves for goods removes the need for differential commodity taxation in consequence nothing can be learned about commodity taxes from consumer demand studies in which commodity demands are explained conditionally on total expenditure and commodity prices and which assume linear engel curves all such studies require separability from leisure as a maintained hypothesis and so are consistent with uniform commodity taxation these results suggest that the prospects for meaningful empirical calculations of tax rates are bleak econometricians estimating commodity demand and labor supply equations make generous use of separability assumptions to enable estimation at all in consequence it is likely that empirically calculated tax rates based on econometric estimates of parameters will be determined in structure not by the measurements actually made but by arbitrary untested and even unconscious hypotheses chosen by the econometrician for practical convenience to remedy this situation and as a prelude to fruitful empirical work it is necessary to have a more explicit understanding of how preference structure affects optimal tax rates such is the object of this paper three different

final and intermediate goods taxation in an oligopolistic economy with free entry abstract optimal tax rules are analyzed in an oligopolistic economy with free entry the initial market allocation has two types of distortion price is set above marginal cost by the oligopolistic behavior and the advantage of increasing returns to scale is left to be unexploited by excessive entry of oligopolists with production subsidy accompanied by a self financing lump sum franchise tax on oligopolistic firms pareto efficient allocation could be restored without a lump sum tax on oligopolists however the second best optimum requires taxing intermediate inputs used in the oligopolistic industry the optimal intermediate goods taxation follows the production side ramsey rule to encourage the use of intermediate inputs elastic to output level and vice versa

the mirrlees review and the state of public economics the mirrlees review of taxation in the united kingdom is a landmark in the analysis of u k fiscal policy and of wide interest to public finance economists around the world this review concentrates on what we can learn from the review about the current state of public economics and directions for future research jel e62 h20 h50

a paradox of redistribution in international aid the determinants of poverty oriented development assistance summary donors differ in the amount of official development assistance dedicated to poverty reduction we investigate the causes of variation over time and donors by employing both a regression approach with aggregate data on bilateral aid and two short country studies on germany and the united kingdom we find that there is a trade off between the total amount of money given and the amount of money given to poor countries the trade off is similar to the paradox of redistribution of targeting vs redistribution in rich welfare states case study evidence illustrates how countries have managed this tradeoff

corrective tax and subsidy policies in economies with bertrand competition abstract this paper shows how we can correct market failure due to imperfect competition by using taxes and subsidies the analysis is carried out at the general equilibrium level and the importance of objective demand curves is stressed the main conclusions are first it is possible to tax the economy back to the walrasian equilibrium by using linear taxes and subsidies second the welfare theorem holds in an imperfectly competitive economy with corrective taxes and subsidies third a competitive equilibrium can also be achieved by the use of ad valorem taxes and specific output subsidies

why foreign economic assistance there is general agreement in the economics literature that resource flows among countries in response to market incentives enhance global economic efficiency and welfare in both rich and poor countries it has also been argued that in the presence of capital market imperfections the transfer of resources from developed country governments to the governments of developing countries on commercial terms either directly or through multilateral agencies can normally be expected to be welfare enhancing in both developed and developing countries 1 these arguments do not apply however to official development assistance that involves a substantial grant element two arguments have typically been used in support of transfers that include a grant component one set is based on the economic and strategic self interest of the donor country the second is based on the ethical or moral responsibility of the residents of wealthy countries toward the residents of poor countries both sets of arguments have been the subject of continuous challenge i argue in this article that neither the donor self interest nor the ethical responsibility argument can be rejected on logical or theoretical grounds i also assert that the empirical evidence in support of both the economic and the strategic self interest arguments is exceedingly weak the ethical responsibility arguments impose less burden on the empirical evidence but they are subject to continuous challenge by political theorists and moral philosophers donor self interest

a two part sample selection model of british bilateral foreign aid allocation the allocation of british bilateral foreign aid among developing countries is simultaneously modelled focusing on allocations during the period 1980 87 two aid allocation decisions are analysed using a variant of the lee maddala econometric model the first decision concerns the determination of developing country eligibility for aid while the second concerns the amount of aid eligible countries are allocated given the implied two part decision making process sample selection techniques are employed it is hypothesized that british bilateral aid eligibility and amount decisions are based on bristain s humanitarian commercial and political interests in developing countries results obtained indicate that these decisions are generally consistent with each of these interests especially those relating to the political importance of commonwealth members

rational normative economics vs social welfare and social choice abstract the central part of the social ethics of economics based on concepts of social welfare and the corresponding part of social choice theory are mistaken approaches defining the social optimum as the maximal element of an ordering independent of the possibilities is shown to violate both common concepts of justice and rationality in the normal sense of the term anyway the social optimum need not be defined for non existing possibilities and individual preferences rationality requires that the optimum be defined by equalities of liberties in a large sense means powers rights etc a number of studies work within this paradigm liberalisms equities inequalities etc the origin of the mistake is to be traced to the political introduction of utilitarianism into english political philosophy

ramsey tax rules for economies with imperfect competition abstract this paper derives optimal commodity tax rules for a general equilibrium model with imperfect competition to achieve this functions are constructed that describe the effects of taxation upon the equilibrium prices and profit levels of imperfectly competitive industries the use of these functions allows existing tax rules to be generalised to accommodate imperfect competition

politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid abstract critics of foreign aid programs have long argued that poverty reflects government failure in this paper i test predictions for aid effectiveness based on an analytical framework that relates aid effectiveness to political regimes i find that aid does not significantly increase investment nor benefit the poor as measured by improvements in human development indicators but it does increase the size of government the impact of aid does not vary according to whether recipient governments are liberal democratic or highly repressive but liberal political regimes and democracies ceteris paribus have on average 30 lower infant mortality than the least free regimes this may be due to greater empowerment of the poor under liberal regimes even though the political elite continues to receive the benefits of aid programs an implication is that short term aid targeted to support new liberal regimes may be a more successful means of reducing poverty than current programs

foreign aid responses to political liberalization this paper analyzes the impact of political liberalization on receipt of foreign aid it distinguishes different types of donors facing different constraints in rewarding democratization with foreign aid notably bilateral donors the world bank and the european commission based on a sample of 174 recipient countries from 1995 to 2009 the paper jointly examines short term dynamics and long term effects of sustained liberalization except for the world bank donors react to regime change bilateral donors are found to reward political liberalization in the second year after transition

optimum commodity taxation in pooling equilibria abstract this paper extends the standard model of optimum commodity taxation ramsey f 1927 a contribution to the theory of taxation economic journal 37 47 61 diamond p mirrlees j 1971 optimal taxation and public production ii tax rules american economic review 61 261 278 to a competitive economy in which markets are inefficient due to asymmetric information insurance markets are prime examples consumers impose varying costs on suppliers but firms cannot associate costs with individual customers and consequently all are charged equal prices in such a competitive pooling equilibrium the price of each good is equal to the average of individual marginal costs weighted by equilibrium quantities we derive modified ramsey boiteux conditions for optimum taxes in such an economy and show that in addition to the standard formula they include first order effects which reflect the deviations of prices from marginal costs and the response of equilibrium quantities to the taxes levied an explanation of the additional terms is provided it is shown that a condition on the monotonicity of demand elasticities enables to sign the direction of the deviations from the standard case

the switching effect of environmental taxation within bertrand differentiated duopoly we investigate second best optimal taxation of the polluting variety of a product in a bertrand duopoly with differentiated varieties the analysis provides novel insight on a useful social function of environmental regulation besides internalizing the environmental externality the taxation of the polluting variety improves the matching of consumers and product varieties and so creates a socially desirable business switching between the differentiated varieties

do corrupt governments receive less foreign aid critics of foreign aid programs argue that these funds often support corrupt governments and inefficient bureaucracies supporters argue that foreign aid can be used to reward good governments this paper documents that there is no evidence that less corrupt governments receive more foreign aid on the contrary according to some measures of corruption more corrupt governments receive more aid also we could not find any evidence that an increase in foreign aid reduces corruption in summary the answer to the question posed in the title is no

foreign aid and domestic politics voting in congress and the allocation of usaid contracts across congressional districts this paper investigates the relationship between congressional support for foreign aid and the distribution of united states agency for international development usaid contract spending across congressional districts within the united states the extent to which such a relationship matters has become increasingly important in recent years as the end of the cold war and the advent of the republican controlled congress have eroded the traditional base of support for foreign aid we develop a model to illustrate how the distribution of contract spending could be used to increase support for foreign aid but at the expense of development impact in effect trading quality for quantity data on domestic foreign aid contract spending and votes in the 104th congress house of representatives allow us to test whether the geographic distribution of usaid contract spending within the united states is consistent with a systematic attempt to build support for foreign aid in congress econometric results provide little evidence of such attempts apparently because voting on this issue is insensitive to the distribution of contract spending

the fungibility of u s military and non military assistance and the impacts on expenditures of major aid recipients abstract this paper examines the impact of u s military and non military assistance on the allocation of public and private sector spending for eight major recipients over the 1972 1987 period the model assumes that an aid recipient s effective post assistance budget constraint is a priori unknown and must be estimated two versions of the model are tested in version a the data is converted into real u s dollars using official exchange rates in version b the data is converted using purchasing power parity exchange rates provided by summers and heston 1991 major findings are the same for both versions u s aid is highly fungible with a significant portion channeled to the private sector where it finances current consumption relatively more than investment